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Politics has always been a key dimension of human life. Politics affects everyone, just as the weather does, and since the time of the Greek classics, humankind has attempted to come to grips with its empirical and normative implications. Politics and political science have changed over time and have been even more deeply transformed during the past decades in every part of an ever-smaller world. Empirical research and theoretical reflections on politics and its multiple connections with all other aspects of human life have developed enormously during the second half of the past century and now cover virtually all parts of the world, with their growing interdependence. These studies concern, for example, basic issues such as war and peace, prosperity, welfare, and a sustainable environment, as well as issues of freedom, justice, gender, and democracy under changing cultural perspectives.

At this point, one feels the need for an exhaustive overview of the empirical findings and the reflections on politics. The *International Encyclopedia of Political Science* caters to that need in many different kinds of readers, including undergraduate or graduate students who like to be informed effectively and quickly on their field of study; scholars who seek information on the relevant empirical findings in their area of specialization or in related fields; and lay readers, who may not have a formal background in political science but are attracted to, and interested in, politics. Thus, the encyclopedia can serve both the diffusion of knowledge about politics and the further development of the field.

The encyclopedia is the result of collaborative work by leading international scholars from all over the world. This team ensured the widest possible coverage of key areas, both regionally and globally. In this sense, this is the first truly international encyclopedia of its kind. It aims to give a comprehensive picture of all aspects of political life, recognizing the theoretical and cultural pluralism of the approaches and including findings from all parts of the world. The eight volumes of the encyclopedia cover every field of politics, from political theory and methodology to political sociology, comparative politics, public policies, and international relations.

The entries are arranged in alphabetical order, and a list of entries by subject area appears in the front of each volume. The entries are organized in three major categories, according to their substantive relevance, of roughly 1,800, 3,600, and 8,000 words. In addition, longer entries of 12,000 words cover the major subdisciplines and the state of the art in each field. The encyclopedia contains a detailed index as well as extensive bibliographical references. Thus, it can provide an essential and authoritative guide to the state of political science at the beginning of the 21st century for decades to come. It will be an invaluable resource for a global readership, including researchers, students, and policymakers.

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Introduction to Political Science

Politics

Politics as a Special Sphere

The concept of politics carries different meanings. It can be considered to be an art (scholars are “studying politics”); an activity (one can “play politics” in one’s office, in one’s club, even in one’s family); a profession (some “go into politics”); or a function (“local politics,” “national politics”). Most political scientists consider the first meanings as derived from the last one, even as metaphoric, while some others have a wider and more abstract conception that is broader than that of function. Politics also has been understood as both to polity, which refers to an organization (a state, a regime and its constitution) and to policy, which refers to a system of political decisions and specific subfields (like health, education, foreign relations) through organizations act to carry out their functions. In a comprehensive perspective, politics is thus considered to be linked to a function, a system, an action, and a behavior.

All of them are, however, connected to a special dimension of the history of humankind. Even if some scholars object that some societies ignored
politics (Clastres, 1975), most anthropologists consider politics as a constant of the human condition. In the first part of this entry, this constant will be grasped in its various definitions, and then it will be inserted into the general social order. The following sections examine definitions of this constant as a function and as an instrument.

**Politics as a Function**

Politics can be conceived as a contribution to the social adventure, as a function of the social order, or, quite differently, as a distinctive instrument, a special way of action. The first approach is more classic and deeply rooted in the various philosophical traditions that were elaborated around the world, while the second one is modern, related to the rise of positivist theory in the social sciences. In this section, we consider two ways in which politics can be seen as a function.

**Politics as a Function: Promoting Social Harmony or Supreme Good?**

Many philosophers have located politics in the art of coexistence. If human beings are selfish by nature, as they are often conceived, but must live and grow up together, to create peaceful coexistence is obviously one of the main functions of the polis. As such, politics should be considered as the permanent invention of the polis (city), as the construction of each social unit that aims to keep people together on a permanent basis. This point was already made by Plato, who considered politics as the art of organizing social harmony. We also find it in other traditions. Islam conceives of politics as a weakly differentiated function that aims to overcome tribal fragmentation through the principle of unity (ta'wīd). As such, ta'awid will be achieved through the absolute Unity of God, and so politics cannot be entirely accomplished without religion: Politics cannot be conceived as a differentiated structure, but it is obviously a social function. The same principle can be found in Hindu writings. The *Arthasastra* (3rd century BC) and the *Manusmriti* (2nd century BC) were written during periods of decay and so-called evil, which implied starvation, violence, and chaos, while the *Mahabharata* covered a much longer period (from 1st millennium BCE to the 5th century BCE). Here, politics is presented as an absolute requisite for keeping peace and order, even if the tradition oscillates between divine invention in politics (*Manusmriti*) and its contractual origin (*Mahabharata*). In its turn, the Buddhist vision stresses the entropy of the world that leads to inequality, sexual division, property, and thus to conflicts and lack of safety. The orientation of this reform of Hinduism prompts human beings to choose a king as a guarantor of the social order. Similarly, Confucius pointed out that men need a ruler for preventing disorder, disturbance, and confusion.

This first function, promoting social harmony, obviously shaped political philosophy to a large extent up to the present day. Social contract theory clearly emanated from this postulate, in the Islamic tradition (*mithaq, bay’a*) as well as during the European Enlightenment. The *Arthasastra* anticipated Thomas Hobbes’s vision of the state of nature, when it described the lack of politics as resulting in evil and vices, or when it mentioned the fable of the big fish that will eat the small one (*Matsyanyaya*). The functional dimension of politics, as the art of coexistence and “maintaining harmony,” can, therefore, be considered as really transcultural and common to the humanity’s different histories. Here, we can probably locate the roots of a pluralist vision of politics, as this first definition paves the way for a plural conception of the city (polis) where people do not necessarily share the same interests, the same beliefs, or the same ethnic characteristics. Quite the opposite, in this perspective, diversity is the real raison d’être of politics.

However, politics also claims a second function, which is more demanding and sophisticated. Some philosophers and thinkers are going further, beyond the invention of the city, pointing to another purpose: Politics is supposed to lead to the path of righteousness, to promote virtue, and to enable humans to achieve the Supreme Good. Thus, Aristotle conceived of politics as referring to welfare and virtue. The city must be constructed as the *good city*: Political science is elevated then to something much more demanding, namely, the “science of the good politics” or the “science of good government.” This vision can be found in Islam through the commitment to divine law (*sharia*); when taken to its extreme, this conception even becomes a way of challenging power holders and leads to a political inversion in which protest is a more important political activity even
than governing. In the same way, the Arthasastra describes politics as promoting peace and prosperity, while Buddhism produces an ethic of human behavior. Confucianism also gives the central role to the virtue that humans naturally possesses, but that is achieved through the ruler and his norms.

These two functions of politics convey the two faces of political theory, one of which is positivist, the other normative. If politics is only the science of the city, it is first of all a behavioralist science. If it is the science of the Supreme Good, its normative orientation is dominant. This tension has partly been overcome by an instrumentalist approach to politics, according to which the distinguishing nature of politics has to be found in the instruments used for running the city instead of its ultimate goals.

**Politics as an Instrument: The Science of Power?**

Power—in Max Weber’s sense as the ability to achieve your interests even against someone else’s will, that is, as coercion—is understood here as the first instrument through which politics operates. All major thinkers claim that the city cannot exist without power, no matter how it is structured. There is thus a long tradition of connecting power and politics, in which political science is assigned to study how power is formed, structured, and shared (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950). However, the science of politics and a science of power are not synonymous: Is every kind of power necessarily political, for example, in a firm or a club? In a broader sense, some authors state that politics can be played in an office or inside a family, but this expression is merely a metaphor when conceived in a micro-social order. Conversely, if we consider power as the essence of politics, we have to opt for a wide definition of power that includes ideology, social control, and even social structures, and thus deviates from a vision of power as purely coercive.

For this reason, politics is commonly defined as a specific kind of power; either it is held by a central institution, such as a state, a government, a ruling class, or it is used by a power holder who is considered to be legitimate. The first perspective approaches politics as the science of the state and implies that traditional and weakly institutionalized societies lack the centralized power that is necessary for politics to exist. The second promotes the concept of legitimate authority as the real essence of politics and suggests that in this sense politics is more evident in democracies than in authoritarian or totalitarian systems.

Some visions also link power and norms. Pushing the Aristotelian definition further, they define politics as the set of norms that lead to the City of Good—either the City of God or the City of the Philosopher. This radical conception is to be found in several traditions: that of Augustine, rather than Thomas Aquinas, in the Christian culture; Puritanism with the Reformation and Calvinism; radical Islam in the perspective of Ibn Taimyya. This conception, however, runs the risk of drifting into totalitarianism or at the very least depreciating the political debate, as it makes any kind of political choice impossible.

The connection with territory is also frequently used as an instrumental approach to politics. The Greek tradition paved the way when Aristotle stressed the difference between politics, **ethnos**, and **oikos** (household). If politics is conceived as the coexistence of diverse peoples, it denies that there is such a thing as “natural territory” and implies a socially constructed territory as its required arena. That is why Max Weber makes territory a key element of his definition of politics. For Weber, a community has a political quality only if its rules are granted inside a given territory: this territorial invention hardly fits nomadic societies or even a number of traditional ones (Evans-Pritchard, 1940). But even if it gets close to a state vision of politics, it emphasizes the role of pluralism and diversity inside the political order. In a more extensive conception of the spatial dimension of politics, public and private spheres are opposed: the former is seen as the natural background of political debate, while the latter is conceived as a resistance against political power and its penetrations (Habermas, 1975). We also find again the possible opposition between religious and secular spheres (other-worldly/this-worldly), and even the disenchantment with the world as one of the possible sources of politics.

After going through all these definitions, the criterion of social coexistence seems to be the most extensive one, and probably the least questionable. If politics is everywhere around the world considered more or less as managing social harmony, it can clearly be conceived as the opposite of some
other classical spheres of social action (politics vs. social life, military, administration, etc.). As such, it is part of the general social arena, as an ordinary social fact, but a very specific one.

**Politics in the Social Division of Labor**

Here we face a contradiction that is shaping a serious debate among political scientists. If the conception of politics as an ordinary social fact tends to prevail, political science merges with political sociology (see below). In the opposite version, the latter would be defined as a part of political science, sometimes with ambiguous borders. The vagueness and the mobility of the borderline stem from different factors: the diversity of the great theories in the social sciences, which do not reflect the same visions of politics and which are torn between power and integration; the historical and cultural background of politics, which is shaping different kinds of lineages; and the present impact of globalization, which is probably fueling a new definition of politics that is increasingly detached from concepts of ethnicity and territorially.

**Two Traditions: Power Versus Integration**

Max Weber is obviously considered as a “founding father” by both sociologists and political scientists. He clearly promoted a political vision of sociology when he developed his two major concepts of *Macht* (power as coercion) and *Herrschaft* (power as authority). Both of them can be found in the very first steps of his sociology where he defines power as the ability of one actor in a social relationship to modify the behavior of another, through pressure, force, or other forms of domination. From a Hobbesian perspective, power plays the major role in structuring social relationships, while the social actors strive to give meaning to this asymmetrical relationship in order to make it just and acceptable, thus establishing the legitimacy of those with power.

In modern society, the state plays an important role and politics has an exceptional status, as it is theoretically conceived as the main basis of social order. This conception is also strongly rooted in the Marxist vision, where the state is considered the instrument by which the ruling class maintains its domination, as the bourgeoisie does in the capitalist mode of production. Carl Schmitt also starts from a Weberian presupposition in linking politics to enmity. By contrast, in a Durkheimian vision, integration is substituted for power as the key concept. Politics is conceived neither as an instrument of domination nor as a way of producing social order; rather, it is a function by which the social system is performing its integration. Obviously, this function implies institutions and then a political sphere, including state and government, but it is considerably more diffuse and appears to be produced by the social community and its collective consciousness. From this perspective, a political society is made up of social groups coming together under the same authority. Such an authority derives from the social community and the collective consciousness; it is constituted by rules, norms, and collective beliefs, which are assimilated through socialization processes. As such, politics is closely related to social integration and is supposed to strengthen it further. That is why there is a strong correlation between a growing division of labor, from the increasing political functions, and their differentiation from the social structures. “The greater the development of society, the greater the development of the state” (Durkheim, 1975, 3, p. 170). Durkheim contrasted “mechanical solidarity” arising because of perceived similarities among people (e.g., in work or education) from “organic solidarity” arising when people are doing different things but see themselves as part of an interdependent web of cooperative associations. This Durkheimian vision is to be found later in the functionalist and systemic concepts of political science as elaborated by Talcott Parsons, David Easton, Gabriel Almond and others, but also in the socio-historical traditions, which attempted to link the invention of politics to the sociology of social changes, as in the work of Charles Tilly or Stein Rokkan. It is also congruent with the social psychological paradigm, which tries to capture politics through its social roots, such as socialization, mobilization, and behavioral analysis.

By contrast, state and power are the real sources of a Weberian political science. Politics is no longer a function of the division of labor, but has definitely its own determinants. Quite the opposite, social history is considering the transformations in
the mode of government and more precisely the mode of domination. Power is thus conceived as an explanatory variable of the transformation of societies and political orders. Such a vision is common among those approaches of political science that are centered on power politics, the role of the state, or the nature of political regimes or that are focusing on political institutions and the conditions of their legitimization.

The Diversified Lineages of Politics

Politics is thus approached in different ways, but is also intrinsically plural. During the 1970s, when globalization began to shape the world and when decolonization was completed, both history and anthropology incorporated the perspective of politics with respect to plurality. This perspective on plurality also challenged the mono-dimensional vision that had been promoted by developmentalism a decade earlier. In anthropology, Geertz (1973) pointed out that politics covered several meanings that are changing along historical lines and according to specific cultures. These meanings are socially constructed as human actors encounter different kinds of events, challenges, or goals and as they are rooted or embedded in different sorts of economic and social structures. Politics is understood as achieving the will of God and his law in Islam, while it aims to manage the human city in this world according to the Roman Christian culture. The first conception was fueled by Muhammad’s hijra when the Prophet left Mecca because of opposition to his teaching and went to Medina to build up the City of God. The second conception was shaped by the Roman experience of religion, which survived during the centuries of the Empire and had again to survive when the latter collapsed during the fifth century. In this dramatic contrast, politics does not cover the same meaning, as it is differentiated from the public sphere and oriented toward individuals in the Roman tradition, while it was more globally constructed in the Muslim tradition. In both cultures, this diversification continued; as Geertz mentions, politics does not have the same meaning in Indonesia and in Morocco, two Muslim societies that experienced greatly different histories.

For that reason, politics can be properly defined only when the definition includes the meaning that the social actors usually give to it. This cultural background implies a huge empirical investigation, which is all the more difficult since the observer tends to view things through his or her own concepts, which are obviously culturally oriented. The risk, therefore, is high to consider as universal a cultural vision of politics, which shapes the paradigm of empirical political science. Translations can be particularly misleading and even fanciful. For instance, the Arabic word dawla is often translated as “state,” whereas their meanings are hardly equivalent. It is quite impossible to convey, through translation, the deep cultural gap that really implies two competing visions of politics. The only way of going ahead is to deepen the anthropological and the linguistic investigations in order to identify distinctive features of each conceptualization of politics, following the “thick description method” recommended by Geertz. But is there any end to this “individualization” of politics? To be operative, research must postulate a minimal universality of its own concepts and contain the risks of “culturalism”: It has to keep the connection with history and anthropology while remaining in a universalist framework.

A Politics of Globalization

This dilemma is revived and even stimulated by the globalization of the world. In the new global order, politics is no longer limited or contained by the territoriality principle. It becomes reinvented beyond the classical coexistence of sovereign cities. Politics cannot be conceived as a simple addition of social contracts, as it was in the Westphalian paradigm. This challenge is first posed to the “realist” theory of international relations, questioning the absolute opposition between “inside” and “outside,” or “domestic politics” and “international politics.” The latter is no longer confined to the dialogue of sovereigns and has destroyed the traditional categories and criteria of politics. After all, is there a “global covenant,” as Robert Jackson (2000) argues, that totally reshapes the construction of politics?

The hypothesis that competition among nation-states can be understood as parallel to that within nation-states supported the extension of the concept of politics to the international sphere. The idea of power politics was projected into the
international arena in order to stress that international politics referred to the classical grammar: States, like political actors, were competing according to their own interests and were primarily concerned with their ability to dominate other states, or, at least, to contain the power of the others. Morgenthau (1948) defined international politics as the “struggle for power,” power as “the control over the minds and actions of other men,” and political power as “the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large” (p. 27).

Although this conception is clearly rooted in a Weberian approach to politics, it does not belong only to the past. But it neither covers nor exhausts all the political issues at stake in the new configuration of the international arena. First of all, as sovereignty is fading, the proliferation of transnational actors no longer restricts international politics to a juxtaposition of territorial nation-states. Second, power and coercion are losing their efficiency as influence and social relationships are getting more and more performance oriented. Third, globalization and the growing international social community are shaping common goods, creating a kind of community of humankind; human beings are then creating “a political dialogue that can bridge their differences . . . without having to suppress them or obliterate them” (Jackson, 2000, p. 16). We are here rediscovering Aristotle when he claimed that men need each other for their own survival.

Nevertheless, no one would assert as yet the complete achievement of an international society or an international community. International politics remains an unstable combination of references to power politics and to international social integration: It then confronts the vision of politics as coexistence among diversity. It goes back to the idea of harmony, but without a completed contract, to the hypothesis of a global city without a central government, to the assertion of common norms without binding measures. This combination is at the core of the English School of international relations that refers to the “anarchical society.” But it is also close to the French vision of an international solidarity. In the end, politics gets closer and closer to a functional vision of managing social diversity in order to make it compatible with the need for survival.

Epistemological Building Blocks of Political Science

Some major building blocks of political science can be identified that help characterize some common elements in existing approaches, but also, and perhaps more important, enable us to locate these positions and their differences more precisely with regard to the major epistemological foundations. The first of these building blocks concerns the multidimensionality of our subject matter; the second, its plastic and malleable character and the resulting self-referential problems; the third refers to a systems perspective of politics; and the fourth to the linkages between different levels (micro-, meso-, macro-) of political (and more generally social) analysis.

Multi-Dimensionality

The most basic distinctions of our discipline, which distinguish it in some important respects from the “natural” sciences, concern the dimensions of its subject matter. As in nature, there are certain hard “objects” such as political institutions and social structures, which can be identified and which are “tangible” and observable in certain ways. In addition, however, there is a “subjective” dimension in which such objects are perceived by individuals and groups and translated into concrete actions. Such perceptions themselves are shaped by a number of psychological, social, or other factors. This distinction is commonly accepted and runs through the history of philosophy from antiquity to the present day and concerns all sciences of humankind, including medicine. There, distinctions between body and mind (or consciousness) and the subsequent divisions into subdisciplines such as anatomy and psychology are commonplace. Similarly, the fact that there are possible interactions between these dimensions is well accepted, even though in medicine some of these psychosomatic relationships are still not well researched. The third dimension, the “normative” one that concerns ethical judgments of “good” or “bad” actions and behavior, is more problematic. In medicine, again, some ethical norms have been generally accepted since the time of Hippocrates, but debates continue about, for example, when exactly human life begins or ends, and what the respective theological or philosophical justifications are for such
positions. In philosophy, this “three-dimensionality” of human existence has also been elaborated by Immanuel Kant, for example, in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787/1956, p. 748 ff.).

A graphical representation of these dimensions can be rendered in the following Figure 1 (where the dotted line represents a “holistic” position):

![Figure 1: Dimensions of Human Existence](source: Dirk Berg-Schlosser)

The crux of the matter really concerns problems of distinguishing such dimensions and their interactions not only analytically but also in actual practice, and controversies about normative, ontologically based justifications and their respective epistemological and methodological consequences persist. Here, we cannot go into these debates in any detail, but we find it useful to locate the major emphases of the current meta-theoretical positions in political science with the help of such distinctions. Thus, the major ontological approaches have their basis in the normative dimension ranging from Plato to Eric Voegelin or Leo Strauss, but also concern attempts in linguistic analysis (e.g., Lorenzen, 1978), or communications theory (Habermas, 1981). This also applies to non-Western traditions such as Confucian (Shin, 1999), Indian (Madan, 1992), or sub-Saharan African (Mbiti, 1969) ones.

Sharply opposed to such foundations of political theory are critical-dialectical or historical-materialist positions in the tradition of Karl Marx and his followers. There, the object dimension of the modes of production and re-production of human existence is the basic one from which the others are derived. Thus, the objective social existence determines the subjective consciousness and the political and normative superstructures. On this position, the teleological theory of history of Marx and his followers from the early beginning until the classless society and its peaceful end is based as well.

The third major meta-theoretical position, a behavioral or behavioralist one, takes the subjective dimension as its starting point, expressing a position of methodological or phenomenological individualism (for the use of these terms, see Goodin & Tilly, 2006, p. 10ff.). Then subjective perceptions and subsequent actions of human beings are what really matters. These shape social and political life. This position has been most influential in election studies, for example, but also concerning some aspects of political culture research. In a somewhat broader perception, both subjective and objective dimensions and their interactions are considered by empirical-analytical approaches, but, from a positivistic point of view, no normative judgments can be made on this basis. Long-lasting controversies concerning this position go back to Max Weber and his followers but are also reflected in more recent debates between Karl Popper and Jürgen Habermas, for example (see Adorno et al., 1969).

These basic meta-theoretical positions and their variations remain incompatible. Similarly, whether these dimensions can in actual fact be separated or, by necessity, always go together from a holistic perspective remains controversial. The latter position, in contrast to Kant, is, for example, represented by G. W. F. Hegel, but also by Marx and some of his followers (e.g., Lukács, 1967). In the same way, epistemological positions based on religion, including Buddhism and Confucianism, perceive these dimensions in a holistic manner. From a more pragmatic perspective, it seems that the fundamentalist debates about such matters have subsided in the last few decades and most political or social scientists just agree to disagree about such basic ontological or religious positions and their respective justifications. Nevertheless, Figure 1 may help better locate such positions and to put some conceptual order into these controversies.

**The Plastic Matter of Political Science**

As a result of the change from Newtonian physics with its deterministic relationships to quantum
theory and probabilistic relations in nuclear physics, Popper (1972) has coined the metaphor of “clouds and clocks.” Clocks represent Isaac Newton’s deterministic world, as in astronomy, for example, where the movements of stars and planets or the next solar eclipse can be predicted (or retro-dicted) with clocklike precision. Clouds, by contrast, constitute a very elusive substance, the structures and regularities of which cannot easily be grasped over a somewhat longer period even today by the most advanced computers of meteorologists and their satellite-based data. Between these two extremes, however, which should be perceived as the opposite poles of a continuum rather than mutually exclusive positions, there is a plastic matter that is malleable in the course of time and that is neither perfectly determined nor subject to pure chance.

In an important essay, Gabriel Almond and Stephen Genco (1977) have transferred this concept to the social sciences and politics. They state that

the implication of these complexities of human and social reality is that the explanatory strategy of the hard sciences has only a limited application to the social sciences. . . . Thus, a simple search for regularities and lawful relationships among variables—a strategy that has led to tremendous success in the physical sciences—will not explain social outcomes, but only some of the conditions affecting those outcomes. (p. 493, emphasis added)

The deductive subsumption of individual events under “covering laws” in Carl Hempel’s (1965) sense, according to which claims about individual events can be derived deductively from premises that include a scientific law, thus is not possible for the most part. In addition, factors of human choice and action plus, possibly, some elements of pure chance in certain conjunctures also have to be considered.

As a consequence, we have to be more modest in our claims about the precision of causal relationships, the generalizability of regularities, and the universality of theories. At best, therefore, only theories located more precisely in time and space—what Robert K. Merton called “medium-range theories”—seem to be possible for most practical purposes. Such a view also corresponds with a position already expressed by Aristotle, who located politics in an intermediate sphere between the necessary, where strict science can be applied, and the realm of pure chance, which is not accessible for scientific explanations.

Such distinctions are illustrated in Figure 2:

Again, the full implications of such a perspective cannot be discussed here, but this figure should be helpful, once more, to locate some of the “harder” and some of the “softer” approaches in our discipline along this spectrum. On the whole, we would agree with Almond and Genco’s conclusion that

the essence of political science . . . is the analysis of choice in the context of constraints. That would place the search for regularities, the search for solutions to problems, and the evaluation of these problems on the same level. They would all be parts of a common effort to confront man’s political fate with rigor, with the necessary objectivity, and with an inescapable sense of identification with the subject matter which the political scientist studies. (p. 522)

The last point also leads to the next differensia specifica of the social sciences as compared to the naturalist sciences and their distinct epistemology.

Self-Referential Aspects

This sense of identification also can be seen in different ways. First of all, it means that as human and social beings we are inevitably part of the subject matter we are studying. Even if we attempt to detach ourselves as much as possible from the object under consideration some subjective influences on
our perception remain. These can be analyzed by psychology, the sociology of knowledge to discern our (conscious or unconscious) “interests” in such matters, and so on, but some individual “coloring” of our lenses seems inevitable. Therefore, a certain “hermeneutic circle,” which should be made conscious and explicit in the interactions with others, remains (Moses & Knutsen, 2007, Chapter 7).

However, this limitation can, again in contrast to naturalist perceptions of science, be turned to one’s advantage. As human beings we can empathize with each other and can intersubjectively, if not objectively, understand and interpret the meaning of each other’s thoughts and actions. This is even more the case when we are trained as social scientists in a common methodology and scientific language. This latter point also distinguishes the perception, level of information, and theoretical interpretation of a political scientist from the “man (or woman) in the street” talking politics, in the same way that a meteorologist has a different knowledge of what is happening in the atmosphere compared to the daily small talk about the weather. Nevertheless, such inevitable subjectivity, which is also historically and culturally conditioned, opens the way to more pluralist interpretations and meanings. Constructivist approaches, as contrasted to naturalist ones, can dig deeper in certain ways into this subjectivity and the plurality of meanings (cf., e.g., Foucault, 1970).

Two more points concerning our identification with the subject matter and our self-referential position within it must be mentioned. Being part of the substance, we can also, consciously or unconsciously, act upon it. Thus, self-fulfilling or self-defeating prophecies become possible as feedbacks between the interpretation or even just personal opinion of an important actor or social scientist whose authority in a certain sphere has become acknowledged in the matter he is dealing with. This frequently occurs when some “analysts” give their opinion on probable developments of the stock exchange or currency rates and many people follow suit. This also applies to electoral predictions with respective bandwagon and underdog effects.

Finally, being part of our world and being able, to some extent, to act on it, also raises the question of social and political responsibility. This brings us back to the normative side of politics with which we inevitably have to deal, self-consciously and being aware of possible consequences. In this respect, too, a recent constructivist turn in the theory of international politics, in a somewhat more specific sense of the term, has led to the broader discussion and possible acceptance of more universal norms.

A Systems Perspective

Within this multidimensional, malleable, and dynamic universe more specific political elements can be identified. One difficulty in this respect, again, lies in the contrasting meta-theoretical positions and their perspectives on politics (see the first section above). In a more abstract way, politics can also be conceived as the regulating mechanism in large-scale modern societies. Easton (1965) thus defines politics as “the authoritative allocation of values” in society and the forces shaping these procedures. In this process, different elements interact in a systemic way regulating conflicts. This mechanism can be conceived like a thermostat with the respective inputs and outputs connected by an effective feedback procedure in a cybernetic sense (see also Deutsch, 1963). Such relationships can be illustrated in a simplified system model (see Figure 3).

This system model should not, however, be equated with systems theory in a more demanding sense (e.g., Luhmann, 1984). Thus, such systems need not necessarily be in equilibrium and they may also explode or implode as, in fact, they did in Communist Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, such a model is again helpful to locate the major subdivisions of politics (and political science), which also constitute the major subsections of this encyclopedia and, in fact, many political science departments or national associations. The bottom square includes, in a broader sense, the fields of political sociology and, when this is treated separately, political economy. The square on the left-hand side represents political sociology in a narrower sense of the term (organized interest groups, political parties, etc.). The top square reflects the institutional side (involving a possible separation of powers, etc.) but also questions of governance often including the realm of public policies and public administration on the right-hand side. All this is embedded in the international system concerning interactions with the outside
world both of state and society as the field of international politics and, in a more limited sense, international political economy. The arrows of such interactions can go in both directions. The systematic comparison of such systems or some subfields is the realm of comparative government. Overall theoretical (and philosophical) implications are the concern of political theory, and the respective methods and analytic techniques applied constitute the subfield of political methodology.

**Linkages Between Levels of Analysis**

A final building block to be considered here concerns the links between macro-aspects of entire political systems and their relationship with the micro-world of individual citizens and the meso-level of organisations in between. For this purpose, what has been dubbed “Coleman’s bathtub” (Coleman, 1990, p. 8) is most helpful. Here, a given objective (structural) situation at the macro-level (on the upper-left-hand side in Figure 4) can be linked to the micro-level of individual subjective perceptions and values, which are then translated into concrete actions, possibly aggregated on the meso-level, and then leading to the outcome on the macro-level to be explained (upper-right-hand side). This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4.

It is important to note at this place that we do not imply for the individual actors, as is done for example in economics and rational choice theory, a specific logic of selection, as, for example, maximizing a person’s material well-being. Such very restrictive assumptions of “homo oeconomicus” or even “homo sociologicus” (Dahrendorf, 1977) only rarely apply in political science, where usually a much wider range of choices exists, even if some of which may appear as “irrational” to others (for example, strongly felt ethnic or religious identities).

The purpose here, again, rather lies in the possibility to locate various approaches and their respective assumptions in such a scheme and to show the plurality of concepts that can be integrated here, but keeping them in a coherent relationship. Hartmut Esser (1993, p. 23 ff.), for example, has extended possible assumptions at the micro-level to include “restricted, resourceful, evaluating, expecting, maximizing men” (RREEMM) or women, and even further assumptions about conflicting “identifying” (with some collective entities) or “individualizing” attitudes (RREEIIMM) or similar ones may be added. For the logic of the situation also framing procedures play a role where individual perceptions are shaped by the social milieu of one’s childhood and later environment (see also D’Andrade, 1995). The point here is to
show that in this way given historical and traditional constraints at the macro-level terms can be meaningfully linked to individual and, at the aggregated level, collective political action. Which particular historical, cultural, or other factors condition these choices in any given situation can be left open at this place, leaving room, again, for a plurality of cultural and theoretical perspectives.

The Need for a Reflective Pluralism

As this overview has shown, there are some basic building blocks, which can be usefully employed in a variety of ways for locating different epistemological positions and historical-cultural traditions in political science and similar fields. In this way, it at least becomes clearer where (and perhaps also why) certain contending positions actually differ. We do not intend to “harmonize” these positions. They all have, to varying degrees, their respective strengths and weaknesses, and no coherent, well-integrated theoretical building is constructed here with these blocks. That may even not be desirable, leaving some room to agree to disagree about some basic issues and perspectives. What is desirable instead is to elevate our consciousness and our way to deal with such controversies to a level of reflective pluralism, where not just anything goes, but where contending epistemologies and approaches can be brought into a fruitful interdisciplinary, intercultural, and, possibly even, meta-theoretical dialogue.

As already mentioned, political science has always been characterized by a diversity of contending meta-theoretical positions, paradigms, and approaches. In Europe, in the last century various strands of normative-ontological, Marxist, and empirical-analytical persuasions have been at the forefront (for such and similar terms see, e.g., Easton, Gunnell, & Graziano, 1991; Quermonne, 1996). For several decades in the United States, “behavioralist” positions and, more recently, “rational” and “public choice” approaches have dominated (cf. the influential volumes by King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, and Brady & Collier, 2004). In other parts of the world, different theological, philosophical, and epistemological traditions have influenced the (more recent) emergence of political science there. Altogether, thus a great variety of contending positions, which have been summarized as “naturalist,” “constructivist,” and “realist,” can be observed (Moses & Knutsen, 2007).

Relations With Other Social Sciences

Pluralism and different traditions in political science also emerge when we change perspective and focus more precisely on its relationships with other social sciences. This section explores three sources...
of political science as it differentiated itself from other disciplines.

**Evolution of Political Science**

When looking at the period after World War II, the basic difference in the traditions of different countries and areas of the world is between a plural form (political sciences) that is more common in Europe and encompasses the singular (political science). Conversely, in the tradition of United States the singular form (political science) includes the plural (political sciences). In the singular, there is a pluralist political science where empirical analysis is dominant, but also other perspectives (law, history, philosophy) are present. However, be it plural or singular, during the last decades empirical political science has increasingly differentiated itself from sociology, and above all from political sociology, public law, political philosophy, and contemporary history. Actually, in these developments we can see differences among disciplines or, more precisely, among specific groups of scholars in specific countries, but also overlapping and mutual influences with ever stronger interactions among scholars who are able to cross borders from Europe to North and South America, and to Africa and Asia, with a strong British tradition still present in Australia.

When we trace the original development of empirical political science, we can see that in a large number of European and American countries, political science is the result of empirical developments in public law. Consequently, the first difference concerns the difference between the perspective of law, which deals with “what ought to be”—with norms and the institutions that seek to embody them, and that of political science as transformed by behavioralism into an empirical social science, which is focused on “what is”—on the reality and on the explanations of it.

In Europe as well as in North and South America, there are other strong traditions that make contemporary history a parent of the new, post–World War II empirical political science. Here, despite all its ambiguities, the criterion of differentiation is between historical idiographic research, focused on the analysis of specific unique events, and a political science characterized by epistemological and methodological assumptions of other social sciences such as economics, sociology, and psychology, at least in terms of expectations of empirical findings (nomothetic) with a more general scope (regularities, patterns, laws). Social history and historical sociology as in the works of Reinhard Bendix, Barrington Moore, Stein Rokkan, Charles Tilly, and others have also greatly contributed to our understanding of long-term political processes at the macro-level. In this respect historical studies and political analysis can nicely supplement each other, as in the adage “Political science without history has no root, history without political science bears no fruit.”

Within the European and North American traditions, sociology is the third parent of the new empirical science. Here, in addition to the common epistemology and possibly methodology of research, the overlapping of the contents, when political sociology is considered, makes the differentiation more difficult. Such a criterion was set up by two famous sociologists of the 1950s, Bendix and Seymour Lipset, when they stated that political science starts from the state and analyzes how it influences society, whereas political sociology starts from the society and analyzes how it influences the state (Bendix & Lipset, 1957, p. 87). In other words, the independent variables of a sociologist are the dependent variables of a political scientist: The arrows of explanation are going in opposite directions. Such a distinction sounds artificial and unrealistic when the inner logic of research is taken into account—if we decide in advance what is/are the independent variable/s, how can we stop when no salient results come out and declare that from now on one becomes a sociologist or economist or else? Nevertheless, for years such a distinction was the rule of thumb used to stress the difference between political sociology and political science. However, such a rule was responding more to the necessities of differentiation between academic communities than to the needs of developments in empirical research. It must also be noted that political sociology can be understood in both a broad and a narrow sense. In the former, it covers the broad social-structural and political-cultural bases of politics and their long-term developments over time at the macro level. In the latter, the intermediate and input structures of politics like interest
groups, parties, social movements and other aspects of civil society are dealt with. These, undoubtedly, belong more to the realm of political science proper and have continued to flourish. In the former sense, closer to historical sociology, a certain slackening can be observed. This is due to the fact that the consideration of long-term social-structural developments had rigidified to some extent in the 1970s and 1980s in variants of orthodox Marxism, or the political element had largely disappeared in the analysis of finer social distinctions in Pierre Bourdieu’s sense.

Last but not least, the development of differences between political philosophy and political science should be recalled. Again, there is much overlapping of contents, but epistemology and methods are different and easy to distinguish. As recalled by Giovanni Sartori (1984) with regard to the “language watershed,” first of all, the language is different: The words and the related empirical concepts of political science are operationalized, that is, translated into indicators and, when possible, in measures, whereas the language of political philosophy is not necessarily so; it usually adopts meta-observed concepts, that is, concepts that are not empirically translated.

As discussed in the next section, this apparently simple differentiation covers possible commonalities, but leaves unsolved how the two different disciplinary perspectives deal with normative issues. Norberto Bobbio (1971, pp. 367, 370) made a relevant contribution in this direction when he emphasized that political philosophy focuses mainly on

- the search for the best government;
- the search for the foundations of the state or the justification of political obligations;
- the search for the ‘nature’ of politics or of ‘politicness’; and
- the analysis of political language.

All four topics have an ethical, normative content, which is a characterizing feature of each political philosophical activity. At the same time, Bobbio recalls that an empirical analysis of political phenomena that are the objects of political science should satisfy three conditions:

- the principle of empirical control as the main criterion of validity;
- explanation as the main goal; and
- Wertfreiheit, or freedom from values, as the main virtue of a political scientist.

As noted in the discussion of epistemology above, the key element is in differentiating the speculative, ethically bound activity of a philosopher from the empirical analysis, even of phenomena that are influenced by the values of the actors.

**The Influences of Other Disciplines**

The obvious conclusion of the previous subsection is that there are different ways of analyzing political phenomena that correspond to different traditions and come from different cultural influences. Moreover, the discussion of those differences may help in developing a negative identity of political science. This is the very first meaning of the actual pluralism we have in this domain of knowledge: Pluralism only means that politics can be legitimately studied in different ways and with different goals that belong, at least, also to law, history, sociology, and economics. Pluralism in this sense challenges the autonomy of political science and even, in a radical version, has led to a denial that it constitutes a specific science. This view, however, no longer corresponds to the internal differentiation of the discipline, its specific achievements, and its more general institutionalization as an academic field. In addition, a second sort of pluralism inside political science proper reveals the overlapping and the influences of other disciplines in empirical political science. In this vein, when again considering the period starting after World War II, a main hypothesis can be proposed: Political science is influenced by the discipline or the other social science that in the immediately previous years has developed new salient knowledge. This is so for sociology, as can be seen in the analysis of Lipset and Bendix and other important authors since the end of World War II, who developed the work of classic sociologists, from Weber and Durkheim to Parsons and others. This is so for the influence of general systems theory, coming from cybernetics, and translated meaningfully into the analysis of political systems
Taking into account the views of political science as variously defined in different countries, they identified four fields as constituting the discipline, acknowledging “the influence of the philosophers with ‘political theory,’ the jurists with ‘government,’ the internationalists with ‘international relations,’ and the fledgling behaviorist school of American political science with ‘parties, groups and political opinion.’” Today IPSA serves as the primary international organization in the field, with individual and institutional members as well as affiliations with national political science memberships across the globe.

With respect to the ways that pluralism and interdisciplinary developments have taken place in political science, the North American influence has been paramount. The so-called Americanization affected all of Europe as well as other areas of the world where native scholars, educated in North American universities, went back to conduct research and to teach, bringing a new empirical conception of the discipline that significantly contributed to create new communities of political scientists (Favre, 1985). Moreover, American foundations and research centers gave support for research in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. While there are differences in political science as it exists today on different continents in this domain of knowledge—and actually also in most other scientific research domains—the North American universities, as well as the American research centers and the scholars associated with them, had a great influence that can be compared only to the intellectual German influence during the 50 years between the end of the 19th century and the first 3 decades of the 20th century. Thus, at the end of the 1960s, Mackenzie (1969, p. 59) suggested that in this period 90% of political scientists worked in North America, and Klaus von Beyme noted that the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley had more professors in this field than all German universities combined. Moreover, in those years and earlier in the 1950s in all European countries and in Japan, the American influence had been very strong in all social sciences, with some exceptions such as anthropology, which had a specific French presence. Forty years later, 70% of all political scientists are almost equally present in North America and Western Europe and the other

Recent Developments and Perspectives

As the International Political Science Association notes on its website,

it is hard today for political scientists of 2011 to imagine the very different status their discipline in the world under reconstruction of 1949. In place of the familiar, well-structured web of national associations we know today, there were associations only in the United States (founded in 1903), Canada (1913), Finland (1935), India (1938), China (1932), and Japan (1948). (http://www.ipsa.org/history/prologue)

Founders of the International Political Science Association met in 1948 to plan for a new international organization that would establish dialogue among political scientists throughout the world.
In the most recent developments, the impact of a more continuous and effective communication among scholars through different modalities, such as domestic and international collective associations, research networks, and initiatives of private and public institutions, affected the discipline as a whole mainly in three directions. The first one is a growing trend toward blurring national differences and a consequent convergence between North America, or between North and South America, and Europe. The second is an increased blurring of subdisciplinary divides. This is so especially between comparative politics and international relations, traditionally two separate fields in the past. Such a trend is particularly evident in the European studies. Third, research in political science more and more focuses on relevant, contemporary realities rather than confining itself to an ivory tower, which made it distant and largely irrelevant and, consequently, created that “tragedy of political science” Ricci singled out years ago (1987). Contemporary political science thus has developed into a multi-faceted, well-established discipline that is concerned with the pressing problems of our times and provides sound empirical analyses and meaningful orientation in the ever more integrated and complex world of the 21st century.

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Further Readings


Accountability has become a key concept in both public administration and democratic theory. Its meaning is contested, but the general definition “obligation to answer for the performance of duties” would fit most versions. In this sense, accountability is a relationship between two parties—the person or organization answering or being held to account (the accountor or agent) and the person or organization to whom the account is owed (the account holder or principal). Analysis of accountability therefore begins with the double question: *Who is accountable to whom?* Accountability obligations depend on the terms of the relationship and on its institutional context, leading to two more key questions: (1) *For what is the accountor accountable and (2) how?* This entry covers the following topics: defining accountability, typologies of accountability, mechanisms of public sector accountability, democratic accountability, accountability in international relations, single versus multiple accountability, accountability in networks, and accountability and the new public management (NPM).

Though the English word *accountability* has a respectable historical pedigree (the *Oxford English Dictionary* records its use from the late 18th century), its prominence in political science dates only from the 1980s, before which time the cognate term *responsibility* was preferred. (Indeed, linguistic equivalents of “responsibility” are still dominant in other European languages that lack a direct parallel for “accountability.”) The rapid rise of “accountability” can be traced to its adoption by public choice theory, particularly principal–agent theory, and by management theory, which in turn greatly influenced democratic theory and public administration. However, the relative lack of intellectual history and of cross-disciplinary seminal texts has meant that academic analysis of accountability has proceeded in a haphazard, fragmented, and repetitive fashion. Different subdisciplines, including comparative politics, international relations, deliberative democracy, constitutional law, and public management (further subdivided into U.S. and European versions) have each been developing their own parallel theories of accountability, with little cross-fertilization or sense of common purpose.

**Defining Accountability**

Though the core sense of accountability, the obligation of the accountor to answer for the performance of duties, is uncontroversial, disagreement occurs over what should be added to that core. Most analyses also include the capacity of the account holder to impose sanctions or other remedies on the accountor as a necessary complement to full accountability. However, some versions confine accountability to the initial informing and discussing stages, omitting the requirement for any rectification. In effect, they equate accountability with *transparency*, another popular term with which accountability is frequently linked. Certainly, in complex modern systems of public accountability,
some accountability mechanisms, such as parliamentary inquiry or media investigation, can provide transparency but lack the capacity for imposing sanctions, leaving that function to other agencies such as courts or the executive. But transparency on its own, with no prospect of correction or other adverse consequences, falls short of full accountability.

In its core sense, accountability, like accounting itself, is essentially retrospective or \textit{ex post}, in that it is concerned with information and explanation about past actions of the accountor. Discussion about future actions is, therefore, not, strictly speaking, an exercise in accountability. However, in a continuing relationship between principal and agent, \textit{ex post} can easily overlap with \textit{ex ante}, as in election campaigns when incumbent representatives not only defend their past actions but also outline their future plans. Indeed, some theorists have wanted to distinguish two types or aspects of accountability, \textit{ex post} (retrospective) and \textit{ex ante} (prospective) accountability, while others have included all communication between political leaders and the public as part of an ongoing accountability dialogue. Such usage, while understandable because of the obligations of democratic governments to engage in continuing discussion with their citizens, extends accountability beyond its normal focus of answering for past actions. Similarly, government consultation with stakeholders about future policy certainly helps keep politicians and bureaucrats in touch with relevant sections of public opinion, but it does not necessarily imply accountability in the strict sense of accounting for previous decisions.

Accountability is also sometimes taken beyond its retrospective core when it is equated with institutional devices for limiting or constraining power. For instance, constitutional checks and balances, such as federalism and the separation of powers, are sometimes described as mechanisms of accountability because they limit the legal power of governments and prevent them from abusing the rights of citizen. Such constraints may certainly involve accountability mechanisms, for instance, when a government oversteps its legal powers and is called to account by the courts. However, constitutional laws and regulations themselves are essentially prospective in focus, seeking to limit and control future actions of governments. The mere fact that laws and regulation constrain the power of governments need not in itself imply that they are instruments of accountability.

Significant disagreement also surrounds how far accountability is to be distinguished from other, closely related concepts, namely, responsibility and responsiveness. “Responsibility” and “accountability” share parallel conceptual histories, both originating in the notion of answering (“responding,” “giving an account to”) to someone. “Accountability,” as the obligation to answer for the performance of duties, generally implies a relationship between two or more parties, in which one party is subject to external scrutiny from others. “Responsibility,” on the other hand, typically refers to the internal deliberations and actions of a single person or organization.

This division of conceptual labor is by no means universally observed. “Responsibility” sometimes includes answering to others as well as making individual choices, as, for instance, in the classic British conventions of “responsible government” and “ministerial responsibility.” Indeed, before the rise of the term \textit{accountability}, \textit{responsibility} regularly covered both external and internal aspects (as its equivalents still do in other European languages).

The popularity of “accountability” has seen it extended in a similar fashion, but in the opposite direction, to include not only external scrutiny but also the internal capacity for considered and conscientious action usually described as acting “responsibly.” For instance, where members of caring professions, such as social workers and health professionals, have a strong vocational commitment to serving the interests of the community, this concern is sometimes identified as in itself constituting accountability to the community, regardless of whether members of the community actually have any rights of scrutiny or complaint. Similarly, members of the nonprofit charitable sector commonly see themselves as accountable to the recipients of charity even though they are not, strictly speaking, answerable to them. Particularly where professional standards or values are publicly articulated, voluntary adherence to such standards can be seen as a form of accountability without any requirement to report externally or without external any mechanism for others to demand compliance. The accountability has become internalized, as though the conscientious professional is
in an imaginary dialogue with his or her clients and answering to them.

The question of whether an internalized sense of service should be accepted as a form of accountability recalls the perennial debate over the relative merits of professional discretion compared with external scrutiny as a means of securing public service in the public interest. The issue was classically discussed by Carl Friedrich and Herman Finer in the 1940s as a debate over two contrasting types of responsibility but is now typically described as a clash between two types of accountability. Conceptual clarity might be better served if accountability were reserved for external scrutiny and rectification, recasting the Friedrich–Finer debate as being between the respective merits of (internal) responsibility and (external) accountability. However, the emotive pull of “accountability,” like that of “democracy,” makes supporters of professional discretion unwilling to accept what would amount to an accountability deficit. Instead, they prefer to see themselves as embracing a special form of accountability.

Similar extensions beyond the core meaning of accountability derive from the connection between accountability and responsiveness. Accountability, as the obligation to answer to external scrutiny and rectification, derives its main justification from its contribution to responsiveness, understood as the readiness of institutions and officials to respond to the needs and interests of those whom they serve. In public administration, for instance, responsiveness, the alignment between official action and public preferences, is the goal to which the accountability of governments is a key means. However, accountability procedures of external scrutiny, such as review and audit, are not the only mechanisms for making governments responsive. For instance, changing the organizational culture of a public agency toward a greater client focus and concern for service quality can make the agency more responsive to the public but need not involve additional accountability procedures of scrutiny or inquiry. Yet many in such an agency would typically claim that it had become both more responsive and more accountable, in effect identifying accountability with responsiveness.

The link between accountability and responsiveness also arises with market mechanisms. Markets are unquestionably instruments of responsiveness. They find their main rationale in their capacity to align the provision of goods and services with the preferences of consumers and citizens. But are they therefore instruments of accountability? According to a strict understanding, organizations operating in a market, particularly private companies, are accountable primarily to their owners and shareholders, not to their customers. They may be accountable to individual consumers who have purchased goods or services, and they may also be publicly accountable in the sense of being liable to scrutiny for complying with any relevant law and regulations. However, overall responsiveness to consumer preferences comes from the consumers’ capacity to choose between alternative suppliers in a competitive market. Suppliers adjust to consumer demand not because of any complaints or scrutiny from potential customers, who have no such rights against a supplier, but because they will go out of business if they have no customers.

Markets are thus primarily “exit” mechanisms for securing responsiveness. Dissatisfied customers vote with their feet. Accountability, on the other hand, as normally understood, is a “voice” mechanism, allowing dissatisfied members of the public to complain and to seek information and rectification from an organization. In this case, markets do not count as accountability mechanisms. Nonetheless, because competitive markets have the capacity to force service providers to take note of consumer preferences and, in some sense, to “answer” to expressed demand, to describe them as instruments of accountability can have a certain plausibility.

In the same way, organizations that respond to peer or public opinion through concern for their corporate reputations are sometimes said to be exhibiting “reputational” accountability. Again, there is no direct connection or dialogue between the supposed “accountor” and the “account holder,” no right of the public or the organization’s peers to call the organization to account, and no formal obligation of the accountor to accept sanctions or redirections from others. Again, however, the emotive force of the term accountability leads sympathetic observers to classify such responsiveness as instances of accountability. Moreover, in modern democratic societies, reputational effects are often the result of media publicity and scrutiny. There are good grounds for
seeing the media as agents of accountability, holding public figures and organizations up to scrutiny, even though the media may have no formal rights to demand information or to impose sanctions. As with transparency in general, however, such accountability without rectification is inchoate and incomplete.

Accountability is thus a chameleon-like concept that readily takes on new, additional senses from the different contexts in which it is used. Because external scrutiny and sanctions, the core of accountability, are so central to checking abuses of power and to the processes of representative democracy, the term itself is easily extended to other mechanisms and processes that secure the same overall objectives, including legal and regulatory constraints, market competition, and public service professionalism and commitment to the public interest. These extensions and variations have been driven by the emotive power of the term combined with the lack of widely recognized academic authorities on the topic. To expect agreement on a single concept of accountability is unrealistic. But, at least, analysts of accountability could become more aware of the well-established variations in usage and more willing to place their own versions within that larger conceptual context.

Typologies of Accountability

Most analyses of accountability divide it into different types, though, as with the definition of accountability, there is no agreement on a typology or even on the meaning of some of the labels. Some typologies are based on distinctions in the subject matter of accountability (for what), for instance, between accountability for contestable outcomes (“political”) or for agreed tasks (“managerial”) and accountability for different types of activity, such as finances, processes, and performance. Other typologies focus more on the institutions and mechanisms of accountability, for instance, “political,” “legal,” “bureaucratic,” and “professional.”

Several classifications are built on distinctions in the direction of accountability, such as “vertical,” which can include “upward” accountability within a structured hierarchy as well as downward to citizens and customers, and “horizontal” and “outward,” which refers to accountability to institutions or individual of roughly equal status. A “360-degree” accountability implies accountability in all directions: upward, outward, and horizontal. “Internal” versus “external” accountability can refer to the difference in to whom an organization is accountable, internal referring to those who exercise clear ownership or delegation rights while “external” refers to those who have no such rights but are nevertheless affected.

Typologies tend to be context dependent. For instance, writers on developmental politics and democratization have employed the contrast between “horizontal” and “vertical” accountability to stress the importance of having executive governments accountable (horizontally) to other coequal institutions, such as courts, legislatures, and auditors. Horizontal accountability has become equated with the rule of law and constitutional government, seen as prerequisites for successful representative democracy. In international politics, on the other hand, types of accountability identified in one influential study (hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, legal, market, peer, and reputational) reflect the political realities of international relations and the absence of some of the more robust accountability mechanisms, such as elections and legal sanctions, available within nation-states.

In the public administration literature, the structure of accountability typologies tends to follow constitutional structure, with a sharp division between the approach in the United States and that in the parliamentary systems of the United Kingdom (UK); other Westminster systems such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; and Western Europe. In the United States, the separation of powers, along with federalism, makes bureaucrats independently accountable to a range of institutions, including the president, Congress, and the courts, forcing them to juggle between competing accountability demands. Analyses of accountability tend to stress the discretionary role of bureaucrats and the varied types of accountability forum—hierarchical, political, legal, and professional—in which they operate.

In parliamentary systems, by contrast, bureaucratic accountability centers on the hierarchical chain of accountability through ministers to parliament and the public, associated with the traditional conventions of ministerial responsibility
and described variously as “parliamentary” or “political.” To this have been added other, supplementary types, such as “legal,” “judicial” (to cover accountability through courts and tribunals), or “managerial,” referring specifically to the output-focused accountability emphasized in the NPM.

Not only do different typologies contain different sets and combinations of individual types of accountability but particular individual types also vary in meaning between different typologies. Political accountability, for instance, is sometimes confined to politicians and to processes involving politicians while at other times it refers, more broadly, to contestable outcomes involving non-elected officials as well as elected politicians. Legal and judicial accountability typically imply the processes of courts and the legal system. But they vary as to whether they are confined to the judicial branch of government or also include quasi-judicial tribunals or other executive-based institutions such as ombudsmen and freedom of information rules. Legal accountability has also been defined even more broadly to cover external monitoring for compliance with legally established rules, which therefore implies that legislatures scrutinizing compliance with their own legislation are engaging in legal accountability.

Finally, professional accountability also has no settled meaning. Sometimes it refers to the accountability that members of an expert profession owe to each other (peer accountability). For example, some professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, can be held to account by disciplinary bodies drawn from the profession itself. Less formally, members of a profession, including public servants, may be monitored and called to account through shared networks and collegial relationships. However, professional accountability has also been applied to the independent exercise of ethical norms of a particular profession, which have been internalized through socialization into the profession. In this case, professional accountability is being identified as a sense of professional responsibility, quite detached from any external scrutiny.

**Mechanisms of Public Sector Accountability**

The complex accountability structures surrounding modern governments involve a wide range of institutional mechanisms, which vary according to the section of government on which they focus (who?), the type of issue that they investigate (for what?), and the procedures they follow (how?).

**Elections**

In a representative democracy, the basic accountability mechanism is the general election at which incumbent executive leaders present themselves to the voters and seek a renewal of their mandate to govern. Elections compel elected politicians to explain and justify their actions and give the citizens the opportunity to listen and impose a verdict. Elections legitimize the control exercised by political leaders over the executive bureaucracy and thus underpin the accountability of agency heads to ministers and of junior officials to their superiors through the hierarchical chain of command. Though elections may be held at infrequent intervals, their indirect influence on government accountability is immense, through the threat of future of retribution imposed on unpopular governments.

Elections may be powerful but they are also blunt. Their effectiveness as accountability instruments can be compromised by their forward-looking function of selecting an incoming government. Voters may be deflected from sanctioning an unpopular government by the perception that the alternative leadership is even less palatable. Accountability is also denied where incumbent leaders do not stand for reelection (most notably in the case of second-term United States presidents). Moreover, because elections require a general judgment over a whole regime and its overall program, they do not allow for more fine-grained accountability on particular issues or decisions. Electioneering is dominated by general slogans and misleading rhetoric and does not offer much scope for accurate information or serious discussion.

Elections therefore need to be supplemented by a range of other accountability mechanisms and should not be seen as the sole instruments of democratic accountability, as is the tendency in theories of democracy built around the single act of voting and electoral choice. Conversely, regimes that lack elections, though undemocratic, may still offer citizens opportunities to hold their governments to account, for instance, through legal processes or complaints procedures.
Legislative Scrutiny

Between elections, the major institution of accountability is the legislature. Though primarily defined in terms of their lawmaking functions, modern legislatures have ceded much of their legislative initiative and discretion to the executive branch, especially in parliamentary democracies where the main legislative chamber is typically under the control of the ruling party. In compensation, legislatures have increasingly emphasized their accountability role as the main forum where the executive is required to answer to the public.

Legislatures hold executives to account through a variety of avenues. One is the requirement for regular reporting on executive activities. All government agencies and statutory officials are obliged to report periodically (usually annually) to the legislature on their general performance. Information provided to the legislature thereby enters the public realm and is available for general debate and discussion.

Legislatures also have the right to question members of the executive and subject them to public scrutiny. In Westminster-based democracies, conventions of ministerial responsibility require ministers to answer to parliament for the conduct of their departments, to provide information about decisions, and, where necessary, to impose remedies. Similar conventions exist in most parliamentary democracies where ministers are accountable to parliament. Ministerial responsibility has been a topic of perennial controversy, mainly because of a widespread but erroneous belief that it requires ministers to take personal responsibility for the actions of subordinates and resign when major mistakes are discovered to have been made within their departments. Such “sacrificial” resignation is rarely, if ever, undertaken and the doctrine of “vicarious” responsibility on which it is based (that ministers are personally responsible for the acts of subordinates) does not accord with practice. When ministers resign, they do so because of personal faults of their own making, such as misleading parliament or engaging in improper or corrupt conduct, and the decision is usually politically determined in terms of minimizing damage to the government’s popularity.

Ministerial resignation is a side issue in assessing the role of ministers’ responsibility in government accountability. Much more important, and the basis of the effectiveness of ministerial responsibility as an accountability mechanism, are the obligations it imposes on ministers to answer to the public on matters of public concern, either in parliament or directly through the media. Though ministers are not required to take personal responsibility for all actions of their subordinates, they must provide information and justification when asked. Refusal to respond publicly, which is common among leaders of private organizations, is politically unacceptable for elected politicians. At the same time, however, while avoiding outright deceit (which remains a strong ground for forced resignation), ministers can readily prevaricate and avoid disclosure of embarrassing information. Moreover, their monopoly of the right of public response can carry the corollary that departmental officials remain out of the public eye, which can shield them from legitimate public scrutiny.

To circumvent the problem of bureaucratic anonymity, legislatures also question public officials directly, usually through a system of legislative committees. The practice of committee scrutiny is most highly developed in the U.S. Congress, which, through the separation of powers, is an active partner in shaping government policy and has a legitimate interest in overseeing the whole conduct of government business. In parliamentary systems, the scope of questioning is somewhat more confined, exempting appointed officials from answering on issues of government policy, out of deference to the democratic mandate of the elected leaders. Even so, restricting questions to administrative matters for which officials are more immediately responsible still allows considerable opportunity for holding the bureaucracy to account.

Courts

All governments are subject to legal accountability through the courts because courts determine whether the government has acted within the law. The operation and effect of this power vary with a country’s legal and constitutional structure. One contrast is between Anglo-American countries, where cases involving the government are heard in the same courts as civil cases, and some European countries, notably France, where a completely separate court structure is reserved for cases involving the state. Another contrast concerns the
scope of judicial review. Where the constitution, as in the United States, defines and limits the powers of both Congress and the president, the courts become a forum for holding the government generally accountable across a wide range of substantial policy issues. On the other hand, in parliamentary democracies such as the UK, where few constitutional limits are placed on legislative power, opportunities for challenging policies through the courts are much more limited.

Most legal cases involving the government are brought by individual citizens and deal with particular decisions affecting them that have been made by government agencies. It is open to the court to rule whether a decision was taken within the powers legally conferred on the government agency; whether the citizen received natural justice, in terms of fair procedure and due process; and whether the decision itself was reasonable. Whether courts can decide on the actual substance and merits of a decision varies according to the provisions of the individual legal system. Some systems make use of quasi-judicial tribunals, which operate like courts though with a generally more relaxed approach to procedure and which, being technically part of the executive branch, are empowered to amend executive decisions.

Legal accountability, like litigation generally, suffers from being slow and expensive and is beyond the reach of most people for most issues. However, its availability as a last resort is crucial to the public’s capacity to hold governments to account. Like the rule of law itself, of which it is a key element, accountability through an independent and honest judiciary is the foundation of all public accountability.

**Auditors and Other Monitoring Agencies**

Governments are overseen and investigated by a range of special-purpose accountability agencies. Of these agencies, the most long-standing are the offices of government auditors (variously described as “auditors general” and/or “comptrollers general”). Their traditional function has been the monitoring of government finances on behalf of the legislature to see whether public revenue and expenditure have been managed according to legislative authorization and according to standards of public probity and propriety. The historic function of “regularity auditing” for financial compliance has more recently been supplemented by “performance” (“value for money,” “efficiency,” “comprehensive”) auditing that extends to assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs. Performance audits usually take a program’s objectives as given and then examine whether these objectives have been achieved and at what cost. In performance auditing, as distinct from regularity auditing, auditors typically lack any powers of sanction or rectification and can simply recommend changes and improvement.

In general, government auditors have proved essential in maintaining financial integrity in governments. Conversely, the absence of effective audit is a key indicator of weak and corrupt government systems. They have also been very successful in exposing bureaucratic waste and inefficiency. Even though they cannot mandate any remedies, the authority of their recommendations and the adverse publicity attached to the exposure of serious waste and inefficiency are often sufficient to prompt governments to follow their recommendations voluntarily.

Besides auditors, other investigating bodies include government inspectors and ombudsmen. Inspectors are officials established within particular government departments and agencies with the function of improving efficiency and effectiveness. Inspectors have been employed to monitor school and prison systems as well as government departments in areas such as taxation, defense, and security where bureaucratic performance is a matter of particular concern. The position of ombudsman, first introduced in Scandinavia, has been adopted worldwide as an avenue of complaint for individual citizens seeking redress in connection with particular decisions. Ombudsmen usually have the power to investigate and recommend but not to impose remedies. In spite of this limitation, however, they have proved an effective accountability mechanism midway between individual complaint and full legal proceedings.

Recent decades have witnessed an “audit explosion” as governments and government agencies become subject to increasing supervision by regulatory agencies. With the transfer of responsibility for providing public goods and services away from government departments under political direction to various forms of arm’s-length providers, regulation
has tended to replace political and bureaucratic direction as the means of making public service providers publicly accountable. A plethora of regulatory agencies now monitor different areas of public service provision, such as health and education, or different aspects of government activity, such as occupational health and safety or human rights. While most regulatory bodies are public bodies, some are privately established but have been granted legal powers—for instance, some consumers’ associations and animal protection societies. Other private monitoring bodies have no legal mandate but operate more informally as observers and critics of government activities. These include a number of private international watchdogs, such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International and the financial ratings agencies, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, which have a great impact on economic policy because of the impact of their ratings decisions.

Freedom of Information and the Media

The public availability of information held by governments may be only the initial stage of a full accountability process and needs to be followed up by discussion and then, if necessary, by rectification. However, once such information is released into the public realm it can readily be used to spark a political reaction and force governments into remedies. Public access to government information is therefore an essential component of government accountability and is provided by a number of channels.

One such channel is the right of the general citizen to seek access to information, both personal information held about them as individual citizens and general information about government policy. Rights of freedom of information are found in most established democracies, with the United States having led the way and the UK being a reluctant latecomer. Certain exemptions usually apply, on grounds such as national security, cabinet confidentiality, commercial confidentiality, and protection of legal proceedings. Financial charges can also be imposed, especially on matters of general interest, with the result that information is generally sought by well-resourced journalists or by organized groups with political interests rather than by individual citizens.

The various media outlets, both print and electronic, also help spread information and stimulate debate. In part, their function is strictly intermediary, relaying to a wider public news items and arguments supplied by others. However, they also play an independent role in instigating inquiries and conducting investigations. Though, for the most part, privately owned and not formally part of the machinery of government, the media are essential to effective accountability in large-scale modern states. Indeed, a free press, along with elections and an independent judiciary, has been acknowledged as one of the key institutions in securing an accountable government.

Intra-Organizational Accountability

In addition to being externally accountable, government agencies, like all organizations, also exhibit internal structures of accountability whereby different members or sections are accountable to others within the organization. Indeed, from the perspective of individual officials, organizational accountability upward through the chain of bureaucratic command is often the most immediate and salient form of accountability in their daily activities. To assist in reinforcing upward accountability, organizations often impose their own in-house versions of independent scrutiny, such as internal audit or inspection, which mirrors and anticipates the financial monitoring of external auditors and inspectors.

Accountability of individual officials to their superiors is an essential element in the overall democratic accountability of executive government. If elected leaders are to be accountable for the actions of bureaucrats, then they must be able to rely on their bureaucrats’ willingness to take direction and answer for their actions. Accountability upward is thus a corollary of control downward. Conversely, any slippage in control from above is typically reflected in lack of accountability upward.

Weakness in upward accountability may be symptomatic of the well-known propensity of bureaucrats to pursue their own policy agendas and apply their own judgment against the wishes of their superiors. It may also come from contrary accountability pressures. “Bottom-up” views of administration legitimate the direct accountability
of street-level bureaucrats to their clients among the public and undermine the authority of organizational superiors. From this perspective, accountability through the “top-down” chain of bureaucratic command becomes an unwelcome constraint to be managed rather than a mandate to be respected. Bottom-up versions of accountability can claim their own democratic legitimacy through answerability directly to the members of the public rather than indirectly through the public’s elected representatives.

**Systems of Democratic Accountability**

Democratic accountability can be viewed from various perspectives, from that of the citizen wishing to hold his or her government to account, from that of the elected politicians responding to the voters, or from that of the government official answering to political masters and to the public. Depending on one’s position and interests, different accountability mechanisms claim the most attention. Politicians are focused primarily on elections and the media, whereas public servants are more concerned with accountability to superiors in the hierarchy. Citizens in strife with government agencies will be looking to grievance procedures and ombudsmen. In all cases, the structure of available accountability mechanisms appears complex and untidy, incapable of being reduced to tidy diagrams or flowcharts without oversimplification. Structures of accountability are inherently pluralistic and are better described as “webs,” or possibly “systems,” to indicate their complexity and fluidity.

The various accountability agencies and processes in webs of democratic accountability exhibit widely different functions. Some accountability processes, such as elections, focus on overall performance of government, while others, such as financial audit, concentrate on details of administration. Politicians and the media home in on politically controversial and sensational issues. Auditors and inspectors, by contrast, tend to deliberately steer clear of political controversy and instead concentrate on more humdrum areas of administration, which may appear dull but are often the site of major inefficiencies.

Some agencies, such as courts, exercise the full range of accountability functions, including information, discussion, and rectification, while others, such as the media, are limited to the transparency functions of information and discussion. It is for this reason that democratic accountability cannot be accurately represented by a chain of principal–agent relationships, given such relationships always imply the principal’s right to impose sanctions. Standard structures of democratic accountability certainly involve account holders with the power to impose remedies and sanctions. This power may be located with a number of different actors. The basic right of rectification lies with citizens as voters who have the capacity to remove their elected representatives. But other public officers and institutions can also compel compliance on those accountable to them. Elected political leaders can direct their departments and agency heads in relation to their subordinates. Courts and tribunals can issue binding decisions.

However, not all agencies of accountability possess the power of rectification. Indeed, many of the most effective accountability agencies, including legislative committees, auditors, ombudsmen, and the media, can only investigate and recommend. Their effectiveness depends on their capacity to exert pressure on account holders with rectificatory powers, particularly executive leaders, to impose remedies in response to adverse publicity, backed by the ultimate electoral sanction. Democratic accountability can thus operate as an interlocking system with some institutions specializing in information and investigation while others are relied on for rectification. While there may be grounds for identifying elections as the defining accountability mechanism in representative democracies, they are far from being the only such mechanism.

A key factor in any web of accountability is whether each accountability agency charged with holding the government to account is itself publicly accountable for performing its accountability functions. Legislators, judges, auditors, ombudsmen, regulators, and so on need to be subjected to scrutiny themselves to prevent them from becoming lax or corrupt. Most officials in such scrutinizing positions are granted a degree of statutory autonomy to help them maintain an independent stance against the executive power that they must call to account. At the same time, however, this independence is itself open to abuse. Transparency, media scrutiny, and the ultimate power of arraignment...
and dismissal are essential buttresses of professional integrity. The guardians must be guarded.

Accountability in International Relations

Most analysis of government accountability has taken place within the context of nation-states, where the defining element of legal and political sovereignty provides a framework of effective sanctions to support other accountability mechanisms and where elections provide the people with the ultimate sanction. In the international sphere, however, the absence of effective sovereign power and elections raises the specter of an accountability vacuum. How can international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or the World Bank be held accountable for serving the interests of the international community if that community is not capable of enforcing sanctions on them?

In practice, accountability in the international sphere, though weaker than in many nation-states, is far from nonexistent. In some areas such as trade policy and criminal behavior, international law can offer effective remedies backed up by the coercive power of nation-states. International organizations are subject to accountability mechanisms, such as audit, review, and media scrutiny, as well as being answerable to the national governments that underwrite them. The UN bureaucracy, though often incompetent and corrupt, can be exposed to detailed investigation, as over its handling of the Oil-for-Food Programme, and can be pressured to institute reforms. Rectification tends to be ineffective, because of the apathy and disunity among leading members of the Security Council, the body to which the bureaucracy is accountable. But, with more determination from member states, the accountability deficit could be significantly reduced. As it stands, the accountability deficit in the UN bureaucracy is probably no greater than that found in the national bureaucracies of most of the member states themselves.

The inherent contrast between accountability in nation-states and in the international arena should therefore not be overstated. Both are pluralistic in structure and involve a range of accountability mechanisms, many of which, such as the media and NGO (nongovernmental organization) watchdogs, operate at both levels. The significant lack of effective legal and political sanctions at the international level must be conceded. But so too must the potential for improved international accountability short of a united system of world government.

Single Versus Multiple Accountability

Should the duties of public accountability, whether for government as a whole or for particular government agencies, be concentrated in a single person or dispersed among a number of different people? The main argument for concentration lies in the value of having a designated person, usually the leader or agency head, who is obliged to take collective responsibility and to answer to the public, particularly in times of crisis or government failure. Where responsibility and accountability are dispersed between members of a group or between different agencies, officials and politicians can easily shift the blame to others, with the result that no one accepts an obligation to answer to the public. A single point of accountability, by contrast, makes buck passing much more difficult.

On the other hand, multiple avenue of accountability can provide the public with greater opportunities for extracting information from government and for holding government officials up to scrutiny. A leader exercising sole powers of accountability, while less open to buck passing, is better able to resist embarrassing inquiry into the actions of subordinates and to cover up mistakes. In practice, most collective actions involve the responsibility of many individuals (“the problem of many hands”), and the attempt to hold only one person responsible and accountable obscures the reality of how bureaucracies operate.

In general, multiple avenues of accountability appear superior for the initial stages of accountability, for revealing information, and for encouraging the scrutiny of government. Single points of accountability, however, are more effective for taking charge and imposing remedies. The differing U.S. and UK constitutions illustrate the contrast. The United States, with its separation of powers and multiple points of authority, provides a very open and transparent system of government but one where solutions are hard to impose. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, concentrates power in the prime minister and cabinet under tight conventions of ministerial responsibility, which have preserved executive secrecy but allowed
effective rectification when problems come to light. A similar contrast can be found in the accountability of federal systems compared with that of unitary systems. Federations provide more avenues for inquiry but lack a single point of responsibility and are prone to blame shifting.

These dilemmas remain intractable. The best solution is to try to combine multiple avenues for scrutiny with a single authority for rectification, thus drawing on the virtues of each approach. Indeed, pluralistic democratic systems of accountability can be viewed in this light. Ideally, they combine many different, complementary mechanisms of scrutiny with a few clear points of unambiguous control and direction.

Accountability in Networks

“Networks” are an increasingly important feature of modern government posing particular problems of accountability. Networks may be understood as structures of collective action and decision making in which formally independent groups or individuals cooperate for shared purposes. They are commonly contrasted both with hierarchies, where the members are linked by formal control structures and in superior–subordinate relationships, and with markets, where self-interested parties are linked through formal agreements and contracts. Network members share the formal independence of market players while cooperating in shared values and objectives over a substantial period of time.

The concept of network has come to prominence in the analysis of modern systems of governance (to use a closely associated term) for various reasons. First, it signifies in part the long-standing aspects of all political systems, particularly the more informal cross-institutional relationships, which tended to be overlooked in more traditional institutional analysis and which now appear worthy of much more careful study. For instance, relationships between different levels of government, central and local, federal and state, have always relied heavily on informal partnerships and negotiation. Second, government systems are making more use of arms-length institutions, such as executive agencies and private organizations, for the delivery of public services. Relations between the purchasing government and the provider organizations are neither hierarchical nor market based but instead depend more on network characteristics of partnerships, trust, and agreed values.

Networks cause accountability problems because responsibility for collective action is shared between a number of different parties, giving rise to the classic buck passing associated with multiple accountability. Within the network itself, admittedly, relationships of trust and common interest may lead to mutual accountability and responsiveness. But for outsiders wishing to hold the network to account for its actions, the blurring of responsibility is problematic. Particularly when mistakes are made, interested members of the public are often unable to gain satisfactory answers because the various members of the network can shift the blame to each other.

Outsourcing of public services to stand-alone agencies has been bedeviled by accountability difficulties as politicians blame providers for performance failures and providers respond that the government has given them insufficient resources. The accountability deficit often increases if the providers are in the private sector and not accustomed to the level of public scrutiny applied to the public sector. Commercial contractors plead commercial confidentiality as a reason for concealing their internal operations and are often exempt from investigation by legislative committees or ombudsmen. Nonprofit organizations rely heavily on the conscientiousness of their staff, many of whom are volunteers, and are particularly reluctant to face demands for information and rectification.

Accountability and the New Public Management

The international public sector reform movement of the 1980s and 1990s, known as “the new public management,” though primarily aimed at improving public sector efficiency and effectiveness, also included an accountability agenda. The movement’s main assumption was that the public sector was less efficient than the commercial private sector and needed to move closer to private sector management methods. With respect to accountability, the most serious deficiency of the public sector compared with the commercial private sector is perceived to be its lack of clear objectives. Private companies have a clear and quantifiable “bottom line,” the maximizing of shareholder
value, which provides a clear focus for the performance and accountability of managers. Government agencies, by contrast, often have little sense of their objectives and lack clear criteria for judging the performance of officials and their agencies and for holding them to account.

Another deficiency noted in public sector accountability is bureaucrats’ comparative lack of concern for serving the members of the public with whom they have direct dealings. In contrast to those offering goods and services for sale in a competitive market—who must focus on their customers’ preferences—bureaucrats can exploit their monopoly position and remain largely unaccountable to the members of the public they are supposed to serve.

In other respects, however, the public sector is seen as laboring under excessive accountability burdens. For instance, lack of accountability for results is typically balanced by much more accountability for following set procedures than is found in the private sector. This accountability for process encourages red tape and discourages managerial initiative. At the same time, the managerial efficiency of public sector managers is also stifled by the constant threat of interference in their decisions by their political masters who are themselves responding to the accountability demands of the general public. Because political leaders can be held publicly accountable for any action taken by their departmental officials, the first imperative on all loyal bureaucrats is to save their masters from political embarrassment, even if organizational efficiency is compromised thereby.

The managerial accountability agenda of the NPM reformers therefore includes a number of interlocking strategies. First, objectives are to be clarified, and managers are to be held accountable in terms of achieving measurable outputs. Second, political accountability through elected political leaders is to be confined to the setting of broad objectives and outcomes, leaving responsibility and accountability for outputs with arms-length managers who are quarantined from day-to-day political interference and are accountable to independent regulators rather than to politicians. Third, service providers are to be made more directly accountable to individual citizens, viewed as clients or customers.

The reform agenda has had considerable impact on systems of bureaucratic accountability. Most government agencies now report performance in terms of objectives, including outcomes and outputs, and much effort has been directed toward designing performance measures, particularly in service agencies and in public health and education. The widespread decoupling of service provision from direct political control, through executive agencies and outsourcing, has raised the accountability profile of many agency heads and nongovernment service providers, while removing some internal organizational matters from, public scrutiny. The “audit explosion,” signified by the creation of new monitoring and regulatory bodies, reflects the move away from political accountability to independent regulation. Moves toward greater client focus, including the service charter initiatives, pioneered in the UK, have done much to reorient frontline bureaucrats toward a more user-friendly service culture.

At the same time, however, traditional public sector accountability practices have proved much more resistant to change than the reformers had hoped, largely because of entrenched public expectations about accountability. The managerialist injunction to restrict the politicians’ accountability for general objectives and to delegate accountability for implementation to agency heads and managers has proved politically unworkable. Members of the public and the media will not readily accept what they see as unjustifiable blame shifting from leaders to subordinates or contractors. Leaders become inevitably drawn into discussion of administrative details: making bureaucrats, correspondingly, remain highly sensitive to political direction. Private contractors become similarly adept at anticipating political pressures if they want their contracts renewed. Hopes that public servants would be less process driven have not been fulfilled. In particular, the continuing role of courts and quasi-judicial tribunals in reviewing administrative decisions has maintained a strong demand for due process. The public sector continues to be held to higher procedural standards through the principles of natural justice, which are jealously protected by the courts.

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See also Audit Society; Auditing; Bureaucracy; Contract Theory; Networks; New Public Management; Performance Management; Principal–Agent Theory; Regulation; Responsibility; Responsiveness; Rule of Law.

Further Readings


**Accountability, Electoral**

Electoral accountability is best interpreted as a three-phase process and a feedback. Political actors looking for election will first try to take into account the preferences of the voters. If elected, they will then keep into account what they have heard and learned during the electoral campaign. Returning to the voters, they will give an account of their behavior and their performance. Even those representatives who do not run again will retain some electoral accountability, because none of them would want to ruin the electoral chances of his or her party and successor.

Electoral accountability lies at the heart of all processes of democratic representation. It is a complex, multilayered phenomenon entailing three quite distinct, though interrelated, phases and several individual and collective actors. It is significantly affected and, in some ways, shaped by the electoral system and, more generally, by the institutional arrangements.

**Accountability During the Electoral Campaign**

Electoral accountability begins when a relationship is established between the voters and their potential representatives, candidates, and parties. During the electoral campaign, the candidates and the parties have an interest in getting to know what the voters need and want, which preferences and values they have, and which ideals they would promote. In this phase, accountability manifests itself as the most conscious effort by candidates and parties to learn, that is, to *take into account*...
Accountability, Electoral

what the voters communicate to them. Obviously, there are two limits to this process. First, the voters may not have a very precise idea about their preferences and interests and may not know exactly how to communicate them to the candidates and the parties. Second, the candidates and the parties may discount the preferences and the values of some or several groups of voters or may be unable to introduce them into their predisposed programmatic package and, to a much lesser extent, to their ideological views. On the whole, however, an effort will certainly be made by them to take into account what they have heard and have come to know.

Usually, a difference is drawn between a proportional electoral system used in relatively large constituencies with no possibility of casting a preference vote and plurality-majority electoral systems applied in single-member constituencies. Understandably, in the first case, much or most of the electoral accountability depends on the ability and the willingness of the political parties to take into account what they have heard during the electoral campaign, and much of the electoral accountability will then be projected to the national level. When plurality-majority systems operate in single-member constituencies, individual candidates are the protagonists of electoral accountability (Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, & Morris Fiorina, 1987). It is up to them to interact with the voters, to learn as well as to explain, to take into account what they have been communicated by the voters, and also to carry that knowledge into the representative assembly. The candidates’ ability to learn about the preferences of the voters and to shape them may make a difference in the outcome of the electoral processes and, possibly, in the type of politics and policies proposed and later implemented by their party or governmental coalition.

Accountability in the Implementation of Policies

Electoral accountability does not end with the holding of the elections and their outcomes. Once installed inside the representative assembly at any level of the political system, elected representatives and their parties must try to translate their proposals into policies. Again, there is a difference in the approach taken by representatives elected through a proportional system in large constituencies, even more so when there is no preference vote, and representatives elected in single-member constituencies through a plurality-majority electoral system. In the first case, party leaders will decide which policies to implement, usually claiming to have received a mandate and remaining somewhat indifferent to positions articulated by their individual representatives. Party leaders will keep into account what they believe has been the response of the voters to their overall programmatic offer. As to representatives elected in single-member constituencies, no doubt quite a number of them will certainly support their party’s policies. However, not a small number of those elected representatives will indeed attempt to introduce into the political discourse and the policy debate what they have learned from the/their voters. In addition to some general preferences and interests expressed by their voters and largely compatible with their party’s program/manifesto, elected representatives will seriously attempt to keep into account specific preferences and interests concerning their single-member constituencies and their voters, or all of them. Indeed, the working of a specific representative assembly will be significantly affected by the degree of political discretionality and electoral power of its individual members, especially those elected in single-member constituencies (Heinz Eulau, 1986).

Accountability and Reelection

Neither political debates nor electoral accountability comes to an end in a representative assembly. All party leaders and elected representatives, governmental office holders, and oppositionists are fully aware that public opinion has its (more or less open and informed) eyes on them, that it scrutinizes their behavior, its conformity to the promises and the programs, and its consequences. One way or another, all the protagonists, voters included, know perfectly well that in democratic regimes the voters will periodically pass judgment on the policies that they have approved or opposed and on their behavior while in office. Hence, when the time comes for new elections, elected representatives and party leaders cannot escape from performing another task fully belonging to accountability. They will have to explain to the voters what they have done, not done, or poorly done. They will be obliged to give an account of their
performance in their roles. It is of decisive importance that elected representatives and party leaders accept full responsibility for their performance or lack of it. Indeed, often, but inadequately, electoral accountability is considered mechanically limited only to this specific phase: reward (reelection) and punishment (defeat). No doubt, depending on the strength and the independence of the mass media and on the degree of vibrancy and robustness of civil society, the politicians in office aiming at reacquiring their positions will be held accountable. Technically, the process through which representatives and party leaders launch their reelection bid is called feedback. It introduces old and new issues, renewing the circuit of accountability that depends on what was done and has to be reformed, and what was set aside but must be taken again into account.

Seen from this perspective—that is, focused on the activities, the perceptions, the performance of parties as well as individual representatives—electoral accountability is a never-ending game. However, it is true that from time to time individual representatives do voluntarily retire. It is also true that in some political systems for some political offices, there are term limits that oblige those office holders to exit from politics. One may conjecture that “lame duck” politicians will feel less inclined to take electoral accountability into account in their behavior. They will not be asked by the voters to explain their behavior. Hence, at least in theory, they will run few risks if and when they behave in an irresponsible way. What is missing in all the statements concerning the potential irresponsibility of office holders who are not constrained by the imperatives of reelection is the relationship between those representatives and their corresponding parties. Though there is no specific research on the motivations of the outgoing representatives or on the ability of party leaders to enforce on them the “ethics” of accountability, it does not seem farfetched to suggest that something of the kind is and always has been at work in most cases. That is, practically no outgoing representative has deliberately chosen to behave in an indifferent manner—more precisely, not caring at all about the relationship between his or her promises and his or her behavior, thus negatively affecting the chances of election of his or her party’s candidates.

Accountability in Proportional Versus Majoritarian Electoral Systems

A larger issue looms with regard to electoral accountability, though to be more precise, perhaps one ought to speak of political representation. Though the comparative study by G. Bingham Powell (2000) is excellent, unfortunately it does not tackle the various processes, phases, and interpretations of electoral accountability. Rather, it refers to what kind of representation is overall provided by proportional systems (in which a party’s share of seats is determined by its share of votes) versus majoritarian electoral systems (in which a candidate must win a plurality or an absolute majority of votes to be elected). Assemblies elected through proportional electoral systems and coalition governments may provide for the representation of a wider spectrum of opinions, interests, and preferences. Using the terminology above, they have the possibility of taking into account a greater number of opinions, interests, and preferences in the first phase of the electoral process. Statically, they may almost come to “mirror” them. Not much is learned, however, when it comes to the phase in which those opinions, interests, and preferences will have to be kept into account. The representatives of the various parties and their leaders will attempt to have their way, and the ensuing bargaining process does not at all guarantee better accountability, in terms of transparent and responsible processes of decision making. Also, when returning to the voters to give them an account of what has been done or not done, it is likely that the politics of buck passing will defeat the politics of personal and party accountability. It is also likely that some representatives and several party leaders might enact the politics of outbidding if they believe that they will not be asked to take on governing duties.

On the contrary, in single-member constituencies and in one-party governments, one can legitimately hypothesize that two likely processes will be at work. All representatives elected in single-member constituencies will feel the need to avoid relying exclusively on their “initial” voters. Some of those voters will inevitably be dissatisfied with the performance of their specific representative. Thus, the representative will attempt to increase the number of his or her voters by taking into account a larger set of preferences and by keeping
them into account in his or her representational and governing activities in order to be reelected. A similar process will take place where there is single-party government. In their governing activities, all one-party governments are bound to lose some of their initial supporters. Hence, party leaders will launch their representational net beyond the initial borders of their electoral consensus. By so doing, they will attempt to take into account more interests, more preferences, and more opinions than simply those of the people who had voted their party into office. The process of widening the perimeter of their support seems much more difficult for representatives elected on party lines and for multiparty governments. Each party representative will have to toe the party line lest he or she jeopardizes his or her reselection. Hence, they will all stick to a static interpretation of their accountability: taking and keeping into account exclusively what was learned and promised through party channels. No party belonging to the governmental coalition will be likely to afford looking for additional outside support lest the political jealousy and envy of the other parties making up the governmental coalition lead to its breakup.

All these, admittedly, though indispensably, hypothetical considerations are not necessarily meant to prove that majoritarian electoral systems applied in single-member constituencies are absolutely preferable to proportional electoral systems from the point of view of accountability, not the reverse. What they suggest is that no final conclusion concerning the superiority of proportional systems in terms of accountability seems justified. Only empirical research done countrywide and based on different electoral systems will offer sufficient and satisfactory material to understand and assess the quantity and quality of electoral accountability.

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See also Accountability; Accountability, Interinstitutional; Representation; Responsibility; Responsiveness

Further Readings

ACCOUNTABILITY, INTERINSTITUTIONAL

Interinstitutional accountability is a form of horizontal accountability in which the different institutions provide a check on one another’s behavior. The legislature is supposed to check the actions of the executive branch of government. The judiciary, especially constitutional courts, oversees the behavior of governing and representative institutions. Independent authorities—that is, all those agencies with power of oversight on specifically relevant aspects, such as central banks, regulatory agencies, and ombudspersons, or those authorities who oversee the regulation of media and communication or of competition—indirectly check the government and can be controlled by it in their actual working. Party government remains the best “mechanism” for interinstitutional accountability when party appointees and party representatives are accountable horizontally to their leaders and vertically to the voters.

This entry first discusses the definition of interinstitutional accountability and its evolution in Europe and the United States. It then considers ways in which such accountability has been expanded in recent decades to include the roles of institutions such as central banks, regulatory agencies, and ombudspersons.

The Nature of Interinstitutional Accountability
Institutions may be accountable vertically and horizontally. Vertical accountability, that is, electoral accountability, exists when institutions are exposed to the control of the voters and the citizens. Technically, the voters and the citizens are the principals and the institutions are the agents.
The citizen/voters delegate some representatives in institutions such as government and parliament to perform some tasks. They retain the capacity and the power to reward or punish a government and/or a parliament/congress. In this situation, vertical accountability is said to be at work. This type of accountability is the hallmark of democratic regimes. Where vertical accountability does not exist, there is no democracy, though, of course, a democratic regime requires and provides much more than just “vertical accountability.” On the other hand, horizontal accountability is a relationship established among institutions: the executive, the legislative (parliament or congress), the bureaucracy, the military organization, the judiciary, and independent authorities. It occurs when the various institutions in different ways are in a position to control the activities of another specific institution. This type of control can be reciprocal and balanced, one-sided and skewed, formal and informal, accompanied by predefined sanctions, or largely symbolic.

Notwithstanding their often very significant differences, all these relationships can be legitimately assigned to the area of what is called “interinstitutional accountability.” In a way, horizontal-interinstitutional accountability is a much more complex relationship to be studied, first of all, because it is not dyadic (voters–leaders) and may entail the activities of more than two institutions. Second, not only is it less transparent than any electoral process, but it is also less streamlined. Interinstitutional accountability is also made more complicated by the sheer fact that it is the product of a fair amount of reciprocal interaction and mutual influence. For this reason, its full understanding requires a profound knowledge of the dynamics of the entire political-institutional system. Finally, the study of horizontal-interinstitutional accountability is also more likely to be influenced by the values of the scholars, who may prefer the stability to the instability of the policy process and the concentration of political decision-making power to its diffusion, or, more rarely, vice versa. In different periods of time, some of these preferences, and values, advocated and shared by scholars and power holders, have been translated into concrete institutional arrangements. Indeed, a short exploration of selected constitutional outcomes is a good introduction to the analysis of interinstitutional accountability.

According to Aristotle, mixed regimes are the preferred form of government. If one political actor prevails over all the others, it results in tyranny. If few actors prevail over all the others, the regime is an oligarchy. When many actors have unbridled power, the regime runs the risk of degenerating into what Aristotle called democracy, the positive definition of a well-functioning and balanced regime being politeia. When power is highly concentrated in the hands of just one, a few, or many actors, it is impossible to control the exercise of that power and to impose accountability on the power holders. On the contrary, when it became possible to allocate power to different institutions, through the appearance, for instance, of constitutional monarchies, the seeds of interinstitutional accountability were sown.

Evolution of Interinstitutional Accountability

Most scholars would concur that the famous book by Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois (1748), represents the first attempt to suggest the division of institutional power, though not yet the creation of mechanisms capable of producing interinstitutional accountability. At the time, the problem to be solved was how to take away from the king the power to legislate and the power to adjudicate and give them to two specialized institutions: parliament and the judiciary. In practice, the king retained some legislative and judicial powers, but the very existence of two institutions enjoying most of those powers meant the first appearance of some relatively simple tripartite interinstitutional accountability. The separation of institutional powers created a situation in which different institutions were in a position to control each other, giving birth to the circuit of accountability among the three most important institutions.

The next, highly significant and quite deliberate, attempt to construct a web of interinstitutional accountability—the drafting of the Constitution of the Republic of the United States of America—constituted a response to practical problems more than a full-blown theoretical formulation. In all likelihood, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton thought that they were going to substantially imitate the institutional edifice existing in Great Britain. But they were also aware of the need
to decisively innovate and improve on it. Montesquieu had fundamentally aimed at subtracting the legislative and the judicial power from the executive power (the king). The three powers could then act autonomously and independently, giving birth to a situation of positive institutional pluralism. However, neither autonomy nor independence was in itself leading to interinstitutional accountability. On the contrary, in Montesquieu’s view, the institutional separation of the three “powers” was positive in itself. It was on the other side of the English Channel that a somewhat different interinstitutional formula made its appearance: “the king in parliament,” meaning a close relationship and some reciprocal accountability between the chief executive and the representative assembly. The king could prevent parliament from passing undesired laws, and in its turn, parliament could oppose bills and, above all, taxes desired by the king. The product of a prolonged and even bloody confrontation, this apparently healthy situation represented a most prominent instance of “checks and balances.”

At the time the U.S. Founding Fathers were drafting, defending, and promoting their constitutional package, Madison and Hamilton shared the view that in the English case one could find some separation of the institutions combined with some interaction among them. Both of them, but especially Madison, argued that the separation of the institutions was a good formula to prevent the accumulation and concentration of power in one specific institution. Though Hamilton wanted more power to be given to the presidency, in the end Congress, being more representative of the American people, received more and more important powers. And the U.S. political system parted forever from the institutional architecture of the British constitutional monarchy.

**Great Britain**

The development of the political and institutional dynamics of Britain led to the fusion of powers, the secret of the English Constitution’s efficiency, according to Walter Bagehot (1867). That is, the relationship between the English cabinet and parliament is clearly skewed in favor of the prime minister, who obtains and retains his or her office because he or she is the leader of the parliamentary party that owns the absolute majority of seats. As Max Weber correctly wrote, the English prime minister is “the dictator of the parliamentary battlefield.” Hence, the separation does not run neatly between the prime minister with the cabinet and the parliament, between 10 Downing Street and Westminster, but between the prime minister together with his or her parliamentary majority and the opposition led by its shadow government. In a way, Winston Churchill was wrong: It is not parliament that is fully sovereign and omnipotent, but the parliamentary majority led by its prime minister. As a consequence, the English cabinet is accountable not to parliament as such but above all to its own parliamentary majority. The relationship of accountability does not occur between, on one side, government and, on the other, parliament, but between the governmental majority and the opposition. Still, under some exceptional circumstances, when party discipline breaks down, parliament may and will revive the circuit of interinstitutional accountability with Her Majesty’s government. A similar situation holds in those parliamentary democracies that have imported the British model, for example, Australia, Canada, and, until 1993, New Zealand, plus some former British colonies in the Caribbean and Africa. In all these cases, an effective two-party system seems to be the necessary condition for interinstitutional accountability following the English style.

**United States**

Notwithstanding the oscillations between congressional government and the Imperial presidency, the definition that best characterizes the functioning of the U.S. political system was formulated by Richard Neustadt (1960): “separate institutions sharing powers.” This widely accepted interpretation depicts a reality that is quite different from, one might even say almost the opposite of, the English institutional arrangement. In the United States, the executive and the legislative powers, the president and Congress, are the product of distinct electoral processes. The president does not have the power to dissolve Congress, while Congress cannot dismiss the president except through the very extraordinary procedure of impeachment, which, incidentally, does represent an extreme instance of interinstitutional accountability. Congress and the president are obliged to live and work together lest
a paralysis of the political system follows. They are both endowed with quite powerful instruments to check their respective activities and behavior that, in some exceptional instances, for example, when they disagree on the federal budget, may lead to decision-making paralysis or a stalemate.

Including the judiciary, especially, the Supreme Court, in the overall framework, the situation of “separate institutions sharing powers” is complete. The president holds the power to appoint the justices (as well as several other federal judges), but the Senate retains the power to reject those appointments (“advice and consent”). The Senate has even the power to block the appointment of all the secretaries nominated by the president. In both instances, interinstitutional accountability may also be at work in a rather subtle way: deterrence and anticipated reactions. Fearing the opposition of the Senate, the president will avoid nominating someone who is likely to be rejected. On its part, the Senate will refrain from challenging the president on all nominations. Once appointed, the Supreme Court justices will hold office for life, which allows them to behave with absolute freedom, not being subject to any kind of retaliation. In a way, their accountability stops, but they are in a position to impose a lot of accountability both on Congress and on the president. The members of the European constitutional courts are not appointed for life but for fixed terms. Many of them have a career of their own after their experience in the constitutional court. It is not rare for them, as in the case of Italy, to position themselves, in some cases at the expense of interinstitutional accountability, to obtain other offices.

As to the interinstitutional accountability occurring between the U.S. president and Congress, though Congress enjoys the power to initiate legislation, it is exposed to presidential vetoes, which are often threatened and applied and which, for want of a three-fifth majority, are rarely overridden. A president’s agenda can generally be achieved only in those infrequent cases in which the president’s party has majorities in both branches of Congress that are solid and disciplined. Even the formation of the presidential team of secretaries, the so-called administration, needs the approval of—that is, confirmation by—the Senate. All these complex processes justify Neustadt’s definition and evaluation. Indeed, U.S. institutions, though separate, share powers and compete for the exercise of those powers, making space for many opportunities of interinstitutional accountability. This is even truer when the president’s party does not have a majority in one or both branches of Congress. A divided government may entail not just more interinstitutional accountability but also political and institutional confusion, stalemate in decision making, and pork barrel policies. It is not at all farfetched to hypothesize that confusion in the interinstitutional accountability process will negatively affect the possibility of vertical accountability as well. A number of principals (the citizen-voters) will find it difficult to identify which agents (the president or the members of Congress) to punish or reward. At this point, a classic institutional problem emerges: How much are we willing to sacrifice in terms of decision-making efficacy in order to obtain and maintain democratic control?

France

The quite different institutional arrangement of the Fifth French Republic, and more generally of semipresidential systems, entails different consequences in terms of interinstitutional accountability. In the French case, interinstitutional accountability is a more complicated phenomenon because it depends also on the changing allocation of political power between the president and the Assemblée Nationale (and, eventually, the leader of its parliamentary majority). Reacting against the institutional weakness of the Fourth Republic, Charles De Gaulle favored the concentration of much power in the hands of the president and the president’s government. Semipresidentialism was meant to give more, and, in a way, “shielded” power to the chief executive, in order to endow the chief executive with a lot of (popular) legitimacy, certainly not to establish a circuit of interinstitutional accountability. De Gaulle never envisaged the likelihood of cohabitation, that is, of a president having to live with a party of the opposite political alignment that has the parliamentary majority and a prime minister who belongs to that party. Cohabitation introduces a significant amount of interinstitutional accountability, though at a price. Unlike the U.S. president (and all chief executives in presidential systems), the French president has the option of dissolving parliament in the hope that the voters will
return the majority he or she likes. The president can dissolve parliament only after it has been in office for at least a year. However, no president can risk tarnishing his or her image by having the party with the opposite political alignment repeatedly returned by the voters. Hence, the network of interinstitutional accountability is enriched by the “interference” or the calling of the voters into the picture rather than by staying within the limits of interinstitutional relationships. A prime minister who belongs to a political alignment opposed to the president will avoid deliberately challenging the president, because such a move would risk the early dissolution of a parliament in which the prime minister’s party is in the majority. This potential for the dissolution of parliament thus obliges both the president and the prime minister to behave accountably and, on the whole, predictably. Though both may engage in buck passing, the citizen-voters are in a position to evaluate specific responsibilities and to punish either the president for exaggeratedly interfering or the prime minister and his or her majority for their (lack of) performance. Finally, there is another important structure enforcing some interinstitutional accountability: the Constitutional Council, which can be activated by just 10% of the members of the Assemblée Nationale to challenge the bills approved by the majority.

Emerging Roles of Other Agents of Accountability

When speaking of interinstitutional accountability one must consider another, relatively recent phenomenon that identifies other authorities and agencies that can be instruments of accountability, such as central banks, regulatory agencies, and ombudspersons.

First, many countries have granted full independence to their central banks. The U.S. Federal Reserve has enjoyed such independence for some time, while the British Central Bank acquired it in 1997. With several other countries following suit, this trend means that one can find many instances in which interinstitutional accountability between the treasury and the central banks is at work.

Second, several countries have created independent authorities and agencies charged with tasks once performed by the executive or, at least, supposed to be in its domain or that of the legislature. In the second case, these agencies may complement legislative oversight. Examples are agencies that address areas such as consumer protection, food and drug safety, communications, and privacy issues raised by the news media; enforce regulations intended to ensure a competitive market; and oversee evolving energy technologies. In many cases, those agencies and authorities, whose chairs and boards are appointed either by government or by parliament, report directly to parliament.

Finally, in many countries and even in the European Union (EU) there is an ombudsperson who deals with the complaints of the citizens against their state and its bureaucracy as well as the very decisions of the institutions of the EU.
itself. Also, within the EU, interinstitutional accountability is present in its complex circuit going from the European Council to the European Commission to the European Parliament, but it also plays a role in the relationships between the institutions of the EU and the member states.

It is unclear whether the proliferation of authorities and agencies has actually improved the working and quality of interinstitutional accountability. When dealing with complex processes whose components, antecedents, and consequences are not and cannot be crystal clear, no attempt at evaluation is bound to be satisfactory. One may want to point to the perils of too dense and wide a network of interinstitutional accountability. The first peril has certainly to do with the (im)precise definition of the spheres of action of several institutions. In too many instances, tensions and conflicts may appear between the executive and the legislative, between the federal government and local governments, or, quite often, between the executive and the judiciary. It will then be the constitutional court that decides where the respective spheres of action begin and, above all, end. But there will always remain a gray area. Some institutional actors will try to take advantage of this gray area and engage in the politics of buck passing, that is, attempting to put the blame for what is done, not done, or poorly done on other institutions. In addition to tensions and conflicts, confusion will follow. The perils of interinstitutional accountability will affect the democratic framework itself. Though by definition the citizens are not directly involved in this kind of accountability, still they are more or less informed spectators who can look at what goes on and who can form their own opinion. Not being directly in the position to provide rewards or punishments, they are likely to reach a negative judgment on all the institutions involved in this exercise of political and bureaucratic buck passing. If and when all the institutions are considered equally responsible for the conflict and for the confusion, some political apathy or even alienation cannot be written off.

Technically, the mass media are not considered to be fully a component of the network of interinstitutional accountability. Nevertheless, they are often called the fourth power. But are they accountable to other institutions? Leaving aside their somewhat peculiar accountability to their readers and public opinion at large, at the most the mass media are accountable to the law, hence indirectly to the judiciary. They do play a political role that most certainly affects the way interinstitutional accountability is performed and evaluated, but the mass media themselves are external to that circuit.

Conclusion

In sum, there is a vibrant paradox in all discussions of interinstitutional accountability. Most scholars have maintained that this kind of accountability is quite positive for the working of democratic regimes. It seems to be less positive for the power of the people. Political power should not be concentrated but distributed among several institutions and shared by them. Checks and balances must be devised in such a way as to put a limit on the exercise of power by all institutions. Some activities are so important that they have to be controlled by special bodies: independent authorities and agencies. Recently, doubts have been raised concerning not only the effectiveness of interinstitutional accountability but also, inevitably, whether a dense network of interinstitutional accountability may in practice conspicuously trim all the occurrences of political accountability in which the citizens are the principals. When accountability escapes evaluation by the citizens because some policy areas are insulated and not exposed to their control, the quality of democracy may significantly suffer. Some nostalgia has made its appearance for the period and the situations in which the party government and a partisan opposition faced each other in a visible and transparent competition decided by the voters. There is more than a kernel of truth in the statement that such competition in contexts in which governing parties do not delegate power to outside agencies and authorities does provide for better accountability. When the parties in government are many, the voters will still encounter problems in their attempt to punish and reward their “agents.” But most of the time it will be clear that parties and their leaders are accountable for the positive and negative functioning of the governing, representative, and bureaucratic institutions.

The extension of instances of interinstitutional accountability may have been fueled and nourished by distrust toward parties and party politicians. It may have had as a goal the containment and the reduction of party power. But in many
cases, politicians seem to have reacquired their power working within and through the institutions, thus avoiding electoral accountability. When necessary, party leaders have learned to practice and implement a shrewd politics of appointments of loyal, even subservient, collaborators, in all nongovernmental bodies and agencies, guiding them to enact unpopular policies. The proliferation of institutions endowed with some decision-making power in technical areas or with the power to check the activities of other institutions has seemed to some a democratic conquest, to others an expropriation of the voters. Most of the time, it is still party politicians who control the exercise of political power by and within the institutions, while it is appointed technocrats and career bureaucrats who come to bear the brunt of the blame in the interinstitutional web of accountability. Not all that glitters is gold (democratic) in the circuit of interinstitutional accountability.

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See also Accountability; Accountability, Electoral; Representation; Responsibility; Responsiveness

Further Readings


**Administration**

Governments in many Western countries decided in the 1980s that traditional administration was no longer up to the task of modern government. They looked to the private sector to define a new management approach. Management introduces a new vocabulary, mindset, and culture to government bureaucracies. The purpose is to force the hand of bureaucrats to become more dynamic and better managers. A debate has raged in the political science and public administration literature on the merits of the new public management (NPM) in relation to traditional public administration for the past 25 years. A number of politicians in the 1980s decided that the machinery of government was in an urgent need of repair. The old ways were no longer up to the task, and they packaged a series of reform measures that in time would become known as NPM. Proponents of NPM deliberately set high standards with goals to “reinvent government,” “get government right,” and designate those that would “steer” government from those that would be doing the “rowing.”

The word *management* in NPM implies a decisiveness, a bias for action, and a dynamic mindset. Traditional public administration, meanwhile, conjures up images of rules, regulations, and lethargic decision-making processes. Presidents and prime ministers who came to power in the 1980s concluded that the problem was with bureaucracy, not political institutions. They accused bureaucracy of being bloated, expensive, unresponsive, a creation of routine deliberately resistant to change, and essentially incapable of dealing with new challenges.

It is one thing to diagnose the patient, but it is quite another to come up with the remedy. Initially, at least, political leaders were left to try this or that to see what would work with varying degrees of success. In time, a new approach, anchored in private sector management practices, began to take shape and a label was attached to it—NPM.

The goal was nothing short of introducing a new culture in government departments and agencies. The old culture was found wanting on many fronts. It attached too much importance to due process, prudence, probity, and centrally prescribed administrative rules and regulations. It also encouraged senior civil servants to focus on policy issues rather than on management. The old culture, associated with traditional public administration, was considered not only outdated but also
counterproductive. Public administration became synonymous with the old culture.

NPM would introduce a new vocabulary, a new way of thinking, and a new culture. It would also give rise to a proliferation of management techniques to force government operations to become more efficient. The purpose was to force the hand of senior government officials to become better managers and to learn to make tough management decisions. Taken at face value, the political rhetoric that accompanied the arrival of NPM to government meant setting the civil service at its own throat.

The Canadian government published a report (see Table 1) designed to contrast the old culture (public administration) with the new culture (NPM).

NPM holds important advantages for politicians. In forcing the hand of senior civil servants to become better managers, politicians would gain the upper hand in shaping policy initiatives. The thinking was that civil servants had too much influence on policy at the expense of politicians. The message from politicians to senior civil servants could not be clearer under NPM—you worry about managing government operations better, and we will worry about setting policy priorities.

How then would civil servants become better managers? NPM encompasses a number of broad strategies to promote cultural change in government: decentralization of decision making, empowerment, a reduction on controls on managers, more flexible organizational structures, upgrading the skills of government managers, and a stronger sense of service to the public. Government departments and agencies were also encouraged to launch review exercises to identify “useless” red tape and “delayer” management levels.

In time, NPM became the fashion in much of the Western world. Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom (UK) showed the way with numerous measures designed to overhaul government operations. She cut the size of the civil service (from 733,000 strong to 569,000), restructured government operations by creating executive agencies and gave them a narrow mandate to deliver public services, privatized state corporations, delegated more authority to frontline managers, and overhauled the government’s financial management system. This and other private sector management–inspired measures gave life to NPM in the UK. Before long, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and Canada, among others, also introduced numerous NPM-type measures with varying degrees of success. Countries that did not pursue NPM with any enthusiasm, such as France, were regarded as being out of step with modern management strategies.

The contrast between the old (public administration) and the new (NPM) is striking and instructive. However, it probably came as a surprise for retired civil servants to discover that their culture was “rigid” and gave rise to “suspicious” and “secretive” behavior, which in turn served to “stifle creativity,” which led them to “communicate poorly.”

Old cultures die hard, if they die at all. NPM has met some successes but also failures. Graham Allison (1987) went to the heart of the matter when he wrote,

The perception that government performance lags behind private business performance is

Table 1 | Old Culture (Traditional Public Administration) Versus New Culture (New Public Management)

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<th>Old Culture</th>
<th>New Culture</th>
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<tr>
<td>Controlling</td>
<td>Empowering</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rigid</td>
<td>Flexible</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suspicious</td>
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<td>Administrative</td>
<td>Managerial</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secret</td>
<td>Open</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power based</td>
<td>Task based</td>
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<tr>
<td>Input/process oriented</td>
<td>Results oriented</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preprogrammed and repetitive</td>
<td>Capable of purposeful action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk averse</td>
<td>Willing to take intelligent risks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mandatory</td>
<td>Optional</td>
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<td>Communicating poorly</td>
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<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
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<td>Uniform</td>
<td>Diverse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stifling creativity</td>
<td>Encouraging innovation</td>
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<td>Reactive</td>
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correct. But the notion that there is any significant body of private management practices and skills that can be transferred directly to public management tasks in a way that produces significant improvements is wrong. (p. 525)

The sharp differences between the public and private sectors make it difficult for a number of NPM measures. The public sector does not have a clear bottom line and has legislative requirements of reviewing the work of government managers. Indeed, public sector managers depend on political bodies both for their authority and for their budgets, and they are subject to far greater public scrutiny of their actions. They are directly accountable to their political masters, and no matter what form of government organization is in place it can only enjoy legitimacy through the political process. Although it can take various forms, governments must have an accountability process to make the exercise of power responsible. This speaks of the merits of traditional public administration.

Traditional public administration has shortcomings, but it is directly tied to national political institutions and their accountability requirements. Hierarchy, command and control, and centrally prescribed rules and regulations enable political leaders to reach down to all departments and agencies and determine who did what and why things went wrong.

NPM had to compensate somehow for its call to empower managers, to flatten organizations, and to import numerous private sector management practices to government. An emphasis on measuring performance became another defining characteristic of NPM. Nothing is left in government that is not up for measurement from the performance of senior civil servants to program activities in all sectors whether economic or social. The thinking is that establishing performance standards will provide for more effective accountability and also enable both politicians and citizens to see how well civil servants and programs perform.

The demand for information to fuel performance measurement and evaluation initiatives by central agency and senior departmental officials has increased substantially in recent years throughout the Western world. It seems that everything in government now needs to be measured to have any standing in the expenditure budget process. This squares with NPM’s emphasis on outputs, on good management, and on evaluating how well individual civil servants and programs perform. This too is in contrast to traditional public administration with its emphasis on controlling input costs and holding civil servants accountable for their administrative decisions.

Proponents of traditional public administration insist that politics and the public sector do not lend themselves to big answers. Public administration operates in a political environment that is always on the lookout for “errors” and that exhibits an extremely low tolerance for mistakes. The attention of the national media and political opponents are sufficient to explain why civil servants are cautious and why they strive to operate in an error-free environment. One would have to let the imagination run wild to visualize a headline in the media applauding the fine work of “empowered” civil servants. Supporters of traditional public administration insist that it is unwise to think that one can import private sector management strategies to government. They point out that in business it does not much matter if you get it wrong 10% of the time as long as you turn a profit at the end of the year. In government, it does not much matter if you get it right 90% of the time because the focus will be on the 10% of the time you get it wrong.

In the end, the debate that truly matters between the two camps centers on accountability. Both sides insist that their approach holds greater merit in ensuring that politicians and civil servants are accountable for policies and the delivery of government programs. For politicians and civil servants, both approaches have strengths and drawbacks—traditional public administration provides more stability and predictability while NPM provides greater flexibility and a capacity to measure the performance of both senior civil servants and programs.

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See also Administration Theory; Autonomy; Administrative; Civil Service; Development Administration; Performance Management
Further Readings


Administration Theory

There is no single theory of public administration. Rather, public administration theory contains a complex of statements regarding what administration is, the meaning of public, who creates public administration, what the goals of public administration are, and how public administration should fulfill its tasks. Therefore, administration theories have always been and continue to be interdisciplinary, influenced by concepts from history, law, sociology, political science, management, and even psychology. Public administration theory also applies to a distinction between an academic discipline and a profession and contains approaches from organization theory, politics, governance, and law. This entry provides an overview of the development of administrative theories for the public sector and also examines some contemporary challenges in this area. It begins with early theories that sought to distinguish between politics, which dealt with the choice of the values underlying public policy as articulated through the political process, and administration, which implemented those policies in an efficient way similar to the way that businesses operate. It then considers the impact of theories of scientific management on the development of administrative theory. Last, it examines more recent thought that sees the influence of values on administrative decisions and proposes that the distinction between politics and administration is not as clear as it has been considered in the past.

Development of Administrative Theories

The European tradition of public administrative theory was based on Max Weber’s conception of bureaucracy as a formal-legal institution responsible for implementing public law. This model was an ideal type that represented the highest form of rational-legal development for the state. Furthermore, it was designed to ensure equal treatment of clients through formal rules and through careful maintenance of files. While bureaucracy is generally a negative term in ordinary usage, its original intentions were more positive. In particular, the bureaucracy concept includes

1. division of labor and division of authorities,
2. hierarchy of administrative bodies, and
3. career system as the basis for the organization.

Public administration in the European tradition has been based on law, with the emphasis on the legal foundations of all public actions. Furthermore, executing public duties defined by law is incorporated into constitutional formula of executive authorities (in countries that have a written constitution), among legislative and judicature. As David Rosenbloom and Robert Kravchuk (2005) note, negatively defining administration emphasizes the autonomy of administrative agencies from legislative and judicature, also indicating that administrative actions affect rights and duties of private subjects. A legal approach to public administration, defined by lawyers, brings out the legal limits of administration and its executive nature; however, as some scientists rightfully state, public administration cannot consist solely of executing legal acts—similarly, it cannot be simple execution of policies, created without its involvement.

The American tradition in public administration has been based more on the work of Woodrow
Wilson and his concern with the relationship between administration and politics. Wilson’s famous essay, titled *The Study of Administration* (1887), concentrated on organization and methods of activity of administrative agencies, particularly emphasizing how administrative tasks could be performed to achieve the highest possible efficiency. Wilson also clearly distinguished spheres of politics and administration and initiated the so-called politico-administrative dichotomy. He argued that what distinguishes politics from administration is that administration executes the will of the state as identified through the political process. Numerous scholars such as Frank J. Goodnow, William F. Willoughby, and Leonard White built on Wilson’s work to form the beginning of modern administrative theory.

Following Wilson’s so-called classic contribution, public administration authorities attempted to develop basic principles of public administration. The classic doctrine assumed that democracy and efficient administration were compatible and that the implementation activities of government could be analyzed scientifically. The early theorists of management have emphasized that organization and control can be recognized almost as synonyms, because almost at the same time the other trend of public administration patterns named scientific management was developing.

Wilson was interested in management science, and Frederick W. Taylor, recognized as the father of management science, began research that resulted in *The Principles of Scientific Management* (1911). The assumption of this work was that there is a single best way to achieve any assigned aim, whereas management science was supposed to help achieve the increase of efficiency by inventing the fastest, the most efficient, and the least “tiresome” production methods. This emphasis on management led to an identification of administrative science with bureaucratic forms of organization. The essential scopes of interests of academics and practitioners in the area of public administration have become division of work, the scope of control, hierarchy of organization, the chain of official internal instructions, the reporting system, departmentalization, development of standards, politics, and activity procedures.

The French engineer Henri Fayol was another significant influence on administrative theory and scientific management. Fayol studied company management seeking to enhance efficiency. According to his theory, administration is recognized as the social science ruled by similar rules to natural sciences. Fayol analyzed administration in terms of the functions of industrial organizations, which he classified as planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating, and controlling. Fayol was a rationalist who understood management of both private sector (companies) and public sector (e.g., public administration) organizations to be exactly the same thing. These rules, which he identified for the private sector, apply to the public one as well.

Classical administrative theory was developed further during the 1930s. This period particularly emphasized the inside aspects of public administration: management methods and problems, structures and activities of organizations, budget procedures, and staff problems. Luther Gulick’s approach was contained in an abbreviation—POSDCORB, which management should meet as follows:

- **Planning**—planning, elaborating the direction and methods of planned actions
- **Organizing**—creating formal structure of power, division into organizational units, which cooperate for an assigned aim
- **Staffing**—locating, improving, and developing staff
- **Directing**—ordering, decision-making process, and handling instructions
- **Coordinating**—combining separate parts of the same action
- **Reporting**—informing all actors in the process of accomplishing a plan
- **Budgeting**—financial planning, accountancy control

The classical theory was challenged through decision-making approaches, notably those associated with Herbert Simon and bounded rationality. His 1947 book, *Administrative Behavior*, served as the foundation for the development of the so-called Carnegie School that emphasized the limits on rationality and the organizational basis of decisions. This school then served as the foundation for the rebirth of institutional analysis in political science and public administration.
Simon declared that making administrative decisions lies at the heart of public administration, emphasizing the feasibility of using scientific methods to study public administration; he argued that logical positivism was the right approach in terms of creating administrative policies. He sought to develop a social scientific approach to administration rather than the principles associated with the then conventional wisdom of “principles of administration.” Simon disapproved Gulick’s approach and his POSDCORB, claiming it to be inappropriate for many situations that civil servants face. He created the idea of limited rationality in the decision making, recognizing that people are rational in making decisions, but only to a certain extent. Simon acknowledged that decisions made by civil servants are rational in their view, but at the same time he pointed to many alternative variants that lead to achieving the most rational decision. According to Simon, the new paradigm for the study of public administration means that there should exist two trends in the discipline, harmonizing and mutually, intellectually stimulating:

1. One trend concentrated on progress of pure administrative science, strongly based on fundamentals of social psychology to understand decision making more effectively.

2. Another, more representative trend, aimed at creating guidelines of public policies that could guide decisions, albeit without the understanding of decision-making theory implied in the first principle.

Robert A. Dahl (1947), one of the most important early behaviorists of political science, analyzed “state of the art” of administrative science. According to him, administrative science should

1. recognize the complexity of human behavior,
2. relate to the problems of values eligible in administrative situations, and
3. consider the connections between public administration and surrounding environment.

Critics of Simon’s fundamentals of public administration and political-administrative dichotomy were also supported by another scientist, Dwight Waldo, who defined public administration from the perspective of the surrounding environment, emphasizing the importance of comparative administration. From Waldo’s point of view, public administration should be a branch of political science.

The more political approach to public administration has led to the conclusion that public administration is not only accountable to elected public officials (members of parliament and executive authorities) but also responds to their needs, in other words, being an instrument in politicians’ hands. The importance of public administration from this perspective is stressed by the fact that it has the discrentional authority. B. Guy Peters considers public administration to have a broader scope than a typical bureaucracy (in terms of random organization of administrative character) and emphasizes that it is an integral part of decisive processes of executive authorities.

Contemporary Challenges

Public administration today tends to equate public administration and governance. Etymologically, the term governance derives from the Greek word kubernân (piloting, steering) and was used by Plato to describe the creation of systems of rules. The Greek source gave birth to the Latin gubernare, with a similar meaning (piloting, making rules, steering). Governing, as we make a reference to it here, is close to the term of managing (leading), conducted by governments and their administration. Governing in this approach is connected to the new forms of actions of public administration, which are difficult to classify strictly as executing the law. For example, the World Bank created a definition of “governance” meaning the traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised for the common good. This approach, portraying “different” governing (with regard to traditional administration), is close to the new public management (NPM) conception and forms the base for further analysis of public administration and making new trends, such as new public service (NPS).

The NPM has been a recent and pervasive counterpoise to the emphasis on law in most continental (and Latin American) administrative systems. This approach to public administration emphasizes the economic foundations of governing and argues that public and private management are
Advocacy is essentially the same. Therefore, this theory of administration in the public sector separates politics and administration even more than in the traditional Wilsonian and Weberian formulations. The NPM approach represents a recent theory for public administration, but as its influence wanes at the beginning of the 21st century, there is as yet no clear replacement. That said, the political and managerial weaknesses inherent in NPM have produced a number of important reactions in practice, if not in theory.

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See also Bureaucracy; New Public Management; Rationality, Bounded

Further Readings

Advocacy

Advocacy is a kind of political action addressed to a governing body with the aim of influencing public policy outputs. Though advocacy is often equated with lobbying, it is in fact an umbrella term for organized activism related to a particular set of issues. Lobbying, meanwhile, is the practice of influencing a governing body through direct communication with legislators. Advocacy groups strive to change public policy according to their interests without seeking political mandates. The definition emphasizes the existence of some kind of organization, ranging from loosely coupled networks to highly formalized nonmembership organizations. It includes social movements, voluntary associations, or membership groups as well as institutions such as corporations, universities, cities, or foundations. This entry discusses the major actors, targets, and strategies, and their respective impacts.

Actors

The increase in the number of advocacy groups is one of the most striking and still ongoing trends in Western societies. The number of citizens willing to join an interest group has increased over many decades. In the United States, which has been in the vanguard, this so-called advocacy explosion started around 1960. Whereas between 1920 and 1960 the number of interest groups represented in Washington merely doubled, it quadrupled within the following 20 years. Similarly, at the end of the 1980s, the number of interest groups represented at the European Union (EU) in Brussels was 10 times higher than it was at the beginning of the 1970s, and it quadrupled between 1985 and 1991. The rapid growth in number was accompanied by a structural change with respect to the scope, intensity, and shape of advocacy. Today, advocacy is more diverse and much more professional than it was a few decades ago, including an increase in staff acting as in-house lobbyists, a growth of different kinds of lobbying firms performing surrogate representation, and the development of more and more forms of direct and indirect lobbying.

In the first half of the 20th century, the universe of advocacy groups in the Western world was dominated by trade, professional, and labor organizations. For example, before 1950 in the United States, these three types of groups accounted for over three quarters of all organized interests active in politics. Beginning in the 1960s, however, we can find a significant decline in the rate of unionization, first of all in the United States, and, since the 1980s, also in most Western European countries. Although the number of the other types of established groups continued to increase even in the second half of the century, their share of the group universe declined due to an even more rapid growth of various types of organizations from the
nonprofit sector concerned with health, social welfare, culture, education, public affairs, consumers, senior citizens, taxpayers, civil rights, women’s rights, human rights, the environment, religion, and other areas. Many of these groups originated in the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, which mobilized their constituencies to turn the public’s attention to new interests and new political problems. Parts of these movements turned into associations that would allow the groups to maintain their capacity to advocate even in times of declining mobilization.

The change in the composition of the group universe was paralleled by a process of differentiation in the mode of organization. The advocacy explosion resulted not only from a rise in the number of voluntary associations but also—and perhaps even more—from the fact that more and more institutions, such as corporations, governmental entities, universities, hospitals, and think tanks, have begun to act as interest groups. Many advocacy groups thus no longer represent the aggregate interests of individual group members but are lobbying on behalf of corporate actors, which do not have any members at all. Today, we find a highly differentiated pattern of advocacy in almost all Western countries consisting of a great variety of types of organizations, including broad-based membership groups such as labor unions, professional groups, and citizen groups, as well as institutions and groups with corporate members, such as trade associations and complex umbrella associations.

The different developments in the group universe were induced by several factors. First of all, the rapid social and economic changes in Western countries have created rising numbers of potential members and an overall growth in organizational resources. As people have become more educated, more articulate, and wealthier, and as knowledge and information have become more widespread, new interests have emerged, and traditional ones have been redefined. Accelerated by advanced communication technologies, the translation of interests into formal group organizations became a cumulative process, stimulating other constituencies to organize or to amplify political activities. Recently, another determinant of the expansion of the advocacy group system has come to the fore: government activity. Whenever government activity is expanded to new issues or existing government bodies gain new jurisdictions, new groups will form or existing ones will focus their activities on these new political areas. In spite of these driving forces, advocacy growth may slow down or reach a limit in the future, as it will become increasingly difficult for organizers to find interests not yet politically represented by any group or to mobilize for advocacy in view of scarce resources.

Levels and Targets

The targets of advocacy differ depending on the institutional settings and the decision-making procedures of the political system. Specific structures such as the separation of powers or the formal and informal rules of policy making are critical to advocacy groups’ decisions as to whom to lobby and where to try to gain access. Whereas in centralized systems advocacy will be focused on actors and institutions of the central authority, multilevel or federated systems show a much more differentiated pattern of advocacy. For example, despite Germany being a federal state, advocacy groups in Germany focus on the federal level, particularly on the ministries and on leading parliamentarians, such as the chairs of committees, due to the strong and centralized party system. In contrast, the American federal system, even at the local level with its more than 80,000 governments, forms a significant political target since legislators are heavily dependent on the financial and political support of local coalitions. Finally, in the highly differentiated multilevel system of the EU, advocacy groups find many points of access and several veto points, offering a variety of opportunities to exert influence on policy outcomes.

The choice of political targets also depends on the character and type of the advocacy group. While traditional interest groups are apt to focus their activities on the national level, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), most of them representing the interests of disadvantaged groups, focus on the international level, where their concerns have a better chance of being accepted than at the national level. Thus, Euromax groups tend to be experts in multilevel strategies, acting at the European as well as on the respective national levels, depending on which of the two is most critical for the decision-making process in which they
engage. Legislators and governing boards, however, not only are passive targets of advocacy groups, but they often have an impact on group structures and resources as well. The most common instrument is the financial support given to groups, which otherwise would not be able to organize. Such support is intended to create countervailing forces to the powerful interest groups that tend to dominate the political process or to help form coalitions of advocacy groups that will improve the legislators’ chances of getting reelected or foster their political plans.

Social change and changes in technology, institutional settings, and decision-making procedures will often prompt advocacy groups to address new targets and different levels of the political system. As the European Parliament has gained increasing power and responsibilities, it has increasingly become a target of lobbying activity. Similarly, globalization and denationalization have created new opportunity structures for social movement organizations and NGOs. Relying on new communication technologies, they have developed transnational ties and coordination mechanisms that enable them to organize protest on the international level and to develop countervailing power to the policies of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund. But these processes of adaptation may fail if the characteristics of the advocacy groups do not correspond to the institutional context in which a group wishes to act. For instance, the lack of a genuine European public sphere and the specific decision-making style of the European institutions involve high transaction costs for the mobilization of mass protest in Brussels. Therefore, the activities of social movements have remained predominantly national up to now.

**Strategies and Tactics**

To begin with, advocacy includes many activities that seem to have little to do with lobbying at all, such as gathering information, monitoring the political process, and conducting research. Nevertheless, today we find a great variety of tactics and strategies applied by advocacy groups and lobbyists to make decision makers willing to produce policy outputs consistent with their interests. The single group, however, has to decide which tools to apply and which not, since resources are limited. As a rule, advocacy is focused on a small number of subjects. Lobbyists spend most of their time on only a few critical issues, whereas they spend little time on many others.

For a long time, scholars have agreed that one should distinguish between inside strategies (based on personal contacts between lobbyists and policy makers) and outside strategies (public relations and grassroots contacts). This distinction has been useful for finding correlations between group characteristics or other factors and the selection of tools and for describing shifts in the strategic orientations of advocacy groups. There is a lot of evidence demonstrating that citizen groups will prefer outside strategies while established groups, mainly business, rely heavily on direct lobbying. Recently, however, the overall picture has become more multifaceted. While business groups tend to apply multivoice strategies that give them the chance to be present wherever a channel of influence opens up, social movements and citizen groups have also tried to apply inside strategies. Considering the growing variety of strategies and tactics, the distinction between inside and outside strategies seems to become obsolete and should be replaced by a more differentiated typology as suggested by Jeffrey Berry, who identifies four different advocacy group strategies, namely,

1. litigation and administrative intervention,
2. confrontation (protest, whistle-blowing, public relations, etc.),
3. information (making personal representations to government, releasing research results), and
4. constituency influence.

One of the major factors that has accounted for an expansion of lobbying activities is advocacy explosion. The rise of countervailing power has strengthened competition between new and established groups, forcing the latter to spend more on lobbying and to expand their action repertory. Furthermore, technological innovation in information processing has created new opportunities for lobbyists to gain access to policymakers and to apply new forms of lobbying, particularly those that address the general public, such as media- or issue-based campaigns. These trends have made it
necessary for advocacy groups to acquire new skills and more professional knowledge, required to apply the new tools in an efficient and effective way. The rising demand for advocacy advice, in turn, is the main reason why direct representation by in-house lobbyists has increasingly been supplemented by surrogate representation through lobbying firms. Acting in the name of advocacy groups, such firms can help manage the problems posed by new developments in politics and communication technology. Lobbying firms are common primarily in the United States, where they account for about 20% of all lobbyists present in the capital and where they form a special sector with different types of businesses. In the past 2 decades, we have also seen a rapid growth of lobbying firms in the EU. The increasing scope and density of EU regulations have created a rapidly rising demand for professional advice on how to effectively lobby the European institutions.

**Structures**

Advocacy not only involves unilateral political activities by single groups or their agents but usually results in more or less intensive and stable relationships with other groups and with the groups’ counterparts in the legislative and executive branches of government. These relationships come about if advocacy groups have at their disposal certain resources—be it power based on the control of their membership or information that their counterparts are interested in—and, in turn, if other groups or policymakers can offer them valuable information or give them the opportunity to get directly involved in the formulation and implementation of policies. One basic element of the structure of advocacy is thus an exchange relation between private and state actors. In a given policy sector, all the actors that are connected in this way form a specific policy network characterized by the number and type of its members, its stability, and its structure. Basic elements of a political system, such as the characteristics of government and the mode of interest group participation in decision making, form a framework that promotes the development of certain types of networks and helps them persist. By contrast, as competition between groups has increased, the established actors have been forced to open up policy networks and to integrate new advocacy groups in the policy-making process.

Since decision making in contemporary politics is a very complex process, the scope and density of policy networks vary to a considerable extent, making it an empirical question how stable the relationships between actors are and how power resources are distributed. Most scholars distinguish between several types of networks that can be arranged in a continuum ranging from very open to rather closed patterns of interaction. Whereas in the American context scholars tend to distinguish between “iron triangles” or subgovernments at one extreme and issue networks at the other, the European debate on policy networks is shaped by the opposition of corporatism and pluralism. In spite of these differences in terminology, descriptions of the two extreme types are similar. While the former is characterized by highly restricted participation, stability of interactions, and centralized decision making, the main features of the latter are decentralization, a high level of conflict, dynamism, and broad participation.

The academic discourse on pluralism and corporatism is characterized by a typical asymmetry. As Grant Jordan stated, pluralism is ultimately no more than an antitheory, which is marked by what it excludes rather than by what it establishes. First of all, it describes a complex and confusing configuration of political actors that is open for new advocacy groups and where power is widely dispersed. Its core element is open competition between advocacy groups for political influence, which prevents any single group from dominating the political process. Since pluralism involves a great variety of single acts of exchange between private groups and legislators, the results of political decision making are highly unpredictable. In the corporatist pattern, however, a small number of advocacy groups have considerable resources at their disposal, in particular technical information on the implementation process that makes them essential partners of the legislators, with whom they work in close coordination. Corporatist arrangements consist of stable sets of actors in which the privileged advocacy groups get the chance to considerably influence policy outcomes in return for their cooperation in the implementation of a policy. As less resourceful societal actors
are excluded, corporatism tends to subdivide the group universe into insiders and outsiders.

Whether corporatist arrangements have a chance to develop depends on the institutional, political, and social context. In political systems with a strong central state and encompassing umbrella organizations, as in several European countries, policy processes have been dominated for decades by interelite relations often based, as in Germany, on the public status of the major private actors. By contrast, in the United States, the fragmentation of economic interest groups and the division of American government has prevented corporatist patterns from developing. Since labor unions have always been weak, there was no strong stimulus for business organizations to develop powerful peak associations. So competition between groups of labor and capital has remained high and discouraged single groups from becoming privileged partners of the legislators. Besides, the American political system offers little opportunity to channel advocacy group activities in a way that would favor the development of corporatist arrangements. Federalism, the separation of powers, the fragmentation of power within both Congress and the executive, and the lack of a strong system of party discipline are factors that favor pluralist rather than corporatist patterns of interest intermediation.

Impact

In the modern world of politics, the political activity of advocacy groups is only one of a multiplicity of factors having an impact on public policy decisions. Therefore, methodological approaches that attempt to isolate this factor from the institutional and situational context in which it is embedded have produced unsatisfactory results. Research on advocacy group influence came up with better results when it stopped asking whether or to what extent advocacy groups are powerful at all and instead turned to the less fundamental question of under which circumstances they have an impact on policy outcomes. Today we are able to identify the structural and situational factors that help explain why advocacy is successful in some cases but in others has no impact at all. The five determinants are as follows:

1. group-related characteristics such as size and type of membership; resource endowment, particularly with regard to money; and the tactical and strategic repertory;
2. the features of the group universe, that is, the number of groups in a policy sector and the degree of cooperation and conflict;
3. legislators’ demand for group resources such as information and political support;
4. the institutional framework as a channel for the distribution of opportunities to gain access to decision makers or to gain legal privileges; and
5. issue characteristics, such as policy type, degree of technicality, and public salience.

At first, it seems reasonable to assume that, other factors being equal, advocacy groups that are well endowed with different resources will be more influential than groups that are less endowed. The former will be able to employ more staff and pursue more multifaceted tactics and strategies than the latter. Furthermore, it is often suggested that an imbalance of influence is due to the unequal distribution of money. Indeed, there are many examples of rich groups, particularly corporations and trade associations, gaining easier access to decision makers, being present at more levels of government, and supplying decision makers with more valuable expertise than poorer groups are able to do. But there are only few academic studies that would confirm the assumption that political outcomes are skewed toward the interests of the advocacy groups that spend the most on lobbying. Money has only a limited effect, since there are other resources, such as public support, a large number of members, or political credibility, that may outweigh material affluence and, still more important, that cannot be bought on the political market. Moreover, recent research results suggest that group-related factors, such as money and membership and also tactics and strategies, all in all may have only a limited impact on political outcomes.

Keeping the other factors in mind, these findings do not come as a surprise. First of all, in a competitive group universe most attempts by advocacy groups to exert influence evoke countering activities by rival groups. For example, a sector such as business is, in most cases, unable to act as a unit for it is divided by too many conflicting interests. Furthermore, the advocacy explosion has intensified competition by creating more and
more countervailing pressures. Second, advocacy success is determined by the behavior of legislators. Whereas legislators are often considered as passive targets, in fact they are active players shaping their relationship with advocacy groups according to their interests. Whether a decision maker is influenced by a certain group depends on his or her political goals, strategies, and demand for resources. Third, in any political system, institutions form a screen that is beneficial to some advocacy groups and discriminates against others. Generally, institutional mechanisms may preclude advocacy groups from converting resources into power. If the structures and strategies of a group do not match up with the political institutions, as is the case with social movements on the EU level, even resourceful groups may remain politically ineffective. Fourth, the likelihood of an advocate prevailing in a political conflict also depends on the issue at stake, that is, on the constellation of actors interested in the issue and their positions on the subject. The more groups that are involved in the issue and the higher the level of conflict, the more interests legislators have to take into account. So big issues have an adverse effect on lobbying success.

As a result, the impact of advocacy is limited, depending on factors such as the scope of the policy network, the level of conflict, the number of allies and opponents, and so on. Since every policy process is characterized by a specific, if not unique, constellation of structural and situational elements, the effect of group tactics and strategies is highly uncertain. Provided that the combination of factors in a certain policy arena is constantly changing, as is often the case, the results of public policy decisions are highly unpredictable, making it extremely unlikely for single groups to dominate the political process over time. But we will also find political contexts with a smaller number of actors and more stable patterns of participation where policy outcomes are less indeterminate. Advocacy groups that are formally included in policy-making processes, that deal with an issue that does not attract the interest of the media, and that act in a political niche where countervailing pressures are low will have a much better chance to influence policy outcomes than groups that act under largely varying conditions. As structural and situational factors can be considered as variables, the level of uncertainty is a variable too, featuring different contexts that are sometimes favorable to some groups and sometimes to others.

_See also_ Advocacy Coalition Framework; Interest Groups; Lobbying; Neo-Corporatism; Pluralist Interest Intermediation

**Further Readings**


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**Advocacy Coalition Framework**

The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) was originally designed by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith in the late 1980s to explain the political behavior of actors in the policy process.
The ACF provides researchers a theoretical lens for organizing actors into coalitions by offering a set of hypotheses for explaining coalition structure and behavior, the role of science and technology in the policy process, and the factors conducive to learning and policy change. For more than 2 decades, the ACF has been applied in Europe, Canada, the United States, and developing countries to a range of topics including health policy, environmental/energy policy, economic policy, disaster policy, and education policy.

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith created the ACF in response to what they saw as three shortcomings in the policy process literature. The first was their interpretation of the stages heuristic as both an inadequate causal theory and an inaccurate portrayal of the policy process. The second was a lack of progress to resolve the debate about top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research and a need for system-based theories of policy making. The third was the apparent lack of theory about the role of scientific and technical information in the policy process. In response, the ACF was created as a system-based model, integrating most of the policy stages, incorporating the best aspects of the top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research and a need for system-based theories of policy making. The ACF was created as a system-based model, integrating most of the policy stages, incorporating the best aspects of the top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation, and creating hypotheses that involve the role of scientific and technical information in learning and policy change. This entry provides a broad overview of the assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses in the ACF and ends with directions for future research.

**Foundation**

The structural underpinnings that the ACF begins with are a set of assumptions involving a central role for scientific and technical information in policy processes, a time perspective of 10 years or more to understand policy change, and the assignment of policy subsystems as the primary unit of analysis. Policy subsystems are subunits of political systems, focused on a topical area and involving specialized actors. The ACF guides researchers to study a broad set of subsystem actors including officials from all levels of government, nongovernment actors, consultants, scientists, and members of the media. For these subsystem actors, the ACF assumes a mental model based on limited abilities to process stimuli, a tendency to remember losses more than gains, and a need to rely on beliefs as the principal heuristic to simplify, filter, and sometimes distort stimuli.

The ACF assumes that actors are politically driven by their beliefs and that their policies and programs are best thought of as translations of those beliefs. A three-tiered model of a belief system for its actors is depicted. Within the belief-systems model, the broadest, most rigid, and predominately normative are deep core beliefs, such as liberal and conservative beliefs or the relative concern for the welfare of present versus future generations. Of moderate scope and spanning the substantive and geographic breadth of a policy subsystem are policy core beliefs. Policy core beliefs are rigid but are more adaptive in response to new experiences and information than deep core beliefs. The most substantively and geographically narrow and the most empirical are secondary beliefs. Compared with deep core and policy core beliefs, secondary beliefs are more likely to change.

At the heart of the ACF is the coalition concept. Coalitions consist of actors with shared policy core beliefs who engage in nontrivial degree of coordination, ranging from developing joint plans to sharing information. The goal of a coalition is the attainment of policy objectives, meaning the protection or change in government policies. The behavior of a coalition toward the achievement of their policy objectives varies considerably and depends on their resources and on the resources of their opponents, all of which is constrained by external subsystem affairs. Common coalition strategies include (a) maintaining a long-term perspective and involvement in a policy subsystem, (b) seeking to maintain membership and mobilizing new members, (c) attempting to shape policies indirectly through public opinion campaigns and through supporting scientific and technical information that reinforces their beliefs, and (d) attempting to shape policies directly by shopping their ideas to venues controlled by actors with authority to change policies, such as the courts, executives, agencies, and legislatures. The behavior of coalitions is fundamentally connected to the level of conflict in the policy subsystem. In some subsystems, rivals are not actively present, and a dominant coalition maintains a monopoly over policy affairs. In more adversarial subsystems, coalitions behave caustically toward their rivals, limiting learning between
coalitions. In more collaborative subsystems, coalitions cooperate, share information, and engage in cross-coalition learning.

While coalition members share policy core beliefs and coordinate their behavior, not all coalition members need to be directly tied to their allies. Some members are principal members, who remain active within the coalition for extended periods of time and are well connected with most allies. Principal members anchor the coalition by bearing the cost of coordination and by maintaining connections with—and hence the involvement of—more auxiliary members, whose involvement tends to be more temporally sporadic.

A flow diagram of the ACF is shown in Figure 1. On the right is a policy subsystem, within which coalitions strive to attain their policy objectives through various strategies. Subsystems operate within a broader political environment defined by relatively stable parameters and external events along with long-term coalition opportunity structures and short-term constraints and resources of subsystem actors.

To ease the application across political systems, the flow diagram in Figure 1 depicts three sets of variables as important long-term opportunity structures. The first is the degree of consensus needed for major policy change, which shapes coalition strategies in reaching agreements. The second is the degree of openness of political systems. For example, federalism and checks and balances in the United States create decentralized processes with many venues and encourage entry participation whereas corporatist systems are less open and more centralized and restrict participation. The third is overlapping societal cleavages.

**Figure 1**  A Flow Diagram for the Advocacy Coalition Framework

Paths to Major Policy Change

An explanatory focus of the ACF is to help understand and explain major policy change. Four paths to major policy change have been posited. The first is shocks that occur external to a subsystem, including broad changes in socioeconomic conditions, public opinion, governing coalitions, and other subsystems. Among the factors linking an external shock to major policy change are shifting coalition resources and changing beliefs among coalition actors.

The second path to policy change is shocks within a policy subsystem. An example might include a catastrophic fire in a forest management policy subsystem. The ACF distinguishes between external shocks and internal shocks because the latter are predicted to underscore the failures in current subsystem practices and possibly weakening a dominant coalition.

The third path to policy change is policy-oriented learning. Policy-oriented learning involves relatively enduring changes in beliefs and strategies resulting from experience and/or new information as related to the attainment, and possibly the modifications, of policy objectives. As coalition members learn over time, they may develop new ways to overcome a rival coalition or refine their policy objectives, both of which may lead to major changes in subsystem policies. Since belief systems are rigid and resistant to change, policy-oriented learning primarily shapes secondary beliefs or secondary aspects of the policy subsystem over extended periods of time.

The fourth path to policy change occurs through negotiated agreements among competing coalitions. Probably, the most important condition enabling coalitions to negotiate is a hurting stalemate, which occurs when members of rival coalitions view the status quo as unacceptable and perceive no other venues to achieve their policy objectives other than direct negotiations. Additional conditions enabling negotiated agreements include effective leadership, consensus-based decision rules, diverse funding, duration of process and commitment of members, a focus on empirical issues, an emphasis on building trust, and lack of alternative venues.

Hypotheses

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith provide a dozen hypotheses on topics ranging from belief and policy change to coalition stability. The five most frequently tested hypotheses are the following:

1. Significant perturbations external to the subsystem (e.g., changes in socioeconomic conditions, public opinion, systemwide governing coalitions, or policy outputs from other subsystems) are a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change in the policy core attributes of a governmental program.

2. On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or so.

3. Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there is an intermediate level of informed conflict between the two coalitions. This requires that (a) each has the technical resources to engage in such a debate and (b) the conflict be between secondary aspects of one belief system and core elements of the other or, alternatively, between important secondary aspects of the two belief systems.

4. Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there exists a forum that is (a) prestigious enough to force professionals from different coalitions to participate and (b) dominated by professional norms.

5. The policy core attributes of a governmental program in a specific jurisdiction will not be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy coalition that instituted the program remains in power within that jurisdiction—except when the change is imposed by a hierarchically superior jurisdiction.

Further Development and Applications

The scope of the ACF continues to diversify in topics and theoretical focus. Areas ripe for future research include (a) explaining coalition structure and behavior, especially factors explaining defection and stability of members and choice of political strategy; (b) developing a theory of policy subsystem interdependencies; (c) explaining the effects of scientific and technical information on learning within and between coalitions; and
Advocacy Networks, Transnational

Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) are forms of collective action that cross national borders and are made up of collaborative connections among a myriad of actors who engage in joint initiatives on the basis of common goals and shared values. These networks seek to change states’ and/or international organizations’ policies and/or public opinion, at both a domestic and an international scale. TANs form around areas of specific issues, but these vary considerably, ranging from human rights, environmental protection, poverty, gender equality, and labor rights to networks that seek to change the agendas and policies of international organizations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. Their initiatives usually have a limited life span. Its promoters do not seek to build long-term coalitions; rather, TANs emerge and die as new issues come to the fore or as their demands gain attention.

The concept of TANs thus describes a different form of organized collective action from the more institutionalized international nongovernmental organizations or global social movements. Although some kind of internal division of labor and communication structure is in place, TANs most often do not have headquarters or paid staff. Furthermore, rules for affiliation tend to be loose. However, the internal functioning of TANs varies considerably, and it changes through time and across issue areas.

The literature on TANs is quite recent. It flourished in the 1990s, as part of a broader effort to understand the roles of nonstate actors in international relations. Ever since the publication of the pioneering analyses on transnational relations, around the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, its study has gained increased prominence. What began as an attempt to incorporate the study of nonstate actors—at the time, mainly multinational corporations—into the research agenda of international relations scholars has become a vast literature that takes into consideration an increasingly heterogeneous set of actors and phenomena. The literature on TANs has contributed to moving the debate from the question of whether nonstate actors are relevant in international relations to understanding how they are relevant and how to evaluate their impacts.

Studies about TANs are often multidisciplinary. More specifically, this is a literature that has stimulated a fruitful dialogue between international relations and social movement theories. Although most authors will deny the existence of a simple causal link between globalization and transnational
collective action, the constitution of international regimes and the augmented power of international organizations provide a common political background for TANs. These are understood best by considering the contributions made by international relations theorists. In turn, many of the challenges that social movements face at the domestic level, in terms of coalition building, for example, are also present in the international arena. Most important, social movement theorists help in identifying the mechanisms by which actors are able (or unable) to overcome their differences and construct common purpose.

Studies about TANs also seek to go beyond local–global dichotomies. Thus, rather than speak of the emergence or existence of a “global civil society,” scholars refer to a plurality of TANs springing up intermittently across a wide-ranging set of issues. These networks are made up of various combinations in terms of participants’ national origins and the pathways to transnationality chosen by them. While many actors remain rooted at the local or national scale, others may be part of global social movements or international nongovernmental organizations.

At least two issues remain as key challenges for the TAN literature. First, it is not always clear as to how to set the boundaries of TANs, that is, how to identify participants and differentiate among actors, given the internal asymmetry of power relations. Second, although there has been a concerted effort to evaluate the impacts of these collective action forms, we still know little about their longer term effects.

**Relationships Among Actors in TANs**

TANs are sponsored by a wide variety of actors located in different social positions and geographical locations, so much so that it is often hard to draw their boundaries. There is no consensus in the literature on this topic. For some scholars, TANs are not necessarily limited to nonstate agents but may include sympathetic government officials as well as international organization officials. Among nonstate actors, these may include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), grassroots organizations, foundations, business organizations, the media, churches, and various other types of associations as well as individuals. For other authors, it is best to define TANs, more restrictively, as including only domestic and international nonstate actors, and among these mostly NGOs and social movements. A clearer definition of the boundaries of TANs remains an open challenge.

Whether the definition of participants is more or less restricted, in both cases, there is evidence that actors have very different approaches in terms of targets chosen and strategies used. As sets of interconnected nodes, networks cannot be aprioristically defined as formed by horizontal or homogeneous ties. Nevertheless, this use of the concept of “networks” has been common among activists and scholars alike. It has helped emphasize the novelty of these forms of collaboration with respect to more hierarchical and centralized initiatives of the past. However, recent scholarly efforts have focused on trying to specify better the embeddedness of networks in power relations as spaces of negotiation (and contention) affected by asymmetrical relations among participants. These efforts have led to a more detailed analysis about the internal functioning of TANs, which focus, for example, on questions of accountability, transparency, and decision-making processes. Asymmetries may follow North–South lines, but this is only one possible aspect. Other sources of tension within TANs refer to different political cultures (among countries and also among sectoral domains) and different visions in terms of tactics, both of which can be found within and across the South and the North.

**Impacts of TANs**

To understand under what domestic and international circumstances do TANs succeed or fail to achieve their goals, a long series of case studies and comparisons among them have been undertaken. Scholars have focused on the abilities of networks not only to influence political actors and policies at the domestic and international scales but also to bring about shifts in public opinion on given issues. Research has been done on campaigns oriented toward particular political problems (e.g., debt relief, use of land mines) and policy domains (e.g., the environment, trade negotiations, gender equality). While there are numerous case studies showing that TANs did have a positive impact, this is often not the case. Independent variables that explain these different outcomes in the literature include
characteristics of the networks themselves (e.g., the strength of local grassroots members or the density of ties), characteristics of the issue chosen (e.g., its resonance with existing norms), characteristics of the target (e.g., the vulnerability of states to leverage politics or the access of activists to the state), and the strategies of the networks (e.g., their capacity to generate reliable information quickly).

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink pioneered the efforts to understand the impacts of TANs in their 1998 book, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, in which they propose the “boomerang pattern” as a common and effective tactic used by TANs to enhance their influence. Most especially in cases of closure of the domestic political system, nonstate actors seek allies in other countries (or are sought by them) to apply pressure on other states and/or international organizations. These, in turn, will be able to use their leverage on the original target and thus help bring about the change demanded by domestic activists. Examples of the successful throwing of “boomerangs” include the well-known case of the Brazilian rubber tappers who, in the 1980s, allied with U.S. environmental NGOs to pressure the U.S. Congress to use its leverage on the World Bank. The World Bank, in turn, helped bring about changes in the projects they helped sponsor in the Amazon region and thus bring about changes in the Brazilian state’s policies vis-à-vis environmental protection and the rubber tappers.

Special emphasis has been given by TAN scholars to impacts that are not easily measurable, such as the effects of transnational activism on international norms. This is certainly true in the case of scholars who adhere to a constructivist theoretical approach to the study of transnationalism. The argument is that TANs do contribute to change by shifting the norm structure of global governance. Norms, understood broadly as shared expectations held by actors about what is their appropriate behavior, are affected by the actions of TANs in at least two important ways: (1) as references by which TANs hold states and other actors accountable and (2) by the creation of new norms or the initiation of norm shifting. Either by upholding existing norms or by proposing new ones, TANs have an impact on how people in general think about the world.

Notwithstanding various successful examples of norm and policy shifting, evidence of the impacts of the campaigns launched by TANs is mixed and remains an important topic for future research. More specifically, longer term studies are needed to understand whether these changes are sustained through time.

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See also Civil Society; Social Movements

Further Readings


African Political Thought

The expression “African political thought” can be considered a prima facie misunderstanding in that it oversimplifies the pluralism of thoughts that has always existed in Africa. Deep divergences characterize the African ideological landscape. While Jomo Kenyatta, the Kenyan political thinker who was the first prime minister of Kenya and its president from 1964 to 1978, positioned precolonial Africa as the reference for the rebuilding of independent Africa; Léopold Sédar Senghor, president of Senegal from 1960 to 1980, idealized the
encounter between Africa and Europe as the starting point of any modernity in Africa. In the same way, the call for the immediate building of a United States of Africa was contradicted by the advocacy of a step-by-step process of regional integration.

Pluralism of political thoughts is not the lone obstacle besetting the emergence of a unified school; alongside it, there is also the issue of pluralism in meaning. As the matter of fact, the notion of “African political thought” is influenced by several dialectics, including those between the African continent and the diaspora, between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, and between tradition and modernity. This entry first examines each of these dialectics. It then describes the substance of African political thought through two main categories: (1) “against-stism” and (2) “renaissance.”

Dialectics Influencing African Political Thought

The African Continent and the Black Diaspora

The first dialectic is that between the African continent and the Black diaspora. For instance, without reference to the Jamaican thinker Marcus Garvey or the American thinker William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, it is impossible to understand the genealogy of Pan-Africanism; the Pan-Africanism that constitutes the main paradigm of African political thought is initially a Diaspora idea. As strongly contesting colonization and neocolonialism, African radicalism has been elaborated mainly by the French citizen of Martinique Frantz Fanon. The relationship between these icons of African political thought and the African continent is linked to the color of their skin. African political thought is to some extent a Black political thought. It therefore appears that the idea of African political thought is linked to that of Black political thought. The debate among the diaspora in the United States, in the Americas, and in the modern world has never been considered by the continental African thinkers as foreign to their concern. Senghor and Kwame Nkrumah were always in conversation with Black American thinkers such as Du Bois and Martin Luther King Jr.

The Relationship Between Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa

The second dialectic is that between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. This one concerns the racial divide between “Blacks” and “Arabs.” Africa is not a continent with ethnic or racial homogeneity. The impact of this on African political thought is the cohabitation of “Pan-Africanism” and “Pan-Arabism” in the continent. Even if Pan-Africanism is unification’s ideology, some of its authors restricted Pan-Africanism to “Black Africa.” The Afrocentric Senegalese thinker Cheik Anta Diop established the cultural foundations of a Black African federal state. In practical terms, this idea was reformulated by President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire as a replacement of the Organisation of African Unity by a league of Black people and states. Seko’s proposal was clearly directed against the Arabs of the continent, who were accused of being oriented more toward Middle East through the Arab League. At the same time that Nkrumah of Ghana was advocating Pan-Africanism from Cape Town to Cairo, Gamal Nasser of Egypt was defending Pan-Arabism from Rabbat to Damascus. The dialectic of the African attachment to the continent and their attraction to what is going on in Asia indicates the variable geometry of Pan-Africanism. It is worth noting that whereas Pan-Africanism and blackness are intertwined, the interaction between Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism is still apprehended under the prism of antagonism, instead of complementarities. The presence of Arabs in Northern Africa and the role played by Arab states such as Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco in the liberation of the continent seem to contradict the ongoing misconception of Africa as a Black continent. At this stage, South Africa’s episteme of representing an African rainbow identity is a revolution. Despite the influence of African radicalism that structured the African National Congress, post-apartheid South Africa, under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, transcends racial cleavages: To be an African becomes a cosmopolitan idea that can accommodate Indians, Whites, and Blacks. It is the advent of a postracial African that was envisaged by Mandela’s thought.

Tradition and Modernity

The third dialectic that operates in the realm of African political thought is that between tradition
and modernity. Traditional African political thought is perceived as political thought based on what is authentic to Africa through a precolonial reference (Basil Davidson, 1998; Jomo Kenyatta, 1938). Modern African political thought is political thought generated by the colonial and postcolonial eras. From this artificial dichotomy, tradition-generated political thought is given the label of authentic African political thought. At the same time, modern political thought is stigmatized for being Westernized. This is a false opposition, because tradition and modernity are relative notions and represent intertwined realities. The search for an authentic African political thought is an impediment to the understanding of the dynamics of Africa’s ideological landscape. Instead of initiating a futile debate on the criteria of authenticity, it is better to note what works as an African political thought, be it modern or traditional, Afrocentrist or influenced by “Western” ideologies.

**African Political Thought as “Againstism”**

Modern African political thought is to be understood through the mediation of the relation with the “intimate enemy,” that is, the Western world made up of colonial powers. That is why African political thought focuses on accusation. In this regard, the radical discourse dominates the ideological landscape. The Western world is presented as the enemy on the basis of the experiences of slavery and colonialism. These two experiences are seen as part of the same trend of African humiliation in the modern world. If one agrees with Carl Schmitt that the designation of the enemy is the starting point of politics, then African thought is political and unified when African thinkers define a common enemy as in the following examples:

In the 1930s, Kenyatta accused the “Europeans” of having destroyed the human dignity of the African, denigrated his culture and religion, and stolen his land (Kenyatta, 1938). This discourse on colonization as a brutalization process is shared by the main radical thinkers.

Nkrumah’s opposition to the Western world concerned its colonial and postcolonial faces. In his analysis of the European domination of Africa, Nkrumah (1961) asserts,

The white man arrogated to himself the right to rule and to be obeyed by the non white . . . Under this cloak, the Europeans robbed the continent of vast riches and inflicted unimaginable suffering of the African people. (p. xi)

Despite the independence of African states, Nkrumah identified neocolonialism as “the last stage of imperialism.” Neocolonialism is the continuity of other forms of Western domination:

In place of colonialism . . . we have today neo-colonialism. . . . The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent. . . . In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside. (Nkrumah, 1965, p. 30)

Amilcar Cabral’s (1970) denunciation of colonialism is based on the fact that the Western colonial powers had taken “up arms to destroy or at least to paralyze (the) cultural life (of Africans)”: Foreign domination can be maintained “only by the permanent, organized repression of the cultural life of the people concerned.” Colonization and neocolonialism are explained as negations of the history and culture of African peoples.

Fanon, in his writings, formulated an absolute clash between Africa and Europe: Colonialism is presented as “fundamentally unforgivable” (Fanon, 2006, p. 118) and Europe as having proceeded with cynicism and violence against Africa.

These categories and representations with their Marxist background have exercised a real ideological hegemony in Africa and still do so today. In the intellectual domain, the conservative trend of African political thought constituted a minority. The denunciation of Europe is common to both radical and conservative African political thought. Disunity appears at the level of the relationship with the colonial power: When a conservative African political thinker such as Senghor forgives the former colonial power and regards it as a friend and partner, radical thinkers envisage struggle. The synthesis of this historic cleavage has been
made in postcolonial South Africa through the “truth and reconciliation” process under which a radical liberation movement, African National Congress, accepted to cooperate with apartheid elites.

**African Political Thought as a Renaissance Political Thought**

African political thought is dominated by the idea of renaissance. It is a normative political thought generated by the traumatisms of slavery, colonialism, and underdevelopment. These historical events constitute the implicit or explicit backdrop of African political thought.

The renaissance from the colonial or neocolonial domination is to be obtained through struggle for national liberation. It is a cultural struggle. The liberation movement defends the culture of the people (Cabral, 1970). The struggle is also a military one implying the use of revolutionary violence (Fanon, 2002).

The renaissance following the colonial divide of Africa and its underdevelopment is to be made through the creation of United States of Africa. Despite its practical failure, this ideal still dominates African political thought (Nkrumah, 1963).

The renaissance is a terrain in which several national ideologies situated between Marxism and liberalism, such as “African socialism” or “communal liberalism” flourished.

The renaissance political thought is also a thought of liberty and equality. Under the condemnation of colonialism, apartheid, and authoritarianism, what are at stake are liberty and equality (Mandela, 1995). African political thought then appears in its universality. However, as elsewhere, African political thought is also made up of exclusion of the other. The light of renaissance is contradicted by the darkness of discourses full of hate. Ethnic exclusion and genocide in Africa have always been justified “ideologically.”

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**See also** Colonialism

**Further Readings**


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**AGENCIES**

In this entry, the concept of “agencies” is defined, and a short review of its history and relevance for public administration practice is provided. Finally, some key issues that have emerged from the ever-growing literature on this topic will be discussed.

**Definition**

Agencies are the organizational emanation of administrative decentralization in the public sector by which large monolithic core departmental bureaucracies are “unbundled” into smaller executive organizations that operate at a distance from the center of government. There are many descriptions of the administrative species “agency” in the international literature, such as “nondepartmental public bodies,” “quangos,” “nonmajoritarian
institutions,” “quasi-autonomous public bodies,” and “arm’s-length agencies,” only to name some. For reasons of clarity, the term *agency* will be used throughout this entry. There is, however, a variation in the interpretation of the concept “agency” in different countries. Some argue that what an agency is, and what functions it does, may vary considerably across national cultures, legal systems, and political systems.

Although the definition of an agency, or the way in which “agencies” are conceptualized, may differ from country to country, there are some common features by which agencies can be characterized:

First, in most cases, agencies are public law bodies. This means that they are subject to at least some public law procedures.

Second, agencies have some capacity for autonomous decision making with respect to their internal management and/or policies.

Third, agencies are structurally disaggregated from the center of the governmental apparatus (core ministry). This means that in most cases, agencies are not directly subordinate hierarchically to the oversight authorities, such as the central administration of government or the minister.

Still, fourth, agencies are formally under at least some control of ministers and governmental departments, as there often is a (larger or smaller) degree of political responsibility for what the agency does.

Fifth, in most cases, agencies are (at least partly) staffed with civil servants and (at least partly) financed by the state budget.

In the literature, the distinction is made between internally autonomous agencies and externally autonomous agencies. Internally autonomous agencies do have extended managerial flexibilities, however, compared with the core governmental organizations (from which their “autonomous” status is derived). Examples of internally autonomized agencies are the Next Steps Agencies (United Kingdom [UK]), the Agentschappen (the Netherlands), or many federal agencies in the United States. Externally autonomous agencies are often labeled as “nonministerial agencies” because of their own legal personality and the fact that they are structurally detached from the core of the governmental apparatus. In most cases, the legal personality implies that agencies are controlled and steered by an intermediary body (like a board of governors). The existence of a board implies that the ministerial responsibility toward the agency decreases and often is only political in nature. Examples of externally autonomous agencies are the so-called nondepartmental public bodies (UK), the zelfstandige bestuursorganen (ZBOs; the Netherlands), or the independent administrative institutions (Japan).

**Historical, Theoretical, and Empirical Context**

**Agencies: Not Something New at All**

With the rise of new public management (NPM) as one of the dominant administrative doctrines of the past decades, many countries began reorganizing their administrative apparatus. One particular reform that could be observed in many countries was the so-called unbundling of the traditional large monolithic bureaucracies. For example, in the UK under Margaret Thatcher, the Next Steps Program dissolved the central bureaucracy in dozens of smaller executive agencies that were responsible for the implementation of public policies. This example was followed by similar initiatives in other countries such as the Netherlands or, more recently, Belgium (Flanders). However, this kind of public sector reform can be observed not only in the heartland of NPM (including many English-speaking countries) and in the broader Western world but also elsewhere. Agencification programs in developing countries (e.g., Tanzania, Jamaica), in East Asian countries (e.g., Thailand), and in Central and Eastern European countries (e.g., Latvia) have been documented extensively in the literature. Notwithstanding the fact that the 1980s
and the 1990s were characterized in many countries by the establishment of many arm’s-length agencies, the existence of agency-type administrative entities is not new at all. For example, for centuries the central government in Sweden has consisted of a small core bureaucracy, responsible for policy making, and many executive agencies at arm’s length, responsible for implementing policies. As a second example, in the 1970s (so before NPM came into its heyday), Hong Kong’s central government was unbundled into a lot of small arm’s-length executive agencies. Also, the federal government of the United States has a long tradition of working with agency-like public organizations that are structurally disaggregated from the core of government.

**Why Agencies?**

The popularity of the agency-like administrative species in many governmental reforms is the result of the normative NPM-driven belief that this type of public organization is better suited to deliver public services in an efficient and effective way. As such, establishing agencies was considered by many governments as part of the solution in search of an answer to the crisis of the state in the 1970s and 1980s. Agencies are presumed, according to NPM advocates, to be better performers than traditional bureaucratic organizations because (a) they operate closer to the citizen/client and hence are more responsive to the client’s need, (b) they are more flexible because of their high levels of managerial discretion, and (c) their (quasi-) independent status encourages them to behave more efficiently. The theoretical justification behind this—often normative—point of view can be found in rational economic theories such as property rights theory and principal–agent theory. Agencies, according to these lines of reasoning, are assumed to operate more efficiently and effectively compared with core departmental bureaucracies, because their autonomous status enables them to make their own managerial choices. The fact that agencies have the discretionary power to handle to a certain extent their own resources (personnel, finance, etc.) creates an incentive to use these resources efficiently and effectively (“let the manager manage”). On the other hand, the enlarged discretionary managerial competences on behalf of the agencies create a need to control these agencies by their principals, that is, the political and administrative oversight authorities (“make the manager manage”).

In sum, according to NPM advocates, the creation of agencies is something rational, underpinned by rational-economic theories, as agencies are presumed (due to their quasi-autonomous status) to be better deliverers of public services than large, core-departmental bureaucracies. Recently, however, some scholars have argued that the agency phenomenon is more than an answer in the search for better public service delivery. These scholars argue that the agency phenomenon is a trend, a practice that is copied. There is a growing body of literature that shows that the creation of agencies, as part of public sector reform processes, is not always a rational decision. In many countries, the creation of agencies on a large scale is the result of processes of mimetic, normative, or even coercive isomorphism. In the past decades, public sector reforms that included some kind of “agencification” were considered as a best practice. Governments often tend to copy best practices from each other. Beside that many international institutions (e.g., World Bank, International Monetary Fund [IMF], and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]) and multinational consulting firms have been very active in promoting NPM-like public sector reforms, including agencification programs.

**Diversity**

Despite the often argued fact that one is “converging” toward the agency form all over the world, which is also true to a certain extent, one should recognize that the agency form may not be that homogeneous as one might sometimes think. It can be argued that although the numerous similarities among these organizations have been created all over the world, there is also a great deal of variation, mainly due to differences in national cultures, legal systems, and political systems. The variation occurs along a number of dimensions, such as their governance structure and their relation with ministerial authorities, their degree of autonomy, and the variety of tasks they perform. In some models, agencies are organizations that are more or less directly linked to the core of
government (central ministries). In English-speaking countries, such as the UK, the chief executive of the agency is responsible for an administrative oversight (a ministerial department) rather than a corporate body such as a board. This implies that the hierarchical bonds between agency and oversight are much stronger compared with the Scandinavian model, for example. In the United States, the typical agency is a public law legal person of its own, but it is still subordinate to the department within which it is located. Besides such agencies, established by a congressional act, there are also agencies that are established by and within a department. In other models, though the bonds of agencies with ministries may be weak, yet they have strong autonomy and independence. In Scandinavian countries (e.g., Sweden), agencies are responsible for implementing policies that are issued by small ministries responsible for policy formulation, although the agencies are also active in policy making themselves through their own corporate body, which has a lot of autonomy vis-à-vis the political and administrative oversight authorities. Also, in some cases, private organizations performing public tasks are considered as agencies. Governments may move some functions out of their control (e.g., through privatization), but they are still ultimately responsible for providing basic services to the public (e.g., the privatization and breakup of British Rail).

Key Issues

Roles and Functions

Agencies typically implement policies. They are, in most cases, responsible for delivering public services and public goods, such as public transport, public infrastructure, public security, and so on. This means that the role of agencies can be observed in virtually all policy fields or areas for which government is responsible. The observation that many agencies deliver public goods and services is in line with some NPM-like doctrines that advocate a so-called primacy of politics. According to such doctrines, politicians are democratically legitimised to decide on (the content and scope of) policy, while the main role of administrative actors (e.g., agencies) is to implement these policies. This strict dichotomy between policy (politicians) and operations (administrative actors) should be nuanced on at least two points. First, in reality, we can often observe in many countries that agencies have a large role to play in regulatory policy. In the policy domains of many countries, it is agencies that are the responsible actors to regulate the market in important policy fields such as energy supply, telecommunications, and postal services. These “regulatory agencies” have thus a strong policy element in their task and role (setting standards and norms, controlling market players, [helping in] defining the regulatory framework in the policy field, etc.). Second, recent research shows that agencies that are mainly involved in implementing policies (delivering public goods and services) often have a large role to play in policy making too.

Key Variables: Autonomy and Control

Agencies are generally characterized by two key variables: (1) their autonomy vis-à-vis the political and administrative oversight authorities and (2) the way in, and the extent to, which they are steered and controlled by these oversight authorities.

Autonomy

Autonomy of agencies refers to the discretion these agencies have to make decisions of their own or the extent to which the agency can decide itself about issues it finds important. In this sense, making an agency more autonomous involves the shifting of decision-making competences from external actors (e.g., the oversight authorities) to the agency itself. The level of organizational autonomy of agencies (or the extent to which the agency can make decisions of its own) is determined by the scope and the extent of these decision-making competences. Two different scopes can be discerned. First, agencies may have decision-making competences that are delegated to them from the oversight authorities concerning the choice and use of inputs or organizational resources. This is the managerial autonomy of agencies. An agency can have managerial autonomy with respect to several types of organizational inputs, resources such as financial resources and human resources, or other production factors such as logistics, organization, and housing and infrastructure. The second scope of organizational autonomy refers to decision-making competences of the agency in policy issues.
or the policy autonomy of the agency. The extent to which an agency enjoys policy autonomy will depend on the extent to which the agency is steered by its oversight authorities on processes, outputs, or effects. Having policy autonomy means that the agency can make decisions about the choice of policy instruments, the outputs that should be delivered by the policy, and the desirable societal effects of the policy. According to NPM-like doctrines, the ideal-typical agency has a lot of managerial autonomy, to fulfill the promise of “let the managers manage” and to ensure that the first part of the equation (more managerial competences = better organizational performance) is guaranteed. Policy autonomy, however, is low in an ideal-typical agency. As already suggested above, according to NPM, agencies are mostly expected to implement policies, not to design them (the exception may be regulatory agencies, cf. supra). In reality, however, many agencies that primarily implement policies also have a large influence in designing and evaluating policy. This may not be surprising given the fact that many agencies, as day-to-day policy-implementing actors in the policy field, are experts in their field and have a clear vision on what is happening in the policy field. A final issue concerning the autonomy of agencies is the difference between formal (legal) and real (empirical) autonomy. Formal or legal autonomy is the level of autonomy the agencies enjoy according to the laws, executive decisions, and decrees that deal with the establishment of these agencies. In these (legal) documents, it is formally described to what extent and under what circumstances agencies enjoy their own decision-making competences. In reality, however, many agencies enjoy more or less autonomy than is formally described. Research has shown that this may be due to the (political) salience of the task that the agency performs. In a politically sensitive policy field, agencies may be scrutinized more intensely by politicians compared with agencies in a politically less salient policy field.

Control

The other side of the coin is the extent to, and the way in, which agencies are controlled by their oversight authorities (which may be political—e.g., ministers—or administrative—e.g., ministries). The ways in which agencies are controlled/steered by the oversight authorities can be very diverse. First, agencies may be controlled ex ante (“before the facts”). Ex ante control is the formulation of rules and standards that give direction to the actor so that the desired output (from the viewpoint of the oversight authority) will be achieved. Oversight authorities thus control the agency beforehand. They can do so by setting general or detailed rules that constrain the autonomy of the agency in using the inputs. In this sense, ex ante controls take the form of authoritative mandates, rules, or regulations that specify what the agency can do. Or the oversight authority can control the agency by taking the major decisions itself or by making the decisions of the agency subject to approval by the oversight authorities (e.g., nullification rights or vetoes). Second, ex post control or results control is in essence checking whether the intended organizational goals have been achieved by the agency (and whether there is a need for corrective future actions). Result control involves the setting of the desired organizational results (norms), checking whether or not the organizational results meet this norm, and eventually the adaptation or continuation of the organizational practice. The intention of these “after-the-fact controls” is to motivate the agency to perform well and to make good decisions. As such, agencies are made responsible for the consequences of their decisions (“let the managers manage”). Some argue that result control can be regarded as a cycle that consists of interrelated subsystems: a planning system (setting organizational goals and norms for the agency), a monitoring system (to measure the organizational results ex post), and an evaluation and feedback system. The past decades, alongside the rise of the NPM, a shift toward contractualization in the controlling of agencies by their oversight authorities can be observed. In many instances, newly established agencies have performance contracts or management contracts with their oversight authorities in which the rights and duties of both parties are agreed on. Generally, the commitment of the agency is to deliver goods and services, on behalf of the oversight authorities, with a high level of efficiency, quality, and customer friendliness. Indicators are developed to be able to measure the results achieved by the agencies. The commitment of the oversight authorities generally has to do with ensuring that the agency has the necessary
means (financial, personnel, infrastructural) to be able to achieve good results. Also agencies that have existed for a longer time often see their control regime shifting from ex ante control on inputs to ex post control on results and have to agree on performance or management contracts with their oversight authorities too.

Accountability and Performance

Earlier in this entry, a rather normative justification for the trend toward agencification in the public sector was discussed. NPM advocates often argue that smaller, single-task executive agencies are better vehicles to deliver effective and efficient public services and have better chances to behave innovatively and in a customer-friendly way compared with large monolithic bureaucratic organizations. The practice of performance contracts, it is often argued, also enables one to really assess whether or not agencies are performing well. However, it is not certain whether the promise of better performance has been fulfilled. Scientific evidence is at least inconclusive. One question is what “performance” is. In a public sector context, performance is a broader concept than just (economic) efficiency. No doubt that in many agencies, financial efficiency may have increased due to, among others, a better focus on the job. But other values that are of importance in a public sector context such as equal treatment and impartiality in service delivery are much harder to grasp in indicators, hence to measure for performance. The point is that increased efficiency does not always have to result automatically in increased performance on other aspects of the job that the agencies perform. Second, it is—from a methodological point of view—extremely difficult to compare performance of agencies with performance of other governmental organizations (e.g., bureaucracies). This is due to, among others, the scarcity of public functions/tasks that are in reality performed by organizations of different types in the same country (the exceptions are schools, public and private). Or the lack of null measurement of the performance of the function before it was shifted to a new organizational form (e.g., postal services before and after privatization). In sum, most commentators agree that some economical gains may be observed with agencies but that it does not necessarily imply that gains can be observed in other aspects of performance such as democracy, quality, and impartiality (which are important too, especially in the public sector).

This brings us to a final key issue to be discussed here. Performance of an organization also has to do with the accountability of that organization toward its key stakeholders. The issue of accountability is an important one because one has to be aware that in the search for the economic gains of working with agencies (efficiency; this is why they are created), there is also consideration of the possible political or societal costs because of the lack of control of these arm’s-length agencies. In the case of agencies, the key stakeholders are the oversight authorities, the citizens who receive public services and goods of the agency, and ultimately, the general public or the society as a whole. Agencies are put at arm’s length of the government, which makes control of the agency by government (the oversight authority) more difficult. Some authors therefore argue that the so-called vertical or upward accountability (toward the oversight authorities) may be weakened. In turn, it can be argued that agencies develop mechanisms of so-called horizontal or downward accountability, which is directed to the citizen/client of the agency (e.g., customer surveys, reporting on results, ombudspersons). Whether or not downward accountability can replace upward accountability remains a point of debate. Other observers argue that vertical accountability is large, given the fact that many agencies are subject to a multitude of control practice (nullification rights, performance contracts, audits, parliamentary hearings, etc.). In such cases, lack of accountability seems to be a lesser problem.

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See also Accountability; Autonomy, Administrative; Bureaucracy; Decentralization; Delegation; New Public Management; Principal–Agent Theory

Further Readings

Bouckaert, G., & Peters, G. (2004). What is available and what is missing in the study of quangos? In
Agenda Setting

For any decisions to be made in the political system, an issue must be placed on the active agenda of government. In political science, agenda setting is an important topic for the analysis of collective outcomes, in particular for the evaluation of their democratic nature. Agenda setting concerns the strategic choice or selection of policy alternatives from a set of all possible outcomes on which individual, corporate, and collective actors finally decide. This entry discusses two alternative conceptions of agenda setting. One focuses more on the politics of getting an issue to the agenda. The other body of literature focuses on the impact of agendas on the outcomes of the process and on the power of agenda setters in determining outcomes.

These two bodies of literature are complementary and together provide a full understanding of the role of agendas in shaping policy choices.

The Politics of Agenda Setting

In recent years, agenda-setting theory has also become a prominent approach in political communication research, which describes the transfer of important topics to the public sector for resolution, as discussed extensively by Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones. This portion of the literature discussing agenda setting considers the political and social mechanisms through which problems are identified and then politicized. This literature reflects the strong political role of agendas in making policy.

The agenda-setting literature also has pointed to the varieties of different agendas that exist in the public sector and the manner in which issues are moved on and off these agendas. The systemic agenda represents all those issues that are deemed appropriate for the public sector to take into account, whether or not they are being actively considered. The institutional agendas are those that are being acted on, or at least actively considered, at any point of time. Furthermore, there are important political considerations concerning which institutions constitute the foci for the political activity around any issue. Some political systems, for example, federal systems and those with active court systems, provide would-be agenda setters greater opportunities than do those with fewer points of access.

For an issue to become public policy, it must pass through several different institutions. In most democratic systems, issues must go through the legislature, and often committees within the legislature, although the source of the idea may have been the bureaucracy or the political executive, or perhaps interest groups. Then the issue, once acted on, will have to go to the bureaucracy for implementation and then perhaps to the courts for adjudication. These movements may occur as a normal part of political life but generally require some forms of political impetus for them to occur.

The agenda-setting literature has also focused on the roles of policy entrepreneurs in the process of making policy. Issues do not move on and off agendas on their own but require individual actors...
who foster their development and their adoption. These entrepreneurs have to be prepared when “windows of opportunity” open that permit issues that might otherwise be excluded to come to the active political agenda.

Analytic Models of Agenda Setting and Agenda Control

The second approach to agendas and agenda setting has focused on the influence that agendas and the manipulation of agendas have on the outcomes of deliberative processes. Traditionally, agendas and agenda formation have played a prominent role since the 20th century in analytical political science, which investigates the power of agenda setters in the collective decision-making process. For democratic governance, agenda-setting power can undermine the democratic process when the agenda setter has dictatorial power in manipulating the aggregation of individual preferences to collective outcomes. According to the social choice and legislative analysis literatures, a major precondition for this threat of dictatorial agenda-setting power is the instability of collective outcomes under specific democratic voting rules, which may allow an agenda setter to manipulate (or hinder from manipulating) them. Irrespective of the instability of collective outcomes, bargaining theories and logrolling approaches also emphasize the importance of agenda setting when it creates a bargaining advantage for the first mover. In other words, actors who can make the first moves in bargaining are often the ones who are able to shape the final outcomes of the process.

According to Donald Schön and Martin Rein (1994), a more optimistic interpretation comes from the deliberative literature, which stresses the framing of problems to find (stable) solutions. According to John Dryzek and Christian List (2003), deliberation has been argued to assist in aggregating individual preferences by subdividing or ordering issues in a way that induces stability of outcomes. The discussions involved in deliberative decision making enable the participants to reach solutions that are stable and reflect the underlying preferences of those participants.

According to Kenneth Joseph Arrow (1951), most theoretical work on agenda-setting power originates in social choice theory that focuses on the (in)stability of collective outcomes in democratic systems, which results from the aggregation of actors’ individual preferences under specific democratic voting rules. With regard to the paradox of voting, Duncan Black (1948) and others, such as William Riker, have found that collective outcomes result from the interaction preferences of the actors involved in decision making and the structure of the agenda, that is, how policy alternatives are ordered in the collective decision-making process of democracies. This has important implications for the democratic nature of collective outcomes and the power of the agenda setter who controls the decision-making process and the voting sequence of the actors involved. Under majority rule, this power is restricted only when a median voter guarantees the stability of collective outcomes in the aggregation of actors’ individual preferences.

In many decision-making situations, however, the median voter hardly exists. The existence of a median voter requires that actors with single-peaked preferences vote sincerely on an ordered single dimension. Put differently, the existence of a median voter is unlikely when preferences are not single peaked, when more than one dimension exists, or when actors vote strategically. From these restrictive conditions, under which alone the median voter theorem holds, early studies such as Black (1948) show that an agenda setter is able to achieve any outcome under majority rule. This insight on the dictatorial power of agenda setters applies more generally to all minimally democratic voting rules. Another insight from research on the (in)stability of collective outcomes is that—in policy spaces with more than one dimension—outcomes are almost always influenced by the characteristics of the decision-making processes. When instability of the collective outcome is common among the participants, democratic governance is highly threatened by dictatorial agenda setting.

This skeptical view on democratic governance has stimulated further discussion and research on the power of the agenda setters in collective decision making. More specifically, the crucial question has turned toward the extent to which an agenda setter can select and perhaps manipulate the decision-making process and, if so, what implications follow from this manipulation for collective outcomes. Some of the most influential developments
in this vein of research come from studies of decision making in democratic legislatures. In these analyses, the focus is on who is able to draft and to amend legislative proposals that are finally adopted by the floor. On the most general level, this literature distinguishes between different legislative procedures by the level of institutional restrictions that define the power relationship between an agenda setter and the floor. More precisely, they find that two provisions often restrict the power of the agenda setter in democratic legislatures, the competitive right to initiate proposals and the amendment right on the floor of the legislature. In many democratic legislatures, every (individual, collective, or corporate) legislator has the right to draft a proposal, which can be adopted by the floor under either closed or open rule, the latter allowing for making amendments.

With regard to the findings in social choice theory, the power of the agenda setter is highest in legislatures without the competitive right of initiative, henceforth referred to as operating under closed rule. Under this condition, the agenda setter has complete control over drafting legislative proposals, and generally, there are limited options for amendment. The sole right of initiative is particularly decisive when the agenda setter can “keep the gate closed,” that is, he or she can also ignore requests for drafting proposals or possibly for amendments. However, in some legislatures, the right of initiative is indeed in the hands of a single institutional actor to increase accountability for taking legislative action. For example, in the European Union (EU), the European Commission has the exclusive right to initiate legislation. However, scholars debate whether the Commission is capable of keeping the gates of initiative closed when the member states or the European parliaments request the European Commission to take legislative action. But regardless of the answer to this debate, the provision of an exclusive right of initiative suggests that there is a trade-off between the accountability for the decision and the level of agenda-setting power, which is sometimes minimized by distributing agenda-setting power across specialized committees. Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast (1984) show that specialized committees can influence the outcome on the floor by drafting proposals. Hence, the competitive right to initiate proposals may open the gates for alternative proposals and thus reduce not only agenda-setting power but also accountability for taking action.

Another institutional provision to reduce agenda-setting power concerns the amendment right on the floor of the legislature. Under closed rules, the floor can only adopt or reject a proposal, while under open rules, it can amend the proposals. Therefore, the fundamental question is whether making amendments is subject to (additional) restrictions coming from internal legislative rules. For example, the proposals of the European Commission can formally be amended by the European Council and sometimes by the European Parliament in the following stages of the legislative process, which would suggest a lower agenda-setting power for the European Commission. However, since making amendments requires an absolute majority in the Council, and sometimes the additional bicameral consent of the European Parliament, the European Commission can exploit these higher voting hurdles in a way that makes amendments unlikely. To the extent that the European Commission is able to exploit this (bicameral) restriction, the agenda setter remains de facto powerful and can shape the final outcome.

In powerful, transformative legislatures, such as the U.S. Congress, the floor retains a substantial capacity to amend proposals coming from an agenda setter or from committees that have been preparing the legislation for consideration by the plenary body. These processes tend to minimize the powers of agenda setters and make the decision-making process less predictable than if there were greater control exercised through some agenda setter. That said, such an open-rule system may have more positive democratic effects than the more constrained agenda-setting processes.

Another feature of the amendment process is that legislators often face the problem of selecting among several amendments. As Björn Rasch (2000) notes, theoretically, a large number of voting procedures exist for selecting among several amendments, but legislatures conventionally use two procedures: the successive procedure and the elimination procedure. In the successive procedure, legislators vote successively on each amendment and decide whether or not it should be adopted. If an amendment is adopted, the process ends; if it is rejected, the legislators vote on the next amendment in the specified order. In the elimination
procedure, the legislators pairwisely compare and vote on amendments. The rejected amendment is dropped, and the remaining is matched against the next amendment for a vote, and so on. Under both procedures, legislators can make amendments, but the sequence of voting (and the control thereof) can highly influence the collective outcome. As under closed rule, an agenda setter can manipulate the collective outcome by determining the voting sequence when legislators vote sincerely. In general, amendments that are introduced late on the agenda have a higher probability of adoption. However, when legislators vote strategically and anticipate the outcome, the reverse is also possible.

Although this research commonly finds that agenda setters remain powerful actors in democratic legislatures, some additional insights into the collective instability of outcomes in legislatures warrant greater empirical attention. Theoretically, the agenda setter can produce any collective outcome when legislators vote sincerely, but the scope of manipulation is often restricted when extreme outcomes are much more difficult to achieve. A major reason for this difficulty is that the voting sequence usually becomes very long and complicated when collective outcomes hardly match with the preferences of the legislative majority. In practice, as Rasch (2000) notes, such complicated sequences are hardly observed in legislatures. Another argument against the importance of the instability of collective outcomes and the resulting dictatorial power of the agenda setter criticizes the different level of behavioral assumptions that are made for the agenda setter and the legislators, that is, when the former is assumed to behave strategically while the latter is expected to vote sincerely. When the same behavioral assumption is made and legislators also behave strategically, they can anticipate an outcome from the decision-making process, which means that agenda manipulation becomes much more difficult. Under these conditions, collective outcomes are located in the uncovered set, which generally corresponds to the preferences of legislators more closely.

According to Rasch (2000), in most (democratic) legislatures the structure of the agenda and the sequence of voting are not controlled by a single actor. The responsibility for formulating the agenda is often delegated to the government of the day or to the speaker, but proposals can usually be amended by the parliament or the floor. Hence, when agenda formation is de facto made under open rules, the power of the agenda setter shrinks, and the set of feasible outcomes is restricted to the uncovered set. Given that result, most empirical research suggests that democratic institutions are designed in a way that restricts the power of the agenda setter. For example, the rules can make it possible for legislators to gather more information on their preferences in the decision-making process and thereby induce more stability by providing information. As with the deliberative processes mentioned above, the involvement of more potential decision makers can produce more stable outcomes than more hierarchically determined outcomes in legislatures.

A highly effective (but rarely observed) method of agenda setting in legislatures is to employ procedures in which the intensity of individual preferences is expressed by the number of votes assigned to an alternative (e.g., border count voting). Another way to restrict the power of the agenda setter would be the application of “backward-moving” instead of “forward-moving” agendas. In forward-moving agendas, legislators first take a vote between the status quo and a single alternative, while backward-moving agendas reverse this sequence and place the vote on the status quo on the final stage. As described by Shepsle and Weingast (1984), this procedure for establishing agendas usually limits the ability of the agenda setter to manipulate the outcome of the decision-making process vis-à-vis the status quo. Hence, empirical analyses rarely support the skeptical view on the democratic nature of legislatures when the dictatorial power of the agenda setter is only derived from an inherent instability of outcomes: Cases in which such manipulations have been observed are exceptionally rare in the real world.

Another way to study agenda setting under open rules is described by bargaining theories. In this approach, the implications of open rules often follow the idea that legislators make alternating offers to each other and decide whether they should accept a proposal for a final vote on the floor or whether they should attempt to amend it. In this bargaining process, the legislators are commonly assumed to behave strategically and to make proposals that they believe are acceptable to others involved in the process. They still would, however, only make proposals that would maximize their
own benefit. A key feature of these bargaining models is that they assume that time is costly; that is, the benefits from reaching an early agreement are higher than those derived from reaching the same decision later. Hence, whenever an actor drafts a new proposal, the benefit is assumed to be lower than that derived from adopting the proposal of the earlier round, and so on. As a consequence, actors do not waste their time in infinite sequences of offers and counteroffers. This assumption is often sufficient to identify a solution from the agenda-setting process; that is, when no actor has an incentive to amend a proposal, then some generally acceptable solution has been reached. This assumption about the process implies, however, that actors can benefit from making early proposals in decision-making situations. For the same reason, this also favors patient actors, who can better afford to make counterproposals in the long run. As David Baron and John Ferejohn (1989) note, under majority rule, first movers have an additional advantage in shaping their agenda because their proposal can affect the winning coalition that results from the negotiations. Irrespective of the instability of collective outcomes, bargaining theories also support the view on the importance of agenda setting in collective decision making. Apart from institutional features, these theories demonstrate that actor-specific characteristics, such as the impatience of legislators, have an important impact on which proposals come to a vote and who shapes the final outcome in the negotiations.

These insights into agenda setting are derived from fixed policy spaces, while another line of research addresses the question on how issue linkage or package dealing can change the decision-making process and collective outcomes. According to Elmer Schattschneider (1960), from a strategic perspective, actors may seek to (de-)emphasize particular issues in order to maximize their influence on collective outcomes. With regard to agenda setting, this maximization strategy can comprise several means: First, an agenda setter may bring issues to a vote on which he or she has a winning position, creating a “bandwagon” effect. Another strategy might be to introduce new issues into a policy space that others do not sufficiently address. Hence, issues may strategically be added or removed from the agenda by the agenda setter to reshuffle majorities in collective decisions. Following this idea, issues become prominent when the agenda setter is interested in their awareness.

Conclusion

These analyses of the literature on agendas suggest that analytical political science and political communication research can come together for a future common research agenda. The communication literature emphasizes the role of entrepreneurs and their contribution in shaping agendas. The analytic perspective adds an even more strategic sense and examines how the agenda setter can manipulate the political process to produce desired policy outcomes. These two perspectives are largely complementary but too infrequently are brought together in a more comprehensive analysis of the setting and manipulation of political agendas.

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See also Judicial Decision Making; Policy Process, Models of

Further Readings


Aggregate Data Analysis

Aggregate data are quantified attributes of collectivities that either relate to the body of interest as a whole (e.g., the level of democracy for countries) or have been aggregated on the basis of the properties of individual members of the collective. Aggregate data could also be negative, that is, not individual data, meaning that aggregate data refer to bigger entities (e.g., nations, regions, or companies) than individual data do (e.g., voters, workers, or inhabitants of some geographic area). The process of aggregation can be performed by calculating sums or various means (e.g., geometric or arithmetic mean) of the frequency distribution of individual cases. Aggregate data are predominantly secondary data; that is, researchers do not usually collect such data on their own. Another distinction refers to macro- versus microdata, with aggregate data always referring to quantities on a higher meso- or macrolevel. In this entry, types and sources of such data, major problems of reliability and comparability, and the possible applications of aggregate data are discussed.

Kinds of Aggregate Data

There are three types of aggregate data:

1. data relating to a collective as a whole (e.g., population or democracy indices, number of veto players or other characteristics of political systems);

2. aggregated individual data (e.g., the Gini Index for measuring income disparities, or the unemployment rate), which can be subdivided into two types:
   a. census data, where every single case of the whole population is measured (complete inventory count)
   b. data from samples, which should fit the context of the research question and be as representative as possible; and

3. event data, which give a frequency of events within a given period, mostly gathered from media sources (event data have become important sources for analysis, especially in international conflict research).

Basic Problems With Aggregate Data

There are some basic problems in comparative studies using aggregate data that have to be taken seriously. The first problem is whole-nation bias, which results from ignoring subnational variation; loss of information and reduced complexity are the consequences. Second, aggregate data are often measured in monetary units (e.g., for expenditure, import or trade volumes). For reasons of comparability between countries, the different currencies are most often translated into dollars or euros, which poses the problem of finding an adequate exchange rate for standardizing to the dollar or euro. One such standardization uses purchasing power parities, which may be misleading. Another alternative for comparing aggregated data is to standardize using a percentage of a national product measure. The choice and correct measurement of such indicators (e.g., gross domestic product [GDP] or gross national product [GNP]) are difficult and problematic; official data do not account for huge differences such as those concerning black markets or forms of subsistence income.

Intercountry comparability is also undermined by the use of different bases of calculation and a dissimilar inclusiveness of the indicators. An example makes this clear: The military budget is not identical with the budget of the Ministry of Defense. There may be a number of military expenditures (e.g., for the suppression of terrorism) that fall under the authority of other departments, such as the Ministry of the Interior. Another complication is the fact that the allocation of funds for such expenditure may vary from one country to another. The varying levels of quality in collecting data among countries can serve as a source of heteroskedasticity (i.e., a nonconstant variance where one expects a constant variance in the data). Therefore, different methods of data collection (e.g., estimation instead of more exact measurement) lead to
aggregate data analysis less reliable data and, in the end, to poorer estimates in regression analysis. Depending on which institution supplies the data (e.g., the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] or the International Monetary Fund [IMF] for public finance data), huge differences for measures of the same variables are often seen. Also, revisions over time can lead to serious distortions. OECD data, especially GDP, are revised every 5 years. Apart from comparisons between countries, the comparisons between different points in time within one country can be flawed as well; for example, if statistical offices change their systems of data acquisition and calculation, poor intertemporal comparability can result. Another problem regards event data that mostly depend on media sources; in such cases, selective media coverage can lead to overrepresentation of events in countries with a highly developed media infrastructure.

A different problem in interpreting aggregate data is known as the ecological fallacy. It occurs when inferences drawn about individuals are based solely on data at a higher level of aggregation. For example, when analyzing referenda on European integration, it turns out that rich countries—in terms of GDP—tend to vote less in favor of Europe. By contrast, Eurobarometer statistics show that in most countries individuals with higher incomes tend to vote more pro-Europe than do those with lower income. The ecological fallacy would be to falsely conclude from the strong correlation at the highly aggregated level a correlation at the individual level.

Reasons for the Use of Aggregate Data

So why should political scientists, despite all these basic problems, still be interested in aggregate data? The answer begins on a basic level of theoretical scientific principles with a paraphrase of the well-known Kantian claim that concepts without data are empty, while percepts without concepts are blind. Data without theory also are blind, but theory equally needs data, because standing on its own it would be empty. Generally speaking, social researchers need to have access to data in order to test and develop hypotheses derived from models and theory. Both deductive and inductive approaches need data. Aggregated data should be used in particular (a) when the theory is already formulated at the macrolevel and (b) when the use of primary and individual data would be problematic in terms of availability, comparability, usability, and cost.

Time series of aggregate data are also a strong resource for detecting causal mechanisms. For example, a detailed analysis of the historical evolution of democracies, such as Samuel Huntington’s “waves of democracy,” would have been impossible without measurements of democracies such as those made in the Polity IV database. Another advantage of aggregated data is the possibility of making predictions on the macrolevel, for example, for economic, demographic, or political developments.

Furthermore, reasons for the use of aggregate data arise from the fact that they are especially suited for the use of statistical methods (from simple descriptive statistics to the most sophisticated methods of analysis) allowing for efficient comparisons of large spatial and social units of analysis. With the use of statistics, political scientists are also able to test reliability and to replicate other analyses quite easily.

Sources of Aggregate Data

The availability of aggregate data is important when it comes to the analysis of historical data. One such aggregate data analysis, generally considered the first, was a study of suicide rates in different countries by Émile Durkheim. Durkheim came to the conclusion that suicide is more common in predominantly Protestant countries than in Catholic ones. Max Weber was another early user of aggregated data, using information provided by the national statistical offices, which were established in the late 18th century (1796 in Sweden, 1797 in Norway, 1800 in France, 1829 in Austria). National statistical offices today are still one of the major sources for aggregate data. Other data suppliers are international organizations (e.g., UNSTAT, Eurostat, the World Bank, the IMF), which collect and prepare national data for international comparisons. One of the most comprehensive archives for international comparisons, especially for the developed countries, is hosted by the OECD. Its data archives developed rapidly (in part, due to advances in computer and Internet technology) and provide new research possibilities.
in terms of quantity, quality, and access to data. The steady increase in data availability gives researchers the opportunity to tackle new scientific problems and, by using data collected at different points in time, to employ longitudinal research designs. National social science data archives such as the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) in the United States, the UK Data Archive hosted by the University of Essex, and the “Zentralarchiv” at the University of Cologne, Germany, provide access to specific social science data, often international as well as national data. There are also special data archives serving particular purposes, such as the Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS), which provide comparable income data.

Although easy to use, these data archives bear some potential risks as well. The first risk is empiricism, or as Jan-Eric Lane (1990) put it, there is the “constant hazard that data considerations govern the conduct of comparative inquiry instead of theoretical considerations” (p. 191). Data archives are often constructed without an underlying social science theory, obstructing a sensible selection of information, which in the end could result in a boundless gathering of data that are inapplicable or unusable. This problem of too much, perhaps irrelevant, data stored in archives can be explained as most archives have some bias toward certain types of data that are readily stored; furthermore, relevant information that is more difficult to measure is thus underrepresented. Other less serious problems of data archives that can nevertheless result in a lot of time-consuming work for the social scientist are the contextual problem and the processing problem. The first concerns the fact that data in most archives have been assembled only for certain types of research problems and thus may not be suitable for other research questions—one often has to at least reassemble the data in a way appropriate for testing one’s hypotheses. The latter refers to the myriad possibilities of data storage and formatting, frequently impeding the simple use of data with the statistical package of choice.

In addition to data archives, printed sources can be used to construct a data set: The classical way is to take handbooks with either thematic or regional foci. Examples of the first kind are Dieter Nohlen’s compendia of elections in the world, the electoral almanac of Thomas Mackie and Richard Rose, or the Political Data Handbook by Jan-Erik Lane, David McKay, and Kenneth Newton. Furthermore, the revolution in information technology has cleared the way for new possibilities to gather data, so that the Internet has become the most important data source for scholars around the world. The quantity of online resources is enormous, but from an academic point of view the quality, especially in terms of the validity of the data, is mixed. Many privately run websites do not meet scientific standards.

Analyses That Can Be Done With Aggregate Data

Existing data sets can be used either for replicating former studies (for which these data sets have once been made) or for running further analyses. In a metastudy on the use of data sets in comparative politics, Andreas Schedler and Cas Mudde found that the data sets used in articles published in six of the leading English-speaking journals of political science between 1989 and 2007 show some striking characteristics:

1. Nearly half of all observed studies using data sets are single case studies and only a minority (24.5%) are large-N studies with more than 20 countries in the sample. Large-N studies, however, are becoming more and more common. In 1989, only one of the 30 studies had more than 20 cases; in 2007, these were already 41.4%.

2. Depending on data availability, most studies center on the Western world and only on a small subsample of all the thematic fields comparative politics has to offer; thus, it is a small world, the world of comparative political statistics.

3. In accordance with these findings, it is not surprising that the well-known global political data sets, such as Freedom House, Correlates of War, or Minorities at Risk, are not used as frequently as expected; rather it is the class of country-specific data sets that is most often applied.

The last important finding of their study is that only a very small minority of researchers are able
to perform their analyses without modifying an existing data set. Most scientists have to modify, update, or refine existing data sets to fit their research questions. For a considerable number of studies (38.7%), comparative scholars had to completely construct new data sets on their own.

In general, each aggregate data analysis starts with a simple description of the data. This task can be performed by using either tables or graphical means such as bar charts or box plots. For some simple comparisons, this level of analysis may be sufficient, but most researchers have more specific research questions that they want to address via aggregate data. Let us assume that a political scientist is searching for the causes of government termination in parliamentary democracies; that is, the dependent variable is the time in office. The theory states that in addition to other factors, the polarization of the parliament, the economic environment, as well as the time already spent in office should play a significant role in early terminations. The first step of the analysis would be to select a sample of cases. For this research question, a most similar case’s design seems appropriate, resulting in a selection of all countries having a sufficiently long record as a parliamentary democracy (say, 20 years) and having all necessary information for testing the theory available. This leaves us most likely with the OECD countries and thus quite a small number of cases (approximately $N = 20$)—that is, if we consider each country as one case. Doing so, we could compare the mean government duration of the countries with the means of the explanatory variables, for example, via bivariate cross-section regressions. The results would nevertheless not be very strong because the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable is likely more complex than a simple bivariate relation and the independent variables are probably intercorrelated. Therefore, it makes sense to test the theory with multivariate regression methods.

Here, a problem arises that is quite common in social science. On the one hand, there is a small $N$, and on the other, there are very complex models, consisting of many possible explanatory variables. This constellation generates a severe problem for statistical analyses, as the degrees of freedom are in these circumstances mostly not sufficient for a sound estimation of statistical models. There are two ways to handle this problem: (1) decrease the number of independent variables or (2) increase $N$. One way to minimize the explanatory variables is to construct indices. In our example, the economic environment measured by the two variables, inflation and unemployment rate, could also be covered by a combination of both, called the misery index. Decreasing the number of independent variables can be done only in special circumstances; in most instances, researchers will have to exclude certain explanatory variables from their models. The other possibility is to increase the number of cases. This task is generally quite difficult. A potential alternative is to not only look at the national level but also include subnational entities, when this is appropriate. In our example of government duration, this could be possible in some federal states, but the independent economic variables being defined on the national level undermine a meaningful comparison. Another possibility, which has become quite popular during the past few decades, has been the use of pooled time-series cross-section analysis. The pooling of yearly data into a matrix generates more cases (more precise observations) for the analysis. This procedure nonetheless raises new problems such as autocorrelation, which violates the assumption of random distribution of cases that is required by the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Pooled analyses, therefore, have to be used—if at all—in an extremely careful manner. When all these procedures do not result in a satisfactory cases to independent variables ratio, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), a technique using Boolean algebra, could be applied. Fortunately, in our example, it is easier to maximize $N$, because every government can be regarded as a single case, and the data do not have to be aggregated further. Thus, it is possible to run multivariate regressions on a sample of all governments. However, the best methodological choice is probably not a regression but an event history model, which takes, apart from the other independent variables, elapsed time as a relevant factor into account.

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See also Qualitative Comparative Analysis; Regression; Time-Series Analysis
AliENAtion

Political alienation was introduced in political and social thought in the 19th century. From the beginning, the concept was broadly, ambiguously, and inconsistently used by scholars, mainly because of its ideological connotations and purposes. In Hegel’s and Marx’s analyses of civic and capitalist society, alienation meant a state or a process of human disconnectedness. According to Claude S. Fischer, “alienation is the state in which the actor fails to perceive a positive interdependence between himself and social relationships or other objectifications” (1974, p. 18). According to Melvin Seeman, the most important elements of this conceptualization are the following:

1. Alienation refers to a kind of “discrepancy”—something that is only implicitly entailed in the definition before.

2. The individual himself or herself or his or her social environment functions as a target or a source of alienation.

3. Alienation can be regarded as a state or as a process.

4. It can be considered as a social situation/relationship, an individual mental state, a social circumstance, or a sentiment.

These aspects are discussed below.

In contemporary social science, alienation was restated as an essential part of the critique of advanced capitalism by authors like Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, and Alain Touraine. Alienation, understood as an objective state or process, refers to a lack of socioeconomic resources, an underprivileged social status, an inferior position in a power relation, a lack of autonomy in labor relationships, or the degradation of objective life conditions. As a subjective feeling, it has several different meanings, such as a perceived loss of something considered valuable, a sense of inferiority, feelings of frustration, isolation, anomie, lack of control of one’s own life conditions, or a perception of being manipulated by powerful others or by social structures. Drafted like this, the concept found its way in various scientific disciplines such as philosophy, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, and political science. Manifold social and psychic/attitudinal states and processes were subsumed under the heading of alienation, ranging from physical or mental illness to specific attitudes toward politics, such as political distrust or feelings of belonging to a discriminated social group (class, ethnicity, etc.). In modern political science, alienation was used more narrowly and referred to negative or critical political attitudes often leading to deviant political behavior. The topics that have been most prominent in empirical political research on alienation are analyses of various dimensions of the concept and its measurement and analyses of the impact of feelings of alienation on individuals’ political behavior, particularly political apathy and participation in protest activities.

Other than the view of alienation as a general, diffuse disposition, the term was used as a multidimensional concept in empirical research. In this regard, Seeman was the leading scholar proposing a distinction of the subsequent six different dimensions of alienation, which were primarily understood as mental states:

1. Powerlessness refers to an individual’s perception of low self-esteem or inferiority in political life or to a sense of low control of one’s
own life conditions and the political circumstances one lives in. People feeling politically powerless think that they do not have any opportunity to make their voices heard in political life and to influence the conduct of public affairs. Some scholars distinguish between personal and political powerlessness, with the first set of attitudes describing the (lack of) ability to master one’s own life and the second set referring to the perceived (lack of) capacity to exert some degree of influence on politics. The feeling of powerlessness comes quite close to the sense of political (in)efficacy or subjective (in)competence, which are much more familiar concepts in political science. It was often measured by using the ANES (American National Election Studies) standard items on political efficacy. The I-E (Internal-External Locus of Control) Scale developed by Rotter is the most common alternative measure.

2. **Meaninglessness** has to do with the individuals’ sense of being able to comprehend political events, situations, and decisions and with the individuals’ assessment of the impact of politics on their own lives. In short, people suffering from meaninglessness are cognitively disconnected from social and political life. This attitude resembles to a certain degree the cognitive component of powerlessness and thus is often interpreted as a facet of political (in)efficacy.

3. **Normlessness** as the third subdimension of alienation is largely synonymous to anomie and signifies the expectation that only the use of socially unapproved means will lead to the achievement of given goals. This expectation is due to the perception that social norms regulating individual and collective behavior do not perform their function any longer. Hence, political leaders do not react in a calculable and responsive way to citizens’ demands. Those citizens who are well aware of this situation will rely on illegal or illegitimate forms of political behavior. In the practice of empirical research, normlessness is often equated to distrust and measured by the ANES standard items on trust in government. Alternative scales such as Dean’s scale of normlessness and McClosky and Schaar’s scale of anomie were also used in empirical research.

4. **Self-estrangement** seen as a failure of self-realization is the classical master theme of philosophical work on alienation and originated in the Marxian analysis of working conditions and relations. Accordingly, a lack of intrinsic fulfillment in work or an incapability of controlling one’s working conditions is regarded as the core element of self-estrangement. In widening this narrow conceptualization, some scholars proposed regarding self-estrangement as an individual’s engagement in activities that are not appreciated as intrinsically rewarding or are considered inauthentic. In empirical political science research, this dimension is not particularly important.

5. **Cultural estrangement** overlaps to a certain degree with normlessness and self-estrangement. It means the individual’s rejection of commonly held values in society, while normlessness is seen as a rejection of more specific social norms. Again, the concept does not play a major role in empirical research, despite the important role attributed to value consensus as a source of social and political integration.

6. **Social isolation**, as the sixth subdimension of alienation, was originally seen as a lack of social relationships rather than as a mental state. In practice, however, both aspects cannot really be separated from each other. Lack or loss of social ties does not become a serious problem for individuals unless it will be perceived and assessed. Thus, social isolation signifies not only a whole set of behaviors and attitudes, a sense of being excluded or lonely, a lack of identity, a feeling of being rejected or discriminated as a member of a particular social group but also deviating behavior and lack of integration into social networks. Social isolation is used as an explanatory concept in some community studies, but it is clearly less influential in empirical research than powerlessness and normlessness.

Empirical social science research on alienation reached a point of culmination in the late 1960s and early 1970s when it was mainly embedded in two specific research contexts. The first one was the theory of mass society, which was a fashionable idea to many social scientists in that period. The second impetus came from empirical research on political protest activities and movements, which used the notions of alienation, cynicism,
and subjective deprivation as the main explanatory concepts. The approach to alienation in analyses of mass society was far broader than in empirical research on political protest. As outlined by Seeman, the general research question of the former referred to the relationship of social change to political alienation, while the latter focused on various forms of behavior induced by feelings of alienation. An integration of these three sets of variables (structure, attitude, behavior) was largely missing in empirical research on alienation. An overview of the assumed links between the respective variables is outlined in Table 1.

Even if we agree to the idea of an impact of social change (particularly rapid and deep social changes) on the individual’s perception of society and his or her own place in it as well as to the view of alienation as a source of deviant behavior, the specific hypotheses implied in Seeman’s scheme are far from being conclusive. Political research focused on a smaller set of behaviors as well as attitudes. A first line of empirical research evolved in analyses of participation in civil rights protest movements and thus can be interpreted as an extension of classical studies of the behavioral impact of deprivation. Other research focused on the observation of an increase of political protest in affluent societies and on political protest as a means of privileged groups. The underlying assumption was that objective deprivation is not the only determinant of protest, even violent protest; negative feelings toward the political environment may also be a prominent source of protest activities. Two dimensions of alienation, powerlessness and normlessness, became particularly prominent in empirical research. According to the efficacy-distrust hypothesis, lack of powerlessness (efficacy) is a necessary condition for any type of political activity, since the powerless will generally abstain from participation irrespective of its specific form. Whether the powerful or efficacious will use protest or conventional means of exerting influence will depend on the presence or absence of normlessness (distrust). While the combination of efficacy and distrust leads to (illegal) protest, the efficacious and trusting use conventional forms of political participation such as voting, becoming active in parties, and so on. However, the empirical evidence on the efficacy-distrust hypothesis is not convincing, as is the case for the impact of alienation in general.

In assessing the state of research on political alienation, Seeman came to a rather pessimistic conclusion that still holds true today. According to him, research was often characterized by ideological convictions rather than by conceptual clarity and imbalanced by dealing mainly with powerlessness, normlessness, and social isolation and by neglecting the other components. The theoretical underpinnings of empirical research on political alienation have remained weak so far, the constructs have been used in an inconsistent manner, the measures were poor, and the empirical findings contradictory.

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See also Apathy; Efficacy, Political; Participation, Contentious; Social Movements

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<td><strong>Forms of Alienation</strong></td>
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<td>Kinship to impersonality</td>
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<td>Enlargement of scale</td>
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Alliances

Alliances are among the most studied aspects of international cooperation and play important roles in most broad theories of international relations, particularly theories of war and peace. They are an important component of the security policies of most states in the international system today. This entry first defines and describes alliances, then discusses the motivations of states to form alliances and the effects of alliances on international outcomes.

An alliance is a formal agreement among independent states in the international system to cooperate militarily in the event of militarized conflict with outside parties. Alliances are distinguished from informal alignments by their codification in a written document; while states that share interests and tend to coordinate behavior may be termed aligned, only states that have made an international legal commitment to assist one another are allied. Alliances are distinguished from protectorates, unilateral guarantees, and colonial relationships by their joint commitments; all member states retain sovereignty and independence but commit to adjust their policies to meet allied goals. Commitments need not be symmetrical, but all alliance members must make some cooperative commitment. Finally, alliances involve promises of assistance in the event of military conflict with outside parties. Thus, they are distinguishable from other forms of military cooperation such as arms sales agreements and intelligence-sharing agreements.

Formation and Provisions of Alliances

Most alliances are formed through treaties. The specific promises made in these treaties can vary significantly. Some alliances commit the signatories to assist one another in the event a member state is attacked; these are often referred to as defense pacts. An example of a defense pact is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Other alliances provide for states to assist one another in accomplishing offensive goals, usually in addition to defensive promises. The Pact of Steel, signed by Germany and Italy in 1939, is an example of this sort of alliance. Many alliances, however, fall short of guaranteeing active participation in conflicts that may arise and instead commit the member states to remain neutral and provide no support for the adversary of an ally in the event the ally becomes involved in conflict or commit the members to consult in the event of threat and make every attempt to produce a coordinated response, without any specificity about what that coordinated response might be. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (also known as the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact) signed in 1939 is an example of a neutrality pact, and the Treaty of Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation signed by Russia and China in 2001 is an example of a consultation pact (also known as an entente).

In many cases, alliance treaties also specify the conditions under which the obligations come into force. Rather than applying to any military conflict, an alliance may, for instance, apply only to conflicts with specific adversaries, in specific locations, or in conjunction with a specific dispute. The NATO treaty, for instance, specifies that it applies only to the home territories of members and does not commit members to defend their allies’ colonial possessions. Defense pacts signed by France with both Poland and Czechoslovakia at Locarno, Switzerland, in 1925 commit the states to assist one another only in the event of unprovoked attack by Germany. And some treaties (for instance, the Convention of London signed by France, the United Kingdom, and Italy during the Crimean War) are limited to a specific ongoing conflict, committing the states to work together only through the conclusion of the current war.

Alliances also vary in the level of peacetime investment and coordination they require. While some alliance treaties only require action in the event conflict emerges, others provide for the development of organizations and military integration during peacetime, for one state to place troops on the territory of an ally during peacetime, and/or
for shared development of defense and foreign policy. In addition, alliances vary in size and length of term. Some alliances are bilateral agreements, while others are large multilateral entities. Some alliances are formed for temporary purposes, for instance, for the duration of an ongoing war; whereas others are designed to last for long periods of time, for instance, 20 years, with provisions allowing for renewal.

**Purposes of Alliances**

So why do states form alliances? The most basic reason is that by joining their military forces with those of other states, they become stronger fighting forces. Given that the international system is anarchic, all bargaining among states takes place in the shadow of the use of force. States that can muster more military force can retain their security and compel concessions from others. States maintain their security by deterring threats against them, and successful deterrence requires convincing potential adversaries that pursuing gains at a state’s expense through the use of force would be unsuccessful and/or prohibitively costly due to the state’s ability to wage a successful war. Similarly, states can receive concessions from other states by convincing those states that resisting demands will be unsuccessful and/or prohibitively costly due to the superior military power of the challenging state or coalition. In the event that deterrence or compellence fails, and states find themselves at war, they are more likely to win the war with allied support than without.

Alternatively, states may use alliances to reduce their individual defense burdens. To the extent that economies of scale exist in the provision of defense, states might find it more efficient to combine their defense preparations with other states rather than bear the full burden of defense provisions on their own. For instance, many states found it more efficient to rely on the U.S. or the (former) USSR nuclear umbrellas during the Cold War rather than to develop their own nuclear weapons programs. Similarly, states may have different comparative advantages in defense (e.g., land power vs. sea power) and benefit from combining their efforts.

Interestingly, however, many alliances are formed between strong states and weaker states. Since weaker states usually cannot offer much increased military power to strong states (with the exception of a few weak states that occupy strategically important geographic locations), one might reasonably ask why strong states would see benefit in allying with weaker states. Two explanations (which are probably both accurate) have been proposed. One is that strong states have a self-interest in the security of some weaker states due to factors such as valuable economic relationships or rivalries with other major powers and are willing to bear the costs of defending those states. The other is that weaker states are willing to offer stronger states other advantages—for instance, foreign policy control, use of their territory and resources, or compliance on particular issues of interest to stronger states—in return for an alliance.

**Implementation and Impacts of Alliances**

Yet given that there is no institution to provide external enforcement of contracts in the international system, one might wonder why states believe that alliances will be reliable. How can state leaders be assured that their allies will not abandon them in the event of attack? In fact, this is a significant concern and almost assuredly prevents some potentially beneficial alliances from occurring; states should be reluctant to depend too heavily on other states to guarantee their security and when deciding to form alliances must consider the incentives that their allies will have for fulfilling their alliance commitments in the event of conflict. That being said, many allies do have incentive to work with their partners due to shared interests, and the formalization of cooperation in an alliance treaty enhances the probability of future joint action. Forming and institutionalizing an alliance are costly. Not only do states have to negotiate the agreement, they then have to implement military coordination clauses and coordinate their foreign policies to make the alliance credible. In addition, violating a previous commitment can have negative repercussions for the international reputation of a state and the domestic reputation of a leader. Thus, many scholars believe that states that invest in forming alliances have increased incentive to fulfill them in the event that alliances are invoked.

So how do alliances affect outcomes in the international system? The strongest effects of alliances are on the probability that militarized disputes
occur and the probability that wars expand. Alliances affect the probability that states challenge the current status quo and make threats involving the use of military force. States with allies are less likely to find themselves challenged because potential adversaries understand that to compel compliance would involve facing a joint military effort involving the target and its allies. On the other hand, states that have allies committed to help them may be more willing to challenge the status quo and threaten the use of force in the expectation that their targets will concede their demands.

Yet, while defensive alliances may deter the initiation of disputes, when deterrence fails, states with allies may be more willing to resist a challenger’s demands and take the dispute to war. If this happens, the war is unlikely to remain a bilateral affair. Alliances tend to diffuse wars beyond their initial participants and create larger, more severe conflicts. Because defensive alliances both deter disputes and make it more likely that failures of deterrence result in particularly large and severe wars, it is not easily apparent whether alliances have an overall dampening effect on international conflict.

Many scholars claim, however, that alliances have spillover effects on other kinds of international cooperation. Some argue, for instance, that alliances tend to trade more with one another, that allies are more likely to settle disputes among themselves peacefully, and that institutions initially formed to support alliances become useful for a wide range of other cooperative activities as well. A large number of alliance treaties include specific provisions for nonmilitary cooperation in addition to military cooperation. Thus, alliances may have an indirect pacifying effect as well.

In conclusion, scholars today have considerable agreement on a definition for alliances, on how alliances can be distinguished from other relationships, and on the varying reasons why states form alliances. Research continues in an attempt to specify more precisely the full range of effects of alliances on international outcomes.

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See also Anarchy; International Relations, Theory; Power and International Politics; Security and Defense Policy; Security Cooperation; War and Peace

Further Readings

Analysis of Variance

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a method for decomposing variance in a measured outcome into variance that can be explained, such as by a regression model or an experimental treatment assignment, and variance that cannot be explained, which is often attributable to random error. Using this decomposition into component sums of squares, certain test statistics can be calculated that can be used to describe the data or even justify model selection. Lab experiments have become increasingly popular in political science, and ANOVA is a useful tool for analyzing such experiments. In recent years, there have been a number of laboratory experiments on the effects of campaigning and media advertising. Nicolas Valentino, Vincent Hutchings, and Ismail White (2002), Diana Mutz and Byron Reeves (2005), and Ted Brader (2005) have all performed lab experiments that aim to determine the effect that campaigning and advertising in media have on voters views and decisions. All three experiments employ an ANOVA to control for observable characteristics, interactions between treatment regimes, and significance of the relative effectiveness of treatments. This
entry discusses ANOVA and its applications in greater detail.

In the familiar regression context, the “sum of squares” (SS) can be decomposed as follows. Assuming that $Y_i$ is individual $i$’s outcome, $\bar{Y}$ is the mean of the outcomes, $\hat{Y}_i$ is individual $i$’s fitted value based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, and $e_i$ is the resulting residual,

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} (Y_i - \bar{Y})^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\hat{Y}_i - \bar{Y})^2 + \sum_{i=1}^{N} (e_i^2),$$

where

$$SS_{total} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} (Y_i - \bar{Y})^2$$

is the total sum of squares,

$$SS_{regression} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\hat{Y}_i - \bar{Y})^2$$

refers to the variance explained by the regression, and

$$SS_{error} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} (e_i^2)$$

is the variance due to the error term, also known as the unexplained variance. Commonly, we would write this decomposition as

$$SS_{total} = SS_{regression} + SS_{error}.$$

The equations above show how the total variance in the observations can be decomposed into variance that can be explained by the regression equation and variance that can be attributed to the random error term in the regression model.

ANOVA is not restricted to use with regression models. The concept of decomposing variance can be applied to other models of data, such as an experimental model. The following is the decomposition of a one-way layout experimental design in which an experimenter randomly assigns observations to one of $I$ treatment assignments. Each treatment assignment has $J$ observations assigned to it. In the case of a randomized controlled trial with only one treatment regime and $N$ subjects randomly assigned to treatment with half a probability, this would mean that $I = 2$, one treated group and one control group, where each group has size $J$. In this framework, the variance decomposition would be as follows:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{j=1}^{J} (Y_{ij} - \bar{Y})^2 - \sum_{j=1}^{J} \sum_{i=1}^{I} (\bar{Y}_j - \bar{Y})^2$$

$$+ \sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{j=1}^{J} (\bar{Y}_i - \bar{Y})^2,$$

where

$$\bar{Y}_i = \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^{J} Y_{ij}$$

is defined as the average response under the $I$th treatment and

$$\bar{Y} = \frac{1}{IJ} \sum_{j=1}^{J} \sum_{i=1}^{I} Y_{ij}$$

is defined as the overall average of all observations, regardless of treatment assignment. Commonly, this sum of squares expression is written as

$$SS_{total} = SS_{between} + SS_{within},$$

where $SS_{between}$ refers to the part of the variance that can be attributed to the different treatment assignments and $SS_{within}$ refers to the variance that can be described by the random error within a treatment assignment. From this, we can see that $SS_{between}$ and $SS_{regression}$, from the regression framework, both refer to the explained variance. $SS_{within}$ and $SS_{error}$ both refer to the unexplained variance.

Typically an ANOVA table is constructed to describe the variance decomposition. In the regression context, where $p$ is defined as the number of independent regressors and $n$ is the number of observations, the ANOVA table typically looks like this:
This table gives us an idea as to how to break down our analysis. The column \(df\) refers to the degrees of freedom. In the regression framework, the degrees of freedom for the regression is the number of parameters in the regression equation. The column \(SS\) refers to the sum of squares, which is defined as \(SS/df\) for each row in the table. We can also determine the \(R^2\) value of our treatment or model. We define \(R^2\) as follows:

\[
R^2 = \frac{SS_{\text{regression}}}{SS_{\text{total}}} - 1 - \frac{SS_{\text{error}}}{SS_{\text{total}}}.
\]

The \(R^2\) refers to how much of the variance is explained by the model. A high \(R^2\) value means that much of the variation is explained by the model, implying that the model fits the data well and that little of the variance is explained by the random error term. In the experimental framework, a high \(R^2\) value means that much of the variation is explained by the treatment assignment, and little of the variance is due to random error within those treatment assignments.

**Model Selection and Analysis of Variance**

ANOVA is generally used with linear regression to assess model selection. When selecting the best model, we seek to strike a balance between goodness of fit and parsimony. If two models fit the data equally well, the model selected should include only those explanatory variables that explain a significant degree of the variance in the response variable. The question is how to distinguish between important and trivial variables in a way that is systematic. ANOVA is one method for identifying the parameters of interest. It is important to stress that ANOVA makes all the assumptions made by normal linear regression. Furthermore, in general applications of ANOVA, all the explanatory variables must be mutually orthogonal, although in some limited cases this orthogonality is not necessary to make a reasonable justification for model choice. To determine which covariates are important for the regression model, ANOVA can be run multiple times in succession to determine if adding an additional covariate contributes any more to the explained variance.
Consider two normal linear models:

$$y = \alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \varepsilon,$$

(1)

$$y = \alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \varepsilon,$$

(2)

where $x_1$ and $x_2$ are explanatory variables, $\alpha$ is the intercept, and $\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$ are the parameters of interest. The second is obviously a simpler version of the first. We can think of Model 2 as the version of Model 1, in which $\beta_2$ is restricted to zero. For this reason, we often refer to Model 1 as the unrestricted model and Model 2 as the restricted model. The question is which model is preferable.

In model selection, ANOVA analyzes the degree to which residual variance changes with the addition of explanatory variables to the basic model. Note that the vector of residuals for the restricted model (where $\beta_2 = 0$) can be broken into two components:

$$y - \hat{y}_1 = \{y - \hat{y}_2\} + \{\hat{y}_2 - \hat{y}_1\}$$

$$\hat{y}_1 = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 x_1$$

$$\hat{y}_1 = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 x_1 + \hat{\beta}_2 x_2.$$

Thus, the vector of residuals for the restricted model consists of a vector of the residuals for the unrestricted model plus the residual difference between the two models. By construction of OLS, the vectors $(y - \hat{y}_2)$ and $(\hat{y}_2 - \hat{y}_1)$ are orthogonal, and Pythagoras’s theorem implies that the sum of squares for the restricted model is just the sum of squares for the unrestricted model plus the difference in the sum of squares for the two models, or equivalently,

$$SS_{\beta_1} = SS_{\beta_1, \beta_2} + \{SS_{\beta_1} - SS_{\beta_1, \beta_2}\}.$$

While adding complexity reduces the amount of unexplained variance in the residuals, it also reduces the degrees of freedom. This trade-off motivates the principal of parsimony in model selection. Under the assumptions of OLS, $SS_a$ and $SS_{\beta_1, \beta_2}$ are mutually independent and have a chi-square distribution. The $F$-test is therefore the appropriate test to determine whether the degree to which inclusion of each additional explanatory variable in the model improves the precision of estimation. In this case, the $F$-test would look as follows:

$$F = \frac{(SS_{\beta_1, \beta_2})/p - q}{SS_{\beta_1, \beta_2}/(p - q - 1)},$$

where $p$ and $q$ represent the number of parameters in the unrestricted and restricted model, respectively (excluding the intercept). Under the null hypothesis, the unrestricted model does not provide a significantly better fit than the restricted model; reject the null hypothesis if the $F$ calculated from the data is greater than the critical value of the $F$ distribution with $(p - q, n - p)$ degrees of freedom. The models, their sum of squares, mean square, and $F$-test can be displayed in an ANOVA table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fitted Model</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>$\Delta SS$</th>
<th>$MS$</th>
<th>$F$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{y}_1 = \hat{\alpha}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$SS_{\text{error}} - SS_a$</td>
<td>$SS_{\text{error}} - SS_a$</td>
<td>$(SS_{\text{error}} - SS_a)/(n - 1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{y}_1 = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 x_1$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$SS_a - SS_{\beta_1}$</td>
<td>$SS_a - SS_{\beta_1}$</td>
<td>$SS_a - SS_{\beta_1}/(n - 2)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{y}_1 = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 x_1 + \hat{\beta}_2 x_2$</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$SS_{\beta_1} - SS_{\beta_1, \beta_2}$</td>
<td>$SS_{\beta_1} - SS_{\beta_1, \beta_2}$</td>
<td>$SS_{\beta_1} - SS_{\beta_1, \beta_2}/(n - 3)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$SS_{\text{error}}$</td>
<td>$SS_{\text{error}}/(n - 3)$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Often the results of an ANOVA table are used to justify the inclusion of each individual variable in the model. As the model expands from $p$ to $p+1$ explanatory variables, the $F$-test evaluates the hypothesis that the parameters $B_{p+1} = 0$, given the assumptions of the model are satisfied. If the explanatory variables that constitute the design matrix are all mutually orthogonal and we have the correct model, then the ANOVA results can be used to determine whether the inclusion of $x_{p+1}$ significantly increases the fitness of the model. Without orthogonality, however, we do not know if the order in which the variables are added matters. As successive variables are added from the model, only the variance of the part of the variable that is orthogonal to the previously included variables in the model is removed from the variance of the error.

This entry has discussed the definition of ANOVA and how it is often applied to regression and experimental data. ANOVA is a decomposition of variance into component parts. There is variance that is attributable to a model, such as a regression model or an experimental treatment, and variance that is attributable to random error. ANOVA is often used to construct an ANOVA table, which succinctly presents the variance decomposition. This method can also be used to justify regression model selection where the goal is to find parsimony between fit and degrees of freedom. ANOVA can be used to determine how much extra variance a marginal explanatory variable explains while also weighing the loss of a degree of freedom. It is important to note, however, that the order in which variables are added to a model is important in these tests unless the variables are orthogonal to one another. The decomposition of variance using the analysis of variance is a powerful tool for describing data and the fit of a model.

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See also Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Regression

Further Readings


Analytic Narratives: Applications

Often derided by colleagues for “possessing an $N$ of 1,” those who focus on case studies—Germany between the wars, France during the revolution, or Kasumpa village (see below)—nonetheless aspire to be social scientists. While their commitment to fieldwork, archival research, and qualitative methods runs deep, so too does their commitment to science. Analytic narratives offer a means for reconciling this apparent contradiction. Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Lauran Rosenthal, Barry Weingast, and Robert Bates formulated the approach while focusing on historical cases. This entry illustrates the approach by reviewing its use in a study of Kasumpa village in the Luapula Valley of Zambia.

In this essay, “fieldwork” is defined as immersion in the lives of people who remain resident in their own social setting, while observing and recording their behavior and discussing with them their actions and the values and beliefs that shape it. This also includes, of course, knowledge of the local language. “Science” refers to the attempt to derive valid explanations, which implies two things: An explanation is valid if it follows logically from its premises, and it is valid insofar as it withstands efforts to refute it through the systematic collection and analysis of data. The best test of logical validity is formalization; that of empirical validity is the use of rigorous methods.

Taken together, these clarifications highlight a key feature of the agenda that underlies this
method: the treatment of qualitative research, formal theory, and empirical methods as complementary rather than rival approaches to social research.

Illustration

*Rural Responses to Industrialization: A Study of Village Zambia* by Bates reports on a study of Kasumpa village, a settlement in the Luapula Valley that borders Zambia and Congo and forms a portion of the hinterland of the great mining centers of those two countries. The author of this study notes how, in the initial stages of his fieldwork, he sought to discern the values held by the residents of the village, their perception of the alternatives available to them, and the beliefs that shaped their behavior. The residents of Kasumpa village, he learned, quite rightly viewed themselves as poor and the mining towns as prosperous. Economic life revolved around the export of produce and labor to the mining towns; political life centered on efforts to persuade the government to generate money and jobs by investing in projects in the region. The residents sought to use the markets for produce and labor to gain access to the wealth of the mining towns, and they used political protest to levy a portion of it for themselves.

Based on these insights, the author then turned to theory. In expositing this work, this essay focuses on his treatment of migration, a subject long central to research in the region. The dominant theory of the time, developed by John Harris and Michael Todaro, viewed migration as a decision made by individuals as an effort to maximize their expected incomes. Several implications flowed from that formulation, and the author randomly selected 100 or so out of around 1,000 villagers to test them. If the theory were correct, more men than women would migrate to seek work in town, because there were more jobs for men in the mines, and the probability of securing a job was therefore greater for males than for females. The likelihood of departure from the village should be higher for working-age men: They were more likely to secure jobs than youths were and could amortize the costs of job searches better than old men could. In addition, according to this theory, when people left, they should journey to towns where others had settled before them, thus lowering the costs of job searches and increasing the return from migrating. The demographic structure of the village should therefore be distorted, with a gap where working-age men could normally be expected and a disproportionate number of females and old people of both sexes. An implication for politics also followed: While the migrants might choose to “exit” as a way of escaping poverty, those who remained should “give voice,” pressuring the government to render fishing and maize growing more profitable. Phrased another way, while migrants might employ the market for labor as an alternative to political action, those who remained in the village should treat the market for commodities as a complement to it.

The data lend support to each implication, with young men flocking to the nearest mines, women and older men tending to remain behind, and fishermen and farmers dominating the local party branch and employing their positions to lobby the government for loans to farmers and investments in the local fisheries. However, while collecting the data, the researcher gained a deeper understanding of the migration decision—one that suggested that, in fact, the expected income model was wrong. Migration, it became clear, involved not only those who chose to migrate but also those they left behind and, in particular, their elder kin. Nor was migration the outcome of a choice made at one point of time; rather, it was a portion of an intertemporal sequence of moves in which the older generation paid for the costs of the movement of younger, working-age males from the village to town. Not only did they pay for transport and advance funds for sustenance during the initial period of job search, but they also paid for the costs of education so that the youths might better compete for jobs in town. It was made clear that they did this in the expectation of later receiving remittances from the young, thus assuring them of financial support in old age. In effect, rather than acting as individual agents, the residents of Kasumpa village acted as members of families and organized the relationship between generations so as to invest in the formation of human capital. By responding thus to the opportunities offered by the market for labor, they sought to extract income from the towns.

Stepping back for a moment, note the sequence and the interplay between different research methods. First, there was immersion and the gathering of qualitative information, then the formulation of theory. Next, the theory was tested, using survey methods and engaging further in “soaking and poking”—conversations about the relationships between parents and children, discussions about
family life in the United States and Luapula Valley, and gossip about why X could live in comfort (“great kids”) whereas Y lived in poverty (“the way he neglected his children, no wonder”). Then came the realization that the theory was wrong. The resultant crisis then restarted the cycle but not at a random starting point. Rather, because the failure took place within the context of a theory, it highlighted key features that had been missed the first time around.

It was clear that the decision to migrate did not result from a comparison between rural and urban wage rates, made by individuals who sought to maximize expected incomes, as the Harris-Todaro model might suggest. Rather, it resulted from the strategies used by members of families who sought to invest by forming human capital. Indeed, data from the surveys confirmed that the flow of finances between generations yielded a reasonable rate of return, for plausible rates of discount. But, the researcher realized, if this revised vision of the behavior of migrants was correct, then there was a lot he did not understand: According to the current theory, what was being observed, in fact, should not exist. Less dramatically, it suggested that the arrangement was highly vulnerable and that its persistence suggested that additional factors, not yet described, must be at play.

The theoretical difficulty came from two features of the behavior of the families. The first was that it involved an exchange; the second was that the exchange took place over time. The elders expended resources on the young at one point in time in the expectation that the young would later repay. But, the researcher realized, if this revised vision of the behavior of migrants was correct, then there was a lot he did not understand: According to the current theory, what was being observed, in fact, should not exist. Less dramatically, it suggested that the arrangement was highly vulnerable and that its persistence suggested that additional factors, not yet described, must be at play.

The theoretical difficulty came from two features of the behavior of the families. The first was that it involved an exchange; the second was that the exchange took place over time. The elders expended resources on the young at one point in time in the expectation that the young would later repay. But the preferences of the young should vary over time: They should be initially willing to pay but reluctant to do so when the bill came due later. Given this variation in preferences, the elders, anticipating the later actions of the youths, should not be willing to invest in the first place. The (implicit) contract was therefore vulnerable to the problem of “time consistency.” And yet the elders were observed investing in junior kin.

Highlighting the anomalous nature of the finding was that local conditions reinforced the strength of the temptations facing the young. There was a long lag between the time when the elders bestowed resources on them and when they could be expected to remit money from town; the distance between the village and the town was great as well, making it easy for the young to dissimulate, claiming that the loss of a job, illness, or unforeseen expenses in town made it impossible to fulfill their obligations to village kin. The elders were of course aware of the impact of time and distance on the ability of the young to elude their obligations. And yet the elders continued to use their families in order to invest. The author of the study was thus driven by the failure of his theory to engage once again in the lives of the people of Kasumpa and to seek out what was being missed—accounting for their conduct, which otherwise appeared so rational.

Once again, theory had failed. However, once again, the failure proved generative, for it forced a search for features of village life that had been overlooked thus far. One feature was that the young hoped to return to the villages and depended on their families when seeking to do so. To retire in the village, a worker would need land on which to build a house and plant a garden. To secure that land, he would need to be kumwesu—that is, “one of us.” To establish his bona fides, he would have to rely on his family in the village to testify to his roots there; to his participation in its affairs, as by returning for weddings and funerals; and to his continued support of the welfare of its citizens, as by remitting funds from town. Thus, the ability of the young to fulfill their plans rested on the willingness of their family to confirm that they had fulfilled their obligations to their elder kin.

Theory had therefore failed, or at least been exposed as inconsistent with the known data, and its failure had motivated a renewed pursuit of qualitative data—one focused on a search for features of reality that would fill gaps in the argument. Phrased differently, in the interplay between theory and qualitative research that characterizes the generation of analytic narratives, formal theory—which is often viewed as a deductive method—is instead used inductively.

Thus far, more emphasis has been given to fieldwork and theory than to the use of empirical methods. Recall, however, their use when testing the implications derived from the comparative statics of the expected income theory of migration. As illustrated in Rural Responses to Industrialization, they play an additional role as well: They are used to rule out alternative explanations.

Returning to the contributions of the elders to the young, someone might offer an alternative
Analytic Narratives: Applications

explanation: The elders could be viewed as altruistic rather than self-interested. Their payments to the young could be treated as gifts made out of affection. Given that both accounts are consistent with what has been observed, researchers, when marshalling empirical methods to choose between the two accounts, need to bring them to bear on data drawn from outside of the original sample. To gather such data, the author shifted his attention to the plateaus that lay above the valley. Because of the tsetse flies, the villagers in Luapula could not raise livestock; because the plateaus were free of tsetse flies, those who lived there could. There, the elders invested in cattle. Because cattle reproduce, herds grow over time, and as the urban centers grow, so does the demand for meat. All else being equal, cattle herds therefore increase in value, enabling their owners to recruit clients, bargain for brides, and bid for favors. If the elders were motivated by self-interest, then, rather than investing in their children, they would invest in their cattle; if they were motivated by affection, they would invest in junior kin. The evidence showed clearly that they invested in their herds. They stinted on the payment of school fees, so the level of education remained low. The rate of migration of cattle-keeping peoples remained low as well. Gathering empirical data from out of the original sample thus lend credence to the researcher’s interpretation of the behavior of the villagers. Had affection dominated self-interest, then the flow of resources between generations on the plateau would have resembled that in the valley. Clearly, it did not. The analysis of theoretically relevant data, collected outside of the original sample, thus dispensed with an alternative interpretation, leaving the original intact.

Conclusion

The end product of this research was a “village study.” But it was also a study that was the product of repeated efforts at falsification. When ideas were rendered coherent, then data were gathered to test them; when reflection exposed weaknesses in interpretation, then additional field research filled in the gap. The resultant study was not “large N.” Nor was it axiomatic and deductive. But, as it was shaped by theory and statistical methods, the study “scaled up.” It confirmed that villagers in the middle of Africa were rational and self-interested in their pursuit of wealth and their use of power, a controversial claim at the time and one still contested by cultural anthropologists. As in the treatment of the behavior of the villagers on the plateau, it supported those who contest the premise of cultural conservatism among cattle-keeping peoples. It helped redefine the understanding of how migration takes place and how rural people react to urban opportunities. And, along with the contributions of others, it helped alter the manner in which political scientists approach the study of agrarian politics.

There are some in political science who champion the “deep reading” of texts and “immersion” in rich, qualitative data. Others label themselves as formal theorists and generate rigorous proofs. And still others consider themselves to be methodologists and specialize on the development and use of systematic empirical methods. Those who develop analytic narratives view these approaches as complementary. The first yields Verstehen or comprehension; the second generates conviction, demonstrating that the explanation is logically consistent; and the third determines whether it is compelling—that is, it can be demonstrated convincingly to others. By combining these approaches, those who seek to produce analytic narratives “do science” even while focusing on unique events or particular settings.

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See also Analytic Narratives: The Method; Case Studies; Migration; Mixed Methods; Participant Observation

Further Readings


**Analytic Narratives: The Method**

An analytic narrative is a methodological proposal to bridge rational choice modeling with more traditional narrative explanations of phenomena in the social sciences. Typically, the methodology combines models from game theory with historical narrative. The analytic narrative project, however, does not represent a methodological breakthrough in itself. Rather, the project makes explicit the methodology that numerous scholars have adopted when combining historical and comparative research with rational choice models. Influenced by the work of Douglass C. North, the analytic narrative project started off with a commitment to understand institutional formation and change. In their book *Analytic Narratives* (1998), Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Lauran Rosenthal, and Barry Weingast offer the first systematic outline of the key elements of the methodology, and they do so by exploring institutional change in a wide range of places and times. The authors’ intent, as well as that of the majority of analytic narrativists, is to investigate enduring questions of political economy, such as political order, political and economic governance, and intra- or interstate relations.

Moreover, a distinguishing feature of the analytic narrative project is that it underscores the importance of the institutional context within which historical events occur. Understanding the institutional context helps account for how and why certain events may happen. The importance afforded to the historical and institutional detail is in fact what sets analytic narrativists apart from most rational choice scholars. Both deduce their hypotheses from the assumptions of rational choice and the logic of game theory. Rational choice scholars, however, start off from a general model and then test their hypothesis with appropriate data, while analytic narrativists formulate and refine the model itself in interplay with the context-specific institutional elements of the historical narrative. A major objective of analytic narratives, shared certainly with social science research, is to successfully identify the causal factors that explain a particular historical phenomenon—that is, to determine how some combination of causes brought it about. The notion of “mechanism” is commonly used. This entry discusses the conditions under which analytic narratives are most successful in providing explanations for historical phenomena. It first examines the distinctive roles of formal theory and context-specific evidence in developing a conjecture and ascribing causality. Second, it explores the behavioral assumptions underlying strategic game theory and their implications for analytic narratives.

**Theoretical Model Versus Narrative**

The construction of an analytic narrative proceeds, roughly, as follows. First, the scholar acquires in-depth knowledge about the historical phenomenon of interest; that is, a detailed account of the context and the historical process, based on studying the past through primary sources or reading the already existing historical accounts. A detailed account is essential to isolate the relevant strategic elements in the interaction: the key actors, their goals, and the rules that structure their behavior. These elements can then be formalized in a model. The formulation of the model—generally a game theory model—specifies the choices, constraints, and trade-offs the actors face in the phenomenon in question. The model is supplemented with a narrative that provides a rich explanation of the meaning actors attach to their actions, circumstances, and surroundings: the significance of the local culture. The outcomes predicted by the theoretical analysis are then confronted with the narrative; the narrative serves to assess the predictions and arbitrate among possible explanations in
instances of observational equivalence. Further refinement of the model, and collection of more historical detail, can result from additional iterations between the analytics and the history. Analytic narratives stand on a careful balance between context-specific detail and rigorous analytic techniques. An analytic narrative, however, is problem driven, not theory driven. Thus, the explanation of a particular event is what motivates each study. Nonetheless, even if driven by a particular case, analytic narratives are informed by theoretical modeling. The exercise of formalization, by isolating the relevant strategic elements in an interaction, helps identify the key actors and the combination of causes that can explain the strategic situation in question.

A major reason for applying models to narratives is to attain logically consistent explanations; thus, the predictions of the model must follow deductively. However, it must be pointed out that the model does not need to do the bulk of the explanation. The theory highlights the issues to be explored and the general considerations and evidence that need to be examined, while the knowledge of the historical context is used to develop a conjecture regarding the causal mechanism. The model, thus, constrains but does not determine the conjecture.

The conjecture is then evaluated, refined, or even overhauled through the interactive use of a context-specific model and the historical narrative. This empirical method thereby recognizes and takes advantage of the context specificity and historical contingency of institutional analysis. A successful explanation requires a well-confirmed causal claim about why and how a certain outcome obtained—this can be done even if it is primarily the narrative rather than the model that accounts for the explanation. The explanation that the model points to should also survive competition with other explanations. These can be existing explanations that the author may be contesting or other potential explanations that could account for the historical facts. The proposed explanation must be confronted with these other explanations and shown to be superior.

Analytic narratives, by providing a detailed account of the context and the historical process, acknowledge the uniqueness of situations that take place in particular moments and at specific places. At the same time, analytic narratives seek to identify causal mechanisms that are generalizable to other situations, inasmuch as they explain a social phenomenon by identifying how some combination of causes brought it about. Analytic narratives seek to capture the uniqueness of the situation under investigation by means of the narrative while using the model to capture the general features of the type of phenomena under which this situation falls. The use of rational choice in analytic narratives, by carefully identifying the causal mechanisms, makes possible the application of the logic of one setting to another.

Explanations that can account for different phenomena using few arguments—that is, generalizable explanations—are of course desirable. Generalizability, however, is not a requirement of explanation, since a causal mechanism may be unique to a phenomenon. Thus, for an analytic narrative to provide a successful explanation, it is not necessary that the causal mechanism be generalizable. It suffices that the events the model identifies as causes and effects actually take place. If a generalizable statement of the mechanism identified by an analytic narrative is available, this is of course a plus. In short, for analytic narratives to offer successful explanations, the formalization at the heart of the narrative must correctly identify some of the causes, effects, and enabling conditions in question. This does not require that the causal mechanism be generalizable. What is required is that the events the model identifies as causes and effects actually take place and that the statement of causal mechanism survives competition with other explanations.

Behavioral Assumptions

The reliance of analytic narratives on explicit formal theorizing compels scholars to take a systematic approach and to reveal the reasoning and assumptions behind their explanations. However, by emphasizing certain aspects of reality, this reliance on models, and specifically game theory models, highlights certain scope conditions for which the analytic narrative project is better suited. The scope conditions refer to the situations in which game theory is the best tool to explain human
behavior. In terms of the historical phenomena of interest and the types of questions addressed, analytic narratives are a better tool when causal explanation is found in strategic interactions. They theorize strategic interaction and not the structural conditions under which the interaction takes place. Macrolevel structural factors are taken as exogenous during modeling interactions, which implies that changes in such factors need to be incorporated as moves by “nature” and are not treated in an analytic fashion. This emphasis on strategic interaction, however, is not a weakness of analytic narratives as much as a necessity given their focus on microlevel historical data.

The analytical framework of classical game theory rests on seemingly unrealistic assumptions about the cognition, information, and rationality of the parts in the interaction. What are the costs of these assumptions? Analytic narratives emphasize the importance of the institutional context in which situations take place. This institutional context can, in fact, provide the analytic narrativist with what Greif calls the “socially articulated and disseminated rules” that provide individuals with the cognitive, coordinative, and informational abilities that the theory assumes. Thus, the specificity of the institutional context can in many cases justify the behavioral assumptions (Greif, 2006, chap. 5).

The fact, however, that game theory may not be useful in certain conditions does not imply that analytic narratives must be abandoned. They can theorize by means of other forms of game theory that rely on different behavioral assumptions—for instance, evolutionary game theory and behavioral game theory. Uncertainty about the possible alternatives and complexity of the situation can lead to biases from the predicted game theoretic behavior. In these situations, the scholar needs to evaluate whether the theory should be modified to incorporate uncertainty or the pertinent behavioral assumptions by making use of behavioral or evolutionary game theoretic models. The usefulness of analytic narratives requires an awareness of the types of situations in which game theory is best applicable and that can benefit most from the methodology.

Analytic narratives, therefore, recognize and take advantage of the context specificity and historical contingency of institutional analysis. At the same time, they rely on explicit formal theorizing that compels scholars to take a systematic approach and reveal the reasoning and assumptions behind their explanations. This empirical methodology allows deduction and induction to complement each other and to be complemented by a context-specific analysis.

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See also Analytic Narratives: Applications; Case Studies; Game Theory; Rational Choice

Further Readings

**ANARCHISM**

Etymologically, the term *anarchism* derives from two ancient Greek words: ἀν, meaning “absence of,” and ἀρχή, meaning “authority,” “government,” “ruler,” or “war chief.” Anarchism thus carries a negative charge: the negation of authority, the absence of rulers. *Anarchism* is opposed to all forms of hierarchy, including the state, capitalism, religious institutions, patriarchy, and racism. Yet the term also conveys a positive political project of justice, liberty, equality, and solidarity. According to the basic principles of anarchism,
genuine freedom, equality, and solidarity are logical and political impossibilities in a system or a regime where some rule and others are ruled. All political regimes except anarchy are oppressive and tyrannical, even those claiming to embody the nation or the sovereign people. That is why anarchism can be seen as the ultimate revolutionary ideology and social movement. From the perspective of all elitist ideologies, including liberalism, anarchism is fundamentally flawed because the argument goes, human beings cannot find satisfaction unless they are under the authority of rulers, be they warlords, priests, nobles, property owners, or elected representatives.

As a political ideology or philosophy, anarchism involves three elements: (1) a positive ideal (anarchy), (2) a critical discourse (opposition to hierarchies and oppression), and (3) the means to achieve this ideal (evolution or revolution, nonviolence or violence, mass movement, or affinity groups). In some cases, it may also involve an ontological conception of human nature. By and large, anarchism adopts a neutral sociological outlook posited on a binary human nature with a positive and a negative pole. The positive pole is the ability to live with others in a spirit of equality and solidarity, while the negative pole is the selfish drive for domination. As demonstrated by Peter Kropotkin and Élisée Reclus, it is the social structure that determines which pole prevails. If the structure is hierarchical, then people in a position of authority will become self-indulgent and arrogant and abuse their authority. Only a social environment where no one is in a position to exert power over others can ensure that people’s goodness will prevail.

This entry describes the evolution of anarchism from its early roots to its development during the “anarchist century” from the mid-19th century to 1939. It also examines the resurgence of anarchism in the latter part of the 20th century, influenced by postmaterialist thought.

**Historical Development of Anarchism**

Some commentators assert that anarchism as a political ideology or philosophy has existed since the dawn of humanity and can be found, at least to a degree, in Taoism, stoicism, the works of Zeno, and the concrete experiences of communities on every continent that practiced egalitarianism (among adult males, at any rate). Kropotkin’s book *Mutual Aid* is instructive in this connection. Others consider anarchism as belonging essentially to European modernity, with its forerunners emerging in religious social uprisings (the Anabaptists), the English Revolution (the diggers), and the French Revolution (the *enragés*). William Godwin (1756–1836) is generally regarded as the first true anarchist philosopher (*Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*, 1793). The Frenchmen Anselme Bellégarrigue, editor of *L’anarchie—Journal de L’ordre* (of which only two issues appeared, in 1850), and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon were among the first to call themselves “anarchists.” They were followed by Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876), Louise Michel (1830–1905), Voltairine de Cleyre (1866–1912), Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921), Élisée Reclus (1830–1905), Emma Goldman (1869–1940), and Errico Malatesta (1853–1932).

In its early days, anarchism attracted several prestigious fellow travelers, such as the painters Gustave Courbet and Camille Pissarro, the playwright Henrik Ibsen, the literary critic Herbert Read, and the philosophers Emmanuel Mounier and Bertrand Russell. Some famous anarchists, like the geographers Kropotkin and Reclus, were eminent scientists. Contemporary scholars identified with anarchism include Allan Antliff (art history), Normand Baillargeon (education science), Harold Barclay (anthropology), Susan Brown (political philosophy), John Clark (philosophy), David Colson (sociology), Ronald Creagh (sociology), Uri Gordon (social ecology), David Graeber (anthropology), John Holloway (political philosophy), Ruth Kinna (political science), and Robert Wolff (political philosophy).

There is an anarchist studies network linked with the Political Science Association in Britain and a number of scholarly anarchist journals, such as *Anarchist Studies*, *Réfractions*, and *Social Anarchism*. Yet it is in the nature of anarchism to expect intellectual and political activities to go hand in hand (*praxis*), and any division of labor between theorists or scholars and activists is viewed with suspicion. Bakunin held that anarchism acknowledges that some people may be more talented or skilled in a specific area, including theorization. However, there must be no monopoly of expertise. To be free, the people dealing with any expert should have the following: first,
access to other experts in the same field; second, the right to ignore the advice of experts; and, finally, the opportunity to become experts themselves through education and practice. In other words, while expertise may confer influence on its possessor, it should be available to all and not be used to wield power over others. Anarchist ideas are for the most part expressed and disseminated anonymously in self-published independent journals, zines, and websites (see Infoshop) or in the publications of anarchist groups and organizations (e.g., Fédération Anarchiste and Alternative Libertaire in France, Anarchist Black Cross and Northeastern Federation of Anarchist-Communists in the United States, Class War in Great Britain, and Union Communiste Libertaire au Québec in Canada). Individual artists, like the composer John Cage, or trends, such as the punk movement (e.g., Bérurier Noir, Crass), are also identified with anarchism.

Central Elements of Anarchism

The Classical Age of Anarchism

From a historical perspective, there are two distinct moments of anarchism as a social and political movement. First, the classical age of anarchism—or the “anarchist century”—began with the first texts of Proudhon (who in 1840 famously stated, “Property is theft”) and ended with the defeat of the Spanish Revolution in 1939. The period was characterized primarily by the working-class’s expression and experience of anarchism, although some activists were already concerned with issues such as women’s emancipation (abortion, birth control), free love and bi- or homosexuality, war and peace, racism and anticolonialism, free education, and vegetarianism. This epoch encompasses the Paris Commune of 1871, the Industrial Workers of the World in the United States, the Makhnovist rebellion during the Russian civil war, and the Spanish Revolution (1936–1939). During this time, anarchism was influential in Central and Latin America, especially in Argentina from the late 1800s through the 1920s. Of note is the year 1919, particularly the “bloody week,” when about 1,000 people were killed and 50,000 arrested during a strike, including many anarchists. In Chile, anarchist organizations boasted 50,000 members in 1910 out of a total population of 3 million. In Mexico, anarchism was known through popular figures such as Ricardo Flores Magon (1874–1922), while in Cuba there were tens of thousands of activists in the 1920s. Anarchist activists and propagandists were very often at the forefront of social struggles and strike movements, such as the campaign for the 8-hour working day. In other parts of the world, anarchism was limited to small groups, active only for short periods of time but nevertheless subjected on occasion to bloody repression. Examples include the Philippines anti-colonialist movement around 1900 as well as the Japanese anarchist and antiwar activist Osugi Sakae (1885–1923) and the anarcha-feminist Itô Noe (1895–1923).

The classical age of anarchism is still widely associated with illegalism (social banditism) and terrorism (“propaganda by deeds”). Around 1900, terrorists assassinated several heads of state (French President Sadi Carnot, 1897; William McKinley, president of the United States, 1901; Russian Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin, 1911; Spanish Prime Minister José Canalejas, 1919; King George I of Greece, 1913), property owners, and military officers, very often in response to the bloody repression of the workers’ movement. But at no time did so-called anarchist violence even come close to the level of violence (imprisonment, torture, death penalty, mass murders, etc.) perpetrated against anarchists by agents of the state, private paramilitary units and death squads, nationalist and fascist militias, and authoritarian Marxist militants. Anarchists were targeted by special repressive laws in almost all Western states in the closing decade of the 19th century. Thousands were killed by their former allies in Russia (Leninists) and Spain (Stalinists), and they were among the first political prisoners to enter the Nazi concentration camps in Germany. Violent repression, in conjunction with the heightened popularity and power of authoritarian Marxists following the 1917 Russian Revolution and the Red Army resistance and victory against the Nazi armies in 1941 to 1945, accounts for anarchism’s declining influence within the progressive and revolutionary movements during the first half of the 20th century.

Postmaterialism and the Revival of Anarchism

The second moment of anarchism relates to the so-called postmaterialist context of the 1960s.
With spectacular events such as May 1968 in Paris, anarchism experienced a revival, although authoritarian Marxists (Leninists, Maoists, Trotskyists, Guevarists, etc.) remained very influential among radicals. The anarchist resurgence was also connected with environmentalism, feminism, and pacifism, which embodied anarchism not only by advocating the abolition of capitalism, patriarchy, and the state but also by organizing their militant activities with neither formal leaders nor hierarchy, through a strictly egalitarian, participative, and deliberative decision-making process.

The contemporary resurgence of anarchism as a major tendency among radical progressive forces came with the collapse of the Soviet empire, the intellectual crisis of Marxism, and a series of events at the turn of the 21st century that signaled the rise of the so-called antiglobalization movement and resulted in part from anarchist mobilization: the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil (2001) and the mass protests in Seattle, Washington, in 1999; Washington, D.C., and Prague, Czech Republic, in 2000; and Québec, Canada, and Genoa, Italy, in 2001. Many commentators saw this as a “new anarchism,” characterized by (a) the innovative tactics of direct action, (b) the horizontal structure of militant organizations, and (c) the inclusion of pluralist concerns. The direct action tactics were exemplified by the Black Blocs, a street tactic originating in the German Autonomen movement of the 1980s; Reclaim the Streets in the United Kingdom; and carnivalesque actions such as the Pink Blocs or the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army. The horizontal structures were inherited from the previous generation of radical ecologists, feminists, and pacifists. Finally, the pluralist concerns, emphasizing cultural and sexual diversity, were clearly due to the influence of the feminist and gay and lesbian movements, although some anarchists were still based in the labor movement or were actively involved in labor issues and anticapitalist mobilizations. In principle, the neo-anarchists (or “postanarchists”—Hakim Bey, Lewis Call, Todd May, and Saul Newman) regard as equally important the need to oppose the state, war, capitalism and neoliberalism, racism, sexism and heteronormativity, ageism, and specism. This opposition must furthermore take place globally as well as locally and in everyday life. Indigenous movements of resistance, such as the 1994 Zapatista insurrection in Chiapas, Mexico, are viewed as stimulating examples of anarchism in practice, mainly because they are self-organized through participative and deliberative popular assemblies (the Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred has coined the term anarcho-indigenism).

Currents in Anarchist Thought

Historically, there have been several anarchist currents, each with its particular position on what is primary (the individual or the community, liberty or equality), its priorities (the emancipation of workers or women, the environment), and its organizational structure (mass movements, unions or communes, affinity groups). Very often, they have collaborated in solidarity, at times they have engaged in intense debates, and sometimes they have clashed.

Individual(ist) Anarchism

Individualist anarchism, according to Max Stirner, 1806–1856; Lysander Spooner, 1808–1887; and Benjamin Tucker, 1854–1939, emphasizes liberty and autonomy and denies that there is something other than individuals to which an individual must submit (e.g., nation/motherland, class/proletariat). However, such anarchists are as a rule deeply concerned by the exploitation of the working class and the oppression of women and may very well take part in social struggles, but through affinity groups rather than mass movements. They generally believe that free association can be beneficial for the individual’s happiness and interests, and through the years they have been involved in rural or urban communes and in squats. However, membership in an association must be totally voluntary, with the freedom to join or leave at any time.

Libertarianism and anarcho-capitalism are sometimes used as synonyms of individual anarchism, although the latter is in fact a kind of radical liberalism, advocating free market capitalism for property owners and wageworkers, under the protection of either a state whose function is strictly limited to the enforcement of law and order or, in the absence of a state, of private security agencies. These views imply that property
owners are in a position of authority and power over their employees, an idea inconsistent with individual as well as collective anarchism. *Proprietarian* is the term coined by Murray Bookchin to describe libertarianism.

Like Marxism, anarchism views capitalism as an exploitative system, protected by the state, which also exploits workers to sustain itself. This said, anarchism offers a variety of economic proposals for abolishing capitalism and reorganizing the production of goods and services.

**Collectivist Anarchism**

Proudhon proposed mutualism (from the Mutualists, a 19th-century secret society of weavers in Lyon, France). He suggested that just as the hive belongs to all bees, the means of production and exchange must be collective. However, each member of the collective—a free association—should share to some degree in the worst tasks. This job rotation would provide everyone with a better knowledge and understanding of the whole working process. Higher functionaries, such as architects and engineers, would be assigned through election, but decisions and working rules would be made collectively through a participative deliberative process. The exchange value would be assessed and then converted into tickets of hours of work under the supervision of a People’s Bank, which would also offer interest-free credit. Consequently, there is no need for a violent revolution; workers need only organize among themselves to be free.

Some anarchists have identified serious issues arising from Proudhon’s economic proposal: Should the evaluation of hours of works take into account job intensity and risk, required training and skills, and the worker’s social responsibilities (such as dependents)? Moreover, this remains a very individualistic model of work organization, which draws on a bygone tradition of craftsmanship that values the artisan’s self-reliance and personal pride. Finally, according to some, Proudhon is not a true anarchist, because he devotes considerable energy to demonstrating the physical, intellectual, moral, and political superiority of men over women, as evidenced by the more than 500 pages of blatant misogyny and antifeminism in his *De la Justice dans la Révolution et l’Église* (1860).

**Anarcho-Syndicalist Anarchism**

Anarcho-syndicalists, identified with Rudolf Rocker (1873–1958), see labor unions (*syndicats* in French) as the spearhead of social emancipation and revolution and the seed of the future anarchist society. Property owners—the bourgeoisie—and the state create nothing; they are mere parasites of workers’ productive activity. Hence, if workers unite and stop working for their exploiters, the system will collapse and revolution will ensue. The general strike is therefore the main instrument for the realization of anarchy. Thereafter, global production will be structured according to “industrial groups” in each sector of production and integrated in an “economic federation.” However, collective decision making would remain a bottom-up process centered on the general assembly of every place of work. Economic production based on human needs will ensure that all receive the goods and services they require.

**Anarcho-Communism**

With anarcho-communism, identified with Peter Kropotkin and Alexander Berkman (1870–1936), among others, the state becomes the direct target of a revolutionary mass movement. Although anarcho-communism often stresses the importance of the workers’ movement, it is more open than many other anarchist trends to peasants, women, and the *lumpenproletariat*. Adopting a geographical perspective, anarcho-communism regards the urban or rural commune as the center of the new society. After the revolution, the communes may join in a federation, although the decision-making function will be situated at the local level, in keeping with a bottom-up process. In the absence of exploiters, such as the bourgeoisie and state agents, production output will necessarily surpass society’s needs. Anarchy will therefore lead to a situation of abundance where all will receive whatever goods and services they need and want.

**Working Inside Versus Outside the Political System**

“Libertarian municipalism” is a contemporary version of anarchism, primarily developed in the 1980s by Janet Biehl and Murray Bookchin. Libertarian municipalism lays special emphasis on
ecological issues, contending that these could be dealt with more effectively at the local level but only if municipal institutions were deliberative and participative. Bookchin even suggests that anarchists get involved in municipal politics, a view that has been criticized by other anarchists as obviously inconsistent with the antistate anarchist principle.

Bookchin is not the only self-proclaimed anarchist calling for some sort of involvement in official politics. Authors and activists like Colin Ward and Paul Goodman, or Philippe Corcuff, in France, who coined the term libertarian social democracy, argue that some anarchism in the official system is better than no anarchism at all. They advocate reforms with regard to issues, laws and regulations concerning individual freedom, free education, free sexuality, and so on. According to Noam Chomsky, it is the duty of today’s anarchists to support the state and its welfare programs against neoliberalism and capitalism, or what he calls “private tyrannies.” Chomsky is even in favor of voting for the Democratic Party in the United States, though he admits that mass social movements are still necessary to push the political elite in the right direction.

Others argue that it is possible to have anarchy here and now but outside the official system. For instance, the green anarchist Clark advocates “microcommunities.” In today’s network of squats, for instance, activists who align themselves with anarchism take over unoccupied buildings or land and try to live outside capitalism as much as possible, offering free meals and rooms to travelers and traveling to participate in campaigns of solidarity with immigrants or with antiwar and anticapitalist movements.

**Feminism and Anarchism**

The distinctions between various forms of anarchism are not as schematic in reality as what is generally presented in books, articles, and encyclopedias. Other strands of anarchism do not fit perfectly within the classical economic and political framework. Anarcha-feminism—for instance, is a feminist version of anarchism, devoted to fighting patriarchy both in society at large and within the Marxist and anarchist networks, where misogynistic and antifeminist attitudes are not uncommon (witness the term manarchy, recently coined by U.S. activists to describe inequalities among anarchist men and women). In the 19th century, authors and militants like Goldman and de Cleyre denounced the “sex slavery” of marriage and promoted free love. In the 1930s, the anarcha-feminist autonomous association Mujeres Libres boasted some 30,000 members in Spain and was an active force during the Revolution. It focused on education for girls and women, combat training for women, medical help for wounded fighters, and the emancipation of prostitutes through psychological and material support and the assassination of certain pimps. From the 1960s onward, Peggy Kornegger and Susan Brown, among others, highlighted the similarities between anarchism and feminism, arguing that, to be consistent, anarchists should be feminists (although some feminists, such as the liberal or Marxist statist feminists, may not be anarchists, i.e., opposing all forms of hierarchy and inequality). “Third-wave” feminism, with its emphasis on individual sexual choice and queer identities, is sometimes identified with anarchism. Nevertheless, the anarcha-feminist Claire Snyder warns “choice feminists” that under patriarchy, women’s sexual life may not be totally free from the external control of men or from “internal tyrants,” the name given by Goldman to the socialization—internal fears and false beliefs—that undermines women’s freedom of will and choice. Finally, with regard to economic production, the anarchist and feminist Carol Ehrlich notes that it is not only the bourgeoisie as a class that exploits wage workers but also men who exploit women’s work, which is often undertaken with no monetary compensation.

**Anarchism in the 21st Century**

Today, a large number of principles closely linked to anarchism for the past 150 years have become, for many people, ordinary moral and political liberalism: the 8-hour working day; education for all, boys and girls alike; women’s freedom of choice with regard to matters such as contraception and abortion; freedom in sexuality and love, including bi- and homosexual rights and the right to divorce or to cohabit without marrying; freedom of consciousness with respect to religion and state dogma; and freedom to refuse military service. While not self-identifying with anarchism, several influential
contemporary scholars, especially in France and Italy, have adopted an anarchist approach in their work on state power (Giorgi Agamben), political representation (Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard), micropolitics and resistance (Gilles Deleuze), and the reorganization of production and resistance based on egalitarian principles (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri). Others, such as Donatella della Porta, are investigating new social movements that practice “direct democracy,” which in fact amounts to studying anarchism in action.

This implicitly or explicitly anarchist activism within the “movement for global justice” is the target of state repression, even though anarchism does not represent a significant threat to social, political, and economic liberalism, as might have been the case at the turn of the 20th century. Thus, there were legitimate grounds for former British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s jibe about the summit-hopping “anarchist traveling circus.” Nevertheless, anarchism provides the most vocal and radical left-wing criticism of liberalism. During the 2001 G8 (Group of Eight) Summit in Genoa, after violent clashes between police officers and protesters—one of whom was shot dead at point-blank range—Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien warned about the “anarchists who want to destroy democracy.” In Greece and Italy, anarchist networks have been targeted by the police in recent years: Many have been arrested, and in Greece, one person was killed in 2008. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Scotland Yard have also been preoccupied since the late 1990s with anarchists reputedly training for terrorist actions (which never occurred). Even certain political scientists, such as Tim Dunne of Exeter University, claim that anarchist activists and Al Qaeda militants are very similar in nature. In sum, anarchism said goodbye to the 20th century much as it had welcomed it—that is, cast in the role of a potential “terrorist” threat, the number one internal public enemy.

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See also Anarchy; Capitalism; Democracy, Direct; Libertarianism; Power; State; Terrorism, International

Further Readings
Rolling Thunder journal: http://crimethinc.com/rt
Social Anarchism journal: http://www.socialanarchism.org

ANARCHO-SYNDICALISM

See Anarchism; Anarchy

ANARCHY

Anarchy is the absence of government or, more generally, political authority over and between the units of a political system. As an analytic concept, the term does not imply a lack of political order or the presence of chaos and thus differs from informal and colloquial use. The term also differs from anarchism, a normative and possibly utopian position that advocates minimizing the scope of political authority to maximize the domain of individual autonomy.

The condition of anarchy is widely understood to describe the modern international system in which states are the units of analysis, each is fully sovereign, and all are formally equal. It is this condition of anarchy, in turn, that separates international relations from other domains of politics and renders it, for many analysts, a distinct field of inquiry with different rules and patterns of interaction. Although other political arenas may also be
anarchic, such as legislatures where vote trading between members cannot be legally enforced, the analytic concept has not been widely applied beyond the realm of international relations and, in a few cases, failed states.

Consequences of Anarchy
For most scholars of international relations, anarchy requires that all states must rely only on their own resources and abilities—a practice described as the principle of self-help. Lacking any authority that states can appeal to for protection, aid, or binding adjudication, each state must ultimately depend on its own efforts and wisdom. This further implies that any agreement made between states must be self-enforcing or in the interests of the parties to carry out if and when actually called on to do so.

Although the assumption that the international system is anarchic is widely shared, the meaning and consequences of this assumption are still vigorously debated. For realists, anarchy produces a zero-sum, competitive struggle between states. For political realists, anarchy did not feature prominently and was more a passive background condition; Hans Morgenthau—for instance, rooted the drive for power in the innate character of political man, not in the nature of the international system. For Neorealis ts (sometimes called structural realists), however, anarchy is one of the defining features of international structure with significant causal effects.

Even within neorealism, there are two prominent schools. For defensive realists, anarchy requires only that states seek security, although they may also pursue expansion, glory, or power for other reasons. Given that some states may possess aggressive tendencies, however, all states must be ever vigilant and prepared to defend themselves. Uncertainty over the motives of other states and problems of credible commitment, in turn, sometimes leads to bargaining failures and war. Offensive realists believe anarchy is such a challenging condition that states must pursue power at all times. Since states are always insecure, the fear that others will exploit them forces states to pursue all means necessary to impose their will on others. Also, as power is always zero sum, anything that gives an advantage to one state must create a disadvantage for at least one other. In this view, anarchy implies that international politics are a perpetual and intense struggle for domination.

Neoliberal institutionalists see anarchy as a condition that can be mitigated, if not fully resolved, by voluntarily negotiated institutions between states. Unlike in neorealism, anarchy does not define the goals that states seek but, rather, merely permits dilemmas of collaboration and coordination to arise that thwart cooperation between utility-maximizing states. These dilemmas, in turn, can be overcome in part by institutions that provide information or make commitments more credible. In a form of self-organizing order, states can avoid some of the harsher implications of anarchy by building institutions without necessarily subordinating themselves to any central authority.

Finally, constructivists see anarchy as an open-ended condition filled by the social purposes of states, which are themselves constructed of socially appropriate and interpreted roles and norms that vary over time and space. Thus, within the condition of anarchy, states may represent themselves and others in ways that produce a Hobbesian world depicted by realism, a Lockean world that reflects important elements of neoliberal institutionalism in its focus on natural rights, or a Kantian world of greater peace and cooperation than imagined by either of the alternatives. In all of these different socially constructed world orders, there is a potential for systemic transformation that is excluded by neorealism or neoliberal institutionalism.

Critiques of Anarchy
Although subject to continuing controversy, all three perspectives share a common focus on anarchy even while they debate its meaning and implications. Increasingly, scholars are criticizing the very concept of anarchy and the role it has played in the development of international relations theory. Too numerous to describe in detail here, many of the specific critiques can be grouped into two larger themes. First, the common notion of anarchy and the role it has played in the development of international relations theory. Too numerous to describe in detail here, many of the specific critiques can be grouped into two larger themes. First, the common notion of anarchy is derived from an overly narrow formal-legal conception of authority. Alternative conceptions of authority open up the possibility of many different kinds of authority existing at the same time within the international system. Second, sovereignty is not indivisible, as commonly averred, but
is a bundle of different authorities that can be disaggregated in ways that do not necessarily coincide with traditional nation-states. Divisible sovereignty permits a patchwork of sometimes overlapping, competing, or complementary authorities to exist simultaneously. Taken together, these critical themes suggest that many forms of global governance that have been ruled out by the common assumption of anarchy may have actually existed in the past and may yet expand in the future.

In formal-legal conceptions of authority, the person (or unit) in authority has the right to issue and enforce certain commands over a set of subordinates because of the lawful position or office that he or she holds. Authority does not inhere in the individual (or individual unit) but in the person as an officer who is duly appointed or elected through some lawful procedure. Elected by a majority of the Electoral College, for instance, a person becomes the president of the United States; by established rules of rotation, a country collectively holds the presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU). Applied to international relations, since there is no lawful authority or procedure above states, no state or other unit can be authorized to govern over other states. As a result, the system and relations between states within that system must be anarchic.

Formal-legal authority, however, is simply one possible source of authority. The German sociologist Max Weber, closely identified with this formal-legal conception, also posited that legitimacy and authority could derive from charisma, tradition, or religious belief as well. Others argue that legitimacy and, hence, authority can arise from psychological principles of fairness and justice, socially constructed norms, or a negotiated social contact between ruler and ruled. These other sources of legitimacy at least open the possibility of authority by states, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other units over other similar units. While debate continues over who has authority over whom for what, a growing body of critical research suggests that international relations are not entirely anarchic but better described as a variegated system of multiple units in authority drawn from multiple sources of authority.

In turn, sovereignty has been traditionally conceived as indivisible or culminating in a single apex within each territorially distinct entity. Sovereignty was once vested in a king, emperor, or “sovereign.” Today, sovereignty typically resides in the “people” and has itself evolved over time to include most citizens of a country. But in either case, there is assumed to be within each society a single, ultimate authority that cannot, even in part, be subordinate to any other actor. This assumption is codified in the notion of Westphalian or juridical sovereignty embodied in the United Nations Charter; today, states need not actually control their territory, as in the past, but only need to be recognized as sovereign by other sovereigns to be accorded that status.

Yet there is an increasing awareness that states have never fit this idealized vision of Westphalian sovereignty. Indeed, even historically, sovereignty appears better described as a set of authorities that are disaggregated across units within a state, long recognized as federalism, or, more important, across states and third parties. This disaggregation is not only exemplified by multilevel governance in the contemporary EU but also reflected in numerous international restraints on the freedom of action of states, including rights of protection or guarantee (e.g., the United States and the Federated States of Micronesia), rights of economic and financial control (the United States and the Dominican Republic from 1904 to 1941), rights of servitude (the United States and Japan, under various status of forces agreements), and rights of intervention (the United States and Panama, under the neutrality treaty of 1977).

Combined with multiple forms of authority, the possibility of multiple sites of authority suggest that patterns of global governance are likely to be more varied, complicated, and dynamic than once assumed. Transnational nonstate groups exercise authority over their members, whether they be religious orders, labor unions, or other collective bodies. NGOs earn authority over firms and even states in standard-setting boards and international creditor cartels and regulate behavior through monitoring and certification procedures. States exert authority over one another in spheres of influence, protectorates, or informal empires. International organizations possess authority as well, including the World Trade Organization and its dispute settlement procedures over trade, for instance, and the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency over nuclear facilities and programs.
The assumption of anarchy, critics charge, blinds scholars of international relations to this variegated system of global governance. The critique of anarchy and the expansion of global governance implies three essential challenges for the future: (1) Analysts must map the forms of global governance, identify where current authority is inadequate or itself unregulated (as in the so-called democratic deficit in the EU), and propose reforms to improve human welfare; (2) policymakers must accept and navigate between these multiple forms of authority while harnessing them to their national purposes, when appropriate; and (3) global citizens must work to ensure that global authorities act in the general interest.

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See also Anarchism; Constructivism in International Relations; Governance, Global; Governance, Multilevel; International Organizations; Legitimacy; Neoliberal Institutionalism; Realism in International Relations; Sovereignty; State Failure; Weber, Max; Westphalian Ideal State

Further Readings


ANOMIA

Anomia is a noun that comes from the Greek a (negative prefix) and nomos (law), meaning absence of norms. The original meaning of anomia in the frame of the classical Greek polity defined a condition of being against or outside the law or a situation where current laws were not applied, resulting in a state of illegitimacy or lawlessness. In its modern usage, the meaning of anomia has a much broader scope, although it is a rather recent concept in the history of social thought. In much of the literature, particularly in the English-speaking world, the French spelling anomalie is also extensively used. This entry discusses the use of the term in modern sociology, the widening of its scope, and its present-day relevance.

Anomia in Durkheim’s Thought

In the social sciences, anomia has been a key concept in the development of modern empirical sociology. It is normally associated with the work of Émile Durkheim (1858–1919), the French sociologist who introduced the concept in his early sociological masterpieces, The Division of Labor (1893) and Suicide (1897). In his sociological perspective, anomia was no longer related to the rule of law; thus, it lost its original legal content and was instead defined as the absence of norms (legal rules just being one class of social norms). One of the major tenets of Durkheimian sociology is that a theoretical explanation of social agency must be given in terms of social causal factors and not on the basis of psychological conditions. In fact, one can say that the major contribution of Durkheim to the foundation of modern sociology has been the possibility of grounding the explanation of social action on purely social variables. In the famous Durkheimian formula, presented in Chapter 5 of Rules of Sociological Method (1895), social facts must be explained by other antecedent social facts. In relation to anomia, this thesis implies that the absence of norms is not a subjective psychological condition of the agent but an objective feature of the social structure or, in strictly Durkheimian terms, of the collective life.

The first references to anomia by Durkheim appear in The Division of Labor, his doctoral thesis at the University of Bordeaux. In this early work, referring to the social causes of the division of labor as a phenomenon typical of modern industrial society, Durkheim elaborates on the “abnormal” forms of this phenomenon, one of these forms being the “anomic division of labor.”
In his ensuing famous essay *Suicide*, in which Durkheim put forward a plausible sociological explanation of the apparently purely psychological phenomenon of disposing of one’s own life, he characterized a type of suicide that he called “anomic.” This type occurs in the case of major social crises (e.g., an economic crash)—that is, structural phenomena that invalidate previous regulations to such a degree that some agents are incapable of coping with the radical ambiguity of the ensuing state of normlessness, and thus they take their own life in a supreme act of “anomic suicide.”

The common factor of both the anomic division of labor and the anomic suicide is the dissolution of social integration, the underlying social phenomenon that is manifested in the absence of norms. The reformist stance of Durkheim vis-à-vis the major political and social issues of his time is a reflection on how it were possible to confront trends toward anomic forms of social life in a secularized and functionally differentiated modern society.

In one of his most politically oriented works, *Leçons de Sociologie* (1950), published in English as *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* (1957), Durkheim analyzes the relationships between an individual and the sphere of public regulation. In his view, the institutionalization of individual rights is the role of the State; thus, the latter has not been created to guarantee that individuals are able to exercise their natural rights; rather, the State creates and organizes those fundamental rights, and it makes them a reality. Political anomia is then a condition where public regulations have reached a point of extreme weakness, close to the absence of rules, and, therefore, individual rights cannot be exercised. In political terms, however, anomia is not anarchy. The latter refers to a lack of leadership, hierarchy, and command, whereas anomia implies a weakening of rules, structures, and organizations. Clearly, the Durkheimian concept of political anomia necessarily implies a radical weakening of public regulations. In short, anomia, in all of its possible specific manifestations, can be understood as a societal consequence of rapid and deep social change, and it is in this sense that anomia is a concept that runs in parallel with the notion of social crisis. According to Durkheim, without clear rules individuals cannot find their place in society. Such a state tends to occur in periods of social disruption (such as rapid economic growth or economic depression), bringing about greater anomia and, concurrently, higher rates of suicide, crime, and deviance.

**Anomia and Social Change**

Social change may generate anomia either in the whole of society or in some parts of it, so it must be stressed that, in a given society, social groups may be differentially affected by anomia. As recent events in the world economy illustrate, economic crises brought about by business cycles have differential impacts on groups according to their location in the social pyramid. Both sudden downward mobility, which is normally associated with economic depression, and the rapid onset of material prosperity, leading to quick upward mobility, tend to upset previous networks in which lifestyles are embedded, in each case increasing the chance of anomia. Talcott Parsons, in the early 1940s, discussing the social aspects of fascism, contends that an increase in anomia may be an outcome of almost any social changes that upset previous routines of life or symbolic associations, all of which imply instability of expectations. In Parsons’s strain theory approach, social ambiguity as well as conflicting role expectations may lead to increased anomia, and this, in turn, may create a sort of anxiety-generated pattern of anomic action in areas such as reactionary voting behavior. In expanding the use of the concept of anomia to diverse areas of social interaction, Edward Tiryakian has made an elaboration of the notion of sexual anomia as an heuristic tool in approaching features of contemporary society that involve transformations in sexual relations and sexual identity that presuppose deregulations in modern sexual relations.

**Anomia and Deviant Behavior in Merton’s Theory**

In the normative sphere between regulation of goals and regulation of means, introduced by Robert K. Merton, has become a key dimension in current anomia-related theories that tend to focus on “anomic” deviant behavior. A clear example of this shift in focus is the way in which the *Columbia Encyclopedia* (6th ed.) defines anomia: “a social condition characterized by instability, the
breakdown of social norms, institutional disorganization, and a divorce between socially valid goals and available means for achieving them.” Although Merton, when referring to socially accepted goals (values) and means (instruments for achieving those values), has in mind the overall universal striving for success in the American value system, his theory is a general proposition. In Mertonian terms, in any given society, there is a range of culturally accepted values (goals) and a corresponding set of normatively approved means of securing these goals, but the structure of economic resources in that society enables only certain privileged groups and classes to succeed.

Disparity between goals and means is, according to Merton, the main cause of anomia. Merton identified five possible reactions to the different relationships between goals and means. The first and most common reaction is conformity, which presupposes a nonanomic relationship of appropriate means to reach the socially accepted goals. All of the other four possible reactions are more or less anomic. The second possible reaction is innovation, which implies adherence to goals and rejection of socially accepted means. The third possible reaction is ritualism, based on adherence to means but rejection of socially accepted goals. In the fourth reaction, retreatism, both the goals and the means are rejected. Finally, the fifth and final possible reaction is rebellion, when both goals and means are ambiguously dealt with. In conditions of anomia (maladjustment between goals and means), underprivileged, deprived individuals will turn to various forms of individual deviance that are dependent on alternative means to reach the same desired ends. In other words, anomia occurs as the disjunction of means and goals that differ according to the profile of the social opportunity structure. Merton was then able to propose a theory of anomia embedded in social stratification and the class structure, and it is in this sense that his theory transcends the specificity of the American case and becomes a general theory of anomia.

In short, the concept of anomia has provided quite a fertile intellectual ground for the development of the modern disciplines of the social sciences.

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See also Alienation; Anarchy; Apathy; Crisis; Durkheim, Émile; Social Capital

Further Readings

Anomia in Contemporary Political Economy

The concept of anomia is also present in the field of contemporary political economy in the work of analysts who are advancing a theory of “institutional anomia” that basically states that in the present globalized context, as economic institutions gain dominance in shaping society, noneconomic institutions are weakened and forced to accommodate the market, thus feeding a condition of high institutional anomia that is conducive to higher violent crime rates. To the extent that increased anomia tends to erode and dissolve social networks in which social action is embedded, there is also a clear connection of this concept with the notion of social capital that is basically the outcome of associative networking. Contemporary research on the sources and the uses of social capital by different social actors in promoting their own advancement, which is a strong field in policy-oriented studies, is an interesting area for further applications of the general theory of anomia.

In short, the concept of anomia has provided quite a fertile intellectual ground for the development of the modern disciplines of the social sciences.

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See also Alienation; Anarchy; Apathy; Crisis; Durkheim, Émile; Social Capital

Further Readings
Apathy

Apathy looks at first like a very broad, even vague concept. It plays, however, a very important and critical role in political analysis, particularly in the analysis of the decline in voting turnout and civic engagement and more generally in the study of participation and civic involvement of citizens. The concept is derived from a long, intellectual, interdisciplinary tradition. It was first proposed in philosophy but has been extensively used in cultural psychology, anthropology, sociology, and political science. The concept also has intellectual connections with other concepts or notions coming from the sociological and political philosophical traditions such as alienation and anomie. In a typical use of the apathy concept, theories of mass society have explained, in the wake of World War II, that modernization and urbanization have been responsible for detaching individuals from their primary groups (community, family, early socialization groups), generating withdrawal from the public sphere and lack of interest and motivation in public affairs. This entry discusses the history and recent criticisms of this concept.

The more recent perspective on political apathy started in the 1950s and 1960s, in particular with the publication of the book Civic Culture by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963). One of the issues of Almond’s and Verba’s political culture approach is that the stability of democracy and democratic institutions depends on a “civic culture,” a mixture of participatory, subject, and parochial orientations toward politics. The important point here is that this civic culture seems to allow many citizens to be apathetic about politics. Many critics of the book took this to be a kind of justification for apathy.

Since the 1960s, the political sociology perspective on apathy is mainly linked to the question of political mobilization and political participation. In a very challenging study of the relationship between social class and voting in the mid-1980s in the Netherlands, Leo B. Van Snippenburg and Peer Scheepers recalled that a positive correlation between social protest and income inequalities at least implicitly referred to the thesis of Verelendung (pauperization) that originated from Karl Marx’s work. They also recall that this thesis states that under (relatively) deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, the deprived will turn to social protest and revolt. The thesis was later criticized, emphasizing that history has regularly shown the contrary: Revolt emerges under circumstances of relative social deprivation and is more likely to happen in middle-class or privileged groups rather than in deprived ones. According to these alternative views, instead of revolting against the system that generates inequalities, a form of “collective apathy” often manifests itself in deprived groups (Marie Jahoda, Paul Lazarsfeld, & Hans Zeisel, 1971). This doubt and criticism of the pauperization thesis was strongly formulated in studies by a very influential group of social scientists in the 1930s and the 1940s, the so-called Frankfurt School, in particular their study of the “authoritarian personality” (Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, & Nevitt Sanford, 1950). In this study, it was observed that during the economic depression of the 1930s, the workers and have-nots in Germany did not revolt. They instead remained outside the political scene and were apathetic. Parts of the middle class, by contrast, actively engaged in politics, as did the cultural and economic elites. In light of these facts, the Frankfurt School criticized the Marxian notion concerning the direct effects of pauperization on political radicalism. The Frankfurt School introduced an original hypothesis by putting “personality” as an intermediate variable between social characteristics and political consciousness, between class and ideology. In their view, belonging to a deprived group does not lead to active political behavior but encourages the development of an authoritarian personality (i.e., subordination to authority, conformity to rigid social norms, rejection of those not sharing these norms). Instead, authoritarian personalities show deference to authorities and remain outside the political field.
More recent interpretations came from other studies completing the traditional authoritarian personality theories through a hypothesis proposed by Leo Festinger (1957) in Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Awareness of the low likelihood of benefiting from an “achievement society” generates a mental state of anomie, social isolation, lack of confidence in the system, and apathetic behavior. Socioeconomic frustration and status anxiety thus mediate the correlation between class, authoritarian values, and anomie. From this tradition, it can be concluded that modern societies generate apathy in different ways but especially by creating gaps between aspirations, values, and realities. This body of literature has an obvious relationship with another intellectual tradition, which is known as the relative deprivation or relative frustration hypothesis. This hypothesis states that, despite the socioeconomic deprivation and social inequalities experienced by the popular classes during the periods of economic stagnation, there was no political protest. To explain this paradox, political sociology frequently makes reference to a Tocqueville effect. Alexis de Tocqueville proposed a theory of rising expectations that may offer some clues to the paradox of apathy and mobilization (those who normally would have interest to mobilize are not doing so). According to this theory, it is not deprivation but the obstruction of favorable prospects and rising expectations that encourage social protest and radical political behavior. As remarked by Van Snippenburg and Eisinga Scheepers (1991), citizens experiencing such frustrations “become morally indignant, sometimes socially envious, and they easily turn to political protest and radicalism as a consequence” (p. 45). This Tocqueville effect has been used to explain political protest when social groups experience significant discrepancies between their raising expectations, the realities of their occupational chances, and the possibilities for participating in political decision making.

More recently, the concept of apathy has been rejuvenated and updated by a set of notions proposed in the context of empirical studies on legitimacy and political support. Political apathy has been mentioned in the explanation of the apparent lack of political support and political trust in contemporary democracies. This also used to be the case with the concept of democratic deficit that was first proposed in the context of European Union (EU) integration and its legitimacy. Since the beginning of the 1990s, a significant body of literature has investigated the democratic gap in EU institutions. This democratic deficit is supposed to explain the lack of interest, motivation, and civic engagement of European citizens in the process of EU decision making. The idea of a democratic deficit or democratic disenchantment is also related to a set of phenomena identified as the emergence of critical citizens (Pippa Norris, 1999). According to Norris, critical citizens aspire to democracy and consider it as their ideal form of government, but at the same time they are deeply skeptical when evaluating how democracy works in their own country.

Different explanations have been proposed for such phenomena and are not fully integrated even if going in a common direction. Since the mid-1990s, for instance, many commentators pointed out that if contemporary democracies were not facing a system crisis, at least they were facing a syndrome of disenchantment and democratic malaise: Citizens in many industrial societies had become disengaged from public space. It is worth noting that the theory of critical citizens is perfectly compatible with the portrait of apathetic citizens or skeptical, even angry or cynical citizens rather than with the image of apathetic citizens expecting public services but not supporting the democratic system actively. The set of explanations coming from this literature about the democratic gap in contemporary societies claims that this phenomenon arises from some combination of growing public expectations, negative news, lack of public trust, and failing government performance. Complementary explanations have been proposed, such as social capital theory focusing on a decline of civic engagement and social trust (Robert Putnam, 1993) or postmaterialist theories (Ronald Inglehart, 1997), emphasizing the changing value orientations linked to processes of individualization. Indeed, the World Values Surveys document in a large set of countries that individualization processes detach citizens from the public sphere. But the postmaterialist revolution also shows the capacity of educated citizens to be the changing force of a cultural revolution in many societies, education playing a crucial role in the cognitive mobilization processes underlying such value changes.
A challenging view about apathetic citizens has been proposed by Pierre Rosanvallon, a French historian engaged in research on the intellectual roots of contemporary democracy. In the context of lamentations about the low turnout in European elections and the apathy of citizens regarding EU issues, Rosanvallon contradicted the myth of a passive citizen. His main argument was that the phenomenon of abstention reflects a mutation of, and not just a decline in, the public sphere. According to him, the decline in voter turnout has often been accompanied by other democratic activities. Rosanvallon substitutes the view on democratic fatigue in contemporary societies (a view that too many elections weaken the “democratic appetite” of citizen) with a distinction between three facets of democracy: (1) expression of citizens in making judgments on the rulers and their actions; (2) involvement, which encompasses all means by which citizens get together to produce a common world; and (3) intervention, which consists of all forms of collective action.

According to Rosanvallon, the characteristic elections should be superimposed on these different forms of civic life. In other words, voting is the most condensed form of democracy and the most organized and visible. Rosanvallon observes that although lower participation in elections has undoubtedly eroded the democratic expression, involvement and intervention have been strengthened. As an example, Rosanvallon reports the following data on the French case: In terms of involvement, participation has not declined. The French are now more likely to have signed petitions (68% in 2000 compared with 53% in 1990). They have also taken part in more events and demonstrations to make their voices heard. In other words, citizens’ apathy does have some empirical foundations, but it is a multifaceted and multidimensional phenomenon. Depending on the definition, the available empirical indicators can change significantly the views about a supposedly apathetic citizenry.

Further Readings

Area Studies

Area studies is the generic term for multidisciplinary social research that focuses on specific geographic regions or culturally defined areas. The largest scholarly communities in this respect are loosely defined as Asian, African, Latin American or Middle Eastern studies, together with a variety of subfields (Southeast Asian studies, Caribbean studies, etc.). Political science plays a major role in area studies programs, which typically also draw on disciplines such as history, sociology, ethnology, geography, linguistics, literature, and cultural studies. In political science, the presence of area studies is strongest in comparative politics, but they are also incorporated in international relations (IR) and other fields. This entry first describes the origins of area studies, from early colonial studies to the development and institutionalization of area studies in the Cold
War era. It then outlines the not always easy relation between area studies and the discipline of political science, highlighting key achievements as well as remaining problems. The final section turns to the current research frontier, which is marked by a new impetus for comparative area studies and by transnational perspectives that question, among other things, established concepts of space or area.

The Origins of Area Studies

Today’s area studies can be seen as having their origins in the colonial expansion of European powers and the accompanying academic efforts to better understand those “foreign” or “native” societies that demonstrated a variety of languages, cultures, and social organizations hitherto unknown. In this sense, area studies emerged as a “child of empire,” often driven by commercial and political interests or the perceived “civilizing mission” of the colonial powers. At the same time, the study of ancient civilizations, ethnic codes, social hierarchies, or foreign languages was part of the much broader process of the extension of Western science across the globe. While from the mid-18th century, European capitals began to display the treasures and arts of “exotic” civilizations as much as of ancient civilizations in public museums, the 19th century saw the establishment of colonial studies in European universities. In the United States, interdisciplinary centers for area studies first emerged after World War I, and they received a strong impulse after World War II, parallel to the U.S. rise as a global power. A better understanding of societies in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America was seen as urgent in the context of the Cold War rivalry between competing superpowers looking for local clients and supporters, particularly in the Third World. (A similar, security-driven incentive to promote the study of foreign cultures was again seen after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.)

The work of German geographer Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859) was a forerunner of area studies. Von Humboldt was also one of the founding fathers of multidisciplinarity, which then ranged from social to natural sciences. At a later stage, a critical strand of area studies emerged that openly condemned colonial practices. This branch emphasized respect for other cultures, challenged the supposed universality of the Western worldview and the “Eurocentrism” inherent in theories claiming general validity, and advocated mutual learning instead of unilaterally copying Western social or political models.

A common legacy of all strands of area studies, however, is that they almost always refer to “other” areas. There are no “German studies” in Germany or “U.S. studies” in the United States. Until today, area studies have focused predominantly on the non–Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) world. A remarkable trend, however, has been the emergence and expansion of “European studies” in the wake of the growing importance of the European Union.

Area Studies and Political Science: An Ongoing Debate

The relationship between area studies and the discipline of political science has not always been an easy one. Particularly in the United States, the eclectic use of changing paradigms by area specialists has been criticized. Single-case studies have been attacked by scholars interested in generalization. At times, area specialists have been expected to simply deliver the raw data for universal theories. Conversely, area specialists have accused generalists of superficiality, claiming that an in-depth knowledge of the particular language, culture, and social context is needed to produce adequate analyses of cases that do not conform to the OECD “standard model”—on the empirical realities of which most political science theory has been generated.

Contemporary political science has developed most strongly in the post–World War II period and in the transatlantic North. This explains why the bulk of existing theories and methods have a clear “transatlantic” or “OECD bias.” Democracy, elections, state and administration, security, and so on are conceptualized in mainstream political science using idealized blueprints of Western societies. It cannot be denied that these concepts have been highly influential in other world regions as well and have been internalized by many scholars, elites, and citizens from Argentina to Zimbabwe. However, they are also frequently contested and
compete with other organizing principles of society. The trajectories toward modernity have in fact varied enormously around the globe, with religion, family bonds, or industrialization playing divergent roles in different world regions. The exclusive reliance on “imported” models without local adaptation, so area studies scholars have argued, produces systematic errors in the comprehension of how “other” political systems function. In a more and more globalized world and for advocates of a practice-oriented approach in the subdiscipline of IR, it has become essential to understand the motivations and capabilities of actors in the most remote places of the globe in order to appropriately analyze security and economic challenges for their own societies.

Nonetheless, a balanced view of the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches of both mainstream political science and area studies has led to a more fertile relationship and compromises between “nomothetic” and “idiographic” worldviews. Some of the most prolific strands of research in political science have been strongly influenced by area specialists; for instance, the understandings of corporatism as well as of transitions to democracy in the 1980s were largely developed by Latin American studies scholars, before their concepts “traveled” to explain European and other cases. More recently, the topic of the consolidation and reform of “hybrid regimes” has been studied in Africa and South East or Central Asia, and much of the study of persistent authoritarian rule draws heavily on the scholarship of area specialists; for instance, the understandings of corporatism as well as of transitions to democracy in the 1980s were largely developed by Latin American studies scholars, before their concepts “traveled” to explain European and other cases. More recently, the topic of the consolidation and reform of “hybrid regimes” has been studied in Africa and South East or Central Asia, and much of the study of persistent authoritarian rule draws heavily on the scholarship of area specialists. Some scholars go so far as to call “area studies” a misnomer, stating that area-focused scholarship by political scientists should be understood as an integral component of comparative politics.

The “Orientalism” Debate and the Demarcation of the “Areas” Studied

Criticism of area studies has also been raised from within the regions under scrutiny, most prominently in the “orientalism” debate kicked off by the 1978 publication of Edward Said’s influential critique of Western constructions of the “Orient.” Area studies, according to this critique, expressed an imperialist and condescending worldview regarding the “other”; thus, the object of research had to be redefined, and a complete overhaul of the production of academic research on non-Western societies was necessary. Postcolonial studies emerged from this line of thought as a competing paradigm of research that sharply criticized mainstream Western academic approaches as being part of an international system of domination in continuity with the colonial past. While strongest in literary theory and cultural studies, postcolonialist approaches also concern social and political science.

A different line of critique has come from scholars in countries of the global South, who consider themselves political scientists, just like any North American or European scholar studying his or her own country, but find their research on Brazilian parties, South African trade unions, or Indian class structure labeled as area studies rather than being accepted as political science on an equal footing with similar research in the OECD world.

A particular concern in area studies is the exact territorial demarcation of the “areas” under investigation—all the more so given the recent emphasis on transnational and transregional interrelations. Is it appropriate that African studies more often than not deal exclusively with the Africa south of the Sahara? Put differently, is North Africa part of both African and Arab studies? What implications does the choice between “Arab world” and “Muslim world”—with an emphasis on ethnicity rather than religion—have for the understanding of the region? Does it make sense to group Southeast Asian, Central Asian, and South Asian studies together under the label of Asian studies? While Latin American studies encompass a region with a largely shared historical and cultural legacy, some recent initiatives have shifted to a more hemispheric approach under the label of American studies, which includes Canada and the United States.

Intellectual debates on these matters abound, but the persistence of the existing classifications is a sign that they continue to provide a basis for the production of meaning. Recent research has in fact argued that “regional context” is one crucial variable in many quantitative research designs, and in IR, the concepts of a “world of regions” and an emerging regional architecture in world politics have become an important focus of scholarly
attention, implicitly strengthening the key assumptions underlying the concept of area studies.

Comparative Area Studies
A distinct and new approach is “comparative area studies.” In addition to intraregional and interregional forms of comparison, the long-marginalized field of cross-regional comparisons has emerged as part of the agenda, for example the comparison of social security systems in Venezuela and India or of party systems in Tanzania and Indonesia. The case for comparative area studies is twofold: First, given that the emphasis on regional expertise has been their raison d’être, the different branches of area studies have developed largely separated from each other over decades. The ability of concepts “to travel” from one regional context to another has yet to be investigated in an appropriate way. While, for instance, the analysis of the paradox of concomitant democratization and the persistence of neo-patrimonial rule was pioneered in the African context, its general usefulness can be tested on Latin American and Asian cases. Such cross-area analysis allows the detection of area specificities as much as commonalities. A more general theory may emerge more easily from such a research design than from single-area approaches.

The second line of argument for comparative area studies holds that cross-regional small-N comparisons are particularly well suited to perform a mediating role between area-focused scholarship and the general theoretical and methodological debates in political science. While there will be few scholars with equally profound expertise in distant world regions, the demanding prerequisites for conducting such cross-area research can be systematically fulfilled through collaborative projects between scholars with different regional expertise but shared research interests. Area studies are not limited to a particular set of methods or schools but employ the wide array of methods used in the disciplines involved. Typically, however, case studies and paired and small-N comparisons have been dominant, and—given area scholars’ emphasis on profound knowledge of the area under investigation—qualitative approaches have traditionally been stronger than quantitative studies.

Finally, the dynamic development and increasing self-assertion of scholarship from the regions that are the topic of area studies have led to growing sensitivity toward ethical considerations voiced in “the South.” Area specialists in Northern countries are constantly pressed by their colleagues from Africa, Asia, Latin America, or the Middle East to share their privileged access to libraries, data, and funding. One element of a more collaborative approach is, for example, the open-access movement to publish social science findings free of charge on the Internet for readers worldwide. This may eventually narrow the gap in the access to relevant current literature between the “Harvards” and the “Have-nots.”

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See also Comparative Methods; Hybrid Regimes; Neo-Patrimonialism; Orientalism; Postcolonialism

Further Readings

Arms Race
An arms race may be defined as a pattern of competitive acquisition of military capability between
two or more countries. The term *arms race* is often used quite loosely to refer to any military buildup or spending increases by a group of countries. This definition requires that there be a competitive nature to this buildup, often reflecting an adversarial relationship. The arms race concept is also used fruitfully in other fields, especially evolutionary biology; however, this entry deals only with military arms races.

**Examples of Arms Races**

One example of an arms race is the “Dreadnought” arms race between Germany and Britain prior to World War I. In the early 20th century, Germany as a rising power sought to challenge the United Kingdom’s traditional naval dominance. In 1906, Britain launched a new, more advanced warship, HMS *Dreadnought*, triggering a naval arms race. Between 1909 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Britain launched a further 19 “dreadnoughts” and a further nine battle cruisers, while Germany launched 13 dreadnoughts and five battle cruisers. This arms race is often cited as one of the causes of World War I.

The Cold War nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union is another example of a 20th-century arms race. The United States’ use of nuclear weapons to end World War II led to a determined effort by the Soviet Union to acquire these weapons, leading to a long-running nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. The Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test in 1949. At the end of 1956, the United States had 2,123 strategic warheads to the Soviet Union’s 84. These numbers increased rapidly over the subsequent 30 years. The U.S. arsenal peaked in 1987 at 13,002 warheads, the Soviet Union 2 years later at 11,320 (figures from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). The end of the Cold War effectively ended this arms race.

Arms races may involve a more general competitive acquisition of military capability. This is often measured by military expenditure, although the link between military expenditure and capability is often quite weak. Such more general arms races are often observed among countries engaged in enduring rivalries, which may sometimes appear to follow each other’s military spending levels, especially during periods of heightened tension.

Examples of such arms races include India–Pakistan, Israel–Arab states, Greece–Turkey, and, since 1991, Armenia–Azerbaijan.

**Consequences of Arms Races**

Arms races are frequently regarded as negative occurrences in both economic and security terms. Large-scale arms acquisitions require considerable economic resources. If two countries spend large sums of money just to cancel out each other’s efforts, the expenditure might well be seen as wasted. There is, however, considerable debate surrounding the economic effect of military spending. Some argue that it provides benefits through technological spin-offs, job creation, and infrastructure development; others argue that it displaces more productive forms of investment, while its final output is not itself productive. Certainly, countries that must import arms will see more negative economic effects of an arms race, and arms imports are a major contributor to Third World debt. Even for arms-producing countries, excessive military expenditure is likely eventually to have negative economic consequences. The Soviet Union’s economic difficulties were certainly exacerbated by the very high proportion of the gross domestic product devoted to the arms race.

The question of whether arms races contribute to the outbreak of war is also the subject of considerable debate. An arms race may heighten fear and hostility on the part of the countries involved, but whether this contributes to war is hard to gauge. Some empirical studies do find that arms races are associated with an increased likelihood of war; however, it is not possible to say whether the arms race was itself a cause of war or merely a symptom of existing tensions.

One may also consider the gains for a country that “wins” an arms race in the sense of gaining a decisive military advantage. Arguably, the collapse of the Soviet Union, which left the United States as the sole global superpower, was partly due to the cost of attempting to keep up with the United States.

**Modeling Arms Races**

There is an extensive literature modeling arms races theoretically and empirically. These
include game-theoretic models based on the “prisoners’ dilemma” (PD), dynamic mathematical models based on the Richardson model, and economic models frequently based on a “utility-maximizing” framework. There is overlap between these categories.

**Prisoners’ Dilemma Models**

The famous PD game is frequently applied to arms races between two countries. It is assumed that each country has a choice between a high or low level of arms. Each country’s most preferred outcome is assumed to be where they choose high arms and their rivals low, gaining a clear military advantage. Their least preferred outcome is the reverse. However, the second best outcome for each is where both choose low; if no advantage is gained, it is assumed to be cheaper and more secure to avoid the arms race.

Each player’s “dominant strategy” is to choose high arms, as whichever choice the rival has made, they do better by choosing high than low. This outcome illustrates the Nash equilibrium (named after John Nash), in which each player has chosen the optimal strategy in a noncooperative situation or zero-sum game, given the other player’s strategy. The Nash equilibrium outcome of the game is therefore that both choose high. It is an equilibrium because neither player would change their own choice, given the choice of the rival. However, this arms race outcome is worse for both players than if both had chosen low arms. The logic of their rivalry traps them in a mutually disadvantageous situation.

However, the picture may not necessarily be so bleak, as in reality the “game” is not played once and for all but is an ongoing series of decisions, which can be modeled by the “iterated prisoners’ dilemma” (IPD), where the PD game is played repeatedly by the same players. This opens the possibility for cooperation to emerge through reward and punishment strategies such as “tit for tat”—start by choosing low arms but then match the strategy chosen by the other player in the previous round. Experiments have shown this to be a highly successful strategy in IPD games.

While greatly simplifying real-world situations, the PD may be a useful metaphor to capture the essential dilemma facing countries engaged in an enduring rivalry.

**The Richardson Model and Its Elaborations**

In his seminal work *Arms and Insecurity*, Lewis Fry Richardson proposed a model (which he applied to the Dreadnought race) of an arms race between two countries where each country sets its military expenditure (or arms acquisition) level in each period based on its own and its rival’s level in the previous period in an “action–reaction” pattern. This is modeled by the following equations:

\[
M_1_t = -a_1M_1_{t-1} + b_1M_2_{t-1} + g_1, \\
M_2_t = -a_2M_2_{t-1} + b_2M_1_{t-1} + g_2.
\]

Here, \( M_1_t \) and \( M_2_t \) refer to the military spending levels of Countries 1 and 2 in years \( t \) and \( t - 1 \), respectively. The coefficients \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \) (assumed to be positive) are “fatigue” coefficients, representing the difficulty of maintaining high levels of military spending. The coefficients \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \), also positive, are “reaction” coefficients, measuring the tendency for each country to respond to the military spending of their rival, while \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) are autonomous “grievance” or “ambition” terms, representing each country’s desire for military capability apart from the rivalry. Depending on the relative size of the fatigue and reaction coefficients, the arms race can either reach a stable equilibrium or spiral out of control.

The basic Richardson model has been extensively developed by other authors, both theoretically and empirically. Developments include taking into account the stock of weapons of each country as well as the rate of spending, introducing explicit economic criteria, and modeling the strategic dynamics of the relationship. Richardson models can easily be applied to empirical military spending data, using regression analysis to estimate the parameters of the equation for a pair of countries. The key question is whether the reaction terms \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \) are significantly greater than zero—if so, an “action–reaction” or Richardsonian arms race is said to exist. A wide variety of theoretical models and statistical techniques starting from the Richardson framework have been applied to various pairs of countries.

**Economic Models**

A third approach is to assume that countries’ military expenditure decisions are the outcome of
an economic resource allocation process whereby
the government seeks to achieve a set of economic,
political, and security objectives by allocating
spending between military and civil sectors.
Neoclassical rational choice models are most fre-
quently employed, but others are also used. When
two rival countries are considered, each country’s
level of security is assumed to depend on both its
own level and its rivals’ level of military spending.
Each country makes its decision taking into
account the likely response of the other. The
resulting models are similar to certain elaborations
of the Richardson model: While one starts from
the arms race and builds in economic allocation
issues, the other starts with the allocation problem
and builds in the rivalry.

Weaknesses of Richardsonian Models

While the Richardson model has proved extraor-
dinarily fruitful in generating scholarly analysis of
arms races, the Richardson approach has a rather
poor empirical record in demonstrating the exist-
ence of actual arms races. Some, though not all,
studies of India and Pakistan have found evidence
of a Richardsonian arms race, but few other
enduring rivalries have produced such empirical
results and none consistently.

A problem of the Richardson model is that it
assumes that the parameters of the relationship
(the values of a, b, and g) remain constant, whereas
in reality they may change over time depending on
the changing relationship between the countries. A
second is that it is most applicable to pairs of coun-
tries where the rivalry is the overwhelming factor
for each country’s security, which is relatively rare.

One suggestion is that the changing levels of ten-
sion or hostility between countries may be a better
way of explaining their military spending decisions
than the Richardson action–reaction framework—
or perhaps a combination of levels of hostility with
the rival’s military spending. This would suggest
that arms races are characterized more by short
bursts of rapidly increasing spending during peri-
ods of high tension than by long-term, stable rela-
tionships between their levels of spending.

See also Arms Race; Budgeting, Rational Models; Cold
War; Game Theory; Models, Computational/Agent-
Based; Prisoners’ Dilemma; Rational Choice;
Regression; Statistical Significance; Superpower; War
and Peace

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Attitude Consistency

Three types of attitude consistency can be distin-
guished: (1) consistency among the various compo-
nents of an attitude, (2) consistency between differ-
ent attitudes, and (3) consistency between attitudes
and behavior. This entry addresses the relevant con-
tceptualizations, measurements, and explanations.

Intra-Attitudinal Consistency

An attitude is said to be consistent when all elements
elicit similar evaluative judgments. Intra-attitudinal

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inconsistency arises when some of these elements are positive in nature, while others are negative. Within the cognitive component, accessible beliefs may conflict, cognitions and affects may also conflict, and the various affects may differ, simultaneously. Intra-attitude consistency can be examined by comparing how respondents feel, how they think, and what their summary evaluation is. The many studies that showed low correlations and consistency between the cognitive, affective, and conative (behavioral) components have raised doubts about the early theorists’ multicomponent view of attitudes. Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen restricted the term attitude to a person’s evaluation and drew a clear distinction between cognitions, attitudes, behavioral intentions, and behaviors. From their point of view, an attitude is a person’s general feeling of favorableness or unfavorableness and an index of the degree to which a person likes or dislikes an object. This one-component view of attitude opened the way to the development of more sophisticated explanatory models in which the summary evaluation is at the core of an attitude, while behavior or the intention thereto is an effect, and cognition (knowledge and beliefs) and affect (general moods and specific emotions) are origins of the attitude. The affects underlying attitudes are more easily accessible in memory than the cognitions, and they tend to predominate among ambivalent respondents with different evaluative-cognitive and evaluative-affective consistencies. Individuals differ in their tendency to base their attitudes on cognition or affect, as Geoffrey Haddock and Mark Zanna have shown. Consistent attitudes were found to be stronger, more predictive of subsequent intentions and behavior, more resistant to persuasive communication and change, and thus more stable than inconsistent attitudes. Inconsistent attitudes seem to result in more information processing and knowledge acquisition.

Interattitudinal Consistency
Attitudes toward the same object and attitudes toward different objects are said to be consistent when they do not contradict each other. Interattitudinal consistency with respect to different objects is empirically examined by the extent to which these attitudes are related to one another and/or the level of correspondence between the respondent’s attitudes and his or her ideological self-identification (e.g., consistent liberal or conservative attitudes), left-right self-placement, and respondent’s value system and/or the number of issues on which a respondent adopts his or her (liberal or conservative) party’s position. Interattitudinal consistency is considered desirable from the point of view of “correct” voting in representative democracies, requiring citizens to make well-founded voting decisions. Scholars vary in their views on the level of interattitudinal consistency. Philip Converse was one of the first who showed that the political attitudes that many people have are not consistent and referred to this aspect of public opinion as “nonattitudes.” However, the evidence presented by Max Kaase and Kenneth Newton, using Eurobarometer data, suggests that public opinion (in Western Europe) is relatively internally consistent (at both the aggregate and the individual levels). Mass opinion about the welfare state and the scope of government is structured into relatively few attitude publics. Mass attitudes about spending on government services and attitudes toward policy issues cluster into three groupings of related issues (welfare, security, and quality of life). There is also a match between saying that a particular issue has high priority as a public service and expressing a willingness to pay taxes for it. Finally, the statistical associations with left–right orientation and party identification are usually stronger than with any of the social, economic, and demographic variables. However, this left–right factor generally explains only a small proportion of the variance in issue positions. A factor that can also help us understand the structure of political attitudes is values; there is now a substantial amount of evidence that values are a major source of structure for political attitudes, according to Stanley Feldman.

Explanations of Attitude Consistency
Consistency and inconsistency have both interpersonal and intrapersonal sources. Political socialization theory, represented by, among others, David
Easton, Kent Jennings, Richard Niemi, Judith Torney, and Russell Farnen, emphasizes interpersonal and contextual factors and the level of consistency or inconsistency of the cognitive and affective messages that people receive from the various socialization agencies (including political leaders, mass media, friends and colleagues, religious institutions, school, family) in particular. The scale runs from very high message consistency in totalitarian regimes and autocracies, via moderate consistency in representative democracies with weak elite polarization, to very low consistency in democracies with strong elite polarization.

Various intrapersonal factors have been identified. Individuals differ in their chronic tendency to engage in evaluative responding (which can be measured by a set of items developed by Blair Jarvis and Richard Petty). People also differ in their attempts to reduce or avoid the tension that they experience when they become aware of contradictions. To avoid the anticipated tension, people prefer exposure to consonant media and messages (e.g., Fritz Heider’s balance theory and Leon Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory). The level of political knowledge is another important variable. In general, the mean level is very low but the variance is very high. The higher the level of political knowledge, the more tightly structured or “constrained” the individual’s system of attitudes, as Converse has shown. A few theoretical frameworks have been developed as attempts to explain the organization of political and social attitudes. Converse’s “ideological constraint theory” holds that individual attitudes become consistent thanks to deduction from higher order orientations such as ideology. People differ in attitude consistency because they differ in the use of ideological schemata. Howard Lavine and Cynthia Thomsen have developed the “shared-consequences model” to understand the psychological mechanisms through which structural organization and consistency between attitudes develop. The core of the model is the strength of the perceived implicational relationship between a pair of attitude objects. Perceiving two policies, for example, legalized abortion and capital punishment, as instrumentally influencing a similar set of consequences, for example, the attainment of similar sets of value-related goals, constitutes a strong implicational relationship between them, which, in turn, creates consistency pressures. Consistency, then, is the psychological agreement between the valences of a pair of attitudes and the valence of the implicational relationship perceived to exist between them. The development of interattitudinal organization may proceed through a series of distinct stages: Interattitudinal connections may initially be derived from affective associations that issues have in common, next to self- and group-interest considerations, then from values, and finally from ideology.

**Attitude–Behavior Consistency**

Attitudes are studied primarily because of their expected effects on behavior. It is expected that the more favorable an individual’s attitude toward some object, the more likely the individual will be to perform any given positive behavior and the less likely he or she will be to perform any negative behavior with respect to the object. In Allan Wicker’s analysis of 45 studies, however, only a small minority of studies showed a strong or modest positive relationship between attitude and behavior. Hans Benninghaus’s analysis of 57 studies supported Wicker’s findings. Inconsistency between attitude and behavior is higher if the attitude object is not related to one’s self-interest, if intra-attitude inconsistency is high, and if one’s attitude conflicts with the subjective norm or the perception of how relevant others think one should behave.

In an attempt to improve the attitude–behavior link, the conceptualizations and operationalizations of the two key concepts have been reconsidered. Fishbein and Ajzen introduced the conceptual restriction of attitudes to a person’s evaluation or feeling of favorableness or unfavorableness. With respect to behavior, distinctions were introduced, for instance, between behavioral categories and single actions, isolated individual behavior and behavior in the presence of others, and behaviors under much or little volitional control. In subsequent behavior-explanatory theories, attitude is still an independent variable, though not the one and only, the most important, or the most immediate variable. In Fishbein and Ajzen’s “theory of reasoned action,” which presents a causal chain to predict behavior, the immediate determinant of behavior is the individual’s intention to perform the behavior in question. Attitudes toward the
behavior and the “subjective norm” are the two determinants of the individual’s behavioral intention. Thus, behavioral and normative beliefs are the antecedents of attitude and subjective norm and, as a result, ultimately determine intention and behavior. This reflects a cognitive approach to explaining attitudes and a rational view on human behavior. One of the main comments on the reasoned-action theory was that this theory is only applicable to purely volitional behavior. Ajzen’s “theory of planned behavior” extends the theory of reasoned action by adding the perception of control over behavior. Perceived behavioral control is also cognitive and rational since it is the individual’s set of beliefs about the presence or absence of requisite resources and opportunities. New meta-analyses by, among others, Min-Sun Kim and John Hunter and Christopher Armitage and Mark Conner, showed stronger attitude–behavior relationships and a relatively strong predictive power of the theory of planned behavior. Many studies have demonstrated the applicability of the theory in various content domains, including the political. In Marco Perugini and Mark Conner’s “model of goal-directed behavior,” the basic variables of the planned behavior theory were added, together with three other key variables: desire/motivation, emotions, and habit.

In general, affective variables are gaining in importance in theory and research aiming at explaining the consistency between attitudes and behavior. Promising political science theories, building on new insights from political neuroscience, are George Marcus’s “affective intelligence theory,” Milton Lodge and Charles Taber’s “theory of motivated political reasoning,” and Richard Lau and David Redlawsk’s “model of motivated reasoning.”

Further Readings


Attitudes, Political

Individuals hold attitudes—and eventually change them—in relation to a wide diversity of topics. They eventually establish connections between one topic and another. Thus, for example, for some individuals, attitudes toward a political topic may be based on attitudes toward other subjects not related to politics. The idea that political attitudes constitute, or should constitute, a separate field has two main roots. One is the tradition connecting the sphere of politics with the kind of well-articulated sets of ideas frequently called “ideologies”; the other is the normative tradition postulating that human beings should approach the realm of politics in a way that is different from how they normally approach other spheres of life, basically by putting aside impulses, affects, and passions. We hear and record opinions, but no one can hear or see attitudes. Attitudes lie within individuals’ minds; therefore, they are nonobservable, or latent, properties. To speak about “attitudes,” we need to build, analytically, the aspects of reality the existence of which we postulate. The concept of attitude as it is employed in various political contexts and the factors shaping them are discussed as follows.

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See also Attitudes, Political; Beliefs; Conservatism; Liberalism; Meta-Analysis; Political Psychology; Political Socialization; Values
Definition and Measurement

A critical problem, as ancient as the notion of “attitudes” itself, is how to measure them. Being, by definition, unobservable aspects of reality, any attempt to measure them is based on assumptions. The first and best known attempts to measure attitudes employed projective tools, scales, attitudinal indices, and mathematical models allowing inferences about latent structures through manifest observations and data. All of these tools are based on the principle of a stimulus (a question) and a response (a verbal answer) that elicits some unobservable mental state. The idea that attitudes can be measured by recording manifest verbal expressions from which they can be inferred had a significant impact on the development of the techniques of quantitative survey analysis. This concept provided a logic, a methodological and an empirical support for the field of opinion research.

Let us think of voting. How do we account for the particular decision each voter makes at the ballot box? Is this act something determined from outside himself or herself, such as his or her class position, or is it derived from some kind of “objective interest”? Is it a random impulse? Or is it a consequence of the multiple messages an individual is exposed to in a communication process called an electoral campaign? Or is it to a great extent the result of media and public relations manipulation? Or is it the result of influences and pressures generated in the social groups the person belongs to—family, the neighborhood, friends, colleagues, and peer groups? Is the vote the product of political convictions and ideas of an individual and his or her ability to match those ideas with the ones the candidates communicate? Or is it just the result of preferences on any of the attributes, or issues, the voter sees in a candidate?

However, political convictions or preferences cannot be directly observed. They can only be inferred from what a particular voter says. This nonobservable, latent, level is called attitude: the propensity to produce certain behavioral responses relating to specific subjects, once the individual has been exposed to a stimulus. To the extent that such attitudes determine opinions and behavior, the individual is an autonomous actor rather than a passive object moved by causes external to him or her.

Attitudes or predispositions, as they are frequently called, vary from one individual to another. For some individuals, “ideas,” in the sense of a set of articulated beliefs, matter; to others, tastes are more important. For some individuals, particular issues are more relevant than general concepts; for others, moral values are more important than particular preferences. So, some people may vote because of the positions of candidates or parties on specific issues, whereas others may vote with regard to more general public policies. Some individuals prefer a candidate just because they like or trust him or her, or they base their choices on the perceived honesty of the candidate irrespective of his or her standing on public policy issues.

The idea that there are voters who make their decisions in an erratic, random way has not been alien to the social sciences. Frequently, this idea implies the assumption that individuals are strongly dependent on mass media, leaders, or material incentives, so they are not really autonomous actors. In any case, attitudes are important factors accounting for individual behavior and thought. They constitute a term in an equation intended to describe why autonomous persons do the things they do, other terms being information coming to the individual from society and pressures and influences from the near environment.

The standard representation of attitudes postulates the existence of levels of generality and stability in the judgments people are able to formulate about themselves and the external world. A higher degree of generality means that an idea refers not to a single or particular subject but to a wider set of topics; a higher degree of stability means that ideas sustained through time resist the impact of new information the individual is continually exposed to. In these assumed hierarchies of judgments each individual holds in his or her mind, there are, on one extreme of the continuum, the more general and stable ones—values, values, ideologies; on the other pole, judgments refer to particular issues—opinions; and in the middle are judgments that are less general and stable than the first ones but not as occasional or particular as the latter—attitudes. The expression belief system is sometimes used to refer to the relationship between the different attitudes a person can hold in a stable manner.

The term attitude denotes an individual’s propensity to think and to form opinions in a stable
way when he or she refers to a specific topic. “Attitude” also refers to a propensity in the individual to mobilize certain mental contents, stable points of view, every time he or she formulates specific judgments, utters opinions, or decides on certain conducts.

Citizens do have predispositions toward public affairs, governments, and elections. These vary among individuals. For example, some individuals hold conservative points of view, others hold liberal ones; some are nationalist, others universalist; some favor a certain public policy, others do not.

Some dimensions of predispositions are thought of as if they were a given, by a sort of necessity, in each individual. Thus, it is frequently assumed that individuals are always either liberal or conservative, either left wing or right wing. Empirical evidence in many countries does not support such assumptions. Sometimes, the evidence instead suggests that there are individuals who to some extent may be both liberal and conservative, depending on the issues that are considered. In some countries, people define themselves as oriented to the left, right, or center; in other countries, these concepts are not relevant for many people.

**Attitude Formation**

How these predispositions are formed is a matter of debate among social scientists. Predispositions may result from genetic factors, socialization, learning, or many other influences. Two main traditions have developed within the social sciences. One places emphasis on *interests*: Alexis de Tocqueville said that people’s opinions change with their fortunes. The other focuses on *membership groups* each individual takes part in: Émile Durkheim talked of “likenesses of consciences” in contrast to the effects of the division of labor. The idea that each social position must correspond to a particular set of attitudes is deeply rooted in social theory; it frequently receives empirical support, but the explanation to account for that correlation is far from being consensual.

The theory of attitudes postulates an inferred, nonobservable relationship between a given attitudinal dimension, which is by definition unobservable, and a manifest, observable one. We can conceive of that relationship as a probabilistic one, in the sense that there is no perfect link between the real position of a person on the attitudinal dimension and his or her manifest answer to a particular question at a given time. An individual can be at a certain latent state in the dimension of “nationalism,” but that position does not determine a single answer the individual would produce to a given question aimed to elicit that attitude. A student who knows the content of a given topic very well is supposed to answer all the questions in an exam correctly, but sometimes he or she fails to do so.

We speak, for example, about attitudes toward the government. We could conceive of these attitudes as ranging from a very favorable attitude to a very unfavorable one. To measure that attitude in a particular individual at a given time, we may ask him or her: “What do you think about the performance of the present government?” and we possibly offer him a limited set of options: “very well,” “fairly well,” “about average,” “fairly bad,” or “very bad” or 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, where 5 is a *very favorable* and 1 a *very unfavorable* evaluation. The relation is probabilistic, because, even if the individual usually is in favor of the current government, some days he or she will not necessarily give the same answer, assuming we ask the same question in different ways and that he or she does not remember the previous answers. Moreover, different researchers can construct the scale in different ways: Some offer five options, as in the example, while others offer four or seven choices. The answers generate a variable that is statistically dependent on the latent one, but that variable could also be dependent on many other variables, most of them probably unknown to us.

Critics of this method of measuring attitudes may argue that all the other factors that may influence a response, including the more occasional or situational ones, could reduce the relationship between the latent dimension and the manifest one to zero, making the measurement irrelevant and not valid to measure what it intends to measure. The supporters of the method think that the range of variation between these two levels of reality is far more restricted and that there is no better way to approach attitudes—at least in a quantifiable way.

It is commonly accepted that political attitudes help the analyst explain and predict political preferences and behavior. There is a great deal of research examining the effects of electoral
Attitudes, Political campaigns, political communication, and messages delivered by political leaders on voters’ attitudes. While there are no universal generalizations supported by empirical research, some firm trends can be established. For example, a voter’s level of education and the quantity of information an individual may acquire facilitate a higher propensity to change; membership groups also have an effect, but this effect tends to become weaker the more complex societies are. Political parties in democratic systems used to have a strong influence on voters, but this influence is becoming weaker as the number of citizens who feel independent from parties is increasing. The role of ideology in the propensity of individuals to become exposed to certain kinds of messages and to be receptive to them is also a matter of discussion. The influence of the print media is also a matter of widely divergent points of view—that is, whether the media influence public attitudes or whether they adapt themselves to the prevailing attitudes of their publics.

We know that many citizens today hold stable political predispositions and do not change them easily. They derive their opinions and particular political decisions from those predispositions. However, they do not link their predispositions to particular opinions and decisions in a strongly linear way. Rather, they afford a certain degree of variability in the opinions they form at every moment—including the voting decision. So, different persons eventually may make the same voting decision for different reasons, while persons with similar attitudes may eventually arrive at different voting decisions. Electoral campaigns are sources of intense stimuli, concentrated within a short period of time, which voters cannot easily resist. During a campaign, political advertising, press information, and the messages of the candidate and other leaders are able to produce some variability in particular voting behaviors even while voters’ attitudes may remain relatively stable. Sometimes, those intense messages are able to modify attitudes as well.

Some citizens decide their vote by taking into account both their own attitudes and the ones they attribute to the candidates and then matching them. But there are others who tend to take into account “tactical” considerations, such as defining their vote against a candidate rather than in support of another or to voting for the presumptive loser in order to prevent the winner from obtaining a landslide. To make that kind of decision, electoral polls may influence some voters.

The principle that political behavior, and specifically voting behavior, must be related to what citizens have in their minds is at the root of democratic theory. Quite often, mass democracy is judged negatively precisely on the assumption that voters lack the capacity to make consistent judgments anchored in adequate information. Thus, the ancient problem of the relationship between attitudes and behavior is central in the realm of politics—be it formulated in these terms or not. Even if attitudes, in whatever way they have been formed, tend to be stable and do not vary at random, they are susceptible to change. One important question is whether human beings are able to modify their attitudes in an autonomous way—that is, by thinking and reasoning themselves—or whether they change their attitudes under the influence of messages from the outside world.

Attitude Change

We are far from a theoretical consensus on how attitudes can change. While one theoretical perspective postulates that better informed, more consistent persons are more stable in their attitudes, another theoretical perspective proposes that they are more susceptible to nuances and variations in particular opinions. Recent research tends to give support to the view that particular opinions may vary, to some extent, independently from well-established attitudes. Individuals have many different ideas in their minds; so, they may hold different attitudes, some of them more firmly rooted than others. The assumption that more general judgments are more stable in the mind of individuals does not imply that specific opinions and decisions may vary to a greater extent. That does not necessarily mean that citizens are inconsistent but, rather, that they are flexible.

When an individual receives information from outside, he can dismiss it or accept it; in the latter case, he can process it and record it, totally or partially, in his memory. The new information may have different effects on already existing attitudes: It can modify some of them, it can be conserved without modifying previous attitudes (sometimes even if it produces some inconsistencies), or it can
Attitudes, Political

be rejected. The effect of a new piece of information on previous attitudes can also be sometimes delayed: The new information has been taken into account, but the mind works on it slowly. So there can be a lag between the moment a stimulus is produced and the moment an effective change of attitude takes place. It is possible that those effects are more intense on some attitudes held by an individual than on others; therefore, as each individual holds a collection of interrelated attitudes rather than many separate ones, it is possible that some attitudes change while others do not, thus producing different patterns of consistency or inconsistency over time.

Let us take the example of electoral campaigns. Some voters do not change their attitudes under the effect of a campaign while others do; but to some voters, the effect comes with a lag. So, the transition from one attitudinal property to another could be nil, immediate, or deferred—that is, some persons may adopt a new behavior or a new opinion after a period of time. This leads to the notion of a probability of transition from one attitudinal state to another as a function of a new stimulus or new information received. Much of public opinion research focuses on these effects, frequently analyzing them by means of statistical association coefficients and contingency tables.

In summary, attitudes may change as the result of changes in the social position of persons or of changes in the sociocultural context or because of the effect of communication—press media, advertising, electoral campaigns, leaders’ messages.

To account for variations in voting behavior, it is useful to transpose the electoral market to any situation where individuals must make a choice between different options. In those situations, there are factors that condition the individual’s own perspective and there are factors that are under the control of external sources. When the individual who has to make a choice is exposed to political communication, he or she may or may not be motivated by well-reasoned political purposes. There is no rule about why and how individuals process their own motivations and the information they receive from outside.

A model of the effects that lead to voting decisions in each individual citizen may take into account three forces: (1) the initial position of each individual, (2) the various forces that push him or her toward a change in one direction, and (3) the various forces that push him or her in the opposite direction. The balance of those three types of forces determines whether the person will finally vote for the candidate he or she would vote for if the campaign did not exist and other factors remain the same or whether he or she changes his or her voting decision. Political campaigns are dynamic factors moving against the other factors that keep the system stable.

Generally speaking, attitudes are at the base of the demand side; they help citizens form expectations and respond to what they are offered. Traditionally, political studies have given more emphasis to the supply side: articulated ideologies and widely shared systems of ideas, political parties, leadership, mass media. More recently, the focus has gradually shifted to the demand side; there has been increased interest in understanding individual predispositions and attitudes and the individual sources of opinions and behavior. Market research, motivational research, opinion research, and communications research have been the engines of the approaches centered on the demand side.

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See also Attitude Consistency; Beliefs; Electoral Behavior; Electoral Campaigns; Public Opinion; Survey Research

Further Readings
Audit Society

The concept of “audit society” refers primarily to a logic at work in regulatory and managerial processes and to tendencies, rather than to an epochal state or condition. In this context, an audit refers to a systematic assessment of institutional performance against agreed criteria and standards. The processes used to conduct such audits reflect the transformation of audit and evaluation practices into normative principles of organizational control with a wide reach. This transformation is in turn a function of what political scientists have called the “regulatory state,” meaning in part a state with an operating philosophy of acting “at a distance” on policy domains, via instruments such as accounting and audit. Below, the role of the “audit society” idea as a critical resource is developed, followed by a number of methodological issues and concerns related to its potential application.

The idea of “audit society” provided an organizing motif for criticisms of the public service reforms in the United Kingdom (UK) and elsewhere during the 1980s and 1990s, known collectively as the “new” public management. While the original formulation of the idea relied largely on a synthesis of secondary empirical evidence, it has provided the platform for substantive studies on health workers, teachers, the police, social workers, and psychoanalysts, to name but a few. The working practices of these groups have been targeted by reforms, and they have found their professional lifeworlds transformed to a greater or lesser extent by precise demands for accountability. The critical reaction that enlists the idea of “audit society” has focused on defending the importance of professional judgment, demonstrating the decline of trust and the rise of anxiety, and analyzing the unintended consequence of auditable targets, which damage the very service quality the reforms have been intended to improve.

The auditing process is used in a variety of ways in academia, ranging from performance assessment to evaluating the effectiveness of research grants. The wide-ranging appeal of the “audit society” motif does not necessarily mean that it has been applied consistently across fields. It has often been taken as a given, supplying only a pretext for empirical analysis. In the academy, there are also variations in disciplinary sensitivities. For example, the specific methodological commitments of anthropology make it particularly vulnerable to the shorter timescales of the audit process and to the reductive nature of performance measurement. Marilyn Strathern and others have been highly critical of audit and related forms of performance measurement as they have emerged in universities in the UK. By contrast, economics, which has to a large extent internalized evaluation mechanisms as part of its own “professionalization,” has been relatively silent on auditing as a specific mechanism of control and oversight.

If the concept of audit society is to be taken seriously as more than metaphor, it raises a number of serious issues for scholars. First, among these issues is the much debated boundary between audit and evaluation. Audit can be narrowly defined in the shadow of financial auditing largely as an exercise in compliance verification. From this point of view, it addresses the following question: Does this organization comply with some preestablished set of rules for the quality of its accounting? Even allowing for interpretation and discretion in the application of such rules, audit is fundamentally concerned with conformity with them. Interesting questions then concern the rules of performance themselves: How have they evolved and how are they implemented?

Evaluation, it is argued, is quite different from audit. It is an investigation of the impact of public service programs for change, assessing whether such programs succeed or fail in their own terms, and what unintended consequences they may have created. Whereas audit produces a kind of yes/no answer to compliance issues, evaluation often produces questions and ambiguity. Yet this ideal-typical distinction hides a dynamic by which the audit model expands its influence and affects evaluation in subtle forms. It is easy to see why audit is attractive to policymakers seeking simple measures of performance, and this attraction is grounded in a deeper logic that finds its purest expression in the idea of financial audit but also transcends that practice and is at work in evaluation practices as they are broadly understood. The
power and impact of this logic in different institutional settings is an empirical question, but it is a logic that aspires to transform the evaluated domain according to its own operational values of visibility and traceability (the accountant’s idea of the “audit trail”) in the representation of organizational and individual performance.

Another criticism of the “audit society” idea is that it is a case of mistaken causality; the real driver of an “audit explosion” in the UK was in fact the heightened concern with performance improvement across a range of public services. While this is a very reasonable point to make—supported by the observed production of information that is never audited or checked in the strict sense—the concern with performance has been simultaneously a concern with the production of visible and auditable traces of performance. The logic of audit that requires individuals and organizations to be transparent and comparable plays a constitutive role in shaping conceptions of relevant performance and is at the very heart of what Michael Moran calls the attack on “club government” in the UK.

This means that “audit society” is only partly an argument about the rise of auditors, although data on increases in headcount for oversight activity are suggestive. It is more a claim about a change process that is governed by an audit logic, which in turn shapes the design of performance representations. This emphasis on process raises an important question for the scholarly understanding of “audit society” and for the attention given to the analysis of auditors as compared with those who they audit, respectively. Empirical indicators for the audit explosion can be found in the growth of audit institutions and expansion of their remit and scope. However, the less visible and more profound aspect of “audit society,” which preoccupies many studies outside political science, concerns the manifest impact of the audit on professional service providers and the process by which the logic of audit is internalized by them.

This psychological and behavioral level of analysis reveals the conflicts and the range of strategies that individuals use to cope with new auditized demands for performance reporting. In turn, it suggests that the real “action” of the audit society happens at the level of the construction of “auditees,” who are not docile subjects in Michel Foucault’s sense and may put up considerable resistance to new measures of what they do but nevertheless operate in the shadow of a logic that values precision and traceability in the representation of performance. The strong form of “audit society” analysis goes further to suggest that performance representation in many different fields is shaped by this logic, with highly dysfunctional consequences.

Another methodological concern about “audit society” is that it is a case of selection on the dependent variable, a consequence of which is the failure to recognize the UK-specific nature of the phenomenon. While there is some truth in this, the argument also reveals differences between research sensitivities within and outside political science. Finding new and puzzling phenomena whose character and logic demand analysis is necessarily a precursor to the exploration of the kind of dependency and causality that provide insight into cross-sectional variation of the phenomena. In short, it is always the “dependent” variables that strike us first, generate puzzles, and provide the “value relevance” for research into their independent causes. We do not think much about this question when the dependent variable is well formed, for example, security prices in liquid capital markets, but when it is not, the investigation is more like a “depth hermeneutic” that is explicative and inductive in its movement from phenomena to their underlying logics. The audit society thesis is more than a mistaken focus on a well-formed dependent variable.

That said, cross-national variations in audit society tendencies are indeed significant, depending themselves on how fiscal and service performance issues are problematized and the sources of expertise available in different national settings and fields. The distinctive cultural position of accountants in UK society has influenced the way reform agendas have been shaped, and there is also considerable cross-sectional variation. So audit as an institutional logic with its own dynamic must compete with many others, and its hegemony in any setting is at best highly contingent.

The “audit society” idea has had wide cross-disciplinary impact because of its role in providing a label for the challenges faced by many different professional groups. However, to suggest that an audit logic has dysfunctional side effects is hardly
a new one in social science. Analyses of failed dreams of mastery are well-known to political scientists and historians. The rise of audit and its underlying logic is only the latest version of this dream, and the effects, intended and unintended, are not particularly surprising. Behavioral economists have explored the “hidden costs of control” and the paradoxes of transparency. Bruno Frey and Reto Jegen have provided analyses of the “crowding” of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic efforts at control. This work overlaps with the “audit society” arguments and provides the potential for a more formal expansion of their insights.

Finally, it was suggested above that the rise of audit is closely associated with neoliberal reform agendas and the rise of the regulatory state in developed economies. And yet “audit society” is an intriguing concept precisely because it escapes easy alignment with such labels. The logic of audit embodies values of visibility and transparency that may enable greater democratic participation in service evaluation but may equally support centralist aspirations by states. Audit has been associated with a Soviet-style centralism in UK public policy, and performance audit in the Chinese context is an expression of socialist ideals. The malleability of audit and evaluation in different cultural contexts, and the capacity of their underlying logics to appear in quite different value systems, means that there is still some way to go in order to understand the complex social and organizational dynamics identified under the idea of “audit society.” Not least among these complex dynamics is the apparent invulnerability of audit to its own failure.

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See also Accountability; Auditing; Bureaucracy; Compliance; New Public Management; Performance; Policy Evaluation; Regulation; Self-Regulation

Further Readings


**AUDITING**

If accountability is the hallmark of democratic governance, public auditing is a means to achieve it. Auditing is a form of oversight, or examination from some point external to the system or individual in question. Technically, auditing is a form of verification by an independent body, which compares actual transactions with standard practices. Because it evaluates the relationship of what is against what ought to be, auditing is a normative operation. Public auditing is the traditional instrument to hold actors entrusted with managing public funds accountable by providing information to supervising agents, elected officials, and (sometimes) constituents about compliance with or deviations from accepted standards. Although accountability as a general aim of auditing is undisputed, unavoidable tensions with other principles of good governance arise, such as the exercise of informed discretion by elected decision makers or individual privacy rights when the corset of control is taken to an extreme.

The media, interest groups, private overseers (e.g., credit-rating agencies), international organizations, public audit institutions, and the general public increasing see modern government as an object of scrutiny. At the same time, government regulates society and delivers services through myriad national, international, nonprofit, and private organizations, making control a highly complex issue. The question is: Who oversees whom for what purpose, under whose authority, with what kind of legitimacy, and how?

The balance of autonomy and control is a classic topic for students of government. It touches on
issues such as responsibility, trust, functional differentiation, authorization of execution, assurance, and accountability. At its center stands the question of how public organizations can be task efficient and accountable at the same time.

This entry is divided into four sections: The historical traditions of auditing are traced in the first section, the second one introduces different institutional arrangements of auditing, the third one sketches the main arguments of the audit explosion discourse, and the final one illustrates the politics of auditing.

**Tracing the Historical Traditions of Auditing**

Auditing is one of the oldest and most eminent of state functions, and early forms preceded the rise of the modern democratic state. The Latin word *auditus* means “a hearing.” In ancient Rome, the organization of a “hearing of accounts” was a way in which one official would read out his accounts to another who would compare the figures. This form of oral verification was intended to prevent officials in charge of funds from misusing them. Governors of ancient civilizations, for example, Sumer, Egypt, Phoenicia, Greece, and Rome, appointed trustworthy clerks to find and punish employees for embezzlements and to protect public assets. Early Chinese writings from the 12th-century BCE illustrate an advanced understanding of the role of auditing, describing methods and practices of good economic management and the necessity of securing an independent and high-level status for the auditor. One of the earliest records of public sector financial management in India is the *Arthashastra* written by Kautilya, who was a Brahmin minister under Chandragupta Maurya, the founder of the Mauryan Empire, about 2,300 years ago. Kautilya developed bookkeeping rules to record and classify economic data, emphasized the critical role of independent periodic audits, and proposed the establishment of two important but separate offices—the treasurer and the comptroller-auditor.

The origin of public auditing lies therefore in the review of financial transaction. The concept is closely related to the development of private sector accounting techniques in 16th-century Venice, but some supreme audit institutions date their origin back to the 13th and 14th centuries. The National Audit Office in the UK sees its origin in the early 14th century, the French *Cour des Comptes* cites 1318 as the year of its inception, professional forms of supervision and control of resources in Mexico date back to the Aztec Empire. These audit institutions were not independent of the ruler or crown and were designed to control the financial conduct of the crown servants. Their aim was to protect the interests, property, and wealth of a ruler at a time when the state was still considered private property. In concert with trends of the 18th and 19th centuries—the diminishing role of family and personal loyalty, the increasing division of labor in economy and state (functional differentiation), the emergence of big government, new ideas about responsible behavior of public servants—audit institutions changed in scope, quality, and quantity.

As parliament gained power to grant the financial means to execute public tasks, the need arose to oversee the respective administrations or institutions using the financial resources. The objective was to ensure that the regularity and probity of the expenditures was in accordance with the defined aims of parliament. The state budget was and is the prerequisite for this form of formal legal rationality. Its verification rests on checking receipts against authorized state budget expenditures and vice versa.

The clearest transformation was from internal to external auditing and with it the emergence of independent audit institutions, often considered to be the extended arm of the parliament via the executive government. Over time, they gained a constitutional status in many countries, which secured their statutory and operational independence from executive interference. In many countries, however, especially those under authoritarian rule, this was the exception rather than the rule. In the former German Democratic Republic, an independent audit system did not exist to execute the directives of the Ministry of Finance, which made the Central Committee of the Communist Party a political tool to oversee the completion of economic plans in a state-directed economy. The attribute of constitutionally secured independence of the auditor from those holding and executing power (relational distance), for example, cabinet, bureaucracy, parliament, and the auditor's role in ensuring good governance have become, as many see it, the key to the auditor’s
legitimacy in democracies. The many authoritarian regimes that lack an autonomous body of oversight in effect allow the instrumentalization of spending for partisan purposes. The Mexico Declaration on SAI Independence of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions advocates principles of good auditing and tries to establish common standards of auditing among its global member organizations. It specifies organizational, functional, and financial independence as the core prerequisite to accomplishing tasks objectively, effectively, and without external interference.

The state audit evolved from a rather crude tool to prevent chaos and ruin in public finance to an advanced instrument for safeguarding responsive, accountable, open, regular, and efficient government. Compliance auditing (verification of accounts, legality of expenditures, the organization’s adherence to regulatory guidelines) and financial auditing (the overseeing of public accounts, assessing accuracy and fairness of an organization’s financial statements) were the primary purposes of auditing; performance auditing (examination of how government programs operate and how well they achieve the defined objectives) came somewhat later, gaining an important place in the auditing realm with the new public management reforms. The latter is often referred to as value-for-money auditing, or evaluating the efficiency, effectiveness, and economy of programs and policies. Such a focus is supposed to give way to comparisons with performance criteria of best practices from the private sector. Its critics claim that performance auditing has contributed to an overstretched meaning of auditing: For example, conceptual boundaries with forms of evaluation have started to blur.

Auditing as an Institutional Arrangement

Internal versus external auditing is the most basic differentiation of types of auditing. It refers to the organizational status of the auditing entity relative to the one it audits. Internal means that the auditor is part of the organization and the organization’s employee; external refers to an external oversight body or person operating independently of the entity being audited. Because internal auditors are part of the organization under scrutiny, they work for the benefit of the management of the organization under examination and their insights remain mostly disclosed only within the management. In contrast, external auditors review financial transactions and/or statements and serve third parties, for example, parliament, president, who need reliable financial information about those entrusted with the management of public funds.

Models of Auditing: State, Private, and People’s

The audit of public sector organizations staffed with civil servants differs. The most general classification is based on the question of who conducts the audit. Here we can distinguish between state, private, and people’s auditing. State auditing can be divided into three subgroups according to government level:

1. supreme audit institutions (e.g., the British National Audit Office) examine the affairs of federal government departments;
2. second- or third-level audit institutions (which can be fully independent of other government levels) exist in states, provinces, and municipalities of federal systems to audit their own government entities; and
3. internal auditing bodies operate within any governmental department or agency.

Professional accounting firms charged with private auditing conduct special-purpose audits (such as reviewing public enterprise accounts) and have increased in number and scope in recent decades along with the growth of government-owned business corporations in the public sector. The third audit model, people’s auditing, was exercised in the former Soviet Union by the Narodnyi Control (Soviet People’s Control) as part of a combination of professional auditors with millions of volunteers as so-called people’s inspectors who conducted examinations and inspections in their spare time. This system was meant to educate the masses and be a training ground in the transformation of the country into a communist society. According to the communist ideology, the professional state apparatus would eventually wither away and the ordinary people would take over.
Organization of Auditing: Court or Administrative System

State (supreme) audit institutions can be classified into two broad groups according to their organization: the **cameral** or **court system** and the **administrative** or **monocratic system**.

The Cameral System

In the cameral system, the audit institution is headed by a group of auditors whose independence is ensured by their judicial status and who examine governmental accounts as well as the uses of public funds. To this ideal-type model belong most of the Roman law–based countries, such as not only the Corte dei Conti in Italy, the French Cour des Comptes, and the Tribunal de Cuentas in Spain but also the European Court of Auditors, the German Bundesrechnungshof, the Dutch Algemene Rekenkamer, and the Auditoría General de la Nación of Argentina in Latin America. In Italy, France, and Spain, the auditor often acts as an administrative tribunal with quasi-judicial powers in administrative matters, whereas the variant of this collegiate system in Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany is without jurisdictional authority. The strong legalistic foundation in both variants of the “cameral system” privileges legal and financial compliance over performance auditing. Though in principle a collegiate model in which everyone enjoys the same rights and duties, the institution is commonly headed by a kind of *primus inter pares*. As a “first among equals,” he or she can exert, as in the German case, considerable influence by selecting the heads of sections and tailoring the areas of operation. Despite these far-reaching organizational competencies, the head of the institution cannot interfere with actual matters of auditing or the content of inspectors’ decisions.

The Administrative or Monocratic System

In the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, and most of the former British Empire dominions and colonies, as well as countries such as Mexico, Chile, and Colombia, the state audit institution is organized under the administrative or monocratic system, which is similar to a hierarchically structured government department—that is, headed by a single person called the comptroller or auditor general and acting as an auxiliary institution to the legislature, although charged with ample autonomy. The head of the institution enjoys an independent status, but the institution itself functions according to hierarchical principles of lines of command. Under this system, controls are intended to correct rather than penalize. Supreme audit institutions in these countries focus more on *ex post* auditing, rather than *ex ante* control, and emphasize financial and performance auditing over compliance control.

Interrelating With Others: Parliamentary-Led or Executive-Led Auditing

Audit institutions are embedded in political environments, which is exhibited by the way they interrelate with other actors. Though they all enjoy statutory independence, differences arise with regard to instrumental institutions: the one to which they report, the one that appoints the head of the Supreme Audit Institution, and the one that assigns the annual budget. Despite their statutory independence and regulations to protect that status, auditors are dependent on, for example, national legislative bodies or governmental budget support—forms of leverage that can be used to compromise the auditor’s independence.

In Argentina, Canada, Germany, the United States, Israel, Mexico, and the UK, the parliament or a special committee appoints the Auditor General, acts as supervisor, and decides on the annual budget. This system has been labeled *parliamentary led*, as the auditor is considered the extended arm of the legislator. In an *executive-led* system such as France (also Ecuador), the “Premier Président” and other magistrates of the Cour de Compte are appointed by a decree from the President of the Republic. Appropriations are officially related to the Prime Minister but have special authorization by Parliament. Reports are directed to the president and legislative branch of government. China also has an executive-led arrangement: The auditor reports to the Premier of the State Council (the head of the Chinese government) and the ministry of finance controls the budget. Sweden’s Riksrevisionen, which until 2000 was similar to the executive-led model, now carries out its state audit functions under the auspices of Parliament.
Auditing as a “Neurosis”
Balancing independence with control is a classic topic in public sector research. The new public management (NPM) hype sparked an increased interest in performance auditing, primarily understood as an assessment of efficiency goals and other indicators of economic success with a corresponding system of controlling and reporting. At its center stands the question of how public organizations can be task efficient and accountable while being relatively free of bureaucratic impediment.

In the past 2 decades, almost every local government and many national administrations in OECD countries have implemented some kind of NPM reform. This “wave of modernization” has in many cases changed the way governments and local authorities operate and eventually also the audit regime. Although the NPM doctrine does not prescribe a well-defined list of reform steps, the stereotypical tool box includes privatization, deregulation, outsourcing, service delivery competition, semiautonomous service centers, and—particularly in central and federal government reform—executive agencies, performance standards and measures, increased consumer power, and employment of professional managers and noncareer personnel. Auditing bodies, it is claimed, respond to NPM-type reforms by institutional, procedural, and cultural acclimation. Increasing coproduction of public goods and services by public, private, and nonprofit organizations seems to pose additional challenges to systems of public auditing that are supposed to counter centrifugal tendencies of decentralized agencies and public enterprises.

The conceptual overstretching of auditing is often associated with a debate on the rise of the so-called audit society. An increasing public and academic concern about unethical behavior of public officials, an evaluation-obsessed political and social context, and the observation that modern Western societies would evolve into low-trust societies led observers to conclude that the “audit society” is a way of dealing with this type of neurosis. This diagnosis had its origin in Michael Power’s description of a society obsessed with overseeing almost every domain of public activity and the paradoxical effect that it does not lead to an increase in trust in government. This audit mentality is very often decoupled from its real effects on public sector accountability and has become an end in itself. Auditing is not seen as a rational reaction to the well-defined problem of accountability; rather, the very concept creates, constitutes, and shapes the public perception for which it is a solution. Therefore, by “audit explosion,” Power refers to the growth of audit and related monitoring practices associated with public management reform processes. As a multifaceted concept, the explosion is not only an increment of auditing activities in quantitative terms but also a shift in qualitative perspective, mainly toward the so-called value-for-money audit and other internal control systems. It also means that oversight bodies offshoot into many different fields such as health care and education. The concept of an audit society has been criticized for being too narrowly attributed to the UK or other English-speaking countries, such as Australia or New Zealand, meaning that it does not sufficiently capture the reality of developments in other countries, for example, the United States or Germany.

The Politics of Auditing
Audit institutions do not commonly have the power to set rules or sanction the deviant behavior of auditees. In principle, they lack the capacity to exert direct hierarchical control. This is not undisputed, as the Audit Office of Finland, the Office of the Comptroller General of Chile, and the Court of Audit in Spain are endowed with competencies to prosecute. The Italian Corte dei Conti and the French Cour de Compte also enjoy quasi-judicial powers in administrative matters. Despite these examples, the foundation of their authority in general, however, rests on their constitutionally guaranteed independence from political interference, their professional expertise, the skill to informally cooperate with auditees in order to improve processes, and the ability to ally themselves with like-minded organizations (such as the public accounts committee in parliament) to exercise indirect control. Providing information to other institutions about a specific body’s financial management is the dominant way of exerting influence. The naming and shaming of deviant behavior through the publication of examination results must be seen as ultimo ratio. On one hand, publicizing mismanagement is a powerful lever; on the other, it politicizes
their alleged independence as the auditor is drawn into the struggle between political competitors. For this reason, the evaluation of government policies by auditors is a critical matter. Auditing is per se political in nature. It operates in the nexus of politics and policies. The tension between politicization and institutional independence is permanently felt in the arena of political competition for several reasons. First, the broad legal mandate with the discretion to look into almost any government activity and its potential to unveil, for example, untoward spending practices unwittingly makes the auditor a player within the political game. Second, the nature of the auditing workforce—empowered, well positioned in government, specifically skilled—impels political parties to strategically place favorites. Third, an independent producer of creditable and presumably apolitical information is a highly desirable partner in political arguments. Auditing as a political power or blaming tool is most evident when it is used to detect and deter deviant behavior, such as capitalist tendencies in communist countries, or to achieve certain policy or partisan objectives. The claim of avoiding policy issues and focusing on the operation of the apparatus is therefore understandable, albeit next to impossible, especially in the context of issues framed not objectively but within the perceptions of political actors.

The principle of the auditors’ independence is definitely a necessary condition for a well-functioning system. Other conditions are more general traits of the political system, such as the audit courts’ dependence on the democratic culture of a country, the respect for democratic institutions, the belief in a division of powers, and respectful behavior among those holding power. The main challenge in the development of auditing in modern states is therefore the acceptance of the complementarities of the auditor’s role by relative political actors and the positive use of its potential to improve government operations, ensure good public records, and increase public trust.

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**Further Readings**

**Authoritarian Regimes**

Until the early 1960s, there was a fundamental dichotomy in political science between democratic and totalitarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes were often treated as a type of totalitarian regime. However, with the collapse (Germany) and the subsequent transformation (in the former USSR) of totalitarian regimes after World War II and in
the 1950s, authoritarian regimes have become the dominant form of nondemocratic government.

This entry provides a general definition of authoritarian regime as well as exploring subtypes. Among the many subtypes of authoritarian regimes, the currently most widespread one is the "electoral authoritarian" regime that combines a facade of multiparty elections with a variety of authoritarian controls that, in effect, deprive such elections of any democratic significance. Therefore, this entry, while briefly discussing other subtypes of authoritarian regimes, will particularly focus on electoral authoritarianism. Because such regimes are the dominant regime type in the Middle East and North Africa, a special emphasis will be put on this region.

A Theory of Authoritarian Regimes
Juan J. Linz developed the first full-fledged theory of authoritarian regimes, as distinct from both democracies and totalitarian regimes, as well as from many other types of other nondemocratic regimes (traditional autocracies, sultanistic regimes, semiconstitutional monarchies, oligarchic democracies). As early as 1964, Linz defined authoritarian regimes on the basis of three main characteristics: (1) limited pluralism, (2) the presence of a mentality rather than an ideology, and (3) the absence or low level of political mobilization. He developed and refined his theory in his later work (especially *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, 2000). More recently, such regimes have started to attract greater scholarly attention for several reasons. First, the emergence of military–bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in much of Latin America and elsewhere as a new type of authoritarianism required more detailed research into their dynamics. Second, after the global resurgence of democracy or the "third wave of democratization" in the 1980s and the 1990s, there emerged a still newer type of authoritarianism generally called "electoral authoritarianism." This type lies in the gray area between liberal democracies and "closed" authoritarian regimes, an area that they share with "electoral democracies." Hence, in this entry, while all subtypes of authoritarian regimes will be discussed, the emphasis will be on these intermediary types.

**Limited Pluralism**

Starting with the three-dimensional scheme of Linz, limited pluralism contrasts with the almost unlimited pluralism of liberal democracies and the almost total absence of pluralism in totalitarian regimes. The degree of limited pluralism varies among different subtypes of authoritarian regimes. They may exclude only political opposition groups or may exclude certain types of civil society institutions as well. Such exclusion may be based on legal regulations or de facto restrictions. As this observation indicates, the degree of limited pluralism is a critical variable in distinguishing the subtypes of authoritarian regimes, as will be spelled out below.

**Mentality Versus Ideology**

A second defining element of authoritarian regimes is the presence of a “mentality” rather than an “ideology.” In Linz’s view, in contrast to the more rigid, systematic, rationally developed, utopian, and comprehensive nature of ideologies, mentalities are less systematic and more amorphous ways of thinking and feeling, more emotional than rational. Although the distinction is not clear-cut and there is a large gray area in between, “mentalities,” as recalled by the German sociologist Theodore Geiger, are, actually, more or less ambiguously developed values, such as fatherland, nation, order, hierarchy, tradition, race, ethnicity, and others. The key political characteristic of them is that, precisely because they are ambiguous and intellectually underdeveloped, creating broader political coalitions around them to build the bases of regime legitimacy is much easier than with precise, developed ideologies (Linz, 2000).

**Lack of Political Mobilization**

The third element is the absence of extensive political mobilization, again a crucial difference with totalitarian regimes, even though authoritarian regimes may also have followed mobilizational policies at some point of their development. Actually, this variable is closely related to the second one, since in the absence of an ideology, it is difficult to pursue effective mobilizational policies and to attract the young, students, and intellectuals.
Borderline Cases

Admittedly, in terms of all three criteria, the borderline separating authoritarian regimes from other types of nondemocratic regimes on the one hand and from pseudodemocracies or semidemocracies on the other is a rather blurred one. Thus, an authoritarian regime that allows a fairly large area of limited pluralism in nonpolitical fields and even tolerates and attempts to co-opt some of its political opponents, maintains a fairly flexible mentality that leaves room for different interpretations, and shows little interest in mobilizing the masses in a certain ideological direction may be said to approach a pseudodemocracy, while there may be cases where it is difficult to distinguish authoritarianism from totalitarianism. Hence, this large gray area poses a number of difficult borderline problems, and it requires an effort to distinguish subtypes of authoritarian regimes. Such difficulties of classification are further aggravated by the fact that many regimes combine elements from different types and stress different elements in different phases of their history. Authoritarian regimes are often complex systems combining elements of contradictory models in uneasy coexistence.

Subtypes of Authoritarian Regimes

Linz distinguished the following subtypes of authoritarian regimes using his two criteria of the degree of limited pluralism and the apathy mobilization axis:

- bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes,
- organic statism,
- mobilizational authoritarian regimes in postdemocratic societies,
- postindependence, mobilizational authoritarian regimes,
- racial and ethnic democracies, and
- posttotalitarian authoritarian regimes.

Although space limitations do not allow for a detailed analysis of each of these subtypes, it will be useful to discuss whether this typology is as meaningful today, many decades after Linz’s masterful essay.

Certainly, the collapse of the Soviet type of totalitarianism has made the fundamental distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes much less meaningful at least for practical purposes. Probably the only Soviet-type totalitarian regime today is that of North Korea. Linz classifies China and Cuba as posttotalitarian. Certain former Soviet republics of Central Asia seem to combine posttotalitarian and sultanistic elements. On the other hand, Central and Eastern European countries that were part of the former Soviet bloc seem to have made a successful transition to democracy, while some of the former Soviet republics (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Transcaucasian republics, Kyrgyzstan) are still experiencing serious problems of democratic consolidation, probably because of their much longer totalitarian past and difficulties associated with the problem of “stateness.”

Another interesting borderline case between authoritarianism and totalitarianism is Iran, where an almost totalitarian interpretation of a religious ideology is combined with elements of limited pluralism. Under the Islamist regime, Islam has been transformed into a political ideology with a totalitarian bent, and the limited pluralism is allowed only among political groups loyal to the Islamic revolution. Furthermore, the electoral and legislative processes are under the firm control of tutelary institutions such as the Supreme Leader (appointed by the Assembly of Experts composed of theologians), the Council of Guardians with veto powers over all laws and all candidates seeking elective office, and the Expediency Council added to the Constitution in 1990 as the final arbiter in cases of disagreement between the Majlis (parliament) and the Council of Guardians, all inspired by Khomeini’s doctrine of “the supremacy of the Islamic jurisprudent” (*Velayet-e Faqih*). These tutelary institutions effectively blocked the moderate reform attempts of President Mohammad Khatami (elected twice in 1997 and 2001, himself a cleric loyal to the Islamic Revolution), even though he had the support of the Majlis elected in 2000 and dominated by the reformists. Thus, Iran’s limited pluralism appears very limited indeed.

The momentous socioeconomic and political changes in the past 3 or 4 decades, at the top of which stands “the third wave of democratization,” made some of Linz’s subtypes less relevant today than they used to be. Thus, with the transition to democracy in the South African Republic, the leading example of so-called racial or ethnic
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democracies disappeared. With the demise of totalitarianism, defective and pretotalitarian regimes are no longer a contemporary category. With the successful transition to democracy in former Soviet bloc countries of Central and Eastern Europe, post-totalitarianism is limited to a few countries such as China and Cuba, as was alluded to above. Mobilizational authoritarian regimes in postdemocratic societies also seem to be a category of mainly historical significance. Such regimes emerged in the past in countries with some democratic experience and a degree of political mobilization. Therefore, the authoritarian regimes had to use a mass organizational party and other mass organizations in order to exclude the defeated social force from political participation. However, with the worldwide preeminence of democratic ideology at present, it seems exceedingly difficult to establish such a regime in a country with some prior experience in democratic politics and mass mobilization.

Similar observations can be made about the subtype called “organic statism” by Linz. Such regimes attempt to combine the Catholic corporativist social doctrine with fascistic elements but are distinct from fascist-totalitarian regimes. In these regimes, often described as corporatism or organic democracy, a variety of social groups or institutions that are created or licensed by the state are allowed to participate in some degree in the political process. Linz admits, however, that this model, popular in the 1930s, lost its attraction for a number of reasons. Probably, the most important reason was the disengagement of the Catholic Church from its commitment to essentially undemocratic organic theories of society. A number of “populist regimes” that emerged especially in Latin America in the 1930s and later, such as those of Getulio Vargas in Brazil and Juan Peron in Argentina, interestingly, combined elements of corporatism with those of “electoral authoritarianism” to be discussed later. These regimes displayed a strong developmentalist, nationalistic, statist, and elitist character. With the failure of their import substitution–based development strategy and the emergence of the currently dominant free market economy, however, such regimes seem to have lost their appeal.

Finally, the usefulness of another subtype called “tutelary democracies” by Edward Shils is also open to doubt. Recent research has suggested, for example, that Kemalist Turkey, usually presented as the prototype of such regimes, in fact bore closer resemblance to corporatist or organic statist authoritarian regimes. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of an “enlightened” leader or a group of leaders dedicated to “educate” their people in democratic values and prepared to lose power as the ultimate outcome of the democratization process.

The remaining subtypes of authoritarian regimes with some contemporary relevance seem to be the military–bureaucratic authoritarian regimes and the postindependence mobilizational single-party regimes. The latter are normally associated with a war or struggle of independence from colonial rule. Countries in Black Africa and the Maghreb provide examples of this type. Linz observes that these regimes emerged in countries of low economic development where the colonial rulers had not allowed the growth of an indigenous professional or bureaucratic middle class but destroyed or weakened traditional precolonial authorities. Thus, the new nationalist leadership, mostly trained abroad, successfully mobilized the grievances of the native population against the foreign rulers. As expected, the desire for independence obscured the importance of other cleavages. After a short period of experience with democratic constitutions inherited or inspired by their former colonial rulers, most of these regimes were transformed into single-party regimes, the most notable examples of which were Algeria, Tunisia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Tanzania. The single-party regimes claimed to represent the entire nation and defined their chief mission as nation building. However, their mobilizational and ideological components decayed rapidly. The role of the mass mobilizational single-party regime lost its preeminence. Consequently, they moved in the direction of either military–bureaucratic or organic statist regimes. This process can be compared with “detotalitarianization by decay,” namely, the loss of the revolutionary ideological élan and of the mobilizational capability of the regime, which also explains the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union probably better than anything else.

Turkey was one of the earliest examples of single-party regimes and, as such, attracted the attention of a great number of Western scholars, including Maurice Duverger. The Republican People’s Party (RPP) was founded by Kemal Atatürk, the
leader of the War of Independence (1919–1922) in 1923, and it consolidated its monopoly in 1925 by outlawing the only opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party. It maintained such monopoly until the end of the World War II, when the party leadership allowed the formation of an opposition party, the Democratic Party and lost power to it in the first free election of 1950. The RPP (and its ancestor, the Society of Defense of Rights for Anatolia and Rumelia) was successful in achieving a significant degree of popular mobilization during the War of Independence, appealing to and co-opting Muslim religious orders, Kurdish tribes, radical republicans, and loyal monarchists, and so on. After the victory, however, the RPP was quickly transformed into an “exclusionary” single party, in the words of Samuel Huntington. It showed little interest in mass mobilization and concentrated its efforts on nation building and secularizing the state and society by top-down authoritarian methods, almost a “mission impossible” in a deeply divided, pluralistic, and devoutly religious society.

The military–bureaucratic authoritarian regimes emerged as probably the most widespread type of authoritarianism in the 1960s, especially in Latin America but also elsewhere. Guillermo O’Donnell and others have argued that the emergence of such regimes as a new type of authoritarian rule in Latin America was linked to the failure of import substitution–based industrialization (ISI). The early phases of this industrialization strategy gave rise to populist coalitions that brought together national industrialists, urban professionals, and the emerging urban working class. Both components of the populist coalition benefited from this expansionist policy: Import-substituting industrialists were heavily protected against foreign competition by import quotas, tariffs, and foreign exchange regulations; the urban working class, in turn, obtained employment opportunities, union rights, welfare benefits, and relatively higher wages because the growth of the domestic market was supposed to further stimulate the ISI.

The early, easy phase of the ISI, however, was soon exhausted. Once the limits of growth of domestic markets had been reached, the inefficient, internationally noncompetitive national industries failed to produce the necessary foreign exchange earnings. Thus, ISI-based economies faced severe problems, such as balance-of-payment deficits, foreign exchange shortages, low or negative growth rates, inflation, and unemployment. The economic crisis, in turn, led to the radicalization of the popular sector (the industrial working class) and to increased political polarization. This created fears among the urban middle classes of a Cuban-style radical leftist revolution. With the support of this middle class, the military took over in many important countries of Latin America such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay and established what is known as the bureaucratic–military authoritarian regimes. The fact that these regimes emerged in the most highly developed countries of Latin America lends support to O’Donnell’s economy-based explanation.

Such regimes differ from earlier types of military regimes in Latin America (poder moderador) in that the latter were of relatively short duration and intended to solve a particular constitutional crisis, while the former were of much longer duration and attempted to change the economic structure in a more free market, export-oriented direction. To accomplish this objective, they tried to demobilize the already activated popular sector by severely restricting its political participation opportunities. In this effort, they also enlisted the help of a large group of experts, technocrats, and managers with problem-solving capabilities. Hence, these regimes are often called “military–technocratic–bureaucratic authoritarian regimes” to distinguish them from the more bureaucratic–military–oligarchic authoritarian regimes of interwar Eastern Europe.

Although the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes have been analyzed mostly within the Latin American context, the applicability of this model is not limited to that continent. In fact, the National Security Council (NSC) regime in Turkey (1980–1983) bears strong resemblances to its Latin American counterparts. It also followed a period of deep economic crisis as a result of the failure of an ISI strategy, accompanied by intense political polarization, radicalization of the working class, and the increasing fears of the middle classes. Like its Latin American counterparts, the NSC regime pursued policies aimed at shifting the basis of the economy from an ISI to an export promotion model, while trying to demobilize the working class and depoliticize the society at large.
Parallel to the “global resurgence of democracy,” pure and simple military regimes have virtually disappeared, except perhaps for a transitional period. As Larry Diamond observes, the interventionist armies today try to either legitimize their rule by running for president in contested but manipulated elections or carve out for themselves a large autonomous sphere in the form of tutelary powers and reserved domains behind a veil of civilian, multiparty rule.

**Electoral Authoritarianism**

While some of the subtypes in Linz’s original typology have lost their contemporary relevance, new borderline problems have arisen as a result of the rise of democratic ideology as the almost unrivaled source of legitimacy. Many otherwise quite authoritarian regimes have been obliged to accept at least some outward trappings of democratic regimes. As a result, while in the past, the boundary between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes was not very clear, as opposed to the relatively well-defined boundary between nondemocratic and democratic systems, today the reverse seems to be true. Indeed, there seems to be a large gray area between authoritarian regimes and certain types of democracies variously called “electoral democracies,” “semdemocracies,” “pseudodemocracies,” and so on. A newly coined term, *electoral authoritarianism*, suggests the difficulty of arriving at a neat classification. Electoral or competitive authoritarian regimes are not among the subtypes in Linz’s original typology, for understandable reasons. As Diamond argues, this type of hybrid regime is very much a product of the contemporary world. The worldwide trend toward democracy has forced many authoritarian regimes to mimic some forms of electoral competition. Andreas Schedler argues, in the same vein, that on the bases of 2001 data, out of 151 countries in the “developing world,” 36 (23.8%) are liberal democracies, 32 (21.2%) are electoral democracies, 58 (38.4%) are electoral authoritarian regimes, and 25 (16.5%) are closed authoritarian regimes. Thus, electoral authoritarian regimes make up more than two thirds of all autocracies.

The breadth of this gray area between liberal democracies and full-scale (closed) authoritarian regimes may necessitate the search for further subdivisions within this category. Thus, Schedler distinguishes between electoral democracies and electoral authoritarianism, while Diamond, in a more nuanced distinction, divides it into four subtypes as electoral democracies, ambiguous regimes, competitive authoritarian regimes, and hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes. Both authors agree that the boundaries between these regime types are “blurry” or “foggy” and that it is difficult to fit elusive realities into ideal types. The distinction between liberal and electoral democracies is based on variables other than electoral competitiveness, since both conduct reasonably free and competitive elections as a minimum condition for democracy. Electoral democracies fail to institutionalize the other vital dimensions of liberal democracies, such as the rule of law, political accountability, full protection of civil and political rights, and so on. Another feature distinguishing electoral democracies from liberal democracies may be the presence of tutelary powers and reserved domains in some of them outside the purview of elected officials, most often in favor of the military but also sometimes in favor of clerical leaders as in the case of Iran. Turkey, where free and fair elections have been regularly held since 1950, but the military have enjoyed significant tutelary powers and reserved domains since its intervention in 1960, and even more so after its intervention in 1980, is a good example of such cases.

On the other hand, the difference between electoral democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes centers on the fairness and competitiveness of the electoral process. The criteria for free and fair elections are well known and need not be repeated here. However, as Schedler puts it, historically, elections have been an instrument of authoritarian control as well as a means of democratic governance. And at present, there are many regimes where multiparty elections are regularly held, but many basic democratic norms are systematically violated. Therefore, they should be classified as authoritarian regimes. Indeed, the authoritarian use of elections is nothing new, as attested by an old but influential book, *Elections Without Choice* (1978), edited by Guy Hermet, Richard Rose, and Alain Rouquié, providing earlier examples of such regimes. As Schedler rightly observes, “the menu of manipulation” available to authoritarian rulers is quite rich and varied, ranging from
banning parties and disqualifying candidates to repressive policies against dissenters during election campaigns, fraud and intimidation, informal disenfranchisement, unequal use of state resources, adoption of favorable redistributive rules, and so on. Certainly, one can further subdivide the electoral authoritarianism category into competitive authoritarian and hegemonic authoritarian subtypes, as did Diamond, depending on their degree of competitiveness. In his view, competitive authoritarian regimes are defined by the presence of a significant parliamentary opposition, whereas in the hegemonic subtype, elections are largely an authoritarian facade: The ruling or dominant party wins almost all the seats. Similarly, in hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes, the president is elected with a great majority of the popular vote. Diamond admits, however, the difficulty of distinguishing between the two types. At any rate, the difference seems to be one of degree rather than of kind. No doubt, they both firmly belong to the authoritarian type, but both differ from full-fledged or “closed” authoritarian regimes.

The blurry borderline between electoral democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes poses difficult methodological problems. As Schedler rightly argues, under conditions of electoral manipulation, official election figures do not faithfully reflect the actual distribution of citizen preferences. However, it is difficult to observe electoral manipulations, since these are usually “undercover activities,” constituting “an impenetrable black box.” Nevertheless, available information on the state of political rights in general may give us clues about the extent of electoral manipulation. Thus, unequal access to state resources or mass media, restrictions on freedom of expression and association, bans on political party activities, adoption of electoral rules favorable to the governing party, gerrymandering, and so on may provide reasonably reliable indicators to recognize an electoral authoritarian regime. Observations by international election observers, if available, may provide another source of information.

As was pointed out above, electoral authoritarian regimes constitute the largest group of countries in the developing world. Certainly, the rise of this type is closely associated with the global resurgence of democracy. With the collapse of Soviet-type totalitarianism, democracy has become the only legitimate form of government in the eyes of a much greater portion of the world’s population. As a result of a favorable international climate, active promotion and encouragement of democratic change by major Western powers, the desire to gain international respectability, and domestic pressures associated with rising levels of socioeconomic development, some forms of authoritarianism have become less sustainable. Thus, most hybrid regimes today are quite deliberately pseudodemocratic, dreaming, in Schedler’s words, of reaping the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty. They mimic democratic institutions not only in the electoral field but also by creating mimetic constitutional courts and adopting other outward trappings of a system based on the rule of law. Conceivably, such institutions create potential areas of disidence and conflict, even if they remain far from ensuring democratic accountability. Nevertheless, the concept of electoral authoritarianism centers on the electoral area, as its name indicates.

Thus, electoral authoritarian regimes combine two contradictory dynamics in uneasy coexistence. On the one hand, as Schedler points out, by permitting multiparty, competitive elections, they recognize the principle of democratic legitimacy instead of other sources of legitimacy (such as revolutionary, transcendental, communitarian, charismatic, or substantive). On the other hand, they subvert it in practice using various instruments of authoritarian manipulation. As opposed to democratic regimes in which the rules of electoral game are accepted and respected by all parties, in electoral authoritarian regimes, competition is not only “within rules” but also, and more important, “over rules.” On the other hand, as opposed to closed authoritarian regimes, the rulers have to find a balance between “electoral persuasion” and “electoral manipulation.”

This mixture of contradictory elements makes the future of electoral authoritarian regimes highly uncertain and unpredictable. Again, as Schedler points out, the game of authoritarian elections may lead to a process of gradual democratization as in Mexico and Senegal. It may lead to democracy through the sudden collapse of authoritarianism as in Peru and Serbia. It may also end up in an authoritarian regression. Or such regimes may
survive for an extended period, through various successful survival strategies of the rulers.

At the other end of the democracy–autocracy continuum, “closed authoritarianism” seems to be the relatively smaller category, but a stable one. Thus, during the past 10 years, such a nonfree regime went from 25% of all states (48 in total; Freedom in the World 2000–2001) to 24% (47 in total; Freedom in the World 2009). They may combine some elements of “sultanistic regimes,” considered a separate type by Linz. He has argued that the exceedingly personalistic and arbitrary nature of such regimes distinguishes them from the more institutionalized and predictable behavior of the authoritarian regimes. In sultanistic regimes, the ruler exercises his power unrestrained by legal rules or ideological commitments. Public bureaucracy becomes the personal entourage and servants of the ruler. Classic examples of sultanistic regimes are the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic, the Batista regime in Cuba, the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, the Duvalier regime in Haiti, the Pahlavi regime in Iran, and the Marcos regime in the Philippines. More recent examples may include the Ceaușescu regime in Romania, the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, and the North Korean regime.

If we look at the regional distribution of authoritarian regimes, we see its highest incidence in the Middle East and the North Africa and its lowest in Eastern Europe, with sub-Saharan Africa in between. According to Schedler’s figures (as of early 2006), 11 sub-Saharan African countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia) are in the electoral authoritarian category. According to his figures based on 2001 data, 52.6% of the Middle Eastern and North African regimes are electoral authoritarian regimes and 42.1% belong to closed authoritarianism category. Israel is the only liberal democracy in his classification, with Turkey included in the electoral authoritarian category. In contrast, 57.9% of Eastern European states are liberal democracies, 15.8% electoral democracies, 26.3% electoral authoritarian regimes; no Eastern European regime is in the closed authoritarianism category. The success of the Eastern European cases can be explained by the geographical and cultural proximity of Western democracies and many forms of international influences, including the European Union conditionality. The Middle East and North Africa, on the other hand, stand as the major geographical region of the world least affected by the third wave of democratization, a fact that requires a detailed explanation.

Islam and Democracy

One explanation for the limited democratization in the Middle East and North Africa, based on the alleged inherent incompatibility between democracy and Islam, the dominant religion of the region, must be treated with utmost care. It has been argued by Orientalists, for example, that many notions associated with Western democracy, such as the notions of popular sovereignty, representation, elections, secular laws, an independent judiciary, and a civil society composed of a multitude of autonomous groups, are alien to the Muslim political tradition. Such statements abound in the Orientalist literature and have deeply influenced the Western conceptions of Islam, so much so that Huntington argued that the West’s problem is not Islamic fundamentalism but Islam. It is beyond the scope of this entry to discuss the philosophical, historical, and empirical flaws of this argument. Suffice it to say that Islam, like any other major religion, is not a monolith and that it has given rise to different interpretations and practices at different times and in different places. Likewise, historically speaking, it has been compatible with different forms of government.

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coalitions within a democratic arena whose bounds they respect.

Turkey, with its militantly secular constitutional and legal system and its more than 60 years of (albeit interrupted) democratic experience, is perhaps the leading example in this category. However, the extensive tutelary powers enjoyed by the military, and its less than desirable record on political rights (judged by the ease and frequency of party closures), allow us to classify it only as an electoral democracy. Thus, according to the Freedom in the World 2009 report, it is an electoral democracy in the “partly free” category with a rating of 3 for both political rights and civil liberties, on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being the lowest score. According to the same survey, the major non-Arab, Muslim-majority countries have the following ratings (the first figure refers to the countries’ score on political rights and the second on civil liberties): Albania (3 and 3), Bangladesh (4 and 4), Bosnia-Herzegovina (4 and 3), Indonesia (2 and 3), Malaysia (4 and 4), Pakistan (4 and 5), Senegal (3 and 3), and Turkey (3 and 3). Of these, Indonesia is placed in the “free” category and the rest in the “partly free” category, and all are rated, except for Malaysia and Pakistan, as “electoral democracies.”

Although the Freedom House’s threefold classification of “free,” “partly free,” and “not free” categories are not identical to Schedler’s fourfold (liberal democracy, electoral democracy, electoral authoritarianism, and closed authoritarianism) or Diamond’s sixfold (liberal democracy, electoral democracy, ambiguous regimes, competitive authoritarian, hegemonic electoral authoritarian, and politically closed authoritarian) typologies, there is, no doubt, a large area of overlap. Thus, liberal democracy clearly corresponds to the “free” category, while closed authoritarianism corresponds to “not free.” On the other hand, Freedom House’s partly free category includes both electoral democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes (or the four intermediate regime types in Diamond’s still finer typology), and the borderline between the two may not always be clear. It may be said as a rule of thumb, however, that countries with a Freedom House score of 3 or 4 may be considered electoral democracies, while those with a score of 5 or 6 belong to the electoral authoritarian category.

Among the non-Arab, Muslim-majority countries, the former Soviet states occupy a special place in that they are all in the “not free” or “closed authoritarian” category, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, which is rated partly free by the Freedom House (with scores of 5 and 4). Thus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan have scores of 6 and 5, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are at the authoritarian end of the continuum with scores of 7 and 7. This can be explained by their strong totalitarian legacy. Iran (discussed above) and Afghanistan are the other two special cases.

**Authoritarianism in the Arab World**

The situation is not at all encouraging in the Arab core of the Middle East and North Africa. In 2000, among 16 countries, 10 (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates)—or 12 (if we include two border states Mauritania and Sudan that have an Arab majority)—were in the “not free” category and only 6 (Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen) in the “partly free” category. During the decade, Bahrain, Jordan, and Yemen came into the “not free” category, and consequently, in 2009, Freedom House scores for the remaining partly free Arab countries were as follows: Kuwait (4 and 4), Lebanon (5 and 3), and Morocco (5 and 4). Even more interesting, Stepan observes that, while the 16 Arab countries are “underachievers” in electoral competitiveness (relative to what one would expect from their levels of gross domestic product per capita), the 31 Muslim-majority but non-Arab countries are “overachievers.”

To explain “Arab exceptionalism” requires no less an effort than explaining the much more debatable “Muslim exceptionalism.” It does not seem convincing to attribute the Arab democracy gap to certain inherent characteristics of the Arab political culture. Therefore, one should look for political, rather than ethnic or religious, particularities of the region to explain such exceptionalism. But exactly what kind of “political” particularities? Indeed, authoritarianism in the Arab world has given rise to an extensive literature. Although it is not possible to give the subject a full treatment here, the most common explanations can be summarized as follows.
One such explanation is related to the historical conditions under which Arab states emerged. As Stepan correctly states, many contemporary Arab states have relatively new and arbitrary boundaries cut out of the Ottoman Empire and were afterward occupied and colonized by European powers. Compounding this problem of state identity is the widespread appeal of pan-Arabism in many parts of the region, based on a common language and common religion. Against this background, it is remarkable that the new Arab territorial states have shown a high degree of resilience and durability. Egypt, with its strong sense of identity and tradition of statehood going back to several millennia, may be considered an exceptional case.

Another related factor is the impact of the colonial or semicolonial experience in the political culture of Arab states, where independence from foreign rule was the dominant objective overshadowing concerns such as democracy and human rights. A second explanation centers on the concept of “rentier state.” Many Arab countries are rich in oil and natural gas reserves. The vast income deriving from these sources enabled the ruling elites to buy or co-opt some elements of the potential opposition as well as satisfy the basic material needs of a large majority of the population. This has had a retarding effect on the emergence of an independent bourgeoisie that is the driving force for democratization in Muslim as well as other countries. As Nasr says, Muslim democracy needs the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie needs Muslim democracy. Nevertheless, the rentier state hypothesis cannot explain the prevalence of authoritarianism in oil-poor Arab states.

A third argument, perhaps the most convincing one, provides a cyclical explanation. Thus, the repressive policies of Arab authoritarian rulers against all opposition groups, secular and Islamist alike, and their refusal to even partially liberalize the system radicalize the opposition. The chief beneficiary of this process is the Islamist opposition, much stronger, more broadly based, and better organized than secular opposition groups. This, in turn, increases the perception of threat (real, exaggerated, or manipulated) on the part of the ruling groups and is used to justify even more repressive policies. This fear, although highly exaggerated and manipulated, is also vivid within the Turkish state elites (particularly the military and the judiciary), and it constitutes one of the most formidable roadblocks on the way to further democratization.

The feeling of an Islamist threat also leads to a paradoxical situation in that liberal or secular opposition groups that should normally have been on the side of democratic reforms also support repressive policies against the Islamist opposition. As Daniel Brumberg argues, the alliance between potential democrats and the authoritarian states in the Middle East is the reverse of the political reform process in Eastern Europe. In the latter cases, the not too democratic elites nonetheless found democratic procedures useful for dealing with the opponents of the regime, thereby leading to a “democracy without democrats.” In the Middle East, by contrast, fear of Islamist victories has produced “autocracy with democrats,” as potential democrats now actively support or at least tolerate autocrats as a lesser evil than an Islamist regime. A similar process is under way in Turkey in the ostensibly “social democratic” and militantly secularist RPP’s (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) support for the military’s harsh attitudes and manipulative maneuvers against the governing Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; AKP), even though the latter can in no way be considered an Islamist or even a post-Islamist party.

The dilemma of the authoritarian rulers in the Middle East explains the zigzagged course of liberalization policies. It has been observed that periods of relative liberalization have often been followed by those of deliberatization. Although in some Arab countries, such as Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, and Egypt, controlled or semi-competitive elections have taken place, and moderate advances have been made in areas such as the freedom of the press, association, and assembly, none of these regimes has advanced beyond the level of electoral (or competitive) authoritarianism. Many studies of these cases are rather optimistic, probably reflecting the democratizing bias of their authors.

And yet it seems a fruitful line of inquiry to distinguish between the relatively more successful and less successful of these cases. Thus, Brumberg distinguishes between what he calls “dissonant” states and “harmonic” states. The dissonant states leave some room for competitive or dissonant politics. The examples are Morocco, Egypt, Jordan,
Kuwait, and Lebanon. That such regimes, however autocratic, recognize and do not attempt to destroy societal pluralism creates an arena for competition and negotiation. The “harmonic” states, on the other hand, in their attempt to impose an often artificial unity through repression and cooptation, leave little room for negotiation and compromise and create a deadly game of “winner takes all.” These are the states based on an ideology (be it Islam, Arab socialism, or Kemalism) and a strong sense of mission that attempt to mold the society according to their image of the “good society.” John Waterbury characterizes such states as “ends-oriented” states, arguing that since the mission is considered sacred, debates over ends or means are seen as subservive or blasphemous.

The dissonant Arab states and those in the non-Arab parts of the Muslim world permitted a degree of electoral competition that, in turn, helped moderate the Islamist groups and integrate them into the political system. Turkey is the leading example of this process, where the earlier Islamist parties were transformed into a moderate, center-right, conservative democratic party (the AKP). Other examples include Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan. Similar processes are under way in Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, and Lebanon. As Nasr observes, competitive elections push religious parties toward pragmatism and make other parties more sensitive to Islamic values in a game to win the middle. Electoral competition may eventually lead to a situation of “democracy without democrats,” and this surely is much more preferable to that of “autocracy with democrats.”

Conclusion

The early optimism and enthusiasm about the global resurgence of democracy have been replaced by a sense of greater realism. It is clear that authoritarian regimes, in one variety or other, have shown greater resilience and staying power than originally anticipated, using a skillful mixture of coercion, co-optation, divide-and-rule tactics, and selective democratic openings. However, just as the prospects for sustaining full-scale (or closed) authoritarian regimes in an age of democratization are not good, so are the prospects for electoral (or competitive) authoritarian regimes. The uneasy mixture of democratic and authoritarian elements creates an inherent source of instability, with the possibility of going in the direction of either electoral democracies or less competitive hegemonic authoritarian regimes.

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See also Democracy, Types of; Political Systems, Types; Totalitarian Regimes; Totalitarianism; Traditional Rule

Further Readings

Administrative autonomy is therefore a core concept in the study of public administration. At its heart lie democratic-theoretical questions concerning the relationship between voters, politicians, and civil servants as well as rational-instrumental issues concerning the management and design of effective and efficient public policies. As a theoretical concept, administrative autonomy represents an abstract social construct. Under this lemma, the background of the concept of administrative autonomy within the field of public administration is discussed first. Next, the various attributes and dimensions of the concept of administrative autonomy are described. Finally, an overview of theories of administrative autonomy is provided.

The Concept of Autonomy in the Study of Public Administration

In the field of public administration, the concept of administrative autonomy has been enjoying the close attention of many scholars for more than several decades (see, e.g., Daniel Carpenter, 2001; Peter Clark & James Wilson, 1961; Anthony Downs, 1967; Philip Selznick, 1957). Administrative autonomy is considered a sine qua non for nothing less than the “survival” of a public organization. To survive competition with other public organizations over scarce resources, the attaining of a substantial degree of administrative autonomy is seen as a critical goal: “Autonomy gives an organization a reasonably stable claim to resources and thus places it in a more favorable position from which to compete for those resources” (Clark & Wilson, 1961, p. 158). Administrative autonomy as the lifeblood of successful public organizations is still a vivid argument in contemporary public administration scholarship. In his study of the modernization of the American bureaucracy during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Carpenter (2001) ascribes the success of various agencies, among them the U.S. Postal Service and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, to their leaders’ capabilities to forge autonomy for their organization.

During the 1990s, we witnessed a renewed interest in the concept of administrative autonomy. Three developments were important drivers of this interest. First, starting in the late 1980s and the beginning of...
the 1990s, by setting up “quasi-nongovernmental organizations,” that is, quangos, governments worldwide embarked on the path of restyling their central governmental apparatus according to one of the core prescriptions of the new public management (NPM) paradigm. In traditional Western parliamentary systems, governments were confronted with trade-offs between giving autonomy to parts of their integrated central administrative apparatuses and to retain control over the newly created autonomous bodies.

The second driver of the renewed attention for the concept of autonomy is the wide diffusion and creation of independent regulatory authorities (IRAs). The intellectual foundations for the creation of IRAs stem from the same source as that of NPM described above. The financial and economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s resulted in the liberalization of markets and the breaking down of public monopolies. Deregulation led to reregulation as contracts and property rights within these newly created markets needed public supervision. Legislatures entrusted the protection of property rights and the enforcement of contracts on these new markets to independent regulatory agencies. Their autonomy from government is considered a necessary condition for guaranteeing the credible commitment of the government to not renege on the liberalization of these markets. Consequently, the creation of IRAs brought immediately to the fore the question of who controlled these highly autonomous bodies.

The third and final driver is the emergence of neo-economic theories within public administration and political science. Neo-economic theories entered the fields of political science and public administration through the latter’s adaptations from economic and legal approaches to contract theories. Neo-economic theories first made school within American political science. The warm reception of the principal–agency framework is partly the result of the decades-old American interest in Congress’s capability to control the bureaucracy. Principal–agency and transaction costs theories introduced a new conceptual tool kit into public administration and concepts such as “contract,” “information asymmetry,” “monitoring,” and “costs” started to dominate our talk and thinking about politics and administration. Neo-economic theories soon crossed the Atlantic and assumed a prominent place within European studies on regulation, Europeanization, and quangocratization. This resulted in the growing attention on the concept of administrative autonomy.

The study of administrative autonomy is colored by sociological and neo-economy–inspired political science theories. Whereas sociological theories treat administrative autonomy as an important asset of public organizations to successfully function within their own environment, economic-political science theories consider the autonomy of public organizations as a potential liability. We will see that these perspectives constitute the basic view within two of the three main sets of theories of administrative autonomy.

The Anatomy of Administrative Autonomy

Administrative autonomy is an abstract concept that is not directly observable. In this section, we will present two dimensions of administrative autonomy that are commonly used in studies of this concept.

De Facto and De Jure Autonomy

The first distinction is between formal or de jure autonomy and actual or de facto autonomy of public organizations. De jure autonomy refers to the formal-legal prescriptions concerning the relationship between politicians and public organizations. The laws that created the body (or the laws and regulations that delegate specific tasks to public organizations) state how a political principal and its administrative agent should interact in theory. As such, these laws spell out the rules of the game that should be obeyed when these actors interact with each other. To a certain extent, the de facto or actual autonomy of a public organization is reflected by its formal autonomy. A public organization that is not part of a ministerial department, for example, will have more formal administrative autonomy than a unit of a ministerial department.

However, the correlation between de jure and de facto administrative autonomy is not always strong. George Krause and James Douglas (2005), for example, found that it was not the formal administrative autonomy of three different U.S. economic agencies that affected the outputs of
their economic forecasts but the reputation of the economic professionals who worked within these agencies. Martino Maggetti (2007) found that a higher level of formal administrative autonomy is not a sufficient nor necessary condition for higher levels of de facto autonomy. These findings point at the existence of a discrepancy between rules and competences on paper and rules and competences in practice. In the words of Kutsal Yesilkagit (2004),

Rules, procedures, and competences may seem clear on paper as they inform all actors about the formal intentions of the designers. However, [after the body is created] public organizations leadership can interpret the rules in a different way than politicians had in mind when they designed the rules. (p. 535)

**Dimensions of Autonomy**

Koen Verhoest, Guy B. Peters, Geer Bouckaert, and Bram Vermeulen (2004) distinguish between seven organizational domains and related dimensions of autonomy. The first dimension is managerial autonomy and refers to the extent in which managers may decide on the allocation of the input (e.g., budget) and resources (e.g., personnel) of public organizations without prior approval from a supervisory body (i.e., a minister). Second, policy autonomy designates the discretionary space within which managers of public organizations can decide on the quantities of the goods their organizations produce, choose from among the policy instruments they have to their avail, and arrange the internal procedures within their organizations. Managerial and policy autonomy hence correspond to the discretionary authority of public managers: a space within which managers enjoy some leeway to manage their organizations as they see fit.

External stakeholder may actively limit the discretionary space of the management of public organizations. Administrative autonomy is then a function of the exemption from constraints on the actual use of decision-making competencies that external stakeholders—that is, the ministers—grant these organizations. In democratic systems, central governments always retain certain powers to fine-tune the amount of decision-making competences of public organizations. This fine-tuning may take place through the adjustment of an organization’s structural autonomy, legal autonomy, interventional autonomy, and financial autonomy. Structural autonomy is the extent to which the head of public organizations is exempted from direct supervision of elected officials—that is, the minister. If the head of a public organization reports to a governing board and not directly to the minister, then the structural autonomy of public organizations may be considered as high. The financial autonomy of a public organization is high when it is entitled to draw its own financial resources from the revenues of the services the organization delivers; it is low when the revenues of the organization come from the departmental budget. With regard to the legal dimension of autonomy, Verhoest et al. take the legal basis of the public organization as the measuring rod. If a public organization lacks legal personality or it is established by a statutory instrument instead of a statute, the position of the public organization vis-à-vis the legislature or the cabinet will be weak, as the latter can change the legal status of the public organization with lesser (legislative) costs than when public organizations was founded on primary law or a statute. Finally, interventional autonomy is the extent to which a public organization is exempt from ex post reporting, evaluation, and audit requirements. Table 1 gives a brief schematic overview of the dimensions of autonomy and the substances to which autonomy and/or exemptions refer.

**Theories of Administrative Autonomy**

Until now we have discussed the background and various attributes of the concept of autonomy. Here we will focus on the factors that affect levels of administrative autonomy. In research as well as in practice, we are primarily interested in why some public organizations have more administrative autonomy than others and what these organizations (can) do with their autonomy in public life. Overlooking academic research on administrative autonomy over the past decades suggests that there exist three sets of theories of administrative autonomy: (1) external-control theories, (2) internal-administrative theories, and (3) dynamic-adaptive theories.
External-Control Theories of Administrative Autonomy

External-control theories of administrative autonomy claim that the administrative autonomy of a public organization is a function of the level of pressures exerted on the organization by political stakeholders in the environment of the public organization. The theories that are grouped under this heading have in common that they apply a (version of) principal–agency theory of political control. They assert that the degree of administrative autonomy of public organization depends on the instruments and resources that political principals, such as Congress or the president (in U.S. studies) and parliaments or cabinets and ministers (in studies on parliamentary systems), have to control the actions and outputs of public organizations. These instruments are usually divided between ex ante controls, such as agency design, administrative procedures, and ex post controls, such as audits, reporting requirements, and (threats of) budgetary cuts.

External control is not limited to political principals. Next to formal political actors, interest groups too may act as principals of public organizations. Interest groups are key players in the politics of delegation and administrative design, as they, perhaps more than elected politicians, care about the control regime of public organizations as these organizations are essential to the policy process and the distribution of public services to their members. Political control is therefore not an issue... of congressional dominance or presidential control, but rather of shared authority and the ability to influence policy in one direction or another, a process whereby interest groups’ ability to access and shape policy both directly and indirectly is evident and must not be overlooked. (Scott Furlong, 1998, p. 61)

In other words, political control is a form of “joint custody” of president, congress, interest groups, and the courts, and administrative autonomy is the resultant of the strategies pursued by multiple interacting actors.

Internal-Administrative Theories of Administrative Autonomy

In contrast to external control theories, internal-administrative theories of administrative autonomy put public organizations and their interests, capacities, identity, and mission central to their explanatory models. The main thesis of this line of research is that the administrative autonomy of public organizations is a function of the organization’s capabilities to forge its own autonomy from its direct environment. Whereas we could say that in the former perspective, the organization is considered as a passive taker of the
discretion that its environment grants to itself, in this perspective, public organizations are considered as active seekers or forgers of autonomy (Carpenter, 2001).

As suggested by Wilson (1989, pp. 188–192), two sets of internal-administrative factors are deemed crucial for achieving autonomy. One is “political legitimacy” (Carpenter, 2001)—that is, the belief and reputation that agencies can deliver the services that are “worthwhile to some group with influence over sufficient resources to keep it alive” (Downs, 1967, p. 7). Agencies should “impress those politicians who control the budget that its function generate political support” (p. 7) from which politicians can benefit in terms of their reelection or strengthening of their party political base. Second, administrative autonomy requires the “organizational capacities” to deliver the benefits to their supporters: It must have the staff with the right skills and dedication to fulfill the organization’s ultimate goal of securing a stable and strong autonomous position within the public space. In line with this, Selznick (1957) saw carefully designed recruitment instruments as a prerequisite for autonomy. The leadership of an organization, if it wanted to pass the initial survival threshold and maneuver through critical periods ahead, had to carefully select, first, the “social base,” that is, those segments of “the [organization’s] environment to which operations will be oriented” (Selznick, 1957, p. 104).

Dynamic-Adaptive Theories of Administrative Autonomy

The third set of theories of administrative autonomy commonly claims that the administrative autonomy of public organizations is a function of a complex pattern of interactions between public organizations and its (political) environment. The interactions consist of a mix of stimuli or signals and responses that traverse from various venues in the environment to a public organization as well as from agencies to the political actors in the environment. “[C]ausality” between control and autonomy “does not just flow from each democratic institution towards the administrative organization as assumed in many conceptualizations of political control theories, but . . . also flows from agency to political principals” (Krause, 1996, p. 1089).

According to Dan Wood and Richard Waterman, stimuli are discrete events (e.g., a crisis, the election of a new president), event progressions (e.g., yearly budgetary appropriations, congressional oversight hearings), and tonal stimuli (i.e., changes in the tone of political–bureaucratic relationships), and the responses are a function of the agencies’ technological, rational, and political assets. Unanticipated behavior, a function of the general uncertainty in any policy environment, also influences autonomy. Policies are made in ambiguity; agencies do not only often poorly anticipate possible events, but they are also often not capable of making sense of the stimuli that reach them, causing public organizations to display unanticipated response behavior.

Conclusion

Administrative autonomy is a core concept in the study of public organizations. As the concept stands, it is studied in close relation to democratic-theoretical notions such as legitimacy, public accountability, and democratic control. In the preceding sections, we have discussed the various attributes of this concept and theories of administrative autonomy. We have seen that research on this topic is substantive. However, there are still aspects of administrative autonomy that have not yet been fully studied. Here, three lines of research that are worthy to be explored by future research are discussed.

In the studies discussed above, administrative autonomy is treated as the dependent variable. However, from a democratic perspective, the degree of administrative autonomy of public organizations is particularly important for the extent it enables or restraints public organizations in their operation. Public organizations that are more or less autonomous provide public services and regulate affairs across a variety of societal domains and may deeply affect the lives of citizens. So one line of research that deserves to be further elaborated is on the relationship between administrative autonomy and performance or policy impact. The study of administrative autonomy may be connected to existing studies on bureaucratic responsiveness. These studies examine the impact interest groups have on decision-making processes of public organizations but leave the relationship with administrative autonomy somewhat unexplored.
Second, an underexamined aspect of administrative autonomy is of a more normative nature, namely, the discussion from which stakeholders and public organizations should function autonomously. Public organizations are created to implement democratically chosen public policies. So, autonomy from government will never be absolute, as public organizations have been entrusted with the implementation of collectively agreed-on public policies. Furthermore, public organizations also interact with and are responsive to a number of nongovernmental organizations. So, public organizations will not be entirely autonomous from nongovernmental stakeholders as well. The focus within existing research has predominantly been on the varying degrees of autonomy from governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders, without questions regarding the desirability of varying degrees of autonomy from different stakeholders.

Finally, the globalization of the economy and technological developments increasingly blur the lines between the international order and domestic administration. We move toward a postnational bureaucracy that is hallmarked by the emergence of dense international networks of civil servants. Administrative autonomy becomes situated into a new context as the environment of public organizations becomes more and more transnational. The consequences of globalization of the executive branch force on us new ways of thinking about the relationship between politics and administration. Here, too, administrative autonomy will be a core concept.

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See also Administration; Administration Theory; Autonomy, Subnational; Bureaucracy; Sovereignty

Further Readings


**Autonomy, Subnational**

The concept of autonomy is polysemous in scientific literature and can be used in very different contexts. When used with the word *subnational*, the concept refers to the degree of autonomy in governments below the level of central government,
with the exception of local governments. Examples include the Canadian provinces, the U.S. states, the Spanish autonomous communities, the regions and communities in Belgium, the German and Austrian Länder, and the French departments and regions. Autonomy refers to the degree of decisional autonomy, sovereignty or self-government within a nation-state, enjoyed by these subnational governments.

This entry first discusses subnational autonomy and the structure of the state. Second, it describes the power, resources, and influence of subnational governments. Regionalization is discussed in the third section, the fourth section deals with multilevel governance and subnational autonomy, and the final one examines minority nationalism and subnational autonomy.

### Subnational Autonomy and the Structure of the State

Because nation-states vary in their structure, subnational governments also differ from country to country. In many cases, vast differences are found within a single country. This diversity results in a strong asymmetry between subnational governments in terms of their autonomy. The autonomy of subnational governments is based on several factors, including the institutional setting of a nation-state and the constitutional powers devoted to a subnational government. The more a country is constitutionally decentralized, the greater is the extent to which subnational governments have legislative powers and thus autonomy.

In unitary states such as Denmark or Israel, subnational governments have little or no autonomy. A unitary state is a state governed as one single unit in which the central government is the decision center. Subnational and local governments exercise only the power that the central governments choose to delegate.

In the case of a devolved or decentralized state, subnational governments have more autonomy. A decentralized state is generally a former unitary state such as France. The authority and responsibility for some public functions have been transferred from the central government to the regional government. A devolved state is a centralized state such as the United Kingdom (UK), where subnational governments have a degree of autonomous power devolved from the central government. A devolved government cannot challenge the constitutionality of central government’s law. The power given by the central government can be revoked or reduced. For example, the Northern Ireland Assembly has been suspended many times by London since its creation. In theory, decentralized and devolved states are different, but in practice, the differences are very thin.

A federal state is a type of sovereign state in which sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a central government and the subnational governments (e.g., the Canadian provinces or the German Länder). To qualify as a federation, a minimum requirement is that the constitutional powers of the subnational governments cannot be changed unilaterally by the central government. In federal systems such as Germany, Canada, the United States, or Belgium, subnational governments have considerable autonomy. In Canada, for example, provinces are constitutionally responsible for health care, education, culture, and municipalities. They can also act on economic development, justice, environment, and so on. In Belgium, the autonomy of communities and regions goes even further. Since 1993, Belgium has been, according to the first article of its Constitution, “a federal state composed of communities and regions.” The constitutional revision of 1993 permits the regions and communities to become real international actors. This includes the power of representation and power to sign treaties with sovereign states. Since the revision of the Constitution in 1993, the organization of Belgium’s international relations is fundamentally adapted to the federal state structure. The autonomy of the Belgian substate actors, with regard to external policy, is unique in the world. Its exceptional nature arises from the recognized constitutional principle of in foro interno, in foro externo. On top of that, there is an absence of hierarchy between different levels of administration (see Table 1).

### Subnational Governments Power, Resources, and Influence

The autonomy of subnational governments is also related to the resources that these actors can mobilize. Some subnational governments such as those
in Quebec, Catalonia, Flanders, California, or Bavaria possess more resources than many sovereign states. Let us compare subnational governments with the 192 members of the United Nations. In terms of population, 40 states have a population of less that 1 million and around 13 have between 1 million and 2 million. In the United States alone, 43 states have a population greater than 1 million, and 36 have a population of more than 2 million, according to U.S. Census Bureau data for 2008.

In 2008, according to the World Bank, nominal 2008 gross domestic product (GDP) estimates for 191 nation-states and territories, California would rank among the top 10 in the world. The top 11 American states would rank among the first 25 in the world, the top 26 in the United States are among the top 50 globally, and all 50 states are among the top 86 nation-states. The state of California could even be a member of the G8 (Group of 8; or the G20 [Group of 20]) since its GDP is greater than those of Canada and Spain. The annual budget of California exceeds that of Mexico and numerous sovereign states. Thus, subnational governments are among the most important economic actors in the world.

### Regionalization

Since World War II, authority has shifted away from the central state to international organizations, such as the European Union or the World Trade Organization, and to regions and municipal governments. Regionalization represents a transformation of regional authority where the nation-state creates or reinforces the mesogovernment level between the central state and the local level. If Canada and the United States have been federations for years, in Europe regionalization has gone hand in hand with European integration.

After World War II, only Germany, Switzerland, and Austria were considered decentralized federal states. Since the 1950s, of the 27 countries that are now part of the European Union, including Belgium, Spain, Italy, the UK, and France, 19 have seen the rise of a stronger and deeper regional or subnational government. These governments now handle a wide variety of policy responsibilities. Since 1950, new regional governments have been created in 14 countries of the European Union (EU). Eighteen regions in 7 countries, excluding the Belgian regions and communities and the Spanish autonomous communities, have also been given a special autonomous or different status. In 1950, only 5 countries had directly elected regional assemblies covering the countries as a whole; by 2010, 16 countries had such assemblies. Only 2 countries in Europe with a population of more than 2.5 million, Sweden and Bulgaria, have not followed this trend. In Sweden, decentralization reinforced the role of municipal governments instead.

These meso or regional governments are a fairly new thing in many countries with diverse political history and constitutional setting. These new regional governments are reshaping politics, the distribution of power between the central government and the subnational units, and accountability.

According to some researchers, the driving force behind the rise of these regional governments is related, in part, to globalization. According to some scholars, the nation-state today is too small for the big problems of the world and too big for the small ones. In this context, regional governments are better placed to deliver important public goods.

Other scholars identify the rise of regions with the decline of the authority of the nation-states. In Europe, European integration has reinforced regionalization and decentralization. European integration has noticeably weakened the centralized uniform states with the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity in the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992.

There are also more technical reasons for regionalization or decentralization. For some
scholars, the virtues of centralization and decentralization differ from one policy area to the other. The advantage of centralization is obvious: economies of scales and, in theory, greater equality between the citizens of one country. The virtues of decentralization are different. Some scholars suggest that regionalization and decentralization increase the efficiency of public policy. The fundamental principle of public goods analysis is that a jurisdiction should encompass those who are positively or negatively affected by a specific policy. Because the public goods differ, the scale at which they are most efficient also differs. Some policies, such as urbanism or fire protection, are best handled at the local level. Some policies, such as education or hospitals, are best handled at the regional level, and others such as national transportation, infrastructure, trade, and national security are better handled at the national level.

Some believe that political participation is better and more effective if the decision center is closer to voters. Decentralized governments are closer to the citizens and therefore have better knowledge about what they want and need. Regionalization thus contributes to better democracy because it multiplies opportunities for citizens to influence governments.

According to some researchers, regionalization and decentralization are drivers for better democracy. Elected officials in democratic states may shift decision making away from the central state if it can lead to more efficient decision making and can attract more votes. By contrast, authoritarian states tend to centralize the decision-making process. At best, authoritarian regimes will deconcentrate powers in local outposts so that they can provide more reliable information about local politics and implement more effective central policy. This fact explains why the democratization of southern, central, and eastern Europe went hand in hand with decentralization and subnational autonomy. The so-called third wave of democracy generated more decentralization. Regionalization and decentralization could thus, in theory, lead to more effective public administration and better democracy.

Finally, some specialists think that decentralization comes primarily from the public finance crisis. Regional governments are, in theory, more in phase with the real needs of the population and thus allocate resources more effectively. With the crisis of the public debt in numerous countries, decentralization is a way for the central state to transfer some responsibility to regions in order to reduce the pressure on public finance at the central level.

**Multilevel Governance**

With regionalization and decentralization, the responsibilities of substate governments have expanded considerably. Subnational governments have more power concerning economic development, education, health care, environment, public transport, and so on. Each of these public policy domains requires coordination among governments at diverse levels. Because no government is an island, increased globalization and internationalization have reinforced the need to coordinate local, regional, national, and international policies as the responsibilities of subnational governments expand.

The rise of regional government and subnational autonomy has a big impact on multilevel governance. Decisions taken at one level of government affect the decisions of the other level of government. Most policy thus require some form of coordination among international, European, national, regional, and local governments. We know that, for example, according to a United Nations estimate, between 50% and 70% of all adaptation and mitigation measures against climate change will call for implementation by the regions or subnational governments.

The concept of multilevel governance was created within the framework of the EU to explain the relation between the various levels of government in EU policy making. Multilevel governance means that there are multiple actors from various levels of government interacting to negotiate and implement public policy coming from the EU. The multilevel governance approach illuminates the interdependence between the local, regional, national, and international levels of authority.

At first, multilevel governance was developed for the study of the EU. Now, however, it is applied in various situations because virtually all government activities today are affected by the competence of at least one intergovernmental organization, and frequently many more. In this way, in the context of international organizations and international conferences, themes are dealt
with that relate to education, public health, cultural diversity, the environment, business subsidies, the treatment accorded to investors, the removal of nontariff barriers, barriers to agriculture, to services, and so on. This phenomenon is magnified in Europe by the process of European integration and in North America by the North American Free Trade Agreement. Likewise, enlarging the scope of international issues means that all government departments have activities that are internationalized. This situation makes it harder for a country’s ministry of foreign affairs to centralize the decision-making process.

In this context, subnational governments have become more aware that their political autonomy and their sovereignty—or, in other words, their ability to formulate and implement policy—are subject to negotiation in multilateral fora. Thus, since the 1960s, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of subnational governments that are interested and participate actively in international affairs.

In the United States, for instance, only 4 states had representative offices in other countries in 1970 versus 41 states with 245 representative offices in 34 countries in 2008. In Germany, the Länder have set up some 130 representative offices since 1970, of which 21 are located in the United States. In 2009, Quebec, one of the pioneers in the field, had some 28 representative offices around the world. In Spain, the autonomous region of Catalonia operates some 50 representative offices abroad, and in 2010 the Flemish government has more than 100 political, economic, and economic representations abroad. This phenomenon is also evident in Japan and many other countries.

When considered from the perspective of theories of federalism and international affairs, the two conceptions conflict: the centralizing school and the school devoted to multilevel governance. From the perspective of the centralizing approach, some scholars believe that a monopoly of foreign affairs is a “minimum power” of all central governments. In his landmark study, Kenneth Clinton Wheare highlighted the negative consequences of unbundling central control over foreign affairs for the national interest and for the functioning of the international system. To some scholars, international relations are at the heart of federal regimes. Centralization of the foreign affairs power is a requirement of international law because a centralized political system is a necessary condition for states to be able to play the role they are assigned in international law and practice. In essence, without the existence of a central government that has a plenary authority on its territory in relation to foreign affairs and the ability to participate in international relations and to enforce international obligations in the domestic order, interstate relations can only be seriously compromised. If the power of codecision is granted regarding treaty making, there would be a risk of paralyzing a state’s foreign affairs. Every player would have a veto, resulting in harm to the state’s image in the international arena.

Supporters of the concept of multilevel governance take a different view. According to some scholars, diplomacy or foreign policy cannot be considered a monopoly of the central government. Substate government will always have an important role, even if it is only for the purposes of implementing international agreements concluded by the central government. In addition, giving a monopoly over foreign affairs to central governments in federal regimes puts at risk the distribution of powers between the different orders of government for the benefit of central authorities. There are many examples of federal regime that must operate with important constitutional limitations on their powers in foreign affairs.

Foreign policy should be thought of as a complex system where different actors within the federal regime structure work with each other. Those who favor a multilevel governance approach thus maintain that “obligations of cooperation” exist between central governments and substate actors. To implement a coherent foreign policy, it is important to consult substate actors and, indeed, give them an important role by means of intergovernmental mechanisms, so that they can participate actively in the country’s treaty-making process. According to this view, regional integration, multilateralism, and globalization have thus rendered centralist theses obsolete. The requirements of cooperation between the different orders of government are more and more important, and it is for this reason that one notices a considerable increase in executive federalism or intergovernmental relations in respect of the conclusion of international treaties in federal regimes.
Subnational Autonomy and Minority Nationalism

In multinational states, such as Canada, Spain, or Belgium, decentralization and subnational autonomy are also seen by many scholars as a way to reduce the likelihood of secession or political conflicts. Decentralization is a way to accommodate substate nationalist movements such as those in Catalonia, Flanders, or Quebec. The federalization or decentralization of multinational states is seen as a way to prevent the breakup of a country while permitting political and cultural autonomy of minority nations.

Many scholars have argued that some measure of autonomy or form of self-government will satisfy the majority of people within a minority nation. In practice, that would mean that a minority nation would, to some extent, govern itself while also participating in the nation-state institutions. Federalization of nation-states does not guarantee the end of the national question in multinational countries. The recent experience of Belgium with the Flemish movement, that of Scotland, or even those of Catalonia and Quebec confirm that political conflicts will remain, but it is hard to see any form of successful accommodation in multinational countries that does not include some elements of federalism and subnational autonomy.

Some researchers have reservations about granting subnational autonomy to accommodate minority nationalism. One problem is that federalism tends to accentuate the differences between the majority and the minority nation within a nation-state. The creation of an autonomous subnational government at the regional level gives the minority nation new tools to formulate new demands for more autonomy, which is seen as a never-ending story. Granting some form of self-government for minority nations tends to heighten and politicize the minority nation’s self-consciousness and to facilitate the rise of a self-conscious intelligentsia. In the end, federalization is seen as a last-resort solution that risks fueling, rather than appeasing, minority nationalism. The territorialization of minority nations also risks reducing the cross-cutting interactions between the majority nation and the minority one. Giving some form of self-government to a minority nation holds the potential to polarize politics at the national level. It is thus very difficult or even impossible to create a national consensus on national issues.

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See also Decentralization; European Integration; Federalism; Multilevel Analysis

Further Readings


Autonomy and Sovereignty

See Sovereignty
The balance of power is, arguably, the most central theoretical concept in the study of international relations, yet it is also one of the most controversial concepts in the field. It is a significant concept because it underpins how theorists of a realist predisposition think about international relations, and realism is one of the most widely acknowledged general theories in the discipline. The concept is also controversial because realism, in general, and the balance of power, in particular, have always been fundamentally challenged by other schools of thought. Advocates of the balance of power argue that it helps account for the most fundamental features of international relations and, in particular, the survival and stability of any system of independent states. Critics, by contrast, attack the concept by insisting that it is either incoherent, thereby promoting a spurious understanding of international relations, or dangerous, because it promotes policies that can lead to international tensions and often war. This entry first examines the balance of power metaphor and describes its historical development. It then discusses the roles the concept has in contemporary thought, especially in the work of Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth N. Waltz.

The controversy that surrounds the balance of power is not a recent phenomenon. It can be traced back for several centuries, although there is no authoritative genealogy of the concept. Debates about the balance of power became a regular feature of the theory and practice of international relations in Europe from the 16th century onward. The balance of power is generally regarded as an essentially Eurocentric concept, although this assessment remains somewhat speculative because so little is known about the theory underpinning how other international societies have operated.

While the balance of power is generally regarded as a concept that is quintessentially related to international relations, it is also a concept that is regularly used across the social sciences as well as in general parlance. However, outside international relations, the balance of power is not seen to be particularly controversial. The term is employed ubiquitously because it acts as a metaphor that effectively transforms our conventional understanding of power. Unadorned, power is generally treated as an attribute that enables an agent possessing power to regulate the activities of other actors. In the literature on power, this usage is often referred to as a behavioral or agential conception of power. The balance of power metaphor transforms this conventional meaning into a structural or systemic conception of power.

When treated as a metaphor, the balance of power has been associated with a wide array of images, from a chandelier to the arch of a bridge. The image that most frequently springs to mind is a set of scales. From the perspective of international relations, the scales can be viewed as a system in which the weights that are placed on the pans of the scales are equated with the power capabilities of the states that operate within the system. What the metaphor demonstrates is that if...
the weight/power is increased in one pan, then the weight/power on the other pan is automatically affected. It follows that power must be treated as a relative rather than an absolute phenomenon. But the metaphor can also indicate that if there is a disproportionately heavy weight placed in one pan of the scales, then it is possible to establish an effective counterbalance by placing a number of lighter weights on the other pan. The even distribution of power that is then formed is often represented as the definition of a balance of power.

If the metaphor is brought into focus, however, it is clear that this very specific meaning should be subsumed under a much broader conception that associates the balance of power with a system in which power is a structural attribute. Such a system is, in effect, constituted by the distribution of power that forms within the boundaries of the system. So in a multipolar system, for example, there are several main poles of power, whereas in a bipolar system there are two main poles of power, and in a unipolar system there is only one main pole of power. This structural conception of power has attracted the attention of many historians, theorists, and practitioners from the past and the present who have wanted to understand international relations, and it has led them to presuppose that the behavior of states is or at any rate should be significantly influenced by the structure or balance of power that helps constitute the international system.

In general usage, by contrast, the same kind of assumption is not made. If a wife goes out to work and earns an independent income, it can be argued that the balance of power within the marriage will shift as a consequence. Or, in a multiparty system, if two opposition parties ally, then the balance of power within the political arena will alter. In both cases, the metaphor brings the structure of the system into focus. But there is no presumption that a change in the balance of power within the political arena will alter. In both cases, the metaphor brings the structure of the system into focus. But there is no presumption that a change in the balance of power within the political arena will alter. In both cases, the metaphor brings the structure of the system into focus. But there is no presumption that a change in the balance of power within the political arena will alter. In both cases, the metaphor brings the structure of the system into focus. But there is no presumption that a change in the balance of power within the political arena will alter. But in international relations, there is a long-standing political myth that states will respond to changes in the distribution of power in a way that ensures that international stability is restored. But the veracity of this myth has also long been challenged, and a significant counter-myth has arisen asserting that the preoccupation with the distribution of power in international relations is a major source of conflict and disorder. This controversy about the balance of power has been carried forward into the contemporary discipline and accounts for the very distinctive role that the concept plays in international relations.

**Historical Development of the Idea**

Despite its putative importance, we still do not have a very developed understanding of how the ideas associated with the balance of power have evolved across time. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that the contemporary conception of the balance of power can be traced back to the Italian city-state system and that the key ideas relating to the concept began to take shape in the 15th century. By the start of the 16th century, Francesco Guicciardini (1483–1540), a practicing diplomat and an acquaintance of Niccolò Machiavelli, was able to call on these ideas when he came to write *The History of Italy*. He wrote this history in response to the French invasion of Italy in 1494; his aim was to trace what he viewed as the tragic loss of independence by the Italian city-states in the first decades of the 16th century. He shows how these states failed to respond adequately to external pressures until eventually most of them were absorbed by the Hapsburg Empire. The book provides the first case study of states failing to follow the logic of a balance of power system and, as a consequence, succumbing to hegemony.

Guicciardini’s use of balancing metaphors is restricted to the start of the book where he examines relations among the city-states in the final decades of the 15th century. The focus is on Venice, Naples, Florence, Milan, and Rome, and he acknowledges that relations among these city-states were characterized by suspicion and jealousy. But he also notes that Venice was by far the most powerful state in the system and, moreover, that it had hegemonic ambitions. But the logic of this situation as depicted by Guicciardini is that it preserved a balance of power system because, by forming an alliance, the other city-states were able to counterbalance Venetian power and thereby preserve the independence of all the city-states. Guicciardini, however, also acknowledged that rivalry among the less powerful states could potentially threaten the overall stability of the system.
But this stability was preserved, according to Guicciardini, because the ruler of Florence, Lorenzo de’ Medici, recognized the importance of maintaining peace among the less powerful states and preserving the alliance against Venice. As a consequence, he was willing to operate as a balancer within the system. In other words, Guicciardini argues that Lorenzo had to constantly shift his own position in relation to the other states in the system in order to ensure that the overall balance was sustained.

What began to destabilize the system at the end of the 15th century was an emerging tendency by the city-states to invite outside states to help settle disputes among the city-states. The problem with this tactic, as Guicciardini saw it, was that states such as France outweighed the combined strength of all the Italian city-states. Nevertheless, when the Milanese concluded that Florence and Naples were forming an alliance against them, they called on France for assistance. But this move had the effect of destroying the Italian balance of power system and Guicciardini resorted to medical metaphors to characterize the subsequent developments. Eschewing the balance of power metaphor, he argued that external intervention was a medicine with effects that were far worse than the original disease.

The History of Italy was translated into other European languages, and the ideas associated with the balance of power were rapidly diffused across Europe during the 16th century. By the end of the century, therefore, the balance of power was viewed as a Europe-wide phenomenon. But during this period, the meaning of the balance of power was also extended beyond the idea of shifting alliances in a competitive or adversarial system. For millennia, there has been a metaphorical link between scales and justice, and during the 16th century, there was a growing tendency to discuss the balance of power in terms of a just equilibrium. In other words, the balance of power began to be associated with the establishment of a distribution of power that was not only regarded as stable but also fair. Initially it was argued that the balancer state must have this capacity to establish the link between stability and justice. But, over time, a stable and just balance of power was seen to arise from a general agreement among the great powers in Europe, and so the concept began to be viewed as a product of great power cooperation and mutual association. By the start of the 18th century, Europe-wide peace agreements such as the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 began to make reference to a just equilibrium in their formal provisions. At this juncture, therefore, the balance of power was seen to provide the constitutional basis for what was called the Republic of Europe. As a consequence, it then became possible to extend the idea of the balance of power back to the idea developed by Greek and Roman theorists of a mixed or balanced constitution. But the relationship between these sets of ideas has yet to be teased out in any detail.

By the 18th century, however, there was also growing resistance to the idea that the balance of power could be treated as either some kind of a natural or a man-made law that could promote peace and stability. On the contrary, the balance of power was seen to be irrevocably tied to a system where war was endemic. By the 19th century, critics such as the British radicals Richard Cobden and John Bright were going further and arguing that the balance of power was an utterly meaningless concept. From their perspective, only by moving beyond the balance of power thinking was it possible to promote a peaceful world. The battle between advocates and critics of the balance of power persisted throughout the 20th century and, almost inevitably, when the study of international relations developed as a formal academic discipline during the present era, the balance of power immediately became one of its central but also deeply contentious concepts.

**Contemporary Study of the Balance of Power**

It is not difficult to demonstrate that the balance of power occupies a central position in the contemporary study of international relations because the concept lies at the heart of two of the very most influential theoretical texts published since the end of World War II. The first, Hans J. Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations*, published initially in 1948, epitomizes classical realism and the second, Kenneth N. Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics*, published in 1979, spearheaded what is now known as neorealism or structural realism. Despite the fact that these texts are still enormously
influential, both texts and, in particular, their use of the balance of power have come under continuous criticism ever since they were published. It is certainly not the case, therefore, that either realism or the balance of power has ever occupied a hegemonic position in the field. Instead, it is more appropriate to see them as occupying the central ground but at the same time being engaged in a constant debate with critics coming at them from a number of very different directions.

As a classical realist, Morgenthau was well aware that he was working in the context of a long-standing tradition of European thought that embraced the concept of the balance of power, and he recognized the need to take into account both its adversarial and its associational dimensions. From his perspective, the American Constitution and other similar domestic arrangements provided the most effective examples of a functioning balance of power system, and it followed that, in an international context, the balance of power could work at best only imperfectly. For Morgenthau, the golden age for the balance of power was the era of dynastic international politics in the 18th century when states were governed by an international aristocracy that formed a distinctive international society. Under these circumstances, it was possible to achieve a just equilibrium by means of largely consensual and Europe-wide peace agreements. But even when these agreements broke down, Morgenthau argued that the uncertainties associated with any attempt to calculate the prevailing balance of power generated restraint on the part of the rival dynasties and encouraged them to operate on the basis of the established dynastic rules of the game. At the same time, however, he readily acknowledged that the world had moved a very long way from these conditions. In the aftermath of World War II, what he saw were two ideologically driven behemoths operating in the absence of any international society. The United States and the Soviet Union were restrained only by the crudest kind of balance of power, and he feared for the future of the world. Morgenthau argued that only if the two sides adopted the tools of classical diplomacy was there any hope that humans would survive.

Waltz approached the balance of power from a very different direction, and he reached a very different set of conclusions from those of Morgenthau. He was writing in the context of a detente that marked a period of relaxation in the Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union; however, his aim was to establish a general theory of international relations that would transcend historical difference and help reveal the essential differences between domestic and international politics and explain why the structure of the international system has proved so enduring.

In the first instance, therefore, Waltz argues that all political systems can be categorized under one of two headings: hierarchy or anarchy. In a hierarchical political system, actors are functionally differentiated and power is distributed on a vertical plane, so that actors can exercise power over subordinate actors in the hierarchy but will themselves be subject to the power of actors that occupy a superior position in the hierarchy. Having made the distinction, however, Waltz focuses his attention almost exclusively on anarchic political systems where actors are seen to operate on a horizontal plane. In other words, these actors do not consider that they are operating in a hierarchy or in a functionally differentiated system. They view themselves as independent and autonomous actors operating on the basis of self-help and so they are primarily concerned, in the first instance, with maintaining their independence and autonomy. To be able to do this, they must, from the start, establish how power is structured in the system. This requires them to identify the dominant actors in the system—those actors that possess a disproportionate amount of the overall power in the system. Cutting through complexity, Waltz distinguishes between bipolar and multipolar systems. Then, contrary to Morgenthau, he aims to show theoretically why multipolar systems are prone to generate an unstable balance of power, whereas bipolar systems are prone to generate a stable balance of power.

Focusing first on multipolar systems, Waltz argues that if the balance of power begins to move against any of the dominant states in such a system, they will be pushed to respond by either internal or external balancing. Internal balancing requires the actor to enhance its power position by domestic means. The most obvious mechanisms are either to expand existing military resources or to seek technological improvements. But Waltz
also acknowledges that in a self-help or anarchic political system, there will be a tendency for any action that gives an actor a potential or future power advantage to be emulated by the other dominant actors in the system. As a consequence, he argues that in anarchy there will be a tendency for actors to take the form of like units.

In a multipolar system, however, Waltz argues that when the balance of power shifts, there is the alternative strategy of external balancing. In other words, states can form alliances with each other to enhance their security. But Waltz is very well aware that alliances are an inherently unstable feature of any anarchic system. The literature on alliances reveals that an alliance generates at least two contradictory fears. On the one hand, there is the fear of entrapment, as the result of being drawn by an ally into an unnecessary or dangerous conflict. But, on the other hand, there is also the fear of abandonment. Such problems are endemic in a multipolar system. The problem persists even in the face of a rising hegemon when, rather than forming an overwhelming alliance, states will often choose to pass the buck and, at least in the first instance, leave it to other states to confront the hegemon.

Because of these sorts of uncertainties, it becomes extraordinarily difficult in an anarchic system to identify the nature of the balance of power at any point in time. Nevertheless, despite these uncertainties, Waltz argues that there is sufficient flexibility in the system to ensure that any potential hegemonic state will eventually be met by an effective counterbalancing alliance. But, by the same token, Waltz insists that it is very much easier to identify the state of the balance of power in a bipolar system: There are no alliances to complicate the assessment, and the two dominant states simply have to monitor each other’s activities. As a consequence, not only are there fewer sources of instability, but it is also easier for the two dominant states to reach mutual agreement and thereby to move from an adversarial balance of power through to an associational balance of power, although Waltz does not use this terminology.

Waltz has proved to be extremely influential because he articulated a balance of power theory in such unequivocal terms, and they characterize Waltz’s approach as defensive realism because of the assumption that dominant states only aim to preserve their independence. They dismiss the idea of an associative balance of power and are much more willing to entertain the possibility of hegemonic success. In the same vein, theorists working from a world-historical perspective insist that anarchic systems transform into hierarchical or at least unipolar systems on a very regular basis. This poses a very significant problem for Waltz and for the balance of power theory more generally. But a more immediate problem for Waltz is the persistence of unipolarity in the post–Cold War world. Waltz insisted after the demise of the Soviet Union that unipolarity is a very unstable structure and that it would rapidly give way to multipolarity. But realist critics argue that there are few signs that any states are willing to compete with the United States in the military arena and that in any event Waltz’s own Neorealist logic can be used to show why unipolarity is a very stable structure. It is unlikely that these debates are going to be easily resolved, and, as a consequence, the balance of power will continue to provide a theoretical focal point for theorists and practitioners in the future.

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See also Alliances; Anarchy; Bipolarity and Multipolarity; International Society; International System; Power and International Politics; Realism in International Relations

Further Readings
Bargaining

Bargaining is an everyday activity that pervades all social life and, arguably, is the most important mode by which political decisions are made. It summarizes all social activities in which individuals or corporate actors have a common interest in working together but disagree on how they should cooperate. Bargaining is therefore a voluntary process through which negotiators try to distribute among themselves a mutual benefit. In politics, the mixture between cooperation and conflict that characterizes bargaining situations becomes apparent at all levels of decision making. An example of a recurrent, difficult bargaining process is the distribution of the taxed income of a polity between competing interest groups who advance contradicting claims to bolster their demand for a large share. Below, major game theoretical solutions to bargaining problems and their possible applications in political science are discussed.

In the simplest political bargaining problem, two negotiators disagree over how to divide a pie worth one unit of a fictitious currency (eurodollar). Any outcome in the “bargaining zone,” which is delimited by the minimal individual payoffs the actors expect, can result from the negotiations. Trivially, no bargain is feasible if the minimal expectations do not overlap or, in other words, if the set containing the possible outcomes is empty. If the minimal expectation—technically often called the “reservation price”—of one player is zero, an extreme solution in which one side cashes in 1 eurodollar while the other side leaves the negotiation table empty-handed can occur, since the unlucky negotiator is assumed to be indifferent to the lack of a reward and the failure of negotiations. The “fair solution,” in the absence of any power imbalance or neediness of a negotiator, is a 50:50 deal that splits the eurodollar into equal shares.

In many bargaining situations, actors demand a disproportional division of the spoils. The other negotiators then have to judge whether a credible claim that negotiations would fail without a concession from the other side supports the request. If they reject this demand, bargaining stops or is interrupted. Another suboptimal outcome materializes when negotiators accept a disproportional division and fail to call the bluff by the other side that the negotiations would break down if no concession were granted. The fate of a claim depends on the ability of the negotiators to communicate credibly that their claims are sincere. This creates in return an incentive to bolster the credibility of a specific position through strategic moves.

Social scientists who try to understand bargaining belong to either one of two camps. The first approach stems largely from social psychology and is, by and large, empirical. It tries to assess the importance of cognitive failures and other psychological features based on the performance of individual negotiators. In political science, the strategic theory of bargaining, as it was developed by Francis Edgeworth, Arthur Bowley, Frederik Zeuthen, and John Nash, is more influential as it takes into account that negotiation outcomes result from the interaction of at least two forward-looking actors. Technically, the strategic theory of bargaining is based on game theory. Its applications pertain to any subfield within political science and cover a wide variety of issues, ranging from the analysis of interstate war to delegation problems in public bureaucracies.

Bargaining games are answers to what is known as the “bargaining problem”: Is it possible to predict the equilibrium outcome of a social negotiation in which all participating actors expect an individual gain? It took the genius of Nobel Prize winner John F. Nash to predict a unique equilibrium—that is, a single point—to the bargaining problem. In the Nash bargaining solution (NBS), this outcome represents the maximal product of the differences between the utility a negotiator attaches to his or her share $x$ and the utility of the reservation price $q$.

By way of illustration, imagine a bilateral bargain in which the reservation price of two equally skilful negotiators is 0 so that actor $i$ receives $x_i$ and...
its counterpart \( j \) receives \( 1 - x = y \). We obtain the equilibrium prediction through the maximization of the Nash product \( px(1 - x) \). Setting the differenced equation to zero \( (1 - 2x = 0) \), \( x = 1/2 \) and \( y = 1/2 \) result. A power-free bargain situation entices, in other words, a fair division.

As bargaining power has many facets, it can enter the calculus of the social outcome in various ways. One possibility is to equate power with capabilities \( c_i \) that enter as an exponential weight to the utility function of the individual actor, where the sum of the capabilities add up to 1 within a society. Hence, if negotiator \( i \) is twice as powerful as counterpart \( j \), the maximization problem in the bilateral case reduces to \( x^2(1 - x) \). Differentiating \( x^2 - 3x^3 = 0 \) and setting the result to zero, we receive \( 2x - 3x^2 = 0 \). If we disregard the outcome \( x = 0 \), actor \( i \)'s share amounts to \( 2/3 \).

A further aspect of power at the center of the strategic theory of bargaining stems from the attractiveness of a so-called outside option. This outcome is equivalent to what an individual negotiator could reach if the negotiations fail or if they are stalled for some time. Another Nobel Prize winner, Thomas Schelling, made this point through the counterintuitive “paradox of weakness,” according to which the less flexible negotiator possesses a bargaining advantage. Generally, the presence of an attractive outside option helps negotiators in their attempt to commit themselves credibly to a more beneficial bargaining position. Robert D. Putnam has used this insight in his “two-level games” metaphor, which stands for negotiations between governments that have to care about domestic pivot players. In such negotiations, governments who face a strong, isolationist opposition and a supramajoritarian ratification hurdle back home can convince a more cooperation-minded negotiation partner that only a minimal agreement is feasible. The commitment of such constrained governments is more credible precisely because they cannot get an agreement ratified that does not find the support of certain sections of the opposition. A treaty that is too close to the bargaining position of the foreign government is consequently doomed to fail in the negotiations or at the ratification stage.

The “Schelling conjecture” that the seemingly weak is in real life the strong actor can be illustrated within the NBS framework through the assumption that one of the actors can be committed to a disagreement point of 0.5 in the bargain over a pie of unit size. This credible claim lets the “zone of agreement” shrink and alters the maximization problem to \( (x - 0.5)(1 - x) \), which leads after differentiation to a division of \( x = 0.75 \) and \( y = 0.25 \).

Criticisms of the NBS deal with its static nature, its axiomatic foundations, and its reliance on cooperative game theory. The first objection answers to the observation that most (but not all) negotiations consist of lengthy haggling. The second and the third of the perceived problems respond to the general criteria (axioms) that a bargaining solution has, in Nash’s view, to fulfill in order to qualify as a socially rational outcome of a negotiation. His model, in particular, assumes in line with cooperative game theory that the negotiators agree on certain rules of the game and do not try to outsmart each other through unilateral moves.

A response to these objections is the development of noncooperative bargaining models that are dynamic and include relevant one-sided actions. Noncooperative bargaining models also often study the impact of information deficits on the bargaining outcomes. The most prominent analytical framework that assumes, in its most basic form, fully informed actors is the Ståhl-Rubinstein bargaining model. This sequential game introduces a strict bargaining protocol (a term standing for the order in which the actors are allowed to move) where the right to make an offer moves back and forth between two players. One version of this analytical framework assumes that actors discount the future with the factor \( \delta_i \), \( 0 < \delta_i \leq 1 \). Hence, the longer the bargaining goes on, the less attractive it becomes. The model predicts again a unique outcome that is largely driven by the size of the discount parameters and hence by the patience of the negotiators. In general, the more patient an actor is, the larger is the share of the pie that she or he can bring home. If the intervals between the negotiation rounds converge toward zero, the Ståhl-Rubinstein bargaining model coincides with NBS.

The Ståhl-Rubinstein framework of analysis has been extended to negotiations among \( n \) actors. To make sensible equilibrium predictions in such a context, some additional assumptions about the bargaining protocol and the feasibility of certain strategies are necessary. The Baron-Ferejohn model
of legislative bargaining, for instance, assumes that one member of parliament is randomly recognized as an agenda setter who can make equilibrium proposals to a majority of other legislators.

Generalizations of Schelling’s insight that credible commitments are a key prerequisite to bargaining success incorporate models in which some negotiators are assumed to be imperfectly informed. Such “asymmetric information” pertains in the bargaining context most often to the credibility of a negotiator’s claim that an outside option is more attractive than the proposal made by the badly informed negotiator. The better informed side tries in such a situation to improve the credibility of its claim through what is called “costly signals”; this is why such bargaining games belong to the category of “signaling games.” In an interstate crisis, for instance, a costly signal can consist of a public warning or the mobilization of the troops. Signaling games have been successfully developed to understand conventional and nuclear deterrence; crisis behavior of this sort belongs to what is known as tacit bargaining, where actors use nonverbal means of communication to bolster their claims for a specific division of the spoils. The disadvantage of limited-information models, as games with asymmetric information are also called, is the plethora of possible equilibrium solutions. Oddly, this oversupply of predictions can only be trimmed down at the cost of asking the model agents to behave even more rationally.

The empirical evidence in favor of the equilibrium predictions that can be derived from bargaining models is mixed. In comparison with other decision-making modes such as voting or delegation, bargaining models predict outcomes more accurately. However, the extreme 100/0 division that some bargaining games suggest as a rational strategy hardly finds any support. Both laboratory and field experiments have shown that privileged negotiators often propose fair divisions against their own self-interest. The theoretical merit of these findings remains, however, controversial, although some powerful causal mechanisms that account for such seemingly irrational behavior have been proposed.

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*See also* Experiments, Laboratory; Game Theory; Rational Choice

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**Further Readings**


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**Bayesian Analysis**

*See* Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian

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**Behavioralism**

The behavioral approach may be characterized as an attempt to conduct political science according to the example of the natural sciences—that is to describe, explain, and predict political phenomena as exactly as possible. It is the goal of behavioralism to gain scientifically valid—that is, methodically secured—generalizations on its subject. This method is not unique to the field of the social sciences; this application of the natural sciences to political science must be interpreted as being a part of a greater movement of which—despite great changes—all social sciences have become a part. From this point of view, behavioralism is a phenomenon of general social scientific empiricism that has found and still finds many supporters particularly in the United States. This entry reviews the beginnings of behavioralism and its evolution in the mid-20th century as a movement that reshaped the discipline of political science. It traces its emphasis on explanation, prediction, verifiability, and quantitative research and its growing influence in academic institutions as well as professional organizations. The entry concludes with a discussion of the goals and methodological assumptions that characterize the behavioral approach in political science.
Behavioralism

Origins of Behavioralism

Although behavioralism as a trend began primarily after World War II, there are important predecessors in the context of American political science that paved its way. Beginning in the 1920s, the Chicago School and the New Science of Politics movement urged a greater use of empirical research to establish a scientific identity to the discipline. Charles E. Merriam, a leading figure in political science during those years, and Harold D. Lasswell, with his decades of work in the interdisciplinary area of policy studies, were key figures in those times; without their work, political science may well have taken a different course. Early behavioralist considerations developed in the 1920s as a reaction to the then predominant institutionalist approach, which was called “institutional realism,” “realistic institutionalism,” or simply “realism.” The realist approach focuses on the analysis of the actual relations (in contrast to relations as legally defined) between different government institutions, political parties, and interest groups. In general, the traditional political-scientific analysis of political institutions aimed less at the development of theories than at finding facts. A strict distinction between factual claims and value judgments was an exception rather than the rule.

Originally, behavioralism was a protest movement due to dissatisfaction with traditional political science. The latter—in contrast to its neighboring sciences of sociology and economics—was accused of being characterized neither by cumulative research nor by reasonable scientific communication or even scientific cooperation. This flaw, it was stated, was among others due to political scientists having no common language, no common issues, and no agreement on methods. This was explained by the lack of comprehensive, generally accepted models or terminology schemes of the political process by which research was guided (David Easton, 1969).

This protest was initiated primarily by younger scientists who came from very different intellectual approaches and who were initially rather isolated, since they worked in different fields of political science. Protest was nourished by the experience of increased cooperation between political scientists and government institutions following the New Deal and, most of all, during World War II, when contact with representatives of the other social sciences had also increased. One result of this increased interaction between political scientists and politicians was the painful insight that there was an almost insurmountable difference between what was needed for political advice and what political science could offer. This difference between theory and praxis was not as strong in the neighboring disciplines, particularly psychology and economics, and, to a lesser extent, in sociology. In any case, government institutions were much less interested in advice from political scientists than from economists, psychologists, and sociologists, whose theoretical orientation and methodological basis were generally held in higher esteem than that of political scientists. In this context, the inability of traditional political science to predict events was particularly criticized.

The inability of traditional political science to predict and explain the rise of fascism in Europe was another reason for the dissatisfaction of behavioral-oriented young scientists. But fascism, particularly national socialism, also influenced the rise of behavioralism in another way: in the subliminal reorientation of the philosophy of science in American social sciences, influenced by emigrated European researchers. The popularization of Max Weber by Talcott Parsons and the publication of some of Weber’s science-theoretical essays by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (1946) were significant because they left out some of the pragmatist philosophical traditions. With many later behavioralists, the pragmatic philosophy, stating that value statements can be validated by practice, which was then predominant in the United States, was replaced by Weber’s position that value statements cannot be proven by empirical means.

Another reason for the rise of behavioralism seems to be the changed international situation after 1945 and particularly the leading political role played by the United States in the postwar period. Increasing international interdependence, decolonization, and finally the Cold War confronted the political-scientific disciplines of international politics and comparative politics with tasks that could not be solved using traditional concepts such as diplomatic history, international law, and the comparison of institutions. Dissatisfaction with traditional political science was strongly supported by the exemplary effect of
Behavioralism has been characterized by its interpreters and proponents as a “movement,” as a “mood,” a “conviction,” and a “protest,” as well as a “revolution” and a “renaissance.” Easton distinguished between an intellectual trend and an academic movement; the former, he stated, had many more supporters than the latter. However, he said that it was difficult to identify both the supporters of the movement and the practitioners of the intellectual trend, because membership criteria were vague and the borders of the behavioralist conviction were unclear. In particular, he stated that it was almost impossible to distinguish “true” members of the movement, fellow travelers, and occasional sympathizers from each other.

Easton argued that behavioralism did not show any formal organization as a movement. Although there had been short-term plans in this direction, efforts to bring the movement together had not been very fruitful. On the other hand, there had always been a feeling of being loosely connected and an agreement on basic assumptions and scientific ideals, as well as lively mutual communication. Also, certain spokespeople of the movement had always been accepted by the scientific community. The success of behavioralism, he stated, was due not only to its effective leaders, its capable supporters, and the exemplary effect of important publications but also to a number of favorable conditions. In addition to the funding policies of the great foundations, the significance of the fact that the Social Science Research Council and its committees provided the behavioral movement with organizational vehicles for the development of American political science cannot be overemphasized.

Growing Institutional Influence

In the 1950s and the early 1960s, the increase in numbers of supporters of the behavioral approach seemed unstoppable. It experienced early, important success, as Harold D. Lasswell, perhaps the most important intellectual pioneer of behavioralism, was elected president of the APSA in 1955–1956. His successor, V. O. Key Jr., who was president in 1957–1958, was a behavioralist as well. Under their presidencies, for the first time, the APSA established a special team dealing with questions of political behavior. The number of behavioral-oriented teams at APSA meetings grew considerably until 1960. The rise of behavioralism became manifest in a dramatic rise of research papers after 1960. Soon there was no longer any subfield of political science without behavioral-oriented studies, although naturally the extent to
which behavioral thought penetrated the various subfields varied greatly. The focus of research was the analysis of decision-making processes and patterns of behavior. The individual served as a basis for collecting data, and the individual actor, the group, the institution, or even the political system in its entirety, was the subject on which statements were made. The core concepts of behavioral research took shape mainly in the work by Herbert Simon on political decision making, Heinz Eulau on roles, David Truman on interest groups, David Easton on the political system, Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan on the concept of power, and others. Political-scientific research now focused on theoretical concepts rather than on the analysis of everyday politics as the realists had preferred.

From about 1960 on, a number of important research papers based on the model of behavioralism were published, among them *The American Voter* by Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse (1960), *The Civic Culture* by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963), and Karl Wolfgang Deutsch’s *The Nerves of Government* (published in German in 1963). In addition to studies on elections developed at Columbia University and the University of Michigan (*Voting* and *The Voter Decides*), several programmatic and empirical studies were published that were targeted at fundamentally restructuring the subfields of comparative politics and international relations. After 1956, the profile of the *American Political Science Review* also changed drastically, indicating a gradual change in the discipline. Clearly, the quantitative element was gaining ground. Now, almost all American universities appointed behavioralists to their departments of political science, which triggered off a kind of chain reaction, further supporting the spread of the behavioral conviction. Studies written in the spirit of behavioralism started to dominate the appearance of the most important scientific magazines in the United States. With just a few exceptions, for a number of years after 1964, almost all APSA presidents came from the behavioral movement or were at least related to it. In the course of only 1½ decades, behavioralism had succeeded in fundamentally changing political science in the United States.

Goals and Methodological Assumptions

In this section, the 10 most important goals and methodological assumptions of behavioralism are summarized and commented on. This catalog of behavioral principles tries to comprehensively explain the common core of the various behavioral trends in the context of political science, as far as it is possible to bring the variety of approaches together.

The Need for Theory

The goal of behavioralist political science is not merely to describe political processes but also to explain and predict them. In this context, theory is seen as guiding the selection of research topics and the description and integration of empirical findings.

Looking for Regularities

According to the behavioral basic assumption, one must reach back to law statements in order to be able to explain and predict political processes. One pragmatic precondition for the search for regularities is the assumption that social and political
processes are subject to such laws. However, with its search for laws, behavioralism does not restrict itself to empirical generalizations but tries to go as far as possible to theoretical statements. This makes it different from the classical and radical behaviorism of John Watson and B. F. Skinner with which—erroneously—it is often equated. This, at first, only a verbal equation, which, however, is often supposed to disqualify behavioralism as being “positivist” and thus out-of-date, blurs important, fundamental differences between the two trends. Behavioralism, which indeed is also an analysis of behavior using empirical and quantifying methods, goes far beyond the purely descriptive recording and generalization of behavior. Psychological behavioralism, being a theory-guided empiricism, (a) looks primarily for explanations and not for empirical generalizations and (b) includes intervening variables moderating between stimulation and reaction, for example, cognitive consciousness processes, in the form of theoretical constructions, in its analysis. Thus, in contrast to purely empirical generalizations, the theoretical statements of behavioralism deal not only with processes that could be directly observed but also with dispositional factors such as personality traits and attitudes that by empirical means can only be described indirectly—that is, with the help of indicators. These latent dimensions, which cannot be directly observed, are described with the help of theoretical concepts—that is, by so-called constructs. An example of such a theoretical construct is the concept of identification with a political party. Theoretical constructs are connected by definitions and lawlike statements. These theoretical concepts are connected to the observation level by so-called correspondence rules, which make the empirical evaluation of a theory possible. According to the behavioral opinion, all theoretical concepts must be operationalized (or rather be operationalizable).

Striving for Verifiability and Objectivity

It is typical for science, in the behavioral sense, that all statements must be verifiable. From the empirical point of view, statements are verifiable only if they either immediately refer to observable facts or can at least be based on statements formulated in the observational language. In contrast to the analytical philosophy of science, which only demands that statements must be (at least indirectly) observable or that they can be falsified, behavioralism still follows the verification principle of neo-positivism. For it, sentences that cannot be verified must be excluded from the scientific canon. To meet the criterion of verifiability, the measurements of the empirical researcher must be as objective as possible—that is, independent of the individual scientist. Objective research results are characterized by the possibility of their being repeated by other scientists under the same circumstances. To be verifiable, the applied research tools must provide reliable measured values. A measurement tool is reliable if it produces the same results in the case of repeated measurement of the same events, with a certain leeway for mistakes that must be as small as possible. This way, however, one does not know if a reliable measurement tool, for example, a scale, really measures that what is supposed to be measured. For this reason, measurements must not only be formally reliable but also topically valid. In this context, the formal exactness of measurement is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the topical exactness of measurement. To guarantee the verifiability or more generally the meaningfulness of its results, empirical research must also argue in a way that is without logical contradictions, that explicitly defines its terms and uses them consistently, and that excludes all concepts from the scientific language that do not refer to empirical facts.

Elaborated Research Techniques

Empirical social research employs a number of tools for data collection and data evaluation. These include various methods of attitude measurement, techniques such as the interview, the methods of quantitative topical analysis, and standardized observation schemes. Among the most important research techniques of empirical political science are various random sample procedures. Statistical methods of evaluation include regression analysis, variance and covariance analysis, as well as factor and path analysis, among others. It is the goal of the statistical methods of evaluation to cope with extensive amounts of data, to determine connections between analyzed variables, and to determine the degree of safety by which the measured connections can be accepted. In this context, the use of
constantly improved, refined research techniques is not an end in itself but a means to meet the previously described quality criteria of research.

**The Trend Toward Quantification**

Inevitably, the demand that measurement results must be as exact as possible results in the attempt to make data collection and data evaluation as precise and standardized as possible. In this way, the tendency toward verifiability and comparability of statements is increased. According to its own statement, the call for quantification is not meant as a dogmatic demand but as a useful goal to strive for where it is reasonable for the object. Other goals, such as the theoretical and practical relevance of research results, are not supposed to retreat. Often—and sometimes with justification—the opponents of behavioralism object that its most important characteristic is its quest for maximum quantification while often losing focus on the subject under analysis.

**Focusing on Individual Behavior**

According to the behavioral point of view, all statements must be referred to as observable behavior. On rare occasions, the behavioral concept of behavior also refers to small groups. However, the behavioral concept of behavior is very comprehensive and includes both acts of behavior in the stricter sense and the expression of attitudes, intended behavior, or values as they are collected by using questionnaires or scales. If at the beginning of the behavioral movement, its spokespeople assumed that empirical and theoretical analysis units could be made to coincide—that is, the levels of observation and statement match—soon this behavioral-psychological remnant was abandoned. Political science deals also with groups, associations, and institutions that cannot be excluded from the field of political science just to meet a methodological demand. Otherwise, behavioral political science would actually have been reduced to the social psychology of the political behavior of individuals, as is often claimed by its critics.

**Inductivism**

Another typical feature of behavioral research activity is its inductive way of proceeding. Usually, research happens by observing empirical regularities—for example, that Catholics on the European continent vote for conservative parties more often than Protestants do. These empirical regularities are conceptually expressed by way of law statements. Also, theoretical constructions are definitely used—for example, that of the dogmatic personality. According to the behavioral point of view, these theoretical constructions, which are employed to explain and predict political behavior, must always be directly operationalized, which, however, is not at all necessary according to the point of view of the analytical philosophy of science. Thus, they stay comparatively close to the empirical surface, which might be one of the reasons why behavioralist theses are comparatively less fruitful, which, however, in this respect is hardly different from the theories of its neighboring sciences of sociology and social psychology. What exist in rich quantities are empirical single results and culture-specific generalizations, which, however, are comparatively unconnected.

**Value Relativism**

The behavioral position and the philosophy of science share the opinion that it is not possible to give reasons for value judgments with the help of empirical methods alone. Only cognitive statements can be empirically verified—that is, statements on the world as it is or, rather, as it appears to the scientist, but not statements on what the world should be like or how the scientist would like it to be. Thus, according to the behavioral opinion, value judgments are not capable of truth: They cannot be inferred from statements on facts. According to Arnold Brecht, there is a gap that cannot logically be bridged and that makes it impossible for the scientist to present value judgments as a result of his or her research. Value positions that are included into empirical statements will distort the results of research. Thus, the individual scientist must try to neutralize his or her value tendencies and prejudices. This is why empirical science follows the ideal of impartiality in this sense, although it is in some way like the “Blue Flower” for scientists—a goal that they will never fully achieve. Even according to behavioral opinion, the individual will always be somewhat a prisoner of his or her value preferences.
Behavioralism

Giving up on empirically reasoned value judgments does not rule out that values might be empirically analyzed as dependent or independent variables. Furthermore, according to Immanuel Kant, empirical political science is capable of analyzing systems of value preferences in respect of their consequences as well as of showing inconsistencies and incompatibilities, of researching the conditions for their realization, and of giving technological recommendations in the form of hypothetical imperatives.

Orientation Toward Basic Knowledge

The use of scientific insights for the realization of societal goals is possible only if there is a sufficient amount of basic knowledge. But even today this is not the case with most subfields of political science. Even after approximately 60 years of behavioral-oriented research, sufficiently confirmed theories are rather an exception. On the other hand, application-oriented research contributes little to the growth of scientific basic knowledge. To be able to make sound predictions, according to the behavioral program, there must be knowledge of behavioral regularities as well as theories using general terms, among others. The technological application of scientific insights depends on the existence of a knowledge stock that must be worked out by way of basic scientific orientation. That is why (at least originally) behavioralism supports a program of “true science,” although as a consequence of Easton’s postbehavioral revolution we observe that, in this respect, points of view are not so strict anymore. Today, many younger researchers, who nevertheless are definitely connected to behavioralism in respect of their research techniques, try to combine theoretical and practical relevance, most of all in the field of policy studies.

Integration and Interdisciplinarity

For its efforts to work out a secured and growing knowledge stock, political science must reach back to the concepts, procedures, and results of other social sciences. According to the behavioral opinion, politics include only one field of the social; personality traits in the widest sense may be as significant for political behavior as social or economic facts. It is necessary to reach back to data collection and evaluation techniques of other social sciences because there are only a few empirical methods developed by political science itself. Almost all the research techniques used by it are takeovers or modifications of sociological, social-psychological, economic, or individual-psychological methods and give reason to the demand for an interdisciplinary approach and the integration of research results.

The Lasting Influence of Behavioralism

Even if few political scientists today consider themselves behavioralists in the stricter sense, it is a fact that at first American political science and later international political science have been characterized and penetrated by behavioralism to such an extent that in Thomas Kuhn’s sense—with a grain of salt—we may speak of a scientific turn-around whose heuristic possibilities do not seem to be exhausted at all even after 60 years. It is an achievement of the behavioral revolt that today empirical-quantitative studies are a matter of course. As for the methodical-statistical refinement of analysis, for a long time empirical political science has been acting at the same level as its neighboring disciplines. The bitter quarrels between doctrines from the 1950s to the 1970s have been replaced by a peaceful coexistence of many approaches and theoretical positions. In so far, Robert Dahl proved to have almost prophetic qualities when he subtitled a 1961 article with an early obituary for behavioralism, “Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest.”

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See also Attitudes, Political; Electoral Behavior; Measurement; Policy Analysis; Political Culture; Positivism; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Survey Research

Further Readings
Beliefs

Political beliefs can be defined as individual psychological orientations toward objects of a cognitive nature in the political world (e.g., polities, institutions, actors) that consist of the perceived likelihood of a given attribute being attached to them. Therefore, a political belief has three basic components: an object, an attribute, and the perceived subjective probability that the object and the attribute go together. However, as with other concepts such as values or attitudes, political beliefs are hard to define properly, having been subject to different and even contradictory uses. Furthermore, any survey of the literature will show how political beliefs are measured in different and often imprecise ways. It is, thus, a concept still “open” to full discussion, or, as Imre Lakatos would have put it, it is a concept still in the “morphological phase.” Therefore, this entry first reviews the main uses and definitions of the concept found in the literature to appropriately frame the definition advanced above. This concept of beliefs is then discussed in the wider context of belief systems.

Conceptual Problems

Generally, one can think of political beliefs as individual orientations toward politics, related to other similar concepts such as political values and political attitudes. But the terminological jungle that comes along with these concepts makes it very hard to make sense of such a definition; as William J. McGuire has stated, we find ourselves with a set of names in search of a distinction rather than with a distinction in search of a terminology, making the situation rather complicated and blurry. An often implicit assumption is that these concepts (beliefs, values, and attitudes) can be placed on an underlying continuum ranging from the most basic or abstract to the most specific. The most abstract ones would therefore be the filters through which citizens form their more specific orientations. However, this continuum is often defined by the opposition between attitudes and values. Values are commonly placed on the top of the scale, at the highest level of generality or abstraction, and attitudes are conceptualized as being more specific. But the place of political beliefs within this framework is not so clear. A review of the uses of the concept shows that there is deep controversy over how to locate political beliefs within this context. Indeed, on one hand are scholars who quasi automatically equate political beliefs with values and use both terms almost interchangeably, such as Stanley Feldman, who treats “core” beliefs as roughly equivalent to political values. On the other extreme, there are many scholars who consider beliefs as the more specific components of attitudes. In this latter framework, attitudes are conceptualized as summary evaluations made of opinions and beliefs, and therefore, beliefs would be placed at a lower level of generality or abstraction.

This controversy often passes unnoticed because most scholars simply do not pay attention to the definitional issue. Nevertheless, the extremely divergent uses of the concept must lead us to conclude that the placement of the concept in a latent (undefined) scale is not the appropriate path to follow if we aim at analytical precision. There is no clear consensus on where to place beliefs in such a scale and, therefore, its usefulness is extremely
limited. We thus turn our attention to other attempts that are more analytically oriented.

These contributions are to be found especially in the field of social psychology. Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen advanced perhaps the clearest definition of beliefs: They define the term as the perceived likelihood, or the subjective probability, that an object has a specific attribute or characteristic associated with it. Therefore, political beliefs would be presented only by statements of the following nature: “The government is efficient,” “The government is responsive,” “The judiciary system is fair,” or “Health care is free for all,” and so on. These are cognitive thoughts and ideas that subjectively link specific attributes to political objects. Additionally, as stated by Oskar Niedermayer and Bettina Westle, beliefs can differ in strength, certainty, and subjective relevance or salience. Thus, they should be measured on a single dimension of subjective probability of an object–attribute relationship (i.e., how likely or certain it is that object X has the attribute Y), commonly through the degree of agreement or support to a given statement that must be both object and attribute specific.

This conceptual framework allows for a clearer conceptualization of the term, and it lays the ground for a distinction between beliefs and attitudes. Beliefs are primarily of a cognitive nature, while attitudes are evaluative. As Lester Milbrath states, beliefs are cognitions with a feeling of credulity attached to them. In other words, a belief contains a cognitive component of an object (it has to be known for the belief to exist) linked to “credible (believable) or incredible (unbelievable)” features of that specific object. In this sense, beliefs are distinct from values and attitudes, since the latter imply the attachment of a feeling of valence (like/dislike) to the cognition rather than to credulity. (In Milbrath’s scheme, both beliefs and attitudes have a cognitive dimension since one can only believe or evaluate known objects.) Both feelings, Milbrath insists, are interrelated (i.e., we tend to believe what we like), but at the same time, they are different (we can believe things that we dislike and vice versa). In any case, the argument is the same: Beliefs are based on the perceived probability that an object has a given feature associated with it. An implication of this conceptualization is that beliefs can often be falsified with external, objective criteria, while this is not the case for attitudes and values.

However, as Stuart Oskamp notes, this way of conceptualizing beliefs and attitudes raises the problem of the status of the so-called evaluative beliefs that combine the perceived likelihood of having a given attribute on one hand, and an evaluation on the other (e.g., “The government is inefficient,” “The authorities are responsive,” or “The political system is democratic”). This is so because the attributes being believed or disbelieved have a clear and widely shared positive or negative implication. Even if these statements are syntactically nonevaluative, since they refer to the likelihood of an attribute being attached to an object, semantically they are clearly evaluative orientations. This ambivalence makes evaluative beliefs almost indistinguishable from attitudes. Evaluative beliefs might be considered as an intermediate category, but what they reveal is indeed a continuum that ranges from the most objective (and falsifiable) beliefs to the most evaluative ones.

The inability to distinguish beliefs from attitudes in this kind of literature points again to a serious flaw in conceptualization. As noted above, any meaningful definition of beliefs must, at least, allow us to separate them from political attitudes. Scholars using this theoretical framework try to resolve this problem by going back to the same kind of scale of generality or abstraction: Attitudes are considered to be generalized and enduring evaluations of an object, while beliefs are singular and specific statements (evaluative or not) that refer to particular characteristics of the object. Therefore, most scholars of this framework consider that a person’s attitude toward an object can be thought of as a summary of his or her evaluative beliefs. For example, the overall evaluation of the political system would be an attitude, while the evaluation of each of its specific features (responsiveness, efficacy, transparency, etc.) would, within this framework, be thought of as a belief.

There is an additional empirical problem in this conceptualization: Cognitive beliefs are the foundations for evaluative attitudes and, therefore, we must expect a close empirical relationship among them. However, this relationship is not present in many instances. Scholars justify this lack of empirical evidence by saying that cognitive orientations and evaluative attitudes may not be empirically
related. However, attitudes made up of summary evaluations must show—at least partially—some congruence with the set of beliefs that produces such general evaluations. Without such an empirical congruence, therefore, we should not think of those attitudes as summarizing a set of beliefs.

**Ideology and Political Beliefs: The Belief-Systems Debate**

Despite the relevance of the preceding definitional discussion, we must acknowledge that the core debate in political science on political beliefs has basically revolved around the concept of belief systems—their nature, structure, and internal consistency. This debate was originated by Philip Converse’s seminal work *The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics*. The following section briefly reviews the concept and the terms of the debate, which has been both conceptual and empirical.

The key concept is political belief systems. In Converse’s framework, belief systems are coherent structures of “attitudes and ideas” whose components are logically organized. The internal coherence of belief systems stems from political ideology—mainly in terms of left-right ideology. Ideology, therefore, consists of an overarching set of integrated principles about politics and the social world from which specific beliefs are deductively derived. This concept was meant to overcome the limits of the term ideology, since its multiple (and often contradictory) uses and its normative overtones made it of limited utility for research. How do belief systems acquire their structure and eventually their internal coherence? Converse’s perspective, which has its foundation in physics, implicitly assumes randomness to be, somehow, the natural condition of things. This underlying assumption implies that whenever we find a given structure in citizens’ political beliefs, we must look for an external force, which, in his framework, is called a “constraint.”

What are these external forces, or constraints? Converse discusses two types of constraints: the social and the psychological. However, his focus, and the focus of the literature following him, has been disproportionately placed on the first one. A social constraint for the political belief system comes from the dominant role of political elites, who “package” attitudes and beliefs in coherent structures for consumption by the public, as expressed by Stanley Feldman. These packages are often referred to as “political ideology.” The psychological constraints are based on the role of superior convictions concerning humans and society that bind together more specific orientations, such as attitudes and beliefs. In other words, Converse is referring to what has otherwise been called “values” or, in Stanley Feldman’s terminology, “core beliefs.” Therefore, the ideological structure of mass belief systems (in terms of left-right opposition) might be thought of as a “social” or elite-driven constraint, while the alternative perspective of values and core beliefs, or even non-political normative judgments, may fall under an alternative psychological constraint.

The actual structure (or lack of structure) of citizen belief systems, as well as its main determinants, has also been the subject of an enduring controversy. The empirical findings to test this theory have displayed very little consistency across time and across issues or beliefs. Only a reduced segment of the publics (the so-called ideologues) shows a coherent pattern of beliefs congruent with the basic left-right ideological scheme. This low interitem congruence and overtime stability may signify a limited political understanding of citizens in ideological terms, but it could also be an artifact or measurement error. Furthermore, Converse himself has shown that party identification is substantially more stable over time than ideological self-positioning.

More recent research has led to new reviews of Converse’s findings. For example, John Zaller has shown in *The Nature and Origins of Public Opinion* how citizens’ beliefs and attitudes are changed and polarized according to political elites’ discourses even within the group of citizens in which ideologies are not structured and coherent belief systems are not dominant. Additionally, comparative research has shown how the extent to which citizens hold ideologically structured belief systems also depends on some contextual features, such as the political party system, the structure of party competition, and the electoral system.

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Bilateralism refers to any relationship between two parties. In the study of international relations, we normally think of bilateralism as referring to relations between two states. But this is an overly narrow definition. Bilateralism can denote an arrangement between two private companies—economists, for instance, write of a “bilateral monopoly” where there is effectively only one seller and one purchaser in a market. Alternatively, bilateralism can involve two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), two intergovernmental organizations, or any two-party combination of these actors (including states). For instance, a bilateral agreement is negotiated when an intergovernmental organization, such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), commissions a local NGO to manage a project for it.

The term *bilateralism* is also used to refer to a strategy of how relations are conducted; it denotes an approach that prioritizes reaching agreement with one other party rather than acting by oneself (unilateralism) or together with two or more other parties (multilateralism). It is also differentiated from regionalism, where relations are conducted with two or more other parties within the same geographical area. Bilateralism need not involve geographical proximity—an instance is the U.S. free trade agreement with Bahrain.

The vast majority of treaties between states are of a bilateral character. These cover the full range of diplomacy, including agreements on extradition, overseas development assistance, cultural and educational exchanges, aviation, double taxation, cooperation on criminal and terrorism issues, the exchange of nuclear materials, postal services, visa requirements, mutual acceptance of domestic standards, cooperation on meteorological services and space exploration, as well as defense, investment, and trade issues. It is in the areas of investment and particularly trade that strategies of bilateralism have become most controversial in recent years: The focus in the remainder of this entry is on these areas.

Bilateralism has been the dominant form of international trade agreement since the start of international commerce. Such treaties have a history as long as that of international trade itself—the first known bilateral trade agreement was between Egypt and Babylonia, dating to 2500 BCE. As international commerce expanded, so did the number of bilateral trade treaties multiply, driven first by the establishment of the great maritime empires of the 16th and 17th centuries and then by the Industrial Revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries.

These bilateral agreements customarily assumed the form of a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation, which typically outlined the terms under which trade and shipping between the two states would take place and the rights enjoyed by individuals and firms from one state who lived, conducted business, or owned property in the partner state. The treaty also detailed the tariff treatment to be applied to various goods.

In the 19th century, in particular, these bilateral commercial treaties were used not just to protect existing commerce or to establish, on a reciprocal...
basis, new markets for the two parties but also to impose decidedly unequal arrangements on militarily weaker states. The most notorious examples were the treaties imposed by Britain on Qing Dynasty China after the First Opium War (1839–1842). The Treaty of Nanking opened five ports to British exports, at fixed tariffs to be agreed between the two governments, and ceded Hong Kong to Britain. Other industrializing countries followed suit, the United States, for instance, negotiated a commercial treaty with China in 1884 that was markedly unequal in the concessions made by the two parties.

Although the development of the unconditional most-favored-nation principle by leading European trading states in the 19th century laid a foundation for multilateral commercial treaties, bilateralism remained the norm throughout the interwar period. The decline in commerce following World War I prompted an innovative attempt at multilateral cooperation on trade through the staging of a World Economic Conference in 1927, but the treaty negotiated failed to gain enough signatories to come into effect when countries retreated into protectionism as the depression deepened at the end of the decade. In response to the Great Depression, governments typically sought to negotiate bilateral commercial treaties.

Only with the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 did a multilateral approach to trade cooperation gain precedence over bilateral treaties. The GATT established rules intended to ensure that countries that agreed to participate in multilateral rounds of tariff reduction negotiations would not be able to act unilaterally to negate the obligations to which they committed. The GATT, however, did permit some exceptions to its rule—that contracting parties must unconditionally provide most-favored-nation status to other parties. It thereby opened the way for bilateral agreements to continue to play a role in the governance of global trade. First, it “grandfathered” existing arrangements between imperial powers and their current and former colonies. Second, it permitted the negotiation of free trade agreements and customs unions. Although the original expectation was that the latter provision would apply primarily to regional arrangements, it has increasingly been used to legitimate bilateral arrangements.

For most of the period between the establishment of GATT and that of its successor, the World Trade Organization, in 1995, multilateralism dominated the governance of international trade. All the major trading powers (the United States, the European Union [EU], and Japan) gave strong support to multilateral liberalization despite domestic resistance to the opening up of “sensitive” sectors. In the 1980s, however, bilateral strategies gained new prominence on two dimensions.

First, with the rapid growth of exports from East Asia that caused problems for domestic manufacturers in North America and Europe, and led to rapidly burgeoning trade imbalances, governments increasingly turned to bilateral agreements (as well as unilateral measures) to alleviate these problems. Most prominent were the actions taken by the U.S. government under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act. The 1962 Trade Expansion Act had contained a provision granting the U.S. president authority to impose retaliatory measures when foreign governments were considered to have harmed U.S. trade interests. This measure was substantially strengthened by Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, which moved the primary responsibility for action from the president to the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).

Section 301 provided that in the event of the USTR determining that foreign trade practices were unfair, negotiations should take place, and, if these failed to realize a satisfactory outcome, the United States could then impose restrictions on its partner’s exports or withdraw existing concessions. Although the act allowed for unilateral action, the outcome of the Section 301 investigations often took the form of bilateral negotiations. These produced agreements with a number of East Asian and other industrializing economies (most notably Japan, Korea, and Taiwan), under which their governments undertook to limit the volume of exports of specific products (at various times, automobiles, steel, textiles, clothing, and footwear). These arrangements circumvented GATT regulations in that the country responsible for exports “voluntarily” undertook to restrain them. In 1984, the EU implemented a commercial policy regulation that had similar provisions to the U.S. legislation. “Voluntary export restraints” were outlawed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Treaty: Such bilateral agreements, subsequently, have largely disappeared.
Meanwhile, a new form of bilateralism gained prominence from the mid-1980s: preferential trade agreements (PTAs). As noted above, the GATT exempted parties to free trade areas and customs unions from the requirement of applying for most-favored-nation treatment. In the 1960s, a wave of PTAs had been negotiated by developing economies—but most of them proved ineffective. Among industrialized economies, only the European countries—through the EU and the European Free Trade Association—had pursued regional strategies that led to significant exceptions to the multilateralism of the GATT. The United States and Japan (and other East Asian economies) were enthusiastic supporters of multilateralism. Their attitude began to change—in part because of concerns about the “unfair” trading practices of East Asian economies and about a perceived loss of bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU. The key development that symbolized a U.S. move away from a multilateralism-only strategy was the negotiation of its first bilateral free trade agreement—with Israel—in 1985 (the United States had earlier entered into a bilateral sectoral agreement with Canada—the U.S.–Canada Automotive Products Agreement of 1965—and had introduced a system of trade preferences for Caribbean countries in 1983). The Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement followed in 1989; in turn, this was converted into the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1993 with its extension to Mexico.

Other countries quickly followed suit; the consequence was a veritable explosion in the number of bilateral trade agreements in the years after the establishment of the WTO in 1995 (an ironic outcome in that the creation of the WTO had been regarded as a significant advance in multilateralism). The WTO reported that it had been notified of nearly 300 new PTAs between 1995 and 2008; bilateral agreements accounted for more than three quarters of all PTAs notified and in force. Of particular significance in this context was the abandonment by East Asian states of their previous commitment to nondiscrimination. Whereas only one preferential trade agreement was in place in the region in the mid-1990s (the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement), a decade later more than 80 PTAs either were being implemented or were under negotiation.

Several factors contributed to this growth in bilateralism: the slow progress made in global trade negotiations and perceptions that bringing the Doha Round of WTO negotiations to a successful conclusion would be difficult; the growth in regionalism in other parts of the world (especially the enlargement and deepening of cooperation within the EU), which caused a “domino” effect as other countries sought not to be excluded from the new preferential agreements; and the financial crisis in East Asia in 1997–1998 (which led governments to reconsider prevailing orthodoxies on trade policy).

Proponents of the new bilateralism believe that it offers several advantages over regional and multilateral negotiations: In principle, bilateral agreements should be simpler to negotiate given the small number of parties involved; they also afford an opportunity to negotiate “deeper” cooperation than in the WTO and in doing so can construct a model that provides states with an incentive to emulate its provisions at the global level. Critics, on the other hand, argue that such arrangements are inherently discriminatory, cause distortions because partial and discriminatory liberalization can advantage actors who are not the most efficient producers, politicize trade and bring power considerations to the fore (see the “Unequal” treaties of the 19th century or those between Nazi Germany and its Central European neighbors), and divert attention and scarce resources from potentially more beneficial negotiations at the global level.

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See also Diplomacy; International Trade; Multilateralism; Protectionism; Trade Liberalization; World Trade Organization (WTO)

Further Readings
Biology and Politics

For most of the past century, the so-called standard social science model (SSSM) has been the overwhelmingly dominant paradigm in American political science. As we know, the SSSM holds three tenets to be critical:

1. that humans have no innate behavioral tendencies;
2. that, consequently, human nature and human behavior are solely the products of learning and socialization; and
3. that, consequently, human nature and behavior are essentially malleable.

The launching of the “biology and politics” movement in the mid-1960s by a handful of political scientists was the result of two intellectual convictions they held in common. One was an acute dissatisfaction with the state of the discipline in general and with the hegemonic SSSM in particular; the other was a growing appreciation of the significance for political science of recent advances in the biological sciences—especially in neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, genetics, psychopharmacology (the demonstrated ability of some drugs to change behavior), primatology, and ethology. The first conviction led to a profound difference with their mainstream colleagues in their understanding of the factors that shape human nature and human political behavior. The second produced equally sharp differences with regard to the proper scope and method of political science research and the third in their respective understanding of what constitutes sound public policy. These three, then, constitute the major points of disagreement between proponents of what is commonly called biopolitics and the loyal partisans of the SSSM.

The Wellsprings of Political Behavior

As noted above, the SSSM tenet that culture alone shapes behavior is flatly rejected by those who believe in a “more biologically oriented” political science. Yes, culture is important, they agree, but so are the genetically transmitted behavioral tendencies that our species, as social primates, has evolved over literally millions of years. To ignore or even to slight these is to turn a blind eye to forces that often powerfully influence how we act socially and politically. If the discipline ever hopes to understand and explain political behavior, they insist, both nature and nurture must be given serious attention. That calls, in turn, for some major changes in both the scope of what we study and the methods employed in our research.

Research

Expanding the Scope

The Importance of Genetic Influences

Mainstream political science, to be sure, rejects this idea entirely. From an evolutionary stance, like it or not, there are a number of genetic predispositions that we share with other social primate species. Among the politically most important of these are a proclivity for hierarchical social and political structures characterized by dominance and submission, marked differences of status resulting in unequal access to the good things of life, aggressive behavior (especially among males), xenophobia, and nepotistic favoritism.

Relevance of Primatological Data

According to the SSSM, since behavior is shaped entirely by culture, knowledge of other species, no matter how akin to ours, serves no useful purpose. From a biopolitical viewpoint, however, the study of closely related species—and especially the social primates—can yield valuable clues as to the possible sources of our own behavior. This being the case, careful attention should be given to the other apes and, especially, to the species with which we share some 98% of our genetic material, the chimpanzees.

Better Methods

The study of human behavior from a neo-Darwinian perspective emerged from ethology, a biological discipline guided by the dictum that if we hope to understand how and why an organism
acts as it does we must study its actual behavior in its natural setting. This means that while there are many similarities in research methodology between the two approaches there are also some key differences. We will mention only two here:

**Survey Research**

The strengths and shortcomings of survey research as a means of ascertaining attitudes, possible future behavior, or reporting past actions have already generated an abundant literature, so we will be quite brief. As John Wahlke (1979) argued in his American Political Science Association (APSA) presidential address, survey data, which are necessarily based on self-report and with responses often possibly colored by the framing of the questions, are too often unreliable guides to the respondents’ actual political behavior, political beliefs, or the intensity of those beliefs. Accordingly, biopolitics, with its ethologically derived focus on actual behavior, sees surveys, by and large, as a research instrument of reluctant resort.

**Experiments**

Mainstream political science and biopolitics alike view experiments as a valid means of inquiry. The latter insists, however, that the experiments mirror, to the greatest degree possible, the challenges, problems, and environments that its subject(s) would encounter under real-life conditions. Accordingly, its practitioners are skeptical about the validity of experiments where subjects (often college students, hardly representative of the general population) are placed in a patently artificial setting and asked to perform tasks that lack meaningful consequences.

**The Formulation of Public Policy**

Not surprisingly, the disagreements on the well-springs of human behavior, on the need to study closely related species, and on key aspects of research methodology result in markedly dissimilar conceptions of how to best shape public policy. Two of the most important of these are the view that past behavior can guide future behavior and that it is able to be converted into policies.

**Past Behavior as a Useful Clue to Future Action**

Evolutionary theory assumes that, barring mutation and/or some profound environmental change, the behaviors that a species has evolved and exhibited in the past are likely to remain essentially the same. Thus, as those in biopolitics see the world, when efforts to alter or even prohibit “undesirable” social and political behaviors have consistently failed in the past, similar policies are unlikely to be any more successful in the future. In short, the leopard does not readily change its spots. On the contrary, by believing in the essential malleability of human nature, the SSSM is much more prone to discount past failures. Maybe by better manipulating its environment, we can induce, or even better, compel, the leopard to change its coloration.

**Trade-Offs Versus “Solutions”**

Evolutionary change almost always entails a trade-off—that is, a price. A massive protective shell or carapace comes at the cost of lessened mobility and greater size requires greater caloric demands; as we have seen with our own species, larger brains carry the cost of more painful and more hazardous childbirth. Given their neo-Darwinian set of mind, those in biopolitics tend to approach public policy problems less in terms of far-reaching “solutions” and more in terms of what is to be gained—and what might possibly be the negative political or social consequences. These are matters almost totally ignored, to take some obvious instances, by the ill-fated Eighteenth Amendment, the futile “War on Drugs,” and the predictably futile efforts, literally over the centuries, to prohibit prostitution.

There could be no more convincing an example of the “big-solution” approach than the decision to forcibly export “democracy” to Iraq. Given Homo sapiens’ innate inclination to hierarchical and authoritarian social and political structures, an inclination evidenced both by the rarity of democracies historically and their relative scarcity today in a so-called Age of Democracy, this mode of governance requires a complex of “special enabling conditions” for its emergence and survival. But even to the most untutored eye, very, very few of these essential, enabling conditions
were—or even now are—present in that unfortunate nation.

Slow Start, Brightening Prospects: Long-Term Implications for Political Science

The attempt of the biology and politics movement to reshape the discipline quickly received formal recognition from the International Political Science Association in 1973 and, a bit less readily, from the American Political Science Association in 1981. The task of achieving a distinct “field” identity was basically completed with the establishment of a professional organization, the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences in 1980; the establishment of a peer-reviewed journal, Politics and the Life Sciences, in 1982; and the publication, several years later, of a 90-page Master Bibliography listing more than 1,000 “biopolitical” papers, articles, and books.

Nonetheless, their determined evangelical efforts notwithstanding, until quite recently the proponents of a “more biologically oriented” political science constituted only a minuscule fraction of the discipline, with the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences having, at most, only 300 or 400 members in contrast with APSA’s some 101,000 members. Understandably, the great majority of the profession was unwilling to consider, let alone embrace, a conceptual framework at loggerheads with the orthodoxy in which they had been trained and had labored. Although a biopolitical course or two eventually made its way into the graduate curriculum at a dozen or so schools, only one department (at Northern Illinois University) initiated a formal doctoral program in the field; very few of the professional journals published biopolitical articles; with rare exceptions, biopolitical books somehow escaped the attention of the journals’ book review editors; and the one or two biopolitical panels at APSA’s annual meeting were fortunate to draw more than a dozen or so attendees.

Over the past 3 or 4 years, however, there has been a definite sea change. The professional journals have become much more receptive to biopolitical topics; both the number of biopolitical panels and panel attendance at the APSA meetings have notably increased; and a biopolitically oriented Conference on Experimental Political Science held its third annual meeting in 2010.

There are several reasons for this development. The introduction of functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) technology has opened a new way to study how the brain reacts when experimental subjects are presented with political questions or stimuli—and this research has received a surprising, if regrettably uncritical, coverage in the popular media (some relevant works on the neuropolitical perspective can be found in Rose McDermott, 2007, and Darren Schreiber, 2007). Another handful of biopolitical papers have reignited interest in the debate about the respective roles of nature and nurture in shaping political attitudes (in this instance, of identical twins)—and these, too, have received flattering media attention.

In addition, other influences have also been operative. Over the past couple of decades, biologists have done a superb job of popularizing evolutionary theory and the understanding of, and interest in, the manner in which genes and culture interact to shape our behavior. At the same time, an evolutionary approach has made considerable headway in several of the other behavioral sciences—anthropology, sociology, psychology, law, and what is now called “behavioral” economics. Political science has a well-established history of borrowing concepts and methods from our sister disciplines, and, among these, psychology and economics have long been the most prestigious and influential. And we should surely mention one more possible influence. According to Thomas Kuhn (1970), new paradigms often triumph not simply because of their superior scientific merit but also because of the implacable toll taken by rigor mortis on the avatars of the old order.

Whatever the relative weight of these several factors, their combined impact will almost surely profoundly modify our discipline’s understanding of the forces shaping political behavior, the manner in which it conducts its research, and the intellectual framework within which it formulates its public policy recommendations. In the future, advocates of these views may come to represent a sizable plurality of the profession rather than the current small minority.

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See also Behavioralism; Democracy, Theories of; Policy Analysis; Political Psychology

Further Readings


Bipolarity and Multipolarity

Bipolarity and multipolarity are theoretical concepts that refer to the distribution of relative power capabilities among the major powers in the global and/or regional international system. Bipolarity exists when there are two dominant powers—commonly referred to as “superpowers”—in the system whose power capabilities are considerably greater than those of other major powers. The prime example of bipolarity is the U.S.–Soviet competition during the Cold War. Multipolarity exists when there are three or more great powers in the system. Historically, multipolarity has been the dominant power configuration in the modern European states’ system.

Polarity: Theoretical Approaches

The significance of the distribution of relative power capabilities in the international system is widely contested. For realists, it is the single most important determinant of international politics. Liberals also accept that the distribution of power is an important factor shaping international politics, although they attach greater significance to domestic-level factors (such as regime type) or the existence of international regimes and institutions as determinants of international outcomes. Similarly, the English School has traditionally recognized the importance of the balance of power and the management role of great powers, even though this approach stresses the importance of “international society” as a factor that ameliorates the operation of power politics.

Critical theorists and postpositivists, on the other hand, question the significance of polarity as a theoretical tool for understanding international politics. These, more radical approaches challenge the very concept of “power” as used by realists and other rationalist theories; power, they argue, cannot be reduced to resources, geography, and other material factors. Like constructivists, they tend to emphasize the significance of normative and ideational factors and stress the role of nonstate actors. Consequently, they argue that concepts of bipolarity and multipolarity are irredeemably freighted with realist assumptions and that focusing on polarity obscures the “real” operation of power in the international system that serves the interests of privileged elites.

For realists, however, the distribution of power in the international system is the key factor shaping any regional or global conjuncture. International political systems are inherently unequal, diverse, and pluralistic: They consist of a variety of different actors with wildly differing power capabilities, with a relatively small number of more powerful states. Realists argue that this handful of powerful states—generally known as great powers—exert a disproportionate influence on international affairs and that relations between them provide the key determinants of the structure and dynamics of the international system.
Classical Realism

The classical realist tradition of Hans Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, and Reinhold Niebuhr, as well as English School theorists such as Hedley Bull and Martin Wight, were centrally concerned with the balance of power. They explored the relations between the great powers from a perspective informed by the study of history and philosophy, and their analyses of multipolarity and bipolarity drew heavily on the experience of the modern European states’ system. Much of their work explored the implications of multipolarity and bipolarity for diplomacy and statecraft. Classical realists tended to regard multipolar systems as more stable than bipolar systems, because their greater uncertainty and unpredictability encouraged foreign policy decision makers toward caution and circumspection.

Waltz’s Theory of International Politics

With the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics in 1979, the concepts of multipolarity and bipolarity acquired a new theoretical context and analytical significance. Waltz sought to introduce a far-reaching “Copernican revolution” into the study of international relations by demonstrating how much of states’ actions and interactions, and how much of the outcomes their actions and interactions produced, could be explained by forces operating at the level of the system rather than at the level of the units. His neorealism (also known as structural realism) was a parsimonious theory that focused almost exclusively on the distribution of relative power capabilities between states, specifically the great powers. Waltz argued that the determining feature of any international system, and the basis for any theoretical analysis of international politics, must be about how power is distributed between the major units. If there were three or more great powers, the system was characterized by multipolarity; if there were only two great powers—or superpowers—the system was bipolar. This distribution of relative power capabilities was thus crucial in determining international political outcomes and shaping the structural conditions for war or peace.

Waltz’s Theory of International Politics was as controversial as it was influential. In contrast to many of his classical realist predecessors, Waltz argued that multipolar systems were more unstable and war prone than bipolar systems because in the former, the great powers had a number of potential conflict dyads and defection from an alliance could have a destabilizing impact on the balance of power. In multipolar systems, he argued, dangers were diffused, responsibilities unclear, and definitions of vital interests easily obscured. Moreover, in multipolarity, it was not always clear who was a danger to whom, which complicated the process of alliance building and the establishment of a stable balance of power. In bipolar systems, in contrast, there were only two superpowers and, consequently, the question of who was a danger to whom was never in doubt. This, he argued, was the first big difference between bipolarity and multipolarity. Moreover, power balancing between them depended primarily on “internal balancing” rather than on “external balancing” (i.e., on the generation and more effective use of their own capabilities and resources rather than on alliance building, which relies on the capabilities of others). Thus, the defection of allies was of less significance than in multipolar systems.

Waltz, however, also argued that the “default” position of international systems, whether bipolar or multipolar, was the balance of power. This, he argued, constituted the key insight of his theory of international politics. From the theory, he argued, one could predict that states will engage in balancing behavior, whether or not they consciously seek a balance of power. The expectation, he argued, is not that a balance, once achieved, will be maintained but that a balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or another. Waltz’s argument that international political systems tend toward balance, and that states were primarily concerned with maximizing their security rather than their power, gave his brand of structural realism a relatively benign and status quo flavor, leading some of his realist critics to dub his theory “defensive realism.”

Neorealist Critiques of Waltz

First and foremost among Waltz’s Neorealist critics was John Mearsheimer. He argued that precisely because great powers were security maximizers, they were also power maximizers. In a competitive, self-help system, Mearsheimer argued, the most effective way for great powers to ensure
their security was by becoming the most powerful state in their neighborhood and establishing their regional hegemony. Hence, great powers, whether they liked it or not, were faced by a systemic imperative to maximize their power. This emphasis on power maximization is at the heart of Mearsheimer’s theory of “offensive realism,” which presents a much more conflict-prone and pessimistic view of the “tragedy” of great power politics.

Mearsheimer also introduced an important distinction between different forms of multipolarity. He argued that where power capabilities are roughly equivalent between the great powers, a situation of “balanced multipolarity” existed in which no one great power could make a bid for regional hegemony. In this context, great power cooperation was possible, as occurred in the “Concert of Europe” following the end of the Napoleonic Wars. However, in the context of a multipolar system in which one great power was significantly stronger than the others, “unbalanced multipolarity” existed. Unbalanced multipolar systems were inherently war prone, because the strongest great power would face a systemic imperative to maximize its power by making a bid for regional hegemony. For Mearsheimer, his theory of “offensive realism” provided an explanation for the major great power conflicts, such as the Napoleonic Wars and World Wars I and II.

The Contemporary Debate

With the end of Cold War bipolarity, a wide-ranging debate has taken place on the nature and significance of the distribution of relative power capabilities in the international system. One thread of this debate focuses on the concept of “unipolarity.” Some realists have argued that the United States, as the sole remaining superpower, is so overwhelmingly powerful compared with other great powers that the system is best described as “unipolar.” Among American realists, much of the debate has focused on whether this “unipolar” world order will be relatively short lived or long lasting (i.e., whether it constitutes a unipolar “moment” or a unipolar “era”). Waltz, on the other hand, has argued that after a relatively brief interregnum in which former great powers “relearn” their great power roles and new great powers emerge, the system will return to a multipolar dynamic. In this context, the emergence of the “BRIC” countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) has been taken by some as heralding the emergence of a new multipolar international order.

Against these debates among realists on the nature of contemporary polarity, more radical approaches have taken issue with the realist understanding of the nature of power and power politics. Power is an essentially contested concept in political science, and some have argued that power cannot be understood in terms of material capabilities. Rather, they argue that nonmaterial factors such as reputation, trust, and the attractiveness of states’ economic, political, social, and cultural attributes constitute a new form of power, which they describe as “soft power.” Some critical theorists even speak of “normative power” (i.e., the power of norms and values), which, they suggest, can have a system-transforming impact over the long term.

These more radical understandings of power are linked to arguments about the changed nature of international politics. Some argue that economic interdependence and the emergence of a globally integrated international order have weakened the significance of the distribution of hard power capabilities and therefore made long-established notions of multipolarity and bipolarity largely redundant. Globalization, some now argue, has blurred the distinction between domestic and international politics and weakened the significance of sovereignty. In this postmodern system, borders are increasingly porous, power is diffused, and security can be achieved through governance and interdependence rather than through the balance of power. Concepts of bipolarity and multipolarity thus continued to be employed in international relations, although their significance is deeply contested.

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See also Balance of Power; Cold War; Globalization; Power; Superpower

Further Readings

Boolean Algebra

Boolean algebra is the subfield of mathematical logic devoted to operations and functions of logical variables. After a brief historical introduction, a broad idea of its main concepts, ideas, rules, and applications is given below.

Origins

In his work about the laws of thought, the English mathematician George Boole (1815–1864) showed that it is possible to represent logical thought processes using a system of binary variables: 0-1, TRUE-FALSE, and YES-NO.

As early as 3000 BCE, the Chinese emperor Fu Hi used, within a magical symbol, a set of eight trigrams, in which three binary variables yield a written representation of integers from 0 to 7 (Figure 1). Gottfried W. Leibniz (1646–1716) took inspiration from it when he laid down the basic rules of binary arithmetic (Explanation of Binary Arithmetic, 1703). He realized that he had found a way to translate logic into calculations and laid plans for the first four-operation computing engine. However, it needed Boole’s work for the idea to mature, giving birth to a genuine theory—Boole’s algebra—with its calculation rules, its properties, and its theorems.

Sets, (Classical) Logic, and Boolean Algebra

A specificity of this new theory is that it may be explained under three completely equivalent forms, notwithstanding their apparent differences, using set theory, elementary logic, or Boolean algebra. In a way, we have three different descriptions of the same theory, in three different languages, but allowing perfect translation between them.

Sets

“Naive set theory” uses a set of well-defined elements—its universe—and considers a series of relations and operations between those elements and subsets of this universe. For example, if the universe is the set of all national flags at some specific moment in time, one can easily imagine all kinds of subsets: flags using red, black, or both; those featuring a cross, a circle, bars, stripes; and so forth. Using red is a binary variable, with value YES (or 1) or NO (or 0) for each flag.

Although not absolutely needed for conceptual development, a visual representation using Venn diagrams can show this relationship (see Figure 2). This figure shows the flag Universe and three of its subsets, namely flags using red (R), those using black (B), and those using yellow (Y). It immediately can be seen in the diagram that each subset automatically determines its complement (flags without black, without red, or without yellow). The Italian flag (i), for example, belongs to subset R but to neither B nor Y; this can be noted as $i \in R$, $i \notin B$, and $i \notin Y$.

It is also possible to consider operations on subsets. The intersection ($\cap$) of R and B is the subset of all flags using both red AND black; the union ($\cup$) of R and B is the subset of all flags using either red OR black—or both; this is the inclusive variant of OR. One can see that the French flag ($f$) satisfies $f \in R \cup B$ and $f \notin R \cap B$. Finally, some subset may be totally included ($\subseteq$) within another: The set of
Boolean Algebra

all flags using both red and black is included in the set of all flags that merely use red. This is noted as $R \cap B \subseteq R$.

Logic

Classical logic is able to translate any statement of the elementary set theory; for example, $R \cap B \subseteq R$ translates into an implication ($\Rightarrow$): If a flag uses both red and black, then it uses red. More generally, any statement of the form $A \subseteq B$ becomes $A \Rightarrow B$ (if $A$ is true, then so is $B$). Three logical operators are defined at the beginning: logical conjunction, “AND”; logical disjunction, “OR”; and negation (or denial), “NOT.”

Boolean Algebra

Boolean algebra is based on the following conventions: Each variable is binary; it has only two possible values; and those will be noted 0 (corresponding to the empty set and logical FALSE) and 1 (corresponding to the universe and logical TRUE).

Boole then defined three operations: Boolean product ($\cdot$), Boolean sum ($+$), and complement. Boolean product corresponds to logical AND and a set-theoretical intersection; Boolean sum corresponds to OR and set-theoretical union; and complement corresponds to set-theoretical complement and logical NOT.

To determine how operators make this algebra work, the rules of the game—that is, the axioms—are needed. They are the following:

- Law of excluded middle: $A + \bar{A} = 1$
- Noncontradiction principle: $A \cdot \bar{A} = 0$
- Boundedness conditions: $A \cdot 1 = A$; $A + 0 = A$
- Twofold commutativity: $A + B = B + A$; $A \cdot B = B \cdot A$
- Twofold associativity: $(A + B) + C = A + (B + C)$; $(A \cdot B) \cdot C = A \cdot (B \cdot C)$
- Reciprocal distributivity of “+” and “.”: $(A + B) \cdot C = (A \cdot C) + (B \cdot C)$; $(A \cdot B) + C = (A + C) \cdot (B + C)$; this last identity is less intuitive than others, since it does not hold in ordinary (real-number) arithmetic.

From there, several properties may be deduced, among which are the following:

- $0 = 1$ and $1 = 0$
- Idempotence: $A \cdot A = A$; $A + A = A$
- Absorbing: $A + 1 = 1$ and $A \cdot 0 = 0$

Successive applications of these rules make possible the simplification of complex Boolean expressions, in particular by using the following results:

- Absorption theorems: $A + (A \cdot B) = A$; $A \cdot (A + B) = A$
- Redundancy theorems: $(A \cdot B) + (\bar{A} \cdot C) = (A \cdot B) + (\bar{A} \cdot C) \cdot (B \cdot C)$
- De Morgan’s laws: $\bar{A + B} = \bar{A} \cdot \bar{B}$; $\bar{A \cdot B} = \bar{A} + \bar{B}$

Boolean Functions and Truth Tables

Any Boolean function—that is, any combination of Boolean variables using Boolean operators—may be analyzed using its truth table. The truth table for a function of $n$ variables is always made of $2^n$ lines and $n + 1$ columns; each line corresponds to one combination of values of the variables (0 or 1). For example, the truth table for function $F(A, B) = A \cdot \bar{B} + \bar{A} \cdot B$. $B$ is as follows (Table 1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Truth Table for $F(A, B)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>$B$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All truth tables of two variables will have the same first two columns as this one; the third column completely describes the function. This last column is made up of four binary values; therefore, there are \( 2^4 = 16 \) different functions of two variables. Using set-theoretical representation, function \( F(A, B) = A \cdot B + \bar{A} \cdot B \). \( B \) is shown in the shaded part of Figure 3.

Using two variables, 16 different shaded zones may be defined, made up of 0 to 4 elementary zones (the quadrants of the diagram) (Table 2).

This number increases rapidly with the number \( n \) of variables.

This exponential increase explains the need for using algorithms when analyzing Boolean functions of more than three variables (see Figure 3).

Each compound zone of a Venn diagram also corresponds to a Boolean function. However, there is more than one formula for a given function.

It is therefore interesting to find, among those logically equivalent formulae, which one is the simplest. Simplicity is not a well-defined notion, but an intuitively reasonable approximation will be to choose the shortest formula.

### Reducing a Function’s Algebraic Expression

The longest formula for a given function (its canonical disjunctive form) is very easy to write down: It is merely made up of a union of elementary zones, therefore of a sum of products (monomials, minterms) using all variables. For example, to the following truth table (see Table 3) corresponds the long formula

\[
F(A, B, C) = A \cdot B \cdot C + \bar{A} \cdot B \cdot C + A \cdot \bar{B} \cdot C + A \cdot B \cdot C.
\]

This formula lacks brevity. Using a succession of Boolean algebra rules allows us to simplify it until we get the shortest possible formula:

\[
F(A, B, C) = A \cdot B \cdot C + \bar{A} \cdot B \cdot C + A \cdot \bar{B} \cdot C + A \cdot B \cdot C
\]

\[
F(A, B, C) = 1 \cdot B \cdot C + 1 \cdot \bar{B} \cdot C
\]

\[
F(A, B, C) = B \cdot C + \bar{B} \cdot C
\]

\[
= (B + \bar{B}) \cdot C = 1 \cdot C = C.
\]

This search for the shortest form of the function is the object of the simplification algorithms mentioned above. Karmaugh’s algorithm, a heuristic method for simplifying that can be worked by hand, with acceptable results, for \( n \leq 4 \), may give a good idea of how such algorithms work; other algorithms need a computer to perform, such as the

### Table 2: Number of Zones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Variables</th>
<th>Elementary Zones</th>
<th>Compound Zones</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>( 4 = 2^2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>( 16 = 2^4 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>( 8 = 2^3 )</td>
<td>( 256 = 2^8 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n )</td>
<td>( 2^n )</td>
<td>( 2^{2n} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3: Truth Table for \( F(A, B, C) \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( A )</th>
<th>( B )</th>
<th>( C )</th>
<th>( F(A, B, C) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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The term *breakdown of political systems* connotes the collapse of any rule-based institutional network engaged in the allocation of scarce resources. Though this rubric could technically embrace networks ranging from empires to smaller, nonstate entities such as clans, the vast majority of the literature on the breakdown of political systems focuses on the collapse of either regimes or states. The disintegration of both regimes and states has been a constant throughout history, and thus, the literature on the breakdown of political systems is vast. This overview merely introduces this literature through a discussion of its basic terms, its origins, and some of its principal arguments. The discussion is confined to four types of political system breakdown: the breakdown of dictatorship, the breakdown of democracy, and the breakdown of states, leading either to new, functioning states or to failed states.

### The Basic Notions and Its Origins

Drawing on Robert Fishman’s distinctions, we can define a *regime* as a country-based network of formal and informal organizations at the center of political decision making that determines who has access to political power and how those who are in power deal with those who are not. Democracies and dictatorships are the dominant regime types in our literature.

A *state* is the larger institutional context in which a regime exercises its power. A state is a more permanent structure of domination and coordination in part because, unlike a regime, a functioning state always maintains a coercive apparatus and both the means to administer a society and to extract resources from it. Though there are many state types in our literature, the distinction most relevant to a discussion of system breakdowns is the one between functioning states and failed states.

The current literature on the breakdown of modern political systems has its roots in ancient Athens. Plato attributed political system change (and difference) to “the dispositions of men” and argued that regime types were forged from “the human natures” of their citizens. Later classic commentaries linked the breakdown of oligarchy to societal crises related to taxation, to the successful uprising against the Spartan occupation that followed conflict between Athenian elites, and to structural changes related to the Persian Wars. Aristotle linked political system longevity to levels of economic inequality. Arguments relating the breakdown of political systems to cultural dispositions, fiscal crises, elite divisions, war, and economic inequality remain fundamental to political science literature today.

The Ancients’ attempts to derive general, explanatory arguments from specific, contemporary political events remain fundamental to current literature as well. This is one of the reasons why scholarship on the breakdown of political systems has so often come in clusters, following waves of dramatic political system change. Four clusters of system breakdown stand out as catalysts.

### The Main Explanations

The first set of debates about regime collapse in the 20th century focused on the breakdown of...
democracy in interwar Europe. Proponents of psychosocial arguments asserted that the cause lay in the nexus of personality and politics: Individuals who were profoundly insecure found the uncertainty of democracy intolerable and sought comfort in authoritarian leaders and authoritarian regimes. Though this argument was rooted in social psychology, it resonated with scholars of politics as well. Hannah Arendt attributed the breakdown of interwar democracy to the “negative solidarity” engendered by a mass of “furious individuals” united by “apprehension.” Seymour Martin Lipset attributed “working-class authoritarianism” to economic insecurity and authoritarian family patterns.

While some analysts concentrated on citizen attitudes as a root cause of democratic breakdown, other scholars concentrated on classes instead. Barrington Moore attributed the breakdown of interwar democracy to an alliance between landed elites and sectors of the bourgeoisie who desired a level of labor repression that democracy would not allow. Gregory Luebbert attributed the breakdown to alliances between the family peasantry and the urban middle classes, arguing that their interactions with socialist parties were decisive.

The focus on class actors was eventually challenged by approaches that focused on political institutions and political (rather than class) elites. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan took the lead in fostering this approach. Though Linz ultimately blamed the breakdown of democratic political systems on “citizens of weak commitment,” he attributed citizen defections to a broad range of nonstructural factors, including ineffective leadership and problematic institutional design. In so doing, he argued that system breakdown might have been avoided with better judgment and better institutions, including single parliamentary executives, constructive votes of no confidence, and laws preventing the proliferation of small parties.

The breakdown of democracy occurring during the Cold War was the second major stimulus for explanatory theory and Linz intended his argument to apply to these cases as well. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba also sought to offer a general theory of democratic breakdown but promoted arguments related to political culture instead. They proposed that democratic stability could only be ensured where a “civic culture” based on moderate attitudes, interpersonal trust, and muted interest in political participation existed.

In a similar vein, Harry Eckstein proposed that political systems would be viable only if their authority patterns were congruent with authority patterns in other social organizations.

Suspecting that the roots of citizen attitudes and behaviors lay in economic structures, Lipset proposed that a democratic system breakdown would be less likely as economic development progressed, arguing that the prospects for democratic system stability improved as wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education expanded. A large middle class would mean decreasing class differences, more moderation, and better odds for democratic system stability.

Focusing on the frailty of democratic political systems in South American countries with comparatively large middle classes, Guillermo O’Donnell challenged Lipset and argued that economic development would not guarantee democratic stability if it took place in the context of economic dependency. Democracy could not be maintained in the face of contradictory pressures from transnational capital on the one hand and a popular sector empowered by democratic freedoms on the other.

Debates about the cause of democratic system breakdown were still unresolved when authoritarian regimes began to break down in the 1970s. The theories stimulated by this third set of events were equally diverse. Philippe Schmitter and Guillermo O’Donnell offered one of the first attempts to make sense of the change. They proposed that the breakdown of dictatorship is always the consequence of divisions among regime elites and that “elite dispositions, calculations, and pacts” determine whether system breakdown is possible. Beyond this, they insisted that the breakdown of authoritarianism constituted an example of “underdetermined” social change where class, sectoral, or institutional analysis had little predictive utility.

As cases of authoritarian breakdown began to accumulate, scholars argued that the causes of regime breakdown varied across countries. Samuel Huntington drew attention to three scenarios for breakdown: one in which regime elites played a major role, another in which the breakdown of dictatorship resulted from joint action by regimes and oppositions, and a third in which oppositions took the lead. This last scenario dominated in Africa and Eastern Europe.

Barbara Geddes pointed out that different sorts of authoritarian systems broke down for different
reasons and at different rates. Through quantitative work, she found that military dictatorships were the most likely to break down, that personalist regimes were more resilient, and that single-party regimes were the most resilient of all. Military regimes were susceptible whenever the interests of the military as an institution were at risk. Personalist regimes were susceptible when an equilibrium based on coercion and spoils was disturbed by the death of the leader or by economic crisis. Single-party regimes were the least susceptible to breakdown because their leaders typically had no alternative source of power and thus had stronger incentives to face crises and resolve disputes internally.

The idea that economic crises or economic factors of some sort are the root cause of the breakdown of dictatorship is widespread but still contested. Studying the period between 1950 and 1990, Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi found that the relationship between economic development and the breakdown of dictatorship was bell shaped. Though the likelihood of regime breakdown rose with development in middle-income dictatorships, dictatorships in countries with either very low or very high incomes tended to be stable despite growth. Studying the period from 1800 to 1990, Carles Boix and Susan Stokes drew a different conclusion. They found that economic development always increased the probability that dictatorships would become democracies, though the impact of growth on the likelihood of regime change decreased at higher levels of development and after World War II.

Debates about the roots of dictatorial political system breakdown were enriched by the wave of regime changes associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. This fourth stimulus for explanatory theory brought arguments with an international focus to the fore. Scholars such as Marc Beissinger showed how the breakdown of dictatorships was affected by the cross-border diffusion of models for mobilization. Huntington argued that demonstration effects were so powerful that they worked independent of economic and social conditions. Jon Pevehouse illustrated that the breakdown of dictatorship was linked to membership in international organizations dominated by democracies. Dankwart Rustow concluded that the most powerful impetus for the breakdown of dictatorship was the global trend of “intensifying communication and economic integration,” which spread the awareness of “democratic lifestyles” and delegitimated the myths that sustained dictatorship.

In addition to invigorating work on the breakdown of regimes, the disintegration of the Soviet Union sparked new interest in theories explaining the breakdown of state systems. Scholars explained why new states emerged from old states with a variety of arguments. Linz and Stepan attributed the change to problems of “stateness”: Subnationalist groups that never accepted the boundaries of the state moved to change them as soon as coercion declined. Valerie Bunce offered an institutional explanation, highlighting the fact that all the European states that split apart after 1989 were federal. Carol Skalnik Leff made the point that democratization had a “state-shattering” impact because it shifted power to regions and thereby changed the incentives of regional elites.

The system breakdowns after 1989 also sparked new literature explaining the emergence of “failed” states as places where state actors prey on their citizenry, enjoy no monopoly of force, and fail to control rampant violence. This form of system breakdown is most likely in poor countries, but Robert Bates points out that its roots may lie in poor state resources rather than in poverty per se. Robert Rotberg argues that poverty and institutional weakness contribute to state failure but accords the greatest weight to leadership errors and the drive for personal gain. Jack Goldstone, Robert Bates, Ted Robert Gurr, and Monty Marshall conclude that state failure is most rooted in political factors and that hybrid regimes that are neither democracies nor dictatorships are most susceptible to collapse. We cannot know which of the many explanations for system breakdown given here will prove most convincing in the future, but we can be almost certain that political systems will continue to collapse.

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See also Democratic Consolidation; Democratization; Development, Political; Dictatorship; Regime (Comparative Politics); Secession; State Collapse; State Failure
Buddhism

Buddhism is frequently regarded as a quietist religion, but while there may be some justification for this perception, its political presence and impact in many parts of Asia should not be underestimated. Ever since the period of the Indian emperor Aśoka (269–232 BCE), the religion has shown itself to be a distinctive social and political force in various countries, having considerable backing among the relevant populations. Naturally, where Buddhism is a small minority, as in modern Western countries, its influence is small and the quietist image is strong, but in the countries of Asia, where Buddhism is the majority religion, the situation is quite different. Here, both Buddhist monks and lay leaders have been prominent from time to time in elitist and military maneuverings and more recently in revolutionary and electoral situations. Self-consciously Buddhist political activism is not a stranger in India, Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam. Indeed, in most Asian countries, Buddhist leaders have at various times contributed to both support the prevailing establishment and revolt against it.

Characteristics of Buddhism

The underlying reason for the complex interactions between Buddhism and political forces may be found in two characteristic features of the religion. First, we must look back to the story of the historical Buddha’s decision to proclaim his teaching in the first place, which is a constitutive narrative both for his own biography and for the emergence of Buddhism as an organized religious system. The central story is that Gautama (in the 5th century BCE), though blessed with many privileges as a young man, passed through a personal heart-searching experience about human suffering, illness, old age, and death. Recognizing the transience of existence, he perceived the cause of suffering to lie in ignorance, desire, and attachment to transient things, while its resolution lay in knowledge and detachment. The understanding of all these relationships is summed up as his “enlightenment” or bodhi, which is why he was regarded as a buddha, an enlightened one. Had he preferred a quietist, personal resolution of these general questions of human existence, which according to the narrative he considered steadily as an option, the social impact would most likely have been nil. As it was, the very decision to proclaim his system of teaching (in Sanskrit dharma, in Pali dhamma) led not only to the first ordinations of monks but also to sponsorship by prosperous laity and royalty. This meant that a strong and active symbiosis with a supportive laity grew up from the very beginning, so that the social and political ramifications began to extend themselves in a continuous process.

Second, the concept of the “wheel turner” (in Sanskrit cakravartin, in Pali cakkavatti) is significant. On one hand, it is part of the mythologization of the figure of the Buddha himself, for he is regarded as having achieved the right to “turn the wheel of dharma.” However, the same concept is applied to kingship, for a “wheel-turning monarch” is one who claims the power of extending his rule to the four quarters of the earth, spreading stability in support of a moral society. When a suitable individual is reborn as a “great person,” with excellent qualities and at an appropriately high-class of society, he—presumed to be male—has the option of turning the wheel of dharma or of turning the wheel of political power. Ideally, therefore, a powerful and righteous king will be the contemporary and the patron of a living Buddha. This dual, tandem-like concept was later integrated under the concept of the “wonderful union of king and Buddha.” In some cases, such as

Further Readings


Buddhism

the Tibetan model, this means that the incarnated spiritual leader or Dalai Lama is at the same time the political head of the population, which naturally causes a collision with any modern state such as China, with its secular ideological base. Tensions over this model may be seen to a lesser extent in Mongolia, Bhutan, and Nepal. In a variation of this union, certain kings or princes have been given the title of “Dharma King” (in Sanskrit dharmarāja), which has usually implied not only an elitist espousal of Buddhism, but also that they have authority, direct or indirect, over senior appointments in the monastic hierarchy, as frequently seen in premodern Japan.

Evolution of Buddhism in Southeast and East Asia

The expansion of Buddhism into the countries of Southeast and East Asia took place largely with the help of political domination or influence, with the notable exception of China. As a result, these underlying concepts of the Buddha as both political and spiritual head have played a major role. Starting with a response by the Indian Emperor Aśoka to the Sri Lankan king of the time, Devānampiyatissa, the Theravāda monastic order was set up in Sri Lanka. While this order had royal patronage, the tradition of lay support for the order spread to most levels of society. As a result, the postcolonial independence movement looked to Buddhism, still predominating in a religiously and culturally plural society centuries later, to provide an ideological reference point that would be nationally recognizable as Sinhalese. An important modern Sri Lankan Buddhist was Dharmapala (1864–1933), who, assuming the title of Anagarika or “homeless one,” did much to further a modern revival of Buddhism in India itself, where it had largely died out. This revival was massively furthered by the conversion of Dr. Babasaheb R. Ambedkar (1891–1956), a major contributor to the constitution of independent India, who led some millions of previous “untouchables” into a casteless state under the banner of a modernist, rationalist, and ethically oriented Buddhism.

Following the earlier mission to Sri Lanka, a transmission of the Dhamma to Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos followed in various stages, with the result that Buddhist traditions played a major role in state formation in all of these countries. There were also establishments in Sumatra and Java that had less long-term influence. While kingship models derived from Hinduism were also influential, with even Brahmans functioning at the Thai court, it was the Buddhist monastic order that has remained a pillar of political influence in mainland Southeast Asia. Thus, regardless of contemporary politicians, the two fundamental foci of authority in Thailand remain to this day the monarchy and the monastic order. A key figure in the formation of Thai national consciousness was King Mongkut (Rāma 4th, 1824–1851) who managed the modernization process of the whole country while preserving its independence from Western colonial powers. Before becoming king, he was a dedicated monk who played a leading role in reforming and modernizing the Buddhist religion in Thailand. The process of modernization was continued by his successor Chulalongkorn (Rāma 5th) and later monarchs. In Burma, Buddhist layman U Nu (1907–1995) played a major role in postcolonial political development under the slogan of “Buddhist socialism,” while at the beginning of the 21st century a number of monks have been attempting to recall the country to its rightful path as they see it. In Vietnam, the wars of independence saw cases of Buddhist monks burning themselves alive in the 1960s as a symbolic act, protesting against the repression of the population. This engagement in the social and political process became widely known through writings of the monk Thich Nhat Hanh, such as The Lotus in the Sea of Fire.

If China, with its strong Confucian traditions, did not really need the Buddhist religion to provide a leading civil ideology, the importation of Buddhism from India via Central Asia nevertheless presented a strong challenge to the incipient religious institutionalization of Daoism. Buddhism reached a high point of influence during the Tang dynasty, but it suffered greatly as a consequence of Daoist-inspired persecution in the mid-9th century. If the rivalry of the three religions had frequently led to strife and persecution, now of Daoism and now of Buddhism, there were also attempts to coordinate them. The classic model for this was the idea of the “three teachings” (sān jiào), which was most influentially set forth in a treatise ascribed to the first Ming emperor shortly
after he had taken political control of the country. The compromise that he regarded as essential for political stability does not give a privileged place to Buddhism among the “three teachings,” but it crystallized a model that even today implicitly underlies the law of a secular Chinese regime. Just as the Ming solution juxtaposed Confucianism on the one hand with Buddhism and Daoism on the other, so also now the state ideology of communism is the common reference point for the permitted religions: Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestant Christianity. Confucianism does not occur here as “religion,” having been displaced by communist ideology as the normative backdrop, but Buddhism holds a clear position. The older “three teachings” concept implied the exclusion and suppression of the so-called heretical sects on the assumption that such minority sects lead to instability and are probably a cloak for agitation. This reasoning is therefore not a new communist invention, and observers need to consider contemporary cases carefully, for example, when new movements such as Falungong claim to be “Buddhist” and at the same time call for the overthrow of the government.

Buddhism was transmitted first to Korea and from there to Japan from the 6th century onward. If the dominant ideology in Korea up to the Japanese imperialist period was Confucianist, the postcolonial and postwar period has seen a resurgence of pride in the shamanistic traditions of that country, thus giving them a civil religious function. The political and social influence of Buddhism arises less from the traditional orders in Korea—strongly established though these are—and more from the newly founded lay movements such as the self-consciously modern Won Buddhism. Japanese history has seen immensely complicated variations of Buddhist influence via the imperial court on one hand and the power centers of major denominations on the other. While monks of Mount Hiei to the northeast of Kyōto occasionally led armed raids into this former capital, the millions of followers of the Shin Buddhist faith and others in the Nichirenite tradition were also a political force to be reckoned with and occasionally suffered dire consequences. In modern, postwar times, the influence of the Buddhism-inspired Kōmeitō (“Public Brightness Party”) has been considerable but seems to be receding in the 21st century. Increasingly, lay Japanese Buddhist leaders have promoted a “peace” agenda, the Nichiren-oriented Risshō Kōsei-kai and the Sōka Gakkai being prominent in this respect. The strongly established Shin Buddhist denominations have led the way in reflecting on Japanese war responsibility and in educating their followers accordingly. In Sōtō Zen Buddhist circles, there has also been much heart searching while various influential Buddhist voices support the campaign to preserve Clause 9 of Japan’s present constitution, prohibiting war as a means of settling international disputes.

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See also Confucianism; Monarchy; Religion

Further Readings

Budgeting, Rational Models

Budgeting refers to decisions about how much funding to provide for the programs, staffs, and infrastructures of government, as well as about the processes used to arrive at funding levels. In examining processes, budgeting theories explain how individuals who hold budget-writing positions choose funding levels for programs. A second class of theories explain how and why political elites try to manipulate budgets to foster their goals. Rational theories of individuals responsible for choosing how much to fund budget lines offer bounded rationality explanations of these decisions.
Due to limits on human cognition, vast numbers of lines in the budget, and complex decision-making environments, budgeters’ forecasts about how well their choices will facilitate their goals are imperfect. Despite these limitations, budgeters use decision-making strategies that help them foster their goals. Such strategies are boundedly rational because, although the choices and behavior resulting from such strategies are not optimal, budgeters’ decisions still help them realize program goals. In this way, budgeters “satisfice”—they make decisions that are “good enough.”

The first generation of boundedly rational budgeting theories was developed in the 1960s by Aaron Wildavsky, whose contributions to understanding budgeting continue to exert a profound influence on budgeting scholarship. This perspective, developed with respect to the federal government in the United States, emphasizes that individuals responsible for contributing to the budget must take an incremental approach to arrive at funding levels. Budgeters begin by examining the “base” for each budget line, which refers to the amount that was spent on the line in the previous year’s budget. From this base, budgeters make small adjustments based on new information and limited by the availability of funds. For example, if program advocates can make an effective argument about why additional funds are needed, budgeters may increase funding levels slightly from the previous year. Nevertheless, even if budgets change from year to year, budgeters do not make drastic changes. Budgeters follow this approach out of necessity. Examining the budget holistically would involve the impossible task of investigating each budget line to ascertain the optimal volume of funds required to realize the goals embodied in the programs. Unfortunately, such an approach is not feasible given the vastness of the government and the resulting volume of decisions that must be made. By taking an incremental approach, however, budgeters arrive at funding levels for all budget lines, ensuring that programs continue serving their purposes even if neither the funding levels nor the achievement of program goals are optimal.

Additional research, however, observed that many budgeting decisions were not incremental, spurring refinement of Aaron Wildavsky’s approach. John Padgett’s serial judgment theory of budgeting stresses continuity with the incremental perspective in that budgeters’ decisions are understood from a boundedly rational perspective. Budgeters cope with the volume and complexity of the decisions they face by starting with the level of funding from the previous year and satisficing to arrive at funding levels for the current budget. However, the heuristic employed by budgeters is not incremental choice. Rather than consciously choosing a funding amount that differs slightly from that disbursed previously, budgeters consider, one after another, alternatives for funding levels until they arrive at one that is acceptable. In this way, budgeters satisfice in that they do not try to discover optimal funding levels for programs.

Critically, though, budgetary outputs are predicted to differ from outputs predicted by incremental approaches. Because budgeters move from alternative to alternative until they reach an outcome that is good enough, it is possible for them to arrive at funding levels that are substantially different from the amounts funded in the previous year’s budget. Such dramatic changes can occur, for example, when budgeters’ understandings of what is necessary from a programmatic standpoint leads them to pick a funding level that happens to be a significant departure from the previous year’s base. Research focusing on the distribution of year-to-year changes in programs’ funding levels in the context of U.S. government budgets revealed that this perspective explained better the distribution of year-to-year changes than an incremental approach did. By specifying more precisely the decision-making heuristics employed by budgeters, the serial judgment perspective improved on the incremental model while remaining anchored firmly to a realistically bounded rational view of human decision making.

More recent research by Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones integrates research on agenda setting with a boundedly rational approach to budgeting. Because the set of issues that they can attend to is small, budgeters ignore most information from the political environment. They do so even in the face of political mobilizations by coalitions favoring substantial funding changes. Under these circumstances, year-to-year changes in budgets are characterized by incremental shifts in funding levels. However, when groups in favor of change are successful in securing space for their concerns on the government’s agenda, budgeters
are forced to attend to the issues that these groups prioritize. In doing so, budgeters begin to consider alternative funding amounts for budget lines serially. Since past decisions related to the issues have resulted in incremental changes, political coalitions that have focused budgeters’ attention on a specific budget line are likely to desire significant change in that line. Therefore, the funding levels that allow budgeters to satisfice in such instances are likely to constitute sizable increases/decreases. After all, substantial changes are the only ones likely to satisfy the political forces behind the mobilization. In this way, the heuristics that budgeters employ differ depending on whether advocates for change can secure space for their priorities on the agenda. If not, budgeters ignore information from such groups, leading to incremental changes. However, when agenda space is secured, serial judgment heuristics are triggered. What is more, the nature of the mobilization implies that only substantial changes in funding levels allow budgeters to allay the concerns of the coalitions—and, by extension, allow budgeters to satisfice.

Shifting gears, a separate tradition on government budgets asks whether political elites manipulate budgets to serve their goals. One line of such research asks whether ruling political parties stimulate the economy prior to elections in order to maintain their control of government and its decisions. This political budget cycle thesis was spurred by research conducted in the 1970s examining indicators of economic health in light of election cycles in the United States and in other major industrial democracies during the post–World War II era, observing that unemployment dipped and economic growth increased in years during which elections occurred. Naturally, the argument behind the thesis is that the ruling party prefers to remain in control of government. Therefore, it pursues policies that stimulate the economy to achieve economic growth prior to the election. Voters, the ruling party hopes, observe this performance and reward it by returning it to power.

Subsequent research on this hypothesis has produced mixed findings regarding the ability of ruling parties to pursue this strategy successfully. In recent research, James Alt and David Lassen suggest why: The ability of ruling parties to exploit their position is conditional on several factors. The first involves how transparent the government’s fiscal policy decisions are to the public. Transparency allows the media and political opposition, and by extension the public, to observe the government’s intentions, making it more difficult for the ruling party to try to create economic growth without being accused of doing so for its own benefit. The second factor is the level of polarization between parties. As policy conflict increases between the ruling party and its rival(s), the costs to the party of losing control of government to the opposition increases. These costs increase with policy conflict because the policies that the opposition (as the future ruling party) will adopt will be more offensive to the (present) ruling party for higher levels of policy disagreement between parties. In summary, while it may be feasible for the ruling party in government to rig the economy in order to maximize its chances of continuing in power, the circumstances under which this strategy is feasible may be limited.

Another line of research focusing on elite influence over budgets examines the participation of bureaucrats in shaping the budgets of their agencies. One theory advanced in the early 1970s held that bureaucrats were “budget maximizers” in that they wished to expand the size of their agency’s budget as much as possible. What is more, bureaucrats are well positioned to do so because they possess more information about what is necessary to achieve the policy goals their agencies are responsible for meeting than elected officials who create budgets. This information asymmetry allows bureaucrats to receive substantial increases in their agencies’ budgets.

Subsequent research in the tradition of the budget-shaping perspective by Patrick Dunleavy and others, however, has led to a substantial refinement of this view. In addition to noting that budgets are not characterized by the growth predicted by the maximization perspective, these critics note that, because an agency’s budget is a collective good, bureaucrats face a collective action problem in advocating budget expansions. Moreover, because agencies’ budgets are disaggregated, bureaucrats possess no guarantee that increases to the budget will accrue to their corner of the agency, undercutting the incentive to lobby. Bureaucrats also face varied incentives to lobby for expansions based on the type of agency they work for and their position within their agency. In particular, the highest ranking officials most
BUREAUCRACY

The term **bureaucracy** denotes a particular form of organization that is complex and differentiated, has defined rules and procedures, and is subject to a command-and-control system of hierarchical authority. This entry discusses the nature and functions of bureaucracy and the bureaucratic state, as well as the problems and deficiencies associated with it.

### Definition and Characteristics

The illustrious German sociologist Max Weber noted several characteristics of the bureaucratic form of organization that defined it as an ideal type.

First, bureaucracy derives its authority through law. It depends neither on traditional nor on personal modes of authority. It is instead based on a form of legal-rational authority that defines the foundations of the organization’s jurisdiction and its procedures of operation.

Second, bureaucracy has differentiated offices or units that have specialized competencies and jurisdictions. This aspect of bureaucracy provides it with some obvious advantages, including the ability to bring technical expertise and experience to bear on particular aspects of problems. It also raises some difficulties, however, in coordination of tasks, and it sometimes creates conflicting perspectives as to what the task is or how a problem should be defined.

Third, bureaucracy is characterized by an internally hierarchical system of authority required to bring its distinctive parts together as part of a unified system of coordination. The extent to which this hierarchical control system can actually be put in place is almost always imperfect, though the extent to which it can be consummated rests on many factors other than coercion. These include leadership that obtains support from all of the organization’s distinctive offices and units, clarity of purpose from organizational leadership, and careful assessments of feasible paths to ends.

Fourth, bureaucracy is also characterized by rules and procedures that govern its internal functions. It has a memory and a set of procedures for dealing with recurring matters. Weber referred to this as the organization’s “files,” and this storage of experience and written rules anchors bureaucracy in the legal-rational system of authority. The files provide precedents and also produce standard operating procedures (SOPs) that enable bureaucracies to become more proficient in responding to...
problems that can be readily identified and are within the organizational repertoire. The more ambiguous or multifaceted the problem, however, the more complicated will be the sorting process within a bureaucratic organization and the more likely, therefore, that problems are recognized and defined in ways reflecting the complex differentiation of bureaucratic organizations. This means that there are likely to be many different perspectives rather than a unified one.

Fifth, bureaucracy is typically characterized by a full-time corps of officials. In governments, these officials are known as civil servants; they represent the continuity of the organizations of government, their missions and functions, and the antecedent ongoing commitments of government. Similarly, in private enterprise and even in nonprofit organizations (nongovernmental organizations), full-time managers and subordinates provide the basic maintenance functions within an organization, negotiate its external environment, and organize its production and marketing functions.

Realities are often more complex than this ideal-type description of bureaucracy. Sometimes bureaucratic forms exist but without the reputed benefits of expertise and efficient allocations of attention. Bureaucratic pathologies may run deep reflecting both environmental and cultural influences, shortages of resources, and incentives for suboptimal performance. These pathologies are especially notable in less developed countries. Consequently, to understand the topic better, this entry addresses the following questions: Why do we have bureaucracy? What are the relationships with capitalism and market? What is the bureaucratic state and what are its relationships with democracy? What are the internal and external pathologies of bureaucratic behavior?

**Why Do We Have Bureaucracy?**

In Weber's ideal-type description of bureaucracy, he noted that bureaucracy was the technically most proficient and efficient form of organization. Far from the negative stereotypes that have arisen in the contemporary era from pathologies associated with bureaucracy, Weber observed that bureaucratic organization was a necessary concomitant condition for the rise of capitalism based on economic efficiency. The rise of the modern public stock corporation separated management and ownership making the managers extremely important to the direction and guidance of the firm.

Capitalism necessitated legal-rational forms of authority. The modern corporation is itself a legal entity. Unlike a person or even a partnership, corporations have limited liability for their officers. Corporations and other types of firms require legally grounded rules in a capitalist system. Disputes must ultimately be settled through juridical means, and agreements must be carefully and legally delineated so that there is a record—what Weber referred to as "the files"—or a recorded precedent. Impersonal authority is central to a system of rational-legal authority, and bureaucracy is the embodiment of an organization defined by rules of procedure and responsive to external legal authority.

Above all, complexity requires organizational differentiation, specialization, and limited jurisdiction coordinated through a hierarchical system of authority. These crucial aspects of bureaucracy not only allow for greater efficiency, economy of effort, and expertise but also lead to problems of coordination.

**Bureaucracy and Markets**

On the face of it, bureaucracy and capitalism seem to live in an uneasy coexistence. One is structured by authority and legal rules, while the other in its pure form reflects an uninhibited free exchange of goods and services mediated by the price mechanism. The reality, however, is much more complicated. Sellers are not necessarily numerous, and where possible, they seek to control markets and thus influence, if not dictate, prices. Public stock corporations’ interests lie in increasing the value of their stock. Rarely are consumers fully armed with perfect information as classical theories of economics assume. The rise of governmental regulation of markets and marketing practices and of the safety of products provides a means of short-circuiting the information needs that consumers by themselves would be unlikely to obtain. As a consequence, the rise, and, to some degree, the inevitable excesses of the profit motive lead to the necessity of regulation and the growth of governmental bureaucracy. Newly capitalistic systems, in fact, often suffer from a rapid expansion of production without adequate means of regulating the quality
or safety of what is being produced. Such mechanisms tend to evolve in developed capitalist systems in order to counter the adverse impacts of unregulated capitalism.

The ascendency of capitalism and the modern corporation roughly parallels the rise of professionalism in government and the development of the modern state, characterized by governmental bureaucracy. Ironically, while it is sometimes claimed that capitalism rests on the free exchange of goods and services through the price mechanism and is thus antithetical to bureaucracy, the reality is that modern governments, through their bureaucracies, pave the way for markets to function by providing infrastructure, regulation of markets, transparency in market processes, and regulation of the relationships between private and public interests. In reality, states and markets have been more often collaborative than in conflict. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the effective functioning of markets without the effective functioning of government. The complexity of the modern corporation and the complexity of modern government have grown together more symbiotically than antagonistically.

The Bureaucratic State

It is hard to imagine modern government without bureaucratic capability. Weak states lack capability. And weak states are often characterized as ones affected by civil strife, lacking effective records, influenced by corruption, and unable to bring services to their populations, especially those that are remote from their capital cities. They are also typically incapable of collecting revenues in an impartial fashion. Cronyism runs amok. A professional corps of civil servants is usually absent and government is most often turned into a spoils system of tribal winners—or, as a means of keeping peace among contending factions, sometimes awarding some of the spoils to each of them. Weak states are inept precisely because they lack the desiderata of professional bureaucratic organization and a professional civil service and the resources to ensure their ability to function. Consequently, modern government and bureaucracy are nearly interchangeable. Continuity, specialized expertise, a professional corps of civil servants, the rule of law and impersonal authority, and documented records are the essence of bureaucracy and of modern states capable of governing, providing services, and collecting revenues.

For the most part, the bureaucratic state largely preceded the arrival of democratic government. It served the interests of a sovereign crown and typically led to the crown’s extension of its authority and, eventually, to what we know of today as the modern state. As a result, the state bureaucracy often has been seen as a conservatizing force in society—the consolidator of existing authority rather than a challenger to it. With the growth of mass enfranchisement, the bureaucracy was often viewed as the upholder of the existing regime and a potential threat to democracy. Its power rests on its continuity and specialized expertise and its permanence and durability, while the temporarily mandated leaders of government are often in a position of dependence on the bureaucracy. In a frequently invoked phrase, are the experts on tap or on top?

One major exception to the bureaucracy–democracy sequence was the United States where mass enfranchisement among White males preceded the development of a professionalized bureaucracy. Even after a professional civil service emerged, the federal government had few responsibilities until the 1930s, when the Franklin Roosevelt administration extended the federal role into the realms of economic and business regulation, the provision of social insurance, and, ultimately, the welfare state.

There has been much discussion across many developed societies about transforming bureaucracy, lightening its load, and moving toward market-oriented incentives, but especially in the United States, the bureaucracy has been deeply controversial. There, the identification of bureaucracy with “big government” and with controversial social reforms makes it both a point of partisan division and an object of derision.

The essential point is that while a facade of bureaucracy is no guarantee of effective government, it is virtually impossible to imagine effective government without bureaucracy. That, however, does not mean that public bureaucracy will be without controversy or demands for reform to which it has been subjected especially since the 1980s. Nor does it mean that the bureaucratic organizational form is without contradictions or that it can lead to certain pathologies.
Bureaucratic Pathologies

Despite the advantages conferred by bureaucratic organization, pathologies result from the internal contradictions of this form of organization. These we will call internal pathologies. Another set of pathologies results from the ways in which bureaucracies relate to their environment. These we will call external pathologies.

Internal Pathologies

Analysts, as well as antagonists, of bureaucracy have pointed to a variety of problems stemming from the logic of bureaucratic organization. These are presented in no particular order of importance.

One pathology stems from the very system of impersonal authority and legal rationality on which bureaucratic organization is based. As a rule-driven form of organization, bureaucracies must defend decisions based on legal rulings and precedents. Consequently, bureaucracies may be short on compassion, empathy, or extenuating circumstances of case equity. Uniform procedures rather than case equity are a hallmark of bureaucratic organization. A frequent criticism of this formalism in bureaucracy is characterized by accusations directed to “faceless,” “nameless,” or “unfeeling” bureaucrats whose decisions defy “common sense.” Actually, some studies of bureaucrats dealing with clients indicate that bureaucrats themselves often try to provide sympathy, guidance, and solace within the constraints of the law. But law is what guides bureaucracy, and this particular pathology, in reality, is a critique of the rule of law. By contrast, personal relationships often govern politics, and these relationships, in turn, generate charges of favoritism.

A second pathology stems from the command and control system of hierarchy in bureaucracies. Hierarchical authority is necessary to coordinate the various specialized jurisdictions as well as to provide an ultimate point of organizational accountability. Still, there is a continuous tension in all complex organizations between strict control from the top and devolution of authority to those at more operational levels within an organization. Paradoxically, control from the top downward produces more definitive accountability while also stymieing an organization’s ability to adapt to problems it encounters on the ground. It also may encourage risk-averse behavior and a desire on the part of subordinates to keep chastening news away from their superiors. Studies of military units observe that noncommissioned officers (the bottom rung of authority) are crucial to adaptability and to organizational effectiveness. How to apportion and allocate authority in bureaucratic organizations in ways that keep it from flying apart and thus adhering to no common identity remains unresolved. At the same time, how to imprint leadership direction without imposing stultifying restrictions on operational units is also unclear. Organizations need to be responsive and adaptive to their environments but frequently cannot be if control from the top is excessively restrictive. Obviously, balance is needed, but it is unclear, certainly in the abstract, as to exactly where that balance should be struck. Without sufficient control, unaccountable behaviors may become rampant—a potential issue especially for organizations with many “street-level” bureaucrats. But too much control is likely to lead to cautious, perhaps even timid, behaviors on the part of those responsible for hands-on operations.

A third pathology of bureaucratic behavior stems from the differentiated and specialized jurisdictional character of bureaucratic organization. Especially when individuals have spent much of their careers in a given unit, they are likely to look at and define problems within the definitional context of their units. A number of studies show that each unit tends to see the “face of a problem” in a way consistent with their unit’s responsibilities and the subculture of their unit. Given the tendency to search for problem definition and responses in a cognitively economical fashion, responses are apt to rely deeply on how specific organizational units define and codify responses and perpetuate them. Does this produce a cacophony of voices or a necessary diversity of perspectives? Again, a problem of finding the ever-elusive right balance appears. Organizational subunit responses are not random. In fact, they are typically predictable. But the various subunits’ responses cannot all be equally satisfied, which is, of course, where leadership comes in. Differentiation and the codification and subcultural practices that stem from the distinctive component parts of bureaucratic organization provide predictability but not synthesis, which then becomes the responsibility of central organizational leadership.
Studies, even of crises, show how distinctive “the face of the problem” will appear to different organizational units in accordance with their distinct missions and their core cultures, technologies, and perspectives. Can unity and clarity of direction be woven against the backdrop of these distinctive perspectives? And can central organizational leadership coax the losers in bureaucratic battles to cooperate rather than to continue the struggle covertly?

A fourth potential pathology of bureaucratic organization is the reliance on precedent. One of the most important characteristics of bureaucracy is that it provides for continuity. Critical to continuity is the recording of precedents and the use of precedents as a platform through which to assess current issues. Precedent serves to economize on cognitive energy. Basing current choices on precedents reduces the costs of search for organizations. However, reliance on precedents may lead to a highly conservative outlook temperamentally, one that may be more wedded to the past than to the future. Bureaucracy tends to be thought of as a lumbering status quo form of organization. That is due in no small part to the emphasis on following rules and procedures and the reliance on precedents set by the organization. Ultimately, bureaucracies are expert at routinizing the previously unexpected or contingent. But once this is done, continuity with precedents becomes part of the operating modality and departures that may be required for adaptability, equity, or even sensibility become harder to achieve. Bureaucracy provides ballast and stability but by itself is unlikely to provide fresh direction.

A fifth possible pathology lies in the intersection between the individual interests of bureaucrats and collective well-being. Some analysis based on economic models, for example, suggests that bureaucrats have a stake in the growth of their agencies’ funding as they themselves are apt to benefit from the growth of revenue. A more compelling interpretation, though, would propose that where the fundamental technology of an organizational unit is invested in significantly by the bureaucrats of that unit, changes in the core technology puts at risk those whose training has been part of a prior technology. The more intensive and specialized that training, the more resistance there may be to alterations in it that would threaten the status of the current technology. The usual cliché about this is that all military forces are prepared to fight the previous war. This bit of conventional wisdom may well be overstated but there is a fundamental truth behind it, and that is that no one likes to be displaced by a newer or different technology that renders one’s own training obsolete. The human being inside the machinery of complex bureaucratic organization, therefore, needs to be taken into account.

In summary, the virtues of bureaucratic organization also contain the seeds of its deficiencies. Continuity, predictability, legality, precedent, and specialized expertise, accordingly, may lead to difficulties in adapting to change or recognizing novelty, difficulties in applying case equity, and problems of coordination. Hierarchical authority also can lead to a lack of sensitivity to problems on the ground. Yet a lack of hierarchical control may lead to a lack of accountability. Because these problems are built into a system of law and impersonal authority, there are no set formulas for resolving them. But they remain problems inherent in bureaucracy.

**External Pathologies**

Despite our dependence on bureaucracy to provide orderly processes, the virtues of bureaucracy tend to be hidden to the unschooled eye, whereas its deficiencies seem to be obvious. One of these defects lies in the rule boundedness of bureaucracy resulting in the well-known “red tape” problem. In contrast to the realm of personal authority where one may petition to have a problem fixed through political means, procedural fairness and the accountability of bureaucracy to legal and auditing requirements inevitably produces large amounts of paperwork. The objective is to reduce the improper use of funds and procedural irregularities and to ensure a record of transactions. Few people, even bureaucrats, are enthralled by red tape. Most are frustrated by it. But red tape is the product of demands for accountability and procedural regularity, especially in the public sphere. A bureaucracy notably responsive to its clienteles might be regarded as showing favoritism and evading lawful procedures. The reality is that while we extol the rule of law in the abstract, we often prefer personal relationships concretely. That is, we often want a “fixer” to deal with the complications that regularity of procedures demands. Everyone
wishes to cut through the maze of red tape to get what they want, but they also want to have procedures in place to deter others from getting what is improper.

Public bureaucracies particularly are expected to be both accountable and responsive. These terms, however, are remarkably elusive. Accountable to what and responsive to whom are questions that immediately arise. There appears to be no definitive agreement as to what precisely these words mean. Often, they are used interchangeably. If, however, accountability is taken to mean being answerable to a legally grounded authorization—a constitution, a sovereign, a law, or a fiduciary responsibility—and if responsiveness is taken to mean acceptance of the demands of temporary political authorities or of agency clienteles, one can see how these ideas may come into conflict. The great dilemma is for bureaucracies to be accountable and responsive up to a point—a point, however, that rarely can or even ought to be satisfied fully. An overly responsive bureaucracy will no longer be seen as neutral, fair, or judicious. A bureaucracy, however, that is unresponsive either has succeeded in displacing the elected or, at the other extreme, has lost its political relevance. Bureaucrats need some independence from the current political authorities if they are to function properly, but the line demarcating independence and unresponsiveness is very murky indeed. To find the appropriate balance is as difficult as it is necessary. Studies of senior civil servants in many developed countries indicate that they are sensitive to their political context but are frequently concerned about the proper equilibrium between neutral competence and accountability on the one hand and political/policy responsiveness to the current authorities on the other.

From a political perspective, another criticism of bureaucracy, especially as a regulator of business is that it is a “deadweight” on the functioning of markets by imposing costs on firms that add to prices. While regulation by bureaucrats is the product of political decisions made by duly authorized governments, free market proponents believe that bureaucratic regulation diminishes economic dynamism and efficiency. Each new regulation drives up the cost of doing business and restricts the options that businesses may have available to them. When the regulatory hand is made lighter, however, risks often arise that result in crises or avoidable tragic outcomes, and the call for regulation is renewed. The proper balance between regulation and business flexibility, as with other relationships between desirable but contradictory values, is hard to define, and the proper instrumentation for overseeing and enforcing regulatory behavior is equally difficult to pinpoint.

Finally, a significant criticism of bureaucracy is that its incentive structures are all wrong. Civil servants are insulated through tenure. This insulation may lead to behavior that provides little incentive to promote efficiencies that could disturb the status quo since there is little reward for doing so. A contrast is frequently drawn with private enterprise where continuous innovation is believed to be necessary for a firm’s health and growth prospects. According to this perspective, the business model is presumed to be the form of organization worth emulating, though, of course, most large-scale businesses are also bureaucracies. Administrative-reform efforts beginning in the 1980s, falling under the rubric of “new public management,” essentially emphasized the business model, emphasizing the off-loading of many government functions to the private sector and providing managerial incentives to improve performance in a scaled-down public sector. The assumption was that what worked in the market place would work equally well in government. Freeing up the managers and holding them accountable for performance was one reform pathway. Creating agencies and managers with limited-term contracts was another. In at least one case, tenure itself was eliminated in the public sector.

The results of this emphasis on making government more like business are still uncertain, and the movement toward providing incentives for promoting efficiency and improved performance may rest on an as yet unconfirmed assumption that officials in the public sphere have similar motivations as their counterparts in the private sphere. In fact, what evidence there is on this matter suggests otherwise. In the business model critique of bureaucracy, performance should be based less on adherence to rules and more on results. A lessening of rules-based administration, one can imagine, would be open to extensive challenges, and a fundamental search for consistent application of law would hardly disappear. Emphasizing results, of
course, requires agreement on what the results should be and on the metrics required to assess performance. It is likely that some agency missions may not be easily susceptible to clear metrics. It is also likely that some agencies will adjust the definition of their missions in ways that allow for favorable metrics even if they are peripheral to their broader, if ill-defined, missions.

Living With Bureaucracy

Not all organizations are bureaucratic and, indeed, some of the most innovative ones in the private sector tend to be flat and intermingled to some degree in their functions. However, the growth of bureaucracy reflects modernity and a system ruled by legal authority and by differentiated function. That produces annoyances such as the heavy emphasis on procedures, rules, and specialized offices whose understandings may not be fully integrated with one another. Nevertheless, bureaucracy is able to provide continuity in government, consistency in application, proficiency through specialized and limited jurisdictions, and professionalism through a full-time civil service based on merit.

The limits and critiques of bureaucracy are notable. Its virtues are also often its vices. Balancing the contradictory tensions of the bureaucratic form of organization presents a continuing challenge. There is also no doubt that much of the criticism of bureaucracy is distinctly political and has little to do with bureaucracy itself and more to do with views about the appropriate scope of government. Finally, to appreciate the advantages of bureaucracy, it is useful to contemplate life without it. It would be a world without continuity, without consistency, and with a shortage of competence. We may not like bureaucracy, but we would assuredly dislike a world without it even more.

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Further Readings


Bureaucracy, Rational Choice Models

This entry discusses rational choice models of the bureaucracy. It first defines what it means for a theoretical model of the bureaucracy to employ rational choice and discusses two major applications of these models. It then discusses the basic assumptions underlying most models of the bureaucracy. Finally, it presents major themes and findings in the literature and discusses how these are related to modeling assumptions.

Rational choice models of the bureaucracy operate under the assumption that all relevant actors are rational. All players in the model—the government, bureaucrats, and private sector entities affected by bureaucratic decisions—have well-defined preference orderings over possible outcomes and act in a manner that ensures that their preferred outcomes are realized.
To facilitate analysis, scholars in this tradition typically assume that players’ preferences satisfy several properties. It is generally assumed that players’ preferences can be represented by a utility function, such that a player prefers outcome A to outcome B if and only if that player’s utility from outcome A is greater than that from outcome B. It is often further assumed that players have consistent preferences regarding risk, so that preferences over uncertain outcomes may be represented by expected utilities. Many models further assume that players react to new information according to Bayes’s rule (i.e., how one should change one’s existing beliefs in light of new evidence).

Rational choice models of the bureaucracy tend to be game theoretic. All players are assumed to be strategic in their interactions—each player considers the strategies of all other players in attempting to reach his or her preferred outcome. Analysts derive equilibrium solutions to these models, where an equilibrium is defined as a set of strategies wherein each agent’s strategy is a best response to all other agents’ strategies, and agents’ beliefs are consistent with those strategies.

The rational choice literature on bureaucracy has primarily focused on two, interrelated, problems: delegation and special-interest influence. Models of delegation involve a government granting authority to a bureaucratic agent. The crucial problem for the government lies in the fact that the bureaucracy may not perfectly share its preferences. The government must, therefore, oversee bureaucratic decisions and provide incentives to ensure that the bureaucracy acts in the desired manner. This problem closely relates to the branch of microeconomics known as principal–agent (or contract) theory, which examines a similar problem between firms and their employees.

Models concerned with the influence of special interests focus on the interaction between the bureaucracy and the private sector. Private sector agents may wish to manipulate the behavior of bureaucrats. The mechanisms to do so may involve bribery, appeals to bodies charged with bureaucratic oversight, or the provision of jobs to former members of the bureaucracy (following the principle of the “revolving door”). Such models may also relate to delegation, as the government may wish to curtail special-interest influence and will conduct oversight accordingly.

### Model Assumptions

#### The Preferences of Bureaucrats

Since rational choice models of bureaucracies assume that bureaucrats act to achieve their most preferred outcomes, these models critically depend on assumptions about what bureaucrats prefer. Preferences may be assumed to be primitive, or they may be induced. Primitive preferences describe outcomes bureaucrats inherently enjoy. Induced preferences are defined by actions. Bureaucrats are driven to prefer certain actions as, in equilibrium, these lead to preferable outcomes.

The rational choice literature on bureaucracies has generally defined bureaucrats’ preferences in one of three ways. William Niskanen introduced the assumption that bureaucrats attempt to maximize their agencies’ budget allocations. This preference is treated as primitive for modeling purposes. But Niskanen argues that the preference for budget maximization results from an implicit theory of the interaction between bureaucrats and the government. An individual bureaucrat is presumed to attempt to maximize his or her salary (both currently and in the future) and prestige. Both salary and prestige depend, in part, on the budget of the bureaucrat’s agency. Since the bureaucrat’s salary and prestige are assumed to be improving in the budget allocated to the bureaucrat’s agency, the bureaucrat acts to increase this allocation.

Other models of bureaucracy work with assumptions regarding bureaucrats’ primitive economic preferences. Like other economic agents, bureaucrats attempt to maximize consumption and leisure. Such models may be used to derive induced preferences over actions. For instance, career concerns models predict that bureaucrats act to maximize their reputation in time $t$ because this reputation affects their career prospects, and thus consumption, in time $t + 1$. This result is an equilibrium prediction from the model—an author of a career concerns model need not assume that bureaucrats have primitive preferences regarding their reputation.

Finally, many models of bureaucratic politics treat bureaucrats (and governments) as having preferences over policy outcomes—that is, ideological preferences. Ideological preferences are generally treated as primitive. Individual bureaucrats may have inherent preferences over policy outcomes—a reflection of their individual political ideology.
Alternatively, ideological preferences may be treated as induced by an unmodeled interaction between bureaucrats and other entities. For instance, many models of the American bureaucracy assume that agency preferences reflect those of the president. Because the president is able to appoint and remove many agency heads, it is assumed that bureaucrats will behave as if they share the president’s ideology.

Information

The information available or not available to players shapes their strategies to achieve their preferred outcomes. In models of delegation, it is typical to assume that bureaucratic agencies have an informational advantage vis-à-vis the government. The government delegates rule-making authority to agencies because bureaucrats have technical knowledge and experience that are not available to the average member of government. Governments may be less able than bureaucracies to design policies to achieve desired outcomes. Other forms of informational asymmetries may also be incorporated into models of the bureaucracy. For instance, if the government cannot perfectly observe the skill or ideology of potential bureaucrats, it is faced with a problem of adverse selection. In models of adverse selection, the government must conduct oversight and provide wages keeping in mind the type of agents these incentives will attract. For instance, if some possible recruits are willing to engage in corruption, while others are not, sufficiently low wages may attract corruptible recruits who are better able to supplement their salaries with illicit income.

If the actions of bureaucrats in office are only imperfectly observable, then governments are faced with a problem of moral hazard. It is important to note that moral hazard is only an issue if outcomes are also imperfectly observable or are imperfectly determined by bureaucrats’ actions. If bureaucrats’ actions perfectly map into observable outcomes, then the government can accurately deduce bureaucrats’ behavior based on these outcomes. However, if this is not the case, then the government must conduct oversight in a manner that minimizes the costs of moral hazard. These costs arise because the government is not able to optimally reward and sanction agent behavior. Instead, it can only respond to outcomes that imperfectly reflect this behavior.

Finally, all players may lack information over the future composition of the government due to political uncertainty. Members of the current government may be replaced by elections, coalition realignments, retirement, or death. As new individuals enter government, the ideological preferences of the government may change. All players in the model are therefore uncertain of future government policy preferences.

Government and Bureaucratic Structure

The final elements in a model of bureaucratic politics are assumptions about the number and composition of players. Models of delegation must include, at least, a unitary government and a single representative bureaucratic agent. Similarly, models of interest-group influence require at least a representative bureaucrat and a single special-interest group. But more sophisticated models may incorporate more realistic assumptions about the number of players and their interactions—with important effects on equilibrium outcomes.

For instance, models may vary the number of players considered to be in the government. Some models may incorporate the existence of multiple legislators or the separation of powers between branches of government. Such a model is said to include multiple principals.

Similarly, bureaucracies may be modeled as consisting of multiple bureaucrats or multiple agencies. Models incorporating more than one bureaucrat are said to feature multiple agents. Bureaucrats or agencies may be redundant—that is, assigned to similar or identical tasks. Alternatively, some agencies may be granted oversight authority over others.

Finally, all models of special-interest influence—and some models of delegation—incorporate private sector agents. These may be one or more firms seeking to maximize profits, one or more citizens or groups thereof with ideological preferences, or groups of consumers. The number and composition of these interests affect their interactions with the government and the bureaucracy.

Models of Delegation

As noted above, models of delegation involve a government’s decision to grant authority to a
bureaucratic agent, who may not perfectly share the government’s preferences. These models are used to derive predictions about which bureaucrats will be appointed, how they will perform in office, what forms of oversight will be employed, and how much discretion they will be granted. These predictions will depend, in part, on assumptions regarding the preferences of—and information available to—all players, as well as the number and composition of players in the model.

Appointment

Models of appointment attempt to deduce which candidates will be selected for bureaucratic office, where candidates vary on some dimension. Typically, models of appointment assume that candidates for bureaucratic office have primitive preferences over policy, and candidates vary in their preferred policies.

In most settings, models of bureaucratic appointment predict that governments will appoint officials whose primitive ideological preferences are most proximate to the government’s own. This finding is known as the Ally principle. The logic of this finding is straightforward: If a bureaucrat is granted discretion to implement policy, his or her policy choice will be dictated by his or her preferences. The closer the bureaucrat’s ideological preference to that of the government, the more the government can expect to benefit from the bureaucrat’s policy choice. This principle relates closely to the literature on attempts to politicize the bureaucracy.

However, the Ally principle may be violated under conditions of uncertainty. Assume now that candidates for office vary not only in their ideological preferences but also in their technical knowledge. More precisely, assume that some candidates are better informed of the mapping from policies into outcomes than are others. In this instance, the government may prefer to appoint a more knowledgeable candidate with preferences more removed from its own over an ill-informed candidate with proximate preferences. The ideologically proximate candidate may be unable to ensure that the policies he or she would adopt in office would, in expectation, lead to outcomes that the government prefers over policies that the more ideologically distant—but more competent—candidate would adopt.

The Ally principle may also fail to hold in settings where bureaucratic appointees interact with other players in formulating policies. For instance, a government may prefer to appoint a central banker who is more inflation averse than the government itself. This result holds because policy outcomes—here inflation and unemployment—reflect the interaction between the central banker and the public. Central bankers cannot commit to implement policies they do not prefer. Therefore, if the central banker is not inflation averse, the public will expect him or her to attempt to generate unexpected inflation—thus reducing unemployment. These inflationary expectations produce inflation—and no reduction in unemployment—in equilibrium. However, if the central banker is inflation averse, the public will expect inflation to remain low—a more favorable outcome for the government.

Bureaucratic Slack

A second major concern of models of delegation is the danger of bureaucratic slack. Bureaucrats are said to be shirking—yielding slack—when they exert little or no effort in their duties. Slack is typically a feature of models wherein bureaucrats are assumed to have economic preferences—they maximize consumption and leisure. Slack thus occurs when bureaucrats face insufficient incentives to forgo leisure.

Questions of bureaucratic effort are intimately linked to the power of the incentives bureaucrats are offered. Incentives are said to be high powered when rewards and punishments are heavily conditioned on outcomes. They are low powered when rewards and punishments are largely independent of outcomes. Low-powered incentives tend to increase slack.

The degree of bureaucratic slack will also depend, in part, on the structure of information in the model. In particular, moral hazard will tend to increase shirking. The rationale behind this result is intuitive: If the government is unable to determine the degree of effort exerted by bureaucrats, it will be difficult to reward or punish this effort. It is therefore difficult to encourage bureaucrats not to shirk. Slack will also be affected by the number of players with authority over the bureaucracy. Models with multiple principals will tend to have
lower-powered incentives and greater slack than models with a single principal. Slack will also tend to increase as the interests of the principals diverge. So, for instance, one might expect greater bureaucratic slack to occur when powers are separated between branches of government and when different parties dominate each branch.

The presence of multiple government principals may produce bureaucratic slack for one of two reasons. First, multiple principals may all try to induce bureaucrats to behave in their preferred manner. If principals have different interests, these incentives will tend to conflict, offsetting one another. This type of model is most likely to make sense when depicting a lower level bureaucrat with multiple overseers.

Alternatively, multiple agents within the government (e.g., legislators) may need to coordinate to punish or reward a bureaucrat for his or her performance. As the number of legislators with conflicting interests rises, it grows less likely that a reward or punishment will be agreed on.

Slack will also be affected by the presence of multiple bureaucratic agents in a model. Redundancy—the assignment of an identical task to more than one bureaucrat—will tend to increase slack when bureaucrats only care whether one member of a team performs a task successfully. Such a situation may result if, for instance, multiple police officers are assigned to a given case and all share credit if the case is successfully solved. In such a situation, each officer prefers to shirk while the others work on the case. He or she then might enjoy leisure time and benefit from the rest of the team’s efforts. Since all officers have the same preference for slacking, no officer will exert the optimal amount of effort in solving the case. As a result of this problem, the probability that at least one member of the team solves the case may not rise with the number of officers assigned.

However, in situations characterized by moral hazard, redundancy may reduce slack. In such a situation, the government may compare the performance of one bureaucrat or agency with that of other bureaucrats or agencies charged with the same task. This comparison will allow the government to deduce better the level of effort exerted by the agency and reward or punish it accordingly.

Low-level bureaucrats may also slack in models where the bureaucracy assumes a tiered structure, such that some agents are given oversight authority over others. In such a system, low-level bureaucrats will tend to face low-powered incentives. Were they to face high-powered incentives, low-level bureaucrats may attempt to bribe their overseers to ignore poor performance. As the power of their incentives increases, low-level bureaucrats have greater reason to collude with their overseers and are thus willing to pay larger bribes. The government will thus optimally reduce the power of incentives faced by low-level bureaucrats so as to deter such collusion.

**Bureaucratic Drift**

Bureaucratic drift refers to the phenomenon wherein bureaucrats adopt policies that differ from those preferred by the executive or legislature. Drift is therefore typically a concern in models in which bureaucrats have preferences over policy. Drift results when bureaucrats are given discretion to implement their preferred policy outcomes.

Drift is typically controlled through one of two mechanisms: *ex ante* limits on bureaucratic discretion or *ex post* review of bureaucratic decisions. The former refers to legislative limits that prohibit certain policy positions from ever being adopted. The latter refers to the ability of other government entities (the legislature, the courts, etc.) to review and overturn bureaucratic decisions. These two mechanisms act as substitutes in preventing bureaucratic drift—as *ex post* review becomes more difficult, *ex ante* discretion is likely to decline.

The extent of bureaucratic drift will be affected by the extent of the informational asymmetry between the bureaucracy and the government. The more technically knowledgeable the bureaucracy, relative to the government, the fewer *ex ante* limits on discretion. As levels of discretion expand, the bureaucracy has greater latitude to implement its own ideological preferences.

Adverse selection may also affect the degree of policy drift. A provocative recent paper demonstrates that the degree of policy discretion afforded to bureaucrats may affect their willingness to remain in office and to acquire policy relevant expertise. Policy-motivated bureaucrats will be more likely to invest in acquiring expertise if they are granted discretion. To the extent that discretion is limited, policy-motivated bureaucrats will value office and
expertise less. Such officials will be less willing to exert effort to arrive at correct decisions when discretion is limited. In other words, policy drift may be a necessary cost for an informed bureaucracy.

The number of government principals may also play a role in bureaucratic drift. If these principals must coordinate to overturn bureaucratic decisions—as in a legislature—their ability to exercise ex post review may be limited. The greater the number of principals and the more conflicted their interests, the less likely ex post review will be exercised. To combat the resultant danger of drift, ex ante restrictions on bureaucratic discretion will tend to rise.

Finally, the threat of changes to the governing coalition may affect drift. Suppose that the government at time $t$ fears that it will be replaced by an alternative government with divergent preferences in time $t + 1$. To the extent possible, such a government prefers to lock in current policy choices, limiting the policy discretion of successor governments. One means of so limiting policy discretion is to adopt administrative procedures that limit the oversight authority of future governments. Since future governments may use their oversight powers to force through undesirable policy changes, the government at time $t$ will seek to insulate the bureaucracy from such oversight.

Models of Special Interests

Models of the interaction between special interests and the bureaucracy are centrally concerned with when, and whether, special interests will be able to influence bureaucratic decisions. Influence may emerge through a number of mechanisms: bribery, offers of future employment, and appeals to the government to review bureaucratic decisions. Influence might also be exercised through more subtle mechanisms—for instance, through threatening appeals to overseers. Special-interest influence may affect the agency relationship between the government and the bureaucracy and the decision of whether or not to delegate authority to bureaucrats in the first place.

Capture

A particular concern of models of the interaction between special interests and the bureaucracy is whether bureaucrats—most particularly regulators—will collude with the citizens or the industry they are meant to regulate. This collusion is commonly termed capture. In models of bureaucratic politics, capture is typically modeled using the assumption that bureaucrats have primitive economic preferences and/or are influenced by career concerns. This assumption ensures that bureaucrats may be motivated by bribes or the promise of future employment in the regulated sector.

When models of capture incorporate the agency relationship between the bureaucracy and government, they assume that the government is faced with the problem of moral hazard. If the government had perfect information regarding the actions of the bureaucracy, it would be able to observe, capture, and punish the offenders directly.

Capture may be deterred by legal institutions that investigate the bureaucracy. All else being equal, bureaucrats will be less willing to accept bribes as the risk of detection and punishment rises. Capture may also be deterred by the payment of an efficiency wage—a wage above what bureaucrats would receive from alternative employment. The efficiency wage raises the costs to the bureaucrat of being removed from office and thus deters malfeasance.

Appeals to Overseers

Special interests need not resort to bribery to influence the bureaucracy. They may be able to influence bureaucratic decision making simply through the use—or threatened use—of oversight mechanisms. The threat of appeals to the government or to the courts may be sufficient to dissuade the bureaucracy from performing its anointed tasks.

It has long been recognized that special interests may play a role in overseeing bureaucratic performance. Interested members of the public may review bureaucratic performance and report malfeasance or slacking to the government. This form of oversight is frequently termed fire alarm oversight and has the advantage of being costless to the government.

However, private sectors entities may be self-interested in their decisions to sound fire alarms. A fire alarm oversight may therefore result in biases in favor of special interests. For instance, an interest
group may only report bureaucratic malfeasance if bureaucrats act in a manner that harms that group’s interests. Bureaucrats may thus be tempted to favor special interests to avoid review. A government interested in preventing interest-group influence may therefore need to rely on active investigations into bureaucratic decisions in place of, or in addition to, fire alarm oversight. Such investigations are termed police patrol oversight.

It is possible that special interests may exercise influence without resorting to the oversight process. The mere threat of appeals to the legislature or courts may prove sufficient to deter regulators. One model of such deterrence assumes that an interest group can signal its willingness to appeal bureaucratic decisions by making campaign contributions to legislators. These contributions act as costly—and informative—signals of the interest group’s willingness to contest bureaucratic decisions. The interest group is thus less likely to be regulated as it contributes more to political campaigns.

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See also Game Theory; Politicization of Bureaucracy; Principal–Agent Theory; Rational Choice

Further Readings


**Bureaucracy, Street-Level**

Throughout the world, legislators and government administrators have increasingly called for greater accountability and improved performance in the delivery of public services, reflecting in part the continuing influence of the theory of new public management that stresses more market-based approaches to service delivery and increased responsiveness to citizens and communities. The worldwide financial crisis has further intensified the pressure on government to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of services.

The performance and accountability movement puts the spotlight on the central role of street-level bureaucrats in the development and implementation of public services. As defined by Michael Lipsky in 1980, street-level bureaucrats comprise workers who interact directly with citizens by providing a valued public service; they include teachers, police officers, case workers, physicians, mental health counselors, and home health workers, and they typically possess a substantial degree of discretion over their work. Importantly though, this discretion is bounded by the restrictions on individual choice placed on street-level bureaucrats by factors common in public and nonprofit agencies, including resource constraints, difficult working conditions, and vague and sometimes conflicting expectations on performance. To cope with these work-related challenges, street-level bureaucrats can sometimes reach decisions that are at variance with the rules and procedures of the agency. Thus, the discretion of street-level bureaucrats can result in policy implementation at odds with the goals and priorities of top administrators, legislators, and the citizenry.

Historically, street-level workers occupied key positions in public agencies. Indeed, the growth of the welfare state in advanced industrial countries
in the 20th century typically entailed substantial expansion in the ranks of public sector workers, especially in regions such as the United Kingdom (UK) and the Scandinavian countries. However, in some countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, governments worked in close alliance with large nonprofit organizations who provided social and health services, staffed by countless numbers of street-level workers. The ranks of street-level workers rose sharply around the world in the 1960s and 1970s with the expansion of the welfare state in policy areas such as health care, social services, criminal justice, and education.

Many of these programs in the United States and abroad encountered serious implementation problems prompting a subsequent reassessment of public services and the role of street-level bureaucrats in service provision. As a result, street-level practice has changed profoundly in the past few decades. First, street-level bureaucrats in social and health care are much more likely to work in a nonprofit or for-profit service agency due to a sharp rise in government contracting for services with these agencies. Indeed, the expansion of services such as home care, community care for the disabled and elderly, substance abuse treatment, and workforce development has been almost entirely through government contracting for services with these agencies. Indeed, the expansion of services such as home care, community care for the disabled and elderly, substance abuse treatment, and workforce development has been almost entirely through government contracting for services with these agencies. While this increase in contracting is particularly pronounced in the United States, it is also evident in many other countries, including the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Germany.

The growth of contracting has been accompanied by new performance management strategies, including performance contracting, intensified testing, more rigorous practice standards, and outcome evaluation. Overall, these strategies are often an attempt to control the discretion and autonomy of street-level workers. For instance, performance contracts in welfare-to-work programs include specific expectations for street-level workers on the target program goals and sanctions for the agency if these goals are not attained. Similarly, policies promoting “evidence-based practice” seek to enhance the extent to which street-level workers such as mental health counselors or child welfare case workers adhere to professionally recognized standards of best practice. Recurrent fiscal crises of government have also forced public and private agencies to implement new policies to increase the productivity of street-level workers, with corresponding limitations on their ability to depart from established practice standards.

Importantly, the emphasis on productivity by street-level workers is also a ripple effect of intensified competition among service agencies. The paradigmatic street-level bureaucrat of earlier eras possessed autonomy and discretion and was largely immune from market pressures; teachers, child welfare workers, and physicians certainly fit this model well. Currently, though, private nonprofit and for-profit agencies in many countries and jurisdictions actively compete with each other for government grants and contracts as well as private fee income (and in the case of nonprofit agencies, charitable donations). The degree of competition, though, varies tremendously. Rural areas, for example, may lack a sufficient supply of providers to create a competitive market. Government rules and regulations also may affect the supply of providers. Nonetheless, the shift toward more competition in services is a worldwide trend that is evident even in countries with comprehensive welfare state policies and long-standing traditions of private agency and professional autonomy.

Competition in services is also fostered by the growing trend for more individual choice and control in service delivery. The classic street-level bureaucrat working in a large public or nonprofit agency existed within a top-down hierarchical authority system where individual clients had little control or choice in the street-level workers or agencies from whom they received service. In this role, street-level bureaucrats played a key role in constructing the identity of service recipients as well as their access to services and their very understanding of their service rights and expectations.

Changes in the Bureaucrat–Client Relationship

Two developments are changing this street-level bureaucrat–client relationship, although national, regional, and local practices vary tremendously. First, governments are employing a more diverse set of policy tools to address public problems, including vouchers and quasi vouchers and tax credits and deductions. Vouchers in child care, education, housing, and substance abuse treatment
can be a more empowering way to engage clients in key decisions regarding their public services. For instance, in community care services for the disabled, individual client accounts have been established by government, allowing the disabled individual to purchase needed services directly, rather than relying on street-level workers. The widespread use of vouchers and quasi vouchers and different forms of payments to private agencies has restructured the contracting relationship so governments have shifted away from direct contracts with an agency to funding support that is tied to the individual citizen users. This funding relationship is inherently more unstable from the contract agency’s perspective and puts further competitive pressure on the private service agency and its frontline workers.

The diversification of policy tools is also indicative of a second trend: broad interest and support for individual choice and control in service decisions, evident in vouchers; tax credits for services such as child care; government-subsidized client accounts to purchase needed services; and regulations requiring or promoting greater choice. Over time, this shift is likely to transform the work of street-level bureaucrats who will need to be responsive to client goals and priorities in order to compete effectively for client service dollars.

Greater client choice reflects growing worldwide interest in “coproduction,” or the idea that important services such as mental health or community care are coproduced between the street-level worker and individual clients; thus, street-level workers need to pay heed to client motivation and goals in order to achieve successful programmatic outcomes (John Alford, 2009). Coproduction is also related to the concept of “backward mapping,” advanced by Richard Elmore (1979/1980), who argued that policymakers should begin the formulation of policy by examining the interactions between clients and street-level bureaucrats. With this information, policymakers should be able to design more effective programs.

In recent years, the coproduction approach has broadened to incorporate more active engagement of clients and community organizations in the work of street-level bureaucrats. Indeed, street-level bureaucrats may need to work with several different public and private organizations on behalf of an individual client. Many service programs are designed at their inception as public-private partnerships with hybrid governance structures representing an array of different local interests and organizations. Thus, the governance of street-level work is vastly more complicated today than in the past, with street-level bureaucrats often engaged with multiple internal and external stakeholders in vertical and horizontal relationships. Consequently, sound policy design is even more important to successful policy implementation today than in the past.

This evolving role of street-level bureaucrats has profound implications for citizenship. Teachers, police, case workers, and emergency shelter staff, to name a few, provide valuable public services that may determine the life chances of individual citizens. As the welfare state grew, so did the ranks of street-level bureaucrats and their importance in providing social benefits such as health care and education essential to full citizenship. Yet street-level bureaucrats can also directly affect the political participation and civic engagement of citizens, so street-level workers also can significantly shape political rights as well.

The capacity of street-level bureaucrats to engage in effective coproduction—and effective services in general—may be severely limited by the intensifying market and accountability pressures facing public and private service agencies. Quality street-level practice requires an ongoing investment by government in training and education. To the extent that street-level workers are engaged in contracting and partnerships, new skill development is often essential. Moreover, the investment obligations of government are not limited to support for public sector workers; the staff and volunteers of private nonprofit and for-profit agencies receiving government contracts require ongoing technical assistance and capacity building to provide responsive, effective services. In an era of scarce resources for public services, street-level bureaucrats will need to work actively with allies in the public and private sectors to create advocates for the value and key importance of public services for all citizens.

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See also Accountability; Bureaucracy; Discretion; New Public Management; Organization Theory

Further Readings


CABINETS

Cabinets are small organizational units within governments that consist of politicians who are responsible for the overall policy performance of the government. This entry first describes the history of cabinets and their functions under various forms of government. It then discusses a framework for the analysis of cabinets, which must consider the structural characteristics of the political system, the roles of political parties and of individual ministers, the behavior of the prime minister, and the power of the prime minister’s office. Last, the entry describes important tasks for future research on cabinets worldwide.

Historical Origin and Functions

The notion of a cabinet derives from the designation “Cabinet Council,” first given in Britain by the king in 1622. The monarch counted on this inner core of privy counselors to legitimize his or her political decisions and thereby his or her duration in office. With the emergence of the modern state in the 19th century, monarchs lost power, and newly developed political parties subsequently replaced their authority. As stressed by John Mackintosh (1968), after these mass parties had come into existence in the 1860s and 1870s, the contemporary structure of the modern cabinet system became visible. Today, a cabinet is a small group of politicians (mostly ministers) responsible for political decision making in countries that have a form of government known as cabinet government (i.e., in Western and Central Eastern Europe and much of the Balkans; in many Commonwealth countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Malaysia, and Singapore; in most ex-British Caribbean and Pacific Islands; in Japan; and in Israel).

Cabinets may also exist in constitutional presidential systems (typically in the Americas), in authoritarian presidential systems (e.g., in Africa and in parts of Asia, including the Middle East), or in traditional monarchical systems (e.g., in the Middle East). In these political systems, however, members of the cabinet serve purely as advisors to the president or the monarch. They are not—as in cabinet government systems—dependent on the majority support of parliament for their duration in office or for getting legislative proposals approved.

In cabinet governments, individual members hold a collective responsibility, which stipulates that all cabinet members are bound to cabinet decisions. They may disagree with these decisions in private but must agree in public. As chairman of the cabinet, the prime minister wields a power that is generally seen as superior to the other cabinet members (“first among equals”). The cabinet members, at least its chair, are responsible to parliament and are expected to control the executive and the legislative branches.

Such cabinets can function satisfactorily only if an equilibrium is found between two opposite requirements—those of representativeness and of efficiency. As Jeffrey Cohen (1988) notes, the
requirement of representativeness means that decision making is in the hands of the whole cabinet and not, as, for instance, in the presidential system, in the hands of the leader of the government alone. A cabinet government has therefore to be “collective”: Decisions are taken “together.” This requirement of “togetherness” is regarded as central to the cabinet system because such a mode of operation is felt to be a more liberal, more democratic, and therefore a superior form of decision making.

Yet this representative-cum-collective principle runs directly against the requirement of efficiency, as efficiency entails that decisions be taken speedily despite the continuous increase in the number and complexity of these decisions. Since representativeness entails togetherness, decisions are likely to be taken only after substantial discussions. This may mean delays in elaborating compromises or even, in cases of extreme conflict, the fall of the cabinet. Bernard Grofman and Peter van Roozendaal (1997) note that because the fall of a cabinet is mostly associated with political crises, cabinet stability becomes the key test of the success of all cabinet systems and the number-one indicator of the performance of cabinets.

**Framework for Analysis**

In the contemporary literature, such as the work of Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (1997, 2001), cabinets are analyzed in the context of the constitutional setting, of the cabinet structure, of the external and internal life of cabinets, and of the decision making among their members.

**Constitutional Setting**

The general setting of cabinets is provided in broad terms by constitutions. Although constitutions usually give only a little attention to the organization of cabinets, they typically devote more space to matters of appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, in particular to the role of the head of state in this respect. Constitutions may, for instance, give the head of state the power to participate in the formation of cabinets (as in France, Finland, Belgium, Bulgaria, and the Baltic States and in Poland until 1993). Constitutions may also foster cabinet stability, for instance, by making it relatively difficult for parliaments to pass “no confidence” motions against the prime minister or other ministers. Future research needs to analyze more systematically the constitutional powers of presidents, prime ministers, and ministers in different cabinet systems.

**Internal Operation of Cabinets**

The cabinet structure is foremost determined by its size and by its organizational subunits. Most cabinet governments tend to have around 20 members on average. Because these cabinets are too large to be fully involved in all aspects of decision making, cabinet meetings must be well structured and well prepared. In this context, prime ministers, cabinet committees, and cabinet secretariats play an important role. Although the power of prime ministers varies significantly across countries, they are usually more influential in cabinets based on a majority party than in coalition cabinets. Cabinet committees have been set up in many cabinets to speed up the decision-making process. These committees are different in size and status, but they usually include relevant ministers, junior ministers, and civil servants who prepare filtered suggestions for cabinet decision. Some committees are composed only of civil servants who aim to iron out problems that might occur among the different governmental departments. Cabinet secretariats or prime minister’s offices, on the other hand, ensure efficiency in cabinet decision making. They control the flow of proposals coming to and emanating from cabinet meetings and resolve problems over proposed agenda items in advance of the cabinet meeting. Studies conducted in parliamentary democracies have shown that the impact of prime ministerial staffs on cabinet government can be excessive. The functions of these staffs range between an administrative and a political pole. These officials act administratively when organizing meetings of the cabinet and the flow of business between prime minister and ministers. They also play a part in the development of long-term ideas about cabinet activities and on the improvement of cabinet decision making, but these forms of activities are never wholly administrative. In most cases, they affect the political operation of the cabinet. Future research must therefore consider, in a systematic and comparative manner, not
just personnel and budget but also the actual tasks of the prime ministers’ offices.

**Impact of External Actors on Cabinets**

The operation of cabinets is strongly affected by political parties, parliaments, bureaucracy, and other external actors. Political parties clearly have an impact on the formation, the composition, and the development of cabinets. This impact depends on the overall number of parties in the cabinet (single-party vs. multiparty government) and the type of cabinet coalition (e.g., with or without a dominant party, minority vs. majority party governments). There is usually a stronger battle between cabinets and parties in multiparty coalitions than in one-party majority governments.

The impact of parliament, civil servants, and other political groups on cabinets is closely tied to the role of parties and to the character of coalitions. In some countries, parliaments have substantial power; for example, they may be able to prevent political parties from revolting or erupting. This appears to be particularly true in coalition governments. The impact of civil servants, on the other hand, depends on their position within the administration. The higher civil servants are ranked, and the closer they are to the ministers, the greater their impact on the preparation of cabinet decisions. The role of other external groups in the life of the cabinet can be seen as similar to that of political parties. The most important interest groups are usually linked to specific parties and thereby exercise an indirect impact on cabinet proposals.

**Decision Making**

Cabinet decision making takes place in the context of a conflict among many patterns of relationship. There are, for instance, differences in the extent to which cabinet meetings are genuinely involved in decision making rather than simply ratifying proposals made by other bodies. The efficiency and effectiveness of cabinet decision making to a large extent depend on the ministerial experience and behavior of prime ministers. Studies on cabinet government have shown that ministers with greater political experience or greater expert knowledge can be expected to exercise more influence on cabinet decision making than other cabinet members. Future research on cabinets has therefore to collect more information on the social background and the careers of ministers under comparative perspective. Further, to understand ministerial behavior, one must know what ministers think about their own work, the work of their colleagues, and the part played by the cabinet meeting itself. If cabinet decisions matter, cabinet members also matter; it is therefore essential to find out how ministers view their role in cabinet government. This means interviewing (former) ministers—an enterprise that is long and complex but is surely rewarding. Cabinet decisions are also affected by the behavior of prime ministers as heads of cabinets. Prime ministers are “arbitrators” or “activists” with respect to the implementation of cabinet policy goals. If they are arbitrators, prime ministers may not be involved personally in policy proposals and must be content with moving the cabinet toward an acceptable solution. If they are activists, they are likely to be deeply interested in particular proposals and to attempt to push these proposals through cabinet. A systematic comparative investigation of cabinets has therefore to develop a typology of prime ministerial leadership style and to relate this typology to the different phases and aspects of cabinet decision making.

**Directions for Future Research**

Given the difficulties that most cabinets in democratic countries currently face, a common theory about the functioning of cabinets needs to be developed. This theory needs to take into account five key factors that are responsible for the general functioning of cabinets in democratic countries: (1) the structural characteristics of the political system, (2) the role of the political parties, (3) the role of individual ministers, (4) the leadership style of the prime minister, and (5) the administrative characteristics of the prime minister’s offices. Systematic research on the functioning of cabinets has first to focus on these five aspects in succession to obtain reliable and comparable information about cabinet governments worldwide. Meanwhile, hypotheses linking these five aspects need to be formulated and tested. This is a vast undertaking, especially since the principles of classification still have to be elaborated in a number of ways. If such an approach is adopted, however, it will become
possible to discover and assess the explanations that account for the operation of cabinets.

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See also Bureaucracy; Government; Parliamentary Systems; Presidentialism

Further Readings

Capitalism

Since the early 20th century, the concept of capitalism has been used to capture the structure and dynamics of a particular historical formation of economy and society that first emerged during the late Middle Ages in Southern Europe and later spread to Northwestern Europe. Capitalism emphasizes the attainment of profit through the operation of the market and private ownership of the means of production. This entry describes the role of markets and property rights in capitalism and examines the functions of firms and institutions in its operation. The characteristics of capitalist culture are then discussed. The entry closes with a review of endogenous critiques of capitalism and of the shape it may take in the future.

Since its beginnings in Europe, capitalism has expanded to virtually all parts of the globe. Capitalism can be contrasted with subsistence economy, feudalism, socialism, and slave economy. Third World developing societies may contain insular capitalist patterns in their economy without thereby becoming capitalist societies. Comparative social scientists and historians have distinguished a great number of stages, types, qualifiers, and variants under the broad umbrella concept of capitalism, such as agrarian, commercial, industrial, and financial capitalism; state capitalism and coordinated capitalism; and Nordic, Anglo-Saxon (chiefly British and American), East Asian, and “Rhenish” capitalism.

Most scholars who use the concept of capitalism in a holistic way view it not only as an economic system but also as comprising a type of social structure, political institutions, and specific cultural norms and values. The complementarity, goodness of fit, and range of variation that exist among these realms—essentially the realms of capitalist interests, institutions, and ideas that together make up capitalism—have been the focus of social science analysis since the pioneering works, around the turn of the 19th century, by Max Weber and Werner Sombart to contemporary research on comparative capitalism. On the European continent, the use of the term capitalism, in both political and academic contexts, almost always had critical overtones. Authors who wish to avoid such connotations use “social market economy,” “industrial society,” or simply “modern society” instead; however, such usage may cause them occasionally to lose sight of the problématiques and insights of those classical authors of social science.

Defining Features of Capitalism

There are six defining features of capitalism: (1) markets, (2) property rights, (3) the role of private firms, (4) politico-economic institutions, (5) capitalist patterns of the cognitive and normative culture (Weber’s “spirit” of capitalism), and (6) reflexive dynamics of critique that are specific to capitalist societies. Theorists differ as to the emphasis they attach to each of these components of capitalism. The study of capitalism is a highly interdisciplinary field of investigation to which historians, economists, sociologists, lawyers, political scientists, and philosophers have significantly contributed.

Markets

Capitalist societies are based on economic systems in which most goods and services are bought
and sold in markets for a monetary price, thus making them commodities. The commodification of goods makes for the contingency of economic transactions, meaning that the parameters of these transactions—who buys from and sells to whom and what commodity at which point in time and at what price—become a matter of continuous choice and an ongoing competitive recombination of social relations. Market transactions are governed by a regime of social norms and legal rules (law of contract) that is enforced by a neutral state-operated court system and that specifies the mutual rights and liabilities of agents entering into economic transactions. These norms and rules are designed to rule out the use of openly predatory practices such as individual or organized violence, fraud, theft, deception, conspiracy to deny potential suppliers market access, to some extent even practices of cartelization and monopolization, and bribes as “unfair” means employed in the pursuit of economic gain. To the (historically highly unlikely) extent that such rules are fully implemented, we can speak of a civilizing function of market competition, ideally leaving only prices and qualities/novelty of goods as action parameters of competitors. Yet as prices are “given” in any (nearly) perfect (or “atomistic”) market, suppliers are under strong incentives to innovate both products and (technical and organizational) production processes. Markets determine prices in response to changes in the volume of supply of and demand for specific goods and services. The prominent role of choice, contingency, and civility in economic interaction has led theorists such as Milton Friedman (1962) to equate capitalism with individual freedom. Markets make people “free to choose.”

Yet a defining feature of capitalist market societies consists in the fact that not only goods and services manufactured for the purpose of being sold but also the “factors of production” employed in the process of manufacturing are subject to market exchange under capitalism. Even though these factors—natural resources, human labor power, and money—have not been “produced” (and certainly not produced with the intention of being marketed), they are still subsumed under the commodity form. This “commodification of noncommodities” has been attacked, both in the Marxist tradition and famously by Karl Polanyi (1944), as the core contradiction of capitalism—that is, a source of conflict and instability that constantly calls for (interventionist, reformist, revolutionary, authoritarian, military, etc.) remedies and institutional safeguards to be installed by holders of political power. The commodification of money through speculative investments, with their potentially disastrous effects on financial markets; the commodification of natural resources with their associated environmental damages; and the commodification of human labor power with its distributional and other adverse impacts can all be cited as contemporary instances of this key “mistake” of commodifying what by their very nature are noncommodities, or “fictitious” commodities. Thus, one defining feature of a capitalist society and its dynamics is the existence of a labor market in which the capacity of workers to perform productive services is being traded under labor contracts.

Such commodification of noncommodities has provided for the enormous gains in efficiency, growth, and prosperity that have accompanied the history of capitalism. While under capitalism the commodity form is extended to noncommodities, it is on the other hand restricted (compared with precapitalist monetized exchange relations) to items of “economic” value—that is, excluding items such as positions in the state administration, court decisions, academic titles, marriage licenses, or, most important and since the abolition of slavery, human beings themselves, who are instead governed by the principle of inalienable “self-ownership,” a concept that has its roots in the work of theorists such as John Locke.

By exposing labor to market contingency under the regulatory regime of the labor contract, capitalism inserts workers into the organizational framework of productive organizations (firms), which, due to the division of labor, organizational control mechanisms, and efficiency-enhancing investment goods, allow labor power to be used much more productively than was the case in precapitalist forms of production. Yet the reverse side of this growth and prosperity lies in the commodification of (nominally “free”) contractual labor and the distributional patterns as well as the contingencies following from it. Not only does the individual employer exercise power (as authorized by the labor contract) over the employees within the firm, but the collectivity of all employers also exercises
“structural” or class power over the labor force as a whole. The latter arises from the fact that labor is tied to capital in a relationship of asymmetrical dependency. Because wages are normally workers’ only source of subsistence, workers typically depend more urgently on being employed than employers depend on employing labor, or at least on employing it “here, now, and continuously.” One important cause of this asymmetry resides in the fact that employers are in control of (as well as incentivized through competition to put to use) productivity-enhancing and hence of labor-saving technical and locational change, whereas workers, by themselves, can do little (if anything) to enhance the “welfare yield” of the wages they earn and spend. The process that has been set up by the fundamental capitalist institutions of the labor market and the labor contract can thus be looked on as a “wealth-maximizing game” and, at the same time, a “poverty- and insecurity-generating game.”

After the end of the golden age of stable growth and full employment—an age that coincided roughly with the third quarter of the 20th century for the nations in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—one of the core problems of open (globalized), advanced capitalist economies has become the chronic imbalance between the supply of labor and the demand for it, as was pointed out by Guy Standing (2009). This core problem translates into the divisive dilemma often confronting workers, who must either yield “flexibly” to the pressures to become—and remain—“employable” (which they can rarely accomplish through their own means and efforts alone) or face the prospect of socioeconomic insecurity, precariousness, unemployment, and exclusion.

Property Rights

Participants in markets enjoy state-enforced property rights. More important, such property rights do not imply that every member of the legal community has a right to own some share in the total of the material resources available in the community (as was envisaged by 18th-century revolutionary writers such as Thomas Paine). Rather, it means that members of the community who already happen to be in the possession of units of property are recognized and protected in their ownership status (provided that such property has been acquired in legally permitted ways). Such protection means that the ownership status is safeguarded against the loss of property (e.g., through theft, destruction, confiscation, etc., although, of course, not against losses that may result from unfavorable choices made by the owners). The right to property further means that the owner is free (within limits established by regulatory law) to determine the use to which the property is being put as capital, as well as to appropriate the gains (profits) flowing from its use. One highly consequential aspect of the freedom of owners as constituted by property rights is to use these rights to hire labor, with the further implication that those hired as workers are rendered incapable of acquiring property themselves, under the terms of remuneration under which they are hired and in the absence of potentially productive property of their own. In this case, the availability of property rights to some does not simply coexist with but causes the denial of property rights to others (particularly as the latter typically lack the collateral that they would need to obtain a commercial bank loan).

Firms

If property owners decide to invest their monetary resources (which is the only chance they have to make their property a durable asset or even increase it through accumulation), this investment will show up as capital in firms, unless it is a purely speculative investment in financial markets. The firm is the key capitalist institutional location where investment (in buildings, machinery, raw materials, etc.) is combined with wage labor for the purpose of producing marketable commodities. The two defining features of the capitalist firm are (1) its distaniation (in space, time, social function, and accounting principles) from the household and (2) a hierarchical structure of command and control (with an entrepreneur or a managing board at the top) and a formalized vertical and horizontal division of labor designed to promote the efficiency of the productive process and the realization of its results in markets. In sharp contrast to voluntary and highly contingent market transactions, the interaction (which Marx called “despotic”) that occurs within firms is based on
the contractual right of some agents to give orders and the duty of others (as enforced by some measure of the right of superiors to terminate the labor contract) to carry them out. While the degree of authoritarianism of the internal regimes of capitalist firms may vary greatly, some measure of authoritative coordination seems indispensable. This is so because, first, the labor contract is (for good reasons in terms of efficiency) essentially an incomplete contract with gaps that need to be filled by commands and, second, the conflict of interest inherent in any asymmetrical contractual relation will make it highly unlikely that those gaps in the contract will reliably be filled by acts of spontaneous cooperation, thus overcoming this tension. The result is friction between the (nominally) voluntaristic, egalitarian, and freely chosen relationship between firms and their external market partners, on the one hand, and the authoritarian and hierarchical relations inside the firm as a formal organization, on the other.

The existence of this relationship of social power can be factually accounted for in terms of the asymmetry that capital can hire labor; yet labor, in the absence of savings or a collateral, cannot normally hire capital. And it can institutionally account for the fact that, once employees enter into the labor contract, they subject themselves to the command structure of the enterprise. Virtually all of the labor market, labor relations, and industrial relations policies that we find in the history of capitalist societies (including the building of institutions for collective bargaining and codetermination) can be seen as ongoing attempts of states, workers, and employers to regulate and (un)balance these two basic kinds of power relationships. They are analytically distinct from a third one: the political “exit power” of capital to relocate (or to threaten relocation or shifts to speculative investments in financial markets), to which states and their political elites are vulnerable. This vulnerability results from the dependence of states on tax revenues obtained, directly or indirectly, from investment, growth, and employment, all of which are ultimately controlled by decisions of capitalist enterprises.

The aggregate effect of activity in firms and labor markets generates and reproduces specifically capitalist patterns of inequality, reflecting the differential marketability (employability) of labor. As Standing (2009) notes, these patterns pertain to earnings, employment opportunities, income security, wealth, organizational resources, political power, and even life expectancy. These inequalities unfold in interindividual, intersectoral, interregional, international, and global dimensions. At the bottom of distributional hierarchies are people, regions, and even an entire continent (Africa) whose survival is placed in jeopardy by the dynamic of capitalism or whom the dynamic of capitalism can afford, as it were, “to do without.”

Firms are the institutional location where a specific kind of capitalist rationality unfolds. At every point in time, the intellectual technique of rational capital accounting of costs and returns allows a firm to assess its own value and to evaluate alternative courses of action in terms of probable returns to the capital invested. At the same time, there are two sources of irrationality, one at the source and one at the outcome of rational calculation. As to the former, accumulation is seen as originating from a deeply irrational dynamic of entrepreneurial intuition and vision that can be neither taught nor learned—a kind of imaginative “creativity at the top” that guides the innovation of products and processes. As to the latter, the aggregate outcome of the capitalist dynamic triggers social (including environmental and cultural) changes that just “happen” as unintended and unpremeditated outcomes and cannot be attributed to any rational design or calculation. Even firms themselves can never be certain, given the unpredictability of their environment, that decisions will turn out to have been rational in light of the outcomes. This latter irrationality of outcomes is a point at which the dynamics of capitalism and the normative ideals of modernization diverge. If the project of modernity means the effective mastery of society over its collective fate, this is clearly not a virtue in which capitalism (according to Max Weber, arguably still the “most fateful force of social life”) excels.

Institutions

Firms interact not only with external market participants (customers, workers to be hired, and other firms as suppliers or buyers) but also, and in ways that are not mediated by markets, with the institutional environment in which they are
“embedded.” Sociologists and “institutionalist” economists have explored the vast field of non-commercial interaction that both firms as employers as well as workers as employees are involved in. These noncommercial relations of capitalist firms, as well as of everyone else participating in markets, are governed by institutions and the legal rules, formal procedures, and social norms that institutions consist of. The institutional environment of market actors (beginning with private law and its enforcement in courts and not ending with state-provided investment in infrastructure) is something that they, on the one hand, depend on to reach their market objectives; yet on the other hand, the institutional environment is one that market actors try to actively shape and transform in ways that best suit their respective interests. They are involved in a reflexive process that may be termed the production of the conditions of production (as well as their distribution). The politically mediated production of conditions of production applies to the areas of research, development, and technical change, for instance, in the areas of communication, transportation, and the development of new materials and sources of energy. It also applies to the vast policy areas of infrastructure investment, regulation of markets, trade policy, taxation, labor market and social policy, and macroeconomic steering. At any rate, we would get a seriously deficient and distorted picture if we were to model action in capitalist societies as primarily the market action of buying, selling, and investing. To succeed, market actors take an equally strong interest not only in complying with but also in strategically shaping the non-commodified environment of commercial interaction in markets. The relationship between the actors of a capitalist economy and the institutional environment in which they act is a reciprocal one: Firms, consumers, owners, and workers would not be able to make a single move without relying on premises such as laws, courts, legislatures, regulatory agencies, police protection, schools, physical infrastructure, systems of taxation and tariffs, social insurance systems, central banks, research and development organizations, and many others, mostly supplied, sponsored, and regulated by state agencies and all kinds of private–public hybrids, which in recent literature are referred to as agencies of “governance.” Although capitalism is a global system, the configuration of capitalist economic actors and their institutional environment appears to be still largely shaped by national traditions, path dependencies, and policy approaches shared by the political and economic elites of nation-states. These institutional-context conditions are never “given,” fixed, or sacrosanct according to a master formula of the “mixed economy” but are, in fact, in constant flux under the impact of hegemonic doctrines of social order (e.g., neoliberalism) as well as the strategic efforts of economic actors to alter them in ways that allow for better exploitation of the emerging opportunities. These agents depend on an institutional framework of social order, yet at the same time they are constantly involved in strategic activities designed to disorganize and reorganize it. The capacity for the latter is derived, in spite of the apparent primacy of political state power over economic exchange, from the fact that modern states, in particular modern, liberal, democratic states, and their stability depend as much on the reasonably smooth operation and growth performance of the capitalist economy as the agents in the capitalist economy depend on the state-provided institutional setup. Again, there is an asymmetrical mutual dependency (in contrast to the notion of a hierarchical primacy of the state over the economy), due to the fact that (capitalist) states, in their turn, depend on both fiscal resources and political support (with labor market outcomes as one of its important determinants) for the sake of their stability. This dependency of the state on capital and its profitable investment is all the greater, and the state’s vulnerability more significant, the more the state is a welfare state (i.e., a state with substantial legal commitments to the provision and maintenance of social security) and the more investors enjoy the “exit option” that a denationalized pattern of trade and investment (globalization) provides.

What agents under capitalism actually do is thus much more than buying and selling in the pursuit of gain, profit, and utility maximization. Beyond that, they act reflexively on the very institutional context conditions under which they act, revising, as it were, the rules as the game goes on by constantly reframing what Robert Boyer and Yves Saillard (2002) call their “accumulation regimes.” Firms and their associations are involved
in the legal or managerial design and ongoing adjustment of “production regimes” and modes of “corporate governance.” Moreover, they form cartels and alliances, make threats and promises, warn and demand, bargain and negotiate, associate, advertise, influence, lobby, launch campaigns, donate, resist, mobilize, implicitly blackmail political authority by virtue of the fact that some economic agents are “too big to die,” complain about state policies and advocate alternative ones, opportunistically evade legal and contractual obligations, strike political deals, and so on—all to shape, reshape, and occasionally also subvert the institutional context within which the core economic process of capitalism and the competitive pursuit of profits is going on. Capitalism is a political economy in the sense that it can hardly be conceptualized in terms of a durable institutional equilibrium. To the contrary, rules and their recognition are permanently contested. If the state and its institutions can be said to be devices to generate security of expectations leading to trust and to protect capitalist market society from its own inherent dangers of destabilization, it can also be said that this device is itself not reliably protected from the repercussions of such destabilization. Charles Lindblom (1982) has even compared the market to a “prison” in which the makers of public policies are incarcerated. The assumption that capitalism is at all “governable” (as opposed to essentially “anarchic”) is, in other words, far from axiomatic. This condition of uncertain institutional embeddedness applies even to the overall political regime type. For while it is true that all liberal democracies contain capitalist economies (in spite of the friction that exists between the two), the reverse is not true: Both historically and in the contemporary world, capitalism has coexisted with (and indeed flourished under) various types of nondemocratic regimes.

**Capitalist Culture**

What Max Weber has termed the spirit of capitalism is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that includes cognitive and epistemic as well as motivational and justificatory elements. It has in part motivated the transition from precapitalist to capitalist modes of economic life, and it is in turn shaped and inculcated by the realities of life under capitalism. It also applies differently to different types of actors (e.g., manual workers, white-collar workers, the self-employed, entrepreneurs, managers, and consumers) in the capitalist game, as well as to different stages of its development and associated “production regimes.” For example, Boyer and Saillard (2002) contrast “Fordist” mass production versus post-Fordist “flexible quality production.” Central to the core model of capitalist culture is the notion of selfish and “unfraternal” (as Max Weber put it) individuals’ pursuit of acquisitive rationality for its own sake. These individuals methodically explore the physical and social world in constant search of opportunities for gain. In doing so, they follow their interests, control their own passions through self-imposed discipline, and resist the passions of rulers. This pursuit of interest is conceived as endless—both in the sense that there is no end or state of satiation to be reached where further efforts become pointless and in the sense that it can (and in fact must) go on forever, as any standstill spells failure in a competitive environment. The rationality that governs this behavioral dynamic is “formal,” “abstract,” “self-referential,” unendingly and relentlessly expansive in time and space, and boundless. Everything we encounter in the world is first of all being framed in terms of costs and returns, risk of loss, and opportunity for gain alone. At the same time, the accounting frame of capitalist assessment of costs and returns is too restricted and myopic—that is, insufficiently intelligent—to capture long-term and collective negative externalities, which therefore tend to be systematically ignored. Weber has claimed an “elective affinity” that exists between the urge to accumulate and Puritan asceticism, which abhors wealth to be enjoyed and instead lauds its being transformed into capital to be invested, with the satisfaction of need just being a by-product of the process. Weber, in his 1904 book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, argued that the religious values of Calvinism provided motivation for work and the accumulation of wealth in the secular world. He saw this as an alternative to Marx’s doctrine of historical materialism as the basis of economic structures. (Marx almost never used the term *capitalism.*) Relentless and often fear-driven patterns of acquisitive search behavior have become common today not just among
entrepreneurs and the self-employed but also among a wide range of employees who have adopted entrepreneurial attitudes and values such as the values of flexibility and mobility.

But this characterization of capitalist culture and cognitive style captures just one of its facets. As Daniel Bell (1976) pointed out, others include patterns of hedonistic consumerism with its mindless shortsightedness that creates ever more needs and desires amid affluence. Still another consists in countertendencies to abstract formal rationality, the spread of which can be observed in the irrationalities of superstition, magical thinking, and prejudice of “authoritarian” modal personalities, or in tendencies in postmodernist and antiauthoritarian countercultures that challenge dominant modes of rationality, thus causing “cultural contradictions of capitalism” (Bell, 1976). Whether or not we can speak of specific cultural prerequisites (as opposed to formative cultural consequences) of capitalism is an issue of considerable interest for social research, given that East Asian capitalism has thrived within the cultural framework of Confucianism and also given that there was hardly any founding generation of a capitalistically “spirited” middle class in some of the now capitalist societies that emerged from state socialism in central East Europe, where capitalism was built “without capitalists,” as was stressed by Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelenyi, and Eleanor Townsley (1998). As is the case with political institutions, both high culture and popular culture and both the normative and the cognitive “mental infrastructure” of capitalist societies are constantly (re)negotiated through the joint governance of private actors (e.g., much of the media industries) and public authorities.

**Critiques of Capitalism**

From its historical beginnings, capitalist market societies have encountered strong endogenous critiques. The intellectual and political critique of capitalism and its inherent dynamics comes in two main variants that are often combined by critics. One is based on empirical analysis and prediction and focuses on the observable instability of the systems and its built-in self-destructive tendencies; this kind of critical perspective yields crisis theories according to which the system will become, sooner or later, unsustainable. The other critical perspective is normative and highlights the suffering, deprivation, exclusion, sense of meaninglessness, and various kinds of injustice that are perceived as concomitant features of capitalist growth and development; in response to this experience of injustice, social conflict, be it in the form of class conflict or otherwise, is both predicted and advocated by critics to overcome capitalism and transform it into a type of society that is both more just (at the level of “social integration”) as well as more stable as a viable economic system.

However, the empirical observation of cyclical patterns of crisis that unfold under capitalist institutions, as well as the normative focus on injustice, does not provide a robust argument to the effect that we are entitled to anticipate a crisis or a conflictual challenge of capitalism. This non sequitur is widely recognized today as an analytically unwarranted leap of political faith. For just as cyclical crises and recessions set the scene for ever new rounds of accumulation and growth, capitalism can also thrive on at least some versions of its normative critique, thus arguably continually contributing to the system’s perpetuation rather than its demise.

**Conclusion**

It seems safe to state that the notion of a modern society “after” and “without” capitalism and its key features—a notion that has inspired much of the history of the political left—has largely been rendered obsolete today. This obsolescence is epitomized by the demise of European state socialism in 1989 to 1991. Neither the probability nor the desirability of a full-scale historical abolition (breakdown) of capitalist patterns of socioeconomic organization is widely advocated any longer. Instead, capitalism is seen to be subject to numerous forces of endogenous change, leading to a great deal of variation and institutional diversification of capitalisms. The longitudinal notion of a diachronic sequence of types of social order has yielded to a “synchronized” perspective, with post- and anticapitalist, “decommodified,” and solidaristic patterns of socioeconomic organization now playing a role in ongoing and contingently reversible modifications of enduring capitalist core structures and the ongoing recombination of its components. As stated before, it is in the nature of
capitalism that it consistently breeds reflexive critiques of capitalism. These aim at curbing and holding accountable the various manifestation of the social power of capital and propose to deploy a variety of institutions and policies for its domestication—be it social power over a firm’s employees, power at the level of class relations and its distributional consequences, the role of economic (veto) power in the making of public policy, the power of investors to inflict vast negative externalities on everyone else (and even on themselves) through economic crises and environmental destruction, or the power of capital to shape and “colonize” the process of cultural reproduction.

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See also Critical Theory; Globalization; Individualism; Inequality, Economic; Liberalism; Market Economy; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Neoliberalism

Further Readings

Case Studies

Although much of what we know about the empirical world has been generated by case studies and case studies continue to constitute a large proportion of work generated by the political science discipline, the case study method is poorly understood. Even among its defenders, there is confusion over the virtues and vices of this research design. Practitioners continue to ply their trade but have difficulty articulating what it is they are doing, methodologically speaking. The case study survives in a curious methodological limbo. The problem of ambiguity begins with the term itself. To refer to a work as a case study might mean that its method is qualitative, small N; that the research is holistic and thick (a more or less comprehensive examination of a phenomenon); that it uses a particular type of evidence (e.g., ethnographic, clinical, nonexperimental, non-survey based, participant observation, process tracing, historical, textual, or field research); that its method of evidence gathering is naturalistic (a “real-life context”); that the research investigates the properties of a single observation; or that the research investigates the properties of a single phenomenon, instance, or example. This entry presents a more precise definition of this method and discusses its strengths and limitations.

Evidently, researchers have many things in mind when they talk about case study research. Confusion is compounded by the existence of a large number of near synonyms—single unit, single subject, single case, N = 1, case based, case-control, case history, case method, case record, case work, clinical research, and so forth. As a result of this profusion of terms and meanings, proponents and opponents of the case study marshal a wide range of arguments but do not seem any closer to agreement than when this debate was first broached several decades ago. To talk about this subject in a productive fashion, we must arrive at a narrower definition. In this entry, we stipulate that a case notes a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time. It comprises the sort of phenomena that an inference attempts to explain. Thus, in a study that attempts to explain certain features of nation-states, cases consist of nation-states (across
some temporal frame). In a study that attempts to explain the behavior of individuals, individuals make up the cases. And so forth. Each case may provide a single observation or multiple (within-case) observations.

For students of political science, the archetypal case is the dominant political unit of our time, the nation-state. However, the study of smaller social and political units (regions, cities, villages, communities, social groups, and families) or specific institutions (political parties, interest groups, and businesses) is equally common in other subfields and, perhaps, increasingly so in comparative politics. Whatever the chosen unit, the methodological issues attached to the case study have nothing to do with the size of the individual cases. A case may be created out of any phenomenon so long as it has identifiable boundaries and comprises the primary object of an inference. Note that the spatial boundaries of a case are often more apparent than its temporal boundaries. We know, more or less, where a country begins and ends, even though we may have difficulty explaining when a country begins and ends. Yet some temporal boundaries must be assumed. This is particularly important when cases consist of discrete events—crises, revolutions, legislative acts, and so forth—within a single unit. Occasionally, the temporal boundaries of a case are more obvious than its spatial boundaries. This is true when the phenomena under study are eventful but the unit undergoing the event is amorphous. For example, if one is studying terrorist attacks, it may not be clear how the spatial unit of analysis should be understood, but the events themselves may be well bounded. Following this understanding of “case,” a case study could be defined as the intensive study of a single case for the purpose of understanding a larger population of cases. Several implications flow from this definition, as applied to the social sciences.

By virtue of the small size of the sample and the heterogeneous nature of most social phenomena, the representativeness of a case study is always rather uncertain. One does not know for sure whether the chosen case or cases are similar (in relevant ways) to the larger population of theoretical interest. Of course, there is always some uncertainty attached to the quest for external validity. Even so, the uncertainty normal to this sort of inference is compounded whenever the chosen sample is very small. By virtue of the small size of the sample, it can usually be presumed that the evidence at hand is nonexperimental. Note that if a treatment can be manipulated, there is usually an opportunity to generate large treatment and control groups, moving the style of research away from an intensive focus on a single case. (That said, it is certainly possible to combine a large-N cross-case analysis of experimental evidence with the in-depth study of an individual case, or several cases, within that sample—perhaps with the goal of shedding light on causal mechanisms. Varying approaches to the same evidence often serve a complementary function.)

Case study research may incorporate several cases, as in the style of research known as comparative historical. However, at a certain point it will no longer be possible to investigate those cases intensively. At the point where the emphasis of a study shifts from the individual case to a sample of cases, we shall say that a study is a cross-case one. Thus, the distinction between a case study and cross-case study must be understood along a continuum. The fewer cases there are, and the more intensively they are studied, the more a work merits the appellation case study. Although the case study has been identified thus far by the smallness of the sample, it is important to appreciate that whenever one is conducting an intensive analysis of a single case (or a small number of cases) one is gathering multiple observations from the case(s). Intensive study means multiple observations, usually at a lower level of analysis. Insofar as these observations are comparable with one another, they may be analyzed in a quantitative fashion. Thus, the case study format is entirely compatible with large-N statistical analysis of within-case evidence.

To clarify, what distinguishes a large-N analysis embedded within a case study from a large-N cross-case analysis is that the former is nested within the units of primary theoretical interest. Thus, if one’s purpose is to explain the process of national-level democratization, the units of theoretical interest are nation-states. A case study approach to this question would focus on a single country or a small sample of countries. As part of such a study, one might conduct a survey with thousands of respondents to determine attitudes
and behaviors relevant to democratization. This provides the fodder for a quantitative analysis, nested within the case study format. If, on the other hand, one’s theoretical purpose is to explain individual-level variation in attitudes/behavior related to democratization, then the same study is probably best classified as cross-case, rather than case study: One now has a large sample of the things to be explained, none of which receives a great deal of attention.

So conceived, a case study analysis may contain qualitative or quantitative evidence. Typically, it combines both. So conceived, the case study method is consonant with any theoretical framework and virtually any methodological framework—for example, behavioralism, ethnography, rational choice, institutionalism, interpretivism, and, very occasionally, experimental research (N = 1 experiment). So conceived, it is possible to look dispassionately at the strengths and weaknesses of the case study research design, in contrast with cross-case research designs. These trade-offs derive, first of all, from basic research goals such as

1. whether the study is oriented toward hypothesis generating or hypothesis testing,
2. whether internal or external validity is prioritized,
3. whether insight into causal mechanisms or causal effects is more valuable, and
4. whether the scope of the causal inference is deep or broad.

These trade-offs also hinge on the shape of the empirical universe—that is,

5. whether the population of cases under study is heterogeneous or homogeneous,
6. whether the causal relationship of interest is strong or weak,
7. whether useful variation on key parameters within that population is rare or common, and
8. whether available data are concentrated or dispersed.

Along each of these dimensions, case study research usually has an affinity for the first factor and cross-case research has an affinity for the second. All else being equal, case studies are more useful when the strategy of research is exploratory rather than confirmatory/disconfirmatory, when internal validity is given preference over external validity, when insight into causal mechanisms is prioritized over insight into causal effects, when propositional depth is prized over breadth, when the

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population of interest is heterogeneous rather than homogeneous, when causal relationships are strong rather than weak, when useful information about key parameters is available only for a few cases, and when the available data is concentrated rather than dispersed. These trade-offs are summarized in Table 1. To clarify, they represent methodological affinities, not invariant laws. Exceptions can be found to each one. Even so, these general tendencies are often noted in case study research and have been reproduced in multiple disciplines and sub-disciplines over the course of many decades.

It should also be stressed that each of these trade-offs carries a ceteris paribus caveat. Case studies are more useful for generating new hypotheses, all other things being equal. The reader must bear in mind that many additional factors also rightly influence a writer’s choice of research design, and they may lean in the other direction. Ceteris is not always paribus. One should not jump to conclusions about the research design appropriate to a given setting without considering the entire range of issues involved—some of which may be more important than others.

In conclusion, it may be granted that case studies and cross-case studies explore the world in different ways. Yet, properly constituted, there is no reason why case study results cannot be synthesized with the results gained from cross-case analysis and vice versa. Indeed, they are often complementary. In this light, one might cite the current popularity of multi-method work (triangulation), which often combines large-N cross-case analysis with an intensive focus on one or a few carefully chosen cases. Although this discussion has been brief, it may help restore a greater sense of coherence, purpose, and integrity to the case study method. This narrower and more carefully bounded definition may alleviate some of its most persistent ambiguities. It is also hoped that the characteristic strengths of this method, as well as its limitations, will be apparent to producers and consumers of case study research. The case study is a useful tool for some research objectives but not all.

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See also Analytic Narratives: Applications; Analytic Narratives: The Method; Configurational Comparative Methods; Mixed Methods; Participant Observation; Process Tracing; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods

Further Readings

CATEGORICAL RESPONSE DATA

The term categorical response data refers to data for outcome variables whose values represent distinct categories as opposed to continuous quantities. Categorical variables are pervasive in political science. Examples are as diverse as party affiliation (“Democrat,” “Republican,” “other,” “none”), union membership (“yes,” “no”), form of government (“republic,” “monarchy,” “military dictatorship,” etc.), voter participation (“yes,” “no”), or confidence in the government (“a great deal,” “quite a lot,” “not very much,” “none at all”). Although examples for the collection of categorical data can probably be traced back as far as the ancient censuses in Egypt, it was not until the early 20th century that a systematic development of statistical methods for the analysis of categorical data began. The starting point was the work of Karl Pearson and G. Udny Yule, who debated over how best to analyze associations between categorical variables. Many fundamental contributions that prepared the ground for the emergence of a wide variety of approaches in the subsequent decades were also made by R. A. Fisher in the 1920s and 1930s. This entry provides a brief overview of the rich collection of methods for the analysis of categorical data available today. First, a description of different types of categorical data is given. Second, various ways to analyze categorical data are summarized.
Typology of Categorical Data

The most important differentiation of categorical data distinguishes between **nominal** and **ordinal** variables. The values of a nominal variable identify categories that do not have a natural rank order. Examples are ethnicity (“Black,” “White,” “Hispanic,” etc.) or marital status (“single,” “married,” “divorced,” “widowed”). Methods using nominal data should not depend on the numerical values assigned to the categories. The categories of ordinal data, in contrast, possess a natural ranking. Examples are social class (“lower,” “middle,” and “upper”), agreement with the statement “Democracies are indecisive” (“strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree”), or self-reported political left–right orientation (on a scale from 1 = left to 10 = right). Methods using ordinal data take into account the order of the values, but the exact spacing does not matter. The distinction between nominal and ordinal variables is not always clear. For example, political parties can be ranked on a left–right scale, but the order may be ambiguous for some parties (because they may rank differently on different policies). Moreover, whether a variable is treated as ordinal can depend on the research question.

A further distinction is made between **qualitative** and **quantitative** data. Some authors use the former as a synonym for categorical data. However, while nominal data are clearly qualitative, ordinal data are an intermediate type, often treated as quantitative in practice. Moreover, quantitative data can sometimes be treated as categorical. Quantitative data are either **continuous** or **discrete**. Continuous variables can take on any real value in a given interval, whereas discrete variables are restricted to a fixed set of distinct values (e.g., integers). Discrete quantitative variables are often considered as categorical when the range of observed values is small. Count data are an example.

Categorical variables can be divided into **dichotomous** variables that only have two possible outcomes (“yes”/“no”; “male”/“female”) and **polytomous** variables with more than two categories (“Christian,” “Muslim,” “Hindu,” “Buddhist,” “Jewish,” etc.). A dichotomous variable that is coded 0 and 1 is called an **indicator** or **binary** variable. Dichotomous variables are often technically and conceptually easier to handle than polytomous variables.

More of a philosophical question, which also was the root of the dispute between Pearson and Yule, is whether categorical variables should be treated as inherently categorical (Yule’s view) or whether they can be conceptualized as coarse-grained manifestations of an underlying continuum (Pearson’s position). The distinction, however, has practical consequences for how categorical data are modeled and analyzed. Both views have their justifications, but in some cases, it is more natural to assume fixed categories (for nominal variables such as gender or nationality), whereas in others the assumption of an underlying continuum, or a so-called latent variable, is more applicable (for ordinal data, in particular).

A strong case for the latent variable approach can be made for hybrid variables where a continuous variable is only partially observed. For example, think of a variable classifying households by income; for each household, the range, but not the exact value, of income is known. For such **interval data**, an underlying continuum exists, and thus it is natural to model the data using a latent variable. **Truncated or censored variables** (sometimes called **limited variables**) are a related type of hybrid variable, where the continuous data are only observed under certain conditions or within a certain range (e.g., top-coded earnings). A somewhat different type of hybrid data is **time-to-event data** (survival data), where a categorical variable (the type of event) is tied to a quantitative variable—the duration until the event occurs, possibly censored for some observations (e.g., the timing of military interventions in conflicts or the career paths of politicians).

Categorical Data Analysis

Depending on research interest and data type, a variety of categorical data measures and methods are available.

Describing Distributions of Categorical Variables

One may first wish to describe the relative frequencies (proportions) of the different categories of a categorical variable. For example, in the context of election forecasts, one predicts different parties’ shares of the vote by polling a random sample of voters. If data are available for the entire
population, the proportions can be derived by simple counting. Usually, however, the shares have to be inferred from a random sample. The theoretical distribution used to model statistical properties of dichotomous variables in random samples is the binomial distribution, which can be approximated by a normal distribution for large samples. For polytomous variables, the closely related multinomial distribution is used. Based on these distributions, exact and approximate (i.e., large sample) methods have been developed to compute confidence intervals for proportions and to test whether an observed distribution deviates significantly from a given theoretical distribution of interest (goodness-of-fit test). The most common (multinomial) goodness-of-fit test is the chi-squared test, which is based on the squared differences between the observed category counts and the counts that are to be expected (on average) according to the theoretical distribution. For ordinal variables, the cumulative distribution function (which is a step function) and tests that exploit this additional information, such as the discrete Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, are of interest.

For nominal data, a sensible measure of location is the mode (most frequent category). For ordinal variables, the median is also useful (the middle of the ordered data), as well as the arithmetic mean if the differences among the categories are assumed to be comparable. A measure of variation for nominal data is, for example, Simpson's index of diversity, which reaches its maximum if the distribution is uniform (an equal frequency of each category). For ordinal data, the range and measures based on differences between quantiles, such as the interquartile range (range of middle half of data), are also meaningful.

**Association Among Categorical Variables**

For research questions examining relationships between categorical variables, the joint distribution of the variables can be analyzed using a cross-classification table (contingency table). The cells of such a two-way table report the frequencies or proportions of the different combinations of the variables' categories. It is often useful to condition on row or column totals so that the differences between conditional distributions can easily be identified. For example, think of a table with party preference in rows and ethnicity in columns. Proportions conditioned on column totals (column percent) would then, in each column, reflect the party preference distribution for a specific ethnicity.

To test whether the data provide support for the hypothesis that the conditional distributions across rows or columns are different or, equivalently, whether the two variables are associated with each other, researchers often use the chi-squared homogeneity or independence test, which is based on the squared differences between observed cell counts and the cell counts that would be expected if the two variables were unrelated. Since the chi-squared test may be biased in small samples (especially if there are many cells with low expected frequency), exact tests have also been developed (Fisher's exact test for $2 \times 2$ tables and its generalizations to $n \times m$ tables).

The chi-squared test statistic depends on the number of observations and the size of the table and is therefore not a very useful association measure. However, two popular chi-squared-based measures that can be compared across tables and samples of different size are Pearson's contingency coefficient and Cramér's $V$. A second class of association measures for nominal data is based on the concept of proportional reduction of error (PRE). PRE measures quantify the degree to which knowledge of an observation's value for one variable can be exploited to predict the value of the other (or, more precisely, to which degree the prediction error can be reduced). Different conceptualizations of prediction errors lead to different PRE measures. Examples include Guttman's lambda, Goodman and Kruskal's tau, or the uncertainty coefficient (likelihood ratio index). If variables are strongly associated, then one variable provides a lot of information for the prediction of the other, and the PRE measures are larger. In the case of two dichotomous variables ($2 \times 2$ tables), additional important measures are the odds ratio (the ratio of cross-products of frequencies in the main and secondary diagonal) and the phi coefficient (point correlation coefficient).

The measures discussed so far can be used for any type of categorical variable. For ordinal variables, additional association measures that indicate the direction of a relation have been proposed. Examples are Goodman and Kruskal's gamma,
Kendall’s tau-b, or Somers’ d, which can be expressed in terms of the numbers of concordant and discordant pairs. An alternative approach is to assign scores that roughly reflect the distances between categories and then compute the linear correlation. Assigning ranks to observations, instead of scores (using midranks for observations in the same category), leads to the rank correlation (Spearman’s rho).

Association measures are useful to describe the relation between two variables. A more general framework to uncover association patterns among two or more categorical variables is provided by loglinear models. The basic idea of loglinear models is to express the cell counts in contingency tables as a function of the categories defining the cells. The basic independence model contains one parameter for each category of each variable and simply models the marginal distributions of the variables. Association patterns are then captured by additional parameters for combinations of categories across variables (interaction terms). A vast literature on loglinear models was developed from the 1960s through the 1980s, but the methodology seems to be somewhat less in use today.

Other multivariate methods for categorical data include (multiple) correspondence analysis and latent class analysis, which are similar to principal component analysis and factor analysis but for categorical data. Latent structure models with categorical observed and continuous latent variables are covered by latent trait analysis (item response theory).

Further special topics in the analysis of the association between categorical variables are rater agreement and segregation. The degree to which raters agree with respect to a categorical rating or classification can be analyzed using loglinear models, but specialized measures such as Cohen’s kappa are also available. Segregation analysis asks how group members are distributed among the values of a categorical variable (occupational sex segregation, racial residential segregation) and has its own specialized measures, such as Duncan and Duncan’s index of dissimilarity.

**Explaining Categorical Outcomes**

Methods for contingency tables are often exploratory and descriptive in the sense that they do not distinguish between dependent and explanatory variables. To analyze research questions that make assertions about causal relations, regression-type statistical methods are required. Explanatory variables in such models can be continuous or categorical. Regression coefficients for binary explanatory variables simply reflect conditional group differences, and categorical predictors with more than two categories (called factors) can easily be included in a regression equation by means of indicator variables for the different categories.

First, assume the dependent variable to be dichotomous (binary). For example, think of analyzing union membership of employees (1 = yes, 0 = no) as a function of variables such as sex, age, or political orientation. The expected value of a binary variable is equal to the probability of Outcome 1. As such, standard linear regression methods that model the conditional expectation can be applied. This linear probability model (LPM) has the advantage that regression coefficients can directly be interpreted as partial effects on the probability of Outcome 1. However, the LPM is not always appropriate (e.g., assuming a linear relation between the explanatory variables and the outcome probability is usually unreasonable), and dedicated binary response models such as the logistic regression (logit model) or the probit model have been developed. In the logit model, the log odds, the logarithm of the odds of Outcome 1, are expressed as a linear function of the explanatory variables. In the probit model, the probability of Outcome 1 is linked to the linear predictor through the cumulative normal distribution. Although the interpretation of the coefficients is somewhat more difficult, these models are generally considered more appropriate than the LPM to analyze a binary dependent variable.

Multinomial logit or probit models are generalizations of these models to nominal dependent variables with more than two outcome categories. Multinomial models contain a separate set of coefficients for each outcome, allowing for complex effect patterns of the explanatory variables on the outcome probabilities. Likewise, ordinal logit or probit models are used to analyze ordinal dependent variables, although these models usually contain only one set of coefficients plus a number of cutoff parameters that reflect the latent spacing of the categories. More flexible variants such as the...
stereotype logistic regression or the generalized ordered logit model are also available. Powerful extensions to multinomial models are choice models that are based on data containing alternative-specific information. The classic example is travel mode choice, with information on characteristics such as costs, comfort, and travel duration for each mode. Such models include the conditional logit and the alternative-specific multinomial probit. A related model is the nested logit, which is used if the alternatives can be grouped according to a nested structure (e.g., restaurants grouped by cuisine).

As mentioned above, one can treat count data as categorical, particularly when counts are low. The most prominent regression procedure for count data is the Poisson regression that models event counts as a Poisson process. However, because the inherent assumption of events’ independence is often too restrictive, more flexible models such as the negative binomial regression are generally preferred. Further, an overrepresentation of zeros is often observed in count data, which can be handled by a zero-inflated count model or, depending on the assumed process, a hurdle model that combines a binary response model with a zero-truncated count model. Note that regression models for binary variables and for count variables are both covered in the framework of generalized linear models (GLMs).

Limited dependent variables are analyzed with methods closely related to binary response models. The most well-known is the censored normal regression (tobit model), which is based on the concept of a latent variable with normally distributed errors, as is the probit model. A natural extension are sample selection models (e.g., the Heckman model), which explicitly model the process causing the censoring. Sample selection models have also been developed for the case of a fully categorical dependent variable.

Another closely related field is event history analysis (survival analysis), which is concerned with the explanation of the duration until the occurrence of an event. Time-to-event data are often modeled in terms of the hazard rate: the conditional probability of an event at a certain time point given that the event has not yet occurred. Accelerated failure time models, which are similar to the tobit model, can also be used. Further, discrete-time hazard models are used if the duration is categorical. These models apply a binary response model to the expanded data containing one record per time point for each observation. Another topic in event history analysis is sequence analysis, used to identify and describe typical patterns of event sequences (e.g., career paths of politicians).

Discrimination and classification is a further area in categorical data analysis that has some resemblance to the regression methods discussed. A key difference, however, is that discriminant analysis makes no assertions about direction of causation. It is an exploratory tool to evaluate how well groups can be distinguished with respect to a set of observed characteristics and to derive optimal rules for classifying new observations for which group membership is unknown.

As outlined in this entry, a well-established and diversified toolbox exists for the analysis of categorical data. Moreover, special areas such as categorical panel data and multilevel models, exact inference for binary response and count data models, or nonparametric estimation have made great advances over the past few decades.

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See also Censored and Truncated Data; Correspondence Analysis; Cross-Tabular Analysis; Event Counts; Event History Analysis; Fuzzy-Set Analysis; Logit and Probit Analyses; Measurement, Levels; Nonlinear Models; Regression

Further Readings
Caudillismo refers to a system of political-social domination that arose after the independence wars in Spanish America. The caudillo (strongman—from the Latin word *capitellum*, meaning head) was the head of irregular forces who ruled a politically distinctive territory. These forces were governed through an informal system of sustained obedience based on paternalistic relations to the leader, who attained his position as a result of his forceful personality and charisma. Caudillismo as a concept was first used in Spanish America to describe the characteristics of leaders who challenged the authority of the governments arising from the independence process after 1810 and to refer to the political regimes instated by such leaders. In this limited meaning, the notion of caudillismo is a heuristic instrument for analyzing a given historical period that started after the wars of independence and concluded with the emergence of the national states in the second half of the 19th century. John Lynch, one of the historians who made the greatest efforts to define the characteristics and attributes of Latin America’s caudillos and their political leadership conditions, stated that caudillismo was the image of society and that caudillos were its creatures. This entry is a review of different interpretations of caudillismo, its origins, and its forms of leadership.

The terms *caudillo* and *caudillismo* continued to be used after the conditions that gave rise to “classical caudillismo” had disappeared. The extension of the notion to encompass any kind of personalized leadership that exercises power in an arbitrary manner within a context of fragility or crisis of the political institutions is not that relevant to critical qualitative research. Caudillismo is used to designate and also stigmatize the governments of “strongmen” with no contextual reference.

**Caudillismo After Independence in Spanish America**

We will now elaborate on the limited meaning of caudillismo restricted to the framework of the struggles to control power that followed independence in Spanish America. In 1845, the book *Facundo*, written by Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, provided the classical interpretation of caudillismo in Spanish America in the 1800s. From that standpoint, caudillismo is the expression of political barbarism and the antithesis of a government that ensures security, freedom, and ownership rights for a country’s inhabitants. Sarmiento’s book is a portrait of Facundo Quiroga, the “Tiger of the Plains,” a caudillo in the first half of the 19th century. In Quiroga, Sarmiento believes that he sees the incarnation of the antinomy of civilization and barbarism faced by the peoples of the Americas as a result of their revolutionary experience and geography—the desert—which had turned violence into a lifestyle. Quiroga in the Argentine pampas and José Antonio Paéz in the Venezuela prairies represent caudillismo as a system of government and type of political leadership. Physical vigor, spontaneous cruelty, and the rusticity inherent in the rural world they come from can account for the despotism of the regimes they represent. Antonio López de Santa Anna from Mexico appears as the “Attila of civilization” and Juan Manuel de Rosas as the “River Plate Caligula” of Argentina.

Latin American historiography and the contributions of European and U.S. studies revealed practically unknown facets of the caudillismo phenomenon in the postindependence period, which led to a better understanding of an era obscured by myths and legends. The caudillo figures started to appear with more nuances than in the view of their contemporaries, and it was noted that their governments, in many cases, adapted traditional legality within the emergence of a new context.

The origin of caudillismo has been interpreted differently, encompassing factors such as the militarization of politics as a result of the independence wars, the absence of formal rules after the collapse of the colonial order, the ruralization of power, the importance of monarchic tradition, the legacy of authoritarianism and anarchism from the Spaniards, or the characteristics of the village societies. In Venezuela and the River Plate area, where the war against the royal troops was more radical and the whole of the population took arms, caudillismo developed quicker and in a more pronounced manner. Cattle herders and gauchos, layabouts and bandits joined the Montoneros (an unruly group of horsemen who fought against Spanish colonization in the 1800s, usually under the federalist caudillos of the provinces outside Buenos Aires), which were
truly “informal armies” that got supplies by pillaging and acted under the subordination of the bosses’ prestige.

The militarization of politics and society that outlived the battles for independence linked caudillismo to military power and political competition with armed struggles. The caudillo was first a warrior, during wars of liberation, civil wars, and national wars; the caudillo was the strongman who could recruit troops and protect his people, as John Lynch outlined. Studies on Latin American caudillismo in the 1950s considered it a variable of authoritarianism and militarism in response to anarchy. Agustín Gamarra of Peru, known as “Cuzco’s black angel,” was seen as a prototype of military leaders who, under different guises, dominated politics in postindependence Spanish America. The militias constituted the core of Gamarroismo (a militaristic state based on the [invented] tradition of the Incas). As pointed out by Charles Walker, the militias controlled local society by monitoring any threat of opposition, and they also served as veritable military academies and vehicles of social mobility. High-ranking positions in the militias represented important avenues for political and economic gain. In Mexico and Peru, professional military men played an important role in the political process as pressure groups. In other countries, the military organization of the end of the colonial period was swept away by the wars of independence, although with different outcomes. Nonetheless, some military heads were prevailing figures—for instance, Francisco de Paula Santander in Nueva Granada (present-day Colombia), Juan José Flores in Ecuador, and Paéz in Venezuela and Andrés de Santa Cruz in Bolivia. As Walker notes, the analysis of caudillismo needs to shift its attention from the battlefield and to reconsider the state, as middling officials such as subprefects and militia leaders proved more important for Gamarra than military officers and guerrillas.

Caution is needed with respect to generalizations about Spanish America’s politics during the half-century following independence because of the distinctive institutional legacies of colonialism, as well as differences in geographical and ethnic composition between countries where the indigenous population prevails and is only partly assimilated into Spanish culture and countries with a Creole population mainly integrated into Spanish culture. The church and the army were two big corporations during colonial times, with an institutional and economic preponderance in Mexico not found in other regions. This was an important source of divergence between Catholics and anticlericals in Mexico. Conflicts between rural and urban areas, between federalism and centralism, and between rival trends in trade policies—“protectionism” and “liberalism”—all hindered the consolidation of a stable national policy. The duration and pace of the transition to postcolonial order varied between countries, as did the role of the regional or national caudillos. In all cases, however, the constant feature is loyalty to caudillos, most of whom had no defined ideologies and fluctuated between contradictory positions, whether unitary or federal, conservative or liberal, or favoring protectionism or free trade.

Tulio Halperin Donghi explored the relationship between militarization and democratization that is at the heart of the promotion of the caudillo power. Social promotion opportunities arose after the rupture of colonial order. Agustín de Iturbide, the “constitutional emperor of Mexico,” belonged to a poor family; Gamarra and Ramón Castilla, both from Peru, were Creoles. They all reached positions that would have before been inaccessible to them, but this relative liberal opening was an instrument to impede the excessive dissemination of popular participation within a context in which power legitimacy was always questioned.

In the middle of the 1970s, Eric Wolf and Edgar Hansen defined caudillismo as a subcategory of “clientelism.” These authors believe that caudillismo refers to the quest for power and wealth through violent conquest that establishes a link between protector and protected in an unstable society lacking the institutional channels through which people can compete for these social and financial advantages. John Lynch also states that the patron–client relationship was the essential link that was finally built into the state and became the model of caudillismo. Alan Knight’s more recent view underlines the relevance of traditional authority in village societies, combined with elements of charisma, to understand the command–obedience relationship inherent in caudillismo.

The notion of caudillismo encompasses different leadership subcategories, for instance, the “sword caudillos,” the warlords who dominated during a period of great instability when popular support and force were decisive. Pacification and progressive institutionalization of power relations were
carried out by new leader profiles, the “tame caudillos,” who were deemed to be the arbitrators capable of achieving national unification and building more stable institutions. Rosas’s government (1829–1852) is an example of a new modality. Sarmiento believed that was the end of caudillismo since it combined elements of barbarism with elements of civilization. Cruelty became more sophisticated, the press and the legislature replaced barbarian passion, and strong personalism allowed for the exertion of influence on the political orientation of other River Plate provinces, although Rosas’s powers were not included in a constitutional system. In Mexico, Benito Juárez, a lawyer born into a poor family, used the 1857 Constitution to take on emergency powers and govern in an authoritarian manner, constitutional but cruel. Diego Portales’s constitutional authoritarianism sought support, as he himself defined, in “the weight of night,” in the acquiescence of the masses, passive and ignorant. A prevailing political figure in Chile in the 1830s, Portales was a trader and omnipotent minister but never took office as president. From Sarmiento’s viewpoint, Portales was an example of an illustrated caudillo. The use of the term caudillo was extended to encompass authoritarian leaders such as Juárez or Portales, who governed within the framework of constitutions. According to Lynch, the “impenetrable dictatorship” of Dr. José Francia in Paraguay combined despotism and isolation for 3 decades in which he ensured the basic needs of a Creole society.

The notion of caudillismo makes possible a better understanding of the political processes that took place during that period since interpretation of the past cannot ignore the categories used by their contemporaries.

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See also Anarchy; Charisma; Clientelism; Regionalism; State Formation

Further Readings


Causality

Causality refers to the relationship between events where one set of events (the effects) is a direct consequence of another set of events (the causes). Causal inference is the process by which one can use data to make claims about causal relationships. Since inferring causal relationships is one of the central tasks of science, it is a topic that has been heavily debated in philosophy, statistics, and the scientific disciplines. This entry reviews the models of causation and tools for causal inference most prominent in the social sciences, including regularity approaches, associated with David Hume, and counterfactual models, associated with Jerzy Splawa-Neyman, Donald Rubin, and David Lewis, among many others. One of the most notable developments in the study of causation is the increasing unification of disparate methods around a common conceptual and mathematical language that treats causality in counterfactual terms—that is, the Neyman-Rubin model. This entry discusses how counterfactual models highlight the deep challenges involved in making the move from correlation to causation, particularly in the social sciences, where controlled experiments are relatively rare.

Regularity Models of Causation

Until the advent of counterfactual models, causation was primarily defined in terms of observable phenomena. It was the philosopher Hume in the
18th century who began the modern tradition of regularity models of causation by defining causation in terms of repeated “conjunctions” of events. In An Enquiry Into Human Understanding (1751), Hume argued that the labeling of two particular events as being causally related rested on an untestable metaphysical assumption. Consequently, Hume (1739) argued that causality could be adequately defined only in terms of empirical regularities involving classes of events. He asked, “How could we know that a flame caused heat?”—only by calling “to mind their constant conjunction in all past instances. Without further ceremony, we call the one cause and the other effect and infer the existence of one from that of the other” (Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Pt. 3, sec. 6). In the Enquiry, Hume argued that three empirical phenomena were necessary for inferring causality: (1) contiguity (the cause and effect must be contiguous in time and space), (2) succession (the cause must be prior to the effect), and (3) constant conjunction (there must be a constant union between the cause and effect). Under this framework, causation was defined purely in terms of empirical criteria, rather than unobservable assumptions. In other words, Hume’s definition of causation and his mode of inference were one and the same.

John Stuart Mill, who shared the regularity view of causation with David Hume, elaborated basic tools for causal inference that were highly influential in the social sciences. For Mill, the goal of science was the discovery of regular empirical laws. To that end, Mill proposed in his 1843 A System of Logic, a series of rules or “canons” for inductive inference. These rules entailed a series of research designs that examined whether there existed covariation between a hypothesized cause and its effect, time precedence of the cause, and no plausible alternative explanation of the effect under study. Mill argued that these research designs were effective only when combined with a manipulation in an experiment. Recognizing that manipulation was unrealistic in many areas of the social sciences, Mill expressed skepticism about the possibility of causal inference for questions not amenable to experiments.

The most widely used of Mill’s canons, the “Direct Method of Difference,” entailed the comparison of two units identical in all respects except for some manipulable treatment. The method of difference involves creating a counterfactual control unit for a treated unit under the assumption that the units are exactly alike prior to treatment, an early example of counterfactual reasoning applied to causal inference. Mill (1884) stated the method as follows:

If an instance in which the phenomenon . . . occurs and an instance in which it does not . . . have every circumstance save one in common . . . [then] the circumstance [in] which the two instances differ is the . . . cause or a necessary part of the cause. (Book 3, chap. 8)

The weakness of this research design is that in practice, particularly in the social sciences, it is very difficult to eliminate all heterogeneity in the units under study. Even in the most controlled environments, two units will rarely be the same on all background conditions. Consequently, inferences made under this method require strong assumptions.

Mill’s and related methods have been criticized on a variety of grounds. His canons and related designs assume that the relationship between cause and effect is unique and deterministic. These conditions allow neither for more than one cause of an effect nor for interaction among causes. The assumption that causal relationships are deterministic or perfectly regular precludes the possibility of measurement error. If outcomes are measured with error, as they often are in the social sciences, then methods predicated on detecting constant conjunctions will fail. Further, the causal relationships typically studied in the social and biological sciences are rarely, if ever, unique. Causes in these fields are more likely to have highly contingent effects, making regular causal relationships very rare.

Counterfactual Models of Causation

Regularity models of causation have largely been abandoned in favor of counterfactual models. Rather than defining causality purely in reference to observable events, counterfactual models define causation in terms of a comparison of observable and unobservable events. Linguistically, counterfactual statements are most naturally expressed using subjunctive conditional statements such as “If India had not been democratic, periodic famines
would have continued.” Thus, the counterfactual approach to causality begins with the idea that some of the information required for inferring causal relationships is and always will be unobserved, therefore some assumptions must be made. In stark contrast to the regularity approach of Hume, the fact of counterfactual causation is fundamentally separate from the tools used to infer it. It was statisticians, beginning with Splawa-Neyman in 1923 and continued most prominently by Rubin, who began to clarify the conditions under which causal inferences were possible if causation was fundamentally a “missing-data problem.”

**Counterfactual Models in Philosophy**

In philosophy, counterfactual models of causation were largely absent until the 1970s due to Willard van Orman Quine’s dismissal of the approach in his *Methods of Logic* (1950), where he pointed out that counterfactual statements could be nonsensical. He illustrated this point by his famous comparison of the conditional statements “If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been Italian” and “If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi would have been French.” For Quine, the incoherence of the two statements implied that subjective conditionals lacked clear and objective truth conditions. Quine’s suspicion of conditional statements was also rooted in his skepticism of evaluating the plausibility of counterfactual “feigned worlds,” as he explained in *Word and Object* (1960):

> The subjunctive conditional depends, like indirect quotation and more so, on a dramatic projection: we feign belief in the antecedent and see how convincing we then find the consequent. What traits of the real world to suppose preserved in the feigned world of the contrary-to-fact antecedent can only be guessed from a sympathetic sense of the fabulist’s likely purpose in spinning his fable.

(p. 222)

Perhaps because of this view of counterfactuals, Quine had a dim view of the concept of causality. He argued that as science advanced, vague notions of causal relationships would disappear and be replaced by Humean “concomitances”—that is, regularities.

In philosophy, Lewis popularized the counterfactual approach to causality 50 years after it first appeared in statistics with Splawa-Neyman’s 1923 paper on agricultural experiments. For Lewis, Quine’s examples revealed problems only with **vague** counterfactuals, not counterfactuals in general. A cause, according to Lewis in his 1973 article “Causation,” was “something that makes a difference, and the difference it makes must be a difference from what would have happened without it” (p. 557). More specifically, he defined causality in terms of “possible” (counterfactual) worlds. He postulated that one can order possible worlds with respect to their closeness with the actual world. Counterfactual statements can be defined as follows:

If $A$ were the case, $C$ would be the case is true in the actual world if and only if (i) there are no possible $A$-worlds; or (ii) some $A$-world where $C$ holds is closer to the actual world than is any $A$-world where $C$ does not hold. (p. 560)

More intuitively, causal inferences arise by comparing the actual world with the closest possible world. If $C$ occurs in both the actual and the closest possible world without $A$, then, according to Lewis, $A$ is not the cause of $C$. If, on the other hand, $C$ does not occur in the closest possible world without $A$, then $A$ is a cause of $C$. Lewis’s theory was concerned with ontology, not epistemology. As a result, one might argue that his work has limited use to empirical research since he provided little practical guidance on how one could conjure the closest possible worlds to use as comparison cases. Without additional assumptions, Lewis’s model suggests that causal inference is a fruitless endeavor given our inability to observe nonexistent counterfactual worlds.

**Statistical Models of Causation**

Fortunately, statisticians beginning with Splawa-Neyman in 1923 elaborated a model of causation that allowed one to treat causation in counterfactual terms and provided guidance on how empirical researchers could create observable counterfactuals.
Say we are interested in inferring the effect of some cause $T$ on a parameter $\bar{Y}$ of the distribution of outcome $Y$ in population $A$ relative to treatment $C$ (control). Population $A$ is composed of a finite number of units and $Y_{AT}$ is simply a summary of the distribution of that population when exposed to $T$, such as the mean. If treatment $C$ (control) were to be applied to population $A$, then we would observe $\bar{Y}_{AC}$. To use Lewis's terminology, in the actual world, we observe $Y_{AT}$, and in the counterfactual world, we would observe $\bar{Y}_{AC}$. The causal effect of $T$ relative to $C$ for population $A$ is a measure of the difference between $\bar{Y}_{AT}$ and $\bar{Y}_{AC}$, such as $\bar{Y}_{AT} - \bar{Y}_{AC}$. Of course, we can observe only the parameter that summarizes the actual world and not the counterfactual world.

The key insight of statistical models of causation is that under special circumstances we can use another population, $B$, that was exposed to control to act as the closest possible world of $A$. If we believe that $\bar{Y}_{AC} = \bar{Y}_{BC}$, then we no longer need to rely on an unobserved counterfactual world to make causal inferences; we can simply look at the difference between the observed $\bar{Y}_{AT}$ and $\bar{Y}_{BC}$. In most cases $\bar{Y}_{AC} \neq \bar{Y}_{BC}$, however, so any inferences made by comparing the two populations will be confounded. What are the special circumstances that allow us to construct a suitable counterfactual population and make unconfounded inferences? As discussed below, the most reliable method is through randomization of treatment assignment, but counterfactual inferences with observational data are possible—albeit more hazardous—as well. In either case, causes are defined in reference to some real or imagined intervention, which makes the counterfactuals well-defined.

The Neyman-Rubin Model

The counterfactual model of causation in statistics originated with Splawa-Neyman’s 1923 model, which is nonparametric for a finite number of treatments, where each unit has a potential outcome for each possible treatment condition. In the simplest case with two treatment conditions, each unit has two potential outcomes, one if the unit is treated and the other if untreated. In this case, a causal effect is defined as the difference between the two potential outcomes, but only one of the two potential outcomes is observed. In the 1970s, Rubin developed the model into a general framework for causal inference with implications for observational research. Paul Holland in 1986 wrote an influential review article that highlighted some of the philosophical implications of the framework. Consequently, instead of the “Neyman-Rubin model,” the model is often simply called the Rubin causal model or sometimes the Neyman-Rubin-Holland model or the Neyman-Holland-Rubin model.

The Neyman-Rubin model is more than just the math of the original Neyman model. Unlike Splawa-Neyman’s original formulation, it does not rely on an urn model motivation for the observed potential outcomes but rather on the random assignment of treatment. For observational studies, one relies on the assumption that the assignment of treatment can be treated as if it were random. In either case, the mechanism by which treatment is assigned is of central importance. The realization that the primacy of the assignment mechanism holds true for observational data no less than for experimental data is due to Rubin. This insight has been turned into a motto: “No causation without manipulation.”

Let $Y_{iT}$ denote the potential outcome for unit $i$ if the unit receives treatment, and let $Y_{iC}$ denote the potential outcome for unit $i$ in the control regime. The treatment effect for observation $i$ is defined by $\tau_i = Y_{iT} - Y_{iC}$. Causal inference is a missing-data problem because $Y_{iT}$ and $Y_{iC}$ are never both observed. This remains true regardless of the methodology used to make inferential progress—regardless of whether we use quantitative or qualitative methods of inference. The fact that we cannot observe both potential outcomes at the same time is commonly referred to as the “fundamental problem of causal inference.” Let $T_i$ be a treatment indicator: 1 when $i$ is in the treatment regime and 0 otherwise. The observed outcome for observation $i$ is then

$$Y_i = T_i Y_{iT} + (1 - T_i) Y_{iC}.$$ 

The average causal effect $\tau$ is the difference between the expected values $E(Y_{iT})$ and $E(Y_{iC})$. We observe only the conditional expectations $E(Y_{iT}|T = 1)$ and $E(Y_{iC}|T = 0)$, not the unconditional expectations required for obtaining $\tau$. Until we assume that $E(Y_{iT}|T = 1) = E(Y_{T})$ and...
E(Y_c|T = 0) = E(Y_c), we cannot calculate the average treatment effect. Note that the estimand of interest, such as the average treatment effect, is conceptually distinct from the estimators used to infer it from data, such as difference in means, linear regression, or other techniques.

**Experiments**

To estimate the average treatment effect, we require the assumption of independence. The singular virtue of experiments is that physical randomization of an intervention ensures independence between treatment status and potential outcomes. Ronald Fisher, in the 1920s and 1930s, first emphasized the importance of random assignment for eliminating bias, calling randomization of treatment the “reasoned basis for inference.” From a Lewisian perspective, the control group in an experiment functions as an observable “possible world.” With the independence assumption, the average treatment effect can be estimated from observables using the following expression:

\[
\tau = E(Y_{iT}|T = 1) - E(Y_{iC}|T = 0)
\]

\[
= E(Y_{iT}) - E(Y_{iC}).
\]

Under randomization, the assumption that \( T_i \) is independent of \( Y_{iT} \) and \( Y_{iC} \) is plausible, making the treatment and control groups exchangeable in expectation.

One of the assumptions that randomization by itself does not justify is that the response of one unit should be unaffected by the particular assignment of treatments to the other units. This “no interference between units” is often called the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). SUTVA implies that the potential outcomes for a given unit do not vary with the treatments assigned to any other unit and that there are not different versions of treatment.

**Observational Data**

In observational data, stronger assumptions are usually required to estimate causal effects. In observational studies, the causal quantity of interest is often the “average treatment effect on the treated” or ATT, which is the average effect conditional on being in the treatment regime. The parameter of interest is

\[
\tau|(T = 1) = E(Y_{iT}|T = 1) - E(Y_{iC}|T = 1).
\]

Since the counterfactual control units, \( E(Y_{iC}|T = 1) \), are not observed, a control group must be constructed. The two assumptions required to construct a valid control group are conditional independence of the potential outcomes and treatment assignment and overlap, or

1. \( Y_{iT}, Y_{iC} \perp T|X \),
2. \( 0 < \text{Pr}(T = 1|X) < 1 \).

When these two conditions hold, we can say that treatment assignment is strongly ignorable. Once a control group is constructed that enables us to satisfy these two conditions, the ATT can be estimated as

\[
t|(T = 1) = E[E(Y_{iT}|T = 1) - E(Y_{iC}|T = 0)]|T = 1.
\]

It is important to note that the outer expectation is taken over the distribution of \( X|(T = 1) \), which is the distribution of covariates among the treated units.

Note that the ATT estimator is changing when individual observations are weighted, and the observations that are outside of common support receive zero weights. That is, if some covariate values are observed only for control observations, those observations will be irrelevant for estimating ATT and are effectively dropped. Therefore, the overlap assumption for ATT requires only that the support of \( X \) for treatment observations be a subset of the support of \( X \) for control observations. More generally, one would also want to drop treatment observations if they have covariate values that do not overlap with control observations. In such cases, it is unclear exactly what estimand one is estimating because it is no longer ATT as some treatment observations have been dropped along with some control observations.

The key assumption being made here is strong ignorability. Even thinking about this assumption
presupposes some rigor in the research design. For example, is it clear what is pretreatment and what is posttreatment? If not, one is unable even to form the relevant questions, the most useful of which may be the one suggested by Harold Dorn in 1953, who proposed that the designer of every observational study should ask, “How would the study be conducted if it were possible to do it by controlled experimentation?” This clear question also appears in William Cochran’s 1965 Royal Statistical Society discussion paper on the planning of observational studies of human populations. Dorn’s question has become one that researchers in the tradition of the Neyman-Rubin model ask themselves and their students. The question forces the researcher to focus on a clear manipulation and then on the selection problem at hand. Only then can one even begin to think clearly about how plausible the strong ignorability assumption may or may not be.

**Structural Equation Modeling**

Another prominent approach to causal inference using counterfactuals is structural equation modeling, a method most associated with the work of Judea Pearl. Structural equation modeling is an old enterprise that has a rich history, including foundational work on causality in systems of structural equations by the geneticist Sewall Wright (1921), the economist Trygve Haavelmo (1943), and the political scientist Herbert Simon (1953). Modern advocates of structural equation modeling argue that the probability calculus approach to causal modeling used by researchers in the Neyman-Rubin tradition is too narrow in that it does not explicitly take into account knowledge about the mechanisms linking background, independent variables, and dependent variables. Rather than modeling causality in relation to experiments, structural equation modelers prefer to write out a more elaborate causal model of the relationships under investigation through a system of structural functions. A system of such functions is said to be structural if the functions are assumed to be invariant to possible changes in the form of the other functions. Under this framework, the effects of treatments are understood as interventions in a prespecified structural model.

For structural equation modelers, hypothetical interventions should be explicitly and formally related to the causal mechanisms under study. In Pearl’s version of structural equation modeling, for example, the mathematical operator “do(X)” is used to represent physical interventions in a set of equations that deletes certain functions from the model, replaces them by a constant, and preserves the rest of the model. The counterfactual conditional “If X had been x” is interpreted as an instruction to modify the original model so that some causal variable X is set to x by some intervention, experimental or otherwise. This operator is accompanied by a set of rules called “do calculus,” which helps a researcher judge whether or not sufficient information exists to identify the effect of the intervention of interest. Rather than identifying one all-encompassing assumption—strong ignorability—as in the Neyman-Rubin approach, Pearl proposes that researchers adopt a series of local assumptions about how an intervention interacts with a prespecified structural model to identify causal quantities. Despite the rather substantial conceptual differences between these two approaches, however, they are mutually compatible. This compatibility arises from their shared reliance on counterfactual understandings of causality.

**Causal Mechanisms**

The Neyman-Rubin counterfactual approach is primarily concerned with defining what the effect of a cause is, not explaining how causes affect outcomes. The apparatus of most statistical models of causation has no formal role for social theory, explanation, or causal mechanisms. Given social scientists’ interest in these issues, a common critique of the Neyman-Rubin model and its cousins are that they are too narrow for the social sciences. Advocates of the statistical approach have countered that counterfactual models of causation can be augmented to take into account the causal mechanisms.

While experiments have the virtue of credibly identifying the causal effect of an intervention, they are sometimes criticized as “black boxes.” To understand the pathways by which interventions affect the outcome, social scientists have relied on a method known as “mediation analysis,” which models the relationship between a treatment, a potentially posttreatment variable, and the outcome ultimately of interest. An important distinction in
this literature is whether or not the “mediator” is treated as posttreatment or not. If the mediator is not affected by treatment, the effect of interest is how the manipulable mediator affects or moderates the outcome when the main treatment variable is fixed, known as the “controlled direct effect.”

This controlled direct effect is not always the effect of interest, however, since mediation analysis is often intended to shed light on the role of mechanisms, which in this framework can be defined as a process that can transmit, at least partially, the effect of a treatment on an outcome. An important distinction between a manipulation (a “treatment”) and a mechanism is that the former involves an external intervention, while the latter does not. The goal of this type of mediation analysis is to estimate what fraction of a causal effect is “indirect”—that is, due to the treatment changing the level of the mediator and consequently the outcome—and what fraction is “direct”—that is, due to the treatment affecting the outcome through other pathways. Expressed in counterfactual language, an “uncontrolled” indirect effect is a comparison between the outcome when the mediator is set at the value realized in the treatment condition and the outcome when the mediator is set to the value that would be observed under the control condition while holding treatment status constant.

Uncontrolled mediation effects are often of great interest, but unfortunately, even with a randomized intervention, their identification rests on strong assumptions. In mediation analyses, the level of the mediator is generally assumed to be independent of the counterfactual outcomes conditional on treatment assignment—that is, the mediator is assigned “as if” random. Given that an uncontrolled mediator variable, by definition, is not randomly assigned, this assumption is strong indeed. While the identification assumptions may be warranted in special circumstances, the main lesson of the statistical literature is that the quantitative study of causal mechanisms is an enterprise fraught with difficulties, even in the context of randomized experiments.

Qualitative Evidence and Theory Falsification

While the quantitative study of causality is well developed and increasingly unified under counterfactual models, many social scientists supplement statistical methods with qualitative reasoning to aid causal inference. Sometimes called “causal process observations,” qualitative evidence can be an important source of leverage for both the design of causal analyses and the interpretation of their findings. In the social sciences, for example, most evidence for mechanisms is qualitative, not quantitative. Qualitative researchers argue that by direct observation of causal processes, a researcher can discern potentially important mechanisms that may have escaped notice. Insight derived from observations that are poorly suited for rectangular data sets may then lead to more formal investigations using experimental and observational quantitative methods. The health sciences, for example, are replete with examples of qualitative observation paving the way for groundbreaking experiments.

Given that most questions in the social sciences are studied using observational research designs, another role for qualitative insight is the justification of the conditional independence assumption. Although many and perhaps most observational studies pay inadequate attention to justifying the adequacy of their designs, careful observational research must identify important confounders and uncover fortuitous “natural” experiments for making well-grounded inferences. Qualitative evidence can be used to identify appropriate confounders to adjust for as well as to justify any claim that treatment was allocated “as if” random.

For many questions in the social sciences, however, a research design guaranteeing the validity of causal inferences is difficult to obtain. When this is the case, researchers can attempt to defend hypothesized causal relationships by seeking data that subject their theory to repeated falsification. Karl Popper famously argued that the degree to which we have confidence in a hypothesis is not necessarily a function of the number of tests it has withstood but rather the severity of the tests to which the hypothesis has been subjected. A test of a hypothesis with a design susceptible to hidden bias is not particularly severe or determinative. If the implication is tested in many contexts, however, with different designs that have distinct sources of bias, and the hypothesis is still not rejected, then one may have more confidence that the causal relationship is genuine. Note that repeatedly testing a hypothesis with research designs suffering from similar types of bias does not constitute a
severe test, since each repetition will merely replicate the biases of the original design. In cases where randomized experiments are infeasible or credible natural experiments are unavailable, the inferential difficulties facing researchers are large. In such circumstances, only creative and severe falsification tests can make the move from correlation to causation convincing.

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See also Experiments, Field; Experiments, Natural; Matching; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Statistics: Overview

Further Readings


CENSORED AND TRUNCATED DATA

Both censored and truncated data involve a lack of information about a random variable and occur in the context of quantitative analysis of data, when one is using that variable either to estimate a population mean (or other population parameters) or as the dependent variable in a regression analysis. The key distinction between them is whether one has information about missing values. With censored data, one observes some information about the missing data, either in the form of a range of values that they might fall into or in the form of the knowledge that they are missing. With truncated data, one has no information about the existence or value of missing observations. The difference in the structure of information for two types of data determines how one approaches censored or truncated data, whether in the context of a single random variable or as a dependent variable in a regression analysis. This entry discusses the consequences of this kind of missing data for regression analysis and sample selection.

Concerns about censoring and truncation abound in empirical analysis. They can occur either through the structure of data-gathering efforts or through legal requirements. Historically, researchers relied on assumptions about the distribution of the variable to adjust the estimates to account for truncation or censoring. These concerns are just as important when censored or truncated variables...
are the dependent variables in regression analyses. Scholars have long worried about the consequences of processes such as self-selection for the validity of their regression results, since they often result in biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. While estimators to correct for censoring and truncation have been around for more than 3 decades, researchers have worried about their sensitivity to distributional assumptions and model specification. While recent work attempts to relax some of these critical assumptions and diagnose sensitivity issues, researchers have also extended previous work by designing estimators for a greater variety of data.

**Types of Missing Data**

Censored and truncated data are both forms of missing data, which have been categorized in three ways: (1) missing at random (MAR), (2) missing completely at random (MCAR), and (3) nonignorable (NI). A variable that is MCAR has missing values that are determined randomly, so that they occur with equal probability and do not depend on any information in the data set. A variable that is MAR exhibits a pattern of missingness in which the probability of a missing value depends on other observed variables for that same observation. A variable exhibits NI missingness when unobserved information in its value helps explain its missingness. In this case, the pattern of missingness depends on information beyond that which is contained in the observed variables.

Censored and truncated data can emerge through any of these three forms of missing data. Making valid inferences requires making valid assumptions about the structure of the missingness. Except for the case of MCAR, one will generally reach inaccurate conclusions, whether regarding population characteristics or regression parameters, unless one properly models the pattern of missingness.

**Censored and Truncated Random Variables**

A random variable is censored if one does not observe its true value but rather observes a bound for the range of values into which it falls. If $X$ is a random variable, then $X$ is censored if when $X > b$ the researcher observes only $b$. Similarly, $X$ may be censored from below by a value $a$. The density function of the observed values of $X$ therefore has point masses at the values $a$ and $b$. This form of censoring occurs commonly in political science in the study of the duration of political events. For example, if a researcher observes a set of states that might adopt a particular policy, then states that have not adopted the said policy by the end of the study period are said to be right censored. For those states, the researcher does not know exactly how many years will elapse before they adopt the policy, only that it exceeds the number of years in the study period so far.

A random variable is truncated if the researcher has no information about missing values, including their existence. For example, observations with $X < a$ might not be observed at all. Observations of truncated data do not exhibit point masses at the truncation points. Rather, one accounts for the missing values by focusing on the distribution conditional on observation. This involves normalizing the distribution of the underlying variable, which includes observed and unobserved values, by the probability of the observed region.

An example occurs in the study of campaign finance in the United States: Political contributions to candidates for national office are not reported if the amount does not exceed $200. Data from the government therefore list no contributions less than $200, making it impossible to know the number of such contributions or their amount if any such contributions were made.

**Censoring and Truncation in Regression Analysis**

Regression analysis of censored and truncated variables often requires adaptations of the standard regression model. If the dependent variable is censored, then one must treat observations that take on the censoring value differently (note that the value at which censoring occurs and the value that is observed for censored observations need not be identical). In the case of state policy adoption, discussed above, the data are censored from above, in the sense that the dependent variable for states that have not adopted the said policy by the end of the study period takes on a value equal to the length of the study. In the context of duration analysis, this is referred to as right censoring. If
one treats these observations the same way as those observations that have actually been adopted in the past year, bias will likely ensue. Rather, one should model the information accurately: One knows only that the observation is greater than the censoring value.

Another common form of censoring occurs when smaller values of the dependent variable are not observed. Often this corresponds to situations in which the dependent variable takes on nonnegative values, such as one country’s foreign aid to other countries. Many countries will receive no foreign aid dollars, while others will receive positive amounts. The clump of countries receiving zero dollars can be thought of as cases in which the host country might have preferred to give negative aid, but since this is impossible, the observed value is censored at zero. One would generally analyze data with this structure with a Tobit model, which accounts for the censoring process.

When the dependent variable suffers from truncation, one does not have information about data for which the dependent variable is outside the bound(s) of truncation. The selection equation determines whether one observes the dependent variable of interest for an observation, and the equation of interest determines the value of this variable given the observation. When the unobserved component of the selection equation is correlated with the unobserved component in the outcome equation, nonrandom sample selection is a form of nonignorable missingness. This will generally result in biased coefficients if one ignores the selection process.

Nonrandom sample selection can take two forms. If one observes cases for which the dependent variable is missing, the data suffer from stochastic censoring. One knows that the observation could have experienced the outcome of interest, but because of the selection process, it happened not to experience it. Alternatively, one might have information only about observations with observed values of the outcome of interest. For example, if a survey respondent answers all questions save the dependent variable, then the data exhibit stochastic censoring; whereas if a potential respondent chooses not to answer the entire survey, then the data exhibit stochastic truncation.

Both can be dealt with in the regression context by simultaneously modeling the selection process and the outcome of interest. The most well-known estimator of this type was developed by James Heckman and is often referred to as the Heckman model. While the Heckman model is designed for a continuous dependent variable and data that suffer from stochastic censoring, similar estimators exist for discrete outcomes. Analogous estimators also exist for continuous and discrete outcome variables when the data exhibit stochastic truncation.

Estimation requires proper specification of the selection equation. Furthermore, the estimates tend to be sensitive to the distributional assumption for the error terms (generally bivariate normal). Dealing with stochastic truncation generally poses a greater estimation challenge because one has no information about incomplete observations, making the distributional assumption even more important, since it is the mechanism for identifying the selection process.

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Censorship

Censorship is restriction of the circulation of information, ideas, and images or of political, cultural, religious, and artistic opinions; it occurs mainly when the rulers consider that these could weaken or damage their hold on power. Characteristic of nondemocratic systems, and also present in some democracies, censorship is usually exercised by an authority responsible for monitoring the dissemination of ideas, including those circulated by governmental agencies as well as those from private individuals and organizations. The term censorship has its origin in the Roman Empire, where the “censor” was the person who controlled the dissemination of political ideas.

Since premodern times, censorship has existed under different political regimes. It began to be questioned in the 17th century, when critics of the period’s absolutist states started to call for the limitation of state power and discretion and for the institutionalization of civil and political rights and, particularly, freedom of speech.

Censorship has also existed in social institutions such as the Catholic Church as well as in other religions such as Islam. In this case, the upper echelons of the religious hierarchy exercise censorship to ensure that the content of writings by priests and bishops is in line with the religion’s main tenets.

Censorship is generally at odds with democracy, which is characterized by the institutionalization of civil and political rights, civil liberties, and the existence of an opposition. Although free expression is a central democratic value, some opponents of censorship do recognize exceptions. One of the most commonly proposed exceptions is of child pornography, due to its connection with individuals or organizations that commit crimes such as pedophilia. Supporters of censorship in such cases argue that the right to free expression is outweighed by the need to prevent the extraordinarily harmful impact on children caused by the creation and distribution of child pornography. In contrast, critics of censorship with respect to child pornography argue that the connection between pornography and actual harm to children has not been established. Although some proponents of free speech argue that it has precedence over the defense of children’s interests, most Western democracies ban the possession, production, and distribution of child pornography.

Hate speech is another controversial subject of censorship; again, supporters argue that hate-filled speech encourages actual violence and that this potential harm outweighs the value of free expression. For example, such arguments are made to justify the censorship of neo-Nazi propaganda both in the United States and in Europe.

The use of censorship may be seen not only in a formal way—that is, through officials entitled to control political information using known political means—but also through informal mechanisms, such as threatening independent journalists, punishing a critical press through the denial of paid advertisements, and so forth. These informal censorship mechanisms can be found in young democracies established after military or authoritarian regimes, in which there are political constraints inherited from the prior political order limiting the institutionalization of political rights or caused by the lack of democratic beliefs among the governing elite. Referred to by Wolfgang Merkel as “defective democracies,” they may simply not have repealed the previous regime’s restrictions on press freedom or may consider that censorship is necessary in certain cases for reasons of national security. In this latter case, it is used to restrict publication of information about issues that are considered very sensitive for the armed forces and to avoid possible tensions and ensure the consolidation of democracy. In defective democracies or hybrid regimes, censorship by governing officials is exercised.

See also Data, Missing; Regression; Sampling, Random and Nonrandom; Selection Bias

Further Readings

Censorship through formal and informal mechanisms, including threatening journalists. The elimination of censorship is one of the priority demands of an agenda that seeks to establish real democracy. In delegative democracies, such as Venezuela during Hugo Chavez’s presidency (in power since 1999), public officials use a variety of methods to limit freedom of press, including not only censorship but also actions such as the cancellation of TV and radio licenses. Although censorship is formally rejected in established democracies, freedom of speech can be restricted not as a governing decision but as a consequence of the ownership structure of the media, when business people seek to influence public opinion with their own beliefs or political views, rejecting the dissemination of opposing views. In these situations, editors may employ extensive self-censorship to block the dissemination of news and ideas that may damage the government.

Censorship can be imposed *preventively*—by defining conditions for the dissemination and circulation of ideas through any channel—or *ex post facto*, with the authority sanctioning those who infringe the norms that establish limits on freedom of speech.

Although censorship is incompatible with democracy, this does not mean that public officials lack the resources with which to attempt to persuade the media to block news and information that may be damaging or favor reports that may be negative to the opposition. One of these key tools is the placement of advertising, which can be an important source of media revenues.

With the development of modern technology, particularly the expansion of Internet, the imposition of censorship is more difficult than ever, posing enormous problems for public officials seeking to limit the dissemination of information and news critical of the government. The Internet opened a new channel of communication for dissidents in nondemocratic regimes (e.g., Cuba and China) to denounce abuses and make their demand for pluralism and freedom known to the world. These actions, in turn, trigger support from NGOs and political parties and governments in democratic countries, which helps protect the authors from reprisals. Large international corporations—notably Google—have also emerged as new players in favor of greater pluralism in nondemocratic regimes or defective democracies.

Censorship plays a very important role in authoritarian regimes. It serves as a tool to ensure that limited pluralism—a central element in their identity—remains within the bounds established by the authorities. These regimes allow certain sectors of the elite access to, and even control of, the media and publishing houses through which they seek to gain political power or influence while also restricting the access previously enjoyed by other sectors of the elite. Self-censorship is widely applied in these regimes by editors of private media companies that support the regime, are interested in its continuity, and are particularly strict in preventing the publication of negative news, particularly that referring to opposition activities or conflicts and divisions within the governing elite.

Francisco Franco’s Spain (1939–1975) provides an example of the evolution of censorship, which was not applied uniformly during his regime but underwent a number of changes as a result of conflicts among factions of the ruling elite, which had more influence when the regime was consolidated. With the consolidation of political power and in a context of economic development and social progress, there was a tendency to relax censorship in order to allow the press to play a role in controlling excesses, abuses of power, and, particularly, corruption among top officials. This explained the press law of 1966 in Franco’s Spain, which began a certain liberalization of the official press, bringing greater transparency about the decisions of the authorities. However, the information concerning abuse of power, particularly of economic character, was used by sectors of the governing elite to weaken the power position of other factions, provoking a scandal that led to a cabinet reshuffle and the dismissal of ministers involved in this conflict. However, it also permitted the appearance of opposition publications and even magazines (e.g., *Cuadernos para el Diálogo*), which had costs for the regime in terms of a significant increase in negative political information since they published news about cases of corruption and conflicts within the government and the elite. As a result of these direct and indirect effects of the liberalization of the press, censorship was, in practice, reestablished.

In the context of liberalization of authoritarian regimes, the relaxation of censorship and self-censorship was widely extended, as in the Pinochet regime in Chile (1973–1990) during a period of
political instability caused by the economic crisis in 1983 to 1984. Independent radios and magazines could inform in a broader way on several political facts that had been censored earlier, including repression against opposition organizations. However, the government continued threatening and punishing journalists with formal and informal mechanisms and applying censorship in particular cases. The political space opened by the weakening of censorship was widely used by journalists and media, leading to a significant increase in political information, including adverse information, and favored the development of the opposition and, as a result, the weakening of the political bases of authoritarian rule.

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See also Hybrid Regimes

Further Readings


Central Banks

Modern central banks are public, nonprofit, economic, and political institutions, with special functions derived from their command over monetary resources. They shape monetary policy, have a strong influence on exchange rates, and are the guardians of financial stability. Their decisions influence economic variables determining growth, output, and national development policies and have a bearing on the conditions of international financial and monetary cooperation. As a general rule, central banks are regulated by a mandate from government(s) specifying their goals and the conditions under which control over monetary resources is exercised.

After situating the topic in its theoretical context, this entry discusses the rules and social institutions on which central banks’ command over monetary resources ultimately rest; stresses the establishment of central banks as a trustworthy system of monetary authority, at the domestic and international levels; and examines the way in which the institution’s power has been recast and strengthened in the financial globalization era, in connection with the widespread trend toward central bank independence from elected governments in old and new democracies.

Central Banks as Substate Actors: Theory

An updated review of existing central banks shows a greater variance than is assumed in the dominant rational expectations theories framing the universalistic prescriptions and the role models recommended over the past 30 years. Influence is noticeable, however, in two global trends: (1) in terms of goals, the convergence toward the primacy of price stability, and (2) in terms of the mandated use of monetary resources, the dramatic increase in the number of institutions that acquired statutory independence vis-à-vis governments. Yet the actual variance in the practices and mandates of those institutions across countries and regions limits the scope for generalization. Moreover, central bank functions and powers have been recast over time since the establishment of the first institutions of this breed in the mid-19th century.

A central bank’s status as a public, nonprofit institution is the outcome of an evolutionary process, based on the rules and social institutions that underpin its three core functions: (1) as banker to the government, (2) its monopoly of note issuance, and (3) as banker to the banking system—including that of last-resort lender. These functions refer to the unique relationships between the institution and its principal clients: the government and the profit-maximizing financial institutions, mainly commercial banks.

The Relationship Between the Central Banks and the Government

As a public national institution, the central bank derives its functions from a state-backed power as the sole issuer of a unique currency circulating in a
geographical territory—to which it has been granted the status of legal tender (cours forcé).

Parallel to the processes of political delegation, a contractual, economic relationship with the government involves mutual economic interest and economic calculation. Lending to the government, at an agreed fixed interest rate, generates profits alongside those drawn from currency issuance. For the government, having “its own bank” ensures cheaper deficit financing; its power as principal borrower is used to press for a minimum rate of interest. On the other hand, central banks typically stand out as major holders of a government’s debt, insofar as they invest their capital in government long-term debt instruments, mainly bonds. Where a domestic public debt market exists or is being established, voluntary loans from private savers provide an additional source of deficit financing. It is a market monitored by the central banks—adding the function of debt management to their other functions.

While the government’s preference for cheap finance is an intrinsic component of its relationship to their central banks, deficit financing through monetary expansion—that is, through the monetization of the government’s debt—was exceptional in industrialized countries. Long-term reviews of past practices supplied by Charles Goodhart’s team and by Barry Eichengreen indicate economic as well as political reasons for central banks to be congenitally inflation and risk averse. Because they are major holders of the government’s debt and because they already profit from lending to the government, they have an overriding interest in keeping the real value of its loans stable. There is also a reputation dimension to its practice, in that the strength of the currency issued is closely related to the creditworthiness of the issuer and to the commitment of the issuing institution to price stability. Prior to the 1970s, the commitment of central banks to convertibility and/or price stability was overridden in only one circumstance: when the survival of the state was threatened by wars. Thus, the “inflationary bias” of economic policy and the temptations of monetary financing of government spending in industrialized countries are late developments that call for a more contextualized analysis of the unstable monetary “regime” in the financial globalization era.

Prompted by two “structural” factors, some developing countries, mainly in Latin America, resorted to an “inflation tax.” The first factor was a weak tax system, reflecting the limited capacity of the state to establish itself as a widely accepted fiscal authority. The second was that the inflation tax operated as a conflict-minimizing device to socialize the costs of “catching-up” industrialization. This was typically, as in the case of Brazil, where the state’s commitment to a proactive strategy of rewarding the winners was based on the reiterated distribution of skewed fiscal and monetary incentives to selected economic agents.

**Bank to the Banking System**

As bankers to the banking system, central banks play a leading role mainly vis-à-vis commercial banks and less effectively vis-à-vis other profit-maximizing financial institutions. Such a role is, first of all, one of guidance and monitoring. Because commercial banks act simultaneously as deposit takers and loan makers, they are credit multipliers. Since credit is money, their individual microeconomic decisions, guided by profit-maximizing considerations, have a direct bearing on the increase or reduction in the stock of money available in the economy. Central banks’ overriding concern with financial and economic stability gradually evolved toward a proactive role in averting this source of volatility. Their function as lender of last resort to the banking system—asserted always in the wake of crises—revolves around the bank’s systemic responsibility, in exchange for enhanced powers of supervision and regulation of commercial banks’ behavior. While the necessary function of lender of last resort is called for and is reiterated in crises, it is through its open market operations that the leadership of the central bank over profit-maximizing institutions is exercised. To maintain day-to-day control over the short-term nominal interest rates in all market conditions, the central bank purchases or sells financial securities for cash to change the monetary base. Its power to influence the money supply and other economic variables in this case is exercised through the markets. In other words, through a complex system of incentives and penalties—mainly the bank’s discount rate—it may induce commercial banks to proceed with their lending strategies (or dissuade them). Because
the central bank can impose the ultimate conditions for granting credit, it enjoys the “magical powers” of creating or destroying money. But it does so by relying on market mechanisms—namely, on its monopolistic position in the credit market and on the predictably self-interested response of profit-maximizing institutions to its interest rate policy.

Set against this background, the use of the term central bank is equivalent to and interchangeable with that of monetary authority—a use that is common to economists of all persuasions. This identity relies on three assumptions. One, wherever a market exists, financial firms and investors act independently from one another. Two, the central banks’ power over monetary resources is that of a rule maker—an extension of the state’s capacity of enforcement. Three, its creditworthiness derives from its governance capacity in terms of price and financial stability, which in turn derives mainly from its technical credentials.

Political scientists assume a political economy approach to the international monetary regimes in which central banks operate as rule based and contingent. They take as a premise that domestic and world markets are embedded in and permeated by social institutions. From this perspective, the history of the international monetary order (or disorder) is thought of as “the history of the construction and demolition of rules, constitutive and regulative, explicit or tacit, substantive and procedural,” in the words of Bruce Hall (2008, p. 10). Central to this cognitive framing are the politico-economic processes underlying the establishment or disruption of a policy consensus around a monetary regime.

The International Political Economy and Central Banking

A major distinctive feature of the current monetary and financial regime is the rising power of central banks vis-à-vis established governments and the redefinition of their authority vis-à-vis cross-border market actors. To situate such processes requires a shift of focus from its role as a predominantly substate institution to one including its capacities as a public transnational actor in a multilevel system of global governance. The bank’s command over monetary resources has been recast in tandem with new modes of interaction with government(s) and with market actors. Those shifts were carried out within the cognitive framing of the rational expectations revolution—centered on the notion of central banks’ credibility with the financial markets. They are closely linked to a number of developments that distinguish the post–Bretton Woods monetary era, extending from the 1970s to the present, from its predecessors: the classical gold standard (1844–1945), the interwar decades, and the Bretton Woods system (1945–1971). While the previous systems constituted international monetary regimes proper, whose rules and social institutions were designed and enforced by the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States, respectively, the post–Bretton Woods is considered by many, including Barry Eichengreen, as a “nonsystem.” Successive failures at establishing a durable international monetary order and a great deal of technical experimentation underlie the process by which the powers of the central banks were recast.

The issues around which the practice and theory of central banking came to revolve are explored by the monetary economist Stanley Fisher. On the one hand, the inflationary tendencies are brought about by the conflict between the short-term and the long-run effects of monetary expansion. On the other, it should revolve around the conflict between the need to shield central banks from the political pressures underlying the monetary financing of government spending and the principle of accountability to the public.

Central Banking and Governments

Central banks’ current powers are tied to critical shifts in their relationship with their constituencies and in the cognitive maps adopted by central bankers. A salient aspect of those developments is a shift in the priorities of monetary management toward the primacy of price stability over other policy goals, such as the promotion of full employment and maximum output. The underlying politico-economic framework is shaped by the threat of runaway inflation in the dominant capitalist democracies, in the 1970s and 1980s, mainly in the United States and the UK, which was an unprecedented experience in peacetime. The international political consensus underlying the Bretton Woods
regime had already been shaken in 1971 to 1973 by President Nixon’s unilateral decision to detach the dollar (to which all other currencies were pegged) from the gold standard so that dollars could no longer be converted to gold. Because the dollar was the reserve currency, severe losses in the value of foreign reserves held in dollars were inflicted on the other members in the international monetary system. The ensuing legitimacy crisis was compounded by the refusal of Germany and France to import inflation engendered in the United States.

A matter of interest to the social scientist is brought to the fore by this episode. It highlighted the capacity of a powerful state, the hegemon, to deflect the costs of an overdue domestic adjustment to trading partners. It also highlights the critical role of transnational political coordination in counteracting that mode of power. The unique experience of Europe is a case in point: Both that episode and the crisis of the European Exchange Rate System in the early 1990s propelled the gradual crafting of the institutions that underpinned the Maastricht Agreement provisions aimed at establishing a regional monetary order. The powers of national central banks were redefined accordingly, in tandem with the transfer of their command over monetary resources to the European Central Bank. Insofar as it involved a long-term project, multiple acts of sovereign political delegation, and democratic deliberation, the European Central Bank is a unique case of establishing a transnational monetary authority through statecraft, in the sense explored by Lourdes Sola and Laurence Whitehead (2005) in connection with developing countries.

It is within this shifting monetary, financial, and political context that the new powers and functions assigned to central banks vis-à-vis the governments become meaningful. The centrality of the monetary policy and the monetary counterreaction to the dominance of Keynesian thought marked out a paradigmatic shift away from the postwar economic dirigisme structured around demand management and based on exchange rate, price, and interest rate controls. It brought to an end the subordination of central banks to domestic fiscal authorities.

The empowerment of such institutions, in particular the U.S. Federal Reserve System, highlights in what sense the exercise of monetary authority—as a special mode of political authority—can be strengthened and redesigned within the domestic framework of liberal constitutionalism. Three dimensions are of interest: (1) the strengthened role of central banks as rule makers, (2) the political dimension of their effective capacity for monetary governance, and (3) the relative power of the hegemon—the United States, as the issuer of the international reserve currency, the dollar—to lead the international arrangements that deflected the costs of adjustment to developing countries.

The authority of the Federal Reserve as a substate actor is constitutionally specified and limited. Its autonomy vis-à-vis the executive is constrained by the oversight of the U.S. Congress and, in terms of its goals, by its dual mandate—price stability and full employment. Neither these constraints nor the prospect of the huge social and political costs inseparable from recession and unemployment barred the option for a shock therapy to curb runaway inflation—basically a dramatic increase in the U.S. interest rates by Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker. The political dimensions of the decision-making processes underlying a sharp turn-around of monetary policy remain understudied—despite the evidences that it was premised on successive acts of political delegation from both the executive and the legislative powers.

It is widely agreed that the Federal Reserve’s capacity for monetary governance, in terms of its success in curbing inflationary expectations, is better explained by its political components than by its technical ones. Monetary economists, practitioners, and political economists agree that as a technical exercise, it was hardly a success. Volcker’s economic objective was achieved thanks to his decision to emphasize price stability and to de-emphasize (also on theoretical grounds) the possibility that monetary policy could affect the level of output. This, in turn, relied on the flexible, dual-mandate design of the Fed and, above all, on Volcker’s intellectual authority and moral credentials. To many practitioners, such as Alan Blinder, this is a critical asset to forge the near unanimity required in the collegiate decisions within the Fed. Also, insofar as monetary policy works through the markets, the technical and moral credibility of practitioners in the eyes of market actors are critical. The technical complexities of monetary management make this mode of
personal, contingent authority a powerful instrument of persuasion and legitimation in the deliberative processes in Congress—and in the eyes of the relevant constituencies.

The systemic international functions of the Fed and other core central banks—both as rule makers and in their capacity of governance—relate to one of the most consequential implications of the dramatic rise in U.S. interest for developing countries, particularly for Latin America: soaring indebtedness, vulnerability to further external shocks, and the withdrawal of foreign investors for 9 years. Central banks in core countries were called to lead the coordination of the international arrangements aimed at deflecting to debtors the costs of the U.S. adjustments. The threat that their rising debts might feed on the international banking system prompted the emergence of new institutional arrangements, in concert with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the representatives of the private banking system. The responses to the “debt crisis” in Latin America were designed by the committees organized to this end and enforced on a country-by-country basis. They were conditioned on the implementation of structural economic reforms, including deregulation of the domestic financial systems and, ultimately, central bank independence. Competition for credit and foreign investments explains the compliance with most of those prescriptions. Sylvia Maxfield explains the move toward central bank independence in developing countries as driven by the need to obtain credibility in the eyes of increasingly competitive financial market actors. However, to the extent that this is a global trend across five continents, the recasting powers of the institution at the global level must be specified too.

**Independence as Global Governance: The Emergence of Private Authority**

Underlying the *problématique* of central bank independence is a critical shift in the mode of interaction between the “monetary authority” and market actors. The rising influence of cross-border financial transactions is closely linked to the empowerment of foreign exchange markets and disintermediated debt and bond markets in individual nation-states. The intensified competition among banks and between banks and other financial intermediaries in the past 3 decades continues to be central to this process. Competitive pressures explain also the proliferation of “financial innovations”—that is, the recurring creation of new debt/credit instruments intended to make them more attractive to borrowers and to lenders, both corporate and public. Such innovations lie outside the direct control of domestic central banks, are enhanced by information technology, and are driven by the deregulation and the liberalization of domestic financial markets.

In an international system where there is no world government, governance capacity is found in multiple sites of monetary (and fiscal) authority—public and private, national and transnational. Hall hypothesizes that central banks are integrated into an emerging new system of global multilevel monetary governance. Public transnational institutions endowed with supervisory and coordinating monetary powers include the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) and the European Central Bank. The fact that adherence to such rule-based systems is voluntary—and applied domestically by statutory authority—indicates that its implementation depends also on domestic political variables. At the national level, the executive is the main locus of monetary governance; a central bank may share them with fiscal authorities if it has not been granted independence by the government.

In this context, private market actors operating in the foreign exchange and disintermediated bond markets are empowered to adjudicate the credibility of fiscal and monetary policies through the operation of the markets. This function is complemented by private rating agencies that grade the market of sovereign, corporate, and municipal debt instruments. All such shifts reflect the unprecedented emergence of private authority conceptualized by Thomas Biersteker and Bruce Hall.

It is against this shifting context of deregulated, liberalized financial markets—where all money is fiat money—that the global trend toward central bank independence becomes meaningful. Constructing a trustworthy monetary authority is about making credible its long-term commitment to price stability, ensuring private and public wealth holders that their loans will be redeemed at their real value, plus a risk premium. Insofar as central banks can directly control only very short nominal rates of interest, the technical question of
how monetary policies will work effectively through the markets is a matter of great concern. Economists and practitioners of all persuasions agree that it has been settled technically along the lines of the rational expectations theory. In other words, monetary policy can work through the markets when central banks properly anticipate and coordinate future expectations of economic agents. For this reason, the case for central bank independence at the global level has been strengthened by the rational expectations school and its analysis of the conditions necessary to attain credibility with financial markets. The central bank’s independence from governments and transparency in communicating its long-term future monetary strategies are the major conditions enabling the institution to achieve credibility with market actors. In this intellectual and economic context, the economic and financial impacts of central bankers’ utterances and communicating strategies can hardly be exaggerated.

While rationalists assume a self-equilibrating free market of actors acting independently and including in their calculations the expected impact of monetary policies, constructivists assume a relational mode of interaction between them and among market actors. It rests on shared understandings of the rules, norms, and values that underlie what are and what should be considered best practices—underpinned by epistemic communities of monetary economists and central bankers. Hall, a political economist of a constructivist cast, sets the generalized trend toward central bank independence in the context of multilevel global governance: The powers assigned to the institution are related to its ultimate role as the only nominal anchor to achieve international stability. Policy convergence, in this approach, is meant to drive the most critical structures down to the lowest possible national level of governance so that a uniformly effective impetus toward price stability can be provided. Whether or not this desideratum implied in the rational expectations theory is feasible is a quintessentially political problem. It is constrained by the current shifts in the axis of global monetary power, in particular the diversity of monetary strategies of new, “catching-up” countries. China’s central bank is the most extreme case of subordination to the unique strategies of the government, aimed at national development and integration into the world market.

There are, however, many points of intersection between the two schools. Most important among them is the unspoken assumption underlying their prescriptions on how to reconcile two desiderata: (1) shielding the monetary authority from political pressures and (2) political legitimacy. Both schools take for granted the political framework within which central bankers operate in core democratic governments—that of liberal constitutionalism. The solution is then settled by means of the distinction between “full operational independence” and “goals independence.” The discretion of central banks, in the first case, would be limited to the choice of monetary tools to achieve the goals ultimately set by elected politicians. Basically, these tools provide free access to periodically publicized reports on the fiscal practices, the economic models, the forecasts and outcomes of monetary policy, and the accountability of elected politicians, in periodic hearings of Congress.

Emerging market democracies, in contrast, confront the task of reconciling integration into global markets, with its ensuing fiscal and monetary disciplines, while building the institutions and policy consensus indispensable to legitimate the construction of a monetary authority. It involves a long-term project, an open-ended process of democratic deliberation, leadership, and the development of constituencies supportive of price and financial stability as priority goals. In this regard, they constitute experiments in statecrafting monetary (and fiscal) democratic authorities.

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See also Administration; Bureaucracy; Democracy, Theories of; Democracy, Types of; Economic Policy

Further Readings

**CHANGE, INSTITUTIONAL**

Scholars in political science have approached the problem of institutional change in two very different ways that can be explained by the type of institutions on which they have focused. Institutions are most commonly understood as the *rules of the game*. As such, they can be written formal statutes, such as constitutions, electoral systems, and legal codes. They can also be generally established social norms, such as routines, customs, and habits. In almost all accounts of institutions, they are understood as relatively stable and persisting entities that do not change easily or instantly. The broad notion of institutions and the focus on continuity imply that understanding institutional change is both complicated and equivalent to understanding large-scale social and historical change.

The reasons why institutions are usually seen as durable and difficult to change vary. One is that institutions give rise to self-reinforcing “feedback” mechanisms that may or may not be purposively designed. For example, a social insurance program may be organized so that it covers a majority of the population, thus creating not only social protection but also support from the political majority. Or it may cater to broadly held norms about social justice in the population. In either case, a self-reinforcing mechanism is at work. Another reason for institutional stability is that none of the actors that are involved have an incentive to change. For example, political parties in a “first-past-the-post” two-party political system have little reason to change to a proportional electoral system, or vice versa. Third, formal institutions may become dominating social conventions, and agents may have difficulties imagining a different institutional order.

Explanations for institutional change can be divided into three broad categories. Change may occur as a result of unpredictable and unforeseen “exogenous shocks.” For example, countries may radically change their institutions when hit by an international economic crisis or when drawn into a war. A second type is a change through an evolutionary functionalist logic. Institutions that best suit the underlying structural changes survive through the operation of some kind of selective mechanism, and institutions that do not follow this functionalist logic are weeded out by the competition from more successful institutional orders. Third, institutions may change by intentional design by strategically acting as agents that construct new institutions that serve their future interests. However, the outcome of such strategic design may not always be in line with the agents’ intentions because outcomes from institutional changes are hard to predict, especially if there are simultaneous changes of other institutions outside the control of the designing agents.

**The Two Schools of Institutional Change**

There are currently two very different approaches to the problem of institutional change. In development research, including research in comparative
political economy, there is now almost a consensus that the problem of massive poverty (and the many resultant social ills) in most developing countries is due to their dysfunctional social, legal, and political institutions (e.g., Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson, 2008). This problem, also known as the “good-governance” or the “quality-of-government” problem, has been well captured by the economist Dani Rodrik (2007, p. 153), who argued that the encounter between neoclassical economics and developing societies has revealed the great extent to which market economies rely on a complex and not well understood set of social, legal, and political institutions. Rodrik’s list of such institutions is extensive: a well-specified system of property rights, effective regulation that hinders monopolies from dominating markets, uncorrupted governments, the rule of law, and social welfare systems that can accommodate risks. In addition, Rodrik adds the importance of informal institutions that foster social cohesion, social trust, and cooperation. Following Douglass North, Rodrik criticizes neoclassical economics for omitting the importance of such institutions and argues that the problem is that most economists usually take them for granted. In fact, most poor countries are plagued by a very different set of institutions, such as systemic corruption, clientelism, and patronage, and low levels of social trust and lack of institutions that can handle individual and collective risks. In this type of analysis, the main problem is to explain why societies with a set of institutions that are clearly dysfunctional in terms of general social well-being generally seem unable to adopt the “new set” of institutions that Rodrik lists and that are known to lead to economic prosperity and social well-being. As Bo Rothstein (2003) notes, the central problem in this type of analysis is that the historical record clearly shows that dysfunctional institutions, such as systemic corruption, clientelism, and patronage, are very hard to change. Political and economic leaders in these systems may be able to change the institutions from above, but since they are the group that collects the most rents from the system, they have no incentive to induce change, at least not in a short-term perspective. Change of these systems from below is difficult because agents who want change face a formidable collective action problem. Thus, as Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast (2009) have shown, in this research area, the main issue is the lack of institutional change despite the pressing human need for such change. For example, systemic corruption not only hurts economic growth, causes extreme poverty, and induces civil strife, but it also has devastating humanitarian consequences in areas such as provision of health care, level of infant mortality, and access to safe water.

However, in several recent studies of the rich welfare states and their systems of industrial relations and social provisions, the picture is very different. Here, change of important institutions occurs almost constantly in a mostly incremental process, either because agents are able to find compromises and viable solutions to common problems or as a result of power struggles. As James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2009) and Thelen (2009) have shown, adaptation to new circumstances such as increased international competition for goods and services, globalization of financial markets, and new technologies in the production process may not always be easy in these societies and may be the outcome of difficult political disputes and difficult compromises. Still, the general picture is that in such societies, political and economic elites are, after some initial difficulties, usually able to gradually change central institutions to bring about the distribution of resources and power that they believe will follow from their ideas of new institutional designs.

A problem for our understanding of institutional change is that these two research approaches seldom communicate their theories, problems, or results. Why do the political and economic elites in some (rich, capitalist) societies usually manage to change institutions, while other (poor, developing) societies seem stuck with formal as well as informal institutions that are fundamentally detrimental to their need for economic growth and general social well-being? One reason for this apparent paradox may be that these different approaches to institutional change are dealing with institutions that are fundamentally different.

**Two Logics of Institutional Change**

The idea that institutions include not only formal but also informal rules implies that it is difficult to distinguish them from a society’s basic cultural
traits. In explaining institutional change, this becomes problematic because while it is possible to change codified systems of rules and “standard operating procedures” through methods such as direct and deliberate political intervention, this is much more difficult with institutions viewed as shared mental models and other such generally held basic beliefs that are rooted in a society’s historically established culture. For example, one such informal institution is people’s belief that others in their society are, in general, trustworthy. Comparative survey research shows that this informal institution varies to a large extent among countries. Clearly, changing such a system of beliefs is not the same thing as changing a piece of social insurance legislation or a system of wage negotiations. Thus, as a first distinction, we can differentiate between two basic logics of institutional change, namely, change in a society’s formal institutions and change in its informal ones.

A second distinction has been suggested by George Tsebelis (1990)—namely, between “redistributive” and “efficient” institutions. Redistributive institutions are rules that move resources or power from one group of agents to another. A familiar example would be most tax systems and systems of industrial relations. Historically, one can also think of slavery as a formal redistributive institution. Examples of redistributive informal institutions would be professional networks that give status and prestige to a particular set of its members. Another example is economic systems in which business contracts and career systems follow family lines. Third, many political systems are characterized by informal clan-based nepotism or various forms of corruption.

Socially efficient institutions, on the other hand, have quite the opposite character since their purpose is to improve the welfare of all actors in a system of exchange. As such, they are genuine public goods, implying that they serve a common interest. According to Elinor Ostrom (1990), seen in light of noncooperative game theory, these are institutions that make it possible to avoid situations known as suboptimal outcomes in prisoner’s dilemma, collective action, or tragedy of the commons types of interaction. Rothstein (2005) notes that in the closely related theory about social dilemmas, socially efficient institutions make it possible for agents to avoid ending up in situations known as social traps. These are all situations in which the agents know that they would all be better off if they could collaborate to establish a common set of institutions; however, because they do not trust that the other agents will adhere to the rules or contribute to the costs of establishing and running the institution, the individual agents have no incentive to collaborate. This lack of trust leads to a situation in which all agents are worse off. For example, a corrupt doctor in a public health system may realize that all would gain by ending corruption, but it becomes meaningless for the individual doctor to stop taking bribes if she or he cannot trust that most other doctors would do the same. Similarly, it makes little sense for the single judge or police officer to stop taking bribes if he cannot trust that (almost) all his colleagues will also refrain from this practice. In an emerging democracy, it makes little sense to be the only political party that does not tamper with ballot boxes. The list of examples illustrating this problem is endless.

Examples of socially efficient formal institutions are the rule of law, protection of property rights, and an honest and impartial civil service. In economic terms, such institutions are public goods because they dramatically lower what are known as transaction costs and thereby contribute greatly to economic prosperity. Universal social insurance systems can also be categorized as socially efficient institutions since they handle individual risks in a more cost-efficient way than do market-based social insurance systems.

The most well-known example of informal socially efficient institutions is the existence of generalized trust that is widespread in the population. Institutions such as this increase the likelihood that other agents will not use opportunistic or treacherous strategies but instead will behave in a reciprocal manner. Thereby, generalized trust also decreases transaction costs, but in a less costly way than if agents were to use only the formal legal system.

The reason why it is so difficult to change from dysfunctional to socially efficient institutions (e.g., establishing honesty in a corrupt civil service or changing political exchange from clientelism to impartiality) is that such a change necessitates the trust among agents that (almost) all of them will play by the new rules from time $t$, and that such a trust is not easily manufactured by political means. As Ostrom (1990) has argued, socially efficient
institutions can be seen as collective action problems of the second order.

It should be added that the distinction between socially efficient and redistributive institutions is a theoretical construct and that many, if not most, institutions have traits of both redistribution and social efficiency. Why the distinction is useful may be better understood from the following parallel example. Most political scientists are willing to distinguish between democratic and nondemocratic political systems. However, all democratic systems contain nondemocratic elements, and most nondemocracies feature some kind of system for popular influence and for establishing consent.

The reason why scholars studying the rich democracies and scholars studying developing countries have come to such different conclusions about the possibility for institutional change is that they study fundamentally different types of institutions. The former usually concentrate on redistributive institutions for which the analysis of power constellations explains change. The latter study the lack of socially efficient institutions, which are difficult to establish because they are public goods. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), the problem is that there is currently no generally accepted theory for how they can be established or why they are reproduced. Following standard assumptions about self-interested rational agency, socially efficient institutions of the type described above would not exist, and poor countries that lack them would not be able to change from inefficient to efficient institutions.

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See also Development, Political; Institutionalization; Institutional Theory; Institutions and Institutionalism

Further Readings


CHARISMA

Most basically, charisma refers to a rare trait found in certain humans that combines unusual charm and an ascribed “magnetic” quality of personality and/or appearance. Deriving from the Greek word χάρις (charisma), it includes the meaning of “gift” or “divine favor,” in particular with reference to innate and sophisticated personal communication and persuasiveness.

Charisma as a concept has been employed in several contexts, as a religious concept, a sociological concept, or a psychological concept, and also in journalistic and common language usage. Although impossible to operationalize accurately, charisma is often used to describe, or rather to label, a personality trait that includes the seemingly “supernatural” ability of some rare persons to lead, charm, persuade, and inspire others due to their “magnetic,” alluring quality, without using power or threat. It refers to an ascribed quality, not to be achieved purposefully, in certain people who draw the attention and admiration (but also hatred if the attribution of charisma is perceived to be dangerous) of others.

As a political concept, charisma became famous most of all due to the analytical formulation by Max Weber (1864–1920) as one of his three types
Charisma of legitimate rule (legitime Herrschaft). In addition to the rational-legal (-bureaucratic) rule (legale Herrschaft) and the traditional rule (traditionale Herrschaft), the charismatic rule (charismatische Herrschaft) was applied by Weber (1924/1947) to historical forms of political domination “resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him” (p. 215). In his writings about charismatic rule, Weber (1946) applies the term charisma to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded to be of divine or similar supernatural origin, and on the basis of which an individual is perceived and accepted as a “leader.” . . . How the quality in question is ultimately judged from any more general ethical, aesthetic, or other point of view is, of course, irrelevant for purposes of definition. What only matters is how the individual is actually regarded by his “adherents” or “disciples.” (p. 329)

Charisma thus denotes a relationship rather than an individual personality attribute. Should the strength of this belief fade, the domination of the charismatic leader can also fade quickly, which is why this form of rule can be very unstable, as the exercise of charisma is founded purely on its recognition by the leader’s followers. Although charismatic domination evolves in contexts of traditional and/or rational-legal rule, it tends to challenge these forms of rule and is therefore interpreted by Weber as revolutionary. Although charismatic domination represents personal and noninstitutionalized leadership, Weber points to some processes of longer duration for which he employed the term routinization of charisma (Veralltäglichung des Charisma). Under the constant challenge of traditional and/or rational-legal forms of domination, he recognizes the partial institutionalization of charisma through the establishment of specified positions open exclusively to persons who demonstrate special personal qualities. Institutionalized charisma is also represented by charisma of office (Amtscharisma), which pertains to beliefs that certain officeholders, by virtue of occupying an office (e.g., priesthood), acquire certain special powers or qualities. By contrast, the pure personal charisma attributed to revolutionaries, prophets, and sages resists institutional influences; it is antithetical to stable authority based on fixed codes and customs.

Weber saw the charismatic leader as a vital agent of social, political, and religious change, which led to some criticism attributing an idealistic “Great Men” theory of history to him. In any case, charismatic leaders generally are said to arise in unsettled times permeated by disorienting socio-cultural change. In such periods, unconventional political and/or religious groups arise composed of people who are fearful of the future, who hope that by placing their faith in some charismatic leader they will eradicate the past and protect their lives against unknown and unseen dangers. For example, the two most charismatic leaders in the 20th century are Mahatma Gandhi in India and Nelson Mandela in South Africa. Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran is an example of a leader with combined personal and office charisma.

The volatility of charismatic authority and of groups manifesting charismatic leadership has been a persistent theme. In essence, charismatic domination is unstable because it lacks both institutional restraints and institutional supports. The absence of institutional restraints on charismatic leaders coincides with the lack of institutional supports available to sustain a leader’s authority. Charismatic domination is fundamentally a precarious state of affairs because the leader’s claims to domination rest purely on subjective factors, as the perceptions of the followers of his or her extraordinary qualities may be situation specific and ephemeral. The charismatic leader must continually face the prospect that her or his special “gift” of “grace” will no longer be perceived the way it once was and that her or his authority will fade, as happened in the case of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Charismatic leaders must continually be on the alert for threats to their authority from outsiders, dissidents, and rivals within the movement as well as from their administrative staff of traditional and/or rational-legal domination. The latter is generally oriented toward expanding the scope
of its authority and rationalizing administrative procedures to the detriment of the charismatic leader’s freedom of action, sometimes leading to his or her actual deposition.

An additional consequence of the lack of institutional supports for charismatic leadership involves the absence of regularized procedures for the transfer of authority, that is, the problem of succession. The failure to effectively institutionalize the charisma of the founding leader usually leads to intensifying factionalism and ultimately to the end of charismatic domination.

The precariousness and instability of charismatic leadership and its consequences in terms of group volatility, factionalism, and possible violent episodes represent instances in which the concept of charisma can facilitate the explanation of sociohistorical events. In this context, the concept of charisma has been criticized as basically a descriptive concept that labels rather than explains the power of leaders and the submission of believers. It has been suggested, further, that the development of controversial new movements and noninstitutionalized forms of charismatic behavior has been enhancing the importance of charisma. Yet charismatic authority and its concomitants in terms of the tendency to view social relationships and organizations in personal terms and to envision a messianic termination of present evils is generally thought to be associated more with traditional rather than complex modern societies.

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See also Caudillismo; Legitimacy; Populism; Social Movements

Further Readings


CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

Political families can be identified, following Maurice Duverger’s approach of familles spirituelles, as parties that share the same ideological inspiration, by adopting Stein Rokkan’s structural approach, which identifies parties according to their roots in social cleavages or in terms of institutional international networks, which connect ideologically similar parties in various countries. In the case of the Christian Democratic parties (hereafter CDPs), all these approaches provide fruitful hints in assessing the profile of this political family across countries, since the evolution of the ideological and social orientations coincided with changes in the international organization. This entry discusses some specific features of CDPs, their origins and their evolution over time, and their role in the present world.

CDP is a specific label that implies a rather narrow focus—parties sharing the “Christian-democratic ideology.” However, the acronym CDP is often used more loosely. If we were to follow the structuralist and ideological approaches very strictly, all Christian parties would be part of this political family. To classify CDPs, Rokkan’s framework can be used to refer specifically to religious parties that either arose in Catholic countries as the result of a church–state conflict or were formed when independence was sought by Catholics versus a dominant power as in Belgium, Ireland, and also partly Poland at the time of national independence after World War I. Because the formation of CDPs involved primarily the relationship between the Catholic Church (hereafter the Church) and the political sphere, Protestant denominations of Christianity play a minimal role in CDPs (with the partial exception of the Netherlands) and, thus, are not discussed in this entry.
However, to provide a complete picture, other Christian parties do exist in Europe—for example, in Norway since the end of World War II and in Sweden and Finland since the 1960s and the 1970s, respectively. But these parties represent only a very small number of voters. After 1989, some CDPs emerged in the new democracies in Central-Eastern Europe—for example, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP) in Hungary, the Slovenian Christian Democrats (Slovenski krščanski demokrati, SKD) in Slovenia, the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai partija, LKD), which in 2001 merged with the Christian Democratic Union to form the Lithuanian Christian Democrats—Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai, LKD) in Lithuania, the Christian Democratic Movement (Křesťanskodemokratické hnutie, KDH) in Slovakia, and the Christian and Democratic Union/Czech People’s Party (Křesťanská a demokratická unie/Československá strana lidová, KDU-ČSL) in the Czech Republic. All these parties and the various subsequent mergers never played a pivotal role comparable with their Western counterparts. In most of these cases, they did not even attain 10% of the votes. Most striking is the absence of a true CDP in the fervently Catholic Poland, except for a very short period.

Further, CDPs are present, in descending order of political influence, in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. In Latin America, CDPs played a significant role in various countries thanks to prominent leaders such as Eduardo Frei in Chile and Rafael Caldera in Venezuela. In 1949, these parties created a regional organization, the Christian Democratic Organization of America (CDOA). The formation of CDPs in Latin America followed a different route from the one taken in Europe. Some Catholic parties were present in Latin America in the 19th century, but they were much more conservative than the nascent Catholic political organizations in Europe at the time. After the 1930s, and especially after the 1950s, new, more genuine “Christian Democratic” parties emerged in Latin America, often in opposition to preexisting Catholic parties, as in the case of Ecuador and Uruguay. The most successful case among these parties was the Chilean Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC), which played a dominant role in the democratic periods before and after the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. Other relevant parties are the Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristiano de Venezuela, COPEI) in Venezuela, the Guatemalan Christian Democracy (Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca, DCG) in Guatemala, and the PDC in El Salvador, all of which dramatically declined in the late 1990s, and the Social Christian Unity Party (Partido de Unidad Socialchristiana, PUSC) in Costa Rica and the union of the Christian Democratic Party with the Popular Democrat legislative group (Partido Demócrata Cristiano/ Democracia Popular, PDC–DP) in Ecuador.

Even in their initial formation, CDPs in Latin America had a much looser relationship with the Church than did their European counterparts. However, they have caught up with European trends both in their emphasis on social concerns—at least for most of them—in the first postwar decades and then in relaxing their religious connection following the European trend of a more secular-conservative approach. Given the instability of the Latin American regimes and the frequent disruption of democracy (with the exception of Costa Rica), this analysis will focus mainly on the European context.

In Europe, a different approach to the study of CDPs, such as the “actor-based” one offered by Stathis Kalyvas, leads to the same focus on Catholic parties only (again with the exception of the Netherlands). According to Kalyvas’s landmark contribution (in his book The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe) “core European” CDPs were the by-product of Catholic political entrepreneurs’ reactions to the mounting secular and anticlerical attitude of the liberal elites at the end of the 19th century. The Church did not sponsor the formation of religious/Catholic political organizations; on the contrary, it acted to limit, discourage, or even suppress such initiatives. This interpretation stresses the autonomous role of political entrepreneurs during the formation of the religious parties in Western Europe. The Catholic parties of the late 19th and early 20th centuries grounded their legitimacy in themselves; they did not depend on an external institution for their legitimation. Such internal legitimacy is an important asset for the institutionalization and organizational development of a political party. But despite these favorable internal conditions, the Catholic
Christian Democratic Parties

parties either collapsed or underwent profound modifications after World War II. However, even though they played a rather limited role in the prewar party systems, their role became pivotal and in some cases dominant in postwar Europe. Scholars disagree on the question of whether this shift in the status of European CDPs is best understood as a complete break between prewar and postwar parties or whether there was some continuity despite the change. This academic dispute can be better understood in light of a series of factors: (a) the attitude of the Church vis-à-vis the “modern world,” and of CDPs in particular; (b) the ideological renewal of CDPs; (c) the novel postwar international context; and (d) the role played by CDPs in the various party systems.

Christian Democratic Parties’ Formation and Evolution

The Church and the Modern World

As the first Catholic parties in Europe emerged at the turn of the 20th century, they were in more or less open conflict with the Church over the acceptance of the principles of liberal democracy. The Church still indulged in its self-representation of a “societas perfecta” with the Pope at its apex—as a sovereign among sovereigns—and maintained its condemnation of modern society and liberal-democratic principles, which it held were leading to a general and harmful “social disorder.” The anti-capitalist “social doctrine” of the Church as expressed in the encyclical *Rerum novarum* (1891) derives from this vision of society. However, in the same period, Catholic intellectual circles, especially in Italy and France, elaborated on the mundane ideology of “Christian democracy,” which advocated the protection and promotion of Catholic interests through social networks and communities and the fostering of these positions in the political arena as well. In other words, Christian democracy recognized the opportunity offered by democracy for developing social activities based on Catholic principles and defending Catholic values (and interests) through democratic institutions. The Church radically condemned this ideology in the encyclical *Pascendi* (1907), declaring that the Christian-democratic ideology would cause “confusion between evangelization and the promotion of democracy.” In accordance with this, the pontificate of Pius XI (1922–1939) aimed at restoring the “kingdom of Christ” against the liberal society.

This intransigent position was confronted during World War I and its aftermath. The war involved, in an unprecedented way, the religious hierarchies and the religious constituency in support of each respective state, and this relaxed the negative relationship between the Church and the liberal state. For the first time, the Catholic world overtly supported the state, ending that sense of extraneousness that had been growing since the 1880s. Moreover, the introduction of mass male suffrage enfranchised millions of new voters, and these voters needed a guide to prevent their becoming adherents of atheist socialism. As a consequence, the Church somewhat relaxed its negative attitude regarding political activities by Catholics and Catholic parties, even if it avoided any direct sponsorship.

CDPs did not exploit this “autonomy” from the Church by building up a solid identity and institutionalizing the party organization; on the contrary, they suffered from this distance and remained prone to adapting themselves to whatever position the Church took. Lacking open legitimation by the Church, they were constantly seeking the Church’s approval of their policies. When the Church signed concordats with fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in the 1930s, the CDPs, with few exceptions, accommodated themselves to fascism and in some instances even supported it. The most dramatic case was provided by the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). The radical anticlerical attitude of the Spanish Republican forces led the Church to sponsor, even with enthusiasm, General Francisco Franco’s restoration and the intervention of the Italian fascist troops. The Church espoused the fascist regimes so easily because of its long-drawn-out opposition to modern society, whose liberal institutions and worldview the Church still despised. In addition, the economic depression was seen as a failure of capitalism, increasing the dissatisfaction with liberal society. The economic crisis reinvigorated Christian social doctrine, which was seen now as a “humanistic” third way between capitalism and communism.

The Emergence of Personalism

In the same period, however, a different elaboration was emerging, especially in Italian and
French intellectual circles. That milieu, where Emmanuel Mounier and Jacques Maritain played a crucial role, produced an original and quite powerful “ideology” of Christian inspiration: personalism. In a nutshell, personalism emphasizes the role of the person in society: The person is not conceptualized as the individual of the liberal tradition, an “isolated monad,” but rather as a part of a collective body, intertwined with all the others through a network of associations and communities. Each person has intrinsic value and value as a member of a community or an intermediary body. Persons cannot be disconnected from their social environment, starting with the family. This new ideology played a dramatic role in moving CDPs (and to some extent, the Church) toward acceptance of the modern world and in distancing them from fascism. The most visible confirmation of this change came with the Pope’s Christmas address in 1944, when for the first time he acknowledged democracy explicitly and clearly (apertis verbis). According to some scholars, however, Pius XII (1939–1958) accepted democracy only instrumentally, as the antagonist of communism, rather than for its own sake. Thus, according to Martin Conway and Tom Buchanan, Catholicism in the 1940s and 1950s remained intransigent and made few concessions to the modern world.

**Postwar Christian Democratic Parties**

At any rate, the CDPs that reemerged or were created ex novo after World War II proved much stronger than those of the prewar years. The international context, the Church strategy and profile, the CDPs’ ideological-religious references, the party systems’ new configurations, and the issue at stake are the factors that explain this change.

**Church Profile and Strategy**

World War II changed the image and the mass perception of the Church. Contrary to the antimodern, traditionalist, and mildly profascist stance of the prewar Church, after the conflict it emerged with a new image thanks to its charitable, comprehensive, and universal messages. France was an exception because of the deep involvement of the episcopate with the Vichy regime, which was partially counterbalanced by the support of the lower clergy for the anti-Nazi Maquis. The Church’s acceptance of democracy and its more or less unequivocal accommodation with the modern world facilitated a positive reception of its role in a larger sector of the population than was the case previously. Even more important was the Church’s modified attitude vis-à-vis the political presence of Catholics. Whereas in the interwar years the Church had kept its distance from the Christian parties and even despised them, during the war, the Church began to support CDPs and even sponsored their resurgence and the creation of new CDPs. This positive relationship provided the CDPs with the support of the Church organization: Priests became quite active, and parishes served as local branches or centers of support for the CDPs.

**Anticommunism**

One reason for this change of attitude lay in the new international setting. With the descending of the Iron Curtain and with atheist communism gaining power in Eastern Europe and making strides in Western Europe, too, the Church called on all religious persons to defend Christian civilization. And the CDPs followed suit. Anticommunism was the strongest and most successful appeal for the CDPs. They became the bastion against communist subversion and its antireligious politics. This appeal led to an enlargement of the electoral constituency; not only the faithful but the moderate voters as well were mobilized by anticommunism.

**Location of CDPs in the Party System**

CDPs gained a pivotal position in the various party systems. They were almost always a part of coalition governments in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and France until 1958 (and afterward the residual component in the United Democratic Front [UDF]). In Austria and Germany, however, they had to be in the opposition during some periods (the Austrian People’s Party [Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP] in the 1970s and 1980s and the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [Christlich-Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union, CDU–CSU] in the 1970s and in the 1998–2005 legislatures in Germany). The CDPs’ central position and broader
ideological appeal were supported by the postwar collapse of the moderate-conservative bourgeois parties. These parties were discredited by their inability to counteract the totalitarianism of the interwar period or by their acquiescence to it. Where they attempted a resurgence after the war, it turned out to be a fiasco. The CDPs thus absorbed the conservative constituency too. In this way, the CDPs went beyond their traditional rural constituency, penetrating into the urban bourgeoisie (and sometimes the urban proletariat, too, thanks to the espousal of social welfare in the first years after the war, following the example of the French Popular Republican Movement [Mouvement Républicain Populaire, MRP], the most leftist and welfare oriented of all CDPs).

**Ideology and Policy**

The postwar CDPs’ ideological bases were their reference to the Church on moral issues; the elevation of personalism as an encompassing “ideology”; the adoption of welfare systems combined with the principle of subsidiarity, placing the family at the center; an adequate dose of state intervention congruent with the social market economy; and a consensual/consociational conception of democracy, multilateralism, and peaceful coexistence. In particular, in the 1950s and 1960s, CDPs competed with communists and socialists on their own ground, presenting a social and “humanist” alternative to the Left’s socialist project. Later, the CDPs fully endorsed the “social market economy,” which became their distinctive economic policy. All these elements have not changed up to the present time, except that state intervention has been downsized due to the neoliberal mood of the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, CDPs were affected by the combination of the processes of modernization and secularization, which reduced the social basis of religion and, by the Second Vatican Council, had distanced many believers from active political support of CDPs. The Council had a tremendous impact on the Church and on most fervent Catholics. As far as politics was concerned, the Council fully recognized the principle of liberal democracy as such—and not instrumentally as a bastion against communism—and it disengaged the Church from day-to-day politics and from open support of CDPs. These changes provoked some criticism and backlash against many CDPs but not all of them. As far as their electoral fortunes were concerned, in the Netherlands and Belgium, the impact was strong, negative, and immediate; in Austria and Switzerland, perceptible but limited; and surprisingly quite limited in Italy. Only the CDU–CSU in Germany, thanks also to its interreligious nature, did not suffer any reversal.

The process of secularization and the decline or collapse of most “Christian Democratic” parties in the core of Europe (the Christian Democrats [Democrazia Cristiana, DC] in Italy, the Christian People’s Party/Social Christian Party [Christelijke Volkspartij/Parti Social Chrétien, CVP–PSC] in Belgium, and the Christian Democratic Appeal [Christen-Democratisch Appè, CDA] in the Netherlands) favored a shift toward a more moderate and less religious orientation, following the imprint of the CDU–CSU. The evolution of the European Peoples Party (EPP) in the European Union (EU) shows this tendency quite clearly. EPP was progressively enlarged by moderate secular parties, which relaxed the religious tone while keeping some basic tenants of the CDP ideology: (a) the humanist personalism, (b) the centrality of the family, (c) the welfare concern and the social market economy, (d) subsidiarity, (e) the pro-EU attitude, and (f) the multilateral orientation in the international sphere.

**Electoral Evolution**

In the first elections after World War II, CDPs emerged as the strongest parties in France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, and Germany and as the third strongest in Switzerland. With the exception of France, where the MRP rapidly declined facing a newly established competitor, the Gaullist Party, and then collapsed with the advent of the Fifth Republic, the other CDPs retained their pivotal position for at least 3 decades. In the 1970s, their electoral fortunes and key positions in coalition governments declined. The Belgian and Dutch CDPs suffered the worst blows, losing votes and their dominant position up to the point where the three main Dutch religious parties had to create an interconfessional new party (the CDA) in order to retain their relevance in the political system. In Austria,
the ÖVP lost its primacy to the Socialist Party in the 1970s and never recovered afterward. In Germany, the CDU–CSU, too, scored below the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) in the 1970s; it recovered in the 1980s but lost again in the 1998 elections. The most dramatic decline was experienced by Italy’s Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana, DC), a party that had always been in government since 1945 as the first national party; it was reduced to nearly 10% in 1994, losing almost 20 percentage points in 2 years (from 1992 to 1994). From the DC, a variety of parties emerged: The most relevant were the Italian Popular Party (Partito Popolare Italiano, PPI), its more direct heir, and the more moderate Christian Democratic Union (Cristiani Democratici Uniti, CDU) and Christian Democratic Center (Centro Cristiano Democratico, CCD), which then merged into the Union of the Center (Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro, UDC).

The crisis of many CDPs was due mainly to the process of secularization, on the one hand, and the reemergence of moderate-conservative parties, on the other, which in the first postwar years had left the political space empty. This reemergence brought a new ideological reference—neoliberalism and neoconservatism—which contributed to the marginalization of the two main elements of the CDP ideology, personalism and social concerns.

**International Networks**

The evolution of the international network of CDPs illustrates quite well the recent changes in this political family. Immediately after the war, in 1947, CDP leaders met informally and quite discreetly in the so-called Geneva Circle. That was an occasion for facilitating the relationship between the German Christian Democratic politicians and the other European partners, especially the French ones. It was meant mainly to promote mutual understanding among former rivals and to support the German chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Parallel to this initiative was the somewhat more formal Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI), which was a gathering of Catholic parties and associations. The NEI worked together with the confessional parties of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later in the European Economic Community (EEC) member states. In 1971, the NEI evolved into the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUDC).

This development of international networks in Europe was paralleled by a more global initiative to bring together all the CDPs in the world. Significantly, the Christian Democratic World Union (CDWU) was founded in Chile, in 1961, emphasizing in this way the relevance of Latin American parties and the truly international scope of the organization. The golden era of CDPs, as already stated, came to an end with the process of secularization, with the Church distancing itself from daily politics since the 1970s, and with the return with a vengeance of moderate-conservative ideology and political forces.

In the mid-1970s under the auspices of the CDU–CSU, a new organization was created, the European Democratic Union (EDU), which brought together CDPs such as the CDU–CSU and the ÖVP, and also secular moderate-conservative parties. This move influenced also the former EUDC, which evolved into the EPP in 1978. The new name, not by chance, did not include any reference to religious inspiration. The German CDU–CSU endeavor to enlarge the former CDP network to include secular moderate-conservative parties proved successful: The EPP expanded to become the strongest parliamentary group in the European Parliament in the 1990s. The tendency to loosen the religious connection was not counteracted by the core Catholic parties because of their growing marginality. Such trends affected also the international organization Christian Democratic World Union (CDWU), which in 1999 changed its name to Christian Democratic and People’s Parties International.

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**See also** Christianity; Church–State Relationships; Parties; Party Systems; Religious Movements

**Further Readings**

Christianity generally refers to a system of belief that centers on the assertion that Jesus of Nazareth is Christ the Messiah, the Savior of all humanity. It is embodied in the historical reality of communities that spread across the world through 2 millennia, with a wide variety of expressions in life and liturgy. Because of this earthly embodiment of their belief in human society, Christianity has been the fount of theories and practices that are of particular interest to those in the field of politics.

Source

The “good news” that Christianity proclaims is salvation by the person and the work of Jesus Christ as attested in the scriptures. The New Testament provides basic accounts of the advent of Jesus and his subsequent reception. Because Jesus announced that his advent was the fulfillment of the promise of salvation foreshadowed in the writings of the Israelites, the Old Testament is also included in the authentic canon of Christianity. The terms Old Testament and New Testament therefore suggest a Christian perspective. In Christian tradition, the Old Testament is read in anticipation of the coming Christ and the New Testament in remembrance of the crucified and risen Christ.

The Old Testament contains the same books that Judaism views as scripture, though different in sequence and importance. It has three parts, roughly reflecting the Hebrew distinction of law, prophets, and other writings. The New Testament may be divided into two parts. The first part has four narratives of Jesus from his birth to his death and resurrection and a record of the deeds of the apostles. The Gospels according to Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John were written around the late 1st century, with different authorships, sources, and viewpoints, projecting a polyphonic but coherent figure of Jesus. The second part is composed of letters, written by the Apostle Paul and other early disciples, addressed to the scattered churches and believers of the 1st and 2nd centuries. Taken together, the Bible gives a view of the world and its history, beginning from creation to its apocalyptic consummation.

Judaism, Christianity, and Islam share not only part of their scriptural texts but also the concept of canon. The word is derived from the Greek word meaning rule and refers to a collection of writings exclusively demarcated as authoritative to their faith. The concept is missing in Eastern religious traditions, notably Buddhism, and its absence results in ever-increasing bodies of scriptures. The canon and the creeds it produces mutually authenticate each other and serve as the ultimate guarantor of “orthodoxy,” a concept unique to the Abrahamic traditions. The process of editing and defining the canon took a number of politically charged stages through several centuries, and its different interpretations have often lent themselves to controversy.

Founding

Historians agree that a Jew called Jesus of Nazareth became the source of a distinct religious movement that arose from within Judaism. He was born in line with the Old Testament prophecies, proclaimed the advent of the reign of God, and was crucified by
Pontius Pilate sometime between CE 30 and 33. According to Christian doctrine, Jesus was resurrected from the dead and appeared before disbelieving disciples for a short period before his ascension into heaven. Christianity claims that this Jesus was God incarnate. Not merely was he the messenger, he was the message. Not merely did he give moral teachings and exemplify them by his life and death, he was God himself in utmost humiliation. His resurrection is understood as divine approbation and victory over death. The incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection thus constitute the fundamental basis of Christian doctrine—that God came into this world to save humanity from their sin and alienation and restored them to wholeness by the sacrificial death of the sinless Jesus and that those who believe in him shall be saved.

The biblical accounts of this salvific event gave rise to a series of difficult questions regarding the nature of Christ and his relationship with God. The first few centuries of Christian history were spent in giving definitive forms to the faith that Christians came to believe and confess. The first Council of Nicaea, convened by the Roman Emperor Constantine the Great in CE 325, formulated the doctrine of the Trinity to confirm that Christ the Son of God is of the same substance and coeternal with God the Father. God is three persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—united in one eternal essence. The Council of Chalcedon in CE 451 dealt with the issue of the nature of Christ and declared that he is truly divine and truly human at the same time. These doctrinal formulae are full of mystery not amenable to arithmetic reasoning, but they are the end result of the critical and often controversial reflections on the faith expressions of the early Christians.

The doctrinal decision-making process was naturally subject to concerns that were not purely religious, but it would be misleading to think of the development of Christian doctrines merely in terms of political manipulation and exploitation. The conspiracy theories often framed for contemporary entertainment have no place in actual history, for there is no individual or organization that has the power and authority strong enough to steer the voluntary faith of the multitude of believers in a preferred direction. Theologians and delegates of all levels, even the pope and ecumenical councils, must give due recognition to what the congregations actually believe and practice, albeit critically. The modern sanctioning of the Marian dogmas by the Roman Catholic Church is a good example. The age-old maxim *lex orandi, lex credendi* (how we pray defines the rule of faith) epitomizes this organic and indissoluble correspondence of historical faith and its theoretical formulation.

It is difficult to identify the political vision of early Christianity. While Jesus was crucified by Roman authorities for his allegedly political assertion that he was “the king of the Jews,” the coming kingdom he proclaimed did not lay any immediate claim beyond individual ethics. “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s” (Matthew 22:21) well captures his spiritual claim. The teachings of both Jesus and Paul are in most cases marked with the anticipation of the impending eschaton, and as such they offer little to the constructive agenda of temporal politics. Paul’s injunction not to resist but to obey political authorities (Romans 13:1–7) should also be understood within this context of imminent eschatology. Withdrawal from the world was the guiding principle for the early Christians.

**History**

For the sake of brevity, an overview of Christian history is presented here in three stages that combine epochs and geography. The first stage is called the “Pan-Mediterranean” era, for this is the period in which Christianity spread along the European and African shorelines of the Mediterranean Sea. The axiomatic question of this period pertains to their self-definition: “What is Christianity?” Using the wisdom of Greek philosophy and Roman law, Christianity defined orthodoxy by councils and dogmas and organized the church and its ruling hierarchy. After the imperial decision to employ Christianity as the state religion, it began to exercise influence in all realms of human life and extended over the European continent to form a gigantic compound of religion and culture called *corpus Christianum*. The early principle of withdrawal was replaced with that of synthesis, mutual interference, and even domination. The 11th century saw the official severance of the Eastern Church from the Western, but both traditions developed elaborate systems to balance the secular and ecclesiastical powers.
The second stage is the “Pan-Atlantic” era. A major split caused by the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century made it clear that there could be a plurality of faith in geographical proximity. For Christianity, this meant the task of designing a civil society in which religious adherence was not necessarily defined by region or clan. The paradigm shift from parish to free church was gradual on the European continent, but a small number of English-speaking Puritans took an epoch-making step by sailing the Atlantic sea to the New World to build a civil society in accordance with their own choice of religion. The Christian world evolved on both sides of the Atlantic, and their common question was “How should Christianity be woven into a modern civil society?” Medieval synthesis was taken apart, and new models of relationship between church and state were explored. This era coincided with the Enlightenment, and issues of human rights began to command attention through repeated experiences of persecution and oppression, providing the basis for the claims of religious toleration and other basic rights including the freedom of speech, press, assembly, and voluntary association. The modern vision of Christian politics has been reshaped accordingly, taking into account the distinction between the private and public spheres of individual life.

Christianity in the third stage moves its geographical center further West to represent the “Pan-Pacific” era. Though a thread of early missions had reached India and China in the first era, Asia came in contact with Christianity primarily via missionaries from America in the 19th and 20th centuries. In turn, it was in Asia that Christianity encountered radically different forms of religion for the first time. Facing traditions such as Hinduism and Buddhism, the predominant question now asked was “Why Christianity among other alternatives?” The presence of other religions relativizes the internal distinction of Catholic and Protestant, Western and Eastern Churches. As the vanguard of Christian history, Asia and the Pacific now share with the United States a leading role in the development of global Christianity. American Christianity remains exceptionally active in comparison with “post-Christian” Europe, where it is more a cultural heritage than a lived reality. In regions where Christianity shows a strong presence today, the surge of nationalism and ethnocentrism supported by conservative Christians has gained the attention of political scientists.

Contemporary Outlook

Statistics show that Christianity is no longer a religion of the West. Christians living in Europe and North America now account for a mere third of the world Christian population. Among other religions, Christianity continues to have the largest number of adherents, with Islam having the second greatest number. Within the Christian tradition, the Roman Catholic Church is by far the largest body, with more than 1 billion members. The Eastern tradition is divided by several patriarchs including Greek, Russian, and other Oriental Churches. The Episcopal Church originated in England but now has the worldwide Anglican Communion, in which the English Church is in fact a minority. Among the Protestants, Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist, Lutheran, and other denominations have often been named “mainline,” but in most parts of the world they are rapidly yielding to the fast-growing Pentecostal or Charismatic movement. This movement emphasizes direct and personal revelation through the Holy Spirit, with enthusiastic and often emotional affirmation of miraculous phenomena in efforts to imitate the fervency of the early church.

The church is a human and earthly entity instituted for the transmission and promulgation of the original revelatory content that is by nature difficult to institutionalize. As long as Christianity tries to remain faithful to its contradictory mandate, there will always be oscillation between institutionalism and the free spirit. The cycle of formation and reformation is a hallmark of life.

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See also Church–State Relationships; Religious Movements; Theocracy; Tolerance

Further Readings
Church–State Relationships

Church–state relationships often produce complicated political and constitutional issues even in advanced, consolidated democracies. Despite the expectations of the modernization theory that predicted a decline in the political importance of religion with the rise of modern industrial society, current cross-national studies indicate that the relations between church and state or the question of secularism are still major issues in many societies. Even in countries where a basic consensus exists on these relationships, religiously driven moral issues, such as divorce, abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia, school prayer, and public funding of church schools and other religious institutions, are still hotly debated. This entry examines variations among Western democracies in their approach to secularism as well as the more complicated problems in the Islamic world.

The common brief definition of secularism is the separation of state affairs and religion. It is also commonly accepted that this implies the absence of an official (or state) religion (established church); freedom of religion and conscience for all citizens regardless of religion and sect; full equality before the law and access to public office, again regardless of religion and sect; the absence of a legal requirement for state acts to conform to religious rules and injunctions; and the separation of institutions performing religious services and public (governmental) activities.

Not all Western democracies meet all these conditions. In England, the king (or the queen) is the head of the Anglican Church. The Norwegian Constitution states that the Evangelical-Lutheran religion shall remain the official religion of the State. The inhabitants professing it are bound to bring up their children in the same. (Article 2)

The King shall at all times profess the Evangelical-Lutheran religion, and uphold and protect the same. (Article 4)

More than half the number of the Council of State [i.e., Council of the Ministers] shall profess the official religion of the State. (Article 12)

Under the Danish Constitution,

the Evangelical-Lutheran Church shall be the established Church of Denmark and as such shall be supported by the State. (Article 4)

The King shall be a member of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church. (Article 6)

The Greek Constitution of 1975 states that

the prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church . . . . The text of the Holy Scripture shall be maintained unaltered. Official translation of the text into any other form of language, without prior sanction by the Autocephalus Church of Greece and the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople, is prohibited. (Article 3)

The Greek constitution also prohibits proselytism (Article 13 [2]) and provides for a special regime for Aghion Oros (Mount Athos), under which the region is governed by its 20 Holy Monasteries, as a self-governing part of the Greek state (Article 105).

The preamble of the Irish Constitution of 1999 declares that the Constitution was adopted in the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred . . . [and] humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial.

The 1997 Polish Constitution contains the following:
all citizens of the Republic, both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good, and beauty, as well as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from other sources.

It also refers to “the Christian heritage of the Nation” and “our responsibility before God.” The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The U.S. Supreme Court has issued many decisions that define the scope of this constitutional provision, known as the Establishment Clause.

Despite these seemingly significant deviations from the conventional meaning of secularism in the constitutional formulas, it is clear that religion no longer plays a determining role in the public life of the advanced industrial democracies. In virtually all these societies, the principle of equality before the law is firmly established, discrimination on the basis of religion is forbidden, full freedom of religion and conscience is recognized for all religions and sects as well as for nonbelievers, and the legitimacy of public (governmental) acts do not normally derive from conformity to religious rules and injunctions. This seems to be the irreducible core meaning of secularism and also an indispensable prerequisite of democratic government.

Beneath these common core elements, however, one can observe two different conceptions of, and approaches to, secularism in Western democracies. One, which may be termed passive secularism, essentially means a state neutral with respect to, or equidistant from, all religions and sects without precluding the public visibility of religion. “Assertive” or “combative” secularism (laicité de combat), on the other hand, aims at eliminating religion from the public sphere and confining it to the private domain, that is, to the places of worship and the consciences of the individuals.

Most Western democracies adhere to some version of the passive secularism model, while France and Turkey are the chief protagonists of the assertive secularism approach. The difference between the two approaches can be explained by different patterns of political development. The critical condition that affects the emergence of one or the other model, as Ahmet Kuru argues, is the absence or existence of an ancien régime that combines monarchy with a hegemonic religion. The emergence of assertive secularism in France and Turkey seems to be a response to such a combination of historical conditions. The assertive character is much more marked in Turkey because, in contrast to the strict separation of religion and state in France, the Turkish state maintains a monopoly over religious services and religious education. Therefore, Turkey provides an example not of strict separation but of a system where the individualized version of religion is at the service and under the control of the state.

The situation in the Muslim world is more complicated. It is a commonplace to argue that, as opposed to Christianity, Islam assumes the unity of state and religion and, therefore, is inherently incompatible with secularism; and to the extent that secularism is a sine qua non for democracy, this also means incompatibility with liberal democracy. Indeed, many Muslims see secularism as a creation of Christendom.

The picture is more complicated and nuanced, however, than what these extreme positions suggest. While maintaining the unity of state and religion in principle, Islam provides almost no rules in the field of public law. Even the major Islamic political institution, the Caliphate, is not based on the Koran and Sunnah (the Prophet’s sayings and actions) but on the consensus of believers (icma) after the death of the Prophet, and it ceased to exist with its abolition by the Turkish parliament in 1924. The Islamic law (sharia) covers mostly private law relations (notably, personal status, marriage, divorce, inheritance) and provides some rules in the fields of criminal law and procedural law. Therefore, Islam has been considered compatible with very diverse forms of government in the past and at present. Many Muslim countries have secularized their legal systems to some extent, usually leaving areas such as family and inheritance laws subject to the Islamic rules. Again, Turkey is one of the very few states with a Muslim majority having a totally secularized legal system.

In addition, there remains a considerable difference between Muslim countries and Western democracies in their approaches to secularism. Even in the constitutions of most secularized Arab countries, it is stipulated that Islam is the religion
of the state, the chief of the state has to be a Muslim, and the sharia is a major source of legislation. Further, certain rules of the sharia, such as those pertaining to inequality between genders, inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims, the prohibition of apostasy, and a number of rules in the field of criminal law are clearly incompatible with liberal democratic norms.

When it comes to popular attitudes toward democracy, however, there does not seem to exist a major difference between Western and Muslim societies, contradicting Samuel Huntington’s (1996) clash-of-civilizations thesis. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2004), in their worldwide survey including 11 societies with a Muslim majority, have concluded that as regards democratic values (support for democratic ideals, evaluations of how well democracy works in practice, and disapproval of strong leaders), there is minimal difference between the Muslim world and the West. According to their findings, the chief cultural difference between the West and the Muslim world concerns not political values but social values toward gender equality and sexual liberalization.

In cases of many advanced democracies, a reasonable degree of consensus over the place of religion in public life seems to have been constructed after long periods of public debate and negotiations. Even after such a consensus is crafted, however, certain religiously inspired issues are still on the political agenda. Indeed, neither the passive nor the assertive approaches are without problems. Passive secularism presupposes the existence of a broad consensus, which is difficult to maintain in countries with believers of many religions as well as nonbelievers. Assertive secularism, on the other hand, is prone to lead to conflicts between secularists and believers. Secularists will be suspicious of believers’ commitment to a secular democratic system, and believers will react to secularists’ efforts to eliminate religion from the public sphere.

Perhaps the key to the dilemma is the construction of “twin tolerations” (see Stepan, 2001, pp. 213–253), as the system where religious groups are allowed to organize and propagate their views in civil society and political society but refrain from imposing their views on the other members of society, respecting democratic rules and procedures, and where this boundary line is carefully guarded and monitored by the state.

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See also Religion; Religiosity; Religious Movements; Secularism

Further Readings


CITIZENSHIP

The concept of citizenship has a great elasticity of meaning because of its varied spatial and functional dimensions (e.g., we speak of family citizenship, state-national citizenship, cosmopolitan citizenship). The notion is all the more difficult to use as it refers to very different historical experiences, ranging from the civil makeup of ancient Rome to the contemporary experience of postnational citizenship in Europe, including numerous liberal, republican, and communitarian declensions from this membership. Another difficulty lies within an ethical framework that is an essential part of the scientific debate on citizenship. A few years ago, issues related to the ethical implications of citizenship led certain theoreticians to believe that the
notion had become theoretically ineffective in social and political sciences. Although such an opinion may be somewhat excessive, it highlights the need for a rigorous definition of the concept. In this entry, citizenship is defined as (a) a juridical status of membership in a political community, (b) a status that is the condition of the political participation of citizens in the democratic functioning of the community, and (c) a status that endows individuals with a sense of citizenship that differs from their other social and cultural identities. These three basic elements of citizenship are discussed in the first part of the entry; then, recent transformations of modern civic configurations are examined.

**Basic Elements of Citizenship**

Three basic elements are necessary to consolidate the notion of citizenship and to outline distinctive characteristics that make using the term heuristically possible in political science.

**Citizenship as a Juridical Status of Membership**

The first element identifies the juridical foundation of citizenship as a status of membership in a political entity (often national but not exclusively so) that is juridically codified. In this regard, citizenship is often linked to nationality, which entails the recognition of rights and obligations associated with this status; in most nation-states, this criterion of nationality is still the condition for inclusion in the citizen community. With the development of migration trends and with the diversification in the scales of citizenship, the residency criterion is also sometimes taken into account to facilitate the civic integration of those who live in a nation or other juridically defined territory without full membership as a citizen of that nation-state or other group. This juridical foundation is at the center of the sociological debate put forward by Thomas Marshall when, during his famous conference in Cambridge in 1949 (see Gershon Shafir, 1998, chap. 6), he made citizenship a federative concept for political science. For Marshall, who was particularly concerned about the coherence of an English society threatened by class divisions, the interest in this concept lies in the ability of the juridical status to guarantee equal rights to all citizens. In the now established fashion, Marshall characterizes citizenship as consisting of three components: (1) the civil element, that is, individual rights such as freedom of the person, freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of belief, right of ownership, right to sign contracts, right to a fair legal system, and so on; (2) the political element, including the right to participate in political activity, right to run for office, right to vote, right to petition, and so on; and (3) the social element, mainly through the free and equal access to its social welfare system. Heavily influenced by the British historical experience, this liberal and evolutionary model of citizenship still reflects an interest in putting the status of citizenship into a historical perspective that includes the birth of the constitutional state, the advent of universal suffrage, and the birth of the welfare state, all of which encouraged the progressive expansion of such a juridically codified social role. Here, citizenship is a type of indicator of political modernity. This perspective on citizenship, contested by many critics of Marshall, especially Albert Hirschmann, is based on the evolution of Western societies in which these societies moved away from feudalism and its system of discriminatory orders. Since the introduction of this argument, many works have completed this model by including new elements; in particular, scholars such as Will Kymlicka (1995) have added an important cultural dimension that establishes the notion of “multicultural citizenship,” which is intended to take into account cultural, linguistic, or religious diversity. However, in American Citizenship, Judith Shklar (1991) shows that the symbolic possession of citizenship status is often just as important and sometimes even more fundamental than the actual practice of rights attached to it. Taking the example of American citizenship, for a long time denied to those of African ancestry and linked to the practice of slavery until the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, Shklar argues that for many who have benefited from the fight for civil rights, what is important is not only the regular practice of rights as the recognition of a juridical and a political status that give a minimum of social dignity but also this symbolic recognition.

This first element of citizenship gives rise to a number of important debates and scientific studies in political science, including current discussions...
surrounding the dissociation between citizenship and nationality. Whether one considers a postnational model of civic membership, as Rainer Bauböck or Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal suggest (see Shafir, 1998, chap. 10), or analyzes the partial denationalization caused by the emergence of European citizenship in 1992, as described by Yves Déloye (2008), the debate is centered on the pertinent degree of the social closure of the limits of citizenship and the ability today of this status to match juridically the open conception of human rights that now contrasts with the former closed-minded conception of national rights.

Citizenship as a Foundation of Democratic Practice

The second element of citizenship is characterized by the philosophical and historical link between this membership and the workings of political democracy. Because this link marks the advent of a new way of legitimizing power, which is completely dissociated from any aristocratic or theocratic perspective, citizenship entails a division of political work between the government and the governed, which has made the idea of a change in power the very principle of representative democracies. Political science literature usually compares two stances on this issue. In an elitist version, defended in the past by Gaetano Mosca, Joseph Schumpeter, and more recently by Samuel Huntington, the main idea is to protect democracy from excessive interference by citizens, because civic apathy is seen as functional for the democratic political system, helping it avoid “governability crises” such as those encountered in Western democracies in the 1970s. Conversely, the participatory version advocates a strong involvement (in the sense in which Benjamin Barber uses this term) of citizens in the public sphere. The advocates of this opinion are therefore inclined to increase acts of citizenship. In using this term, some theorists have recently advocated a profound transformation of the studies dedicated to citizenship. They leave behind the perspective of citizenship as the possession of a membership status representing the modern civil freedoms guaranteed by the state, which in return demands the loyalty of its citizens, and instead put forward the practice of civic freedom and the repertoire of political expression (e.g., flash mobs, consumer awareness, hijacking political symbols through art), which play a role in making citizens the first actors of a citizenship that escapes the state’s control and sometimes even questions it. The reversal of this perspective from top to bottom cannot be mentioned without referring to the old dialogue between two antagonistic civic conceptions observed by the English historian John Pocock (see Shafir, 1998, chap. 2). According to Pocock, two ideal conceptions of citizenship have coexisted since antiquity. The first, expressed by Aristotle, emphasizes the civic dimension and defines citizenship as a mode of activity specific to humanity; the second conception, outlined in the work of the Roman lawyer Gaius, sees citizenship above all as a specific legal status and one that values its civil dimension. Beyond this founding opposition, the contemporary analysis tends to emphasize the fact that an “act of citizenship” questions the nature of “civic virtues” expected from citizens. Usually when citizenship is discussed, this questioning is related to the normative position of those who participate in the debate. The argument between liberals and communitarians is largely influential in political science and in other disciplines. Following John Rawls, liberals view citizens as individual rational agents rather than as members of a community that helps shape their values. Conversely, the communitarian critique (as presented by Michael Walzer and Alasdair MacIntyre) claims that the status of citizen presupposes an engagement in the public sphere, a sphere that constitutes the cement of the community and the solidarity that characterizes it. The topic of this intense debate, which borders on normative political philosophy and political science, points to the third element of citizenship: the impact on identity.

The Impact of Citizenship on Identity

This third element of citizenship emphasizes the principle of separation between citizen membership and other social memberships—rival sources of identification. As Jean Leca (1990) indicates in his classic text, citizenship constitutes “a civil society distinct from family, lineage and seigneurial communities” (p. 148). If the model of the Western medieval city analyzed by Max Weber is often referred to here as the paradigm of this necessary differentiation between civic identity and corporate
or religious identities, it is, however, with the political experience of liberal revolutions of the 18th century that this illustration of modern citizenship develops. It is then associated with two fundamental historical movements: (1) individuation, which contributes to strongly linking individualism to citizenship, to the extent that the individual and the modern citizen merge in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, and (2) the universalization of rights, which makes citizenship all the more inclusive. By causing a reorganization of social and religious identities between the public and private spheres, citizenship demonstrates the establishment of a social formation where the combination of status and affiliations to primary groups (family, ethnic, religious, etc.) is compatible with the promotion of an allegiance to a political community. As the classic sociologists Émile Durkheim and Georg Simmel had established, the system of division from which these civic allegiances are created favors the emancipation of the individual and the promotion of civil liberty. The classic works of Reinhard Bendix (Nation-Building and Citizenship, 1977) and Ernest Gellner (Culture, Identity and Politics, 1987) show that this civic emancipation is often in harmony with the affirmation of the nation-state, whose cultural cohesion is linked to the ability of citizenship to evoke in individuals a strong sense of identification to its culture and to its political vision. The comparative historical sociology of the nation-state, as described by Déloye (2008) and Juan Linz (1993), claims, however, that this cultural homogeneity is often questioned by the populations and therefore depends on the level of success in establishing political and social identities. One must be particularly aware of the diversity of historical paths in building the nation-state. As Linz indicates, the process of nation building—which aims to historically complete the process of state building and to develop among its citizens a strong subjective sense of belonging to the same political and cultural community—is often in the end thwarted by demands for cultural, religious, or linguistic recognition. Such demands make it politically very costly for a republican-type homogeneous citizenship to emerge, capable of making peripheral or social identities invisible—identities that individuals hold on to because of their primary socialization. Taking this historical fact into account, Linz puts forward a conceptual reflection useful for an analysis of citizenship: Establishing the exceptional character of the nation-state (with the exception of the successful model of the French state and its model of republican citizenship), he encourages us to abandon “the idea according to which every state should try to be a nation-state” in order to “turn to methods of state [and civic] integration rather than those based on national construction” (Linz, 1993, pp. 356, 365). At the heart of this conceptual shift—which leads him to prefer the notion of “state-nation” to “nation-state”—is a whole series of essential questions examined by political theory and by the comparative approach to citizenship: the recognition of cultural diversity in a liberal democracy, the development of “multicultural citizenship” models, the political construction and political validity of multinational states founded on the plurality of civic and cultural methods of identification (e.g., in Canada, India, Belgium), the “postnational” future of contemporary societies, and the transformations of the different types of political patriotism and allegiance associated with models of citizenship. The common factor here is the insistence that the observer distance himself from the abstract notion of citizenship, that of “man born again” (a favorite expression of many French revolutionaries of 1789), without the primary social or cultural characteristics, to recognize the man who is embedded, enclosed in a series of social identities that help shape his behavior in public and make him feel like a “citizen.”

This shift links up with the communitarian and feminist critique formulated in contrast to a universalistic conception of citizenship linked to an “ideal” separation between the public and the private sphere. For the communitarian critique of liberalism, the issue is the atomized conception of “Oneself,” with no true meaning, or historical and empirical contingency, which is capable of thinking in an independent and rational way and capable of implementing civil liberties, which are recognized by one’s status as citizen in a purely autonomous way. Contrary to this definition, which Isaiah Berlin strongly defends in his Four Essays on Liberty (1969), the communitarian theoreticians developed the hypothesis of “Oneself,” inevitably “embedded” and dependent on his common environment. This “communitarian constitution of
Oneself," to borrow Charles Taylor’s terms, leads the communitarian critique of liberal citizenship to emphasize the fact that the political and civic identity of citizens is constituted on the basis of an attachment to one or several communities of reference that noticeably reduces the degree of possible differentiation from the political city.

This tension of citizenship between private man and public duty, formerly mentioned by H. Mark Roelofs (1957), is also at the heart of the feminist critique of liberal and republican citizenship. According to Carole Pateman (1989), quite rightly, this critique betrays the androcentrism of the traditional notion of citizenship, which, behind a conception of the abstract universal, tends to reflect the civil evolution of men more than it does of women. From this point of view, it is obvious that the famous typology of civic rights formulated by T. H. Marshall and discussed earlier hardly concerns women who, in most Western countries, are denied the civic rights considered by the British sociologist. In the same way that universal suffrage was considered “universal” for a long time when only men had the right to participate in the election of parliamentary elites, the notion of citizenship remained for too long a prisoner of a conception of politics that overlooked gender. In light of gender, studies on citizenship are now enriched with new sociological analysis and major conceptual reappraisals; the idea that the public and the private sphere constitute two hermetic and distinct spheres, a hypothesis that is at the foundation of liberal and republican conceptions of citizenship as described, for example, by Engin Isin and Bryan Turner (2002, chaps. 8 and 9), has been criticized because it was the main source of the exclusion of women from the political city. In a similar way, the universal perspective of citizenship was strongly modified to recognize the multiple irreducible differences between men and women. Some of the most substantial studies in gendered political science, however, deal with the inclusion of women in parliament. Whether in terms of correcting the flaws of representativeness, adjusting the electoral system to increase the presence of women in elective assemblies, or thinking of the effects of parity on politics, research on civic representation has been greatly expanded as a result of a gendered approach that most often combines political theory with comparative political analysis.

Transformations in the Civic Community

Beyond these theoretical debates, the concept of citizenship is an excellent reflection of contemporary political metamorphoses, as Isin and Turner (2002) have shown. The controversies enliven the numerous studies on citizenship that force political science to put the political actor in touch with themes such as rights and obligations, political loyalty in political configurations made more complex by the globalization and the uprooting of politics, and new methods of political communalization in multicultural societies often marked by postcolonial demands. Without trying to cover every civic transformation, Figure 1 summarizes the two main transformations of political citizenship observed at

![Figure 1](Historical Changes of Civic Configurations)
the beginning of the 21st century. The first line of evolution concerns the normative impact of citizenship (left-hand side of Figure 1); the second transformation applies to the degree of politicization of the contemporary status of citizenship (right-hand side of Figure 1).

In the same way as classic works approach the topic of citizenship, the identification of individuals as members of a political community (local, national, or postnational) is historically linked to the normative integration of citizens. It is because individuals share not only the same system of values and representations but also common rules of behavior that they become aware of their “unity.” The strength of the idea of identification with a national “we” revealed by various political science studies is also due, in one part, to this normative tonality of membership in a nation-state and its emotional capacity to unite citizens around a body of central and shared values and rules. New civic methods experimented with in Europe, North America, and Asia are probably in line with a different perspective. In many current political configurations (e.g., European Union, India, Canada, Australia, South Africa), a plurality of values coexist in the public sphere and set the social actor against cultural subsystems of different values. In this case, the question of political legitimacy is no longer asked in relation to ultimate values but often on an administrative and a technocratic level. The weakness of cultural integration—which was at the heart of this state-national civic project, for instance, the republican one—is compensated for by the economic capacity of the social welfare system to ensure to every person a certain equality of access to material well-being. The pragmatic running of society occurs here without reference to the founding values on the basis of which citizens struggle to come together because of former or present distributive conflicts. This new paradigm creates a model of citizenship, slightly inclusive in political and cultural terms but also capable of encouraging equal—more or less fair—access to economic and social goods and services (bottom of Figure 1). From this point of view, it might seem to have an affinity with historical logics used in this process of building the “state-nations” referred to by Linz (1993). However, such a conception of citizenship makes it very difficult to develop a strong sense of belonging to contemporary political spheres whose economy is also highly globalized and increasingly discriminatory.

In the manner of an ideal type, it is possible to compare these two models of civic configuration. On the one hand is the model of citizenship, which was experimented with for Western countries (top part of Figure 1), encouraging the politics of vertical integration and a certain level of homogenization or at least a certain level of cultural convergence. This model is based on a common body of values, beliefs, and representations, which conveys norms and duties that the state has to uphold. At the other end of the scale is a model of multicultural citizenship, whose horizontal inclusive logic is limited to ensuring that every citizen has equal access to the economic and social welfare of society and is free to choose his or her cultural and identity affiliations (bottom part of Figure 1). Numerous intermediate positions are possible between these two models.

A second line of evolution takes shape in the background once attention is turned to the contemporary sources of civic “communalization.” Three dominant sources of communalization can be identified in a broad outline, thanks to Max Weber’s old typology: a cultural source (religion, e.g., for feudal societies), a political source (e.g., the civic loyalty demanded by the nation-state), and an economic source (e.g., access to the economic market). Historically, these three sources of communalization operate in a mixed way but in varied proportions and according to different connections. What is at stake here is clarifying the respective contributions of the political order, of the cultural order, and of the economic order to the communalization of citizens. Today, in Europe and elsewhere, the market and economic or professional mobility hold a decisive place in the processes of regional integration, and these forces may lead to rivalry between groups with different cultural identities. At the same time, other social institutions, such as religion or the family, may lose some of their power to regulate relationships between cultural groups. Thus, these contemporary transformations of citizenship call into question the very status of the political with respect to its role as a source of integration and regulation. Whereas citizenship was once seen as a vehicle for distinguishing civic membership from other social identities, today it must accommodate itself to societal demands. This relative “depoliticization”
appears to be the result of a new stability between different sources of civic communalization that clearly reduces the importance of political loyalties in favor of both transnational patterns of material consumption and self-assertion on a cultural level.

It is in this overall historical transformation that it seems necessary to locate present conditions of identification and of political participation in contemporary societies. It is also by taking into consideration these profound transformations that the concept of citizenship can remain a central notion in political science.

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See also Civic Culture; Civic Participation; Collective Security; Democracy, Theories of; Ethics; Feminism; Liberalism; Multiculturalism; Nation Building; Nationalism; Representation; Republicanism; Welfare State

Further Readings


Civic Culture

Civic culture is a subtype of political culture, that is, a set of political attitudes, habits, sentiments, and behavior, related to the functioning of a democratic regime. It implies that although citizens are not necessarily involved in politics all the time, they are aware to a certain extent of their political rights and also of the implications of the decision-making processes that affect their life and society. Both political awareness and participation are supposed to be relevant to the stability of a political regime. By contrast, citizens’ withdrawal from political life has consequences not only for their ability to get what they want from the political community but also for the quality of democracy. Civic culture involves, therefore, some level of perception of the republican character of modern politics and adds a psychological dimension to the concept of citizenship. In the following, the evolution of this concept, its criticism and limitations, and its relevance for contemporary politics are discussed.

The concept of civic culture is part of a long tradition of thought that investigates the nature of democracy from a historical perspective. It refers to the role of political traditions, values, and culture in the achievement of democratization and the stabilization of a regime. Its rationale goes back to the thinking of ancient political philosophers such as Aristotle, but in modern and contemporary times also, Niccolo Machiavelli, Baron de Montesquieu, Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, Max Weber, and Norberto Bobbio, among others, have discussed whether a set of specific political attitudes, convictions, and behavior are a necessary and/or sufficient condition for the success of modern democracies. The question is controversial, but it has never disappeared from the debate about the necessary conditions to achieve the “good government,” that is, a political regime committed to the ideal of full human realization.

While Aristotle and some Roman philosophers were mostly concerned with the excesses of the
original models of democracy and popular republics, Montesquieu and Tocqueville focused on the links between the “spirit” of political institutions and laws and the “habits of the heart” that drive people toward greater public cooperation and associational life. Aristotle spoke not only of the political goodwill necessary for a political regime to be able to fulfill its mission but also of public virtues such as civic partnership and political restraint. Tocqueville claimed that the success of modern democratic regimes depended on an individual’s self-interest rightly understood” and asserted that an open and free public life is not a natural given but depends on human will; he also emphasized the importance of a sense of moderation and self-restraint in the process of political participation.

Contemporary concern with civic culture is due mainly to two political phenomena of modern times: first, the excesses of political revolutions (e.g., the French, the Paris Commune, and the Soviet), and second, the collapse of democracy in Europe in the period between World Wars I and II, as was the case with the Weimar Republic. Democracy cannot fulfill its promises if there are no democrats; and if the nature of the democratic regime does not create an excess of political participation—which may degenerate into violence against minorities and opponents—neither does it predicate a cynical or apathetic public, which withdraws from public life and which could lead to abuses of power. As a system of government both of and for the people, but not directly by the people, representative democracy demands public involvement, political participation, and vertical, horizontal, and social accountability. The existence, independence, and autonomy of civil society are integral parts of it. Moreover, a widespread tolerance for a plurality of views and interests and a widely distributed sense of political efficacy, trust in government, and mutual trust among the citizenry are seen as key elements in effective civic culture.

Civic Culture as Political Culture
The most important contemporary contribution to the development of this theme appeared early in the 1960s in the work of the American political scientists Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. Their book The Civic Culture demonstrated the connection between specific political attitudes and the historical experience of democratic stability or the absence of it in five regions: Germany, Italy, Mexico, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States.

In the context of the process of decolonization and redemocratization that emerged after World War II, Almond and Verba were concerned with the broader question of the emergence of a new world culture involving positive and negative political tendencies in countries that had become democratized as a result of external pressure, such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, and also in Third World nations recently freed from their colonial status but not necessarily from their traditional political heritage. They wanted to know whether those countries had the necessary conditions to give birth to effective democratic regimes or whether old authoritarian or antidemocratic values would prevent those countries from establishing free, competitive, and effective political systems. The continuing existence of a number of authoritarian regimes in Europe (Spain, Portugal, and Greece) and similar experiences in Latin America, Africa, and Asia in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s showed the relevance of their concern.

According to the logic of political culture theory—in which some critics found that psychological approaches had too great an influence—the effective performance of a democratic regime would require some kind of accommodation between the elitist conception of the role of political leaders and some level of citizens’ involvement in the realm of politics. While it was later defined in terms of the strategic role of political elites in making governments govern—through their political initiatives and performance—the new theory maintained that there was also an area of collective political convictions and modes of participation to be taken into consideration. The latter was said to provide the context for the emergence of the former. The microdimension of politics, perceived at the individual level, should be congruent with its macrostructures, seen at the national level. Incongruence of political attitudes and the behavior of the masses and elites, on the one hand, and the functioning of democratic institutions, on the other, could produce a situation in which there were incomplete, untrustworthy, or dysfunctional political systems. Looking at the survival of democracy
in Britain, the United States, and some European countries in the interwar period, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba discussed what kind of citizenry was needed to achieve a proper balance of power and to enable a stable democratic regime to be responsive.

This theory held that to work according to its principles, the democratic process should involve a healthy tension between civic obligation and actual civic performance. It required appreciation by the public of the virtues of democracy as compared with its alternatives. To submit to the law, to the mechanisms of its enforcement, and to the authorities, citizens should give both formal and informal consent to the functioning of the political system; but at the same time, they should have a proper sense of their own duties. In this respect, both the subjective and the objective political competences of citizens were considered to be of great importance. Such a political culture depended also on the levels of mutual trust among citizens. This long-established notion referred to the fact that interpersonal trust is necessary to stimulate common action directed toward the realization of collective goals. Citizens should acknowledge their obligation to be part of the system and also believe that political institutions would be accessible to their participation, but at the same time, they should be selective if their performance fell short of what was required. Then, how could one balance political activity and passivity while allowing political leaders both to exercise power and to respond to the demands and preferences of citizens? A political division of labor—strongly criticized by both communitarian and republican defenders—was seen as an essential condition to allow the political system to work effectively, to make political choices, and to encourage voters to evaluate the performance of political leaders and governments.

Politics presupposes conflict and antagonism between parties and groups in open democratic systems, but these forces should be contained by a general national loyalty and support for the political system. The civic culture approach presupposes that a political culture congruent with a stable democracy involves a high degree of consensus concerning the legitimacy of democratic institutions and the content of public policy.

Political culture has been defined as a set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments that give order and meaning to the political process and provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior within the political system. Expanding on this definition, Almond and Verba distinguished between three different types of political orientation: (1) cognitive, referring to knowledge of and belief in the political system, its roles, incumbents, inputs, and outputs; (2) affective, translated as feelings and sentiments about the political system, its roles, personnel, and outcomes; and (3) evaluative, based on judgments and opinions about political objects, particularly, the input and output processes, incumbents, and their performance.

The political culture of the five nations that they compared was characterized in terms of two key attitudinal variables: commitment and involvement. The first looks at individual attitudes toward the political system, distinguishing between allegiance, apathetic, and alienated political orientations; the second measures attitudes toward participation, differentiating between parochial, subject, and participant attitudinal types. Civic culture would combine both a participatory and a deferential perspective of politics, forming a mixed political culture in which action and nonaction, obligation and performance, and conflict and cooperation would be balanced and combined. Citizens would have to mobilize certain particular civic virtues in order to be able to evaluate issues relevant to them and their society. These civic virtues would then help prevent both the overload of the political system and an excessively deferential polity, which could give way to new forms of authoritarianism.

Critical Views of the Concept

The concept of civic culture had a considerable influence on the development of political analyses in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Conceptually linked with the so-called behavioral revolution, its proponents wanted to signal a movement away from the study of formal institutions—typical of the so-called old institutionalism—toward the study of informal behavior to see politics in real life. In the 1970s, however, the cultural approach fell out of academic fashion and came under strong criticism for being conservative, static, and tautological; for ignoring real-power relations; and for being incapable of explaining social, political, and cultural
change. The view of political culture and democracy presented in *The Civic Culture* rapidly became the subject of considerable and rather heated debate. Its critics said it was deterministic, ideological, and inconsistent with the real nature of liberal capitalistic societies and only represented an idealistic (and ideological) version of politics in the United States and the United Kingdom, their prototypes of civic cultures. But the strongest charge against the theory concerned the direction of causality in the relation between culture and political structure. The British political philosopher Brian Barry and the American political scientist Dankwart Rustow claimed that Almond and Verba failed to explain the assumption about the congruence between political structure and the culture needed for democratic regimes to succeed. The culture of politics is a consequence, not a cause of institutional structure, they argued. People believe in a system through learned processes based on “habitation” and “accommodation” with the logic of democratic institutions and not the other way round. But neither Barry nor Rustow did any empirical research to prove their point. At the time he was making his criticism, Barry thought that there was not enough research to allow consistent conclusions about the controversy to be drawn and suggested that to advance the debate, scholars should study the phenomenon of transformation of political regimes to be able to grasp the real sense of causality—at the time, however, there were no regimes undergoing such a change.

Political values and orientations certainly cannot exist in a vacuum, but critics were missing the point—as Arendt Lijphart pointed out. Almond and Verba allowed causality to work both ways; in other words, political culture not only influences institutional design, but it is also influenced by institutional quality and its functioning. Moreover, the critics did not explain the normative basis of institutional choices, something else that was not to be taken as a given. In other words, institutions are chosen to carry out specific functions in order that societies can work as people want them to, and unless one assumes that institutional choices are disembodied and independent of human desires, ideals, and objectives, they do refer to normative goals, which are part of political tradition and culture. Individuals’ continuing commitment to political principles—such as the right to contest power or participate in the political process—is a central aspect of the process of institutional choice. Rational motivations involved in such choices are contextualized by power relations, political culture, and tradition.

The concept has also been criticized for its supposed inability to deal with political and cultural change. Citizens are not automatons, passively receiving and internalizing political values and norms, said the critics, and although political culture is transmitted from generation to generation, it is not transmitted unchanged, nor is it transmitted randomly or without question. Cultural transmission is an active and responsive process, which is continuously being negotiated by individuals. The adult political experience over time, rather than just political socialization during childhood, is crucial to explain the ways political views are shaped. This means that experiences with institutions do matter, but critics of *The Civic Culture* never acknowledged that its authors did actually draw attention to the fact that previous political analysis had underemphasized the crucial role of experience within political systems. The study was also criticized for not properly considering the process of competing norms and values within a society. Marxist critics or liberals such as Carole Pateman also claimed that they did not deal with class cleavages in their study and were therefore not able to grasp the processes of political cultural changes occurring as a consequence of the dispute for power and political hegemony in contemporary societies.

Between the 1970s and the 1990s the civic culture approach became squeezed between two extremely prestigious and critical perspectives of contemporary political science: neo-institutionalism and the different theories that investigate the success of a democratic regime on the basis of the political and economic performance of governments, political leaders, and parties. While the first excludes any reference to a normative approach to explain the design and functioning of institutions, the second emphasizes the effects of economic and political performance. Both approaches contradict the notion that an individual’s internalization of values and cultural norms is relevant in explaining the outcomes of a political system.

Consistent responses to those critics appeared, however, in the mid-1990s when the complexity of
processes of political transition in different countries around the world demanded more sophisticated explanations, recognizing factors other than only those relating to institutions or political performance. The question now was the quality of democracy, not just its mere existence.

The Renaissance of Civic Culture

Recent explanations of democratization are once more returning to the cultural approach. These studies are less deterministic and are based on a probabilistic perspective about the influence of political culture. They also assume that political structures and civic culture have a mutual influence. One of its main motivations is the perception that the simple transformation of institutions that usually characterizes the end of processes of political transition is not enough to explain the different outcomes. The fact that in different parts of the world there are democratic regimes that do not fully uphold the rule of law, the principles of civil and political rights, and the mechanisms of accountability has directed researchers’ attention once again to the role of attitudes, convictions, and behavior of people in explaining the variance of the quality of democracy.

This renaissance of the civic culture approach is principally due to two kinds of contributions. The first is the work of Robert Putnam on the role of social capital in social and political development. Social capital—bonding, bridging, and linking—is defined as networks and social norms of trust and reciprocity that strongly connect individuals to the common interests and goals of their community. Putnam has shown with his work on Italy and the United States that social networks based on mutual trust and the desire of individuals to act in common is decisive for the achievement of social goals and for the development of a democratic institutional environment. While in the south of Italy traditional ties do not work toward achieving openness in public life and form part of a cycle of political abuse, corruption, and governments characterized by low performance, in the north a long and cumulative tradition of cooperation and mutual trust has engendered higher levels of social and political participation and allowed regional governments to perform much better. Social trust derived from the accumulation of social capital makes citizens more cooperative, reciprocal, and willing to associate and act collectively. Thus, Putnam’s contribution has emphasized how different objective and subjective conditions affect institutional development.

The second refers to the extensive work of Ronald Inglehart about the relevance of postmaterialist values from a human development perspective, which involves the consolidation of attitudes that contribute toward democratic structures. Inglehart revised the theory of modernization and argued that social and economic changes profoundly affect the traditional political culture of contemporary societies in such a way that individuals leave behind, as time passes, their attachment to survival values and develop means of self-expression that enable them to have more autonomy and independent patterns of relations with political authorities. Basing their studies on the five waves of the World Values Survey, Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel tested, on the one hand, the impact of values over time on the existence of effective democracies and, on the other, the influence of democratic institutions and the length of time a system of government with democratic values is in place. According to them, the results clearly demonstrate that while values are decisive in determining the existence and duration of democratic institutions, the latter have only a weak influence over time in creating a civic culture; indeed, under the influence of other variables their effects disappear altogether. They claim that studies have confirmed some basic assumptions of theories of political culture even when other variables are included in explanations of democratization processes.

Toward the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of this century, the works of Pippa Norris, Richard Rose, and Doh Shin also became associated with the resurgence of the civic-cultural approach. Using different arguments, they reacted to the analyses that in the 1970s and 1980s were deeply concerned with the decrease of political trust in Europe and the United States and also to the enormous difficulties faced by newly democratized countries in creating effective democracies. In the book Critical Citizens (1999), Norris and her collaborators combine the institutionalist approach with the recognition that citizens’ political experience is crucial in explaining their attitudes and
behavior. Shin, Rose, and others argue that ordinary people’s support for a democratic regime is a learning and relearning process in which both their values and their normative perspectives have a role to play as well as their rational perception and evaluation of the functioning and performance of institutions. In both cases, without opposing the perspectives of civic culture and institutionalism, they emphasize the importance of the adult political experience of citizens in explaining the conditions under which normative expectations about the role of institutions interact with rational evaluations of institutional and governmental performance. The critical view of citizens is interpreted as part of the new civic culture.

Conclusion

The Civic Culture remains a model of scientific inquiry, allowing researchers to test, refine, or reject their hypotheses. According to Aaron Wildavsky, Almond and Verba made their evidence speak on a profound theoretical issue, and their empirical work allows others to test their assumptions. Presently, the concept is undergoing a renaissance, but this does not simply imply going back to the original approach. New developments have incorporated a more flexible interpretive and less formalistic perspective, integrating both institutional and cultural approaches that explain how citizens are involved in politics and how they influence it. Civic culture is considered to be relevant not only for the stability of any democratic regime but also for its quality.

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See also Attitudes, Political; Civic Participation; Democratic Consolidation; Democracy; Quality; Political Culture; Political Socialization; Social Capital

Further Readings


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Further Readings


Civic Participation

Civic participation can be defined as citizens' access to and participation in information, decision making, and implementation of public policies broadly construed;
taking part in democracy—individually or as a part of organized groups—through communication and public actions (including electoral campaigns and elections) where public interests prevail over private ones;
the act of becoming involved in the political process and working to better the community; and
a means to guarantee the credibility of institutions, through articulation of citizens’ demands and holding public officials accountable.

As the base concept of participation, the notion of civic participation is rooted in the normative assumption that the efficiency of any economic, management, and other social system as well as the legitimacy of democratic political systems depends on the involvement and participation of the public and does not simply derive from the output dispensed by the system.

The term civic participation concentrates on the different means by which the public can participate in the decision-making process within the political community. Democracy is considered to be the political regime that allows for the best civic participation, because democratic regimes are based on the principle of interaction and communication between political institutions (parties, parliaments, local government, etc.) and the people. Civic participation brings a great number of people with diverse sources of information and interests into the process of public decision making. Widespread and intensive public discussions enhance the critical assessment of different moral ideas, informing decision makers. As a result, civic engagement contributes to the quality of democracy.

This entry presents an analytic overview of the concept’s academic interpretations. It considers the conceptualization and various empirical manifestations of civic participation and evokes several unresolved theoretical issues.

Conceptualization

Civic participation (civic is derived from the Latin word civis [“citizen”] and refers to involvement in the public sphere, as in the classical Greek polis) is an old concept that was introduced when civil life surpassed the arbitrary absolutistic monarchies or feudal powers, calling for individual freedom and the balance between individual liberty and social equality. Alexis de Tocqueville argued that participation in purpose-driven associations socialized people into a polity with more than merely egotistic desires, and he concluded that democracy worked through people’s participation in collective activities, independent of the state.

The concept of civic participation was further elaborated in modernization theories (theories of social and economic development and democratization) and became one of the main vehicles of international (mostly sponsored by the United Nations) development policies in various regions of the world. As Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba note, the idea is that prospects of socioeconomic development and democratization rely on a civic culture, participatory public attitudes, and social values. Through civic participation, people can influence social, cultural, and economic policies, and their participation extends beyond regular participation in elections. This means that decision makers must continuously take into account the interests, rights, and opinions of members of society. If participatory culture is weak and/or political institutions are inaccessible to people (or representation is biased toward the privileged), then the connection between people and politics is poor, compromising sustained socioeconomic development. Amartya Sen (1999) argues that “no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press” (p. 152). The thrust of this argument is that politicians in democratic settings (with a minimum of respect for the freedom of expression) face the demands of citizens and have to accommodate them (including those of the most disadvantaged groups).

Robert Dahl presented an institutional model, linking participation within the structure of political institutions. In his account, political actors are individuals who rationally calculate if, when, and where they spend their scarce resources (e.g., money, time, know-how) in the pursuit of broader collective goals in public affairs. Individuals’ public involvement is shaped by their individual taste and preference for political actions, contrasted with opportunities for other social activities (and the possibility to free ride, as the theory of collective action emphasizes). The institutional model of participation confines the issues with which each individual might be concerned and alleges that the scope and ways of people’s participation are rather limited. Yet it claims that conditions of pluralistic democracy allow people to participate in public affairs roughly as equals. This approach views democracy instrumentally, as a bargaining process.
among different groups, where interests of each group are not subject to any further debate.

In normative democratic theory, the institutional model of participation is prominently criticized by Carole Pateman, who refined the concept of participation and focused it on a community or a social group rather than on separate individuals. Pateman elaborated the notion of participation, which, as a form of genuine civic action, is possible only in democracies, contrasted with totalitarian or authoritarian states, which force participation by propaganda or sheer repression. Civic action is defined as being undertaken collectively in pursuit of the general good, in line with the principle of political morality that benefits and burdens all citizens equally. The individual pursuit of self-interest is not its only and decisive driving force. In her generic account of civic participation, Pateman puts forward public discussions of common issues rather than rational strategies aiming at individual or narrow group goals. In a way, she makes a conceptual distinction between participation as an instrumental action (pursuing mostly protective functions) and as an interaction (with mostly educative functions) and clearly attaches more importance to the latter.

In the tradition of Aristotelian and Rousseauian political philosophy, the ideal of active deliberation lies at the basis of Hannah Arendt’s conception of participatory citizenship, which in democratic polities rests on values and preferences that are discursively examined, acknowledged, and renewed. Active engagement of citizens in the public realm (discussing public issues and solving problems of their communities) provides people with the experience of public freedom and conveys a sense of their political agency (meaningfulness). In that respect, it is important to underline that Arendt cherished the idea of direct political participation and claimed that citizenship can only be practiced as a common action, collective deliberation, and the sharing of power. According to Arendt, relations of civility and solidarity among citizens can be established and maintained only through their engaged public participation. By contrast, Arendt argued that citizenship should not be conceptualized in terms of intimacy, warmth, authenticity, and communal feelings, since those inevitably led to the loss of public values such as impartiality and civic friendship and the blurring of distinctions between public and private interests.

Attempts to synthesize these two apparently incompatible models of institutional and communal participation gave birth to the concept of civic engagement, as described by Robert Putnam, Theda Skocpol, and Morris Fiorina. Here, engagement means being interested in public issues and getting and staying involved in social activities. Civic engagement refers to individuals’ belonging and participating in various social groupings or associations. Civic engagement is grounded in the face-to-face interaction and communication among persons (in real empirical settings such as neighborhoods, clubs, schools, churches). As Putnam notes (2000), without “face-to-face interaction, without immediate feedback, without being forced to examine our opinions under the light of other citizens’ scrutiny, we find it easier to hawk quick fixes and to demonize anyone who disagrees” (pp. 341–342). However, civic engagement interactions usually (and realistically) do not evolve into any elevated political discussion, that is, they do not yield acute public debate about the future of the entire community or about the totality of social activities within the community. The conversations and exchanges here mostly concern everyday-life issues and community routines. Civic engagement generates social networks, habits of cooperation, interpersonal trust, and norms of reciprocity, which further contribute to the social capital, or generalized social trust (mostly measured by the trust in public institutions and in people in general). Subsequently, the stock of social capital might be applied to cooperative discussions of political issues and joint civic actions, and hence, it might ultimately contribute to better results in all domains of public life. Putnam (2000) observes that “in the language of economics, social capital lowers transaction costs and eases dilemmas of collective action” (p. 346).

From the historical-institutional perspective, Skocpol claims that associative activities are not by and of themselves sufficient to ensure good governance. Reminiscent of the protracted pernicious activities of various racist and xenophobic organizations, Skocpol argues that state institutions remain important in channeling and focusing public activism, bringing together different perceptions of the public interest as well as limiting arbitrary
political power. Along with Putnam’s observation of the decline of social capital in modern societies, Fiorina and Skocpol acknowledge that the rise of professional organizations and single-issue advocacy groups alienate many ordinary citizens from public life. The authors maintain that encouraging more participation by ordinary people is the best way to counteract these destructive tendencies of constricted participation in modern democracies.

Although civic engagement places broadly defined social participation before political participation, it is a type of participation that is aimed at the core of state institutions and public affairs. The civic engagement model helpfully addresses issues such as the scope and types of nongovernmental (voluntary) activities in society, the fields of nonprofit activity, the degree of public affairs politicization, and so on. Yet more questions arise when one studies the problems of defense of public interests, not readily concentrated in some geographical space and not united in some well-thought-out groups. These include environmental concerns, consumer awareness, good governance (transparency) ideals, and human rights, which are exceedingly dispersed and usually opposed by concentrated, entrenched interest groups, often including state agencies. The concept of social movement is frequently used to address such research puzzles.

Social movements are defined as a series of contentious performances, displays, and campaigns by which ordinary people make collective claims. Charles Tilly enumerates a series of factors that brought about modern social movements. They include urbanization (the massive presence of people in cities facilitates social interaction and the formation of purposeful groups), industrialization (significant groups of workers are concentrated in factories), mass education (higher education helps develop and articulate ideologies and collective claims), communication (technological progress makes contacts and interaction easier), and democratization (the worldwide spread of democratic regimes legitimizes the quest for political rights and empowerment).

In the contemporary world, given the uncertainties caused by representative democracy and the failures of formal mechanisms for civic participation under conditions of modern complexity, the importance of large-scale informal actions is very great. Even though informal structures and ways of participation in public affairs have always coexisted with codified procedures, yet the recent phenomenon of continuous and adaptable civic participation through social movements represents a significant expression of active civil society. New consequential societal goals (expressive and deliberative actions, devoid of purely pragmatic aims) are achieved through changes brought by social movements into existing ideological and organizational environments.

Actually, social movements extend in terms of range from local and international movements to multilevel and global movements. In terms of methods, violent movements continue to play an important role and are often shaped as semiterrorist and terrorist organizations with some social support. Yet the majority of social movements seek to achieve social and civic goals by peaceful means. Rights and obligations associated with civic participation require the constitutional framework that can be jeopardized by violence. There are important examples of (at least partially) successful peaceful social movements: Mahatma Gandhi’s civil disobedience movement against the British rule in India (1930s–1940s), the American civil rights movement (late 1950s–1960s), the Polish Solidarność, and the Lithuanian Sąjūdis movements against the Soviet-imposed communist regime (1980s–1990s). Events such as the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004) and the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2005) can also be termed social movements because of the accepted methods of opposition and the huge popular involvement.

Concerning the interests represented in social movements, most of the 19th-century movements had their roots in social classes or cultural communities (workers, peasants, aristocrats, petty bourgeois, religious [mostly Protestant] communities, Whites, etc.). They attempted to advance their living conditions or social status. Often, these types of social movements developed into political parties. In the second part of the 20th century, new social movements (feminist, prolife, pro-abortion, gay rights, antinuclear, environmental, etc.) began to emerge and reshape the sociopolitical landscape in many countries and even internationally. The new social movements present an opportunity to reestablish the basic standards, values, and norms of civic participation. They require continuous
commitment and personal activity in the public sphere.

The public sphere, in Jürgen Habermas’s sense, is defined as an area of social life that has the following four primary governing principles: (1) the social status of participants is disregarded, (2) discussions within the public sphere presuppose the challenging of previously unquestioned issues, (3) issues in the public sphere are driven and decided by rational arguments, and (4) the public is inclusive. Contrary to the private sphere, where individuals decide to participate in accordance with their private interests, and to the public authority sphere, where the actions of individuals and institutions are shaped by formal decision-making procedures aimed at the implementation of public policies and the distribution of public goods, the public sphere is a sphere sui generis transcending individual interests and profit maximization and is mostly concerned with the deliberation of public issues.

Civic Education as an Integral Part of Civic Participation

In all these conceptualizations, civic participation is associated to some extent with civic education and the cognitive mobilization of citizens. As early as in 1861, John Stuart Mill argued that democracy tends to enhance the moral qualities of citizens because when people in some way participate in decision making, they have to listen to others, they are obliged to justify themselves to others, and they have to act sensibly, taking into account the interests and concerns of others. Rational choice theorists also agree that when people find themselves under circumstances of participatory democracy, they genuinely consider the issues of the common good and justice. Hence, civic participation tends to enhance the autonomy, rationality, and morality of participants.

In their analysis of survey data from five countries, Almond and Verba considered education (based on critical thinking and analysis) to be the most important factor creating attitudes and values vital for a participant culture. Adherents of deliberative democracy maintain that public discussions represent the only way available to democracies for the promotion of the intellectual and moral progress of the citizenry, which is their raison d’être. Proponents of the civic engagement model underline the importance of capacity development: empowering people to effectively participate in public life, to learn the routine practices of cooperation, and to acquire a taste for public affairs. Yet it must be acknowledged that people’s capacities to communicate, organize, analyze, negotiate, and take positions on issues have to be commensurate with adequate capacities of staff in government institutions and other organizations in order to account for such activities.

Analytically, the extent and forms of civic participation depend on civic dispositions (interpersonal trust, people’s confidence to participate in civic life, openness, tolerance, and responsibility of citizens), civic knowledge (people’s familiarity with political issues and their social context; knowing one’s political, civil, social, and economic rights; understanding the roles, rights, and responsibilities of citizens and public officials), and civic skills (the ability to explain, analyze, evaluate, and defend a position; using knowledge for informed participation). United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, claims that sustainability, equity, and empowerment are direct results of civic education leading to inclusive participation.

Empirical Measurements of Civic Participation

Recognizing that democracy is the prerequisite for any meaningful civic participation, different forms and intensity of civic participation can be observed across countries, social groups, and times. According to Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase (1979), the level of civic participation can be seen as a continuum. At one extreme are people who have no interest in politics at all (they do not vote, petition, or demonstrate; do not read newspapers; are not informed and do not want to be informed about public issues; and never volunteer); at the other extreme are active citizens (they are interested in politics; vote; are involved in political parties, trade unions, nongovernmental organizations and civic associations; and use other forms of contention). Between these two extremes, most citizens participate through conventional electoral events (they get mobilized in special circumstances); they more or less understand public issues and occasionally attempt to have an impact on them.
Political scientists identify several sets of incentives and disincentives of participation. Pippa Norris presents an institutional account of incentives of political participation (defined narrowly as voting in elections): a proportional electoral system, not very frequent elections, small distances between the relevant contenders, and great electoral choice of candidates (parties). These factors are intrinsically related to the cognitive conditions of democracy and certainly foster civic participation. The institutional clarity of a political system and party polarization facilitate social and political mobilization, since clear ideological conflicts socialize citizens to comprehend complex political issues through simplified and normatively coherent discourses.

Putnam compiled the social capital index, consisting of measures of participation in civic and political activities, including group membership, attending public meetings on local and school affairs, service as an officer or committee member of an organization, attending club meetings, volunteer work and community projects, home entertaining and socializing with friends, social trust, electoral turnout, and the incidence of nonprofit organizations. It appears that these indicators of formal and informal civic participation and social trust are strongly intercorrelated. Research shows that local differences in the social capital index have an effect on child welfare and education, safe and productive neighborhoods, economic prosperity, health and happiness, and democratic citizenship and governance performance.

Comparative research initiated in the 1970s, such as that by Inglehart (1997), demonstrates that citizens not only want to hold their leaders accountable through elections once every 4 or 5 years but they increasingly intend to scrutinize and to influence their leaders during their term of office. It is a global evolution of continuous democracy, combining electoral rights, freedoms of association, and new kinds of contentious participation.

Another line of research considers the idea that people understand public issues and eventually involve themselves in public affairs because of and through the images given by political leaders and the media, not through personal experience. Therefore, along with institutional account and civic education considerations, research on political communication is an integral part of the study of civic participation. Civic journalism dwells on the principle that adequate coverage of politics is important for public life. The role of mass media is very important for civic participation: When journalists, academics, human rights activists, intellectuals, and artists publicly contest various norms and decisions, they safeguard the rights and freedoms of the entire community, benefiting from mobilization and vigilance of its most active citizens.

Theoretical Tensions Regarding Civic Participation

There is an inherent tension between the universalistic (communal, civic engagement, social movement) and functional (institutional) concepts of civic participation. The universalistic rhetoric claims that any public action is derivative from the civil society and contributes to the general interest, common good, and justice and not just to the agenda of interest groups. The idea of civic participation assumes that the actions undertaken by organized groups (mobilized minorities) can contribute to the benefit of the entire community and strengthen the administrative accountability and political legitimacy of the regime.

Interest groups frequently use words such as citizens, civil society, people, and general public (practicing pluralist, lobbying, or corporatist strategies). Yet most concrete proposals concern organized groups. Therefore, in empirical terms, the logic of negotiation between the institutions and some limited groups remains at the core of active citizens’ participation.

Another problematic issue of civic participation has to do with its limitation to the nondecision (the consultative, predecision) stage or the deliberative part, although contemporary democratic governments claim to promote civic participation throughout the whole policy chain. Civic participation in the implementation and evaluation of public policies is limited. Considering that actual public policy decisions usually are taken by public authorities in cooperation with selected organized groups, other social actors have to face the decisions ex post.

The thrust for promotion of civic participation is derived from the liberal conception of democracy. Openness and transparency, organized consultation, better communication, decentralization,
and so on can make institutions more accountable. However, these techniques are not substitutes for the representative forms of democracy and citizenship, and they do not encourage an average citizen to become active, since they require considerable intellectual and financial resources.

Finally, the concept of civic participation concentrates on sets of functional groups with particular ends (trade unions, employers’ organizations, professional associations, community-based organizations, charities and religious groups, etc.). Yet civic participation research often overlooks the general actors (e.g., political parties) who represent a global view at the grassroots, while only the top of their organizations belong to the public authorities, acting on behalf of the state.

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See also Civic Culture; Civil Society; Interest Groups; Participation; Social Capital; Social Movements

Further Readings


Civil Service

A civil service is a system for managing human resources using mechanisms with which governments select, employ, and promote the personnel who act as public administrators. A civil service system takes into account the qualifications and aptitudes of employees. In other words, it is the institutional framework within which the human resources employed in the public sector are organized in a way that allows governments to employ the best people. These employees work to achieve the results of projects put forward by their governments, regardless of their political affiliation or party. The bases of the civil service are established in statutes, laws, or regulations, and for its successful operation, an autonomous structure is required—a body that will oversee its strict operation and the observation of the norms that regulate the civil service, so that its usefulness contributes to strengthening the democratic values of the societies it serves. This entry describes the characteristics of career civil service, the forms it may
take, and the subsystems involved in its operation. The place of the civil service in public administration and the benefits associated with it are then examined in light of evolving democratic values.

**Characteristics of the Civil Service**

Given its autonomous role as described above, the civil service is not simply a series of rules and technical conditions; rather, it should be seen as a type of moral code for public service that is designed to achieve common objectives and should be shared by all its functionaries. Civil services are based on three fundamental values for a democratic public administration, taken principally from the logic of bureaucratic organization proposed by Max Weber: (1) equality, (2) merit, and (3) impartiality. Thus, modern civil services are based on the following:

1. **Recruitment** is based on the *merits* of the civil servants and not on patronage or inherited posts.

2. The idea of equality allows anyone to participate in the competition to occupy public posts, provided that they meet the prerequisites established for the position in question; and, once they are in the civil service, the system of evaluation and any sanctions should be comparable for all the functionaries.

3. **Impartiality** guarantees that the members of the civil service should maintain a neutral position toward political parties, related to an internal logic, to grant all applicants the same opportunities and, when dealing with the public, provide the same attention and quality in the services offered to all citizens regardless of their gender, religion, or partisan preference.

The concept of a career civil service can be given at least two meanings. First, it is used as a synonym of public bureaucracy, although not all the government functionaries necessarily form part of it. The Latin American Center of Administration for Development (CLAD) maintains in the Ibero-American Charter of Public Affairs that, in Ibero-America, the terms *public function* and *civil service* are generally used as synonyms. Within this acceptance, there is an enormous variation in the use of the term, since sometimes *civil service* may in fact consist of any or all functionaries who carry out administrative work within a government. The second use given to the term *civil service* refers specifically to the area or areas of the government in charge of performing the recruitment and evaluation of the functionaries.

Therefore, not all civil services are the same; the systems of recruitment, sanctions, and recognition and, above all, the attributes and extent of the civil service vary according to the political and institutional context they are in. It is important to mention that within the same civil service there can be various types of labor relations; this means that there can be some functionaries appointed by direct political nomination and others by means of a public competition.

Members of the civil service are known as career public servants, and they can be employed at any level of government (federal, provincial, or local), depending on the size of the civil service, or in the autonomous institutions, such as electoral organisms or any of the three powers of government: executive, legislative, or judicial. In some countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), career civil servants are only those who work for the Crown; functionaries who serve in the lower levels of government are not included. In the United States, on the other hand, there are civil servants within state and local governments, and in France, officials of some public enterprises are also included.

Further, career civil services are regulated by laws or statutes that have different characteristics relative to the rest of the labor legislation for the country in question; as a result, these functionaries usually remain separate from other public employees. These differences become apparent in the policies relating to retirement and the establishment of pensions, as well as the type and degree of sanctions, or in the capacity to organize themselves in unions and other associations.

As the name suggests, the military are not included in career civil services, although some civil servants who work in the areas of national defense are generally considered to be career civil servants. There are also functionaries who hold their posts because they were political nominees or because they were elected by popular vote, which places them outside the civil service. In the case of Ireland, for example, government ministers and
some of their political advisors are excluded from the civil service.

**Types of Civil Services**

*Closed Versus Open Services*

Conceptually, a career civil service can be either open or closed. A closed service takes for granted that persons entering the public service plan to develop their whole career there. It is a closed system because one can enter only at the lowest levels of the organizational pyramid and from there gradually climb up to the higher positions. That is, personnel tend to be hired for the lower echelons, and from there, mobility through the ranks may be possible. To enter, one has to have a certain level of education and submit to a public competition in order to be selected; because entrance takes place at the lower levels of the organization, the participants' experience has little relevance in the selection process. One great advantage of this system is the creation of an ethos in the public service, as the functionaries manage to accumulate important knowledge about their organizations. The following are the principal disadvantages of this model. The first is that upward mobility within the organization is usually linked to the seniority of a functionary and not to his or her performance. The second is that this system limits the universe of contestans to those who have accumulated little or no experience; finally, this model can produce unwanted results by generating incorrect incentives, and it can even lead to poor performance by the functionaries, by not generating competitiveness with the outside labor force. The oldest civil services are built on the basis of this model and have found it necessary to make important revisions to their schemes, as in the cases of the career civil services in France and Germany.

An open civil service, in contrast, allows for public competition not only for posts at the lower levels but also for the higher positions within the organization. The system is therefore open to outside participants, although there may be a clause stipulating that preference be given to those who already belong to the civil service. In this system, the creation of a spirit of public service becomes less evident, since there is the possibility that employees from the private sector can become public functionaries and vice versa. Nevertheless, one evident advantage of this assumption is that by alternating between private enterprise and the public sector the number of participants increases, allowing for a broader universe for recruitment of the most qualified as well as the benefit of the transfer of knowledge from one sector to the other. These employment civil services are being tried out in countries that have recently created or reformed their civil services, such as New Zealand and the UK.

*Executive Versus Senior Service*

Because of their scope at the different levels of government, the civil services are also classified as executive or senior civil services. This distinction implies the separation between the authority of the higher and middle levels of command within the public sector.

**Operational Subsystems**

Whatever model is adopted, the civil service operates with certain subsystems that are indispensable for their proper functioning. The subsystems that make up a “traditional” civil service are the following.

*Recruitment and Selection*

The subsystem for recruitment and selection establishes the selection procedures in the contest for the position (if there are to be quotas for positive discrimination or not, i.e., if it is mandatory to include applicants or representatives from minority or marginal sectors of society). In addition, it specifies whether the contest is to be public or closed, what type of exams and study guides are to be used, and what interviews are to be held and with which of the functionaries, among others. It also establishes the requisite profile and academic qualifications, experience, samples of work, and personal references that the candidates for the post should have, as well as establishing the conditions under which they would be integrated into the public sector, that is, what type of contract they would subscribe to, what salary they would receive, and if they would be evaluated before being confirmed in the post or if they would first be subjected to a trial period. For this procedure, first, there should be a process of revision of the applicants’ curricula vitae; second, they should undergo examinations
and psychometric tests; and third, they should submit to an interview, and on occasion, as previously mentioned, they are given a trial period in the post. Ideally, this subsystem should have mechanisms allowing rejected candidates to appeal the decisions made by the recruitment team, something that is not always taken into consideration. Moreover, the system demands constant revision to remain adapted to the requirements of the different posts, revising among other things the pertinence of the evaluations to make sure they correspond to the catalog of existing posts.

**Education and Training**

The subsystem of education and training regulates the training of the public servants, whether initial, continuous, or a combination of both. Initial education consists of generating mechanisms that allow for the development of competence relevant to the post aspired to, which would not have been acquired during the professional education of the functionary, as well as those that lead to the homogenization of the knowledge of the functionaries to facilitate more or less uniform performance in the job. It should be mentioned that not all civil services have subsystems for initial formation, as many demand that this should be provided by a particular institution, which could be internal, such as the Civil Service College of the UK, or by an external institution such as the Hautes Écoles or the École Nationale d’Administration in the case of France. Continuous education, on the other hand, responds in some cases to the demands of the public and in others to the modifications or updating of the different administrations or the incorporation of new values in the face of changing scenarios, including in organizational culture. Recently, this subsystem has greatly benefited from the advances in information technology, from the possibility of attending courses and presenting evaluations at a distance. All this has, no doubt, resulted in better use being made of working hours and improvement in the activities undertaken by public functionaries. Although one should mention that in many cases these resources are not optimized because continuous education has been focused on nominative subjects instead of operative affairs, which detracts from the possibilities of immediate usefulness.

**Evaluation**

The subsystem of evaluation seeks to identify the strengths and weaknesses in the public management from individual and organizational evaluations. It is necessary to decide in what domain to conduct an evaluation, how evaluation is to be carried out, what indicators will be used and with what frequency, and what is to be corrected or improved. This subsystem can be linked to sanctions applied to public functionaries, ranging from verbal reprimands to permanent removal from the post. It also covers the schemes for evaluating performance, where there is a relation between wages or the bonuses of the functionaries in relation to the goals set, in the first case, and to an outstanding performance, in the second. Linking the assessment of performance to the budget may be advantageous because it leads to increases in efficiency and effectiveness, better planning, and a clearer focus on results. However, it can also have its disadvantages, by exceeding the budgets of the organizations or by cutting resources in areas where they are needed, without determining accurately the causes of a deficient performance, which may have been, for example, due to inadequate resources. In addition, evaluations should become an important input for the subsystem of continuous education, since they can identify the areas that require a greater effort in formation and training and the contents that these options should include.

**Promotions and Mobility**

The subsystem of promotions and mobility manages the horizontal and vertical mobility of the civil servants. Because mobility can be horizontal as well as vertical (particularly in the case of an open employment system), the exchange and transfer of knowledge from one area to another are encouraged, although this situation can cause a loss of experience within organizations. Mobility can occur both in an open system, where anyone can have access to a post, and in the so-called elitist systems, in which only graduates from certain universities or careers can occupy positions at the highest levels. In the more traditional systems, promotion of functionaries has been related to seniority in the post and within the schemes of the civil service; however, as a result of reforms arising from the adoption of ideas associated with the new
public management approach, priority is now sometimes given to the performance of functionaries rather than to the length of time that they have held the post.

Removal From Office

Under the traditional principles of administration of the subsystem for removal from office, a functionary would leave office only to receive a pension. However, the stability that this immobility gave the functionaries is a negative performance incentive. Current tendencies indicate that removal from office can occur for at least two reasons: (1) the civil servant’s retirement or (2) the temporary removal or separation from office due to the poor performance of the public servant, a situation that should be very accurately documented.

Public Administrations and Career Civil Service

The successful implementation of a career civil service is indispensable for improving and modernizing public administrations, since this allows for greater continuity in public policies and also increases the efficiency and efficacy of the administration. In addition, to set in motion a professional civil service requires prior institutional action to integrate a catalog of posts that allows complete restructuring of public administration from within and in the medium and long terms. Detailed job descriptions of each post also favors an increase in accountability within each organization.

The career civil services are remarkably effective in reducing corruption and increasing the equity of the public services, since functionaries know that permanence in their posts depends on their performance and not on electoral cycles, political movements, or arbitrary dismissals, all of which discourage them from creating and attending to specific clientele. The autonomy that the administration acquires facilitates continuity in the application of programs and laws, because the administration is evaluated by the degree of fulfillment of the programmed objectives, and it also minimizes the influence of the politicians on the implementation of programs.

Similarly, adequate administration of human resources inside government results in enhanced transparency, as much for individuals as for organizations, since beginning with the integration of a catalog of posts and a clear definition of organizational structures, one can know who is responsible for the results of programs and government policies. At first glance, civil services may appear rigid; however, when their schemes are well integrated, they can even give greater flexibility to the public administration since it is easier to make quick adaptations to the demands of changing circumstances.

The professionalization of the public administration can also result in greater confidence by citizens. First, by legitimating the government through more efficient administration, and second, by being more flexible, and thus more successful, in the interaction with average citizens. In fact, a civil service system also tends to foster values within public administration such as impartiality, awareness of financial limitations, as well as legality and integrity of the government and public officers. These values contribute to the collective construction of an ethos for the public sector, indispensable for the identification of the personnel as part of an organization that aims at the collective, consecutive pursuit of objectives, preserving the institutional memory and promoting its prestige outside the organization. The public sector ethos also has a function within the public administration: It enhances communication between the various members of the organization and can direct efforts toward common objectives. In this way, communication and coordination between bureaucratic organizations can improve. Moreover, career professional services within the civil service can build up skills and expertise within the public administration, which, in the long run, will enhance not only the government institutions but also a solid democratic system.

From their perspective, public functionaries are also directly benefited by forming a part of civil service, since apart from the obvious advantage of not being arbitrarily removed from their offices, they are subjected to clear regulations and specific responsibilities, and they receive a continuous education that allows them to keep their knowledge up-to-date and to eventually make a career within the public administration, which is useful socially.

The nature and usefulness of the schemes for a career civil service have been the subject of intense debate and important processes of adjustment.
because, among other reasons, they are recognized as a fundamental element in the processes of renovation and modernization of public administrations. A career civil service plays a central role in the transformations favored by democratic schemes, such as commitments to making public administration more transparent and improving the mechanisms for public accountability and the management of public resources. Professionalizing the public function is an indispensable condition for national development.

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See also Administration; Administration Theory; Autonomy, Administrative; Development Administration; Public Employment

Further Readings

Civil Society

From the perspective of political sociology, the concept of civil society refers to a certain type of society. Its basic characteristic is the attitudinal capability of its members, that is, citizens, to actively organize themselves to pursue certain (common) goals, within a framework of specific formal institutions. In detailed definitions, depending on particular research goals, civil society may therefore be defined in either attitudinal or institutional terms. This entry discusses their perspectives, their origins, and their applications to the contemporary world.

In the attitudinal perspective, the pivotal concept is that of citizenship as an individual’s attitude toward the entire political collectivity and other individuals, as well as to institutions and procedures. The basis of this attitude is seen as the individual’s internalization of the rights and obligations associated with membership in the collectivity, and this attitude constitutes the foundation of the citizen’s role.

Elements of citizenship thus defined include, for instance, political identity and self-awareness, the character and sources of agency, law and order, attitudes toward recognized authorities, attitudes toward pluralism and diversity, the level of openness toward the terms of membership in a political community, and, finally, convictions regarding the nature of civil rights (their universality or particularity). From this perspective, a civil society is a state of democratic political culture, a conglomerate of norms and values typical of a community of citizens who are free and equal before the law, which they shape and develop through their active participation in a public life.

In the institutional approach, civil society is seen as an arena of citizens’ activity embedded in an institutional framework, a structurally described sphere of social and individual autonomy that
Civil Society: Classical Roots and Modern Developments

The idea of a civil society is deeply rooted in European culture. It goes back to ancient Greek and Roman thought. To Aristotle, a civil society (koinonia politike) was an ethical and political community of free citizens pursuing and achieving full humanity through active participation in the life of the polis—its tradition, law, morality, and interest. The ancient Greek agora as a space of communication for citizens, a forum for exchange of arguments, for sharing visions of the common good and taking communal decisions, was the proper space of cogovernance and, hence, the realm of politics. What the Roman tradition contributed to the idea of civil society was the concept of natural law, discovered through rational thought. According to Cicero, the civil society (societas civilis) was the highest kind of social order, reflecting the eternal and unchangeable natural law, a community of people who recognize the same law and work together for the common good (res publica).

A continuation of such republican thought on the eve of modern times can be found in the writings of the Renaissance Italian thinkers. For Niccolò Machiavelli, the civil society was a political community bound by efficient governance that ensured its stability, internal order, harmony, security, and glory. At the same time, this was a space for political virtue to emerge and be pursued. Despite differences, these classical republican perspectives have in common the perception of civic community as valuable in itself, defining a good to which individuals’ particular interests must be subordinated. Here, the freedom and sovereignty of a political community as the common good is the prerequisite for an individual citizen’s freedom, which is only achievable through membership in this political community. What regulates those freedoms is the authority of the law and political institutions as well as shared values and customs. This common good is discovered, identified, and, as a consequence, pursued through citizens’ participation in public life. In this classical republican perspective, civil society is therefore a moral and political community pursuing a common good, where its citizens realize their freedom by exercising their rights, fulfilling their duties, and exhibiting civic virtues.

Modern times brought a dramatic reversal of this relationship. The revolution started with rationalism as a philosophical trend that regarded each human being as capable of rational judgment and established the individual, rather than the community, as the source of morality. This thought was followed up by the pioneers of the Enlightenment and liberalism, who held equal rights of individuals (e.g., habeas corpus, private property) to be natural and inalienable. The primordiality of those rights vis-à-vis the political assembly is expressed in the concept of the “social contract,” according to which
a voluntary agreement of free and equal individuals is established to secure their natural rights against the abuse of power. The despotism of nation-states that emerged after the Westphalian Treaty of 1648 often gave rise to a negative definition of a citizen’s freedom as a sense of security (founded on a law that restricts the arbitrariness of other political actors). Subsequent political revolutions in England, the United States, and France adopted and strengthened this modern perspective of an individual as holding natural rights and freedoms that a state, as a legal institution established by a voluntary political assembly of its citizens, must safeguard.

The classic liberal thinkers believed in fundamental individual rights that include property rights and the freedom to dispose of one’s property. According to liberalism, the basic domain of freedom is the market, through which individuals can most efficiently pursue their particular interests. The clash of those individual interests is seen as a universal model shaping the dynamics of the free social space. Hence, in this liberal perspective, civil society is treated as a universe of free individuals who pursue their own goals in their own way while respecting agreed-on principles. It is a sphere of independence and freedom extending between the family and the state, where a spontaneous self-organization of individuals emerges, making it pluralist and heterogeneous (politically, economically, and culturally). What immanently binds this social space of diversity and conflicting interests is, according to the followers of the Scottish Enlightenment, either the inherent social impulse—the friendship and altruism of human beings—or conformism, vanity, and a desire to please others. Even though distinguished from the institution of the state, the sphere of civil society remains in a constructive relationship to it, as citizens use it to decide with others on matters of shared interest.

This liberal perspective on civil society became a negative point of reference for thinkers such as Georg Hegel and Karl Marx, who did not share its optimism as to the immanent powers regulating the conflicts of particular interests and egotisms. Both Hegel and Marx explicitly equated the civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) with the economic society and the private sphere, with which they contrasted the public sphere as the only one capable of curbing conflicts and disparities within civil society. According to Hegel, the embodiment and guarantor of this superindividual order was the state. For Marx, it was a political civil society that can be created after the abolition of private property, which is the source of disparities, domination, and social conflicts. It was with reference to these two thinkers that Antonio Gramsci developed his concept of civil society in the first half of the 20th century.

However, from the mid-19th century until the 1970s, the interest in the concept of civil society virtually disappeared, replaced by a more detailed reflection on the institutional and normative framework of the democratic order. The renaissance of this idea in the last decades of the 20th century is related to the birth of opposition movements in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, where self-organizing social and civic structures operated beyond the state or in opposition to it. From the perspective of mainly Western analysts, the category of a civil society seemed to be an appropriate tool to describe them. Civic movements in authoritarian countries were undoubtedly a major impulse for the renaissance of interest in the category of civil society. It was all the more important, however, that they occurred concurrently with social and political phenomena and changes taking place in Western societies themselves (e.g., the welfare state crisis, new social movements). In the public debate, criticism was directed either at the excessive welfare state or at the alienation of representative democracies from civil society. The advocates of social and economic mobilization or social and political democratization, of increasing civic participation and involvement in public life, and of combating alienation and individualism quite often made reference to the classical republican visions of the truly civil society. At the same time, they forced political thinkers to revisit this issue in the context of the modern era.

With respect to the concept of civil society, the most interesting aspect of this debate is the dispute between liberals and communitarians, pursued with varying intensity over the past 30 years of the 20th century. Even though it is rooted in two different visions of the individual–collectivity relationship and the factors constituting the Self, this dispute finds its practical expression mostly in the different understanding of a civil society and its relationship to the democratic state. Putting it as simply as possible, for liberals, a state is one of the many voluntary assemblies of free and equal citizens who agree on the principles of justice, which they can reflect on, question, and renegotiate. Its
basic role is to safeguard the agreed procedures. Those procedures (e.g., the rule of law) and the results of their application are what liberals are inclined to consider a “procedural” common good. A state, largely restricted to safeguarding the agreed rules, would open even more space for the development of a civil society. As a guardian of procedures, it should remain neutral to various goals, visions, and ideals of good life, which are to emerge and compete with one another within the very space of the civil society, in the “free marketplace of ideas.” It is civil society rather than the state that selects and orders these procedures. In this sense, a liberal civil society, as distinct from the state, remains in a constructive relationship with the state but is more significant than the latter. A political society is important but has no absolute priority.

For communitarians, by contrast, the state is the most powerful political community, defined as a particular “community of experience” in which a shared past and future are intertwined. The community’s tradition is its substantial common good, and its maintenance is a common goal and endeavor. Active participation and involvement in the community’s life leads to identification with its goals and generates a sense of solidarity, so promoting the culture of participation is a value worth supporting. A state may remain neutral on various matters but not on the matter of patriotism. Only by discovering the principles, ties, and loyalties that bind the community together can individuals fully understand their social and civic roles. Civil society is not a chaotic set of competing or cooperating associations but an entity united by a shared self-awareness of its own history, tradition, culture, institutions, and achievements; the goals and concepts presented in the “free market of ideas” must be intelligible to everyone and must be embedded in the culture or tradition of the community. Thus, the state is entitled and obliged to support a common understanding, by following the policy of preference for the common good and establishing a hierarchy of goals and values to inspire its members. This policy of preferring a substantially understood common good over the policy of neutrality makes the state the ultimate entity. In this sense, the state is more important than the civil society, or to put it in other words, a civil society is tantamount to both the political community and the state.

This controversy over ideas, theories, or even ideologies can often be found in daily life and disputes in liberal democracies. It refers, among other things, to the practical dimension of the relationship between the state and the civil society, in particular in different models of cooperation between public administrative structures and the so-called third sector.

**State and Civil Society**

Analytically, we can distinguish three types of relationships between the civil society and a democratic state. In the first, a civil society is a complement to the state. In the second, the state is a complement to civil society. In the third, the state and civil society are in an antagonistic relationship. The first type of relationship emerges where the state is the major agent for the redistribution of national wealth and takes responsibility for providing and operating many spheres of collective life (e.g., education, health care, pensions). In this situation, civic organizations enter only those areas of collective life that the state does not provide with sufficient social services. Such a relationship can be observed in welfare states characterized by an extended sphere of social benefits, and its theoretical grounds can be found in communitarian concepts. An excessive welfare state may, however, lead to the “learned helplessness” syndrome (or dependency on social benefits), which converts some citizens into the welfare state’s clients. This weakens the vigor of civil society.

The second type of relationship refers to the situation where the state’s responsibilities are restricted to the minimum (e.g., police, army, courts, diplomacy). The remaining part of public life is taken care of by grassroots citizens’ groups. Such a relationship stems from liberal concepts of citizenship and state. It is worth noting that where a state’s noninvolvement is too restricted, social inequalities may increase, which may lead to the marginalization or exclusion of some segments of society. This, in turn, reduces the vitality of a civil society because for marginalized individuals, dealing with public matters ceases to be of importance, having to focus on survival. The third type of relationship echoes the relation between individuals and the authoritarian state. It can be found predominantly in young democracies as this antagonistic relationship between citizens and the nondemocratic state is still present in the collective memory and in common cognitive structures. In this case, various organizations of civil society usually have little trust in the
state institutions (and vice versa). As a consequence, conflict prevails over cooperation. Over time, especially when a young democracy has completed the consolidation phase, this generalized antagonism may disappear, replaced by civic defiance focused on certain acts of a democratic state.

Cognitive Usefulness of the Concept

The usefulness of the concept of civil society changes over time. There are periods where researchers’ attention is drawn to other areas, with the civil society itself being treated as secondary to some more fundamental issues (e.g., the rule of law, functioning of democratic state institutions, party system development and functioning). In such cases, sociological or political science narratives push the concept of “civil society” to the background, if they refer to it at all. This happens where the subject of research is a well-consolidated democracy (at least in some of its aspects).

There are times, however, where researchers rediscover the cognitive usefulness of the concept. This takes place, for example, where a stable functioning and reproduction of the democratic order is disrupted and the very existence of democracy is jeopardized. This is also the case when new social movements emerge in the public sphere, contesting a particular part of reality as, for example, ecological movements that have had an impact on political decision makers and made the public opinion sensitive to the consequences of environmental devastation. However, the revival of this concept can be seen most clearly in times of great historical revolutions, leading to a democratic order that emerged after the breakdown of authoritarian systems, as was the case in the 1980s and 1990s.

In different theories of democracy, the analytical usefulness of the concept of civil society varies. Generally, in theories that focus solely on the procedural dimension of democracy, where the problem of civic participation in public life is of lesser importance, the usefulness of this concept is less than in theories focusing on substantial aspects. In the former approach, a civil society is reduced to the so-called third sector, understood as the totality of voluntary nongovernmental associations that articulate various interests in the public sphere. In the latter approach, the usefulness of civil society is greater as the activity of citizens in the public realm determines the vitality of democracy. Examples of such a perspective are the associational democracy model as well as the deliberative democracy model.

Civil Society and Globalization

In the globalized world of today, with the progress of technologies, transport, and, most of all, means of mass communication that cover the entire world, problems that used to be of local impact (humanitarian disasters, epidemics, financial crises) now turn into global issues. These problems are addressed by governments of nation-states, international economic and political organizations (e.g., the United Nations, the World Bank, or the World Trade Organization), as well as private financial or industrial multinational corporations. The global governance of transnational decision-making structures creates the need to ensure civil scrutiny and to build a “global civil society.”

However, using the concept of civil society in a global context creates both theoretical and practical difficulties. It is true that some institutions of civil society are becoming globalized. The 1980s were a breakthrough decade in this respect, when some civil initiatives (e.g., human rights and pacifist movements) transcended the borders of the nation-states. They referred to global problems and demanded global solutions as well. Some of those initiatives entered the institutional phase, which resulted in the emergence of nongovernmental civic institutions of global scope (e.g., Greenpeace, Transparency International, Amnesty International). However, the conclusion that we are dealing with the beginnings of a global civil society seems to be premature for a number of reasons.

First, a civil society consists of citizens to whom authorities, legitimated by democratic procedures (e.g., elections), are accountable for their decisions. Global governance cannot be equated with political power defined in this way; because there is no global accountability procedure, this relationship cannot be directly transposed to the global level. Second, there are no rules to legitimize the actions of global civil structures, as a result of which their activity faces claims of usurpation. Third, the emergence of “global civil society” would require a common normative base, on which even contradictory civil initiatives could meet and operate in mutual respect. In a global dimension, there is no such common cultural denominator. Even the concept of
basic human rights is not generally recognized and is sometimes interpreted as a product of the Western culture and a tool for its expansion.

The importance of global governance is rising, as is that of global grassroots civil initiatives. However, because there is no “social contract” on the global level, both institutions that execute global governance and global civil organizations suffer from legitimacy deficits. Therefore, their relationship is usually antagonistic. Hence, the concept of civil society may again turn out to be a useful analytical category to describe further developments of globalization.

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See also Accountability; Citizenship; Democracy, Types of; Liberalism; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Participation; Political Culture; Republicanism; State

Further Readings


Civil War

Civil war can be defined as a violent conflict that pits states against one or more organized nonstate actors on their territory. This distinguishes civil wars from interstate conflict (where states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving the state (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or cohesive group, including genocides or similar violence by nonstate actors, such as terrorism or violent crime. This entry first discusses the various kinds of civil war and reviews the key patterns and trends in such conflicts. It then presents theories on the causes of civil war and the current research agenda.

The above conceptual definition of civil war clearly encompasses many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars where insurgents seek territorial secession or autonomy and conflicts where insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the center or state apparatus, as in military coups, or challengers may come from the periphery, or outside the political establishment. Others separate between ethnic civil wars, where the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, where insurgents aim for major social transformation. Colonial conflicts are sometimes singled out as a set distinct from civil wars on states’ core territory. However, even if these suggested categories may be conceptually distinct types and could suggest different causes and dynamics, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state. Thus, most researchers do not impose such strict a priori distinctions between varieties to analyze these as separate types but instead study civil war as a common class of conflict.

Patterns and Trends in Civil War

Even though the modern state sometimes is defined by its alleged monopoly on violence, armed challenges to state authority are as old as states
themselves. Despite numerous historical accounts of civil wars, there are few systematic data sources on civil conflict prior to 1945, since so little is known about the extent of conflicts outside the developed countries before this date. Figure 1 displays the number of ongoing conflicts (top) and new outbreaks (bottom) since 1945, using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (UCDP/PRIO), Armed Conflict Dataset. UCDP/PRIO classifies conflicts claiming more than 25 deaths in a year as interstate conflicts, extrasystemic (or colonial) conflicts, as well as internal conflicts, or as civil wars, including internationalized internal conflicts where other states fight on the side of the government. Figure 1 shows that while there are relatively few interstate wars since 1945, civil wars have been common. Whereas interstate conflicts tend to be short, civil wars often persist for a long time. Research also demonstrates that civil wars are less likely to be settled by formal agreements than interstate wars and much more likely to recur. Many observers saw the initial rise in new outbreaks of civil conflict after the end of the Cold War as evidence that the world would be more turbulent and violent after a period of stable deterrence between the superpowers. However, Figure 1 demonstrates a clear decline in civil war since this peak after the Cold War. The specific causes that may underlie this decline remain disputed, and the number of ongoing civil wars remains high in absolute terms.

Civil wars are generally less severe than interstate wars in terms of the direct battle deaths. However, civil wars have been more frequent and often persistent, and more than 90% of the recorded deaths in battle since the Cold War stem from civil wars. Further, war can have a substantial indirect impact on human welfare beyond the direct loss of life. Studies indicate that countries experiencing civil war see a pronounced fall in their gross domestic product and never recover their earlier growth trajectory. According to Paul Collier et al. (2003), “Civil war is development in reverse.” Civil wars also dispel trade and investment and leave large social legacies in unemployed former combatants and displaced individuals. The negative consequences of civil war are not limited only to the countries that experience them; studies find that neighboring countries also suffer a negative economic impact and may be more prone to violence themselves as a consequence of conflict among neighbors.

Causes of Civil War

The literature on the causes of civil war is enormous, and it is impossible to provide an exhaustive review of the many arguments that have been presented here. Contributions have emphasized a variety of social, economic, and political factors. However, theories of civil war, in general, point either to specific motives for why people resort to violence or to specific opportunities that make violence more or less feasible or attractive. This entry examines theories of civil war by the specific clusters of factors emphasized, in an order roughly following the chronology of theory development and the specific events and cases that motivated these arguments.

Economic Grievances, Motives, and Opportunities

Most civil wars take place within relatively poorer societies, and many studies corroborate the link between development and income. Early contributions to the study of violence within societies tended to focus on economic deprivation and grievances as key motives. In particular, Ted Gurr highlighted inequality and how groups may resort to rebellion if they are dissatisfied with their current economic status relative to their aspirations. The literature on nationalist conflicts has emphasized how both relatively poorer and wealthier groups are likely to rebel against the center if they believe that they can do better under independence. Civil wars in Latin American countries were often interpreted within a framework focusing on economic grievances, in the form of either unequal land distribution or high income inequality. However, the empirical evidence linking individual income inequality and conflict is mixed. Older studies focusing on a broad range of political violence often found a positive effect of higher inequality, while newer studies of civil war more specifically tend to find little support. However, one should be cautious in making strong inferences from this, given the poor quality and coverage of cross-national data on individual income inequality.
Figure 1  Ongoing Armed Conflicts (top) and Onset of New Conflicts (bottom)

Source: Author. Data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

Note: UCDP/PRIO = Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.
More recent political economy studies of civil war tend to be very dismissive of the role of grievances. Some researchers have argued that grievances are ubiquitous and that it is more important to focus on variation in the opportunities for violence. Collier and Anke Hoeffler argue that low income makes it easier to mobilize insurgencies, since potential recruits have less to lose in forgone income from normal economic activities and wages for soldering will be much lower than in wealthier societies. James Fearon and David Laitin argue that civil war is primarily a problem of weak states, which in turn is largely determined by economic development. Researchers in this tradition also link mobilization to the role of individual incentives. Opportunities for insurgencies are better when participants can do well out of war, for example, through looting or rents derived from valuable natural resources. Empirical studies lend some support to link between natural resources and a higher risk of civil war. Civil wars in Africa are often taken to support these perspectives.

**Political Grievances, Motives, and Opportunities**

Political deprivation, such as colonial subordination or lack of political rights, provides another plausible motivation for resort to violence. Many conflicts after 1945 first emerged as groups sought to achieve independence for areas under colonial rule. The Indochina War and the Algerian War of Independence helped mobilize movements in other countries by showing how overwhelmingly more powerful colonial powers could be defeated through sustained violent campaigns. Although overseas colonies eventually received their independence, many ethnically distinct groups within contiguous empires such as Russia or Ethiopia see themselves in similar struggles of national liberation. Researchers have highlighted how violence may arise around such peripheral ethnic minority groups. The violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia spurred renewed interest in ethnic conflict. Many researchers postulated strong parallels between the security dilemmas in an anarchic international system and relations between ethnic groups, where only full territorial partition could provide stable solutions.

Much of the subsequent empirical literature has emphasized that there is little evidence that ethnically more diverse countries are generally more prone to conflict. However, looking only at the number or relative size of ethnic groups disregards their political status and the extent to which ethnic groups are systematically excluded from political power or discriminated against by the state. Studies looking at ethnic exclusion find stronger evidence for a relationship to violence. Ethnically diverse countries are not necessarily more prone to conflict if they have inclusive institutions or grant autonomy rights, and control of the state or access to power does not always follow directly from the relative size of ethnic groups. Many ethnic civil wars see minority groups controlling political institutions and excluding larger groups from power, such as the Amhara in Ethiopia until their defeat by a coalition of other groups in 1991. Political, economic, and ethnic grievances are often linked. Studies that focus on inequalities that follow group lines rather than individual income inequalities find a stronger relationship to conflict.

Struggles for broader political rights in autocratic systems provide another context where violence may occur. Political democracy provides many avenues for actors to express dissent through nonviolent political means. Autocratic regimes typically deny citizens room for political activities and often resort to severe repression of protest, which in turn may motivate resort to arms. Protests against autocratic or exclusionary regimes have often turned violent, sometimes leading to sustained campaigns, as, for example, in South Africa. Claims for greater political rights and freedom are clearly important elements of the rhetoric and call for mobilization of many insurgent movements, even if these do not necessarily move to implement democratic institutions if successful in achieving power.

Much of civil war research has focused on the role of political institutions in structuring the opportunities for violence rather than the potential accommodative effect of greater democracy. Many have argued that although autocratic institutions provide fewer avenues for nonviolent political activities and protest, autocratic regimes are often sufficiently repressive to successfully deter dissent. By contrast, anocracies, or regimes combining autocratic and democratic features, are seen as the most prone to see violent conflict by combining the lack of political freedom motivating violence with the sufficient opportunities afforded by a less repressive regime. Many studies have found evidence for such an inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and civil war. However, there is no consensus on the underlying mechanisms (e.g., reforms in
autocracies may be a response to conflict potential rather than a prior cause). Some hold these relationships to be in part artifacts resulting from the definition of empirical democracy measures.

Opportunity Structures and Dynamic Events
Most of the theories discussed above emphasize structural factors that rarely change or change only slowly over time. Such persistent structural features do not provide clear explanations for why civil wars break out at specific times and not others. Research on social movements suggests that certain events can create “political opportunity structures” that afford groups better prospects for extracting concessions from the state or center. This may include demonstrations of state weakness, conflict between elites, or events that make it easier for groups to mobilize, for example, by bringing groups together or indicating focal points for organizing protests. The concept of opportunity structures has so far not had much direct impact on studies on civil conflict, but there are many existing arguments and findings in civil war research that can be interpreted within this framework. Regime change and other signals of weakened state authority can increase the perceived chances of success or extracting concessions from a government. Studies have shown that economic crises and natural disasters can increase the risk of conflict. This is consistent with the idea that crises and emergencies can help provide a setting for rallying protest against the government. For example, the 1973 earthquake in Nicaragua, and the massive corruption and lack of subsequent reconstruction, generated widespread disillusionment and helped a long-standing Marxist insurgency dramatically increase recruitment.

International Dimensions of Civil War
Most research on civil war has assumed that since civil wars are “internal” conflicts rather than conflicts between states, their main causes must also be domestic or located within state boundaries. However, factors outside individual countries can play an important role in the outbreak of conflicts, as well as how they evolve. Many actors in civil wars are not necessarily confined within individual countries. Ethnic groups often span international boundaries, and transnational kin frequently participate in or provide support for insurgencies in other states. The status of international borders generates different constraints and opportunities for governments and rebels. Borders are, in a technical sense, just lines in the sand and are often not difficult to cross from a purely military perspective. However, the fact that borders formally delineate state sovereignty makes it more difficult for governments to violate the sovereignty of other countries, while such constraints are less relevant for rebels. Governments risk retaliation from neighboring countries from territorial incursions and face difficulties in targeting transnational support. This in turn means that rebels can have a logistic advantage in operating out of extraterritorial bases, and transnational rebel movements can be more difficult for governments to deter or defeat. The presence of conflict in another state can help facilitate violent mobilization, either through emulation of successful rebellions or through the direct imports of arms and combatants. Finally, civil wars are often closely linked to interstate war. Poor relations between states may motivate governments to support insurgencies in rival countries, and civil wars may in turn promote military conflict between states, for example, as a result of conflict over border violations, alleged support for insurgents, or conflicts over the externalities generated by conflicts. Western Africa in the 1990s, for example, provides many examples of governments supporting insurgencies in neighboring countries and retaliating against alleged support and border violations. The fact that conflicts are not necessarily limited to single countries and may involve participation by other states in various forms demonstrates how a strict dichotomy between civil and interstate wars often may be untenable.

Civil War Termination and Duration
Although most research focuses on accounting for the original outbreak of civil war, there has also been growing interests in understanding the prospects for conflict termination and why some conflicts are so persistent. Many researchers argued that there must be some symmetry between the original causes of civil war and the factors that lead to their eventual termination. From this perspective, efforts to foster conflict settlement should focus on addressing the issues that gave rise to the conflict. For example, civil wars would be likely to end earlier in more developed countries, where the opportunity costs are higher and states are stronger. Events such
as political reform and increasing accommodation could help promote the end of conflicts. However, other researchers argue that the factors that make conflicts endure can be quite different from those influencing the initial outbreak of conflict. While interstate wars tend to be relatively short and typically end quickly in some kind of formal settlement once the relative strength of the actors becomes clear, civil wars often persist for a long time, as in the case of Southern Sudan or Angola. A number of explanations have been proposed to account for this paradox. Some emphasize how civil wars tend to be low-intensity conflicts fought in the periphery, where the features that facilitate insurgency make it difficult for governments to conclusively defeat rebels. Others point to how insurgents that can do well during war through looting and control over valuable resources may have little interest in seeking an end to conflict. Other research emphasizes how conflict termination involves severe problems of credible commitment. Even if it may be relatively easy to reach consensus on the terms of an agreement in principle, carrying through with an agreement may be difficult since parties have incentives to make promises that they later renege on. For rebels, laying down arms is a risky choice, since they will be left less able to defend themselves. Moreover, it can be difficult for governments to ascertain whether rebels will uphold their end of agreements, for example, through decommissioning or controlling violent breakaway factions in the aftermath of agreements. Research on credible commitment problems after civil war argues that the success of agreements often hinges on whether third parties can serve as external enforcers. New research on peacekeeping and conflict management suggests that involvement by international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) can increase the prospects for settling conflict and preventing wars. However, many interventions in civil conflicts have clearly been less than fully successful. There is little consensus on how best the UN may contribute or to what extent the characteristics of conflicts or initial prospects for settlements determine whether external actors are willing to be involved in the first place.

**Disaggregation in Civil War Research**

Civil war has gone from being a peripheral area to a major focus in the study of conflict. Moreover, the field shows clear positive synergies from the interaction between theory development and research design. Older studies of civil war were often quite descriptive, focused on single cases, and frequently reluctant to consider general theories of civil war. The renewed interest in civil wars in the 1990s recognized the need to take into account nonconflict cases and turned to cross-national studies, comparing the various characteristics believed to make countries more prone to conflict across countries and its relationship to civil war. However, recent research has highlighted how the proxy measures used in cross-country comparative studies are often quite far removed from the key theoretical concepts. Moreover, looking at states and countries at large often downplays the nonstate actors in civil wars and ignores the often considerable variation within countries. Conflicts tend to be localized and often involve actors and regions that are markedly different from national averages, as, for example, the Chechen conflict in Russia. Recent contributions, accompanied by many new data developments, often turn to greater disaggregation within countries and a more specific focus on actors to more carefully evaluate theories of civil war. A number of studies have looked at the specific conflictual events within individual countries over time to better understand the microlevel interactions between actors in conflict. Some studies have looked at dyads of peripheral groups and the center to take into account how the attributes of nonstate actors may influence the risk of conflict. Other studies have looked at the characteristics of specific rebel groups to better understand capacity or opportunities for conflict or used individual-level data on participants in insurgencies to examine motivations. Some researchers consider geographically disaggregated data, either on the characteristics of the places where conflict occurs or using smaller units within countries, for a more detailed resolution of how social, economic, and political factors may be related to conflict. These studies indicate that the characteristics of conflict zones tend to be quite different from national aggregates and averages. Moreover, the conclusions from country-level studies on who participates in insurgencies and their motivations are often not supported by more direct evidence. Such innovations in the study of civil conflict attest to the vibrancy of this research area. Moreover, they underscore the important relationship research design and the conclusions that we reach, and how theory must inform the
former. Although existing research has clearly generated many useful insights about civil war, this review illustrates the considerable changes in the conventional wisdom on civil war over time. Advances in theory development and research are likely to continue to spur further changes.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Conflicts; Democratization; Dissatisfaction, Political; Ethnicity; Inequality, Economic; Mobilization, Political; Nationalism; Nonstate Actors; Peace; Revolution; Secession; State Failure; Violence; War and Peace; Warlords

Further Readings
along two dimensions. First, opinions diverge on the economic base to be used to analyze the class structure. Second, strong disagreement persists on the cultural, social, and political consequences of classes. On the one hand, this is related to the specific mechanisms that trigger the transformation of classes from mere aggregates of people into social groups: collective actors that recognize common values and interests and organize themselves to pursue common goals. On the other hand, scholars differ in the evaluation of the impact, over time, of classes on social behavior (lifestyle, consumption) and political behavior (participation, voting).

In the next section, the main approaches to the origins and consequences of social classes are discussed. First, the perspectives of classical authors such as Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Émile Durkheim are contrasted. The influence of these authors on the ensuing research is extensive. Contemporary studies are still affected by their different views. After discussing the most important proposals for reframing class structure in the light of economic and political changes, attention is devoted to debate over the past decade on the decline of social classes: To what extent do social classes remain important as an instrument for understanding contemporary societies?

Contrasting Views in the Classics

Among the classicists, Marx is the author who gave greatest emphasis to social classes. The struggle between classes plays a fundamental role in the historical development of human societies. Classes are social groupings that share a specific position in the control of the means of production. Each historical type of society is characterized by a dominant mode of production and specific classes. The capitalist mode of production is based on the private property of the means of production and on the role of the market in regulating productive activities and the distribution of incomes. Capitalist societies were therefore increasingly shaped by the capitalist mode of production with its two main classes: (1) the owners of the means of production (capitalist bourgeoisie) and (2) the workers, who are employed by the former and receive a wage. According to Marx, there was an objective conflict of interest between these two classes, because the industrial bourgeoisie could maintain, and strengthen, its position of economic, social, and political privilege as far as it was able to exploit the workers and extract from their activities a surplus value as determinant of profit. Over time, however, the growing crises of the capitalist economy would worsen the conditions of the working class and would encourage its social and political organization, which, in turn, led to a revolutionary change in the mode of production and the advent of a socialist society.

Marx was aware that the class structure of capitalist societies was more complex. At the same time, he recognized that the making of the working class as a historical actor did not depend on economic factors alone. He frequently discussed the sociocultural and political factors that could affect the formation of class consciousness (as he puts it, the passage from a “class in itself” to a “class for itself”). However, over time the extension of the capitalist mode of production would lead to the increasing polarization of bourgeoisie and workers and to an overwhelming trend toward conflict. The history of the past 2 centuries has shown the importance of classes and class struggle, but it has also demonstrated that Marx overestimated the role of class conflict and overlooked the autonomous role of social and political processes and institutions.

Weber was convinced of the important role played by class and class conflict. However, he saw class structure in a more flexible way, which allowed him to account for the increasing differentiation introduced by the development of a modern capitalist economy. This was done by defining classes as social groupings based on a common position in the market rather than on the control of means of production, as Marx asserted. Therefore, a class is composed of people who have similar life chances, affected by the income they can obtain in the market. This common power in the market (“class situation”) is determined not only by the ownership of the means of production but also by wealth, education, and professional skills.

Another difference concerns the passage from a common class situation to the formation of self-aware social groups that organize themselves to pursue common interests. While Marx was convinced that the economic dynamic of capitalism would lead, in the end, to class consciousness and
collective action, Weber was much more skeptical about this possibility. He thought that people within the same class situation would share life chances, social inequalities, styles of consumption, social and even political behavior, but they would usually remain aggregates of individuals rather than becoming self-aware social groups based on social interaction. In this respect, the German sociologist distinguished between mass action and community action. A common class situation usually brings about mass action. But the passage to community action requires certain noneconomic conditions: Status groups (religious, ethnic groups) must be absent or marginal; a large number of people must be in the same class situation; because they are concentrated in large firms and urban neighborhoods, it is relatively easy to organize them; and intellectuals will play an important role in the diffusion of a class ideology and in the organization of the people involved. Despite these clear-cut differences in their view of classes and class conflict, both Marx and Weber recognized the importance of social inequalities as a determinant of social behavior and source of conflict in modern societies.

A different perspective was adopted by another founding father of sociology, Durkheim. Writing at the end of the 19th century, he emphasized the increasing division of labor as the main feature of modern society. A fundamental requisite of this society, based on the high differentiation and integration of specialized roles, concerns the recruitment and reward of individuals. It is necessary that each individual be called to fulfill the function he or she will perform best and receive an adequate reward for his or her efforts. In other words, people must be motivated to perform different roles thanks to structured social inequalities. This is the main function of stratification in the social system according to Talcott Parsons, the most influential figure in the sociology of the 1950s, who developed the functionalist premises of Durkheim’s work. Parsons and other scholars of the functionalist approach, such as Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore (1945), gave a more optimistic account of the role of social stratification in the stability of society. This trend—which was also influenced by the economic and social climate of the postwar period—fostered the growth of descriptive research on social stratification, especially in the United States. Social strata were constructed by reputational analysis (asking people to rank others) or by a mix of reputational evaluations and objective indicators, such as wealth, income, and education. Usually, as in the well-known work by Lloyd Warner (1963), these studies presented a classification based on various status groups (upper classes, middle classes, and lower classes).

Reframing Class Analysis

In the 1950s and 1960s, the stratification approach largely prevailed in the study of social classes. This situation changed in the 1970s with the development of new empirical research based on occupational classes. In this strand of literature, there is a shared critique of the descriptive features of stratification studies and an emphasis on the “relational” attributes of classes. This means classes are to be defined on the basis of their position in the market and in the productive process, as in Weber and Marx, and therefore in relation to the other classes with which they compete for greater resources. However, the origins and aims of the new studies are clearly different. The component most influenced by Marx and the Marxist tradition is more interested in the analysis of the middle classes and in its consequences for the proletarianization of work, originally foreseen by Marx. The other component is closer to the Weberian perspective and looks at the empirical study of classes as the necessary basis for a more adequate analysis of social mobility.

The followers of the Marxist perspective tried to account for both the persistence of the petty bourgeoisie and the unexpected (in Marxist terms) growth of the new, dependent, middle classes (managers, supervisors, technicians). In designing an empirical map of social classes, Erik Wright tried to solve this problem through the concept of “contradictory class locations.” In his studies, he distinguished between the ownership and control of the means of production. As a consequence, top and middle-level managers, technicians, and supervisors may also experience variable degrees of autonomy in performing their role.
In the 1980s and 1990s, another influential class map was provided by John Goldthorpe. He distinguished between a labor contract and a service contract. Employment regulated by a labor contract entails a short-term and specific exchange of money for work, while a service contract involves a delegation of authority, specialized knowledge, and a certain degree of autonomy on the part of employees. On this basis, a class schema for empirical analysis and comparisons was worked out. It included seven main classes: (1) service class (managers, professionals, higher-grade technicians), (2) less skilled white-collar workers, (3) petty bourgeoisie (artisans, small proprietors), (4) skilled manual workers, (5) unskilled manual workers, (6) small farmers, and (7) farm laborers. In practice, this schema is similar to the map designed by Wright. Both account for the growth of the new middle classes and an increasing differentiation among manual workers. Both of them can be used in diachronic and cross-country comparisons. For example, over time the class structure of advanced countries shows a decline of the old middle classes (the petty bourgeoisie); an increase in professionals, technicians, and white-collar workers (the new, dependent middle classes); and a growing differentiation among manual workers. Cross-country comparisons may help analyze the differences among advanced countries, which are related not only to the productive model and organization but also to the role of the state and the extension of nonmarket forms of coordination (“varieties of capitalism”). Interesting insights may also come from comparisons between advanced and developing countries. However, the main application of the Goldthorpe schema has been in the comparative study of social mobility. In this respect, robust research findings have been produced on the strong influence of classes on social mobility. These findings do not confirm the expectations of the liberal theory that industrial societies tend to become more mobile and more open. Rather, mobility rates (in particular relative rates) show a high degree of temporal stability. The chances for the children of less privileged classes of moving to the upper positions of the class structure remain low, without revealing significant differences among countries.

In spite of their different origins and goals, both the Marxist and Weberian maps achieved similar results and shed light on the class-based social inequalities typical of advanced capitalist societies until the 1970s. However, in the following period, there was a double change. On the one hand, the crisis of the “Fordist” model of production brought about a decline of large firms and their organization of labor. New forms of productive organization developed, based on flexible specialization and networks linking firms. On the other hand, welfare systems had to be restructured to deal with increasing costs. As a consequence, important changes affected the whole class structure. New maps had to be designed. “Postindustrial” societies are characterized by the growing role of the service sector. The traditional axis of stratification based on industrialism has shrunk, both because of the new technologies that reduce the use of labor and because of increasing trends to outsource manufacturing activities to developing countries. In advanced capitalist societies, new activities have developed in business services (finance, legal and accounting services, software programming), in social services (health, education, and welfare services), and in consumer service (restaurants, laundries, services related to leisure). Therefore, as Gøsta Esping-Andersen has pointed out, a new axis of stratification has emerged. This requires that new groupings be more clearly distinguished within the middle classes and the workers. The roles of professionals and scientists, together with that of technicians and semiprofessionals (schoolteachers, social workers, technical designers), become more important in the middle classes and have to be differentiated from those of managers and supervisors. Among the workers, it is necessary to distinguish new figures such as skilled service workers (police officers, hairdressers, etc.) and unskilled service workers or service proletariat (cleaners, wait staff, shop assistants, etc.). The new groupings tend to experience specific forms of career regimes and life chances and therefore are involved in processes of class closure that differentiate them from the traditional classes based on the Fordist industrial model.

Persistence or Decline?

Two macrochanges have influenced the debate on social classes in the past decades: (1) postindustrialism and (2) globalization. According to many scholars, the crisis of Fordism, the emergence of a
service-based economy in advanced capitalist countries, and the increasing delocalization of manufacturing activities toward the developing countries have brought about a decline in social classes. The basic arguments in support of this thesis refer to two main trends: On the one hand, the increasing fragmentation of class structure and the growing individualization of life chances, and on the other hand, the weakening of class-based attitudes and behavior. For example, according to Ulrich Beck (1992), social inequalities tend to become “classless,” whereas Anthony Giddens pointed out that—as a consequence of fragmentation and globalization—classes are no longer experienced as a significant source of collective identity.

Those who share the idea of a class decline usually refer to both dimensions: the loss of influence over social inequalities and social behavior. In contrast to this thesis, other scholars strongly criticize this view of a decline. However, they mainly focus on the relationship between classes and social inequalities. Goldthorpe provided a clear synthesis of the latter position, which makes wide reference to empirical findings. He pointed to the more detailed arguments advanced in support of the decline: insecurity and mobility. The theorists of decline assume that within the context of globalization, the threat of unemployment is not confined mainly to the members of the less advantaged classes but tends to become pervasive. As for mobility, globalization and postindustrial forms of economic organization are supposed to break up the continuity of working careers and of membership in the traditional occupational classes. The growth of flexible and nonstandard work and the emergence of new, more fragmented work trajectories reduce the significance of class as a lifetime experience. However, in contrast to these expectations, empirical findings show the persistence of class as the main determinant of inequalities. Thus, it is true that economic changes have brought about increasing job insecurity and a growth of nonstandard employment, but the chances of losing their jobs remain much higher for skilled and especially nonskilled workers than for professional, administrative, and managerial posts. In addition, empirical research demonstrates that inequalities in important spheres such as income, health, and access to education remain strongly associated with the class of people, defined according to the job they hold. As for social mobility, there is clear evidence that the overall association between class origin and destination is still characterized by high temporal stability and, therefore, despite changes in the organization of work, classes continue to provide lifetime experiences.

In the debate on class decline, particular attention has been devoted to the influence of class on voting and political participation. According to the theories that point to the weakening of class experience, class politics gives way to new forms of political behavior influenced more by cultural factors, lifestyles, and elective choices. One of the most powerful factors that feed this trend is the dramatic reduction in size of the traditional working class and the growth of service workers and the new middle classes. As a consequence, class cleavages become a less important basis for social identity. Their place is increasingly taken by other divisions, such as race and ethnicity, gender and sexuality. Many scholars also share Ronald Inglehart’s (1990) thesis of the new “postmaterialism” in the politics of the advanced societies. This view sees politics no longer as influenced by the search for economic well-being and the defense of material interests but as increasingly affected by a personal search for autonomy and self-fulfillment and by a greater cultural interest in the quality of life.

As in the case of social inequality, scholars mainly involved in empirical research have rejected the thesis of a declining class influence on politics. They have pointed to findings that clearly question the hypothesis of a class dealignment—a reduction in the level of class voting—controlling for changes in the relative size of classes and the overall popularity of parties: Old relations between classes and parties—such as those of workers and left-wing parties—still hold. It has also been noted that a possible realignment will usually reveal new links between class and voting patterns rather than their disappearance. Thus, in concluding his accurate comparative study, Geoffrey Evans pointed out that the theory of a generalized decline in the class basis of voting is wrong.

However, in assessing the influence of class, a more clear-cut distinction has to be made between the impact on voting patterns and party affiliation and the strength of social classes as political actors, that is, as self-aware collective subjects, capable of
Cleavages, Social and Political

The term cleavage identifies social and political divisions characterized by a close connection between individuals’ positioning in the social stratification system, their beliefs and normative orientations, and their behavioral patterns. This close connection contributes to the resilience and stability of cleavages over time. In this entry, the constitutive elements of this concept are discussed and brought into a coherent overall framework that helps illuminate the political relevance of such cleavages.

The Concept

Empirical evidence about individual actors in politics concerns these three distinct dimensions: social structural, attitudinal, and behavioral. Individuals can be regrouped in social aggregates on the basis of gender, residence, education, property, ethnic group, religion, competence in political matters, available social relationships, and so on. Scholars

Further Readings


See also Cleavages, Social and Political; Conflicts; Electoral Behavior
regroup individuals in this way because some theory or previous research has led them to believe that these social aggregates have an impact on the other two kinds of information we can collect about the same individuals: (1) their subjective perceptions and judgments about the world of politics and (2) their actual political behavior.

Individuals in fact have opinions, preferences, and value judgments about a large variety of political issues, institutions, and actors, as well as normative views on good government, a just society, welfare and redistribution, race and ethnicity, religion, and so on. Some of these beliefs and values are superficial and unstable and change rapidly and frequently, while others are profound and resilient and more impermeable to environmental changes. In some cases, these various beliefs are unrelated to each other, while in other cases, they are strongly correlated and constitute clusters or systems of beliefs.

We also can collect information about what individuals do—their behavior. People establish wide or narrow social relationships (they marry, do business, establish friendships) in their environment. Some individuals invest heavily in culture and education, while others have different consumption patterns. Some cooperate easily with others while others withdraw. (See Table 1.) People vote or abstain, join parties or interest groups, rebel or acquiesce, and, more generally, engage or do not engage in a vast repertory of political acts.

Most sociopolitical research is based on the attempt to investigate relationships between social positions and aggregates, beliefs systems and value orientations, and behavioral patterns. While it is clear that objective social positions are derived from theories of social stratification criteria that are independent of the normative orientations and the behavioral patterns of the individuals, the relation between beliefs and behaviors is more intimate and the direction of influence more difficult to ascertain. These three sources of information should, therefore, remain conceptually distinct as much as possible.

The literature frequently associates these three sources of information about individuals with different kinds of “cleavages.” Objective social positions are often thought to be the basis for “social” cleavages (sometimes called “economic” cleavages); beliefs and values are considered to be the source of “cultural” cleavages and also of “political cleavages”; and political behavior is often indicated as an expression of political cleavages. The term cleavage is therefore frequently accompanied by qualifying adjectives such as social, political, economic, attitudinal, behavioral, cultural, ideological, structural, segmental, institutionalized, and so on. This generates considerable theoretical confusion and has led to a soft use of the term cleavage as a general concept that is largely synonymous with the broad notion of divisions, oppositions, or conflicts.

In fact, the historical divisions to which the term cleavage originally was applied by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan in reference to party system formation (center–periphery, urban–rural, class, religion, etc.) included socioeconomic bases; attitudinal, ideological, or, more generally, normative bases; and behavioral or organizational bases. None of the historical cleavages was ever purely “economic” or “demographic,” merely attitudinal or ideological, or exclusively behavioral. On the contrary, they represented a peculiar combination of these divisions, with a tendency to overlap and to reinforce each other. Indeed, the peculiarity of the concept of “cleavage” is its capacity to bridge social with ideological or normative and with behavioral/organizational divisions. In short, the theoretical connotation of the concept of cleavage refers to the combination of interest orientations rooted in social structure, cultural/ideological orientations rooted in the normative system, and behavioral patterns expressed in organizational membership and action.

To properly define and identify cleavages, therefore, it is necessary to locate them in relation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Types of Information About Individuals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective Social Positions</td>
<td>Attribution of individuals to “relevant” social categories as defined by the observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs and Value Orientations</td>
<td>Subjective orientations toward political and social objects, institutions, and actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behaviors</td>
<td>Repertory of socially and politically relevant behaviors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

beliefs and values are considered to be the source of “cultural” cleavages and also of “political cleavages”; and political behavior is often indicated as an expression of political cleavages. The term cleavage is therefore frequently accompanied by qualifying adjectives such as social, political, economic, attitudinal, behavioral, cultural, ideological, structural, segmental, institutionalized, and so on. This generates considerable theoretical confusion and has led to a soft use of the term cleavage as a general concept that is largely synonymous with the broad notion of divisions, oppositions, or conflicts.

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To properly define and identify cleavages, therefore, it is necessary to locate them in relation
to the various kinds of “divides” that exist and are continuously generated and redefined in our societies. Cleavages then emerge as a peculiar combination of different types of divisions. This is achieved by first discussing separately the sources of divisions rooted in the (a) social stratification system, (b) normative system, and (c) behavioral system.

The Social Stratification System

Pure divisions of interest rooted in social stratification, based on property, market positions, education, religious affiliation, and so on, are unlikely to constitute a sufficient base for the structuring of cleavages unless they tend to overlap and reinforce each other. The higher the frequency and the degree of overlapping membership in different social contexts, the more unlikely it is that any such social context will be dominant.

Individuals play a range of different social roles, some of which imply competing and contradictory tasks, activities, expectations, and values. Individuals’ group memberships (in the family, employment, friendship, communication, and leisure activities) and relative social positions (with respect to education, property, income, class, religion, ethnic group, etc.) in modern societies are usually highly differentiated, and the chances are low that many individuals will share the same combination of stratification positions and group membership. At the extreme, however, there may be only a few socially relevant categories, which are characterized by mutually exclusive membership, as in a strongly stratified caste society or a society with strong ethnic, religious, or similar divisions. Then, a high proportion of agents act exclusively in one category or social group. This second situation generates and exacerbates potential divisions among self-containing groups whose nonoverlapping but reinforcing membership facilitates common values and perceptions but makes an exchange of information, experiences, and so on across groups much more difficult. This accentuates group conflicts, particularly because closed groups will tend to claim the complete and total involvement of their members toward some collective aspiration or design.

In low-mobility and high-status contexts, the social boundaries of social groups may be so strong and so institutionally reinforced that exit options at the individual level are basically unthinkable. This reinforces cultural solidarity in the group and reduces individualistic options in favor of collective choices. The more the empirical evidence approaches this situation, the greater the likelihood that the similarity of social positions and interests will give birth to strong and cohesive normative visions of the group’s role in society—that is, to a code of collective identity.

The Normative System

At the core of all codes of collective identity is a distinction between “we” and “the others.” A typology of the symbolic codes of collective identity distinguishes between codes of primordiality, civility, and culture.

Primordial elements of collective identity focus on gender, generation, kinship, ethnicity, and race as bases for constructing and reinforcing the boundaries between inside and outside. This code of closure makes reference to original and unchangeable distinctions that are by definition exempted from communication, reflexivity, and exchange among the members of the community. Such distinctions cannot be changed by voluntary action; they relate to “nature” and as such provide a firm and stable basis beyond the realm of voluntary actions and thus do not allow for shifting involvements. In other words, primordial types of codes basically “naturalize” the constitutive boundary between insiders and outsiders, and they tend to be exempted from social definition and alteration. Therefore, primordial boundaries are very difficult to change, and complex rituals to cross these boundaries actually reinforce and reaffirm them.

Identity boundaries built on the civility code of closure and exclusion are constructed on the basis of familiarity with implicit rules of conduct, traditions, and social routines that define and demarcate the boundary of the community. Tradition and collective civic rituals are important (the myths of the founder; particular persons, places, and historical events such as revolutions; migrations, etc.). Very often these are embedded in the constitutional practices of the public arena. There are some civic rituals but no peculiar rituals of initiation, commitment, or confession to demarcate the boundaries. The stranger is primarily
“unfamiliar.” Civility codes allow a stronger differentiation between the “public” and “private” spheres, between polity and the market, and between the entitlements to public goods, which are restricted to members of the community, and access to commodities exchanged in the market, which are open to everyone on the basis of material rewards and instrumental calculation and which, therefore, are identity free.

The third code of collective identity—the cultural code—is based on the boundary between “us” and the “other” on a particular relation of the collective subject to some fundamental values. The collectivity so defined on the basis of values related to God, reason, progress, rationality, or to some sort of definition of the ideal mundane or heavenly world. Boundaries between members and nonmembers can be crossed by communication, education, and conversion, and in principle everyone is invited to do so. The cultural code usually represents a rupture between past and present, in strong opposition to primordiality codes that always overemphasize the past as the source of legitimacy. The openness of the boundary is compensated by stratified access to the center by rituals of initiation.

Primordial, civic, and cultural codes of identity can be ranged in terms of difficulty in crossing the boundary of the identified community; that is, to exit and to enter the social relationship. We go from the exclusive codes, based on primordial traits, to the inclusive and cultural codes, while civility codes are located in an intermediate position between these two extremes.

The level of identity, solidarity, and loyalty generated by different codes entails consequences for the allocation of resources and for the definition of the entitlements of the members of the collectivity as distinct from those of outsiders. Groups’ identities differ with respect to what entitlements are distributed in the name of the collective to its members and the mode of distributing those entitlements (hierarchical vs. egalitarian).

The Behavioral System

Collective action is undertaken by social movements, interest groups, and politico-electoral organizations or political parties. The levels of rigidity/permeability of the social stratification system and of the normative closure of the identity code affect the predominant form of political behavior and the structure of political agencies.

There is no one-to-one relationship between codes of closure and types of organizational membership. However, some predominant associations can be specified on the basis of the synthetic scheme of organizational membership variations presented in Table 2. Forms of organized political action can be ranged along four dimensions. First, they can be characterized by different degrees of territorial centralization/decentralization (national vs. regional or local forms). Second, forms of organized political action can be analyzed in terms of their degree of “segmentation” along cultural dividing lines (as, e.g., in the case of religious and ethno-linguistic divisions). Third, they can be organized by level of “fragmentation” along ideological dividing lines (as, e.g., the political Left–Right fragmentation). Finally, different forms of organized political action can be studied in terms of the level of their “organizational interlocking” with other forms—for instance, the more or less interlocking relationships between political parties, unions, interest groups, or sociopolitical movements.

The presence of primordial codes of closure is likely to generate territorially decentralized or culturally fragmentated political organizations and social movements within a country. Civility codes in their pure form are more likely to be associated with the ideological fragmentation of political action, where divisions concern primarily the level, type, and quality of resources distributed within the collectivity and the access to public goods. However, they can occasionally be associated with decentralized forms of political action resting on the specific civic traditions of certain territories. Cultural codes are more encompassing and are conducive to both cultural segmentation (e.g., religious mobilization) and/or ideological fragmentation (progress vs. conservatism, change, and tradition). Well-integrated territorial polities with no internal primordial groups and with high civility and cultural homogeneity tend to produce political organizations that more closely mirror the ideological differences between social and economic interest–based groups.

Therefore, membership- and action-based divisions may be organizationally expressed by territorial decentralization, cultural segmentation,
Table 2  A Map of Political Structuring Variations in Organizational Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural segmentation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Segmented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial centralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological fragmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interlocked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterns of organized political action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational interlocking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and ideological fragmentation and by different degrees of interlocking relations between specific sociopolitical movements, corporate, and electoral organizations.

Types of Divisions and Cleavages

At this stage, a general typology of all possible divisions and the place that cleavages occupy in such a typology can be achieved by combining the elements of the separate dimensions of the social stratification, normative, and behavioral systems. This is presented in Table 3, which identifies the three bases for all sorts of conflicts and oppositions. They correspond to the interest orientation linked to the social stratification system, the cultural/ideological orientation linked to the normative system, and the organizational base linked to the behavioral system. Taken separately, these oppositions and conflicts identify *simple* divisions. They generate *compound* divisions when they interact and cumulate. In line with the definition at the beginning of this entry, *cleavages* are identified as a special type of complex division that combines these three bases and roots.

*Simple Divisions*

Some divisions are based simply on processes of interest differentiation and perceptions of interest similarity. Though these interest divisions are mainly categorized as statistical or analytical, they may also occasionally generate conflicts and oppositions. Cultural divides exist among social identities linked to various types of civility and cultural codes (primordial codes are by definition rooted in the social structure via the stigmata of the group), and they have proved their historical resilience even in situations unsuitable for their behavioral expression (e.g., repression). Finally, we can observe conflicts and oppositions that are mainly related to the behavioral divisions among various types of voluntary organizations and that are not linked to divisions rooted in either the social structure or in the normative cultural system.

However, none of these “simple divides” is likely to provide long-lasting sources and bases for the political structuring of the polity unless they are combined. Interest divisions are unlikely to overcome the free riding problem and the cost of organizational mobilization without normative or organizational foundations. Interest orientations need to be “generalized” and somehow made “universal” through an idealized appeal to solidarity. Similarly, pure membership divisions are unlikely to maintain the organizational cohesion of the membership groups only by distributing material incentives and resources. Even the most scandalous and corrupt “spoils” party or organization is likely to require some cultural and/or ideological underpinning to
survive and stabilize over time. Cultural divisions may be the only ones that are able to survive “underground” with weak interaction bases and loose organizational support.

**Compound Divisions**

The most important divisions are, therefore, “compound,” and they are the only ones able to generate the forms of organized political action we usually observe as social and political movements, interest organizations, and political parties.

The combination of interest orientations with organizational membership may be sufficient to generate highly contingent and goal-oriented organizational cooperation without necessarily being rooted in strong cultural orientations. Indeed, this type of division may allow a considerable amount of within-group differentiation in many other domains different from the one in which the organizational cooperation is generated. This is the typical and elementary form of interest (or pressure) group formation.

Social divisions are based on the combination of interest orientations rooted in the social structure with stronger normative orientations concerning the identification of the group and its role in society. In this type of division, the social determination is less strong than in corporate divisions. The distinctiveness of social roots may be more or less fundamental but the normative orientation is usually essential and decisive. In this case, cooperation is not based on specific and well-defined interests, and the organizational capacity is weak, intermittent, not consolidated, or sometimes nonexistent. The normative orientation is therefore essential to the definition of the group identity. This seems to be the typical form for the emergence of social movements.

The ideal type of political division is expressed via a combination of cultural/ideological orientations with a strong organizational dimension. The ideational solidarity takes the form of common but general goals to be achieved in the polity through the organizational–ideological competition for the attainment of binding decisions. These divisions are more institutionalized and strongly embedded in the institutional structure of the polity. The organizational dimension gives them solidity and stability over time, which may enable them to survive even when the original cultural and ideological bases fade way. Political parties are a typical expression of such political divisions.

**Cleavages**

Finally, “cleavages” are a type of division that incorporates the three elements of a clear interest orientation, a clear-cut normative vision, and a strong organizational basis. Cleavages encompass corporate and social divisions with political ones. Cleavages show a remarkable degree of resilience over time. They are not transient and intermittent but durable, entrenched, and entrapped. Given their high degree of organizational infrastructure and institutionalization, they often endure over

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**Table 3** Types of Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social stratification system</th>
<th>Interest orientation</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normative system</td>
<td>Cultural/ideological orientation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral system</td>
<td>Organizational base</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resulting divide</th>
<th>Interest divides</th>
<th>Cultural divides</th>
<th>Membership divides</th>
<th>Corporate divides</th>
<th>Social divides</th>
<th>Political divides</th>
<th>Cleavages</th>
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Clientelism involves a particularistic exchange between patrons and clients in which resources of some kind are traded in a mutually beneficial way. Both parties are supposed to benefit from the exchange, but it involves actors of unequal status. The patrons, for example, landlords or local notables, are the more powerful actors in the exchange. They possess privileged access to resources, such as land, which is denied to their clients, typically poor peasants, migrants, and other marginalized groups. The patrons release these resources in a selective way that directly benefits the clients, and in return, they expect their help, support, or allegiance. These exchanges eventually produce an enduring social relationship, typical for traditional societies, governed by a sense of obligation and loyalty that binds the client to the patron. In modern political settings, clientelism is associated with the selective use of public resources in the electoral process. The patrons, who can be individual politicians or political parties, selectively release various resources—jobs in state administration, titles, pension schemes, or building projects—to individuals.
or groups in order to “purchase” their vote. This is an understanding dominant in the political science literature where clientelism is seen as a type of representation or of political mobilization that differs from both universalistic programmatic appeals and appeals based purely on personality traits and charisma. This entry focuses on this understanding of clientelism. The first part discusses the concept of clientelism, in particular its relation to other closely related concepts, such as patronage, corruption, and pork barrel. The second part discusses the relevance of clientelism in contemporary political process.

Identifying Clientelism

The passage from traditional to fully mobilized mass democratic societies brought about substantial changes in patron–client relationships. The traditional clientelistic linkage, characterized by face-to-face contact that is managed by a powerful person, has been replaced by exchanges in which an organization, the political party, has become the key distributor of goods and services to the clients. The individual patron–client ties of local notables and powerful landlord has thus eventually evolved into the clientelism managed by complex political organizations. However, studies on the subject have long suffered from a high degree of conceptual vagueness and ambiguity. This problem is particularly evident in the use of the concepts of patronage and clientelism, which are seen either as the same phenomenon or, in contrast, as two different phenomena but without any explanation of what differentiates the two.

Patronage and clientelism do fundamentally denote the same type of exchange but, as Simona Piattoni (2001) points out in the introduction to her edited volume, the latter is a far more penetrating phenomenon. The difference between the two lies in the objects of exchange (i.e., the type of resources that are used in the trade) and in the goals of the exchange (i.e., what the deal is supposed to achieve). Regarding the object of exchange, the key feature of patronage is the discretionary allocation of public jobs by (party) politicians. The recipients of these jobs are normally assumed to be party leaders, party activists, influential party backers, or party voters, though the fact that politicians have power for discretionary hiring is more important for defining patronage than the characteristics of appointees. In other words, patronage should not necessarily imply that appointees are exclusively party members or party supporters, though in reality it has always been associated with rewarding individuals or groups who have played an important role in party life and party strategy. Concerning the goal of the exchange, parties or politicians are typically seen to allocate jobs in order to secure supporters’ votes. However, given that most modern polities are best characterized as having “too few jobs and too many votes,” the use of patronage as a way of directly securing electoral support is unlikely to be a very feasible strategy. Instead, patronage has always served mainly organizational and governmental goals, such as entrenching party or politicians’ networks within the public sector, serving as an inducement for building and maintaining party organizations by offering selective incentives to party activists in exchange for their work for the party, or ensuring the effectiveness of (party) government by controlling the process of policy making and policy implementation through the appointment of like-minded individuals to key public positions. This understanding of patronage—as a distribution of public jobs—coincides with the Anglo-Saxon use of the term. In the American literature, for example, it is widely used to describe the politics of (city) machines in which bosses handed out patronage jobs to shore up their campaign organizations; it is also employed to describe the wholesale changes in administration following presidential elections, sometimes referred to as the “spoils system.”

In contrast to patronage, clientelism should essentially be considered an electoral tool in which benefits are delivered to obtain the recipients’ vote. In fully mobilized mass societies, clientelism denotes an exchange between a political party on the one hand and individuals or groups on the other hand, in which divisible benefits are offered directly and on a wide scale to tie supporters to the party. The object of these exchanges can of course be public jobs, but this is unlikely to secure any major electoral advantage to patrons, as argued above. Clientelism most often includes distribution of a wide variety of other benefits, ranging from food and medicines to a pension or a low-interest loan, access to housing, or award of selective
development projects in a particular area. Therefore, in contrast to patronage, clientelism, especially in its mass society incarnation, requires other methods of reaching the clients than just a distribution of a handful of state jobs. These methods are often fairly bureaucratized and based on impersonal measures, such as when the incumbents pass a decree favoring a particular category of persons, such as taxi drivers, teachers, or small shopkeepers. Clientelism also implies an asymmetrical nature of the linkage, which takes place between actors of different status and power. Even when both sides accrue benefits and both may perceive the exchange as mutually beneficial, the clientelistic linkage often entails an element of inequality. This is also why, empirically, clientelism is most often found in the context of widespread urban and rural poverty and inequality. In contrast, distribution of patronage jobs to party activists or key party benefactors is likely to involve a far more symmetrical relationship of power, at least in that the recipients will be less dependent on obtaining these jobs, and their social status will often be equal to that of their political patrons.

Pork barrel politics is normally subsumed as a subtype of either clientelism or patronage. Yet it is a distinct practice that denotes tactical allocation of government funds, usually in the form of legislation on public works projects, to favor specific constituencies. Susan Stokes (2007) distinguishes pork barrel from clientelism on the basis of their different distributive criterion. While the distributive criterion of clientelism is “Did you (will you) vote for me?”, the implicit criterion in the distribution of pork barrel politics is “Do you live in my district?” In other words, while clientelism entails a benefit for particular individuals or groups, pork barrel implies that a whole constituency is favored by a public policy decision. Although the goal of both clientelism and pork barrel politics is to obtain the recipients’ electoral support, they also differ in that the element of exploitation and inequality that characterizes the former is absent in the latter. That is probably the reason why these two practices are viewed differently in normative terms. Politicians who deliver goods and services on a clientelistic basis usually try to keep it as a secret matter between them and the clients. In contrast, politicians who manage to pass pork barrel legislation are often eager to present them as a political asset.

Indeed, both patronage and clientelism are nearly always seen as corrupt or morally questionable practices, even though corruption is empirically and conceptually a distinct phenomenon. Political corruption denotes illegal public decisions taken by parties or individual politicians to obtain financial resources, such as when parties may favor firms by handing over the concession of a public utility or permitting the development of an economic activity without the fulfillment of all legal requirements and demand, in exchange, financial kickbacks to party coffers. Clientelism and patronage can undoubtedly lead into corruption, such as when discretionally appointed party hacks use the state office for personal enrichment through demanding bribes or when politicians try to obtain resources for their clientelistic policies through illegal dealings with economic firms. In that sense, both patronage and clientelism can breed corruption, which might explain why the public discourse in many postcommunist countries refers to clientelism in connection with the penetration of the state by organized crime and by other rent-seeking groups. However, patronage appointments are often legally sanctioned and above board, and hence not corrupt; similarly, many of the clientelistic deals between patrons and their voters and supporters fit, even if uneasily, within the legal remit of policy and administrative decision making. Importantly, clientelistic exchanges are never directly aimed at obtaining monetary goods on the part of the patrons.

To recap, clientelism and patronage, though closely related, can usefully be distinguished on the basis of the goals and objects of the exchange. Clientelism—a particularistic form of political and electoral mobilization—is by definition more penetrating than party patronage, usually reaching larger numbers of people and covering wider ranges of exchanges. However, patronage—discretional allocation of jobs—is the necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the emergence of clientelism, for it is mainly due to their ability to control public jobs that parties and politicians are able to manipulate administrative processes in order to deliver targeted divisible benefits to their clients. In other words, insofar as parties or politicians do not control at least the key jobs in the public administration, they will hardly be in the position to develop large-scale “clientelistic” exchanges. This is why patronage
and clientelism will always remain closely related in empirical reality, in spite of the fact that handing out state jobs will lead to tangible electoral returns only in very small democracies or in countries with limited suffrage and partial mobilization.

**Clientelism in Contemporary Democracies**

Traditional clientelistic practices have usually been seen as a product of early-modern development and to be particularly important in rural and less economically well-developed regions and in political systems in developing countries. For numerous reasons, they were expected to disappear in the process of political and economic modernization and development of mass party organizations that characterized the 20th century. First, the individualized processes of vertical integration and mobilization associated with patron–client ties were undermined by the forms of horizontal mobilization and integration promoted by class politics and cleavage structuring. In other words, as a society developed mass electoral alignments, the scope for individually based networks of supporters became more limited. Second, as the mass party itself took over from premodern and cadre parties, and as appeals based on programs and ideology replaced those based on more personalized political representation, it also became more difficult to sustain patron–client links, and especially to build a distinctive clientele. Third, as polities modernized and professionalized, meritocratic systems of advancement became more acceptable and widespread, and hence objective rules, exams, and qualifications replaced favors, friendships, and networks in the process of career building. Here too, then, the scope for patronage as one facet of clientelism became limited, in this case as a result of a shortage of supply. Fourth, as economies modernized, local markets, especially in poor rural areas, became better integrated into larger regional, national, or even supranational units. The members of these initially isolated communities entered into commercial and social ties with persons in other places, which, in turn, diminished demand for patrons to advance their interests at the center.

Finally, as societies also became richer and more educated, the demand for particularized benefits or favors diminished, while citizens also became more confident of their own ability to deal with the bureaucracy. In this sense, citizens began to handle their own affairs more effectively and hence have less need of a patron to work on their behalf. As a result, the deals between patrons and clients also became increasingly difficult to monitor and enforce. Now it was no longer possible to scrutinize clients’ behavior through their natural seclusion in relatively small and homogeneous communities; in addition, the increased mobility and education among the electorates made the enforcement of clientelistic deals nearly impossible.

All of this implies a more or less secular process, whereby clientelism becomes steadily eliminated in favor of collective representation and accountability. The key actors in this process are, of course, the emerging mass parties, which encourage horizontal rather than vertical integration and which promote the provision of universal rather than particularistic benefits. However, this is not to suggest that clientelism did not survive the advent of the mass party. In many countries, for example, Italy, Austria, Ireland, and Japan, mass parties have also been known to adapt these practices as a means of ensuring their own electoral survival. Rather than making a full leap from traditional clientelistic to programmatic politics, as was widely expected in the 1950s and 1960s, the mass parties in these countries instituted a relatively bureaucratized and impersonalized system of clientelism, which combined particularistic politics with the more universalistic appeals. This was no longer the personalistic patronage system based on organic ties between patrons and clients but still a system in which a large proportion of public services and jobs was distributed to selective clienteles in an attempt to build political support and win elections.

What is clear, however, is that clientelistic practices in general have gradually become more difficult to sustain in the era of the mass party and hence proved more exceptional than conventional in modern democracies. Indeed, bureaucratic clientelism became difficult to maintain even in the advanced democracies in which it functioned well into the 1970s and 1980s. This happened mainly for two reasons. First, parties and politicians today face more and more constraints on acquiring clientelistic resources. With the shrinking of the public sector due to privatization and marketization on the one hand, and increasing exposure of domestic economies to pressures of globalized markets on
the other hand, it is now more difficult for politicians to obtain resources for greasing the clientelistic system without compromising performance of the economy and inflow of investments. Second, the shrinking of resources is also related to the vigilance of mass media and civil society groups in reporting clientelistic and other abusive state practices, on the one hand, and the increased willingness of judicial authorities to punish them, on the other. These may not be universally effective in all countries, but it is clear that anticorruption programs together with various measures to limit the politicization of the public sector have constrained the range of options that clientelistic parties and politicians can exploit at their discretion. All in all, therefore, whether one looks at the supply or demand side, in contemporary modern polities, the tide seems to operate against clientelism.

Does this mean that clientelism is irrelevant in contemporary societies? If one looks at the upsurge of works on clientelism in the recent decade, such as Piattoni (2001) and Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson (2007), the answer must be a resounding no. These new studies suggest that far from being dead, clientelism is likely to be an enduring feature of politics and to encourage inquiries into the conditions that favor or constrain clientelism in contemporary democracies. This is in no small part thanks to the recent waves of democratization in Latin America, South Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa. In many of these emerging new democracies, clientelistic practices were well-entrenched phenomena prior to democratization and hence were always likely to play a role in the quest for power and votes after the (re)entry of competitive politics. These newly democratized polities are often marked by the emergence of weakly structured parties and party systems that are unlikely to attract voters (only) on the basis of coherent programmatic packages. Recent developments in the patterns and processes of politics in advanced industrial democracies also suggest at least a partial rethinking of the familiar assumption about the relative insignificance of clientelistic practices as a mode of representation. It can, for example, be argued that the declining intensity of ideological differences across parties in many modern democracies may encourage cultivation of clientelistic links at the grassroots level at the same time as it encourages a more personalized style of leadership at the top.

In other words, whether one looks at contemporary new or long-established democracies, it seems that political clientelism has received a fresh impetus and hence might prove to be, somewhat paradoxically, the product of modernization rather than its victim. Few case studies aside, however, there is still a lack of solid cross-national empirical evidence that would probe into these theoretical expectations concerning the resurgence of clientelism and show how important it is as a mode of citizen–politician linkage. The evidence is clearer with respect to patronage, which was distinguished here from clientelism on the basis of the type of resources that are traded and the goals that it serves to politicians. Like clientelism, patronage politics can also prove resilient and adaptable. Indeed, patronage is still likely to prove an effective strategy for dealing with problems of party organization and party building, particularly as the traditional representational links between parties and society become weaker. In other words, as modern parties become more entwined within the institutions of the state, and as they lose their traditional grounding within the wider society, patronage can become a key resource in anchoring the party presence within the political system and in controlling flows of communication. Through the appointment of party personnel to key agencies and institutions, parties can hope to gain an oversight of the likely demands posed to political leaders as well as of the likely policies and programs that are needed to meet these demands. Patronage can therefore compensate for otherwise decaying organizational networks.

Several studies focusing on both new (e.g., Anna Grzymala-Busse, 2007; Conor O’Dwyer, 2006) and established democracies (e.g., Guy Peters & Jon Pierre, 2001) have effectively shown that political use of public jobs is a rampant practice in many of these polities; these studies also ask critical questions about factors that might explain cross-national differences in the pervasiveness of patronage practices. However, it is probably fair to say that political science literature has dealt with the development of patronage networks within the state usually only in passing, under the banner of party government (see, e.g., Jean Blondel & Maurizio Cotta, 1996). Moreover, as Dominic Bearfield (2009) correctly points out, the negative connotation associated with patronage has led
academics to understand patronage as corrupt and pathological, and hence something either undesirable or difficult to study empirically. It is for these reasons that many excellent studies dealing with patronage appointments can be found in public administration rather than in political science literature, even though the specific concern of that literature is usually less with the role of parties and politicians in the process of patronage appointments and more with the impact that it has on the performance of bureaucratic organizations. Largely as a result of this disjuncture between public administration and political science analytical objectives, here too we still lack solid cross-national evidence that would allow us to scrutinize the range and depth of patronage practices and lead us to appreciate the precise goals that political patrons seek to achieve in making patronage appointments. This represents a significant gap in the literature on the workings of democracy, political parties, government, and institutions of the state because theoretical reasons for the survival and adaptation of patronage practices in contemporary democracies are perhaps even more compelling than the expectations concerning the relevance of clientelism.

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See also Mobilization, Political; Party Linkage; Party Organization; Politicization of Bureaucracy

Further Readings


COALITIONS

A coalition is the temporary cooperation of different individuals, groups, or political parties to achieve a common purpose, which can be either short term or long term. Almost all politics can be conceived as involving the formation of some kind of coalition. Pressure groups, social movements, and political parties are coalitions of individuals with a common interest; governments can be formed by coalitions of political parties, not only in parliamentary regimes but also in regimes of division of powers; maintaining political stability or resolving political or ethnic conflicts can induce the formation of broad coalitions committed to support a new regime; and different governments and states can form military coalitions unified under a single command. A coalition implies cooperation among its members. A relationship of conflict usually develops between different coalitions whose members have opposite interests.

The most usual analyses of coalitions in politics deal with the formation of multiparty cabinets in parliamentary regimes. In government coalitions, several political parties cooperate, usually during a legislative term between two elections. Coalition governments are the most usual form in most parliamentary regimes using
electoral rules of proportional representation, which typically do not produce a single-party majority of seats. This includes most countries in continental Europe, as well as other democratic countries such as India, Israel, and New Zealand. However, other broad coalitions have resulted from political settlements or conflict resolution, such as in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, or Madagascar, often involving international or external moderators.

An example of government formation in parliamentary regimes is Germany, where all cabinets since the end of World War II have been multiparty coalitions. The chancellor or prime minister has always been either a Christian Democrat or a Social Democrat, but government coalitions include several formulas: rightist Christian Democrats (always with their allies, the Bavarian Social Christians) with center-right Free Democrats, center-left Social Democrats with Free Democrats, Social Democrats with left Greens, and the so-called “grand coalition” of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. All these governmental formulas have had majority support in terms of both popular votes and parliamentary seats. Due to the long-term participation of a few parties in government and other institutional mechanisms, the degree of stability in major public policies in Germany is very high. In contrast, the alternation of single-party cabinets when different parties receive a majority of seats in successive elections, as in Britain, may provoke periodic shifts in major public policy making.

Within political science, the formation and termination of cabinet coalitions have been analyzed as cooperative games in game theory. Both the search for office and the search for policy or ideological goals can be presumed to be realistic and legitimate motivations of politicians when they try to form a multiparty coalition. At the time of forming government, the interest of members of parliament in enjoying as much power as possible translates into the aspiration to accumulate as many government portfolios or ministries as possible for their party. This becomes a criterion to form a coalition with the minimum viable size. The explanation for this is that if a government is formed of a multiparty coalition without superfluous members, it can give each party a relatively high share of power to exert and enjoy. In a minimum winning coalition, each of its party members is pivotal, in the sense that the loss of a party would render the coalition no longer a winning coalition. In the particular case when a party has an absolute majority of seats in parliament, the minimum winning “coalition” is the majority single-party government without additional partners.

For parties interested in policy, a criterion to select potential partners in a government coalition is the minimization of policy–ideology distance. Specifically, parties may try to form a coalition with “connected” parties, for example, on the left-right dimension, that is, with parties that are contiguous to their positions and then devoid of unnecessary parties. Closeness can facilitate the negotiation of a government program and diminish internal policy conflicts within the coalition. For instance, social-democratic, leftist, and green parties are more likely to form coalitions among themselves than with liberal, Christian Democratic, or conservative parties, which in turn can be prone to unite themselves in some governmental coalition.

A minimal connected winning coalition with more than two parties may include some superfluous partners in terms of size that are located on intermediate ideological positions and are thus necessary to maintain the ideological connection between its members. But also in a minimal connected winning coalition, each party is pivotal because the loss of a party would render the coalition either no longer winning or no longer connected. On a single-dimension policy space such as the left–right axis, the median party will always be included in a connected winning coalition. The median is the position having less than half positions on each side and is, thus, necessary to form a consistent majority along the issue space. Empirical analyses show that government coalitions containing the median party in parliament are more likely to be formed.

When different winning coalitions can be formed in a parliament, the party composition of the government may depend on the bargaining power of each party and the presence, or not, of a dominant party. Several tools can be used to analyze these points. Different political parties may have bargaining power to form a government coalition, which does not mechanically correspond to their numbers of seats. A relatively minor party, which is “pivotal” to form a majority, that is, a party able to contribute with the necessary number
of seats to make a coalition winning, may have relatively high power to negotiate cabinet membership or policy decisions. For example, some center, agrarian, ethnic, radical, or democratic parties may be located in a central place able to form coalitions, at different moments, with either the parties on their left or those on their right. In contrast, a relatively large party whose contribution can be easily replaced with that of a smaller party may have relatively low bargaining power in comparison to its size. A party’s bargaining power in parliament can be measured, thus, not by its number of seats but by the proportion of potential winning coalitions in which the party is pivotal. There are several “power indices” available to measure a party’s bargaining power. They slightly differ in their assumptions regarding actors’ criteria, coalition models, and decision rules, but most of them produce similar results.

In certain configurations, the largest party in parliament, even if it does not have a majority of seats, can be dominant if its central position makes it able to block any coalition cabinet and take all portfolios. In other words, a party is dominant if the other parties cannot form a winning coalition without that party. If the nondominant parties are unable to form a majority coalition among themselves due to their ideological distance, then the dominant party can block any coalition and form a minority cabinet. Minority cabinets of a dominant party are viable and likely to be formed the greater the policy–ideology divisions and the smaller the size of the parties in the opposition. For example, the Indian National Congress party in India, the Christian Democratic Party in Italy, the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, and the Social Democratic parties in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway were dominant single parties for long periods.

Additional analyses deal not only with which parties are more likely to enter a coalition cabinet but also with the allocation of ministries to the parties within the cabinet. The distribution of cabinet portfolios among coalition parties tends to be proportional to the number of seats controlled by each party—that is, with its contribution to making a coalition winning. However, different parties have preferences for different portfolios depending on the policy issues they emphasize the most, which may produce varied allocations. The prime minister’s party usually controls most of the portfolios in charge of major policy domains, especially economy, defense, and home affairs. Other cabinet portfolios can be allocated to parties with a strong profile on certain issues on which they tend to campaign and attract citizens’ votes, such as social policy for Laborites or Social Democrats, education for Christian Democrats, finance for Liberals, agriculture for Agrarians, and so on.

Different coalition formulas are associated with different durations of cabinets. Regular parliamentary elections are usually scheduled at intervals of 3, 4, or 5 years, depending on the country. But a significant number of parliamentary cabinets do not last as long as they legally could because there are anticipated dissolutions of parliament, elections (which can usually be called by the prime minister), resignations by prime ministers, and successful motions of censure and defeated motions of confidence. Regarding the party composition of cabinets, single-party majority cabinets tend to last longer than multiparty coalition or minority cabinets. In single-party governments, conspiracies among party members to replace the incumbent prime minister are relatively likely, especially if party members expect to have better electoral prospects with a new candidate. In contrast, in multiparty coalition governments, internal party cohesion tends to increase, but coalition partners are more willing to work against the incumbent formula. For coalition cabinets, the higher the number of parties and the broader the ideological distance between them, the more vulnerable to splits and departures and less durable they should be expected to be. This kind of crisis is relatively frequent in parliamentary regimes. In 15 countries of Western Europe since World War II, about one sixth of parliamentary governments have not concluded their term due to a change of prime minister, a change in the party composition of the government coalition, or the dissolution of parliament and the call of an early election.

Multiparty coalition cabinets in parliamentary regimes tend to induce a relatively balanced institutional relationship between the prime minister and the parliament. As political parties need to bargain and reach agreements in order to make policy decisions and pass bills, they learn to share power and develop negotiation skills. Cabinet members from different parties need to cooperate as well. The prime minister cannot prevail over the
cabinet or the assembly as much as when leading a single-party government because, even if he or she is a member of one of the parties involved, he or she has to negotiate with the other parties and maintain the coalition united. In a parliamentary regime, the institutional role of the parliament thrives when no party has an absolute majority of seats.

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See also Cabinets; Cooperation; Game Theory; Parliamentary Systems; Parties; Party Systems

Further Readings

Cohort Analysis

A typical question posed by researchers of political socialization is whether people socialized under distinct political and social conditions manifest different attitudinal and behavioral patterns and the extent to which such differences persist during their life span. Addressing this question at the individual level is difficult because it requires tracing different age-groups during their life trajectories. Since long-term panel data are still scarce in political science, a common approach is to focus on aggregate patterns of change. The accumulation of cross-sectional data during recent decades has enabled the use of pseudopanels, created by pooling repeated cross-sections over a long period of time. Accordingly, units are aggregated after being classified according to their age and the period in which the phenomenon of interest is measured. For example, if the aim is to examine the sources of variation in turnout levels over the past 50 years, 25-year-olds interviewed in the 1970s can be simultaneously compared with 50-year-olds interviewed in the same year interval and with 25-year-olds interviewed in the 1990s. In so doing, the aim of this type of analysis, known as cohort analysis, is to explore whether variation in an attribute of interest is mainly accounted for by particular political periods, age-groups, or subcategories defined by an interaction of the two. The aim of this entry is to describe this analytical strategy and to shed some light on some of its limitations.

Period Effects
As a way to motivate the discussion, let us imagine a population of interest, voting for one of the two parties, A and B, which compete in elections that are held every 4 years. Assuming that the only source of change in the composition of the population is that of succession, that birth and death rates are approximately equal, and that the structure of the party system remains stable, the question is how can political change occur in this context? It turns out that change regarding a social attribute of interest under these circumstances is essentially produced through two different mechanisms, both of which can be traced in Table 1, which distinguishes only between two subgroups of interest, namely, young and old voters (the reason for using age as a forcing variable will be clear in the next paragraph). The first mechanism involves a coming event or a sequence of events that might induce people to change their minds. This is referred to as a period effect. For instance, people might vote predominantly for Party A during Time 1. An event takes place, and they shift to Party B. If this shift occurs at approximately equal rates between different age-groups, one should observe a difference between the two columns of Table 1, whereas no difference should be found between the two rows of each column. This is shown in the upper panel of Table 1.

Cohort Effects
Political events, however, are unlikely to affect all people in the same way. Most of the time researchers...
observe (or assume) particular cohorts, that is, groups of individuals who pass some crucial stage of their lives at approximately the same time, to be considerably more affected by political events than other cohorts. Although different cohorts of interest have been examined, the most common approach is to distinguish between new cohorts and older ones with the first deemed more susceptible to political stimuli. That this assumption is implicitly made in most cohort analyses is evident from the definitions given to different cohorts so as to distinguish one from the other. In most cases, each cohort is characterized by the salient historical and/or political features that marked its early adulthood (the “war generation,” the “1968 generation,” etc.). If such shaping socialization processes dominate over inertial forces of intergenerational transmission of political attitudes, young adults can differ in terms of their value orientations or any other attitudinal aspect of interest from one generation to another. This second mechanism of change, known as a cohort effect, is presented in the second panel of Table 1. Whereas the older age-group remains stable over time, young cohorts shift from Party A to Party B. According to this scenario, change is driven only through the entrance of new generations.

**Life Cycle Effects**

Political change can hardly ever be attributed to either of the two sources independently. In most cases, the two mechanisms interplay and the evaluation of their independent contribution in aggregate change is far from a straightforward enterprise. This effort is further blurred by the role of life cycle. The latter can incorporate physiological, social, and psychological intracohort changes taking place during chronological aging. Physiological changes may have important attitudinal implications (e.g., participation in politics becomes more costly for the elderly) but they tend to vary only slightly among different political contexts, and thus, they do not constitute the primary source of interest in most political science applications. Social change due to aging involves contextual influences stemming from peer groups and social roles (getting married, finding a job, settling down, etc.) that most people assume during his or her life span. These influences might, for example, lead young people to opt for a more liberal party than their older counterparts. Such evidence would be the outcome of an age gap, largely persistent through time. This is seen in the final panel of Table 1, which indicates an age difference in party choice that holds at both points in time. This pattern cannot account for change over time unless the population distribution changes in a consistent fashion. For instance, if older people opt for more conservative parties than younger people, a gradual increase of their relative portion in the composition of the population might reveal an aggregate difference over time without people actually changing their attitudinal profiles. Such a pattern would be due to aging effects.

Psychological change can manifest itself in various ways. For instance, disengagement theory asserts that some otherwise distinct life stages might for different reasons discourage people from participating in political affairs. More important, aging might serve as a proxy for the process of reinforcement and crystallization of people’s prior orientations. This is probably the most salient effect of the life cycle, especially in applications of voting research, and has been already implicitly alluded to in the previous section. People form their political predispositions in a developmental manner, and thus, change in attitudinal respects is increasingly less likely to occur as people accumulate experience with the political world. The example provided below shows how this process might confound the observed pattern of aggregate change.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>An Illustrative Example of Period, Cohort, and Life Cycle Effects</th>
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<td>Time 1</td>
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<td><strong>Period effects</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Cohort effects</strong></td>
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An Example

Let us now assume that in our imaginary population we observe a trend shown in Figure 1, that is, the percentage of the population affiliated to a party during the past 30 years decreases in a rather progressive fashion. What could we infer about the sources of change? On the one hand, people’s attachments with the parties might have declined as a consequence of disappointing government performance. On the other hand, the coming of new cohorts that are on average less attached to the parties might also account for this pattern. Looking only at Figure 1, it is impossible to say which of the two explanations is at work. Consequently, a typical first step in such types of analysis is to disaggregate this general trend into different cohorts. Figures 2 and 3 do that, each one giving pride of place to one of the two mechanisms described previously.

As can be seen, the two figures tell a completely different story. In Figure 2, pure period effects are observed. Each new cohort enters the electorate from the exact point that the previous cohort stopped and they continue together thereafter. No intercohort difference is observed and hence the cohort-specific curves merge in a single curve, making the graph look identical to Figure 1. In other words, distinguishing between age-groups is redundant because all of them react identically to the political influences they experience. Figure 3,

![Figure 1](https://example.com/figure1.png)

**Figure 1** Percentage of People Registering Partisanship With Either Party A or Party B in a 30-Year Time Interval
in contrast, shows that all cohorts remain relatively stable through time but each coming cohort is constantly less affiliated to either of the two parties. Consequently, the overall trend is simply the outcome of intercohort variation, although each cohort designates remarkable stability in its political orientations during the observed time interval. Political change, in this case, is simply due to the lower starting level of each coming cohort. If that was what produced the average decline, change would need to be allocated to pure cohort effects.

Needless to say, the artificial lines drawn here only serve as idealized benchmarks useful to evaluate the role of each of the two mechanisms against real data. That said, social reality is much more complicated since both mechanisms, albeit at different rates, are typically at work. To make matters worse, any analysis of such effects needs to account for the role of aging, which can confound either cohort or period effects. In the first case, if aging implies a societal type of change, not taking it into account might give room to spurious cohort effects. Addressing this possibility requires gathering data over a long period of time. This is the only way to examine whether differences between young people and older cohorts persist over time. For instance, to see whether the fact that 20-year-olds in the 1970s vote at lower levels than 40-year-olds is due to aging or cohort effects, one needs to
Cohort Analysis

trace both groups for at least 20 years. If both groups continue voting at the same levels as 20 years ago, we would observe evidence in favor of cohort effects. If the first group approaches the turnout levels of the older group, this would constitute evidence for life cycle effects. The problem, of course, is that on many occasions these mechanisms might coexist, making their independent contribution in the overall pattern of change difficult to assess.

Aging can also be a confounder or a mediator of period effects. This is mainly through the immunization hypothesis. To explore whether aging implies an increased resilience to political change stimuli, we need to compare the trajectories of different cohorts over time. This is done in Figures 4 and 5. In the first case, no particular period shock is assumed. The first group, representing people with an already long record in political affairs, seems to remain stable over time. Newly coming cohorts, however, begin from a low starting level but progressively strengthen their feeling of belonging to a particular party as they accumulate electoral experience. Failing to account for this intercohort difference might falsely result in attributing the change to period effects. To be sure, there are ceiling effects in this process that make further differences due to age evaporate. This pattern can be grasped by the comparison of Cohorts 6 and 7 of Figure 4, where initial age-related differences diminish as both cohorts increase their level of attitudinal stability. The only difference between the two cohorts is that the more recent one began its trajectory with a lag. However, their

Figure 3  Cohort Effects

Note: There is always some noise (error) in the curves, indicating that even in the most ideal case, some fluctuation would still exist due to sampling variability.
route is otherwise indistinguishable. In the presence of ceiling effects, this means that they eventually converge once this process of partisan learning is complete.

Figure 5 shows how aging can work as a mediator of period effects by approximating the idea that period shocks are more consequential among younger cohorts. A temporal shock causing a decline in the level of partisan affiliation in Year 28 is more decisive for people with lower levels of prior electoral experience. As can be seen from the downward spike, the magnitude of this effect diminishes in a monotonic fashion as we move from younger to older cohorts. The reason for that, once again, is that the latter experience this shock having already established firmer political beliefs.

**The Age–Cohort–Period Framework and Its Deficiencies**

A systematic attempt to simultaneously address all three potentially confounding factors is next to impossible. Until recently, the industry standard in this subfield was to disentangle the sources of political change through the so-called Age–Cohort–Period (ACP) framework. Four important limitations characterize this procedure. The first problem is the well-known identification problem. Since each of the three terms is a linear function of the
other, unless one of them is assumed to have a non-linear impact on change, their effect, let alone interactions, cannot be independently estimated from the data. To see why this is so, consider the following equation, where \( A \), \( P \), and \( C \) stand for age, period, and cohort, respectively: \( A = P - C \); equivalently, \( C = P - A \) or, alternatively, \( P = A + C \). In other words, any of the three variables is a linear function of the others: Age can be directly deduced by knowing the year of the survey and the cohort in which the person belongs. Examining, for instance, respondents belonging in the 35-year-old cohort in 1987 is equivalent to examining those born in 1952. Evidently, we cannot isolate the impact of belonging in this cohort from the effect attributed to the role of age.

The usual way out is to constrain the impact of one of the three factors either to zero or to a non-linear function. If, for instance, age is thought to be related to political participation in a curvilinear fashion, or cohort effects can be measured in a categorical way, a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression can capture adequately the independent effects of each confounding factor. To be sure, this leverage comes only at the cost of a more parsimonious specification, which assumes that period or cohort effects operate in the same way across cohorts with different years of birth. More

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**Figure 5  Aging Effects II**

*Note:* To retain simplicity, each group is allowed to return to previous levels immediately after the shock, hence it is assumed that there is no difference in the long-term effects of this shock on different cohorts.
recently, the use of Bayesian methods, generalized additive models, nonlinear regression models, discriminant analysis, or dynamic modeling of the effect of period shocks on different cohorts has helped examine the three factors independently, making only minimal assumptions about the way they affect the phenomenon of interest.

The second problem is that even when a typical regression model manages to produce point estimates for the effects of each of the three mechanisms, the standard errors will typically be unreliable. The reason for this is that the unit of analysis is usually an aggregate measure (percentage, mean values, etc.) of a group of individual responses taken from a sample of a targeted population. Thus, even in a case of a full-probability random sample, each cell represents an estimate, and thus, the uncertainty associated with this estimate needs to be also taken into account. The third problem is that tracing a cohort over a long period of time is also subject to nonrandom sampling error. As a given cohort becomes older, the number of observations representing it falls drastically. Importantly, the probability of survival may well be nonignorable to the trait of interest.

This last, less cited but probably more serious, problem of the ACP framework relates to its exploratory rather than explanatory character. Any ACP analysis is primarily useful as an effort to partition change into each of its components. However, since the year of birth and/or the year of survey cannot be logically treated as autonomous influences on any observed phenomenon of interest, unless some further examination of the causal processes that lead to this observation is made, any ACP account is only useful as suggestive evidence for what might be considered as the potential explanations for the underlying phenomenon. A more elaborate analysis, however, would need to model these processes and unpack the structural factors lurking behind each of the three terms. In statistical parlance, no analysis of this kind can account for the underlying process generating the data.

This last remark should not be interpreted as an argument against the use of cohort analysis altogether. That would mean throwing out the baby with the bathwater. In effect, cohort analysis, which started in the 1970s as a powerful tool that social scientists adopted from demographers to study patterns of social change, remains a creative strategy to disentangle interrelated sources of aggregate change. Although the difficulty of the ACP framework to separate these mechanisms creates limitations in the statistical analysis, it is also useful in showing researchers that social reality is often more complex than assumed by models, which fail to take into account all these competing mechanisms. Cohort analysis can be very useful either as a first explorative step accompanied by individual-level panel analysis or as a way to examine well-developed theories that mainly focus on one of the three mechanisms of change. Any such analysis needs to provide rigid theoretical argumentation and empirical evidence that would help unpack any of the three terms into substantive factors that operate through this process. In sum, cohort analysis can provide suggestive evidence about the dominant source of aggregate change when such exists or, as a minimum, make it clear that in various instances disentangling these effects is asking too much from the existing information that we have at hand.

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See also Cross-Tabular Analysis; Electoral Behavior; Political Culture; Political Socialization

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Collaboration is a process in which the state engages with business and civil society to shape policy agendas, and to design and implement policy programs. Sometimes this is interpreted as meaning that the public policy process reflects the principles of deliberative democracy, in which actors engage in a rational debate with the intention of seeking a consensus solution. Other literatures place more emphasis on collaboration arising from resource interdependencies and complex problems that require a multisectoral response. A more critical understanding of collaboration is as one of the mechanisms through which the state subjugates populations via new mechanisms of self-governance.

Despite definitional differences, there is general agreement that collaboration is different from cooperation and coordination. All, however, are points on a continuum from organizational independence to organizational integration. Cooperation involves sharing information or expertise in a context where organizations remain autonomous from each other, for example, in client referrals in social welfare networks. Coordination involves a process of independent organizations introducing a degree of integration by undertaking mutual adjustment to produce a better overall outcome. This takes place when organizations agree to redesign their procedures so that, for example, clients can use a single point of contact to access services from a variety of agencies. Collaboration is the next step in the continuum. It involves organizations recognizing that they are interdependent and creating a greater degree of integration of procedures, policies, and structures. Such collaboration might involve the creation of an overarching board to make strategic decisions that are binding on the constituent organizations.

Collaboration is often regarded as an activity that takes place at the subnational level, and there is a large literature on partnership and other forms of collaboration at city or neighborhood level, for example, in urban regeneration and sustainability. However, it would be incorrect to privilege these spatial scales. In an era of multilevel and global governance, it is important that the discussion of collaboration also take into account interactions at national and transnational level, as well as interactions between these and other levels of governance. This is because collaborative mechanisms engaging government with civil society and business have become the preferred delivery mechanisms for many aspects of European and national policy, including those related to economic restructuring, social inclusion, environmental sustainability, and the knowledge society. These policy initiatives stimulate activity at the subnational level and in some cases (as in a number of European Commission initiatives) become the instrument through which specific policy intentions are expected to be realized. In the field of international relations, the creation by states of instruments of global governance can be regarded as the outcome of a process that is intended to lead to greater collaboration, for example, through the regulation of standards or economic, environmental, or social policies. Collaboration, therefore, involves both horizontal and vertical forms of interorganizational engagement.

How Does Collaboration Relate to Other Concepts?

The concept of collaboration is closely related to other concepts in common usage. The first term to consider is governance. In political science and public policy, this typically refers to a changing form of state rule through which government attempts to engage other actors in its political projects through cultural rather than coercive mechanisms. However, the extent to which actors from business and civil society are able or willing to engage in collaborative activity with government will be influenced by the nature of the state and its historical relationships. So the experience of the United States with its tradition of “small government” and extensive private provision of public services will be very different from that of Western Europe, where the state has played a much more prominent role in service provision. The emergence of multilevel governance is especially a recent consequence of European integration, although decentralization and different
levels of government are a part of traditions inside and outside Europe.

Second, collaboration is broadly synonymous with the concept of “partnership.” This concept is used in some English-speaking countries (e.g., the United Kingdom [UK], Australia, New Zealand) to refer to the quasi-formal organizational arrangements that provide an envelope for interaction between state, civil society, and business on particular policy questions. In these countries, “public-private partnership” typically refers to contractual agreements between government and business related to the provision of infrastructure or services, whereas in Europe and the United States, it tends to encapsulate both this specific meaning and the wider Anglo idea of partnership. For U.S. scholars, “collaborative public management” has a meaning synonymous with the idea of “partnership” in the UK.

The third concept with which collaboration connects is that of “networks,” which develops the older idea of policy networks. Here, the emphasis is on an institutionalized pattern of relationships between autonomous actors in a particular policy realm. Negotiated agreements between actors could be understood as collaboration to the extent that the actors agree to forgo some of their autonomy in order to realize collective benefits.

Why Is Collaboration Important Today?
The contemporary importance of this idea arises from the changing role of the state in the late 20th and early 21st century. The argument is that the state lacks the necessary capacity and resources to deliver public policy goals in advanced capitalist economies and chooses to fill this gap by involving others sectors more into functions that would—under traditional public administration—have been reserved to the state and its functionaries. Collaboration is therefore part of the new public management movement, which includes the view that public services could be delivered more efficiently and effectively by external providers—including the widespread fascination with the involvement of the private sector.

A related explanation is that neoliberal ideology, especially in social welfare and former socialist states, has resulted in a fragmentation of government due to privatization, contracting out, the creation and hiving off of separate agencies from large public bureaucracies, and other new public management initiatives. Collaboration arises from the need to retain a capacity to integrate across this distributed organizational landscape so that policy intentions can be realized and steering is possible. Such integration occurs at a number of levels. At the discursive level, there are powerful ideas—for example, about “partnership”—which mobilize actors around collaborative projects despite the differences between them. At the institutional level, collaboration involves a process of rule creation where there is greater flexibility for actors than in representative government. And at the behavioral level, boundary spanners and network managers are valued because of their capacity to build coalitions between organizations and groupings in an ambiguous and changing environment.

What Are the Democratic Implications of Collaboration?
From a progressive perspective, collaboration offers a way of developing participative forms of governance that bypass, or at least complement, representative democracy. It facilitates the engagement of a wider range of actors in the policy process and potentially enables them to contribute throughout the process rather than just being consulted at the start and excluded from the black box of decision making. So collaboration can be treated as synonymous with deliberative and participative democracy, and the opening up of the state to other interests (and especially those of citizens and civil society actors). This progressive perspective is reflected in the normative tone that can be found in the literature.

A more critical reading positions collaboration in the light of Foucauldian governmentality, where close engagement with the state introduces a regime of discipline on participants. In this process, they become part of the mechanisms of governance in a complex society, taking on themselves the concerns of the state and self-regulating their actions in this way. Thus, citizens involved with the state in regenerating disadvantaged communities take on the mantle of the state’s discourse of disadvantage and the performance management systems that go along with delivering public policy. This constrains their capacity to think and act outside this discourse in
ways that might serve their interests better but go against the state. On this basis, citizens might adopt a political strategy of exit rather than remain trapped by the false reality of collaboration.

This discussion reminds us that collaboration—for all its progressive overtones—is about political action. The prevailing discourse of collaboration conceals the darker side in which decisions are removed from the arena of representative government with its public interest safeguards and located instead in less transparent institutional contexts whose rules in use are evolving and more malleable. If we agree that the relations of power between state, business, and civil society are structured to give advantage to the former two actors, and thus biased against civil society, then collaboration is likely to do little to redress these more fundamental imbalances. The challenge for academics analyzing these new arrangements is to investigate beneath the epiphenomenon of political discourse and understand the nature and impact of collaboration on the relations between actors in historically embedded contexts.

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See also Deliberative Policy Making; Governance; Networks; New Public Management; Policy Analysis; Policy Instruments; Risk and Public Policy

Further Readings

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

A collective security system is one in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all and agrees to join in a collective response to threats to, and breaches of, the peace. A weaker version posits a system that commits governments to develop and enforce broadly accepted international rules in the area of international peace and security and to do so through collective action legitimized by international institutions.

The idea of collective security goes back at least to the European peace plans of the 18th century and gained ground in the post–World War I period as international society sought to restrict the previously wide-ranging right of states to resort to war as an instrument of state policy, first in the League of Nations and then in the United Nations (UN). The UN did not constitute a pure collective security system (e.g., in relation to the veto given to permanent members of the Security Council); but it contained powerful elements of collective security, above all in terms of the clear prohibition of aggressive force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and in the far-reaching responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, including the authorization of mandatory sanctions and military action. The end of the Cold War appeared to many to open new opportunities for collective security, with an increasing number of enforcement resolutions adopted under Chapter VII and a very significant expansion in the number and coercive character of UN peacekeeping operation and of UN-established international administrations.

The Nature of Collective Security
Collective security raises five sets of questions about its nature, with respect to the participants in collective security arrangements, the kind of security provided, and the forms of collective action to be taken.

Security for Whom?
The traditional conception of collective security was intended to strengthen the rights of states to independence and to reinforce an international legal order built around the concepts of sovereignty and nonintervention. On the Wilsonian view, one of its chief attractions was that, in contrast to the balance of power, it guaranteed the independence of all states, including small and
weak states. Yet the stress on reinforcing the rights of states and on maintaining the sanctity of established borders against forcible change has given rise to one of the most enduring dilemmas: how to accommodate change and how to prevent a collective security organization from becoming an instrument for maintaining the status quo. The liberal assumption of a shared interest in the peaceful maintenance of the status quo has been repeatedly challenged.

What Kind of Security?

Second, what kind of security is embodied in the phrase collective security? As it developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, collective security was conceived as a response to the dangers of formal interstate violence and, in particular, to the problem of the aggressive use of force by states. Faced with the united opposition of the international community, states would come to accept that aggression simply could not pay. Although not as novel as sometimes claimed, the post–Cold War period has seen an enormous literature on the changing character of security and the changing dynamics of the global security landscape: the easing of major power rivalry and the emergence of a wide range of new security challenges connected with civil wars, domestic social conflicts, ethnic strife, refugee crises, humanitarian disasters, and transnational terrorist threats. In addition, many have argued that much greater priority should be given to human security, rather than the security of states or of regimes. Such moves illustrate the politically contested character of the concept of security, emphasized, in particular, by critical security theory. Collective security is sometimes understood analytically as a problem of capturing a well-understood and broadly shared interest (perhaps by viewing security as a global public good) in the face of the twin problems of defection and free riding. Clearly, these problems are formidable in a world in which states and government leaders are faced with powerful incentives to protect their immediate short-term interests. But such rationalist logic underplays the challenge of the essentially contested nature of security. Very different historical circumstances and divergent values mean that there is rarely an easy answer to the question of whose security is to be upheld or against which threats that security is to be promoted. Together with the deeper intervention required to deal with many new security challenges, this in turn increases the problems of legitimacy as well as the difficulties of securing the willingness of states to commit armed forces to conflicts that are often seen as marginal to core foreign policy interests.

Which Collectivity?

Third, which collectivity is involved in “collective security”? There have always been strong arguments for the broadest possible membership of a collective security system: to ensure that the power of the collectivity is sufficient to deter aggression and, if necessary, to enforce its decisions against all states, and to reduce the danger that collective security will merely provide a framework within which power political competition and alliance politics are played out under a different guise. On the other hand, there have also been repeated arguments that an effective collective security system requires leadership and that an effective collectivity will consist of a smaller group of like-minded states with the effective (as opposed to theoretical) power to enforce their decisions. Hence, there have been recurrent arguments that regionally based collective security systems are most likely to prove effective, and the post–Cold War period has seen an expansion of the role of regional security organizations.

What Form of Collectivity?

Fourth, what form of collectivity? It is important to disentangle two approaches to thinking about collective security systems. In one view, the dominant one in the recent past, collective security has been seen as a means of enforcing order between independent political communities, of achieving a degree of centralization that does not radically threaten the independence and autonomy of states. An alternative, and historically deep-rooted, conception has viewed moves toward the collective management of armed force as part of a broader process of reorganizing the political system and moving beyond the state system toward more centralized or federal forms of global political order.

The other issue here concerns the dilemma of preponderant power. In theory, collective security
offers the purest solution to the dilemma of preponderant power. Inequality is not to be feared, opposed, or balanced against but is, instead, to be harnessed to the legitimate collective purposes of the international community. In practice, the situation is more complex. On the one hand, the veto within the UN Security Council reflects the reality of a power distribution in which attempts to coerce any of the major powers of the system could be achieved only at great risk and high cost. On the other hand, unable to command substantial military forces of its own in the ways envisaged in the Charter, UN enforcement action has operated by means of authorizing the use of force by member states, especially those with the capacity to deploy effective military power. Such a situation is always likely to create problems of effective delegation and control and to increase the risk that a system aimed at collective security will in fact become one of selective security.

What Forms of Collective Action?

Finally, what forms of collective action are envisaged in a collective security system? Collective security involves a shared acceptance that a breach of the peace threatens the interests of all states. It also involves a shared willingness to act effectively to enforce the law and to protect the interests of the international community. Enforcement has very often been seen as critical, but not always. Much of 19th-century liberal thought, for example, believed fervently that the clear elaboration of international law would be crucial. Others believed in the power of enlightened international opinion. The arguments for effective enforcement grow through the century and are, of course, given particular force by the catastrophe of World War I. At the same time, however, these older liberal views never entirely faded, and there remained the hope that the paradox of fighting a war to ensure peace could be avoided.

It should also be noted that the emphasis on deterrence and enforcement places collective security analytically close to mainstream realist writing on alliances and the balance of power. This can be contrasted with constructivist writing on cooperative security and on security communities. It is the possible emergence of a situation in which cooperation goes beyond instrumental calculation and in which the use of force declines as a tool of statecraft that opens the door to constructivist theories. Such theories highlight the importance of historically constructed interests and identities, of learning and ideational forces, and of normative and institutional structures within which state interests are constructed and redefined. Instead of focusing solely on material incentives, constructivists claim that understanding intersubjective structures allows us to trace the ways in which interests and identities change over time and new forms of security cooperation and community can emerge.

Liberals argue that, although there is no collective security system, the collective element in security management has increased and even major states need multilateral security institutions both to share the material and political burdens of security management and to gain the authority and legitimacy that the possession of crude power alone can never secure. Realists continue to stress that peace is not indivisible, that states and their citizens are often unwilling to bear the costs of collective action in conflicts in which their direct interests are only weakly engaged, and that large parts of the global security system continue to be shaped by the unilateral pursuit of state interest and by practices of both the balance of power and hierarchical power.

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See also Balance of Power; Civil War; Intervention, Humanitarian; Liberalism in International Relations; Peacekeeping; Security Cooperation; State Failure; War and Peace

Further Readings

Colonialism is usually understood as a political doctrine promoting and justifying the exploitation by a colonizing power of a territory under its control either for its own benefit or for the benefit of the colons settled in this territory. In this sense, colonialism refers mainly to the unequal relationships developed between European colonizers and their respective colonial empires. This conventional definition has been considered too restrictive by some scholars who, in the past 20 years, have stretched the notion. Colonialism has come to include many different kinds of unequal power relationships between two countries (e.g., between Israel and Palestine) and between the West and the world (the concept of colonialism replacing to some extent that of imperialism). Colonialism has also been used in association with larger modern political and economic processes such as the economic world system since the 16th century or, more generally, with a vision of European “modernity.” The polysemy of colonialism is largely due to the renewed interest, since the 1980s, in the colonial and postcolonial periods among literary critics, historians, anthropologists, and political scientists. In this entry, colonialism is analyzed only as a set of complex, unequal, and past relationships linking European colonizing powers to colonies (for other meanings, see the entry on postcolonialism). It is, thus, useful to dissociate colonialism as a political doctrine forged by those writing during the colonial period from colonialism as a paradigm reexamined by scholars since the 1980s. In the last section of this entry, the way postcolonial thinkers have portrayed colonialism is briefly explored before other approaches examining colonialism from a more political, social, and economic angle are examined.

Colonialism as a Political Doctrine

The word colonialism is created from the words colonial and colony, which have a longer history. English and French terms for colonial and colony derive from colonus, the Latin word for “farmer.” The founding of colonies was one of the strategies the ancient Romans employed in establishing their empire. During the Renaissance and the 16th-century European expansion, the words colon and colony gradually took on their current meaning: The word colon referred to a person living in a colony, as opposed to an inhabitant of a European colonial power; the world colony designated a territory dominated and administered by a foreign power or a group of settlers; the verb to colonize gradually came to mean “to conquer a territory.” At different periods but mainly in the second half of the 18th century, the words colonial, colonize, and colonization appeared in English and were then translated into French.

The term colonialism obviously derived from colonial, but it appeared later, in the framework of 19th-century imperialism. It first appeared in English around the middle of the 19th century and was used to mean practices or idioms peculiar to, or characteristic of, a colony. In 1886, it was used to mean the colonial system or principle, thus referring to colonialism as a systematic and wide-ranging phenomenon. In France, it also followed the pace of overseas expansion. The word colonist, common after the conquest of Algeria in 1830, referred specifically to a partisan of the colonization of Algeria, while anticolonist referred to opponents of this process of colonization. This specific use did not last, however, and colonialism/anticolonism came to replace the terms colonist/anticolonist in the early 20th century.

It is thus not really surprising that colonialism became a political doctrine promoted by theorists and defended by interest groups only in the 19th century, during the heyday of imperialism. Colonialism can hardly be understood without the
element of self-legitimation inherent in it. The most powerful form of self-legitimating was the colonizer’s claim of improving the conquered country and bringing the fruits of progress and modernity to the subject peoples. All European powers claimed to pursue a civilizing project in their colonies, but they used different terminologies to this end. In the 19th century, it was called *improvement*, *betterment*, or *moral and material progress*. All these terms were then subsumed under the term *civilizing mission*, which became the imperial ideology and official doctrine from the late 19th century onward. Parallel to this historical trend, there was an increasing feeling of racial superiority in European nations, along with the development of a positivist approach in the natural and human sciences associated with an increasing obsession with classifying people, plants, and animals. Some Western philosophers, academics, writers, and politicians developed a new vision of the world. There were continents with history and those without history (Friedrich Hegel, 1770–1831); there were superior and inferior races to colonize (Jules Ferry, 1832–1893), fortunate and less fortunate races to educate (Rudyard Kipling, 1865–1936), inferior and superior languages (Ernest Renan, 1823–1892), and a primitive or prelogical mode of thought and a logical one (Lucien Levy-Bruhl, 1857–1939).

In the 19th century, however, colonialism as a political ideology was not yet a unifying body of knowledge. In the British Empire, the aim for moral improvement and material betterment of society became common among a generation of administrators guided by the 18th-century legal reforms of Warren Hastings (1732–1818), Lord Cornwallis (1738–1805), and Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832). Gradually, British historiography started to describe colonization as a history of progress. This is well exemplified by James Mill’s *History of British India*, an early and influential piece of colonial historiography that was published in 1818. In contrast, a specific doctrine of modern colonization emerged in France only in the early years of the Third Republic (1871–1940). Following Germany’s defeat of France in 1870–1871 and France’s loss of the two provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, some disparate groups developed a common set of arguments to justify overseas expansion. In 1874, the economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu (1843–1916) advanced the view in his famous book *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes* (Colonization among modern nations) that investing in colonies was the best business for an old and rich country such as France. The most influential Republican leaders, Léon Gambetta (1838–1882) and Jules Ferry, also defended colonial expansion as a way to recover from the events of the 1870s. While colonization initially divided monarchists, republicans, and radicals in France, no political parties in Europe opposed colonization prior to World War I.

The making of 20th-century colonialism was a process driven by a set of intellectuals, writers, and academics and by a new administrative machinery (the colonial office) assisted by experts (ethnographers, ethnologists, and later on anthropologists and sociologists) and increasingly after World War II by technicians (medical officers, educationists, town planners, welfarists, etc.). While the idea of progress was very common in justifications of colonial conquest in the 19th century, a considerable debate emerged in the early colonial days of administration concerning what kind of colonial rule was desirable. Assimilation, association, and indirect rule are generally considered to be the three major colonial doctrines that emerged between the end of the 19th century and the 1920s. This debate became most intense in France and Germany; it was more restricted in the United Kingdom, where there was general agreement that indirect rule should be the underlying philosophy of the system of government. The doctrine of assimilation was based on the heritage of the French Revolution and the belief in the equality of all people irrespective of their racial origin or cultural background. Colonized people had to prove themselves worthy of assimilation by demonstrating to the authorities that they had the attributes needed for citizenship. Practically, however, access to full rights of French citizenship was highly restricted, mainly to the inhabitants of four communes in Senegal (Dakar, Gorée, Rufisque, and Saint-Louis) and to a limited number of educated people (*évolués*) before World War II. In contrast, the doctrine of indirect rule was inspired by the idea that Europeans and Africans were culturally distinct, and indigenous political institutions were necessary for the purposes of local government. This was conceptualized by Lord Frederick Lugard,
Governor General of Nigeria from 1914 to 1919, in his *Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa*, published in 1922. Rather than preserving the precolonial polity, indirect rule largely modified the public authority of traditional chiefs to ensure the exploitation of the country through means such as the introduction of taxes and forced labor and the modification of customary law. The differences in colonial doctrines should not be overstated. For instance, association was mainly another word for indirect rule in French colonial theory. In the administrative offices within the colonies themselves, colonial theory was less important than in European capitals; most of the time, colonial administration used indirect rule without acknowledging it as the cheapest way to govern colonies.

The participation of soldiers from European colonies in the two World Wars, the multiplication of colonial exhibitions all over Europe, the increasing number of colonial magazines, and the teaching of the history and geography of the empires in schools generated popular support for European colonization between the two wars. The legitimacy of colonialism was little contested at the time. Anticolonialism was limited to a few writers and to the extreme left (although the Communist Party in general was not really anticolonial when it was in government). It was only during and after World War II, with the rise of nationalism in Asian and African countries, that colonialism became radically contested both in colonizing and in colonized countries. Providing different rights to different peoples on the basis of their racial classification became illegitimate after the defeat of the Nazis and the rise of a bipolar world. In addition to the revolutionary anticolonialism of the far left, there was a broader moral opposition to violence arising in the colonial context, such as that in Madagascar, Kenya, and Algeria.

The various European colonial powers reacted differently to the new postwar order. Portugal decided not to concede independence or freedom to its African colonies, while other European governments granted new political and social rights and tried to reshape a more legitimate colonialism under the new ideology of development through technology, public health, and economic and local government reforms. Subjects were transformed into citizens, and they began to demand the same social and political rights as those in the European colonizing countries. The cost of this new dispensation, however, was too high for postwar European budgets; these economic concerns, together with the rise of nationalism, convinced European leaders to give up formal political ties with their former colonies. In less than 15 years, colonialism ceased to be a legitimate political doctrine and ultimately disappeared in the early 1960s. It survived only in Portugal, in Portuguese colonies and in settler colonies, where it was described sometimes as internal colonialism (as, e.g., in South Africa or Rhodesia). Elsewhere, the notion of colonialism and anticolonialism was replaced by neocolonialism, a neologism used to describe, and more often to denounce, the conditions under which former colonies continued to serve the economic, political, military, and other interests of powerful, mostly Western, countries. The concept of neocolonialism was popularized by the new independent leader of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, in his 1964 book *Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism*.

**Colonialism as a Contested Paradigm**

When colonialism was a highly contested political issue in the 1950s, the French sociologist Georges Balandier wrote a pioneering article on the colonial situation (1951), in which he explained the necessity of understanding colonization as both a social phenomenon and a specific historical process. Balandier’s recommendation was not followed, however, as researchers in the 1960s and 1970s were no longer interested in a political ideology that had been banished from the realm of legitimate forms of political organization. As mentioned by Frederick Cooper, there is something strange about the writing of colonialism: Scholarly interest in colonialism arose when colonial empires had already lost their international legitimacy. This rediscovery is partly explained by the rise, in academic institutions of the English-speaking world, of what has been labeled as postcolonial studies.

During the first decades after independence, the ideology of progress and modernization (then perceived to be Western) was largely shared by the political and intellectual elites of former colonies. However, the various projects of modernization of the state and the economy implemented after
According to the historian Frederick Cooper, a significant part of postcolonial thought has taken colonial studies out of its historical context, treating colonialism abstractly, generically, as located somewhere between 1492 and the 1970s, and as something to be juxtaposed with an equally flat vision of European “modernity.” Moreover, colonial societies should not be understood merely in terms of a “European versus indigenous” dichotomy, and the actions of former colonized people should not be reduced to merely resistance to colonialism or collaboration with the colonial order. Similarly, when colonialism is portrayed as a power-demarcating and racializing space, the complexities of the colonial situation are ignored or one tends to neglect the internal divisions within European and indigenous communities alike.

The analysis of the relationship between colonialism and biomedicine can be used as an example to explain the capacity of colonialism to produce both a contradictory and a generic discourse on colonized people. According to Megan Vaughan, who traced the emergence of various medical discourses in Africa, there was, on the one hand, a long tradition, elaborated by Christian missionaries, that viewed the “primitiveness” of African societies as a factor predisposing them to certain diseases. On the other hand, research on the relationship between colonialism and biomedicine from the interwar period indicated that Africans got sick because they forgot who they were: Urbanization, industrialization, and deculturation were seen as factors leading to insanity, sexually transmitted diseases, or leprosy. Taken together, these contradictory viewpoints show, however, a fundamental difference in the emergence of biomedical discourse in Europe: Africans were always conceived of as members of a collectivity—as colonial people—and beyond that as members of collectivities—in the form of tribes or cultural groups—and this led to different views in tracing the relationship between colonialism and biomedicine.

This reification of groups by colonialism has been contested by social historians and anthropologists. Groups and categories under colonial rule (chiefs, the educated elite, traders, peasants, workers, and also women, youth, and elders) pursued their own agendas, defended their own interests, and consequently changed the limits of
subordination within the colonial system. In this sense, opposing too markedly the “bourgeoisie” and the “working class” or the “elite” and the “people” includes the risk of reproducing the old colonial dichotomy as well as creating new ones (opposing the modern to the traditional). A large part of African and Indian historiography in the past 3 decades has tried to overcome this vision present in colonialism by looking at the agency of individuals and groups, the contingent nature of their connections and networks, and their respective roles in shaping power relations. Actually, colonialism did not produce only differences between colonizers and the colonized. It also produced individuals with varying investments in a range of identities, sexual identities, class identities, religious identities, and ethnic identities. Similarly, colonialism not only led to conflicts between colonizers and the colonized, it was also decisive in shaping new roles, divisions, and conflicts between elders and youth, men and women, and migrants and urban dwellers.

The understanding of conflicting colonial repertoires helps explain why colonialism was not pervasively efficacious in implementing modernization. According to Nicholas Thomas (1994), “colonialism was not a unitary project but a fractured one, riddled with contradictions and exhausted as much by its internal debates as by the resistance of the colonized” (p. 51). Colonized people were able to turn the discourse of modernization into a language of claims concerning the obligations of colonial powers. For instance, when development emerged as a colonial project with aid from the former colonial power, it did so in the face of serious objective challenges from the West Indies and Africa in the 1930s and the 1940s.

The various forms of present-day oppressions in some former colonies have sometimes been regarded as a legacy of colonialism. For instance, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) argues that colonial rule created a “bifurcated state” that distinguished between a despotic tribal power in rural areas and a democratic civil society based in towns and cities. According to Mamdani, this duality of power has been a major obstacle to democratization in post-independence Africa. However, historians have shown that colonial power was limited by tribal chiefs’ obligation to ensure the well-being of their community to maintain the legitimacy on which colonial authorities depended. As mentioned by Thomas Spear (2003), colonial dependence on chieftaincy often limited colonial power as much as facilitating it. The reification by colonialism of categories of citizen/subject and urban/rural overstates the role of urban and elite power and undervalues the strategic place of rural constituencies and the importance of urban–rural links in the making of African politics. Eventually, drawing a direct causal connection between the indirect rule of the 1920s and 1930s and the politics of authoritarianism and ethnicity in the 1980s and 1990s fails to see what lies in between, especially the explosion of citizenship in the final years of colonial rule.

Historians, anthropologists, and political scientists interested in understanding the everyday practices of colonialism have changed their framework of analysis to take account of these issues. They today insist on the necessity of looking simultaneously at the colonizing countries and the colonies and the process by which each entity affected the political transformation of the whole empire. This marks an important break with former imperial historiography, which had long treated colonies as marginal to a history that remained national or as a projection of national culture and power. Empirical evidence now suggests that new forms of administration, town planning, architecture, policing, and medical practice, to mention just a few examples, were not only a one-way imposition of norms coming from the metropolis but were also coproduced in the colonies and contribute to larger debates about the nature of colonialism and its impact. Colonialism profoundly shaped both colonized and colonizers’ society.

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See also Imperialism; Postcolonialism

Further Readings


Common Goods

Social scientists call goods all the resources that people use in their life. A well-established taxonomy of goods distinguishes them on the basis of two attributes: excludability and rivalry. The first attribute refers to the right of the owner to exclude other individuals from the consumption of the goods. The second means that the consumption of a unit by one individual prevents the consumption of the same unit by another. Private goods, with which basic microeconomics is concerned, are excludable and rivalrous. Goods that lack one or both of these attributes are called common goods by political analysts. This entry discusses the attributes of common goods, a variety of forms of these goods, and ways in which they can be managed.

Three different types of common goods have been envisaged since the 1950s. Economists have drawn attention to public goods, which are nonexcludable and nonrivalrous, such as national defense, traffic lights, air to breathe, and eradication of contagious diseases. More recently toll goods or club goods have been considered, that is, nonrivalrous and excludable goods, such as highways, cable television, shooting or fishing permits, and museums. Finally, environmental scientists and political analysts have envisaged common pool resources (CPRs) or commons, which are nonexcludable but subject to rivalry, such as fisheries, free meadows, hunting game, and groundwater basins. Table 1 illustrates the positions of goods in the taxonomy.

Nonexcludability and/or nonrivalry of common goods pose a series of problems for collective action that have been extensively examined.

Collective Action for Public Goods

Political scientists began to study the role of groups in politics at the beginning of the 20th century. With time, a scholarly tradition became established, and a group theory was proposed that implicitly assumes that whenever all the individuals in a group have the same aim, they will all act to achieve that aim. Mancur Olson, in his book *The Logic of Collective Action*, was the first to argue that this apparently obvious assertion is in general untrue for public goods.

 Olson’s argument is that the attribute of nonexcludability implies that no individual member of a group has an incentive to contribute voluntarily to the provision of a public good, as each would get his or her part, in any case, once it came into existence. Irrespective of the nature of the group (i.e., a rural community, a town, a union, or a nation), this free riding behavior may spread among individuals, so that a group may be unable to give rise to a

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<td>Excludable</td>
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<td>Rival</td>
<td>Private goods</td>
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<td>Toll goods (club goods)</td>
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Note: CPRs = common pool resources.
single unit of public good, no matter how important it might be for the group. Consequently, the existence of a public good depends on the capacity of the group to prevent free riding, which means detecting and punishing people who do not cooperate in its provision. This is easiest when the number of group affiliates is small, because they know each other personally, interact frequently, and can regularly monitor their respective actions. Because of this capacity to surmount opportunistic behavior, small groups are privileged and are able to activate and stabilize. Large groups, on the contrary, are anonymous, so that it may be difficult for partners to detect and punish free riding. This is why large groups are difficult to mobilize and may remain latent.

The Tragedy of the Commons
For goods with the rivalry attribute, a unit of CPR taken by one person is taken away from another person. For goods with the nonexcludability attribute, no one can singularly claim property rights. Because CPRs have both these features, they not only have the problem of free riding, shared with nonexcludable public goods, but also are vulnerable to intense exploitation, which may completely erode their value. Garrett Hardin drew attention to this problem in a 1968 article published in Science, where he gave the example of an open pasture. Because no individual property right can be claimed on its land, each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the pasture. This spontaneous arrangement might last for centuries, as long as wars and diseases keep the population of both men and cattle below the highest level that the meadow can sustain. However, were these traditional evils to be defeated, the population of herdsmen and cattle would grow beyond that threshold, and a new evil, called by Hardin the tragedy of the commons, would emerge.

The catastrophe by no means depends on the carelessness of the herdsmen. Deciding whether to introduce a new unit within the pasture, a perfectly rational herdsman will weigh up expected costs and benefits: Introducing an additional beast gives him the opportunity to add nearly the value of this unit to his income, while the cost of overgrazing produced by that new unit generates only a little erosion of the free grass, a loss that furthermore is distributed among all herdsmen. This reasoning can be extended to any one additional beast and to any herdsman. Therefore, individual rationality pushes each herdsman to increase his herd without limit, progressively reducing the likelihood that any animal will find enough food to survive, and finally, leading all the herdsman to complete ruin.

Managing Common Goods
In spite of the tragedy of the commons and the problems with collective action, groups of any size have always existed in human societies, delivering common goods to their members in a more or less efficient manner. Of course, this is well known to scholars, who have pondered the various ways in which practical politics has adapted to cope with the problems that theoretical analysis has envisaged.

To begin with, both CPRs and public goods are nonexcludable, which implies exposure to free riding. Then, the theoretical insights considered so far would be corroborated if the strategies of practical politics were to be aimed at increasing the cost of free riding or at giving to common goods some attributes of excludability.

The first strategy amounts to making use of the coercive force of the state—whether or not legitimized by democratic procedures and majority endorsement—in order to deter opportunistic behavior. This strategy is actually largely adopted by all public authorities under all regimes, as the reality of enforced taxation makes clear beyond any doubt. However, the alternative strategy of providing common goods with the attribute of excludability is no less important. Convinced that CPRs generate social evils, Hardin maintained that the history of civilization is that of limiting the “freedom of the commons,” introducing property rights by law, and transforming them into private goods, as happens when concessions are granted. Also, public goods can be equipped with elements of excludability. This is accomplished when public authorities introduce fees or tickets that transform public goods into toll goods. Appealing to this strategy, Olson is able to explain how large groups succeed in providing their members with public goods when no mutual control is available to defeat free riding. His explanation is based on the role of selective incentives. These are benefits that
the group offers to each potential member as an inducement to join and bear a share of the collective enterprise. Thus, large latent groups have the opportunity to mobilize and gain their public goods as by-products of selective incentives.

An Alternative Way to Cope With CPRs

The strategies so far considered by which groups can provide their affiliates with common goods imply an institutional change, toward either centralization or privatization. However, institutional changes are costly, and in both cases, further analysis of additional costs is needed. This has been clearly pointed out by Elinor Ostrom in her book *Governing the Commons*, devoted to the analysis of CPRs. Her first point is that only public authorities are entitled to introduce property rights on CPRs. That means that creating a market for commons implies the costs that public authorities must bear to establish an agency to define market rules and control their effectiveness and efficiency. On the other hand, if property rights remain in government hands, one must add the cost of detecting defectors as well as the costs of errors, such as mistakenly sanctioning those who cooperate or failing to sanction defectors.

From all this, the conjecture emerges that full privatization or full centralization imposed by external authorities may be a questionable means of coping with the problems with CPRs and that institutional arrangements provided by the commoners themselves may offer better solutions. To examine this hypothesis, Ostrom makes a thoughtful analysis of the decision processes in many empirical cases of CPRs ruled by self-governing communities, such as forest tenures, irrigation systems, or inshore fisheries from various countries in different continents with different levels of economic development. Her scrutiny reveals that people interacting in a CPR can avoid resource erosion through a system of rules contingent on the specific situation, monitored by accountable individuals, and regulated by graduated sanctions. However, to realize such an institutional change, the individuals concerned must know one another through other repeated interaction, so that over time, they can accumulate the social capital necessary to discover shared norms promoting mutual cooperation. These conditions are more likely to be met in the type of small-scale CPRs investigated in Ostrom’s book.

It is important to underline the fact that Ostrom does not deny the relevance of the problems that Hardin and Olson have pointed out with common goods. Her aim, more limited and yet extremely important for political analysis, is to show that the assumption that problems with common goods can be solved only by external authorities imposing privatization or centralization, although widespread among policy analysts, is invalid.

Social analysts have scrutinized common goods using contributions of increasing complexity. Hardin’s approach exemplifies the environmental scientists’ concern for the ultimate tragic consequences of the commons. Olson enhances Hardin’s analysis, paying due attention to decision processes and proposing an economic model where individual incentives interact with a given institutional framework. Ostrom considers many aspects concerning the provision and maintenance of common goods. Her analysis strongly suggests that designing the necessary institutional change and considering its costs should not be omitted when modeling decisional processes concerning human attempts to attain collective benefits. Her teachings have been very influential, and subsequent research on common goods has followed her analytic framework, focusing on institutional design and multilevel governance. Thus, it has been possible to extend her method far beyond the small-scale CPRs to research into the international governance of common goods such as the Internet and financial markets and environmental global commons such as Antarctica, the oceans, and the atmosphere.

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See also Collective Security; Institutional Theory; Social Capital

Further Readings
Communism

After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it seemed that communism belonged only to the past and was a more appropriate subject of research for historians than for political scientists. This impression is wrong. Communism is directly relevant to political science, not only because communist regimes still exist in Cuba, China, and elsewhere in Asia, but also because an adequate account of communism must include an explanation of why it is attractive or, on the contrary, why it has failed. An understanding of communism must also include an examination of its future as well as its legacy in former communist countries that are now democracies. This entry addresses these topics by analyzing communism as a theory, a type of regime, and a political organization. As a political theory, communism has changed over the years but has always been significant to some philosophers and activists, and it remains an important point of reference in critiques of capitalism and current political debates. In this respect, it is necessary to distinguish between the idea and its political realizations.

Evolution and Actualization of the Idea of Communism

The idea of communism is a very old one that has its roots in the vision of a society based on the absolute equality of human conditions and the elimination of individual enrichment. It is present in the works of many thinkers from Plato through the 18th-century utopians, the Soviet analysts, and some contemporary theoreticians. The terms communism and communist were first used in France during the 11th century to designate the common practices, interests, and rights of some peasants. During the French Revolution, some authors used the word communism in its more modern sense of a general sharing of goods in a regime established by a revolutionary process. Others, for example, Robert Owen, Etienne Cabet, Wilhem Weitling, and Moses Hess, used the term to designate utopian projects of societies based on a new system of exchanges and distribution. But it was around the mid-19th century that the idea of communism became more widespread. The creation of the Communist League by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in 1847 and the publication of their Communist Manifesto in 1848 marked a turning point in the evolution of the communist idea as embodied in a political structure and metamorphosed into a coherent doctrine that, despite Marx’s protests, quickly took on a religious and dogmatic dimension. The word communism came to refer to a general project, a political action, and a political ideology presented as a real and powerful science, different from reformism. For Marx, communism meant not only social equality and the end of private property but also the necessity of a revolution based on class struggle directed by an organized proletariat that would completely destroy capitalism and the bourgeoisie, establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. After this first step, it would be possible to establish a perfected new order with collective ownership, a progressive disappearance of the state, and the dissolution of social classes.

Prior to 1917, there was confusion within the international labor movement concerning the relationship between socialism and communism. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, Lenin gave the name Communist to the Bolshevik party, and with the creation of the Third International in 1919, the distinction between the Communist Party and social-democratic and socialist parties was strengthened. Lenin and his comrades set themselves up as Marx’s only heirs, delegitimizing the numerous other interpretations of Marxism.

Marxism–Leninism became the main and strongest codification of the doctrine of communism during the 20th century, with the Soviet Union presented as a model. Thus, the Soviet Union can be considered the first incarnation of communism; however, after World War II, other nations, such as...
Communism as a Type of Regime
Because of the existence of these countries who claimed their affiliation to communism and Marxism, communism also designates a type of regime. Usually, they show important specificities in terms of how they implemented the communist program and in their respective historical, national, and social environments. However, there were also commonalities; in particular, the establishment of a communist regime was in each case followed by an intense period of violence and terror marked by mass crimes, genocides, trials, deportation, and the creation of detention and concentration camps for all political, cultural, and religious “enemies” as well as bloody purges of opponents inside the party. The prime example was the Soviet Union under Lenin and then under Stalin, until the latter’s death in 1953. One of the grimmest examples of communist terror was in Kampuchea (Cambodia), where from 1975 to 1978, the communist Khmer Rouge was responsible for the death of an estimated 1 million to 1.5 million people.

Often, a period of acute repression in a communist regime was followed by a relaxation of the repression; this was the case in Russia and in East and Central Europe after Stalin’s death in 1953 and Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization in 1956. However, during this period, there remained a restriction of liberties and a general fear based in part on memories of past repression. Other common features are the following:

- the establishment of one-party rule or a hegemonic and preeminent communist party, with some insignificant allies who keep alive the fiction of plurality, as in some of the Eastern and Central European countries after 1945;
- the monopoly of all activities, including political, economic, social, intellectual, and cultural activities, and of the media, who were used for intensive propaganda;
- an emphasis on the importance of ideology for the party and for the whole population;
- the rigorous control and surveillance of society;
- the endeavor to create a “new man,” who was ideologically convinced, completely devoted to the party, and willing to sacrifice his life;
- the centralization of all powers, especially in countries with great cultural, ethnic, religious, or geographical diversity; and
- the preeminent affirmation of the leadership, which may lead to an organized cult as, for instance, in the cases of Stalin, Mao, Kim Il Sung, Ho Chi Minh, or Castro.

During the years 1920 to 1930 and after World War II, these features sparked polemics about the nature of communist regimes and their classification: What were they exactly? Were they a new version of classical dictatorship or a variety of authoritarian systems, or did they belong to totalitarianism? The debate about this last notion was always fierce. Supporters of the totalitarian concept insist that it is as valid for communism as for fascism or Nazism. Some, such as Hannah Arendt and Raymond Aron, thought that, after 1956, the Soviet Union, for instance, became a posttotalitarian regime or an authoritarian one that experienced a deep political and economic crisis, resulting in a reduction of its attraction. Other specialists emphasized the permanence of the essential characteristics of totalitarianism from the beginning to the end but recognized that there was alternation between the extreme and the more relaxed forms of totalitarianism. In contrast, other scholars reject the pertinence of the totalitarian concept for communism and criticize the validity of comparing it with fascism. For them, totalitarianism is too wide and schematic a concept for comparison, because it does not take into account the differences between fascism, Nazism, and communism, as well as those between communist countries. These critics also argue that the concept of totalitarianism does not take into account the spaces of autonomy that were operating despite the weight of oppression. In any case, communist regimes also served as a model for dictatorships elsewhere.

Communism as a Political Organization
Communism also refers to an important mutation of political organization. Marx spoke in favor of the importance and the necessity of a communist party but without giving precise definitions or
recommendations about its structure. It was Lenin who described more precisely the process of building such a party, in his book *What Is to Be Done?* published in 1902. Lenin is the inventor of the first prototype of an ideological party, composed of a vanguard of professional revolutionaries, with a military and secret service component, publishing a newspaper conceived as a key element of the party’s activity, propaganda, and ideological formation. This party was to be ruled such that there was complete submission of the inferior echelons of the party to the superior ones, a strong and centralized authority of the leadership, absolute discipline (whereby the minority had to obey the majority), and, in democratic countries, total control of the members of parliament by the central leadership of the party. This famous invention, called democratic centralism by Lenin, was completely counter to the classical concept of a mass social-democratic party. The party also had to form specialized mass organizations for attracting a variety of people. Through their propaganda, the ideas of communism could be spread more easily, and they could also be used as a channel of recruitment for the party. Trade unions were considered a decisive influence on the working class, but as a transmission agent, they had to be subject to the party’s orders. This specific communist party was supposed to be adapted to the conditions of political struggle under tsarist Russia. But after the victorious Soviet revolution, Lenin and Trotsky decided to generalize the model and impose this organization on the new communist parties all over the world. They also created another important rupture with the internationalist working class tradition by inventing a new Communist International, with its powerful center in Moscow. The Communist International was conceived as a world party with one unique goal: to make revolution on a global scale. In reality, with Stalin’s leadership from the end of the 1920s, the Communist International had to defend the Soviet Union against the supposed attacks of “imperialism.”

The party was completely Stalinized and became monolithic. In other countries, the communist party tried to transform itself into a mass party open to different social categories, for example intellectuals, but with a prominence of working-class members at all levels. In some countries, and especially in China under Mao’s authority, priority was given to the peasants. The military had to consist of disciplined members, courageous and always ready to defend the party’s positions and, if necessary, to sacrifice their lives, as was the case, for instance, during World War II in the Resistance, during some civil wars (in Spain 1936–1939, in Greece 1946–1949), and in the national liberation movement in Vietnam. The party was attractive because it offered the only possibility for political, social, or symbolic promotion. In the course of time, the ideology was no longer an element of faith but just empty rhetoric, with its sole aim being to legitimate those who were in power. The party was a party-state where the state was only an appearance; the reality of power, leadership, and decisions was under its control. At the international level, the communist parties had been organized from 1919 into the Communist International, the so-called Komintern, which was self-dissolved in 1943. This organization was also Stalinized from the end of the 1920s and had to respect the orders from Moscow. The leadership of the Communist International, directly under Stalin’s authority, decided the strategy of each party, controlled the internal life of the party, and selected its leaders. After World War II, the Kominform was created as a successor organization. The Soviet party, with the support of the East European parties, tried to maintain the unity of world communism and the centrality of the Soviet Union by organizing international communist conferences, organizing formal meetings among parties, and providing material (even financial) support. The Soviet party tried to structure this world communist system to achieve its expansion over all continents. But it was confronted with a trend toward autonomy and, sometimes, a defense of national interests (e.g., with the Romanians and the Polish). Some parties decided to oppose Soviet primacy and to split communist unity, such as the Yugoslavs in 1948 and the Chinese and Albanian Communists in the 1960s. In the West, communist Italians after 1956, the French in the 1970s, and then the Spanish soon after tried hard to invent a form of Eurocommunism that emphasized the importance of democracy and personal freedoms and rejected dictatorship. However, they always defended Soviet superiority when confronted with imperialism and capitalism.
Communism as an Ideal

The theoretical, political, and sociological interpretation of communism has always divided the scientific community. Communism has been interpreted as a contemporary form of utopia that would fulfill the classical quest for happiness in a perfect and pacified world and give expression to the “passion of equality” that Alexis de Tocqueville saw as inseparable from democratization. Many thinkers have argued that although communist regimes vigorously repressed religion, communism itself took the form of a secular or political religion. In Europe, communism had more success in Catholic and Orthodox countries and in some Jewish communities than among Protestants. Where Islam was the dominant religion, communism generally failed to take hold; however, it prospered in Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian countries. Thus, communism could be seen as a secular substitute for traditional religions and its establishment, the result of a transfer of faith from classical religions to this new one.

Communism was embraced by many different sections of the population, from the uneducated to intellectuals, who found in its beliefs a basis for political involvement. Even though it was closely associated with the protection of Soviet interests, communism also may be seen to involve a commitment to internationalism as the foundation of world fraternity. However, communism could also strengthen nationalistic values, as it did in some countries that were fighting for their independence, such as Vietnam or Cambodia. Such ambivalence existed on other topics as well. Communism succeeded as a movement determined to practice violence against dictatorships but also within democracies (as the communist parties did from the 1920s to the 1940s); yet, at the same time, especially in the West, communism presented itself as a peaceful movement allied with Catholic and Protestant associations and independent personalities who were not properly affiliated to a party but were strongly committed to leftist values. Obviously, in theory, communism was a child of the Age of Enlightenment, with its ideals of equality and its aspiration to emancipation and democracy. But in practice, although there were differences between communism and totalitarian movements such as fascism and Nazism, communism translated to dictatorship. In Western countries, communist parties criticized the “bourgeois” and “formal” democracies in the name of a future and perfect democracy. After World War II and their active participation in antifascist resistance or anticolonialist movements, communist parties—the most powerful of which were in Western Europe—gradually accepted democratic principles and made some changes in their own organizations.

But the main question is whether communism represented an archaic political phenomenon or a modern one. Communism, as an affirmation of the values of a classless society, can be seen as archaic because of its rejection of capitalism, the market economy, individualism, and liberal and representative democracy. Communism could also be presented as a specific authoritarian form of economic and social modernization developed by a ruling communist party—a modernization that was a complete disaster everywhere. However, in democratic countries where strong communist parties existed, as in France or Italy, their presence and the protection they gave to the poorest people could be seen as providing a foundation for the modern welfare state.

Communism and Today’s World

Communist regimes no longer exist in Russia and in Eastern Europe. Efforts to reform communism in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union under Gorbachev failed. Western European communist parties are in decline or have changed their names and identities. Communism as a whole has lost its momentum. But it is still alive in some countries as a totalitarian regime, as in North Korea, or in the form of coexistence between a market economy and the domination of a single party, as in China. Communism has left an important legacy. Communist domination did leave its mark on welfare in countries that have undergone a transition to democracy, which explains the nostalgia for equality and social protection. In some countries, Communists have maintained a good reputation among the public because the collective memory associates them with the social class struggles of the past and with antifascism. Communist doctrine itself is in a deep crisis, but some authors find an actuality in Marxism. Some elements of the communist culture are still alive in the form of...
anticapitalism, aspiration to utopian ideals, the search for a radical alternative, contestation of the reality of democracy, and hostility to reformism. In other words, communism is perhaps finished as a political centralized and authoritarian organized movement but remains alive and present as an aspiration.

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See also Capitalism; Class, Social; Communist Parties; Communist Systems; Equality; Imperialism; Labor Movement; Maoism; Marxism; Revolution; Socialism; Stalinism; Totalitarianism; Utopianism

Further Readings


COMMUNIST PARTIES

Communist parties are radical Leftist political organizations that aim to facilitate either a coercive or peaceful transition of society from capitalism to communism. Such parties initially emerged as factions within many European socialist and social-democratic parties at the end of the 19th century. Communist parties claim to represent the interests and values of the working class. The seizure of power by the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) in a coup d’état in Tsarist Russia in November 1917 was a signal for the emergence of communist parties nearly all over the globe. After World War II, communist parties seized power in Eastern Europe, China, and some other Asian countries. A rapid decline of communist parties worldwide began after Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) initiated reforms of the Soviet regime in 1985. This entry discusses their ideology, origins, organization, and worldwide impact.

Ideology

The term communist was used for the first time by the utopian socialist Goodwyn Barmby, who introduced the word into the English language as a translation of the French word communiste and founded the London Communist Propaganda Society in 1841. An essential distinctive characteristic of communist parties was the importance accorded to ideology. In communist parties, ideology occupies a much more fundamental place than in other parties as a primary concern of the party is to indoctrinate the rank and file with communism or Marxism.

The doctrine of communism refers to the theory of society developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the 1840s. In the mid-1840s, Marx and Engels became engaged in politics by joining the League of the Just, a secret society consisting mainly of émigré German artisans. In February 1846, Marx and Engels set up the Communist Correspondence Committee with the aim of reclaiming control of the League of the Just. In June 1847, the League was transformed from a secret society into an open revolutionary organization—the Communist League. The second congress of the Communist League, in December 1847, asked Marx and Engels to draw up a manifesto stating its principles. In February 1848, Marx and Engels published the Manifesto of the
Communist Party, where they formulated the basic principles of communism. The major author of Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei was Karl Marx; it was originally published in German in London.

A cornerstone of Marxist theory was the economic (often called the materialistic) interpretation of history and theory of the social revolution. According to this doctrine, human society is developing through a series of historical stages based on changing modes of production, which are the fundamental determinants of social structures and social relations. As seen by Marx and Engels, the history of human society is the history of class struggles. According to Marxist doctrine, human society has passed through the successive phases of a primitive society, slavery, feudalism, and capitalism and must advance to communism. The class struggle under capitalism is between those who own the means of production—the bourgeoisie—and those who labor for a wage—the working class. Communism means an abolition of private property and the creation of a classless society in which productive wealth is owned collectively.

Origins

Several predecessors of modern communist parties existed, but the major roots of revolutionary movements with a clear communist leaning and a direct involvement of the father of the communist doctrine, that is, Marx, go back to the International Working Men’s Association, or the First International. The First International, an organization of workers that represented an alliance of people from diverse groups, such as the French Proudhonists, Blanquists, the English Owenites, the Italian Republicans, proponents of individualistic anarchism, and other socialists of various persuasions, was founded in 1864. Under the influence of Marx, the Social Democratic Workers’ Party of Germany, the strongest member of the First International, was founded in 1869. In 1872, the First International split between Marxist and anarchist currents, and the organization was disbanded 4 years later at its 1876 Philadelphia conference.

In July 1889, European socialist and labor parties from 20 countries established the Second International, excluding the powerful anarcho-syndicalist movement. One of the most prominent Russian communist leaders—Vladimir Ilyich Lenin—was a member of the Second International from 1905. The Second International dissolved during World War I, in 1916, as the national parties that composed it did not agree on a unified position against the war.

Marx and Engels argued in the Manifesto of the Communist Party that among the immediate goals of Communists were the “formation of the proletariat into a class, the overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, and the conquest of political power by the proletariat.” The ultimate aim of communism was the replacement of the old bourgeoisie by a classless communist society.

Until the collapse of the Second International, Marxists worked within existing social-democratic parties. Marx claimed in the Manifesto of the Communist Party that “the Communists do not form a separate party opposed to the other working-class parties.” However, in his words, Communists differ from other working-class parties in that they “bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality,” and “they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.”

In 1902, Lenin wrote a political pamphlet—What Is to Be Done?—where he developed a concept of a “party of a new type.” Here, Lenin formulated the basic elements of the concept of a revolutionary party:

a. a centralized and disciplined (cadre) party of professional revolutionaries,
b. a party organized as a bureaucratic or semimilitary hierarchy, and
c. a party able to communicate socialist ideology to the more intellectually developed workers, who could act as the vanguard of the working class and be capable of overthrowing the regime of the bourgeoisie and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This “Leninist” type of party, as an authoritarian structure, was to become the highest authority of the class-based organization, which would lead all other organizations of the working class and society as a whole. For many decades, the organization, strategy, and tactics of the Leninist party
were interpreted as providing the impetus for the establishment of the totalitarian regime in the Soviet Union.

In 1990, however, the American socialist Hal Draper published an article “The Myth of Lenin’s ‘Concept of The Party’ or What They Did to What Is to Be Done?” where he argued that Lenin’s concept of the working-class party was highly misinterpreted. First of all, Lenin did not speak about intellectuals as the carriers of socialist ideas in the political organizations of the working class. Second, Lenin’s demand of centralism did not mean a “democratic centralism”—that is, a semi-military hierarchy within the party—but rather the aim to establish an organized all-Russian party for the first time. The aim of having a class-based party was just a reaction to the fact that throughout history, the socialist movement was mostly organized in sects. Third, Lenin did not propose a revolutionary sect, but instead, he aimed “to organize the revolutionary current as a political centre of some sort inside the mass party.” John P. Plamenatz (1954), a political philosopher, argued long before Draper that in 1902, Lenin’s ideas of a revolutionary party were not “undemocratic, but merely advice adapted to the needs of a revolutionary party active in Russia in the first decade of the twentieth century” (p. 225), which, however, took an antidemocratic turn in “what happened after the Bolshevik Revolution.”

In 1918, the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) was renamed the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and from 1920 until 1991, it was the only legal political party in the Soviet Union. In 1925, the name of the party was changed once again, and it became the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and eventually was transformed into the CPSU in 1952. After the attempted coup d’état in August 1991, the CPSU was dissolved by Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin.

Organization

As the first communist parties were splinter groups of existing social-democratic and/or socialist parties, initially, they inherited the traditional organization of mass parties. After the October Revolution of 1917, the Russian Communist Party gradually centralized political power and developed a strict cadre policy. A high degree of centralization is a distinctive characteristic of communist parties. All mass-based parties tend to be centralized, but within communist parties, it was significantly more important than in other mass-based parties.

All political factions and dissent were forbidden within the Russian Communist Party in 1921, and afterward, all party members had to adhere to the decisions that had been made by the central bodies. The internal party organization was based on the principle of democratic centralism, where “democracy” meant the freedom of party members to discuss matters of policy and to pass decisions by majority vote, and “centralism” was understood as a duty of party members to uphold decisions taken by the majority. In theory, democratic centralism also included elections to all party institutions from the bottom to the top, accountability of party structures and leaders to the rank and file, strict party discipline and mandatory decisions of the upper structures for the lower structures, and personal responsibility of party members for the assignments given to them by the party. In reality, democratic procedures were an empty formality as leadership at all levels of the party organization prohibited criticism and dissent in decisions and actions.

The Russian Communist Party also introduced a nomenklatura system through which party elites were appointed to key positions in the administrative, economic, military, cultural, and educational bureaucracies as well as throughout the party’s own hierarchy. Lenin himself formulated the first criteria for nomenklatura appointments as follows: reliability, political loyalty, and administrative ability. Joseph Stalin finished the building of the party’s patronage system and used it to distribute his confidants throughout the party bureaucracy. Under Stalin’s direction in 1922, the party created departments of the Central Committee and other organs at lower levels that were responsible for the appointment of party officials. After Leonid Brezhnev’s accession to power in October 1964, the party considerably expanded its appointment authority. At the all-union level, the Party Building and Cadre Work Department supervised nomenklatura appointments. This department maintained records on party members throughout the former USSR, made appointments to positions on the all-union level, and approved nomenklatura
appointments to the lower levels of the hierarchy. The head of this department was sometimes a member of the party Secretariat and was often a protégé of the General Secretary of the CPSU.

The communist parties developed a new structural organization. While other mass-based parties focused their organization and drew their support from a particular geographical or territorial area, the communist groups formed their cells in the workplace. Party members were employed in the same enterprise or professional institution, above which were territorial district, city, regional, and national party committees. The workplace cell organization proved to be effective. These workplace cells were more numerous than territorial local branches in other mass-based parties’ sections. Also, this system led each cell to concern itself with problems of a corporate and professional nature rather than with more political issues. Last but not least, this organizational system allowed party leaders to have extensive authority over primary party cells. At the end of the 1980s, the CPSU had around 20 million members organized into about 400,000 primary party cells.

At the top was the party congress, which met only every few years, where strictly selected delegates elected the members of the republican and the all-union party central committees. The Politburo was the highest political and executive institution of the CPSU. It was created on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, but it became fully functional only in 1919 and soon overshadowed the Central Committee in power. Nominally, the Politburo was elected by the Central Committee to direct the party’s policy between the Central Committee’s plenary sessions. In fact, the Politburo was the most important decision-making institution in the Communist Party and has commonly been seen as a rough equivalent to the cabinet in Western political systems. The size of the Politburo of the CPSU varied, and from 1952 until 1966, it was called the Presidium of the Central Committee.

In addition, the Communist Party was surrounded by various satellite mass organizations. In the Soviet Union, among the most important were the Communist Youth Union (Komsomol), from which nearly 75% of party members were recruited, and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, with more than 100 million members. The Communist Party controlled all facets of economic, political, military, and cultural life, and Article 6 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution stated that “the leading and guiding force of the Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state organizations and public organizations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.”

**Communist Parties Worldwide**

After the establishment of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1919 by representatives of 34 parties, most emerging communist parties worldwide were patterned along the model of the organization of the Russian Communists. In 1920, the Second Congress of the Communist International formally adopted the Twenty-One Conditions—officially the Conditions of Admission to the Communist International—as prerequisites for any political group wanting to become affiliated to the Communist International. These conditions encouraged the buildup of communist organizations along democratic centralist lines.

Many European Socialist parties went through splits based on whether they adhered to the Communist International. The French Section of the Workers International (SFIO) broke away with the 1920 Tours Congress, leading to the creation of the new French Communist Party. The Communist Party of Spain was created in 1920 on the basis of the Federation of Socialist Youth; the Communist Party of Italy was created in 1921 following a split in the Italian Socialist Party; the Belgian Communist Party emerged in September 1921 following a split from the Belgian Workers Party, and so on. Membership in the Communist International in itself formalized the split between the Communists and moderate social democracy.

In the interwar period, the Communist Party of Germany was not only a major party in Germany but was also the strongest communist party in Europe outside of the Soviet Union. In the four Reichstag elections of 1930–1932, the Communist Party polled between 5 and 6 million votes. The party was then suppressed by the Nazi regime. A considerable number of senior German communist leaders in exile were also executed during Stalin’s Great Purge of 1937–1938, and more than a thousand were handed over to Nazi Germany by Stalin’s regime. The Soviet-dominated communist
parties and the Comintern in the interwar period were the main instruments to export the Bolshevik Revolution. By the end of the 1920s, the revolutionary upsurge in Europe was over, and communist parties were established in most countries, but in most cases, the Communists did not play a leading role in the labor movement.

After World War II, the Soviet victory over fascism contributed to a surge of popularity of communist parties, even in Western Europe, which were originally established in 1918 to 1923. Communist parties were stronger in the less developed countries of Southern Europe, particularly in Greece and Italy but also in France. However, their influence significantly decreased from the 1980s onward.

The Italian Communist Party was established in 1921 through a split within the Italian Socialist Party. It was outlawed by the Mussolini regime but eventually reemerged as the strongest party of the Left in Italy, and at its peak, it was the largest communist party in Western Europe, with a membership averaging about 1.5 million from the 1940s until the early 1980s. The party was organized like the CPSU, with local sections forming federations, which in turn were grouped into regional committees. Since the late 1940s, the Italian Communist Party has held power in many municipalities, and since the 1970s, it has shared control of major urban centers in the country with the Socialist party. However, much of postfascist politics in Italy was organized around the perceived need to keep the Italian Communist Party out of central government.

The French Communist Party was founded in 1920 as an antisytem, leftist, and secular political organization representing French workers and became especially strong in the industrial areas of northern and eastern France and the suburbs of Paris, obtaining a high of almost 29% of the votes in the 1946 elections. Although the French Communist Party has never won a majority of voters, by the late 1970s, it was the largest of all French parties, with a membership of some 700,000, and a few Communists served in the leftist cabinets in 1981 to 1984 and in 1997. Beginning in the 1970s, some currents in the French Communist Party joined with those of Italy and Spain to advocate a more liberal and pluralistic form of communism, that is, Eurocommunism.

Greek Communists, similar to those in France and Italy, built their leading role on the claim of anti-Nazi resistance during World War II. In 1944, Greek Communists participated in the national unity government, holding a number of important portfolios, including the position of Minister of Finance. After the Greek Civil War in 1946 to 1949, the Communist Party was banned until the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1974. Two other Southern European communist parties—the Spanish and the Portuguese—were politically strong and at their peak after the transition to democracy in the 1970s. They captured about 15% and 20%, respectively, of the total vote in national elections.

In Western and Northern Europe, with the exception of Finland, communist parties had only a marginal political influence. In Finland, Communists created the Finnish People’s Democratic League, which received around 20% of the vote on a regular basis till the end of the 1970s.

Eastern Europe, with the exception of Yugoslavia, became a bastion of Soviet-style communism, as communist parties, relying in most cases on Soviet military presence, were able to win and consolidate power in 1945 to 1948. Nonetheless, all the communist parties of Eastern Europe, with the exception of Albania (the party was founded in 1941), had their origins in the period 1891 to 1921. Communist-led governments after 1945 were formed in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland. In some cases, communist parties cemented their power through a merger with other socialist or social-democratic parties, as in the case of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Hungarian Working People’s Party, the Romanian Workers’ Party, and the Polish United Workers’ Party. Soon after coming to power, ruling communist parties abolished free elections and other political freedoms. Attempts to reform the existing regime in the Communist-ruled countries were suppressed directly by the intervention of Soviet-led military forces—as in the German Democratic Republic in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968—justified by the Brezhnev Doctrine of the limited sovereignty of socialist countries or by the repression of the national communist government, as in Poland in 1981 to 1983.
However, the CPSU was not able to maintain unity and control of the international communist movement and communist regimes. As early as 1948, the Yugoslav Communists removed themselves from Soviet subordination. Yugoslavia and Albania were liberated by communist partisans (led by Josip Broz Tito) and without Soviet military aid. This was the main reason to stay largely independent of the CPSU hegemony and to advocate national communism as an independent road to socialism. Albania remained allied with the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1960, but the Party of Labour of Albania was Stalinist even after the CPSU had turned away from Stalinism in the late 1950s. After 1960, it broke with the former USSR and joined ranks with Maoist China.

The supremacy of the CPSU was most challenged by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The party was founded in 1921. In 1949, the Chinese Communists were able to win power on their own and established the People’s Republic. Since 1949, the CCP, initially led by Mao Zedong, has been the country’s only legal party. Organizationally, the CCP followed the model of the CPSU, having at the top a Politburo and Central Committee, together with party committees at the provincial, district, county, and municipal levels. Divergence between the Chinese and Soviet parties gradually emerged from the mid-1950s through ideological disputes and Khrushchev’s policy of de-Stalinization; later, it led to a Cold War–like conflict between the two communist nations. At the end, the CCP tried to win over to its side communist parties throughout the world. This was most successful in Southeast Asia and in Albania.

In some Latin American countries, notably Chile, El Salvador, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, mass communist parties exercised considerable political influence but never held power as a single party. They supported, however, various leftist coalitions and sometimes guerrilla activities. The only ruling communist party in Central America is the Cuban Communist Party, which came to power in 1959 through a revolutionary movement led by Fidel Castro. The Cuban Communists were heavily dependent on the former USSR for financial support during the 1970s and 1980s. The Cuban communist government was able to survive the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe after 1989, and Fidel Castro ranked among the world’s longest-serving heads of state.

In the 1980s, more than one fourth of the world’s population lived under communist rule. Two of the world’s most populous nations, China and the former USSR, had communist governments. Communist parties held power in Asia (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea, and Vietnam), many countries of Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and former Yugoslavia), Africa (Ethiopia), and Central America (Cuba).

The communist parties, despite the same or similar principles of organization and similar ideological beliefs, have never been a fully uniform or monolithic phenomenon. It is possible to point out the following distinct phases of development of communist parties worldwide:

a. a period of establishment of these parties as autonomous political organizations in the second and third decades of the 20th century;

b. Bolshevization and Stalinization of the communist parties in the 1920s and 1930s;

c. a challenge to Soviet hegemony in the communist movement of the late 1940s and 1950s through the ideological split between Tito and Stalin and the rise of Maoism;

d. the de-Stalinization of the CPSU and most Eastern European communist parties in the late 1950s and early 1960s;

e. the rise of Eurocommunism, or “socialism with a human face,” primarily in Southern Europe since the 1970s; and

f. perestroika in the Soviet Union and the end of orthodox communism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Altogether, the 20th century could be called the “age of shine and decline” of communist parties worldwide.

**Communist Parties After 1989**

With the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, communist parties were severely weakened throughout the world.
CPSU membership declined from about 19.5 million in 1988 to 15 million in 1991, and after the attempted coup d’état in August 1991, it was finally dissolved. Responding to democratic upheavals in the former USSR, European and other communist parties redefined their ideological positions moving in a direction of social democracy. Some of them changed their names, and some disappeared from the political scene altogether.

However, at the end of the 20th century, the transformation of the communist parties was not a linear process. Unlike the communist organizations of Eastern Europe, the CCP was able to stem the democratic protest in the late 1980s and introduced economic reforms from above, which led to an impressive modernization of the country. The CCP is the largest communist party in the world, with an estimated membership of more than 66 million at the beginning of the 21st century.

In some Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, communist organizations were transformed into social-democratic parties, and these successor parties have achieved significant electoral success. In many post-Soviet countries, except the Baltic States, communist parties survived the demise of the Soviet Union as they were reorganized along national lines. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation was (re)founded in 1993. In general, these parties preserved certain leftist ideological beliefs and regained reduced political influence emphasizing nationalism instead of communist ideology (in Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia).

In recent years, in a number of countries such as Nepal, Cyprus, Brazil, India, Venezuela, South Africa, and Sri Lanka, Communists have enjoyed a certain level of electoral success and shared power in multiparty national and local governments. In five countries—China, Laos, Vietnam, Cuba, and North Korea—communist parties remain in power. However, three countries—that is, China, Vietnam, and Laos—have moved toward market economies but without major privatization of the state sector.

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See also Communism; Maoism; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Social Democracy

Further Readings

COMMUNIST SYSTEMS

Communist systems were historically shaped in the 20th century and based on oppressive centralized political power aiming at control over a usually nationalized economy, culture, and society. Such systems appeal to a communist ideology according to which a fully communist system ensures the liquidation of exploitation and equality in a classless society. Because this ideology remained an unfulfilled utopia, the term communist systems refers to existing systems based on the characteristics mentioned above: oppressiveness and striving for control over a nationalized reality. According to communist ideology, such systems are supposed to be only transitional forms on the path to full communism, while in reality they are the only form of communism in existence. Although this entry discusses communism considered as a system rather than an ideology, it should be remembered that the communist ideology caused the deaths of tens of millions of victims of communist repression. This ideology was responsible for economic waste and the stifling of human energy that led to the collapse of the system in Europe in 1989 and the fall of the Soviet Union, leaving only a few communist countries on the map of the world.
Communism was a peculiar system in which formal solutions generated their opposites, as many researchers noted (e.g., Alain Besançon, Elemer Hankiss, Robert Sharlet, Jadwiga Staniszki). Centralization gave rise to spontaneous decentralization, formal regulation resulted in informality, and ideologically based unity brought a diversity that could not be coped with. This is an example of the dynamic of this system. What created communism as a system was an ability to generate and absorb these contradictions in a single whole. A system driven by contradictions was integrated by the relations between particular poles of opposition, with the result that both opposing poles were in need of each other and were strengthened. This created communism as a system and allowed it to reproduce itself. At the same time, however, these contradictions were also a factor for change and adaptation of the system. The informal economy and its relation to the official economy can serve as an example here. The informal economy made it possible to function and somehow also changed the system but, by consuming resources, also contributed to its erosion. These contradictions of the official form of communism were the result of its inability to adapt to social needs and aspirations, and as a result, the contradictions were tolerated by the official system—a mechanism of adaptation extending the life of the system and enabling reproductions.

This entry presents three basic areas of function of communist systems: politics, the economy, and society. Making a precise separation of the three areas is difficult because the specificity of communist systems lay in the powerful tangle of political economic and social structures. At the same time, there was a hierarchy: Politics was the prime cause overriding the other areas.

From Dominance by Politics to a Lack of Politics

In the institutional sense, communism was a system based on the domination of politics over other spheres of life, the organization of life being based on principles of centralism and the elimination of political and social pluralism. One consequence of the aim to eliminate independent structures was an economy based on state ownership, but the economy is just one example of the attempts to subordinate social life to the political authorities. The system sought its justification in an ideology that derived communism from criticism of the structural contradictions of capitalism and promised the creation of a society free from contradictions. Communism in reality has sometimes been seen as a system fulfilling the requirements of the totalitarian model, something rather doubtful in view of the many internal contradictions mentioned above. The totalitarian model then can be seen as a certain type of communist system.

An important characteristic of communism as it actually existed in the political dimension was the paradoxical coexistence of revolutionary mechanisms in the power system and the façade of institutions of parliamentary democracy remaining from the previous system. Although the communist party was the dominant actor, the existence of a government and parliament provided a façade of parliamentary democracy. Its main function was legitimation, although it was also the meeting point and place of negotiation for various group interests, above all at the local level. The communist system, based on the assumption of a unity of interests in society—because after the elimination of antagonistic classes, the basis for opposition of interests was supposed to disappear—had, however, to deal with their real differentiation. These interests were various but in a significant way arose from the segmentation introduced by the system itself, in various branches and sectors throughout the institutional whole. Communism was unable to suspend the working of the laws of economics, which is why real if not overt negotiations and peculiar bargaining appeared in the economy. It was also not able to suspend the generation of interests by all organizational structures—interests in a large part autonomous with respect to central decrees. In an informal way, they had therefore to penetrate the formal structures. This created fertile ground for phenomena related to corruption.

The necessity of taking into account the differentiation of interests in the political sphere in fact marks one of the institutional contradictions of the communist regime. On the one hand, there was the principle of centralism, while on the other, to maintain its ability to reproduce and adapt itself, it was necessary to incorporate into its structure the
differentiated interests, at least to an extent that enabled it to continue functioning. The coexistence of those incoherent elements constituted both an opportunity for reform and a limitation on the reformability of the institutional system of communism. The opportunity was created by the incompletely defined character of the boundaries, and the limit was the fundamental contradiction: The more bottom-up representation of interests was strengthened, the more central control was weakened. This mechanism was clearly visible in the case of unsuccessful economic reform.

The aim of total political control not only resulted in its opposite but also led to the disappearance of any meaningful politics. A system in which everything is controlled by politics in fact does not leave room for any politics at all. A lack of real politics, understood as negotiation of pluralistic interests, seems obvious in the case of communism—in which, paradoxically, everything was meant to be politics.

From a Centrally Planned Economy to Disorganization

The economy was one of the spheres in which the communist system was supposed to fulfill ideological aims. In practice, this was a matter of subordination of economic choices to political criteria. This mechanism was based on institutional structures joining economic organisms with the administration of the state, which moreover was the chief owner of the economy. The basis for economic choices and decisions was a system of economic plans whose justification was the overcoming of the irrationality and contradictions of the capitalist economy and the ensuring of social needs by an economy of real socialism. This system created institutional frameworks for the so-called socialist industrialization, which according to the Polish sociologist Witold Morawski was characterized by preeminence of the means of production, central planning, hierarchic administrative control, strong engagement of the party in the economy, and a lack of independent economic institutions.

The striving for political control was manifested in management and planning carried out centrally. The centralist way of planning and the command-distribution system of management was justified strictly by economic necessity; sometimes, it was argued that it was necessary in a situation of limited resources. In practice, it turned out that linking an economy of scarcity to centralization produced the opposite of what was intended. Centralization failed as a mechanism of control precisely when resources were scarce, and it transformed itself into its own opposite, into spontaneous decentralization. Sociologists such as Lena Kolarska-Bobińska have shown that in such a situation of an economic scarcity, real influence was gained by suppliers of resources at the cost of the political authorities, and this is a way of decentralizing without a precise awareness. As a result, the system of management of the economy, instead of being a system of its hierarchical control became instead the space for various games in which organizations and various interest groups within the institutions of management participated. However, that spontaneous decentralization did not damage the essence of the system because it still had at least two mechanisms of control. The first was control by personnel policy, including the nomenklatura mechanism, through which the party controlled its personnel. Perhaps, the economy was uncontrollable, but that did not mean that some other source of control gained power. The economy drifted rather than moving in another ideologically unacceptable direction. The economy was further limited by the fact that due to communism’s definition of the preeminence of the branch producing the means of production, suppliers of precisely that branch gained more influence and indirectly reinforced the strategic aim of control over the economy. That control at best became more static than dynamic; the economy did not achieve the set goals.

A second source of limitation on the centralizing mechanisms was the cycle of reform. To satisfy the needs of society, the communist economy had to realize economic aims, not merely political ones. The implementation of communism showed that these aims remained in contradiction with one another, and in the last instance, political aims took precedence. The typical cycle of unrealized reform resulted in low effectiveness of management leading to the danger of social upheaval, which was quite frequent in some communist countries (e.g., Poland). In response to this threat to its power, the current government instituted
economic reform by loosening its regulation of the economy; however, this decreased control of the economy, which, in turn, heightened the government’s fear of losing power, and therefore, the government retreated from this economic policy. In this way, the same political factor (fear of loss of power) led both to the initiation of reform and to withdrawal of the same. This does not mean, however, that the reforms had no effect. Each led to the discovery of successive limits to the reformability of the system. At different points of time during communist rule, various provisions were considered as solutions to existing problems, such as change of cabinets, managerial reform (more independence for directors of firms), and a role for mechanisms of self-government. None of these reforms on its own was introduced systematically, but together, they had a cumulative effect. That accumulation of experience of unsuccessful attempts at reform led in the end to the discovery that it was impossible to reform communist economic policy.

The next characteristic of the communist model of management was emphasis on formal procedures and mechanisms that also generated their own contradictions in the form of the role of informal mechanisms. The inability to satisfy the needs of the population generated various informal mechanisms that can be regarded as types of supply structures. The informal economy is compatible with different systems, but under communism, it fulfilled a specific function. This is because its essence was not avoidance of registration for reasons such as taxation, as happens in market economies. In the non-market economy, it served as a mechanism compensating for the deficit of market goods. From this point of view, it can be said that it constituted a necessary supplement to the economy of “first circulation” to a certain degree tolerated by the official system. Therefore, it is possible in fact to talk about a powerful entanglement of formal and informal structures in which the existence of the latter was an important element of the economy.

However, not every deviation from the economic aims of enterprises was a result of informality. Some were direct results of ideological assumptions according to which the workplace was supposed to be a forum for achieving not only pragmatic but also social aims: the socialization of employees to function in conditions laid down and preferred by the system. Creation of the real communist economy was at the same time an attempt to create a class of socialist employees. For this reason, there were various forms of competition, ideological schooling, and methods for satisfying the needs of employees in their role as consumers, not through the market but through the workplace. The whole system of the communist welfare state was based to a large extent on the distribution of various goods through the workplace. The provision of health care, access to cultural events, and education were often tied to the workplace. This social function of the workplace—constituting an element of the ideology—was at the same time functional in addressing the permanent state of economy of scarcity. Distribution through the workplace of consumer goods in short supply was in fact a supply mechanism of the economy of scarcity. Simultaneously, it found its justification in the ideology of the system.

Society: From a Myth of Unity to Real Contradictions

The model of communist society in its actual form never achieved full unity. This section first outlines the mechanisms creating inequality into a system appealing to the idea of equality and then discusses the rejection of the legitimization of the system that according to its ideology rested on mass support.

The real communist principle of “from each according to his usefulness to the authorities” infringed the principle of “from each according to his work,” which was an element of the ideological basis of communism. The two therefore were in contradiction and, what is more, infringement of either of them brought about a crisis of legitimization with respect to the basic principles of the identity of the system. The mechanisms of the deviation from the principle of “from each according to his work (ability, contribution)” were largely caused by politics that by a system of priorities favored defined institutional segments of the system. In the economic sphere, it was the branch of production of the means of production, and above all heavy industry, and those segments of machine building that were useful for military production. This was not just a matter of ideologically motivated segmentation. In the case of the real economy of scarcity, branches or indeed firms
producing scarce consumer goods took on particular importance.

This whole mechanism demolished in an obvious way the official vision of social stratification. It led to the decomposition of status factors described in the literature by shaking the tie between contribution of work measured in terms of—for example—qualifications and prestige or earnings. Instead, in the definition of the level of income from work, or more broadly the economic position of the individual, an essential role was played by the branch of industry or indeed the type of organization in which one worked. Systemic sources of social inequality in communism were supposed, in theory, to ensure the political stability of the system but, in practice, led to further erosion of its legitimization. This is because it was not possible to justify any of the legitimizing principles—by appeal either to the slogan “from each according to his work” or to the slogan “from each according to his needs.” This is another example showing how the adaptive mechanisms generated by systemic incoherence sustained its further reproduction in the short term while, in the longer term, contributing to its collapse.

All this revealed that mass legitimization (the conviction that subordination to the system is morally justified) was a myth to be replaced by multiple processes of adaptation. Various authors have shown that adaptation rather than legitimization was the factor maintaining stability, albeit within a limited scope and for a limited time. It lasted for some time, however, and those factors of accommodating stabilization were varied and evolving. There were attempts to substitute economic achievements for political legitimization, with a relative quasi legitimization or various forms of pragmatic adaptation to the system.

Without doubt, the establishment of the Solidarity trade union in Poland in 1980 dealt a vital blow to the legitimizing myths of communism. This was because for the first time, workers questioned the myth of unity of interests in an open and in fact institutionalized manner. They demanded neither joint management nor participation in decisions, as had occurred after 1956 on the wave of popularity of self-management. Rather, the demand was for trade unions as separate organizations that would serve their interests as employees, interests that they did not see as identical to those of their employers. This was the beginning of the end of the system based on the myth of unity of those interests because the state under real communism was supposed to be precisely the representative of employees’ interests since that was why private ownership of the means of production was abolished. In this way, the legitimizing myth of communism came to an end. Before that happened, however, communist systems were torn by waves of outbreaks of social dissatisfaction (e.g., during 1956 in Hungary and in 1970, 1976, and 1980 in Poland) prompted by frustration with an inefficient economy that failed to meet workers’ interests and economic needs. By degrees, however, these revolts took on a political character and articulated a demand for institutional change, one example of which was the creation of trade unions independent of the authorities, as noted previously.

**Variations in Communist Systems**

Communist systems were not static; they underwent change over time. This dynamic was one of the two fundamental sources of their variety. The second was differentiation resulting from various traditions and social and cultural conditions. The first communist state constituting a sort of template of the system was the Soviet Union. (Formally, it was established in 1922; however, Soviet Russia came into existence in 1917 and was not dissolved until 1991.) The government of Joseph Stalin (1878–1953), who led the Communist Party in the USSR from 1922 until his death, can be seen as the formative period of the institutions of the communist system. This period coincided with the building of the military position and the significance of the communist system that controlled many countries of Central and Eastern Europe after World War II (1939–1945), realizing the imperial mission of the Soviet Union in the face of the passivity of the West with respect to the expansion of the USSR, recently an ally in the war against Nazi Germany. The building of this position was achieved at the cost of millions of victims of a whole system of repression comprising police terror, administration of justice entirely under political control, and a system of labor camps. Estimates of the number of victims of the entire communist system fall, according to Jean-Louis Margolin and
Communist Systems

Nicolas Werth, in the range of between 65 million and 93 million (Stephen Courtois et al., 1999). After the death of Stalin, the communist system underwent gradual liberalization, with a somewhat looser political control over different spheres of life and a weakening of the system of mass repression against individuals and groups seen as enemies of the system. Even though the wave of terror and repression of Stalinist times did not return, nevertheless, the systems never achieved complete liberalization because their full realization would have simply meant questioning their very essence.

Apart from changes over time, it is also worth noting local variations in the communist system. Communism was introduced by force after World War II in many countries of Eastern and Central Europe and was brought to an end by the peaceful revolutions of 1989. Since 1949, a communist system has prevailed in China, which today has a population of more than 1.3 billion; communist systems also exist today in North Korea and Cuba. There is therefore a group of communist countries with varied traditions and social and ethnic structures. Communist systems within Europe were also quite varied. For example, the Romanian variant, which maintained a certain independence from the Soviet Union, was much more repressive than the Hungarian or Polish versions, while the Yugoslavian variant in turn strongly accentuated self-management (under the control of the Communist Party, however). Taking the Asian variants into account only deepens the differentiation. The Chinese model links a powerful, almost fully market economy with political control by the Communist Party; in contrast, the North Korean model approaches the totalitarian model in the scale of its control and repression. In spite of the differences among communist systems, the limits to change were defined, and attempts to cross them met with refusal. They were emphatically manifested in the military interventions by the Soviet army in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (when the Soviet army was accompanied by those of a group of countries from the Warsaw Pact) and also the introduction of martial law by the Polish Communists in 1981. In each case, these actions constituted a brutal reaction to attempts to liberalize the communist systems.

Collapse of Communist Systems

The sources of the downfall of the communist system lie above all in its inability to accommodate itself to social needs and aspirations. This brought about many manifestations of dissatisfaction and the establishment of movements of opposition to communism in many countries (e.g., Sajudis in Lithuania, Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, and the Workers’ Defence Committee in Poland). The catalyst for these changes was without doubt the disintegration of the Soviet Union, being an unintended effect of reforms begun by Gorbachev, leader of the Soviet Communist Party in the last period of existence of the USSR. Additional factors in the erosion of communist systems were the opposition to communism and the diplomatic efforts of Pope John Paul II. It is a unique phenomenon in the history of civilization that basically, apart from certain exceptions, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist systems in the European countries took place peacefully, mainly as a result of negotiation by opposition elites with the communist authorities.

Communist systems, then, had internal sources of dynamics and change. The dynamic was neither ideologically based, nor one consisting exclusively of constant protest under which communism eventually folded and collapsed. It was also a matter of a dynamic resulting from contradictions generated by the system itself that turned out in the end to be insurmountable and that led to its collapse.

Not all the cracks in the systems arose from contradictions generated by the dynamic of communism: Some of them were the result of the persistence of certain systemic remnants from the previous regime (in certain countries, e.g., in Poland, a large role was played by private ownership of agricultural land and by the Roman Catholic Church).

In this way, then, the processes of adaptation that made continuation of the system possible, in the end, also constituted the seed of its collapse, as they led to erosion of resources that finally rendered the system incapable of production. They were, therefore, the source of the persistence of the communist system, its modification, and finally its collapse.

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Communitarianism is a social philosophy that builds on the assumption that the good should be defined socially. This core assumption is in sharp contrast with liberalism, which assumes that each person ought to determine the good individually. Communitarianism stresses that individuals are socially “embedded” rather than free agents, that people have social responsibilities to each other, to their communities, and to the common good.

Although communitarianism is a small philosophical school, it has a measure of influence on public dialogues and politics, especially as an antidote to the laissez-faire conservatism championed by Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States. President Barack Obama gave voice to communitarian ideas and ideals in his book *The Audacity of Hope* and repeatedly during the 2008 presidential election campaign, calling on his fellow citizens to “ground our politics in the notion of a common good” (2006, p. 9), for an “age of responsibility” and to forgo identity politics in favor of building community-wide unity. At the same time, it should be noted that many in the West consider *communitarian* an awkward term that evokes misleading associations. Hence, Obama, as well as other public leaders who have embraced communitarian themes, such as Tony Blair in the United Kingdom and Bill Clinton in the United States, avoid the term itself.

**Branches of Communitarianism**

**Academic (Philosophical) Communitarianism**

In the 1980s, communitarian thinking was largely associated with the works of political philosophers such as Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, and Michael Walzer. Others sometimes associated with this group include Alasdair MacIntyre, Seyla Benhabib, and Shlomo Avineri. These scholars called attention to the mistaken assumptions about the nature of the self on which liberal philosophy, especially as espoused by John Rawls, rested. Liberalism, these communitarian critics pointed out, views the person as divorced from all his moral commitments and communal attachments. These communitarians challenged this view, depicting the self as fundamentally “situated” or “contextualized” in a given culture, within a particular history, and with a particular set of values. These academic communitarians, and the sociologists who preceded them, like Émile Durkheim and Ferdinand Tönnies, stressed that individuals in viable communities not only flourish as human beings but also are more reasonable and productive than isolated individuals. Only if social pressures to conform rise to excessively high levels do they undermine the development and expression of the self.

Academic communitarians also argued that the nature of the political community was misunderstood by liberalism. Where liberal philosophers described a neutral framework of rules within which a diversity of commitments to moral values can coexist, communitarians showed that such a “thin” conception of political community was both empirically misleading and normatively dangerous. Good societies, according to these authors, rested on much more than “neutral” rules and procedures; they relied on shared moral culture.

Some academic communitarians argued even more strongly on behalf of particularistic values,
suggesting that, indeed, these were the only kind of values that mattered and that it was a philosophical error to posit any universal moral values. Alasdair MacIntyre wrote that human rights are as real as unicorns. Michael Walzer initially argued that concrete universal values were philosophically illusory and that societies could be measured only according to their own particularistic moral standards. As the debate over abstract universal values gave way to a discussion about cross-cultural justifications of human rights, the problems of such a relativistic position came to be widely (though not universally) acknowledged. In the 1990s, responsive communitarians developed a position that accommodated both particularistic and universal values (see below).

It should be noted that, despite being widely referred to as communitarians, Taylor, Sandel, and Walzer systematically avoided the term. Arguably, this was the case because the term used to be, and to some extent still is, associated with authoritarian communitarianism.

**Authoritarian Communitarianism**

Often referred to as East Asian communitarians, authoritarian communitarians argue that to maintain social order and harmony, individual rights and political liberties must be curtailed. They hold that individuals find their role and meaning in their service to the common good, are organic parts of a great whole, just as human cells are in a human body.

Some East Asian communitarians believe in the strong arm of the state (e.g., former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysian head of state Mahathir Bin Mohammad) and some in strong social bonds and the voice of the family and community (especially the kind of society Japan had, at least until 1990). Authoritarian communitarians argue that the Western value of liberty actually amounts to social, political, and moral anarchy and that legal and political rights are a distinctively Western idea that the West uses to impose its own vision on other cultures, which have their own preferred values. Over the years, East Asian communitarians have moderated many of these claims, have made more room for individual rights, and have been increasingly eclipsed, at least in the West, by responsive communitarians.

**Responsive (Political) Communitarianism**

Early in the 1990s, a new group was founded by Amitai Etzioni, working with William A. Galston, which took the communitarian philosophy from a small academic group, introduced it into public life, and recast its academic content. The group, variously referred to as “responsive,” “neo,” or “political” communitarians, stressed the importance of society and its institutions above and beyond that of the state and the market, the focus of other public philosophies. It emphasized the key role played by socialization, moral culture, and informal social controls rather than state coercion or market pressures. Responsive communitarianism served as a major correction to authoritarian communitarianism by stressing that strong rights presume strong responsibilities and that one should not be neglected in the name of the other.

The group started by forming a platform, whose drafters included Mary Ann Glendon (law); Thomas Spragens Jr.; James Fishkin and Benjamin Barber (political science); Hans Joas, Phillip Selznick, and Robert Bellah (sociology); and Alan Ehrenhalt (author). The platform was initially endorsed by more than 150 public leaders from across the political spectrum. The voice the group raised was soon found in numerous op-eds and public lectures and on TV and radio programs in a considerable number of countries. The group also issued several position papers on subjects such as organ donation, character education, and HIV testing. In the 1990s, several of the members of this group worked with the New Democrats and advocates of the Third Way in Europe.

The ideas of the group were further developed, both on the public side and on the academic side, in books and in an intellectual quarterly, *The Responsive Community*. These works stressed that social institutions and public policies should reflect shared values and the common good in addition to aggregation of individual preferences, which themselves are culturally penetrated. Beyond universal principles, communitarianism emphasizes particularism, the special moral obligations people have to their families, kin, communities, national societies, and the nascent global community.

Responsive communitarians showed that society is best understood not as composed of millions of individuals, but as pluralism within unity. That is, subcultures and loyalties to various ethnic and
regional communities do not undermine the integrity of society as long as a core of shared values and institutions—such as the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, the democratic way of life, and mutual tolerance—are respected. These observations are of special import today for societies that are in the process of coming to terms with mass immigration (e.g., many European societies and Japan) and in which minorities are questioning their place in the national whole (Quebecois, Scots, Basques, Sunnis in Iraq, etc.).

Although this model of the good society is applicable to all societies, at different moments in history, a given society is likely to miss the desired balance between rights and the common good or between particularistic loyalties and society-wide bonds but in a direction different from that of others. Hence, different societies may need to move in different directions in order to approximate the same balance. Thus, contemporary East Asian societies require moving toward much greater tolerance for individualism and pluralism, while in American society, as Robert Bellah and his colleagues along with many others have shown, excessive individualism ought to be reined in.

**Applications of Responsive Communitarianism for Political Science**

The following are a few illustrative, salient issues to which responsive communitarianism has contributed.

**International Relations Theory**

Although communitarianism has dealt mainly with national societies, it has also been applied on the international level. Given the rapid increase of pressing transnational issues, such as environmental degradation, illegal immigration, financial crises, transnational mafias, and terrorists with global reach, the need for significant changes in transnational governance (sometimes referred to as global governance) seems evident. As a rule, transnational problems are still tackled by the Old System—by national governments and the international organizations managed by national representatives and funded by national allotments. But in most cases, this Old System has proved to be inadequate to cope with these problems.

Communitarians have addressed the question of how new transnational institutions may be constructed. They argued that just as in early ages, loyalties and commitments once limited to local communities were transferred in part to national communities, in the future, some such transfer will have to take place to global institutions. Supranationality, the concept that forms the backbone of the communitarian theory of international relations outlined here, characterizes a political body that has acquired some of the attributes usually associated with a nation, such as political loyalty and decision-making power, based not on an aggregate of national decisions or those made by representatives of the member states but rather on those made by the supranational bodies themselves. Their capacity to make decisions on their own terms allows supranational bodies to move with much greater agility and speed than international organizations. At this stage, few such institutions exist and those that do face strict limitations because nations still form the major communitarian bodies. A study of the International Criminal Court, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, and the World Trade Organization illustrates this point. The European Union, the most advanced attempt to form supranational institutions, is not global but regional, and it too, so far, has had only limited success in transferring significant communal loyalties to a transnational level.

**Homeland Security**

Liberals and especially libertarians tend to seek to protect individual rights against the claims of homeland security. For instance, they call for treating terrorists like other criminals, according them the full rights of citizens. East Asian communitarians tend to hold that security is a common good that trumps individual rights and, hence, support policies that give up civil liberties for the sake of security. Responsive communitarianism holds that there must be a carefully crafted balance between rights and security and that the point of balance changes as technical and international conditions change. They point out that courts in free societies regularly use the terminology of balance between the public interest and individual rights and allow the latter to be curtailed when they undermine a
“compelling public interest”—for instance, allowing the violation of privacy of sex offenders in order to protect children from sex abuse and authorizing wire taps for suspected killers. Responsive communitarians have extended the same concept to homeland security.

On reviewing new security measures introduced in the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; in the United Kingdom after the IRA’s terrorism; and in Spain after the Madrid train bombings, responsive communitarians found a somewhat more complex picture than the claim that fear mongering had led to wholesale violations of rights (“privacy is dead”) or that rights advocates block vital security measures (indeed that even raising such questions is “aiding and abetting the enemy”).

Some measures are fully justified, indeed overdue. These often entail a mere adaptation of the law for technical developments. For example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 provided guidelines under which a federal agent could obtain authorization to conduct surveillance for “foreign intelligence purposes.” Prior to 9/11, wiretap warrants were limited to a given phone. Due to the increasing use of multiple cell phones and e-mail accounts over the last decades, federal officials engaged in court authorized surveillance under FISA could not follow suspects as they changed the instruments they were using unless they got a new court order for each communication device. The USA PATRIOT Act, enacted in October 2001, amended the FISA law to allow what is called “roving surveillance authority,” making it legal for agents to follow one suspect, once a warrant is granted, whatever instrument he or she uses. It seems that unless one holds that terrorists are entitled to benefit from new technologies but law enforcement is not entitled to catch up, this is a reasonable measure. (Note that the American constitution bars only “unreasonable” searches and was never absolute in this matter. Although the PATRIOT Act has become a symbol for great excesses in hasty pursuit of security, only a small fraction, about 15 of its more than 150 measures, have been seriously contested. Most are considered reasonable.)

Whatever the new security risks, there are measures that no nation should resort to. These taboo tactics should remain so even if one’s adversaries employ them. Banning these measures sets free societies apart from those whose regimes and actions are illegitimate and provides them with the moral high ground. Key examples of such measures are torture, the indefinite suspension of habeas corpus, and mass detention on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.

Further, responsive communitarians hold that many measures are neither inherently justified because enhanced security requires them nor inappropriate because they wantonly violate rights. Instead, their status is conditioned on their being subject to proper oversight. A measure that may seem tilted toward excessive attention to security may be tolerated if closely supervised by oversight organs, while a measure that is judged as tilting toward excessive attention to individual rights may be tolerated if sufficient exceptions are provided that are backed up by second balance organs. That is, new measures can either be excessively privileged (undermining either security or the regime of rights) or excessively discriminated against (leading to inaction on behalf of either element of a sound balance).

The balance sought here is not between the public interest and rights but between the supervised and the supervisors. Deficient accountability opens the door to government abuses of power, and excessively tight controls make agents reluctant or incapable to act.

In effect, the history of homeland protection can be told in terms of lack of accountability being overcorrected, which in turn is overreduced, in the quest for a sound balance. In the United States, the FBI went way overboard in its surveillance of alleged Communists and civil rights activists. In the 1970s, the FBI was reined in by the Church Committee and additional rules the FBI itself issued—rules that in turn became one reason why 9/11 was not prevented. In reaction, the Bush administration introduced a large number of extreme security measures—which were curtailed by the Obama administration as of 2009. Whether the proper balance has been reached between rights and security and the proper level of accountability is far from clear.

Communal Moral Dialogues as Agents of Change

Thus far, this entry has focused on responsive communitarianism’s answer to the question of
what makes a good society—a balance between social order and individual rights. The remainder of this entry deals with the next question of how understandings of the good are shaped and spread in societies.

One widely shared liberal answer to the question just articulated—what are the main ways and processes by which people’s sense of what is legitimate is shaped and reshaped?—is provided by the students of deliberative democracy. These authors point to “reasoned deliberations” as the key way in which citizens of a democracy come to change their judgments and emphasize “cool” and rational processes while minimizing the role played by emotions and other such “hot” factors.

Responsive communitarians argue that such cool, rational deliberations are almost impossible to achieve or even to approximate under most circumstances. The examination of actual processes of decision making, especially when they concern normative matters, shows that they are much more impassionate and proceed by means different from those depicted by the champions of deliberative democracy. More important, deliberative democracy is the “wrong” model for determining the normative bases of political acts—for determining the good. Instead, individual preferences and judgments are shaped largely through interactive communications about values, through “moral dialogues” that combine passion with normative arguments and rely on nonrational processes of persuasion, education, and leadership. According to responsive communitarians, although information and reason have an appropriate role in dialogues about which policies are legitimate, information and reason play a much smaller role than is often asserted. This is so both because they are much weaker tools than believed and because a much greater role is played by another factor: the appeal to values.

Moral dialogues often have no clear opening point or closing event. They are prolonged, heated, and seemingly meandering. However, they often lead to new or reformulated shared normative understandings (cases in point follow). Even very large and complex societies engage in moral dialogues that lead to changes in social definitions of the good. These dialogues take place by linking millions of local conversations (e.g., between couples, in neighborhood bars, in coffeehouses or teahouses, and around watercoolers at work) into society-wide networks and shared public focal points. They take place during regional and national meetings of many thousands of voluntary associations in which local representatives dialogue—in state, regional, and national party caucuses; in state assemblies and in Congress; and increasingly via electronic links (e.g., groups that meet on the Internet). Focal points of these dialogues are national call-in shows, debates on network television, and nationally circulated newspapers and magazines.

Society-wide moral dialogues are often fostered, accelerated, and affected by public events such as hearings (e.g., the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill case focused discussion on sexual harassment), trials (e.g., the 1925 Scopes trial challenged the normative standing of evolution), and demonstrations (e.g., those that highlighted the normative case against the war in Vietnam).

A brief illustration follows. Until 1970, the protection of the environment was not considered a shared core value in most societies. A book, Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring*, which was very widely read and discussed, triggered a society-wide moral dialogue. A massive oil spill and the ensuing protests and the Three-Mile Island incident further established the subject on the national normative agenda. An estimated 200,000 people gathered on the Capitol Mall in 1970 in Washington, D.C., to demonstrate concern for the environment on Earth Day. These are a few of many such incidents. All these served as dialogue starters and were followed by billions of hours of dialogue, culminating in a shared sense that both persons and communities had a moral commitment to Mother Earth.

The new commitment was strong enough to legitimate various public acts. It moved a conservative president, Richard Nixon, to establish the Environmental Protection Agency and pushed Congress to introduce many policies favorable to the environment, such as recycling and Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. Similar dialogues led to profound changes in what is considered just treatment of minorities, especially African Americans (dialogues triggered and nurtured by the civil rights movement), relationships between genders (by the women’s movement), and many others. Some current dialogues in American society, concerning same-sex marriage and the
Comparative Methods

At the most general level, the term comparative methods may be used to refer to any research technique that focuses on patterns of similarities and differences across cases. More commonly, however, the term is used to refer to a family of techniques employed by small-N researchers. It is this family of techniques that is the main focus of this entry. Though comparative methods do have particular advantages for small-N researchers, there is no inherent connection between comparative methods and small Ns. The development of formal methods of comparative research—specifically, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related techniques—has facilitated the extension of comparative logic, which is configurational in nature, to large-N studies.

This entry has six major sections. The first emphasizes the case-oriented nature of comparative research. This feature clearly differentiates it
from conventional variable-oriented research and underscores its broad links to qualitative inquiry in general. The second section considers the goals of comparative research, linking comparative research to both inductive theory building and deductive theory testing. The logic of comparative analysis is the central focus of the third section. The importance of the analysis of set-theoretic relations to comparative research is emphasized, and the analysis of sufficiency and necessity is linked to subset and superset relations. These connections are important because much of social science theory is formulated in terms of set relations, and it is important to use analytic methods that are true to theoretical formulations. The language and logic of sets underlie both informal and formal methods of comparative analysis, which is the topic of the fourth section. Traditionally, comparative researchers have made use of informal methods, explicitly or implicitly relying on John Stuart Mill’s methods of agreement and difference. Over the past 2 decades, Charles Ragin has formalized the comparative method as QCA, which is discussed in detail in this section. In the fifth section, discontinuities between comparative research and conventional variable-oriented research are addressed, and in the closing section, current development in formal methods of comparative analysis is described.

The Case-Oriented Nature of Comparative Research

Comparative researchers tend to conceptualize causality in terms of necessity and sufficiency. A common concern is the combination of conditions that are sufficient for an outcome. Often, comparative researchers find that different combinations of causal conditions generate the same outcome. This approach to causal conditions is distinct from that of variable-oriented research programs, which seek to identify the net effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable, isolating its effect from that of competing variables.

While the sufficiency of causal combinations is a major preoccupation of comparativists, necessary conditions are also important, especially to theory. For example, Barrington Moore’s famous maxim, “No bourgeoisie, no democracy,” exemplifies the necessary condition: The rise of a capitalist class is necessary for—but by no means guarantees—the development of democracy. The bourgeoisie would also need to resist domination by the aristocracy and peasantry, promote the development of commercial agriculture, and participate in a revolutionary break with the past. This combination of conditions, Moore found, was sufficient to produce a democratic state in the cases he studied.

The analysis of necessity and sufficiency requires that cases be considered on their own terms, as interpretable wholes. To identify and make sense of the bourgeoisie’s revolutionary role, Moore conducted a series of historical case studies. For each case, Moore examined how various aspects of the case (e.g., the relationships among the bourgeoisie, aristocracy, and peasantry and the development of commercial agriculture) interacted with and influenced each other. This is the defining characteristic of case-oriented research: A case constitutes a coherent whole, and its various aspects are understood relationally. Thus, case-oriented research is inherently configurational. The comparative aspect of comparative research, therefore, is the comparison of configurations of interconnected aspects—the cross-case analysis of configurations of similarities and differences.

Within the social sciences, comparative research is most commonly associated with small-N macro-comparative research. But in fact, its logic may be applied at any level of analysis. The same techniques that a macrolevel comparative researcher might use to examine the relationship between economic development and the emergence of democracy could be used by a microlevel comparative researcher exploring the relationship between religious beliefs, socioeconomic status, and divorce. What matters is not the number of cases under investigation but that the researcher make sense of these cases by treating them as instances of interconnected aspects, respecting their coherence and integrity as cases.

There is, of course, always a trade-off between the breadth and the depth of an analysis, and it is the researcher’s responsibility to determine whether a given research question is best answered by examining fewer cases in great detail or more cases in less depth. Generally, this choice is dictated by the goals of the research.
The Goals of Comparative Research

Comparative methods can be used for either theory development or evaluating hypotheses. When developing theory, the researcher conducts a series of case studies, strategically selecting cases so as to produce an accumulation of knowledge. For example, a specific type of evidence that is not available in one case may prompt the investigator to select for his or her next study a case that offers this evidence. Questions raised by previous case studies direct the investigator’s subsequent case selection. In this manner, comparative researchers can develop their theoretical arguments inductively, building their theories from the bottom up. This grounded approach of theory development can be contrasted with a deductive, hypothesis-testing approach that begins with multiple cases. Here, the researcher starts with a preliminary specification of the relevant cases. For example, a researcher interested in testing Theda Skocpol’s theory of social revolution would begin by identifying cases that fall within her specified scope conditions, as explained by Gary Goertz in his book Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide. The researcher would then examine the characteristics of these cases to see if they are consistent with Skocpol’s theory—namely, that countries experiencing social revolutions exhibit the relevant causal conditions (e.g., state breakdown combined with peasant revolts and some form of international pressure).

The inductive approach to comparative research seeks to develop an individual explanation for each case, in relative isolation from other cases. Of course, it is impossible for researchers to wear blinders or forget what they have already learned, and knowledge of one case will invariably influence one’s understanding of subsequent cases. Nor would such a “clean-slate” approach be desirable—the knowledge gained during the research process assists the researcher in determining where to focus his or her attention next. Still, the goal of the inductive approach is to produce a series of individual case studies, allowing for maximum diversity. It is only on completing the individual case studies that the researcher turns to the task of making an encompassing comparison. The researcher examines each case against the others, sometimes by applying formal techniques, such as QCA. The goal of this cross-fertilization of case studies is to identify what the cases do and do not have in common. The researcher uses these comparisons to develop an analytic frame that clarifies the nature of the cases under investigation and their relationship(s) to one another. The construction of this analytic frame produces a structured theoretical account of the cases that may be used to identify cross-case patterns of similarity and difference (e.g., different paths to the same outcome).

Where the inductive approach concludes with the development of an analytic frame, the deductive approach begins with it. Based on existing theoretical and substantive knowledge, the researcher develops an analytic frame to guide his or her investigation of the hypothesis that he or she intends to test. Here, think of an analytic frame as akin to a survey instrument that “interrogates” each respondent (case) in a uniform manner. The analytic frame directs the researcher’s investigation, identifying plausible cases for inclusion in the analysis and telling him or her which characteristics of the cases to examine, what questions to ask, and how to record the information. Fundamental to the deductive approach are the goals of unbiasedness and efficiency, both of which a clearly defined analytic frame helps achieve. Having completed data collection, the researcher then seeks to assess the hypothesis. As in inductive comparative research projects, a formal technique such as QCA may be used to simplify the analysis. In fact, it is somewhat more common for QCA to be used in deductive comparative research than in inductive research because Ns tend to be larger.

The inductive and deductive approaches are combined when a researcher seeks to study a theoretically specified range of cases. As with the deductive approach, the researcher relies on a preexisting analytic frame to guide case selection. Here, the analytic frame serves as a device for classifying cases according to aspects of theoretical or substantive interest. For example, the researcher might construct a contingency table cross-tabulating the level of development of countries with their level of democracy. The researcher then seeks to fill each cell of this table with at least one case. He or she can then subject these cases to in-depth, inductive analysis, confident in the knowledge that important case aspects are well represented in the study.

Inductive comparative research proceeds in a bottom-up fashion, accumulating case knowledge...
so as to generate new theory. By contrast, deductive comparative research follows a top-down formula. Beginning with theory, the deductive comparative researcher seeks out cases to subject to some form of hypothesis testing. Of course, neither of these strategies is practiced in pure form, and there are many examples where the two are explicitly blended. Regardless of the direction in which the research proceeds, however, the same basic analytic logic is employed.

The Logic of Case-Oriented Comparison

As noted previously, comparative research is fundamentally case oriented. Cases are conceived as configurations, and comparison of these configurations is achieved by categorizing cases into sets. Thus, the logic of comparative research is fundamentally set theoretic. Set-theoretic social research, based on Boolean algebra, involves the analysis of set relations, especially the identification of subset relationships. Most social theoretical statements are framed in terms of subset relationships. For example, when social researchers observe that “religious fundamentalists are politically conservative,” they are specifying a subset relationship: Religious fundamentalists constitute a subset of political conservatives. The observation that economically developed countries are democratic follows the same pattern; the conjecture is that the former constitute a subset of the latter.

Subset relationships such as these—ones in which the cause (e.g., religious fundamentalism or economic development) is a subset of the outcome (e.g., political conservatism or democracy)—are consistent with a relationship of sufficiency. That is to say, membership in the set of religious fundamentalists is sufficient for membership in the set of political conservatives. The observation that economically developed countries are democratic follows the same pattern; the conjecture is that the former constitute a subset of the latter.

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an ideal type. Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s distinction among types of welfare regimes is a case in point. There are, of course, no pure cases of liberalism, social democracy, or corporatism. In practice, states of each type borrow from the others. How, then, does one decide on the proper categorization of welfare states? The first step is to conceive of each welfare regime as an ideal type and to specify the essential elements that constitute it as a type. These elements can then be formulated as sets, and the degree of membership of each empirical case in each set can be assessed (via fuzzy-set membership scores). The membership of each empirical case in each ideal-typical regime type is given by the minimum of its memberships in the constituent sets for each regime type. (Using the minimum in this way is known as fuzzy-set intersection.) The use of the minimum is based on the simple idea that degree of membership of an empirical case in an ideal type is only as strong as its weakest link (lowest membership score), a principle that follows from the theoretical notion of the ideal type as a specific combination or coalescence of essential elements.

The analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions and the construction of ideal types are not necessarily independent of one another. Frequently, the results of one analysis will prompt the researcher to reconsider the results of the other. Whether they recognize it or not, comparative researchers commonly engage in both forms of analysis.

**Formal Versus Informal Methods of Comparative Research**

Classical studies in comparative political economy such as Barrington Moore’s *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* and Theda Skocpol’s *States and Social Revolutions* rely on informal methods of comparative analysis, and to date, most comparative researchers continue in this tradition. It was with the publication of *The Comparative Method* in 1987 that formal methods of comparative analysis first gained prominence. Informal and formal comparative methods share an underlying logic and, in the hands of a capable researcher, will produce the same general conclusions. The difference is that formal methods explicitly make use of Boolean algebra to structure the analytic process.

The logic of comparative analysis and inductive inquiry in general can be traced to the work of John Stuart Mill and George Boole. In *A System of Logic*, Mill proposed a series of methods of inductive reasoning that would lay the logical foundation of informal methods of comparative research. Contemporaneously, Boole was developing his calculus of truth values. Boolean algebra, as it came to be known, would develop into set algebra and, ultimately, be integrated into formal methods of comparative research, especially QCA.

**Mill’s Method of Agreement and Indirect Method of Difference**

The simplest of all comparative logics are Mill’s method of agreement and his indirect method of difference, both of which assume that any given outcome has one and only one cause. Although Mill described these methods in terms of individual causes, it is straightforward to extend these methods to accommodate combinations of causal conditions when it makes sense to conceptualize them as decisive causal conjunctions. A researcher using the method of agreement examines a set of cases, each of which exhibits the same outcome. If the researcher finds that all the cases share one or more causal conditions, he or she can infer that this causal condition (or combination of causal conditions) is linked to the presence of the outcome. The indirect method of difference operates under related premises, except that both positive and negative instances of the outcome are examined. This method applies agreement and difference seriatim; for this reason, it is often referred to as the joint method of agreement and difference. The researcher first applies the method of agreement to cases exhibiting the outcome. On identifying a causal condition (or causal combination) linked to the outcome, the researcher examines the negative cases to see if the absence of the outcome is associated with the absence of the cause or causal combination. This double application provides researchers with stronger evidence on which to base their conclusions.

Comparative researchers continue to employ these methods today, albeit under different monikers. The method of agreement is the basis of the most different systems design, which is better conceived as a most different/same outcome design (MDSO). This alternate labeling makes it clear that in this design, diverse cases share the same outcome.
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The researcher attempts to identify the decisive, causally relevant conditions shared by these diverse cases. The other popular design implements the indirect method of difference. It is commonly known as most similar systems design, but it is better understood as a most similar/different outcome design (MSDO), making it clear that there are both positive and negative cases. Ideally, negative cases should be matched as closely as possible with positive cases.

Mill’s methods also provide the underlying logic of the “most likely,” “least likely,” and “crucial” case study research methods. The most likely case study employs cases that theory predicts should strongly exhibit the outcome, while the least likely case study employs cases that would do so weakly, if at all. Least likely cases that conform to predictions serve to marshal support in favor of a given theory. In contrast, most likely cases that do not behave as predicted cast doubt on a theory’s validity. The strongest claim is made by the crucial case study, which asserts that a case must exhibit the outcome if the theory is not to be falsified.

The limitation of Mill’s methods and derivative techniques is that they are incapable of addressing various forms of causal heterogeneity, especially equifinality and multiple conjunctural causation. Mill himself noted that his techniques fail when an outcome has more than one cause. Researchers are able to overcome this deficiency by immersing themselves in the cases. This immersion, however, necessarily restricts the breadth of analysis. It is perhaps for this reason that comparative research has become so closely associated with small-N analysis. QCA challenges this affinity by formalizing many aspects of the comparative research process and enables comparative researchers to address larger Ns.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis

QCA was originally developed for use with binary data or “crisp sets.” The logic of QCA, however, extends to fuzzy sets in which set membership scores can be coded in the interval from 0.0 to 1.0. The present discussion encompasses both types of data. Note that crisp-set analysis is easier for novices to grasp, while fuzzy-set analysis provides more nuanced results. There are four basic steps in most applications of QCA. In practice, of course, these are intimately connected, and researchers should view the research process as a dialogue among four analytic moments. In other words, comparative research is usually retroductive rather than predominantly inductive or deductive.

Step 1: Calibration

As has been emphasized, comparative research is fundamentally set theoretic. The classification of cases into sets, therefore, is of primary importance. This classification process is referred to as calibration. Calibration is a routine practice in the natural sciences. Simply put, calibration refers to the practice of adjusting measuring instruments so that they conform to dependable, known standards. The act of adjusting one’s watch is an act of calibration as is checking the accuracy of a thermometer. While calibration is routine in the natural sciences, most social scientists make use of uncalibrated measures that merely show the positions of cases relative to one another. Uncalibrated measures, however, are clearly inferior to calibrated measures. With an uncalibrated thermometer, for example, it is possible to know that one object has a higher temperature than another, but one still does not know whether either object is hot or cold. This is the key: Calibrated measures provide directly interpretable values. Calibration permits researchers to classify a country as democratic or autocratic, not merely more versus less democratic than the next (or the average).

The reason that crisp-set analysis is more accessible is because the calibration process is more straightforward. When calibrating crisp sets, the researcher need only determine whether each case is part of the target set or not. So, for example, a poverty researcher might seek to classify respondents as “poor” or “not poor.” When calibrating fuzzy sets, by contrast, the researcher must determine the degree to which each case belongs to the target set. The relevant distinctions here might be between respondents who are poor (membership = 1.0), somewhat poor (membership = 0.67), not that poor (membership = 0.33), and not poor (membership = 0). As with a calibrated thermometer, a calibrated fuzzy set integrates both qualitative and quantitative assessments in a single instrument.

Regardless of whether the researcher is calibrating crisp or fuzzy sets, the process demands that he or she carefully consider the nature of the target set—specifically, what the target set represents and
how it is labeled. In other words, conceptualization and calibration are closely intertwined. With crisp sets, a case is either in or out of the target set, and sometimes, cases must be force-fitted into categories. Alternatively, the researcher may generate new crisp categories to capture wayward cases. Fuzzy-set calibration, by contrast, permits the use of finely grained distinctions. When calibrating fuzzy sets, it is important for the researcher to specify thresholds for set membership and non-membership in the set, as well as what is known as the crossover point (fuzzy membership = 0.5), which distinguishes cases that are “more in” the target set from those that are “more out.” The calibration process concludes with the production of a data set. As with a conventional data set, cases occupy the rows. The columns, however, do not represent conventional variables but instead represent sets, and the values in the cells indicate the degree to which each case belongs to each set.

**Step 2: Necessity Analysis**

Having generated the calibrated data set, the researcher next tests for the presence of necessary conditions. As described earlier, the necessity test takes the form of a set-theoretic analysis. A necessary causal condition is one that is a superset of the outcome. Visually, a set relation consistent with necessity is represented by a scatterplot of two fuzzy sets (with outcome membership scores on the Y axis and membership in the causal condition on the X axis) in which all cases reside in the lower-right triangular region. With a calibrated data set, this situation can easily be tested, and a relationship of necessity can be established if, for each case, the value of the causal condition is greater than or equal to the value of the outcome (i.e., \( X_i \geq Y_i \)), within the bounds of the consistency threshold. This test can be extended to combinations of causal conditions, and software packages such as fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) contain functions to automate the procedure.

**Step 3: Truth Table Construction**

Truth tables are used to assess the sufficiency of causal conditions, especially in combinations. Necessary conditions are excluded from the truth table analysis, which is why the researcher tests for them first. Sufficiency is indicated when a causal condition (or, more commonly, a combination of causal conditions) constitutes a consistent subset of the outcome and is mathematically represented by the equation, \( X \subseteq Y \). Again, the consistency test is conducted within the bounds of the consistency threshold established by the researcher.

Superficially, a truth table appears similar to a conventional data set in that it presents a cases-by-variables format. But the rows of a truth table are not observations as they are in a conventional data set. Rather, each row represents a logically possible combination of causal conditions (which, in turn, can be seen as constituting an ideal-typical case or configuration). Consisting of one row per logically possible combination of conditions, a truth table has \( 2^k \) rows, where \( k \) equals the number of causal conditions. As the number of causal conditions increases, the size of the truth table grows exponentially, and analysis becomes increasingly complex. Software packages help manage this complexity; nevertheless, most practitioners restrict their analysis to between 4 and 10 causal conditions.

To construct the truth table, the researcher refers to the calibrated data set and uses the consistency measure to determine which combinations of causal conditions are linked to the presence of the outcome and which are linked to its absence. With a large number of cases and/or causal conditions, this process can become error prone. Software packages facilitate the conversion of a calibrated data set into a truth table and should be used for all but the simplest analyses. Researchers should keep in mind that the process of converting the calibrated data set into a truth table will frequently force them to reconsider the measurement and calibration of both their causal conditions and outcome. In many ways, the process of constructing the truth table is the heart of the comparative research process, and it must not be approached mechanically. It is during this phase of research that the researcher refines and, ultimately, finalizes his or her analytic frame. Indeed, for a descriptive project, the researcher may choose to conclude simply with a presentation of the truth table. Functionally, the truth table is a compact way of presenting a multidimensional typology.

**Step 4: Truth Table Reduction**

The analysis of a truth table involves a process known as truth table reduction or Boolean minimization. This process results in a Boolean equation that expresses the various causal combinations that
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are linked to the presence of the outcome. Researchers interested in the mechanics of this process are directed to Ragin’s three books on this subject: *The Comparative Method*, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*, and *Redesigning Social Inquiry*. The following discussion focuses on the results of the reduction procedure. The truth table reduction produces two main types of solutions, known as the complex and parsimonious solutions, depending on whether or not the researcher chooses to make use of remainders. Remainders are rows of the truth table that lack cases (empirical instances). Remainders are not uncommon. The social world is characterized by limited diversity, and many combinations of causal conditions simply do not exist.

Remainders are best understood as potential counterfactual cases—combinations of conditions that do not exist empirically, at least not in the investigator’s data set, and are thus subject to conjecture. By including remainders in the truth table reduction process, the researcher is able to use QCA to conduct counterfactual analysis. The most common use of remainders in QCA is to produce a parsimonious solution in addition to the usual complex solution. The parsimonious solution allows the use of any remainder, as along as its inclusion in the solution results in a logically simpler formula for the outcome. The complex solution bars the use of remainders altogether on the assumption that all the different combinations that are linked to the outcome in question are represented in the investigator’s data set.

QCA also provides researchers the opportunity to use their theoretical and substantive knowledge to produce intermediate solutions. This knowledge is input into the software via a simple table and is used to bar the inclusion of untenable counterfactuals from the solution. In general, intermediate solutions are best because they more closely mimic the use of counterfactual cases in traditional case-oriented comparative research. Of necessity, complex solutions constitute subsets of intermediate solutions, and intermediate solutions constitute subsets of parsimonious solutions. In other words, the three solutions are logically nested, according to the degree to which each incorporates counterfactual combinations. Complex solutions incorporate no counterfactual combinations and thus are often needlessly complex; parsimonious solutions are the simplest, but they often incorporate counterfactual combinations that contradict existing theory and knowledge. Intermediate solutions, by contrast, are based on counterfactual analysis that is guided and constrained by theoretical and substantive knowledge.

As has been repeatedly emphasized throughout this discussion, the process of comparative research is iterative. It is likely that the results of the truth table reduction will motivate the researcher to revisit one or more of the previous steps. It is also quite common for researchers to reconsider not simply the calibration process but also whether they are, in fact, capturing the appropriate causal conditions and outcome. Comparative researchers regularly reflect on the nature of their research questions and frequently refine their questions as the research proceeds. QCA does not eliminate the necessity of this process. On the contrary, it makes it explicit. Both overly simplistic solutions and overly complex ones serve as warnings, directing the researcher to reconsider their solutions, revisit their evidence, and sometimes reformulate their analytic frames.

**Discontinuities Between Comparative and Variable-Oriented Research**

It is best to understand comparative analysis as a distinct methodological approach, one that can be conducted using either informal or formal methods. Far too often, QCA is viewed as a methodology in and of itself when, in fact, it is a formalization and extension of case-oriented comparative research. As has been emphasized throughout this discussion, the comparative approach is fundamentally case oriented, and as such, its tools are designed to answer questions that differ from those of conventional variable-oriented research. Nevertheless, the distinctiveness of comparative research is often overlooked, with the result that comparative researchers and variable-oriented researchers often talk past each other when discussing their research.

Ironically, the popularity of QCA has, to some degree, exacerbated this issue. Just as the rise of desktop statistical software has made it easy to estimate a poorly designed regression model, it is now straightforward for naive users to conduct a QCA without recognizing the different assumptions that they are taking on board. This does not
refer to philosophical debates regarding epistemological and ontological differences between case-oriented and variable-oriented strategies. Rather, there are substantial differences between what the research tools themselves produce in terms of social-scientific representations.

The importance of these differences can be seen clearly in the contrasts between how each perspective establishes causality. As this entry has discussed, comparative researchers establish causality by identifying subset relationships: “No bourgeoisie, no democracy.” But such a claim does not make sense from the variable-oriented perspective. Subset relationships typically exhibit little to no covariation, which is the foundation for the variable-oriented researcher’s causal inference. Similarly, the covariation of variables is insensitive to subset relationships—the type of explicit connection that is central to case-oriented comparative analysis. From each perspective, the other’s claim to an empirical basis for causal inference appears flawed. Although both approaches use theory and data to construct representations of social life, they do so in ways that involve sharply contrasting orientations regarding the consideration of cases, the relationship between causal conditions and outcomes, and the criteria of a successful analysis.

The Consideration of Cases

From the perspective of a comparative researcher, the primary problem with variable-oriented methods is that they veil cases. When a variable-oriented researcher, for example, computes a correlation between two variables, it is the variables that take center stage. The cases essentially disappear. In contrast, it is the cases that take center stage in a comparative analysis. It is a simple matter, for example, to map cases onto the rows of a truth table, and some software packages automate this procedure. The two approaches also differ in their methods of case selection. As previously noted, comparative researchers choose cases purposefully, based on either theoretical or substantive criteria. Further, the set of cases included in an investigation may shift as the researcher decides that one or more cases do not “fit” with the others or realizes that an important type of case is missing from the analysis. Variable-oriented researchers, by contrast, typically delineate their samples of cases at the outset of their research. What matters most is that the cases are selected in a manner that ensures that the sample is representative of the larger population, however conceived and defined.

The Connection Between Causal Conditions and Outcomes

Variable-oriented research is usually concerned with explaining variation in the values of a dependent variable—an outcome that varies across cases. The goal of such research is to explain how changes in the values of independent variables affect the value of the dependent variable. Techniques such as linear regression accomplish this by identifying the net contribution of each independent variable. Comparative research, in contrast, is concerned with how causal conditions combine to produce a particular outcome. The solutions of a QCA application, for example, represent different paths or recipes for a given outcome.

In a variable-oriented study, causation is inferred from patterns of covariation. Usually, the researcher measures the relative strength of several causal variables simultaneously. Frequently, the goal is to assess the relative strength of competing theories by determining which independent variable (or set of independent variables) explains the most variation in the outcome variable. In other instances, the goal may be simply to appraise the relative importance of the different independent variables or simply to establish that the causal impact of a theoretically important variable is significant and can be estimated. In virtually all types of variable-oriented analysis, variables compete with one another to explain variation. The moniker of independent is important here. Each independent variable is considered on its own terms, capable of affecting the outcome variable regardless of the presence or level of the other causal variables. The comparative researcher, by contrast, does not assume that causal conditions are independent of one another. Independence is the exception rather than the rule, and causation is understood to be conjunctural in nature. The goal of the investigation is to identify combinations of causal conditions that are shared by sets of cases and, in tandem, produce the outcome.
The Criteria of a Successful Analysis

It is useful as well to contrast the different criteria used to judge a successful conclusion of a study. For the variable-oriented researcher, the analysis is successful when a theory can explain why changes in the values of the independent variables affect the value of the dependent variable in a particular manner. For the comparative researcher, by contrast, a successful conclusion is one in which the various paths to the outcome are clearly and convincingly articulated and cases can be associated with the different paths. In short, to justify their conclusions, comparative researchers point to their cases, while variable-oriented researchers point to theory.

From the perspective of variable-oriented researchers, comparative research is replete with analytic sins and errors. Samples are purposively constructed, and their sizes are small. Researchers may add or drop cases at any stage of the analysis. Important causal factors do not vary. In a variable-oriented analysis, any of these situations would undermine attempts at causal inference. Likewise, common practices in variable-oriented research would seriously undermine the validity of the conclusions when viewed from the perspective of comparative research. There are too many cases for an in-depth analysis to be conducted. A fixed sampling frame assumes a level of comparability among cases that may be unwarranted. And the focus on independent effects of variables violates the configurational assumption of comparative analysis. Comparative research is fundamentally case oriented, and consequently, its practices fundamentally clash with those of variable-oriented research. It is therefore not surprising that researchers frequently talk past one another.

Current Developments in Comparative Research Methods

The use of informal methods of comparative research is, of course, well established among social researchers, as is the use of crisp-set QCA. The extension of QCA to encompass fuzzy-set analysis has been welcomed by researchers, although there is a lag between new developments in the approach and their adoption by researchers. For example, the inclusion algorithm (using the principle of set inclusion) described by Ragin in Fuzzy-Set Social Science has been superseded by a hybrid algorithm that uses truth tables to synthesize the results of the analysis of fuzzy-set relationships. Although the transition to the truth table algorithm has been widely documented, a number of researchers continue to rely on the procedures discussed in the 2000 text. The publication of Ragin’s Redesigning Social Inquiry establishes the superiority of the truth table algorithm.

The popularity of QCA has encouraged a number of researchers to propose various extensions to the method. Many of these proposed extensions can be found in working papers at the COMPASSS website, which serves as a hub for researchers interested in the development of formal methods of comparative analysis. Although a number of these proposals aim to incorporate variable-oriented techniques into QCA, such proposals have not gained much traction. The most promising of these extensions are those arising from or inspired by the concerns of traditional small-N researchers. Particularly promising is the application of QCA to the analysis of scope conditions, which are used to distinguish between cases that do and do not apply to a given theory. Also promising is the application of QCA to possibility analysis. A relatively recent development, the analysis of possibility seeks to identify those cases that are within a theory’s scope but for which the outcome is nevertheless impossible or virtually impossible. The question of whether an individual born into poverty can acquire a high-status occupation, for example, is a question of possibility: What conditions serve to make social mobility possible? The appeal of extending QCA to the study of scope and possibility is easy to see: Such questions are set theoretic in nature. They are theoretically important questions but outside the grasp of conventional quantitative methods.

The popularity of multimethod research suggests that researchers will increasingly seek to use QCA in tandem with other analytic methods. Such projects have proved to be most successful when QCA is combined with both case-oriented and variable-oriented techniques. The combination of QCA and techniques of social network analysis have also proved to be particularly fruitful, and development in this direction is expected to continue. Initiatives to implement the QCA techniques in statistical environments such as R and Stata have begun. By and large, these translation efforts are incomplete, and the canonical package remains
Ragin’s fsQCA. Cronqvist’s Tools for Small-N Analysis (TOSMANA) is also popular. Although lacking fuzzy-set capabilities and procedures for counterfactual analysis and intermediate solutions, TOSMANA includes a number of attractive features such as a threshold-setting tool—to aid the construction of crisp and multivalue sets—and the ability to graphically represent Boolean solutions as Venn diagrams.

The popularity of formal comparative methods is expected to continue to grow. There are two reasons for this. First, QCA permits comparative researchers to include more cases in a given study. Research projects previously too complex to conduct due to the limitations of informal comparative methods are now feasible. Second, and perhaps more important, the process of formalizing the comparative approach served to highlight the fact that despite the popularity of variable-oriented methods, most social theory is actually set theoretic in nature. Many research questions are actually more appropriately answered using comparative methods, because of their set-theoretic nature, than variable-oriented ones. Researchers who previously would have turned to variable-oriented techniques are more likely today to recognize the value of comparative methods.

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See also Boolean Algebra; Case Studies; Causality; Conditions, Necessary and Sufficient; Configurational Comparative Methods; Fuzzy-Set Analysis; Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Further Readings


Comparative Politics

Comparative politics is a subdiscipline of political science. The goal of political science is to promote the comparison of different political entities, and comparative politics is the study of domestic politics within states. It differs from the other subdiscipline of political science—international relations—which instead focuses on politics between states. Traditionally, it has been assumed that whereas comparative politics studies politics in contexts where there is an ordering principle (the sovereign state), international relations, instead, studies politics in contexts without such a principle (the international system). The first is interested in studying politics in stable domestic contexts, the second in studying politics in unstable, extradomestic contexts. The first has concerned itself with studying order (because it is guaranteed by the sovereignty of the state), the second with studying disorder (an outcome of the anarchy of the relations between states). Some have questioned whether such a distinction between these subdisciplines is still plausible at the beginning of the 21st century.

This entry is divided into four parts, beginning with an analysis of the main methods of comparative politics. The second part discusses the main theories of comparative politics, and the third part identifies some of the issues of comparative politics investigated in the various regions of the world. The entry concludes with a discussion of the future of comparative politics in a globalized world.

Methods in Comparative Politics

Although comparative politics is defined primarily by the phenomena it researches, it is also characterized by the method employed in that research. One cannot engage in comparative analysis without a method for comparing; a method is necessary for testing empirical hypotheses about relations between variables in different cases. Such hypotheses concern the relations between the variables that are held to structure the political phenomenon one wishes to study, investigate, or interpret. In general, political research aims to understand the links between the dependent variable (the outcome of the process one wants to explain), the independent variable (the structure, the context, the cognitive frame within which this process unfolds), and the intervening variable (the factor that exerts an influence on that given process). As Hans Keman observed, the question to understand is which independent variables can account for the variation of the dependent variable across different political systems.

Political science employs several methods—four in particular—to check its research process and falsify its results: the experimental method, the statistical method, the case study, and the comparative method.

The Experimental Method

The experimental method can rarely be employed by political scientists. In contrast to the natural scientist, the political scientist cannot hope to study politics in a laboratory, in which the intervening factors can be kept constant so that the causal effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable can be reconstructed. Politics is rather more complex than what is studied in a science laboratory, above all because it involves factors that cannot be isolated and is structured by interactions that cannot be separated. Moreover, whereas in natural science the objects of study may be inanimate, the same cannot be said of politics and of those who engage in it. Politics is activated by actors (heads of governments, ministers, members of parliament, party leaders and activists, members of movements and associations, and citizens) who continually learn from their experience, thus modifying their behavior, even in the absence of variation in the independent variables.

The Statistical Method

The statistical method, however, is ever more widely employed by political scientists. It obviously presupposes the availability of numerical data. Those data are the product of a standardized process of quantitative measurement of aspects of political life—standardized because the same criteria of measurement can (and should) be used in different contexts. It goes without saying that, to be effective, this method requires a large number of quantitative and reliable data. However, whereas the experimental method presupposes the existence of a cause-and-effect relation, the statistical method
Comparative Politics does not. It provides information, but as such, it does not suggest an interpretation. Thus, without the support of a theory concerning relations between variables (measured quantitatively), the statistical method is destined to be of little use in scientific research. Moreover, when using this method, one is forced to neglect factors that are not easily quantifiable, such as cultural factors.

**The Case Study Method**

The analysis of the idiosyncratic factors mentioned above, instead, constitutes the object of the third method at the disposal of political research: the case study. This method has also characterized historical research and is designed to collect the largest possible amount of information (quantitative and qualitative) on a specific country (or other political entity). This method is also referred to as ideographic. A case study may have a purely descriptive purpose or, instead, may have an interpretative goal or even be designed to generate hypotheses (if not theories) susceptible to generalization (e.g., Alexis de Tocqueville’s study of U.S. democracy, from which several hypotheses as well as a theory on the tendencies of Western democracies have been derived). This method is largely used in the United States, as is evident even from the comparative politics section of the book reviews in the American Political Science Association journal *Perspectives on Politics*, where there is an abundance of studies on single countries. This is not so (or rather less so) in Europe, where comparison generally involves the study of several cases.

**The Comparative Method**

There can be no doubt that the main method at the disposal of political science is the comparative method. In a now-classic 1970 essay, Giovanni Sartori pointed out that all political science presupposes, even if implicitly, a comparative frame of reference. The same author would write repeatedly that he who knows only one thing knows nothing at all. The comparative method requires, first, that the object to be compared be defined, next that the units used to compare and the time period to which the comparison refers be identified, and, finally, that the properties of those units be specified. Whereas the statistical method presupposes that the variables of many cases can be quantified, the comparative method is generally applied to a more limited number of cases. These cases may be very similar—that is, the strategy of the most similar research design—or they may be very dissimilar—the strategy of the most dissimilar research design. The first strategy allows more in-depth comparisons, whereas the second yields broader comparisons. The choice of strategy depends on the purpose of the study (see Table 1).

Comparative politics has become increasingly identified with the comparative method, to the extent that that method has become the defining characteristic of the academic discipline. It has permitted the construction of a particular type of scientific explanation based on correlations, as it assesses the validity of an explanation by assuming a correspondence between the properties of the independent variables and those of the dependent variables. But how and where do such correlations operate? The comparative method does not provide a clear answer. Regarding the how, the correlations operate if there are actors that activate them. How then should political agency be conceptualized? There is no univocal answer to this question. Regarding the where, the comparative method has to rely on few cases. The method of correlations has proved to be satisfactory when

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those cases are not only limited but also homogeneous (e.g., established democracies, post-Soviet democratizing countries). But if one wishes to broaden the perspective by comparing many nonhomogeneous cases (e.g., democracies, nondemocracies, and emerging democracies), what happens to a method based on correlations between uniform variables? It is no coincidence that political scientists have “regional” knowledge that cannot be easily applied in other “regions.”

Conclusions

Certainly the buoyant growth of available data on the various political systems of the world has permitted complementing the statistical method with the comparative one, thus arriving at some classificatory systems that manage to comprise more cases belonging to different “regions,” thereby making the analyses less Western centric. Yet the problem raised years ago by Sartori remains unsolved. Sartori argued that empirical concepts are subject to a sort of trade-off between their extension and their intensity. If a concept is applied to a large number of cases (extension), it will display only a limited ability to generate valid explanations for each case (intensity), and vice versa. When concepts are so abstract that they can be applied to the entire world, then, analytical vagueness is inevitable.

Comparison is a method used to test research hypotheses. The comparative method is generally employed by scholars of comparative politics, although it is increasingly complemented by the statistical method. The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s has brought about an enormous growth in the number of formally sovereign countries. Simultaneously, the available information resources (e.g., databases) also grew significantly, thus making it possible to have recourse to statistical comparisons. Yet a method is a tool at the disposal of researchers who take a scientific approach. It is a way of organizing the conceptual relations between the factors that are thought to structure the problem under investigation. Accordingly, there is a need for a theory that identifies those relations on the basis of a logically consistent argument. The theory informs us what to research and why. Bereft of a theoretical orientation, even the most sophisticated method provides only information or description. How to use or interpret the data depends on the theory.

Theories of Comparative Politics

There are many theories in comparative politics. The main theories generally have a focus on institutions; they are variations of the institutionalist approach. Institutionalism not only constitutes the main branch of the theories of comparative politics but also stands at the origin of political science as a whole. Without harking back to Aristotle, the genealogical tree of comparative politics had its roots at the beginning of the 20th century in the sociological constitutionalism of scholars such as Max Weber and Vilfredo Pareto and the legal constitutionalism of scholars such as James Bryce and Woodrow Wilson. From there developed, after World War II, the comparative historical sociology of scholars such as Stein Rokkan and Harry Eckstein as well as the comparative political science of scholars such as Robert A. Dahl, Samuel P. Huntington, and Giovanni Sartori. These roots obviously have not prevented the subsequent emergence of noninstitutionalist developments, frequently deriving from political scientists’ use of theoretical constructs from other social sciences. Examples include behavioralism (derived from social psychology), structural functionalism (derived from anthropology and subsequently from sociology), and systems theory (derived from the new cybernetic sciences).

All these new developments had to live alongside the institutionalist approach (or “old” institutionalism), which never ceased to exert its influence on the comparative political research of the post–World War II period. Since the 1980s, the old institutionalism has been superseded by theoretical developments that have merged in the new institutionalism—new because it is distinct from its predecessor owing to its nonformalistic vision of institutions and norms. As noted by Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, there are significant differences within the new or neoinstitutionalism. Some are microlevel institutionalist theories, as they take their point of departure from the preferences or interests of individual political actors or collective political actors understood as unitary. Others, instead, are macrolevel institutionalist theories, as they depart from supraindividual aggregates. Still others are mesolevel institutionalist theories, as
they study the cognitive interactions between determined (but not limited) institutional configurations as well as the actors that operate within them. Whereas the macrolevel and mesolevel approaches treat the institutions (i.e., their structural characteristics or their cultural codes) as the independent variable, in the microlevel theories, this role is played instead by the preferences or the interests of the individual actors.

**Rational Choice Institutionalism**

The Theoretical Apparatus

The main microlevel theory of comparative politics is rational choice institutionalism. It constitutes an adaptation to political science of theories developed in the field of economics. The scholars who have most influenced the rational choice theorists are Anthony Downs, William Riker, Mancur Olson, and Douglass North. The point of reference for rational choice theorists is the neoclassical economic model, which conceptualizes collective action as the outcome of the behavior of individuals aiming to maximize their own utility (i.e., their own egoistic interests). Similarly, the political theory of rational choice postulates that the individuals who participate in politics are rational actors, acting on the basis of strategic considerations in order to maximize their utility. The actors’ preferences are formed outside the political process. They are exogenous with respect to the interaction between the actors. Accordingly, individual preferences can be treated as the independent variable in this approach.

The basic unit of analysis of the rationalist theories is the actor. Politics is a game between individual actors or between collective actors understood as unitary subjects. As Riker has argued in many writings, the aim of this theory is to explain how collective action emerges in a multiactor game and to examine the microlevel foundations of processes that give rise to macrolevel effects. This does not imply that the macrolevel effects are necessarily rational (on the social level). Rather, as pointed out by Margaret Levi, a scholar working within this approach, collective action may be irrational even though individuals act in a rational way, unless they are subjected to the constraints of specific rules in the pursuit of their interests.

Institutions matter because they make collective action possible by lowering the transaction costs between the actors, by furnishing reliable information on the rules of the transaction itself, and by sanctioning free riding, thus making individual behavior predictable. Rational choice institutionalism assumes that institutions are necessary because they make possible virtuous interaction (i.e., cooperation) between the actors. Without the rules guaranteed and promoted by institutions, the game would become uncooperative. Institutional equilibrium obtains when none of the actors has an incentive to question the status quo because no actor is able to establish whether a more satisfactory equilibrium may result from doing so. Such equilibriums are defined as Pareto optimal, with reference to the well-known Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923). For rational choice theory, as it is employed in comparative politics, institutions and norms are intervening variables—factors that intervene from the outside to regulate the interactions between individual actors.

Rational choice institutionalism is a testable theory because, once the institutional framework that regulates behavior is known, it can yield falsifiable statements. It establishes a correlation of events identifying the causal mechanism that links the independent with the dependent variables. By assuming that individual behavior (as well as the behavior of collective actors whose actions are taken to be unitary), in any context whatsoever, is driven by the maximization of individual utility, rational choice theory is able to claim that its analytical framework has universal validity. Moreover, this scientific claim is supported by quantifying variables so that the rational choice theory can be expressed in a formal mathematical language. Indeed, according to these theorists, political science may legitimately compete with economics as long as it adopts the highly formalized analytical apparatus characteristic of the latter. Hence, rational choice theory derives its extraordinary academic and scientific success, especially among the community of U.S. political scientists, where it still sustains a strong hegemony of neoclassical economics within the social sciences.

**Criticisms**

Rational choice theory has not been spared criticism. First, it has been pointed out that an
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analysis that assumes institutions to be ahistorical entities ends up being overly abstract. Institutions are not aseptic rules but structures that are permeable to history. The same institutional structure may produce different effects in different historical periods. Second, it has also been shown that institutions constitute coherent and interconnected agglomerates of regulative structures. As a result, it is hardly plausible to examine a given institutional variable in isolation, assuming that the other institutional variables will remain constant. In reality, there is a reciprocal interaction between them, since the institutional variable considered may produce different effects if the variables with which it is linked are subjected to specific and unforeseen influences. Third, it has been argued that rational choice institutionalism runs the risk of turning into a remodeled functionalist theory, to the extent that it explains the existence of an institution with reference to the effects that it produces. Fourth, it has been shown how an intentionalist conception of human agency lurks behind the theory of rational choice because it assumes that the process of creating an institution is intentional—that is, controlled by actors who correctly perceive the effects of the institutions created by them. Indeed, it is rarely the case that the actors intend to create institutions or that the actors correctly foresee the future impact of institutions. Moreover, rational choice institutionalists conceive the formation of institutions as a quasi-contractual process marked by voluntary agreements between relatively equal and independent actors, almost as if they still found themselves in a state of nature. Again, this is rarely the case. The elegance of the formal theory is insufficient to compensate for the weakness of the hypotheses of rational choice institutionalism concerning the driving forces of individual choice and the persistence of institutions.

Rational choice has been shown to be convincing in the analysis of microphenomena (e.g., why a certain decision was made in a committee of the U.S. Congress or why the negotiations within the intergovernmental conference of the European heads of state and government led to a certain outcome), but it is less successful in analyzing macrolevel processes (e.g., why the U.S. Congress has established itself as the most powerful legislature of the democratic world or why the process of European integration has given rise to a political system unforeseen by the states that had launched this process). Rational choice theory is generally of little use when the number of actors involved in the phenomenon under examination is large and when the timeframe is extended. It is certainly true that rational choice theory has positively contributed to raising the degree of formalization of political science. Yet as Barbara Geddes points out, it is equally beyond doubt that rational choice scholars have focused only on those phenomena that would allow such formalization. As a result, rational choice scholars have ended up studying a problem not because of its political relevance but of its ability to be formalized.

**Historical Institutionalism**

The Theoretical Apparatus

The main macrolevel theory of comparative politics is historical institutionalism. It has been developed by scholars such as Paul Pierson, Theda Skocpol, and Kathleen Thelen among others, elaborating the rich tradition of the historical social sciences of the 1950s and 1960s, represented by Barrington Moore Jr., Reinhard Bendix, and Seymour M. Lipset. It differs from rational choice institutionalism to the extent that it understands institutions not simply as arrangements that serve to regulate an interactive game but as historical structures that have origins and develop independently from those that operate within them. Moreover, whereas the analytical focus of rational choice institutionalism is on the actor, the analytical focus of historical institutionalism lies instead on institutional structures and their evolution over time.

Historical institutionalists analyze institutional and organizational configurations rather than single institutions in isolation, and they pay attention to processes of long duration. They show how general contexts and interactor processes give shape to the units that organize the political process. For them, time is a crucial intervening variable in explanations of specific outcomes. The aim of the analysis is to establish the sequences and the variations of scale and time that characterize a given political process. One of the fundamental concepts of historical institutionalism is path dependence. The theory of path dependence argues
that, in politics, decisions made at time $t$ will tend to shape the decisions made at time $t + 1$. Once a given institution has asserted itself, it tends to reproduce over time. Contrary to what occurs in the economy, however, in politics, the marginal productivity of an institution increases over time, as Paul Pierson has shown.

To the individualistic outlook of rational choice theory, historical institutionalism has placed in opposition a vision of the political process as structured by institutions that have consolidated over time and thus shape this process. Also, windows of opportunity for institutional change open up under conditions of institutional crisis, but the actors, nevertheless, are constrained to act within the bounds inherited from the previous arrangements. Here, there is no heroic vision of actors as in the voluntaristic vision of agency that rational choice institutionalism assumes. Simultaneously, regarding historical macro-analyses, historical institutionalism has steered clear of the pitfalls of teleology that have frequently imprisoned historical research.

**Criticisms**

This theory too has been subject to criticism. First, historical institutionalism has paid less attention than rational choice institutionalism to the role of individual actors, and, in general, it has been more concerned with the possibility of agency in the historical evolution of a given institutional structure. The absence of a theory of agency has led historical institutionalists to emphasize the inertia of institutions (conceived as “sticky” structures), even though they were frequently constrained to modify or adapt themselves. For this reason, they are unable to provide precise indications concerning the chains of cause and effect that operate between the institutional macrostructures and the microlevel individual decisions. Second, historical institutionalism does not have at its disposal an analytical device to falsify its conclusions. Once a particular institution or policy has been reconstructed, it may prove difficult to imagine an alternative sequence. If every historical development is unique and if it is not possible to employ counterfactual hypotheses, then the possibility that the theory will fall into some kind of determinism is high.

Third, historical institutionalists have compared only a limited number of cases (and it could not have been otherwise, given their need to examine each case in depth), so how can valid knowledge be generated from these few cases unless supported by an extensive verification of the postulated hypotheses? It is no coincidence that the scholars who most extensively employ statistical methods criticize historical institutionalists for selecting their case studies according to the dependent variable that they wish to explain. As Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba have pointed out, historical institutionalism, like rational choice institutionalism, tends to select cases that fit with the approach adopted while ignoring those that do not. For example, historical institutionalists compare countries in which a political revolution occurred but do not explain why this did not happen in other countries with similar economic, social, and cultural characteristics.

**Sociological Institutionalism**

**The Return of Political Culture**

The main mesolevel theory of comparative politics is sociological institutionalism. Among the representatives of this approach, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen should be mentioned. According to sociological institutionalism, institutions are not just the source of rules for solving the problem of collective action or path-dependent structures that condition future decisions but configurations of meanings that the actors come to adopt. They solicit the formation of mental maps concerning the appropriate political behavior that guide the actors operating within institutions. They are sources of meaning independent of the actors that embrace them. Sociological institutionalism is a mesolevel theory that conceptualizes interactions between actors within institutional systems that are not limited (unlike limited systems, e.g., the committees of the U.S. Congress) and that are not extended (unlike systems such as welfare states).

Sociological institutionalism exhibits a strategic interest in culture (i.e., in meanings, symbols, common sense, ways of thinking, and cognitive frames). Indeed, it is a development of the rich tradition of cultural theory of comparative politics, which was rather relevant in political science until the 1970s. After a phase of decline, during the 1990s, the
interest in political culture has clamorously returned to the stage of scientific debate. In particular, with the development of large-scale researches on social capital, the interest in political culture was and continues to be shared not only by political scientists but also by sociologists, economists, and anthropologists. Robert Putnam has been a pioneer in this regard, first conducting extensive empirical research on the relations between the social capital of the various regions of Italy and their institutional performance (Putnam, 1993) and then investigating the decline of social capital in the United States and its effects on the associationalism of that country (Putnam, 2000). In both cases, Putnam has shown how the quality of civic life forms the basis for the development of effective institutions in the context of a democratic society. This model was thus tested in a comparative research effort, directed by Putnam and published in 2002, which analyzed the relation between social capital and institutional performance in the main contemporary advanced democracies.

According to these theorists, political culture has to be treated as the independent variable and institutional performance as the dependent variable. Societies differ because they are characterized by different politico-cultural attitudes. Those cultural differences are relatively durable, even if they are not immutable. They can explain, for example, why some countries enjoy a stable democracy whereas others do not. The theorists of political culture have sought to provide an intersubjective analysis of politics, in which the intersubjectivity is conditioned (if not determined) by the cultural context in which it develops. This approach has been of considerable relevance for the contemporary world as it has provided an explanation of why institutional innovations encounter difficulties in unchanged cultural contexts and why processes of democratization find it difficult to advance in certain countries where the cultural assumptions of the previous regime have not been questioned. Yet, according to the critics, the concept of political culture risks being tautological in character. Citizens behave in a certain way because of the presence of a particular culture, but that particular culture is defined by the fact that citizens behave in a certain way. As a consequence, this concept makes it hard to explain the changes in social behavior and individual beliefs, changes that nevertheless occur regularly in contemporary political systems.

Sociological institutionalists have sought to come to terms with that debate by reducing the concept of political culture to the institutions that shape it and to the individuals that legitimate them. According to these scholars, institutions are not only rules of the game or crystallized historical arrangements but also encompass symbolic systems, cognitive maps, and moral frameworks of reference that represent the meanings that guide behavior. Accordingly, culture is transmitted by means of institutions, and because of this, they are simultaneously formative and constraining. Culture functions as the independent variable to the extent that it is institutionalized. Sociological institutionalism has undertaken a holistic analysis that seeks to recombine agency and structure in a comprehensive scheme of meanings and ways of thinking. As has been noted, anyone who has spent time waiting at a traffic light when nobody else was around will be able to understand the importance of internalized ways of thinking. In stable institutional contexts, as March and Olsen have noted, behavior is rarely motivated by the logic of utility but rather by the logic of appropriateness. Individuals behave in a certain way because that is what is expected of them in that particular institutional context. A given political culture is a component of the process that produces it, thus making the relation between the independent and the dependent variables in this process much more interactive.

Criticisms

Sociological institutionalism has not been immune to criticism. Two points are of particular relevance. First, as Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor (1996) have argued, sociological institutionalism is based on the assumption of stable and legitimate institutional conditions. But what happens if one wants to explain the emergence or construction of new institutions? And what is the appropriate behavior in a situation of change? Processes of institution building inevitably tend to involve actors with diverse and contradictory cognitive frameworks and with conflicting interests. Second, the holistic approach of sociological institutionalism does not allow for a conceptualization,
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and even less measurement, of the contrasts between cognitive frameworks—that is, of competition or conflict between actors over how to understand and apply the predominant cultural frames. Institutions and actors stand in a relation of reciprocal influence: Whereas institutions contribute to defining the identity of the actors, sociological institutionalism must also hold that the characteristics of the latter (their decisions, their strategies, their visions) tend to define the identity of the former. Sociological institutionalism, thus, underestimates the impact of competition and conflict between actors (and between their contrasting interpretations of the appropriate behavior) on the definition of those same institutions. This implies that even consolidated institutions are cognitively less determined than sociological institutionalism assumes. For a summary of the discussion on the three institutionalisms, see Table 2.

Conclusion

It is difficult to find a theory of comparative politics that does not refer, in one way or another, to institutions. For comparative politics scholars, institutions matter. Yet these theories differ significantly with respect to (a) what is understood to be an institution, (b) how institutions are created, (c) why and when they are important, and (d) how institutions change. The different viewpoints of institutionalist scholars have also highlighted the existence of different research programs. The rationalist approach is engaged in a formidable undertaking of simplification of comparative politics, as these scholars aim to provide their research program with a microeconomic foundation. Historical and sociological institutionalists, instead, seem to be engaged in an equally formidable enterprise of complexification of comparative politics, as they start from less limited and less restrictive assumptions. The former seek to construct a theory on the basis of the actor, whereas the latter start from the structures or the meanings embedded in them.

This division ultimately refers to the problem of what is to be understood as a theory in political science (Charles Ragin, 1994). According to the rationalists, political science needs to equip itself with an epistemological structure similar to that of the most formalized social science—namely, economics. For nonrational approaches, its social utility is justified by the ability to provide conceptual frameworks within which problems of public relevance can be examined but without any pretense of becoming a positive science. The first wants to predict what will happen; the other two want to explain what has happened. Which one of the available theories to employ should be decided by the problem under investigation and not as a matter of principle. Because it is the task of political science to investigate different problems, then, as Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating submit, the lively theoretical pluralism of the discipline should be welcomed.

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Issues of Comparative Politics

There are significant regional differences in the issues investigated by scholars in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe, and the United States since the end of the Cold War. However, those issues generally deal with the implications, functioning, and transformation of democracy. This is perhaps why institutional theories of comparative politics have become so successful. Democracy is a political regime that requires specific institutions, although those institutions may function properly if legitimated by coherent values (or political culture) diffused among the citizens. Since the end of the Cold War, democracy has become the only legitimate game in town. In 1900, only 10 countries were considered democracies, but in 1975, there were 30 such countries. In 2010, 115 out of 194 countries recognized by the United Nations were considered electoral democracies by the international nongovernmental organization Freedom House. This spectacular diffusion of democracy has inevitably attracted the interest of comparative politics scholars. Certainly, other topics unrelated to democracy have been investigated in a comparative perspective (e.g., revolutions, civil wars, ethnic strife, Islamic regimes). Nevertheless, the issues connected to democracy have represented the operational link between Western and non-Western scholars. The following sections identify a few areas of investigation within the vast literature.

Democracy and Supranational Developments

The debate on democratic models has continued to be at the center of comparative politics in the Western world. Thanks to the pioneering work of Arend Lijphart (1999), different patterns of democratic organization and functioning have been detected within the family of stable democratic countries. According to Lijphart, democracies might be classified according to the two ideal types—majoritarian democracies and consensual democracies—as a consequence of the structure of their social cleavages and institutional rules. This classification has been very important for freeing the analysis from the old normative argument, which assumed that there were more developed democracies (of course, the Anglo-American ones) and less developed democracies (of course, the continental European ones). Lijphart’s classification has been revised by several authors. For some of them, such as Sergio Fabbrini (2008), the distinction between patterns of democracy concerns more their functional logic than their specific institutional properties. What matters is the fact that certain democracies function through an alternation in government of opposite political options, whereas others function through aggregation in government of all the main political options. Indeed, alternation in government takes place regularly in democracies that do not adopt a majoritarian (Westminster) first-past-the-post electoral system, such as Spain, Greece, or Germany. These democracies are competitive, notwithstanding their nonmajoritarian electoral systems. The consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia has increased the number of countries to be considered for the identification of democratic patterns. In dealing with this process, Lijphart (in his subsequent works) has gradually (and surprisingly) shifted to a more normative approach, arguing that the consensual model represents a better model for the new democracies to adopt.

At the same time, the end of the Cold War and the prospect of the political reaggregation of the continent have accelerated the process of European integration; in the period from the Maastricht Treaty (1992) to the Lisbon Treaty (2009), Europe has become the European Union (or EU). The process of European integration was traditionally considered a unique experiment in international relations. International relations scholars were interested in explaining the process of integration rather than its outcome (i.e., the community system and its institutional characteristics). Since the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), a new generation of studies has started to investigate the EU as a political system. However, although the EU could no longer be considered an international regime, it could not be compared with other domestic political systems. In some cases, its supranational character has come to be considered exceptional, sui generis, unique by several observers and scholars. Or, if compared, the EU has been compared on the basis of generic or behavioral criteria, such as the style of decision making, ways in which political leaders interact, attitudes in managing public policies, and relations between interest groups. Lijphart (in his book of 1999) considered the EU as a case of consensual democracy.

A different comparative approach has been taken by other authors. Based on specific institutional
criteria, Fabbrini (2010) has argued that the EU is a political system organized around multiple separations of powers. In the EU, there is no government as such, as in the parliamentary or semipresidential systems of its member states that are organized according to the principle of the fusion of powers. Contrary to systems of fusion of powers, the system of multiple separations of power functions without a government as the final locus of decision-making power. Such systems are proper unions of states rather than nation-states—in particular, unions of asymmetrically correlated states. Because of this (structural and cultural) asymmetry, such unions cannot accommodate the centralization of decision-making power. If institutions matter, then to classify the EU as a consensual democracy appears highly unconvincing. Like other democratic unions of states, such the United States and Switzerland, the EU is a species of a different democratic genus, and could be called a compound democracy. Asymmetrical unions of states can be subsumed neither under the model of consensual democracy nor under the models of majoritarian/competitive democracy, because they have neither a government nor an opposition. One might argue that they are Madisonian systems functioning on the basis of checks and balances between institutions and not between political options as in fusion-of-powers democracies. The classification of democratic patterns, if it is to take into consideration institutional systems, needs be enlarged to a more comprehensive typology. The development of the EU has allowed comparative politics to overcome national borders and apply its tools, concepts, methods, and theories to the study of a supranational political system. At the same time, the EU has also been compared with other regional organizations, a comparison that has shown the difference between political and economic regionalism. The comparative analysis of politics has been relaunched by the development of the EU.

**Democratization and Consolidation**

The end of the Cold War also had dramatic effects in the non-Western world, ushering in a new democratic era in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. In these regions, a process of democratization started with the aim of creating regimes able to provide, as it was claimed in many quarters, security in the sense of protection against widespread and arbitrary violations of civil liberties. Many political elites of new democratizing countries seemed to share the belief that a democratic regime has an intrinsic value. This belief was epitomized by the introduction of democratic rule in South Africa in 1994. On these empirical bases, the 1990s registered a diffusion of studies on democratization (e.g., Geddes, 2007), studies that benefited largely from the previous generation of works on the democratization of Southern Europe and Latin America, such as that by Leonardo Morlino (1998).

Democratization has entailed the introduction of reforms aimed at limiting the role of the state in the political sphere. It has been about restoring political pluralism, whereby different political and civic organizations participate in the political process without hindrance. According to Ben O. Nwabueze (1993), democratization was meant to enhance transparency and accountability. Although most countries in Africa and Asia have introduced political changes in their polities, the crucial question, especially in Africa, has continued to be whether democratization is reversible or not. As Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, among others, have pointed out, in some cases, newly established democratic orders have devolved into pseudodemocracies. Despite this, Africa, Asia, and Latin America have made tremendous progress toward democratization, although North Africa and the Middle East have yet to make a major step in this regard. Especially in the 1990s, scholars of comparative politics devoted their work to seeking to explain why some countries and not others were successful in transitioning from nondemocratic to democratic systems. Some studies focused on the strategic role played by individual leaders (Nelson Mandela in South Africa or Mahathir Mohamad in Malaysia) as key drivers of change and guarantors of political transformation. Others emphasized the role of specific institutional settings for supporting the democratization of a country. Still others have investigated the role of civil society in fostering or contrasting democratization, according to an approach not dissimilar to the social capital approach.

With the diffusion of democracy in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the first decade of the
In the 21st century, scholars have started to investigate the conditions that have helped or impeded the consolidation of democracy after two decades of repeated elections and broad institutional reforms. The challenges of democratic consolidation have been greater in Africa than in other parts of the world. The democratization of Eastern European and Latin American countries has been largely supported by regional organizations (e.g., as the EU or Mercosur [Mercado Común del Sur]). One of the conditions for participating in these organizations and for enjoying their economic benefits is that democratic principles should be respected. This has not been the case in Africa because of the fragility of the African Union. Although there are still cases of conflict and instability in countries such as Venezuela, Peru, Timor-Leste (East Timor), Thailand, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, these are isolated cases. It is in Africa that the consolidation of democracy has continued to be an open question. Although Africa has made a big step toward democratization, democracy is far from having been consolidated. Democratic reversal has continued to be a likely possibility for most African countries. The political crises in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar in the past few years are cases in point. Democratic consolidation requires, among other things, a government turnover, and most countries in Africa are yet to undergo this crucial test. Even in countries that have maintained stability, such as Botswana and Namibia, one-party dominance remains a key feature of their democracy.

Quality of Democracy and Development

Following pioneering works on the quality of democracy, such as that by Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (2005), scholars have investigated the same in the countries of Africa and Asia, reaching very critical conclusions. In Africa, due mainly to the low levels of development and widespread poverty, the traditional debate on democracy versus economic development has been very much alive (Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, & Fernando Limongi, 2000). In the 1990s, the return to multiparty democratic systems in African countries raised hopes and expectations for development. After almost two decades of multiparty elections, however, those hopes have begun to dwindle as development is slow and poverty levels have remained high. A number of surveys, such as those by the Afro Barometer Group, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and Transparency International and several others based on regional and individual country comparisons, have been conducted in Africa on the subject of public perceptions of good governance, the effective delivery of services by the state, and levels of corruption and performance on human development indicators. In Asia, similar studies on public perceptions of democracy and the effects of government performance on development have been common.

Investigating developments in Africa and Asia, comparative politics scholars have come up with indicators that purport to measure democracy and good governance. The World Bank has been a leading institution in asserting that good governance is the basis for economic success. It has argued that those countries that have successfully instituted rule of law, established a culture of regular free and fair elections, and minimized corruption have been able to attract foreign private investors and thereby performed much better in development than those that have been unable to do so. Other organizations based mainly in Europe and North America, such as Freedom House, International Institute for Democracy, and the United Nations Development Program, have come up with criteria for assessing performance in political and civil rights, democracy, governance, and economic performance. In Africa, the UNECA has developed an elaborate survey methodology seeking to evaluate public perceptions of the state in various countries, comparing their performance on some key governance indicators, such as rule of law, freedom and fairness of elections, women’s participation in politics, levels of corruption, and the effectiveness of the checks and balances between the core institutions of governance (with a particular focus on the independence of the judiciary).

Africa experienced poor governance and rampant corruption in the decolonization decades of the 1970s and 1980s, in part because of the diffuse corruption of public officials and governors. As a result, since the 1990s, Africa has been under pressure from international organizations and local reformers to embrace governance reforms. The African Union has acknowledged that good governance continues to be a challenge in Africa. It has
therefore introduced the African Peer Review Mechanism and the African Union’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related Offences for improving the standards of governance in the continent. Finally, some investigations have shown a correlation between human development and political stability. Indeed, human development has evaded most countries of the developing world because political instability has continued to be a major and recurrent problem. Examples include Algeria, Burundi, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Africa; parts of India, Nepal, and Pakistan in Asia; and Colombia and Guatemala in Latin America.

**Democracy and Constitutionalization**

The study of constitutions and constitution-making processes features prominently in the comparative politics discourse, especially in the newly democratizing countries. The return to democratic rule has ushered in new debates on how best to craft and reform constitutions and helped ensure that constitutions facilitate democratic governance and protect human, ethnic, cultural, and other rights that characterize complex postcolonial and postconflict societies. In this regard, in Africa, the constitutions of Namibia and South Africa have been considered good examples because of their racial and ethnic balancing, power-sharing mechanisms, protection of basic human rights, and enshrined checks and balances. Constitutional reforms have been introduced in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and Lesotho to deal with internal conflicts. In these and other cases, the reform of the national constitution has been considered necessary for engineering peaceful political succession.

Many countries, especially in Africa, have set a two-term limit for the presidency. In practice, this innovative measure has sparked controversy and conflict in Malawi, Namibia, and Zambia, among others, where the outgoing president has sought to change the constitution to ensure that he could serve a third term. The third-term issue has thus become central in political debate. Succession is an area that has attracted interest and controversy in Africa and in some Latin American countries, such as Venezuela and Honduras. The succession not only to the state’s presidency but also to the party leadership have become political issues. The cases of Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Uganda, South Africa, and Zimbabwe show that the African continent has not yet resolved these issues. Succession in the party has been a concern because it has been closely linked to succession in the presidency. As a result, political scientists such as Roger Southall and Henning Melber have focused on the role of former presidents, the legacies of political power, and the importance of term limits.

The issues of constitutions and constitution making have been central in the European debate also. Through the 1990s, all the Eastern European countries had to redefine their constitutional settings drastically. At the same time, the process of enlargement of the EU has accelerated the search for a new constitutional setting able to guarantee the functioning of a regional organization encompassing (in 2010) 27 member states and half a billion inhabitants. The first decade of the 21st century has been the constitutional decade of the EU, although this decade has witnessed the amendment of the existing treaties rather than the approval of a new and encompassing constitutional treaty. Even the contrasted process of constitutionalization of the EU has appeared less exceptional when compared with the experience of other compound democracies. This debate has also led to a vivid discussion on European citizenship and more generally on how to guarantee human rights in a multilevel supranational system.

**Democracy and Representation**

Political representation has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. In established democratic systems, starting with the United States, political parties have entered a long phase of downsizing and restructuring. Mass political parties have become icons of the past. Political parties have become state agencies in Europe (as argued by Richard Katz and Peter Mair) and electoral committees in the United States (as argued by Sandy Maisel). On both sides of the Atlantic, they have developed as supporting structures of the leader at the electoral and governmental level. A vast literature has shown how parties have been integrated by other actors in the electoral arena. While in the West scholars have been investigating the consequences
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on governance of the decline and transformation of political parties, in the non-Western world, the research issue has been the opposite: What role can newly founded parties play in promoting democracy? In democratizing countries, strong political parties have been considered a necessary pillar for supporting democratic consolidation (M. A. Mohamed Salih, 2003). Political parties have generally been weak and constrained by a lack of resources. This has also drawn attention to the issue of their funding. The weakness of political parties has been fed also by their tendency to fragment along ethnic lines or to rally around a founder patron who has often constrained their ability to institutionalize and practice internal democracy. Opposition parties, in particular, have been conflict ridden and fragmented throughout the new democracies, leading to their poor showing at elections.

In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, comparative politics has focused, in particular, on the functioning of elections, thus contributing to identify criteria for evaluating the legitimacy of the electoral process. The issues have concerned the impact of election rules on the legitimacy of emerging democracies, the institutional conditions that make elections free and fair, the role of electoral management bodies as institutions of governance, and the implications of observation and monitoring on the outcome of the electoral process. These studies have inspired specific regulations, such as the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa/Electoral Commissions Forum’s Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC Region, both made public in 2004. That notwithstanding, in many African countries, elections have not called into question the power of former liberation movements or ruling parties to dominate domestic politics.

Weakened parties in the European parliamentary democracies have contributed to the decision-making decline of legislatures, thus leaving larger room for maneuvering to the executives. Indeed, parties have come to be controlled by their leader once in government, thus justifying, as noted by Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb, a process of presidentialization of politics in modern democracies. This process has not concerned separation of powers systems; the U.S. Congress has continued to be the most powerful legislature in the democratic world. Although for different reasons, in non-Western democracies also, parliaments have continued to remain weak institutions. For instance, it has been argued that African parliaments have been weak because of both one-party dominance of the country and an overly powerful executive, although other studies have pointed to a lack of public support for them.

To foster such support, proposals for integrating traditional institutions of leadership and governance into modern structures of representation were advanced. These traditional institutions are still influential at local and regional levels in many countries around the world. In Africa, the institution of chieftaincy, or even kingdom, is still important in people’s daily existence. Political efforts to sideline, and in some countries to abolish, these traditional institutions have not succeeded. Many countries, in Africa especially, have molded their modern governance institutions around traditional ones. Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa present a model that seems to have struck a balance of mutual respect between modern and traditional institutions. In other countries such as Zimbabwe, chiefs have been directly co-opted into parliament, while in other countries such as Swaziland, it has been the traditional monarchy that has sought to incorporate modern political institutions.

The return to institutional approach in comparative politics is linked to global support for democracy. Many development agencies (e.g., the U.S. Agency for International Development, the United Nations Development Programme, and other non-governmental organizations) have devoted significant resources to the strengthening of the institutions of governance. In particular, across the former Soviet Union, Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the focus has been on strengthening parliamentary and judiciary institutions, and academics and practitioners are studying these programs to assess their impact. A substantial body of comparative politics literature on development assistance has thus emerged.

Comparative Policy Analysis

The interest in the organization and functioning of democratic regimes has inevitably promoted research on the latter’s performance by scholars of
comparative politics. Starting with the 1981 volume edited by Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer during the 1980s, the comparative approach to policy analysis came to be adopted by many scholars, in particular for understanding the historical development of different welfare systems and for explaining the different features of welfare policies in Western Europe and the United States, as shown by the contributions of Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Paul Pierson, and Francis Castles. One might argue that the analysis of Western welfare policies constitutes the starting point of comparative policy analysis, and even today, it represents its core business.

However, with the end of the Cold War and the development of the globalization process, the comparative study of welfare systems has come to include the analysis of new social risks, risks that epitomize the pathology of contemporary postindustrial societies, as argued in the volume edited by Peter Taylor-Gooby in 2004. At the same time, the diffusion of the process of globalization has made the Western experience with welfare systems less peculiar than in the past. The problems associated with guaranteeing social security in market societies have come to be shared by many countries—developing as well as developed, democratizing as well as democratic. Market globalization has generated new social externalities, bringing to the center of comparative policy analysis new problems, such as immigration and environmental issues. In this regard, one has to consider the 1997 volume edited by Martin Janicke, Helmut Widner, and Helge Jorgens on national environmental policies and the 2007 volume by Eytan Meyers on international immigration policy.

Starting in the 1990s, the field of public policy has also seen a dramatic expansion. Globalization and Europeanization have not only created new problems, but they have pressured international institutions to promote thorough investigations of the economic, financial, administrative, and political performance of the various countries, investigations accompanied by frequent, specific recommendations for public policy. The conspicuous development of comparative policy analysis has been made possible by an easier access to empirical data concerning the various members of international and regional organizations. The latter have also supported specific policy priorities, introducing new criteria for evaluating countries’ approximation to the expectations for good governance, including the call for the promotion of gender equality. Indeed, since the second half of the 1990s, gender policy has emerged as a significant policy interest, and not just in developed countries, as shown by the 1995 volume edited by Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy G. Mazur. This policy field has been finalized not only to investigate the structural constraints on women’s participation in the economic and social life of a country but also to identify resources and practices that might promote women’s interests in the various national contexts.

The gender approach to public policies has thus called into question the normative premises of many public policies. In fact, the latter have been based on a culturally defined view of family organization, social needs, and individual expectations. The same concept of security has been redifined to meet new social preferences and personal attitudes. Indeed, the comparative study of public policy has led to a greater understanding of the value structures of contemporary societies, thereby helping combine empirical analysis and normative assessments.

The Future of Comparative Politics

Comparative politics (as an academic discipline) has been a major success. In the post–Cold War era, our knowledge of democratic, democratizing, and nondemocratic political systems has grown enormously. The methodologies, concepts, and theories of comparative research are widely used by political scientists. With the exception of the United States, where “American politics” scholars constitute the majority, comparative politics has become the central subdiscipline of world political science. Indeed, as noted by Henry Brady and David Collier, the discipline as a whole has been defined epistemologically by the debate in comparative politics. However, the success story of comparative politics has reached a critical juncture. Comparative politics is encountering issues with confronting the political problems of a globalization world. Its methods and theories face difficulties when applied to processes that transcend state borders and undermine the structure of the traditional political relations on which comparative politics is based.
The historical transformations that have occurred after the end of the Cold War have called into question the concept of sovereignty itself, which is the foundation of the study of comparative politics. With the processes of globalization that have unfolded tempestuously since then, the external and internal sovereignty of the nation-state (the basic unit of analysis of comparative research) has been eroded. Simultaneously, the complexity of political systems and their external relations has increased to such an unprecedented extent as to give rise to a complex interdependence. This complex interdependence is changing the nature, powers, and outlook of the units used by comparative analysis for the study of politics. It simultaneously disarticulates domestic and international politics, creating more levels of correlation between variables, levels that are not necessarily connected with each other.

This being so, it becomes increasingly less plausible to establish what constitutes an independent cause of a dependent outcome. If domestic political systems are not independent of external processes and if the actors that operate within them do not have the ability to act as agents that connect cause and effect, then the fundamental preconditions of comparative analysis are being eroded. Therefore, it is increasingly less likely to assume that the various political systems are distinct entities, because in reality, they are not.

Globalization and Europeanization

Domestic political systems are embedded in an institutionalized international context that noticeably constrains the autonomy of their decisions. The majority of nation-states are members of international economic organizations (e.g., the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization) or of military alliances (e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and South East Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO]) where decisions are made (with their participation, of course) that have significant domestic implications. Over and above this, the sovereignty of the nation-state is also being eroded from below. At least in Europe, the unitary and centralized state is being superseded. New regional and municipal authorities have emerged and have become institutionalized. Not only has the room for maneuver of the national or central authorities been reduced, but the cognitive context itself, within which their actions unfold, has changed. Our conception of the state has been modified.

Globalization, as noted by Philippe Schmitter, has become the independent variable in many national contexts. It has reduced the impermeability of the nation-states to external pressures. This, in turn, has weakened relations between the citizens and the institutions of those states, as soon as the former have become aware that the latter are unable to respond to their demands. The legitimacy of public institutions has been further reduced by the growing role that noninstitutional actors have acquired in the context of globalization. These actors comprise companies, associations, and transnational nongovernmental organizations that operate outside the border of single states, and they have contributed to the emergence of new supranational regulative systems or international regimes. One may claim that no nation-state (not even the most important ones like the United States or China) is able to control domestic decision-making processes, autonomously steer its own economic dynamics, or develop its own separate cultural identity.

If globalization has challenged the assumptions of comparative politics, this is even truer in the case of the Europeanization induced by the process of European integration. There are many definitions of Europeanization. According to Vivien Schmidt, it consists in the process through which the political and economic dynamics of the EU have become part of the institutional and cultural logic of domestic politics. However one defines Europeanization, there can be no doubt that it consists of the implementation, at the level of the single member states, of institutional procedures, public policies, and cognitive frameworks to address the domestic problems deriving from the EU level. No member state of the EU (not even those most proud of their own traditional sovereignty, e.g., the United Kingdom and France, or those most proud to have recently regained sovereignty, e.g., Poland and the Czech Republic) can decide (in myriad areas of public policy) on the basis of autonomous considerations. This does not mean that the European nation-states have disappeared. Rather, it is even plausible to argue, as
Alan Milward has done, that European integration has rescued them, taking care of tasks they were no longer able to tackle. This, however, means that their sovereignty has been eroded and redefined. They are sovereign in some areas of public policy (e.g., defense and, partially, foreign affairs), whereas they are entirely bereft of sovereignty in other areas (e.g., monetary policy and, more generally, all areas related to the creation of the common market). In yet other areas (e.g., environmental and research policies), they share sovereignty.

It is clear that Europeanization constitutes a formidable challenge to the assumptions of comparative politics—namely, to conceive of the European states as sovereign and independent units that are autonomous in terms of decision making. In Europe and elsewhere, the dividing line between internal (domestic) politics and external (international) politics has shifted significantly (Robert Elgie, 1999).

**Toward an International Comparative Politics**

Globalization and Europeanization have brought radical transformations to the states and to the relations between them. These transformations call into question the traditional distinction between comparative politics and international relations. Regarding comparative politics, the sovereignty of nation-states has been fundamentally questioned. Sovereignty has been unpacked, fragmented, and segmented, thereby challenging a long normative (and hypocritical) tradition that assumed that sovereignty is an indivisible reality. The same supposed order of the domestic polity is dramatically belied by the fact that most of the major conflicts that occurred during the 1990s have happened within states rather than between them. Regarding international relations, it is no longer certain that the international system is the anarchic world that has formed the basic condition of interstate relations. This system is organized in several international regimes and managed by several international organizations, each of them equipped with tools and norms to peacefully adjudicate disputes between public and private actors.

Various studies have recognized that the epistemological and methodological boundaries between the two subdisciplines of political science are no longer evident. Scholars developing the foreign policy analysis approach have included the domestic structure of a given regime in their analysis, showing how it exerts a significant influence on the decisions and styles of foreign policy of a country. Scholars investigating the relations between the economic structures and the political arrangements of various countries have shown the interactions between international pressures and domestic arrangements (with their effects on the organization of markets, the construction of welfare regimes, the organization of systems of representation, and interest intermediation). One could mention the most recent literature on democratic peace, which has sought to show why democratic countries do not go to war with each other, because of the domestic constraints to which their decision makers are subjected; however, this does not imply that they are not inclined to go to war with nondemocratic countries. Finally, leading international relations scholars have continued to work with models connecting international and domestic variables.

These and other studies have called for the development of an integrated political science that is subdivided by the topics it seeks to study rather than by the units of analysis chosen (the domestic system or the international system). A political world marked by complex interdependence calls for a political science ready to experiment with new methods and new theories. A new field of study, which some scholars call International Comparative Politics, might be developed to confront the challenges of this world. However, the structure of academic careers, still rigidly organized around the distinction between the two subdisciplines, will make such development difficult.

**Conclusion**

The fundamental transformations induced by the processes of globalization and Europeanization have ended up questioning the methodological and theoretical self-sufficiency of comparative politics. These processes have urged scholars of comparative politics to take the international context of a country into account as an essential variable in explanations of the functioning of domestic politics. Simultaneously, the effects of domestic structures on supranational and international processes have driven international relations scholars to
reexamine the methodological and theoretical self-sufficiency of their discipline. Substantial changes in the real world of politics are urging political scientists to develop methods and theories that can come to terms with the complex domestic and international forces that shape the important problems requiring study and explanation. After all, the undertaking of political science, as of all other social sciences, is justified by its ability to furnish plausible solutions to real problems. Accordingly, the profession should not be afraid to question itself, to overcome consolidated divisions between subdisciplines, and to seek new perspectives. A self-sufficient political science serves neither political scientists themselves nor the citizens of the contemporary world.

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See also Comparative Methods; Constitutional Engineering; Constitutionalism; Democracy, Quality; Democracy, Theories of; Democratic Consolidation; Democratization; Development, Political; European Integration; Europeanization of Policy; Institutions and Institutionalism; Policy Analysis; Policy Process, Models of; Rational Choice; Representation

Further Readings


Competition, Political

Competition is understood as the struggle between two or more agents to capture scarce, limited, and valued resources within a defined system or context. It is often assumed that competition is a zero-sum game, in which one participant’s gain or loss is exactly matched by the loss or gain of another. Political competition involves the struggle for power, for example, through elections in a democratic regime. It is a concept employed in virtually all subdisciplines of political science, for it is a universal aspect of human life. Although in one way or another everyone is affected by it, a clear definition of the concept remains elusive. This entry is structured as follows: First, the term competition is isolated from other concepts with which it has been fused or mixed. Second, using an analysis of measurement, a distinction is drawn between the two most important areas of political competition in democracies: the electoral and the governmental. Finally, the entry differentiates between the latest developments in electoral and governmental competition in new Third World democracies and those in other developed democracies.

Definition of Competition

One of the reasons for the concept’s elusiveness is that the term has often been conflated with competitiveness. A democracy may not have competitiveness during long periods of time despite being a competitive regime (as in the example of predominant party systems). Indeed, Robert Dahl’s definition of polyarchy allowed for the free exercise of political contestation in—and between—elections, but it never implied that effective competition had to occur. Thus, competition comprises a possible competitiveness but not otherwise. In the words of Giovanni Sartori (1976/2005), “Competition is a structure, or a rule of the game. Competitiveness is a particular state of the game” (p. 194, emphasis original). The literature is rather strong in claiming that the more competitiveness an election has, the higher the probability that a single vote can affect the outcome, which increases the expected utility of voting and, thereby, voter turnout. Thus, high levels of competitiveness are strongly related to the health of a democracy.

Areas of Competition: Elections and Government

Contemporary democracies are the systems in which political competition occurs par excellence. Democracy could be understood as a system of government that frames, regulates, and limits political competition in order to ensure that those elected will enjoy broader popular support and that there is equal opportunity for all competitors. Of course, not every public office to be filled in a democracy is elected (e.g., justices of the highest court) and not every aspect of democratic life is subject to political competition (e.g., respect for basic human rights is not contingent on political competition but guaranteed to all). The scope of political competition’s excluded areas is still a fertile ground for theoretical discussion (e.g., why not elect high officials through lots instead of votes and why not select the best instead of the one chosen by the many?). Despite these debates about the limits of political competition in the democratic realm, political competition and competitiveness are clearly observed in two major arenas of democracies: the electoral and the governmental.

Within the realm of electoral competition, Joseph Schumpeter offered perhaps the first attempt to
provide a working definition that challenged the classical, more normative doctrine of democracy. In his view, democracy was not an end in itself but rather a political competitive process or struggle for the people’s vote. Schumpeter’s “minimalist” definition of democracy has been a catalyst for innovation in this literature. Nonetheless, it is only after Anthony Downs that the formalization of political competition, especially among political parties, was bolstered by the analogy to markets. Political parties are crucial organizations in contemporary democracies as competition is channeled by them. The principal way to understand the competition among them was through the lens of partisanship: Parties were aggregates of vote-seeking politicians. While we usually see political competition as an ongoing and never-ending process, paradoxically, the formalization of political competition has almost the sole purpose of seeking equilibrium—that is, an outcome from which no party has an incentive to deviate—something hardly ever attained.

Downs delivered a model of political competition of candidates with respect to their ideological position in a single-issue dimension. Along a single-issue dimension, a two-party competition is expected. Parties will experience strong pressures to converge on the position of the median voter if they wish to avoid electoral defeat. Important works have been devoted to showing that this predicted convergence is just partial in real life, given that Downs’s theory relies on highly restrictive assumptions; for example, much of this literature has been centered on direct democracy or voting in committees, where very few players are involved. The median voter theorem produces a Nash equilibrium, in which no player has anything to gain by changing strategies unilaterally. The literature that emanated from Downs’s seminal work was strongly influenced by Duncan Black’s median voter model, in probably what is one of the founding texts of social choice theory, and by Kenneth Arrow’s discussion of the dilemmas of aggregating single-picked individual preferences into a collective choice. All of them were predated by Harold Hotelling’s model of spatial competition—the location of different sellers in a market with respect to one another—probably the pioneering paper in public choice. Here, the market analogy is more than an analogy; this literature really does derive from the idea of market competition.

Up to that time, the literature on political competition was notably influenced, and inspired by, the bipartisan background of the U.S. political system. Although U.S. elections have tended to exhibit tremendous competitiveness, governing activity exhibited stable patterns of competition (i.e., a party in the executive and basically two large parties in the legislature of roughly the same size). The discussions arise concerning how the government performs when the party that holds the executive does not have a majority in Congress—a situation usually known as a “divided government.”

Yet the Downsean perspective was not unique in observing and understanding spatial models of party competition. George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine Macdonald, for example, use a directional-spatial model of electoral competition in which utility is based on the intensity and direction between voters and candidates in contrast to the traditional proximity spatial model, which represents utility as a declining function of distance between voter and candidate ideal positions. The directional-spatial model of electoral competition suggests two main hypotheses: The first is that voters prefer candidates who are on their side, and the second is that given two equidistant candidates, they prefer the more intense and more credible to their cause. From the directional models, a new line of research emerged—the theory of discounting—denoting that candidates cannot fulfill all their promises, and therefore, voters discount the campaign and judge according to what they expect candidates to realistically achieve in government. This theory emphasizes the role of status quo in setting expectations about what the candidates can really do and assumes a programmatic or ideological linkage between candidates’ and voters’ understanding that the electorate’s decisions are very focused on policy proposals or ideological stances.

An extremely lucid analysis of electoral competition was advanced by Adam Przeworski (1991). He remarked that “democratization is an act of subjecting all interests to competition, of institutionalizing uncertainty” (p. 14). Like economic competition, where there are clear limitations against a single agent imposing a price or product, political competition obeys rules among relevant actors. Thus, the institutionalization of uncertainty
has three main features: ex ante uncertainty (anyone can win), ex post irreversibility (losers do not try to reverse results), and repeatability. Without any of these, democracy is hardly possible.

**Measures and Theory**

While there is little consensus on how to properly calculate competition—students of democracy and elections have developed different measures of this vague concept—some advances are evident in the literature. For example, it is possible to measure political competition as the frequency of alternation in power over a delimited period of time or by building multidimensional and longitudinal indices of competition for a few political units (i.e., the American states). This long-term perspective is not very useful for new democracies, in which just a few elections may have taken place. Other scholars have measured competition as the winner’s percentage of the votes, the percentage margin of victory, or the raw vote margin of victory in elections. Such measures are less contingent on time and provide clearer pictures of political competition in a particular moment, yet they are heavily biased against two-party systems because margins of victory tend to be smaller in multiparty democracies.

A more useful measurement of competitiveness comes from Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera’s widely used \( N \) index, which is a weighted average of the number of parties that compete in a national political system, and it is expressed as \( N = 1 / \sum p_i^2 \), where \( p_i \) is the share of seats a party has in the legislature. The \( N \) index is strongly related to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, an indicator of the amount of competition among firms in relation to the industry, which is denoted as \( H = 1 / \sum s_i^2 \), where \( s_i \) is the market share of firm \( i \) in the market. Though both indices, the \( N \) and the \( H \), were created as indices of diversity (fragmentation) of political parties or firms, they are frequently used as measurements of competitiveness. The higher the index, the more the competition. These indices also suffer from important limitations, such as other institutional features like degree of proportionality of legislatures, mathematical distributional procedures of seat allocation (e.g., D’Hondt, Hare), party registration limitations, and others.

With all their limitations, the Laakso and Taagepera or Herfindahl-Hirschman indices provide an accurate view of the correlation of power among agents in a given arena (the legislature or the market itself). Still, their major shortcoming is that little is said in regard to how the legislature or the market would perform. Knowing that counting parties is not sufficient for analyzing a party system, Giovanni Sartori in his classic work of 1976 presents a theory of the dynamics of political competitiveness in regard to whether centrifugal or centripetal forces act in a given party system, which is an improvement over the earlier ones. Recent developments have tried to make a more subtle connection between electoral results and governmental activity. For instance, David Altman and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán developed a measure that weights the sizes of the “typical” parties in government, \( G = \sum g_i / \sum g_i \), and in opposition \( O = \sum o_i / \sum o_i \), in the following way: \( C = 1 - (100) \cdot (G - O) / 100 \). The value of \( C \) tends to zero whenever the government (or the opposition) controls the whole legislature and to one if there is balance between government and opposition. This index provides a forecast of governmental activity and the relationship between the executive and legislative because it reflects the opposition’s access to the legislative process rather than mere electoral outcomes.

In spite of these miscellaneous indices, a whole body of research was detached from the American model and jumped the Atlantic in search of new models of political competition, particularly in the context of governability and executive coalition theories. It is not hard to understand why this literature bloomed in the context of the study of governing coalitions in Western European parliamentary democracies. The process of forming coalitions in parliamentarian regimes involves a relatively reduced number of actors (parties) competing in a closed and rule-bound milieu (parliaments) for clear purposes (membership in the executive cabinet), where the quantity and quality of portfolios are crucial. One of the strengths of this literature is exactly that it is not circumscribed by political competition, but it necessarily touches on the flip side of the coin—political cooperation—and hence provides a more comprehensive panorama of political competition.

Thus, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, in the political competition literature, mainly via the study of coalitions, the meaning of “getting votes”
shifted and came to be understood as a means to reach other objectives: office, and then policy making. Probably, the three models of party competition (votes, offices, and policies) are relevant to all parties at any instant in time, although more so at some times than at others. Doubtless, new research on governing coalitions in presidential regimes shows that parties shift their objectives in synchronization to the fixed electoral calendar. Before a national election, they are principally concerned with obtaining votes. After elections, party members strive to obtain political appointments from elected officials, and then later, policy-seeking behavior ranks first in their preferences.

This literature has developed a great deal since William Gamson’s and William Riker’s seminal works. Gamson theorized that parties compete for office and seek their payoff (players’ utilities resulting from the outcome of a game), which is fair as it is directly proportional to the amount of resources that they contribute to a coalition. The prediction of his theory is that payoffs in any government are limited and therefore, the greater the number of parties in a coalition, the lower is the payoff for each. Resources are limited because, for example, a governing coalition cannot satisfy all policy demands simultaneously (e.g., lowering and increasing taxes). As a result, in order to not distribute unnecessary payoffs, Riker predicted the formation of winning coalitions of minimum size (meaning the number of parliamentary seats a coalition of political parties must control to receive a majority vote for investiture).

Since then, authors have devoted themselves to testing variables that presumably would affect political competition. Robert Axelrod argues that coalition parties are likely to be adjacent in a one-dimensional policy space, predicting minimal connected winning coalitions. That is, parties in an executive coalition will be adjacent to each other in a one-dimensional policy space, and also, the coalition will not include any more parties than necessary to be connected and winning. Others, such as Norman Schofield, have centered their arguments on the importance of large parties and their position in the policy space; large parties whose policy positions are located in the core of the policy space—that is, parties with policy positions such that no alternative policy is preferred by a simple majority—tend to form minority and surplus majority governments. In short, most of this literature on political competition has as its hard core the fragmentation of the party system and each party’s location and coverage of the ideological space.

Although a vast number of alternative hypotheses for why and how parties compete have been put forward, three facts must be underlined. First, little research has been done on how differences in party organizations affect political competition. Most studies from a rational choice perspective treat parties as unitary actors that bargain over a set of well-defined gains—usually office or policy. There is some truth in this assumption but more error. Parties are complex organizations, where internal divisions and structures affect how they and their leaders behave. Important works in the literature have already underlined the problems attached to treating parties in this manner. Despite the fact that many of the ordinary political phenomena can be explained by treating parties as if they were unitary actors, we undoubtedly need to take into account what goes on inside parties if we want to provide an explanation of party decision making in a model of some political course of action. While some scholars stress one of these motivations, other scholars combine them in one way or another.

Second, a proper specification of political competition requires a theory whereby parties compete in multidimensional spaces, because even if one is interested only in one narrow particular policy (say taxes), the position on other issues will affect the equilibrium in that narrow particular policy. Following Downs, most commonly used theories of political competition posit a unidimensional political space where competition occurs or at least—acknowledging the multidimensionality of political life—try to isolate the particular dimension in consideration. Yet, even in the case of single-peaked preferences of political actors, the results might be unstable and inefficient as regards social decisions, as was clearly demonstrated by Condorcet’s paradox of voting and Arrow’s impossibility theorem. It does not mean, as Gordon Tullock shows, that unstable social decisions generate total chaos or instability of these decisions because institutions play a crucial role in suppressing the underlying unsteadiness (institutions such as agenda setters, party discipline, or procedural
rules in parliaments). Some scholars (e.g., Kenneth Shepsle) call the equilibrium resulting from these regulating forces a structure-induced equilibrium.

Third, the regime divide has been minimized and brought into the discussion. Incentives for party competition are quite different in a presidential system than in a parliamentary one for four reasons. First, in a presidential regime, fewer coalition configurations are likely because one party—the president’s party—is normally expected to be a coalition member. The rare exceptions to this rule so far have not undermined this normal expectation. Second, given the prominence that the president’s reputation has in citizens’ evaluations of governmental performance (either positive or negative), the president’s coalition partners are less able to claim credit for good government performance. Thus, under presidentialism, players have fewer incentives than under parliamentarism to join or to remain in a coalition. Consequently, third, the president’s approval rating has a powerful effect on parties’ decisions to associate themselves with, or to distance themselves from, the government. And fourth, based on the previous statement, most of the incentives change over time in synchronization with the fixed electoral calendar. Because parties know when the next elections will take place, they have incentives to distinguish themselves from the president and start to compete in order to increase their chances of getting elected in the next election.

Despite important progress in the development of coalition theories, the jury is still out on certain issues. All theories of coalition formation and survival under parliamentary regimes make assumptions, hidden or explicit, about political parties’ preferences and their concomitant logics of competition. Michael Laver provides new extensions of policy-driven political competition into a multi-party environment where voters constantly evaluate party support and switch parties to augment their expectations; parties continually readapt policy positions to the shifting affiliations of voters. Political competition is based on four clear types of party behaviors:

1. **predator** (move party policy toward the policy position of the largest party),
2. **aggregator** (adapt party policy to the ideal policy positions of party supporters),
3. **hunter** (repeat policy moves that were rewarded; otherwise make random moves), and
4. **sticker** (never change party policy).

Laver’s contribution provides the first steps toward endogenizing key features of the process of competition, including the birth and death of parties, internal party decision rules, and voter ideal points.

**Developments in New Third World Democracies**

At the risk of making a gross generalization, some countries of what is often called the Third World are lately showing signs of new patterns of electoral and governmental competition. These patterns are characterized by the emergence of personalistic leaderships, hegemonic actors, and a tendency to institutional innovation rather than consolidation, all in the context of high levels of civic disaffection, distrust of political parties, and in general, animosity toward democratic actors and institutions. The arena of electoral competition involves new forms of citizen mobilization through a large dose of social polarization, often fed from above. Once in power, in the realm of governmental competition, leaders provide comprehensive packages of institutional reforms, endorsed by constituent assemblies and usually ratified by direct popular votes (plebiscites). The proposed reforms more often than not include the reelection of elected officials, particularly of presidents, and a concentration of power in the executive at the expense of others, primarily the judiciary. This is particularly relevant in Latin America (e.g., in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador) but is not confined to this region.

In short, political competition is probably one of the most complex concepts in political science, and as such, a clear definition of it is likely to remain hard to pin down. In any case, as a concept that touches on every aspect of political life, political competition will remain at the center stage of political science.

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See also Democracy, Quality; Democracy, Theories of; Democracy, Types of; Parliamentary Systems; Party System Fragmentation; Party Systems; Presidentialism

Further Readings


Complexity

The science of complexity in the natural and social sciences involves the use of formalized (mathematical or computational or both) theoretical models to study systems of interacting agents where the following hold:

1. Each agent’s behavior is governed by a small set of simple rules, which often depend on local information and feedback from the agent’s past behavior and from other agents’ behavior.

2. Characterizing and understanding the behavior of each of the agents does not directly lead to predicting or understanding the behavior of the entire system. The local rules produce emergent patterns—stable equilibria, cycles, unstable equilibria and long transitions to new equilibria, and randomness—and emergent properties such as robustness.

3. Agents’ interactions are interdependent and affect others in the system; thus, removing an agent has consequences for the system beyond merely subtracting out that single agent’s direct effect on other agents with which it interacts.

This entry presents the foundations of complex system modeling and points to diverse applications in political science.

Foundations

It is said that Thomas Schelling proposed the first modern complex systems model in the social sciences. In research in the 1960s into the phenomenon of racial segregation in housing, he modeled a process where people (agents) decide where to live based on the racial mix of their neighborhood. Schelling randomly placed nickels and dimes on a checkerboard, with each coin resting on only one square and with fewer coins than available squares. He then randomly picked one of the coins, say a dime, and examined its neighborhood, meaning the squares that bordered the square on which the dime stood. There will be eight squares in the neighborhood (unless it rested on the edge of the board, which we shall ignore for this example). If the neighborhood consisted of fewer than 5 nickels, Schelling did nothing. Otherwise, he moved the dime to another place on the board where there were fewer than 5 nickels in the neighborhood. He then iteratively moved through each coin and either moved it somewhere else or kept it in place, using the 5/8ths rule for tolerance of neighbors of the other type. Schelling argued that 5/8ths was a pretty tolerant threshold, in that his coins (agents) would stay put even if half of their neighborhood consisted of the other type. He showed that even with this relatively tolerant threshold, the dimes and nickels segregated into homogeneous zones on the checkerboard. He then started over and examined what happened with other
kinds of thresholds (1/2, 3/4, etc.) and how quickly, if at all, the agents segregated themselves incrementally.

Note what happens in the dynamics of the Schelling model. When a coin is moved to another area of the checkerboard, it changes its own neighborhood and the neighborhood to which it moves. A single move alters the diversity of the neighborhoods of multiple agents and thus potentially alters the decisions of multiple other agents. This is an example of the kind of feedback that occurs in complex systems. Further, it is difficult to predict simply from the decision rule of the agents how the system will behave. Schelling confessed that he could not predict in advance when and if the system would segregate into neighborhoods of all dimes and all nickels.

Today, researchers using complex systems methods typically rely on computer programs to simulate the interactions of artificial agents, examining the aggregate patterns that emerge from many instances of microlevel behaviors. (Some additional terminology: What is sometimes called agent-based modeling is the use of computation to study the links between microbehavior of agents and macropatterns in a complex system.)

As can be seen in the Schelling example, it would be misleading to say that this branch of science involves the study of highly complex models. As with any theoretical modeling in the sciences, complex systems modeling involves making simplifying assumptions to craft a model of behavior, analyzing the consequences of those assumptions, and then linking the model to real-world phenomena. The use of the word complex refers to the characteristics of the social system under study and not to the approach of the modeler. Many complex systems models, such as the Schelling example, are extremely simple in their construction.

Applications in Political Science

A variety of social systems have been characterized as complex, and accordingly, in social science disciplines, the use of complex systems modeling has grown. Within political science, complex systems modeling has been applied to the study of international diplomacy and war, electoral competition, voting systems, the spread of culture, the evolution of cooperative behavior, criminal behavior and punishment, the sorting of people into communities, political networks, and the development of law.

Researchers studying diplomacy and war, for instance, have devised modeling frameworks to analyze the sensitivity of international alliances to changes in resource inequalities across alliance partners. When a developing country discovers oil, what effect does this have on military or trade alliances? Complex systems models can enable researchers to analyze the system-level, often nonlinear, effects of such changes.

Using complex systems models on collective action and cooperation, researchers learned of the importance of reciprocity and forgiveness in the evolution of cooperation. For a long time, scholars puzzled over the question of how cooperative behavior arises among selfish individuals. Recently, researchers have made new discoveries about the importance of “tagging” or noninformative markers on agents that permit discrimination and discernment in choosing partners. Such tags can actually promote more cooperation among all agents rather than create groupings that shut out others. And in a practical application of these types of models, some have analyzed social systems where some agents can choose to commit crimes (citizens) and others can choose to enforce community norms (police). These models have led to discoveries about the trade-offs among different strategies for fighting crime. Societies face trade-offs between devoting resources to monitoring behavior and to stricter punishments for criminals. The consequences of particular strategies for law enforcement are difficult to understand without models that specifically incorporate feedback effects from agent behavior to the development of new agent strategies.

Researchers have also used complex systems modeling to discover the conditions under which a group of diverse individuals with different ways of framing a problem can choose more effective public policies than a group of homogeneous individuals who all frame the same problem identically. Diversity, these models tell us, can in common circumstances improve collective decision making in legislatures, councils, organizations, and committees.

Research into social and political networks has increasingly included complex systems modeling. There are models that help researchers understand
better the conditions in a social network that encourage innovation and the spread of innovations among agents in that network.

Complex systems modeling is sometimes seen as a challenge to traditional game-theoretical methods of modeling. But most practitioners of complex systems modeling within political science view it as complementary to game-theoretical methods. Not only are quite a few well-known complex systems models within political science based fundamentally on game theoretical techniques, but the researchers themselves have typically published work spanning a variety of modeling tools, including game theory. Well-known complexity models depict iterated prisoner’s dilemma situations. Agents in these models play repeated prisoner’s dilemma games with each other, and researchers seek to discover the kinds of strategies that do well in environments with agents that can alter their strategies to get ahead.

A large portion of complexity research in political science focuses attention on models where the agents are not fully rational in the manner defined by economists and many other social scientists. That is, agents are portrayed as adaptive and boundedly rational. This certainly characterizes the Schelling agents. More generally, this means that agents display a subset of the following features:

1. they do not fully optimize their utility functions given their information;
2. they are not forward-looking in being able to predict accurately the probability of certain outcomes in the future, given their behavior; and
3. they are myopic in that they do not have information outside of some defined local “zone” of interaction or geography.

Many game-theoretical models in political science have agents with one or more of these features—modelers through various assumptions end up restricting the information or actions available to agents. Nevertheless, one generalization that can be made is that, at heart, game theory relies on the assumptions following the work of John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern, and John Nash that agents are rational (optimize) and intelligent (they know the game they are in as well as the modeler does). Complexity systems models can violate both of these assumptions, especially the latter. Note in the Schelling model how the agents are assumed to make decisions solely on the mix of other agents in their limited neighborhood. They do not consider the implications of their actions in the long run or what happens outside their own neighborhood (either the one they leave or the one they move to).

In fact, some commentators have identified insight gained from studying systems of adaptive, less than fully rational agents as one of the noteworthy benefits of using complexity methods. There is nothing inherent in the methodology that requires that agents be boundedly rational or adaptive, but it is clearly a common feature of such models.

Consider the recent work on political party systems using complex systems modeling of electoral competition. In the work of one researcher, adaptive political parties were assumed to be one of four types, each boundedly rational but in a different way. Hunter parties change their ideological positions in a hill-climbing pattern; that is, they keep changing in the same ideological direction as long they continue to win more votes. Predator parties change their ideological positions to mimic the most popular political party. Aggregator parties adopt the most popular ideological position among their existing supporters in the electorate. And Sticker parties do not change their ideologies. The researcher attempted to simulate the party politics of Ireland using this model, matching up the type of party to a real-world example. For instance, the researcher concluded that the Fine Gael party was like a Hunter, while the Democratic Left was like a Sticker.

What is innovative about this work is the incorporation of real-world data on micromotivations directly into the assumptions of a model. Then, after a series of complex systems simulations, the researcher compared the distribution of votes among the artificial parties and the ideological positions of the artificial parties with real-world data on parties from Ireland. The methodology permits researchers to unpack the dynamics of the system by running the simulations under various scenarios, discovering what aspects of the model are driving which system-level results.

Complex systems models are best described as a set of tools for analysis. Researchers consider what
Compliance simply put, is the extent to which an actor fulfills its obligations. In the realm of international relations, scholars are most concerned with state compliance and have focused their attention on the degree to which states conform to the prescriptions and proscriptions stipulated by their international commitments.

Interest in compliance has burgeoned as states increasingly construct and enter into rule-based governance arrangements to guide behavior and solve problems in a variety of issue areas, such as trade, security, human rights, and the environment. Scholarship on international cooperation, regimes, law, and institutions has focused on why states do or do not comply with their international obligations and what conditions and institutional features facilitate compliance.

The subject of compliance is often connected to the debate over the importance and efficacy of international institutions, but the relationship between compliance and effectiveness is a murky one. There is widespread agreement that compliance is not sufficient for effectiveness; however, there is a debate over whether and to what extent high levels of compliance are necessary for, or at least associated with, consequential institutions and effective agreements.

Scholars from the realist tradition are generally skeptical that international institutions and law are significant determinants of state behavior. In the view of the majority of realists, power relations are the most reliable predictor of international outcomes, and states often strive to avoid complying with inconvenient obligations. In cases where compliance rates are high, realists tend to see the outcome as the result of shallow agreements that reflect the law of the least ambitious party or as
merely codifications of what states would have done even in the absence of an agreement.

Other perspectives, such as neoliberal institutionalism and social constructivism, are more sanguine regarding the potential influence of international institutions and agreements. Neoliberal institutionalism, with its rationalistic metatheoretical orientation and focus on constellations of interests, sees high levels of compliance with international rules as a possibility. Moreover, compliance or even good-faith efforts that fall short of full compliance, together with other factors such as the achievement of policy goals and behavioral change, can be treated as an indicator for evaluating the impact of international institutions and agreements. Neoliberal institutionalism, with its rationalistic metatheoretical orientation and focus on constellations of interests, sees high levels of compliance with international rules as a possibility. Moreover, compliance or even good-faith efforts that fall short of full compliance, together with other factors such as the achievement of policy goals and behavioral change, can be treated as an indicator for evaluating the impact of international institutions and agreements. This perspective holds that states operate according to a logic of consequence and that institutional design matters in influencing how states will calculate their interests and goals and evaluate the costs and benefits of compliance or noncompliance. Institutional properties and mechanisms, such as monitoring capabilities and verification systems (e.g., the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguard system fulfills this role in the case of the nuclear nonproliferation regime), can result in increased transparency, greater information, and the creation of material (sanctions, loss of privileges) and social (reputational) costs for noncompliant behavior.

Social constructivist and normative approaches take the position that international institutions and regulations are meaningful and that their norms and rules tend to enjoy widespread compliance. As the legal scholar Louis Henkin (1979, p. 47) concluded, “Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” Social constructivism, which has a sociological metatheoretical orientation, emphasizes the interplay between norms and identity and stresses knowledge and communication dynamics to explain state behavior. Constructivists see states as role players and have found that international institutions can play an important role in socializing states to accept and internalize particular norms and rules. In their view, decisions about compliance are driven by a logic of appropriateness that reflects intersubjective normative understandings and identity concerns. Behavior is not strictly determined by rational calculations of the state’s interests but by deeper norms and shared beliefs about what actions and policies are legitimate and appropriate in international relations (Thomas Franck, 1990, pp. 205–207). Therefore, from this perspective, the decision to comply with international provisions concerning issues such as slavery, piracy, human rights, the use of chemical weapons, and the acquisition of nuclear weapons serves the important function of both shaping and reflecting a state’s identity.

**Promoting Compliance and Coping With Noncompliance**

As Helmut Breitmeier, Oran Young, and Michael Zürn (2006) have noted, while states often comply with international rules, compliance problems remain a persistent challenge. For this reason, scholars have attempted to identify the factors that foster compliance and have debated the best way to reduce noncompliance, whether it be deliberate, inadvertent, or due to lack of capacity. The management and enforcement approaches provide contending views of the most important determinants of compliance.

The management approach has stressed the importance of transparency, dialogue among the agreement’s parties, dispute resolution procedures, and technical and financial assistance to promote compliance and has downplayed the need for punitive enforcement mechanisms, such as sanctions. Advocates of the managerial school argue that this approach usefully addresses the primary types of noncompliance. The provision of resources or expertise can address noncompliance that has resulted from a lack of capacity. Clarification procedures, for example, can be used to address ambiguous behavior that other parties might perceive as possible noncompliance. Finally, mechanisms that provide transparency can deter and expose purposeful breaches. “For a party deliberately contemplating violation, the high probability of discovery reduces the expected benefits rather than increasing the costs and would thus deter violation regardless of the prospects of sanctions” (Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, 1993, p. 18).

The enforcement approach criticizes the managerial school for underestimating the importance of sanctions and punitive measures. Enforcement scholars have argued that even in the case of environmental regimes, which are the source of many managerialist examples demonstrating high compliance
levels, “enforcement plays a greater role in successes than one is led to believe and its absence is conspicuous in some notable failures” (George Downs, David Rocke, & Peter Barsoom, 1996, p. 395). They hold that in matters of deep cooperation, such as security, there is always the possibility that the benefits of cheating might be too great to be offset solely by transparency. According to advocates of the enforcement approach, elaborate verification measures attest to the importance of transparency, but to believe that the power of transparency can be exclusively depended on to compel compliance in the absence of sanctions is naive. Therefore, the enforcement approach has stressed monitoring activities in conjunction with potent sanctions. Ideally, from this point of view, multilateral agreements should be equipped with mechanisms that provide incentives (resource carrots) for compliance while applying strong sanctions (punishing sticks) for noncompliance.

Rather than treating the management and enforcement approaches as diametrically opposed propositions, some scholars have argued that well-designed international regimes or agreements would benefit from including elements recommended by both approaches. They contend that the provision of help and assistance, and clarification procedures, followed by investigation, followed by inspection, followed by detection, followed by material and social sanctions is better thought of as a continuum or process to be carried out rather than as a choice between preferred extremes. For example, a study by David Victor (1998) of the noncompliance procedure of the Montreal Protocol—the regime designed to protect the stratospheric ozone layer—found that the protocol’s implementation committee was most effective when it blended the two approaches. “Management avoids the most severe and unproductive antagonism, but the credible threat of tougher actions, including sanctions, helps ensure cooperation, especially when dealing with parties who are unswayed by management alone” (Victor, 1998, p. 139).

An important study that used a relational database covering 23 international environmental regimes found elements of both the management and enforcement approaches wanting and concluded that neither was able to convincingly “explain patterns of compliance with international regimes” (Breitmeier et al., 2006, p. 110). Although this study confirmed that institutionalized enforcement measures and strong verification procedures were indeed crucial, it also found that the compliance pull exerted by legal rules that enjoyed widespread legitimacy was more important than commonly understood. According to their findings,

adequate and even impressive rates of compliance with international environmental rules occur when appropriate incentive mechanisms are coupled with juridification, participation on the part of transnational NGOs in the rule-making process, and a responsive approach to the development of compliance mechanisms over time. (p. 112)

In the years ahead, additional work—methodological and conceptual—will be needed to help us better judge to what extent states are complying with their international obligations and more effectively evaluate to what extent international governance arrangements are actually achieving their goals. Moreover, more effort needs to be expended to improve our understanding of the relationship between compliance and the influence exerted by international institutions, regimes, and agreements. The dense thicket of long-standing and emerging transnational problems that demand international solutions ensures that the subject of international cooperation and the challenge of compliance will be of enduring relevance and interest to scholars and practitioners alike.

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See also Constructivism in International Relations; International Law; International Organizations; International Regimes; International Relations as a Field of Study; Liberalism in International Relations; Realism in International Relations

Further Readings


## Concept Formation

Concepts are central to the enterprise of political science. The concepts we use shape the world we see. Without solid conceptual foundations, the edifice of political science is insecure. If we fail to develop clear and precise concepts, our theoretical insights and empirical discoveries will fail to be clear and precise, too. This entry reviews major pitfalls for conceptual analysis as well as the fundamental challenges to concept formation and conceptual innovation in the study of politics.

In contemporary political science, concept formation is often regarded as a distraction, a mere prelude to serious research that is given scarce attention. Scholars sometimes ignore conceptual disputes, resolve them by fiat, or delegate their resolution to political philosophers. At the same time, a strong tradition of self-conscious and systematic concept analysis, resting on the pioneering work of Giovanni Sartori, David Collier, and others, does exist in the discipline. This entry offers an analytical synthesis that weaves together insights of conceptual debate in both philosophy and political science.

**Conceptual Commitments**

Since its origins in ancient Greece, Western philosophy has been debating the nature and meaning of concepts. For centuries, thinkers tried to resolve one fundamental problem: the relation between the world and the mind, the objective and the subjective, things and ideas. They conceived the mind as a mirror and concepts as mental images of the outside world, as cognitive representations of objective realities that uphold the fragile correspondence between the two worlds. In the mid-20th century, the so-called linguistic turn in modern philosophy, brought about by authors like Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Austin, redefined the basic coordinates of concept analysis. It shifted the axis of conceptual debate from cognition to language and from language as a system of representative symbols (“Platonism”) to language as a medium of social action (“pragmatism”).

### Language Acts

According to the classic conception of language, concepts are our basic units of thought. According to a pragmatic understanding of language, concepts are our basic units of (linguistic) action. In this perspective, concepts are not interior images that correspond to external realities but practical tools that allow us to do many things, many more than just putting vivid labels on inanimate objects. They allow us to threaten and promise, to bless
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and condemn, to give orders and to request favors, to express tenderness and anger, to know and believe, to contract marriage and christen ships, and so on. Designating objects “out there” in the external world (reference) is just one linguistic function among innumerable others.

As practitioners of social science, too, we do more than offer aseptic statements about the world. In our texts and speeches, we do more than describe and explain, more than refer to facts and associations between facts. We laud and criticize colleagues, highlight and downplay themes, support and refute arguments, persuade and dissuade readers, and so forth. However, while reference is not everything, it does play a leading role in the social sciences. All types of “speech acts” (John Searle) characteristically contain referential elements. They refer to something, be it in the physical world of objects, the social world of norms and interaction, or the subjective world of emotion and cognition. Arguably, articulating empirical and theoretical propositions constitutes the nucleus of our linguistic activities. It is what we are supposed to do with social science concepts: developing descriptive and explanatory inferences, making and breaking claims about the social world. In these linguistic performances—our primary speech acts in the social sciences—reference is key. We need our concepts to perform referential roles. We need them to grasp concrete realities in abstract terms. Classical philosophy was centrally concerned with one specific purpose of language: its referential role. We should not be surprised to see that conceptual discussions in contemporary social sciences, too, privilege traditional reference over other linguistic roles.

**Meaning**

If concepts are means of action, their meaning does not derive from their correspondence to objective realities but from their practical roles in linguistic communication. In Wittgenstein’s famous dictum, “The meaning of a word is its use in the language” (1952/1968, sec. 43). Language is a medium of social communication. Its rules of usage and meaning are public, not private. Our shared knowledge about the meaning of a word derives from our shared linguistic practices. As competent language users, we know what others know about the meaning (the conditions of legitimate use) of a concept. As responsible language users, we accept the meaning of a concept (its conditions of legitimate use) when we use it and accept that others can hold us to account for using it. As in other realms of social action, responsibility means that we accept the consequences of our deeds. Take the standard example of a promise. If I promise you \( x \), I understand the meaning of promise making and accept its conditions of validity. Among other things, I understand and accept that \( x \) is a future action that benefits you, that I am able to perform it, that my promise obliges me to perform it, and that I actually intend to perform it (Searle, 1969, chap. 3). If I promise, yet violate any of these conditions of validity that constitute the meaning of promises and in consequence fail to carry out \( x \), you can hold me accountable.

When we employ concepts more specifically as means of propositions (the primary form of speech acts in the social sciences), we use them as carriers of general claims about the empirical phenomena they are referring to. When applying them to concrete cases, we subscribe to these claims. We commit ourselves to their truth (applicability). If I call a man a friend, a thief, or a left-wing dictator, I articulate (and thus embrace) certain (contextually understood) claims about my relationship to him, his relationship to alien property, or the form and substance of his exercise of state power. In case of doubt, confusion, or contestation, I must be ready to justify my conceptual choices and accept the consequences. The bundles of claims we commit ourselves to when employing a concept comprises its meaning. Often these claims and commitments remain implicit. Formal definitions serve to make them explicit (Robert Brandom, 2000).

**Reification**

In political science, we still have to assimilate the insights of pragmatic philosophy. Our discussions of concepts, as far as they take place, still tend to be anchored in the classical distinction between mental creations and real objects. In addition, we tend to reify both sides of the mind–world distinction. We tend to treat both concepts and their referents as if they were things. The result might be described as a kind of double false
consciousness. We tend to misrepresent social reality as well as our representations of reality.

(a) The Reification of Reference. Concepts are abstractions, not proper names. They do not serve to designate particular objects but classes of objects. On the referential side, our paradigms of objects are still concrete, material things with observable properties. Very few objects of political research correspond to this model. The realities we study are symbolic. Our concepts are not generalizations from observed properties but abstractions of symbolic realities.

(b) The Reification of Concepts. On the conceptual side, we tend to treat our abstractions, too, as if they were tangible objects, fixed in time and space. Employing the language of factual propositions, we tend to ask what a concept is (and is not) and what its essential attributes are (and are not), as if comprehending the concept required discerning its visible properties.

The Triangle

According to the widely used tripartite conception of concepts developed by Charles Kay Ogden and Ivor Armstrong Richards (the Ogden-Richards triangle), concepts are symbolic entities that consist of three elements: their meaning (connotation or intension), their referents (denotation or extension), and a term or word (their name). This conception of concepts, introduced by Sartori into political science, is still indebted to the notion of concepts as symbolic intermediaries between mind (as location of meaning) and the objective world (as location of reference). It is therefore vulnerable to the reification of both reference and meaning. Still, it serves well to understand the contingent nature of conceptual commitments (the element of choice in the relations between terms, meaning, and reference) and in general offers a set of useful distinctions to analyze the formation and de-formation of concepts (which will guide parts of our subsequent discussions).

Conceptual Disorders

Conceptual discussions in the social sciences often carry therapeutic ambitions. In the pursuit of clarity and precision, they strive to cure scientific language of the multiple disorders that are thought to afflict ordinary language. The tradition of conceptual analysis in political science that was initiated by Sartori and his colleagues in the 1970s and is continued today most prominently by David Collier and John Gerring (2009) partakes of this therapeutic project. Ordinary language is not generally defective, though. It is as clear and precise as speakers need it to be. Still, scientific language differs from ordinary language in some fundamental regards. Among other things, it is written in form and literal in style; it involves a strong commitment to truthful, transparent, and evidence-based argumentation; it aims at generating general knowledge; and it demands the development of a common specialized vocabulary within the academic community. Most of these distinctions are normative, not empirical. They do not give social scientists a mandate to remedy the deficiencies of ordinary language, but they do involve the professional obligation to craft a shared specialized vocabulary that steers clear of major conceptual disorders and malpractices.

Conceptual Opacity

Everyday linguistic communication unfolds on the basis of implicit meaning. Neither do speakers offer formal definitions of the words they use, nor do their interlocutors ask for them—except when their shared understandings turn problematic and when communicative irritations arise, which are instances of incongruence between the concrete application of concepts and their social meaning that we take for granted. You promised to be punctual and are an hour late. Is this your notion of punctuality? You say we are friends, but you left me alone in the face of danger. Is this your idea of friendship?

In the social sciences, we run higher systemic risks of breaking through the thin ice of implicit understandings. Our key concepts are often complex and contested, and we cannot take for granted that others comprehend them in the same manner as we do. Linguistic transparency is, therefore, our first obligation in the social-scientific use of concepts. Karl Marx remarked once that he needed three volumes to explain the concept of capital. We need not go that far in explicating the core concepts.
we use in our research. Concise formal definitions will often suffice. Yet if we fail to make explicit our central conceptual commitments, our theories and findings cannot contribute to the construction of common knowledge, only to the accumulation of fragmentary statements whose interrelations are uncertain. Conceptual opacity engenders opaque research.

**Conceptual Confusion**

As the descendents of Noah in ancient Babylonia set out to build a premodern skyscraper (“a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven”), God, alarmed by their capacity of monolingual coordination, intervened to “confound their language, that they may not understand one another’s speech” (Genesis 11:7). More than anything else, the concept analytical tradition of Sartori has been concerned about conceptual confusion. According to its disciplinary diagnosis, the builders of comparative political science are afflicted by a similar confusion of tongues as the architects of the Tower of Babel. Lacking discipline and coherence, schools and scholars are speaking past each other with different, mutually incomprehensible vocabularies.

If concepts form triangles of terms, meanings, and referents, conceptual confusion may arise from three sources: confusing relations between terms and meanings (ambiguity), confusing relations between meanings and referents (vagueness), and confusing stipulations of meaning (definitional defects).

**Conceptual Ambiguity**

To ensure unequivocal associations of words and conceptual commitments “the golden rule is to have one word for each meaning” (Sartori, 1984/2009, p. 113). Confusion may arise if we have several words for one concept (synonyms) or one word with various meanings (homonyms).

Genuine synonyms pose no problem for communication. They enrich our vocabulary and help us avoid tedious repetition. The troubles arise from fuzzy synonyms—neighboring or overlapping terms that are situated in a disorderly semantic field and whose exact relations remain unspecified. Political science is replete with such terms. While language users employ them (loosely) as synonymous, it is unclear whether they actually do carry equivalent conceptual commitments. For instance, *institutions* are often defined as *rules*, and vice versa. Yet we do not know to what extent we can treat the two as interchangeable concepts. In the best of cases, fuzzy synonyms share a recognizable semantic core but differ in their precise connotations (additional shades of meaning). For example, *genocide* and *ethnic cleansing* may refer to the same murderous acts, yet the former maintains analytic distance, while the latter adopts the hygienic discourse of the assassin.

Although words frequently carry multiple meanings, in ordinary language, homonymy does little to disturb our ability to communicate. In everyday talk, context determines meaning. If it fails to do so, we can always ask for clarification. In the social sciences, by contrast, homonymous terms are more corrosive to communication. If scholars attach incongruent meanings to key terms that define their fields of inquiry, they will fail to create common knowledge. Instead of studying one class of phenomena, they will be studying different subjects under the same name. The unity of their field of research will be apparent only, a nominal delusion veiling the substantive fragmentation of their research. For instance, if some hold the goal of “democratic consolidation” to be the prevention of authoritarian regression while others take it to lie in the achievement of democratic deepening, comparative inquiries into the conditions of democratic consolidation will address qualitatively different substantive problems.

**Conceptual Vagueness**

Concepts are abstractions. They allow us to speak about empirical phenomena in general rather than marvel at them one by one, in puzzlement over their uniqueness (which we could not grasp anyway without a prior notion of generality). In the social sciences, we want concepts to be precise, to circumscribe clearly the realm of phenomena to which they apply. Vague concepts fail to do so. They leave the relation between conceptual claims and empirical objects indeterminate. They do not allow us to decide which phenomena lie inside and which outside their realm of application. Political actors often apply such elastic concepts of unclear denotation as weapons of political struggle. For
instance, candidates would condemn “vote buying” by their adversaries without making clear what kind of acts they are referring to. Are they condemning any campaign promise that offers voters material benefits in the future? Squeezed between conflicting expectations, political contenders often benefit from evasiveness. Scholars, by contrast, cannot leave their readers guessing what they are talking about. Leaving its empirical referents in the dark, vague concepts lead our research into obscurity.

Definitional Defects

Our semantic definitions are sources of confusion if their relations to words and things are confusing. They are confusing, too, if their internal structure is defective. Definitional defects may be manifold. Our definitions may be contradictory or tautological. They may be incomprehensible or prone to provoke misunderstandings. They may ignore standard rules of classification by offering classificatory schemes that fail to be exclusive, exhaustive, and one-dimensional. Or they may confound levels of abstraction within taxonomical orders of classes and subclasses. As a matter of fact, there is nothing easier than to be confusing. A moment of distraction, a slip of the tongue, a typographical mistake, and the meaning of what we meant to say dissolves in mist.

Conceptual Instability

In the social sciences, linguistic stability permits continuity in research. The diffusion of new theoretical approaches tends to involve major shifts in our vocabulary. That is what new theories often are: new vocabularies and redescriptions of the world. The waves of conceptual instability they induce tend to reshape collective research agendas. They tend to disrupt established lines of inquiry even when substantive concerns remain essentially the same. Each time we replace our theoretical vocabularies, we tend to reinvent the wheel of empirical research. For instance, the new literature on the political economy of political regime change ignores earlier debates on capitalism and democracy, the new literature on state failure ignores the earlier literature on state building, and so on. Unless we develop and conserve the ability to translate between theoretical languages, destabilizing our core categories can be deeply damaging to the much cherished accumulation of knowledge.

Conceptual Abuse

The tools of language are open to almost limitless forms of abuse. Two symmetrical strategies of reality distortion are of particular interest to political scientists: conceptual stretching (Sartori) and conceptual masking. Conceptual stretching involves the application of (often value-laden) concepts to cases that lack essential characteristics of these concepts (as when a corrupt politician describes himself as an honest man). Conceptual masking involves the description of (morally relevant) cases through neutral concepts that disguise the essential characteristics of these cases (as when a bank robber describes himself as a common customer). The former puts forward semantic overstatements in which concept application betrays fundamental conceptual commitments. The latter puts forward semantic understatements in which concept application denies fundamental factual realities.

These forms of conceptual abuse are surely more frequent and more severe in politics than in political science. Modern authoritarian regimes, masters of linguistic abuse, routinely practice both. Stretching the notion of popular rule beyond recognition, they tend to portray themselves as higher forms of democracy, as when Augusto Pinochet described his form of military dictatorship in Chile as “protected democracy.” The totalitarian regimes of the 20th century were notorious in inventing quasi-neutral technical terms and bureaucratic acronyms to camouflage the unspeakable atrocities they committed against humanity. For instance, the Nazis described their factories of assassination as “concentration camps,” the Soviets under Stalin their officially inexistent colonies of slave labor and death as “Gulag,” “the zone,” or simply and enigmatically “the other side.”

Both malpractices destroy conceptual validity. They sever the link between connotation and denotation, between conceptual commitments and factual applications. In instances of conceptual stretching, speakers claim too much, and realities negate the essence of the concepts they use (often,
their moral essence). In instances of conceptual masking, speakers claim too little, and concepts deny the essence of the realities they face (often, their moral essence).

**Conceptual Lumping**

Names allow us to designate individuals, concepts classes of individuals. More general concepts capture larger classes, more concrete concepts smaller ones. According to the well-known “ladder of abstraction” introduced by Sartori, the number of defining attributes of a concept (connotation or intension) and the number of its referents (denotation or extension) are inversely related. At a high level of abstraction, concepts carry few defining attributes and cover many cases. At low levels of generality, they contain numerous defining features and apply to few cases.

In scholarly research, just as in ordinary language, we have to choose the level of conceptual abstraction that seems appropriate for our purpose. If we talk too abstractly in everyday life, our interlocutors may get irritated: Come down, be concrete, we don’t want to hear generalities! If we are overly specific and draw excessively fine distinctions, they may well get impatient, too: Focus on the relevant, stop splitting hairs! In William Ockham’s famous formulation, “You need no razor to cut butter.”

In crafting social-scientific concepts, we have to seek a pragmatic balance between our ambitions of theoretical generalization and our needs for analytical differentiation. As in everyday interactions, we may err on either side when choosing our levels of conceptual abstraction. If we aim too high and employ excessively general concepts that obliterate “differences that make a difference” (Gregory Bateson), our critics will accuse us of conceptual lumping (Sartori). If we aim too low and choose excessively specific concepts that trace irrelevant distinctions, our critics will reproach us with conceptual splitting.

Overall, to the extent that the social science community is amenable to “linguistic therapy” (Umberto Eco) and avoids developing conceptual pathologies, it strengthens its collective capacity to communicate effectively. Social-scientific language demands more than conceptual health and discipline, though. It also requires theoretical and conceptual creativity, grounded in linguistic competence and empirical knowledge.

**Concept Formation**

Concept formation is the systematic development and explication of the core claims to which we commit ourselves when applying a concept. It requires us to understand ordinary and specialized uses of the concept, map its location within its semantic field, situate it within empirical realities and analytical frames, understand its structural properties, choose our semantic commitments, and choose the term that best resonates with its meaning.

**Reconstruction**

If the meaning of a word lies in its use, we need to comprehend the usage of a word if we wish to comprehend the semantic commitments it involves. The first question to ask concerns usage in ordinary language. In English, this question has a straightforward answer: the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED). Initiated well before the advent of 20th-century pragmatic philosophy of language, the OED is a monument to a pragmatic understanding of language as a medium of social practice. Alien to prescriptive or regulatory pretensions, it meticulously registers “the meaning of everything” (Simon Winchester) by documenting concrete instances of word usage across centuries of linguistic development.

The second question concerns the scientific usage of a word. According to Sartori’s seminal “Guidelines for Concept Analysis,” the semantic “reconstruction” of a concept starts with a review of the relevant scholarly literature. Unlike the OED, Sartori does not recommend tracing concepts in usage in order to uncover the implicit claims that can be inferred from their practical applications. Rather, he directs scholars to compile lists of explicit definitions (until they get bored by repetition and redundancy), enumerate the attributes included, and bring them “into some meaningful kind of organization” (Sartori, 1984/2009, p. 120). Meaningful organization, indeed, is the central task of concept formation and the most difficult one, as it escapes rules and recipes. To begin with, it requires us to place our concepts in their linguistic contexts.
Semantic Fields

If we wish to understand a concept properly, we must not analyze it in isolation. We need to map the semantic field it inhabits and locate it in the web of relationships that connects it with its conceptual neighbors. Unless we know what the concept shares with proximate concepts and what separates it from them, we cannot grasp its specificity. Neighboring concepts often share large intersecting circles of meaning, yet carry semantic nuances that are relevant for our research purposes. For instance, if we set out to study civil wars, we step into a rich semantic field of overlapping, yet not identical, concepts, such as guerrilla war, revolution, rebellion, ethnic violence, regional violence, organized violence, political violence, state failure, anarchy, political disorder, and political fragmentation. Semantic cartography, surveying and mapping the “systems of terms” (Sartori, 1984/2009, p. 142) that constitute semantic fields, provides a relational and comparative understanding of such clusters of concepts. It helps us grasp better not only the central connotations of interrelated concepts but also their finer shades of meaning that may be decisive in choosing one concept over another.

Empirical Boundaries

In shedding comparative light on the precise meaning (intension) of related concepts, the analysis of semantic fields also helps clarify their precise referents (extension). To the extent that we grasp the differences and similarities in the substantive claims neighboring concepts contain, we grasp the differences and similarities in the empirical phenomena they refer to. For instance, in the semantic field of civil war, some concepts, such as political violence, are situated at high levels of abstraction and include violent actions outside contexts of societal warfare (e.g., terrorism), while others, such as regional violence, refer to more narrow categories of violent conflict. Some concepts, such as ethnic violence, involve claims about the motives of violence, while others do not. Some, such as guerrilla war, emphasize the presence of organized actors, while others, such as political disorder, emphasize the dissolution of central authority. Some concepts, such as state failure, attribute agency to the state, while others, such as civil war, distribute it among societal actors.

All these semantic differences involve empirical differences. They point to different empirical phenomena. Understanding these differences allows us to understand the empirical scope of concepts—their bounded territories. It gives us an idea of what they include and exclude. Depending on what we want to see and what we decide to ignore, it allows us to choose and use the concepts most akin to our analytical interests. Concepts, writes Gary Goertz (2006), are “theories about the fundamental constitutive elements of a phenomenon” (p. 5). Within the semantic field of civil war, we will select our concept of choice depending on the empirical dimensions our theories designate as relevant—the organized nature of civil wars, their political motives, their outcomes, their causal association with state power, or their membership in the general category of political violence. Sometimes, our inherited vocabulary does not trace the precise distinctions we are interested in. Still, our semantic maps allow us to visualize the configurations of empirical boundaries as previous concept users have found them relevant. Though at times incomplete and inconclusive, they open up a first dialogue between concepts and cases, mediated by theory.

Analytic Frames

When scholars reconstruct the scientific usage of their core concepts in relation to proximate concepts (semantic fields), they may come up with long lists of contending or coexisting, divergent or convergent terms, definitions, and applications. In and of themselves, such listings are of little analytic use. The key challenge is to order them in a manner that resonates with theoretical traditions and empirical concerns in relevant fields of research, and this is easier said than done. The standard recommendation sounds simple: First identify underlying analytical dimensions and then show how different concepts and uses of concepts differ along these dimensions. But which are these underlying dimensions? They do not just lie around, self-evident and open to simple inspection. How then can we find them, and how can we construct them?

The answer is perhaps disappointing: Concept formation is not a bureaucratic enterprise but a constructive one (like social science in general). It
Concept Formation is not about the mechanical application of rules, be it of logic or language, but about the creative process of abstraction. In our efforts to make sense of divergent definitions and uses of concepts, we have to renounce the comfort of rules. This is the weak point, the structural lacuna, regarding guidelines for concept formation: There is none for this crucial task.

As a first step, it is always helpful to ask about units of analysis. If authors talk about democracy, is it regimes or states they are talking about? If they talk about the rule of law, is it individual decisions or judicial systems they are talking about? Clarity about the kinds of “objects” different usages of a concept strive to grasp often helps us locate them at different levels of abstraction. However, it does not tell us anything about the substantive claims different usages carry. We are not biologists looking at elephants or cows, tangible, objective phenomena whose observable characteristics make them easy prey to the classic logic of classification per genus et differentiam. Identifying the general commonalities that determine their genus and then the specific characteristics that determine their species still involves a good deal of complexity and controversy within the biological community and yet in principle requires little “sociological imagination” (C. Wright Mills). But this is not so in the social sciences. If we have determined, for example, that students of “ideology” alternatively refer to structures of thought, language, or behavior, we still do not know what kind of structures they are talking about. We still have to discern (somehow) the analytical dimensions that distinguish different claims about the defining structures of ideologies, such as internal coherence, external differentiation, sophistication, factual accuracy, abstraction, hierarchy, stability, dogmatism, sincerity, and consciousness (Gerring, 1997).

Scholars do not, however, enter the process empty-handed. They are not naive observers of unstructured data. They know the literature, they know the facts and the theories, and they know the language and the paradigmatic cases that define their field of study. The analytical dimensions they introduce (as well as the analytical dimensions their predecessors introduced in the first place) to bring “meaningful order” into conglomerates of contending definitions are anchored in their theoretical and empirical knowledge. It is such theoretical as well as empirical anchorage that makes the meaningful, fruitful, useful organization of semantic fields possible.

Conceptual Structures

Once we have succeeded in bringing analytical order into multiple uses of a concept, we can reconstruct its structural properties. Conceptual structures are configurations of conceptual commitments. Once we have understood the claims authors commit themselves to when using a certain concept, two questions ensue: How strong are their conceptual commitments? And how do those commitments they consider binding (the “essential features” of a concept) relate to each other?

Conceptual Cores

The strength of our commitments to the conceptual claims we articulate varies by degrees. Some claims we hold to be indispensable across contexts. They constitute the core meaning of a concept. Other claims we deem to be secondary and contingent. They form the peripheral and contextual connotations of a concept. According to the classical approach to concept analysis, from Aristotle to Sartori, if we wish to comprehend a concept, we need to identify the former, its semantic core. In the face of multiple uses of a concept, the semantic core is located at the intersecting area of those claims competent concept users declare to be binding (“necessary and sufficient”). Staking out a common ground of binding conceptual commitments (“the core concept”) often allows us to distinguish “narrow,” “thin,” or “minimal” definitions (that limit themselves to the core) from “broad,” “thick,” or even “maximal” ones (that go beyond, up to envisioning ideal-typical instances of the concept).

Family Resemblances

According to the classical conception of concepts, if different uses of a term do not share common semantic ground, they do not count as instances of the same concept. They appear as instances of multiple concepts. Modern philosophers of language (reinforced by more recent psychological
research on typicality effects) have shed doubt on the notion that our ordinary usage of concepts is governed by the strict membership rules of necessary and sufficient conditions. They have contested the notion that concepts carry semantic cores. Rather than committing themselves to a fixed set of indispensable claims, they have suggested that concept users often commit themselves to a more open set of mutually substitutable claims. Wittgenstein (1952/1968, sec. 66–71) introduced the idea of family resemblances to describe concepts that are defined by an ensemble of alternative attributes rather than sharing a core of necessary attributes. In set-theoretic terms, the relevant features of family resemblance or radial concepts do not form intersections but unions. In terms of classical logic, they are not linked by the operator AND (necessity) but by the operator OR (substitutability) (Goertz, 2006, chap. 2).

It seems indeed to be the case that ordinary language users routinely apply empirical concepts, such as fruit and furniture, to concrete objects on the basis of their closeness to typical examples (“prototypes”). These intuitive applications are not based on an invariable set of claims all competent language users subscribe to. However, the use of family resemblance seems less frequent (and less compelling) in the social sciences. When students of politics use the notion of family resemblance, they commonly apply it not to the highest level of abstraction (the definition of general properties of a concept) but to lower levels of abstraction (the definition of constitutive dimensions or the observation of concrete instances of a concept). Concepts described as family resemblances often do seem to share an abstract semantic core (at a high level of generality), even if either their constitutive dimensions or their observational indicators are mutually substitutive (at lower levels of generality).

As a matter of fact, the observation of family resemblances seems to be generally dependent on the prior comprehension (at least vaguely and implicitly) of an abstract semantic core. It is only because we possess a general notion of their common nature that we can discern the elastic observational resemblance of certain classes of cases. Otherwise, we would perceive no more than superficial similarities among disjointed phenomena. Arguably, this is even true for the two paradigmatic concepts of “families” and “games” from which Wittgenstein derived his notion of family resemblances.

Consider families. The sociological literature offers numerous overlapping definitions of families and subtypes of families. For instance, the modern nuclear family typically includes spouses and their dependent children. The notion of family resemblance, however, does not explicate the meaning of the concept of family. It does not respond to the semantic question of conceptual essence but to the phenomenological question of empirical appearance. It does not pretend to identify families and distinguish them from other social groups on the basis of their general characteristics but to identify the members of particular families on the basis of their physical appearance. Family members may look alike, but they are not members of a family (neither in general nor in particular) because they look alike.

**Diminished Subtypes**

In cases of family resemblance, empirical referents may lack relevant characteristics of a concept and still represent genuine instances of it. In cases of “diminished subtypes” (David Collier & Steven Levitsky, 1997), empirical referents do not fully possess the relevant characteristics of a concept and therefore do not represent genuine instances of it. Classical typologies do not differentiate among members of a category. Objects are either in or out. If they are in, they are equal members of full standing. Diminished subtypes take into account that all members are equal—but some are less equal than others.

Diminished subtypes arise from continuous multidimensional concepts. When all constitutive dimensions of a concept are held to be essential, the full absence of any dimension involves the absence of the phenomenon in question. However, if constitutive dimensions are not dichotomous, but continuous, cases may lie somewhere in between full presence and full absence on any specific dimension. Situated in the “gray zone” (Goertz) of one constitutive dimension, these cases are still recognizable members of a general class of phenomena. Yet they are less than full members. Due to their structural deficiencies, they appear as distant, damaged, distorted representatives. By adding qualifiers (adjectives) to the original concept, we can
avoid conceptual stretching (fraudulent claims to full membership in a category) and point to their specific deficiencies. The beauty of diminished subtypes lies in their diagnostic precision.

For example, if democracy requires competitive elections under universal suffrage, the absence of either electoral competitiveness or electoral inclusiveness renders a political regime nondemocratic. Yet governments may impose partial restrictions on either electoral competition or electoral participation that are not severe and systematic enough to involve the absence of either dimension. Such bounded, ambiguous constraints may turn electoral regimes into diminished subtypes of democracy. In the face of bounded restrictions on competition, we might speak of controlled democracies. In the face of bounded suffrage restrictions, we might speak of exclusionary democracies.

Diminished subtypes of multidimensional concepts may arise from the limited presence of one (or some) of their essential dimensions. They may also arise from the full absence of desirable, yet nonessential, attributes. Diminished subtypes of democracy often seem to express structural deficiencies whose benchmarks are not the core of democracy but the ideal of democracy. They refer to democratic regimes that are in full accordance with democratic minimum standards, yet fail to fulfill more stringent expectations to democratic governance. For example, in clientelist democracies, citizens lack the programmatic orientation, and in apathetic democracies, they do not show the participatory enthusiasm we expect from high-quality democracies. In a symmetrical manner, as empirical cases may be underperforming in relation to a particular standard, they may also be overperforming, thus giving rise to “enhanced subtypes.”

**Contested Concepts**

The notion of family resemblances introduces some degree of flexibility and fuzziness into the classical idea of essential attributes. The notion of “essentially contested concepts,” formulated by British philosopher Walter Bryce Gallie only a couple of years after the publication of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*, involves a potentially more radical objection to the classical idea of conceptual cores. According to Gallie’s (1956) seminal paper, all concepts are open to contestation, yet some are “essentially” contested insofar as “their proper use . . . inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses” (p. 169). Which is the source of such intrinsic and irresolvable conceptual disputes? There are two plausible answers. One points to the complexities of concept application, the other to inner tensions that lie at the very core of some concepts.

Gallie’s (1956) account focuses on concept application. For concepts to become essentially contested, he says, they must be multidimensional—“internally complex”—and normative—“appraisive” (pp. 171–172). Competent speakers recognize and value the various dimensions of the concept. “Any explanation of its worth must therefore include reference to the respective contributions” of each dimension (p. 172). Yet, despite their abstract consensus on the fundamental component parts of the concept, speakers are likely to weight them differently and apply them differently. They are likely to dispute their relative importance as well as their practical implications under changing circumstances. For instance, actors may agree that modern democracy rests on the principles of majority rule and constitutional governance but still disagree about their rank order (which is more important) and their operationalization (how they are to be put into practice).

According to a more radical reading, essential contestation affects the very core of concepts, not just their application. It arises when concepts involve irresolvable inner contradictions and when they are founded on genuine dilemmas, paradoxes, or impossible ideals—“conflicting imperatives” (Reinhard Bendix). Consider the ideas of democracy and the rule of law. The etymological root of democracy (“rule of the people”) assigns citizens the double, paradoxical role of rulers and ruled. Their powers cannot be maximized simultaneously. In addition, modern democracy arguably embodies fundamental principles (e.g., popular participation and constitutional restraints) that are mutually supportive as well as (at times) mutually subversive. Balancing the trade-offs they impose demands more than establishing simple orders of priorities. The concept of “the rule of law” suggests a mode of impersonal domination where formal rules govern, rather than human beings—the government of laws, not people. Yet the abolishment of human judgment in the exercise of power constitutes an impossible
ideal. These inner tensions are constitutive for concepts such as democracy and the rule of law. Since they are irresolvable, they feed an inexhaustible stream of legitimate disputes that are irresolvable as well. In this perspective, appraising concepts are likely to be essentially contested if they are essentially self-contradictory.

**Conceptual Innovation**

Language is a social medium of communication and is public and restrained by shared rules of grammar and semantics. At the same time, it is the quintessential medium of personal expression, free and open to variation and innovation as no other societal institution. Ask James Joyce and Ernst Jandl, for example. In the social sciences, our license to innovative uses of language is more limited than, say, in poetry or insult. Still, within constraints, we do enjoy important margins of conceptual innovation.

**New Definitions**

In the face of contending definitions, scholars cannot rely on the common, accepted usage of a concept. They have to meddle with the rules of the language game by formulating their own conceptual commitments. The particular definitions they develop may relate in various ways to preexisting definitions. They may privilege one usage against others (selective definitions), they may tie new bundles of conceptual claims by accepting some but shedding others (eclectic definitions), they may strive to express underlying commonalities among multiple conceptions (synthetic definitions), or they may embrace new claims that alter the central connotation of the concept (deviant or original definitions). The last move overlaps with the creation of new concepts.

**New Concepts**

When do we need new concepts? The answer is very simple: when we wish to draw distinctions that we had not drawn before or when we wish to grasp commonalities that we had not grasped before. Sometimes we wish to seize new empirical phenomena, and sometimes we would like to adopt new perspectives on old phenomena. In the study of politics, we are continually confronted with novel realities; continually, we are trying to see together what political actors tend to look at in isolation; and continually, we are developing theories that redefine the relevant boundaries of the political world. Hence, our incessant demand for conceptual creativity.

Like the political realities they try to capture and the political theories they strive to express, new concepts seldom emerge de novo as radical breaks with the past. More often than not, scholars introduce new concepts by modifying old ones. The repertoire of incremental conceptual innovation is broad. Authors may craft new concepts by (a) redefining the substantive meaning of a given concept, (b) importing concepts from other languages or scientific disciplines, (c) remodeling the ladder of abstraction by adding new distinctions or removing established ones, (d) introducing diminished or enhanced subtypes, or (e) changing the property space of a concept (by altering the distance between conceptual poles, shifting their location, or introducing intermediate categories).

**New Terms**

When we have reviewed the various uses of a concept and its semantic neighbors and when we have understood the configuration of conceptual claims others accept as binding and chosen those we do, we sometimes face the task of “selecting the term that designates the concept” (Sartori, 1984/2009, p. 123)—sometimes but not always. Sometimes we have terminological choices; sometimes we do not.

The names of grand concepts in political science, such as justice, power, and rationality, the terms we use to designate them (and have used to designate them for years, decades, or even centuries), are given and fixed at present. Scholars often disagree about the precise meaning they associate with certain concepts designated by certain terms. They embrace contending “conceptions” of the concepts under dispute. The tight coupling between terms and concepts, however, prevents their semantic disagreements from spilling over into terminological disagreements. Switching the term under discussion would involve switching the concept under discussion. Authors who discuss, for instance, the concepts of justice, power, and rationality either
discuss these concepts under these names, or they discuss something else. If they move even to neighboring terms, such as fairness, authority, and intelligence, they move into different (albeit contiguous) conceptual terrains. When terms and concepts are welded together through strong bonds of semantic history and when the former represent the latter without equivalent substitutes, terminological choices precede semantic debates. By choosing a term, we bring the concept it stands for into focus, which then allows us to partake in ongoing disputes about disputed aspects of its meaning.

When concepts are less deeply anchored in history and theory, the sequence can be inverted. We can first determine the substantive claims we are interested in and then settle on appropriate names, either by selecting among available terms or by crafting new ones. If we articulate our conceptual claims in a precise manner, we put ourselves in a position of selecting the precise terms whose connotations correspond most closely to the substance of our concept. Semantic fields that are densely populated with near-synonyms of similar standing (with none of them dominating all the others) offer the most latitude for fine-tuning our terminological choices. For instance, if we study the consolidation of political regimes, we may choose alternative terms that lie in its semantic vicinity yet emphasize diverging substantive concerns. If we wish to stress the duration of regimes over time, we may talk about continuity, endurance, or persistence. If we wish to stress their ability to weather systemic crises, we may talk about resilience, viability, or sustainability. If we wish to stress the process character of consolidation, we may talk about stabilization, institutionalization, or entrenchment.

While refined concepts ask for refined vocabularies, new concepts demand new terms. Whenever the diffusion of new theories (e.g., game theory) or the emergence of new realities (e.g., electoral autocracies) induces waves of conceptual creativity, they are accompanied by waves of terminological innovation. The rise of game theory has brought a whole new vocabulary into political science that includes notions such as backward induction, bounded rationality, perfect equilibrium, incomplete information, cooperative games, focal points, mixed strategies, and so on. The rise of electoral authoritarian regimes since the end of the Cold War has led comparative scholars to propose a broad assortment of labels designed to capture these novel political systems, such as hybrid regimes, semiauthoritarian regimes, inconsistent regimes, multiparty autocracies, competitive authoritarianism, and institutionalized dictatorship. Overall, driven by changing theories as well as changing realities, terminological innovation is a pervasive phenomenon in political science.

Semantic Constraints

Linguistic innovation, in political science as elsewhere, is always anchored in linguistic tradition. While deviating from tradition, it cannot cut itself loose from it. Conceptual innovations in political science, whether they involve new definitions, new concepts, or new terms, are therefore inevitably constrained innovations (whether tightly or loosely). They are constrained by the semantic past of concepts (etymology and conceptual history) as well as by their semantic present (ordinary and specialized usage). They are also constrained by the systemic logic of semantic fields. Modifying individual nodes in the web of interdependent terms that constitutes a semantic field reverberates throughout the entire web. Any pretension to remake our conceptual tools has to recognize this twin linguistic reality that concepts are rooted in their semantic past and present and embedded in their semantic environment. Semantic constraints are not straitjackets. They leave room for critique and creativity, for selective changes and selective continuities—some more, some less. Yet if conceptual innovations depart too sharply from established usage and create arbitrary associations between words and meanings, they will fail to serve as effective tools for communicating novel insights. They will be outright incomprehensible, liable to provoke systematic misunderstandings, or devoid of resonance and thus condemned to oblivion.

Conclusion

“Clear thinking requires clear language,” Sartori (1984/2009, p. 102) wrote a quarter of a century ago. To begin with, it requires clear thinking about language. If we learn to incorporate conceptual self-awareness into our canon of methodological sophistication, we will do better theory and better
research. We may not reach the impossible ideal of a fully transparent, clear, and precise technical language, and as a scientific community, we may be too diverse and competitive to build another tower of Babel. Yet we will put the edifice of political science on more solid foundations.

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See also Comparative Methods; Cross-National Surveys, Discourse Analysis; Hermeneutics; Measurement; Methodology; Political Communication; Political Philosophy; Positivism; Qualitative Comparative Analysis; Thick Description

Further Readings

Conditionality

Conditionality in political science refers to the use of the conditions an actor attaches to awarding benefits to—or to not imposing costs on—another actor in order to influence his behavior. Benefits are granted only if the target actor has fulfilled certain requirements (ex ante conditionality). Such external rewards can also be suspended or withdrawn if the recipient reneges on his commitment (ex post conditionality). Rather than withdrawing a promised or granted reward (positive conditionality), the violation of predetermined conditions can also be punished (negative conditionality). Conditionality targets either performance and outcomes (policy conditionality) or the governance and administrative systems (political/democratic conditionality).

The term refers more narrowly to the Bretton Woods institutions seeking to impose the Washington Consensus around the world or, more broadly, to all explicit and implicit requirements for lending, including covenants for project-based aid, environmental safeguards, and performance-based aid allocation. This entry follows the broader understanding of conditionality as a political instrument used by national governments and international organizations to advance their foreign policy goals. First, the concept is linked back to the instrumental logic of social action in order to specify the causal mechanisms through which conditionality is to influence the behavior of third countries (i.e., those who are not members of the European Union [EU]). Second, the emergence of conditionality as a key instrument of development cooperation and foreign policy, more broadly speaking, is traced. Finally, critical evaluations regarding the effectiveness and legitimacy of conditionality are discussed to outline how these have led to readjustments of the instrument.

Conditionality and the Manipulation of Utility Calculations

Conditionality seeks to influence the behavior of actors through the manipulation of utility calculations, by providing negative and positive incentives. Donor states or organizations seek to promote structural adjustments in third countries by promising or granting additional benefits, such as
Evolution of Conditionality as an Instrument of External Governance

Conditionality emerged in the field of development cooperation. In the 1980s, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank increasingly linked loans, debt relief, and financial aid to certain conditions, known as structural adjustments, which included aid effectiveness (e.g. anticorruption measures), financial austerity, or the privatization of key public services. While international donors have used conditional aid to promote selective reforms deemed necessary for good governance, the EU turned conditionality into the key instrument in its attempt to support the transformation in postcommunist countries after the end of the Cold War (Heather Grabbe, 2006). The Maastricht Treaty had made any contractual relations of the EU with third countries conditional on the respect for human rights, the rule of law, and democracy (see Tanya Börzel & Thomas Risse, 2009). States applying for membership in the EU have to fulfill the so-called Copenhagen Criteria (democratic conditionality). Once the EU agreed to open accession negotiations, accession conditionality gave the European Commission a powerful tool to push candidate countries toward downloading the comprehensive acquis communautaire and introducing institutional reforms (see Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2006).
target country that is willing to use external incentives to push for compliance domestically (Jan Pronk, 2001). These conditions are seldom met, even among the current EU candidate countries, including the Western Balkans and Turkey.

In reaction to the limited effectiveness of conditionality, issues of recipient ownership, greater selectivity based on country performance, stronger results orientation, and thus a shift to *ex post* conditionality have gained relevance. While the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund aim to streamline conditionality and rely on greater selectivity and new approaches, such as programmatic lending, the European Commission attempts to reconcile a predictable budget support for low-income countries with a stronger performance orientation that bases disbursements on outcomes. Other critical observers call for the abandonment of conditionality altogether and argue instead for broad political dialogue and the allocation of funds on the basis of need.

The legitimacy of conditionality is equally contested. On the one hand, the output legitimacy of external interference has come under fire because structural adjustments have failed to produce the intended outcomes or have even been blamed for causing negative effects. On the other hand, the input legitimacy of conditionality is challenged by international norms of state sovereignty and self-determination. This legitimacy problem is exacerbated if externally promoted norms and standards are not equally promoted inside the donor organization or state (double standards). At the same time, conditionality has a legitimating function inside the donor states to justify payments to third countries, especially under high uncertainty regarding the effect on external actors. There seems to be a trade-off between legitimacy concerns in recipient and donor countries that creates a serious normative dilemma and adds to the controversy surrounding the use of conditionality both among policymakers and researchers.

**See also** Democratization; Developing World and International Relations; Development, Political; European Integration

## Further Readings


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### CONDITIONS, NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT

Social science, as all science, is a continuous quest for an explanation and understanding of the world around us. This search is carried out through Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr’s “research triad” of theory, logic, and research design, all of which are central to both hypotheses and results. The key element of explanation and understanding is causation. Social scientists are concerned with causation as applied both to individual events or cases and to classes or groups of events. The causal relationship may take many forms. Two of the most prominent, important, and commonly used forms of the causal relationship involve necessary and/or sufficient relationships. As emphasized in the work of Most and Starr among others, analyses must be concerned with the form of the relationship. David Hume’s classic definition of cause involves the
“constant conjunction” of an object followed by another, where all objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Causation is seen as including three elements, the first being the existence of correlation between two factors or variables. That is, changes or attributes in one factor are associated with changes or attributes in another. Correlation is one possible form of any specific relationship. Correlation itself may take several forms, such as linear or curvilinear. The second element of cause involves the temporal dimension—the proposed causal factor must take place before the “effect” or the phenomenon to be explained. Cause must precede effect. The third element is the most rigorous and difficult—the elimination of other explanatory factors beyond those proposed (the central idea of “control”). Below, the various implications of these relationships and some current applications in political science are discussed.

Necessity and sufficiency are themselves different forms of the causal relationship. They represent different forms of constant conjunction. Scholars have argued that research designs (the nature of the theoretical logic and research hypotheses being employed) built around these different forms of causation will be affected by the nature and types of the cases selected, the controls employed for dealing with possible other (explanatory) factors, and the methods used for evaluating the theory and proposed research hypotheses. All three elements of the research triad—theory, logic, and research design—are thus affected by the form of the relationship, especially looking at necessary relationships in distinction from sufficient relationships or even simple correlational relationships. The differences between how necessary and sufficient conditions are treated are additionally important in regard to the research designs needed to investigate inference in the small-N studies that characterize much of comparative politics (and qualitative analyses more generally). The logics of necessary and sufficient conditions need to be investigated in order to cross the boundaries between political science subfields as well as the quantitative–qualitative divide.

**Definitions and Logics**

The most basic definition of sufficiency states, “if $X$ then $Y$.” That is, $X$ always leads to $Y$, but $Y$ is not always preceded by $X$. For example, proponents of the theory of democratic peace argue that democracies have peaceful relations with one another—that is, a pair of democracies ($X$) will lead to peace ($Y$), which is defined as the absence of war. However, peace may result from many other factors (e.g., power preponderance, lack of contact or opportunity), so that it may occur without the presence of a democratic dyad. The presence of democratic dyads predicts the presence of peace: $X$ “yes” and $Y$ “yes,” as in Cell A of Figure 1. A much less important prediction (or expectation) is that the absence of a democratic dyad is followed by an absence of peace: the “no/no” Cell D of Figure 1. Cell B in Figure 1, where a democratic dyad is not present but peace is, is not relevant for sufficiency, because $Y$ may occur without $X$ (i.e., when $X$ is a sufficient but not necessary condition for $Y$). The key relationship is in Cell B, when $X$ does occur but $Y$ does not. This cell will be empty when $X$ is a sufficient condition for $Y$. Thus, a research design that looks for sufficient relationships must look at the full range of $Y$, the dependent variable—when $Y$ occurs and when it does not. Herein rests the strong admonition by scholars that the researcher cannot select on the dependent variable (which would toss out the ability to look at the key cell that permits the investigation of sufficiency).

**Figure 1**  
$X$ Is Sufficient for $Y$ (If $X$ Then $Y$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$X = 1$</th>
<th>$X = 0$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Y = 1$</td>
<td>(A) Predicted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y = 0$</td>
<td>(C) KEY—should be empty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2**  
$X$ Is Necessary for $Y$ (Only if $X$ Then $Y$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$X = 1$</th>
<th>$X = 0$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Y = 1$</td>
<td>(A) Predicted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y = 0$</td>
<td>(C) Irrelevant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In many ways, necessity produces reverse expectations. Necessity means the following: only if \( X \), then \( Y \). That is, \( Y \) is always preceded by \( X \), but \( X \) does not always lead to \( Y \). Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s theory of positive expected utility (EU) notes that positive EU is a necessary condition for war—that war (\( Y \)) is always preceded by positive EU on the part of decision makers going to war (\( X \)). In essence, necessity asks us to look for preconditions or prerequisites of some phenomenon \( Y \). It should be noted that the authors in Gary Goertz and Harvey Starr’s edited volume define necessity in various ways and using different logics: set theory, calculus, a probabilistic logic, fuzzy logic/set theory, and Aristotelian two-valued logic.

Returning to the current example, simply having positive EU does not mean that there will be war, for a variety of domestic and external factors, again including lack of opportunity. As seen in Figure 2, Cell A, the presence of the causal factor (positive EU), predicts or is followed by the presence of war, or the dependent variable. A much less important prediction (or expectation) is that the absence of the independent variable or causal factor \( X \) is related to the expectation or prediction that the effect, or dependent variable, \( Y \) is also absent (Cell D). Cell C presents the condition where \( X \) is present, but there is no effect on \( Y \). This is not relevant to necessity because \( X \) does not always lead to \( Y \) (indeed, this has been a major confusion in critiques of the early EU models of Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues). For necessity, the key relationship is when the causal factor \( X \) does not occur but the effect \( Y \) still appears—Cell B. If \( X \) is a necessary condition for \( Y \), this cell or set will be empty. Note that this means that the whole range of the independent variable \( X \) must be included. One must see cases where \( X \) does not occur. Necessity then can be tested using only the occurrence of \( Y \), the dependent variable. With questions of necessity, therefore, the researcher may select on the dependent variable but cannot select only on the occurrence of \( X \), the independent variable. This distinction between sufficiency and necessity suggests that case selection should be guided by the outcome that the researcher is interested in and how the logic of the proposed causal mechanism identifies that outcome (as argued by Goertz and colleagues). As noted above, one evident way to do this is with set theory. Thus, a strong set-theoretic basis to the logic of necessary relationships is found.

It should be clear that the logics of necessity differ from those of sufficiency. Much of the analyses performed on relationships of sufficiency use continuous variables, looking to find linear relationships on normally distributed values and to maximize the explanation of variance in the dependent variable (these have been called frequentist statistical methodologies). Necessity more often looks at the presence or absence of an explanatory factor \( X \). That is, a necessary analysis looks to see if values on a measure have crossed a threshold, reached a “turning point,” or have come to a “critical juncture” (see also the “powder keg” explanations discussed by Gary Goertz and Jack Levy). Goertz thus argues that necessary conditions and the statistical models related to them set out different sorts of hypotheses from standard quantitative analyses of sufficient relationships. Rather than tracking how changes in any \( X \) are related to changes in some \( Y \), most necessary analyses focus on whether \( X \) makes \( Y \) possible or more likely. Goertz contrasts a “necessary condition hypothesis,” which might propose that some minimum level of variable \( X \) is necessary for an outcome variable \( Y \), with a “correlational hypothesis,” which would propose that the greater the value of some \( X \) then the greater the value of some \( Y \). Another example of analytical differences has been identified by Charles Ragin, among others. He has argued that while standard statistical techniques are often applied to deal with (i.e., remove) heteroskedasticity, this is a central condition and characteristic of necessary relationships and thus needs to be part of the analysis and not removed.

Necessary and sufficient hypotheses, then, often work within different causal chains. Correlational hypotheses tend to focus on classes of events, while necessary-condition hypotheses tend to focus on causation within a single case (but which may also be aggregated probabilistically across such cases). The latter is often associated with process tracing within cases to identify the causal mechanisms at work and is thus of importance to comparative politics, qualitative approaches, and comparative-historical methodology. Goertz has demonstrated the range, ubiquity, and importance of necessary-condition hypotheses found throughout the political science literature. They often take the form of
counterfactuals, especially in case studies focusing on explaining individual events. The necessity relationship claims that *only if* $X$ can there be $Y$. The counterfactual claim holds that *without* $X$, if $X$ had not happened, $Y$ would not have occurred. Goertz and Levy contrast a necessary-conditions counterfactual approach (looking for necessary conditions within individual cases) with a nomological covering-law approach (based on the constant conjunction of covering laws stated and tested with large-$n$ statistical/probabilistic methods). More than 2 decades ago, Most and Starr demonstrated that researchers will produce meaningless findings when creating research designs that can test only for necessary conditions while stating their hypotheses in terms of sufficiency (and vice versa). That is, the cases selected and the methods used must match the questions asked. The method of selecting cases will logically preclude some questions and some designs.

Scholars across political science subfields as well as different research traditions have come more and more to seek designs that uncover complex causality, recognizing that there may be multiple causal paths to the same outcome. This is often called *equifinality*. Contingency plays a large part in such causal complexity—that some theory or hypothesis will hold only under certain conditions or that a pair of contending theories may both be true under different conditions or contingencies (or what Most and Starr call “nice laws”). In many cases, contingency is expressed as a necessary condition, without which some effect, outcome, or other dependent condition could not occur. This is why necessity is a key component of a philosophical view of causality becoming more prominent in the literature—the INUS view of causation. An INUS explanation is an “Insufficient but Nonredundant [i.e., necessary] part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition,” for which James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2006, p. 232) provide a succinct explanation:

An INUS cause is neither individually necessary nor individually sufficient for an outcome. Instead it is one cause within a combination of causes that are jointly sufficient for an outcome. Thus, with this approach, scholars seek to identify combinations of variable values that are sufficient for outcomes of interest. The approach assumes that distinct combinations may each be sufficient, such that there are multiple paths to the same outcome.

Research findings with INUS causes can often be formally expressed through Boolean equations such as $Y = (A \text{ AND } B \text{ AND } C) \text{ OR } (C \text{ AND } D \text{ AND } E)$.

The logic of necessity and sufficiency, and multiple causal paths, may thus be clearly captured by Boolean logic and methods (most fully introduced in the work of Charles Ragin). The conjunctive Boolean AND denotes necessary conditions. Thus, in the above equation, $A$, $B$, and $C$ are all necessary conditions in combination, to be sufficient for $Y$. But note, so are $C$, $D$, and $E$ in combination. The Boolean disjunctive OR indicates that either of these two combinations is sufficient for $Y$—multiple paths to the same outcome. The reader should note that the philosophy of science dealing with concepts holds a similar position—that a good definition of a concept is one with necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient.

**Conclusion**

This brief overview has attempted to present the most recent reflections and findings on necessity and sufficiency, setting out the basic phenomena and issues that are currently being discussed in the political science literature. The reader who investigates the works cited and suggested below and follows the footnotes and references in those materials will obtain the most comprehensive picture of current thinking on necessity and sufficiency. These works reinforce the observation of Most and Starr that there is a need for a better understanding of logical linkages that serve as alternatives to the standard statistical techniques commonly employed in large-$N$ statistical analyses with an almost exclusive focus on sufficient relationships.

These newer works provide the theory, logic, and findings that support Mahoney’s refutation of a set of “erroneous beliefs” about necessity and sufficiency. Based on the present discussion and the works cited, one can, in fact, say that

1. necessary and sufficient causes do exist and are found in interesting hypotheses;
2. necessary and sufficient causes are not trivial, tautological, or irrelevant (see Goertz’s work for an in-depth conceptualization of the trivialness, importance, and relevance of necessity and sufficiency and ways to measure them);
3. necessary and sufficient causes are neither
deterministic nor inconsistent with probabilistic
analysis, and they can be measured continuously
(see especially Ragin); and

4. subsequently, methods do exist to test
hypotheses of necessity or sufficiency, including
tests for significance/trivialness.

For Points 3 and 4, see especially work by Mahoney
as well as Goertz.

Finally, and perhaps most important, newer
works on necessity and sufficiency point out ways
in which research can be designed to capture cau-
sality (in its various forms) across small-N and
large-N analyses and cross boundaries between
so-called qualitative and quantitative analysis. In
so doing, this work also enhances boundary crossing
between international relations and comparative
politics at a time when greater and greater
attention is being directed toward two-level analy-
sis, taking into account the impact of internal/
domestic factors and context along with external/
international factors and context.

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See also Case Studies; Causality; Comparative Methods;
Hypothesis Testing; Quantitative Methods, Basic
Assumptions; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods

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CONFIGURATIONAL
COMPARATIVE METHODS

Configurational comparative methods (CCMs)
designate both a methodological approach and a
set of specific techniques enabling systematic cross-
case comparison while also taking into account
within-case complexity. They have been developed,
initially, for small- and intermediate-N research
designs in the social sciences (Benoit Rihoux &
Charles Ragin, 2009). The whole CCMs enterprise
was initiated by Ragin (1987), who outlined a
“synthetic strategy” that could bridge case-oriented
and variable-oriented approaches to social phe-
nomena. He also developed a first technique, QCA
(qualitative comparative analysis—now labeled
crisp-set QCA [csQCA]), and applied it to macro-
level cases such as countries. Below, the basic
assumptions, specific techniques, and applications,
and recent developments are discussed.

Core Assumptions and Goals

The whole ambition behind CCMs is, on the one
hand, to make qualitative case analysis more sys-
tematic and to offer case-oriented researchers some
tools that enable them to systematically compare
thick, complex cases. On the other hand, it strives
to offer an alternative way to envisage causal argu-
ments made in mainstream quantitative (read sta-
tistical) social-scientific work. The overarching goal
of CCMs is to unravel causal complexity by applying
set-theoretic methods to cross-case evidence. In
more concrete terms, the different QCA techniques
developed within CCMs enable one to identify core
combinations of conditions (input variables), which
explain the variation of a given outcome (output
variable) of interest. Therefore, QCA techniques
are geared toward the identification of so-called
specific connections between conditions and out-
comes. In contrast to most statistical techniques,
they are not geared toward the establishment of
general, tendential, or correlational connections
between each independent variable, on the one
hand, and the dependent variable, on the other
(Ragin, 2008; Rihoux, 2008).

Causality, or linkages between conditions and
the outcome, more generally, are assumed to be
multiple and conjunctural. This implies the following assumptions: (a) Most often, it is a combination of conditions (rather than a single condition) that generates the outcome; (b) several different combinations of conditions may produce the same outcome; and (c) there is no fixed effect of a given condition on the outcome—depending on how it is combined with other conditions, different values of this condition can produce the outcome. The concrete goal of CCMs, from this perspective, is to identify those different causal paths leading to some outcome of interest, each path being relevant in its own way, regardless of the number of cases it covers. Thus, this concept of causality does not take on board most of the core assumptions underlying mainstream statistical analysis, such as permanent causality, uniformity of causal effects, unit homogeneity, additivity, linearity, and causal symmetry (Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Gisèle De Meur, Benoît Rihoux, & Charles Ragin, 2009).

The logical foundations of CCMs can be found in John Stuart Mill’s “canons,” in particular the method of agreement, the method of difference, and the joint method of agreement and difference, which are all logical ways to systematically contrast and match cases, so as to establish common causal relationships. In practical terms, in CCMs, this is translated into tests for necessity and sufficiency.

Techniques

The overall rationale behind the QCA techniques is that, through some step-by-step logical operations (based on Boolean algebra or set-theoretical logic), one is able to reduce complex data tables to shorter combinations of conditions explaining the outcome of interest. Therefore, at the heart of CCMs lies the quest for parsimony—but not in such a way that within-case complexity would be sacrificed. So far, three specific techniques have been developed under the umbrella term of QCA: crisp-set QCA (csQCA), the initial technique that uses Boolean, that is, dichotomous, sets; multiple-value QCA (mvQCA), which allows the use of multiple-category conditions; and fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), which uses finer grained fuzzy-set membership scores.

These techniques can be exploited in at least five different ways. The first two uses are more descriptive or classificatory. One can use QCA techniques, first, simply to summarize data through the production of a truth table (or table of configurations), which can be examined to discover, for instance, how cases cluster together, or to elaborate typologies. Second, QCA techniques can be used as a tool to assess the coherence of the data—in particular through the detection of so-called contradictory configurations—which lead the researcher to reflect on the cases and the theory.

The three other, more full-fledged uses of QCA techniques imply some sort of testing of a causal argument: checking hypotheses or existing theories, quickly testing some conjectures made by the researcher, and developing new theoretical arguments. Thus, QCA techniques can be used for both theory testing and theory building.

In a full QCA application, whatever the specific technique, the core steps are basically the same (Benoit Rihoux & Bojana Lobe, 2009). In a first phase, upstream of QCA proper, a comparative research design is chosen, cases are selected in a purposeful way, sufficient intimacy is gained with each one of the cases, the outcome of interest is defined, the conditions are selected (model specification), and the cases and the model are visualized or synthesized in various ways. These first operations already result in some level of reduction of complexity by transforming thick, complex case narratives to analytical (i.e., variable-based) data.

The second core phase corresponds to the more formal, computer-run part of QCA. There are several steps to be performed: operationalizing the outcome and condition variables (dichotomization or some finer grained calibration), producing the truth table, solving the contradictory configurations so as to obtain a contradiction-free truth table, minimizing the truth table (with and without the inclusion of logical remainders, i.e., nonobserved cases), solving contradictory simplifying assumptions produced by the use of logical remainders, and finally obtaining minimal formulae that contain those core, most parsimonious combinations of conditions leading to the outcome of interest.

The third phase, downstream, consists of different ways of moving back to more (case) complexity: identifying more crucial conditions, interpreting the minimal formulae in a case-by-case manner, interpreting cross-case patterns, performing limited historical or modest generalizations, and finally, possibly, going through the next cycle of
QCA, for example, through the examination of some more, rather proximate cases.

All these steps should be performed in a reflexive, iterative way, and with frequent loops back to theoretical and/or case-based knowledge. As QCA techniques have been consolidating and as applications have been becoming more diverse, a body of good practices has also been consolidated.

**Applications**

The applications of CCMs have become increasingly diverse. More than two thirds of them are found in various subfields of political science—in particular, comparative politics and policy studies. The breadth of applications has expanded in several respects. In terms of number of cases, though QCA techniques were initially geared toward small- and intermediate-N designs, larger-N applications have also proved successful. In terms of the nature of cases envisaged, most applications so far envisage macrolevel (e.g., countries, political systems, and policy processes) or mesolevel (e.g., party organizations, social movements, and collective actors) cases. However, some researchers are beginning to apply QCA on microlevel cases as well. Another type of broadening is related to the fact that some users who are more application oriented are also becoming interested in such methods, for example, in the field of policy evaluation and monitoring, beyond the academic sphere. With regard to the number of conditions included in the analysis, there is also broad variation, though a good practice dictates that QCA models be kept relatively short due to the limited-diversity issue—that is, too long a model will not be in the interests of parsimony.

Gradually, applications have become technically more sophisticated. Two main computer programs have been developed and are now used for most applications: TOSMANA (Tools for Small-N Analysis; for csQCA and mvQCA) and FSQCA (fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis for csQCA and fsQCA). Some other interfaces are also being gradually exploited, such as R and STATA.

**Debates and Further Developments**

As CCMs are still rather recent and as they are being perceived by some as a challenge to some other methodologies, they are subject to a lot of debate. The core critiques concentrate in particular on the following points: the dichotomization of the data, the use of nonobserved cases, case sensitivity, the difficulty in selecting conditions, the inability of CCMs to actually establish causal linkages and broad generalizations (inference), and the nonexplicit inclusion of the time dimension. Naturally, as with all methods, there are limitations and weaknesses with CCMs, but many strategies have been developed to overcome most of these drawbacks. One should also bear in mind the specific goals and assumptions of CCMs. For instance, contending that CCMs are weaker than statistical techniques because they do not produce inference (generalization from a sample to a whole population) is a misplaced criticism, because this is not the goal of CCMs—they follow a more case- and diversity-oriented logic.

Many developments and improvements of CCMs are under way—the launching of mvQCA and fsQCA is an example; these programs were developed as a response to some of the limitations of the dichotomous csQCA. Among the many ongoing refinements, one can mention the following: the improvement of computer software, the inclusion of the time dimension, the distinction between distant and proximate conditions (two-step models; see Carsten Schneider & Claudius Wagemann, 2006), the Most Similar Different Outcome/Most Different Same Outcome (MSDO/MDSO) procedure in the process of model building (Berg-Schlosser & De Meur, 2009), more elaborate strategies to tackle logical remainders and contradictory simplifying assumptions, better visualization of the cases and the minimal formulae, and so on.

In another line of improvements, CCMs have been increasingly combined or sequenced with qualitative and/or quantitative methods. On the smaller-N side of the spectrum, the connection with qualitative, case-oriented work is self-evident, as in-depth case knowledge goes along with the QCA protocol—the graphic display of synthetic case descriptions is one way to bridge more explicitly the thick case evidence and the formal QCA procedure (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009). In intermediate- and larger-N designs, several works have fruitfully confronted or mutually enriched some QCA techniques with statistical techniques, such
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as discriminant analysis, factor analysis, and various types of regression-based analyses.

Many more developments can be expected within the next few years as the community of users of CCMs is enlarging and also becoming more diverse in disciplinary terms—in fact, some of the cutting-edge work is now also being done in fields such as management, organizational studies, and communication studies. The speed of further improvements of CCMs will largely depend on the ability of this growing community to share experiences as well as innovations and to make this a cumulative enterprise.

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See also Case Studies; Causality; Comparative Methods; Complexity; Conditions, Necessary, and Sufficient; Fuzzy-Set Analysis; Qualitative Comparative Analysis; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions

Further Readings


Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution is a term that we all understand until we try to define it. Synonyms abound: such as conflict settlement, conflict termination, conflict management, and conflict transformation. Moreover, conflict resolution is both a situation and a process. A conflict is resolved when all the parties to a dispute agree that it is over for good, in full knowledge of the situation, and without any form of coercion, whether personal, manifest or structural, since they acknowledge that their respective interests and values have been satisfied. The concerned parties are those who cannot be seen off or defeated and without whom there can be no resolution in the long run. Resolution requires a new relationship to be self-sustaining without any form of coercion.

All conflicts end. Even bitter and decade-long disputes involving several wars have been resolved. On the way to resolution, there may be truces or temporary settlements in which coercion is exerted, but the roots of the conflict remain embedded so that any weakening or withdrawal of coercive mechanisms may risk a new flare-up. Thus, for example, in the Franco-German context, the Treaty of Versailles (1919) was a conflict settlement, whereas the Charter of Paris (1990) was a conflict resolution.

Conflict resolution is at the far end of a spectrum of outcomes that begins with a diketat imposed by a victor. But losers usually have leeway since victors are often dependent on local cooperation. Very rarely is the complete destruction of the
enemy, or genocide, envisaged. A second outcome is a **negotiated** one involving compromise and lengthy negotiations often accompanied by considerable violence. Such a settlement is contingent on the balance of forces, and should these change, the smoldering conflict may again flare up. A **stasis outcome** is one in which actual physical violence has ended and its recurrence is unlikely, but the protracted conflict continues by other means since major issues remain unresolved. Finally, a full **resolution** is one in which all the parties have their values and interests satisfied. Conflict resolution is the most ambitious outcome sought since resolution based on a noncoercive framework is hard, but not impossible, to achieve.

Conflicts occur at all levels and in all social relationships. Each has its special characteristics, but there are elements in common. General statements can be made about conflict resolution, which apply to international, intercommunal, industrial, marital, or other conflict. Many principles and, indeed techniques, may be similar, albeit with due account being paid to the idiosyncrasies of level and type.

In political conflict, broadly defined, we can identify three traditions with differing approaches, conceptions of its origin and modalities, as well as aspirations for ending it. The first is the realist or power politics tradition that lays emphasis on the nature of international relations in an anarchical society. Societal elements exist, but they are weak and relations are close to the Hobbesian characterization of life as nasty, poor, brutish, solitary, and short. This is particularly true of the international system where the only reliable help is self-help due to the absence of sufficiently strongly held shared values to form the basis for a collective security. The ensuing security dilemma confronts actors with a tragic choice between guns or butter. Judgments are required about the capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries. Moreover, if this security dilemma is also linked to the notion that all individuals and groups have a drive to dominate, then there can be no peace in a real sense. There can be a truce, a cold war, order, and stability, but all this is contingent on a balance of forces between those who dominate and those who are dominated. It is an eternal struggle between the status quo and the revisionist powers. Order and stability are the products of a particular balance of forces, and any major change will upset that balance and a new equilibrium will have to be established to reflect those changes, perhaps on the battlefield. This is a classic case of conflict settlement.

The second traditional approach points to the importance of structures, with conflict being the result of incompatible interests built into structures. Structural violence suggests that peace is more than the absence of overt violence. Structural violence occurs where an actor may be a “happy slave,” unable even to conceive of behaving as others can or prevented from so doing by prejudice, ignorance, or lack of access to facilities available to others. Such impediments are often not of a legal nature or enforced by overt pressure, but they are found in the mind, history, education, and culture of individuals and the society within which they live.

Not all structures are instruments of structural violence. Self-sufficiency is not necessary where we can benefit from comparative advantage, as long as the “terms of trade” are seen as fair by all parties in full knowledge of all aspects of the relationship, including the structural ones. Then a role differentiation can be legitimized and with it the structure within which the roles are embedded. Different roles do not necessarily imply an unfair relationship dependent on coercion. All may benefit equitably if the differentiation is acceptable to all with their eyes open.

Dyed-in-the-wool structuralists in a Marxist tradition would regard the concepts of legitimacy and evolutionary change as simply a means of throwing sand in the eyes of the masses. They insist that structures with embedded incompatible interests cannot be reformed and must be destroyed. Peace, or conflict resolution, is thus dependent on the destruction of existing exploitative structures and the creation of a revolutionary peace, if necessary by violence. Increasing the degree of confrontation in society is thus a step toward revolution and, thereafter, conflict resolution.

At all levels, conflict resolution is very different in the pluralist tradition since it gives salience to the notion of harmony of interests. Collective security will work if all the actors in a system come together to agree on the rules of behavior and on how to alter the rules to accommodate change. They further accept that if anybody strays from the fold they shall be brought back into it, forcibly if
necessary. Underpinning this is the idea that all human beings have a high degree of shared values and that they can pursue these in a rational manner, in the right circumstances.

Rationality in this context is primarily concerned with the opportunity cost, that is, what other desired goals have to be sacrificed in order to achieve a particular goal. Parties in conflict frequently have a tunnel vision in which they become obsessed by one particular goal, paying a very high price in other desired goals to attain it. To see this in context, actors are encouraged to spell out the full range of their perceived goals and then attempt to minimize the opportunity cost between those goals. The next stage is to repeat the exercise, but this time in the context of others, so that in the long run all parties will be in a position where they are maximizing the totality of their values and minimizing the overall opportunity cost. Such an exercise in rational opportunity costing frequently leads to a consideration of basic human needs that must be satisfied if conflict is to be resolved.

Basic human needs include food and water as well as social needs such as security, identity, participation, self-actualization, and esteem. But these needs are not necessarily in short supply. One person’s or group’s identity is not necessarily at the expense of another’s nor is their security, their development, or their self-actualization. They may be seen as zero sum at a particular moment, but conflict resolution as a process seeks to move to a win-win position. This is difficult since there is no panacea and it often requires third-party facilitation. Nevertheless conflicts can be resolved because the things that we all seem to care about are not inherently in short supply.

Article 33 of the United Nations Charter says that the member states “shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.” Conflict settlements in the realist tradition rely on an uncertain balance of power. A revolutionary peace requires the destruction of exploitative structures and the eradication of structural violence. The pluralist approach to the process of conflict resolution is of a different ilk. In deep-rooted conflicts where there is little or seemingly no value consensus, negotiation between the parties very quickly descends into a rut of accusation and counteraccusation with little understanding or effective communication. Thus, recourse to other measures under Article 33 involving a third party is frequent. If the goal is merely conflict settlement then a biased mediation from a major actor to impose a settlement may suffice. However, if the goal is conflict resolution, it is more likely that the process is one of facilitation, which has a number of characteristics.

Facilitators in the resolution process are non-judgmental since they do not pronounce guilt or innocence nor are they directive. They do not contend that they know best. They are, however, extremely supportive of all the parties since the values and interests of all must be met. The process is highly participatory with all the veto holders present, no matter what their past. Finally, there is a disempowerment of the parties by emphasizing that they share a joint problem that they can only resolve together. This approach typifies a more general movement at all conflict levels from judgmental decision making to that of a supportive framework. This is particularly apposite in “new international conflicts,” where civil wars, transnational conflicts, and fragile and collapsed states are seemingly endemic in struggles of greed and grievance. Wars and conflicts that go beyond the international system require approaches, methods, and institutions that do likewise. Second-track diplomacy, especially facilitation, becomes thereby a major tool for resolution, involving a variety of actors both governmental and nongovernmental.

The process of conflict resolution is frequently the last resort when the parties know that they can neither win nor are likely to lose. They cannot escape from the conflict, but they know it is costing a great deal in various ways. The process of conflict resolution therefore accumulates many of the hard cases. It is brought in when all else has failed and it is trying to achieve the most difficult goal. However, conflict resolution is relevant earlier in the conflict cycle, as a preventive measure. Much thought has been given to this due to the upsurge of international interventionism and the evident need for emancipatory resolution based on social justice and solidarity in a local context.

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See also Conflicts; Mediation in International Relations; Peace; War and Peace

Further Readings

CONFLICT THEORY

See Conflict Resolution

CONFLICTS

In everyday English-language usage, conflicts refer to (a) serious disagreements, (b) prolonged struggles (e.g., armed clashes resulting in loss of life, or labor disputes), or (c) the clash of incompatible claims or principles, as in conflicts of interest.

In political science, conflicts can be analyzed as the outcomes of a certain kind of relationship, comparing relationships of cooperation and competition with those of conflict. When there is cooperation, humans work together in pursuit of common objectives. When there is competition, they struggle with one another in contests governed by rules that determine who succeeds and that identify the sanctions to be imposed for noncompliance. When there is conflict, either no rules are recognized or any relevant rules are not properly enforced. While rules may be embodied in laws or treaties, there may be dispute about their application. Moral principles may sometimes be regarded as rules of conduct. It should be noted that even in armed conflicts between states, offenders can be punished for war crimes, while the Geneva Conventions specify the ways in which civilians are to be protected in international conflicts.

Though the absence of conflict is not considered newsworthy, it can be just as important to political science as the analysis of violence. Distinguishing the dimensions of conflict makes it possible to uncover underlying principles, such as has been done in game theory. Less abstract lines of analysis, such as field investigations of the strategies pursued by the parties to conflicts, and the options open to them, can be equally illuminating.

Everyday Language

In the newspapers, and in popular discussion, conflicts are divided into kinds or classes of conflict, such as economic, ethnic, national, racial, and religious conflicts. Yet conflicts do not fall into any natural classification. If they are classified, it can only be for a specific, and limited, purpose.

National conflicts have been of particular interest to political scientists; they are commonly associated with the formation of states and the delimitation of their territory. After major wars, state boundaries have been drawn or redrawn at international conferences convened by what used to be called “the Great Powers.” Thus, in the history of Europe, two long-running wars were brought to an end in 1648 by the Treaty of Westphalia; this marked the birth of the concept of the nation-state. After the Napoleonic Wars, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 redrew the political map. After World War I, the Paris Conference of 1919 revised that map and gave birth to the League of Nations. After World War II, the three-power conference at Yalta delimited “spheres of influence”; the United Nations (UN) was established, and its Security Council provided a forum for the regulation of interstate conflicts. The UN has made states responsible for the regulation of conflicts arising within areas subject to their jurisdiction.

The then-UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his 1992 report An Agenda for Peace, stated,

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the world have left some 20 million dead. The United Nations was rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises because of the vetoes—279 of them—cast in the Security Council, which were a vivid expression of the divisions of that period. With the end of the cold war there have been no such vetoes since 31 May 1990, and demands on the United Nations have surged.
International conferences, such as the Paris Conference of 1919, have often changed state boundaries or created new ones without the agreement of the populations concerned. Campaigning for the restoration to a country of territory occupied by coethnics is known as irredentism. One of the challenges to political science is to explain why, after the ending of the Cold War in 1989, Armenia, Croatia, and Serbia engaged in expensive irredentist campaigns while Hungary, Romania, and Russia did not.

The new international order has been unable to resolve some interstate conflicts. For example, the United Kingdom (UK) decided that it would withdraw from India in 1947 and that the territory should be divided to create the new state of Pakistan. It made this decision in advance of any agreement about the course of the boundary between the two states and about whether Kashmir (i.e., what was then the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir) would form part of India or Pakistan. With partition, Muslims and Hindus moved across the new border, rioting occurred elsewhere, and some 2 million men, women, and children lost their lives. The conflict over Kashmir remains unresolved and is a threat to peace in the region.

The following year (1948) saw the creation of the state of Israel and the intensification of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians; this conflict has also remained unresolved and is a threat to peace in the Middle East.

The Paris Conference led to the recognition of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as an extension of what had earlier been the Kingdom of Serbia. In 1945, it was reconstituted as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Federation broke up after Croatia and Slovenia seceded in 1991. Disputes have persisted over recognition of the state of Macedonia (and its name) and over the status of Kosovo, traditionally part of Serbia but with a largely Albanian population.

Elsewhere there have been serious intrastate conflicts, sometimes initiated by elements within the government itself, such as the attempted genocide in Rwanda in which, in 1994, many ethnic Hutus attempted to murder all ethnic Tutsis.

The Dimensions of Conflict

It is difficult to classify conflicts because each conflict is unique. A conflict is, by its very nature, political, but it may also have other dimensions.

Consider the case of Northern Ireland, an entity that was created in 1922 when what is now the Republic of Ireland was allowed to leave the UK and become independent. A narrow majority of the population of Northern Ireland identified as Protestant and wished to remain part of the UK. A minority, identified as Catholic and Republican, believed that no boundary should have been drawn, because the island was one unit. This was not a conflict between two homogeneous blocs, for many Republicans, despite believing that they had legitimate grievances, would have been satisfied without a united Ireland, and many in the majority disassociated themselves from the extreme expressions of Unionism. On both the Unionist and Republican sides, there was more than one political party competing for votes, quite apart from the party that was trying to bridge the divide.

Over the years there were issues that mobilized varying degrees of support either for protest or for the repression of what was perceived as a terrorist movement. Some sort of conflict continued, but it varied in intensity. It had a national dimension because, although the border had been guaranteed by the two states, it was still contested. It had an economic dimension because the Unionists monopolized the better-paid jobs. It had a religious dimension because many identified themselves by the faith they professed. Insofar as there were distinctive communities, it may be said that there was a conflict with an ethnic dimension. Different individuals had different motives for participating in the conflict (or for evading it by emigration). Individual identification with the opposing parties, and with the actions which expressed the conflict, varied continually.

If a broad definition is employed, it could be said that Northern Ireland provides an example of an ethnic conflict, though ethnicity is scarcely its distinguishing characteristic, and a classification as “ethnic” does not contribute anything of value to the analysis of events there.

Pakistanis are affronted that Kashmir, with a majority Muslim population, should remain a part of India, therefore the conflict there also has both a national and a religious dimension. Since the territory is valuable, it has an economic one as well. The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians likewise
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has a national dimension, reflecting a struggle between, on the one hand, a people with a Zionist state, and, on the other, a people who want either a new state of their own or equality in a reconstituted non-Zionist state. It has a religious dimension and, because of the great inequality of the conditions of the two peoples, an economic dimension as well. What is now the People’s Republic of China contends with two conflicts that are either—depending on interpretations of the historical record—within or on its borders. Tibet and Xinjiang have at times been subjected to Chinese overrule; in both, the indigenous people practice their own religions and demand a greater autonomy than that accorded by Chinese policies. Since the parties to each of these four conflicts are distinctive peoples, they are often represented as having an ethnic dimension. This suggests that all persisting conflicts, like all persisting social groups of the kind called communities, are almost certain to be multidimensional.

Theories of Conflict

In the 1960s and 1970s, some sociologists criticized prevailing assumptions that societies were based on consensus and that conflicts were therefore a deviant condition. Such inferences were criticized by Ralf Dahrendorf and others who maintained that, in industrial societies, there were necessarily conflicts of interest, such as those between employees and their employers. Indeed, according to the Marxist version of what was sometimes called “conflict theory,” the institutional structure of any capitalist society had to be explained as an imposed scheme for the regulation of class conflict. This was a useful correction of the approach known as structural functionalism, but to call it “conflict theory” was to use the word theory to describe a philosophy of society rather than to build a set of testable propositions.

A different example of theory in political science is the application of game theory to the study of conflict. Some conflicts resemble a zero-sum game: If one side makes a gain, the other side loses by an equal amount. Gains and losses sum to zero. Other conflicts have a positive-sum outcome. For example, conflicts serve the common good if they bring underlying disputes to the surface and lead to their resolution. In industrial relations, a threatened strike over pay can force an employer to make changes (e.g., investing in new machinery) that increase production and improve the income of both employers and employees. The sum of gains and losses on both sides is then more than zero. Yet other conflicts either leave both sides worse off, or any gain is more than counterbalanced by losses elsewhere; these then resemble a negative-sum game.

During the Cold War, game theory was used for calculating strategies for military opposition between East and West. The planners reasoned, “If we do this, they may retaliate with Policy A or Policy B. What is then the best course for us to follow in either event?” This was an application in which the two superpowers were seen as playing a game. The same reasoning can picture individuals as players—for example, “Will my gain exceed my losses to a greater degree if I support one side or the other in a given conflict? Or will it pay me to support neither?” This reasoning relies on rational choice theory to calculate the costs incurred by any failure to follow the course that maximizes net advantages.

In recent times, some major conflicts have been resolved by the intervention of a third party. During the Cold War, each of the superpowers intervened to resolve major conflicts within its own sphere of interest lest the opposing superpower exploit them in its interest. (For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] powers could not allow the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus to become an armed conflict.) Since the ending of the Cold War, the United States (helped by Canada) has intervened successfully to resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland and, so far unsuccessfully, the conflict over the rights of Palestinians. Superpower intervention is more potent because only such a power is able to promise rewards for all parties and thus hold out the prospect of a positive-sum outcome.

Those who apply game theory liken the parties to a conflict to the players of a game, but they cannot explain why there is a conflict in the first place. In the game of chess, one party plays white and one plays black. Game theory cannot explain which party gets to play white rather than black. Nor has this approach yet been very successful in linking the considerations of domestic policy to those of foreign policy, though models of two-level game theory take a step in this direction. In domestic
negotiations, the executive is pictured as absorbing the concerns of interest groups and building coalitions with them; at the international level, the executive then tries to further these concerns without committing to anything that will have deleterious effects at home. When the objectives of actors at both levels are in harmony, an international agreement can be negotiated.

**Strategy**

That conceptions of interest may be overlaid by other perceptions can be illustrated from studies of conflicts arising within the Hindu caste system of India. That system institutionalized inequality in ways that can be seen as attempting, with only limited success, to prevent competition between caste groups and to make protest illegitimate.

Some conflicts can be observed at the level of the village. A study in the state of Orissa by Frederick George Bailey in the early 1950s described a village in which the population was divided into caste groups (or *jatis*). Almost everyone was a Brahmin, a warrior, a distiller, a herdsman, a potter, a washerman, or a weaver, and there was no exit option. The weavers were “untouchables” (now often referred to as *Dalits*). They knew that the passing of the Temple Entry Act in 1947 had made it an offense to bar Hindus from temples on the grounds of untouchability, and they decided to assert their new right. They notified the local police headquarters that on the occasion of a particular festival, they would, as usual, take their offerings to a temple, but this time they would, like the higher castes, take them into the forechamber. The upper castes mounted a guard to prevent their doing so. The police arrived. They apparently advised the weavers to seek a remedy through the courts and probably said that if there were any more reports of trouble, two constables would be stationed in the village. The upper castes mounted a guard to prevent their doing so. The police arrived. They apparently advised the weavers to seek a remedy through the courts and probably said that if there were any more reports of trouble, two constables would be stationed in the village. The upper castes punished the weavers by ceasing to employ them as musicians on festive occasions, but the alleged failure to observe the 1947 Act did not go to court, and the previous equilibrium was restored.

The strategy of the weavers showed calculation in their choice of a particular temple and of a non-violent form of protest, and in declining the opportunity to pursue legal action. They invited oversight of their dispute, but they did not press for intervention. Everyone knew that if a police unit were to be billeted on the village it would be a collective punishment, a negative-sum outcome. By demonstrating a capacity to press a shared interest, they had presumably gained an enhanced self-respect at the price of a small material loss. They had warned the higher caste groups not to take traditional distinctions for granted.

Interpersonal relations within the village were multidimensional. Throughout, the caste groups cooperated but on terms that were not universally accepted. Dissent over these terms led to the challenge in which all concerned counted the cost of their actions.

Tolerance of what some regard as unjustified inequalities can be changed by the eloquence of mobilizers or by the messages of the mass media. Commentators agree that the highly selective use of television and radio to disseminate misleading accounts of the conduct of members of the national groups in the former Yugoslavia did much to stimulate violent conflict and led to the breakup of the federation. In Rwanda, radio messages inciting Hutus to slaughter Tutsis helped mobilize the mobs responsible for the genocide there. The calculation of strategy at the local level may be skewed by events beyond local control.

**Questions and Answers**

Political science research on the nature of conflicts needs to delimit the area of inquiry by examining a particular kind of conflict, or a particular aspect of it. Only by delimiting the question posed can an inquiry culminate in the sort of answer that characterizes social science.

Many studies have concentrated on violence, especially deadly violence. As forms of collective violence, riots have been distinguished from feuds, violent protests, terrorism, civil war, and genocide. Some of the questions posed have had a top-down character: Why are there more violent conflicts in some regions than in others? Why do their occurrence vary from one historical period or time to another? Why do some localities experience repeated violence? Most of the violent conflict in India is not between caste groups but centers on the hostility between Hindus and Muslims. Why should eight cities, containing just 18% of India’s population, have accounted for nearly half of the
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Ashutosh Varshney compared the conflict-prone city of Aligarh with the relatively conflict-free city of Calicut. In both cities there were conflicts between Hindus and Muslims, and in both cities committees to prevent violence had been established. They were effective in Calicut for several reasons, among them the counterbalancing effect of caste divisions among the Hindus. In Calicut, the interest of the political elite lay in the prevention of violence. In Aligarh, by contrast, different sections of the elite could gain from it. The study counted Hindu–Muslim violence as ethnic conflict, which is questionable; it took violence as a criterion for determining when an opposition became a conflict, which may not suffice as a criterion of conflict in other circumstances.

Is there an association between the nature of the state and the nature of the violence? For example, it has been argued that whereas a democratic country with a powerful state, such as Japan, experiences low levels of violence, a less democratic regime with a powerful military, such as Turkey, experiences more and that, because of state power, it has to take the form of terrorism rather than of rioting. Such an explanation must be qualified because, in Turkey, the actions described as terrorist have been taken on behalf of a minority seeking recognition as an ethnic or national unit, and there is no comparable minority in Japan.

Some questions have a bottom-up character. Why is one category of persons attacked rather than another? After the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 by a Punjabi Sikh, mobs in Delhi attacked Sikhs, but those they attacked were Sikhs from parts of India other than the Punjab, and the victims were not supporters of Punjabi separatism. In the Northern Nigerian town of Kano, in 1953, and again in 1966, Ibo settlers from the southern regions were attacked but not Yoruba settlers. The Northerners had just as much reason to suspect the political and commercial ambitions of the Yoruba from the Southwest as the Ibos from the Southeast. Why should one group have been victimized while another remained unharmed?

Rioters often justify their actions as responses to provocation, yet sometimes incidents that could be represented as provocative are ignored. Such differences inspire important questions about how violent incidents are organized and the willingness, or ability, of officials (such as police commanders), and of political elites, to suppress them.

Why, it was asked earlier, did Armenia go to war in 1991 with Azerbaijan in order to establish a corridor linking up with an Armenian enclave living in Azerbaijani territory? It proved an expensive venture, and the result has not been acceptable to other states. Why did Croatia try to grab portions of Bosnia inhabited by fellow Croats and Serbia risk so much on behalf of Serbs outside Serbia? Can these actions be attributed to nationalism? If so, why did Hungary not try to renegotiate its boundary with Romania to recover some of the territory it lost in 1920? Romania lost Bessarabia in 1939; later it became the state of Moldova. Why did Romania and Moldova not reunite after 1989? Why, after the dissolution of the USSR, was not more done to bring the 25 million people outside Russia into closer contact with their motherland? A closer analysis of these cases shows, for example, that Armenian nationalism was exceptionally sensitive because of the genocidal persecution of Armenians in Turkey in 1916. Nationalist sentiment in itself achieves little unless there are politicians who can attain power by inciting it, while the voters do not want to carry the costs of incorporating a minority from whom they have grown distant.

Apart from the questions about the policies of states, there are many questions about the behavior, in conflict situations, of the public. Why do otherwise peaceful neighbors kill each other? If they kill others, why do they kill them in one way rather than another? Why are the bodies of victims of collective violence sometimes mutilated? Why are certain sorts of people more inclined to participate in collective violence? Within the same group, some prefer peace and others riot. Why are men more prone to violence than women? Anyone who favors a particular answer to such a question then has to ask why that answer obtains in certain circumstances and not in others.

Conclusion

Germany and France were at war with one another from 1870 to 1871, 1914 to 1918, and 1939 to 1945. In the 21st century, it is inconceivable that
either country would declare war on the other because their economies, and the lives of their peoples, are now so closely intertwined. The sources of peace are to be sought in the relations between humans, their understanding of the nature of these relations, and their knowledge of other people. By seeking these sources, political science research aims to advance knowledge about the nature and regulation of conflicts, and it has therefore to account for the absence of conflict as well as for variations in the intensity and scope of conflicts. While the detailed historical examination of particular conflicts is essential, there are general issues that continue to stimulate research.

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See also Bargaining; Game Theory; Peace Research; Rational Choice; United Nations

Further Readings
and other early Confucians, society becomes harmonious only when those who occupy positions of responsibility are the ones with the ability to discharge those responsibilities.

What specific quality is required of those who should govern? Confucianism endorses the possession of virtue—understanding of and commitment to the common good—as the only proper basis for a claim to governmental authority. Accordingly, Confucius and his followers called for government by the virtuous and wise, not by ordinary people. Yet they did not favor the hereditary system of aristocracy. Instead, they advocated a merit-based system of government, which would allow every citizen to take competitive examinations that test virtues and knowledge. Thus, the most talented would rise to the highest offices. This system of meritocracy replaced the rule by hereditary aristocracy in Confucian Asia long before the same was done in the West.

How should rulers govern the state to build a harmonious and prosperous community? Early Confucians advocated the principle of minben as the most important principle of governing. Minben, which originates from the pre-Confucian period, means treating “people” (min) as “roots” (ben). Thus, they form the foundation of the state. To govern according to this principle is, therefore, to govern for the people (min), for their economic prosperity, and for their physical security just as the roots of trees (ben) should be tended (Analects, XIII 9). By embracing ordinary citizens as the roots of government, this principle demands that rulers seek the prosperity and welfare of ordinary citizens as the ultimate end of good government.

To govern according to the principle of minben involves not only providing sufficient food and security but also disseminating virtue throughout society (Analects, XII 7). In this regard, Confucius said that people should be educated as soon as their livelihood is secured (Analects, XIII 9). Confucianism gives priority to the task of securing livelihood because people can only be expected to behave morally after they are relieved of poverty. As Benjamin Schwartz (1985) points out, Mencius (5a.3) emphasized an economic livelihood as an indispensable precondition for moral education and advocated the hierarchy of human needs as a conceptual tool for governance more than 2 millennia before Abraham Maslow did.

To early Confucians, moral education was essential to the building of a harmonious community because law and punishment were viewed as ineffective means for maintaining order. The higher goal of social harmony could be attained only when people became virtuous and fulfilled their duties to others voluntarily. To build a nation of virtues, therefore, Confucianism emphasized the importance of providing education to all segments of the population. Confucius himself said there is no class distinction in education (Analects, VII 7). He was the first scholar to advocate and popularize the notion of mandatory universal education.

The minben principle also holds that good government depends on the mutually beneficial relationship between rulers and the ruled (Analects, XII 9). For this reason, Confucius advocated not only good intentions but also benevolent behavior on the part of rulers and the avoidance of cruelty, oppression, injury, and meanness (Analects, XX 2). Confucius urged rulers to treat people as generously and honestly as their own guests. They were not to impose on others what they themselves did not desire (Analects, XII 2). Only when rulers practice this golden rule of ren (benevolence) can the people provide a sense of legitimacy to their government. In other words, rulers can govern people only when they have acquired their trust. Otherwise, people will begin to think they are oppressed (Analects, XIX 10).

According to early Confucians, heaven consents to the legitimacy of a government when its people consent to it. According to Mencius (5a.5), heaven sees with the eyes of its people; heaven hears with the ears of its people. They further emphasized popular consent as the most essential component of good government, more essential than sufficient food and sufficient weapons (Analects, XX 2). In short, early Confucians proposed an important political theory that holds that governmental legitimacy depends solely on popular support and trust. This notion of governmental legitimacy is at the heart of the contemporary theory of democratic regime consolidation. As Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) observe, democracy becomes legitimized only when people embrace it unconditionally.

To obtain good government, the early Confucians advocated the use of moral persuasion rather than universally applicable penal laws,
Confucianism

because the latter often require coercion. Having assumed that people are inherently good and thus capable of learning and achieving moral development, they can be persuaded to overcome their selfishness and exercise moral discipline instead of being forced to do so by law. By motivating them to follow positive examples and fulfill their duties voluntarily, the rule of virtue or rule by morality can win their loyalty to the government.

Rule by law, on the other hand, involves forcing people to submit to government through punishments, thus making them distrust it. For another reason, early Confucians preferred the rule of morality and customs to that of laws and regulations. They believed that a sense of losing face and being shamed would serve as a more effective deterrent to crime than the sense of guilt that the latter engenders.

The third Confucian principle of good government is known as zhongyong, or the doctrine of the Mean. This tells rulers how to make decisions in order to achieve the state of harmony among those with different preferences and interests. To underline the importance of this decision-making principle, Confucius said that perfect is the virtue that is according to the Mean. The core idea of this principle is that going beyond the limit is as bad as falling short (A. T. Nuyen, 2000). It requires being reasonable and moderate without going to the extreme or being one-sided. As a decision-making rule, this principle predates the contemporary median voter theory, holding that politicians should commit to the median policy position preferred by the electorate in order to maximize their votes (Anthony Downs, 1957).

Conclusion

Confucianism equates good government primarily with a benevolent government built on the consent of the people. It also equates good government with primary reliance on virtue and morality. The Confucian governing model calls for government for the people by a virtuous and meritocratic leadership, not government by the people. The Confucian model contrasts sharply with the liberal democratic notion of government, with its emphasis on a government elected by the people and operated according to the rule of law. Due to these differences, there is contemporary debate among scholars such as David Hall and Roger Ames, Samuel Huntington, and Fareed Zakaria over whether China and other East Asian societies shaped by Confucianism can fully accommodate to liberal democracy as practiced in the West.

Nonetheless, we should note that Confucianism has played a vital role in the process of socioeconomic modernization in Asian societies by inducing their governments to promote universal education as a means of national development. To the scholarly community, it offers the original notion of a human-needs hierarchy and theories of governmental decision making and legitimacy. The rich Confucian cultural heritage, moreover, provides the mass publics of the Asian nations the essential premises on which they can construct a viable balance of individual rights and interests with communal goods and obligations as an alternative to the liberal democracy model practiced in the West.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Elitism; Governance, Good; Legitimacy; Virtue

Further Readings

Unlike many concepts in political science whose meaning is quite contentious—for example, democracy, ethnicity, and state—the concept of consensus is among the simplest and most transparent in the discipline. It is universally agreed that the term denotes agreement or unanimity. It is often used in phrases and in conjunction with qualifiers, such as near-consensus, consensus building, international consensus, moral consensus, consensus-based approach, permissive consensus, and cross-party consensus. Although there is strong agreement on the meaning of consensus, there are many concepts that refer to its absence, including cleavage, conflict, competition, contestation, division, majoritarianism, pluralism, and polarization.

The concept of consensus has played a key role in four areas of research within political science: political philosophy, where John Rawls proposed the term overlapping consensus to provide a practical solution to a fundamental political problem for liberal democratic theory: How is political order maintained when reasonable people hold deeply divergent comprehensive worldviews? Rawls believed that there is no philosophical solution to the problem, that it is impossible to reach a consensus by rational discussion on the meaning of the public good. His solution was to propose a liberal political framework, one maintained by overlapping consensus among those with fundamentally different comprehensive worldviews. The framework reflects a “thin” theory of the good—that is, one not based on a single conception of the good. However, Rawls claims that this liberal framework of overlapping consensus is not a second-best pragmatic compromise, a mere result of a stalemate among competing worldviews, and a regrettable necessity given that no one worldview is sufficiently powerful to dominate all others. Instead, he claimed that a liberal framework is the best political solution, one that can be a crucial element in competing comprehensive worldviews. (Some critics questioned his optimism on this score.)

Other political theorists, including Charles Taylor and Jürgen Habermas, have advocated seeking to develop consensus through rational discussion, and the concept known as deliberative democracy has highlighted the value of promoting extended discussion to reach consensus rather than foreclosing deliberation by majority vote. (Political theorists who have contributed to the project are James S. Fishkin and Jon Elster.)

From another vantage point, some political theorists have challenged the normative value of consensus. They claim that a hallmark of democracy is divergence, debate, and conflict. For example,
Chantal Mouffe praises the value of what she terms *antagonistic pluralism*. At an extreme, Isaiah Berlin warned decades ago of the danger of a totalitarian temptation implicit in seeking and imposing a single consensual understanding of the common good.

**Consensus Democracy**

Lijphart suggested the term *consensus democracy* as an extension and partial revision of the earlier concept that he developed: consociational democracy. Consociationalism is a pattern of governance that Lijphart first identified in the Netherlands and later applied, in both descriptive and normative terms, to other deeply divided societies. It involves a pattern of decision making in which elites from separate sectors or pillars reach accommodation or consensus across ethnic, religious, or ideological divides.

Lijphart identified consensus democracy as a broader form of political accommodation. It is an ideal type of regime, one characterized by inclusion, in contrast to its polar opposite, what Lijphart termed *majoritarian democracy*. Some key institutional features of consensus democracies are bicameral legislatures, the use of proportional representation to elect the lower house of the legislature, multiparty systems, multiparty governing coalitions that typically promote supermajority support for the passage of significant reforms, and ample protection for minorities. Consensus democracies are associated with broad governing coalitions. Rather than reaching decisions by narrow majorities, consensus democracies promote policy changes only if they enjoy broad political support.

Critics of Lijphart have challenged what they regard as antidemocratic features of his approach. They charge that the accommodations reached by elites in consociational democracies come at the expense of democratic participation and decision making. And requiring supermajorities within consensus democracies enables minorities to block the majority will. Lijphart responded that comparisons between the two regime types suggest that consensus democracies outperform majoritarian democracies on significant measures of good governance.

**Washington Consensus**

The term *Washington Consensus* was coined in 1990 to describe a policy agenda developed by officials in the U.S. government and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), influential international financial institutions whose headquarters are in Washington, D.C. Leaders of these institutions agreed that neoliberal economic policies were the most appropriate and desirable to promote economic development and growth. The Washington Consensus accorded priority to economic “fundamentals,” including balanced budgets, price stability, tax and spending cuts, trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization of state-provided goods and services such as utilities, transport, and education. These goals were to be achieved by adopting structural adjustment policies consistent with neoliberal doctrine. In simplest terms, the Washington Consensus advocated more markets and less state. It was crafted in reaction to the approach stressing state-directed economic policies, which was practiced by less developed countries, especially in Latin America, in the 1950s and 1960s. A key element of the statist approach involved import substitute industrialization—that is, state intervention to foster domestic industrial development, especially by substituting local production of consumer goods for foreign imports.

The Washington Consensus was extremely influential for several decades. It informed the aid policies of the U.S. government, the World Bank, and the IMF and shaped the orientation of many governments throughout the less developed world. The Washington Consensus was far from commanding a consensus. Opponents included progressive economists in the advanced industrial world and governmental leaders and popular movements in countries such as Malaysia, Russia, and Argentina, which experienced economic dislocations and crises after adopting the policies of the Washington Consensus. Critics charged that the Washington Consensus promoted austerity for the broad mass of the population without generating adequate economic benefits, reflected a one-size-fits-all approach that ignored extensive variations among countries, emphasized the value of large industrialization projects that often caused social dislocations and environmental degradation, bypassed democratic decision making, produced financial panics and economic crises, and neglected problems of poverty, corruption, and autocracy.

By the 1990s, modifications occurred within the Washington Consensus. For example, the World
Bank reduced support for large-scale industrial projects such as giant dams; placed priority on developing honest, effective political institutions; and provided for wider consultation in developing policy recommendations. However, as a general matter, changes have occurred within the Washington Consensus; no comparably broad alternative has replaced the paradigm.

**Domain Consensus**

The concept of domain consensus has been an important element within the field of organization theory. It refers to the fact that expectations about what is appropriate behavior varies for members of different domains, including sectors such as civil society, the market, and the state; different regions and localities; and specific organizations. The concept refers to expectations about how members in the domain will interact with each other and with nonmembers, about the nature of their respective roles and responsibilities, and about what the collectivity will and will not do.

**Political Applications of Consensus**

Consensus-based approaches to decision making are relatively rare in nation-states. Bureaucracies usually make decisions by fiat, often after top-down consultation. Legislative decision making is usually made on the basis of majority rule, although in many cases (especially in Lijphart’s consensus democracies) supermajorities are the rule. The situation is different in most international organizations, where decisions typically require a consensus of member states. Examples include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Southern Common Market Agreement (Mercado Común del Sur, MERCOSUR), and World Trade Organization (WTO). There are exceptions. In the European Union, voting on many issues is by a simple majority, decisions on others is by a weighted majority in which certain member states have plural votes, and some issues are of such importance (notably, the admission of new members or changes of constitutional importance) that unanimity by member states is required. The United Nations Security Council practices a form of supermajority voting. Not only must a proposal pass by majority vote but all five permanent members of the Council must either support or at least refrain from vetoing proposals.

There are many examples of microlevel institutions that employ a consensus-based approach based on the principles of deliberative democracy, including consensus conferences in Denmark, citizens’ juries in the United States, planning cells in Germany, and citizens’ panels in Britain. These mechanisms often bring together technical experts, government officials, and rank-and-file citizens to analyze issues such as the siting of waste treatment plants or the risks involved in genetically modified organisms and other technological innovations. The goal is to encourage those of diverse perspectives to engage in extended dialogue in order to forge a consensus or at least avoid polarization.

As is evident from this overview, if the definition of consensus is unproblematic, there is no consensus on how the concept is applied and evaluated. It has played a role in highly diverse political analyses and practices. This both testifies to its utility and invites further reflection and experimentation by scholars, practitioners, and citizens.

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**See also** Cleavages, Social and Political; Competition, Political; Conflicts; Pluralism

**Further Readings**


Conservatism

Conservatism is one of the basic currents of democratic political life, which is founded on a (moderate) critique of liberalism. Conservatism generally accepts the political institutions of liberal democracy, but it denounces the dangers that come from the decline of traditions and from the modern emancipation of individuals. The study of the diverse traditions of conservatism must start with the explanation of its complex nature as philosophy and as political attitude; it requires a historical study of the growth of conservatism from the Enlightenment to the birth of modern democracy through the democratic revolutions of Europe and America and, in the end, a philosophical examination of its theoretical foundations. This entry begins with a definition of conservatism as both a philosophy and a political ideology, briefly traces its historical origins and development in British politics, and concludes with a look at contemporary conservative thought.

Conservatism is both a political philosophy, with its concepts, traditions and classical authors, and a political ideology, which is one of the main currents of political life in modern democratic politics. As a philosophy, it is founded on a critique of modern liberalism, which, as Philippe Bénéton has shown, is directed against what conservatism regards as three great illusions that are the consequences of individual liberalism. The first of these illusions is epistemological and comes from one of the main tendencies of modern philosophy, originating with René Descartes and the age of Enlightenment: It consists in identifying individual reason as the judge of truth. The second one, more directly political, makes individual reason the only foundation of political legitimacy. The third could be named “sociological” and leads to the notion of society as a mere aggregate of individuals, to the detriment of community and/or of social hierarchy. To these illusions, conservatism objects that the individual is never really independent, that all his or her accomplishments have some underlying communitarian or traditional condition that escapes individual reason, and that the neglect of such a debt is a danger for the community and finally even for the individual.

Conservatism is not only a philosophy but also a political attitude that interacts with other currents in political life. To understand its nature, we can start with the usual tripartition that makes conservatism one of the three basic political currents, together with liberalism and socialism: Liberalism is the center of gravity of modern democratic politics but, as it cannot satisfy all the expectations that arise in an open society, it engenders permanent criticisms that can be “socialist,” if they argue for a new reconstruction of society, or “conservative,” if they try to maintain or restore something of the “world we have lost.” In both definitions, conservatism appears not only as an expression of permanent dispositions of human nature but also as a paradoxical product of modernity, which is dependent on what it contests, namely, the faith in individual reason as the foundation of authority, and the philosophical and political order, and which can be defined by three essential features:

1. Conservatism is a modern criticism of modernity, which criticizes or even condemns some principles of modernity but does not reject all the consequences of liberal modernity.

2. Even if conservatism was strengthened by its opposition to the French Revolution, its main themes were born before it, within liberal politics, as an internal criticism of classical liberalism.

3. The most central idea of conservative thought is that of the risk of self-destruction of liberal traditions and institutions, which is supposed to be the consequence of a violent rupture with the past and/or with the “natural” basis of human societies. The diverse varieties of conservatism differ in their interpretations of this common idea.

Thus, comprehension of conservatism requires a historical examination of the growth of conservative politics between the 17th and 19th centuries and then a philosophical examination of the diverse expressions of the conservative arguments.

The British Sources of Conservatism

The distinction between liberals and conservatives emerged within English politics, with the opposition between the Tory and Whig Parties, and it
took on a new significance with the French Revolution.

Whig and Tory are two English words that refer to the two great tendencies—respectively, liberal and conservative—of British politics before the rise of the Labour Party. A Whig is not only a liberal but also a conscious heir of the constitutional English tradition, that of rule of law and parliamentary government; a Tory is devoted to a certain type of social relations, in which the authority of “gentlemen” goes with a protective function and which is connected with High Church Anglicanism. Before 1688, the appellation “Tory” designated the supporters of James II (who the “Whigs” mistrusted because of his alleged “papism” and his commitment to a French-style “absolutist” monarchy), but after the Glorious Revolution the significance of the opposition changed. Most Tories abandoned the absolutist doctrine and partially accepted the Whig interpretation of the English regime as a limited monarchy, but they remained faithful to the institution of prerogative, which authorizes the king to make exceptions to the law of parliament in some special cases, and, more generally, they were devoted to everything that, in the English regime, was favorable to traditional hierarchies. The Tory Party was marginal during the long period of Whig supremacy, which begins with the accession of George I to the throne (1714), but the opposition Whig and Tory became relevant again at the end of 18th century. The Tory Party found a new vigor with William Pitt the Younger, who founded a new alliance between gentry and the commercial elite, while the New Whigs became more democratic thanks to the leadership of James Fox. The French Revolution showed the significance of this evolution; it caused the rupture between James Fox and Edmund Burke who, although a Whig, denounced the French experience as a radical subversion of a tradition that English and even American Revolutions had respected. Whiggism and, more generally, liberalism divided into two tendencies, “radical” and “conservative,” which never disappeared afterward.

Has English conservatism experienced a general significance beyond this historical context? One may think so, if one leans on the interpretation of English politics that David Hume gave and on a reflection on the philosophical implications Edmund Burke’s criticism of the French Revolution.

David Hume (1711–1776) was certainly a “liberal” with some “conservative” elements in his doctrine, but he was neither a Whig nor a Tory, because he interpreted the English constitution in a sense that explains the permanent division of English politics between successive pairs of parties (first Tory/Whig, then Court/Country). According to Hume, the English regime is both republican, because liberty is expressed through the institution of Parliament, and monarchic, because of the executive power of the king. So the “parties of Great Britain” are for him the expressions of the dual nature of the constitution. In political philosophy, this opposition gave birth to two conflicting doctrines. The Whigs consider that all legitimate government must be founded on explicit consent (“original contract”); the Tories offer an extremist interpretation of loyalism and argue for the idea of “passive obedience” to legal authorities (especially to the king). Hume refuses both principles: “Original contract” cannot explain the real nature of political obligation, and “passive obedience” is incompatible with the real interest of society. Nevertheless, he considers that these two conflicting principles have some kind of truth in the English context, as expressions of the two elements of the constitution of Great Britain, and he shows how some strong “conservative” feeling can be a functional feature of a free government. But, even if he is not himself a “Tory,” Hume provides a political philosophy that is “conservative” in another sense. Hume’s doctrine of politics accepts the effects of revolution without assuming its principles because he refuses the illusion of a rational, deliberate reconstruction of political order; he argues for a sort of synthesis between “liberalism” and “conservatism,” according to which the durable foundation of liberty requires the stability of institutions and a historical continuity that makes possible a translation of political innovations into the language of tradition. Beyond the Tory pastoral, another kind of conservatism is possible, philosophically skeptical and open to political innovation, intended as a paradoxical mean of conservation of social order (the well-known sentence of novelist Giuseppe di Lampedusa’s hero in The Leopard—“Everything must change so that everything can stay the same”—could just as well be from Hume).

The French Revolution was seen as the critical turning point in the history of liberalism, which
produced a division between two wings: the radical or democratic and the conservative. The most important author is Edmund Burke, who was the first great critic of the French Revolution, as early as 1790, with his major book *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. Burke was himself a genuine Whig, who had supported every great liberal cause, from the fight against political corruption to religious freedom, and who had even accepted American Independence; so his opposition to the French Revolution was especially significant as an expression of the divisions of liberal opinion.

According to Burke, there is an essential difference between the French Revolution of 1789 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688 or even the American Revolution. In one case, people make an exception to the constitutional rule in order to save a regime at risk (the Glorious Revolution of 1688) or to resist tyranny (the American Revolution of 1776); in the other one, a rule is made of the exception itself, by the affirmation that political liberty and the capacity to change the rulers are human rights. For that reason, the French theory of *droits de l’homme* (human rights) represents an aggression against the European political order and a rupture of tradition. On this foundation, Burke builds a coherent conservative doctrine, the influence of which is very large. The basic idea is that of the fragility of human nature, which implies that freedom cannot be natural but emerges only as a product of history and chance, much more than of deliberate action (such is the meaning of the well-known opposition between “rights of man” and “rights of English people”). For this reason, the first condition of liberty is historical continuity, and it explains the ambivalence of the Enlightenment: If, as in England, modernity respects tradition, its effects can be beneficent, but when modern reason revolts against the Christian and aristocratic sources of liberty, it becomes destructive. Thus, the English regime is an example of moderate liberty, in which open aristocracy associates itself with new elites thanks to a transaction between “landed interest” and “monied interest,” whereas France is the theater of a mortal conflict between noblesse and bourgeoisie, which produces the insurrection of the mob. This philosophy implies a sound criticism of modern individualism, which constitutes the central argument of Burke in favor of “prejudices” and tradition, which are more rational than individual reason. Burke reasserts many liberal views, most of which come from English and Scottish traditions, but he reinterprets them in a new sense: The market is a way not only of cooperation but also of subordination; the social contract is not equalitarian but is founded on the alliance between God and His creatures. So this theory, which, in Burke’s works, remains liberal and, in some way, faithful to moderate Enlightenment, is also one of the main sources of illiberal doctrines, as those of the French Counter-Revolution or German Political Romanticism.

If the legacy of classical conservatism (“Tory,” “Humean,” or “Burkean”) is rich and even imposing in the English-speaking world, it is commonly seen as less impressive in continental Europe and especially in Germany and in France (even if politicians like Guizot and Bismarck or de Gaulle and Adenauer can be considered as great conservative statesmen). In this part of the world, as political liberty comes principally from the French Revolution, liberalism is not traditional, and the criticism of liberal and/or radical politics is often more reactionary than conservative.

**Main Currents of Conservative Thought**

To identify the main themes of conservative thought, one can either use a historical investigation (which presupposes some hypothesis about the nature of conservatism) or try to give a general analysis that follows from a view of the uses and functions of conservatism in political life.

The first way can be exemplified by Russell Kirk’s *The Conservative Mind*, which is itself a classical work of conservative philosophy. Kirk presented himself as the American champion of a forgotten tradition, who tried to make Americans conscious of the conservative elements of their own culture. He goes back to the origins of American tradition and tries to resuscitate the classical or traditional dimension of the American regime, which he interprets as a mixed constitution, including, thanks to John Adams, some aristocratic features not reducible to the democratic spirit of Jefferson. Referring to diverse American and English thinkers, Kirk proposes a kind of ideal type of conservatism, which combines features such as the belief in a transcendent order, affection for the “variety and mystery” of human existence, acceptance of social hierarchy, and devotion to custom.
and tradition as conditions of legitimate innovations. Invoking sometimes tradition, sometimes divine revelation or natural law, Kirk is a religious (Christian) and traditionalist thinker whose philosophy conveys a kind of American Toryism.

One can find a good example of a structural analysis of conservatism in Albert O. Hirschman’s *The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy*, which describes the general features of conservative rhetoric when confronted by various examples of liberal or radical arguments or action. Conservatism (which could be called here a “reaction”) is supposed to underlie the typical arguments that can be opposed to any attempts to transform or ameliorate the social order. One can say the projected action is dangerous, because it can produce unintended and bad or “perverse” effects (the argument of “perversity”). One can insist on the uselessness of reforms or revolutions, which never can change the human condition or the basic social relations (“futility”). One can, finally, assert that attractive innovations are dangerous for social goods (“jeopardy” vs., for example, the criticism of the welfare state as a danger for civil and political liberty).

Both theories present some interest as descriptions of the conservative spirit or attitude, but to some observers, neither of them seems really sufficient. One possible weakness of Kirk’s account is a lack of emphasis on certain themes that are independent of religious faith: Many “conservative” authors, notably in what Robert Nisbet calls the “sociological tradition,” were in fact nonbelievers or even atheists, whose criticism of modernity is not founded on nostalgia for the age of faith or on the idea of natural law. As for Hirschman, his model can be applied to any argumentation against deliberate action: the so-called reactionary rhetoric can be used by liberals or progressives (if they want to prevent some “ reactionary” decision) and, on the contrary, conservatives can abandon and even reject it when they try to convince people to act with courage or to accept some risks for the public good. There are probably several sorts of conservatism, insofar as the criticism of modernity can be made from different points of view. Perhaps the definition of conservatism must be essentially negative, starting with what conservatives refuse rather than with what they desire. If one accepts the hypothesis with which this entry starts (conservatism is a basically a modern criticism of modernity), one can say that the main theme of conservatism lies in the refusal of two liberal and progressive ideas: that of the self-sufficiency of the individual and that of a possible social solution to the permanent problems of humanity. This refusal is evidently central in the thinkers that Kirk admires, but it is no less important in other traditions that are not committed to the nostalgia for religious tradition. In fact, besides lovers of transcendence, we find among conservatives many sober (and sometimes even cynical) critics of any sort of idealism. This is notably the case, in the sociological tradition, of the so-called Machiavellians, who contributed notably to the growth and vitality of conservative thought.

One of the most interesting contributions of social science to conservative thought can be found in Vilfredo Pareto’s *Treatise on General Sociology*, which is at the same time very critical of humanistic values and almost skeptical toward traditional ideas. The basic thesis of the *Treatise* is that of the eternity of the division of society between the elite and “the people”; It comes from Machiavelli but without any of the democratic connotations that one can find in the Florentine philosopher. For Pareto, society is always divided between the mass of individuals and the ruling, honored (and generally propertied) minority, whose definition is itself value neutral. The elites are not necessarily virtuous or even beneficial: They include all the persons or groups that are in some way above the average. Concerning the ruling elite, it is defined by some capacity for domination, either by strength or by cunning (see Machiavelli’s division of rulers into “lions” and “foxes”). So this “sociology” is supposed to refute the democratic and socialist idea of an egalitarian society, and it implies some “conservative” or “reactionary” argument in the sense of Hirschman’s theory: If division of society is eternal, social change is an illusion, and revolutions are, at best, futile. Besides, Pareto gives not only an argument against some specific action but also a general theory, which includes a pessimistic view of human capacity to rationalize society. However, this theory is not “conservative” in Kirk’s sense of the word; the social order has no transcendent basis or value, and the first aim of the ruling class is not to
promote the social good but to make its domination legitimate. So we can consider Pareto’s theory as an example of a conservative theory that abandons the arguments favoring tradition and legitimates the ruling elites without accepting their opinions or arguments.

From this point of view, the most important elements of Pareto’s theory are probably, on the one hand, the idea of the circulation of elites and, on the other hand, the division of motives of actions between residues and derivations. The theory of circulation of elites derives from the elite–mass division: If that division is eternal, all that happens can be only a replacement of an old, exhausted elite by a new and vigorous one. But it implies also some political teachings for the ruling class. If it wants to keep its position, the elite must not submit to humanitarian illusion of egalitarian relations with the ruled, but it must also be open to some elements from the ruled, both to attenuate the conflict with other classes and to regenerate itself thanks to the incorporation of talented people. So, even if it includes some emphatic exaltation of the elite, the Paretian ideal of a ruling class is close to the moderate English idea of open aristocracy. The distinction between residues and derivations gives a sociological equivalent of a theory of human nature. For Pareto, the main problem of sociology is to explain what he calls “nonlogical” actions—that is, actions in which the means are not adapted to the ends, even if the actor believes that they are. People give many arguments for such actions, but, in fact, experience shows that these justifications are less important than the basic feeling, or instinct, that underlies human actions. So one can distinguish between two classes of motives, a and b. The first class—a, that of residues—includes constant and permanent motives of action; the second one—b, that of derivations—comes from the “work accomplished by mind in order to explain a” and is much more variable because it comes from “fancy” (Treatise, sec. 850–851). Pareto enumerates six classes of residues, among which the two first ones have the greatest importance and pertinence for political analysis. The first class is the “instinct of combinations,” which underlies invention and innovation and which is the basis of progress or civilization. The second class is “persistence of aggregates,” which explains the fondness for past combinations and the mistrust of innovations. Each of them corresponds to distinct types of human beings and the predominance of one class of residues in a society explains much of its culture and of its political trends. “Conservatism” in the vulgar sense evidently has a strong affinity with “persistence of aggregates,” but, for Pareto, the conservation of society (and of an elite) requires an association between the two classes of residues. On one side, we have ancient Athens, or modern France, in which “instinct of combination” predominates: These societies are brilliant but unstable. On the other side, one finds Sparta, or 19th-century Prussia, in which “persistence of aggregates” is very important: They can seem stronger, but they lack the capacity of adaptation to change. The middle between these extremes could be ancient Rome or modern England, in which the combination of the two classes is such that innovation does not jeopardize the conservation of society or of political combination. So, the general theory of human motives (or of human nature) confirms the teaching of the analysis of social stratification: The best way for the elite is to accept change and circulation without adoring them and this “dynamic” conservatism is founded on a secular vision without any faith in Natural Law or in religion.

Pareto has many descendants in social science who could be defined as realists and modern conservatives. The most prominent of them is probably Joseph Schumpeter, whose theory of capitalism and of democracy is a touchstone of conservative sociology. In his political theory, Schumpeter shows that democracy is not really the government of the people by the people and for the people but is simply the free competition of elites for power, with the people as arbiter. However, he admits implicitly that people count, since he considers that democracy can undermine capitalism and even engender “socialism.” His vision of capitalism includes a major topic of conservatism. Capitalism is defined by its capacity for innovation, but this strength is at the same time its weakness: The danger is that capitalism could itself destroy the cultural conditions of its development.

So conservatism includes a traditionalist criticism of modernization but is not reducible to that. If it has its roots in disillusionment with the effects of modern liberalism, it is possible to designate as “conservative” some other premodern doctrines,
when they are founded on a similar skeptical reaction to social change. Inversely, one can consider that conservatism is always difficult in modern democracies, where innovation is generally more appreciated than stability. One example of this difficulty could be the so-called American neoconservatives, who advocated the use of radical means to attain conservative ends.

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See also Liberalism; Modernization Theory; Socialism; Traditional Rule

Further Readings

CONSERVATIVE PARTIES

Parties are organizations that seek to mobilize public support in order to compete for political power. In principle, attempts at support mobilization can be, and not infrequently are, based on appeals other than those rooted in political views (e.g., the promise of patronage benefits). However, where the publics to be mobilized are very large (as in most liberal-democratic regimes), parties cannot avoid having to compete by espousing alternative sets of public policies—in their turn linked to, and informed by, contrasting political principles or ideologies. At their simplest, then, conservative parties can be defined as organizations bringing together people committed to the quest for power in order to advance an agenda of conservatism—which may in turn be defined as a set of political principles arising from and expressing a commitment to the status quo or the status quo ante. Yet on this definition alone, even parties that most political scientists would not see as belonging to the category—for example, the Soviet Communist Party after 1917—would qualify. So there is also a historical criterion that must be fulfilled, since the parties that have tended to attract the label are ones that first emerged in some parts of the world about 200 years ago to counter the demands of liberals—here meaning 18th- and 19th-century Europeans committed to four essential tenets: (1) a belief in the ontological priority of individuals as against society and (2) an unlimited potential for human improvement through the application of reason, therefore (3) a normative commitment to individual freedom and the view that (4) government is legitimate only insofar as it rests on the consent of the governed. Conservatives especially opposed, among the political positions stemming from these tenets, those according to which there was neither inherent value in tradition nor any role for hereditary or religious criteria in political institutions or decision making. This entry reviews conservative political principles in more detail, looking at how they have evolved over time. It also considers how the parties espousing them have been organized, who has supported them and how they have performed electorally, and the role they have played in the party systems that they have been part of.

Political Principles

Conservative parties have, generally, been reluctant to call themselves such, preferring more inclusive
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The reason is that “party” and “conservatism” implied that they sought to make a case for a specific point of view or interest, whereas they saw themselves as defending a way of life, society being viewed as an organic whole—and from their point of view, this was not something they ought to have been obliged to argue over in the first place. From this outlook stemmed their professions of antipathy to “ideology”—the product of reason—with its capacity to disarticulate a body politic whose parts were integrated, not by design but thanks to the accumulated wisdom of the ages. This did not mean that the conservative position was one of opposition to change of whatever kind: On the contrary, societies, like organisms, had to adjust to new circumstances if they were to survive. But it meant that change was to be adaptive, not revolutionary.

The role of change in the conservative outlook has meant that over the years its agendas and programs have—paradoxically—altered much more radically than have liberal and socialist agendas and programs with their greater attachment to abiding principles. Of the changes and trends that required this alteration, the two most significant following the conservative parties’ emergence were the spread of industrialism and extension of the franchise. The first brought about, in many instances, a gradual reconciliation and integration of the interests of the landed elite with those of the rising bourgeoisie—the successful pursuit of whose activities required priority to be given to the quintessentially liberal principles of due process, the rule of law, and meritocracy. In such instances, the principles became conservative ones as well.

The second trend threatened to render conservatism unappealing on account of its traditional opposition to democracy—but also offered the means to its survival. Conservatives’ defense of the established order had always entailed a paternalistic sensitivity to the legitimate concerns of ordinary people and the poor. The mass franchise now enabled and required a renewed emphasis on this social reform aspect of the conservative agenda.

A third significant trend was the growth of nationalism. Originally popular and democratic, it was not therefore a distinctively conservative principle. However, as it increasingly became an accomplished fact—through the unification of Italy and Germany and similar events—it offered a means of countering the most significant threat posed by the advent of the mass franchise: the growth of socialist parties and ideologies of international workers’ solidarity.

The final major adjustment in conservative thinking took place in the period after World War II. Initially, the collapse of fascism had brought a “technocratic” kind of conservatism. A social-democratic hegemony based around the principles of the welfare state and Keynesian demand management had gone hand in hand with the growth of so-called catchall parties seeking votes wherever they could find them and bending principles and ideology to that end. Under these circumstances, conservatives found the distinctiveness of their outlook increasingly difficult to convey, seeming to many to stand for little more than a claim to be able to manage politics more competently than their rivals. Later, the increasing difficulties encountered by social-democratic politics in the economic sphere, coupled with the growth in the social sphere of new movements pressing the demands of environmentalists, peace activists, feminists, gays, and ethnic minorities, provided conservatives with a renewed opportunity to press a distinctive agenda. This gave the pride of place not only to the old liberal principles of free markets and the minimal state but also, in opposition to the left libertarianism of the new social movements, to the strong state: a state that would enforce free markets through firmness in welfare and trade union matters and robustly defend laws embodying traditional social values.

Organization

In most cases, conservative parties originated as informal groups within predemocratic legislatures, only later, with extensions of the franchise, developing formally organized extraparliamentary structures covering the national territory. Even then, in many instances, the degree of formality of these structures for long remained incomplete and the real power acquired by them limited. The British Conservative Party, for example, did not have individual members before the 20th century, and until the 1970s, its local associations not infrequently refrained from fielding candidates in municipal and
Conservative Parties
county council elections: giving, in such instances, a free run to “Independents,” who were Conservatives at the national level. This was a convenient way of ensuring that local influence remained in the hands of preexisting Conservative elites and did not need to be shared with less privileged groups in the party. Nowadays, there is little that is especially distinctive about conservative parties from an organizational point of view. They differ between themselves depending on the mix of resources—money, activists, charismatic leadership, and so on—available to enable them to compete. Like parties generally, their penetration of society has declined in the postwar period, with internal distributions of power increasingly consolidated in the hands of elected officials, progressively more important, with the spread of the media, for mobilizing a mass electorate.

Social Base and Electoral Performance
Generally speaking, the likelihood of voting for a conservative party increases with religious observance and the belief that religion is important, with high socioeconomic status, with age, and with a view of oneself as being located on the right of the left–right spectrum. However, generalizing about the precise impact of variables such as these is impossible for two sets of reasons, the first being the influence of context in mediating their impact. For example, if in Britain the Conservatives have traditionally attracted very high levels of support among farmers, the same cannot be said of Conservatives in places such as Norway and Sweden, whose party systems, from the 1920s onward, included influential agrarian parties. Second, there is the problem of the choice of parties to include. Frequently in comparative analyses, conservative parties have been grouped together with other parties of the moderate right, such as Christian democratic parties with which they have sometimes shared important features, for example, size and significance in the party system, ideological flexibility, and the conviction that, in standing for the interests of the entire nation, theirs is more than a political point of view on a par with the rest. The choice makes a significant difference. Comparing the British Conservative Party with the pre-1990s Italian Christian Democrats, for example, would reveal not similarities but enormous differences, both quantitative and qualitative, in the impact of religious observance and left–right self-placement on propensities to vote.

In few other places in the postwar period have conservatives matched the electoral success of the British Conservative Party. Again, much depends on the choice of specific parties to include, with particular controversy surrounding the status of the U.S. Republicans and Ireland’s Fianna Fáil, but if we include only the uncontroversial cases, then the British Conservatives’ only real rival in Western Europe is Greece’s New Democracy (which has averaged 43.9% of the vote in parliamentary elections since 1974 as compared with 37.8% for the Conservatives). Elsewhere in Western Europe, the best average performance has been by Luxembourg’s Christian Social People’s Party (with an average of 32.3% since 1974). In some countries, conservative parties are essentially nonexistent: the contrast with countries where they are strong being due to differences of party-system context inherited from the past.

Role in Party Systems
In Britain, the arrival of democratic politics enabled the conservatives to consolidate a position as one of two large parties by virtue of the relative insignificance of three of the major social cleavages—that is, center–periphery, state–church, land–industry—which elsewhere spawned more complex party systems; and by virtue of the fact that extensions of the franchise had begun early and taken place over a long period of time, enabling the party to adapt successfully to the emergence of the fourth major cleavage, that between owners and workers.

In other major European countries—Germany and Italy—the party systems supporting the reemergence of democratic politics after World War II could find no place for conservative parties because of the experience of Nazism and fascism: This made it impossible for anyone to espouse important conservative themes such as nation, tradition, order, and hierarchy without arousing painful memories and the suspicion that they harbored extreme right-wing sympathies. Consequently, in these countries the role of principal party of the center-right came to be played by a Christian democratic party.

In France, conservatism, though present, was able to make less headway than in Britain, for the country’s deep divisions—between church and state; between monarchists, parliamentarians, and
Bonapartists; between land and industry; and between owners and workers—gave it a highly fragmented party system within which conservatives had many significant rivals. Meanwhile, the localization of party politics and the two-ballot system inhibited the development of cohesive national parties—and, thus, the emergence of conservatism as a unified force. Though the constitutional overhaul that ushered in the Fifth Republic in 1958 brought an initial decline in polarization, a degree of party-system fluidity continued, and today at least two significantly sized entities—the Union for French Democracy and the Union for a Popular Movement—their local coalitions, can claim to provide a home to conservatives.

At the European level, the main transnational party organization embracing conservative parties is the European People’s Party. This also encompasses Christian Democratic parties and the internal life of the organization is not without tensions between pro-European (mainly Christian Democratic) and Eurosceptic (mainly British Conservative) members.

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See also Christian Democratic Parties; Conservatism; Electoral Behavior; Liberalism; Nationalism; Party Organization; Party Systems

Further Readings

**CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING**

Constitutional engineering refers, generally, to the process by which political actors devise higher law, which is usually—but not always—specified in a formal written document and labeled the “constitution.” Constitutional design is a close synonym. Any particular instance of constitutional engineering must deal with certain basic questions of organization and process. These include designating who is to be involved, when that involvement takes place, and how the actors are to proceed in formulating, discussing, and approving a text. Although there are conceivably as many variants in the process as there are constitutions, several common patterns emerge. This entry describes the factors that distinguish instances of constitutional engineering and some of the typical patterns.

**Stages**

Constitution making occurs in discernible stages, some of which resemble an ordinary legislative process familiar to many drafters in consolidated democracies. A schematic design of these phases might include, in sequential order, the mobilization of interests (and counterinterests), drafting, consultation, deliberation, adoption, and ratification. These different stages interact with the possible actors who might fill the roles to create a matrix of options for designers. Afghanistan’s constitution of 2004, for example, was drafted in relative secrecy by a commission with foreign advice and then sent to the president’s office before deliberation and adoption at an inclusive constituent assembly, the Loya Jirga. In this model—which appears to be relatively common—each stage is potentially consequential, although it is likely that inertial forces and the power of agenda setting will apportion disproportionate influence to actors involved at earlier stages. Still, it is quite possible that early-stage actors will anticipate the preferences and needs of later stage actors, thus mitigating any sequence effects. Jon Elster has introduced the vivid distinction between upstream and downstream constraints in the process: Upstream constraints are imposed by the powers setting up the constitution-drafting body, whereas downstream constraints result from the anticipation of preferences of those involved in later stages. Ratification by public referendum, for example, is a downstream constraint that can hamstring leaders in an earlier stage who recognize that their document must ultimately obtain public approval.
Actors

Perhaps the most critical variable in constitution making has to do with which actors are included in the process. Actors involved in constitution making can include expert commissions, legislative bodies or committees, the executive, the judiciary, national conferences, elite roundtables, transitional legislatures, specially elected constituent assemblies, interest groups and nongovernmental organizations, foreign advisors, and the public itself. Public involvement has become the subject of particular attention in recent years and is urged by scholars, governments, and international organizations. But not all constitutions involve the public, and some are drafted by a handful of leaders behind closed doors.

Certainly, a central dimension on which constitution-making processes differ is the degree of public participation. Because the constitution is the highest level of lawmaking and provides the ultimate rule of recognition for lawmaking processes, it arguably requires the greatest possible level of legitimation in democratic theory. In an ideal world, one might desire universal consent over the rules of society, a standard that is obviously impractical. Higher levels of participation are presumed to function like supermajority rules, restricting the adoption of undesirable institutions and protecting prospective minorities in the democratic processes that are established. Participation thus legitimizes and constrains, substituting inclusive processes for consent to make effective government possible.

The modal form of participation in constitutional design is the power to approve the charter, usually by referendum on the final document as a whole. Available data suggest a significant trend, beginning in the early 20th century, toward public ratification. Approval by referendum may be an increasingly popular mode of public involvement, but it is clearly a limited one in that it involves only an up or down vote over a package of provisions. Since at least World War II, however, participation in constitutional design has become more direct and has penetrated more deeply (or at least earlier) in the process. One common approach is to involve the public in selecting those who will draft or deliberate over aspects of the charter. This sort of voice is possible whether the representative group is a constituent assembly elected expressly for the purpose or is a regular legislature that takes on the project in addition to other duties. Some constitutional processes have experimented with more bottom-up methods of direct democracy, such as the citizen initiative, in which ideas can bubble up from civil society.

Still another mode of participation involves direct consultation with the public or representative groups at various stages, which might occur before, during, or after the drafting of the initial text. The drafting phase seems to be especially crucial because we can expect a fair degree of inertia in the later stages of the process. But the phase is also likely to be the least participatory, given the challenges of writing-by-committee, much less writing-by-nation. Indeed, in some well-known cases, the public is excluded from the drafting process and not consulted at all.

Of course, actors and their accompanying constraints may come from outside, as well as inside, a state’s borders. An extreme case is that of the “occupation constitution,” a document drafted when a country is under the control of a foreign military power. Such constitutions are usually presumed to have less involvement on the part of local actors and hence to be less legitimate. Some scholars believe that international involvement creates disincentives to enforce the constitution locally, as actors will strategically acquiesce to conditions they have no intention of fulfilling simply to remove external oversight.

Of course, international constraints on constitution making can range in their intensity and degree of coordination, from borrowing to imposition. External influence need not be as blatant as in occupation constitutions. Constitutional drafting that occurs concurrently with peace negotiations often attracts international advisers and interests, be they donors, creditors, interested states, or the United Nations. The prospect of future membership in the European Union, for example, led some Eastern European countries to make modifications to their draft constitutions at the behest of the Council of Europe. Many accounts of foreign borrowing point to the decisive role of influential consultants who appear to be part of a cottage industry of constitutional advisors.

The voluminous literature on policy diffusion reminds us that any sort of policy or institutional reform will be a highly interdependent process.
Constitution making—often undertaken during moments of crisis when states are at their most amenable to foreign models and suggestions—may be especially interdependent and networked. Certainly, scholars have long noted a high degree of similarity across documents, and nearly anyone privy to the details of a case of constitution making can recount an episode of international borrowing. The persistence of presidentialism in Latin America, the use of French and Westminster models of government in former colonies, and the recent use of national conferences in Francophone Africa are all examples of diffusion that occurs at a subglobal level. Given the persistent centrality of the U.S. Constitution to the American legal academy, there has been a fair amount of interest in documenting its influence over the years, but other constitutional models have also clearly had some impact.

Other Conditions

There are potentially consequential aspects of process other than the identity of the actors involved. Some constraints reflect the circumstances that lead to constitution making in the first place. The conventional wisdom is that constitution making is coincident with a cataclysmic event of some kind, such as war, coup, economic crisis, or revolution. In fact, some evidence suggests that, although crises do frequently precede constitutional reform, the degree of noncrisis constitution making is probably underestimated. Sweden’s 1972 reform of its 163-year-old constitution is a prominent example of crisis-free reform. The various socialist constitutions, such as those in the Soviet Union (1936, 1977) and China (1982), seem to follow the installation of new leaders, a practice that was often justified by the Marxist view of evolution in stages. These different patterns, reflecting various degrees of crisis or continuity, will affect the process, creating an atmosphere of either urgency or deliberation.

The process can also vary in terms of time involved. At one extreme, the secretive process that led to Myanmar’s 2008 constitution took 17 years. At the other extreme, a small group of American bureaucrats working for the occupation authorities drafted the basic form of Japan’s 1946 constitution in a little over a week, and the entire process, including elections, legislative deliberation, and approval by the emperor, took a mere 8 months. Both of these cases are distant outliers. On average, constitution making takes around 16 months. Anecdotally, constitution-making processes involving either a very short or very long amount of time seem to occur in nondemocracies. Speedy processes do not allow sufficient time for mobilization of the public and civil society, whereas extended processes are unlikely to hold public attention for the duration.

Another dimension on which processes differ is the size of the deliberative body, an issue that has also plagued those who design legislatures. The concern is that large bodies—which have the advantages of minimizing deal making and assuring representativeness—can be unwieldy and lead to collective action problems.

Constitutions and their design have long been central to the work of political scientists since at least Aristotle. For whatever reason, however, the scientific study of the rules that govern the process of constitutional engineering has lagged. This state of affairs is regrettable but, happily, quite remediable. Processes of constitutional design and adoption vary widely along a number of identifiable dimensions. Speculation about the effects of these differences runs rampant and evidence will undoubtedly be close behind.

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See also Constitutionalism

Further Readings


**Constitutionalism**

Constitutionalism is sometimes regarded as a synonym for limited government. On some accounts, this doctrine is associated in turn with minimal or less government. But that is only one interpretation and by no means the most prominent historically. A more representative general definition would be that constitutionalism seeks to prevent arbitrary government. At its most generic level, arbitrariness consists in the capacity of rulers to govern willfully—that is, with complete discretion—and to serve their own interests rather than those of the ruled. Constitutionalism attempts to avoid these dangers by designing mechanisms that determine who can rule, how, and for what purposes. However, constitutional traditions differ as to what precisely counts as an arbitrary act and which mechanisms offer the best defense against their occurring. The classical, neo-republican tradition of political constitutionalism identifies arbitrariness with domination of the ruled by their rulers and seeks to avoid it by establishing a condition of political equality characterized by a balance of power between all the relevant groups and parties within a polity, so that no one can rule without consulting the interests of the ruled. The modern, liberal tradition identifies arbitrariness with interference with individual rights and seeks to establish protections for them via the separation of powers and a judicially protected constitution.

Both traditions are present within most democracies and can be found side by side in many constitutions. The first tradition focuses on the design and functioning of the democratic process, including the selection of electoral systems and the choice between presidential or parliamentary forms of government, of unitary or federal arrangements, and of unicameralism or bicameralism. Although the detailing of these procedural mechanisms and the relations between them usually forms the bulk of most constitutional documents, their constitutional importance has come to be eclipsed—in legal circles particularly—by the second tradition. This view emphasizes the specification and judicial protection of the different competences of the political system and of constitutionally entrenched rights by a constitutional court. Political theorists and scientists disagree, however, on whether these two traditions are complementary, mutually entailed, or incompatible. The second is often seen as necessary to ensure the fairness of the procedures and/or the outcomes of the first. Yet it lays itself open in turn to doubts that courts are, or could ever be, truly bound by constitutions so that law rather than judges rule and if so whether judicial processes are not more arbitrary and prone to error for deciding constitutional outcomes than the democratic procedures and outcomes they are often thought legitimately to limit. In the following sections, this entry traces these two traditions and then turns to exploring their respective advantages and disadvantages and any tensions and complementarities that exist between them.

**Two Traditions of Constitutionalism**

**Political Constitutionalism: From Mixed Government to Representative Democracy**

The theory of mixed government originated with ancient thought and the classification of political systems on the basis of whether one, a few, or many ruled. According to this theory, the three basic types of polity—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—were liable to degenerate into tyranny, oligarchy, and anarchy, respectively. This corruption stemmed from the concentration of power in the hands of a single person or group, which created a temptation to its abuse through allowing arbitrary rule. The solution was to ensure moderation and proportion by combining or mixing various types. As a result, the virtues of each form of government, namely, a strong executive, the involvement of the better elements of society, and popular legitimacy, could be obtained without the corresponding vices.

Three elements underlie this classic theory of mixed government. First, arbitrary power was defined as the capacity of one individual or group
to dominate another—that is, to possess the ability to rule them without consulting their interests. To be dominated in such an arbitrary way was to be reduced to the condition of a slave who must act as his or her master wills. Overcoming arbitrariness so conceived requires that a condition of political equality exist among all free citizens. Only then will no one person or group be able to think or act as the masters of others. Second, the means to minimize such domination was to ensure none could rule without the support of at least one other individual or body. The aim was to so mix social classes and factions in decision making to ensure that their interests were given equal consideration, with each being forced to “hear the other side.” To quote another republican motto, “The price of liberty is eternal vigilance,” with each group watching over the others to ensure none dominated them by ignoring their concerns. Third, the balance to be achieved was one that aspired to harmonize different social interests and maintain the stability of the polity, preventing so far as was possible the inevitable degeneration into one of the corrupt forms of government.

Thus, mixed government provides a model of constitutionalism according to the institutions that structure the way decisions are taken. Although elements of the theory can be found in Aristotle’s *Politics*, the locus classicus is Book VI of Polybius’s *Histories*. He underlined its prime purpose as providing mechanisms whereby no individual, body, or group could rule alone, thereby curbing the descent into tyranny, oligarchy, or anarchy. Polybius regarded the republican constitution of ancient Rome as exemplifying this theory. Thus, the consuls provided the monarchical element, the Senate provided the aristocratic, while the popular element was represented by the Tribunes of the People, the Plebeian Council, and the electoral, judicial, and legislative powers the people could exercise directly. As he noted, the key feature of Roman republican government was that each of these three groups exercised slightly different powers but required the cooperation of the others to do so. So consuls might exercise war powers, yet they needed the Senate to approve generals, reward them, and provide the necessary funds, while the people approved treaties and could try high officials and generals for misconduct. Meanwhile, the more-executive roles possessing the most discretion were further weakened by their power being shared among multiple officeholders and its being dependent on elections and of short duration. Thus, there were two consuls, each able to veto the other’s decisions, 10 tribunes with similar countervailing powers, and so on, with none able to hold office for more than a year.

The resulting need for different groups to work together was summarized in the slogan *Senatus Populusque Romanus* (The Senate and the Roman People, frequently abbreviated to SPQR). In reality, though, their relationship was far from harmonious, with the patrician element largely predominating, except when factional disputes led a given group among them to seek the support of the plebeians. The conflict between social classes was given greater emphasis by Machiavelli, who offered a radical version of the Polybian argument in his *Discorsi*. He observed how all polities contain two classes, the nobles (*grandi*) and the people (*popolo*), whose desires conflict. However, he claimed that their discord, far from being destructive, actively promoted “all the laws made in favour of liberty”—each was led to promote freedom by virtue of seeking ways of checking the arbitrary power of the other. However, like Polybius, Machiavelli believed that all systems ultimately became corrupt and degenerated into either tyranny or anarchy—the balance of power merely served to stave off this inevitable cycle.

The 17th and 18th centuries brought three main changes to the doctrine. The first, explored below, was the development of the separation of powers as a variation on the doctrine of mixed government. The theory of mixed government involves no clear distinction between the different branches of government. Executive, legislative, and especially judicial tasks were shared between the different social classes and exercised by all the government bodies. Indeed, the popular element exercised certain legislative and judicial functions directly through plebiscites and as jurors. The second change was in the type of “balance” mixed government was supposed to achieve. The classic theory took the idea of the “body” politic literally. Just as bodily health was said to rely on a sound physical constitution and a balanced diet and way of life, so the health of the polity depended on a sound constitution that achieved a “natural” balance between the various organs and “humors” of the political
body. As we saw, in line with this organic imagery, the aim was to hold off the inevitable degeneration and corruption of the system. Balance was a static equilibrium, designed to maintain the status quo. However, the 17th and 18th centuries saw a new, more dynamic notion of balance, inspired by Newtonian physics and based on mechanics and physical forces. In this conception, balance could involve a harnessing of opposed forces, holding them in a dynamic equilibrium that combined and increased their joint power. The change can be seen in the notion of the “balance of trade,” which went from being an equal exchange of goods between states to become a competition between trading nations that encouraged their mutual productivity and innovation. In this account, the “cycle of life,” where growth was followed by decay, became replaced by the idea of progress, in which change and transformation had positive connotations.

The third development drew on these two. This was the idea that political balance now consisted in the competition between government and a “loyal” opposition. As parties evolved from simple factions and patronage networks among rivals for office, and became electoral machines defined as much by ideology and social composition as by the personal ambitions and interests of the political class, they became the organs of this new type of balance. In keeping with the older theory of mixed government, one of the virtues of parties was their ability to mix different social classes and interests and combine them around a common program. Indeed, just as economic competition led rival firms to compete over price, innovate, and explore untapped markets, so electoral competition led rival parties to compete over policy efficiency and effectiveness, devise novel forms of delivery, and focus on areas appealing to different sections of the electorate. This modern form of political constitutionalism has proven constitutional in both form and substance. Equal votes, majority rule, and competitive party elections offer a mechanism for impartially and equitably weighing and combining the views of millions of citizens about the nature of the public good. And in making politicians popularly accountable, it gives them an incentive to rule in nonarbitrary ways that respond to the concerns of the different minorities that form any working majority, thereby upholding both rights and the public interest rather than their own interests.

Meanwhile, mixed government has developed in new ways through federal and convocational arrangements that likewise seek to ensure that different kinds of interest are involved in the policy- and lawmaking processes on an equal basis. Yet nobody would deny that the systems of most democracies are far from perfect, and it has become increasingly common to look to other constitutional traditions to rectify these problems.

**Legal Constitutionalism: From the Separation of Powers to Rights and Judicial Review**

According to Article 16 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, “A society where rights are not secured or the separation of powers established has no constitution at all.” Though widely accepted today, this view was novel at the time, shaped by the experience of the English, American, and French revolutions. The separation of powers developed out of the theory of mixed government during the English civil war of the mid-17th century. In 1642, Charles I belatedly invoked the doctrine of mixed government to defend the joint rule of Monarch, Lords, and Commons as implied by the notion that Parliament meant all three (the doctrine of “King in Parliament” as the sovereign body of the realm). His execution posed the problem of how to control government in a society without distinctions of rank. Dividing the executive, legislative, and judicial functions between three distinct agencies appeared to provide a response to this dilemma. However, it took some time to evolve. Although Book 11, Chapter 6 of Montesquieu’s *The Spirit of the Laws* has been credited with offering a definitive statement of the doctrine, his account still bore the hallmarks of its origins in the system of mixed government—not least because of its being based on an analysis of the British parliamentary system and the respective roles of monarch, lords, and commons within it. The functional division also remained far from clear-cut, with the judicial branch and function still imperfectly differentiated from the other two. Only with the drafting of the U.S. Constitution and the debates surrounding it, most notably the *Federalist Papers*, did the doctrine emerge in its mature form.
The underlying rationale of this separation is that individuals or groups should not be “judges in their own cause.” The division between the three branches aims to ensure that those who formulate the laws are distinct from those entrusted with their interpretation, application, and enforcement. In this way, lawmakers are subject to the same laws and so have an incentive to avoid self-interested legislation and to frame it in general terms that will be equally applicable to all. These laws then guide the decisions of the executive and judiciary, who because they are similarly under the law also have good reason to act in an impartial manner. Separating functions also brings the efficiency gains associated with the division of labor. In particular, the activity of the legislature is made less cumbersome through delegating more short-term decisions to an executive branch capable of acting with greater coherence and dispatch.

On its own, it is unclear how effective this separation is. Not only are the four functions hard to distinguish clearly, but unless a different group operates each branch, there is nothing to prevent their acting in concert. However, four other theoretical developments accompanied the shift from mixed government to the separation of powers that changed its character. First, mixed government had been challenged earlier by theorists of sovereignty, such as Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, who regarded the idea of dividing power as incoherent. The separation of powers came into being in a context shaped by the notion that at some level power had to be concentrated, and, in the context of the English, American, and French revolutions, the natural assumption was to shift the sovereign power of the monarch to the people as a whole. Second, the notion of the people as a whole was likewise new. Previously, the “people” had simply meant the “commons” or the “many.” The whole people became the authors of the constitution, which as the embodiment of their will became sovereign over the will of any subdivision of the people, including the majority. Third, as a corollary, constitutions became entrenched written documents expressing a “higher” law, which could be amended only by the people as a whole or by some supermajority that could plausibly be said to represent their will. Fourth, notions of rights became key aspects of the constitution. Initially rights were no more an intrinsic part of the separation of powers than they had been of mixed government. The Bill of Rights was an appendix to the U.S. Constitution, which had previously been confined to describing the system of government. Nevertheless, the securing of individual rights gradually became the goal of all constitutional arrangements.

These four developments, but particularly the last two, had a tremendous impact on constitutionalism and proved crucial in moving it in a legal and especially a judicial direction. Within the “pure” theory of the separation of powers, all three branches were coequal. As with the theory of mixed government, the aim was to prevent any one section of society dominating another by obliging each to collaborate with the others. If anything, the legislative power was logically prior to the others—producing in the U.S. scheme federal and bicameral arrangements within the legislature that harked back to the doctrine of mixed government and a clear division between the legislature and executive. As noted earlier, the distinctiveness of judicial functions was weak in the doctrine of mixed government and slow to emerge in the theory of the separation of powers. However, making a legal document sovereign—only challengeable by the sovereignty of the people as a whole—inevitably empowered the judiciary, particularly given the comparative length of judicial appointments and their relative isolation from electoral pressures by contrast to the other branches. The judiciary now decided the competences of the various branches of government, including their own, and set limits not only to the processes of government but also to its goals with regard to individual rights. These features have come to define modern constitutionalism and are reflected in all the constitutional arrangements of postwar democracies. Yet they also coexist with forms of political constitutionalism and mixed government. It remains to explore their respective advantages and disadvantages and the tensions between them.

**Political and Legal Constitutionalism Compared**

An entrenched, rights-based, and justiciable constitution is said to ensure stable and accountable government, obliging legislatures and executives to operate according to the established rules and
Constitutionalism

Constitutionalism procedures, and above all prevents their sacrificing individual rights to administrative convenience, popular prejudices, or short-term gains. Given no working constitutional government has not been also a working democracy, few analysts believe constitutions can restrain a genuinely tyrannical government. Rather, the aim is to prevent democratic governments from falling below their self-professed standards of showing all equal concern and respect. So a legal constitution is seen as a corrective to—even a foundation for—a working political constitution. Yet it remains a moot point whether it performs its appointed task any more effectively or legitimately.

Democratic governments are said to be prone to overreacting to emergency situations, sacrificing civil rights to security, and pandering to either electorally important, yet unrepresentative, minorities or the populist sentiments of the majority. Insulated from such pressures, a court can be more impartial while its judgments are bound by constitutional law. However, others contend these supposed advantages turn out to be disadvantageous. Going to law offers an alternative to entering the political realm, yet access is more restricted than voting and the costs of a case as prohibitive to most ordinary citizens as founding a new party. Meanwhile, it allows those with deep pockets to fasten on to a single issue that affects their interests without the necessity of winning others to their point of view. Courts may be restricted to the law in their judgments—but what does that mean? Is the law to be found in the text of the constitution, the original intentions of those who drafted it, the objective meaning of the principles, or the common understandings of the people? Words are open to multiple meanings, so textualism hardly proves binding on judgments, while semantics seems an odd way to decide difficult moral and political issues. The intentions of the drafters are unlikely to be consistent or knowable and may well be inappropriate in contemporary conditions. Being bound by the past favors the status quo and those who are privileged by current arrangements, thereby hindering progressive reform. If the principles behind the constitution are universal and timeless, then it could be applied to any and all situations. Yet legal philosophers—no less than citizens—disagree whether such principles even exist, let alone what they might require in particular cases.

Appealing to a popular consensus will not resolve that problem, for it is either unlikely or better provided by a political constitutionalism that consults popular views directly. In all these respects, judicial review risks becoming arbitrary rather than being a block on arbitrariness.

As legal constitutionalism has spread, establishing itself not just in former authoritarian regimes but also in the United Kingdom and Commonwealth countries where political constitutionalism had hitherto held sway alone, so empirical scholarship has highlighted these drawbacks. More often than not, legal constitutionalist arrangements have been introduced by hegemonic groups fearing political challenges to their position, with the record of the new regimes faring no better overall on civil rights and, from an egalitarian perspective, rather worse on social and economic rights. Whereas political constitutionalism responds to majority views for enhanced and more equal public goods, legal constitutionalism has invariably inhibited such reforms on grounds of their interfering with individual property and other rights. Nor has it upheld political constitutional arrangements particularly well—for example, blocking campaign finance limits in many jurisdictions. Of course, important exceptions exist, with the progressive rulings of the Warren Court (1953–1969) in the United States offering an apparent contrast to the free market decisions of the Lochner era (1897–1937). However, these decisions largely reflected sustained, national, majority opinion and only became effected when backed by legislative rulings and executive action. At best, legal constitutionalism proves only as good as the political constitution; at worst, it inhibits its more equitable and legitimate working.

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See also Constitutional Engineering; Rule of Law

Further Readings

Constructivism is a theory according to which social phenomena are constructed through interactions among humans, who interpret one another’s actions and define situations based on those interpretations. Thus, constructivism offers a way of studying social phenomena, which people tend to treat as though they were objective entities. However, from the viewpoint of constructivism, what people believe to be objective entities are actually accomplished through interactions between human actors who interpret those phenomena within specific social and historical contexts.

Constructivism is not a theory composed of a series of hypotheses but a perspective that studies discourse in order to analyze phenomena. This perspective gained prominence following the publication in 1966 of Peter Berger’s and Thomas Luckmann’s *The Social Construction of Reality*. Since then it has become widely influential throughout the social and human sciences. For example, in anthropology and sociology, there were the debates between “essentialism” and “constructivism” concerning sex, race, and ethnicity. The debate made it clear that sex and race cannot be differentiated using only biological standards nor reduced to unchanging essences. People use these categories in practical ways, contingent on the context: Depending on the situation, a certain gender or racial category is attributed to a particular person.

Thus, it is impossible to identify sex using only an objective biological standard. There are people who experience an inconsistency between their biological sex and their subjective consciousness of the sex to which they think of themselves as belonging. In Japan, a law was passed in 2003, by which people who undergo gender reassignment surgery and who do not have any juvenile children can be categorized legally as being of their new sex by getting permission from the family court. They can marry people of their previous gender. Similar laws, some of which allow more lenient conditions for changing one’s legal sex, were legislated in a number of European countries.

Race (usually understood as rooted in biology) and ethnicity (understood as cultural) also prove hard to classify. Many people are so-called mixed race, and ascribing racial categories to them is not easy. For example, the U.S. Census treats “Hispanic” and “Latino” as ethnic categories, and Hispanics or Latinos may classify themselves as belonging to the racial category of White, Two or More Races, or Some Other Race. However, in informal contexts, Latino and Hispanic may be considered to be either ethnic or racial classifications.

Ethnicity is characterized by cultural traits such as language, religion, customs, and social behavior, but standards for ascribing ethnicity also are uncertain. In the United Kingdom (UK), Chinese are sometimes considered an independent category, differentiated from the separate Asian category, while there are different ethnic groups among Arabic people. Also, as ethnicity has become the focus for many nationalist movements in the world, it becomes apparent that the concept of ethnicity itself is a historical product.

**On Terminology**

Readers may have encountered two terms: *constructivism* and *constructionism*. Concerning these different terms, Holstein and Gubrium, the editors of a comprehensive handbook on the study of constructivism published in 2008, point out that, although *constructivism* is the preferred term in science and technology studies and *constructionism* is more widely used in the social sciences, the two terms can be used interchangeably in most cases. Joel Best, another sociologist, notes that *constructivism* has high cultural overtones and appears to be favored by British scholars, although American sociologists seem to use the two terms interchangeably. Thus, this entry’s use of *constructivism* as a generic term in the social sciences encompasses *constructionism*, the term often used in empirical research by political scientists.

**Constructivist Studies of Science**

No one can dispute that the roots of constructivism are in the sociology of knowledge. However,
the sociology of social problems and the sociology of science were the specialties that took the lead in exploring constructivism and within which this perspective became dominant. Using ethnographical and/or anthropological studies, sociologists interested in studying science from a constructivist viewpoint described how scientists reach agreement when they discover new information.

Although these researchers focused on the interactions among scientists in the laboratory, they tended to neglect outside influences. Constructivists who study the sociology of science often do limited, microsphere ethnography in laboratories. Some of them focus narrowly on scientists’ conversations, as though only discourse can determine what is considered a scientific finding. These researchers are liable to be committed to relativism. That is, some of them seem to argue that anything might be recognized as true so long as there is consensus through discourse within a community, or they seem to imply that there is no way to make sure of the certainty of assertions. When some of them expanded their research to scientists’ networks outside the laboratory, they discovered much broader, structural contexts that influence the activities of scientific research.

**Constructivist Studies of Social Problems**

The study of social problems is the constructivist work most relevant to political science. Research in which sociologists escaped from the trap of relativism can be seen in the study of social problems. Social constructivist studies of social problems evolved from the labeling perspective on deviant behavior. Labeling, which flourished in the late 1960s and early 1970s, focused less on the deviant behavior itself than on the process through which some behavior is defined and treated as deviant. It studied how deviant behavior is socially constructed.

Positivists who study social problems search for the causes of social problems. Constructivists, however, point out that social problems are taken for granted by positivist scholars. Positivists presuppose what are social problems and treat them as though they are social conditions, rather than first studying how some phenomenon is constructed into a social problem through the interactions among social actors, agencies, groups, organizations, and institutions. A social problem is what those people—not academic researchers—define as a social problem. Thus, as Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse (1977) assert, social problems are not objective conditions but the activities of individuals or groups who make claims with respect to some “putative conditions.” Analysts should focus on the people making and responding to claims and counterclaims and on the interactions among claims-making groups and responding groups and institutions.

When this constructivist perspective was criticized for inevitably presupposing some characteristics of the “putative conditions,” it divided into two schools: strict constructivism and contextual constructivism. Strict constructivism claims that researchers should refrain from any presuppositions about the characteristics of “putative conditions” and aims for a pure, presupposition-free constructivist position. Contextual constructivism says that it is impossible to have presupposition-free constructivism. It also says that scientists can sometimes check the “putative conditions” and find that some claims might be absurd, even though the aim of contextual constructivist research is not debunking the content of the claims. At the beginning, there seemed to be much support for strict constructivism, yet the great majority of published research adopts the stance of contextual constructivism.

Even when the same behavior is claimed to be a social problem, the people making the claims can adopt very different “frames,” depending on historical and social contexts. Social problems that are constructed using frames that are easy to accept tend to become established, familiar social problems. Recent examples of such widely accepted frames include “human rights,” “health,” and “democracy.” Consider the case of smoking. Selling cigarettes was banned in 15 states, such as Kansas, Illinois, and Minnesota, in the United States by 1909. (During World War I, people became tolerant of cigarette smoking, and these laws were later abolished.) This was accomplished by defining it as a vicious habit and an immoral behavior from the viewpoint of Protestant ethics. More recently, smoking became regulated because of its harmful effects on health. But even the health frame can be constructed in different ways: Initial claims emphasized the damage to the smoker’s own health; however, more recent regulations
have been justified in terms of the risks to others’ health caused by passive smoking. Thus, the current construction invokes a synthesis of health and rights frames.

Once a social problem gains acceptance, it can undergo what Best (2008) calls “domain expansion.” When “hate crime” was first categorized, it was defined as a crime caused by racial prejudice. However, its domain has expanded to include prejudice against sexual orientation. Similarly, child abuse initially meant physical violence inflicted on children, such as beatings, but now it has been expanded to include verbal and psychological abuse.

When the mass media focus on some phenomenon claimed to be a social problem, to attract more attention and have a stronger impact, they tend to depict an extremely serious case. Because it is referred to repeatedly, it becomes a high-profile case, and people are liable to think of this instance as though it were a typical case of that social problem. For example, claims about missing children are illustrated with cases of children kidnapped and murdered by strangers. However, the reality is that most child abductions are committed by a separated partner in the course of a family dispute, while the great majority of children reported as missing have been runaways who returned home safely and voluntarily.

Social problems are constructed by using the language and narratives of claims makers, victims, supporters, and the media and through interaction among them and their readers and audiences. First, a phenomenon should be recognized and named. In that sense, it is constructed as being linguistically different from other phenomena. Such claims serve as a kind of advertising activity, promoted by mobilizing resources to make the phenomenon recognized as a serious problem to others and to demand some sort of solution from among various alternatives. Rhetoric is crucial to stimulate people’s emotions and to persuade them. Thus, victims are presented as innocent and vulnerable.

This discourse of claims can be analyzed from different approaches to constructivism. Historically sensitive constructivism inspired by Michel Foucault analyzes discourse at a macrolevel. Constructivism informed by ethnomethodology and conversation analysis studies discourse at a microlevel.

**Construction of Crime Problems and Social Policy**

In advanced societies, social problems and politics intersect when deviant behavior is being constructed as a criminal problem. One strategy taken to solve such problems is to “get tough” and mete out harsher punishment. This policy is most evident in the United States and the UK.

In the United States, the “broken-windows” theory has been put into practice. According to this theory, broken windows, graffiti, and similar public displays of neglected property and petty criminality tend to encourage further criminal behavior. The strategy in this theory is to regulate such minor offenses in order to prevent serious offenses. In the UK, the government has instituted laws to control antisocial behavior. Drawing graffiti, making noise to disturb neighbors, annoying pedestrians, and other similar behaviors are defined as antisocial. When people commit such behavior for the first time, they are cautioned and get an Anti-Social Behavior Order (ASBO), which leads to a civil case before a magistrate’s court. If they exhibit antisocial behavior again and breach the ASBO, they can be prosecuted by an agency of the local government at a magistrate’s court as a criminal case and can be imprisoned.

People are afraid of youth crime. By showing themselves to be “tough on crime,” politicians gain popularity and receive more votes from their constituents. Even though politicians may know that the true dichotomy is not tough versus soft on crime, when they see the tabloid newspaper headlines and articles, which they think reflect public opinion, they hesitate to be seen as soft, being afraid to lose popularity among voters.

Media coverage can foster a strong fear of crime. Also, it encourages readers and audiences to empathize with victims. The fear of being victimized and the desire for revenge against the perpetrators rises, and people demand tougher policies against crime. Politicians not only think it their responsibility to respond to the population’s desire but also try to use the situation as an election instrument. This is “penal populism,” promoted by distorted public opinion inspired by the mass media’s sensational crime reporting, politicians’ posturing so as not to lose popularity, campaigns by interest groups including formal social control agencies, and the enterprises that run private correctional facilities.
In 2008, the International Centre for Prison Studies reported that the number of people incarcerated in U.S. prisons and jails was 2,293,157 (including pretrial detainees). The incarceration rate was 756 per 100,000 of population: the highest rate in the world, and according to U.S. Department of Justice statistics, one in nine Black males between the ages of 20 and 34 years was in jail. The International Centre reported that in England and Wales, the number of prisoners nearly doubled, from 42,000 in 1991, to more than 83,000 in 2008. The 2008 incarceration rate was 153 per 100,000 population.

Another aspect of the social construction of policy is the social construction of target populations of social policy. Research done by constructivist policy scholars shows that people who are most vulnerable tend to participate least in politics, so their interests are liable to be ignored in the designs of social policies. It is also the case that people who are deemed the target of benevolent social policies tend to be disadvantaged and therefore neglected, as they suffer from a scarcity of resources and fail to participate in politics.

**Constructivism and International Relations**

In the study of international politics, realism has been the dominant theory. That perspective supposes that nations unwaveringly pursue power and wealth. However, the situation of “the war of all against all” is not always a natural condition nor universally adaptive to all situations. If the leading nations adopt an attitude that assumes all other nations are enemies, the situation of the war of all against all seems to be accomplished by the reactions of other nations, which is to take the same attitude to defend themselves from stronger nations. This becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, this is not an unavoidable or necessary situation. Alexander Wendt (1999) identified three types of cultural conditions of anarchy and called this type “Hobbesian.” He pointed out that there are alternatives such as “Lockean,” which is based on roles of rivalry, and “Kantian,” which is based on friendship roles. Using the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens and symbolic interactionism in sociology, Wendt postulates that agents and structures are mutually constitutive, and he emphasizes agents’ interpretive activities through which collective identities are formed.

Thus, what looks to be a general principle presupposes some conditions that are not universal. Constructivism points out what is taken for granted by ordinary citizens, diplomats, leaders, groups, organizations, agencies, and states. Thus, in the field of international relations, there cannot be objective and universal rules such as those that govern in the natural sciences.

From the viewpoint of constructivism, the actions of nations are also performed according to their accounts and interpretations of what is considered legitimate, appropriate, or authentic. It is not only material power but also ideas and norms that influence their actions. Actions of nations are not automatic reactions to the global power structure. Further, they cannot be predicted using only a rational choice theory based on the calculation of nations’ material powers and interests.

Not only nations but also agencies, such as nongovernmental organizations, nonprofit organizations, human rights organizations, the United Nations (UN), the UN’s Human Rights Committee, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the European Commission of Human Rights (now obsolete), and the International Criminal Court, have become more significant in international relations. It is important to take into account these groups’ own definitions of the situations concerning norms, appropriateness, legitimacy, roles, and identities that affect their behavior.

Because nations interpret and define situations, they are not puppets or organs that produce the same outcome confined by the international structure. Compared with the adherents of realism, which emphasizes material power, constructivists are interested in researching international norms that affect international relations. Constructivists explore how new norms emerge, cascade, and become internalized within international relations. Although the emergence of norms in international relations is an interesting theme of constructivism, in sociology the control of human behavior by rules has been studied mainly by structural functionalists. However, in international relations, global situations are much more fluid than the social structure of a single state, and constructivists study all the facets of norms, such as their emergence, interpretation, role taking, and life cycles. This complexity is why constructivism, rather than structural functionalism, is needed to study international relations.
When a norm is applied, we can expect that interpretations of it will be very different from situation to situation. The pragmatics of norms, the rhetoric that is endorsed when norms are activated, and the discourse that can mobilize concepts such as legitimacy, authenticity, appropriateness, and conventions are interesting themes of constructivism. One of the main characteristics of constructivism is that it does not assume that the behavior of nations is objectively predetermined by material power or interest; rather, constructivism recognizes that interpretations of ideas and definitions of situations by human agencies shape international relations.

Conclusion

Constructivism has become too influential in most of the social sciences to be ignored. In some fields, such as the study of ethnicity and race, it has become almost impossible to find studies that have nothing to do with constructivism or were not inspired by it. The number of academic papers in the social sciences that contain terms relevant to social construction has increased (Best, 2008). Since the connotations of “social construction” or “socially constructed” have become so diversified in academic papers and books, it looks as if the term constructivism (or constructionism) might no longer cover all that their usages have come to signify.

Although the majority of research in political science and the social sciences continues to be within the positivist tradition, constructivism has become increasingly valued for its insights and creativity, and it will likely continue to play a growing role.

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See also Constructivism in International Relations; Discourse Analysis; Political Philosophy; Political Theory

Further Readings


Constructivism in International Relations

Constructivism in international relations (IR) refers to a family of theoretical approaches that share three analytical focal points in appraising world politics: intersubjectivity, the mutual constitution of agents and structures, and the double hermeneutics (i.e., the interpretation of interpretations). Heavily inspired by sociological thinking, constructivism is not a substantive theory of international politics in the same way that neorealism is, for instance. In the IR discipline, constructivists generally seek to redress the lack of attention given to social factors in political life, which characterizes rationalist utilitarian models. Starting from the premise that world politics basically consist of social relations, constructivist scholars believe that international politics are not fundamentally different from other
Constructivism in International Relations

spheres of human activity, where practices are produced, reproduced, and contested inside a meaningful and patterned social context.

Although constructivism emerged 5 decades ago in philosophy, sociology, and anthropology, it did not reach the field of IR until the late 1980s and early 1990s. Two main evolutions favored the rise of constructivism in IR. First, the failure of dominant theories to predict or, more simply, to explain the end of the Cold War, arguably one of the most important international changes in decades, led to something of an existential crisis in the discipline. Second, the rise of the “third debate” in IR theory about epistemology shook up more orthodox understandings about how social scientists should go about the study of world politics. During the 1990s, constructivism gradually imposed itself as a via media, or middle ground, in the IR theoretical landscape, revisiting a number of disciplinary foundations with novel ideas such as Alexander Wendt’s “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1999).

One evocative way to locate constructivism in IR is to look at the notion of interest and the analytical work that it does according to different theories. Like rationalism, constructivism assumes that agents have interests and that they act on the basis of those interests. But while rationalism takes preferences to be exogenously given (i.e., the origin of interests falls outside the scope of the theory), for constructivism the question of where interests come from is front and center in the analysis. Just how do people come to want what they want? From a constructivist perspective, the crucial issue of interest formation cannot be dismissed without losing sight of a fundamental dimension of politics. If it is true that interests drive the world, then we must know where they come from and how they form. By contrast with the rationalist science of decision making, focused on how people act on the basis of preexisting preferences, then, constructivism favors the analysis of sense making—that is, how people define and construe their interests. Instead of being magically read off a material structure, interests are contextually defined (Focal Point 1: intersubjectivity); they are not individually defined by atomized individuals but generated in and through social relations (Focal Point 2: mutual constitution of structure and agency); and they need to be interpreted, at the levels of action and observation (Focal Point 3: double hermeneutics).

The following portions of this entry introduce constructivism in IR in two different ways. The first section reconstructs the three developmental stages that the family of theories has gone through over the past 20 years. The second section discusses and illustrates the three conceptual building blocks that constructivism is premised on. The conclusion assesses whether constructivism, one generation after its rise, has lived up to its promises to open new thinking space in the IR discipline.

The Three Moments of Constructivism in International Relations

The word constructivism appeared on the IR radar screen for the first time in Nicholas Onuf’s 1989 book World of Our Making. In the following decade, the theoretical label quickly gained in prominence, experiencing its heyday at the turn of the millennium with the publication of Wendt’s seminal Social Theory of International Politics (1999). Now a vibrant approach in the IR theoretical landscape, constructivism has shifted gears lately, taking a break from metatheory to move into questions of applied research and methodology. Twenty years after its rise, constructivism is not an exotic approach any more in IR, as the disciplinary aggiornamento that accompanied its rise came to pass. To be sure, as is always the case with historiography, this narrative simplifies and rationalizes post hoc a much more complex and contested disciplinary trajectory. Its heuristic purpose is limited to understanding better what constructivism does differently from other IR approaches, by grasping the evolutionary stages that the approach went through over the past 20 years: an epistemological moment, an ontological moment, and a methodological moment.

An Epistemological Moment

The “third debate” in IR, which emerged in reaction to the neorealist orthodoxy of the early 1980s, was the necessary condition for constructivism to emerge. Influenced by continental philosophy, a number of critical scholars started to question the rampant positivism of the IR discipline. Building on the insights of the linguistic turn (a development in 20th-century thought that focused
on the relationship between philosophy and language), they interrogated the scientific ambition by emphasizing the performativity of language and, by implication, of theory and practice. In replacement for the naturalist orthodoxy, critics promoted a postpositivist epistemology premised on reflexivity and the plurality of viewpoints and methods. More than 20 years later, it is fair to say that the third debate in IR was inconclusive, with both sides retreating to their respective trenches with many bruises but little advancement of their positions.

In this context of disciplinary upheaval, constructivism emerged as a form of epistemological third way that had, for a time at least, much to offer to both positivists and postpositivists. For the former, constructivism facilitated the cooptation of certain novel insights into the IR theoretical mainstream—for instance, about the role of ideational variables. For the latter, constructivism’s rising profile in IR appeared to grant some legitimacy to a large part of the postpositivist epistemological critique. In the end, however, the middle ground proved a very uneasy position to occupy, and fierce debates over “explaining versus understanding” continued to rage among IR scholars. To this day, there still exists a fracture between (scientific) realist constructivists, whose epistemology can accommodate positivism, and interpretive constructivists, who are philosophically closer to postpositivism. Though inconclusive, the epistemological moment of constructivism came to pass during the 1990s as key proponents of the approach moved the spotlight onto ontological matters.

**An Ontological Moment**

Born out of an epistemological controversy, constructivism imposed itself in IR largely by shifting attention away from the third debate and toward ontology. Building on scientific realism, several constructivists argued that the “stuff” of reality that is out there should take analytical precedence over the way that we get to know it. Ontology, in other words, matters more than epistemology. While this position was crucial in establishing IR constructivism as a “legitimate” approach in the eyes of the disciplinary mainstream, among constructivists it has been hotly contested ever since Wendt and others put it forward. The majority view nowadays rather portrays ontology and epistemology as two sides of the same coin: After all, as Stefano Guzzini notes, constructivism is about the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality.

Constructivism brought two key ontological innovations to IR, which are discussed at greater length below. First, building on the sociology of knowledge, constructivism emphasizes the social construction of reality: Ideas, meanings, and other forms of collectively held beliefs matter in the explanation of social and political life. In IR, that argument is a direct rejoinder to neorealism, by which ideas are nothing but epiphenomena of deeper material forces, as well as to cognitivism, which tends to reduce beliefs to ideas held by individuals. Second, taking inspiration from developments in sociological theory, constructivism puts the mutual constitution of agents and structures at the center of analysis. Against both individualism and holism, constructivism argues that actors and their environments determine one another in a recurring pattern of coevolution. Building on these two innovative insights, IR constructivists have sought to rejuvenate the ontological foundations of the IR discipline by putting forward a number of new concepts and by revisiting old ones such as norms, identities, rules, communicative action, culture, and communities. Pointing to the many socially constructed realities that make up world politics, constructivists throughout the 1990s legitimized their frameworks by “discovering” novel ontological entities—the most famous one being Wendt’s 1999 reinterpretation of anarchy as a cultural and historically contingent structure of interaction.

**A Methodological Moment**

Despite its success, the ontological revolution that constructivism brought about in IR did not go without problems. First, it had been made possible by brushing under the carpet a number of important epistemological controversies. To take an obvious one, if reality is socially constructed, what are the implications for the development of social-scientific knowledge? And second, the success of constructivism sparked a number of defensive reactions from the disciplinary mainstream. By the beginning of the 21st century, a metatheoretical fatigue had set in as calls for constructivists to do “real research” and study actual problems in world politics multiplied.
Since the turn of the millennium, IR constructivism has focused largely on issues of methodology, operationalization, and empirics. How should constructivism proceed with the study of world politics given its ontological innovations and epistemological diversity? In the past decade, the number of in-depth empirical analyses of world political phenomena has exploded. That evolution is paralleled by an increasingly loud debate about methods. What is discourse analysis and how should it be practiced? Is quantification amenable to the constructivist style of reasoning? What type of fieldwork data can best support a constructivist argument? How can we adjudicate between explanations—constructivist or otherwise? Can constructivist findings travel from one case to another? Often grounded in the empirical analysis of international politics, these very important methodological issues have received increasing scrutiny over the past few years, allowing constructivism to enter a constructive and grounded dialogue with the rest of the IR discipline.

The Three Building Blocks of Constructivism in International Relations

What do constructivists do, as they research world politics, that makes them distinct from scholars who favor other theoretical approaches in IR? There are obviously many ways to answer this question. In the following paragraphs, constructivism is characterized by the three analytical focal points that its advocates typically put to work in their analyses: (1) intersubjectivity, (2) the mutual constitution of structure and agency, and (3) the double hermeneutics.

Intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity refers to the condition of meanings that do not depend on a particular point of view to exist. In an intuitive sense, ideas belong to individuals and are located between people’s earlobes. Taking this view, a number of IR specialists have emphasized the role of perceptions in shaping world politics. But constructivism stresses a different (though related) kind of meaning—not subjective but intersubjective. Contrary to ideas held by individuals (e.g., a cognitive bias), intersubjective meanings define reality as something independent of our volition. The classic example, used by John Searle (1995), is that of money: In a banking system, certain bits of paper engraved with specific markings are consensually taken to be worth 20 dollars. This socially constructed meaning, which is attached to bits of paper by a collectivity, is very real in its effects (e.g., in buying groceries), regardless of one’s personal misgivings about capitalism and despite the fact that for Martians paper money would probably be worthless. Conventions—just like rules, norms, identities, cultures, or languages—are intersubjective structures, that is, objectified sets of meanings that order social configurations irrespective of what the specific agents that take part in them believe. Such is also the case, for instance, in a football game: Whatever specific strategies individual players may have, the rules of the game will define their interaction along ideological constraints that do not depend on any player’s individual point of view to exist. Social facts exert effects on politics by virtue of a critical mass of relevant agents taking their reality for granted. As such, they make social action possible by creating elements of a common world.

Building on this insight, IR constructivists have focused attention on a wide variety of social facts and artifacts in international politics. International threats, for instance, are not self-evident physical facts but socially constructed realities. Similarly, norms, identities, institutions, rules, cultures, practices, languages, ideologies, and narratives are all forms of intersubjective meanings that shape world politics and guide action. States’ national identities constitute foreign policies; international cultures of anarchy drive interstate relations; world structures of rules and norms determine appropriate behavior on the international stage. As John Ruggie argues, for instance, it is not simply hegemony or preponderance in material power that explains the content of our contemporary world order but the social purposes and norms that intersubjectively define the identity of the American hegemon. All in all, taking intersubjectivity seriously implies not only that meanings matter but also that they matter as structural forces in world politics.

The Mutual Constitution of Structure and Agency

The mutual constitution of structure and agency refers to the dynamic processes through which
actors and contexts coevolve and codetermine one another. Inspired by Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory and Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, the notion stresses that the social world comprises neither freestanding individuals nor free-floating structures. Instead, structures are made possible by agents’ practices, which are themselves constituted by their context. According to Wendt, the idea can be simplified with two “truisms” about social life:

1) Human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and
2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors. Taken together these truisms suggest that human agents and social structures are, in one way or another, theoretically interdependent or mutually implicating entities. (Wendt, 1987, pp. 337–338)

In other words, structures emerge out of agents’ practices and vice versa; neither is reducible to the other. Note that this view entails a processual ontology by which agents and structures should not be treated as reified or static substances but as evolving sets of relations and interplays of practices. As stabilized as certain patterns may be, any practice either reinforces or undermines the existing order of things. Agency, the power to deviate from structure, introduces contestation as well as contingency.

To grasp what the mutual constitution of structures and agents changes for the study of world politics, it is convenient to compare constructivism with rationalist frameworks in IR. The latter ontology, based on utilitarianism, envisions an atomistic set of self-constituted and self-regarding units whose identity is given and fixed. In this framework, structural effects are limited to regulating behaviors because units preexist structures. In the constructivist view, structures also affect the properties of agents, constituting their identities and interests in the first place. This makes for a much deeper structural effect: Agents would not be what they are but for structural constitution. A classic example of this constitutive effect can be found, as noted by Searle (1995), in the practice of playing chess. The rules of the game do not simply regulate the movement of the pieces on the board; they make the game possible in the first place. Without these constitutive rules, one cannot play chess; at the same time, without the application of these rules in and through practice, there cannot be an intersubjective structure called the game of chess. Similarly, the norm of sovereignty makes the current international society possible. Given the importance of constitutive theorization, the next challenge for constructivists is methodological: If intersubjective structures and meaningful practices make world politics possible, how can we account for them?

**The Double Hermeneutics**

*Double hermeneutics* refers to a methodology centered on the interpretation of interpretations. It is central to the constructivist approach in IR because world politics presents itself as a reality that is already interpreted by its actors. Since human beings are meaning makers, their interpretations are the primary object of study for constructivists. People are of course not like rocks: They attach meanings to the different parts of their environment and act on the basis of those meanings. The first interpretive moment, then, happens at the level of action. The second interpretive moment takes place at the level of observation, as social scientists seek to establish the meanings of the practices that they observe. In summary, as Giddens notes, the double hermeneutics captures the core of the social-scientific enterprise from a constructivist perspective, which is to develop scientific interpretations of lay interpretations.

In the practice of research, the notion is also reminiscent of the hermeneutic circle, according to which making sense of something involves relating the parts in terms of the whole and vice versa. Hans Georg Gadamer famously compared interpretation to a “fusion of horizons,” drawing an analogy with the practice of attaining fluency in a second language to better translate from that language into one’s mother tongue (Mark Neufeld, 1993). Because of interpretation, scholars cannot construe their task as simply improving the match between the world and our knowledge about it (i.e., the correspondence theory of truth). As Patrick Jackson has observed, taking the double hermeneutics seriously entails that validity does
not simply stem from matching the world with words, because words partake in constituting the world. After all, most of the time, it is language that makes intersubjectivity possible by “detaching” the meaning from immediate expressions of subjectivity and representing them as “facts” external to agents. If discourse is constitutive of reality, then the social-scientific discourse, with its interpretation from afar of lay interpretations, also bears tremendous normative consequences. This is perhaps why the majority of IR constructivists exhibit a strong disposition toward reflexivity, trying to make strange what seems obvious, problematize the taken-for-granted, and denaturalize alleged universal truths. In this view, the task of IR scholars is not to define which international threats are “really real” and which ones are not, for instance; instead, they should document the political technologies that make certain threats look “really real” to various publics and should analyze the consequences that ensue for world politics.

**Conclusion**

This entry has argued that constructivism in IR is a broad family of theories whose distinctiveness stems from their common use of three crucial notions in analyzing world politics: intersubjectivity, the mutual constitution of agents and structures, and the double hermeneutics. In historiographical terms, constructivism has attained a degree of disciplinary legitimacy in IR by going through three stages of development: (1) an epistemological moment, which remains largely inconclusive to this day; (2) an ontological moment, which has been successfully incorporated by large sections of the discipline; and (3) a methodological moment, which is currently underway. One generation later, the “constructivist turn” has now been taken in IR, and while the approach remains far from dominant in the discipline, it cannot be relegated to the margins anymore. Constructivism is evidently here to stay. So, as an interim assessment 20 years on, has the constructivist project lived up to its promises in IR?

To be sure, the fact that constructivism has not provided a unified and applied theory of international politics in the way that Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism has cannot be construed as a failure. In fact, the pluralism that characterizes the approach today speaks of its vibrancy and its capacity to accommodate theoretical debates. Since conversations among scholars hold the best hopes of pragmatic progress, the lack of orthodoxy should be welcome. In addition, the absence of one overarching and exclusive theoretical narrative is quite coherent with constructivist premises, including its critical disposition toward the imposition of the order of things. So far, so good.

But that may well be where the good news ends, because one outcome of the constructivist turn in IR that is more problematic, one could argue, is the further polarization of a discipline that was already suffering from a particularly debilitating degree of fragmentation. To caricature a bit, constructivism has become so mainstream in most parts of Europe that it is now risking redundancy: World politics is socially constructed—so what? By contrast, in many North American universities, constructivism has become eminently suspect and the target of gatekeeping strategies. This polarization is obviously very damaging for interparadigmatic dialogue. While the responsibility for this regrettable state of affairs does not fall on constructivism alone, it is hard not to take some share of the blame for the metatheoretical fatigue that now plagues the IR discipline. In this context, there may be a danger, much to constructivism’s detriment, that the window of opportunity for theoretical rejuvenation in IR that opened with the end of the Cold War is now shutting down.

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*See also* Anarchy; Constructivism; Critical Theory in International Relations; Hermeneutics; International Relations, Theory; Logic of Appropriateness

**Further Readings**


CONTAINMENT

The concept of containment was presented by the American diplomat George F. Kennan in a long telegram to the U.S. Department of State on February 22, 1946, and in an article published in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs, signed “X.” The concept was intended to influence the U.S. policy response in the specific strategic context of the Cold War, but with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the end of a bipolar world raised new questions regarding the relevance of containment—especially as the George W. Bush administration began to target new kinds of enemies.

The Cold War and the Origins of the Concept

Containment was adopted by President Harry S. Truman’s administration (1945–1953), both as a doctrine and as a rationale for external action, and was carried on by Truman’s successors, especially Lyndon Johnson (1963–1969). The main objective of this new doctrine was to use military, economic, and diplomatic means to oppose what Kennan depicted as the Soviet Union’s “hegemonic” strategy: “The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies” (X [Kennan], 1947, Part 2). The United States pursued a host of policies in the name of keeping an essential commitment to prevent the spread of the Soviet influence throughout the world. A large proportion of these actions were carried out in Europe and Asia. Some examples include support given to Greece to fight against the “Communist subversion” (1947); the launching of the Marshall Plan (a program of direct economic aid to Europe); the promise to support “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” as stated by President Truman in a speech on March 12, 1947; the construction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (1949); and the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

Although declining in the late 1960s (during the “détente” promoted by U.S. President Richard Nixon and the U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, then during the easing of tensions with the USSR and communist China), and challenged by the more radical concept of “rollback” (most notably under President Eisenhower’s secretary of state John Foster Dulles, who called for the “liberation” of Eastern Europe), the policy of containment continued to mark the American foreign policy landscape until the end of the Cold War, as President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) sent military aid to anticomunist movements in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua; deployed the Pershing II missiles in Europe; and promoted the Strategic Defense Initiative, which would use ground- and space-based systems to protect the United States against nuclear missile attack.

Both external and internal factors influenced the relative power of containment as a doctrine. The Truman administration had the advantage of a favorable economic context. Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953 allowed U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to be less influenced by balance of power relations. Instead, he focused more on cutting government spending and reducing economic assistance plans and gave less priority to expensive conventional military deployments. It
would have thus been reasonable to deduce that the end of the Cold War (1989–1991) would have marked the official end of the United States’ reliance on containment policy. Once America’s 40-year enemy disappeared, the expectation was that a “brave new world” would pay “dividends of peace” and render obsolete an expensive containment policy. But 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are more than 700 operable U.S. military bases, and approximately 370,000 American troops remain deployed in more than 150 countries. Nevertheless, fears continue to be expressed about the need to circumscribe emerging peer competitors, new global enemies, and new threats.

**Post-Bipolar Containments?**

If the rhetoric of containment has officially disappeared with the demise of the Soviet Union, its spirit can be found in the targeting of new “threats” by the United States, especially in three main categories: rogue states, peer competitors, and ambiguous entities.

**Rogue States**

Iraq was the subject of a containment policy between the 1991 Gulf War (following its invasion of Kuwait) and the attacks on the United States in September 2001. Severe sanctions were applied, United Nations weapons inspections were imposed, U.S. troops and air patrols in the Persian Gulf were deployed, and the economic weakening and political isolation of Iraq was put into place. The uniqueness of the Iraqi example stems from the fact that it led to a radical change of course when the administration of George W. Bush opted for a policy of regime change via military action in 2003 and toppled Saddam Hussein. This raised questions about whether a similar fate awaited Iran and North Korea, the two other states (besides Iraq) characterized in Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address as the “axis of evil” and potential nuclear threats.

**Peer Competitors**

A new containment of China was hinted at (but officially denied) by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as she paid tribute to Kennan (March 2005 in Tokyo) following his death. The context was the elaboration of a new logic of maintaining alliances, along with a mentioning of the need for China to play “a positive role.” In 2009, the United States had military bases in South Korea, Japan, and Afghanistan, much as it provided military equipment to South Korea, Japan, India, and Taiwan (whose security is guaranteed by Washington). Even after the election of Barack Obama to the presidency in November 2008, declarations by the new Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, evoked the need to diminish China’s global economic influence. Russia, after invading neighboring Georgia in August 2008, was also considered to be somewhat of a threat requiring containment: Moscow felt directly targeted by the installation of a U.S. missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic (even though Washington insisted its official purpose was to counter “rogue states” such as Iran).

**Ambiguous Entities**

A relevant innovation following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, was the effort by the United States to drag its allies into a third type of containment against “terror.” Identified by Washington as the new global security priority since 2001, the “war on terror” became a massive endeavor to counter political or religious groups and movements—even social, economic, or cultural practices—with potential links to terrorism. With efforts concentrated mostly in the Middle East and the Muslim world (in Iraq, then Afghanistan; in the Gulf but also in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa), the United States has been deploying troops and military bases, fighting against social and financial networks, and working to change political regimes and to control transnational flows.

The revelation found in this new type of containment lies in the nature of the enemy targeted. With neither a clear political nucleus nor a defined territory (even if linked to the Muslim world in American rhetoric), the “terrorist” entity hardly conforms to Kennan’s initial containment theory, which was proposed to counter the Komintern and which included cutting diplomatic relations and all exchanges with the state in question. Still, Washington’s insistence on organizing the eradication of both “terror” and its state and nonstate sponsors recalls the initial containment doctrine.
and raises the question of whether the concept of containment is enduring, relevant only to a specific time, or altogether obsolete.

**Containment Versus Engagement**

Was containment policy efficient? And can it be effective today? In his 1947 article, Kennan advocated “the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points” by the United States. He believed that a policy of containment would add to internal pressures on the Kremlin that would ultimately lead to “the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” Because the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the containment policy would seem to have proven successful. Still, the approach was controversial from the beginning and remains so.

In the 1940s, the lauded columnist Walter Lippmann put forth a harsh criticism against the “X” article for failing to differentiate between vital and peripheral American interests. Moreover, the debate persists on whether the end of the Cold War was the direct result of U.S. foreign policy strategies or whether it owes more to complex interaction between domestic and global economic and social factors.

The containment strategy now appears to be outdated for several reasons. First, containing one specific enemy in a globalized world is an illusory goal—the possibilities of circumventing any attempts at isolation are now virtually infinite. Second, containment has been used almost exclusively by the United States and its allies, and it led to a counterproductive result: States considered to be the main enemies of the United States may gain solidarity from other “protest diplomacies” and the support of public opinion (mostly in the South). Third, political and economic isolation has proved useless, and even dangerous, in an interdependent world, notably when the targeted country or entity has already acquired enough potential to cause havoc.

In contrast, dialogue and diplomatic commitment have emerged as more serious means of dealing with difficult interlocutors. Containment of China, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela—even Hamas or Hezbollah—would indeed be hazardous from material, social, political, and military perspectives. Finally, the post-bipolar structure of the international system no longer allows for such an approach; for containment was forged in a different international system with one permanent peer competitor in mind and not conceived for fast-changing and asymmetrical targets in a turbulent world.

The formal temptation of a containment policy is still present and possible. Its reemergence is possible in the context of a new global competition between the United States and China. However, in material, political, and social terms, containment is no longer tenable. Classical in its conception (a struggle for survival against an enemy in a balance-of-power competition), ambitious in its implementation, and influential among U.S. allies, the concept of containment is a remnant of the Cold War whose translation to modern times is a troubled one.

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**See also** Bipolarity and Multipolarity; Cold War; Foreign Policy Analysis; Security and Defense Policy; War and Peace

**Further Readings**


**CONTINGENCY THEORY**

Universalist theories of organization say that the highest-performing organizations have maximum levels on the variables that compose their structure,
such as maximum decentralization of decision making. In contrast, contingency theory says that the highest-performing organizations have levels on their structural variables that fit the levels on their contingency variables—that is, the level of decentralization that fits the level of organizational size. Thus, the optimal structural level is seldom the maximum level, and it is not universal across all organizations. Rather, the level of the structure that causes highest performance is contingent on the contingency variables (or factors). In other words, the contingency variable moderates the effect of structure on performance. Performance is high only if structure fits the contingency variable. The more that structure misfits the contingency variable, the lower is performance in consequence. This entry discusses the intellectual backgrounds of contingency theory and its application to the public sector.

Key Variables for Performance
Specialization, formalization, decentralization, and divisionalization are some of the variables of organizational structure that have contingent effects on performance. Some of the contingency variables of organizational structure are size, diversification, and task uncertainty. For instance, size is a contingency of decentralization, in that the larger the organization is (i.e., the more members it has), the more complex are the issues in managing it; therefore, top management cannot make all the decisions, and some must be delegated down the managerial hierarchy. This reduces the number of levels in the hierarchy through which information must pass and brings decision making closer to the bottom level, which interacts with customers or clients and which produces products.

As another instance, diversification is a contingency of divisionalization. Undiversified (i.e., single product or service) organizations can be effectively organized as structures in which the main subunits reporting to the chief executive officer (CEO) are functions. In contrast, diversified (i.e., multiple product or service) organizations can be effectively organized as structures in which the main subunits reporting to the CEO are divisions, each containing its own operating functions (e.g., sales and production), so that each is an autonomous organization. In this way, diversification is also a contingency of decentralization.

Hence, both size and diversification are contingencies of decentralization. Thus, some structural variables have more than one contingency variable they need to fit to have high performance.

Task Uncertainty
Task uncertainty is a contingency of formalization, specialization, and decentralization. Where the task has high certainty, rules (formalization) can be formulated that provide guidance for effective decisions. The preprogramming of decisions also allows jobs to be narrowly defined and hence highly specialized. In contrast, where tasks are highly uncertain, it is not possible to formulate rules that provide guides for effective decisions, and jobs cannot be narrowly defined; hence formalization and specialization need to be low. Instead, more highly qualified and skilled employees need to be empowered to make some of the decisions, so that decentralization is higher. The higher the task uncertainty, the lower the formalization and specialization and the higher the decentralization need to be in order to fit the task to the uncertainty contingency.

Uncertainty enters tasks in a major way when organizations seek to innovate, such as by creating new products or services or by using new technologies for producing its products or services. Organizations repeatedly producing the same products and services are fitted with a mechanistic structure, which is high on formalization, specialization, and centralization. Organizations innovating their products and services are fitted with an organic structure, which is low on formalization, specialization, and centralization. Innovating organizations also need more interaction between their functional departments. This requires lateral coordination mechanisms such as cross-functional project teams headed by integrators (project leaders independent of the functions from which the team members are drawn). In contrast, noninnovating organizations can adequately manage the lesser interaction between their functional departments by hierarchy and planning.

Fits and Misfits
Some form of contingency theory conceives of the fits as configurations or gestalts—that is, as bundles of structural variables where the levels of the
structural variable are discrete. For instance, an organization that is small is fitted by a simple structure that is low on formalization, while a large organization is fitted by being high on formalization. These fitting levels of formalization differ considerably on any scale quantifying formalization. The intermediary levels of formalization between low and high are all misfits that cause low performance. Hence, an organization will tend not to remain at intermediary levels of formalization. Therefore, organizations make quantum leaps from low to high formalization but do so only infrequently. This is also the case for other structural variables such as specialization and decentralization, so that organizations are composed of bundles of such structural variables—the configurations or gestalts. Empirically, analysts quantify misfit by calculating the exact score on each structural variable that is the ideal for that configuration and then measure the distance of each organization from that ideal.

In contrast, one form of contingency theory conceives of the fits in a Cartesian manner. The contingency and structural variables are both continua and so are their fits. There is a line of fitting points such that each level of the contingency variable has a level of the structural variable that is its fit. For instance, size and formalization are both continuous variables, being the contingency and structural variables, respectively. Small size is fitted by low formalization and high size by high formalization (as in configuration theory), but also medium size is fitted by medium formalization, and all the intermediary levels of size are fitted by intermediary structural levels (unlike in configuration theory). Thus, there are many fits in Cartesian contingency theory, forming the fit line. Therefore, a growing organization can readily move from one level of structure that fits it, to the next level. Thus, the fit line is a set of stepping stones that allow organizations to change incrementally and gradually, thereby possibly growing from small and unformalized to medium sized and medium formalized or, eventually, to large and highly formalized. Empirically, analysts quantify misfit by locating the fit line, from theory or data, and then measuring the distance of each organization from that fit line.

The internal distribution of power between departments at the same hierarchical level addresses an aspect of the politics within organizations. The strategic contingencies theory of intraorganizational power says that the department that successfully deals with the key challenge to the organization will become the most powerful department. However, departments become powerful only if they are nonsubstitutable, so that the organization is dependent on them. For example, in brewing firms, where marketing was severely constrained by government regulations about pricing and the like, financial success came to those whose manufacturing departments produced at low cost. Consequently, these manufacturing departments received more of the budget in their firms and also controlled decisions pertaining to their boundaries with other departments—for example, the packaging department. In other industries, powerful departments such as these have been shown to supply the next CEO.

Contingency theory is functionalist in that it explains the structures that are adopted as being those that fit the contingency and so produce higher performance. It is also positivist in that it features quantitative evidence and general models, in which factors of the situation, such as the environment or size, determine the structure, so that there is a contingency imperative. Some critics assert, in contradistinction, that managers exercise free will, unconstrained by contingency variables. Others, more moderately, hold that organizations whose level of the contingency variable have changed and so are misfitted by the existing structure nevertheless retain it until there is a crisis of poor organizational performance, when they move into fit. Again, there is an argument that organizations can regain fit by adjusting the contingency variable to fit the structure. However, empirically, organizations usually change their structure to fit the contingency, so there is a contingency imperative.

Overall, there has been much empirical research supporting contingency theory, across organizations of many types, industries, and nationalities. However, some issues, such as configuration versus Cartesianism, or contingency imperative versus free choice, remain in contention, with evidence for and against.

Traditionally in contingency theory, fit is seen as iso-performance, meaning that the high level of performance produced by the fit of, for instance,
low formalization to small size is the same (hence “iso-”) as the high level of performance produced by the fit of high formalization to large size. But this would provide no incentive for firms to grow and increase their level of formalization. In contrast, hetero-performance says that the level of performance produced by the fit of, for instance, high formalization to large size is greater than the performance produced by the fit of low formalization to small size. Thus, organizations have an incentive to grow and increase their level of formalization. Whereas in the traditional iso-performance theory, the contingency variable plays the role of only being a moderator of the effect of structure on performance, hetero-performance theory sees the contingency variable as also making a direct, positive contribution to performance. While hetero-performance has logical appeal, it is at the present time only a theoretical conjecture that has yet to be proven. Moreover, some contingency variables are beyond managerial control, such as uncertainty in the environment, so that the environmental contingency can increase its level without any action by managers in an organization or any incentive on them to do so. Thus, while some contingency effects are probably hetero-performance, some are iso-performance.

Traditionally again, contingency theory holds that underfit has the same effect as overfit, in that too little structure (e.g., formalization) for a given level of the contingency (e.g., size) decreases performance by the same amount as too much structure. However, it has been argued that underfit produces worse performance in that the organization is unable to attain its goals, whereas in overfit the organization can attain its goals but just incurs the unnecessary costs of an overelaborate structure.

Research is ongoing in contingency theory, giving rise to new theoretical developments and empirical findings. It represents a continuing pattern of development in the study of organizations in both the public and private sectors.

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**Contract Theory**

The expression *contract theory* refers to a large variety of conceptions in social sciences. In the vast literature dedicated to the topic in economics, contract theory consists of the study of microeconomic relations between agents within a market. In law, contract theory is equally important and pertains to the analysis of contract law. But the most dominant usage of the expression *contract theory* is political and this is also the sense that will apply in this entry.

Within the realm of political theory, contract theory refers to a set of philosophical ideas, mostly developed since the 17th century, the goal of which is to offer a rational understanding of the creation of society and political powers. It also induces a normative reflection on the legitimacy of powers. A subset of preoccupations derives from this broad consideration and regards as crucial for political theory topics such as the place of religion in a collectivity, the question of the sovereignty, the respective role of the people and the prince, and basic rights and liberties. Beyond the borders
of political thought, contractarian theoreticians have often addressed issues relevant to psychology, anthropology, law, and economics.

The core of contract theory, in this political sense, is the fundamental intuition that all social dealings are based on an initial agreement between individuals to belong to the same society and to obey certain designated authorities. Hence the idea of a “contract” at the root of social existence—often known as the “social contract” after Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s famous book, On the Social Contract, published in 1762. According to Rousseau (1712–1778), the ties that bind individuals within a society are the outcome of a contract between them that was initiated at the beginning of this very society. Regarding the contract itself, it is a deliberate decision of each individual who sees the value of being engaged in society where rules limit liberty rather than being left alone in total freedom. This is why contract theories are all based on the idea of a reasoning individual able to recognize the greater benefits of society.

Whether this contract is regarded by authors as actually having been sealed in the course of history or whether it is for them only a fruitful hypothesis, the basic principle of contract theory is to regard society as the result of such a pact between individuals. Further, contract theory purports structural consequences such as individual rights and liberty. Indeed, if individuals had no rights, they could not logically engage in a contract (they would literally not have the right to do so). And if the contract they are engaged in did not guarantee some rights or liberty—in other terms, if social existence meant the total alienation of individuals—it would be impossible to understand why individuals would have chosen to submit to such an unfair contract and on what basis it should subsist.

Contract theory is quintessentially modern. It reflects the decisive evolution of Western political thought from the 16th century on toward an “individualistic” understanding of society and politics for which any collectivity is regarded as the distant eventual result of individual decisions. As a matter of fact, contract theory is not the only modern political conception able to accommodate individualism. But it has been one of the most prominent: If the rise of revolutionary doctrines challenged the contractarian approach in the 19th and 20th centuries, it never totally superseded it. It then gained renewed attention after the works of the philosopher John Rawls (1921–2002) in the 1970s, which insisted on the necessity of having common principles of justice agreed on in a well-ordered society. His influential Theory of Justice, published in 1971, claims the heritage of the tradition of the social contract and has had a considerable influence, which still continues to feed contemporary political thought.

Normative Diversity and the Intellectual Unity of Contract Theory

The term contract theory did not come into widespread use until the 20th century, and the expression should be considered as a flexible label by which to categorize a tradition of thinkers among whom influences are easily spotted, even across centuries, but who are also very different. Their very understanding of what the “contract” at the origin of society is, the depiction of its nature, and the role it plays in their conceptions vary greatly among them. This lack of unity is obvious with regard to the kind of normative judgments over politics it has supported among the different “contractarian” philosophers and political thinkers. Positions have ranged from justifying royal absolutism (Thomas Hobbes, 17th century) to leaning on a republican understanding of just politics (Rousseau, 18th century) or accommodating a “liberal” philosophy (Rawls, 20th century).

Although one cannot disregard the fundamental differences and oppositions that appear between contractarian philosophies, it would be a serious mistake to ignore their underlying unity. This is not to be found in what they advocate politically but rather in a relatively homogeneous pattern of ideas. The most constant one is an inquiry into the legitimacy of powers. These are no longer considered as imposed by nature or by God. Contractarian theories provide another explanation: We live in a collectivity because we want it. We obey laws because we want them. Society and authority are the reflection of our will, if only implicitly. Legitimate powers are those that respect the conditions of this will.

This does not mean that obeying laws and respecting more generally the constraints that any social life carries are dependent on the fantasy of
its members or that we can be free from our obligations “at will.” Here the theme of the contract is precisely to signify that there is no contradiction between binding obligations and the personal will to enter them. We are bound to obey the rules in society, just as in any contract we engage willingly to perform services and duties that we are not free to disengage from without a penalty.

The emergence of social contract theories at the end of the 16th century should be understood in its historical context as the progressive awareness of a deep contradiction regarding the modern condition of politics. How is it that human beings both accept and reject authority, as shown by the bloodshed of the religious wars on the continent and the civil war in England? How is it possible to have people live together, while wars and revolutions give the constant example of what the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) calls, in his 1784 *Idea for a Universal History From a Cosmopolitan Point of View* (fourth thesis), “the unsociable sociability of man”? Only a sound understanding of what human beings should accept in political matters—in other words, only a rational account of the legitimacy of power—could provide understanding and perhaps a solution to the evils of the time and grant a more stable future. This is ultimately the promise of contract theories.

The historical situation is not in itself the sole cause of such interrogations. After all, the course of history has always been a run of blood and misery. But the wakening of modern times makes it more intolerable intellectually. More and more, a new spirit inherited from the Renaissance values reason as a tool for improvement and insists on the equality in reason of human beings. This new sense of progress clashes with the dark situation of Europe in the 17th century and the harshness of social existence in the 18th. The new sense of equality is at odds with the hierarchical orders of the times. To these contradictions, contract theories have been the very much needed intellectual response.

The sense of novelty in contract theories is expressed in the constant rejection of conceptions of political life that we can label as “traditional” and that considered society as natural. No one more explicitly than Hobbes (1588–1679) in the first pages of his *De Cive* (*The Citizen*) has rejected this interpretation of society, inherited from Aristotle (and more generally from the whole of antiquity), for whom—man being a “sociable animal”—any human being seeks association with others in a city. For Hobbes, it is a delusion or a lie:

> The greatest part of those men who have written ought concerning Commonwealths, either suppose, or require us, or beg of us to believe, That Man is a Creature born fit for Society [...] which Axiom, though received by most, is yet certainly False. (I, chap. 1, para. 2)

Hobbes thinks that the prominence of strife and conflicts over benevolence and enjoyment in human ties belies the idea that society is about cooperation. He is drawn to the conclusion, which is shared by the whole contractarian tradition, is that if people live together, it is not out of a natural instinct. It is because they commit themselves to overcome the natural difficulty of togetherness. This commitment takes the form of a voluntary contract at the root of social existence.

**History**

It has sometimes been argued that the ancient Greeks and Romans recognized some form of social contract. It is difficult to concur with this view. The idea that cities had to start at some point with the gathering of a handful people was not foreign to ancient philosophers, it is true. For instance, Plato (ca. 427–ca. 347 BCE), in the third book of his *Republic*, relates the beginning of a city. But, he insists, it is the consequence of the fact that “human beings aren’t self-sufficient” (369b); like other philosophers in antiquity, he pictures the beginning of societies (or rather cities) as the prime accomplishment of human nature, which would be incomplete otherwise. Contractarian theorists have a radically opposite point of view. For them, human beings are initially self-sufficient. However, this autonomy leads to unbearable conflicts and threatens their survival. Rather than being their natural destiny, society is their second-best choice (through a contract) to avoid extinction. This emphasis among contractarian theorists on the individual is another incompatibility of ancient theories for which the individualization of behaviors is the end of a well-formed city; as Plato sees it, for instance, the path to tyranny starts when
“everyone has the right to do as he chooses” (Republic, 557b). In contractarian philosophy, the individual freedom of choice is the very basis of the contract that gives way to collective existence.

It is not necessary to multiply quotations and examples to realize that no Greek or Latin author would go so far as to consider that society was based on a contract between its members. For them, society was part of the natural order of the universe and nature provided a spontaneous impetus to collective life. Even when the idea is developed that social life is organized by conventions among human beings—an important claim by the sophists that is vigorously contested by authors such as Plato and Aristotle (384–322 BCE)—the role of these conventions is not quite similar to a proper social contract. The sophists think that conventions organize the collective life of human beings. Unlike contractarian theorists centuries after them, they never consider that they could have established it. Moreover, for the sophists, social conventions are mostly arbitrary or delusional, while for contractarian theorists, the convention between the members of a society is a rational one, based on the ability of human beings to make informed decisions and bind themselves through promises.

If we are to consider the influence of past theories on the emergence of contractarian theories, the legitimate reference should be not to antiquity but to social and political practices that developed later with the organization of feudal societies, which had, despite their own diversity, one remarkable characteristic: At its core, feudalism is the contract between a vassal and his lord. This contract states reciprocal obligations: the vassal serves, the lord protects. Eventually, feudal societies become shaped by a tight net of reciprocal obligations properly chartered as contracts.

This conception has led to spectacular practices, well beyond the Middle Ages. For instance, at the highest level of politics, contractualization was used in the 16th century by Henry VIII and Elizabeth I through a policy called “surrender and regrant”: By contract, the rebel English lords in Ireland had to surrender their lands to the crown and receive them back in exchange for their submission, obtaining new extended rights of property they did not possess previously. This very idea will find an outstanding philosophical extension in Rousseau’s Social Contract: According to him (as it is for John Locke before him and Kant after), the effect of the original contract is precisely to turn factual possession into legitimate property with the agreement of all.

Another (famous) example, the Mayflower Compact, showcases the continued taste in the 17th century for contractualization as a governance tool, even at a microlevel. Less than 2 decades after the death of Elizabeth, a group of settlers navigate to the new world—they later become the American icon of the colonization of the continent under the name “the Pilgrim Fathers.” On the ship, the Mayflower, dissent provokes a serious crisis. To solve it, the passengers decide to “Covenant and Combine [them]selves together into a Civil Body Politic.” This agreement has quite naturally been the subject of many interpretations, which see in it a sort of social contract, if not the “original American social contract.” Such a comparison is flawed with misinterpretation. If a text such as the Mayflower Compact is to be regarded as having some tie to contract theory, it is not as an illustration and still less as an actualization of it. It is rather a good empirical example showing how the theme of the social contract is a highly sophisticated intellectual generalization of a rather common practice of the time to establish covenants in political matters.

It does not follow that the evolution from the practices of contract in the Middle Ages to contractarian doctrines is seamless, and even at its limited level the Mayflower Compact points out one of the most important differences. Medieval conceptions were rooted in hierarchies, whereas the Compact is an agreement between equal parties. Even if it is an exaggeration to describe the episode—as it has often been the case—as “democratic,” it is nevertheless an example of the greater sense of equality in the 17th century. This sense is pervasive in contractarian philosophies and makes them break free from the very meaning of feudal contractualization, the goal of which was to regulate a constant exchange of services between the inferior and the superior. Contract theories, on the contrary, state that inequalities can be understood only after a primary agreement to live in society.

Contract theories are radically distinct from medieval conceptions on another crucial instance: While politics and their representation in the
Middle Ages gravitate around religion, contract philosophies are inherently secular. In the Middle Ages, religion is the ultimate justification of the authority of the princes whose power is regarded as proceeding from God’s will. References to religion are repetitive, insistent, and lean on an often quoted passage of Paul’s *Letter to the Romans* (XIII 1–2): “For there is no power but of God; and the powers that be are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, withstandeth the ordinance of God: and they that withstand shall receive to themselves judgment.”

Even if contractarian thinkers such as Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694) or John Locke (1632–1704) consider that the idea of a fundamental contract coheres with the plans of God, they never recognize a direct divine influence. The idea that society is the outcome of a covenant between human beings implies stepping away from such an immediate consecration of rulers by God. This is why, despite prudent maneuvers to avoid the accusation, contractarian philosophers have often been accused of being hostile to religion: Whether they adopt, like Hobbes, a strategy of compulsive justification of their positions by references taken from the Bible or whether they contemptuously dismiss faith as a source of comprehension for society, like Rousseau, they were equally considered in their time as impious.

Thus, the real novelty of contractarian theories is not that they assume the existence of a contract between the government and its subjects—this is the traditional aspect, inherited from the Middle Ages. The novelty is that they describe the very existence of society, the mere fact of living together, as the outcome of a pact between the members of society without direct reference to God’s will. Assuming the idea of a global pact at the foundation of society, contract theories have transformed what was a local, discrete agreement of submission into a general mechanism accounting for all basic social and political relations.

### The State of Nature

The assumption of contract theories that societies were created by an initial agreement purports the consequence that there is a state before society, a state in which human beings live *without being tied by the requirements of social life*. In the 17th century, an expression is coined to describe this moment when human beings are not formally engaged in the bonds of society: “the state of nature.” The use of the word *nature* to characterize what is “not social” is remarkable: It is a direct translation of the new conviction in the 17th century that politics oppose society and nature. This antagonism itself is complex but rests on a conviction shared by all the authors: Society is about restraining an unlimited thirst for freedom and license that dominates the state of nature. Hence, there is a fundamental contrast: On the one hand, man (few authors reflect on the status of women, usually considering that the division of genders is a natural one) is naturally free and wants to be infinitely free; on the other hand, this freedom is not sustainable and ultimately leads to anarchy. Society is about the rules and constraints that bind this initial liberty. For this reason, contractarian authors have a repressive conception of society generally—even if, along with Rousseau or Kant, they explain that this repression is true liberty, liberty within autonomous rules.

In this perspective, the state of nature serves as a way to explain this liberty that men have given up by entering into the ties of society. In its most common versions, it is described as an age only dominated by “natural law,” in the new understanding that the expression has had since the 16th century. *Natural law* is the law that determines the behavior of human beings without reference to any positive norm. In his 1690 *Second Treatise of Civil Government*, Locke has summed up what natural law entails for most contractarian authors: “perfect freedom [for men] to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit . . . without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man” (chap. 2, sec. 1).

Nothing but strength or opportunity seems to limit men in their endeavors. It leads to a situation of at least potential threat, and more surely to violence and to anarchy. As Hobbes puts it, the “state of nature” is a “state of war”—“the war of everyone against everyone,” to recall a famous quote from his *Leviathan*, published in 1651 (I 4). The place of strife in the state of nature is not always as pregnant as in Hobbes’s philosophy: Rousseau strongly opposes the idea, considering that conflict follows the invention of society—an
ill-regulated society without a social contract—instead of preceding it. Locke thinks that while not being constant, conflict may pose a problem at any moment. In all these cases, despite deep oppositions about the nature of conflict and its presence in the state of nature, the theme of the contract surfaces as a response to a potential menace: At some point, human beings decide to live together under the rules of a centralized government that will protect them as long as they limit their liberty and obey the rules that this government is in charge of enforcing.

John Milton’s 1650 *Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* includes a good summary of these main ideas:

All men naturally were borne [sic] free . . . and were . . . born to command and not to obey: and that they liv’d so. Till . . . falling among themselves to doe wrong and violence, and foreseeing that such courses must needs tend to the destruction of them all, they agreed by common league to bind each other from mutual injury, and joyntly to defend themselves against any that gave disturbance or opposition to such agreement. Hence came Citties, Townes and Commonwealths. And because no faith in all was found sufficiently binding, they saw it needful to ordaine som authoritie, that might restrain by force and punishment what was violated against peace and common right.

This authoritie and power of self­defence and preservation being originally and naturally in every one of them, and unitedly in them all, for ease, for order, and least each man should be his own partial Judge, they communicated and deriv’d either to one, whom for the eminence of his wisdom and integritie they chose above the rest.

Milton sums up the starting point of contractarian theories. Beginning with an anthropology that claims that the fate of man is liberty and commandment and not obedience, Milton points out the danger: If nobody obeys common rules, humanity is doomed to suffer from violence because there are no possible restraints on whatever action is undertaken by whoever wants something. However, the response is the ability of men to “foresee” the trouble and to surrender their original freedom and equality to secure peace against potential troublemakers. So is born the age of law, an age of limited freedom under law and authority. The substance of what is called “the social contract” is made of this agreement disclosing rights and duties, legitimacy and obedience.

Authors pay more or less attention to the detail of the state of nature. We find ample depictions in Hobbes, Pufendorf, or Locke; and Rousseau takes the idea of the state of nature to an unequal level of theoretical sophistication in his *Second Discourse* (published in 1755). In contemporary philosophy, the reprise of Sigmund Freud’s narrative about primitive society in Carole Pateman’s notion of sexual contract also gives a developed narrative about the equivalent of the state of nature. But authors such as Kant or Rawls mention only briefly the “state of nature.” Its sole goal is to give a sense of what human attitudes toward engaging in political life could be if existing social constraints had no influence on the choices they make. Whatever its development in the different theories, the state of nature and its equivalent form an extraordinary hypothesis about a humanity freed from any kind of social constraint and depict, often under the guise of fiction, the experience of a humanity for which every path, from radical anarchy to complete social integration, is open.

Using the state of nature for a heuristic hypothesis about human freedom is not without problems. The first is its logics. If humanity has stepped away from nature, how can a proper understanding of the latter be retrieved since—as Rousseau put it—the necessary experiences to retrieve the “original man” are impossible to create? Some authors just assume, like Hobbes, that the state of nature can still be perceived in contemporary human behaviors: As soon as the constraints of rules stop making their grip felt, all the violence of nature comes back, with abuses, desire for violence, and strife. The second question is the one of the reality of the state of nature and, beyond, of the initial agreement that gave way to the existence of society. For Rousseau it is just a “conjecture,” a state that is “no more” and that has “probably never been” (as Rousseau puts it in his *Second Discourse*). But Locke, for instance, never renounces the idea that the initial pact corresponds to some extent to historical events. Pufendorf—being careful not to contradict the biblical narrative of the
creation of humanity—considers that “the whole human race has never at one and the same time been in the natural state” (Pufendorf, II, chap. 1): It is a fragmentary experience.

From Rousseau on, the interest in the historical accuracy of the contractarian narrative fades. Rousseau certainly indulges in a long, detailed, and forcefully evocative narrative about the state of nature in his Second Discourse. But he also decides to “lay facts aside, as they do not affect the question”: The narrative of the state of nature is bound to remain a fiction. This renunciation to ground the theory of contract in empirical evi-
dences is connected to the assumption that, as Kant puts it, the notion of a social contract is a pure a priori idea of reason. Kant opines that such ideas allow us to think and to understand reality but are not derived from experience. That is why—apart from an explicit fear of revolution—Kant criticizes empirical inquiries about the origins of the society: “It is vain to inquire into the historical origin of the political mechanism; for it is no longer possible to discover historically the point of time at which civil society took its beginning” (Kant, Eternal Peace, p. 146). Rawls’s contemporary version of contractarianism follows this tradition: His own radical position advocates the suppression of particular information in the “original position,” which is the first step to determine principles of justice, an undertaking that he presents as an analog of the social contract. Here, as with Kant, the reality described by the social contract is not the reality of social facts but the reality of a social reasoning giving way to an appropriate perspective on social reality. After Rousseau, contract theories are no more about history, they are a rational standpoint to study society.

An Individualistic Understanding of Political Life

Considering societies as owing their existence to an initial agreement involves three main questions that have been dealt with thoroughly throughout the history of contract theories: (1) about the status of the contracting parties, (2) about its motivation of the covenant, and (3) about its limit—who, why, what?

Answering the second question first is probably the easiest, because there is a certain consensus among authors about “why,” at a certain point, human beings find it fit to engage in the ties of society, abandoning their initial freedom and equality to respect common laws and the authority in charge of enforcing them. All agree that the state of nature is by nature unstable and unsustainable: Unlike animals, the human fate is not to stay in nature. Only Rousseau disagrees with this view. He considers that it is only by accident, through some unknown catastrophe, that men have come to be in contact with one another, while they could have stayed forever in the animal state. This conception allows him to avoid the less gentle explanation that other philosophers were keen on offering: Man cannot remain an animal, because he is worse than the animals. As Pufendorf writes in On the Duties of Man and Citizen, man is “more wretched than that of any wild beast” (I 4) and “no animal is fiercer or more untameable than man, and more prone to vices capable of disturbing the peace of society” (V 6). Hobbes coins a famous sentence to sum up this somber anthropology in a vision of “the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Leviathan, chap. 13). Whether by accident (for Rousseau) or out of the continuous strife that the vices of men initiate when there are no rules to tame them, there is a moment when the natural state of man is untenable. The reason why man agrees on a contract that forces him to renounce his initial liberty for the sake of securing what is the most important to him (property for Locke, rights for Rousseau, life for Hobbes, a bit of everything for Pufendorf) is the direct consequence of this state of violence to which the initial condition has evolved.

The reason why a contract seems to be compulsory to contractarians shows how narrowly it is linked with a conception of humanity—in other words, an anthropology. The anthropology at stake has one consensual element among philosophers who, otherwise, have very different views on human nature: Man who is party to the contract is defined as an individual. Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) spells it out in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus: “Each individual transfers the whole of the power he has of himself to the community” (chap. 14). Hobbes uses the first person to individualize the engagement in the compact: “I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition;
that thou give up, thy right to him . . .” (Leviathan, II 17). Rousseau equally emphasizes the individualistic dimension of the social compact, which is for him “the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community; for, in the first place, as each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all” (On Social Contract, I 6).

Such formulations clearly indicate the reorganization of the conception of society with contract doctrines: Collectivities are to be understood starting with the individuals. They also lead contractarian philosophers to develop anthropological inquiries in order to determine that what is genuinely human as the core opposition of contractarian theories is the one between a state before society and civil society. This anthropology, diverse thought the ideas of the authors can be, is based on some convictions that they all share. All agree, for instance, that man is naturally free, equal to any other. The question of reason is more debated, and usually authors describe humanity in the state of nature as dominated by desire and appetite, the development of reason requiring in their opinion exchanges made possible only by the existence of society. Once again, Spinoza provides an accurate summary of this anthropology in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus:

The natural right of every man therefore is determined by appetite and power, not by sound reason. For all are not constituted by nature to act according to the rules of reason. On the contrary, all are born ignorant of everything; and before they can know the true rule of life, and acquire virtuous habits, a great part of their lives must already have passed. (chap. 16)

However, the consequences drawn from such a description, which is not solely Spinoza’s, but could be agreed on by most authors of the 17th- and 18th-century contractarian thinkers, are often at odds. Hobbes considers that the fear of death, and hence the potential threat that any human being represents to any other, is the dominant passion, while Rousseau notes that the fear of death is too complex an idea to have it attributed to the natural state of man. Locke insists on the role of property and considers that the need to protect possession is the driving factor for the establishment of a civil society. For many contractarian philosophers, while a person is described as an individual, this individual is often engaged in different kinds of social intercourses. These do not lead to a properly established society—these relations are not formalized as laws and enforced by the existence of a state. As Kant repetitively states it in The Science of Right, the natural state of man can be a “social state” even if it is by no means a “civil state” because the civil state is characterized by the establishment of permanent laws, the violation of which is punished by a recognized authority.

Only Rousseau seeks to build a philosophical anthropology that would be a radically individualistic one, by eliminating from his consideration of man before the social contract any type of interactions between human beings in the state of nature. It seems contradictory to him to establish society on the basis of an individual agreement if we are unable to consider the individuals as such, without connections to one another. Even Hobbes’s “war of all against all” in the state of nature seems to him a contradiction: If one is on her or his own, why should there be a conflict and how could two individuals who are entirely free to flee fight if they have no possession to defend and no complex idea such as honor and recognition to drive them? This opposition is far from being a point of detail. It is a way for Rousseau to develop to its furthest consequence the individualistic standpoint of contractarian doctrines and allows him either to develop or reformulate them or to overcome some of their difficulties.

For instance, Rousseau’s radically individualistic stance gives him the possibility to address an aspect of the social contract that is often carefully avoided by most authors: the question of women. Contractarian philosophers tend to think that female subordination is natural—for example, Pufendorf, for whom marriage is part of the natural law. Hence, women have hardly a word to say in the original covenant, and the social contract is indeed gendered—Pateman is far from being wrong in reading the social contract as a sexual one, opposing the social contract, which is about freedom, to the sexual contract, which is about subordination. Even if Rousseau’s claims about the legitimate subjection of woman to man in society are conventional and quite disappointing for the modern reader, his initial intuition is remarkable.
An individualistic society is gender neutral. This claim was long forgotten before being rediscovered in the 20th century—for instance, by Rawls, according to whom the decision about the principles of justice has been made under a veil of ignorance so thick that one does not even know the gender of the founder.

The emphasis on the individual is also decisive for the substance of the contract—the “what question.” With his radical insight, Rousseau is able to overcome some of the least liberal aspects of contractarian doctrines and to give them a more democratic undertone—though technically Rousseau was never in favor of democracy, a regime he imagined only fit for “a people of gods.” Admitting a social relation of some sort among men before the founding contract of society means that there is something wrong with human beings in the state of nature since they are unable to cope with it in a sustainable fashion. For many contract philosophies, the place of the individual is purely disruptive: Individuals tend to free themselves from the natural law—the rules that commend the action of man in the state of nature—since there is no institution to guarantee retaliation for misdeeds. Punishment requires the invention of a developed society and is a function of the state that is created after the contract is agreed on. If individuals spontaneously behaved according to the law of nature, indeed, there would be no need for a social contract. To be precise, one of the goals of the contract is to have man abandon natural law to ensure what this natural law cannot guarantee: its own enforcement. The risk is then to interpret the contract that founded a society either in a purely repressive way—this is basically the case with Hobbes—or to be exposed to a fallacy, as might be the case with Locke.

Indeed, if the main issue in human interactions in the state of nature is the menace of violence, because individuals have the right to anything they wish under the natural law, the scope of the contract can be strictly limited to guarantee the absence of conflict by all means. It is the case with Hobbes, who considers that the only limitation of the authority to which the contract has transferred each individual’s power and right is that it cannot harm the life of its subjects. In such a context, even if it has been argued that Hobbes was the first “liberal” thinker, authoritarian regimes can be perfectly legitimate ones.

But if, as Rousseau did, one starts with an individual isolated from the others, then conflict only appears when society is formed because it puts into contact with each other human beings who are not meant to be placed in such a situation. Hence, suppressing conflicts means retrieving the initial state by finding a way—which is precisely the contract—to guarantee what has been lost with the gathering of individuals who were initially separate entities. In a way, Rousseau plays the civil state against the social state: society without laws oppresses the individuals; society with laws should enable them to thrive again in a superior way. This leads to a major step ahead in the values linked with the idea of a social contract. For Rousseau, the aim of the initial contract is not only to protect the physical life of the individual but also to protect his or her inherent qualities: freedom, rights, and equal standing with everybody in society. To that extent, he follows the lesson of Locke in his Second Treatise, who says that “law, in its true notion, is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest” (sec. 57). And Rousseau extends the idea to its ultimate consequence: if law is here to protect liberty, as Locke claims it, then Rousseau feels that the logical follow-up is that “obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty” (On the Social Contract, I 8).

Rousseau’s difference with Locke is precisely that Locke also considers that human beings in the state of nature are not isolated. He goes so far as to think that they have some common understanding of the law (of nature) they should respect. But the problem with this view—and the possible fallacy in the reasoning—is that it shows that social relations are right away flawed with conflict and violations of norms that are however respected. The formation of civil society through the contract only adds government and law to the problems of society but does not solve them. By retracing the origins of society, not to a state of nature that would have been to some extent social but to the idea of the individual considered in himself or herself, Rousseau is in a better position to reinforce the claim of an original contract that is in place to preserve individual rights, because they can be thought independent from any kind of interactions.
Beyond the Contract

No author more clearly than Pufendorf in his *Duty of Man and Citizen* has grasped the essence of the questions raised by contractarian theories. “For a state to coalesce regularly,” Pufendorf writes, it is necessary that first each individual agrees “to a permanent community” with the others, or, in other words, it is necessary “that they mutually desire to become fellow-citizens.” This is the first compact. Then, once engaged in society, the collectivity has to decide in “one decree” under which regime it chooses to live. Then, another compact is needed, when the person, or persons, upon whom the government of the nascent state is conferred are established in authority. By this compact these bind themselves to take care of the common security and safety, the rest to yield them their obedience; and by it also all subject their own wills to the will of that person or persons. (II 6)

One compact is thus about living together, another about submission to authority. This theory, sometimes known as the “two-pacts theory,” underlines the twofold character of contractarian theories: on the one hand, the question of power; on the other, the question of togetherness—in other terms, the question of political legitimacy and the question of social diversity. If Rousseau’s formula “the social contract” has been so successful in summing up the inspiration of contract theory, it is precisely because the original contract is not solely about government. It is about the very existence of any collectivity, any society. The purpose of contract theory is thus not only to identify the characteristics of legitimate power. It also deals with the mere possibility of living together and raises the question of social ties.

We can safely say that this new question is born with contractarianism and that contract theory has been the first to give an account of it. With the emergence of the figure of the individual, social bonds appear frailer because one realizes the power that each member has to seclude himself from ties that can be challenged. While tyranny has always been considered as a political evil, contract theories also admit that, beyond the oppression, seeing communities torn down by internal disputes is an equal danger. The times of revolutions and civil wars that saw the birth of contractarian doctrines gave ample illustration to this fact to authors who tried to figure out what response to the tragedies of the time could be offered.

Pufendorf, by separating the will to live together from the consent to power, spells out this new condition—the social condition—of politics in the wake of modernity. However, if he is analytically right, he has been seen as politically wrong, and the rest of the contractarian tradition has rejected the theory of the two pacts. The fundamental problem of modern politics might be twofold—living together, obeying a legitimate authority—but it does not consist of two separate problems. Determining the right authority, the right “principle of justice,” as Rawls puts it in the 20th century, is inseparable from our way of living together. According to Rawls, it is not the case that there is our political existence on one side and the kind of relations we have with other members of our society on the other side. Politics, relations of authority, pervade the entire network of social links: Political sociology always meshes with the framework of governance. With contractarian doctrines, political philosophy has entered the age of ideology: Social relations are to be accounted for in terms of politics.

By the same token, the presence of contract theory in political thought has been abating whenever those questions have appeared as secondary or even suspect ones or when alternative theories of modernity have shown a better way of giving explanations of the facts that contract theorists wanted to explain. Another kind of critique has also come from those who, as David Hume (1711–1776) puts it in one of his essays dedicated to the critique of contractarian theories, “trace up” “government to the Deity.” The very inspiration of a secular doctrine is for these critics its very and most fundamental flaw. But as this kind of normative position has lost its grip on Western political thought, the real critique has come from doctrines that have assumed their own identification with modernity, showing that contract theory could embrace the whole of modern politics.

In the first phase, after the French Revolution, one of the major problems of contract theories—social plurality and the question of how to live together in society—loses some of its importance. The 19th century was an age of nation building
and social reengineering. The national imaginary favors the conception of tightly knitted communities, whose main problem was to get rid of external influence. The neighbor was not a problem provided that he or she was from the same kin, and the legitimate government was not primarily the one that grants rights but the national one. Socialist doctrines, then so influential and whose influence extended far into the 20th century, were equally at odds with this question of social plurality. Their insistence on collective organization could not but repel the general inspiration of contract philosophies. Insisting on class conscience, on class organization, meant having very little interest in cultural diversity or in political struggles that would not be linked to structural, economic factors. It also meant a clear inability to even consider the significance of any individualistic point of view on society, which contract theories always involve. Eventually, the style of political thought involved in contractarian theories also could be challenged with the development of a scientific approach of politics favoring the collection and the analysis of empirical data: It did not leave much room for theories that were highly speculative.

Another type of critique of contractarian doctrines deals with the issue of liberty. One of the most constant representations of liberty in contractarian theories rests in its dramatic character: Human beings, left on their own without the restraints of a political order, are led into a state of violence. But since the 18th century, liberal and then libertarian philosophies have considered that the lack of liberty is the sole source of violence. Left to themselves, human beings are able to live in harmony. This is the gist of the inspiration of market theories, which have a reach that is initially far beyond a limited explanation of how economics work or should work. To be free, only local contracts are necessary, and the government, far from being the outcome of a collective decision to protect liberty, should not intervene in matters regarding liberty. Safeguarding liberty does not need the establishment of an original contract but freedom from the government.

These competing doctrines also have shown their limits, again placing contractarian doctrines in the foreground. The publication in 1971 of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice is largely recognized as a milestone in the renewal of interest in contractarian approaches. It coincided with the awareness that a free market could not be a substitute for a just society, and that questions of principles were raised through new political issues such as discrimination among a population: national citizenship alone was not enough to build a political community. The rise in the United States and the United Kingdom of political agendas more centered on individuals in social interactions than in the previous decades, as well as the declining influence of socialist and Marxist interpretations of society, also allowed the contractarian framework to appear as a credible alternative. They have provided, under a new guise, a way to conciliate the renewed prominence of the figure of the individual and the continued necessity of organizing collective existence. In societies that are becoming more and more diverse, and where governance faces repetitive crisis, contractarian theories might not offer the solution but should still count among the most powerful tools we have to understand the contemporary world of politics. This is indeed the problem of what we have eventually called “democracy” and where we now recognize the very definition of our age.

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See also Conflicts; Hobbes, Thomas; Individualism; Locke, John; Natural Law; Rational Choice; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

Further Readings
Many definitions of politics emphasize the conflictual aspect of human relations. But cooperation should be considered the essential element of politics even if it is not always achieved at the degree that would produce optimum results. Cooperation is action for the common benefit. Only human beings are able to cooperate and abide by collective rules for their common interests, including making exchanges in their mutual benefit, forming coalitions and stable organizations, making enforceable decisions on collective affairs, and living in large communities under shared norms. This entry describes some of the aspects of human existence in which cooperation can play a key role, examines ways in which game theory can illuminate the nature of cooperation, and discusses some of the factors that are important in developing and maintaining cooperation.

**Crucial Areas for Cooperation**

All fundamental problems in politics face the crucial question of how, under what circumstances, and to what extent human beings can be motivated to cooperate in their common interest. Cooperation is at the core of the issues of conviviality, democracy, peaceful coexistence between different communities, and the preservation of human life on Earth, as is briefly reviewed in the following paragraphs.

**Community**

In what certain classical authors called “the state of nature,” conflict is pervasive. If human interactions are unconstrained, anyone, with the advantage of surprise, can try to impose his or her will on others. But if all do, then people may find themselves living in a state of chaos in which, in Thomas Hobbes’s famous words, life tends to be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” In such an environment, it is not reasonable to risk unilateral cooperation, while cooperation within groups is precarious. However, human beings can do better. People can agree on creating a government equipped with tools of coercion to enforce rules mandating cooperative actions that produce beneficial results for society as a whole. The government may apply sanctions against “defectors”—that is, violators of mutually beneficial rules of conduct—discourage free riding on public goods, and craft incentives for cooperation. People can rationally accept conditional consent. By an agreed “social contract,” the efficient outcome of civilization or “commonwealth,” in which each can live in peace and security, can be attained.

**Democratization**

In situations of institutional regime crisis in which authoritarian rulers cannot go on as they were accustomed to do, actors with opposite political regime preferences can generate violent conflict or a civil war in which both sides may
fight to eliminate each other. Eventually, one of the sides can become a single, absolute winner. But choosing confrontation, with an uncertain outcome, also entails the risk of becoming an absolute loser, as well as the costs of significant destruction on both sides. In contrast, by anticipating the foreseeable consequences of their choices, either the rulers or the opposition leaders can offer conditional, retractable cooperation. Negotiations can lead to a provisional compromise, including the calling of a multiparty election that does not secure an absolute winner, which may open further developments in favor of either of the actors involved, as has happened in so many cases of democratization in different parts of the world since the last quarter of the 20th century.

**Deterrence**

International relations have traditionally been dominated by conflict, which culminated in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union during the second half of the 20th century. However, a major clash was prevented by underlying cooperation. An arms race triggered by the Soviets choosing to build new weapons and the United States doing the same, and vice versa, put both countries at risk. The “balance of terror” without an actual frontal war was durable because, with nuclear weapons and the possibility of total destruction, the stakes were so high. The United States and the Soviet Union attempted to cooperate in order to reduce and control arms through negotiations and agreements. Nevertheless, the arms race stopped only with the dissolution of one of the players.

**Environment**

Climate change has become a broad concern, leading many people to call to stop the planet from overheating. Yet some skepticism persists regarding human agency in climate change, and few governments are willing to deal with the problem by themselves. The Kyoto Protocol, placing voluntary limits on emissions of greenhouse gases, was formally accepted by 36 developed countries for the period 2005 to 2012. However, the United States and Australia initially refused to sign. Even some of the protocol signatories, as well as many developing countries, including most prominently China, continue to tolerate high levels of industrial emissions known to exacerbate the greenhouse effect. Without international cooperation, the world may be condemned to an eventual burning, according to those who hold the global warming hypothesis. Most countries seem to have recently found some incentive to avoid being sanctioned for their misconduct. The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate has attained new cooperation on development and technology transfer enabling a reduction in gas emissions. The United Nations held successful talks with virtually all countries in the world to replace the Kyoto Protocol after its deadline expires. If things get bad enough, then cooperation may flourish.

**Developing and Sustaining Cooperation**

The conditions in which cooperation among different actors for their common interest can emerge and hold up, such as in the cases mentioned above, can be illuminated with the help of some analytical tools provided by game theory. In particular, competitive, non-zero-sum games, such as the famous “prisoners’ dilemma,” involve different combinations of cooperation and conflict. When mutual cooperation can produce gains for all participants, it is said that the sum of the players’ benefits is positive. But people may fail to cooperate with others even if cooperation would produce a better collective outcome for all the participants.

The lessons from prisoners’ dilemma can be applied to any group or community facing a cooperation problem among its members. On the one hand, the previously conditions of the state of nature, civil war, arms race, or destruction of natural resources can be conceived as inefficient, equilibrium outcomes of prisoners’ dilemma type of interactions. On the other hand, the state of civilization, democracy, peaceful coexistence, and conservation of the atmosphere can correspond to alternative, efficient, although somewhat vulnerable, outcomes of this type of game produced by mutual cooperation.

Game theory models with “repeated” games suggest that the greater the uncertainty over the future relationship and the higher the number of interactions between the parties, the more conflict can diminish and mutual cooperation emerge and be
sustained. If people are going to engage in repeated interactions, it may make sense to try to cooperate in order to receive others’ cooperation in the future. A community or institutional setting in which everybody can expect to keep interacting with the same people regularly for some time in the future may include a household or a neighborhood, the workplace, a mall or a school, a professional organization, or a political party, as well as the city, the state, the empire, or the world one is aware of living in and where one intends to stay. A reasonable behavior for repeated interactions with other individuals with some common interest can imply conditional cooperation and a positive response to the other’s behavior. In the long term, cooperation may spread and become the prevailing way of conduct.

According to this insight, we can observe that cooperation, as can be substantiated in the form of collective action or a joint organization, is indeed more intense and sustained among certain groups of people interacting for long periods of indefinite length. Cooperation should be higher, for example, among members of a condominium association rather than among motel clients, among town residents rather than among tourists or occasional visitors, among fixed employees rather than among temporarily unemployed people expecting to find a job soon, among civil servants rather than among seasonal workers, and among store owners in a commercial mall rather than among sporadic vendors in a street market.

If people reciprocate to cooperation with cooperation in repeated interactions, they can build a good reputation for themselves that may move others to cooperate with them. Feelings of trust may emerge among people having information about others’ past actions and among new participants obtaining regular positive retribution for their conduct. In the middle or long term, increasing and sustained cooperation among members of a community may induce them to construct institutional environments that limit individual competition and tend to homogenize the population. Internal sanctions against defectors can go together with the promotion of values such as honesty and empathy with the distress of others, thus reinforcing social cooperativeness. Emerging and self-sustaining cooperation in the long term can also help promote conviviality, democracy, peaceful coexistence, and environmental conservation mentioned earlier.

Nevertheless, the development of cooperation among members of a community requires some mutual commitment to stay within its contours. If, conversely, people living within the same institutional setting consider themselves as belonging to different groups with opposite goals, asymmetric relations of cooperation and conflict within the community can develop. The difference between groups can be based on language, race, ethnicity, religion, family or tribal traditions, contrary economic interests, or adversarial preferences for the location of public goods. Thus, high degrees of success or failure in attaining cooperation within a group do not necessarily correspond to socially efficient or inefficient solutions. The collective strength of some groups may indeed provoke conflict with other groups or favor asymmetric and biased redistri­butions of resources, hindering more satisfactory outcomes for greater numbers of people.

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See also Coalitions; Competition, Political; Conflict Resolution; Contract Theory; Coordination; Democratization; Deterrence; Game Theory; Prisoners’ Dilemma

Further Readings

COORDINATION

An initial statement of what is typically meant by the pursuit of coordination is the ambition to
achieve greater coherence among the departments, agencies, authorities, services, and professions of government, as well as those providing public services under contract or license, each of which has some responsibilities for a given problem or issue. This entry provides a framework for understanding coordination in terms of the problems it seeks to address and the means through which its goals are pursued. It also discusses the way in which the concern with coordination evolved, the main theoretical approaches that have been taken in research on it, and the limitations of efforts to provide evidence of its effectiveness.

Goals and Means
The word coordination is sometimes used to describe a class of policy goals or outcomes, loosely labeled as “coherence.” This entry distinguishes several distinct goals that fall under this general term. Each of these goals, though, consists to some degree in the reduction or even removal of tensions among policies, so that they do not undermine each other and, perhaps, instead even support each other.

Because coordination covers a range of initiatives designed to combat certain types of problems, one way to understand its meaning is as something offered as the opposite of any or several of those problems. Broadly, the problems for which greater coordination is presented as a solution can be divided into six kinds, ranked here in order of declining ferocity of conflict between the imperatives set out in the institutional or organizational guidelines, organizational or professional goals, incentives, regulatory requirements, and legal duties (see Christopher Pollitt, 2003):

Conflict. Mutually undermining imperatives lead to conflict. For example, goals of promoting economic growth and limiting the environmental impact of human activity quickly come into conflict, but almost every government is expected to promote both to some degree, and they are often given to distinct agencies to pursue. Another such case arises when one regulatory agency demands adaptations to buildings to enable wheelchair access, while another regulatory body forbids it on the ground that they would violate the integrity of a historic building.

Contradiction. This entails inconsistent imperatives that have not actually come into direct conflict but may do so. For example, consider the goal of designing welfare systems to get people who have few skills and some disadvantages, such as learning difficulties or mental health problems, into the workforce. Such a program may conflict with the imperative of productivity even in a strong economy, but the conflict may remain latent. However, in a weak economy, the inconsistency in goals may become important and constitute an actual conflict.

Competition. This involves imperatives that are not strictly inconsistent but, in practice, come into conflict or at least are in rivalry for priority or resources. This is a perennial problem, in which the competition between emphasizing investment in secondary and tertiary education and between crime reduction and reduction of the fear of crime can serve as examples.

Incoherence and Fragmentation. Imperatives that are neither mutually contradictory nor in competition may have little to do with each other, when arguably gains could be achieved if they were brought together. The frequent complaints of “departmentalism,” “silo mentality,” and “territorialism” between neighboring local authorities are all examples of this kind of problem.

Duplication. This refers to similar or even identical imperatives expressed in different arrangements that result in wasteful and excessive use of resources. For example, there are often cases where very similar programs are provided by both health authorities and local authorities or by local authorities and probation services; a similar issue can arise when multiple regulators all conduct on-site inspections, each looking at the same sets of organizational records or processes but for different purposes, where there might be possibilities to reduce the burden on regulated bodies by combining inspections.

Pursuit of coordination as a goal rests on the claim that better outcomes such as health, educational achievement, security against crime, economic development, or effectiveness in defense are better promoted when the policies pursued by each particular agency, department, or authority within the system of governance stand in little tension with each other. To many people, this claim seems
obviously and intuitively true. However, as we shall see below, it is contested, and some of the arguments offered against it have very distinguished pedigrees in both organizational and political thought.

Often, however, “coordination” is also used to describe the means by which the aims of better integrated policy are pursued. Indeed, in this respect, the term is used to refer to

- general processes, such as markets, hierarchy, clans, or clusters, as broad types of change process that bring people and organizations into some kind of alignment with and in adjustment to each other;
- policy instruments, such as incentives, directives, or the provision of information (or, more simply, sticks, carrots, and sermons, which form the canonical trinity of types of tools of government); or
- very specific interorganizational arrangements, such as joint committees, joint budgets, or even activities or outputs such as a “one-stop shop” or shared services centers that are outlets to the service users or the public.

For the most part, governments use these means in combination. Rarely do they rely exclusively on one type of process or instrument even in a single field of policy, let alone across the whole span of public management. Much of the recent effort in the study of coordination is now devoted to the effort to understand the likely consequences, in different circumstances, of different combinations of processes, instruments, and arrangements. A common slogan for this is that “it’s the mix that matters.”

Just what relationship these means of coordination have to the goals of coordination is the subject of some disagreement and some disappointment. For example, some researchers have found that the very proliferation of large numbers of joint committees, budgets, and customer service centers itself produces new kinds of fragmentation. Certainly, all these things are expensive to establish and run. This raises the question of whether the gains in improved policy outcomes are worth the higher administrative costs of introducing and operating all the coordinating machinery. There is also evidence from the study of mergers that directing managerial attention to the working of committees and budgets and centers can distract them, sometimes for quite long periods, from the larger policy goals, while they concentrate on the minutiae of interorganizational relations. It would be quite wrong to say that coordination efforts typically fail or cost more than they are worth. Indeed, the literature includes many positive evaluations. But as yet, we lack sufficient evidence to make many general claims about when, where, and why the means support the goals and to what degree they can be expected to do so.

Origins

Coordination has been an eternal concern of government and the public services. Between the different branches of the armed forces, it has been a topic for institutional innovation, political anxiety, and intellectual work since antiquity. The need to reduce conflict between the impacts of the tax-collecting and economic activity–stimulating work of different functions of government was a matter of enduring concern throughout the Roman Empire. Incoherence and conflicting jurisdiction became a major problem for the absolutist monarchs of early-modern Europe, because the combination of the sale of offices, the farming of taxes, and the conflict of monarchical laws with local systems of laws produced growing contradictions.

With the development of responsibilities for the welfare of citizens in domestic policy toward the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the issue came to be of central importance in many countries. The “Progressive Era” reforms in late-19th-century United States produced some systematic thought on the question. In British imperial public administration and especially in India after 1857, the need for coordination became a constant litany.

In 1918 in Britain, the Haldane Committee published its report, examining more systematically than any previous study had done the various principles and administrative designs available by which greater coordination might be pursued. Options considered included those of organizing around geographical jurisdiction, clientele, or function, each requiring different approaches to horizontal interorganizational linkage.

In the decades after World War II, many countries experimented with mergers to produce ever larger departments or groups of departments in the hope that this would produce greater cohesion, but the results were generally disappointing. In the
1960s, some came to pin their hopes for coordination on techniques of central control rather than in structural change, emphasizing management by objectives, program analysis, and review and other forms of managerial and financial accountability. Yet by the mid-1970s, disappointment with these too had become widespread.

The 1980s and 1990s were characterized in Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States by a series of reforms, closely documented in the scholarly literature, which are commonly labeled the new public management, although this term probably gives them greater unity than they in fact exhibited. By the mid- to late 1990s, concern was growing that these reforms had overemphasized the role of the dedicated specialist agency, often working under a contract for the performance of its own principal function exclusively, to the detriment of coordination. In Britain, the aspiration for a major initiative at every level toward greater cross-government working was given the label “joined-up government” by the New Labor administration that came to power in 1997; in practice, its interest in this waned significantly after a few years. In Australia, the preferred term was the whole of government approach; political commitment there was sustained for a longer period. The movement had no national programmatic emphasis in the United States, not least because many of the functions that would be candidates for spearheading greater coordination are in that country administered at state level. Indeed, it was at the state level that a wide range of efforts in things described variously as integration, horizontal working, and “network governance” came to be pursued.

In practice, different reform programs have pursued rather different things in the name of coherence and coordination. In some countries, the priorities have been around integrating access to specific local services targeting the same clientele, through “one-stop shop” centers on main business streets or online. In others, the priority has been the formation of joint boards between a modest number of particular public authorities to manage special programs. In yet others, the principal effort has been put into designing systems of government-wide accountability to sharpen incentives for the pursuit of particular outcomes, irrespective of agency; finally, for some governments, improving the mutual understanding and joint efforts of their civil servants working in different departments of state to formulate policies is the greater priority.

It seems that the high watermark of this most recent tide of efforts in coordination had passed by the late 2000s, as governments became more interested in “modernization,” supporting individual service user choice of provider, or as fiscal positions deteriorated in the wake of the financial and then the general economic crisis. No doubt, however, in due course, interest in aspirations for enhanced coordination will revive.

Although some advocates in the late 1990s had perhaps hoped otherwise, few votes have been won on the basis of greater coordination. At best, the contribution to electoral success achieved by coordination is indirect. Moreover, many of those who make the greatest use of those frontline public services for which coordination is typically a high priority are often poor and, therefore, typically less likely to vote. But this measure understates the political importance of the issue. Coordination has provided governments—and in particular, center-left governments—with an aspiration and ideas for programs of reform to the machinery of government with which to answer the charge that government is somehow inherently incapable of improving its performance. Although the details of administrative arrangements are of little interest to most voters, the ideological battle between those who hope for better government and those who argue for less government is a central one in defining political projects, and it is to this conflict that the debates about coordination make their political contribution.

Theories

Four kinds of questions about coordination have been the principal subjects for theoretical work in the literature:

1. explaining the waxing and waning over time and the differences between countries in political commitment to put into action programs of reform for coordination;

2. explaining the emergence, whether by conscious and deliberate choice or otherwise, of forms of interorganizational relations that have prevailed in pursuit of coordination in different countries, policy fields, and so on;
3. explaining the choice of instrumentation made by particular governments in pursuit of coordination; and

4. explaining the conditions under which we can expect certain programs to be successfully put in place administratively, or—more ambitiously—to make a positive difference to outcomes.

On the first and second questions, academic writing about coordination is a field where empirical work dominates both theory development and theory testing. Certainly, the grand explanatory frameworks of rational choice, historical institutionalism, structural functionalism, ideationalism, and so forth that dominate much of political science and international relations research and from which particular theories are often derived are not addressed by many scholars working on coordination.

The most commonly deployed argument in answer to each of the four questions is the broadly historical institutionalist one that the prior institutionalization of departments, organizations, tiers, and functions among the public services continues to inhibit the scope for greater coordination and joint working across boundaries. Much of the literature is devoted to the identification of institutionalized barriers to cooperation. Making lists of barriers, obstacles, constraints, or, conversely, facilitating conditions abounds. What is often unclear about the theoretical status and role of these sorts of factors is whether they are offered as necessary conditions for successful implementation of any particular level and degree of coordination, jointly necessary conditions for it to be sought at all, or simply factors that influence probabilities. Nor is it very often clear what causal relationship these structural factors have with agency. A partial exception is the attempt by Perri 6, Diana Leat, Kimberly Seltzer, and Stoker Gerry (2002) to apply the neo-Durkheimian institutional theoretic tradition to develop theories about both the first and the second questions.

On the first question, 6 and colleagues argue that political commitment to coordination is sustained principally during periods of centrist government and that this pattern can be traced back throughout the 20th century. By contrast, Helen Sullivan and Chris Skelcher argue that it is a recent development and an artifact of reaction against the excesses of the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s commonly referred to as the “new public management.” The disagreement here turns on empirical questions about just how different the recent efforts in coordination really are from those pursued in previous periods of administrative history. Whereas 6 and colleagues and Christopher Hood see continuities in the elementary forms of organization and interorganizational relations, Sullivan and Skelcher argue that the range of tasks with which the public services are charged now and the context of the reaction against the excesses of the reforms of the 1980s represent a distinct historical conjuncture.

Most theorizing about the second question has used the conventional classification of types or forms of interorganizational relations that parses them into hierarchies, markets, and networks. This trichotomy has its roots in institutional theories in economies descending from Ronald Coase, William Ouchi, and Oliver Williamson. Nonetheless, there has been growing recognition of the fact that many arrangements or relationships that exhibit the formal features of markets or networks are, at the level of their informal institutions, more genuinely hierarchical. Conversely, it has long been recognized that many formally hierarchical partnerships are, in their informal institutions, highly individu- alistic. Finally, according to Perri 6, Nick Goodwin, Edward Peck, and Tim Freeman, it has been found that the concept of a “network” increasingly does not correspond to any single institutional form.

Authors have differed in the extent to which they have sought to use the trichotomy for truly theoretical and explanatory purposes or the extent to which it has been used mainly descriptively as a coding schema. For Koen Verhoest, Geert Bouckaert, and Guy Peters, the three institutional forms achieve their explanatory force by enabling the operation of what they describe as mechanisms, a term that in their usage largely corresponds to policy instruments used for control, incentive, or persuasion and for accountability. Some, such as Sullivan and Skelcher, propose positive feedback explanations, such that prior and latent institutional patterns are reinforced during periods of deliberate effort to cultivate greater coordination: This sits slightly uneasily with their negative feedback theory in answer to the first question, and reconciliation depends on very exact
periodization that has not yet been tested with detailed historical research.

There have been many attempts to engage in theory development in the field using concepts of trust and networks. It is common to find authors, such as Robert Agranoff, claiming that coordination is best facilitated by nonhierarchical, high-trust consensual managerial practices, although it is rather rare to find close comparative analysis of cases where more hierarchical approaches are used, holding the service field and political jurisdiction constant; this leaves continuing question marks over these kinds of claims.

It is common to find small-N studies used to develop necessary-condition hypotheses about the extent of prior trust or prior operation of certain patterns of networks of organizations before we can expect to see even administrative implementation of programs being sustained, let alone positive impact on outcomes. Other studies, such as that by Jeanette Moore, Robert M. West, Justin Keen, Mary Godfrey, and Jean Townsend, or by H. Brinton Milward and Keith Provan, are concerned with networks of referral of clients between organizations, and they draw on sociometric approaches to network analysis to offer predictive understandings of these relations between organizations and services.

Eugene Bardach, presenting his argument relatively informally, has offered a strategy for answering the second question by reference to a thesis that assumes a rather strongly individualistic institutional character of organization, arguing that such a setting allows individual entrepreneurs to broker their way into fluid patterns of interorganizational relations, in which trust is taken to be a largely pragmatic affair. In a similar vein, there is a large body of work inferring from qualitative work on the role of particular individuals that “leadership” is a necessary condition for success, although quite what types of leadership have just which effects and in which circumstances remains ill specified.

The fourth question, about conditions for “success,” is most frequently addressed—for example, by Bob Hudson, Brian Hardy, Melanie Henwood, and Gerald Wistow—using theories of organizational process, ranging from theories of the life cycles of initiatives through to more eclectic approaches that combine institutional constraints with models of interaction processes and organizational capability theory.

Opposing Principles

Advocates of coordination argue that the six concerns discussed above (in the “Goals and Means” section of this entry) are problems to be combated, as a matter of priority. But by no means do all governments or policymakers agree. For many, conflict, contradiction, and competition may be regarded as broadly healthy, and fragmentation and duplication might be regarded as losses that are acceptable as the price of other important gains. For, indeed, coordination is directly opposed to a number of principles for the organization of policy making and of public services that have long had, and continue to have, powerful advocates.

Four of the commonest principles that can and sometimes have implied contrary principles of organization might be called (1) specialism in accountability, (2) specialism in creative tension, (3) liberal constitutionalism, and (4) populism.

Specialism is the argument that organizing the principal accountabilities of policy making and public services around functions, by which we conventionally mean the administration of discrete services that call for particular bodies of knowledge, skill, professionalism, and so on, is the most effective way either to ensure efficient use of inputs or, perhaps, to secure the responsiveness of the services to the will of the government of the day. It is generally much more straightforward to attach estimates of costs and control of expenditure to inputs than it is to attach them to outputs or outcomes, though it is true that outcomes such as upward social mobility, health status, levels of educational attainment, the rate of unemployment, or the prevailing level of the fear of crime are each affected by the work of many agencies, departments, and services. But measuring the contribution of each to the outcome in a way that enables accountability or managerial control is extremely challenging; indeed, the particular relationships may not be very stable over time, yet systems of managerial control have to be kept in place for some time if we are to be able to tell whether they are capable of being implemented at all, let alone if we want to gather evidence about whether they might or might not be effective. We can, in short, manage and hold accountable each of the services for what they can do, but we will find it difficult to manage and hold each to account for what they
Contribute to what all should care about. Second, the specialist position argues that trying to manage and hold them to account for shared outcomes in practice results in the blurring of imperatives, scope for buck-passing, and the blunting of the commitment to the best use of specialist expertise, which is often critical to the best use of the professionals of medicine, policing, teaching, counseling, land use planning, building, and even administering of payments and processes that make up the interventions supplied by the public services. In the reforms of public management that were adopted in the central government in Britain and New Zealand and many other administrations during the 1980s, the argument of specialism was widely deployed, often under the banners of “managerial focus” and the “dedicated agency.”

A second kind of argument for specialism directly contests the claim with which this entry began: that better outcomes result from reducing tensions between the policies implicitly or explicitly pursued by agencies. On the contrary, it could be suggested that it is precisely these tensions between the goals of different agencies that spur thought, innovation, adjustment, development, and sophistication related to both means and ends in those agencies. Tension, according to this argument, can be creative. At any one time, it may appear statically inefficient, because managing tensions must always take up managerial time and often cause no little irritation. It is easy to fall into the trap of imagining that if the tensions did not exist, then that time would be better deployed. However, this view would suggest that it is not necessarily or even typically true. Rather, too much pressure for coordination may undermine the creativity that, over the longer term, might produce much greater dynamic efficiency, which would more than compensate for any loss of static efficiency.

The liberal constitutionalist argument holds that both the coordinators and the specialists are misguided in their pursuit of either effectiveness or efficiency. Instead, the liberal constitutionalist fears the excess and abuse of governmental power above all and seeks to harness conflict, contradiction, competition, and incoherence as sources of checks and balances and as a mutually countervailing force for the competing imperatives. Based on this view, the real threat is not that government may not work very well but that it might become too powerful; we should be prepared to accept the consequences for any measures used to derail it, in order to prevent its becoming overweening.

The populist argument is that government should be organized around the principle that the people should be able immediately to understand its organization and that the units to which accountability, budgets, legal powers, and other resources are granted should be defined around things that the public can instantly recognize as having to do with tangible services. Organizing around grandiose and abstract outcomes and interdepartmental committees, creating crosscutting matrices of partnerships and joint budgets, and combining professions and services under headings that correspond to no single category of work may all be valuable instruments if all we ever cared about were that government produce results that can be measured statistically (see below on instruments of coordination). However, for the populist, the most important principle for the organization of government is not the achievement of results that are measured in that way but the intelligibility and immediacy of the organizational system of government to the governed and the ability of the governed to look into that system and readily appreciate what it does. If for the specialist, loss of managerial control over inputs for efficiency is the great risk, and if for the liberal constitutionalist, the overweening ambition and intrusion of government is the primary threat, then for the populist, the worst prospect is a system of government that is opaque and technocratic. In practice, populism has often led to an emphasis on organizing government according to the principles of clientele, territory, or jurisdiction or visible service function.

Readers of the history of the American Revolution will recognize the roots of specialism, liberal constitutionalism, and populism in at least some of the ideas associated with the names of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson, respectively. The enduring political significance of these rival traditions, and the importance of media and pressure group activity to further their claims, forms part of the explanation for the fact that the periods when coordination is a central strategic commitment of reforming governments tend not to last very long. Sooner or later, however strongly they are committed to coordination, politicians must begin to give some weight to some of these...
other considerations. Bluntly, politics must care about many things in government other than the question of whether or not it works very well.

**Instruments**

The range of available policy instruments, mechanisms, tools, or administrative arrangements by which coordination can be pursued is very wide indeed. However, for the sake of convenience, they can be grouped as follows:

**Bringing Together Inputs.** This approach to the promotion of coordination spans the creation of budgets held jointly by two or more departments or agencies for a defined purpose: the creation of common information systems, programs of joint training, and individual posts that report to two or more agencies and pursue goals for which each agency has some part of the overall responsibility.

**Bringing Together Organizations.** Although one extreme of the distribution on this group of instruments includes the full merger of whole departments and agencies, there is a plethora of other ways in which organizations can be brought together. Joint matrix management is sometimes possible for organizations that have not fully merged but where each is asked to work toward goals previously expressed principally within another organization. The commonest instrument is the formal partnership, with its own joint board, but there are also several kinds of joint subsidiaries for joint ventures, all of which may be temporary or permanent and may cover all or only some of the functions of the participating agencies.

**Bringing Together Accountability and Authority.** Holding agencies to account for their contribution to achievements or problems for which each has some responsibility can be done in a variety of ways. Financially, the release of funds can be made conditional on the making of certain kinds of efforts and commitments. Managerially, executive oversight systems can be put in place that provide for review and accountability of teams and individual managers on the contribution of their work to goals that run beyond those of their immediate function. Parliamentary scrutiny can be exercised in a manner that does not confine itself to the oversight of its particular departments by each committee. Panels of service users can be recruited and supported to scrutinize the performance of many services to meet the needs or achieve the goals that they care and are informed about.

**Types and Levels**

*Coordination* takes its place in an extensive lexicon of cognate terms. At least some of the commoner ones are noted below. These terms can be grouped under the four headings shown below. The definitions of these cognate terms that are presented serve to display some of the main ways in which scholars have developed typologies and taxonomies for types of strategic approach, levels of coordination, and policy instruments used to pursue those different approaches.

**Strategic Approaches**

- **Horizontal government:** a synonym for coordination
- **Joined-up government:** coordination to combat inconsistency in activities and goals
- **Holistic government:** coordination to pursue settlements in which potentially rival imperatives are made mutually reinforcing in pursuit of enhanced outcomes

**Levels**

- **Whole-of-government approach:** coordination relying principally on bringing together accountabilities and oversight authority
- **Collaboration:** any kind of coordination that involves bringing together either inputs or organizations
- **Joint working:** collaboration on specific programs rather than for the whole pattern of relations between organizations
- **Integration:** coordination that emphasizes bringing together organizations in especially tight ways—for example, through long-term, tightly supervised strategic partnerships or even mergers
- **Interdepartmental working:** coordination at the tier of central government policy formulation work
- **Multiagency working:** coordination in which the participating agencies retain their distinct identities
Interagency working: coordination that seeks to blur the distinct identities of the participating agencies

Interprofessional working: coordination at the level of the professions rather than the organizations

Instruments

Partnership: a formal structure with a constitution, a board, legal powers, a legal personality, and a specific task, in which participating organizations take full membership

Collaborative: a small team comprising professionals from several distinct professions working together with a distinct clientele or on a series of consecutive processes

One-stop shop: a “Main Street” business area–based or web-based facility in which citizens can access a wide range of services in one place

Problems Targeted

Crosscutting issue: any issue addressed by coordination that affects a wide range of different agencies, organizations, and professions

Wicked issue: any issue addressed by coordination that affects a wide range of different agencies, organizations, or professions; where the measurement of success in addressing the problem raises fundamental methodological problems; and where the causality by which interventions work appears to be nonlinear

Evidence of Effectiveness

There is a truly vast body of literature—including official governmental, practitioner, and peer-reviewed research texts—that claims to offer evidence for and against the effectiveness either of some of the particular recent programs or else of the uses of particular instruments. Unfortunately, much of this literature is rather unsatisfactory. Most studies are not conducted to evaluate effectiveness against any clear alternatives used for comparison or control. Indeed, it is not always clear just what the relevant practicable alternative program or instrument might be, against which comparison ought to be made. Before-and-after comparisons have well-known methodological weaknesses for the purpose of determining effectiveness. Moreover, most studies examine very small numbers of initiatives, limiting the scope for comparison. Because most of the outcomes for the environment, poverty, employment, health status, fear of crime, rates of reported crime, and so on are affected by a great many other factors than those of the deployment of instruments of coordination, for which few studies can realistically control, it is very difficult to place much confidence in the claims made. Recognizing these difficulties, most authors offer only process evaluations, rather than making claims for outcome evaluations. The process evaluation literature is replete with lists of “barriers” or “obstacles,” either to the possibility of attempting particular programs of coordination or to the use of certain instruments at all or else to the chances of achieving satisfaction in the self-reports of the practitioners studied in the process. It is very difficult to know what to make of these many lists. For many of the entries have to do with things such as apathy, inertia, mistrust of others, protection of bureaucratic turf, risk aversion, concern for professional status, and fear of loss of control of budgets or other resources. Many of these things are either among the eternal verities of organizational life or else “barriers” to attempting anything and hardly specific to the instruments of coordination. At this stage in the development of the research, therefore, it is hard to be confident that much has been learned from the studies conducted in the 1990s and the 2000s that was not already known from the many, much earlier studies on the difficulties experienced in the joint implementation of policies in earlier decades—for example, from Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky’s famous (1973/1984) study of the difficulties of multi- and interagency working in U.S. efforts to implement some of the “Great Society” economic development programs launched by the Lyndon Johnson administration in the 1960s.

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See also Policy Analysis; Policy Evaluation; Policy Formulation; Policy Framing; Policy Instruments; Policy Process, Models of
Corporativism

Despite a centuries-long debate on corporativist forms of political representation and statehood, the concept of corporativism (corporatism) is still elusive, owing to insufficient definition and ideological controversy. This entry discusses the definition and the basic idea of corporativism with reference to its historical roots in the Middle Ages and its subsequent developments up to the 19th and 20th centuries. The more recent Catholic element and the secular one are also presented. Finally, the authoritarian features of corporatist rule, especially in Latin America but also in other parts of the world, are discussed.

The Notion

In its most basic meaning, corporativism refers to a political power structure and practice of consensus formation based on the functional representation of professional groups. Associations of farmers, craft workers, industrialists, laborers, lawyers, doctors, or the clergy (churches) act as self-governing bodies on their own behalf and as intermediaries between the government and their members. Political status and rights are attached to occupation and group membership and, thus, differ from those of modern citizenship and equal representation of individuals in parliaments related to a certain territory. The concept of corporativism dates back to the medieval estates and guild system. It found renewed attention among romanticist philosophers in the Germanic world during the 19th century as a remedy against social uprooting in the wake of industrialization and class conflict. The Catholic social teaching has drawn inspiration from corporativist ideas, as have a number of authoritarian regimes in Europe and South America. As a political ideology, corporativism has been fiercely rejected by liberals as a movement that would elevate collectivist corporate bodies to the cornerstones of politics and the economy while denying individual representation, civil liberties, free competition, and democracy. Socialists and Communists fought the idea as a particularly oppressive variant of capitalist class rule that would eliminate the Left and control the working-class masses with a carrot-and-stick...

Further Readings


Corporativism

Not the least, it was the modern state itself and its ideal of universal citizenship, territorial instead of occupational representation, and indivisible sovereignty that ran counter to the establishment of corporate power holders acting as intermediaries between governments and segments of the society. Nevertheless, modern welfare states bear some features of corporativism and neo-corporatist policy making that have become manifest in networks and negotiations between state administrations and powerful corporate actors such as business associations or labor unions in fields such as industrial and social policy. In contrast to such current patterns of corporatist policy making, the term corporativism (corporatism, corporativismo, corporatisme, and Korporativismus) denotes a specific political philosophy and controversial ideology as well as a political regime type.

The Model and Idea of Corporativism

For centuries, debates on corporativism referred—directly or indirectly—to the medieval guild system. Being collective bodies (Latin corpora), medieval guilds served manifold economic, social, cultural, religious, and not the least political functions for their professional membership. Among them one finds the setting of standards for quality, prices and wages, education and work, caring for widows and orphans, representation on town councils, serving in courts and town militia, and maintaining charitable institutions such as hospitals, orphanages, poorhouses, and more. With the rise of the modern state and capitalist economies, those tasks became subject to royal law, state administrations, or markets. The decline of medieval corporativism began at the turn of the 14th century. It was driven not by absolutist claims to sovereignty at first but by recurrent pestilence, severe famine, and extreme weather as well as the spread of Renaissance humanism and Reformationist ideas about religion, science, and society that began to shake the old corporate order of the High Middle Ages and paved the way for a growing emphasis on individualism, centralized territorial rule, and secular supremacy.

Medieval Corporativism

Elements of corporativism appeared in many different sites of medieval political philosophy, though Johannes Althusius (1563–1638) was the first to formulate a comprehensive theory of a corporativist or, in his words, “consociationalist” constitution where the medieval order had already lost ground against new thoughts of monarchical absolutism and indivisible territorial sovereignty. Antony Black refers to Althusius as being one of the “few great theorists of corporatism” (Black, 1984, p. 141), providing us “with perhaps the most substantial exposition of guild ideas ever known” (p. 131). The universal commonwealth (consociatio universalis), Althusius proclaims, has to be understood—in his own words—as “an association inclusive of all other associations (families, collegia [guilds], cities, and provinces) within a determinate large area and recognizing no superior to itself” (Althusius, 1603/1964, chap. 12). In conceiving the social contract as a real pact among corporate legal entities that compose society, Althusius differed from his near-contemporary Thomas Hobbes, who thought of a single agreement, entered into by individuals, who commit themselves to an absolute subjection to a common power: “one Man or one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will” (Leviathan, Part II, chap. 17). Althusius had a notion of shared sovereignty that stands in deep contrast not only to Hobbes’s unitarism but also to Jean Bodin’s doctrine of monarchical sovereignty. Due to his emphasis on corporative autonomy, the subsidiarity principle, and the multilevel character of his constitutional system, Althusius is now reputed for being an early-modern protagonist and forerunner of federalism.

Corporativism has been criticized for its emphasis on collective, instead of individual, autonomy. While this is true for authoritarian concepts connected with various semicorporativist but in fact centralist regimes of the 19th and 20th centuries, early-modern “corporativist” thinkers like Althusius and Marsilius of Padua fought not only for a decentralized polity but also for popular sovereignty. In formulating that the sovereign rights of the people were inalienable, unassignable, and imprescriptible, Althusius rejected Bodin’s notion of sovereignty according to which the people enter into the social contract with the monarch as a collectivity and not as free individuals. This is not surprising if one considers that medieval corporations, both in constitutional theory as in the
Corporativism everyday life of guilds and communes, was marked by a constant tension and interplay between the claims of individuals and those to be found on the level of corporations and their interrelations—a factually conflict-ridden power structure that fed unitarian anticorporativist political sentiments in the long run.

In serving the public and private needs not only of corporate status groups but also of communities at large, medieval corporativism ideologically aimed at an organic whole and, thus, was devoid of modern differentiations such as those between the collective and the individual, government (state) and society, politics and religion, or the public and the private sphere. The antimodernist overtone of corporativism derives from its organicist idea of segmenting society into an articulate multiplicity of interrelated semiautonomous corporations regulated by the principle that men should live freely only in the narrow sphere of their God-given social status.

**Challenging the Liberal Paradigm**

The medieval model of a static organic order received new attention from philosophers and state theorists during the 19th century. The dark side of rapid industrialization, together with the decay of traditional social security mechanisms and an emerging class conflict, resulted in intellectual attempts to find alternatives to the individualist market-liberal paradigm. Corporativist ideas came up again after the French Revolution, particularly regarding its failures and disappointments of widespread beliefs in a republican solution. They have to be seen as an attempt to reconstruct intermediary corporations as moral institutions to support communitarian politicization and individual orientation in times of rapid social change and as a barrier against social uprooting. Corporatist thoughts in the works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Adam Müller, and G. W. F. Hegel (see Tetsushi Harada, 1989) should help fill the gap between a society of individuals and the governmental administration with semiautonomous communal institutions that would eventually strengthen the state as an embodiment of the general interest. Social stabilization in the face of revolutionary threats has been the one—conservative—facet of such concepts, whereas the protection of craft workers, unskilled workers, and industrialists against social and commercial threats represents a more constructive if not humanistic concern. For Hegel (1770–1831), corporativism was the solution to the problem of an increasingly atomized society. Starting from the assumption that the rule of law is based on the need to articulate modern civil society as the realm of particularity, on one hand, and the state as the concrete form of moral generality, on the other, corporations are meant to embrace particularity from below and generality from above and, thus, to function as integrating links between civil society and the state. In his critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, Karl Marx identified the Achilles heel of Hegel’s corporativist design exactly in the ambiguity of corporations (Estates) as intermediate power holders:

> While the Estates, according to Hegel, stand between the government in general on the one hand and the nation broken up into particulars (people and associations) on the other, the significance of their position...is that, in common with the organized executive, they are a middle term. Regarding the first position, the Estates represent the nation over against the executive, but the nation *en miniature*. This is their oppositional position. Regarding the second, they represent the executive over against the nation, but the amplified executive. This is their conservative position. They are themselves a part of the executive over against the people, but in such a way that they simultaneously have the significance of representing the people over against the executive. (Marx, 1978, p. 68)

Corporatist theories have always struggled with the dilemma of intermediate political corporations to represent and discipline the demands of their membership at the same time. One speaks of “societal” or “state” corporatism depending on whether a bottom-up representative approach or a top-down disciplinary one prevails.

During and after Hegel’s time, a number of scholars—Otto von Gierke (1841–1921) and Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) in particular—suggested corporativist associations and intermediation as a remedy against the disorder, social anomie, and isolation resulting from a growing
division of labor and the crisis of traditional institutions of solidarity.

**Modern Corporatist Ideologies**

Besides being a theoretical concept and regime type, corporativism has been perceived first and foremost as a political ideology, just like liberalism and socialism—the other great “ism,” as Howard J. Wiarda called it. Among contemporary secular ideologies, it is not only the oldest but also the most manifold and inconsistent one. It is difficult to draw a clear dividing line between individualist liberalism and collectivist socialism since corporativist thoughts and methods took up elements of market liberalism as well as economic planning. It was a common trait of 20th-century corporativism to protect private property and simultaneously to fight against free competition in markets and politics. Experiences in Europe, Latin America, and Asia clearly show that authoritarian corporativism together with rightist populism has served as an instrument of conservative rule in periods of intensified class struggles and leftist revolts.

**Papal Encyclicals**

The Roman Catholic school of thought on the social, political, and economic order of capitalism, as put down first in the Papal encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (Of New Things, 1891) and supplemented by *Quadragesimo Anno* (In the 40th Year, 1931), above all builds on the corporativist principles of solidarity and subsidiarity. *Rerum Novarum* has to be seen as a response to the social instability and labor conflicts of its time. It advocates a “natural right” to form associations and engage in free collective bargaining and makes it the duty of governments to protect the poor. Faced with strong communist and fascist movements in Europe, *Quadragesimo Anno* also concentrates on the dangers to human freedom and dignity arising from unrestrained capitalism and totalitarian communism.

The Catholic plea for an organic and hierarchical reconstruction of industrial societies was inspired by, and in turn influenced by, the works of a number of 19th-century social philosophers from Italy (Frédéric Ozanam and Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio) and France (Philip Buchez, Count Albert de Mun, and Count La Tour du Pin). They imagined Catholic Guilds where the interest of the profession is superior to private interest, where antagonism between capitalist and workingman gives way to patronage exercised in a Christian spirit and freely accepted. . . . It is always the same thought: limit competition, associate common interests, impose upon the employer the duty of patronage, uplift labor and the condition of the laborer. (Albert de Mun, 1847, as cited in Moon, 1921, p. 99)

Though full of normative ideology and never free of theoretical inconsistency, the social Catholic movement succeeded in maintaining a fairly coherent political reform program that is still focused on corporativist attributes of solidarity and subsidiarity. The insistent demand for subsidiary autonomy of the social sphere resulted in a somewhat muted critique of totalitarian fascism in *Quadragesimo Anno*. The Catholic Church, however, never did endorse—as German constitutional lawyers feared—a decomposition of statehood in the name of the subsidiarity principle.

**Secular Corporatist Ideologies**

Among secular corporatist ideologies, the idea of *guild socialism* found a number of supporters among intellectuals as well as workers and labor unions in Britain. Functional representation was one of the most distinctive doctrines of British guild socialism, according to which the population should be represented both as producers and as consumers in a multilevel system. Municipalities, regions, and the national state would be governed by two chambers: one elected by professional guilds and the other by territorial constituencies. George D. H. Cole, who formed the British National Guilds League in 1915, proposed a central guild congress that should be the supreme industrial body, standing for the people as producers in the same way as parliament will stand for the people as consumers. In advocating the cosovereignty of workmans’ guilds and the representative government guild, socialism rejected the traditional notion of sovereign statehood. The concept had been indirectly inspired by Althusius’s corporativist-cum-federalist medieval concept through the reception of Gierke’s
theory of associations. Part of Gierke’s magnum opus *Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht* (German Cooperative Law) was published in Britain in 1990 as *Political Theories of the Middle Ages* and subsequently gave an impetus to a newly emerging pluralist school of academic political thought, of which guild socialist ideologies attained the most far-reaching though rather short-lived political impact. The sudden decline of guild socialism after World War I had been attributed to a changing ideological climate that was no longer in favor of ideas requiring employers and business owners to share or give up control over industry.

The corporativist wave that began in the 1920s after World War I was conservative and ranged from right-wing to totalitarian political ideologies. Authoritarian nationalists in Franco’s Spain, Salazar’s Portugal, Dollfuss’s Austria, Pilsudski’s Poland, Vargas’s Brazil, Perón’s Argentina, or Calles’s Mexico made use of corporativist theories to legitimize their claim to power as did totalitarian Fascists throughout Europe. During the 1930s, there were a number of fascist regimes not only in Mussolini’s Italy and Nazi Germany but also in Hungary, Greece, and Romania as well as fascist movements and parties in almost all European countries. The corporativist and religious elements of fascism had been strongest in Italy and among (though also present within) the Falange movement in Spain and Romania. The attempt to violently infiltrate and control every sector of social life, together with their militaristic orientation, cast doubts over whether fascist dictatorships fall under the category of corporativism at all. Of course, there were a host of separate nongovernmental organizations controlled by government for all kinds of purposes, such as economic planning, leisure, sports, science, and education, but without any higher coordinating organs. Gaetano Salvemini, in his 1936 book *Under the Axe of Fascism*, noted that to search for real cooperation and genuine consultation taking place through corporatist institutions was like “looking in a dark room for a black cat which is not there.” Contrary to the imagination produced by their propaganda machine, fascist regimes generally caused bureaucratic confusion and provoked the decline of constitutional and administrative order for the benefit of the revolutionary movement and violent oppression. Today, as Juan J. Linz has pointed out, there is widespread consensus not to subsume totalitarian fascism under the corporativist paradigm but rather to treat it as a separate regime type.

Authoritarian Corporativism

The term *authoritarian corporativism* originally referred to a variety of political regimes in Latin America. Most basically, it means that autocratic governments seek to impose a system of interest representation and intermediation on functional interest groups, especially labor unions, in order to deal with perpetual threats of industrial conflict and popular protest. Different structures and methods of incorporation across countries and over time, together with inconsistent or even lacking principles of political design, bear witness to the complexities involved in this political regime type.

Authoritarian corporativism emerged during the stages of late economic development from situations where weakly integrated societies, widespread clientelism, internal migration, and organizational fragmentation caused governments to reorganize, mobilize, and control socioeconomic groups in order to increase their predictability and eventually overcome economic stagnancy. Whereas the landed gentry, peasants, rural workers, clerics, and shopkeepers continued to be grouped territorially along vertical chains of patron–client relations—irrespective of class, race, caste, or region—up to the government level, new urban groups associated themselves along occupational and class lines on the national level. When, spurred by economic recession, the traditional landed, export, and commercial elite failed to check the manifold demands, political divisions, and modernization conflicts of such asynchronous societies “clientelism declined in favor of corporatism” (Guillermo O’Donnell, 1977, p. 67), and in many cases, it resulted in hybrid regimes of corporatist, populist, nationalist, and military authoritarian rule.

One can find similar sequences of events in many late-developing nations, with similar outcomes. South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, China, and others have relied on various forms of functional representation though usually avoiding the label corporativism because of its pejorative connotation of authoritarianism. Most East Asian developmental states borrowed heavily from Japan’s earlier experiences.
Government-assigned farmer associations had been established there in the early 1900s for reasons of productivity improvement and political subordination. During the 1930s, the Japanese government reorganized the small- and medium-business sectors into peak associations, which were sanctioned to control their memberships through administrative decrees. Administrative guidance and cartelization have become symbols for the close state–society relations of the Japanese, but in the meantime, they have come to characterize a number of late-developing East Asian countries. In Taiwan, the government took over the farmers’ associations that the Japanese colonial regime had established and afterward awarded an official quota of seats to functional associations in the country’s—almost powerless—National Assembly. South Korea orchestrated its economic takeoff by means of government bureaus within a system of state corporatist arrangements, and China is about to top all previous attempts of corporativist control. Corporativist bodies dating back to the era of Mao Zedong have been revitalized as centers of guidance and legitimacy in economic and social matters. New associations in fields such as health, sports, culture, social welfare, or science have been established on the government’s own initiative and—for the politically relevant—based on obligatory membership.

Apart from the more or less corporativist and authoritarian elements that can be located in current developmental states in Latin America, Asia, Southeastern Europe, or Africa, one can hardly find countries with a manifest corporativist constitutional background—with only a few exceptions. Among them is Croatia, with its long-established corporativist traditions that have led to a rather unique constitutional second chamber based on the corporative representation of trade unions, employers’ and farmers’ organizations, universities and colleges, craft workers, freelance professionals, and so on. Another case is Hong Kong, having up to half of the legislature elected by functional constituencies defined by professional occupations or economic sectors since 1985. Research on these cases suggests that strong corporativist regime elements as well as experiments with constitutional corporativism—other than neo-corporatist methods of policy coordination—have adverse effects on party development and the achievement of universal civil rights and have fostered legislative fragmentation through particularistic bargaining.

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See also Interest Groups; Neo-Corporatism; Pluralism; Representation

Further Readings

Correlation

Correlation is a statistical measure of the association between two or more variables. Two or more
variables are associated if they change together (covary). In statistics, such simultaneous movement is called dependence. Thus, correlation is simply an indication of a lack of independence between variables. Measures of correlation can also indicate the direction of the relationship between variables—that is, whether it is positive or negative. In addition, while correlation alone is insufficient to establish a causal relationship, it often illuminates the potential for such. Below, the basic properties and applications of current correlation measures are discussed.

The modern statistical concept of correlation was initially put forward by Sir Francis Galton in a series of papers on heredity in the late 1800s. Correlation was subsequently refined in various works by Karl Pearson and G. Udny Yule. These initial works culminated in a statistic now called the Pearson product–moment correlation coefficient, Pearson’s $r$. Pearson’s $r$ is perhaps the most widely used of all statistics because of its value as an indicator of correlation and its relationship to multivariate analysis, in particular linear regression. However, it is only one of several indicators of statistical correlation. Today, the concept of correlation is a broad term that comprises a host of indices used to measure both parametric and nonparametric association. Of the latter, Kendall’s $\tau$ and $\tau_b$, Cramér’s $V$, and Goodman and Kruskal’s $\gamma$ are especially prevalent in applied statistics.

Pearson’s $r$ indicates both the degree and direction of linear dependence between variables. Direction in a linear relationship can take one of two forms: positive or negative. For example, take two variables $X$ and $Y$. If high scores on $X$ correspond to low scores on $Y$, there is a negative relationship. If high scores on $X$ correspond to high scores on $Y$, there is a positive relationship. Similarly, degree measures the strength of a relationship between variables. Such a relationship might be strong or weak, where a strong correlation means that large values of $X$ are associated with large values of $Y$ and vice versa.

Correlation may be visualized via scatterplots—that is, by arranging the values of one variable on one axis and the corresponding values of another variable on another axis. In scatterplots, points falling close to a straight line imply strong correlation, whereas a cloud of points are more suggestive of a weak correlation or a lack of one. Similarly, if most points are in the bottom-left and top-right quadrants, a positive relationship is plausible, whereas if most points are in the top left and bottom right, a negative relationship is likely. A scatterplot may also detect nonlinear relationships between variables.

The Pearson $r$ can be intuitively derived from a standardization of the covariance between variables. The covariance between $X$ and $Y$ is

$$\frac{\sum(X - \bar{X})(Y - \bar{Y})}{N},$$

where $N$ is the sample size, and $\bar{X}$ and $\bar{Y}$ are the means of the variables. Covariance combines the deviations computed using the scores from each variable and accounts for the sample size in the denominator.

However, covariance does not control for the potential for substantial differences in the amount of deviation within each variable. Thus, to derive Pearson’s $r$, the covariance is adjusted by the deviation of each variable. Simply divide the covariance by the product of standard deviations as given below:

$$\frac{\sum(X - \bar{X})(Y - \bar{Y})}{\sqrt{\frac{\sum(X - \bar{X})^2}{N}} \sqrt{\frac{\sum(Y - \bar{Y})^2}{N}}},$$

which, through some basic algebra, becomes the typical formula for Pearson’s $r$:

$$r = \frac{\sum(X - \bar{Y})(Y - \bar{Y})}{\sqrt{\sum(X - \bar{Y})^2(Y - \bar{Y})^2}}.$$

Pearson’s $r$ has the attractive property of lying between $-1$ and $1$. Positive values signify positive relationships and negative values negative ones. The higher the absolute value of a measure, the stronger the relationship. Thus, a value of zero indicates that the variables are linearly independent of each other. A correlation of zero, however, does not indicate that the variables are necessarily completely independent. The relationship must be
linear for Pearson’s $r$ to be an appropriate indicator of correlation. Curvilinear or alternative relationship forms will not be properly detected with Pearson’s $r$. In addition, caution should be used when applying Pearson’s $r$ to small sample sizes.

Consider Figure 1 (next page) that presents scatterplots of a strong positive and a weak negative correlation between two pairs of variables for 23 countries that belong to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In the left scatterplot, the tight grouping of countries’ $(X, Y)$ coordinates along the best fitting line suggests a strong positive correlation between countries’ economic openness and growth in real gross domestic product (GDP). Pearson’s $r$ is .73, which confirms the relationship illustrated in the scatterplot. In the right scatterplot, the looser cloud of points suggests a weaker negative correlation between the percentage of women in parliament and the percentage of right-wing parties in cabinet posts. In this case, Pearson’s $r$ is $-.51$.

Pearson’s $r$ can be used to make statistical inferences about the population correlation $\rho$. Inference typically assumes a bivariate normal distribution, such that the relationship between $X$ and $Y$ must be linear, and $X$ and $Y$ must be continuous. Given a Pearson’s $r$ from a reasonably large sample, the null hypothesis of $\rho = 0$ can be tested with a $t$ distribution, such that

$$t = \frac{r \sqrt{n - 2}}{\sqrt{1 - r^2}},$$

where $n - 2$ represents the degrees of freedom.

The formula for Pearson’s $r$ is both simple and versatile, so much so that it can be expanded to relationships between variables at various levels of measurement. As a particularly useful case, consider the relationship between two ranked variables, which in the case of ties between variables’ scores can also be computed with Pearson’s $r$. When there are no ties, the formula can be simplified to the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient:

$$r_{\text{rank}} = 1 - \frac{6 \sum d^2}{n(n^2 - 1)},$$

where $d = X - Y$ or the difference in the ranked scores. Testing $\rho$ for ranked variables is also performed via sampling from a $t$ distribution with

$$t = \frac{r_{\text{rank}}}{\sqrt{(1 - r_{\text{rank}}^2)/(n - 2)},}$$

and degrees of freedom $n - 2$.

Correlation indices can detect a relationship between variables even when no causal link exists between them. There are hosts of examples where two variables are perceived to correlate, because a third variable is causing them both to change together. This is called a spurious relationship. Thus, there is no direct causal relationship between the two variables, but there is a common dependence on the third. For example, when considering the correlation of partisanship with general attitudes on violence, the potential for a spurious relationship might be furthered by examining the role of gender, where women are more likely to join a left-leaning party and also oppose violence.

Given concerns about a spurious relationship, applied researchers have taken recourse to statistical control with partial correlation. Partial correlation measures the relationship between two variables while controlling for one or more variables. For example, the correlation of $X$ with $Y$ controlling for a series of control variables, $Z = \{Z_1, Z_2, \ldots, Z_k\}$, can be estimated as the correlation between the set of residuals, $R_X$ and $R_Y$, calculated from the least squares regression of $X$ on $Z_i$ and of $Y$ on $Z_i$, respectively.

Assuming that a single $Z$ is the only variable that affects $X$ and $Y$, the partial correlation coefficient, $r_{xy,z}$, can be simplified to

$$r_{xy,z} = \frac{r_{xy} - r_{xz}r_{yz}}{\sqrt{1 - r_{xz}^2}\sqrt{1 - r_{yz}^2}}.$$

A hypothesis test of the population estimate, $\rho_{xy,z}$, can be performed with a $t$ test, where

$$t = \frac{r_{xy,z}}{\sqrt{1 - r_{xy,z}^2}}\sqrt{n - 3},$$

where $\sqrt{n - 3}$ is the degrees of freedom.
It may already be clear that correlation is closely related to multivariate analysis with least squares regression. Pearson’s \( r \) essentially measures the direction and degree to which observations fall close to a line, which indicates a relationship between two variables. The best fitting line in such a relationship is the least squares regression line.

The regression line is arrived at by minimizing the squared errors with the function\(^1\):

\[
\sum (\hat{Y} - \bar{Y})^2 = \sum (Y - \bar{Y})^2.
\]

This can be calculated from the residuals instead of the expected squares such that one less the residual sum of squares over the total sum of squares is the coefficient of determination:

\[
r^2 = 1 - \frac{\sum (Y - \hat{Y})^2}{\sum (Y - \bar{Y})^2}.
\]

Because \( r^2 \) indicates the ratio of explained to total variance, it can be considered an estimate of the fit of the regression model. In a linear regression model, the coefficient of determination can range from 0 to 1. Returning to the example above, on the correlation between trade openness and GDP (see Figure 1).
Figure 1), the coefficient of determination would be simply $r^2 = .73^2 = .53$. In a regression context, this suggests that changes in trade openness explain about 53% of the variance in GDP growth. Likewise, according to the coefficient of nondetermination, about 47% of the variance in GDP growth is unexplained by this simple bivariate relationship.

Measures of correlation may also be nonparametric. Nonparametric correlation applies to relationships where the distributional assumptions above (e.g., drawing from a bivariate normal distribution) are not met. Oftentimes, this is the result of dealing with noncontinuous variables—that is, ordinal, nominal, or a mix of measurement levels. Similar to Spearman’s rank-order coefficient above, Kendall’s $\tau$ and $\tau_b$ are performed to test the correlation between ordinal variables. Kendall’s $\tau$ counts all pairs of observations between two variables that are consistently above or below the rankings of correspondent pairs as concordant, or $C$. More formally, a $C$ is counted every time the product of $(X_i - X_j)(Y_i - Y_j)$ is positive. Similarly, all pairs that are inconsistently above or below other pairs are counted as discordant and $D$. Kendall’s $\tau$ is calculated to expose the difference between discordant and concordant pairs:

$$\tau = \frac{2(C - D)}{n(n - 1)}.$$  

Here, $\tau$ ranges from $-1$ to $1$, and the direction of the relationship is evident from the formula $(C - D)$, such that negative outcomes suggest a negative relationship and vice versa. For sample sizes greater than 10, a test of $\tau = 0$ can be done with a $z$ test:

$$z = \frac{\tau}{\sqrt{2(2n + 5)}}.$$  

When there are tied ranks in the data, slight derivations to the $\tau$ formula given above can account for ties. Kendall’s $\tau_t$ and Stuart’s $\tau_c$ require only a few additional terms to model the ranked ties. In the former, ties among the $X$ values are collected in $u$, which enters the equation as

$$U = \frac{1}{2} \sum u(u - 1),$$  

while ties in $Y$ are collected in $v$, which similarly enters the equation as

$$V = \frac{1}{2} \sum v(v - 1).$$  

In the latter, $m$ is the smaller number of ranked categories in $X$ and $Y$. Kendall’s $\tau_b$ is then a calculation of discrepancy in concordant and discordant pairs while controlling for the number of ties in each variable:

$$\tau_b = \frac{C - D}{\sqrt{\frac{n(n - 1)}{2}} - U - V}.$$  

Similarly, Stuart’s $\tau_c$ takes into account tied ranks via the smaller number of ranked categories, $m$:

$$\tau_c = \frac{2m(C - D)}{n^2(m - 1)}.$$  

Note that when there are many ties, both of the above measures will slightly underestimate the association. In that case, Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma does a better job of correcting for several ties:

$$\gamma = \frac{(C - D)}{(C + D)}.$$  

When there are no ties, this equation is equivalent to that for Kendall’s $\tau$.

The relationship between multichotomous variables can also be explored with correlation coefficients. Despite the prevalence of the contingency coefficient, $C$, Cramér’s $V$ is a more practical choice for dealing with this kind of data. Consider a three-by-three contingency table of two multichotomous variables: partisanship (Republican, Independent, and Democrat) and campaign advertisement exposure (television, Internet, and radio). To test the independence assumption between partisanship and campaign media, one applies the $X^2$ test. However, the $X^2$ test only provides information about the existence of a relationship, not the strength of a
Correspondence Analysis

Correspondence analysis is a method for interpreting tabular data visually in the form of spatial maps in which the rows and columns of the table are depicted as points. Two forms of the method are common: simple-correspondence analysis (CA) and multiple-correspondence analysis (MCA). Cross-tabulations and raw categorical data in the social sciences are prime examples for being visualized by CA. Typically, a cross-tabulation is subjected to a test for association between the row and column variables using a chi-square test, for example. By contrast, CA visualizes the actual structure of this association, whether it is statistically significant or not. MCA generalizes this method to many variables, usually questions in a survey, showing how the response categories interrelate. In this entry, each approach is explained using data from an international survey on the role of government.

The theory underlying CA has its origins, as early as the 1940s, in the scaling of categorical variables (i.e., assigning numerical scores to their category levels) to achieve an objective such as maximizing their pairwise correlations or maximizing between-row or between-column variances. The geometric approach along with its name is derived from the French term analyse des correspondances, developed and popularized by Jean-Paul Benzécri and colleagues starting in the early 1960s. It is this approach that is presented here.

Simple Correspondence Analysis

As a first example, consider data from the International Social Survey Programme’s Role of Government survey in 2006, in particular a question concerning government’s contribution to the public health system. Respondents were asked whether government should pay “much more,” “more,” “same as now,” “less,” or “much less” for health services, and the responses were cross-tabulated with the respondents’ interest in politics, in five levels (from 1 = very much interested to 5 = not at all interested). Table 1 shows these counts for three different samples, from France and the former West and East Germany, the latter still being kept separated for research purposes. In this table, the response categories “less” and “much less” have been combined because of very low frequencies of the latter response to the question. To simplify the present analysis, respondents with missing values have been removed. Missing data such as “can’t choose,” “don’t know,” or “refused to answer” can

\[ V = \sqrt{\frac{\chi^2}{n \min(r, c) - 1}}. \]

where \([\min(r, c)]\) is the smaller of the number of rows or columns in the contingency table, which provides an accurate measure of association for multichotomous variables.

The correlation statistics presented here are only a sample of those most commonly used in social science. Because correlation plays a central role in understanding causal and spurious relationships, it has garnered a great deal of attention in the 100-plus years since its inception. In modern applied statistics, it remains one of the foundational concepts and the starting point for most practical research.

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See also Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Regression; Statistics: Overview

Further Readings

be coded as an additional level, either combined or separately, but these nonsubstantive responses often dominate the results, obscuring the interpretation of the substantive responses (Michael Greenacre & Jorg Blasius, 2006).

The first thing to note about CA is that it depicts the relative frequencies of response, called *profiles*. For example, the profile of French respondents with a high interest in politics (row F1 of Table 1) is \[\frac{73}{229}, \frac{73}{229}, \frac{65}{229}, \frac{18}{229}\] = \[0.319, 0.319, 0.284, 0.079\]—hence, a profile is a set of proportions summing to 1. The profiles of the French sample as a whole and the two German samples, as well as the respondents all together, called *average*.

Table 1  Government Spending on Health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Political Interest</th>
<th>Much More</th>
<th>More</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Less/Much Less</th>
<th>Sums</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>He1</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>97</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West Germany</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW3</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>478</td>
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<td>99</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
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<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Germany</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE3</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE4</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>114</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F</strong></td>
<td>391</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>1701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DW</strong></td>
<td>178</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DE</strong></td>
<td>130</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALL</strong></td>
<td>699</td>
<td>1362</td>
<td>1003</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>3285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: Frequencies of responses to the question “How much should government pay for health services?” are cross-tabulated by political interest (from 1 = very much interested to 5 = not at all interested); samples are from France (N = 1701), the former West Germany (N = 1065), and the former East Germany (N = 519). Country totals and overall total, with corresponding relative frequencies, are given in the last rows. He = public health; F = French; DW = former West Germany; DE = former East Germany.
profiles, are given in the last rows of Table 1 in bold italics, and the data for group F1 can be compared with these averages. Thus, compared with all French, those with a high interest in politics are proportionally higher in number in saying that government should spend much more on health (0.319 compared with 0.230); and they are proportionally fewer in saying that they should spend the same as now (0.284 compared with 0.325). This pattern is similar when compared with the total sample.

All the comparisons of the profiles with one another, and by implication with the averages as well, can be depicted optimally in one CA map, shown in Figure 1. A distance function, called the chi-square distance, is defined between profiles, and an approximate map of these distances is drawn. The chi-square distance recognizes that differences between high relative frequencies are inherently greater than those between low ones and adjusts for this disparity using the average of each response category (given in the last row of Table 1). For example, the chi-square distance between the first two rows, F1 and F2, of Table 1, with profiles [0.319, 0.319, 0.284, 0.079] and [0.226, 0.375, 0.315, 0.084] is

\[
\sqrt{\frac{(0.319 - 0.226)^2}{0.213} + \frac{(0.319 - 0.375)^2}{0.415} + \frac{(0.284 - 0.315)^2}{0.305} + \frac{(0.079 - 0.084)^2}{0.067}} = 0.227.
\]

![Figure 1](image_url)

**Figure 1** Correspondence Analysis Map of the Cross-Tabulation in Table 1.


*Notes:* The average profiles for F = France, DW = former West Germany, and DE = former East Germany are shown as supplementary points. The overall profile (last row of Table 1) is the center of the map.
The smaller squared difference \((0.079 - 0.084)^2\) between the fourth category is increased by dividing it by the smaller average value of 0.067, compared with the larger squared differences in the other categories, which are divided by their respectively larger averages. It is this distance that the map of Figure 1 attempts to emulate in the positioning of the points F1 and F2. The points F, DW, and DE in Figure 1, depicting the average profiles in each country, are called supplementary points: They are not included in the CA when computing the map but are added to the map afterward. The point F, for example, is the weighted average of the five points F1, F2, . . . , F5, where these five political interest points are weighted proportionally to their respective frequencies in the French sample.

Apart from the row profiles and their averages, the response categories of the spending question (column points) are visualized in the same map, and this provides the basic interpretation of the different regions of the map. Hence, the more to the right of the map, the more frequent is the attitude toward more spending, with the upper quadrant corresponding to “more” and the lower quadrant to “much more,” while the more to the left of the map, the more frequent the attitude is toward spending the “same” or “less/much less.” The center of the map corresponds to the average over all the samples studied, so by “more frequent” we really mean “more frequent compared with the average.” Individual profile points can be compared: For example, the point F1 corresponding to the group described above is the one that is the most in the direction of “much more” spending—it can be verified that there is no other row in the table that has a higher proportion of respondents having this opinion. The map allows an easy comparison of each of the five levels of political interest in each country as well as an overall comparison between the countries. East German opinion is well to the side of spending “more” and “much more,” as opposed to West German opinion on the other side, along with the French. The French average, however, is lower down—all five French points are lower negative on the vertical dimension on the side of “much more.” Of the five levels of political interest, the high level shows the greatest differences between the countries, with F1 the most toward “much more,” DW1 the most toward “less/much less,” and DE1 in between. To illustrate further the style of interpretation of these maps, note that the East German groups DE4 and DE5 (low levels of political interest) must have higher proportions of opinions toward “more” spending than the West German group DW4, for example. It is not the proximity of the groups to the response category that indicates a higher propensity toward that category but rather how far out from the average (the center) the points are in the direction indicated by the response category—“more” in this case.

CA aims to visualize the relationships between the rows and columns of a cross-tabulation. A separate issue is to test whether this association is statistically significant or not. Chi-square statistics, for example, can be computed for the three 5 × 3 tables in Table 1 and are equal to 22.5 (\(p = .033\)), 28.0 (\(p = .006\)), and 24.1 (\(p = .020\)), respectively. For the entire 15 × 3 table, chi-square is equal to 142.9 (\(p < .0001\)); so from a statistical viewpoint, we are looking at significant differences both within each country and among them. In CA, the chi-square statistic divided by the grand total of the table is called the inertia, a dimensionless quantity that measures the total variation in the data: In this case, the inertia is equal to 142.9/3285 = 0.0435. This inertia is decomposed along the axes of the CA solution in a similar way to the variance decomposition in principal component analysis. These parts of inertia are indicated on the axes of Figure 1, as also their percentages of the total inertia: 0.0263 (60.6%) and 0.0114 (26.1%), so that 86.7% of the inertia is accounted for, while 13.3% is not shown in the two-dimensional solution.

In summary, correspondence analysis of a cross-tabulation maps the association (measured by the inertia) between the rows and the columns of a cross-tabulation into a low-dimensional solution, facilitating the interpretation of this association. The method maximizes the inertia represented in the chosen solution, which is usually two-dimensional.

**Multiple Correspondence Analysis**

The simple form of CA described above is applicable to a single cross-tabulation, visualizing the relationship between two categorical variables. In MCA, there are typically several variables describing a particular phenomenon of interest, and the method’s objective is to visualize how all these
Correspondence Analysis

variables interrelate among each other. For example, consider not one but several questions about government spending: in addition to spending on public health (abbreviated as He), spending on environmental protection (En), law enforcement (La), education (Ed), defense (De), retirement pensions (Re), unemployment benefits (Un), and culture (Cu). There are eight questions in all, and each has the same five response categories (here we can keep the categories “less” and “much less” separated, because for some of the questions, there are quite high frequencies of the response “much less”). After the respondents with missing values on any of the questions have been removed, we have a total sample of 2,913 respondents: 1,486 French, 957 West Germans, and 470 East Germans.

There are several equivalent ways to define MCA: Here, we describe the method as an analysis of dummy variables for all the response categories. The original $2913 \times 8$ matrix of responses can be converted into a $2913 \times 40$ indicator matrix of dummy variables, where there are five columns per question for its five response categories. The responses are coded as 0s and 1s, with a 1 indicating the response category: For example, the response “more,” which is the second response category, is coded as $0 \; 1 \; 0 \; 0 \; 0$. MCA is the application of CA to this indicator matrix, leading to points for all categories of response and for all respondents, as shown in separate maps (A and B) in Figure 2. The method then visualizes the associations between these categories across the respondents: As in simple CA, categories that co-occur much more frequently than one would expect from their marginal frequencies will be grouped together, while those that have fewer than expected respondents in common will be placed far apart.

Correspondingly, respondents with similar response patterns will be located close to one another, and ones with different patterns will be located far apart. The substantive questions are again used to interpret the space—thus, it can be seen that the more the respondents (or groups of

![Figure 2](image-url)
Correspondence Analysis

respondents) are located up on the vertical axis, the less they advocate government spending, and the more they are to the left on the horizontal axis, the more they advocate spending. The most extreme views in these two directions are “spending much less on education” (point Ed5) and “spending much more on defense” (De1). The dense cloud of respondent points at the lower right, however, shows that the majority of responses are at or near the middle-response categories “same as now.” If respondents tend in the opposite direction toward the upper left, this would reflect a type of polarization in their response pattern, combining the two attitudes captured by the two axes. For example, the position of La5, which is pulled somewhat into this quadrant, away from the vertical spread of the other “spend much less” categories toward the “spend much more” categories, implies that there are several respondents who—apart from advocating much less spending on law enforcement—are in favor of more spending on several of the other aspects. Another way of thinking about the correspondence between response categories and the respondents is that the position of each response category is the average of the respondents who gave that particular response. The relative positions of the categories thus reflect associations in the responses: For example, the category Ed1 (spend much more on education) is much closer to the bunch of middle responses than Ed5 (spend much less on education), showing that spending much more on education is not an extreme view but associated with an attitude generally associated with middle responses, while spending much less on education is an extreme attitude.

In the same way, a supplementary categorical variable, such as the country or level of political interest, can be added to the map afterward to see if it has any connection with the configuration of response category associations. Figure 3 shows the positions of the countries, genders, levels of political interest, and education levels as mean positions of the respondents in the corresponding category. In other words, the point m shows the average of the 1,538 male respondent points in Figure 2 and f the average of the 1,375 female respondents—so males are on average more in favor of spending less, and females on average are more in favor of spending more. Interestingly, the highest and lowest categories of political interest fall close to each other, together with the lower categories of education, all on the left side of the map toward more spending.

Comparing the scale of Figure 3 with that of Figure 2, one can see that these differences are, in fact, quite small and possibly need to be qualified by some type of hypothesis test if the statistical significance of the findings is sought.

In summary, MCA analyzes respondent-level data on several categorical variables simultaneously in one spatial map. Although individual respondent points exist, it is the response category points that are of main interest. These category points are positioned to reflect optimally their associations with one another across the respondents. Additional categorical variables that classify the respondents into groups can be displayed as supplementary points after the map is constructed, to assist in the interpretation—these are

Figure 3  Average Positions of Groups of Respondents in Correspondence Analysis Map of Figure 2


Notes: F = France, DW = former West Germany, DE = former East Germany; m = male, f = female; I1, I2, . . . , I5 = interest in politics, from high to low; E0, E1, . . . , E5 = education level, from low to high.
the average positions of the respondents in the respective categories.

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See also Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Statistics: Overview

Further Readings

CORRUPTION

The term corruption is used with reference not only to politics and to public administration but also to personal life and to business. It may refer to the perversion of any accepted standard. Common usage also includes the corruption of language, as with the corruption—that is, unauthorized alteration—of a written text. The first section of this entry examines the main problems of defining the concept of corruption. A typology of political corruption and its patterns are discussed in the second and third sections; measures, explanations, effects, and possible cures for corruption are presented in the subsequent sections; and academic analyses versus practical actions is the final topic analyzed.

Problems of Definition
Moral corruption refers to the state of an individual or an entire society in which virtues have been lost and citizens have become depraved and ruined by the pursuit of luxury and gratification. For example, what were seen as corrupt practices within the Roman Catholic Church led to Protestantism. Also, the ideals of republican virtue and the warning lessons of the moral corruption that had led to the fall of the Roman Empire were much in the minds of the framers of the constitution of the United States.

In the business sphere, corruption is said to occur when a person betrays trust and misuses knowledge or authority for personal gain, for example, if a member of a firm’s staff sells trade secrets.

Political corruption involves the perversion of accepted standards of behavior in political life. In particular, it may be defined as the misuse of public office or authority for unauthorized private gain. Nevertheless, this and other definitions need to be treated with caution since the meaning of “political corruption” is itself a complex matter. The difficulty of finding a clear and agreed-on definition poses problems both for political scientists seeking to measure and compare corruption in different countries and for those responsible for drawing up anticorruption laws.

First, not all forms of misbehavior by those in positions of public trust constitute corruption. A politician who betrays secret information to an enemy country for ideological reasons is guilty of treachery but not corruption since he or she acts from an ideological motive and not for monetary gain. If that same politician reveals the secret information for payment, the action can then be characterized as corrupt as well as treacherous. Political corruption usually involves the pursuit of some form of personal gain, particularly material advantage.

Second, the mere fact that politicians or public officials derive material benefits from their positions does not automatically mean that they are corrupt. It is accepted that they are entitled to salaries and benefits for their work. It is only when they accept some unauthorized or illegal benefit that corruption is involved. However, it is not always clear which benefits a politician is or is not permitted to enjoy. For example, a major scandal in the United Kingdom (UK) ensued in 2009 from revelations about allowances used by a large number of members of parliament. In many of these cases, the parliamentarians had been permitted by the parliamentary authorities to make expense claims, which then were publicly condemned as unseemly when they were revealed. In
only a few cases were the claims considered strictly illegal.

Third, and connected with the previous point, illegality is not the only criterion whereby an activity or payment may be judged to be corrupt. Especially during times of changes in public attitudes about expected standards of behavior of politicians, the law may itself be deemed to be corrupt. This is because some may see existing laws as contrary to what they feel are proper standards of morality and may wish, therefore, to alter the law.

Not only are expected standards of behavior subject to change, but also the expectations of the political class may differ from those of ordinary electors. In countries ruled by occupying or colonial authorities, there may be differences between the standards imposed by the authorities and the traditional standards within the society. Sometimes the clash of cultures is seen in the way officeholders treat members of their extended families or tribes. According to laws and rules drawn up by colonial governments or those enacted under pressure from international development aid agencies, politicians and officials must not show favoritism. By contrast, traditional social mores may oblige them to reserve jobs in the public service for their relatives. (Edward C. Banfield has referred to this traditional view as “amoral familism.” Apparently, this has been an aspect of politics in Sicily. In Albania, traditional familial obligations relating to honor killings and other matters are set out in the Kanun [canon] of Lek Dukagjin, a code dating from the 15th century. By using the term amoral, Banfield is reflecting a Western view of a local culture.)

Fourth, the term corruption often refers not only to misconduct by those already holding elective office but also to abuses relating to the electoral process whereby such office is won.

Fifth, though corruption is used primarily to mean the unsanctioned use of public office for personal gain, it may apply too when the intended gain is not strictly “personal” but for an official’s political party. For example, in a case in Philadelphia where lawyers paid bribes to obtain appointments as judges, the money went into the coffers of the ruling party and was not used for the direct financial benefit of the bribe takers.

If it is accepted that corruption is involved when the gain goes to a group (such as a political party) as well as to a politician or to the close family members of a politician, a further definitional problem arises. For it is a part of normal politics that politicians represent groups and not society as a whole. In a system where voters in a particular geographical area elect a legislator, it is expected that he or she will try to represent their local interests. Gaining a material benefit for a locality is a normal aspect of pork-barrel politics; gaining a material benefit for a political party is a corrupt practice.

Sixth, corruption need not involve any favor by the bribe taker beyond a disclosure of unpublished information. Where the government is about to make an announcement that will affect the value of the shares of a company or sector of the stock market, prior notice enables favored persons to buy and sell shares to their advantage. Also, where a local government authority is about to make a decision about the route of a new road or rail line, a tip-off to party supporters will permit them to make property purchases or sales guaranteed to be to their advantage once the decision has been announced.

Seventh, in cases of bribery, does the corruption consist in the taking of a bribe or in the giving of an unauthorized favor in return for the bribe? If a judge accepts a bribe from a defendant but then finds the defendant guilty as charged, and the bribe did not affect the judge’s decision, is the judge guilty of corruption?

Eighth, one defining test for whether an act is or is not corrupt is transparency. Typically, unacceptable transactions must be conducted in secret. A judge who accepts a bribe will be foolish to boast about it. However, not all corrupt acts are secret. Some politicians are so powerful that they feel able to flaunt their privileges. The Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu (1918–1989) felt so confident in his immunity from prosecution that he built huge palaces for himself.

Ninth, there are differences of usage between scholars as to whether “political” corruption includes the acts of civil servants and other public employees or whether it should be restricted to elected officials and those who owe their jobs to political influence.

**Types of Political Corruption**

It is convenient, in the first place, to categorize corruption by the position held by the corrupted person, as, for example, with the following:

- Legislative corruption
- Judicial corruption
Police corruption
Administrative corruption
Corruption of local and national political executives (presidents, prime ministers, ministers, and mayors)

When there is corruption in obtaining office, it can be classified as

Electoral corruption

A second categorization is by the type of action involved. According to the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre group of development agencies, it is convenient to distinguish between corrupt actions by those already in power aimed at gaining unauthorized benefits (“corrupt accumulation and extraction”) and corrupt actions aimed at winning and retaining political office (“corrupt means of power preservation”). Corrupt accumulation and extraction includes the following:

Bribes, “commissions,” and fees taken from private sector businesses
Undue extraction through taxation and customs
Fraud and economic crime
Politically created rent-seeking opportunities
Politically created market favors benefiting businesses owned by political elites
Off-budget transfers and manipulated processes of privatization
Extorting party and campaign funding from the state, private sector, and voters

Corrupt means of power preservation include actions such as the following:

Buying political support and majorities from other parties and politicians
Co-optation and maintenance of patron-client networks
Buying decisions from parliament, judiciary, and control and oversight bodies
Favoritism and patronage in allocation of government resources
Buying voters and votes and electoral fraud
Use of public money for political campaigns
Buying off the media and civil society

A third categorization distinguishes between national (high-level) grand corruption and local (low-level or petty) corruption. Examples of petty corruption are small payments demanded by officials to avoid delays in processing requests for licenses, passports, and other routine documents (“speed money”) or small bribes demanded by

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head of Government</th>
<th>Estimates of Funds Allegedly Embezzled (in U.S. dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Suharto, President of Indonesia, 1967–1998</td>
<td>15 billion to 35 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferdinand Marcos, President of Philippines, 1972–1986</td>
<td>5 billion to 10 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobutu Sese Seko, President of Zaire, 1965–1997</td>
<td>5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sani Abacha, President of Nigeria, 1993–1998</td>
<td>2 billion to 5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia/Yugoslavia, 1989–2000</td>
<td>1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Claude Duvalier, President of Haiti, 1971–1986</td>
<td>300 to 800 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberto Fujimori, President of Peru, 1990–2000</td>
<td>600 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Note: Estimates of funds allegedly embezzled are drawn from publicly available sources. The estimates do not reflect any legal developments that have occurred since 2003.*
traffic police or customs officials. Grand corruption or “kleptocracy” is the demand for huge payments (typically, from those seeking major government contracts) for top politicians.

In its Global Corruption Report 2004, the anti-corruption organization Transparency International gave estimates of the money allegedly embezzled by some leading politicians (see Table 1).

**Patterns of Corruption**

Corruption not only takes many forms and exists in different parts of a political system, but it is usually clandestine and is thus hard to measure. Thus, any attempt to assess which countries are most affected and which parts of their political systems are especially corruption-prone is problematic.

The following activities frequently feature in corruption scandals in many countries.

**Arms Sales**

Contracts for the purchase of guns, military aircraft, and other forms of defense equipment may involve sums of money amounting to billions of U.S. dollars. Because the competition for such contracts is so fierce and the stakes are so high for the providers of the equipment, massive bribes may be given to secure them. Some of the most spectacular corruption cases of recent decades have involved the arms trade. The Lockheed Scandal of the 1970s involved bribes by the United States aircraft company to the then Japanese prime minister Kakuei Tanaka (who was sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment but remained free on appeal at the time of his death in 1993); Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands; and to leading political figures in Italy, West Germany, and elsewhere. The Bofors scandal of the 1980s concerned bribes reportedly paid by the Swedish arms manufacturer to the Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi to win a contract for howitzer guns. The Al-Yamama deals involved contracts for military aircraft between the British manufacturer British Aerospace (BAE Systems) and Saudi Arabia. These occurred between 1985 and 2006. Following press and television reports of corrupt payments to members of the Saudi royal family, there was an inquiry by the U.K. Serious Fraud Office. However, this was dropped in December 2006 under pressure from the Saudi authorities. The U.K. attorney general announced that the investigation was being halted on national interest grounds. The Agusta-Dassault Scandal led in 1995 to the resignation of Belgium’s former foreign minister as secretary-general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to his later conviction. Belgium’s former deputy premier was assassinated. The scandal involved the purchase of military helicopters by the Belgian army.

**Illegal Sales of Alcohol, Illegal Gambling, Pornography, Prostitution, and Drugs**

Attempts to ban forms of vice in which large numbers of people—including “decent” citizens—indulge have led regularly to the corruption of law enforcement authorities by gangs of organized criminals. To service an extensive clientele, vice activities need to be open or semiopen. If drug takers can find the illegal suppliers, so can members of the police. To safeguard their illegal activities, the organized gangs who control them have a strong incentive to bribe members of police vice squads. In addition, they need to ensure that politicians tolerate such bribery.

Characteristically, organized criminals, therefore, supply campaign contributions to potentially cooperative politicians.

**Local Government Corruption**

Decisions on zoning (whether land may be used for building purposes) greatly affect the value of land. Thus, bribery of local politicians who have the authority to make or to influence zoning decisions is common. It has been the subject of major ongoing scandals in Spain. (A similar scandal led in the 1970s to the resignation of the British deputy premier.) Another common form of local bribery concerns kickbacks on local government contracts. The tangential (‘bribe city’) scandal in Milan, Italy, which broke in the early 1990s, is a major example. A further common form of local government corruption is the assignment of jobs, housing benefits, and other forms of patronage as spoils to party activists. Such patronage politics was a defining feature of the “machine politics” in cities in the United States in the 19th century and in much of the 20th century.
**Corruption Relating to Campaign Contributions**

Political donations may be considered corrupt if

1. they contravene existing political finance laws,
2. they derive from the proceeds of a corrupt transaction,
3. they involve the unauthorized use of state resources for partisan purposes,
4. they are accepted in exchange for a promise of some unauthorized favor or contract,
5. they are from disreputable sources (such as drug barons or other criminals), or
6. the money is to be spent on illegal electoral practices such as vote buying.

There have been major scandals in recent years in Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Ecuador, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Spain, Suriname, South Korea, the UK, and Venezuela.

**Electoral Corruption**

The stuffing of ballot boxes with fake votes, deliberate miscounting of votes (sometimes by officials who have received bribes), and vote buying are some of the most common forms of electoral corruption. Other corruption techniques include the inclusion of fake names on the voters’ register and personation (falsely pretending to be another voter). Such practices are potentially widespread in elections that are held in countries wracked by violence or in developing nations where it is almost impossible to draw up a reasonably accurate register of eligible electors. In advanced democracies too—the UK is an example—the phenomenon of electoral fraud is not unknown, especially in some urban areas with mobile populations.

**Measures of Corruption**

It is extremely hard to measure the overall extent of corruption within a locality or an entire country. A count of the number of legal cases may do nothing more than demonstrate the effectiveness (or lack of it) of law enforcement authorities or of the press in bringing attention to scandals. Moreover, cases may vary in importance, thus making a simple count of prosecutions misleading. Any attempt to compare levels of corruption in different countries runs up against the definitional problems already described: Behavior that is considered corrupt (or is actually illegal) may not be seen in the same way in other countries.

Especially since the 1990s, various anticorruption organizations therefore have used surveys or the subjective estimates of experts as surrogate measures of corruption or of indicators of corruption (such as the degree of transparency within a country). There is considerable competition between rival corruption indices. Transparency International promotes its Corruption Perceptions Index as well as a Bribe Payers’ Index and Global Corruption Barometer. The Opacity Index comes from the accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers. The Center for Public Integrity entered the field with a Public Integrity Index—one of the best indices in “State Capture,” developed by World Bank. A total of 20 measures of transparency are listed by Ann Bellver and Daniel Kaufmann of the World Bank in their August 2005 paper “Transparenting Transparency: Initial Empirics and Policy Applications.” In 2009, the Corruption Perceptions Index rated New Zealand as the least corrupt and Somalia as the most corrupt of the 180 countries studied.

One of the curious by-products of the rivalry between different anticorruption organizations is that Transparency International treats as strictly confidential the base data on which it bases its Corruption Perceptions Index. The value of these well-publicized metrics is open to question, especially since the results of information from country experts depend inevitably on the choice of experts. Moreover, there is a tendency to rely on the assessments of experts from economically advanced countries about the state of corruption in poorer countries.

**Causes of Corruption**

According to one view, corruption exists to evade governmental regulation. It follows that the less the regulation, the smaller the scope for corruption. Thus, socialist countries—such as the former Soviet Union—experienced an exceptionally high
level of corruption as members of the power elite sought ways to evade egalitarian policies. Similarly, the prohibition of alcohol in the United States proved impractical. It merely produced widespread corruption and encouraged organized crime. This—some argue—is the inevitable consequence of laws to regulate widespread forms of private behavior.

There is an opposite view that capitalism, not socialism, encourages corruption. It is the essence of the capitalist ethic—according to this argument—that “greed is good.” Hence, companies will do everything they can to bend the rules if it is in the interest of making a larger profit. Large corporations are especially rapacious when it comes to dealings in foreign, less developed nations.

A third view, popular in the 1960s and 1970s, is that corruption is especially prevalent during periods of social and economic transition. Developmental theorists such as Arnold J. Heidenheimer posited that there is relatively little corruption in socially stable, traditional societies. When there is rapid industrialization and migration, the old norms are abandoned, and corruption flourishes. However, corruption then greatly declines (without the need for any anticorruption policies) with the coming of an affluent society in which middle-class respectability and suburban lifestyles predominate.

This theory now seems much less convincing than it was at the time Heidenheimer published his influential work in 1970. The Watergate scandal in the United States during 1972 to 1974 and the Poulson Affair in the UK at about the same time showed that the theory of middle-class civic virtue was overoptimistic.

Several other causes are sometimes suggested: lack of democracy, bad governance, low salaries for public officials, one-party rule in a locality, or lack of a free and active press. Such explanations either are too vague or they are (at least partly) defective and subject to notable exceptions. For example, Singapore is a country with low democratic credentials but with a well-regarded record in the field of anticorruption.

**Effects of Corruption**

In the 1960s and 1970s, influential writers such as Samuel Huntington, Nathaniel Leff, and Colin Leys argued against the “moralistic” view that corruption is necessarily damaging. In fact, corruption could oil the wheels of progress by enabling investors to find ways around restrictive rules. Especially in developing countries, corruption therefore was sometimes to be welcomed. This was the predominant view of Heidenheimer mentioned previously.

There was a sudden and massive change of opinion following a World Bank report in 1969 on corruption in Africa. From then onward, corruption came to be seen as a major evil and as an impediment to economic growth. The World Bank itself became active in promoting a campaign against corruption. Transparency International was founded in 1993 as a campaigning organization, partly by former officials of the World Bank.

The sweeping statements that have been made first about the virtues and then about the vices of corruption have tended to act as substitutes for open-minded studies of the effects of corruption. The problem of relating corruption and economic development is seen by comparing countries with high levels of corruption—such as South Korea and the Philippines. In the Philippines, economic growth has been low, but it has been very high in South Korea. This shows that the effects of corruption on economic growth are, at the very least, complex and serves as a warning against generalizations and moral exhortations.

**Cures for Corruption**

Many different cures for corruption have been suggested, though none of them has proved to be widely effective.

The proposals include

1. cutting the number of regulations and freeing markets;
2. international anticorruption conventions, such as that of the United Nations, which came into force in 2005;
3. national laws to outlaw international bribery, such as the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977;
4. specialized anticorruption agencies such as Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption;
5. campaigns by nongovernmental organizations such as Transparency International;
6. improved accounting procedures;
7. improved procedures to ensure competitive bidding for public contracts;
8. improved international efforts to combat organized crime;
9. higher salaries for officials to reduce incentives for corruption;
10. better training for law enforcement officials;
11. ethical training for officials;
12. reforms of libel and other press laws to enable journalists to expose and report corruption;
13. aid conditionality—threatened or actual withdrawal of assistance to countries whose governments fail to implement anticorruption measures;
14. measures to combat international money laundering; and
15. reforms of laws relating to the funding of political parties and election campaigns to reduce the reliance of candidates and parties on large (and possibly corrupt) political donations.

Conclusion: Academic Studies Versus Practical Actions
In the past 20 years, international organizations, governmental agencies, and pressure groups have devoted major attention and large sums of money to the fight against corruption. This campaign has had a vital impact on the academic study of corruption. It has tended to divert attention from fundamental research into areas related to advocacy and to the recommendation of cures. Most of the corruption indices, which have become the vogue, provide pseudomeasurements. They may be of some practical value, but they are dangerous if treated with too much reverence.

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See also Administration; Clientelism; Election Research; Electoral Campaigns; Elites; Judiciary; Party Finance; Police

Further Readings
U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre: http://www.U4.no

Corruption, Administrative
Administrative corruption is the abuse of roles, powers, or resources found within public bureaucracies. It may be initiated by line or staff officials, their superiors, or the agency clients. The latter will usually be private parties (e.g., applicants for licenses), but particularly in large and centralized governments; clients might also be individuals or institutions from elsewhere in the public sector. This entry considers the complexities of defining administrative corruption, some common varieties, major causal factors and consequences, the central role of administrative corruption and public administration theories in reform movements, and the effects of changing relationships between the public and private sectors on the basic concepts of administrative corruption.

Administrative corruption is a subset of the broader phenomenon of corruption, and is commonly distinguished from political corruption. Corrupt practices in the administrative realm, such as bribery, extortion, graft, patronage, and official
Theft, to name a few, can occur in the political arena too and, indeed, can be common in private sector administration. Indeed, some varieties of administrative corruption involve “middlemen” who station themselves at the boundaries between state and society, promising to reduce transaction costs for citizens and bureaucrats alike—even though such gains may be small or even illusory. Still, the term administrative corruption is usually reserved for abuses in the realm of government agencies and programs.

Conceptually, administrative corruption shares some, but not all, of the definitional problems that plague the analysis of corruption generally. Formal rules and roles are also usually more clearly specified in administration than in political life. But in societies with dominant and pervasive government agencies, or with very weak public institutions, the limits of the administration or its internal organization may not be particularly clear. Where the state lacks legitimacy or credibility—or, where it is dominated by a dictator, ruling inner circle, the military, or one political party—the formal and de facto norms of administration may diverge sharply. Moreover, what constitutes “abuse” may well be more than just a question of administrative process: Laws and regulations can be vague or contradictory (perhaps deliberately so). Obligations and preferences flowing from politics or social ties may not only cause rules to be broken but can also become normative systems themselves, rivaling formal rules in salience and power.

Like corruption generally, the causes of administrative corruption may be personalistic, institutional, or systemic. In the first category are factors such as venal, or poorly recruited and poorly trained personnel. The second includes not only poor institutional management but also administrative systems that encourage or conceal corruption because of their internal structures (consider a tax collection agency that gives individual agents the power to alter assessments as well as to collect funds) or incentive systems (e.g., very low pay). Systemic causes of corruption might include excessive political interference by elected officials or citizens, widespread poverty, or a lack of government legitimacy.

The consequences of administrative corruption have been a matter of much debate. Many have portrayed it as functional—as “grease for the wheels,” providing incentives to speed up official processes—or as creating informal price systems and a rough-and-ready kind of accountability that would not otherwise exist. Since the late 1980s, however, improved theory and data have shown that administrative corruption is much more like sand in the gears. There is not, after all, a finite amount of inefficiency in administrative agencies; bureaucrats—particularly the very poorly paid officials of developing states—can create much more of it if they stand to gain as a result. Bribes are thus more powerful signals that money can be made by contriving new requirements, “losing” records, or simply doing nothing until clients pay up. Regulatory and extractive functions such as inspections and tax collections are subject to a similar logic.

Measuring corruption of any sort is problematic because it is usually clandestine and lacks an immediate victim with a stake in reporting abuses. Vulnerability to administrative corruption may be somewhat easier to estimate; however, compiling indicators of government performance and comparing them against realistic benchmarks is a promising approach. A licensing process that takes 7 weeks and involves 33 steps in City A, for example, likely has worse corruption than a similar process requiring 4 days and 5 steps in City B. The numerous steps and long delays in the first instance may well reflect past corruption—bureaucrats have learned that they can make money by adding requirements and delays, as noted above—and also tell us something about current incentives sustaining it, since the longer and less responsive the process, the greater the temptation becomes to lay out some “speed money.”

Administrative corruption has generally been the main focus for anticorruption movements around the world. That is so for several reasons. At a practical level, many of the international and intergovernmental bodies that have energized reform efforts are barred from involvement in societies’ internal politics. Nongovernmental organizations and grassroots reformers often find it prudent to de-emphasize political corruption, since taking on such issues often means confronting powerful entrenched interests. Focusing on administrative corruption is a way to get at the problem without directly confronting regimes and may allow reformers to draw on legal and administrative sources of
support, for which there may be few counterparts in political life.

Initiatives against administrative, as opposed to political, corruption also draw on more extensive bodies of theory and evidence. In the former category are a variety of “micro”-theoretical approaches that strip processes and structures down to their essentials. Examples include principal-agent or principal–agent–client models that simplify administrative pathologies in useful ways, identifying vulnerabilities and incentive problems. Another elegant framework, Klitgaard’s widely applied “equation” suggesting that Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability, considers the individual official’s power in somewhat greater detail and compares those powers against key constraints. Theories of, and arrangements for, queuing—that is, how cases are assigned to officials—highlight the importance of client vulnerabilities and official collusion, both on a single structural level and involving dealings with superiors. Often, such micro accounts of administrative corruption can be usefully nested within the broader analysis of rent-seeking opportunities and practices. A shortcoming of some micro theories is that they treat administrative corruption and bribery as nearly synonymous, underestimating both the variety of corrupt practices and the ingenuity of both officials and clients seeking illicit benefits.

At the overall organizational level, public administration theories examine structure and process, internal control, management of personnel and resources, and accountability of several sorts. Historically, the struggle against administrative corruption has helped shape and establish the value of public administration approaches. Frank Amechi­arico and James Jacobs point out that in the United States, an anticorruption movement emerging out of abolitionism and determined to reform corrupt cities intertwined with emerging theories of public administration to define four distinctive “visions” of administrative corruption and reform, each dominant within a particular era. The “Antipatronage Vision” (roughly between 1870 and 1900) was aimed not only at political reform but also—critically for the theories that followed—at driving machine patronage and the influence of political bosses out of public administration. The “Progressive Vision” (1900–1933)—like its predecessor, part of a larger political movement—sought a nearly total segregation of administration from politics and did so on the national stage; it also emphasized efficiency in internal processes as both the means and the metric for reduced corruption and better government. The “Scientific Administration Vision” (1933–1970) shifted the emphasis from political reform to rigorous internal management of government guided by organization theory, pointing to a science of administration independent of the substantive competence of specific agencies. Finally, the “Panoptic Vision” (1970 onward) took advantage of new technology to institute internal controls that were so pervasive as to become problems in their own right.

Insistence on the separation of politics from administration has thus shaped both reform and public administration thinking. But it also raises problems. Few would argue for the pervasive politicization of administration, but critics suggest that reforms, with their focus on efficiency, specialization, and independent administration, may create governments that are accountable to no one—neither voters nor elected officials.

That separation of politics and administration may come under increasing strain as privatization, the rise of parastatal bodies, and an increasing (if not always appropriate) expectation that public administration be carried out in more business-like ways alter state agencies and their relationships to society. Privatization and the devolution of government functions onto corporate-style entities are often proposed as a way of eradicating administrative corruption by taking bureaucrats out of the loop: Public functionaries with nothing to sell cannot be corrupt. The result, however, may be even less accountability and responsiveness in the ways in which people are governed, as more functions move into the private sector or are conducted, even partially, by its rules. Public–private partnerships, for their part, may invite private influence—which may well be nonpartisan but will often have strong political implications—into the halls of government. Both strategies, in differing ways, mingle state with society and public with private enterprise, and they do so in a setting of weakened political accountability. Such trends not only raise practical problems, but they also suggest that the basic distinction between administrative corruption and other varieties may be more an extension of the
normative doctrine that such separation should be maintained than of any sharp empirical boundaries surrounding the administration process.

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See also Accountability; Administration; Administration Theory; Principal–Agent Theory; Privatization

Further Readings

Cost–Benefit Analysis

Cost–benefit analysis (CBA) is an accounting framework that compares benefits and costs associated with a public investment or decision laid out for purposes of information and discussion. A related framework, widely used in health care but also in other areas, is cost-effectiveness analysis, sometimes known as least cost planning. In least cost planning, the goal is given, for example, to achieve a given level of carbon monoxide in a city, and the least expensive way of achieving this goal is sought.

Externalities
The rationale for government investment is externalities. Externalities are effects that are not accounted for in market operations. They arise solely from the expenses of operating markets. Air pollution, for example, is considered an externality as the polluting firm does not take into account the damaging effect of its pollution on the surrounding population. In a market system, the population could pay the firm to reduce pollution. Or the firm could pay the individuals to tolerate it, whichever course was the cheapest. Yet any such market arrangement might be too expensive to implement due to transaction costs. Sometimes the government can institute a quasi market as in cap-and-trade permits. In this case, the government fixes the quantity of pollution allowed and then sells (or gives away) rights to this quantity. These rights can then be traded. This sort of arrangement is increasingly used in fisheries to prevent overfishing. The total quota of fish allowed to be caught is set and rights are then distributed among fishermen for portions of the total quota. The decision about whether to use a quota system, or to use, say, pollution taxes or emissions limits on the basis of the available technology is the sort of decision that CBA can be used to address. More commonly, CBA is used to address questions in areas such as transportation, dam building, and, more recently, expenditures on social programs such as Head Start.

Government Use
The U.S. Federal Government widely uses CBA under presidential executive orders. Under these orders, the Office of Management and the Budget (OMB) requires the use of CBA by executive agencies and many congressional agencies as well. OMB has created a set of guidelines for the use of CBA.
CBA is also used, but less widely, by state and municipal governments. If used properly, the CBA framework can reduce poorly conceived government spending. In fact, it has already played this role to a significant extent but not to the extent possible.

What Are Benefits and Costs?

Benefits

Benefits are measured by the willingness to pay (WTP) for gains. Thus, in evaluating the building of a new road, the government might calculate the time savings to users. Then, they would estimate the value of users’ time and determine a total value of time saved. This figure would then represent an estimate of the users’ WTP and therefore of their benefits.

Costs

Costs are the amount that those bearing them would be willing to accept (WTA) in order to bear the burden of the project or decision. Thus, in building a new road, the analyst would seek to determine what payment the taxpayers would have to make. In addition, homeowners who live near the road might bear certain costs in terms of pollution and noise. The amount it would take to compensate these homeowners would be an addition to the costs. Alternatively, the government might build a barrier to reduce noise so that the cost to nearby homeowners is small and might be ignored.

Standing

Not everyone affected nor all sentiments created are included in practice in a CBA. The decision about whom to include or exclude in a CBA is to decide the standing of those affected. Most analyses are done from a particular viewpoint. A municipality might consider only the effects to municipal revenues or only those felt within the city. The state government might not consider the effects of its pollution policy on neighboring states, and the federal government might not consider its effects on foreign countries. Many projects will have only minor effects on certain groups, and it may be considered too expensive to calculate these. In addition, certain sentiments may be disregarded as not being acceptable; for example, one might suffer harm from envy, but this harm would generally go unrecognized in a CBA. A more useful example concerns the value of stolen goods to the thief. Clearly, they have value to the thief, but in considering whether or not these goods should be returned, one would not count their value to the thief, as holding such goods is illegal.

Partial and General Equilibrium Analysis

How many markets will a project affect? Suppose a buyer is considering whether or not to buy a less expensive regular refrigerator or a more expensive energy-saving refrigerator. The energy-saving model will save energy costs each year, and the buyer wonders if the extra expense is worthwhile. This can be determined by the buyer’s own personal CBA. Any effect on markets is negligible and can be ignored. An analysis such as this that is very limited in its inclusion of markets is called partial equilibrium analysis. However, if one is considering a countrywide policy to subsidize energy-saving models, the analysis should consider markets more broadly. When the effects in many markets are taken into account, the analysis is general equilibrium analysis. Consider a national oil tax and all of the markets affected: transportation markets; the price of products made with oil, such as plastics; labor markets; and others. One analysis is that such a policy should be implemented from a general-equilibrium perspective.

Discounting

Consider the choice between a more expensive energy-saver refrigerator and a less expensive one. Suppose the buyer faces the following costs and benefits over time. For simplicity, we will assume that the life of each refrigerator is 5 years and that the energy costs are constant (see Table 1).

The buyer would spend an extra $200 now to save $255 over 5 years. Is it worthwhile buying the energy saver? The savings of $45 per year amounts to a total of $225, which is greater than the $200 extra cost, but this comparison fails to take into account the time value of money. Suppose you know that you can obtain a 5% yearly return from investing in a safe Certificate of Deposit (CD). The question now is what sum of money you could invest today at 5% that would yield $45 per year
for 5 years. The answer to this question is the present value (PV) of the stream of 5-year payments. This PV will be given by the formula for an annuity (a uniform stream of payments), which is

\[ PV = \frac{A[1 - (1 + r)^{-t}]}{(1 + r)^t}, \]

where \( A \) is the yearly amount, \( t \) is time, and \( r \) is the discount or interest rate (here 5%). In the case of the energy saver refrigerator, this will be

\[ PV = \frac{45[1 - (1.05)^{-5}]}{.05} = \$194.83. \]

Since this PV is less than the $200 cost, it is not worthwhile buying the energy saver. If one’s discount rate were, for example, 1%, then the PV of the energy saving would be $218.40, and it would be worthwhile. The lower the discount rate, the greater is the PV of future benefits. The net present value (NPV) is the PV of benefits minus costs. The CBA test is to determine if the NPV is positive, in which case it is said that the project is financially desirable. The NPV in the present example would be as follows:

\[ NPV = \$194.83 - \$200 = -\$5.17. \]

Since this is a negative value, the project is not financially desirable. One way to look at this example is that if one receives less than the 5% return, one can gain from investing the $200 in a safe CD. The NPV is not the only measure used but is the one most used by economists.

**Risk and Uncertainty**

CBA almost always involves considering cash flows in the future. The future is always uncertain and risky. Risk is usually defined as occurring when the probabilities of events are known. Uncertainty occurs when the probabilities are unknown or subject to unknown variances. In considering the purchase of the refrigerator, for example, we might expect the energy savings to increase over time with some certain probability. This would be a question of risk. As a simple procedure, we might calculate the expected value of the future energy savings, given the known probabilities of increases in energy prices. The expected value is the energy savings times its probability. Suppose we expect the value of the energy savings to be $20 per year due to the increase in energy costs and that this increase in savings is expected with 90% probability. The expected value of this in each year would be $5.00 times 90% or $4.5 dollars per year. Taking the PV of this annuity at 5% for 5 years, we have $19.48. When we add this to the PV in the previous scenarios with the 5% discount rate, we would have a total of NPV = $14.31. Since this is positive, the energy saver passes the CBA test, given that the energy costs go up by $5 per year with 90% probability.

In a more sophisticated analysis, we would have a distribution of probabilities. The NPV can also be calculated in these situations. A common procedure is to use a Monte Carlo simulation program that allows us to account for the entire probability distribution. Further discussion of this issue lies beyond this essay.

**Nonmarket Values**

Although CBA is a sort of financial accounting, it considers many values not always counted in business accounting. Many preferences can be valued, although they are not always readily apparent. The
value of a house with a view compared with the same house without a view is readily determined, for example. The value of cleaner air and water can also be determined. The value of fishing in a less polluted stream as compared with a more polluted stream is more challenging. Similarly, the value of visiting a national park requires more sophisticated work. Economists have developed a number of techniques for determining environmental and other values. For example, they ask how far a person might drive to arrive at a park destination. Valuations can be made by looking at the cost of driving to drivers arriving from various estimated distances from the park. Also, questionnaires can be used to determine values. Analogies from market behavior can be applied to nonmarket behavior. Prices used to value nonmarket behavior are called *shadow prices*. Thus, CBA attempts to perform a sort of social accounting to determine the best public investments.

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**See also Economic Policy**

**Further Readings**


**CREDIBLE COMMITMENT**

 Individuals are generally assumed to choose rationally in ways that make themselves better off. However, there are times when a political actor can benefit by denying himself or herself, early in a political interaction, the option of choosing self-serving actions later on. A general may know that retreat could be a valuable option in the future, but “burning one’s bridges” may elicit more advantageous behavior from one’s soldiers (or one’s opponents). Constraining self-interested choice to induce beneficial actions from other players is called “credible commitment.”

This entry examines several systematic and foundational credible commitment problems. In international relations, credible commitment can strengthen deterrence. Further, opportunism by government officials can intimidate economic actors; healthy economic growth requires the government to be credibly constrained from opportunistic behavior. Constitutions, courts, independent central banks, and international agencies can facilitate the kind of credible commitment that enhances economic development. In democracies, credible commitment necessarily entails a limitation on the scope and power of majority rule.

**Credible Commitment, Programming, and Delegation**

At the heart of the problem of credible commitment is the strategic interdependence of two or more actors making sequenced choices. An example explored in the early 1960s by Thomas Schelling is nuclear deterrence. A stylized version of this problem is as follows: Assume that the Soviet Union moves first, choosing whether or not to invade Europe. The United States then responds to an invasion with either conventional or nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union’s choice depends on what it thinks the United States will do in response. The Soviet Union’s dominance in conventional weaponry would give it a victory in Europe if the United States restricts itself to conventional weapons. However, if the United States responds with nuclear weapons, the result will be a nuclear holocaust that is the worst outcome for both sides.

The United States would like to convince the Soviet Union of its willingness to use its nuclear arsenal. However, after an invasion, the self-interested choice for the United States is not to initiate a nuclear exchange. The self-interest of the United
States diminishes the deterrent effect of its nuclear arsenal. Based on its assessment of the U.S. selfinterested response, the Soviet Union can invade with impunity. Paradoxically, the option of making a self-interested choice works against the U.S.’s own best interests—thus, encouraging the very action that it would like to deter.

The United States would be better off if it could commit itself, prior to the invasion, to a course of action that would not be in its best interests later on. If it could commit itself to using the nuclear deterrent, willingly initiating a nuclear war in response to a Soviet invasion, then the best choice for the Soviet Union would be not to invade.

But how could the United States commit itself, prior to an invasion, to an action that would defy its self-interest in the event? One answer is programming of behavior. If the United States creates bureaucratic machinery that mechanically implements a nuclear response in the event of an invasion, then the Soviet Union would choose not to invade.

Closely related to programming is delegation. If the response to a Soviet invasion were transparently and credibly delegated to someone who could be expected to choose a nuclear exchange, then the Soviet Union would be given pause. For example, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1961 to 1965 was General Curtis LeMay. LeMay had not only implemented the firebombing of Tokyo during World War II, but he had also expressed support for the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet government’s awareness of LeMay’s central role in strategic decision making might well have made the nuclear deterrent more credible—not because he was representative of other public officials but because he was unrepresentative.

The delegation solution to credible commitment problems defies our conventional wisdom. Conventional wisdom (and a good deal of principal-agent theory) concludes that selecting an agent with preferences similar to the principal’s preferences is desirable; or failing this, the principal should shape the agent’s behavior through incentives that cause the agent to choose as the principal would in any decision situation. However, delegation is an effective means of credible commitment only when the person receiving the delegated authority has preferences different from the person doing the delegating.

### Political Moral Hazard and Central Banking

In the case of nuclear deterrence, credible commitment had the potential to help the United States while depriving the Soviet Union of a victory. Other uses of credible commitment make all players better off. For instance, consider an investor who has hidden some money underneath her mattress. If she were to invest in government bonds, then she could increase her wealth, and the government would have funds necessary to pursue its agenda.

Is the investor’s money safe with government bonds? They may be a safe investment if the government pursues a stable, noninflationary monetary policy. However, democratically elected public officials inevitably have an incentive to give a surprise “boost” to the economy with monetary policies that would end up with inflation—diminishing the value of the bonds. If the government is not credibly constrained from engaging in inflationary policies, then the investor may seek a hedge against inflation and pass up the government’s bonds. Both the investor and the government would be better off if monetary policy were delegated to an agency that is guaranteed to be beyond the control of the democratically elected officials—a central bank.

Creating an independent central bank is increasingly thought of as an essential feature of modern political economy—precisely because it denies public officials the opportunity to pursue their morally hazardous preferences. The evidence has shown, as noted by Robert J. Franzese Jr. (1999), that independence in central banks does decrease inflation, by differing the amounts depending on trade openness. Most interestingly, as Giandomenico Majone (1999) observes, to resolve credible commitment issues, “the delegate is chosen precisely because his or her preferences do not mirror those of the delegating authority” (p. 69).

### Credible Commitment to Nonmajoritarian Institutions

The case of central banking is one in which we are accustomed to thinking of delegation to a nonmajoritarian institution as a form of credible commitment that protects the public from the dangerous impulses of elected officials. However, delegation
may play a similar role in a variety of policy arenas in which elected officials experience temptations to use power opportunistically in ways that endanger property rights and contract enforcement and, thus, diminish investment and long-run economic growth.

Many of a government’s actions are crucial to the strategic thinking of investors, entrepreneurs, homeowners, and other citizens. Citizens may have reason to suspect opportunistic behavior on the part of the government; this is seen around the world in the concept of “political risk.” If a firm invests in an expensive, immobile manufacturing plant, will the government then use its taxation powers to extract all the profits? If an investor embarks on an investment strategy that assumes low inflation rates, will the politicians undermine that strategy with monetary surprises? If an employer hires workers assuming fixed employment regulations and contracts, will those be suddenly changed as a result of the latest election results?

All of these may be thought of as credible commitment problems, in which the prior constraint of political actors may encourage beneficial economic growth. Seen through the lens of credible commitment, a number of constitutional features can be thought of as aiding the resolution of credible commitment problems. A Madisonian separation of powers is beneficial because it diminishes the ability of the branches of government to unite in opportunistic schemes.

Separation of powers also strengthens the independence of the judiciary. In many regimes, the courts may do a good job of arbitrating disputes between citizens, but in disputes between citizens and the state, the courts may defer to the state and its authority. When economic actors are convinced that the judiciary can serve as a check on government officials, they are more willing to make investments contributing to economic development.

The creation of an independent regulatory agency may be thought of as an attempt to limit the opportunistic actions of politicians. Key decisions are delegated to commissioners and staff who have only tenuous links to political factions, and they are expected to embed their decision-making process in a fixed procedure that discourages abrupt changes in policy. In the United States, for example, the National Labor Relations Board has embedded policy decision making in a bureaucratic and legalistic process that has resulted in the long-term development of a body of labor laws that diminishes uncertainty surrounding employment contracts. In these and other cases, “Political property rights—the rights to exercise public authority in certain policy areas—have been altered by delegating important powers to nonmajoritarian institutions” (Majone, 2001, p. 58).

In general, problems of credible commitment constitute a change of direction for rational choice theories of politics. Whereas early rational choice theories sought to explain political phenomena in terms of the self-interested choices of actors, the notion of credible commitment tries to explain certain political phenomena (central banks, independent judges, and autonomous bureaucrats) as institutional manifestations of the need to deny rational actors opportunities to pursue their morally hazardous short-term incentives.

Problems of credible commitment constitute a challenge to democratic theory as well. While democratic theorists may think of accountability to elected officials as the sine qua non of constitutional arrangements, empowering democratic forces to make monetary and regulatory decisions can pose a threat. An alternative constitutionalist perspective maintains the necessity of dividing, checking, and ultimately constraining democratic institutions.

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See also Bureaucracy; Central Banks; Judicial Independence; Principal–Agent Theory

Further Readings
At first sight, political crises appear as sudden and acute disruptions in the “normal” working of political systems. This ordinary perception of political crises is hereafter taken as their provisional definition, which offers at least the convenience of illuminating a paradoxical situation. The history of our societies is extremely rich in periods or events that may serve as examples. However, political crises have only belatedly been approached as phenomena deserving to be systematically analyzed and explained for their own sake, worthy of being elevated to the status of explicit research objects. Indeed, in most works dealing with them, political crises have been approached as a means of understanding or explaining something else. This orientation of the scholar’s interest has constituted a long-lasting handicap for the knowledge of these critical phenomena. The main root of this handicap lies in the common fascination with outcomes of historical processes, especially with the outcomes of critical processes, and in the automatic assumption that these outcomes should constitute the explicanda of these process analyses. This entry examines, first, how fascination with outcomes pervades most of the approaches that have dominated this field of research; second, the perspectives that have posited crises as particular stages on the paths of political development and the ones that have attempted to insert into crisis analysis the activities and choices of actors; and third, the approaches that have aimed at identifying, within the historical paths or sequences, turning points or branchings that are supposed to explain their course toward diverse outcomes.

It is precisely the departure from this fascination with outcomes that has cleared the way for a radical reorientation of the analysis of political crises. The next part of the entry focuses on the crux of this reorientation, which consists in grasping crises as particular states of the structures of the societies affected by these crises. This perspective not only allows us to account for a considerable number of the properties of crises but also to understand why the mundane idea that analysis and explanation of periods perceived as abnormal would require exceptional approaches is misleading. The final section of the entry comprises a brief discussion of several implications of this reorientation regarding some central features of the processes of crisis, particularly the uncertainty that characterizes such processes, the frequent emergence of charismatic leaders, the question of the alleged prevalence of hidden arenas over what is at stake in the open, and, finally, the question of the autonomy of the processes of crisis from their etiology.

The Focus on Outcomes

The intellectual attraction of the outcomes of crises is perfectly exemplified by conceptualizations of political development or political modernization. For instance, in a seminal set of studies, Leonard Binder and associates have distinguished several types of crises of political development such as identity, legitimacy, participation, distribution, and penetration crises. These crises have been thought of as functional requisites or necessary conditions for the emergence of a developed political system. Concurrently with their teleological biases, such approaches, as Sydney Verba has noticed, did not succeed in distinguishing crises as processes of “disruption” of the ordinary working of political systems from problems that political elites had to solve in order to modernize their country—even though some of these problems have occasionally given birth to conflicts more closely fitting the provisional definition of crises. This difficulty is heightened in those approaches that tried to link specific outcomes (typically democracy) with their preconditions seized through global economic or social indicators (e.g., literacy or urbanization rates, gross national product per capita), because the quest for statistical correlations between these indicators and their assumed outcomes excludes from the research agenda all the main components of political crises—the activity...
of the protagonists as well as what shapes or constrains it.

In contrast, other approaches, while assigning themselves the same explicanda (the outcomes of crises), have attempted to rehabilitate actors’ activity and strategies. Their major contribution lies in the historical description of the elites’ or leaders’ moves, of their tactics and dilemmas of coalition building, and of the bargains among the “great” protagonists of the events scrutinized, particularly the bargains of the contested regimes’ incumbents with their opponents. Often rich in insights, such approaches nonetheless analyze the actors’ tactical activity with the aim of identifying, for each type of outcome, a specific historical path or trajectory—especially a distinctive sequence of typical stages (each type of outcome being thus characterized by a distinctive path). This affects works dealing with the establishment of democratic systems and with the crises, collapses, and breakdowns these systems experienced as well as works concerning the processes that resulted in various types of authoritarian regimes (particularly in the interwar period in Europe) and, later, in the transitions to democracy. The intellectual appeal of outcome is easy to understand: Once it has occurred—but only then—the outcome (the seizure of power by Italian Fascists or the survival of democracy in France after the May 1958 crisis) matters; it often weighs heavily on the fate of individuals and societies. The appeal of outcome constitutes, however, a huge trap. First, it determines the scholar’s modus operandi—as a matter of fact that of the natural history of revolutions, according to Crane Brinton: The aim being to explain the actual outcome, it seems self-evident to cut off the historical sequence through a regressive analysis, taking as a starting point the outcome itself; the selection of facts then operates so as to make them converge toward the outcome that occurred. Second, a heavy historicist bias informs such reasoning, leading the scholar to ignore de facto the contingency of the crises’ outcomes and also implying that outcomes reflect or reveal the nature or essence of the critical processes or events that brought them about.

Many scholars have thought that they could avoid these pitfalls by introducing into historical paths some branchings, or moments when “history hesitates”—that is, by proposing a treelike image of the course of history. In an influential essay on the breakdowns of democratic regimes, Juan Linz has thus described the supposedly characteristic path of this particular set of outcomes by proposing roughly the following sequence: emergence of unsolvable problems/loss of incumbents’ power/power vacuum/transfer of power to the antidemocratic opposition, civil war, and re-equilibration of the democratic system—here lies the crucial branching point. Remarkably enough, that way of thinking about historical branchings permeates works referring to the most different sociological traditions, such as, prior to Linz’s essay, the structural Marxist analysis that Nicos Poulantzas devoted to the historical paths that led to the fascist regimes in Italy and Germany (the author combines the branchings with the idea, rather implicit in other works, that, at some stage, the processes under study reach points of no return and are conceived of as reversible before that point). Unfortunately, the remedy—the introduction of branchings—proves insufficient; it even leads to a dead end. Although these approaches claim to emphasize the role of political leaders and their decisions, they retain the hard core of historicist reasoning. They link each type of outcome—whether the process led to the cooptation of disloyal opposition, to civil war, and so on—with one, and only one, historical path supposed to be characteristic of it and supposed to be different from the paths or sequences ascribed to processes that resulted in other types of outcomes. We shall go back to this question again below from a different viewpoint. Nevertheless, it is far more meaningful that, commenting on their own analysis of transitions to democracy, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philipp Schmitter—who took Linz’s sequence of stages, supposedly typical of the breakdown of democracy, as an explicit model of explanation—acknowledged their failure to uncover a distinctive historical path proper to transitions. But this failure itself constitutes an interesting result of their work—probably the most important one. This observation actually applies to all the approaches mentioned previously.

**Crisis as Structural Transformation**

There is only one way to elude what is merely a particular kind of belief in laws of history (laws of historical development): namely, to bracket off, at
least temporarily, the outcomes of crises and, more broadly, the outcomes of critical processes and to break with the idea that to account for these phenomena consists in explaining their outcomes—that is, to choose a different puzzle to solve. But what is at stake in this move is not only the elimination of historicist biases; it is above all to identify and explain what the crises are made of and what happens during crises. Everyone today agrees on the idea that matter—physical matter—exists in different states: solid, gaseous, or liquid. For the theory of fluid conjunctures outlined by Michel Dobry, social structures and, more broadly, configurations of institutions and social relations, even when deeply objectified, are not necessarily more structurally stable than is matter. They can undergo short-term transformations of their state, and they can experience different states (which gain from being termed conjunctures, as particular states of social structures). This perspective thus opens the possibility of bringing to light the plasticity of structures and their sensitivity to actors’ mobilizations.

All this must be specified. First, the theory of fluid conjunctures applies exclusively to critical conjunctures peculiar to complex social systems. These systems are defined by their high internal differentiation into a multiplicity of social sectors, spheres, or fields, relatively autonomous from each other, strongly institutionalized, tending toward self-reference, and each of them endowed with its own social logic (a set of constraints, resources, stakes, pragmatic and normative rules of the game, etc.), a logic that weighs heavily, in routine conjunctures, on the perceptions, calculations, and tactical activities of actors. This means that within these systems—which are not necessarily democratic ones—ordinary politics operates as a relatively autonomous sector or field, with its own specific logic. Second, many of the empirical regularities of the political crises that affect these systems have been already noticed or observed by their actors or by scholars. The point is that these regularities can be fully explained when thought of as a process that alters, in a short term, the structural features of these systems, which, in the first place, is their particular form of differentiation—that is, more precisely, when thought of as a process, or as a dynamics, of desectorization of these systems. Crucially, this dynamics—which occurs particularly under the impact of multisectoral mobilizations (those that spread, on a competitive mode, in several differentiated social sectors)—is a process that accounts also for a lot of regularities previously poorly identified or unidentified.

This is the main reason why, to understand political crises or, better, fluid conjunctures, the major features of this desectorization dynamics must qualify—or even substitute for—the provisional definition sketched above. Desectorization first involves a manifest reduction, and sometimes the complete collapse, of the autonomy of the different sectors; a visible fading or crumbling of sectoral frontiers; and a rapidly growing permeability to tactical moves and to stakes external to sectoral social logics, notably external to those of the political sectors or fields. Among other features, this results in a dramatic and unexpected mobility of stakes—puzzling for protagonists of crises as for observers—sudden disruptions of sectoral institutionalized temporalities or rhythms, rapid alterations of the ordinary division of political labor, and the no less abrupt outbursts of processes of de-objectification—the loss of the natural, taken-for-granted dimension that is also the legitimacy—of the social reality of institutions and collective bodies.

Further, the effects of this conjunctural desectorization can be fully checked when looking at the perceptions, anticipations, tactical dilemmas, calculations, and moves of actors. This deserves, however, a detour by one delicate question: the belief that abnormal or exceptional periods require an exceptional approach, different from the viewpoint of “normal” social sciences. Let us revert to the historical branchings discussed previously: In most works, the introduction of such branchings cumulates the effects of historicism and the effects, a priori logically incompatible, of methodological exceptionalism. Ultimately, justified by the alleged abnormal—in olden times called “pathological”—characteristic of crisis phenomena, this exceptionalism takes a classical form. On the one hand, periods of political stability, or political “equilibrium,” would fall within the scope of so-called normal, that is, structural (whatever meaning one gives to this notion), and deterministic approaches. On the other hand, periods of crisis (or “transition,” “revolution,” etc.) would require, by their very nature, to be explained in terms of choice, of
decision making, or of strategic calculation. Such
an exceptionalism, seemingly taken for granted, is
constitutive of the heroic fallacy. First, it leads the
scholar to abandon any sustained interest in struc
tures and for what they become during critical
periods. Second, it conveys a conception of actors’
choices or decisions as, at a minimum, underdeter
dined and, most often, undetermine—that is, free
from the causalties that “normal” social sciences
attempt to establish. It is noteworthy that this fal
lacy is not confined to scholars: It replicates the
ordinary point of view of practitioners of modern
revolutions (e.g., Lenin or Trotsky) who, to cope
with revolutionary situations, oppose the catego
ries of objective factors and subjective factors of
revolutions and conceive of situations such as the
exclusive realm of subjective factors. All these
remarks entirely apply to the standard conception
of critical junctures: If these junctures are sup
posed to constitute the starting points of path
dependency processes, they are usually thought of
as moments of choices, choices freed from any
determination or structural constraint; that is
why critical junctures—which can also, as many
authors forget and as Paul Pierson reminds us,
correspond to events in no way critical—must not
be confused with fluid or critical conjunctures.
The heroic fallacy presumably is an illusion nec
essary to the practice of actors. In terms of
knowledge, it leads to losing at once on several
counts: first, by ignoring what structures become
in periods of crisis and, second, because it
excludes any possibility of identifying and
explaining not only the factors shaping actors’
perceptions and actions but also the differences
distinguishing critical conjunctures from routine
ones. This has an important consequence: We
have to refuse to change approaches when switching
from the analysis of normal structural constraint to the
analysis of abnormal or exceptional periods. In
other words, the understanding of political crises
calls for a methodological normalization of these
phenomena (i.e., for a principle of methodologi
cal continuity).

The question especially matters when confronting
the uncertainty that the actors of crises have to
deal with. This uncertainty does not boil down to
a narrow uncertainty on the outcome of crises or
on the postcrisis course of possible ensuing path
dependency processes—this is only a marginal part
of it. Uncertainty, rather, is an overwhelming, mul
tiform, and pervasive component of the situatio
nal constraints stemming from the desectoriza
tion of social space, which affects all the protago
nists of crises. The specific social logics of the
various differentiated social sectors, spheres, or
fields cease to be the reference and the material of
actors’ calculations, assessments of varied lines of
action’s efficiency, and definitions of situations.
The often dramatic collapse of the sectoral logics’
hold on actors’ calculations goes hand in hand
with the emergence of a widened form of interde
pendence that tends to replace social games—par
ticularly political games—that, in routine con
junctures, are characterized by more local, sector
ized, and compartmentalized forms of interdepen
dence. This widened interdependence not only
tends to introduce into actors’ calculations
resources, actors, and stakes that are external to
the ordinary logics of political sectors but also
deprives actors of their routine means or tools of
calculation and anticipation and their routine ref
erences, clues, markers, pragmatic rules of the
game, and so forth. Widened interdependence is
the mainspring of the sudden and unpredictable
variations of the efficiency, or value, of various
lines of action and resources. It simultaneously
results in making it difficult and often very costly
for actors to access information on that efficiency
as well as information on orientations of other
actors and, regarding collective actors, on their
very consistency and identities (Who exactly are
my allies today? Who are the real hardliners? Are
the moderates still moderates?). That is why it is
relevant to term this uncertainty structural uncer
tainty, in its strong meaning. This entails that
conjunctures of crisis are no less constraining for
actors than are normal situations; actors are no
less rational, but they are compelled to manage to
calculate, anticipate, and orient themselves in
other ways. For instance, from this derives, in
these conjunctures, the special and growing attrac
tion of situational focal points.

Implications for the Study of Crises
All this has multiple and varied implications. It
first induces a reconsideration of several classical
topoi of political sociology. Two of them can illus
trate the point fairly well:
1. The Weberian theory of charismatic leadership in critical periods stresses the personal qualities, words, claims, and deeds of the leader; however, as in the case of the French May 1958 crisis, this conception should be questioned: Actually, the charismatic leadership attributed to General de Gaulle stems primarily from the fact that he represented a strictly situational focal point for diverse opposing actors, most of whom were not his proponents.

2. Delegitimization processes in political crises are traditionally conceived as necessary preconditions of crises, but the desectorization dynamic peculiar to fluid conjunctures (and the resulting de-objectification, or de-reification, of institutions) prompts us to think of delegitimization processes also, and often primarily, as by-products of desectorization dynamics, and to observe that crises may occur without any prior delegitimization of authorities or regimes.

Second, it permits accounting for usually misinterpreted empirical phenomena—for example, the idea that the hidden overdetermines and the visible informs many analyses of critical processes. In this way, while somewhat reticent about conspiracy theories, Linz nevertheless asserts that in one of the crucial stages of the breakdown of democratic processes, we should observe a narrowing of the political arena, marked by the regime leaders’ opening up to the disloyal opposition (e.g., Mussolini in the Italian case), the supposedly decisive role of secret bargaining, and the replacement of the parliamentary arena by a hidden one, accessible only to a very restricted number of individuals. Although in such contexts—as in many others, often more ordinary ones—actors may be tempted by secret negotiations and moves, we hardly find this kind of overdetermination of the visible or the open by the secret. Since these critical contexts are situations of widened interdependence, hidden arenas, restricted groups, conspiracies, and covert agreements per se can never benefit from any causal or ontological superiority over visible moves and events and, more specifically, over the expressive, nonintentional information that visible moves carry and that focus all actors’ attention, whether they like it or not. The March on Rome, seen by some historians as an inefficient theatrical staging, nonetheless constrained, at that moment, the anticipations, calculations, and tactics of all protagonists, even those operating undercover. Moreover, Linz rightly points out the coming into play, during that stage, of actors external to the political field, such as the church, the unions, and the army or high-ranking civil servants; obviously, all of this is much more consistent with the desectorization perspective than with the narrowing hypothesis.

There remains one last implication to consider. According to Carl von Clausewitz, if war is the continuation of political relations by other means, it nevertheless has the property, once produced by politics, of depending also on its own dynamics or its own “grammar,” which is the rise to the extremes of violence, whatever the ends or will of actors. The reader already knows that the dynamics of political crises, despite the imagery of the intensification of conflict and of the rise in the scale of violence haunting many works, is not that of wars. And yet, like wars, political crises tend to escape, to pull themselves away from their conditions of genesis, but because of their own distinctive dynamics, that is, that of desectorization. The autonomy of critical processes from their causes or conditions of emergence is not innocuous: It further undermines the premises and causal imagery of historicist approaches and prompts a critical reflection on what the social sciences have often expected, and still expect, from the unveiling of the historical conditions of emergence of political crises and critical processes—particularly the belief that the ultimate sociological truth of these phenomena exclusively or primarily lies in the factors that engendered them. It is easy to guess that the target of this criticism is not causality as such but rather some pedestrian forms of misplaced determinism.

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See also Breakdown of Political Systems; Charisma; Conflicts; Democratization; Legitimacy; Revolution; Transition

Further Readings

Crisis Management

We speak of crisis when a community of people—an organization, a town, or a nation—perceives an urgent threat to core values or life-sustaining functions, which must be urgently dealt with under conditions of deep uncertainty. Crisis management pertains to all activities addressing that threat and aimed at minimizing its consequences.

Crisis and the Modern Society

Public authorities face a variety of crises, such as natural disasters and war, financial meltdowns and terrorist attacks, epidemics and explosions, and infrastructural dramas and failures of information and communications technology (ICT). Crises are not routine events (e.g., fires or traffic accidents). Crises are inconceivable events that often take politicians, citizens, and the media by complete surprise.

Crises create tough challenges for public authorities and their organizations. Citizens expect public authorities to safeguard them from the threat, make critical decisions, and implement them—under considerable time pressure and in the absence of essential information about causes and consequences. Two factors make it increasingly hard to meet these challenges.

First, the very qualities that increase welfare and drive progress in modern societies make them vulnerable to crises. Modern society has become increasingly complex and integrated. Complexity makes it hard to fully understand emerging vulnerabilities, which, as a result, can go long unrecognized; attempts to deal with them often produce unintended consequences (fueling rather than dampening the crisis). Tight coupling between a system’s component parts and those of other systems facilitates the rapid proliferation of disturbances throughout the system. Crises may thus have their roots far away (in a geographical sense), but they can rapidly snowball through global networks, jumping from one system to another and gathering destructive potential along the way.

All this makes it very hard to recognize a crisis before its consequences materialize. When a crisis begins to unfold, policymakers often do not see anything out of the ordinary. Hidden interactions eat away at the pillars of the system, but it is only when the crisis is in full swing that policymakers can recognize it for what it is. Once a crisis has escalated into view, authorities can only try to minimize its consequences.

Second, the contested nature of crisis complicates the situation. A crisis rarely, if ever, “speaks for itself.” The definition of a situation is, as social scientists say, the outcome of a subjective process and is continuously subjected to the forces of politicization. One person’s crisis is another’s opportunity. For public authorities, this spells trouble: Many seemingly innocent events can be transformed into crises. Western citizens have
grown impatient with imperfections; they have come to fear glitches, and they see more of what they fear. In this culture of fear—sometimes referred to as the “risk society”—the modern mass media play an amplifying role (Ulrick Beck, 1992).

**Challenges of Crisis Management**

Crisis management has two dimensions. The technical-administrative dimension pertains to the coping capacity of governmental institutions and public policies in the face of emerging threats. But there is also a political dimension: Crisis management is a deeply controversial and intensely political activity. A combination of these dimensions translates into what Arjen Boin, Paul ’t Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius have identified as the five critical challenges of crisis management: sense making, decision making, meaning making, terminating, and learning.

**Sense Making**

Crises seem to pose a straightforward challenge: Once a crisis becomes manifest, crisis managers must take measures to deal with its consequences. Reality is much more complex, however. Most crises do not materialize with a big bang. Policymakers must recognize from vague and contradictory signals that something out of the ordinary is developing. They must appraise the threat and decide what the crisis is about.

Crisis managers often find it hard to meet this challenge. The bewildering pace, ambiguity, and complexity of a crisis can easily overwhelm normal modes of situation assessment. Stress may further impair sense-making abilities. Organizational pathologies can produce additional barriers to crisis recognition.

Some categories of people are known for their ability to stay clearheaded under pressure. They have developed a mode of information processing that enables competent performance under crisis conditions. Veteran military officers, journalists, and fire and police commanders are known for this. Some organizations have developed a proactive culture of “looking for problems” in their environment. These so-called high-reliability organizations have somehow developed a capacity for thorough yet fast-paced information processing under stressful conditions. The unresolved question, as noted by Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe, is whether organizations can design these features into existing organizational cultures.

**Making Critical Decisions**

During a crisis, critical decisions must be made. Scarce resources may have to be prioritized. This is much like politics as usual, except that in crisis circumstances the disparities between demand and supply of public resources are much bigger, the situation remains unclear and volatile, and the time to think, consult, and gain acceptance for decisions is restricted. Crises confront governments and leaders with issues they do not face on a daily basis, for example, concerning the deployment of the military, the use of lethal force, or the radical restriction of civil liberties. Crisis decision making is making hard calls, which involve tough value trade-offs and major political risks.

An effective response to crisis requires coordination. After all, each decision must be implemented by a variety of organizations; effective implementation requires that these organizations work together. Getting public bureaucracies to adapt to crisis circumstances is a daunting—some say impossible—task. Most public organizations were originally designed to conduct routine business in accordance with values such as fairness, lawfulness, and efficiency. The management of crisis, however, requires flexibility, improvisation, redundancy, and the breaking of rules.

Coordination is not a self-evident feature of crisis management operations. The question of who is in charge typically arouses great passions. In disaster studies, the “battle of the Samaritans” is a well-documented phenomenon: Agencies representing different technologies of crisis management find it difficult to align their actions. Moreover, a crisis does not make the sensitivities and conflicts that governed the daily relations between authorities and others before the crisis disappear.

An effective crisis response is to a large extent the result of a naturally evolving process. It cannot be managed in a linear, step-by-step, and comprehensive fashion from a single crisis center. There are simply too many hurdles that separate a critical decision from its timely execution in the field.
Meaning Making

In a crisis, leaders are expected to reduce uncertainty and provide an authoritative account of what is going on, why it is happening, and what needs to be done. Leaders must get others to accept their definition of the situation. If they are not successful, their decisions may not be understood or accepted.

Public leaders are not the only ones trying to frame the crisis. Their messages coincide and compete with those of other parties, who hold other positions and interests and who are likely to espouse various alternative definitions of the situation and advocate different courses of action. If other actors succeed in dominating the meaning-making process, the ability of incumbent leaders to decide and maneuver is severely constrained.

It is often difficult for authorities to provide correct information right away. They struggle with the mountains of raw data (reports, rumors, and pictures) that are quickly amassed when something extraordinary happens. Turning these data into a coherent picture of the situation is a challenge. Getting it out to the public in the form of accurate, clear, and actionable information requires a major public relations effort. This effort is often hindered by the aroused state of the audience: People whose lives are deeply affected tend to be anxious and stressed (distressed). Moreover, they do not necessarily see the government as their ally.

Terminating a Crisis

Crisis termination is twofold. It is about shifting back from emergency to routine mode. This requires some form of downsizing of crisis operations. At the strategic level, it also requires rendering an account of what has happened and gaining acceptance for it. These two aspects of crisis termination are distinct, but in practice, they are often closely intertwined. The system of governance—its rules, its organizations, and its power holders—has to be (re)stabilized; it must regain the necessary legitimacy to perform its usual functions. Leaders generally cannot bring this about by unilateral decree, even if they possess the formal mandate to terminate crises in a legal sense. Formal termination gestures can follow but never lead the mood of a community. Premature closure may even backfire: Allegations of underestimation and cover-up are quick to emerge in an opinion climate that is still on edge.

Accountability debates can easily degenerate into blame games. Crisis leaders can be competent and conscientious, but that alone says little about how their performance will be evaluated when the crisis is over. Policymakers and agencies that failed to perform their duties prior to or during the critical stages may manage the crisis aftermath well, thus preventing losses to their reputation, autonomy, and resources. Crises have winners and losers. The political (and legal) dynamics of the accountability process determines which crisis actors end up where.

Learning

A crisis offers a reservoir of potential lessons for contingency planning and training for future crises. One would expect all those involved to study these lessons and feed them back into organizational practices, policies, and laws. This does not always happen, however. Lesson drawing is one of the most underdeveloped aspects of crisis management. In addition to cognitive and institutional barriers to learning, lesson drawing is constrained by the role of these lessons in determining the impact that crises have on a society.

The depiction of a crisis as a product of prevention and foresight failures would force people to rethink the assumptions on which preexisting policies and rule systems rested. Other stakeholders might seize on the lessons to advocate measures and policy reforms that incumbent leaders reject. Leaders thus have a large stake in steering the lesson-drawing process in the political and bureaucratic arenas.

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See also Leadership

Further Readings


**Critical Theory**

Today, the term *critical theory* refers to a broad variety of theoretical approaches in social and cultural studies as well as social philosophy. Originally, critical theory was the programmatic name of a German group of philosophers and social scientists who, in 1930, began to work together under the directorship of Max Horkheimer at the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research and who continued their work after emigrating to the United States in the early 1930s. This group has also been labeled the “Frankfurt School” and is the subject of this entry.

From 1932 until 1941, the group published *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* (Journal for Social Research). After World War II, Horkheimer returned to Frankfurt and together with Theodor Adorno, who during the 1940s had become his most important theoretical companion, reestablished the Frankfurt Institute. Next to Adorno, among the important members of the first generation, are the philosophers Herbert Marcuse and Walter Benjamin, the economist Friedrich Pollock, the psychologist Erich Fromm, and the sociologist Leo Loewenthal.

With Jürgen Habermas, who in 1966 became Adorno’s successor at the Frankfurt Institute, not only did a new generation take over, but a theoretical shift within the Frankfurt School appeared and soon became internationally recognized in political science and political theory in addition to philosophy. Nevertheless, Habermas in his social theory continued the critiques of “late capitalism” initiated by his predecessors. Today, some speak about a “third generation,” referring to authors like Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, or Axel Honneth or focus primarily on Honneth as the successor to Habermas’s chair and directorship of the Frankfurt Institute. However, the international diffusion and pluralization of the original ideas of critical theory renders questionable any claim to continuity of critical theory by intergenerational transmission. Compared with the first generation and Habermas, no such coherent school or theory exists any longer. The term *critical theory* today lacks a single specific meaning, and critical theory as a specific approach has, arguably, found its historical fulfillment with the life work of Habermas.

**Origins and Early Development**

The origin of critical theory has to be understood in the context of the deep political and theoretical crisis of the Marxist Second International during and after World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the founding of the Soviet Union under V. I. Lenin. Perry Anderson has coined the term *Western Marxism* to summarize the different theoretical approaches of Georg Lukács, Karl Korsch, and Antonio Gramsci among others, who during the 1920s reacted to this crisis by creating their own rereadings of Marxism. In the late 1920s, this Marxist revisionism came to be strongly influenced by the first publication of Marx’s early so-called humanistic writings. In all their variety, these new approaches were, on the one hand, opposed to the deterministic interpretation of history by “Marxism” (historical materialism) and, on the other, critical of the political instrumentalization of the Marxist approach as a mere power ideology in what soon came to be called “Marxism–Leninism.”

When Horkheimer delivered his famous inaugural speech as director of the Institute in 1932, he introduced a research program that has been called “interdisciplinary materialism” (Wolfgang Bonß & Norbert Schindler, 1982). Its goal was to integrate, in a new manner, the Hegel–Marx tradition of philosophy of history with empirical social research in various disciplines into a new paradigm of practical philosophy. In this project, the role of philosophy was to integrate empirical research into a theoretical totality that could both represent reality and provide a normative perspective on it. Given the fact that in Western societies the proletariat had
not proven to be the revolutionary class that would, according to Marx, overthrow the capitalist system of exploitation and alienation, the new paradigm of interdisciplinary materialism nevertheless was to remain devoted to the practical aim of emancipating society in totality by developing its inherent rational potential and its possibilities for liberation. The critique of ideology was one more traditional way to demonstrate the normative cleavages between the universal promises of the French Revolution—liberté, égalité, fraternité—and the unjust class realities of bourgeois society, based on a capitalist economy in which monopolistic structures had irreversibly undermined the socioeconomic foundations of liberalism. Despite the critique of liberalism, critical theory in its normative perspective always favored individualism over collectivism. Only an emancipated society could finally provide the social basis of “real individualism,” while capitalism had reduced “individualism” to mere market-driven egoism and class antagonism.

In the face of the triumph of both Nazism and Stalinism, and with disappearing hope for a practical solution to the revolutionary question, Horkheimer reformulated the program of the group, in a famous article in 1937, as “critical theory.” Critical theory, as opposed to “traditional theory” (i.e., positivism), should at least keep the consciousness alive in the absence of a revolutionary subject—that normative alternatives beyond the mere positivist affirmation of the given status quo in the fate of humankind were thinkable, at least in principle—that is, critical theory as the notorious “message in a bottle” in the absence of a practical subject of emancipation.

By the early 1940s, when Horkheimer and Adorno wrote their famous Dialektik der Aufklärung (Dialectic of Enlightenment; published in English in 1972), their diagnosis of time and history had become even more pessimistic. From the beginnings of enlightenment early in human history, the development of “reason” in the dominant form of “instrumental rationality” or “purposive rationality” alienated individuals and especially their system of social interaction from “objective reason” in constituting the subject—and thus their human potential. The history of humankind was thus—against Hegel’s and Marx’s views—perceived as, at best, an ambivalent story.

In this pessimistic vision of mankind “logic of decay” at present, there was no longer a theoretical basis for hope of change. Later, in the 1960s, Adorno in his Negative Dialectic (published in English in 1973) confirmed this negative diagnosis in the topos of a “totally administered society.” Marcuse, despite some political and personal distance from Horkheimer and Adorno since the late 1930s, came very close to this pessimistic approach with his concept of the one-dimensional man totally shaped by the main dominant values, in the early 1960s—though it was perceived quite differently by the international student protest movement of the late 1960s. The first generation of critical theorists, at least Horkheimer and Adorno, at the end of their theoretical path, which began without the practical subject of revolutionary practice, were deprived of a convincing theoretical foundation of rationality that could have been the background of their critical claim.

Habermas’s Contributions to Critical Theory

It was Habermas who, as a former assistant to Adorno in the Frankfurt Institute, started a profound critique of the aporia concerning the way in which reason is held to be constituted. In Habermas’s proclaimed “critical theory without praxis,” he searched during the 1960s for a new immanent theoretical basis for the foundation of reason or rationality that could effectively claim to critique mere instrumental or purposive rationality. According to Habermas, the way back to Kantian transcendentalism would lead to normative philosophy only, which could not as such relate to the tradition of “materialist” social research. He critiqued the Hegelian naturalism inherent in the early program of critical theory; after some diversions, he began to develop a new foundation for critical theory in a linguistic turn away from the traditional Marxist approach. One could definitely ask the question whether traditional critical theory did not come to an end already with this fundamental shift in theoretical foundation, but Habermas vigorously, and finally successfully, always claimed the successorship.

Based on his reception of the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, pragmatism, hermeneutics, and the theory of speech acts as developed by John L. Austin and John Searle, Habermas proclaimed that
in the logic of communicative interaction a “telos of understanding” is always inherent. So he shifted the basis of socialization (Vergesellschaftung) from the Marxist emphasis on labor to the communication of people in their lifeworld. Properly analyzed and turned into reflexive practices, “communicative rationality” now could serve as the pragmatic fundamentum of various forms of rationality. This is the task of the discurs proposed and simulated at once in Habermas’s new version of critical theory: In a discourse, the various implicit performative claims of participants become reflexive and, in Immanuel Kant’s phrase, “under the coercion-free coercion of the better argument,” accordingly transformative. Thus, in every real practice of discursive deliberation, participants have to agree on the normative principles of discursive justification.

Theory of Communicative Action

In his magnum opus, the Theorie kommunikativen Handelns (Theory of Communicative Action), Habermas elaborated the different forms of rationality, necessarily inherent if speakers claim the truth, rightness, or justice of what they say. In this analysis, he refers to a “counterfactual ideal speech situation,” to which every person would have equal access, in which no power relations intervene and only the validity of arguments counts. According to Habermas, under such ideal conditions, participants would normally reach a consensus that, thus, could claim universal validity as reasonable. As one can see, at the heart of this argument lies the Kantian assumption that generalizability grounds normative universality.

The Public Sphere

While Habermas exposed this philosophical reconstruction of practical communication, he at once embedded it into a more empirically grounded social theory. Modern society—which he continued to describe as “late capitalist” (1975)—is functionally differentiated in “systems,” such as the “political-administrative system” or the “economy,” that are perpetuated through an abstract logic of purposive rationality, on the one hand, and the Lebenswelt (lifeworld), on the other, which is coordinated through communicative interaction; the “public sphere” functions in between, somehow intermediating. As an actual critical diagnosis, Habermas’s thesis on a “colonization of the lifeworld by abstract systemic processes,” especially its “economization,” became very prominent and was popularized thereafter and perceived as the definitive new commentary of critical theory on the present society in “late capitalism.” “Colonization” was substituted for the Marxist term of alienation in its critical function.

Critical theory always claimed to be more than just a normative theory by grounding the normative potential of its actual critique in the structures and logics of the society itself. While Habermas could claim that he has found this grounding on a microlevel in his discursive theory based on his pragmatic analysis of communication, for a critical theory of the present society, he had to demonstrate the applicability of his ideas on a macrolevel as well. Already, in his early Der Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere), he reconstructed in an ideal-type manner the development and function of the public sphere (Öffentlichkeit) as part of the political and social emancipation of “bourgeois society” from feudal domination. In the institutions of this “public sphere”—journals, parties, associations, clubs, salons, and finally the parliament—emerging and prospering during the late 18th and the 19th centuries, the practice of discursive deliberation in public formed decisively the political and normative development of bourgeois society during its liberal period. Publicity—which had already played a role in Kant’s philosophy—now emerged as a normative principle guiding the development of the rule of law (Rechtsstaatlichkeit) and the legitimization of political power. The “public sphere” thus represented in real history the societal requisite for public deliberation. Unfortunately and due foremost to the capitalist structure of the developing mass media, this public sphere, in the past liberal period of capitalism, had turned into an instrument of mass manipulation in the hands of big capital—leading to the “structural change” in the title of the book. So the normative functioning of the public sphere is just a potential reality that requires certain supporting conditions such as open and fair access for various social groups, freedom from censorship, and pluralistic media. In his later writings, Habermas in part also used the concept of civil society in which all sorts of informal
groups, associations, and social movements contribute to this public process of normative and practical deliberation.

**Deliberative Democracy**

In recent years, Habermas has worked on reconstructing the interplay between the systemic reproduction of the economy (market) and the political-administrative system, on the one hand, and the norm-generating communication of lifeworld and civil society, on the other. In *Faktizität und Geltung* (Between Facts and Norms), Habermas offered a new account of the history of democracy and the rule of law (*Rechtsstaatlichkeit*) and applied it to the analysis of present Western democracies. Compared with the writings of critical theory up until the 1960s, Habermas now finally dropped the idea of any revolutionary transcendentalization of critical theory and reconstructed it as a normative critique based on the practical lifeworld perspective of participants. Against the imperatives of the purely purposive rationality of systemic reproduction in the fields of market economy and political administration, active participants (“citizens”) in civil society involved in all sorts of mobilization, from protest movements to political parties, now have the chance to raise issues and to impregnate the systemic processes with the normative repertoire of lifeworld communication. Democracy, a specific version of it, now plays a central strategic role. Against the critique of mere liberal majority rule à la Joseph Schumpeter, Habermas develops his more philosophical discursive justification into a model of “democratic deliberation.” According to this model, the democratic process does not just recognize and aggregate the prepolitical preferences of individuals as in the liberal model but views citizens as active participants in a process of public deliberation on practical and normative questions. This process is bound to what Philip Pettit (1992) has called “preference laundering”: Participants are thus required to accept the principle of deliberative justification and change their original preferences in light of better arguments. Analogously to the normative philosophical model of discourse, the deliberative communications of the “public sphere” in the end also deserve the supposition that the generated outcome in the form of “public opinion” on a certain question is reasonable; a supposition, as Habermas continues to proclaim, that first depends on the approximation of the real communications process to the normative ideal requirements of discursive justification and, second, always remains fallible in the future.

In *Faktizität und Geltung*, this theory of deliberative democracy now serves as the normative foundation of the legitimacy of law; in its development, the system of law in a democratic society at best reflects the normative outcome of the lifeworld-based communications in practical and ethical issues in civil society; if and when the channels and institutions of the public sphere work properly, deliberation and communication are not distorted, and open access is given to the various normative preferences of a pluralist society.

The evolution of law under democratic conditions can thus in the long run be viewed as a social process of learning by which modern societies permanently adapt their system of positive law to new requirements in their internal and external environment. The “logic of decay,” so characteristic of the main representatives of critical theory until the 1960s, has been gradually transformed by Habermas into an evolutionist framework of affirming the inherent potential of modern societies for normative and reasonable progress. In recent years, this more or less optimistic and somehow even neo-Hegelian view of historical progress has been expanded by Habermas to the evaluation of international law. While he vigorously critiques the unilateral interventionist policies of the United States under the George W. Bush administration, he has at the same time judged certain “humanistic interventions” based on moral grounds as “anticipating the universal rights of the people” and the reformed UN system as the core of a global legal system of justice.

**Habermas’s Influence in Political Science and Policy Studies**

Habermas’s philosophical works in recent years have had an enormous impact on analytical and theoretical developments within political science. In the political science literature, Claus Offe represents next to Habermas the turn to a more analytically based approach of critical theory; especially, the concepts of deliberation and justification through deliberation have widely spread from the
subdisciplines of international relations to the empirical field of policy studies. In the former, Habermas’s ideas have backed and reformulated the constructivist approach to international relations, such as that of Thomas Risse, and even inspired ideas of “cosmopolitan democracy,” as in the work of David Held, while in various approaches to policy research, “deliberation in networks” is today viewed not only as a proper analytical tool but also as a practical device for more effective governance.

This cannot be covered here in detail. Only some questions and fundamental problems related to these adoptions of Habermas’s normative theory can be briefly raised.

Most such problems arise in the process of transforming the “quasi-transcendental” normative theory of discourse and discursive justification of practical and ethical norms into a real model of policy making and democracy. The real political process in pluralistic societies has to take into account not only arguments but also particular interests and even beliefs and emotions that are not rationally grounded. Even the analytical distinction between processes of “arguing” for practical norms and “negotiating” for interests is not complex enough to cover all the legitimate possibilities of expression of individual and collective preferences. The normative requirement of participation in public deliberation—namely, of preference transformation in discourses—can turn into illiberal coercion against individuals and groups, which might deprive them of their privacy.

As far as the future of “democracy beyond the state” (see Michael Greven & Louis Pauly’s 2000 book by that title) is concerned, another problem related to the deliberative conception of democracy becomes even more evident and, indeed, already is on the level of nation-states: Who can and who should participate in deliberative governance networks as they have developed and are proposed on the transnational level? Not every kind of participation in arrangements of “participatory governance” is democratic, because often, the essential normative requirement insisting on the equality of participants is violated by the “participation” of collective actors and all kinds of organizations. The normative principal–agent problem refers to collective actors who also claim to be advocates of public interests.

Confronted with the ongoing and seemingly irreversible process of denationalization and growing interdependence of former state-organized democracies, which both threaten the idea of congruence between a democratic demos and a territorial-based regime of governance, critical theory should perhaps return to its original historical approach and start to think about a future beyond traditional democracy.

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See also Critical Theory in International Relations; Kant, Immanuel; Liberalism; Marxism; Positivism

Further Readings

Critical Theory in International Relations

The development of explicitly critical approaches to the study of international relations (IR)—that is,
critical IR theory—is generally dated to the early 1980s. Today, it can be seen as a pluralistic family of theories, containing both modernist and postmodernist variants, including Frankfurt School–influenced IR theory, Gramscian international political economy, feminist IR theory, postmodern IR theory, and most recently, postcolonial theory.

What these admittedly disparate traditions have in common is a commitment to the enterprise of critique. At its most general level, this can be understood in terms of the distinction, common to the work of many critical IR theorists, between two forms of theorizing—“problem solving” (or “traditional”), on the one hand, and “critical,” on the other. Proponents of critical theory start from the proposition that theory is never neutral but always constructed in response to a specific agenda and in the service of a specific project. Problem-solving and traditional theory—of which mainstream IR theory stands as a prime example—is judged by the proponents of critical theory to be a form of theorizing that stands in the service of the status quo. The knowledge associated with mainstream IR theory is in their view not value free; rather, it is generated to help society’s elites maintain their positions of power and privilege, and, at its most extreme, it is in the service of a totalitarian project on a global scale.

In contrast, critical forms of theorizing are characterized by the following elements.

The first element common to these critical forms of theorizing is methodological opposition to positivism in mainstream IR theory. From the perspective of critical theory, positivism, with its defining characteristics of naturalism, the separation of fact and value, and the separation of the observed and the observer, is more than just an approach to the study of social phenomena. Rather, it contains within it a telos of domination—a telos that derives from positivism’s interest in constituting the world for the purposes of control and from its tendency to reinforce the status quo by treating the socially constructed as given and by representing that which is alterable as something that cannot be changed.

It should be noted that the critique of the highly normative agenda of mainstream IR theory is not an argument about the ideological biases of mainstream theorists and how they inform and distort the social-scientific enterprise. Such biases may well exist, but in the view of critical theorists, it is the knowledge-constituting interests of mainstream IR theory itself, not the values of individual researchers, that give it its conservative politico-normative agenda. Therefore, mainstream researchers cannot overcome their conservative bias by being more vigilant in their research design or by being more self-aware of their biases.

In contrast, critical theory integrates so-called qualitative methodologies aimed at unearthing the way intersubjective meanings are both embedded in and instantiate social practices. The objective here is not to deny the existence of regularities in the social world but rather to determine when such observable regularities are regularities tout court and when they can be understood to be the manifestations of ideologically petrified relationships of domination that could be challenged and overcome.

A second element of critical forms of theorizing is the adoption of a strategy of immanent—as opposed to transcendent—critique. Where the latter applies transhistorical (and therefore, ahistorical) standards to objects or phenomena under examination, immanent critique applies historically emergent standards for the purposes of criticism that are generated by the object/phenomenon itself.

A third element is a shared commitment to promoting self-consciously normative discussions within the discipline. What is distinctive about this activity, moreover, is that in light of the critique of the separation of fact and value noted above, critical theory’s promotion of normative critique is formulated so as not to reproduce the problematic separation of fact and value characteristic of positivism. That is, critical IR theory problematizes the conventional distinction between “normative” and “empirical” theory, noting the inherently normative content of all forms of theorizing, including so-called “empirical” efforts.

A fourth element is the critique of ideology. From the conclusion that neorealism and neoliberalism are two sides of the same mainstream coin, to the critique of the gendered nature of the global political economy (not to mention the theories developed to “explain” it), and to the way dominant academic discourse continues to contribute to the view that the underdeveloped world is a simple casualty of inherent weaknesses and limitations, critical IR theory carries its agenda of ideology critique forward on a number of different levels
and in terms of a range of distinct, but interrelated, foci (class, race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.).

A fifth element is a shared interest in questions of oppositional practice and their potential to contribute to emancipatory change. Here, the focus is on social forces—social movements, old and new (e.g., labor, ecological movements, women’s movements, and human rights)—and the way in which critical theory can help explain the emergence and nature of these movements as well as how critical IR theory can generate knowledge that might prove to be of use to these movements.

As already noted, differences exist between critical IR’s subtraditions. An early tension was one between modernist—enlightenment-inspired forms of theorizing—and postmodernist challengers. The latter’s skepticism about metanarratives in general—including metanarratives framed in terms of the telos of human emancipation—raised fundamental questions both about the viability of modernist variants of critical IR theory and about the political content of postmodernist variants.

Beyond this tension, others have manifested themselves. An early success by mainly postmodernist critical theorists in being given a special issue of the *International Studies Quarterly* was marred by their failure to include even one contribution from a feminist theorist. Wariness on the part of the feminist IR community with regard to “masculinist” theorizing—including critical theorizing—continues (and not without justification). More recently, postcolonial theorists (who include a number of feminists) have suggested that insensitivity to matters of race as well as gender leaves at least some critical IR theory open to the charge that it is not only masculinist but “White supremacist” as well.

In recent years, a number of efforts have been made to assess the impact of the critical theoretical tradition on the discipline as a whole. Some have argued that the critical engagement with positivism and the openness to interpretive methodologies have helped create greater “thinking space” within the mainstream IR theory (see, e.g., the movement within mainstream IR known as constructivism). This judgment gives rise to the following question: Having had a positive influence on mainstream IR theory, does an explicitly oppositional critical theory have any further use in the discipline?

More skeptical critics have expressed doubts about whether the metatheoretical discourse of critical IR theory has done more than waste intellectual energies that might have been better put to use studying the concrete problems of world politics. Some have even gone so far as to charge critical theory with an ideologically motivated “cleansing” agenda, with mainstream approaches such as realism being driven increasingly to the margins of the discipline.

In addition, some who profess to share ongoing sympathies with the critical project nonetheless expressed doubts about its adequacy in terms of practice—specifically, critical IR’s failure to make meaningful links to antisystemic movements—whether as a result of inadequacy at the level of conceptualization or in terms of the origins and prejudices of critical theorists themselves.

Finally, the origins and geographical presence of critical IR theory itself is worth noting. The discipline of IR is overwhelmingly a discipline of the English-speaking world, with the United States being the unquestioned center in which the bulk of IR theory is produced. Significantly, critical IR theory is largely a product of the academic “semiperiphery.” That is, while some critical IR theorists are to be found within the borders of the United States, a disproportionate number are products of and are academically active in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. A sociology of knowledge account of this aspect of critical IR theory remains to be written.

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See also Feminist Theory in International Relations; Hegemony; Positivism; Postcolonialism; Postmodernism in International Relations; Realism in International Relations

Further Readings
Cross-National Surveys

Comparative research has been broadly applied by the social sciences research community for at least 60 years now. Its application in disciplines such as cultural or social anthropology counts among the most important advancements in the contemporary understanding of cultures and societies. In political science, cross-cultural studies have increasingly been based on cross-national surveys. The word survey itself is broad, even if many researchers use it with a “quantitative” meaning: the collection, through a questionnaire survey and on a representative sample, of observations coming from the quantitative coding of the responses chosen by respondents. In the following, the use of the word survey will follow this tradition. This entry discusses the developments in this field and addresses remaining problems.

Evolution of Cross-National Research

The developments of European integration and the interdependences created by globalization have clearly increased the value of comparisons across different national systems and across cultures; we are in the context of what Anthony Heath calls the “globalization of public opinion research.” This is reflected in the greater number of available sociopolitical “barometers.” Following the example of the Eurobarometer since the 1970s, these are now combined in the “Global Barometers” project, including also Afrobarometer, Latinobarómetro, and East Asia Barometer.

Despite these significant recent developments, cross-national survey methodology has a long history. The process started more than 4 decades ago, with Gabriel Almond’s and Sidney Verba’s seminal contribution in The Civic Culture (1963), which was updated and revised in 1980. Previously, a few other cross-national surveys of political attitudes had been developed, notably William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril’s How Nations See Each Other (1953), sponsored by UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). In a recent overview of available cross-national surveys, the German data archive (Zentralarchiv in Cologne) found that from 1948 (fieldwork date for How Nations See Each Other) to 2004, more than 60 projects of cross-national surveys have taken place. Profusion of data rather than a lack of data is, in fact, the case today. But profusion does not necessarily mean availability of “truly” comparative, harmonized, and replicated studies. In the beginning of the 1990s, a European Science Foundation (ESF) paper reported that Europe was rich in social sciences data but poor in harmonized and comparable data. Since that period, much progress has been made (in particular due to the European Social Survey, ESS), but a few important methodological problems comparing surveys remain.

The profusion of available data makes it impossible to present an exhaustive picture of cross-national surveys. It is more fruitful to present some of the major series and the methodological issues that they pose in terms of measurement, comparison, and data analysis. In another recent survey of major comparative studies, Pippa Norris (2009) presents a quasi-exhaustive list of the most relevant ones. She proposes to keep as most relevant the studies “defined as those covering more than one independent nation-state which have established a regular series of surveys of social and political attitudes and behavior” (p. 522). This includes the Eurobarometer and related European Union (EU) surveys (which started in 1970), the European Elections Study (1979), the European Values Survey and the World Values Survey (1981), the International Social Survey Programme (1985), the Global Barometers (from 1990), the Comparative National Elections Project (1990), the European Voter and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, the ESS (2002), the Transatlantic Trends survey (2002), the Pew Global Attitudes project (2002), and the Gallup World Poll (2005). In the following, only a few of these studies can be discussed in greater detail.

The Eurobarometer

Among these, the Eurobarometer is the most important with regard to its time series and its coverage. The Eurobarometers, initiated, developed,
Cross-National Surveys

Cross-National Surveys
and organized by the European Commission, have played a key role in the expansion of political and social attitudinal measurement across Europe. Initiated by Jacques-René Rabier, a high-level civil servant at the European Commission having visionary ideas about the role of citizens in the construction of a legitimate Europe, this series investigates mainly the key question of European citizens’ attitudes toward European integration. The series has been, and continues to be, more than just a public communication tool for the EU Commission. Its findings and data have been extensively used by social scientists in particular in two fields of political sociology: the analysis of attitudes toward EU (integration, enlargement, EU domains of public policies, citizenship and national attachment, trust and knowledge about EU institutions, and support for EU) and the analysis of the postmaterialist “revolution.” This research, initiated by Ronald Inglehart, was clearly linked, at least in the first steps, to Eurobarometer survey items.

Even if academic researchers have many opportunities to use Eurobarometer data, this project has its own agenda and is largely, if not exclusively, directed toward EU matters. Conducted two times a year since 1973, the “regular” Eurobarometer series (the EU Commission also organizes other “special” Eurobarometer studies on focused topics) offers a unique time series to investigate trends in support for the EU. A recent development of the questionnaire concerns the introduction of items related to globalization and the attitudinal connections between perceptions of the EU and perceptions of globalization. The Eurobarometer covers the population of the respective nationalities of each EU member state aged 15 years and older. An interesting point of the series is that it also samples the populations of candidate countries (in 2010, Croatia, Turkey, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; it also samples the Turkish Cypriot Community). With few exceptions (e.g., Luxembourg), the sample sizes of national samples are about 1,000.

European Values Studies

A second well-established cross-national survey series is the European Values Studies (EVS), from which the World Values Study (WVS) developed. Funded by a private foundation (the EVS foundation, based at Tilburg University in the Netherlands), the primary focus of the EVS is on changing moral and social values, with particular emphasis on Christian values and their possible replacement by alternative “values systems” (see Loek Halman, 2001). The EVS series is profoundly marked by this original intellectual project, whose goal is to understand the value changes across Europe, being investigated in specific domains such as family, religion, morality, work, and politics. Some new issues were covered in the last EVS wave, such as environmental concerns. The questionnaire of the EVS series is among the most extensive in contemporary social surveys, and the contribution of the EVS series to comparative political sociology is certainly very important; the quality of the questionnaire and its methodological and substantive integration are of a very high standard. A major difference with the Eurobarometer series is the restriction of the EVS questionnaire to a set of articulated and intellectually integrated research questions and items. The first round of the EVS was conducted in 1981, the second in 1990, the third in 1999/2000, and the last one in 2008/2009. EVS is completely social science driven, managed by Tilburg University, in connection with national academic teams. It is conducted only every 8 to 9 years because political and social values do not change rapidly. In other words, the EVS perspective is on gradual cultural changes rather than on the yearly monitoring of a public opinion barometer. The exclusive academic orientation of the EVS series also makes a big difference compared with the Eurobarometer: A “theory group” and a “methodology group” investigate and monitor closely the production of the questionnaire and the harmonization of fieldwork, translations, and data coding protocols. The last wave of the EVS (2008/2009) has in particular been the object of intensive methodological analysis by these two committees. The EVS is now composed of 46 national representative samples (there were 16 countries in the EVS series in 1981, 23 in 1990, and 33 in 1999). The sampling procedure for EVS is, for each country, a representative (multistage or stratified random probability) sample of the adult population of the country aged 18 years and older. The sample size is about 1,500 respondents per country. Although EVS is rather different
from Eurobarometer, it is similar to it in that it is not a “general social survey.”

**The International Social Survey Programme**

The International Social Survey Programme series (ISSP) is also not a general social survey, but it is academically oriented and managed like the EVS. It is conducted on a yearly basis, which makes it possible to follow a set of indicators over time. From the perspective of a questionnaire design, the particularity of ISSP is the “rotating-modules” component: Every year the questionnaire is devoted to a particular topic (e.g., religion, role of government, and social inequalities). Each module is designed to be repeated at nonregular intervals to allow measures of change over time and between countries. From the population coverage point of view, ISSP has an international perspective with a broad and diverse set of countries: In 2010, 44 countries from all continents participated in ISSP, even if South Africa remained the only African country. The methodological rules of ISSP (the harmonization of sampling designs, questionnaire translation, and modes of interview) are quite strict. ISSP is organized with an annual general assembly that decides key issues, in particular the choice of the rotating modules. The lack of resources for permanent management weakens the strong methodological requirements somewhat, and ISSP is more like a collection of highly integrated and harmonized national studies than a truly pan-international study. Samples are representative samples of the population of the countries aged 18 years and older; no telephone interviews are permitted (but alternatives to face-to-face interviews are possible, e.g., postal surveys); and sample sizes and sampling designs may vary somewhat from country to country.

**The European Social Survey**

The ESS is the most recent cross-national data enterprise and, surely, with EVS, the most advanced one in terms of methodological controls. The ESS found its original motivation in a “blueprint” document coming from a group of experts commissioned by the ESF, following the ESF program “Beliefs in Government.” The ESS has many particularities in funding (it has been funded through the European Commission’s Framework Programmes, the European Science Foundation, and national funding bodies in each country), in organization (the ESS is directed by a Central Coordinating Team, CCT), and in methodological excellence. The ESS can be considered as one of the most integrated and harmonized comparative projects in the social sciences, and in 2005, it has been awarded Europe’s very prestigious annual social science award—the Descartes Prize. Five waves (the fieldwork for the fifth round finished in early 2011) have been completed on random samples of resident populations over the age of 15 in most EU countries as well as in some non-EU member states (e.g., Switzerland and Norway). Depending on the waves, a set of about 30 countries is covered by ESS, which runs every 2 years. The technical specification of the ESS requires that a minimum “effective achieved sample size” should be 1,500 respondents, or 800 in countries with populations of fewer than 2 million.

The ESS represents a very significant step forward in the methodological controls before, during, and after the fieldwork period. The methodological high standards have been a key issue for the ESS from its beginning, and the establishment of a permanent team taking decisions, supporting, and controlling strictly the national teams is an important aspect of this organization. To get the official label of “ESS,” a national team has to strictly follow and implement a methodological and organizational template, which covers sampling (strict random sampling), translation of the questionnaire, fieldwork administration, documenting, and delivering the different data files to the NSD archive in Bergen, Norway. Since the creation of the ESS in 2002, many scholars across the world have used it, and very significant improvements of survey practices and data uses have been made. The CCT is supported by a number of advisory and consultative groups, principal among which is the Scientific Advisory Board under the chairmanship of Max Kaase. The Scientific Advisory Board consists of one representative each from the participating national funding agencies, one from the ESF, and two from the Commission. A small multinational “methods group” advises on other methodological issues. For every round of the ESS, a core set of questions is replicated (achieving in so doing the objective of a regular general social survey), while two “rotating modules” are chosen after an open and international competition between research teams.
Methodological and Substantive Issues

This short and selective overview of cross-national surveys leads to a set of conclusions. Very significant progress has been made on the data quality and on the harmonization of sampling designs, questionnaire translations, equivalence of measures, and data analysis. The problem of functional equivalence persists, however, and using cross-national surveys requires a lot of attention to methodological concerns. The long and sometimes difficult road to the production of truly comparative surveys is certainly not yet at its end, even if the ESS has achieved a high standard of methodological controls. Methodological and substantive issues are closely connected in achieving comparative cross-national data; comparative analysis is (or should be) about testing if apparent commonalities or differences are “true” and to investigate the role of deep (thick) idiosyncrasies (e.g., of history, institutions, and territories) in those findings. Even with the best intentions (as in the studies mentioned above), some methodological problems remain. For example, response rates have some variance across countries, difficulties in translating some items and concepts persist, and controlling for fieldwork specificities is critical. Documenting and reporting about these issues as well as details about interviewers and fieldwork is very important. Knowing the possible sources of errors and misinterpretations in the comparative analysis of cross-national surveys is, indeed, fundamental. The achievements of the different data archives (e.g., Council of European Social Science Data [CESSDA] archives, Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research [ICPSR], or comparative data labs such as European Centre for Analysis in the Social Sciences [ECASS] or Network of Economic and Social Science Infrastructures in Europe [NESSIE]) in this respect are already remarkable but not yet finished. In a digital world, the easy access of users to very diverse collections of data, but those that are sometimes not comparable and not fully documented, creates an even greater need for infrastructures with permanent duties and resources for harmonizing, documenting, archiving, and disseminating data and training the users.

The profusion, diversity, and availability of cross-national surveys also raises a set of new methodological issues. In increasing the N (in both space and time), the availability of new data sets has returned an old question on the agenda of comparativists: the challenging intellectual project defined in 1970 by Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune to replace the proper names of nations (or states or cultures) with the names of variables. Cross-national surveys, in particular when they are conducted in a large number of countries and/or repeated through time on a regular basis, make it possible to think about this variable-oriented approach. If this project is challenged by case-oriented approaches, because cultures, nations, or states are not just “control” variables, the availability of cross-national surveys such as the ESS, EVS, ISSP, or Eurobarometer at least makes it possible to go in that direction. The return of this old question also challenges the statistical techniques used to analyze the data, in particular to test for country effects. Many users still simply juxtapose their results country by country, not really facing the logic of statistical control for country effects, or they just introduce countries as dummy variables in their models. But this is not enough. Recent advancements in statistical techniques make it possible to analyze the data coming from studies such as the ESS, EVS, ISSP, or Eurobarometers with modeling techniques with more sophisticated contextual analysis techniques (e.g., multilevel models, latent class analysis, and multivariate techniques coping with country effects). A new challenge is thus going to be the production of data sets articulating the microdata (respondents) with proper contextual variables not reduced to the macrovariables at the national level. Availability of contextual variables at the subnational level will be an important concern as well as the availability of political contextual variables “closer” to the respondents than the national ones. The impact of institutional designs on political attitudes and behaviors also could benefit greatly from more detailed contextual data.

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See also Attitudes, Political; Beliefs; Election Research; Political Culture; Postmaterialism; Survey Research; Survey Research Modes; Values
Cross-tabular analysis is the statistical technique by which two or more discrete random variables (usually variables that can take only on a finite number of distinct values) are cross-classified to fully characterize their joint distribution and thereby the relations between them. The analysis of the resulting cross-classification of frequencies, or contingency table, is most often carried out to establish relations of (in)dependence between the variables and to gauge the strength of these relations, although several other objectives are equally well served with the use of cross-tabular analysis. This type of statistical analysis is relatively simple to understand, easy to implement, and well suited for a variety of interesting questions. As follows, its major features using a simple example from political science are discussed.

To illustrate the use of cross-tabular analysis, consider the following hypothetical example. A researcher is interested in understanding the cosponsorship decisions of legislators. From a random sample of legislators, she or he has collected data on the number of times legislators cosponsored with members of the parties they ran against in the previous election (i.e., their adversary parties) as well as a dichotomous measure of how electorally vulnerable legislators reported to have felt in the previous election. She or he is interested in knowing (a) whether these two variables are discernibly related and, if they are, (b) how sizable the effects of the relation are.

A two-way (i.e., including two variables), two-by-two (each taking on two distinct values) contingency table reports the results of her or his data collection (Table 1). In this case, variables C (for Column and Cosponsorship) and R (for Row and Reported vulnerability) were laid out in this particular order following the convention of placing the categories of the response variable in the columns and the categories of the explanatory variable in the rows. This is mere convention, and transposing the table would not lead to different conclusions. Three sample distributions can be derived that fully summarize the component variables: (1) the sample joint distribution of R and C, (2) the sample marginal distribution of R (or C), and (3) the sample conditional distribution of R given C (or C given R).

The joint distribution of R and C gives the probability of classifying an observation in a particular cell of the table and can be approximated by calculating the proportion of the data that fall into each cell; this is the sample joint distribution. The marginal distribution of R (or C) is the probability of classifying observations in a particular row (or column) of the table, and once more, it can be approximated by the sample marginal distribution of R (or C), obtained by summing across columns (or rows) and dividing by the total amount of observations. Finally, the conditional distribution of R (or C) comprises the probabilities of classifying an observation in a particular row (or column) given that they have been classified in a particular column (or row), and it can be approximated by dividing the proportion of observations being classified in a particular cell over the overall proportion of observations being classified in the corresponding column (or row), yielding the sample conditional probability of R given C (or C given R).

To answer question (a) from the previous page, the researcher must evaluate the proposition of independence. In the cross-tabular setting, independence means that the probability of classifying
an observation in a particular cell is equal to the product of the (marginal) probability of classifying an observation in the corresponding row and the (marginal) probability of classifying an observation in the corresponding column. The difference between the values expected under independence and the values actually observed becomes the basis for evaluating question (a). More formally, the researcher must calculate
\[
\text{Pearson } X^2 = \sum_{r=1}^{R} \sum_{c=1}^{C} \frac{(n_{rc} - e_{rc})^2}{e_{rc}},
\]
where \( n_{rc} \) is the observed count at cell \( rc \), and \( e_{rc} \) is the expected count at cell \( rc \) under independence (i.e., the product of the marginals). The researcher then compares this test statistic with an \( X^2 \) distribution with \((R - 1)(C - 1)\) degrees of freedom. First, the test of question (a) (i.e., the test of independence) can be carried out by obtaining the test statistic, choosing a significance level for the test \( \alpha \), and then comparing the value of the test statistic with that of the quartile of the \( X^2 \) table for \((R - 1)(C - 1)\) degrees of freedom and the chosen \( \alpha \) level. If the value of the test statistic is higher than the resulting quartile obtained from the table, the researcher rejects the null hypothesis of independence.

This procedure is known as the Pearson \( X^2 \) test. It is, by far, the most widely used test of independence and, for a large number of observations, is equivalent to other tests for cross-tabulated data—namely, the randomization \( X^2 \) and the likelihood ratio \( X^2 \). As a rule of thumb, the expected cell frequencies under the null hypothesis of independence should exceed 5 for all cells for the test to produce reliable results. When cell sparseness is an issue, Fisher’s exact test of independence is recommended instead. Also, if at least one of the component variables is ordinal, more powerful (i.e., more likely to reject a false null hypothesis) tests are available, and therefore, their use is recommended whenever appropriate (e.g., the mean score statistic test).

In the above hypothetical case, the researcher finds a test statistic of 148.1, which was not likely drawn from an \( X^2 \) distribution with \( 1 = (R - 1)(C - 1) \) degrees of freedom. Hence, the evidence supports the idea that these two variables are, in fact, not independent.

Next, the researcher will try to establish how big a substantive effect this dependence entails—question (b). The most commonly used measure of effect magnitude is the odds ratio. Odds are a measure of relative probabilities, which convey how much more likely an outcome is than its alternative. Hence, odds ratios are themselves relative measures of how much more likely an outcome is than its alternative for a given individual than it is for another one, defining individuals as actors with different probabilities assigned to each outcome. These ratios can take any nonnegative value and are usually expected to be different from one—a ratio of one implying no difference in the odds of an event for the two different individuals (or compared groups). Therefore, they can be used to investigate the effects of belonging to different categories of the \( R \) variable on the odds of belonging to a particular category in the \( C \) variable. To calculate odds ratios, the sample joint probability distribution is needed again, and the proportions of observations of the cells are denoted as \( p_{rc} \). In general, the odds ratio in a two-by-two setting is calculated by
\[
\Omega = \frac{p_{11}p_{22}}{p_{12}p_{21}}.
\]

The fact that main and off-diagonal elements are multiplied and divided earned the odds ratio the name “cross-product” ratio, and this is also the reason why the results are impervious to table transposition. In the case of our researcher, the odds of vulnerable legislators sponsoring a bill

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### Table 1  Contingency Table of Cosponsorship Patterns Versus Reported Vulnerability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reported vulnerability</th>
<th>Bills Cosponsored With Adversary</th>
<th>Bills Not Cosponsored With Adversary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reported vulnerability</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not report vulnerability</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Culturalism, which would ground explanations of political phenomena in cultures rather than in notions of structure or agency, is problematic because of the lack of consensus on how to define culture. Moreover, there is little agreement on the added value of culturalism: Whether culture is the main explanatory variable or a residual intervening factor is a cause of enduring debate among scholars. Culturalism may be seen as belonging to the archaeology of politics as do structuralism, functionalism, and behaviorism, once very popular themselves. Alternatively, it could be viewed as living a new life, rejuvenated within the field of “cultural studies,” which is nevertheless little concerned with politics but tries to capture all sorts of discourses and ways of life. Finally, it may be overlapping with emerging paradigms that make an

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See also Categorical Response Data; Logit and Probit Analyses; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian

Further Readings
extensive use of culture without claiming it—such as constructivism and cognitive science.

Discussing culturalism has some virtue. First, it brings to the fore some particular aspects of social and international life that are ignored by “structural” or “rationalist” theories—such as identity issues, which are still divisive everywhere. Second, its anthropological stance enriches overly parsimonious analyses of decision making that rely on a limited set of factors to fit scientific standards, as does “rational choice.” Third, whereas its birth coincides with the demise of functionalism—whose self-proclaimed biological inspiration from the 19th century onward was a source of numerous caveats—culturalism was at its apex when political economy failed to explain change. At the very least, then, it was instrumental in discrediting “organicism” and Marxism. Fourth, although excluded from most comparative research, it recently made a great comeback in international studies, where the topics of conflicts between civilizations and intercultural negotiations have become popular. Therefore, it is now taken for granted that culturalism has some merits to be properly evaluated.

Unfortunately, culturalism itself cannot be easily defined, since culture can be

- what makes a polity distinct (“Culture” with a capital C);
- a set of shared beliefs about causation, norms, and values within a local, domestic, or international community (“culture” in the singular); or
- shorthand for a long list of things that people living in the same country have in common, from lifestyles to sources of national pride, not to forget a common understanding of what alternative policy issues are (“cultures” in the plural).

As for the term culturalism, it suggests

- awareness of the possible contribution of cultural variables to the aggregated explanation of a political phenomenon (“thin” culturalism) or
- privileging cultural factors over more political variables such as social stratification, ideological and partisan cleavages, political attitudes, institutional constraints, and strategic choice (“thick” culturalism).

Because science is deterministic and multicausal, the second and fourth definitions are adopted here. That both lack precision stems from the ontological status of culture: Becoming visible only through transmission from one generation or country to the next (i.e., the “socialization” and “acculturation” processes), it can only be deducted from its impact on receivers.

A Short Genealogy

Until the end of the Cold War, sociologism and functionalism were deeply opposed in methodology as well as with respect to the goals of social science. On the left, sociologists of all creeds predicted the end of capitalism, exploitation, alienation, and imperialism. On the right, functionalists assumed that social change was not as effective as expected: Because basic functions had to be fulfilled at any rate, a “new class” of people coming from a different background would inevitably replace their predecessors. Consequently, there would be no predictable end of history.

Culturalism seemed less divisive than its rivals. It helped explain why some societies were more tolerant than others toward difference, why some were risk taking and others risk averse, why some were stable and others unstable, and why most were lagging behind a minority of the rest in economic development and political liberalization. For instance, “thin” culturalism claimed that Africa and India got a late start in the aftermath of independence not because of colonial rule or corrupted elites but because investment was not a value; “thick” culturalism traced the gap between rich and poor nations in these regions to an alleged incompatibility between religion and profit—an argument turned upside down farther East when an incredibly rapid industrial growth was attributed to “Asian values.”

In spite of numerous caveats, cultural differences do have deep consequences for institutional design and political action. Beliefs have an impact on individual behavior, and the way peoples solve their internal and external conflicts varies among countries. Memories of conflict resolution frame current decisions. Even false beliefs about reality matter: The misperception of Arabs’ capabilities explain the early defeat in 1973 of the overconfident Israelis; the belief that Iraq had weapons of
mass destruction contributed to support for an enduring civil war that Western conceptions of cost–benefit analyses did not anticipate; and the French or Americans may well believe in their “exceptionalism.”

However, if culture reproduced itself fully from one generation to the next, change would be impossible. Deviants, revolutionaries, and reformists of all sorts—those who do not believe in the core values shared by their fellow citizens—make history, and culturalism is little equipped to examine them. Could neo-culturalism address change better than classical culturalism does?

Toward a New Conception of Culturalism

Each time a particular explanation of political and international life loses attractiveness, a new generation of scholars adapt it to the social and global context of their time. Two contenders succeeded behaviorism: political psychology and rational choice. Functionalism (as in European studies); structuralism, realism, and liberalism (as in international relations); or institutionalism (in policy analysis) were rejuvenated with the addition of the word neo to their traditional denomination. Culturalism did not follow suit, and no scholar coined a hyphenated “neo-culturalism” to save it from growing irrelevance. The time has come to argue that rejuvenating culturalism could open new avenues to both “positive” and “meaningful” knowledge. This would also preempt the occupation of available academic space by “constructivism” (when it refers to imagined communities, identity building, etc.) and “cognitivism” (whose learning processes look very similar to “socialization” and “acculturation”).

Neo-culturalism could be shorn of embarrassing claims that mattered much in the demise of classical culturalism: On top of the list is an insistence on “specificity” that did not bring to its predecessor the benefits historians gained from their own use of “historicity.” On the contrary, classical culturalism was deeply affected by critics of its contradictory assumptions that values were either universal or not comparable. Every society is deeply divided and multicultural to some extent: Even the society considered as the most homogeneous in the world, Japan, is composed of several communities of origin and will accommodate more migrants in the future. As evidenced in several comparative surveys, “pride” and “loyalty” are shared less widely across nations than assumed by pollsters. And it is a solid lesson of history that even in the ancient world, “national” cultures never erased local ones despite considerable efforts made by writers and architects to promote the official culture in monuments, poetry, epics, and drama.

Neo-culturalism would also show how diverse were the answers given to the same questions in world history and what these differences actually mean. For instance, public deliberation on policy issues is universally attested in every documented case, but the format of the debate differs from one case to another, and variations matter. The iconography of public deliberation is full of insight about the reasons why a particular configuration was once preferred over other alternatives.

There is also a realm in which neo-culturalism has no rival: tracing individual behavior to interpersonal connections. This would apply first to the records of reciprocity and solidarity obligations and the rights and duties assigned to each actor according to his or her place in a vast system of interactions. It would also show that lineages are at the heart of such networks, be they family links, kinship ties, or relationships with neighbors. After all, the unexpected success of “social capital” stems from its ability to focus on networks of interactions among people.

It may even happen that cultural differences account for variations in social organization, institutional design, and policy making. The most striking example is the preference for endogamy: In Arabic-speaking countries, marrying a first cousin is an ideal, as was the case several millennia ago in the Middle East. Being incompatible with political alliances, it is not conducive to state formation, whereas exogamic marriage prevents military feuds, enlarges property, and makes “foreign” rule acceptable. On the contrary, breaking with blood ties as in the Japanese adoption system through which promising young adults could change family names (yōshi) is conducive to peace and prosperity.

Finally, neo-culturalism has much to say about languages as frames of perception of the real world. It casts new light on the meaning of institutions that are usually taken as essentially uncontested. For instance, states (in the languages derived from Latin or borrowing from it) are presumably
“established,” whereas *dawla* (in Semitic languages) experience revolutionary cycles. The *koku/goku* conflation of nation and country in Northeastern Asia differs from the Western practice of hyphenating states and nations and is quite telling about the autochthonous versus nonautochthonous conceptions of loyalty. In the same vein, symbolic distinctions, for instance, commemorations and official narratives, were made possible because people forgot the cleavages and hard disputes that gave birth to them, their role being to celebrate a current union carved out of historical divisions.

**The Added Value of Culturalism in Political Science**

Cultural variables are useful when every other factor fails to give satisfying explanations for a phenomenon. Therefore, its minimum contribution to science lies in its capacity to mobilize residual factors that may have been neglected by other paradigms.

However, neo-culturalism also underscores the role of kinship, heredity, and clienteles in politics. It brings to the fore ethnicity and identity issues without being prejudiced against demands for recognition that may appear to be too far-fetched in normative theory. It certainly says much more about worldviews as conveyed by language and their impact on domestic and international politics.

It is difficult to forecast the future of neo-culturalism in political science. Whereas there is little chance that it will ever benefit from the kind of appeal that boosted classical culturalism in the 1960s and early 1970s, it may engender explanations complementary to more structural and rational theories. Moreover, this paradigm may survive in other guises, such as constructivism (with its insistence on identity and recognition issues) and cognitivism (with its promises to better understand how ideas, inherited attitudes, core principles, and causal beliefs influence perceptions of current issues and solutions to collective problems).

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See also Civic Culture; Discourse Analysis; Ideology; Political Culture; Social Capital; Values

**Further Readings**

Data, Archival

Although any data that are safely stored and retrievable can be described as archived or archival, here the term applies only to the records of people or organizations that are created for their own use, whether or not they have been collected or manipulated by a researcher. Sometimes the records are numerical. Then, if the data are judged sufficiently accurate, complete, and relevant, they can be compiled and analyzed statistically. The material is more often plain text (or sometimes images) originally created to meet contemporary personal or organizational requirements. This entry discusses challenges in obtaining access to materials, some methodological questions, the impact of digitization of information, and frontiers in archival research.

Access to Materials

Because modern governments and most nongovernmental organizations usually produce a written record of their activity, the variety of archival data and the purposes for which researchers use such data are too numerous to count. Probably the most common objective in academic research on politics has been to analyze high-level government decisions, especially foreign policy decisions. Archived records are often the most important sources of information about these decisions, and sometimes the only one. Even though attempts to perform process tracing on policy decisions can also use interviews or oral histories, analyses of open governmental and nongovernmental sources, statistical analyses of observable actions, and findings from other published research, access to even a small portion of the internal records often provides information not available by other means, and the opening of formerly secret records often leads to significant changes in how decisions are understood.

Researchers who use archival data generally do not regard them as offering an unbiased and complete account of events. Most governments do not operate under laws that establish a presumption of public access to government records. They almost always restrict access to much of their records, especially when they have been recently created, relate to foreign policy, or are politically sensitive for some reason. Although in some countries the law provides that citizens have certain legal rights to government information and can request the release of restricted material, governments can implement these laws in ways that partially nullify their effect by allowing long delays, imposing large fees for search and document production, constraining search requests as narrowly as possible, and sometimes simply ignoring their legal obligations. Although determined petitioners with the requisite money, time, or political influence can sometimes overturn these restrictions, they can frustrate some researchers and discourage others. Even when they make available a large portion of their records on a subject, governments often hold back material when its release is deemed to have significant negative political consequences. Governments also
Data, Archival

destroy a substantial share of the documents they create, and they often redact portions of documents that they release to the public. They might alter their policies on the release of restricted material in response to current political events, in some cases actually reimposing restrictions on material that formerly had been available (this has happened in both the United States and the Russian Federation).

Governments can facilitate or hinder the use of archival material by how they manage their records. Even when documents have been deposited in an archive, they must usually be sorted, catalogued, and listed in a finding aid, checked against mandated restrictions on their full or partial release, and stored in suitable containers. Funding levels and legal or donors’ restrictions can greatly affect the rate at which processing can proceed, and fees for photocopying or retrieving material will constrain those without the necessary funding. Archives typically hold large inventories of unprocessed materials; how much value this material has to researchers depends not only on how rapidly it is processed but also on how archivists use any discretion that they might possess to alert researchers to unprocessed material that might be relevant to their research interests. In the United States, the delays in governments’ response to many requests for declassification are a significant hindrance to the research for books, articles, theses, and dissertations that rely on such material, as researchers often face deadlines that might be impossible to meet if important material has not been promptly declassified.

Methodological Questions

Very little has been written about the methodology of archival research. A pioneering effort is Marc Trachtenberg’s The Craft of International History, which discusses search strategies, evaluations of document quality and significance, and how multiple sources can be used to cross-check document contents and researchers’ conclusions.

In a country such as the United States, the massive holdings of the National Archives (as of 2003: 2.8 million cubic feet of paper text and 4.7 billion electronic records) require that researchers who intend to investigate this material possess some framework or theory that guides their search. Relying on material used by previous research or presented in government publications as a starting point is common. If one views archival records as documenting the flow of information within a single social network, the choice of starting point might not seem crucial; in principle, all one needs to do is to follow the documentary trail as it takes the researcher first to one decision maker, then to others, until the full network is covered. As a practical matter, several factors often make tracing the information flows quite difficult and comprehensive coverage unlikely. The organization of material is often dependent on the personal practices of specific officials, agencies, or presidential administrations, and learning where to search is not always quick or easy. Especially sensitive information might never be written down. Even when it is, it might be stated in a blind memo or worded such that is very difficult to understand without very good knowledge of the historical context. It is sometimes difficult to know whether an official has actually read a document—as opposed to him merely being on the distribution list. Finally, the time and resources available generally are insufficient to examine all material, so some sampling procedure is usually followed, even if only implicitly.

The interaction of the sampling method with the decision to begin with the material used in previous research involves some risk. For example, in studying diplomatic history, a presupposition and a consequence of archival research that follows such a strategy is that the information collected will say relatively little about officials’ interaction with private persons. Government publications of archival material ordinarily include very few items that were not created by government officials. Although archives often contain correspondence files that contain letters from private persons and less often records of office appointments, telephone calls, or other interactions with nongovernmental contacts, it might require a fair amount of contextual knowledge to appreciate which contacts are significant and which are not. The impression that such interactions have little impact is further strengthened by a widely followed practice of writers of governmental documents, who typically justify and explain policies in terms of plausible “public interest” claims. This strategy is sensible because such justifications by definition will have a wide appeal, and because considerations of narrow political
advantage are often viewed as illegitimate motivations for government policy. While scholarship that emphasizes the role of interpretation in the reading and writing of texts has become one of the main intellectual currents within the social sciences over the past quarter century, its concern with “authorial positioning” and interpretation as a choice rather than a reflex seems to have been focused more often on those who read and write about the documents than on those who create them.

Source evaluation and interpretation is also a challenge that can typically be met only with a good understanding of the context within which material was created. Before investigating an archive, one usually has acquired some background knowledge from previous research. At a minimum, this provides a list of the most visible participants in the formal decision-making process, their most visible concerns, and some conception of the flow of events. Information about informal mechanisms and more sensitive (and thus more private) concerns and information is valuable in opening a path to understanding the less obvious factors bearing on a decision. As Trachtenberg explains, prior understandings held at the outset of archival research are generally reshaped by the encounter with new material. This creates a dynamic process in which interpretation of new material triggers changes in the interpretation of material previously collected, which then alter search patterns or the interpretation of additional new material. As the amount of potentially relevant material is often vast and cannot be interpreted by any one individual, this process is a social rather than merely a personal activity.

Impact of Digitization of Information

The widespread computerization of records and the shift to electronic communications such as e-mail and texting has had complex effects on archival research. Making document images or files available on the Internet makes them much more accessible, but only a very small proportion of government and nongovernment records are available this way. Having finding aids and catalogues available online is a significant advance, making it possible to learn in detail about archival collections without needing to visit. If documents were originally created in electronic form, archival storage of the documents is facilitated, provided durable and stable storage media are used. If text is machine readable, then it is much easier to search it systematically, analyze it with text analysis software, and excerpt it for teaching or publication purposes. However, whether governments will decide that e-mails, texts, and other electronic communications are as “real” as paper documents, and devote substantial effort to preserving them, is difficult to predict.

Archival Research

Trachtenberg is the first scholar to present systematic “declassification analysis,” which inspects streams of declassified material on a topic over an extended period to infer the basis for declassification decisions from the characteristics of what was released and withheld at various times. This practice also illuminates what material a government believed to be especially sensitive, though that understanding is, of course, heavily context dependent.

Text analysis software is now beginning to be used in archival research. Even ordinary word processors can facilitate analysis by searching text databases for strings of text. Specialized software provides for more complex search strategies (such as Boolean searches), attaching annotative tags to text, and relatively easy and rapid recombining of document excerpts.

Government information policy is a topic that has received little scholarly attention in political science. In view of its pervasive effect on how citizens and researchers understand government, it is a topic that should receive significantly more attention.

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See also Data, Textual; Discourse Analysis; Process Tracing; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions

Further Readings
Data, Missing

Missing data problems arise frequently in social science applications. Household survey respondents may fail to provide responses to questions for reasons of refusal, fatigue, enumerator error or perhaps a split sample design is used, in which case the missingness is an intentional strategy to conserve resources. Personal income is often missing in surveys due to respondents’ refusal to reveal what they earn. Cross-national data on macroeconomic conditions may fail to include entries for some countries in some years due to crises, lack of capacity to generate data regularly, or ex post realization that past reporting methods were flawed. Measures of national income inequality are often missing for some countries in some years in cross-national data because their calculation requires an income survey; such surveys are too expensive for some countries to implement every year. In the household survey example, the analyst must decide whether and how to use data from respondents who refused to state their income. In the cross-national example, the same issue arises for country-years for which the inequality measure is missing. These are instances of what analysts may label as “item missingness.” This is the focus of this entry.

The “items” are the individual survey questions or bits of information. The idea is that for each household or country, analysts have information on some items but not for others. This is to be distinguished from “unit missingness,” where “units” refer to units of observation—the households or country-years in the examples above.

That is, unit nonresponse refers to the situation in which data collection failed to accumulate any data for some units, for example, some households were unreachable or refused to participate altogether, or some country-years contained no usable data on any variables. Fixes for unit nonresponse in surveys include ex post weighting (via post-stratification) to externally available population information, such as a census. For cross-national data, the analyst typically has no way to adjust for unit missingness, and so he or she is required to state that the results hold only for the subpopulation for which data are available.

Listwise Deletion

By far the most common approach to missing data in political science has been to simply drop incomplete cases, something known as “listwise deletion” in the methodological literature. This is tantamount to taking cases of item missingness to be instances of unit missingness. In special circumstances, ignoring cases exhibiting item or unit missingness is a perfectly reasonable thing to do. For a unit $i$, consider an outcome variable—call it $y_i$—and a set of predictor variables recorded for the unit—call them $x_i$, collectively. Suppose that the distribution of $y_i$ depends on $x_i$ in a manner characterized by a probability density function $f(.)$. In that case, the analyst can write the probability density of $y_i$ given $x_i$ as $f(y_i|x_i)$. An example would be a linear structural model of the form $y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \epsilon_i$ with $\epsilon_i \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$. In this case, $x_i = (x_{i1}, x_{i2})$, and

$$f(y_i|x_i) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} \exp\left(-\frac{(y_i - \beta_0 - \beta_1 x_{i1} - \beta_2 x_{i2})^2}{2\sigma^2}\right).$$

The goal of data analysis in such a circumstance is to estimate the parameters that characterize $f(y_i|x_i)$—here, the $\beta$ coefficients and the variance, $\sigma^2$, of the error term, $\epsilon_i$. Listwise deletion allows the analyst to do so without bias as long as two conditions hold: (1) the analyst has correctly specified the functional form of $f(y_i|x_i)$, and (2) the probability that an item for $i$ is missing systematically depends only on the elements of $x_i$ that are always observed for all units.
This is an important result, but one should understand that Conditions 1 and 2 are never exactly true in social science data analysis. In social science, analysts work with approximations (e.g., regressions with linear or maybe quadratic terms) of the complex and unknown functional forms that govern the relationships in their data. This violates Condition 1. The result for unbiasedness does not hold for estimating parameters in an approximation model. Missingness may depend on the value of \( y \), or the value of the missing item itself (if other than \( y \)), violating Condition 2. Therefore, using listwise deletion requires a leap of faith: Analysts assume that the inevitable bias is small and thus of little importance. This may or may not be true.

Even when bias is not a major concern, listwise deletion can be highly inefficient. It can cause analysts to discard lots of information that could improve the certainty of their inferences about parameters of interest. To see this, suppose that an analyst has a data set with five variables that are needed for the analysis. Suppose each variable has a 5% chance of being missing. The analyst expects to have recorded information 95% of the time for each variable, but listwise deletion implies that about \((1 - .95^5) \times 100\% = 23\%\) of the observations will be discarded. This is a sizeable amount of data to discard, making inferences considerably less precise. The analyst would be throwing away many cases with only one missing item, which is wasteful. There are better ways to proceed.

**Multiple Imputation**

This entry does not discuss what is known as “selection bias,” where missingness occurs only on an outcome variable that cannot be observed or where missingness is a result of actions of actors that should be modeled. Such missingness occurs, for example, when analysts do not observe the votes of those who abstain or the outcomes of wars that states decide not to engage in. The remainder of this entry is concerned with cases of missing data for items that are either designated as “predictor” variables in a regression analysis, can sometimes serve as predictors and sometimes as outcomes, or will be used for descriptive analysis (e.g., to estimate a population mean). The presentation is based on Rod Little and Donald Rubin’s seminal book *Statistical Analysis With Missing Data*, first published in 1987.

Imputation would seem to offer a solution. Imputation refers to “filling in” (i.e., “imputing”) missing items with reasonable estimates of what those items should be. Simple imputation methods include selecting item values from similar units (what is called “hot deck” imputation), imputing the mean or median value, or using a regression to predict a conditional mean. Census bureaus and other statistical agencies employed such simple methods until recently. As Little and Rubin have helped clarify, such simple imputation methods can create problems. First, they distort covariance relationship between variables in a data set, introducing bias into subsequent analysis. Second, imputing a single item and then treating it as the “true” item value for that unit ignores one’s uncertainty about whether or not the imputed item value is correct.

For these reasons, methodologists have developed “multiple imputation” as a statistically sound way to address item missingness in a principled manner. This method takes care to preserve the overall covariance structure of the data set by, essentially, adding the right kind of noise to the imputations. Uncertainty about the imputed items is propagated by generating multiple data sets in which missing items are imputed. The substantive statistical analysis is then conducted on each of these data sets, and the results are averaged. Standard error estimates incorporate both within-sample variability and the variability across the imputed data sets. The method and accompanying theory were developed in Rubin’s 1987 work, *Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys*.

Multiple imputation requires that either missingness is completely random or variables exhibiting missingness can be modeled well using other variables in the data set. This is an instance of what statisticians refer to as “ignorability.” This is not true when the missingness pattern in a variable, \( y \), depends on the values of \( y \) itself in such a manner that other variables in the data set are of limited use in modeling this pattern. The latter case is called “nonignorable” missingness
and can be corrected only by making non-innocuous assumptions about how the missing data behave.

Many multiple imputation algorithms have been incorporated into commonly used statistical software packages. The two most common types of algorithms are those that use (1) a multivariate model of the entire data set or (2) a series of regressions. An example of the first type is the Amelia algorithm, first introduced by Gary King, James Honaker, Anne Joseph, and Kenneth Scheve. Their article, “Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data,” may be credited with doing the most to make political scientists think about using multiple imputation rather than listwise deletion. Amelia models the entire data set with a multivariate normal model. It uses a novel iterative approach to estimate all of the mean and covariance parameters for the model and fills in the missing data with random draws from the model. Regression-based algorithms are based on the following idea: For a variable, $y$, exhibiting missingness, a regression model using the other variables in the data set is specified. Then, the parameters of the regression model are estimated, including, importantly, the variance of the random errors and terms characterizing uncertainty about the parameters of the model. Then, missing values on $y$ are filled in with random draws based on the fitted model and incorporating all sources of random variability in the model and the parameter estimates. Because the regression model will generally include predictors that themselves exhibit missingness, an iterative sampling algorithm is used to fit the models. Regression-based algorithms may alternatively use “predictive-mean matching,” which allows the analyst to avoid having to model the data directly. Predictive-mean matching uses linear approximations to match units that exhibit missingness to “donor” units that do not exhibit missingness. Missing values are filled in with the values from the donors.

Other alternatives exist in principle for resolving problems of item missingness. These include maximum likelihood or Bayesian methods that skip the imputation process and directly adjust the substantive analysis by taking missingness patterns into account. Such approaches are rarely used in practice, however, because they require significant application-specific statistical programming. Such methods have not been shown to perform any better than multiple imputation, although, as mentioned, the number of attempts are few.

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See also Regression; Selection Bias

Further Readings


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**DATA, SPATIAL**

Data of interest to a political scientist often refer to attributes of units—for example, individuals or nation-states—that have a spatial location. Although analysts typically disregard geographical position and spatial configuration and treat their data as collections of independent units, there are many reasons why it may be essential to consider the spatial ordering of the data. In particular, attention to the spatial dimension can help generate new insights and may be essential for drawing correct inferences about the influence of other features in statistical analyses, even when spatial patterns are not the researcher’s primary concern. In the following, the impact of spatial relations and their use in regression analyses are discussed.

**Spatial Relations**

One way to appreciate the importance of spatial patterns in data is to consider the analogy to time-series data. Researchers are increasingly sensitive to how individual data points collected over time often will not be independent of one another, as many social and political processes display clear
trends and persistence over time. To use a concrete example, consider how people’s evaluations of an incumbent government typically change slowly over time. Data on approval taken at two points that are close in time are thus likely to display similar values or serial correlation. It would be misleading to consider the individual observations a random sample, and analysts will need to take into account their temporal ordering if they want to examine how other features such as economic performance may influence changes in approval. If economic performance is believed to influence approval and such data also display a trend over time, then analysts risk making spurious inferences if they do not take into account the possibility of serial correlation.

Social science researchers have been much less attuned to the possibility that data collected for units at the same point in time may not be independent of one another across space. Francis Galton pointed out in an early influential comment on an article comparing marital institutions across societies that the observed outcomes could result from diffusion between societies rather than independent processes operating in isolation in each unit. Stated differently, common marital institutions may not reflect a functional relationship to certain shared social characteristics, as implied by the author of the article Galton commented on, but could stem from a diffusion process in which societies may be likely to adopt the institutions found in other societies that they interact with. Distinguishing between the results of independent outcomes within each unit and diffusion may be difficult, hence the term Galton’s problem. For example, societies that interact more with one another may be similar in other respects, such as in economic or other social structures. Analyzing the observations as independent units and looking for functional relationships between social characteristics and marital institutions would run the risk of making unwarranted inferences about causal relationships from social characteristics to marital institutions, unless the possibility of diffusion or spatial dependence among units is taken into account.

There are many reasons to suspect that political and social phenomena often reflect diffusion or spatial dependence, in the sense that observations that are “near” or “connected” in some manner tend to have similar values. For example, individual attitudes may not just reflect an individual’s own characteristics but could also be influenced by the people that this person interacts with. As such, two individuals who are connected by common ties may have similar attitudes, even if they at a first glance would seem very different on other social characteristics. Likewise, policies and institutions may be influenced by the policies and institutions adopted by other states. For example, the prospects for democratic reform in autocracies may be influenced not just by domestic events and characteristics but also by international ties and events in other states. Likewise, certain policies such as smoking bans have evolved from being perceived as an extreme form of legislation to become a mainstream policy adopted by many states with very different characteristics. Beth Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett provide a typology of different diffusion mechanisms for policies and institutions, distinguishing between coercion, competition, learning, and emulation. Attention to spatial dependence can be very helpful in learning new insights or developing new hypotheses about the phenomenon of interest. However, it is unlikely that a single theory of diffusion or spatial dependence will be generally applicable, and such theorizing is probably best done on a case-specific basis.

More generally, there is spatial clustering or dependence if the values of a response variable for two units that are linked or connected tend to be similar, so that positive/negative deviations from the sample average for one unit are likely to go together with similar deviations from the average for the other unit. The map of autocracies, anocracies, or democracies in 2004, as classified by the Polity data (Figure 1), provides an example of spatial dependence, in the sense that democracies are much more likely to have democratic neighbors and autocracies are much more likely to be surrounded by other autocracies.

The consequences of spatial dependence for statistical analysis are similar to the consequences of serial correlation over time. Although spatial correlations in principle could be both positive or negative, nontrivial spatial correlations in the social sciences tend to be positive, and this section focuses on this case (although one could imagine negative correlation arising, e.g., through free-riding behavior, where higher spending by
one unit makes other connected units likely to spend less). In a linear regression setting, the coefficient estimates are no longer efficient estimates of the true parameters if one ignores spatial dependence and could be substantially off the correct values. Moreover, the standard errors assuming independence are incorrect and generally too small in the presence of positive spatial correlation. A helpful, intuitive way to understand why standard errors are likely to be too small in the presence of spatial correlation is to consider its impact on effective sample size. When observations are serially correlated, either in time or in space, so that close observations are similar to one another, the sample does not contain as much independent information as would be suggested by the apparent sample size \( N \). The normal standard error estimate ignores the correlation between nearby observations and will thus understate the true variance.

To detect whether data display spatial clustering first requires the specification of what is meant by “space.” In general, the structure of spatial dependence must be prespecified by the analyst, and it is only possible to test for a specific form of spatial dependence. Whereas time has an inherent ordering and data are usually collected at intervals that suggest likely temporal dependence structures, space is multidimensional and there may be many possible forms of dependence between observations. Since much interaction tends to be geographically determined so that units that are close to one another tend to interact more, geographical distance is often considered. However, one can imagine forms of dependence other than geographical distance being important. For example, observed indicators of interactions such as trade could be used to specify likely patterns of dependence, or one could consider links between units that are similar on some other criterion, such as a shared language.

**Regression Analysis**

Given some criteria for potential spatial dependence, the analyst can represent the potential structure of dependence as a graph, specifying how units are connected to one another, or as a connectivity matrix \( W \), where the value of an entry \( w_{ij} \) indicates whether (and to what extent) one unit \( i \) is linked or connected to another unit \( j \). Connectivity matrices can represent a very wide range of possible dependence structures. The connectivity matrix may be based on a single threshold, where two units \( i \) and \( j \) are considered connected, and their corresponding entries \( w_{ij} \) acquire nonzero values if they meet this threshold. Alternatively, the connections could be weighted—in the sense that units are “more” connected the closer two units are on some criterion—for example, with values based on inverse decay of the distance between units. A connectivity matrix
could be symmetric, to reflect a reciprocal relationship, where a link from \( i \) to \( j \) goes together with a link from \( j \) to \( i \); or it could be directed in an asymmetric manner, so that the fact that \( i \) influences \( j \) does not necessarily imply that there is a reverse link from \( j \) to \( i \).

A variable \( y \) displays spatial correlation to the extent that the value of \( y \) for one individual unit \( i \) is similar to the values of \( y \) for proximate or connected observations \( j \). Since a single unit usually has many connected units, one must take into account the degree of similarity across the connected observations to assess the overall spatial correlation. For many purposes, it is useful to row-normalize the connectivity matrix so that all the connectivities for a single unit sum to 1. This is often referred to as a standardized spatial weights matrix \( W \) in the spatial econometrics literature. This allows one to generate a “spatial lag” of a variable \( y \) by postmultiplying it with the weights matrix \( W \)—that is, \( Wy \). The individual elements of the resulting vector for an observation \( i \) can be interpreted as the average of \( y \) among neighbors or the other observations \( j \) that are connected to \( i \) following the specification of the connectivity matrix \( W \). A variable displays positive spatial correlation if the values of \( y \) for one unit \( i \), \( y_i \), are similar to the values for its connected observations given by row \( i \) of the connectivity matrix—that is, \( w_i y \).

One useful summary measure for spatial correlation of a variable \( y \) is Moran’s \( I \) correlation coefficient. This is based on comparing the deviations from the mean of \( y \) for a unit \( i \) with the deviations from those of its neighbors—that is,

\[
I = \frac{N \sum \sum_{i \neq j} w_{ij} (y_i - \bar{y}) (y_j - \bar{y})}{(\sum \sum_{i \neq j} w_{ij}) (\bar{y} - \bar{y})^2}.
\]

A standard error can be approximated for Moran’s \( I \), based on sampling assumptions, which in turn allows testing whether the spatial clustering is significant or deviates from what would be expected if there were no spatial pattern. Moran’s \( I \) can be given a useful graphical interpretation. Figure 2 shows a plot of a variable (in this case the Polity democracy scale in 2004) on the horizontal axis, standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, against its spatial lag on the vertical axis (here based on taking countries within 500 kilometers of the outer boundaries of a state as connected to one another). Drawing vertical and horizontal lines through the origin (0, 0) divides the figure into four quadrants, where the values of the individual observations variable are either below or above the mean on the input variable and its spatial lag. If there is positive spatial correlation, one would expect to see positive deviations from the mean on the input variable for one unit to systematically go together with positive deviations from the mean for its neighbors or the spatial lag. There should be relatively few observations far from the dashed lines of the averages in the upper left (I) and lower right (IV) quadrants, where the sign of the two deviations diverge, and the bulk of the individual observations should be in Quadrants II and III, where positive and negative deviations go together for both variables. Although some cases fall inside the boundaries of Quadrants I and IV in Figure 2, the bulk of the observations are clearly in Quadrants II and III, reflecting how most countries tend to have levels of democracy similar to the weighted average of the levels found among their neighbors. Moran’s \( I \) is the slope of the regression of the spatial lag on the standardized input variable. This
Data, Spatial

is indicated in Figure 2 as a gray dashed line, and one can see that the slope of the regression line clearly is positive. In contrast, if there is no spatial correlation, one would not see any tendency for the deviations to have similar signs, and the slope of the regression line would be close to 0. Moran’s I statistic can be used to detect both spatial clustering in an input variable and spatial correlation in the residuals from a regression, and this is implemented in common software options (see Figure 2).

When theory or preliminary analysis suggests spatial dependence, researchers may wish to try to integrate the spatial component in a regression model. The appropriate model specification depends on specific theoretical arguments or the likely causes of spatial dependence as well as on whether the dependent variable is continuous or categorical. Model estimators for spatial regression models with continuous dependent variables are relatively well established, and this section focuses only on this case. Models where the dependent variable is categorical, such as binary responses or counts, are considerably more complex, but various estimation approaches relying on simulation or data augmentation have been proposed.

As in the case of time series, one might approach spatial dependence either as a nuisance to estimation that must be taken into account when considering other phenomena of interest or as a phenomenon of interest in its own right. In the former case, researchers may find it helpful to consider a regression model where the errors display a spatially correlated structure. This can be written as $y = X\beta + \lambda W \zeta + \varepsilon$, where $X\beta$ denotes the systematic component of the model, $W \zeta$ indicates a spatially correlated error structure as specified by the connectivity matrix $W$, and $\varepsilon$ is a residual random error. The parameter $\lambda$ reflects the extent to which errors are spatially clustered. If $\lambda = 0$, then the model reduces to a standard linear regression, where the observations are independent of one another. If $\lambda \neq 0$, there is a spatially clustered pattern, where a linear regression treating the observations as independent of one another may give misleading results. This approach may be appropriate if a researcher believes that there is likely to be spatial dependence arising from some spatially clustered omitted variable. If the model is correct, the consequences of spatial dependence for inference can be addressed by letting the errors of the model be spatially clustered, so that the sign and size of errors for individual observation covary spatially. This can be seen as analogous to time-series–correlated error models, in the sense that observations are interdependent only due to omitted variables that are spatially correlated. Once removed from the systematic component to the error, space no longer matters.

One interesting alternative model of spatial dependence from a substantive perspective is the so-called spatially lagged dependent variable, which can be written as $y = \rho Wy + X\beta + \varepsilon$. The dependent variable for connected units itself is here specified as having a direct impact on the value of the dependent variable for unit $i$ and appears on the right-hand side of the model. The parameter $\rho$ indicates the extent to which the value of the dependent variable $y$ for a unit $i$ is influenced by the values of $y$ of its neighbors $j$. This can be seen as a spatial analogy to a time-series model with a temporally lagged dependent variable. The spatially lagged dependent variable model is straightforward to estimate as a standard linear regression if the spatial impact operates with a time lag, so that the values of $y$ for the connected units affecting $i$ can be taken as predetermined at time $t$. However, if the spatial impact is considered to be contemporaneous, or within the same period, there is a problem of simultaneity, since $y$ at time $t$ appears on both the left- and the right-hand side of the equation and the individual values are jointly determined. The model must be estimated via either instrumental variables or a maximum likelihood estimator, which is now implemented in many common software options. Standard significance tests can be used to test whether the spatial lag has a significant impact on the response variable, and the model with the spatially lagged dependent variable can be compared with a model assuming independent observations using standard comparisons and tests of nested models.

The interpretation of a model with a spatially lagged dependent variable differs notably from that of a model where the units are considered to be independent. In the latter, the coefficient estimates $\beta$ for a right-hand-side independent variable $x$ can be interpreted as the expected change on the dependent variable $y$ following a one unit change
Data, Textual

Textual data refer to systematically collected material consisting of written, printed, or electronically published words, typically either purposefully written or transcribed from speech. Text collected for use as data typically reflects a conscious research purpose, motivated by a design aimed at yielding insight on some feature of the social or political world. This entry outlines the purpose, issues, and challenges involved in selecting, preparing, and analyzing textual data.

The process of textual data analysis follows several main steps. First, a text and its author are identified that will directly inform the research question at hand, for instance, legislative speeches if one is interested in lawmakers’ policy agenda. Second, this text must be processed, typically involving numerous decisions about how to convert, store, edit, and combine texts. Next, the processed text is analyzed, a step that may take any of a wide variety of forms. Humans may read the text to classify it, possibly after dividing texts into smaller units; computerized tools may analyze the text to count frequencies of preidentified words or phrases; statistical methods may be applied to specific words, word patterns, or sentences to construct scales, clusters, or to identify other patterns. Finally, the results of the analysis are summarized, interpreted, and reported to inform the research question that motivated the analysis of the textual data.

Further Readings


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See also Aggregate Data Analysis; Comparative Methods; Maximum Likelihood; Network Analysis; Regression; Sampling, Random and Nonrandom; Statistics: Overview; Variables, Instrumental
The steps in this process are not dissimilar to those found in any empirical research design, but the systematic use of textual data may present special challenges in the stages related to identifying the data to be collected and preparing the data for analysis. In the modern era of near-ubiquitous electronic textual content, this problem stems not from a lack of availability of textual data or tools for working with them but, rather, from the opposite: The staggering quantity and variety of textual data create real challenges in selecting which texts to analyze. Furthermore, the technical challenges of working with different formats for recording electronic texts, as well as converting these into formats or “data sets” that suit the purpose of analysis, are often far from trivial. Despite such challenges, however, textual data remain one of the most promising and one of the least explored sources of systematic information about the political and social world.

The Appeal of Textual Data

Textual data in the political and social sciences have several principal advantages. The first can be found in the nature of text and the information it may contain about the authors or speakers generating that text. If the task at hand is to gauge overt messages or signals conveyed through text, of course, then no better source of information exists than the texts themselves. For instance, in 1951, in a well-known study of articles by other Politburo members about Stalin on the occasion of his 70th birthday, Nathan Leites, Else Bernaut, and Raymond Garthoff were able to discern differences in groups with regard to communist ideology. In this instance, the messages signaled not only an underlying orientation but also a degree of political maneuvering with regard to a leadership struggle following the foreseeable event of Stalin’s death. The messages are themselves significant, and these could only be gleaned from the public articles authored by each Politburo member, written in the full knowledge that they would be reprinted in the party and general Soviet press. Similar content is present in the overt messages from advertising—although such analyses frequently focus on nontextual content as well—as well as in political speeches and political advertising. The principal advantage of textual data is that what political actors write or say may be a significant political signal or act, a form of purposive political act best judged using the textual data as the best manifestation of the act itself.

A second notable advantage of textual data for political analysis lies in the possibly unique capacity of text to inform us about the qualities of political and social actors that are unobservable through direct means. The most frequently analyzed quantities of this type in political science are political “ideal points” referring to an actor’s preference on left–right policy scales, such as a relative preference for socially and morally liberal policies versus conservative ones. Other preferences could include being relatively for or against a specific policy, such as the repeal of the Corn Laws in Britain in 1846; being for or against further European integration during the debate over the Laeken Convention; or being for or against a no confidence motion. The preferences are inner states of political actors, whether these are legislators, parties, delegates, or candidates, and hence cannot be directly observed. The most common alternative approach not based on texts is to infer preferences from observed voting patterns. Yet it has been widely shown that voting is a highly strategic political act, subject in particular to strict party discipline in most contexts, and therefore reflects preferences strategically rather than sincerely. Texts and speeches, by contrast, are less subject to political monitoring and punishment than voting, since their content in democratic systems tends to be relatively unregulated as well as having fewer direct consequences for policy outcomes. In sum, textual data frequently contain important information about orientations and beliefs for which nonverbal forms of behavior may serve as poor indicators. Short of reading the minds of political and social actors to find out what they are really thinking—something that neither technology nor ethical codes of research make possible— the next best step is to read what they are writing and saying.

A final advantage of text is its ready availability for analysis. Talk is cheap not just in the political sense but also in the sense of being readily and, in most cases, freely available in electronic formats easily amenable to systematic analysis. Political actors leave a trail of recorded text behind them following almost all of their official verbal activities: speeches, debates, websites, party platforms, press
Data, Textual

releases, all easily accessible usually for minimal cost and effort. Recorded text never ages, and never forgets, unlike, for instance, participants in a panel survey or an expert interview, and can therefore be used to analyze historical episodes as well as contemporary ones. Text never gets tired or worn out, no matter how many times it is analyzed. While these are properties shared by other behavioral data, such as voting records, they are decidedly not features involving human recall, participant or expert interviews, or surveys—other (indirect) methods frequently used to assess the unobservable, inner orientations of political actors. For practical reasons then, textual data offer immense advantages of availability and durability, provided that valid and reliable means can be deployed to unlock their secrets.

Substantive Decisions in the Analysis of Textual Data

Any research using textual data begins with the researcher identifying the corpus of texts relevant to the research question of interest. From this corpus, texts will be sampled or selected for analysis. Texts are generally distinguished from one another by attributes relating to the author or speaker of the text, perhaps also separated by time, topic, or act. A week’s worth of lead daily opinion pieces from The New York Times, for instance, could form a set of seven distinct texts. A set of debates during a no confidence motion in the British House of Commons could form a set of numerous distinct texts differentiated by speaker. The set of election manifestos from 1948 to 1997 of the Irish Fianna Fáil Party could form a set of texts differentiated by election date. In each case, distinguishing external attributes attached to each text allows researchers to partition the verbal data they contain, thereby distinguishing one text from another. Knowing that a single text represents an identifiable, purposeful verbal act gives it meaning as well as a set of variable attributes that can be used to compare that text with another. This does not necessarily mean, however, that in analyzing the text, these distinguishing attributes will form the basis for analyzing these data. Here it is useful to distinguish the sampling units of textual data from the units of analysis for analyzing these data. For example, while texts are generally stored as “Bush’s 2007 State of the Union Address” and “Bush’s 2008 State of the Union Address,” these textual data will usually be analyzed by breaking them down into constituent textual units. The most common constituent units of analysis for textual data analysis are words, consecutive word sequences, and sentences. Determining which are most suitable will depend on the research question, the nature of the analytical technique, and sometimes the length and nature of the texts themselves. Knowing how the sampling procedure for the textual data selection relates to the sampling units and the units of analysis may have implications for subsequent inference, given that the units of analysis are not randomly sampled textual data, irrespective of the sampling units.

In many political science applications using textual data, the “sample” of texts may, in fact, be all possible texts generated by the political world for that application. In tracking the words spoken on abortion per day in the U.S. Congress, for instance, a study might examine every spoken utterance in the Senate from 1997 to 2004. Yet even in such situations where a researcher may not confront overt sampling decisions, such as how many newspaper articles to select from which set of days, from a larger population that is too large to cover in its entirety, it is still important to be aware of selection issues that shape what sort of text becomes a recorded feature of the social system. Such “social bookkeeping” has long been noted by historians seeking texts to gain leverage on events long past, but it may also feature in many forms of observed political text, especially spoken text in structured settings such as legislatures. The key is to be aware of the mechanisms governing the generation of text, with an aim to making sure that the observable text provides a valid representation of the phenomenon that it will be used to investigate.

Practical Issues in Dealing With Textual Data

Text comes in many shapes, sizes, and forms, but for text to be useful as data, it is almost always converted to electronic form prior to analysis. Electronic text has the advantage of being easily stored and easily manipulated. Fortunately for modern users of textual data, new texts are almost invariably recorded in electronic form that can be
easily converted for analysis. Websites, electronic documents, text stored on optical media, electronic mail, word processing files, news feeds—all provide text that can be easily captured and manipulated for analysis. The exception tends to be text generated from interactive, spoken activities such as interviews. In such cases, interviewers may need to transcribe textual data or use speech recognition software (combined with a thorough human check on the software’s transcription) to convert spoken text into written, electronic text.

One potentially tricky practical issue when dealing with textual data concerns the manner in which text is electronically encoded by computers. Broadly speaking, “text” means the representation of language as a set of recorded characters, following language-specific rules for syntax, grammar, and style to be meaningful. Pre-electronic textual data were typically series of characters drawn or printed on paper. For text to be stored electronically, however, each character must be encoded in a way that corresponds to a digital format used by computers. Morse code, for instance, encodes characters as a series of dots and dashes. Unfortunately—but hardly surprisingly—different computers encode character sets in different ways, and this can create challenges when preparing texts for processing together when these texts use different encodings. For instance, two instances of démocratie may be considered as two different words by software designed to compile a word frequency table, when the term occurs in two different documents stored with different text encodings. Encoding issues are further complicated when texts must be converted from other formats, the most common being Microsoft Word, HTML, or Adobe’s PDF format. The same Microsoft Word document converted to text twice, once in UTF-8 (an implementation of Unicode) and once in Microsoft Windows’ 1,252-character set for Western European languages, will not be equivalent if the document includes words with diacritic marks (such as démocratie or Länder) or even specialized formatting or punctuation marks—such as “smart quotes” or long-dashed elements—contained in nearly all formatted text, including this sentence.

Many users of textual data find it useful to process raw text prior to analysis, with an aim to identifying more appropriate units of analysis than is offered by the raw text. The most common types of preprocessing are reduction of words to their word stems (or “lemmas,” which strips words to their stems while also considering context) or elimination of words through the use of “stop lists” or based on their relative infrequency. The first form of textual data preprocessing treats words as equivalent that differ only in their inflected forms, so that, for example, the different words taxes, tax, taxation, taxing, taxed, and taxable are all converted to the word stem “tax.” The second common textual preprocessing practice is to remove words that are considered unlikely to contribute useful information for analysis. These words, commonly called “stop” words, are usually function words such as conjunctions, prepositions, and articles that occur in the greatest frequency in natural language texts but add little specific political meaning to the text that would be deemed useful to analyze from textual data. These stop words may be identified in advance in the form of a “stop word list”—on a language-specific basis of course—or may be identified by their relative frequencies across and within sampling units (documents). The problem with excluding words from an a priori list, however, is that there may be no universal, cross-applicable list of words known to contribute nothing useful to all textual data uses. For instance, the pronoun “her,” it has been demonstrated, has a decidedly partisan orientation in debates on abortion in the U.S. Senate. For these reasons, it has been noted that a general trend in preparing textual data for analysis has been gradually to reduce or eliminate reliance on stop lists. Another approach to restricting the focus of textual data analysis from all words to only potentially informative words is to filter words by indices constructed from their relative frequency across as well as within documents. For such purposes, the “tf.idf” or “term frequency-inverse document” frequency measure (and its many variants) has become a staple of computational linguistics, usually serving as a weight to assign to words rather than as a simple inclusion or exclusion mechanism. The idea behind using tf.idf to weight textual data used in analysis is that the most informative words about a particular text are those that appear many times in that text but in relatively few others. At the extreme, weighting words by their tf.idf will exclude words that occur equally in all documents.
Other methods of preprocessing textual data aimed at generating units of analysis from sampling units include converting text to “n-grams,” defined as sequences of $n$ consecutive items, usually words in political science applications—thereby distinguishing “command economy” from “market economy.” In an application of a political dictionary to text fragments where election manifestos defined the sampling units, for instance, one might define sampling units as 10-word sequences, irrespective of punctuation. Words may also be tagged by their part of speech, using languagespecific algorithms developed in computational linguistics, with different parts of speech treated differently in whatever analysis follows.

Identifying units of analysis may also be done qualitatively, based on reading the texts and identifying politically relevant units of text. The best known example in political research is the “quasi sentence” that forms the unit of analysis for the long-running Comparative Manifesto Project. Quasi sentences are textual units that express a policy proposition and may be either a complete natural sentence or part of one. Because some authors may express two distinct policy statements within a single natural sentence, the use of “quasi” sentences permits a more valid and complete representation of the content of the textual data. The trade-off, however, is that the same human decision process that interprets the sentence structure to identify text units causes the procedure to be unreliable and often difficult or impossible to replicate. This trade-off between reliability—whether repetition of a procedure produces stable results—and validity—whether the measurement or analysis reflects the truth of what is being measured or represented by the textual data—is a recurrent theme in research involving textual data. This affects not just the identification and preparation of units for analysis but also the design of coding frames and measurement and scaling models for analyzing textual data.

Confronting these practical issues may seem like a potentially complex matter, but fortunately, for nearly every practical need, there exist several ready-made software solutions. Stemmers, stop word lists, word frequency generators, $n$-gram parsers, parts of speech identifiers, encoding converters, and a variety of utilities to translate from one format to another are readily, and often freely, available. The practical challenge of dealing with textual data then becomes more one of work flow management and research design than of the technical matter of solving specific practical needs.

**Analyzing Textual Data**

Once texts have been identified, selected, and prepared, they are ready for analysis. The analysis of textual data is not different from the analysis of any other data: no matter what its form, the analysis procedure is only of value if it can somehow produce propositions, measures, scales, or interpretations of lesser complexity than the textual data themselves. Analyzing textual data involves applying some explicit procedure to units of analysis from the texts, whether this procedure is purely qualitative, purely quantitative, or some hybrid in between. In practice, the variety of ways that text may be analyzed is vast. Some techniques are purely qualitative, involving interpretation of textual data by simply reading them and producing some summary account. Other qualitative methods involve reading a text and classifying the text according to a relatively simple coding frame, such as prowar, neutral, or antiwar. Yet other qualitative methods rely on human judgment to apply rules to units of textual data and possibly also in identifying those units. The Comparative Manifesto Project is an example of such a scheme, using human coders to identify and classify variable textual units using a 56-fold scheme of political policy categories: so is the 65-category coding scheme developed by Frank Baumgartner, Suzanna DeBoef, and Amber Boydstun in 2008 to capture arguments for and against the death penalty.

Many methods for analyzing textual data combine schemes involving human decisions and qualitative judgments with the use of computers to perform the mechanics of the processing and analysis. Tagging text with a predefined scheme or dictionary is an example of such a procedure. Several scaling algorithms, for example the “word-scores” method developed by Michael Laver, Kenneth Benoit, and John Garry, require human judgment to identify reference texts and to specify their relative locations on the scale of interest in order to estimate scaled positions for additional texts subsequently, using a purely automated procedure requiring no further human judgment.
The ultimate quantitative extreme in textual data analysis uses scaling procedures borrowed from item response theory methods developed originally in psychometrics. Both Jon Slapin and Sven-Oliver Proksch’s Poisson scaling model and Burt Monroe and Ko Maeda’s similar scaling method assume that word frequencies are generated by a probabilistic function driven by the author’s position on some latent scale of interest and can be used to estimate those latent positions relative to the positions of other texts. Such methods may be applied to word frequency matrixes constructed from texts with no human decision making of any kind. The disadvantage is that while the scaled estimates resulting from the procedure represent relative differences between texts, they must be interpreted if a researcher is to understand what politically significant differences the scaled results represent. This interpretation is not always self-evident.

Recent textual data analysis methods used in political science have also focused on classification: determining which category a given text belongs to. Recent examples include methods to categorize the topics debated in the U.S. Congress as a means of measuring political agendas. Variants on classification include recently developed methods designed to estimate accurately the proportions of categories of opinions about the U.S. presidency from blog postings, even though the classifier on which it is based performs poorly for individual texts. New methodologies for drawing more information from political texts continue to be developed, using clustering methodologies, more advanced item response theory models, support vector machines, and semisupervised and unsupervised machine learning techniques.

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See also Data, Archival; Discourse Analysis; Interviews, Expert; Party Manifesto

Further Readings


DATA ANALYSIS, EXPLORATORY

John W. Tukey, the definer of the phrase exploratory data analysis (EDA), made remarkable contributions to the physical and social sciences. In the matter of data analysis, his groundbreaking contributions included the fast Fourier transform algorithm and EDA. He reenergized descriptive statistics through EDA and changed the language and paradigm of statistics in doing so. Interestingly, it is hard, if not impossible, to find a precise definition of EDA in Tukey’s writings. This is no great surprise, because he liked to work with vague concepts, things that could be made precise in several ways. It seems that he introduced EDA by describing its characteristics and creating novel tools. His descriptions include the following:

1. “Three of the main strategies of data analysis are: 1. graphical presentation. 2. provision of flexibility in viewpoint and in facilities, 3. intensive search for parsimony and simplicity.” (Jones, 1986, Vol. IV, p. 558)

2. “In exploratory data analysis there can be no substitute for flexibility; for adapting what is calculated—and what we hope plotted—both to the needs of the situation and the clues that the data have already provided.” (p. 736)

3. “I would like to convince you that the histogram is old-fashioned. . . .” (p. 741)
4. “Exploratory data analysis . . . does not need probability, significance or confidence.” (p. 794)

5. “I hope that I have shown that exploratory data analysis is actively incisive rather than passively descriptive, with real emphasis on the discovery of the unexpected.” (p. lxii)

6. “‘Exploratory data analysis’ is an attitude, a state of flexibility, a willingness to look for those things that we believe are not there, as well as those we believe to be there.” (p. 806)

7. “Exploratory data analysis isolates patterns and features of the data and reveals these forcefully to the analyst.” (Hoaglin, Mosteller, & Tukey, 1983, p. 1)

8. “If we need a short suggestion of what exploratory data analysis is, I would suggest that: 1. it is an attitude, AND 2. a flexibility, AND 3. some graph paper (or transparencies, or both).” (Jones, 1986, Vol. IV, p. 815)

This entry presents a selection of EDA techniques including tables, five-number summaries, stem-and-leaf displays, scatterplot matrices, box plots, residual plots, outliers, bag plots, smoothers, reexpressions, and median polishing. Graphics are a common theme. These are tools for looking in the data for structure, or for the lack of it. Some of these tools of EDA will be illustrated here employing U.S. presidential elections data from 1952 through 2008. Specifically, Table 1 displays the percentage of the vote that the Democrats received in the states of California, Oregon, and Washington in those years. The percentages for the Republican and third-party candidates are not a present concern. In EDA, one seeks displays and quantities that provide insights, understanding, and surprises.

**Table**

A table is the simplest EDA object. It simply arranges the data in a convenient form. Table 1 is a two-way table.

**Five-Number Summary**

Given a batch of numbers, the five-number summary consists of the largest, smallest, median, and upper and lower quartiles. These numbers are useful for auditing a data set and for getting a feel for the data. More complex EDA tools may be based on them. For the California data, the five-number summary in percents is shown in Figure 1.

These data are centered at 47.6% and have a spread measured by the interquartile range of 8.75%. Tukey actually employed related quantities in a hope to avoid confusion.

**Stem-and-Leaf Display**

The numbers of Table 1 provide all the information, yet condensations can prove better. Figure 2

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<td>49.6</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>47.6</td>
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<td>50.2</td>
<td>52.8</td>
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</table>

**Source:** Statistical Abstracts of the U.S. Census Bureau.

<table>
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<td>47.6</td>
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<td>61.0</td>
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</table>

**Figure 1** A Five-Number Summary for the California Democrat Percentages

Note: The minimum, 35.9%, occurred in 1980 and the maximum, 61%, in 2008.
Figure 2  Stem-and-Leaf Displays, With Scales of 1 and 2, for the California Democratic Data

provides a stem-and-leaf display for the data of the table. There are stems and leaves. The stem is a line with a value. See the numbers to the left of the ”|”. The leaves are numbers on a stem, the righthand parts of the values displayed.

Using this exhibit, one can read, off various quartiles, the five-number summary approximately; see indications of skewness; and infer multiple modes.

Figure 3  Scatterplots of Percentages for the States Versus Percentages for the States in Pairs

Notes: A least squares line has been added as a reference. CA = California; OR = Oregon; WA = Washington.
Scatterplot Matrix

Figure 3 displays individual scatterplots for the state pairs (CA, OR), (CA, WA), and (OR, WA). A least squares line has been added in each display to provide a reference. One sees the x and y values staying together. An advantage of the figure over three individual scatterplots is that one sees the plots simultaneously.

Outliers

An outlier is an observation strikingly far from some central value. It is an unusual value relative to the bulk of the data. Commonly computed quantities such as averages and least squares lines can be drastically affected by such values. Methods to detect outliers and to moderate their effects are needed. So far, the tools discussed in this entry have not found any clear outliers.

Box Plots

A box plot consists of a rectangle with top and bottom sides at the levels of the quartiles, a horizontal line added at the level of the median, and whiskers, of length 1.5 times the interquartile range, added at the top and bottom. It is based on numerical values. Points outside these limits are plotted and are possible outliers. Figure 4 presents three box plots. When more than one box plot are present in a figure, they are referred to as parallel box plots.

Figure 4 presents a parallel box plot display for the presidential data. The California values tend to be higher than those of Oregon and Washington. Those show a single outlier each and a skewing toward higher values. Both the outliers are for the 1964 election.

Residual Plots

A residual plot is another tool for detecting outliers and noticing unusual patterns. Suppose there is a fit to the data, say, a least squares line. The residuals are then the differences between the data and their corresponding fitted values.

Consider the percentages in the table depending on the year of the election—that is, consider the data as a time series (Figure 5).

The time series of these three states track each other very well, and there is a suggestion of an outlier in each plot.

Bag Plots

The bag plot is a generalization of the box plots of Figure 4. It is often a convenient way to study the scatter of bivariate data. In the construction of a bag plot, one needs a bivariate median, analogs of the quartiles, and whiskers. Tukey and his collaborators developed these. The center of the bag plot is the Tukey median. The “bag” surrounds the center and contains the 50% of the observations with the greatest depth. The “fence” separates inliers from
Data Analysis, Exploratory

Figure 5  Graphs of the Individual State Democrat Percentages Versus the Election Years

Notes: A least squares line has been added as a reference. CA = California; OR = Oregon; WA = Washington.

Figure 6  Residuals From Least Squares Line Versus Year With 0-Line Added

Note: CA = California; OR = Oregon; WA = Washington.

outliers. Lines called whiskers mark observations between the bag and the fence. The fence is obtained by inflating the bag, from the center, by a factor of 3.

Figure 7 provides bag plots for each of the pairs (CA, OR), (CA, WA), and (OR, WA).

One sees an apparent outlier in both the California versus Oregon and the California versus Washington cases. Interestingly there is not one for the Oregon versus Washington case. On inspection, it is seen that the outliers correspond to the 1964 election. One also sees that the points
vaguely surround a line. Because of the bag plot’s resistance to outliers, the unusual point does not affect its location and shape.

**Smoothers**

Smoothers have as a goal the replacement of a scatter of points by a smooth curve. Sometimes the effect of smoothing is dramatic and a signal appears. The curve resulting from smoothing might be a straight line. More usefully, a local least squares fit might be employed with the local curves, \( y = f(x) \), a quadratics. The local character is often introduced by employing a kernel. A second kernel might be introduced to make the operation robust/resistant. It will have the effect of reducing the impact of points with large residuals.

Figure 8 shows the result of local smoothing of the Democrat percentages as a function of election year. The loess procedure was employed.

**Figure 7**  Bag Plots for the State Pairs, Percentages Versus Percentages

*Note:* The bivariate median is the black spot within the bag (darker shading), and the fence is the outer boundary.
The curves have a similar general appearance. They are pulled up by the outlier at the 1964 point.

**Robust Variant**

The behavior in 1964 being understood to a degree, one would like an automatic way to obtain a curve not so strongly affected by this outlier. The loess procedure has a robust/resistant variant. The results follow in Figure 9.

Having understood that 1964 was an unusual year, one can use a robust curve to understand the other values better. The plots have similar shapes. One sees a general growth in the Democrat percentages starting around 1980. In this two-step procedure, it is important to study both the outlier and the robust/resistant curve.

**Reexpression**

This term refers to expressing the same information by different numbers, for example, using \( \text{logit} = \log(p/(1 - p)) \) instead of the proportion \( p \). The purpose may be additivity, obtaining straightness or symmetry, or making variability more nearly uniform.

The final method is a tool for working with two-way tables.

**Median Polish**

This is a process of alternately finding and subtracting medians from rows and then columns and perhaps continuing to do this until the results do not change much. One purpose is to seek an additive model for a two-way table, in the presence of outliers in the data.

The state percentages in Table 1 form a \( 3 \times 15 \) table and a candidate for median polish. The resulting row (year) effects are shown in Figure 10.

These effects are not meant to be strongly affected by outliers. Figure 10 shows the same general curve as in Figure 5.
This entry ends with Tukey’s 1973 rejoinder: “Undoubtedly, the swing to exploratory data analysis will go somewhat too far” (cited in Jones, Vol. III, p. lxii).

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See also Cross-Tabular Analysis; Data Visualization; Graphics, Statistical; Statistics: Overview

Further Readings

Data Visualization

The basic objective of data visualization is to provide an efficient graphical display for summarizing and reasoning about quantitative information. Data visualization should be distinguished from other types of visualization used in political science (more general information and knowledge visualization, concept visualization, strategy and workflow visualization, metaphor visualization, etc.) as it is more specific to the representation of quantitative data existing in the form of numerical tables. In the following sections, the different types and methods of data visualization and their application in political science are presented.

Chart Types and Methods

During the past decades, political science has accumulated a large corpus of various kinds of data such as comprehensive fact books and atlases, characterizing all or most of existing states by multiple and objectively assessed numerical indicators within certain time periods (e.g., OECD Factbook and Political Atlas of the Modern World). As a consequence, there exists a tendency for political science to gradually become a more quantitative scientific field and to use quantitative information in analysis and reasoning. Any analysis in political science must be multidimensional and combine various sources of information; however, human capabilities for perception of large amounts of numerical information are limited. Hence, methods and approaches for the visualization of quantitative and qualitative data (especially multivariate data) are an extremely important topic in political science. Data visualization approaches can be classified into several groups, starting from creating informative charts and diagrams (statistical graphics and infographics) and ending with advanced statistical methods for visualizing multidimensional tables containing both quantitative and qualitative information. Data visualization in political science takes advantage of recent developments in computer science and computer graphics, statistical methods, methods of information visualization, visual design, and psychology. Data visualization in political science has certain special features such as the frequent use of geographical maps, which creates a link with the well-developed field of geographic information systems (GIS). Furthermore, numerical tables in political science are often incomplete, which makes important the use of methods dealing with missing or uncertainly measured data entries.

There are two main types of numerical tables that can be the subject of data visualization. The first one is called an object-feature table, where each row represents an observation or an object and each column corresponds to a numerical feature or indicator commonly measured for the whole set of objects. An example of such an object-feature table
Figure 1  Examples of Data Visualization for a Small Subset of Data (14 Socioeconomic Numerical Indicators for 40 Countries)


Notes: The indicators describe education, energy consumption, employment situation, macroeconomic trends, population and migration, prices, and quality-of-life aspects of each country. The table itself is a graphical information display. The bars and arrows in the table cells show the indicator values (arrow up—above the median; arrow down—below the median; arrow right—near the median). The rows and columns are reordered so that the correlated indicators and statistical country profiles are ranked closely. The dendrogram on the right (or at the bottom) shows the separation of countries into groups (or grouping correlated indicators) as suggested by hierarchical clustering. CPI = Corruption Perception Index; GDP = gross domestic product.

is a fact book for a set of countries (see Figure 1), where the objects are countries and the features are numerical indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, employment rate, life expectancy, and so on. The second type of numerical tables is called connection or distance tables, where both rows and columns correspond to objects and a numerical value characterizing a link between two
objects is found at the intersection of a row and a column. Alternatively, such tables can be represented in the form of a list of links. A typical example of a connection table is the table representing migration rates or the mutual volumes of exports and imports for a set of countries (at the intersection of Row A and Column B, the volume of export from Country A to County B is found).

Data visualization plays several important roles in science: It (a) helps create informative illustrations of the data, recapitulating large amounts of quantitative information on a diagram; (b) helps formulate new hypotheses or to confirm existing hypotheses for quantitative data; and (c) guides a statistical analysis of data and checks its validity. One can also mention the role of infographics in creating images with a clear and visual message, based on numbers; thus, data visualization can serve as a powerful public relations or educational tool. Graphical display allows not only visualizing and analyzing the message contained in data but also remembering it, since for most people visual memory is more persistent than verbal or auditory memory (the phenomenon of pictorial superiority).

Several groups of methods for data visualization can be distinguished in political science:

- **Statistical graphics and infographics**, with extensive use of color, form, size, shape, and style to superimpose many quantitative variables in the same chart or diagram;
- **Geographic information systems** to visualize geographically linked data;
- **Graph visualization or network maps** for representing the relations between objects; and
- **Data cartography**—that is, the projection of multidimensional data on low-dimensional screens with further visualization.

As follows, a description of these principal groups of data visualization methods, along with references to examples of their application in political science, is provided.

**Statistical Graphics and Infographics**

Statistical graphics started to be used in science in the 18th century but began to be widely exploited only from the end of the 19th century. Many of the currently used types of charts were introduced by William Playfair, a Scottish political economist, and Johann Heinrich Lambert, a Swiss German mathematician. With the appearance of computer-based technologies toward the end of the 20th century, the use of statistical graphics exploded and included exploitation of three-dimensional, dynamic, and interactive data representations.

Ralph Lengler and Martin Eppler suggested a “periodic table” of visualization methods with many examples of elements of statistical graphics. The most commonly used quantitative data displays can be classified as follows:

- **Univariate plots** are designed to visualize value distribution of a single variable. The basic ones are pie charts, bar charts, histograms, box plots (see Figure 2).
- **Bivariate plots**, are designed to visualize relations between two variables. These include various types of scatterplots and line plots (see Figure 3). A particularly important case is the line plot—visualizing time series in which one variable is time.
- **Multivariate plots**, designed to visualize the values of several variables at the same time and comparing them. Examples of these are area charts, radar charts, mosaic plots, parallel coordinates plots, and the more sophisticated Chernoff faces.

This classification is elementary; however, modern statistical graphics usually superimpose several types of plots and use color, shape, size, and style of their elements to increase the dimensionality of the plot. New types of data displays are invented continuously and proposed as parts of commonly used software for data analysis. As an example, the data table itself can serve as a data display (see Figure 1). Moreover, the table can be converted into the more elaborate information lens display. Time-series representation can be significantly enhanced by colorful horizon graphs that allow visualizing hundreds of time series simultaneously and identifying patterns in their behavior visually. Treemaps are a space-filling approach to show hierarchies in which the rectangular screen space is divided into regions, and then each region is divided again for each level in the hierarchy (e.g., treemaps were used for visualization of the U.S. budget). Intersections
between sets of objects can be represented by Venn diagrams. Many useful graphical displays result from application of multidimensional statistical analysis techniques such as factor analysis (including principal components analysis) and clustering (see Figures 1 and 4 and the section on multidimensional data cartography).

In the physical, biological, and social sciences, the scatterplot is the predominant type of data display (according to Edward R. Tufte, approximately 75% of graphs used in science are scatterplots). Scatterplots serve two basic purposes: (1) to visually detect linear and nonlinear relations between two variables; the human eye can do this efficiently and is extremely robust to the effects of anomalous observations (outliers) and other aberrations in the data, and (2) to create a map of data allowing one to visualize other information on top of it. In the case of a large number of points, the scatterplot can be improved by visualizing the point density, using gradient shading (Figure 4) or isodensity levels (i.e., contours connecting points with the same density).

In contrast, it was shown that the use of statistical graphics in news media is mainly limited to univariate plots (if time-series plots are not considered), mainly bar charts and pie charts. Curiously, several Japanese news journals and the British Economist create notable exceptions and provide up to 9% of data visualizations in the form of bivariate plots. One of the first books on the history of data visualization, Graphic Presentation, was written by Willard Brinton in 1939. It contains
many examples of thoughtful data visualization in the precomputer era.

**Geographic Information Systems**

In 1854, John Snow depicted a cholera outbreak in London and detected the source of the epidemic using points to localize some individual cases. This was one of the earliest applications of the geographic method—that is, combining the use of a geographical map and statistical data. Nowadays, the use of geographical maps with several layers of information (also called thematic maps or semantic layers) is facilitated by GIS. GIS is the merging of cartography, statistical analysis, and database technology. Geovisualization tools have been used extensively in electoral studies, urbanization studies, and various geopolitical studies of empires, wars, boundaries, and trade routes.

In the mid-2000s, several publicly available GIS systems called virtual globes appeared, with Google Earth being the most popular one. These systems allow the visualization of geographical maps and various types of global and local semantic layers mapped on them in a highly dynamic, interactive fashion. Importantly, these systems themselves can collect information from users (Public Participation GIS). Because of their wide use by the public for

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**Figure 3** Scatterplot as a Means to Visualize the Values of Five Indicators Simultaneously


*Notes:* The five indicators are GDP and population growth rates, using abscissa and ordinate point position; employment rate, using marker size; GDP per capita, using marker color; and population, using the text size of the data labels. In addition, the geographical localization is visualized in the form of the marker. The box plots on the axes depict the median value, lower and upper quartiles, extent of the data, and outlier values (by crosses). GDP = gross domestic product.
Graph Visualization (Network) Visualization

Graph visualization (where a graph is understood as a set of vertices connected by arrows, directed or undirected), also known as network maps, is a graphical data display that allows one to visualize a specific type of connection tables. On such a display, a vertex represents an object or an observation, and an arrow between two vertices represents a connection between two objects. Usually, only arrows representing nonempty connections (or having a strength exceeding a certain threshold) are introduced into the graph. On the network maps, one can use the size and the color of vertices to visualize some features of the objects and the thickness and the color of arrows to represent some features of connections between objects (typically, the strength of the connection). If the connections are asymmetrical (e.g., export and import flows, migration rates between countries), then two directed arrows connecting the same objects can be used to represent the asymmetric flow in both directions. Network maps can also represent distances between objects in the multidimensional space of multivariate observations. Network maps are widely used for visualizing social network structures, trading relations

Figure 4 Data Cartography for Multivariate Data Visualization


Notes: The nonlinear data map is shown on the right and created with the use of the elastic map algorithm implemented in ViDaExpert software (http://bioinfo.curie.fr/projects/vidaexpert). The gray shading represents the density of points (from this semantic map, four groups of countries can be distinguished). The geographical map on the left shows geographical localization of some of the points corresponding to European countries. The marker gray scale here represents GDP per capita (from white to black). The countries close on the geographical map are colocaled physically, while the countries close on the data map are neighbors in the multidimensional space of indicators and have similar statistical profiles. The axes of the data map themselves do not have an explicit interpretation; what matters is the distance between points, showing similar statistical profiles for points with a short distance and different ones for those with a larger distance. GDP = gross domestic product.
between countries, migration rates, and so on. A good example of such visualization is the Mapping Globalization Project of Princeton University.

The principal difficulty in using network map displays is that they easily become too entangled with a growing number of arrows. This poses technical challenges for (a) finding a good layout for placing vertices on a two-dimensional plane to minimize the number of arrow intersections or visualize the internal structure of the graph better and (b) creating handy browsers for huge network presentations. For example, in the Walrus network visualization tool, three-dimensional interactive network map representations are combined with a hyperbolic viewer that creates a fish eye–like distortion to magnify (to zoom) a particular part of the graph while the rest of it remains less detailed and serves rather for orientation and navigation.

**Multidimensional Data Cartography**

Inventors of statistical graphics thought of data displays as analogues of geographical maps. For bivariate data visualization plots, it was a crucial invention to replace geographical latitude and longitude with arbitrary measurement axes, which required the notion of a coordinate system formalized in René Descartes' *La Géometrie* written in 1637. Thus, on a scatterplot, instead of putting geographically colocated objects together, one puts together the points corresponding to similar combinations of measured $x$ and $y$ values.

For multivariate observations, one can formulate a similar problem: How to map a set of objects (vectors) from a multidimensional space onto a two-dimensional plane (or into a three-dimensional space) such that the objects with similar numerical feature profiles would be located close and dissimilar objects would be located at a larger distance after projection. There are a number of statistical methods aiming at producing such data maps. That is a part of exploratory data analysis.

The most fundamental method for mapping multidimensional data into low-dimensional space is the principal component analysis (PCA), invented by Karl Pearson. The method can be applied for the numerical tables of the object–feature type. The set of table rows is represented as a cloud of data points (vectors) in the multidimensional space of features. Then the PCA constructs an optimal linear two-dimensional screen (a plane) embedded into the multidimensional space of data such that the sum of squared distances between the data points and the screen is minimal. After that, the data points can be projected onto the screen and the distribution of the projections is represented using standard statistical graphics techniques. The great advantage of such visualization is that it takes into account all numerical dimensions at the same time and not only two dimensions as on the standard bivariate scatterplots. The disadvantage of all multidimensional data mapping methods is that the new axes of the resulting scatterplot do not have explicit meaning (in general, they are complex functions of the initial numerical features). What matters on such data visualization displays are the relative distances between projections that represent the distances between objects in the initial multidimensional space. The method of principal components as a multivariate data visualization tool was used in several studies, including *Political Atlas of the Modern World*. The classical PCA method can have nonlinear generalizations (principal manifolds approach), and in this case, it becomes more precise and informative in visualizing the data structure. In this case, a nonlinear (curved) two-dimensional screen is constructed in the multidimensional space and used in the same way for projecting the data as in classical PCA. Other multivariate data-mapping techniques such as correspondence analysis, self-organizing maps, metro maps visualization of principal trees, multidimensional scaling, locally linear embedding, and ISOMAP have been recently developed and applied in political and social science.

Visualizing multivariate data by projection onto a low-dimensional screen is a subject of multidimensional data cartography: The projection creates a data map that is an alternative to the geographical map (see Figure 4) and on which the objects (not necessarily linked to geography) with similar feature profiles are colocalized. For these data maps, the methods of data visualization developed for GIS can be reused. For example, an atlas of semantic layers can be created, each layer corresponding to the values of a particular numerical attribute.
Data Visualization Problems and Risks

Despite the undeniable role of data visualization in providing an efficient tool for reasoning on quantitative data, there are a number of problems connected with the possible misuse of graphical data displays. Potentially, this can lead to a wrong interpretation of the message contained in the diagram.

In their books, Edward Tufte and Howard Wainer provided numerous examples of mistakes or intentionally introduced distortions in data visualization plots that can result in a message that is significantly different or even opposite to the one contained in the data. Most often these problems are related to misuse of axis scales, color palette, or elements of design.

Sabrina Bresciani and Martin Eppler provided a two-dimensional classification of data visualization problems. First, the problems can be induced by the designer (intentionally or unintentionally) or by the user of the diagram. Second, these problems can be classified into cognitive, emotional, and social ones. Cognitive problems can be connected to inappropriate use of graphical elements, lack of clarity, or oversimplification or overcomplexification of the graphical display or induced by heterogeneity of target user groups (e.g., women have a more accurate perception of the color palette than men). Emotional problems can be connected to a repulsive content of the graphical design. Social problems can be connected to cross-cultural differences of users (e.g., in some Eastern countries, time is shown from right to left, and the meaning of red and green is not identical to that accepted by Western countries).

In the field of data cartography, the main problem of data visualization is the possible distortion of mutual distances when projecting data points from a multidimensional to a low-dimensional space. Distant points in the multidimensional space can be projected at a short distance in the classical PCA method, and points close in the multidimensional space can be projected at a large distance in applications of nonlinear data-mapping techniques. There are visualization methods warning the user about possible distortions; however, in general, any conclusion derived from analyzing a data map should be verified carefully by rigorous statistical techniques of hypothesis testing.

Yet another source of problems in data visualization comes from the use of categorical or qualitative measurements for which no standardized and well-established graphical displays exist.

Data visualization risks should be distinguished from challenges posed to scientific data visualization in various fields. These challenges aim at making data visualization more informative and taking advantage of recent achievements in computer graphics, psychology, and computer science. For example, 10 top data visualization problems were formulated, such as the need for ameliorating usability and scalability of graphical displays as well as shifting the visualization focus from visualizing static structures to visualizing dynamics. Several international conferences (such as IEEE Visualization and IEEE Information Visualization) provide a wide forum for answering these challenges through international and interdisciplinary research efforts.

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See also Correspondence Analysis; Data, Missing; Data, Spatial; Factor Analysis; Network Analysis; Time-Series Analysis

Further Readings


Decentralization

The concept of decentralization refers to the allocation of power in organizations or social structures usually from the higher to the lower-level structure(s)/organization(s). It can describe either an existing structure in which smaller or peripheral units have effective powers or a process of structural change implying a shift of power from the center to these units. The structure concerned can be a network differentiated into a center and a periphery, a hierarchical organization internally differentiated into sectors or subdivisions, or a territorial organization differentiated into levels of geographical space.

In political science, decentralization usually refers to multilevel structures of government or administration. It results from (re)allocation of power to elect or denominate policymakers of legislative or administrative competences or of fiscal resources from higher to lower levels. Given interdependencies between levels, decentralization is to be regarded as a relational concept. The effects of policies made by lower-level units depend on the power of the center, and shifts of power toward lower levels usually affect the degree of centralization or decentralization, while only major reforms change the character of a political system, for example, by turning a unitary into a federal system. Nevertheless, regardless of its extent, decentralization affects governance and democratic legitimacy. For this reason, it is not only a matter of multilevel power games but also contested for normative reasons.

For long, decentralization was not a salient concept in political theory. History of government was about centralization of power to manage conflicts of competing local elites and social groups. The modern state evolved in a process of center formation. The 20th century saw a trend toward inter- or transnational governance. However, these developments never went in only one direction. Centralization was also often thwarted by countervailing powers from below. In the final decades of the 20th century, a general trend toward more decentralization gained ground in many developed states. At the same time, decentralization became a kind of paradigm for governance in developing countries.

In political theory and practice, decentralization is now mostly regarded as a preferable alternative to centralization. As a principle guiding the organization of government, it is justified by different normative theories. All of them can be traced back to different political theories and ideas, but all are under dispute, as is exemplified by the writings of Johannes Althusius and Jean
Bodin or the controversies between the American Federalists and anti-Federalists.

The first reason for decentralization is derived from the principle of subsidiarity. Rooted in the political philosophy of reformed Protestantism in the early 17th century and in social theory of the Catholic Church of the 19th century, it defends the priority of small social communities against large societies and a centralized, bureaucratic state. While this collectivist view reemerged in communitarian theories, the principle has a strong impact in discourses on constitutional design. Here, subsidiarity has turned into a legal principle stipulating a prerogative for decentralization in case of dispute.

To justify this prerogative, two main arguments are relevant: The first holds that decentralization improves democracy. If government is closer to the people, communication between citizens and their representatives should be more effective and individual preferences should have better chances to be considered in political decisions. Moreover, decentralization is said to reflect plurality and regional differentiation of societal interests. Liberalist theories prefer decentralization as a device against dictatorship either of autocrats or of majorities. Against these assumptions, empirical studies have revealed, that governance at lower levels is often more elitist and exclusive compared with representative democracy in larger territorial units and that it may, under particular conditions, support regional conflicts or separatism.

Economic theories stipulate that decentralization fosters efficiency of policy making. If citizens have an opportunity to choose between alternative supplies of public goods or services provided by lower-level governments demanding different tax burdens, they force governments competing for taxpayers to make every effort to find an optimal ratio of costs and benefits. However, to achieve this positive effect, two basic conditions must apply: First, a sufficient number of taxpayers from different groups of a society must be able and willing to move between jurisdictions. Second, policies should not produce external effects spilling over the borders of a jurisdiction. In practice, moving to change jurisdictions (“voting by feet”) is hardly a real opportunity for ordinary citizens, and external effects occur frequently. Therefore, to encourage innovation, economic theory now emphasizes “yardstick competition,” in which suppliers of goods and services are evaluated against best practices in that economic sector. But again, this outcome can be achieved only under particular provisions. Moreover, if policies have redistributive effects, decentralization is problematic. In regionally divided societies, it can cause vicious cycles leading to inequality, inefficiency, and instability.

Finally, political scientists praise decentralization as a device to avoid a concentration of power in a government. Powers should be divided not only between executive, legislative, and judiciary but also between central and regional or local levels. Although the general argument is convincing, it leaves open the question of which powers should be centralized and which should be decentralized. Moreover, decentralization can divide powers for legislation, as is typical in a federal state, or it can refer to executive powers while legislation remains to the center, as is often the case in unitary states. There is no convincing evidence to conclude which system creates better checks and balances and which one is protected better against centralist trends.

Normative disputes on the effects of decentralization can be settled by empirical research. However, decentralization is difficult to measure. First, as mentioned above, power is a multidimensional concept. It can be based on formal competences, on effective capacities to make or impede decisions, on support by electors/voters or influential associations, or on fiscal resources. Usually, scholars find no congruence in the allocation of these different sources of power, and weighting their relative significance is rather problematic. Second, the degree of centralization and decentralization can vary between the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches of government. The party system reflecting the relations between government and society may also matter when measuring decentralization and may differ from other institutional dimension of multilevel government. Third, to measure the degree of decentralization, researchers have to assess the power relations between levels of government. Decentralization is often identified with “self-rule,”—that is, the power of regional or local governments to decide on their affairs autonomously. But usually, central governments can intervene in lower-level policy making by different means such as regulation, supervision, incentives, or capacity building. On the other hand, decentralized authorities may be able to evade central control.
Also, in federal systems, regional governments (i.e., representatives from states, Länder, or provinces) participate in decisions of the central government (“shared rule”). Finally, the real power generated by decentralization of formal competences or resources depends on governance capacities of lower levels. Under certain condition, decentralization may overburden governments with unsolvable conflicts and problems and at the same time unburden the central government from pressure.

Nevertheless, by constructing indicators, scholars have been able to provide information about decentralization in governments. In contrast to economics, where fiscal issues are considered, political scientists try to measure relative political power of governments. By applying their Regional Authority Index, Gary Marks, Liesbeth Hooghe, and Arjan H. Schakel (2008) recently revealed that, among the 42 advanced industrialized countries covered in their study, 29 saw an increase of regional powers, while only two countries saw a decline. Studies on local government have portrayed a similar evolution, although often with thequalification that many cities have suffered from fiscal constraints during the last decades. In general, decentralization seems to constitute a general trend in government, at least in developed countries.

This trend can be explained by different factors. One is the change in public policies, in particular, the shift from distributive welfare policies to the provision of services. The process of democratization is also said to have supported decentralization. Many governments have to respond to pressure from new nationalist or regionalist movements demanding political autonomy. Economic globalization has reduced the effects of national policies to support firms and increased the relevance of regional and local responsibilities for infrastructure and administrative services. Discourses about public sector reform have been guided by the paradigm of decentralization, which influenced institutional reforms in many countries. Besides these forces toward decentralization, institutionalist theories rightly point out that the “stickiness,” the ability to succeed, of existing institutions constrains a reallocation of power. In multilevel governments, proposals to decentralize raise conflicts between central, regional, and local governments. Even if external forces or approved reform concepts support decentralization, central governments try to maintain their powers. Therefore, the outcome of processes of decentralization usually reflects compromises between actors involved in bargaining for power, which is often perceived as a zero-sum game. However, these explanations do not add up to a theory and most of the individual hypotheses are still not sufficiently tested in empirical research.

Unlike what is suggested in normative reasoning, there is also no theory explaining the effects of decentralization, whichever aspect is under consideration. On the contrary, as Daniel Treisman has shown in a comprehensive review of the relevant literature, available empirical studies provide at best mixed results. What decentralization brings about depends not only on the particular mode of decentralization but also on additional conditions of governance, such as the patterns of democracy, organization of society, economic situation, or political culture. As a rule, benefits of decentralizations have to be charged up against the costs, and the evaluation of the balance depends on interests, standards, and perspectives. For this reason, decentralization should not be taken as a value or principle for organizing government. Rather, it should be regarded as an issue in institutional or constitutional policy, which, from a normative point of view, requires a careful study of positive and negative effects under particular conditions, and, from an analytical point of view, is a matter of political conflicts and decisions making.

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See also Autonomy, Subnational; Balance of Power; Federalism; Governance, Multilevel; Governance, Urban; Institutional Theory; Local Government; Regionalization

Further Readings
Delegation occurs in politics whenever one actor or body grants authority to another to act on behalf of or to carry out a function for the first in a political process. In such general terms, delegation is ubiquitous and a defining feature of politics beyond direct individual actions. Voters delegate to elected officials in representative government; governments delegate to ambassadors in foreign affairs; legislatures delegate to committees the authority to study policy issues and report bills and to bureaucracies the authority to make policy.

Because of the breadth of the topic, this entry focuses specifically on delegation from legislatures to bureaucracies in administrative and bureaucratic governments. Delegation has become inherent in this mode of governance as the reach of public policy has expanded beyond what elected legislatures can possibly handle. Such delegation presents particularly interesting institutional and political problems in the United States due to separation of powers, and thus, this entry focuses even more specifically on the rationale for and determinants of delegation in this case. Because of space limitations, this entry does not address whether agency use of delegated authority is responsive to the policy goals of external political actors (Congress, the president, courts, interest groups) or the channels by which this responsiveness is effected.

Scope of Delegation to Bureaucracies in the United States

Delegation to bureaucracy presents important questions of political and democratic legitimacy because it often imparts to the bureaucracy some power to shape the law. In practice, delegation involves the bureaucracy in making law, beyond the nonlegislative functions of executing laws passed by Congress. Yet Article 1 of the Constitution explicitly allocates the power to make law only to Congress. Moreover, delegation of lawmaking power implies that bureaucracies blend the formal powers (legislative, executive, and judicial) that the Constitution separates. The Supreme Court held such delegation, in its most expansive form, unconstitutional in its 1935 decision in *Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States*, which invalidated the administrative nerve center of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal. Since then, the typical formulation to legitimize Congress’s delegation of its Article I power to make law is that Congress articulates at least a “general standard” to guide agency policy making, and agencies merely “fill in the details.” However, no statute has been invalidated by the Supreme Court on delegation grounds since 1935; even extremely broad guidelines stipulating only that agencies regulate “in the public interest” have been upheld. Thus, it is debatable whether Congress faces any meaningful legal restrictions on its delegation to agencies.

James M. Landis, one of the foremost legal scholars of regulation and architect of the Securities and Exchange Commission, disputed such critiques of delegation on the grounds that, first, each constitutional branch of government possessed ample checks over administrative agencies, and second, delegation to administrative boards was necessary to reconcile democratic government with the formidably complex policy problems created by economic developments. This defense has retained intellectual currency since Landis first offered it.

Causes and Effects of Delegation

The history of delegation to bureaucracy in the United States is a history of Congress working hard to give away a measure of formal power allocated to it in the Constitution. Since Congress often keeps close watch on its constitutional prerogatives, this is a choice that is interesting to try to explain. Scholars have offered a wide variety of theories to do so. Broadly speaking, the contemporary political science literature avers that delegation...
of policy-making authority to bureaucracies allows a legislature to achieve policy ends that it could not achieve through legislation itself.

First, Congress may delegate simply because of the opportunity cost of its time spent on any one issue. For example, in policy pertaining to the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), Congress could set technological standards and allocate spectrum rights to various classes of users itself. Instead it has charged the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to do so “in the public interest.” Congress can therefore reserve its attention for broader and more nationally significant policy choices, leaving the FCC with the relatively more arcane choices over EMS use.

This rationale suggests that delegation presents Congress with a “principal–agent problem.” The bureaucratic agent may pursue different goals with its authority from those Congress (the “principal”) would pursue. Several scholars have noted that legislative and executive policy goals are more congruent under unified than under a divided government. This reasoning has led to one of the more robust empirical findings on delegation: legislative delegation of policy-making authority to bureaucracies increases under a unified government. David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran (1999) established this at the federal level in a study of delegation from 1947 to 1995. John Huber and Charles Shipan (2002) further established that this pattern holds at the state level in the United States and comparatively among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries (where “policy conflict” between the legislature and executive is operationalized by minority coalition governments).

A second and closely related explanation for delegation is that Congress delegates to tap into expertise that bureaucrats have over some policy domain. For instance, both the FCC and the Department of Justice make policy with respect to market competition; by delegating this authority, Congress can leverage the expertise these organizations have developed in the economic analysis of the competitive effects of industrial structure. The implicit presumption is that Congress does not have or wish to develop this expertise itself, which at some level is presumably a result of the opportunity cost of time spent doing so.

Formally, delegation of policy-making authority is often conceived as granting a “zone of discretion” to an agent, a set of policies among which the agent can choose freely and without further interference from the legislature. The legislature decides which policies are in the zone and which are not. This was formulated in 1984 by Bengt Holmström and was first applied in the political science literature on bureaucracy by Epstein and O’Halloran (1994). The critical strategic problem confronted by Congress is to induce the agency to use its expertise as Congress itself would use it, if Congress possessed it, by tailoring the zone of discretion in particular cases. Because the zone of discretion is a blunt instrument, this problem generally cannot be perfectly “solved” from Congress’s point of view; it is inherent that the agent will sometimes use its information to pursue policies Congress does not always prefer. This “agency loss” is simply a necessary cost of an otherwise desirable process and does not undermine the case for delegation in normative terms. A Congress aware of this agency loss would simply not delegate if it were too large compared with the benefits of delegation.

Empirical evidence bears out that bureaucratic expertise is a rationale for delegation. For instance, in their comprehensive study of major postwar federal legislation, Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) found that laws pertaining to more technically complex policy areas delegated more authority to bureaucratic agencies, net of constraints simultaneously placed on those agencies, than laws pertaining to less complex policy areas.

Of course, agencies cannot always be presumed to possess expertise, especially when they are initially created to deal with a novel policy problem. Delegation can also help induce agencies to develop expertise. First, agencies have an incentive to develop expertise if they anticipate that their policy authority over tasks they deem important will increase as a result (Sean Gailmard & John Patty, 2007). Second, delegating authority over a task that an agent considers important provides an incentive for the agent to acquire information about how best to perform the task. Given the delegated authority over an important task, the agent remains ignorant at its peril; acquiring expertise allows the agent to obtain private benefits from good performance.

Third, delegation can act as a commitment by Congress to a future course of policy. For instance, under the Steel Trigger Price Mechanism, the
International Trade Commission (ITC) investigates possible instances of “dumping” in the United States by international trading partners. The policy commits the United States to import restrictions whenever dumping is found. If Congress had not delegated this authority to the ITC but instead retained the authority to determine policy on a case-by-case basis, import restrictions in response to dumping would not be so evident. It would depend on the policy preferences of members of Congress and the president toward import restrictions. A protrade Congress or president would be sufficient to prevent enactment of import restrictions, even if illegal dumping were identified. By delegating fact-finding authority and programming, a Congress at one time can preprogram the policy response to changing conditions even after a new Congress is seated. In celebrated analyses of the political origins of administrative institutions, Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast (1987) offer separate but related arguments that commitment of future policy is an important rationale for delegation. Such delegation as commitment is only effective if the administering agency is able to hold steady in changing political winds; thus, T. M. Moe predicts that in such cases agencies will be deliberately insulated from and unresponsive to future Congresses and presidents.

Opportunity cost theories suggest implicitly that delegation inherits whatever normative appeal is inherent in congressional policy goals. Commitment theory is more ambiguous because it suggests that one legislative coalition achieves its goals by compromising the ability of future coalitions to do the same, thus dampening the responsiveness of public policy to shifts in congressional goals.

Besides explanations based on achieving policy ends, scholars have also argued that delegation allows legislators to evade accountability and difficult policy choices. Congress may delegate to shift blame if policy may be unpopular or fails to achieve desired results. In some policy domains, success is expected and failure is a high-profile event. In airline safety, the public does not celebrate flights that land safely. When airplanes operate safely the public may even protest that safety and security measures are too onerous in terms of time and money. But when airplanes crash we can expect recriminations about gaps in the system. Much the same story applies to homeland security issues. The blame-shifting explanation suggests that Congress delegates authority over these policy areas so that Congress will not be held responsible in case of a problem, and doing so may even allow Congress to claim credit for solving problems. This explanation implicitly assumes the public does not realize that Congress chose to arrange the system this way and is thus still ultimately responsible. For instance, if the decision to delegate is separated by a long interval from resulting problems, it may not make sense for voters to hold sitting legislators answerable for the delegation and oversight of the agency’s initial policy choices.

Conclusion

Delegation from Congress to bureaucratic agencies, including the delegated power to make law, is pervasive in the United States. Indeed, it is a given in most major legislation passed since the New Deal. Delegation to administrative agencies cannot remove politics from policy making; it can merely move the political choices around in the policy process and push politics inexorably further into administration. Delegation is a choice that requires both normative justification and positive explanation. The positive explanations reviewed above are not necessarily mutually exclusive, though they carry dramatically different normative implications for how delegation from legislatures to bureaucracies should be evaluated.

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See also Policy Process, Models of; Regulation

Further Readings


Deliberative policy making applies principles derived from the theory of deliberative democracy to public policy making. The theory of deliberative democracy responds to the perceived shortcomings of a majoritarian democracy where actors bargain to defend their interests (strategic action), bargaining and voting procedures do not change actors' preferences while discouraging social learning, the strong impose their will on the weak, and constraints on lying, deception, and manipulation are few and far between. Against this vision of democracy as a pluralist interest aggregation, deliberative democracy upholds an alternative model based on discussion and persuasion where actors must defend and criticize proposals with reasoning they believe others will accept (communicative action), public discussion can transform actors' preferences, the majority prefers to compromise with the minority, and inclusion in public discussion of all social positions and perspectives aims to maximize social learning. Deliberative policy making aims for genuine preference transformation rather than mere preference aggregation by expanding in governance institutions the role of deliberation based on norms such as reason giving, publicity, joint problem solving, and inclusive participation. This entry reviews the aims and varieties of deliberative policy making before assessing its achievements and shortcomings.

Aims

Deliberative policy making seeks to reach policy decisions that are both democratically legitimate and technically sound. Especially as applied to environmental regulation, theorists such as Walter Baber and Robert Bartlett have defended the substantive claim that expanding deliberation in policy making increases the ecological rationality of decisions. Unlike traditional, hierarchical forms of administrative decision making, deliberative, horizontal methods are said to be more flexible and robust in the face of the epistemic complexity and uncertainty that characterizes such policy problems in the "network society." By revitalizing the role of nonexpert citizens in policy inquiry and generating policy-relevant information on as wide a social basis as possible, deliberative policy making helps guard against closing off debate prematurely and discarding policy alternatives.

A normatively demanding conception of public deliberation, which theorists argue is superior to pluralist bargaining, is said to promote these aims. Public deliberation as conceived by theorists such as James Bohman is not merely talk; rather, it involves the exchange of reasons aimed at evaluating alternative proposals for action. Citizens submit their ideas and beliefs for discussion and criticism by fellow citizens, making it less likely that selfish or poorly thought-out proposals will survive the debate. Note that public deliberation requires a considerable level of freedom and equality: inclusion of everyone affected by a decision, substantial political equality including equal opportunities to participate in deliberation, equality in methods of decision making and setting the agenda, free and open exchange of information and reasons sufficient to acquire an understanding of both the issue in question and the opinion of others. These conditions are much more restrictive than the standards usually applied to political debate and difficult to achieve in practice.

Efforts to adapt such principles of public deliberation for practical use have yielded public consultation techniques that go beyond government agencies merely seeking public input from individual citizens or firms. Rather, their goal is to generate high-quality deliberation conceived as dialogue among the participants. These techniques include the consensus conferences pioneered in Denmark, the deliberative opinion polls developed by James Fishkin, collaborative governance schemes involving multiple stakeholders, and the citizen jury. The next section classifies these varieties of deliberative policy making, using a simple typology.
Varieties: Hot Versus Cold, Weak Versus Strong

Deliberative policy-making techniques vary along two dimensions: partisanship and authority. Deliberative forums differ widely in how they confront the question of partisanship. Some deliberative forums seek to accommodate partisanship by inviting partisan stakeholders to participate in the deliberations and then structuring the proceedings so as to maximize deliberation while minimizing bargaining (consensus conference, collaborative governance). Stakeholders are included in such forums on the assumption that decisions reached without their participation lack the broad-based acceptance required to translate decisions into practice. Because they aim to accommodate pluralism, partisan forums may be thought of as a deliberative extension of pluralist interest aggregation. Nonpartisan forums, by contrast, seek to minimize partisanship by excluding interest groups from the deliberations (deliberative opinion poll, citizen jury) in the expectation that interest representation inevitably diminishes partisans’ ability to follow the norms of deliberation outlined above. Here the goal is to approximate Jürgen Habermas’s “ideal speech situation,” which brackets forms of manipulation and coercion external to the logic of reasoned argument and persuasion. Insofar as they hope to transcend pluralism, nonpartisan forums may be thought of as a deliberative alternative to pluralist interest aggregation. The respective virtues of “hot” and “cold” forms of public deliberation are subject to increasingly refined empirical analysis in the literature.

A further variation among forms of deliberative policy making is their degree of political authority. This is expressed as the difference between “strong” and “weak” publics in the literature. Weak publics such as the informal public sphere engage only in opinion formation, while strong publics such as parliaments also make collectively binding decisions about the proposals before them. Endowing nonelected, nonexpert, ad hoc deliberative forums with the authority to make policy decisions is a contentious proposition, however. Is it a permissible delegation of legislative authority, or does it violate basic norms of representative democracy? In practice, weak publics predominate. Deliberative policy making is typically advisory in nature; participants are confined by sponsoring agencies to preparing recommendations as a basis for decision making by elected officials and public managers.

Deliberative forums can be evaluated in terms of their deliberative capacity, impact, and legitimacy. High-quality deliberation may be more easily achieved in nonpartisan forums, while partisan forums may have a greater impact on policy decisions and enjoy greater legitimacy—especially where external conditions provide sufficient incentives for powerful stakeholders to prefer deliberation to other ways of resolving their differences, such as litigation. However, given the tremendous variability, first, among designed deliberative forums and, second, among the political, administrative, and legal contexts in which they must function, these empirical relationships are not particularly robust. The complex interplay between deliberative designs, their internal dynamics, and external context limits the potential for generalizing about deliberative policy making.

Critiques of Deliberative Policy Making

This section considers some popular objections to deliberative policy making—namely, that its conception of democratic legitimacy is substantively too demanding, that it is too costly, and that it cannot accommodate interests.

Deliberative Policy Making Asks Too Much of Democratic Legitimacy

It is rarely realistic, critics contend, to expect reasoned debate to lead to a consensus supported by all participants. Public deliberation, however, does not demand that all participants support an agreement for the same reasons, or that they come to any agreement at all. Bohman’s “plural agreement,” for example, only requires a commitment to continued cooperation in public deliberation, even with persistent disagreements. The very conditions of public deliberation—publicity, reversibility of decisions, and social inclusiveness—encourage an ongoing cooperation with others who disagree, which is at least not unreasonable. The give-and-take of reasons in public deliberation makes it less likely that irrational and untenable arguments will decide outcomes. Decision-making procedures allow revisions of arguments and decisions and even include procedures that either take up features
of defeated positions or improve their chances of being heard. And finally, deliberative decision-making procedures are broadly inclusive, so minorities may hope to affect future outcomes.

The condition of publicity ensures that decisions are more likely to be made on the basis of all relevant perspectives, interests, and information and that they are less likely to exclude legitimate interests, relevant knowledge, or dissenting opinions. When proposals are subjected to a wide range of possible alternative opinions in a forum that is open to all societal interests and perspectives, the quality of reasons for decisions is therefore likely to improve. Participants—and, it is hoped, citizens generally—should be able to accept decisions reached in this manner as reasonable unless and until they are shown to be otherwise in future rounds of deliberation.

**Deliberative Policy Making Is Inefficient**

Deliberative policy making requires additional resources, increasing administrative costs. Insofar as decisions reached through deliberation can be expected to enjoy broader public support than decisions reached by nondeliberative means, they may avoid costly and time-consuming legal challenges and delays in implementation. At the very least, deliberative policy making provides administrators with better information. Adding the cost of deliberation to an already complex decision-making process may improve the odds that a given decision will survive legal scrutiny. In the United States, for example, most Environmental Protection Agency regulations face court challenges at some point in their history. Even major regulations, often the result of several years of work, do not always survive legal scrutiny. More and better public deliberation in rule making makes such failures less likely because it improves the odds that all relevant perspectives, interests, and relevant objections will be considered from the outset.

**Deliberative Policy Making Cannot Accommodate Interests**

Is deliberative policy making naive about the role of interests, and hence of negotiation and bargaining, in politics? Deliberative democracy makes two claims about interests, neither of which denies its role in democratic politics. The first is that interests cannot be known prior to public deliberation. On this view, interests are not fixed or given but subject to discovery and transformation through public debate about joint problems and conflicts. In the absence of public deliberation, therefore, interests cannot be adequately taken into account in decision making. The second claim is that policy proposals cannot be defended merely on the basis of self-interest because such a defense is unlikely to survive deliberative scrutiny. Participants will be suspicious of proposals that serve selfish purposes but are falsely advanced in the name of public interests. There is no denying in deliberative policy making that politics involves interests; rather, it encourages their disclosure and sometimes their transformation.

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**See also** Democracy, Theories of; Discursive Institutionalism

**Further Readings**


**Democracy, Consociational**

Consociational (from Latin, *consociatio*—close political and social interlinkage) democracy denotes a democratic political order in which political decisions are reached mainly by negotiations between political elites. Majority rule is not the dominant technique in decision making. Rather, political actors seek to find broad compromise based on amicable arrangement. Switzerland and the Netherlands are frequently cited as examples of
consociational democracy. There is a variety of conceptual definitions of consociational democracy. However, consensus exists about the antipode. This is a majoritarian democracy in which elites eschew negotiations and compromise as soon they have a plurality of 50% of the vote plus one. The best known empirical illustration is the political system of the United Kingdom. Therefore, the antipode to consociational democracy is frequently labeled “Westminster democracy” since the British parliament resides in the Palace of Westminster. The political system of postwar New Zealand comes even closer to the ideal type of a majoritarian democracy.

The concept of consociational democracy is important for the comparative analysis of political systems since it emphasizes variations between forms of democratic government. This is in stark contrast to the traditional argument that English-speaking countries have a homogeneous political culture—that is, the actors share general orientations in the political system. There is consensus with regard to general political ends and means. This is a prerequisite of a stable democratic order. The more homogeneous a political culture is, the higher the stability of democracy, with the Anglo-Saxon countries being particularly homogeneous. In a nutshell, there is one form of democratic government, and the Anglo-Saxon countries are the best examples. In contrast, Continental European countries have a heterogeneous political culture. Subgroups such as Catholic groups, workers’ movements, and the middle classes differ considerably in ideology and strategy. These fundamental differences are the germ of system instability.

However, postwar history demonstrated that, in deeply divided European societies, heterogeneity in political culture and a stable democracy are not mutually exclusive. The concept and underlying causal hypotheses of consociational democracy provided explanations for the political stability in segmented societies. Obviously, there are different routes to the Rome of democracy and consociational democracy is one of these variants.

Varieties of Consociational Democracies

The term consociational democracy entered the scientific debate in 1961, when it was used to describe African political systems that accommodated by compromises a large number of groups with divergent ideologies to achieve a common goal. Arend Lijphart and Gerhard Lehmbruch applied the term to Western European countries at the end of the 1960s. In his book about the Dutch political system, Lijphart argued that, in a critical historical period during World War I, the leaders of the Dutch societal segments agreed on pragmatic solutions to deep conflicts over the relation of state and churches in education and over the electoral formula. This pacificatie (peaceful settlement) of 1917 had three major characteristics: (1) the elites negotiated on behalf of their segments without any extensive consultation with their constituencies, (2) elites of all segments participated in the agreement, and (3) the principle of proportionality in the substance of the settlement was of utmost importance (Lijphart, 1968). A deliberate decision of the elites to cooperate as the best response strategy underlay this pacificatie. Once practiced, this mode of top-level compromise became institutionalized in the Netherlands. The basic sociocultural prerequisite of this system was the pillarization (verzuiling) of society. Individuals belong to clearly separated societal pillars—that is, sociocultural subgroups—and only the elites on the top of these pillars had contact with and negotiated with elites from other pillars. Operational criteria for the classification as a consociational democracy are grand coalitions, cultural autonomy of subgroups, proportionality, and minority voting (Lijphart, 2008).

Lehmbruch (1967) analyzed the pattern of conflict management in Austria and Switzerland. In Switzerland, the important conflicts were those that emerged between groups that are regionally concentrated: cantons with Catholic or Protestant orientation, agricultural or industrial structures, or German- or French-speaking populations. Hence bargaining between regional elites was the dominant pattern of conflict regulation. In contrast, Austria resembled the Netherlands in the sense that the conflicts existed between sociocultural groups—Catholic-Conservative versus Socialist camps—without a regional identification. Lehmburch used the Austrian term of Proporzdemokratie (democracy based on proportionality) for consociational democracy; he also pointed to the Swiss term of Konkordanzdemokratie (democracy based on concordance). Hence, consociational democracy,
Konkordanzdemokratie, or Proporzdemokratie can be used synonymously to describe a form of government in which the majority rule is not the dominant technique of decision making. The underlying reason is a deep sociocultural or political division of the country that does not allow for a system of alternating majorities. Either there is no group that could be a majority or the minority groups are very suspicious of the other groups and see little chance of becoming a majority sometime in the future.

Obviously, consociational democracy is hard to define in operational terms. This may be one reason for the development of a new concept—consensus democracy—which is described as a system of power sharing. Lijphart (2008) points to four major differences between consociational and consensus democracy. The first difference is that consociational democracy denotes the peaceful system of conflict regulation in deeply divided societies. The term condenses the main findings from the descriptive analysis of these political systems. In contrast, consensus democracy started from the ideal type of a majoritarian democracy, enumerating all the major characteristics and then defining the nonmajoritarian as a contrast. This led to the following list of variables. It can be subdivided into the two dimensions of “Parties–Executives” and “Federal–Unitary.” These dimensions are, however, only weakly correlated empirically (Lijphart, 1999).

**Parties–Executives**

1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets versus executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions.
2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant versus executive–legislative balance of power.
3. Two-party versus multiparty systems.
4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional representation.
5. Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition among groups versus coordinated and “corporatist” interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation. (pp. 3–4)

**Federal–Unitary**

1. Unitary and centralized government versus federal and decentralized government.
2. Concentration of legislative power in unicameral legislature versus division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses.
3. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majority versus rigid constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities.
4. Systems in which legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their own legislation versus systems in which laws are subject to judicial review of their constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts.
5. Central banks that are dependent on the executive versus independent central banks. (pp. 3–4)

The second difference concerns the principles of consociationalism, which are broader than those of consensus democracy. For instance, in the consociational framework, grand coalition could mean more than just a multiparty coalition; grand coalition could be created informally by advisory arrangements or by alternating presidencies. This is connected to the third difference: Consensus democracy tends to emphasize formal institutional devices while consociational democracy relates mainly to informal practices. Finally, consociational democracy is more demanding in the sense that group autonomy or inclusion of all relevant groups is required while consensus democracy provides incentives for cooperative behavior.

To avoid the normative undertones and evaluations of the term consensus democracy, André Kaiser (1997) suggests the term negotiation democracy. This seems to be particularly appropriate since consensus democracy combines basically three different aspects of coordination: between political elites (which is the sole focus of consociational democracy), between governments and interest groups (which is the focus of the debate on corporatism versus pluralist interest representation), and between veto points that may have competitive or
collective orientations. According to Vicki Birchfeld and Marcus Crepaz (1998), competitive veto points occur when different political actors operate through separate institutions with mutual veto powers, as in federalism and strong bicameralism. Collective veto points emerge from institutions where the different political actors operate in the same body and whose members interact with each other on a face-to-face basis, as in proportional electoral systems and multiparty governments.

**Genesis and Determinants**

The literature distinguishes between at least three causal explanations of consociational democracy. The institutional explanation points to incentives and constraints produced by institutions, such as electoral laws or direct democracy. Electoral rules allowing for proportional representation tend to lead to multiparty systems. The need to negotiate and to build coalitions is larger in such party systems since there is no clear majority party that is able to dominate all the other parties. Likewise, direct democracy creates strong incentives for elites to cooperate and to build compromises. If they try to push through their goals, they risk the possibility that neglected groups may trigger a popular vote and that the policy of the majority group in parliament or government may be terminated by a popular vote. This is one reason why Switzerland embarked on conflict regulation by negotiation and inclusion of all groups that are capable of triggering a popular vote.

A second explanation relates to deliberate decisions of the elites (Lijphart, 1968). According to this explanation, in a critical historical situation, elites consider their options. They then take a deliberate decision for compromise solutions—and waive the option of conflictual strategies—based on either careful cost–benefit analyses or orientation to the common good. Once the basic decision for negotiation is taken, it becomes institutionalized. Lijphart (2008, pp. 51–52) identified nine facilitating conditions that make this decision more likely:

1. the absence of a solid majority that prefers pure majority rule to consociationalism;
2. the absence of large socioeconomic differences between the subgroups of the society;
3. a moderate number of groups, so that negotiation is a feasible option and is not made too difficult and too complex;
4. the groups having roughly the same size;
5. a relatively small population—such as in the classical cases of European consociational democracy (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland);
6. an external economic or military threat that promotes internal unity;
7. overarching loyalties, such as a common national identity;
8. federalism as a means to foster group autonomy (if groups are regionally concentrated), which is conducive to consociationalism; and
9. traditions of compromise and accommodation.

Controlling for these favorable conditions, the core argument of this explanation is a voluntaristic, deliberate choice by elites. Hence, in principle, the option of consociationalism exists in all divided societies; it just depends on elites who are convinced of this type of conflict regulation.

A third explanation emphasizes the role of history and learning. Consociational democracy is more likely when elites are used to compromise and negotiate. This tradition amplifies learning processes. Elites become socialized in systems of negotiations, and they learn that negotiation and accommodation are appropriate techniques of decision making. Alternative conflictual decision modes are normatively inferior, less efficient, and more costly in several respects. Lehmburch has radicalized this explanation by arguing that the consociational and corporatist European systems can be traced back to the religious peace treaties of the 17th and 18th centuries.

**Impacts and Consequences of Consociational Democracy**

Consociational and consensus democracy have a mixed balance of impacts and consequences. Manfred Schmidt (2008, pp. 313–316) identified six deficits:

1. Consociational techniques depend on top-level negotiations and compromise between elites.
Most of this accommodation is done behind closed doors; otherwise, politicians will not have enough flexibility given the constraints of electoral competition. By implication, voters cannot check whether their representatives stay within the corridors of policy choices that conform to the preferences of the electorate. Since the compromises are considered to be a result of quid pro quo, it is hard to assign responsibility to particular political groups and parties.

2. These compromises require that elites can decide on behalf of their constituencies and that these constituencies follow passively the leaders of their sociocultural group. Politically interested and active individual citizens are a disturbance variable in consociational democracies.

3. Minority groups have the right to veto and can obstruct solutions that are in the interest of the overwhelming majority of the nation. While competitive democracy has to face the danger of the tyranny of the majority, consociational and consensus democracies may suffer from the tyranny of the minority.

4. Policy decisions in consociational democracies need considerable time due to processes of inclusion and negotiation. Hence, these forms of government may appear particularly disadvantageous if the political system has to respond quickly to threats, such as an imminent economic crisis.

5. Negotiations and compromise imply that policy decisions have a considerable likelihood of being incoherent and hence less efficient than policy packages that are shaped by a single political goal or ideology.

6. This system of compromise is vulnerable to populist movements on the right and the left, and it may frustrate citizens in their political activity.

These disadvantages used to be considered as the price for a stable democracy in deeply divided societies. However, recent empirical research found other benefits and evidence that the disadvantages of consociational systems are much lower than suggested by the critics. In addition to political stability, consociational democracy is inclusive, giving smaller groups (or their representatives) a much better say in the political process. This may outweigh some of the democratic deficits of consociationalism. In addition, since the policy packages are based on compromise, implementation of policies may be quicker and more efficient than in competitive democracies. Hence, consensus systems may make up some of the loss in time and efficiency during the phase of policy formation. Finally, consensus democracies tend to be less violent, economically superior, and “kinder and gentler” compared with majoritarian democracies. In consensus systems, citizens are politically more satisfied; the government is more redistributive; strike activity, unemployment, inflation, and inequality are less; political activity and participation are higher; and policies are more “woman friendly.” Some of these findings are controversial; however, there is strong evidence that the political and economic achievements of consociational democracies are not inferior to those of majoritarian democracies.

Criticism

Criticism of consociational democracy pointed to conceptual and empirical deficits. While the literature on consociationalism argued that this decision mode allows for a stable political order in deeply divided societies, Ian Lustick (1979) developed a control approach that focuses “on the emergence and maintenance of a relationship in which the superior power of one segment is mobilized to enforce stability by constraining the political actions and opportunities of another segment” (p. 328). Brian Barry (1975) detected a tautological argument in Lijphart’s work in that consociationalism was described as a deliberate choice of elites, since for this choice elites need to compromise from the very beginning. Other authors emphasized that separated societal segments as the sociocultural precondition of consociational democracies started to decline exactly when consociational techniques were strongly used in the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, critics identified problems in mixing normative and empirical typologies, noting that Lijphart’s list of favorable conditions for consociationalism changed since the first publications about consociationalism.

Rein Taagepera (2003) argues that Lijphart’s indicators of the first dimension of consensus
Democracy are mainly output variables, which are not directly amenable to institutional design, while the indicators of the second dimension are based on expert judgments and measured mostly on a nominal level. Likewise, Steffen Ganghof (2005) states that Lijphart’s concepts refer to institutions, while many of his indices relate to observed behavior such as coalition building or social partnership.

Two criticisms have strong implications for the political importance of consociational democracy. Lijphart suggests that elites have an option for consociational democracy and it is up to them to decide in favor or against. Based on this assumption, he recommends to politicians in deeply divided societies to adopt the consensus or, even better, the consociational system. Already early in the debate, this voluntaristic approach was questioned by Lehmbruch. If consociationalism depends on learning processes, long-term elite socialization, and supporting institutions, it cannot be inserted successfully from outside into a political system that lacks these enabling conditions.

The second problem may be the decline of the prerequisite of any system of compromise in segmented societies: Individuals are integrated into sociocultural segments, and these segments have legitimate political representatives. The processes of individualization and modernization tend to undermine this precondition. Increasingly—even in formerly strongly segmented societies—individuals do not build stable links to groups and political organizations. Hence, the sociocultural foundations of consociationalism vanish, endangering the long-term stability of consensus institutions. A limited decline of consociational democracy has been observed in many countries (see Adrian Vatter, 2008). On the other hand, one of the preconditions of an ideal type of majoritarian democracy suffers from the same modernization processes. Modern societies do not consist any longer of two groups of similar size whose political representatives alternate in government. Rather, political integration in large groups declines, and democracies may benefit from institutions of negotiation that are able to include these numerous small groups of modern society, none of which is able to produce a political majority. The obvious problem seems to be that these societies may be able to solve their problems with consociational techniques; however, they lack the sociocultural preconditions to use these techniques.

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See also Democracy, Quality; Democracy, Theories of; Democracy, Types of

Further Readings


Democracy, Direct

Direct democracy means forms of direct participation of citizens in democratic decision making in contrast to indirect or representative democracy, based on the sovereignty of the people. This can happen in the form of an assembly democracy or by initiative and referendum with ballot voting, with direct voting on issues instead of for candidates or parties. Sometimes the term is also used for electing representatives in a direct vote as opposed to indirect elections (by voting for an electing body, electoral college, etc.), as well as for recalling elected officeholders. Direct democracy may be understood as a full-scale system of political institutions, but in modern times, it means most often specific decision-making institutions in the broader system environment of representative democracy. The following sections (a) introduce some historical background and theoretical ideas, (b) elaborate on various forms of direct democracy, (c) describe regulations and use of direct democracy in some important countries, and (d) present main issues and controversies.

History and Theoretical Context

The most important historical reference of direct democracy is to assembly democracy in ancient Greek city-states, particularly Athens, where decisions were taken by people’s assemblies of some 1,000 male citizens. Later, people’s assemblies were used in many Swiss cantons and towns, as well as in town meetings in some American colonies and states. Early U.S. states also started using procedures in which constitutions or constitutional amendments were ratified by referendums, which later became common in the United States. Popular sovereignty, proclaimed in the French Revolution, had rather been distorted, however, in Napoleon’s autocratic plebiscites. Switzerland and many U.S. states incorporated direct democracy in their constitutions during the 19th century, while Germany and few other countries adopted some elements after World War I. In a more general perspective, the ensuing introduction or practical use of direct-democratic institutions originated from three major types of developments:

1. social class conflict to curb the political power of a dominating oligarchy (e.g., Switzerland, U.S. states);
2. processes toward political/territorial autonomy or independence for legitimizing and integrating the new state unit (beginning after World War I); and
3. processes of democratic transformation from authoritarian rule (e.g., Germany’s regional states after 1945, some Latin American countries).

Some countries show gradual reform developments (e.g., Uruguay).

Modern democracy most often developed not from the starting point of assembly democracy but, under absolutist or feudal conditions, from people gradually claiming a larger share of political representation and extension of representative voting rights. Constitutions, civil rights, and universal suffrage, which had been achieved in European and many other countries (generally by the end of World War I), were usually identified with “democracy” on the normative basis of the principles of popular sovereignty, freedom, and political equality. Thus, in many countries and theories, these principles have been tied to and absorbed by a narrow notion of representative democracy rather than
being used to support a more comprehensive concept of democracy.

Normative theory of direct democracy still rests basically on popular sovereignty, freedom, and political equality, with Jean-Jacques Rousseau as the outstanding theorist of unanimous consent of the people for a free republican constitution and subsequent forms of participation. During the 19th century, these principles were increasingly challenged, or they were deprived of their substance beyond representative institutions. So, in many countries, direct-democracy institutions have not been established or implemented since representative elites developed a strong interest in monopolizing power. In addition, pragmatic theories contended that direct democracy could not work under space and time conditions of large modern states.

With this background of historical and theoretical restrictions, the normative theory of direct democracy cannot exclusively rest on popular sovereignty, which is also claimed by representative democracy. More specific arguments originate from the participatory theory of democracy and the critique of a lack of responsiveness and legitimacy of representative (party) democracy. The two sets of democratic institutions are distinguished according to the main initiating actors who start the procedure: mandatory referendums have to be held when a referendum vote is required by law (e.g., a constitution) for deciding a specific subject. Referendums of governmental authorities take place when a president, cabinet, or legislature decides, under preregulated conditions or ad hoc, to call a popular vote on a particular issue. Sometimes, a minority of a legislature also is entitled to demand such a vote. Citizens' initiatives that are supported by a required number of signatures allow the electorate to vote on political measures proposed by a group, on legislative acts by a parliament not yet in force, or on existing laws (citizen-demanded referendums). A popular vote may be binding according to the simple or specific majority or turnout requirements for a valid vote or may be defined as only consultative or advisory.

Some jurisdictions provide an agenda initiative that allows citizens with the support of a minimum number of signatures to place a particular issue on the agenda of a government or legislative authority. Such proposals have to be considered by the authority addressed, but they do not lead to a referendum vote.

There is some ambiguity and controversy as to whether procedures with a focus on directly electing or recalling holders of public office (executive positions, legislators) may be meaningfully included in the concept of direct democracy. These procedures refer, in fact, to the institutional system of representative democracy and its typical processes and, therefore, are not at the core of debates on direct democracy. However, there may be some differences in the degree to which voters have a direct influence on the final outcome of an electoral procedure (e.g., fixed or flexible list of candidates, direct vote, or vote for members of an intermediate body). In recall procedures, interrupting routine patterns of fixed office terms may stress the aspect of citizens reclaiming control of office functions. In practice, recall options of executive office holders are much more common than of members of legislative bodies or of complete legislatures.

Procedural types of direct democracy should be distinguished according to the main initiating
actor of a procedure because they typically show different features regarding the agenda setter, the contents and wording of the proposal, the function of the ballot vote in terms of legitimation, innovation, and so on.

Governmental authorities initiating a referendum vote generally seek legitimation for policies on the government agenda, will regularly advocate an affirmative vote, and will have many ways of influencing process and outcome, including official communication resources. Therefore, the term *plebiscite* is often used, even more so when they are employed by autocratic or dictatorial regimes that cannot be called democratic at all.

Mandatory referendums also very often originate from governmental authorities entitled to bring forward proposals for which ratification by a referendum vote is required, particularly in the case of constitutional amendments or matters of state sovereignty, territory, or identity. Thus, whereas a popular vote on such specific subjects is required by law, the agenda and the substance of the referendum proposal are most often determined by governmental authorities. In some jurisdictions, however, specific issues, again like constitutional amendments, may also be proposed by citizens’ initiative and lead to a mandatory ballot vote (Switzerland, the United States, or German states).

In citizens’ initiative procedures, the agenda for issues and the proposals generally originate “bottom up” from some opposition or civil society groups that demand new political measures or legislation (law-promoting initiative) or object to a particular government project or legislative act (law-controlling initiative). In such a setting, the political initiative comes from social or minority forces, whereas governmental authorities are likely to be in a defensive position and want to defeat the proposals in a referendum vote.

Except for ad hoc referendum calls by governmental authorities, procedures of direct democracy, particularly citizen-initiated procedures, are regulated in various aspects. The area of admissible subject matters may be very restrictive, the number of signatures required for qualifying an initiative for a ballot vote may range from about 1% to one third of eligible voters, the time allowed for collecting signatures may be very short. Requirements for the validity of a popular vote may also vary from a majority of voters to qualified or double majorities or to specific turnout quorums. Usage will clearly be restrained by high initiating or validity requirements and initiating actors with strong resources will be privileged. Yet a higher level of approval may support the legitimacy of a vote.

**Countries and Developmental Background**

Provisions for direct-democratic instruments as well as their usage are distributed rather unevenly across continents, countries, and different levels of states.

**National Level**

On the national level, procedures and usage are most frequent in Europe and Latin America, whereas in Africa, Asia, or North America their number is small. Switzerland traditionally has the most elaborated system of direct democracy at the national, cantonal, and municipal levels. On the national level, mandatory referendums on constitutional amendments were introduced in 1848, citizen-demanded rejective referendums on new legislation of parliament in 1874, citizens’ initiatives on constitutional amendments in 1891, and mandatory referendums on major international treaties in 1921. Up to 2008, 222 mandatory referendums on constitutional and treaty issues, 162 rejective (“facultative”) referendums, and 165 citizen-initiated referendums on constitutional amendments have been held. On the lower levels, even more instruments are often available, such as the mandatory financial referendum and legislative citizens’ initiative. More than one of the instruments of direct democracy are also provided for and practiced on the national level in Uruguay and, more recently, in some of the Eastern European countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, or Hungary.

On the national level in most other countries, basically one specific instrument stands out. In Italy, for instance, most of the popular votes originated from citizens’ initiatives for an “abrogative referendum” to repeal an existing law or parts thereof (some 60 cases since 1970). In Australia and Ireland, only mandatory referendums on constitutional amendments are possible. In Austria, the national parliament can call a vote (used only
once). In the Fifth Republic of France, the president has the right to call a referendum on important matters of sovereignty and state structure since 2008; one fifth of the National Assembly in combination with 10% of the electorate can also do so. In many countries, governmental authorities call referenda not on a preregulated but on an ad hoc basis. The subjects of these referenda have included accession to the European Economic Community or to the European Union (EU), independence or national unity in Canada, and ratification of a new constitution or of an agreement for conflict or constitutional settlement in Bolivia, Chile, Kenya, Russia, Spain, and South Africa.

**Regional Level**

The level of regional states within federations also offers important examples of direct democracy. In particular, about half of the states in the United States provide citizens’ initiative rights and some other procedures that quite often allow referendum votes on public finance. In many of these states, including Oregon, California, Colorado, and North Dakota, citizens’ initiatives (introduced before 1914) are frequently used. In Germany, all regional states (Länder) have introduced citizens’ initiatives, which, on the average, are used less often due to more restrictive requirements. In the United States and in Germany, initiatives and referendums are available and frequently used on the municipal level as well. In some countries, including the Czech Republic, Japan, Norway, and Poland, initiatives and referendums are only possible at the municipal level.

**Paths to Direct Democracy**

In systems of representative democracy, the introduction of instruments of direct democracy is not very likely since they are regarded as undermining established power structures. The historical origins of direct democracy institutions can be distinguished in typical paths:

1. antioligarchic conflict, where initiative and referendum are directed against economic-political domination, like in Switzerland and the progressive movement in the Western states of the United States before 1914;

2. system transformation toward democracy, like in post-Fascist Italy (implementation delayed until 1970), in German regional states after dictatorships in 1945 and 1990, or in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s;

3. state independence, like in Ireland (1922/1937) or in Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia after Soviet or Yugoslav domination.

From the first two paths, initiative instruments with lower requirements quite often emerged, whereas national independence often coincided with requirements stressing majoritarian unity. The origins of referendums called by governmental authorities are much more dispersed since they are mainly regarded as under government control and, thus, less dangerous to the governmental system. Issues of state independence, but also accession of states to supranational organizations such as the EU, very often are dealt with in government-initiated or in mandatory referendums. The first instrument of direct democracy with a transnational character is the European Citizens’ Initiative of the Lisbon Treaty, entered into force on December 1, 2009 (Article 11.4), an agenda initiative that allows 1 million European citizens to propose legislation to the European Commission (without a referendum).

**Issues and Controversies**

Discussions on direct democracy institutions deal with several issues. The strongest normative grounds for direct democracy are the democratic principles of popular sovereignty, political equality, and all the arguments for participative democracy that support the idea that all citizens should have the right not only to elect representatives but also to vote on policy issues in referendums. Since assembly democracy cannot be an option in modern societies, direct democracy institutions are not regarded as a full-scale system alternative to representative democracy but as a supplement to or counterweight within democratic systems with major representative features. Nevertheless, the institutional difference and competition between representative and direct democratic processes lie at the core of the controversy whether direct democracy contributes to undermining representative democracy or can offer enrichments of democracy.
In general, representative democracy is often seen as superior because general elections give citizens an encompassing choice between alternative governments and complex and coherent programs, because governments and parliaments have greater capacity for informed decisions including expert judgment, and because representatives can be held accountable for their decisions. Arguments in support of direct democratic instruments refer to various aspects:

1. Direct democratic issue voting can, during terms of office, deal with issues that have not been discussed at general elections. Citizens’ initiatives in particular can enrich the political agenda and, thus, contribute to the function of political articulation and innovation. The range of political actors tends to be broader than already present in the party system.

2. Direct democracy also offers citizens additional and more specific instruments of political control during terms of office, particularly initiative proposals and citizen-demanded referendums to reject new legislation or delete existing laws.

3. One major area of controversy deals with information, competence, and the quality of decision making. While representative institutions may indeed hold intense deliberations on many subjects, direct-democratic decision-making processes can also provide for specific issues the opportunity of intense and widespread public debates, during which citizens can become informed about controversial value and factual considerations. Yet as voters are often described as badly informed and incompetent, the danger of manipulation by resourceful actors (parties, strong interest organizations, corporations, media) is a major issue. Design and regulations, however, can make a difference, for example, comparing Switzerland and U.S. states such as California, since Switzerland does not allow TV advertising in referendum campaigns. Hanspeter Kriesi (2005) and Daniel Smith and Caroline Tolbert (2004) especially found that, as a general trend, referendum debates and campaigns provide a major potential for dissemination of information and for political education. Important factors are a broader field of political actors in such campaigns and more intense communication of arguments in the media.

4. How voters select their choice in referendum voting attracted two rather opposite assumptions. According to one, party orientations might be simply duplicated in issue voting behavior; the other contends that interest groups, media, and even “demagogues” can influence voters strongly. The trend in the literature seems to be that the less informed parts of the electorate look for party orientation, while voters who are better informed and educated may take a more independent choice by using more arguments for forming opinions. Thus, as Ian Budge (1996) notes, direct democracy must not be unmediated, since governments and parties can also play an important mediating role. This may be particularly true when government authorities initiate a referendum vote in optional or mandatory referendums.

5. One promise of direct democracy is that more political participation can be realized. This is surely the case since more opportunities and occasions to debate policy issues and to vote in referendums are offered. Nevertheless, some criticism remains that the participation goal is not realized, particularly for social groups that also participate little in electoral politics. It is argued that in referendums turnout is often lower than in general elections and that referendums lead to a lower turnout in elections also. Yet this cannot be generalized since turnout varies significantly dependent on issues, for example, in Switzerland from 30% to around 80% of registered voters. In addition, when ballot votes regularly do not take place in conjunction with general elections (like in Switzerland), turnout variation will be stronger than when referendum votes are mostly held on election days (like in the United States). Other shortcomings of extended participation of direct democracy are seen in a “social bias,” where lower social strata with deficits in status, income, and education tend to be less motivated or competent to participate in discussions or in voting. Again, at least to some degree, this seems to be balanced by policy issues specifically relevant for these groups in which they participate to a larger degree.

Finally, if a larger share of citizens do not participate, but abstain from voting, legitimation problems in referendum votes may arise. In some jurisdictions, regulations respond by requiring a qualified majority for a valid vote in the form of turnout or approval quorums. The disadvantage of
turnout quorums is that, in turn, it invites even more abstentions and campaigns to abstain even from voting “no,” while approval quorums at least devaluate majority votes.

6. Direct democracy institutions have also been reflected in their relation to majorities and minorities. Citizen-initiated procedures are supposed to serve as potential instruments of minorities since they can present new proposals or demand a referendum on new legislation. This is likely to be true for placing issues on the agenda. In the referendum vote, however, the majority principle applies, which means that minority rights or interests can be endangered. Specific concerns relate to basic rights of minorities, which, however, can best be protected against offensive majority rule by constitutional guarantees, courts, and prereferendum constitutionality checks. Sometimes, the validity of referendum votes is regulated by qualified or double majorities to protect minorities. More generally, referendums can also support developments toward autonomy or even independence of regional “minority” populations.

7. Policy impacts of direct democratic decision making also received attention. Research on economic and financial effects at the regional and local levels of Swiss and U.S. direct democratic institutions found beneficial consequences in macroeconomic and fiscal performance. According to one thesis, strong interest groups will gain more from initiatives and referendums, whereas empirical economic studies, such as the one by John Matsusaka (2004), tend to find advantages rather with the broader population. In other policy issues such as the environment or moral topics, tentative and controversial evidence prevails.

8. Other consequences attributed to direct democracy refer to structural or system impacts on representative democracy or the overall system of democracy. In the case of Switzerland, particularly, it has been argued that direct democracy had a long-term effect toward a system of consensus democracy as opposed to majoritarian democracy. Mechanisms of consensus governments may indeed have developed to anticipate and integrate as many interests as possible, which otherwise might be able to initiate referendums against new legislation (instruments such as citizens’ initiatives and mandatory referendums would be less relevant here).

In other jurisdictions, however (e.g., in Italy or German or U.S. states), similar effects away from majoritarian party competition and toward consensus democracy could not be observed; in presidential systems such as in the U.S. states legislative majorities and the executive are disconnected anyway. Thus, generalizations from the Swiss example on a developmental logic toward consensus government should not be easily drawn.

One should keep in mind that government-initiated and government-controlled referendums may in many respects show distinct features from citizen-initiated procedures. Government-driven instruments tend to be more influenced by policy projects and campaign capacities of central political authorities. Citizen-initiated procedures are more open for minorities, participation, innovation, and government control, yet they are less likely to succeed in the ballot vote. Nevertheless, as a process, they tend to offer a greater potential for supplementing and balancing the institutional shortcomings and power structures of representative democracy. Particularly in times of political crises, direct democracy can provide an important function in offering channels for reactivating popular sovereignty as the fundamental value and force of democracy. This power of preserving the sources of popular sovereignty alone makes it worth while to keep direct democracy going under routine conditions of democracy.

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See also Democracy, Quality; Democracy, Theories of; Referenda; Representation

Further Readings
In recent decades, discontent, dissatisfaction, and alienation have been growing political phenomena in old, established democracies. At the same time, more and more countries have been defined as democratic. Democratization has also brought about a large number of so-called hybrid regimes. From these three different perspectives, the same question emerges: What is the quality of democracy in any specific country, and what does this tell us in terms of (a) how actual and deep the satisfaction or dissatisfaction is, (b) what is behind democratic appearances, and (c) how ambiguous cases can be turned into democracies by improving their quality? This entry focuses on the notion of quality, its key dimensions or qualities, and the mechanism of quality subversion as a key aspect to explore when dealing with this topic.

What Is Quality?

There are at least three main streams of literature dealing with this topic. A first group of scholars have been working on democratizations, consolidation, and crisis and in their analyses of democracy have also pointed out aspects related, directly or indirectly, to the topic. Among them are Guillermo O’Donnell with his notion of “delegative democracy,” Arend Lijphart with his thesis on the superiority of consensual democracy vis-à-vis majoritarian democracies in terms of implementing democratic quality, and David Altman and Aníbal Pérez-Liñan who refer to three aspects that draw on Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy (civil rights, participation, and competition). The second group of scholars focused on established democracies, especially those belonging to the Anglo-Saxon tradition—that is, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Among them, David Beetham (see especially David Beetham, Sarah Bracking, Iain Kearton, & Stuart Weir, 2002) developed an analysis in terms of audit—that is, a systematic assessment of institutional performance against agreed criteria and standards. The auditing procedure should follow four steps:

1. Identify appropriate criteria for assessment.
2. Determine standards of good or best practice that provide a benchmark for the assessment.
3. Assemble the relevant evidence from both formal rules and informal practices.
4. Review the evidence in the light of the audit criteria and defined standards to reach a systematic assessment.

A number of authors followed Beetham by implementing his framework in other countries, such as Canada and Australia (see, e.g., Marian Sawer, Norman Abjorensen, & Phil Larkin, 2009; see also Todd Landman, 2006).

The third stream is formed by a number of data banks, such as those of Polity IV, Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit, World Bank, and also the Bertelsmann Index, which provide measures of aspects related to democratic performance and, more generally, to the quality of democracy. The different data banks are massive efforts to provide scores and rank orders of a large number of countries or, in some cases (first and foremost Freedom House), of all existing independent countries on key aspects such as rule of law and freedom.

Thus, phenomena such as democratization processes and political science research paved the way for the development of a more systematic theoretical analysis of the quality of democracy, where a
key point is spelling out a clear notion of quality. A survey of the use of the term in the industrial and marketing sectors suggests three different meanings of quality:

1. Quality is defined by the established procedural aspects associated with each product; a “quality” product is the result of an exact, controlled process carried out according to precise, recurring methods and timing; here the emphasis is on the procedure.

2. Quality is defined by the structural characteristics of a product, be it the design, materials, or functioning of the good or other details that it features; here, the emphasis is on the content.

3. The quality of a product or service is indirectly derived from the satisfaction expressed by the customers, by their repeated requests for the same product or service, regardless of how it is produced or what the actual contents are or how the consumers go about acquiring the product or service; according to such a meaning, the quality is simply based on result.

The three different notions of quality are grounded in procedures, contents, or results. Each has different implications for empirical research. Importantly, even with all the adjustments demanded by the complexity of the object under examination—democracy—it is still necessary to keep these conceptualizations of quality in mind as definitions and models of democratic qualities are elaborated. The next questions, then, are “What is a quality democracy?” and, more precisely, “What are the procedural, content, and result qualities of a democracy?”

“Good” Democracy
A quality democracy or a “good” democracy presents a stable institutional structure that realizes the liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its institutions and mechanisms—that is, a good democracy is first and foremost a broadly legitimated regime that completely satisfies citizens (quality in terms of result); one in which the citizens, associations, and communities of which it is composed enjoy liberty and equality, even in different forms and degrees (quality in terms of content); and one in which the citizens themselves have the power to check and evaluate whether the government pursues the objectives of liberty and equality according to the rule of law (quality in terms of procedure).

Alternative normative definitions of democracy could be recalled, such as liberal democracy, responsive democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, associative democracy, egalitarian or social democracy, and good governance. However, regardless of what normative definition of democracy is accepted, empirical analysis tends to reveal the same specific features.

What Qualities?
Eight possible dimensions or qualities on which a “good” democracy might vary are at the core of the empirical analysis to cover the normative notions of democracy mentioned above. The first five are procedural dimensions. Though also relevant to the contents, these dimensions mainly concern the rules. The first procedural quality is the rule of law. The second and third procedural qualities regard the two forms of accountability (electoral and interinstitutional). The fourth and fifth are the classic participation and competition, which, however, have a special theoretical status (see below). The sixth and seventh dimensions are substantive in nature and deal with quality as defined in terms of content; The sixth is full respect for rights that are expanded through the achievement of a range of freedoms. The seventh is the progressive implementation of greater political, social, and economic equality. The final, eighth, dimension concerns the responsiveness or correspondence of the system to the desires of the citizens and civil society in general, and this is quality defined in terms of results. Some essential considerations about these dimensions have still to be added.

The institutions and mechanisms of representative democracies are actually the main objects of the empirical analysis of democratic qualities. This is not to ignore the direct democracy as the highest expression of democratic quality but to acknowledge the centuries-long empirical experience of representative democracies. If the analysis is to focus on representative democracies, then accountability—a
core feature in the representative democracy—becomes a truly central dimension insomuch as it grants citizens and civil society in general an effective means of control over political institutions. This feature attenuates the difficulties that exist objectively when there is a shift from direct to representative democracy.

The principal actors of such a democracy are the citizen-individuals, the territorial communities, and the various forms of associations with common values, traditions, or aims. In this sense, the possibility for good democracy exists not only in the case of a defined territory with a specific population controlled by state institutions under a democratic government but also for wider ranging entities. The main point is that the above-named subjects are at the heart of a democracy in which the most important processes are those that work from the bottom up, and not vice versa. In this way, the transfer of the analytical dimensions from the national level to the supranational level—though not uncomplicated and without difficulty—is possible.

It is particularly important to point out the specific empirical aspects to explore for each of the eight qualities. They are briefly summed up here.

**Quality in Terms of Procedure**

**Rule of Law**

If the rule of law is at stake, the relevant elements to examine are

1. individual security and civil order, with a focus on right to life, freedom from fear and torture, personal security, and right to own property guaranteed and protected through the country;
2. an independent judiciary and a modern justice system, focused on mechanisms establishing an independent, professional, and efficient judiciary system that allows equal access to justice, free of the undue pressures and enforcement of decisions;
3. institutional and administrative capacity to formulate, implement, and enforce the law, where the focus is on the governance system (parliament and government), the capability to ensure the production of quality legislation and the implementation through the country of a transparent policy-making process allowing for the participation of civil society, and the presence of a professional, neutral, accountable, and efficient state bureaucracy;
4. effective fight against corruption, illegality, and abuse of power by state agencies, where the focus is on the existence and implementation of the comprehensive legislative framework to prevent and fight the corruption; and
5. security forces that are respectful of citizen rights and are under civilian control; the focus is on the mechanisms of civilian control over security forces as well as on efficient, noncorrupted, disciplined police forces respectful of human and political rights.

**Electoral Accountability**

If the quality to analyze is electoral accountability, the best strategy for detecting it empirically is to refer to its most immediate conditions:

1. free, fair, and recurrent elections, with their specific procedural aspects;
2. plural and independent information;
3. freedom of the party organization and related aspects; and
4. the presence and stability of alternatives.

**Interinstitutional Accountability**

If the quality to analyze is interinstitutional accountability, the main subdimensions and indicators to explore refer to

1. legislative–executive relations, with special focus on the parliamentary opposition or the role of the legislative body;
2. constitutional courts;
3. ombudsmen;
4. audit courts; and
5. modes and extent of decentralization.

**Political Participation**

If political participation has to be considered, one should look at
1. identifying participation, to become a “part,” to revive, or to restate the belonging or identification with a group of a different sort and

2. instrumental participation, to try to achieve some goal.

So the basic forms in the case of conventional participation are referendum, electoral participation at the country and local levels, and membership and other forms of affiliation in political organizations and interest associations. In the case of nonconventional participation, the basic forms are strikes, demonstrations, and riots; there are other forms involving participation, in addition to forms of participation with regard to specific policies.

Political Competition

The basic salient subdimensions of political competition are the following:

1. competition among political and societal actors, characterized by freedom for all political parties to compete with each other and by fairness of political competition;
2. competition within political and societal actors; and
3. the output side of political competition.

Quality in Terms of Content

Freedom

The three main subdimensions of freedom are the following:

1. personal dignity,
2. civil rights, and
3. political rights.

For all of them, there is the existence of opportunity in the legal system of the country and the actual guarantee of each.

Equality

The guarantee and effective implementation of social, economic, and cultural rights helps reduce differences in those domains. In addition, when considering equality, other basic aspects to analyze include the following:

1. the allocation of economic resources within the population,
2. the extent of poverty,
3. the diffusion of education,
4. the existence of gender discrimination, and
5. the existence of ethnic discrimination.

Quality in Terms of Result

Responsiveness

Responsiveness refers to the legitimacy of government—that is, the citizens’ perception of responsiveness. In other words, the empirical aspects to consider should be the diffusion of attitudes favorable to the existing democratic institutions and the approval of their activities because of the assumption that attitudes of satisfaction show the effective perception by civil society of existing responsiveness. On this quality, limited resources and economic constraints on public spending affect the responsiveness of even the wealthiest countries. Likewise, the persistent problems posed by unemployment and immigration are also illustrative of the near impossibility of finding generally satisfactory, legitimate, and responsive solutions in contemporary democracies. Indeed, the situation is more and more characterized by discontent, dissatisfaction, fear of poverty, and general democratic malaise.

Recurrent Patterns of Subversion

A different, meaningful perspective on the analysis of qualities, above all a more realistic one, is to look at all the recurrent ways in which elites and citizens consciously or otherwise try to subvert those qualities for their political or private purposes. Here the eight qualities with their possible and often probable subversions are reviewed.

Rule of Law

Starting with the rule of law, first and foremost, a rigorous application of laws or, in certain cases,
the relationships with an only apparently efficient bureaucracy can have particularly negative consequences for the most socially weak and vulnerable members of society. Then, there is the possible use of the law as a genuine political “weapon.” Here, one can see a persistent and diffuse temptation for politicians to use the law against their adversaries if, for example, the opposition is condemned to remain as such for a long time and has no chance of electoral victory in the near future. Politicians are also tempted to use judicial acts to reinforce their own position against the opposition. In other cases, when there is collusion among politicians, the judges themselves, with the support of the media, are tempted to turn to the judiciary in retaliation for certain political decisions that they consider unacceptable. On a different level, there is also a growing tendency among individual citizens or economic groups to resort to the law to assert their own interests. Some scholars note this phenomenon as a “juridification” of contemporary democracy. Finally, and not altogether different, there is the popular and diffuse cultural attitude that interprets the law as a severe impediment to realizing one’s own interests that should be circumvented in any way possible. This attitude, which is common in various countries throughout the world from Southern Europe to Latin America, Eastern Europe, and also Asian democratic countries, extends from the popular to the entrepreneurial classes.

Accountability

With respect to electoral accountability, given the well-known opacity of political processes and the complexity of reality, politicians have ample opportunity to manipulate their contexts in such a way as to absolve themselves of any concrete responsibility. Accountability frequently becomes a catchphrase more connected to the image of a politician than to any decisions he or she may have taken or results he or she might have produced. Negative outcomes are easily justified by making reference to unforeseen events or by taking advantage of a favorable press to influence public opinion. At the same time, good results, obtained sometimes at the cost of sacrifices by the governed, might result in negative or punitive judgments for the governor at the time of the next elections. Thus, when a politician supports something that is unpopular but necessary for the welfare of the state, he may lose the support of the electorate. The very action, often ideological and instrumental, of parties or other components of the political opposition or even of media actors in a position to conduct public processes can, sometimes on inconsistent grounds, make the effective implementation of electoral accountability more difficult. The lack of clear distinctions between incumbent leaders and party leaders—the head of government often also controls the parties—means that parties, be they of the opposition or of the majority, are hindered in carrying out their role as watchdogs for their constituents. At the parliamentary level, party discipline is considered more important than accountability toward the electors and, in practice, the parliamentary majority supports the government without controlling it. Furthermore, there should also be a clear distinction between the responsible leader, either of the government or of the opposition, and the intermediate layers of party actors that range from militants to sympathizers. These latter should trigger a bottom-up process that gives direction to how parties should control the government or organize their opposition. However, recent empirical studies on party organization in a number of advanced democracies indicate an opposite trend, which is characterized by strong party leaders who act in collusion (instead of in competition) with other parties or party leaders. The most extreme scenario relating to this phenomenon is that parties, supported by public financing, effectively form “cartels” where the political opposition is actually disappeared.

Citizens in European countries encounter further difficulties in ensuring electoral accountability because of the existence of the supranational dimension created by the European Union (EU). The most fitting example of how governments in these countries avoid accountability is the well-known tactic of blame shifting. Here, the political responsibility for every unpopular decision taken by the government is shifted from the national to the European level, even if they concern clear-cut issues such as streamlining national administrations or reorganizing state finances to meet large national deficits. Governments or national politicians justify actions resulting in widespread public
opposition by claiming that their hands were forced by opposing coalitions in the Council of Ministers of the EU or in the European Council of prime ministers and chiefs of state or by votes in the European Parliament.

As José Maravall (1997) has discussed, there are many ways by which government leaders can avoid electoral accountability. At the same time, the absence or extreme weakness of interinstitutional accountability leaves electoral accountability as the only instrument for guaranteeing this dimension of quality democracy. The chances of exercising electoral accountability, however, are only periodic, and in some cases citizens must wait several years before the next elections. As O’Donnell (1994) notes, the result is that we obtain a “delegative democracy”—a democracy of poor quality in which the citizen casts his or her vote and is subsequently ignored until the next election. Citizens are left without any means of controlling corruption and bad government, and there are no other institutions really capable of guaranteeing interinstitutional accountability.

**Participation**

Participation can be subverted and constrained in a variety of subtle and overt ways in democracies around the world. Citizen dissatisfaction, passivity, indifference, and alienation are key reasons for the consequent sharp decline of voting and other forms of citizen participation. But the subversion of the meaning and consequence of participation can be seen when it is no longer spontaneous, voluntary, and free but instead comes to be influenced and even shaped by a different sort of elites. A key role in this can be played by television and other mass media. The so-called audience democracy is the main context of such pseudoparticipation. In fact, within a highly personalized politics where communication elites are very important and the political debate is transferred from institutional arenas to public opinion, effective participation has almost no room. Moreover, there are attempts to secure a controlled participation that may just take the form of obedient support for government actions. That is, there is an effort to get people to participate but only with behaviors that support the incumbent authorities.

Other forms of participation are discouraged, and this is not difficult in social and political contexts with a poor tradition of active, autonomous civil society. Participation compounded by various forms of violence is also a subverted way of “taking part” in politics. As suggested by Dahl some years ago (and, more recently, in 1998), a key, necessary, definitional element of democracy is a firm commitment to “the peaceful solution of conflicts.” Consequently, the use of violent means twists and distorts the very working of every democracy.

**Competition**

There are also a few recurrent patterns of subverting competition. The first one is the attempt to exclude competition in some area where the effective working of competition is supposed to have relevant consequences, for example, by making a pact between two parties participating in an election or by agreeing to exclude a priori a political actor, person, or group from fair participation in an election. Second, a distortion of competition can be the end result of inadequate implementation of rules regulating electoral campaigns and financial support for parties. A third, recurrent way of distorting the competition is in obfuscating the program and/or policy differences among parties or party coalitions. Collusive pacts between government and opposition may also be formed. Especially in hybrid regimes, competition can be seriously subverted if leaders and parties are able to arbitrarily control the implementation of rules, especially the electoral ones, or are able to constrain pluralism of information. Finally, use of violence is another way of subverting the competition among political actors.

**Freedom, Equality, and Responsiveness**

Without going into details, freedom and equality are subverted when they are merely formally acknowledged as rights but not put into practice. The failure to allocate the funding needed for implementation of these rights is one common barrier to their realization. Responsiveness can also be subverted when citizens are not adequately informed about the impact of political actions, as
such information is at the root of the formation of responsiveness perceptions.

Empirical research on the varieties of ways the dimensions or qualities can be subverted can also make it possible to detect the democracies with lesser or without qualities and even to understand from a different perspective how and why problems of delegitimation and eventually related problems of consolidation can emerge in the scrutinized country.

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See also Accountability, Electoral; Accountability, Interinstitutional; Competition, Political; Democracy, Theories of; Democratization; Equality; Equality, Political; Human Rights, Comparative Perspectives; Hybrid Regimes; Participation; Responsiveness; Rights; Rule of Law; Transition

Further Readings


Democracy, Theories of

Theories of democracy consist of definitions and generalizations used to describe, explain, and evaluate existing or past political orders. Their purpose is thus twofold: (1) to get a better understanding of the preconditions and performance of democratic systems and (2) to try to judge this reality according to certain democratic core values.

Democracy means collective self-determination. Its purpose is to form political decisions according to the will of the citizens. Apart from this rather abstract meaning, there is a great difference between ancient and modern democracy. The first section of this entry recapitulates the mainly negative use of democracy in ancient thought and the development from the ancient to the modern understanding of democracy, outlining three semantic transformations from the ancient to the modern understanding. The second section focuses on contemporary theories of democracy, distinguishing three types: empirical, positive, and normative. Finally, two different answers to the postnational challenge of democracy are outlined: the concepts of global democracy and postdemocracy.

Ancient and Modern Theories of Democracy

Ancient Critics of Democracy

In ancient political theory, “democracy” was a polemic and negative concept. In the late 5th century BCE, Pseudo-Xenophon, the first Athenian critic of democracy we know of, calls it a regime in which the many rule in a selfish and destructive manner. Democratic men strive for their personal gain, and to this end, they not only suppress the aristocratic best and the population of the naval colonies but also rule without regard to the common weal. According to Pseudo-Xenophon, this leads to an unjust political and moral order. However, he does not deny a certain rationality of the democratic regime insofar as the many live better in a democracy than in an aristocratic best and the population of the naval colonies but also rule without regard to the common weal. According to Pseudo-Xenophon, this leads to an unjust political and moral order. However, he does not deny a certain rationality of the democratic regime insofar as the many live better in a democracy than in an aristocratic best and the population of the naval colonies but also rule without regard to the common weal. According to Pseudo-Xenophon, this leads to an unjust political and moral order. However, he does not deny a certain rationality of the democratic regime insofar as the many live better in a democracy than in an aristocratic best and the population of the naval colonies but also rule without regard to the common weal. According to Pseudo-Xenophon, this leads to an unjust political and moral order. However, he does not deny a certain rationality of the democratic regime insofar as the many live better in a democracy.
Pseudo-Xenophon, he describes the supposed shortcomings of the democratic regime, such as rhetorical betrayal and demagoguery. Because the many cannot know the political areté, they are merely a pawn for the sophists who are interested only in their personal gain. To counter these democratic practices, Plato formulates his model of the philosopher-king, which is founded in an epistemic understanding of politics. For Plato, good politics is based on higher knowledge, which only the few with special philosophical talent and training can attain.

There are at least two problems with this fusion of politics and philosophy. The first is its metaphysical character. Plato bases his political philosophy in an idealistic framework dubious even to his contemporaries. The second problem is the utopian character of the philosopher-king, as Plato himself mentioned in the * Politieia*. Democratic practices and norms are very widespread in the Athenian demos, so his model is simply not realizable. Therefore, Plato argues in the * Laws* for a second-best regime. It is no longer the philosopher-king who is to guarantee the good order but a system of laws that regulate even the smallest details. To integrate the many into the regime, he considers democratic modes of decision making, such as the participation of the many in elections and even drawing lots. However, these concessions to democratic practices do not mean that Plato has abandoned his aristocratic ideals. Democratic institutions are subordinated to exclusive ones, thereby thwarting the rule of the many.

Aristotle’s reflections on democracy differ from Plato’s in at least two ways. First, he develops his insights by examining the empirical world. Second, he transcends Plato’s dichotomies of philosophy and democracy, the few and the many, and formulates a more integrated and therefore realistic understanding of the political world. Aristotle even concedes that the democratic order displays some rationality insofar as the many, if they deliberate together, can obtain more information than an oligarchic assembly can. Nevertheless, he is no friend of democracy. In *Politics*, he criticizes the democratic order of Athens, which he regards as “extreme,” and as Pseudo-Xenophon does, he criticizes demagoguery and the tendency of the demos to neglect the common weal. Therefore, Aristotle argues for a more moderate constitution, the “polity,” which he sometimes also calls the “best” democracy. This constitution is characterized by the rule of law, and oligarchic and democratic institutions are mixed. In this regime, a strong separation exists between the political experts—that is, the educated few, who are chosen mainly by elections and not by lot, and the orderly demos. With this conception, Aristotle abandons the Athenian praxis of direct democracy and moves in the direction of a modern, representative understanding of democracy.

In short, for these “intellectual critics of popular role” (Josiah Ober, 1998), the democratic praxis of the ancient world with the direct involvement of the demos was unjust and highly pathological. This assessment did not change after the decline of the Grecian city-states at the end of the 4th century BCE. On the contrary, this change further supported the antidemocratic bias of political thought. The reference point was no longer the political praxis of the city-states but the antidemocratic writings of Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle. In the Roman discussion and the political theory of the Middle Ages, democracy was not only regarded as a regime of the past but also as an illegitimate order. In the early-modern age, this critical or even negative assessment of democracy changes only slightly. Until the end of the 18th century, the pejorative connotation of “democracy” dominated political thought. However, after the “democratic” revolutions of the late 18th century, there was a new beginning in democratic theory. It was a beginning that fundamentally changed the semantics of democracy from the direct involvement of the masses to a system in which elected representatives rule.

This shift in meaning from the antique to the modern concept of democracy was carried out in a multistage process of transformation. The basic semantic changes concern the evaluation, temporalization, and institutionalization of the concept of democracy and can be described with the terms *positivation*, *futurization*, and *completion*.

**Three Semantic Transformations of “Democracy”**

**Positivation**

In the ancient theories of Plato and Aristotle as well as Cicero and Polybius, “democracy” was a negative concept. All major primary sources from which the ancient concept of democracy is handed
down to us are by critics, if not enemies, of democracy. Their critique was vehement, and their list of democracy’s shortcomings contained, as shown, very different points: It permits unqualified citizens to participate in politics, it complicates political decision-making processes, it produces bad decisions, it debauches the political culture, or it is simply an amoral order—just to mention the most important points of criticism. This negative usage of the concept continued uninterrupted from the Middle Ages to modern times, and only in the writings of Spinoza and in the political speeches of some Dutch Republican thinkers in the 1780s can one find attempts to give democracy a positive designation. This positive connotation of democracy gradually became accepted after the French Revolution and then in the course of the extension of suffrage in the United States, Western Europe, New Zealand, and Australia in the 19th century. This process was accompanied by ideological disputes that ended in the mid-20th century. Today, the transformation to a positive concept is complete at least in Western society; the concept has developed into a category of self-description in global political disputes. While democracy in modern democracies has many critics, it no longer has any fundamental enemies, at least in the Western world.

Futurization

Even the political thinkers of Hellenism and later Roman authors such as Cicero regarded democracy as a form of government of a bygone era. They considered it a thing of the past and associated it with the existence of small city-states of the lost world of ancient Greece. If only for that reason, and regardless of its negative aspects, authors such as Baron de Montesquieu, John Locke, or the writers of the Federalist Papers did not think it a serious option as a concept for the political future. Admittedly, Montesquieu arrives at a positive understanding of democracy in his *Spirits of the Laws*, but he binds the idea of democracy so tightly to the prerequisites of equality and rurality that there is no room for a democratic order in his age with its advancing economical and social differentiation. For him, democratic practices could only be a subordinate element in a mixed regime. Montesquieu’s understanding is typical for the equation of democracy with the praxis of the ancient city-states. For him, democracy was a regime of the past and not a realistic option for the future. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel had a more positive view of the contemporary meaning of ancient democracy, but since the liberation of the subjective mind, he too was unsure of its future. Even authors such as Johannes Althusius and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose theories ventured to take big steps toward positivation, were rather cautious concerning a realistic future for democracy.

It was only with Alexis de Tocqueville's book on America that a political rhetoric prevailed that turned around the structure of time dominating in most contemporaries’ minds and enabled them to see democracy as a project of the future. In Tocqueville’s view, North America was already mostly a democracy, and Europe would soon be predominantly a democracy as well, as problematic as he felt this tendency to be. This futurization made the concept of democracy a key term for the political battles of the 19th and 20th centuries. This perspective electrified enemies as well as proponents of democracy, the former because they now faced a challenge that laid claim to the future, the latter because they had a feasible political project with the name “democracy” before them. Today, the futuristic character of democracy is undisputed. Democracy is a project on perfecting in which we all cooperate, in the hope of one day accomplishing it completely.

Completion

Third, the concept of democracy underwent a fundamental change in its institutional inventory. While there was a primacy of political participation in antiquity, slowly a constitutional usage prevailed that systematically restricted the moment of direct participation. It is the transition, so welcomed by Benjamin Constant, from the freedom of the old to the freedom of the new at the beginning of the 19th century that makes this paradigmatic rupture apparent. The change from a negative to a positive evaluation of the concept of democracy coincides historically with the transition to a primacy of liberal defensive rights and the installation of a representative system. Democracy is now regarded as an institutional
order that must be complemented by a system of “checks and balances” so that negative freedom—the protection of the individual from decisions by the democratic majority—is secured. Accordingly, the list of proposals of how the institutions of democracy should be complemented is long and bears witness to a high level of institutional creativity on the part of contemporary authors. The most important ones are constitutionalism (e.g., independence of the judiciary, a coherent legal system), different models for the separation of powers, federalism, and multistage representative systems.

It is only because of these three semantic transformations that a concept of democracy, which stands in such conspicuous discrepancy to its original usage in antiquity, could survive. In view of the great shifts in meaning, it is hard to answer the obvious question of why the concept of “democracy” was not simply given up, instead of being intricately filled with new meanings. Its astounding ability to survive can probably be explained best by the attraction of associations inspired by the parts of the Greek compound—“demos” and “kratein.” The rhetorical reference to “the people” and their “rule” constitutes a—however weakened—reference to participatory components in political systems and provides them with mass legitimacy.

Modern Theories of Democracy

Empirical, Positive, and Normative Theories of Democracy

There are different ways to comprehend the extensive and confusing debates of modern theories of democracy. Basically, the discussions can be grouped in two approaches: diachronic and synchronic ones. The first approach traces the historical development of democratic thought. The purpose of this method is to detect the crucial steps and the striking changes of democratic thought. The “advancements” of modern theories of democracy are shown, for example, the history of the concept of representative democracy from John Locke to Robert A. Dahl. In the second approach, theories of democracy are condensed to models or paradigms, for example, liberal or republican theories. The purpose of this method is to compare the different models and to rank them. This ranking can take place according to their degree of accordance with the institutions of liberal democracy or the requirements of global governance. However, there is another distinction underlying these differences. It concerns the scientific modality of the theories, the way they look at democracy. Therefore, one can distinguish between three “logical” modes of democratic theory: the empirical, the positive, and the normative type.

Empirical Theories of Democracy

Empirical theories of democracy try to rank political systems according to a scale of democratic values and institutions or to determine the necessary functional preconditions of democratic systems and measure how such systems perform.

The goal of the first group is to construct reliable and standardized scales in order to obtain a yardstick for comparing different political systems that can then be ranked according to their degree of democracy. Dahl wrote the classical study in 1971. Dahl formulates seven indicators of a “polyarchy,” which in his view is the modern form of democracy: (1) the freedom to form and join organizations, (2) freedom of expression, (3) the right to vote, (4) the right of political leaders to compete for support, (5) alternative sources of information, (6) free and fair elections, and (7) institutions for making government policies responsive. The points of reference for these democratic standards are, on the one hand, the norms and institutions of Western democracies and, on the other, normative theories of democracy, which try to justify these norms and institutions. In the next step, Dahl measures political systems according to these indicators and then orders them, applying a scale ranging from full polyarchies to near-polyarchies to nonpolyarchical systems. Dahl’s empirical finding is that the Western democracies are not the only full polyarchies but also countries such as India and Costa Rica.

Dahl’s work inspired many empirical studies based on different theoretical foundations. Especially in recent years, measuring democracy has become a burgeoning academic pursuit. The discussion is this field is focused on adequate indicators of democracy and their application in empirical research. At this point, a fundamental problem of measuring democracy arises: The selected indicators as well as
their operationalization rest on more or less carefully considered normative assumptions about the nature of democracy (see below).

A second group of empirical theories tries to analyze the functional preconditions and the performance of democratic systems. Their starting point is the sociological theory of modernization, which in the 1950s asserted that the connection between economic development and the political system of societies was narrow. In 1960, Seymour Martin Lipset wrote one of the first studies in this field. He investigated the connection between the degree of democratization and social-economic variables such as average income or level of education. His main result confirmed the theory of modernization: The higher the level of economic development, the more democratic a society will be. Many scholars have followed Lipset and, with some variations in research design, have come to similar conclusions. Compared with autocratic systems, democratic ones perform much better in most policy areas (e.g., health care, education, or environmental resource management). Such research can be carried out contrasting democracies with other political orders such as monarchies or one-party systems. Another way is to estimate the performance of different subtypes of democratic systems, for example, parliamentarian or presidential systems.

**Positive Theories of Democracy**

Positive theories of democracy construct formal models of the democratic process, for example, voting behavior. They do not involve empirical study of the workings of real democracies but rather are deductive theories of political processes under constructed conditions, such as the rationality of agents or the closed logic of functional systems. Their starting points are certain axioms that are used as a basis for developing the main characteristics of democratic systems. In contrast to empirical theories, neither the basic assumptions nor the causal or functional explanations of positive theories claim to be normative. Rather, the authors of positive theories explicitly do not want to formulate normative statements; they seek only to characterize the democratic process and to explain typical political sequences in modern democracies.

There are two versions of positive democratic theories, and they focus on the opposite ends of the democratic process: One is based on the findings of rational choice theories; the other is Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory. Rational choice theories focus on the microlevel of society and start with the assumption that individual actors are mainly motivated to maximize their personal gains. With the same theoretical grounding, they try to explain the political actions of collective actors such as political parties, interest groups, and even states. In contrast, systems theory begins on the macrolevel of society. Luhmann regards the different realms of society, for example, the economy, the political sphere, or the scientific community, as distinct and self-contained systems and analyzes their structures as well as their functions for the whole of society. Individual actions are outside of the theory’s focus, they are simply irrelevant. In Luhmann’s view, systems function according to their own logic, which is independent of the actions of individual persons.

Even though rational choice theory and systems theory try to avoid normative claims, they nevertheless possess enormous critical potential because they demonstrate two shortcomings of democracy: the irrationality of democratic decision making and the constrained range of political actions. One of the most important normative arguments for democratic modes of decision making is the assumption that one can determine the correct will of the majority in this way. However, according to the findings of Moisei Ostrogorski, one of the forerunners of rational choice theory, this is a myth. The Ostrogorski paradox shows that even the smallest changes in voting behavior can lead to big differences in voting results. This finding is explosive from a normative point of view because it casts doubt on the legitimacy of majority decisions. Besides that, rational choice theory does not regard irrational decision as deviations from democratic norms but as the inevitable result of the aggregation of individual votes or of the merging of different forms of rationality in the political process.

Similar statements can be made about the findings of systems theory. Although Luhmann regards democratic political systems as the appropriate form of modern, functionally differentiated societies, he criticizes the normative bias of democratic
practices. In his view, the political system in modern societies is no longer at the top of a pyramid but is just one system among others, with a code of its own. In addition, this code of government and opposition cannot be transferred into other functional systems, for example, the economic or the juridical system, without harm. Therefore, the effects of democratic politics are limited. According to Luhmann, democratic imperatives simply cannot govern the other functional spheres, the code of government and opposition can only irritate, at worst destroy, the reproduction of the other systems. The function of the political system and its democratic form is thus only to reproduce the necessary illusion that a society can be governed by collective decisions.

In contrast to empirical and positive theories, normative approaches try to formulate convincing justifications of democratic orders. The goal of normative approaches is to deliver criteria for praising or criticizing normative and institutional orders. In this way, empirical theories can use their findings to evaluate existing political systems. Normative theories explicitly do not strive for ethical neutrality or freedom from value judgment. Far from it, these value-based justifications are seen as an essentially scientific endeavor. Some scholars cast doubts on the scientific character of normative approaches due to this ethical grounding. However, as seen, even positive and empirical theories are not value-free, and it can be said that normative justifications elucidate the inescapable nature of any type of democratic theory.

The Three Normative Axes of Theories of Democracy

Normative theories of democracy differ from each other, too, in regard to the way they are reasoned as well as in their institutional consequences. In the past 20 years, we have witnessed a tremendous differentiation and refinement of the traditional models. In addition to the classical approaches of liberal, elitist, conservative, socialist, and participatory theories of democracy, deliberative, neorepublican, neoliberal, communitarian, cosmopolitan, associative, feminist, ecological, experimental, multiculturalist, and postmodern theories have come along, to mention only the most important ones. The subjects of the normative theories are by now all imaginable aspects of democracy: its traditions, goals, institutional settings, and procedures. Normative theories have been and still are largely influenced by political fashions whose themes are at the center of scientific debates. Therefore, a listing and sorting of these debates offers only little orientation in the jungle of the numerous normative theories.

Rather than simply listing them, it is more helpful to ask how normative theories proceed in assessing real or hypothetical political arrangements as “democratic.” In other words, how do they construct the criteria that are to generate normative statements about political systems and procedures? Obviously, the development of theses criteria does not take place in a vacuum but is incorporated in certain political experiences and assumptions about the central problems of democracy. Thus, they have historical underpinnings. The forms of those experiences and assumptions that have structured the debates in the past 3 decades can be named the “three normative axes of theories of democracy.”

The Social Object of Democracy

On the first axis, the discussions concern the social spheres in which democratic norms should and could apply. The recent debates about the appropriate social object of democracy focus on four issues. Common to them is an inclusive perspective—that is, the integration of additional social spheres under democratic rule. An initial focus in the 1970s was the call to democratize further realms of society, especially the economy, the workplace, and educational organizations. These demands found a certain resonance in theories of “strong” or “radical” democracy. In the 1980s and 1990s, feminist theories of democracy were a second focal point. Starting from the empirically based assumption of a “gender gap” in modern democracies, their goal is to include females and female perspectives in the political process. In most feminist approaches, the fulfillment of this demand is connected with a qualitative advancement of politics and policies. These positive expectations are related to a new, more communicative style of politics and a political agenda directed to making family life and the working environment more compatible in modern societies. In a third debate
about inclusion, and in parallel to the feminist theories of democracy, various concepts of multicultural democracy have been developed. Based on the observation that minorities in liberal democracies are discriminated in many ways and that they are not adequately represented, the purpose of multiculturalist approaches is to integrate the different collective identities in the political sphere. The proposals for reform are centered on the opening of existing institutional arrangements. Some authors propose special mechanisms of group representation or quotas that have to be balanced with the liberal-democratic demand for equality.

In a fourth and more recent discussion, some authors argue for an inclusion of children, future generations, and even apes in the democratic process. At the very least, the demand to consider the interests of apes in political decision making, which seems odd at first glance, highlights the difficulties of obtaining adequate criteria for limiting the social object of democracy. In the semantics of “democratization,” democracy is in principle a never-ending process during which its boundaries and goals must be discussed again and again.

**Degree and Ways of Participation**

On the second axis, normative theories of democracy formulate statements about the optimal degree of participation and the ideal relationship between the entire demos and the political elites. The focus of all relevant controversies about democracy during the 20th century was the degree and the forms of citizens’ involvement in the political process: the debates between the advocates of government by council democracy and those of parliamentarism in the 1920s and again in the 1970s, the political disputes between the champions of a Fascist leader and their Liberal and Leftist adversaries in the 1930s, the controversy between the advocates of a representative and those of a plebiscitary democracy in the 1960s and in the 1980s, or the dispute between the theorists of an elite democracy and those of a grassroots democracy in the late 1960s and early 1970s and again in the 1990s. In all those debates, it was and still is contested how the demos is to be included in the process of political decision making. Authoritarian concepts consider the process of acclamation to the charismatic leader to be the genuine democratic way of declaring consent; liberal and elitist conceptions link their versions of democracy with the principle of representation and elections; and theorists of a grassroots democracy or of a government by council democracy support the idea of an intensely participating citizen.

While the controversy about the pros and cons of a higher degree of citizen participation in the 1970s and 1980s were hot-tempered and ideologically based, it has cooled down since then. One of the main reasons for this development is the findings of empirical research on direct democracy. Neither the hopes of the advocates nor the fears of the adversaries have been fulfilled. The empirical results show instead that procedures of direct democracy can lead to a higher degree of citizen satisfaction and rational problem solving in certain cultural and institutional contexts, but they can also be used as an instrument of populism. Because of these complex and contradictory findings of empirical research, the question about the forms of citizen involvement is no longer at the center of normative theories of democracy. By now, the mainstream literature focuses on the institutions of democracy and the question of their performance. This leads us to the third axis.

**Degree of Rationality**

On a third normative axis, theories of democracy finally contain certain assumptions about the degree of rationality of democratic decision making. They make statements about the technical and factual reasonableness of democratic decisions and even about their moral quality. Thus, conservative and liberal critics have frequently accused democracy of leading to irrational decisions. Leftist advocates of democracy, on the other hand, have considered the democratic character to be the ultimate condition that makes correct and therefore rational decisions possible. Only in recent discussions have these factional struggles faded away.

The rise of the theory of deliberative democracy in the past 2 decades has demonstrated that the question of rationality has gained relevance significantly. Deliberation is the exhaustive and reflective debate about political questions. The deliberative give-and-take of arguments aims to elucidate individual and collective interests. More ambitious forms of deliberative democracy do not
stop at this point and demand of the participants that they transcend their own wishes in view of new moral insights. This change of the guiding interests is attributed to the public nature of deliberative processes and is characterized as a clarification and moral bettering of preferences. Although the goal is not to discover an unchangeable moral truth, the expectation is that in the deliberative process all arguments that serve only private goals can be eliminated. For this reason, advocates of deliberative democracy claim that its results have a higher degree of legitimacy than elections and voting.

Theories of deliberative democracy stand against two alternative theories. On the one hand, they criticize rational choice conceptions of the aggregation of preferences and insist that preferences can change in communicative processes. On the other hand, deliberative approaches fault models of democracy that demand a higher degree of participation without showing how the citizen can gain the moral resources required for this ambitious endeavor.

The institutional implications of deliberative approaches go in three directions. The first is directed toward the individual citizen. According to Robert E. Goodin, each member of the political community should reflect on the moral implications of his or her preferences (“deliberation within”). The practical consequence of this approach is the demand that all citizens receive a better education, which is to lead to higher sensibility for the moral interests of the other citizens. A second strain argues in connection with Jürgen Habermas for the deliberative character of political institutions as representative assemblies and channels of the public sphere. These approaches do not strive for a basic change of the political institutions but for a widening of the deliberative character of liberal democracies, for example, in strengthening the discursive character of parliaments, or for enhancing the rationality of public debates. Other authors argue for institutional innovations within liberal democracy. One prominent suggestion is the deliberative opinion poll by James Fishkin, where randomly selected citizens discuss political questions in a deliberative setting. The results of these deliberations can inform the elected authorities or even lead directly to political decisions.

A third and more radical version is not satisfied with such a deliberative interpretation of existing societies but argues for changes in the basic structures of liberal democracies to achieve the moral goals of deliberative democracy. They criticize the different forms of exclusion in modern societies that are still relevant in deliberative settings. Therefore, they demand a democratization of all of society as a prerequisite for deliberative procedures. These radical approaches have some obvious connections with theories of participation and grassroots theories of democracy, and they support a politicization of civil society.

Interplay of Empirical and Normative Theories and the Rationalization of Democracy

Empirical and normative theories of democracy are of course not entirely separated. As seen, empirical theories draw their criteria for assessing the democratic nature of political systems from theories about the essential norms and institutions of democracy, such as Dahl’s. Empirical democracy research is assisted by systems theory and rational choice theory, each of which in its own way theoretically deduces why political participation in modern mass democracies is nearly without effect and ultimately makes no sense at all. Nevertheless, this is only one side of their influencing one another; contemporary normative theories in turn are oriented to the findings of empirical research on theories of democracy.

All normative approaches that can currently claim scientific relevance follow the findings of empirical democratic theory. In the academic debate about democracy, no idea is taken seriously if it does not demonstrate its ability to be connected to empiricism and thus its proximity to reality. Thus, the findings of empirical research on democracy, for example, on the degree of political interests or on the irrationality of most citizens’ political preferences, produce subliminal but nonetheless powerful pressure on the making of normative theories. In this perspective, democracy becomes a regime type that produces a certain amount of legal certainty, cultural and educational goods, welfare, and other collective goods (recently, above all, security from terrorism) but that has lost the active political participation of its citizens.

With this result, normative democracy theory again provides the justification for empirical democracy research in which rule of law and the
production of welfare and stability constitute the most important parameters, more important than the participation of all citizens: At best, participation is used as a dependent variable. The indices of empirical democracy measurement stubbornly test for certain institutionalizations, for example, the existence of individual rights or of the basic building blocks of a parliamentary democracy with separation of powers. The participatory component has become a ballast of the concept of democracy, standing in the way of its continued success. When reviewing the most important approaches in current political theory, one notices—despite all the differences—a common terminological shift with which the path to a fourth and new semantic transformation in democratic theory was paved. Most current theories use a concept of democracy that discerns deep chasms between political participation and “rational” results and, when in doubt, argues against political participation. This transformation can be described as the “rationalization” of democratic theory. It means that the focus of modern theories of democracy has shifted to the evaluation of the quality of the results of politics. Democratic theory is becoming more and more output oriented, and its normative efforts’ main goal is to increase the degree of rationality of this output. Larger differences within this paradigm occur only where the following criteria of rationality are concerned: effectiveness, feasibility, representation of interests, justice, or the public weal. Political participation is no longer regarded as the goal but as one of several possible ways to enhance the degree of rationality of collectively binding decisions.

**The Future of Democratic Theory: Global Democracy or Postdemocracy?**

One of the most important motivations to “rationalize” democracy is the decline of the nation-state in the era of globalization. In the past 2 decades, we have witnessed a displacement of political decisions from the national to the international or supranational level. This is of course a reaction to the growing need for global coordination of economic and political processes. The answer to this postnational constellation is the development and strengthening of regimes and organizations as means for “global governance.” The most impressive of these supranational organizations is the European Union (EU) with a huge amount of political competencies. However, even at the global level, there is a large variety of regimes and organizations for coordinating international politics. One only has to think about the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization to comprehend the relevance of international organizations for the well-being of nearly every person on the planet. However, these global economic multilaterals are only the best known organizations of global governance. It seems that the era of the nation-state has gone; at least the political power of the states to determine the lives of their citizens has been weakened drastically in the past 20 years. This raises the question as to whether postnational forms of democracy are imaginable.

**Theories of Global Democracy**

The process of globalization is a major challenge for democratic theory because most of the conceptions discussed above—with the exception of deliberative democracy, see below—have taken the national base of democracy for granted. In addition, the all-important institutions of modern democracy such as elections, parliaments, political parties, and the public sphere are embedded in the nation-state. Nevertheless, the era of the democratic nation-state seems to be coming to an end. Accordingly, there is a growing literature on the question of the democratization of global governance. One of the issues discussed most is how to transform the democratic institutions and procedures to the supranational and even the global level. At least three strains of the debate about democracy in the global order can be discerned.

The first group of authors doubts that the new structures of global governance are responsible for the significant decline of democracy we are witnessing today. In contrast, the second group begins by asserting a fundamental democratic deficit and tries to transfer the values and institutions of national democracy to the supranational and global sphere. In addition, a third group makes the effort to change the semantics of democracy in order to demonstrate the perspectives global governance may open up for democracy. In the context of the debate about a so-called democratic
deficit of the EU, but also in view of the institutional structures of world politics, authors such as Giandomenico Majone and Andrew Moravcsik argue that this accusation is misleading for two reasons. First, there exists a kind of legitimating chain from the direct or indirect election of national parliaments and governments up to the supranational institutions such as the European Commission. It is a kind of political delegation of power from the constituents in each country to their national representatives and delegates in the transnational or global settings. Therefore, even the World Trade Organization is considered democratically responsive. In a second and supporting way, Majone and Moravcsik argue that many of the supranational and transnational institutions of world politics are directed toward technical issues that should be depoliticized. Examples include the world finance institutions or the European Central Bank or institutions occupied with juridical and economic issues. In these authors’ view, it is in the interest of the people that experts manage these issues, because only they have the necessary knowledge. It is a governing not by but for the people. Countering this opinion, many scholars have objected that they have overlooked the fact that juridical and economic issues of global governance are inevitably political. Moreover, without the involvement of the people, there is the risk that these bodies of experts will consider only the interests of strong actors.

Thus, in contrast to Majone and Moravcsik, a second group of authors such as David Held and Daniele Archibugi begins by claiming that there is a real democratic deficit in global governance. Their theoretical background is the norms and institutions of national democracy, and they try to ascertain how these norms and institutions can be transformed to the supranational and even the global sphere. Only if the global order can be subjected to democratic values, such as the equality of citizens, the majority principle, and the duty of governments to act in the interests of the people, can the new forms of governance be legitimate. The crucial question in the global age therefore is, “How can democracy preserve its core values and yet adapt to new circumstances and issues?” (Archibugi, 2004, p. 446). The answer to this question is the concept of cosmopolitan democracy, which is conceived as a multilevel order. There should be different degrees of democratic participation at the local, national, interstate, supranational, and global levels. In the concept of a cosmopolitan democracy, the participation of the people at the local and the national levels is to follow the traditional understanding of democratic norms, institutions, and practices, but this is also demanded regarding the supranational and the global levels. Advocates of cosmopolitan democracy argue that there is an emerging global public sphere, consisting of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International, as well as a global media system. Even if these structures do not fulfill the demands of a democratic public sphere, they are at least the necessary conditions for strengthening and increasing the transparency and accountability of global politics. However, these are only the pre-conditions of a cosmopolitan democracy. Both at the supranational and the global levels, parliamentary institutions are regarded as the cornerstone of a democratic order. For the advocates of a cosmopolitan democracy, a world parliament is thus the sine qua non. This parliament is to be elected by all citizens of the world (at least those of democratic states) and have the right to make legislation valid worldwide. One of the logical necessities of this model is therefore a new understanding of the role of states. They are no longer sovereign actors but only one vehicle of the democratic governance of the people. Some authors even foster the notion of a world-state, and therefore some kind of world government, to implement global justice and democratic demands. Opponents of cosmopolitan democracy fundamentally doubt the prospects of a democratic world order. They refer mainly to the structure of power in world politics and to the enormous obstacles to the participation of the people in global governance. Nearly 6 billion voters, for example, would elect a world parliament. How can one guarantee the representative nature of this parliament? In addition, what about the populations of nondemocratic systems—today nearly three quarters of the world’s population? The critics of cosmopolitan democracy view even the global public sphere and INGOs critically. For others, the project of cosmopolitan democracy is just a new way to establish and strengthen the hegemonic power of the West and the values and practices of a new global class as cosmopolitanism of the few.
A third group also begins by claiming a democratic deficit in global governance, but, in contrast to the advocates of cosmopolitan democracy, they do not want to transfer the institutions of national democracy to the global level. Instead, these authors try to reconsider the notion of democracy in order to close the legitimacy gap in world politics. There are at least two ways of redescribing democracy along these lines. The first consists in highlighting new ways of political engagement. According to authors such as Ann-Marie Slaughter, international non-INGOs are the representatives of a global demos. Together with the postulate of a growing global public sphere and a growing process of juridical constitutionalization, INGOs are seen as an essential component of a new democratic world order. Their inclusion in the processes of global governance, for example, in the hearings of the World Trade Organization, is seen as a crucial step toward the democratization of international politics. Critics have countered this scenario by arguing that a global public sphere and a vivid array of international civil actors are only the precondition but not the essence of democracy. Others criticize the oligarchic structure of most of the INGOs and that they mostly articulate the demands of the rich countries of the Western world. The question therefore is, Who has authorized these organizations? Furthermore, critics object that the influence of the INGOs in international politics should not be overestimated. According to these critics, world politics is a game played only by powerful elites and their experts. In their view, the participation of nongovernmental organizations merely functions to legitimize undemocratic ways of decision making.

A second way of adapting the meaning of democracy to the needs of global governance is taken by the advocates of a deliberative understanding of politics. Inspired in particular by the work of Habermas, some authors rely on the epistemic functions of transnational decision-making bodies. The starting point is Habermas’s distinction between a substantial and a proceduralist understanding of popular sovereignty. Habermas refers to an anonymous civil society without a concrete democratic subject. This opens up the possibility of transferring the concept of democracy to the global sphere where the demos is only conceivable in form of the manifold demands articulated there. The crucial step is the integration of these demands into the global decision-making bodies. In addition, a second feature of deliberative democracy is relevant here—namely, the epistemic understanding of politics. As seen above, the goal of the deliberative process is to tease out the better argument by means of discussions between the relevant groups. But it is often difficult to include all relevant groups in international politics. However, according to the advocates of deliberative democracy, this need not lead to an undemocratic way of decision making. As far as the relevant viewpoints are included, it is sufficient that political experts discuss the relevant topics to gain “rationally acceptable results.” Critics argue against this understanding of democracy, insisting on the necessity of real participation by the people. Habermas’s legitimation of the epistemic gains of global governance threatens to erode the very meaning of democracy—that is, the involvement of all the people and not only the advocates of the better argument.

**Postdemocracy and Beyond**

Another way to capture the changing reality of democracy in the era of globalization is the strategy of Colin Crouch, who describes Western political systems as “postdemocracies.” According to Crouch, genuinely democratic institutions such as parliament, regular elections, party competition, and the rule of law still exist. Therefore, these societies differ in a significant way from autocratic societies. Nevertheless, the processes of globalization and the weakening of the state’s capacity to regulate the economy are progressively undermining these institutions. This leads not only to a loss of importance of central democratic ways of political decision making but also to a shift in power relations. According to Crouch, Western societies are therefore characterized by a fundamental ambivalence. On the one hand, the forms of democracy still exist, and are even expanding (e.g., due to the establishment of new forms of direct democracy), but on the other, they have lost their relevance and are getting wedged in by new intransparent forms of national and global governance, where powerful elites dictate the rule of the game. The most significant consequences of this new power structure are the decline of egalitarian
Since the end of the Cold War, democracy has become the unrivaled form of government in the world. Acceptance of a country as a full partner in the global community of nations is considerably facilitated by its being characterized as a political democracy; international military interventions, as in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, state their goal as the building of democracy; less democratic countries are asked to improve the quality of their democracy to gain esteem; and countries that hardly possess the attributes of democratic governance claim to be democratic because such characterization is thought to bestow prestige on them.

Among democracies, there is no single mode of organizing a polity as a political democracy. Institutional arrangements of democratic governance have varied across time and countries. Furthermore, democratic systems have evolved and operated in countries that have, among others, different histories, cultures, traditions, economies, demographic compositions, and socioeconomic characteristics. These factors have all put their imprint on how democratic institutions are organized and operate in specific countries. Attempts at presenting and discussing types and typologies of democracies are several. Some types and typologies, not widely employed by students of democracy thus far, have not been included in this entry. But

**See also** Deliberative Policy Making; Democracy, Quality; Equality, Political; Modernization Theory; Normative Political Theory; Participation; Political Philosophy; Rational Choice; Social Democracy; Systems Theory

**Further Readings**


**Democracy, Types of**

Since the end of the Cold War, democracy has become the unrivaled form of government in the world. Acceptance of a country as a full partner in the global community of nations is considerably facilitated by its being characterized as a political democracy; international military interventions, as in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, state their goal as the building of democracy; less democratic countries are asked to improve the quality of their democracy to gain esteem; and countries that hardly possess the attributes of democratic governance claim to be democratic because such characterization is thought to bestow prestige on them.

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before presenting the most well-known analyses, a methodological “warning” is necessary.

The word type may be used in two different senses. First, it may be used to define the necessary set of characteristics that need to be present to identify certain phenomena as distinct from others and give it a name. The word model is also sometimes employed to convey the meaning of type in this sense. Second, it may be a category that emerges from classifying phenomena according to certain criteria. In this second sense, “type” emerges as a subcategory—that is, as the product of an effort at generating a typology. One may, for example, identify all political systems that satisfy the criteria for being a democracy (model) but then group them according to some key features (variables) along which they may differ from each other. This exercise, which aims at developing a typology, generates subcategories that are also called “types.” Types as subcategories of a typology include all attributes of democracy and then some that make them unique, helping us distinguish them from others.

This entry is a discussion of the types of democracy. The first section focuses on the two fundamental models of democracy, direct and liberal representative, as major concerns of political thought. This section on normative models introduces the fundamental philosophical underpinnings of actual democratic systems as they have developed in different societies. The second section offers a typology of democratic systems as they operate in the world today. Here the scheme of classification is based on whether minimum or maximum possible majorities are sought in making decisions since such a distinction constitutes a major variable along which contemporary democracies differ from each other. Some types based on the empirical study of how systems function are also offered here. Finally, normative models critical of the outcome of the operation of contemporary democracies are taken up.

Normative and Empirical Models

Two different approaches may be used in defining types and developing typologies. The first approach confines itself to positing a set of criteria or norms, thereby defining what a democracy is or ought to be. Using this normative theoretical approach, one may identify models of democracy. The second approach focuses on societies that already have systems that satisfy the norms that are depicted in the definition of democracy but then proceed to classify them, thereby developing typologies and then types as subcategories based on how each differs from the others, for example, in terms of its institutional arrangements, its cultural and behavioral environment, and its functioning. Understandably, this second approach requires an empirical examination of democratic societies. This approach, in contrast to normative democratic theory, constitutes the basis of empirical democratic theory.

Classic Normative Models of Democracy

Dictionaries, relying on the Greek origins of the word, *demos* (people) and *kratos* (rule), often define democracy as rule by and for the people. More scholarly definitions have elaborated the basic idea. Charles Tilly (2007), for example, has emphasized “the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation” (pp. 13–14). Such definitions have focused neither on who the people are nor on how or through what mechanisms they rule themselves. The question of who the people are, after historical and long struggles, has been answered by the realization of universal suffrage. How the people should rule themselves, on the other hand, has been given two different answers, leading to the emergence of two normative models of (1) direct or participatory democracy and (2) liberal representative democracy.

Direct Democracy and Its Variants

In terms of historical order, direct democracy comes first. Its basic idea was developed and practiced in some of the city-states of ancient Greece, notably Athens, for about a century and a half and then disappeared. The basic idea of direct or participatory democracy is that all members of the political community take part in discussion, debate, and decision making on matters belonging to the public domain without the intermediation of agents. Decisions may be reached by the collectivity by voting or by reaching consensus through
deliberation. As regards who qualify as members of the political community, throughout history, different criteria for exclusion–inclusion have been employed, including those based on age, gender, race, being a free man, property ownership, and paying taxes. In contemporary times, only a moderate age requirement and some other reasonable limitations such as not being insane constitute the only restrictions to being a citizen with full rights to participate in the political debate and decision making.

Athenian Democracy. The city-state of Athens is usually cited as the place where democracy was born. Yet Athenian democracy deviated in significant ways from what we know as democracy today. Only free men of 25 years or older qualified as members of the political community to participate in town meetings or Ekklesiae where discussion about the public affairs of the community affairs took place. Decisions were made by direct vote. Forty Ekklesiae were held during a year. An administrative council whose members were identified by drawing lots was given the responsibility of implementing the decisions arrived at these meetings.

As a normative model of self rule, Athenian democracy appears attractive. From a more contemporary empirical perspective, it may be criticized for not being sufficiently inclusive since it allowed only free men of 25 years or older to participate in decision making about the political affairs of the community, leaving slaves and women out. An empirical evaluation, to the extent this is possible in view of scant information, reveals that only a small minority of citizens actually attended these meetings. In fact, meeting places were not designed to accommodate large crowds of citizens. Leaders with oratorical and organizational skills were often capable of determining both the agenda and the decisions that were eventually made. Inevitably, the Athenian system was inefficient because it took much time to produce a decision. And finally, since attendance was often limited and the composition of those who attended the meetings varied, policy coherence and continuity were difficult to achieve. Perhaps it should not be surprising that neither Plato nor Aristotle or Thucydides express admiration for the Athenian system whose legend has come to be so venerated among the later exponents of democracy.

What have we inherited from Athenian democracy? Two ideas may have been important: first, the idea of a citizen that has approximately an equal standing and voice against the state; and second, the rotation of civic responsibilities among citizens (Tilly, 2007, pp. 26–27). Many problems encountered in defining and implementing democracy in contemporary times were also anticipated in the Greek experience.

Contemporary Varieties of Direct Democracy. The Athenian democratic experiment disappeared after failing to meet external challenges. The notion of direct democracy has been practiced, however, in later times in two different ways. First, in local government, it has been adopted by small communities in the form of town meetings. Second, in some representative democracies, the mass electorates have been asked to make policy decisions by means of referenda.

Although the practice has been declining, direct democracy, sometimes also called primary democracy, where all members of the political community come together to decide on public matters pertaining to their town, continues to be practiced in parts of New England (town meetings) and in Switzerland (Landgemeinde). Direct, participatory democracy as a comprehensive system of rule appears not to be suited for communities with populations more than a few thousands or for complex tasks that contemporary governments need to address.

Another direct democratic practice with an increasing frequency in recent years is the holding of public referenda, asking the voters to determine policy choices. The more widely used form of referendum democracy is for the government to submit a policy question to a public referendum either on its own or because the laws require it. The less widely practiced form, known as the citizen initiative, allows citizens to collect a required number of signatures in order to place a proposal on the ballot. The initiative is used at all levels of government in Switzerland, in a substantial number of American states, as well as in Italy (Ian Budge, 1996, p. 85).

Direct Democracy in the Future. Technological developments appear to have opened the way for
new possibilities for practicing direct democracy. With Internet service reaching a growing number of homes, it may be possible to consult voters about their preferences regarding major policy questions. The practice of such tele-democracy may lead to more widely approved policies. It has also been suggested it may even be possible in the future to realize interactive communications and create a modern version of Athenian democracy, so to speak, a cyber-democracy.

**Liberal Representative Democracy**

After the disappearance of Athenian democracy, there was an interim of nearly 2,000 years before the idea reappeared but this time in liberal representative form. The new system involved the placement of individuals into public decision-making roles by popular elections, thereby conferring legitimacy on the authority of those who were elected. Liberal democracy, as the name already suggests, is a synthesis of two underlying concepts: liberalism and democracy. Liberalism, although attributed changing meanings in different contexts and time points, was a reaction to the power of absolute monarchs and an interventionist church in all aspects of community and personal life. Arguing for tolerance, reason, and freedom of choice, liberalism aimed to create a uniquely private sphere for the individual in which neither the state nor the church could intervene. Placing the individual in the center of their thinking, the Liberals advocated limiting the powers of the state through constitutions and defended private property and the market economy as a means by which the individual’s interests would be served (David Held, 1996). In liberal representative democratic thought, the market constituted an arena where individuals pursue their personal gain while politics served as the domain in which the interests or the common good of the community would prevail.

The idea of representative government appears to be a natural outcome of the concern of liberal philosophers with the protection of the individual against the state. This would be achieved by giving the citizens the power to choose those who govern them through periodic elections and by holding those elected accountable for their decisions and actions within the context of a constitutional system. The election of representatives to do what the citizens were expected to do on their own in a direct democracy appeared to provide the solution to the question of how large number of citizens could still rule themselves. The questions of who comprised the citizens and the conditions necessary for them to exercise the right to choose those who shall govern them continue to constitute critical questions in societies that are in the process of democratizing and, on occasion, in societies that are already democracies today. While universal suffrage appears to have acquired reasonably universal acceptance, the conditions under which political competition is to take place, such as freedom of association, information, and expression, present both existing democracies and societies that aspire to develop into liberal representative democracies with dilemmas of how to balance authority and the coercive capabilities of the state and the collective interests of the community with the liberties of the individual.

A multiplicity of social, economic, and political processes led to the emergence of liberal representative democracy as ideology. By the 19th century, aided by growing commerce and industrialization, European kings had succeeded in unifying small political entities into nation-states, creating political communities much larger than those that had existed before. The industrial revolution had also produced social classes, most notably the bourgeoisie and the workers that rejected the absolute power of the monarchs and searched for ways to limit the scope of their political decisions and influence their content. Factors such as urbanization, factory production, and new forms of communication and transportation provided opportunities for self-organization not possible in earlier times. The philosophy of liberal representative democracy developed, in this historical context, as the framework through which power could be shared between monarchs, aristocrats, and the mass publics and could gradually be transferred to the latter. The size of nation-states, in terms of population and the geographical space, necessitated an arrangement whereby public decisions would be made by relatively few people that represented the many who had elected them.

The adoption and consolidation of liberal representative democratic philosophy and arranging political systems along democratic lines did not become a fully established reality even in Western
Europe until after the World War II. Apart from Spain and Portugal, which were ruled by the remnants of fascist dictatorships of the interwar period, and Greece and Turkey, which were plagued by occasional military rule, other members of the Atlantic Community, calling themselves the “Free World,” possessed regimes based on liberal democracy. The adoption of liberal representative democratic systems in the world received an initial boost from the replacement of the authoritarian Spanish, Portuguese, and later some Latin American systems by democracies. But the most significant change came with the demise of the Warsaw Pact first and then the Soviet Union. The Baltic States and many of the East European countries managed quickly to convert themselves into regimes based on liberal representative democracy. This opened the way for democratization in other parts of the world and created pressures on democracies to improve their performance.

**Empirical Typologies and Types**

We may discuss in normative terms what attributes a liberal representative democracy ought to have, what the proper basis of authority is, and what purposes it may serve. But in determining whether or not a particular system is a liberal representative democracy and if so, what type of a democracy it is, an empirical and descriptive approach is needed. Many scholars have, in fact, tried to develop an empirically testable set of criteria—that is, a procedural or operational definition—to distinguish political democracies from nondemocracies and then offer an empirically derived typology of democracies. A survey of democracy literature shows that a significant number of procedural elements have been proposed that identify a system as a democracy. These have included the following:

1. the right to vote, equality in voting, women’s right to vote, elimination of property and wealth qualifications for voting, and inclusion of all adults;
2. the right to be elected;
3. the right of political leaders and political parties to compete for support and votes—a competitive party system;
4. periodic free and fair elections, secret ballot, and absence of massive fraud;
5. freedom of association;
6. freedom of expression;
7. freedom of information, the existence of alternative sources of information, and opportunities to learn about different policies;
8. institutions for making public policies depending on votes and other expressions of preference, responsibility of all power holders to the electorate, and opportunities for effective participation;
9. constitutions explicitly describing and limiting the authority of the power holder, institutional checks to prevent elected leaders from governing arbitrarily and without restraint, and the presence of accessible procedures for protecting the liberties of citizens;
10. control of the agenda by the elected officials;
11. the ability of elected officials to exercise their constitutional powers without being significantly constrained by unelected officials, such as bureaucrats and members of the military; and
12. a self-governing polity possessing the ability to act independently of the constraints of an overarching political system, and minimum consensus or support among the general public for values such as respect for the rights of others and tolerance.

As is evident, other elements may be added to this list, some may be combined under more general headings, and some may be broken down further. Some have also argued that if only some of these procedural elements are present, a system could be classified as a lesser or diminutive type of democracy, while others have insisted that a system is either a democracy or a nondemocracy. Diminutive types are covered in hybrid regimes in another entry in this encyclopedia.

**Classifying Democracies**

Among systems that are classified as political democracies, there are significant differences in terms of how political institutions are organized and how they operate. Since many of the world’s democracies
were initially located in Western Europe and North America or in countries that had been settled by West Europeans, initial attempts at classification focused on the differences between how democratic systems operated in English-speaking countries and countries in Continental Europe. Such geographically based designations were, however, gradually changed since democracies not only operated in other geographies but also seemed to be spreading to different parts of the world.

Majoritarian Versus Consensus Models

The departure from geography-based classifications led to the identification of two basic types: majoritarian and consensus models of democracy. To the related questions of who shall govern and whose interests the government will respond to when voter preferences diverge, two answers were offered: (1) the majority of the people or (2) as many people as possible rather than a simple majority (Arend Lijphart, 1999). If a majority, however small, was considered sufficient for governing and making rules and policies, then such a democracy was a majoritarian democracy. Since the British parliamentary democracy constituted the foremost example of this type, the model was frequently referred to as the Westminster model of democracy, though this was but one example of a majoritarian system.

In some societies, the achievement of a majority was seen as a minimum condition for governing while building as big a majority as possible was accepted as a political goal. A democracy in which an attempt was made to build the largest possible majority was referred to as the consensus model. Institutional arrangements, political practices, and patterns of interaction among political actors differed in the two models. For example, whereas executive power was concentrated in one party and the cabinet in the Westminster model, leading to the domination of the system by the executive, power was shared in broad coalition cabinets producing a government–legislature balance in the consensus model. Majoritarian democracies were usually characterized by a two-party government, consensus models by a multiparty government. The former generally used the first-past-the-post voting system, as opposed to the prevalence of proportional representation in the latter.

Efforts to develop this initial classification eventually led to the development of a more refined typology deriving from the cross-tabulation of two axes: the structure of society and elite behavior. The structure of a society could be homogeneous or plural, while the behavior of the elite could be coalescent or adversarial (Lijphart, 1977). The combination of the two axes produced four types of democracy:

1. plural-coalescent: consociational democracy,
2. plural-adversarial: centrifugal democracy,
3. homogeneous-coalescent: depoliticized democracy, and
4. homogeneous-adversarial: centripetal democracy.

Consociational and Centrifugal Democracies

In the case of societies with socially heterogeneous populations, whether the political elite pursues coalescent or adversarial behavior appears to make a determining difference. Coalescent behavior produces a consociational democracy, whereas adversarial behavior leads to a centrifugal democracy. In consociational democracies, political leaders strive to achieve the largest majority possible, incorporating the support of as many groups and citizens as they can persuade. The preference of the political elite to enlist the participation of larger numbers than needed is a way of controlling the centrifugal tendencies that are usually present, even if not always inherent, in plural societies. To achieve a substantial majority at the societal level, leaders of different segments of the population work together to mobilize majorities in their respective communities. They also respect mutual vetoes. In this way, political power is dispersed and shared. To cement the system further, public funds are allocated to different groups comprising the plural society on a proportional basis and each group is granted extensive autonomy to organize its own affairs.

If the political elite in a society with a heterogeneous population pursues adversarial behavior, if they insist on considering the achievement of a bare majority sufficient to produce decisions that are binding for all (i.e., if they pursue a policy of strong majoritarianism), those finding themselves
frequently or permanently in the minority may find the outcome unacceptable. In such a contingency, the tendency would be for each group to form a coalition in which it would always aim to be in the winning camp, directing it to undo any coalition where it is not included or alternatively opt out of a system that consistently fails to serve its interests, hence the centrifugal democracy. For example, one way to cope with inability to form stable and working coalitions in the face of centrifugal tendencies particularly (but not only) in a presidential system is for an elected leader to opt for delegative democracy. Generally, consociational democracies are rather stable, while centrifugal democracies are exposed to intensive tensions, instability, and the possibility of malfunctioning and breakdowns.

Depoliticized and Centripetal Democracies

To the extent societies and their politics are always changing, systems of specific countries may move from one type to another. For example, during World War II, many democracies in Western Europe turned into depoliticized democracies. All political parties were united around the fundamental goal of winning the war, while politics was perceived less in government versus opposition terms and more in terms of maintaining the unity of all political actors to achieve the common objective of victory. There may also be occasions when temporary conditions encourage the forming of a coalition between government and the opposition, such as the one between the Christian Democratic Union and the German Social Democratic Party under Kurt Georg Kiesinger in Germany (1966–1969), which led to the practice of depoliticized politics for a limited period of time.

Depoliticized democracy and centripetal democracy are distinguished by the fact that in the latter, politics is conceptualized much more as a competitive game between government and the opposition, whereas depoliticized democracy is characterized by the minimization of conflict and a sustained effort toward achieving a broadly based consensus. The British system is given as the example of a centripetal democracy. In the U.S. system, the majority party in the Senate and in the House will generally try to ensure that its members vote with the party on particular pieces of legislation. In centripetal democracies, the competition to achieve a minimum majority (strong majoritarianism) does not threaten the unity of the system or the integration of rival parties into it. The alternation of majorities between elections reinforces the desire of competing parties to win the elections, inviting them to adopt positions that will appeal to large groups of voters and drawing them toward the center—hence the designation as centripetal democracy. The homogeneity of social structure stands in the way of political fragmentation and the consequent emergence of permanent minorities that may sometimes even desire to break off from the system. Strongly adversarial conceptualization of oppositions is further eroded by two other factors. First, in many economically advanced societies, ideological, religious, and to a more limited extent racial tensions have receded to the background in recent decades, leading voters to fail to perceive major differences between competing parties. Therefore, a change in the governing party is not seen to be particularly critical. Second, all major interests in society find opportunities to be represented in decision making through a variety of mechanisms. These points will be further elaborated in the models of polyarchy and functional democracies.

Polyarchy

The critical problem that needs to be overcome in sustaining a democratic system and ensuring its stability appears to be that no group be cornered into a position of a permanent political minority—that is, be placed permanently in an inferior status under the mercy of a permanent majority. Such an outcome may be achieved either by shifting majorities or by ensuring that the majority is as large as possible. The latter option is associated with the consociational democracy that is usually found in plural societies. There are many societies that are neither plural nor consciously subscribe to the consensus model. What is the mechanism in such societies for ensuring that the same majority does not prevail over the same minority on a permanent basis? The simple answer is that voters change their preferences. In a democratic society where people can form associations, express their thoughts, and reach alternative sources of information freely and
where free and fair elections are held regularly, voters have the opportunity to replace the majority in power by another majority. But, this explanation does not rule out the possibility that some groups would be left permanently out of the decision-making process.

The way out of this predicament, Robert Dahl argued (1971), is the recognition of how contemporary democracies operate in fact. Although political competition appears to be dominated by political parties, there is also a proliferation of organized interest groups. The political competition in a democratic society does not simply produce a majority and a minority. Rather, a plurality of actors compete and cooperate with each other, usually forming issue-based majorities, to produce policy decisions. Different coalitions form behind different policy choices in an environment in which power is dispersed among various actors in society. What obtains is not majority rule as such but a rule of different coalitions of minorities. These minorities negotiate, bargain, compromise, and form alliances and coalitions to produce outcomes that they desire. Dahl called his explanation of how democracy works polyarchy.

Its proponents argue that polyarchy is an empirically derived description of how democracies function. It has been criticized on the ground that it relies to a large extent on the study of American experience. It assumes that organized interests prevail in a society, that these represent a significant segment of society, and that through competition they are capable of controlling each other such that none is able to prevail permanently over others. These assumptions require empirical scrutiny particularly outside of the United States and specifically in European and non-Western environments. Some sample questions would include whether all groups in society are equally capable of organizing themselves into effective organizations, whether they have equal resources to influence the political process, and whether some groups get much of what they want much of the time while others get hardly anything at all.

Polyarchy involves a permanent process of building coalitions among different groups to form majorities. Each majority comprises a different configuration of groups. This would lead actors to confine themselves to the achievement of bare majorities rather than pursuing the consensus model and trying to build as large a majority as possible.

Functional Democracy

The polyarchy model assumes that multifarious interests will organize and compete with each other in affecting public policies in their favor, with none getting all of what it wants. There does exist a rather different way of linking interest groups to the democratic political process: that of corporatism. Although corporatist or functional democracy may take many forms, its basic idea is to incorporate major organized interests (usually each represented by a single organizational entity) into the policy-making and implementation processes. Corporatist arrangements, it is sometimes argued, are more effective in ensuring that the interests of all major groups are represented in politics. Yet a number of questions remain. First, how can we be sure that all major interest groups are included in this arrangement? This question becomes all the more important since any corporatist system would tend to work in favor of those groups that have existed for a very long time and at the expense of those that are newly emerging. Second, we may ask, are the interest groups that are linked with the government run democratically themselves? Again, it is important to know the answer not only because there may exist different interpretations of what is in the interest of a particular group or what its interests are, but also because group leaders often develop an interest in sustaining themselves in office at the expense of the groups that they are supposed to represent and whose interests they are supposed to protect. Third, what concessions do the leaders of organized interests have to make to maintain their favored status vis-à-vis the government? Implicit in the question is the possibility that the leaders of interest groups may simply ease into becoming agents of government policy, transmitting, explaining, defending, and even helping implement it. Fourth, what effect do the corporatist arrangements have on other democratic institutions? For example, do these arrangements undermine respect for institutions such as political parties that have traditionally served as a channel for managing conflicting interests? These questions
point to some of the potential shortcomings of functional democracy.

**Delegative Democracy**

In examining how democracies functioned in Latin America, Guillermo O'Donnell observed that while these systems met the criteria for being designated “democratic,” they failed to display many of the characteristics of liberal representative democracies because they operated on the premise that the winner of the national election acquired the right to govern as he or she sees fit. The systems under study are presidential systems, where apparently the president feels that for a constitutionally defined period of time between elections, he or she is at liberty to rule mainly according to his or her preferences, only constrained by the distribution of power in society. O'Donnell termed these systems *delegative democracies*.

In systems where delegative democracy prevails, accountability runs vertically, whereas in institutionalized representative democracies, there is, in addition, horizontal accountability. Vertical accountability denotes electoral accountability. Horizontal accountability, on the other hand, refers to the presence and effectiveness of a network of autonomous institutions that exercise oversight on government officials to ensure that they discharge their responsibilities properly or be subject to sanctions. Presidents in delegative democracies treat institutions of horizontal responsibility as unwanted impediments to the performance of their duties as the custodian of national interest. They accept, however, the existence of rival parties and a reasonably free press as normal.

Delegative democracy is a less liberal form of democracy than a fully representative liberal democracy. It is strongly majoritarian with elections that give powers to a president who claims to serve as the “interpreter of the high interests of the nation.” Although they are not institutionalized, delegative democracies may be enduring.

**Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies**

When one focuses on the institutional arrangements within the liberal representative democracies, the most common distinction is between parliamentary democracies and presidential ones. The *presidential arrangement* was the product of the American Revolution. Not having a fully functioning parliamentary system before them that they could choose to emulate, the leaders of the American Revolution converted the institution of the Absolute Monarch to a president who was elected for a defined period of time and with limited powers. *Parliamentary democracy*, on the other hand, evolved in Britain and Continental Europe as a result of the rise of new social classes during the industrial revolution that claimed a share in ruling society. The conversion of consultative mechanisms among the king, the nobility, and sometimes the church into parliaments whose members were elected through a competitive process was achieved often through a combination of violent change and peaceful transfer of power.

Presidential democracy as initially developed in the United States was part of a constitutional system based on the separation of powers as well as building checks and balances between the three branches of government. The president was elected by an electoral college whose members were elected explicitly to elect a president. The members of the legislature, the U.S. Congress, on the other hand, were elected directly through general elections. The president, elected independently, did not need to maintain the confidence of the legislature to stay in power and served a 4-year term. Initially by convention, much later by constitutional requirement, his tenure was limited to two terms. The American presidential system became more democratic over time. The adoption of a Bill of Rights, the abolishment of slavery after a destructive civil war, and the extension of franchise to Blacks and later to women constituted some of the landmark developments in this evolution.

The presidential system was adopted by almost all Latin American countries, but in none did it function as democratically as in the United States. In many instances, the presidential system constituted a method of promoting full or semi-dictatorships. Many Latin American presidential democracies today (not all are necessarily democratic) continue to exhibit the characteristics of delegative democracies.

Parliamentary democracy, a must for royal systems in which the office of the chief executive and the head of state is hereditary, is mainly a product
of the 20th century. While some parliamentary systems were in operation intermittently in some European countries and somewhat more regularly in Britain, they were neither fully democratic nor consolidated. Most European parliamentary democracies did not extend suffrage to women until after World War I. Introduction of universal suffrage destabilized many of them, leading some, such as the Weimar Germany, Spain, Italy, and Austrian systems, to collapse while producing deep political polarization in such countries as Belgium, France, and Finland.

Parliamentary democracy is characterized by a fusion of powers in that the government is generally formed among parties in the parliament. The prime minister is almost always required to be an elected member of parliament, while other ministers are also usually deputies even if that is not always a legal requirement. The government is required to enjoy the confidence of a parliamentary majority to stay in office. The parliament, on the other hand, scrutinizes the government by questions, inquiries, committee hearings, interpellations, and motions of censure or no confidence. But, not unlike the presidential variant, parliamentary democracies exhibit significant variety among themselves.

Presidential and parliamentary democracies differ from each other in important ways. As already said in part, legislatures may not dismiss a president (except in cases of corruption, mental incompetence, etc.), while parliaments, although subject to some limitations, may dismiss a government by a vote of no confidence. In parliamentary democracies, governments may choose the timing of the elections, while election dates are more likely to be fixed in presidential democracies. Almost universally, presidential democracies have term limits for the president because he or she wields so much power. One is more likely to find multiparty systems in parliamentary than in presidential democracies. Although it has been suggested that presidential democracies enjoy strong, personalized leadership, the rise of party leaders to unequal supremacy in parliamentary democracies has also produced a similar type of leadership. Furthermore, many parliamentary democracies have evolved in the direction of prime ministerial government where the former many appoint and dismiss ministers pretty much as if he or she were a president.

There is a hybrid institutional arrangement that also deserves brief mention: the semipresidential democratic system, an arrangement that is most closely associated with France. In these systems, the elections of the president and the members of parliament usually take place in coterminous but distinct elections. The timing of the elections is fixed. In the French case, to ensure that the mandate of the president is backed by a majority, a runoff election is required among leading contenders. There is a division of responsibilities between the president and the prime minister, not very precise, regarding domains in which they are to be active. As in the case of presidential democracies, in semipresidential systems, the majority in the legislature and the partisan affiliation of the president may be at variance, necessitating cohabitation.

Critical Approaches: Democracy in Theory and in Practice

The diffusion of liberal democratic ideologies and the prevalence of democratic systems in the world have produced two contradictory outcomes. On the one hand, the crumbling of nondemocratic systems has given satisfaction to those that have been ruled by democratic regimes as well as a sense of confidence that democracies have outlasted what appeared to be powerful authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, democracies have come under greater scrutiny as scholars have begun to take a closer look at the imperfections of democracy as an ideology and as an operating political system.

Criticism of Democracy in Operation

Some problematical outcomes of democratic systems in operation have been observed and criticized by different observers. One relatively frequently made observations is that the liberal representative model has evolved into party democracy in which representatives are obliged to serve the parties under whose auspices they have been elected; therefore, they are neither able to express their own judgment nor represent without constraints the views of their own constituency. Parties, on the other hand, publicize their policy priorities in the electoral campaign and then proceed to implement them once in office. Parties,
however, are in fact generally directed by their leaders. In this way, democracy in operation has become plebiscitary leadership democracy, an exercise in which the voters have periodic chances to express or deny confidence in the political leadership that runs the government (Held, 1996). Furthermore, the parties in power may represent only a minority of the voters and may use their being in office as a resource for extending their rule.

Approaching democracy in operation from another angle, it has been suggested that contemporary democracy is elitist democracy or that it is characterized by democratic elitism because key political decisions are made by small minorities. This is seen as a necessity deriving from the complexities of decisions, the time frame within which decisions have to be made, and the voluminous topics on which decisions have to be rendered. In this process, the role of the voter is no more than choosing among rival teams of elites. Even more problematical, the voters are often not well-informed and not sufficiently committed to the fundamental values of democracy such that too much involvement on their part may become a source of instability, a threat to the functioning of the democratic system (Peter Bachrach, 1969).

Radical Democracy

Radical democracy is an imprecise term that offers criticism of the contemporary applications of democracy from a variety of perspectives. Many persons whose names are associated with radical democracy are not interested in the replacement of the liberal and pluralistic democracy with another type, rather, they argue that it may be deepened and expanded to cover many areas of public life. One example is a deliberate effort to incorporate into the public all potential voters by enfranchising them so as to curb the ability of majorities to use their position to maintain their dominance of society. Another example is the struggle to undo the relations of subordination deriving from differences in gender, race, and sexual preference in addition to those deriving from the political economy. In all these instances, it is argued that the expansion of liberty and equality to all aspects of public life within the framework of political liberalism will enhance democracy and protect the rights of the individual against the tyranny of the majority. To conclude, the various proponents of radical democracy argue that contemporary applications of liberal democracy fail in being sufficiently inclusive to bring in all segments of the population into the political process. They further argue that current liberal democracies do not sufficiently extend liberal democratic applications to all areas of public life.

Deliberative Democracy

The prevalence of liberal representative democracy as the normative basis for the functioning democracies in the world today has led some analysts to focus on some of the problematical aspects and outcomes and proposals to remedy them. The best known school of thinking that has come under different names such as communicative or discursive, but most frequently as the deliberative theory of democracy, offers a normative framework for addressing some of the problematical aspects of liberal democratic theory.

Proponents of deliberative democracy point out that the two ideas of liberalism and democracy that are brought together in liberal democracy in fact harbor conflicts. While liberalism dwells on pluralism, individualism, and freedom, critical democratic principles include unity, community, and equality. First, there is a conflict between the liberal emphasis on pluralism and the basic need for the basic social and political unity of democratic society. Second, while individualism is ontological to liberalism, democracy assumes communitarianism. Finally, freedom, so fundamental to liberal thinking, and the principle of equality, so fundamental to democratic thought, may be seen as being pitted against each other.

These conflicts, in fact, are not conciliated in liberal democracy because while there may be argument and bargaining, the decision is formed by voting, which is an aggregative act, not one of reasoning in which all members of the community are persuaded by argumentation and discussion. Therefore, a decision that emerges as a result of voting does not reflect a consensus among all citizens. Deliberative democracy argues that free and open debate among equal citizens should continue until the emergence of a community consensus. In this process of what may be called practical reasoning, participants offer ideas and proposals for
how to best solve problems and meet the needs and so on of the community. Each presents arguments to persuade the others to accept his or her proposals, eventually leading to a consensus. In this model, democratic process is primarily a discussion of problems, disagreements, expressed needs, and interests where, through dialogue, each tests and challenges the proposals and arguments of others.

For a deliberative democracy to operate, citizens must share or demonstrate a commitment to solve their collective problems through public reasoning and accept the framework for public deliberation as legitimate. Jürgen Habermas has argued that the successful operation of the deliberative democratic procedure is based on the following postulates:

1. Deliberation is in argumentative form. There is a regulated exchange of information among parties who introduce and critically test proposals.

2. All those who are affected by the decision have an opportunity to take part in the debate. In principle, no one may be excluded from the deliberations that are public.

3. The deliberations are free of external and internal coercion that undermine the equality of participants.

4. The deliberations aim to achieve rationally based agreement. They may be discontinued and resumed any time.

5. It is expected that the predeliberation attitudes and preferences of parties will be changed through arguments.

It is evident that deliberative democracy does not offer a practical alternative to the operation of contemporary democracies. Its application in societies with large populations where the government is expected to address many problems simultaneously is not a realistic possibility since the time needed to implement the process would be unacceptably long and near-full consensus might be impossible to attain in many situations. Nevertheless, the proponents of deliberative democracy point to some problematical aspects—that is, contradictions and weaknesses in contemporary applications of liberal democracy. Reaching decisions by majority vote may exclude many of those most closely affected by a decision; majorities and minorities may display a reasonable permanent character, frustrating those that are pushed to the position of a minority.

**Cosmopolitan Democracy**

In contrast to the radical and deliberative criticisms of contemporary liberal democracy that emphasize current shortcomings, the proponents of cosmopolitan democracy point to the direction they think democracies should take in view of the changes in the world. Noting that democratic systems get transformed and become redefined as societies evolve, as new needs appear, and as some functions and institutions no longer respond to needs and become redundant, Daniel Archibugi and David Held (1995) have pointed out that democratic systems operate under the highly questionable assumption that a government exercises sovereignty over a national political community that inhabits a delineated territory. Yet national, regional, and global connectedness belies the validity of this assumption. Therefore, there is a need to adjust democratic systems and applications to global change. The solution may be the development of a multipronged global model of democracy where innovations such as regional parliaments would produce decisions that would be recognized as sources of law; the holding of referenda across nation-states on issues such as energy policy, transportation systems, and so on; and the entrenchment of a body of individual rights with a political, economic, and social content. It may be noted, in this regard, that some basis has already evolved for the implementation of these ideas since there are already various products of regional integration in the world as well as a growing acceptance of universal standards for the observation of human rights. These may well mark the beginning of a process that will take us to a democracy that transcends the borders of the nation-states, keeping in mind, however, that there is no single inevitable way societies respond to pressures for change.

**Social Democracy Versus Liberal Democracy**

The discussion of the types of democracy has focused so far on institutional arrangements. Since
political democracy is usually thought of as a political regime, this is natural. The content of social and economic policies that democracies have pursued, however, has also constituted grounds for distinguishing between two policy-based types: liberal and social democracies. As a political ideology, liberal democracy and social democracy are based on the two rival premises of equality of opportunity and equality of condition, respectively. Liberal democracy argues that the market constitutes the most reliable instrument for offering equality of opportunity to all citizens, leading it to advocate policies that rely on the market as the mechanism that brings solutions to social and economic problems. Consequently, it favors policies that promote the undisturbed operation of the market, such as not introducing wage and price controls, maintaining low taxes, and pursuing free trade. It expects the individual to pay fully for his or her needs, such as housing and health care. Social democracy, on the other hand, assuming a society in which members consider themselves as being socially equal, proposes the adoption and implementation of policies that aim to enhance the equality of conditions, such as a large public presence in the economy, minimum wages, unemployment insurance, social security, universal health service, and free public education, as well as other similar functions. Many political parties that pursue social-democratic goals and policies also bear the name “Social Democratic” (in capital letters).

It has been observed that originally liberal democracy evolved in societies where the middle classes were united and coherent, while the urban working class was weakly organized and divided. In contrast, social democracy emerged in areas where the middle classes were fragmented and lacked coherence, while urban working classes were capable of organizing and forcing a social compact. As some of the policy goals initially sought by social democracy (e.g., social security, minimum wages, unemployment insurance) became standard policy in contemporary democratic societies, the policy content of both liberal and social democracy has become redefined, and their differences have become less clear. Nevertheless, these two types continue to constitute one of the fundamental bases of political choice on which electoral competition is conducted in most societies ruled by democracy.

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See also Deliberative Policy Making; Democracy, Consociational; Democracy, Direct; Parliaments; Presidentialism; Representation

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DEMOCRACY: CHINESE PERSPECTIVES

As a universal idea today, democracy has different meanings in various countries. The Chinese perspectives of democracy are a product of not only Western cultural diffusion but also ideas that were shaped by the country’s history and political reality. Indeed, the vision of the rule by the people came to China from abroad. However, the thought of the rule for the people (minben) has deep historical roots and now takes a central position in Chinese official ideology. As the Communist Party of China (CPC) is defined as the only ruling party constitutionally, multiparty competition is beyond the imagination of most Chinese due to their value orientation and political calculation. In other words, Chinese history, ideological context, and constitutional framework as well as Western cultural influences have set up parameters for the Chinese perspectives of democracy. In the following, both the official view of Chinese democracy and some contending voices concerning other and more recent positions are examined.

Socialist Democracy With Chinese Characteristics: The Official View

China officially claims to unswervingly develop socialist democracy as an indispensable goal of socialism with Chinese characteristics. According to the official doctrine, the Chinese socialist democracy must integrate “the leadership of the Communist Party, the position of the people as masters of the country (renmin dangjia zuozhu), and the rule by law (yifa zhiguo).” Such a trinity, reflecting an ideological mix of guardianship and populism, demonstrates the basic notion and principle of democracy in the Chinese official view. From the perspective of the Chinese authorities, the ideal type of democracy is the socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics. Its basic form is people’s democratic dictatorship, a phrase incorporated into the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by Mao Zedong, the founder of the republic. Such a phrase, derived from the dictatorship of the proletariat, is notable for being one of the few cases in which the term dictatorship is used in a nonpejorative manner. The premise of the people’s democratic dictatorship is that the party and state democratically represent and act on behalf of the people but possess and may use dictatorial powers against reactionary forces.

Such a form of democracy means to ensure democratic rights for people while exercising dictatorship in relationship to people’s internal enemies. Implicit in the concept of the people’s democratic dictatorship is the notion that dictatorial means are a necessary evil and that, without a dictatorship, the government may collapse and create a situation that is worse than the dictatorship. In the post-Mao era, however, “dictatorship” has been mentioned more rarely, and by contrast, “socialist democracy” has gained more prominence. As the former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin argued, the essence of people’s democratic dictatorship is people’s democracy. The 17th CPC National Congress in 2007 proclaimed that people’s democracy is the lifeblood of socialism. Etymologically, democracy means people’s rule. By using the tautology “people’s democracy,” the CPC attempts to conceptualize socialist democracy and distinguish it from liberal democracy, which is usually regarded as Western democracy or capitalist democracy. According to the Chinese official doctrine, capitalist democracy or bourgeois democracy is only a democracy for a few people—the bourgeoisie, while the people’s democracy or socialist democracy means a democracy for the overwhelming majority of the people. Theoretically, the socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics aims to develop the people’s democracy to a high degree; as Party General Secretary Hu Jintao put it, the party has been consistently pursuing the goal of developing socialist democracy, and the essence and core of socialist democracy are that the people are masters of the country.

The “people’s democracy” in China, therefore, carries a strong flavor of direct democracy as opposed to liberal democracy. At least, democracy in the Chinese context is, to some extent, a mixture of direct democracy and representative democracy. According to the Chinese official proclamation, the CPC must ensure that all power of the state belongs to the people, expand the orderly participation of citizens in political affairs at each level and in every field, and mobilize and organize the people as extensively as possible to manage state and social affairs as well as economic and cultural
programs. In the official conception of people’s democracy, democratic election, decision making, administration, and oversight are the four important elements featured by the spirit of direct democracy, whereas the ideas of democratic decision making and democratic administration both presume that people are capable of getting involved in public administration and policy making directly without relying on their representatives. This ideological inclination is consistent with the populist view of politics, which assumes that each person has an equal say on all policy issues at all times. Actually, for most Chinese, including many leaders, democracy means people’s rule, government by a mass of people, “the position of the people as masters of the country,” or even mob rule and anarchism.

By contrast, the idea of socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics, or people’s democracy, carries a legacy of people’s democratic dictatorship. Although the Chinese leadership has downplayed the concepts of class struggle and social revolution since China’s reforms and opening up in 1978, it still maintains concepts such as “antagonistic forces” (didui shili) and “contradiction between people and its enemy” (diwo maodun) in the official language. Any hostile forces are subject to people’s dictatorship, without the freedom of enjoying people’s democracy. A truly liberal democracy is applicable to all citizens (except for criminals) in a community.

Systems

To support people’s democracy, the party and state have established a series of political systems, including the system of people’s congresses, the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CPC, the system of regional ethnic autonomy, and the system of self-governance at the primary level of society.

The system of people’s congresses, as China’s fundamental political system, is an organizational form of the state power in China. According to China’s constitution, the power in the People’s Republic of China belongs to the people, and the organs for the people to exercise state power are the National People’s Congress (NPC) and local people’s congresses at all levels. The NPC and local people’s congresses are established through elections, and they are responsible to and supervised by the people. State executive and judicial organs at the different levels are created by, responsible to, and supervised by the people’s congresses. The NPC is the organ with supreme state power, and local people’s congresses are local organs of state power. The formal powers of the people’s congresses stipulated by the constitution, however, have been neutralized by the leading role of the CPC, which is defined as the only ruling party by the constitution and operates under the principle of democratic centralism. Despite the growing assertions of the NPC and its standing committee vis-à-vis the State Council, the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the NPC’s supreme powers in elections, legislation, and supervision are constrained by the Party’s discipline and ideology.

Historically, the NPC was designed according to the Marxist–Leninist principle of “combining legislative and executive into one organ” (yixing heyi), in order to ensure power concentration and political efficiency. According to Marx, the principle of checks and balances would leave governmental branches outside the direct control of the electorate; all levels of government therefore should be a working body fully accountable to the people. Informed by Marx’s idea, Lenin adopted the model of the Paris Commune and created the Soviet regime in Russia. To transform an old bourgeois parliament—“a talkative organ” in Lenin’s words—into a proletarian working body, Lenin proposed that every member of the Soviet should take both legislative and executive jobs. Following the Leninist principle of democratic centralism and the Soviet model of political regime, the Chinese ruling elite denigrated the liberal proposition of separation of powers from the very beginning. For the ruling elite, institutional checks and balances among legislative, executive, and judicial branches would lead to a divided sovereignty and therefore reduce political efficiency. These are at odds not only with the ruling party’s belief in democratic centralism but also with the traditional vision of the rule by virtue (dezhi), which prescribes a unitary and harmonious government as an ideal goal.

The multiparty cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CPC is a basic political system in China. Besides the CPC, there are eight minor “democratic parties” (minzhu dangpai) in China, which are neither the ruling parties
nor opposition parties, because they do not challenge the leadership of the CPC and demand for competitive elections in China. Rather, they are called “participatory parties” (canzheng dang) mainly through the mechanism of political consultation, particularly via the institution of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The political powers and rights enjoyed by the “democratic parties” are delegated or endowed by the ruling party, rather than being based on their own electorate. Nevertheless, the people’s congresses, the CPPCC, and government agencies at all levels have members from the “democratic parties” as part of their leaders. Occasionally, some members of “democratic parties” can serve as ministers in the State Council.

In addition to the system of people’s congresses and the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation, self-governance in some ethnic areas and grassroots communities normatively displays one of the features of the Chinese socialist democracy, which are called the system of regional ethnic autonomy and the system of self-governance at the primary level of society. Empirically, self-governance in Chinese villages has developed rapidly in the past years, and especially, competitive elections for village committees have been spreading all over the country.

Conceptualizing a Chinese Model of Democracy: Academic Exploration

Although the Chinese official view of democracy illustrates an outline of the pattern and framework for democracy and democratization in contemporary China, it is far from a sophisticated theory. Among others, one of the vague issues is what the “Chinese characteristics” mean within the socialist democracy advocated by the Chinese authorities. In other words, what model could China develop for democracy? With reference to such a question, Chinese intellectuals have different viewpoints under the umbrella of socialist democracy or beyond, in search of an ideal or possible democratic model for the future China.

Direct Democracy/Autonomous Democracy

The socialist democracy or people’s democracy in China, as mentioned above, has an orientation of direct democracy. Accordingly, the official doctrine insists on democratic elections, democratic decision making, democratic administration, and democratic oversight, which constitute the basic framework of Chinese orthodoxy on democracy with properties of autonomy or direct democracy. Furthermore, grassroots autonomy in Chinese villages has developed rapidly since the 1990s, giving an empirical support to such orthodoxy. Resulting from this development, autonomous democracy is regarded as one major option of the Chinese democratic model.

From a perspective of the state–society dichotomy, some scholars write that the political system can be divided into state power and grassroots communities. Accordingly, the state and grassroots levels of democracy can also be distinguished; at the state level, indirect or representative democracy is employed, and at the grassroots level, direct or autonomous democracy is practiced. In China, grassroots democracy includes rural autonomy in villages, urban autonomy in communities, democratic administration in the enterprises, and urban and rural civic participation in public affairs. What is more, some scholars believe that villagers’ autonomy would be a breakthrough or growing point for China’s democratization. To enhance autonomous democracy, some scholars suggest expanding the scope of grassroots democracy from villages and urban neighborhood communities up to the township or higher levels.

Besides the grassroots democratic autonomy in the rural and urban communities, some other kinds of direct democracy have also emerged in recent years. Some leaders and scholars emphasize the importance of citizens’ direct participation in public affairs and policy making through public hearings, participatory budgeting (open discussion on local public budgets), Internet discussions, and so on. In particular, cyber democracy has developed quite rapidly and is more prevalent compared with other forms of democracy in China, even exceeding its development in Western democracies to some extent. This is mainly because in China there are hardly any other effective channels for citizens to articulate their views except for the Internet. More and more Chinese people prefer to use the Internet as a means to express their opinions on public affairs, to influence public policy, and to oversee public officials. With the greatest
population of netizens in the world, China’s cyber democracy is developing ahead of representative democracy and is welcomed by most Chinese people, who regard it as a new form of socialist democracy. Although for most scholars, cyber democracy does not necessarily challenge the prudence of representative democracy, some intellectuals consider it to be an alternative to representative democracy.

**Deliberative Democracy/Consultative Democracy**

In today’s China, various ideas of democracy, including direct democracy, autonomous democracy, participatory democracy, and cyber democracy, are becoming increasingly influential compared with liberal democracy. In addition, deliberative democracy has been regarded as a possible model for China’s democracy by some officials and scholars. The concept of deliberative democracy was created in Western society. Ironically, deliberative democracy serves as a supplementary mechanism accompanying representative democracy in the West, but it is considered by some Chinese scholars and government officials as an alternative to electoral competition. The popularity of deliberative democracy in China is partly attributable to the Chinese advocacy of political consultations between the ruling party and other political actors, which bears a resemblance to the idea of Western deliberative democracy. According to the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CPC, the CPPCC has been established at both central and local levels. Although the Chinese practice of political consultation has a different implication from the Western idea of democratic deliberation, in Chinese, the term *consultation* (xieshang) shares the same characters as *deliberation*. Consequently, *consultative democracy* in Chinese (xieshang minzhu) becomes an equivalent for *deliberative democracy* in English, thus blurring the nuance between the two key words. Within this linguistic context, some Chinese scholars further argue that Western democracy is traditionally characterized by electoral democracy, whereas Chinese democracy is traditionally characterized by deliberative democracy (actually consultative democracy) since China has already established the CPPCC system, which symbolizes the characteristics of Chinese democracy or the Chinese model of democracy.

Other scholars assert that deliberative democracy and liberal democracy can support each other. This perspective is endorsed by the White Paper on China’s Party System, issued by the Chinese government in 2007, which recognizes the importance of both electoral democracy and deliberative democracy. Furthermore, some scholars consider the two main Chinese political institutions—people’s congress and people’s political consultative conference—as examples of electoral democracy and deliberative democracy, respectively.

It is worth pointing out the significant difference between political consultation in China’s context and deliberative democracy in Western backgrounds. However, there are also eye-catching experiments on the very sense of *deliberative democracy* in a few Chinese grassroots communities, such as the democratic discussion meetings in Wenling, Zhejiang Province. Other forms of community discussion councils and public forums have been created in a few localities thereafter.

**Inner-Party Democracy**

Compared with other proposed models, inner-party democracy is a widely recognized scheme for China’s potential democratic model. Some scholars believe that China should first develop inner-party democracy since the CPC is the only ruling party normatively and empirically. Inner-party democracy is a legitimate tenet that has been accepted by the ruling party from the very beginning, and is characterized by criticism and self-criticism and a democratic lifestyle within the party. Since the 1990s, it has been reinvented by Chinese scholars as a strategy for China’s democratization, while searching to democratize in the existing political system itself with one-party leadership. The logical sequence for political democratization in China, accordingly, is from the CPC to the outside of the ruling party, from the elite to the masses, and from intrasystem to extrasystem domains. This strategy was acknowledged officially when the party leader Zemin proclaimed to “promote people’s democracy actively through the development of inner-party democracy” in 2001 at the 80th CPC anniversary gathering.
For some scholars, the basic principle for inner-party democracy is to handle correctly the relationships among the CPC’s National Congress, the Central Committee and its Politburo, and Politburo Standing Committee in order to allow the party’s National Congress and the Central Committee to perform their basic roles. The key approach to achieve this goal is to improve the electoral function of the National Congress and Central Committee by encouraging multicandidate elections (cha’e xuanju), which will create an institutionalized channel of interest aggregation for the party elites. These proposals have been more or less endorsed by the party since the beginning of the 21st century. Major measures being adopted or that are under consideration include improving the function of party congresses, expanding power sharing among party committee members, increasing information sharing among party members, developing a division of power within the Party, and allowing limited inner-party electoral competition. The CPC first introduced multicandidate elections in the 13th Party Congress in 1987 and expanded electoral competition in the 17th Party Congress in 2007. Such a reform program could possibly become the potential germination point of democratic transition and competitive elections in China.

Inner-party democracy, therefore, does not challenge the wisdom of representative democracy and electoral competition; rather, it tries to accommodate the plurality of social interests and the spirit of free competition by continuously expanding the scope of democratic elections within the party and finding a way to reconcile the model of “one-party dominance” with the model of “one-party pluralism” derived from the experiences of East Asian political development. In other words, supporters of inner-party democracy believe that in searching for a democratic model with Chinese characteristics, they can take a third path—an institutional compromise between single-party authoritarianism and multiparty democracy. In the opinion of some scholars, the strategy of building inner-party democracy or following the model of one dominant party with pluralism within, from a long-term perspective, may result in a chain reaction in the Chinese democratization process and would be an alternative to a multiparty system.

Democracy in Controversies: Liberal Democracy and Beyond

Though there is no lack of advocates of liberal (Western style) democracy in Chinese intellectual circles, more and more criticisms of liberal democracy have emerged in contemporary China, which has even been conceived as a wave of antidemocratic ideology in a general sense. Debates on democratic theories, in general, and liberal democracy, in particular, concern whether democracy is a good thing for China and whether China can find an alternative (such as deliberative democracy) to liberal democracy featured by electoral politics.

Democracy: A Good or a Bad Thing?

Supporters of democracy believe that democracy is a good thing for China. Some scholars contend that democracy is a universal truth, observing that a string of antidemocratic ideas, combined with the old thesis of “China uniqueness,” is gradually developing and has severely blocked China’s movement toward a socialist democracy. One of the influential arguments is that only democratic socialism can save China, and only democratic constitutionalism can fundamentally resolve the problem of political corruption within the government. Some scholars are more cautious in supporting democracy, proclaiming that democracy is neither a bad nor a good thing, but then is also the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried, as Winston Churchill once said, or proclaiming that what China needs is a good democracy, not a bad one, paying more attention to substantial democracy rather than procedural democracy.

Opponents of democracy, by contrast, believe that democracy will do harm to China. Some argue that political order and social harmony are more important than other values and what China needs is not democracy but a limited government of checks and balances with the rule of law. Presupposing grassroots mobilization, popular elections, majority rule, and power politics, democracy would result in the “tyranny of the majority” in China’s context. Some even bluntly declare that democracy is a bad thing and that democratization is the worst choice and would cause social disturbance and disaster in China.
rather than resolving the problems of political corruption and social inequality. Some scholars also dismiss the idea that democracy is a universal truth that can avoid the worst features of political life.

**Arguments Against Liberal Democracy**

Debates on general democratic theories in China focus on the value of liberal democracy, the mainstream of Western democratic theories. Liberal democracy is not the mainstream in Chinese academic discourse. On the contrary, various criticisms of liberal democracy and electoral competition are popular, particularly in official media. For some Chinese new-Leftists, furthermore, the ideal type of government is demarchy or lottocracy, a political system run by randomly selected decision makers who have been selected by lot. They argue that economic equality (rather than freedom) is the precondition for political equality, and representative democracy through the mechanism of free elections cannot guarantee an equal say for all citizens in public affairs. Unsatisfied with Western democracy, one scholar argues that once democracy is defined by any other concept, such as liberal democracy or representative democracy, it will lose its true meaning and value. The core value of pure or direct democracy is equality; hence democracy can be better guaranteed through the mechanism of selecting leaders and making policy by casting lots, in addition to enhancing political consultation, cyber participation, and working-place democracy. One can find a link between such an idea and Athenian democratic practice. A common thread running through these models is a strong commitment to egalitarianism, even at the cost of liberalism.

From the perspective of liberal democracy, open and fair elections are the bottom line of democracy, though it may be insufficient or unachievable without the support of other favorable conditions. In the Chinese context, however, many perceive competitive election as either a bad thing or as being irrelevant for democratic development. The new Leftists are not satisfied with liberal democracy because they want people’s rule or direct democracy; meanwhile, the conservatives argue that competitive elections will bring about political chaos, money politics, social discord, and so on. For all the opponents of liberal democracy, the best solution for China’s dilemma regarding democracy is to develop a democracy without elections.

**Debates on Deliberative Democracy**

Contrary to liberal democracy, deliberative democracy has gained more popularity in China than in Western democracies, and deliberative democracy in China is usually linked to multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CPC. As some scholars point out, this is a misreading or misunderstanding of deliberative democracy in its original meaning. As for the scholars who know well the theory of deliberative democracy, some forms of deliberative democracy, such as democratic discussion forums practiced in local politics and public hearings, are also heralded by them. In their opinion, institutional deliberation, as one form of democracy, can improve the quality of China’s local politics and bring China to democracy. Some scholars expand the connotation of deliberative democracy to include other elements of democracy, such as elections, checks and balances of powers, rational discussion, and direct participation, and advocate the promotion of deliberative democracy as a rational strategic choice for China in developing socialist democracy. Some even suggest considering deliberative democracy as an alternative to electoral competition.

Other scholars, however, take a more cautious approach concerning the feasibility of deliberative democracy in China. They argue that there is a gap between China’s political consultative system void of competitive elections and Western deliberative democracy based on representative politics. As an ideal and nonmainstream theory in the West, deliberative democracy cannot function as an alternative to representative democracy. The strength of deliberative democracy lies in its encouragement of rational thinking, dialogue, and participation, but it consumes more time and money than periodical elections. They argue, therefore, that the feasible step for China to take is to develop representative democracy based on elections, and without the context of competitive elections, true deliberation on an equal basis cannot take place, even at the grassroots level.
**Divergence in the Chinese Model of Democracy**

While the Chinese authorities declare that they intend to build a socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics and some scholars are keen to illustrate the Chinese model of democracy along with China’s economic rise, many intellectuals in today’s China believe that democracy is a universal concept and that there is no particular model for China’s democracy. Democracy as practiced in China and other countries in the world should share some fundamental principles and institutional arrangements.

Some scholars believe, by contrast, that China has created a unique model of democracy, which is more advanced than that practiced in the West. As one scholar argues, China has experienced the most successful industrialization in the world, guaranteed people’s rights and created a dynamic society through orderly political reforms, and enjoyed a leap forward because of the concentration of national resources. This suggests that the Chinese democratic model is the best one in the world. This perspective has been endorsed by the White Paper on the Building of Political Democracy in China, issued by the Chinese government in 2005. According to this white paper, there is no single, absolute, and universally applicable democratic model in the world.

Rather than highlighting the Chinese characteristics of democracy or the best democratic model in China, some scholars argue that China has not crossed the threshold of democracy at all but remains an authoritarian regime or posttotalitarian state. While Chinese elites have made great efforts since the reforms to promote grassroots democracy from below and inner-party democracy from inside, no substantial progress in terms of democratization has been made in the view of the liberals. Up to now, there is no consensus on China’s democracy and its model. Philosophically, however, China’s democracy will be a combination of universalism and particularism, which is accepted by most intellectuals.

**Further Readings**


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**DEMOCRACY: MIDDLE EAST PERSPECTIVES**

Notwithstanding the political change that has taken place to varying degrees during the past 2 decades in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), an extensive region comprising the 22 members of the Arab League as well as Israel, Iran, and Turkey, Middle East scholars concur in the assessment that, with few exceptions proving the rule, MENA is still a democratic wasteland. Although most of the region’s regimes run some sort of representative body or have a formally democratic political system, this statement holds true even when applying a minimalist Schumpeterian definition of democracy focusing on the legitimization of governance through regular free and fair elections. The relative absence of both democratic regimes and substantial democratization processes,
especially in the Arab region, has led to intensive discussions about why the region has largely been unaffected by the “Third Wave of Democratization” (Samuel P. Huntington). To denote the region’s alleged uniqueness in autocracy, economic misery, and the abundance of conflicts, the term Middle Eastern Exceptionalism has gained wide usage, even though many Middle East scholars feel uneasy about the term itself and its implications. While the assumption that MENA is the most conflict-prone world region and that conflict dynamics follow a deviant logic as compared with non-MENA conflicts has been invalidated, many scholars also challenge the core assumption of Middle Eastern Exceptionalism—that is, that MENA proves to be exceptionally hostile to democratization. First, it is argued that, given the sobering record of persistent authoritarianism and stalled or aborted democratization processes in a considerable number of countries in Central Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet Union, MENA can hardly be referred to as being unique. Second, promising democratization processes in Turkey, a candidate country for membership in the European Union (EU), and Israel’s consolidated democracy not only question the term’s spatial scope but also reveal its lack of explanatory power when discussing global trends.

In order to approach the prospects for Middle Eastern democracy, this entry first gives a review of the obstacles to democracy in MENA as discussed in the academic literature. It then outlines recent sociopolitical developments, including the role of Islamist parties in the domestic political process and their impact on democratization.

Roadblocks to Democracy

The quest for the reasons that account for the absence of democracy in MENA has spawned an immense body of literature over the past years. At least five major determinants are put forward to explain why authoritarianism is still the dominant type of regime in the region: weak civil societies, patrimonialism, rentier structures, geostrategic location, and Islam. None of these determinants is without controversy, though. Before elaborating on the single determinant, it is worth noting, however, that the shift from the macrolevel of analysis in democratization theory to agency-based approaches as introduced by the seminal work Transitions From Authoritarian Rule by Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986) was accompanied by the conceptual break with the “precondition” tradition. That is, theories of democratization that preceded agency-based transition theory took for granted that the establishment of democracy would be a by-product of modernization characterized by greater wealth, the formation of a bourgeoisie, more tolerant civic cultures, and the overcoming of economic dependency. But as democratic transitions in former authoritarian countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe have shown, that reality somewhat belied theory since those countries democratized without meeting the preconditions or prerequisites of democracy in advance. Thus, recent democratization theory argues that favorable socioeconomic conditions account for the survivability of democracy rather than the transition to it. It is, therefore, valuable that Eva Bellin (2004) reminds us of the pitfalls in the precondition paradigm, which seems to have been extended in the case of Middle Eastern studies, even though it is ill-founded from a theoretical perspective.

The following reasons are listed to illustrate the failure of Middle Eastern democratization: First, civil society, which is commonly assumed to play an essential role in the development of a vibrant democracy, is overwhelmingly judged to be weak in MENA. However, assessments on civil societal structures in MENA are ambivalent. While some authors even wonder whether “there is any civil society at all in the Arab Middle East,” others like Saad Eddin Ibrahim are far more confident, detecting a potential for grassroots pressure in Middle Eastern civil societal organizations. To be sure, a balanced evaluation of the strength of civil society depends on the differences among individual MENA countries. Concerning Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, for instance, the Arab Human Development Report 2005 positively speaks of an increasing role of civil societal organizations in the political public sphere. On the other hand, some authors dislike the Islamist domination of the civil society sector, a fact that need not necessarily appear in a bad light since, even among Islamists, there is broad agreement that enlarging a democratically engaged public sphere is top priority for MENA development.

Related to this argument is the assumption that a patriarchal tradition of power is deep-rooted in the Arab-Islamic culture and thus impedes democratization. The persistence of patrimonial regimes,
however, is more convincingly elucidated by the rentier state paradigm than by mentality. As Giacomo Luciani has noted, rentier states, that is, states whose revenue is predominantly derived from nonproductive sources of income, such as oil or other foreign sources, and whose expenditure constitutes a substantial share of gross domestic product (GDP), are less dependent on the extraction of wealth from their populations to finance the state. Accordingly, there is no need for accountability on the part of the ruling elites whose actions remain unchecked for the reason that, from an alleged population's point of view, it is not imperative to stand up to arbitrary taxation and demand greater political participation (“No representation without taxation”). Political quietism is furthermore evoked by governmental distribution of rents, which, in addition, solidifies the existing patterns of political patronage. The share of the private sector in GDP remains marginal and accounts for both the calamitous economic performance of rentier states and the impediment to the emergence of a large middle class, which is commonly regarded as the germ cell of democracy.

The “oil factor” leads to another major roadblock for Middle Eastern democracy: the geostrategic location of MENA states. It is contended that the desire of the United States and Europe for stable Arab regimes outweighs their desire for democratization, and thus potentially destabilization, of the region since only stable regimes can safeguard Western energy supply and contain the terrorist threat. Western claims for a democratic Middle East are hence undermined by Western economic and military aid to MENA regimes, in the eyes of local human rights activists. The geostrategic determinant, furthermore, subsumes the impact of the Arab–Israeli conflict that is often believed to inhibit democratization as the regional authoritarian regimes argue that the external threat of Israel renders the maintenance of a strong military and security apparatus necessary, which, in fact, turns out to be a coercive apparatus for internal repressive measures in the first instance, as these regimes use the Israel threat as an excuse for internal repression.

Finally, Islam is probably the most contentious point of debate. Some well-known scholars maintain that Islam is utterly inconsistent with Western notions of democracy and pluralism. By contrast, there exists a voluminous literature demonstrating that Islam and democracy are not only compatible but can also be complementary. Here, it is necessary to distinguish between two levels of analysis. First, it is important not to confuse Islam with Islamism, with the latter being defined here and commonly as the active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, or policies that are supposed to be Islamic in character—a definition that, by its nature, awkwardly encompasses jihadi groups, such as Al Qaeda, as well as the Syrian liberal reformer Muhammad Shahrur. The Islamic authoritative scriptures (Qur’an and Hadith) leave wide margins for interpretation, especially when it comes to the political, social, and economic relations among humans as well as the relations between humans and governmental organizations. Having said that and bearing in mind the variety of Islamic doctrinal schools and traditions, one can understand the existence of a wide spectrum of conflictive interpretations by Islamic scholars (ulema) or Islamist activists, ranging from the liberal interpretations of, for example, the Egyptian Islamist Wasat Party to the fundamentalist tenets of the influential Egyptian Islamic scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi. In addition, empirical findings have shown that the support for democracy as an ideal is high among Muslims and, more important in this context, that Islam has less influence on political attitudes than is frequently presumed (Steven Hofman, 2004).

This list of reasons, which are supposed to account for the absence of democracy in MENA, is not comprehensive. Other causes associated with the major categories introduced above are also highlighted, such as the low level of education, the weakness of national identities based on artificial Middle Eastern state formation, or the remoteness of a democratic neighborhood. While various reasons are commonly cited in a cumulative way to dwell on the Middle Eastern failure of achieving democracy, few authors contest that the region has undergone important sociopolitical changes in the past few decades. Rather, it is now the scope, depth, and intention of political reforms that are debated.

**Recent Trends in Sociopolitical Development**

Over the past few years, the MENA countries have launched a number of reforms in response to domestic and global challenges. The dimensions of political, economic, and social crises that the Arab Middle East faces are vividly captured in the recently published Arab Human Development
Reports. These reports, indeed, demonstrate that Arab regimes lag behind with regard to some significant political and economic reforms. However, the steps that have been taken in several MENA countries to counteract the present crises may also be considered as a basis for notable change in the medium and longer term. Subsequently, the ambivalent record of reforms in MENA again opens the door for scholarly discussion.

Regarding Middle Eastern economies, the provision of finance by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank has, in return, led to structural reforms in key Arab states, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. These reforms induced programs of economic liberalization that opened up recipient economies to the world economy. This so-called infitah policy has raised hope among proponents of modernization theory that economic liberalization will be followed by political openings in the long run. In terms of political reform, the MENA region has witnessed slight improvements in political rights and civil liberties. The Freedom House Survey 2009 asserts that during the Bush presidency, nine of the region’s countries experienced some advancement on the Freedom in the World scale, including several of the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. Yet despite the first formally competitive presidential elections in Algeria (2004) and Egypt (2005), the first Saudi municipal elections in 2005, the introduction of a new family code in Morocco in 2004, and the appearance of political protest movements (e.g., Kifaya in Egypt and the Damascus Declaration in Syria), all of which have been interpreted as important steps toward more political liberalization, no major breakthroughs had been detected in MENA by 2009. Israel is still the only country in the region that the Freedom in the World 2009 survey (by Freedom House) classifies as free, whereas only six MENA states are categorized as partly free (Turkey, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Kuwait). The rest fall into the category of not free.

However, events in 2011 might turn the political landscape of the Arab world inside out. On January 14, the long-serving Tunisian President Zayn Al-Abidin Bin ‘Ali surrendered to public demands and, following a relatively short period of massive popular protest, fled the country. The seemingly effortless fall of Bin ‘Ali, whose security apparatus was deemed one of the strongest and most oppressive in the region, came to be known as the Jasmine Revolution and incited further popular upheaval across the Arab world, primarily borne and engineered by the region’s urban, marginalized, and well-educated youth. Only a short time after, on February 11, Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, was swept away. While other Arab leaders may still meet the same fate, it remains to be seen whether the so-called Peaceful Youth Revolution (thawra al-shabab al-salma) in the Middle East will eventually result in liberal democracies or not.

Skeptics admit that today a rapid and extensive political transformation process is underway in MENA but point to the robustness of Middle Eastern authoritarianism. In light of the ambivalent inventory of reforms predating the Arab uprising, only few authors saw the Arab world as being on the path toward democracy. Rather, there was widespread agreement that the region’s authoritarian regimes had learned not only to accommodate themselves to new political, economic, and social conditions but also to shape them according to their own best interests. Steven Heydemann hence speaks of “Authoritarian Upgrading” and illustrates how Arab regimes have succeeded in managing political contestation, benefiting from selective economic reforms, controlling new communication technologies, and stemming as well as appropriating civil society. Or, in other words, they have up to now skillfully handled Western democracy promotion by means of superficial reforms while simultaneously retaining domestic authority.

The Rise of Islamist Competitors

Yet another trend characterizes the recent sociopolitical development in the region—the rise of Islamist competitors to authoritarian rule. Within the past 2 decades, Islamist movements (baraka) such as the Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwan al-muslimun) have become popular grassroots organizations with their associated political parties (hizb) being capable of winning the majority of votes in most MENA countries, if free and fair elections were held. From Morocco to Iraq, Islamists are represented in the national parliaments, if granted access to the political system, or, like the Mouvement pour la Société de la Paix (MSP) in Algeria, even participate in government coalitions. This thriving of Islamist parties is closely observed by Western academics and politicians alike. Still, many voices disapprove of and
fear the Islamists’ political successes. In the meantime, however, the majority of Middle East scholars distinguish between moderate and radical Islamists. While the latter aim at the creation of an Islamic state through revolution in the Qutbian tradition (or seek to maintain it, as is the case, for instance, with the Shiite ulema appointed to the Council of Guardians in the formally democratic Islamic Republic of Iran), the former are prepared to pursue their political agenda by peaceful means within the existing political institutions. This is a more balanced approach, which gives consideration to Middle Eastern realities. It is far from reasonable to look at Turkey’s ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: AKP) in the same way as at the fundamentalist Hizb al-Tahrir, which is banned in many MENA countries. Vali Nasr, for instance, counts the AKP among “Muslim democrats.” According to Nasr, Muslim democratic parties, which are found mainly in the non-Arab Muslim world, are akin to Christian democratic parties due to their commitment to democratic values, their moderate religious ideology, and their systemic modus operandi. Such moderate Islamist parties, however, are also emerging in the Arab Middle East. Or, more precisely, as Islamist parties are overwhelmingly composed of radical and moderate wings, moderates there are getting the upper hand over their more radical party members.

The success of Islamist parties must not only be attributed to the eroding legitimacy of secularist and nationalist elites in MENA but also to the ability of their Islamist mother organizations to synthesize the interests of the lower and the middle classes. Besides, Islamist movements are popular because of their welfare activities, which provide broad social strata with basic health, nutrition, and educational services, a task insufficiently performed by public institutions. Also, as a result of anticipated electoral successes on account of a strong popular backing, Islamist parties have turned toward political participation within existing state institutions—all the more as former strategies of overthrowing regimes using violence have failed. This change of strategy can, in addition, be substantiated by the rationale of rent seeking: The middle classes who are incorporated into Islamist movements to a large extent do not engage in conflicts with the state but rather hope for more upward mobility and access to rents from within the state apparatus. Evidently, the inclusion of Islamists in the political process also presupposes the preparedness of the regime to include rather than exclude Islamists.

At present, Islamist parties are on a learning curve, and the moderation of many Islamist parties arises from their inclusion in the political process. After their moving into parliament, Islamists have to assume responsibility for taking action as well as refraining from doing so. Like every political party, Islamists have to compile party platforms, which give answers to domestic and global challenges and justify their positions in public. Once accountable to the electorate, they swiftly realize that there are no such easy remedies for urgent social and socioeconomic problems, such as just proclaiming “Islam is the Solution” (al-Islam huwa al-ball). The day-to-day work in parliaments or in parliamentary committees also leads to an institutionalization and modernization of party structures. Similarly, it requires getting along with former ideological opponents. To convince non-Islamist parliamentarians, Islamists learn to argue on a political and economical basis in different policy fields instead of incessantly resorting to religious reasoning. All this leads to the professionalization and de-radicalization of Islamist parties, as can be observed in the cases of the Moroccan Justice and Development Party (Parti de la Justice et du Développement, PJD) or the Algerian Movement for the Society of Peace (MSP). Within the party leadership, new technocratic elites are eclipsing the old religious elites step by step, a process that involves both the gradual establishment of inner-party democracy, including internal party strife as a matter of course, and growing independence from their mother organizations.

Obviously, not all Islamist parties chose to take the path of political participation or, as mentioned before, were barred by the regime from doing so. However, all Islamist parties that did embark on the strategy of participation have been faced by what is best described as the “participation dilemma.” That is to say, as Islamist parties are co-opted into the regime, they run the risk of losing credibility in the eyes of their supporters. Votes of Islamist parties in Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, and Yemen demonstrate that Islamist parties, accordingly, have performed badly in elections once they entered parliament or the government—all the more as the hoped for exertion of influence on political decision making often proved to be
unrealistic. Since the political system that they presently operate in does not allow for serious policy changes, Islamists often confine themselves to playing the role of moral watchdogs in parliament. Nevertheless, in this way, Islamists have become a major pillar of the regimes since by their very participation in the political process they bestow legitimacy on the regimes and foreclose the emergence of a more powerful opposition.

Moderate Islamists: Partners of the West?

Even though there is no doubt that there have been significant changes in the ideologies of many Islamist parties and their course of action, the question of whether this change is genuine and can be trusted is a highly controversial one. Many hold that even moderate Islamists will only show their true colors after having assumed power. While it is virtually impossible to disprove the latter assumption ex ante, drawing a balance sheet of academic findings about the political performance of moderate Islamists in the past can be helpful. Whether out of strategic considerations or conviction, moderate Islamist parties have stipulated democracy in their party platforms. Here, democracy is no longer understood as a Western product, rather general procedural aspects are emphasized. Islamists strongly advocate transparency as well as the establishment of and abidance by democratic standards. By way of inclusion into the parliamentary system, Islamists have learnt to focus on national interests and to put ideology on hold. In this way, Islamists are guided by increasing pragmatism when attempting to handle political challenges. Furthermore, Islamists have shown their willingness to seriously work in coalition with secular parties and, as is the case with the Yemeni Joint Meeting Parties, also with other denominational forces. Having said that, to this day Islamist parties have not yet completed the process of moderation, and it is still uncertain whether their interpretations of Islamic law (shari’ah) are flexible enough to fully reconcile religious with democratic values.

Islamist parties have taken a firm stand, too, with regard to another important policy field, the economy. An analysis of party platforms shows that Islamists favor a social market economy modeled on continental European examples. That is, they clearly reject a state-directed economy while approving a state-led regulation of the public sector. And they demand the strengthening of the private sector while endorsing public welfare spending. Hence, Islamist economic programs are directed to their party clientele, the middle class. And it is, ironically, the Islamist parties that are committed to agreements with regard to the Washington Consensus.

Against the background of the dismal prospects for democracy in MENA, on the one hand, and the rising relevance of Islamist parties, on the other, more and more Middle East scholars contend that democratization in MENA is impossible to reach without the participation of Islamist parties. Thus, Western governmental elites and scholars alike have begun to address the issue of whether or not moderate Islamist parties can be seen as reliable partners in future democratic developments.

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Further Readings


DEMOCRACY: RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES

The first use of the word демократия (demokratia) in Russian can be traced to the translation of Samuel Pufendorf’s (1718) Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe. But this does not mean that there was no idea of democracy in Russia before that time. Russian chroniclers or statesmen have, centuries earlier, described some democratic practices with words such as самодержавие (samoderzhavie—literally “self-consolidation”), самовластие (samovlastie—literally “self-rule”), and самоволие (samovolie—literally “self-will”), and they called some Cossack communities a kind of a republic using a transliterated Polish word речьпосполита (rzeczpospolita) or simply called democratic orders “free” (свободный—svobody) or “unrestricted” (вольный—vol’nyj). This entry discusses some of the historical roots and various interpretations of democracy in Russia.

Despite the relatively late use of the term, democracy was quickly given a very specific Russian implication. Democracy was considered to be deeply inherent in the everyday life of the Russian peasant community—obschina—and exceptionally specific in this regard, nothing like its plain Western counterpart. The 19th century was a time of profound social crisis and ongoing preparations for the liberation of serfs and subsequent modernizing reforms. It was the time when talk about the democratic instincts of Russian peasants and the archetypal centrality of pure and incorrupt (direct) democracy to Russian obschina were common in intellectual circles. In fact, democratic potential can be traced to primordial tribal times in any tradition. As for Russia, such democratic ways were fairly well expressed in history and were still alive in local communities in the 19th century and even later.

Beginning around the 9th century, the poleis of Eastern Slavic tribes and tribal federations interacted with the equally rudimentary military democracy of Varangian (druzhina—princely retinue, literally “camaraderie”) and set up a common military–trade infrastructure. Their interface contributed to the development of a patrimonial power structure of the Kievan Rus’ principality, where interactions between the prince and the people produced legitimizing effects. Polis structures with their democratic potential (such as veche—ecclesia and/or boule in various cities—literally talk, deliberation, council) were important elements of early democratic elements in Russia, as were ves’ grad (general assembly or polis, as a partner to the prince, literally all the city), startsy gradskie (city elders), and sbor (assembly). Equally significant were conciliar structures such as družina (early princely council, literally camaraderie) and duma (late princely council, literally thought).

The Mongols (the “Golden Horde”) invaded Russia during 1236 to 1242. With the conquest of Rus’ by the Horde, princes emerged as the only authority to control political order in Russian dependencies of the Horde in the eastern and southern parts of the former Kievan Rus’. Their rule was granted by Khans (jarlyk—mandate, Mongolian jarlyg—literally order). Actually, the Khan was the only source of all power. The power was delegated from the top down. Still, there was only one but significant exception. Princes also had to maintain the Christian derzhava (literally something holding together), which united them with the people and domestically was an alternative source of power and princely authority.

In ancient and medieval Rus’, ideas of democracy and autocracy were not opposed to each other but in fact closely interwoven. In fact, in medieval Russian texts, the terms mentioned earlier—samoderzhavie (“self-consolidation”), samovlastie (“self-rule”), or samovolie (“self-will”)—were used to denote both democracy and autocracy. The difference was contextual. It depended on who was the self in question—the whole community or the ruling authority or, more typically, both, integrated into a single body politic. It was conceptual substance (consolidation of power) that was important, not the form of the consolidation—monocentric, polycentric, or dispersed.

The Russian word samoderzhavie is usually translated as “autocracy.” The word actually emerged as a Slavic counterpart of the respective Greek term autokratia. But the translation was not...
exact. While the first components of both words (auto- and samo-) may be considered fairly equivalent as denomination of Self, the second ones were somewhat different. Both implied power but of a different kind. The Greek kratos denoted coercive and instrumental power, mingling the ideas of “military or physical supremacy” (i.e., krat-) and “hardiness” (i.e., kartu-) (Émile Benveniste, 1969). The Slavic derzhava connoted integrative power of holding people together originating from dher- (“to hold together”). So while autocracy suggested coercive power of an unrestricted Self over one’s subordinates, samoderzhavie stood for the power of self-integration. The reason was that a fairly primitive tribal power structure would not differentiate between the power emanating from the tribal community and the power of its chief. Conceptually, it implied that both authorities and people are fully integrated into a single body politic. In fact, this conceptual scheme has been so strong that it produced one of the most widespread Soviet slogans “People and the Party are integral” (narod i partiia ediny—literally “people and the party are one, single, united”). In fact, any ruling authority in Russia has been obsessed with the idea of unity with the people. Typically, Putin’s dominant party is called Edinaia Rossia (literally “people and the party are one, single, united”) and not Obyedinennia Rossia or “United Russia” as it is inaccurately translated.

Authority Versus People

The emergence of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy in the late 15th century was a great act of emancipation from nearly 3 centuries of Mongol external domination, known as the Tatar Yoke. Around that time, Ivan III Vasilevich (Ivan the Great) of Muscovy and his brother-in-law Stefan cel Mare the Great of Moldova introduced a conceptual innovation. Claiming political independence from the Golden Horde and the Ottoman Empire, they called themselves gosudar’ and gospodar’ (two alternative forms of the same word), respectively, and called the polities they controlled their “households”—gosudastvo and gospodarsvo, respectively. In current Russian, gosudastvo is a standard term for the state. The word gosudar’ is just a form of the Old Slavic word Gospod’—the Lord. Its meaning can be traced back to the Indo-European notion of authority over aliens. In other words, the notion referred to a very important function of distinguishing kin from alien and deciding which aliens could be treated as adopted kin and which were to be rejected as enemies.

To stress his exceptional status, Ivan III demanded to be called not just gosudar’ but velikii (great) or samoderzhavnii (independent, self-integrating). Typically another Russian polity, the Novgorod Republic, was often called Gospodin Velikii Novgorod, which can be translated as the Great Overlord Novgorod or more accurately Great Sovereign Novgorod. In any case, both Muscovite and Novgorod claims to the status of samoderzhavnii gosudar’ implied that both the household lord—princely or republican—and his people were integrated by the same derzhava, which made them all free. The Grand Duchy of Muscovy reemerged as a sovereign (samoderzhavnaiia) Russia in its first revolution of self-integration, as Russia’s emancipation from the outside threat to its very existence turned into subordination to the very authority that was considered instrumental in bringing about that emancipation. Thus, the grand act of total emancipation immediately turned into ultimate subordination. This pattern is being repeated in the later history of the country as well.

Development of the Russian polity was uneven and contradictory. Still, new important elements of a democratic nature appeared including a system of representative bodies. In 1549, Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible) convoked the so-called Sobor Primirenia (Assembly of Reconciliation). It was composed of three bodies—Boyar Duma (Royal Council), Osveschennyi Sobor (Blessed or Holy Assembly), and Zemski Sobor (Assembly of the Land). A short-lived attempt was made to create a structure of four “estates”—tsar, nobility, clergy, and commoners, with the last three having their assemblies.

Since the mid-16th century, all kinds of assemblies were more or less regularly convoked. Zemski Sobor was an important but subordinate body under Ivan the Terrible. It was essentially used to outbalance Boyar Duma. Sobors of the late 16th and early 17th centuries were instruments of political manipulation rubber-stamping adventurous takeovers and conquests. Zemski Sobor of the “tsarless” period of 1610–1613
became an actual legislative and even executive authority. In 1613, it had carried out a series of regional sobors and a special joint session to elect Mikhail Romanov as a new tsar and the founder of a new dynasty. Under Mikhail, sobors met regularly until 1622; their meetings resumed in 1632, but their roles changed. They were only to consent to the tsar’s decisions and ceased to be convened after 1684.

The long and dramatic story of changing concepts and institutions of Russia (gosudarstvo, tsarstvo, derzgava, otechestvo, etc.) arrived at a critical point in the mid-17th century. In Europe, it was the time of termination of the epoch of confessionalism marked by the Peace of Westphalia (1648). European sovereigns were emancipated from a mandatory subordination to transcendental authority and could rely on ratio status. They had to rationalize relations with their subjects by developing networks of bureaucracies and representative bodies. In Russia, the time was equally decisive. It reemerged again as a sovereign, samoderzhavnaiia power in its second revolution of self-integration after the Times of Trouble of the early 17th century, marked by famine, the Polish invasion, and the end of the Rurik dynasty. This time, it was the so-called Velikaia Russkaia Samoderzhavnaiia Revolutsia (Great Russian Autocratic Revolution; see Yuri Pivovarov & Andrei Fursov, 2001), in which the new Romanov dynasty emerged following Polish domination. Again, radical emancipation ultimately became subordination as history repeated itself, and domination of subjects by their rulers continued. In contrast to Western Europe, which was territorially divided, Russia or rather Northern Eurasia was territorially integrated. In Europe, sovereign states developed agencies of various levels to circulate the power. In Russia, all former political agencies were reduced to insignificance, and the tsar alone emerged as the sole authority to his tsarstvo and his people. With all the centralizing effects of the Great Russian Authoritarian Revolution, a country as big as Russia simply could not be governed by using only one simple principle of integration of power and the populace, which was the main feature of the Russian system that ensued after the Great Russian Autocratic Revolution. Many other patterns of rule, management, and decision making were applied particularly at geographical and social peripheries and specific domains of activities. It is there that undeveloped or even primeval patterns of democratic governance survived, including local village communities or small townships typically called sloboda (literally “free settlement”), military orders of Cossacks (literally “free rambler” in Turkic), religious and ethnic self-governing communities, companies of explorers (important for Russia’s frontier of unexplored land in Siberia, the steppes, and the Far North), merchants and artisans (so-called artel), and so on.

It took nearly 2 centuries (and more than a century of Europeanization) to expand the polity to such an extent, and for practical reasons, a vast network of institutions had to be developed to regulate relations between individuals, groups of individuals, and the imperial superstructure. Along with democratic patterns of operation at the peripheries of all kinds, these institutions were influenced and distorted by the Russian system but were to a lesser or greater extent resistant to its sway.

During that period two important political notions emerged: (1) Otechestvo—Fatherland—a nation with a long conceptual history from collective heritage within lineage through votchina and (2) a member of the nation typically called Syn Otechestva—Son of the Fatherland. Those two notions were extremely important alternatives both to the power and to the populace. Highly personalized power was depersonalized, and impersonal populace turned into a community of personalized sons of the nation.

By the beginning of the 19th century, Russia was ready for another revolution. It was accelerated by the Napoleonic invasion. The Patriotic War of 1812, called in Russian Otechestvennaia voina (the war that sons of the Fatherland waged to save their Fatherland), turned into the third revolution of self-integration. Russia reemerged again as a sovereign, samoderzhavnaiia power destined to maintain the political and moral order of post-Napoleonic Europe as Alexander I the Blessed solemnly declared at the Vienna Congress. Another grand act of total liberation from foreign occupation turned into strengthening the autocrat and his or her power.

Still it was not all that simple and one-sided. Endogenous political developments coupled with efforts to Westernize and integrate into European
political order produced significant changes. Probably the most decisive factor was the emergence of a notion of people that would cover not only the populace but also a potential actor safeguarding Russia itself. Typically it was “silent,” for example, in the symbolic scene of the election of the tsar in Pushkin’s “Boris Godunov,” but it was able to act spontaneously and decisively during crucial, “revolutionary” moments such as Otechestvennaia voina. An important reflection of the changes and of a new balance of essentials of Russian politics manifested itself with the declaration of the guiding ideological formula—pravoslavie (orthodoxy), samoderzhavie (autocracy but also sovereignty and self-integrity), and narodnost’ (nationality or people mindedness, ability to think and act as the integral Russian people). It is true that the formula coined by the Russian minister of education Sergei Uvarov in 1833 was a counterpart of the formula of the French revolution—Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité—and to that extent was “the Russian version of a general European ideology of restoration and reaction” (Nicholas Riasanovsky, 2005, p. 133). But it is equally true that it redefined the power setup within the Russian System. Prawoslavie reaffirmed the old principle of sacral derzhava with all the power coming from above. Samoderzhavie provided pragmatic derzhava of the autocrat and his Polizeistaat administration and also for Russia’s sovereignty and integrity. Narodnost’ indicated that in practical terms Russian people were the core frame of reference for conceptualizing and enacting politics. Conceptually, it implied that the Russian people along with the Supreme Lord and the Autocrat were a source of power. The modern principle of organizing politics bottom-up was implicitly recognized. As we can see it now, it was a major precondition to anticipated modernization and still murky democratization.

The tripartite formula was a step forward to rationalize political integrity not only conceptually but also functionally and structurally. It was confronted with the strong determination of Slavophiles, such as Ivan Kireevskiy and Alexei Khomiakov, to work out a new holistic idea for Russia that would be essentially based on the integrity of Orthodox ecclesia and Russian obschina. They introduced the idea of Sobornost’—holistic spirituality integrating worldly communities of Orthodox Russians. This new idea was potentially extremely revolutionary since it could imply that there was no need either for absolutist Polizeistaat machinery or for the state as such. Sobornost’ would rely not on the mundane practicalities of rule and subordination but rather on traditions of peasant and boyar conciliarm having clear connections with the sobors of the patriarchal Muscovite past and the romanticized spiritual integrity of the people and the tsar.

Sovereignty of the People

In the discourse of, first, Alexander Herzen and then Nikolay Chernyshevskiy and his associates, samoderzhavie tzarei (autocracy of the tsars) was opposed to samoderzhavie naroda (popular sovereignty). A clearly modern way of thinking was embedded into the national tradition. Integration was a clear priority but could be achieved only on the basis of narod (the people) becoming a true sovereign or samoderzhets (autocrats). Early Russian democrats were very optimistic about the prospects of peasant democracy and, hence, socialism in Russia. In 1862, they created a revolutionary organization Zemlia i volia—land and liberty, or rather unrestricted self-will (Russian воля, English will, and Greek βουλή, all derive from the uel—“to wish”). The name of the organization clearly demonstrated the objective to surpass the moderate results of the emancipation of serfs and to achieve a far more radical redistribution of land alongside with provision of individual liberties of all kinds. This venture was short-lived. It was brutally crushed a year later when the Polish uprising provoked harsh political repressions throughout the whole country.

Soon thereafter, in the late 1860s and 1870s, a broader movement of narodniki (usually translated as “populists,” but a more exact rendering would be “people minded, concerned with people’s cause”) emerged. From 1873 to 1875, many narodniki left the cities for villages on a mission of kbozhdienie v narod (literally “going into the people”) in an attempt to reintegrate with the peasantry and thus bring about moral and social revolution. This campaign failed. The radicals among the narodniki joined terrorist organizations, such as Narodnaya Volia (People’s Will), which was active from 1879 to 1883. Some others joined the anarchist movement, inspired by Mikhail Bakunin and Petr Kropotkin. More moderate and liberal-minded
persons accepted a strategy of “small ventures” and became active in local self-government—the Zemstvo movement.

In practical terms, Zemstvo—a name for a local representative body, literally “community of a land”—was one of the most significant achievements of the so-called Great Reforms. In 1864, Alexander II created self-governing bodies in a number of provinces and localities. Their number as well as competence gradually increased. Zemstvo ran educational and medical establishments, developed all kinds of infrastructural projects, and so on. What is particularly important is that they practiced elections to representative bodies, for example, representative councils (zemskie sobranie) and controlled executive ones (e.g., executive boards—zemskaia uprava). This was an invaluable democratic experience for Russia.

Glasnost’ (usually translated as “openness” but deriving from the Russian word for “voice” thus meaning “voicefulness”) became an important key word. It implied accountability of authority and importance of public opinion in the running of reforms (Bruce Lincoln, 1981). Perestroika (“rebuilding”) was another key word of the time.

With all the validity of local and autonomous self-government of specific communities, the imperative of Volonté Générale of the entire people still prevailed. Despite the growing diversity of the political and intellectual landscape of post-reform Russia, popular feelings and intellectual efforts focused on ideas of political integrity. One of the most significant instances was a notion of samoderzhavnaya respublika (autocratic republic) introduced by the Founding Father of Russian liberalism, Konstantin Kavelin (1818–1885). His point of departure was “organic integrity (“one-ness”) of the authority and the people.” On that basis, he concluded, “Since the people (collective singular) no doubt in its very essence are (literally is) autocratic, so single with it authority, eo ipso must be autocratic.” He further developed his prognosis:

Tsar is the only and most secure bulwark of peasantry against aristocratic and citizen (menschanski, literary “town dwellers” meaning “bourgeois”) constitutions. In future as well he is the best security against emergence of any privileged ruling classes. There is no doubt that by all its mass Russia would follow only the autocratic, i.e. free Tsar, who is independent either of boyars or of plutocrats. The history itself makes us create a new, unprecedented and unique political order that no other wording would fit but autocratic republic. (Kavelin, 1989, p. 436 ff).

A very similar political order emerged after the October Revolution of 1917. But the project, as well as the conceptualization, was different. During the revolution in 1905, Lenin started to speak about Soviet Power as a new form of political organization or direct democracy of the masses. In 1917, the slogan “All power to the soviets!” (Vsya vlast sovyetam!) was used by the Bolsheviks to successfully crush Kerenski’s Provisional Government and to establish the new political order.

**Democracy of Soviets**

Both sovereign and autocratic (samoderzhavnaia) power reemerged again in its fourth liberation revolution of self-integration. This time it was the so-called Velikaia Oktiabrskaiia Sotsialisticheskaiia Revolutsia (Great October Socialist Revolution). Again, the grand act of total emancipation turned into outright dictatorship. Soviet Power was highly ambivalent: On the one hand, it relied on mass participation and thus had a clear democratic calling coupled with the institutional form of direct democracy of Soviets—“Councils of Workers and Peasants Deputies”—but on the other, the emergent system could only be run by a highly integrated and disciplined—a new type of—vanguard party. Lenin, in his seminal 1920 book, “Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder, clearly fixed a hierarchy of power: leaders, party, (working) class, and masses.

Democratic centralism was an answer to the practical running of the country. Initially, it was a set of principles of internal organization of the nascent Russian social-democratic party advocated not only by Bolsheviks but also by Lenin personally. In its fuller version, democratic centralism implied five key points:

1. election of all party organs from bottom to top and systematic renewal of their composition, if needed;
2. responsibility of party structures to both lower and upper structures;
3. strict and conscious discipline in the party—that is, the minority must follow the majority decisions until such time as the policy is changed;
4. decisions of upper structures mandatory for the lower structures; and
5. cooperation of all party organs in a collective manner at all times and, correspondingly, personal responsibility of party members for the assignments given to them and for the assignments they themselves create.

With the consolidation of Soviet Russia, those five principles were introduced into the internal machinery of the Soviet system of rule with very minor adjustments of a purely technical nature. Democratic centralism was formally fixed in Article 7 of the Soviet Constitution of 1977 as a principle for operating the state:

The Soviet state is organized and functions on the principle of democratic centralism, namely the electiveness of all bodies of state authority from the lowest to the highest, their accountability to the people, and the obligation of lower bodies to observe the decisions of higher ones. Democratic centralism combines central leadership with local initiative and creative activity and with the responsibility of each state body and official for the work entrusted to them.

Another way to describe the Soviet rule was “totalitarian democracy” (Jacob Talmon, 1952). In his book, Talmon explores the reshaping of government into one in which social utility takes absolute precedence. While for Talmon the origins of totalitarian democracy are a merger of the interests of the individual and the state into a single Volonté Générale, in the Russian case, Rousseauist-Marxist and Jacobin Bolshevik lineages were only complementary to the recurring mode of the three successive liberation revolutions of self-integration of the country and its people. This system of governance was developing. During the Khruschevian period, the concept of an “All-Peoples State” stressing the democratic ideals of the nation of USSR was introduced. The Party was keen to maintain the integrity of the people and authority. A common slogan of the period was that the people and the Party are one.

**Perestroika: More Democracy, More Socialism**

In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The key notions of Perestroika and Glasnost entered public discourse at the time of the 27th Congress of the CPSU in February 1986. Slogans such as “more democracy, more socialism” and “back to Lenin” implied the embedding of democratic reforms in Soviet tradition. Yegor Ligachev, the party boss from Siberia whom Gorbachev had brought into the Politburo, asserted, “The Party expresses the profound essence of perestroika by the formula ‘more socialism’” (Pravda, November 6, 1986).

The terms democracy and democratization, which had been used in various formulas by the Party in all periods, became essentially contested concepts. Typical of perestroika jargon was the “democratization” of everything. During the Congress, Gorbachev himself, as well as others, spoke about the “free revelation (vyjavlenie) of interests and the will of all classes and social groups” and about the “self-regulation and self-government of society.” Though far-reaching in their implications, such statements gave no details of the institutional designs; a vague notion of democratization covered everything. When the legislative framework did appear, it was presented as a return to original Soviet institutions. Although the reforms marked a radical departure in the country’s political structures, the constitutional arrangements adopted by the Supreme Soviet in November 1988 also left scope for traditional structures. Citizens would directly elect the People’s Deputies, who would constitute the Congress of People’s Deputies, which would in turn elect a bicameral Supreme Soviet. One third of the deputies would be elected, not by territory but by “public organizations” such as the Communist Party, the Young Communist League, and the trade unions. After a turbulent campaign, the first competitive elections were held on March 26, 1989, and more than 30 top party officials were defeated. The First Congress of the People’s Deputies of the
USSR met in May 1989. The Extraordinary Fifth Congress met in September 1991 only to start the process of dismantling the USSR.

From a Crippled to a Sovereign Democracy
The end of the USSR in December 1991 marked a new stage in the fifth liberation revolution. It was the stage of consolidating new polities all claiming to become democracies. Various aspects of autocratic and democratic traditions as well as of their uneasy symbiosis manifested themselves in each of the cases of the 15 new independent states. In each case, the grand act of total emancipation turned into specific configurations of political institutions and practices. For the most part, those configurations were and continue to be highly ambiguous and contradictory. It was very symbolic that the key word for the Boris Yeltsin regime was sovereignty—not samoderzhavie this time, but still, integrity of power was very much the main political issue.

In the Russian Federation, interpretations of democracy and of new institutions of the country differed immensely, not only ideologically or partywise but also conceptually. There was a great gap between normative and pragmatic interpretations of democracy as such and the emerging democracy of the new Russia in particular. Often, if not typically, both visions were intricately intertwined. An apt example was the phase attributed to Deputy Prime Minister and actual head of the cabinet from 1991 to 1994, Yegor Gadar—“Russia is a crippled democracy, but it is a democracy at the end of the day.”

Feelings that the newborn Russian democracy was inefficient and/or insufficient were very widespread in all political quarters of the country, but interpretations were quite different. That there was a great gap between the expectations and results achieved could not be denied. Some attributed the problems to the loss of an independent and consolidated power base of the regime. For others, the problem lay in the inability of the regime to stand up to normative ideals and best international practice. While the first view seemed more practical and consonant with Russian traditions, the second one was clearly impractical, wishful, and foreign. The first one gradually prevailed both in the minds of the authorities and the populace in general. The second view was characteristic of dogmatic “democrats” and zealous critics of the Yeltsin and, later, the Vladimir Putin regimes.

It was only natural that gradual consolidation of the political order and infrastructure of governance led to a reconceptualization of the constitutional framework of the Russian Federation as sovereign democracy (suveryennaya demokratiya). This formula was first introduced by Vladislav Surkov, the deputy head of the presidential administration, in his speech to the trainees of United Russia’s Center for Party Personnel Training on February 7, 2006. Soon, the text was published as an article, “The Nationalization of the Future” in Expert magazine. It explained the notion as a proper synonym for “political competitiveness.” Critics were quick to interpret the notion as a cover for exceptional democracy that would not tolerate any outside criticism. While this may be a secondary interpretation, the champions of sovereign democracy in fact insist that it highlights the great power status of Russia. Another possible, but unfortunately not widespread, interpretation is that of a sovereign (constitutional, etc.) state working to develop democracy.

It is very indicative that both Putin and Dmitry Medvedev deliberately refrained from public support of the concept. Rather, they voiced their reservations but agreed that the idea was worth pondering about. Still, it cannot be denied that with the notion of sovereign democracy, traditional priorities of political integrity have gained momentum. Although institutional and procedural aspects of accountability of authorities and of transparency remain grossly underdeveloped, sovereign democracy gives room for further promotion and anchoring of democratic institutions.

This short outline of Russia’s leanings toward democracy shows that it is wrong to treat all its traditions as outright autocratic and democracy as something that had to start there from scratch. Russia’s democratization story began as far back as the mid-19th century. Its heritage is rich albeit often tragic. Temptations to achieve radical breakthroughs to “pure” or complete integrity of authority and the people (far older than the democratization story itself) recurrently led to reestablishing the autocratic “integration” of Russia top-down. The present phase of sovereign democracy may be replaced by further moves toward more consequential accountability of authorities and popular political
Democratic Consolidation

Democratic consolidation may be described as the process of defining and firmly establishing the essential characteristics (and adjusting the secondary ones) of the structures and norms inherent in a democratic regime, which comes about also, but not exclusively, with the passage of time. Institutions, procedures, practices, customs, and routines are defined and adapted, and at the same time, the structures and regulations for the peaceful resolution of conflicts become accepted, thus strengthening the regime’s legitimization. In short, consolidation is one of the possible outcomes arising out of the introduction of democracy: This may result not only in a fully functioning democracy but also in its bare survival or in a new crisis of the political system and a subsequent shift toward authoritarianism. This entry defines democracy and clarifies the principal meanings of consolidation used in this analysis. After a brief discussion of some criticisms of the concept, the entry examines the empirical dimension and the mechanisms through which democracies can be consolidated. Finally, following an analysis of the factors that favor this process, some concluding considerations are offered.

**Definitions**

Defining the concept requires first of all (a) identifying when a government can claim to be at least minimally democratic and (b) outlining the different types of democracy along a continuum running from partial forms of democracy to more complete ones. As far as the first objective is concerned, one can start with the well-accepted notion of polyarchy, whereby a political regime is democratic when key civil and political rights are protected and elections are free, transparent, and competitive. The minimum forms of democracy have been defined as “electoral democracies”: In these democracies, some of the procedural requisites of polyarchy are respected, but elections are only partially free, and the chances of an opposition victory are limited. For a regime of this type to claim to be democratic, however, election results must reflect the will of the voters, and in particular, it must be possible to remove unpopular politicians from power. This necessitates an open electoral arena, with substantial freedom for parties and candidates to publicize their ideas and canvass votes, along with guarantees that they may speak, publish, meet, organize, and move freely within the country to pursue their objectives peacefully.

**Further Readings**


von Haxthausen, A. (1847–1852). *Studien über die inneren Zustände, das Volksleben und insbesondere die ländlichen Einrichtungen Russlands* (3 vols.) [Studies about the inner affairs, the life of the people and, in particular, the rural institutions of Russia]. Hannover (Vols. 1 & 2)/Berlin (Vol. 3), Germany: Hahn.
In some historical and geographical contexts, democracies have achieved a certain level of maturity, the government and public administration operate better, the judicial system is more independent and effective, parties and interest groups are better structured, the democratic political culture is more robust, and civil society is autonomous and vibrant. Likewise, governments react responsibly to requests from voters and social organizations and endeavor to represent the interests of all—including marginal and weaker groups and ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities. In this case, one can legitimately speak of “liberal democracies.”

To consolidate a democracy implies strengthening it. But democracy can be strengthened in different ways. Originally, it was thought that strengthening a democracy was synonymous with making it “secure,” extending its “life expectancy” and safeguarding it from the danger of authoritarianism. Subsequently, this interpretation was widened to incorporate a series of other “missions.” The resulting long list thus includes neutralizing antisystem actors, building a party system, organizing economic and social interests, stabilizing electoral laws, decentralizing state power, reforming the judicial system, and solving problems of poverty and underdevelopment. The new objective, therefore, seems to be that of getting as close as possible to the organizational forms and political and social performances of advanced Western democracies. In this sense, strengthening a democracy means deepening its characteristics and realizing its full potential.

Seen in this light, democratic consolidation takes on two very different meanings. The first is substantially negative: It implies avoiding authoritarianism—that is, moving from an “electoral democracy” to a new authoritarian regime—or preventing the erosion of democracy and its recession from advanced forms to other more precarious ones. In the first case, the danger is that of a sudden death, that is, of democratic breakdown; in the second, the risk is of impoverishment and a slow death, of a gradual unraveling of democracy and an almost imperceptible return to authoritarian political forms. The second meaning of consolidation is positive. Consolidating democracy in this sense means bringing it to fruition, progressing from an initial form to other more complete forms, from “electoral” forms of democracy to a democracy in which civil and political rights are more numerous, more detailed, and better protected. According to many, social and economic rights should also be fully protected, and consolidating democracy thus means creating an “advanced democracy,” which represents the ideal goal of more progressive political practices.

Which of these interpretations is preferable? It seems appropriate to limit the term to the first set of meanings, the negative ones and in particular to that of survival: Consolidation should imply only the expectation of the regime’s endurance. Some find the other definitions problematic, since democracy and its identity cannot be statically and definitively fixed, and its contents are in perennial movement, always open to new clarifications. Hence, it would be analytically impossible and futile to attempt to define once and for all what constitutes a “good democracy” and a “finally consolidated” democracy. Given the confusion surrounding it, the concept of positive consolidation associated with this interpretation is equally empty. Those scholars who believe that one can study democratic performance and its potential for full realization through other concepts, such as the quality of democracy, have reached similar conclusions: For them, too, the typical sphere of consolidation remains the original one, rooted in the prospects of democracy’s maintenance and mere survival rather than the possibility of full democratic realization, which would again involve the concept of quality.

Although they are always changeable and undefined, the specific contents of democracy are not entirely indeterminate and are relevant to the prospects for consolidation. In fact, it is no coincidence that the consolidation of modern democracies requires the crafting of mutually acceptable rules that concern crucial themes such as negotiation between capitalists and workers, guarantees of different forms of property, and assurances concerning levels of social protection to be established or defended. In more general terms, democracy enjoys better consolidation prospects when the major political actors have a stake in its survival. In this setup, actors outside the electoral arena, especially the military and entrepreneurs, receive guarantees that their vital interests will be respected. Likewise, political parties and movements not in government must have realistic chances of taking power
through elections. Only when an agreement of this type exists can they too, over time, become accustomed to democracy. Once they realize that their initial fears were mainly groundless, they can transform lukewarm acceptance of the new regime into full support.

**Criticism**

Some political scientists have (at times sharply) criticized the concept of democratic consolidation and deemed it unacceptable on account of its strong teleological flavor. Cases that have not achieved full institutionalization are seen as enduringly unconsolidated. Such a view presupposes that there are factors working in favor of increased consolidation or institutionalization but that countervailing obstacles obstruct a process of change that otherwise would operate unfettered. The current existence of many countries that have been in a state of failed or partial consolidation for decades, however, casts the existence of this linear progression into doubt. To claim that consolidation occurs only when the behavior of the main political actors is adapted to the formal rules of democracy would be to ignore the experience of many countries, such as India or Italy, that are widely considered to be consolidated democracies but in which particularism and patronage remain widespread. Others, finally, find no trace of a specific empirical dimension of the concept, which should be observable if the chances of a democratic regime’s survival over time were increased simply because it has already survived for a sufficiently long period.

**Empirical Indications of Consolidation**

Many political scientists have focused their attention on this dimension, wondering, at first, how a consolidated democratic regime can be empirically recognized. Even if this analysis is limited to the prospects of regime survival, as discussed above, the answer to this question is problematic. First and foremost, it is important to note that some have studied the behavior of political actors, and others their attitudes. The former in particular have concentrated on antidemocratic behavior as a symptom of the weakness of a democracy and have tried to determine how and when such behavior violates its basic rules. Principally, democracy is challenged when political actors try to achieve their goals through violence. These acts include a series of actions ranging from the systematic destruction of public or private property to the assassination of political adversaries, and to attempts to forcibly overturn the government and intimidate voters and candidates. The refusal to recognize the validity of genuinely free political elections can also trigger an irreversible democratic crisis, for example, by deciding not to participate in voting, stopping others from participating, or manipulating electoral results at will. Finally, consolidation implies that political actors must respect the laws and the constitution, and accept the agreed rules of political behavior. When the government violates the established rules while legislating, enforcing laws, interpreting them, or resolving conflicts, and especially when these violations become customary, the survival of democracy is severely at risk.

Having clarified these essential points, many other questions nevertheless remain unanswered. For example, which levels of antidemocratic behavior are sufficient to trigger a democratic crisis and can therefore be considered a symptom of de-consolidation? It is obvious that the higher the levels, the greater the risk for the new democracy, but it is also possible that relatively low levels can accumulate over time to produce a crisis that may be unexpected. And it is perfectly possible that a democratic crisis will serve to bolster the new democratic regime rather than destroy it. This was the case, for example, with Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina’s attempted coup d’état in Spain in 1981. Finally, consolidation can be considered authentic only if it guarantees democratic survival when adverse external conditions are present. It is essential, for example, that a governing party peacefully accepts giving up power in the event of an opposition election victory. The turnover-in-government test reflects this rationale, and if turnover takes place twice, then the test is even more stringent: In this latter case, not only are we then certain that two large democratic parties have been formed but also that elite groups and public opinion fully accept the functioning of the democratic mechanism, as they have proved that they are willing to change the government, but not the democratic regime, when things have gone badly.
A second empirical indicator of consolidation concerns the attitudes of political actors as regards both normative and cognitive aspects. Democracy is consolidated normatively when its citizens consistently give it genuine support and value it as an intrinsic good, not merely an instrumental one. For many, this transformation signals the conclusion of the process: Although democracies can survive at relatively low levels of consensus, it is undoubted that marked legitimacy provides significant help in tackling and overcoming moments of crisis, including acute ones. The most widely used tool to determine whether, and to what extent, the citizens of new postauthoritarian regimes appreciate democracy is opinion polling. Undoubtedly, this is still a fragile tool, especially if polls consist of generic questions that are difficult to interpret with any certainty, such as those concerning public preference for democracy over other political regimes. This is not only because alternative experiences to democracy in some cases are only a distant memory but also because the dimensions and experiences linked to democracy are too numerous, and in part contradictory, to allow for a single reply. Among the attitudes to consider are the democratic expectations of political actors, that is, the extent to which they think democracy will survive—a cognitive aspect relating to personal evaluations. Again, as in the case of public consensus, opinion polls are a significant, though not always complete, tool to analyze some of their empirical features.

**Mechanisms of Consolidation**

Having attempted to define the concept in its theoretical and empirical components, this entry now looks at how it operates. Which processes accompany the consolidation of democracy? Who are the actors and what strategies do they employ? Consolidation implies the definition of relations between representative and governing institutions and civil society. These relationships develop in two directions: from the bottom upwards, that is, from society to the institutions, and from the top downward, in other words, from the newly created institutions through intermediate structures to society. In the first case, it is civil society that backs the regime through a process of legitimization and support. It is worth noting that some scholars claim that the crucial aspect for the survival of a regime is not active support but rather the lack of organized alternatives. Consensus, therefore, may often be only acquiescence and passive acceptance of the status quo. However, no matter how one defines the foundations of legitimization, it must be stressed that, if legitimization is widespread, if all political organizations are integrated and involved in accepting and supporting democratic institutions, then an important step toward democratic consolidation has already been taken in practice. By contrast, where support is limited, consolidation is only possible through the opposite mechanism, known as “anchoring,” which operates from the top down.

The key “anchors” of democratic consolidation are political parties and their organizations (parties may be more or less institutionalized), their gate-keeping function (with which they control the access of interest groups to the decision-making arena and establish priorities among different demands), their links of patronage (particularistic relationships with large and small private entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens), and neocorporatist agreements. In sum, political parties exercise their function of political “anchors” by organizing, integrating, and sometimes even controlling general civil society and the specific sectors that make it up, consequently helping strengthen the democratic political regime. The crucial point is that the process of consolidation and the particular mix of its two components (legitimization and anchorage) give rise to different consolidation formulas in different countries, thus enabling one to determine the type of democracy that derives from it. For example, in Italy, legitimization of the democratic regime created after World War II was limited, and the parties established a position of domination over interest groups, giving rise to consolidation of the party-based type. By contrast, in Spain after Franco’s death, the parties were generally weaker than in Italy and were more neutral toward interest groups. However, in the period after democratization, the new regime acquired strong legitimacy, partially due to the role played by the party elites: Spain is therefore an example of consolidation through the elite. It should be noted, though, that especially if they have contributed to democratic consolidation, the principal “anchors” may not be
very adaptable to the changing circumstances of political life, and a series of factors—long permanence in power, lack of turnover, absence of coalition partners in government—may throw the new democratic regime, and the prevalent type of consolidation, into crisis. This in turn may lead to instability and produce the contrary phenomenon of “disanchoring” of civil society from politics.

Factors Influencing the Success of Consolidation

The conditions that favor the success of democratic consolidation remain to be discussed. The list is long; here a general outline is provided, distinguishing between political, economic, and international scenario-related factors. Among the first, the nature of the previous authoritarian regime is significant: Some scholars argue that if political repression was intense or if the authoritarian regime collapsed after military defeat, the new democratic government will enjoy “inverse” legitimization thanks simply to having replaced a widely discredited government; however, this effect does not last long. Others are of the view that democratic structures are more easily reinforced if less violence has been used and the attitude of the defeated authoritarian government is one of compromise and negotiation with the democratic forces.

Previous democratic experiences may be of more significance: If some democratic institutions were maintained during the authoritarian interval, consolidation is more likely to be successful, compared with a scenario in which such institutions have to be created ex novo. In the first case, the prior democratic experience greatly facilitates the restoration of previous alliances between parties and groups and the reemergence of associations, trade unions, and other organizations that support democracy. Indeed, during the 20th century, few countries succeeded in introducing a stable and lasting democracy at the first attempt. Nonetheless, more recent experiences, involving the progressive democratization of countries with little or no previous democratic history, may open new and interesting scenarios for the survival of democracy in such cases.

Certain structural elements, such as some degree of ethnic and religious homogeneity and the absence of deep ideological divisions or severe economic and social inequality, appear to favor the emergence of a strong political culture, which is another important determinant for consolidation. These characteristics are also associated with a robust civil society. Democratic consolidation is thus held to benefit from associations and institutions that are strongly rooted in civil society, provided that these try to achieve their own interests also in opposition to political power, in turn restricting the desire of the latter to expand disproportionately. In order to be effective, these associations must be strong, centralized, and willing to mobilize for political objectives; otherwise, the government will find it easy to deal with those opposing it, whether by intimidating them or buying their services.

Among the political institutions that facilitate the process, parties are undeniably of central importance; this entry has already mentioned their role in the development of consolidation, as agents promoting legitimacy bottom-up and, if this fails, anchoring it top-down. Parliamentary systems are thought by some scholars to be more favorable to democratic consolidation than presidential ones, since the former reduce the harsher aspects of political confrontation through the creation of party coalitions necessary to form a government and because they provide a better balance between the powers of the president and those of the head of government. Electoral systems are also the subject of debate, with the question posed of which more effectively strengthens democracy: a proportional system, which better represents the claims of economic, social, local, and ideological minorities, or a majoritarian system, seen as more capable of delivering a clearer and more credible governing alternative? Although the empirical evidence remains somewhat ambiguous, the prevailing current of thought is that parliamentary systems are better in this sense than presidential ones, especially if the latter are combined with a proportional party system, which multiplies its limitations.

A second group of conditions that facilitate democratic consolidation are economic in nature and involve two possible scenarios. Reaching certain levels of development is thought to reflect the fact that a democratic regime has been consolidated and that it no longer runs a significant risk
of lapsing into authoritarianism. In Argentina, the per capita income in 1975 was above $6,000, still one of the highest levels of wealth ever associated with a democracy that was overturned. However, wealth is not necessary for consolidation: Even poorer countries can maintain a democratic regime if they can generate strong economic growth, accompanied by moderate and stable levels of inflation and if they extend the new wealth to the majority of the population. The probabilities of a democracy dying, in particular, also appear to vary inversely with economic inequality, in line with what was already suggested in the 1960s. In brief, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a modern industrialized economy, in a complex relatively egalitarian society with an educated population, favors the maintenance of democracy. One of the implications of this analysis is that while economic crises destabilize all democracies, they hit poor democracies particularly hard since they are more vulnerable to weak economic performance. Consolidation is also helped by the presence of an adequate social welfare system. If democratic governments succeed in reducing social and economic inequality through appropriate social policies, disorder and rebellion in the poorer countries will be reduced, and in all cases, the sensation of the legitimacy and efficacy of the new regime will be strengthened. Indeed, recent studies have documented the growth in social spending during the phases following the introduction of democracy in several of the third wave of democratic transitions, with taxation often having been increased to finance and extend welfare systems, reduce poverty levels, improve medical assistance, and expand education.

The international scenario and external actors may also be of considerable importance. Think, for example, of the role played by Federal Germany in the democratization and political consolidation of East Germany and that of the European Community (later the European Union) with regard to Southern and Eastern European countries. Especially in the cases of more recent democratizations, the international system has either facilitated or hindered existing democratic tendencies: in the former cases, acting to support them when the democratic context was widespread and solid, and in the latter cases, acting as an obstacle when prevalent governments and political regimes were hostile or indifferent to democracy. It is worth noting that some paradoxical and unexpected effects, however, for example, in some cases, the excessive encouragement of democratization by powerful international actors—before adequate economic and social conditions have taken root in the country in question—have exacerbated problems of consolidation. There is also a danger that regimes to which aid is destined are satisfied with acquiring a veneer of international legitimacy, without actually modifying the authoritarian nature of domestic power management.

Conclusion
The concept of democratic consolidation is complex, problematic, and to some extent contradictory. This makes it all the more important to clarify and circumscribe the meaning of the term. It has been suggested by some scholars that the concept be limited to its original significance, that is, the survival of democracy to avoid the risk of an authoritarian regression. As proposed above, this implies limiting its application to the “negative” sphere: preventing democratic collapse or protecting democracy from a slower death through erosion. First and foremost, this choice enables us to reestablish the many meanings associated with the concept, which can then be used more consciously and consistently. The other sense in which it is widely used—that of completing and satisfying the many “unfulfilled promises” of democracy, to use Norberto Bobbio’s well-known expression—calls for an analysis of the goals and criteria held to be indispensable for achieving “full” and desirable democracy. This type of analysis appears to belong to studies on the “quality” or “full achievement” of democracy and should be developed in that context. In the wake of the more recent experiences of democratization, studies of this type are now increasing sharply. They are still only at the beginning, and their preliminary results require verification; however, they represent a coherent means of completing the analysis of the functioning and performance of democracy that originated in studies of democratic consolidation.

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Democratic Peace

Democratic peace refers most specifically to the proposition that democratic states have not fought and are not likely to fight interstate wars against each other. It refers more generally to the notion that democracy has an important pacifying impact on international politics, whether by making individual states less warlike, by creating peaceful relationships for pairs of states, or by making the entire globe more peaceful. It is a proposition that lies at the heart of the American academic field of international politics, born in the wake of a world war ostensibly fought to make the world safe for democracy. Though its philosophical roots go back to Immanuel Kant and Thomas Paine, in its contemporary form, democratic peace focuses most intently on democracy’s impact on interactions within pairs of states. This entry reviews research on that impact, its theoretical bases, major criticisms of it, and the most important responses to those criticisms.

Impact of Democracy

Recent interest evoked by democratic peace is the result, in an important part, of the strikingly simple claim that no two democratic states have ever fought a war against each other. This is not a trivial claim. Though interstate wars are far too common, statistically speaking, they are rare events. In most years, 99% of the pairs of states in the international system avoid fighting wars against each other. For the rate of warfare among democratic states to be significantly different from that for states, in general, the number of wars between democratic states must be at least close to zero.

So critics of democratic peace point out exceptions to the alleged rule about democratic states having universally peaceful relationships with each other. The War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain, the U.S. Civil War, the Spanish American War in 1898, even World War I, the official state of war between Great Britain and Finland in World War II, the war between Lebanon and Israel in 1948, and the military conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999 are among the most frequently mentioned wars on this list.

Resolving the debate about whether any or all of these are actually exceptions to the democratic peace rule obviously must involve definitions of “war” and “democracy.” A specific definition of war widely adopted by researchers focusing on quantitative analysis of evidence regarding its causes specifies that an interstate war involves military conflict between independent states leading to the deaths of at least 1,000 soldiers. This definition has been adopted by most analysts conducting systematic empirical evaluations of hypotheses regarding the causes of war for several decades.

Definitions and measures of democracy are probably more contestable. Most of the research on democratic peace has adopted a numerical threshold based on data consisting of annual scores rating states on a continuum from fully
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Autocratic to entirely democratic. These thresholds are inescapably arbitrary to some extent. In fact, all definitions contain an important arbitrary element. Furthermore, to evaluate the validity of the statement that democratic states never fight wars against each other, all states must be sorted into “democratic” or “not democratic” categories. Obviously, states do not naturally or clearly fall into neatly exclusive or exhaustive categories of that kind. So, ultimately, the proposition that needs to be evaluated is “states that are sufficiently democratic never (or rarely) fight wars against each other.” How much democracy is enough, and how can that level of democracy be identified, are crucial questions with no answers that will generate universal consensus. One characteristic receiving some attention focuses on the ability of a state to stage elections in which executive leadership of the state passes from one independent political party to another, different independent political party.

Theoretical Frameworks

The debate about which attributes commonly thought of as “democracy” possess the most effective pacifying impact leads inevitably to a more general issue regarding the theoretical basis for the democratic peace proposition. This debate shifts the focus from questions about whether it is true that democratic states have fought wars or become involved in militarized disputes at a lower rate than other kinds of states to a rather different issue: Assuming an acceptance of the claim that jointly democratic states do have a historical record of conflict that is distinctive in the way the democratic peace theory would suggest, what has brought about this record? One prominent answer focuses on the potential cultural or psychological impact of democracy on states and their leaders. Political leaders in democratic states are accustomed to resolving political debates and disputes in a peaceful, rule-based fashion. Leaders of democratic states can be expected to bring attitudes and expectations about conflict resolution cultivated in domestic political processes to interactions with their counterparts in other states. For their own protection, democratic leaders bring quite different attitudes and expectations to their interactions with leaders of autocratic states. They find such leaders ethically and morally suspect from the outset. And they have no expectation that conflicts with them can be resolved in a peaceful manner. But if the leaders of other states are democratic, leaders of democratic states anticipate that disagreements can be resolved in a peaceful manner.

The second main theoretical argument about the potential pacifying effect of democracy focuses on the structure of domestic political systems. An important starting point for such arguments posits that political leaders of all states place the highest priority on staying in power. Analysts point out that to initiate military interventions or attacks, leaders of democratic states need to persuade various elements in the government, interest groups, and even the general population to support such ventures. This process, relatively cumbersome compared with that faced by autocratic leaders, makes democratic states more hesitant and cautious about getting involved in military conflict. Then, too, democratic leaders are more vulnerable to being removed from office if they become involved in a war, or even a less serious militarized conflict, and they lose that war or conflict. Since democratic states tend to win the wars in which they become involved, democratic states are, everything else being equal, opponents to be avoided in military conflicts. Autocratic leaders tend to be not so cautious and not so anxious to win the wars in which they are entangled. All they need to do to maintain themselves in power is to satisfy or appease their relatively small winning coalitions. And since those winning coalitions are small, supporters of dictators tend to be loyal. They understand that they might well be excluded from the small winning coalition supporting any successor regime.

Democratic leaders must satisfy a much larger coalition. Therefore, they depend more crucially on providing public goods to that larger coalition, such as victories in war. If a war is lost, they probably cannot provide enough private goods to a sufficiently large portion of their coalition to maintain themselves in power. This is especially the case because supporters of democratic leaders tend to be much less loyal than supporters of autocratic leaders. The winning coalition of any successor in a democratic regime must necessarily be large, at least approaching one half of the population involved in selecting leaders—that is, the entire electorate. In other words, in political systems based on relatively large winning coalitions, those
who desert the coalition supporting the current leader also have a reasonable chance of joining the winning coalition of the successor. All of these considerations make democratic states cautious about getting involved in wars or militarized conflicts, especially against other democratic states.

Criticism and Response

Some critics of both these approaches to explaining the alleged lower rate of warfare and militarized conflict among democratic states acknowledge that the statistical pattern exists. They argue, however, that the correlation between democracy and peace for pairs of states is not the reflection of a causal linkage. One argument has it that it is actually peace that produces democracy. That is, states that for whatever reason come into existence and/or exist for prolonged periods of time in an environment of peace are more likely to be democratic. But this does not prove that democracy causes peace.

One of the most prominent antidemocratic peace arguments points out that most of the historical examples of democratic pairs of states avoiding wars against each other come from the decades following the onset of the Cold War. Democratic states in that era, it is argued, avoided wars against each other not because they were democratic but because they shared the unifying threat of a powerful common enemy in the Soviet Union or the communist coalition of the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and various allies.

However, several statistical analyses of the relationship between democracy and peace control for the impact of alliance ties and still find that democracy apparently leads to peace. And, it is not true that the potentially unifying impact of opposition from the communist world was universally effective. That opposition did not prevent, for example, a war between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969, military conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus in 1974, or the clash between Great Britain and Argentina over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands in 1982. In each of these cases, at least one of the antagonists was not democratic. Furthermore, the communist world was confronted by a capitalist/democratic world even more imposing than itself in terms of military and industrial capabilities, and the allegedly unifying impact of that opposition did not prevent the Soviet Union from invading Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Afghanistan, the serious clashes between China and Vietnam, and Vietnam’s attack on and occupation of Cambodia.

Democratic peace ideas influenced the foreign policies of the Clinton and Bush administrations during the 2 decades after the end of the Cold War. Especially in the latter case, some foreign policy initiatives ostensibly based on those ideas had problematic outcomes. One important criticism of the democratic peace literature is that it has never laid out clearly the policy implications of its findings, even though it is also true that few if any democratic peace advocates, for example, endorsed the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003. In short, democracy may have an important pacifying impact on relationships between states. How policymakers might best take advantage of that impact is not always clear.

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See also Conflict Resolution; Cooperation; Dictatorship; International Relations, Theory; Kant, Immanuel; Liberalism in International Relations; Peace; War and Peace

Further Readings


DEMOCRATIZATION

Democratization can be defined as two different political processes:
1. Democratization is the transformation from a nondemocratic regime to a democratic political regime. It is a transition from nondemocratic to democratic types of political regime and involves regime change.

2. Democratization is the process of political transformation from an electoral or partial democracy toward a full or consolidated democracy. It is a transition between different degrees of democracy within a specific democratic political system.

This entry covers both meanings, by discussing the actors who may bring democracy, the factors of and impediments to democracy, and historical and future perspectives of democracy and the democratic trend.

Agency Factors of Democratization

The main theory with emphasis on “agency,” as developed in sociological theory, is the transition approach, which was proposed by Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986) and further developed by Gretchen Casper and Michelle Taylor (1996). This agency approach analyzes the process of transition toward democracy with political elites as the main actors and as the crucial and critical factor of democratization. One of the conditions that help initiate a transition to democracy in an authoritarian regime is if the ruling elite splits into factions with opposing interests. This is likelier to happen in more developed societies whose complexity creates multifaceted regime coalitions that are not as easily held together. Rifts within the ruling elite are also more likely when there is a mounting legitimacy crisis due to economic setbacks, unfulfilled policy promises, and failures in crisis management.

In heterogeneous regime coalitions, legitimacy crises encourage elite splits because they create an opportunity for some elite groups to try to strengthen their position in the regime coalition by pursuing a reform strategy that they hope will bring them popular support, thus regaining legitimacy. Accordingly, many transitions to democracy have been instigated by the emergence of a reform camp within the regime. Typically, the reformers initiate a liberalization program that opens a space for criticism and alternative voices.

As a result, opposition groups surface from the underground and, in many cases, advance further claims for democratization. If the opposition groups remain moderate in their methods (avoiding violence) and demonstrate their readiness for compromise but at the same time muster widespread public support, a negotiated transition to democracy becomes possible.

The emergence of opposition to a regime does not always result from an elite-initiated opening process. Sometimes, policy failures lead to spontaneous manifestations of widespread mass opposition, launching a legitimacy crisis that impels an intra-elite reform camp to surface and engage in negotiations with the opposition. Again, this configuration of events often leads to negotiated, or “pacted,” transitions.

The institutional basis of a given authoritarian regime is an important factor in this context because different types of authoritarian regimes show different vulnerabilities to democratizing pressures. For instance, the weakness of military regimes is that they lack an ideological mission that legitimates them on a long-term basis. Usually, they take power as crisis managers, so their justification is—often explicitly—only temporary. The legitimacy of military regimes is relatively easily questioned, either because the junta fails to manage the crisis, in which case its justification lacks credibility, or because things run smoothly, in which case the need for crisis management becomes obsolete. One obvious advantage of military regimes is that they control the means of coercion, so they can silence emerging opposition by brute force. But confronted with widespread mass opposition that proves resilient even in the face of oppression, the loyalty of the troops may erode if they are ordered to turn on peaceful protestors. On the other hand, even though military regimes sometimes exit quickly from power, they also easily return, as the repeated oscillations between military and civilian rule in countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, or Thailand demonstrate.

Personalistic regimes put all their eggs into the basket of the central ruler’s charisma. Accordingly, when the ruler dies, there is an opportunity for political change, as has been clearly demonstrated in Spain. Whether or not this opportunity is used for a transition to democracy then depends on the
power balance between prodemocratic and antidemocratic forces and their relative support among the population.

One-party regimes, whether leftist or rightist, profit from a more strongly institutionalized power basis. These regimes usually have an ideological mission that inspires their existence and provides legitimacy. It generally takes longer and is a bigger challenge for a potential opposition group to erode the ideological basis of one-party regimes. One strategy that proved successful in the former communist bloc is to demonstrate that a regime betrays its very own ideals. When communist countries signed the human rights declaration in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) while refusing to respect these rights in practice, civil rights movements such as the Charta 77 effectively publicized this contradiction and in doing so helped erode the regime’s legitimacy. Eventually, the legitimacy crisis went so deep that even within the communist parties no one believed any longer in the regime’s ideals. In this situation, reform camps surfaced in a number of communist parties (most notably in the Soviet Union and Hungary), together with organizations outside the party that were opposed to the regime, once Mikhail Gorbachev’s nullification of the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1998 made this seem like a viable strategy in Central and Eastern Europe.

Splits in the ruling elite are important because they give leverage to domestic as well as international actors, enhancing their bargaining options to push a democratization agenda through. The leverage that international actors have in pushing for democracy increases insofar as a country depends on international aid. In some cases, dependence on international assistance can be so strong that external powers can trigger democratization even in the absence of a prodemocratic opposition group within the country. In the extreme case, democratic powers can enforce democratic institutions by military intervention as was attempted in Afghanistan and Iraq. But externally triggered processes of democratization are unlikely to penetrate very deep unless there are strong domestic forces inside a country.

When parties of the ruling elite are unified to sustain an authoritarian system, the transition to democracy is less easily achieved, particularly if the regime is able to isolate itself from international democratizing pressures. In such cases, the chances to democratize depend strongly on whether a prodemocratic opposition group emerges, how massive it grows, and how skilfully it uses its repertoire of elite-challenging actions. If the opposition can mobilize support from all layers of the population, if it is able to demonstrate this support, and if it remains resilient even in the face of oppression, loyalty to the regime erodes, even among the armed forces, undermining the regime’s repressive capacities. Thus, massive, determined, and well-organized opposition groups can overcome the resistance of the ruling elite to democratization. If, however, the opposition remains limited to isolated sectors of society, is unable to demonstrate popular support across the country, and cannot remain resilient in the face of repression, its chances of success will be limited.

To a considerable extent, then, democratization is a matter of the skills and virtues of mass opposition leaders. It matters how willing and able they are to advance claims that resonate with many people, to mobilize resources for popular campaigns, and to make use of the full set of ruling elite-challenging actions even in the face of repression. Tactical and strategic factors, such as the presence of skilful political dissidents, benevolent reforms by the ruling elite, and international assistance, are important, but when it comes to full democratization, these factors can hardly compensate for deficiencies in the development of ordinary people’s capabilities and motivation to practice democracy.

Factors of Democratization: Economic, Social, and Cultural Modernization

Mounting and sustaining a prodemocratic opposition against authoritarian rulers require that societies embark on a process of human empowerment that develops organizational skills and resources among the population. It also requires that substantial segments of the population give high priority to democratic freedoms, making them able and willing to struggle for democratic institutions. Ordinary people’s readiness to struggle for democratic freedoms is necessary for deep democratization to be attained, for authoritarian leaders are unlikely to surrender their powers unless they are pressured to do so.
Paramount is a type of economic development that is knowledge driven and distributes human social and political resources widely throughout society rather than concentrating them in small minorities of the population. Industrialization and the rise of the knowledge society equip growing segments of the population with the material means, intellectual skills, and social opportunities needed to mount effective pressures on elites. As a consequence, ordinary people’s action repertoires expand in ways that make the value of democratic freedoms intuitively obvious, giving rise to emancipative worldviews that value freedoms highly. These long-term developmental factors enhance a society’s ability and willingness to struggle for democracy.

The crucial and critical importance of economic, social, and cultural modernization has been at the core of a modernization theory of democratization. The main author of such a theory of modernization as the most important factor of democratization is Seymour Martin Lipset (1994). This modernization theory of democratization was expanded and refined by Larry Diamond (1992). Hence, this theory of democratization can be called the Lipset-Diamond theory of democratization.

The human empowerment approach of democratization is a hybrid structure–agency theory of democratization and has been developed by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2005).

External Threats and Group Hostilities as Impediments to Democracy

Various situations can arise that prevent developmental factors from giving rise to the pro-democratic effects associated with them. Perceptions of external threats and internal group hostilities tend to be detrimental to democracy because they diminish tolerance of opposition—a basic principle of democratic organization. External threats help leaders use “rally around the flag” strategies that silence inner opposition. Group hostilities do the same within groups, closing ranks around leaders and silencing opposing views.

Involvement of a country in an enduring international conflict can undermine democratic institutions because they provide a sense of being threatened that allows skilful leaders to present suppression of the opposition as crucial to the nation’s survival. Similarly, internal group divisions are not inherently threatening to democracy, but ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other easily discernible group divisions can be manipulated to foment support for authoritarian leaders. Extremist leaders almost always mobilize support by playing on group hostilities. Thus, democracy has historically been more easily established and consolidated in societies that are relatively homogeneous culturally and relatively egalitarian economically.

Regardless of whether such hindering factors are present, deep democratization requires that a society’s people acquire the capability and motivation to struggle for the freedoms that define democracy. This is because democracy is a socially embedded phenomenon, not just an institutional machine that operates in a vacuum. Shallow democratization involves crafting institutions, but deep democratization involves the development of supportive values and skills among large segments of a society.

Democratization and Transition in a Long-Term Historical Perspective

How can we understand the fact that democratization processes in separate countries cluster into coherent and sweeping international waves, behaving as if they were centrally coordinated by a master agent when in fact neither that master agent nor central coordination of the international waves exists? The answer is that evolutionary forces are at work that go beyond the awareness and control of even the most powerful elites. These evolutionary forces bestow a systematic selective advantage on democracies over autocracies. To the extent that such selective advantages exist, it is essential to understand them in order to assess the future potential of democracy and in order to understand the limits and opportunities within which agents pursuing a democratic agenda are acting.

An evolutionary dynamic is present when processes are directed, behaving as if they were centrally coordinated, when in fact such coordination does not exist. Markets behave in this way and so does the long-term evolution of democracy. But why do levels of democracy evolve over time? Higher levels of democracy emerge as higher levels of action resources become available to the average
person in a society. In an era of mass politics, democracies enjoy three distinct selective advantages over autocracies. First, there is a selective advantage by international confrontations. States have been involved in international conflicts and wars, and often the winning states’ political regimes replaced the losing states’ ones. Success in international confrontations has been related to the type of regime. Democracies usually won the wars they were engaged in, partly because in the long run, they could mobilize their people and resources more effectively. Moreover, democracies tend not to fight each other, avoiding extinguishing their own kind. Autocracies do not have this tendency.

Second, there is a selective advantage by economic performance. Democracies have emerged and persisted in technologically and economically more advanced and powerful states, which partly explains their superiority in international confrontations with autocracies. Democracies have been established in more prosperous economies from the start. In addition, democracies continued to outperform autocracies economically, greatly increasing their initial prosperity advantage over time. Equally important, autocracies repeatedly lost their more prosperous members to the democratic camp.

The third selective advantage of democracies is an advantage by popular support, which is a truly selective force. Because they grant power to the people and because their rulers are selected by the population, democracies tend to have more popular support than autocracies, which enables them to mobilize their people more effectively. This also allows them to limit mass disaffection more effectively than autocracies. Even autocracies that seem stable on the surface, lacking obvious signs of mass opposition, are vulnerable to the “element of surprise” that becomes apparent in democratic revolutions when massive opposition to a regime suddenly emerges and persists, toppling a regime that may have lasted for decades. Democracies are less vulnerable to extinction by popular revolutions. They simply change their rulers through elections.

Democratization and the Future of Politics
The selective advantages of democracy are of such a long-term nature and so deeply rooted in basic developmental processes that there is no reason to assume that the odds will fundamentally turn against democracy in the foreseeable future. Setbacks will occur in specific countries, but the achievements of the global wave of democracy are unlikely to be reversed. But this does not mean that there are no future challenges. Instead, we see a number of challenges on the democratic agenda, which can be formulated in terms of the following questions:

1. Will democracy continue to spread geographically?
2. Will the deficiencies of new democracies, such as those in the former Soviet Union, be overcome?
3. Will the democratic qualities of established democracies be further deepened?

One might also question the viability of the democratic principle in an era in which the major organizational frame of democracy, the nation-state, is said to have lost its significance. And one might question the viability of the democratic principle in a world in which decisive ecological measures seem to be unpopular, though they may be necessary to save our planet.

Spreading Democracy to New Regions
Two important geographical areas have, so far, proved to be relatively immune to the democratic trend: China, and the predominantly Islamic Middle East and North Africa. Anchoring democracy in these two areas would without doubt constitute a major breakthrough for the democratic principle. As far as the Middle East and North Africa are concerned, a sweeping democratic trend throughout the region does not seem likely in the near future. The terror and violence nurtured by the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Islamic fundamentalism, and the predominance of patrimonial states based on oil rents all amount to powerful obstacles to democratization. In addition, there is throughout much of the Islamic world, but especially in the Middle East, a cultural self-appraisal of Islam as the West’s countercivilization—an understanding that is sometimes mirrored in Western views of Islam as its countercivilization. On this basis, democracy is considered to be a Western product
in much of the Islamic world, which might disqualify it in the eyes of many people. Evidence from the World Values Surveys indicates that even among those segments of Islamic populations that overtly support democracy, there is often a fundamental misunderstanding of democratic principles. Evidence from the World Values Surveys also suggests that patriarchal-authoritarian values, which are incompatible with democracy, are prevalent in much of the region, particularly the Arab-speaking countries. Although these factors hinder the emergence of democracy, the general idea of democracy is widely approved, and democratic institutions seem to be taking root in some historically Islamic societies such as Turkey.

**Consolidating and Improving New Democracies**

Many new democracies in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Central and Eastern Europe show serious deficiencies concerning the rule of law, accountability, and transparency. Not surprisingly then, there is widespread popular cynicism about the integrity of representatives, the trustworthiness of institutions, and policy performance in these new democracies. This popular cynicism often leads to political apathy rather than mass political activism, weakening civil society and placing corrupt leaders under little popular pressure to behave more responsibly. But in those new democracies where cynical citizens become “critical citizens” who sustain a high level of elite-challenging mass activities, government is consistently more effective, transparent, and accountable. Civic action matters: Both within new and old democracies, relatively widespread civic action helps in increasing accountable governance. This insight is important. It shows that the quality of democracy is not solely the concern of the ruling elite. It is also, and very markedly so, a matter that concerns the citizens. When they are motivated to put the ruling elite under popular pressure and actually do so, they can improve the quality and effectiveness of governance. There is no reason for civic defeatism.

**Deepening Old Democracies**

The most obvious aspect of the global democratic trend is the geographical spread of democracy. But the global democratic trend has a second, often forgotten aspect: the deepening of democracy. This occurs even where democracy has been in place for many decades. This trend is well documented in the book *Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies* by Bruce E. Cain, Russell J. Dalton, and Susan E. Scarrow (2005), showing that over the past 25 years most postindustrial democracies have widened the elements of direct democracy, opened channels of citizen participation in policy planning, extended the scope of civic rights, and improved accountability to the public. These institutional changes have been accompanied and driven by cultural changes that gave rise to emancipative values and high levels of sustained elite-challenging actions. In fact, a major reason why long-established democracies show high levels of accountable governance is because they are constantly exposed to popular pressure by increasingly critical citizens. This should affect our views of what kind of citizenry is needed to consolidate democracies and keep them flourishing.

In *The Civic Culture*, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) assumed that in order for democracy to flourish, citizen participation should be limited to the institutional channels of representative democracy, focusing on elections and the activities around them. This view was reinforced by Samuel Huntington’s (1968) influential work *Political Order in Changing Societies*, contributing to deep-seated suspicions of noninstitutionalized, assertive citizen action. This suspicion is so deeply ingrained in political science that, even today, prevailing concepts of social capital and civil society still focus on institutionally channeled participation, emphasizing membership and participation in formal associations. By contrast, noninstitutionalized forms of assertive citizen action are rarely recognized in prevailing conceptions of civil society. The dominant view of what sort of citizenry makes and keeps countries democratic needs to be revised. Democracy flourishes with an uncomfortable citizenry that makes life difficult for their rulers, exposing them to constant popular pressure. Democracy requires a citizenry who place a high value on democratic freedoms and are capable of struggling for them—to attain them when they are denied and to sustain them when they are challenged.
Unfortunately, such a citizenry cannot be ordered into existence by elite decree, nor can it be crafted by institutions. Its emergence reflects a more basic process of human empowerment and social and cultural modernization through which people acquire the resources and skills to demand responsive government and the values that motivate them to practice democracy. Democratic institutions can be imposed from outside, but if these conditions are absent, it is likely to be a flawed version of democracy if it survives at all. Anchoring democracy is not just about crafting institutions. It is about shaping the development of economic, cultural, and political modernization of a given society.

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See also Democracy, Quality; Democracy, Theories of; Democratic Consolidation; Democracy, Types of; Hybrid Regimes, Transition

Further Readings


**Dependency Theory**

According to dependency theory, Third World countries in the periphery of the global capitalist system are poor and underdeveloped because they are exploited by the advanced capitalist countries in the core. Their major problem is dependency on the core countries. That is the central claim made by dependency theory, a mode of analysis developed primarily by Latin American scholars in the 1960s and 1970s.

Dependency theory emerged as a reaction against the modernization paradigm, which dominated Western liberal approaches to development during the decades after World War II. Modernization theory argued that Third World countries should be expected to follow the same developmental path as taken earlier by developed countries in the West: a progressive journey from a traditional, preindustrial, agrarian society, toward a modern, industrial, mass-consumption society. Development meant overcoming barriers of preindustrial production, backward institutions, and parochial value systems that impeded the process of growth and modernization.

The theoretical endeavors among modernization theorists concerned identification of the full range of impediments to modernization as well as all factors that promote modernization. A famous economic modernization theory by Walt Whitman Rostow specifically stressed that the “takeoff,” the crucial push in moving from traditional toward modern, is characterized by a marked increase in modern sector investment to a minimum of 10% of the gross national product. Another critical
element concerns the relationship of Third World countries to the world market. Close market relations with the developed countries are seen to have a positive developmental effect on Third World economies. Foreign trade is viewed as a road to market expansion and further growth of the modern sector. Foreign direct investment in the Third World by transnational corporations (TNCs) brings in the much needed modern technology and production skills.

**Early Critiques of Liberal Economic Theory**

This liberal understanding of development was subjected to increasing criticism during the 1960s and 1970s. That was partly in reaction to the lack of progress in many Third World countries at the time. While growth rates in the developed world reached unprecedented highs in the postwar decades, many Third World countries had difficulties in getting economic development under way. Their economies refused to “take off.” That naturally led to increasing dissatisfaction with modernization theory.

Already in the late 1940s, the Argentinean economist and central bank director Raul Prebisch had criticized liberal economic theory in relation to the Third World. In particular, he turned against David Ricardo’s famous notion of comparative advantage according to which countries in the periphery would be better off specializing in production and export of raw materials and agricultural products, leaving advanced industrial production to the core countries. Prebisch argued that production from the periphery was subjected to deteriorating terms of trade compared with products from the advanced countries. Two factors were involved. The first is income elasticity, which states that raw materials and agricultural products are less in demand when incomes increase; consumers turn to non-food items, and technological advance decreases the demand for raw materials. Second, because of strong labor unions in the advanced countries, productivity increases lead to real wage improvements in the core rather than to lower prices for manufactured products. In effect, comparative advantage does not work for the periphery. The core countries keep the benefits of exchange for themselves.

**Emergence of Dependency Theory**

Dependency theorists were inspired by Prebisch. They took his critique and developed it further, to a full-scale attack on liberal ideas of modernization, specialization, and comparative advantage. According to Theotonio dos Santos (1970), dependency is a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. . . . [Some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and become self-sustaining while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion. (p. 231)

Based on this general notion, scholars primarily from the Latin American school of theory developed their particular theories of dependency. In addition to dos Santos, they include Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Andre Gunder Frank, Ruy Mauro Marini, Osvaldo Sunkel, and several others. In the present context, it is relevant to focus on Frank and Cardoso because they represent the most forceful and popular varieties of dependency theory. They are neo-Marxist in the sense that they both draw on classical Marxist analysis of the capital–labor relationship, but they differ from classical Marxism in a basic respect. Unlike Marx, dependency theorists do not expect capitalist development to take root and unfold in the Third World in the same way that capitalism evolved in Western Europe and North America. At the same time, they disagree about the prospects for development in the Third World. Radical theorists, such as Frank, believe that a separation from capitalism and the creation of a popular-based socialist model is the only way forward. Moderate theorists such as Cardoso argue that some form of dependent development can take place in the periphery in context of the capitalist system. In both cases, however, focus is less on future strategies for development and more on present weaknesses of the capitalist system.

Frank was born in Berlin and educated as an economist in Chicago before he came to Chile and Mexico to take up the analysis of dependency. His book from 1967, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, was a central factor in the
establishment of dependency theory as a major approach to the study of the Third World; it was strongly inspired by Paul Baran’s study *The Political Economy of Growth* from 1957.

For modernization theorists, “traditional society” was the place where all countries started their process of development and modernization. Frank rejects that view. The starting point for him is not tradition—it is underdevelopment. Underdevelopment is not a condition that once characterized all countries. It is a process within the framework of the global capitalist system to which Third World countries have been subjected: They have been underdeveloped as an intentional by-product of the development of the advanced core countries. Earlier forms of society in the Third World may have been undeveloped; underdevelopment begins only with the arrival of a global capitalist system. That is, global capitalism in one single process generates development and wealth (in the industrialized world) and underdevelopment and poverty (in the Third World).

This is due to what Frank (1967) calls the three basic contradictions in capitalism: (1) the expropriation/appropriation of economic surplus, (2) the polarization into metropolitan center and peripheral satellites, and (3) the continuity of the capitalist structure and its generation of underdevelopment. In other words, the core countries began the exploitation of the periphery early—in the 16th century in Chile’s case. The core appropriates economic surplus from the satellites and uses it for its own development. Some industrial development in the periphery may be possible, but it is dominated by external economic interests; these external forces result in crippled and distorted societal structures inside peripheral countries. To overcome underdevelopment, a delinking from external dominance is required.

Frank’s analysis is simple and clear. It is also conceptually imprecise. “Capitalism” is said to have existed since the 16th century; “economic surplus” has been appropriated by the core for several centuries; and “underdevelopment” characterizes the periphery irrespective of the level of industrialization. Consider the example of Brazil. From the sugar mills run by slaves in the 17th century to the advanced petrochemical industries of today where transnational corporations participate, history merely repeats itself, in that global capitalism creates underdevelopment because of the system’s basic contradictions. In one sense, Frank’s dependency theory turns modernization theory on its head: What comes out of the core is always bad (whereas for modernization theory, it is always good), and capitalism perpetuates underdevelopment. As Aidan Foster-Carter (1976) notes, where modernization theory had difficulties in explaining why “traditional” societies would inevitably move toward modernity, dependency theory has difficulties in explaining why the result must always be underdevelopment rather than development.

The Egyptian economist Samir Amin basically agrees with Frank, but he proposes an analysis that tackles some of the problems mentioned here. Amin focuses on Africa. He analyses the different historical phases of African dependency and argues that the specific structure of peripheral economies is based on export of raw materials and import of (mostly luxury) consumer goods. Yet Amin agrees with Frank that any economic development of the periphery is blocked due to the subordination of the periphery to the core.

**Criticism of the “Blocked Development” Theory**

From early on, this radical claim of “blocked development” in the periphery had been met with skepticism by several Latin American scholars. Already in 1969, Cardoso and Enzo Faletto had published a book on dependency and development in Latin America rejecting the soundness of a general theory of “blocked development” and arguing in favor of concrete historical analysis of specific situations of dependency. In the mid-1970s, Cardoso published a critique of the radical claims, exposing what he called “five false theses” about capitalism in Latin America. Cardoso argued that some form of “dependent-associated development” was possible in the periphery through a form of capital accumulation similar to capitalism in the advanced countries.

This, then, was the major issue of contention among dependency theorists in the 1970s: Is the periphery doomed to nondevelopment? Or, is it more relevant to speak of a process of “dependent development” formed by the specific national conditions in each country, especially by the relative
strength and alliance of social classes and factions? The case of Brazil would appear to support the latter view: Industrial development in that country was shaped by an alliance between elements of the international bourgeoisie, the local bourgeoisie, and public and entrepreneurial bureaucratic elites. The North American sociologist Peter Evans wrote a well-known analysis of Brazil in 1979 based on this view.

Most of the critique of dependency theory, which emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, was directed against the “blocked development” view of Frank, Amin, and others. A number of countries in Southeast Asia, most notably the “Four Tigers” (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong), experienced rapid economic growth combined with world market integration. That was a blow to radical dependency theory’s prediction of stagnation and misery in the periphery. The “dependent development” view was less easy to reject. At the same time, Cardoso’s theoretical views were also less clear because they tied the fate of peripheral countries to particular historical circumstances. That is a difficult starting point for attempts at a general theory of development and underdevelopment. (Later, Cardoso entered active politics and was president of Brazil for two periods—between 1995 and 2003.)

**World Systems Theory**

Some of the core claims of radical dependency theory were repeated in the world system analysis by Immanuel Wallerstein. At the same time, Wallerstein repaired some of the theory’s weaknesses. His focus was on the capitalist world economy established in “the long 16th century” (1450–1640). It was based on an international division of labor that covered Europe first but soon expanded to the Western hemisphere and later to other parts of the world as well. Within this division of labor, a process of specialization took place; at first, this somehow happened accidentally. For a number of reasons, Northwest Europe was in a better position to diversify its agriculture and to connect it with industrial advances in textiles and shipping. So the capitalist world economy is built on a hierarchy of core areas, peripheral areas, and semiperipheral areas. The core areas contain the advanced and complex economic activities (mass market industries and sophisticated agriculture). Furthermore, these activities are controlled by an indigenous bourgeoisie. Peripheral areas are at the bottom of the hierarchy. They produce staple goods such as grain, wood, and sugar. They often employ slavery or coerced labor. Semiperipheral areas are economically mixed and constitute a middle layer between the upper stratum of the core and the lower stratum of the peripheral countries.

A basic mechanism of the capitalist world economy is unequal exchange. Economic surplus is transferred from the periphery to the core. This transfer is further accentuated by the emergence of strong state machineries in the core and weak state machineries in the periphery. Strong states can enforce unequal exchange on weak ones. In the process of unequal exchange, tensions are created in the system. The semiperiphery has an important function in this regard. It provides an element of political stability because the core countries are not facing a unified opposition. The semiperiphery acts as a buffer or shock absorber. At the same time, the world economy is not entirely static; any single area of the system may change from periphery to semiperiphery, from semiperiphery to core, and vice versa. But Wallerstein emphasizes that the capitalist system as such does not change. It remains a hierarchy of core, semiperiphery, and periphery, characterized by unequal exchange.

Wallerstein sees the end of the Cold War and the destruction of the Soviet bloc as a consequence of the development of the capitalist world economy. However, the long-term prospect is the demise of the capitalist system because the contradictions of that system are now unleashed on a world scale. Success, not failure, is the real threat to global capitalism. When the possibilities for expansion are all used up, the never-ending quest for more profit will lead to new crises in the world capitalist economy, which sooner or later will spell its transformation.

Wallerstein injects some dynamic elements into the picture of unequal exchange and exploitation of the periphery by the core. Single countries can move up and down in the system. The semiperiphery is categorized as a new “buffer zone.” Politics and conditions in single countries play a larger role. But still, focus remains on economics and the subordination of the periphery. Recent analyses
such as that of John Darwin (2007) reject that view as one dimensional and reductionist. Already by the early 1990s, several areas in the Third World experienced dynamics of development difficult to reconcile with radical dependency analysis even in its more sophisticated Wallerstein version. Instead, more emphasis was laid on the moderate “dependent development” view, which was now combined with new analyses of the internationalization of capital or economic globalization.

New Approaches
Cardoso and Faletto studied the internationalization of capital as seen from the periphery. A new generation of analyses took up this topic as seen from the core countries. This latter approach had already been used by the classical theories of imperialism, for example, those of Lenin, Rosa Luxembourg, John Hobson, and others. The more recent generation of studies focuses on the so-called new international division of labor where industrial production is relocated from the core to the periphery in search of cheap labor and other favorable conditions of operations and/or in search of local markets that could not easily be accessed from the outside. A pioneering study from the three German scholars Folker Fröbel, Jürgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye argued that already during the 1960s, a world market for industrial activity emerged. It was based on three factors: (1) a huge supply of cheap labor with basic skills in the Third World and in Eastern Europe, (2) communication and transport technologies that facilitate relocation on a global scale, and (3) production technologies allowing the separation of complex processes of production into relatively simple component parts. The analysis points out that not only labor-intensive industries, such as textiles, clothing, footwear, and toys, but also industries that are associated with the production of electronic parts, machine building, and computer manufacturing are good candidates for global scale manufacturing.

Other studies focused on the attempt to access lucrative domestic markets in the Third World as the major push to internationalization. In Brazil, foreign investment helped create a substantial automobile industry and also participated in the development of petrochemical, computer, and aircraft industries. These developments raised the issue anew of whether foreign capital should be seen as a primarily “constructive” or primarily “destructive” factor in terms of economic development in the periphery. Cardoso had hinted at both: There was development, but there was also dependency. The new generation of analyses further developed this view. It is argued that foreign transnationals can be both “constructive” and “destructive” in the periphery. Whether they are primarily one or the other depends on the conditions under which the companies operate in the host countries. A decisive element in this regard concerns the power position (economically and politically) of local capital relative to that of foreign capital. The stronger the position held by local capital in an industry, the better the possibilities of benefiting from the “constructive” effects and avoiding the “destructive” effects of transnationals (Georg Sørensen, 1983). In other words, successful modernizers, such as the Asian “tigers,” China, Brazil, and India, will be better positioned to reap benefits from foreign investment than will very poor and weak states (in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere) where local capital is next to nonexistent, and the state is incapable of effective regulation and control.

In sum, even if one can still find examples of radical dependency analysis, it has gone into decline. The 1980s and 1990s saw a strong revival of liberal economic ideas in development thinking. Ronald Reagan’s presidency in the United States and Margaret Thatcher’s administration in the United Kingdom both promoted liberal policies that emphasized the role of free market forces and the downsizing of state bureaucracies and state regulations. Third World countries were encouraged to pursue similar policies.

Some scholars continue to employ radical dependency ideas in their analysis of macrohistorical developments of capitalism, but most analyses of Third World countries have moved in different directions. The period dominated by liberal economics in the 1980s and part of the 1990s also had dissenting voices. Some of these voices were inspired by the moderate “dependent development” position in their attempt to evaluate prospects for Third World development. This current view is critical of neoliberal free market ideology. We may call it modern mercantilism. Modern mercantilism suggests that Third World countries need
to steer between the extremes of economic delinking on the one hand and full integration in the world economy on the other. They argue that the success of economic development of East Asian countries is precisely due to their pursuit of a modern mercantilist strategy. A second core area of development where the modern mercantilists strike a balance concerns the market and the state. Economic liberals argue that free market forces and a minimal role for the state are best for the promotion of economic development. Mercantilists reply that there may be serious flaws in the alleged efficiency of the market. Furthermore, there is no firm support in economic theory for maintaining that state intervention is by definition counterproductive. The fact that some interventions are flawed does not constitute a case against intervention per se. South Korea’s and Taiwan’s development achievements have been based on states actively working toward building desire structures of production.

Modern mercantilism, then, is based on three ideas: (1) strike a balance between national autonomy and international integration—that is, between incorporation into the world market and self-reliance; (2) strike a balance between state and market—that is, between free market forces and state regulation; (3) foreign direct investment by TNCs can be a strong force for modernization but only provided that TNCs are counterbalanced by local industry and host government supervision.

In conclusion, radical dependency theory is no longer a major approach to Third World development problems, but elements of moderate dependency theory remain centrally relevant for thinking about economic development in the periphery.

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See also Imperialism; International Trade; Modernization Theory; Multinational Corporations (MNCs)

Further Readings


Deregulation

In the broadest sense, deregulation can be described as the nonmarginal reduction or total withdrawal of the state’s legal control over the social and economic activities of firms and citizens. Although deregulation is often associated with the aim of increasing competition in economic sectors, such as transport, energy, and audiovisual markets, the concept covers social and administrative regulation too. In this case, competition is not the only aim of deregulation, since social regulation can be inspired by the notion of increasing access (i.e., via simplification) and participation or the aim of respecting individual choice in delicate areas (e.g., the consumption of recreational drugs). Administrative deregulation has triggered ambitious government programs to reduce administrative burdens affecting citizens and firms in Europe, North America, and some developing countries.

However, the notion of deregulation must be put in context to identify its purpose and implications as well as the inextricable link with its counterpart—regulation. Indeed, when new policy is designed, deregulation is one of the instruments of regulatory choice, together with self-regulation, regulation by information, coregulation, command, and control regulation.
Deregulation can be analyzed from both historical and theoretical angles. In turn, these perspectives are linked to three clusters of questions: (1) How, where, and when does deregulation occur? (2) Why does it occur? (3) What (actors or structural forces) caused it? In addition, a geographical angle is also needed, especially in light of debates on regulatory reform and the diverse meaning that deregulation has in different continents, transition economies, and leading economies.

**Historical Perspective**

Historically, deregulation emerged as a response to the welfare and Keynesian programs of the 1950s and 1960s and the economic instability of the 1970s. Conventionally, deregulation is associated with the rise to power of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom (1979) and Ronald Reagan in the United States (1981). In this received view, deregulation is associated with the economic paradigm of neoliberalism. The international diffusion of deregulation was facilitated by the programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF; e.g., in Latin America), the ideas cementing the Washington Consensus, and the promotion of approaches to deregulation, such as the ones pursued by labor governments in Australia and New Zealand. When labor governments joined the bandwagon of deregulation, the international spread of the phenomenon seemed to some observers universal and unstoppable. The conventional wisdom, however, ignores that (a) as a matter of fact, the total amount of regulation continued to grow in the 1980s and is still on the rise; (b) the association between deregulation and other so-called neoliberal ideas is dubious, as shown by the spurious correlation between deregulation and privatization; (c) there was strong political opposition to deregulation ideas (“genuine,” “persistent,” and “vicious,” according to Sam Peltzman), hence they were never uncontested and triumphant; with the financial crisis triggered by the credit crunch of 2008–2009, deregulatory ideas lost much of their intellectual appeal, amid several calls for “new” forms of regulatory capitalism; and (d) in continental Europe at least, the deregulation of domestic utilities and other crucial markets was caused by a newly emerging regulatory power, that is, the European Union (EU) as “regulatory state.”

National rules were removed and remodeled, but this happened in the context of a transfer of regulatory powers to the supranational European level to facilitate the creation of the EU Internal Market.

**Theoretical Perspectives**

The theoretical perspectives address the question of why this phenomenon occurs in the first place. Basically, there are four theoretical rationales or explanations. The first looks at the politics of ideas. As mentioned, the conventional wisdom of deregulation points in the direction of the ideas of the New Right, the economic policy missionaries of international organizations, and the doctrines of economic rationalism. However, a more accurate interpretation in terms of politics of ideas was provided by Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk. They argue that deregulation was the product of successful, convincing, evidence-based economic arguments that demonstrated the large diffuse benefits of deregulation to the public and politicians, thus overcoming the resistance of client politics, that is, the narrow, concentrated benefits from regulatory rents. But interest group theorists propose a second explanation, rooted in the advantages that firms exposed to international competition gain from deregulation (a variant of this explanation looks at the power of corporate consumers or business consumers). A third explanation turns to historical narratives and sees deregulation as the effect of previous dynamics of regulatory policy—a case of policy self-destruction once regulation reached its politically sustainable climax. By focusing on the formal analysis of the rules of the political system (but often blended with historical narratives of specific cycles of deregulation), a fourth explanation sheds light on the institutional capacity for reform, showing when and how institutions, often in combination with the emergence of policy entrepreneurs or reform champions, can overcome the inertial dynamics of regulatory agencies and client politics. This fourth explanation ties in with the question of who (de)regulates. Comparative research has explained the different incentives and constraints to deregulation, how institutional rules and legacies provide opportunity structures to reform agents, and finally how these structures can be changed.

The natural complement to these theoretical interrogations is provided by empirical studies of
deregulatory policies and their actual outcome in several sectors. Analyses often focus on the economic deregulation of specific industries and show the redistribution of the costs and benefits of deregulation across different societal groups. While the effects of (economic) deregulation on prices, competition, and market structure are clearly identifiable in several instances, at times, the final outcome of this policy cannot be fully separated from other variables such as technological change and, more broadly, from other ingredients of regulatory reform (e.g., reregulation).

Regulatory Strategies

Contemporary capitalism is an era of regulatory flux where regulatory, deregulatory, and reregulatory shifts are occurring simultaneously. New regulatory domains have emerged, such as risk, the regulation of private security companies, financial (re)regulation, and corporate governance, as well as ambitious attempts for forging international regulatory cooperation in areas such as climate change and intellectual property rights.

Deregulation was widely adopted by developing countries with the aims of increasing foreign direct investment and reducing regulatory burdens on endogenous growth. Yet deregulatory failures, especially but not exclusively in developing countries, have triggered a recalibration of policy strategies. The emphasis has shifted from deregulation to regulatory quality—the question is not the total level of regulation but the efficiency, accountability, consistency, and transparency of regulation. In turn, research on regulatory quality has shown that it cannot be achieved by simply clamping down on the total number of rules. It requires a proper institutional design of regulatory bodies and regulatory oversight institutions. This explains the political attention to institutional innovations such as independent regulatory authorities and other nonmajoritarian bodies, the economic analysis of proposed regulation (also known as regulatory impact assessment), and the role of central oversight units in charge of regulatory quality goals (Giandomenico Majone, 2001; OECD, 2002). It is regulatory quality, rather than the total level of regulation, that has been identified as an important factor of growth (see Hossein Jalilian, Colin Kirkpatrick, & David Parker, 2007, for econometric evidence on developing countries).

Thus, although at the time some authors interpreted deregulation as yet another sign of the end of history, the academic analysis and the policy debate on deregulation is very much alive 30 years after Ronald Reagan famously said on January 20, 1981, in his inauguration speech: “Government is not the solution to our problem, government is the problem.”

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Further Readings

Détente is a word of French origin meaning “a relaxation of tension.” In its traditional diplomatic usage, détente has most commonly been used to indicate a reduction of tension between two adversarial states. Détente has alternately been used to define a condition, a process, a policy, and a period of history. The concept is not synonymous with peace or a natural harmony of interests. In fact, a central element to any definition of détente is the precondition of intense tension and rivalry between two states with substantial conflicting interests. Détente, as Richard W. Stevenson (1985) proposed, might be best defined as “the process of easing tension between states whose interests are so radically divergent that reconciliation is inherently limited” (p. 11). Within that process, policies of engagement, accommodation, and cooperation may be pursued by adversarial states to reduce the tension created by their underlying conflict, which left unrestrained might eventually lead to war.

Détente first became part of diplomatic parlance in 1908 as the European great powers attempted to reduce the tension created by the then crises in Morocco and other imperial rivalries. However, détente is most famously associated with the foreign policy of former U.S. President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor—eventually Secretary of State—Henry Kissinger during the 1970s. When Nixon came to power in 1969, constant threat of nuclear war and deep hostility of the Cold War had characterized U.S.–Soviet relations for more than 2 decades. To be sure, the real fear of nuclear catastrophe created by the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 introduced an element of caution into the Cold War era and was perhaps the impetus for agreements such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, but U.S.–Soviet relations throughout the late 1960s continued to be marked by suspicion and intense ideological rivalry.

International conflict, such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and continuing American war against communist forces in Vietnam, only heightened the danger of U.S.–Soviet military confrontation and possible escalation.

Nixon and Kissinger pursued détente in this strategic context. The first indication of the new U.S. approach to the Soviet Union and China appeared in Nixon’s inaugural address on January 20, 1969, when he declared, “After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation.” Furthermore, Nixon sketched a rough outline of the framework for détente when he invited the adversaries of the United States into a “peaceful competition” and proposed cooperation to “reduce the burden of arms.” The elements of arms control and restrained competition would come to be central features of the Nixon–Kissinger détente efforts.

The mechanics of détente were primarily left to Kissinger, who as Nixon’s national security advisor centralized control of foreign policy in the White House under the auspices of the National Security Council (NSC). Circumventing the traditional foreign policy bureaucracy of the State Department, Kissinger established a “back channel” with the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin. This back channel provided an outlet for Nixon to communicate directly with Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on sensitive bilateral issues and during emerging crises. The origins of many of the significant U.S.–Soviet agreements and accords of the détente era can be traced to the Kissinger–Dobrynin back channel.

The Nixon–Kissinger approach to détente can be viewed as an attempt to find a modus vivendi with the ascendant Soviet Union. By the late 1960s, the Soviet Union had achieved a rough parity with the United States in terms of strategic military power, and détente provided Nixon and Kissinger with a method of managing the Soviet Union’s rise to true superpower status while concurrently attempting to mitigate the negative aftermath of the Vietnam War on U.S. power and prestige. Nixon and Kissinger promoted the concept of linking multiple policy issues to gain greater diplomatic leverage over the Soviet Union. In their view, linkage politics provided a method of addressing a broad range of issues while trying to
prevent any single issue from derailing the overall process and milieu created by détente. Despite the Soviet Union’s emergence as a global power in the military sense, Soviet power was not nearly as multidimensional as U.S. power. As a result, there were power asymmetries, which provided opportunities—in Kissinger’s view—for the United States to exploit these asymmetries through linkage politics thereby restraining Soviet actions.

Détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, as Mike Bowker and Phil Williams have noted, consisted of four primary and interconnected elements: (1) European normalization, (2) arms control, (3) codes of conduct, and (4) East–West trade. The issue of normalizing European relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries had remained unresolved following the end of World War II, and in 1969, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt instituted a policy of Ostpolitik (Eastern politics) designed to improve and increase relations between West Germany, East Germany, and the Soviet Union. Détente in Europe proceeded slightly apart from superpower détente despite Kissinger’s efforts to prevent any separation of the two diplomatic tracks. In 1970, the Moscow Treaty formally recognizing Europe’s post–World War II borders and the division of Germany was signed by West Germany and the Soviet Union. The historically thorny issue of Berlin involved greater participation by the superpowers, and the Kissinger-Dobrynin back channel proved to be a useful device during these negotiations. The formal agreement on the status of Berlin was signed by the four occupying powers—(1) the United States, (2) the United Kingdom, (3) France, and (4) the former USSR—in September 1971. Several other treaties normalizing the borders and relations between West Germany and other Eastern Communist states, including Poland (1970), East Germany (1972), and Czechoslovakia (1973), were enacted during the early years of European détente. The normalization of European relations through détente did much to relax the tension on what had historically been one of the Cold War’s central fronts.

The issue of bilateral arms control was perhaps the centerpiece of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. Preliminary negotiations on arms control, commonly known as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), began in November 1969, but little progress was made until the Kissinger-Dobrynin back channel reportedly produced a breakthrough in May 1971. Protracted negotiations resulted in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which were signed in May 1972 by Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev at a highly publicized summit meeting in Moscow. The ABM Treaty limited the number of missile defense sites in either country to a total of two and prohibited the further development, testing, and deployment of various types of ABM capabilities. The Interim Agreement limited the number of land-based Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and ballistic missile submarines. The ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement arising from SALT were hailed as significant diplomatic accomplishments critical for sustaining superpower détente.

The 1972 Moscow summit also produced diplomatic agreements designed to provide a framework for limiting the possibility of escalation resulting from superpower competition. The Basic Principles Agreement (BPA), also known as the Basic Principles of U.S.–Soviet Relations, represented a loose code of conduct for the continuation of détente. The superpowers pledged to avoid actions that might increase bilateral tension and the risk of military confrontation, refrain from threats or use of force against allies or each other, urgently consult each other during crises featuring a possibility of a nuclear conflict, and use negotiation to settle disputes peacefully. Additionally, the Agreement on Avoiding Incidents at Sea was also signed at the Moscow summit. Nixon’s desire for “peaceful competition” and Kissinger’s plan for using détente to construct a more stable international system based on a triangular—United States, former USSR, and China—balance of power were readily apparent in the form and substance of these agreements. Similarly, the June 1973 U.S.–Soviet summit meeting in Washington, D.C., resulted in further diplomatic agreements based on the emerging détente. Nixon and Brezhnev signed a declaration of principles designed to jumpstart the stalled Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) negotiations, and they also signed the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War that elaborated on the Basic Principles Agreement.
Improved U.S.–Soviet relations in the early 1970s also provided an opportunity to expand commercial ties. U.S.–Soviet trade dramatically increased during the early years of détente, and there was even an effort to grant most favored nation (MFN) status to the Soviet Union. However, the element of increasing trade with the Soviet Union was quite controversial in U.S. domestic politics, especially after a massive Soviet purchase of U.S. grain at subsidized prices caused a sharp increase in U.S. domestic grain prices and turned into a political debacle for the Nixon administration.

Détente during this era also faced domestic and international challenges. Whereas Nixon’s rapprochement with China was most likely the key factor originally motivating the Soviet Union to pursue détente, other international events undermined the process. U.S. involvement in Vietnam was a constant source of friction, especially since Nixon and Kissinger believed that the Soviet Union could exert greater pressure on North Vietnam to conclude a peace agreement. The 1973 Arab–Israeli War strained détente to its limits by heightening the risks of escalation—the United States increased its nuclear alert at one point in the crisis—and brought into question the efficacy of the BPA in restraining superpower actions. Likewise, the Soviet involvement in Angola in 1975 further weakened détente, led to a cessation of U.S.–Soviet trade, and prompted President Gerald Ford to withdraw support for granting MFN status to the Soviets.

The domestic political challenges to détente in the United States were no less severe. By circumventing the traditional foreign policy bureaucracy and emphasizing secrecy and executive control, the Nixon–Kissinger approach failed to build strong institutional support for détente. This lack of domestic support was compounded by presidential electoral politics and congressional opposition. Presidential politics led Nixon and Kissinger to overstate the diplomatic successes of 1972 and oversell the future promise of détente, and the Watergate scandal only added to Nixon’s political difficulties. Congressional opposition, especially from Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D-Washington), further complicated the overall process. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974 is a case in point. Underlying the entire issue of domestic support for détente was the worldview of the average American citizen. As Paul Lauren, Gordon Craig, and Alexander George (2007) note,

The pursuit of détente required a more sophisticated mental and emotional analysis than that of Cold War rivalry... Members of Congress and the public often were unable or unwilling to grasp the subtleties of a strategy that combined both sticks of punishment and carrots of incentives. (pp. 102–103)

An example of that is provided by the Helsinki Accords of 1975, scoffed at by the Soviets in tandem with elements of the U.S. public but not insignificant in ending the Cold War.

The last vestiges of superpower détente perished in the wake of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Carter administration removed the SALT II Treaty from Senate consideration, increased military spending, and initiated the reevaluation of U.S. nuclear war-fighting strategy. With the election of Reagan in 1980, the Cold War returned in earnest until the Soviet Union’s eventual collapse in 1991.

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See also Arms Race; Diplomacy; Disarmament; Superpower

Further Readings
Developing World and International Relations

Cleavages matter in all social relations. Given that international relations are a specific form of social relations, it is normal that the role of cleavages is taken seriously. Cleavages can be geographic, political, cultural, or economic. They indicate the extent of polarization of the world around different criteria. For instance, cultural cleavages derive from various differences, including religion, ethnicity, and nationality. Political cleavages are linked to differences in ideology or institutional setup, such as authoritarian regimes versus democratic ones. Economic cleavages have to do with the level of development. In international relations, they are translated through the antagonism between the developed world (the Global North) and the developing world (the Global South). The concept of the developing world is an important one that has acquired an enduring meaning in international relations. This entry examines the concept of the developing world through a discussion of the cleavage between the North and the South.

The developing world cannot be understood without reference to the developed world—they form an antagonistic couple. Each of these worlds has specific attributes. It could be said that while the developed world is a world of high economic performance and standard of living, the developing world is a world of relative or absolute deprivation. However, it is important to bear in mind that the concept of the developing world is an overgeneralization of a complex reality. Instead of a single developing world, there are several such worlds. The concept of the developing world does not refer to the same reality in Asia and in Africa. The level of poverty and the lack of industrialization are not the same. For example, in 1970, China was viewed as an underdeveloped country in relation to the average Northern developed country, not underdeveloped African countries. There is a hierarchy within the developed world in which some countries of the South are seen as nearer to those of the North. Moreover, the developed world is not a monolithic world. This concept of development is dynamic: One country can be considered part of the developing world at one time and of the developed world at another. For example, today, China is viewed as much more economically powerful than it was several decades ago. While some Arab countries such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait are global financial players due to the incomes generated by oil, they remain poorly industrialized and have a lower literacy rate than other developed countries. Within the developing world, countries can be classified as having relatively low, medium, or high levels of development. Therefore, it appears that the concept of developing world is elastic, and it can easily be simplified when those realities are under scrutiny. Thus, the notion of developing world should be considered as relative and provisional. Through the mediation of international institutions, the dynamics of international relations has progressively defined the notion of developing world. For instance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) uses its Human Development Index to measure development in terms of several indicators such as life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and human poverty. The UNDP’s Millennium Development Goals are another entryway to understanding the developing world. The goals, adopted in 2000 by many members of the international community, identify eight objectives to be achieved by 2015. For example, the first goal, “to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger,” includes the target of reducing by one half the proportion of people living on less than $1 per day. The UNDP goals are a way of identifying the objective reality that characterizes developing countries. However, a country’s recognition and identification of itself as underdeveloped also constitutes a subjective reality; the underdevelopment status is also created and demanded by the underdeveloped


Deterrence

See Arms Race
countries. A supplementary illustration of this point is an African country that seeks World Bank status of “highly and poorly indebted country” to receive international relief.

From the preceding discussion, it appears that the developing world is an element in international relations. Here, two meanings of international relations are to be taken into consideration: first, the phenomenon of international relations in which the “developing world” intervenes as an actor and, second, the concept of international relations as a science that has to explain the dynamics of the “developing world.”

The Phenomenon of International Relations and the Developing World

Like all social relations, international relations are structured by the balance of forces. In this context, power is based on the level of development. The developed world is the dominant world, the world of the powerful, while the developing world is the dominated world, the world of the powerless. Thus, the developing world stands as testimony to the inequality in international relations and constitutes a specific field of action.

The existence of an international hierarchy is confirmed by the category of “developing world.” It is the world that, compared with the one that is developed, is considered backward. In contemporary international relations, the developing world has often been named the Third World. This terminology comes from the period during the French Revolution, when Third Estate referred to the commoners. According to this analogy, the term Third World was used for countries that were neither Western capitalist countries (First World) nor the socialist countries of Eastern and Central Europe (Second World). The term Third World indicates the lower position occupied by countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Despite the collapse of Marxism and the Second World, the notion of Third World is still used to designate the developing world. It is the world on which developed countries wield their power through various means: economic, cultural, political, or military.

Economically, the lower position is reflected by the weakness of the national currencies, raw materials dependent on the trade structure, high rate of human poverty, or insufficient industrialization. These elements, with variations, are common to developing countries and explain their dependence on the developed world. The inequality of developing countries is well captured by the Millennium Development Goals: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, and improve maternal health. The fact that these objectives are proposed as goals is an indication of the insufficiencies that characterize the developing world. Therefore, in international relations, developing countries are to a large extent subordinate to developed countries, which create explicitly or implicitly international clientelism: Patron states are developed states; client states are developing states. Clientelism makes it difficult for developing states to have diplomatic autonomy or to go beyond vocal affirmation of sovereignty. However, the economic dependence of the developing world is not an absolute. Ideological, political, or religious parameters may determine the diplomatic demarche of a developing state. For example, the overreliance of Egypt on U.S. economic aid has not led to Egypt aligning with the United States on issues regarding the Middle East.

As a specific space of action, the “developing world” has at least two meanings. The “developing world” emerges from the solidarity approach to international relations used by states and international organizations in their action. Each developed state defines its south. For instance, while the United States had privileged South Asia and Latin America during the Cold War era, France was organizing its aid policy with an emphasis on Africa. International organizations such as the World Bank or UNDP elaborate quantitative criteria to measure underdevelopment and then rationalize the contribution of the international community. In this regard, the “developing world” is the space filled by world generosity. The “developing world” has influenced the structuring of international relations through the agencies, funds, and programs aimed at the development of Third World countries. Inasmuch as the “developing world” induces the creation of development organizations, international institutions crystallize the existence of the “developing world.”

The “developing world” has also emerged as a distinct language of international relations. The
“developing world” was the world politically created by peoples of Africa and Asia meeting in Bandung in 1955; the Bandung conference was the beginning of the collective claim of Third World countries for decolonization and development. From this conference, a collective consciousness of belonging to the underdeveloped world and a clear resolution to change international relations arose. For this reason, the trademark of developing countries in international relations has been (and still is) the denunciation of the international order. In the same way that Westphalia constitutes a mythical reference for the foundation of European public order, Bandung is a reference in international relations. Its revolutionary dimension should not be minimized. Even though notions of equality and noninterference in internal affairs were already part of the language of international relations, these notions were applied only within the European world. They did not guide relations with non-European states. That is why European public law has not outlawed colonization or imperialism. The Bandung conference was a Third World appropriation of principles of European public law and the United Nations Charter. The creation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 in Belgrade was part of the same dynamics. The developing world is a world in rebellion against the international order: the Economic International Order and the Information and Communication World Order.

The clash between the “developing world” and the “developed world” is relative. There are alliances that transcend cleavages. The French aid policy toward its former colonies of sub-Saharan Africa had been an instrument of political control. In return, a small developing country such as Gabon has influenced France through oil exportation. The Non-Aligned Movement as a way to institutionalize the ideological autonomy of developing countries was counterbalanced by the Marxist orientations of its main members such as Cuba and Ghana. Therefore, the “developing world” does not refer to an autonomous entity. There is even internal rivalry due to external interference or local stakes. The rivalry between the presidents of Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea during the 1960s cannot be explained only by the dependence of Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire on France and the rebellion of Sékou Touré of Guinea. The regional leadership in French-speaking Africa, which concerns states and individuals, was also at stake. In summary, economic cleavages are not sufficient conditions for the formation of two fighting communities: “them” and “us.”

However, to some extent, developing countries have succeeded in constructing the “North” as the enemy of the “South” through a mobilization of the history of colonization, the systematization of neocolonialism, and the explanation of underdevelopment by exogenous factors. Thus, the recognition of the fluidity of each pole and the relativity of the cleavage between the “North” and the “South” should not lead to the denial of this opposition. If a misunderstanding does exist, it is a workable one. In international relations, the developing world has been institutionalized as a category of vision, division, and action. It is a basis of solidarities of both resemblance and interests: solidarity of resemblance through the regrouping of developing states in circles such as the Group of 77 and solidarity of interests due to the relative similarity of the economic problems of developing states, as exemplified in the dialogue between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States. It is not just chance that despite the differences that exist between the developing states of Latin America, their respective national and regional diplomatic agendas are dominated by the theme of international democratization, which is in fact a euphemism for the decolonization of international relations.

**The Concept of International Relations and the Developing World**

The concept of international relations refers to the science of the specific social relations characterized as international relations. As a body of organized knowledge, the science of international relations does not explain the situation and the role of the states in the same way. The science of international relations does not just involve general knowledge but also particular knowledge of given situations. Therefore, the science of international relations as related to the developing world involves tension between universalism and relativism. As with every science, international relations has general concepts such as those of the state, sovereignty, and power that are applied to the whole world
regardless of the level of development. States in the North and the South are both discussed with territory, population, and government as bases. Such a generalization is a lazy one. Territory does not have the same meaning in different political and cultural contexts. The dialectics of unique and multiple meaning(s) are useful. The globalization of the state is paired with its vernacularization. Therefore, its understanding has to be both on global and local levels. A general science of international relations is to some extent an epistemological obstacle for the study of the developing world, because it blurs specificities and differences. It is in this context of local knowledge that a fertile science of international relations is a particular science, that is, a science that opts for the relativity of general categories and concepts. In this regard, it must be acknowledged that some paradigms of international relations possess a real heuristic power to study the role and state of the developing world. However, while universal concepts may be useful in some contexts, it is also important to recognize that seemingly straightforward concepts such as state and sovereignty can mask inequalities and impede the development of knowledge about the developing world, which requires local as well as global knowledge.

The status of the underdeveloped world in international relations gave birth to a specific theorization, and under this rubric some theories of development and underdevelopment, as Ronald H. Chilcote (1981) pointed out, can be located. The dominant explanatory paradigm of the developing world in international relations is Marxist oriented even though societies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America were not the main concern of Karl Marx’s thought; the developing world is an interesting terrain for critical international relations theories and more precisely for the use of Marx’s writings. Three main themes are taken into consideration by the Marxist-oriented approach: (1) underdevelopment, (2) dependency, and (3) imperialism.

According to the interpretation of the Marxist-oriented approach presented by Samir Amin (1974, 1976), Walter Rodney (1972), and Andre G. Frank (1966), the formation of an underdeveloped world can only be understood in the context of international relations where capitalism evolves as a process of relationship between unequal partners. The underdeveloped world is the product of the development of the capitalist mode of production at the periphery. Therefore, the relations between developed countries and underdeveloped ones are like metropole–satellite relations. This school of thought perceives underdevelopment as related to capitalist, colonialist, and imperialist exploitation. From this perspective, the notion of the developing world is meaningless; only that of an underdeveloped world matters, because Third World countries cannot be liberated from their backward status. Underdeveloped countries and developed ones are perceived as completely different in international relations: The development is unequal because underdeveloped countries are bound to organize their economies according to the needs of the dominant ones.

Dependency of peripheral states on central ones is one of the main characteristics of the international relations structure (Fernando Enrique Cardoso, 1973). The argument of the dependence of the underdeveloped world is based on several elements among which are internal colonialism, which is the domination of the economy by the metropolis, and the extraversion toward central states of the economy.

Imperialism is proposed as an explanation for the actions of some dominant nations in the world. The independence of the underdeveloped states is seen as formal. The actual reality, however, involves the concept of neocolonialism. Inspired by Vladimir Lenin, who considered imperialism to be the highest stage of capitalism, Kwame Nkrumah assumed neocolonialism to be the supreme stage of imperialism.

As briefly summarized, the Marxist-oriented approach to international relations positions the developing world in a specific way in international relations. Contrary to positivist approaches such as realism, which take the position of underdeveloped states as given, the Marxist-oriented approach historicizes the weakness of those states: Where does underdevelopment come from? Under this theoretical prism, the classical concepts of states and sovereignty appear as variables. States and sovereignty do not have the same meaning in metropolitan states (colonizers) and satellite states (the colonies). It is clear that the sovereignty of the latter is more
normative than that of the former. However, the Marxist critique of international relations is to be nuanced in light of the experience of the underdeveloped states. First, the fiction of sovereignty and equality among states, be they from the North or the South, has led to a positive reality of decolonization (often not the product of the colonial power’s goodwill) and of the ability of weak southern states to oppose strong northern states through diplomatic engagement made possible by the legal and formal superstructure of international relations that can affect the balance of forces. Second, the excessive focus on the dependence dimension of the relationship between the North and the South hides the complex reality of the interdependence that leads to compromise or a variable sum game. Third, the presentation of the underdeveloped world as clay in the hands of the developed world is far from the reality of the relative autonomy of Third World leaders and their capacity to contract alliances according to their interests.

The classical realist paradigm of international relations has indirect consequences in the explanation of the underdeveloped world. It is known that, historically, realism is elaborated from the experiences of major Western states. It has not been easy for classical realism to apprehend the underdeveloped states as they are. During the Cold War period, these states were seen under the prism and of their relations with the two superpowers. Their relative autonomy was ignored. However, under specific conditions, realism can help understand the underdeveloped world in international relations.

Classical realism demystifies the idea of the “underdeveloped world” as an actor in international relations. The unit of analysis and level of observation are constituted by the “state.” The notion of “underdeveloped world” is de-globalized for the benefit of underdeveloped states. These states are recognized as being different, with divergent or convergent national interests and with peaceful or conflict-ridden relations. Based on the universal concepts of state, power, and sovereignty, classical realism can then contribute to the de-provincialization of underdeveloped states in international relations. They are states like others. This does not mean that classical realism disregards absolutely sets of states and recognizes only peculiar states. Sets of states are considered when they are political, economic, or military alliances, for instance; an alliance with the underdeveloped world is not an alliance to be taken for granted: There are often alliances between Northern states and Southern states or among some Southern states that crystallize the heterogeneity of the underdeveloped world. At the same time that realism prevents the illusion of spontaneous formation of an alliance, it destroys the illusion of the similarity of underdeveloped states: Like other states, underdeveloped states have distinct resources. Those resources determine their power position. Among underdeveloped states, there are some states that are weaker than the others. Therefore, the realist image of a hierarchy of states is still meaningful.

The redefinition of realism under the traits of “ethnorealism” (Paul Roe, 1999) or “subaltern realism” (Mohammed Ayoob, 1998) constitutes operating attempts to adapt realism to the specificity of Third World states. Both adaptations of classical realism aim at shedding more light on the intrastate dimension of international relations. Linked to the experience of Western states where war and peace are supposed to depend on interstate relations, classical realism does not understand the dynamics of internal conflicts that are preponderant in the underdeveloped world. To cross the boundary that stops classical realism from analyzing the intrastate level, ethnorealism and subaltern realism were proposed. The conceptual basis of international relations is to be reinvented from this perspective. Initially, the great divide is legitimated by the belief that “inside” is the place of order—peace—while the “outside” is dominated by disorder. In several states of the underdeveloped world, internal life is characterized by the intensification of conflicts. In Africa, there are more intrastate wars than interstate ones (Luc Sindjoun, 2002). Thus, it could be said that the study of the underdeveloped world implies a reformulation of classical realism.

The situation of the underdeveloped world in international relations has been a pretext for the denunciation of international relations theory. In fact, this is based on the relationship that is supposed to exist between indigenous culture and Western domination (Homi Bhabha, 2007). An
epistemology of the dominant international relations knowledge shows that there is an interaction between realism and imperialism. That is the reason for the call for a postcolonial theory of international relations.

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See also Developing World and International Relations; Imperialism; Postcolonialism

Further Readings


DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL

Political development gained recognition as a subfield of comparative politics in the 1960s. This entry describes its roots in modernization theory and dependency theory, examines broad themes in its subsequent evolution, and concludes with a look at the role of area studies in the discipline today.

Prior to the 1960s, comparative politics had tended to focus on the forms of government that prevailed in the advanced industrial world, that is, Europe and the former Soviet Union. But with the break up of Europe’s empires following World War II and the entry of numerous postcolonial states into the global political system, an increasing number of scholars chose instead to focus on what became known as the developing world. Figure 1 shows the age composition of the states that became independent in different periods and captures the size of the new group of nations in the past 66 years: 120 out of 194, that is, almost two thirds.

The study of political development was foreshadowed by studies of nationalism. Initially, scholars treated the subject as a branch of contemporary history: The rise of nationalism in the postwar world seemed to resemble the rise of nationalism in Europe, be it in 19th-century Germany, Greece, or Italy, or in Central and Eastern Europe following the conference in Versailles. But many soon recognized that politics in the newly developed nations differed from that in the developed. They found it necessary to address new themes: economic growth, the rise of industry, and the marginalization of agriculture as well as the politics that accompanied these transformations.

While diverse intellectually, those making early contributions to the field tended to subscribe to what became known as “modernization” theory. Modernization theory constituted a claim that the breakdown of the previous agrarian and traditional order made people available for political mobilization. Increasing levels of urbanization, literacy, and income, its proponents argued, bore a close relationship with the rise of political participation. They posited sociological and social psychological mechanisms—the desire for community and the impact of anomie, for example—to link
economic and social change to the growth of mass movements. Drawing on the work of area specialists, several stressed the manner in which nationalist politicians harnessed the political energies of voluntary associations and in particular groups formed in town by recent migrants from the countryside. Rather than being highly organized and disciplined electoral machines, some nationalist parties, these specialists found, were but loose assemblages of these organizations—something that lent credibility to the reasoning of the modernization theorists.

The following is a key question faced by students of the developing nations: What kind of polities would emerge in the developing world? Given the bipolar structure of power in the post-war era, this question was equivalent to asking whether these nations would favor democracy or totalitarianism. When Seymour Martin Lipset reported a systematic relationship between the level of per capita income and the level of democracy in a cross-sectional regression of nation-states, the answer seemed clear. Given that higher levels of urbanization and literacy covary with higher levels of income and that—as Lipset found—higher levels of income correlate with democracy, then the developing world, as it modernized, was destined to be democratic.

This claim soon became the focal point of heated debate, however, one that brought to the fore an alternative form of political analysis. In the midst of the recession and debt crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, military governments overthrew democratic regimes in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. As these nations numbered among the most prosperous in the developing world, when these regimes closed newspapers, banned political parties, and jailed or assassinated political opponents, they made a mockery of the claim that democracy covaried with development. Rather, their behavior lent credence to what became known as “dependency theory.”

Modernization theory traced its intellectual roots to the writings of Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, and other sociologists (e.g., Ferdinand Tönnies) who studied the emergence of Europe as a modern society. The roots of dependency theory lay instead in the writings of Karl Marx, who focused on the economic forces that propelled Europe’s 19th-century transformation. For important reasons, however, the dependency theorists did not draw on Marx himself but rather on his followers, in particular, Vladimir I. Lenin.

As Lenin recognized, the predictions of Marx had been falsified. In modern industry, wages of employees were rising; employers such as Ford found that by paying higher wages, they could sell more products. As a result, it was becoming increasingly difficult to write of the immiseration of the working class. Nor could observers find evidence of political conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Thus, Lenin’s acknowledgment that at the outbreak of World War I, in each major European nation, socialist parties had joined bourgeois parties in voting to finance their militaries. They were even prepared to kill workers if they
wore the uniforms of another nation. The proletarian parties had acted as if they had more interests in common with their own nation’s bourgeoisie than with another nation’s working class.

Faced with these realities, Lenin turned to a key question: If the bourgeoisie were not exploiting workers in the advanced industrial countries, then from where did they draw their capital? The answer, he responded, was from abroad. Through multinational firms, international bankers, and global markets, the rich nations of Europe were able to extract resources from the poor nations of the periphery. Rather than taking place in the advanced industrial economies, the extraction of surplus took place at the global level.

For the dependency theorists, then, the fall of elected governments in the most prosperous nations in the developing world was not paradoxical. For the purpose of governments in the developing world, they believed, was not to serve the interests of their own people but rather the interests of investors from abroad. That the military governments repressed labor, destroyed trade unions, and jailed—or killed—socialist agitators was what was to be expected of any government occupying their position in the global system.

Lending further credence to the Leninist interpretation was the war in Vietnam. In the United States, workers—the so-called hard hats, in the argot of the time—supported the war; and in Vietnam, a peasant-based army fought the army of a capitalist nation. Political forces thus aligned in a manner redolent of Lenin’s analyses. In addition, the war reminded scholars of Barrington Moore’s claim that all modern revolutions were based on the peasantry rather than the proletariat—something that would follow from the reasoning of the dependency school.

Despite its initial appeal, dependency analysis fell victim to discordant facts. One was the rise of the industrialized economies in regions that formerly had been underdeveloped, most notably in Asia. Not only did these economies grow, and their nations escape the ranks of the underdeveloped, but also their growth was spurred by foreign trade—an instrument of immiseration, in most Marxist accounts. Also significant was the so-called third wave of democratization that culminated in the fall of the Soviet Union. With Russia reforming politically; Chile, Brazil, and Argentina restored to the ranks of democracies; and several of the newly industrialized nations of Asia choosing their rulers in contested elections, countries that had lain off Lipset’s regression line snapped back on to it. Modernization theory appeared redeemed.

While Marxist political analysis may have lost its appeal, scholars continue to explore its central concerns: the impact of global trade, international finance, and the multinational structure of firms. And while democratic political forces may have displaced military and authoritarian regimes, many of the new democracies exhibit authoritarian features: legislatures with but token powers, limits on association and expression, and the maintenance in power of incumbent leaders or political parties. The result is a rapidly growing literature on “partial democracies.” Contemporaneous with the spread of democracy in the developing world, moreover, was the growth of civil conflict, which leads to copious research into the causes of civil war and state failure in the developing world. As ethnicity and religion have played a major role in these conflicts, attention has refocused on the cultural roots of politics in the developing world. While each of these themes figured prominently in the early literature, scholars now approach them in new ways. Although the importance of cultural forces had long been recognized, for example, scholars now seek to find how, and under what conditions, they affect political behavior and collect data and design experiments to test their claims.

The Broad Themes

The decline of dependency theory left the field of development bereft of a “master narrative.” While accepting many of the basic empirical findings of modernization theory, few scholars were inclined to subscribe to its tacit endorsement of the cultural, economic, or political triumph of the West. Their demurral became more pronounced following the late-century rise of a prosperous and powerful Asia. Rather than achieving a theoretical consensus, then, the field is marked by themes, which in turn lead to a redefinition of disciplinary boundaries.

Political Economy

Modernization and dependency theory focused on the political impact of economic
change, linking (variously) democracy or authoritarianism to capital accumulation and economic growth. More recently, scholars have focused on the impact of politics on the performance of the economy. Some have looked at the role of interest groups and the way in which they shape policies toward trade, others on the regulation of markets and the manner in which they are transformed into political machines, and still others on the way in which the movement to democratic forms of government alter policy decisions, inducing or failing to induce them to employ public goods rather than private transfers in search of office. These lines of research have brought students of development into close contact with political scientists in the field of international political economy and economists studying politics.

Security Studies

Those studying development have also forged closer ties with those in the field of security. In recent decades, the locus of military security has shifted from the international to the domestic level, with far more deaths resulting from civil conflict than from wars. For years, students of international conflict have been able to apply geopolitical reasoning to “the state,” viewing the latter as a unitary actor; the latter assumption is no longer tenable when studying conflicts at the sub-national level. Just as students of development gain insights into the use of military power from their colleagues in security studies, those in security studies now find themselves benefiting from the insights of those who study the domestic politics of developing countries. Driven by the importance of this research theme, the subfields have come into greater contact.

History

While thus probing deeply into the politics of the developing world, scholars are simultaneously viewing it from a more detached vantage point. The recent rise of Asia reminds many that not so long ago, it was Asia that constituted the core while the West languished in the periphery. Inspired by this realization, students of development increasingly work in concert with students of economic history. Some return to the study of Western imperialism and the manner in which it, by toppling the nations of Asia, generated a reversal of economic fortunes on the one hand while laying the foundations for subsequent and enduring inequality on the other. Others look for factors, such as institutions, that can account for both differences in economic performance over time and across regions. Many look for lessons from history that might be applied to the developing world, focusing in particular on the origins of democracy and the role of warfare in rendering states “developmental.”

Area Studies and the Discipline

A last major topic should be addressed: the relationship between those doing area studies and those who “do” social science, making extensive use of formal theory and empirical methods. Rather than treating the approaches as rivals, as has been the case in the past, scholars are now more inclined to treat them as complements. Drawn into political science because of their love of a region and their commitment to its development, scholars are increasingly inclined to combine a deep understanding of its politics and culture, derived from field research and the use of ethnographic methods, with the use of formal theory, statistical analysis, and experimental methods. The clash of cultures that once marked the field now appears muted; area studies are now firmly based within, rather than in opposition to, the discipline.

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See also Area Studies; Democratization; Dependency Theory; Developing World and International Relations; Development Administration; Economic Policy; Security and Defense Policy

Further Readings


Development Administration

Development administration refers to a form of public administration meant to be suitable for developing countries. The concept gained widespread recognition in the 1960s, coinciding with the emphasis at the time on state-led development. Development was something that needed to be centrally managed. The concept has since lost much of its initial value, and what many expected to be a new field of inquiry has never materialized. Instead, the concept has become subsumed under others such as development management and governance. This entry traces the history of and contending perspectives on the concept before concluding with a discussion of its demise and gradual inclusion into rivaling intellectual traditions.

History

Development administration emerged as a significant concept in the field of public administration in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Its promotion came from three distinct sources.

First, progressive civil servants who realized that the rigid system of administration that they associated with colonial rule would not work once these countries in Africa and Asia were independent constituted one constituency in favor of a more developmental form of administration. Several of these civil servants who themselves had personal experience of working in the colonial administration shifted to becoming international civil servants working on technical assistance contracts in these countries.

A second group was made up of philanthropic foundation officers with an interest in facilitating the development of new states in Africa and Asia. Among U.S. entities, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations came to play an especially significant role. The former was very active in India and Pakistan as well as in Anglophone African countries. Support by these foundations was critical not only for improvement in administrative practices but also for experimenting with new theories of administration. The Ford Foundation–funded African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) played a particularly important role in fulfilling this dual objective in the 1960s and 1970s.

The third group consisted of academics with an interest in making a contribution to the cause of development by inventing new theories of administration that would be applicable in particular to the new states in the developing regions of the world. These scholars were largely from developed countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This group eventually grew to include scholars from developing countries. Onkar P. Dwivedi from India, Jorge Nef from Brazil, and Dele Olowu from Nigeria are among the most significant contributors.

The enthusiasm with which the concept was met in the 1960s lasted into the 1970s but began to wane subsequently for two main reasons. The first was the shift in intellectual paradigm from a state-led to a market-inspired approach to development. Reforms in public administration became less urgent than similar actions in the economy. The second was the dearth of achievements in development administration. The theorists had largely failed to translate their ideas into practical action. What had been presented as a promising new academic field with practical value for developing countries had little to show for itself by the 1980s. What happened thereafter was an attempt to redefine reform in broader terms than had been the case in the previous 2 decades.

Contending Perspectives

There has never been a single and coherent theory guiding the field of development administration. It
failed to develop beyond a preparadigmatic stage. There were four main theoretical perspectives that competed for domination of the field, although none ever reached that point.

The first theoretical effort by Victor Thompson drew its inspiration from an earlier study of enterprise management in the United Kingdom. The authors of this study made a distinction between two forms of management—mechanistic and organic. The former would coincide with a classical bureaucratic form in which authority follows hierarchical lines, roles are clearly defined and rules strictly enforced. The latter relies on a more flexible form of organization in which relations among employees are more collegial, and rules can be bent in the interest of achieving a common overarching goal. Thompson borrowed these ideas and developed his own theory of organization that applied to how administration should be structured to be conducive to development. His assumption was that since organic management was especially suitable in conditions of change, for example, in technology or market opportunities, this could be applied also to administration of development since the latter implies change. Thompson’s theory focused on how behavioral change could be induced by senior administrators. It assumed that bureaucratic organizations could be reformed from within. His theory, therefore, was attractive to practitioners interested in making public administration in the new states more developmental.

A second approach that is associated especially with Fred Riggs started from a systems point of view and was less precise in terms of what could or should be done. His “prismatic theory of society” was inspired by modernization theory, according to which societies move from being “traditional” to becoming “modern.” Riggs’s contribution was that in the field of administration, states in Asia, Africa, or Latin America were caught somewhere in between, with influences coming both from the past and the present, hence creating a syncretic combination that was different but not necessarily developmental. His work attracted interest from other scholars as long as modernization theory had its influence until the early 1970s but lost it immediately thereafter.

Whereas Thompson had concentrated on what could be done with development administration theory inside organizations, Riggs argued that administrative organizations reflected the values intrinsic in society. Theories of development administration could not be applied without attention to its “ecology” or societal environment. These contending perspectives dominated the debate in the 1970s. David Leonard made perhaps the most original and empirically based contribution to this debate with his pathbreaking study of the agricultural extension services in Kenya. He reached two important conclusions that helped set the debate into the 1980s. The first was that rejecting a mechanistic form of organization in favor of an organic one had its own costs because there are certain basic functions in bureaucracies, such as personnel management and accounting, that cannot be overlooked if administration is going to be developmental. Preferring the concept of “development bureaucracy,” Leonard suggested that there is not necessarily a tension between mechanistic and organic forms of organization. The second contribution was that although societal factors matter, organizations can make a difference if properly administered. Government ministries are not “hopeless cases” but rather potential change agents. Leonard, therefore, kept the field of development administration alive by merging previously contending perspectives and arguing that development is possible through more careful and systematic attention to bureaucratic organizations.

A fourth perspective on development administration was provided by George Gant, who made a distinction between what may be called a more down-to-earth administration in specific-line ministries, on the one hand, and a comprehensive development administration concentrated in a superior branch of government, for example, a President’s Office or a Planning Commission, on the other. Gant was skeptical that a developmental form of administration could emerge in day-to-day bureaucratic settings and advocated, therefore, the creation of a “super” administration in charge of development, an idea that he appears to have borrowed from the literature and practice of development planning.

This account of significant contributions to the field would not be complete without mentioning two other names. The first is Milton Esman, who through various contributions followed the evolution of the field from its heyday to its demise. Together with colleagues at Cornell University, he was also responsible for applying organizational
theory to empirical reality in South Asia. The other is Bernard Schaffer, who wrote a seminal piece in 1969 in which he was the first to criticize the ambitions of the field for being naïve about the possibility of making bureaucratic forms of administration more developmental. Drawing especially on his studies and experience in India, Schaffer argued somewhat along the same lines as Riggs that where norms in society are different from those required in a functioning administrative organization, development administration is unlikely to emerge.

**Demise**

Development administration never took off as a field of its own. It became a victim of its own high aspirations and the difficulties of realizing them. The shift in the 1980s away from state-led development exacerbated this difficulty. What has happened since may be captured in two distinct trends. One has been the incorporation of development administration into the field of public administration—a return to where it all came from in the first place. This manifests itself in the belief that for developing countries to become successful, they require a public administration similar to that found in developed countries. The multiple public sector reform programs that have been launched in the 1990s and 2000s with generous funding from the donor community are a confirmation of this trend. In this perspective, development administration has been reduced to simply being administration in developing countries. It has no longer a theory of its own.

The second trend has been the move from development administration to governance. This metamorphosis has subordinated issues of public administration to a broader set of concerns, both economic and political. Thus, rather than treating issues of administrative reform as a separate concern, these issues are interpreted in a broader economic and political reform perspective. Costs of administration have become a central issue thanks to its encounter with economics. Likewise, administration and politics are no longer two distinct fields but brought together in the name of good governance to make both activities more relevant and appealing to the public, an objective that is now applied by both scholars and development practitioners to developed and developing countries alike.

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See also Administration; Administration Theory; Development, Political; Economic Policy; Governance, Administration Policies

**Further Readings**


**Diaspora**

The word *diaspora* comes from the ancient Greek *dia speiro*, meaning to sow over. It refers to populations that originated from the same place but have now scattered to different locations. The concept of diaspora has long been used to refer to the Greeks in the Hellenic world and to the Jews after the fall of Jerusalem, and beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, scholars began to use it with reference to the African diaspora. However, it has come to be used more widely during the past 2 decades. This entry first puts the concept of diaspora in historical perspective and discusses the various typologies that researchers have developed in analyzing it. The entry then focuses on the political implications of both the phenomenon and its interpretations, and finally, it considers what is at stake in the transformation of the
nation-state system that arises out of the diaspora experience.

Evolution of the Concept of the Diaspora
The concept of diaspora did not figure prominently in the social sciences until the late 1960s, and the use of the plural is recent. It used to refer primarily to the Jewish experience, in Greek versions, particularly through the expulsion of the people and destruction of the Jerusalem temple under the Babylonian empire. The Jewish population's experience of a dispersal made necessary by its loss of territory shapes a tragic vision of the diaspora, long shared by many analysts. Nonetheless, since ancient times, the concept has been used in a positive though much less influential way to refer to the Greek colonization between the 6th and 4th centuries BCE in all the Mediterranean lands, from the shores of present Turkey and Crimea to the Strait of Gibraltar, spreading civilization in these territories through many Hellenic cities.

Both experiences—rooted in the Western tradition—have constituted stereotypes of diasporas, though other noticeable cases from the East have developed for the medieval and modern times. For instance, the expansion of China has been perceived as an acceptable phenomenon, described in an ancient Chinese poem: “Wherever the ocean waves touch, there is an overseas Chinese”—thus naturalizing diasporic initiatives along trade routes. India’s expansion, especially throughout the Indian Ocean, has also provided an example of the settlement of a population beyond its own boundaries. Since the 19th century, the increase in the populations of coolies to work in agricultural or industrial plants worldwide has drawn particular attention.

In fact, when scholars attempted to classify different experiences, from the late 1980s onward, in order to be able to identify diasporic processes beyond the unique and restrictive Jewish case, the Greek, Chinese Indian, and African ones served to establish a typology, along with the former. As Robin Cohen (1997) describes, diasporas were classified as victim, imperial/colonial, trade, or labor diasporas, according to the main motives that generated original migration—namely, expulsion, expansion, commerce, or work. Other examples, fitting into such types, demonstrated the transhistorical relevance of such a classification. For instance, the Armenian exile in Europe, British thalassocratic empire, Lebanese trading posts in Africa and Latin America, and Moroccan cheap labor settlements in Western Europe.

Other typologies, departing from functionalist views, emphasize historical or political factors. Thus, according to Gabriel Sheffer (2003), they mention traditional/historical (Jewish, Greek, Phoenician), dormant (American/U.S.), incipient (Russian, post-Soviet), stateless (Palestinian, Roma/gypsy), and state-linked (Mexico, China) diasporas. Such classifications assume that diasporas are unstable social bodies whose morphology can change over time, passing from one category to another. This evolutionary and flexible approach shows that, if diasporas have indeed existed since ancient times, some have formed, others have disappeared, but even more have been recently created.

Most of the scholars converge on the fact that massive population moves since the middle of the 19th century have generated multiple diasporas that became especially visible in the late 20th century. As a world map of the impact of migrations would show, durable expatriate communities have been established around the globe. The question that arises is, Do these settlements share enough common points to be all denominated diasporas? The issue of criteria divides the academic community. Some scholars insist on permanence (of the settlements), others on internal community organization, on the contrast with or exclusion from host societies, on social composition of expatriate communities, on the modes of communication between these, on the number of dispersed units, or on the will to come back to the place of origin, and so on. According to the evidence they collected, they argue that one or several of these criteria will prevail over the others and define a true diaspora.

Political Significance
The minimal feature of diasporas is, in fact, the dispersion from a common origin. This origin may be partly mythical or purely symbolic, as in the case of the Black/African diaspora, whose collective identity resides more in a sociocultural experience of suffering (based on a history of exploitation) than in an actual relationship (Stéphane Dufoix, 2003). However, most of the diasporas have kept
relationship with the place of origin and among the scattered groups themselves. As Georges Prévélakis (1996) notes, the network structure that links the different parts is therefore a general feature. According to Sheffer (2003) and William Berthomière and Christine Chivallon (2006), because the origins of recent diasporas are existing or potential nation-states, some authors qualify these as ethno-national diasporas to explicitly distinguish them from transnational networks in general that have developed in the context of globalization. In that sense, diasporas appear as transborder extensions of nation-states and deter- ritorialized countries’ populations, in an increasingly normal pattern.

Today’s estimate is that almost 1 out of 10 human beings is living in a diasporic situation (between 400 and 600 million). The number of individuals with dual citizenship has exploded in a short period of time. In Latin America alone, from 4 countries allowing it in the 1980s, the number had reached 10 by early 2000 (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay; see Michael Jones-Correa, 2001).

Surveys show that dozens of countries today have set up organizations, institutions, procedures, and devices of all sorts to reach and capitalize on their expatriates. Financial remittances of migrants (not only first generation) have gone up to several hundred billion dollars per year and are increasingly channeled for productive collective projects, not just for individual consumption purposes. Social remittances such as technology transfers, information or knowledge exchanges, organizational/management norms, or democratic values transmission are also mentioned as positive inputs for development in home countries. Migrants’ and expatriates’ associations are burgeoning in many host countries.

The emerging interest of diaspora populations in their countries of origin leads host countries to worry about whether diaspora populations may manipulate or exploit them. These host countries fear a fifth column operating against national interest or suspicious ethnic networks involved in delinquent or terrorist activities. However, the host countries’ approach is generally favorable to diasporas and supportive of their organizations. They consider that it is easier to control migrant groups through these organizations than to deal with amorphous and heterogeneous populations without proper representation. At the same time, cooperation through diaspora groups creates all sorts of opportunities abroad for the receiving nations.

Cooperation, however, cannot be taken for granted. In a number of cases, diasporas come from origin countries where their members are not welcome and where free circulation is limited, making cooperation impossible. On the other side, xenophobia and a reluctance to accept foreign people have not disappeared and can spread in crisis situations. Diasporic conditions in a nation-state system remain submitted to territorial legislations and decision making, which may limit their initiatives.

**Future Perspectives**

The diaspora may sometimes appear as a step toward a postnational system of governance, as a transition to a cosmopolitan regime. The fact that nation-states are no longer contiguous, but rather expand in networks in which national boundaries overlap, does change the landscape of international relations. So far, it seems that this generally does not bring problems. The fear that double citizenship, for instance, would create a conflict of loyalty between the local/host government and the country of origin has not materialized. The reason is simply that the probability of irremediable antagonism between both poles of migration is extremely low. When it happened in the past, in exceptional cases, expatriates tended to identify with the country where they live, work, and raise children. Generally speaking, today, individuals and groups from the diaspora combine identities, feeling that they belong to both home and host countries and that they can mix both easily in their daily life in a nonexclusive and productive manner.

Today, many people claim to be living in a diaspora, to be part of a minority, or to have ancestors from a different ethnic group. Contrary to former pessimistic views, they attach a positive value to this as if it added a premium of identity, rather than a negative stigmatization. The present-day mobility of individuals no longer means an experience of being uprooted and immersed in a foreign world; rather, it is seen as the ability to keep in touch with relatives and contacts abroad/at home and to remain connected to cultural, cognitive, and
symbolic values of remote places. Information and communication technologies have obviously facilitated this new proximity, but host countries’ evolution from a homogeneous conception of citizenship toward more pluralistic, multiethnic approaches is also crucial. Today, more than in the past, political, and socioeconomic integration may be dissociated from cultural and relational assimilation.

Some authors consider this as a postmodern condition in which individuals have multiple and fragmented identities that the diaspora would be reflective of. There are indeed strong examples of hybridization through the diaspora—for instance, expatriate engineers and information scientists joining associations of Asian natives in North America to promote their mutual interests and careers through social networking. Ethnic background thus becomes a means for achieving economic goals in a foreign environment, with an individual’s multifaceted affiliation serving as a professional advantage. In that sense, the very term ethno-national diasporas may be restrictive, today, as it reduces the expatriates groupings to a single dimension. A social-constructivist approach, in which identity building results from local interactions and interests, articulated with larger determinants through network-operated negotiations, is appropriate. Identities are thus no longer petrified in macrosocial categories, but neither have they vanished in an atomistic world.

In such a situation, the nation-state still remains sovereign. According to Sheffer (2003), until now, there has been no case in which the diaspora has imposed its own decisions on the country of origin, even though there have been many effective interventions of expatriates (e.g., the struggles for democratisation in South Africa and Eastern Europe in the 1990s). At the opposite end, direct and decisive involvement in nation-states has been seen in the actions of the former Soviet Union toward incipient Russian diasporas. This reminds us that new actors and relations, such as diasporas, may be translated and interpreted in traditional politics, where irredentism might be perceived again as a source of problems, in a purely realistic approach to international relations.

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See also Constructivism in International Relations; Globalization; Identity, Social and Political; Migration; Networks; Postmodernism in International Relations

Further Readings

Dictatorship

A dictatorship is a form of government in which a person or a group has absolute power, unlimited by constitution or other laws and not based on traditional legitimacy. The meaning of the term, and the content of the phenomenon itself, has changed over time. In political science, the study of dictatorship constitutes an important subject. Understanding it is vital for comparative politics and for the study of new democracies that emerged from the ashes of former dictatorial regimes. This entry first describes the history of dictatorships and reviews the major typologies used to classify them. It then discusses the causes of dictatorships and the various ways in which they have been ended.

History

The term dictator was used for the first time in ancient Rome. In times of calamities, consuls, on the recommendation of the Senate confirmed by the popular assembly (comitia curiata), appointed a dictator (with the title of magister populi) from among former consuls. Such dictators had unlimited power (imperium summum) for a limited
period of 6 months. A dictator was first appointed in 501 BCE. In the 1st century BCE, the institution changed its character; under the dictators Lucius Cornelius Sulla (82–79 BCE) and Gaius Julius Caesar (49–44 BCE), dictatorship became the permanent rule of powerful individuals. After the abolishment of the Republic in 33 BCE, the Roman Empire became an early version of military dictatorship with the Praetorian Guard holding effective power to appoint and overthrow the emperors. Late Roman praetorianism became a prototype for the military dictatorship in modern times. The collapse of the Roman Empire resulted in the disappearance of the dictatorial system for more than 12 centuries.

The concept of dictatorship appeared in political thought in the 16th century. Niccolò Machiavelli, in the 34th chapter of Discourses, criticized the Roman dictatorship for having led to tyranny, but he advocated the idea of a dictator ruling by the will of the people to bring unity and freedom to Italy. Jean Bodin used the term dictatorship to define sovereignty, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau defined dictatorship as a system suspending the legitimate government.

Early-modern dictatorships were the result of revolutions, which abolished the monarchy but were unable to establish stable democratic governments. The rule of Oliver Cromwell in England (1649–1658) and Napoleon Bonaparte in France (1799–1814) are the best known examples of successful military commanders becoming absolute rulers due to the weakness of the democratic institutions in their respective countries and the support of the armed forces under their command. Following the national revolutions in Latin America in the early 19th century, dictatorial systems headed by military commanders (caudillos) were established, and in many countries of the region, they became the dominant pattern of government until the second half of the 20th century.

Europe faced the strongest wave of dictatorships in the first half of the 20th century. The Russian Revolution of 1917 resulted in the establishment of the first dictatorship of the Communist Party. Its ideological justification was based on the Marxist concept of the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” coined by Karl Marx but redefined by Vladimir Lenin. According to the Leninist doctrine, during the long process of constructing the communist society, power should be concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party, defined as the avant-garde of the working class.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the establishment of a secular one-party regime in Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

During the interwar period (1918–1939) in all newly independent states of Central Europe with the exception of Czechoslovakia, democratic governments were overthrown and dictatorships, mostly military, were established. In 1922, the fascist party of Benito Mussolini seized power in Italy; in 1926, a dictatorial regime was established in Portugal; and in 1933, the National Socialist Workers Party of Germany (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, or NSDAP) headed by Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany. After winning the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), the military under Francesco Franco established a dictatorial system based on a coalition of the military, the Roman Catholic Church, and the fascist party Falange. On the eve of World War II, the majority of European states were ruled by dictatorial regimes. The Japanese military established their de facto power behind the facade of the absolute rule of the emperor.

World War II resulted in the defeat of dictatorial regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan, opening the road to the democratization of those three countries. In East-Central Europe and North Korea, however, the hegemony of the Soviet Union resulted in the establishment of dictatorial rules of the communist parties. In later years, communist dictatorships have been established through revolutions and wars for independence in China (1949), Cuba (1959), Vietnam (1954 in the North and 1975 in the whole country), and Cambodia (1975). In Western Europe prewar dictatorships survived only in Portugal (until 1974) and Spain (until 1975). In Greece, the military established dictatorship in 1967, only to abdicate its power in 1974 after the abortive attempt to incorporate Cyprus.

The process of decolonization produced several dictatorial regimes in the new states of Africa where the democratic governments established by the departing colonial powers proved to be weak and inefficient. The same process took place in some newly independent states of Asia (Pakistan,
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Burma, and South Korea). In the Arab countries of North Africa and the Middle East, nationalistic dictators came to power following the pattern of the Egyptian revolution of 1952. As the result of these processes, in the early 1970s, dictatorships of various types ruled over more than half of the world population. Of the 122 states with more than 1 million inhabitants, only 30 (24.6%) were democracies in the 1970s (data from Freedom House definition with regard to civil and political rights). Democratic governments survived in Western Europe, North America, and Australia and in a few other states.

The retreat of dictatorship began during the 20 years of the third wave of democratization (1974–1995). Between 1974 and 1975, Portugal, Greece, and Spain abolished dictatorships. In the 1980s, democracy was reestablished in most of the Latin American states, and in 1989, the process of democratization started in the communist states of East-Central Europe, followed by the abolishment of the communist rule and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, there were also democratic changes in some countries of Africa and Asia. The net result of the third wave of democratization was the reduction in the number of dictatorial regimes. In 2008, according to the Economic Intelligence Unit, dictatorial regimes survived only in 51 (30.5%) states with 34.9% of the world population. The largest and most powerful contemporary dictatorship is the rule of the People’s Republic of China by the Communist Party of China. Communist dictatorships survived also in North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba. In some post-Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), authoritarian rule substituted for the former communist dictatorship. Dictatorships survived also in several countries of Africa and Asia.

Typologies

Modern dictatorships differ in their political form, social content, and ideological orientation.

Political Form

As far as the political form of dictatorship is concerned, the most important distinction introduced in the early 1950s, mostly by scholars such as Hannah Arendt, Carl J. Friedrich, Karl Wittfogel, and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, was between totalitarianism and other forms of dictatorship. Later, Juan J. Linz and Leonardo Morlino developed this typology by comparing totalitarian and authoritarian types of dictatorship. According to them, totalitarian dictatorship differs from other forms of dictatorial rule by the existence of the “totalitarian syndrome” composed of

1. an ideology professing the total transformation of social relations,
2. the rule of a single party opposition to which is illegal,
3. state monopoly of the means of violence and of the media,
4. state control of the economy, and
5. police terror.

Two of the most important forms of totalitarian dictatorship have been fascism and Nazism on one hand and communism on the other. Authoritarian regimes make up a more diversified category, with military dictatorships being the most common but not the only form of such a system. They also tend to be less stable than totalitarian regimes.

A different typology related to the political form of dictatorship focuses on who holds power in a dictatorial regime. From this perspective, dictatorships can be divided into three main categories: personalistic, military, and party dictatorships.

Personalistic dictatorship is characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of the supreme leader who dominates the institutions. Totalitarian dictatorship took this form under powerful leaders such as Hitler, Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Fidel Castro, who dominated the political institutions. Military regimes based on the domination of armed forces were the most common form of dictatorship in the 19th century, particularly in Latin America. Military dictatorships in the early 21st century include those in Myanmar (Burma), Fiji, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, Mauritania, and Syria, as well as authoritarian regimes established by military coups (in Egypt, Tunisia). Party dictatorships have had two main forms: totalitarian (fascist, Nazi, and
communist) and non-totalitarian (Turkey 1923–1945, Mexico 1929–1977). Some communist dictatorships (Yugoslavia after 1949, Poland after 1956) lost their totalitarian character, remaining authoritarian versions of party dictatorship. There have been several dictatorships based on a mixture of military, party, and bureaucratic characteristics.

The German political writer Carl Schmitt introduced a third typology that distinguished between two main types of dictatorship based on the political form of dictatorship: commissarial and sovereign. The first is established to restore order so that the existing constitution can function normally, while the latter abrogates the existing constitution to establish a new political order.

Social Content

A typology based on the relation between the dictatorship and the social structure distinguishes between three types of dictatorial rule: conservative, modernizing, and counterrevolutionary. The conservative dictatorship serves the interests of the dominant social classes and defends the existing social order. A peculiar version of the conservative dictatorship, subordinated to the Islamic clergy and devoted to the preservation of religious values, was established in Iran in 1979 and in Afghanistan in 1992. The modernizing dictatorial regimes attempt to reform the society from above, sometimes with the support of the underprivileged strata of the society. The counterrevolutionary dictatorship came to power as the result of a successful use of force in defense of the interests of the privileged strata endangered by the radical reforms of a modernizing government. The great majority of the military dictatorships belong to the conservative category, but some have been modernizing regimes (e.g., Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Pasha, 1923–1938; Egypt under Abdel Nasser, 1952–1970; and Argentina under Juan Perón, 1945–1955). Spain under Francisco Franco (1936–1975) and Chile under Augusto Pinochet (1973–1989) are classic cases of counterrevolutionary dictatorships. They were established by military coups to undo the socialist reforms carried out by democratically elected governments. With the passing of time, the social role of the dictatorship often changes, with the regime becoming more the guardian of the vested interests of the ruling elite rather than a champion of social change. Such change took place in the communist regimes.

Ideological Orientation

Typology based on the relation between the regime and ideology distinguishes between ideological and pragmatic dictatorships. In addition to totalitarian dictatorships, which have been ideological by definition, there have been some other ideological dictatorships, but most dictatorial regimes are based rather on vaguely defined ideas, such as the national interest or the political legacy of the founder of the regime (e.g., Kemalism in Turkey, Peronism in Argentina), than on more articulated ideologies. In addition to communism, fascism, and Nazism, which were the ideologies of the totalitarian regimes, religious ideologies and nationalism have been the most frequent types of justification for modern dictatorships. Spanish and Portuguese dictatorships relied on Roman Catholicism as the ideological rationale of the regime, while Islam has been the ideological base of dictatorships in several countries in the Muslim world, particularly in Iran since 1979 and in Afghanistan from 1992 to 2001.

Causes and Mechanisms of Dictatorship

Explanations of the emergence and survival of dictatorships refer to (a) political and societal conditions that make it possible to abolish the existing system and to establish a dictatorship, (b) motivations of the principal actors, and (c) techniques employed by the architects of dictatorships.

Political and Social Causes

The main political cause of dictatorships is the weakness of the former regime. Such a political situation results from a variety of causes, such as (a) the weakness of traditional monarchy, no longer commanding the loyalty of its subjects; (b) weakness, ineffectiveness, and corruption of the democratic governments combined with the lack of democratic mechanisms to change such a situation; (c) the lack or weakness of democratic political culture, both at the elite and at the mass level; (d) humiliation and frustration caused by the defeat in a war; and (e) imposition of a dictatorial
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regime by the hegemonic power (as was the case in most of the Communist dictatorships in East-Central Europe after World War II). Social causes of dictatorship, often combined with the political ones, include the following: (a) sharp social conflicts endangering the existing social and economic system, (b) economic crisis resulting in a drastic deterioration of the standard of life of the large part of the society, and (c) the emergence of a large number of people (mostly young males) who have lost, or never gained, a stable place in the social structure and are likely to become foot soldiers of a movement to establish dictatorship.

Motivations

Motivations to establish a dictatorship include ideological or religious beliefs, frustration with the existing political and/or economic situation and the feeling that extraordinary means are necessary to save the state, group interests (particularly the corporate interests of the military), and the personal ambitions of a strong leader.

Techniques

In most cases, techniques of the establishment of a dictatorial regime are based on the use of force, particularly military force. Such a coup takes various forms: from the threat to use force (pronunciamiento in Latin American terminology) through the forceful removal of the existing government to a prolonged civil war. In the first two cases, cohesion of the forces supporting the coup is crucial for its success. In the case of a civil war, its result depends on a number of military and nonmilitary factors, particularly on the ability to win the support of a considerable part of the population.

Newly established dictatorships often seek a degree of legitimacy. Some rely on plebiscites in which citizens ratify the results of the coup. Napoleon Bonaparte first introduced the plebiscitary form of legitimating a dictatorship. Some regimes use a version of noncompetitive (plebiscitary) election to gain a degree of legitimization. Mass propaganda campaigns, sometimes with direct participation of the dictator, serve also to legitimize the regime. The effectiveness of such campaigns varies. Some dictatorships have been able to obtain a strong, albeit nondemocratic, mandate, while others are forced to rely mostly on naked coercion.

Dictatorships differ in the degree to which they use coercion. The common characteristic of dictatorships is that all of them use coercion to suppress opposition and/or to achieve other goals. However, the degree and nature of coercion vary.

In their formative stage, all dictatorial regimes tend to use repression against real or alleged enemies, but the intensity of such repression varies. Thousands of republicans were killed after the Spanish Civil War, and more than 3,000 supporters of the overthrown government were exterminated by the Chilean military after the coup of 1973. There were, however, relatively benign dictatorships, which used coercion rarely and tolerated independent political activities, which were severely punished in other dictatorships (Poland after the military coup of 1926). In most cases, the prolonged existence of the dictatorships leads to the reduction of the intensity of coercion and, in many cases, to the gradual liberalization of the regime. However, even in a relatively benign dictatorship, the state of human rights departs significantly from the democratic standards.

Extrication From Dictatorship

The great majority of modern dictatorships have existed for relatively short periods of time, usually less than 2 decades. Authoritarian dictatorships in Portugal (1926–1974) and Spain (1936–1975) were exceptionally durable. In Egypt after the 1952 military coup, the problem of succession in an authoritarian dictatorship was twice resolved by the orderly access to power of former vice presidents, Anwar Sadat in 1970 and Hosni Mubarak in 1981, following the death of their predecessors; however, Mubarak’s regime was overthrown in 2011. Communist dictatorships lasted much longer than most of the noncommunist dictatorial regimes. The Soviet system survived 74 years and the communist regimes in East-Central Europe for more than 40 years. The still existing communist dictatorships in China, Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam belong to the oldest dictatorial regimes in the contemporary world. Even they, however, are much younger than old democracies, which function successfully for many generations, in some cases for more than 2 centuries (the United Kingdom
The relative instability of dictatorships results from several structural weaknesses. Dictatorships usually have problems in establishing secure mechanisms of succession. This is particularly true in personalistic dictatorships since as long as the supreme leader is alive nobody is allowed to become the official successor. Selection of competent functionaries is difficult because political loyalty is considered more important than professionalism. Dictatorships also have problems with handling popular dissatisfaction. Since there are few possibilities of legal expression of protest, dissatisfaction leads to alienation from the regime and to spontaneous outbursts. When the level of such dissatisfaction is too high, naked force is not enough to secure the survival of the regime. After World War II, the international environment made it more difficult to maintain dictatorial systems of government in those parts of the world where the influence of the democratic powers were the strongest.

There have been several ways of extrication from dictatorships. Not all of them, however, were fully successful in the sense of establishing stable democracies. In several cases, departure from a dictatorial system led to establishment of another dictatorship. In some others, the result was unstable democracy or even anarchy and the collapse of state power.

The main patterns of extrication from dictatorship are (a) defeat in war and foreign occupation, (b) revolution or a coup, (c) democratization of the regime from above with or without negotiations with the opposition, and (d) capitulation caused by a major setback for the existing regime.

**Military Defeat and Foreign Occupation**

Some dictatorships have been abolished as a consequence of the war lost. Napoleon Bonaparte lost power after his defeat in the anti-Napoleonic Wars of Liberation (1813–1814). Several European dictatorships, including the German and Italian ones, as well as the military rule in Japan, were destroyed as a consequence of World War II. The dictatorship of the Red Khmers in Cambodia was removed from power by the invading army of Vietnam in 1978. In Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003, dictatorial regimes were removed by the military intervention of the United States and its allies. The removal of a dictatorship by foreign forces opens the door for the construction of a democratic system under temporary foreign protectorate, in some cases lasting several years. Not always, however, was the process as successful as it had been in Germany, Italy, and Japan.

**Revolution or Coup**

Sometimes dictatorships are overthrown by a revolution or by a military coup. Such cases were few, due to the effective use of force by the dictatorial regimes and the relative weakness of their opponents. The instances of successful revolutions launched against the dictatorship regimes were Cuba in 1959 and Portugal in 1974. Originally, a popular revolt in Hungary in 1956 managed almost to destroy the communist dictatorship, but soon it was crushed by the military intervention of the Soviet Union. Only in one case—Romania in 1989—a communist dictatorship has been overthrown by popular reform, supported by the armed forces. Revolts and coups often result in one dictatorship being substituted by another. In several African states, dictators were overthrown by armed rebels who then established their own dictatorial rule. In some Latin American states (e.g., Argentina in 1955), the military removed dictators only to establish their own rule.

**Democratization**

In several cases, dictatorships have been abolished through a process of democratization initiated by the reform-oriented wing of the existing regime, with or without cooperation with the moderate wing of the opposition. In Turkey, the ruling party initiated the democratization in 1945 by permitting the formation of opposition and by introducing competitive elections. Brazilian democratization from above (abertura, a Portuguese term that means “opening,” used to describe Brazil’s transition from military to elected government) began in the second half of the 1970s and resulted in full return to democracy in about 10 years. A similar process took place in Mexico where the new law of 1977 opened possibilities for electoral competition between the ruling party and the opposition and in the Republic of Korea in the last years of the 20th
century. In Spain, after the death of General Franco in 1975, King Juan Carlos opened the process of negotiations with the (then illegal) opposition, which resulted in restoration of democracy in few years. In Poland in 1989 and in Hungary in 1990, negotiations between the ruling communist parties and the opposition led to competitive elections and to restoration of democracy. Similar processes of democratization from above took place in some republics of former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia) as well as in Bulgaria, Albania, and Mongolia. In the Soviet Union, democratic reforms were initiated by the last leader of the Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, in the second half of the 1980s and resulted in the collapse of the communist system in 1991.

Capitulation
Abdication of a dictatorial regime takes place when a serious external fiasco or a peaceful mass protest makes the status quo untenable. In Greece, the military government abdicated its power after it had provoked an international crisis over a failed attempt to incorporate Cyprus in 1974, and in Argentina, the military rulers gave up their power after the humiliating defeat in the short war with the UK over the Falkland Islands in 1983. The authoritarian regime in Philippines collapsed in 1986 as the result of mass protests, supported by the Roman Catholic Church and the armed forces. Communist governments in Czechoslovakia and in the German Democratic Republic capitulated in late 1989 when they had been confronted with mass protests and were unable to suppress the protest due to the lack of Soviet support.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Democracy, Types of; Democratization; Hybrid Regimes; Totalitarianism; Transition

Further Readings

Diplomacy
In its broadest sense, diplomacy refers to the conduct of human affairs by peaceful means, employing techniques of persuasion and negotiation. In the more specific sphere of international politics, through the utilization of such techniques, it has come to be regarded as one of the key processes characterizing the international system and a defining institution of the system of sovereign states—often referred to as the “Westphalian” system after the 1684 Peace of Westphalia. Its usage, however, embraces some important distinctions. First, at the state level, it has frequently been used (particularly in studies of diplomatic history) as a synonym for foreign policy—as in “Russian,” “German,” and “Japanese” diplomacy (foreign policy). More commonly, however, it is used to refer to one means by which such policies are implemented. Second, viewed as an institution of the international system, a distinction can be made between diplomacy as a set of processes and as a set of structures through which these processes are conducted. Debates about the continuing utility of diplomacy in contemporary international politics frequently reflect confusion between these meanings. In the course of the following discussion, the
origins of diplomacy are outlined, together with differing analytical approaches to its nature and significance as a feature of international politics. The changing nature of diplomatic processes is then discussed, followed by an examination of the evolution of the structures through which diplomacy has been conducted at both the state and international levels.

**Theoretical Approaches**

While the study of diplomacy has a long and honorable tradition dating back to Machiavellian thought, it is only in recent years that diplomatic practice has started to receive detailed theoretical attention. There is a notable absence of conscious theorizing in much of the scholarship on diplomacy. Instead, the bulk of the scholarship offers detailed historical accounts of diplomatic events (diplomatic history) as well as texts on diplomatic practice. Most scholars of diplomacy implicitly choose from a very narrow range of analytical frameworks drawn almost exclusively from the realist tradition in international relations (IR). As a consequence, the orthodox study of diplomacy has been marked by a remarkably unified theoretical approach—something quite unique in political science. There is a surprising ontological consensus about what diplomacy is and who the diplomats are. This consensus arises from the dominant influence of rationalist thinking. The upshot of this dominance is that the range of the scholarship in a majority of studies of diplomacy tends to be limited to analysis of the international realm of sovereign states in the context of high politics. There is little enthusiasm among mainstream scholars to explore the diplomatic world beyond interstate relations or low politics and that relating to the nonpolitical. This is now changing. There is a growing body of work interested in diplomacy not simply as a foreign policy tool of states but as a means of connecting cultures, polities, economies, and societies. This section aims to highlight briefly the orthodox and unorthodox approaches to the study of diplomacy.

**Diplomacy and Realism**

The realist core of orthodox approaches to diplomacy is undisputed and is clearly evident in a number of key features found in this prevailing approach. The most telling is the focus on the sovereign state as the primary unit of analysis in diplomacy such that the study of diplomacy is confined to the study of the process and content of interstate relations—that is, how sovereign states seek to engage with each other. Prevailing models of diplomacy focus almost exclusively on singular state-to-state relations. The orthodoxy defines diplomacy as processes of communication, negotiation, and information sharing among sovereign states. Diplomatic processes revolve around the activities of professional diplomats—that is, officials of foreign ministries and overseas missions. More common, especially in North American scholarship, is the narrower definition of diplomacy as a foreign policy tool of states—that is, diplomacy as statecraft. This more limited definition has led to a great deal of foreign policy analysis passing itself off as diplomatic studies, despite the fact that it does not consider the processes of interstate relations as its main focus. Both definitions, however, share the view that diplomacy has an ordering role to play in the otherwise anarchic and unstable international system of states—a view that has theoretical roots in realism. Successful diplomacy, it is argued, creates a system of states. It constructs balances of power, facilitates hegemonic structures, and fashions post-hegemonic regimes. When diplomacy fails or is absent, conflict and war usually follow. Indeed, it is the very fact of conflict between states (a core realist assumption) that warrants the emergence of diplomatic systems.

**Beyond Realism**

In recent years, however, there have been significant conceptual shifts in the study of diplomacy, and as a result, those studying diplomacy are able to choose from a wider range of analytical approaches. The customary view of what the proper study of diplomacy entails is now contested by scholars who apply analytical strategies drawn from constructivist, postmodern, and critical IR theory to draw attention to the necessity of understanding IR—and diplomacy—beyond the state and the international state system. As a consequence, the study of diplomacy has stepped outside the narrow state-centric security nexus into a
world of diplomacy that is more varied but also more difficult to specify. It is perhaps this lack of specificity in what is being analyzed, and why, that explains why unorthodox approaches continue to be marginalized.

Unorthodox approaches are analytically diverse, yet they share a key point of departure from orthodox approaches—a refusal to accept the state as the exclusive unit of diplomatic analysis. Diplomacy is seen as a more open-ended process where diplomatic agency includes not only the state but also a range of nonstate actors such that a sociological concept of diplomacy emerges where diplomacy possesses economic, cultural, social, as well as political forms and functions. A common theme within these approaches is, therefore, the problematic core idea of the foreign ministry and its overseas missions as the sole agent of diplomacy. Unorthodox approaches suggest that the proper terrain of the study of diplomacy includes, and extends beyond, foreign ministries, overseas missions, and the state officials that work in these government institutions and international organizations to potentially include diplomatic networks largely drawn from all sections of domestic and international society covering any number of issues from the environment and e-commerce to avian flu and land mines. An important implication of this is that diplomacy has many modes, including conventional interstate relations, non-conventional intercultural relations or commercial relations, and modes that mix the two. Moreover, the study of diplomacy entails the rejection of the simple reproduction of the status quo of interstate power relations (described as antidiplomacy) at the heart of orthodox studies of diplomacy and, in the case of postmodern approaches, the production of the concept of “otherness,” which, it is claimed, is the core of all diplomatic modes. In this sense, the world of diplomacy is characterized not by the commonality of the material and security interests of states but by differences—different interests, diverse cultures, and varied identities.

While orthodox approaches import analytical tools from realist IR to develop concepts such as summit diplomacy, bilateral diplomacy, and multilateral diplomacy, unorthodox approaches, by contrast, import analytical tools from other social science fields such as political economy, business and management studies, philosophy, theology, sociology, and anthropology to explore diplomatic practice. As a result, new concepts of diplomacy such as catalytic diplomacy, network diplomacy, sustainable diplomacy, and multi-stakeholder diplomacy have been developed to provide analytical means to explain the contemporary diplomatic practice in ways that draw attention to the different interests, cultures, and identities represented by state and nonstate actors and the varied modes of diplomacy that emerge with the dual engagement of this “otherness.” These new concepts also draw attention to the changing character of contemporary diplomatic forms, sometimes casting doubt on the notion of the progressive development of diplomatic systems found in traditional approaches to diplomacy. In sum, unorthodox approaches to diplomacy do not always tie diplomatic practice to the state or to the problem of anarchy. Instead, diplomacy is seen as a means of connecting individuals, groups, societies, economies, and states to build and manage social relations in domestic and systemic environments. By moving beyond traditional realism, unorthodox approaches to the study of diplomacy have promoted greater theoretical reflection and created an intellectual multiplicity in the analysis of diplomatic practices, modes, and processes. It is to these practices, modes, and processes that we now turn.

The Emergence and Development of Diplomacy

As the above discussion of the theories of diplomacy indicates, those who study diplomacy remain divided over whether it is essentially a state-based set of political processes or whether it is a set of network-based political processes. Those who maintain that diplomacy is primarily the pursuit of the foreign policy interests of the state in the international system of states argue that diplomacy is confined to a quite narrow set of bilateral and multilateral processes of communication, representation, and mediation focused on the foreign ministry and its overseas missions. Diplomatic processes continue to exhibit some regularity so that functions, institutions, codes, conventions, and cultures of diplomacy are marked by continuity and marginal change and so that diplomatic rules and norms continue to hold in the future. The
obvious casualty in this approach is any in-depth analysis of change in diplomatic structures and processes. By contrast, those who conceptualize diplomacy outside state-centric framework, tend to emphasize continual change in the conduct and context of diplomacy. The principle objective of network-based approaches is to highlight and analyze the challenges posed to diplomacy by contemporary changes in the international system. Scholars turn to issues of globalization and regionalization to emphasize the increasingly complex social, economic, and political context of diplomacy (at domestic, regional, and international levels). For these scholars, change and transformation in diplomatic processes and structures is the central concern of analysis, and in this frame, diplomacy is seen to have both formal and informal structures. Diplomatic processes are network based and draw in a range of public and private actors; there is an absence of agreed rules and norms of diplomatic engagement such that new codes and conventions are emerging or in need of development. In short, diplomacy, in terms of both the varying processes through which it is effected and the machinery through which it is conducted, is a closely linked phenomenon that is the subject of differing interpretations. We will now examine how these have developed in response to changes in both domestic and international environments.

The Origins of Diplomacy

The origins and development of diplomacy are frequently equated with that of the European system of states. In this view, it is associated with the system of states that emerged and consolidated its forms and practices in the wake of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia marking the end of the Thirty Years’ War. However, diplomacy and its institutions have a much longer, and more complex, pedigree and have been identified as existing in some of the earliest human societies. Rather than being associated with a specific historical era, diplomacy has been seen as a response to a set of needs and requirements—namely, the mediation of separateness between communities and the desire and need to establish modes of communication between them. Thus, the earliest documents recording what we would now regard as formalized diplomatic practices are to be found in approximately 2500 BCE in what is now the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, and one of the most familiar features of contemporary diplomacy—namely, the practice of using resident ambassadors—predates its usage in the modern European context by some 3,000 years. Elements of diplomacy and diplomatic institutions can be identified in a variety of international systems, including those of Greece, Rome, and China, but none of these possessed what has come to be regarded as the key characteristics of a fully fledged diplomatic system—namely, effective communication, a set of procedures and conventions governing patterns of communication, and a capacity to mediate between diverse cultures. In general terms, the development of diplomacy has been determined by the character of the societies that it has sought to mediate, the international environment, the available modes of communication, and the technologies that determined them.

Thus, in the European context, the medieval era witnessed the growth of diplomatic processes as international relationships became more complex and dense. But this occurred in a period when the sovereign state as we recognize it today had not emerged. Against a background in which universalist ideas represented by the concept of Christendom underpinned by the authority of the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire were a dominant reality, diplomacy was not yet associated with the state, involving diverse political units. Moreover, while rulers engaged in the sending of missions to one another, so too did other entities—commercial, ecclesiastical, and private—in the medieval landscape. Relative distance underscored by the difficulties of communication meant that the dispatch of diplomatic missions was infrequent, and their success marked by a high degree of uncertainty resulting from the hazards associated with medieval travel. Furthermore, the precise functions of the representative were circumscribed. In the early part of the Middle Ages, the most common diplomatic agent was the nuncius, whose function was to act as the mouthpiece of the principal on whose behalf he was acting and whose capacity to negotiate was nonexistent or strictly circumscribed. While this matched the requirements of the period in which it developed, the growing complexity of interactions marking the later Middle Ages required the use of officials (procurators) granted the ability to engage in negotiations. In short, while
we can see the beginnings of the European diplomatic environment, this was the pre-sovereign-state phase of diplomacy marked by quite fluid and flexible procedures representative of a period of major social, political, and economic change.

It was during the 15th and 16th centuries that a clear outline of the diplomatic system as it was to develop over the next 200 years became visible. By this time, the collapse of the universal concept of Christendom had been accompanied by the gradual emergence of the sovereign state. This not only required a greater capacity to communicate within a changing political and economic environment and thus the development of ways in which this could be effected but also provided enhanced domestic administrative resources necessary to its operations. It was in Northern Italy that the earliest manifestations of this new phase of diplomacy were commonly identified. Here, an early form of what was to become the European system of states could be seen. Significant factors were the geographical proximity of the Italian city-states, their relative similarity in terms of power and thus an inability to exercise hegemonic power, and a shared cultural environment that facilitated communication.

**Modern Diplomacy**

Against this background, the practices of modern diplomacy were honed. In institutional terms, the key development was the growing utilization of the resident ambassador. As noted above, it was not that this practice was unknown in earlier periods but that diplomacy by mission for specific purposes was far more common, meeting the perceived requirements of the time. Again, it was a combination of political and social change and the consequent requirements imposed on diplomacy that underlay this development. In particular, while its ceremonial and symbolic functions remained significant, a growing need for the gathering of reliable and continuous information replaced the earlier emphasis on the exchange of messages. Gradually, the practices developed in this region of Europe were to spread across the continent and, subsequently, would be adopted as key principles for the conduct of diplomacy as the international system expanded beyond its shores.

These principles assumed several forms. On the one hand, as already seen, more regularized and permanent structures were deemed appropriate and necessary. During the ensuing centuries, the exchange of permanent representatives between national governments would become the norm of diplomatic intercourse as its structures and processes were aligned with the state. Consequently, the rules and norms of diplomacy were refined to support the diplomatic system through the consolidation of the principle of immunity for diplomats and the development of protocol—such as the rules of precedent—established at the 1815 Congress of Vienna and codified in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The growing importance attached to the practice of diplomacy is reflected in the numerous treatises on the necessary qualities required of the ambassador, notably in the writings of Bernard du Rosier, Philippe de Commynes, and François de Callières. Not only did these writings serve as diplomatic manuals for ambassadors, they reflected the ways in which diplomacy was adapting to the realities of a developing system of sovereign states. At the governmental level, enhanced importance was attached to the capacity to process the growing flow of intelligence generated by diplomatic networks. France, under Cardinal Richelieu, is credited with the creation of the first recognizable foreign ministry in the early 17th century and the gradual separation in the conduct of domestic and foreign policy. Thus, by the 18th century, the patterns of diplomacy at both the international and national levels had assumed the shape that would become a familiar feature of the international order in the ensuing centuries.

The 19th century witnessed the consolidation of these patterns but, at the same time, saw considerable change in response to developments at national and international levels. At the national level, the administrative apparatus for the conduct of diplomacy would become larger, more elaborate, and more professional. This not only reflected changes in the role and structure of the state and the consequent need for more sophisticated bureaucratic systems but also mirrored the growing complexity of foreign policy and the demands that this placed on national governments. The emergence of the modern state and the professionalization of bureaucracy affected foreign ministries, as did the profound social change. Although a gradual and uneven process, the image of diplomacy as the
preserve of the aristocracy was weakened as recruitment became less a matter of patronage and more a matter of talent. Across Europe, foreign ministries and their diplomatic services developed systems of recruitment, selection by means of examination, promotion by merit rather than patronage, and embryonic training programs. An early form of the latter was the creation of the Oriental Academy (later Consular Academy) established in the Hapsburg Empire in the mid-18th century. From a focus on language training, diplomatic education was to expand in scope to include aspects such as commercial diplomacy as international economic linkages developed. Despite the fact that diplomacy had begun to embrace the middle classes and to lose some of its aristocratic connotations, the ambience that the latter bestowed on it was slow to disappear, particularly in some European states. In France, for example, by the early 20th century, the diplomatic profession was dominated by the middle class, whereas in Germany, the nobility were a dominant presence. One factor that assisted this process of democratization was the recognition that diplomats could not be expected to finance their activities from their own resources, which had, at least in part, been a feature of past practice, and that unpaid attachés seeking an opening in diplomacy were no longer part of a professional service, hence the development of career structures and the grading of salaries, however meager these might be, alongside. Nevertheless, none of this was to take from diplomacy the air of exclusivity that, to a degree, it continues to possess and that came to be seen as a feature of what would be designated as the “old diplomacy.”

Many of the characteristic structures of the foreign ministry would also be established in this period. One of these was the distinction between geographical and functional organizational principles, the latter a recognition of the growing complexity of IR that cut across the division of the world into geographical regions. It would, however, be incorrect to assume that the foreign ministry was a focus of policy making. Much of its work was of a clerical-administrative nature with foreign policy being made at the political level with direct communications between a foreign minister and ambassadors. Moreover, despite later assertions on the part of foreign ministries that they had once been the gatekeeper between states and their international environments, it was not always the case that they enjoyed the privileged position that this implies. For some states, it was other departments—particularly those overseeing commercial relations—that were regarded as possessing greater functionality and prestige.

Developments at the national level went hand in hand with those at the international level. This was represented by the extension of the diplomatic network. By the latter part of the 19th century, all the great powers of Europe had exchanged missions, thus marking bilateral diplomatic relations conducted through permanent residential posts as the hallmark of the international diplomatic system. Furthermore, the practice had spread beyond European shores. Despite suspicions of, and a reluctance to engage in, what was often regarded as a manifestation of old world ills, the United States began to expand its diplomatic service during the 19th century. Elsewhere, countries as diverse as Japan, Persia, and Brazil would develop the makings of a diplomatic machinery at home and a diplomatic service overseas. But of particular significance was the gradual spread of European diplomatic norms—not least those relating to diplomatic privilege and immunities—of great significance as the international system became global in its scope during the 20th century.

Alongside these developments was the emergence of “conference” diplomacy heralding the growth of multilateral diplomacy in the ensuing decades. One manifestation of this was the short-lived “Congress System” following the end of the Napoleonic Wars, comprising sovereigns and chief ministers. Greater effects flowed from the creation of standing conferences of ambassadors in major capitals dealing with specific issues—such as that set up in London on the abolition of the slave trade after the Congress of Vienna. By the latter half of the century, technological developments, particularly in communications, had prompted recognition of the need for international cooperation in areas such as telegraphic (the International Telegraphic Union created in 1865) and postal (Universal Postal Union created in 1874) communications. This not only generated an awareness of the need for diplomatic activity in this area, it also brought with it two effects that would become themes for diplomatic change in later years. One
was the need for technical expertise in diplomacy, and the other was the gradual involvement of “domestic” departments in international negotiations, an early example of which was the representation of the Home Office in the British delegation to the 1910 International Aerial Navigation Conference. By the eve of the Great War, then, not only had the structures and processes of diplomacy assumed many of their modern forms, the challenges that they would confront in the coming decades were equally identifiable.

**Diplomacy in the 20th Century**

Developments in the 20th century posed just as many challenges to diplomacy as those in the previous century and indeed some developments were to exact a high price on the reputation and prestige of the diplomatic system and professional diplomats. The crisis of the Great War (1914–1918) was one such development, and it holds particular significance since it led to widespread condemnation of the old European-based diplomacy, which had not only failed to prevent war but also had, as many concluded, contributed to its outbreak. One key failing of diplomacy in this period was the abandonment of established diplomatic channels of communication by resident ambassadors in favor of more secretive diplomatic practices. Diplomacy quickly deteriorated into a closed system, where behind-the-scenes bilateralism and propaganda fed an appetite for the brutal pursuit of national interest in an atmosphere of mistrust and rivalry that the diplomats themselves had done much to create. The old diplomacy that emerged at the end of the 19th century had created the very problems that drove the European powers to all-out war within the first 2 decades of the following century, and condemnation of the old diplomacy quickly led to demands for a new, and more open, diplomatic system where diplomats could be held accountable to their executives.

European states’ response to these demands was almost universal. Across Europe, the semiautonomous resident ambassador was replaced by a centrally controlled system of overseas permanent missions. While bilateralism remained a core diplomatic process around these new permanent overseas missions, during the Great War period and in the following decade, multilateral diplomacy took off. A significant amount of intergovernmental diplomacy was now taking place outside the more established bilateral diplomatic structures and foreign ministries in the form of intergovernmental conferences of state leaders and other government ministers such as finance and trade. Multilateral diplomacy involving officials from departments across government became a key vehicle for allied cooperation during the war on issues such as food and munitions transportation, as well as intelligence sharing and military coordination.

Important and influential though it certainly was, the Great War did not exhaust the challenges that the so-called new diplomacy would face in the 20th century. Within just a few decades, the European-based diplomatic system would be both overhauled and expanded to other continents as the diplomatic system adapted to two open-ended developments: (1) the growing interdependence of states in the international system, which increased the demand for effective coordination of international cooperation in an ever-growing number of policy areas but especially in trade and finance, and (2) the onset of decolonization and independence that more than quadrupled the number of sovereign states in the international system by the end of the 20th century.

The Great Depression of the 1930s demonstrated very starkly the economic interdependence of states, and after the end of World War II, financial and trade integration intensified, creating demands on, as well as opportunities for, diplomats to coordinate international economic policy in bilateral, regional, and multilateral relationships. Indeed, the development of the Bretton Woods system created a number of powerful international economic organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade where diplomats would negotiate international trade policies and rules governing trade. Economic interdependence within regions led to a huge expansion in the number of regional organizations in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and eventually Africa and the Caribbean. The vast increase in the number of international organizations from around 40 at the beginning of the 20th century to almost 400 at its end is one of the most significant developments in IR during this period. These organizations would also present both opportunities for, and demands on, diplomacy to work in new institutional and
policy environments and to develop new diplomatic methods in, for example, multilateral bargaining. With the development of nuclear arms and the Cold War from the 1950s and international terrorism from the 1970s onward, strategic interdependence between states became worldwide. Diplomats would populate the increasing number of multilateral and regional strategic organizations from the United Nations Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact. Diplomats would quickly develop new diplomatic methods in, for example, coercive diplomacy, deterrence, and intelligence gathering, as well as management of new processes such as superpower summitry and international peacekeeping. The development of rapid mass communications in the 20th century linked domestic developments in one country directly with others, again creating opportunities for, and demands on, diplomats to develop new practices in order to influence political and policy developments in each others’ countries. These included public diplomacy. Interdependence essentially brought an international dimension to almost all aspects of policy and strategy such that the realm and content of diplomacy during the 20th century covered the entirety of world governance.

While interdependence between societies intensified and deepened as a result of globalization and regionalization processes throughout the 20th century, it was especially so in the latter decades as new technologies expedited and reduced communication and transportation costs. The pattern of IR would change dramatically during this period as transnational relations between nonstate actors developed and new global and regional actors from the private sector and civil society emerged and sought to influence policy and processes at all levels creating demands for open and accountable global and regional governance processes. These developments posed fundamental questions about the role and influence of the state—and hence diplomacy—relative to other actors in the system such as transnational business and global civil society. If the state was indeed in decline, then state-based diplomatic systems would, it seems, have decreasing utility.

These new patterns—whether viewed as the cause or response—went hand in hand with the development of linkage of increasingly complex and technical policy issues. Issues of interdependence, globalization, and regionalization raised practical matters crucial to the continued effective practice of diplomacy. How could the diplomat—a generalist by nature and by training—have sufficient grasp of such highly technical policy issues and how could the foreign ministry continue to manage policy issues that cut across several domestic department concerns?

At the same time that these pressures were raising questions about the effectiveness of the state and state-based diplomacy, the processes of decolonization and independence in the mid- and late 20th century highlighted the continued relevance of the state and the continuing appeal of European diplomatic institutions. Decolonization and independence of the colonial states and the former Soviet states increased the number of sovereign states in the international system and, almost without fail, each of the new states created diplomatic institutions in the image of the European model of a foreign ministry and system of overseas missions and permanent delegations. The expansion in the number of sovereign states raised questions about the diplomatic capacity of the new states, the impact a flush of new states would have on multilateral and regional diplomacy, and the development of bilateral diplomacy between the new states and the old states.

With the exception of India, which had for some time before independence in 1947 acquired a quasi-diplomatic system to represent itself in, for example, the League of Nations, most new states, and in particular African states, had very limited resources to spend on developing a European-style diplomatic system of an extensive network of overseas missions. Most relied on a handful of diplomats in key international organizations and key capitals, and it became common practice for diplomats from developing countries to provide diplomatic representation in multiple arenas. An African diplomat is often, for example, the permanent delegate to the UN as well as ambassador in Washington and Ottawa. Similarly, the ambassador for Tonga usually fills a number of posts: permanent delegate at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva and European Union (EU) in Brussels, as well as ambassador in London.
The extent of the newly developed states’ involvement in multilateral diplomacy was, inevitably, limited, at least until developing countries began to form strategic alliances such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 in the UN. Newly independent states also created their own intergovernmental organizations, such as the Organization for African Unity created in 1963, as a way of managing regional integration and security as well as building collective diplomatic strategies.

The arrival of many new states into the system raised strategic issues for the old states, since they did not always have, or wish to spend, the resources required to establish diplomatic representation in so many new countries. Internal debates ensued about how to keep costs down and retain effective coverage of key strategic countries and regions. Many European governments, for example, faced demands to reduce bilateral missions in European capitals in the wake of the development of very large permanent delegations to the EU.

**Contemporary Trends in Diplomacy**

Three broad trends in contemporary diplomacy are now evident: (1) **fragmentation**, as the conduct of diplomacy at the governmental level now involves government departments traditionally associated with purely “domestic” issues; (2) **concentration**, as the fusion of domestic and international politics has been accompanied by the expanding involvement of heads of government in international policy; and (3) **diffusion**, as professional diplomats have found themselves required to engage with a growing range of nongovernmental stakeholders in complex policy networks.

The first of these trends, fragmentation, came to be associated from the 1970s onward with the development of an expanded “foreign policy community”—that is, an expanding range of governmental agencies and a multiplicity of channels in the conduct of external relations supplementing and often challenging the role claimed by foreign ministries. One consequence of this has been a growing emphasis on the need for policy coordination at the national level, underpinned by recognition that an uncoordinated stance in international negotiations reflecting various bureaucratic interests has potential costs in terms of attainment of policy goals. This partly explains the trend toward concentration. Awareness of the potential costs of lack of bureaucratic and political coordination and politicization of international policy, combined with a growing international role for heads of government, have resulted in a tendency to centralize the conduct of diplomacy in, for example, prime ministerial and presidential offices. Additionally, the imperatives of coordination have resulted in the merging of departments in the quest for greater efficiency in the management of external relations, notably in the area of external trade relations. Hence, both Canada and Australia merged their foreign ministries and international trade departments during the 1980s.

The third trend, diffusion, reflects the fact that diplomatic processes have increasingly required the development of policy networks as complex policy issues demand that state-focused diplomacy is supplemented by linkages with civil society organizations and, in specific contexts, the business community. Part of this development mirrors the changing nature of international negotiation as it assumes the character of a management process marked by its technical qualities, complexity, uncertainty, and bureaucratization. In this context, diplomacy has become much more than the trading of concessions in pursuit of a negotiated settlement. Many contemporary negotiations, such as those in the area of the environment, involve processes of mutual learning and the creation and systematizing of new knowledge and mutual education among a group of interests, each of which has contributions to make to the management of policy issues. The impact of this can be seen not only in the growing engagement between actors at the national level but also in multilateral diplomatic environments. Stakeholder engagement has become a watchword in the majority of international organizations, from the UN to the World Bank and the WTO. Underpinning these developments at the national and international levels is the enhanced emphasis on public diplomacy from the late 1990s onward. But from being primarily concerned with image management, public diplomacy strategies are increasingly founded on an awareness that the routes of influence within the international system are changing and that shaping international policy outcomes demand strategies for influencing a much wider range of constituencies than those at
the governmental level. Consequently, by the early 21st century, public diplomacy had become one of the primary concerns of foreign ministries. One obvious manifestation of the awareness of the importance of engaging with an expanded audience at home and abroad has been the attention paid by foreign ministries to the use of the Internet and increasingly sophisticated and accessible Web sites. Recognition of the growing demand for interactive processes means that these ministries are now using social networking sites such as Facebook together with YouTube and Twitter to engage in a dialogue with audiences at home and overseas. Hesitant forays into the virtual world, Second Life, have begun. Sweden has established an embassy there and the U.S. State Department has sought to develop its public diplomacy strategies by using this resource to engage with bloggers in the Middle East.

Change has not been limited to the foreign ministry, however. The structure and operations of diplomatic services have undergone significant change, partly as a result of resource constraints but also due to the evolving international order itself. Here, the need to operate more economically has combined with an awareness that patterns of international representation have failed to keep pace with geopolitical and geoeconomic change. In the United States, the announcement by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice of the Transformational Diplomacy program was stimulated by these concerns. In addition to this, the impact of the twin processes of fragmentation and consolidation has meant that the overseas network of diplomatic posts is now regarded as representative of the entire governmental apparatus and not only of the foreign ministry. Indeed, in some diplomatic posts, the number of traditional diplomats is dwarfed by the presence of officials from a range of “domestic” government departments.

A further significant development is the revolution in communications and the role of the media in international policy. The adoption of e-mail and secure facsimile links between foreign ministries and overseas missions (contrary to the traditional arguments concerning the impact of enhanced communications on diplomacy) has allowed missions to play a more direct role in the policy processes. Simultaneously, the development of the electronic mass media creates pressure on governments to respond to events almost instantaneously and, at the same time, provides opportunities to project their policies to domestic and foreign audiences. Again, this has implications for the respective roles of foreign ministries and diplomats in the field. The enhanced speed of events can often assume as great an importance as the events themselves. Nowhere is this more evident than in natural and man-made disasters. The growing incidence of terrorist attacks and events such as the tsunami in 2004 has placed renewed emphasis on the consular dimension of diplomacy. The rise of mass tourism and a media ready to judge diplomats by the immediacy of their response to such crises has established a new benchmark by which the diplomatic profession is judged.

Cumulatively, these developments have had a significant impact on the role of the professional diplomat. Increasingly, this is portrayed in terms of a “coordinator-manager” and “facilitator” in complex processes spanning the boundaries between the international and national domains. They also pose questions concerning the traditional norms of behavior associated with diplomacy. To take one significant example, the traditional emphasis on confidentiality and secrecy is challenged by the norms demanded by the need to work with a range of “nondiplomatic” stakeholders in specific policy milieus. The latter, working to their own codes and norms of behavior, do not always respect the traditions associated with the conduct of diplomacy, and establishing mutual understanding and cooperation is one of the major challenges of contemporary diplomacy.

**Adaptation and Change in Diplomacy**

Several clear themes emerge from this discussion of the emergence and development of diplomacy. The first is that diplomacy has a history and a logic that transcends the system of states with which it is often equated. Just as diplomacy preceded the emergence of the sovereign state, so also it has adapted to the latter’s transformation in response to forces associated with globalization and regionalization. The second theme relates to the first: Diplomacy has a capacity to adapt to change. It is something of a truism—and a recurrent topic of diplomatic memoirs—that diplomacy is not what it was. Thus, change runs as a leitmotif through its
evolution as the processes of diplomacy and the structures through which it has been conducted have responded to transforming environments. This, however, has been a gradual process, so much so that the frequently used distinction between “old” and “new” diplomacies is misleading, ignoring as it does the inherent adaptive capacity of the processes on which diplomacy has relied over time. Similarly, debates about the “decline” of diplomacy are usually founded on the association of these processes with particular structures or forms—such as the emergence of resident bilateral diplomacy. To understand the nature and significance of diplomacy in its historical and contemporary manifestations we must recognize that there is no single mechanism through which its objectives can be served. Diplomacy’s capacity for change ensures that in the early 21st century, where complex agendas require evermore inventive modes of global governance, the processes associated with diplomacy remain a major component of international life.

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See also Anarchy; Balance of Power; Bilateralism; Economic Statecraft; Foreign Policy Analysis; Globalization; Governance, Global; International Organizations; International Society; International System; Mediation in International Relations; Multilateralism; Networks; Nonstate Actors; Policy Network; Realism in International Relations; Regionalization; State; United Nations; War and Peace; Westphalian Ideal State; World Bank; World Trade Organization (WTO)

Further Readings

**DISARMAMENT**

The term *disarmament* is generally used to describe a process of reducing and eliminating certain weapons systems, but it may also depict an end state when a specific type of weapon has been abolished. The quest for a definition is complicated because the concept of disarmament may be employed for different purposes in diplomacy, in international relations, and in national and international security debates. Disarmament can apply to any armaments system, from nuclear weapons to land mines, and depending on political perspective may be cast as negative (inducing vulnerability) or positive (promoting peace).
Though disarmament may be linked with arms control, the two approaches are different. Arms control covers partial measures and mechanisms for managing and restricting the development and possession of certain kinds of armaments, whereas disarmament is the process or accomplishment of the elimination and abolition of such weapons systems. Arms control may be an end in itself, leaving some weapons in the hands of some countries, or it can provide a stepping stone toward disarmament, but the two concepts are not interchangeable and should not be confused. Concepts of disarmament are related not only to reducing and eliminating weapons but also to challenging traditional, military concepts of security, defense, and deterrence and constructing alternative approaches for peace and security. This entry discusses various approaches to disarmament.

**General and Complete Disarmament**

When used in relation to nuclear weapons, disarmament and nonproliferation are frequently described as two sides of the same coin, implying that one is not sustainable without the other. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 with the purpose of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and technologies, contained in its Article VI an obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament. Article VI also referred to “general and complete disarmament,” a phrase drawn from United Nations (UN) resolutions going back to 1946. No timetable was set for achieving these objectives, and there are many competing interpretations of what would actually need to be done to implement Article VI.

In the aftermath of World War II, “general and complete disarmament” reflected the aspiration of resolving all conflict through diplomacy, without recourse to force and arms, but its meaning has never been clarified. Was it intended to mean a world without all weapons or a world without nationally controlled war-fighting weapons? It appears that the founders of the UN wanted this aspiration to guide international relations toward more peaceful directions. Certainly, the world would have to change fundamentally if total disarmament, peace, and security were ever to be possible. The inclusion of “general and complete disarmament” in Article VI of the NPT has more often been used by some of the nuclear weapon states (defined in the NPT to include China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom [UK], and the United States) to justify not eliminating their nuclear weapons until there is general and complete disarmament. So that the laudable but remote goal of total disarmament would not be used as an excuse to hold on to nuclear weapons, the Sixth Review Conference of the NPT, held in 2000, made clear in its consensus final document that nuclear disarmament is the most urgent priority under the treaty and that achieving nuclear disarmament is not contingent on general and complete disarmament, which is the “ultimate goal.”

**Disarmament Initiatives, Conferences, and Agreements**

While the aspiration of general and complete disarmament is unlikely ever to be fully achieved, much can be done to reduce and eliminate many weapons systems. From government-led action to remove all guns from Japan in the 15th and 16th centuries to negotiations on banning cluster munitions in 2008, there have been a range of disarmament initiatives, conferences, and agreements. The Hague Peace Conferences that took place from 1899 effectively outlawed dum-dum bullets. After World War I, the Geneva Conventions were developed to regulate the conduct and customs of warfare, including aspects of arms developments and trade. The 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (known as the Geneva Gas Protocol) was an early disarmament effort that focused on banning the use of inhumane weapons rather than mandating physical disarmament of the actual weapons. It took a further 47 years to negotiate the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which prohibited the development, manufacture, and stockpiling of bioweapons.

During the Cold War, arms control was considered to be an important part of the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was particularly true of nuclear weapons, where a number of bilateral agreements sought to cap a spiraling arms race in which the dominant powers developed more than 70,000...
nuclear weapons. One of these, the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, removed and eliminated all nuclear-armed Cruise and Pershing Missiles from Europe. This treaty was brought about by changing perspectives and leadership in the Soviet Union and the United States in response to a massive upsurge of civil society protests and campaigning for nuclear disarmament and human rights in the 1980s. Unusually, it met the criteria for both disarmament and arms control.

In political discourse, disarmament is often qualified as “unilateral,” denoting one country’s decisions and actions to renounce a particular type of weapon, and “multilateral,” denoting decisions and processes undertaken by many states, generally through negotiations. Though unilateral and multilateral approaches may be different, they are not mutually exclusive and can be mutually reinforcing. Nation-states are members of the various bodies and institutions that constitute the world’s disarmament machinery. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) was formally constituted in Geneva following the First UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, which had identified the need for a “single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size taking decisions on the basis of consensus.” The CD accomplished little until the Cold War ended. In 1993, it concluded negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibited the acquisition, manufacture, and development of chemical weapons and created the multilateral Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to oversee and verify the complete elimination of such armaments. As its membership went from 38 to 66 UN member states, the CD negotiated the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was concluded and opened for signature in 1996. By banning nuclear tests, the CTBT contributes to nuclear disarmament as well as nonproliferation.

The UN General Assembly’s First Committee covers international security and disarmament issues and meets annually to consider between 60 and 70 resolutions on these issues, ranging from nuclear weapon-free zones to prevention of an arms race in outer space. There is also a UN Disarmament Commission, which is open to all UN member states, but this meets only for 2 weeks every year and does not have decision-making powers. The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs is headed by the Secretary-General’s High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and provides support for multilateral treaties and UN-related institutions dealing with weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons.

At the end of the Cold War, disarmament was promoted for humanitarian as well as strategic or conflict reduction purposes. In the field of conventional weapons, civil society—notably disarmament campaigners, war veterans, and humanitarian aid workers—built momentum around the demand to ban land mines on grounds that the weapons continued to maim and kill noncombatants long after the military purpose had ceased. They promoted conditions for a group of concerned middle-power states to establish a forum and begin negotiations to ban antipersonnel land mines. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty was negotiated outside the traditional multilateral machinery because efforts to get negotiations on this issue in the CD or among parties to the 1981 Inhumane Weapons Convention were blocked by states with a vested interest in retaining the weapons. A decade later, another coalition of governments and civil society created their own series of negotiating conferences to achieve a ban on the use and manufacture of cluster munitions. Though some of the major governments chose to boycott the negotiations, they were not able to block them. The resulting disarmament treaties have proved significant in stigmatizing certain weapons as inhumane and creating a normative framework within which even nonsignatories find that their deployment and use of such weapons is constrained. Once the treaties establish the disarmament norm, they change states’ behavior. Most of the states that boycotted the negotiations have later signed and ratified.

Public Involvement

In recent history, it has taken active public engagement and civil society pressure to persuade governments to renounce certain kinds of weapons. Though lip service is paid to the desirability of disarmament, it does not occur in a vacuum. As one type of weapon is banned and disarmed, there are vested interests keen on developing new weapons. Arms trading is big business, netting huge profits for arms manufacturers, defense contractors, governments,
Discourse Analysis

and black marketers. Governments may support nonproliferation to disarm others while retaining high-value weapons for themselves.

Where traditional concepts of defense and arms control are associated with national security paradigms, disarmament has come to be associated with the evolving human security paradigm and linked with development, human rights, and a redistribution of resources away from military methods and expenditure.

Considered as an end state, disarmament may never be complete, though specific weapons systems have been comprehensively prohibited and eliminated. Viewed as a process, disarmament is taking place on many levels all around the world: from the women who help implement the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons by coordinating local initiatives to collecting and destroying guns to the diplomats negotiating the next nuclear treaties and from disarmament activists halting nuclear weapon convoys to the international inspectors verifying that states are complying fully with their treaty obligations.

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See also Arms Race; Conflict Resolution; Multilateralism; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Security and Defense Policy; Security Cooperation; United Nations

Further Readings

Discipline of Political Science, The

See Introduction to Political Science (Volume 1)

Discontent

See Dissatisfaction, Political

Discourse Analysis

The aim of discourse analysis is to reveal the ontological and epistemological premises that are embedded in language and that allow a statement to be understood as rational or interpreted as meaningful. Discourse analysis investigates whether—in statements or texts—it is possible to establish any regularity in not only the objects that are discussed, the subjects designated as actors, and the causal relations claimed to exist between objects (explanans) and subjects (explanandum) but also the expected outcome of subjects trying to influence objects, the goal of their action, and finally the time dimension by which these relations are framed. Discourses thus comprise the underlying conditions for a statement to be interpreted as meaningful and rational. At the same time, discourse analysis is the study of rationality and how it is expressed in a particular historical context. Discourse analysis is part of the constructivist (or social-constructivist) approach within the humanities and social sciences. It assumes that basic assumptions with regard to being, self, and the world are constructed by individuals living in a historical and cultural context that is produced and reproduced by their speech and acts.

There is no mainstream definition of discourse within the social sciences. Neither is there any generally accepted understanding of what discourse analysis is or which method(s) its practitioners should use. Consequently, it is difficult to give a precise description of what characterizes discourse.
analysis. This entry reviews several forms of discourse analysis and their application to politics. Three approaches are distinguished, all of which are called discourse analysis, but they alternate in their approaches to what a discourse is and what the aim of analyzing discourses is. The first approach is the discourse-analytical, the second is the discourse-theoretical, and the third is the critical discourse analysis.

Varieties of Discourse Analysis

Analyses of discourse have been carried out within a variety of social science disciplines, including linguistics, anthropology, sociology, international relations, communication studies, and political science. Although the concept of political discourse has been used for centuries to describe political debate or for deliberation in political theory and philosophy, it is only during the past 40 years or so that there has been a theoretical and methodological interest in how to study the relationship between language and political action. This started in the 1960s in Europe as part of a philosophical renewal of the humanities (including the social sciences), later to be known as structuralism and poststructuralism or in more general terms as the linguistic turn. In the 1970s, it spread to the United States with studies of how political concepts and political news play a role in the construction of social problems. Today, there are several approaches on how to understand the role of language in politics. Among these are conceptual historiography (Begriffsgeschichte), the history of political ideas, and the theory of narration. They all differ from discourse analysis by the fact that their object of study is concepts, narration, and ideas and not discourses. The most important difference among discourse analytical approaches is between those that seek to understand discourse as a contingent form of knowledge and use discourse analysis to see how knowledge and the production of knowledge have changed over time and those that take for granted that “the world” is a product of how we categorize it through our statements and therefore look on discourse as a universal type of social action and use discourse analysis to establish a general theory of discourse. Although discourse analytic approaches emphasize the connection between discourse and power, they differ in how they attach the concept of discourse to other concepts such as knowledge, ideology, ideas, and truth.

Discourse Analysis

This understanding of discourse and discourse analysis is closely connected to Michel Foucault and his publications from 1963 to 1971. In this period, Foucault studied the history of language and how words (or language) were placed in relation to things (or what is observable) at various periods in history. Foucault was concerned with the fact that from the mid-1800s, the human sciences had begun to analyze language and to argue that all human actions and social formations are somehow related to language or can even be understood as constructed in (or by the use of) language. According to Foucault, then, discourse analysis is not some independent theory or method but a way in which the human sciences perceive the world. Foucault shows how language was turned into an empirical object for scientific studies and views discourse analysis as a historically specific manner in which the human sciences relate to reality. Hence, Foucault considers that scientific interest in language is a historical event: the end of the modernity period, where man stood at the center of scientific interest, and the start of a new period, where language became the central object of study. It is in this context that Foucault introduces the concepts of archives and archaeology in an attempt to portray discourses as historically determined forms of knowledge, which, together with other discourses, enters into a form of institutionalized rationality (an archive). The archive, in consequence, is a historically determined knowledge horizon, a framework for how ideas are produced and sustained and for how knowledge is accepted (as being trustworthy) or not. Ideas are created in discursive events, which subsequently—by historical analysis—can be understood to have added new positions to the archive or to have transformed already existing positions in the archive. At the same time, the archaeology is the knowledge we possess about the history of the various forms of knowledge and of the limitations and possibilities that exist for creating knowledge and generating ideas. These limitations and possibilities are not exclusively linguistic. They are also extradiscursive
and institutional. Discourses are supported by institutions, and together with various technologies (e.g., disciplining or sanctioning), they constitute a historically determined rationality.

**Discourse Theory**

In contrast to Foucault, *discourse theory* aims at developing a universal theory of discourses. Discourse theory sees all social phenomena as discursive constructions and assumes that all social phenomena can be studied by discourse analysis. It is in this sense that discourse theory turns social phenomena into language and language into an object for discourse analysis. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe are the best examples. They have advanced discourse theory by deconstructing other theories. First, with inspiration from structuralist linguistics, they emphasize that the smallest unit in a discourse (langue) is the sign and that discourses include a system of signs characterized by every sign being different from other signs. Second, with inspiration from poststructuralism, they emphasize that signs are infused with meaning through articulation (*signifié*), while the content of signs (*significant*) is always contingent and never fixed. Finally, with inspiration from Neo-Marxism, they stress that the articulation is embedded in a political process. In their definition, discourse is a system of signs that allocates meaning through articulation. The articulation, on the one hand, is understood as a conflict between persons whose object is to achieve political status by imposing a particular taken-for-granted understanding of the world. On the other hand, discourse analysis is used to map or trace this process as a political process. The task of discourse analysis is to find the nodal points that give other signs their meaning and to observe the process through which the allocation of meaning is taking place. In political theory, for example, “democracy” is a nodal point around which conflicts are constantly taking place. In contrast to Foucault’s discourse analysis, the concept of ideology (or objectivity) plays an important role in discourse theory. All discourses are ideological because they appear as objectivity—that which is taken for granted—and thus conceal alternative realities. Also, in contrast to Foucault, the concept of knowledge does not enter into the vocabulary of discourse theory. Where Foucault can study how knowledge *has become* an archive with his archaeological (diachronic) approach, the discourse theoretical (synchronic) approach is analyzing how meaning *is created* by politics. And finally, where Foucault sees institutions as supporting knowledge and therefore capable of having an independent (nondiscursive) status, in discourse theory institutions are understood as discursive constructions without any extradiscursive status.

**Critical Discourse Analysis**

*Critical discourse analysis* emphasizes the necessity of establishing methods for empirical investigation of relations between discursive and nondiscursive practices. In this sense, it distinguishes itself mainly from discourse theory. The work of Norman Fairclough is central here. According to Fairclough, discourse is not only a communicative act but also a social practice. Discourses not only constitute social phenomena but are also constituted by social phenomena in the form of social (or political) practice. Any use of language (a communicative action) therefore consists of a discursive practice where discourses are produced or consumed and a social practice or an institutional context of which a communicative action is a part. The communicative action can draw on (consume) or create (produce) discourses, but it will always be part of an order of discourse, where several discourses are articulated simultaneously. The communicative act is linked to social practice through the use of genres or conventional text types; the news media can, for example, draw on interviews as a genre, while the family can use the dinner table conversation in the same manner. Fairclough combines linguistic textual analysis with macro- and microsociological analysis of texts and conversations, using a comprehensive research design that recognizes five components (problem formulation, choice of empirical methods, transcription, analysis, and results), each extended by specific methods and checklists.

In contrast to the theory of discourse, the critical discourse analysis distinguishes between discourse and institutions as two different types of social phenomena. It studies how discourse and institution interact in the constitution of a social world and how discursive practices are institutionalized or are moved from being linguistic utterances to set
Discourse Analysis

Discourse Analytical Approaches to Politics

Discourse analysis has developed rather rapidly from emphasizing the ontological (constructivist or antirealistic) approach to building up methods and tools for studying language and texts. Most recently, the question of method has come to occupy a central position, as has the requirement of being able to evaluate the validity of findings produced by discourse analysis. Still, discourse analysis remains an alternative—critical—approach to mainstream political science and other social sciences. It assumes that political science, like other social science disciplines, is a form of knowledge that constitutes a historically constructed understanding of what can be studied as politics (an ontology) and a historically constructed interpretation of what are assumed to be true statements about politics (an epistemology). It reflects on political science as a discipline and on the role of the discipline in constructing a certain form of political order (or polity). It finally applies concepts such as polity, politics, and policy in ways different from mainstream political science. In contrast to the realism that characterizes mainstream political science, discourse analysis is built on an antirealistic, or constructivist, approach, perceiving any form of political order to be embedded in language (and institutions) and articulated by the use of speech acts. Thus, for discourse analysis, the conflicts through which what politics is (and what is nonpolitical) is defined, therefore, are an important dimension to every type of polity and thus also an important object for political science to study.

The most important contribution of discourse analysis to political science lies in the theories of power. From Thomas Hobbes to Robert A. Dahl, power has been seen as the ability to affect, to limit, or to control the behavior of people or as the ability A has to compel B to do something that B would not otherwise have done. In contrast to this view, discourse analysis understands power as entrenched in the taken-for-granted. Foucault speaks about the productivity of power and perceives power as one of the technologies by which individual and collective identities are constructed and in which the understanding of self and of communality comes to be taken-for-granted or to be understood as meaningful and rational. Where mainstream power theory (e.g., Dahl) takes for granted that A and B exist, each with its own set of preferences, Foucault sees the constitution of subjectivity and of the relation between A and B as the productivity of power. His analysis—together with the two other types of discourse analysis—looks for the “hidden power” embedded in both individual and collective identities and for the underlying conditions for interests, expectations, and interpretations to be understood as rational. Apart from regarding power as ontological, the three approaches therefore agree that it is also epistemological. Power is not only the ability to affect the behavior of others. It is also the productive force by which A and B are constructed, each with its set of interests and each with its set of expectations and interpretations.

By combining the critical with the analytical approach, discourse analysis is characterized as standing at the crossroads of several approaches in the study of politics. It opens avenues that bring political science into close relationship not only with history and institutional theory but also with linguistic and narrative theory. Underlying the three discourse-analytical approaches are two approaches to time and space. The first is the diachronic, where the question is raised about how epochs come into being and what, over their long history (the longue durée), makes the various types of political orders different from each other. The diachronic understanding generates a history of polities, their periods, and geography, which also allows discourse analysis to sit at the crossroads of history as a scientific discipline (archaeology) and political science as the history of political orders.
Discourse Analysis

Foucault is an example in point. He describes the history of bio-politics, and by doing so also establishes the historiography of a specific type of political technique called governance. The second is the synchronic understanding of time, where the question is raised about how political orders are constructed and changed by the means of politics. By studying how politics constructs political orders, the short-term and long-term perspectives are connected, and the history of political orders is combined in the study of how politics are constructed through changes in understandings of what politics is. The combination of the two makes it possible to study the history of political orders as a precondition for the study of political change. Fairclough is an example in point. He describes how an ideology becomes dominant and how social conflicts are taking place within the context of dominant ideologies. He also studies how discursive practices are institutionalized and how they proceed within a context of institutions. The synchronic process tracking thus generates insight into the political processes as conflicts over dominance, which positions the discourse analysis at the crossroads of institutional theory (and theories of institutional change) and political science as the theory of politics (or political change).

Within the past few years, institutional theory has become aware of the role of ideas in explaining institutional change. Attempts are being made to understand how ideas are causally powerful in explaining the form and content of institutional change. The ideational account of institutional change is thus moving institutional theory in the direction of discourse analysis. This applies to studies of economic ideas and their role in defining economic crises, for example, in the 1970s and 1980s. It applies to studies of the role of socioeconomic understanding in establishing preconditions for institutionalized processes of compromising and consensus making in the postwar period in the Nordic and other small Western European countries. It also applies to policy studies of how environment, energy, and social and labor market policies are established and change within epistemic communities. Finally, it also applies to studies of European integration and international relations. In this way, both approaches have focused on the role of speech acts and texts in analyzing the articulation of politics; and while different concepts are put to use (ideas or discourse), both approaches take it for granted that language matters, just as it is accepted that politics takes place through the construction of interpretative frameworks. This finally places discourse analysis at the crossroads of theories of narration and political science as a theory of political communication. Within mainstream political science, there is a growing interest in the role of the genres (drama, history, and the epics) in producing political news or in how politics are framed and named. The use of narratives in political argumentation is explored in understanding news as a political institution and public policy as agendas for political discourse. Within political science, it is also becoming common to study the organizations in which ideas are produced (or consumed) and the epistemic communities through which ideas are debated and disseminated. The role of institutional entrepreneurs in universities, think tanks, expert systems, and the media, using narratives to frame and name political problems, is becoming an important topic.

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See also Constructivism; Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; Institutional Theory; Institutions and Institutionalism; Policy, Discourse Models; Political Communication; Power

Further Readings


Discretion

Discretion is an issue of interest not only to political scientists but also to scholars of public administration, law, and organizations. In everyday language, using one's discretion refers simply to the employment of good judgment, caution, or care in decision making and, hence, is normally juxtaposed with acting according to formal standards or rules. Political scientists are interested in the exercise of discretion delegated to politicians by their electorate, but it is normally within the administrative realm that the issue of discretion (and the related matter of decision-making legitimacy) provokes most debate and discussion. This is because considerable discretionary authority tends to be granted to bureaucracies in order to make and implement policy, as legislatures are content to delegate the implementation of agreed policy to those at the “street level.” For students of public administration, therefore, discretion can be defined as the autonomy extended to bureaucrats to implement or disregard a law in accordance with the principles established in a political arena for that law, based on values appropriate to the public interest. Those who exercise bureaucratic discretion range from effective standard setters (including regulators) who exercise considerable discretionary authority to those enjoying more limited authority when applying established standards to individual situations.

Historically, as a core concept in law and laterly in public administration, discretion has been examined by way of consideration of the different external mechanisms used for its limitation and control, including legislative oversight, executive command, and judicial review. As the scope of state power has expanded, it is the role of the judicial system in limiting discretionary behavior that, however, has generated an almost universal debate. Indeed, much of contemporary writing on the issue of discretion stems from legal theory with a strong focus on the role of law in policy implementation. For lawyers and legal philosophers, there is considerable discussion as to how and why the state’s administrators, from police “on the beat” to judges in courtrooms, determine the public interest and exercise their discretion. This literature is concerned with the relationship between discretion and various conceptions of justice. Key questions include how much discretion, if at all, should be granted, how will it be granted, and, more fundamentally, who will decide on the public interest?

Arguments for and Against the Use of Discretion

The arguments for and against discretionary behavior in decision making are well developed. For advocates of discretion, its principal virtue is that it provides decision makers (politicians, judges, regulators, and civil servants) the ability to fill the gaps emerging between established rules of law. In other words, for a policy to be matched with the appropriate type of implementing mechanism, forms of discretion are required so that the spirit, if not the letter, of the law is adhered to. For this school of thought, discretion is an essential tool to help decision makers resolve problems in ways that can accommodate the parties involved and also soften the often harsh and indiscriminate impact of rules. They argue that rules limiting discretion may formally legitimate decisions, but such decisions may not be fair or may conflict with the public interest. Therefore, and in line with the theory of representative bureaucracy, administrators must have discretion as it allows them to produce results that reflect the public interest—that is, the values and beliefs held by the public they serve. It follows that officials should be provided with “formal” discretionary powers when options for policy implementation are written into a law. Thus, discretion forms an integral part of the legal
process, which, among other things, allows for contexts and circumstances to be taken into account when assessing breaches of the law.

The arguments against discretion are also well rehearsed, particularly within legal philosophy where the rule of law constitutes a buffer between the citizen and the arbitrary exercise of power. In contrast with those who advocate the provision of discretion, advocates of rules and rule adherence (most prominently Kenneth Culp Davis) point to the fact that discretion facilitates an uneven or subjective implementation of the law by providing decision makers the ability to employ illegitimate considerations in the formulation of a decision. In such circumstances, decisions can be made using criteria that are in conflict with those established and envisaged by the rules, for example, nepotism or gender discrimination. Therefore, the enforcement of rules ensures that like cases are treated alike and avoids bringing a “private” dimension into decision making. Discretionary powers vary considerably and may in certain circumstances extend to rule breaking, arbitrary behavior, and injustices. It follows that the scope for inappropriate discretion (as opposed to necessary discretion as in the case of regulators) should be narrowed as much as possible by legislation.

The Nature of Discretion

Discretion is routinely contrasted with the rule of law—that is, those obligations and duties that constrain and determine the choice of action. There is much debate within public administration and legal philosophy as to whether discretionary behavior is rule-free or is in fact embedded within and influenced by rule frameworks (the famous “doughnut” conceptualization of discretion proposed by Ronald Dworkin in which discretion occupies the hole in the doughnut’s center). Many scholars seek compromise and argue that dichotomies between rules and discretion fail to recognize the complex interdependence between the two concepts, particularly as a greater number of delegated bodies and actors with varieties of rule making and hence discretionary powers now exist in modern polities.

Within legal texts, there are two broad categories of discretion. The first is the discretion to make rules, which is normally the preserve of political institutions such as legislatures or local authorities (which are subject to electoral sanction) or indeed of other fora to which such functions are delegated. The second concerns the discretion to find facts and interpret them as the law—that is, the discretion to decide cases. This power is retained by courts and administrative agencies. Of course, the two are connected, and the central issue in the analysis of discretion is the extent to which legislatures, in the process of making law, constrain or provide discretion to courts and agencies to decide on cases. At its core, administrative law centers on the creation of rules that allow government and its agencies the freedom to achieve agreed goals while discouraging them from abusing this freedom.

Courts and judges tend to enjoy considerable discretionary powers in the enforcement and administration of the law. In this instance, discretion is most tangible when a judge, having consulted all relevant legal material, is left free by law to decide on a course of action. The type of public law used is also of relevance here, as it is generally thought that within common law legal systems, judges are afforded more discretion than their civil law counterparts.

Applications of Discretion

For scholars of political science and public administration, since the mid-1930s, research into administrative discretion has been primarily concerned with analysis of how the use of discretion by street-level bureaucrats leads to varieties of outcomes in public service delivery. Within the study of public management, a well-developed strand of research concerns the tensions inherent in the search for norms of value-free administration and the exercise of discretion in increasingly complex policy environments. More recently, the debate on discretion has become a core concern of regulation and regulatory governance, best captured by the literature on the “regulatory state” and its accountability. In particular, the work of independent regulatory agencies, which can be quasi judicial in character, raises important questions concerning the proper balance between formula-driven and discretionary approaches to regulation. Much recent scholarship has demonstrated a wide variety in the interpretation by regulatory agencies of their discretionary
role and the principles on which their decisions are based. The understanding and use of discretion depends on its context, and many tasks will inevitably remain too complicated to legislate for in a detailed manner, thus requiring the individual bureaucrat to respond on a case-by-case basis. It may also occur that bureaucrats are subject to contradictory rules and therefore have discretion to decide on which rules to implement. Discretion also tends to be of more significance in contexts where resources are in short supply but demands are unlimited, providing opportunities for discrimination as well as rationing. By way of contrast, contracts between public authorities and private companies over service delivery (such as waste disposal or road building) seek to ensure that discretion rests solely with the principal rather than with the agent. Discretion sharing also occurs in collaborative forms of organizations, such as networks.

As street-level bureaucrats often provide the public face of government, their activities have a symbolic import that stretches beyond the service in question. Their decisions can reinforce or undermine political objectives. For political and administrative managers, therefore, problems of asymmetrical information mean that controlling the discretionary activities of street-level bureaucrats through normal superior–subordinate routines is problematic. This does not stop street-level bureaucrats from being subjected to ever-increasing amounts of rules. Therefore, apart from the external means of restricting administration discretion (above), internal means such as administrative ethics, peer review, and an emphasis on professional norms are emphasized. The development of common public service values through induction and training is also routinely identified as a means of ensuring that discretionary behavior operates within commonly shared norms and understandings.

Organizational theory holds that wherever work is delegated, there is some loss of control by the delegating person or institution. Also, the greater the degree of task complexity, the greater the need for discretion by those involved. Thus, discretion is closely connected to levels of trust within organizations, with managers seeking a virtuous circle of high trust and high discretion in performance. One strand of research on organizations is increasingly interested in the evolution of rules and discretion within hierarchical organizations. They examine how organizations may shape discretion by imposing constraints on the way in which members use it. The formal and informal means through which discretionary behavior is tolerated or sanctioned is also an emerging field of inquiry.

Within organizational theory, it is also proposed that culture plays a role in the use of discretion, and work from this field of inquiry has identified how increased bureaucratic formalization tends to diminish discretion. Organizational sociologists are also keenly interested in the concept, proposing that a greater understanding of the determinants of discretionary behavior requires analysis of the social norms prevalent within an organization’s operating environment. The dilemmas inherent in the exercise of discretion thus help explain the origins of trust, behavioral norms, and boundaries of autonomy.

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See also Bureaucracy; Bureaucracy, Street-Level; Organization Theory; Regulation; Rule of Law

Further Readings

**Discriminant Analysis/Classification**

See Categorical Response Data
Discrimination

Originating from the Latin word *discriminare* (distinguish, separate), in contemporary societies, the term *discrimination* is applied to related but varying phenomena about the content of which there is no general agreement. The least controversial meaning is the intended or accomplished differential treatment of persons or social groups for reasons of certain generalized traits. The targets are often minorities, but it may also be majorities, as Black people were under apartheid in South Africa. For the most part, discrimination implicitly entails the idea of acts resulting in a disadvantage for the target of such action. More precise terms are *intentional* or *willful* discrimination. An ever-growing number of terms has been coined to label phenomena of this kind related to groups, traits, or properties, such as race (racism), religion (e.g., anti-Semitism, Islamophobia), sex (sexism), sexual orientation (e.g., homophobia), class (classism), age (ageism), disability (ableism), a person’s stature (heightism, discrimination against short people), physical appearance (lookism), overweight (weightism), and many more. Although there are many other forms of discrimination, not all of them have been identified as specific targets of social action. In the following sections, the different elements of such a definition, their controversial treatment in the social sciences, and their political implications are discussed.

Controversies in Defining Discrimination

While the definition of discrimination as differential treatment on the basis of generalized traits is relatively straightforward, a number of additional elements that might be added to the definition are controversial.

Must Behavior Be Unjustified?

As Michael Banton (1994) notes, “One analytical tradition excludes considerations of immorality and illegality altogether for the sake of conceptual clarity and to avoid contradicting opinions about their justification” (p. 1). But politicians argue that the definition should serve the purpose of identifying a social problem and thus restrict the term to *unjustified* behavior.

Are There Legitimate Exceptions?

Should references to *legitimate exceptions* be included? Many scientific and political definitions of discrimination contain conditions under which differential treatment is deemed undue versus those under which it is deemed admissible. Discrimination here relates only to unequal treatment that is based on criteria lacking objective or rational justification. Aaron Antonovsky (1960), for example, speaks of “effective injurious treatment of persons on grounds rationally irrelevant to the situation” (p. 81). The weakness of this definition lies in its assumption that rationality in the Weberian sense can define uniform collective goals that should override the legitimacy of egotistic, individual claims that run counter to them. Conflicts over protectionist discrimination against foreign companies illustrate that competitors, consumers, state economic planners, environmentalists, and Third World and workers’ rights activists may have conflicting particular interests precluding a single universal rationality. What can be said is that discrimination is seen to exist when reasons for actions are perceived as illegitimate by relevant groups. But concepts of legitimacy vary between and within societies and change over time. Barring women from the ballot was long considered to be justified, and even in Western democracies, full formal economic rights for women were established only in the course of the 20th century. In feudal societies, it was generally accepted that access to positions of leadership was made difficult for, or denied to, persons of lowly origin, regardless of their ability or merit. Only in the modern age did the bourgeois classes question the nobility’s inherited privileges. Since modern societies consider themselves universalistic in the sense that only merit shall determine social positions, a convergence of public opinion has occurred to exclude ascriptive (hereditary, unchosen, and unchangeable) criteria in favor of achievement only.

Human Rights or Positive Law?

Does any contravention of the universal principle of equal rights constitute discrimination regardless of the traits involved or does the definition relate to an *inventory of specific qualities*? Brandishing discrimination, activists often invoke natural law or general fundamental human rights.
Wary of potential liabilities resulting from open definitions, legislators prefer to enact positive law that defines specific new rights rather than relying on concepts of natural law.

**Are There Exemptions for Private Actors?**

Which classes of actors fall under the scope of the concept? While there is broad agreement that governments and para-statal agencies should not discriminate, private sector economic actors often successfully seek exemption on the ground that nondiscrimination will disadvantage them (e.g., by resulting in lower productivity, by overriding customers’ preferences). In general, definitions are ambiguous as to their application in the realm of private life in which differential treatment based on personal preferences is widespread but considered to be legitimate.

**Is Discrimination an Attitude or an Act?**

Does a mere attitude, such as the intention to treat someone differentially, constitute discrimination, or must a tangible disadvantage following accomplished action occur? Much research in social psychology focuses on the conditions under which members of one group develop unfavorable attitudes toward members of other groups, a process labeled outgroup discrimination. Other disciplines such as the economic, political, and social sciences have traditions of observing discriminatory acts and their detrimental consequences. Discriminatory attitudes do not always lead to corresponding acts.

**The Contingency of Discrimination**

Discrimination is a contingent phenomenon since acceptance of universalistic principles and awareness of inequality have developed historically. Statistical evidence can demonstrate certain forms of social inequality while explanations remain contested. Demands that discrimination be recognized are made in contexts of power relations and often succeed only as a result of pressure groups claiming minority rights against vested interests. Discrimination thus is as much a state of political consciousness as it is an ontological matter. This holds all the more true at the level of legal codification. Specific legislation has been enacted in some countries, for example, with regard to mandating equal treatment for women, gays, and people with disabilities; however, differential treatment on grounds of foreign citizenship is considered defensible for raisons d’état and has failed to achieve recognition as discrimination. A glance at the fate of left-handed people, vegans, and others reveals that traits and categories exist that are connected to some kinds of inequality but that have not yet been associated with discrimination.

**Types of Discrimination**

Statistical discrimination is considered to occur when distinctions are made between demographic groups based on aggregate characteristics rather than on an actor’s individual preference and prejudice. While a group is known to possess certain characteristics, an actor unaware of the personal characteristics of an individual treats him or her as an average member of a group. But the perception of similar phenomena of this type is inconsistent. Ethnic profiling—that is, differential treatment of an ethnic or racial group by security personnel, may be considered discriminatory even if evidence existed to support it as a rational strategy of law enforcement, because members of certain groups figure high in criminal statistics. When employers promote equally qualified women to leading positions less frequently because experience shows a higher likelihood of interruption of employment due to pregnancy or child care, political reactions often are ambiguous: This can be seen as illegitimate with regard to the individual person, whereas employers defend it as rational behavior maximizing productivity. By contrast, it is less noncontroversial that insurance companies grant preferential conditions according to age, sex, occupation, or other criteria based on evaluations of risk statistics.

While intentional discrimination is located at the level of individuals, institutional discrimination denotes explicit policies of social institutions that exclude, impede, or otherwise harm certain groups irrespective of adverse attitudes of implementing agents. Famous examples are laws restricting rights of racial or ethnic minorities or banning women from politics. Recently, courts in Europe have held proceedings against laws barring foreigners from particular professions. By contrast,
Discrimination

(structural) (i.e., indirect) discrimination characterizes policies that are neutral in intent and in implementation but still result in adverse effects for minorities. In the literal sense, structural discrimination constitutes the very opposite of discrimination and it is, therefore, most controversial. Its proponents hold that states based on universal principles have to bring about equal life chances for all, which includes the duty on the part of institutions, for example, in education, to compensate proactively for the inequalities minorities have experienced from discrimination suffered in the past or in other social systems. They argue that the failure to do so constitutes discrimination.

Explanations of Discrimination

Social psychological explanations of discrimination based on social identity theory presume that humans rely on the groups they belong to for a part of their identity. Belonging to a group that is more prestigious and powerful than others boosts one’s sense of self-esteem. Discrimination in the sense of debasing and impairing outgroup members or declining them access to resources and wealth serves the purpose of strengthening the relative position of one’s in-group and also indirectly boosts individual self-esteem. Empirical studies confirm that persons with a low sense of social recognition display more outgroup devaluation and group-focused enmity based on an ideology of human inequality (Wilhelm Heitmeyer, 2002). Negative attitudes toward different outgroups (ethnic and religious minorities, women, and people who are disabled or homeless) strongly intercorrelate, indicating the unspecific nature of discrimination. Social dominance theory argues that societies as a consequence of evolution generally develop hierarchical structures and humans have a disposition of dominance orientation and willingness to discriminate, but, in addition, a high group status exerts a reinforcing influence on this attitude.

Beyond statistical discrimination, economic explanations argue that a part of the difference between groups in income, prestige, and status achievement is due to differences in productivity. Women, for example, are assumed to choose occupations compatible with family demands and akin to female role models that are on average paid worse and to invest less in training since their returns would be smaller than men’s. Differential treatment based on productivity gradients is held to be legitimate. According to Gary Becker (1971), illegitimate differences are explained by “tastes of discrimination” on the part of employers, customers, and landlords. Since such tastes imply inefficient attribution of factors of production, they cause disadvantages on perfect markets and are therefore deemed to vanish over time. It has been shown, however, that in majority–minority situations, under state control, and in other market irregularities discrimination due to taste may persist. Economic explanations have been criticized for failing to address the root causes of differential preferences along gender, class, and ethnic lines and the mechanisms behind discrimination.

Sociological analyses have shown widespread ideological constructions of superiority of certain groups, for example, “gender status beliefs,” legitimizing unequal access to status positions. One area of research is dedicated to the intergenerational stability of class positions. Pierre Bourdieu (1980), for example, argues that powerful groups define a specific taste that, internalized at an early age, serves as a lifelong means of distinction between classes and regulates status assignment in contradiction to meritocratic principles of modernity.

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See also Equality; Gender; Social Exclusion

Further Readings

Discursive Institutionalism

The term discursive institutionalism is an umbrella concept for the wide range of works in political science that focus on the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse by which they are generated and communicated in given institutional contexts. This makes for a definition that is somewhat broader than when the same or similar terms are used by those who focus primarily on the substance of political agents’ ideas in the ideational turn or on the text in discourse analysis. Below, relations to other institutionalist approaches, varieties of this concept, and their applications in political science are discussed.

Discursive institutionalism can be considered the fourth “new institutionalism,” because it is a distinctive approach that contributes to our understanding of political action in ways that the other three neo-institutionalisms—rational choice, historical, and sociological—cannot. It provides insight into areas of politics that political scientists working within the other neo-institutionalist traditions have long neglected: the role of ideas in constituting politics and in reconstructing political interests and values, the power of discourse for persuasion in political debate and legitimation in democracy, the importance of ideas and discourse in explaining the microdynamics of change in rationalist interests and structures, historical paths and regularities, and cultural frames and norms.

The word institutionalism in the term, moreover, suggests that this approach is not only about the discursive construction and communication of ideas but equally about the institutional context in which and through which ideas are communicated via discourse. This institutional context refers first and foremost to the structure, construction, and communication of meaning. But it can also be understood as the background information provided by the other three neo-institutionalisms in political science with which discursive institutionalists may engage and from which they often emerge.

Varieties of Approaches

Discursive institutionalism encompasses a wide range of approaches across fields of political science, from constructivism in international relations to the ideational turn in American political development and comparative politics, from the deliberative democracy of political theory to the analysis of campaign rhetoric and media discourse in American electoral politics, and from the discourse analysis of critical legal studies or poststructuralist theory to that of feminist gender studies. In such approaches, when discursive institutionalists focus on ideas, they may consider different types of ideas—cognitive ideas justified in terms of interest-based logics and/or normative ideas legitimated through value-based logics of appropriateness—at different levels of generality, from policy ideas to programmatic ideas or from paradigms to deeper philosophical ideas. When they are more concerned with discourse, they may concentrate on the representation of ideas through frames, narratives, myths, collective memories, stories, scripts, and the like or on the discursive processes by which such ideas are constructed and communicated in the public sphere.

Discursive institutionalists may also be divided over which part of the public sphere they ought to investigate. Some are more interested in the coordinative discourse of the policy sphere, in which policy actors construct ideas through epistemic communities of loosely connected individuals with shared ideas about a common policy enterprise, advocacy coalitions of more closely connected elites with shared ideas and access to policy making in local and national politics, advocacy networks of activists contesting ideas in international politics, and entrepreneurs or mediators who serve as catalysts for change as they articulate the ideas of discursive communities. Other discursive institutionalists are more focused on the communicative discourse of the political sphere, in which political actors discuss, deliberate, and legitimate the ideas developed in the coordinative discourse. These actors include elected officials, opposition parties, or spin doctors, civil servants, and/or policy actors.
involved in the mass electoral process of public persuasion. But they also involve opinion leaders, public intellectuals, and the media engaged in public debates; organized interests in specialized policy forums; members of civil society engaged in grassroots organizations and social movements; or mini-publics participating in citizen juries and issue forums, as well as citizens whose voices are heard not only in opinion polls but also in votes—where actions speak even louder than words. The communicative discourse itself may be seen as top-down, as elites seek to form mass public opinion or legitimate public policy; as bottom-up, as social activists attempt to influence national and international debates; at the top among policy and political actors, as elites debate ideas in national or global policy forums; or at the bottom, among everyday actors engaged in deliberative democracy or in expressing ideas through their everyday practices.

Discursive Institutionalism in Institutionalist Perspective

All discursive institutionalists define institutional context first of all in terms of the meaning context in which ideas and discourse make sense, such that speakers “get it right” in terms of the ideational rules or rationality of a given setting by addressing their remarks to the “right” audiences, at the “right” times, and in the “right” ways. But beyond this, they may differ in terms of how they refine their definitions of institutional context and their objects of explanation, depending on the background information they add from one or another of the other neo-institutionalist traditions.

For example, discursive institutionalists who engage with rational choice institutionalism also often use the language of interest maximization and incentive structures. But unlike rational choice institutionalists, who tend to put interests first, leaving aside ideas as little more than mechanisms to choose among objective interests or as focal points to choose among equilibria, discursive institutionalists put ideas first, as constituting or constructing subjective interests that encompass a wider range of strategic ideas and social norms than most rational choice institutionalists admit. As for institutions, rather than the rational choice institutionalists’ “neutral” incentive structures, discursive institutionalists see them as infused with ideas and values or collective memories that make them objects of trust or mistrust and changeable over time as actors’ ideas and discourse about them change along with their performance. Moreover, instead of attributing interests to “rational” actors who are assumed to live in a world of knowable risk, discursive institutionalists investigate the actual ideas about interests of real actors who live in a world that is often characterized by radical or immeasurable uncertainty. Finally, against the rational choice institutionalists’ view of talk as by definition “cheap” and actions as “speaking more loudly than words,” discursive institutionalists take what people say about their actions as well as the exchange of ideas in public debates and discourse as key to explaining politics, as the basis of leadership through the top-down processes of mass persuasion and of democracy through the bottom-up processes of opinion formation and deliberation.

Discursive institutionalists who engage with sociological institutionalism have much less to disagree with since sociological institutionalists already use the language of ideas, norms, and discourse. Moreover, for the most part, they share a constructivist ontology about the nature of interests and institutions. For both, in place of rationalists’ assumptions about material interests as determinants of individual action, they consider political agents’ ideas about interests as well as norms in response to material reality. For discursive institutionalists, the main sources of disagreement arise with those sociological institutionalists who come down more on the side of institutional stasis, by emphasizing how cultural frames constrain ideas, discourse, and action, as opposed to the institutional dynamics that comes from the reframing of action through ideas and discourse.

Discursive institutionalists who engage with historical institutionalism have similar concerns about the static nature of approaches that emphasize institutional path dependence and see change as the result of unexplained exogenous shocks. They find, moreover, that even though the recent shift in historical institutionalism from exogenous to incremental or evolutionary theories has gone a long way toward endogenizing change, this only does more to describe what changes occur than to explain why change occurs. Any such explanation requires a move from a focus on structure to
agency, to explore the microfoundations of the macropatterns. But instead of continuing to turn for such agency either to the incentive-driven rational agents of rational choice institutionalism or to the culturally framed social agents of sociological institutionalism, discursive institutionalists argue that historical institutionalists would do better to look to the ideas and discourse of sentient—or reflexive, meaning self-reflective thinking and speaking—agents.

For discursive institutionalists, the problem with the three other neo-institutionalisms is that the structures—of incentives, culture, or path dependence—that make up the institutional context act mainly as external constraints on action. Instead, discursive institutionalists treat institutions at one and the same time as given (i.e., as structures that are the context within which agents think, speak, and act) and as contingent (i.e., as constructs that result from agents’ thoughts, words, and actions. Here, continuity and change in institutions can be explained by the dynamic processes through which agents use not only their background ideational abilities—a generic term for John Searle’s background abilities or Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus—to create and maintain not only their institutions but also their foreground discursive abilities—akin to Jürgen Habermas’s communicative action—to communicate and deliberate about taking action collectively to change (or maintain) those institutions.

The relationship between discursive institutionalism and the other neo-institutionalisms is complicated, therefore, since discursive institutionalists may accept some of the language and logic of the other approaches even as they critique them. With regard to rational choice institutionalism, discursive institutionalists sometimes take its account of interest-based ideas as a shortcut to that which can be expected (albeit not predicted) although even the expected is always open to investigation. With regard to sociological institutionalism, discursive institutionalists often take its account of culture, norms, and frames as a useful starting point for a closer examination of the dynamics of change (or continuity). With regard to historical institutionalism, discursive institutionalists help explain the dynamics of change in historical structures through an agent-centered, meaning-based logic of communication. By the same token, however, historical institutionalism can lend a hand to discursive institutionalism, by helping show how formal institutions may shape discursive interactions. For example, compound polities, in which governing activities are dispersed among multiple authorities, tend to produce more elaborate coordinative discourses among policy actors, whereas simple polities, in which governing activities tend to be channeled through a single authority, facilitate more elaborate communicative discourses to the public.

**Discursive Institutionalist Methods**

But how can discursive institutionalists demonstrate that ideas and discourse make a difference for political action, let alone have a causal influence? Political scientists often use methods based on comparative case studies and process tracing to demonstrate how ideas and discourse are tied to action. This may involve pointing to the ideas that serve as before-the-fact guides for action, as after-the-fact sources of justification and legitimation for action, or as ongoing frames through which actors understand as well as explain their actions. But it may instead involve considering the discursive exchange of ideas, as actors in debates or negotiations change their ideas as a result of the process of persuasion—something that Habermas calls “arguing”—in contrast to “bargaining.” Another such method involves showing that ideas and discourse can be independent variables by demonstrating that no other neo-institutionalist explanation, whether in terms of rationalist interests, historical path dependencies, or cultural norms, does a better job of accounting for the clear changes (or continuities) in political action. Examining matched pairs of cases in which everything is controlled for except the ideas and discourse can also usefully show when these phenomena make a difference. Finally, although qualitative methods are most prevalent, discursive institutionalists also employ a variety of quantitative techniques such as surveys, opinion polls, and fuzzy sets to establish the influence of ideas and discourse.

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Discursive Policy Analysis

Discursive policy analysis focuses on discussion or debate as the main object of scrutiny. Originally, the word *discourse* was derived from the Latin noun *discursus*, which means “running to and fro.” It is this dynamic aspect that we still find in discursive policy analysis, which often concerns itself with the development of meaning. How do specific meanings evolve during the policy process? Why do certain terms pop up more often? Can we see how coalitions are organized around these terms? Why does a policy process move first this way, then that way? This entry first gives a short overview of the various meanings associated with the term *discursive policy analysis*, then elaborates on the relationship between discourse and practice and language and power, and ends with a short note on the normative or prescriptive potential of discursive policy analysis.

The Meaning of Discursive Policy Analysis

The discursive analyst takes discussion as the object of analysis and then sets out to trace linguistic regularities within those debates. These linguistic regularities are generally called discourses. However, the term *discourse* is used in different ways, ranging from the speech–act theory to the “archeology” of Michel Foucault.

What the approaches share is an anti-essentialist ontology. Discursive analysis can be placed within the constructivist or interpretive tradition of the social sciences: It assumes that language is constitutive of social realities and takes a critical stance toward a singular notion of an objective “truth” waiting to be discovered. This is not to assume that phenomena exist only in language (as critics tend to state), but it does suppose that we can perceive phenomena only by linguistically making sense of them. This assumption of multiple social realities is of particular importance for the policy analyst, because, in the words of Carol Bacchi (2000),

The premise behind a policy-as-discourse approach is that it is inappropriate to see governments as responding to “problems” that exist “out there” in the community. Rather “problems” are “created” or “given shape” in the very policy proposals that are offered as “responses.” (p. 48)

Societal events are almost by definition ambiguous and so complex that they can never be fully described. Every description or narrative gives a particular perspective on the problem; indeed, the very perspective will determine whether a particular phenomenon will be seen at all as a problem that requires political action. Words, catchphrases, metaphors, and story lines frame societal problems, and as this framing influences our answer to the question, “Who gets (and who should get) what, when, and how?” it is inherently political.

As language is not transparent—we cannot “see through” it—there is a continuous interaction between the terms in which a policy is described and the way we think about it. In their famous
book *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), George Lakoff and Mark Johnson explained how describing something in terms of something else (what they call the “thinness of a that”) structures our thought processes. For instance, it matters whether we describe integration in terms of a melting pot, an invasion, or even a war, as the description will shape not only our understanding of what it is but also the ways we respond to it. Moreover, a particular policy will always come with categories and target groups and descriptions of deserving and undeserving people, thereby creating its own political reality. In the words of Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak (1997),

> discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. (p. 258)

The central question then becomes how certain meanings are created, challenged, or sustained.

**Language in Use**

To answer that question, studying language alone will often prove insufficient. After all, language does not “float” in society but is uttered in particular contexts that influence its meaning; the words “Yes, I do” have an entirely different meaning at the altar in a church than at the card table in a pub. Likewise, a particular policy might be documented in papers and reports, but in most cases, its meaning will be formed and solidified during implementation, in the interaction between street-level bureaucrats and (would-be) target groups. Meanings are not only localized in language but also in symbolic artifacts and the physical environment in which the interaction takes place. Discourse analysis, then, is contextual; it is the study of language in use.

Such a statement could be placed in a Foucaultian tradition of discursive analysis that tried to “overcome the traditional distinction between what one says (language) and what one does (practice)” (Stuart Hall, 2001, p. 72). Thus, Maarten Hajer (1995) defined discourse as a set of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena. That “ensemble” is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of “practices.” There is, however, a second problem of definition, because *practice* is a catch-all term as well. According to Etienne Wenger (1998), *practice* is “doing in a historical and social context that gives structure and meaning to what we do” and includes not only “the language, tools, documents, images, symbols, well-defined roles, specified criteria, codified procedures, regulations and contracts” but also “the implicit relations, tacit conventions, subtle cues, untold rules of thumb, recognizable intuitions, specific perception, well-tuned sensitivities, embodied understandings, underlying assumptions, and shared world-views” (p. 47).

This leads to the paradoxical situation that discourse can include practice, that practice also includes discourse, and that both terms can be used to describe almost anything. It seems justified to ask, paraphrasing Aaron Wildavsky, “If discourse is everything, maybe it is nothing?”

**Words and Interests**

When reading the literature on discursive policy analysis with its contradictory and often implicit definitions, one might be tempted to answer affirmatively. By making the explanandum (social reality) into an explanans (practice), a structure–agency dilemma can be easily kept out of sight. No wonder then that Bacchi (2000) argues that discursive analysts tend to be positioned on the left of the political spectrum, to come in with an agenda for change and to define discourse in a way suiting their political purpose as constraints on change.

While the truth of this observation can hardly be denied, the ability to answer not only “what” but also “why” and “how” questions remains a crucial strength of discursive policy analysis, but this requires explicit attention for the way in which language is related to power and vice versa. To what extent are subjects “controlled” by the unconscious use of language in context that in itself incorporates particular power differences or, on the contrary, to what extent do subjects control their environment by strategically using discourse? And if subjects are captivated in the worldview of dominant discourses, how would transformation
be possible? Again, various discursive policy analysts would answer these questions in different ways; whereas some scholars (e.g., the political scientist Murray Edelman) emphasize the strategic and conscious use of symbolic language by those in power, practice researchers point to the way in which the relationship between actors is constituted by the contextualized practices in which they act.

Both practices and discourses have meaning only to the extent that they are taken up by the actors involved in a particular process. Whereas subjects will almost always draw on stock texts and practices and on memory, conventions, and historical references, situations might arise in which these default narratives are no longer sufficient and can be challenged by new discourse coalitions. During these moments of dislocation, discursive policy analysis can be helpful not only for studying how power is given shape in particular practices but also to understand how interests come about in the first place. Whereas money and power are constant factors in politics, as both means and ends, it is only via language that actors can set their priorities and determine what their interests are. Vice versa are the chances for a particular discourse to become dominant, or at least partly dependent, on unevenly distributed means for symbolic distribution (e.g., easy access to the media).

**What About the “Real” Problems?**
The adage of “speaking truth to power” seems hard to combine with the ontological assumptions of discursive policy analysis, but this does not mean that all normative or prescriptive ambitions should be set aside. Various analysts have asked themselves whether discursive interpellations could also be actively promoted by active discourse management. Policy problems are not discovered “out there,” but they are linguistically constructed. Yet some of these linguistic constructs may be more helpful for understanding complex phenomena and thus for developing effective policy practices. Whereas this is obviously a complicated endeavor, it also raises questions about the role of the policy analyst. Rather than regarding oneself as an objective provider of knowledge, the policy analyst becomes an active mediator in the complex interaction between politics, science, and societal groups. The art of discursive policy analysis could then be considered as, in the words of Piet Hein, “the solving of problems that cannot be expressed until they are solved.”

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*See also* Analytic Narratives: Applications; Data, Textual; Discourse Analysis; Discursive Institutionalism; Identity, Social and Political; Interviewing

**Further Readings**

**Dissatisfaction, Political**

Political dissatisfaction is the attitudinal expression of unhappiness or lack of satisfaction based on the belief that the government or incumbent policies and their outcomes are falling short of the citizen’s preferences or expectations, resulting in a negative feeling toward the government and the incumbents. This definition implies the following from a theoretical point of view: First, it means that this is an attitude related mostly with the evaluation of policies and their outcomes. Second,
it implies that citizens are able to distinguish and identify those policies and their consequences, evaluate them, and compare them with their given preferences. Third, the definition also signifies that citizens attribute these policy decisions to specific political authorities who are responsible for selecting and implementing them. Fourth, it means that citizens think that there are alternative policies that better suit their problems and expectations, opening the possibility of giving the support to other contenders. Below, the origins and various interpretations of this concept, its relationship with similar ones, and possibilities of its operationalization are discussed.

Origin and Historical Evolution of the Concept

The political dissatisfaction concept is linked theoretically to David Easton’s model of system support. According to Easton, it is citizens’ evaluation of political outcomes that determines the degree to which public authorities, governments, and political systems as a whole are supported by mass publics. Easton considers that political dissatisfaction is part of the political support, and, more concretely, part of the “specific support” (or the lack thereof) that lies in the relationship with the satisfaction that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities if they are opposed to them, disquieted by these policies, and dissatisfied with their conditions of life.

This contribution has led many scholars to misinterpret the concept that remained conceptually and methodologically undefined. This is why there is a diverse use of the concept and many variations of its operationalization in the literature, leading to important theoretical and empirical confusions. Often, this problem arises when linking political dissatisfaction with political mistrust or cynicism toward the entire political system, making all these attitudes part of the same attitudinal continuum pertaining to the same one-dimensional concept of political support. A good example of this occurred when William Gamson provided a general theoretical notion of the process underlying the development of political distrust and political disaffection. He maintained that dissatisfaction can lead to a more general problem of institutional and system distrust when an undesirable outcome is seen as producing a general distrust vis-à-vis political authorities and the whole representation process. This interpretation also can be found in the writings by Robert Dahl and, more recently, Leonardo Morlino, when they assert that political dissatisfaction results from the perception of government’s general inability to deal effectively with problems regarded by citizens as important.

However, these scholars and other authors following this line of thought forget that each political object, including political authorities, can be the object of diffuse or specific support. What distinguishes the type of support is not the object of the support but the nature of the support—that is, if it is conditional (instrumental) or unconditional. Specific support can be object specific in two ways: First, people are assumed to be aware of the political authorities responsible for decision making; second, it takes into account the perceived decisions, policies, actions, proclamations, and style of the authorities. In this sense, the members of a political system can perform a rational calculation to find out whether the authorities’ actions address their needs and demands. Under such conditions, specific support, which can only exist in societies whose institutions allow authorities to be held accountable for their actions and the resulting policies, will fluctuate according to people’s perceived benefits and preferences. So dissatisfaction with specific policies and the authorities approving and implementing them, which is the result of instrumental calculations conditioned by people’s preferences, does not necessarily affect the diffuse support accorded to the governmental institution as such. Furthermore, this relationship between output and general political trust is empirically questionable. Recent literature has demonstrated why this may not happen in many cases (see, e.g., Russel J. Dalton, 2004; Richard P. Gunther & José Ramón Montero, 2006). Finally, Gamson’s developmental model does not incorporate a concern with cause and effect or the intricate set of interactions that may occur over time between policy dissatisfaction, distrust, and social or historical events. Declining levels of political trust may be the result of increased policy dissatisfaction, or it may be the other way around, or there might be an independent factor responsible for the decline in both of these variables. Some societal factor may cause an
increase in political cynicism, which in turn acts as an intervening variable to bring about a rise in dissatisfaction with government policies. Alternatively, cynicism and dissatisfaction could both be connected with some changing social conditions and, therefore, be only spuriously related to each other.

Some authors, however, depart from this misleading interpretation of the concept. In this line of thought, Giuseppe Di Palma developed at the beginning of the 1970s a definition of political dissatisfaction very close to the one presented above. According to Di Palma, political dissatisfaction is an expression of displeasure resulting from the belief that the performance of the government or political system is falling short of citizens' wishes or expectations. This is an important clarification because of the following two reasons. First, it points out that political dissatisfaction is the product of the difference between expectations and policy outcomes, and, as is well-known by now, expectations are endogenous to one's own political system and the fulfillment of demands provided by the incumbent government; second, it focuses on the policies produced by a given government or incumbent actors, implying some sort of short-time evaluation. Still more important is the contribution by Arthur Miller, one of the protagonists of the well-known Miller–Citrin controversy that took place during the mid-1970s. Miller, distancing himself from Jack Citrin's (1974) comment, maintains that satisfaction with the political authorities and political trust are two theoretically different things that should be separated in empirical research. The contribution by Miller (1974) has become crucial over the years. He is signaling that the applicability of the concept of political support depends on the validity of the assumption that people can be aware, however vaguely, of a relationship between their needs, wants, and demands, on the one hand, and the actions of the political authorities on the other. The relationship has to be such that the citizens perceive, whether correctly in some objective sense or not, that the fulfillment of their needs and demands can be associated with the authorities in some way. Finally, this way of understanding and defining political support and political dissatisfaction has been continued by Barbara Farah, Samuel Barnes, and Felix Heunks (1979) when they affirm that the concept of political support is based on the belief that the political order should be responsive to citizens' demands and that these demands are expected to result in governmental outputs. It is the responsibility of the elected officials to translate these demands into public policy, and subsequently, their performance can be evaluated by the general public. Dissatisfaction, then, emerges when performance is viewed negatively. This is the line of thought of more recent works by Mariano Torcal and José Ramón Montero (2006), although they make the concept of political dissatisfaction interchangeable with the concept of political discontent.

The final point important to mention here is that this attitude is the result of evaluations of incumbents and policies. It tends to produce a critical support for concrete authorities, being strongly related to the electoral support of these authorities. So the most concrete and conspicuous consequence of political dissatisfaction is electoral change, either approving or choosing other parties or producing electoral abstention. This is the most frequent result of political dissatisfaction. Another question, even though not fully investigated, concerns the potential consequences of political dissatisfaction on other attitudes such as political trust when the political system does not offer real alternative policies to those who are dissatisfied.

Measurement and Operationalization

There have been different attempts to measure this concept. Several authors attempted to measure this concept with indicators of internal or external political efficacy, institutional trust, or even political cynicism. These attempts have mostly produced confusing and misleading results. Following the definition proposed above, measurement of political dissatisfaction should include indicators of approval and evaluations in terms of the distance between the individual's own policy or party preference and the policy alternative that the individual identifies with a particular party. Underlying here is the assumption that if an individual completely agrees with the policy alternative of a particular party as he or she perceives it (i.e., when a respondent places both himself or herself and the party at the same point on a scale), the individual is more satisfied with the party's policies than if the individual identified the party with a policy some
Domestic Politics and International Relations

The study of the impact of domestic politics on international relations is currently experiencing a renaissance after a long period of neglect. Almost all work in international relations today deals in some way with the effect of processes within state borders on events outside of them. Scholars are interested, for instance, in how different interest groups and political parties formulate their foreign policy preferences, how institutions aggregate those different agendas, and how the combination affects strategic interaction among states and their ability to get what they want.

This entry provides a review of the recent contributions to the study of domestic politics in the international relations (IR) literature. As this literature is vast, the notion of paradigms of IR is used—that is, particular ways of looking at world politics that are premised on different key concepts and variables. Certainly, not all the research being done on the role of domestic politics fits neatly into one of these approaches, nor is it necessary for it to do so. However, paradigms do provide a way of categorizing the different ways in which domestic politics is understood by IR scholars to affect IR, and in doing so, they provide a fruitful tool for systematizing such research. First, however, a very brief history of the study of domestic politics in “modern” IR will be provided, covering roughly the past 30 years, noting the rise and fall and then the rise again of interest in domestic politics.

By a domestic politics approach, IR scholars generally mean analysis that tries to unpack the state into its constituent parts—that is, opening up the “black box” for closer examination. Consequently, scholars intent on demonstrating how states with different domestic institutions act differently in their IR can be said to use such an approach. This should be distinguished from those analysts who focus on the microlevel or individual

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**Further Readings**


level, such as the foreign policy role of key decision makers in the executive branch. This is the criterion used here to distinguish domestic politics from the individual- and systemic-level analyses.

**A Brief History of the Study of Domestic Politics in Modern International Relations Theory**

Scholarship aiming to understand how what occurs within a state affects its dealings with other states has a long intellectual pedigree, generally categorized under the rubric of “liberalism” in IR theory. Liberalism is sometimes understood as any argument or approach that disaggregates the state into its component parts. It finds its origins in the pluralism evident in liberal political theory in which individuals each pursue their own destiny. However, examining the processes occurring within a state is not confined to democracies. Autocracies have their own domestic political processes, although they are generally less obvious and transparent to the outside world. This approach to explaining world politics reached its apex with the publication of *Power and Interdependence* in 1977 by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. In it, they not only described an ideal type of world in which nation-states were disaggregated into their constituent parts—branches of government, bureaucracies, the media, advocacy, and interest groups—but they also argued that these parts coordinated with one another across country lines, sometimes in pursuit of a common agenda that put them at odds with other elements in their own societies. In this view, the state was not unimportant, but it was certainly viewed as becoming increasingly weaker in an increasingly interdependent world.

With what one might call the structural revolution in IR theory, approaches focusing on domestic politics were placed on the back burner for almost 20 years. Just after Keohane and Nye’s book appeared, Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* dealt an almost deadly blow to the more pluralistic approach to IR that includes a study of domestic politics. Waltz argued that only by understanding states as operating within a system could the persistence of patterns in world politics, most notably the pursuit of the national interest through the acquisition of military power, be explained. Due to the anarchic nature of IR, a characteristic of the international system, states of all different shapes and sizes pursue very similar policies. Given the lack of any enforceable law or governance in international affairs, states need to help themselves. Survival requires the accumulation of power and the subordination of other elements of state policy, such as trade or the pursuit of human rights, to that end.

Under this logic and given the stakes involved, domestic politics should not be allowed to intrude into the state decision-making process. Given individuals’ shared interest in security within a nation-state, the system encourages them to come together in support of the national interest. This justifies what has been known as the “billiard ball” or “black box” approach, according to which, what happens inside the nation-state is seen as unimportant. For all intents and purposes, all states can be understood as being unitary actors responding to the same systemic pressures, with only their relative power left to distinguish them from other states. The implication is that it is the obligation of the state to guard the interests of society, even if this involves disregarding particular domestic interests. It should act as a unitary actor protecting a country’s national interest, understood as more than just the aggregation of the preferences of individuals and groups within society. States should judge and interpret their environment as objectively as possible, since mistakes can have serious consequences.

This left little room for domestic politics. Only through systemic analysis can one understand the continuity in IR. By this, Waltz meant the big questions such as why phenomena such as war and the balance of power continually occur, which constitute the core of the discipline. Under Waltz’s logic, domestic politics explains variation in foreign policy—that is, the smaller questions of day-to-day management of international affairs in contrast to international politics proper. Hence, domestic politics is a matter of foreign policy, not of IR. A generation of neorealist or structural realist scholars set out to show how the state might be understood as a unitary actor, coming together in times of threat to meet challenges in the rational way dictated by the system. The clear influence of this structural revolution in IR theory was reflected in the adoption of the unitary action assumption by
Keohane in his next critique of realist IR theory, *After Hegemony*. Keohane took issue with the pessimistic conclusions reached by structural realism but not with its foundational premises.

In recent years, however, there has been an explosion of interest in the influence of domestic politics in IR. This is partially the product of two new approaches, rationalism and constructivism, which question realist assumptions. However, even realists have begun to investigate domestic politics, although generally in keeping with the basic premises and constraints of structural realism. Certainly, not all research focusing on domestic politics explicitly identifies with these three approaches, or needs to. Given the enormous size of the literature, however, looking at the logic of these three strands helps us sort through and make sense of the broader trends in the discipline.

**Rationalism**

Although rationalism is a very broad approach that may not constitute a coherent paradigm of IR, it is nevertheless possible to identify central themes and a certain logic to the approach. It is based first and foremost on the presumption of utilitarianism on the part of individual political actors. Rationalism understands its objects of inquiry as calculating, egoistic players whose only possible bond is self-interest. Focusing on individual utility maximization leads rationalists naturally to break apart the state and look into the black box of structural realism.

While the premise of self-regarding rational action might strike one as somewhat trivial at first, it has been revolutionary for IR theory and has led scholars to question what was often the received wisdom of structural realism. For example, while a realist would stress how the importance of national security serves as a powerful incentive against petty domestic politics interfering with foreign and security policy, rationalists have focused on the often diverging interests within a country, for example, economic interests or office-seeking politicians. There is a large literature that argues that major questions of war and crisis initiation are dictated by the electoral calendar or the domestic popularity of the government, sometimes known as the “diversionary theory of war.” Many have found an economic rationale underlying grand strategy—the fundamental and guiding principles of a state’s foreign policy generally assumed to be driven by a state’s structural position (i.e., its relative power or its geography) or its core ideology. In this view, instead of reflecting a national consensus or security imperatives, security policy is actually a post hoc rationalization of the economic interests of powerful constituencies seeking to secure and protect export markets.

By examining domestic politics in this manner, rationalists allow us to see that there is often a divergence between state policy and what is good for the society as a whole. This often makes for suboptimal policy. For instance, leaders might continue fighting wars long past the point at which victory is likely because they fear the domestic political consequences of defeat. The same counterintuitive logic is seen in international political economy, as states embrace protectionism that does not serve their interest in terms of collective welfare but rather serves a narrow parochial economic interest with a greater stake in the outcome.

Institutions are generally crucial for explaining this gap between the aggregate welfare of a nation-state and its actual policy. Depending on their configuration, institutions privilege some actors over others, giving a few the opportunity to direct policy in a direction that serves their parochial interests rather than the common good. This disjuncture, however, is something that varies. Democratic foreign policy is thought to reflect more accurately the aggregate welfare of society as a whole inasmuch as democracies have more inclusive representation. However, given the asymmetry of the stakes and information, there is often a wide gap between collective welfare and policy in democracies as well.

The sum total of this view is a very pluralistic approach of “boxes within boxes.” Individuals aggregate into groups on the basis of common interests and engage in a process of bargaining and strategic interaction to realize their preferred ends. Domestic institutions are a key mediating influence as they privilege some groups over others. Once a particular policy preference emerges among competing groups, say political parties in a democracy, the broader group to which they both belong, say the state, then engages in a process of bargaining and strategic interaction with other like units.
Domestic institutions are also important in strategic interaction in that they allow for credible signaling in bargaining situations, a primary concern of rationalism given its utilitarian core. For instance, in the case of a deterrence dispute or a trade negotiation, a state must undertake an action that states that lacked resolve would or could not pursue. This can be done through “costly signaling.” As the accountability of democratic institutions means that leaders face significant costs in case of failure, military escalation by democratic countries during crises is therefore a more credible signal of resolve than similar action by nondemocracies. Another option is to make private information about a country’s commitment and capability more public to demonstrate that it has the power and the resolve to prevail. Democracies are also more transparent and information rich, allowing them to convey more persuasively their interests and will when resolute or their peaceful intentions when they want to reassure. However, the nature of democracies can also prove negative in negotiations. Given the presence of elections in democratic societies, negotiating partners might fear that democracies are less able to commit long term to their agreements, such as an agreement to liberalize trade.

Even while rationalists embrace the domestic level of analysis, its emphasis on institutions often comes at the neglect of domestic politics per se. Domestic institutions structure the political environment, acting as constraints on self-interested political actors. Rationalists focus on structural features, albeit at the domestic level, but do not devote great attention to the political process that plays out within them. As in the case of neorealism, the preferences of political actors are more often assumed than explained. A common assumption is that politicians are “office seekers” who design their political agenda, in foreign as well as domestic affairs, around the goal of obtaining or maintaining office. Using these universally applicable assumptions, rationalists can explain variation in terms of the differing types of domestic institutions. These are structural arguments that do not problematize the origin of political preferences and the political process that brings about policy. Interestingly enough, rationalism can be thought in some ways to apply structural realist assumptions at the domestic level of analysis.

Politicians, like states, seek to survive, with survival meaning in this case staying in office and maintaining power. Rationalism does not truly eliminate the black box assumption. It merely adds boxes of different colors and sizes.

**Constructivism**

The constructivist research project is a powerful critique of structural realism. At its core is the idea that the nature of IR is social and as such is a constant project of construction. If foreign affairs are marked by mistrust, balance of power, and war, this is because states in the system have embraced a particular *culture of anarchy*, to use Alexander Wendt’s term. Given the social nature of IR, however, it is capable of being reconstituted on the basis of different social practices. States can adopt different norms and identities that lead to different behaviors and transform the character of international interaction. The nature of anarchy is not determinate or given; it is mutable. Constructivism’s logic leads to a natural focus on “ideational factors” such as norms, values, culture, and ideology.

While this opens up the potential for political agency and therefore domestic politics, the tendency among IR constructivists has been to focus on social interaction at the international level rather than the domestic level. The norms it uncovers and explains are generally systemic ones that lead to transnational convergence in behavior. The empirical fact that states of very different kinds adopt the same norms is a tool for showing, theoretically, that norms are powerful. Given that the primary task of the paradigm is to illustrate that what are regarded as immutable features of international politics, such as self-help or sovereignty, are, in fact, social constructions, this is not surprising.

Demonstrating that IR are social also involves showing that these cultures of anarchy become reified, accepted as a given on the part of those embracing the norms undergirding the system. That is, constructivists emphasize the structure in the mutual constitution of structure and agency. Constructivism’s interest tends to be directed at these types of major macro outcomes or constitutive principles of the international system as a whole.

While this focus on reification and systemic norms is intrinsic to their efforts to show that
norms matter, constructivists sometimes lose sight of why the social nature of IR means that there should be great domestic political contestation on issues of IR. Reification means the absence of agency, as political actors do not question but rather take these institutions for granted.

There are some exceptions, however. Constructivist literature has focused on the effect of a state’s political culture, embodied in its political institutions. Democratic institutions lead to different types of foreign policy on the part of democracies not because of the incentives they provide to self-serving politicians but because they are the instantiation of a set of values externalized in foreign policy. Democracies build stronger alliances based on consultation, mutual identity, and trust.

Constructivists show that countries are marked by particular foreign policy cultures, an ideational consensus on the principles that guide a country’s relations with others, and that these are generally based on a unique conception of self or identity. These cultures are not objectively given by a state’s strategic setting but socially constructed on the basis of collective experience and the interpretation given to those events.

Both the focus on culturally revealing institutions and foreign policy cultures tends to imply political consensus at home. However, constructivists are also interested in ideological contestation over foreign policy, often expressed by political parties that serve as vehicles for different conceptions of a state’s role in the world consistent with the set of values they represent in domestic affairs. Such considerations may affect a state’s alignment choices, steering them in the direction of like-minded actors abroad. It facilitates analogies between domestic and foreign policy situations that allow political parties to develop unique stands on foreign policy issues that contrast with their domestic political competitors at home.

**Neoclassical Realism**

Ironically, some of the most innovative and interesting work on domestic politics and IR is being done by neoclassical realists, heirs to Waltz’s legacy of structural realism. While Waltz stressed that the anarchic nature of the international system provided incentives to states to help themselves, he was careful to note that it was ultimately up to states themselves to understand their environment and heed its lessons. The system could only punish after the fact, not force states to act in a particular way. Waltz does not necessarily expect that all states will act in ways that suit the system’s imperatives, only that those that do not will be punished. Domestic politics, by privileging parochial interests over that of the collective whole, can divert states from their optimal path. When they do so, the system will punish them. Waltz thus offers an observation and a caution—where we see excessive intrusion of domestic politics into foreign policy making, the state will not act as a unitary actor and foreign policy will be suboptimal.

Neoclassical realists demonstrate that foreign policy yields the best outcomes when the state acts as a coherent and unified political entity. For instance, strong states better able to extract resources from society are more powerful than those that cannot and better able to innovate militarily to meet security challenges by emulating the practices of the best performing states. More fragmented states, which resemble liberalism’s pluralist model, are less adapted to this environment. When states are captured by parochial interest groups serving their own narrow agenda, states are led in disastrous directions.

Social and elite cleavages inhibit group feeling and cohesion, which makes states less able to act as unitary actors. These divisions reflect the prioritization of more parochial interests such as ethnic, cultural, ideological, religious, class, bureaucratic, regional, or party over the national interest. Governments presiding over fractured societies are weak and are unable to take the steps necessary to counter real threats. These factors interfere with the proper operation of self-help and the balance of power. Institutions also matter. Strong legislatures representing smaller sectional interests interfere with the making of a rational foreign policy by policy executives. Legislatures provide an access point into foreign policy for narrow constituencies that pull the settlement away from an ideal point that the state would otherwise prefer.

Unlike in rationalism, however, the state is a genuine entity with a life of its own that acts as the true representative of national interests. It serves as the perspicacious and sagacious agent of a country’s true interests, threatened by smaller, sectional interests. Society might be powerful enough to
sometimes trump the state, but the latter is generally not merely the reflection of aggregation of the former's interests, as is the case with the more pluralist theory of the state adopted by liberals. This concept of the state separates the neoclassical realist literature from others that stress how state representatives are primarily motivated by their own egoistic and parochial interests in staying in office. Where this does occur, neoclassical realism endeavors to show that there are severe consequences. The systempunishes.

**Current Trends**

These three paradigms offer three unique ways in which processes at the domestic level of analysis influence IR. In rationalism, domestic politics are the battleground for competing individual and group interests over the state. In constructivism, the domestic level is the place where we locate culture and identity conceptions that guide a country’s foreign relations in a unique way or a place in which this is contested on ideological grounds. In realism, domestic politics is the source of obstacles to a state’s pursuit of the genuine national interest. Currently, rationalism is the starting point for most who take domestic politics seriously. Constructivism has dealt less with the subject. Ironically, neoclassical realists provide some of the most exciting new thinking on the topic.

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**See also** Constructivism; Democratic Peace; Foreign Policy Analysis; International Relations, Theory; Liberalism in International Relations; Rational Choice; Realism in International Relations

**Further Readings**


Durkheim, Émile  
(1858–1917)

Émile Durkheim was a French sociologist who taught at the University of Bourdeaux and successively at the Paris Sorbonne. His main works include *De la Division du Travail Social* (The Division of Labor in Society, 1893), *Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique* (Rules of Sociological Method, 1895), *Le Suicide: Etude de Sociologie* (Suicide: A Study in Sociology, 1897), and *Les Formes Elementaires de la Vie Religieuse* (The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 1912). Durkheim committed his whole professional life, within the French university system, to the task of establishing sociology as a scientific discipline distinct from philosophy, psychology, and other social sciences. His intent (one might label it “positivistic”) was to ground sociological discourse on an objective approach to social facts (i.e., collective “manners of thinking, acting, and feeling”). In pursuing this goal, he gave relatively little attention in his writings to expressly political phenomena, the intellectual discussion of which, in the fin de siècle French context, was chiefly the concern of philosophical, juridical, and ideological discourses.

It can plausibly be said that Durkheim’s work was chiefly aimed at providing a scientific solution to the problem of social order. Aware as he was that the problem had been posed in the most compelling manner by Thomas Hobbes, a political philosopher, Durkheim did not accept Hobbes’s own, expressly political solution of that problem: the fear-motivated submission of all individuals to an unchallengeable sovereign brought into being

artificially by the social contract. According to Durkheim, humans are by nature intensely social beings, and the individuals’ ability and willingness to coordinate their reciprocal activities could not be reliably and durably sustained by the coercive enforcement of the sovereign’s commands. Normally, instead, it expressed a condition of solidarity between individuals.

However, in the course of social evolution, solidarity, while always called on to ground and guarantee the social order, presents itself in varying forms. In *Division* (the first and perhaps the greatest of his works), Durkheim sharply simplified such variation by subsuming all forms of solidarity under one or the other of two basic, sharply contrasted types: mechanical and organic.

Mechanical solidarity is associated with the earliest stages of social evolution. Here, societies that might be called “primitive” have small populations operating over relatively large territories (thus, characterized by low densities). Their sub-units differ very little from one another, enjoy rather poor command over natural resources, and are sustained only by rudimentary technology and by minimal division of labor; thus, only to a very limited extent do they exchange their products with one another. In turn, within each of these sub-units, the individuals themselves, the ultimate components of the society, again barely differ from one another, for the existence of all is managed with reference to universally shared bodies of practical knowledge. They all harbor within their minds the same cultural patrimony, which all sub-units periodically revisit and celebrate on ceremonial occasions. Thus, in a society of this nature, solidarity rests on the extent to which individuals are like one another, for they all share understandings of what is true and proper, which cover all the contingencies of the society’s simple, tradition-based mode of existence.

The second type of solidarity, the organic, is common to all other societies, which may be labeled “advanced.” These have evolved out of “primitive” ones and are characterized chiefly by a more or less advanced degree of division of labor, and thus by their complexity. Typically, these societies have large populations, densely settled over the territory, and their sub-units are differentiated from one another; part of the population, for instance, inhabits towns; the rest inhabits the countryside. Different regions specialize in the production of different goods and services and exchange these with one another. Furthermore, the individuals inhabiting each locale are in turn differentiated from one another with regard to their occupation, their skills, and the techniques they employ in performing their specialized tasks. Inevitably, they share only a small portion of the increasingly wide, diverse, and changing cultural patrimony of society as a whole while they make their own and identify with a narrow subset of it that varies according to their differentiated conditions. Put otherwise, individuals are increasingly individualized and expected and authorized to operate as self-conscious, self-activated, and self-seeking units.

The solidarity typical of such a society can no longer be grounded on the universal sharing of beliefs, values, and norms; rather, it rests on the extent to which society’s sub-units (and within these the individuals themselves) have become differentiated, for this process makes them interdependent and generates wide and flexible networks of exchange. Individuals, in particular, are induced to relate to one another largely by means of contractual arrangements, where each party’s legitimate concern to foster its own well-being finds expression in its efforts to provide for the other’s needs and to contribute to the other’s well-being.

One could say that according to Durkheim, in the course of social evolution, the basis of solidarity (thus, the solution to the problem of social order) shifted from cultural homogeneity to material interdependence. Neither basis, on the face of it, is expressly political in nature. However, Durkheim’s profound, sophisticated sociological discourse could not fail to confront at different points, in a more or less explicit and elaborate manner, the political dimension of social affairs, and as it did so, it produced results worthy of attention, including some of marked originality.

Perhaps Durkheim’s awareness of political phenomena was inspired by some traits of his personality. He was an austere man and rather forceful man, whose strong sense of hierarchy and authority found expression, among other things, in the way he selected and trained his intellectual followers and monitored their performance. Also, in the pursuit of his lifelong mission—again, establishing the discipline of sociology in the French
academic system—he found it useful to associate himself in the capacity of a privileged consultant with the ministerial authorities who managed that system with a maximum of central direction and control from above. He took the same approach in attempting to accomplish a broader task—which to him meant *his own* sociology) provide an intellectual inspiration for the structuring of the educational system at large and for the shaping of its programs specifically. Finally, he was a committed republican, convinced of the superior merits (not just for France) of the “principles of 1789”—*égalité, liberté, fraternité*—the last of which inspired his concern for solidarity.

In any case, Durkheim also acquired a sense for the significance of political phenomena from the substance of his own sociological discourse, beginning with *Division* and other early works. According to *Règles de la Méthode Sociologique*, for instance, only “manners of thinking, acting and feeling” that are “sanctioned” can be qualified as proper “social facts.” That is, there have to be arrangements, no matter how varied across time and space, for rewarding those observing some manners (positive sanctions) and/or for taking to task those disrespecting and violating them (negative sanctions). Now, the idea of sanction itself, and especially of negative sanction, imparts, so to speak, a vertical dimension to the collective unit (a society or a group), which privileges some “manners” and makes them its own; it suggests, however, a structured and justified command-and-obedience relationship between one part of the unit and the others, and such a relationship has traditionally been seen as intrinsically political.

In *Division*, Durkheim used as an indicator of the changing nature of solidarity the laws and in particular the prevailing nature of the sanctions applied to violators of legal expectations. In primitive societies (where the laws were mostly customary), *punitive* sanctions prevailed, for society’s intense reprobation of universally shared and cherished norms found expression in the infliction of suffering on violators. In advanced societies, punishment became less significant than *restitutive* sanctions. Here, whenever a party to a contract fails to fulfill its obligations toward the other, it allows the latter, after fulfilling its own obligations, to recover, in some way or other, what it legitimately expected. Again, this way of conceptualizing the critical difference points up, however implicitly, the vertical structuring of both societies; for even the application of restitutive sanction, no less than that of punitive ones, requires some authoritative, power-ful arrangements for identifying and dealing with violators. And it seems appropriate to think of such arrangements as political in nature.

Furthermore, in *Division*, Durkheim opposes the excessive emphasis placed by some authors (both in his time and ours) on contract (and thus on the market) as *the* distinctive, superior way of coordinating the actions of individuals in advanced society. Durkheim agrees that contract is central to such a society and is associated with significant moral values (such as individual autonomy and responsibility) but insists that it should not displace authoritative, public institutions as regulators of private, self-interested activities. For him, “not everything is contractual about the contract.” Individuals can enter binding contracts only by availing themselves of the *institution* of contract, a set of preexistent authoritative arrangements establishing who can make contracts about what matters, in what forms, and with what consequences.

The notion of institution is of utmost significance for Durkheim, who at one point defined sociology itself as the science of institutions. These are arrangements (bodies of personnel, distinctive practices, resources, etc.) focused on matters of central concern to the whole society and backed by a diffuse moral appreciation of them as morally valid. But one can also see institutions as operating “vertically”—operating on society, as it were, from above.

This aspect of institutions is apparent when Durkheim raises political matters—developing and applying expressly sociological insights and eschewing any involvement in the politics of parties—and proposes institutional changes he obviously hoped would be realized via legislative acts.

The characteristic dynamism of modern society, propelled by the competition between economic actors and by technological innovation, often generates conflicts and crises and atomizes individuals, depriving them of the normative guidance previously provided by tradition and by local memberships. The machinery for regulation operated by the state and activated by the competition of parties mostly cannot deal effectively with these new circumstances. To remedy this, the state itself should
Durkheim, Émile

empower “corporations”—public bodies identified with specific sectors of the economy—to monitor closely the economic process, discipline the unruly relations between employers and employees, and instill in both a sense of responsibility toward customers and toward the public at large.

In a lecture course Durkheim taught repeatedly at Bordeaux and at the Sorbonne, whose content was made available after World War II, this corporatist proposal (put forward also in other writings) complements a sophisticated and original argument on expressly political affairs. According to an insight already present in Division, a critical step in the advance of the division of labor was constituted by the emergence of a part of society entrusted with the task of controlling the whole by making and implementing specific decisions concerning its relations with the (natural and social) environment.

In modern society, this task is performed in a particularly purposeful and self-conscious manner by the state. This stands to the rest of society as the brain stands to the organism of advanced animal species; its essential function is thus the acquisition and processing of information about the relevant environments, leading to the formation and implementation of collective decisions.

This bold, “cybernetic” view of the state connects in Durkheim’s views with a particular understanding of democracy. Durkheim considered democratic arrangements for political representation via parties, coupled with bureaucratic administration, as particularly effective ways of generating and accumulating information on social affairs and communicating it upward and downward, thus allowing decisions to be made in a particularly deliberate and sophisticated manner. Thus, according to Durkheim, democracy was a particularly apt mechanism for, as it were, putting and keeping state and society in touch with one another. By the same token, democratization was the most appropriate political expression of the advance of modernity.

Although here Durkheim confronts expressly political themes, and imaginatively emphasizes their informational and communicational aspects, he articulates, once more, a “vertical” understanding of them, attending chiefly to political institutions and paying little attention to what could be considered the “horizontal” aspect of political experience—that is, to politics. This may express, again, his prevalent concern with social order, which induced him to consider with distaste social, and thus also political, conflict.

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See also Corporativism; Democracy, Theories of; Functionalism; State

Further Readings
ECONOMIC POLICY

Economic policy is one of the central activities of government. This entry describes the changing nature of economic policy, discusses the important forms of government intervention, and describes the emerging trends in public sector interventions in the economy. The decision makers, content, and policy instruments of economic policy have changed substantially over the past 50 years. It was once a more straightforward matter to define economic policy than it is in the early 21st century. At one time, economic policy was about macroeconomic policy—the targeting of policy objectives such as growth, employment, and inflation through measures to influence the demand side of the economy principally using the policy instruments of fiscal policy, taxation, and government spending. National governments were the principal decision makers and were held accountable by their electorates in democratic societies for the conduct of economic policy. In communist societies, the economic plan was a central device for achieving socialism.

Internationalization of Economic Policy

At the domestic level, governments now share their economic decision-making authority with central banks and a range of bodies that seek to regulate the financial sector in particular. However, economic policy has become much more internationalized with a complex system of multilevel decision making. Bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) set the rules within which economic activity takes place, while the G-8 and, more recently, the G-20 seek to coordinate the economic policies of major governments. The 27 member states of the European Union (EU), particularly those using the euro, face another regional level of decision making that shapes that economic policy.

This more internationalized system of decision making reflects the increasing internationalization of economic activity. In the period between World War I and World War II, nation-states pursued policies of autarchy in which they aimed for self-sufficiency either within their own national borders or in economic systems that embraced their colonies. These policies of protectionism, combined in some countries with the denomination of their currency in gold—the gold standard—which produced overvalued currencies, undermined international trade and the efficiency gains it could provide through comparative advantage.

After World War II, the world, under the leadership of the United States, sought to move toward a more liberal international economic system, at least within the Western bloc. The so-called Bretton Woods institutions and agreements—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, along with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—sought to create the economic and political space within which this system could operate. In the period between the end of World War II and the 1970s, this system was built around fixed exchange rates, pegged against the dollar backed by gold and by relative
capital immobility. These arrangements were not without costs for the United States, but it was often prepared to bear them in the pursuit of broader policy objectives such as underpinning Western economies in the context of the Cold War. Through this period, international trade was stimulated by the reduction of tariffs through the GATT negotiating rounds, although one unintended consequence was that nontariff barriers to trade started to assume a greater importance.

This system came under increasing strain in the late 1960s. In part, this was a consequence of the long-run decline in the economic dominance of the United States, exacerbated in the short run by the economic strains arising from the Vietnam War and the costs of programs, including Medicare, enacted as part of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society program. In the early 1970s, the Bretton Woods system collapsed when the United States removed the link between the dollar and gold. There was no longer a fixed rate system but only currencies that fluctuated substantially against each other. One consequence was that the European Economic Community started moving toward a zone of regional currency stability, initially through the creation of the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System in 1979. Another was the need for a system of economic policy coordination between the major economic powers to compensate for the inability of the United States to take a leadership role by the establishment of economic summits in 1975 that became institutionalized as the G-7 (later G-8) process.

The industrial dominance of the United States and the leading European countries was being challenged by the emergence of newly industrializing countries (NICs). The first of these countries was Japan. The economic success of the United States had been built on Fordist systems of the mass production and consumption of standardized economic goods, which relied on securing efficiencies that drove down unit costs to produce price-competitive goods that could first be sold to the large American market and then through branch plants overseas. A major motive for establishing the common market in Europe was to achieve comparable economies of scale there.

Japan had initially competed with the West by producing relatively standard industrial goods such as steel and ships using Western technology. Among the first motor vehicles that Japan sold to the United States were pick-up trucks. Over time, however, Japan came to increasingly emphasize quality in production and produce more sophisticated goods that challenged Western goods in their home markets. As Japan moved upmarket, a number of countries, initially “Asian tigers” such as South Korea and Taiwan, moved into more standardized goods production using “off-the-shelf” technology. They were able to sell these goods into Western markets because of the lowering of tariff barriers. This led to the development of new policy instruments in the form of nontariff barriers to restrain the penetration of Western domestic markets by these NICs.

The sharp increase in oil and other commodity prices in the early 1970s triggered a process known as stagflation. Since 1945, the Western countries had enjoyed a long postwar boom with high growth rates and low levels of unemployment, although this was accompanied by increasing problems in restraining inflation. This had been made possible by a variety of factors: technological breakthroughs (e.g., the widespread use of new materials such as plastics), postwar reconstruction, demographic shifts, and, more controversially, new forms of economic policy. In the 1970s, growth slowed, unemployment rose, and inflation increased. These problems were compounded by the second oil crisis or shock at the end of the 1970s, which triggered a recession in the early 1980s.

Information Technology and Economic Policy

Toward the end of the 1980s, the world began to experience the benefits of an industrial revolution comparable to the harnessing of steam power and the development of the factory system at the end of the 18th century and the science-led industrial revolution at the end of the 19th century based on the application of electricity to industrial production and the development of science-based industries such as chemicals. This third industrial revolution was based around information technology. Mainframe computers had been available for some time and had been used for tasks such as processing inventory and wages. However, it became possible to network micro or desk computers, and this opened up new possibilities in information...
management in companies. Advances in computer-aided manufacturing and computer-aided design also facilitated automation and precision production in manufacturing. This in turn made possible more variations in forms of production, thus facilitating differentiated batches of production to serve niche markets. The Fordist world of production was to become a post-Fordist one, in terms of both systems of production and consumer preferences.

By creating new, faster, and more reliable systems of communication, information and communication technology (ICT) also facilitated the increasing integration of the world economy. This had been a long-term process, driven by technology, market organization, and policy. It increasingly became referred to as “globalization,” although this was a highly contested term. It implied that there had been a step change in the organization of the world economy, and not all analysts accepted that this had been the case. There was also considerable normative dispute about whether globalization was beneficial or not, and this conditioned policy responses to it.

**Trends in Economic Policy**

It is possible to identify a general trend in the world economy with the following characteristics. Except in intermittent recessions, trade tended to grow faster than national output, and this upward trend line was invariably resumed once a recession had ended. Foreign investment tended to grow faster than trade as multinational companies became more dominant in the international economy. Indeed, trade increasingly took the form of trade within multinational companies as they integrated production. The development of these multinational companies created a need for a more integrated international financial system with a wider and more sophisticated range of financial instruments. These financial instruments increasingly developed a momentum of their own with a particular development of trading in debt. Regulators seeking to supervise these developments faced asymmetric information problems: There were too many instruments to supervise effectively with the resources available, particularly given their complexity, and in any case the prevailing philosophy was one of “light touch” regulation. The risks associated with this approach became apparent in the financial crisis of 2008, which was in large part triggered by the issuance of subprime mortgages to borrowers with poor credit histories. These subprime mortgages were then bundled into packages of debt that were traded.

The fundamental problem was that economic policy was still conducted largely at a national level, yet the economic structure was increasingly internationalized. What institutions were available to coordinate economic policy at an international level, and how effective were they? The IMF had been created after World War II to resolve the problem of global imbalances. These problems remained in the first decade of the 21st century, although now the imbalance was principally between the G-2 countries of China and the United States, an economic relationship that was complicated by tensions over security and human rights issues. In economic terms, China played a major role in funding U.S. government debt, enabling the United States to run both a budget deficit and a balance of payments deficit, the latter enabling China to sell its exports into the U.S. market.

The IMF had a clearer role in the era of fixed currencies and relative capital immobility in the period up to the early 1970s. After that, its role became less certain, although it was able to make a significant intervention when British economic policy ran into trouble in 1976, imposing restraint on public expenditure. However, as the story of those events has become better known as the archives opened up, it has become apparent that domestic actors were using IMF intervention to impose greater restraint than was strictly necessary, in part as an effort to restore government authority, which had been undermined by the role of the trade unions as veto groups on economic policy. As larger sums of money started to move around the international financial system, the sums available to the IMF became less significant as leverage on government policy. In the financial crisis of 2008, the IMF was able to bail out smaller economies in serious trouble, such as Iceland and Latvia, but was not able to come up with any general solution to the world’s economic problems.

That role would have at one time fallen on the G-7, which became the G-8 with the addition of Russia. In the 1970s, the G-7 had a clear focus on economic issues, but it increasingly became a general
summit covering topics such as terrorism. Even when it did make pronouncements on economic issues, such as international trade negotiations, it seemed to have little impact. The leaders, particularly the host country, seemed to treat the event as a major profile-raising exercise for domestic audiences, and if any effective work was done, it was by the “sherpas”—officials who prepared the ground for the meetings through bilateral and multilateral contacts. Moreover, the G-7/G-8 appeared to be increasingly irrelevant to the structure of the world economy. It did not include China and other emerging economies. The G-7 included Canada and four EU member states: Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. The inability of the EU to have one representative demonstrates its lack of unity on economic issues, with Britain, in any case, outside the eurozone. The EU’s initial response to the financial crisis was sluggish, with no clear central policy making on economic policy, despite the increasing prominence of the Economic and Financial Council (Ecofin). Perhaps the most important set of policy instruments, certainly in the context of a recession—namely, those of fiscal policy—remained under the control of the individual member states.

The international response was to establish a new body, the G-20, which included emerging countries such as Brazil, China, and India, reflecting the shift in balance of economic power in the world. Some commentators were concerned that the new body had gone too far in the direction of inclusiveness at the expense of effectiveness by bringing in countries such as Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. Nevertheless, it made a relatively effective start to its work, eclipsing the G-7/G-8. This body was left with an uncertain future role. However, it was important not to exaggerate the extent to which power had shifted away from the traditional power holders. Even if the United States could no longer impose its preferred policies on others, an economic policy solution that did not have U.S. support was unlikely to meet with much success.

The international architecture of economic policy making has become increasingly important, but the domestic level remains significant. It is important to appreciate how domestic policy has evolved over time and policy instruments have changed. This in turn needs an appreciation of the importance of economic ideas, the way in which economic orthodoxies have changed, and the significance of economists, within government, in business, in the media, and as academics in influencing policy.

Although the precise origins of the term macroeconomic policy are the subject of some dispute, it was not in common use before World War II. This was because governments did not seek to influence the macroeconomic aggregates beyond pursuing policies of sound money through a balanced budget and a stable currency. In the 1930s, governments in the United States, Britain, and elsewhere did become involved in seeking to rationalize and revive depressed economic sectors, but these were sector-specific policies.

World War II led to a step change in the involvement of governments in economic management, particularly as a consequence of a widespread commitment to the maintenance of full employment, although what exactly constituted full employment was left ambiguous. In his General Theory (1936), John Maynard Keynes had set out an approach that sought to run the economy at a higher equilibrium employment level. Because Keynes wrote so extensively, and his work was interpreted and developed by his disciples after his death, there is some controversy about what exactly may be called “Keynesianism.” In essence, it advocated the use of fiscal policy measures to avert high levels of unemployment by stimulating investment and consumption by reducing taxes and/or increasing public expenditure. Spending on public works was seen to be especially effective, because through the “multiplier” effect originally identified by Richard Kahn, an initial investment could have a far greater effect on levels of economic activity. To prevent the economy from “overheating” as a result of productive capacity not keeping pace with growing aggregate demand (as, e.g., in an economic boom), taxes could be increased and public expenditure reduced. The existence of an inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation rates, as described by the Phillips curve, offered a range of choices to policymakers. Keynesian ideas spread more rapidly in some countries than in others, but by 1971, even an economic conservative like President Nixon was able to state to an ABC News reporter, “I am now a Keynesian in economics.”

These new techniques of economic management seemed to be associated with a prolonged period of relatively high growth and high levels of employment after World War II. However, it is difficult to disentangle how much of this good
performance was due to Keynesianism and how much due to other factors such as the deployment of technological advances made during the war, the needs of postwar reconstruction, and demography. Keynesianism also brought problems in its train. It tended to produce stop–go cycles as the economy was accelerated and decelerated. This was particularly a problem in Britain, and it was thought that one solution was the adoption of the French indicative planning model, but a watered-down version was applied in the United Kingdom.

As Keynes himself had admitted, he had no solution to the inflation problem in a full-employment economy. Countries resorted to various forms of income policies, either agreements between centralized employers’ organizations and trade unions, which held back wage growth, or interventions by government to impose restraint. The more voluntary agreements, provided they were negotiated by centrally controlled trade unions, tended to be more effective, especially in countries such as Austria and Sweden, and came to be known as “corporatism” in the academic literature, although many policymakers did not like this term because of its fascist associations. These arrangements worked well enough in a period of rapid growth when no one left the bargaining table empty-handed, but they became more challenged when growth rates fell in the 1970s, which led to the phenomenon known as stagflation: low growth and high inflation (and increasing unemployment). Barry Eichengreen argues that the institutional arrangements that worked so successfully up to the 1970s were less successful afterward and slowed down the ability of the corporatist economies to readjust to changed conditions.

The apparent failure of Keynesianism led to a search for a new economic orthodoxy, and this was found in the work of Milton Friedman and his advocacy of monetarism. Even in Britain, money supply indicators proved to be too volatile and unreliable to provide a decision rule for the economy, but they ushered in a period when there was a substantial reduction in government involvement in the economy. Controlling inflation was prioritized over maintaining employment, and the accepted economic orthodoxy was reversed so that microeconomic, supply-side policy was seen as the mechanism for achieving growth, while macroeconomic policy focused on the control of inflation. Monetary policy instruments, principally the control of the interest rate, became more important relative to fiscal policy instruments, and emphasis was placed on targeting the inflation rate as the principal economic objective.

One consequence was an increase in the importance of independent or quasi-independent central banks. The Bundesbank as a constitutionally guaranteed autonomous actor had been central to the success of postwar German economic policy. In Britain, from 1997 onward, the New Labour Government had handed over operational control of interest rates to the Bank of England. The reality of “all power to the central bankers” was reflected in the importance of the Federal Reserve to U.S. economic policy. In the EU, the European Central Bank faced a disjuncture in the eurozone: It controlled monetary policy, but fiscal policy remained the responsibility of the member states. The Stability and Growth Pact was supposed to restrain excessive deficit spending by member states but in practice failed to do so as it was defied by France and Germany.

Colin Crouch and others have traced the evolution of a system of “privatized Keynesianism” in which an economic stimulus was provided, particularly in Britain and the United States, by large amounts of consumer and corporate debt. This increasingly became linked to the housing market, with Britain using an inflation measure as a policy guide that omitted the cost of housing. However, the provision of increasingly risky loans and the increased selling of financial instruments made up of packages of debt undermined the foundations of the financial system. It led to the subprime crisis in the United States triggered by defaults on loans to poor-quality borrowers, which developed into a serious global financial crisis and contributed to the onset of a severe economic recession by 2008.

A range of new policy instruments had been deployed to cope with this crisis, with renewed efforts to achieve effective international coordination. Some saw the events as vindicating Keynesianism, although not all countries, particularly Germany, were enthusiastic about a fiscal stimulus based on government debt. New techniques of “quantitative easing” involved central banks buying up corporate and government debt, so the central banks remained key actors alongside government economic ministries. The result of these measures was a massive increase in public debt. Although low
Economic statecraft is the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals. Foreign aid, trade, and policies governing the international flow of capital can be used as foreign policy tools and are considered the most common forms of economic statecraft. In principle, policies governing the international movement of labor could also be considered instances of economic statecraft if they are intended to promote foreign policy goals; but such measures are not usually included under the rubric of economic statecraft and are not considered here. This entry discusses the forms of economic statecraft, the uses of such instruments, and approaches to the study of economic statecraft.

Economicstatecraft

Economic statecraft is the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals. Foreign aid, trade, and policies governing the international flow of capital can be used as foreign policy tools and are considered the most common forms of economic statecraft. In principle, policies governing the international movement of labor could also be considered instances of economic statecraft if they are intended to promote foreign policy goals; but such measures are not usually included under the rubric of economic statecraft and are not considered here. This entry discusses the forms of economic statecraft, the uses of such instruments, and approaches to the study of economic statecraft.

Economic techniques of statecraft are distinguished from other foreign policy tools, such as the following: (a) military statecraft, which concerns the use or threat of military force; (b) diplomacy, which concerns negotiation; and (c) propaganda, which concerns manipulating verbal or visual symbols. Most foreign policies consist of some combination of these techniques.

Economic statecraft takes many different forms, including both positive and negative sanctions. Negative sanctions are actual or threatened punishments, while positive sanctions are actual or promised rewards. Examples of negative sanctions include the following: refusing to export (embargos), refusing to import (boycotts), covert refusals to trade (blacklists), purchases intended to keep goods out of the hands of target countries (preclusive buying), deprivation of ownership (expropriation), punitive taxation, aid suspensions, and asset freezes. Examples of positive sanctions include preferential tariffs, subsidies, foreign aid, investment guarantees, and preferential taxation of foreign investment.

Neither the study nor the practice of economic statecraft is of recent origin. Although the Athenian use of the Megarian Decree may be the most famous example from ancient times, it was surely not the first. Examples of various types of economic statecraft can be found throughout recorded history. The use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals has been discussed by a number of thinkers through the ages, including Plato, Aristotle, John Locke, Francis Bacon, Montesquieu, David Hume, Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List, John Stuart Mill, Woodrow Wilson, and John Maynard Keynes.

Tools of economic statecraft have been used to pursue a wide variety of foreign policy goals.
These include preparing for war, preventing war, fighting a war, promoting democracy, punishing human rights violators, promoting communism, opposing communism, promoting economic development, discouraging economic development, preventing regime change, encouraging regime change, and many other goals. Pericles, Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, and the United Nations (UN) have used various forms of economic statecraft to pursue goals that were sometimes noble and sometimes nefarious. Like other techniques of statecraft, economic tools can be used wisely or unwisely, justly or unjustly, depending on the situation.

In the first part of the 20th century, the League of Nations generated hopes that warfare could, to some extent, be prevented or replaced by economic sanctions. The League of Nations imposed sanctions on Italy in response to its invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 partly to punish Italy but also to warn Hitler of its members’ determination to resist aggression. The failure of the sanctions with respect to both goals generated a widespread belief that such measures do not work. Much of the last half of the 20th century was dominated by the acceptance of this belief as conventional wisdom.

Answering the question of whether economic sanctions “work,” however, is more complicated than it seems. There is not even a consensus on what “work” means in this context. Does it mean complete achievement of the primary goal? Of all goals? At what cost? And in comparison with which alternative techniques? These are just some of the questions begged by the misleading question: “Do economic sanctions work?”

The first—and most important—step in evaluating the utility of any technique of statecraft, including economic sanctions, is identifying what goals were being pursued with respect to which targets. In the case of the League of Nations sanctions against Italy, for example, impressing Hitler was probably more important than stopping Italian aggression. In addition, there was a desire not to impose such hardship on Italy that it might undermine the fascist regime and bring the communists to power.

Human beings in general—and nation-states in particular—rarely, if ever, pursue only one goal at a time with respect to only one other individual or group. When a country imposes economic sanctions on another country, it is usually pursuing multiple goals of varying degrees of importance with respect to a multiplicity of other actors in the international arena. Although no assessment of the overall success of an influence attempt based on economic means could be expected to consider all goals and targets, it is reasonable to expect such assessments to consider the most important goals and targets. Most attempts to assess the success of economic sanctions, however, consider only one goal with respect to one target.

An additional complication is that success is almost always a matter of degree. In statecraft, as in everyday life, complete success in goal attainment occurs rarely—if ever. The potential number of degrees of success (or failure), of course, is infinite; thus, any attempt to measure degrees of success must involve simplification. Whether a 3-point scale or a 16-point scale is more appropriate is a matter for reasonable dispute, but a dichotomous conception, which fails to allow for any degree of success, is difficult to justify. Most influence attempts are likely to result in some degree of success with respect to at least some goals and some targets.

In addition to estimating goal attainment, determining the success of economic sanctions involves estimating the costs of the undertaking. Measuring the costs of economic sanctions is usually easier than measuring the noneconomic costs. Political costs are likely to be both important and difficult to measure. This does not mean that reasonable estimates are impossible.

Perhaps the most difficult step in assessing the utility of economic techniques of statecraft is setting such assessments in the context of the logic of choice. Without comparable evaluations of the costs and benefits of alternative techniques of statecraft, estimates of the likely costs and benefits of economic sanctions are of little or no interest. For policymakers, it is the relative utility of a policy option that matters. This is especially important when the alternative to economic sanctions is military force. In such cases, economic sanctions often provide a policy alternative with modest expectations of goal attainment at relatively low cost, while military force involves a higher probability of goal attainment accompanied by much higher costs.

If the goal is to choose the policy alternative with the most utility, the rational choice may be
one that accomplishes fewer goals at much lower cost. The U.S.–led invasion of Iraq in 2003 provides an example. The economic sanctions against Iraq were not providing the United States with the degree of assurance that Iraq was not building weapons of mass destruction that it desired, and sanctions were not bringing about regime change even though several of the goals specified by the UN had been accomplished. Advocates of war argued that the costs of maintaining the sanctions could go on for years, whereas the costs of war would be limited in both time and magnitude. As is often the case, the costs of war were significantly underestimated. Thus, to make a policy-relevant assessment of the utility of economic sanctions, it is necessary not only to estimate the costs and benefits of sanctions but also the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, such as war.

The critics of economic sanctions often dismissed them as “merely symbolic,” implying that they were empty gestures aimed at giving domestic audiences the false impression that “something was being done.” Although some economic sanctions may well fit this description, not all do. As scholarly work in foreign policy and international politics has come to recognize the importance of signaling, the symbolic uses of economic sanctions have received serious scholarly attention. Economic sanctions can serve as costly signals that increase the credibility of foreign policy stances. Thus, the symbolic use of economic sanctions can be an important way to influence the actions and attitudes of other countries. Game-theoretical models have been especially useful in the study of this aspect of economic statecraft.

In sum, economic statecraft is the use of economic means in pursuit of foreign policy goals. As with other foreign policy tools, economic statecraft can be used to make either threats or promises and to either punish or reward. And as with other foreign policy tools, success is often difficult to evaluate.

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See also Diplomacy; Foreign Aid and Development; Foreign Policy Analysis; International Political Economy; International Trade; Sanctions

Further Readings

ECONOMIC THEORIES OF POLITICS

Economic theories of politics use theoretical approaches from economics to analyze political phenomena. This entry examines assumptions about rational choice that are shared by the two fields and discusses the application of rational choice approaches, including game theory, to the analysis of individual choice and strategic interactions. It then considers the way in which social choice theory can illuminate the aggregation of individual choices in collective decision making. The relationship of such processes to voting, particularly in the context of democracy, is described. Finally, the entry looks at the application of economic theories to international relations with respect to issues such as arms races, war, development, and trade.

Rational Choice and Strategic Interactions

Most political scientists would agree that politics involves “control, influence, power, or authority.” If one adds Max Weber’s concerns about government, legitimacy, and the state, together with Aristotle’s more normative focus on issues of participation, citizenship, and justice, one has a fairly complete picture of what Robert Dahl calls the “political aspect.” One can see immediately how politics touches every dimension of human activity, including the procedural or distributional dimension (who gets what, when, how, why, and at whose cost?); the legal or statist dimension, which
involves issues of governance and legitimacy; and the ethical or normative dimension, which revolves around questions of citizenship, justice, and participation.

The study of politics, like economics, also involves preferences, interests, and trade-offs. But unlike economics, where the emphasis is on scarcity and efficiency, in politics the primary emphasis is on power, influence, and authority, with strong ethical and normative overtones, concerning justice, membership, and citizenship. In a free market, the allocation of scarce goods and resources takes place according to the logic of the marketplace (the price mechanism)—that is, the interaction of supply and demand. The exercise of power, however, takes place in the ideational, legal, and institutional confines of political systems.

Then, what have economic theories added to the study of politics? Political scientists know that politics, unlike economics, is not interested narrowly in the allocation of scarce goods and resources. Although politics affects markets through policies, laws, and rules that regulate competition, in a mixed capitalist system politics is not directly concerned with the individual economic decisions of consumers and producers or the optimal allocation of scarce resources. But politics, like economics, does involve choices and strategic interactions. This is where those who advocate a positive approach to the study of politics join forces with economists to lay the micro-foundations of political analysis. So-called rational choice approaches in political science share common assumptions with economics about human rationality and strategic decision making, and economists seek to construct economic theories to explain political behavior.

The most common economic theories of politics take rational choice approaches. They assume that individuals are rational in the sense that they will make choices to “maximize their chances of achieving their goals” (Barbara Geddes, 2003, p. 177). They give priority to agency (individual rational actors) over structure (institutions and other political constraints). They assume that individuals have goals and that institutions and other factors affect individual strategies and preferences. In this framework, utility-maximizing individuals will do what they can to achieve their goals, engaging in strategies to anticipate the actions of others (their opponents), who will in turn anticipate the actions of the other side. Strategic interactions therefore refer to the ways in which each individual not only looks out for his or her own interests but also takes into account the interests and strategies of others. In this rational choice framework, conflict, cooperation, and the give and take of political life are outcomes of myriad strategic interactions.

Rational choice approaches often use game theory to understand the complexity of strategic interactions in situations of conflict. Developed by applied mathematicians in the mid-20th century, game theory is widely used by economists and, to an increasing extent, by political scientists. Game theory is not a “theory” in the sense of a set of claims, laws, or propositions about the way the world works. It is rather a method of constructing theories, and it offers the analyst a set of concepts and tools that enable him or her to formalize arguments. Game-theoretic analysis requires careful specification of the beliefs, wants, and needs of individuals and a clear understanding of what strategies are available to them. The need for specificity makes game theory less useful as a tool for applied political and social science; nonetheless, it helps political and social scientists understand the logic and structure of politics, whether they are studying voting, international relations, or policy making.

**Strategic Interactions and Collective Choice**

Rational choice approaches or “economic theories” of politics begin with assumptions about individual rationality. But how do collective decisions relate to individual choices? To answer this question, social choice theory focuses on how individual preferences are aggregated and what roles institutions play in “engineering” social (or collective) choices. The disjuncture between individual and collective preferences is summed up in Condorcet’s paradox—the puzzle that calls into question the notion of majority rule, which is incapable of producing a stable relationship between individual preferences and collective decisions. Kenneth Arrow sought to address the puzzle of how individual preferences affect collective choices and concluded that there is no mechanism short of a dictatorship that can achieve collective rationality. This is known as Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
As an economic theory of politics, Arrow’s theorem helped explain how democracies work. Arrow does not prove that collective rationality—which would guarantee the aggregation of individual preferences transitively—requires concentration of power in the hands of a single decision maker or dictator. The main implication of Arrow’s theorem is that institutions are the critical link in understanding how radically divergent individual preferences are translated into collective action in rather stable ways.

Building on Arrow’s social choice theory, William Riker (1980) argues that

politics is the dismal science because we have learned from it that there are no fundamental equilibria to predict. In the absence of such equilibria we cannot know much about the future at all, whether it is likely to be palatable or unpalatable, and in that sense our future is subject to the tricks and accidents of the way in which questions are posed and alternatives are offered and eliminated. (p. 443)

While Riker recognized the failure to find equilibria for collective rationality, he stressed the importance of institutions for the smooth functioning of a democracy. His answer to the question of how democracies can reach collective decisions despite the lack of equilibria was

[in a democracy] the way . . . tastes and values are brought forward for consideration, eliminated, and finally selected is controlled by . . . institutions. And institutions may have systematic biases in them so that they regularly produce one kind of outcome rather than another. (p. 443)

Following Riker’s expansion of Arrow’s theorem, political and social scientists must ask how institutions matter in democratic decision making. Many studies have debated whether and how institutional structures determine the existence and location of equilibria for collective choice. Anthony Downs points out that governments are not really interested in maximizing individual voters’ preferences but in maximizing votes. In his analysis, the sole point of politics is to gain and hold power; in a two-party system, politicians are forced to take positions as close as possible to the median voter. Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal (1978), however, showed that once agenda control is taken into consideration, the collective outcome of policy making is often not the median voter’s ideal point. Kenneth Shepsle (1979), in a more generalized way, shows that institutions could induce equilibrium for collective choice where individual preferences alone would not yield equilibrium.

Voting has long been a principal subject of political analysis, from the so-called paradox of voting, first identified by Downs—why should individuals bother to vote when the costs of voting (time and effort) far outweigh the benefits (the likelihood that a single vote will influence the outcome)?—to strategic voting. Maurice Duverger points out that the strategic behavior of voters and candidates is heavily influenced by electoral institutions. Duverger’s law holds that plurality voting in single-member districts tends to produce two-party systems, whereas voting based on proportional representation or multimember districts leads to multiparty systems and coalition governments. In two-party systems, candidates have an incentive to obfuscate and avoid taking strong stands on key issues as they jockey for position vis-à-vis the median voter; in multiparty systems, however, candidates have an incentive to take stronger positions to attract a significant minority of voters, but their positions may change once they enter a coalition government. In retrospect, these arguments may seem obvious or almost self-evident, but they are in fact early examples of economic reasoning in the study of politics.

Following Duverger and others, one can see that political parties and electoral systems are the most important institutions for the smooth functioning of a democracy. They translate and aggregate individual preferences into policy. John Aldrich (1995) argues that democracies would not work without parties. He shows how parties regulate the number of people seeking office and how they mobilize voters to achieve and maintain the majorities needed to implement policy once they have gained power. By aggregating individual preferences, parties help solve (or at least side step) Arrow’s impossibility theorem, and they move society toward equilibria that make governing possible. This argument for the importance of parties relies heavily on economic reasoning, and it
assumes that voters are able to make informed choices.

To take a concrete example, the founders of the American Republic believed that voters would have enough information to make the “right choices.” In the Federalist Papers, James Madison argued that people should have the “virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom.” Studies of democratic elections, however, have found that individuals lack detailed information about politics. Voters make their choices by trusting expert opinion, by accepting consensus judgments, and by using what little information they have to make their choices at the ballot box. In short, voters vote as if they are well informed and using the limited information available to them.

Strategic Interactions and International Relations

Economic theories of politics abound in the study of international relations. At first glance, it is not surprising to see that states are more often than not in conflict, because each state must pursue its own interests, maximizing its power and wealth to provide security. States are trapped in a security dilemma; if they do not correctly assess threats from other states, they risk their very survival. The logic of the security dilemma is often explained in game-theoretic terms, using the so-called prisoner’s dilemma, whereby states are compared with two prisoners, accused of a crime, jailed, and isolated by prosecutors. Each prisoner is offered a deal if he or she will confess. If both confess, each will receive a moderate sentence; if neither confesses, both will receive a reduced sentence; and if one confesses and the other remains silent, the one who confesses goes free while the other receives a life sentence. The smart play is to keep quiet, but by not knowing what his or her partner in crime will say to the authorities, each prisoner’s temptation to confess (defect) is overwhelming. The point is that actors have an individual incentive to defect, which leads to an outcome of mutual defection even though both would be better off with mutual cooperation. With respect to the security situation, it may seem irrational for states to engage in an arms race, thereby increasing the propensity to go to war and making it more difficult to resolve their differences through negotiations. However, military expansion yields a better outcome than disarming when the other side arms, even though the best outcome would be for both states to disarm. Thus, the states engage in an arms race, which is costly and may lead to war.

Motivated by this puzzle, James Fearon (1995) offers several “rationalist explanations for war.” He postulated three mechanisms by which conflict can lead to war. First, war may occur if there is uncertainty about the adversary’s capabilities, such as the size of the military, the effectiveness of military technology, the quality of leadership, and the contribution, if any, of allies to the cause. There may also be uncertainty about the adversary’s resolve to fight wars, which raises questions about how much each side values the “good” that is in dispute and what the ultimate cost of war will be in terms of blood (casualties) and treasure (wealth). Second, Fearon argues that war can occur if states are unable or unwilling to honor bargains—versions of the prisoner’s dilemma. If there are advantages in striking first, if the relative power of one side is expected to grow rapidly, or if the bargaining is over goods that affect future bargaining power, then states may face a choice between war today on favorable terms and the threat of war tomorrow on unfavorable terms (the shadow of the future). Finally, bargaining may not help avoid war if the good in dispute is indivisible.

Hence, Fearon’s economic theory of war shows us that a mutual (and rational) preference for peace is not sufficient for states to overcome the “asymmetric information problem.” As a result, states generally have incentives to exaggerate and misrepresent their capabilities and their resolve to fight—recall the bluster of Saddam Hussein in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States (also known as the second Gulf War). In such a situation, the danger is that brinksmanship—the act of sending credible signals about capabilities or resolve—may raise the risk of war.

One of the enduring issues in the study of international relations is the so-called democratic peace argument, with many competing arguments about why democracies rarely, if ever, fight wars against one another. One explanation is that democracy increases the political costs of war by making elected leaders accountable to people who ultimately must pay the costs of war. Another explanation is that democracy increases transparency,
which may help overcome the asymmetric information and commitment problems in strategic interactions between states, thereby reducing the severity of the security dilemma. An alternative argument is that democratic states never go to war with each other because they almost always have a common enemy—an example would be the Soviet Union versus the Western democracies during the Cold War period.

Some have argued that international institutions reduce the risks of war and help alleviate the security dilemma. The United Nations (UN), for example, provides a set of rules that structures international relations in such a way as to promote collective security. However, the UN, like other international institutions, lacks the capacity to enforce its rulings. States have the right to defend themselves when attacked—the self-help rule—but there is no guarantee that other states will come to their aid. Still, some would argue that international institutions mitigate the effects of anarchy and promote cooperation. By setting up norms and rules and through creating repeated interactions (iterative games), international institutions help states overcome the security dilemma, and cooperation rather than conflict becomes the norm of international relations—this is the so-called shadow of the future. Institutions offer a set of norms and standards of acceptable behavior; they provide information about activities of other states (potential adversaries), thereby creating linkages across issues and raising the costs of free riding and defection (Lisa Martin & Beth Simmons, 2001).

Economic theories of politics not only help us understand the classic issues of war and peace in international relations, but they are essential to understanding trade policy. If economists are correct in arguing that trade is beneficial for all trading partners, then why do some states insist on protecting their markets, restricting trade, and damaging the prospects for world economic growth and welfare? Is this not irrational behavior? The theory of comparative advantage shows that trade is beneficial for society as a whole, but it is known that trade creates winners and losers. Using the simple economic logic of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which postulates that protectionism leads to an increase in the income of a state’s scarce factor, Ronald Rogowski (1989) developed a theory to explain how political coalitions form to support or oppose free trade. The logic of collective action suggests that when the benefits of protectionism are concentrated and the costs are diffuse, the state may be captured by powerful interests who stand to win from protectionism. Conversely, if a state pursues free trade and opens its markets, the benefits will accrue to the exporting sectors, in which case the state is able to overcome collective action problems and pursue a trade liberalization policy. This is a classic example of an economic theory of politics, which helps us understand the politics of trade.

The same reasoning can be applied to problems of development. At a meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Cancun in 2003, talks aimed at reducing protectionism and liberalizing trade broke down due to a conflict between rich and poor states. Here, one can see how the decline of U.S. economic power has made it more difficult to achieve multilateral trade agreements. In the absence of a leader (hegemon), there is a greater propensity for states to pursue beggar-thy-neighbor policies and to free ride—gain the benefits of trade but without paying the costs (lower tariffs and less protectionism) needed to maintain an open international economy. More important, the integration of developing countries into the global market has generated a backlash against trade liberalization. As Geoffrey Garrett (1998) notes, unskilled workers in developed countries—losers from free trade according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem—have opposed globalization because of fear of downward pressure on wages, while people in developing countries (and the activists who speak for them) fear vulnerabilities to global markets. Though economists argue that social welfare policies to support the losers of free trade and the recent trend of globalization (such as income compensations) are more efficient than trade protectionism, the formal model of Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson (2006, chap. 10) shows that global capital mobility makes it more difficult for a democracy to provide social welfare policies that the majority of the citizens may want.

**Conclusion**

Supporters of economic theories of politics, specifically rational choice approaches, argue that it is the most scientific (hypothetico-deductive) way of
studying politics, and as such they contend that it is high time that the discipline of political science embraces a more rationalist and utilitarian theory of politics. Some would go so far as to say that rational choice theory constitutes a “scientific revolution” à la Thomas Kuhn, moving the study of politics away from its formal-legal and social-psychological roots and in the direction of more systematic and falsifiable propositions. The irony is that economics seems to be moving in the opposite direction, with a renewed emphasis on socio-psychological approaches to the study of markets and economic behavior. Perhaps the two disciplines will meet halfway and a true political economy will emerge; but this seems unlikely because the objects and the subjects of inquiry are quite different. This entry cannot begin to resolve the dispute between rationalists and social psychologists and institutionalists; instead, it falls back on Weber who leaves ample room for rationalist and interpretivist approaches to the study of politics.

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See also Collective Security; Game Theory; Rational Choice; Social Choice Theory; Strategic (Security) Studies

Further Readings


Effectiveness, Bureaucratic

This entry discusses bureaucratic effectiveness and its meanings. These various meanings include an agency’s political capabilities and effectiveness at acquiring resources, its ability to preserve its autonomy, and ultimately its ability to produce public value and to measure that value. The validity of metrics, however, is related to clarity of goals, and some goals and functions are inherently clearer than others. In addition, political controversy makes clear goal definition problematic.

Varieties of Bureaucratic Effectiveness

It is difficult to find a single definition of bureaucratic effectiveness. A big part of the explanation for that lies in the many distinct functions that bureaucratic agencies have. Some have very defined customer service characteristics. An automobile licensing agency, for example, may be able to calculate the wait time for its customers and seek to cut that through better management. Taxing agencies might well calculate their effectiveness in terms of recovering revenue. But what, some have asked, does a foreign ministry do and how does one measure whether or not it is meeting its goals, assuming it could define them?

It is necessary to distinguish between bureaucracies in the private and public spheres. Generally, private firms measure their success, if they are public stock corporations, in the confidence of their investors. This is typically reflected in the value of its stock price and its trajectory. In the public sphere, however, bureaucratic agencies’ missions are defined by legal and political authority, and usually these missions are articulated in ways that
are highly general, aspirational, vague, and potentially even contradictory.

Bureaucracies may be effective or ineffective across many different dimensions. Some dimensions consider their prowess in politics and gaining power, others with maintaining their autonomy and organizational culture, and yet others with procuring resources sufficient for the tasks to which they have been assigned. Additional dimensions have to do with defining and gaining acceptance for favorable accounts of success, gaining reputation for innovation and efficient management, and other measurements of organizational outputs. And sometimes bureaucratic agencies have the good (or bad) fortune to have outcomes move in a favorable (or unfavorable) direction despite their own activity. The perceived quality of police agencies, for example, is often related to the rise and fall of crime rates whether or not the police actually are directly responsible for these trends. Ironically, the higher the crime rate, the more the police may be valued whereas the lower the crime rate, the more the public and its politicians may find downsizing the police acceptable. This produces perverse incentives for the police agencies, although they are not the only agencies for whom less demand threatens their resources.

**Resources and Alliances**

As individuals, we generally prefer more to less. Organizations are no different. They too prefer having greater resources to work with than fewer. For one thing, it makes it more likely that agencies can achieve more of their goals than not. It is also a sign of an agency’s power, raising the stakes for those who may be trying to cut it down to size. Having more resources rather than fewer also helps maintain morale and makes it more possible to retain highly qualified employees.

There is a need to distinguish, however, between resources that are mandated under law, such as pension benefits, and discretionary or appropriated resources. Transfer payments, for example, may account for a high level of mandated expenditures, whereas increasing agency personnel or giving more discretion as to how personnel may be used is a discretionary, and highly valued, resource.

Ensuring the availability of slack resources (sufficiency plus a reserve) is often an indicator of an organization’s political prowess. Resource availability or lack thereof is also a function of the priorities of political leadership outside the organization. In view of these shifting priorities from the outside, the ability to generate support and allies of a long-standing nature and to be buffeted from political turbulence is the mark of a politically effective organization. Effective engagement with stakeholders and sources of political support and the ability to make its functions seem indispensable are essential to the political effectiveness of bureaucracy.

**Capability and Instrumentation**

No organization wants to be caught lacking the capability or instruments to do effectively the jobs for which it is tasked. Bureaucracies with capital and labor-intensive functions—notably in defense, transportation, infrastructure, and other high-capital investment sectors, including science and technology—often have two competing incentives. One is technical efficiency, defined here as the most effective route for the best marginal return on resources. Another is political support, emphasizing the extent to which capital projects can spread largesse sufficient to attract and sustain political support or be able to provide a compelling narrative. Sending astronauts to Mars, for example, provides a more compelling narrative than sending robots, though the scientific merits of doing so are at least debatable. Nearly all public agencies and especially those that can disperse capital projects face the choice between efficiency and political support. It is necessary to distinguish between the instruments and capabilities that are needed to effectively perform an agency’s tasks and those needed to attract substantial political support. Too much emphasis on the first likely will lead to insularity and even irrelevance. But excessive emphasis on the latter frequently leads to the displacement of goals and certainly to inefficiencies.

**Preserving Organizational Definition**

All bureaucratic organizations face conflicts between their missions and the political needs related to their budgets and resources. This conflict can be viewed as a struggle, on the one hand, between the desire for organizational autonomy and securing the integrity of an organization’s
mission from outside interference and, on the other, the need to gain broad legitimacy in order to sustain organizational functions. As organizations accept more functions and diversify their stakeholders, they run the risk of losing control over mission definition. Not all bureaucracies desire to absorb new functions for precisely these reasons, but others, perhaps most, prefer more to less and will adapt their missions to gain political support.

Typically, bureaucracies dealing with finance, treasury, and overhead functions in financial accountability have been able to minimize external clientele interference in their affairs and even, to some degree, political interference. Some specialized scientific and technological functions as well as similarly situated military or intelligence units have also managed to preserve significant autonomy partly because their activities seem sufficiently esoteric and technical. The ability of bureaucracies to sustain autonomy depends on creating an aura of professionalism and success on matters that everyone cares about. An organization whose initial leadership has played an outsized role in establishing an aura of invincibility and indispensability can help sustain substantial organizational autonomy—and resources. From an agency’s standpoint, the combination of resources and autonomy is the goal.

Innovation and Adaptation

So far, the discussion of bureaucratic effectiveness has focused on political problems—procuring support, gaining resources, ensuring that capabilities exist for the functions that have been assigned, and preserving organizational autonomy. These are, however, means to ends. From an agency’s standpoint, those means provide advantages in power struggles and enable the bureaucracy to control its destiny. Public bureaucracies, however, are supposed to do more than harbor resources. Presumably, their purpose is to achieve public goals efficiently.

Thus, another way of examining organizational improvements is to assess how well a bureaucracy innovates or adapts to new conditions. Non-incremental change does not come naturally to bureaucracies weighted down by inertia. Both experts and leaders may account for organizations’ adaptive and innovative capabilities. Technical experts within bureaucracies can play an important role in policy innovations. Organizational leaders may emphasize the importance of continuous adaptation. Slogans abound to call attention to leaders who claim to find ways to innovate, for example, “doing more with less.” Whether there is actual innovation or mere cost-cutting is another question. Organizational leaders acquire a reputation by appearing to be innovative, and that becomes useful currency to the leaders, if not to their organizations. The language and symbols of innovation, however, usually outpace its actual occurrence.

Innovation is itself a challenging concept in the literature on bureaucratic effectiveness. It is not easily defined. One thing that can be said about an innovation is that it represents a parametric shift in the way in which some activity is conducted or in the way it is defined. The standard assumption is that it is better to innovate than enervate.

From Goals to Metrics

Increasingly, bureaucracies have to operationally define their goals and assess their progress through quantitative indicators. These procedures may be related to an organization’s actual goals, but the goals may be redefined so as to be measurable. To the extent that metrics are outcomes related rather than outputs related, there likely are many uncontrollables present.

Policy areas especially subject to extensive analysis of metrics are education, health, and crime. An analysis of outcomes requires distinctions to be drawn between manipulable matters such as program design, or what agencies should emphasize, and nonmanipulable matters, such as demographics and social backgrounds. Policies may be responsible for only a small part of positive or negative change. Bureaucratic innovations to improve operations and outputs can be taken only within the existing policy parameters. Ultimately, assessing bureaucratic activities through metrics requires agreement on goals and on what the metrics should be. In areas such as education, debate continues on what the purpose of education is and how narrowly or broadly it should be pursued.

There is no doubt that there is more self-assessment undertaken by bureaucratic organizations and more assessments demanded by leadership. Performance evaluation is ongoing, and as with any measurable activity, much depends on the validity of what is being measured and how the
outcomes can best be assessed. All assessments are imperfect, but that is still better than operating blindly. As agencies demand impact assessments in some cases from those whom they regulate, their own regulations also have become increasingly subject to cost–benefit analytics.

The most difficult element to measure in an agency often is management. Outside experts and agencies have collaborated in the United States to try to assess organizational goals for each federal agency. It is probably not terribly surprising to learn that less controversial agencies tend to do better at clarifying their goals or that agencies with higher proportions of civil servants among their senior executives tend to be managed better. Agencies that are politically controversial have more difficulties defining goals since these are likely to change with the political context. These agencies also tend to have a higher proportion of politically appointed officials. In most governments, some agencies are regarded as too important to fail, and party politics is minimized. But equally in most systems, other agencies are seen as offshoots of the policies of current governments or administrations, and some are seen as indulging in pork barrel politics.

In sum, performance evaluation is an imperfect, but necessary, science, and there is simply no question that organizations are being required to know more about potential problems, continually assess improvement efforts, and evaluate the costs of alternatives. This is the essence of a scientific-rational model of effectiveness evaluation in bureaucracies. But metrics demand clarity, and it is easier to distill an appropriate set of metrics when there is clarity about goals. That tends to push against the world of politics, which in turn limits bureaucratic effectiveness.

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See also Bureaucracy; Civil Service; Performance; Performance Management

Further Readings


**Efficacy, Political**

Political efficacy is one of the most important topics in research on political attitudes and political culture. A large number of terms such as ego strength, self-esteem, self-reliance, subjective or civic political competence, or (lack of) powerlessness/futility can be found in the relevant literature as equivalents. The concept, which was first introduced into empirical research by Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Edward Miller (1954), referred to the citizen's self-perception as a knowledgeable, active, and self-confident participant in political life. According to Campbell et al., the sense of political efficacy refers to the feeling that individual political action has or can have an impact on the political process. Political efficacy includes cognitive and behavioral components. The cognitive dimension refers to an individual’s subjective belief that he or she is able to understand what is going on in politics, while the behavioral component taps the citizen’s conviction that he or she can play an active role in politics, exert political influence, and thus cause political leaders and the political system to eventually react responsively to the citizen’s actions. The following describes the development and measurement of the concept and then turns to the way in which political efficacy is used in political research.

**Development and Measurement**

In the first stage of research, political efficacy was regarded as a unidimensional concept important to
the explanation of electoral participation. A cumulative scale to measure feelings of political efficacy consisting of five items was developed and included in the American National Election Survey (ANES) of 1952. The items were worded as follows:

1. “I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think.”
2. “The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country.”
3. “Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how government runs things.”
4. “People like me don’t have any say about what the government does.”
5. “Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on.”

 Rejecting Items 1, 3, 4, and 5 and accepting Item 2 indicated feelings of political efficacy.

The second stage of research was characterized by refining the theoretical concept of political efficacy gradually and improving the measurement. From a theoretical perspective, Robert E. Lane’s study Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics (1959) was an important step forward in the analysis of political efficacy. Lane regarded the prevailing unidimensional concept as too simplistic because it neglected to distinguish the individual’s political self-image as a political actor from the individual’s orientation toward the political environment. Accordingly, he proposed a distinction between the two separate dimensions of internal and external efficacy. The first component, internal political efficacy, entailed the belief that the normal citizen is able to understand and influence politics. External political efficacy referred to the perceived openness and responsiveness of the political system and the political elites.

Lane himself did not validate the distinction between internal and external efficacy. But his contribution served as a starting point for a broad and intense methodological debate on the meaning and the measurement of the concept. Several studies published from the mid-1970s on dealt with the validity of the concept and the quality of the items developed to measure feelings of political efficacy.

Research carried out in this context followed two different lines: on the one hand, validating the distinction of internal from external efficacy and, on the other hand, improving the quality of the items used as measures of these two facets of the concept.

A first important contribution to the validation of the concepts of internal and external efficacy was made in an article published by Balch in 1974. In a construct validation based on external criteria, Balch showed convincingly that internal and external efficacy correlated with different indicators of political attitudes and behaviors: While internal efficacy items were related to political interest, knowledge, and conventional forms of political participation, external efficacy was closely linked to trust in government and participation in unconventional political activities, particularly civil disobedience. The construct of internal efficacy was represented by the “Voting is the only way” and “Politics is too complex” items, while “Officials don’t care” and “People have no influence” turned out to be measures of external efficacy. One of the original items (“Vote decides how things are run”) was dropped from the ANES surveys after 1952.

During the 1970s and 1980s, efficacy items were included in a considerable number of surveys. The improvement of the data situation encouraged a considerable number of methodological studies aimed to validate the concept further. They not only developed and tested additional items but also used more sophisticated strategies of validation, particularly structural equation models. All studies confirmed the theoretical and empirical relevance of the distinction between internal and external efficacy. However, they did not convey clear results regarding the quality of the items and their relationship toward the constructs of external and internal efficacy. To improve the quality of the scales, two additional measures of external efficacy were included in 1968 in the ANES: (1) “Generally speaking, those we elected to Congress in Washington lose touch with the people pretty quickly” and (2) “Parties are only interested in people’s votes but not in their opinions.” These latter two, together with the item “Public officials don’t care,” were mostly used to measure external political efficacy, while the remaining three items served as indicators of internal efficacy. These six items also became part of opinion surveys conducted outside the United
States and in several cross-national surveys. In most recent studies, the “voting” item is no longer used as a measure of internal efficacy due to its ambiguity but replaced by some new items better suited for measuring the citizens’ cognitive capability and feelings of competence. The distinction of these two latter subdimensions of feelings of internal efficacy was also confirmed empirically by several German studies published in the 1990s.

Use in Political Research

The concern with developing appropriate measures played an important, if not dominant, role in research on political efficacy. However, the concept was also applied in several fields of substantive research on peoples’ political attitudes and behaviors. In the initial stages of research, feelings of political efficacy were not so much regarded as a research topic in its own right but rather as an explanatory variable in analyses of political participation. It was assumed and confirmed by empirical research that feelings of political efficacy were positively related to electoral turnout and other forms of political participation, even if education and political interest were held constant. In some of these national and cross-national empirical studies, feelings of (internal) political efficacy were introduced as independent explanatory concepts, and in others, they were considered as being part of a broader class of attitudes, labeled as “psychological involvements in politics.” The traditional assumptions on the direction of the causal link of (internal) political efficacy to political participation were challenged by some empirical studies in the 1980s and 1990s, which showed a reciprocal relationship between political efficacy and participation. Accordingly, feelings of political efficacy not only encourage people to become active participants, but active participation in political life also consolidates and strengthens the citizens’ self-perception as competent and influential political actors.

Most of the studies mentioned so far referred to conventional forms of political participation. As political protest became more widespread in the Western world, some attempts to explain the new phenomenon also referred to political efficacy. Some studies emphasized the interaction of political distrust and political efficacy as determinants of different types of political behavior. Accordingly, the coincidence of low efficacy and low trust was assumed to be a source of extreme political disengagement, because people characterized by a likewise combination of attitudes did not feel sufficiently competent and at the same time doubted that government officials would behave in an appropriate way if in the face of civic activity. On the other hand, a combination of high efficacy and low trust was seen as leading to political protest, civil disobedience, and sometimes even political aggression or violence, because people felt influential but did not trust the government to behave appropriately. People who primarily relied on conventional or reformist styles of political influence were characterized by a strong sense of political efficacy going along with strong trust in politics. Explanations of this type became familiar under the heading of the “efficacy–distrust hypothesis.” However, empirical support for this assumption was rather weak.

Apart from research on political participation, the analysis of civic self-consciousness developed as an independent field of research in the 1950s. Scholars such as Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, Robert Lane, Paul Sniderman, and Alex Inkeles introduced political efficacy and related concepts as parts of the democratic personality or of a broader syndrome called “civic culture” or “participant citizenship,” which was considered an important cultural prerequisite of a modern, particularly democratic, political community. In their study *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Almond and Verba (1963) introduced subjective civic competence as an indispensable element of a democratic political culture. According to them, the civic culture is characterized by a pattern of political attitudes contributing to two different requirements of democratic politics: the power to govern effectively on the one hand and responsiveness to the people’s demands on the other. While they conceived political trust as the attitude providing power to elites to make and implement authoritative decisions and policies, subjective political competence functions as a counterbalance to power in their view. Only competent citizens become active to make their voices heard in political life. The mere perception of the potentiality of civic activity—and less the activity in itself—was regarded by Almond
and Verba as a sufficient condition of elite and systemic responsiveness. The idea of a necessary balance of political power and responsiveness (structure), and political trust and efficacy (culture) is emphasized by several theoretical and empirical contributions to research on political culture and democratic citizenship. Other contexts in which political efficacy or concepts similar to political efficacy can be found are studies of political apathy and political alienation. In research on political apathy (or lack of political involvement), lack of political efficacy is analyzed together with low political interest and political knowledge, and sometimes political participation. Research on alienation distinguishes between several components of the respective syndrome. Feelings of powerlessness, which are the most broadly analyzed component of alienation, are measured by efficacy items in most instances.

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See also Alienation; Apathy; Civic Culture; Civic Participation; Electoral Behavior; Political Culture

Further Readings


ELECTION BY LOT

The election of public officers by lots, or lottery, is a procedure that can prevent the formation of a permanent leading group and diffuse knowledge of public affairs among the members of the community. It can be an appropriate formula in settings in which an assembly of members or representative council makes decisions by broad consensus or unanimity, and public jobs do not require high technical skills. The selection of delegates by turns and the subsequent rotation of people in public offices can have about the same effects as lotteries. There is an old tradition of choosing public officers by drawing lots that can be found in ancient and medieval local democracies, modern private settings, and some international organizations. In most cases, it goes together with the central role of the assembly to make decisions on the most relevant issues, typically by consensual agreement, on the assumption that the identification of a common interest should not be too difficult a task.

The most relevant historical experience of selection of delegates, representatives, or public officers by lots was developed in Athens during the democratic period from the mid-5th century to the end of the 4th century BCE. On the basis of this experience, the philosopher Aristotle built his concept of democracy, which included the possibility of “ruling and being ruled by turns.” In Book IV, Chapter 15, of his Politics, Aristotle introduced a sharp distinction between the appointment of magistrates by lot, which was thought to be democratic, and their election, which was considered oligarchic. By democracy, he meant government by all the people, while election entailed government by an aristocracy consisting of the few best, which could lead to a perverse form of oligarchy. This classical criterion was taken up in the 18th century by the French provincial Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, who regarded suffrage by lot as “natural to democracy.” According to Montesquieu, the advantages of making choices by lot are, first, that it “is unfair to nobody, and [second, that] it leaves each citizen a reasonable hope of serving his country” (The Spirit of Laws, Book 2, chap. 2). Likewise, in Book IV of The Social Contract, the Genevan philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau highlighted the role of lots in an ideal democracy, in which, according to his Athens-inspired, assembly-based model, public offices should be considered “a burdensome charge,” and administrative acts should be reduced as much as possible.
Election by Lot

The choosing of public officers by lots may have, thus, two types of advantages. First, by having this done frequently and establishing short terms of office, it can produce a high rotation of members in administrative or arbitral posts, thus preventing the formation and self-reproduction of permanent and closed elite, whether in the form of an economic oligarchy or a class of professional politicians. By replacing public officials frequently and opening public jobs to wide layers of society, no one can be blamed for making or implementing unpleasant decisions, but no one can be praised either. Only the assembly members remain ultimately responsible for the consequences of collective decisions.

The second type of advantage to choosing by lots and the subsequent rotation in public offices is the production of wide dispersal of knowledge of political and administrative affairs among the citizens. The experience of learning and becoming familiar with the problems of satisfying collective common interests can be a good platform for further occasions of participation in voting and elections, such as the assembly’s decision making and the choice of some other public officials.

Thus, a lottery can be an appropriate procedure to select public officers where there is a clear identification of the common interest of the members of the community, there are relatively low technical requirements to fill some public jobs, and there are alternative solid instruments, such as the assembly’s decision making and the choice of some other public officials.

In the Athenian democracy, in order to preserve the central role of the assembly to make decisions by acclamation or assent, the Council of 500 members in charge of setting the agenda for the assembly was formed of 50 members selected by lot by each of the 10 tribes, which had evolved from military into basic administrative units. The permanent committee of the Council and its president were also selected by lots. About 600 of the other 700 public officers were also selected by lots from among candidates previously presented, including the following: the 10 members of the archonship, approximately equivalent to the post of the modern attorney general, as well as the body in charge of organizing religious ceremonies, who were appointed by lots from a pool of candidates previously selected by each tribe, also by lots; the tribunal members, chosen by lots from a pool of all adult citizens, who were in charge of passing judgment on the legality of the conduct of public officials; and those holding a number of administrative jobs, encompassing treasurers, those in charge of settling public contracts and collecting public revenues, and those supervising streets or inspecting markets. The procedure of selecting candidates for public offices by lots was based, initially, on candidates drawing white and black beans from a container with an open top. In a further development, Athenians also used allotment machines, usually a tube in which balls could be inserted at random and released at the other end.

Among further occurrences, the first apostles of Jesus drew lots to select the replacement for the traitor Judas Iscariot, according to the Acts of the Apostles. On the basis of this precedent, some early nonorthodox Gnostic Christians drew lots at each of their meetings to elect priests, bishops, and other officers. This device could also be aimed at preventing a sacerdotal oligarchy from developing. But the Christian Church condemned such a practice as blasphemy and solemnly forbade the choice of priests, bishops, or other prelates by lot, more formally after the 13th century.

A number of late-medieval and renaissance city-republics and communes around the Mediterranean Sea used lots for choosing magistrates and allocating officers in charge of implementing assembly decisions. This was, in particular, the case in Venice for the indirect election of the Duke (Doge) from the 13th century following direct election by the people’s assembly from the end of the 7th century. The popularly elected Great Council adopted an increasingly complicated, 5-day-long procedure to choose the Duke with up to nine stages of approval ballots and lots, which was conceived with the aim of making manipulative maneuvers impossible. Likewise, the Florentine republics during the 14th and 15th centuries, and again in the late 15th and early 16th centuries, elected their main governmental body, the Lordship (Signoria), chaired by the standard bearer of justice (Gonfaloniere), by means of a complex system of approval ballots and very frequent lots. Again, the aim was to prevent fraud, manipulation, and the commune’s domination by a few powerful families. Also, in Barcelona, at least from the 15th century, the popularly elected...
Council of 100 chose the members of the Consulate of the Sea, the judicial body for commercial and maritime affairs, by an indirect procedure involving lots.

Finally, lots were still being used, in combination with several stages of indirect elections, in Spain and the Spanish colonies in the Americas in the early 19th century. First, elections called by the central junta formed to organize the resistance against Napoleon’s troops were held in 1809, with municipalities electing candidates for deputies that were finally selected by lot. New elections in 1810 to form an extraordinary assembly (“Cortes”), which gathered in Cádiz and produced a new constitution, also involved a combination of indirect elections in three stages and a final selection of one deputy in each district by lots among the two or three candidates previously chosen. After the approval of the so-called constitution of Cádiz in 1812, this type of procedure was not used again in Spain, but it was followed in some further elections in Spanish America. Specifically, in Buenos Aires, indirect elections of colleges (usually called “juntas”) led to the final selection of members of the provincial assembly by lots in 1811, while a mixed procedure of voting, lots, and final popular vote by plurality was used for the election of governors in 1815. In Mexico, local elections in 1812 involved some stage of selection of candidates by lots. In Chile, a combination of lots and plurality voting was still being used in 1822. Lots remained the usual practice in indigenous communities that were not politically integrated into the new independent states’ political institutions. Ironically, they became part of the supposedly traditional “usages and customs” of the indigenous people to be preserved in the 21st century—although the use of lots was actually the most visible legacy of Spanish colonial rule.

The choice of public officers by lots was replaced by election of representatives based on popular votes as new, increasingly large communities and modern states addressed collective issues of higher complexity and as different interests and values developed among their citizens. In current times, lots are used as a method to distribute goods and responsibilities in some private corporations as well as for allocating temporary jobs, vacation periods, or household tasks in other private settings. For public affairs, they are used in some countries for certain sectoral or relatively minor tasks, such as selecting jurors for jury trials, appointing election administrators, breaking election ties, or selecting candidates for military service.

At higher political levels, similar procedures are used in certain institutional settings in confederal or international organizations when members require that decisions be made only by near unanimity or a broad consensus. Some of them use, in particular, procedures of rotation by turns of high public offices, which, a priori and in the long term, produce the same effect of random selection as lotteries. A major example is the Helvetic Confederation of Switzerland, which is still mainly an instrument for preserving popular self-government of the communes and the cantons, where the presidency of the Federal Council is filled in rotation among the Council members by turns. Likewise, for a long period, the chairmanship of the European Council was held in 6-month turns by the member states. The United Nations Organization also distributes some high offices by informal rotation and turns among its member states. The presidency of the General Assembly is filled by “symmetric rotation” among countries of the five regional groups (Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Europe and other developed countries, and Eastern Europe). The Security Council, which works by near-unanimity decisions of the five permanent members, is also formed by a number of temporary members rotating in post for periods of 2 years. They are formally elected by the Assembly, but they must also be distributed fairly from among the different world regions, including two for Latin America and the Caribbean, two for Western Europe, one for Eastern Europe, and five for Africa and Asia. Similar proportions are used for filling, by informal turns, the posts in the Economic and Social Council and other committees.

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See also Consensus; Democracy, Direct; Electoral Systems

Further Readings
Election Observation

Election observation entails “the purposeful gathering of information regarding an electoral process, and the making of informed judgments on the conduct of such a process on the basis of the information collected, by persons who are not inherently authorized to intervene in the process” (UN Code of Practice quoted in Harris, 1997, p. 27).

Thus, election observation is not only central to but also has become part of the electoral process worldwide, especially in emerging democracies. The purposes of electoral observation are to promote transparency and encourage free and fair elections. Openness is an essential element of ensuring confidence in the election process. Election observation helps strengthen the democratic process and institutions, enhances the value of elections, and instills confidence in the outcome of the election (John Dugard, 1998). Election observation is expected to be nonpartisan, so that all interested parties can accept the election observers’ findings on the observed elections. For an election observation to thrive, it has to be credible in the eyes of contesting parties. This trustworthiness comes from the election observers’ refusal to take sides and the impartial and fair-minded nature of the observation endeavor.

Transparency in the electoral process is of critical importance in ensuring public confidence in the election system and recognition of the election outcome (Carl Dundas, 1994). Election observers might persuade some citizens and politicians to take part in the electoral process rather than to resort to violence, as was the case in Angola and Mozambique. In Zambia, in 1991, observers calmed intense disagreements over electoral rules and regulations by asking for concessions from government and electoral officials on areas of disagreement (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1992). Thus, as Gerhard Totemeyer and Denis Kadima (2000) note, election observation can perform a constructive function in generating an environment favorable for everyone to take part in general elections. Election observation adds value to the electoral process and thereby gives it legitimacy. Moreover, the involvement of observers may also encourage a government that has lost power to recognize the outcome and therefore step down. Nicaragua in 1990 under President Daniel Ortega and Zambia in 1991 under President Kenneth Kaunda are cases in point. In this way, election observation helps promote stability.

International observers may be asked to arbitrate disagreements among contesting political organizations in an attempt to lessen hostilities prior to, during, and in the postelection periods. According to the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (1992), for an election outcome to be acceptable to all interested parties, it should not only be seen as free and fair but should also not be marred by allegations of fraud. Thus, although free and fair elections are not a sufficient condition toward democratic consolidation, they are central to democracy development because of “their ability to jump-start the process of democratisation and boost the morale of prodemocracy forces” (Neil Nevitte & Santiago Canton, 1997, p. 51).

Historical Origins

Previously, journalists, academics, and embassy staff observed elections in foreign countries. However, following World War I, political participation in government came to be accepted as a fundamental right of all citizens; since then, election observation has become institutionalized internationally. The United Nations initially took part in election observation in South Korea in 1948, because monitoring the elections in countries coming out of dictatorial military regimes or authoritarian rules was considered essential. Since then, election observation has become common and is used in developed and developing countries. Subsequently, a number of organizations, such as the Commonwealth in 1971 and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1990,
became involved in election observation. There has been an increasing acceptance of the contribution observation makes to the election process notwithstanding its limitations.

As M. Kupe (2000) has noted, participation of observers could help decrease propensities toward improper practices by overzealous political parties or government administrators in charge of elections. The involvement of observers during voting and at the count can help calm down volatile election environments and is thought to encourage the openness of both the polling and counting of the ballot papers (Dundas, 1994). The presence of international observers is intended to promote confidence in the process, to discourage electoral irregularities, and to give an account on the impartiality of the elections to the international community. Election observation ensures that the electoral outcome is credible internationally in the light of specific democratic conditions imposed by donors who provide economic assistance and other help. This explains why election observation has become so important in recent years, especially in countries undergoing political change.

In established democracies, election observation seeks to act as an example to emerging democracies. Election observation is not merely about verifying the fairness of an election; instead, and more crucially, observation efforts strengthen the legitimacy of democratic norms and procedures to thousands of people and, thus, help in building and strengthening a culture of democracy. It is in this context that election observation has come to be accepted as a key part of the democratic process because such efforts seek to promote transparency and accountability—the central tenets of democracy.

Election observation missions take different shapes. Their diversity depends on the type and size of the organization involved, the organization's period of stay in the country holding elections, and the kind of report the organization produces after the elections. Nevertheless, there are certain experienced and credible election observers—the Commonwealth, the European Union, and the Carter Center for Democracy in Atlanta, Georgia—that have greater resources for observation than others. Generally, election observers oversee the administrative arrangements; preparations of the electoral authority; the behavior of election officials, police, party agents, and voters; the sealing of ballot boxes before and after voting; the escorting of boxes to the counting center; and counting (The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, 1994). The observers are expected to produce a report, which highlights the problems noted, and make recommendations. They are also expected to determine whether the elections were free and fair. As Kupe (2000) states,

Election observers are “watchdogs working for the electorate and the political parties involved in the elections. It is their business to make sure that elections are conducted properly during the prescribed times and at the designated venues. It is the observer who reports directly or indirectly to the outside world regarding the fairness, or otherwise, of the election process. (p. 102)

Types of Election Observers

There are two main types of observer groups: local and international groups. Local observers, who are normally citizens of the country whose elections are being monitored, have an advantage over international observers in that they are familiar with the country concerned. However, although local observers promote transparency in the electoral process, they are often treated with suspicion as having a different agenda and thus not seen as impartial. On the other hand, international observers “have added a new dimension to election transparency” (Dundas, 1994, p. 45). Nevitte and Canton (1997) observed that “public confidence in internationally driven [observation] efforts characteristically hinges on the reputation and legitimacy of the international or regional organization involved, and derives in large part from the multinational membership of the observation team in place” (p. 50). For Phiroshaw Camay and Anne Gordon (1999) “international observers bring an added credibility to the monitoring and assessment of elections, in that they are able to refer to their experience elsewhere and apply international standards of good practice wherever they go” (p. 259). Such observations demonstrate that international observers act as a stamp of approval.

Moreover, observer groups can use different approaches to observe elections. These can take the form of regular short visits, permanent groups, mobile teams, or stationary teams. Nevertheless,
Election observation is common in countries undergoing political transformation from autocratic regimes to multiparty systems. The uncertainty and confusion in these countries create concerns about whether election administrations can deliver accurate and impartial electoral results. International observation of elections in Africa initially occurred as nations made the transition from colonial rule to independence (in Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1989) or when there was no centrally controlled authority, as in Uganda in 1980. In 1991, Zambia became the first independent African country to ask for international election observers. According to the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, local and external election observers can help ensure that elections are free and fair, which in turn can contribute to the development of accountable, effective governance. International election observation provides evidence of the extent to which a regime is committed to a variety of democratic values and procedural norms. It also gives voters a critical opportunity to challenge authoritarian governments (Nevitte & Canton, 1997). Such observation occurs primarily in cases where there are doubts that a free and fair election can be conducted (Ananias Elago, 1999). As Bojosi Othogile (1994) notes, these transitional countries are attempting to reconstruct themselves politically and seek affirmation from observers that elections were fairly conducted and that they meet the minimum requirements of an international standard. Such validation can help these countries regain their places in the international community.

As Othogile notes, countries undergoing transformation attract international observers because there is unease surrounding an election in such a country. Observation is meant to reestablish confidence among those contesting such an election as well as among foreign investors and the international community generally.

Notwithstanding the importance of election observation in promoting transparency and accountability in the electoral process, a few observations can be made about election observers. Although election observers are widely appreciated and at times overemphasized, their findings have never resulted in a reelection in any country, regardless of the assessment. The April and December 2003 elections in Nigeria and Russia, respectively, are cases in point. In fact, election observation has become a standard institution that is expected to contribute to the democratic process, especially for the reasons discussed above. Moreover, even if they are expected to be impartial, an element of bias cannot be ruled out. However, their reports might indirectly prompt people to revolt, resulting in a new election.

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See also Democratization; Election Research; Electoral Systems; Transition

Further Readings
Election Research

As the defining institution of democracy, elections have always been a major focus of attention both for political theorists and analysts—and for journalists and practicing politicians. Indeed, it is hard to talk about democracy, either generally or at a national level, without referring to elections. This entry focuses on specialized research, mostly quantitative, into voting at general elections. It thus passes over the interesting and growing literature on direct policy elections (referendums and initiatives) since they are still not a major feature of contemporary democracies except in Switzerland and, at the state level, in the United States. On the other hand, the choices voters make are framed by political parties, so the entry has to consider their activities, particularly as they impinge on voting.

Demographics and Political Geography

While analyses of party organization and campaigning appeared from the latter part of the 19th century onward, the tradition of systematic quantitative studies of voting statistics began with André Siegfried in France, Harold Gosnell in the American Midwest, and V. O. Key in the American South from 1900 onward. Such analyses used demographic data—social and voting statistics, generally from the smallest constituency unit available—to make sophisticated inferences about individual voting behavior and its influence on both personal characteristics and political history.

This tradition of research, however, passed out of the mainstream under the impact of two developments. The first was the discovery of the ecological fallacy involved in inferring individual behavior from aggregate statistics. For example, the finding that constituencies in the United Kingdom with a large Black population voted disproportionately for the racist British National Party (BNP) does not imply that the BNP attracts non-White votes. On the contrary, it shows that Whites in such constituencies vote for it disproportionately, under the impact of high immigration. It is hard to tell from aggregate statistics exactly what is going on at the individual voter level. The second development relates to the use of mass survey techniques.

Survey-Based Research and Social Group Theory

In addition to difficulties involving the ecological fallacy, the problem for the statistical foundations of demographic research was compounded by the application of mass survey techniques to study individual voters directly. This approach was pioneered by Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates in Erie County, New York, for the U.S. presidential election of 1940, and replicated in Elmira, New York, in 1948. Not only did these studies demonstrate the feasibility of applying statistical techniques of sampling and quantitative analysis to voting, but they also demonstrated the way in which data collection and analysis had to be driven by theory to produce relevant conclusions or even to develop a questionnaire in the first place.

Coming from a market research background, Lazarsfeld envisaged voters as behaving like consumers choosing between tins of beans on the supermarket shelves. Relying solely on advertising for their information, brands promoted more in the media would sell better than ones promoted less. The 1940 questionnaire thus featured many questions on voter media exposure (with parallel content analyses of actual media coverage of candidates), with a few questions on social characteristics thrown in for classification purposes. To their surprise, the research team found few and weak correlations between media coverage and voting behavior but strong correlations with class, religion, and urban versus rural residence.

In response, they jettisoned the media and adopted instead a social group theory of voting behavior, measured through an Index of Political Predisposition (IPP), which very roughly measured...
probabilities for individuals with varying combinations of social characteristics voting Democrat or Republican. On this basis, the questionnaire for the 1948 U.S. presidential election sought to understand how voters’ flow of information and voting preferences were structured by their social group membership, pulling them back to the historical group choice in the course of the campaign. Social group theory reached its apotheosis, with the help of computers, when Ithiel de Sola Pool, Samuel Popkin, and Paul Abelson pooled all existing public opinion surveys of American voters to create demographic profiles of the U.S. states and the impact of current issues on small subgroups of voters. On the basis of these simulations, they correctly predicted the result of the 1960 and 1964 presidential elections in advance, achieving high correlations with the actual electoral college votes of the non-Southern states.

The Michigan School: Party Identification and Issue Impacts

The publication by Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes of The American Voter in 1960 not only substituted national mass surveys for local ones but also proposed an alternative conceptualization of voting choice to social group theory. It was not that this “Michigan School” ignored the influence of social factors. They saw them, however, as lying rather far back in the “funnel of causality” preceding the voting act. Their influence was channeled through an individual’s party identification—their affective orientation to an important group object in their environment. Social influences were thus transmuted into individual psychology. Party loyalty then colored the voters’ reactions to immediate influences on how they viewed the candidates and issues of the campaign. The change in these from the end of the 1940s to the 1950s explained the landslide election of the Republican Dwight Eisenhower after the Democratic rally of Harry Truman in 1948.

This conceptualization of voting as essentially individual and psychological in nature dominated empirical research on elections in both the United States and the rest of the world for the next 30 years. In a modified form, it continues to this day. Its dominance is only partly explained by its comprehensive reach and intellectual power. It was also embedded in the design of questionnaires for the mass election surveys now carried out regularly in almost all the developed democracies of the world. The Michigan authors themselves were active in stimulating and organizing such surveys in Europe, from whence they spread to Asia, Latin America, and Australasia.

For the first time, such surveys provided an insight into the political thinking and behavior of ordinary individuals, complemented by the massive increase in both the number and sophistication of public opinion polls. In addition, for the first time, successive surveys provided information about the dynamics of opinion change between elections and the effect this had on party support. Such over-time analyses required continuity in the questions asked at each election, simply to provide comparable information over long periods. This embedded the Michigan School’s conceptualizations and measures even in studies that did not necessarily share their preconceptions or that even set out to challenge them.

Party Identification and Voting Predispositions

The major challenge was to understand the concept of party identification and whether it really differed, methodologically or conceptually, from voting intention. Michigan-style surveys carried out in Europe seemed to indicate that the two were correlated and fluctuated together. If so, what was the point of distinguishing the two?

One answer was to generalize from the specific concept of party identification to the idea of enduring predispositions toward voting in a certain way. The majority of electors vote in the same way from election to election. At the same time, some change their vote, providing the dynamics for election change and party competition. It therefore seems that both predispositions and specific campaign influences such as issues and candidates have to be brought into the explanation of voting choice. A group of largely European scholars in Party Identification and Beyond (2009) argued that both Campbell and his associates and Lazarsfeld and his associates had been trying to do just that. Both party identification (PI) and the IPP were trying to measure predispositions, while both allowed for the differentiated impacts on strong
partisans and weaker ones of short-term campaign effects or election cues.

**Issue Voting and Rational Choice Theory**

This recognition of short-term effects rendered the debate of the 1970s on the “replacement” of PI by “issue effects” from new issues, such as Vietnam, gender bias, and the environment, rather superfluous. It did, however, mark the emergence for the first time of purely theoretical influences on voting research as distinct from the theory-driven data analysis that had dominated the field up to then. These influences stemmed from the seminal presentation by Anthony Downs of *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957)—a collection of many theories and models, not generally reconcilable with each other, of how office-seeking parties competed for votes and electors cast votes for the party closest to them on policy.

The most influential of Downs’s models (because it seemed to fit Anglo-American politics so well) was where two parties competed with each other on policy in a one-dimensional left–right space, along which electors ranged themselves in a symmetrical unimodal distribution, with the central peak coinciding with the median (middle) voter position. To form a majority of 50% plus one, the median vote was crucial, so both parties would move toward the more moderate position of the median voter to secure a majority. This accounted for the consensual bargaining and policy compromises of the Anglo-American democracies, as contrasted with the *immobilisme* and ideological rigidity of multiparty governments.

**Turnout**

Downs’s two-party spatial model had an increasing influence on election research from the 1970s onward, in line with the growing dominance within political science of rational choice reasoning and mathematical modeling. One aspect of his ideas was not closely pursued, however—his demonstration that it was not rational to vote. He assumed that electors wish to consider their policy preference and decide whether to vote on the basis of their utility from this, discounted by the probability of their vote changing the election outcome. Since this probability is always vanishingly small, nobody should vote. As the majority do (in general elections at least), other factors, principally a sense of duty, have to be drafted in as explanations—supported so far as they go by the survey data.

**Economic Voting**

Rational choice theorists seemed to have little difficulty with incorporating duty or altruism into their equations on turnout. On the other hand, voting choice seemed potentially explainable by self-interested, primarily economic, calculations. Government’s ability to sustain prosperity and growth, increase employment, and avoid inflation were increasingly seen as the main drivers of vote. Conceptually, theorists also seemed capable of linking political science more closely with economics in the study of political economy.

While such analyses could be and were carried through at the individual level, on survey data both economic indicators and voting statistics were readily available in aggregated form. Where necessary, survey responses themselves could be aggregated to give preference and policy time series. As a result, the focus of empirical research shifted—from surveys and individual-level analysis to the aggregate level—in the 1980s. As the major objective was to explain (and preferably predict) the overall election outcome, aggregate equations and econometric methods formed a more direct way to approach this. Moreover, the general availability of aggregate indicators lent a comparative dimension to research—all governments published them, whereas election surveys were not always carried out in the countries of interest.

Despite 2 decades of intensive analysis, however, little progress was made toward the ultimate goal of a unified theory of economic voting. A review of around 2,000 concluded that economic conditions produced contradictory and conflicting political results. The main generalization to emerge from numerous studies over different countries was that governments generally lost votes at the rate of 2.2% of their previous vote. The loss was the cost of governing, expressed in economic fashion but hardly due to exclusively economic factors.

**Predispositions and Cues at the Aggregate Level**

One reaction to the failure of economic trends to produce consistent voting responses was to regard
them as one type of issue among others. A comprehensive classification of issues could be made on the basis of surveys and newspaper reports, and a universal direction and weight can be assigned to each issue type. By seeing what issues were prominent in each campaign, the result could be predicted and compared with the actual outcome.

The idea that certain issues always favor certain parties stemmed from a salience theory of party competition and elections, whereby parties always strove to make their own issues prominent and downgrade those of their opponents. However, the number of votes affected by issues prominent in the campaign was always less than the basic vote of the party—the average vote it received independently of issue effects. This vote was explained as being cast by core supporters or party loyalists—party identifiers or core social group voters under another name. In this way, the old survey-based frameworks reemerged at aggregate level under other names—still necessary concepts, however, to cope with the stability and change simultaneously present in election results.

Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie's attempt to explain and predict elections in this way remained an isolated venture. They used the same logic in ad hoc models designed to predict the outcome of a general election. In Britain, these took the form of the Essex model. This was a multivariate regression equation, which allowed previous voting support, economic expectations, and tax levels to explain all the month-to-month fluctuation in voting intentions that they could. Sharp falls or increases in voting support were identified with events that occurred at that time (e.g., the Blair effect following Tony Blair’s election as Labor leader in 1994). The combined equation, modified for each election, was used to predict votes in the 1997 and 2001 general elections successfully. This predictive success was bought at some cost in terms of generalizability and explanatory power (why should Blair have this effect?). However, the overall approach to prediction is itself generalizable to other contexts.

The Macro Polity: An Update of the American Voter at the Aggregate Level

The same approach involving econometric modeling and aggregate data was used in adapting the concerns of The American Voter to modern times.

Using basically the same framework as The American Voter, The Macro Polity (2002), by Robert Erikson, Michael McKuen, and James Stimson, models voting at the aggregate level as the effect of aggregate predispositions to vote for a party and the effects of issues, particularly economic issues, in changing votes. Reflecting a growing recognition that voting has to be put in context, Macro Polity also concerns itself with the end result of the process—how election outcomes affect government policy intentions and enacted policy—and even with how these match up with voter preferences, thus addressing the central concern of democracy. A major technical achievement of the project has been to devise a measure of the (left–right) policy mood of the electorate from hundreds of different policy questions asked in opinion polls over the past 50 years. This not only provides a basis for explaining voting behavior but also for investigating the extent to which public policy reflects popular preferences.

The limitations of The Macro Policy are also those of its predecessor—it focused on the politics of one country over a limited period of time. This limits the number of cases to 12 (postwar presidential elections). It also runs the danger of tying its investigation too much to the specifics of U.S. politics, which, as The American Voter showed, have their peculiarities. Parallel studies are currently under way in Britain and France. One may hope after 40 years that they do not stir up the same controversy over concepts and measures as party identification did. So far, policy mood seems to apply as well in Europe as in the United States.

Multimotivated Voting

When reading through long lists of detailed and variable findings from the election studies, one is sometimes tempted to ask just what the detailed and expensive analyses of elections over the past 5 decades have shown. There is much confusion about this. One consistent lesson, however, from the earliest to the latest studies is that voters are multimotivated. That is, they do not vote on their policy preferences alone, and some votes in fact may be cast on grounds unrelated to policy. This is not solely due to electors themselves having non-policy concerns. To a considerable extent, the institutional structure of general elections requires them to settle nonpolicy questions: Who is best at
governing us? Which party has the most appealing and trustworthy candidate? Which has best ridden out the most recent scandal? All these factors may enter quite legitimately into the voting decision.

The fact that voters are multimotivated puts current rational choice models largely out of court so far as explaining elections are concerned. They all postulate that voters are purely policy oriented. If they are not, parties have no need to converge, and the median preference (or seeming median preference, as the declared distribution of votes cannot be unambiguously interpreted as a policy distribution) loses its preeminent position.

**Representational Consequences**

Elections are at the heart of the democratic representational process and are thus expected to reveal and enforce popular preferences. As Bingham Powell (2000) notes, recognition of their role has prompted the broadening of election research noted above, to the extent that elections are increasingly being studied in their full representational context as “instruments of democracy.”

According to Joseph Schumpeter (1942), here the recognition of voters as multimotivated and not driven by pure policy concerns poses an acute dilemma for representative democracy. If elections do not clearly reveal the popular will so far as public policy is concerned, how can the democracy be directed to effect it? Or do we simply define democracy as a struggle for power between competing teams of leaders decided by voters in elections—who have, however, to put up with whatever the policy leaders decide on subsequently?

The solution may be to recognize, with Powell, that elections express the popular will in two ways:

1. the *proportional* way, operationalized in the preference of the median voter (even though the median position, which emerges from the declared distribution of party votes, may be a bit unstable and subject to challenge), and

2. the *majoritarian* way, in which the popular will is identified with the policy preference of plurality party voters.

The plurality voter position may also be subject to challenge since nobody knows how many votes cast for the largest party were actually cast on nonpolicy grounds. In the end, however, the declared distribution of votes has to be accepted as providing authoritative guidance on policy preferences as on other matters as well. With no way of deciding between median and plurality claims to represent the popular will, researchers have to accept both and arrange compromises between them. How this is done, however, is more a matter for research into governments than into elections.

**Election Data**

While election research has generated and tested many theories of the determinants of voting choice, its most significant achievement to date could well be described as the generation of vast amounts of information, primarily survey data, but broadening out to time series and comparative collections of economic indicators, voting statistics, government expenditures and policy indices, personnel and structures of governments, text-based counts of policy emphases, campaign issues, manifestos, and speeches—the range and quantity of the information is truly staggering and still underexplored. The combination of information at the several levels of electors, parties, governments, and policies gives political scientists the ability to settle many of the unanswered questions raised in the previous discussion. If there is not yet a complete theory of democratic decision making and of the role of elections within it, researchers certainly now have the ability to formulate and check one against the material now available—not just for any one country but for the whole range of democracies. This is perhaps the major product of election research over the past 50 years, which has contributed cumulatively to the understanding of voting choice and of the democratic electorate.

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See also Party Manifesto; Political Psychology; Rational Choice; Representation

**Further Readings**

Elections, Primary

Primary elections—or preliminary, earlier elections—can come first both in order and in importance. They come first in order because selecting candidates is one of the first things that political parties must do before an election. They can be first in importance as well because those who are eventually elected to office are the successful candidates whom the parties previously selected; and they are the ones who will determine what the party, the parliament, and the country’s politics will look like until the next elections.

In the study of preliminary elections, the unit of analysis is the single party in a particular country at a specific time. There are very few established democracies where the legal system specifies criteria for candidate selection—for example, Finland, Germany, New Zealand, and Norway (until 2002)—and only in the United States does the legal system extensively regulate the primary elections. Preliminary elections, or candidate selection methods, are thus the nonstandardized and predominantly unregulated party mechanisms by which political parties choose their candidates for general elections. The result of this process is the designation of a candidate, or list of candidates, as the candidate(s) of the party. The party then becomes effectively committed to the candidate(s) and to mobilizing its strength behind the chosen candidate(s).

This entry delineates the most important distinguishing variable for explaining how political parties choose their candidates—the selectorate, that is, who is allowed to take part in the selection of the candidates. Along with another important variable, that of candidacy requirements, these two criteria are akin to the supply and demand sides of candidate selection. While candidacy narrows the supply of contestants who can be selected, it is the selectorate that decides who will eventually face the voters in the general election. Due to the scope of its political consequences, the selectorate is the most significant and far-reaching explanatory variable when it comes to primary elections.

The selectorate continuum starts with the most inclusive body—all voters—and ends with the most exclusive one—the single leader. Each part of the continuum, and the variations along it, is illustrated by empirical examples from both established and new democracies. This entry begins by focusing on the well-known case of primary elections in the United States, which reflect the most inclusive of selectorates. It then expands to cover other democracies and their use of preliminary elections. The entry concludes with a short analysis of the political consequences of different selectorates.

Classifying Primary Elections

Primary elections can be classified by distinguishing the five archetypical kinds of selectorates, from the most inclusive to the most exclusive:

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<th>Party Elite</th>
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<td>Inclusive</td>
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<td>Exclusive</td>
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Figure 1 Party Selectorates in Primary Elections
1. **The most inclusive selectorate: voters.** This selectorate includes the entire electorate that has the right to vote in the general elections.

2. **The highly inclusive selectorate: party members.** This refers to dues-paying party membership in its European sense, implemented and controlled by the party itself, rather than simply registration as a party supporter as in the United States, which belongs to the above category.

3. **The in-between selectorate: party delegates.** This selectorate is composed of representatives selected by the party members. They can be members of party agencies (e.g., conventions, central committees, congresses) or delegate bodies that were selected for this purpose alone.

4. **The highly exclusive selectorate: the party elite.** This includes small party agencies and committees that were indirectly selected or whose composition was ratified by wider party agencies and other less formal groups.

5. **The most exclusive selectorate: a nominating entity of a single leader.**

**Voters**

The primary elections in the 50 states of the United States provide most of the examples on the inclusive end of the continuum. The exact location of American primaries depends on the restrictions defined by the different state laws. At the extreme end are the American nonparty primary elections, used in Louisiana from 1978 to select candidates for Congress. In these primary elections, every registered voter could vote for candidates from any party. Blanket primary elections—used in Washington (since 1938), Alaska (since 1968), and California (1998, 2000)—are also at the extreme inclusiveness pole. Here, voters receive a single ballot listing all the candidates from all the parties and decide, for each post separately, which party candidate to vote for. In both the nonparty and blanket primaries, participants do not need to declare their party affiliation in order to take part in candidate selection.

Open primary elections—used in Hawaii, Michigan, Vermont, and other states—are slightly less inclusive than the two previous kinds. As in nonparty and blanket primaries, the voters are allowed to decide in which primaries they want to take part without the need to announce their partisan preference. Yet, unlike these previous types, voters can take part in the primaries of only one party.

Semiclosed primary elections—also used by several states such as Arizona, Indiana, and Rhode Island—require participants to declare their party affiliation only on the selection day and/or allow independents to take part in the party primary they announce their wish to vote in. Semiclosed primary elections move ever so slightly away from the inclusive end of the selectorate continuum because voters need to publicly affiliate with a political party.

The inclusive end of the continuum also includes examples from Iceland, Taiwan, and Spain. From 1971 on, parties in Iceland adopted primary elections in some, and sometimes all, electoral districts, where every citizen in a particular electoral district could participate. In Taiwan, the National Party adopted inclusive primary elections in 1998. The Catalan Socialist Party in Spain opened its candidate selection to “registered sympathizers”—nonmembers who could register as party supporters without paying a membership fee.

American closed primary elections, which demand that voters register according to their party affiliation before the day of the primaries, are located further away from the inclusive end. The level of inclusiveness of the selectorate of the Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan (1998–2001) also places it at this point. It used a unique weighted selectorate that combined the results of both a vote of the party members and a public opinion poll.

The open convention, which allows any voter to take part in a candidate selection meeting, is probably a less inclusive version of the most inclusive family of selectorates. While it allows any voter to take part in a selection meeting without the need to prove party affiliation or even to preregister, it is still quite a demanding system as it requires the voter to attend a meeting at a certain date, time, and location. This kind of selection—which is similar to the American caucus—was used in the past in Canada, in the 1920s to 1950s period, before the parties began institutionalizing their membership.
**Party Members**

This discussion now moves into the party members’ zone. At its inclusive end, it comes close to including all the voters—as in the case of the Dutch Democrats 66, which allowed party members to vote via postal ballots but then held meetings where both party members and all voters could participate. Another example is the Argentine Peronist and Radical parties, which in some districts (1983–2001) allowed party members and independents to participate in their primaries.

In the middle of the party members’ zone is the typical European closed primary elections, which—as opposed to American closed primary elections—usually mean “party primaries” in which the selectors are party members, not just supporters. From this point on in the selectorate continuum, mere party supporters are excluded. The purest type of party primary is where the party members’ votes alone determine the candidates. A number of parties have used such party primaries, albeit not consistently over time and not necessarily in all the districts. Among them are the following examples: the Australian Labor Party; the Belgian ECOLO; the German Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and Greens at the single-member district level; the Icelandic Independence, Social Democratic, Progressive and People’s Alliance parties; the Israeli Labor, Likud, and Kadima parties; and the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary and the Democratic Revolution parties.

When party members have a dominant or significant role in candidate selection—but are not the sole selectors and other, more exclusive party actors take part in the selection of candidates—the selectorate remains in the party members’ zone but is moving toward the party delegates area. For example, in several of the Danish parties, from the 1970s until recently, central party agencies could veto or change the selection made by the party members. In Finland, the election law states that party organizations have the right to change up to one fourth of the candidates selected by the members’ vote. In Canada, national party leaders have some power over candidate selection, although they usually refrain from exercising it, while in Ireland the national party leadership kept and even enhanced its power in those parties that adopted a membership ballot.

Cases where party agencies first filter the candidates who are then put to a membership vote are close to the middle between the party members and the party delegates zones. If the screening process still leaves a large and viable pool of candidates from whom the party members can make the final decision, then the selectorate is still on the party members’ side. Since the mid-1990s, the Israeli Meretz party has produced a sizeable “panel” of candidates from which the members choose the final list. The Social Democrats and the Liberals in Britain did much the same, as did several of the parties in Belgium in some districts, particularly the Belgian Socialist Party during the 1960s.

When equal weight is given to the party delegates and to the party members, the selectorate is in the middle between these two categories. In Taiwan, in 1995–1996, the Democratic Progressive Party used a weighted method in which the vote of the members was equally weighed to the vote of the party representatives. British Labour’s use of a multistage method since 1997—where candidates are screened by party agencies, selected by party members, and can then be vetoed by the National Executive Committee—can also be seen as a middle-of-the-road example. The same seems to be the case for the Democratic Party of Botswana in 2002, where party members selected candidates after a national party agency screening, and for both the Labor (1960–1964) and the Pacifist Socialist (1957–1973) parties of the Netherlands, which allowed their national executives to propose the list of candidates but let the members then vote and alter both the rank and the composition of these lists.

It should be noted that the party members’ selectorate can be further distinguished according to the restrictions on party membership. For example, one rule that could restrict membership—or the right to participate in primary elections—is the rate of membership dues. Members’ participation may also be restricted by the requirement of a minimal party membership period prior to candidate selection, proof of party activity, and so on.

**Party Delegates**

When the party members have less of an impact than selected party delegates, the selectorate is still located between these two zones but is closer to the latter. Here, for example, the members can
ratify or reject a list of candidates drawn up by the party agency, as was done by the French Socialist Party in 1986. Since the 1980s, the British Conservatives use a multistage method, which starts with a screening by a nonselected national party agency, followed by a locally selected party agency screening, and finally a party members’ selection meeting.

The selectorate moves slightly closer to exclusivity when the candidates are produced by a wide delegate convention, as was the case in Ireland with Fianna Fail, Fine Gael (until it adopted membership ballots in the 1990s), and Labour. Another example is selection by a party agency that might be followed (or preceded) by a membership ballot, as implemented by the Swedish Communist/Left Party.

When the selectorate is an agency of the party, the selectorate is in the middle of the selectorate continuum. Inside the party, the relative size of each agency is a sign of its inclusiveness: Conventions are usually larger than central committees, which in turn are usually larger than executive bodies, such as bureaus. As the size of the particular party agency gets smaller, the selectorate moves toward the exclusive pole of the continuum. The terminology used in each country is not necessarily equivalent, and hence one must be cautious when inferring the extent of inclusiveness based solely on what a particular party calls a specific agency. The use of party delegates is widespread. Since the 1950s, the major German parties have used delegate conventions at the single-member district level. This was also the typical selectorate in Australia. Several Israeli parties use their central committees to select their candidates. This was also one of the methods used by the Canadian parties 60 years ago (1920–1950), which have since adopted the more inclusive membership ballot.

When a nonselected party agency—such as a nominating committee—has an influence on the selection of candidates along with the selected party agency, the selectorate moves toward more inclusiveness but remains within the party agency zone. One example is the assorted system used by both the National Liberation and the United Social Christian parties in Costa Rica, where most candidates were chosen by a selected party agency, but several were nominated by the party president. There are many examples of both directly and indirectly selected party agencies taking part in candidate selection, as in the Austrian Socialist Party (1945–1990); the Dutch Christian Democrats (1986), Christian Historical Union (1960–1979), and Radical Political Party (1973–1989); and the British Conservatives from the 1950s to the 1970s and British Labour from the 1950s until 1987. Yet another example is the New Zealand Labour Party, which has used a method since the 1950s where both nominated and selected delegates choose the candidates.

The selectorate is between the party delegates and the party elite when there is a relative balance of power between the selected and the nonselected party agencies. This was the case with the methods used in the 1980s in the Union for French Democracy, the Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy from the 1960s to the 1990s, and the Spanish Socialists from 1979 to 1998. The Norwegian parties, in most cases, from the 1920s and until 2002, followed such a system by virtue of a law that allocated funding to political parties that selected their candidates in a (selected) delegate convention at the level of the multimember constituency. Candidate selection at the länder level in Germany also belongs here—although party delegates are the final decision makers at this level, the selection is made on the basis of a recommended list that is designed by the land party elite.

**Party Elite**

This category includes nominating committees that are formed for the sole purpose of selecting the party’s candidates as well as nonselected party agencies (typically small executive boards) that are entrusted with several different tasks, including the selection of candidates. The composition of both nominating committees and nonselected party agencies can be regarded as slightly more inclusive if it is indirectly selected or somewhat more exclusive if it is not.

When the selection power of the party elite is stronger than that of the selected party agency, the selectorate moves into the party elite zone and is within the exclusive part of the continuum. There are cases of methods that involve various selected and nonselected (or highly indirectly selected) party agencies, with more influence given to the latter. For example, the French Rally for the
Republic in the 1980s allowed a nominating committee to select its candidates but afforded some influence to other directly and indirectly selected party agencies. The Italian Communist Party from 1956 to 1986 allowed for the involvement of a selected party agency, but the final word on candidate selection was given to an indirectly selected party agency. The Italian Communist Party from 1956 to 1986 allowed for the involvement of a selected party agency, but the final word on candidate selection was given to an indirectly selected party agency. The Chilean Party for Democracy and the National Renovation Party allowed their national councils to be involved, but the final decision was made—because of the constraints set by the binominal electoral system—by negotiations between the party leaders. When, for example, the selected party agency is only asked to ratify a decision made by the nominating committee, the selectorate is still leaning slightly toward the inclusive side of the party elite zone. This was the case in the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party in the period between 1950 and 1990.

When only a nonselected party agency/group is involved in candidate selection, then the selectorate is squarely in the middle of the party elite zone. This was the case in the Venezuelan Democratic Action Party in the 1990s; the Italian Christian Democrats from 1957 to 1984; the Mexican Institutional Revolution Party before 2000; the Chilean Independent Democratic Union from 1989 to 2001; in a significant number of constituencies in several of the main Belgian parties, especially since 1968; the Indian Congress Party in the 1950s and 1960s; and the Danish Peoples Party in 1998.

The selectorate moves toward the single-leader pole with such exclusive selectorates as a gathering of the party founders in a new party or an informal group of factional leaders in older parties. Israel’s ultrareligious parties serve as an example of such highly exclusive selectorates.

Single Leader

The extreme end of the exclusive pole is defined by a selectorate composed of a single individual. If the leader does not have complete control over candidate selection, then the selectorate is close to the exclusive end of the selectorate continuum but not at its pole. In Forza Italia, in the 1990s, the founding leader Silvio Berlusconi chose the candidates in cooperation with the party’s regional coordinators. The French National Front leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, together with the party’s general secretary, chose the party’s candidates, with some influence given to nonselected forces. Winston Peters, New Zealand First’s founder, was also given almost complete control over candidate selection.

Like the party elite, a single leader will lean more toward the inclusive side if the leader is selected and more toward the exclusive pole if the leader is not a selected leader. In 2005, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon quit his party (Likud) and formed a new one (Kadima). Since he also quit his position as prime minister and called for early elections, time constraints and a new party allowed him to choose the list of candidates.

Political Consequences

Different levels of selectorate inclusiveness produce different political consequences. For example, in terms of quantity, the more inclusive selectorates are the more participatory ones. In terms of quality, though, the picture becomes less clear because most of those who do join parties do not participate in their party’s candidate selection process and are not affiliated for more than a short period.

Smaller, exclusive selectorates are able to balance representation, which is more difficult when the aggregation of a large number of votes produces the party candidates. Party agencies are actually more competitive than primaries because of the shorter “distance” between the candidates and their selectors.

Inclusiveness also influences responsiveness. Legislators selected by a small selectorate owe their positions to that selectorate and are likely to be party players. Legislators selected in primaries need to reach a massive, fluid audience and will behave more like individuals than team players.

Conclusion

The consequences of primary elections can be more or less significant as a result of the characteristics of a particular nation’s politics. For example, in countries with single-member districts, if the number of safe seats is either large or growing then the selection process of the winning party could be more decisive than the election itself. In both the United States and Great Britain, more than one
half of the constituencies are safe for one party or the other, with majorities of greater than 10%, which means that the effective choice of who will become a legislator is made not by the voters in the general election but by the selectorate in the primary elections. Moreover, even in marginal seats, the correct choice of a candidate by a party could make the decisive difference between winning the seat and losing it. In countries using proportional electoral systems, the selection of candidates at the top of a party list can virtually guarantee election, particularly in the major parties, practically regardless of the results of the general election. In short, in the majority of democratic nations, in a majority of the parties, the preliminary selection inside the party is as important as the subsequent election by the general population.

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See also Competition, Political; Electoral Behavior; Electoral Campaigns; Electoral Geography; Electoral Systems; Electoral Turnout; Participation; Parties; Party Organization

Further Readings


Elections, Volatility

A recurring exercise in the field of electoral behavior is assessing to what extent parties' share of the vote and voter choice remain stable over time. Voters may remain loyal to the same party they voted for in the previous election or change preference by voting for another party, abstaining, or spoiling their ballots. A significant number of studies have been devoted to understanding the dynamic of such changes in contemporary democracies. The change of voters from one party to another in the election is called election volatility.

Possible changes in voters' preferences over time may be measured on the individual level or on the aggregate level of the electorate. A voter may change preferences during an election campaign, or over a longer period involving at least two elections. The traditional way of identifying the level of permanence/change in electoral preference on the individual level is quite simply asking voters. For this reason, election surveys are the fundamental source for picking up permanence/change in preference on a microlevel.

For electoral studies on the aggregate level, the source of data is the final result of the race (parties’ vote, turnout, and spoiled votes) for a certain electoral unit (national or subnational) in at least two elections. Easy access to election results throughout the world may be the main reason why studies about electoral changes on the macrolevel have been conducted with such frequency over the past few years.
Many indices have been proposed to measure permanence/change in electoral preferences. The most fortunate, and one widely used at present in studies on comparative party systems, is the volatil-
ity index, created by Mogens Pedersen (1979, 1980). The term volatility first appeared in chemistry and refers to the tendency of a substance to vaporize. It has also been defined as a measure of how readily a substance vaporizes. The notion of a change in physical state captures the fundamental idea of the index, which is to quantify the intensity of change in party preferences when two elections are compared.

### The Index

The volatility index (or total volatility, TV) measures the level of aggregate electoral change over two consecutive elections. Although the index is traditionally calculated for the total number of votes received by parties, it can also be calculated including total turnout and spoiled votes. Its formula is

\[
TV = \frac{1}{2}(|PaV| + |PbV| + |PcV|),
\]

where \( V \) represents the percentage difference of votes (or seats) for each party in two consecutive elections.

The volatility index is calculated as follows: The percentage of votes (or seats) that a party received in an election is subtracted from the percentage of votes obtained by this same party in the preceding election; the difference indicates the change, and the (−) or (+) signs reveal the decline or growth of a party, respectively. The next step is to add the result of this operation (not considering the sign) and divide by two. The value of the index expresses the total number of votes lost by the parties whose votes fell from one election to the next or the total number of votes gained by the parties whose votes grew in the same period. For example, a volatility index of 10.0 indicates that the combined share of the vote of all the parties whose vote fell was 10 percentage points and, consequently, that the parties whose vote grew, taken together, increased their share of the vote by the same figure.

Theoretically the index can vary from 0 to 100, although these values could only occur in empirically improbable cases. The index is zero when the parties have identical percentages of votes (or seats) in two successive elections. The index is 100 when a radical revolution in voters’ preferences takes place between two elections: The parties that ran in Election 1 receive no votes in Election 2.

One must be careful on two counts when interpreting the volatility index. The first is that even in a situation in which there are no changes in voters’ preferences there may be a certain degree of volatility. The reason is simple: New voters may have a voting pattern that is different from that of traditional voters. In such a situation, volatility is derived from the difference between the votes cast by new voters and those that have been cast by voters who have since died (see Bartolini & Mair, 1990, p. 21).

The second count is regarding the relation between changes in the sphere of individual preferences and aggregate volatility. A party might maintain the same percentage of votes in two consecutive elections on aggregate but not on the microlevel. For example, imagine that two parties (A and B) have each received 50% of the votes in two consecutive elections but that all the voters of A in Election 1 voted for B in Election 2 and vice versa. In spite of the fact that all the voters changed their vote on the microlevel, total volatility was equal to zero.

Scott Mainwaring and Edurne Zoco (2007) carried out a wide-ranging comparative study on the subject of electoral volatility in 47 countries in the post-1945 period. The mean values found for each country varied significantly: The lowest volatility found was that of the United States (3.3), while the highest was for Ukraine (59.2). The mean volatility of the countries studied is 23.2; the median is 17.0. The authors investigated whether the variation in volatility is associated with a set of variables. Two of them have some statistically significant association with volatility: fragmentation of the party system and duration of the democratic regime. They argue that fragmentation is positively associated with volatility, while duration of the democratic regime is negatively associated with it. Put differently, countries with low fragmentation and a democracy of long duration would tend to have less volatile party systems (Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007, pp. 164–165).

### Bloc and Intrabloc Volatility

Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair (1990) proposed the calculation of bloc volatility (BV) and
**intrabloc volatility** (IV). Unlike the total volatility index, which is based on gains and losses on the part of individual parties, BV and IV take as their starting point a set of parties, such as government parties \(=\) opposition parties, right \(=\) left, religious parties \(=\) secular parties, and so on. Bloc volatility has the following mathematical expression:

\[
BV = \frac{1}{2} \sum P(aV + bV + cV) + \sum P(dV + eV + fV),
\]

where \(P(aV + bV + cV)\) represents the percentage of votes gained (or lost) by the parties of this bloc in relation to the bloc \(P(dV + eV + fV)\). Bloc volatility is part of the total volatility and evinces the exchange that occurs between the two blocs.

Intrabloc volatility (IV) is equal to the difference between the total volatility and the bloc volatility. Hence,

\[
TV = BV + IV.
\]

Intrabloc volatility can be measured by the sum total, for each bloc, of the parties with an algebraic sign different from that of the bloc as a whole. For example, let us imagine two blocs with three parties and the following individual volatilities: \((+6, -2, -1), (-5, -2, +4)\) and \(TV = 10\). In this case, BV and IV would be, respectively,

\[
BV = \frac{|+6 - 2 - 1| + |-5 - 2 + 4|}{2} = 3
\]

and

\[
IV = |-2| + |-1| + |+4| = 7(10 - 3).
\]

**An Index in Search of a Concept?**

There is not much controversy about the capacity of the volatility index to detect changes in the party system on the aggregate level. The index is good both for diachronic comparisons within a country and for comparisons between countries. Hence, it can be said that a country has a higher volatility index than another or that volatility in a certain country fell, for example.

As Gary Goertz (2005) notes, a classic effort of the social sciences is producing indices that may make certain concepts operational in the best way possible. But the incorporation of the term volatility into political science did not follow this path. The term began to be used to designate a recently created index. In other words, the term volatility is more associated with a measurement than with a concept. This brand of origin becomes clear when one observes the definition of volatility, which may be found in several texts on the theme: Volatility is the net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers.

Bartolini and Mair (1990) have pointed out the conceptual fragility of the volatility index:

A variety of different theoretical meanings have recently been attributed to the concept and measure of electoral volatility. For example, evidence of volatility has been read as an indicator of the “integration” or “catchall” nature of party support, as a symptom of realignment and/or dealignment; as an indicator of cleavage strength and persistence; as expressing an “issue-effect” vis-à-vis the basic vote of parties, and so on. (pp. 23–24)

For this reason, the volatility index has been used to measure different political processes: electoral dealignment/alignment (Raul Madrid, 2005; Pedersen, 1980), the freezing of political cleavages (Bartolini & Mair, 1990), and the institutionalization of the party system (Michelle Kuenzi & Gina Lambright, 2001; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007).

This conceptual ambiguity, added to some other difficulties inherent to any interval measurement—when used for the analysis of institutions—has left open a series of questions. What level of volatility would allow one to consider a party system to be institutionalized (or not)? How should one interpret low volatility in a party system with low institutionalization? And, conversely, how should one interpret high volatility in a consolidated party system? In substance, what does it mean to say, for instance, that the average volatility for Colombia is 12.5, while that of Canada is 11.9? In spite of the limits pointed out, the volatility index is one of the most widely known and used indicator in political science. It has helped in identifying tendencies in longitudinal studies of a single country and contributed to the effort of comparing
several party systems—a rare success story for an indicator.

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See also Election Research; Electoral Behavior; Electoral Campaigns; Electoral Systems; Electoral Turnout

Further Readings

**Electoral Behavior**

In representative democracies, voting is one of the fundamental acts that allow citizens to express their belonging to a political community and to make decisions about their own future. Analyzing electoral behavior is one of the oldest and most productive domains of research in political science. Research on electoral behavior contributes to our understanding of how democratic systems function and develop over time. It does this by analyzing the answers to the following questions: Whom do people vote for? Why do they do so? What do they want to achieve by doing so?

This research has developed over many years using three main approaches: sociological, psychosociological, and rational choice. It should be remembered nonetheless, in France particularly, that the first studies concentrated on electoral geography and were based on analysis of aggregate electoral data at different geographical levels and that this subdiscipline continues to be of great interest.

The sociological approach endeavors to explain the electoral behavior of individuals according to their position in society and their belonging to particular social groups. It studies the social determinants of voting behavior. The psychosociological approach studies the individual attitudes of voters which they base their electoral choices. The rational choice approach developed from economic theories of rationality. Voters decide which way to vote using a cost–benefit calculation, depending on their preferences and what the different parties and candidates have to offer. These approaches are discussed in detail as follows.

**The Sociological Approach Based on Social Cleavages**

Sociological research on voting behavior has been developed since the 1950s as a result of the increasing presence of major opinion poll surveys based on large samples of voters. These surveys allowed a great deal of individual data to be gathered and submitted to complex quantitative processing. In many countries, strong statistical relationships appeared between the social characteristics of individuals and the way they voted. Among the main social variables used and whose effect has been measured, class and religious belonging were initially the most frequently analyzed, and they also appeared to be the factors that had the most determining effect.

Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan’s theory of cleavages looked at the history of European societies to identify the main stable social cleavages at the roots of political and partisan cleavages. They exerted a huge influence on research into voting behavior by showing the profound and lasting nature of the major social determinants of voting. Their research has provided solid results on this
question. The study of class voting was thus well developed, as was the study of the relationship between religious belonging and voting behavior. Thus, for example, while class constituted the most important electoral cleavage in Great Britain, religion seemed to be the variable with the greatest impact in both Germany and France, though class also played a role but to a lesser extent.

More recently, this approach has been criticized in several ways. It was observed that the ability of these two variables to explain voting behavior was becoming weaker in accordance with a long-term trend. Thus, the permanence of class voting, particularly in Great Britain, but also more broadly speaking in Europe, became debatable as a result of analyses that showed an underlying decrease of the left-wing working-class vote and the right-wing middle-class vote. Many explanations for the decline of class voting have been suggested. Some of these point to changes in social structures in Western societies and to both the decrease and fragmentation of the working class. Others stress the individualization of these societies and the increasing autonomy of individuals in relation to the groups they belong to. This hypothesis is also suggested for the religious factor, as European societies have become increasingly secular.

Others again stress changes in the political parties themselves rather than changes among the electorate. According to this hypothesis, it is no longer in the interest of the parties to present themselves as “class-based parties” for the purpose of winning an election. This has contributed to weakening the coherence of the different classes as self-conscious collective actors. As a response to these criticisms, other researchers have relativized or denied the “end of class voting.” According to them, current surveys show that the decrease of class voting does not imply its disappearance. The operationalizations designed to measure it have also been criticized. It is argued that the use of more detailed and more complex social and occupational classifications would reveal that the relationship between belonging to a social group—and not necessarily to one of the two major classes conceptualized by Marxism—and voting behavior remain significant. Finally, the ideological supposition according to which the working-class vote, for example, can only be classified as a class vote if it is a left-wing vote can be called into question. For example, in France in 2002, working-class voters voted more than any other social group for the extreme Right. How can such a vote be qualified according to the class voting theory?

The same is true for the religious variable. Although surveys (notably in Europe) have revealed a decrease in both religious attachment and the relationship between religious belonging and voting behavior, this relationship is far from having disappeared. Furthermore, the increasing importance of Muslims in Europe has made this variable relevant once again in the analysis of voting behavior. In France, for example, Muslims are far more likely to vote left than right. In the same way, in the United States, presidential elections in this century still show the permanence of the strong relationship between religion and how people vote.

Finally, even if the hypothesis according to which the vote has become individualized should be taken seriously, it nonetheless merits a certain degree of relativity. In particular, although the role played by certain social variables in voting behavior is diminishing, the role played by other social variables is emerging, reappearing, or indeed gaining importance. This applies, for example, for gender and age. Furthermore, in a number of European countries, the regional vote, which is a vote based on a sense of identity, has been strongly expressed for several years, such as in Scotland, in Catalonia, in the Basque country, and in Flanders. In the same way, the ethnic or racial vote is not receding either and may, indeed, be increasing. In the 2008 American presidential elections, 95% of African Americans voted for Barack Obama as compared to 43% of Americans of European descent.

Whatever the tendency toward the individualization of Western societies, voters remain individuals belonging to different social groups and networks. Individuals have multiple identities, and one or another of these may more or less dominate and be mobilized depending on the period, the events, and what the parties and candidates are offering. Although the sociological approach has real limits—and in particular it has not always sufficiently concerned itself with what politics has to offer, at times reifying a given determinant and overestimating its permanence or its centrality—it remains nonetheless an essential approach in the analysis of electoral behavior.
The Sociopsychological Approach

In the 1950s, the publication of *The American Voter* brought about a turning point in the study of electoral behavior. The starting point for the model used—known as the Michigan model—was, on the one hand, the apparent contradiction between the absence of political sophistication among the electorate and the instability of their opinions on different issues and, on the other hand, the fact that the vast majority of voters constantly voted for the same party throughout their lifetime. This model, which was founded on the importance of political socialization (familial, professional, ethnic, regional, etc.) and on the way in which political choices and preferences develop among individuals, has produced the concept of party identification to explain electoral behavior. Partisan identification is of an affective nature. It is politically stable, and this stability may even become stronger with age. Individuals often reproduce the same partisan preferences of their parents. This partisanship creates a basis for political identity and provides cues for evaluating political events, candidates, issues, and subsequently for voting preferences.

This model also has a strong heuristic value. However, it has nonetheless been criticized for many reasons. It has been judged to be tautological and nonexplicative—voters who vote for a given party say they feel close to the party as a result of voting for it and not the other way around. Furthermore, more recent studies have shown a strong decrease in partisan identification in several countries. Various theses on the modernization and individualization of our societies have highlighted the fact that it is less useful for a more and more sophisticated electorate to use partisan identification as a shortcut in deciding how to vote. Other studies have measured increasing levels of individual electoral volatility and have highlighted the fact that the partisan de-alignment phenomenon is part of a general process of political change that is transforming the relationship between voters and parties. Finally, it has been noted that this concept has always been more relevant in two-party systems than in countries where the system is multipartisan and unstable.

The psychological and, in particular, the affective dimension of the concept should be put into perspective although it does still exist for a certain category of voters. However, a little vaguer but perhaps more heuristic notion of partisan proximity, but also possibly of partisan distance, remains useful. For many voters, it represents an important way to locate themselves in the political landscape. The general dynamic of political modernization tends to individualize electoral behavior. However, this does not mean that all citizens have the same relationship to politics, the same level of sophistication, and the same interest in or information about politics. Some people have a greater need of shortcuts and symbolic clues to help them decide how to vote. In continental Europe, where party systems are frequently multipartisan, the notions of left and right are often more useful tools to study the orientation and stability of political preferences than the notion of party identification, as used in Great Britain or the United States. The notions of Left and Right can play a comparable role. Studies have shown, furthermore, that the importance of the voter’s relationship to the party—or to the Right or the Left—is not eliminated by the increasing importance of the leading candidates’ personalities. This is all the more true as the major candidates are designated and supported by political parties.

Attitudes of an affective nature in the relationship between the voter and the political system do not, however, only concern the relationship to political parties. They also concern the candidates and other political personalities. The dynamic at work in most democracies shows the increasing importance of the personalization of politics, in particular in presidential or semipresidential systems. The role played by the media, by opinion polls, and by expert opinion is in strong competition with the role played by the parties and favors the personalization of politics. The choice of a leader includes an affective dimension to the extent that, at a given moment, the leader incarnates responsibility for the destiny of the political community. Studies have shown that the governmental credibility of a leader plays an important role in decisions on how to vote. This is particularly true at times of serious national crisis, whether it be economic, international, or political. The notion of the leader’s credibility, which is an important dimension for electoral choice, cannot be separated from the notion of confidence, which is partly of an affective nature. This is why, when
designating candidates, the major parties must take the charismatic aspect of their personalities into account. Admittedly, studies have undermined the hypothesis according to which voters essentially make a decision based on the personal image of a candidate and independently of their personal political orientations and of those of the candidate. Conversely, however, the candidate’s personal image cannot be considered to be secondary. Political leaders have become electorally important in their own right by personifying the policy platforms of their respective parties. This personification necessarily contains a psychological dimension even if this is not the only dimension.

The psychosociological approach to voting behavior does not merely concern the study of the effects of partisan identification and personalization. It also takes the voter’s ideological orientations and value systems into account. Even though these systems may be complex and modifiable, they are nonetheless consistent and long lasting. In the political landscape, some of the major value cleavages reflect cleavages in the politico-ideological field. From this point of view, the role of the left–right dimension is also important. In many countries, studies have shown that two main subdimensions of attitudes provide structure to the left–right dimension. These are the economic dimension, on the one hand (economic liberalism vs. state interventionism), and the societal dimension, on the other hand (cultural liberalism or libertarianism, or in a certain sense, postmaterialism), versus cultural conservatism. A voter who subscribes to both economic liberalism and cultural conservatism is more likely to vote for the Right, whereas hostility to economic liberalism and support for cultural liberalism is more likely to foster a vote for the Left. To take this further, France is a country where there is great diversity in what is on offer politically. It has been noted in recent elections that the existence of a supply of centrist and extreme-right parties has favored the political expression of economic antiliberals and cultural antiliberals who voted for the extreme Right and economic liberals and cultural liberals who voted for the centrist parties. It seems, therefore, that the left–right dimension is in reality not a continuum but a complex structure made up of different ideological dimensions that are expressed in different ways depending on the period and on the country. Thus, in many European countries, the increasing importance attributed by the socialist left to the values of cultural liberalism and antiracism, which is widely shared by the well-educated middle classes, encouraged a certain number of working-class voters to change their electoral behavior. These were voters who, up until then, had been attached to the left because of their economic antiliberalism positions but whose xenophobic tendencies were increasing. They availed themselves of the presence of an extreme-right party that combined the two types of antiliberalism in its ideology and voted for it.

Similar to the sociological approach, the psychological and sociopsychological approaches have kept heuristic power. Furthermore, it should be noted, as this last example shows, that the two approaches are complementary to the extent that there are strong relationships between social groups and value systems.

The Rational Choice Approach and Short-Term Elements

The rational choice approach has more recently influenced the study of voting behavior. Its point of departure is the notion of a cost–benefit calculation. Voters vote in accordance with their preferences for the party that will best satisfy them. Based on a microeconomic decision-making model, illustrated notably by Anthony Downs, this approach differs from the sociological and psychological approach in that it considers the voter to be a rational individual. According to this model, citizens vote for the party they believe will provide them with more benefits than the other parties. Parties offer policies; voters look at these policies and decide which of them will provide maximum benefits for them and vote accordingly. Parties and candidates, on the one hand, and voters, on the other, are in a constant state of interaction. Parties constantly adapt to the demands of the voters in an attempt to conquer or maintain power, which, according to this theory, is their essential and indeed only aim.

This approach has been very strongly criticized in different ways. It has been argued that the notion of interest or utility is not directly applicable to the relationship of citizens to politics, as their expectations are expressed in a complex way both in terms of material and symbolic retributions and also in
terms of precise demands and attachment to values. It becomes necessary to attribute such a broad meaning to the notion of preference that the use of the notion of utility becomes problematic. Certain critics have gone so far as to claim that this approach has no real value. The result has been a veritable battle between two schools of thought.

And yet this model holds many advantages. It highlights the importance of the process of interaction between voters and parties. This approach stresses that any study of voting behavior cannot take only the voter into account without also including the political system, the party system, and the set of alternative propositions (set of policies) proposed by the parties and candidates. Here, the role played by what the parties have to offer is essential. The parties frame what is on offer politically, and the choice made by the voter is largely constrained by the issues that the parties themselves have chosen to highlight.

Another advantage of this model is that it places the voter/individual at the heart of the process and considers that, whatever their position in society, voters are capable of working out their electoral choices themselves. What is involved is an individual decision-making process. A significant contribution offered by this approach is that it makes a real attempt to build complex statistical models to enhance understanding of electoral behavior. The development of this approach has contributed in a certain sense to the current tendency in electoral analysis to show a general decline of the long-term determinants, a growth in the importance of short-term attitudes, and a fragmentation of voter choice (diversity of decision-making processes). This tendency notably benefits research on issue voting and economic voting.

Analyses of issue voting partly stem from the rational choice approach to the extent that they deal with the interactive political relation between supply and demand and presuppose that the voter is relatively sophisticated. Two types of issues are usually identified: position issues, where the parties give priority to different issues, each in relation to the other, with these issues thus being in competition with each other, and performance issues (valence issues), where the parties pursue objectives aspired to by all (e.g., a reduction in the rate of unemployment) and try to demonstrate their competence in this respect as a means to reach them.

In terms of issue voting, the rational choice approach has produced spatial theories on voting behavior. The proximity theories of voting place voters and parties in a political landscape. According to these theories, voters feel close to the parties they vote for and distant from those they don’t vote for, and there is a measurable distance between the voter’s position on policies and issues and the party’s equivalent positions. There is a distance between the voter and the parties on offer, the function of this distance being to identify which party a voter will choose in a given election. The “proximity” function, which has long been accepted for modeling party and self-placement data, has been challenged by directional theories. Based on an analysis of the notion of proximity, the rational choice models concluded that it was in the interests of the parties to adopt the position of the median voter. Supporters of the directional thesis bring not only the choice of an issue by the voter into play but also the (psychological) intensity of the preference for the issue in question. Here, the rational choice model includes recourse to the psychosociological one. Indeed, within this model, voters may prefer a party that has a very strong position on the issue in question, even if it is not the party the voter feels closest to. By the same token, it may be in the party’s interest to adopt a strong position on the issue and not necessarily to attempt to position itself in relation to the median voter. Under these conditions, parties do not necessarily converge toward the center of the political landscape. Today, this family of models represents the formalized attempt to draw up a synthesis between the different approaches encompassing both the rational choice elements of the proximity model and the psychological processes of the directional equivalent.

All analyses of issue voting pose problems of a more general nature. First, their specific contribution cannot be evaluated without, at the same time, taking the contributions made by other types of variables that affect voting behavior into account. For example, a voter who feels very close to a given party will tend to attribute the best mark to this party on all the issues proposed. Thus, in this model, the question of causality (what comes first?) has to be addressed. Second and more important, preferences on issues are not independent of the more clearly articulated and long-lasting value systems of voters or of their social position and socialization.
Therefore, both the short-term (new issues) and the long-term (stable and consistent ideological alignments) factors must be taken into account. From this point of view, the analysis of issue voting cannot be carried out independent of the analysis of values and attitudes. However, a new issue can, for example, disturb or contribute to the reconfiguration of different dimensions of a voter’s value system or indeed reverse the priority given by the voter to one dimension over another within the system. It can update the voter’s long-term predispositions (concept of funnel of causality).

Short-term analyses also cover economic voting. They are based on the hypothesis according to which an analysis by the voter of the economic performance of those in power or simply the voter’s perception of the economic situation and its development has an influence on his or her vote. Analysis of economic voting poses several problems even if certain results remain convincing. First, the results obtained are not always consistent, depending on the country and period of time involved. Second, retrospective judgment analyses on policies implemented, particularly in the economic field, show that, similar to judgments on issue voting, they are not independent of voters’ partisan proximities and their political orientations and therefore of the political orientation of the incumbent government.

Conclusion

The study of voting behavior is an extremely complex affair for all the reasons described above but also because political systems evolve over time and according to country, and voters adapt to the changes in these systems. Whatever the attempts to universalize the different theories, the significance of the vote differs from one society to another, from one historical phase to another, and from one voter to another. The studies available on societies other than North American and European ones (which are still too scarce) show that the major approaches used here do not always work very well in other systems. Thus, in democratic societies in the making, with embryonic party systems and without any real unity or national awareness, and in societies that are still traditional, the social determinants that produce the vote may be quite different. Many factors can strongly influence the vote, such as belonging to an ethnic, religious, or village community; belonging to a client-type network; the existence of mafia-type systems; and so on. Research must therefore extend itself in the future to include the whole range of electoral behaviors.

Finally, research on institutional aspects and the rules that organize voting must also be developed. This is notably the case for the effects on electoral behavior of voting systems, the size of constituencies, the political and institutional issues at stake during a given election, and the material organization itself of the vote.

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See also Class, Social; Cleavages, Social and Political; Electoral Geography; Electoral Systems

Further Readings


Electoral Campaigns

Electoral campaigns are the means by which political parties, alliances, coalitions, and candidates convey their policies and election programs
to the electorate in an election contest. Electoral campaigns are essential in a democratic society that holds national and local elections on a periodic basis. International standards governing the environment, conduct, and principles involved in electoral campaigns in democratic elections have evolved over the past several decades.

In order to create an environment conducive to the organization and conduct of free and fair elections, a number of checks and balances have been developed over time to assist parties and candidates in ensuring a level playing field during the campaign period. Similarly, measures have been developed to avoid or reduce the threat of intimidation or violence against candidates, parties, or their supporters. In addition to provisions dealing with election campaigns in the given legal framework, a code of conduct aimed at parties, candidates, and their supporters is often recommended. In a similar vein, a code of conduct to guide the media, particularly the publicly owned media, is always recommended.

**Nature of Electoral Campaigns**

Many electoral legislative schemes stipulate a fixed period during which electoral campaigning should take place. The stipulated period may range from 14 days to 11 weeks or even longer. The campaign period may be required to end 24 or 48 hours, or even some days, before polling day. The electoral law or the code of conduct for parties, alliances/coalitions, and candidates sometimes impose penalties for campaigning outside the official designated period.

Electoral campaigns flourish best where there are constitutional guarantees of freedom of association and freedom of speech. These fundamental rights are essential to the electoral campaign environment, as was vividly shown to the world in Zimbabwe’s run-off election in June 2008 when the opposition candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai, had to withdraw from the contest because of disruption to his campaign rallies, intimidation, and violence against his supporters.

**Methods of Electoral Campaigns**

There are a number of electoral campaign methods, including rallies, motorcades, radio broadcasts, television broadcasts, debates, party manifestos, advertisements, house-to-house canvassing, and the use of banners, fliers, bunting, billboards, shopping bags, clothing, and theater plays. In many countries, the issuance of permits to hold rallies and motorcades resides with the police authorities, who can act in favor of the ruling party. The issuance of permits to hold rallies or motorcades often operates more smoothly when it is done by the electoral management body in cooperation with the police authorities as in Gambia and Sierra Leone.

Media access, particularly the publicly owned media—electronic and print—is sometimes regulated by specific legislation and/or by a media code designed to regulate election campaign reporting. The publicly owned electronic media may allow free airtime in accordance with an agreed formula (based on equal or equitable or fair allocation free time). In many new and emerging democracies, the public media find it difficult to follow the rules relating to the allocation of free time to the opposition. The private media sometimes enter into voluntary conduct aimed at developing balanced reporting during an electoral campaign, but this approach is not widespread.

The behavior of the media can have a significant impact on leveling the playing field for the contestants in an electoral campaign. Fair access is only one dimension of the media environment. There is also the issue of whether or not the media reports campaign news in a balanced and nonpartisan way and whether misstatements are corrected with equal prominence as the original report.

**Manifestos**

It is customary for political parties, alliances, coalitions, and candidates, including independent candidates, to publish an election manifesto or platform during the electoral campaign. Such an election manifesto or platform sets out the program that the parties or candidates intend to put across to the voters as the one they would implement if they were elected. This proposition suggests that manifestos in national elections are about issues affecting voters and the country. However, often, perhaps too often, the campaigns are run on the personality of individual candidates rather than the issues raised by the manifestos.

The extent to which a party’s or candidate’s manifesto or platform is binding may be political
rather than legal. Parties or candidates who do not honor their manifestos’ pledges may pay a political price at the next election. Of course, these programs may be modified to meet changed circumstances, but such changes should be properly explained to the electorate. There have been cases where elections have been held without political parties, as in Uganda until recently and Swaziland, and there are a number of countries where independent candidates are not allowed to contest elections, as in Tanzania.

Incumbency

The term *incumbency* refers to the party in power, that is, a party or the parties forming a government at some level or to an individual holding an office. An incumbent authority usually attracts advantages in a campaign by virtue of the office held, unless steps are taken to reduce the incidence of abuse of such an office. To avoid incumbency abuses, some countries, most notably India, have introduced strict measures by way of a code of conduct governing incumbent parties and candidates during electoral campaigns. These measures, for example, restrict the combination of ministerial functions with party political campaigning and forbid the use of public resources for campaign purposes. Bangladesh’s attempt to reduce the influence of incumbency on general elections was to require the government to leave office at the end of its term and turn over the role of government to a caretaker government to oversee the preparation and conduct of the elections. Regrettably, that approach has not worked well and not only has it led to the disintegration of the democratic path to holding elections but also in part has brought down the entire system of democracy and brought in an army-backed regime.

Level Playing Field

The phrase *level playing field* has taken hold with respect to electoral campaigns and is used to describe the treatment meted out to competing contestants during an electoral campaign. Often, complaints are triggered by stakeholders when they consider that the election environment does not give rise to a level playing field. This situation arises frequently with access to the media and to the use of public resources. The negative aspect of a level playing field sometimes comes into play when the police authorities delay or refuse to grant permits for election rallies.

Campaign Finance

Dealing with campaign financing may range from no regulation by the state or the election management body (EMB) concerned to tight controls either by the state or by the EMB. Such controls may include limits on maximum expenditure by parties and/or candidates, party-sponsored or independent maximum public contribution, or maximum contribution by individuals or companies. There may also be strict rules governing disclosure of the amount of private contributions received during the electoral campaign. Such disclosure is often open to public scrutiny, and the contributions are subject to audit by reputable auditors. Campaign finance reporting should be required at a stipulated period before and/or after polling day. Failure to meet the stipulated deadline usually incurs significant sanctions, and any material breach of the campaign finance rules may result in forfeiture of the elected office by a successful candidate.

Role of the Media

The media play the most important role in conveying to the electorate the message of parties and candidates. The electronic media has been playing an increasingly prominent role through television, radio, and the Internet (mainly in the developed world). In many new and emerging democracies, the radio has the greatest reach with respect to comprehensive countrywide coverage (although in a few countries even the use of radio batteries during a campaign period have proven to be beyond the means of rural dwellers).

Often, a distinction is made for electoral campaign purposes between publicly and privately owned electronic media. This is because the ruling party frequently influences those public bodies to operate in a partisan manner. This behavior is often mitigated by codes of conduct for the media whereby a schedule for free time broadcast by parties and candidates is regulated by statute or voluntarily. Free time allocation is done by a formula
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based on fair, equal, or equitable distribution. The basic rule of good practice is that, in addition to fair access to the electronic media, the reporting of election news and the coverage thereof should be balanced.

The print media also play an important role in many campaigns. A similar distinction between public and privately owned print media and code of conduct may be useful in creating a level playing field with respect to access between the ruling party and others. However, in addition to fair access to publicly owned print media, the privately owned media should have access to print paper and to distribution outlets as in normal times outside campaign periods.

Security

The security of party functionaries and candidates is pivotal during the period of election campaigning. Some electoral legislative schemes, supported by codes of conduct for parties, their supporters, and candidates, provide the security framework for election campaigns. Occasionally, security measures that were designed for election campaigns do not follow through to the immediate postpolling period as happened during the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007–2008. Equally disturbing, the election campaign security may break down through the partisan behavior of the security forces either at the instigation of the governing party or with their complicity, as in the run-off presidential election in Zimbabwe in June 2008 between Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai. Inadequate campaign security in the past, and even recently, as, for example, in December 2007, when Benazir Bhutto was assassinated at a campaign rally in Pakistan, can profoundly and adversely affect election campaigns and may even influence the results. The security forces employed during election campaigns should be properly trained and ensure adequate security to all contestants without partisanship during an election campaign.

Intimidation and Violence

When perpetrated during an election campaign and designed to interfere in any way with an opponent’s legitimate campaign activities, intimidation and violence should be condemned and sanctioned strongly under the election law and/or the code of conduct for parties, their supporters, and candidates. Credible reports by independent election observers, international and domestic, and other stakeholders described a campaign environment in Zimbabwe for the June 2008 run-off presidential elections of relentless and continuing violence and intimidation that resulted in many deaths and injuries. According to many stakeholders, the sustained vicious intimidation and violence directed mainly at supporters of the opposition could be attributed to premeditated planning by the ruling-party to prevent the opposition contesting the run-off elections. Rallies planned by the opposition were either denied the required police permit or, when the required permit was granted, disrupted by ruling-party activities. The consequence of the unlawful acts against the opposition was the withdrawal of their presidential candidate, leaving the incumbent presidential candidate unchallenged at the polls.

Conclusion

In recent years, the spotlight in election organization has been very much on campaigns. This has led to more political parties adhering to codes of conduct and subscribing to greater transparency in campaign financing. The growing acceptance of domestic and international observation at national elections campaigns is enhancing the transparency in election planning and conduct. Notwithstanding the notable improvements being made, certain undesirable practices linger on in emerging democracies in the African Union countries and in countries in Eastern Europe (including Russia) and in central Asia. These undesirable campaign features include undue influence on EMBs, abuse of incumbent advantages, not having a level playing field in respect of access to publicly owned media, and use of public resources by ruling parties.

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See also Election Observation; Election Research; Electoral Geography; Electoral Systems; Electoral Turnout
Electoral Geography

Further Readings


Electoral Geography

The electoral geography hypothesis is that electoral behavior is related to place—neighborhood, community, town or city, region, or country—and cannot entirely be explained by considering individual voters, and nonvoters, as possessing characteristics on an atomized and isolated basis. It claims that geographical and contextual effects are significant and that the process of day-to-day personal communication and social interaction in the community—or in a variety of communities—influences voting patterns. As explained by John Agnew (2002), localities are the arena for political socialization and produce the settings for much interpersonal social interaction. The general tensions within society are actualized within localities, influencing the relative weight and various meanings attached to social divisions and hence the appeal of different ideologies—which are not the same everywhere. Political movements then use geography in their search for electoral and other support, using claims relating to localities, regions, and so forth to mobilize that support.

Geographical Effects on Electoral Behavior

There is a long history of debate about whether such geographical effects on electoral behavior do in fact exist. Opponents of the electoral geography hypothesis have contended that once all the variables affecting individual electoral behavior have been fully identified and properly specified, there is no role for geographical and contextual variables to have any independent effect. Furthermore, research on the existence and nature of neighborhood effects depends on the existence of usable neighborhood data: As a result, it is not necessarily easy to investigate the various levels at which they may exist.

Neighborhood effects in voting patterns were first demonstrated in 1937 in Sweden by Herbert Tingsten, who showed that the more working class the area, the more likely the working-class voter was to cast a socialist vote. Much subsequent work in this area has focused on the United States and the United Kingdom, perhaps because the political effects of the links between electoral geography and political representation are more immediately evident under majoritarian electoral systems. Support for the electoral geography hypothesis has been more extensively demonstrated in the work in the UK, over many years, of Ron Johnston and Charles Pattie, demonstrating that, in the words of William Miller (1977), “people who talk together vote together.” These effects are not, however, uniform. They are, for example, more powerful in “working-class” neighborhoods than in “middle-class” neighborhoods, probably because the social circles of salaried workers are likely to be wider and more geographically varied than those of residents of poorer neighborhoods.

The impact of neighborhood effects on patterns of political representation is affected not only by the formation and evolution of social communities but also by the geographical definition of electoral communities achieved by the delimitation of electoral boundaries. The legislation, which defines how delimitation and redistribution takes place; the independence or otherwise of the authority that undertakes it; and the attempts of political parties and movements to influence it in their favor are all relevant factors. It is not possible for redistribution to produce outcomes without a bias of some form. The inherence of geographic factors in redistribution is shown in the analysis of Bernard Grofman and others (1997), breaking down bias into three component parts: (1) bias resulting from malapportionment, (2) bias resulting from different levels...
of turnout, and (3) bias that results from the geographic distribution of party vote shares. Although requirements on a delimitation authority to control or eliminate malapportionment through a stipulation that the electorates of all seats be equal within a stated small tolerance level are now common, statutory exceptions exist for sparsely populated areas, for example, Norway and Western Australia. In South Australia, boundary revisions are also required to take into account the geography of party or grouping vote shares and ensure that the party or grouping with more than half the two-party preferred vote sees this reflected by an elected majority in the state legislative council.

The effect of demographic changes and boundary delimitation can be accentuated by party campaigning activity, as UK Liberals and later Liberal Democrats demonstrated through successes generated by intensive campaigning in individual localities in local elections from the 1970s onward. On a larger scale, the 1997 and subsequent general election victories of the UK Labour Party also owed much to the party’s efforts to “create its own geography,” in Johnston and Pattie’s words, through targeted geographical focus of its efforts linked to an overall increase in the effectiveness of the party machine. Electoral geography is not only determined by changing demographics and community formation and by the outcomes of boundary delimitation exercises but also by the response of political parties in targeting their resources, the intensity of campaigning, and promoting or implicitly accepting tactical voting. Furthermore, effective party management recognizes that changes in electoral geography can affect the motivation and activity of party organization and responds accordingly.

The Salience of the Electoral System

At a broader level, the overall electoral geography of a country and hence the dynamic not only of its electoral politics but of its political system as a whole are linked to the form of electoral system chosen. Cleavages can be accentuated or weakened by electoral system choice. Majoritarian systems usually have a strong built-in tendency to produce a seat bonus for the winning party, but there are occasions in practice where this does not happen. In Malawi in 1999, the three leading parties, United Democratic Front (UDF), Malawi Congress Party (MCP), and Alliance for Democracy (AforD), received 47%, 34%, and 11% of the national vote, respectively, which converted into 48%, 34%, and 15% of the seats. However, 82% of the UDF seats were in the southern region, 82% of the MCP seats were in the central region, and 97% of the AforD seats were in the northern region—which inevitably produced a dynamic of regional cleavage in the parliament.

By contrast, Indonesia has used list proportional representation (with differences in detail) in the democratic elections of the reform era from 1999 onward. In a political climate where the maintenance of the unity of the state was both a domestic political and a societal imperative and a priority of the international community, this type of electoral system ensured that each of the major parties secured representation from across Indonesia. Probably as a consequence, political divisions since 1999 have hardly demonstrated a regional dimension. However, mapping of the leading party in each local authority area shows a clustering of party support in different parts of the country, which would almost certainly have led to party groups in the legislature with a strong regional origin and identity. Had this happened, the likely consequence would have been the emergence of regionalism as a much stronger cleavage at the national level, with probable significant negative effects on national unity and the process of democratic consolidation. It is not only the proportion of seats gained by each party that influences the way a political system works in practice, for the geographical distribution of the leadership and elected members can be just as significant.

Future Research

While there no longer appears to be significant contest about the contribution of geographic effects to explain electoral behavior, there is still much scope for research into how they work. The study of electoral geography brings together political scientists and geographers, and there may be rich fields for future exploration both in the comparative study of electoral geographies and in the change of electoral geographies over time. Looking forward, it is a fair hypothesis that continuing changes in the way people form communities of different kinds will affect the working of the electoral geography
hypothesis in practice. The spread of access to telecommunications and personal transport in many parts of the world has clearly affected the context of the evolution of communities. The growth of Internet-based social networking and the consequent advent of virtual communities may be expected also to generate new impacts on the way in which personal interaction leads to electoral decision.

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See also Data, Spatial; Electoral Behavior; Electoral Systems; Redistribution; Social Capital

Further Readings

**Electoral Systems**

One may view electoral rules for a given office as having six basic components: (1) determination of who is eligible to be on the ballot (e.g., parties only or also individual candidates), (2) internal party rules for determining who are to be a given party’s candidates and/or for specifying candidate rankings within a party list, (3) specification of ballot type, (4) specification of constituencies (districts), (5) determination of election timing, and (6) rules for ballot aggregation (tallying rules). In addition, what is not to be forgotten is the seventh component of all elections—the voter—whose preferences and beliefs about how voting rules will translate those preferences into outcomes as well as the ways in which voter preferences are geographically distributed will critically affect how electoral rules operate in the real world.

Sometimes the term electoral system is used more broadly to include other aspects of elections and their regulation, such as rules for voter suffrage, campaign finance, campaign advertising, location of and times of access to polling stations, and so on. While all these elements are interrelated and part of the study of rules for conducting an election, in this entry, because of space constraints, the focus is primarily on ballot aggregation mechanisms. The entry examines the nature of the rules that determine electoral outcomes, identifies the most important rules used worldwide, considers alternative approaches to the study of electoral systems, and discusses domains of electoral system impact.

**Typologies of Electoral Rules**

Elections and the political parties that compete in them are at the heart of modern democracy. The study of elections and of the voting rules that are their engines has attracted the attention of many scholars and led to a literature, which, in the 4 decades since the publication of Douglas Rae’s *Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* in 1967 (second edition, 1971), has become well developed, both empirically and theoretically. The study of electoral rules and their effects is made easier by the existence of variables that can be precisely defined and usually made quantifiable, for example, votes and seats. Because of the close connections between the study of electoral rules and the study of topics such as party systems, representation, and constitutional design, success in understanding electoral rules and their effects can have what Rein Taagepera has called a “Rosetta stone” linkage function for more general theory building in political science.

But there are also very practical reasons for trying to understand electoral system effects. Of the fundamental aspects of constitutional design, for example, along continua such as unitary versus federal systems or parliamentary versus presidential systems, electoral rules are the easiest to change. In most countries, electoral rules are not constitutionally embedded, or at least many key details are left for legislative determination. There
are myriad different ways of conducting elections, and there is widespread belief, backed by empirical evidence, that choice of electoral rules matters a great deal for who gets what, when, and how—the questions that lie at the heart of all politics. Thus, manipulation of electoral rules seems an obvious tool of institutional engineering.

Candidate Eligibility/Designation of Candidates

In most polities, complex rules govern which parties and which candidate names can appear on the official ballot; for example, there may be signature requirements for nominating petitions, which require a certain number of names or a certain number of names from a certain number of different geographic regions, but some rules may be waived for parties that have demonstrated a substantial level of support via their vote share in the previous election(s). In most election settings, however, it is parties that designate the candidates entitled to appear on the ballot under their party label, sometimes choosing them by mechanisms purely internal to the party’s formal organization, sometimes by “primary” elections with voting restricted to party members or those registered as party affiliates, sometimes in so-called open primaries where voters can choose the party primary in which they participate. Thus, it is often sensible to talk not about the electoral rules but about electoral rules for a general election, on the one hand, and electoral rules for party nominations, on the other, especially if different parties handle nominations in different ways.

Ballot Type

There are three main ways to distinguish types of ballots: (1) ballot complexity, (2) number of rounds of balloting, and (3) types of alternatives.

Ballot complexity refers to the kind of information that voters are required to provide. The simplest ballot is one where voters mark an X for some prespecified number of alternatives, or for up to some prespecified number of alternatives—for example, approval voting, where every voter may indicate that up to \( M \) alternatives are “satisfactory,” with the \( M \) alternatives receiving the most “approval” votes being the ones that win; or limited voting, where each voter has a fixed number, \( k \), of X ballots to cast, where \( k \) is less than the number of seats to be filled, \( M \); and the most common case where voters have but a single X to cast, for example, plurality voting in a single-seat district. Another important type of X ballot is pure list PR, where there is a list prepared by each party, and a certain number of the top candidates on each list are elected, with that number determined by the proportion of (viable) votes cast for that party.

More complex ballots require voters to rank order alternatives, for example, the Borda count or the single transferable vote, or to assign cardinal numbers to alternatives, for example, cumulative voting. If one neglects the possibility of ties, one may think of the Borda method as involving each voter ranking all candidates and giving \( C - k \) votes to the candidate the voter puts in \( k \)th place, where \( C \) is the number of candidates in the contest. For each candidate, their Borda score is the sum (over all voters) of these Borda counts, with the candidate with the highest Borda score to be elected. Under single transferable vote, voters also rank order the candidates. If there are \( M \) seats to be filled, any candidate who receives at least a Droop quota of votes (=\( E/[M + 1] \), where \( E \) is the size of the actual electorate) is elected, exactly \( E/(M + 1) \) of the ballots in which that candidate is at the top of the preference rankings are removed from further consideration, and the votes on the remaining ballots on which that candidate is at the top of the preference ranking are reallocated to the next highest ranked (still eligible) candidate on that ballot. If that reallocation now gives some additional candidate a Droop quota, then that candidate is elected, and we continue in this fashion as long as we can. If there are still unfilled seats, the candidate with the fewest first-place votes is dropped from eligibility, and his or her votes are reallocated to the next highest ranked (still eligible) candidate on the ballots of those who had the dropped candidate at the top of their preference ranking. This process continues until all seats are filled. (If there are some voters who do not rank sufficiently many candidates, their ballots may never come into play, and so sometimes it may be necessary to elect the last candidate[s] with less than a Droop quota.) There are many variants of cumulative voting, with perhaps the most common involving the requirement that all components of the allocation vector that
must sum to the number of votes each voter is entitled to cast must be integers.

The two most common options for numbers of rounds of balloting are one-round and two-round ballots, but the exact number of rounds required in some forms of election (e.g., multi-round sequential elimination elections) can vary with the distribution of votes among the various candidates. In a multi-round sequential elimination system, there is some rule for dropping candidates at each round if no candidate has received a majority of first-place preferences among the set of still-viable candidates, for example, dropping the candidate with the fewest first-place votes from eligibility and then revoting among the remaining candidates.

Type of alternatives is meant to distinguish among the situations where voters choose among party lists versus voting for individual candidates versus some mix of the two—for example, open list PR systems or mixed electoral systems. In pure list PR, only parties are objects of choice, and the parties determine and rank their own candidates so that a party that wins \( r \) seats will elect the top \( r \) candidates on its list of candidates; in open list PR, in contrast, voters may also affect by their vote choices (even if not fully determine) which individual candidates from a given party will be elected. A mixed electoral system is, technically, simply one in which the electoral rule is not constant across all constituencies, but the term is more commonly used to refer to electoral systems that include both constituencies in which voters vote for a single candidate and those in which candidates are elected by some form of proportional representation (see Matthew Shugart & Martin Wattenberg, 2001).

But a further distinction is necessary as to what information about the candidate's party affiliation voters have available on the ballot. Even where voters are choosing among candidates rather than parties, voters usually know the party affiliation of each candidate or whether a candidate is running without a party attachment (i.e., as an "independent"). Nonpartisan elections, that is, elections without party labels for any of the candidates on the ballot, are relatively rare outside the United States, but in the United States such elections are the most common mechanism for electing local officials. Such nonpartisan elections are usually single-round, plurality-based elections, but there is a two-round variant called a blanket primary, used in a few U.S. states, where the top two vote getters enter into a second-round runoff if no candidate receives an actual majority of the votes cast. However, nonpartisanship often is merely a form of disguised partisanship, with the party affiliations of nominees being an open secret to knowledgeable voters.

Constituencies

Worldwide, most elections take place within geographically defined constituencies. As Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley (2008) note,

There are two kinds of exceptions to districted elections, the at-large election and the communal roll. In at-large elections, the entire polity is used as the district and thus there is no need ever to redraw constituency boundaries. Netherlands and Israel, for example, elect their national parliaments using List PR from the nation as a whole; while in the United States, the majority of cities elect city council representatives city-wide. In communal rolls, the fundamental basis of representation is non-geographic: choices are made from candidacies drawn from the members of a given race or ethnicity or religion. Usually, but not always, only members of a given community will be eligible to vote for representatives from that community. (p. 6, Footnote 3)

But, of course, even at-large elections, when they take place below the national level, are thought of as geographically based, and in many cases communal rolls may also be geographically based.

With respect to districted constituencies, a key distinction is between single-member districts (SMDs) and multimember districts (MMDs). The specification of constituency boundaries, called redistricting in the United States and boundary delimitation in much of the rest of the English-speaking world, is an important topic from both a legal and a theoretical point of view. For example, rules about the degree of population equality required across constituencies can be instrumental in permitting or preventing malapportionment, which, whether deliberate or unintended, can have substantial consequences for the translation of
votes into seats and the representation of groups that differ in their geographical locations and degree of geographic concentration, such as blocs of ethnic voters or party supporters.

**Election Timing**

In terms of election timing there are two important distinctions. The first is between elections that take place at predetermined intervals versus elections that may be “called” by those in power or that result from the failure of a vote of confidence in the parliament. When election dates are not predetermined, there is scope for strategy in the timing of elections, and parties within a governing multi-party coalition may have credible threats to withdraw from the cabinet so as to force a new election. Such threat potential can create policy uncertainties and ultimately destabilize governments.

The second distinction, involving election timing, is about the degree to which elections of various types and at various levels of government are held concurrently. Generally speaking, when elections are not held concurrently, this increases the likelihood that different policies will be pursued at different levels of government and that different parties will be in power for different offices.

**Ballot Aggregation**

The process by which ballots are turned into outcomes is referred to as ballot aggregation in the social choice literature.

The most frequently made distinction among ballot aggregation methods is between majoritarian/plurality methods and methods of representation intended to allow unified blocs of voters of a certain size that do not constitute an overall majority to nonetheless gain representation. The best known form of minoritarian representation is proportional representation. The proportionality principle refers to the idea that seat shares in a legislature should reflect vote shares.

The distinction between SMDs and MMDs is linked to this distinction, in that proportional representation methods can only be used in MMDs; however, use of MMDs does not imply the use of proportional representation, since there can be plurality voting in MMDs (sometimes called plurality bloc voting), where each voter has $M$ (single) votes to cast and where the $M$ candidates with the most votes are elected, or limited voting in MMDs, which, for $k > 1$, is a semiproportional system (see below).

The standard way to conceptualize the continuum anchored by majoritarian/plurality methods, at one end, and proportional representation methods, at the other end, is in terms of the threshold of exclusion, which Douglas Rae, Victor Hanby, and John Loosemore define as the largest vote share a party can receive and still be denied any seats in the district (see Rae, 1967/1971). The threshold of exclusion involves a hypothetical worst-case scenario in terms of the distribution of votes among the other parties that will minimize the given party’s seat share. For $M$ seat districts, in pure PR systems, the threshold of exclusion is either exactly or approximately $1/(M + 1)$. In other words, if it coordinates its votes, a group that has only a $1/(M + 1)$th share of the district’s population can guarantee to elect a candidate of its choice. As $M$ gets larger, smaller and smaller minorities become a large enough share of the electorate to win a seat for a candidate of their choice. The minimum feasible threshold of exclusion, which occurs for PR systems with the whole polity as the single constituency, is $1/(S + 1)$, where $S$ is the number of seats in the parliament. At the other end of the continuum, for simple plurality and majority systems, the threshold of exclusion is (infinitesimally under) $1/2$, regardless of $M$. Intermediate cases arise for limited voting, where voters have $k$ (single) votes to cast, and there are $M$ seats to be filled ($k < M$), with the $M$ highest vote getters elected. Here, the threshold of exclusion is $k/(k + M)$. The closer $k$ is to $M$, the less proportional is the limited voting rule. The threshold of exclusion for SNTV, the single nontransferable vote, which is another name for limited voting in $M$ seat districts ($M > 1$) where voters have but a single vote to cast, is identical to that of the d’Hondt form of list PR, namely $1/(M + 1)$.

Within any given country, an $m$-seat district can be expected to have roughly $m$ times the population of a single-seat district. Thus, if one is interested in the actual number of voters who must change their mind to affect election outcomes, then threshold of exclusion values need to be adjusted to take population differences into account across constituencies of different sizes.
Paralleling the threshold of exclusion, there is also a *threshold of representation*, which is the smallest vote share a party can receive and still win a seat in the district (see Rae, 1967/1971). The threshold of representation involves a hypothetical best case scenario in terms of the distribution of votes among the other parties that will maximize the given party’s seat share.

The thresholds of exclusion and representation are theoretical concepts. In any given electoral system, the actual vote share that a party will need to be assured of to gain representation will often be much less than the theoretical maximum. Relatedly, as Rein Taagepera (personal communication, June 4, 2004) observes, “The same electoral rules can lead to vastly different disproportionality, even in the same country and even in consecutive elections.” To deal with this problem, scholars commonly calculate *empirical indices* of disproportionality.

For partisan elections, the two most common measures of overall proportionality are the Loosemore-Hanby Index of Distortion (see Rae, 1967/1971),

\[
D = \frac{1}{2} \sum |v_i - s_i|,
\]

with \(v_i\) being the vote share of the \(i\)th party and \(s_i\) the seat share of that same party; and the Gallagher Index (Michael Gallagher, 1991),

\[
G_h = \left[ \frac{1}{2} \sum (V_i - S_j)^2 \right]^{0.5}.
\]

For two-party competition, another approach to measuring disproportionality empirically is in terms of what is called the *swing ratio*. Edward Tufte (1973) proposed that, in two-party legislative competition, a party can expect to receive a share of seats such that

\[
\frac{\log s}{1 - s} = k \frac{\log v}{1 - v} + \varepsilon.
\]

Here, the closer \(k\) is to 1, the closer we are, empirically, to proportionality.

While the PR versus plurality/majority distinction is certainly important, there are equally important distinctions among the members of each of the two groupings.

Among PR methods, the most important threefold distinction is between list PR methods and rules that are based on preference rankings, most notably the single transferable vote (STV, aka the Hare system), on the one hand, and those that involve point schemes, most notably the simple cumulative vote (CV), where each voter has \(M\) votes to be divided (in whole integers) among candidates in any way that the voter wishes, on the other hand. While CV, like SNTV, is sometimes called semiproportional since it requires voter coordination to ensure proportionality, this is a quantitative rather than a qualitative difference between them and, say, list PR methods, and so both are treated under the general rubric of PR. The intermediate category of semiproportional systems is reserved for limited voting, with \(1 < k < M\).

There are also important distinctions among list PR systems. This entry has already mentioned the issue of whether the system allows voters to choose among candidates rather than parties. A second, rather more technical, distinction is between methods that can be characterized as *divisor methods* and methods that cannot be so characterized, most notably the *greatest-remainder* method. Divisor methods are methods where one can determine outcomes by taking the party vote shares \(p_i\) and dividing each in turn by a particular vector of divisors \(d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_M\) and then allocating seats to each party corresponding to their having one of the \(M\) highest quotients from among the \(n \times M\) member set \([p_i/d_i]\). For example, d’Hondt (also sometimes known as the Hagenbach-Bischoff method) uses the vector of divisors \(1, 2, 3, 4, \ldots, M\), while Sainte-Laguë uses \(1, 3, 5, 7, \ldots, 2n - 1\), and the modified Sainte-Laguë uses \(1.4, 3, 5, 7, \ldots, 2n - 1\).

For example, if there were three parties of sizes 0.40, 0.35, and 0.25, respectively, and six seats to be filled, under d’Hondt one would look at the set of numbers \(0.40, 0.35, 0.25; 0.20, 0.175, 0.125; 0.133, 0.117, 0.083; \text{etc.}\) and find the six highest, which would result in three seats to the largest parties (from quotients of 0.40, 0.20, and 0.133), two seats to the second largest party (from quotients of 0.35 and 0.175), and one seat to the smallest party (from a quotient of 0.25). Since the quotient of 0.40/3 (=0.133) is higher than 0.25/2 (=0.125),
the sixth seat goes to the largest party rather than the smallest party. To calculate the greatest-remainder results, one would look at \( p_i \times M \) and first allocate whole quotients to the parties and then allocate the remaining seats in order of the magnitude of the remainder. For the same six-seat example with three parties of sizes 0.40, 0.35, and 0.25, one gets 2.4, 2.1, and 1.5, respectively. Since the greatest remainder is 0.5, each party ends up getting two seats, despite the disparities in size among the three parties.

Note that even though both d’Hondt and the greatest remainder are PR systems, they do not always yield identical allocations. In general, although most often the allocations under the two rules will be the same, sometimes d’Hondt will be more favorable to the largest/larger parties than will the greatest remainder. But not all divisor rules produce the same results, either. In particular, Sainte-Laguë is likely to be in between the other two rules in terms of favoring larger over smaller parties, while the modified Sainte-Laguë was specifically designed to be more favorable to moderately sized parties than the unmodified Sainte-Laguë.

Mathematically, divisor methods for allocating seats to parties on the basis of party vote shares are identical to divisor methods for allocating seats to geographic units on the basis of the unit’s share of the total population. The same method may go under different names in the two different contexts. Thus, the d’Hondt method was actually first invented by Thomas Jefferson to partition seats in the U.S. House of Representatives among the states. Similarly, the Sainte-Laguë method is identical to an apportionment method devised by the American legislator Daniel Webster. Five divisor methods have particular centrality because they each correspond to a particular way of rounding values to create integer allocations of seats to the various parties that sum up to \( M \). The Adams method corresponds to rounding up; the Jefferson method (d’Hondt) corresponds to rounding down; the Webster method (Sainte-Laguë) corresponds to rounding up if the remainder is greater than 0.5; the Dean method corresponds to taking the harmonic mean; and the Hill-Huntington method corresponds to taking the geometric mean and is the method that is currently in use in the U.S. House of Representatives to determine how many seats each state will get (subject to the constraint that each state must have at least one seat in the House). There are also alternative ways to define divisor methods, for example, in terms of quotient maximization functions. It should also be noted that the greatest-remainder method is also called the Hamilton method because Alexander Hamilton proposed it as way of allocating seats to the states.

While the distinctions among types of ballot aggregation identified above are the ones most often studied—generating what Rein Taagepera (2007) refers to as the set of simple electoral systems—they are only the tip of the iceberg. The devil is in the details, and there are many other features of electoral rules that can affect vote aggregation. For example, there may be rules that allow parties to combine their vote share by entering into pre-election alliances; and/or there may be specific national, regional, or district vote share thresholds or rules for geographic distribution that must be surmounted before a party can receive any seats; and/or there may be complex mixtures of electoral rules, with different types of rules applying in different constituencies or in multiple tiers of representation involving different levels of proportionality and “topping up” across the various tiers.

**Electoral Rule Effects**

There are five major theoretical perspectives on how to estimate the likely consequences of electoral rules or changes in electoral rules: (1) social choice theory, (2) mainstream empirical research, (3) rational choice and game-theoretic models, (4) the social physics perspective, and (5) the embedded systems approach.

Social choice approaches are those that (a) in the spirit of Kenneth Arrow (1951/1963) study the normative properties of voting rules, for example, responsiveness to changes in underlying voter preferences, the likelihood of choosing a candidate who can receive a majority over all other candidates in a head-on-head contest (known in this literature as Condorcet efficiency), and/or seek to characterize voting rules in axiomatic form; (b) are concerned about the structure of individual preferences, for example, the extent to which preferences have a particular form of unidimensionality known as single peakedness or satisfy other domain restrictions; and/or (c) for a
fixed set of voter preferences, assess the likelihood that different voting methods will yield the same outcome.

Mainstream empirical research seeks to measure the effects of particular electoral rules, cross-nationally or across different units in the same polity, by techniques such as regressing an outcome variable— for example, (effective) number of political parties or measures of proportionality of seats–votes relationships—against electoral system features and some set of control variables (see, e.g., Arend Lijphart, 1994). It is characterized by large-scale data analysis of both survey and aggregate data.

Rational choice modeling emphasizes strategic behavior on the part of voters and candidates/parties and makes extensive use of game theory. Customarily, results are in the form of theorems about how electoral system effects, in equilibrium, are determined by the incentives that different rules provide for the behavior of voters and parties/candidates under different assumptions about the motivations ascribed to voters and the utility functions (office seeking, policy seeking, or some combination thereof) that are ascribed to parties/candidates (see, e.g., Gary Cox, 1997). While the formal properties of electoral rules determine how “inputs,” that is, completed ballots, will be converted into electoral outcomes, it is the structure of electoral incentives that helps determine both what options will actually be available to the voters on the ballot and how voters will decide among those options. In particular, when there is strategic voting, such that voters do not always support the candidate/party they most prefer if they do not believe that that candidate/party has a realistic chance to be elected, then great care must be taken in projecting outcomes from underlying preferences and the nature of the voting rule.

The social physics approach, associated with the work of Rein Taagepera (see Taagepera & Matthew Shugart, 1989; also especially Taagepera, 2007), is inspired by the principles of statistical thermodynamics in physics. It does not attempt to predict the effects of electoral rules in individual political units but seeks instead to precisely model effects on average. Also, it (a) makes use of only a handful of key variables; (b) uses functional forms, which must yield results consistent with the boundary conditions determining the range of feasible outcomes; and (c) requires that left-hand (dependent) and right-hand (independent) variables be stated in a fashion that yields dimensional comparability.

The term embedded systems was introduced in Grofman (1999) and used in subsequent work by Grofman and coauthors, but many others use the same approach without calling it by that name. The hallmark of the embedded systems approach to electoral systems is the notion that electoral system effects can be fully understood only within the context of the overall constitutional, social, and party systems in which they are embedded. Of special concern are (a) seeing how similar systems can yield different outcomes in different contexts; (b) the need for care in attributing causality to electoral system effects when the choice of electoral rules may be endogenously determined, which leads to an interest in experiments on voting rules and “natural experiments” such as those that occur when different methods are used within the same polity in different geographic areas or at different time points; (c) attention to how the seemingly trivial differences in electoral rules, for example, different rules for nominating candidates, can have major consequences; and (d) attention to the fact that it will take time until voters, candidates, and parties come to understand how a given set of electoral rules, embedded as they are within a particular political context, will affect outcomes.

While social choice theory has, historically, largely limited itself to studying the properties of voting rules in the abstract, many political scientists and economists have been more interested in who/what is being affected by the choice of rules. Scholars have looked at the implications/consequences of electoral rules for voters, parties, and interest groups as well as at general effects on governance and effects on specific policy outputs.

For voters, there is an extensive literature on how electoral systems may affect representation of geographic areas and of racial/ethnic/social groupings, and voter turnout, as well as on spillover effects, such as on voter perceptions of transparency and voter efficacy. For parties, there is work on the consequence of electoral rules for party proliferation, party ideological dispersal, strength of party organization, party discipline in the legislature, party coalitional strategies, and of course, the relationships between party vote shares and party seat shares in terms of the extent of proportionality and of partisan bias. For governance,
important questions have to do with the link between electoral rules and issues such as the incentives for corruption, the incentives for localism and pork-barrel politics, the durability of parliamentary governments, and for ethnically divided societies, the links between electoral rules and civic unrest and the strength of secessionist movements. For specific policy arenas, hypotheses have been proposed about the (independent) effects of electoral rules on the size of the welfare system and the degree of economic inequality (see, e.g., Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2003).

The electoral systems literature is now so vast that no single essay can possibly do justice to it. Readers are reminded of two points: First, one must be attentive to issues of endogeneity and interaction effects. Voting rules do not exist in a vacuum; on the one hand, they are determined by past history and maintained only in some type of political equilibrium, and on the other, their consequences are shaped by the present political context in which they are embedded even though they also affect that context. Second, and relatedly, to understand electoral system effects, one must understand both the formal properties of electoral rules (including prosaic facts such as the maximum number of parties elected in a constituency being capped by the number of seats that are up for election), on the one hand, and the (short-run and long-run) incentives for voters, candidates, parties, and interest groups created by those rules, on the other.

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See also Election by Lot; Elections, Primary; Election Research; Elections, Volatility; Electoral Behavior; Electoral Geography; Electoral Turnout

Further Readings


Electoral Turnout

Electoral turnout is called an “aggregate-level” concept because it only makes sense to talk of turnout when talking of aggregates of individuals. Yet because turnout derives from cumulating individual-level decisions, one must start with an understanding of why people vote—something about which there is little agreement in the scholarly literature. Proposed theories have been based on rational, expressive, mobilized, habitual, dutiful, altruistic, and even genetic explanations; see, for example, Benny Geys (2006) and James Fowler and Christopher Dawes (2008). From a rational choice perspective, the decision to vote is conceptualized as the result of a cost–benefit “calculus of voting” in which difficulties of becoming informed and getting to the polling booth, and so
Electoral Turnout on, are compared with the benefits a voter expects if his or her preferred party is enabled to implement promised policies. The calculus must take account of the probability that one vote will affect an election’s outcome. In a large electorate, this probability is vanishingly small, so a truly rational voter would “free ride” on the efforts of others. The fact that in reality many citizens do vote has come to be called the “paradox of voting.”

Electoral Participation as Social Behavior

The recognition of the paradox of voting led some scholars to reinterpret benefits and costs in terms that are unrelated to outcomes of elections by assuming that people are motivated by social, ethical, or expressive considerations rather than narrow self-interest. In brief, ethical explanations claim that citizens vote out of a sense of civic duty, mobilization theories argue that people are motivated by political campaigns, while expressive explanations suggest that individuals are affirming their (group) identity. Proponents of these theories have not, however, explained why, if motivations are unrelated to election outcomes, people would be more likely to vote when their vote has more impact on the outcome (e.g., in a close race) or when more is at stake (see below).

An approach with more promise of overcoming the paradox of voting recognizes that voting benefits more people than just the individual voter and sees voters as social beings motivated in part—especially if they are of an altruistic disposition—by their obligations to groups with which they identify and responsive to the expectations and mobilizing efforts of members of those groups. This approach has gained prominence with recent research demonstrating that turnout is subject to socialization, learning, and habit formation, as shown by Eric Plutzer (2002). In addition, the value of this approach is in demonstrating that most voters acquire a habit of voting over time and that contextual factors such as the closeness of the race have a stronger impact on voters who have not yet acquired the habit of voting, as demonstrated by Mark Franklin (2004).

The fact that people differ in terms of whether their behavior is based on habit suggests that much earlier research into individual-level explanations of turnout variations, demonstrating the influence of sociodemographic factors (such as education, income, or age) and social factors (such as home ownership or church attendance), were focusing on factors that facilitated this learning process. A reconceptualization of the decision to vote into long-term (habitual) and short-term (variable) behavior shows promise of clarifying much that is currently confusing in the turnout literature.

Short- and Long-Term Forces in Turnout Change

The same distinction between short- and long-term forces helps explain a puzzle that has not received much attention. Turnout differences between countries are considerable. In some countries (e.g., Australia, Belgium, or Malta), virtually everyone votes. In other countries (Switzerland or the United States), turnout rarely reaches 50%. These differences are huge, yet in established democracies the turnout seldom varies by as much as 5% between successive elections of the same type (presidential elections in the United States, parliamentary elections elsewhere). Only over a longer period (20 years or more) do some countries see marked changes in their turnout levels. This puzzle is resolved if one understands that most people in established democracies at any given time have acquired established habits of voting or not voting—habits that condition the level of turnout according to the ratio of habitual voters to habitual nonvoters. An electorate consisting mainly of habitual voters will regularly produce a high turnout, whereas an electorate with more nonvoters will produce lower turnout, and these levels of turnout will be quite stable in the short run. Any long-term change in turnout levels must come from new voters whose behavior is not yet habitual. If the proportion of new voters who acquire the habit of voting changes and remains at a different level (higher or lower), then long-term change will arise from natural processes of generational replacement. Such processes are slow but inexorable because an electorate will be entirely replaced with new voters over the course of about 50 or 60 years.

What would lead new voters to acquire the habit of voting at a different rate than their elders did? To answer this question, one needs to turn to explanations of turnout variations that focus on things about elections rather than things about individuals.
Election-Level Explanations

Changes in the level of turnout between countries and over time are not due to changes in individual-level characteristics. Increases in the proportion of university-educated or high-income individuals (two characteristics strongly associated with the acquisition of habitual voting) do not result in rising turnout. The United States and Switzerland are both rich countries with very high levels of education, yet their turnout is lowest of all established democracies; and in both countries, turnout fell even as wealth and education increased. Moreover, countries that see high turnout do not have markedly different distributions of these and other social characteristics in their electorates. So there must be something else that can motivate everyone—even the poorest and least educated—to vote in certain circumstances, quite overriding the influence of individual-level factors—something that must be weaker or even absent in other circumstances.

Scholars agree that this “something” relates to what is at stake in an election. In countries where much is at stake, everybody votes. Where the stakes are lower, so is turnout. Research has pointed to several factors that raise the stakes of an election—primarily, the institutional and competitive context (see Andre Blais, 2006; Benny Geys, 2006). To indicate the nature and importance of the more potent contextual factors, Table 1 displays their effects in 22 established democracies between 1945 and 1999. The right-hand column shows the maximum extent of turnout differences found to be associated with each factor, comparing elections with the lowest stakes in terms of that factor to elections with the highest stakes.

These influences are ordered in terms of their importance in the long-term perspective (i.e., after allowing time for generational replacement to reveal their full effects), with the most influential characteristic being “policy responsiveness.” This influence is emblematic because it relates so clearly to the policy stakes of an election: Some political systems have separated powers or other obstacles that stand in the way of a majority enacting its policies, reducing the extent to which voters can easily estimate the policy consequences of an election. “Electorate size” is almost as important, picking up additional aspects of policy responsiveness since larger countries are more often subdivided by means of federal or quasi-federal arrangements. Electorate size also dilutes the power of each individual vote. “Largest party size” is a measure of legislative power. A party that reaches the 50% threshold can govern alone; one that comes close can dominate any coalition of which it cannot.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Range of Values</th>
<th>Maximum Turnout Difference Due to This Influence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy responsiveness</td>
<td>0–3 units</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electorate size</td>
<td>1–280 million</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory voting</td>
<td>0, 1 = yes</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest party size</td>
<td>33–50%&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean margin across districts</td>
<td>0–10%</td>
<td>5.7&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin of victory nationwide</td>
<td>0–10%</td>
<td>5.3&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party cohesiveness</td>
<td>0, 1 = yes</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sum of differences 56.5<sup>b</sup>

Source: Adapted from Table 5.2 in Franklin, M. N. (2004). 
Voter turnout and the dynamics of electoral competition in established democracies since 1945. New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>a</sup> Maximum limited to 50%, the threshold for majority status.

<sup>b</sup> Margin and mean margin operate in different countries, so one is zero when the other is not.
forms a part, yielding confidence that it will enact its policy promises (other factors permitting). One obvious prerequisite is “party cohesiveness” at the foot of the table—that is, the extent to which parties enjoy disciplined support in the country’s legislature. Two alternative measures of margin of victory are shown, depending on whether votes are cast in districts where the “winner takes all” or seats are assigned proportionately to votes. Both measures tap the extent to which an election is a close one, in which every vote counts. “Compulsory voting” has a rather different influence, increasing the stakes of an election by threatening sanctions (real or imagined) for failure to vote. In practice, this influence has been shown to have most effect where turnout would otherwise be lowest, effectively trumping all other influences on turnout (Arend Lijphart, 1997).

The final coefficient at the bottom of the table shows the long-term difference in turnout that might be observed empirically between a hypothetical election in which all stakes are at their maximum and one where all stakes are at their minimum. It is something of an underestimate because several small influences have been omitted for simplicity. However, no established democracy in practice has elections characterized by minimum possible stakes, so the hypothetical total difference of 56% is not an unrealistic maximum.

In new or transitional democracies, greater swings in turnout can occur than generally seen in established democracies—presumably because in new democracies no one has yet had time to acquire habitual behavior patterns. Indeed, the more volatile turnout seen in such countries serves to reinforce our conclusions about the role of habitual behavior in turnout change. Nevertheless, little is known about how the mechanics of turnout change in established democracies play out in new democracies (Andre Blais & Agnieszka Dobrzynska, 1998; Pippa Norris, 2002). So the study of new and transitional democracies remains an important avenue for future research.

Further research is also needed to test competing explanations of individual-level behavior. At the aggregate level, more research is needed on new democracies as well as research connecting the aggregate context of elections to individual voter behavior. The methodological advances being made in time series and multilevel analysis should help answer the remaining puzzles.

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See also Civic Participation; Democratization; Electoral Behavior; Electoral Systems; Multilevel Analysis; Participation; Rational Choice; Time-Series Analysis

Further Readings

Elites

Elites are small groups of persons who exercise disproportionate power and influence in social domains. It is customary to distinguish between political elites, whose locations in powerful institutions, organizations, and movements enable them to shape or influence political outcomes, often decisively, and cultural elites, who enjoy a high status and influence in nonpolitical spheres such as arts and letters, philanthropy, professions, and civic associations. At the national level, political elites number only a few thousand persons in all but the largest countries, whereas the makeup...
of cultural elites is more indeterminate and turns on the nonpolitical spheres regarded as consequential in a society. Taking their lead from Gaetano Mosca (1856–1941), Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), and Robert Michels (1876–1936), political scientists focus on political elites (simply elites hereafter), investigating how their actions and beliefs, social profiles, and overall configurations affect political regimes and policies. Below, various aspects of elite formation, autonomy, structure, transformation, and their analysis in political science are discussed.

Mosca, Pareto, and Michels portrayed elite formation as inescapable in modern societies and as imposing limits on what is possible in politics. They maintained, for example, that genuine democratic systems are impossible because there are always self-interested elites who out-organize and outwit the demos. The most that can be hoped for, in their view, is a relatively liberal but still quite unequal order led by capable, cooperative, and enlightened elites. But, they noted, elites in most societies and times fall well short of these attributes, so politics usually involve fierce power struggles between ambitious, blinkered, and insecure elites.

The research literature on elites is large. Especially prominent are studies of parliamentary and cabinet-level politicians; high civil servants; and the owners, CEOs, and board members of major business firms. Studies of military, trade union, mass media, pressure group, religious, and social movement elites are also numerous. There is, in addition, a substantial body of historical research uncovering the makeup and role of elites in pivotal events and processes of economic, political, and social change. Researchers identify elites in terms of who holds the most important formal positions in a society, who has pronounced reputations for political power and influence, or who participates in making key decisions and policies. Each identification method tends to produce a distinctive elite configuration. Concentrating on positions highlights the differentiation of elites by sectors (politics, business, government administration, etc.); focusing on reputations often identifies a cohesive and small “power elite” sitting astride diverse sectors; and studying participation in decisions and policies most often yields an array of specialized elite groups. To overcome these identification peculiarities, researchers frequently use more than one method and combine the results.

Once elites are identified, how their positions overlap and interlock can be analyzed, and data on their social background, education, and careers can be compiled from public registers and questionnaires; also, elite persons’ opinions and perceptions, as well as their informal interactions and networks, may be solicited through interviews. A perennial question is the degree to which collective elite profiles mirror those of nonelite publics and, thus, the extent to which elites can be supposed to reflect and represent such publics. Other important questions include the extent to which elites are autonomous actors, how their compositions and behavior vary among societies, and how elites change, gradually or suddenly, in these and other respects.

Elites and Nonelites

Research shows that in their social background, education, and occupations, elites are almost always more privileged than cross sections of non-elite populations. They come prevalingly from well-off families, some of whose members may have held elite positions in preceding generations. The frequency with which they hold university degrees—often from “elite” institutions—far exceeds the distribution of such education among nonelite publics. Elites also come disproportionately from high-status occupations—lawyers, teachers, and public or private sector managers. There are exceptions, of course. Significant proportions of civil service elites have career graphs that begin in lowly positions and involve long climbs to the top. Self-made entrepreneurs are certainly not unknown among business elites. Historically, the elites of trade unions and various social movements exhibited a modest background and education, although today in industrialized countries, they are predominantly middle class in background and university educated. Elite-level politicians are increasingly involved in full-time careers in or close to politics, often starting as student political leaders and then serving on leading politicians’ staffs or holding paid positions in parties, or they come from politically relevant careers in journalism, public relations, and policy think tanks. Historically, elites have consisted almost entirely of men, and men continue to outnumber
women greatly in most elite sectors. In multi-ethnic or multiracial societies, elite persons usually belong to the largest or otherwise dominant ethnic or racial population segment. Finally, in average age, elites tend to be significantly older than nonelites.

Research shows, however, that these differences between elites and nonelites are gradually being reduced. For example, research on the social, educational, and occupational profiles of parliamentary elites in 11 European countries from the middle of the 19th century to the present reveals a long trend toward less exclusive and privileged profiles. Changes in the gender makeups of elites are also now quite evident. It is possible, moreover, that the preponderance of bureaucratic and service work in many contemporary societies is intermingling elites and nonelites in important ways. Both perform essentially similar nonmanual work tasks and not infrequently rub shoulders in offices. Because elites now more frequently ascend to their positions from nonelite origins than in the rigidly stratified societies of earlier times, not a few see themselves as one of a kind with nonelites, among whom they have intimate personal associates and for whom they have considerable empathy. Such closer and more empathetic ties may dispose elites toward actions that better reflect and represent nonelite desires and interests. There is, furthermore, a debate about the degree to which the backgrounds of elites translate into opinions and actions that disregard nonelites. Some scholars argue that there is at most a weak linkage between elite backgrounds and elite opinions and actions. Faced with pressing and constantly changing organizational and political imperatives, elites hold views and take actions that resonate poorly, if at all, with their life histories. Elite backgrounds may reveal more about the distribution of opportunities in a society than why its elites think and act as they do.

**Elite Autonomy**

Elites seldom enjoy complete autonomy. To carry out major initiatives and perpetuate their holds on power, elites need nonelite support. To win it, elites frame appeals that accord, at least roughly, with nonelite interests and political orientations. It is reasonable to suppose that nonelite interests and orientations are not created by elites but derive from combinations of human nature, life circumstances, and beliefs, although elites often activate or muffle nonelite interests and orientations through well-couched appeals. Failure to win nonelite support frequently shortens elite tenures or undermines elite effectiveness. Still, elites normally have a range of choices that are decisive for political outcomes. In political crises, for example, opposing elite camps and factions may choose to enter into accommodations or persist in lethal oppositions. During transitions to democracy, ascendant factions may choose to embrace or merely feign democratic practices. In well-instituted democracies, elites may proffer outcomes they know to be impossible or resort to obfuscations that enable them to avoid responsibility for what happens.

How much autonomy elites have—and should have—are questions that have long dogged discussions of “democratic elitism.” In his seminal book *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950) held that democracy is simply a method by which voters select governing leaders and elites, who should then be left alone to get on with the business of governing. For Schumpeter, in other words, democracy combines autonomous governance by leaders and elites with time-limited mandates to govern given by the *demos* in periodic elections. However, many critics of democratic elitism claim that this too blithely assumes leaders and elites to be creative and responsible actors who can safely be entrusted with autonomy. Whether the autonomy of leaders and elites is increasing or decreasing in contemporary democracies is a major empirical question in political science, and its desirability is a bone of contention in normative democratic theory.

**Variation in Elite Structure and Values**

It is obvious in modern history and today’s world that elites differ importantly in their structures and values. First, elites located in functionally differentiated societal sectors display different modes of organization and different aims. Much research on the careers, outlooks, and skills peculiar to elites in specific sectors, as well as the ease or difficulty with which elite persons traverse sector boundaries or hold interlocked positions in two or more sectors, assesses the extent to which elites are pluralistic or monolithic in their structures and values.
Second, there are efforts to capture different types of national elites when considered as wholes. These efforts risk being too simplistic, yet the comparative study of elites cannot escape the need for a broad typology. Typologies that have been put forth concentrate on the extent of structural integration and the extent of value consensus. Structural integration involves the relative inclusiveness of formal and informal networks of communication and influence among elite members. Value consensus involves their relative agreement about the worth of existing political institutions and a code of political behavior.

Comparing national elites along these dimensions, a disunited type and two types of united elites can be distinguished, although there are difficult borderline cases. In the disunited type, elite groups are clearly divided and separated from each other, they disagree fundamentally about the worth of existing institutions, and they adhere to no single code of behavior. This is still the most common type of elite in the modern world. It is usually associated with authoritarian regimes in which one elite group or camp has the upper hand and governs ruthlessly. A disunited elite may also be associated with illiberal democracies, in which competitive elections take place but are so ridden with fraudulent practices that few elites and citizens accept their outcomes as legitimate.

Disunited elites have originated principally in processes of national state formation, during which elites in one territory forcibly annex and subjugate other territories and elites. The resulting conflicts and hatreds have most often produced deeply disunited elites in new national states. There are many examples: the animosities and bitter memories that followed the formation of national states in Europe between the 16th and 19th centuries, the “man on horseback’s” (caudillos) control of Latin American states from their formations early in the 19th century until long into the 20th century, nearly all African states under alternating military and civilian rule since their emergence in the 1950s and 1960s, and the creation of postcolonial states by dynastic ruling elites in the Middle East.

In one of the two types of united elites, by contrast, elite structure is sharply centralized in a party, theocratic, or ethno-nationalist state. There is a secular ideology, religious doctrine, or ethno-nationalist creed that is defined by the uppermost political leaders and professed publicly by all or nearly all elite persons. Much less common than the disunited type of elite, examples of this “ideologically united” type are the Soviet elite from 1922 until the mid-1980s, Germany’s elite during the Third Reich, the North Korean elite under Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il, China’s elite during Mao Zedong’s rule and after, the Cuban elite under Fidel Castro, the Viet Minh elite since gaining control of North Vietnam in 1954 and all of Vietnam in 1975, the Khmer Rouge elite in Cambodia (until 1978), and the Iranian elite from the time of Ayatollah Khomeini’s ascendancy (1979) and, arguably, until the present. As these examples indicate, the ideologically united type of elite most often originates in a revolutionary or anticolonial war that culminates in the victory and dominance of an especially doctrinaire elite group.

Disunited and ideologically united elites are clearly incompatible with stable liberal democracies, whereas a second type of united elite—what might be labeled a “consensually united” elite—appears to be a precondition for them. In this second type, elite structure consists of formal and informal networks of influence and acquaintance that are most dense within the functionally differentiated sectors mentioned above. But these networks overlap and interlock to form web works and “inner” or “central” circles through which sector elites are tied together and obtain access to key political decision makers. As well, the members of this second type of united elite share a voluntary, mostly tacit consensus about political norms and practices, the hallmark of which is keeping political competition restrained and nonviolent. Factions recognize each other’s right to be heard, they agree to disagree when decisions cannot be reached, they emphasize technical and procedural feasibilities rather than ultimate rights and wrongs, and they practice enough secrecy to have flexibility when bargaining and fashioning compromises on difficult policy issues.

Like ideologically united elites, consensually united elites are relative rarities in the modern world. They appear to originate in only two or three ways. One is through a deliberate, sudden, and basic “settlement” of costly and long-standing oppositions, as occurred between Tory and Whig elite camps in England’s Glorious Revolution during 1688 to 1689 and between Franquist and
anti-Franquist elite camps in Spain during 1977 to 1978. A second way has been through a long experience of relatively benign colonial home rule during which settler or “native” elites learn to practice cautious and restrained politics and eventually make a unifying effort to gain independence—the origin of consensually united elites in the former British colonies of Australia, Canada, India, Jamaica, New Zealand, and, not least, the United States. A third way has been the gradual convergence of camps in a disunited elite toward consensual unity when spreading prosperity and agreement about basic democratic rights and principles, which erodes the postures taken by radically dissident camps, as happened in France and Italy during the 1960s and 1970s and Germany and Japan during the 1970s and 1980s. It must be noted, however, that basic settlements between opposed elites are highly contingent and have been historically relatively rare occurrences. The further consolidation and formation of elite consensus in the more recent “Third Wave” (Huntington) democracies remains to be seen.

**Elite Circulation and Transformation**

How elites change in their composition and behavior is a major question. Mosca and Pareto emphasized elites’ need to replenish their ranks through constant but gradual and peaceful inflows and outflows of members. Pareto also toyed with a more dramatic process, in which cunning and foxlike elites are replaced, gradually or suddenly, by belligerent and lion-like elites, who are, however, in turn eventually displaced by new foxlike elites in an endless cycle. In this context, Pareto famously depicted revolutions as amounting to little more than circulations of ruling elites. Processes of elite circulation and transformation appear to vary according to the basic type of elite that exists in a society. Where this is a disunited elite, sudden and violent displacements of ruling elite camps and cliques tend to occur frequently. Through a coup or elite-led popular uprising, one camp or clique seizes and holds power until the next coup or uprising. Modern history is replete with such violent but essentially garden-variety elite circulations. More rarely, the ascendant camp in a disunited elite may so mismanage its rule or suffer so many misfortunes that the state and its coercive forces collapse, opening the door to a revolutionary interregnum and the victory of a previously peripheral but tightly organized and doctrinaire elite group. Where this happens, one may speak of a transformation from the disunited to the ideologically united type. The classic example is the collapse of the war-ravaged Tsarist state and the ensuing revolutionary triumph of the tiny Bolshevik elite in Russia between 1917 and 1921.

Where, as in the Soviet Union from 1922, an ideologically united elite holds sway, elite circulation occurs more or less exclusively by jockeying for high positions in a crushingly dominant party or movement. Eventually, however, the imposed and “official” ideology or other dogma of that party or movement may become so threadbare and at odds with societal developments that its elite unravels or implodes. The ideologically united elite is transformed into a disunited elite, different in makeup but not in basic type from the disunited elite that preceded the earlier revolutionary transformation. This was the fate of the Soviet Union’s ruling elite some 70 years after it took power. Its implosion created disunited elites in Russia and all of the newly independent states that had constituted the Soviet Union. A question at present is whether similar implosions of ideologically united elites will occur in China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Vietnam, and perhaps Iraq.

Consensually united elites appear to be immune to such dramatic circulations and transformations. Sudden and irregular seizures of governing power by competing elite camps and factions do not occur, and the historical record indicates that, once formed, a consensually united elite strongly tends to persist over long periods: in England/Britain since 1689, the United States since 1789, Sweden since 1809, Canada since 1867, Australia since 1901, India since 1947, inter alia. Elite circulation occurs gradually through periodic election contests and complex career and other hierarchical recruitment structures in which “merit” is emphasized and rewarded, even if mainly in the eyes of those who are successful. This circulation is not inconsequential, however. Modern communication technologies so heighten elite organization and mobilization of public support that electoral competition and policy disputes increasingly approximate battles between armada-like
coalitions of elites, whose alternating victories bring sharp changes in governing style and policy content.

Elites and Political Science

The study of elites confronts political science with difficult problems. First, elite behavior always contains enough arbitrary and capricious elements to defy deterministic explanation. A theory of elites and politics must allow considerable leeway for unpredictable elite choice, and its explicative claims must, therefore, be modest. This means, second, that a theory should focus principally on what is unlikely or impossible in politics—on what the inescapability of elites and their relatively autonomous actions rule out. Yet much political science regards political possibilities—especially possibilities for making people more free and equal, more enlightened and participative—as essentially open-ended.

Third, the secrecy that elites routinely practice is at odds with the strong empirical bent of political science. Compiling more data on elite backgrounds and other aspects of their profiles, conducting more surveys of usually evasive elite opinions and momentary network locations, and manipulating such data with rigorous statistical techniques are unlikely to bring political scientists appreciably closer to a robust understanding of elites and politics. In short, elites often do not lend themselves to empirical and inductive research. Capturing what elites do and why they do it requires a deductive and rationalistic theory that must be tested against observed events. Do events occur as they would if the theory were true? Does the theory make better sense of what happens politically than other theories? If it does, are there nevertheless clear and undoubted facts that show the theory to be at least in part mistaken? These are legitimate and necessary questions. “Can each of the theory’s postulates about elite behavior and motivation be demonstrated and measured empirically?” is not, however, a legitimate question. No seriously explicative theory, even in the most experimental and reputedly scientific fields, can meet such a test. Things that are observable merely happen as they would if the theory were true and no more elegant and parsimonious explanation is available. While barriers to empirical research and inductive explanation exist in many areas of political science, they are especially pronounced in the study of elites.

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See also Democratization; Elitism; Interviews, Elite; Masses; Oligarchy; Political Class; State Formation

Further Readings


Elitism

The etymology of the word elite (occasionally spelled élite) comes from the Latin eligere (to elect). In general usage, an elite is a relatively small dominant group or social category of people who occupy a position of privilege or dominance and have a privileged status within a larger society. To examine the “elite” category in political science is to take up a fundamental question—that of defining the group or groups that hold “power” in a
social system, that is, those who have a dominating influence on the definition and the carrying out of public decisions. The question of who holds power in modern societies is generally dealt with from three different theoretical standpoints: (1) elitism, (2) pluralism, and (3) Marxism. From an elitist perspective, power belongs to an elite that is rather united. Pluralists, on the other hand, consider that there is no single ruling class but rather a plurality of ruling groups that alternate between cooperation and confrontation. According to Marxists, power in capitalist societies is monopolized by a dominant class—the bourgeoisie—and its auxiliaries. Here, domination is concealed by ideology.

Theories of Elitism

The concept of the elite was first introduced by Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), an Italian economist, sociologist, and senator. A firm believer in economic liberalism and an adversary of socialism, he aimed at challenging the Marxist conception of class struggle. In 1901, he published Rivista italiana di sociologia, a famous text later translated as The Rise and Fall of the Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology (1968), and in 1916 he published Trattato di Sociologia Generale, later translated as The Mind and Society (1935). He defined members of the elite as people with exceptional virtues who show distinguished abilities in any domain. Being part of the elite therefore depends on individual capacities and natural talent that lead to above-average success.

Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941) had previously worked on a very similar theory, although not explicitly using the concept of elite. A professor of public law, and deputy and then life senator of the former Kingdom of Italy, he wrote the first version of Elementi di scienza politica in 1896 (The Ruling Class, 1939). He further developed the notion of the “ruling class” and the idea that all societies are based on a distinction between the ruled and rulers. According to Mosca, the former is always an organized minority that takes on all political responsibilities, monopolizes power, and enjoys all the subsequent advantages. The latter, always greater in number, is led and controlled by the rulers, who act more or less legally and sometimes violently.

The German socialist Roberto Michels (1876–1936) is also among the elitist authors. A pupil of Max Weber, he studied in England, France, Germany, and Italy, where he taught economics and political science. After World War I, he joined Mussolini’s Fascist party, whose ideals he perceived as a more democratic form of socialism. In 1911, he published Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie. Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens (Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracies, 1915). His premise was that the masses lacked the “mechanical and technical” capacity to govern themselves. According to Michels, a society cannot exist without a dominant class because leadership is technically indispensable to the survival of organizations. The principle of his “iron law of oligarchy” is that one dominant class inevitably succeeds to leadership in an organization, as the collective psychological characteristics of both masses and elites make the leaders of any organization become concerned above all with remaining in office and strengthening their control over the organization.

In 1941, when his seminal work The Managerial Revolution: What Is Happening in the World was published, James Burnham (1905–1987) had already left the American Socialist Workers Party and was soon to serve as a public intellectual of the American conservative movement. Burnham argued that the 19th-century bourgeoisie has been replaced since World War I by a “social group or class,” which he called “managers.” They control the management, the leadership, and the coordination of the economy. But these managers are not capitalists as they do not own, finance, or have a major share in the company. Thus, the main difference between the ruling elite and the masses does not lie in ownership as much as in the control of the means of production, in particular through knowledge and technical competence. According to Burnham, managers do not seek profits so much as they seek power itself, their incentive being more political than economic. They do not distinguish between corporate and state ownership, and their oligarchy holds power in both capitalist and socialist regimes.

These four authors are sometimes called the “Machiavellians,” as they are deemed to convey a pessimistic and cynical view of the world. They defend the idea of the autonomy of politics toward
economic infrastructure and give a prominent position to political factors (and not economic ones), as their main interest lies in power, not in ownership.

Usually defined as one of the elitist authors, the American sociologist C. Wright Mills (1916–1962) opposed both Marxism (and its principle that power is based on the ownership of the means of production) and the liberal version defended by the previous authors (in particular, the idea of an autonomous political order). Mills (1956) showed that in the United States, the main decisions are made by an elite composed of the people at the top of the three big institutional hierarchies (political, military, and economic elites) that form a “triangle of power.” These major institutional orders are interdependent and interlocked, and their members share a common worldview and a class identity (they consider themselves as being separate and superior to the rest of the society).

Similarly, the American professor of psychology and sociology G. William Domhoff (1936– ) argued in his 1967 book *Who Rules America?* that there exists a ruling class in the United States that is the elite and in it is concentrated the major part of national wealth; it controls the major companies and the main banks; runs the foundations, universities, and media; and therefore leads the country’s economy. According to Domhoff, those who own income-producing property (corporations, real estate, and agribusinesses) set the rules within which policy battles are waged. For him, economy is the only power network of any consequence in the history of the United States. Floyd Hunter (1953) reached similar conclusions about power at the local level. He examined in detail the power relationships in Atlanta, Georgia, where he found that the city was led by a small and homogeneous elite and that “real” decisions were made by a corporate oligarchy.

**Elites’ Circulation**

The notion of elites’ circulation is central to elitist theories. According to Pareto, because being part of the elite is not hereditary, there is a constant replacement of old elites by new ones via the circulation of individuals, a process that enables a certain social equilibrium (and prevents revolution). This continuous replacement of one elite by another is the driving force behind history. Mosca further developed Pareto’s theory of elites’ circulation, claiming that modern democratic societies enabled a high degree of upward social mobility. For these authors, hereditary inequalities are secondary and affect elites’ circulation only marginally. Individual capacities are indeed necessary to remain part of the elite, given the fierce individual competition at stake.

According to Mills, the interlocking nature of the power elite allows for interchange between different sorts of institutions, maintaining and strengthening the power of each. But circulation is confined to the “three bigs,” among which it is easy to move frequently given the shared interests and origins of the rulers. In the same vein, the French political sociologist Pierre Birnbaum (1940– ) holds that there is interpenetration and a never-ending circulation within this socially and culturally homogeneous ruling space (Birnbaum, 1978).

**Criticisms of Theories on Elitism**

**The Pluralist View**

Strongly inspired by Weber’s work, supporters of pluralist analysis believe that public policy is the result of interactions between the players and various competing groups situated both inside and outside the sphere of the state. No particular group, or elite, can occupy a constant and far-reaching dominant position.

Robert Alan Dahl (1915– ) strongly opposes Mills’s and Domhoff’s views on the nature of politics in the United States. Dahl holds that far from being unitary and demographically narrow, the elites are numerous and autonomous, and alternate between competition and compromises. According to his polyarchy model, no elite dominates, which makes compromises and negotiations necessary. His 1961 study of the formal and informal power structures in New Haven, Connecticut, where the University of Yale is located, supports this view. This analysis can also be found in Aaron Wildavsky (1930–1993) who examined local decisions made in Oberlin, Ohio. In his 1964 book, *Leadership in a Small Town*, he concludes that the structure of power is pluralistic and that according to the nature of the problems at stake, different groups will lead and rule at the local level.
According to the French sociologist, political scientist, philosopher, and journalist Raymond Aron (1905–1983), power is structured in a very complex way in modern societies (Aron, 1950). He distinguishes the political elite from five ruling categories: those who hold “spiritual power” and influence the ways of thinking and believing (priests, intellectuals, scientists and scholars, and ideologists), army and police chiefs, managers of collective work (those who own or control the means of production), mass leaders (at the head of trade unions or political parties), and senior civil servants who hold administrative power. In modern societies, these categories are highly competitive.

The Marxist Thesis

Marxist theory is based on an economic analysis according to which power is held by the owners of the means of production, the bourgeoisie, who also monopolize political power and control the state apparatus. According to Marxists, economic factors play a prominent role; the state, far from being neutral, is a means of political domination in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

According to Marxists, pluralists conceal reality by substantiating the liberal illusion of an autonomous political order. They give credence to the idea of state neutrality and mask the true nature of state power as well as class struggle. Marxists also criticize Mills’s elitism for not being based on the ownership of the means of production. Elitists in general are criticized for focusing on political domination and failing to identify it with the economic class that owns the means of production. This criticism is in particular supported by the Greco-French political sociologist Nicos Poulantzas (1937–1979), who rejected the very notion of elite in Pouvoir politique et classes sociales (1968), published in English as Political Power and Social Classes (1973). He disagreed with another Marxist political theorist and sociologist, Ralph Miliband (1924–1994), a friend of Mills, who claimed that the notion of elite was relevant and that Marxists could even admit the plurality of elites. Besides being diverse, these elites all belong to the same dominant social class and share the same social origins, the same networks, and the same ideology.

Elites and Socialization

For a theorist such as Mills, leaders share the same origins, the same interests, and the same education and training. Their solidarity stems from their “social similarities and psychological affinities,” in which their common training plays a critical role as the basis for permanent alliances of power and for strategic marriages and other affiliations. According to Domhoff (1967), educational institutions participate in the reproduction of the power of the wealthy few. Schools and universities are indeed developed by the upper class and are filled with their children, who are socialized in an upper-class worldview along with the newly wealthy people who are assimilated there. The primarily White and Protestant elite of the Ivy League that he identifies as being dominant in all fields hold a common vision of society and “what must be done” to govern. This homogeneity is linked to a homologous socialization (same schools, same social circles, etc.) and to their easy access to positions of power both in and out of the government.

Education is also critical in the reproduction of the social order, according to the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002). He showed that elites are able to reproduce themselves, that is, pass on their privileges to their offspring, even in the ostensibly most meritocratic social fields, such as education. The educational system enables children from the dominant class to obtain the best diplomas and thus gain access to dominant social positions. At the same time, the system legitimizes their academic achievement by linking it to individual and natural gifts, concealing its social origins (Bourdieu, 1996).

Education and Monopolization of Power Positions

According to Birnbaum (in Madeleine Grawitz & Jean Leca, 1985), the differentiation between state and society, which is greater or smaller depending on the country and the time period, may account for both the contours of the elite or elites involved in the making of public decisions and the extent of their power. Thus, for example, in the case of France, at least since 1945, the combination of a protean state intervention and networks for the education and selection of elites in a few prestigious state “grandes écoles” have contributed to the quasi-monopolization of ruling positions by
those belonging to the highest levels of the engineering and administrative fields (Ezra Suleiman, 1978). This tendency was mainly reinforced by the relative weakness of intermediary bodies, employers’ organizations, and trade unions and, from the 1960s onward, by a process of political “technocratization,” that is, the access to positions of political responsibility by high-ranking civil servants. The fact that these situations were not called into question undoubtedly contributed to the legitimation of an ultimately hegemonic organization of power distribution.

If one believes that the place occupied by the elite(s) varies according to the problems presented and the time period concerned, then the beginning of the crisis of the French model of public policies in the 1970s had a significant effect on the elitist structures. Members of the state nobility still occupy the majority of the dominant positions in the field of public service and continue to be the main players. The ability of the administrative elite to move easily from one social group to another (e.g., to hold directorial positions in large private firms) allows them to continue to capture a lot of power, even if they are not in power. But a state’s fall into a crisis, on both ideological and practical levels, is also accompanied by the promotion of new elites who are supposed to embody new ways of defining public policy. The more competitive nature of the decision-making networks, the introduction of private sector–inspired management models into public administration, Europeanization, and even the globalization of issues, and thus of procedures, are directly contrary to a unified, monistic conception of power. Administrative elites are thus beginning to be seriously challenged by corporate actors such as private consultants, who have been educated in the same “grandes écoles” and impose themselves as experts on public sector matters, as in other countries (Canada, the United States, or the United Kingdom) where their success has been much quicker (Denis Saint-Martin, 2001).

The Concept of Elite and the Issue of Democracy

Most authors agree on the fact that democracy is an illusion and impossible to achieve. According to Roberto Michels, history is led by elites’ struggle for power. His idea of the iron law of oligarchy was the result of his analysis of leadership patterns in democratic governments and in other organizations, such as trade unions. According to this law, the overthrow of any elite by the masses will eventually lead to such oligarchical leadership. Michels, therefore, refutes the possibility of the existence of an ideal democracy. For the supporters of classical elitist theories, the existence of elites at all times and places is a natural phenomenon because of unequal distribution of talent, wealth, and political influence in society.

According to Mills, the great masses of people are largely unorganized, ill informed, virtually powerless, and controlled and manipulated by the powerful elite who exploit them both economically and politically. Their dependence and disorganization prevent the masses from participating in democratic life. Above the masses, Mills saw a middle level of power (composed of local opinion leaders and special interest groups) that is reflected in the U.S. Congress and in U.S. political parties. But they not only fail to represent the masses but also have no real effect on the elites, who leave them to debate and decide some minor issues, as long as they do not represent a serious challenge to their authority. The political directorate itself is described as undemocratic in both the process of its selection and its maintenance. Moreover, Mills believed that widespread alienation of the masses, their political indifference, and the economic and political concentration of power are serious threats to democracy. The U.S. political scientist Harold Dwight Lasswell (1902–1978), who also used both power and control of hierarchies as elements in identifying elites, insisted on the critical importance of legitimacy. In his 1930 book Psychopathology and Politics, he held that the extent of elites’ positions of authority is determined by the reactions of the public toward those who hold power. The existence of political elites depends on the legitimacy of their authority “in the eyes of the people.”

Pluralists do not believe in the ideal of democracy either. For Dahl (1989), it is a theoretical utopia. But Dahl sees polyarchical institutions as a major improvement as they create multiple and autonomous centers of political powers where decisions can be made through competition, bargaining, and compromises.

Marxists also view liberal democracy as an unrealistic utopia. According to them, the capitalist
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state is inherently undemocratic as it represents the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The fact that intermediary powers such as the media and most political parties need the support of the bourgeoisie to win elections makes the system intrinsically undemocratic. Vladimir Lenin asserted in *The State and Revolution* (1917) that the dictatorship of the proletariat would be the highest possible form of democracy.

**Broadening and Completing the Analysis**

In other respects, the development of research on the structuring of public decisions and their practical implementation has led to a better understanding of the role played by the elite. The classic idea that it is the position held that infers the power now appears to be a necessary but insufficient condition. Research on the sociology of elites conducted in the 1960s and 1970s remains quite relevant when it comes to describing the social and educational resources required to hold a position of influence and/or power. On the other hand, since the 1980s, developments in sociology of public policy have allowed for the reexamination of at least three avenues of research:

1. Public decisions are made in an often competitive and uncertain context. Holding a position objectively seen as being dominant does not guarantee the ability to effectively develop a given public policy. If the “dominators” remain dominant, they must exercise their authority more often than in the past and bargain to keep it.

2. Exerting a direct influence on the definition of a public policy does not necessarily mean that the policy, once implemented, will not be the object of various and sometimes unexpected reappropriations that can ultimately produce concrete results that are quite different from what the producers intended.

3. To understand public policies through the eyes of an elite(s), one must go beyond the question of specific interests to take into account the values, world visions, and, more generally, the knowledge that together play a role in the framing of political exchanges and decision making.

One of the major contributions of the sociology of the players and the studies of “street-level bureaucracy” (Michael Lipsky, 1980) or middle-ranking officials (Herbert Kaufman, 1960; Page, 2003) who carry out the wishes of the administrative elite is to show that public policies are shaped and designed during the implementation process by people with low- or middle-range powers. In short, the elitist approach to public policy, since it expresses a global point of view, can be supplemented and enriched by a more microsociological perspective that provides a better explanation of public policies in action and thus proposes a re-reading of elitist theories in the negative.

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**See also** Class, Social; Elites; Oligarchy; Political Socialization; Power

**Further Readings**


An empire is a type of political organization in which the metropolis exercises control over diverse peripheral actors through formal annexations and/or various forms of informal domination. This short definition may well be uncontroversial, but when one tries to make it more specific consensus is lost. This is partly because most social science categorizations reflect abstract models that appear in a variety of shapes, forms, times, and places. In this sense, the term empire is as fuzzy and contestable as terms such as democracy, class, power, or nation. But unlike these other categories, empire is laden with negative historical and ideological connotations and is often used as a synonym for colonial rule based on oppression and exploitation. This entry examines the concept of empire, the historical evolution of empires, and the ways in which a study of empire can shed light on international politics.

The Nature and Evolution of Empire

Such an understanding of empire is ahistorical and biased. Empire has been a characteristic form of political organization since early antiquity and predates colonial rule by several centuries. The colonial era may be over, but this does not imply the end of empire (although it is important to emphasize that the colonial legacy still haunts former colonial empires and their erstwhile colonies). Moreover, many empires were symbols of peace and prosperity, rather than of oppression and exploitation. Studies of empires show that control within them can be based on incentives rather than coercion or on a combination of both. It can be exercised through a variety of military, economic, and cultural means. It can be formal or informal to varying degrees. Periphery status within an empire can also differ. Some peripheral actors are given access to the decision making and resources of the metropolis, while others are kept at a distance or even subject to open discrimination and exploitation. The relationship between metropolis and periphery can certainly be hierarchical and conflict ridden, but it can also be harmonious and based on mutual dependency. Some empires are organized in concentric circles or even form quite loose multiple independencies.

The nature of both metropolis and peripheral actors can also differ. In most cases, the metropolis has a centralized government, differentiated economy, and shared political loyalties, while the “imperializable peripheries” (to use Michael Doyle’s term) have weak government, undifferentiated economies, and highly divided political loyalties (Doyle, 1986, p. 19). However, the imperial metropolis can also have a relatively weak, limited, and decentralized government; an inefficient economic system; and multiple cultural identities. For instance, medieval empires are known for having limited and decentralized government performing only a few basic governmental functions. They were ridden by internal conflicts between king (or emperor) and the lower aristocracy (whether feudal...
or bureaucratic), while the persistent divergence of local cultures, religions, and traditions implied a highly divided political loyalty.

The metropolis does not always have a master plan of imperial conquest. States can become empires by default because they try to bring some order to unstable neighbors or try to convert barbarians into “good” citizens or into a specific religion. Likewise, an empire does not necessarily come into being through outright aggression. Some empires emerge quietly or even surreptitiously through uneven modernization and social differentiation. They may not even see themselves as empires.

Different historical periods have generated different types of empires. Alexander the Great built his empire and brought a multitude of nationalities under his central authority largely by the use of military force. The Roman Empire relied far more on peaceful methods, using language and law in the service of its civilizing effort. The Chinese Han Empire was renowned for its administrative skills, enabling it to keep diverse and autonomous provinces under a single rule. The British Empire, like those of France, Portugal, and Spain, used its maritime power and supremacy in global trade. The Soviet Empire skillfully applied ideological penetration alongside the older military, political, and economic techniques of empire building.

The “end of empire” has been declared several times throughout history, but at the beginning of the 21st century it looks as if empires are on the rise rather than in decline. The United States, China, the European Union (EU), and Russia are most frequently described as empires. All four represent vast territorial units with global influence in material, institutional, and ideological terms. They possess not only global economic and military reach but also the ability to influence the global institutional agenda and shape the notion of legitimacy (if not normality) in various parts of the world. In addition, all four have a record of acting in a way that imposes significant domestic constraints on a variety of formally sovereign actors. These actors are seen as a kind of periphery to be governed by the imperial center. (China and Russia also contain peripheries within their own borders and without formal sovereignty, such as Tibet or Chechnya.) Moreover, the policies of the United States, China, the EU, and Russia are guided not merely by their selfish interests but also, if not primarily, by a universal normative vocation reminiscent of the Pax Romana or the old Chinese Mandate of Heaven. In other words, they all pursue a civilizing mission to benefit their region if not the entire world. John Ikenberry notes that the United States claims to be an “indispensable nation” maintaining global order and possessing an economic project “congruent with the deeper forces of modernization.” The EU sees itself as a pole of attraction for its neighbors, contributing to what the EU High Representative has described as a fairer, safer, and more united world. Even contemporary Russia sees itself as a bastion against the barbarian forces of chaos, nationalism, and religious fundamentalism flourishing in its backyard.

However, there are significant, and in some cases striking, differences among these four contemporary empires. Consider, for instance, the difference between an autocratic, nationalistic, and militaristic Russia and the peculiar, postmodern polity that is the EU, with no single center of government, no single demos (let alone nation), and no army. Nor is there an American equivalent of a subjected inner periphery like Tibet, Xinjiang, and what China calls Inner Mongolia. However, many of those who study empire argue that the United States tends to treat the entire world as its periphery. Its scope of territorial control is truly global. Although control by the United States is usually informal, it is backed up by enormous military and economic might.

Of course, empires may rise and fall even while the criteria for defining them are under discussion. Japan, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Germany may be seen as empires of a sort or may become empires in the next few decades. For instance, Japan’s reluctance to reassume an imperial posture is more a function of historical memory than of military capability. Contemporary Japan, like China, shows signs of a “middle kingdom” mentality—a belief that the world revolves around it. This is clearly an imperial feature. And Japanese military expenditure is nearly as large as the Chinese and much higher than the Russian.

India also shows signs of a middle-kingdom mentality. Moreover, India exercises significant influence over Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh. Time and again, India has been able to use its power quite effectively in global trade talks, environmental
negotiations, and interstate disputes. Many Indians believe that their democratic and economic profile, together with their language abilities, give them the edge over Russia or China. But the strength of Indian society has yet to translate into strong institutions, and this hampers India’s global rise and contains its imperial aspirations.

**Empire and the Analysis of International Politics**

If the list of empires is open-ended and the differences between them are so striking, does a study of empire help our understanding of international politics? Is the state paradigm not sufficient and, indeed, more suitable? The problem is that the notion of a state is as fuzzy as the notion of empire. The United States is a state; but so too are Somalia, Luxembourg, and Costa Rica. Moreover, the state paradigm, with its emphasis on territoriality and sovereignty, seems ill suited for understanding the 21st century with its cascading economic interdependence, transnational jurisdictions, and multiple cultural loyalties. Besides, the reemergence of empires does not herald the end of nation states. As Herfried Münkler (2007) pointed out, contemporary imperial structures are superimposed on the state order, but they no longer replace it: “Whoever thinks of imperial ity as simply an alternative to statehood will come to the conclusion that no empires exist today” (p. 6).

Some authors prefer to use the term *hegemony* in place of *empire*. However, hegemony is not necessarily a synonym for empire. According to Alejandro Colás (2007, p. 165), for example, hegemony, unlike empire, has no final instance, no decisive location or moment of authority, but is reproduced instead through a sequence of coordinated and generally consensual actions by a multiplicity of actors, albeit orchestrated by a leading state. True, the concept of hegemony, like the concept of empire, underlines the inequality among individual actors and the ensuing hierarchy in the international system. However, the literature on hegemony tells us less about the nature of the actors exercising hegemony than does the literature on empire. Power is often detached from agency in the study of hegemony. Hegemony discourse is more about the symptoms of power politics than its causes.

The study of empire is not only about power but also about the actors engaged in power politics. As such, it helps us understand the nature of the magnetic poles within the current global system. Moreover, it forces us to examine power not only in crude economic or military terms but also in institutional and ideological ones. As noted above, most empires try to “civilize” and “institutionalize” their peripheries, not merely to conquer them. The study of empire also underlines the role of order, hierarchy, and structure in international politics. It is not chiefly about exploitation and inequality, as is often the case in the study of hegemony. In fact, the study of empire shows that some peripheries can display an impressive ability to determine the politics of the center, despite all the material or normative asymmetries. This leads to another advantage that a focus on empire offers: It helps overcome the often misleading distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. Empires seldom possess fixed and hard borders, and this fuzziness or permeability of borders largely determines the politics of the imperial center. For instance, the nature of European integration is constantly being reshaped by its successive waves of enlargement. Russian policy is largely determined by the fate of ethnic Russians living outside its formal frontiers. The one-way permeability of U.S. borders allows Washington to intervene in the politics of various states in Central America and the Caribbean, without having seriously to consider the possibility that they will intervene in the U.S. sphere.

Finally, the study of empire helps us understand the evolving pattern of cooperation and conflict among major power poles. History shows that empires can coexist in parallel if they do not contest similar spheres and spaces and if they respect each other’s claims to legitimacy. The parallel functioning of the Roman and Chinese empires is a good example of such coexistence. Contemporary empires often contest similar spheres and spaces. Moreover, the dominance of the United States is likely to generate conflict even though other contemporary empires have not yet tried to balance or deter the United States.

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Empowerment is a concept that has received much interest in the generic management literature during recent years. There are numerous definitions of this concept, but the common denominator of all these deals with the distribution of power to lower levels of a hierarchy. The meaning of empowerment for the public sector is, however, an arena that calls for more elaboration and revivification. This short entry aims at three major goals: (1) to provide an up-to-date review and explanation of the generic meaning of empowerment, (2) to explore the importance of empowerment for public sector domains, and (3) to provide a short direction to different foci of empowerment in the context of the public sector.

The Essence of Empowerment: A Broad Organizational and Managerial View

Empowerment is a multifaceted construct, and there is much deliberation with regard to its meaning and focus. Discussions regarding its meaning include questions of whether it is merely the sharing of power, a more general concept of decentralization, or a psychological motivational concept regarding the person’s feelings of worth. The focus or target of the empowerment process may be employees, the end users/clients/public, or institutions/organizations/subnational governments.

As control and power are regarded in the management literature from either a relational perspective or a motivational perspective, the concept of empowerment too can be seen from these two different points of view. From the relational perspective, power is a function of dependence and/or interdependence of parties, and thus empowerment is a process in which a leader or manager shares his or her power with subordinates, making them less dependent on him or her. In accordance, empowerment is practiced, by those adopting this perspective, through participative management techniques such as goal setting by subordinates and quality circles. From a motivational perspective, power is an intrinsic need for self-determination or a belief in personal self-efficacy. Thus, empowerment is the creation of conditions enhancing a strong sense of self-efficacy. Kenneth Thomas and Betty Velthouse (1990) built on this psychological-motivational definition and argued that empowerment is a multifaceted concept of four cognitions: (1) meaning, (2) competence, (3) self-determination, and (4) impact. Meaning is a match between the job requirements and the person’s beliefs, values, and behaviors. Competence is the person’s belief in his or her own capability to perform the job well. Self-determination is related to autonomy in initiating and continuing work behaviors and processes. Finally, impact is the extent to which a person can influence strategic, administrative, or operational outcomes. These cognitions are shaped by the person’s work context and personality characteristics and in turn motivate individual behavior. Thus, empowerment processes under this perspective will encourage self-managing or cross-functional teams and will provide information about the organization’s goals and strategy to give the workers a sense of ownership. Similarly, according to David Bowen and Edward Lawler (1995), empowerment entails a high-involvement approach. Thus, organizations are encouraged to change their policies, practices, and structure in order to create and sustain empowerment, and this change must distribute power, authority, responsibility, information, knowledge, and rewards throughout the organization.
The Meaning of Empowerment in the Public Sector

The generic psychological understanding of empowerment in organizations is useful and meaningful when state agencies and social governmental environments are discussed. Essentially, the discussion of empowerment in such neighborhoods calls for integration of other concepts such as democracy, citizens’ involvement, public sector reforms, and multiple stakeholders’ engagement. As will be explained below, such a discussion must also consider both the personal and the institutional implications of empowerment. Putting it another way, what is the contribution of empowerment to the theory and practice of public administration, to public organizations, and to the overall understanding of government and governance?

Most important, empowerment can be seen as a democratic strategy that involves multiple stakeholders in the action of governance or in the action of managing governmental agencies. As such, empowerment allows greater self-contributing behavior; it encourages individuals’ engagement in public actions and advances the production of public goods and services. It can also contribute to commitment to public service and to public sector motivation (PSM) by all those who are part of the process, be it public personnel, citizens, residents of cities and communities, or other stakeholders such as the private sector and the third sector.

There are two major perspectives of empowerment in this regard. One perspective sees democracy as a predominantly aggregative theory, and the other perspective sees democracy as a predominantly integrative theory. Predominantly aggregative theories see democracy as a means of distributing political power and influence and of regulating conflict within a society. Thus, empowerment refers to equal influence over processes of collective governance and individual autonomy. According to Albert Hirschman, citizens have two means of empowerment available to them when they are not satisfied with the consequences of a collective action: exit and voice. In an aggregative strategy of empowerment, exit by voting for a new political party is a way of punishing politicians and political organizations that were unsatisfactory and a way of escaping unacceptable majority decisions. Voice, in this perspective, is a supplementary means of empowerment as it gives the decision makers information about the reasons exit was taken.

Predominantly integrative theories see democracy as a means for producing democratic citizens. According to this view, society is a social construction that is more than the sum of the preferences of individuals. Empowerment is therefore the transformation of individuals into citizens by participation. Thus, in this perspective, voice is the main vein of empowering individuals as it gives them a chance to participate in decision-making processes. As Danny Burns, Robin Hambleton, and Paul Hoggett (1994) point out, voice empowers as it informs, organizes, and gives confidence to the citizens. They argue that a strategy of empowerment under this perspective must include decentralization of authority to local governments, institutionalization of communication channels between citizens and politicians, and encouragement of citizen participation in general.

The Target of Empowerment: A Triple Meaning

Based on the above, empowerment in public administration employs at least three major targets: (1) public officers/employees, (2) citizens as customers, and (3) institutions or subsectors. Whereas the first relate to the individual level, the latter refers to the institutional and subgovernment level.

First, stemming from the generic managerial literature, the most classical orientation of empowerment in the public sector is with public sector employees. These internal “agents” of policy and public action are the primary mechanism through which public strategies, policies, and actions are implemented. Public employees and public officers can be trained and encouraged to take greater control over their jobs, tasks, and decisions in the organizations. This process of empowering people should go hand in hand with formal rules and procedures that characterize the public bureaucracy. Although they cannot go against them, they must also give employees more flexibility in doing the job. Flexibility does not mean taking individual decisions that contradict the formal rules that bureaucracies so typically maintain and safeguard. Hence, although bureaucracy may become some barrier to empowerment, there is much room for building innovative mechanisms that allow healthy
involvement, intra-organizational democracy, and self-motivation that works for the good of many. The restraints and control of bureaucracy also somewhat limit the voice of employees, but modern managerial techniques such as team building, self-managed teams, job enrichment, and even quality circles or goal-setting strategies may increase commitment and build a sense of recreation in public sector agencies.

Next is the citizenry level. While in the management literature the focus or target of empowerment are the employees, in the public administration literature the reference is the citizens themselves. When the focus is the citizens themselves, empowerment is the government acknowledging that people should be involved in decisions regarding their own lives and acting accordingly. As Eran Vigoda (2002) notes, empowerment is seen when governments treat the citizens as customers or as partners, take their complaints seriously, encourage them to participate in open hearings, and, at more extreme levels, let them manage public institutions such as schools or housing estates. According to Eran Vigoda-Gadot and Shlomo Mizrahi (2008), this view has gained major attention in recent decades, and a rich discussion of public sector reforms has evolved, which has been heavily influenced by the new public management (NPM) doctrine that highlighted the role of citizens in governance and the meaning of customer orientation in public service.

Finally, the literature mentions empowerment in regard to subnational governments. When the focus of empowerment is on subnational government, the discussion is around “decentralization” or “devolution” of power, with the notion that local or regional decision makers know better what matches the needs and capabilities of their respective public. However, such empowerment is much debated as it produces little coherence in decision making and does not necessarily result in superior public policy. In addition, governments may empower social movements to carry out actions and legislation relevant to a specific social movement or to represent specific ideas in government deliberations. In recent years, the question of social movements and third-sector empowerment has intensified. Should government encourage more empowerment of those bodies and by so doing improve services to citizens? Or, could this be a sign of the hollow state that is practically incapable of meeting the expectations of the people with its own resources and bureaucratic agencies? This question remains moot.

Conclusion

Taking both the aggregative and integrative theories together, it is easier to understand the complex meaning of empowerment in public sector domains. Beyond the conventional meaning of engagement in organizational life, empowerment in the public sector has deeper and wider implications. It needs to refer to more stakeholders. It must consider the effect on larger sections of society, and it deals with forming and shaping the nature of our democratic values. Therefore, public sector empowerment has a widespread effect beyond the organizational arena. Its echo is heard far beyond the realms of public organization and affects the inner fabric of government and governance in modern societies.

Empowerment is thus a concept that is of much relevance in modern times to organizations, markets, governments, and people. Its generic managerial exploration diffuses into the public sector and receives additional interpretations that reflect the complexity of public organizations and the need to involve multiple stakeholders and subcontract with institutions on the federal, national, and local levels. Empowerment in the public sector means continuous interactions with the values of democracy and citizens’ involvement and with the need to decentralize activities from state agencies to others. In the coming years, the public sector will undoubtedly make use of the ethos of empowerment to move forward with reforms and change and to improve services using self-mechanisms of public employees and citizens alike.

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See also Administration; Administration Theory

Further Readings
Environmental issues are concerned with human actions that affect the biosphere that humans and other species inhabit. Interest in the conservation of particular species, habitats, or landscapes, in particular localities or countries, dates back to the 19th century, but a concern with international environmental issues that transcend national boundaries may be dated back to the beginning of the 1970s. The European Conservation Year in 1970, the first Earth Day in 1970, and the United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972, which initiated the UN Environmental Programme, raised and focused the level of awareness and interest. A number of institutional developments also took place around this time. The Environmental Protection Agency in the United States was established in 1970, as was the Department of the Environment in the United Kingdom. In the European Community, the 1972 Paris summit of heads of government called on the Commission to draw up an environmental policy and set up a directorate responsible for environmental protection. The Community published its first Environmental Action Programme in 1973. New nongovernmental organizations with a broader agenda than older conservationist bodies and with a greater reliance on methods of direct action were founded around this time, the most important being Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, both in 1971.

Why did this new interest in environmental issues emerge at this time? A more affluent and better educated society was becoming less interested in prosperity per se and more interested in a broader definition of the quality of life. Rachel Carson’s best-selling book *Silent Spring* published in 1962, which dealt with the effects of pesticide use on the countryside, raised public awareness of the fact that modern technology had costs as well as benefits. The fragility, vulnerability, and beauty of the Earth were emphasized by the first pictures of the planet taken from deep space in 1968. This initial period of the environmental debate was also influenced by a concern about world population growth and its impact on scarce natural resources. Incidents such as the mercury poisoning at Minamata Bay in Japan in 1959 showed that pollution could have serious public health consequences, a lesson reinforced at the end of the 1970s by the Love Canal incident in the United States where leaking toxic waste affected the health of children, among others.

This early phase of the environmental debate was characterized by a more integrated ecological approach to the problems being encountered, in which the ecosphere was conceived as a whole, with changes in one part of the system seen as having effects elsewhere. This approach was exemplified by the 1972 Club of Rome *Limits to Growth* report. The analysis carried out for this report by researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) used computer modeling techniques to explore the relationships between a number of variables such as industrialization, resource depletion, pollution, food production, and population. Seen in retrospect, the results were far too pessimistic and highlight the dangers of projecting current trends into the future, but the report was highly influential at the time and encouraged consideration of the environment as an interacting system rather than just particular pollutants that had been the focus of earlier ad hoc policy interventions.
As policy measures developed, the debate became much more fragmented. It became focused on particular pieces of legislation concerned with various forms of pollution (air, water, and soil) and with habitats and biodiversity. One of the reasons for this fragmentation was that devising effective policy measures created a necessity for very specific policy expertise that was not readily transferable from one arena to another. An expert on river pollution might be of little help in tackling problems of marine pollution and certainly could not contribute very much to the debate on stratospheric air pollution. One risk associated with this more fragmented approach was an emphasis on legislative outputs rather than a focus on their likely impact on outcomes in terms of the state of the environment. The development of the climate change debate has given a central organizing narrative to environmental policy once again but perhaps at the expense of subordinating other aspects of environmental policy to this central goal. Thus, the protection of biodiversity may be viewed through the lens of the effects of climate change.

New Concepts in the Debate

The debate on environmental issues was being driven increasingly by international reports and events, even if the required policies needed action at national and local levels, often supported by increasingly successful Green parties. A particularly influential report was produced by the UN World Commission on Environment and Development on *Our Common Future*, often referred to as the Brundtland Report after its chair. The report introduced the concept of “sustainable development,” which focused on intergenerational justice. It was defined as meeting “the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” It became a key defining objective of many environmental policies.

Another concept that became increasingly influential was that of the “precautionary principle.” This originally emerged in Germany as the *Vorsorgeprinzip* or principle of precaution. Although it initially had a number of definitions, it became increasingly influential in international discourse. The principle was first incorporated in an international treaty in the 1987 Montreal Protocol and was also reflected in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. At the center of the concept is the idea of taking anticipatory action in the absence of complete proof of harm when there is scientific uncertainty about causal links. The 1998 Wingspread Statement produced by a group of lawyers, scientists, and environmental activists summarizes the principle in this way: “When an activity raises threats to the environment or human health, precautionary measures should be taken even if some causes and effect...
relationships are not fully established scientifically.” A communication from the European Commission on the precautionary principle in 2001 emphasized that any measures based on it should be proportional to the chosen level of protection, nondiscriminatory in their application, and consistent with similar measures already taken.

The assumption that there was a zero-sum trade-off between environmental protection and economic growth was challenged by the concept of “ecological modernization.” Following the Brundtland Report, it was argued that a high level of environmental protection was essential to the success of a modern economy. Increasing energy efficiency, reducing pollution, and using waste products could boost the profits of firms and the success of the economy as a whole. The environmental technology industry could itself make an important contribution to economic success, particularly for the first companies to enter the market, as has happened in Germany with regard to solar technology. Politicians began to refer to the benefits of “green-collar” jobs. One consequence of this new school of thinking was less emphasis on “command and control” forms of environmental regulation and more emphasis on a range of “new environmental policy instruments,” such as eco audits, voluntary agreements, and labeling.

Climate Change

Climate change refers to the warming of the planet as the result of human-made greenhouse gases, principally carbon dioxide, but also with significant impacts from gases such as methane, nitrous oxide, and halocarbons. Considerable uncertainty attaches to the consequences of these changes in the atmosphere, but they are likely to include a rise in sea levels, changes in weather patterns, and more extreme weather events. There is a global distributional issue attached to climate change as those most likely to lose out as a result are poor low-lying countries that have low emissions themselves and countries in sub-Saharan Africa that may experience an increased incidence of drought, affecting their agriculture.

Devising an effective set of policy solutions to the challenge of climate change is difficult. One is dealing not only with considerable uncertainty but with future uncertainty. The problem is caused by everyone and affects everyone on the planet, so there is an evident public issue that needs to be tackled, but there are also collective action and free-rider problems. The scale of international cooperation required is unprecedented. Much of business was initially opposed to any action being taken, trying to argue that climate change was not occurring, or if it was, it was not caused by human agency. However, being a “climate change denier” has become a less tenable and respectable position, while emissions trading represents a policy approach to the problem that business generally finds acceptable. The 2006 Stern Report highlighted the economic costs of inaction. The United States refused to sign the 1997 Kyoto protocol, but both candidates in the 2008 presidential election supported action on climate change. Emerging countries such as China and India objected to having to reduce their emissions when the problem had been caused by countries that developed before them. However, even if an effective international agreement can be reached, greenhouse gas emissions result from billions of independent decisions by households and firms. The policy instruments available to governments, such as information, incentives, and regulations, may prove to be inadequate.

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See also Environmental Policy; Green Parties; Postmaterialism; Social Movements

Further Readings

For as long as humans have existed on planet Earth, they have sought to alter it to suit their purposes. In its most basic sense, environmental policy seeks to govern the relationship between humans and their natural environment. A relatively new area of state activity, it has grown enormously, particularly since the 1960s. Indeed, its spectacular rate and extent of growth has been such that it is no longer a small and fairly discrete area of policy but one that increasingly intrudes into virtually all other policy areas. At its core is an identifiable “environmental state” comprising specific ministries, agencies, and organizations whose mandate is to secure environmental improvements. Underpinning environmental politics is the tense relationship between this state and its opposite numbers representing the social and economic realms. As the following sections show, this inherent tension can be better understood first through tracing the historical evolution of environmental policy, then outlining its distinctive characteristics, and finally by identifying its underlying rationales. While this overview would suggest that environmental policy development has resulted in a great deal of state building, the overall impacts on the state of the environment are not so clear.

The Main Phases of Environmental Policy Making

One way to understand environmental policy is to trace its historical evolution. Modern environmental thought dates back to the preindustrial period. Before the 1960s, environmental policy making was primarily geared toward protecting human health from pollution and establishing designated areas of green space for leisure activities. These ends were mainly achieved by limiting pollution from point sources such as factories and establishing protected areas and national parks.

In a second phase broadly encompassing the 1960s and 1970s, environmental policy really took off and environmental pressure groups boomed. It is often said that the first evocative images of the Earth transmitted from deep space in 1968 were what really catalyzed public concern for what became known as “the environment.” The environmental state was born in this period as many jurisdictions created environmental ministries and agencies. However, these responses remained isolated, uncoordinated, and generally reactive. Policies adopted were mainly regulatory in nature, specifying process and emission standards; many were very poorly implemented.

In the 1980s and 1990s, environmental policy entered a third phase. The sector witnessed a huge expansion in the scale of the new environmental states, which sought to address problems in a more preventive manner at source. Old ways of thinking (such as “pollution control”) duly gave way to new ones (“ecological modernization” and “sustainable development”). Rather than promoting end-of-pipe standards, these sought to embed environmental concerns within wider systems of human production and consumption. More specifically, they supplemented “command and control” regulations with new environmental policy instruments such as eco-taxes, voluntary agreements, and product-labeling devices. The new environmental states also began seeking innovative ways to cooperate on addressing cross-border pollution and resource overexploitation. A number of international environmental agreements mushroomed in this phase, and supranational bodies such as the European Union began to assume an ever-greater role in environmental problem solving, as shown by Andrew Jordan (2005).

Environmental policy in the industrialized world is currently in a fourth phase, roughly covering the period since 2000. This phase has witnessed another set of policy developments as the implications of environmental policy have ramified into ever more cognate policy domains. In this phase, it has become even more obvious that environmental problems arise not from single-point sources such as factories and power stations but from countless everyday social practices such as travelling, shopping, and even using the Internet. State action, by implication,
Environmental Policy is a necessary precondition for progress, but society too must play its part in nurturing and delivering environmental policy.

The issue that most clearly encapsulates these challenges is that of climate change—arguably the greatest environmental threat the world has faced (Andrew Jordan, Dave Huitema, Harro van Asselt, Tim Rayner, & Frans Berkhout, 2010). Crucially, it links into many other social and economic challenges such as poverty reduction, energy insecurity, and massive biodiversity loss and is stubbornly resistant to simple “techno-fixes.” Climate change cannot, in short, be left entirely to environmental policymakers, but it demands long-term and socially transformative adjustments—a systematic “carbon revolution” no less—which mirrors the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century.

It is hugely important to be aware of the differences between these phases while at the same time remaining cognizant of the underlying continuities. The best way to appreciate the importance of both is to explore what distinguishes the environment from other policy areas.

**What Is Distinctive About Environmental Policy?**

Environmental quality exemplifies what economists term a *nonexcludable* or “public” good. In other words, the benefits of higher environmental quality often accrue to the wider public rather than to specific individuals. By contrast, the costs of protection (e.g., the fitting of abatement equipment) tend to be borne by specific groups (principally those that pollute or who are prevented from developing their land). Consequently, there is a basic asymmetry between those that pollute (in the initial phases noted above, generally a minority) and those (the wider public) suffering the consequences. Polluters have strong incentives to unite and fight to protect their “rights” to pollute and have therefore tended to enjoy advantages over those enduring its disbenefits. The latter are often too widely dispersed or individually suffer too little to mobilize into a coherent group.

In the third and fourth phases, this asymmetry has arguably become less stark as mass consumption has gradually eclipsed dirty “point sources” as the main driver of environmental change. Nonetheless, the state’s role is still to mediate between those supporting and those opposing development. Because environmental damage has its origins in otherwise socially legitimate activities such as driving, using electricity, and farming, the state is routinely called on to limit any damage imposed by one section on another. Initially, this was achieved by regulating polluting activities. As regulating is a technically demanding process, the state found itself relying heavily on polluters and scientists for information and, eventually, political support. Environmentalists routinely claimed that this skewed regulation was in favor of producer interests. In Phases 3 and 4, the state has therefore come under pressure to explore alternative instruments to promote more sustainable forms of mass consumption (W. Neil Adger & Andrew Jordan, 2009).

Environmental policy tends to be heavily reliant on science, both to establish the extent of environmental problems and to determine how to resolve them. However, science is rarely capable of delivering clear-cut advice to policymakers in this regard. On the contrary, different interests, including governments, tend to choose and interpret scientific findings selectively in order to justify their preconceived views. These tensions are most acute when policymakers are required to go “beyond science” and address problems, such as climate change, whose causes and consequences are not precisely understood.

Environmental problems are highly expansive—they spill across political borders and create problems extending well into the future. The precise spatial and temporal distribution of costs and benefits produces alliances of self-interest, which then battle to determine the scope and content of policy. This is particularly visible in cross-national settings. International environmental policy burgeoned in the third and fourth phases noted above.

Balancing these various factors is the core policy challenge in the environmental policy sector. According to widely adopted interpretations of sustainable development (see above), policymakers should address the development needs of current generations of humans without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs. While there is general agreement that sustainable development is preferential to unsustainable development, moving from the latter to the former raises
difficult questions centered on justice and morality, to say nothing of due democratic process.

Fifth, environmental policy is probably unique in the extent to which it cuts across traditional sectors of policy making. One great unmet challenge identified in the third phase has been how to integrate environmental concerns into and across all policy areas. The irony is that were this to happen, there would be no need for an identifiable “environmental” policy. For the time being, this seems an unlikely prospect: Although environmental arguments tend to find a more receptive audience in policy networks surrounding environment departments, they clash powerfully with producer-oriented networks found in the agriculture, transport, and energy sectors. Environmental policymakers are attracted to integration because it potentially helps tackle problems at source. As Andrew J. Jordan and Andrea Lenschow (2008) note, the danger, however, is that the sectors may only accept integration on their own terms or, worse still, take active steps to “reverse integrate” environmental policy with their preferred (sectoral) objectives. Integration in other words, is a two-way, not a one-way, street.

Sixth, environmental policy is probably the only policy domain that seeks to actively protect nonhuman entities. But to what extent should moral significance be ascribed to plants and animals, especially if it involves limiting human choice and raising the economic costs of development? This has opened up many ethically charged debates between those adopting broadly anthropocentric positions and those favoring more ecocentric ones. The former regards nature as primarily a source of resources and amenity; the latter holds that the nonhuman world should enjoy much greater (and in some cases equivalent) moral significance. Although there is plenty of evidence to suggest that people are more ecocentric than they were in the 1960s, many (if not all) contemporary environmental conflicts are still driven by the clash between these two worldviews.

What Drives Environmental Policy?

Ultimately, the main source of environmental policy making is environmentalism, a broad social movement that emerged in the late 1960s and loudly demanded that “quality of life” issues should receive more attention. In the past, environmental concern has tended to exhibit a cyclical pattern, with particularly pronounced peaks in support in the late 1960s and the late 1980s. Closer scrutiny reveals that these short-term “pulses” often coincided with periods of economic growth and social introspection. Conversely, concern has tended to tail off during economic recession. It is not normally as pronounced in poorer sections of Western society or in developing countries, although academic views differ on this matter. Looked at over longer time periods, an underlying effect is evident—each policy phase has provided the foundations for the next. During the third and fourth phases in particular, environmental policymakers sought new ways to institutionalize environmental concern and escape what Anthony Downs termed the episodic “issue attention cycle.”

Environmental Policy: Retrospect and Prospect

Environmental policy addresses the complex and reciprocal links between the underlying structure of modern economies and societies and the quality of their natural environment. As such, it is probably unique in its breadth and its political complexity. Since the 1960s, a new “environmental state” has evolved to produce and implement it, paralleling the emergence of the welfare state in the 19th and 20th centuries. Both represent lagged and socially mediated responses to the negative effects of industrialization. And naturally, both are highly fertile grounds for political science and public policy research. But what has all this activity produced? While environmental policy has witnessed a great deal of state building, its overall impacts are still far from clear. For sure, the most damaging forms of air and water pollution have largely been contained in the most industrialized states. Yet efforts to address the creeping decline in ecosystem health reported by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) as well as to stabilize Earth’s climatic system have been continually overwhelmed by the ever-growing scale and speed of human activity. Consequently, environmental policy remains, at best, a work in progress.

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Environmental Security Studies

Environmental security studies analyze both the confluence of foreign policy and environmental security, particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War, and the linkages between security cooperation and global environmental risks. They result from an opening in the fields of foreign policy, defense studies, and security cooperation, wherein researchers have tended to move away from a narrowly defined military and strategic understanding of threat, vulnerability, risk, and national interest. In a post–Cold War era characterized by growing transnational flows, emerging environmental movements, and a global political process of ecological awareness building, the changes produced in the regional and global environment have become a critical area on the security agenda. However, the term environmental security has acquired multiple meanings and has gone through contentious academic and policy debates about how environment and security can be connected.

Neither scientific programs nor policy agendas have so far been able to produce a commonly agreed definition of environmental security, which also shows the academic relevance and the policy-building interest of continuous reflection in this research field. However, the same goes for the concept of security itself; as Edward Page (2000) affirms, environmental security appears to be a clear example of a concept that is prone to endless, irresolvable dispute regarding its meaning and policy application. This entry discusses how concerns with environmental security have evolved since the Cold War era and then examines its place in foreign policy today.

Origin and Evolution of Concerns With Environmental Security

In the 1960s, the first efforts were directed toward articulating issues about the environment and security. They were generally concerned with the impact produced by humans on the security of nature, animals, and plants and also with the links between development and quality of life. These first interpretations of environmental security have shed light on the misuse of pesticides and fertilizers and the threats to the environment associated with nuclear energy. As in the cases of Rachel Carson’s book *Silent Spring* (1962), Aldous Huxley’s article “The Politics of Ecology: The Question of Survival” (1963), and Kenneth E. Boulding’s notion of spaceship Earth (1966), these perspectives have emphasized the need to secure the integrity of ecosystems in order to ensure mankind’s survival. Mercury poisoning associated with the Chisso-Minamata disease (1959) and the Torrey Canyon shipwreck off the western coast of Cornwall in England (1967), among other environmental disasters, have played a key role in this context.

In the 1970s, other readings analyzing the environmental effects of war and refugee movements developed, and research also tackled issues related to the link between the environment and development. This was the case with the “Only One Earth” report written by Barbara Ward and René Dubos, Edward Goldsmith’s “Blueprint for Survival,” and the “Limits to Growth” report, all of them published in 1972. They all expressed an overreaction to some of the supposed dangers of environmental degradation to human
security. The United Nations (UN) Conference on Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972), despite the fact that it ended with a largely dead minimalist consensus among states on 26 principles and 109 nonbinding recommendations, has paved the way for future environmental cooperation, led to the establishment of global and regional environmental monitoring networks, and allowed the creation of the UN Environmental Program in Nairobi. In its final declaration, there is not a single reference to environmental security, although its Principle 21 states that “States have . . . the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” Herein resides the idea of environmental threats to the national interest of a state, which should eventually produce a change in the conception of foreign and defense politics.

Since the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, most of the academic debate has been conceptual, leading to the creation of several schools of thought. Some researchers have analyzed the significance of environmental stress as a contributing factor to conflict in many developing countries, generally in an attempt to relate environmental scarcity (environmental degradation or the depletion of renewable resources) to violent conflict. Research has also developed on environmental change produced by human activities and conflicts and shifted to examining how environmental stress may contribute to conflict in combination with other relevant factors. Since 1989, for instance, Thomas Homer-Dixon and his team have produced a significant body of research on the connections between large-scale human-induced environmental stress and mass violence in developing countries. This team of researchers has analyzed the links between water scarcity and conflict, rapid urbanization and urban violence, and environmentally induced migration and ethnic violence, among other issues, having conducted case studies of environmental stress and violence in Rwanda, South Africa, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, China, Nicaragua, Mexico, and so on.

More recently, research has highlighted the importance of disputes arising from access to natural resources such as water, oil, or minerals for strategic purposes. Some researchers call them new wars. It is clear that for some, what needs to be secured remains predominantly the survival of the state, and in this sense environmental insecurity can be read as synonymous with environmental threats to the nation-state (e.g., military operations may have an impact on the environment or the environment may be manipulated or contaminated as a target during wars). For other researchers, environmental security has a much broader scope, including the security of individuals and communities and the security of nature itself. Some more critical researchers associate environmental security with issues of inequality in North–South relations, social class, and revenue distribution. To them, the central research questions are “Whose security is at stake?” and “Who defines the need to protect what and for whom?”

These theoretical debates also show clearly that the relationship between the environment and security is historically and politically complex and controversial and that many factors play a role in it. The cause-and-effect relationships between tensions and vulnerabilities are multidimensional, and the links between the various political and economic components may be direct or indirect. These vibrant discussions also reflect different concepts of nature and the very distinct social representations of what should get counted as part of the environment. One of the dangers of some approaches is that they often dichotomize human beings and nature. On the one hand, deep ecology may often see nature as a subject in itself—a subject that requires protection and for which technical norms should be set up. On the other hand, anthropocentric visions tend to promote human interests over those of the environment. If one understands the notion of environment as including humans, then the way one defines environmental problems alters, and one may come to reformulate the concept of environmental security in terms of broader human security. What constitutes the environment is, in this respect, a key conceptual matter for our understanding of environmental security.

Environmental Security and Foreign Policy

Foreign policy has traditionally referred to a series of actions followed by one nation to deal with
another nation, another region, or an international issue in a multilateral setting. In this connection, a state’s foreign policy would be based on values (democracy, promotion of peace and human rights, rule of law, etc.) and national interest and would usually be aimed at preserving the state’s economic and political goals abroad as well as its position in the world. Foreign policy analysis has classically oriented its lenses to the actions of national governments, principally those related to diplomatic or military issues, thus reflecting an overly simplified view of a world justified in the name of a well-established sense of national interest and threats to national security. Today, the media, the corporate sector, lobbyists, think tanks, environmental and human rights nongovernmental organizations, ethnic groups, and social movements, among other actors, play an increasingly important role in trying to influence foreign policy in many countries. Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War, the in/out divide has lost its absolute relevance, and there has been a keener interest in domestic policy issues, such as energy policies, ecological and health issues, the use of chemicals in agriculture, and the impact of genetically modified organisms in the environment. These developments have deeply changed the analytic field of foreign policy, its agendas, decision-making processes, and the definition of the social practices of its stakeholders. Taking into account environmental security is but another intellectual and political challenge put forward to both the epistemic community and the world of practitioners of foreign policy.

In fact, Braden Allenby (2000) suggests that environmental security may be an important evolution in the definition of what constitutes the national interest of states in international policy systems. Because the previous apparent stability generated by the ideological confrontation between capitalism and communism has broken down, global environmental changes and the need to promote environmental security worldwide potentially affect both foreign policy and security agendas more easily. Environmental issues can no longer be thought of as merely subsidiary components of industrial, social, political, and economic systems. There is a movement of environmental problems from an “overhead” to a “strategic” position on the global agenda. This movement from “periphery” to the “center” occurs at many different scales within firms, industrial sectors, society itself, and governments. They may differ in detail and timetable but have many fundamental similarities in each case and across regions—both North–South and East–West.

This happens also because there is an important constellation of environmental issues (energy, access to natural resources, climate change and sea-level increases, biodiversity-related wealth, dangerous waste management, etc.) that support the fabric of a country’s security and its territorial integrity. They may also threaten and be of most concern for foreign policy analysts and decision makers. They challenge two comfortable classical assumptions that have been at the basis of traditional views of foreign policy: (1) that the nation-state is relatively absolute in the definition of its sovereign security interests and that (2) only interstate relations (particularly within Cold War conflicts between capitalism and communism) define global geopolitics. From a state-centric perspective, security is national; thus, environmental threats to national security should be dealt with by national authorities.

The integration of the notion of environmental security (and insecurity) into the field of foreign policy makes these assumptions, at least in their absolute form, much less valid.

It is in this connection that the Worldwatch Institute had already demanded, in 1977, a broadening of the sense of national security. Lester R. Brown, in “Redefining National Security,” had reaffirmed that threats to countries and societies should stem less from relations with nations and more from relations with nature. Jessica Mathews makes the same argument in her 1989 article on “Redefining Security.” Even within the more traditional realist scholarship, there is an emphasis on this link; for example, George Kennan claimed (in 1985) that the degradation of the environment is one of two threats facing mankind, the other being military and terrorist attacks. Extreme versions of realism, such as the geopolitical theories of major-general Karl Haushofer, look at the security implications of strategic raw materials. Both German and Japanese expansion in the 1930s would partly have been a search for raw materials. Some researchers see President George Bush’s intervention in Iraq in 2003 as an attempt to secure the oil resources of the Middle East.
Indeed, the foreign policy of the United States of America has begun to evolve in response to these recent environmental security challenges, in part by recognizing the need to manage a new set of issues, broadening the generally accepted and cozy concept of security as part of a larger national security mission. In a speech at Stanford University in 1996, the then U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher had explicitly recognized the need to include additional dimensions in American foreign policy, noting that “our Administration has recognized from the beginning that our ability to advance our global interests is inextricably linked to how we manage the Earth’s natural resources,” and the great relevance to “contend with the vast new danger posed to our national interests by damage to the environment and resulting global and regional instability.” Irrespective of the rhetorical dimension of such a statement, the U.S. secretary of state then concluded on a strong note: “That is why we are determined to put environmental issues where they belong: in the mainstream of American foreign policy.” In the case of Japan, in his 1980 “Report on Comprehensive National Security,” the then prime minister of Japan asserted that security would encompass economic vulnerabilities, natural disasters, environmental degradation, and ecological imbalances.

These developments confirm what Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jay Blitt, in their 1998 book Ecoviolence, had pointed to as their key findings in the analysis of linkages between environmental scarcity and foreign policy:

1. Scarcities of renewable resources produce civil violence, instability, and conflict.
2. The degradation and depletion of renewable resources causes environmental scarcity.
3. Powerful groups capture valuable resources, while marginal groups migrate to ecologically sensitive areas.
4. Environmental scarcity constrains economic development and produces migration.
5. Existing distinctions between social groups may be sharpened by environmental scarcity.
6. Environmental scarcity weakens governmental institutions and states.
7. Environmental scarcity can also cause ethnic conflicts, insurgencies, and coups d’état.
8. The international community can be indirectly affected by these conflicts generated by environmental scarcity.

These discoveries support the assumptions of political ecology researchers who argue that environmental degradation often leads to economic underdevelopment, which can in turn diminish political stability in countries and societies in the South.

Global Environmental Risks and Security Cooperation

There is no doubt that today’s human activities constitute a significant and frequently destructive feature of Earth’s ecosystem. Interpretations may vary, but UN sources suggest that around 40% of the entire natural photosynthetic product of the biosphere is appropriated by human beings. It is clear that the world faces a global environmental crisis and, inseparable from this, a coincidental crisis of growing social inequality and poverty. Unprecedented environmental and social changes pose huge challenges to the interstate system, one key question being if and how a global set of local sovereign states would be capable of saving the biosphere from environmental degradation and pollution. Many signs indicate a need for society’s cross-sectoral attention to the environment as an underlying security issue. This sentiment had echoed through the literature on environmental and ecological problems and also through the opening words of the Brundtland Report in 1987: “The Earth is one but the world is not. We all depend on our biosphere for sustaining our lives. Yet each community, each country, strives for survival and prosperity with little regard for its impact on others” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).

Although security tends to be defined only from a military perspective and is thus not open to environmental concerns, since the end of the 1980s some debate has been devoted to global environmental risks and to the threats that they represent to collective security. Al Gore, in his 1992 book, Earth in the Balance, had pointed to global risks
such as the production and trade of highly toxic chemicals, the loss of biodiversity, ozone deple-
tion, climate change, marine degradation, and
desertification and deforestation. The environ-
ment, peace, and security chapter of Our Common
Future was not subject to much negotiation at the
and Development in Rio de Janeiro.

Developing countries did not endorse a global
dialogue on environmental issues within the context
of conflict and security, reacting negatively to any
multilateral treatment of environmental security
proposals within UN forums. Coalitions of develop-
ing nations, mainly the Group of 77, perceived the
security frame as a Pandora’s box that, once
opened, could formally menace their claims of sov-
erign control over their resources. Moreover, lead-
ing developing nations (Brazil, China, India, and
Malaysia, among others) tend to consider that pre-
dominantly Northern geopolitical concerns about
the impacts of environmental conflicts on national
sovereignty and the destruction of the global com-
mons associated with comprehensive security have
largely dominated environmental security negotia-
tions and policy making to date. Their criticisms
focus on the failure of this security approach to
address the causes of inequality and injustice that
underpin poverty and environmental degradation at
local and global levels. Representatives from devel-
oping nations support that global change has more
impact on those least able to protect themselves
from its effects, such as the poor and coastal com-
nunities at risk from severe flooding and climate
change spillovers.

Therefore, the world of interstate relations has
not welcomed the ideal of environmental responsi-
bility as another normative principle in interna-
tional relations, arguing that it would justify
breaches in the state’s sovereignty and legitimiz-
foreign interventions by stronger countries. That is
why some authors such as Norman Myers tend to
defend the individual level of analysis; that is, secu-
ity should apply mostly at the level of the individu-
lar citizen as a basis of political stability. In his
view, security should not be a function of stable
macrosocial processes (such as sociopolitical, eco-
omic, or even military systems); rather, it should
be seen as a goal to be achieved at the microlevel
of human existence. Another type of definition is
provided by ecological security approaches, which
tend to consider that environmental degradation,
by undermining mankind’s means of subsistence,threatens the security of ecosystems. Ecological
security takes into account the need to provide for
the physical circumstances and conditions of the
needs of a community without diminishing natural
stocks. Other approaches—for instance, the one
supported by the United Nations Development
Program—are inclined to privilege human security
as an overarching concept. As a consequence, envi-
ronmental security and human rights would be
inextricably linked. In this case, security should
become an all-encompassing term relating to the
social, economic, political, and ecological well-
being of individual human beings.

Irrespective of the level of analysis, all these per-
spectives agree that environmental threats pose
long-term dangers to security and that the causes
of environmental insecurity are related to popula-
tion growth, degradation, overuse and abuse of resources,
depletion of finite global resources, transborder
effects of environmental degradation, or the en-
getic impact of unsustainable consumption patterns.
Apart from the intrinsic shortcomings associated
with the interstate system to deal with global envi-
ronmental security issues, another major obstacle
that may stand in the way of effective global gover-
nance mechanisms and structures relates to the
extraordinary power of transnational corporations.
Of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are
corporations; and the top 500 corporations now
control almost two thirds of world trade.

The literature on environmental security is very
much shaped by the assumption that the behavior of
states is determined by the structure of power rela-
tions in international relations. Particularly in the
1990s, this literature has also been under the influ-
ence of a credo that no regulatory mechanisms
should guide or control corporate behavior. In this
sense, security would be restricted to the need to
protect a population and a territory against foreign
threats while at the same time defending the interests
of the state. Questions related to scope and content
would be withdrawn from the policy debate, but
some scholars insist on retaining them: What is the
nature of the societies, organizations, and institu-
tions whose security matters from the point of view
of security discourse? What environmental phenom-
ena put them at risk and render them insecure? Who
is threatened by environmental insecurity?
According to Steven Ney (1999), it is necessary to recall that evaluating different models, or conceptual maps, of environmental security is not a straightforward task. Using Graham Allison’s terminology, models can be considered *perceptual lenses* that allow us to make sense of the world: A theory is a way of seeing as well as a way of not seeing. As such, models are tools with which policy actors may construct arguments in the course of policy negotiation and deliberation. Models can have a pragmatic impact on policy making, and by extension they may be designed solely to affect the policy process. They may perform as well as inform. That is why it does not make sense to assess models in isolation of their argumentative contexts and concrete policy settings in which they are to be employed. As constructivist and critical researchers argue, the often implicit normative assumptions that underpin the different approaches to environmental security should also be analyzed. For instance, one of the explanatory powers of many environmental security approaches is based on the assumption that increased population growth inevitably leads to environmental degradation. By the same token, however, this argument does not take into consideration how individual and social consumption patterns are structured and how some of them may have a stronger impact on the environment. It is true that the various theoretical approaches to environmental security contribute to promoting global environmental issues into policy agendas worldwide, but the question that environmental security studies should also pose relates to how these issues are being brought into the agendas.

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See also Environmental Issues; Environmental Policy; National Interest; Security and Defense Policy; Security Cooperation

Further Readings


**Epistemic Communities**

Epistemic communities are networks of knowledge-based communities with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within their domain of expertise. Their members share knowledge about
the causation of social or physical phenomena in an area for which they have a reputation for competence and a common set of normative beliefs about what actions will benefit human welfare in such a domain. In particular, they are a group of professionals, often from a number of different disciplines, who share the following set of characteristics:

1. *Shared principled beliefs:* Such beliefs provide a value-based rationale for social action of the members of the community.

2. *Shared causal beliefs or professional judgment:* Such beliefs provide analytic reasons and explanations of behavior, offering causal explanations for the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes.

3. *Common notions of validity—intersubjective, internally defined criteria for validating knowledge:* These allow community members to confidently differentiate between warranted and unwarranted claims about states of the world and policies to change those states.

4. *A common policy enterprise:* This entails tackling a set of practices associated with a central set of problems, presumably out of a conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.

*Epistemic communities* is a concept invoked by constructivist scholars of international relations to focus analytic attention on the process by which states formulate interests and reconcile differences of interest. Epistemic communities are a principal channel by which consensual knowledge about causal understandings is applied to international policy coordination and by which states may learn through processes of international cooperation.

John Ruggie introduced the term *episteme*, borrowed in turn from Michel Foucault, to describe the overarching perspective through which political relationships are visualized and understood during historical eras. The 1992 winter issue of *International Organization* on “Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination” focused on the actors responsible for articulating and aggregating knowledge-based understanding in areas of security, environment, and international political economy (IPE). It also developed the now standard four-element definition of an epistemic community provided above.

By analyzing epistemic communities, constructivist scholars gained leverage on understanding the processes of social construction and collective learning. If contemporary international relations is characterized as a setting of complexity and uncertainty, as argued by constructivist scholars—particularly under contemporary circumstances of complex interdependence, increasing globalization, and the emergence of new technical issues on the international agenda with which traditional decision makers are habitually unfamiliar—then state interests are often unknown or incompletely specified. International relations then becomes a matter of applying embedded and institutionalized beliefs about the nature of problems and the appropriate means of collective response rather than the process of resolving rationally formulated state preferences as argued by many current theorists of international relations. Changes in information processing are likely to follow well-publicized shocks or crises. Only at such times are decision makers likely to recognize major anomalies and pursue new policy patterns. During subsequent, less revolutionary periods, these new doctrines or orthodoxies assume the status of taken-for-granted assumptions or dogma, which persist until called into question again by external stimuli. Because of the disjointed equilibrium nature of policy change, an evolutionary focus on institutional learning and path dependence may provide an appropriate model by which to understand the international recognition and response to global change. Such a research program may provide a better understanding of factors that influence the introduction of new policy frames, collective understandings, or doctrines as well as illuminate mechanisms of lock-in and identify those factors that may influence the degree of irreversibility of national and collective actions.

Epistemic communities are one of the principal actors responsible for aggregating and articulating knowledge in terms of state interests for decision makers and disseminating those beliefs internationally. In a broader political context, epistemic communities provide one of the major channels by which overarching regime principles, norms, and rules are articulated for the international community and disseminated internationally. While epistemic
communities are the principal agents responsible for articulating such principles, norms, and rules, the extent to which they become more deeply diffused and embedded internationally has to do with the political influence of epistemic community members: their ability to persuade others, their ability to consolidate bureaucratic influence in important institutional venues, and their ability to retain influence over time. State interests and decisions to deploy state power are thus identified subject to consensual knowledge.

Research on Epistemic Communities

The epistemic community literature is now nearly 20 years old. The epistemic communities concept was initially favorably received in international relations because it provided a means for focusing on the ideational component of politics and also allowed for agency in theorizing about governance and policy making. Studies of the European Union (EU) in particular have analyzed the role of various epistemic communities in shaping EU directives as well as in building a broader sense of European identity. Since the initial response to epistemic communities, analysts have developed a variety of clarifications, refined hypotheses, carried out further empirical work, and empirically confirmed the broad predicted social patterns associated with epistemic communities.

Initial critiques of epistemic communities called for a clearer theory of the state as well as a clearer metric by which epistemic communities could be recognized and consensus within an epistemic community could be measured.

Critical voices from the literature were sounded on social studies of knowledge regarding the degree of political autonomy enjoyed by epistemic communities and science-based arguments in general for public policy, questioning the political consequences of such ideas and also the potential implicit political bias in the research programs pursued by epistemic community members. They feared that by depoliticizing expertise and the consequences of expert-based advice, epistemic communities may become antidemocratic and antiparticipatory. However, such points were explicitly acknowledged in the initial formulation of the epistemic community research program—namely, the political nature of all policy debate. The epistemic community argument was that, normatively, epistemic communities ultimately provided more impartial advice than other modes of policy advice and, analytically, their study offered a clear causal pathway by which ideas came to inform political practices that was superior to conventional approaches to the study of politics, which are unable to provide credible explanations for how ideas influenced politics or the conditions under which ideas were likely to be influential.

Epistemic community members can be identified through interviews, from secondary literature (especially by journalists), and by cross-checking membership lists for international negotiations and consultations over time. Recurrent names are eligible candidates. Refining an identification of the consensual knowledge shared by the epistemic community members can be done by reading their publications (especially scientific ones with equations that force precision) and open-ended interviews. The extent to which they feel that they are members of a common community can be ascertained through interviews and through snowball techniques, in which prospective members identify others with whom they believe they share beliefs. The combination of self-identified traits and externally confirmed traits (such as the application of consensus approaches to truth) define the epistemic community. The causal mechanisms by which they exercise influence—learning—can effectively be pursued by process tracing, focused comparative case studies, counterfactuals, and alternative hypothesis testing.

Stronger hypotheses about the mechanisms, effects, and variation of epistemic communities’ influence were also developed. Epistemic communities are likely to be found in substantive issues where methods from scientific disciplines have been applied to policy-oriented work and in countries with well-established institutional capacities for administration, and science and technology. Governments with such capacities are likely to see the need for the technical skills that epistemic community members command, and such professionals may be attracted to governmental service only when they believe that their policy enterprise can be advanced. Crises or widely publicized shocks are probably necessary precipitants of environmental regime creation, but crises alone are insufficient to explain how or which collective responses to a perceived joint problem are likely to develop.
Epistemic communities then help identify cause-and-effect relationships, elucidate interlinkages between problems, help define the consulting state’s or organization’s interests, and help formulate policy. Their aggregate effect depends on the extent to which their ideas become embedded in influential multilateral institutions more generally: powerful countries and international institutions and, possibly, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which will then deploy their own influence to disseminate the shared ideas enunciated within the epistemic community. Overall, learning will occur in the policy system as new policy-relevant knowledge is identified and applied to a common problem.

The initial reception of their ideas is likely to occur in rich democratic societies, where scientific capacity and the free flow of information within society are high. However, other countries may also be receptive to epistemic communities’ ideas but not as quickly.

Treaties developed with a strong contribution from epistemic communities are likely to enter into force more rapidly than those developed through other political mechanisms, as the social influence of epistemic community members will accelerate ratification in domestic legislative venues.

Multiple mechanisms of diffusion are possible through various international channels at different political scales. For instance, in stratospheric ozone protection, the very regulatory scheme arose from atmospheric chemists, but the new technologies to satisfy those regulations emerged through the interplay of multinational corporations (MNCs, e.g., DuPont, ATOCHEM, and ICI), international institutions (the Montreal Ozone Protocol’s technical advisory panels and the Montreal Ozone Fund), and NGOs (most notably, Greenpeace). The appropriate factors by which international institutions may induce other actors to accept the epistemic ideas will vary because of the political and economic conditions in the target country; for instance, advanced industrialized societies are more responsive to public education campaigns, whereas poor developing countries respond to material incentives from capacity building. The key analytic point, though, is that without the involvement of epistemic communities to set the agenda and impart new ideas, the political dynamics of collective action are likely to be far more conventional and lack the potential for reflective learning by policymakers.

Subsequent empirical work has found that epistemic community members have played a strong role in negotiating international environmental agreements. Members of the epistemic community that have dominated technical discussions in environmental regimes have subscribed to holistic ecological beliefs about the need for policy coordination subject to ecosystemic laws. Thus, they promote international environmental regimes that are grounded on policies that offer coherent plans for the management of entire ecosystems and are sensitive to interactions among environmental media (such as air and water), sources of pollution, and contending uses of the common property resource, rather than being limited to more traditional policies for managing discrete activities or physical resources spaces within fairly short-term time horizons. Epistemically informed collective action has a distinctively comprehensive form and is politically resilient, yielding patterns that are not associated with political dynamics involving any other sets of political actors. Moreover, epistemically informed treaties are more likely to be effective because the regulatory standards fit the behavior of the socio-ecosystem being managed.

Further studies of international institutions refined the characteristics of formal international organizations that are likely to absorb the lessons of epistemic communities and disseminate them. Design principles for international scientific panels were also identified.

The hypotheses about the distinctive patterns of epistemic collective action were confirmed by numerous focused comparative case studies of a wide array of multilateral environmental regimes. In IPE (international political economy), similar dynamics are associated with the popularization and dissemination of major economic doctrines, including the Washington Consensus, Keynesianism and structuralism, and development economics.

The ideational focus was absorbed into the broader constructivist research program developed in international relations and comparative politics, which looked at the role of beliefs and ideas in shaping state interests and practices, with epistemic communities serving as one of the mechanisms by which new ideas are developed and circulated. Analyzing epistemic communities continues to provide a key
group of actors associated with a distinctive set of processes by which causal understandings shape actor interests and regime dynamic amid constructivists’ broader focus on other ideational forces, including norms, linguistic usage, and the like.

More recent publications in the epistemic communities research program have been looking more carefully at the context in which epistemic communities arise and operate. Current works try to clarify the institutional factors that shape or amplify ideational consensus and dissemination and that influence the creation of relatively impartial and usable scientific advice, and they try to separate the causal mechanisms of social learning from other causal mechanisms that drive collective action. For instance, how can one explain which epistemic community will prevail and when? One could ask why environmental scientists have tended to prevail over economists in all environmental issues other than climate change. Additional research frontiers include the mechanisms of lock-in, the domestic dynamics that influence the authority, the identity and influence of epistemic communities, and the mechanisms by which decision makers learn more about the nature of the international political system as well as the management of isolated issues.

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See also Elitism; Governance; Intellectuals; Power

Further Readings


Epistemological and Methodological Foundations

Understood literally, method-ology means the study and/or use of methods. This understanding implies the existence of more than one method and that the utility of a particular method can vary across contexts. For many practitioners in political science, the method of choice is determined by the number of observations: Students of relatively abundant political phenomena rely on statistical techniques, students of unique political phenomena use case study techniques, and those in the middle sample choose from a wide array of qualitative or small-N comparative approaches. This methodological rule of thumb is derived from an implicit hierarchy of methods, which is the product of a particular, and very influential, research tradition.

This entry examines the ontological and epistemological foundations of this research tradition to explain the reasoning behind its implicit hierarchy of methods and to show some of its inherent limitations. There are two objectives for this. The first objective is to broaden the reader’s methodological horizons by showing how one’s choice of methods should reflect the nature of the subject one studies as well as the way in which one can acquire knowledge about that subject. By examining these methodological foundations, political scientists can become more aware of both the potential and the shortcomings of the methods they use. Just as important, methodological reflection can encourage political scientists to use a broader range of methods. In recognizing how the usefulness of any particular method will depend on the nature of the subject under study as well as on the mode of explanation that the analyst deems most appropriate, political scientists may find it necessary to adapt their methods, or adopt new ones, as the nature of the political world (and political scientists’ interest in it) evolves.
To stimulate this sort of reflection, this entry focuses on the philosophical underpinnings of the most common approaches. For empirically minded political scientists, these philosophical concerns are twofold: (1) they need to be aware of the nature of the things they study, and (2) they need to concern themselves with the various means by which they can secure reliable knowledge about those things. These two concerns provide the basic framework for this entry. The first section examines the way in which mainstream approaches depend on a particular understanding of the political world to produce the theories and generalizations that the political science profession admires. The most common methods are designed to exploit specific ontological contexts and epistemological standards; as a result, they do not always work as designed when transplanted to new and different contexts. The second section introduces an alternative ontological approach and its relationship to the same, commonplace methods. In short, the relationship among ontology, epistemology, and the methods is discussed in the first two sections that follow. The third section examines some of the most common difficulties facing researchers who are trying to secure reliable knowledge about that political world. In their attempt to secure and understand knowledge about the world, they inevitably impose their own ways of ordering it. Recognizing and correcting these inherent biases is the subject of the third section, which harks back to Francis Bacon for the task.

The Political World

Political science—as an academic discipline—has grown out of several fields, which vary significantly from one national tradition to the next. In some contexts, the weight of history has been strongest; in others, politics grew from the study of law; in still others, economics or philosophy were the host communities. As a result, modern political science can draw from a very deep methodological well, if only one is willing to tap into it. Throughout most of the history of European political thought, one can find a remarkable diversity and openness about how to address political affairs. The founding thinkers of the political science discipline—Plato and his student Aristotle—could not agree about the nature of the world they studied, the utility of different sources of knowledge about that world, or on any particular method for studying that world. After all, Plato was not especially interested in experience or empirical detail; he emphasized the importance of reason in discovering truths about an ideal world. Aristotle, by contrast, favored a more down-to-earth approach, where observation of events in the world and careful comparisons could show us true from false.

In these foundational thinkers, one can find an open discussion about the importance of linking the approach of study to the world of study. In the centuries since, there has been a broad consensus that the nature of the social and political world is relatively similar to that of the natural world. Indeed, this consensus is one reason why many methods developed for studying the natural world have successfully migrated to the social sciences, and it may be an important reason why political scientists spend so little time discussing ontological issues. As will be seen in the next section, this is not the only ontological perspective embraced by political scientists—but it remains the most dominant. Most political scientists view the political world in a way that is strongly influenced by a long and illustrious tradition in the natural sciences. This tradition builds on two important assumptions. The first holds that the phenomena studied are independent of the observer, so that observations do not affect them in any significant way. In this tradition, political scientists can approach their world of study confident that there is an objective subject of study—a Real World—and that this subject will reveal itself consistently to each observer. Because the Real World exists independent of us, and because that World is stable and unchanging, it is possible to arrive at singular truths about the nature of this Real World, given the appropriate techniques.

The second common assumption holds that this Real World is patterned—that it obeys a certain logic of its own—and that these patterns are also independent of their observers. Because these patterns are a natural part of the world, this can be called a naturalist ontology, perspective, or worldview. While some of these patterns are patently obvious (e.g., heavy items, when dropped, fall to the ground; the sun rises in the east and sets in the west), others are concealed by the complexities of nature and life. The latter is especially true in the
political world. It is the fixed existence and independent nature of these underlying patterns that allows us to generalize about the nature of social relationships. In recognizing these fundamental components of this ontology, researchers have developed methods that can search for, uncover, and eventually explain the systematic patterns that they believe exist but that are often hidden from the casual observer.

Belief in the existence of these natural and stable patterns can explain the predominance of two main sources of knowledge in political science: reason and experience (or sensory perception). These are not the only sources of knowledge available to political scientists, nor are they exclusive to the naturalist’s world view. Still, rationalism and empiricism remain political scientists’ most common and dominant sources of knowledge. The first of these, rational knowledge, acquires understanding about the world through strict adherence to rigorous thinking (e.g., by using syllogisms or formal logic). Because we believe the world to be stable and patterned, we can use reason and logic to uncover the underlying form, ideal, or model on which the Real World is based. While the original motivation for this way of interpreting the world was religious (that an all-powerful God created the world and imbued it with meaning), it enjoys a long and august pedigree: one that extends from Plato, through 17th-century continental European philosophy (e.g., Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz), and continues today in mathematical and/or rational choice approaches to studying the political world.

In the rationalist tradition, the patterned nature of the Real World can be uncovered and understood by creating consistent and logical models to show how the world really is beneath the confusing complexity of everyday life. By filtering out the particular irregularities of experience and by focusing on the underlying concepts and relationships, rationalist approaches are able to create pristine models of social behavior. Thus, for example, economists can generate models of what a true market, in equilibrium, should look and behave like (e.g., in the absence of organized interests and government regulations). Similarly, social choice theorists can show (under a number of very reasonable conditions) that no voting system is fair.

Implicitly, the authors of these models believe that they correspond to the true nature of the (underlying) Real World. To complicate matters, this Real World might differ from the world of experience. When models do not actually correspond to observable actions or patterns, supporters can argue (like Plato) that the particular experiences of everyday life (or our description of these experiences) get in the way of, or obscure, our perception of the underlying patterns and relationships. Consequently, the standard of proof in this tradition tends to be reason, not a reference to how things actually are in the world of everyday experience.

The second main source of knowledge—empiricist knowledge—is arguably the most dominant in contemporary political science. The power of this type of knowledge is derived from the belief that the most secure means of obtaining knowledge about the world is through sensory perception and the clear description of these sensory experiences. Although it may be harmful to depict the history of science in simple—dichotomous—terms, it is common and convenient to depict the empiricist tradition as a response to—or in dialogue with—the rationalist tradition. Thus, Aristotle is seen to have reacted to Plato’s rationalism in beginning his treatise on Politics with the simple claim that “observation shows us,” and British philosophers such as Francis Bacon, John Locke, and David Hume are said to be responding to the continental philosophers associated with the rationalist tradition.

Here, too, the messiness of everyday life can cloud the underlying patterns:

The universe to the eye of the human understanding is framed like a labyrinth, presenting as it does on every side so many ambiguities of way, such deceitful resemblances of objects and signs, natures so irregular in their lines and so knotted and entangled. And then the way is still to be made by the uncertain light of the sense, sometimes shining out, sometimes clouded over, through the woods of experience and particulars; while those who offer themselves for guides are (as was said) themselves also puzzled, and increase the number of errors and wanderers. (Bacon, 1620/1863a, Preface)

Although the true patterns of a Real World lie hidden in this labyrinth of experience, empiricists believe that the use of appropriate methods and careful study can uncover them and reveal the
truth. Following Karl Popper, naturalists in the empiricist tradition believe that a statement is true if it accurately corresponds to a state of affairs in the Real World.

For the world of political science, as for the world of nature (or perhaps even more so), the complexity of overlapping vocabularies and perspectives can make it very difficult to see the underlying and stable patterns that make up the Real World. To uncover these patterns, researchers must choose their approaches carefully and dissect the world systematically. Modern empiricist approaches draw from the “experimental methods” in John Stuart Mill’s (1891) *A System of Logic* to develop inductive approaches that can identify the lawlike relationship in the underlying (political) world. Modern political science—in all its variants—is remarkably indebted to Mill’s methods of experimentation. His method of difference, method of agreement, indirect method of difference, and method of concomitant variation have become the building blocks of modern comparative and statistical analyses: tools that are used to systematically control and compare our experiences of the political world in ways that allow us to discover the stable connections and causal regularities that are hidden beneath the surface.

Both these mainstream sources of knowledge (rationalism and empiricism) assume that the Real World not only exists but that it is naturally structured or patterned in a logical, meaningful way. Methods that rest atop both rationalist and empiricist foundations are designed to uncover singular truths about the nature of the Real World and to do so in an objective, disinterested manner. It is this pattern (or logic) that allows us to use systematic tools of induction (or methods of experimentation, to use Mill’s terms) to tease out the patterns that lie just beneath the surface or to generate logical and rational models of how the world *actually is*. In this mainstream (naturalist) tradition, political scientists can transcend their personal, temporal, and cultural perspectives, and beliefs and prejudices, to arrive at valid knowledge and objective truths.

Most contemporary political scientists have inherited approaches that have grown out of this tradition: They have found utility and meaning in methods that have been carefully adapted in ways that make them more suitable for studying the political world. Indeed, scholars in this tradition subscribe to a strong (if implicit) hierarchy of methods for uncovering truths about the world, and they do so by combining elements from both the rationalist and empiricist traditions.

At the top of this hierarchy lies the experimental method. This method is prized because it allows researchers to manipulate the relevant variables, in a context that controls for all other sources of influence, in order to secure firm knowledge about posited relationships. This method works because we assume the world to be made up of discrete and independent parts (not unlike those in a clock), which can be mixed and matched in different ways to reveal (and test) causal relationships. Indeed, this capacity to control and compare components of the real world is a hallmark of all good science.

When experimentation is not a realistic alternative—and many areas of political life do not lend themselves to experimental design—naturalists tend toward statistical approaches. Here too, manipulation, comparison, and control are central to uncovering real-world patterns. But instead of manipulating the contexts in which these variables lie, the statistician’s computer manipulates the data in ways that mimic experimental control. Because statistics do not involve the physical manipulation of data, it is a method that lends itself to the study of social phenomena, where the tendency is to study events that have already occurred.

The naturalist’s third best alternative is small-N comparative approaches. These are used when one is interested in questions that have too few observations to run reliable statistical enquiries. As both statistical and small-N comparative methods use experimental designs, they share much in common. The most important difference is that the comparativist selects the cases of study in a strategic way, so as to maximize the variance of the independent variables and to minimize the influence of other (control) variables. In other words, unlike statistical and experimental designs, case selection in small-N comparative projects is anything but random. Because of this, researchers need to rely on theory to avoid major problems associated with this method and its control strategy (such as over-determination and a sampling bias).

Finally, case studies constitute the bottom rung of this methods hierarchy. This method is used
only when researchers are faced with a paucity of data or relevant comparisons. Case studies are histories with a point: They gather information on cases that are interesting or relevant in light of a larger theoretical concern or a specific research design. By collecting more data on such cases, researchers might eventually bump the study up to a higher rung on the hierarchy. On their own, however, case studies have little value, in that studying a single case can provide little grounds for generalization about the patterns that motivate the research.

These methods work remarkably well when used in the right contexts and when the limitations of each are recognized and respected. These contexts draw on a naturalist ontology that sees the world as something independent of the observer, patterned in nature, and accessible by methods that use observation, control, and comparison. The methods depend on a world that can be broken down into its component parts (variables), which are themselves independent and autonomous. This allows the researcher to cut up a political phenomenon, manipulate its component parts, and use this structured manipulation (of either the world or the data) to interrogate the phenomenon in a way that will reveal its logic or pattern. However, when these methods are used in a methodologically naïve manner—when they are used in contexts that do not correspond to the assumptions that gird them—the results can be misleading, biased, and wrong.

**A Few Examples**

There is little point in humiliating those who have ignored the ontological assumptions that underlie their methods. This problem is common enough for the shame to be shared by many. Still, this point can be made with reference to a couple of recent (positive) examples of colleagues who have reflected on (and responded to) the shortcomings of a particularly popular method. Although both these examples are critical of cross-national regression analyses, it is not meant to suggest that this problem is confined to statistical studies. These examples are used because they highlight the sort of difficulties that can be found, even among the most refined, explicit, and sophisticated of contemporary methods. A fundamental assumption of most comparative research is that a representative sample of independent observations, drawn from the population of interest, is used. The independence of observations is important as it affects the effective number of observations (e.g., if there are four people in a household and they generate an opinion together, the number of independent opinions is one not four). Samples based on observations that are not independent will generate findings that misestimate the amount of variability in the population, producing biased sample statistics and erroneous conclusions. This assumption of (observational) independence meshes well with the ontological assumptions girding many of the fields of research that use regression techniques. When applied on international samples, this assumption is also in tune with the logic of the Westphalian state system (at least an idealized view of that system), where states are understood to be autonomous and independent. But in a world that is increasingly characterized by international integration and diffusion, this assumption is increasingly tenuous.

This problem is nothing new, and it is usually traced back to the critical comments of Sir Francis Galton, who—late in the 19th century—questioned the results of a paper that used data from a cross-cultural sample to test the relationship between marriage laws and descent patterns in tribal cultures. “Galton’s problem” was born when he noted that the observed correlation might have been a result of contacts between the cultures in the sample (and not the result of a test of truly independent cases). While anthropologists have been struggling with Galton’s problem for some time, political scientists have been remarkably slow to realize (and address) the problem. In recent years, however, there has been an explosion of activity on this front, as many statisticians attempt to deal with the effects of globalization. Detlef Jahn (2006) provides political scientists with a good introduction to the nature of the problem and suggests one way to try to deal with it. In an honest attempt to align method and ontology, Jahn proposes a simple modification of ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression techniques that allow him to measure the strength of the diffusion associated with globalization.

This is one way to resolve the growing tension between a changing world and the most popular method for its study. Jahn provides us with a
“patch” to an approach that is not particularly well suited for dealing with the changing world of international politics. These sorts of patches work if they are few in number and do not overwhelm the underlying approach (the result, then, would be like trying to run Windows XP on an old 386 processor). In the long run, it is likely that an approach that is better designed, from the bottom up, will need to be developed to deal with this new context. In the meantime, however, Jahn gets us thinking.

A second example comes from an article by Peter Hall (2008). Like Jahn, Hall is critical of mainstream regression techniques but for different reasons. His concern is not so much in the changing nature of the things researchers study but on the different kinds of things they study. In particular, Hall is interested in how researchers secure causal explanations of political phenomena. More to the point, Hall is critical of the (common) assumption that large-N statistical approaches provide the best grounds for causal inference. After reviewing three different modes of explanation (historically specific, multivariate, and theory oriented) Hall shows how small-N comparative designs can be valuable for causal inference. In particular, an intensive examination of the causal chain provides researchers with a new and different basis for causal inference—one that is especially well suited for assessing the sort of complex causal theories that are so prominent in the social sciences. When they use systematic process analyses (Hall’s term), small-N comparisons can be especially useful for developing theory-oriented explanations.

Hall’s reasoning rests on ontological foundations. In addition to traditional arguments (such as the need to be aware of the state of the literature), Hall notes how the researcher’s methodology should be conditioned on the state of the world, as he or she perceives it (Hall, 2008; see also Hall, 2003). Because standard regression models build on assumptions that are unlikely to hold in situations where researchers are trying to develop theory-oriented explanations, he questions the (common) claim that a single (statistical) method can adequately assess the validity of causal inferences in the social sciences. While the underlying assumptions of standard regression analyses were usefully employed to assess the conditions conducive to securing stable democracy, when those conditions were thought to include basic socioeconomic factors, such as the level of economic development, related levels of literacy and the correlates of “modernisation” . . . when theorists began to see stable democracy as the product of an intricate strategic interaction among reforms, extremists and defenders of the old regime, statistical methods were no longer appropriate for assessing the causal chain. (Hall, 2008, p. 307)

Both these examples show how greater awareness of ontological assumptions should be important for empirically minded political scientists. In the first example, this sort of awareness was used to tweak an existing approach in a way that makes more sense in a changed (and changing) world of study. In the second example, explicit reflection on the different types of causal arguments was used to argue for the inclusion of small-N methods, more suitable for some of the tasks at hand. Both examples illustrate the importance of embracing different methods and thinking carefully about how our methods engage the world we study.

Competing Worldviews

As with just about everything else in political science, there is more than one way to look at the political world. Indeed, there are many who are unwilling to commit to a single Real World of political study, and this has important consequences for the way that methods (even familiar methods) are used. While the focus of this entry is based on mainstream, naturalist approaches to political science, it can be useful to glance at an alternative ontological perspective to show how standard methods play different roles when used in different contexts.

This alternative ontological perspective can be called constructivism. Its followers question the existence of a single world of study, independent of its examiner and capable of revealing objective and singular truths. Instead, constructivists believe that truth lies in the eyes of the observer and in the constellation of power and forces that support that truth. As our observations and descriptions of events cannot be shielded from the biases that surround us, constructivists do not believe that it is possible to secure an absolute
truth that corresponds to a single Real World. Their objectives are more modest: They point to the ways in which our contexts (and those of our subject matter) frame the way we come to develop an understanding.

This constructivist tradition is often marginalized by mainstream political science for being unreliable and even serendipitous. Some think mainstream political science does so at its own peril. This is because constructivism shares a number of ontological and epistemological features with the naturalist tradition, and these similarities allow each tradition to borrow from the other. In some respects, the two perspectives can complement one another, and the lessons learned from one tradition can be amended, or modified, to be applied in contexts more familiar to the other. Indeed, this useful collaboration is evident in the growing movement for scientific realism. Most important, constructivists and naturalists share a willingness to see the world in terms of interpretable patterns, and both traditions rely heavily on rationalist and empiricist sources of knowledge for understanding these patterns.

How these perspectives differ is in their view of the source of these patterns and the ends to which they use rationalist and empiricist sources of knowledge. For constructivists, the patterns of interest are not firmly rooted in nature, but they are the products of our making: Each of us sees and experiences different things, and what we see (or experience) is determined by a complicated mix of social and contextual influences and/or presuppositions.

The modern intellectual roots of this tradition can be traced to Immanuel Kant, who was struggling with the implication of David Hume’s difficulty in securing firm knowledge about causality. Hume’s approach to causation rested on a rather simple theory of sensory perception: The human mind (straightforwardly, even mechanistically) absorbs impressions through the senses. Kant seems to have appreciated Hume’s general theory of sensory perception, but he did not think that the human mind should be understood as an empty vessel into which sensory perceptions were merely dumped. For Kant, our senses only bring perceptions to the doorstep of the mind. It was then up to the mind to reorganize, characterize, and then store these perceptions for later use. To perform this task, Kant believed that the human mind was prewired with basic preconditioning concepts, or forms of understanding. Thus, in thinking about how we experience and store sense perceptions, Kant shifted the ontological terrain of patterned (lawlike) behavior from nature to the human mind. In other words, Kant believed that the patterns we see in nature are the result of our mental manipulation of sensory perceptions—not a characteristic of nature itself.

Kant did not suggest that the social world was ontologically different from the natural world. Neither did he question the existence of a Real World. Rather, Kant argued that we cannot know anything about the Real World (noumena, in his vocabulary). All we can know is that our perceptions (phenoumena) of the Real World are somehow related to it—and that the nature of this relationship is complex and ambiguous. The result of this complex and ambiguous process is that scientists (both natural and social) find themselves facing what appear to be different, even competing, worlds.

There are several other reasons to question the naturalist ontology. Many of these responses emphasize the unique qualities of human agency to argue that the nature of human relations must be different from those that we find in the natural world. “We are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude toward the world and to lend it significance” (Weber, 1949, p. 81). Constructivists take observations such as these to show how human agency, itself, can create objects that have a different ontological status than those found in the natural world: where the very existence of social facts (e.g., money, property rights, and sovereignty) depends on human agreement and institutions. Given this different ontological context, constructivists question the utility of employing methods to search for naturally occurring (independent) patterns of behavior.

Because constructivists embrace a world that is ontologically diverse and complex, they tend to draw on more and different types of evidence and proof. While constructivists draw heavily on rationalist and empiricist sources of knowledge, they are often willing to employ other, more radical, sources of knowledge as well (including, e.g., empathy, revelation, and myths). While these alternative
sources of knowledge may be less reliable, they are firmly anchored in human experience. For this reason, they can provide important keys for unlocking the (constructed) patterns researchers study. As constructivists are not searching for objective and verifiable patterns of phenomena existing naturally in the social world, they do not subscribe to the naturalist’s hierarchy of methods. After all, this tradition doesn’t believe that truth is just “out there”; knowledge about the social world is always knowledge in context; it is socially situated and it has social consequences. While it is difficult to argue that constructivists subscribe to an explicit methods’ hierarchy of their own, they clearly prioritize methods that protect and nurture the contexts that can explain the source of the patterns they see. As these patterns are understood to be socially (or individually) constructed, their methods aim to uncover the motivations and presuppositions that generate the underlying patterns.

For this reason, constructivists have a soft spot for narrative approaches, as these provide researchers with a nearness to the data and context that is necessary and desirable in order to gain insight. This emphasis on narration and the importance of context and contingency is extended to the way in which constructivists employ comparisons—as a tool for developing associations that can help establish meaning. While constructivists seldom use statistical and experimental approaches, there is nothing inherent to either of these methods that need alienate constructivist scholars. With a little thought and imagination (two traits usually embraced by constructivists), statistical and experimental approaches could be designed and used in ways that can exploit contextual familiarity and appeal to constructivists. In short, constructivists tend to use the same basic methods, but they do so in different ways, toward different objectives.

In a nutshell, naturalists tend to exhibit little regard for the surrounding context. Their methods are designed to cut into contexts in order to gain access to the component parts. These are then manipulated to control for, and capture, relevant variation. Because the patterns they seek are assumed to exist independently of the component agents and their observers, preserving the interpretive context is not a high priority for naturalists. Constructivists, on the other hand, want to use comparisons to better understand the nature or source of these patterns. As the patterns they see are a function of the agents they study, or the observers themselves, familiar methods are often turned inside out to look critically at how the contexts themselves provide meaning to the patterns under study.

As in the naturalist tradition, constructivists can draw from an impressive intellectual legacy, which stretches back to antiquity. More surprising, perhaps, is that this perspective finds support among some rather unlikely allies. For example, this entry has already noted how indebted mainstream (naturalist) political science is to the experimental methods developed by J. S. Mill. What was not mentioned previously was that Mill himself (e.g., Mill, 2002) was skeptical of their application to the world of politics, and his skepticism rested on ontological foundations.

This sort of skepticism has been voiced by many others. Indeed, these shaky ontological foundations may be the reason why political science knowledge doesn’t measure up (in terms of, say, the ability to generalize and/or predict) to the knowledge produced in the other branches of (natural) science. While such failures might be explained by other factors (e.g., the youth of the discipline, the complexity of human action), there are formidable arguments—authored by reputable thinkers such as Wilhelm Dilthey, John Stuart Mill, Martin Heidegger, Jürgen Habermas, and Charles Taylor—for believing that the shortcomings of this discipline are the result of relying on methods that rest on faulty ontological assumptions.

These sorts of challenges are important, if only because they force political scientists to consider ontological alternatives. The very existence, and growing popularity, of these alternatives should encourage political scientists to consider the degree to which their approaches and methods rely on assumptions about the nature of the real world. After all, if the political world is not really as political scientists assume—if its patterns are not constant, universal, and independent of us—then the workhorse methods they have developed will lose much of their pull.

**Overcoming Bias**
The previous two sections argued for the importance of thinking carefully about the nature of the
political world researchers study and how that nature affects the way they can and should study political phenomena. This section sets aside these larger ontological issues and narrows the focus to the most common approaches in contemporary political science: approaches that assume a naturalist ontology and rely on empiricist sources of knowledge. But even here, in this familiar ontological and epistemological context, political scientists face a number of important obstacles that can stand in the way of securing objective truths about the world they study. Overcoming these obstacles is another role to consider when choosing a particular method or methods.

While there are many ways to think about the practice of securing unbiased and true knowledge from the Real World, most of them draw from a common and distinguished intellectual legacy. This section highlights the contribution of a foundational thinker in that legacy: Francis Bacon. Bacon’s approach to studying the political world is similar to that of contemporary political science: It begins by assuming that there is a real world out there and that it is possible to obtain true knowledge about that world. Also, Bacon was not particularly troubled by the possibility that our senses might deceive us (or any of the other arguments advanced by those who are skeptical of our ability to secure truth). Rather, Bacon was concerned with unmasking the underlying sources of misconception, irrationality, and error that bar us from reaching the truth. He seems to have believed that any impediment to knowledge could be overcome by the careful and considered means of dealing with the subtleties of nature:

The mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it not be delivered and reduced [corrected]. (Bacon, 1605, Book 2, chap 14, p. 9)

To deliver and reduce this enchanted glass, Bacon provided us with a typology for thinking about the most common hindrances to seeing truth. In Novum Organum (1620/1863b), Bacon introduces the idols of the mind that had hitherto blocked the progress of mankind’s knowledge of nature. For Bacon, these idols are like deceitful pictures—they are images that stand in the way of our grasping the truth, even though they may be grounded in human reason. Together, these idols capture the range of mental, psychological, and social dispositions that Bacon believed were responsible for distortion and error. The first of these are the idols of the tribe. These idols are intellectual errors that result from our common (i.e., human) weaknesses. For example, Bacon tells us that we tend to assume more order and regularity in the world than is actually the case; we have a soft spot for common sense—that is, we rely on limited assumptions without trying to verify them as established truths; we tenaciously hold on to our beliefs by means of continual rationalization, even in the face of countervailing evidence; we are attracted to positive examples more than to negative examples; we pursue wishful thinking (i.e., we believe what we want to believe); and we have a tendency to overgeneralize and to believe in ultimate causes.

In short, Bacon’s idols of the tribe refer to our tendency to project our own (human) patterns of instinctive thinking onto nature. This tendency has not died with Bacon, nor has it been permanently corrected by subsequent methodological developments. Indeed, these idols can be seen at the forefront of all the social sciences. For example, the idols of the tribe might be used to explain why political scientists search for (and find!) the democratic peace, why economists find it fruitful to borrow the concept and mathematics of “energy” from 19th-century physics and apply it to the concept of utility, and why social science journals do not appear to be interested in publishing negative findings (and why it has been so difficult to launch a journal of negative results in the social sciences). More to the point, these idols may explain our willingness to assume that nature is constant, independent, and patterned, even in the absence of an almighty God that was once said to have made it so. Bacon himself would have political scientists continually question the underlying ontological assumptions of their discipline—not because those assumptions are unique to their discipline but because those assumptions might reflect a deeper, human need for a world that is constant and patterned, as if designed by a god.

This entry is not suggesting that the democratic peace, neoclassical economics, or all of the positive
examples in professional journals are either false or illusive. (Nor does this entry intend to argue for—or against—the existence of God.) The point, like Bacon’s, is more modest: Researchers need to be extra diligent and skeptical when they discover anthropocentric patterns and arrive at convenient truths.

The second category of Bacon’s idols concerns those of the cave. Idols of the cave represent the peculiarities of each individual’s temperament and limitations. These individual biases can include, for example, tendencies toward insularity, conservatism, or novelty; acceptance of authoritative propositions; or a willingness to bypass intellectually difficult positions. While the idols of the tribe are derived from the human condition, the idols of the cave reflect one’s own individual biases. These biases are particularly difficult to shed, as they are derived from (and forged in) individual experience. But they are biases, nonetheless. Consider how practitioners of political science often become beholden to a particular method. As methods become more specialized and technical, this sort of method’s monogamy is increasingly common. This specialization is, in itself, a welcome development, as a division of specialized labor can boost productivity and the quality of its research. In doing so, however, political scientists reverse the way in which scientists have traditionally understood the relationship between the world, the methods, and the understanding. Rather than let the nature of the question determine the proper method and means of understanding, we see the world as we would have it from the comfort of our cave.

This method’s monogamy can have serious consequences for the way we come to interpret and understand the world. Political scientists may remember their own training in regression techniques and how exciting (and challenging) it was to interpret the world anew in terms of dependent and independent variables. This new perspective can be liberating, but it is also blinkered: “Someone with a new hammer thinks the world as a nail.” As with the idols of the tribe, Bacon teaches us that it is possible to overcome idols of the cave by being aware of our individual biases and confronting them directly in a critical, balanced, and clear way. It is for this reason (rather than a need for a clear demarcation principle) that researchers should strive to falsify their findings.

The next two types of idols are not so easily corrected. Bacon’s third category, the idols of the marketplace, is derived from the shortcomings of language and intercourse, as words often betray their own purpose and obscure the very thoughts they are designed to express. At the most general level, Bacon’s idols of the marketplace contain two types of misunderstandings. First, we often give confusing, even ill-defined, names to things that do exist. After all, the world is full of meaningless words, words with double meanings, personalized meanings, jargon, and so on. Second, names are sometimes given to unreal things (e.g., Fortune, Prime Mover). While the first type of errors is difficult to eliminate, as they are deep-seated and quite complicated, Bacon believed that the latter errors can be easily thrown out along with the theories that inform them.

Most social scientists are aware of the slippery and inaccurate ways in which language and concepts can be used in the social sciences. Consider, for example, the different ways in which “significance” is often used in statistical papers or the varied and overlapping ways that political scientists refer to democracy, political parties, globalization, or even justice. As Émile Durkheim noted,

In the present state of knowledge, we cannot be certain of the exact nature of the state, of sovereignty, political liberty, democracy, socialism, communism, etc. Our methods should, then, require our avoidance of all use of these concepts so long as they have not been scientifically established. And yet the words which express them recur constantly in the discussions of sociologists [and political scientists]. They are freely employed with great assurance, as though they correspond to things well known and precisely defined, where as they awake in us nothing but confused ideas, a tangle of impressions, prejudices and emotions. (Durkheim, 1895/1964, pp. 65–66)

The fourth and final of Bacon’s categories contains the idols of the theater. These are idols derived from things learned in the past, on the basis of poorly conceived experiments and superstitions. This makes them particularly difficult to avoid or overcome, as false learnings—when cultivated—gain wide influence and become unquestioned by their followers. It is because of this that
Bacon dedicated most energy to deal with these idols, criticizing the habits of earlier philosophers and their approaches.

Presently, the political world (and its most influential actors) has begun to recognize the idolatry of a once dominant model of political and economic exchange. The idea of a self-regulating, equilibrating marketplace—one that could usefully and peacefully coexist within democratic polities—had become ingrained in the minds of men and is supported by the sort of poorly conceived experiments and superstitions to which Bacon referred. As the curtain appears to be falling on this idol of the theater, political scientists will have to rely on new understandings of the political world—understandings that are more aware of their debt to the “various dogmas of philosophy” and the “wrong laws of demonstration.”

For Bacon, these idols did not challenge his underlying (naturalist) ontology. Rather, he sought to undermine the authority of accepted sources of knowledge; he wanted to point out the pitfalls that lie along our path to more useful knowledge, as only then do we have a chance of avoiding them. Bacon believed that the mind of man is like a circus mirror; it reflects what is going on in the world, but it distorts it in the process. As a result, our mind produces false images or idols. While the mind will always create these false images, Bacon believed that it was possible to compensate for the distortion by building a correcting lens. Broad-based methodological reflection provides that lens.

**Conclusion**

Bacon’s *Novum Organum* is divided into two books. The first book introduces the idols of the human mind, to show the sort of obstacles, biases, prejudices, and limitations of perspective that can stand in the way of our quest for knowledge. These idols warn of the dangers inherent to both inductive and deductive approaches.

The second book provides the sort of lens that he believed was necessary to correct for the maligned images. In doing so, he did not argue that all the idols could be overcome. Indeed, the latter two types of idols (those of the marketplace and theater) could not be eradicated, as they denote social and ideological biases that are imposed from the outside. For these idols, we can only be aware of their existence and hope that this awareness will protect us from the insidious effects they have on our minds.

The first two idols, by contrast, “inhere in the nature of the intellect.” For this reason, Bacon believed that these idols of the tribe and the cave could be overcome by confronting them in a critical, balanced, and clear way. It is in this light that methodological reflection is so important for good science—whatever its ontological foundations. Bacon’s solution to these problems was to develop a single method, called induction, which could correct these many distortions. This name for his method hasfooled many into seeing Bacon as some sort of poster boy for atheoretical empiricist approaches. It is hoped that by reviewing his idols of the mind, readers will see how critical Bacon was of the idea that simple observation alone could convey accurate knowledge of the Real World. Bacon’s (1620/1863b) approach combined rational and empiricist elements in a middle-course approach:

Those who have handled sciences have been either men of experiment or men of dogmas. The men of experiment are like the ant, they only collect and use; the reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance. But the bee takes a middle course: it gathers its material from the flowers of the garden and of the field, but transforms and digests it by a power of its own. Not unlike this is the true business of philosophy; for it neither relies solely or chiefly on the powers of the mind, nor does it take the matter which it gathers from natural history and mechanical experiments and lay it up in the memory whole, as it finds it, but lays it up in the understanding altered and digested. Therefore from a closer and purer league between these two faculties, the experimental and the rational (such as has never yet been made), much may be hoped. (Book 1, p. 95/xcv)

In the same way that Bacon counsels us to borrow from the ways of the ant *and* those of the spider, good methodologists need to be aware of—and draw from—competing worldviews, sources of knowledge, and methods. Choosing the right method requires critical reflection on how a given method can interrogate the world under
study and generate the type of knowledge we hope to obtain.

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See also Causality; Constructivism; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods

Further Readings

EQUALITY

Throughout human history, equality as an ideal has evoked powerful emotions. It has fueled revolutions and social movements, and people have died and have killed for it. In addition, it has been the subject of formal analysis that has sought to analyze, compare, and measure inequalities in goods, liberties, and opportunities. This entry examines the concept of equality, beginning with the two fundamental questions: “why equality?” and “equality of what?” The second issue concerns the varied domains in which equality may be sought. This distinguishes the various social ethical conceptions, but it seems a priori that such a moral question can be answered only if the former question is: why equality in the first place? There turns out to be various types of reasons for equality, and in particular the trivial equality as generality or universality, the basic equality as logic or rationality, and the socially essential equality as the absence of subjection and domination (hence as this freedom). The discussion of equality from rationality introduces an analysis in terms of rule equality.

The entry then explores alternative conceptualizations of distributive justice, which can be considered with respect to both their substance (the goods to be distributed) and their structure (the principles according to which distribution should occur). The concept of equality of liberty is then explored with respect to the equality of basic rights; of real liberty (including means for the possibility of free action); and of opportunity. The relationship between equality and responsibility, the concept of equal hypothetical liberty, and the notion of comparative egalitarianism are also considered.

The concept of equality is an important concern for political science, and the entry considers the relationship between democracy and political equality. For philosophers, the concept of impartiality
has been a central one, and the entry discusses its elaboration through the theory of the original position. The work of social scientists on the measurement and comparison of inequality is also noted. Finally, equality in social relations can be seen as grounded in reciprocity—the fundamental tendency of human beings to treat and relate to others as they treat and relate to you.

The Problem of Equality

Equality as the First Virtue of Society

Human history is intrinsically linked to inequality, in such forms as slavery, racism, apartheid, sexism, class and caste structures, and other forms of domination and discrimination. A vast array of facts, emotions, and reasons establishes the overwhelming importance of both the question of equality and of its necessary conceptual clarification. Equality may sometimes be so bad that only one thing can be worse: its absence. “Inequality is the source of all evil” is Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s (1755) clear-cut conclusion of a nevertheless elaborate investigation. Aristotle and John Rawls see justice as actual or ideal equality and find it to be the first virtue of society. Indeed, “Justice is equality, as everybody thinks it is, quite apart from other considerations” is Aristotle’s teaching to the king’s son in *Nicomachean Ethics*. Social ethical equality, the topic here, is almost consubstantial with the concepts of justice in the same field (social justice, distributive justice, compensatory justice, restorative justice, commutative justice, diorthic justice, etc.), but this entry first considers the issues from the equality angle.

Equality of What?

Of course, equality can a priori be of many things, with often opposite actual consequences. Equality may be of various types, including

- equality of income or goods;
- equality of basic rights or liberties;
- equal right to the product of one’s labor or capacities;
- equality in psychological welfare (happiness, satisfaction);

...and equality in “real” freedom of choice; equality of opportunity; the political equalities; relational equality; equality in dignity; equality of consideration; a society of equals; and ontological equality.

Equality is commonly thought to mean equality in incomes or goods. It can also be in liberty, however. Historically, in fact, the first and main demand for general equality was equality in rights and notably in basic rights, which are essentially liberties (“Men are free and equal in rights” is the opening statement of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen). This freedom from forceful interference has been seen as forbidding income redistribution, thus as meaning equal full self-ownership (i.e., each person is entitled to the effects and products of her own capacities to work and earn, and to enjoy) and hence implying a precise opposite of income equality. Equality may be not in goods but in the (psychological) welfare or “happiness” people derive from them thanks to their capacities to enjoy. On the contrary, it can be in the (other) resources given to society, and therefore in the “real liberty” of using them, thus complementing the “real liberty” provided by the basic rights. If these resources are attached to the individuals, as their earning capacities or social conditions are, transfers or specific policies achieve this equalization. This can give various equalities of opportunity. Equality can also be in the variety of social relations, processes, statuses, situations, or conditions. Of particular importance is political equality, equality in political power and civic duty, and its manifestation in democracy. Finally, one kind of equality is particularly fundamental in the ethics of modernity: that of the basic moral worth of humans as such, with the attached respect, consideration, dignity, and social and material consequences. This “ontological equality” refers to our common humanity, which should be respected in all its instances (basic moral equality). In Immanuel Kant’s words, all humans are equal in the kingdom of ends, and no...
one should consider any other as a means only. Equality can also appear in different types of rules that permit to determine individual situations. It is, for instance, an equality of weights in utilitarianism or in the highest social income (highest sums of individuals' utilities or incomes). Equality is also sometimes rule-equality (or functional equality), that is, the items of individuals are derived from their specific given or chosen characteristics by the same rule or function. As is noted below, this is the very structure of rationality in the sense of providing a reason, with important consequences.

Equality and Modernity: Formal and Real Equalities

The equalities considered here are results of choices by society, often by institutions but sometimes by individuals. In almost all societies there are peer groups with some values of equality between their members, and, often, equalities of certain types with larger extensions. However, we are also particularly interested in equality in the ethics of modernity. The logical analysis of equality will apply to all cases. The ethics of modernity is characterized by the acceptance or demand, by large majorities of populations, of certain equalities for large populations, universally for some equalities. These ideal values are, first, moral basic worth, classical basic rights, and some sort of democracy. Respect, and basic rights when the distribution of resources is given, are nonrival (that is, one individual's benefit from an item does not prevent or impair similar benefits for others) and therefore the demands may simply be that each person should have them, which implies their equality. In contrast with these consensual values of the ethic of modernity, this ethic is deeply divided with regard to the distribution of goods—the economic values. The polar positions are, on the one hand, a divided family of “egalitarians” who favor equality in incomes, goods, resources, or welfare and, on the other hand, “classical liberals” who advocate self-ownership of all personal capacities (to earn and enjoy)—and hence, by the way, equal self-ownership for all. This issue and the resulting structure of the optimum distributions are discussed below. Note that since (prima facie) equal treatment of equals in the relevant characteristics turns out to be a logically necessary property of a determinate social choice with minimal rationality (cf. below), equality appears in two different ways in social choice: (1) as this rationally necessary property of all social ethics that applies to the particular equalizand and scope of this ethics whatever they are—it can in particular be an equal freedom, for instance; and (2) as the particular values of the noted family of distributional “egalitarians” (in goods, incomes, resources, or welfare).

The object of equality has various possible structural properties, discussed below. For now, simply note that equality can be between individuals but also between groups or institutions variously defined (with, possibly, the problem of relating the situation of the group to that of its members). For simplicity in presentation, this entry uses expressions of equality between persons or individuals only.

Why Equality?

Equality raises two classical questions: “of what?” (including between whom and in what circumstances) and “why?” The operational question is “of what?” However, it seems that it can be answered if and only if we first have the answer to the other, apparently deeper question, “why?” The issue is more subtle, however. Consider, for instance, very common claims such as that all humans should equally have, for instance, any thing such as “the basic rights,” or “at least the food needed for survival.” This “of what,” whatever its own reason, constitutes the reason for this equality, it explains it. Then, the answer to “equality of what” entails the answer to “why equality?” In this case, the mention of equality is in fact redundant. Yet it is often emphasized for reasons noted below. In another example, the very commonly given reason “I divide this cake equally because I see no reason to divide it otherwise” has a puzzling logic analyzed shortly. In other cases, equality and its reason or value are just two different names for the same thing, as with the most important equality as nondomination or nonsubjection (the two faces of the same relational coin).

When reasons for equality are considered, the striking fact is that there is not one reason or motive for equality but many of them, of very different and often unrelated kinds. The two most important types of reason for equality are
of totally different natures. One is equality as logic or rationality. It concerns the reason for “equal treatment of equals,” the logic of justification, the property of “permutability,” and the meanings of justifying equality by the absence of a sufficient reason for inequality. The other type is social. It is equality as nonsubjection and non-domination, a protective or negative relational equality, justified by this type of liberty and of dignity, and extending to the general properties of relations between equals. Equality as rationality can apply to all issues—economic, social, political.

Logic—if one dare say—provides also another reason for equality that is trivial from its viewpoint, a tautology, and is nevertheless often repeated, sometimes with great emphasis and a great importance attached to it. This is equality as generality or universality, meaning that each member of a given group has or should have some given property of any nature. This is extended into a comparison: each member has, all members have, all members equally have. This property then is general to the members of the group. It is “universal” in this group, but the term “universal” is often reserved for cases in which the group is all mankind. Logically, this mention of equality is redundant. Its presence may have two reasons aiming at reinforcing the claim or value. One is to draw attention on the fact that, in the present or past states, some members only have or had the property. Another may be to appeal to other reasons for equality, namely comparative fairness based on the emphasis that the persons in question have the same relevant characteristics.

Comparative equality results from the comparison of persons’ endowments of the items relevant in nature and in measure (e.g., perhaps the appropriate concepts relative to some specific characteristic of the person). Equality then results from sentiments of relative fairness, and it prevents the various social sentiments that may be aroused by inequality (such as envy or sentiments of injustice, unfairness, inferiority, or superiority). This fairness, however, is based on the notion that the persons have the same relevant characteristics (no one deserves, needs, or is entitled to or accountable for more than the other) and on the logical reasons presented in the section dealing with rationality as a reason for equality. Relatedly, the principle of “equity-no-envy” saying that each person prefers to have her own allocation or situation rather than that of any other person holds a central place in equality analyses.

Equality, therefore, is essentially a derived value. It derives from direct (end-) values by implications that are varied and opposite in type and direction. In the various cases, it is a condition, a cause, or a consequence. For nondomination, equality is factually identical with it and hence morally a consequence of it. Directly comparative approval of equality results from some sentiment of propriety perhaps supported by the justification from rationality. However, it is not sure that equality is or can be valued as an end in itself, directly, although it may look like this in some egalitarian judgments that appear as gut feelings or flashes of moral intuition, previous to considered analysis (the opposite of the search for a good reason). This may concern, in particular, the basic worth of humans, relational equality in itself (relation between equals), comparative fairness, the absence or impossibility of a reason for inequality, and the pure quasi-aesthetic value of balance and symmetry.

When the relevant equality is impossible or costly on other grounds, some reasons for it or judgments favoring it can extend to preferring lower corresponding inequalities. This extends considerably the complexity of the problem and constitutes a vast field of studies. When what is wrong with inequality is that people who have the least have too little, and if another situation can improve their situation sufficiently without costs in the other people’s endowments of this item or otherwise that would make the overall situation worse, the solution may be to maximize the lowest endowments or “maximin” (“practical justice” for interpersonally comparable ordinal utilities in Serge Kolm [1971], the “difference principle” for an index of “primary goods” in Rawls [1971], or Derek Parfit’s [1995] “prioritarianism”).

Finally, some equalities induce, entail, or require others. This can result from the existence of strictly complementary goods. For instance, enjoying some right or liberty may require some condition such as the access to some amount of some good. But the most famous and classical example is Arthur
Pigou’s derivation of equal income from the utilitarian highest sum—hence with equal weights—of identical concave individual utility functions. A more elaborate similar property is the basis of the present-day welfarist theory of measures of inequality.

The essential question of the relations between equality and liberty will be split in two: equality as liberty, the historically most important defensive relational equality of nonsubjection and nondomination, and equality of liberty, including the basic rights and the various cases of equality of freedom of choice and of opportunity.

**Equality as Liberty: Nondomination and Nonsubjection**

Today, equality is commonly considered as opposed to liberty. This usually refers to inequalities in income and wealth resulting from free exchange, and to interferences by public redistributions tending to reduce these inequalities. It sometimes also refers more philosophically to freedom permitting the manifestation of differences in preferences in a diversity seen as an inequality. However, liberty and equality entered—and founded—the modern world not as enemies but as associates, or, rather, as identical situations. Such a radical change as overthrowing the "feudal" order required the association of these two powerful values. The principle that "men are free and equal in rights" (the 1789 Declaration) transmutes dominated subjects (and their masters) into equal and free citizens.

The absence of the relation of subjection and domination is, indeed, in a society, both the most basic equality and the most basic liberty. Relations are more intrinsic to society than comparisons are, and, in a relation, freedom from the other’s command and equality are practically synonyms. Domination is a person’s power to compel another do something, notably by force or threat. By nature, the corresponding subjection is the most vicious of unfreedoms since, in it, a person’s will determines another’s acts. It is in essence worse than a simple constraint, not only because of the a priori uncertainty, but, much more basically, because it constitutes a kind of amputation of part of the dominated self, and this substitution of wills, this occupation of the other’s command center by force (or ruse), is the annihilation of the condition for agency, autonomy, self-respect, and dignity. Domination is usually maintained by force, but it may be worse when the subject endorses the situation in “voluntary servitude” as Etienne de La Boétie put it. The situation admits of degrees, however, depending on possibilities and costs of avoiding the domination. Slavery is one extreme, and there are many forms of it. Avoiding subjection is sometimes prevented by a status of lower caste one is born in. Servitude of diverse types also exists, as do lifetime servants of the same master. Domination sometimes masquerades as free exchange, which is fictitious when the alternative is starvation or the lack of satisfaction of some essential need. The wage relationship differs from an exchange of services by its being subjection to the boss’s orders within some limits, and the wage earner may have no real alternative or, perhaps, has the only choice to replace one boss by another. This limited possibility to leave the relation also results in a low wage, hence inequality in this respect too, and situations of unequal exchange and exploitation. Intrafamily domination and emancipation toward equal status, power, and rights and duties are major problems of humankind. The domination can also be group-wise, as with colonial situations, and equal status obtained by independence or liberation. All this covers, of course, a large variety of situations according to cases, places, and historical periods.

The absence of subjection, or of strong forms of it, is jointly an equality in itself, relational, and, if all members of a group (or of mankind) have to be free from the corresponding domination, an equality of liberty and an equality as generality (or universality).

**Equality From Logic**

**Overview**

The basic property of equal treatment of equals in the relevant characteristics results from logic for two different reasons. In one, equality as rationality, it results from rationality in the relevant and most common sense of providing a reason—justifying. This holds whatever the reason, and even from simply being favorable to provide a reason since the equal treatment of equals turns out to be a necessary condition for all reasons. The second
way in which logic requires equal treatment of equals is the property—shortly explained—of “permutable treatment of equals” plus the requirement of full determination (uniqueness) of the result. However, this equality of equals is sometimes an inferior solution and, then, “permutable treatment” is the second-best logically egalitarian concept. The next two sections discuss these topics. Then, the famous principle of “insufficient reason” for inequality is examined and shown to be either fallacious, tautological in two possible ways, or any of the two above reasons.

The relevant characteristics may include, notably, a description of the relations to possibilities. At any rate, this equality can be prima facie, that is, in the absence of an overriding reason that may be impossibility or the joint relevance of some other value (which may be the ideal equality of something else, a unanimous benefit from leaving equality, and so on).

Equality From Rationality

Equal is rational, rational is equal. Indeed, rational, in its most common sense, used here, means to give a reason, to justify, or to begin to do it or at least to intend to. It opposes the irrational, unjustified, or arbitrary. Assume individual \( i \) receives \( x_i \) of the relevant item of any nature (goods, income, wealth, position, right, freedom, power, respect, honor, reputation, consideration, bundles of these, interpersonally comparable level of satisfaction, etc.; the item may even be a rule providing something to an individual as a function of some facts possibly including some characteristics of hers, and the equality is that the same rule is used for various persons, a derived rule-equality that will shortly appear to be the very form of rationality itself). If this specific \( x_i \) is intrinsically justified, given a reason for, this reason a priori refers to a number of relevant characteristics of individual \( i \) of any nature. The set of these relevant characteristics is denoted as \( y_i \). The reason that leads to choose \( x_i \), because of \( y_i \), is described by a function

\[ x_i = r(y_i). \]  

(1)

Note that we write equation (1) rather than \( x_i = r_i(y_i) \) with a function \( r_i \) proper to individual \( i \) because, in this case, the reasons, a priori proper to individual \( i \), that leads one to write \( r_i \) should be included in the set of relevant characteristics \( y_i \) and the function takes form with equation (1). Moreover, a complete social choice determines a unique \( x_i \), and then \( r \) is a proper function. Then, if another person, \( j \), has an identical (equal) set of relevant characteristics, \( y_j = y_i \), relation (1) implies that she receives \( x_j = x_i \). This equality is derived from the simple requirement of justifying, giving a reason, that is, from rationality applied to this social issue.

Note that this rationality provides, in fact, two (equivalent) types of equality: a conditional equality, \( x_i = x_j \) if \( y_i = y_j \), and a functional equality meaning that the same function \( r \) is used for all individuals, which manifests the universality of rationality (giving a reason) fully applied. The former is also substitutability, that is, if another individual \( j \) than \( i \), for which \( y_j = y_i \), is substituted to individual \( i \), then \( x_j = x_i \). The latter is also called rule-equality, that is, the same rule \( r \), rather than specific rules \( r \), possibly different for different \( i \), relates \( y_i \) to \( x_i \); rationality (in this most common sense) implies rule-equality. (The converse is not true, although it generally holds; most rules describe reasons; logically, however, there can be rules not justifiable from a “reason.”) The equality \( x_i = x_j \) results from a requirement of rationality when \( y_i = y_j \) (if direct comparisons are furthermore introduced, function \( r \) may also depend on \( x_i \) for \( j \neq i \) for describing these comparisons; then, it should also depend on \( y_j \), and \( y_j = y_i \) entails the comparison between \( x_j \) and \( x_i \) which favors \( x_j = x_i \).

In this pure rational equality, there is no direct comparison between \( x_i \) and \( x_j \). Sentiments of justice or fairness refer in particular to the choice of the relevant characteristics \( y_i \). This choice implies the answer to the question “equality among whom?” A particular form of characteristics \( y_i \) is simply “belonging to a certain set of individuals \( I \)” then the \( x_i \) of all these individuals should be prima facie equal (“equality from generality”).

The property of equal \( x_i \) for equal \( y_i \) holds irrespective of the specific reason \( r \). The simple fact of giving a reason, justifying, suffices for this result. This is common grounds of all reasons and a necessary property for the existence of a reason. Hence, the mere a priori posture or intention to provide a reason whatever it is suffices for the
result “$x_i = x_j$, if $y_i = y_j$.” This is strictly minimal rationality. A reason that yields unequal results ($x_i \neq x_j$) is applied to different sets of relevant characteristics ($y_i \neq y_j$).

A remarkable consequence is that if one has to share something perfectly divisible between a number of persons who have no other relevant different characteristic, their $y_i$ is—or amounts to—belonging to this group and hence is the same for all, and general a priori rationality (and more generally any particular rule consistent with the constraint) requires equal sharing. No reason can give another choice: any other choice is necessarily without a rule and hence without a reason—that is, irrational. Equal sharing is the only rational (and rule-following) solution (a unique one if all the good is distributed). This is, of course, what is usually done. An example can be drawing lots between these persons: rationality requires allocating equal probabilities to them (actually, this happens to be the basic Condorcet-Laplace axiom of the theory of probabilities).

**Permutable Treatment of Equals**

Denote as $z_i = (x_i, y_i)$ the pair of $x_i$ and $y_i$. Choose the set of characteristics $y_i$ as being sufficiently encompassing for $z_i$ to include all that concerns person $i$ for the judgment under consideration. Then, if individual $i$ is attributed $z_i$ instead of $z_j$, whereas individual $j$ is attributed $z_i$ instead of $z_j$, the two social states are not relevantly discernible and are equivalent for this evaluation. Hence, any permutation of the $z_i$ between the persons $i$ creates equivalent social states. Consider now that all the individuals $i$ belonging to a subset $I$ have the same sets of characteristics $y_i = y$. Then permuting the $z_i = (x_i, y)$ between persons $i$ of $I$ is identical to the same permutation of the $x_i$ only between them. Hence, these permutations of the $x_i$ give equivalent social states. This is *permutable treatment of equals in the relevant characteristics*. Consider three applications of this property.

**Full Determination**

If some of these $x_i$ differ from one another, these permuted social states are not all identical since at least one individual has different $x_i$ in some of these states. However, a virtue of a principle of social choice is that it be *complete*, providing *full determination*, that is, it designates one of the alternative social states only rather than several equivalent ones. Indeed, notably, action and implementation are the realization of one of these mutually exclusive possible alternatives only, and the principle fully plays its role of guiding the choice solely if it has this property.

Now the states derived by the permutations of the $x_i$ between the persons $i$ of $I$ (with $y_i = y$) are one and the same state if and only if all these $x_i$ are the same. This is equal treatment of equals in the relevant characteristics. Therefore, *permutable treatment of equals plus full determination implies equal treatment of equals*.

**Permutability as Second-Best Equality**

However, it may be that, actually, some unequal treatment of equals is better than equal treatment of equals. For instance, some collective tasks are better performed with a hierarchical organization of the people, even if they a priori have the same capacities. This is conspicuous for the military defense of society, but it is also the case for many productive or administrative tasks: firms and administrations have everywhere a hierarchical organization. Then, people have different powers, which usually entails different statuses (and unequal pays). Society (and all its members) may also benefit from a differentiated education of people, even if their abilities in all respects are a priori identical. Savings provides another example. Aggregate savings become investment and provide growth. Since people usually save a larger fraction of their income when this income is larger, an unequal distribution of income provides higher aggregate savings even if people have the same propensity to save (as a function of their income), hence a priori a higher growth rate. For a similar reason, private support of the arts benefits from unequal income distributions (with rich sponsors). There may also simply be a limited number of non-divisible consumption goods or tools, and it is usually better that they be actually distributed and used rather than not using them at all, which is the feasible equality. In all such cases, unequal treatment of a priori equals is generally better than possible equal treatment. It may be that everybody benefits from it.
In such situations, permutations of the different \( x_i \)—ranks, education, incomes, or items—between individuals \( i \) with identical relevant characteristics \( y_i = y \) provide social states that cannot be judged otherwise than “equally good” from an external standpoint although they are not so for each individual. This permutable treatment of equals is the “egalitarian” property of such cases. The property it keeps from equal treatment of equals is the equal social value—in some sense—of permutations of individuals’ allocations. It is a kind of second-best egalitarianism. The drawback is that the corresponding social choice is no longer fully determined by the problem alone, since one of the socially equivalent permuted states has to be chosen. A strictly egalitarian desire to equalize the individual situations leads to an overall worsening. Using lotteries or rotation are classical means to face such situations (both were used, for instance, by the Athenian democracy to fill official positions). Lottery provides a choice with the possibility of ex ante equality, but it leaves the actual, ex post, inequality.

The Principle of Insufficient Reason

Answering the question “Why equality?” by the trivial “Why not?” seems hardly serious. However, “if there is no reason for inequality, choose equality” (or “if there is no good, valid, or sufficient reason for it”) is the “reason” for equality proposed by innumerable people, including some of the best minds from Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan*, John Locke in the *Second Treatise on Government*, and Condorcet in his 1789 proposal for a Declaration of Rights, to many contemporary thinkers, including Rawls, who proposes that a good reason would be that everybody or the poorest benefit from inequality, and so on. Consider, however, the following properties of this most famous position for equality.

1. Indeed, if there is no reason, or good or sufficient reason, for inequality, what else can one advocate but equality? This seems to be a tautology about providing reasons. Any other choice would be irrational or arbitrary.

2. However, if this argument in favor of equality is of any use, this implies that there is no other sufficient reason for equality either. Then, consider any state with inequality. There is no reason for any other state, with equality or inequality. Therefore, the same argument leads one to advocate this specific unequal state. Finally, this argument leads one to choose any state, equal or unequal. This apparent tautology is in fact worse: a fallacy.

3. The same reasoning is the “principle of non-sufficient reason,” which is the basis of the axiomatic epistemic foundation of the theory of probability, introduced by Laplace and Condorcet: if there is no reason for an event to be more likely than another, attribute equal probabilities to them. However, the principle is, in this context, actually an axiom. This suggests that, in social ethics, this statement could just express a “moral taste,” an a priori preference for equality. What it adds to just expressing this is open-mindedness: if there is a reason, a fortiori a good or valid reason, and unavoidably a sufficient reason, for states with inequality, one is ready to abandon this preference. However, equality and inequality are a priori unevenly treated: a reason is required for inequality, not for equality. This is a *prima facie* preference for equality. But not a justified one, so far. Why this unequal treatment of equality and inequality, this asymmetrical status of symmetry and asymmetry?

4. However, preferences do or may also intervene for deciding what counts as a good, valid, acceptable, and in the end sufficient reason for inequality, that is, one that can override the choice of equality. Then, the statement just is: “I choose equality if I do not prefer something else to equality.” However, this can mean two things, depending on whether preference alone is considered or the necessity of choosing also is. First, we have pointed out that this choice of equality is to be seen as resulting from a preference. Hence, the statement just says: “I prefer equality if I do not prefer something else to equality.” This is a strange preference structure that omits indifference. Second, in fact, a choice has to be made between mutually exclusive alternatives. Then, the statement becomes: “I prefer to choose equality rather than anything else if I do not prefer to choose anything else rather than equality,” which now is a tautology.
5. Nevertheless, the absence of reason for inequality may also mean two other things. One is that no imaginable reason for an overall allocation of equals gives inequality. This certainly implies that all possibly relevant characteristics \( y_i \)—which could a priori be used for such a reason—are identical for all \( i \). Then, for any reason \( r \), the definite \( x_i = r(y_i) \) are also identical for all \( i \). This simply is the general a priori equal treatment of equals.

6. In particular, we may have to choose the allocations \( x_i \) to the individuals \( i \) who belong to a certain set \( I \), while we have no (other) reason for this choice. Hence, the relevant characteristic of these individuals is only that they belong to the set \( I \). This is \( y_i \) for all these \( i \). Hence, these \( y_i \) are identical. Then any reason based on them gives identical \( x_i \) for all \( i \). Note that, here, there is no a priori other reason either for equality or for inequality.

7. A different type of reason can justify the principle. With sufficient sets of characteristics \( y_i \), permutations of the individuals’ pairs \( z_i = (x_i, y_i) \) among the individuals are not discernible. Then, if all these \( y_i \) are equal (perhaps just for \( i \) belonging to the set \( I \)), this permutation is identical to a permutation of the individual allocations \( x_i \) only among the individuals. These permutations are therefore equivalent for any evaluation of the social state. If one is a solution, so are the others. Yet, when the \( x_i \) are not all equal, some of these permuted states differ from one another since at least one individual receives different \( x_i \). However, a complete social choice consists of a unique solution. Then, this can only happen if the \( x_i \) are all equal. Equality results from permutable treatment of equals and the requirement of full determination of the choice. Sharing the cake between two equal individuals in proportions \( (1/3, 2/3) \) or \( (2/3, 1/3) \) is equivalent in moral terms although it is not equivalent for each individual. For the proportion \( (1/2, 1/2) \) only this multiplicity is avoided. Although there are cases in which equal treatment of equals is less good than unequal permutable allocations, the outcome then is not uniquely determined.

Finally, the insufficient reason for equality is either a fallacy, one of two tautologies, or any of the two basic logical requirements of *prima facie* equality.

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### Equalities Determining the Overall Distribution

#### The Five Alternative Equalities of Distributive Justice

Besides the equalities protecting against force in nonsubjection, basic rights, and democracy, the most important role of equalities may concern the overall distribution of the resources of society. Equalities are used in many types of relations. Inspired by Max Weber’s remarks about people’s ethical judgments, Michael Walzer (1983) argues that this is how it should be with equality in each of a variety of “spheres of justice.” One sphere, however, is much more important than others in volume: that in which income distribution is determined (especially since various services can optionally be bought with disposable income—i.e. put in the market sphere). This overall distribution of the resources of society through income belongs to the domain of “macrojustice”—which Rawls calls “social justice,” but the common use of this term is sometimes more extensive (including, for instance, the question of handicaps). This contrasts with the multifarious issues of “microjustice” specific as regards goods, people, or circumstances, and with issues of “mesojustice” concerned with specific goods but important ones that concern everybody (e.g., education and health).

For macrojustice, five polar theories of the appropriate distribution are classical and important claims. As for all theories of justice, they are characterized by what they hold should be equal. These equalizands are characterized by two aspects. One is their substance (material, currency, metric) such as income or resources, welfare as happiness, or, in an equality from generality, self-ownership. The second aspect is their structure, as with an ideal equality in individuals’ income, resource endowment or welfare, or an equal weight in the highest sum of welfare (utilitarianism) or of incomes. Figure 1 shows this overall structure of the issues. The values of liberties, responsibility, entitlement, happiness, needs, deserts, and merits are implicit, as shortly seen.

These five polar equalities of social justice are very different in nature. The most tangible of these equalities is that of incomes. Welfare classically means, in this context, psychological welfare, for instance satisfaction or happiness.
Equality

Economists represent it by individuals’ utilities. Concepts of equality, addition, or other operations concerning such notions are, of course, problematic, but classical theories consider them and this may more or less provide rough guidelines for policies. Income egalitarians differ from welfare egalitarians by their holding that individuals are accountable for their own different capacities to enjoy (utility functions). If, in addition, people are also entitled to their own capacities to produce and earn (and hence to their resulting income), the result is equal self-ownership. It suffices, for it, to say that each individual has self-ownership—hence it is also an equality from redundancy, generality, or universality.

Equalities in welfare or income from which it is not possible that everyone has more (whereas income transfers are a priori possible) can also be described as maximizing the lowest individual endowment of these items, or “maximin.” If equality is desired because individuals who have little of the item have too little, and if some situation with inequality can give more to everybody than situations with equality, equality is to be replaced by maximin (e.g., Rawls’s [1971] “difference principle” for “primary goods” and Kolm’s [1971] “practical justice” for interpersonally comparable welfare). This assumes that policy can improve the lowest endowment without excessive cost (notably in terms of lowering those of other people).

Equality in weights is a priori anterior—more “upstream”—in the evaluation. Nevertheless, the egalitarian aspect of utilitarianism due to equal weight is classically forcefully (and redundantly) emphasized by Jeremy Bentham and quoted by John Stuart Mill: “each is to count for one and nobody for more than one” (Utilitarianism, Chapter 5). It is the basis of Richard Hare’s (1981) defense of this philosophy as an interpretation of Kant’s view that each individual should be given equal consideration (it seems, however, that the product of individual utilities would not give them less equal consideration than their sum—it amounts to comparing relative variations in utilities rather than their absolute variations).

The Multiple Equalities of the Overall Distribution

If everybody, which includes voters and officials, holds that some social principle is irrelevant for a problem, this principle cannot be implemented for this question on social grounds. Now people actually hold that the comparison of individuals’ capacities to enjoy (hedonistic capacities) or their variations, and of their tastes, is relevant for allocative choices in two types of cases: when they refer to suffering and when the distribution is between people who sufficiently know one another to feel empathy towards the others. Allocations in a hospital or in a family are typical cases. If national fraternity actually ruled the minds, or in case of national disasters creating general suffering, the principle of overall national distribution (for instance for the income tax) would be in the welfarist family. In the other cases, people’s opinions about income distribution are instances and associations of the other two cases only, income egalitarianism on the one hand, and the self-ownership of classical liberalism on the other. The resulting social and political synthesis or compromise is a mix of these two values.

The normal way of representing the resulting incomes is that they are the sum of two parts, an egalitarian income and a classical liberal one. For clarity, denote as \( i \) one of the \( n \) individuals, \( y_i \) her income, \( \ell_i \) her labor, \( w_i \) her wage rate. Her earned income is \( w_i \ell_i \). The average wage is \( \bar{w} \). The egalitarian income is the equal sharing of individuals’ earnings during an equal labor \( k, kw_i \) for individual \( i \). This egalitarian income is \( k \bar{w} \). Above that,
however, individuals are free to work \( \ell_i \) and keep their earning from the extra labor, \((\ell_i - k)\omega_i\). Their disposable income is

\[
y_i = k\bar{\omega} + (\ell_i - k)\omega_i.
\]

For individuals participating in this redistribution, the equalization labor should be such that \( k \leq \ell_i \) because people do not accept taxing leisure \( k - \ell_i \) at the value of labor (if \( \omega_i > \bar{\omega} \)), and providing a wage supplement (of \((\bar{\omega} - \omega_i)\) if \( \omega_i < \bar{\omega} \)) to hours \( k - \ell_i \), which provide no wage seems absurd.

This redistribution is egalitarian in various respects. On tangible grounds, it is the more egalitarian the higher the equalization labor \( k \) is (it is not at all for \( k = 0 \), the pure self-ownership of classical liberalism). On rational grounds, it has a number of remarkable egalitarian structures. It transfers from each equally in labor (or in equal proportion of her capacities), and to each equally in income. It implies an equal minimum income \( k\bar{\omega} \). It amounts to each receiving an equal universal basic income \( k\bar{\omega} \) financed by an equal labor \( k \) of each or in equal proportion \( k \) of each capacity \( \omega_i \). It also amounts to each individual equally yielding to each other the product \( \omega_i \cdot (k/n) \) of an equal labor \( k/n \) in a kind of general equal labor reciprocity. It is also equal free exchange (of labor) from an equal allocation \( k\bar{\omega} \) in income and \( k \) in labor or the complementary leisure. The two parts of income are equality according to deserts (equal income \( k\bar{\omega} \) for the equal labor \( k \)) and to merit (i.e., including the effects of personal capacities \( \omega_i \) for labor \( \ell_i - k \)), respectively. Individual \( i \)'s leisure is \( \lambda_i = 1 - \ell_i \) if total time is measured as 1. Individual \( i \)'s total income, including the value of her leisure, \( \omega_i \lambda_i \), is

\[
Y_i = \omega_i + \omega_i \lambda_i = \omega_i + k(\bar{\omega} - \omega_i) = k\bar{\omega} + (1 - k)\omega_i.
\]

Hence, \( Y_i/P_i \) is the same for all \( i \). But \( Y_i/P_i \) is by definition the corresponding “real income” or “purchasing power” of individual \( i \). Therefore, the distribution in question also amounts to equal purchasing power, which is a kind of equal real liberty, for individuals’ choices of income (or consumption) and leisure (or labor). This equal liberty is not an identity of domains of choice (with different \( \omega_i \)).

Note that basing a tax on the wage rate can be done as in the present French tax law, by exempting overtime labor earnings from the income tax, over a low benchmark. There is de facto no cheating (because it would be too complicated to hide this basis from the possible controls). The full theory adds other dimensions of labor than duration, notably formation.

**Equality of Liberty**

**Basic Rights or Equal Negative, Protective, or Civic Liberty**

The use or threat of force may be steady or occasional. A person may incur it from others as individuals, in groups, or through institutions. The absence of such forceful interference defines a freedom called social, protective, negative (a term used by Kant, Mill, and Isaiah Berlin), or civic (Mill). Its application to various specific issues constitutes the basic rights or basic liberties. With this freedom, a forceful constraint on someone can only implement a previous acceptation of it and notably a previous agreement (possibly an implicit one) of this person. This absence of force in inter-individual relations is an equality, and a general basic demand of modern society is that all individuals benefit equally from such liberty (equality as generality or universality). This demand is even that this liberty has priority (this is the first and main statement of the corresponding constitutions).

Is this general equal liberty with priority possible, however? This raises an essential conceptual issue with important consequences. The text of the French *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, and many thinkers such as Rousseau, Condorcet, Mill, and Rawls have held that these basic liberties or rights should be, with priority, “equal for all and, then, maximal” (Rawls even admits inequality if it permits each of the least endowed to have more, as he does about “primary goods”). However, they consider jointly these rights and liberties plus some means to make them actual possibilities or “real” (as Marx puts it). They want to face Anatole France’s objection that: “rich and poor people alike have an equal right to sleep under the bridges” (the traditional shelter of Paris tramps). However, there is no a priori limit to these means (to the number of private planes and airports for freedom to move, the size of private cathedrals for
freedom of worship, the privately owned media for freedom of expression). Then, this principle uses all the resources of society without even a principle for choosing between these various real liberties. The solution of defining some amount of means for each right is a priori arbitrary. Moreover, any equality of these means for all would be found worse by everybody than some other, unequal solution because people make different uses of these rights and have different preferences about them.

The rational solution consists in distinguishing the formal rights from the means of benefiting from them, and in putting the question of the means in that of the general distribution and of the free exchanges of goods resulting from it (with the possibility of some minimum income). Then, when actions or intentions of different individuals oppose one another and cannot be implemented jointly, this opposition can be attributed to the means and is solved by the property rights concerning them (for instance, the occupation of the same place at some time) and not to the “formal” rights in themselves. Then these rights are nonrival between themselves and can be equally held in full and used at satiety by everybody.

Equal Real Liberty

The next issue about liberty concerns people’s means of free action, which was the topic of the section on the overall distribution. The necessary distinction between general “macrojustice” and more specific issues of “microjustice” and “mesojustice” is explained there. The basic liberties imply equal freedom of exchange, given the overall income allocation. The theory of macrojustice obtains a structure of distribution that can be defined in various ways as equal liberty (although with different domains of choice as a result of the different earning and productive capacities of the individuals—see Kolm, 2004, 2008a, 2010).

Equality of Opportunity

Equality of opportunity describes a set of cases of equality of liberty to be found in various issues of justice at all levels. A priori it means the identity, for various agents, of a set of alternatives among which each can choose. In the standard and most common meaning, this refers to social conditions of access to certain benefits, positions, situations, jobs (for instance, with regard to various types of discrimination or family influence), or possibilities (such as access to various types of education). The concept has been extended to transform these formal freedoms into more “real” ones, and these direct choices into their outcomes, by adding the effects of personal capacities and social settings and thus considering opportunities for income, achieved level of education, or the actual performance permitted by jobs or positions (perhaps for given levels of effort). One could also consider equality of opportunity for welfare as happiness or satisfaction by adding the consideration of capacities to enjoy or be satisfied. Equality of opportunity thus describes cases that are different and sometimes opposed. This explains why politicians of all kinds love the concept whereas practically all philosophers criticize it severely.

The initial motives for equality of opportunity arose or arise from two different and opposed perspectives, one for realizing an equality and the other for criticizing another equality. The equality to be realized is that of some possibility of choice, as the name indicates (for example, one wants some people to have access to certain positions without discrimination or other obstacle). The other motive is the objection to policies of equalization or uniformization, for different people, of outcomes due in part to their actions, and the demand to replace this equality by that of domains of choice in which these agents choose, thus replacing an equal outcome by an equal liberty to pursue this end. Since this change generally leads to unequal results of actions, this stance is anti-egalitarian in this sense. The emphasis is often not only on the comparison between the agents but also on some competition between them, for which the equality of opportunity is supposed to provide fair conditions. This elicits the classical leftist judgment, preferring not only the “actual” outcome equality but also or mainly the possibly convivial relationships jeopardized by the competition, as expressed in the statement that “equality of opportunity is good for horse races but not for humans.” However, equality of opportunity includes both liberty and equality in possibilities; the absence of such equality includes cases that are generally considered to constitute the most viciously unjust features of societies.

The basic feature and difference between the cases are in the definition of equal versus unequal
opportunities. The main one refers to discrimination that limits choices on the basis of such criteria as race/ethnicity, family, caste, feudal-like order, gender, and religion. Apart from formal discrimination, the principle often refers to advantages provided by family relations, including favoritism, nepotism, social networks, information, direct support, and the role of families in education at home or school. A basic issue is whether personal capacities, innate or due to family influence, notably in childhood, are counted among the sources of the opportunities in question. The famous meritocratic slogan “the career opened to talents” refers to a situation in which positions are allocated according to talents alone, banning other social discrimination. Policies described as “positive discrimination” often are attempts to compensate for disadvantages resulting from social setting and family influence.

The simple slogan “equality of opportunity” thus covers a number of cases that are quite different and can belong to opposing ethical positions. Formally, there are several types of equality of opportunity.

**Negative equal opportunity in action** bans formal social discrimination of all kinds.

**Positive equal opportunity in action** helps people who cannot perform some relevant action to actually perform it.

**Equal opportunity in action and result** implies that if some people choose to perform the same action, they will obtain the same outcome, possibly with help for those who are disadvantaged as a result of unfavorable personal capacities or circumstances (notably social environment).

The next step would simply be equality in outcome, which is not equality of opportunity from the point of view of its causes, but which can be equality of opportunity for the further use of the outcome in so far as it is an intermediate product—such as wealth or education or health as used for further choices and actions.

**Equality and Responsibility: Responsibility-Free Equality and Equal Joint Responsibility**

Responsibility is the assignment of the effects of an action to the actor. It requires freedom, which conversely implies responsibility if this issue is raised. The allocative principle of responsibility holds that this should determine the allocation of benefits and costs (and not only blame or praise). This principle can be equally applied to several or all actors. If this is the only principle, facts of society that do not result from members’ actions have no particular reason for their allocation and therefore their value should be equally shared (from rationality). However, beneficial or detrimental aspects of society are generally joint products of the actions of several people and of given facts. Apart from particular structures of the effects of the acts (separability, additivity, symmetry), there is no a priori solution to the corresponding allocation of costs or benefits. However, when several agents’ acts and the allocation of the resulting benefits or liabilities are collectively chosen by a required unanimous agreement between these people, each of them has a veto power on the realization; therefore she is fully responsible for it, and hence in particular for her own act and her benefit or liability. When there is some impediment to this general agreement (in the nature of a “transaction cost”), a solution is to estimate what this agreement would have been were this impediment absent and to impose the obtained sharings and acts (this is a “liberal social contract”—see Kolm, 1985). Recently, the responsibility-free equality has been emphasized by Gerald Cohen (1989), and closely analyzed on philosophical grounds by Matt Matravers (2007) and on economic grounds by Marc Fleurbaey (2008). A particular important application on a delicate point differentiates two main theories of what should be equal. Rawls (1971) and Ronald Dworkin (1981) hold people fully responsible for their own tastes, preferences, capacities to enjoy (and hence “utility functions”), which is a priori rather strange but can be defended by considering people’s ends, desires or values as “ambitions” or “life plans” chosen by them. In contrast, the ordinary “welfarist” theories include compensations derived from differences between individuals’ hedonic capacities.

**Fundamental Insurance: Equal Hypothetical Liberty**

A “fundamental insurance” is a hypothetical mutual insurance undertaken by people against the
risk of some disadvantage that in fact they already have. This may be, for instance, having poor health or having received a poor education because of family status. This theory provides a rationale for corresponding compensating transfers that mitigate the inequality. It rests on a putative free choice (an exchange, which makes it be a kind of "social contract" in the technical sense), and it also is a "partial original position" with a "partial veil of ignorance." Its assimilation of a choice concerning justice to a choice in uncertainty is a priori problematic but is to be accepted if this is general opinion. This is the case, for instance, for the European system of public health insurance; the fact that what people pay does not depend on their given propensities to be sick implies a "fundamental insurance" of these handicaps. This particular kind of "liberal social contracts" (the impediment to the insurance agreement is the "arrow of time") has also been directly suggested by Dworkin (1981).

Comparative Egalitarianism

Sentiments favoring equality are often the result of direct, intuition-like comparative judgments. However, the logical "equal treatment of equals in the relevant characteristics" certainly lurks behind such emotions. Nevertheless, such judgments seem close to aesthetic ones, as remarked by Kant and confirmed by location on brain imagery (fair comes from a Germanic word referring to beauty, and the Greek and Latin concepts of beauty, kalon and pulchrum, were never neatly and consistently distinguished from the moral good).

When the individual items that are compared have several dimensions about which the individuals can have different preferences (this is the case, for instance, for bundles of commodities), it is possible that no individual prefers any other’s "allocation" to her own without these individual allocations being identical. This principle, called equity-no-envy, is one of the most commonly used in egalitarian studies since the early 1970s. Its egalitarian properties are readily seen. If there is one (desired) dimension only, the principle implies equality. If the individuals have identical preferences, the principle implies that they are indifferent between all individual allocations. However, the most important egalitarian property of this principle is that it amounts to an equality in liberty. It is satisfied if and only if there exists a domain of choice such that each individual’s allocation can be chosen by this individual (with her given preferences) in a domain identical to it. The analysis of this principle in Kolm (1971), after mentions by Jan Tinbergen and Duncan Foley, was followed by a large number of applications and variants reviewed by William Thomson (2008). It cannot be called "no envy" by itself because the sentiment of envy arises from the joint presence of the other’s and one’s own allocation in one’s “utility function,” but it is formally related to structural properties of a genuine theory of envy (Kolm, 1995).

Political Equality: Democracy

One of the most important applications of equality is to politics, in the realm of democracy. The Athenian four equalities of democracy still provide the basic framework:

- equality in the eyes of the law, or isonomia;
- equality in voting, “one man one vote,” or democracy stricto sensu;
- equality in public expression for influencing others, or isegoria, applied in Athens as a right to equal time of speech in the assembly of citizen;
- equality in the access to official positions, implemented there by drawing lots or by rotation.

This was for a middle-sized society, with officials but a priori the possibility of mutual influence between citizens. Women, slaves, and foreigners were excluded, and official positions soon became the privilege of members of influential families.

Later democracies had a variety of restrictions to voting rights or access to positions. In present-day mass societies, the most violated democratic equality is isegoria, since the flow of public messages is that of the mass media in which a tiny aristocracy of journalists, media owners, and politicians send views, values, information (and entertainment) to the mass of the people who are gagged in this respect (the Internet opens new possibilities that already have had some important political effects, but it is not clear whether this will or can develop at the level of the overall problem). Although democracy has led to important inequality-lowering
redistributive transfers in many countries, it also allows corporate and other interest groups to buy favorable laws with contributions to campaigns. The various specific rules of particular democratic systems also raise innumerable issues with respect to equality. In the end, the main egalitarian virtue of democracy is as a barrage against dictatorship, the harshest inequality.

Equality and Impartiality

From a social point of view, humans manage to shelter two opposed selves “in their breast” as Adam Smith puts it. Their self-centered and partial self favors themselves and the people they like or have particular relations with only. However, they also have an impartial self able to take an objective view putting everybody—themselves included—on the same footing: This is what Thomas Nagel (1986, 1991) calls “the view from nowhere”—but is there such a place as nowhere?

A priori, the distribution most favorable to someone’s strict interest is without equality. Moreover, among situations with equality of some kind, one (in general) is most favorable to this person’s interest than the others. For instance it is equal incomes (barring incentive effects) for people with low earning power, and equal self-ownership in the free market for people with high earning capacities. The person’s impartial self, however, will generally make some other choice with some sort of equality. But will this latter choice be the same for everybody? This is often believed, for instance, by Adam Smith; by Mill, who takes the equality to be that of the weights in an egalitarian sum of utilities; and probably by Thomas Nagel. However, the a priori only logical structural requirement of an impartial judgment is that it respects equality of some sort. Hence, there is a priori a very large choice for such a judgment. Moreover, the impartial individual evaluation uses some psychological characteristics of this person that a priori differ from one person to the other. Therefore, there tends a priori to be different impartial evaluations (hence with different equalities) for the various individuals—other phenomena such as a common moral culture or mutual influence through dialog can change this.

However, since an individual’s impartial judgment of society does not depend on her own specific interests, she produces such a judgment if she is asked to judge when she does not know which specific person she is, which specific situation is hers. Each individual may still be purely self-interested, but her ignorance prevents her from favoring her own actual self-interest. On can think of this as a time sequence, with evaluations “before” the individuals know which specific person they will be, before the actual individual situations—with the specific interests attached to them—are assigned. Rawls (1971) calls this state the “original position,” in which individuals evaluate “behind the veil of ignorance,” and this way of thinking is the most famous modern theory of impartiality. A first result appears straightforwardly: Since the individuals in the original position face the same (uncertain) prospect, their evaluation there are the same: They make an equal, unanimous “original social choice.” Rawls then assumes that some possible risks faced by these individuals are so severe that they choose maximal protection thanks to three principles in order of priority: (1) the basic liberties (equal and maximal); (2) nondiscrimination; (3) the “difference principle,” that is, the highest possible level of the lowest individual endowment of “primary goods” (one of which is income or wealth), which is not an equality because incentive and disincentive effects permit unequal allocations to induce a higher production, hence to provide more to the least endowed. This implies, however, that the individuals in the original position, who are assumed to make a social contract for the adoption of the “principles of justice,” do not also agree not to follow their self-interested impulses when working in real life.

Rawls built this theory in order to provide an alternative to utilitarianism, then the prevailing view in English-language philosophy. However, John Harsanyi (1976) produced another theory of the original position, which leads to a utilitarian-like structure! He finds that the individuals in the original position want to maximize a sum of individuals’ utilities obtained from the mathematical expectation of utility with equal probabilities of being all the actual individuals. Yet the various individuals, in the original position, should in fact have different maximands because they a priori differ with respect to (1) their preferences for being the actual individuals (some prefer to be rich, others prefer to be liked or famous, still others prefer to be good), and (2) their risk-aversion. For both theories, moreover, the reduction of a choice of justice
or social optimality to a self-interested choice in uncertainty is problematic: the former is accountable to society and ethics, as the second is not. The individuals may also be risk-seekers, which leads to the most unegalitarian result. The theory of “moral time-sharing,” which asks the individuals to consider that they are the various actual individuals successively in time is another impartiality theory, which, however, raises similar problems.

**Equality as Lower Inequality**

Philosophers discuss equality, but since large equalities do not exist in real life, sociologists study inequality (Melvin Tumin, 1967, provides a good overview) and economists compare and measure inequalities. This comparison and measure of inequality has developed into a very large field of studies since the mid-1960s. Various questions are analyzed: Does income inequality increase or decrease when all incomes vary in the same proportion or by the same amount? Does a transfer from a richer person to a poorer one diminish inequality (it augments the inequalities between the poorer and the equally poor and still poorer, and between the richer and the equally rich and still richer, yet it may be favored on the grounds of welfare if the poorer suffers from this poverty)? Are the relevant inequalities relative or absolute? And so on (Kolm, 1966). Multidimensional inequalities and inequalities in liberty are also studied. The *Handbook of Income Inequality Measurement*, edited by Jacques Silber (2000), gathers reflections of most of the experts.

Multidimensional equalities, that is, equalities in each of several goods, are in general such that other, unequal distributions are preferred by everybody, because people a priori have different tastes. However, among allocations of these goods that are not so dominated, some can be defined as “more equal” than the others. But if each individual consumes some of each good, these solutions amount to equal incomes (Kolm, 1977, 1996b). One famous proposal of such multidimensional equality is Sen’s (1985) for individuals’ “capabilities”; the noted result applies to it.

**Positive Relational Equalities, Reciprocity**

Equality in social relations does not solely involve the noted absences of domination, too unequal distribution, or envy. It has many other dimensions. Equality can also be with respect to status, respect, and consideration, with, notably, mutual respect and consideration. In such a society, people relate to one another on an equal footing and interact with others as *alter ego*. They are knights of the round table of society. Such a *society of equals* is something other than an egalitarian society, although it certainly limits inequalities of various types. It adds a requirement of liberty in the consideration of others, which situates these relations on the verge of fraternity. Relations between equals are described in particular by Marcel Mauss (1924) and David Miller and Wayne Norman, in Mason (1998).

These positive relational equalities can be supported by a basic sociopsychological property of humans: the tendency to treat others and relate to them as they treat you and relate to you; such reciprocity is a relational egalitarian reaction that is a main cement of society (Kolm 1984, 2008b).

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**See also** Inequality, Economic; Inequality, Political; Justice

**Further Readings**


Political equality is understood as a condition in which all citizens have equal influence on the collective decision making of a political community. Political equality can never be fully realized. It stands in tension with social and economic power as well as cultural hegemony, but countries and communities differ greatly in the degrees and forms of political inequality. Democracy puts a premium on reducing political inequality, and for many the measure of political equality points to a critical dimension along which the quality of democracy varies. Yet there are significant controversies on whether and how public policy should try to reduce political inequality. Whatever one’s normative position, it is important to recognize the reality of major disparities in the power resources of “the few” and “the many.” These disparities explain the difficulties of coming closer to political equality. Sheer numbers aside, collective organization is the main form of power available to the many, counterbalancing the advantages of dominant groups.

During most of recorded human history, claiming political equality as an ideal was an incomprehensible notion, except for a few who retained in subordinate positions sufficient independence of thought. Political equality became conceivable as a goal with the rise of democracy. Instigated by excluded groups who increasingly could make their voice heard, even rather elementary forms of democracy created a zone of relative autonomy within which political decisions are taken. Democratic politics must to some extent be insulated from the overall structures of power and the system of social inequality as a whole if citizens are to be able to exercise democratic freedoms. Conventionally defined by freedoms of expression and association, regular elections with comprehensive suffrage, and the government’s responsibility to those elected as the people’s representatives, a democratic polity gives citizens equal political rights—to vote, to equal protection of political freedoms, and to equality before the law. Critics have deprecated the conventional definition of democracy as merely “formal” because it works to even out advantages only within a circumscribed political sphere while overlooking broader and subtler ways in which social inequality shapes politics. Yet even formal democracy opens the possibility of political contest about the acceptable degree of political inequality.

Dominant groups can use their social and economic power resources in the political sphere. Specifically, they can use their influence over
education, cultural productions, and mass communications—their cultural hegemony—to shape in less than obvious ways the views, values, and preferences of subordinate groups. If these effects of social and economic equality are not substantially contained, political equality will be extremely limited.

The distance between the ideal and the reality of democratic equality has varied greatly over time and continues to vary widely from one country to another. In each instance, this equality gap represents a compromise between dominant groups and the many, often shaped by political and social institutions of long standing. The underlying factors include the power balance within society, the relations between the state and civil society, international power constellations, the organization and the degree of cultural autonomy that subordinate groups enjoy, and the extent to which dominant groups see democratization as a threat to their interests.

**Competing Concerns**

Advancing political equality is clearly not an uncontested goal. It is at odds with major interests, and it may involve the sacrifice of competing values. Opposition to greater political equality, whether based on interest or principle, is likely to vary depending on whether the topic is the political realm narrowly conceived, the conversion of socioeconomic conditions to political advantage, or the overall impact of social inequality on the political sphere.

Does increasing political equality constitute an unqualified good? Or does it involve sacrificing other important values? If there are trade-offs, how do we judge different outcomes? These are normative issues, but their discussion often intertines the empirical with normative claims. Thus, it seems reasonable to sketch some of these contested issues and to indicate alternative views of them.

Even if we stay purely within the political realm, there are two major objections to promoting political equality as much as possible. The first is that “the many” are not competent to choose reasonable policies. The second is that increasing the number of participants can worsen coordination problems to the point of system overload and ungovernability. The conventional form of democratic rule—representative democracy—answers most of these objections by interposing a professional state apparatus (responsible to elected officials) between voters and policy outcomes, though the issues of voter competence and coordination problems will vary widely across countries and historical situations.

Both the objection from competence and the objection from numbers raise issues of reduced efficiency and its costs. These seem outweighed in principle by three considerations of a different sort. First, “efficiency” takes on substantive meaning only in light of the aims being pursued, and these in turn depend on material and immaterial interests on which people are often divided. Second, a reasonable principle holds that all members of a political community whose interests are affected by collective decisions should have a say in them; affected interests trump limited competence. Finally, political equality is an acknowledgment of the decisively similar dignity of all citizens as human beings who are entitled to the rule of reciprocity. In practice, broader measures aimed at reducing political inequality—among them high-quality general education, multiple sources of information and analysis, and trustworthy organizations to represent interests that are otherwise at a disadvantage—may in effect also cut these costs in efficiency.

Limiting the conversion of assets from other spheres into political advantages is far more controversial. And objections mount even further against policy proposals to level differential assets outside the sphere of politics because spillover effects are too difficult to contain.

There is first the issue of using economic assets in electoral campaigns. In *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* (2010), the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled, much to the outrage of some, that spending money in campaigns for political office enjoys the same protection as free speech. Critics of the decision note that the Court, in effect, dealt with economic inequality as if it were irrelevant to the integrity of the democratic political process. While there may be other ways of evening out the financial aspects of electoral competition, none is likely to shut off the flow of money into politics completely.

Economic inequality has consequences for political equality that go far beyond the issues of a level playing field in electoral campaigns. The wealthy can disproportionately influence how policies are
made and implemented. Monopolistic and oligopolistic market power can easily be turned into political bargaining advantage. Different levels of government—from local to national—are dependent on investment decisions of large corporations. In addition, most voters in industrial and knowledge-based societies depend for their economic security on employment. The threat of unemployment is taken for granted in capitalist societies, but it has a major impact on their political dynamics. All advanced capitalist countries have legislation that seeks to constrain the creation and use of monopolistic economic power. But such measures have at best slowed the trend toward concentration of corporate ownership, and few have focused on blunting their impact on politics. Measures to soften the impact of unemployment enjoy widely varying support across countries.

Attempts to go further in limiting the conversion of economic power into political gain are subject to fundamental ideological objections as well as to pragmatic arguments that the pursuit of equality will harm economic growth. While the value of economic freedom for entrepreneurs and capital owners is in principle hardly a match for the value of increased political equality, claims that measures compromising the functioning of markets also impair growth have persuasive power in Western countries. The more comprehensive welfare states in advanced capitalist countries insist, however, that this protection of the market mechanism has to be combined with relatively generous compensatory policies, which make the functioning of the market socially sustainable.

If measures to limit the conversion of economic advantage into political power have only a partial effect, does the pursuit of political equality warrant policies that reduce inequalities of income and wealth more directly? There can be little doubt that differences in the distribution of income and wealth across countries and over time within countries make for significant variations in political equality.

Competing value claims dominate the discussion of policies meant to change the distribution of income and wealth. It is on the issue of direct political action to reduce income and wealth differentials that the claims of an inherent contradiction between equality and freedom have concentrated. These claims are plausible when one thinks of sudden policies of increased taxation and expropriation that are aimed at leveling incomes and wealth. Such policies would be fought by the privileged with all means at their disposal, potentially endangering democratic rule. In turn, breaking this opposition could indeed lead to ruthless dictatorship. Reduced levels of economic inequality would then coincide with the destruction of democratic equality. On the other hand, we know of examples—the Scandinavian countries are the most prominent—where popular policies pursued over decades have resulted in significant reductions of after-tax and after-transfer income inequalities. Yet political freedom remained unimpaired, and no long-run drop in economic growth has accompanied these policies.

The other major issues beset by value controversies concern cultural hegemony. There is little question that relatively small elites have a disproportionate influence on the production of culture as well as on its diffusion through education and the mass media. Yet this influence is in most advanced capitalist countries quite heterogeneous in character. It is pluralistic; but it is unequal nevertheless. Cultural hegemony, however manifold and complex, creates substantial political inequality.

Policy responses to issues of cultural hegemony are limited. Apart from some attempts at hindering if not obstructing the trend toward concentrated ownership of the media and support for public education and public broadcasting networks, the standards of news journalism and of academic freedom and analytic universalism constitute an important protection against direct conversions of wealth and political influence into control over news and research.

At the same time, measures that would go beyond these broadly accepted policies of insulating certain cultural institutions and spheres against direct partisan influence face nearly insuperable difficulties. Most people who care about undue influence in cultural production and diffusion are part of the dominant, though internally heterogeneous, mainstream. Efforts to curtail such influence, furthermore, quickly run up against two important and commonly accepted principles—freedom of expression and respect for the autonomy of different cultural spheres such as art, news reporting, or academic research. Furthermore, since some protections against the conversion of economic and political clout into cultural influence rely precisely
on these principles, policies at odds with them would at least partly be counterproductive.

**Power Resources and Political Equality**

If competing values argue against reining in processes that have inegalitarian implications, the effects of these processes are not thereby rendered any less real. A clearer picture of the chances of decreasing, maintaining, or increasing political inequality can therefore benefit from a brief overview of the main power resources of the few and the many.

*Coercive power* is a fundamental resource that is inherently distributed unequally. If the state succeeds in monopolizing coercive power—as most states strive to do—democratic equality is protected only if the use of that power is regulated by law and if equality before the law is sufficiently realized to rule out differential intimidation for political gain. While this can roughly be taken for granted in most rich democracies today, pockets of private coercive power and gross imperfections in equality before the law are major factors subverting political equality in a number of countries in the developing and postcommunist worlds.

The state *administrative apparatus* represents another power resource of great reach, combining expertise, tax-based funding, readymade organizational capacity, and ultimate recourse to coercion. The administrative organizations of modern states preempt a good deal of decision making and can create substantial imbalances in political equality. Supranational administrative bodies such as the European Union or the World Trade Organization wield great power unchecked by democratic controls.

Economic advantage is a major obstacle standing in the way of realistic political equality. Capital ownership, as already indicated, carries great power, the more so the greater the mobility of capital. Again, transnational corporations, much as transnational public agencies, wield power that is unconstrained by democratic controls, except in conditions of severe crisis.

Income differences are less concentrated than capital ownership, but they vary greatly from one country to another as well as across time periods. The two ends of a distribution are most significant for democratic equality. The poor never attain influence commensurate with their numbers, and the very rich nearly inevitably have disproportion-ate political clout.

Social status represents more than a point on a scale of esteem; it involves social attachments and aversions. It shapes interaction patterns, offering entrance to, and imposing exclusion from, different social circles. Politically, it defines the chance to be heard and to be trusted; it increases or diminishes one’s political “voice.” The importance of status differentials varies considerably across countries, but status hierarchies tend to persist over time. However, some major correlates of status, including economic position and level of education, are not policy independent. Broadening access to advanced education and flattening the distribution of posttax and posttransfer incomes reduce even persistent differences grounded in ethnic, racial, and gender status.

The unequal influence on the production and diffusion of culture exerted by varied but small cultural, religious, and economic elites constitutes, as noted, a major problem for political equality. Cultural hegemony represents inequality of a peculiar kind: Its effects remain largely invisible to those whose views, values, and preferences it shapes, and they are taken for granted by those whose material and immaterial interests find expression under the hegemonic status quo.

Many regard arguments about cultural hegemony as spurious expressions of Marxist ideology—the claims of “false consciousness” in a new guise. But the conception of cultural hegemony sketched here does not claim superior knowledge of people’s objective interests; it simply argues that elite views and interests tend to shape the views and preferences of subordinate groups more than vice versa.

It is useful to explore these problems of cultural inequality in regard to the specific issue of politically relevant knowledge. Political knowledge is a major power resource, and its distribution is profoundly unequal. This is true most obviously in regard to information. Those who are favored by education and their position in networks of information have clear advantages over those less favored. Furthermore, for judging and absorbing the flow of information and for the ability to resist spin, complex background knowledge is necessary. This is largely a function of education and of the repeated exercise of such assessments.
Beyond these cognitive advantages, there is another more basic kind. It concerns the knowledge that is generated by systematic inquiry. Here, the question is not how this newly generated knowledge is disseminated but whether the problem formulations and specific questions asked in research are shaped by concerns and presuppositions as well as by blind spots that correspond to the concerns and blind spots of select groups while neglecting the interests and perspectives of others.

The establishment of feminist and African American scholarly niches may have gone against the norms, but it certainly is an indication that for a long time these norms of universalism had rather disappointing results. The problem may well be equally serious for class-based cognitive interests. Researchers from a lower class background acquire a new social and economic status in the process of their training and career, and they have better career chances if they stay within established theoretical frameworks of basic assumptions and problem formulation.

That the orientation of research is of great importance for long-term political gains is also reflected in the proliferation of privately financed (though tax supported) think tanks in the United States, many of which have a right-of-center outlook. In many other Western countries, the orientation of similar centers is less weighted toward one side and often balanced by publicly supported institutions.

Organization for collective action in voluntary associations, unions, and parties is the most promising power resource of “the many.” Collective organization can compensate for the impact of social and economic inequality on democratic politics. It can mobilize voters and campaigners, it can raise substantial funds if membership and small contributions are numerous enough, it can represent otherwise dispersed interests between elections, and it can compensate to some extent for the cultural hegemony of the most influential groups and institutions, advancing its own views and symbols and shielding the followers against the dominant influences.

This compensation for the impact of social and economic inequality requires, however, that these organizations are relatively autonomous from dominant groups and responsive to their constituencies. Responsiveness may be endangered by oligarchic tendencies that are hard to control. Furthermore, dominant interests quite often seek to protect themselves by sponsoring sympathetic organizations and parties with broad appeal. Many voluntary associations rely on private (though often tax supported) funding from a relatively small number of wealthy patrons. A simple measure of participation in civil society, then, is not sufficient to gauge the compensatory potential of collective organization. What is decisive is that relatively autonomous organizations protect otherwise disadvantaged interests.

The importance of autonomous collective organization in parties and politically relevant voluntary associations for leveling political inequality can hardly be exaggerated. If the economic and political power of concentrated wealth, the cultural hegemony of a limited set of elites, and the decision-making power of an imperfectly controlled state apparatus are the most important factors underlying political inequality, strong and autonomous organization of subordinate interests is the most important counterbalancing factor. It offers political competition to the influence of wealth and high status and limits the relative autonomy of the state vis-à-vis subordinate interests. It gives subordinate groups some protection against hegemonic influence by offering alternative views and orientations. And it can strengthen the universalistic norms of academic, social, and political analysis as well as of news reporting by sponsoring research informed by the concerns and interests of subordinate groups.

The conditions favoring or hindering the development of such forms of collective organization are closely related to the conditions shaping political participation generally. Prominent among them are mutually reinforcing processes in the political sphere: The prospect of political success stimulates political participation, while its absence stifles it; this seems to be a major reason why, in many countries, politically oriented participation is more prevalent among the middle classes than among the working class or the poor. Gaining or losing political influence on decisions about legislation and implementation can in turn favor or hinder collective organization.

In countries whose institutional setting has been shaped by strong unions, strong parties of the left,
and a significant participation of these parties in
government, class and status differences in social
and political participation are much reduced or
eliminated. This claim has empirical support, and
on simple reflection it makes good theoretical sense.
It is no real surprise that the sustained impact of
successful self-organization of subordinate interests
and of the representation of these interests in the
governance of societies diminishes the social, eco-
nomic, and cultural factors maintaining political
inequality and leads to a leveling in the social and
political participation of different socioeconomic
strata. By contrast, the disappointing performance
of recently democratized political systems in Latin
America seems largely due to a renewed weakness
in the organized representation of subordinate
interests.

These interactions between collective organiza-
tion and political success can create stable paths of
advance or decline of equality in a political system,
one critical turning points are passed. Therefore,
the chances of a political self-organization of sub-
ordinate interests and its potential effects on
political equality may well be dependent on his-
torical conditions that are not easily changed.

Democratic Equality Versus
Social and Economic Power

Political equality is a critical dimension of the
quality of any system of democratic rule. It stands
in tension with the structure of social, economic,
and cultural inequality. Even democracy as mini-
mally conceived is only possible if political deci-
sions are to some extent separated from the
system of class, status, and power. But since struc-
tured inequality can never be entirely eradicated
and political decision making can never be fully
emancipated from the inequality in power
resources, democratic equality is a goal that can
only be approximated at a considerable distance.
At the same time, political equality is a value that
is grounded in many practices and commitments
common in democracies. The principle of an
equal vote is only one but not the least among
these.

The tension between democratic equality and
the impact of differential economic, cultural, and
social power is not a constant across modern
democracies. There exists a great deal of variation,
which ranges from democracies that remain
extremely shallow in their egalitarian substance to
realistic, if still limited approximations to demo-
cratic equality that are built on a significant
empowerment of socially, economically, and cul-
turally subordinate groups. To deepen democracy
in the direction of greater political equality requires
strong and sustained policies promoting social and
economic equality.

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See also Civil Society; Class, Social; Democracy, Quality;
Hegemony; Inequality, Economic; Social Stratification;
Welfare State

Further Readings
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Equilibrium

See Game Theory
ETHICS

Ethics is the most general term used to characterize the different conceptions of the good as opposed to the evil and the just as opposed to the unjust. These abstract conceptions vary from one school of thought to the other. Kantianism favors an approach that focuses on principles, insisting on the role of duty and the universality of moral law. It builds a liberal ethics stressing the necessity of a public debate on the universality of core moral and political choices. In its Benthamian version, consequentialism and utilitarianism plead in favor of the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain, while John Stuart Mill argues in favor of the maximization of happiness and the minimization of unhappiness. Aristotelian ethics focuses on the importance of virtues that characterize the citizen of the polis. When ethics is contextualized, it is most often referred to as morality and designates a less abstract phenomenon. The different sets of values to which the good and the just are associated are then rooted in historical and social preferences. Finally, ethics is also used as a synonym of morals that characterize the domain of habits that includes ethos and mores. The etymological root of the word ethics—ethos—already includes this double meaning: ethics and habits. This threefold dimension of this notion—ethics, morality, and ethos—is of great importance for political scientists. It parallels the division between different approaches used in the discipline: normative accounts, causal explanatory analyses of social phenomena or correlation analyses, and interpretative analyses.

Political science echoes a strong interest for ethics and its related themes that has prevailed in the humanities since the early 1990s. However, the degree to which ethics is accepted as a legitimate theme of research differs from one subfield to the other. Some political scientists are still reluctant to use this terminology. It is more common for political theorists to do so because at least some of them engage in debates on normative issues. Political sociologists are more skeptical about using ethics as a concept. Since they usually maintain a position of axiological neutrality, they are more inclined to study the functional uses of morality. In comparative politics, the use of ethics as a terminology and as an abstract and absolute concept can also be a controversial issue, because ethics, some political scientists argue, has different cultural meanings. For similar reasons, ethics is also a controversial question in the field of international relations; it has, however, attracted significant attention and has become more and more popular in the literature over the past 2 decades.

The social sciences have been primarily interested in explaining and understanding ethics as a social and political phenomenon. Political scientists have drawn their inspiration from the works of major authors who have studied the genesis of ethics and its functions. They have used this knowledge to elaborate a new thinking on contemporary issues in which norms and values play a significant role. This has created a debate that is of great significance for all the branches of political science and has had a deep epistemological resonance. It also unveils tensions and quarrels between social sciences and normative theories, primarily those proposed in philosophy, that need to be elaborated. This development should encourage political scientists to engage in an interdisciplinarity debate and be open to views that lie at the close borders of their field.

The Social History of Ethics

There is a long-standing debate on the historical origins of ethics and the mechanisms that have led to the emergence and the development of ethics, morality, or morals. The work of Émile Durkheim serves as a reference for those who wish to ground morality in the community. Morality is rooted in ancient religious and ethnic communities, and religion serves as a pillar of moral values. Durkheim and his followers see morality as a collective phenomenon that includes looser conceptions of morality, such as an ethos, around which the members of the group coalesce. To Paul Fauconnet, one of Durkheim’s disciples, who has made a significant contribution to the sociological study of responsibility, moral and legal sanctions are the cement of society.

Ethnic groups and the political communities such as nation-states produce values and moral codes, creating a web of meaning that has deep political consequences. Republicanism is a form of secular religion that brings social cohesion to wide collective entities that otherwise face the risk of
anomy. As a collective, the French République is nourished by this sense of belonging to a national community. The French nation-state is sustained by the efforts of those who strongly believe in republican values. This community has its equivalents of cardinals and priests: high-ranking civil servants who serve as role models, who demonstrate a commitment to the well-being of the community and to strong ideals of freedom, justice, and brotherhood. The comparison with the United States is indeed very illuminating. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Congress from establishing religion and from preventing the free exercise of religion, a prohibition that Thomas Jefferson described as “building a wall of separation” between church and state. Various U.S. Supreme Court decisions have provided guidelines for what the establishment and free exercise clauses prohibit. Thus, unlike in some European countries, there is no official (i.e., state) religion in the United States.

Ethics can be a powerful driving force for the development of societies. The development of capitalism relies, according to the German sociologist Max Weber, on puritan values that were predominant in America since its origins. An individualistic approach best captures the mechanisms that prevail in the emergence and then the development of capitalism. According to Weber, individuals forge their own capitalistic ethos grounded on the belief of predestination. The puritan has to show evidence of his or her worldly success to dispel any doubt about his or her salvation by God. Social scientists such as Peter Berger and David Martin have been tempted by this mode of analysis when explaining the role of Protestantism—and its new churches—in Latin America or in countries such as South Korea, where the growth of capitalism has paralleled the spread of this new creed. This phenomenon is explained in terms of correlation.

In his work on the court society, Norbert Elias has drawn our attention to another aspect of the development of mores. Individuals are part of a “civilizational process” that finds its origins in the postmedieval European court society and that leads them to greater self-restraint. This psychological phenomenon is nurtured by a historical dynamic that has important social consequences for the functioning of social organizations and state bureaucracies. Of course, several major events in the history of modern society—and most particularly World War II—serve as strong counterexamples that weaken the theory. However, the work of Elias is an interesting contribution to the study of progress and the euphemization of violence in contemporary democracies, for example, when studying the attitudes toward casualties in war, at a time when the number of casualties is changing more dramatically. Another dynamic that is of great importance in the study of ethics is the moralization of societies and the measure of moral progress.

Michel Foucault has brought to light another aspect of morality. Although the term itself is controversial when it is used in reference to Foucault’s thought, morality is part of the first phase of his work, and individual ethics is at the center of his study of sexuality. Foucault explains in genealogical terms the role of utilitarianism in power relations in 18th- and 19th-century England. Utilitarianism is used when considering an architectural project for building a prison. Utilitarianism is also at the center of a critique of political power addressed by the agents of the market; Foucault refers to this phenomenon as the “critique of governmental reason” (critique de la raison gouvernementale). Utility becomes the cornerstone of their critique of political and particularly state decision. Political leaders and politics as a system are still being challenged by market-oriented agents and or utilitarians who frame their discourse in similar terms. In the second part of his work, Foucault discusses the modes of sexual identities and relationships in ancient Greece and highlights one of its principal aspects: the “care of the self” (le souci de soi). This self-knowledge reflects the virtues of the Greek citizen; it also has a political dimension to the extent that these personal traits characterize those who belong to the polis.

These social science approaches all provide an explanation of the emergence and development of ethics. As in the case of Weber, Elias, and Foucault, they also favor a study of the understanding of ethics as a language or as an element of discourse. Explaining and understanding are also intermingled with normative views. Durkheim’s philosophical background is Kantianism. Weber makes a distinction between the scholar’s principled approach to ethics—an ethics of conviction—and a consequentialist framework that belongs to the sphere of politics. Foucault gives an illuminating interpretation of utilitarianism and also puts into perspective the role
of virtue that lies at the core of Greek philosophy and especially Aristotelian ethics. Elias also gives an example of the use of a virtue, restraint, as a trait of moral character rooted in the psyche.

The Tensions Between Ethics and Politics
Those who successfully promote ethical ideas often have access to power and to material resources. This fact has led some major philosophers to see ethics as an ideology used to subordinate the weak. The disillusionment expressed in this ontological and political vision is shared by many political scientists. Thomas Hobbes argues in favor of the use of religion as a source of legitimacy for the Leviathan that exercises his control over the church. Marxism points at the predominant role of economic and political power over ideas. Political scientists have mostly focused on one social dimension of ethics and its instrumentalization of ethics by the rulers.

Realists and neo-Marxists consider that material power prevails and that ideas play a political role when they are not an obstacle to the pursuit and maximization of the power of social and political elites. The founding fathers of classical realism have argued along those lines. Neo-Marxist approaches or theoretical frameworks inspired by the work of Pierre Bourdieu also tend to discard the role of ethics in the fields of politics and economics. When they refer to ethics, rulers use this discourse of legitimation to pursue their ends; they only play lip service to ethics and only when it does not constrain their action. On the contrary, it is a resource used to maximize their power. When discussing the role of lawyers or moral entrepreneurs, Bourdieu’s followers often refer to a “market of virtue,” widely dominated by those who have the resources to set the rules of the game.

However, there can be other more interesting and nuanced approaches to this question. Depending on the historical and cultural context, morality and the legitimacy derived from its sources can be a powerful resource. This, however, does not necessarily imply the structural subordination of ethical agents to power. Religious actors can be crucial players that engage in bargaining relations with princes. Indeed, over its history, the Papacy has often been courted by leaders willing to be endorsed by the Church. In contemporary politics, the role of religious groups has been highlighted when they use their bargaining powers in democratic elections.

Even classical realism is more nuanced than the general materialistic approach that is generally attributed to it, in which ethics is subordinated to power. Indeed, at the individual level, Hans Morgenthau points out the virtues of political leaders, and in doing so he rehabilitates the role of ethics in politics. Wisdom as a moral trait is an important resource for the prince or political head. The art of politics lies on some moral capacities and virtues in an Aristotelian sense.

Interests and Ideas
The interaction between interests and ideas—which include moral visions or beliefs—is one of the central conceptual dimensions of the question of moral authority. When interests determine the content of ideas, material power has the capacity to dictate the moral message of moral entrepreneurs. However, as Weber has brought to light, ideas do matter. Moral agents and the moral visions that might emanate from them can in specific contexts orient the definition of the interests of and, therefore, the decisions made by rulers.

Constructivists describe, interpret, and explain the trajectories of certain norms. Contingent visions of morality can lie at the origins of the norm trajectory as Martha Finnemore, Nina Tannenwald, and Richard Price indicate in their work on the cultures of national security. This genealogical analysis highlights the social origins of certain prohibitions. A taboo can be a source of inaction, as in the case of the nuclear weapons not used since World War II; such a taboo also parallels other abstract visions of the ethics of nuclear weapons that set a legal and ethical framework banning their use.

There are numerous critiques to this approach. Critical sociologists and realists first consider that liberal theory and constructivism overestimate the role of ethics in politics and the power of norms and moral entrepreneurs. Critical sociologists also strongly criticize liberal theorists and constructivists for their political agenda. These critics argue that liberals and constructivists are too complacent about the relationship between states and power elites and thus reproduce their own discourse of legitimation, whereas the task of the social scientist would be to deconstruct this discourse. Their
epistemological flaws are said to reflect their political biases and their naïveté.

There are more convincing critiques that can be addressed to constructivist analysis of morality. The constructivist focus on moral progress can induce a bias in their vision of international relations. There is a need to differentiate between the source of the emergence of a norm—a taboo, for instance, or a natural instinct of the just and the good—and the consequence of the application or nonapplication of the norm. There is also a need to take into account the indirect consequences of the implementation of a norm. A norm might have some indirect negative consequences that are sometimes unforeseeable or remain unforeseen; thus, such a norm may not be considered as a cause of moral progress.

**Universalism and Relativism**

When political scientists study ethics, willingly or not, they engage in an epistemological debate with normativists, primarily philosophers. Indeed, several key epistemological issues have recently emerged and have created lines of debate and front lines in the subfields of political science. There have been some interesting discussions that all testify to the necessity of interdisciplinarity in the social sciences and in the humanities.

The question of universalism versus relativism is one of the most common issues that has created tensions both within the political science community and also in the discussions between social scientists and philosophers, as, for example, in the debates between Clifford Geertz and Richard Rorty on relativism, antirelativism, and anti-antirelativism. The position that power determines what is just and good, advocated by some political scientists, implies a strong relativist stance. The debate about democracy and democratization is an interesting case in this regard. Liberal political theorists implicitly engage in a normative debate about the moral superiority of democracies over other types of regimes. Liberal theorists argue that respecting the rule of law and ensuring pluralism are duties that a political regime must fulfill. Consensus does not prevail. Political sociologists or anthropologists would make the case that societies should have a certain degree of autonomy, with each following its own path. They therefore de facto create their own norms, values, and ethos. In the long run, do societies tend to be democratic? In the 1970s, developmental studies argued that there is a political trajectory of development leading to democracy. This mode of explanation has strong normative implications and has been severely criticized for being Western-centric, paternalistic, and hegemonic.

Are rules of justice universal? If there is such a universalism, to what extent ought it be promoted or imposed by coercive measures? This question is of crucial importance for the various branches of political science. Political sociologists argue about the reasons that motivate the imposition of moral norms and about their consequences. They also discuss the universality of norms and their social and historical contextualization. Philosophers too are deeply concerned with these issues. The theory of justice presented by philosopher John Rawls has been one of the major contributions to political theory over the past decades. Rawls’s vision of justice as fairness and his concept of the veil of ignorance have greatly influenced the literature in this field and also points at other questions that go beyond political theory. Indeed, Rawls’s theory of justice was elaborated in a context where individuals gather in one closed political community. How is this question to be elaborated at the international level? Would a Rawlsian approach favor the imposition of principles of justice on nonliberal states? His views on this question are nuanced. Rawls argues in *The Law of Peoples* that although liberal regimes are superior to nonliberal ones, tolerance should prevail so long as a regime does not violate human rights; however, international intervention is justified when human rights are violated.

The tendency toward an increasing social and cultural interdependence is a strong incentive to develop a new thinking in this area. “Thick” and “thin” are the two categories that Michael Walzer uses to distinguish a strong, abstract, and a priori normative judgment from one in which flexibility prevails and where moral judgment is more contextualized. In this second case, there would be a core set of principles that should never be violated; the avoidance of inflicting unnecessary pain could be such a principle. Different societies may have different interpretations of the same principle, and their members would be free to preserve their cultural identity. The core principles of a democracy, such as public liberties and the right not to be discriminated against, are inalienable, whereas moral and
Ethnicity

Understanding ethnicity is a challenge for political science. How is the good polity to deal with cultural differences: Should it insist that each individual be treated “equally,” or should it take note of cultural variation and ethnic diversity? These questions pose challenges for normative theorists. Equally compelling are the challenges posed for students of development, a subfield in which the study of ethnicity looms large. Although there are many things that “development” can denote, this discussion limits it to two: economic prosperity and political security. Ethnicity plays an ambivalent role with respect to each, it would appear, promoting private accumulation but inhibiting public investment and multiplying opportunities for peaceful bargaining while also provoking bloodshed and violence. Even within a discussion so narrowly framed, the relationships between ethnicity and development are complex. This entry discusses these relationships from a political economy perspective.

Prosperity

The formation of capital underpins the growth of prosperity. When people form capital, they refrain from consumption and set a portion of

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their earnings aside; by investing that portion today, they seek to secure higher levels of consumption tomorrow. When the gains from the investment outweigh the losses from the initial sacrifice, then the result is an increase in welfare for the individual and economic growth for the society.

When we speak of investment, we are speaking of capital formation. Families play a major role in capital formation and, in particular, in the formation of human capital. They do so by structuring relationships between generations such that the older generation, rather than consuming all its income, instead devotes a portion of its resources to the younger, who in turn will prosper and, while doing so, offer support to those who had previously invested in them.

This intergenerational flow of funds underpins two forms of capital formation, and ethnic groups play a major role in both. One is education, another migration. The two are closely related, of course, as by educating their children, parents seek to prepare them to compete in urban labor markets.

To illustrate, consider Victor Uchendu, a noted anthropologist, who writes of his childhood in eastern Nigeria. Uchendu recalls the pride he felt as a child as his academic abilities became apparent. He writes, too, of the sacrifices his parents made to pay for his schooling and of the contributions collected by his community to send him for further education abroad. Each step of the way—from village school room, to secondary school, and thence to the university—opened up a broader range of opportunities. Uchendu also writes of the burden of his success; for those who made it possible then looked to him for leadership, hoping that he, as an “Ibo son abroad,” would facilitate their own transition from villager to a member of the global community.

The pressures placed on Uchendu find their parallel in other upwardly mobile communities. The Kikuyu of Kenya, the Chinese of Malaysia, the Jews in Europe, and the Bengali in India: These and other ethnic groups have pursued a strategy of collective improvement, based on the transfer of resources between generations and the formation of human capital.

Already suggested is the close link between education and migration: Investments in the former are often made to ensure success in the latter, as the skills acquired in school translate into better jobs in urban labor markets. Migration, it has been found, like education, represents a strategy formulated by families rather than a decision made by individuals. With globalization, moreover, the urban destination need not be an adjacent city or the national capital, but rather Houston, London, or Paris. Reflecting the investment-like character of the process, the Northern flow of people is mirrored by a Southern flow of remittances. But why do these assume an ethnic character?

One reason is that as educated persons from the countryside flow into labor markets in towns, their skills confer a competitive advantage. Locals often respond by demanding that places in the classroom be reserved for them and that the government guarantee them a “fair share” of the jobs. As “sons of the soil,” they demand preferential treatment (Myron Weiner, 1978). Such responses characterized those of the Yoruba tribe in the face of Ibo immigration, the Malays in response to the Chinese, and the local population of Assam when challenged by the Bengali—the list is long.

Less apparent but no less powerful is the role of ethnicity in strengthening the expectations that shape the relationships between generations. It is the adults who sacrifice and invest and the youths who benefit and repay. The sacrifice is immediate; the repayment is necessarily delayed. While both parents and offspring should benefit from the investment, it is the parents who bear the risk; should they fear the youths’ defection, the pact between generations will break down. The role of the ethnic group is to reduce such fears.

One way is by celebrating the family bonds. The groups celebrate the blood their members share and the ties of kinship that bind them. They honor the contributions of previous generations and the debt that is owed. Inculcating such values in the young helps assure the old that the youths will fulfill the intergenerational contract. In addition, in some settings, ethnic groups possess power. If a group possesses a homeland, the elders are likely to occupy political and religious offices. Being in a position to sanction youths who abscond, the elders may then have reason to believe that few will actually do so (Robert Bates & Irene Yackolev, 2002).

Public Goods

While ethnic groups may thus contribute to prosperity by promoting the formation of human capital,
they also appear to impede it. They do so when the diversity of preferences among ethnic groups reduces a community’s ability to supply public goods or to share in the costs of their provision. A transport system, the supply of electricity or water, or a harbor or airport, each requires large public investments. And the costs per capita—that is, the tax burden—will be lower the larger the size of the community that provides them. But as the size of the population increases, so too will the heterogeneity of preferences. One group might prefer that a road run through its territory rather than elsewhere; another may prefer that the airport not be located in “its back yard.” The ability to apportion the costs and benefits declines as the number and intensity of such disagreements rises, making it more difficult for multiethnic societies to contract for the supply of public services. Ethnic diversity is an important source of such heterogeneity, and a great deal of research has been devoted to its impact. The relationship between diversity and public goods provision is “one of the most powerful hypotheses in political economy” (Abhijit Banerjee, Lakshmi Iyer, & Rohini Somanathan, 2005, p. 629).

James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein (2009) deepen our understanding of the relationship between ethnicity and public goods provision. Using experimental methods in a field setting, they probe the microlevel linkages that underlie the macrolevel patterns described in this entry. While Bates believes that Habyarimana et al. (2009) fail sufficiently to replicate conditions of external threat—conditions commonly associated with ethnic politics—they significantly advance our understanding of the mechanisms that impart causal force to ethnic relations.

Ethnicity is thus Janus-like. On the one hand, ethnic groups provide governance structures that promote private investments in education and migration. For individual families, then, they strengthen the prospects for prosperity; and for societies, they strengthen the forces of economic modernization. On the other hand, where there is ethnic diversity, this tends to weaken the ability of the state to supply public goods. Insofar as these services are themselves valuable or underpin private production, ethnic diversity lowers the level of diversity and the level of development.

Conflict

In addition to raising the costs of providing public goods, ethnic diversity—it is held—poses an additional threat: the prospect of conflict. While intuitively appealing, there is little systematic evidence to support this claim. Rather, once again, a more nuanced view emerges from the literature.

The equation of ethnic diversity and conflict stems from an obvious reality: In much of the developing world, where there is conflict, ethnic groups are likely to be involved. But, as noted by Bates and Yackolev (2002) and James Fearon and David Laitin (1996), while ethnic diversity may characterize developing polities, conflict remains a rare event: Even where there is a high level of ethnic diversity, there is often little fighting. The implication is clear: As a rule, ethnic groups cohabit peacefully. And, indeed, cross-national regressions find no systematic relationship between measures of ethnic diversity and the likelihood of civil conflict.

In general, ethnic politics in the developing world resembles that in the major metropolitan areas in the developed world. Politicians draw on ethnic blocs of voters, extract enough resources to offer enough patronage to retain their positions, and bargain with others similarly positioned.

Having set aside the conventional wisdom and clarified the basic reality, the fact remains that ethnic groups do fight each other and that ethnic clashes number among the most deadly forms of civil conflict. It is important to determine, then, the conditions under which ethnic politics turn violent.

They do so, it would appear, when a group faces the prospect of political exclusion. When in 1962 politicians from the northern region of Nigeria allied with those in the western region, for example, the Ibo in the eastern region “stood alone,” in the words of their leading newspaper; their isolation marked an important step toward the civil war that resulted from their attempted succession. More data come from India, where Steven Wilkinson (2004) finds a systematic relationship between the threat of exclusion and political violence in municipal elections. In constituencies that offer multiple ways of forming majority coalitions, he finds, politicians face incentives to bargain in order to construct a majority coalition, and the composition of that coalition may alter between
elections; when the constituency is evenly divided and the divisions likely to be long-standing, however, political leaders may seek to provoke incidents that will politicize and rally their backers. The expected value of the risky outcome from violence may exceed the losses certain to follow from the exclusion from power.

Some have noted and stressed the spatial as well as the size distribution of ethnic groups; others have emphasized the extent to which they differ from each other, not only culturally and linguistically but also in their choice of religion and their incomes. Such features are difficult to summarize numerically, which hinders efforts to test their significance for ethnic conflict. Thus far, only indices of ethnic polarization have been computed, and they have in fact been found to be positively related to political conflict.

Politicians may also provoke ethnic violence when the loss of office would leave them vulnerable to reprisals. This is particularly true, of course, of those who have themselves used violence while in office. Examples can be taken from the period of redemocratization in Africa (roughly between 1989 and 1994). Some, such as Samuel Doe of Nigeria, purposively attacked the traditional rivals of his own ethnic group so that the latter would be unable to defect from his coalition and thus lose the protection he, as president, could offer. A similar situation was seen in Rwanda when the Hutu elite appeared to have provoked retaliatory attacks by Tutsi in an effort to obviate the formation of a cross-ethnic coalition that would have threatened their rule. Statistical support is offered by Paul Collier and Robert Bates (2008), who find that when rulers have used violence to consolidate their power, ethnic diversity increases the likelihood of conflict. While there is thus no universal relationship between ethnic diversity and political conflict, there appear to be particular conditions that render ethnic violence significantly more likely.

**Conclusion**

Recent work has thus deepened our understanding of the relationship between ethnicity and development. In light of this work, the sweeping claims of earlier scholars (David Apter, 1963) and contemporary commentators (Robert Kaplan, 1994) give way to a more nuanced assessment. We now know that ethnicity can both help and hinder the process of development and also help one to have a clear idea of the conditions under which it will do the one or the other.

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See also Clientelism; Conflicts; Discrimination; Identity, Social and Political

**Further Readings**


Ethnographic Methods

Ethnography is a methodology with more than 100 years of history. It originated in the Western world as a particular form of knowledge about distant cultures (typically non-Western ones) that were previously largely unknown to the outside world, having had only fleeting contacts or brief conversations with some persons. After having entered several disciplines of the social sciences (anthropology, sociology, and psychology), in recent times ethnography has become an important tool in political science as well (where it takes the name of political ethnography), as a part of interpretive methodologies and research. This entry discusses the origins and definitions of this method, its strengths and weaknesses, and its increasing relevance for political science.

Competing Definitions of Ethnography

Defining a term is always difficult because there are as many definitions as there are different points of view. Paul Atkinson and Martyn Hammersley observe that the definition of the term ethnography has been subject to controversy. For some scholars, it refers to a philosophical paradigm to which one makes a total commitment; for others it designates a method that one uses as and when appropriate. But the controversy extends further. Since the 1980s, the meaning of ethnography has been expanded to such an extent that it encompasses forms of research that are extremely diverse from a methodological point of view. Everything is now ethnography: from life stories to analysis of letters and questionnaires, from autobiography to narrative analysis, and from action research to performance to field research lasting from a few days to several years. For example, leading scholars such as James Lull and David Morley have pointed out that what passes as ethnography in cultural studies fails to fulfill the fundamental requirements for data collection and reporting typical of most anthropological and sociological ethnographic research. Ethnography has become an abused buzzword and has been diluted into a multitude of sometimes contrasting and contradictory meanings, becoming synonymous with qualitative studies.

Amid this increasing polysemy of meanings, there are at least three terms that are related to ethnography: participant observation, fieldwork, and case study. However, these should not be confounded. The term case study denotes research on a system bounded in space and time and embedded in a particular physical and sociocultural context. Research is conducted using diverse methodologies, methods, and data sources, such as participant observation, interviews, audiovisual materials, documents, and so on. The term fieldwork emphasizes the continuous presence of the researcher in the field, as opposed to the grab-it-and-run methodologies, such as surveys, in-depth interviews, or analysis of documents and recordings. In this case, too, diverse methodologies and methods may be used. Finally, participant observation is a distinct research strategy. Participant observation and fieldwork treat observation mostly as a mere technique, whereas the term ethnography stresses the theoretical basis of such work stemming from a particular history and tradition.

An Updated Definition

The stretching of the term ethnography has emptied it of its original meaning. Ethnography was born as a technique based on direct observation. By contrast, interviews and surveys are mainly based on listening and asking questions. Of course, it is also essential in ethnography to listen to the conversations of the actors “on stage,” read the documents produced by the organization under study, ask people questions, and so on. Yet what most distinguishes ethnography from other methodologies is the role of the “protagonist” assigned to observation. Ethnographic methodology comprises two research strategies: nonparticipant observation and participant observation. In the former case, the researcher observes the subjects “from a distance” without interacting with them. Those who use this strategy are uninterested in


investigating the symbolic sphere, and they make sure not to interfere with the subjects’ actions so as not to influence their behavior. Of course, there are many intermediate situations between the two extremes of participant and nonparticipant observation.

Participant observation has the following characteristics: (a) the researcher establishes a direct relationship with the social actors, (b) staying in their natural environment, (c) with the purpose of observing and describing their behavior, (d) by interacting with them and participating in their everyday ceremonials and rituals, and (e) learning their code (or at least parts of it) to understand the meaning of their actions.

A Historical Sketch

The birth of ethnographic methodology is commonly dated to the period between the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It was developed in ethnology, a discipline that in the first half of the 1800s split from traditional anthropology, which was then dominated by physical and biological concepts. Ethnology was more concerned with studying peoples (through comparison of their material artifacts) and their cultures and classifying their salient features. Before the advent of ethnographic methodology, ethnologists did not collect information by means of direct observation; instead, they examined statistics, the archives of government offices and missions, documentation centers, accounts of journeys, archaeological finds, and native manufactures or objects furnished by collectors of exotic art, or they conversed with travelers, missionaries, and explorers. These anthropologists considered the members of native peoples to be “primitives”: They were savages to be educated, and they could not be used as direct informants because they could not be trusted to furnish objective information.

Ethnographic methodology did not suddenly erupt in anthropology; rather, it developed gradually through the work of various authors, among them the English anthropologist of Polish origin Bronislaw K. Malinowski (1884–1942), and the English anthropologist Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955). British social anthropology assimilated the positivist intellectual climate of its time and put itself forward, according to Radcliffe-Brown (1948), as a “natural science of society” that was better able to furnish an objective description of a culture than the other methods used by anthropologists at the time. Radcliffe-Brown’s polemic was directed against the then dominant speculative or “desk” anthropology, which preferred to rely on secondary sources rather than to conduct direct observation of social facts (customs, rituals, and ceremonies) in order to uncover the “laws” that govern a society.

Malinowski is commonly regarded as being the first to systematize ethnographic methodology. In his famous Introduction to Argonauts of the Western Pacific—the book that sets out his research conducted in the Trobriand Islands of the Melanesian archipelago off eastern New Guinea—Malinowski described the methodological principles underpinning the main goal of ethnography, which is to grasp the native’s point of view and his relation to life and to realize his vision of his world. For this purpose, Malinowski lived for several years during World War I among the Kula of the Trobriand Islands. He learned their language (Kiriwinian), used natives as informants, and directly observed the social life of a village, participating in its everyday activities. Malinowski inaugurated a view “from within” that American anthropologists of the 1950s would call the “emic” perspective—as opposed to the “etic” or comparative perspective, which instead seeks to establish categories useful for the analyst but not necessarily important for the members of the culture studied.

From the 1920s onward, ethnographic methodology was incorporated into sociology—where it was adopted by researchers who mostly belonged to the Chicago School—and then into psychology and (recently) political science. It was imported from anthropology, however, for 70 years earlier the French mining engineer and later sociologist Pierre Le Play (1806–1892) had used primitive forms of participant observation when he had stayed with the working-class families that he was studying. The English philanthropist Seebohm B. Rowntree (1871–1954) also used early forms of participant observation (after 1886) for his inquiries into poverty and living conditions in the London slums.

Ethnography and Political Science

Ethnographic methods have recently also entered political science, long dominated by official statistics,
Ethnographic Methods

surveys, and comparative methods. The entry of ethnography has been favored by two cultural and theoretical changes in the discipline: an interest in the “micro” dimensions of political phenomena and an openness to the insights of qualitative research. These two changes have been carried forward by important scholars such as Sidney Tarrow (1995) and Charles Tilly (2001), who proposed bridging qualitative and quantitative approaches by means of “triangulation” to explore the micro–macro link, considering that a purely quantitative approach fails to uncover the causal mechanisms of political processes.

As said with regard to other disciplines, the term ethnography has assumed a variety of meanings in political science, and it has become largely synonymous with fieldwork. The work of Jeremy Weinstein (2007) on political violence and civil wars and Elizabeth Jean Wood (2000) on democratic transitions in South Africa and El Salvador are examples of this kind. Drawing mainly on narrative interviews (with the addition of some observations, official statistics, and government documents), these authors have sought to reach the experiences, the subjective perspectives, and the points of view of people involved in violent actions and democratic transitions.

Weinstein attempted to uncover specific causal mechanisms (why some rebel groups decide to use indiscriminate violence against civilians) by going beyond traditional quantitative studies, which explain this phenomenon of violence through macrovariables such as income and so on. He analyzed the inner dynamics (the recruitment of members and the inner hierarchical structure) of rebel groups in Peru, Mozambique, and Uganda. He found that indiscriminate violence against civilians was committed mainly by rebel groups with external financial resources, such as those deriving from drug trafficking, foreign aid, and so on. Consequently, these groups did not need or seek civilians’ involvement in and consensus on their political actions.

Wood noted that South Africa and El Salvador are very different when structural variables (economic development, race composition, etc.) are considered but quite similar when the link between the political elite and the economic elite is examined. She also focused on the bottom-up, violent mobilization of workers, pointing out that this produces an increase in costs affecting the entire production system (and, consequently, the economic elite)—strikes, vandalism, economic uncertainty, a decrease in foreign capital inflows, and so on. To resolve the situation, the economic elites push for reform of the authoritarian regime and the economic and productive system that supports this form of government. Wood pinpoints everyday political processes, the impact of local actions on national politics, and the effects of micro-events on macrophenomena.

In addition to studies based on fieldwork, now appearing in political science are real ethnographies, such as the work of Adam Ashforth (2005) on violence and democracy in South Africa. Ashforth, a White American, spent 3 years as a guest of a family in Soweto, the well-known Black township on the outskirts of Johannesburg. During this time, Ashforth realized that it would be extremely difficult to understand local politics (macro) without considering witchcraft (micro) and its role in social relations (meso). Through participation in the everyday life of the community, he acquired the conceptual categories, the constellation of meanings, and the culture of Soweto’s residents. He learned that witchcraft beliefs were remedies for the uncertainty and insecurity of everyday life; that envy and jealousy produced the social conditions for the success of witchcraft; and that the latter shaped relations among individuals, social groups, and political institutions on issues such as the spread of AIDS, its social consequences, and health policies. He also discovered the effects of the building of democracy on community members, their acceptance of violence, the shape of the concept of social justice, and the affirmation of a modern democratic and liberal state.

The Added Value of Ethnography

As mentioned before, ethnographic methodology gives priority to observation as its primary source of information. This purpose is also served, in a secondary and ancillary manner, by other sources of information used by the ethnographer in the field: informal conversations, individual or group interviews, and documentary materials (diaries, letters, class essays, organizational documents, newspapers, photographs, and audiovisual aids). However, the overriding concern is always to observe actions as they are performed in concrete settings. As John
Heritage notes, if one is interested in action, the statements made by social actors during interviews cannot be treated as an appropriate substitute for the observation of actual behavior. In fact, there is an often documented gap between attitudes and behaviors, between what people say and what they do. Ethnography is therefore the privileged methodology with which to analyze and understand social and political actions in their making.

The presence of the researcher in the field enables him or her to gain better understanding of the conceptual categories of social actors, their points of view (emic), the meanings of their actions and behavior, and social and political processes. As Javier Auyero (2006) maintains, political ethnography highlights the aspects neglected by quantitative analysis, such as the impact of micropolitics on macrophenomena, the complexity of everyday life, the network of participants’ meanings, their motivations, the making of political action, and the practices of politics. As Charles Tilly (2006) notes, ethnographic methods are useful for the analysis of political phenomena consisting not of macrostructures and fixed roles but of interactions among participants, families, and small groups, emancipating an inquiry from the ethnocentrism (etic) that still characterizes many explanations of political science.

Ethnography and Its Enemies

Notwithstanding the acknowledged usefulness of ethnography, however, it is still subject to several well-known stereotypes and prejudices.

Is Ethnography a Highly Subjective Method?

It is often argued that ethnography is a purely subjective method, in the sense that it is very sensitive to the researcher’s attitudes and perceptions. In other words, if different researchers visit the same setting, they will see different things, and their ethnographic notes will record different aspects. Instead, a questionnaire or a discursive interview, if conducted correctly, is more likely to obtain similar replies (reliability) regardless of who the interviewer is. And yet experience shows that this idea has weak empirical foundations. For example, some time ago, Giampietro Gobo’s students conducted an ethnographic study in a pub. Two groups (formed of three students each) visited the same pub a few days apart. The fact that they had chosen the same pub was absolutely coincidental, in the sense that they had not agreed on it beforehand. Nevertheless, the two groups had a specific research design: to study the rituals, ceremonials, and behaviors of consumption in pubs. They then produced a report. Gobo discovered, to his great surprise, that they had observed and discovered practically the same things. Therefore, the research design makes a greater contribution to discovery (or construction of data) than does the researcher himself or herself. Ethnography, therefore, is anything but a highly subjective methodology (even if subjectivity is ever present, as in all methodologies).

Behaviors Are More Consistent Than Attitudes and Opinions

What does the experience just described tell us theoretically? In other words, why did six different observers in the same pub notice practically the same things? Because what ethnography mainly observes are behaviors (rituals, routines, and ceremonials), and these are much more stable over time than are attitudes and opinions (the privileged fields of inquiry for discursive interviews and surveys), as shown by Richard La Pierre’s well-known experiments in the early 1930s. Those who deal with organizations know very well that altering a behavior requires more time than altering an attitude, not to mention opinions, which are sometimes so volatile that they change from one day to the next.

Can Ethnographic Research Be Replicated, Reproduced?

From this it follows that, because behaviors are temporally rather stable, the results of ethnographic research can be repeated and reproduced, with two requirements:

1. the presence of a precise research design that has guided the research and
2. no significant changes between one study and the next.

Ethnography and Generalization

A recurrent criticism made of ethnographic methods is that their results are impossible to generalize
because they are based on few cases, sometimes on only one. However, there are numerous disciplines that work on a limited number of cases: for instance, paleontology, archaeology, geology, ethology, biology, astrophysics, history, genetics, anthropology, linguistics, cognitive science, and psychology (whose theories are largely based on experiments and therefore on research conducted on nonprobabilistic samples and on few cases). According to Howard Becker, these disciplines are unconcerned about their use of only a handful of cases to draw inferences and generalizations about thousands of people, animals, plants, and other objects. Moreover, science studies the individual object/phenomenon not in itself but as a member of a broader class of objects/phenomena with particular characteristics/properties (Geoff Payne & Malcolm Williams, 2005; Williams, 2000).

For these reasons, it is anything but odd to think that the results of ethnographic research cannot be generalized. As Randall Collins stated, much of the best work in sociology has been carried out using qualitative methods without statistical tests. This has been true of research areas ranging from organizational and community studies to microstudies of face-to-face interaction and macrostudies of the world system. In addition, if the focus of ethnography is on behaviors, and given that these are stable in time, then it is likely that generalizations are possible. Obviously, precise criteria must be followed in the choice of samples. Nevertheless, ethnography is not precluded from making generalizations.

**Sampling Cases or Instances**

It will by now be clear that the term *case* is used ambiguously in ethnographic research. In surveys and discursive interviews, the cases correspond to the number of persons interviewed (the sample) and who are usually interviewed only once. Indeed, it is rather rare for several interviews to be conducted with the same person (during a single piece of research). Then, statistical calculations and analyses of the interviews are performed on these cases.

Ethnographic research is very different. What is usually referred to as the “case” (the organization or the group studied) is in fact the setting. The cases are instead the hundreds of instances (pertaining to rituals, ceremonials, and routines) that the researcher observes or the dozens of individuals that he or she meets dozens of times during his or her presence in the field. The researcher is not interested in the organization (or the group) per se but rather in the behaviors that take place within it. Consequently, to not create confusion with the other methodologies, it would be better in ethnographic research to abandon the term *case* and replace it with that of *instance*.

**The Future of Ethnography**

Even if ethnography is a methodology with more than 100 years of history, it is perceived (especially in political science) as a new method. The reason why ethnography is now becoming so fashionable, probably, concerns not its inner features but the sociohistorical period in which we live. If the relationship between science and society (on how social beliefs have influenced knowledge and scientific theories and vice versa) has been widely proven and if also the relationship between technology and society (on how the birth of certain artifacts, e.g., the bicycle or the personal computer, are related to the type of society that has produced them) has been tested, it seems necessary to enlarge these perspectives by acknowledging the relationship between society and research methods—the interdependence among social beliefs and methodologies. Ethnography and society are mutually constitutive: On the one hand, ethnography (like surveys and in-depth interviewing in a previous age) requires a particular type of society for it to come into being and develop; on the other hand, these research methods strengthen the society that has produced them. We are probably entering the “observation society”—a social formation in which watching and scrutinizing are becoming the dominant cognitive modes alongside the others, such as listening, feeling, hearing, and eavesdropping, typical of the “interview society” from which survey methodology originated. This phenomenon also accounts for the increasing demand in various sectors of society—from marketing to security and from television to the fashion industry—for observation and ethnography. Ours are becoming observation societies. Amid the increasing popularity of interpretive methods, driven by epistemological approaches such as constructivism, postmodernism, feminism, and relativism, political ethnography is in a position to play a major role. The emic perspective, which
aims to capture the social actors’ points of view, perspectives, meanings, motivations, and emotions, has an important place in political science methods.

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See also Case Studies; Grounded Theory; Participant Observation; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods; Thick Description

Further Readings

Europe as an International Actor

Considering Europe as an international actor continues to be a contested perspective in the study of European politics and international relations, even though scholars and decision makers increasingly see Europe as an important player within the global political system. Thus, the meaning of the phrase Europe as an international actor needs a few clarifications to avoid misunderstandings and disputes. Actor is not a controversial concept in political science. Broadly speaking, it means a unit (person, group, or organization) able to select and carry out actions aimed at influencing the subjects, institutions, and policies of the political system. Accordingly, international actor is the unit capable of making decisions aimed at influencing other international actors and the institutions and policies of the international political system. States as well as international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and associations of various kinds are considered to be international actors—that is, units having attributes such as rationality and goal orientation, autonomy, and the control of resources and instruments for acting internationally. Consequently, considering Europe as an international actor means recognizing that Europe has the attributes necessary to influence by intention the actors, institutions, and policies of the international system. However, Europe is an international actor as far as the European countries agree, voluntarily and by using institutionalized mechanisms of decision, to act cohesively for influencing the international system. However, this condition applies only to the 27 countries that are members of the European Union (EU). Therefore, in this discourse, Europe is the same as the EU. In fact, the EU member states are able to make decisions on common actions toward the world system because they have the same image of the external world, agree on a cluster of common international values, share important international interests, and pursue common external goals. Furthermore, they have created policy-making offices and mechanisms in the areas of international politics and economic external relations and are determined to improve these offices and mechanisms, expand the international action capabilities of the common institutions, and make efforts for achieving better external policies. Finally, the international role and actions of the EU can count on the broad support of international actors, such as states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.

A Europe of Common Values and Interests

How can one explain this common pursuit of values and interests on the part of the states belonging to the EU? Interdependence forces states to cooperate in order to produce compatible rules and policies regarding common problems such as environment degradation, transnational crime,
migration, public security, and so on. This pressure is especially urgent in the case of states that, like the European ones, are in general small- and medium-sized countries placed in a rather small continental space; have an economy highly dependent on the world market; and share a democratic regime controlled by people and the media. This pressure drives governments to coordinate domestic and foreign policies in order to implement the logic of scale. Generally speaking, the larger the scale of execution of political decisions, the more appropriate and efficient will be the policy solutions of the common problems. The European governments react rather swiftly to the requisites of the logistics of scale because they know well the benefits of such a strategy due to the long process of economic coordination and integration that they have passed through in the past 50 years. Thus, the European resolve to become an international actor is founded on an awareness of international interdependence and the perceived success of joint custom, trade, monetary, and other economic and sectoral policies.

However, not all analysts agree on this interpretation of the European ambition of becoming an international actor. Some of them underline the complexity and consequent slowness of the building process of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). These analysts concede only that the EU is an international actor in the making, not an existing one. Others question the capacity of member states in building a common foreign policy and point to the national differences that make it almost impossible for the EU to solve existing policy differences viewed in the short and medium term. To other analysts, the success of an international actor depends on its economic strength as well as on the appropriateness and consistency of its strategy in global economic negotiations. These analysts hold that the EU’s role as an international actor is mostly dependent on the strength of the external economic relations of the EU and is restricted to this area of international relations. Finally, some analysts claim that Europe’s attempt to be an actor in international politics has been linked to Europe’s ability to perform as a civilian power in the diffusion and defense of new values such as environmentalism, cultural pluralism, and human rights. These analysts point to the potentially negative consequences of current attempts to establish a common security and defense policy (ESDP) for the international prestige and leverage that the EU has achieved thanks to its role as a civilian power, advising European leaders that the best way to exert influence as an international actor is to limit themselves to exerting normative power.

This criticism notwithstanding, the convergence of the EU member states toward an important set of international values and goals is apparent in recent EU treaties. This convergence has made possible the construction of a European conception of the world system and the consequent ascription to the EU of the role of promoter of a definite set of international values and interests. In the treaties of Nice and Lisbon, the signing governments proceed from a pluralist and communitarian image of the world system and represent the EU as an actor engaged in defending values related to this image. Europe’s image of the world is a pluralist one because, in addition to states, entities of a different kind—that is, individuals, peoples, and nongovernmental organizations and associations—are presented as important actors within the world system. Furthermore, the defense of new, nonstate values is considered as equal in importance to the preservation of state values. In a world encompassing individuals, organizations, peoples, and states as equals, communitarian solidarity and mutual respect among all the subjects must be promoted. States, in particular, are called on to respect the communitarian principle of mutual recognition by all the subjects and therefore to rigorously adhere and contribute to the development of international law and the principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter. In harmony with this pluralist and communitarian view, the European governments see the EU as a legitimate international actor that wants to defend different values such as peace and security, sustainable development, free and just trade, elimination of poverty, and the defense of all human rights.

Furthermore, the promotion and defense of the European identity, territorial integrity, and EU-specific values and interests are also claimed by the European leaders to be goals of European international action. In other words, the EU wants to participate in a world of peoples, individuals, and states also in order to promote its own values by all the means at its disposal. Hence, on the one hand, the EU’s pluralist and communitarian image of the world is close to the conception of Europe
as a civilian and normative power. On the other hand, this does not exclude a vigorous defense of European interests and specific values. Consequently, the formal image of the world contained in the treaties must be complemented by adding the position the EU leaders affirmed in the document *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, the so-called European Security Strategy, issued in 2003, as a result of the agreed decision to build the common defense policy. In this document, the EU forcefully declared a preference for effective multilateralism as the fundamental instrument of any international action aimed at fostering the development of a stronger international society, the efficient operation of international institutions, and an international order based on international law. As will be seen below, multilateralism is, indeed, the blueprint for European strategies of action in the international system.

**Europe as a Security Actor**

The process of convergence toward shared international interests is less definite and narrower in scope than the convergence of values. Strengthening international stability and containing conflict are interests shared by all the European states. In this view, creating conditions for the security of all the member states contributes to consolidating the common economic growth that continues to be the paramount objective of European unification. In addition, European states accept that acting together as a single international actor, especially in areas close to Europe, is more efficient and productive than acting individually; this not only provides for more resources, but neighboring countries are also less apprehensive of joint external EU actions than of the actions of individual states. Finally, convergent interests are promoted by globalization and interdependence in as much as these processes extend the international public space well beyond diplomatic and economic matters. Contemporary international relations encompass a plurality of dimensions such as the physical environment, human rights, transnational labor, and crime organizations; these cannot be dealt with efficaciously by means of independent national policies. Thus, the logic of scale is clearly perceived by all the European countries also in the area of foreign policy. Consequently, the EU governments normally agree to discuss and negotiate among themselves first in order to reach a joint position on issues of world politics. In short, having a joint European position at international conferences is viewed as the most feasible way for advancing the interests of each EU member state.

However, this pressure for interest convergence notwithstanding, the administrative and diplomatic structures of foreign policy making of the member states have not been dismantled and are far from being dismantled, for the reason that European governments want to preserve their own instruments for promoting and defending those national interests that they consider as not fully compatible with the common interests as defined by the EU itself. Consequently, in the medium to long term, EU international actions will be the output of what has been called European foreign policy. This, indeed, is the sum of three elements: (1) the common policy of external economic relations, (2) the formal dimension of the CFSP and ESDP, and (3) the national foreign policies that, at the same time, are independent from one another but under the institutional influence of the CFSP/ESDP and the views of other member states.

**Europe as an International Actor in Practice**

Within this framework that encompasses shared international values, a common image of the world, and the converging international interests of the European countries, this entry now discusses the presence of Europe as an international actor in the world system by reviewing Europe’s strategy and actions in crucial areas of contemporary international relations, such as the politics of regions and interregional affairs, the UN, and world economic affairs.

The process of integration that sustained the development of the EU over the past 50 years and the pan-European cooperation process known as the Helsinki Process, lasting for about 30 years, from 1971 to the end of the past century, is the seminal experience that created a European preference for the so-called global approach to the solution of problems at the regional and region-to-region levels. Over the past 50 years, European countries have recognized that peaceful relations and cooperation among neighboring countries can arise from the balanced and multidimensional management of political, economic, and social interactions. On this
Europe as an International Actor

premise, European governments constructed the principle that any cooperative program must be “global”—that is, it must encompass the political and security dimensions; the economic and financial dimensions; and the social, cultural, and human dimensions. The myth of European civil and normative power—articulated by academics and encouraged by the EU institutions and officers—is also at the root of the vision of what European foreign policy values are and what drives the EU’s role as an international actor. Indeed, the global approach lies at the core of the EU grand strategy as an international actor. The late Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, now superseded by the Union for the Mediterranean, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the region-to-region cooperation programs, such as ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) and the EU-Gulf Cooperation Council relations, are all examples of this style of international behavior. Although the results of this strategy remain meager, Europe can present itself as a new kind of actor, to distinguish it from the United States. In fact, the American government has a preference for the strategy of bilateral relations and the use of specific problem measures to manage international problems, while Europe has a strong preference for multilateral agreements and the global approach to manage cooperation programs with other countries. In the past 10 years, however, European governments have recognized that change in the area of international security, and also in the European region, demands the adoption of an assertive policy extending to military capabilities. The experience of the relations with Serbia on the occasion of the Kosovo crisis in 1995, after the negative experience of the European failure to manage the collapse of the Yugoslav federation, caused Europe to face security problems provoked by low-intensity conflicts that have had important destabilizing consequences in nearby areas. For this reason, Europe accelerated the formation of the common defense policy, launched the European security strategy, and established military and civil capabilities of crisis and conflict management as additional instruments of European international action.

This European resolve to act militarily in the form of crisis management and peace support operations is relevant also to the European presence in the UN. The European Community obtained observer status in the UN General Assembly in 1974. In subsequent years, this status was obtained also in many UN agencies, such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), International Labour Organization (ILO), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thanks to the exclusive competence the European treaties gave to the EU in various policy areas, the EU became a member of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO; as the European Community) in 1991, participates in many UN-specialized conferences, and has signed more than 50 conventions of the UN. On the whole, the importance of the EU and its member states in the UN system is remarkable. Although the 27 votes of the EU member states are one eighth of all the General Assembly votes, the contribution rate of the EU states to many areas of the UN system is larger than the vote rate. In the financial sector, for instance, EU states contribute about 38% of the UN ordinary budget, 50% of the contributions to special funds and programs, and 40% of the UN peace operations costs.

The EU’s proactive attitude toward the UN showed a significant upward trend in the early 2000s. In 2001, the European Commission released the Communication on Building, an effective partnership with the UN in the fields of development and humanitarian affairs. In May 2003, a financial and administrative framework agreement was signed by the EU and UN. In 2003, the Commission released the communication on the EU and the UN: the Choice of Multilateralism, which made public the areas in which the Union was ready to engage itself as a UN partner. In September 2003, the European Council and the UN signed the Joint Declaration on cooperation in crisis management. This document is proof of the importance the EU governments give to ESDP as an instrument of European action in world affairs.
Europe as an International Actor

Europe as an International Actor and multilateralism. Finally, it is worth remembering that in addition to the EU's role in economic and trade multilateralism, there is one other area in which European action in the UN and multilateral governance is very important. This is the area of environment protection, within which the EU has taken on a leadership role, even in confrontation with the United States, in many negotiations on crucial matters such as those relating to the ozone layer, climate change, desertification, and biodiversity.

In the UN agencies and programs, the EU presence has been the responsibility of the European Commission, but the role of the presidency has been very important in coordinating the position of the member states and in representing the EU in various forms, such as issuing official declarations and making démarches toward third countries. Actually, change in the responsibility of driving the European presence in the UN is an important example of the institutionalization of the EU transformation into an international actor. In fact, important reforms of this responsibility are contained in the Lisbon Treaty. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will be given the function of coordinating the action of the member states in international organizations and conferences. The High Representative will have the right to be informed about matters of common interest by the EU member states, which are also members of the Security Council. In addition, when the EU has formed a common position on an object on the agenda of the UN Security Council, those member states that sit in the Security Council shall request that the High Representative be invited to present the EU's position.

The strategy of global approach of the EU as an international actor has not changed the importance of Europe in the world economic market and in other interactions. The EU is the area of the world with the largest internal market in terms of gross product and the largest actor in world trade. The European import–export rate is higher than that of the United States. Export contributes to the gross domestic product of the member states to an extent larger than that of the United States. These achievements, which are the result of the European economic integration process, cannot be safeguarded without appropriate actions in the world economic system. Therefore, in harmony with the liberal character of the European economy, the European external economic policy is aimed at preserving the solidity of the European economy within the free international trade regime. But preserving the strength of the European economy depends also on protectionist measures such as the external common tariff, the imposition of import quotas and antidumping measures, and the adoption of voluntary restrictions on exports. Accordingly, in the World Trade Organization, the EU supports the liberalization of world trade and the abolition of tariff restrictions to commerce. However, at the same time, it compromises on and delays the implementation of measures of trade liberalization when these measures may put European industries in difficult positions. Political and economic opportunity reasons also determine the definition of economic and trade agreements with single countries and groups of countries. Indeed, some economic agreements signed by the EU distort the rules of free trade for the sake of defending the European industries. This is the case, for instance, with the free exchange agreements with Israel and Switzerland; the mutual recognition agreements with the United States and Canada; and the trade agreements signed by the EU and countries such as Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, and South Korea. Other trade agreements are aimed at developing good relations with nearby states—for instance, the European Economic Area agreement with Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein and the custom union with Turkey. Other commercial agreements aim at giving to the EU a politically rather than an economically favorable position in the dialogue with disadvantaged countries—for example, the Lomé Convention that grants preferential trade measures to 70 countries of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific and the Generalized System of Preferences that gives to products coming from 145 developing countries free access to the European market. Other agreements aim at building good political relations with neighboring countries and giving preferential measures to economically weak countries, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements with Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia, and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with 10 former Soviet Union countries. Finally, some agreements respond to the logic of regionalism of the contemporary world economy—for instance, the agreements with the Andean Pact,
Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur; MERCOSUR), the Central America custom union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Briefly, the external economic action of the EU is driven by a policy that combines the strategy for consolidating the European position in the world trade system with strategies of a political nature aimed at either preserving existing political relations or creating new political solidarity with countries of interest to Europe. Both strategies interact with the sphere of the international political relations between the EU and external actors and are dependent on the ability of the EU to act as an international actor.

Conclusion

The EU is an international actor by ascription and practice. It has emerged to such a role thanks to interdependence and globalization and the self-change process of economic integration. In the 1980s and 1990s, European transformations in the form of the Helsinki Process and, later, the fall of the Communist bloc and the unification of regional politics promoted the search for a common security policy. Finally, the current reconfiguration of world politics has created the conditions for a self-conscious ascription of specific roles in the EU-constructed image of the world system. At the same time, it is true that the EU is something like an infant international actor that has to drive itself by trial and error in world affairs while facing the problems of building its own mechanisms of foreign policy making.

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See also Diplomacy; European Integration; Europeanization of Policy; Foreign Aid and Development; Foreign Policy Analysis; Globalization; Governance, Global; Interdependence; Regional Integration (Supranational); Sovereignty; Transatlantic Relations

Further Readings


European Integration

European integration is the voluntary creation and maintenance of regional institutions by states in Europe. It is legally binding and involves intense and varied patterns of interaction in areas such as economics, agriculture, justice, immigration, and foreign affairs. The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the subsequent establishment of both the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 marked the initial phase of European integration. Today, the European Union (EU) is the key pillar of European integration: It has 27 member states, and its constitutional basis lies in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. EU institutions have binding powers in several fields, chiefly economic, and are burdened with corresponding levels of public expectation. However, the transfer of financial resources and political loyalty to the EU headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, has been limited. While the EU represents a new political community, largely autonomous from its individual member states, it has not superimposed itself on, or replaced, these states.

This entry discusses the entire process of integration, first, by giving the historical background at the origin of the very decision of creating the ECSC and the related complexities of the enterprise; second, by examining the key features of widening and deepening the process; third, by singling out the aspect of EU policy making; and fourth, by analyzing the role of the EU in world politics. A few remarks on the future perspective of EU conclude the entry.
Introduction

European history over the past 2 centuries was dominated by the forces of nationalism, left–right ideological battles, and the militarism accompanying these clashes of belief. The principal vehicle of modern European history up until 1945 was the nation-state: a territorially delimited entity whose predominant collective self-understanding was the nation. In his seminal history of Europe, A. J. P. Taylor treated European states as personified entities with human characteristics: French arrogance, British aloofness, and German frustration. One of the driving forces behind European integration since the early 1950s has been transformation of the nation-state in Europe. Looking at how states of the EU relate to each other today, we see that nation-states have been replaced by member states. These member states are committed to cooperation within the institutions and frameworks of European integration, a commitment that raises questions about their own sovereignty. Certainly, national self-interest has not disappeared, and states still bargain hard with each other over matters of policy. However, the 27 member states are committed to finding an agreement often at considerable cost to themselves. They also delegate to the EU powers that were traditionally thought of as the prerogative of sovereign states.

The very purpose and character of this exercise has never been clearly spelled out, and the end goals of the integration process have remained shrouded in mystery. From the very start of the European integration project, ambiguity, obfuscation, and the prevalence of competing sets of underlying principles has been the norm. Successive generations of European leaders have been faced with multiple and ever-changing agendas for which there were no readymade solutions. Persistent differences among European actors concern the very nature of integration (federalism vs. intergovernmentalism) and the functional scope of integration (high politics vs. low politics), and at each stage a compromise between competing national agendas has had to be found. In this situation, pragmatism, incrementalism, and vagueness become operative principles, with the result that ambitious and straightforwardly cooperative projects have had a fairly good chance of being shot down. A good example is the European Defense Community (EDC) launched by the French government in the early 1950s. Opposed by both Gaullists and Communists in the name of a dangerous federalism that would see French soldiers come under the authority of German officers, the EDC was voted down in the French National Assembly in 1954. Unable or unwilling to overcome these residual currents of national sentiment, European policymakers were faced with a choice: integration in disguise or no integration. The language of successive cooperative arrangements had to be vague, and no specific destination point for the European project was ever officially proclaimed. Although some scholars and politicians talked about constructing a European federation resembling the United States of Europe, most were happy to see the EU as an “unidentified political object,” to use Jacques Delors’s famous expression. Major decisions taken in the EEC and later the EU were thus based on a search for compromise and consensus rather than on any clearly articulated political principles or strategic end goals. The implications of this for democracy at the national level were never properly defined.

Deepening and Widening

In addition to such ambiguity pertaining to the ends of integration, the process itself has been an uneven mixture of deepening and widening. Extending cooperation to ever-new fields required different legal and procedural arrangements given the unwillingness of member states to delegate powers to the European Commission in certain areas. The same rules governing European competition policy or common agriculture policy could hardly be applied to the European justice and home affairs, let alone to the European Common Foreign and Defense Policy. Territorial widening of the integration project has generated yet further complexity. The EU has enlarged several times since the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark, and Ireland joined the original six member states of the EEC in 1973. With each new enlargement, there have been institutional and procedural changes in the EU system. New members have imported into the EU their diverse cultures, political concerns, and legal procedures. This has especially been the
case with the “big bang” enlargement in 2004 that saw the entry of eight new member states from Central and Eastern Europe (followed by the entry of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007). These new member states are significantly poorer than their Western counterparts and are unlikely to close the wealth gap in the following decades. Their democratic institutions are still relatively unstable, and their economic, legal, and administrative structures are undeveloped when compared with those in the older member states. Central and Eastern European members also have their own distinct histories, societies, and cultures. For instance, while “de-communization” is a central preoccupation of political life in Eastern Europe, it plays no role in Western European politics. Eastern Europe still has relatively few immigrants from Third World countries compared with Western Europe, but it is struggling to come to terms with its own diverse and often sizable national minorities. These include Russians in Latvia and Estonia and Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia. New members have also different foreign and security priorities, especially regarding relations with the United States and Russia.

The EU’s present complexity, however, is not the result of the enlargement process alone. The EU’s diversity goes well beyond the simple East-West divide. It also corresponds to the different levels of development and of national experience across Europe as a whole. Countries such as Portugal, Greece, Spain, Ireland, and even Finland have all undergone significant modernization and adaptation after joining the European Communities/EU. The difficulties that arose in 2010 in Greece, Ireland, and Spain suggest that significant levels of unevenness pertain within the EU. In addition, Western European countries are struggling to overcome their own internal problems related to the incomplete integration of their large immigrant populations. Given the nature of the political responses generated by these challenges—from the emergence of populist rightwing parties to the spread of Euroscepticism across the continent—it comes as no surprise that the enlargement process has stalled. Though membership for Bosnia, Serbia, or Turkey might make good geo-strategic sense, given how effective enlargement has been as a tool for stabilizing the EU’s external environment, the entry of these countries remains in doubt. Burdened by the EU’s own institutional, political, and social complexity, the future of its enlargement process is far from guaranteed.

**Challenges to EU Policy Making**

Such complexities indicate how far we have come since the days of the traditional mode of European governance, the so-called community method. This method rested on the presumption of equal rights and duties of all member states and the central role of the European Commission as guardian and agent of the common European interest. This method has repeatedly clashed with the forces of modernization and globalization, which generate increasing levels of interdependence in the fields of economic exchange and migration and the concomitant demand for discretionary and flexible responses by powerful national actors within the EU. That different fields of cooperation had evolved along with different memberships and different internal rules has made adaptation to changes all the more difficult. For instance, Norway and Iceland are parties to the Schengen Agreement, while the UK, Ireland, and Bulgaria are not, albeit for different reasons. Only some EU member states are members of the Euro Zone, but their decisions directly affect the entire EU. More flexible, diversified, and decentralized modes of governance have therefore been suggested for the EU, but it is far from clear whether they will prevail. This is partly because the experiments with these nonhierarchical types of governance have not been very successful. (The so-called open method of coordination, which relies on benchmarking of national progress, organized mutual learning, and deliberative problem solving across the EU, has failed to produce any tangible results.) This is also because the economic crisis that started in 2008 has reinforced the need for regulation and enforcement of the agreed rules.

As these challenges have grown, and alongside them the need to make crucial decisions pertaining to people’s well-being, the dissociation between politics and policy making that was the hallmark of the Community method has become a major problem. The peculiar relationship between politics and policy making is at the heart of the “comitology” system. This system consists of some 250-plus committees set up to regulate the implementation
of European Commission policies. The committees are chaired by the Commission, are composed of national officials from the member states, and are the site for detailed and highly technical deliberations over the secondary rules that govern how policies are to be implemented. In all political systems, negotiations over the implementation of policy agendas exist as a fundamental part of political life. What is distinctive about comitology is what Vivien Schmidt calls “policy without politics.” Because the work of these committees is highly technical, they are staffed mainly by experts. The committees thus see themselves not as fora for political debates but as problem-solving bodies. Even when political questions intrude into the workings of these committees, this issue is mainly about the balance between the power of the Commission and the power of member states. Political battles amount to institutional turf wars rather than debates over political principles or ethics. Notwithstanding its central role in the organization of contemporary European society, the EU’s mode of functioning thus excises the question of the “good life” from its deliberations. As a result, comitology is a system of policy making where the political questions about the EU’s purpose and end goals are not addressed. This system has found itself under increasing pressure as the evidently political questions dealt with by the EU imply answers that have important consequences for people’s daily lives.

At issue here is the question of democracy and public participation within the European integration project. Striking rejections of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in France and in the Netherlands in 2005 have been accompanied by a rise in Eurosceptic sentiment. Gone are the days of the “permissive consensus,” where citizens of EU member states passively accepted the inevitability of an “ever-closer Union.” Central to the debate about the “democratic deficit” of the EU is the question of standards. Against which standards should the EU be judged? Critics of the EU often imply that we should expect the EU to be as democratic as our own national political systems. Supporters of the EU respond that the EU is not a state and as such should be assessed on a different basis. As long as those decision-making powers delegated to the European Commission are adequately monitored (jointly by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament), there is little cause for concern. Notwithstanding this debate about standards, certain facts remain. The European elections to the European Parliament are striking for their demonstration of the growing disinterest of European citizens. In the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, turnout across the member states was 61.99%. Since then, there has been a steady decline: 58.98% in 1984, 58.41% in 1989, 56.67% in 1994, 49.51% in 1999, 45.47% in 2004, and 43% in 2009. Alongside the disinterest, doubts have been raised about the democratic quality of pan-European initiatives. In Germany, there was great reluctance to support Greece when the latter ran into economic difficulties in 2010. If national sentiment no longer corresponds to the processes and procedures of European integration, then realignment is necessary in order that the EU remain consistent with European public opinion.

From Peace in Europe to Peace Building Around the World

Throughout its history, European integration has been seen as an engine behind Europe’s economic prosperity. Lifting exchange controls, eliminating quotas, reducing tariffs, and combating monopolist practices associated with the creation of the European Common Market have been generating economic competition and growth for some decades. However, as Giandomenico Majone and others have pointed out, growth has stagnated, or even regressed, since the launch of the two most important economic projects of the past 2 decades: the Single Market Programme and the European Monetary Union. European integration has not necessarily been responsible for this negative development. However, the lack of economic success has prompted European leaders to search for another rationale of European integration, and many have alighted on the role the EU can play in world politics. From tackling climate change to crisis management in conflict zones around the world, the EU is identified as a potential heavyweight. As China and India take their place on the world stage, it has become commonplace to repeat Jacques Delors’s phrase, pronounced at a time when France had to decide on its European or national
vocation: The choice is only between a United Europe and decline.

The EU is indeed, by all measures, a very powerful global actor. With its 27 member states, nearly 500 million inhabitants, a quarter of the world’s GNP, around 40% of the world merchandise exports, and a comprehensive array of economic, legal, diplomatic, and military instruments at its disposal, the EU is able to exercise significant influence in various parts of the world. The euro is now the world’s second most important international reserve and trade currency and as such serves as a conduit for EU influence across the global arena. Owing to the size of its internal market, European norms and regulations are progressively being adopted by others in the global economy. Leverage in this field allows the EU to shape the multilateral agenda on issues such as trade, investment, competition, banking, accounting, government procurement, and other types of services. Together, the EU and the United States produce around 80% of the international norms and standards that regulate global markets. The EU also campaigns for universal labor standards, environmental protection, eradication of poverty, and sustainable development. It champions the cause of international law and multilateral cooperation by supporting international endeavors such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child or the International Criminal Court. Democracy and human rights are also high on its agenda, even though the EU has eschewed the United States’ more interventionist approach to democracy promotion and regime change. The EU, if one adds up national and EU-level funds, is also the largest provider of developmental aid.

There are other good reasons to take the European foreign policy project seriously. Diplomats from EU countries meet about 100 times a year and adopt more than 100 joint statements, communiqués, and declarations. Following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is now in the process of developing its own diplomatic service. The EU’s institutional framework has become the focal point for European foreign policy debates, and it is the preferred point of departure for most national diplomacies. Today, all EU member states try to speak and act “in the name of Europe,” even if that does not mean acting through Europe itself. In recent years, the EU’s contribution to international peace and security has seen it dispatch missions to far-flung places, from East Timor, Congo, Sudan, and Afghanistan to Iraq, Lebanon, Bosnia, and Georgia.

However, the EU’s global policy is confronted with numerous problems. Europe’s external trade relations are largely divorced from Europe’s foreign policy. Responsibility over external trade is shared or split between the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the Council of Ministers, the Eurogroup, or the member states. Foreign policy proper, unlike external trade, is subject to individual countries’ veto. Moreover, EU member states are allowed to act outside the EU framework, and, in fact, they frequently do so, either within the United Nations framework or via the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, or NATO. European foreign and security policies are often carried out by formal or informal coalitions of the willing, by contact groups or bilateral initiatives. And the EU has practically no military standing force at its disposal and has to rely on member states’ voluntary contributions.

Export of EU laws and norms has proved successful chiefly in the EU’s immediate neighborhood where its power was overwhelming and its norms were shared, as was the case in Central and Eastern Europe. In regions farther away, the EU’s efforts to promote its norms in fields such as trade, environment, or social protection are often seen as disguised forms of protectionism, of benefit mainly to those European producers and consumers wishing to be shielded from the competitive pressures of less developed countries. In fact, the opposition of a group of developing countries led by India and Brazil has made it impossible for the EU to include as part of the multilateral trade agenda the so-called Singapore issues: competition policy, investment, government procurement, and trade facilities. Moreover, major players such as the United States or China are able to play individual EU member states against each other, effectively undermining the EU’s aggregate potential. This is because the EU lacks a European equivalent of the raison d’état: As the president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, put it, the EU’s strategic partnerships with rising powers such as China lack any real strategic vision. Moreover, the EU’s mechanisms for identifying common interests
are weak and unable to overcome national particularities, leaving it susceptible to divide-and-rule practices by rivals such as Russia.

Conclusion: Twilight of the EU?

European integration has never been a smooth or linear process, and it has always had its critics. Nevertheless, in recent years doubts have been raised about the very viability of the EU. Its political legitimacy was profoundly shaken by the failure of the European Constitution in 2005 and the arm-twisting that occurred at the time of Ireland’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. Its existence as a stable and unified monetary community is in doubt as weaker member states—from Ireland to Portugal and Greece—struggle to service their debts without external help. The EU’s foreign and security policy is a continual source of frustration for those who believe in the EU’s vocation as a power with global reach; from the Balkans to the Middle East, the EU is still unable to credibly answer Henry Kissinger’s often-cited question about which number to call when wanting to get through to “Europe.”

These crises and disappointments have clearly undermined the EU’s credibility and stalled individual projects either in the domain of widening or of deepening. And yet as in previous moments of instability and crisis, it would be premature to talk of the swing of the pendulum from integration to disintegration. As politicians of EU member state governments themselves admit, European integration is the context within which they all think and act. Calls to exit the EU are still viewed as quixotic; it is rather like wanting to retreat from a globalized and interconnected world in favor of a premodern idyll. The EU’s central function as a mediator of conflict between its members suggests that in the years to come it may be more necessary than ever. Moreover, the structural shift from nation-states to member states implies that Europe itself has changed and that European integration has become an integral feature of contemporary statehood today in Europe. The end of European integration also runs against the play of international politics as it would make it difficult for European states to aggregate their power when faced with global competitors such as China, India, Russia, or the United States of America.

There may be much to criticize about European integration, but alternatives to it seem either utopian or outdated. Adjustment to the rapidly changing external environment and the management of internal public expectations was and still is the greatest challenge for the EU in the years to come.

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See also Autonomy, Subnational; Comparative Politics; Cross-National Surveys; Europeanization of Policy; Governance, Multilevel; Intergovernmentalism; Parties; Regionalism; Welfare State

Further Readings


Europeanization of Policy

*Europeanization* most often refers to domestic adaptation to regional integration. It can also denote the diffusion of European values and forms of governance to other parts of the world. In a third meaning, the concept may refer to the emergence of common political standards and patterns throughout Europe. Studies on Europeanization focus on different aspects of the political system: values, institutions, policies, policy styles, and policy procedures. There is no consensus among scholars as to what, more specifically, Europeanization is and where it takes place. This entry focuses on two different ways of defining Europeanization as adaptation to regional integration, because these are the most frequently used definitions. One popular definition is that Europeanization is the impact of the European Union (EU) on domestic policy, polity, and politics. This implies that Europeanization is something that happens within EU member states and others, and Europeanization is thus seen as an outcome of European integration. Another definition derives Europeanization from the interaction between European and domestic policy processes. In this view, Europeanization is seen as a process embedded in the evolution of European integration. These two different ways of defining Europeanization are accompanied by different sets of analytical concepts and generate different research questions.

Europeanization is not a theory of its own, but the increasing number of studies of Europeanization since the end of the 1990s signals a growing interest in the theoretical aspects of the integration process. Even though the intellectual development of this concept has not been particularly tidy, it shows a shift in focus by students interested in theories of European integration from the development of laws, regulations, and institutions on the EU level to changes at domestic levels. In this way, the concept has been used not solely for studies of EU member states but also for states that are not EU members (both future members and other states).

**Europeanization as an Outcome**

When Europeanization is seen as the impact of the EU on domestic policy, polity, and politics, it conceptualizes Europeanization as taking place on the domestic level. In this model, Europeanization is defined as national or regional changes caused by European integration. Through this prism, one can study Europeanization as the consequence of a formal or informal European integration process. In this model, the main research question is frequently whether, or to what extent, something has been Europeanized.

In this understanding of Europeanization—as used, for example, in an anthology edited by Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso, and Thomas Risse and in a much-cited article by Robert Ladrech—one needs to specify which specific domestic changes in policy, politics, and polity can be caused by European integration and can count as Europeanization. The literature on the concept does not agree on the relevant effects of the process. Analyses of transposition and implementation examine changes in legislation and legal practice, whereas other studies focus on policy change, institutional persistence, and policy discourse.

The literature also examines the mechanisms by which this impact comes about, and important efforts have been made, for example, by Claudio Radaelli, Christoph Knill, and Dirk Lehmkuhl to systematize how domestic changes take place, drawing on the conceptual toolboxes of various disciplines. In some cases, there are sequences of voluntary Europeanization in one area as a spill-over of coercive Europeanization in another policy area.

Another distinction has been made between vertical and horizontal mechanisms of Europeanization. Vertical mechanisms function where there is a European model that a state should adhere to, resulting in direct adaptational pressure. The horizontal mechanisms involve different kinds of framing processes, such as learning, inspiration, mimicry, and copying. From this point of departure, the mode of governance in a policy area may help predict the character and efficiency of the Europeanization drivers. This means that the
organizational placement of a policy area as either a supranational policy area (where law is made) or an intergovernmental policy area (where policy primarily is coordinated) may influence the levers of Europeanization.

**Europeanization as a Process**

Even in policy areas where there is no supranational policy process or where its impact is very limited, domestic policy is influenced by what happens in other European states and more generally in the European context. In this way, the interaction between European and domestic policy processes can be thought of as generating new policy areas.

The novelty in these policy areas lies less in substance than in shape and framing. When previously domestic policy areas are affected by European policy making and jurisprudence, they often change names and demarcation lines to other policy areas. Such shifts occur not only in fields where the EU has legislative competence but also in many other spheres. It might be more accurate to speak of partially Europeanized policy areas. Both state and nonstate actors within such areas have a growing number of international contacts and are increasingly exposed to European rules and other extraneous influences. The process of adaptation is seldom unidirectional and sequential. More often, it takes the form of gradual and mutual adaptation, with increased integration and domestic changes affecting each other and taking place in parallel.

While some studies treat Europeanization as an objective phenomenon, others emphasize its rhetorical and discursive dimensions by treating it as a construct with particular political functions. A popular research design makes Europeanization a dual process in which European and domestic political patterns are intertwined. Some scholars, for example, Ulrika Mörth, argue that it is impossible to study the European and domestic processes in separation as they are increasingly interwoven and dependent on each other. Others, for example, Ian Bache, Simon Bulmer, and Martin Burch, have examined Europeanization as a two-way process and made efforts to distinguish the different streams from each other. From this point of view, Europeanization not only consists of the downloading of EU policies that affect member states' policy, politics, and polity but also of its uploading.

Conceptualizing Europeanization as an interaction between domestic and European levels makes it difficult to measure the effects of the integration process. Recent researchers tend to distance themselves from the sequential conception of policy making in which decision makers were seen as identifying problems, setting goals, proceeding then to compare alternative strategies, and choosing those with a favorable ratio between costs and expected results. Instead, following John Kingdon (building on the garbage can model), they operate at the intersection of problems, policies, and solutions floating around in the partially Europeanized policy processes.

The question of when Europeanization takes place is also complicated by the temporal aspects of the European integration process that in several ways affect domestic planning horizons. Within this model, the important research question is not whether Europeanization has taken place but how it proceeds and manifests itself in various modes of interaction between European and domestic policy processes.

Of crucial importance for this line of research is a closer look at the specific linkages and ligatures of multilevel governance. Understanding the nature of Europeanization requires notions illuminating the particular ways and forms in which European and domestic policy processes are related. Some concepts in the literature on Europeanization that might guide such an analysis are customizing, framing, the idea of social representations, and mediated cross-load.

Customizing refers to efforts undertaken by national politicians to make the EU resemble their own state. When participating in the EU policy process, member states emphasize features of the European policy that makes it more similar to the domestic policy, thereby making the EU more familiar to various national constituencies. This is a way of strengthening the legitimacy of the EU within the national political culture.

A related notion is that of framing, which stands for the context in which a policy is presented. Again, the purpose is to gain acceptance for specific proposals or lines of action. A similar idea is that of “social representations,” which
shape the institutionalization of the policy area and define frameworks for possible cooperation.

An idea related to that of upload and download discussed earlier is that of cross-load, where local practices are disseminated from one state to another without necessarily passing the central EU level and its institutions in Brussels. However, even if practice is not disseminated via the EU institutions, they are not necessarily isolated policy transfers, but they can be expected to be mediated by other processes on the European level, which would be mediated cross-load. Such processes might take place in transnational networks. In addition, policy transfer in a policy area may take place between some countries and might then be pushed “upward” to the European policy process. Such conceptual tools have been employed in the analyses of Europeanization encompassing domestic changes that precede and facilitate further formal integration.

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See also European Integration; Globalization; Implementation; Institutionalization

Further Readings


Evaluation Research

Evaluation research is about assessing the consequences of public policy. The emphasis can be either on the policy process or on the outputs and the outcomes of the policies. Evaluation research thus has a clear democratic and learning goal: to inform the decision makers, citizens, and interest groups whether public policies have or have not had the intended consequences. Whether public policies result in alleviating public problems is a central question for many societal stakeholders. Governments are keen on showing that the practiced policy making has been effective and that promises made during an election campaign have been kept. In addition, evaluation is an important tool of monitoring; governments as principals use evaluation to keep the agents and the bureaucracy accountable. Opposition parties, in principle, are as keen on showing that government policies have not had the intended effects. The media and think tanks inform citizens, and to do so, they need information on activities. This definition implies, first, that evaluation research is usually empirical and, second, that evaluation is usually bound to the goals of public policy making. This is, however, not the only option. Seen against the multitude of benefits it serves, evaluation research is not without problems. The academic element of evaluation research is to develop and further improve the tools with which to evaluate. The problems of evaluation concern both the practice of evaluation—how to do it—and the usage of evaluation. This entry focuses on the how question, and thereafter the focus moves on to the usage of evaluation.

Conducting Evaluation

Researchers engaged in the evaluation of public policies face a number of choices related to approach, focus, and criteria. First, various forms of evaluation research differ from each other on the basis of the selected approach. The principal approaches are formative and summative evaluation. Formative evaluation monitors the way in which a program is
being administered or managed so as to provide feedback that may serve to improve the implementation process. Summative evaluation measures how a program has actually affected the problems it was designed to address. Second, evaluation can focus on various parts in a policy process: on the process or implementation at various levels of government, ranging from the top of the hierarchy to the grassroots bureaucrats, or on the outputs and outcomes. Third, evaluation can focus on various aspects of the process or outputs. The approach and focus used determine the criteria for evaluating a program’s success. Usually, evaluation involves a comparison of the goals and impacts of a program, with the program’s goals often selected as the yardstick for measuring or evaluating success. But efficiency, organizational changes, stakeholder concerns, and democracy can also be used as criteria. In other words, if a new policy aims at diminishing traffic accidents, the evaluator assesses whether this indeed has been the result. Other options include focusing on economy (Has money been wasted?), democracy (Did the program respond to popular will?), or impacts. In recent decades, public administration has moved into using performance indicators (PI) to guide agencies and lower rank officials to aim at the negotiated targets. For example, in academia, PI may include the number of publications and student achievement scores; for health care, PI may include the number of operations and patient calls. The debate concerning the use of PI has pointed out that the choice of indicators is important so as not to narrow the target field too much and has warned that top-down set indicators can have a demoralizing effect on lower rank officials’ professional drive for work improvement.

The formal goals of policies form an important starting point for evaluators. This is because government ought to respond to the needs and expectations of the people. If evaluation shows that the results are poor or that the way in which programs are carried out is not optimal, government should be concerned. At the same time, there are a number of reasons to defend the replacement of formal goals as an evaluation criterion. First, political goals are not always very precise. Public programs can contain multiple goals, some of which may be meant to satisfy the voters rather than target a problem. Second, concentrating solely on monitoring the realization of formal goals may restrict the identification of various side effects that policies may have. These are usually not evaluated as thoroughly as the formal goals. Yet unintentional side effects can replace and disturb the formal goals in the long run.

An extreme option for criteria is to select a goal-free approach—that is, to study a policy process from all possible angles. A more recent approach, a realistic one, asks what works for whom in what circumstances, emphasizing thus the importance of the context in which a policy is making an impact. All in all, the various evaluation models or approaches have various emphases and hence may lead to different sorts of conclusions as to what constitutes a successful program. An evaluation researcher usually either chooses a particular perspective, say how a regional policy affects the participation of the local citizens, or can aim at reconstructing a comprehensive account of the merits of a program. The latter choice inevitably involves a selection of multiple criteria, data, and perspectives in a program. Finally, as in social science in general, some researchers prefer a deductive approach and others inductive one; some prefer a quantitative analysis, others a qualitative case approach.

Whereas evaluating the administrative process whereby policies are fulfilled can be relatively easy, emphasizing the impact of public policies is loaded with difficulties. This is mainly because public policies are not the only factor that affects societal processes. A standard example is education. Although schools play a vital role in education by providing the institutional framework (schools, teachers, and resources) for learning, education is also dependent on the pupils themselves, their parents, and the underlying culture. In other words, a number of other factors may intervene once a public policy is implemented. Regional policy offers a good example: A tax relief program may be proposed to encourage private sector enterprises to add jobs. Once the program is implemented, it is but a single factor when such enterprises consider whether or not to invest in hiring additional staff. In education, similarly, good education is a necessary but not a sufficient ingredient of learning. Full impacts take time to be realized. In other words, when public policies are put into effect, as time passes, it becomes difficult to distinguish between the net effect of the policy and other effects. Furthermore, the task is not made easier by the fact that the grassroots officials often cooperate with other officials. Environmental
health inspectors, for example, talk and meet with representatives of other municipal branches (garbage, health, fire, and planning), other public officials and relevant private shopkeepers, producers, and so on, and all this adds up to environmental health. One particular policy constitutes only a fraction of the total impact; alone it does not suffice to make much difference. A bottom-up perspective into a policy process opens up a different scenario compared with a top-down perspective.

Use of Evaluation Results

The usage of evaluation results is also not without problems. First, the aforementioned methodological constraints mean that evaluation results are not totally reliable. One can, for example, argue for or against the application of one specific criterion or approach. The evaluation of economic efficiency, for example, can be criticized if it does not include in the analysis an indicator for the quality of services too. The same applies to other criteria, and hence, one solution is to apply several criteria. Also, it may simply be impossible to sample all the necessary data. Evaluation as a part of monitoring usually has to rely on quantitative data. European Union programs, for example, are assessed on the basis of the number of new jobs created. There is, however, no certainty that these jobs will be lasting. Qualitative data may, however, be more difficult and costly to obtain in a day-to-day routine evaluation. Second, the difficulties of impact assessment are serious but not impossible. It is evident that public policy outputs need to be balanced in relation to other intervening factors. In the recent Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) evaluations, which compare international education results, reading, for example, is defined as determined by a combination of teaching, the pupil’s own activity, and support by parents. Impacts are also complex in the modern world. Globalization, crowded policy space, and postmodern citizen attitudes mean that the way individual policies influence the target problems is more and more uncertain. However, full impacts can hardly be assessed on a routine basis. Also, as the realistic argument says, the contextual nature of policy implementation implies that the process and hence also the impact varies, and explanations do not rest on certainty but on varying degrees of plausibility.

Irrespective of how skillfully and comprehensively an evaluation is conducted, its results may be poorly used. This has to do with power. Governments and other policymakers may not be willing to publish news when the impact of government programs has been poor, nor will the responsible agency applaud if the results of its activities are criticized. After all, public agencies are interested in both good results and maintaining their status. Evaluation results are, in other words, treated strategically, and this can take various forms. Evaluation can, for example, be designed and conducted in concert with the individual or organization who commissions it. Thus, the selection of criteria can be affected by factors other than the principles of good evaluation. A second possibility is simply that evaluation results may be rejected if they do not correspond with the wishes of those who authorized the evaluation. Evaluation is a part of democratic governance. Feedback and openly discussing impartial evidence are signs of transparency and openness. A perfect evaluation is seldom possible due to the aforementioned restrictions. Evaluation should not be abandoned, and the effort to see how public programs are working should not be given up. Evaluation is just one element in the debate over policies and programs. It may have an influence but so do other factors, including political commitments, the preservation of institutional relationships, public opinion, and so on. Politics in democratic societies, on the other hand, is about the belief that policy making can and will make differences, and hence public policy making needs feedback. There is a lot of uncertainty involved. Successful evaluations are based on clear, explicated criteria. A particular debate within evaluation research concerns the underlying theoretical assumptions of the various approaches and to what extent these affect the evaluation results. Evaluation research, in other words, cannot escape the common basis of social science to which it belongs.

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See also Accountability; Monitoring

Further Readings

Event Counts

Many subjects of interest to political scientists take the form of event counts: nonnegative, integer counts of the number of times that a particular event has occurred. Event count data are found in American politics (e.g., counts of the number of policy adoptions, presidential vetoes, and judicial decision reversals), international relations (e.g., interstate conflicts, militarized disputes, and treaty violations), and comparative politics (e.g., protest activities, cabinet changes, and regime transitions). Just as scholars are often interested in estimating the time of event occurrence, via event history analysis, so also are they often interested in modeling counts of events that are observed, via event count models. Count data present problems for the linear regression model developed for continuous dependent variables, which can produce biased, inconsistent, and inefficient estimates when applied to count data. As a consequence, scholars have developed several alternative event count models for count data. These are discussed below.

Poisson Regression Model

The most basic event count model is the Poisson regression model, which assumes that the count data are produced by a Poisson process, with a conditional mean captured by the covariates in the model:

$$\Pr(y_i|x_i) = \frac{\exp(-\mu_i)\mu_i^{y_i}}{y_i!}, \quad (1)$$

where $\mu_i = \exp(x_i \beta)$. Because the Poisson regression model is a loglinear model, the expected count changes by a factor of $\exp(\beta_k)$ for a one-unit change in $x_k$. The Poisson regression model can be estimated by maximum likelihood. Although it is natural to conceive of count processes as following a Poisson process, the Poisson regression model actually contains three quite restrictive limitations that limit its applicability. First, the Poisson process is premised on events being independent of each other—the occurrence of an event does not increase the probability of the unit experiencing the same type of event in the future. This assumption will often be violated in practice. Second, related to this, the Poisson regression model also assumes that the conditional variance is equal to the conditional mean, a condition known as equidispersion. In many applications, the conditional variance will exceed the conditional mean, a condition known as overdispersion. Third, the Poisson regression model underpredicts the number of zeros (absences of events) that are observed in many applications. More sophisticated count models than the Poisson regression model account for these divergences from the assumptions of the Poisson model.

Overdispersion

In an event count model, the dependent variable is the number of events, not the occurrence of an event. As a consequence, the researcher needs to make assumptions about the process that aggregates to the event count. When overdispersion is present, estimates from the Poisson regression model generally will still be consistent if the conditional mean is properly specified. (Note, however, that truncated or censored data can result in inconsistency, even if the conditional mean is properly specified). Standard errors from Poisson regressions, however, will be biased downward, leading to Type I errors (rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true) in inference. As a consequence, overdispersion must be incorporated into the model specification when present.

There are two principal sources of overdispersion in count data. On the one hand, unmodeled sources of heterogeneity may produce a conditional variance that is larger than the conditional mean. On the other hand, the assumption of independence of events inherent in the Poisson process may be violated. Typically, researchers conceive of this nonindependence as a form of contagion within units—the experience of an initial event increases the probability of the same unit experiencing subsequent events. For example, a country’s
experience of an interstate conflict may increase the probability of the country experiencing subsequent interstate conflicts.

Given the tendency of event count data to exhibit overdispersion, it is important to test for this violation of the Poisson regression assumption rather than simply accepting the estimates from a Poisson model. A variety of tests for overdispersion have been developed. A common regression-based test for overdispersion typically assumes that the overdispersion takes the following form:

\[ V(y_i|x_i) = \mu_i + \alpha g(\mu_i), \]

where \( \alpha \) is the dispersion parameter and \( g \) is a known function. Under the null of equidispersion, \( \alpha = 0 \). A test of \( H_0: \alpha = 0 \), then proceeds by estimating a Poisson regression model and running an auxiliary ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. If the null of equidispersion can be rejected, the researcher will then wish to estimate a model capable of capturing overdispersion.

**Negative Binomial Regression Model**

The most commonly employed model for overdispersion is the negative binomial regression model. The mean \( \mu = \exp(x|\beta) \) from the Poisson regression model is replaced in the negative binomial regression model with a random variable:

\[
\tilde{\mu}_i = \exp(x_i|\beta + \varepsilon_i) = \exp(x_i|\beta) \exp(\varepsilon_i),
\]

where \( \varepsilon_i \) is an error term reflecting unobserved heterogeneity. In other words, the heterogeneity in unmodeled covariates that produces a variance that exceeds the mean is modeled in the negative binomial regression through the random variable \( \tilde{\mu} \). With \( \delta_i = \exp(\varepsilon_i) \), the distribution of the \( y_i \) conditional on \( x_i \) and \( \delta_i \) remains Poisson:

\[
\Pr(y_i|x_i, \delta_i) = \frac{\exp(-\tilde{\mu}_i)\tilde{\mu}_i^{y_i}}{y_i!},
\]

Typically, a gamma distribution with parameter \( \theta_i \) is assumed for the \( \delta_i \), resulting in the following negative binomial probability distribution:

\[
\Pr(y_i|x_i) = \frac{\Gamma(y_i + \theta_i)}{y_i!\Gamma(\theta_i)} \left( \frac{\theta_i}{\theta_i + \mu_i} \right)^{\theta_i} \left( \frac{\mu_i}{\theta_i + \mu_i} \right)^{y_i}, \quad (5)
\]

The expected value, \( \mu_i \), remains the same for the negative binomial distribution as in the Poisson. The conditional variance in the negative binomial, however, is larger than the conditional mean:

\[
\text{Var}(y_i|x_i) = \exp(x_i|\beta) \left( 1 + \frac{\exp(x_i|\beta)}{\theta_i} \right). \quad (6)
\]

The negative binomial regression model can be estimated by maximum likelihood.

**Excess Zeros**

A variance larger than the mean, overdispersion, is evidenced by a larger number of zero counts of events (the absence of any events) than is predicted by the Poisson regression model. The negative binomial regression model accounts for this excess number of zeros by modifying the conditional variance from the standard Poisson model. Heterogeneity and contagion, however, are not the only possible sources of excess zeros. An excessive number of zeros may also be produced by a dual-regime process, in which the data-generating processes producing zero counts and producing event counts once events are possible are qualitatively different. The first of the two stages is a transition stage, which governs the probability of transitioning from experiencing no event to experiencing events. The second stage is the events stage, which produces the number of events that are experienced once the unit has transitioned into the stage in which events are possible.

If a dual-regime process is suspected, rather than modifying the conditional variance and leaving the conditional mean unchanged from the Poisson model, the researcher will instead wish to modify the model for the conditional mean. This is done by recognizing the dual regime nature of the data-generating process. Two principal dual-regime alternatives have been proposed: the zero-inflated model and the hurdle model. The two alternative...
dual-regime models differ in their conception of the possibility of zero counts once a unit has exited the transition process.

**Zero-Inflated Models**

In zero-inflated models, zero counts can be observed in either of two distinct regimes. In the first regime, the outcome is always zero. In the second regime, events or nonevents may be observed. Although developed for the application of identifying defects in manufacturing processes (in a perfect manufacturing process, defects are never observed in the first regime), it is easy to think of political science applications in which these two distinct types of regimes are possible. For example, under certain conditions, states may never go to war; however, if these conditions are not met, then either war or the absence of war may be observed.

The probability of exiting the regime in which only zeros are observed can be parameterized as a logit or probit. Poisson and negative binomial models have been used to parameterize the second events stage. But whether one uses a Poisson or negative binomial specification, the commonality of these zero-inflated approaches is that zero counts are possible for either of the two regimes in the model. This latter feature sets these models apart from another common event count model, the hurdle model.

**Hurdle Models**

Like their zero-inflated counterparts, hurdle models also assume a dual regime process. Hurdle models, however, depart from zero-inflated models in assuming that zero counts are not possible in the events stage. Instead, once the unit has crossed the hurdle and departed the first stage, at least one event will be observed. The second-stage process is thus truncated at zero. As a consequence, the probability of excessive zeros is determined solely by the first-stage process. As with zero-inflated models, both Poisson and negative binomial versions of hurdle models are used by researchers, depending on their conception of the events stage process.

**Conclusion**

Political scientists are increasingly interested in modeling phenomena for which the standard linear regression model is not appropriate. One of these phenomena is count processes, which arise in each of the empirical subfields of the discipline. A variety of specialized models have been developed to model count processes, and research continues on these models. Important recent developments in event count models include correlated event count models, panel data models, and Bayesian models.

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See also Event History Analysis; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian; Maximum Likelihood

**Further Readings**


**Event History Analysis**

Event history analysis allows researchers to investigate not only occurrences of certain political events but also the processes or histories of those events. In essence, event history analysis estimates how histories of events or durations leading up to the events (if events occur at all) change with different values of independent variables (or covariates). Such estimates allow researchers to discuss how included covariates increase or decrease the probability of the event occurrence at any given time. Since event history analyzes the duration between the start when the event is possible to the
time when the event actually occurs (if it occurs), event history analysis is often called duration analysis. Alternatively, as event history analysis models the probability of an observation surviving (not experiencing the event), event history analysis is sometimes called survival analysis. Below, this entry discusses some major features and possible applications of event history analysis, taking into account both parametric and nonparametric models and some recent extensions.

Many political science studies ask questions regarding occurrences of significant political events. For instance, scholars in comparative politics are interested in why some countries democratize while others fail to do so (democratization), or why some countries are able to economically develop while others stay in poverty (economic development). Likewise, scholars in international relations study why some countries join many international organizations, while others join only a few (international organization [IO] membership) and why some pairs of states are more likely to engage in militarized interstate disputes than others (militarized disputes). Scholars in American politics ask why some court nominees are approved, while others are not (legislative and judicial branch relations), and what makes an incumbent more likely to face a challenger (reelection). By answering these questions, political scientists are able to identify systematic dynamics influencing occurrences of these political events.

While these inquiries certainly enhance our understanding of interesting political phenomena, the timing of occurrences of such events can provide even richer information and thus help further enhance our understanding of the underlying dynamics. For instance, not only identifying under what conditions a country is able to democratize but also finding out under what conditions a country is able to do so faster than other countries would help promote our understanding of democratization. Event history analysis provides researchers with a unique opportunity to exploit richer information of the histories of events.

Since event history analysis has been introduced to political science, there have been a growing number of studies that use it in empirical investigations. With this powerful new tool, many old research questions have been revisited, and many new research questions have been developed and empirically tested. These questions cut across subdisciplines of political science, and examples of them are numerous. Why do some coalition governments last longer than others? Why do some militarized disputes last longer than others? Why do some periods of peace last longer than others? Why do some economic sanctions last longer than others? Why do some drugs take a longer time to get approved by the Food and Drug Administration than other drugs? And why can some representatives maintain their seats longer than others? The popularity of the event history analysis is due to its usefulness in understanding the underlying political dynamics of events and their histories. Specifically, event history analysis has a few advantages over traditional binary logit or probit analysis, on the one hand, and over ordinary least squares regression (OLS), on the other.

Event history analysis has many advantages over binary logit or probit models. First of all, event history analysis takes the history of an event seriously by taking duration into account. As how long it takes for an event to occur provides more information than just whether the event occurs or not, it helps better understand the dynamics of the events under investigation. Returning to a prior example, some countries may successfully democratize less than a few decades after independence, others may democratize after more than a few decades, while still others may not be able to democratize at all. Conventional logit or probit models cannot differentiate between those cases democratizing in less than a few decades and those in more than a few decades. In contrast, event history analysis allows researchers not only to investigate factors that make democratization more likely but also to investigate factors that hasten democratization by exploiting richer data.

Likewise, one may think that OLS regression might be able to capture factors influencing duration quite nicely, as it examines continuous dependent variables. But event history/duration data pose several challenges for traditional continuous dependent variables. But event history/duration data pose several challenges for traditional continuous dependent variables. For one, duration data are often right skewed and the OLS approach requires an arbitrary transformation of data (most commonly taking a log) to deal with a right-skewed data set. A more serious problem is data truncation. Data truncation happens when researchers do not know either the exact entry time of an observation (left truncated)
or the end time—this is the case when events have not yet occurred when the data collection is done (right censoring). That is, there could be some observations that, at the time of data collection, are still ongoing. OLS treats left-truncated observations as if they have an equivalent entry time with other observations and copes with right-censoring problems either by dropping all the observations that have not experienced the event or by capping the history by assuming that the event has occurred at the conclusion of the period of data collection. Both these arbitrary assumptions can cause biases. In contrast, event history analysis takes into account these cases of left truncation and right censoring. Finally, event history analysis can accommodate time-varying covariates (TVCs), which are independent variables with different values over time.

In event history, an “event” is the primary phenomenon of interest, and the “history of such an event” refers to the duration leading up to the event. If we think that history can span across time \( T \), then the probability of the event occurring at any given time point \( t \) \( (t \) is an element of \( T \)) can be written as a probability density function \( f(t) \). Then, the cumulative probability at time \( t \) is given by \( F(t) \) and the integration of \( f(t) \) from 0 to \( t \). This is the probability of the event having occurred between time 0 and \( t \). Then, the probability of survival, or the event not having occurred up to time \( t \), can be simply written as \( S(t) = 1 - F(t) \). Given \( f(t) \) and \( S(t) \), the hazard rate is the probability of the event happening at time \( t \) given the observation has not experienced the event until time \( t \). With the simple notations outlined above, the hazard rate \( h(t) \) is equal to \( f(t)/S(t) \), the conditional probability of an event occurring, given that it has not happened up until time \( t \).

Going back to the democratization example, the hazard rate at 10 years after a country’s independence would be the probability of democratization at Year 10 divided by the probability of democratization not having happened for the past decade in this country. Theoretically, various factors would presumably influence the hazard rate. For instance, one may think that the level of economic development, former colonial experience, and strength of military force all affect the hazard rate, as well as the duration itself, and build the event history model accordingly. Event history analysis then estimates the hazard rate for democratization as the function of both these covariates and time. A baseline hazard rate refers to the hazard rate as only a function of time \( t \).

**Parametric and Nonparametric Approaches**

There are various modeling options for researchers who seek to use event history analysis based on appropriateness to the data and background theories. First, the choice between parametric and nonparametric approaches depends on how confident researchers are of the shape of the baseline hazard, which ideally is guided by theory. In essence, all parametric models make explicit assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard, while nonparametric models do not make such assumptions.

Parametric models make assumptions for the baseline hazard rate once covariates are included in the model. There are a wide variety of models, and models may be nested in others. For instance, the exponential model assumes that the baseline hazard is flat across time. This would mean that the probability of an event occurring at time \( t \) conditional on the event not having occurred is constant over time. The exact value then depends on included covariates. The Weibull model is more flexible than the exponential model, and it allows that the baseline hazard rate may be monotonically increasing, monotonically decreasing, or flat over time. Thus, the Weibull model nests the exponential model.

Both the Weibull and exponential models assume proportional hazards as the changes of hazard rates with changes of covariates are proportional to the baseline hazard rate. The proportional hazards assumption should be tested. Since the Weibull model can be flexible, there have been many studies that have used it. Yet, in some settings, the monotonicity assumption may not be appropriate, and for those cases parametric models without a monotonicity assumption can be used. These models include the log-logistic and the lognormal models. These models allow hazard rates to first increase and then decrease as \( t \) passes. Neither of these models has the proportional hazards property.

The generalized gamma model can be useful to adjudicate among different parametric models, as several parametric models are nested within the generalized gamma model. The exponential, the Weibull, the lognormal, and the gamma models
are all special forms of the generalized gamma model. When one has no a priori theoretical justification about how the baseline hazard rate varies across time, the generalized gamma model is likely to be particularly useful. If the fit is correct, parametric models generally have smaller standard errors than their semiparametric counterparts. However, as parametric models require assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard, when assumptions are not correct, the estimation will be biased.

In comparison with the parametric models, nonparametric approaches do not make assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard. While it is true that some parametric models are more flexible than others, they all still make assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard. Moreover, more flexible models require more parameters to be estimated, and inclusion of such parameters may be tenuous and cumbersome. Finally, nonparametric models will approximate a correct parametric model; if the correct parametric model is the Weibull, nonparametric estimates will closely approximate the Weibull; if the correct parametric model is the exponential, nonparametric estimates will approximate the exponential without specifying the baseline hazard. In general, given that there is little theoretical justification for the shape of the baseline hazard in most political science inquiries, there seems to be a rising consensus that there is little to lose and much to gain in using nonparametric models in social science applications. Thus, it may be better to leave the baseline hazard unspecified and instead focus on how covariates of interest influence the hazard rate. This is the basic justification of the Cox proportional hazards model, or simply the Cox model. Time-varying covariates are easily handled in the Cox model as well.

The Cox model estimates the hazard rate of the \( i \)th observation at time \( t \) as a function of both the unspecified baseline hazard and the covariates. As the hazard rate is a product of the function of the covariates and the baseline hazard, the Cox model is also a proportional hazards model, and this assumption needs to be checked. The Cox model uses partial likelihood methods to estimate coefficients for each covariate. The partial likelihood function for some given data is the product of the hazard rate of the observation that experiences the \( n \)th event over the sum of all the hazard rates of observations that have not experienced the event, \( n \) to \( K \), when \( n \) varies from 1 to \( N \), where \( N \) is the number of observations that experience the event in the data, and \( K \) is the total number of observations. Then, the partial likelihood function is maximized, and the coefficients are obtained. For instance, imagine a data set with three observations \( (K = 3) \), where only two of them \( (N = 2) \) experience the event. The partial likelihood is then given by the hazard rate of the observation that experiences the event first over the sum of the hazard rates of all three observations multiplied by the hazard rate of the observation that experiences the event second over the sum of the hazard rates of the two remaining observations.

As illustrated, the Cox model uses information about which observation experiences the event sooner than others. Thus, the interval between two observations experiencing events does not provide any additional information. In this sense, the Cox model is an ordered events model. Important advances have been made in handling ties, which are observations that experience the event at the same time, such as the Breslow, the Efron, and the exact discrete approximations.

**Discrete and Continuous Time Approaches**

Thus far, the discussion of event history analysis implicitly assumes continuous time. While time is continuous in nature, in reality the data sets that researchers use are often discrete. Event history data in discrete time contain the same information in different forms—a series of binary observations in which zeros are recorded for a nonevent, and ones are recorded for an event. In such a case, researchers need to select a probability distribution to capture the binary decision. The logistic distribution (as in a logit model) and the standard normal distribution (as in a probit model) are typically used.

Duration dependence still needs to be directly accounted for in the discrete time model, which is generally handled by fitting smoothing functions such as spline functions or lowess. Some argue for discrete time due to greater familiarity by most social scientists with logit/probit models. Others argue for continuous time approaches since modeling duration dependency does not require extra modeling steps. Both discrete and continuous time models are appropriate and adequate.
Model fit and assumptions should be tested for event history models, just as they are for any other statistical model. Residual plots show the difference between the observed values and the predicted values from the estimated model, and residual measures can be used as graphical tests for various purposes. Cox-Snell residuals are often used to evaluate the overall fit of the estimated model. When Cox-Snell residuals plot roughly around the 45° reference line, the Cox model performs reasonably well. When there is a systematic deviation of the plotted residuals from the reference line, then there may be some omitted variables or problems with model specifications. But one should also note that the Cox-Snell residuals are not a definite evidence of how the estimated model fits.

Since the Cox model and some parametric models assume proportional hazards, it is important to test this assumption. If it does not hold, it is not possible to interpret the hazard rate or ratio constant across time, and additional modeling steps are required. Graphically, scaled Schoenfeld residuals can be used in testing the proportional hazards assumption. Scaled Schoenfeld residuals can be thought of as the difference between the expected values of the covariates and the observed values of the covariates. Thus, when scaled Schoenfeld residuals are plotted across time, one can see if any variable shows violations of the proportional hazards assumption. When scaled Schoenfeld residuals are consistently gathered around the zero line, the proportional hazards assumption is likely to hold. When residuals systematically deviate from the zero line or show heterogeneity across time, it is possible that the model is misspecified and the proportional hazards assumption might not hold. There is a global statistical test to examine the proportional assumption as well. If the global test indicates that the model may have a violation, Harrell’s rho can be used to focus on offending covariates individually. Typically, an interaction with time and the offending covariate is included in the model to account for the nonproportionality.

Additional extensions make event history analysis even more useful. For instance, an observation may experience an event more than once. It is also possible that an observation can exit in more than one way. The model can also be extended to include unobserved heterogeneity among observations, event dependence, or spatial dependence.

Repeated events are simply those when the observation can experience the event more than once, such as occurs in the study of repeated interstate disputes between certain pairs of countries. The analysis of repeated events takes into account the fact that the first, second, third, and such other events are not independent. Pairs of countries with two prior interstate disputes will likely have a different probability of having another dispute than pairs of countries with no such prior experiences of having an interstate dispute. Stratification by event number is an appropriate way to model repeated events to allow the hazard rate to vary by event number.

Competing risks extensions to the basic Cox model allow analysts to consider different types of events. For example, a member of Congress may leave office due to defeat in the primary election, defeat in the general election, running for higher office, or retiring. Economic sanctions may end with either a sanctioning failure—a sanctioner lifting sanctions without achieving desired policy goals—or a sanctioning success—a target accepting the demand from the sanctioner. These events are distinct, and the covariate effects are likely to differ. The usual modeling strategy for a competing risks model is to estimate separate models for each event while treating observations experiencing other events as censored. One drawback of this approach is that it assumes independence between different types of events. Yet, often, this assumption is questionable. For instance, the hazard rate of sanctioning failure may depend on the hazard rate of sanctioning success. The competing risks model does not assume a time order for events to occur.

Unobserved Heterogeneity
In an ideal world, researchers would include all relevant covariates in the statistical model to estimate
the precise effects of each covariate. But it is often not the case that all the relevant variables are available. Some may be unmeasurable, and others may be unobservable. The frailty model extension of the Cox model provides one way to account for unobserved heterogeneity across observations. The frailty term can be thought of as an additional factor that measures how prone or “frail” observations are to experiencing the event. The frailty can be modeled as either a group- or individual-specific term.

Event Dependence

The conditional frailty model separates and accounts for both event dependence and heterogeneity in repeated events models. Event dependence exists when the occurrence of one event makes further events more or less likely. For example, learning effects or damaging effects may make an event more or less likely to occur. In short, the risk of an event may be a function of a prior event occurring. Separating out event dependence and heterogeneity is helpful to analysts methodologically in order to draw more accurate substantive conclusions.

Spatial Dependence

Finally, recent extensions incorporate spatial dependence into event history models. This is an exciting development because it offers an effective approach to account for spatial dependence in political event processes. The model allows for spatially correlated random effects at neighboring locations. For example, scholars have looked at incorporating the proximity of civil unrest on the timing of outbreaks of additional violence and the diffusion of state policy adoption across states on the timing of those policy adoptions.

Further Readings


Evidence-based policy making (EBP) has developed over the past 40 years from conceptual roots that lie in the health care profession. Its deeper intellectual roots can be traced back even further to the Enlightenment, the policy sciences movement in the mid-20th century, and efforts to address societal ills through informed and activist government in the 1960s. Definitions of EBP may vary, but most observers agree that EBP requires rational and systematic processes for producing evidence to be applied in the policy making process. While differences in definitions of EBP tend to focus on variations on this idea, there is debate about the kinds of evidence that should be collected, EBP’s feasibility as an actual guide for policy making, and the standards of evidence that it requires. In this sense, EBP shares challenges that are similar to earlier movements that sought to rationalize policy making and policy-making processes.

See also Censored and Truncated Data; Logit and Probit Analysis; Time-Series Analysis
Evidence-Based Policy’s more recent conceptual roots lie in research on health care practices. In 1971, Archibald Cochrane, a British epidemiologist, highlighted gaps between the state of medical knowledge and the realities of medical practice. He advocated more systematic research on patient care as well as on the systematic application of knowledge gained through this research to clinical practice. In the early 1990s, his hope for more systematic assessments of clinical practices and their use in guiding patient care was realized when the international Cochrane Collaboration was established in Oxford, United Kingdom (UK), to execute systematic reviews of medical evidence. The work of the Cochrane Collaboration and the nearby Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine at John Radcliffe Hospital in Oxford caught the attention of policymakers in the UK, the United States, and elsewhere.

Research on evidence-based medicine gave rise to practical applications in both health care and other policy sectors. As Sue Dopson, Louise Locock, John Gabbay, Ewan Ferlie, and Louise Fitzgerald (2003) note, in the health care sector, the UK and the United States promoted the application of evidence-based research and practice in various ways, including the establishment of guidelines and research centers to encourage the use of systematic medical research findings in clinical practices. In the UK, the Labour government of the 1990s embraced the EBP concept and expanded it to other policy areas as a part of its efforts to modernize government. The Labour Government’s 1999 Cabinet Office White Paper on Modernizing Government, for example, highlighted the importance of evidence and research in policy making across the board, not just in the health care arena. In an effort to ensure that public policies actually work to achieve their objectives, the UK also increased funding for social research during this time period.

In recent years, the phrase evidence-based policy making has been used with increasing frequency. For example, the title of the Association of Public Policy Analysis and Management’s (APPAM) Annual Research Conference in Washington, D.C., during the fall of 2009, was “Evidence-Based Policy Making in the Post Bush/Clinton Era.” This title reflects recognition of the importance of the phrase not only in the UK, where it has been commonly used, but also in North America and elsewhere as well.

However, while the EBP terminology has developed only in recent decades, the ideas underlying it have been in evidence for many years. Some trace the roots of EBP to the Enlightenment and its emphasis on applying science and knowledge for purposes of human betterment (Carolyn Heinrich, 2007). In the 1940s and 1950s, Harold Lasswell’s efforts to build a science of policy through policy analysis sought to encourage analytically based policy improvement efforts that are similar to those targeted by EBP. And, in the 1960s, governmental efforts to create a “Great Society” in the United States were predicated on the idea that rationally constructed public policies could be implemented in ways that alleviate societal ills. These policies, in turn, were accompanied by the establishment of public policy think tanks in universities and elsewhere that were designed to provide objective information to help guide efforts to improve policy making on an ongoing basis.

The attention that EBP has received is in part traceable to its grounding in basic concerns about the application of human knowledge to improve public policies, but it also has roots in the unique circumstances of the past several decades. During the 1980s, growing skepticism regarding the effectiveness of government programs led to a search for new alternatives that took better account of their costs and the cost-effectiveness. These concerns contributed to the performance measurement movement of the 1990s and a need for government programs that “work better and cost less,” to borrow a phrase from the famous 1993 Gore report in the United States. The EBP movement fit in nicely with these concerns and added a specific focus on the role of research and evidence to the performance measurement interests that came to dominate public sector management in the 1990s and the early years of the 21st century.

Challenges for Evidence-Based Policy

However, while the EBP movement coincided well with the times in which it developed, it did not escape the issues that had plagued similar movements in the past. At least three issues are worth addressing in this regard.

First, the concept of EBP assumes that researchers and/or policymakers can define what evidence is important and apply it appropriately to achieve
 Evidence-Based Policy

desired policy outcomes. However, public sector programs may seek to achieve more than one goal, and choices regarding the most appropriate evidence to collect are not always clear. The evidence one needs to garner depends on the goals one chooses to pursue or assess. Where goals are numerous and differ with respect to the availability of evidence and the ease with which it can be developed, the evidence produced may be inherently biased toward goals that are easily measured. As a result, some argue that EBP and performance measurement more broadly are inherently biased toward measures of efficiency that are more easily quantified in monetary terms than measures of other values, such as those relating to equity, fairness, and democratic participation. This concern is exacerbated by the fact that producing evidence often requires money, which may be available in less abundance to those in society who are most concerned about these other values.

Second, there are debates about whether evidence produced by research efforts can be incorporated effectively into policy-making processes. Research takes time to be done in quality fashion, and time is often in short supply as policymakers make decisions to address both perceived emergencies and ambitious policy agendas. There are also issues relating to the ability of policymakers to access the right or best information as they make decisions. Because policymakers are often generalists, they may have limited ability to grasp all aspects of the evidence they receive. As a result, they may depend heavily on those who provide them with evidence, and they may ultimately rely more on the perceptions of those who provide the evidence than on the evidence itself—particularly when the evidence is complex and subject to interpretation. Finally, because policymakers in democratic political systems are (at least theoretically) held accountable to their electorates, they may perceive a need to react to public perceptions of evidence and risk rather than to the evidence itself. And where public perceptions of risk and evidence differ from the actual evidence provided by experts, systems of democratic accountability may encourage decisions based on public perceptions rather than on objective evidence.

A third difficulty that is inherent in EBP relates to decisions regarding the adequacy of evidence that is provided. Even within scientific disciplines, there is often disagreement among experts regarding the kinds of evidence that are most appropriate for answering particular kinds of questions. This is true in the social sciences as well as in the natural sciences, and it is particularly true when evidence is being gathered to help guide policy making because of varying values that may come into play in these cases. Some researchers argue that quantitative information is critically important if one is to assess policy effectiveness in objective fashion, while others argue that more qualitative assessments are also required if one is to reach balanced conclusions that address a range of legitimately held values in society. As a result, even where evidence is timely, appropriate, and clear to all involved, there are likely to be cases where differing kinds of evidence lead one to differing conclusions. And there is certainly room for debate over what kinds of evidence are most appropriate to believe in these contexts.

In all three of the aforementioned areas, EBP faces challenges that parallel the challenges faced by similar movements in the past. While EBP has the benefit of past experiences and appears to be particularly cognizant of these challenges as a result, it is still working to address these questions. What kind of evidence should be collected? How should evidence be incorporated into policy-making processes? And what standards of evidential quality should be applied? These are not simple questions, but they are important ones. There is reason to be skeptical of the extent to which these questions will be answered adequately once and for all, but—if one believes that human intelligence and the rigors of systematic inquiry can yield beneficial impacts—there appears to be little alternative to addressing them in some fashion. In the end, EBP and its predecessor movements focus on bringing systematic evidence to bear on the policy-making process and—despite the questions raised above—this may be the best kind of process that is available.

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See also Policy Analysis; Policy Evaluation; Policy Formulation; Policy Framing; Policy Instruments; Policy Network; Policy Process, Models of
Further Readings


**EXECUTIVE**

The national executive—more usually referred to as the “government” or, in the United States, as the “administration”—is the only political institution that exists in every country. There cannot be a state without a national executive, while bodies such as legislatures, parties, or interest groups exist only where the polity is, at least relatively speaking, liberal-democratic. This entry concentrates exclusively on liberal-democratic polities, which have become, by the early years of the 21st century, a substantial majority of the 200 or so polities of the world; yet there are still countries without legislatures, without parties, or even without interest groups, either because they are very traditional, as some of the Middle Eastern states, or because a coup, typically of a military character, replaced a liberal-democratic political system that had been in place for only a few years.

Both the composition and the power of national executives need to be examined with care—the composition because it varies appreciably in terms of the relationship among government members and because of the role of the leader of the government, and the power because of the variations and indeed even marked disagreements over what governments can effectively achieve with whatever powers they may formally have. This entry therefore looks successively at both aspects; before doing so, however, it briefly describes the way in which national executives gradually developed.

**Evolution of the National Executive**

While the proportion of liberal-democratic national executives is large in the contemporary world, as noted, this was not the case at all in the past, even in much of the 20th century, let alone earlier. It is worth noting that, in the classical Roman Republic, there were a number of separate executive positions rather than a government—for instance, the positions of consul, pretor, or edile. A similar framework was adopted by the few republics that came to exist during the Middle Ages and later, principally in Italy. The idea of a government prevailed in monarchies, as kings or queens came to appoint “secretaries” or “ministers” to oversee the fields that had to be covered, such as those of finance, foreign affairs, or defense. This model was widely adopted in the strong—or absolute—monarchies of 16th-, 17th-, and 18th-century Europe. As against this trend, the first modern—and liberal—republic, that of the United States, was established by a formal constitution that came into force in 1789 and proved to be a great success; that is, it endured and was imitated early in the 19th century, as a variety of Latin American states became independent from Spanish rule.

On the other hand, the French revolutionary republic, set up in 1792, was not a success: It was replaced after a few years by Napoleon’s empire, and the monarchy was reestablished in 1815. Yet that monarchy was different in character from the one that had ruled France for centuries; this was the result of the profound changes in the direction of liberal government that had begun to occur in Britain over a century earlier, from 1688. Such a move toward liberal government in Britain was followed gradually after 1815 through the course of the 19th century in parts of Western Europe and beyond, including Japan. The evolution toward a
liberal-democratic government was to lead to the emergence of a parliamentary-cabinet system, which was to characterize much of Western Europe and the “Old Commonwealth” countries from the end of the 19th century in contrast to the American presidential system.

The move toward liberal democracy in Europe was interrupted between the two World Wars, however, as the liberal-democratic model was shaken and indeed replaced by dictatorships. Revolutionary Russia, renamed the Soviet Union, became the first Communist state from the 1920s to the 1990s; in the 1920s and 1930s, right-wing dictatorships were installed, by coups or even as a result of elections, in many parts of continental Europe, especially in Italy, Germany, and Spain, as well as in most of the states that had been created after World War I in East-Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, although World War II ended with the victory of democracies in 1945, only in the 1980s and 1990s did the trend toward liberal democracy become widespread. Many of the new states of Asia and Africa had indeed quickly become dictatorships after having acquired independence from European colonial powers in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s; the major exception being India that was to remain, from 1948 onward, by far the most populous liberal democracy.

Structure and Composition of the National Executive

The national executive is the body that governs the state, both in democratic and in nondemocratic countries; exactly who composes that executive is not always entirely clear, and the relationship among its members is both varied and sometimes rather obscure. As was already suggested, liberal-democratic executives are often said to be divided into two types: the presidential and the parliamentary-cabinet type. While that dichotomy does correspond to a major distinction, there are variations within each of the two groups. There is also an intermediate type known as semipresidential, singled out and theoretically developed by Maurice Duverger (1980) and Robert Elgie (1999).

The “ideal-type” presidential model is based on a sharp division among three state powers—executive, legislative, and judiciary—the assumption being that none of these powers can encroach on the others, a distinction that is particularly relevant with respect to the relationship between the executive and legislative powers. The model originated in the United States at the time of independence; while the American constitution of 1787 (ratified in 1789) has been amended many times, it has kept its main original features. The cornerstone of the executive is naturally the presidency, whose holder is elected for 4 years by the people (albeit indirectly, as electors vote for the members of an electoral college that has as its only function the election of the president). The Twenty-Second Amendment (1947) further mandated that the president can be reelected only once, while in some Latin American states (most of which adopted a similar model) the president cannot serve two successive terms and in some cases cannot be reelected at all.

The U.S. president is free to appoint the members of the administration at will, except that the upper house of the legislature—the Senate—has to approve these appointments. The top echelon of the executive is constituted by what is formally described as a cabinet composed of secretaries in charge of the various departments of the government, under whom are assistant secretaries, also appointed by the president. There is also an Executive Office of the President, while the closest advisers are part of the White House Office. All these are appointed at the “pleasure” of the president and rarely remain in their position from one presidential administration to the next, even if the incoming and outgoing presidents are members of the same party.

Perhaps the key characteristic of the American executive (and probably of at least many of those presidential systems modeled on the American system) is that its members are only loosely connected together and often do not know each other well at all; indeed, the president may not have had a close relationship with at least a number of them, although some of the positions may be filled by friends who are rewarded for their help, in particular during the presidential election campaign. This does create a situation that Hugh Heclo (1977) has described as a “government of strangers.” It also follows that one does not really know precisely who is part of the government. Problems are particularly serious with respect to the distinction between the secretaries and their assistants, on the one hand, and White House staff members, on the other, the latter being often effectively in charge of some of
the functions of the secretaries, particularly in the context of foreign affairs, as when Henry Kissinger was adviser to President Richard Nixon before he became Secretary of State in the early 1970s.

The structure and composition of the national executive are very different in the other models of liberal-democratic executives; for example, that of the parliamentary-cabinet system, which, following British developments since the late 17th century, has been adopted widely in Europe and in many Commonwealth countries, as well as, among others, in Japan, Thailand, Israel, and Turkey. Originally, as was suggested earlier, the system allowed the members of the government—typically a cabinet—to run the affairs of the state, at least nominally, on behalf of the monarch.

The cabinet system differs in two fundamental ways from the presidential model, first in that the cabinet must enjoy the “confidence” of parliament to be able to be and remain in office and, second, in that the cabinet takes its decisions “collegially”: The prime minister is the head of the cabinet and therefore a part of it, while American presidents are not strictly speaking a part of their cabinet. As a result, members of the cabinet form a team: They stand or fall together; moreover, given the part played by parliament in the whole structure, cabinet members are typically drawn from among members of parliament. A further indirect consequence is that the duration of a cabinet is not fixed in advance but depends on the maintenance of parliamentary support.

Furthermore, and again largely because the cabinet needs the support of a majority in parliament, cabinets may be—and often are—based on coalitions among two or more parties. There can be single-party governments when one party enjoys an absolute majority in parliament or when, as occurs fairly frequently in Scandinavian countries, the government commands minority party support only but has negotiated (typically in advance) a promise from some of the other parties that they will vote for the impending government. In this case, but also in cases of coalitions, formal agreements that aim at determining in advance what the policy of the government will be are needed.

While the president is the head of the executive that he or she has set up, in parliamentary government the prime minister does not have, as a result of his or her position alone, a formally dominant position in the parliamentary-cabinet executive. This may happen, but many situations prevent the prime minister from exercising the kind of supreme leadership that the president is often said to have. Yet the president is also constrained in many ways, despite the fact that the expression *presidentialization* is sometimes used to refer to very powerful prime ministers.

Because the presidential system is regarded as somewhat rigid (Juan Linz, 1994), an intermediate system, known as semipresidentialism, has been adopted in some countries, France in particular, which is where it has lasted the longest, in effect for half a century since 1958; but it has also prevailed, in a less clear-cut manner, admittedly, in Finland and in Portugal, as well as outside Europe, in Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and South Korea. The detailed organization and practice of semipresidential systems varies appreciably, but the general principle is that, alongside the president, who is popularly elected, a cabinet headed by a prime minister is, as in parliamentary-cabinet systems, responsible to parliament. Finally, to be truly comprehensive, the case of Switzerland must be mentioned, since this is the only country in which the national executive, known as the Federal Council, which is composed of seven members elected for 4 years by parliament, is truly collective.

To be able to compare effectively these forms of government, and in particular presidential and parliamentary-cabinet systems, this entry turns to an examination of the power of these bodies, both formally and in practice, to direct the policies of the nations at the head of which they are.

**Power of National Executives**

Executive power is difficult to define. It is not based only on the powers that, for example, constitutions give to these bodies. As a matter of fact, most constitutions are somewhat vague or even misleading in this respect, to the extent that they may suggest that legislatures are in charge of the lawmaking process. This may be true from a purely constitutional point of view, but it is rarely true in practice. Moreover, the word *executives* conveys the impression that executives merely execute policies or ideas that have originated elsewhere. In reality, both in parliamentary-cabinet systems and, albeit to a more limited extent, in
liberal-democratic presidential systems, legislation is prepared by the government.

Executives have in reality to fulfill three different functions: those of initiation, coordination, and implementation. Initiation means that the ideas that may have been put forward previously by parties, especially by those that are represented in the government, as well as by interest groups or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and indeed by members of the legislature have to be implementable, both administratively and politically. They must not arouse conflicts such that the ability of the government to achieve its overall goals will be affected. Second, executives must coordinate the policies that have been initiated, as some of these may be closely connected to others; moreover, the policy-making process as a whole has to be financially sustainable: Proposals may have to be postponed, despite the fact that they may have previously been announced as being part of the government program. Finally, policies have to be implemented. It is often believed that implementation is simple and can be left to subordinates. This is true only up to a point, as implementation may be difficult, for instance, if a new organization has to be set up or if a matter is regarded as particularly urgent.

The skills required of ministers to fulfill satisfactorily these three governmental functions are very different. Initiation implies imagination to ensure that the new policy will be attractive and effective, coordination entails being able to work closely together with other members of the government, and implementation means managing public service bodies that are often very large and whose permanent officials may prefer to postpone new developments. Many members of the executive may find it difficult to carry out all three sets of activities well. The problem is particularly serious in parliamentary-cabinet systems as these are officially collective and at least collegial. It is in this type of executive that the members of the cabinet—the ministers—are expected to have the skills required to initiate, coordinate, and implement policies.

The following discussion first examines the case of members of the executive in presidential systems and, specifically, of liberal-democratic presidential systems, such as the American polity. As was noted earlier, there is a cabinet in the United States, but that cabinet is not in charge of the overall policy making; the president is in charge. The members of the cabinet—the secretaries—are essentially regarded as managers of policies that have been previously adopted in principle by the president. They may have helped frame these policies, together with their officials of the federal civil service, but the decision to proceed has to be given by the president. Coordination is also likely to be the province of the Executive Office of the President, where the Office of Management and Budget is located.

Yet each president tends to hold different views about how the whole executive is to be organized as well as about the ways in which the various offices are to relate to each other; moreover, as we noted, the secretaries are likely to be strangers to each other and to the departments that they run. As Shirley Warshaw (1996) has noted, there have therefore been substantial variations from president to president about the process of policy making, and the results have often been unsatisfactory.

These kinds of difficulties seem to be in the nature of the liberal-democratic presidential system, especially when that executive is very large, as it is in the case of the American federal government; yet two further sets of problems arise almost inevitably. The first has to do with the fact that there is clearly some ambiguity about the effective power of the executive with respect to the initiation of policies, especially when these require new legislation. As in liberal-democratic presidential systems, the legislature is elected independently from the executive, and it tends to maintain substantial control over the proposed bills that are submitted, including those that the president sends; it also exercises much independent control over the budget, in terms of both income and expenditure. There is therefore a clear limit to the influence that presidents can exercise. They may cajole and induce; they cannot threaten.

Second, at the other end of the chain, there is also a limit, in practice, to what the president and the secretaries can extract, so to speak, from the departments. Most departments cherish some kinds of policy developments more than others; meanwhile, they cultivate close relationships with some members and in particular some committees of the Congress; this enables the officials of these departments to obtain financial support for their requests. As a result, the top members of the executive—the secretaries—are often likely to find it difficult to change the direction of
the policies of their departments. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, for instance, President Lyndon Johnson, who was a policy expansionist, and President Richard Nixon, who was in favor of retrenchment, experienced problems in convincing departments to achieve their own goals in view of what can be regarded as the policy “habits” of the departments of the federal government.

Thus, in practice, there are clear limitations to the power that the president and the executive in general can exercise in a liberal-democratic presidential system such as that of the United States. Such limitations do not occur to the same extent in those presidential systems in which the presidential powers are less constrained by the constitution, as stressed by Mathew Shugart and John Carey (1992). Most political scientists believe that there were fewer limitations to the effective power of the executive, seemingly, in the few liberal-democratic semipresidential systems that existed in the beginning of the 21st century, of which France is often regarded as the best example. Finally, the executive appears to be least constrained of all in parliamentary-cabinet systems principally because that executive, more than the American executive, usually controls the legislature.

In parliamentary-cabinet systems, the government does indeed need majority support of the legislature to remain in existence and, by and large, that support exists because it is sustained by one or more parties that constitute the majority. According to Jean Blondel and Maurizio Cotta (2000), this is why that type of executive has often been described as being based on party government. Since there is a close relationship between the executive and the legislature in the parliamentary-cabinet system, the cabinet is able to exercise enough pressure on the legislature to obtain support at any rate for a very large proportion of the bills that it introduces in parliament as well as for a very large proportion of the financial requirements that it submits for approval. This does not mean that parliament can never have its way on any issue or on any budgetary provisions; there are indeed differences from country to country about the extent to which parliament can induce the executive to modify its policies, but by and large, across Western and even East-Central Europe, as well as in those countries of the Commonwealth that are liberal-democratic parliamentary systems, the executive is broadly speaking able to achieve its goals. If this is not achieved, there will be a governmental “crisis”: The prime minister is likely at least to threaten to resign and, indeed, in some cases, the threat is implemented.

The power of the executive in parliamentary cabinets of a liberal-democratic kind is thus large; yet it does not follow that all the members of these cabinets, let alone all the members of the executive, including those who are below cabinet rank, can exercise an equal fraction of that overall power. It has been pointed out by Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle (1996) that ministers are often more concerned about what goes on in the department that they run than about overall governmental policy. Although all members of the cabinet formally share the overall power of initiation that was referred to earlier, many do not exercise that power in fact at cabinet meetings. In parliamentary-cabinet systems, these meetings take place frequently (typically, once a week); yet they would be overburdened if every one of the 15 to 20 members of the cabinet were to participate actively on every issue. The result is that, by and large, the prime minister exercises more than the usually recognized role of “first among equals” and indeed that some prime ministers, in Britain but also elsewhere, are regarded as being “presidential,” wrongly in a sense because, as was noted earlier, presidents of liberal-democratic systems are confronted with the substantial power of the legislature and with the tendency of departments to be somewhat autonomous in the way they conduct their affairs. The power and strength of prime ministers do indeed vary appreciably, partly across countries, but partly also as a result of the extent to which they wish to be activists, in leading, indeed possibly in forcing, members of their cabinet to follow their line (Brian Farrell, 1971; Anthony King, 1994). It is nonetheless usually recognized that prime ministers of parliamentary cabinets enjoy a degree of power over political developments in their countries that exceeds that of presidents of liberal-democratic systems.

Conclusion

Executives in the contemporary world are, by and large, very powerful, even if they head liberal-democratic systems in which there are
constitutional and customary limitations to what governments can do—that is to say, their members are constrained by “veto players,” as George Tsebelis (2002) called them. Admittedly, some decisions may be slow to take because of the influence that interest groups and NGOs are able to exert and of the consequential unwillingness of governments to attempt, or attempt quickly, to override the proposals of these bodies.

Yet it is not the case that liberal-democratic governments cannot achieve what they propose to do, especially if these proposals are part of the program that was presented to the electorate at the previous election. While presidents in presidential systems of the liberal-democratic variety are typically, especially in the American case, not closely constrained by these election programs, parliamentary-cabinet governments are; this constraint limits effectively the power that these executives would be able to exercise if they were not party governments. There is thus little danger that governments should become unable to act because of the constitutional or customary limitations under which they operate. The limitations to which they have to pay strong attention stem from the part that the civil society at large is able to take in a democratic society, and it is surely right that it should be so if liberal-democratic systems are to deserve their name.

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See also Cabinets; Democracy, Types of; Government; Leadership; Parliamentary Systems; Presidentialism; Semipresidentialism

Further Readings

Experiments, Field

Field experimentation brings the rigorous estimation of causal effects that is the hallmark of experimentation to more naturalistic settings. This entry begins by defining field experimentation. It then describes the early history of political science field experimentation and discusses more recent developments. It concludes with a discussion of some of the weaknesses of field experimentation.

Definition

Experimentation is a method for obtaining unbiased estimates of causal effects. In social science experiments, the unit of observation is randomly assigned to different interventions, and the effect of the intervention is measured by comparing outcomes of interest across the randomly assigned groups. Field experiments are experiments that take place in real-world settings and attempt to reproduce the environment in which the phenomenon of interest naturally occurs. In contrast, laboratory experiments are often highly stylized representations of the social behaviors the investigators wish to learn about through their experiments, leading to concern that the results from the laboratory will
Experiments, Field

not apply to behavior more generally. The realism of field experiments is intended to minimize concerns about the external validity, or the generalizability, of the experimental results.

Experiments have many components, which may differ in their degree of realism, leading to a blurring of the distinction between what is or is not a field experiment. Economists Glenn Harrison and John List propose a four-category taxonomy to distinguish field experiments from laboratory experiments. According to this taxonomy, a conventional laboratory experiment uses a standard subject pool (i.e., drawn from the university) and an abstract framing of the problem being investigated. Examples of this would be laboratory studies of play in dictator and ultimatum games. Two intermediate categories of experiments, which move in the direction of greater realism, are the artifactual and the framed field experiments. An artifactual field experiment deviates from the conventional laboratory experiment through the use of nonstandard subjects. For example, researchers have investigated ethnic conflict by performing standard laboratory games, such as the dictator game, in Africa, with subjects drawn from groups with a history of ethnic rivalry. The framed field experiment moves further away from the conventional laboratory experiment. This type of experiment uses realistic subjects (as does the artifactual experiment); however, in contrast to the artifactual experiment, the task and context is also more realistic. An example of a framed field experiment in political science is research on the effect of money on legislative access, in which congressional staffers make hypothetical scheduling decisions based on information they are provided about the individual seeking time with the representative. A natural field experiment, which is the design often referred to simply as a “field experiment” in political science, is the same as a framed field experiment, except that the environment is the one where the subjects naturally perform the task in question and the subjects are unaware that they are in an experiment. Research in which political campaigns randomly assign households to receive different campaign mailings to test the effect of alternative communications on voter turnout is an example of a natural field experiment.

This entry focuses on natural field experiments. Although the degree of naturalism in field experiments is the greatest strength of the method, it is important to remember that the goal of experimental interventions is to estimate a causal effect, not to achieve “realism.” If the researcher aims to capture basic psychological processes that do not vary across populations, experimental contexts, or subject awareness of the experiment, then there is no problem with conventional laboratory studies. That said, understanding behavior in natural environments is frequently the ultimate goal of social science research, and it is hard if not impossible to even recognize the full set of threats to external validity present in artificial contexts, let alone adjust the measured experimental effects and measures of uncertainty to account for these threats.

Field Experiments in Political Science

The earliest field experiments in political science were performed in the 1920s by Harold Gosnell, who sought to measure the effect of get-out-the-vote appeals in the 1924 presidential and 1925 mayoral elections in Chicago. Over the next 30 years, researchers conducted related field experimental work on the relative effectiveness of emotional versus rational political appeals and the turnout effects of different modes of communication (mail, phone, and visits). This early literature appears to have been inspired by the development and application of experimental methodology in agriculture, medicine, and other fields. These pioneering field experiments, however, had limited impact on subsequent research strategies. With rare exceptions, there was no follow-up work using the experimental method in real-world settings to replicate the earlier experiments, to extend the voter mobilization studies to new settings or communications methods, or to apply the method to new questions. Rather, when considering alternative research designs, field experimentation was either ignored or dismissed due to skepticism about whether real-world experiments were feasible. Indeed, no field experiment appeared in a major political science journal in the 1990s.

In recent years, there has been a significant revival of field experimentation in several disciplines, most notably in economics and political science. This turn to field experimentation follows important intellectual developments across the social sciences. During the 1980s, there was increasing appreciation, especially in economics, of
the difficulty in estimating causal effects from standard observational data due to bias caused by unobservable factors. Researchers were increasingly attracted to naturally occurring randomizations or near-randomized applications of a “treatment” that could provide data where, as in a planned experiment, there is no expected association between the treatment and the unobservables. Examples of this work include Joshua Angrist’s study of the effect of Vietnam War service on wages, where an individual’s draft lottery number altered the likelihood of service, and Steven Levitt’s use of variation in policing levels associated with election cycles to estimate the effect of police on crime. This brand of research was characterized by enormous creativity. However, naturally occurring randomizations or near randomizations are rare, perhaps as rare as the talent required to spot them, and valid instrumental variables must satisfy rigorous requirements. In contrast, randomized experimental interventions permit scholars to produce exogenous variation in the treatment variable by design, avoiding the need to discover a fortuitous naturally occurring randomization or make the often questionable assumptions required by other statistical designs. A further advantage of planned experiments is that the researcher knows which subjects are assigned to be treated. This is frequently not the case in observational studies. In particular, for studies based on survey data, treatment assignment is typically measured through self-reports, introducing the possibility of bias due to measurement error.

The modern revival of field experiments in political science can be traced to Alan Gerber and Donald Green, who in 2000 examined the effect of voter mobilization in New Haven, Connecticut, on the November 1998 elections. Gerber and Green measured the turnout effects of nonpartisan face-to-face canvassing, phone calls, and mailings. Since this study, numerous field experiments have measured the effects of political communications on voter turnout. Several replicate the basic design of the New Haven study and measure the effect of canvassing, phone, or mail in new political contexts, including other countries. Others examine new modes of communication or variations on the simple programs used in New Haven, such as an analysis of the effect of phone calls or contacts by communicators matched to the ethnicity of the household, repeat phone calls, or partisan television and radio broadcasts. Recent work has begun to consider the effects of newer technologies, such as e-mail and text messaging, or novel approaches to mobilization, such as election day parties at polling places. Meta-analysis of the results of dozens of canvassing, mail, and phone studies is reported in a quadrennial literature review, “Get Out the Vote.” Overall, the results have been consistent with the initial New Haven findings. Canvassing has a much larger effect than less personal modes of communication, such as phone and mail. The effect of brief commercial calls, such as those studied in New Haven, and nonpartisan mailings appear to be less than 1 percentage point while canvassing boosts turnout by about 7 percentage points in a typical election.

In recent years, field experimentation has spread beyond measuring the effects of various interventions on voter turnout to address other aspects of political behavior, to assess institutional performance, and to consider broader theoretical issues such as social influence, norm compliance, collective action, and interpersonal influence. For instance, one recent application of field experiments to investigate theoretical constructs in political behavior uses a field experiment to measure the causal effect of partisanship. Researchers sent mailings informing unaffiliated, registered voters of the need to affiliate with a party to participate in the upcoming closed primary in Connecticut. They found that the mailings increased formal party affiliation, and a posttreatment survey found a shift in partisan identification as well as a shift in political attitudes. Another study measures social spillover effects of political communications and finds that spouses and roommates of those who are contacted during a voter mobilization drive are also more likely to vote. Other scholars have investigated the effect of social pressure on norm compliance by measuring the effects of alternative mailings that exert varying degrees of social pressure. These findings indicate that a pre-election mailing listing the recipient’s own voting record and a mailing listing the voting record of the recipient and their neighbors cause a dramatic increase in turnout. Follow-up research uses a postexperiment survey to measure whether this treatment response varies with subject personality. A novel study of elite behavior examines the effect of a lobbying effort on
a bill in the New Hampshire legislature and finds that a random e-mail from an interest group causes a statistically significant increase in roll call voting for the sponsor’s measure.

Although the initial studies in the modern wave of field experiments were entirely by American politics specialists, comparative politics and international relations scholars are now applying the method to important questions in these fields. For example, one study compares broad policy versus narrow clientelistic campaign messages in a 2001 Benin election. Another study examines the effect of election monitors on vote fraud levels. In a study of collective action and social capital conducted following civil war in Liberia, researchers found that foreign aid for community-driven reconstruction projects increases social cohesion as measured by behavior in public goods games. A recent example of work that examines institutional performance compares the performance of alternative institutions for the selection of a public good in Indonesia. This research finds that while more participatory institutions do not change the set of projects approved, participants are more satisfied with the decision-making process. A recent study examined the effect of legislative performance report cards on representatives’ attendance records in Uganda. They report that instituting this method of showing legislators’ attendance to their constituents results in higher levels of parliamentary attendance rates. This work highlights an important contrast between field experimentation and observational methods: Field experiments may be used to study both common real-world phenomena (such as campaign television commercials or the effect of election monitors) as well as novel interventions for which there are no observational counterparts (unusual mailings or legislative report cards in developing countries). For novel interventions, there are no naturally occurring parallels to the intervention, and so no observational study is even possible.

In addition to these and other substantive applications, field experiments have increasingly been used to assess the performance of nonexperimental methods. Following the example of Robert LaLonde’s study of job training programs, data from experimental studies can be reanalyzed using observational techniques. The performance of the observational method can then be evaluated by comparing the results with the unbiased estimates obtained when the analyst uses knowledge of the randomized treatment assignment. Applying this approach to an experimental study of voter mobilization phone calls, researchers compared the experimental and observational estimates of the effect of the intervention. They find that regression analysis and exact matching both dramatically overestimate the treatment effect.

**Some Weaknesses of Field Experimentation**

The combination of unbiased estimation and a natural context makes field experimentation very attractive, but the method has some important drawbacks. Among the various criticisms, three are focused on here. First, field experiments are typically more costly and difficult to implement than conventional laboratory experiments or standard observational studies. A field experiment designed to test the effects of face-to-face canvassing involves recruiting and training canvassers and then sending out canvassers to deliver mobilization messages, perhaps in the rain, to subjects who may or may not be home. Following the election, the data must be merged with the postelection voter file. It is logistically more challenging than inviting subjects into your university laboratory to listen to a script and then state their vote intention. Scholars have analyzed the design of experiments to improve their statistical efficiency, an especially important concern for field experiments facing low compliance rates.

Second, in contrast to the laboratory environment, interaction between subjects cannot be controlled in the field environment, which leads to the possibility that the outcomes for subjects will be influenced by the treatment status of other subjects. For example, a study comparing treatment group and control group households will be biased if those who are treated interact with those assigned to the control group and in turn alter the behavior of those in untreated households. These contamination effects can be minimized by measuring the outcome soon after treatment or treating a small fraction of the subject pool. Furthermore, contamination effects can themselves become the object of study, either by asking about interactions across subjects in a posttreatment survey or by measuring the effects of the proximity of control
Experiments, Laboratory

Laboratory experiments are used in political science to empirically test the results and assumptions of formal models. These types of experiments are conducted using human subjects in a specific location, usually in a computer laboratory, where the experimenter has complete control over the experimental environment. These types of experiments often use a computer interface to deliver the experimental stimuli to subjects. For example, laboratory experiments are used to empirically test formal models of elections, committees, bargaining, and other political topics. This entry presents some of the special features and advantages of this method.

Formal models are mathematically defined and derived by assumptions where the assumptions (sometimes) result in an equilibrium prediction. In formal models, the assumptions are of two types: assumptions about institutional and other exogenous factors such as voting rules, bargaining procedures, preference distributions, and so forth, and assumptions about the behavioral choices of the political actors in the context of these exogenous factors. The model makes assumptions about both electoral institutions and voters’ rationality, and the predictions are behavioral.

Laboratory experiments are ideal to test formal models since the assumptions of the model can be operationalized in the laboratory, and human subjects can be used to play the role of actors within the model. Hence, researchers can empirically determine how the assumptions and predictions of the model hold up when human subjects play the game. In laboratory experiments, researchers are able to establish controls over the experimental environment.

References


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See also Experiments, Laboratory; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian

Further Readings

environment that allow them to establish and measure causality, which is how one variable(s) affects another variable(s). In experiments, causality is established by specifying different control variables and then having subjects randomly assigned to various treatments. For instance, if a researcher is interested in how the cost of voting affects voting behavior, the researcher can specify two treatments—one with a voting cost and another without a voting cost. Then, holding all other parameters of the experiment constant, it is possible to compare the two treatments and isolate the effects of voting cost, given the parameters introduced in the experiment.

Most laboratory experiments use a within-subject design as opposed to a between-subject design. In a within-subject design, subjects in the experiment experience all treatments; in a between-subject design, subjects experience only one treatment. In a within-subject design, subjects are randomly assigned to all the treatments over multiple periods. One advantage of a within-subject design is that it greatly increases the data that are collected. Another advantage as opposed to a between-subject design is that it reduces the error variance associated with differences in subject behavior (i.e., in a between-subject design, subjects may not be randomly mixed and might have shared factors that are unknown to the experimenter). Third, a within-subject design reduces repeated game effects, which means that most models are a one-shot game, but experiments usually test the model over multiple periods. To keep the one-shot nature of the model intact, subjects are assigned to different treatments over multiple periods, so that they will experience a different experimental environment in each period. Hence, each period will be a new experience, and subjects should not feel like they are playing the same experiment in each period.

As mentioned above, causality is established by experimental controls and randomization of subjects to different treatments, allowing the researcher to directly observe the impact of one variable on another without the use of sophisticated statistical methods. One important control is the motivation of subjects. Laboratory experiments follow the dictates of induced value theory. This means that subjects in the experiment have monetary incentives, and they are paid earnings based on their performance during the experiment. With this payment structure then, one subject might take an action that earns him $1, while another subject might take a different action that earns her $2. Induced value theory specifies that as long as subjects are sufficiently rewarded monetarily, subject choices in the experiment should be natural.

To enhance a subject’s monetary incentive and to control factors that are not controlled for in the experiment (e.g., psychological factors), laboratory experiments use a sterile environment as opposed to a contextual environment. For instance, in an election experiment, instead of having voters vote for two candidates labeled the left and the right candidate, candidates are given generic labels, such as A or B, or Green and Red. The reason is that a subject might vote for a right candidate because the subject is conservative and thinks the right candidate is more aligned with his or her preferences. Hence, the subject might vote for a candidate based on ideological preferences and mistakenly not vote for a candidate based on the monetary structure induced within the experiment.

Using monetary incentives, the experimenter is able to establish controls over the preferences of subjects. Why do researchers need to control the preferences of subjects? Because this allows a subject’s behavior to be measured. Generally, subjects are assigned a utility function that maps monetary amounts to various outcomes. For instance, assume that there are three alternatives that a subject confronts during the experiment—A, B, C—where for a subject, A is worth $2, B is worth $1, and C is worth $0. Hence, a subject’s preferences over the alternatives are A > B > C. In the experiment, a subject’s motivation is to make choices that yield the highest possible payoff for the subject. Subjects in the experiment can have conflicting interests, such that another subject might have the preferences C > B > A.

By controlling preferences, it is possible to examine a wide range of topics, but let us consider one: strategic and coordinated voting in three-candidate elections. To illustrate, suppose a group of four subjects (Group 1) has the preferences A > B > C, another group of four subjects (Group 2) has the preferences B > A > C, and a third group of six subjects (Group 3) prefers C and is indifferent between A and B (i.e., A = B). If the experimental election assumed plurality voting and all subjects voted for their most preferred alternative,
then C would win the election. But note that this is the least preferred outcome of Groups 1 and 2. Hence, members of Groups 1 and 2 have an incentive to vote strategically—that is to vote for a least preferred outcome to get a better one. To accomplish this, either members of Group 1 would have to strategically vote for B or members of Group 2 would have to strategically vote for A. Hence, it is a coordination problem. In experiments Robert Forsythe and colleagues found that without any type of coordination device, voters were unable to coordinate.

Within this framework, it is possible to vary other control variables to determine the impact that other variables have on the ability of voters to coordinate their vote when strategic voting will increase their payoffs. One variable is the type of election rule subjects vote under. Experiments that varied election rules, such as the Borda rule and approval voting, found that as compared with plurality voting, the Borda rule and approval voting allowed subjects to coordinate more easily.

Another important control variable that is established in the laboratory is the information that subjects have about the experimental environment. For instance, in election experiments, it is possible to vary the information that subjects have about candidates (i.e., a voter may know that A is her most preferred candidate but does not know if she prefers B or C). Controlling subject information has been used to experimentally study the classic Downsian model of elections. In this model, political candidates adopt policy positions over a single-issue dimension (i.e., a single line that ranges from 0 to 100). Voters in this setup have single-peaked preferences over the dimension (single-peaked preferences means that voters have an ideal point over the dimension or a best location). Assuming an odd number of voters who know where the candidates are located on the dimension and of candidates who know where voters are located on the dimension, candidates’ optimal location or equilibrium is at the position of the median voter—which is the well-known median voter theorem.

Experiments were conducted that relaxed the full-information condition of the model to determine if the median voter result would still hold. Richard McKelvey and Peter Ordeshook limited the information that voters and candidate subjects had about the election environment. They found that when voters only knew the relative location of candidates and candidates had no knowledge of the voters’ distribution of preferences, then outcomes generally conformed to the median voter’s ideal point.

In addition to the controls over the experimental environment, laboratory experiments allow researchers to study political phenomena that would be difficult to study using real-world data. For instance, Marco Battaglini, Rebecca Morton, and Thomas Palfrey examined a “swing voter’s curse” that relates to the paradox of why people vote, since the probability of a single vote affecting the outcome is very small. If there is a cost to voting, then there is no rational reason to vote, but what if a voter pays the cost of voting and goes to the polling station but then does not vote for certain items on the ballot? The swing voter’s curse happens when a voter forgoes voting for an item on a ballot and delegates this decision to other voters whom he thinks are more informed. The results showed that uninformed voters do in fact delegate their vote or abstain most of the time in these cases. Hence, knowledge of why voters behave in this manner would be difficult to discern without using laboratory experiments.

One concern that has been expressed about laboratory experiments among nonexperimental researchers is related to validity issues. The reason that experimental researchers face this question is that nonexperimental researchers feel that a computer laboratory is an artificial environment and does not replicate the real world. However, the artificiality of the environment is a desirable property, and it allows the researcher to make precise measurements of behavior within the laboratory. The results in the laboratory can be compared with other studies using different types of data to further enhance validity.

In sum, laboratory experiments are used to test the assumptions and predictions of formal models. Using this methodology, it is easy to measure causality by specifying different control variables and randomly assigning subjects to different treatments. Control over motivation in the experiment allows for the control of preferences and allows for the measurement of behavior. Also, using this method, a researcher is able to examine the properties of political mechanisms that have not been instituted or used very little in the real world.
Finally, laboratory experiments allow the researcher to empirically examine all types of political mechanisms and collect relevant data, which are difficult to obtain using nonexperimental methods.

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See also  
Causality; Comparative Methods; Experiments, Field; Experiments, Natural

Further Readings


**Experiments, Natural**

The importance of natural experiments—analyses of real-world situations that attempt to employ some type of random assignment—is in their contribution to addressing confounding, a pervasive problem in the social sciences. Consider the obstacles to addressing the following hypothesis: Extending property titles to poor land squatters boosts access to credit markets and promotes beliefs in individual political efficacy, thereby fostering socioeconomic development. To test this idea, researchers might compare poor squatters who possess land titles with those who do not. Yet confounding may be a problem because differences in individual attitudes and behaviors could in part be due to factors—such as family background—that also make certain poor squatters more likely to acquire titles to their property. This entry examines both the strengths and potential limitations of natural experiments and how they fit among the various research strategies available to political scientists.

It is useful to contrast natural experiments with both conventional observational studies and true experiments. In the first approach, investigators seek to control for potential confounders in observational (nonexperimental) data. For instance, they may compare titled and untitled squatters within strata defined by measures of family background. At the core of conventional quantitative methods is the hope that such confounders can be identified, measured, and controlled. Yet this is not easy to do. Even within the strata defined by family background and intelligence, there may be other difficult-to-measure confounders—say, determination—that are associated with obtaining titles and that also influence economic and political behaviors.

A second approach would be to use a randomized controlled experiment to estimate the effects of land titling. Subjects could be randomly assigned to receive titles or not; family background, determination, and other possible confounders would then be equivalent, on average and up to random error, across these two groups. Thus, large posttitling differences would then be credible evidence for a causal effect of land titles. However, experimental research in such contexts may be expensive, impractical, or unethical.

Scholars therefore increasingly make use of natural experiments—attempting to identify and analyze real-world situations in which some process of random or as-if random assignment places cases in alternative categories of the key independent variable. In the social sciences, this approach has been used to study the relationship between
lottery winnings and political attitudes, the effect of voting costs on turnout, the impact of quotas for women village councilors on public goods provision in India, and many other topics. In the health sciences, a paradigmatic example comes from John Snow’s 19th-century tests of the hypothesis that cholera is waterborne.

Natural experiments share one crucial attribute with true experiments and partially share a second attribute. First, outcomes are typically compared across subjects exposed to a treatment and those exposed to a control condition (or a different treatment). Second, in partial contrast with true experiments, subjects are often assigned to the treatment not at random but rather as-if at random (though sometimes true randomization occurs, as in lottery studies). Given that the data come from naturally occurring phenomena that often entail social and political processes, the manipulation of the treatment is not under the control of the analyst; thus, the study is observational.

However, a researcher carrying out this type of study can often make a credible claim that the assignment of nonexperimental subjects to treatment and control conditions is as good as random. This distinguishes natural experiments from “quasi experiments,” in which comparisons are also made across treatment and control groups, but nonrandom assignment to treatment is a key feature of the designs.

Yet how can the claim of as-if random assignment in natural experiments be validated? And how much leverage do natural experiments in fact provide for causal inference? These questions are discussed below, after the initial example on land titling is discussed at greater length.

**How Do Property Rights Affect the Poor?**

An interesting social-scientific example comes from a study of how land titles influence the socio-economic development of poor communities. In 1981, urban squatters organized by the Catholic Church in Argentina occupied open land in the province of Buenos Aires, dividing the land into parcels that were allocated to individual families. A 1984 law, adopted after the return to democracy in 1983, expropriated this land with the intention of transferring titles to the squatters. However, some of the original landowners challenged the expropriation in court, leading to long delays in the transfer of titles to some of the squatters. By contrast, for other squatters, titles were granted immediately.

The legal action therefore created a (treatment) group of squatters to whom titles were granted promptly and a (control) group to whom titles were not granted. The authors of the study found subsequent differences across the two groups in standard social development indicators: average housing investment, household structure, and educational attainment of children. In contrast, the authors do not find a difference in access to credit markets, which contradicts a well-known theory that the poor will use titled property to collateralize debt. They also found a positive effect of property rights on self-perceptions of individual efficacy. For instance, squatters who were granted land titles— for reasons over which they apparently had no control—disproportionately agreed with statements that people get ahead in life due to hard work.

Is this a valid natural experiment? The key claim is that land titles were assigned to the squatters as-if at random, and the authors present various kinds of evidence to support this assertion. In 1981, for example, the eventual expropriation of land by the state and the transfer of titles to squatters could not have been predicted. Moreover, there was little basis for successful prediction by squatters or the Catholic Church organizers of which particular parcels would eventually have their titles transferred in 1984. Titled and untitled parcels sat side-by-side in the occupied area, and the parcels had similar characteristics, such as distance from polluted creeks. The authors also show that the squatters’ characteristics, such as age and sex, were statistically unrelated to whether they received titles—as should be the case if titles were assigned at random. Finally, the government offered equivalent compensation—based on the size of the lot—to the original owners in both groups, suggesting that the value of the parcels does not explain which owners challenged expropriation and which did not. On the basis of extensive interviews and other qualitative fieldwork, the authors argue convincingly that idiosyncratic factors explain some owners’ decisions to challenge expropriation and that these factors were
unrelated to the characteristics of squatters or their parcels.

The authors thus present compelling evidence for the equivalence of treated and untreated units. Along with qualitative evidence on the process by which the squatting took place, this evidence helps bolster the assertion that assignment is as-if random. Of course, assignment was not randomized, so the possibility of unobserved confounders cannot be entirely ruled out. Yet the argument for as-good-as-random assignment appears compelling. Note that the natural experiment plays a crucial role. Without it, the intriguing findings about the self-reinforcing (not to mention self-deluding) beliefs of the squatters could have been explained as a result of unobserved characteristics of those squatters who did or did not successfully gain titles.

A Framework for Evaluating Natural Experiments

How much leverage for causal inference do natural experiments in fact provide? To address this question, it is helpful to discuss three dimensions along which natural experiments may vary:

1. plausibility of an as-if random assignment;
2. credibility of the statistical models, which is closely connected with the simplicity and transparency of the data analysis; and
3. substantive relevance of the intervention—that is, whether and in what ways the specific contrast between treatment and control provides insight into a wider range of important issues and contexts.

First, the key claim—and the definitional criterion—for a natural experiment is that treatment assignment is as good as random. Yet one finds marked variation in the plausibility of this claim among studies that claim to use natural experiments.

How can the assertion of as-if random be at least partially validated? First, it should be supported by the available empirical evidence—for example, by showing equivalence on relevant pre-treatment variables (those whose values were determined before the intervention took place) across treatment and control groups, as would occur on average with true randomization. Qualitative knowledge about the process by which treatment assignment takes place can also play a key role in validating a natural experiment. The authors of the studies on land titling use both quantitative comparisons and qualitative evidence about the process of organizing squatters’ settlements to validate the claim of an as-if random assignment.

A second dimension along which natural experiments may vary is in the credibility of the statistical models used to analyze the data. As with true experiments, as-if random assignment implies that both known and unknown confounders are balanced (in expectation) across treatment and control groups, obviating the need to measure and control for confounding variables. This has the great advantage of permitting the use of simple analytic tools—for example, comparisons of means or percentages across the treatment and control groups—to make causal inferences. In principle, the simplicity and transparency of the statistical analysis provides natural experiments with an important advantage, relative to the conventional quantitative methods that have in recent years incurred substantial criticism from leading methodologists.

In practice, greater credibility of statistical models is not inherent in all studies that claim to use natural experiments. One recent survey of leading examples from political science and economics found that about half of the studies failed to present simple, unadjusted difference-of-means tests (in addition to any auxiliary analyses). Of course, in less-than-perfect natural experiments, in which the plausibility of as-if random is perhaps impeachable, researchers may feel compelled to control for potential confounders they can measure. Yet any substantial changes after adjustment likely point to a lack of as-if random assignment—because randomization would ensure that control variables are independent of treatment assignment. Post hoc statistical fixes can also lead to data mining, with only “significant” estimates of causal effects making their way into published reports. (Researchers also sometimes use multivariate regression to reduce the variability of treatment effect estimators; yet variance may be higher or lower after adjustment, and the standard errors calculated using the usual
regression formulas do not apply.) Thus, to bolster the credibility of the statistical models used in natural-experimental designs, analysts should report unadjusted difference-of-means tests, in addition to any auxiliary analyses.

A third dimension along which natural experiments can be classified is the substantive relevance of the intervention. Here we ask, “To what extent does as-if random assignment shed light on the wider social-scientific, substantive, and/or policy issues that motivate the study?” Answers to this question might be a cause for concern, for a number of reasons. For instance, the type of subjects or units exposed to the intervention might be more or less like the populations in which we are most interested. In lottery studies of electoral behavior, for example, levels of lottery winnings may be randomly assigned among lottery players, but we might doubt whether lottery players are like other populations (say, all voters). Next, the particular treatment might have idiosyncratic effects that are distinct from the effects of greatest interest. To continue the same example, levels of lottery winnings may or may not have similar effects on, say, political attitudes as income earned through work. Finally, natural experimental interventions (like the interventions in some true experiments) may “bundle” many distinct treatments or components of treatments, which may limit the extent to which this approach isolates the effect of the explanatory variable about which the researcher cares most. Such ideas are often discussed under the rubric of “external validity,” but the issue of substantive relevance involves a broader question—that is, whether the intervention in fact yields causal inferences about the real causal hypothesis of concern.

To tie this discussion together, we can imagine a cube, in which the three axes are defined by these three dimensions:

1. plausibility of as-if random assignment,
2. credibility of statistical models, and
3. substantive relevance of intervention.

In the front lower-left corner of the cube, we find those natural experiments that offer the least plausibility, credibility, and substantive relevance. In the back upper-right corner of the cube, we find those studies with the most plausibility, credibility, and relevance. The process of achieving a strong research design—in which natural experiments provide substantial leverage for causal inference—may be understood as the process of moving from the front lower-left, “weak research design” corner of the cube, to the back upper-right, “strong research design” corner of the cube.

Two points are important to make in closing. First, there may be trade-offs in seeking to design a strong natural experiment—that is, in moving to the back upper-right corner of the cube. Different studies may manage the trade-off among these three dimensions in different ways, and which trade-offs are acceptable (or unavoidable) may depend on the question being asked.

Second, deep substantive knowledge, and a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses, can help analysts better achieve success along all the three dimensions of the framework described above. Consider the studies of squatters in Argentina. There, substantive knowledge was necessary to recognize the potential to use a natural experiment to study the effect of land titling, and many field interviews were required to probe the plausibility of as-if randomness—that is, to validate the research design. Fieldwork can also enrich analysts’ understanding and interpretation of the causal effects they estimate.

In sum, many modes of inquiry may contribute to successful causal inference using natural experiments; ultimately, the right mix of methods substantially depends on the research question involved. Natural experiments, like regression analysis, do not provide a technical quick fix to the challenges of causal inference. In every study, analysts are challenged to think critically about the match between the assumptions of models and the empirical reality they are studying. Natural experiments are valuable to the extent that they build on real substantive knowledge and appropriate methodological craftsmanship and a full awareness of the trade-offs inherent in this style of research.

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See also Causality; Experiments, Field; Experiments, Laboratory; Mixed Methods; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods

Further Readings


Factor Analysis

Factor analysis is a well-established method that attempts to measure latent constructs such as attitudes or values, which cannot be observed directly. The standard model assumes that the measured variables (items or indicators) are linear additive functions of the unobserved (latent) factors and the error component. This is called the common-factor model. The general system of equations for this model is

\[ y_j = \lambda_1 \eta_1 + \lambda_2 \eta_2 + \cdots + \lambda_m \eta_m + \varepsilon_j, \]

where \( y_j \) represents the 1, \ldots, \( j \) observed variables measured on a sample of \( n \) independent subjects; \( \eta_1, \ldots, \eta_m \) represent the 1, \ldots, \( m \) latent constructs (factors) in the model; \( \lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_m \) represent the factor loading (partialized regression coefficient) relating variables 1, \ldots, \( j \) to the first to \( m \)th factors; and \( \varepsilon_1, \ldots, \varepsilon_j \) stands for the error component (uniqueness). It is assumed that the error component of one indicator or item is independent of all factors and of all error components of the other items. In this entry, the two major forms—exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)—are presented.

An example with five items (\( y_1, \ldots, y_5 \)), two factors (\( \eta_1, \eta_2 \)), and five random measurement errors (\( \varepsilon_1, \ldots, \varepsilon_5 \)) is given in Figure 1; \( \phi_{12} \) is the symbol for the covariance between the Factors 1 and 2.

The variance of the unique component can be further decomposed as \( \varepsilon_i = \varepsilon_s + \varepsilon_e \), where \( \varepsilon_s \) is the specific error variance due to the particular item (e.g., a specific item wording) and \( \varepsilon_e \) the random measurement error. In most cross-sectional studies, one cannot distinguish between these two kinds of errors because they are not separately identified. It is possible to separate these components only by using special designs like multitrait-multimethod or panel studies.

Generally, one has to differentiate between EFA and CFA. EFA is used when there is no or not sufficient a priori knowledge about the number of factors and the relationship between items and constructs. CFA, in contrast, is used when researchers have concrete assumptions about the measurement model.

**Exploratory Factor Analysis**

EFA is a method used to detect the optimal number of factors that accounts for the correlation of
Factor Analysis

items. Each factor is interpreted and named based on the items that have high loadings on this factor. Its character is inductive as the number of factors, the amount of correlations between factors, and the assignments between items and factors are performed empirically without a precise deductive theoretical model. There is no unique solution for the relation between observed items and latent factors. There are two different approaches to the factor model—(a) common-factor model and (b) principal component analysis—and each implies different substantive assumptions. In the common-factor model, it is assumed that every item is measured with some error. Therefore, the common-factor model is most appropriate in survey research, where items are always measured with some error. However, in the principal component model, the researcher assumes that there is no measurement error in the items. All analyses are based on correlation matrices as input.

EFA is performed in five steps:

1. **Factor extraction:** The method that is most often used is the method of principal axis factoring and is based on the computation of the eigenvalues and vectors of the correlation matrix between all measured variables. Its goal is the maximization of the variance of each successively extracted factor.

2. **Number of factors:** Different procedures determine the number of factors: (a) According to the Kaiser-Guttman criterion, the number of factors should correspond to the number of eigenvalues of the full input correlation matrix that exceed one. (b) The scree plot is a graph of each eigenvalue plotted in descending order. The number of factors is determined by visual inspection by observing whether, suddenly, the plot shows no real difference between the last two eigenvalues in the scree plot. (c) In parallel analysis, a second factor analysis is calculated with a random data set with the same numbers of variables and cases as in the original analysis. Only the factors with higher eigenvalues than the factors of the random data are accepted. (d) In maximum likelihood estimation, one studies the amount of residuals left over after introducing more factors and evaluates them by goodness-of-fit tests of the whole model.

3. **Communality estimation as a measure for the common variance of every item:** The most often used method for an initial estimate is the squared multiple correlation of one item with all other items. Depending on the number of factors extracted, the final solution contains the explained variance of every item.

4. **Factor rotation:** The goal of rotation is to achieve “a simple structure” that allows a good interpretation of the resulting solution. Rotations can be orthogonal, assuming that there are no correlations between factors (e.g., varimax, quartimax, and equimax), or oblique (e.g., promax, oblimin), assuming that there exist correlations between factors. In the case of correlated factors, the factor loadings of items on factors contained in the pattern factor matrix represent standardized partialized regression coefficients. In the case of noncorrelated factors, these coefficients are simply correlation coefficients between items and factors. The factor structure matrix contains the simple bivariate correlations between items and constructs. The values differ from the factor pattern matrix only if factors are correlated.

5. **Factor score estimation:** As a final step, one may be interested in estimating the factor scores. The factor scores are often used as weights for raw scores in the computation of indices that are used in subsequent analyses.

**Confirmatory Factor Analysis**

In contrast to EFA, in CFA, a theoretical model is needed that contains a series of a priori hypotheses. These hypotheses should be drawn from the substantive literature. For example, in the theory of values of Shalom Schwartz, 10 values are postulated and theoretically derived. Therefore, the 10 theoretical constructs can be formalized and tested as latent variables in a CFA model. However, it is not definitely determined in the literature which and how many dimensions and items are adequate to measure the concepts of nationalism and patriotism and whether one can differentiate between them. The hypotheses in a CFA model refer to the following aspects of a measurement model: (a) determination of the number of factors, (b) assumption regarding whether the factors are correlated or not, (c) determination of which items load on which factor and where to set loadings a priori to zero, and (d) assumptions about the correlations of the errors. CFA allows the specification and testing of these assumptions. It is possible to fix parameters to a
certain value or to constrain parameters that are set equal to other parameters. One assumes that the expected value of random measurement error is zero \( (e_i = 0) \) and the correlation of the random measurement error with the latent variable (factor) is also zero. Furthermore, it is necessary to fix one of the loadings to one or to standardize the variance of the latent variable to reach identification of the model, that is, to achieve a unique solution.

To illustrate this, in this entry, we use data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) National Identity module collected in 2003, which contains items to measure nationalism and constructive patriotism. Theoretically, it has been discussed whether there are two different latent variables (factors)—namely, nationalism and constructive patriotism. Nationalism was measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The questions were worded as follows: (1) “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [country nationality of the respondent].” (2) “Generally speaking, [the respondent’s country] is a better country than most other countries.” A high score indicates a high degree of nationalism. Constructive patriotism was measured using the following three items: “How proud are you of [respondent’s country] in each of the following:” (3) “The way democracy works.” (4) “Its social security system.” (5) “Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society.” Responses were given on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (not proud at all) to 4 (very proud). The Pearson correlation matrix and standard deviations are provided for the United States in Table 1. Pairwise deletion of missing values was used because the number of missing values was low (less than 5%).

The standardized and unstandardized coefficients were computed using the maximum likelihood estimation procedure in AMOS version 18 software with graphical input (see Figure 2).

Figure 2 shows that the two latent variables (factors)—constructive patriotism and nationalism—are positively correlated \( (r = .48) \). The standardized factor loadings are all equal to or higher than .50, which is an expression of the sufficient formal validity of the items in the model. Furthermore, “demo,” “security,” and “fair” are only explained by patriotism, whereas “like us” and “better” are only explained by nationalism. There are no cross-loadings. Therefore, both convergent validity by sufficient factor loadings of the items on their respective factors and divergent validity by having no cross-loadings and a correlation between the

| Source: Data from International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), National Identity II (2003). Distributor: GESIS Cologne Germany, ZA No. 3910. |
| Note: \( r \) = Pearson’s correlation coefficient; correlations between indicators of the same construct are shaded. |

Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Items (U.S. Sample)

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<th>Like Us</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Demo</th>
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<th>Fair</th>
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\[ R^2 = \text{explained variance} \]

\[ F = \frac{R^2 / k}{(1 - R^2) / (N - k - 1)} \]
Factor Analysis

concepts that is not too high have been established. The explained variances of the observed variables (given at the edge of the rectangles) are between .25 for “security” and .53 for “better.” The unstandardized factor loadings and their standard errors are reported in Table 2. The model fit (not reported) is satisfactory according to standard criteria.

One important generalization of CFA is multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA), which allows us to test the invariance of factor loadings, factor covariances and variances, measurement errors, intercepts of observed variables, and latent means. This procedure is especially relevant for comparative social research and politics—for example, in cross-national comparisons to establish measurement equivalence across countries. The invariance of the factor model presented above for nationalism and constructive patriotism was tested in 34 countries. According to the global fit measures, the factor loadings were not substantially different between the countries in the ISSP 2003. Therefore, one can conclude that the necessary condition for the equality of meaning of the constructs in the 34 countries is given, and the relations can thus be compared on the theoretical level.

Furthermore, in both EFA and CFA, higher order factors can be estimated. This means that the correlation between factors is explained with one or several higher order factors. Further topics are non-linear CFA, CFA with categorical and nonnormal indicators, the relationship to item–response theory, application of Bayesian estimation, CFA with longitudinal data, multilevel CFA, and mixture CFA.

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See also Analysis of Variance; Statistics: Overview

Further Readings
Fair Division

Fair division analyzes how to divide divisible or indivisible goods among two or more players in order to satisfy certain criteria of fairness. The problem of fair division goes back at least to the Bible. Abraham and Lot had to decide who would get Canaan and who Jordan; Solomon had to decide which of two women was the mother of a disputed baby. What was a fair solution in each case? This entry first discusses the criteria of fair division, followed by specific procedures and some applications in political science and everyday life.

The oldest known procedure for dividing a single divisible good, such as a cake or land, between two players is “I cut, you choose,” or divide-and-choose. The same procedure can be used if there are multiple indivisible goods: The divider partitions the items into two piles, and the chooser selects one pile. If the divider has no knowledge of the chooser’s preferences, the divider should divide the items 50/50. That way, whichever pile the chooser selects, the divider is assured of getting 50%. The chooser, by contrast, will get more than 50% if she thinks that the two piles are unequal and selects the one that she thinks is more valuable. If, however, the divider knows the chooser’s preferences, he can exploit this information to make one pile slightly more valuable than 50% for the chooser, so the chooser will select that, keeping for the divider the pile he values more (assuming that he values items different from what the chooser values). It is important to note here that fairness does not refer to an “objective” criterion of equality but agreement according to one’s subjective preferences.

Criteria of Fair Division

Is divide-and-choose fair? To make an assessment, consider the following criteria for determining what a fair share is:

**Proportionality:** If there are $n$ players and they are each equally entitled to the items, a division is proportional if each player thinks that he or she received at least $1/n$ of the total value. Proportionality can be traced back to Aristotle, who argued in his book *Ethics* that goods should be divided in proportion to each player’s contribution.

**Envy Freeness:** If no player is willing to give up his portion in exchange for the portion another player receives, this player will not envy any other player. In two-player disputes, a division is envy free if and only if it is proportional. To see why this is so, assume that a settlement is proportional, so you think you are getting at least 1/2 of the total value of all the items. Will you envy me? Not if you think that you have at least 1/2, because then you must think that I have at most 1/2. Symmetrically, if I think I have at least 1/2, then I will not envy you, so the settlement is envy free. Conversely, if the settlement is envy free, then both of us think that each is getting at least 1/2; otherwise, at least one of us will envy the other for getting more than 1/2. Thus, if there are only two players, proportionality and envy freeness are equivalent.

In the case of three players, however, envy freeness is more demanding than proportionality. For example, I may think I’m getting 1/3, but if I think you’re getting 1/2 (e.g., because the third player, in my eyes, is getting only 1/6), then I will envy you. By contrast, if an allocation among three players is envy free, then I must think I received at least 1/3 (otherwise, I would think the others together received more than 2/3, and I would envy the one or both players who received more than 1/3). Hence, an envy-free allocation is always proportional, even if there are more than two players, but a proportional allocation is not necessarily envy free.

**Equitability:** A division is equitable if all players think that they receive exactly the same value above 1/n. Equitability is an aspect of satisfaction more subtle than envy freeness. To illustrate it in a divorce settlement, suppose you think you got 51%
of the marital property but your spouse thinks she got 90% (because she had little interest in what you got). While you do not envy the portion of your spouse—in your eyes, she got only 49%—you may envy her happiness: She got more of what she wanted than you did of what you wanted.

Equitability means that both players think that they receive the same fraction of the total as each of them values different items. Coupled with envy freeness, it means not only that both get more than 50% but also that both exceed 50% by the same amount. Thus, if both spouses think that they receive 70% of the total value, they are equally pleased by their allocations. Equitability may be a difficult property to ascertain. How does one measure whether both players are equally happy with their allocations? In fact, it generally requires an interpersonal comparison of utilities.

**Efficiency**: An allocation is efficient if there is no other allocation that is better for some player without being worse for some other player. Efficiency by itself—that is, when not linked with properties such as proportionality, envy freeness, or equitability—is no guarantee that an allocation will be fair. For example, an allocation that gives everything to me and nothing to you is efficient: Any other allocation will make me worse off when it makes you better off. It is the other properties of fairness, combined with efficiency, that ensure that the maximum possible value is distributed according to the aforementioned properties.

**Fair-Division Procedures**

The modern mathematical theory of fair division has its roots in the 1940s, particularly in the work of Polish mathematicians. They proposed different procedures for dividing both divisible goods such as a piece of land and indivisible goods such as a car, boat, or house. Procedures that involve dividing divisible goods include a plethora of cake-cutting schemes, some of which use “moving knives” that parties stop when they believe they have a fair share; others involve trimming pieces from a cake, or a set of divisible goods, to construct fair shares. Many of these procedures are quite esoteric and, therefore, impractical to apply. Besides divide-and-choose, probably the two most feasible procedures are the following:

1. **Strict and balanced alternation**: Strict alternation is simply taking turns: You pick an item, then I pick one, you choose again, and so on. Of course, going first can be a huge advantage; giving extra choices to compensate for going second can reduce, if not eliminate, this advantage. A specific way of balancing choices out yields a procedure called balanced alternation. If there are, say, four items to be divided among Players A and B, the order of choice under balanced alternation is ABBA. Balanced alternation can be extended to more than two players and any number of items they may wish to divide.

2. **Adjusted winner**: Two players begin by independently distributing a total of 100 points across all the items to be divided, depending on the relative value they attach to each. Thus, if you consider a certain item to be worth 1/4 of the total value of everything to be divided, then you would put 25 points on it. The term *winner* in “adjusted winner” comes from the next step: Each player is temporarily given the items on which it placed more points than its opponent. Then, the *adjusted* part comes in: Items are transferred from the initial winner to the initial loser in a certain order until the point totals of the two players are equal. This order of transfer, which requires splitting at most one item (it could also be shared or sold and the proceeds divided), guarantees that the final allocation will be envy free, equitable, and efficient if the players are truthful. To be sure, players may try to manipulate a procedure to their advantage by giving false information about their preferences. However, most fair-division procedures provide certain guarantees, even against players that are exploitative.

To return to divide-and-choose, it was shown that the divider can guarantee that he receives a tied-for-largest portion, whatever the chooser selects, by dividing the items 50/50 for himself. Moreover, the chooser can do at least as well by selecting what she considers the larger pile, so this procedure is envy free. However, divide-and-choose may be neither efficient nor equitable. Thus, both players may do better with some other allocation, making the division inefficient. In the case of a chocolate and vanilla cake, for example, if the divider does not know which flavor the chooser favors, the divider will cut it so each pile comprises 50% chocolate and 50% vanilla. But if, in fact, the divider likes chocolate and the chooser likes vanilla,
it would be better for both players if the cut were made so as to separate the chocolate from the vanilla, giving each player an opportunity to get the preferred flavor. Divide-and-choose may be inequitable because the chooser could receive a piece she considers larger than 50% when the cutter receives only 50%. Of course, the tables can be turned if the cutter has information about the chooser’s preferences and uses it to get a substantially greater than 50% portion for himself when the chooser must settle for only slightly more than 50%.

Applications
The procedures discussed so far offer an algorithmic approach to fair division: A set of rules is specified; subject to the rules, the players select strategies (e.g., the divider cuts the cake into two equal portions) that give each certain guarantees about the resulting allocation (e.g., it will be envy free). Political scientists, sociologists, and applied economists have taken a more empirical tack, seeking to determine the conditions under which fairness and departures from it occur in the world and what consequences they have for people and institutions. Psychologists, especially, have paid heed to how perceptions of fairness impinge on people’s attitudes and affect their behavior.

Theoretical economists and game theorists have been more interested in finding axioms that characterize fairness. Their models are often nonconstructive in the sense that they establish the existence—or sometimes the nonexistence—of an allocation satisfying certain properties. (The problem of nonexistence is particularly acute in the case of indivisible goods.) But even models that show existence may provide no clue as to how to construct the desired allocation. Many analysts are interested in fairness because they desire to help people settle their differences amicably. Numerous books have been written that purport to show how to achieve win–win solutions, whereby players win—or at least do not lose—on the issues they consider most important.

Ultimately, players will want to know on which issues they will win, on which they will lose, and on which they will have to compromise. For this purpose, fair-division procedures that can guarantee that the disputants do as well as possible in realizing all the win–win potential that is available can be extremely useful. From a normative perspective, fair-division procedures can help disputants reduce the frustration, anger, and occasional violence that accompany escalating demands and endless haggling. By facilitating the disputants’ bringing their own closure to a dispute, fair-division procedures help them avoid the arbitrary imposition of a settlement or continuing impasse. Thereby, these procedures tend to level the playing field, so players with greater resources or capabilities are prevented from gaining unduly large shares. In this sense, fair-division procedures offer a means to prevent exploitation of the weak by the strong and to minimize the effects of power differences.

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See also Bargaining; Conflict Resolution; Game Theory; Rational Choice

Further Readings

**Fascism**

Fascism has become a generic term used to represent a political movement that developed between the two world wars principally in Europe, with a few extensions notably in Latin America. This term was employed for the first time as a partisan label in Italy in 1919 by Benito Mussolini, who appealed to younger veterans to establish *Fasci di combattimento*. In Italy, a new type of political organization emerged, developed, and was eventually imposed—-one that more or less indirectly foreshadowed and inspired a set of movements and political regimes,
including Adolf Hitler’s National Socialism in Germany, Léon Degrelle’s Rexisme in Belgium, Oswald Mosley’s Fascist Union in Great Britain, Corneliu Codreanu’s Iron Guard in Romania, Ferenc Szálasi’s Arrow Cross Party in Hungary, José Antonio Primo de Rivera’s Falange in Spain, Plinio Salgado’s Integralist Action in Brazil, and Jacques Doriot’s French Popular Party in France. Within this group, important differences persisted among movements. Some of them remained minority opposition forces, while others formed political regimes; some ruled in coalition, while others gave rise to dictatorships based on a single party. There are also important differences in the ideology or the social basis of these fascist-inspired movements as these emerged and took shape in very different socioeconomic and cultural contexts. Important variables include the degree to which their setting was industrialized and secular and the extent of nationalization and politicization of the masses. It is nevertheless possible to classify a group of movements and regimes into a category labeled fascism. These share some major typical traits, formed in the context of the political laboratory represented by the Blackshirts in Italy. This entry analyzes fascism through its connections with World War I, its ideology, and finally the way in which it produced a new kind of regime.

The Decisive Influence of World War I

The first common feature lies in relation to war. In Europe, World War I is indeed the cradle of fascism. It represents a critical element of context, for both the birth of fascist leaders and the organizational and ideological forms that characterized this political movement. Whether in Italy or in Germany, the most committed elements of fascism and National Socialism were, for the most part, young veterans for whom the war proved to be a fundamental initiation experience. Like their respective leaders, Mussolini and Hitler, they supported the war and, above all, gloried in the “spirit of the trenches”; they also suffered from postwar demobilization. Their political trajectory, their values, the ideology they claimed, the political organizations they would frame, and the regimes they sometimes succeeded in creating cannot be understood outside of this initial context: The Great War led to the brutalization of societies.

The influence of the war could already be seen in the type of partisan organizations set up by those who would become fascist leaders. First in Italy, then in Germany and other European countries, they forged a new type of organization: the militia party. This organizational model was a synthesis of the mass party, previously unique to the labor movement, and of the military organization systems developed in the front lines of World War I. The result was a form of political organization unlike any other, driven by agents who, in the case of Italy, came mainly from the middle class, often fought in the ranks of the extreme Left (left-wing Socialist Party, revolutionary syndicalism), and were most often veterans of the Italian Army elite troops (Arditi). This militia party was designed to assemble an avant-garde group organized around a military model: uniforms, strict hierarchical organization, inculcation of discipline, and maintenance of military sociability modeled on the camaraderie of the front. Thanks to this organization, the fascists introduced methods of war into the political arena. In the context of latent civil war that characterized immediate postwar Italy and parts of Europe in the 1920s as well as the climate of political radicalization caused by the crisis of the early 1930s, the fascist militias (including death squads, Storm Troopers, green shirts, etc.) carried out violent attacks on labor movement organizations, which included attacks on the Socialist and Communist parties’ public meetings, ransacking of left-wing municipalities, burning down local trade union offices, and intimidating the red league of farmers. During this fierce struggle against labor organizations, the fascists won the sympathy and even the active support of some economic elites and ruling circles, a development that would greatly facilitate their coming to power in a coalition government with Center and Right traditional parties.

Fascist Ideology

These militia parties mobilized their members around a set of values, creeds, and myths that formed the common ideological basis of fascism. This was primarily an ideology of action that found its immediate extension in a style and in a quite singular aesthetic. As in organizational matters, fascisms practiced hybridization in ideological matters. They created a synthesis of influences from the
ultra-Right (the most radical nationalist and racist standards) and influences from the ultra-Left (e.g., revolutionary syndicalism inspired by Sorel). France was one of the first laboratories of this new ideological alchemy. The result was a cult of action, violence, and youth and a revolutionary rupture with the parliamentary system and liberal society. Fascist ideology initially involved hostility to the political currents of the Enlightenment; liberalism and Marxism were its targets of choice. It was based on a radical denunciation of social egalitarianism as well as of bourgeois society, presenting itself as a third-force ideology, different from both capitalism and communism. On economic and social development, this third position would find its solution in the corporatist principle of harmonious cooperation between labor and capital for the benefit of the nation; nationalism—not class consciousness—was the backbone of the fascist ideology. This ideology, accordingly, was organized around the myth of the nation conceived as an organic and compact community. Fascism’s mission was to purify the nation politically, anthropologically, and even racially with a view to the assertion of its power. Most fascist movements, beginning of course with National Socialism, put racism and anti-Semitism at the center of their doctrine and political plan. Even Italian fascism, which was initially based on a more political conception of the nation, ended in the mid-1930s by putting the issue of race in the foreground and adopting anti-Semitic legislation in 1938. This homogeneous national community was destined to be permanently mobilized for the goal of conquest. The fascist ideology was guided by an imperialist teleology: conquest of Lebensraum in the case of National Socialism and construction of a new world order in the case of Italian fascism. Fascism was not just born from war, it was also born for war: Its intention was to ideologically mobilize the population, with a view to forming a combatant community fit for military conquest.

**A Regime of Mass Mobilization**

In the Italian and German cases, fascism as a rising power aimed objectively to establish a system of permanent mobilization in which society was seen as an army and the citizen as a soldier. Along with this initiative of a militarized society, the development of fascism into a regime started a political sanctification process; its ideology was introduced into “civil religion,” which citizens were called to practice with ardor. This was accompanied by a massive production of liturgies, ceremonies, and political customs. Accordingly, fascism’s goal of the “New Man” included both a believer and a soldier: an ideal summed up by one of the most famous programmatic slogans of the Italian fascist regime—“believe, obey, fight.”

This mobilizing regime is based on a very specific mechanism. The mass party was the essential element, the central institution of fascist society. Fascist movements came to power in coalition, formally respecting constitutional executives. But very quickly, they implemented strategies to monopolize power by violently destroying labor movement organizations and causing dissolution or taking over the traditional right-wing parties. This process quickly led to a situation of a one-party dictatorship. The dynamics of fascism then operated as a dual process of further state and civil society penetration. The capture of power set in motion a symbiotic process of nationalization of the party and partisan penetration of the state. The state party proved to be an effective tool for the regime’s objectives. In particular, it allowed deep penetration into a civil society that was heavily supervised by youth organizations, unions, associations, and governmental agencies in areas such as sports, culture, and recreation. Thanks to the millions of members in fascist organizations, the system could organize the ultrasupervised mobilization of the population, ensure the dissemination of fascist values and ideology, and organize the faith in the regime and its leader. This leader (Duce, Führer), “Almighty” and “infallible,” was also one of the typical elements of fascist domination. His seemingly limitless power was inextricably linked to the strength of the party. This is because the leader had quasi-absolute control over a party that itself had an unrestricted influence over the population. The leader’s power was thus a direct reflection of the power of the fascist movement as it became a political regime. Fascist organizations were also formidable instruments that were used to control political conformity. Spread over the whole territory, present in all spheres of social life—in the workplace as well as in recreational activities, in factories as well as in families—they contributed to the establishment of a social and political control exerted on the entire
population with intensity unlike any other, finding an equivalent only in Stalin’s Soviet Union.

This situation leads to the question of the nature of fascism and, more precisely, its place within the typologies forged by political science to situate the political regimes of the 20th century. The answer to the question of whether fascism should be classified as an authoritarian regime or a totalitarian regime depends, in part, on what principles of logic and restrictive definitions are implemented. If we adopt a restrictive definition of fascism and say that only Italian fascism and Nazism fully qualify, we can consider fascism to be one component of the totalitarian phenomenon. This is indeed a form of domination based on the mobilization of the population through a mass political organization around a civil religion, generating a level of control of individuals that is unprecedented in its intensity, resulting in the eradication of all forms of organized political opposition and functioning even in tandem with any dissenting public expression. Nazism and, to a lesser extent, Italian fascism largely corresponded to this totalitarian type by the time they collapsed under the weight of their military defeats.

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See also Fascist Movements; Nationalism; Totalitarianism

Further Readings

Fascist Movements

In the years between World Wars I and II, there were violent fascist movements all over Europe. Nearly every country had at least one; France had six and Switzerland three. The fascist category was quite vague and included, among several competing groups, militant nationalists and veterans of World War I. Their chief antagonists, the socialists and communists, called them fascists—from Benito Mussolini’s fasci di combattimento (combat squads)—but the criteria for such a label to be used were rather hazy at first. Even after nearly a decade in power, Mussolini himself was reluctant to define the faith of his movement until he allowed Giovanni Gentile, a fascist philosopher, to write his famous article on fascism for the Italian Encyclopedia Treccani in 1931. A once-prominent revolutionary socialist leader, Mussolini forged the character of his movement as he went along, seeking violent confrontations with his erstwhile party comrades and accepting the support of whatever group would back him at the time, including former enemies such as big industry, the state, and the Catholic Church. During his struggle for power, he had learned tactics from Vladimir Lenin’s violent takeover of the mighty Tsarist Empire. Adolf Hitler in turn sought to imitate Mussolini’s methods, and finally, scores of other European fascist movements began to imitate and curry favor with the triumphant Third Reich. Opportunism and constantly changing profiles were typical features of the early fascist movements. Their virulence and relative “purity,” however, were quickly watered down and compromised once they participated in governments. Fascist regimes usually sidelined their “old fighters” and left policy to the leadership, the army, and the bureaucracy.

The most important European fascist movements were the Italian National Fascist party (Partito Nazionale Fascista, or PNF), the National Socialist (NS) German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, or NSDAP), the Hungarian Arrow Cross, the Romanian Iron Guard, the Belgian Rexists, and the Spanish JONS/Falange, but there were dozens of others, including many imitators of the most successful fascist movements. Some were more on the side of labor, some with employers. Some claimed to defend the church; most were stridently anti-Semitic and opposed to minorities. Imitation also characterized their use of quasi-military uniforms and ranks, their flags, and their internal organization. The larger movements developed specialized organizations, for example, for youth and women and also for quasi-military
enforcement operations and subversion abroad. During World War II, the Third Reich armed forces even established elite Waffen-SS divisions—the SS (originally Hitler’s body guard) being otherwise employed for enforcement and concentration camp guard duty. Some movements, such as the NSDAP, also strove to recruit into their ranks corporatist groups, such as the German Labour Front and professional NS associations, for example, a NS Doctors Federation, NS Farmers, and many others to which all German workers, doctors, and farmers, and so on had to belong.

**Historical Causes of Fascism**

Major historical issues and mid-20th-century conflicts gave rise to most fascist movements. Among the most important was a country’s participation in World War I, especially on the losing side. The defeated of the war—the Central Powers (Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Turkey) and others—who felt left out of the distribution of the spoils were fertile ground for organizations of resistance and revenge. It is impossible to imagine the atmosphere surrounding the birth of Italian fascism without mentioning the 600,000 Italian casualties, the sense of having been cheated out of the fruits of victory, and the territorial ambitions of many middle-class Italians. Germans felt similarly stricken by vast casualties and economic losses and obsessed with the loss of German colonies and lands. The war had destroyed four empires (Austro-Hungarian, German, Russian, and Turkish) and led to vast transfers of territory, leaving behind seething resentments and unfulfilled aspirations, sowing hatred and the seed for future conflicts, for example, in the Balkans, and still generating bloodshed and ethnic cleansing today. The so-called axis of fascist powers and movements after World War I was made up of countries and elements violently opposed to the peace settlements of the war, such as the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon. The war also explains the extreme degree of militarization of these fascist movements, the prominent presence of veterans, and the widespread belief among them that quasi-military violence could overpower democratic majority decisions and parliamentary rule. For this purpose, they all sported private armies like the Nazi storm troopers and the Italian Blackshirts and trumpeted their belief in political violence. Fascism thus left a legacy that was most inhospitable to the development of constitutional democracy.

The second reason for the formation of fascist movements was the significant Left–Right schism that had been developing in various European countries for decades. Industrialization, capitalism, and organized labor at different stages of political modernization had reached a point of all-out confrontation by the time of the war. In highly industrialized areas such as Germany and Northern Italy, a vanguard of socialist and communist parties emerged with electoral majorities and was stirred to action by the Russian Revolution of 1917. Tsarist Russia was still mostly agrarian, but the war had brought it to its knees with the onslaught of pacifism, anarchism, and Lenin’s socialist forces. The Whites, the military defenders of the monarchy, nobility, and traditional order in the bloody Russian civil war, in many ways resembled the fascist movements of Central and Eastern Europe. In republican Spain, rebellious workers, anarchists, socialists, and communists faced off against capitalists, state forces, the Church, and General Franco’s army. In semi-industrial Italy, when the rising socialist challenge culminated in the seizure of factories and agrarian estates, the fascists spearheaded a counter-revolution that was really aimed at establishing their own dictatorship. Everywhere, fascist-like movements were defined by their violent opposition to the inexorable rise of socialist or communist movements, and the brutal use of violence became their trademark.

There were other, later, causes for the fascist eruptions in mid-20th-century Europe: The Great Depression of the 1930s mostly aggravated and deepened the Left–Right schism rather than being the primary cause. Similarly, the rising power of the fascist Axis and its interventions into the domestic politics of small neighboring states—for example, by Mussolini’s Italy into Austrian or Hungarian politics—created incentives for fascist movements or profascist realignments. Eventually, fascist puppet regimes came into power in the Balkans and in German-occupied Northern Europe during World War II. Native fascist movements like the Hungarian Arrow Cross, the Romanian Iron Guard, and the Norwegian Nasjonal Samling thus briefly achieved participation in government, although with little popular support.
After World War II, the more prominent interwar fascist movements generated small successor movements such as the Italian Social Movement (*Movimento Sociale Italiano*, or MSI) and the half dozen German neo-Nazi groups. Their members generally were nostalgic “old fighters,” and their children were constrained by West German anti-Nazi legislation to refrain from publicly repeating old Nazi propaganda. There were several waves of such successor organizations, each progressively less authentic. They even appeared in Eastern Europe, following the collapse of the communist empire, consisting mostly of violent, anti-immigrant youth gangs and nativist skinhead bands.

**Membership**

The focus on fascist movements naturally puts the emphasis on the membership. How large were these movements? What was the typical age of the members? At what point did they join up and why? The largest among them—the PNF and the NSDAP—approached the magical 1-million mark at about the time they came to power or shortly thereafter, but their membership was notoriously volatile, as if motivated only by short-term bouts of passion. After taking power, both tended to absorb other existing groups such as youth organizations or other parties. Fascist movements, like most political parties, were inclined to brag about their membership figures or to keep poor records. Hectic membership growth was also related closely to the postwar demobilization from military service, though fascist movements were in competition with veterans groups and, in Germany and Austria, with large right-wing vigilante organizations (*Einwohnerwehr*). A large influx also occurred after election triumphs and the takeover of power.

At the very beginning, of course, the membership, say of the Italian “fascists of the first hour” or the Nazi “old fighters” was very small. Their first goal, in terms of membership, had to be to acquire a mass following and audience amid the huge followings of their left-wing rivals, given the burgeoning mass politics of most interwar countries.

**Social Composition**

Although there is little and often unreliable information about the social composition of most interwar European fascist movements, the question of their socioeconomic origins, from their beginnings, took on great significance. Given the rising challenge of labor movements and the prominence of Marxist interpretations in advanced industrial countries throughout much of the 20th century, many analysts equated socialist and communist parties with the rising industrial proletariat while associating fascist movements with the militant defense of the interests of the bourgeois middle class and old aristocratic elites. Fascist antisocialism was thus interpreted as the bourgeois “class struggle *à rebours*” (the class struggle in reverse) against the advance of working-class parties and trade unions.

There was of course much evidence for this antisocialist behavior of fascists, although they themselves resisted such an interpretation and frequently directed their polemics also against capitalism and the “reactionary” social elites. The NSDAP even called itself National Socialist German Workers Party and often pointed out its worker-friendly program. Nearly a third of its rank-and-file membership in 1935, indeed, were blue-collar workers, and one fifth were low-level white-collar employees. To be sure, the German Socialists (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*; SPD) and Communists (*Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands*; KPD) had a far larger working-class component, and the blue-collar share of the total German population at the time was 46.3% (Peter Merkl, 1980a, Tables 3–5, pp. 765–767; Tables 9–11, pp. 774–776). The guiding formula of most contemporary fascist movements was a third-force formula combining strident nationalism with a form of non-Marxist socialism.

But the crux of the matter is that it makes little sense to equate Karl Marx’s sweeping concept of the rising proletariat with the fragmented occupational statistics of socialist and Nazi movements. Occupational status does not necessarily imply a class role and ideology. It makes a difference, also, whether a worker is skilled or unskilled, a foreman or just an ordinary worker; whether he or she belongs to a well-established, traditional trade, is a union member or not, and so on. The Nazis and the Italian fascists even had their own, large trade unions and so did various conservative parties, such as the Catholic Center Party in Germany and the Christian trade unions in several other European nations.
The status differences within fascist parties also matter: The blue-collar share among all NSDAP party office holders, for example, was much smaller—only 23% in 1935 (Merkel, 1980a)—than among the rank and file. Neither Hitler nor Mussolini nor comparable European fascist leaders were workers, although at the start of his political career, Mussolini was a revolutionary socialist intellectual but hardly a worker.

Failing to clearly associate Nazis and other fascists, social analysts then tried to concentrate on exactly how the NSDAP differed from the population of Germany in 1935: According to Merkl (1980a), the party had far higher percentages of white-collar employees (20.6%), civil servants (9.6%), teachers (3.4%), professionals (3.2%), business owners (7.5%), and independent artisans (19.5%).

Unable to attribute fascism to bourgeois and upper-class interests alone, the analysts tried to label the NSDAP a “lower-middle-class” or “petty bourgeois” movement. But although, the German white-collar occupations, for example, had grown prodigiously since 1900, the concept of a lower middle class united by a common awareness of its interests is quite vague. Does the professional military, the civil service, or the large farm population belong to it or not? It was never a part of any overarching class struggle, which would have assigned it a role in the dynamic of the larger society.

Change in the Movements

In the dozen or so years since its beginnings, furthermore, the NSDAP changed radically, and the disproportionate numbers of demobilized, militant veterans and university students of the early (Bavarian) phase were replaced by white-collar and blue-collar elements in the party of the 1930s. There were similar groups outside Bavaria before 1925, such as the Freikorps (Free Corps) and the Deutschvölkische Schutz- und Trutzbund, but there is a lack of sufficient data for comparison. By the early 1930s, farmers, blue- and white-collar employees, and victims of foreclosure, bankruptcy, and mass unemployment swelled the ranks.

Once in power and able to dispense favors, like jobs to the unemployed, the NSDAP grew prodigiously. Particularly civil servants (earlier barred from joining) and professional and business people in small towns and rural areas joined up so that, by 1937, its membership stood at about 2.5 million. But what had been dangerous rebels before the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923, when their demonstration was shot at by the police, had become a rather tame collection of conformists. Only the leadership, not the movement as such, had taken over the state, which continued to be run by its specialized services. The Italian PNF experienced similar rapid growth after coming into power with the bold March on Rome in 1922 and accumulated well over a million members by 1929, when even the Vatican was ready to conclude a concordat with Mussolini that became the 1929 Lateran Treaty.

Statistical gaps and differences in national population statistics make it harder to compare the social composition of the 20-some other fascist movements of interwar Europe. Many of the smaller ones kept no records, but many had their own historical interpretations of themselves, usually outside the Marxist scheme and not derived from the judgment of their antagonists. As in many revolutionary situations, university students often played a big role among the various fascist movements, whether they were the prewar French camelots du roi with their integral nationalism and anti-Semitism, the anti-Russian Finnish Academic Karelian Society (AKS), or the Moldavian student disciples of the anti-Semite Alexander Cuza from whom the Romanian Iron Guard of Corneliu Codreanu eventually sprang with a nativist and frenetically religious fascism found otherwise only among the Belgian Rexists and the Slovakian Hlinka fascists.

Marginal Fascist Movements

Were there other fascist movements, perhaps in India, Argentina, or the Middle East, far from rising Marxist labor parties? For many Balkan or East European successor states, left in the wake of falling empires where power gravitated toward old imperial elites, a Marxist interpretation seems beside the point. Fighting off ethnic secession movements with socialist overtones was not the same as facing the challenge of a rising labor movement. Even the post-Tsarist Whites in the Russian civil war and post-Hapsburg Hungary fit this category: The old aristocratic, landowning elites supported the growth of ex-military and
fascist movements against the urban Bolsheviks of St. Petersburg and Budapest and ethnic-nationalist rebellions. The Bolsheviks won in the end in Russia, though hardly because of the support of an industrial working class. The violence of the first war and upheavals involving “dictatorships of workers and soldiers” from Russia and Finland to Budapest, Vienna, Munich, and Berlin made for civil war–like confrontations and attitudes: Revolution and violence create militants.

But the farther west and north one goes, if not always toward greater industrial development, the greater is the role of the Marxist image of capital versus workers and, therefore, the significance of the social composition of self-styled fascist movements. In the newborn Austrian republic, the Heimwehr veterans were perhaps more reliable supporters of the aristocrats and landowners of the old order than the German-supported Austrian NSDAP of 1934 and 1938. Its fight against the socialists and organized workers was hardly a defense of capital that could be exhaustively described by the Marxist formula. In Italy, the separate developments in the north—which was closer to the model—and the Nationalists of the south who were eventually co-opted by Mussolini also did not quite add up to a victory of the bourgeoisie in a class struggle au rebours.

The role of the Catholic Church in Southeastern and Southern European fascism was nowhere stronger than in the complex fronts of the Spanish Civil War. Spain had not been part of World War I, but the external intervention of General Franco’s colonial army in defense of a mix of well-established interests (monarchists, landowners, capital, and the Church) was decisive in beating down the republican coalition, not to mention secessionist challenges. The real fascists, the Falange/JONS, were castrated, forced into a merger with monarchists, and sidelined as a kind of popular ideological auxiliary by the real winner, the military dictator Franco. The resulting Falange/Movimiento became another toothless fascist façade not unlike the Nazi storm troopers (Sturm Abteilung, or SA) after 1934.

A Generational Explosion?

These interwar movements mostly started in a grandiose manner and, then, even though they reached amazing numbers, began to decline in militant spirit. Could their age composition explain their counterrevolutionary power? Their earliest years, whether right after the Great War or at the onset of the Great Depression, were often marked by the surprising youth of most of the militants. Fascist leaders, though not particularly young themselves, tended to take advantage of the enthusiasm and energy of the young with slogans like “Move over, you old ones!” or by celebrating youth in their songs—Giovinezza, Giovinezza. They often pointed to the generational abyss between their own parties and their more established and gerontocratic rivals (except the equally young Communists).

The long period of peaceful prewar development, in particular, and the war itself often led to a kind of sclerosis within progressive movements and then an explosion of generational conflict. Young and old clashed over their goals, which helped produce the fatal wartime splits among socialists or between them and the communists. In some battlegrounds, such as Berlin between 1928 and 1933, the two ferocious young armies—the young Nazi storm troopers and the Communist Red Front Fighters—were mirror images of each other, both from proletarian backgrounds but one nationalistic and the other socialist. Right at the end of the war, Mussolini’s squadristi boasted as their antecedents the equally young arditii shock troops of the Italian army, while the brown-shirted Ordner (bouncers) of the NSDAP rallies claimed the youthful Sturmbatallione (elite battalions) of the German army.

The actual ages at which would-be fascists were recruited may have been even lower than that of the soldiers: Comparative statistics are limited, but they suggest that nearly half of the Bavarian Nazis of 1923, 37% of the NSDAP of 1930, and one fourth of the Austrian NSDAP of 1934 (the year of the Dollfuss Putsch) were under 24 years of age. One third of Danish, Norwegian, and British fascists of the 1930s were under 26 (Merkel, 1980a, Tables 6–7, pp. 768–770). One empirical study, based on the Abel Collection of autobiographies of early Nazis, emphasizes the large number of German youth groups of the 1920s, many of a political sort from Left to Right, that the young would-be Nazis had briefly joined before homing in on the storm troopers or the party itself. The youngest to join militant Nazi organizations were
barely teenagers. Like the neo-Nazi skinheads of 60-some years later, many already had records of criminal violence and confrontations with authority. The very young were also the most violent and the most likely to participate soon in marching in demonstrations and proselytizing for the movement. It is generally accepted that what attracted these youngsters most was largely the sheer impetus of an extremist populist movement and the constant action and comradeship and to a lesser extent the ideological content of what they were fighting, marching, and proselytizing for, including anti-Semitism. There was quite a difference between them and the relatively less violent but also more racist or anti-Semitic adult party members who never joined the storm troopers.

Investigations of contemporary neo-Nazi and skinhead violence thus reveal major differences between them and their interwar predecessors. First of all, there appears to be a broad range of very young perpetrators of antiforeigner violence, including soccer rowdies, among whom real political affiliation with neo-Nazi groups is rare though many wear pins and insignia that suggest otherwise. They are part of today’s very violent European youth scene, especially those 15 to 20 years old, and resemble youth gangs and their activities all over the world far more than their counterparts who took part in political violence of the interwar period (see, e.g., Merkl, 1995; Willems, 1993). Older skinheads tend to be more political and often anti-Semitic and affiliated with neo-Nazi parties that vainly struggle to attract the young hooligans. There is little in common with the quasi-military, disciplined organizations of the fascist past that aimed at major political goals such as overturning the peace settlements of World War I.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Fascism; Party Identification; Party Organization; Totalitarian Regimes; Totalitarianism

Further Readings


Federalism

Federalism is often referred to in current writings on politics as an old political idea whose time has finally come in the 21st century. In this respect, a distinguished scholar of this subject, Ronald L. Watts (2008), has noted “there are at present some 25 countries encompassing over 40% of the world’s population, and each exhibiting the fundamental characteristics of a functioning federation” (p. 1). And he points out that “a distinctive feature about this current popularity of federalism in the world is that the application of the federal idea has taken a great variety of forms” (p. 7).

The initial framing of “federalism” in its modern manifestation, both as an idea and as an institutional form, is generally attributed to two
prominent American Constitutional Fathers, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, the principal authors of *The Federalist*, in October 1787. In promoting this concept, they sought to defend a new hybrid regime form that they and other framers of the American Constitution had proposed at the founding Philadelphia Convention on September 17, 1787, for later ratification. It was intended to strike a balance between the decentralized and centralized forms of confederal and unitary government. The former had been applied to the much more decentralized political union that had operated from 1781 to 1787 in the 13 newly independent colonies of British North America under the Articles of Confederation. In this earlier short-lived and highly unstable political arrangement, the original constituent units were essentially in control of the newly formed and fragile central government. A similar pattern of union had operated in the German, Dutch, and Swiss Confederations of the 16th and 17th centuries. Unitary government, on the other hand, was the pattern of rule that operated in most other states in which political decision-making power and authority were vested in one unit or center. The American Constitutional Fathers favored federalism as an intermediate form between centralized and decentralized government because they believed that by dividing sovereignty in this balanced way, they could prevent the concentration of authority and promote liberty and political pluralism in a new union. They considered federalism to be a vertical extension of the concept of separation of powers between the executive, legislature, and judiciary, which they had adapted from the noted 18th-century French political philosopher, the Baron de Montesquieu.

**Defining Principles and Characteristics**

The major and defining principle of this new regime form, according to the British constitutional thinker Kenneth C. Wheare in his pioneering study *Federal Government* (1964), consisted of a division of power and authority between two different political decision-making units—a central one exercising jurisdiction over the entire nation-state and a constituent or regional one having responsibility for a part of that nation-state. These two governmental units would be recognized as having equal status in law, so that neither one could abolish or subordinate the other. Other characteristics of federalism, such as the capacity to exercise authority and decision-making power directly on their respective populations and the right of each unit to legislate or regulate policy within its assigned sphere of authority, flowed directly from this principle. The same was true of the various institutional elements or manifestations of this basic idea. These included the institution of two complementary legislative bodies—one to represent the center on the basis of population and the other to represent the constituent units in terms of territoriality—and the establishment of courts as judicial arbiters in jurisdictional disputes between the two levels of government. Both levels would also be expected to participate in a formal and fundamental way in any future constitutional amendments.

**Pre-1945 Theoretical Contributions**

This general concept of federalism gradually gained prominence and approval by some leading 19th- and early-20th-century political thinkers, including luminaries like Alexis de Tocqueville, Albert V. Dicey, James Bryce, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and Harold Laski (Sobei Mogi, 1931). Like the authors of *The Federalist*, they viewed federalism in both normative and descriptive terms largely as an institutional device designed to divide sovereignty and prevent the concentration of authority and power in a single decision-making center, promote political pluralism, and maximize liberty. It was entrenched as a regime form in the 19th and early 20th centuries in several countries besides the United States, including Switzerland, Canada, and Australia. It was also embraced by the new post-war regimes in Germany and Austria and, at least in a formal sense, by a number of newly independent Third World countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and Mexico in Latin America; South Africa and Nigeria in Africa; and India and Malaysia in Asia. Still, its adoption, both intellectually and institutionally, was limited and slow. Moreover, it faced widespread opposition globally from critics for what was perceived to be its predisposition to cumbersome and inefficient governmental decision-making processes, pervasive internal conflict and division, and regime instability and breakdown.
Post–World War II Theoretical Trends

After World War II, the core ideas and writings on federalism began to diverge in political science and to coalesce around two distinct traditions, which are generally designated as Anglo-American and continental European. The former (the Anglo-American tradition) encouraged the formulation of new analytical approaches to federalism, which paralleled conceptual and paradigmatic changes in the discipline as a whole. The proponents of these new approaches to federalism, like the advocates of the reform-oriented behavioral movement in political science during this period, generally embraced positivist, empirically oriented, systematic, and individualistic intellectual perspectives in the study of politics. They also sought to minimize and downplay the significance of values in their analyses.

The Postwar Anglo-American Tradition

An early and seminal contribution to this postwar tradition was made by Wheare (1964), who defined federalism both constitutionally and in governmental practice as that system of government in which authority is divided between national and regional governments, so that each, within a sphere, is coordinate (i.e., co-equal) and independent. For Wheare, a principal focus of analysis for identifying the degree of federalism that existed in the constitutions and governmental practices of nation-states was the division of legislative powers between its levels of government. Wheare applied this analytical device to a comparison of the institutions and working practices of four “mature federations” of that time: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States. His approach was rapidly and widely accepted as an appropriate template for identifying and analyzing federalism.

But as occurred in post–World War II political science in general, criticism by federalism specialists began to be directed at what was seen as the excessive formal-legalism of Wheare’s approach. Their critique encouraged other Anglo-American scholars to redefine federalism in different terms and contribute to its further theoretical development. They included William S. Livingston, who viewed federalism from a sociological standpoint as “a device by which the federal qualities of a society are articulated and protected” (Livingston, 1952/1971, p. 22); William Riker (1964), who defined federalism in political and rational choice terms as a “bargain”; Carl Friedrich (1968), who envisaged federalism as an ongoing “process”; and Daniel Elazar (1962), who first analyzed federalism as a cooperative “partnership” between the two major levels of government. Later, in conjunction with Vincent Ostrom (1970), he redefined the concept of partnership as a “covenant” or legal and moral contract between these governmental partners (Elazar, 1987).

There were also some strong criticisms directed at these new postwar approaches to federalism by William Riker and S. Rufus Davis. Riker questioned whether federalism as a regime form even existed and, if it did, whether it mattered at all (Riker, 1969). Davis attacked the post–World War II predilection for redefining and applying different analytical constructs of federalism as an artificial doctoring of what he considered to be an ambiguous and value-laden concept consisting of many different, noncomparable concrete forms in different societal settings (Davis, 1978). After this rather fertile period in the theoretical evolution of federalism from the late 1940s to the 1970s, there was a dearth of innovative and influential Anglo-American contributions to federal theory.

The Postwar Continental European Tradition

Early Mentors

The proponents of the postwar continental European tradition of federalism generally looked to different mentors or guides for their intellectual inspiration (Michael Burgess, 2000). For many of them, the originators and intellectual founders of modern federalism were not the principal authors of The Federalist. Rather, they considered themselves to be the theoretical disciples of Johannes Althusius, a German, Protestant (Reformed) local councilor from the city of Endic, who remained a relatively obscure social and political thinker during his lifetime and for the ensuing two and a half centuries. Even though he lived and wrote almost 200 years prior to the drafting of the American constitution, Althusius’s ideas are often regarded today as a bridge between premodern and postmodern Western political thought. More precisely, they are viewed as a precursor of the pluralist critique of
statist and sovereigntist ideas that have dominated Western thinking since the establishment of the Westphalian state system in the mid-17th century. He viewed federalism in broad terms as a manifestation of plural governance, popular consent, and a normative commitment to social solidarity. His concept of federalism was multilevel and societal rather than two-tiered and narrowly political. It was derived from his understanding of politics as a “consociation” or social network of generically equivalent associations linking family and kinship groups to social and economic guilds or colleges, cities, rural districts and provinces, and ultimately a universal commonwealth (Thomas Hueglin, 1999, pp. 114–116).

Another early inspiration for this postwar continental tradition of federalism can be found in Du principe federatif (The Federal Principle) published in 1863, one of the last works of the influential 19th-century anarcho-socialist French philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Like Althusius, he advanced a notion of federalism embodying an organic view of state and society, in which emphasis is placed on the whole person in social interaction with others, rather than on the more socially isolated individual. He likewise incorporated into his federal idea the medieval concepts of corporatism (i.e., representation of functional associations in public policy making) and subsidiarity (i.e., investing decision-making authority in a governing unit closest and most attuned to the needs of the mass of the population, wherever feasible). Also, he espoused a normative and secular rather than religious conception of federalism.

Proudhon’s federalist thought also resembled that of Althusius in that he viewed federalism as a series of agreements struck by the associational representatives of socially engaged individuals. These associations were likewise multiteried, linking the smallest and most primary group, the family, to the largest and most remote of secondary associations, the state. But unlike in Althusius’s vision, his corporatism embodied the free association of economic producers and workers interacting in what he considered to be the socialist ideal of a “mutualist” society. In this type of socioeconomic order, goods are exchanged between individuals on the basis of a “just value” defined in terms of labor input.

Both of these earlier philosophers had a significant impact on post–World War II continental European intellectuals and political activists who advocated the formation of some type of loose supranational federal structure for Europe. This was also the case for some leading social Catholic thinkers of late-19th- and early-20th-century Europe, who derived many of their ideas from the papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (1931). While generally omitting any direct reference to the concept of federalism itself, they helped popularize some of the central concepts previously identified with the early antecedents of continental European federal thought. These included an organic view of state and society based on corporatism and subsidiarity, an emphasis on the socially interactive person rather than the atomized individual, and the fostering of a normative view of politics based on ethical-religious principles.

Postwar Manifestations

There have been two distinct post–World War II manifestations of the continental European federal tradition. The first was that of the integral federalists, a mixture of institutionally unattached intellectuals and political activists, who advocated a so-called maximalist revolutionary concept of federalism for postwar Europe. The second is a more mainstream and traditional intellectual group made up primarily of university-affiliated social and political scientists, who promote a more flexible, inclusive, and looser form of federalism for the postwar European Union (EU), which is widely referred to as multilevel governance (MLG).

Integral federalism was initially established in France in the 1930s by a group of continental European thinkers who called for a pan-European federalism based on Proudhonian principles, including antinationalism, decentralization, and mutualism, designed to combat the growing conflict between France and Germany at that time. However, it was forced to dissolve in 1939 in the face of the looming global conflict. Its original members regrouped and formed a more broadly based intellectual and political group in 1944 that included some prominent social Catholic thinkers who were in the vanguard of the movement for a pan-EU in the post–World War II period. Their ideas included reorganization of European society from the ground up according to organic and corporatist principles,
Federalism

transnational integration of different branches of the economy as a precondition for the creation of supranational economic structures, and the establishment of new political structures that involved regional decentralization, devolution of power to functional economic agencies, and the creation of a constituent assembly to fashion a new pan-European legal-political order along federalist lines. Although the integral federalists attempted to give these ideas more concrete meaning by applying them to the particular conditions of postwar Europe, most advocates of a supranational European community rejected their views as too radical and utopian and as lacking in an accompanying strategy for their practical realization. As a result, the direct influence of the integral federalists on the evolution of the European Community began to wane by the late 1940s. Since then, the handful of remaining members have focused more on political education than on practical politics (Lutz Roemheld, 1990).

Those who are committed to applying the concept of MLG to the political analysis of the EU today constitute the most recent and probably the most influential global proponents of new federal theoretical ideas. They comprise, primarily, university-based social and political analysts. They first began to promote the use of the concept of MLG rather than federalism to describe the EU in response to what they considered to be the unique character of the new supranational governance form that had emerged after the passage of the Single European Act in 1985 and the negotiation and implementation of the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s. Their writings on MLG have been numerous and wide-ranging, and their definitions of the concept, although manifesting some common or shared characteristics, are highly divergent. They have sought to describe and analyze the new multilayered European political entity consisting of overlapping jurisdictions by first broadening the idea of federalism to encompass more than two levels of government and more than two autonomous policy-making structures; they now include both regional/supranational and local government tiers. Their concepts have other common strands—most notably, accepting or even promoting the participation of nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, and unions, in intergovernmental decision making; observing and applauding the proliferation of overlapping decision-making networks engaged in these functions; pointing to the change in the style of state decision making from that of command and control to steering, coordination, and networking; and exposing new and difficult challenges facing MLG structures, such as how to assign governing responsibility and how to foster democratic accountability (Ian Bache & Matthew Flinders, 2004).

The concept of MLG has since been extended by its proponents to other areas of systematic political analysis besides the decision-making structures and functions of the EU, among them regionalism and urban governance. It has also gained followers in other continents and geographic areas, including North America, South America, Asia, and Africa, and it is increasingly applied as a tool of political analysis, largely due to its flexibility and adaptability to the existing but rapidly changing global economic and political conditions.

However, its adherents have also been subjected to a broad range of criticisms, including that of being too descriptive and insufficiently predictive; exaggerating the importance of subnational actors in decision making; neglecting the implementation and outcome stage of policy making; overemphasizing what they describe as the postconstitutional and extraconstitutional nature of the patterns of governance that they try to encompass; giving priority to accommodation, consensus, and efficiency in governance over the core values of democratic government; and above all, acceding too readily to definitional imprecision and conceptual stretching by applying MLG indiscriminately “to any complex and multifaceted political process” (Bache, 1998, pp. 153–154).

Since the mid-1990s, there has been an increasing blurring of the distinction between the concepts of federalism and MLG, again primarily as a result of the growing complexity in patterns of intergovernmental relations in federal systems emanating from the forces of globalization. The historical and analytical relationship between these two concepts tends to operate in a multidirectional, interactive, and interdependent manner, so that their respective theoretical developments are mutually intertwined and overlapping in both content and direction. Thus, MLG may be regarded as
a useful addition to the conceptual toolbox of scholars of federalism.

Future Theoretical Directions and Applications

If the concept of federalism continues to evolve in this flexible manner in the face of intensifying globalization, it is likely that it will be increasingly embraced in positive terms by both political analysts and practitioners across the globe. This is particularly the case if the two post–World War II theoretical traditions of federalism—the Anglo-American and Continental European—persist in their current patterns of mutual interaction, influence, and convergence. And it is also likely to manifest itself in future political studies that draw on either or both of the prevailing definitions of federalism and MLG.

Whether the same pattern of convergence will develop in future institutional applications of these two concepts is more difficult to predict. A few developed and developing countries, such as Spain, South Africa, Russia, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, are currently experimenting with or are still considering using some type of federal institutional form for their regimes. Others, such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the Sudan, Iraq, and Sri Lanka, have previously embraced or have seriously contemplated adopting federal structures and found them to be inapplicable to conditions in their countries. Therefore, it is uncertain whether the recent global trend toward expanding federalism as an institutional device in the 21st century will persist. But there is little doubt that this concept, in one form or another, will continue to influence in significant ways the political thought and analysis of future generations of political scientists.

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See also Pluralism

Further Readings


Feminism

The 20th century was a momentous one for feminism and politics. Beginning with the spread of women’s voting rights, the political participation
and engagement of women expanded during the decades that followed. Links were forged between women’s workforce participation and their active involvement in public affairs. Women’s civic associative activity, often voluntary, brought the public and private worlds of citizenship together. Women’s liberation movements reached across age, class, and racial barriers to forge new policy demands. Gender inequalities in representation, too, mobilized coalitions of women determined to open up formal politics. Women played active roles in the democracy-seeking political movements of the latter part of the century. Although the adoption of feminist insights for making sense of the world of politics was relatively slow in the field of political studies, gender and politics scholarship is now a coherent subfield within the wider discipline. Over the past few years, this body of scholarly research has significantly evolved. New research questions, concepts, theories, and methods have emerged in response to new developments in the feminist struggle for women’s empowerment, together with important developments in the social sciences and in the wider context of world politics. Against this background, this entry dwells on the legacy of the 20th century for women’s advancement in politics, maps out the main methodological approaches used by feminist political scientists, and outlines the main thematic areas in the study of politics and gender.

**Women and Politics: The Legacy of the 20th Century**

In 1906, Finland became the first country in the world to give women the right to vote and to stand for election. One year later, 19 women were sent to the Finnish parliament. This is a momentous landmark in the story of women’s participation in public affairs since it was the first time in history when involvement in democratic politics became a right for all women and not the privilege of some. In addition, this also represents a first milestone in a century of unprecedented activism on gender equality.

The right to vote and be elected to parliament was an agenda around which the first great wave of women’s mobilization rallied—a movement that soon became a global one as it spread rapidly, with mass demonstrations, rallies, and marches. Winning the vote created a demand for women to become political party activists, speakers at public meetings, and candidates, though their latter role was largely tokenist at the time. It realized, in some measure, the dreams of 18th- and 19th-century feminist political philosophers and women’s rights advocates such as Olympe de Gouge, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Harriet Taylor Mill. However, not all countries accorded women the right to vote at the turn of the 20th century as in many of them, women did not have access to this political right until well into the middle of the century. Thus, Spain accorded women voting rights in 1931, France in 1944, and Italy in 1946. Indonesian women won the vote in 1945, while Peruvian women followed a decade later in 1955. Switzerland finally extended the franchise to women in 1971, while the Kuwaiti parliament passed a law enfranchising women in 2005.

As the century moved on, women’s sense of civic identity became linked with their ambitions for personal fulfillment. The years of World War II were defining in this regard as the armaments industry, and the various services supporting the war effort drew increasing numbers of women into the workplace. War-induced employment, presented as a patriotic act, provided low-paid women already in work with better jobs and conditions and brought married women into the workforce (although most women of working age remained in the home). After the war, working women either returned to the home or were squeezed back into lower paid positions. Women’s status declined, the gender wage gap increased, and as Wilma Rule noted (1974, p. 1715) “many left [employment] voluntarily in the ideological milieu of a new familialism buttressed by a popularized Freudianism which portrayed the non-homebound woman as psychologically afflicted.” The fact that women in the 1950s were expected by society to marry and be full-time homemakers means that they lost out on the orientation to civic and public affairs that the world of employment tends to offer, although it did not mean that they were not civically engaged. On the contrary, women’s associational life during the 1950s was, by all accounts, active and vibrant, as hundreds of thousands of home-based women joined locally based voluntary women’s organizations in Britain and the United States. Yet because these organizations focused on church and charity-related volunteering, improving homemaking skills,
civic engagement, and education, associational activity was engaged in for its own sake, not as a political enterprise, although some scholars have suggested that by encouraging the citizen housewife, these associational groups contributed to the blurring of the distinction between the public and the private worlds of women.

By the 1960s, women’s membership in these associations had suffered a severe decline. The decade of housewives was followed by the decade of women’s liberationists. Many of these women’s associations became redefined as locally based civic bodies with national and international advocacy roles coordinated by a professionalized leadership. This is a decade that ushered in a new phase of economic and social development in industrialized societies, which in turn had an impact on women’s social roles. Women’s educational attainment, an important contributor to social and civic empowerment, had risen and, in the United States and Europe, began to outstrip that of men. Employment opportunities, a technological revolution that drove a new phase in consumerism and communications, and the expansion of middle-class aspirations began to chip away at traditional gender role contracts in both public and private spheres. The antiwar, civil rights, and student protest movements of the 1960s in advanced democracies provided the impulse for the second wave of feminism. The popularizing of authors such as Betty Friedan, Simone de Beauvoir, and Germaine Greer through the new media of television brought the issue of women’s oppression into homes across industrialized postwar democracies. At around the same time, legislation in the United Kingdom and the United States had begun to tackle pay and other discriminations against women in the workplace. Government reports in many countries documented women’s disadvantaged legal and social status and made recommendations for reform. Women’s liberation movements in Britain, the United States, and other countries, engaged in a period of intense activity. Regional and national meetings that attracted hundreds of women, local consciousness-raising groups, marches on parliament, and other high-visibility protests characterized the movement. Connections were made across class and race lines, and for a brief time, all women were united in their commitment to end discrimination. The sisterly solidarity fragmented shortly afterward, with class, race, and other deep-seated social and political divisions reasserting themselves. The lasting legacy of the women’s movement, though, was to change social attitudes toward women’s role and status. It had a long-term effect on public policy, on sociocultural norms, and on women’s aspirations. What was just as important was that it mobilized and engaged a generation of women and affected the attitudes of a generation of men.

Following the women’s liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the last part of the century saw the global diffusion of gender equality norms. This was supported by the United Nations (UN) Commission on the Status of Women, which in turn is dedicated to gender equality and the advancement of women. Responding to the momentum generated by the women’s movement in the 1970s, the General Assembly declared 1975 as International Women’s Year and organized the first World Conference on Women in Mexico City, followed by others in Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985), and Beijing (1995). In 1979, the UN adopted the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, seen as the international bill of women’s human rights. In 1995, it adopted the Beijing commitments and Platform for Action to secure gender equality and peace, and in 2000, it adopted Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security, calling for women’s inclusion in peace-building processes. In 2009, it added to this resolution by explicitly mandating peacekeeping forces to protect women and children from sexual violence during armed conflict.

None of these policies and events would have occurred in the absence of a concerted, focused, transnational impetus from women. Transnational activism was the chief characteristic of women’s movements of the end of the century. It linked local issues with global concerns, built connections across borders, and created dialogue between feminists in the Global North and the Global South. It began in the mid-1980s, as preparations for the Nairobi World Conference on Women got under way, although it took some time before women from the Global North and Global South could agree on a common agenda. Two paradigm shifts in the economic and cultural world order prompted consensus building among First World
and Third World women: the assertion of transnational neo-liberal markets dependent on cheap labor (often provided by women) and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Both were seen as global threats to women’s equality and empowerment. A more united transnational feminist activism quickly proliferated, particularly after the Beijing conference. In parallel with this transnational civic and political engagement of women, awareness of the absence of women from elite decision making grew. The importance of their presence in this arena for bringing about gender equality and for representing women’s concerns resulted in the widespread adoption of gender quotas in political and public life. By 2000, many European and Latin American countries had adopted some form of gender quota, along with a range of countries in Asia, largely due to women’s engagement with party and political systems. However, even currently, women’s equality with men in political decision making has some considerable way to go. Their representation stood at 18% worldwide at the end of the century.

Feminism in Political Science: Perspectives and Methods

Despite the important achievements in women’s political empowerment that took place over the course of the 20th century, the incorporation of feminist perspectives into the discipline of political science was a much slower process. Thus, it was not until the 1980s that research on gender and politics took off and not until the 1990s that it consolidated itself as a subfield within the wider discipline of politics—with dedicated journals, research networks, projects and events, specialized research centers and institutions, postgraduate programs, and so on. However, to claim that gender and politics has become a coherent subfield does not mean that it is a uniform subfield—quite the opposite, in fact, as we can find a diversity of research agendas that are informed by manifold theoretical perspectives and methods and that are as diverse as the feminisms on which they draw. This section provides a summary overview of the variety of feminist perspectives underpinning most of the gender and politics research that is being conducted today.

Studies on gender and politics are framed within one or more of the main feminist perspectives that have been developed up to the present. These are liberal, radical, poststructuralist, and postcolonial feminisms. Categorizing studies into one or another perspective is not always straightforward since these perspectives are used to address a variety of questions specifically concerned with gender and politics; many opt to develop a modified version of a particular one while incorporating valuable insights from the others.

Liberal Feminism

The first perspective is liberal feminism. Research on gender and politics informed by this perspective is characterized by a number of features. The first one is that the structures of the liberal state are assumed rather than problematized. In other words, the problem is not the structures of the liberal state but the lack of women and women’s representatives within its structures. Therefore, for gender and politics scholars influenced by liberal feminism, the task of feminizing politics consists in bringing more women into the political realm. It is a reformist, rather than a transformative, agenda. The second feature of gender and politics research influence by this perspective is its acceptance of mainstream understandings of the political as the world of government and public affairs. Consequently, their subject matter is constructed on a strict distinction between the public and the private realms, where the latter is considered to fall outside the scope of research and, therefore, to be irrelevant to the central research questions. The third feature of this research relates to the methodologies adopted, as it operates with a sharp distinction between fact and value statements, a strong reliance on positivist epistemologies, and a favoring of quantitative methods. Finally, the fourth feature of this research is that it is, to a large extent, focused on individuals and agency for understanding our social reality (e.g., lack of individual women in parliaments) and as a main source of social change (e.g., women political leaders, women’s and feminist interest groups).

Radical Feminism

The second perspective is radical feminism. A key feature of gender and politics research influenced by this perspective is its questioning of the public–private split that has traditionally defined the feminist study of political science. The blurring
of the boundaries between the public and the private derives from one of the central premises of radical feminism—namely, the idea that women have been traditionally oppressed by a power system of male supremacy (patriarchy) that permeates all social structures and relations. This male hegemony not only applies in public institutions but also in those areas belonging to what has been traditionally understood as the private sphere (i.e., the body, sexuality and reproduction, nurturing and intimacy, the emotions, etc.). Consequently, according to this perspective, there is nothing in the entire social system that is exempted from becoming an object of political struggle. In contrast to research influenced by liberal feminism, gender and politics scholars influenced by radical feminism do not see the project of bringing more women into state structures (legislatures, executives, and judiciaries) as emancipatory unless it is accompanied by other changes that imply a deeper transformation of those existing structures themselves. Another characteristic feature of this research is a shift of attention from the concept of sex to that of gender. Thus, instead of focusing on individual women (or the lack of them) in political institutions, this research is mainly interested in the gendered nature of social structures, including formal political institutions. Finally, in relation to the methodologies adopted by this kind of research, it should be noted that although scholars influenced by the tenets of radical feminism may be suspicious of positivism, no specific feminist methodology has been developed for the study of the political world. Instead, these researchers opt for a diversity of qualitative methods such as discourse analysis, ethnographic analysis, and case studies.

Poststructuralism

The third feminist perspective that has influenced gender and politics scholars is poststructuralism. A distinctive feature of this strand of research is the idea that traditional concepts in this field of research—such as gender, representation, or the state—are discursive constructions rather than objectively or structurally given realities. Using this perspective, the main focus of the gender and politics researcher is not on individual women and their lack of political representation and participation or on social structures and the gender–power relations embedded in formal and informal political institutions but, rather, on the discourses and practices that construct those concepts. A second feature of this research is that it operates with an idea of power understood as a relational, rather than a static, concept. Hence, in contrast to an idea of power as something that individual men or patriarchal structures own and try to retain, from a feminist poststructuralist perspective, power is understood as an unstable and ever-shifting expression of relations in all aspects of every life. A third distinctive feature of gender and politics research influenced by poststructuralism is the abandonment of a normative standpoint from which value judgments are made to appraise or condemn a reality that is taken as objectively given, such as the patriarchal or the women-friendly state. In other words, the aim of research informed by this perspective is not to provide answers but to show how gender power is constructed through relational discursive practices in specific social and political contexts. For example, recent studies on gender and the state argue that the idea that the state is discursively constructed can explain not only why there are patriarchal states as well as women-friendly states but also why it is possible to find significant differences in this regard between different parts of the same state. Poststructural feminist perspectives have also influenced recent work on gender and political representation.

Postcolonial Feminism

The postcolonial feminist perspective (mainly in the field of international relations) challenges the epistemological and ontological bases of liberal and radical feminist research in two important ways. First, it argues that gender oppression is perpetrated by colonialism as well as patriarchy and that the combination of both forms of oppression shape women’s roles and their status in non-Western societies. It is critical of the universalist assumptions of women’s shared experiences that liberal and radical feminism presume. This leads postcolonial scholars to question the Western discursive construction of Third World women as a singular entity, its inbuilt tendency to homogenize women’s experiences, and its unstated valuing of Western women’s empowerment. Second, it challenges the inherent racism in the colonial project.
in historical and contemporary contexts. Postcolonial feminism as a research approach uses the deconstruction of the Euro/Western-centric legacy to recognize the multiple forms of women’s activism and empowerment in Third World societies. More recent studies have sought to uncover the shared sites of oppression among women—such as global capitalism—while recognizing the diversity of their traditions, standpoints, and experiences. Postcolonial feminist political research has much in common with postmodern studies: Both seek to uncover the multiple layers of female oppression that are created through discourse and narrative. Both are attentive to the intersections of race, class, gender, and sexuality with national, cultural, political, and other identities.

Established and Emerging Research Agendas in Feminism and Politics

The brief reviews above of women’s political empowerment and scholarly approaches to studying gender and politics reveal a close connection between the worlds of activism and research. This section outlines some important thematic areas of research that unite the study of feminism and politics.

The first theme is one that is fundamental to political science—democracy and political representation. Feminist scholars have paid considerable attention to this theme, grounding their work in case and comparative studies of women’s political participation and legislative seat holding and electoral and party politics. This research also encompasses extensive studies on gender differences in political attitudes and behavior. An extension of this research examines women’s contributions to democracy and democratization processes. The cultural turn in feminist studies is also reflected in this scholarship, with a focus on the role of the media in shaping gender perceptions of politics. The studies in this thematic area are generally conducted within the tradition of liberal feminism and employ positivist and historical methods of scholarship. The concern in this field of research is to identify and explore women’s participation in civic and political activity and the sites and issues on which women challenge the state and seek to represent interests and perspectives that may be unacknowledged in the existing political order.

A related thematic research field is that of the relationship between gender politics and the state. This disparate area addresses the many and varied sites of feminist political contestation, including women’s movements, nationalism and feminism, policy issues, gender mainstreaming, and the male-gendered nature of political institutions. There are two common characteristics of this research, especially among most recent scholarship. One is a shift of attention from women in politics to gender in politics. This highlights the way in which political institutions are gendered and how they act to construct and reinforce gender–power relations, both in the political world and in the wider society. The second characteristic is the marked influence on gender and politics research of the institutional turn that has taken place in the wider field of political science. Emerging research agendas in this area focus on changes in the modern nation-state with a view to exploring the differential impact of a variety of state architectures (federalism, regionalism, etc.) on gender relations as well as examining how recent trends in globalization, supranationalization, and decentralization call into question established assumptions about gender politics and the state. Again, producing a prolific output of scholarly analysis, this body of work uses mainly qualitative methodologies in both liberal and radical feminist traditions.

Women’s advocacy in transnational and global civil society constitutes a more recent thematic area in feminism and politics research. Prompted by observations on the globalizing nature of political life in the 21st century and its effects on women’s opportunities for civic and political expression, this scholarship examines the gendered effects of the global political economy and international political institutions. This research strand is firmly grounded in feminist international relations research, where questions of transnational activism and the gendered nature of international political institutions, linkages, and practices are opened to critical review. This thematic field offers the most eclectic use of methodologies in conducting research, and the influence of critical social and political theory on scholarship is apparent.

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See also Democracy, Direct; Democracy, Quality; Democracy, Theories of; Democracy, Types of; Interest Groups; Participation; Representation; Social Movements; State

Further Readings

**Feminist Movements**

Feminist movements have become ubiquitous in the modern world over the last half century, and today, there are few countries in which such organizations do not exist. Feminist movements have mobilized on a vast number of issues ranging from civil and equal rights to violence against women and reproductive rights. They have also organized around issues of war and peace, the environment, racism, and world poverty. Feminist movements were part of the struggles for national liberation in the 20th century and played an important part in recent transitions to democracy. They have always had international connections, but since the United Nations (UN) Women’s World Conferences at Nairobi (1985) and Beijing (1995) and the UN World Population Conference at Cairo (1994), there has been an exponential growth of transnational women’s groups. In their aims, feminist movements have never been solely concerned with political change; sociocultural change has always been seen as essential to challenging gender hierarchies.

Given the plethora of issues on which women have mobilized, distinguishing feminist movements from women’s movements in general has been contentious in the literature. Women’s movements mobilize women as women, as a constituency, regardless of the issue that they address. The term feminist movement is best reserved for those women’s movements challenging gender hierarchies that subordinate women to men. This debate has been fueled by historical records showing that both have often intermingled and influenced each other. In recent studies, the definition of feminist and women’s movements is now regarded as an empirical question, to be answered by contextual analysis of the discourses and activities of the movements in question. Among scholars, it has become common, given the varieties in feminism, to speak of feminist movements in the plural.

The term feminism was first used in 19th-century Europe, but the discourse itself can be traced to the early 15th century. Its principal thesis is that the condition of women is not ordained by nature or supernatural order but can and should be changed. During the era of colonization, Western feminist ideas became familiar in the East and the South, which led to early reforms of women’s rights in the first half of the 20th century in a number of countries as diverse as China, Turkey, and much of Latin America as well as in North America and Europe.

Up to the 1980s, women’s movements in the South had been critical of the concept of feminism, regarding it as a limited Western approach to women’s issues and arguing that social-economic development is of greater importance for improving women’s status in the developing world. The critique was shared by many from the former communist world who depicted feminism as a bourgeois ideology and claimed women’s equality had been achieved under communism. However, autonomous feminist movements have since then emerged in many countries in the South and East, with their own feminist discourses and agendas of gender justice. The increasing international engagement of feminist movements has led to a consensus in the 2000s on a broad social feminism engaging with global inequalities and social justice as well as including reproductive rights and violence against women.

Social movement scholars have argued that the emergence of social movements is tied to the development of the national state, which created a public sphere for addressing grievances and protest.
Mobilization occurs in periods of crisis, nearly always generating feminist-inspired protest alongside other social movements. In the literature on feminist movements, these periods of heightened activities have been denoted by the metaphor of waves. Usually the term first wave is reserved for the feminist movements that arose in the second half of the 19th century, the period of industrialization in Europe and Northern America, and the second wave for those originating in the major social changes of the 1960s and 1970s. Historians have made a strong case, however, for earlier waves of feminist activity in the period of the English Civil War and the French Enlightenment as well as during the French Revolution, when numerous treatises and pamphlets on the status of women were published. The metaphor is also somewhat misleading as there is ample evidence of sustained contention by women between the waves. Moreover, the timing of protests is not synchronous across the world. Women’s suffrage and changes in patriarchal family law were gained in the 1920s and 1930s in Latin America, while in many European countries, such reforms had taken place in the previous decades.

The early social movements of the mid-19th century are the precursors of feminist movements in the Western world. These were the antislavery (abolitionist) and temperance movements in the United States and Britain, and many social reform and religious revival movements in Europe. By the late 19th century, feminist movements had developed, either arguing that women were equal to men, and therefore were entitled to equal rights, or different from men, requiring the recognition of women’s unique contribution to society. The first wave has often been reduced to the struggle for suffrage, but it had a much broader agenda of social and legal rights. The campaign for suffrage emerged in the late 19th century; today, the only countries where women cannot vote on a par with men are several Islamic states in the Middle East.

Other issues of the first wave were the reform of family law, access to education, and the right to work. The first wave retained its social reform character, organizing on issues as diverse as public health, social work, temperance, peace, prostitution, and the trafficking of women. Many feminists also campaigned against informal social codes limiting women’s activities, such as dress reform, access to public spaces, and bars on female sports. Antiwar activism and campaigns against trafficking led to the first transnational feminist organizations in the 1890s. Often, it is held that the first wave ended in the West after World War I, but in many countries the feminist movement remained active in social reform issues beneficial to women, such as maternal leave. Such demands were able to cross class divides. One of the major contentious issues has always been that of how far feminist movements were speaking on behalf of all women and not just for the middle class and whether working class women stood to gain by suffrage and equal rights.

Demobilization occurred in the 1940s and 1950s, but the revival of feminism owes much to entrenched feminist networks and women’s institutions during this period. The second wave emerged in the wake of the early protest movements of the 1960s, such as the civil rights, student, and antiwar movements in the West and the rising tide of national independence and social revolutionary movements in Latin America and the decolonizing world. Often called the new or the autonomous women’s movement, its emergence galvanized existing women’s organizations across much of the world. Differences in organizational style, action repertoire, and ideology distinguished the second wave from the older branches of feminisms in many countries. The new feminist groups were highly critical of formal politics, organized in loose networks, and used street protest instead of the traditional lobby to reach their goals. They created a new radical feminist ideology that emphasized consciousness raising and developed a far-reaching critique of patriarchy, culture, and men.

Politicizing the body, by setting abortion and reproductive rights, sexuality (including lesbianism), and (sexual) violence on the political agenda, also originated in the new feminist groups. These issues have become the distinctive marks of second-wave feminism, leading to worldwide reforms and to strong opposition from (religious) conservatives in general. But the second wave also set out to achieve time-honored goals, such as equal political representation, access to education and work, and decent living conditions in the developing world. The creation of a vibrant women’s culture, with its own media, women’s centers, and networks, has also been integral to most feminist movements. In countries faced with authoritarian or military regimes, a
Feminist Theory in International Relations

constituency of women originated who fought for democratization and rights for women in new constitutions, as in South Africa and many Latin American states. This was much less the case in the former communist states, where feminism became discredited by its connection to the former regimes.

One of the crucial issues the feminist movement has been confronting is the diversity of women: No organization can claim to speak on behalf of all women. Differences of class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, and disabilities have challenged unity and the choice of priorities. These debates occurred in different sequences in most countries and in the international arena. Scholars generally agree that the feminist movement is one of the most successful of the 1960s social movements and the one with the greatest longevity. This is testimony to the increasing success of feminist movements in bridging diverse communities and coping with the changing global environment. Scholars disagree about the end of the second wave. Some scholars have contended that the new autonomous movement disappeared by the early 1980s. Others have pointed out that many second-wave groups have turned into professional lobby organizations still targeting government and parliament on women’s issues into the 2000s, a phenomenon also well documented at the supranational level.

The study of feminist and women’s movements, like social movements in general, has fallen victim to the division of labor between political scientists, historians, and sociologists. Political science, with its strong distinction between the public and the private, has emphasized formal institutions and political behavior. Sociology tackled social movements but has often paid only nominal attention to feminist and women’s movements, raising questions about the validity of its theories. Women’s studies and women’s history, both legacies of second-wave feminism, have produced most of the current knowledge; as of now, these findings have been only incompletely incorporated in the other disciplines, and they do provide the most promising material for further study.

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See also Feminism; Gender; Rights; Social Movements

Further Readings


Feminist Theory in International Relations

Feminist theory has developed in the context of the feminist movement and seeks to explain women’s subordination, its causes, and the ways in which it is perpetuated. It employs gender as a key concept, that is, the social relation between the sexes, arguing that this relation is not naturally given but socially constructed. Many feminists today think of gender as informing multiple dimensions of human experience, from individual identities to social and political institutions. Thus, gender operates through individual identifications, shared narratives, and symbols. As a social construct, gender not only produces a social reality but also signifies a relationship of power—the predominance of things and people gendered masculine over those gendered feminine. Thus, feminists also use gender as a methodological tool, a lens through which to look at the world in order to reveal gendered relationships of power. In international relations, feminist theory has made three distinct contributions: First, using gender as a lens, it has served to inform critiques of the field as gendered. Second, approaching gender as a social construct, it has described the reproduction of masculinity and
femininity in the conduct of international relations. Finally, it has introduced a unique methodology that requires researchers to think about their own position in the research enterprise. This entry describes the three distinct contributions.

Compared with other disciplines, feminist theory entered the field of international relations relatively recently, with seminal writings by Cynthia Enloe and Jean Elshtain in the late 1980s and J. Ann Tickner, V. Spike Peterson, and Christine Sylvester in the early 1990s. While this first generation of feminist research in international relations focused on critiquing concepts, a second generation has focused on empirical investigations, which have resulted in a broader questioning of methodologies. International relations scholarship employing feminist theory has become institutionalized through the formation of the Feminist Theory and Gender Studies section of the International Studies Association in 1990 and the founding of a new journal in 1999, the International Feminist Journal of Politics.

Critiquing the Canon

Feminists have argued that standard concepts of international relations orthodoxy are gendered, that is, that they carry associations of masculinity and femininity. Classical realism imagines individuals seeking domination and engaged in a struggle for power. Feminists have suggested that this conception of individuals reflects masculine experiences. What realists consider human nature (following the theories of Thomas Hobbes) does not reflect the experiences of mothers and other caretakers who know themselves less as autonomous individuals separate from others but as connected in their caring relationships. Feminists point out that Thomas Hobbes’s state of nature is populated by individuals who are self-generated, not born of or nurtured by women, but who—in his own words—shot out of the ground like mushrooms. This image has informed political theories that presume atomistic human subjects. Projected onto the state, it has become the starting point for a realist imagining of the international world as made up of autonomous and self-interested actors devoid of social connections.

In addition to constructing humans as essentially male, realist theories celebrate a militarized version of masculinity. They construct this form of masculinity as hegemonic, implicitly denigrating other forms of masculinity and any type of femininity. The opposition between hegemonic masculinity and subordinated masculinities and femininities drives narratives of war and security. For example, the opposition between a masculine protector and women in need of protection is a basic structuring device that justifies and thus perpetuates war making. In her examination of women and war, Elshtain gives further content to this opposition, finding that Western philosophy constructs the opposition as one between masculine “just warriors” and feminine “beautiful souls” imagined as innocent about the ways of the world. The opposition drives a basic narrative that has drawn women and men into war while silencing the stories of women and men that do not fit the stereotypes. The opposition also informs a multiplicity of stories around war fighting, from male courage and heroism to feminine nobility and sacrifice. By privileging an understanding of a militarized male as the prototypical human, theories of international relations produce an intrinsically biased, highly militarized understanding of the international world, while at the same time reproducing a thoroughly stereotypical understanding of what it means to be a woman or man.

If the citizen warrior reigns supreme in classical security studies, notions of rational man replace him in liberal international political economy (IPE). Feminists have criticized the instrumental rationality reflected in notions of economic man because it denies the neediness of human beings and their
mutual dependence on each other. Presumptions of self-interested cost–benefit calculations in economic conduct neglect this dependence and underestimate the role of caring in the production of values. As in security studies, feminists have also found explanations in IPE to be based on the denigration of the private sphere. This devaluing leads theories of political economy—in both the liberal and Marxist variety—to ignore the broad realm of social reproduction, the value generated, mostly by women, through the unpaid work of subsistence production, caring, and housekeeping.

Women and Men, Femininity and Masculinity in International Relations

The feminist critique of the international relations canon has directed scholars toward exploring areas left out of orthodox international relations scholarship. Arguably, feminist scholars operate within a different ontology of international relations—one that includes spaces and practices of women and one in which gender produces a diverse range of outcomes. A major focus of inquiries thus has been to make visible the practices of gendered agents. Another focus has been to analyze the situated constructions of femininity and masculinity that are produced in such practices.

In security studies, feminists have followed Enloe’s lead and argued that power operates in a wide variety of everyday activities to sustain militarized security arrangements. Camouflage clothing, Rambo movies, the training programs of the U.S. military in schools and colleges, the military’s regulation of prostitution around foreign army bases, the employment of sexualized and homely imagery when defense intellectuals talk about weapons systems—all function to construct the military and its often horrific weapons systems as a benign force, part of the normal order of things. Women gain a militarized role in this order as much as men—as mothers who encourage their sons to go to war, as pinup girls, nurses, prostitutes, and soldiers’ wives who divert and sustain them and who remind them of the purpose of their fighting. Because war in this way depends on constructions of gender, the postwar reconstruction of countries needs to include a reconstruction of gender relations if it wants to prevent wars in the future.

Feminists also have explored the kinds of masculinities being constructed in particular wars and militaries, finding the warrior citizen model hegemonic but also tamed in the first Gulf War by a combination of toughness and tenderness. They have sought to destabilize the model of militarized masculinity by exploring the resistance against gays in the military and the military’s refusal to acknowledge posttraumatic stress disorder. Denying differences in sexual orientation and denying the humanity of soldiers in the face of the horrors they encounter are efforts to preserve a militarized version of tough and fearless masculinity that thrives on the fiction of being the masculine protector of feminized “women and children” (Enloe’s formulation).

In IPE, feminist researchers have sought to make visible the work of women engaged in “reproduction,” including subsistence farmers, maids, homeworkers, and sex workers. They have identified a different type of masculinity as hegemonic—that is, a bourgeois-rationalist model that celebrates competition, reason, and self-control. This model has become particularly emphasized in the context of neoliberal restructurings and globalization. Feminists have explored the construction of a class of global jet-setting managers empowered by forms of hegemonic masculinity and have shown that this has been accompanied by the development of a global low-pay feminized services economy. They have described the reconstructions of gender relations in postsocialist transition economies, including patterns that pushed women out of workforces and parliaments and re-enabled their sexual objectification. And they have interpreted the newly emerging East Asian developmentalism as a reversal of colonial hypermasculinity and as made possible by an inflated traditional paternalism in newly industrializing countries. Finally, they have explored feminist efforts to mainstream considerations of gender in institutions of global economic governance, such as the World Bank, showing how feminism becomes integrated into existing arrangements, sometimes improving the situation of women at the margins while also continuing to deny the relevance of the reproductive economy.

Feminist Methodology

Most feminists in international relations have argued for postpositivist methodologies that allow them to critically interrogate the field and its practices. Having grown out of a political movement, feminist
research has often sought to ask questions relevant to women’s experiences and produce knowledge useful to the movement. Rather than insisting on the researcher keeping a distance from her topic, feminists have sought to specify their relationship to the topic. For some, this requires defining a feminist standpoint—that is, specifying that they speak from the perspective of a specific movement or a specific community. For others, it has meant making into a subject matter their own position or experience during the research process. Yet others employ positivist methods that keep the researcher’s distance from the object of inquiry but make sure to ask feminist questions. All share an element of reflexivity toward the research enterprise that distinguishes feminism from most other approaches in international relations. It allows feminists to problematize the political effects of the knowledge produced and arguably abide by a more robust version of objectivity than approaches that fail to keep in view the relationship between the researcher and the researched.

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See also Feminism; Feminist Movements; International Political Economy; Positivism; Realism in International Relations

Further Readings

Foreign Aid and Development

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines “development assistance” (or foreign aid) as financial flows that qualify as official development assistance (ODA). ODA is calculated as the sum of grants and loans to aid recipients that are (a) undertaken by the official sector of the donor country, (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare in recipient countries as the main objective, (c) at concessional financial terms, where the grant element is equal to at least 25%. In addition to financial flows, technical cooperation costs are included in ODA; but grants, loans, and credits for military purposes are excluded, and transfer payments to private individuals are in general not counted. The same goes for donations from the public, commercial loans, and foreign direct investment (FDI). It is common to treat ODA and foreign aid as equivalent, but this can be misleading. Assistance funded by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) including church-based agencies has grown significantly in the past 25 years and now amounts to about one third of ODA.

Only official aid to “traditional” developing countries counted as ODA until 2005. For these (Part I) countries, there is a long-standing United Nations (UN) target from 1970 that they should receive 0.7% of donors’ gross national income (GNI) as aid. Assistance to the “more advanced” Eastern European and “more advanced” developing (Part II) countries was recorded separately by DAC as “official aid,” not included as part of ODA. DAC countries have over the years accounted for some 95% of all ODA flows, but the distinction between Part I and Part II countries is no longer used. All flows that fulfill the established criteria are now included in the aggregate measure of ODA, but NGO-funded contributions are not added. In 2009, the total amount of ODA disbursed by donors to developing countries and multilateral organizations reached US$123.1 billion according to the OECD/DAC 2010 statistics. (For the data in this and subsequent paragraphs, see OECD, 2010).

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This means that the average citizen in the donor countries contributed around US$149 as ODA. This can be compared with a figure of around US$64 in 1960–1973 and US$99 in 1992. However, the UN target of 0.7% of GNI is with few exceptions far from being reached. Donors disbursed 30.4% of total foreign aid to multilateral organizations in 2006, and some 70% of this flow was disbursed to developing countries, with
the European Union and the International Monetary Fund and World Bank as the dominating sources followed by the UN and the Regional Development Banks.

It is a widespread perception that foreign aid amounts to a very significant resource, in both absolute and relative terms, and that aid is not insignificant measured relative to developing country production and income. At the same time, aid is much less sizeable when measured in relation to GNI or government budgets in the donor countries or in comparison with population size of aid-receiving countries. Moreover, aid has been on a declining trend since the early 1990s as a share of GNI in recipient countries. Most recipient countries receive aid to the order of 1.8% of their GNI per year with a median of 3.2%. This corresponds to a distribution of aid per capita with a mode of US$17.9 per year and a median of US$31. Accordingly, the relative size of the aid inflow varies significantly among recipients, and while the 13.2% size of the aid to GNI ratio in, for example, Tanzania may seem high, this share reflects not only the size of the aid flow but also the very low level of income. With this background, modest expectations are advisable when analyzing the overall impact of past aid on development.

In subsequent paragraphs, the historical and theoretical context of foreign aid is reviewed first. This is followed by overviews of the empirical evidence on the allocation of aid and its impact on furthering growth and development in aid-receiving countries. The conclusion provides discussion and summary remarks.

Historical and Theoretical Context

Foreign aid in its modern form has roots back to the early 1940s and intensified after the disruption that followed World War II. The international economic system had collapsed, and war-ravaged Europe faced a critical shortage of capital and an acute need for physical reconstruction. The response was the European Recovery Program, commonly known as the Marshall Plan. During the peak years, the United States transferred some 2% to 3% of its national income to help restore Europe. The Marshall Plan, which was administered by the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the predecessor of the OECD, was implemented on schedule, and its success fuelled highly optimistic expectations about the future effectiveness of foreign aid.

After the success of the Marshall Plan, the attention of industrialized nations turned to the developing countries, many of which became independent around 1960. Economic growth in a state-led planning tradition became a key objective during the 1950s and 1960s, and it was widely believed that poverty and inequality would be quickly eliminated through growth and modernization (“trickle-down”). Theoretical thinking on economic development at the macrolevel was informed by both the Harrod-Domar growth model (which was extended into the two-gap model of Chenery and Strout) and the Lewis dual-sector model framework; whereas standard microeconomic cost–benefit analysis (CBA) was relied on in project analysis. The Harrod-Domar model is based on the assumption that investment is the key constraint on growth, whereas the Lewis model is concerned with the transfer of labor from the “traditional” (rural) to the “modern” (industrial) sector. CBA, on the other hand, assesses cost and benefits of individual microeconomic project interventions based on shadow prices for inputs and outputs and derives net present values and internal rates of return.

The major part of the rapidly increasing bilateral flows during the 1950s came from the United States. New bilateral donor agencies (other than the United States) were mainly established in the 1960s, with the Commonwealth-inspired Colombo Plan from 1950 being an exception. A transition toward more independent, multilateral relations also began to emerge during the 1960s. This created a constituency for foreign aid, and the non-aligned movement gave an articulated developing country focus to this voice, as did the various organs of the UN. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or World Bank, established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, came to play a central role in development assistance and international policy formulation, especially following the creation of the International Development Association in 1960.

The original Marshall Plan was built around support to finance general categories of imports and strengthen the balance of payments (i.e., program aid), but from the early 1950s, project aid became the dominating aid modality. Some donors
continued to supply program aid, but aid was increasingly disbursed for the implementation of specific capital investment projects and associated technical assistance.

The multilateralism of aid became somewhat more pronounced after the mid-1970s. Multilateral channels were at the time seen as more efficient and less political than bilateral aid, so the UN, World Bank, and other multilateral agencies expanded their activities considerably. The 1970s also saw an increased focus on employment, income distribution, and poverty alleviation as essential objectives of development and foreign aid. The effectiveness of trickle-down was widely questioned, and new strategies referred to as basic human needs and redistribution with growth were formulated and propagated alongside more radical dependency theories of development. Nevertheless, the typical project aid modality remained largely unchanged.

The golden era of the 1960s and 1970s came to an abrupt end at the beginning of the 1980s. The second oil shock in 1979 reversed economic conditions, and there was a huge increase in interest rates due to the economic stabilization policies in the developed countries. The international debt crisis erupted, and macroeconomic imbalance became characteristic. On the political scene, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher came to power in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively, and at the World Bank, Anne Krueger became vice president and chief economist, replacing Hollis Chenery. Economic circumstances in the developing countries and relations between the North and South changed radically. The crisis hit hard, especially in many African countries. Focus in development strategy and policy shifted to internal domestic policy failure, and achieving macroeconomic balance (externally and internally) became widely perceived as an essential prerequisite for renewed development.

“Rolling back the state” turned into a rallying call in the subsequent structural adjustment efforts, and reliance on market forces, outward orientation, and the role of the private sector, including NGOs, was emphasized by the World Bank and others. In parallel, poverty alleviation slipped out of view in mainstream agendas for economic reform but remained at the center of attention in more unorthodox thinking such as the “adjustment with a human face” approach of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). At the same time, bilateral donors and international agencies struggled with how to channel resources to the developing world. Quick-disbursing macroeconomic program assistance, such as balance of payments support and sector budget support (which were not tied to investment projects and which could be justified under the headings of stabilization and adjustment), appeared an ideal solution to the dilemma of maintaining the resource flow and the desire to promote policy reform. Financial program aid and adjustment loans (and eventually debt relief) became fashionable and policy conditionality more widespread. In other words, a rationale that corresponded well with the orthodox guidelines for good policy summarized by the “Washington Consensus” had been found for maintaining the aid flow.

Accordingly, total aid continued to grow steadily in real terms until the early 1990s, but after 1992, total aid flows started to decline in absolute terms until the turn of the millennium. Many reasons account for the fall in aggregate flows after 1992, including first of all the end of the Cold War. The same can be said for the weakening patron–client relationships among the developing countries and the former colonial powers. The traditional support of foreign aid by vocal interest groups in the industrial countries receded. Bilateral and multilateral aid institutions were subjected to criticism and characterized at times as blunt instruments of commercial interests in the industrial world or as self-interested, inefficient, rent-seeking bureaucracies. Moreover, acute awareness in donor countries of cases of bad governance, corruption, and “crony capitalism” led to skepticism about the credibility of governments receiving aid.

The potential role of foreign aid in all this attracted attention, and the fear that aid can generate undesirable dependency relationships became clear during the second part of the 1990s and persisted into the 21st century. In parallel, the perception that policy conditionality was failing to promote policy reform started to assert itself. This assessment prompted World Bank and independent academic researchers to start digging into the aid–growth relationship using modern econometric techniques. Even more recently, efforts to develop
randomized program evaluation techniques (including a variety of experimental approaches) appeared based both on micro-CBA studies from the past and an increasing understanding of the need for developing proper counterfactuals in economic analysis of foreign aid and associated policy interventions.

Aid Allocation

Over the years, foreign aid has been justified in public policy pronouncements in widely differing ways, ranging from pure altruism to the shared benefits of economic development in poor countries and further on to the political ideology, foreign policy, and commercial interests of the donor country. Few would dispute that humanitarian sentiments have also motivated donors. Action following severe natural calamities, which continue to be endemic in poor countries, is an example. Food and emergency relief also remains an important form of aid. In addition, existing data and analyses confirm that donors allocate relatively more ODA to the poorest countries.

Emphasis on the needs of poor countries was a particularly prominent characteristic—and the underlying economic rationale—in much of the policy literature on foreign aid in the 1950s and 1960s. Here focus was on estimating aid requirements in the tradition of the two-gap model. While still influential in practice, the two-gap model has been subjected to a variety of criticisms, and in parallel, the role of aid has changed to a much more multidimensional set of concerns. Economic return is by no means the only goal of aid. Nevertheless, growth and economic development in aid-receiving countries have continued as a yardstick for the effectiveness of aid both in their own right and as necessary conditions for the realization of other development aims.

It is not new that selfish motives are critical in bilateral donor decisions. Moreover, bilateral donors do indeed behave very differently among themselves. Up to about 1990, the Cold War was used as a powerful justification for providing aid to developing countries to stem the spread of communism. Similarly, aid from socialist governments was motivated to promote socialist political and economic systems. Other strategic interests play a role as well. The United States has over the years earmarked substantial amounts of aid to Egypt and Israel; being a former colony is an important determinant in getting access to French aid; and voting behavior in the UN can affect aid allocation both bilaterally and through the multilateral system. The same goes for how bilateral donors are influenced in aid allocations by their own strategic and commercial interest versus the development motives of aid recipients.

It is widely accepted that not all donors behave the same; but the donor community has as a whole failed to meet the established international target of contributing 0.7% of their national income as ODA. This is so in spite of widespread endorsement of the recommendations for a large scaling up in the context of the Millennium Development Goals. Only the group of Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands (according to OECD/DAC statistics) have consistently met the 0.7% target since the mid-1970s, while the United States contributed around 0.2% of its GNI in 2009.

Aid Impact

To measure the effect of aid properly, the analyst must in principle be able to compare the value of a chosen indicator (such as growth or poverty reduction) in two strictly independent situations—with and without aid. To establish the “true” measure of aid impact, the importance of all other circumstances that have affected a given country over time needs to be properly accounted for. Comparing what actually happened with an appropriate counterfactual is the fundamental evaluation challenge. Yet there is in social science no way of addressing this problem (i.e., the challenge of establishing an appropriate counterfactual) in a broadly acceptable way without making assumptions that are bound to be debatable, in theory and in practice.

Accordingly, the past decades have witnessed a massive outpouring of studies on the effectiveness of foreign aid. This topic has been a central and recurring theme with which many development experts, subscribing to the different paradigms of development thinking, have grappled, and methodologies have varied. More specifically, (a) the impact of aid has been evaluated at the micro- and macroeconomic level, (b) cross-country comparisons as well as single-country case studies have been relied on, and (c) aid effectiveness research
includes broad surveys of a qualitative and interdisciplinary nature as well as more hard-core quantitative work.

One key point on which there is at least some agreement in the literature is that aid has in many cases been highly successful at the microeconomic level. The most rigorous project evaluations in this area are done by the World Bank, and reports from the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank are generally encouraging. Average rates of return are generally above 20%, and decent project rates of return have been reported regularly over the years in one survey after the other. Overall, a mass of project-based evidence has been collected, and few dispute that aid interventions have worked in helping improve social outcomes through better health and in helping promote and develop appropriate technology (i.e., the green revolution) and so on. Yet it remains less clear what works in more concrete terms and what does not work, and doubts about aid’s overall impact on growth and development linger on. The question is regularly raised whether all this adds up at the macrolevel.

It is easy to arrive at a negative association between aid and growth in simple aid–growth correlation analysis. There is, however, no logical inconsistency in development terms between little growth and aid inflows of the size experienced in the past. Donors allocate more aid to poorer countries, which are subject to difficulties and shocks of many kinds, including natural and man-made calamities. When countries have done well for a while average income has gone up, donors tend to transfer less aid, and eventually they withdraw. While such “graduation” may take a while, simple correlations are on this background likely to show a negative relationship; but they do not reveal the “true” impact of aid. Aid allocation matters, as do the major changes that have taken place in the global economy and affected the environment in which aid is implemented. Targets for aid have also been changing from one decade to the next. Thus, simple correlation analysis or storytelling cannot—and should not—be allowed to settle the causality debate about aid’s potential impact on development.

It is, however, never straightforward to generalize from case studies, and this helps explain why macroeconomic cross-country (panel data) studies of the aid–growth link became so popular from around 1995. Such an approach makes it possible in principle to move beyond simplistic aid–growth correlation analysis, where the analysis of causal effects is rather primitive. Much of the modern empirical aid effectiveness literature has focused on whether the impact of aid is conditional on policy or whether aid can be expected to have a separate and positive impact, independent of policy. This has involved a mixture of concerns. They range from technically demanding econometric modeling issues to fundamentally different approaches to the design and implementation of development strategy and policy.

Overall, it has become clear that coming up with the “true” aid–growth relationship is far from easy, and aid is in any case of much too limited a size to turn the wheels of history. Yet, while aid is controversial, few reject aid as a potentially useful instrument in the fight against poverty. Careful, nuanced, and subtle assessments are advisable with the empirical evidence in hand; and the single most common result in the modern aid–growth literature is that aid seems to have had a positive impact on per capita growth. No excessive claims about aid impact on development should be made on this basis, and the empirical evidence remains an area of dispute, leaving the door open for conflicting interpretations and policy recommendations.

**Conclusion**

Foreign aid has been associated with development successes and failures, and the fundamental analytical problem in assessing its impact is that nobody has to date successfully identified the underlying development model. Analysts therefore continue to work with reduced-form models, which are bound to be debatable. In parallel, existing data suggest that foreign aid is far from equally effective everywhere. The necessary and sufficient conditions for aid to have a positive contribution on the development process remain elusive. In other words, how to come to grips better with what actually drives existing differences in the impact of foreign aid is a challenge in theory and practice. This is so, for example, in relation to potential interaction with economic policy, but the same goes for deeper structural characteristics.

The lack of generalized understanding of the complex links in particular country circumstances
between aid, growth, and development objectives, such as poverty reduction, means that selectivity in aid allocation, based on simple macroeconomic criteria, is hard to defend. Few would argue that old-fashioned conditionality should be brought back to rule the way; but a better understanding of the intricacies of the donor–recipient relationship in theory and in practice would be valuable. This would as key elements include addressing issues such as (a) the best way to channel resources to the poor, when national governments are not capable and/or willing to take on this task; (b) how to ensure that aid delivered directly to national governments does not undermine local accountability; and (c) establishing the appropriate balance between aid going to the government vis-à-vis individuals and others in the private sector. Accordingly, how best to strengthen incentives in support of genuine domestic policy leadership is a challenge. The same goes for the fundamental task of furthering accountability and transparency vis-à-vis local populations. Recent years have seen a drive to scale up aid. In this context, it is critically important to avoid making the mistake of the past of promising too much—that is, of contributing to the misconception that aid can on its own turn history. It would, based on history, appear that aid has much to offer, but managing expectations is far from easy. It is demanding to determine how best to make sure that promises made are kept. There are many unresolved issues here, including deciding how best to design incentives in aid agencies to meet this challenge alongside topics such as the role of independent evaluation, of coordination among multiple donors, and of the need to consider political economy issues, including the need to sharpen the incentives for recipients to use aid effectively in promoting development.

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See also Accountability; Bilateralism; Case Studies; Conditionality; Cost–Benefit Analysis; Hypothesis Testing; Interaction Effects; International Organizations; Modernization Theory; Neoliberalism; Nonstate Actors; Panel Data Analysis; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; World Bank

Further Readings


FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Foreign Policy Analysis (upper case, abbreviated as FPA) is a subfield of the academic subject of international relations (IR) that has developed since the 1950s, broadly in parallel with IR itself. Foreign policy analysis (lower case, abbreviated as fpa) is what all commentators on matters of foreign policy do as a matter of routine, for one country or many. (This distinction between FPA
and fpa will be used here for clarity.) Whether academics, journalists, or think tank researchers, they dissect the sources, goals, instruments, and feasibility of foreign policies and have thus gained over the years the sobriquet of foreign policy analysts. The term itself, however, is relatively modern in origin and owes much to the emergence of the academic field of FPA, which is the main focus of this entry, given its importance for IR and for political science more widely.

FPA has predominantly become established in the Anglo-Saxon world (i.e., England and her former colonies), including the United States, the United Kingdom, together with Scandinavia and some countries of the Commonwealth, such as Australia, Canada, India, Nigeria, and South Africa. Foreign policy has been long studied elsewhere but more in the fpa tradition and influenced more by history and international law than by political science. Even within the relatively narrow world of FPA, there are important differences of approach. The U.S. scholarly community has produced most of the important work in all areas of the subject, but it has also historically placed much more emphasis on large-scale data sets associated with the specialization known as comparative foreign policy (CFP), which has not attracted much interest (or the necessary resources) outside the United States. Elsewhere the focus has been more on case studies, on the microaspects of decision making, and on the ideas of foreign policy—particularly in the past decade, with the rise of constructivism and its concern with identity politics. But wherever the subject is studied, it is underpinned by the preoccupation with the relationship between process and outcome. Even those primarily concerned to generate events data have been motivated by the wish to discover correlations between certain kinds of foreign policy events and key variables, such as domestic upheaval or degrees of pluralism.

FPA can operate with a zoom or a wide-angle lens, on individual decisions, and on a class of actions—behavior in crises, for instance. Yet even close-textured analysis is set up in such a way as to enable comparisons to take place. In this, it is similar to the study of comparative politics, which can be regarded as its equivalent, or parallel, within mainstream political science. Yoked together, the two subjects constitute a solid bridge between political science and IR. Each also draws on history and area studies, as one cannot understand political culture, whether in the singular or the plural, without a grounding in its geographical and historical particularities. Theory is central to FPA, but it is not, by itself, a powerful tool in this particular context. FPA also looks to the study of international law and organization (more properly to the sociology of law and organization) for insights into the constraints under which foreign policymakers operate. In fact the literature of IR as a whole is useful in this respect. Even Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism, which explicitly disavows having anything to say about foreign policy (it being a different level of analysis from his own), provides a clear picture of the nature of the international system, with implied guidance for the actors within it.

It might be thought that the comparison between FPA and comparative politics is misplaced because the former focuses on policy and the latter on the overall nature of a political system. But this is only superficially true. FPA has evolved beyond both policy and decision making to include all the domestic sources of foreign policy—and to some extent also the foreign sources of domestic policy. It thus provides scholars with a way of comparing how different polities behave outside their own borders and of analyzing the various ways in which domestic society becomes involved with IR. At one level, it is certainly the study of the external dimension of public policy and therefore directly comparable with that particular branch of political science. But it goes beyond that to engage with the nature of the political process as revealed through arguments about foreign policy.

If one looks for the intellectual origins of FPA, one needs to go back further than its actual beginnings, with the work of Richard Snyder and his colleagues at Princeton in the mid-1950s. Their work was rooted in the burgeoning belief in the value of social science, following in the powerful tracks of natural science, which had changed the world so dramatically over the previous century. This meant both that foreign policy should be analyzed in as dispassionate a manner as possible, avoiding the unproductive polemics that had marked the discussion of Munich, or McCarthyism, so as to probe beneath the surface of what is now called the “spin” from all sides, to reveal “what really happened.” On this basis, governments and
citizens could gain a better grasp of what was involved in improving the quality of what was from then on to be known as decision making—that is, a neutral term, divorced from the particularities of time or place, by comparison with public administration, which studied specific institutions such as Congress or Whitehall in their own terms. Given the dangers of the just commenced nuclear age this was an understandable, indeed noble, aim.

Beyond this general trend of the growth of social science, and its application to decisions about war and peace, lay also work in economics, politics, sociology, and philosophy going back to Aristotle, which had produced in various ways attempts to think systematically about how those in positions of political responsibility should—and did—calculate their best strategy under conditions of conflict, scarcity, and danger. Political theorists (as they are now called) had focused largely on how to promote the good life (or for whom) and how to manage power, often including speculation about relations with foreigners. Economists from the 18th century on had constructed theories of the efficient use of resources, while sociologists had begun to identify elites whose work extended beyond that of formal officeholders. The interest in psychology sparked by Sigmund Freud (together with the evident psychopathology of Adolf Hitler and his associates) was starting to turn a searchlight onto the behavior and motivations of all those in positions of power. Key individuals such as Max Weber were capable of making connections between these strands and thus laying down the interdisciplinary foundations necessary for the study of political decision making. It was therefore virtually inevitable that at some point the long tradition of concern over war and its consequences would fuse with wider developments in social science to produce a systematic approach to the study of foreign policy—in short, to produce Foreign Policy Analysis, even if the term itself took some time to become routine. In the following, the theoretical concerns, subfields, and contemporary significance of FPA are discussed.

Theoretical Concerns

As FPA has evolved, it has acquired certain defining characteristics, or key assumptions. These may not be shared by everyone working in the field to the same extent, but they are certainly points of reference that all must take into account. This section identifies five such assumptions and adds three more that may be in the process of attracting consensus as the field progresses and adapts to its changing intellectual and real-world environments. Between them, these eight assumptions delineate the central content of FPA while also helping mark its external boundaries.

The first, and most fundamental, assumption has already been referred to—namely, that process affects outcomes. This is why decision making is such an important part of FPA, even if it should never be confused with the field as a whole. The making of decisions and policies is studied because it is taken for granted that the way in which a problem is handled, and by whom, will have a considerable effect on the quality of the subsequent decisions. Perhaps surprisingly, before World War II, this point, which now seems a truism, was not explicitly formulated in such a way, even if much attention was given to the personality and foibles of individual leaders. But the structures in which they worked, to say nothing of their governmental cultures, was not given formal attention. FPA, however, soon made it clear (using among other tools, systems theory) that not only did decision making have certain common features across national contexts but also that feedback loops existed between policy outputs, reactions from outsiders, and a policy system. Thus, policy processes shape the outcomes in State A, but outcomes are also determined by interaction with States B, C, and so on, which in turn may modify the original structures for taking decisions in State A—and so on. One straightforward example is the setting up of the hotline between Washington and Moscow after the perilous missile crisis of October 1962—an innovation designed to improve the crisis management machinery in both capitals.

A second central characteristic of FPA is the acceptance that foreign policy as an area is incapable of generating an overall theory of IR in the way that work pitched at the level of the international system is. The latter may be deemed (especially by Foreign Policy Analysts) as parsimonious to the point of abstraction, telling us very little about the actual dilemmas of states and citizens beyond what can be deduced a priori from the overarching theory (as with neorealism), but at least it has a set of
propositions about how the world as a whole functions. A focus on foreign policy cannot do this. Contrary to the view commonly expressed by Neorealists, foreign policy theories are not inherently reductionist, because they rarely claim to generate explanations of the international system. But they do focus on agency, that is, on how agents, or rather actors (the former being a more ambiguous term) cope with the various domestic and international structures in which they are embedded. This coping will be of a variable nature, according to the actor in question, even if it takes place within certain limits, dictated by what Edmund Burke called “the empire of circumstance.” We may thus draw certain conclusions about what kind of behavior, whether by states or by other kinds of actor, meets with greater or lesser success, and therefore about what kind of world we all live in, but this is not the main purpose of FPA, and it is difficult to be rigorous about it unless we shift level to that of the system overall.

A related assumption to that just described is the consensus that has emerged over the past 2 decades in FPA that, even at the level of comparative foreign policy, it will not be possible to construct a convincing overarching theory—in other words, a single theory of foreign policy is the chimera. The reason for this is clear enough. Finding a single model of how foreign policy is made and conducted that would fit the 192 member states of the United Nations (to say nothing of nonstate actors) would entail such a high level of generality as to be banal in the extreme. When one allows for the importance of the vast range of different policy-making arrangements, degrees of interest group involvement, national cultures, and historical traditions, together with the mosaic of distinctive geopolitical locations, resource distribution, cultural patrimonies, and degrees of development of the states concerned, it is clear that an umbrella theory of foreign policy must be reduced to the same kind of lofty generalization as that imposed by realism or Marxism—indeed the latter can be justly accused of the reverse sin of reductionism, an error that might be labeled “holism” because of its flattening out of the variety of world politics in the interests of parsimony. That said, the flowcharts and taxonomies of the decision-making process that have been produced by such figures as Richard Snyder and Michael Brecher are extremely useful in revealing the wiring diagrams of what occurs in most foreign policy systems, to a greater or lesser extent—but they are not theories, that is, sets of propositions capable of explaining why certain patterns of behavior emerge and/or on giving guidance on how we should behave in any given situation.

The third point of reference for most FPA scholars follows from the skepticism over grand theory, namely the emphasis on analysis. But what is meant by this common term? It is less than theory and more than description, to be sure. It refers to breaking down the process of foreign policy making and execution into its component parts, to understand better what lies beneath the surface of events. To do this, it uses concepts and theories of a particular kind, as will be explained below, in a process of deconstruction and reconstruction. In part, this involves locating foreign policy in its own specific environments, identifying the constraints under which it thus operates, and also the interactions between action and environments that result. “Analysis” here thus has its routine, scientific associations, but it also has some of the connotations of psychoanalysis, in the sense of the wish to probe beneath the surface of events to uncover a semiconcealed, barely understood set of forces that shape behavior just as much as the formal roles of the actors or the reasons they give for their actions do. Most foreign policy analysts, whatever their own designation, present themselves as having this capacity to see beyond the public, or perhaps more exactly the public relations, dimension of international affairs.

The fourth underpinning assumption of FPA is that it generates middle-range theories. Middle-range theories are those that attempt to explain certain delimited and specified aspects of human behavior. They are self-evidently neither grand theory nor microtheory—the latter tending to attach to specific phenomena (or “phenotypes”), as with, for example, a theory that tried to explain Russian foreign policy in terms of the fear of encirclement. By contrast, middle-range theory addresses classes of phenomena (“genotypes”) but within limits, so as to not overload the activity with too many variables. FPA has been notably successful at generating this kind of theory, because by focusing on, say, the operation of bureaucracy
it inherently limits the scope of explanation to one set of players (bureaucrats) and to one aspect of politics (foreign policy). This allows for manageability without restricting intellectual ambition. While reality is complex, our understanding of it has to simplify, by theorizing the critical factors but not at such a high level of generality as to become meaningless—hence middle-range theory. There is no doubt, however, that this still leaves open the big issue of how to aggregate the various insights from diverse middle-range theories, just as we have to find some way of putting fruitfully together agent-based theories derived from FPA with structural theories pitched at the level of the international system. There is no easy answer to this dilemma. The most that can be said is that it is better to make sense of certain dimensions of reality and then to be faced with the problem of commensurability than to take refuge in excessive detail on the one hand or empirically thin generalization on the other.

The last of the conceptual anchor points for FPA has been implicit in much of what has gone before—namely, that the subject’s principal focus is on agency, that is, the business of deciding and acting in the world. In one sense this seems a straightforward job description: Focus on what states and other actors do, rather than on the structures within which they operate. But the subject’s own evolution, together with lessons learned from the philosophy of social science, has brought us to understand three important caveats. First, actors and structures are engaged in a continual process of mutual interaction and mutual constitution and therefore cannot be regarded as fixed points; second, some actors have rather more capacity to have an impact on structures than others do, just as not all structures are relevant to all actors in the same way; third, it is, indeed, not always possible to make clear distinctions between actors and structures. In part, this is because the latter are multiple and nest inside each other like Chinese boxes—for example, the French state exists within the structure of the European Union (EU) but is itself the main structure that French political parties relate to, while they in turn represent key structures for individual politicians and interest groups. But it is also because, while most actors are readily identifiable empirically, structures are often conceptual entities whose existence cannot be falsified, such as “the international community” or “globalization.” Accordingly, it is more common for structures to be identified in terms of actors—whether dominant groups such as the United Nations Security Council, or “the West,” in the case of the international community; or the aggregate of states, companies, and individuals, in the case of globalization. Waltz made a strenuous effort to avoid this trap in his neorealist theory by stressing that it was the pattern of the balance of power that determined the structure of international anarchy, even if this is all too easily reducible to the activities of major players.

The result of this problem so far as FPA is concerned is that it is all too easy to get drawn into wider issues than the problem of action and especially to neglect the viewpoint of the actor—when it is indispensable from the viewpoint of good scholarship to be able to reconstruct the perspective of decision makers themselves, rather than to impose on them assumptions drawn from a universal model. The other side of the coin is that foreign policy analysts may, in the very attempt to distinguish actors from structures, unnecessarily reify the state (or even actors like Al Qaeda), when they are more intelligently understood as a series of interconnected points of agency, overlapping with other apparent actors. This is clearly the case within the EU, where national foreign policy occupies a still important but nonetheless ambiguous position in relation to the Union’s own collective activity. Ultimately, individual human beings make foreign policy decisions but always within organizational structures, some of which will have formal responsibilities and are accountable to various types of constituency. The nature of the agency that is the key interest of FPA therefore wobbles between and across the levels of individual and collective action, while the latter is itself divided between different political and bureaucratic formations and sometimes between a state and the alliances/organizations to which it belongs.

Beyond these five pillars of FPA research are three further assumptions that, while more contestable, are increasingly widely shared. The first of these is that foreign policy is not only the business of states. While it may seem something of a category mistake to talk of “foreign” policy in relation to actors that do not have sovereignty, or even a clear territorial expression, there can be
little doubt that, among those described generically as nonstate actors (the use of the negative tells us of the difficulty in identifying any other common characteristics), many have political strategies for influencing IR. It is not unreasonable to conclude that they too possess international strategies that may be identified, with some qualification, as “private foreign policies.” Certainly any organization, from the smallest firm to the United Nations, makes a distinction between its internal affairs and its external environment and has to formulate strategies for dealing with the latter. The British Academy, for example, which exists to promote scholarship, uses the term Foreign Secretary to describe the Fellow appointed to liaise with similar bodies in other countries.

The category of nonstate actors contains bodies as diverse as these civil society groupings at one end of the spectrum and Al Qaeda at the other. In between come transnational churches, corporations, sports organizations, and charities, many of which are taking on more of a political role, in terms of both the protection of their own interests internationally and the wish to influence the nature of what they perceive as a single, globalized, environment. Given that FPA is the main site of the concern with agency within IR, it must pay attention to the significance of these actors, their aims, instruments, and effectiveness. This is because of their inherent importance and also because of their interaction with states, shaping the latter’s choices. Just as transnational relations has added another dimension to the traditional interstate focus of IR, so transnational actors have expanded the scope of FPA.

The proliferation of transnational actors has helped reinforce a further common preoccupation of FPA in recent years, that over the increasing difficulty of defining foreign policy. Apart from the fact that there is an inherent problem in deciding whether an aspect of public policy is by and large inwardly or outwardly directed, the development of the world economy since 1945, with the freer movement of goods, people, and capital, has meant that foreign and domestic policies increasingly merge into each other. Indeed, most ministries in developed states now work with their equivalents in other states, while classical foreign policy has to be concerned not simply with negotiation and the calibration of power but also (and quite legitimately) with the domestic politics of other states.

All this calls into question the boundaries of FPA and possibly its whole raison d’être. If the explanandum is only vaguely discernible, then how can a systematic analysis be possible, let alone an explanation? The answer to this is twofold: On the one hand, practitioners and citizens continue to use the term foreign policy as central to their political vocabulary. To put it crudely, if enough people think foreign policy exists, then it does exist or, at least, it is a sufficiently important idea to be worth serious investigation. On the other, whatever the blurring that has occurred between inside and outside, the two dimensions of actors’ activity cannot be reduced to the same thing. Rather, and this proposition is likely to attract general support within the field, policy now exists on a single continuum, with matters that are almost entirely domestic (such as local government) at one end and those that are almost entirely foreign, such as a civil war in a third country where the given state has no particular interests, at the other. The task of FPA is then to interrogate areas of policy to see whether there are still important differences according to the extent of their external ramifications and also to show how international factors play into domestic politics (the “second image reversed”). In fact, the very enquiry into the nature and boundaries of foreign policy is an important scholarly task that many inside FPA have been engaged in.

The last of the more recent common reference points that underpin FPA derives from constructivism, and more from “thick” than from “thin” constructivism at that. This is the proposition that identity is central to our understanding of foreign policy, and (often) vice versa. Identity is an imprecise notion, even by comparison with those essentially contested concepts (e.g., national interest) that political scientists work with regularly. But its use does extend FPA’s standard concern with the domestic sources of foreign policy to the area of culture, including nationalism, tradition, memory, and self-understanding. At first sight this simply adds another set of variables to the equation: now, if one wants a full understanding of a country’s foreign relations, one has to take into account its sense of itself and its culture. Outsiders’ perceptions of that identity will also be important. That
this is hardly a new insight, indeed one that would have been familiar to Alexis de Tocqueville, matters little. The boost that constructivism has given to the study of culture and language has certainly affected FPA, both giving it a new lease of life and posing some new challenges to its orthodoxies.

The challenges seem largely to be at the level of methodology, in stressing discourse analysis, interviews, and texts more than foreign policy “events” or institutional data. More significantly, however, the “cultural turn” represents an epistemological challenge in the sense of the renewed criticism of positivism that it implies—not all FPA has been positivist in orientation, but it was undoubtedly a product of the “scientific” wave of IR work in the postwar period. It suggests that foreign policy can both arise from a constructed national identity and be constitutive of that identity. The circular tendency of this reasoning, not to mention its essentialism, is naturally not to the taste of everyone working in FPA. But a certain consensus is merging, as in IR more generally, to the effect not only that issues of identity and culture cannot be ignored but also that they may also be central to our understanding of much foreign policy behavior—not least in an era when religious strife has reemerged, and public diplomacy has become a more prominent instrument of state policy. Most would certainly concede that foreign policies such as that of Wilhelmine Germany, or Brezhnev’s USSR, were profoundly important in determining not only the external image of those countries but their very conformation at the time.

The Subfields of Foreign Policy Analysis

Over its 50-year history, FPA has produced a number of well-researched subfields, sometimes drawing on work already done elsewhere in IR and political science but also often deriving from advances in the other social sciences. Taken together, they represent a massive advance on the understanding of foreign policy making that existed in the days of Edward Carr and Hans Morgenthau—which is not to say that the keen insights of figures such as these were misplaced; they were simply not cumulative, or part of a systematic schema. They also depended on the acceptance of a few top-heavy assumptions. Now, for anyone who cares to look, there is a vast array of analytic and comparative work on the machinery of foreign policy, on its conceptual aspects, on its implementation, and on its relationship to different kinds of polity. What is more, most of this work is accessible to intelligent general readers and is certainly capable of being translated into a form that enables it to enter political and popular debate. What follows outlines five important clusters of activity in the research agenda of FPA. No pretense at comprehensive coverage can be made, given the limited space available. But there cannot be much work of major interest that would not fit under one of the subheads that follow.

Leadership and Decision Making

FPA tends to start at the center and work outward. The center consists of the high officeholders, formally responsible for policy, and their intimate counselors. If we were living in the time of Louis XIV the focus would be on the king and his court. Now it is on the head of government, often but not always elected, together with his or her political advisers, the security council or its equivalent, and the heads of the key relevant departments, which means (at a minimum) the foreign and defense ministries, and the intelligence service. But what are the questions that FPA asks about this inner executive? The most straightforward is that familiar to political analysts over 3 millennia: What is the impact of an individual leader, extended in the post-Freudian age to include the impact of the leader’s personality and psychological quirks, on foreign policy? An important line of thought that has emerged in FPA is the difficulty of considering such questions outside a relational context—that is, not only how does the leader behave and why, but how are his or her actions received by others? In short, this entails the analysis of leadership as such, which is central to political science as a whole, but has certain specific dimensions in IR, given that a good part of foreign policy making is conducted away from public scrutiny, while at the same time much of a leader’s constituency actually consists of foreigners, whether other leaders or their publics.

Perhaps the most well-known product of FPA research relates to the psychology of small groups at the top level of the policy process—namely groupthink. This theory, which was validated by
the various enquiries in the United States and Britain on the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, looks at the dynamics of leadership within the foreign policy executive, with particular reference to its psychological dimension and impact on the quality of decisions. It is closely related to our by now extensive understanding of how political perception works, with distortions caused by both emotional factors and formal roles within a group. FPA has learned much from its sister subject of political psychology but has also made a contribution of its own, notably in relation to groupthink, images of the foreign, and the concept of misperception, the consequences of which can be particularly dramatic in IR.

One interesting new strand of work that is emerging from this well-grounded tradition is that relating to neuroscience. It stresses the role of emotion and of preconscious factors in determining choice. Rationality is thus bounded not only by the limited ability of the human mind to process information or to trade off a large number of variables but also by emotional predisposition—some have said that we are hardwired, for example, to defend our existing beliefs. On the other hand, whatever the physiological and neurological sources of emotional preferences, it has been known from the early days of FPA that personal as well as political forms of bias affect decision making—indeed, that the two sources are difficult to distinguish. What the recent wave of interest in neuroscience has brought to the party is the insight that reason itself is intimately connected to emotion and that the two phenomena are not separated in the brain. What the problem remains of how such distortions work at the collective level: Are they cumulative as in groupthink or reined in through the checks and balances of argument and interinstitutional conflict? This issue is at the heart of the subject as a whole and opens the possibility of advising practitioners on how best to avoid the wrong implications that may arise as a result of errors of such distortions.

It also connects up with the other main avenue of research on top-level decision making, that of bureaucratic politics. This came originally from practical insights under the Kennedy presidency, spawning a large and fruitful academic literature that has fed back into policy making in the form of direct advice but also as warnings to the citizenry that policy making is much more a matter of turf wars than they are led to believe. As a result, the insights of bureaucratic politics are now routinely used in case studies, in historical writing, and in think tank policy briefings. They do, nonetheless, cut both ways: On the one hand, they alert us to the way in which most outputs are the result of pulling and hauling, leading to arbitrary compromises, even in nondemocratic systems. This makes it virtually impossible to live up to the rational/realist ideal type of the consistent pursuit of a clearly identifiable national interest. On the other hand, they point up the advantages of collective debate, even on the crude basis of competing institutional interests. They can counter the personal biases of the leader and the tendencies to group conformity, which have been noted by the psychological approaches referred to above. This is both a matter of fact and one of preference, in that while some would wish to give a leader a free hand when dealing with foreign threats, others are convinced by the arguments for pluralism in decision making, in foreign policy as in other areas of public policy.

The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy

One sign of progress in a social science is when its insights change from seeming marginal, or even outlandish, to being an accepted way of looking at a problem. This has been the case with FPA’s emphasis on the domestic sources of foreign policy. Of course any claim has to be subject to the caveat of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, in that a change in general attitudes might have occurred anyway, through events, rather than because of any academic research. But FPA has certainly educated generations of students, against the still powerful realist skepticism over domestic factors, including the vagaries of public opinion, having the capacity to complicate, even shape, foreign policy. To a degree this has been a matter of life imitating art, as the more that an understanding of the foreign policy process has been disseminated, the more pressure groups have sprung up to insert themselves into the interstices of the process.

There have long been both hopes and fears about the way in which the public’s opinion could disrupt or hold to account the best laid plans of their more expert leaders. On the pessimistic side
were Alexis de Tocqueville and Walter Lippmann, while the optimists are liberals such as Woodrow Wilson or Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson. Work done in FPA, however, has helped disentangle the analytical from the normative elements in this inherently political debate while distinguishing the new dimensions brought to elite–mass relations by the rise of the mass media, information technology, and the 24/7 news cycle. The activities of interest groups and social movements in relation to foreign policy have also been excavated, including the previously neglected gender dimension. Equally neglected for many years was the measurement of public attitudes on foreign policy questions, especially outside the United States. The creation of scientific polling by the Gallup Organization in 1937 led for the most part to the generation of data on elections, economics, and domestic political attitudes. When views were sought on international politics they were usually at a high level of generality or in the midst of major crises. But in recent years, it has become accepted both that the public can have a serious interest in foreign policy (with quite consistent views) and that the blurring of the line between domestic and foreign policy has ended the presumption that politics (and therefore public participation) stops at the national frontier.

Although Marxists and other political economists, together with some liberals, have always stressed the connection between domestic and international politics, within academic IR it has been primarily FPA that has insisted on its importance, not least in the face of the powerful neorealist movement of the 1980s and the rather different globalization paradigm of the 1990s, for both of which domestic events were subordinate to the logic of the international system. The constructivist wave has reinforced this research tradition by legitimizing a focus on culture and identity that had previously been seen as unscientific. Taken as a whole, FPA is a powerful demonstration of how realist attempts to abstract foreign policy from the political and social context in which it is embedded are misguided, even dangerously simplistic.

**Organizational Logics**

The theory of bureaucratic politics expounded by Graham Allison collapsed into one of his previously separate models of governmental politics and organizational behavior. There are, however, good reasons for keeping the two separate, as indeed the second edition of Allison’s *Essence of Decision* (with Philip Zelikow, 1999) recognized. The institutional competition associated with the former has its most significant effects at the top levels of decision making. It also rests on the assumption that as individuals identify with their particular organizational home, they will pursue its particular interests or view of the world. By contrast, the organizational process approach identifies processes and mind-sets that derive from the nature of the complex state in the age of the masses. By contrast with the ideal type of Max Weber, the research conducted by and drawn on by FPA sees modern bureaucracy as developing pathologies that often inhibit the efficient and specialized divisions of labor it exists to promote. That is, the very conduct of government necessitates complex and often large organizations that inevitably fail to live up to their terms of reference. A century ago this would not have applied to foreign policy, with small and cohesive diplomatic services. Now it does, with many departments involved in policy making, defense budgets usually representing a major claim on the public purse, and the amount of information available about global politics growing exponentially.

The management of information, indeed, as of the increasingly large organizations themselves, is one of the major challenges facing the modern foreign policymaker and one on which FPA has much to offer. The study of intelligence is a case in point. For many years after 1945, intelligence was seen as both too sensitive and too difficult a subject for academic researchers. Over the past 2 to 3 decades, however, this assumption has changed, thanks to both historians and political scientists. The critical role played by secret intelligence—political, military, and economic—has come under scrutiny by all those interested in decision making. In part this has involved the study of turf disputes—for example, as between the numerous U.S. intelligence agencies—but it has also involved the more complex issue of how an issue gets framed and by whom, how to evaluate different sources of information, how to weigh capabilities against intentions, and—most critically in the case of Iraq in 2002 to 2003—what constitutes reliable professional judgment in a highly politicized environment. As the intelligence
community has come to emerge from the shadows, it has become more willing to accept the value of dispassionate outside analysis of its role in foreign policy making.

Another benefit of the organizational approach comes via the focus on the decisional flow—namely, the stages through which major decisions pass. The orthodox approach in the political world is to focus on individuals, agencies, and the nature of public debate. But this needs complementing by the perspective to be found in FPA that peels back the surface layers to reveal the degree to which a particular decision, or policy, arose out of a linear process of information gathering and consultation or sprang from various forms of short-circuiting, whereby some parts of the government machine were cut out of the process and/or informal groups formed across organizational boundaries to hasten matters to the point of action. The linear process starts with information gathering or political inputs, moves to an assessment of the issue and the framing of the problem, which in turn lead to the delineation of options, the point of authoritative decision, and finally the complexities of implementation. Sometimes this model is actually borne out by events, but more often it represents an ideal type against which derogations can be measured. All too often the formal structure, on which democratic accountability depends (where possible in the first place), dissolves into a set of arrangements that is half constitutional and half ad hoc, with some stages of the process missed out or accelerated. Only careful analysis based on rigorous enquiry can reveal the true nature of the process. This will almost inevitably be after the event, with academics sometimes helped by the high-level enquiries often convened after the fiascos that a high-handed approach to policy making can produce.

Goals, Purposes, and Values

In all agency-focused social science, the issue of the objectives of action is always at stake. What specific goals does an actor have, what broad purposes, and what underlying values? How far, indeed, is behavior purposive? We have seen that the study of both political psychology and organizational behavior places big question marks against any assumption of rationality, which may be extended to the idea of purposive behavior itself. Foreign policy is still a sufficiently discrete area for evidence on this question to be gathered systematically. Because goals for the most part have to be outwardly directed, against specific “others,” they are more visible—or more notable when absent—than the objectives of domestic politics, which so often blur electoral considerations with those of economics and welfare. On the other hand, FPA has shown how foreign policy does not usually require legislation and can often fall back on maintaining a small number of parameters within acceptable tolerances.

The classic way of explaining the distinctive nature of foreign policy goals was through the concept of the national interest. It was one of the early achievements of FPA to blow holes in that concept. It has not sunk without trace, given the predilection of politicians for rhetoric and linguistic shorthands, but few serious observers would now regard it as unproblematic. In its place, the subject has emphasized the importance of understanding the ends–means relationship, the diverse and sometimes contradictory targets that decision makers pursue, and the partiality of many of the diverse interests that are pursued in the name of the state. The domestic dimension has been brought even more into play by showing how foreign policy relates to nation building and is infected by ideologies (including nationalism and religion) even in states that stress their pragmatism. In other words, the sources of both goal-directed and more impulsive behavior in foreign policy are regularly interrogated within FPA, both theoretically and by country specialists.

Closely related to this line of enquiry is the effectiveness of foreign policies, for success can hardly be measured without reference to the goals that are at stake. Research here has recently clustered around the concept of “soft power” (“civilian” or “normative” power in the case of the EU), but this is simply the latest stage in a long-running and cumulative program of enquiry. It derived from the realist preoccupation with exercise of power and steadily became more refined, variously seeing power as currency or on a spectrum between Machtpolitik and isolationism. It differentiated between the various instruments of foreign policy, with much attention being given to economic statecraft, to the use and threat of force, and to diplomacy in its various guises. Much of the most
fruitful work has been done on the interplay and overlaps between these various categories, such as coercive diplomacy, sanctions, or the projection of a national image abroad (public diplomacy). Practitioners are particularly interested in academic findings on such subjects and frequently call on them during political debate.

For too long FPA had a tendency to concentrate on process and to avoid the issue of the content of foreign policy. It was forced out of this ostrich posture by the democratic peace debate, which had its origins more in philosophical approaches to IR than in the empirical study of state behavior. It did, however, quickly attract the empiricists and gave a further lease on life to the CFP school within FPA, whose large data sets on the behavior of classes of states seemed immediately relevant. The revival proved temporary, as once again CFP's combination of broad brush and methodological introversion proved insufficient to cope with the subtleties of the argument over what kind of democracies went to war in what kinds of circumstance. But there was a valuable payoff for FPA in that a new bridge was created between the empirical study of foreign policy and the renewed interest in ethics within IR. The work of the Carnegie Council and other bodies had long emphasized the need for a sophisticated discussion on the ethical dimension of international behavior. Now, following the lead of Stanley Hoffmann and Michael Walzer, this need began to be fulfilled, to the point where international theorists such as Chris Brown or Nicholas Wheeler regularly work on the edges of political theory and FPA, in their discussions of topics such as the motives for humanitarian interventionism or the priority to be given to overseas development aid. This has proved timely in that the post–Cold War era has led some governments to raise the ethical dimension of foreign policy without a trace of the defensiveness that would have been apparent in the years of Cold War realism and has liberated the forces in (usually Western) public opinion that wished to see foreign policy consistent with their own domestic values. Yet foreign policy analysts, as opposed to philosophers, bring an important practical perspective to bear on these complex problems. They relate moral questions to those of policy practice without falling back either on the simplistic realist assumption that everything ultimately reduces to the national interest or on the common liberal view that interests and ethics can be made to coincide. Rather, an analytical approach attempts to identify the multiple constituencies that a given state is trying to serve and to deconstruct the priorities that are revealed by practice. It can then go on to assess the feasibility of expecting X or Y of any given actor, given that actor's values and circumstances.

**Environments and Structures**

The external circumstances in which foreign policy is made constitute the last main area of work within FPA described here. From its early years the politically minded geographers Harold and Margaret Sprout had set the parameters for thinking about foreign policy within the frame of both material and political factors. In so doing they also raised the fundamental questions of causation and determinism—namely, how much freedom of action do foreign policymakers enjoy, given the difficulties of operating on the international level, and how much difference do size, location, and power make to the margins of maneuver. It might be thought, for example, that the great powers must enjoy more freedom than others, but much work within the context of FPA has been devoted to demonstrating the paradoxical freedoms of small states and the burdens of overextension on the part of large ones.

The Sprouts' emphasis was on the environments of foreign policy, and this has produced the useful orthodoxy of a division between the domestic, the external, and the psychological environments. They were also remarkably prescient in developing an ecological perspective on human affairs. To some extent, however, this perspective has been overtaken theoretically by the agent–structure debate. Structures are multiple and cross the internal/external frontier, but for foreign policymakers the most obvious structures in which they have to work are the international. These are material, in terms of the distribution of resources and climatic advantage; political but tangible, in terms of international law and institutions; and abstract/normative, in terms of the values of international society. The different ways in which they bear down on the great variety of kinds of states in the world are grist for the mill for FPA researchers,
who can thereby work both from the outside inward and from the inside outward, showing how participation in the international system to some degree shapes the actors that operate within it and how the actors, both state and nonstate, singly and in groups, themselves determine the way in which the system evolves.

The Contemporary Significance of Foreign Policy Analysis

FPA as a field has three broad paths by which the problems outlined in this entry may be approached: theory, comparisons, and country studies. The theoretical activity revolves mainly around decision making, the problems of agency and rationality, the relationship between the state and the system in which it is embedded, and ethical questions. This is hardly a trivial agenda. In pursuing it, FPA borrows much from other subjects where advances have already been made but its own distinctive problematique requires original work that then makes its own contribution to social science—as we have seen with the now ubiquitous concepts of groupthink and bureaucratic politics.

The comparative perspective in FPA can operate on the grand scale, as with CFP, in an attempt to use all foreign policy events to identify patterns of behavior, and with correlations with types of state and/or types of internal events. More frequently, and more fruitfully, it now concentrates on limited classes of actor, such as small states, democracies, or specified types of events such as crises or economic sanctions. Even with such a restriction, the task of producing nonbanal generalizations is formidable and then most useful at a heuristic level. But despite the obstacles, all work in FPA is by definition comparative, if only at times implicitly, in that even single events are approached using common concepts and methodologies, so that they may be related to other similar instances. In fact, most case studies are influenced by the method of structured, focused comparison designed by Alexander George to minimize the randomness. Where processes are the focus rather than case studies the method is inherently comparative. The discussion of organizational process, or leadership, for example, begins with propositions of a universal character, which are then usually qualified according to the context in which they are applied.

For example, is the domination of foreign policy by charismatic leaders, say, more likely in a developing country or in those with access to the sophisticated techniques of the mass media?

Country studies are the most conventional path for analysts to take. They are unfashionable because they are all too often seen as intellectually less interesting than theory or comparison, rather like the prejudice within social science against area studies. But this is a simplistic view. There are, after all, many ways of studying an individual country’s foreign policy, some highly analytical and incisive. It is, in fact, rare these days to find a work that does not rise above the descriptive. Indeed, when significant change occurs in a state’s international position, the natural response is a flood of work within the broad FPA tradition—as was the case with Germany and the United States after 1989 and China after its rise to economic power. This tradition is indispensable, for however insightful a theory, or however rigorous and wide-ranging a work of comparison, they cannot provide the rich, in-depth understanding of a particular country and its foreign policy choices. Any attempt to deduce the strategy of Burma or Saudi Arabia, for example, from neorealism or some other parsimonious theory, is doomed to superficiality. Such states are comparable only up to a very limited point, qua states. Individual cases might fit a generalization in some broad sense, but the resulting knowledge cannot have the thickness achieved by combining theoretically based analysis with expertise in the country or particular issue at stake.

This is why FPA, like all other aspects of social science, cannot be a subject unto itself. It relies on collaboration with others. If IR and political science are the most immediate points of contact, other social sciences, notably psychology, geography, and political economy, are equally important. What is more, FPA needs to be close to history, philosophy, and area studies, which may not be social sciences themselves but provide much foundational material for the latter. But FPA is not just a matter of scope, a field where the master disciplines play out their games. Over half a century, it has focused attention on one of the most important areas of human activity, if judged by the potential consequences for the mass of humanity. And it has accumulated a considerable body of knowledge, and techniques, for throwing light on
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See also Diplomacy; Foreign Aid and Development; Governance, Global; International Relations, Theory; International Solidarity; Risk and Public Policy

Further Readings


FORMAL THEORY

See Game Theory; Social Choice Theory

FREEDOM

See Liberty

FUNCTIONALISM

Functionalism refers to the methodological concept of explaining social phenomena by specifying an asymmetrical relationship between two objects under consideration. Functionalism rests on the view that phenomena can be best explained in terms of what they do and what their impact is on other phenomena; thus, it considers systems of interaction among individuals and groups. In political science, functionalism emphasizes the functions of social institutions. After providing a general definition of functional explanation, this entry outlines the ideas of some of the most influential originators of functionalism. Next, it describes the main stages in the development—structural functionalism, equivalence functionalism, and neo-functionalism. The entry ends with a critical summary of the status of functionalism today.

Definition

A functional explanation can take this general form:

Given a system $S$ in a certain state $s$ with a structure $T$, there is an activity $a$ from the point of view of the observer, regularly coming from an element $E$ of $T$, and having an effect on $S$ or its environment.
The theoretical status of s can either be stationary (the most frequent case) or dynamic. If one can, with respect to a certain theoretical point of reference, claim a systematic relationship between a and s, then E can be interpreted as a “function” for, or a as a “functional contribution” to, the maintenance of S, whether it means stability, identity, equilibrium, or changing of S. This explanation of s neither involves an explication of a’s origin nor the causal nexus of its effect on s. For example, a political party can be considered as contributing to the working democracy without constructing this function as the cause of its creation.

Functional explanations are based on empirical evidence: After s and a have been observed, the functional character of the relationship between them can be deduced from the features of T and E. Of course, these explanations can be formulated with a teleological orientation: as a projection of a future s, derived from T as a goal-orientated agent, under the assumption that a’s effect on S is a functional prerequisite for the maintenance of it. In case there is a deliberately role-differentiated organization under consideration, such a prognosis will become normative. It will express the expectation that S, as a whole, will function in the way prescribed by its blueprint.

However, functional explanations make sense only under several conditions. For example, if one states that general and free elections in parliamentary systems have the “function” of maintaining the circulation of political elites, then a bottom-up nomination of candidates is assumed, but other functions (such as lawmaking or representation) are not, however, excluded. Functional analyses are based on theoretical assumptions, but they hardly suggest new ones by themselves. According to the widespread usage of functional explanations, systems can be represented as institutions, religious behavior patterns, cultures, societies, and so on, whereas a may operate as a kind of activity, exchange, information, sanction, service, coercion, production, and other forms of output.

**Origins**

Functionalism, as a tradition or “school,” culminated in the 1950s and 1960s. However, its origins can be found in the works of many of the classic social and political theorists. Charles de Montesquieu may be considered such an early proto-functionalist thinker. In his chief work *Spirit of Laws* (1748), he classified the components of political systems in terms of their physical, geographic, climatic, mental, and cultural “nature”—that is, the structure of their external systems. The respective legal principles activate the “natural” structures toward an outcome of political order by which the subjects are reminded of their duties and rights. The privileges of nobility, for instance, are a function of its freedom, whereas parliamentary power is one of the principles of constitutional monarchy. At the same time, Montesquieu tried to make it clear that important political functions can often hide behind ostensibly incidental or useless symbols and ways of acting.

An important predecessor of classical functionalism was Herbert Spencer, who, as a leading social Darwinist, tried to explain the development of industrial society in an evolutionist way. According to Spencer, the law underlying societal evolution proceeds from homogeneity of equal and independent parts to heterogeneity of unequal and dependent ones. These parts—institutions, groups, technologies, ideas, and so on—tend to become increasingly specialized and, as a result, fulfill increasingly special functions for society. The starting point of this process is that the management of population growth implies prerequisites such as advances of productivity, distribution, or regulation. Social differentiation, functional specialization, and interdependence of parts feed back to one another as mechanisms of the same movement.

One of the founders of modern sociology, Émile Durkheim, then adopted functional analysis, logically distinguishing it from genetic-causal explanation, as a methodological program. In his works *The Division of Labor in Society* (1892) and *Rules of the Sociological Method* (1895), he argued:

1. In explaining a social phenomenon, one has to distinguish its generating cause from the function actually fulfilled by it. It is inadmissible to explain collective phenomena in a utilitarian way because their respective functions can originate from or serve different purposes. At the same time, teleological-causal explanation is not promising because a collective phenomenon such as society does not constitute a consistently acting whole.
2. With this, Durkheim suggested that we understand social phenomena as emergents: They come into being through an accumulation of immense courses of aggregated individual actions or of unintended effects of purposeful action.

3. A social phenomenon emerges and tends to enhance the importance of its function when individuals recognize the advantage gained from it and develop an interest in optimizing profit. Durkheim was one of the first to conceptualize function as a self-reinforcing mechanism and a feedback system. Durkheim demonstrated this in the light of division of labor. Specialization of occupations and social roles lead actors into growing dependence. With this, human networks become closer, making the exchange of specialized goods easier. As a result, a social order that Durkheim called organic solidarity is established, as a kind of moral sui generis. In the course of this process, people also experience the secondary benefits of division of labor, such as the growth of economic productivity or differentiation of the legal system. Finally, modern division of labor derives from needs that have emerged at a preceding state. Thus, the theoretical meaning of social progress is a growing complexity of functions.

In the 1930s through the 1950s, functionalist thinking spread, especially in anthropology. From an ethnological point of view in the Western perspective, there was a strong temptation to interpret “strange” phenomena by taking the stability of the social and cultural systems as a point of reference. Bronislaw Malinowski (1944) and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1952), for instance, tried to explain the performance of magic rites by Pacific Islanders in this way. While Malinowski emphasized the physio-psychological functions of need satisfaction and fear reduction by magic, Radcliffe-Brown claimed that magic served to promote the survival of the group and the maintenance of the system’s structure. It was George Homans who presented an interesting proposition for “reconciling” these approaches by overcoming the one-sidedness of both of them: Magic initially was performed to soothe ghosts or to release stress and anxiety in dangerous situations, such as sea fishing or childbearing, and to bring about confidence, provided that the rites are performed in the “right” way. At the same time, this procedure involves conformity with the norms that are in force, the violation of which would have serious consequences for the group. Therefore, society instills in its members a fear of punishment for noncompliance through rites that serve as a means of enforcing compliance with such norms. At the same time, magic rites are important group activities, strengthening the bond and solidarity of the group and promoting the survival of the system thereby. Homans, by combining the psychological and the structural aspects of a functional explanation, demonstrated how to take the hybrid nature of functions into account—following Durkheim’s basic idea.

**Structural Functionalism**

Classical functionalism culminated in Talcott Parsons’s (1951) systems theory. Parsons called his approach *structural functionalism*, later on giving up this term at the zenith of his work. Social systems, as the point of reference for his theory, have to solve a limited number of general problems for their maintenance or keeping their balance. When modern society is being considered, “function” refers to the solutions to such general problems. Some functions are externally directed: They provide for the adaptation of the system to its environment. Others are internally directed, prerequisites for the integration of parts or for actors’ motivations. In his famous AGIL (adaptation, goal attainment, integration, latency) scheme, Parsons systematically specified the four main system problems and related them to the four subsystems, from which the corresponding functions of problem solution proceed (see Table 1). The functions are interrelated by processes of interchanging special classes of “media” that define their respective outputs, as if they were material, psychic, and social goods or energies in the metabolism of society.

Along these lines, adaptation—that is, maintenance within environment—is the function of economy, including technology, labor, and consumption, and the output of it flows in the general form of (equivalences of) money. Attainment of goals fundamental to society is guaranteed by the subsystem of polity bringing about effects of control in the form of power. The interchange between A and G, for instance, can be manifested in the way laws and sanctions (polity) regulate the functioning of markets, whereas the economy enables
the functioning of the political system by providing revenue from taxes. Societal communities contribute to system integration by providing for an optimal climate of morals, solidarity, and socialization as well as sanctioning conformity with values and norms (e.g., by awarding prestige). Finally, pattern maintenance typically arises from the fiduciary subsystem, the actors of which are sources of influence toward ensuring common interests, standards of professionalism, and other grounds of trust. Within the subsystems, social roles—the intersections of structure and actor—are interlinking. They represent the institutionalized expectations toward the occupants of social positions derived from the given structure of social differentiation. Therefore, the classification of functional parts according to the four system problems is repeated on every sublevel: Subsystems consist in functionally structured subsystems of the same nature. The system as a whole is vaulted by the cultural system as the total of legitimate values, norms, and symbols.

For several decades, Parsons’s functionalist approach, as a heuristic scheme, has been used in various research applications. However, to apply the AGIL model to empirical systems involved some compromises. For example, some overlapping of the subsystem–function dimensions had to be accepted in matching a specific function with a given part of the system.

Most criticism of Parsons’s approach focused on its inherent tendency of holism to consider society as an “actor” without any microfoundations, assuming the fiction of a system’s tendency toward an equilibrium, the fiction of common goals of society, and their teleological character. Finally, Parsons was said to have explained social change too simply by referring to interference from environment or internal accident, instead of taking into consideration dynamic features in the system’s structure itself.

Robert K. Merton was the most prominent critic of structural functionalism. Not rejecting functionalism in total, he suggested revising it on many points. First of all, he distinguished between “manifest” and “latent” functions. The former arise as cumulated effects from individual, intended action, mostly a case of individual conformity to collective rationality. The latter means the type of collective effects that emerge beyond the control of individuals, when there is no matching of goals and consequences. This distinction corresponds to the difference between “functional systems” and “systems of interdependence” suggested by Raymond Boudon (1981). The first are goal-orientated systems of interaction regulated on the base of reciprocal, specialized role expectations as well as controlling by means of input–output assessments. Business organizations, universities, political parties, bureaucracies, and so on are of this kind. On the other hand, systems of interdependence emerge wherever actors are interrelated, losing (parts of) control over their actions, ultimately becoming involved in a complex structure that is nontransparent both in its nature and in its consequences. If, for instance, at an election with three contesting parties, a clear ranking of votes is the result, one usually would expect that the leader of the most successful Party A is likely to become the next prime minister. Yet in case of a proportional representation, together with a proved culture of forming coalitions, the next prime minister could come from the secondary Party B as well if Party B successfully negotiates with Party C, which has the least number of votes, and together Party B’s and Party C’s votes total more than 50%. The main feature of this system of interdependence is that cabinet formation does not derive directly from the ranking of votes. Thus, the ideal function of democratic elections to provide for a freely selected government is not achieved. To understand

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function for Solution of System Problems</th>
<th>Subsystem</th>
<th>Media of Interchange</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) Adaptation</td>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(G) Goal attainment</td>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(I) Integration</td>
<td>Societal community</td>
<td>Moral appeals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(L) Latency (pattern maintenance)</td>
<td>Fiduciary system</td>
<td>Influence</td>
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*Note: AGIL = adaptation, goal attainment, integration, latency.*
this structure of emergence, it is necessary to find out the statistical as well as institutional and procedural rules that are interdependently responsible for the composition of collective consequences out of the individual effects of action.

Merton had already approached such a skepticism of the fruitfulness of trying to functionally analyze systems of interdependence, including society. He turned away from “big theory” (as a global explanation), pleading for progress in developing less abstract, and less general, “theories of the middle range,” which target a more modest explanation. As a consequence, he proposed deconstructing the general concept of function and making a distinction between function (in a sense of adaptation or adjustment of a system), dysfunction (as a consequence of action destabilizing a system), and nonfunctional consequences (irrelevant to the state of a system). For a functional analysis with higher concreteness and specification, he proposed a number of conditions or restrictions such as the following:

- the phenomena under consideration should have an institutional character and be standardized;
- subjective moments of action should be taken into account as well as the distinction of positive, negative, and neutral consequences;
- the functional affected units should be specified as well as the criteria for system maintenance;
- functional alternatives should be specified, with respect to their scope of application;
- dysfunctions producing change should be identified;
- comparative studies to better validate approaches of explanation should be performed;
- features of actors, meanings, places, motivational, and overt behavior that are involved in pattern of action should be specified.

It is hard to imagine that this demanding program would have been executed in a more or less exhaustive way. The usual restrictions on personal, material, and temporal resources and on theoretical potentialities allowed only for selective implementations in a few studies.

**Equivalence Functionalism**

Along with claiming to have established a universal theory of social systems as modern, Niklas Luhmann (1995) proposed a new definition of “function” that allowed for a larger scope of interpretations. In his approach, functions have both a multiple sense, as with Durkheim, and also an “equivalent” one: Functions serve as criteria for comparison of the actually identified functions with virtual ones—that is, some of the theoretically possible relationships in a system under consideration. They are viewed as an expression of “unity and difference,” indicating contingent structures of the system. Luhmann used the research question of what mechanisms regulate the shortness of goods to illustrate his approach. At first sight, it is easy to come to a function as a combination of moral rules and economic mechanisms, the particular effects of which can be compared with each other. Yet the question of why shortness actually shall be regulated “can only be answered with respect to system/environment differences” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 404, German edition). The openness, indefiniteness, and complexity of this concept of function involve a comparative approach for functional explanations, distinguishing particular system levels as well as system–environment differences.

**Neo-Functionalism**

Jeffrey Alexander (1998) and others made the next step in the further development of functionalism, calling their approach *neo-functionalism*. The main aspects of their revisions, in accord with some of Merton’s suggestions, are as follows:

- Parsons’s analytic model shall be preserved, however, there were no explications given on the methodological status of the concept “function” or a functional explanation.
- Parsons’s view of society as a network of relatively independent parts tending toward an equilibrium is not empirically substantiated.
- The inflexibility of the systems theory approach must be loosened up by the inclusion of “contingencies” in individual action: The interrelations between cultural order, as the frame of action and the contingent moments in themselves, are to be empirically analyzed. Thereby, knowledge from micropolitics or sociology, ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism, and so on must become integrated.
• Parsons’s “idealistic” view, that is, the predomination of culture and values in modeling social order, is widened by emphasizing the instrumental-rational dimensions of action and by incorporating conflict theories.

Alexander gave an example of analyzing social change based on these criteria. The general acceptance of new institutional structures that, on the basis of approved principles, are better able to resolve an acute problem will emerge at the end of a multistage, conflictual process. As a result of the pressure from this process, competing, contrasting interest groups will form and be stimulated to action. Then it becomes functional to optimize an internal division of labor so the numbers of alternatives are reduced step by step, and a generalization of public discussion emerges. If, farther on, under the pressure of “institutional entrepreneurs,” it happens that an established pattern becomes illegitimate, then a certain alternative can win if it is accepted as final by the actors. At the same time, the general value system was never jeopardized.

Recent Variants in Political Science

Variants of (neo-)functionalism are still taking effect in parts of comparative politics. Here, the concept of function mostly refers to the meaning of institutional task, concern, responsibility, or another aspect of purposeful action carried out by or expected from actors, systems, or strategies. Thus, functions are understood as intentional rather than emergent processes or collective effects of action. Furthermore, approaches in political functionalism are based on empirical generalizations rather than explicit theoretical or methodological principles. Common to them is the conception that political systems or processes, such as international affairs or European unification, can be controlled better by frontier-crossing institutions, nongovernmental organizations, experts, or supraregional networks of scientists than by governments within their territorial sovereignty. Processes of political decision chiefly run along the actual activities (functions) of these agents instead of those done by formally legitimated authorities, who only validate the results. Therefore, certain needs or interests of groups, who are the truly operating agents, have become the focal point of research, so far making use of a bottom-up method of analysis.

If the functional output of an institution oversteps a certain threshold value, then a spillover effect may emerge, for instance, when the outcome of international economic cooperation involves an enhanced political cooperation (A. J. R. Groom & Paul Taylor, 1975; David Mitrany, 1975).

A reversing of functional thinking can be found in the theoretical framework for comparative politics by Gabriel Almond, Bingham Powell, Russell Dalton, and Kaare Strøm (2008). After having subjected a great number of states to comparative analysis, a limited typology of functions, taken as inherent processes of system maintenance, is generated and standardized for all of the cases. Then the same procedure is done with respect to the system units exercising functions, such as parliaments, executives, courts, bureaucracies, and so on. Due to their origin and direction, the functions are distinguished in the following way. System functions are settled in the domestic environment: socialization, recruitment, and communication. They are intervening conditions for the process functions: interest articulation and aggregation, policy making, and policy implementation and adjustment. Policy functions, as a result, operate as the essential outputs: extraction, regulation, and distribution. They again react to the process functions, thus closing a dynamic control loop, which, beyond that, is interchanged with the political systems of other states. In empirical practice, after having operationalized these concepts for the empirical application, comparative analyses are carried out to find out how, in different real systems, the functions under consideration are fulfilled and what this means with respect to policy production as well as to the kinds of relationships between the states under observation. To state it once more: As a feature of this approach, functions do not mean ex post facto interpretations of relations having been observed. Rather, they are outcomes from institutions and agents, a priori specified as indicators for data collection, that on the ground of foreknowledge are available to the researchers.

Conclusion

Functionalism as a scientific school or continuously developing research program has had its day. The main arguments against it were too serious to
permit further promising development. Among the problems were the following:

- an inclination to holism, with a neglect of effects of action on the micro- and mesolevel;
- an overemphasis on system stability or equilibrium, without explicating potentials of change as a feature of structure itself;
- a temptation to look at systems by analogy with organisms—that is, institutions may function in principle like the organs of a living being;
- a tendency to make teleological assumptions, even with respect to systems whose structures are not created purposefully; overabstractedness of functions having been discovered, for lack of specification of their origins, places, and ranges of manifestation; lack of specification of the actors involved; or lack of efficacy; and
- a lack of comparative studies for the purpose of better validation of function detected as well as the identification of functional equivalences.

Nevertheless, many suggestions from classical functionalism entered the mainstream of social and political science, such as the basic distinction between genetic-causal and functional explanations, focusing one’s attention to undesirable collective consequences of individual actions, finally sharpening the view to a complexity and interaction that defy simple interpretations.

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See also Durkheim, Émile; Interdependence;
Methodology; Political Sociology as a Field of Study;
Systems Theory

Further Readings

Fundamentalism

Fundamentalism is an inclusive term for modern religious movements that appeal to past events, texts, and authoritative figures and project into the future a variety of doctrines, stories, or laws that protect the group that is devoted to them and that serve to motivate and influence attitudes and actions, more or less aggressive, toward those outside the group.

The term may not be acceptable to adherents in all religions and cultures because it was first identified with 20th-century American Protestantism. However, the concept may be described as portable and is easily translated to cognate movements in the various religions and cultures. Sometimes it is appropriate to speak of these as “fundamentalist-like” movements, or movements that bear “family resemblances” to fundamentalism.

Historical Background

The term fundamentalism did not appear in dictionaries or encyclopedias before the 20th century. Scholars trace it to usage by partisans in denominational conflicts in the United States, debates that divided especially the Baptist and Presbyterian groups. Thus, among the Northern Baptists, an
editor complained that great numbers in the church body claimed to be and wanted to be called “conservative,” but their conservatism was passive. As such, it was not useful in the decisive struggles of the period. He and those who sided with him described a situation in which there were theological and moral threats to the religious identity and integrity of the adherents.

In the case of the American Protestants, the threats came from some “modern” or “modernist” claims and innovations. These threats, which included the challenge posed by Darwinism to the inherited biblical understandings of the creation of the universe and of humans, were seen to be an assault on human dignity; to undercut faith in the authority of the scriptures, which were described as inerrant in all detail; and to erode the psychological and theological boundaries of the members of the group. The leaders who rallied those who would, in the terms of the day, “do battle for the Lord” named their cause “fundamentalism.” When the term, which they banneled in the beginning, invited stigmatization by their churchly foes and in the public media and consciousness, some of them chose other terms to signal that they were less aggressive. In Protestantism, the term evangelical was sometimes used.

From the beginning, it was clear that “fundamentalism” was not the same as “conservatism,” though both may have started from the same base. Fundamentalism was a specific response to modern challenges; the word reaction best serves to describe the impulse and strategy of fundamentalists. The modern assaults on this reaction were corrosive and erosive of boundaries around the group and took the form of increased openness to and tolerance of other beliefs on the part of adherents.

It could be said that all through history religious groups have felt threats to their beliefs, practices, and identities, so one must ask why the early-20th-century challenges met the particular forms of response that they did. While it is never possible to substantiate exact claims regarding cause-and-effect relations, some elements stand out. One of the most notable is the sophistication of mass media of communication, notably the radio. Such media made it possible to reach beyond immediate locales to recruit, minister to, and draw on the discontents and aspirations of the like-minded who lived far away. Such employment of media suggests one of the paradoxes of fundamentalisms: their use of the most modern instruments to propagate messages that they advertise as and may believe to be what some Americans called “the old-time religion.”

In the context of other religions, there has been an identification of fundamentalism with anticolonial and nationalist programs. Thus, in India, around 1925, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was formed to link religious nationalist movements with mainly Hindu bases; this was extended by the creation of the Bharatiya Janata Sangh (now the Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP) in 1951. In Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood organized to resist what its leaders saw as secularizing forces and was promoted as a fusion of the Islamic religion and nationalist goals. These leaders revived classic originating stories from the Muslim past, building on the Koran, the revelatory text uttered by Allah through the prophet Mohammed. Those who followed the founders of the Muslim Brotherhood set out to restore, enhance, and enforce laws from the sharia, the code of Islamic laws. From Egypt, Wahabi Muslim movements fanned out, for instance, to the Arabian Peninsula, where they found ready followers.

**Characteristics of Fundamentalisms**

Scholars who view fundamentalisms synoptically and comparatively find characteristics common to most of them. When such scholars point to similar motives and expressions in, for example, American Protestantism and Shiite Islam, they are not saying that fundamentalisms are all the same. To suggest that would be foolish, because all fundamentalisms must have something to be fundamentalist about. The myths that animate Hindu movements differ vastly from those of Judaism or Islam. These myths are usually autochthonous, which means that they grew up out of their own soil and were not transplanted.

**Devotion to Scriptures**

The host documents in most fundamentalisms are ancient scriptures, almost always believed to be a revelation of God or the gods, as in Hinduism, and thus carrying divine authority. When some religious scholars began to interpret scriptures as
they would other ancient writings, they appeared to some believers to be the ultimate threats, and their questioning and assaults inspired more precise defining defense than was needed when there was no challenge. When various schools of interpretation emerge, often competitively, it is necessary for the movements to make claims for one uniquely. Since these texts have been cherished and guarded by the community that gave rise to them, they also come to be used as definers of exclusivity. All other sacred or putatively sacred texts are repudiated. No measure or bases for tolerance or synthesis, attitudes typically born in the Enlightenment era, is permitted.

**Group Exclusivism**

If scripturalism is the first mark, then the exclusivism just mentioned is a necessary correlate. Psychologists who study fundamentalisms note that, across the board, fundamentalisms draw people who have no tolerance for ambiguity, contradiction, or paradox. If those who have nothing at stake in the question of their authenticity or who are from another religion find such phenomena, fundamentalist scholars immediately offer explanations that appear to define away any apparent contradictions. The drama of interpretation that excites many in religion is closed down in the interest of a monopolistic, unitary interpretation within a community, where only one version of one story from one text is seen to be “fundamental” and inerrant.

**Rejection of Moderates**

These texts may have vastly different characteristics. In Judaism and Islam, fundamentalisms are legalistic; an adherent lives by the divinely revealed law. In Christianity, in part retaining its Jewish base, communities thrive on stories and legalistic application of norms inspired by the texts. When critics challenge the integrity of a sacred text, they cause distress within the groups that revere the text in question. Couple this with intolerance of ambiguity, and it can be seen that the texts impart rules and meanings that cannot be questioned. For this reason, in many fundamentalisms, moderates are more despised than modernists. The modernist is an obvious enemy. The moderate knows the norms of the group but is open to listening to other sources and, in a sense, is thus traitorous, which means giving the game away. The apostate, the questioner, and the person at the margin demand the most defensive response and inspire positive counteraction.

**“The Fundamentals” as Weapons**

Such action includes a closing of the ranks to keep those enclosed within and to protect against influences from without. Fundamentalisms can be seen as enclaves—self-reinforcing and bounded communities. Those committed to each other around the fundamentals need spiritual ammunition to use against the enemy, the “other.” This includes key doctrines, stories, or descriptions that are important to the believing community and a negation of all others. To further the chosen causes, fundamentalisms need and have rationales for setbacks and postponements of various consummations, such as military victory, the conversion of multitudes to the faith, or the assurance that God is on one’s side.

**Confidence in Victory**

However the goals of the community are defined, no matter how great the odds against success may be, and despite setbacks and even the martyrdom of some members, the group has the assurance of ultimate victory: God or the forces behind the texts and the movement may not always be visible or clear, but they cannot withdraw the promises extended to the group any more than they could withhold the truth in the texts and usually the ancient laws and meanings.

**Conversion of Others**

If fundamentalists define “the other” negatively and are ready for defensive and aggressive action, sometimes lethal in character, they do not ordinarily allow their exclusivism to be absolute, there is an appeal to others to whom members witness and who come to see the assets that are enjoyed by those within the group, an appeal that leads to calls for conversion. The concept of being “born again,” which is one of the marks of Protestant fundamentalism, is enriched and enhanced as members spread the message, utter threats to the future of the
resistant, and offer those who join rewards that may be realized in this life or in a life to come.

The Politics of Fundamentalisms

Most fundamentalisms expect an eschatological consummation; that is, their adherents await an end to history and the world as it is now known and, more immediately, an end to their present earthly existence. For Jews, the ancient expectation of a Messiah—the anointed one who would rescue Israel and give it an exalted place—gets translated in the contemporary world into political actions that justify and impel actions in the modern state of Israel. The ultratraditionalist Haredim, orthodox Jews who are extreme in their attempts to fulfill the law, do not support the state of Israel as a fulfillment of Messianic dreams and are not considered by friends, foes, or scholars to be fundamentalists, to whom they, nevertheless, bear some likeness. Some version of rewards or fulfillment in the life to come, usually offered to the community of Israel, is another version of this eschatological hope.

Islamic fundamentalism adheres fervently to calls to serve Allah in ways that will ensure a future to Muslims as individuals and within the community. One’s personal death, particularly if it occurs in such service, is followed by a fulfillment in the life to come. In fundamentalisms, that service acquires political and often military involvement, so that the values and meanings of the Islamic community are realized.

Christian fundamentalists may hold different views of the future beyond history, but they do have distinctive views. Most of these are related to the prophecy of a millennium, a 1,000-year reign of Christ, who will return to the earth. Christian fundamentalists also share with other Christians a belief in a personal resurrection in the life to come and proclaim one or another of the biblical pictures of what such a realized life involves.

Accenting both personal and communal consummation beyond history, as nonfundamentalists in these faiths also may do, led and leads many to be classified as “otherworldly.” That is, the true drama of their existence transcended an ordinary this-worldly life. The main task in proclaiming the truth of the religion was to convert others, which meant to rescue them from the travails of earthly life. In this stage of their development, such fundamentalisms do not seem to have much to do with politics. Earlier histories of their movements tended to pick up on their otherworldly emphasis and show them to be unconcerned with the drama of politics. A typical case was that of a founder of American Protestant fundamentalism, Dwight Moody, who announced his program thus: The world, he said, was a flood. God gave him a boat and told him, “Save all you can.” That was it.

Of course, that was not wholly it, in Protestant or other fundamentalisms. Most of these movements spent much energy in inculcating personal virtues that can serve as benefits in the polis, the human city, and the political order. All things being equal, one would observe them to be law-abiding and conforming to approved norms of society. Most of them have the reputation for being rigorous, in Christian terms “puritanical” and in Muslim versions more so. Fundamentalisms stipulate rules of behavior and expect and enforce adherence to them. They engage in the critique of violations of what they take to be the norms of good civil society. Where the regimes within which they live have what they consider to be positive characteristics, they are supportive of civil goals. Most of them are patriotic and quite characteristically can be militant in support of their state. Few fundamentalists are pacifist, and they believe that their God placed the sword in the hands of the state, so it is to be used against offenders from other tribes and states and nations. God is a warrior God, justifying the actions of God’s people when their ways are congruent with divine commands.

If it were possible to quantify types within observed fundamentalist groups, it is safe to say that most of them concentrate on individual vices and virtues just as they focus on otherworldly realizations. Yet there are enormous and dramatic exceptions, and late in the 20th century, most were no longer perceived as simply otherworldly. How the turn came about differs in various religions and nations, but it is informative to concentrate on vivid examples. Thus, American Protestant fundamentalists, living generally peaceful ethical lives on the sidelines, rather suddenly changed and, in alliance with conservative evangelicals, Roman Catholics, and Jews, formed “moral majorities” or coalitions that advanced very pointed political programs and
garnered support for them. One notable Protestant fundamentalist, Jerry Falwell, expressed a rationale for the change. Years before he turned political, his camp criticized Christians who were political and thus were sinful, since politics was tainting and distracting. Now, however, for the churches not to be in politics was the sin.

Why the change? In the political order and cultural ethos, threats had come against which private fundamentalists had no defense; the mass media in particular were universally intrusive. Fundamentalists responded to these cultural changes by urging those who shared their beliefs to work together to change that “corrupt” order through politics. Fundamentalists produced some political leaders or gravitated toward them, exploiting them just as they were often being exploited. Fundamentalists were not unique among religious groups in this respect. What was remarkable was that the believers who had first and foremost opposed political involvement now mastered many techniques, forms of organization, and patterns of rhetoric to make gains for their causes and themselves.

This turn to the political occurred in part in response to specific public actions. To follow the American Protestant example, the threat of communism during the Cold War called them to militancy. U.S. Supreme Court rulings on the legality of abortion and the illegality of state-sponsored prayer in public schools did much to solidify and motivate their base and attract converts. Their political action was generally compatible with the goals and means of other religious groups in a republic: One garnered votes, promoted legislation, sought constitutional change where necessary, and “won some and lost some,” as is the manner in politics, which involves compromise and partial victories or defeats.

Where the terms of governmental life are not those of republics, fundamentalists have had to resort to other kinds of tactics. Most visible in the final 2 decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st were the stirrings in Islam. Concurrently, Hindu-based fundamentalist movements in India engaged in military and terrorist action against Muslims, and vice versa. Still, Islam produced movements of such size and scope compared with other fundamentalisms and attracted so much media attention around the world that “Islamic fundamentalism” came to be the best known—probably the most feared by its enemies—and the most inspiring of all to its constituencies. Many of these fundamentalists were theocratic, like the fundamentalist Jews, who promoted settlement in the West Bank to fulfill their vision of a Biblically based map of the state of Israel: They believed that God ruled and had revealed that divine purposes were to be fulfilled through their actions, directed against “the infidel” or the “heretic.”

The goal of some Muslim fundamentalists was to realize a dream they had nurtured for centuries when Muslims were not rulers or where they had once ruled but now had been pushed back. What one scholar, Marshall Hodgson, called “Islamdom”—on the model of “Christendom,” when and where Christians had a domain (dom)—was something to be retrieved from the infidels, who had conquered parts of it or corrupted all of it. The Iranian Revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 to 1980 was of this character: The United States must be attacked when and because this “Great Satan” supported the enemies of those who would rule wherever Muslims had once ruled.

In radical Islamism, such terrorism is justified as following in the light of divine commands and promises, mediated through texts rich in story, or doctrine, or law. Terrorism is thus an extreme form of action beyond politics, since politics always involves some compromise, and fundamentalisms are absolutist and uncompromising. That is the characteristic of fundamentalism that is unsettling to nonfundamentalists in government or to those who inhabit other nations, hold on to other religions and customs, and would like to find ways to live with people of other religions.

Not all fundamentalisms can be or need be pictured as static and unchangeable. Some movements among them move on, thanks to the company they keep in coalitions, the realism that sets in when goals are frustrated, or their devotion to texts other than the militant or terrorist texts in Hebrew Scriptures, the Koran, the Christian New Testament, or a variety of Hindu texts. Using them, they would preach and promise peace and understanding.

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See also Islam; Judaism; Theocracy
Further Readings


Fundamentalist Movements, Islamic

The term fundamentalism has its origin in a struggle that developed between conservative and liberal Protestant Christian theologians in the United States around the turn of the 20th century. This struggle was epitomized in the publication by the Bible Institute of Los Angeles in the years between 1910 and 1915 of the series The Fundamentals: A Testimony to Truth, which in 12 volumes detailed 90 fundamental beliefs on which there could be no compromise for a true Christian believer. Later, the term took on a broader, more general meaning of strict and uncompromising adherence to and advocacy of certain basic principles or a set of beliefs, though it is most commonly used in reference to religious movements that are presumably characterized by such an attitude and that serve to motivate and effect aggressive attitudes and actions toward those outside the group. These include evangelical movements in the United States and elsewhere, fundamentalist Jewish settlers on the West Bank, and similar contemporary developments. In the international public sphere, and not the least in the media, fundamentalism is currently very often used to describe political movements among Muslim populations that legitimize their ideology and politics through a reference to Islam. Other terms in use for this phenomenon are “political Islam” and “Islamism,” both of which have the analytical advantage that they carry a somewhat lesser baggage of preconceptions. The following, therefore, mostly focuses on recent religious and political developments in the Islamic sphere.

What is involved in the political utilization of the mobilizing resources of the Muslim culture and religion? In understanding the phenomenon, it is important to distinguish clearly between two levels of analysis: on the one hand, the reasons why political actors have recourse to framing their ideological and political discourse with reference to semantically potent symbols from Muslim culture, history, and religion, sometimes to the extent of insisting on using a distinctly Islamic vocabulary, and, on the other, the extremely varied uses to which these same actors put those Islamic references in national and international politics and the variables that affect their choices.

Reasons for the Use of Islam as a Reference for Guidance and Meaning

At the first level, there are two central driving forces behind the recourse to Islam as a reference for guidance and meaning: One is related to the defense of Muslim identity against a perceived foreign onslaught; the other is linked to an attempt to resurrect a moral framework for a rapidly changing society.

Maintaining Muslim Identity

In the context of the colonial expansion in the 19th and 20th centuries, the symbolic categories and signs of the imposed colonial culture came to replace the institutional and normative, and even the aesthetic, expression of the local Muslim culture. The “losing” culture found itself progressively marginalized and “indigenized” or “folklorized.” The exclusion of its symbolic attributes from the production of meaning and more specifically from expressing values perceived as universal served dramatically to underline the humiliating centrality of the colonizing culture. While confining the expressions of religious
culture to the sphere of personal status, the importation of secularization also initiated a very different process in “the lands of Islam.” In the European context in general, secularism often appeared as a liberation from religious power and as part of a modernization that facilitated the coexistence of potentially conflicting loyalties and identities. In the Muslim world, where secularism was imported by the colonizing power or by elites that were associated with it, it has carried the sense of a denial of the local culture and its right to satisfy the normative needs of the society in the direction of public affairs. This privilege has been brutally transferred to a foreign culture, not the least through a wholesale importation of judicial codes.

It is against this background of a symbolic dispossessing from the hegemonic drive of the culture of the colonizers that a generation of Muslims in the period between the two World Wars committed themselves to restoring the visibility of the inherited Muslim culture and reaffirming the centrality of its norms. It seemed to this generation that modernization should no more be constructed around the opposition between “progress” and “reaction” or “dominant class” and “popular masses” but between “endogenous” and “exogenous” and “inherited” and “imported” cultural traits. With an indigenous vocabulary, the Islamist rhetoric brings to the dynamic of nationalist resistance to foreign domination a new symbolic resource. In rehabilitating the use of references that had for a time been excluded from political discourse, this rhetoric at the same time allows for the reconciliation of this discourse with a more intuitive culture. This culture is above all perceived of as that of the ancestors (real or mythical), with whom a symbolic affiliation now again becomes possible. The restoration of the categories of the Muslim culture does not produce more than a relative rupture. What it does is reaffirm the ambition of the endogenous culture of adding its contribution to the expression of universality on an equal footing with other cultures of the world and in particular with that of the former colonizers.

At the start, in the face of what a part of society perceived as a wave of rampant Westernization, the Islamist mobilization consisted of reaffirming the political role of the religious endogenous culture in the resistance to colonization. In 1928, 10 years after the dismembering of the Ottoman Empire, 4 years after the dissolution of the Caliphate, and 8 years before the recognition of a precarious independence for Egypt (Treaty of London, 1936), the founding in Ismailiya at the Suez Canal of the Muslim Brotherhood by the schoolteacher Hasan al-Banna may be seen as the beginning of the organization of this reaction. In the context of the anticolonial struggle, the Muslim Brothers devoted themselves to reaffirming the centrality of the religious lexicon in the fight for independence. In Egypt, they engaged simultaneously the internal political debate and the field of social and educational work. Adept at modern modes of mobilization such as public meetings and the publication of magazines, they also very rapidly developed regional ambitions. In 1948, the Brothers in Egypt mobilized volunteers to counter the creation of Israel, and this became the beginning of a rapid spread of resistance throughout the countries of the Arab Middle East. This first Islamist generation, however, failed to achieve control of the state apparatuses that were eventually left vacant by the colonizers. While some old royal dynasties managed to reassert themselves in many central countries of the Middle East, the reins of power were grasped by nationalists of a more secular leaning, typically through military coups.

From the period when most countries in the Middle East gained independence (1945–1970) until the 1990s, two overlapping processes unfolded: first, the affirmation and then the beginning of the challenging of the indigenous elites that had come to power. The primary critique the Islamists directed toward the Nasserists and Baathists in power was that they suffered from a deficit of cultural authenticity. The Islamists called for the continuation in the ideological and symbolic sphere of the distancing from the colonizers that had until then been focused on achieving independence in political and economic terms. In the Maghreb, the persistence of the official and public use of the French language made this rupture explicit: The secular elites progressively became denounced as Hizb Fransa, “the party of France.”

Except on the Arab peninsula and in Jordan, the first generation of Islamist mobilization was eventually not only denied access to the legal political scene but was systematically suppressed. Even more than at the time of its reaction to colonial
violence, it was faced with suppression when the first radical ideological and political offshoots saw the light and won their first followers. The crushing of the Muslim Brothers by Nasser in Egypt in 1954, after he had realized the strength of their mobilizing potential, is the archetype of this repression. The “theology of war” that Sayyid Qutb—imprisoned continuously from 1954 until he was hanged in 1966—developed in response to Nasser’s torture is central to the revolutionary posture that from the 1970s onward was adopted by radical groups. To respond to the injustice of the tyrant who oppressed him, Qutb declared him an infidel, a kafir, and thus deprived him of the protection afforded to members of the Muslim community. He further denounced the tyrant as the standard bearer of a new jabiliyya (a term usually referring to the state of ignorance that prevailed in Arabia before Muhammad). Then, he expanded the scope of his excommunication and did the same to the society that refused to reject such a ruler. His rhetoric was picked up in diverse forms by those who some years later (October 6, 1981) assassinated the Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat, and to this day, it continues to mobilize the devotees of “direct action” simultaneously against the infidel rulers and against their foreign protectors. The Muslim Brotherhood also joined the opposition forces, which led to the downfall of President Mubarak in 2011. The emergence of the radical Qutb-inspired groups formed part of a much wider phenomenon: the great wave of Islamic awakening that swept the Muslim world from the mid-1970s onward and that greatly reinvigorated the Islamist movements. The vastly expanded numbers of high school and university students were the main basis of the early stages of this awakening. Some of these students were attracted to the violent groups, but most eventually contributed to swelling again the ranks of the Muslim Brothers, who were by now staunchly settled on a course of peaceful work for political and social change, except in the fight against a foreign occupier, as in Palestine. As for the radicalization that would lead a fringe of the wider movement to commit acts such as the September 11, 2001, attacks, the ideological variable is most often invoked in explaining it, and emphasis is put on the diffusion of the sectarian theology of Qutb among the activists trained in Afghanistan. But this inverses the causal order and obscures the centrality of simple political variables. The radical drive is a result of the unilateralism of the existing political order. First, there is that of the Arab regimes. For a whole generation of opposition members, the promises of the 1980s of a democratic transition have brutally given way to a repressive backlash. Despite some hesitant opening of the institutional political sphere in some countries for a while, the generalization of the use of torture at the national level and of the recourse to “hard power” by the regional (Israeli) and global (U.S.) powers worked to discredit reformist and legalist strategies for change and thus reinforced the credibility of the sectarian currents and their revolutionary strategies.

From 1990, Islamist parties here and there found doors being tentatively and partially opened to the legal political arena. Some (in Jordan, Algeria, Palestine, Lebanon, Kuwait, Sudan, and Morocco) established more or less permanent footholds in the parliaments—occupying ministerial posts (Yemen) or even directing governments (Palestine). But in the global arena as well as in the terrain of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and in most national frameworks, these openings turned out to be limited indeed. Almost everywhere, elections proved the fragility of popular support for the regimes and incited them (in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt in particular) to narrow the limited openings that had been granted and to define political competition as a threat to security.

The prevailing unilateralism also operated at the global scale, where the militarization of the foreign policy of the United States echoed the regional generalization of repression and torture. At the Sharm al-Shaykh summit in March 1996, under cover of the “fight against terrorism,” the cooperation between the U.S., European, and Israeli security apparatuses on one side and the repressive apparatuses of the Arab regimes on the other reinforced the ideological criminalization of all resistance to the existing local and global order.

Providing a Moral Framework

But Islamism is a multifaceted movement rooted in the legitimate concerns of broad layers of the population. A sort of identity politics mobilized to counter foreign domination and repressive regimes allied with the foreigners is a central driving force.
Yet the success of Islamism in dominating the political and ideological landscape of popular activism is also linked to another strong dynamic at work, which may be termed the promotion of modernization under pious discipline. Looking at the leading activists of the movements in question, one finds that they are representative of dynamic elements within the middle and lower-middle classes, for whom modernization opens the way to upward social mobility. They have a positive attitude toward economic and technological modernization. But the ensuing social change is rapidly breaking up the old framework of town quarter, village, kinship group, and patron–client relations in which people led their lives. To counter the uncertainty and fear of social chaos springing from these dissolving effects of modernization, it is not unnatural that people from traditional religious families look to Islam to provide both a personal feeling of safety and confidence and at the same time social cohesion. However, this call for re-Islamization is a sign that the traditional Islam of the ulema has not kept up with the changes. What the Islamists do is to consciously or unconsciously create a new version of Islam suited to give moral guidance to a changing society while promoting economic progress. Their Islam is marked by a stress on individual responsibility, on the duty of the true believer to engage in a constant struggle against evil within oneself and in society, and to work hard to increase prosperity and welfare. At the same time, it involves new organizational practices, where lay people collect outside the traditional village or kinship groups in associations that study the scriptures to edify the soul and engage in social and political activism for the perceived cause of God.

Islamic Reference in Social and Political Mobilization

On both counts, the relation between the dynamic of re-Islamization, on the one hand, and the dynamics of social modernization and political liberalization, on the other, is far from simply one of opposition. If a reactive rejectionist approach has sometimes been prominent, the complex process of rehabilitation of the vocabulary of Islamic culture seems on the whole rather to extend the field of application of the dynamics of modernization and to accelerate its rhythm than to interrupt it or to reverse its progress. A mobilization centered on questions of identity and morality is rarely confined to particular social groups. And, taken together, existing studies of the social basis of Islamist movements do in fact show a great diversity. Urban workers figure alongside dignitaries of the various bourgeoisie (oil, merchant, military, and tribal), the whole spectrum of middle classes, people from different generations, and those from all spheres of work and levels of education. The factor of gender is often invoked, yet women are well represented along with men in the ranks of those mobilized by Islamism. Within the social diversity involved, the main social stronghold of Islamists, in particular where they remain in opposition, has been and remains among the socially mobile lower-middle and middle classes, especially among students and educated elites. The leading activists have typically been engineers, doctors, teachers, lawyers, and other members of the modern professions along with an important segment of the upcoming business elites. Even if they preserve a “reactive” component inherent in the identity affirmation that is part of the driving force of the movement, the discourse of Islamists and the practices that it legitimizes are not only varied but also continuously evolving. Depending on the political context—local or regional—and on the practices of their opponents, they come forth as “literalist” or “liberal,” “democrats” or “authoritarian,” or “legalist” or “revolutionary.”

From the deposed Taliban regime to the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Teyyip Erdogan, the same term Islamist has served to designate actors who express themselves within extremely varying doctrinal and political forms. While armed operations are part of the picture for some movements and in some circumstances, parliamentary action has for some time massively been part of the Islamist repertoire of practices. Besides the developments in non-Arab Iran and Turkey, electoral success has led Islamists to leave the pure oppositional position to participate in and even lead governments in Yemen (1993), Jordan (1989), Iraq (2005), and Palestine (2006). For those involved directly in political struggle, it is a distinctly noticeable trend over the past decades and, in spite of the fluctuating levels of repression, toward a more principled stand against the use of violent means to further
the cause of Islamic reform and in favor of a
democratic political system. Yet again, under the
identical label “Islamists,” those who are adept at
“speaking Muslim” may equally well be members
of pietistic movements or new converts who stay
mostly outside the political arena, whether of the
revolutionary or the legalist kind.

A wide range of discourses, attitudes, and prac-
tices may be observed as well in oppositional pos-
tures as in the practices of “Islamic” regimes in
power. At one extreme of the doctrinal spectrum,
the expression of an automated and indiscriminate
rejection of any Western democratic institution
persists. In that corner, popular sovereignty is con-
sidered as strictly incompatible with its divine
competitor. At the opposite end, movements that
have demonstrated repeatedly their capacity to
win a majority of votes (notably in Algeria,
Palestine, and in large parts of Egypt) have under-
taken a kind of cultural reappropriation of the
same popular sovereignty. The rewriting of the
modern categories of politics with references from
the Islamic repertoire works little by little to heal
the symbolic fracture caused by the colonial inter-
ruption. Religious affirmation and ethical reaction
will certainly not go away. But the religious
resource is no longer used to deny the legitimacy of
the democratic principle, but on the contrary, it is
used more and more to affirm it. The same goes
for the defense of human rights (even increas-
ingly, if often ambiguously, women’s rights), which have
earlier tended to be seen as solely linked to Western
culture and thereby disqualified.

Two major movements, the Muslim Brothers
and the salafis, provide the often diffuse and flu-
ctuating landscape of Islamism with a structuring
axis. According to varying national configura-
tions, the fluctuating borderline between the two
does not follow exactly the same course in every
country or society. The Muslim Brothers and the
organizations that have emerged from it, which vary
greatly from Tunisia to Kuwait, have for sev-
eral decades been engaged, where they are given
the opportunity, in legal–political action and elec-
toral competition. It is the Muslim Brothers that
have contributed the most to popularizing the
evolution of classical Islamic thinking and, nota-
bly, to the acceptance of an autonomous space for
politics and the secularization that is implicit in the
recourse to the techniques and the juridical and
political categories of the modern parliamentary
scene. Where legal recognition continues to be
denied to them (as in Tunisia, Libya, and Syria),
the activists of the Muslim Brothers engage in
educational efforts and devote themselves to
work in the associations of civil society and in the
antechambers of parliamentary life (professional
associations, human rights organizations, and
charitable institutions). The principal alternative
to the Muslim Brothers is the so-called salafi
movement, a reference to the “pietist ancestors”
who are seen to have never deviated from the
straight path and by whose example this trend
portends to be guided. The salafis have in particu-
lar affirmed themselves through a virulent
critique of the Muslim Brothers, the main coun-
terimage of their own Islamist identity.

Even if some of the recruits for jihadi direct
action come from salafi ranks, the great majority of
salafis are pietist and quietist. It is outside the field
of armed or even political struggle that they mani-
fest their rupture with society, through a cultural
practice by which they wish to be cleansed of all
recent or ancient exegetic influences. The salafis
radically refuse all ideas of a contextualization of
the religious norms. They consider the stages in the
development of the Muslim Brothers with regard to
political liberation and social modernization (and
notably the formation of parties or, indeed, organi-
zational structures as such) as so many illegitimate
alterations of orthodoxy (bid’a). Their doctrine and
their practices, less systematically studied than
those of the Brothers, who preceded them histori-
cally, are neither homogeneous nor static. Con-
versely, the Muslim Brothers are themselves the
object of a modernizing critique coming from more
modernist Islamists, who seek to accelerate the very
reforming dynamics that the salafis want to put a
brake on and who denounce the inflexibility and
doctrinal rigidity of the Muslim Brothers.

The Islamist regimes, for their part, have con-
trasting but nevertheless converging performances.
Even if the pace is slow, the development of an
autonomous political space, the limitation of
recourse to repressive violence by the state, and
the affirmation of the place of women in the pub-
lic, professional, and political spheres is hardly
moving slower in Sudan, Iran, and especially in
the Turkey of the Justice and Development Party
than in Algeria, Egypt, or the Tunisia of the
“defenders of secularism.” In Iran, even if the reference to a double legitimacy, popular and religious, has continued to limit the real importance of the democratic game and the mechanism of parliamentary and presidential elections is far from being definitively sheltered from the authoritarianism of the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council, the lively debates indicate the formation of a veritable public space. And the possibility offered to the electors of influencing the relation of forces at the top layers of the state is, even if seen against the turbulent aftermath of the “stolen” presidential elections of 2009, rather more credible than that offered to their Algerian, Tunisian, or Egyptian counterparts.

On the scale of the past half-century, it is in fact difficult to demonstrate that the Islamists have in any significant way broken with the norm of institutional and political practices of their secular competitors. Nowhere have they imported violence into a democratic universe, for the simple reason that, in the region under discussion, such a universe has not yet really emerged. Their occasional recourse to political violence may, most often, be correlated with the violence that is exercised against them by forces in the national or international environment. The process of domination seems thus to be at the heart of the principal ideological and strategic trajectories of this category of actors.

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See also Church–State Relationships; Civil Society;
Democracy: Middle East Perspectives;
Fundamentalism; Globalization; Ideology; Islam;
Islamist Movements; Mobilization, Political;
Nationalism; Nationalist Movements; Religion;
Religious Movements

Further Readings
Austin: University of Texas Press.

**Fuzzy-Set Analysis**

Fuzzy-set analysis (FSA) is one branch of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The idea of fuzzy sets goes back to earlier insights from computer science and formal logic, which had led to the development of a fuzzy-set approach already in the 1960s. As George Klir, Ute St. Clair, and Bo Yuan (1997) have shown, the difference between fuzzy sets and conventional (“crisp”) sets is that set memberships are unequivocal in crisp sets. For example, the element “Sunday” is a member in the set of all days of the week (membership value of 1); whereas the element “January” is not a member of that same set (membership value of 0). By contrast, fuzzy sets have the characteristic that nonperfect set membership can exist. This is especially relevant considering that social science concepts very often have fuzzy boundaries. Democracies are usually not perfect democracies but just democracies to a certain degree. Following this reasoning, most countries have both a partial membership in the set of “democracies” as well as in the set of “nondemocracies.” This is also a fundamental difference to crisp sets: In fuzzy sets, one and the same case can have a (partial) membership both in the original set and in the complementary set. A dichotomy is implicitly maintained, but membership degrees render it possible to differentiate for the degree. QCA as a technique is based...
on the notion of a set. Since crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) can be criticized for requiring dichotomous conditions and outcomes, and since many phenomena in the social sciences are not simply dichotomous, it is understandable why fuzzy sets are attractive for an inclusion in QCA. Below, this entry discusses some of its major features and current developments.

Both the dichotomous version csQCA and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) are based on an algebra that is different from mainstream linear algebra, as it is applied in conventional statistical methods. csQCA is based on Boolean algebra and fsQCA on fuzzy algebra. However, it is wrong to assume that fuzzy algebra would be an extension of Boolean algebra; rather, Boolean algebra should be seen as a special case of fuzzy algebra. Indeed, all rules for fuzzy algebra are also valid for Boolean algebra but not vice versa. Dichotomies (as used in csQCA and for Boolean algebra) are nothing else than very restricted versions of fuzzy scales, containing just the values of 0 and 1. One of the most difficult (and also most contested) points with regard to FSA is the decision about the attribution of fuzzy values to individual cases. More concretely, if the level of democracy of a given country has to be coded, the question is how the fuzzy values (between 0 and 1) are attributed to single countries, or, in other words, which indicators have to be chosen to attribute a lower fuzzy value to one country and a higher value to another. One possibility is to use already existing quantitative indicators and to standardize them on a range between 0 and 1. However, as Charles Ragin (2000) notes, such a strategy would overlook the central aspect of the coding, namely, that fuzzy values represent the degree of presence of a concept and that they are based on theoretical knowledge. Furthermore, most social science concepts suffer from not having easily definable quantitative equivalents. Therefore, an important part of FSA deals with the translation of qualitative degrees of the presence/absence of a concept into quantitative measures. Indeed, “[i]n the hands of a social scientist [ . . . ], a fuzzy set can be seen as a fine-grained, continuous measure that has been carefully calibrated using substantive and theoretical knowledge” (p. 7). This also means that in-depth case knowledge is the undeniable prerequisite for a meaningful FSA. Therefore, the coding process usually comes more toward the end of the research process. Recently, Ragin has proposed two more methods to calibrate fuzzy values: a so-called direct and an indirect method that both combine the (theory driven) setting of qualitative anchors with quantitative standardizations in between these anchors (for details, see Ragin, 2008, 71ff).

As in conventional csQCA, the main interest of fsQCA is to find necessary and sufficient conditions (or combinations of conditions) to account for a certain outcome. In fsQCA, the rule is that a condition is necessary if its fuzzy value is always greater than or equal to the fuzzy value of the outcome to be explained. This goes back to the insight that in the dichotomous world a condition is necessary if it exists whenever the outcome is observed. The condition can exist without the outcome being present, but the outcome must not exist without the (necessary) condition being present. This insight from the dichotomous version, namely, that the value of the condition must not be 0 when the value of the outcome is 1, is translated to the fuzzy situation in which values between 0 and 1 are also permitted: A condition is necessary if its fuzzy value is not smaller than the fuzzy value of the outcome. Note that “conditions” in this sense also can mean combinations of conditions that can be created following the rules of fuzzy algebra. Similarly, sufficiency can be defined: A condition is sufficient if its fuzzy value is always smaller than or equal to (but not greater than) the fuzzy value of the outcome to be explained.

Since FSAs very often comprise data for a considerable number of cases and also examine very different conditions, a thorough assessment of sufficiency and necessity cannot be made “by hand.” Therefore, a software program has been developed that can be downloaded from the Fuzzy Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis website. It is based on an algorithm that attributes the individual cases to their (dichotomous) ideal types within which they have various degrees of fuzzy membership values (remember that in fsQCA a case can be a member in more than just one set). These ideal types are then assessed for representing sufficient and necessary conditions and are finally minimized, following the rules of Boolean algebra that are at the heart of each QCA analysis. This analysis is summarized in the so-called Truth Table.
Algorithm. In the end, a Boolean equation results (identical to conventional QCA results), from which sufficient and necessary conditions can be extracted. The consistency measure indicates how well the resulting equation corresponds to the empirical data. The overall coverage measure is a measure to indicate which portion of the outcome is explained; this is comparable with the function of an $R^2$ in quantitative analysis. Raw coverage values show how much each single component of the solution contributes to the explanation of the outcome; unique coverage values indicate which portion of the explanation of the outcome is unique to each single component of the solution term. Consistency and coverage are in a trade-off relationship. It is hard to have optimal values for both of them. Usually, values around 0.7 or (even better) 0.8 are considered acceptable.

As Ragin (1987) notes, another problem of QCA analyses is how to deal with limited diversity—that is, the fact that for some theoretical combinations of conditions no empirical representations (cases) exist. If, for example, a comparative study among Western European countries includes the conditions of a “strong welfare state” and “European Union (EU) membership,” we may not find a country that does not have a strong welfare state and is not a member in the EU. It can be argued that limited diversity is an even stronger problem in fsQCA than in csQCA, since not only the two values 0 and 1 are permitted for fuzzy scales but potentially an infinite number of values and therefore also an infinite number of theoretically possible combinations. However, in this case, ideal types are examined. If there are any ideal types to which no single empirical case can be ideally attributed (because the case would be better attributed to another ideal type), then this ideal type is considered a remainder (i.e., not existing in the empirical data), and limited diversity is affirmed. However, it is not limited diversity in the same sense as in conventional csQCA, since each case is a member in all the ideal types up to a certain extent. Too much limited diversity may affect the validity of fsQCA results. Indeed, if a result is based on not enough empirical information, its usefulness can be questionable. There are a number of proposals how to deal with the problem of limited diversity, but of course, no definite answer can be given, since nonexisting data cannot simply be recuperated.

fsQCA can be applied in all social sciences disciplines. An overview is offered on the homepage of the COMPASSS group website. Although it is often considered a small-$N$ method, a certain minimum of cases is required. Otherwise, the problem of limited diversity becomes too severe. By contrast, also not too many cases should be examined, since otherwise the intimacy with single cases, which is needed for the calibration of the fuzzy values, is lost. Nevertheless, fsQCA has also been successfully applied to large-$N$ data sets.

It is important to underline that fsQCA is not just a technique of data manipulation (the “analytical moment”) but that its logic of set-theoretic relationships influences the research process right from the beginning. Therefore, fsQCA should never be applied mechanically but be integrated in a well-prepared research design. Currently, fsQCA scholars work on the improvement of the algorithm and implement ever more features. Additionally, a code of good practice is being developed that should improve advanced applications of the method. As a relatively new technique, fsQCA risks being misinterpreted in many ways.

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See also Boolean Algebra; Comparative Methods; Configurational Comparative Methods; Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Further Readings
COMPASSS group: http://www.compasss.org
Fuzzy Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis: http://www.fsqca.com
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Game theory is the study of rational behavior in situations of interactive decision making—that is, situations in which two or more individuals make decisions that jointly determine an outcome about which the participants have differing preferences or information. As a theory, it aims to articulate the criteria and implications of such decision making, defining principles of idealized strategic choice. These principles can then be used to clarify explanatory and normative concepts of human interaction. An experimental branch examines the extent to which real decision makers in a laboratory setting realize those principles and identifies regular patterns of departure from them. As an empirical tool, game theoretic models of social phenomena yield empirical predictions suitable for testing with observational data. Originally applied to economics, game theory has found application across the social sciences, as well as in biology (where in effect the “selfish gene” and natural selection replace individual strategic decision making) and literary theory (where game theory principles have been used to explicate portrayals of conflict and cooperation, as well as the interaction between author and reader).

Following scattered preliminaries during the period from 1910 to 1927, game theory was essentially created by the mathematician John von Neumann in a paper published in 1928 defining strategic play in finite games of pure conflict with two players. In collaboration with the economist Oskar Morgenstern, von Neumann authored Games and Economic Behavior (published in 1944), further developing the theory and beginning its application to problems of economic interaction. Rapid theoretical development followed World War II, and the theory made its first scattered appearances in the political science journals in the 1950s. By the 1980s, game theory had become the primary model-building tool of rational choice political science, with applications in virtually all subfields. International relations saw some of the earliest use of game theory, which came to be especially common in the study of crisis bargaining and the inception of war. The scholars of U.S. politics were also early adopters, applying game theory extensively to legislative processes, electoral competition, and even school budget referendum politics. Many of the American politics applications were generalized to similar questions concerning legislative and electoral politics in comparative perspective, but game theoretic applications to coalition formation, class relations, and ethnic politics were pioneered in comparative politics. In political theory, game theoretic tools were proving useful for gaining new normative understanding in areas such as collective action and constitutionalism.

Game theory itself consists of two main branches: (1) noncooperative and (2) cooperative. Noncooperative game theory focuses on individual decisions, dwelling on problems of strategic moves and incentives, and attempting to explain not only conflict and competition but also the attainment of commitment, coordination, or cooperation in groups. This entry dwells mostly on the
Strategic Games

The strategic game formulation portrays two or more players choosing simultaneously and independently among (possibly different) sets of feasible strategies. Most simply, a strategy may represent a simple action: the casting of a vote, for example. More generally, however, each strategy may encompass a complex scheme of conditional actions, reactions, and randomizations, as if chosen entirely in advance and then automatically implemented. The techniques involved in solving strategic games play important roles in analyzing sequential games as well. Political scientists have applied strategic games to a wide variety of political interactions. In some, the choices are, for all intents and purposes, literally simultaneous—secret-ballot voting, for example. More often, the model is used to understand choices with an important simultaneous aspect, such as candidate or party electoral competition and international military confrontations. Strategic games have also proven highly useful in the conceptualization of problems important in political theory and political economy, such as commons problems, free rider problems, and the role of coordination in the formation and interpretation of constitutions.

General Formulation

Three elements specify an elementary strategic game:

1. a set of players, designated for convenience as \( N \) or \( \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \), with individual players labeled \( i, j, \) and so on;
2. a number of strategy sets, one for each player, with \( i \)’s strategy set denoted \( S_i \); and
3. for each player \( i \), a real-valued utility function \( u_i \) defined on the set of all outcomes of the game.

For games of perfect information, all players are assumed to know the full description of the game: who the players are, what their strategic opportunities are, and what their utility functions are. The players are each to choose, simultaneously and independently, one strategy from their respective strategy sets. One thinks of the resulting strategy profile \( s = (s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_n) \in S \) as identifying an outcome, and the utility function \( u_i \) on \( S \) represents the preferences of player \( i \). Traditionally, the utility derived by player \( i \) when the players choose strategy profile \( s \), \( u_i(s) \), is called player \( i \)’s payoff from \( s \). (In many concrete applications, distinct strategy profiles may lead to identical substantive “outcomes,” such as “Candidate A wins the election”). Finally, it is often convenient to write \( s_- \) for \( (s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_{i-1}, s_{i+1}, \ldots, s_n) \), the profile of all players other than \( i \), and to let \( (s_1, s_-) \) denote \( s \) as well. The utility function, by definition, is meant to capture completely the preferences of a player. This includes any considerations the player may give to attaining some sort of winning margin over other players, to avoiding or seeking risk, or to such considerations as altruism, revenge seeking, and the like. Game theory is not inherently a theory of selfish preferences or material preferences; however, its applications have traction only insofar as correct assumptions about player preferences are employed.

The analysis of some games involves the use of probabilities and expected utility, sources of which are examined below. In the absence of such features, only the players’ preference orderings over outcomes matters in the analysis of strategic play. If probability is involved, however, then payoffs must be cardinal, in the sense of being von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions based on preferences over “lotteries” of outcomes. Even so, applying any positive linear transformation of any player’s utility function does not affect the analysis of strategic play. Usually, game theory avoids the
comparison of payoff values across players for exactly the same reason that such interpersonal comparisons of utilities are eschewed in microeconomic theory: The absolute numbers are taken to have no objective meaning, apart from the ordinal preferences (whether over outcomes or lotteries) from which they are derived. When the number of players and the number of strategies are small, a strategic game can be conveniently described with a payoff matrix, which often also gives meaningful labels for the players and strategies in a particular model. For example, Prisoners’ Dilemma is often represented as shown in Table 1 where, for example, if Player 1 chooses “Defect” and Player 2 chooses “Cooperate,” the payoffs are indicated by the two numbers in the bottom-left cell: 5 for Player 1 and 0 for Player 2. The payoff result in a cell is often written as (5, 0).

**Rational Play in Strategic Games**

The main concern of game theory is to define what it means for players to choose rationally in such an environment of interactive decision making. A basic concept for defining rational choice is the best response: Given that the players other than $i$ choose the strategies $s_{-i}$, a best response to $s_{-i}$ is a strategy $s_i$ in $S_i$ that maximizes $u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$. If $S_i$ is not finite (as is common in many games of bargaining and of electoral and legislative competition), additional assumptions are needed to ensure existence of a best response. Notice that there may be more than one best response, each giving the same utility. In that case, each best response is called a weak but not a strict best response. (Note, however, when authors speak of the set of player $i$'s weak best responses to $s_{-i}$, they mean to include the strict best responses as well: that set is a singleton when there is only one best response to $s_{-i}$, a multiple-element set when there is more than one best response—and the empty set if there is no best response due to an infinite $S_i$.)

The standard formulation of rational strategic play is Nash equilibrium. A strategy profile $s^*$ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for each $i$, $s_i = s_i^*$ maximizes $u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$ over $S_i$. In general, Nash equilibria can be identified by deriving the correspondence of best responses of each $i$ to all possible $s_{-i}$,

$$B_i(s_{-i}) = \{s_i \in S_i \mid s_i \text{ maximizes } u_i(s, s_{-i})\}$$

and then finding the intersection of those correspondences, that is,

$$\{s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_n\} \text{ for each } i, s_i \in B_i(s_{-i}).$$

This definition satisfies two criteria for strategic rationality. First, each player chooses a best response to the choices he or she anticipates the other players will make, while anticipating that the other players too are strategically rational. This criterion alone defines a weaker solution concept, a rationalizable strategy profile. As we will see, however, this may or may not result in outcomes in which each player has chosen a best response to the actual choices of all other players.

Second, Nash equilibrium satisfies a criterion of what one might call rational experienced play. This criterion is embodied in the assumption that each player’s anticipation of the others’ choices actually matches those choices. Suppose groups of $n$ individuals in a population of much larger size are randomly combined from time to time to play a single iteration of the original game and that all have information about how the game is being played. Each individual has a contingent strategy plan—that is, a plan of which strategy to choose if placed in the role of Player 1, Player 2, . . . , or Player $n$. Suppose further that individuals revise their plans when they observe that an alternative strategy could have yielded a higher payoff to profiles recently played than did the player’s previous intended choice and that those revisions tend to adopt higher payoff strategies against the observed actions of others. In this setting, any population strategy profile that does not induce a Nash equilibrium for every possible assignment of $n$ individuals to the player roles in the game will be subject to such change by some player. That is, only Nash equilibria can

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player 1</th>
<th>Cooperate</th>
<th>Defect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1  A Typical Payoff Matrix: Prisoners’ Dilemma**
be stable. (The literature on learning in games formalizes this intuition.)

Coalitionally Rational Play

The ideas of best response and hence of Nash equilibrium imagine, in effect, that every player considers only individual deviations from a profile. For equilibrium profiles in some games, however, it may be the case that two or more players could all have achieved higher payoffs had they all chosen differently. The analysis of possible coalitional action in a strategic game can sometimes be accomplished through a version of Nash equilibrium that inquires not only about individual departures from a strategy profile but also about simultaneous departures by several players. For any strategy profile \( s \) and any subset or coalition of players \( C \subseteq N \), write \( s_C \) for the list of strategies chosen by players in \( C \), \( s_{-C} \) for the list of strategies chosen by players not in \( C \), and let \((s_C, s_{-C})\) also denote \( s \). A strategy profile \( s^* = (s^*_C, s^*_{-C}) \) is a strong Nash equilibrium if for every coalition \( C \) and for every feasible alternative list of strategies \( s_C \) (where for each \( i \in C, s_i \in S_i \)), there is some member \( j \) of \( C \) for whom

\[ u(s_C, s^*_{-C}) \leq u(s_C, s^*_{-C}). \]

That is, for no coalition is it possible to find an alternative profile for coalition members such that all would have been strictly better off had all chosen those alternative strategies, given the strategies of nonmembers. Note that a strong Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, since the coalitions in the definition must include single-element sets of players, \( C = \{i\} \). However, not every Nash equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium. Moreover, no strongly inefficient strategy profile can be a strong Nash equilibrium, since the coalitions in the definition must include the universal coalition, \( C = N \).

For example, in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, (Defect, Defect) is a Nash equilibrium but not a strong Nash equilibrium, since all members of the universal coalition \( C = \{\text{Player 1, Player 2}\} \) could have achieved a higher payoff had they instead chosen (Cooperate, Cooperate). The latter profile, however, is not a strong Nash equilibrium either, since the singleton coalition \( C = \{\text{Player 1}\} \) could strictly improve its members’ payoffs by instead choosing Defect. The Prisoners’ Dilemma has no strong Nash equilibrium.

Mixed Strategies and Existence of Nash Equilibrium

A game may not have any Nash equilibria in such deterministic (or “pure”) strategies. A classic example is the game usually called “Matching Pennies,” shown in Table 2. More generally, this happens in games in which one player wants, in some sense, to match the other but not vice versa: Rock-Paper-Scissors and Soccer Penalty Kicks are also common examples. Such examples are not confined to games of pure conflict, however. In such situations, it behooves a player to be as unpredictable as possible to his or her opponent. Game theorists denote this through the device of a mixed strategy, in which player \( i \) randomizes over \( S_i \). In an analysis allowing mixed strategies, a strategy is denoted by a probability distribution over \( S_i \). (The set of all mixed strategies includes all the deterministic strategies as well, which are denoted by degenerate probability distributions placing all weight on one element of \( S_i \).) And in that setting, players are assumed to choose strategies so as to maximize expected payoff.

With the addition of mixed strategies, this seminal existence result known as Nash’s theorem holds: Every finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.

Multiple Nash Equilibria

Nash equilibrium eliminates some rationalizable strategy profiles, but a game may still have many Nash equilibria. The canonical example is the game of pure coordination, shown in Table 3, which has two pure-strategy (and one mixed

Table 2  A Game With No Pure-Strategy Equilibria: Matching Pennies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Heads</th>
<th>Tails</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Player 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tails</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

strategy) equilibria. Without additional assumptions—concerning, for example, iterated play and dynamics—game theory proper has nothing further to say about which equilibrium would be chosen. In applications, the historical or cultural context in which a game is played might afford the players additional information about what each other will anticipate, resulting in a focal point, a choice among equilibria that players can arrive at more often than random chance or symmetric mixed strategies would predict. Games with multiple equilibria demonstrate the difference between rationalizable and Nash strategy profiles: If Player 1 chooses A based on the belief that 2 will choose A, and Player 2 chooses B based on the belief 1 will choose B, this is a rationalizable profile of strategies and beliefs. But the result disconfirms the players’ beliefs and disappoints their expectations.

Evolutionary Game Theory and Learning in Games

Evolutionary game theory offers an additional set of assumptions and tools to say more about the conditions under which various Nash equilibria will be selected. These tools are used in biology to study actual evolution through natural selection (usually with “selfish genes” filling the role of rational players). Individuals whose phenotypes—strategies—yield them higher reproductive fitness in one generation have more progeny in the next. A distribution of genotypes stable in the resulting dynamic system corresponds roughly to equilibrium in the game.

In the social sciences, the tools of evolutionary game theory are more commonly applied to models of “learning in games,” in which individuals play games many times against different opponents, occasionally switching strategies to adopt a new one observed to have been more successful. The abandoning of one strategy in favor of another takes the place of the biologist’s process of natural selection. This learning process can be quite myopic and error ridden, but generally the result is that a population of individuals may reach a stable point, a whole-population profile of strategies in which little further systematic improvement is possible. Stable points correspond under general conditions to a subset of Nash equilibria. Models of learning in games are significant to game theory overall because they demonstrate that the strong assumptions used to construct basic games—perfect and common information, perfect ability to select optimal strategies, and an a priori coincidence in the selection among multiple equilibria—are not remotely necessary to produce choices that correspond to classic Nash equilibrium. What is required is a sufficient opportunity for players to gain experience in playing.

Imperfect Information in Strategic Games

The assumption of perfect information is obviously an extreme idealization of strategic interaction. Even in classical game theory (as opposed to evolutionary or population learning models), a major preoccupation is the generalization of this ideal case. This is accomplished by specifying probability distributions that describe the state of a player’s knowledge, including knowledge about the state of other players’ knowledge. In general, imperfect information about the set of players, the strategy sets, or the utility functions in a strategic game can all be expressed in terms of uncertainty about the utility functions alone: An unavailable strategy can be represented by an extremely low utility for any profile in which that strategy is used, and an absent player can be assigned a singleton strategy set. Often, the true payoff function of a player is called the player’s type.

Once each player’s imperfect information is expressed in the form of a probability distribution over payoffs, the criterion of best response can be expressed in terms of expected-payoff maximization. Nash equilibrium generalizes directly to this form of best response. An important complication is that, in calculating best responses, a player’s subjective probabilities about other player types must be updated to account for the circumstances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player 1</th>
<th>Player 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: A Game With Two Pure-Strategy Equilibria: Pure Coordination

The assumptions used to construct basic games—perfect and common information, perfect ability to select optimal strategies, and an a priori coincidence in the selection among multiple equilibria—are not remotely necessary to produce choices that correspond to classic Nash equilibrium. What is required is a sufficient opportunity for players to gain experience in playing.
under which the first player's action will affect his or her payoff. For example, in models of instrumental voting, only the cases in which a player's vote will be pivotal have any importance for maximizing payoff; but the fact of being pivotal carries implications about what the other players' types might be in those circumstances.

Sequential Games

Strategic games abstract away players' opportunities to react to other players or to anticipate their future decisions, burying such activity implicitly within each player's strategy. Sequential games, by contrast, offer an alternative model designed to emphasize this aspect of interactive decision making. Political processes are usually sequential decision processes, and political scientists have exploited this in numerous ways. Crisis bargaining and the inception of war were early and important objects of study through sequential games; later models of ethnic conflict and cooperation involve an approach similar in spirit. In the study of policy formation through voting, agenda-setting models such as committee gatekeeping have been widely employed, and the theory of legislative bargaining has achieved the status of a general-purpose tool for legislative politics, political parties, and group choice generally. Sequential game models are prominent also in the study of delegation of powers to an agency or committee and of decision making within a system of separated powers. Games of sequentially repeated interaction are often applied to the formation and maintenance of community or of collective action, in settings ranging from the theoretical study of polities to the stability of international organizations. With the incorporation of incomplete information, sequential games have also found important applications to all manner of political communication phenomena, such as policy advice from biased experts, lobbying, and informative political debate.

General Formulation

The following elements are necessary to specify a basic sequential game; for special purposes, additional elements may be needed, and these will be described in the subsequent sections. Just as with strategic games, every sequential game has a set \( N \) of players and, for each player \( i \), a utility function \( u_i \) over outcomes. The difference lies in the description of player decisions and, thus, of outcomes. A sequential game also consists of a description of turns on which a given player has the chance to act and the actions among which that player may choose. A game need not simply describe the turns as alternating regularly among players; in general, the coming of a player's turn, as well as the actions available to that player, may depend on the prior actions of all players. The description of the game must also fully specify the sequences of player actions that determine the various outcomes of the game. As with strategic games using this description, any outcome may be simply specified by the sequence of actions that led to it, although in applications the outcomes usually correspond to substantive results.

Traditionally, and in most small games, the whole description of turns, actions, and outcomes is accomplished through the specification of a game tree. The “tree” terminology refers to a rooted tree in the mathematical theory of graphs. In that theory, a graph consists of a set of nodes and the edges that connect some nodes directly to other nodes; a tree is any graph that is both connected (any node can be reached from any other node via a sequence of edges that does not retrace itself, called a path) and acyclic (has no cycles, i.e., no path from a node back to itself); and a rooted tree has one node designated as the initial node (or root). The properties of connectedness and acyclicity then imply that for any two paths leading away from the initial node, once those two paths diverge onto different edges they never reconnect—giving the graph the shape, schematically, of the branches of a tree.

The initial node represents the beginning of the game. The path leading from the initial node to any particular node represents a partial or complete history of play of the game (including the “null history” at the initial node); at each node along any path from the initial node, either it is one player's turn to move or else the path outward from the root ends. These nodes along any path are called nonterminal and terminal histories of the game, respectively. The edge connecting the node of a nonterminal history, \( h \), to the next node outward from the root represents an action chosen by the player \( P(h) \) whose turn came at \( h \). Each
terminal history represents an \textit{outcome} of the game, the result of a particular \textit{path of play}.

This description of a sequential game as a game tree is just a way of forcing the specification of turns, action choices, potential histories, and outcomes to satisfy appropriate regularity conditions, making the description unambiguous and internally consistent. With the addition, described below, of chance moves, simultaneous moves, and information sets, the structure is remarkably versatile and yet amenable to powerful proofs concerning the general properties of types of games and their solutions. Figure 1 shows an example of a simple game tree, a so-called entry or incumbency game. In the figure, the payoffs of the two players are shown by a label on each terminal history, with $u_1(x)$ written above $u_2(x)$. This is sometimes written instead as $(u_1(x), u_2(x))$.

Note, however, that the general form of a sequential game may involve trees that cannot be literally portrayed in a tree diagram such as Figure 1. For many applications, analytic tractability is improved by allowing a player $i$ at a given history $h$ to have a set of available actions $A_i(h)$ that is infinite, as in games of bargaining over the division of a stock or in a spatial model of electoral competition. Also, it is often important that there be no a priori limit on the possible length of a path of play, so that some terminal histories are infinitely long, as in alternating-offer bargaining processes or in repeated games. A well-specified model must somehow limit the payoff to such an infinite “terminal” history (e.g., by a low reversion payoff in bargaining or by discounting in a repeated game). An infinitely long path of play is nevertheless, of course, unrealistic as an outcome; but the ever-present possibility of continuing the game is strategically critical. A game having at least one terminal history of infinite length is said to have “infinite horizon.” A game having no such history, and in which the set of available actions at every turn is finite, is a “finite game.”

\textbf{Strategies and Solutions in Basic Sequential Games}

A strategy for player $i$ in a sequential game consists of a function $s_i$ specifying, for each $h$ having $P(h) = i$, an action $s_i(h)$ from $i$'s set of available actions at that history. A strategy profile is a list of such functions, one for each player. As with strategic games, a strategy profile is written equivalently as $s_i$, $(s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_n)$, or $(s_i, s_{\neq i})$.

\textbf{Backward Induction}

For any finite basic sequential game, a simple and appealing solution concept is available: the method of \textit{backward induction}. Consider an “ultimate” nonterminal history, that is, a history $h$ such that every action taken by player $P(h)$ will end the game. Since there is a finite number of such actions, at least one of them yields a maximum payoff. Here at the end of the game, the only relevant implication of this player’s choice is to determine his or her own payoff; clearly the rational choice is one yielding that maximum. Backward induction begins by identifying one such payoff-maximizing action for every ultimate nonterminal history. Now consider a “penultimate” history: a history $h'$ for which $(h', a')$ is an “ultimate” history no matter which action $a'$ is chosen by player $P(h')$. For a given $a'$, let $a$ be the action that will then be taken at the resulting ultimate history $(h', a')$. In that case, using our analysis of ultimate histories, player
\( i = P(h') \) will receive a predictable payoff from \( a' \), namely, \( u_i(h', a', a) \). Proceeding in this fashion, backing up the tree to the initial node specifies an action choice for the choosing player at every non-terminal history, defining a strategy for every player. This strategy profile defines the sequence of actions that will transpire when the game is played—a terminal history or complete path of play through the game tree—as well as the actions that would be chosen following any arbitrary departure from that path. This strategy has the property that all actions chosen, both on and off the path, are payoff maximizing, given all the subsequent choices by all players. Call this strategy profile the solution by backward induction.

Nash Equilibrium: The Strategic Form of a Sequential Game

Alternatively, a sequential game can be converted to an essentially equivalent strategic form and solved by specifying a Nash equilibrium. For a finite basic sequential game, consider the strategic game defined by (a) the same set of players \( N \); (b) for each player \( i \), the strategy set consisting of all full sequential-game strategies for player \( i \); and (c) for every profile of such strategies, a payoff equal to the sequential game payoff corresponding to the terminal node that would result from applying that strategy profile to the sequential game. A Nash equilibrium of this strategic form is defined as a Nash equilibrium of the original sequential game; the strategic form is also known as the normal form or occasionally the matrix form. The sequential form is also known as the extensive form or occasionally the tree form of the game.

Notice that every solution by backward induction is a Nash equilibrium of the game. In a backward-induction solution, no player has any incentive to change both an ultimate and any penultimate moves because all the ultimate moves are optimal regardless of how those ultimate histories were arrived at, and the penultimate moves were optimal given those. Backing up through the game tree, similar reasoning establishes that no player would want to change any subset of his or her moves in the backward-induction solution; hence the profile is a Nash equilibrium.

Not every Nash equilibrium is a backward-induction solution, however. Consider the Challenge Game shown in Figure 1. Backward induction yields a profile in which Incumbent Acquiesces, and Challenger Enters, which is also a Nash equilibrium. Consider another strategy profile in which Challenger chooses Stay Out and Incumbent chooses Fight. Clearly, Challenger would not prefer to Enter if Incumbent will Fight; moreover, given that Challenger will Stay Out, Incumbent has no incentive to Acquiesce. This too is a Nash equilibrium, but it violates backward induction. Such a flawed Nash equilibrium is sometimes called “imperfect.”

Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium

A subgame of a sequential game \( G \) is the part of the game that follows any nonterminal node \( h \), and thus, it is a game in its own right. Its set of histories corresponds to the set of all histories of \( G \) that begin with \( h \); its payoffs are the corresponding payoffs from \( G \); and its player set is the same, although some may have no moves to make in the subgame. (For games of imperfect information, defined below, this definition is modified to exclude putative subgames whose set of nonterminal histories would contain an incomplete portion of any information set.) When a game is solved by backward induction, a backward-induction solution on every subgame is induced as well. Thus, backward induction induces a Nash equilibrium on every subgame.

This property can be applied as well to a game with infinite horizon, which cannot be solved via backward induction. For any sequential game, a Nash equilibrium that induces a Nash equilibrium on every subgame avoids the “imperfection” described above; hence, it is called a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Since not every Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect, subgame perfection is also referred to as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. (The qualification “subgame” perfect distinguishes this refinement from other refinements treating alternative notions of imperfection.) Where backward induction is not possible or feasible, other methods may be employed to derive subgame-perfect equilibria. Such methods are often based in one way or another on Bellman’s principle of dynamic programming: An optimal strategy is identified by always taking the optimal current action, assuming that the subsequent
actions are optimal. Other Nash equilibrium refinements in a similar spirit use criteria based on rational behavior when choices are known to be subject to small errors or trembles, both in sequential and in strategic games. Examples include trembling-hand perfection and proper equilibrium.

**Extending the Basic Formulation**

The basic formulation of a sequential game, whether finite or infinite, can be extended in several ways. Backward-induction and subgame-perfect equilibrium extend as well, making the sequential game a powerful all-purpose modeling tool. This section examines how to generalize the formulation of sequential games to include simultaneous moves, chance occurrences, randomized actions, and imperfect information.

**Simultaneous Moves**

Suppose that, following some histories, two or more players are to choose actions simultaneously, after which the game may continue. This can be represented by letting the player function \( P \) designate a set of players, \( P(h) \subseteq N \), rather than a single player. For each \( i \in P(h) \), we still let \( A_i(h) \) represent the set of actions among which \( i \) is to choose; this may, in general, be a different set of actions for each player in \( P(h) \). The description of a history accommodates such simultaneous moves by allowing the sequence of actions defining \( h \) to include, where appropriate, a profile of actions by a set \( P(h) \) of players, in place of the move by a single player. For example, if action \( a^1 \) by Player 1 is followed by a simultaneous choice by Players 2 and 3, who choose \( a^2 \) and \( a^3 \), respectively, then resulting history may be written unambiguously as \((a^1, (a^2, a^3))\). Player \( i \)'s strategy in a sequential game can still be represented in the same form as before, letting \( s_i(h) \) represent the action \( i \) would take at history \( h \) regardless of whether other players are simultaneously making choices at \( h \). A basic sequential game is one in which \( P(h) \) is always a singleton \( \{i\} \). A strategic game now becomes a special case of a sequential game, in which the null history \( \emptyset \) is the only nonterminal history, with \( P(\emptyset) = N \).

Finally, it is natural to extend backward induction to simultaneous-choice situations as follows: when, in the process of backward induction, a history \( b \) is reached at which \( P(b) \) has more than one player, then construct a special strategic game in which the set of players is \( P(b) \); player \( i \)'s strategy set is \( A_i(h) \); and player \( i \)'s payoff to strategy profile \( s(h) \) in the special strategic game is identical to \( i \)'s payoff in the overall sequential game from the terminal history defined by \( b \), followed by \( s(h) \), followed by continued play according to the backward-induction steps already completed. The backward induction is continued, then, by designating a Nash equilibrium \( s'(h) \) in the special strategic game at \( h \), and then continuing up the tree under the assumption that if \( b \) is reached, the players in \( P(b) \) will choose according to \( s'(h) \). As in backward induction in a basic sequential game, if a simultaneous-move history has more than one Nash equilibrium, the implications of each must be traced out for the remaining steps of backward induction, yielding several different backward-induction solutions. Extending the method of backward induction in this manner preserves the definition of strategic form, the definition of Nash equilibrium for sequential games, and the correspondence between backward-induction and subgame-perfect equilibrium all in the same form as defined for basic sequential games.

**Example: Repeated Games**

An important application of sequential games with simultaneous moves is the case of repeated games. Let \( G \) be a strategic game (players \( N \), strategy sets \( S \), and utility functions \( u \)). In a repeated game, the same set of players plays \( G \), known as the stage game; all learn the outcome; and all play \( G \) again, and so on. The players know that \( G \) will be repeated a specific number of times or indefinitely. The payoff to this entire sequence is the sum of the payoffs to the successive instances of \( G \), perhaps discounted (i.e., multiplied by some “discount factor” between 0 and 1 for each repetition) due to time preferences or to the probabilistic termination of the sequence.

Consider for instance the Prisoners’ Dilemma shown in Table 1 as the stage game, to be repeated infinitely with discount factor \( \omega \). This forms an infinite-horizon sequential game, in which at every nonterminal (i.e., every finite) history \( h \), \( P(h) = \{ \text{Player 1, Player 2} \} \) and \( A_1(h) = \{ \text{Cooperate,} \)
Defect}. A terminal history is an infinite sequence of the form \((a_{t0}, a_{t1}), (a_{t1}, a_{t2}), \ldots\)
where each \(a_t \in \{\text{Cooperate}, \text{Defect}\}\). The payoff to player \(i\) from such a terminal history is
\[
\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} w^t u_i(a_{t1}, a_{t2}),
\]
where \(t\) represents time.

Finally, a strategy takes the form of a rule telling what action would be chosen at every possible nonterminal history. Actual strategies of interest are usually expressed in the form of a relatively simple rule. For example, the strategy of Tit for Tat in the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma can be described as follows: Cooperate at \(t = 0\); and for all \(t > 0\), imitate the other player’s action at \(t - 1\).

A repeated-game strategy profile can be proven to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium by showing that at no possible history (on or off its path of play) could payoff be increased by changing the action taken at that history and nowhere else. This method is derived from Bellman’s principle. Notice that the profile in which both players use Tit for Tat is a Nash equilibrium for sufficiently large \(w\) but is not a subgame-perfect equilibrium for any value of \(w\). This is because if one player ever commits an unexplained Defection, then, under the assumption that both players would adhere to Tit for Tat in the future, it would be better for the other player to forgo punishing the defection (incurring a punishment in turn). If the strategy for both players is modified, however, to include an “apology”—namely, Cooperate twice regardless of the other player’s action—for any unprovoked Defection, it becomes a subgame-perfect equilibrium (again, for sufficiently large \(w\)). Thus, although Defect is a dominant strategy in the unrepeated game, full cooperation can be maintained in equilibrium in the indefinitely repeated game.

**Moves by Chance**

The interactions we subject to game theoretic analysis sometimes depend in part on intervening events best understood by the players as being random. Such phenomena can be included by allowing the player function to specify that at some histories \(h\), instead of a player or players choosing an action, a random event occurs before subsequent player actions or payoff determinations take place. This is denoted by writing \(P(h) = \text{Chance}\) or \(P(h) = \{\text{Chance}\}\) and such an \(h\) is casually referred to as a “move by Chance” or by “Nature.” In describing the game, any such instance must be accompanied by a set of possible outcomes of the random element, which we might as well write \(A_{\text{Chance}}(h)\), and a probability distribution \(p\) on \(A_{\text{Chance}}(h)\). The outcome of a Chance move is part of the sequence of actions defining any history.

If Chance moves are encountered in the pathway of play under a profile \(s\), then \(s\) determines not a particular terminal history but rather a probability distribution over terminal histories. For a game involving moves by Chance, then, the backward-induction process must be modified by maximizing expected payoffs, computed in the appropriate way using the probability distributions for the Chance moves to determine the probabilities of various payoffs given a strategy profile.

**Behaviorally Mixed Strategies**

Mixed strategies are usually treated in a different way for sequential games than for strategic games. Game theorists use the term behavioral (or behaviorally) mixed strategy to refer to a strategy in a sequential game in which the player randomizes over the actions. (Where the context is clear, the modifier “behavioral” is usually dropped.) Unless otherwise specified, these randomizations are always taken to be independent across players; they are represented as independent across histories too, although of course different actions at an earlier history lead to different subsequent histories, at which the player may use different randomizing probabilities.

Obviously, a strategy profile involving randomization will determine a probability distribution over outcomes, and expected utility is the criterion for backward induction. Analogous to deriving subgame-perfect equilibria in strategic games, the procedure in a sequential game for finding subgame-perfect equilibria involving behavioral mixed strategies depends on the fact that a player who maximizes expected utility can rationally randomize if and only if each of the actions accorded positive probability would, if used alone, also maximize expected utility. In the backward-induction process, this means that a single player \(P(h)\) could use either no randomized action or a continuum of
randomized actions at \( b \). However, many of these possibilities will often be ruled out of the eventual subgame-perfect equilibrium, since randomizations by more than one player or at more than one history will require multiple indifference conditions that (again as in strategic games) constrain the feasible values of the probabilities used.

**Imperfect Information**

Perhaps the single most important extension of the basic formulation is to represent games in which players do not have full information about the previous actions of other players. This is, after all, an important feature of many parlor games as well as a key feature of real-world interactions. The state of player \( i \)'s knowledge about previous moves in a sequential game is represented by distinguishing, as an *information set* of player \( i \), any subset of histories at which player \( i \) is required to move but among which \( i \) is unable to distinguish at the time they are reached. Thus, for all histories within the same information set, the player is required to choose the same action. The whole collection of such information sets for a player is that player’s *information structure*. To define equilibrium in a game with imperfect information requires that we incorporate a notion of player \( i \)'s probabilistic beliefs about previous actions. These notions are formalized below to facilitate defining the relevant equilibrium concepts.

For each player \( i \), let \( H(i) \) be the set of histories for which \( i \) is in the player set. Let \( I \) be a partition of \( H(i) \)—that is, a set of nonempty subsets of \( H(i) \) such that each history in \( H(i) \) is an element of exactly one of those subsets. Denote by \( I(h) \) the partition element containing \( h \), called \( i \)'s *information set* at \( h \). In what follows, the symbol \( Z \) denotes a typical information set without reference to a particular history in it; but for any \( h \) in \( Z \), \( I(h) = Z \). \( I \) is a valid *information structure* for \( i \) if and only if, for each information set \( Z \) in \( I \), player \( i \) has exactly the same action choices at every \( h \) in \( Z \). (In any application, the names or labels of the actions for each history in an information set should be identical as well. From a theoretical standpoint, however, the labels on the actions are irrelevant; hence, the only real restriction is that the action sets be of the same size.) This restriction is needed since \( i \) must be aware of the available choices at the present history; it must be impossible for the player to infer from this whether that history is \( h \) or \( h' \). Thus, we may as well write \( A_i(I(h)) \) for the actions available at every \( h \) in information set \( I(h) \). Finally, for any history \( h \) at which player \( i \) in \( P(h) \) does know the entire sequence of previous actions, \( I(h) = \{ h \} \), just that one history.

This approach requires a slight redefinition of a strategy. Since player \( i \) cannot distinguish between \( b \) and \( b' \) in an information set \( Z \), a strategy must specify the same action at both histories. Thus, in general, a strategy for player \( i \) can be fully described as a mapping not from each history into its action set but simply from each information set \( Z \in I \) into its action set; thus, instead of \( s(h) \), we keep track of the accounting by writing \( s(Z) \), which automatically reminds us that \( b, b' \in Z \) implies \( s(b) = s(b') \). As noted above, the presence of information sets restricts the applicability of the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium. In a proper subgame, every \( h \) within the subgame must have the property that the subgame contains all the histories in \( I(h) \). That is, no information set can be “shared” between two subgames. Thus, in a game of imperfect information, not every nonterminal \( h \) gives rise to a subgame. With this restriction on what qualifies as a subgame, the definition of subgame-perfect equilibrium remains the same as before.

To go further in assessing the choice of a rational strategy requires that we devise some method of handling a player’s uncertainty at any nontrivial information set \( Z \). As usual, we represent the state of the player’s knowledge about what is the actual history in \( Z \) with a probability distribution over \( Z \). Now, the payoff from choosing action \( a \) from \( A_i(Z) \) is the expectation over the histories in \( Z \) of the payoffs from choosing \( a \). Each of these payoffs, in turn, may be an expectation based on subsequent moves by nature or randomized actions to be chosen by \( i \) or by other players subsequent to that. We thus wish to equip each player \( i \) with a probability distribution over each nontrivial \( Z \) in \( I \). Let \( \mu_2(h) \) represent \( i \)'s subjective probability that the current history is \( h \) given that the current information set is \( Z \in I \). The distribution \( \mu_2 \) is known as player \( i \)'s *beliefs* at \( Z \), and \( \mu_2 \) as defined over all \( Z \) for all players is a *system of beliefs*. Using this notion of beliefs, we can generalize subgame-perfect equilibrium to the imperfect-information setting. There are several such
extended definitions, each having the following form: An equilibrium consists of an assessment, that is, a profile of strategies \( s \) and a system of beliefs \( \mu \), obeying two conditions:

1. **Sequential rationality:** For each \( i \) and each \( Z \in I_i \), \( s_i(Z) \) maximizes the expected value of \( u_i \) given \( s_{-i} \) and \( \mu \).

2. **Consistency:** Each \( \mu_Z \) is consistent with \( s \) and with the probabilities placed on Chance moves, given the laws of probability and other considerations.

The sequential rationality condition is just a restatement of the criterion we have been using all along, that each action maximizes expected payoff. The consistency condition varies according to the “other considerations” imposed as conditions, and this gives rise to different solution concepts.

The simplest consistency condition—and the least restrictive while still being consistent with the laws of probability—is that beliefs must comport with Bayes’s rule wherever it is directly applicable. That is, for every information set \( Z \) that can actually be reached with positive probability given \( s \), for every history \( h' \) in \( Z \), we must define \( \mu_Z(h') \) according to Bayes’s rule, namely, as the conditional probability of reaching \( h' \) given that \( Z \) is reached, given the players’ strategies and the game’s Chance-move probabilities. This amounts to

\[
\mu_Z(h') = \frac{\Pr(h')}{\Pr(Z)} = \frac{\Pr(h')}{\sum_{h \in Z} \Pr(h)},
\]

for all \( h' \) in \( Z \). Each marginal probability \( \Pr(h) \) is calculated by multiplying all the mixed-strategy action probabilities and Chance-move probabilities along the sequence of actions that make up \( h \). An assessment \( (s^*, \mu^*) \) satisfying this form of consistency, as well as sequential rationality, is a weak sequential equilibrium (WSE).

Game theoretic models frequently invoke a related equilibrium concept called perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). A sequentially rational assessment \( (s^*, \mu^*) \) is a PBE if and only if it induces a WSE on every subgame. The only difference between PBE and WSE occurs when there is an information set \( Z \) that is not reached by \( s \) but for which other off-path actions or chance moves intervene between the point where \( s \) diverges from \( Z \) and \( Z \) itself. In such cases, WSE consistency imposes no restriction on beliefs in \( Z \), but PBE consistency requires that the probabilities in \( Z \) comport with the probabilities of reaching \( Z \) conditional on the initial departure from the path of \( s \). Other, stronger consistency conditions produce further belief-based refinements of WSE, such as sequential equilibrium and divine equilibrium. In general, such refinements are used to rule out equilibria thought to be based on “unreasonable” beliefs.

**Example: Signaling Games**

The important example of “semipooling” equilibrium in certain signaling games provides important applications of chance moves, behavioral mixed strategies, and imperfect information. In a signaling game, a Sender learns the value of an initial Chance move and then sends one of a set of feasible signals to a Receiver, who must choose an action. The players’ payoffs depend in different ways on the combination of the true chance move and the Receiver’s move. If the Sender’s payoff does not depend directly on the Sender’s signal, the game is one of “cheap talk”; otherwise it may be a game of “costly signaling.” Depending on the details of the conflict between the players’ interests, in equilibrium the Sender’s signal may be (a) ignored by the Receiver, called “pooling” since the Sender’s behavior is the same regardless of the Chance move; (b) perfectly informative about the Chance move, called “separating” since the Sender’s signal perfectly distinguishes the possible Chance moves; or (c) partially informative, called “semipooling” since the Sender uses a mixed strategy, reporting truthfully with some probability less than 1.

Figure 2 shows the game tree for a signaling game that minimally embodies all these features. The game begins (in the middle of the diagram) with Chance determining whether Policy A or Policy B would be best for Receiver; A is best with probability \( p < .5 \). Sender learns the truth and signals either \( a \) or \( b \). Receiver knows \( p \) but does not know the Chance move; thus, Receiver has two nontrivial information sets, one reached when Sender signals \( a \) and the other when Sender signals \( b \). These are indicated in the game tree by the dotted lines connecting histories that Receiver cannot distinguish. After hearing the report from Sender,
Receiver must choose either \( \alpha \) (implement Policy A) or \( \beta \) (implement Policy B). At each terminal history, each pair of payoffs in the diagram shows Sender’s payoff above Receiver’s payoff. Thus, Receiver’s preferences simply favor Policy A when A is best and B when B is best, with equal intensity. We assume that Sender’s payoff parameters obey \( x > w > y > 0 \), so Sender has a preference for A regardless of which policy is best for Receiver. Since \( w > y \), Sender’s message has a direct impact on Sender’s utility: if B is best and B is implemented, Sender’s utility will be reduced (by \( w - y \)) for having falsely reported that A is best. This is, therefore, a game of costly signaling rather than cheap talk.

This game has a semipooling equilibrium defined by the following assessment, which incorporates a behavioral mixed strategy:

- Sender signals \( a \) when A is best; when B is best, Sender signals \( a \) with probability \( r = (1 - 2p) / (1 - p) \) and \( b \) with probability \( 1 - r \).
- Following a signal of \( b \) (the left-hand information set), Receiver believes that B is best with probability 1. Following a signal of \( a \) (the right-hand information set), Receiver believes there is a probability \( m = p / (p + (1 - p)r) \) that A is best and a probability \( 1 - m \) that B is best.

- Following a signal of \( b \), Receiver chooses \( \beta \) with certainty. Following a signal of \( a \), Receiver chooses \( \alpha \) with probability \( s = (w - y)(x - y) \) and chooses \( \beta \) with probability \( 1 - s \).

To see how the belief \( m \) is derived from Bayes’s rule, notice that the top history in the right-hand information set is reached with probability \( p \) (Chance probability that A is best, times Sender’s probability 1 of truthfully reporting that) and the bottom history is reached with probability \( (1 - p)r \) (the Chance probability B is best times Sender’s mixed-strategy probability of falsely reporting A is best). Notice that this formulation of \( m \) is equivalent to the usual form of Bayes’ rule: \( m \) is the conditional probability that A has occurred, given that Sender has reported \( a \), so Bayes’ rule says \( \Pr(A|a) = \Pr(A)\Pr(a|A) / [\Pr(A)\Pr(a|A) + \Pr(B)\Pr(a|B)] \), which is just \( p / [p + (1 - p)r] \), as given above.

As with any signaling game, there are also pooling equilibria in which Sender uses the same signaling probabilities regardless of Chance’s move; and Receiver chooses \( \beta \) in all cases, believing B is best with probability \( 1 - p > .5 \) regardless of the signal.

**Figure 2** Semipooling Equilibrium in a Signaling Game
These are often referred to as “babbling” equilibria, since the Sender’s signaling is meaningless.

Cooperative Game Theory

The term cooperative game theory should be understood to cover a variety of fairly distinct approaches, including axiomatic bargaining theory and spatial voting theory; but the central and original branch of the theory is that of games in characteristic function form or simply coalition games. A brief treatment will serve to illustrate the approach and its differences from and similarities to the noncooperative theory.

As the emphasis on coalitions might lead one to expect, some of the original applications of game theory to politics used cooperative game theory. The cooperative game formulation provided the basis for the calculation of power indices that, in a 1950s conceptual breakthrough, clarified the difference between voting weights and voting influence for small weighted-voting bodies and for voting bodies with complex veto rules, notably the United Nations Security Council. The earliest models of voting competition also took the form of cooperative games, being based on the specification of winning and blocking coalitions; this approach is still used productively, both in theoretical analyses and in the empirical study of multiparty election systems. A related early political science use of game theory was in the study of parliamentary government formation, where coalition patterns were analyzed using both party size and the restriction that coalitions include ideologically compatible partners.

The theory of coalition games originated with the attempt of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern to theorize about zero-sum games with more than two players. In such games, a coalition of players could act in concert to assure themselves certain outcomes regardless of the efforts of the remaining players; the question is, “what coalitions will form to take advantage of their capabilities?” The original formulation assumed, contrary to our previous assumptions, that payoffs have meaning across players and can in fact be combined and voluntarily transferred from one player to another in a simple additive fashion. This class of coalition games is today called transferable utility (TU) games; in nontransferable utility (NTU) games, by contrast, one keeps separate account of the payoffs chosen by the coalition for each player.

Formally, let \( N = \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \) be a set of players. For every subset of players \( C \), let \( v(C) \) be the total payoff that those players can ensure receiving regardless of the actions of the remaining players; each nonempty \( C \) is a possible coalition, and \( v \) is the characteristic function; strictly speaking, \( v \) completely describes the game (since it implicitly includes a specification of the set of players). A valid characteristic function should be superadditive: For any two disjoint coalitions \( C \) and \( D \), \( v(C) + v(D) \leq v(C \cup D) \), since, acting together, the members of the two coalitions could do anything they could have done by acting separately, and perhaps more. Let \( x = (x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n) \) be the distribution of payoffs that ultimately results from the play of the game, after any transfers of utility to which members of coalitions have agreed. The aim of the characteristic function formulation is to predict the distribution of payoffs among the players, given the capabilities of the coalitions that they might enter into. Notice that the particular actions taken by individuals, acting alone or in concert, are completely abstracted away, and that it is implicitly assumed that a coalition can perfectly accomplish any desired commitment, cooperation, or coordination to achieve its potential total payoff. The definition of \( v(C) \) as the most that \( C \)'s members can ensure themselves embodies a pessimistic viewpoint that is really appropriate only where the underlying game is zero sum (so \( v(N) = 0 \)), although that restriction is not always imposed when the coalition theories are applied.

The first, very weak, solution concept is the set of imputations of a game \( v \). This is the set of payoff distributions satisfying two properties:

1. **Individual rationality**: For every player \( i \), \( x_i \geq v(\{i\}) \), since the player has no reason to accept a payoff lower than what he or she could ensure himself or herself by acting alone.

2. **Efficiency**: \( x_1 + x_2 + \cdots + x_n = v(N) \), since by definition the grand coalition can get any feasible total payoff, and there is no reason to settle for less.

The addition of one more condition defines the fundamental solution concept for coalition games, the core. Let \( x \) and \( y \) be two imputations; \( x \) is said to dominate \( y \) if there is some coalition \( C \) such that
(a) \(v(C) \geq \sum_{i \in C} x_i\), that is, members of \(C\) have the power to impose \(x\), and (b) \(x_i \geq y_i\) for each \(i \in C\), and strictly so for some \(i \in C\), that is, each member of \(C\) is at least as well off, and some better off, under \(x\) than under \(y\). The core of \(v\) then consists of the set of all undominated imputations. In many games of interest, the core is empty; consider, for example, three players who divide a dollar by majority rule. The Bondareva-Shapley theorem gives a balance condition ensuring the core will be nonempty. Alternative conditions on imputations yield other solution concepts, such as the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution, the kernel, and the nucleolus.

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See also Analytic Narratives: The Method; Bargaining; Cooperation; Coordination; Experiments, Laboratory; Prisoners’ Dilemma; Rational Choice; Social Choice Theory; Spatial Models of Politics

Further Readings

Gender

Today, gender—a term that is also used in languages other than English—is used in the context of gender relations or as a social construction of sexuality. It is comparatively a new term, with gender originally being used until the 1960s only as a grammatical category to allocate nouns into different categories—feminine, masculine, and neutral. Since then, the term has been fully engrained in the social and cultural sciences discourse and has also established itself in the political discourse of different societies, as the concepts of gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting show. The expansion of the term and its widespread use can be seen as a sign that gender inequality is perceived in many areas of society and is examined as a social—organizational form. This entry discusses the origins of this concept, its relevance in social discourses, and its implications for contemporary political science.

Background
As opposed to the biological term sex, the term gender refers to the “social” or “psychological” gender of a person, where “sex” and “gender” should be seen as analytically independent of each other. Gender refers to a historically specific practice of social classification. It focuses on the special perceptions and patterns of interpretation by which the binary structure of “male” and “female” is viewed, dealt with, and institutionalized. In doing so, it deals with the symbolic order of sexes in a society, as well as with the self-attributions and identification of the individual, which focus on it but are not identical to this symbolism. In most societies, categorizing into male and female gender categories takes place on the basis of the shaping of primary and secondary gender characteristics. Disambiguations and the one-sidedness of “male” and “female” are associated with the twogender classification, as well as with social relations of symmetry and asymmetry, equality and hierarchy, of inclusion and exclusion. These relationships are embedded in concrete social relations and structural connections. At the same time, the fact that classifications do not simply exist but constantly need to be reacquired points to their instability and dependency on having to be updated at a practical level. Based on the realization that social gender differentiation is not based on anthropological, biological, or physiological conditions but on the result of social classifications, it
can be inferred that the hierarchical relationship of the sexes to one another is not an expression of a “natural” order that cannot be changed.

Stages in the Discourse

The sociological debate on inequality between women and men and the category of “gender” began around the middle of the 1960s and is closely linked to the so-called second wave of the women’s movement emerging at that time in many Western countries. The studies, mainly compiled by female academics, first concentrated on unmasking science as “male oriented” and criticizing the lack of awareness of women’s lives and active dealings in research and teaching. A close connection between the women’s movement and feminist criticism in science was established, and it resulted in criticism of the discrimination against women in academia and society and of the one-sidedness of research that was mainly conducted by men and that often treated women as objects.

Feminist criticism of science highlighted the facts that cultural, political, and socially dominant gender images influenced the scientific theories of the time. Based on this, the much lauded scientific objectivity was often distorted by a male point of view. The primary aim in women’s studies was, therefore, to make the ignored contributions of women in academia visible by coming to terms with and analyzing the social setting of the time and women’s thoughts and actions. In doing so, women’s studies were viewed at first as biased research that placed the focus on women and on the changes in their life situations.

This view was gradually broadened, however, and increasingly women’s thinking and actions were analyzed in relation to men’s with the intention of identifying differences and hierarchies. It was in this context that the discussion began about what sex and gender really mean. In gender and women’s studies, gender is no longer treated as something natural but as a social or structural category with subsequent social roles. People are assigned or denied specific characteristics, attributes, and places in society on the basis of their sex. Sociological gender studies since the 1980s, therefore, speak of gender as a structural category. What is meant is that the separation and hierarchization of social spheres such as reproduction and production, and, consequently, the public and private realms are significant characteristics of modern, industrial societies. This separation and hierarchization are accompanied by an engendering of different spheres and social subdisciplines. Gender is regarded as a binary hierarchy that co-organizes the different levels of social organizations. Although study on the discrimination against women is frequently the point of departure for research, gender research now also addresses the social organization of gender relationships more broadly.

Based on the recognition that gender is a part and a result of a construction process in which “he” and “she” as individuals are involved, a sociological shift has occurred: Gender is no longer viewed as a structural category but also as a process category. Candace West and Don Zimmerman’s concept of “doing gender,” which was developed in 1987, differentiates itself from the current sex/gender distinction and the nature/culture concept transported with it. Doing gender understands gender attribution and gender identity as a continuous production process that is taking place in all human activities. This ensures that the gender discrepancy is generated by people continuously making themselves—and allowing themselves to be turned into—women and men in their everyday lives. It is a collective and individual process of construction through which, depending on the context and the situation, dual-gender classification is strategically implemented in practical social actions.

Similarly, a critical “men’s studies” category is emerging that focuses on male disciplinary and normalization processes and calls into question the norms and realities of “hegemonic maleness.” A central understanding within men’s studies is the recognition that hegemonic maleness is responsible not only for the dominance of men over women but also for hierarchies among men. Beyond this, research on maleness has emphasized the fact that men are also subjected to one-dimensional gender assignations that are formative and do not at all represent the “general human being.” An important difference from women’s studies continues to be that the experience of injustice and discrimination has not formed the basis of research and the relationship between research and practice in the context of a “political” or partisan intervention—as was central in the early days of women’s studies—has therefore had very little significance.
Gender studies further broadened in scope in the 1990s. The category of gender, which had until then been viewed as a “natural” classification, even if culturally and socially formed, was questioned. *Gender Trouble*, a book by the American philosopher Judith Butler published in 1990, evoked a comprehensive discussion on the identity-giving category of “woman.” What had widely served as an unquestionable basic assumption in women’s studies—the natural existence of two exclusive genders—increasingly became an object of academic examination. The binary distinction between two—and only two—genders is now frequently understood as an ideological construct of a discursive power system. Gender affiliation of persons and the two-sex model as a social classification and functional differentiation principle do not refer to the law of nature but are the result of social constructive processes.

This construction of gender cannot, however, be viewed as a neutral form of determination; rather, it is already part of the social determination of gender relations and therein also of the social inequality between men and women. The factitiousness of gender not only affects gender, however, but also applies to the biological category of sex. As the latter is also not free of a sociocultural construct, the “prediscursivity” of sex and the norms and regulations tied to biological sex must be debated.

Gay theory also focused the spotlight on the connection between gender and heteronormativity, or the social norm of heterosexuality. Academic studies continue to take up heterosexuality as a power configuration, which gender studies has barely researched and has not acknowledged as hetero-normatively composed. Normative reference points in women’s and gender studies are put up for discussion with the transformation and broadening of knowledge on the category of gender as a binary construct.

In the beginning, gender studies were oriented—as was the women’s movement—toward the issue of how equality between women and men could be attained in all areas and which barriers are an obstacle to this goal at the political, legal, symbolic, and other levels. At a practical political level, equality was seen as nondiscriminatory, but this view raised the issue that equality leads to a cementing or even strengthening of inequality according to the different points of departure and socially created differences. In addition, there was a criticism that the concept of equality was targeted toward aligning the position of women—their social and individual possibilities—with those of men. The measure of equality is thus “the man” and the options, values, and concepts of work, life, and politics ascribed to him.

As a patriarchal devaluation of the female is latently connected to this view of equality, the difference perspective articulated the suggestion that women should be treated differently from men. Connected to this is the challenge to go beyond stereotypical attributions to reflect on the ways in which women are different or unique. Furthermore, the characteristics, lifestyles, and so on of women should not be viewed as deficient but as parts of one and the same concrete whole. Associated with this, however, is a fear of a codification of typical female characteristics and gender roles that tend to become gridlocked. The discussion on equality or difference has become a never-ending story; nonetheless, it is clear that the deconstruction of gender has led to a shift from the selection of one of these two positions to a concern with analyzing the connections between equality and difference. For some years now, the perspective has broadened, and in addition to the gender imbalance, differences among women are also increasingly being taken into consideration—especially class-specific or ethnic differences that resulted from American theory-building discourses and Black feminism, as well as the debate surrounding women (co)perpetrators during National Socialism.

As all individuals not only belong to a group but always belong to multiple groups at the same time, how the category of gender interacts with other categories of inequality is analyzed below. Both legally and politically, this is codified in the concept of multiple discrimination. At a theoretical level, gender studies subsume this phenomenon as a crossing over between different categories of inequality under the term of *intersectionality*, a term that the American legal specialist Kimberlé Crenshaw coined in 1987 in the context of Black feminism. The debate surrounding intersectionality and the interdependencies among race, class, and gender has so far been mainly theory driven and is only gradually being enhanced by empirical studies. In general, it is argued that the question of
whether sex or another category has a larger influence on discrimination, which has been raised in the discussion on gender as a “master category” from time to time, should remain open in the analysis.

**Gender in Political Science**

In comparison with other social science disciplines, political science was relatively late in focusing on gender as a category. In the beginning, solely the field of “women and politics” was the object of study. Within this context, the question of the political representation of women and how it was reflected in political issues was especially interesting. The feminist perspective first took up this analytical perspective and questioned the reasons behind the formal and informal exclusion of women from politics.

A reconceptualization and expansion of the research field to include “gender and politics,” however, was initiated relatively quickly. In this context, maleness/masculinity as a measure and norm is inscribed in all political processes in a more or less subtle manner. In most countries, a quantitative overrepresentation of men in politics exists that is oriented on the biological sex. Politics is not, however, male because almost all political decision-making bodies are dominated by men, but because male interests are systematically presented as hegemonic, representing and giving preferential treatment to interests that most closely correspond to the everyday lives of this social group. In addition, there is a substantive masculinity: as Joan Acker highlighted with the term *gendered organizations*, institutionalized male patterns are integral components of political organizations that influence political rules, values, norms, and structures.

Thus, gender-critical discourse within political science generally takes place at two levels. First, it occurs at the sociopolitical level and expounds on the limited number of women in the discipline. The underrepresentation of women results in the fact that women receive less attention as actors and, at the same time, the androcentric scholarly conception of women, sex, and sexuality is maintained. The other level focuses primarily on epistemological and conceptual questions and delivers a critical inspection of political science paradigms and terms at a theoretical analytical level with the goal of making the gender subtext visible. Based on this deconstruction of apparently gender-neutral normative premises, terms, and research interests in mainstream political science, the political was broadened and reformulated to include a gendered view. Part and parcel of this was a critical revision of its core areas and subdisciplines, among others the fundamentals of political scientific thinking. Among these, especially, are the fundamental categories of the public sphere, privacy, and politics.

**The Public Versus the Private Sphere**

The central point of departure for a gender-critical political science is the challenge of the separation and polarization between the public political and the private nonpolitical spheres. Every debate concerning this distinction deals with the problem of participation at its very core or the possibilities and conditions of women’s presence in politics. In the history of political ideologies, “women, together with other groups such as slaves, servants (to which a large number of women belonged) and landless men, were described as incapable of leading a moral life or able to participate in the justice system” (Seyla Benhabib & Linda Nicholson, 1987, p. 514). The differences and inequalities between the genders were substantiated on four assumptions: First, the natural, anatomical, and physiological differences were used to justify inequality by claiming that the ability to give birth as well as other apparent characteristics of women were decisive criteria for participating in political life. Second, it was assumed that men are both physically and intellectually superior to women, which brought with it a hierarchy of naturalized differences that was also reflected in the significance of the spheres. Third, the so-called female sphere is irrelevant for political life. This is accompanied by the fourth point—the assumption that the domestic sphere, although it takes place outside the political arena, is nonetheless controlled by politics and is inferior to it (Benhabib & Nicholson, 1987, p. 515). In sum, this means that male reason and rational conduct are attributed to the public sphere, while the private sphere is seen as being characterized by irrational, unpredictable patterns.

Criticism is targeted at the double separation of the public and the private, which has traditionally
influenced theory formation in political science. By distinguishing state and (private) economy on the one hand, and economy and (private) households on the other, gender inequalities are left out of sight in many respects. The gender-specific division of labor that is constitutive for the (private) economy (paid/unpaid) eludes state and political regulation, such as gender-hierarchical appraisal of labor (well paid/badly paid), which essentially represents a continuation of this labor division in a semipublic space in its differentiation between women’s and men’s activities. The entire vocabulary used in political science is built on this dichotomy. Feminist welfare state research especially points to the fact that gender-specific labor division is not only a constitutive element of the (welfare) state—as Carole Pateman (1988) showed with the “sexual contract” approach—but that politics is also gendered and supports gendered processes: “In a society in which there is a gendered division of labour there is almost no area of policy in which women and men are not differently affected” (Joni Lovenduski, 1992, p. 610). The discourse on the separation of public and private highlights the fact that a close connection exists between the two spheres, and that, at the same time, these are placed in a hierarchy (e.g., important–unimportant, inclusion–exclusion) that is constructed and has an ideological basis.

Broadening of the Definition of Politics

The division between the public and the private sphere has also become engrained in the field of politics and the political. The classic definition of politics views politics (politikos) as the administration of the affairs of the polis, the community. In contrast, the areas of housework, household administration, the house (oikos), and the family, or in other words those areas in which women were traditionally active, were not seen as political. Even if this classic political understanding in political science does not dominate (anymore), and many different political definitions exist, the political is commonly positioned in the public sphere. Feminist political science, therefore, calls for a widening of a public and institutionalized definition of politics that only sees gender relationships and gender relations as un- or prepolitical but not as a political expression or object.

The American political scientist and philosopher Nancy Fraser, for example, distinguishes between an official political and a discursive political definition. The former views a matter as political if it is represented in official government institutions or, in other words, in parliaments, administrations, and other bodies. As Fraser (1989) notes, “the discursive political definition comprises everything that is disputed beyond a range of different discursive arenas and among a range of different discourse publics” (p. 166). Between the political definitions is a close connection, as an issue usually only turns into an object of legitimate state intervention once it has been discussed among the broader public. The border between both attributions is not defined but is an object of conflict and changes within social discourses.

The expansion of political contents and spaces is accompanied by criticism against forms, norms, processes, and practices linked to a governmental political definition. This would lead to the fact that women not only as a group of people but also concerning women’s interests (even if these are not necessarily homogeneous interests) would insufficiently be represented or not be represented at all.

A further important aspect in the discourse surrounding the definition of politics concerns the question of how gender relations and gender relationships can be viewed as political objects. When politics govern social relationships, they also embody identities and interests and the relationships between men and women, as well as between different groups of women or men. If this understanding is pursued, the field of activity of political science is broadened to include a debate and analysis of politics as the regulation of bipolar hierarchical gender relationships. Birgit Sauer (2005) outlines the meaning of gender categories for political science as follows:

As a structural category in politics and political science, gender is constituted at the subjective individual and objective levels—a culturally formed, socially shaped relationship that is loaded with purpose and meaning, that possesses structural and institution-building potency. (p. 381)

Gender is to be understood as a structural and structuring category. This means that gender, on the one hand, is a political institution and that, on
the other hand, institutions “have” a gender and reproduce genders. The following five levels are relevant to the analysis of gender in political science: first, the level of political cultures and symbols; second, the level of state organizations and rules (polity); third, the policy level; fourth, the level of political processes and their actors (politics); and fifth, the level of political subjects.

**Status Quo**

Nowadays, a gendered view of the discipline can be found in nearly all areas of the field, such as international relations, political theory, political systems, or policy research. Similar to this profiling, a partial institutionalization of feminist or gendered political science as an area of research and as a teaching subject has taken place. Nevertheless, a problem that Virgina Sapiro (1995) identified almost 15 years ago continues to be true:

> Despite the size of the gender politics community, and despite the fact that most political science departments now offer at least one course in this area, gender politics has not been fully integrated into political science; its theories, questions, and conclusions have not been “mainstreamed” to any significant degree. (p. 292)

This means that gender relations beyond the feminist and gender-oriented branch of the discipline are not, or are barely, conceptualized as social relations that structure politics.

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**See also** Feminism; Feminist Movements; Feminist Theory in International Relations

**Further Readings**


**GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES**

See Weighted Least Squares

**GENOCIDE**

While the term *genocide* is new, the phenomenon is old. Genocide has a long history, going back to at least the 12th century BCE and continuing into the present. The 20th century can be considered an “age of genocide,” with numerous examples of genocide throughout the period claiming as many as 70 million lives (some scholars would say many more than that). After the Holocaust, the watchword was “Never again,” yet since 1945 the lives claimed by genocide exceed those killed in international and civil wars combined. But with so many genocides, different situations, motives, and victim groups, it has been difficult to define *genocide* in ways that everyone would accept. Moreover, the term is widely used in a rhetorical fashion to attract attention and to further political and social demands.

Nevertheless, the definition of genocide that is contained in the United Nations (UN) Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, though widely criticized, is the one that prevails among scholars. To complicate matters further, the concept of genocide could be described, following Ludwig Wittgenstein, as a concept with “blurred edges.” Here, the family resemblances and differences between genocide and other concepts, such as ethnic cleansing, must be taken into account. There is still a core meaning: Genocide consists of acts that intentionally threaten the existence of human groups. Yet this statement itself is incomplete: What acts? What level of threat? What is a group? Who defines it? And how is intentionality determined?

Before the term genocide existed, mass killings were referred to as massacres, race extermination, and so on. Perpetrators had very different terms: victory, self-defense, purification of society. It was not until 1944 that the term genocide was created by the Polish Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin in his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. The term was based on the Greek genos (race, group) with the Latin cide (killing). Lemkin used the term to describe not so much the destruction of individuals but “the destruction of a nation or ethnic group.” Political and social groups, such as classes, were not included in his definition and nor was the partial destruction of a group. He stated, “Genocide is a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups completely” (p. 79). For him, the core of the crime was the destruction of groups, not individuals; he believed that groups were the bearers of civilization and culture, of identity, of diversity, and thus in special need of protection. Pieter Drost (1959) countered with a definition that focused not on the destruction of groups but of individuals: “Genocide is the deliberate destruction of physical life of individual human beings by reason of their membership of any human collectivity as such” (p. 125).

Lemkin pressed the UN to declare genocide a crime against international law. From 1946 to 1948, the UN debated the wording of what would become, by unanimous vote in December 1948, the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. With sufficient ratifications by member states, the Convention entered into force in early 1951. But despite the occurrence of numerous examples of genocide in the years following, not a single case of genocide was tried under international law until the opening years of the 21st century. The International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have now both charged and convicted several individuals for genocide. One problem with this, however, is that a vast, state-organized process, with deep societal involvement, is treated as if it were simply a trial for murder.

The Convention makes genocide and related crimes, such as incitement to genocide, crimes under international law, “whether committed in time of peace or in time of war.” But the heart of the Convention is found in Article II, where the crime of genocide is defined and where many of the problems with the concept lie:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Many important issues arise from this conception of genocide. First, not all groups are protected; political and social groups, such as classes, lie outside the boundaries of the definition. The reasons for this are that (a) only groups would be covered that were “stable and permanent” and (b) many countries wanted to keep open their right to suppress by violence any political or social challenge to the authority of the ruling power. Second, not only must there be intent to destroy a group, but there must also be “specific intent,” that is, the intent to destroy the group must be because of its particular characteristics (national, ethnical, racial, or religious). Destroying such a group for, say, economic reasons, would not count as genocide. Third, the question of destroying a group “in part” has raised issues about how large a part and
whether it is a matter of numbers or a percentage of the overall group that counts. In general, these issues have now been dealt with by saying a “substantial part,” leaving it to courts to decide just where to draw the boundaries. Some legal scholars, however, would add that “in part” could mean a “significant part,” in some functional sense—for example, culling the leadership elements of the group.

A fourth issue concerns the problem of what constitutes a group. For example, the Tutsis in Rwanda were neither a national nor an ethnic group, but they were perceived by their killers to be members of a group. In the UN Rwandan tribunal, the court decided that groups and membership in them are defined by the perceptions of the perpetrator. Finally, the acts that are listed as constituting genocide are physical, biological, and cultural may not matter, but of the five acts, any one of which constitutes genocide, only one of them actually involves killing, though all aim at the destruction of the group. The UN definition focuses on intent, not on results. That genocide could occur with few or even no deaths is a surprising conceptual outcome of the UN’s approach and contrary to both scholarly analysis and public understanding of what is meant by genocide.

There are other concepts that bear a family resemblance to genocide but also can be distinguished from it—for example, war. Many genocides occur within the context of war, but apart from ancient warfare, which was synonymous with genocide, war traditionally was a battle between armed combatants not between perpetrators and largely unarmed civilians. In the 20th century, war has often been total war, and waged against civilians as well as soldiers, but not with the idea of eliminating the “enemy” as a group. Genocide, on the other hand, is a species of total war: It is aimed at a particular group, most of whom are unarmed, and the intent is not the subduing of the group but its elimination, if not in whole, in substantial part.

Massacre also can be part of how genocide is carried out, but more often it is geared toward revenge or repression, not annihilation. It tends also to be episodic and isolated rather than sustained and pervasive as in genocide.

The term ethnic cleansing, on the other hand, has gained so much traction since the war and genocide within Bosnia that it has almost displaced the idea of genocide or, alternatively, is treated as another term for genocide. In practice, ethnic cleansing is often part of the genocidal process; the term is also a euphemism used by the perpetrator to disguise what is actually taking place. But in theory, ethnic cleansing means using violence, rape, terror, and forced deportation to drive out or remove a particular group from a common territory. The emphasis is on creating a homogeneous society through fear and expulsion, not as in genocide on annihilating the group.

There are legal and institutional developments that also relate to the status of genocide within international law. In 1998, the Statute of Rome created an International Criminal Court, with the following crimes within its jurisdiction: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. The very term crimes against humanity arose out of the Young Turk genocide of the Armenians, when the Allies in May 1915 warned the Ottoman rulers that they would be held accountable and tried for “crimes against humanity and civilization.” In the statute, “crime against humanity” is defined in terms of a number of particular acts, including murder, extermination, and deportation or forcible transfer of population but more widely, torture, apartheid, and “other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” Any of these acts “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population” constitutes a crime against humanity. The key category here is “civilian population,” not particular groups as indicated in the Genocide Convention; and the question of intent is different from that required under the Convention: Here, no specific intent is required.

Though one can differentiate “genocide” and “crimes against humanity” in important respects, the two concepts overlap in many ways. But it is much easier to prosecute actions as crimes against humanity than as genocide; the former also have a wider reach, not being restricted to crimes against particular groups named in the Convention. Some international legal scholars suggest that with the increased emphasis on crimes against humanity, the international community could dispense with the Genocide Convention. Prosecution of crimes
against humanity would thus provide alternatives to the conceptual confusions and limitations of the Convention.

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See also International Law; Violence; War and Peace

Further Readings

GEOPOLITICS

Geopolitics denotes, generically, strategic power struggles among states over the political control of territories and resources. More specifically, it suggests that politics is primarily defined by geographical location, territorial expansion, and interstate competition over finite spaces. The late-19th-century interimperial rivalries provided the historical context for the rise of geopolitical thought across the core countries of the imperial zone, rearticulating the relation between economic expansion and territorial control. The final division of the last extra-European vacant spaces generated an acute awareness of the closure of absolute space in a new “planetary” age. Inter-imperial relations came to be regarded as intensified zero-sum conflicts over the redivision of an occupied planet. This closed spatial horizon prompted a reconceptualization of the state as a territorial phenomenon in space, locked into a permanent struggle for survival. The revalorization and politicization of geography and its absorption into a reconceptualized science of politics forged the new field of political geography—geopolitics’ direct precursor. Today, particularly with increasing globalization, geopolitics is more and more challenged and questioned: Territory has lost its classical relevance, as transnational relationships imply a new vision of the global world, which is less compatible with geopolitics. Critical geography points out the ideological and political background of geopolitics.

The concept of geopolitics was invented by the Swedish political scientist Johan Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922) and developed in The State as an Organism (1917)—a critique of the prevailing legal positivism in constitutional and international law. The radicalization of political geography into Geopolitik as a specifically German theory of international politics was prosecuted—most notably by Karl Haushofer (1869–1946) and his school and, from a different angle, by Carl Schmitt (1888–1985)—during the revisionist conflicts over the Versailles Settlement in Weimar Germany. Geopolitics had a lasting, though not exclusive, impact on Nazi foreign policy. Intellectually, it positioned itself as a counternarrative against Marxist theories of imperialism (Rosa Luxemburg, Nikolai Bukharin, Vladimir Lenin) and against the Wilsonian liberal internationalism, represented by Isaiah Bowman (1878–1950). Basic elements of geopolitical thought infused, if in a semantically altered and politically sanitized form, the American Cold War discourse of neorealism in a new binary world-political geography. The proliferating but often indiscriminate contemporary invocations of the term geopolitics reflected the shifting post–Cold War strategic geography—globalization,
multipolarity, hegemony, unipolarity, empire—and a renewed urgency of resource politics in times of natural resource depletion and environmental degradation. Simultaneously, the new approaches of critical and Marxist geopolitics sought to recover, respectively, the cartographic discourses that shape the construction of geopolitics and the efficacy of geopolitical conflicts that mediate European and worldwide socioeconomic and political developments.

Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), a professor of political geography and the cofounder of the Alldeutscher Verband (Pan-German League), was cross-nationally the most influential figure in the development of the geopolitical tradition. Applying ideas from biology, evolutionism, and human geography, he contended that state behavior—the expansion and contraction of states in space—is primarily determined by geographical properties and geostrategic location. Space, as a political category, is no longer conceived as a geometric, neutral, and empty expanse (the absolute space of nonhuman geography) but as a concretely ordered and constructed territory (the historical-relational space of political geography). Fusing an organic-biological conception of the state with principles of Darwinian natural selection in interstate relations, Ratzel claimed that states come to life, grow, and die in the struggle for space. Borders are temporary phenomena in a pulsating geopolitical environment. Preoccupied by the quest for a “scientific” legitimation of Wilhelmine Germany’s expansionist policies, his Politische Geographie (1897) suggested that states enjoy a natural right to an adequate Lebensraum (living space) grounded in variations between soil fertility and population growth. Population “density pressures,” established by a calculus between state territory and demography, are formalized in the “laws of the spatial growth of states.” Differences arise in the prewar era between ethnocentric and geopolitical conceptions of states and the goals and limits of their foreign policies. While the ethnocentric notion defines nations as cultural-linguistic units (Volksnation), leading to a self-limiting territorial correspondence between a nation’s area of settlement and the scale of state territory, the latter conception (Staatsnation) prioritizes territorial aggrandizement over ethnic-racial homogeneity, although it may also involve an active policy of ethnic settlement (Germanicization). Volksnation and Staatsnation are not synonymous and constitute rival points of reference. This tension between “race” and “space” resurfaced later in differences between the original program of German geopolitics and Adolf Hitler’s racial ideology.

Contemporaneously, Alfred T. Mahan’s (1840–1914) anti-isolationist navalism and Halford Mackinder’s (1861–1947) heartland theory formed the core of political geography in the United States and Britain. Admiral Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660–1783 (1890) identified the fleet-based domination of seaborne commerce as the decisive factor in world politics, exemplified by Britain’s early modern oceanic hegemony. In an age of pre-aerial warfare and limited mechanization of terrestrial military technology, a major battle fleet secures a mutually reinforcing and self-sustaining relation between naval domination and commercial supremacy—the geostrategic axis of history. Mackinder drew the opposite conclusion in his lecture The Geographical Pivot of History (1904). Naval power, after unifying the world into a closed political system during the Columbian age (1500–1900), was superseded during the post-Columbian age by land power. According to Mackinder’s trizonal global geography, a geostrategically immune inner-Eurasian heartland—the pivot of history—is surrounded by an inner crescent (the European periphery, Near/Middle East, India, China), enclosed, in turn, by an outer crescent (England, the Americas, Africa, Australia, Oceania, Japan). The contemporary global balance between land and sea power was decisively altered by the infrastructural penetration of the pivot area (Central Asia, Russia) through the construction of transcontinental railway networks. The future belonged to a German–Russian alliance, strategically invulnerable in its territorial heartland against sea power. Only a grand coalition of sea powers could prevent Eurasian world domination. Both conceptions had to be situated in the transition from cosmopolitan free trade imperialism to protectionist neomercantilism.

During the passage from the 19th-century European pentarchy to the new constellation of world politics, flanked by the rise of the United States and the former USSR, political geography turned into German geopolitics. Kjellén’s antilegalistic The State as an Organism contrasted the
norm-oriented concept of the state as a legal subject, most notably represented in Weimar Germany by Hans Kelsen, with an “empirical viewpoint” of the state as a geographic organism commanding space. Foreign policy was elevated to an existential condition. Geopolitics was redefined as an auxiliary science of statecraft in the international struggle for survival. Ratzel’s and Kjellén’s thoughts received a wide and enthusiastic reception in Weimar Germany during the revanchist intellectual struggles against the Versailles Diktat and as a key legitimation for national-socialist Großraumpolitik. The rise of the geopolitical tradition in the 1920s was marked by the foundation of the Institute of Geopolitics in Munich (1922), the Geopolitische Seminar at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (1924) in Berlin, and the launch of the high-circulation Journal of Geopolitics (1924). Haushofer, who was professor of geography at the University of Munich (1919–1939), director of the Institute of Geopolitics, president of the German Academy (1934–1945), and a close confidant of Rudolf Hess, emerged as the most influential figure in the German discourse. Its intellectual core was premised on

1. an organic-biological conception of the state and a Darwinian view of interstate rivalry;

2. a critique of Western, liberal, and “mechanistic” conceptions of state and society, contrasted with the völkisch “ideas of 1914” that recast states as expressions of culturally defined and homogeneous peoples, organically rooted in specific territories;

3. a revaluation of agriculture, mystified as “chthonic” and “organic,” coupled with a neo-Malthusian understanding of population growth, leading to demands of an autarchic Lebensraum;

4. the rejection of international law (League of Nations) and its replacement by a new Großraumordnung (Grand Spatial Order);

5. a geostrategic determinism premised on the dualism between land power and sea power, informing the programmatic policy prescriptions for a Eurasian power bloc under German leadership;

6. the promotion of geography as the key science of statecraft and the dissemination of “suggestive cartography” for the collective preparation of the nation in its struggle for survival; and

7. the combination and political radicalization of these elements in Anglophobia and anti-Semitism.

Geopolitics matured from 1933 onward into the official German science of the state. Scientific pretense and normative orientation blended into a highly politicized literature. Attacking the “liberal” system of European Kleinstaaten (ministates), the juridicization of international politics and the fixing of borders, the geopoliticians invoked during the 1930s the “law of growing spaces.” Buoyed by the first Nazi foreign policy successes, the new spatial order envisaged no longer sovereign nation-states as the units of the international system—the defunct Westphalian System—but a plurality of Großräume (Pan-regions). Schmitt, although institutionally unconnected to the geopolitical school, emerged as the sharpest critic of the League of Nations project and advocate of a new Nomos of the Earth (1950). He argued that all conceptions of international law are ultimately grounded in metajuridical foundations—the power projections and land appropriations that underlie state formations and expansion, exemplified in relation to the Spanish and English conquests of the Americas. Anglo-American international law was based on a structural correspondence tying the postwar promotion of liberal-constitutional Kleinstaaten on the European continent and beyond to their capitalist penetration by private economic forces and integration into the world market. Their incorporation into the League obliterated their political essence—the right to define an enemy and to wage war—due to the turn toward a discriminatory concept of war. The apolitical “spaceless universalism” of universal law—the flattening of differentially organized polities and their submission to common legal principles—sanctioned a constitutive dualism between the proliferation of liberal-constitutional states and the expansion of a borderless private world market. This strategy represented a concrete political project of global domination—the rationalization of global space driven by a nonterritorial capitalist imperialism for American Lebensraum.
The architect behind this project was Bowman, director of the American Geographical Society (1915–1935), key adviser to Woodrow Wilson at Versailles and, later, to Franklin D. Roosevelt. Wilson’s moralistic liberal internationalism was commensurate with the American national interest in an attempt to move international order “beyond geography.” Simultaneously, Schmitt contended that U.S. hemispheric policy toward the Pacific, Middle, and South America (Monroe Doctrine, 1823) and the British Empire constituted legal precedents for his multi-Großräume vision. The Monroe Doctrine manifested Anglo-American double standards in international law and politics. Against this background, Schmitt set out the historico-legal argument for the pluralization and regionalization of diverse, coexisting, and mutually exclusive legal spheres. Großraumwirtschaft (Grand Economic Order) and Großraum—not a biological, but a political-juridical category—merged into a supranational hegemonic order in Central and Eastern Europe under German leadership, located between the Soviet bloc and the Western powers’ spheres of interest. Schmitt remained vague on the inner structure of Pan-regions and silent on inter-Großraum relations, excepting the principle of nonintervention for foreign powers. Similarly, Haushofer pleaded with reference to Mackinder’s heartland theory for the construction of a continental bloc, comprising Germany, the former USSR, and Japan. This conception informed the German-Japanese Anticomintern Pact (1936), the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (1939), and the division of Poland. The contradiction between Haushofer’s anti-Bolshevism and his demands for an Eurasian bloc remains irresolvable. During the late 1930s, the term geopolitics became recharged with völkisch terms and was finally subordinated to racial policies.

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See also Anarchy; Balance of Power; Biology and Politics; Capitalism; Fascism; Imperialism; International Law; International Relations, Theory; International System; Marxism; Power and International Politics; Realism in International Relations; Sovereignty; State; Territory; War and Peace; Westphalian Ideal State

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Globalization

Globalization refers to the integration of separate nations, regions, or even individuals into a wider global system. It is characterized by increasing the linkages and connections between peoples and countries and by the growing knowledge of these interactions. This integration process can affect the economy, polity, society, or culture; that is, the definition of the process is very general and can refer to economic, political, social, or cultural integration. The question of who is being integrated is also left open, although in political science it is mostly the countries themselves that are at issue. The way in which such integration operates is also variable. The most common form of globalization in the literature involves the economic integration of national economies into a wider global one, usually through international trade, capital flows, labor movements, and global production networks. For some authors, this means the integration of countries into a global capitalist system—that is, one based on private property, limited government intervention, and the use of markets to allocate economic value. Some term this neoliberal globalization. Capitalism, international capitalist groups, and neoliberal practices all spread throughout the world as globalization proceeds. Whether this is good or bad for countries and individuals greatly depends on a scholar’s perspective. Some associate globalization with the homogenization of distinct
Globalization

groups; one example is the loss of many local languages and the increasing diffusion of the use of English. Others associate it with the domination of American (or Anglo-American) values, beliefs, and practices. The global turn to liberal democracy is often cited as an example. Globalization is not complete at this point. Countries have different levels of integration into the world system. The extent to which a truly global system—whether economic, political, or social—exists is a point of debate. The causes and consequences of globalization are also debated.

Globalization has both secular and cyclical aspects. For some, the roots of globalization are in technological changes, such as the lowering of the costs of communications and transportation, which make the movement of people, ideas, goods, services, and capital faster and less costly. These changes are irreversible and often increase over time. While countries and their governments may try to put up barriers against such changes, it is very difficult for them to successfully fend off the pressures of globalization. In this view, globalization has been increasing steadily over time as technological change makes the world ever smaller. Sometimes technological change is treated as exogenous—that is, it has sources other than countries’ policies or global integration. Other times, globalization itself, especially via trade of capital flows, is seen as having an impact on technology; it usually is conceived of as helping induce innovation and speeding its transfer around the world. Globalization and technological change may then go hand in hand, each encouraging the other.

On the other hand, globalization has been viewed as cyclical; high levels of global integration have been associated with two distinct periods in recent history. In the mid- to late 19th century, a global economy emerged as the European powers, especially the British, forged an open economy using both military power and economic policy. The development of colonies around the globe and the extension of European trade, capital, values, and political power undergirded this period of globalization. In the late 19th century, the world economy attained levels of openness that had never been seen before. In some areas such as the movement of labor, such levels of integration have never been achieved since. This open economy collapsed in the early 20th century with the two World Wars and the Great Depression. From 1914 to 1945, globalization was in retreat. Protectionism became the dominant trade policy for many countries; trade and currency blocs formed regionally, often around one powerful country, and military conflict was prevalent. Nationalism, isolationism, and regionalism marked this 30-year period. Globalization thus declined during this period.

However, after 1945 the United States picked up the mantle from the British and began to forge a world economy through the creation of international institutions, an open economic policy, and an internationalist foreign policy. The global system, however, was divided into at least two blocs with the United States on one side and the former Soviet Union on the other; hence, globalization would always be limited in this Cold War system. The United States pressed ahead with the organization of an open, capitalist economy guided by principles embodied in various international institutions. It worked to encourage democratization in certain regions and then to include democracies in this integration process. The creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the subsequent development of the European Community started a process of trade liberalization among developed countries. The Bretton Woods monetary system supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank helped countries establish currency convertibility and a fairly stable world monetary system based on the dollar. This stability provided the conditions for the development of private international capital markets, and over time these markets have come to dwarf those for goods and services. The removal of capital controls from many advanced economies in the 1970s and 1980s, after the termination of the Bretton Woods fixed-exchange rate system, opened these economies even more to global markets. While labor flows never became as free from government intervention as those of capital and goods, largely because of immigration restrictions in the developed world, there was some return to the greater mobility of labor that had prevailed in the late-19th-century period of high globalization. The extension of the European Union (EU) to new sets of countries and new issues also characterized this integration movement. By the 1980s, most of the advanced industrial world, except the former Soviet Union and its satellites, had joined the
world capitalist economy. Globalization was only partial in this period.

From the 1980s onward, the rest of the world’s countries began opening their markets and borders even more and joining the world economy. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, and the economic reform movement in China all added impetus to the globalization process, as the former communist countries and China all began to integrate their economies into the global capitalist one. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the world’s developing countries began joining this world economy and its international institutions in large numbers. Most countries in the world now belong to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the IMF, and the World Bank. Democracy was also spreading throughout much of the world at this time. Countries also increasingly chose to join a wide variety of international organizations and treaty systems. Conventions on labor standards, human rights, environmental issues, and other areas became widely adopted by countries around the world. By 2009, most of the world’s countries had become part of a global system that had become increasingly organized around a series of common principles and values governing numerous issues. Economic shocks, such as the 1998 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 financial crisis begun in the United States, spread across the globe rapidly. The second period of globalization had arrived. A major issue is to what extent globalization was purposefully constructed, rather than unintentionally realized. Whether globalization is reversible or not is also at issue.

Globalization has been studied from two general perspectives. On the one hand, the causes of globalization have attracted much attention. Why has there been a movement toward increasing contact and interaction between states and peoples all over the globe? Why has this occurred more at certain times than others? Why have some regions or peoples been more involved in this process than others? Why have certain aspects of globalization such as international trade moved faster than others? Many questions have been raised about globalization as an outcome that in itself needs explanation. On the other hand, the impact of globalization has also received great attention. What effects does this process of increasing contact and interaction among states and peoples have on the economy, politics, society, and culture? Are these effects large or small? Negative or positive? Delineating the myriad effects that globalization might have and developing evidence for these has been central to the literature. Once we understand more about globalization, we can then address the question of how to manage the process and its effects.

The Causes of Globalization

A question of much import has been how globalization has developed, and why it has developed the way it has. If one adopts the secular view of globalization, then its advance can be explained by how fast technological change occurs and spreads. In periods where such change is very rapid and when the adoption of new ideas and techniques is quick, globalization will progress rapidly. Many seem to feel that this was the case in the mid- and late 19th century, when critical innovations such as steam power, railroads, and the telegraph changed political, social, and economic life around the globe. Spread in part by military competition and imperial control, these technologies helped integrate distant regions of the world. Technological change did not stop in the interwar period when globalization was in retreat; indeed, war tends to spur such innovation. But the spread of such technologies in this period was much more limited since many borders were closed and countries guarded their new secrets, which were often tied to war fighting. The development of nuclear weapons is a case in point. The period after World War II has again been viewed as one when rapid technological change was fostered by governments, when the spread of new processes and products was unhindered, and when the adoption of innovations at least in the noncommunist countries was embraced by states. Globalization thus sped up after 1950 because technological change accelerated.

It is important to note that technological change is not just about the economy; such changes have major ramifications for society, culture, and the polity. Electricity, the telephone (not to mention the mobile phone), radio, television, refrigerated shipping containers, automobiles, airplanes, and now the Internet—to name just a few of the major innovations of the last century and a half—have affected social, political, and cultural life in enormous ways. They have all contributed to globalization by
Globalization reducing the cost of transportation and communication among individuals across the globe. In this secular story of global integration, countries can try to impede innovation and slow its spread, but they cannot ultimately halt such change. To the extent that technology reduces transportation and communication costs, technological innovation provides an irrepressible force for globalization. The pace of globalization may be affected but not its forward movement.

In the cyclical view of globalization, other factors are often cited as being of great importance to the changes we see. One theory focuses attention on the salience of having one country lead the globalization process. Hegemonic stability theory (HST), developed in the 1970s and 1980s, argued that a single world leader was necessary for an open, stable world economy. Without such a leader, even technological change would not bring globalization. Two versions of this theory exist. In one, the hegemon, who has overwhelming capabilities in all areas relative to other countries, exercises a benign influence over the rest of the world by organizing and paying the costs for such openness and stability. It plays the role of leader and others benefit from its efforts. The United Kingdom (UK) and the United States are cited as two examples of this in the mid- to late 19th and mid- to late 20th centuries, respectively. The loss of British leadership capacity and the failure of the United States to exert leadership in the interwar period were seen as the leading causes of the closure and turmoil of that period. Without such benign leadership, the world would not be able to integrate and countries would remain in an isolationist stance trying to beggar their neighbors. The hegemon solves the problem of trust and competition for the smaller states and thus allows everyone to emerge better off through its provision of global public goods. It acts as lender of last resort and tries to provide an open market in difficult economic times. By creating international institutions to help countries in difficult times, the hegemon can also promote stability and bind itself to reassure other countries of its benign motives.

Globalization requires leadership from the world’s strongest power. Some note that perhaps a small group of powerful countries could provide this same leadership, but concerns about disagreement or buck passing within this group have shed doubt on this view.

In a second view, the role of the hegemon is not seen as selfless. Here the global leader seeks to maximize its own interests and uses its superior resources to bribe and coerce others into following it. British and American hegemony is seen as a coercive process by which the country imposes its will on others; the hegemon gains, while everyone else submits. In the British case, imperialism combined with open markets and the dominant role of the pound helped it induce others open their markets and join the international trading and financial system. Even international law as developed in this period served to enable globalization as the European powers used it to force open the colonies. British domination ran into increasing difficulty, however, as other countries grew and became competitors. Once Britain could no longer dictate the terms of engagement with the world economy, regional blocs developed around the strongest powers. Britain could no longer force countries, including the United States and Germany, to follow its preferred practices, such as joining the sterling system or opening their markets to international trade. The decline of British hegemony then ended the period of globalization as powerful rivals developed their own spheres of influence.

In the case of the United States, its dominance in all domains after World War II helped it establish a system of international governance that has maintained American hegemony for over 60 years. Unlike the British earlier, the Americans set up a series of international institutions to embed the U.S. global order. The GATT/WTO, IMF, World Bank, and regional development banks have, among others, been a means for the United States to exercise its domination without having to do so directly. These institutions have pushed countries to adopt capitalist practices, to open their markets to flows of goods, services, and capital, and to follow the so-called Washington Consensus in other economic matters. Allowing or encouraging countries to become indebted and then imposing conditions on them when they are unable to service their debts has allowed international institutions to open the developing world to the global economy. More recently, pressure for democratization has also come from these institutions. Thus, the American method for controlling the global system has differed from the British one, but it has also involved coercing others to join the global economy. The use
of soft power has been perhaps more evident in the case of the United States. But American military intervention around the world has been plentiful, and this view has served to enforce its global vision. In this view of coercive hegemony, first the UK and then the United States gained much from their exalted position at the center of the global system; ironically, however, in both cases their decline seems to be connected to their leadership role. This view of the malign hegemon is associated with both a realist and a Marxist approach to international relations. Substantial debate exists as to whether the coercive or benign view of hegemony is more evident. This debate includes controversy over the extent to which the countries other than the hegemon have been hurt or helped by this globalization process.

A more constructivist account of the globalization process would focus on the way ideas and norms about the global community and modernity shape state behavior. It would identify the dominant ideas of the past 60 years and how these have been legitimated and spread throughout the system. Beliefs in liberal democracy, human rights, capitalism, and neoliberalism, for instance, have diffused across the globe; these institutions and practices have become legitimated and viewed as the “modern” way to manage a country. Countries thus aspire to introduce and develop them in order to be a part of the global community. International institutions embody and diffuse these ideas, as do norm entrepreneurs from global civil society. The focal effect of these ideas, however, is to reduce diversity and contribute to homogenization. Scholars are often divided as to whether this normative globalization is beneficial or not. Clearly, the spread of some ideas (e.g., democracy and human rights) is seen in a more positive light than the spread of others by some scholars (e.g., capitalism and neoliberalism). There is also debate over how certain ideas come to be dominant. Is it through coercion or inducement by a powerful country, such as the United States, that others espouse these ideas? Is it more the zeitgeist of the time that makes certain ideas fit the situation better? Or is it the impact of international political entrepreneurs who give legitimacy and moral suasion to certain views, independent of countries?

Another reason given for the rise of globalization is much less intentional. The uncoordinated actions of countries over time have simply resulted in an increasingly open and interconnected system. No country desired such a result, but each one acting on its own best interests adopted policies that resulted in a globalized world. This view has support since the reasons for and sequencing of many countries’ decisions to globalize were nationally distinctive. The advanced industrial countries liberalized trade and then their capital markets back in the 1960s to 1980s. The EU was a major force for movement in this direction; however, European countries joined and expanded the Union for reasons other than globalization, such as domestic politics or international security. China then launched its economic reform program in the late 1970s and early 1980s for internal reasons, and political reforms have not been forthcoming. The former communist countries only moved toward a more open and capitalist economy after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the former Soviet Union in 1991, and for many of them, joining the EU had important domestic political and international security motivations. In the developing world, democratization often came before economic liberalization. Many poor countries did not liberalize economically until the late 1990s and later. Indeed, the most striking is the different paths that countries have taken since the 1970s. The manner in which and the degree to which countries are integrated into the world system are remarkably varied. While the overall trend has been toward greater contacts and openness, there has been substantial diversity in how states realized this. For instance, English is spoken much more in most countries today than 30 years ago, but the penetration of English varies greatly from country to country. In this view, this uncoordinated process has been driven by different causes in each country. Globalization has developed differently for each; and the fate of globalization lies with the (somewhat independent) decisions of countries. The reactions to the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 to 2009 underline this view since governments have failed to coordinate and have instead responded distinctly.

Consequences of Globalization

In addition to the debates over the causes of globalization, there is much debate about its consequences. There are at least three distinct views in
Globalization is alleged to have had a variety of effects on economic growth. Growing integration of national economies into a wider global one has usually been achieved through trade liberalization and the pursuit of foreign investment, and sometimes through capital market liberalization. The consequences of these policies for economic growth are still debated. Some research supports the idea that all of the policies increase growth; there is probably more evidence that trade and foreign investment support growth than does capital market liberalization. Research also shows evidence that countries that globalized in the past 30 years grew faster than those that did not. Many expected that the integration of developing countries into the world economy would promote economic convergence—that is, it would make the poorest countries grow faster and hence catch up over time with the richest. There is some evidence that this has occurred in parts of the world—mainly Asia—but not much support for it globally. The North–South divide does not seem to have closed much over the past few decades. In part, this is because the North has had faster growth rates than some developing countries. For a wide range of countries, however, globalization does not seem to have fostered faster growth. Scholars point out that for parts of Latin America and Africa growth rates were higher in the decades before the 1980s than after. The impact of trade on growth for many countries has also been ambiguous; some, especially in Asia, seem to have gained from it. But many others, in Latin America and Africa, for instance, do not. Foreign direct investment has tended to flow to the most rapidly developing economies and so it is associated with fast growth, but this may not be causal. Finally, there is much skepticism that capital market liberalization for developing countries is or has been good for economic growth. Some of the problems associated with globalization, such as inequality and volatility, seem to have affected its capacity to deliver growth.

Poverty and Inequality

A large debate centers on the impact of globalization on poverty and inequality. World Bank data suggest that from the early 1980s to roughly 2005, poverty declined globally. The number of extreme poor (those living on less than $1.25/day) decreased from 1.9 billion in 1981 to 1.4 billion in 2005, which is equivalent to a decrease from 50% of the developing countries’ population to 25% thereof (World Bank Annual Report 2009, p. 61). Also, for example, in the East Asia and Pacific regions, the percentage living on less than $2 a day fell from 69% in 1990 to 25% in 2007. Nevertheless, 2.5 billion people in the world still live on less than $2 a day (World Bank Annual Report 2008, pp. 14, 34).

Other measures of the quality of life in developing countries have also improved: Literacy rates, life expectancy, and infant mortality, for example, have ameliorated in most regions except where HIV/AIDS has struck hardest. Was this decline due to globalization? Some countries that have lowered trade barriers and promoted foreign investment, such as China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, have experienced significant declines in poverty in the past decades. However, even for these countries, it is not clear that within-country inequality has been reduced; the growing rural–urban divide in many developing countries suggests rising inequality. Many other countries have seen little change in
poverty levels, and inequality has either remained fairly constant or risen.

The World Bank associates greater globalization with increased growth, declining poverty, and falling inequality—especially globally. But other data call this optimistic scenario into question. A number of studies of trade have shown that its liberalization in developing countries does not reduce poverty or inequality. The so-called skill bias associated with trade and foreign investment today often means that more highly skilled workers gain more from international integration than do low-skilled ones, which tends to exacerbate the degree of within-country inequality. Interestingly, inequality seems to also have risen recently in the developed countries. This outcome was not unexpected. Standard models of trade suggest that in rich countries, high-skilled workers should gain the most from globalization and low-skilled ones should be the losers; this is the opposite of what should happen in the poor countries. This seems to have occurred in a number of developed countries, although it has probably been tempered by the redistributive effects of the welfare state. Inequality has thus risen in a number of developed countries.

The more surprising outcome has been that low-skilled workers in the developing world have not done better. While there are numerous reasons articulated for this result, it is a problem for poverty reduction and equity in the developing world, especially since these countries by and large do not have well-developed welfare states. The impact of financial crises and their diffusion in a global system are also concerns with regard to poverty and inequality. Some argue that such crises are more likely, more intense, and spread more broadly in a globalized world. Others point out that with an open economy domestic and international shocks may balance each other out and actually make the system more stable. There is little doubt, however, that these financial shocks can have negative consequences for countries. The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s and the recent global financial crisis have both increased poverty and inequality. This suggests that countries will have quite different experiences with globalization.

**Politics and Democratization**

Globalization has also been credited with having effects on politics. Some argue that it has helped spread democracy and put pressure on leaders to democratize. Democracy has certainly increased globally since the 1980s. But has this been due to globalization? Globalization through an open economy or through international pressure generated by international institutions or norm entrepreneurs may induce leaders to adopt more democratic forms of governance if they want to be members of the international system. Some argue the reverse: Democratization was necessary for the change in policies in many countries that led to greater globalization. The causal connection between democratization and globalization is much debated. There is also the difficult question of whether democracy and globalization are compatible. Political regimes practice democracy within their boundaries, and publics see their governments as responsible for the outcomes they experience. But in a globalized world both of these may be compromised. Democracy may have little meaning if the most important outcomes result from global forces and if governments can do little to affect these forces. The supposed democratic deficit in the EU is one manifestation of this problem. The growing number of international institutions may also be a related concern. Many of these institutions are established to facilitate international cooperation and prevent countries from pursuing beggar-thy-neighbor policies. But if they take decision-making power away from governments, they may undermine democracy at home and the public’s faith in it. Others have argued that democracy may be enhanced by such international institutions. The spread of democracy and this wave of globalization seem to have gone hand in hand; how countries react over time to a highly globalized world may or may not be propitious for democracy.

**Conflict**

Globalization may have an impact on conflict as well. The frequency of international wars has declined steadily since the World Wars, but civil wars had risen in frequency until recently. Some research suggests that aspects of globalization can reduce conflict, especially interstate war. Research
Globalization has shown that increased trade among countries, increased foreign investment, and trade agreements are all associated with less international conflict. The so-called international capitalist peace is one example of this argument. International institutions also seem to have a similar relationship: The more of them a country joins, the less likely it is to get into military conflicts. There do not seem to be similar connections for civil war. On the other side of the ledger, however, as countries trade and invest more with each other, they become more likely to have trade and investment disputes. Over time these can exacerbate, if not create, conflicts. Furthermore, as distant countries and peoples are brought into ever closer contact, the potential for misunderstandings and disputes rises as their different cultures, values, and beliefs clash; the so-called clash of civilizations is more likely in a highly interdependent world. As their interdependence increases, countries also become more vulnerable to the actions of other states. International economic ties have the potential to be used as political leverage. An interesting example is the case of China and the United States in the early 2000s. The growth of trade and investment ties between the two countries has resulted in very large and imbalanced flows of capital and trade from China to the United States; these economic linkages can serve as potential political levers for both sides. The relationship has become much more complex and fraught with political stress. Some think that these ties will dampen any propensity to engage militarily; others see them as potential sparks for a future conflict. Globalization may reduce tendencies toward conflict by making it more costly since countries will have to break their economic ties if they fight; or it may induce conflict as they have more and more linkages that can lead to disputes.

State Capacity to Govern and International Cooperation

Questions have arisen about the impact of globalization on state capacity. That is, does globalization weaken countries and erode their capacity to govern? States are often judged by their capacity to manage their economies, to respond to crises, and to provide public goods such as health care, national defense, and education. As they become increasingly intertwined in a global economy, states may lose the ability to manage their economies. The smaller the national economy relative to the world economy, the more likely is this outcome. Countries will experience the externalities of other countries’ policies but will often be unable to manage these negative consequences. Losing control over monetary policy, especially if a country opens its capital account and lets its currency float, is a well-known example of this. Tax competition among states in a globalized world is another concern, since taxes provide the resources for governments to provide public goods. The race-to-the-bottom phenomenon in general that is associated with globalization can signal a country’s increasing loss of control over its economy and perhaps its polity. As noted above, for democracies this loss of control can be especially worrisome as it may induce a loss of public faith in the government and in democracy overall.

On the other hand, international cooperation and international institutions may help states alleviate the problems associated with globalization. State behavior can create negative externalities for others even in a system that is not very globalized. But without globalization it may be very hard for states to cooperate to address these externalities. Globalization may awaken states to the need for organized cooperation. It may induce the creation of international institutions that help states deal with these externalities and thus provide greater political capacity than otherwise. One can think of the EU in this light. The states within the EU may now have greater capacity as a group to affect their economies than they did before joining the EU. Individually they might not be able to manage the pressures of globalization but with an institutionalized cooperative regime they may be much better able to do so. The recent interest of countries such as Iceland in joining the EU after the 2008 financial crisis suggests such an outcome. Globalization no doubt creates or exacerbates problems that do not respect national borders, but it may also contain pressures that allow countries to better respond to those problems.

Convergence Among States

Globalization has also been associated with policy and institutional convergence among states.
Some have suggested that as countries open their economies they become more likely to adopt similar policies and institutions. This convergence process can be driven by different pressures. Some attribute it to the power of the world’s hegemon; some, to the increased vulnerability of states to the pressures of international institutions; some, to increased competition among states; others, to a learning process undertaken by countries. Whatever the cause, this convergence seems to have occurred in economic policy and institutions. The widespread adoption of neoliberal policies, or the so-called Washington Consensus, has been notable since the late 1980s. Other examples are the decisions by many countries to create independent central banks and to allow their currencies to float. This process has been remarked in other areas, from the creation of bureaucracies to deal with science and technology issues to the turn to democracy itself. Globalization may narrow the choices that states have and pressure them to adopt similar institutional forms and practices. To the extent that these forms and practices result in better outcomes, this process may be welcomed. However, if they are not productive for states, then this convergence process may be a negative for governments everywhere.

When this convergence pressure extends to cultural and social life, it is often seen as a negative force. Losing the cultural and social diversity that are associated with distinct regions, ethnic groups, languages, and nations is an often remarked effect of globalization. The disappearance of many languages and the increasing use of English are two such examples. For some, this is a benefit since transaction costs are greatly reduced if all people speak the same language, and the dream of a common global language has a long history. The pressure on countries or peoples to curtail certain practices and rituals that are not considered “modern” or “civilized” is said to be growing as well. Debate rages over whether countries have the right to condone all types of practices within their borders or whether there exist certain minimal standards that all countries must follow. And the end of some practices, such as slavery, has been widely applauded. The decrease in both communication and transaction costs in a globalized world has obviously helped intensify such convergence. External pressures to conform to global norms may be stronger today than ever but such pressures have always existed. Today they are less likely to be imposed through the use of force or conquest but that does not mean these pressures are less powerful.

Scholars also worry that a global system is an increasingly interconnected one where problems in one country or region can spread more rapidly, forcefully, and widely than in a less interconnected environment. The increasing ease of transportation, for example, makes the spread of disease much faster and perhaps deadlier. The communications revolution does much the same for new ideas and fads. Information cascades are more likely in such systems. This means that instability may be greater as well. Small changes to the system radiate out in all directions and can lead to large consequences. There is a concern that crises are also more likely and more contagious in such a globalized world. The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s and the recent global financial crisis of 2008 to 2009 are two such examples. Some have argued that the world’s largest economies have experienced a “great moderation” since the 1970s with a dampening of business cycles and decreasing inflation due partially to greater international exposure. Others see an international economy beset by rising volatility over time, as crises multiply and spread. Globalization may stabilize a system by spreading problems out and bringing counterbalancing forces to bear, but it may also destabilize a system by creating a network of linkages among all countries and across all sectors that transmits and magnifies problems.

Domestic Economies

In addition to the question about which countries gain and lose from globalization, there is the issue of which groups gain and lose domestically. Many see globalization as strengthening the hand of capital owners and right-wing political parties as opposed to labor owners and left-wing parties. With a global economy where capital can move relatively freely, it becomes advantaged domestically. Globalization changes the domestic balance of power between business and labor. When owners of capital do not like a government policy or fear labor has become too strong, they can often move to a new political environment that is more
accommodating. This process can then generate race-to-the-bottom pressures as governments try to retain capital in their country by deregulating and adopting more business-friendly policies. Some claim that globalization has helped undermine labor unions and other forms of labor market organization. This process can then influence the political system. If right-wing parties represent business interests more, they may be strengthened by globalization. Left-wing parties and their programs may seem increasingly unattractive as they “scare” capital away and perhaps slow down growth. Evidence for this effect is mixed. Some claim that left-wing parties and governments actually do a better job wooing capital and thus are not disadvantaged by globalization; they may even make better partners for international business than right-wing parties. Some scholars see no effect of globalization on domestic politics; they claim that domestic political institutions filter and shape such external pressures so that their ultimate effects are a function of domestic politics. Preexisting domestic institutions and practices then govern whether and how globalization affects internal politics. The impact of globalization on political power within and between countries is a topic of debate and great importance for future research.

**Limits of Current Research**

The consequences of globalization could thus be widespread. They might affect economics, politics, society, and culture. Existing research points out that globalization has affected economic growth rates, poverty, inequality, democracy, conflict, state capacity, policy and institutional convergence, cultural diversity, volatility and the diffusion of crises, and balance of power between capital and labor. But it provides little consensus on the direction or magnitude of these effects.

**Globalization and the Future**

Given the many consequences that globalization might have, one question that is often raised is whether countries can manage its impact. This is especially important to the extent that globalization has negative consequences. Many types of problems that have been endemic to countries for centuries have taken on a new perspective in a globalized world. Problems that were national have become transnational. The ability of countries to realize many of their basic goals has become more and more tied to the actions of other countries. Economic prosperity domestically often depends now on international trade and capital movements around the globe; national security from all sorts of threats depends on the behavior of other countries and nonstate actors; environmental conditions rely on the behavior of other agents globally; and public health relies more and more on transnational factors and the behavior of international agents. Countries have always faced such problems; it is just that their impact and resolution depend more and more on agents outside the state itself. Globalization is intimately connected to this process. By increasing contacts and interactions among countries and peoples, it helps make many issues transnational in character, rather than national.

Given that governance is largely the domain of nation-states, is there anything that can be done to address these transnational problems? One country can rarely dictate another’s economic, environmental, security, or public health policy, for example. But to deal with transnational problems, coordination of policies may be the best way forward. In particular, cooperation where countries coordinate their policies to arrive at mutually preferable outcomes may be essential. Globalization may facilitate cooperation; it may make the costs of failing to cooperate so high that countries are more willing to try. But it may also make the stakes of cooperation much higher and thus render it less likely.

International institutions may be one way to address these concerns. In a globalized era, some see such institutions as essential for dealing with transnational problems. Countries alone cannot successfully deal with them; they require changes in the behavior of other states. International institutions that states voluntarily join and comply with may help them. Such institutions may help states realize cooperative outcomes; they may provide transparency and lower transaction costs for negotiating solutions to transnational issues; they may embody global norms and practices that allow states to identify focal points for cooperation and/or help them enforce compliance with international
norms and cooperative agreements. These are the potential benefits of global institutions. They may have costs as well. Not all international institutions function adequately; some have serious internal defects that cause them to operate poorly. Others are deadlocked by internal divisions. Some are dominated by one or two states that coerce others to adopt their preferred norms and practices even if these are not very beneficial for the others. International institutions cannot be seen as a costless and efficient solution to all transnational problems. But many of them have shown some ability either to prevent transnational problems from worsening (e.g., the WHO and the WTO in times of crisis) or to allow states to cooperate in order to better manage problems in a globalized world (e.g., the EU).

A related issue is concern over globalization’s future. If one adopts the secular view of it, then little chance exists that the increasing contact and interactions among peoples and countries can be reversed. Indeed if there is technological progress, there is likely to be increasing globalization; more and more contact and interaction are inevitable as technology brings people in the world closer together. On the other hand, the more cyclical view suggests that globalization comes and goes in waves depending on political, economic, and social reactions. We may now be experiencing the height of this period of globalization. Forces for a backlash against the pressure exerted by increasing contacts and interactions among peoples and states may be gaining strength. The economic and financial crisis of 2008 to 2009 may be a prelude to this type of backlash. In this view, governments can respond in ways that curtail or reverse globalization; they can protect their economies, close their borders, end participation in international institutions, and take other steps that seal them off from the rest of the world. The period between 1914 and 1945 is one example of this. The question, of course, is what would be the costs and benefits of such a course of action and would governments be able to achieve any kind of meaningful autonomy or autarchy, given the technologies we now have and the public expectations about their connections to the rest of the world. Whether globalization is reversible or not is a question of great import; the costs of doing so would be a key factor. More realistic, perhaps, are questions about whether globalization can be slowed down or managed in ways that are better for all concerned.

In conclusion, debate rages about globalization. A number of theories exist about its sources. Technological change, international political hegemony, global normative convergence, and/or independent country reactions have all been cited as major causes of globalization. Globalization’s effects have been debated in even greater intensity and breadth. Substantial literatures exist on whether globalization has affected economic growth rates, poverty, inequality, democracy, conflict, state capacity, policy and institutional convergence, cultural diversity, volatility and the diffusion of crises, and balance of power between capital and labor. Agreement on the nature of its effects on any of these is scarce. For some, the balance of its impact has been negative in almost all domains; for others, it is seen as largely positive, especially in the economic and political areas; and for yet others, it has costs and benefits that are hard to calculate and summarize overall. One fact not in doubt is that globalization is an important feature of our world these days; it seems to have consequences for all domains of economic, political, social, and cultural affairs. How to manage it in order to make states, peoples, or the world better off is thus of central importance.

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See also Capitalism; Colonialism; Conditionality; Democracy, Theories of; Development, Political; Governance; Hegemony; Human Rights, Comparative Perspectives; Human Rights in International Relations; Inequality, Economic; International Monetary Fund (IMF); International Organizations; International Trade; Multinational Corporations (MNCs); Neoliberalism; Power; Realism in International Relations; Trade Liberalization; World Bank; World Trade Organization (WTO)

Further Readings
Governance

Amid the debate on globalization and its influence on domestic politics and institutional arrangements, it is intriguing to note the resilience of national institutions, policy styles, and perceptions of the role of the state in society. True, many countries that displayed significantly different governance arrangements a few decades ago today present a more common governance model. Even so, however, the legacy of—or more correctly, perhaps, the continued support for—traditions of statehood, governance, and collective action loom large. These traditions can be seen as value systems that have evolved over an extensive period of time, continuously reproduced in public policy and public discourse. If there is strong resilience in institutions and policy, this in part can be attributed to strong political and administrative tradition. This entry examines the nature of the contemporary state and then examines the different governance models as means of solidifying policy preferences.

Although it makes sense to think of these value systems as traditions, they can mostly be traced back to specific political contexts and policy choice (see, e.g., Francis Castles, 1993). For instance, the Asian “developmental state” (Chalmers Johnson, 1982) and the Scandinavian and continental European welfare state models (Gosta Esping-Andersen, 1990) evolved through a series of political choices about the role of the state, the market, and civil society. Against this backdrop, the purpose of this entry is to explore the linkages between policy choice and models of governance. Conventional wisdom holds that policy choice is largely a product of institutional arrangements. The immediate interest in this entry is to see to what extent those institutions, in turn, can be related to a more overarching set of values and beliefs about the role of the state. (Value refers to everything that is considered to have a value, be it material, ideological, ethical, or other, by most people/citizens.) Should that be the case, we will be well under way to connect a typology of governance arrangements to broad categorizations of policy. There has been some work done on the relationship between different types of policy, drawing on the familiar typology developed by Ted Lowi, and the institutional arrangements of the state but this is a vast research field and much more work remains before we have a more complete account of the linkages between governance arrangements and policy styles.

This entry then looks at a couple of different governance models as a form of institutionalization of overarching policy choices in terms of...
constitutional and institutional arrangements. The underlying premise of this entry is that the institutions framing policy choice are themselves “locked in” by fundamental policy choices concerning the role of the state in society and its centrality in governance. The predominant governance model of a particular country is not a given but reflects entrenched notions about the role of the state, the market, and civil society.

These values and perceptions become deeply institutionalized over time and elevated into political culture above and beyond day-to-day policy making. Even so, however, when observed over a longer stretch of time distinct changes in these value systems can be observed. The role of government in the United States changed fundamentally from Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society project in the 1960s to Ronald Reagan’s neoliberal policy style in the 1980s; in Britain, Labour under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown looked significantly different from Labour under Harold Wilson; in Japan, the relationship between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the bureaucracy, and the corporate sector has changed profoundly since the 1960s; and in Scandinavia, the welfare state today has very different organization and modus operandi from those of the 1960s or 1970s, and so on. Thus, however entrenched and institutionalized these values may be, they do nonetheless change, sometimes abruptly, sometimes more subtly.

The hypothesis that specific cases of policy making are embedded in more overarching values and norms, perhaps even a social theory, concerning what should be the role of the state in society opens up for potential theoretical circularities. It could be that the more general values are simply defined as the sum of specific policies, in which case the argument about embeddedness and institutionalization becomes circular. And, even if different specific types of policies can be theoretically linked to different governance arrangements, a causal mechanism is still needed to explain how and why that would be the case. A more plausible way of looking at such relationships would be to suggest that policy and governance tend to foster and reinforce each other. For instance, “big government” service models tend to emphasize redistributive policies and equality and equal treatment in service delivery, while neoliberal policies emphasize economic growth and a customer-oriented, market-like model of public service. Thus, different aspects of public policy and public administration practices are closely related.

This entry first looks at four broad dimensions of governance that relate to different aspects of the role of the state in society. It then discusses three different models of governance: state-centric, liberal-democratic, and network-based governance. The third section merges these two analyses to elaborate the features and logics of the three governance models. Since issues related to institutions, institutionalization, and deinstitutionalization are central to the present analysis, these issues are discussed before a concluding section sums up the entry.

**Dimensions of Governance**

Nation-states around the world offer a wide variety in terms of how they organize their governance. Perhaps the most obvious and striking differences relate to the fundamental aspects of state organization in terms of their institutional arrangement. Thus, there are federal states and unitary states, centralized states and decentralized states, and states with a long tradition in regulating markets and social behavior while other states see their role as enabling and facilitating markets and free individuals.

These institutional arrangements are highly path dependent. They evolved as constitutional systems defining the model of governance, which were believed to reflect popular expectations and the requirements of a political system to govern the country. Thus, for instance, American or Canadian federalism was the model that was believed to provide the optimal balance between national interests and regional autonomy in those vast territories, while the unitary state was the preferred arrangement in smaller European countries. These are complex issues to capture analytically because they are shaped by the history of the country and its unification process, its state tradition, the homogeneity of the population, and its geopolitical context.

One strategy to approach these issues is to relate them to a set of dimensions of governance. If we conceive of governance as the pursuit of collective interests, with the state as a coordinating and enabling actor, we can clearly see that governance is both a process that is endogenous to the
state—division of labor, competencies, jurisdictions, and resources—and a process in which the state interacts with other actors in society. Therefore, we will want the dimensions of governance to capture both the internal and external aspects of governance. Below, four such dimensions of governance are briefly outlined. These dimensions describe different relationships between the state, the society, and the market.

The governance dimensions speak to very basic issues about the organization of the state and its role in society. Therefore, it should not be surprising to find that they are normatively charged and are frequently topics of political disunity in many countries.

**Popular Representation Versus Institutional Autonomy**

The first governance dimension measures the degree to which the state is responsive to popular demands and expectations, and it places that responsiveness in juxtaposition to a high degree of autonomy for the state’s political and administrative institutions. For governance to qualify as democratic, it is essential that the state responds to popular demands and incumbent political parties are allowed to shape the policy agenda and to engage in public discourse. At the same time, however, institutions need to have some integrity and autonomy, both in relationship to partisan ideologies and to direct popular pressures in order to be able to fulfill their role in the policy process. Institutions that develop close and bilateral relationships with parochial societal interests can develop networks as alternative instruments of policy implementation, but they will have problems in implementing policies that discriminate among policy targets. This is, thus, a dimension where both extremes are unsatisfactory from a governance perspective; democratic governance is contingent on both popular input on public policy and some degree of institutional autonomy allowing those institutions to pursue policies that might not enjoy popular support but are necessary to the state.

Another example of the complexities associated with this dimension can be seen in the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. On the one hand, we expect the civil service to be responsive to the government of the day, implementing its political wishes without prejudice. On the other hand, we expect the public administration to be guided by values such as impartiality and by due process and public law, and a “politicization” of the administrative system is often seen as a controversial development that could compromise the integrity of the bureaucracy. Again, both extremes on the dimension are problematic in a governance perspective whereas some form of combination of the two positions fosters democratic governance or is indeed integral to governance.

**Societal Integrity Versus Institutional Capacity**

A second dimension of governance refers to the tension between fundamental values related to individual freedom, on the one hand, and the need for institutions to encroach on that freedom in order to ensure collective interests and values, on the other. This dilemma and the question it raises on forms of justification for political control over individuals is a major field of research and discourse in political philosophy, and the finer details of that debate are not probed too deeply here. There are obviously values related to the individual qua an individual and other values derived from the individual as a member of a polity. The tension between these two types of values plays out almost daily in a variety of policy sectors such as environmental policy and climate change, crime prevention, social welfare, and tax policy. The government’s need to collect information about individual behavior has become a major issue, particularly in matters related to national security where the need for surveillance stands against personal integrity. A similar debate has surrounded means-tested welfare state programs where government agencies require beneficiaries to submit detailed information about their standard of living and income.

The degree to which government should have access to private information or regulate personal behavior is ultimately a normative issue where different interests are weighed against each other; it is not possible to objectively delineate the pursuit of individual interests aggregated into government action, on the one hand, and the rights of individuals to act freely, on the other. The point here is instead that some encroachment on individual freedom is necessary for government to govern
society, while the precise extent to which such encroachment can be justified remains a normative issue that reemerges fairly regularly on the political agenda. Meanwhile, constitutional reform and institutional design have to wrestle with this issue in a more mundane and pragmatic fashion.

Institutional capacity is a key variable in a broader governance perspective. According to one perspective, contemporary society has become too complex for any single actor to provide effective steering or coordination. Even if government previously had the capacity to fulfill those roles, the growing complexity has undermined the governing capacity of the state. As a result, governance is conducted through networks, partnerships, and other interactive instruments of coordination and collective action. In terms of institutional capacity, this perspective argues that in contemporary governance, such capacity is not so much a matter of constitutional mandates as a continuous process of reproducing institutional leverage through cooperation with societal actors.

**National Interests Versus Subnational Autonomy**

All systems of government integrate political and administrative action on different institutional levels. Exactly how that integration is organized is, however, a matter of substantive cross-national variation. Thus, subnational political systems are granted some degree of autonomy in relationship to central government (for an overview, see Alan Norton, 1994).

The basic logic of organizing government in this way is one of efficiency and expediency, but there are also important aspects of these arrangements that speak to the development of democratic governance. The efficiency argument is fairly obvious; it simply does not make any sense to have the national government organize water and sewage system maintenance or garbage disposal service in every town and village throughout the country. The democracy argument holds that participation in local public affairs socializes citizens into the democracy form of governance. For that socialization to work, local government must have some autonomy, some jurisdiction, within which the local demos can make decisions pertaining to public matters in their locale. Also, the democratic theory of local government holds that the role of elected officials should be to cater to the interests of the populace in a nonpartisan way. Ideology and division should not be imported from national politics and brought onto the local political scene.

This somewhat cozy account of local government is troubled by the existence of national interests, which play out in the local territory. In issues such as infrastructural development, the location of windmill parks, or the deposit of nuclear waste, national interests frequently encounter fierce opposition from local governments. The question then becomes under what conditions should the central government be allowed to override the will of a local demos? The problem is larger than simple not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) politics; it relates ultimately to the problem of two competing demos: the national and the local.

Again, the two extremes of this dimension—complete dominance of national interests and extensive, unconditional local autonomy—raise serious questions in terms of the quality and, indeed, the prospects, of governance. Instead, some middle ground position characterized by dialogue between central and local government with respect for both the national and local demos should provide for better governance.

As is the case with the previous dimension, this dimension, too, speaks directly to governance issues in several different ways. If central, regional, and local governments have overlapping competencies and jurisdictions, that is, if policy making involves several levels of government, the policy process will be characterized by a significant vertical dimension of resource allocation, control, and bargaining. If, on the other hand, policy sectors are largely divided among institutional levels so that central government is in control of some policy sectors, regional government of other sectors, and local governments of yet other sectors, the process becomes less complex and will not involve much interaction among institutional levels. It is thus essential to acknowledge the political nature of state–local relationships; while a formal institutional analysis depicts those relationships mainly as one of division of labor, a closer inspection of central–local interactions will uncover struggles over control, financial resources, and policy.

Another example of the governance ramifications of central–local relationships is that they define to a large extent the relationship between a
city and key players in the local environment. Urbanists would refer to this as the interplay between horizontal and vertical dimensions of autonomy where the vertical dimension defines much of the preconditions for horizontal, urban governance.

**Autonomous Markets Versus Regulation**

The degree to which government regulates markets is often seen as a fundamental aspect of the left–right division in political life. Parties on the political right typically insist that markets work best if they are left alone; market regulation chokes the market, rendering it an inefficient instrument of resource allocation. Government regulation in this perspective distorts market mechanisms, perverts pricing, and removes incentives for risk taking and entrepreneurialism. Leftist parties, on the other hand, maintain that markets need to be brought under some public control partly in order to ensure that they do not create politically undesirable outcomes such as vast differences in wealth and life chances. Many of the areas of society that are essential to the type of social reform that parties on the political left pursue (e.g., housing, education, health care, and work), operate under market control. Therefore, market regulation is an important instrument to insert political objectives into markets.

Market regulation, as mentioned earlier, is politically controversial. While there may be agreement among political actors on long-term policy goals such as economic growth, issues become charged as soon as the role of the market toward those political goals is to be defined. Parties right of center will argue that markets left alone will deliver the highest economic growth, whereas parties on the political Left will insist that markets cannot deliver a socially acceptable economic development or that markets are simply unable to solve collective problems.

That having been said, however, there is also a fair amount of pragmatism surrounding the issue of market regulation. The American political culture has historically, albeit with few but important exceptions, heralded the notion of free markets and small government. Meanwhile, the economic history of the United States is replete with examples of publicly driven large-scale infrastructure development projects and public service delivery, according to Jeff Madrick (2009). More broadly, there is an understanding from Adam Smith’s classic book in the field, *On the Wealth of Nations*, onward that markets need a regulatory framework to function properly. Furthermore, the evidence supporting the argument that nonregulated markets perform better than markets under some degree of government regulation is agnostic. The key problems seem to revolve around issues such as designing the governance of a market economy that generates growth at the same time as it solves problems of coordination and provides consumer protection and sustainable development.

This leads us to consider the critical distinction between regulation of and within markets. The regulation of markets means providing a regulatory framework defining property, contracts, and so on and a mechanism for settling disputes among market actors. Regulation in a market refers to political and administrative control of market mechanisms such as price or supply by regulating entrance to the market. The former type of regulation is non-discriminatory, while the latter form is discriminatory and targeted to ensure collective interests in the markets such as consumer protection and price caps on specific goods provided by the market. Such public presence in the market could also manifest itself in taxes or incentives to sanction or encourage different forms of market behavior.

From a governance perspective, this dimension provides important information about the political economy of governing. Peter Hall and David Soskice’s (2001) distinction between “liberal” and “coordinated” market economies suggests that the degree to which the capitalist economy is embedded in domestic governance varies considerably among different countries. In coordinated market economies, with the continental European, Scandinavian, and several Asian countries as leading examples, interactions between the state and private capital are institutionalized, making concerted governance less complicated and politically sensitive than in the Anglo-American liberal market economies. Also, market regulation is a policy instrument defining a political objective in the market. That objective could, however, also be implemented in less obtrusive ways, thereby facilitating a higher degree of concerted action among public and private interests.
As is the case with the other governance dimensions, both end points of the dimension—completely free or completely regulated markets—are neither efficient from a market point of view nor perhaps desirable from a democratic governance perspective.

**Governance Models**

Let us now turn to a brief presentation of a few stylized models of governance. In 2005, Jon Pierre, together with Guy Peters, outlined a theory of governance drawing on a typology of governance models. The basic assumption sustaining that analysis was that all governance arrangements have to fulfill a number of roles or functions, but different governance models accord the state and societal actors widely different significance for those roles. The authors found that both the most state-centric governance model and, at the other end of the spectrum, network-based governance had problems with defining a state–society interaction that blended institutional autonomy with openness to the interests and expertise found among societal actors. Instead, governance models between the two extreme positions on the continuum, such as the corporatist governance model, fared relatively well; they were capable of blending some indigenous capacity to steer with a fair openness in state–society exchanges.

The defining feature of governance theory, as opposed to more traditional government-centric accounts of governing, is the centrality of exchanges between the state and actors in its external environment. The three models outlined here describe different types of such relationships and interactions. However, the present space only allows for very brief accounts of complex and multidimensional governance arrangements.

**State-Centric Governance**

The first governance model portrays the state exercising firm control over its territory and population. The state has few contingencies to other societal actors and does not have to be concerned about any lack of institutional capacity to impose its will on society. The typical governing style of government in state-centric governance is to use policy instruments sufficiently distinct to ensure the desired change in social behavior. That includes securing tax revenues of sufficient level to sustain those projects that the state wishes to implement. The state, in this model of governance, sees little reason to engage in collaborative forms of governance or service delivery.

If we accept Joel Migdal’s (2001) argument that state and society mutually constitute each other, democratic forms of state-centric governance occur where there is a societal expectation for such a leading role of the state. That means that although government will not refrain to use obtrusive policy instruments, the societal submission to the state suggests that the state does rarely have to throw much weight to impose its will on society. Whether it is because the state sees it as its role to provide distinct leadership or because society expects it, state-centric governance is built on the centrality of the state. That centrality is obviously a significant asset in terms of being able to steer and control societal development. However, it tends to entail a fairly unidirectional process of state–society exchange whereby the state executes its preferences on society. States in this model of governance easily become self-referential and arrogant vis-à-vis societal actors and may thus be unaware or oblivious of societal change.

France is historically seen as a prime example of state-centric governance although that state predominance is today somewhat less articulated. We also find examples of state-centric governance in many Latin American countries such as Argentina (not least under Juan Perón) and Uruguay. Note that state-centric governance does not correlate with the existence of leftist political regimes. The legitimacy of state encroachment on society stems from a symbiotic notion of the state embodying the people and catering to its interests like parents look after their children. In this model of governance, nationalism plays a significant role and it is legitimate, and expected, of the government to intervene in markets if it can be justified with reference to interests of the state.

**Liberal-Democratic Governance**

The previous model of governance is a relatively rare phenomenon in time and space. Liberal-democratic governance is a much more common creature. The Anglo-American democracies and
the continental European countries belong to this category as do some of the Asian countries, particularly with regard to their post-2000 model of governance. Thus, although the fundamental features of the governance model cover a fairly narrow section of the spectrum of different governance models, we should expect to find a fair degree of empirical heterogeneity as we inspect this model in more detail.

In terms of democratic theory, liberal-democratic governance rests on a notion of a distinct separation between state and society. The state is not expected to interfere in markets and to honor values of individual freedom and personal integrity. However, the state is expected to play a key role in the regulation of markets by upholding a regulatory framework for markets and ensuring free competition. Thus, in the spirit of Adam Smith, the “regulatory state” model sees the government enforcing antitrust legislation to protect markets from cartels and other forms of improper market behavior. Thus, there is an emphasis of regulation of the market and an equally strong normative belief that government should regulate within markets. In the parlance of economic theory, it is the role of the state in this governance model to prevent market failure. It should not, however, pursue political objectives through regulation within markets.

The state in liberal-democratic governance is more deeply embedded in society than state-centric governance, yet it is able to maintain some degree of institutional integrity in relationship to policy targets and other social interests. The state is not alien to collaborative forms of governance but insists on playing the role of a primus inter pares in those arrangements. That means that government will consult with social partners in policy making but will reserve the right to make the final decisions on policy design. Thus, in some ways liberal-democratic governance could be just as intrusive on society as state-centric governance, but the mechanisms and processes sustaining that capacity of the state are less derived from institutional strength and more a result of social bargaining.

The different forms of corporatism that have been a trademark of state–society exchanges in several European countries and also in Japan fit nicely into this model of governance. This applies in particular to the tripartite arrangements between the state, private capital, and labor where the state can be both an arbitrator as well as a negotiating party. The significance of these corporatist arrangements has declined in several countries remains strong in, for instance, Denmark.

**Network Governance**

Some time ago now, Rod Rhodes gave new momentum to the emerging debate on contemporary governance by arguing that policy networks were the key instrument of governance, hence governance of policy sectors saw government as one of a large number of actors. Indeed, cohesive policy networks had the capacity to resist government policy and were basically capable of governing the sector themselves. Coupled with the growing literature on the governance problems that stemmed from the increasing social complexity and multilevel institutional arrangements of the political and administrative sphere, networks and other interactive forms of governance became the key focus of a large group of governance scholars.

Network governance scholars deliver a powerful argument about the lack of institutional capacity and integrity of the state. Short of those features, segments of the state embark in a range of different interactive arenas where collective solutions are designed and implemented in concert with social partners. Policy becomes reflective of the contextualized process from which it evolves; interactive governance forms have difficulties with imposing unpopular policies on those social actors and collective action becomes to a large extent defined by the least common denominator among the network participants. That said, network governance provides public officials with a multitude of social contacts that ensures up-to-date information about social change. Network governance therefore provides quicker and more effective linkages between changing societal problems and a political response to those changes.

It is difficult to think of any national context where networks do not exist. The intriguing question is how such forms of governance are integrated with more traditional, hierarchical governance and administrative arrangements and what the consequences are of blending different governance models. Network governance is predicated on substantive autonomy and empowerment for lower-level civil servants so that they...
can engage in meaningful dialogue with social partners. Thus, network governance challenges traditional top-down channels of communication in public sector organizations, both in terms of policy implementation and in bringing information from networks to the attention of the senior levels of the organization.

Governance as Institutionalization of Policy Choices

Following these discussions about dimensions and models of governance, this entry now presents a more elaborated account of different stylized models of governance with regard to how they score on the overarching dimensions of governance.

It is particularly challenging to look at the dynamic nature of these interactions. The dimensions of governance described earlier could easily produce a functionalist analysis of the roles of government in governance with all that entails in terms of static modeling. However, thinking about how government resolves these issues and tasks in a governance perspective yields a highly dynamic account of the role of the state since the core assumption in governance theory is that collective objectives are pursued in a variety of different concerted and collaborative process between state and society. The key assumption being explored in this analysis is that the degree to which political actors and institutions shape the governance process determines much of how specific governance arrangements relate to the three dimensions of governance.

State-Centric Governance

With the leading role of the state in this model of governance, we would expect that its institutions enjoy a high degree of autonomy in relationship to societal actors and interests. Since those institutions have very little collaborative interaction with societal actors, there is little incentive for them to make concessions on policy. Also, given the centrality of the state and its insistence on “going it alone” in terms of policy implementation and service delivery, government institutions will have the administrative and financial resources required to play those roles.

State-centric governance is also likely to display a priority for national interests over local autonomy. It is interesting to note that many of the empirical contexts that we associate with state-centric governance, again with France as a leading example, have weak and fragmented local government systems. This is obviously not a feature only of countries with state-centric governance—consider for the sake of comparison the equally fragmented local government system in the United States—but it makes sense to stipulate that state-centric societies do not develop strong subnational government as that could create or exacerbate central–local conflict.

State-centric governance easily translates into strong regulation of markets. This is because these states have a path-dependent political and administrative behavior according to which they rarely yield to the interests of societal actors. The state defines its interests and objectives in the market and implements whatever regulation is required toward those ends.

All these features of state-centric governance—strong, insulated institutions, central government control, tight market regulation, and so on—are in fact reflections of society as much as of the state. It is very difficult to think of a democratic state ascending to such societal predominance without the consent and indeed expectation from society. While this is a governance model that may appear to be highly obtrusive and insensitive to societal actors, a closer inspection of specific governance processes indicates that coercive policy instruments are not always necessary for the state to control society; societal actors anticipate the preferences of government and act accordingly. A case in point is the Japanese developmental state, which throughout much of the postwar period was a case of state-centric governance. Governance was coordinated within the tripod of the Liberal-Democratic Party, the bureaucracy, and leading corporate players. The chief ministry driving the economic modernization programs could ensure compliance for its plans by formulating “visions”; it rarely had to employ its institutional capacity to ensure corporate compliance with its policy, according to Johnson (1982).

However, as we look at the dimensions of governance, we can see that the case of Japan offers some intriguing patterns. For instance, although national interests were paramount through the history of Japan, not least during the postwar economic
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recovery, and although central–local relationships have been predominantly hierarchical, the relationship between central and subnational government has been replete with ideological conflict. Central government actively promoted the ascension of Tokyo to a global city status, triggering rivalries with several other metropolitan areas. National interests have translated into Tokyo interests, arguably at the expense of other cities.

The paradox of state-centric governance is thus that although the state has all the instruments and resources necessary to impose a strict regime on society, it rarely needs to use all that muscle as societal actors readily submit to more subtle forms of governing. Society expects the state to play a leading role in governance. When we bring state–society exchanges that are integral to governance theory into the analysis, it becomes clear that the more formal power bases that a state controls, the less it will have to use those forces.

The governance approach to these issues also suggests that states remain strong but that the sources of that strength have changed. State-centric governance, embedded in norms that legitimized such governance and prescribed long-term policy goals, defined overarching policy choices that continued to shape public policy for decades. Economic development has seen a distinct role for the state either as a coordinator of private business or as a leading player in research and development or as safeguard against overseas competition or all of the above. State-centrism has also had a major influence on the policy instruments typically employed in policy implementation. Again, this rather self-referential modus operandi proved to be a significant problem in times of rapid external change such as when globalization caught momentum, opening up society to new political, financial, and cultural influences.

Liberal-Democratic Governance

If state-centric governance presents a pattern of a state that enjoys extensive capabilities to impose its will on society but rarely has to use that leverage, an almost opposite pattern is found in liberal-democratic governance. In this governance model, the state has some political and institutional capabilities but the exercise of those power bases is more contested than is the case in state-centric governance. Thus, this governance model displays a medium level of institutional autonomy and an institutional capacity that is more contextualized than in the previous model.

The portrayal of the state in liberal-democratic theory is an idealized account of the state as distinctly separate from society. It could be seen as an extension of the Wilsonian model of public administration as firmly separated from the political sphere of the state. That model has lost much of its empirical accuracy in contemporary public administration and a similar development can be seen with regard to the separation of state and society. Migdal (2001) describes this development of the state nicely:

Various parts or fragments of the state have allied with one another, as well as with groups outside, to further their goals. Those practices and alliances have acted to promote a variety of sets of rules, often quite distinct from those set out in the state’s own official laws and regulations. These alliances, coalitions, or networks have neutralized the sharp territorial and social boundary that the first portrayal of the state has acted to establish, as well as the demarcation between the state as a pre-eminent rule maker and society as the recipient of those rules. (p. 20)

With the border between state and society thus compromised by parochial interests inside and outside the state, governance theory offers a new and promising approach to understanding the process of governing. Indeed, Migdal’s account of the contemporary liberal-democratic state is an apt illustration of the contemporary liberal-democratic state, involved in collaborative governance and a rule taker almost as much as a rule maker. It might be argued that the state–society division that this model of governance departs from has become a normative myth. This myth may at some previous time have defined what constitutes proper exchanges between the state and its external environment, but given the complexities of contemporary governance the state–society separation has become impossible to sustain. That having been said, normative models still matter. As the rules of the political game, normative models provide definitions of roles for political actors and institutions. Those norms are
also the foundation on which constitutions are written and amended.

In the liberal-democratic governance model, the state itself has moderate institutional capacity but makes up for that through collaboration with social partners. This can take place through corporatist models of interest representation and mediation but it can also be generated through more ad hoc models of joint ventures such as public–private partnerships. Also, states in liberal-democratic governance tend to define their chief role as a “regulatory state,” providing market stability without necessarily being committed to extensive service delivery.

It is interesting to note that liberal-democratic governance would encompass both liberal and coordinated market economies. Government plays a distinctly different role in those two models of the capitalist economy, with a higher profile and more accentuated political presence in the market in the case of the coordinated market economy. According to Hall and Soskice (2001), there is also more legitimacy for articulating collective interests in economic development in the coordinated market economy than in the liberal market economy where government is expected to provide a regulatory framework for the economy but not to itself be a player in the market. Corporatism is clearly related to the coordinated market economy. This stronger legitimacy for market intervention in the coordinated market economy links it strongly to welfare state models and to overarching policy choices that give a higher priority to distributive or redistributive types of policy than to promoting economic growth.

**Network Governance**

This model of governance could be summarized as characterized by low institutional autonomy; its institutional capacity is to a large extent contingent on societal consent and a low degree of regulation or even self-regulation. In a model of governance where concerted action is the typical strategy to govern, the issue of institutional autonomy becomes moot as institutions do not require autonomy to engage social partners. Indeed, such autonomy could be an obstacle to creative problem solving since it suggests that there are rules defining the forms and conditions for institutions’ exchange with their external environment.

The institutional capacity in network governance is limited; it is part of the logic of network governance that action is based on consent and therefore institutions can only implement those programs that other actors in the network agree to, which frequently comprises important policy targets. That having been said, however, when there is consensus for the execution of a policy, implementation is likely to be swift and efficient since interaction between institutions and their social partners continues throughout the implementation process.

The regulatory capacity of networks is high within the network itself but less so outside the network. In network governance theory, primary attention is on networks as instruments of self-regulation within a policy sector. In that perspective, networks offer regulation that, by definition, is reflective of the interests of the participants in the network.

This is not a model of governance that defines large-scale political projects such as welfare states or developmental states. It lacks the social inclusion and capacity to resolve conflicts between the network and other social constituencies. Rather, it operates within the parameters set by long-term policy objectives.

**Change and Resilience in Models of Governance**

The three governance models discussed in this entry are manifestations of social norms and values related to individual versus collective action, state versus market, and proactive versus reactive policies. They become institutionalized in the system of government so that state-centric governance draws on extensive institutional capabilities and a strong legitimacy of political encroachment of society, or in liberal-democratic governance where there is a search for a balance between political capabilities and individual and societal freedom.

These norms and values are reinterpreted over time. What constituted a free market in the early 20th century was different from what is today considered a free market. The developmental state was the Japanese state’s response to a situation of
national urgency. It became deeply institutionalized in the Japanese society for decades but was weakened during the 1980s when the downsides to aggressive pro-growth policies surfaced and the most acute problems had been resolved. The Scandinavian welfare state enjoyed massive political support for several decades but has lost some of that support along with growing social affluence and increasing tax levels. The Great Society in the United States had a shorter life span and was put to rest with the election of Ronald Reagan as president in 1980.

Thus, although governance models are, by definition, institutionalized, they change over time. It is a major task in itself to account for what drives those changes. Given their institutionalization, redefining the role of the state or the market is a slow and incremental process. One type of change is where values and norms and expectations on the state are not fundamentally reassessed but instead rearticulated and given a new meaning in a new political and economic landscape. In other cases, new governance models emerge to solve new types of societal problems. Network governance could be seen as a response to growing social complexity and a lacking capacity or knowledge within the state to effectively and appropriately address those problems. If the state cannot solve such problems, actors closer to the source of problems may spring into action themselves.

Another driver of change is international influences and the diffusion of strategies and instruments for problem solving. Globalization has brought with it seamless and instant communication spreading ideas and expertise across national and jurisdictional boundaries. This means that models of problem solving, including the best agents of those measures, are imported and implemented in another national or local context, something that in turn triggers a reassessment of which actors are best equipped for such action.

**Conclusion**

We should not expect broad definitions of models of governance to provide clues about policy choices; as any textbook in public policy will testify, policy evolves through complex and contextualized processes. More important than promoting specific policy choices, it appears as if the governance models are manifestations of previous choices of policy styles and the role of government in solving collective problems. State-centric governance does not, in and of itself, define any long-term policy objectives. However, it does define a particular policy style. Also, the governance models define different institutional arrangements in the state, which in turn define the preconditions for broader policy choices. It is, to give an example, difficult to think of extensive welfare state policies managed overwhelmingly through network governance arrangements.

This brings us back to a comment made earlier in this entry about causal mechanisms. Do overarching policy choices such as welfare states or developmental states lead to the emergence of a particular model of governance, or is it rather the case that the entrenched governance model that is typical to a country is conducive to a particular set of broad policy goals? A tentative and preliminary answer to these questions is that there could well be causality in both directions, that is, processes of mutual reinforcement of values and norms through which one fosters the other. Megapolicy choices such as between a developmental state and a welfare state must by necessity include the creation of an institutional system equipped to coordinate and implement such large political campaigns.

Equally important, for such projects to be successful, they must draw on political and social sentiments of the significance of such projects to the country. There will only be a welfare state if dominant social constituencies support such a massive undertaking in terms of government effort and treasury, just as a developmental state requires all political, administrative, and corporate actors to commit themselves to such a national priority. Such commitment is reflective of fundamental social values such as national security or, in the case of the welfare state, social justice. Thus, social norms are directly or indirectly instrumental in fostering both overarching policy choices and predominant governance models.

The analysis presented here represents the first few steps in what appears to be a rather long journey toward a better understanding of why and how different national contexts or what Castles called “families of nations” develop different models of governance. This entry explored only a few
conceivable explanatory factors. It is likely that state traditions, the trajectory of state building, political culture, and national prosperity provide important additional clues to answering those questions.

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See also Institutions and Institutionalism; State

Further Readings


GOVERNANCE, ADMINISTRATION POLICIES

Some decades ago, in the early 1950s, Harold Lasswell defined politics as “who gets what.” This simple but powerful definition emphasizes the fundamental point that virtually all political action is directed toward using the power of the public sector to allocate goods and services among the members of a society. Some politics is symbolic and emotive, but to some extent even those components of political action may help legitimate the political system and the decisions it must make about allocations of costs and benefits among citizens. Citizens may be willing to accept allocations with which they do not agree in part because of their emotional attachment to their government and the legitimacy associated with that attachment. This entry examines basic questions about making and implementing public policy in contemporary political systems.

Perhaps the broadest possible manner in which to consider this process of allocating goods and services through the public sector is to employ the concept of governance. As explained more fully below, the meaning of governance is contested rather vigorously in the academic community, but the fundamental notion of governance is that there is a need for some form of collective decision making to steer the society. This functionalist conception of governance emphasizes that although the market may be an efficient mechanism for making individual choices, there is a need to make some decisions for the society as a whole. Furthermore, those decisions may need to take into account a range of human values, not just economic values, and also attempt to accommodate influences from a range of actors. (Value refers to everything that is considered to have a value, be it material, ideological, ethical, or other, by most people/citizens.)
The idea of governance therefore is to provide some means of collective steering for the economy and society, and the word is derived from a Greek word for steering that also is the root for cybernetics. This steering activity is usually associated with government and with the formal institutions of the public sector, but this entry presents an argument for seeing the concept as neutral about the manner in which steering occurs, as suggested by Jon Pierre and Guy Peters in 2001. Although those formal institutions of the public sector continue to have a role in governing, social actors—both market and societal—also have an influence. This involvement of social actors certainly occurs in democratic societies but may also operate in less democratic systems that have sought to co-opt those social actors as part of their legitimation strategies.

The activity that we generally conceptualize as public policy making is a major component of governance. Governments exercise that steering function mainly by making policies and then putting them into action. The policy choices made through the state, and also involving actors from the civil society, are directed at a range of targets, involve the use of a number of instruments, and reflect a variety of political, economic, and social values. Furthermore, the process through which governments make policy (and again this typically is done with the involvement of other actors) is complex, often taking years to complete, and involves a large number of actors, many of whom may be able to exercise a virtual veto over the actions as suggested by George Tsebelis in 2002.

The emphasis on who gets what from political action is sometimes considered to be technical and apolitical, focusing on economic values of efficiency, or on the legalistic application of the law through public administration. Public policy is, however, anything but apolitical and reflects the convergence of a wide array of political forces, all attempting to influence the policy choices in ways that will benefit them and their constituents. According to Margaret Hill in 2005, these political forces play themselves out through complex processes that move from recognizing policy problems to deciding what good policy would be and then to evaluating the consequences of public action.

Although it is only one component of the policy-making process, governance depends heavily on the implementation of policies through a variety of political and social institutions, notably the public bureaucracy. Although much research in contemporary political science is directed at organizations and actors involved in making inputs into the political system—through voting, political parties, policy networks, legislatures, and so on—the public bureaucracy remains the largest component of the public sector, and arguably the most significant for policy choices. Not only does the expertise of the public bureaucracy inform policy making, but the bureaucracy is, in fact, more often in touch with citizens than are other parts of the public sector.

Following the implicit outline already presented, this entry begins with the most general concept of governance, moves on to the policy-making process as a major component of public action in governing, and concludes by discussing public administration and its importance in implementing, as well as making, public policy. All these aspects of governing are necessarily linked in the “real world” and in theory, but each of them also must be considered separately to understand better how the three interact. The three perspectives all combine to provide a picture of what the public sector actually does and how it affects the lives of citizens.

Studying these three aspects of political science involves the relationships between policy and administrative issues that occur in the reality of public governance and in the analytic and theoretical approaches that social scientists employ to interpret and understand those problems. Although the objective problems in these areas have considerable practical relevance, the role of theory must also be emphasized. This emphasis on theory is especially important given that some of the same strands of theory, for example, institutionalism and bounded rationality, can be applied across these areas. Therefore, the entry is a tour d'horizon designed to identify the principal issues and approaches in these parts of the discipline of political science.

**Governance and Political Science**

The basic idea of governance has been part of political science as long as there has been such a discipline, but the concept has become more central to studying politics over the past several decades. The exact date and source of the revival
of the term is perhaps not important. What is more important is that the discipline has been supplementing its general concern with individual political behavior with greater concern with what the political processes and all that individual behavior produce by working through institutions and processes. The outcomes of governance can be conceptualized to include not only policy choices but also the general management of the political and social systems. These outcomes would therefore include the capacity to involve members of the public in the governance process, the building of trust and social capital, and what Canadians might recognize as the maintenance of “peace, order and good government,” as identified in the Constitution Act of 1867.

At its most basic level, governance means the capacity to steer the economy and society toward collective goals. That definition does not privilege any particular actors or any particular institutions, but, instead, it recognizes the functional need to provide that steering and then attempts to understand how the process is carried out. One of the most important distinguishing features between governance and other forms of social action, for example, markets, is the notion of collective goals and their centrality in steering. Other forms of social action, for example, markets, assume that individual goals are sufficient, or that goals emerge through interaction, but a governance perspective assumes that goals emerge through collective choice of some sort.

Governance models in political science therefore are at their heart functionalist explanations for the processes of governing writ large. In this way, the governance approach to political science has some affinity with the structural-functionalist approaches used in comparative politics during the 1960s and 1970s. In those approaches, there was an assumption that some form of collective choice is necessary, but the specific actors to be involved in making that choice were not identified, and the variations in the way in which decisions were made were the loci for comparison. The same assumption concerning the need for collective choice is made about governance, and the approach, in the view of some political scientists, should be agnostic about how it is performed and about what activity should be subject to collective control and what is better left to the market and society.

The major contrast concerning governance that has been made in contemporary political science is between government and governance. The traditional assumption in political science was that governance almost inherently was the appropriate province of the institutions within the formal public sector. To the extent that nongovernmental actors were involved in the process, they were to different degrees suspect. The degree of suspicion concerning nongovernmental actors varied with political cultures. For example, the pluralist traditions in Anglo-American countries have tended to assume that interest groups pursue “the private use of public power.” On the other hand, however, most of the countries of Northern and continental Europe have some tradition of corporatist involvement of private sector actors in making and implementing policy, and these countries tend not to denigrate but often laud that involvement.

This contrast between government and governance (see, e.g., Seppo Tiihonen, 2004) has emerged as a central analytic question for scholars concerned with governance. Many scholars advocating the governance perspective have argued that the formal institutions of the public sector have become increasingly incapable of providing that scarce commodity called governance. The formal organizations of the public sector are characterized as bureaucratic, clumsy, and incapable of coping with the rapidly changing societies with which they are confronted. There is ample evidence of policy failure (for a variety of evidence, see Mark Bovens, Paul ‘t Hart, & Guy Peters, 2001) and the underperformance of the public sector in many countries that has been used to justify the position that governments are not able to provide governance.

Critics of conventional forms of government have argued that as well as being weak in terms of efficiency, they are also weak in democratic terms. The institutions of representative democracy appear unable to capture the enthusiasm of many citizens, and levels of voting in most industrial democracies have been decreasing. Likewise, membership in political parties and many other political organizations appears to be dropping rather inexorably. Much of the successful political mobilization that has occurred has been around “flash parties” that are developed around an individual or around a particular political issue. The advocates of the “new
governance,” therefore, believe that providing other loci and methods of political participation will make public action more democratic as well as more capable of solving collective problems.

Even if citizens were engaged in the mass politics of representative democracy, the limited capacity of those institutions to translate their preferences into effective policy choices is clear. Richard Rose pointed out in the mid-1970s that even in majoritarian Westminster systems, voting was an extremely blunt instrument to use to control policy choices. In addition, the divided-government literature helps explain the extent to which coalition governments further complicate democratic control over policy. These constraints on governance become even more apparent as governments move away from direct ministerial mechanisms for service delivery that are driven more by market and social actors than by political controls.

The lack of agreement about what the term governance actually means has been addressed in part by adding various adjectives to the basic concept. One of the most important of these more circumscribed terms has been network governance (Eva Sørenson & Jacob Torfing, 2007), and indeed a good deal of the movement toward governance as an approach to political life has been focused on the capacity of networks to provide governance. The basic conviction of network governance is that self-organizing networks of social actors are better suited to coping with the complexity of contemporary governing demands than are hierarchical mechanisms. The “new governance” of networks is assumed to be better able to cope with that complexity and respond to changing social conditions.

Another way of limiting the meaning of governance has been to focus on “good governance,” generally meaning the reduction of corruption and the creation of greater accountability, especially in less developed political systems. This version of governance has been dominant in much of the international donor community that is seeking not only to describe governance but also to improve public sector performance. Some scholars, however, have begun to focus on the quality of governance in a more general vein, attempting to understand what features of political systems may be associated with the capacity to improve the quality of life of citizens.

The linkages between institutional and behavioral characteristics of political systems and the quality of public decisions is often tenuous, but establishing that linkage can both help develop understanding governance within comparative politics and enhance the actual performance of the public sector. There is as yet very little discussion of the design of governance systems, but the accumulation of evidence may provide that version of “constitutional engineering” just as knowledge about formal public sector institutions has generated some design principles.

Governance has been discussed primarily at the national level, but the concept can be used to discuss steering capacity at all levels. For example, “global governance” has been used to describe steering at the international level. At this level, the state often ceases to be the major actor in governance, much as national governments cease to be the principal actors in some models of governance. Instead, regimes composed of nongovernmental actors are often central to providing some control over policy areas that governments may not be able to or want to. Although states have attempted to exert some control over areas such as climate control, the nongovernmental actors may prove to be more effective.

Urban areas, as well as other subnational levels, also require governance, and these regions experience all the problems of mobilizing consent and exercising control over policy choices that the national level may encounter. Indeed, networks and other forms of social actors may be more significant at the local level than at the national level, and much of the study of local politics has revolved around these interactions between formal and informal actors. Perhaps more than at other levels of government, urban areas have developed complex patterns of service delivery that correspond to the governance ideas of involving a range of private sector actors in the process of steering.

As Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders noted in 2004, one of the more important aspects of the development of governance as a means of understanding comparative politics has been the development of multilevel governance. While students of federalism, such as Thomas Heuglein and Alan Fenna (2006), and of intergovernmental relations more generally might consider that this term has to
some extent reinvented a very old wheel, the prominence of the concept of multilevel governance has emphasized the complexity of the processes through which public programs are made and implemented. The basic point of multilevel governance is that most attempts to govern in the early 21st century involve interactions among multiple levels of government, as well as interactions between the public and private sectors.

The multilevel governance approach also points to the extent to which the contemporary state has been disaggregated and the linkage between the structure of states and the governance being provided. Christopher Pollitt and Colin Talbot noted in 2004 that as the public sector has moved a large number of its activities to agencies and quangos or has developed mechanisms such as public–private partnerships to deliver services more efficiently, the capacity for control from the center is reduced. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks in 2003 pointed to the variable consequences of the different mechanisms for disaggregating the central state, but the general consequence has been to reduce the steering capacity of the center of government.

The need to understand reactions to disaggregation and the empowering of nonstate actors in governance has led to consideration of the capacity to restore some direction from the center. The concept of “metagovernance” has been coined to reflect the need for central steering the context of a more decentralized and devolved world of political action. Metagovernance is the governance of governance, or the attempt to provide or create some coherence out of very decentered policy processes. Metagovernance does not imply a return to the command and control style of governing associated with the hierarchical state but rather reflects an attempt to steer through frames and guidelines instead of through hierarchy and formal rules.

Metagovernance also represents an attempt on the part of many political leaders to reassert the primacy of politics. If networks and other forms of devolved political action are increasingly dominating political life, then the connection between voting and policy choices is becoming more attenuated. Political leaders therefore have felt the need to control policy without necessarily undermining the efficiency and legitimation gains achieved by using the devolved and marketized methods of governing. In some cases, these attempts at control have involved overt politicization of the public service, but others have involved softer forms of steering and control.

Even if one accepts that a great deal of the action of governing has been shifted away from formal institutions in the public sector and toward devolved and delegated action, it is important to remember that this activity is always being done in the “shadow of hierarchy,” as noted by Fritz Scharpf (1997). That is, if the market or social actors being given grants of power fail to perform adequately in making and implementing policy, then the state can always revoke its delegation and resume control over the policy. The reassertion of hierarchical control would go beyond the softer controls associated with metagovernance to recapture direct control of policy and a more direct imposition of the priorities of elected politicians.

At the same time that governing is carried on in the shadow of hierarchy, to some extent, more formal patterns of governing are carried on in the “shadow of governance.” The policy-making processes of the public sector do fail all too often; creating policy arrangements that rely more heavily on nonstate actors provide political leaders an opportunity to correct for, or perhaps avoid, those failures. In part, the capacity to move activities that may fail within the state out of the center is an important means of blame avoidance for politicians. Using market and nonstate actors can, of course, be a less “political” strategy and more a reflection of the capacity of those institutions to act in ways that the public sector cannot—whether that is being less bureaucratic in the pejorative sense of the term, being able to respond more nimbly to changing conditions, or being able to leverage human and financial resources that are out of the reach of government.

In summary, the governance turn in political science has brought the discipline back to some of its roots in thinking about the capacity of the public sector to provide coherent direction to society. Clearly, in the case of failed states, this type of governance is not possible, and even for some more successful political systems, it can be sporadic and inconsistent. Furthermore, governance is not just about the success or failure of the formal public sector but also involves the capacity of those institutions to interact successfully with
social actors and also increasingly the capacity to interact with the global environment.

Public Policy

Public policy studies are the second major body of work to be considered when thinking about the outputs of the public sector. Most political scientists do not think of themselves as “policy scientists” of the type advocated by Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan in 1950, but in essence they are. The individualistic turn in political science, reflected in both behavioral and rational choice approaches to the discipline, has diverted attention from the output side of the political system toward aspects of political life where institutions and processes are less dominant features. For many political scientists taking those approaches, public policy is better left to economists or to professions such as planning.

Although the two aspects of political science—policy and individual behavior—are in fact more complementary than competitive, they tend to ignore each other and to press the primacy of one or the other. This is most unfortunate, given, that it is individuals, working singly or collectively, who must make policy decisions; we need to know more about how they make those decisions. Likewise, public policies frame a good deal of the political action by individuals, so that voting may be voting for or against specific policy choices.

The Policy Process

The study of public policy in political science has several important but somewhat disparate dimensions. The largest single body of research has been on the policy process, notably the work of Charles O. Jones. This approach to policy is inherently political, arguing that the policy choices made by government are primarily a function of the political process through which they are made. The majority of the process models attempt to explain policy choices by understanding the actors who are involved at each of these stages, as well as by understanding linkages among the stages. These models are, however, far more useful as heuristics for describing the process than they are as means of explaining outcomes.

The conventional process model of policy making begins with agenda setting or problem definition and then proceeds through a series of steps such as program design, legitimation, resource attachment, and evaluation; typically, it did not have any strong assumptions about the political mechanisms that were used to manage that movement. Although some elements within the general model, for example, agenda setting, relied on the role of policy entrepreneurs to provide agency within the process, the general models tended to be largely devoid of that animation.

Furthermore, the process model as generally used in political science did not reflect the degree of conflict that might exist in these crucial political processes; rather, the process appeared to move along rather smoothly to its conclusion. One important addition to process models that did contain that conflict was Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith’s (1993) “advocacy–coalition framework.” This model was concerned explicitly with policy change and suggested that policy change came about through the clash of ideas, as manifested in an existing policy coalition and a potential replacement. These conflicts could be worked out through bargaining processes, often generating a new synthesis about policy, which would in turn be institutionalized, setting the stage for the next round of policy change.

In addition to the general model of the policy process, there has been a substantial degree of theorizing about various components of the policy process. In particular, political scientists have been concerned with agenda setting, budgeting, implementation, and, at one point, evaluation. These process considerations have, however, often been divorced from concerns about the quality of policies being adopted. Each of these process areas has produced a large body of literature that has influenced more general studies of policy. That having been said, with the exception of the study of agenda setting, these areas of research have declined in political science to some extent, reflecting the general decline in the importance of policy studies in the discipline.

Implementation

The first of these components of the policy-making process to emerge as a distinctive field for research was implementation. Although the term is hardly new, it was brought to center stage in policy
studies by Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky in 1974. They focused attention on the difficulties of taking legislation and making it work in “the real world” and especially the difficulties in making it work in the manner intended by the framers of the legislation. They developed this analysis by identifying the number of clearance points that had to be passed successfully if the program were to go into effect. While their analysis of the difficulties of implementation was perhaps excessively pessimistic, it did help frame a fundamental policy problem in a strong analytic model.

The Pressman and Wildavsky framework for understanding implementation is a top-down perspective on the process, while the process may also be analyzed from a bottom-up perspective. The bottom-up perspective assumes that programs might be better designed from the perspective of the prospective of implementation. This “backward-mapping” perspective assumes that programs might ultimately be more effective if their final implementation were central to their formation. Although criticized as putting implementation ahead of policy goals, this approach does emphasize the key role of implementation in making programs actually work.

A third wave of implementation research emphasized quantitative studies of the success and failure of implementation efforts, relying heavily on measures that were in many ways difficult to sustain in the face of the complexity of the implementation process. If anything, the complexity of implementation has become even greater. For example, implementation increasingly involves multiple actors at multiple levels of government, as described by Laurence O’Toole in 2004, or perhaps also actors in the private sector.

**Budgeting**

Wildavsky was also central to the emergence of public budgeting as an area of concerted research in political science in the mid-1960s. In contrast to economists who looked at the public budget as a search for a Pigovian optimal allocation, Wildavsky saw budgeting in a much more political manner, emphasizing the importance of structure and process in producing the outcomes. In particular, the repetitive nature of budgeting and the multiple organizations involved in the process (at least in the United States) tended to produce incremental outcomes. There was also some individual element involved in this model of incrementalism, given that many of the actors involved played the “game” year after year and their memories and their interpersonal trust also influenced the outcomes.

After his initial insights into the American budgetary process, Wildavsky and his colleagues, Otto Davis and Michael Dempster, made a number of other important contributions to a political understanding of budgeting. First, they formalized and tested the incremental model of budgeting in 1966 and demonstrated that there was a great deal of predictability in the decisions made for the U.S. federal budget. Furthermore, Wildavsky and colleagues developed alternative models that could describe budgetary choices in other types of political systems. Finally, Hugh Heclo and Wildavsky in 1974 provided a detailed analysis of budgetary decision making in the British Treasury, again emphasizing the importance of trust in these deliberations.

The seminal work by Wildavsky sparked a number of interesting elaborations of budgeting and critiques of the incremental model. Unfortunately, however, that interest in budgeting has not been maintained, even given its centrality in governing. The interest in budgeting that remains has been largely on the part of rational choice scholars who see the budget as a logic locus for actors to seek to maximize their own benefits and to pursue interesting strategies in order to do so.

As Charles Lindblom (1965) notes, the incremental ideas that have been central to understanding budgeting in the United States, and to a lesser extent elsewhere, are related to more general analytic approaches emphasizing the likelihood, and the desirability, of incremental decision making. In this view, the public sector will produce better governance through successive limited comparisons rather than through attempting to make a single, correct, and comprehensive decision. While such a pattern of governing can be condemned as excessively conservative, the logic also corresponded well to the American political style from which it had evolved.

At a more theoretical level, beginning with Herbert Simon’s (1947) work, the logic of **bounded rationality** has been a powerful contender in the attempted domination of more rationalistic
approaches to policy, and to politics more generally. In this view, any attempt at comprehensive rationality in public decision making is doomed to failure, so the more appropriate course of action is to make a series of smaller decisions, examining the outcomes of those decisions in turn and adjusting. Furthermore, the objective of the policy-making exercise is better understood as satisficing rather than maximizing utilities, so that all that decision makers must find is a decision that is good enough rather than one that is optimal.

**Agenda Setting**

Agenda setting is the final element of policy process that has achieved a great deal of prominence in the discipline. Roger Cobb and Charles Elder were responsible for bringing the idea of agenda setting to a central place in the study of policy in the early 1980s. The basic argument is, of course, that nothing can be done about a problem in society unless it is identified and transferred to the active agenda of a political institution. Thus, one of the most important aspects of political mobilization is generating awareness of the issue and commitment on the part of politicians to attempt to deal with it.

Cobb and Elder’s approach to agenda setting was largely purposive, but later approaches to this stage of policy making emphasized the almost random elements of the process. In particular, Kingdon’s (1995) work emphasized the need for a “policy window” to open before an issue can be put on the agenda. This idea is not dissimilar to the garbage can model of decision making proposed in 1972 by Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen in the bounded rationality literature mentioned earlier, which argues that decisions are largely the product of the fortunate confluence of opportunities and ideas and actors. This is, of course, in marked contrast to the usual rational assumptions about how social and political decisions are made.

The agenda-setting literature has been expanded significantly by Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones’s (1993) discussion of patterns of movement of issues on and off active agendas. They used some of the same terminology as historical institutionalism, such as “punctuations” to emphasize the rather abrupt changes in the visibility and the salience of policy problems. Their plotting of the dynamics of agenda in American politics has generated a large new area of inquiry in the United States and in other countries that has made significant progress in mapping the sources of policy change and the political foundations of policy choices.

**Policy Causes Politics**

A second strand of theorizing about policy in political science, developed or initiated by Theodore J. Lowi (1972), has to some extent reversed the logic of the process model, arguing that policy produces politics. This model involves the assumption that four fundamental types of policy tend to be associated with certain types of political action. They are distributive, constituent, regulative, and redistributive. For example, redistributive policies are assumed to be associated with the immediate applicability of coercion focused on the environment of conduct rather than on the conduct itself. In 1974 Robert H. Salisbury and John P. Heinz used a similar set of policy variables, although relating them more to the types of demands being placed on the policy-making system and the degree of fragmentation of that policy-making system.

The model developed by Lowi has motivated a great deal of empirical research as well as a number of theoretical critiques. Perhaps the most fundamental contribution has been, however, to make political scientists think about policies in more analytic categories. There is always the tendency to think about policies in terms of the names one finds on government buildings—agriculture, defense, housing, and so on. That manner of thinking is useful, but only up to a point, and it may mask some of the internal variations in individual policy areas.

A slightly different version of the “policy causes politics” approach is the argument made by Gary Freeman and others that the differences across political systems are not as great as the differences across policy areas. The technical and political foundations of a policy area such as health may be more similar across countries than are those foundations for disparate policy areas within a single system. As policy ideas spread across national boundaries, these common aspects of policy may become more similar. Pressures from globalization
and from Europeanization have tended to homogenize policy across national boundaries, further reinforcing Freeman’s argument.

**Policy Styles**

To understand public policy, it is important to consider the policy choices made by any one country (or subnational unit). It is also important to compare those choices with the choices made by other countries. This comparison could be done on a policy-by-policy basis, as described for the welfare state below, or the policy-making style of the political system in question could be typified. In this case, rather than policy being assumed to cause policy, policy is used to characterize the political systems; policy becomes the lens through which to compare those systems.

Jeremy Richardson made the first major analysis of policy styles in Western Europe, arguing that the policy styles in these countries could be characterized by two variables. One was an active–reactive dimension, assessing whether a county attempted to anticipate policy problems, and, if so, to what extent, or simply waited until the problem appeared. The other dimension was one of imposition versus negotiation, reflecting in part patterns of corporatist interest intermediation in some political systems.

Almost all the research on policy styles has been done on the industrialized democracies. This pattern has the advantage of holding some important variables, notably wealth and democracy, relatively constant. There have been some attempts to assess the policy styles of less affluent countries, generally attempting to build something on the order of a model of policy making for one region or another. In particular, a great deal of work has been done on the policy styles of Asian countries and their relationship to economic growth.

**Policy Instruments**

Implementation studies have been concerned with the ability to transform stated policies into effective action. The ability to make the difficult translation from law to action involves a number of components; one of the more important elements is the choice of a policy instrument, or tool (Christopher Hood, 1976). The basic idea of policy instruments is that the public sector can achieve its goals using a variety of different types of programs—subsidies, regulation, vouchers, and so on—and each of these instruments will have distinct substantive and political characteristics that will influence the likely success of the program being implemented.

While it is common to think of these instruments in more or less technical terms, it is crucial to remember that they do have a strong political dimension. For example, as the politics of governing have changed to cast suspicion on direct public sector interventions, many of the conventional “command and control” instruments of the public sector, such as regulation, have been exchanged for softer instruments. The choice of policy instruments may also reflect the need to build coalitions needed to get legislation adopted. For example, much of the federal support for university students in the United States is provided through private bank loans guaranteed by government. While it might be more efficient to have the loans managed through the universities, it was important to create a political ally in the banking industry.

The study of policy instruments leads to a number of other, even more difficult, questions about public policy and the possibilities of effective public sector intervention. The most fundamental issue that the choice of instruments raises is the possibilities of policy design. Do policy analysts, whether in political science or not, have the ability to design better policies? To do so requires some understanding of the causation of policy problems, the relationship of those problems to the instruments available to address those issues, and some normative basis to evaluate the outcomes of the policy intervention (Pearl Eliadas, Margaret Hill, & Michael Howlett, 2005). The design issue also raises the question of whether the simple functional categories we generally use for policy are sufficient to capture the complexity of the challenges faced when attempting to match instruments to the underlying dimensions of policy problems.

**Discourse and Deliberation**

The majority of thinking about public policy has used a strongly objective model, attempting to measure policies as dependent variables and then
finding the factors that explain those policy choices. Likewise, economic and utilitarian values tend to undergird much of this analysis, assuming that policies are best understood in terms of how they improve the economic well-being of the objects of the policy. One strand of reasoning in political science, however, argues that policy is best understood in more linguistic terms. The assumption of deliberative models as presented by Frank Fischer (2003) is that the discourse surrounding the policy, and the conflicts between alternative discourses, defines the ways in which policy choices are made. Of course, utilitarian values belong to a discourse, but they are only one among many possible sets of values that can guide policy choices.

Discourse and deliberative models are often best applied in areas such as science policy and some aspects of environmental policy where there are often widely diverging understandings of the nature of the policy. Herbert Gottweiss, for example, has examined the deliberative aspects of research on human biology, and there have been a number of studies of environmental policy that apply the deliberative approach to policy analysis. These studies have demonstrated the range of values that may be involved in complex policy issues as well as something of the ways in which those almost inherent conflicts may be resolved.

**Welfare State**

Although there are many policy areas, the discussion will focus attention on the development of, and then the challenges to, the welfare state. This special treatment is justified because not only have welfare state politics and policy been central to the legitimation of the contemporary political systems in Europe, and to some extent the rest of the world, but the welfare state has played a central role in theorizing about the politics of public policy. Furthermore, the study of the welfare state has to some extent integrated the study of policy, comparative politics, and normative political theory.

The development of the welfare state and the various forms that this policy regime has assumed has been a rich vein of research and theorizing. Gosta Esping-Andersen’s *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990) is perhaps the most famous work of this sort. Esping-Andersen identified three types of welfare states, based on the extent to which labor was commodified, and the welfare system was seen as replacement for labor or simply as more of a right of citizenship. Although the Esping-Andersen work has been central to thinking about the welfare state, a number of other studies have attempted to explain patterns of development and differences in the contemporary systems. For example, Peter Flora and Arnold Heidenheimer constructed a development model to explain welfare policy choices, taking into account explicitly the differences between Europe and North America.

Although the welfare state project has been central to legitimating the states of Western Europe, and in improving the quality of life for most citizens of those countries, the model for building a social safety net for all members of society has been under a good deal of pressure since at least the late 1970s. The oil crisis of the 1970s brought the cost of these programs to greater public attention, and those costs have only continued to increase. Furthermore, the continuing aging of the societies with well-developed welfare states will exacerbate the financial problems. In addition to the manifest fiscal problems of the welfare state, this model of governing has been the source of large-scale ideological assaults driven by shifts in the consensus that had dominated policy. Those assaults came from both the political Right and, less predictably, from the political Left, which complained about the depersonalization and bureaucracy of the welfare state.

The pressures on the welfare state have engendered a number of important studies that have integrated the study of the policies themselves with the study of comparative politics. For example, Paul Pierson and his collaborators have been concerned with the role of demographic and fiscal pressures on the erosion, or at least recasting, of many welfare state programs, even in the countries that have been among the most committed to this style of governing. Rather than being a simple economic response, however, these transformations are considered in a very political light, reflecting the variety of pressures being exerted on government and the internal politics of organizations within the public sector itself.

The pressures on the welfare state reflect the confluence of political, economic, and social change and the impact of that juncture of forces on
a set of very successful public programs. Somewhat ironically, the welfare state that had been crucial for legitimating the state has now become a source of delegitimation in many political systems. In an era of neoliberal economics and politics, these programs no longer have an uncontested place in governing but yet remain crucial for the well-being of many segments of society.

Public Administration

The third body of literature to be included in this entry, public administration, has been a component of public sector studies virtually since that inquiry began. Governments have always had to have some means of implementing their programs (see above), and the public bureaucracy has been central to that role. As important as public administration is in implementation, however, its role is not limited to that activity, and public administrators play a major role in shaping public policy and making public policy directly too. Finally, civil servants also play a role, and an increasing role, in linking the public sector and the public, so that public administration has become a central locus for emerging forms of democratic control over governing processes.

Bureaucracy

To this point, this entry has dealt with bureaucracy and public administration as virtually identical concepts, but the two should be differentiated. Public administration is the more general term, while bureaucracy refers to a particular organizational form, and especially to the ideal-type model of bureaucracy developed by Max Weber in 1946. That conceptual distinction does not, however, prevent bureaucracy being used as a word of opprobrium for public administration, referring to the perceived inefficiency and excessive formality of those public organizations.

As the concept was developed by Weber, bureaucracy was meant to be the highest level of development of rational-legal governance. Rather than oppressing the public, as is now often argued, the bureaucracy should provide both greater equality and greater transparency than the traditional forms of governance that it would replace. The reliance on law, the separation of the bureaucracy from political controls, and the development of files were assumed to allow citizens to know when decisions were being made in their case and to have some justification for those decisions. These patterns would be markedly different from the patrimonial administrations that characterized many governments at the time that Weber wrote and that also characterize many governments in the early 21st century.

Although the Weberian model of bureaucracy and associated model of the state were dismissed almost completely by reformers stressing markets (see the discussion of new public management [NPM] below) and/or social networks as alternatives to the hierarchy of bureaucracy, the bureaucratic model has made something of a comeback. Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert (2004) have argued for the emergence of a “neo-Weberian state” that would reassert some of the values of bureaucracy, albeit while retaining many of the reforms that have produced greater efficiency in the public sector. In particular, the neo-Weberian state is an attempt to recapture accountability for service delivery instruments that have become increasingly divorced from controls by legislatures and political executives.

The New Public Management

The Weberian style of bureaucracy not only produced a number of benefits for the public sector and for citizens, but it was also the focus of intense criticism. Rigidity, reliance on formal authority, impersonality, and overspecialization were but a few of the numerous criticisms leveled at formal bureaucracy. Beginning from the end of the 1970s, NPM (Hood, 1991) posed a series of challenges to the bureaucratic model and, to some extent, became a new paradigm for public administration.

NPM has been defined in any number of ways and has been argued to be both the salvation and damnation of the public sector. At its most fundamental, NPM implies at least (a) the use of market-type mechanisms for public policy and for public management and (b) an emphasis on the role of managers in the public sector, often using the mantra of “let the managers manage” (see Peters, 2001). To this core set of ideas in NPM might be added some notion of the citizen as an important
actor in the process, although citizens are more likely to be conceptualized as customers than as full-fledged citizens participating in a democratic, political process.

As NPM has evolved, the style of governing has become one of making the managers manage rather than merely letting them manage. Performance management has been one of the principal instruments for that change in emphasis. The measurement of the outputs of individuals and programs, and using that information to make decisions about budgets, retention, and other important outcomes for the organization and its managers, places pressure on those managers to perform as well as possible. To be successful, however, that performance must be measured well and there must be a means of enforcing the results.

Public Personnel

The people who work for the public sector are one of the crucial elements explaining the relative success or failure of administration. There is little disagreement on the proposition that the public should, to the extent possible, employ the “best and brightest.” Indeed, management in the public sector is almost certainly more difficult than in the private sector, given the absence of clear criteria for success and failure, the transparency of most of the operations, and the absence of control over many aspects of the personnel and budget systems.

Public personnel management raises a number of highly technical questions about the employment, training, and motivation of public employees, but there are several crucial political questions as well. The following sections focus on three political concerns: (1) the role of representative bureaucracy, (2) the politicization of the civil service, and (3) the importance of understanding the rewards of high public office, whether elected or appointed.

Representative Bureaucracy

*Representative bureaucracy* is one of the classic topics in public administration. The term was coined toward the end of World War II when it became clear that there would be a socialist government in the United Kingdom (UK) at the end of the war and that the implementation of what appeared to be a rather sweeping set of policy initiatives would be the responsibility of a civil service that was in cast of mind, if not of party membership, conservative. Could the new government expect support from this civil service, or would its social background prevent its whole-hearted support?

The question of to what extent membership of the public service mirrors the nature of society has both empirical and normative elements. The empirical questions require identifying the extent to which the members of the civil service are representative of the population, and especially the extent to which women and members of minority groups are included in government. The answers to these questions vary markedly depending on what level within the government is being considered. As a whole, the public sector in most industrialized countries does represent the society reasonably well, and often is more than half female. On the other hand, at the higher levels of the public bureaucracy, women, and especially minority group members, tend to be underrepresented.

The second part of the empirical question concerning representative bureaucracy is whether it really makes any difference. One version of the role of representation is a passive one, in which merely having women and minority group members in the public service is assumed to present a positive image to the public and to produce better outcomes. In a more active version of representation, those minority representatives would assume a more active role in governing and in attempting to use their positions to redress some of the inequalities that may exist in the social and economic benefits available from government.

The normative questions about representative democracy are based on the logic that the public sector should be a “model employer” and should demonstrate that more equitable hiring practices can be effective. They are further based on the logic of attempting to use the public sector as a means of addressing long-standing social and economic deprivations experienced by social groups, with public servants adopting a more active representational role in that process. These normative stances may not be as effective as their advocates might like them to be in improving the lot of members of society, but they do express some commitment toward social justice through administration.
Another important political question about recruitment of public officials is the extent to which political criteria are, and should be, involved in the selection of public officials. The logic of bureaucracy and the civil service is that public administrators should be selected on the basis of merit and that political criteria should be irrelevant. On the other extreme, however, there is a perceived need by politicians to have advisors, and to some extent also managers, who will support their programs.

Although the norm of a professional and depoliticized public service is certainly accepted in the industrialized democracy, it is also under attack. The movements toward a more politicized public service are generally subtle and the argument in favor of the movement is difficult to press overtly, but politicians clearly want to have greater control over their public servants. The movement toward greater politicization reflects in part the consequences of adopting NPM, with many programs being moved from direct ministerial control. Furthermore, contemporary changes in personnel management, reflecting the logic of NPM, have made it easier for ministers to make decisions about hiring that are not done strictly on merit criteria.

For many of the less developed countries, politicization of the public service is quite common. The failure to institutionalize a merit-based civil service reflects the importance of public service employment in less affluent countries. For politicians in these often clientelistic administrative systems, the ability to distribute public office is an important means of building a political power base. In addition, political leaders may perceive the need for loyalty from their civil servants, as well as commitment to particular policy agendas, which is crucial for their vision of development as well as their political future.

Although merit recruitment is the usual standard for a “proper” civil service, all public sectors have some place for political recruitment. At one extreme among the industrial democracies, the United States has more than 4,000 political appointments in positions that in many other countries would be career positions. In France and Belgium, there is also large-scale use of political appointments in ministerial cabinets that advise ministers and help enforce their decisions. In a number of other cases, a parallel bureaucracy may be created with political appointees to some extent shadowing the actions of the career public servants.

Decisions about the level of rewards for public employees are a final issue in personnel policy. Although there is a good deal of evidence that pay is not the prime motivation for individuals joining or remaining in the public service, it must be considered. Financial rewards are increasingly important because of the adoption of ideas from NPM concerning the opening of the public service to direct entry from outside. These rewards may be especially important for the top officials of the public sector, who may be responsible for extremely large organizations but receive very modest rewards. At the extreme, the Secretary of Defense in the United States, who is responsible for the largest organization in the world, receives a “princely” salary of $180,100, while his subordinates receive even lower salaries.

If we want to understand the importance of public rewards for the public sector, however, we need to move beyond formal salary levels. The formal salaries and visible benefits of public officials are but a small portion of the rewards for high public officials in many countries. At the extreme, the nominal salaries of the leaders of China are less than $100 per month, but that figure does not begin to take into account the huge range of housing, transportation, and other benefits from holding office. At the other end of the dimension of visibility, public officials in Australia and New Zealand receive few indirect rewards and are held to close account for the benefits they do receive.

The degree of rewards received by public officials, and especially those informal rewards received in addition to their formal salaries and benefits, is important for the legitimacy of the system as well as for recruitment. The relationship between rewards and legitimacy often represents a negative spiral in which low legitimacy makes it difficult for some governments to provide adequate resources to their employees, and therefore, those governments may choose to provide a number of intransparent rewards. They are almost inevitably exposed
to public scrutiny, increasing public cynicism about government and reducing legitimacy.

**Politicians and Bureaucrats**

Thus far, this entry has considered the role of public servants primarily as the providers of public services to the public. That role is certainly their dominant image for most citizens, but senior public servants also play a crucial role in the political processes of their countries. Although both scholars and practitioners had understood for years the importance of civil servants in making policy and in advising their political masters, the understanding was largely anecdotal until Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman (1981) began to conceptualize and measure the relationships more precisely. Their work has been the foundation of a number of other studies on the roles of civil servants in a range of countries. Although there are a number of differences across political systems and across time, the research does find that the same roles appear in most countries, although they may be interpreted differently.

The Aberbach et al. approach to the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats is largely attitudinal, judging the extent to which both sets of actors have attitudes that are conducive to cooperation and to effective policy making. These relationships can, however, be considered in terms of structural relationships. For example, Peters identified five ideal types of relationships between politicians and bureaucrats and then used those models as a means of comparing the styles of executive politics in a number of countries. These models ranged from the formal Weberian/Wilsonian domination of governing by elected politicians to an administrative state in which experts in the bureaucracy dominate policy. All the models were conceived of as ideals, but there were certainly empirical referents in a number of countries.

Finally, the relationship between civil servants and politicians can be conceptualized as a bargain between the two sets of actors. It can be argued that politicians give up some of their personal powers in this bargain so that they could create a professional and career public service and thus gain the loyalty and commitment of an expert body of professionals. Likewise, the civil servants cede their capacity to complain publicly about policies in return for a more or less guaranteed position in the structures of governing and a predictable set of rewards.

**Accountability**

While public administrators have a powerful role in governing and exercise substantial control over the public as they implement programs, these officials also have substantial influence over public policy. In both their roles—implementing policy and making policy—bureaucrats have been able to exercise their power with little direct control from the public (but see below). The traditional model of accountability for public servants was that they were accountable to their ministers (or to some other political official), the minister was accountable to the legislature, and the legislature was accountable to the people. Even in nondemocratic regimes there has been some sense of the necessity of holding public officials accountable for their actions, often to the hegemonic party rather than to duly elected officials.

To make the hierarchical model of accountability function effectively, governments have developed a number of instruments that enable political officials, and the public, to detect malfeasance and to force some reckoning for failures (whether of commission or omission). These instruments are too numerous and beyond the scope of this entry, but some generalizations should at least be mentioned here. One is that many of the instruments for accountability are internal to the executive branch of government, and they require ministers (and other public servants) to exercise control over their subordinates.

A second generalization about hierarchical forms of accountability is that legislatures have played a central role. This role is easier for well-staffed legislatures with strong committees, such as the U.S. Congress, but it is true even for the less well-resourced legislatures. In addition, as cabinets and prime ministers come to dominate parliamentary systems, their legislatures appear to be using the enforcement of accountability as a means of recapturing some of the powers they may have lost. Legislatures appear to be adding staff and creating structures to facilitate this central function, but they still have a great deal to do to be effective controllers for the executive.
In addition to the revival of legislatures as a locus of accountability, public policy and administration have become increasingly influenced by law and the courts. Public administration has always been the implementation of law, and in some administrative systems such as that of France and those derivative of that tradition, there has been substantial *ex ante* judicial control. Legal means of control over administration have, however, become more central, especially in Westminster systems in which the courts had relatively little capacity to control the other branches of government. However, with the adoption of some constitutional instruments such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Canada, and the UK’s membership in the European Union (EU), the courts have gained a greater capacity to enforce accountability even in those systems.

To some extent, all these mechanisms for accountability, even those with a strong institutional foundation, depend on transparency and openness. If an administrative system can keep its practices hidden from the public and from political actors, then the possibilities for exercising control over that administration are very limited. The central role of transparency is at the heart of many efforts by international organizations, for example, the World Bank, to promote transparency and accountability in transitional and developing countries. Transparency is important for maintaining accountability in general, but it may be especially important in the ongoing war against corruption in these systems.

The traditional, hierarchical model of accountability was built on some heroic assumptions, and to some extent it is now being complemented by a range of other approaches to accountability that relies on a variety of different instruments. The most important addition to the repertoire of accountability instruments has been the use of competition both to identify problems in service provision and to find the means of enforcing control over less successful programs. This method of control is to some extent manifested in performance management (see above), and it further rely on the “customers” of programs paying attention to the success or failure of the programs that serve them and becoming mobilized politically if the programs perform poorly.

A final point concerning accountability is that we need to recognize the growing importance of output legitimation in many countries. The traditional democratic model of legitimation is that the political process, along with inputs such as voting, is central to legitimating government and its policy decisions. To an increasing extent, however, the public sector is legitimated by its ability to provide services. This change is, at least in part, a consequence of the NPM and its emphasis on service provision, but it is also in part a function of the declining centrality of political participation in many democratic systems. Furthermore, many scholars argue that the alleged democratic deficit in the EU, due to inadequate mechanisms of representation, has required output legitimation.

**The Centrality of Administration**

Although most citizens, and many political scientists, do not consider public administration as a central part of contemporary politics and government, it is difficult to understand what is happening in governance without understanding the central role of the public bureaucracy. Furthermore, the centrality of administration may be increasing as many political institutions lose some of their capacity for governance and the actions of public administrators become more important both for making substantive decisions and for linking state and social actors.

The increasing centrality of administrative actors in governing is to some extent a paradoxical result of some reforms of the public sector that were designed to transform administration and to make service delivery more market and customer driven. Although many of these reforms were directed ostensibly at the public bureaucracy as traditionally organized and managed, the net effect of the reforms has been to reduce the power of the political officials nominally in charge of government. In reality, NPM was a broader theory of governance as much as a theory of public administration per se. Its explicit demand was to let the managers manage; its implicit recommendation was that politicians should absent themselves from the process of governing as much as possible.

**Linking the Fields of Inquiry**

The preceding discussion has considered three major fields of inquiry in political science somewhat in isolation from one another, namely, (1) the role of representative bureaucracy, (2) the politicization of the civil service, and (3) the...
importance of understanding the rewards of high public office, whether elected or appointed. While that strategy helps clarify each of the three fields individually, it does not capture the reality of governing and the close interconnections between policy choices, the administration of policies, and the overall governance capacity of these systems. The purpose of political science can be understood as finding ways to explain why certain policy choices are made, why they are effective, and what their consequences are for citizens. All these three fields focus on what governments actually do to improve the lives of their citizens.

If we adopt the basic Lasswellian principle that politics is about transforming the life chances for citizens, then we should begin with the study of public policies and work back from those outputs of the political process. These policy choices can be conceptualized both as a dependent variable for the political process and as an independent variable for explaining the steering capacity of the political system. That is, the nature of the policy process, as well as the demands being pressed on the system, may serve some purposes well but may not enable the governance system to steer effectively. For example, Scharpf has pointed out that the design of policy-making systems in the EU and in Germany tends to produce suboptimal results, and hence the steering capacity of these systems is not as great as it might otherwise be. There are mechanisms available to overcome those problems, but they too may present governance challenges. Furthermore, in other cases, the outputs of the political system may reflect the interests of dominant groups in society, but by ignoring other interests, they may complicate its steering and diminish its overall legitimacy.

When beginning to think about the broader processes of governing with making policy choices, however, it is important to remember that making and implementing policy is not a final set of choices. Almost all policy making in contemporary political systems consists of revisioning and attempting to improve older policies, sometimes incrementally and sometimes radically, but there tends to be a framework for public action that must be addressed. That is, remaking policy, or policy succession feedback from the earlier attempts to make policy, is a crucial part of assessing the success and failure of those interventions. For comparative political analysis, the capacity and willingness of political systems to respond to feedback is one crucial element for understanding the differences in policy making.

The feedback process places public administration in a central position. There are certainly political processes for providing feedback, but the connections between the bureaucracy and the environment are crucial. Hood (1976) noted that the tools of government (see above) included both detectors and “effectors” and that the public bureaucracy was central to both. The involvement of the bureaucracy in feedback occurs in part through its connections with clients, and especially because of the role of street-level bureaucrats. The public bureaucracy may also be important in detecting more “objective” problems in policy, given the wide range of data collection in which it is engaged.

As patterns of governing continue to shift toward the greater use of market and civil society actors, the bureaucracy may become even more important as a locus for steering. The public bureaucracy is crucial for managing instruments such as contracts and partnerships and in providing the linkage between networks of social actors and the public sector. Political leaders may not have the technical capacity for some of these aspects of contemporary governing and may not be willing to engage in the continuous bargaining and adjustment needed for coping with networks. These patterns of governing may therefore be uncomfortable for many public servants who believe that they are being forced to make too many policy decisions and for politicians who may feel they have lost control of governing.

In addition to being linked through some aspects of the common problems with which they are concerned, these three major components of political science are also linked through theory. Each area has its own particular theoretical and conceptual issues, as identified above, but there are also some common theoretical strands that unite them. Perhaps the most apparent of these is institutionalism, and the fundamental assumption that structure matters. These three bodies of research all recognize that agency is also a part of any explanation; however, at the heart of the three, and perhaps especially public administration, there is also a strong sense that structures to a great extent constrain that individual agency (Peters, 2001).

While institutionalist approaches may appear the most logical means to link these three sets of
literature, they may also be addressed through other approaches, such as rational-choice models. Certainly, rational choice has been applied to both public administration (Murray Horn, 1995) and to public policy, providing a good deal of insight into these aspects of governing. Rational choice has, however, been applied to the more comprehensive issues associated with governance only to a limited extent. Although that has been the case, one can see how that application might be made. The design of governance structures can be considered from the rational perspective almost as easily as can the design of administrative structures or the choice of policy.

In addition to the central role of institutions in making and implementing public policy, a number of the central concepts in political science are relevant for understanding governing. Governing involves the use of power, as the public sector must impose its decisions on society and is often confronted by countervailing power within society. Power is often subtle and is seen as much in what does not happen as in what does. Governing also involves the use of authority and legitimacy, allowing governance without the overt application of power. The list of fundamental concepts could be extended, but the fundamental point is that public administration and policy are not distinct from the remainder of political science but rather may be at the heart of the discipline and its concerns.

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See also Governance

Further Readings


Goverance, Global

Few terms are as insecurely defined or controversial in a normative sense as *global governance*. A
major part of the problem is the word *governance*. How does this differ from traditional notions of government exercised by sovereign states and their legal subdivisions? Must governance be institutionalized and rest on national, legal, and moral authority? To the extent that governance exists beyond the state, must it be created by formal agreement among states? Or should governance be understood to include all forms and degrees of rule, exercised by states and nonstate actors, whether based on law and institutionalized or much less formal in nature? If governance is other than traditional government by states, from where does such governance derive its legitimacy? Indeed, does legitimacy actually matter if there exists a capacity to govern effectively? Does authority imply legitimacy or only effective governance?

Confusion is compounded by the word *global*. Is the analytical focus only on some form of world government—that is, a truly global manifestation of some form of rule that extends over all the territory and persons in the world? Or should global governance be understood as including all forms of governance, however narrow in function and limited in territorial reach?

The answers to each of these questions obviously affect the answers to still others: How old or new is global governance? How do present patterns of global governance differ from those of the past? This entry discusses several forms of global governance, including international governmental organizations (IGOs), international regimes, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the legitimacy of global governance.

**International Governmental Organizations**

Not coincidentally, even as *globalization* in the 1990s became a popular way to describe a vast acceleration in the volume and pace of transnational activities, so did global governance gain prominence in diplomatic and academic circles as a concept that seemed to capture the increasing challenge of managing issues that were beyond the geographical reach of individual states to address on their own.

The term *global governance* was associated early on in the decade with the Commission on Global Governance. In 1991, a group of distinguished public figures met in Stockholm and pledged to form an international commission intended to help build a more effective system of world security and governance. The United Nations’ (UN) then–Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali endorsed the initiative, and in 1992, the commission was established with 28 members from around the world, who served in their personal capacities. The commission issued its report *Our Global Neighbourhood* in 1994, making recommendations for the reform of the UN Economic and Social Council and certain other UN bodies. Few of the recommendations were implemented, so the report constituted more of a landmark than a watershed.

Be that as it may, the commission experience did seem to link global governance with the UN and, more broadly, with IGOs whose members are states. In the modern state system, growth in IGOs went hand in hand with the expansion of international law in the 19th and early 20th centuries. More than 20 times as many treaties from 1851 to 1950 took the multilateral form as in the period between 1751 and 1850 (Charlotte Ku, cited in Jan A. Scholte, 2005).

One trend was multilateral conference diplomacy, beginning after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, with the Concert of Europe, an informal consultation mechanism of European government officials. The concert convened periodically to deal with perceived general European problems, including arms races and potential clashes over imperial expansion, which was the main focus of the 1884–1885 Berlin meeting. Over time, the number of countries attending multilateral conferences increased and included some beyond Europe. The Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 banned aerial bombing, chemical warfare, and the use of hollow-point bullets; attempted to control the proliferation of submarines and armed merchant vessels; and established the Permanent Court of Arbitration. In addition, the two Hague Conventions, along with the later Geneva Conventions, profoundly shaped the laws of war and related matters, such as the treatment of prisoners.

Meanwhile, beginning with the 1826 Panama Congress, there was also a series of inter-American and Pan–Latin American conferences. The inter-American meetings eventually led to the creation of the Pan-American Union in 1910. Later inter-American conferences were overshadowed by U.S. military interventions in the Caribbean basin, but
after the Roosevelt Good Neighbor Policy and as World War II loomed, the Americas forged an almost united hemispheric alliance against the Axis.

Another parallel trend in the establishment of IGOs was that of functional and/or regulatory organizations that from the outset concerned themselves about global matters within the area of their expertise. What is now the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) was created in 1865 and the Universal Postal Union in 1874. An agreement on universal time coordination (UTC) based on the Greenwich prime meridian was concluded in 1884. Technical standardization started with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) in 1906. The International Labor Organization (ILO) was founded in 1919. Functional IGOs to date include a total of 19 UN-specialized agencies—among them, well-known organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the Ford and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO)—as well as numerous others outside the UN system, such as the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) founded in 1930, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and any number of other regulatory bodies at the regional level.

The aftermath of the two world wars saw a momentous advance in universal IGOs: the League of Nations and then the UN. Both organizations institutionalized great power control at the council level that seemed to recall the earlier Concert of Europe and were primarily, although not exclusively, concerned with peace and security issues. The same, by definition, was true of post–World War II alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, and the Organization of American States, which alone included a process for resolving disputes among its own members. On the other hand, economics was the focus of the Bretton Woods institutions—the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD—the World Bank), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and its eventual successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Likewise, economic recovery and growth were the central motivation for post–World War II European institution building that over time produced the European Common Market and today’s European Union (EU). Yet another area of concern for universal IGOs has been law and justice, including the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and most recently the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Overall, the growth in the numbers of IGOs has been so rapid that The Yearbook of International Organizations, 2004–2005 (Union of International Organizations, 2004, Appendix 3, Table 1) was able to list some 245 as “conventional” IGOs and another 1,743 under the classification of “other international bodies.”

### International Regimes

Foreshadowing later discussions about global governance, regime theory appeared in the 1970s and 1980s partly to explain how international cooperation might continue even as United States’ post–World War II dominance gradually eroded. This was a concept of what has been described as “government without government” that did not require a “hegemon,” or at least one dominating the entire international system.

Regime theory postulates that states cooperate through institutional arrangements, rules, or shared practices. According to Oran Young, the capacity of these regimes depends either on the ability of a dominant actor or on jointly maximizing shared interests. Some authors point out the role of influential groups of experts, constituted as epistemic communities, who define the problem at stake and suggest solutions; others, in a more functionalist vision, consider the regime as spontaneously emerging when it is needed. According to this perspective, states succeed in cooperating when (and to the extent that) they are able to form institutional arrangements or sets of roles, rules, and relationships of the sort we have come to think of as international regimes. This perspective attempts to explain successes and failures in terms of whether such regimes are created.

Regime theory paradoxically, for all its emphasis on states, was important not least because it pointed away from an exclusively state-centric view of global affairs. Rather, as Hedley Bull (1977) suggested about the same time, cooperation and order are as commonplace in international
society as competition and anarchy. Cooperation might result in the creation of constitutionalized IGOs—which themselves often proved to be more than the simple sum of their state parts—but equally significant were international treaties and other much less formal arrangements (“conventions” in a different sense) that shaped outcomes in particular issue areas. There were regimes to protect endangered species and transnational ecosystems, to curb nuclear proliferation and chemical warfare, and so on. Moreover, regime theory highlighted the prominence of epistemic communities linking experts inside national bureaucracies, IGO bureaucracies, and NGOs.

Postinternational Perspectives on Global Governance

Classical-realist international relations (IR) theory rested so firmly on the presumed egoistic behavior of states and assumptions about anarchy in world politics that it put little stock in international organizations and international law. Therefore, it is not surprising that IR theory was late in acknowledging the significant presence of NGOs, let alone in beginning to conceptualize their influence on and even direct involvement in governance both within and across state boundaries. In fact, there has been such a proliferation of NGOs in the past few decades that they have become increasingly impossible to ignore. James Rosenau (2003) describes this growth as a veritable “organizational explosion.” Many of even the most “local” among the millions of NGOs are concerned with issues that also resonate at regional and global levels, and many if not most such NGOs are networked with others that advance their joint positions transnationally.

The same reference work on international organizations (Union of International Organizations, 2004, Appendix 3, Table 1) cited earlier for numbers of IGOs lists 7,261 “conventional” NGOs and an additional 13,590 under the heading of “other international bodies.” Many of these NGOs have institutionalized relationships or are at least selectively engaged with IGOs. Rosenau (2003), for example, noted that NGOs were involved with some 70% of World Bank projects in 2002. The literature on globalization has tended to characterize the proliferation of NGOs and their transnational activism with the rise of “global civil society.” A related body of writings has built on earlier work on nonstate actors and transnational corporations (TNCs) to spotlight the growing importance of “private authority” in global governance and international affairs generally (see, especially, A. Clair Cutler, Virginia Haufler, & Tony Porter, 1999; Rodney B. Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker, 2002).

However, the NGO and TNC dimension of the organizational explosion is only one of numerous sweeping changes in the global system identified by Postinternationalists like Rosenau, as well as Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach (2004, 2008). They argue that these changes are the fundamental trends that profoundly shape patterns of governance at all levels. The central analytical challenge, as Rosenau (1997) expresses it, is how to assess a world in which the [domestic-foreign] Frontier is continuously shifting, widening and narrowing, simultaneously undergoing erosion with respect to many issues and reinforcement with respect to others? . . . Under what circumstances does authority along the Frontier accrue to like-minded states, to global regimes, to transnational organizations, to subnational entities, or to coalitions of diverse types of actors? (p. 5)

Postinternational change is the product of simultaneous processes of fusion and fission of authority. The first is reflected in the growth of networks that connect and influence the behavior of persons geographically far from one another. As has often been observed, some associations are falling apart even as others come together. In his book Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization (2003), Rosenau describes this dual process as “fragmegration.” The main argument is that “the best way to grasp world affairs today requires viewing them as an endless series of distant proximities in which the forces pressing for greater globalization and those inducing greater localization interactively play themselves out” (p. 4). The second tendency is the fracturing of existing political units into islands of self-identification that localize and often specialize authority and that may encumber efforts to deliver collective goods.
Postinternational theory sees the world today (also historically) as inhabited by countless actors of many different types that reflect different identities, are differentially engaged in countless issues, and exercise effective authority in particular domains and contexts.

Accelerating change is producing an increasingly complex universe of actors in global/local politics. Ferguson and Mansbach call them *polities*, while Rosenau prefers the term *spheres of authority* (SOAs). Polities are collectivities with a significant measure of identity and institutionalization, a degree of hierarchy in their organization, and the capacity to mobilize persons and groups for political purposes (value satisfaction). Some entities more clearly meet these criteria than others. For instance, most states, international institutions, TNCs, major NGOs, and criminal and terrorist organizations are polities. By contrast, most markets are not polities because they lack the requisite identity, institutionalization, and hierarchy.

Polities coexist, cooperate, compete, and clash. They often overlap, layer, and “nest” (Ferguson & Mansbach, 1996) and hence share some of the same “political space”—territory, institutions, issues, identities, markets, and/or cyberspace. Polities are all “becoming” in the sense that political evolution is constant, although they evolve at different rates and not necessarily in a unilinear fashion. In the postinternational framework, each type of polity is only an ideal type and assumes many different forms in practice. For example, there are many variations in the structures and processes of cities and empires, and the same is plainly true of sovereign states, IGOs, NGOs, TNCs, and so on—not to mention hybrid polities such as public–private partnerships or polities arising out of networks or alliances. The “domain” of any polity—its “reach” in political space—consists of the persons and groups who identify with it and comply with its directives, as well as the resources it can therefore command.

All polities are authorities and govern within their respective and often overlapping domains. Thus, governance exists within, across, and beyond the jurisdictions of sovereign states. Global governance, in turn, refers to the totality of discernible polity authority domains in the world. It is important to understand that postinternational theory defines authority and governance as effective influence or control. Authority need not be legitimate to be effective, although almost every polity offers some sort of ideological justification for its existence and behavior, and those that are widely regarded as legitimate obviously tend, for that very reason, to be all the more secure.

A postinternational approach presumes that another related assumption of traditional IR theory—that the world is fundamentally anarchic—tells us little more than that there is no effective world government. Human affairs are largely governed—that is, ruled on a day-to-day basis—not only by states but also by a multitude of individual polities that exist within, crisscross, or transcend individual states. Some of these polities are internally dysfunctional or inclined to disruption and violence, but many if not most act individually and collectively in a peaceful, fairly effective, patterned, and often predictable manner. This is the “real world order.”

**The Legitimacy of Global Governance**

Long before a global financial crisis triggered a major downturn in the global economy in mid-2008, there was a rising worldwide antiglobalization movement revolving around resistance to free trade and unregulated markets, to the Washington Consensus model for development, and to presumed threats to local culture, labor standards, and the local and global environment from more open borders and rapid economic change. The earliest mass demonstrations occurred in 1999 and ebbed and flowed in subsequent years at meetings of global economic institutions, the G7 (+1), G20, and the World Economic Forum at Davos. For most of the antiglobalization protesters, global governance was and continues to be a symbol of unrestrained economic liberalism and thus something that is inherently illegitimate.

Among scholars, policymakers, and attentive publics more favorably inclined to a globalizing world, there has also arisen a separate debate about the legitimacy of international institutions and other actors engaged in global governance. This discussion has usually been framed as concern about a “democratic deficit” in global governance. In sum, the ideal notion of governance in liberal democratic states has been that it derives from the “consent of the governed,” expressed in elections
and other democratic processes. How can such an ideal be translated to governance by international institutions and other nonstate actors? Indeed, should the same sort of ideal apply?

In fact, from one perspective, the entire problem is vastly overstated. First, except for a few high-profile institutions such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and the EU, most global governance actors operate with little publicity and far off the radar except for those relatively few states and citizens most closely affected by their activities.

A second and important reason is that most of the states in the world are not democracies and many of those who claim to be have a serious democratic deficit of their own. It is not an exaggeration to say that most international institutions are paragons of democratic virtue by comparison with most states.

From a third perspective, the problem is minimal because states are the main actors in international institutions and regimes. In a legalistic sense, states thus “consent” at least to this governance on behalf of their citizens.

This third perspective is what Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane (2006) term “the Pedigree View,” that “legally constituted institutions, created by states according to the recognized procedures of public international law and consistent with it, are ipso facto legitimate or at the very least enjoy a strong presumption of legitimacy” (pp. 412–413). As they observe,

The Pedigree View fails because it is hard to see how state consent could render global governance institutions legitimate, given that many states are non-democratic and systematically violate the human rights of their citizens and are for that reason themselves illegitimate. State consent in these cases cannot transfer legitimacy for the simple reason that there is no legitimacy to transfer. (pp. 412–413)

Moreover, as Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2004) emphasize, many international institutions have a tendency to build on their initial mandate, which may itself be sufficiently ambiguous as to invite improvisation.

Scholarship on organizations generally (not just IOs) has made it abundantly clear that organizations routinely behave in ways unanticipated by their creators and not formally sanctioned by their members. Organizations that start with one mission routinely acquire others... They exhibit mission creep. They wander far from their original mandate... They develop new rules and procedures in response to new problems they identify. They formulate rules that are politically safe and comfortably routine rather than efficient or effective... [They act] like the bureaucracies they are. (pp. 2–3)

How, then, may we best understand the issue of the legitimacy of global governance? It is crucial to recognize that legitimacy is different from authority. Authority, for those inclined to a legalistic interpretation, rests on a legal right to exercise it. For the Postinternationalists and Constructivists Barnett and Finnemore (2004), authority is the capacity to “rule” effectively, which may be bolstered by—but does not depend on—law and general approbation.

Legitimacy, at root, is the widespread belief that a global governance actor has the right to exercise whatever authority it does. That belief may be influenced by an actor’s constitutionality, state pedigree, and internal democratic character and processes, as well as matters such as the actor’s reputation for moral authority or possession of expert knowledge. However, legitimacy derives fundamentally from a global governance actor’s ability to deliver the goods that its constituents (members and wider publics) need and want. Success in doing so, over time, establishes a track record and tends to attract broader support, identity, and even loyalty. Consistent failure, obviously, courts the reverse.

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See also Authority; Governance; International Organizations; Legitimacy; Political Systems, Types

Further Readings
Governance, Good

The concept of good governance has multiple meanings, but it most generally refers to a standard or model for how states or other political entities should govern and be governed. This usually includes a long list of normative principles to which these entities should adhere, such as transparency, accountability, inclusiveness, effectiveness, and impartiality. Quite commonly, good governance is defined in terms of its antonyms—that is, by referring to phenomena that indicate its absence, such as corruption, nepotism, favoritism, particularism, or patrimonialism. Within policy circles of the developmental aid community, the concept has been used as an agenda for reform of developing countries, such as civil service reforms, securing property rights, or installing judicial independence. Within the academic community, where close synonyms such as institutional quality or quality of government have been developed, the concept has been systematically linked to several highly desirable outcomes, most notably economic growth and long-term development.

The concept was first launched by the World Bank in the late 1980s and early 1990s in a series of reports that sought to develop a new strategy for aid conditionality. Previously, the Bank had refrained from taking political criteria into account in its donor policy. By demanding that recipient countries adhere to the agenda of “good governance reforms,” this stance was changed. By the late 1990s, the concept started to surface on the research agenda of several academic fields in the social sciences, most notably in economics and political science. To a considerable extent, this development was propelled by the appearance of empirical measures, or worldwide governance indicators, made publicly available by the World Bank Institute.

To apprehend the scope of meanings attached to the concept, a series of distinctions is needed. First, good governance may be defined in terms of what it is (as a good in itself) or in terms of what it is good for (e.g., good for economic development). The former may be called an internal definition and the latter an external (or functionalist) definition of good governance. In the internal case, some proper- ties of the governance system of a country must be singled out in advance, together with a notion of why these properties make the system better or of a higher quality. This could, for example, be the idea that good governance is to be equated with the rule of law. Countries abiding by this principle are then considered to have good governance, regardless of whether the rule of law leads to other desirable consequences. In the external case, empirical scrutiny is required to determine what properties of the system are considered to be good, namely, those that are found to exert an influence on some preferable, external outcome. In this case too, rule of law might be considered to be part of good governance but only to the extent that rule of law can be shown to influence, for example, economic growth or other desirable phenomena.
Second, good governance may be defined in terms of procedures or policy content. Procedural definitions refer to regulatory principles, codes of conduct, norms, or other value-laden criteria that constrain the forms in which politics may be conducted. Definitions demanding certain contents, by contrast, require certain policies to be enacted by the political system, such as market deregulation or state privatization.

Third, there is a fundamental difference between procedural definitions referring to the input and the output sides of the political system. The former, where access to public authority is regulated, is the realm of decision-making bodies, such as parliaments, cabinets, juntas, party executive committees, or royal councils. The output side concerns, instead, the exercise of public authority: how reforms are implemented, rules enforced, court cases decided, and so on. This is the realm of the public administration, the courts, and the law enforcement bodies of the state apparatus. Different regulatory principles guide our general thinking as to what makes different political systems better than others on these two sides of the political system. On the input side, democracy and the principle of political equality (one person, one vote; civil and political rights, etc.) is the most well-established norm. On the output side, key guiding principles are the rule of law, administrative effectiveness (or efficiency), and impartial policy implementation. The most comprehensive procedural definitions of good governance encompass all these normative views and facets of the political system, whereas other more specific notions concentrate on the output side, or even on certain aspects of the output side (such as administrative corruption).

The academic discourse has concerned itself with both the causes and consequences of good governance or quality of government. Starting with consequences, the strongest empirical regularity, as already mentioned, concerns the positive link to long-run economic growth. The theory underlying these findings posits that governance is key to shaping the incentives of key economic actors in society, in particular their propensity to invest in physical and human capital and technology, the key generators of growth. Most critical in this regard is the security of property and contract rights for a broad cross section of the population. Simply put, investments require transactions where a commodity at one time or place is traded for a return that occurs at another time or place. Key examples include borrowing and lending, a demander and supplier some distance apart, and the parties to an insurance policy. Secure contract rights (or contract enforcement) underpin beliefs among economic actors that their agreement will be carried out in these situations. Secure property rights, in addition, guarantees that the fruits of such transactions are not at some later point of time expropriated by the state or by other economic actors. Research on the determinants of economic growth has highlighted the importance of good governance or quality of government in securing these contract and property rights.

Other positive consequences of good governance have been uncovered in the literature. Some of these concern individual-level phenomena. Empirical studies show that corruption has a negative impact on ordinary people’s feelings of trust, not only in political authorities but also in one another (the latter sometimes being referred to as interpersonal trust or social capital). The more general governance indicators published by the World Bank Institute have even been found to be strongly related to feelings of happiness or life satisfaction. Thus, people living in countries with better working government institutions are on average happier than those living in corrupt and ill-governed countries, other things being equal. Studies of peace and conflict have also taken interest in the quality of government institutions. It has been argued that dysfunctional government institutions make both civil war and interstate belligerence more likely.

The literature on causes of good governance or quality of government is most refined in the area of explaining the origins of corruption, but key insights from this work apply to other, broader governance phenomena as well. There are two general approaches to understanding the prevalence of corruption or other forms of illicit behavior on behalf of government officials. The first is the principal–agent model. According to this view, a collective body of actors (e.g., the top political leadership in a country) are the principals who delegate the performance of some government task to another collective body of actors (e.g., the bureaucracy), the agents. As in any situation where authority is being delegated, the problem from the
perspective of the principal is that the agents may acquire specific information about the task at hand that they do not disclose to the principal, or that they may have other private motivations affecting their behavior than the goals of performing the delegated task. In the case of corruption, administrators delegated the task of collecting a tax, for example, may collude with firms and collect bribes rather than taxes. The principals will try to monitor the behavior of their agents by exacting legal remedies for those being caught collecting bribes. Seen from this principal–agent perspective, the level of corruption—or, more generally, the extent to which good governance is being upheld—in a country is primarily a function of the individual incentives and risk perceptions of the agents. The principal, in turn, may affect these individual motivations by use of control instruments such as increasing the effectiveness of the monitoring system and the severity of the legal punishment exacted.

The principal–agent model of corruption (or other forms of governance failures) has been a forceful tool for understanding this phenomenon, but it suffers from several limitations. The most serious flaw is probably the implicit assumption that the principals are benevolent—that is, that their overall goal is to promote good governance and quality of government in the country. In a more pessimistic (some would say, more realistic) scenario, however, everyone has something to gain personally from a dysfunctional system as long as a large enough body of actors continues to play foul. This may be called the collective action theory of good governance and quality of government in the country. In a more pessimistic (some would say, more realistic) scenario, however, everyone has something to gain personally from a dysfunctional system as long as a large enough body of actors continues to play foul. This may be called the collective action theory of good governance and quality of government in the country. In a more pessimistic (some would say, more realistic) scenario, however, everyone has something to gain personally from a dysfunctional system as long as a large enough body of actors continues to play foul. This may be called the collective action theory of good governance and quality of government in the country.

The study of good governance or quality of government is a fairly new and rapidly growing field of research. The future of this field will in large part hinge on how well the literature resolves a number of tensions inherent in the concept itself. These include, above all, the tensions between narrow (e.g., corruption) and broader (e.g., impartial government institutions) concepts of good governance, between functionalist and internal understandings, between definitions referring to policy contents and those referring to procedures, and between definitions stressing the input and those stressing the output side of the political system.

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See also Corruption; Corruption, Administrative; Rule of Law; State Collapse; State Failure; State Formation

Further Readings

**Governance, Informal**

Many academic observers would argue that we have witnessed a shift from government to governance over the past decennia, reflected in “softer” and more indirect steering mechanisms. Governance also involves more interaction between...
public authorities and other social actors. Still, from a distance, the discussion seems rather confusing, in that different meanings of the concept of governance are used in the literature. According to a few European scholars, the term governance basically refers to “new” ideas related to the involvement of society in the process of governing. According to some American specialists, on the other hand, the term retains much of its original steering conception. To overcome this conceptual challenge, one may understand governance as consisting of four activities:

1. the process of articulating common priorities,
2. the process of bringing coherence to these priorities,
3. the process of and capacity for steering, and
4. the processes of establishing some form of accountability.

Based on this perspective, this entry explains the characteristics of informal governance and the different forms it takes and discusses how informal governance may be evaluated in terms of effectiveness and democracy.

Governance can assume many different forms and can be classified along different dimensions. Focusing on the extent of formality, one can argue that governance is formal when the production of authoritative decisions and actions takes place in a single hierarchical structure, such as a democratically elected legislative assembly and government.

Moving to the opposite pole, informal governance means that the production of public values arises from the interaction of a plethora of public and private and collective and individual actors. The mechanisms in use depend, moreover, to some extent on the cooperation of the involved nongovernmental actors. Informal governance means that participation in the decision-making process is not yet or cannot in fact be codified and publicly enforced. But it may also mean that a certain group of decision makers agree informally to advocate or enact particular policies, while still acting in formal decision-making contexts.

Informal governance is not new, nor should it be associated with specific institutions or levels of government. Governments have been engaged in informal governance since time immemorial, and informal governance can be found in institutions such as the European Union (EU), as in national, regional, and local policy processes.

**Why Informal Governance?**

Although not new, governments have come to rely more heavily on informal governance. Many reasons exist for this shift toward informality. One is the declining trust in, and respect for, government in many countries. As most formal instruments of governance rely on a government’s legitimate authority to be effective, the waning of legitimacy makes traditional instruments less certain. Likewise, governments have experienced direct mechanisms as costly and inefficient, compared with the use of the private sector as partners in implementation. Governments are seldom the sole proprietors of expert knowledge, often needing to rely on other institutions’ expert knowledge, and a wide range of stakeholders wish to participate in the policy process. Ideological changes toward “new public management” and a “network society” have also stressed the need to move away from direct government involvement to more indirect forms of governing and informal governance.

Some argue that informal governance is propelled by the EU, and to a significant extent, informal governance can be claimed to be a necessary part of the EU system, because the EU can often actually make policy by way of informal routes and networking. One example of this is the Eurogroup: the circle of finance ministers arguably shaping European economic governance by pre-agreeing on all critical decisions made by the council, deciding on overall orientation of economic governance in the euro area, and establishing common interpretations of the European Monetary Union’s (EMU’s) core policy instruments. In spite of its important role, the Eurogroup is seen as administratively precarious and only semirecognized by law. It is formally recognized that it should meet informally, and consequently neither a secretariat nor a Eurogroup mailbox exists in Brussels.

**Forms of Informal Governance**

Even if informal governance appears as a concept in the literature, one should not treat all forms as virtually identical. These interventions in the name
of, if not by, the public itself need to be invested more carefully, and one should attempt to put into perspective the various political, economic, and administrative logics of choice involved.

One way to categorize different forms of informal governance, proposed by B. Guy Peters, is to divide informal governance into soft law, networks, partnerships, coproduction, multilevel governance, and the so-called open method of coordination.

The basic idea of soft law is that the public sector does not establish all the rules for action but permits social actors to bargain within a broader established policy statement. One example is negotiated rule making in the United States, where the affected parties and relevant government agencies are permitted to bargain among themselves with regard to the final and operating rules. This commonly discussed form of governance stands in contrast to the hard law of legal command and formal regulations.

Network is a second type of informal governance, covering mechanisms through which state and society have become more closely linked. Networks represent a broad and general category of interactions that is grounded in interdependency among actors simultaneously keeping their operational autonomy intact. These actors interact and negotiate over a period of time, creating an institutional framework of rules, norms, shared knowledge, and social imagination.

Public–private partnerships represent a distinct subcategory of networks and a common mechanism for implementing public programs. The basic idea of these arrangements is that a relationship is created between the public sector and one or more private actors, intending to deliver a specific service jointly. Most commonly, these arrangements materialize as written contracts between the involved partners. Building or using existing trust is arguably a necessary condition to make these partnerships work.

Coproduction is closely related to partnerships and departs from the idea that the public sector will cooperate with private actors in the delivery of a service, therefore running the risk of devolving the necessary authority to these actors. Public programs directed at “neighborhood watch” and different kinds of user boards consisting of, for example, school teachers and parents have served as examples of informal governance—in the form of coproduction.

Multilevel governance is usually understood in terms of public actors who, through bargaining, make decisions and coordinate their actions. But even if a clear hierarchy does not exist, multilevel governance still does not by definition include social actors. On the other hand, the use of these interactions, and the way they steer clear of the traditional hierarchy, may provide social actors with greater opportunities for influence.

The so-called open method of coordination, a distinct form developed in the EU, resembles to some extent the form of soft law discussed above. This cannot be defined as a single method, rather a variety of mechanisms, such as benchmarking and sharing best practices to change the behavior of the relevant actors (in the case of the EU, the governments within the union). But the basic ideas of benchmarking apply much more widely and indicate that this model should be understood as a more general form of informal governance.

Evaluating Informal Governance

Informal governance can be evaluated on different terms, and the specific forms mentioned above will to some extent score differently depending on which criterion is used. However, relevant literature on the subject tends to agree that informal governance has consequences for its steering capacity. Permitting a wider range of actors to become involved in, for example, policy processes means that their views will be known to actors with a formal capacity to make decisions. This may improve the quality of decisions and, thereby, prevent later problems when policies are actually implemented. However, this may also slow down the process and make bargaining among the different actors more complicated.

The most problematic aspects of informal governance are still related to democracy and accountability. Informal governance, whatever specific form it takes, means that some social actors become part of the public policy process, while others do not. To evaluate informal governance in democratic terms, questions need to be raised about authority, participation, and assurance: Who has the authority to invite participants? Who participates and on what terms? And finally, how are justice and reliability assured?

Just asking these questions leads one to draw the inevitable conclusion that the existence of
informal governance definitely challenges core ideas about democracy. These challenges appear at two levels. From the viewpoint of representative democracy, we are entitled to ask whether informal governance can be developed in such a way that its foundation in representative government remains clear. But informal governance may also lead to a broader discussion about democracy and to whether the whole idea of democracy should be rethought in such a way that informal governance becomes less challenging.

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See also Coordination; Governance, Multilevel; Networks; Soft Law

Further Readings

Governance, Multilevel

Multilevel governance gained prominence in the field of European Union (EU) studies, where it was applied to explain patterns of European integration and the way in which policy was made and implemented within an increasingly populated European political arena. Feeding into the broader governance debate, which seeks to understand the challenges to governmental capacity presented by processes such as hollowing out and fragmentation, multilevel governance highlights the vertical relations between actors and institutions across various territorial levels, alongside the transforming horizontal relationships between state and nonstate actors. Proponents of multilevel governance reject the state-centricity of many alternative accounts to highlight the blurring of boundaries between domestic and international politics, wherein authority is increasingly shared across levels. In turn, the growing multiplicity of both state and nonstate participants and of policy implementation is highlighted. A key empirical question underpinning theories of multilevel governance is therefore the extent to which central governments are subsequently losing their authority and capacity to achieve their policy preferences. This entry identifies the commonly understood strands that underpin accounts of multilevel governance before considering the various distinct forms that multilevel governance can assume. This entry then provides an account of multilevel governance’s major strengths, while highlighting the weaknesses identified, to illustrate its utility as a theory of political science.

Historical and Theoretical Context

The intellectual origins of multilevel governance can be found in the study of the EU. Influenced by the emerging perspective of the EU as a distinct political system, the term was first used by Gary Marks in 1992 to capture developments in European policy making. Prior to the 1980s, the study of the EU and the process of European integration were dominated by approaches that were influenced by the field of international relations (IR). Drawing on the tradition of pluralism within IR studies, the neo-functionalist approach, which prevailed in the late 1950s and early 1960s, suggested that despite their initiation of the integration process, national governments were increasingly losing control in a complex network of state and nonstate actors. The neo-functionalist perspective was not unanimously accepted and was countered
by the intergovernmentalist approach, which drew on the realist approaches in IR to stress the ongoing dominance of national governments within European structures. Its assumptions were strengthened by the reassertion of national authority and the continuance of national veto across the majority of policy areas, and the intergovernmentalist approach emerged as the dominant approach to EU studies from the 1960s onward. However, by the mid-1980s, the structures of the EU had begun to undergo a series of significant reforms, including the creation of a single market (the common market) following the 1986 Single European Act and the continued extension of qualified majority voting across a range of policy areas, which in turn reduced the scope of national veto. In particular, the ongoing shift toward qualified majority voting influenced new perspectives regarding the EU, wherein the EU was perceived as a distinct political system, with parallels to domestic political institutions, rather than simply as a vehicle, or process, of integration. In turn, greater attention was given to the role of subnational and supranational actors within EU policy making, which led to a reappraisal of traditional conceptions of center–periphery relationships. It was against this theoretical and empirical backdrop that Marks sought to move away from a two-dimensional analysis, centered on the upward flow of power from national to supranational actors, in order to highlight the effects of the downward seepage of power to subnational actors and their resultant impact on the policy process. He also drew on ideas regarding fragmentation, policy networks, and the role of nonstate actors to indicate the horizontal, as well as the vertical, flows of power.

**Essence of Multilevel Governance**

The burgeoning role of subnational governments as key actors in the European political arena has attracted increasing academic attention, within which multilevel governance has emerged as a key theoretical response. A central assumption of multilevel governance is that the process of European integration has meant that authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government—subnational, national, and supranational. In contrast to the earlier state-centric views, multilevel governance has stressed the apparently independent role played by subnational actors in the European policy-making process, suggesting that regional governments have sufficient independence from national governments to shape their own preferences and directly influence the EU agenda. In turn, as Marks has noted, national governments are perceived as no longer representing the sole interface between the domestic and supranational arenas. The theoretical focus of multilevel governance can be located within the governance narrative, which has gained increasing currency since the mid-1990s as a way of understanding the challenges of steering and coordinating policy making and policy implementation within an increasingly complex social system. Central to the governance debate is the ability of national governments to assert their agendas on increasingly segmented polities, wherein concepts such as hollowing out and fragmentation have been applied to suggest that national governments have become simply one among a range of competing authorities. Multilevel governance thus refers to the negotiated, nonhierarchical exchanges between institutions at the supranational, national, regional, and local levels, highlighting the vertical layering of governance processes at these different levels.

As with so many concepts and theories in political science, multilevel governance is without an all-encompassing definition, and disagreement exists regarding its scope and utility. Nonetheless, there are several commonly agreed strands. A shared starting point is the acceptance that decision making occurs at various territorial levels and is characterized by the participation of state and societal actors. In turn, this has meant that the identification of the discrete and/or nested levels of decision making has become increasingly difficult in the context of complex, overlapping networks. Within this context, according to Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders (2004), the role of the state is under transformation, as emergent nonstate actors seek to develop new strategies of coordination, steering, and networking to protect, or even enhance, their autonomy. It is important to note that multilevel governance does not necessarily confront the sovereignty of states directly, and it casts national governments as the most important pieces of the European puzzle. Nevertheless, by highlighting the inability of national governments to monopolize the policy process, theories of
Multilevel governance make important judgments regarding state capacity, suggesting that the sharing of decision-making competencies among actors at various geopolitical levels has involved a significant loss of control for individual national governments. This has been compounded by the shift away from nested political arenas to increasingly interconnected policy networks, wherein subnational actors operate in both the national and international arenas, creating a range of transnational associations. Instead of being explicitly challenged, EU states are therefore being melded into a multi-level polity by their leaders and the actions of numerous sub-national and supranational actors, [and] one does not have to argue that states are on the verge of political extinction to believe that their control . . . has significantly weakened. (Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, 2001, p. 27)

Reflecting on their changing capacity, many accounts of multilevel governance have identified the development of a gatekeeping role for state actors, wherein national governments act as a mediator between subnational and supranational actors to control access to the European policy arena in order to achieve or defend its preferred policy outcomes. Adopting the role of gatekeeper is perceived as enabling state actors to address strategic alternatives to zero-sum power struggles, as they seek to move away from “authoritative allocation and regulation ‘from above’ to the role of partner and mediator” (Beate Kohler-Koch, 1996, p. 371).

Competing Models of Multilevel Governance

In many respects, multilevel governance had assumed the guise of a conceptual umbrella, and it had been suggested that the breadth of its focus was sometimes at the expense of its explanatory power and analytical vigor. In particular, multilevel governance had been criticized for its focus on relationships between state actors across different levels rather than across different sectors, for being overly descriptive, and for overemphasizing the role of subnational actors in the policy process. Andrew Jordan (2001), for example, suggested that while multilevel governance (MLG) provides an “appealing picture of what the EU looks like,” it was “weak at explaining which levels are the most important and why, and what actually motivated the experiment in governance in the first place” (p. 194). This led him to conclude that “the most we can currently say about MLG is that it needs to be subject to a great deal more case-study testing before it can be adopted as a general account of how (parts of) the EU operate(s)” (p. 204).

In response to such criticisms, Hooghe and Marks sought to delineate two contrasting views of the organization of multilevel governance, which they labeled simply Type I and Type II, summarized in Table 1. Type I multilevel governance focuses on formal intergovernmental relationships at a limited number of levels. These jurisdictions are general purpose, bundling together a range of policy responsibilities, and the membership boundaries of each jurisdiction do not intersect. Alternatively, Type II is composed of specialized jurisdictions wherein governance arrangements are organized around functionally specific governance networks (Hooghe & Marks, 2003).

As this brief overview suggests, Type I and Type II multilevel governance have different intellectual foundations, and therefore, they seek to explain different manifestations of the policy process. With its emphasis on power sharing among a limited number of formal governmental levels—international, national, regional, meso, and local—Type I multilevel governance has been influenced

<table>
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<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Types of Multilevel Governance</th>
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<td><strong>Type I</strong></td>
<td><strong>Type II</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>General-purpose jurisdictions</td>
<td>Task-specific jurisdictions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nonintersecting memberships</td>
<td>Intersecting memberships</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jurisdictions at a limited number of intervals</td>
<td>No limit to the number of jurisdictional levels</td>
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by theories of federalism, which have been developed and applied beyond the parameters of individual nation-states. Type I multilevel governance is characterized as a “nested” or “Russian doll” model, wherein there is only one relevant jurisdiction at any particular territorial scale, which is intended to be stable for several decades or more. The bundling together of policy functions in a system of Type I multilevel governance is perceived to gain the benefits of varying territorial scale while minimizing the number of jurisdictions to be coordinated. Within this typology, nation-states remain of central importance, reflecting the emphasis given to national boundaries as a key organizer of political activity, and the focus of analysis is therefore on individual governments or institutions rather than on specific policies or issues. Alternatively, Type II multilevel governance reflects too many of the concepts associated with the governance narrative to present a fluid and complex picture of governance. Unlike the general purpose design of Type I multilevel governance, jurisdictions in Type II multilevel governance are task specific and organized around explicit problems or policy areas, their organization being flexible as governance demands change. These jurisdictions can entail intersecting memberships and can be organized across a range of jurisdictional levels, without being constrained by the nested hierarchical structures associated with Type I multilevel governance. Type II governance structures are intended to secure optimum efficiency in policy making and will be discontinued once they have served their purpose, in accordance with the emphasis on flexibility. Each typology is therefore based on a different conception of power. Type I is suited to dealing with zero-sum conflict about basic values, because it facilitates logrolling and cross-issue trading. However, Type II is effective in solving ad hoc coordination problems among individuals sharing the same geographical or functional space (Marks & Hooghe, 2004). Nonetheless, the two typologies are not mutually exclusive, and often, Type II governance is embedded within a Type I structure, for example, general-purpose jurisdictions can coexist alongside special-purpose jurisdictions; and formal institutions of government can actively assign functions to special-purpose bodies charged with addressing particular problems. The result of this has been described as a “baroque patchwork of Type II jurisdictions overlaying a nested pattern of Type I jurisdictions” (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 238).

Strengths and Weaknesses

Multilevel governance has made an important contribution to political theory and has utility across a range of empirical settings. It has drawn on a range of ideas and concepts in political science—such as internationalization, regionalization, complexity, governance, and policy networks—to highlight the transdisciplinary approach that is needed in analyzing many contemporary issues and challenges. In particular, the theory bridges the traditional dichotomy between domestic and international politics to emphasize the “blurring of the distinction between the two through the process of European integration” (Bache, 2008, p. 28). Although developed in the context of EU policy making, multilevel governance has also gained increasing salience across a range of geopolitical settings, being perceived as a far more relevant way of understanding intergovernmental relationships by moving beyond the characterization of the zero-sum nature of intergovernmental relations implicit in previous approaches. While it remains contested, the broad appeal of multilevel governance reflects a shared concern with the role of nonstate actors, the growth of intersecting jurisdictions, increased complexity across the policy arena, and the challenges posed to state power. In this respect, multilevel governance has made an important contribution to the broader governance debate, providing a theoretical model, the robustness of which has been reinforced by the later distinction between Type I and Type II, which highlights the relationship between vertically organized territorial units of governance on the one hand and the interplay between task-specific, horizontally organized jurisdictions on the other. Multilevel governance has therefore been seen to provide a way of understanding the interaction of complexity within and between all jurisdictional levels, highlighting the role of state and nonstate actors. In this sense, multilevel governance can be seen as having been successful in moving beyond simplistic conceptions of the linear exercise of power that was implicit in earlier intergovernmentalist approaches by focusing attention on the impact of processes such as supranationalization,
decentralization, devolution, and the dispersal of authority to semiautonomous bodies. In turn, multilevel governance can be used to sharpen questions regarding the mechanisms and strategies used to govern within a system of multilevel governance not just by national government actors seeking to ensure their influence in an increasingly complex policy arena but also by regional and subnational actors who similarly seek to ensure their influence.

Nonetheless, there have been several criticisms of multilevel governance as a way of understanding contemporary policy making and implementation. While posited as a counter to state-centric approaches, there are criticisms that multilevel governance has overstated the erosion of the governing capacity of nation-state actors, and it has been suggested that an emphasis on the plurality of competing interests has led to “fundamental questions” about the structure of power relations being “downplayed” (Paul Stubbs, 2005). It has also been suggested that multilevel governance has been overly descriptive at the expense of analytical vigor (e.g., Jordan, 2001). This was acknowledged by several exponents of multilevel governance, contributing to the delineation between Type I and Type II multilevel governance discussed above; see, for example, Hooghe and Marks (2003). Nevertheless, despite attempts at refinement, there is uncertainty regarding the ability of multilevel governance to “travel” across alternative geopolitical settings, with a distinction being made between the “theoretical vagueness” of multilevel governance as a concept, which can travel, and its precise and “rigid” modeling, which is unsuited to different contexts (Stubbs, 2005). A pronounced normative dimension has also been identified within several later accounts of multilevel governance. Despite suggesting that “there is no agreement about how multi-level governance should be organised,” Marks and Hooghe (2004) have argued that

the dispersion of governance across multiple jurisdictions is both more effective than, and normatively superior to [italics added], central state monopoly . . . that governance must operate at multiple scales in order to capture variations in the territorial reach of policy externalities . . . To internalize externalities, governance must be multi-level. (p. 16)

The normative justification for the application of multilevel governance has been perceived as a “very dubious elision” of “what governance should be, whilst a legitimate question in normative political science, is of a different order to questions of what governance is” (Stubbs, 2005, p. 69). Thus, as Bache and Flinders have argued, it is therefore important to distinguish between multilevel governance as an analytical mode and a normative concept.

Role in Future Political Analysis
While some aspects remain contested, multilevel governance has emerged as an important way of making sense of policy making and implementation in an increasingly crowded polity. Although its roots are in the study of the EU, the way in which multilevel governance bridges the divide between the study of international and domestic politics has meant that its utility has extended beyond the field of Europeanization and into a range of alternative analytical areas. To promote the ongoing salience of multilevel governance, a key challenge will be in ensuring that it remains responsive to the organic evolution of the political world that it seeks to explain. Returning to the study of the EU, the 2004 enlargement saw 10 further countries formally join the EU, which were joined by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007; and accession negotiations are going on with several other states. As the EU continues to expand east, it is likely that questions will emerge regarding the possibility of stretching a Type I jurisdiction of an EU that comprises upward of 27 countries or the extent to which Type II governance arrangements will be used in policy making and implementation. Another emergent issue is the extent to which the changing context of policy making, as perceived within accounts of multilevel governance, has challenged traditional conceptions of democratic accountability. In turn, this necessitates their reappraisal, as while different forms of multilevel governance may add to the legitimacy of policy making through increased efficiency, this may reduce democratic legitimacy unless new means of connecting citizens with these shifting locations of power are identified. Finally, as noted by Bache and Flinders, there is some evidence that suggests the emergence of unintended consequences
arising from forms of multilevel governance that are beyond state control, and a key future research agenda will entail making sense of their occurrence.

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*See also* European Integration; Europeanization of Policy; Governance, Good; Governance, Informal

**Further Readings**


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**Governance, Urban**

The term *governance* is increasingly used in urban politics, policy, and administration to signify activities related to public policy that are undertaken jointly by multiple actors, including some outside government. Gerry Stoker (2000) defines governance as “working across boundaries within the public sector or between the public sector and private or voluntary sectors” (p. 93). Although the literature has dealt with governance at different levels, the idea has special relevance at the local level, where solving problems or creating the capacity to act often involves mobilizing support from other sectors and other levels of government. This entry first discusses the evolution and types of governance and then focuses on models of urban governance.

**Why Governance?**

Social and economic changes have increased the permeability of policy making. The literature points to forces such as globalization and fiscal pressures across advanced industrial democracies, particularly because of demographic change and economic competition. Jan Kooiman (2000) describes this complexity as the growing ungovernability of society. At the same time, the demands and expectations of citizens have increased. Rising education levels, more critical citizens, and decreased trust in government have increased pressures for reform and alternative service delivery.

These reforms have opened up government to the market, and in some cases it has led to more participation at the grassroots level. As Donald Kettl in 2000 and B. Guy Peters in 2001 note, the wave of privatization in the United States in the 1980s and trends such as new public management abroad or government “reinvention” here have produced new contractual relationships
with private sector and nonprofit organizations. These changes have also multiplied quasi-governmental agencies and special districts. Most governance theory and research is concerned with describing, explaining, and managing processes within this new context, particularly processes of bargaining and cooperation.

While cities in the decentralized American system are particularly sensitive to business investment decisions, Stoker (2000) contends that fragmentation and interdependence are more generally high in urban policy across countries. Problems such as poverty and the redevelopment of distressed areas are not easily solved by government alone. Theories of local governance have evolved more broadly to embrace other types of local policy partnerships.

Types of Governance

Two general approaches to governance are identified by Jon Pierre (2000), and while these apply to governance at the national level, they are useful for thinking about models of local governance as well. One is governance as goal definition and policy making. Pierre and Peters (2005) define it in terms of four activities:

1. goal definition (articulating a common set of priorities for society),
2. coherence (consistency and coordination),
3. steering (finding ways of achieving goals), and
4. accountability.

In the literature on local governance, urban regimes or governing coalitions set the policy agenda and goals more generally within the community, in contrast to the more specialized governance relations in policy networks.

On the other hand, research on governance as networks emphasizes interactions within policy domains such as education, economic development, or public safety, as described, for example, by Walter J. M. Kickert, Erik-Hans Klijn, and Joop F. M. Kopenjan (1997), Laurence J. O'Toole (1997), Rod A. W. Rhodes (1997), R. A. W. Rhodes and David Marsh (1992), and Fritz Scharpf (1993). Interdependent and cooperative relationships in networks are often depicted as distinct from those in hierarchies or markets, as noted by Kooiman (2000) and Rhodes (1997). According to Pierre and Peters (2005) and Stoker (2000), collaboration, of course, entails costs in terms of time and effort, and processes of negotiation and compromise may also produce outcomes that are not congruent with the goals of all participating organizations. The research on urban governance as policy networks is often more prominent in European research, as local governments often have less autonomy from the central government and play an important role in delivering the services of the welfare state. But work on civic capacity and urban education in the United States also falls into this category.

Urban Regimes and Governing

Models of local governance arose in response to earlier debates on community power and contemporary debates over the role of economic development in American local government. In 1987 John Logan and Harvey Molotch, for example, depicted urban governance as occurring through local growth coalitions, composed of city officials and locally dependent businesses such as newspapers, utilities, banks, and developers. The most influential framework for understanding cross-sectoral governance at the local level has been urban regime analysis. A “regime” connotes a set of governing arrangements, and in its usage over the past few decades, it indicates cooperation across institutional boundaries, beyond the formal apparatus of government. According to Karen Mossberger and Gerry Stoker (2001), collaboration is a response to the fragmentation of authority and interdependence between the policy-making capacity of democratic institutions and the wealth-generating resources of the market economy.

Early versions of regime analysis emphasized cross-sectoral goal setting and steering rather than network, for example, historical variation in regimes, and suggest change over time in goals, resources, and partners in American cities. Their typology described directive regimes during the period of urban renewal, concessionary regimes in the 1960s, and entrepreneurial regimes that responded to later cuts in federal aid and capital mobility with economic development initiatives. For Stephen Elkin, regimes are also goal setting and
steering in the most fundamental sense. They are “constitutive” or formative institutions that shape the interaction between the democratic state and the privately controlled market. Elkin also depicts historical and geographic variation in regime types.

According to Clarence Stone (1989), urban regimes are governing arrangements also; but more concretely, they are carried out by a governing coalition, “an informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions” (p. 4). Stone’s work echoes many of the same themes found in the network literature—interdependence, congruent goals, the mobilization of resources, negotiation, and mutual adjustment of goals through interaction over time. The social production model of power in regime analysis is necessary to overcome the fragmentation of authority and resources. Regimes embody the “power to act” or the “capacity to act” rather than simply domination over other actors. According to Stone, the goal-setting and steering aspects of regimes are significant—urban regimes are more than economic development coalitions. They are governing coalitions that set priorities for the city as a whole. Over time, Stone (2005) has broadened the concept, arguing that regimes may vary in their stability and that cross-sectoral participation does not require the presence of business. The participation of other groups varies with the policy agenda of the regime.

Stone and his collaborators on education reform have formulated the concept of “civic capacity,” applied to cooperation within a more specific local policy network (rather than a governing coalition). Civic capacity is needed “to devise and employ formal and informal mechanisms to collectively solve problems,” but it also engages a broader range of actors than governing coalitions, including neighborhood residents and community groups as well as policy professionals, universities, nonprofit organizations, businesses, and other stakeholders in the particular issue. Influencing policy requires changing governing arrangements within policy subsystems rather than winning sporadic victories through interest group pressure. Some other scholars have used elements of urban regime analysis to explain cooperation in local policy networks—for example, in AIDS policy.

The range of actors, the motivations, and the difficulty of mobilizing resources and maintaining collaboration would be expected to differ across policy areas.

Other Models of Urban Governance

At the same time that urban regime analysis developed in the United States, economic restructuring and changes in the welfare state in many countries increased pressures at the local level and the possibility that urban regime analysis could explain new forms of governance appearing in many places. One study of 11 cities in the United States, Germany, and France found stable urban regimes in all three countries, particularly where there were locally dependent businesses. There are also instances where no stable regime has formed in any of the countries in the study.

The cross-national use of the urban regime concept poses some challenges, however (see Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). European institutional contexts offer markedly different patterns of resources, authority, and incentives for cross-sectoral collaboration at the local level. In Europe, greater fiscal support from central governments, more public ownership of municipal land, and other factors lessen the need for business involvement as a critical factor for the “power to” achieve development and support local services. In some countries, business is more centralized (as in the United Kingdom), or corporatist arrangements are largely worked out through the national parties. Stronger parties more generally lend a national character to political relationships at the local level, in contrast with the United States. Partnerships in small U.K. cities, for example, appear to be the result of top-down initiatives from central government rather than an expression of the social production model of power at the local level. Economic development partnerships are apparent in several Western European countries, but despite some parallels with urban regimes, the central government often played a large role in the formation and priorities of the partnerships. And European instances of cross-sectoral cooperation are not always setting agendas for the city as a whole. Furthermore, economic development policy in Britain tends to resemble a discrete
policy network with strong vertical links to the central government as well as business participation. As such, it appears to be closer to the model of networks within policy domains rather than a governing coalition that influences citywide priorities.

Pierre (2005) and Alan DiGaetano and Elizabeth Strom (2003) have argued for a broader concept of urban governance that is more comparative. There has been a burgeoning literature on local governance across many countries, conceived of as a local multi-actor collaboration that fits either policy networks or governing models. Studies show evidence of trends toward governance at the local level in most advanced industrialized countries and in some other countries as well. One edited volume containing studies of a dozen Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries reveals the presence of public–private partnerships in 10 of them. The authors caution that these “may not look like urban regimes” but that there is increased local economic development activity and greater dependence on other organizations outside of government at the local and regional levels (see Robin Hambleton & Jill Gross, 2007).

Conclusion

Concepts of urban governance have been useful for describing patterns of urban policy making in both citywide agenda setting and in local policy domains. While forms of governance differ across countries, the concept has described trends toward policy making, mobilizing the resources of multiple actors in governing coalitions or networks. There are many questions about governance that bear further scrutiny—the role and legitimacy of actors outside of government, the costs and difficulty of coordination, the consequences of unequal power within coalitions and networks for representation and for problem solving, and diffused accountability for achieving public purposes. All of these are important questions for empirical investigation and for theory, across different countries, policy areas, and forms of urban governance.

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See also Governance, Administration Policies; Governance, Informal; Governance, Multilevel; Regime (Comparative Politics)

Further Readings


Governance Networks

Governance is usually defined as the processes through which a plurality of actors aim to produce and deliver public purpose in the broad sense of political visions, operative plans, problem definitions, policy solutions, infrastructures, regulations, resource allocations, and public services. Governance can be provided by unincentric forms of government based on hierarchical command structures. It may
also involve forming multicentric forms of quasi markets where public and/or private actors compete to deliver goods and services on terms defined by elected governments. Finally, governance may take the form of pluricentric partnerships and networks in which policy decisions are reached through negotiated interaction among interdependent actors.

The study of governance networks constitutes a novel research field based on the “discovery” of nonhierarchical forms of governance involving networks of public and/or private actors. The basic argument prompting the recent surge in governance network research is that public policy, defined as common attempts to achieve a desired outcome, is the result of governing processes that are no longer controlled by the government, instead involving a wide range of relevant and affected actors engaged in ongoing negotiations that give rise to a stable pattern of horizontal interaction constituting a specific mode of coordination. It is this “hierarchical” mode of coordination that is dubbed “governance networks” in the academic literature.

The focus on governance networks has an empirical background in the widespread recognition of the increasingly fragmented, complex, and dynamic character of contemporary society. Fragmentation increases as a result of the functional differentiation of society into relatively autonomous subsystems and organizational entities. At the same time, the breakup of the sedimented forms of political alignment and identification spurs multiplication of political actors and identities. Complexity increases as a result of the growth and interweaving of crosscutting policy problems, and it is further augmented by the advent of new forms of risk and the blurring of the boundaries between institutions, sectors, and scales. Finally, new societal dynamics are created by the proliferation and interconnection of new spatial and temporal horizons of action. The contingent articulation and interaction of the different rationalities, procedures, and strategies for solving policy problems and exploiting new opportunities produces new and unpredictable developments. The result of the growing fragmentation, complexity, and dynamism is an increasing ungovernability of society that makes it difficult to meet the growing steering ambitions demanding that public governance be flexible, knowledge based, targeted, responsive, and inexpensive. The mobilization of the knowledge, resources, and energies of relevant and affected actors through governance networks offers a promising way out of this impasse.

Leading politicians and executive administrators seem to have taken governance networks to their hearts. Governments around the world and at different levels increasingly aim to govern at a distance by creating arenas for self-governance and self-regulation. Public agencies and managers are becoming linked through new initiatives aiming to promote joined-up government. Last but not least, public and private actors are brought together through the formation of different kinds of partnerships and collaborative governance.

After closer inspection of the definition of governance networks and a brief account of the theoretical roots of the concept of governance networks, some caveats regarding the discussion of governance networks are presented here. This is followed by an assessment of the merits and problems of governance networks in public policy making. Finally, some of the main theories of governance networks are presented before a concluding discussion of the major themes in the research on governance networks.

Defining Governance Networks

Governance networks can be defined as (a) a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent but operationally autonomous actors, (b) that interact with one another through ongoing negotiations (c) that take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive, and imaginary framework; (d) facilitate self-regulation within the limits set by external forces; and (e) contribute to the production of public purpose. Other defining features might be added, but this definition captures the essence of what are commonly referred to as governance networks.

This entry attempts to unpack this dense definition of governance networks by considering each defining feature in turn. First, governance networks articulate a number of public, semipublic, and private actors who, on the one hand, are dependent on one another’s resources and capacities to get things done and, on the other hand, are operationally autonomous in that they are not commanded by superiors to act in a certain way. The interdependent relations between the network actors mean that they are horizontally, rather than vertically, related. However, the horizontal relations
between the network actors do not imply equality in terms of authority and resources. There might be an asymmetric allocation of material and immaterial resources among the network actors, but since participation is voluntary and the actors are free to leave the network—and since the actors are mutually dependent—no single actor can fully exercise its power to exert hierarchical control over anyone else.

Second, members of governance networks interact through negotiations that combine elements of bargaining and deliberation. The network actors may bargain over the distribution of resources to maximize outcomes; however, to facilitate some degree of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration, the bargaining process must be embedded in a deliberative process that facilitates trust building, reciprocal recognition, learning, and common understanding. Nevertheless, deliberation within governance networks will seldom lead to consensus, since it transpires within a context of power struggles that breed conflict and social antagonism. Hence, outcomes involve a collective agreement-based compromise and tacit acceptance of decisions despite grievances.

Third, the negotiated interaction between the network actors does not take place in an institutional vacuum. Rather, it proceeds within a relatively institutionalized framework that is shaped and reshaped in the course of action. In the beginning, when a governance network is formed, there is no agreed-on institutional framework that determines where and how a legitimate decision is to be taken. However, the ongoing interaction of network actors will lead to the formulation of an incomplete and precarious framework of rules, norms, values, and ideas that condition the future interaction in the network by defining appropriate action. (Value refers to everything that is considered to have a value, be it material, ideological, ethical, or other, by most people/citizens.)

Fourth, governance networks are relatively self-regulating, as they are not part of a hierarchical chain of command or components of markets. Rather, they aim at regulating a particular policy field or problem area based on their own ideas, resources, and dynamic interactions, and they do so within a regulative, normative, cognitive, and imaginary framework that is adjusted through negotiations between the participating actors. Nevertheless, governance networks always operate in a shadow of hierarchy as public authorities and other legitimate and resourceful actors aim to facilitate, shape, and constrain the network’s preference and capacity for self-regulation. Governance networks that are metagoverned in this way only enjoy a bounded autonomy.

Fifth, governance networks contribute to the production of public purpose within a certain policy area. Public purpose is an ensemble of visions, values, plans, policies, and regulations that are claimed to be valid for, and directed toward, the general public. As such, the network actors are engaged in political negotiations about how to identify and solve emerging policy problems and provide new opportunities. Networks that do not contribute to the production of public purpose in this broad sense cannot be counted as governance networks.

Governance networks, as defined above, may have different functions. Some governance networks merely contribute to the exchange of knowledge, ideas, and experiences, while other networks aim to coordinate action in order to avoid conflicts and duplication of efforts. Some governance networks might even attempt to arrive at a common understanding of emerging policy problems and formulate joint solutions. Governance networks may also take different forms as they grow autonomously from below or are initiated from above, are open or closed, are loosely connected or highly integrated, are short-lived or relatively permanent, and have a sector-specific or society-wide scope. Finally, governance networks have many different labels as they are frequently referred to as planning cells, think tanks, public boards and committees, commissions, partnerships, and so on. The different labels, forms, and functions of governance networks attest to the broad relevance of the concept for describing contemporary interactive governance.

Theoretical Roots

The increasing prominence of governance network research is rooted in theoretical developments in organization theory, political theory, policy analysis, Europeanization studies, and international relations. The conception of organizations as open systems adapting to environmental changes—and the subsequent recognition that this environment consists of other organizations—paved the way for a new focus on the interorganizational exchange of information and resources taking place through
relatively stable forms of network-based negotiation. Likewise, the recognition of the limits of the corporatist and neo-corporatist images of Iron Triangles, linking state agencies and social partners in tightly organized decision-making arenas, spurred the attempts of political theorists to distinguish between different kinds of more or less integrated policy networks that may include a broader range of public and private actors.

If both organization theory and political theory gradually arrived at some notion of governance networks, the real breakthrough for the new focus on governance networks came in the field of policy analysis. Decision-making theorists revealed the limits of the rational decision-making model in the face of the complexity of increasingly fragmented policy processes in which social and political actors struggle to link problems and solutions in highly contingent policy decisions, and implementation theorists demonstrated the failure of comprehensive planning and top-down programming in the face of the fierce resistance of street-level bureaucrats, user groups, and interest organizations. The inescapable conclusion was that public policy making becomes more efficient if the key actors are somehow included in the policy process and develop an ownership to joint decisions.

The empirical discovery and analytical description of the European Union as a networked polity in which public and private actors negotiate within and across multiple levels and the current transformation of international regimes into transnational networks where private actors play an increasingly important role in policy making have further contributed to the development of theories of network governance.

**Some Caveats**

Policy making and public governance are not congruent with the formal political institutions in terms of parliament and public administration but take place in and through interactive forms of network governance. Some scholars tend to describe the result of this apparent shift from government to governance as a hollowing out of the state. However, others note that the growth of interactive forms of governance in the shape of networks and partnerships has not mitigated the role and impact of the state. The state may have lost its privileged position in public policy making, but many of the former state powers remain in place and new capacities are developed as central and local state agencies take on the task of metagoverning governance networks at different levels. As such, state power is not reduced; rather, it is exercised in new and subtle ways.

A common misunderstanding is that governance networks are an entirely new phenomenon. In many countries and policy areas, there are long traditions for the corporatist involvement of the social partners in the formulation and implementation of policy, and interaction between public and private actors is a key feature of modern government and a constitutive trait of pluralist theory. What is new, however, is that political theorists and central decision makers increasingly view governance networks as both an efficient and legitimate mechanism of public governance. This is evidenced by the increasing reliance on governance networks at all levels of government.

When discussing governance networks, it is important to counteract the tendency to perceive governance networks as the perfect solution to all kinds of public governance problems. Governance networks are no panacea. When it comes to the exercise of public authority, there are good reasons for placing this task in the hands of public bureaucracies that can be held accountable for their action and inaction. Likewise, when it comes to the production of fairly standardized public goods and services, private markets might provide good value for public money. Governance networks have little to offer in relation to these public tasks, but they have their strength in relation to the large amount of “wicked problems” in public governance where the nature of the policy problem is uncertain, specialized knowledge is needed, and there are many relevant stakeholders from different sectors and levels and a high risk of conflict.

**Merits and Problems of Governance Networks**

Today, governance networks are increasingly perceived as a suitable response to the question of how to tackle complex and crosscutting policy problems and governance tasks. Hence, both political scientists and practitioners praise governance networks for their potential contribution to efficient governance. Efficiency gains derive from the distinctive features of governance networks. First of all, it is
Governance networks are often claimed that ongoing negotiations among relevant and affected actors give governance networks a large potential for proactive governance. The network actors can identify policy problems and future opportunities at a relatively early stage and produce adequate responses that allow for adjustments in the face of new developments and changing conditions. This helps explain why small states with strong traditions for negotiated governance have done relatively well in the face of fluctuations in world markets.

Governance networks are also regarded as important instruments for the aggregation of information, knowledge, and assessments that can help in qualifying policy decisions. The network actors often possess specific knowledge that is relevant for political decision making, and when the knowledge of all of the network actors is pooled together, it represents an important basis for formulating and selecting innovative and yet feasible solutions or responses to the problems and challenges at hand.

In addition, governance networks are said to establish a framework for consensus building or, at least, for the civilizing of conflicts among the stakeholders. Governance networks tend to develop their own logic of appropriate action, which regulates the process of negotiation, the formulation of shared objectives, and the resolution of conflicts. Trust building through social interaction, through joint fact-finding, and through mutual learning further contributes to mediation of conflicts.

Finally, governance networks tend to reduce the risk of implementation resistance. If the affected actors are actively involved in the decision-making process, they will develop a sense of joint responsibility and ownership for the political decisions, even when they disagree with crucial aspects of these decisions. The shared ownership will oblige the stakeholders to support, rather than hamper, the implementation of public policy based on collaborative interaction.

The problem is that the potential efficiency and legitimacy gains of governance networks are only fully realized in well-functioning governance networks. Changes in the composition of a network and the presence of unresolved tensions and conflicts, weak and ineffective leadership, frustrations over the lack of clear and visible results, and external events that jeopardize the policy process tend to destabilize governance networks and turn them into inefficient talking shops. Careful institutional design and network management might prevent major dislocations and mitigate the impact of various disturbances, but optimizing the functioning of governance networks on all dimensions poses a daunting task. Even apparently well-functioning networks might cause problems for public policy making, either by enabling particular veto players to block new and innovative policy initiatives or by attempting to shift the costs of expensive policy solutions to third parties. To avoid such problems, elected governments and other forms of political agency must exercise their powers to overrule veto players and provide incentives for the networks to find responsible solutions.

Theories of Governance Networks

The concept of governance networks is descriptive, but the study of the emergence, functioning, and results of interactive forms of network governance certainly has explanatory ambitions, though not in the classical sense of aiming to establish deterministic causalities with a lawlike character. The ambition is to produce open-ended, context-sensitive knowledge that is relevant for the actors engaged in network governance. Explanation is established through theoretically informed empirical analysis of network-based policy processes and policy outcomes. The attempts of politicians and administrators to metagovern the relatively self-regulatory governance networks, the sociopolitical conditions and institutional design of governance networks, and the power struggles among the key stakeholders are central factors in explaining the outputs and outcomes of networked policy making.

Explanation of the formation, development, and impact of governance networks may draw on central insights from two of the main theories of governance networks: interdependence theory and governability theory. Both theories tend to view social action as driven by interest-based calculations, but they differ in their view on the prospect of overcoming conflicts and facilitating collaboration among multiple stakeholders.

Interdependence theory is inspired by historical institutionalism. It defines governance networks as an interorganizational medium for interest mediation between interdependent—but conflicting—actors, each with a rule and resource base. Governance networks are formed as a result of
Governance networks are formed through incremental bottom-up processes but are recruited as vehicles of public policy making by public authorities. The network actors pursue different interests through internal power struggles, but they are held together by their mutual interdependence, which facilitates negotiation and compromise.

*Governability theory* combines rational choice institutionalism with a systems theoretical view of societal development. It defines a governance networks as a horizontal coordination between autonomous actors who interact through different negotiation games. The formation of governance networks is seen as a functional response to the increasing societal complexity, differentiation, and dynamism that undermine the ability to govern society efficiently through hierarchy and market. Governance networks are viewed as gamelike structures that facilitate horizontal coordination among systems and organizations and are held together partly by the anticipated gains from resource pooling and joint action and partly by development of mutual trust that helps overcome collective action problems and mitigate conflicts.

Institutional theories of normative integration and theories of governmentality advanced by Michel Foucault and his followers also provide insights into the intricacies of interactive governance. These theories do not focus explicitly on governance networks, but they tend to view governance as a decentered process involving a plethora of public and private actors. While differing in the emphasis on the role of power and conflict in societal governance, both theories take an interpretative approach to social action, emphasizing the role of institutions and discourses in shaping the identity, perceptions, and actions of social actors.

*Institutional theories of normative integration* define governance networks as an institutionalized field of interaction between relevant policy actors who are integrated in a community defined by common rules, norms, and perceptions. Governance networks are regarded as a normative response to the twin problems of totalitarian overintegration and individualistic underintegration of social agency. They are formed through a bottom-up process whereby contacts established due to the recognition of interdependence are evaluated and extended on the basis of institutionalized logics of appropriateness. Over time, governance networks develop their own logic of appropriateness, and the network actors become normatively integrated through the construction of solidarity and common identities.

*Governmentality theory* implicitly defines governance networks as an attempt by an increasingly reflexive and facilitating state to mobilize and shape the free actions of self-governing actors. Governance networks are interpreted as a political response to the failure of neoliberalism to realize its key goal of less state and more market. The problematization of neoliberalism has led to the formulation of a new governmentality program, associated with advanced liberal government that aims to shift the burden of government to local networks in which the energies of social and political actors are mobilized and given a particular direction in order to ensure conformity. Governance networks are constructed and framed by particular governmental technologies and narratives that aim to recruit social and political actors as vehicles of the exercise of power.

**Major Themes in First- and Second-Generation Research**

Although the field of research is relatively new, it is possible to talk about first and second generations of governance network research. The first generation attempted to convince us that something new was occurring. As such, it was primarily preoccupied with explaining why and how governance networks are formed, how they differ from traditional forms of governance in terms of hierarchy and markets, and how they contribute to efficient governance within different policy fields and at different regulatory scales. The first generation succeeded in linking the rise of network governance to new societal trends, in fleshing out the distinctive features of governance networks vis-à-vis state and market, and in analyzing the formation and functioning of governance networks in different countries, in policy areas, and at different scales.
Slowly but surely, the research agenda has proceeded beyond the preoccupations of the first generation of governance network research. Governance networks no longer represent something new and exotic; rather, they are an intrinsic part of modern governance. At this stage, new and as yet unanswered questions have come to the fore and constitute the research agenda of a second generation of governance network research. The new generation does not constitute a clear break with the past as there is a considerable overlap in terms of scholars and research themes. However, the research agenda has been expanded to include a number of pressing questions. First, there is a growing number of researchers who are analyzing the sources of governance network failure and the conditions of success. Second, a large number of scholars are studying how public authorities and other legitimate and resourceful agencies can regulate self-regulating governance networks through different kinds of metagovernance. Third, the persistent critique of the tendency to view networked policy processes as depoliticized, managerial problem solving has prompted studies of the role of political conflicts and power struggles. Finally, political theorists and public administration researchers are paying increasing attention to the democratic problems and merits of governance networks.

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See also Governance, Administration Policies; Governance, Global; Governance, Good; Governance, Informal; Governance, Multilevel

Further Readings

Government

Government is a key concept in comparative political science that has undergone frequent changes in terminology and has different importance in the intellectual traditions of democratic countries. Its core, more current definition refers to all activities of steering within human groups, from tribes to the state and to supranational and international organizations. This entry first discusses the meanings of the term government and then reviews the main functions of government. In the third section, the different contemporary models of government are illustrated. The subsequent two sections examine the key institutional aspects of government and the new approaches to the study of government, such as the so-called core executive models, the rational choice institutionalism, and governance studies.

Terminology

In the Middle Ages, the terms regere and gubernare were used as synonyms. The tradition of English- and French-speaking countries derived to govern and government or gouverner and gouvernement from the Latin term gubernare, whereas the German-speaking countries derived their main term Regierung from the Latin word regere. The French terminology preserved the notion of régime,
which later was frequently used in a pejorative sense. The term ancien régime originally referred to the French system of government from about the 15th century until the French Revolution. Following Alexis de Tocqueville’s 1856 work on the concept of ancien régime, the term was usually not used in a value-free and neutral way to refer to the prerevolutionary system under the Bourbon dynasty. Still, Max Weber, in his political writings, denounced the “regime” of his country as “half-patriarchical, half caesaristic.”

In early-modern times, government and administration were rarely differentiated. Later, under the impact of the division of power theories of the 18th and 19th centuries, they were combined under the heading of the executive—as contrasted with the legislature or parliament. In the era of absolutist monarchy, government—defined as the auxiliary institution of a monarch—was the most important term. With the increasing constitutionalization of monarchy, government was no longer the leading institution in a political system but became a subsystem under the control of parliament and jurisdiction. Even in constitutional regimes with a dualistic structure but without a dominant parliament, as in Britain and the United States, the legal state or Rechtsstaat promoted the idea that government could not act without being empowered by a legislative decision. In Germany, positivist legal thinkers restricted the possibility of acting without mandate from parliament in the so-called justizfreien Hoheitsakte (governmental acts as an emanation of a sovereign will in the state, not underlying judicial review) in foreign policy and military affairs.

After the parliamentarization of monarchical regimes, the political power of government was increasingly differentiated from the mere technical execution of decisions taken by a common enterprise of legislature and government. New terminology arose due to the rise of the parties in parliament. With the tenure of Benjamin Disraeli as prime minister in Britain, the term party government came to be used to demonstrate the integration of those politicians who are currently holding office. Parliamentary majorities and the prime minister and his or her ministerial crew were united by a common organization originally though not yet provided for in the statutes of the legislature—that is, the parties or parliamentary party groups.

Outside Britain or the United States, there is rarely one homogeneous majority party governing the country. Governmental coalitions or Regierungskoalitionen are directed by various office holders with quite different names, such as the British prime minister, the French président du conseil, or the imperial or federal chancellor in the German and Austrian traditions. In the hierarchy of government, there are normally two or more levels. In Britain, the cabinet constitutes only the inner core with ministers of state and parliamentary secretaries. In the United States, government is normally described as the administration or the executive.

Key Functions of Government

In parliamentary systems, the government has several functions. Most important is the function of initiating policies. Quite frequently, parliamentary bills are prepared by the executive offices. Moreover, government has the increasingly important function of implementation. Research on implementation has shown that laws and decrees are changed substantially by modes of implementation in the hand of bureaucracies under the guidance of governmental offices. A third function of government is coordination. The office of the government leader has to ensure that policies and bills and their implementation are complementary and do not contradict each other. With the growing power and fragmentation of parties in parliament during the 20th century, conservative political theorists frequently complained that countries were becoming increasingly difficult to govern. Ungovernability was a polemical term that became a popular exaggeration of political reality in the 1970s. The highly normative debate on governability was a reaction to the growth of the new social movements—the ecological and right-wing populists. The more progressive analysts who fought against the conservative doomsday scenarios accepted the new society of movements. They accepted the ecological movement as a promising source of change in society. These theorists came to less negative conclusions about the populist movements, which criticized “the system” but did not challenge the system as a whole, instead directing their criticism primarily at individual institutions and at the behavior of the “political class.”
The postmodern cultural turn created other derivations. In France, Michel Foucault developed the expression *gouvernementalité*, which tried to link the mode of governing and regulations with the specific rationality of a decision. The mode of governing in this context aims less at direct influence of the individual and collective actors and focuses more on the indirect impact of action. *Gouvernementalité* tried to overcome the restrictions of an outlook that puts the sovereignty of state at the center of analysis. The dichotomy of notions, such as governing oneself and governing over others, is meant to strengthen the self-responsibility of modern citizens. Criticism in this theory is directed not so much against the existing governments and their institutions but against the underlying rationality of governmental aims and actions.

In the history of comparative research, the original term *comparative government* is rarely used anymore, and the dilemma of how to define government is avoided by adopting the new term *governance*, which came into use in the 1990s. In recent encyclopedias, “government” is no longer listed as an entry but is generally replaced by entries on “governance” and “governability” instead. In other professional dictionaries, only specialized articles such as “government regulation,” “government budget constraint,” or “government lawyers” and “government statistics” are included. In some European systems, the existence of federal actors and constitutional courts with certain veto powers complicated decision making. Postmodern politics developed this kind of cooperation with a certain regularity. Governance includes decision making not only via deliberation and negotiation but also through implementing bodies. Governance is no longer centered on the coercive power of the state—the incarnation of national sovereignty—although governance is not just another term for the market.

In a family tree of comparative politics, Philippe Schmitter in 2009 differentiated between three main branches of comparative politics: (1) *historical-sociological institutionalism* from Alexis de Tocqueville and Max Weber to Raymond Aron, Gabriel A. Almond, and David Apter; (2) *legal constitutionalism* from Maurice Duverger and Carl J. Friedrich to Klaus von Beyme; (3) *rational institutionalism* in the public choice tradition from Mancur Olson and Albert Hirschman to Anthony Downs, James Buchanan, and William Riker. Public policy and administration—no longer lumped together under the heading of “government”—could be studied under the auspices of both neo-institutionalism and rational institutionalism. Schmitter’s plea was in favor of “complexification”—that is, of using different approaches depending on the problem to be addressed.

In spite of the dominance of the notion “governance” during past decades, the term *government* is still used in various ways. In a recent essay, the political scientist Jean Blondel concluded that the governments are a recurrent feature of all social organization. In a broad sense, government comprises—especially in the British tradition—the central institutions of decision making, such as parliament and government. In 1930s and later, *government* was used in the broader sense of a whole political system. The classifications of systems since Aristotle, such as “monarchy,” “aristocracy,” and “democracy,” have been treated under the notion of “classification of governments.” Later, government appeared in subtypes of representative democracies, such as “parliamentary government” and “presidential government.” These prototypes were developed by Britain and the United States. In a parliamentary government, the cabinet is responsible to parliament. There is mutual dependence, contrary to the

**Models of Government**

Government as a subject of comparative political science in recent years is no longer at the center of scholarly attention as it used to be until the 1970s. The literature on executive government in parliamentary systems is often not written by political scientists. Biographies and journalistic approaches dominate (Rod Rhodes, 2006). Government was defined as an institution that has the authority to allocate values within a legitimately recognized set of institutions. Experience increasingly showed, however, that government was no longer capable of making the desired allocations. Complex arrangements rest on horizontal forms of interaction between actors, independent of each other and no longer embedded in one hierarchical structure. Such horizontal relations have always been studied by political science, as in the “cozy triangles” of interest groups, administrators, and parliamentarians.
dualism in a presidential government; parliamentary majorities can topple the government by votes of nonconfidence, and governments can dissolve parliament and call for new elections. In general, there are parliamentary governments throughout the European continent and in the British dominions. Presidential government in many variations was developed in Latin America and Eastern Europe when those countries were making the transition to democracy. Presidential government tends to be less dependent on parties, especially the parliamentary party groups. Under Charles de Gaulle, a semipresidential government with a popularly elected president was reinvented in France, a system that had existed in the Second French Republic (1848–1851), in the Weimar Republic (1919–1933), and in Finland (since 1919). With the third wave of democratization since the early 1970s, new variations were created in Eastern Europe, such as in Poland and Russia. As suggested by Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb (2005, pp. 8ff), in a postmodern media society the various types of executives are becoming more similar—that is, there is a “presidentialization of parliamentary government” that exists even in the United Kingdom.

Institutional Settings of Government

In a narrower sense, government “is” governmental organization, including the chief executive and his or her office, the cabinet, and the ministries. The varieties of governmental organizations depend on constitutional provisions, conventions, and standing orders of parliament and routine orders in the bureaucracy. In the governments of Great Britain and some Commonwealth countries, the government is dominated by the prime minister. In the French Third and Fourth Republics, the président du conseil was weak and ministers had more room for maneuvering. The British principle of “hire and fire” is rarely valid in continental government organizations because coalition parties and important politicians representing wings of the majority party limit the power of the head of government. The German chancellor system is somewhat closer to the British prime ministerial government, though it has always needed a coalition government—with one exception, 1957–1961 under Konrad Adenauer, and even in this case, the federal chancellor preferred a coalition to provide majorities for a case of less comfortable majorities in forthcoming elections. The cabinet or council of ministers was legally recognized for the first time, though rather late, in the constitutional laws of the Third French Republic (1875).

Beyond these legal principles, governments in most countries have developed informal traditions. In European parliamentary systems, governmental organization is hierarchical and bureaucratic. The collaborators of the chief of government are mostly experienced professional civil servants. The recruitment of politicians for important offices is determined by the strength of their parties. When the influence of parties is strong, the cabinet considers its leader as primus inter pares. This is, however, incompatible with the legal framework of the German government. Nevertheless, German history shows strong chancellors, such as Konrad Adenauer or Helmut Schmidt, and weak chancellors, such as Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Angela Merkel. These latter leaders were restricted in their power by a grand coalition of the two major parties. Such a chancellor has to set guidelines for all ministers, as mandated by Article 65 of the Basic Law. Some offices, such as agriculture or health, also attract exponents of important interest groups. Moreover, in the United States, the Senate has an important influence on the composition of government because it confirms the president’s appointees for certain government offices.

Several years ago, it was common to identify the United States with having an “amateur type” of government and France with a “technocratic type” of leader who usually came from a few grandes écoles (elite schools). Most European parliamentary systems are somewhere in between. As noted above, Germany is relatively close to the British type of selection of government officers, which could be dubbed the “parliamentary party type.” In systems with a high number of parties and the resultant fragmentation, coordination is more difficult, and governmental stability may be underdeveloped. The most important example was Italy before Silvio Berlusconi’s period. In fact, the highly fragmented party government increased the number of offices. With a strong factionalism within parties, as in the case of the Italian correnti, the government apparatus expanded. In general, it was largely accepted that coalition governments increased the number of offices. But
prime ministerial, single-party governments of the Westminster type contributed still more to the proliferation of offices, up to the point where one third of the governing parliamentary group in Britain held executive office. The “executivization” of parliamentary personnel had repercussions on parliament. When all the capable deputies held office, the remaining parliamentarians were weakened, and it was not easy to organize parliamentary activities independent of the government. Some systems, therefore, limited the number of ministers, as in Norway. The cabinet in a narrow sense and the government in a broader sense in parliamentary systems comprise a number of offices from a dozen to several dozens of governmental posts. In the presidential system of the United States, the patronage power of the president can result in about 4,000 nominations for government positions. In Germany, there are about 20,000 employees in the government in a broader sense, but only about 150 positions are held by secretaries of state and leading ministerial directors who can be dismissed at any time. German government in a broad sense includes also trustees for special tasks (about 27) and parliamentary secretaries of state who are parliamentarians, and as exponents of their respective parties, they connect government and parliament. Their main task is to support the views of government and to defend governmental propositions in parliament to find a majority of favorable votes.

Recent research on government in Europe increasingly turns to the study of multilevel government within the European Union (EU), characterized by the fact that most parliamentary legislation in member countries is the implementation of EU decisions and directives. The European influence on national government depends on the policy arena, most frequently in environment, agriculture, traffic, and communication. The least affected so far is the most important area for citizens—that is, social security (about 5%). According to Klaus von Beyme (1998), not more than one quarter of the laws in European countries are the absorption inside each country of decisions made by the EU.

New Approaches to the Study of Government

Three approaches have recently been used to study governments in order to overcome the conventional classifications of types of government: core executive models, rational choice institutionalism, and governance studies.

**Core Executive Models**

The six core executive models that have been differentiated by Robert Elgie (1997) more exactly indicate the true center of power than traditional notions such as parliamentary government:

1. **Monocratic government:** The key feature is personal leadership by a prime minister or president.
2. **Collective government:** Small, face-to-face groups decide policy, with no single member controlling.
3. **Ministerial government:** The political heads of major departments decide policy.
4. **Bureaucratic government:** Nonelected officials in government departments and agencies decide policy.
5. **Shared government:** Two or three individuals have joint and equal responsibility for policy making.
6. **Segmented government:** A sectoral division of labor among executive actors with little or no cross-sectoral coordination.

These “ideal types” are rarely found in modern democracies, but elements of them are combined in fluid patterns and sometimes one model succeeds another.

**Rational-Choice Institutionalism**

George Tsebelis (2002), in his approach to rational choice, posits that governments in order to change policies must get individual actors or veto players to agree. Institutional veto players are specified by the constitution and partisan veto players are specified by the party system. Tsebelis (2002) reverses the usual meaning of notions such as parliamentary and presidential government: “Agenda control most frequently belongs to governments in parliamentary systems and parliament in presidential ones.” If the veto players are differentiated according to policy areas, the old
taxonomy of representative systems is more or less irrelevant.

Governance Studies

The concept of governance (derived from the Latin term *gubernantia*) has a wider range than that of government because it includes all individual and collective interactions of governments with nongovernmental organizations, interest groups, social movements, and citizen groups. Even before the invention of the notion of governance, the governmental organization was integral to the communications network involving interest groups and expert bodies of political advice. Also included in the notion of governance are long-term policy networks and short-lived networks established for individual decisions. The increasing complexity of the decision-making process has contributed to a wide debate on “government overload,” namely, a higher number of demands that are difficult or impossible for government to meet. This overload contributed to the discussion on ungovernability that occurred in the 1980s. Governance studies have shown that the generic analyses of ungovernability were misleading, given the new forms of overcoming crises and deadlocks that have been developed in postmodern societies.

The term *governance* was first widely used in the subdiscipline of international relations where “governing without government” (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel, 1995) played a major role. Moreover, in the subfield of international relations dealing with developmental politics in the Third World, the term *good governance* has been used. It aims at finding normative criteria for efficient aid to developing countries. This approach was directed against an ideological motivation for aid to developing countries in the times of the Cold War. Later, the instrumental combination of multilateral developmental strategies and the ideological preoccupation of developed democracies for the promotion of democracy in the Third World were criticized by the elites in the Third World. Building on the resolutions adopted by the United Nations since 1996, scientific criteria for good governance were developed.

Governance gained a central importance for the discipline when *network* became the central expression for a great variety of interactions beginning in the early 1980s. *Governance* is a new term for old approaches that started with theories of neocorporatism on guided cooperation of governments and interest groups and theories on governmental steering when the term *planning*, which dominated in the 1970s, became obsolete. Theories of the cooperative government and interdependence management in the science of administration also prepared the road for studies of governance. The older approaches were clearly centered on “actors.” Governance was not only a new game of words but part of a neo-institutionalist turn in the social sciences. Governance approaches were built on the experience that policy formulation became more difficult in postmodern societies. There is more differentiation in the new century in the realm of interest groups and social movements than in neocorporatism—a dominant paradigm in the 1980s—aimed at cooperation between state agencies and main actors, such as organizations of business and trade unions. Self-organization in a civil society made “steering” less easy. The core executive was no longer dominant even in the area of traditional government because many governmental and para-statal agencies are involved in policy formulation and policy implementation and a new term—*agencification*—has been invented. In the name of new public management reform for greater efficiency, a separation of policies and operations was recommended by Christopher Pollitt and Colin Talbot (2003). Lobbying also changed in postmodern governments. Clienteles relations grew up between ministerial and para-statal agencies and organized interests, as Marian Döhler (2001) pointed out. Think tanks and councils of experts gained an important role in many policy fields.

Moreover, the role of the media has increased. Public affairs agencies and international organizations of attorneys that do not permanently work for the same interests grew in importance against the traditional organized lobbies. Privatization and liberalization of former state monopolies in infrastructure (e.g., mail services, telephone, railroads, and energy supply) have created new profiles of governmental tasks. The old instruments of government such as laws, persuasion and propaganda, coercion, and regulation developed a different relative weight. As already suggested by von Beyme (1998), today, there is virtually no institution that is “sovereign,” for example, “the
Granger Causality

Granger causality is the concept that if a variable causes another variable, it should help with the prediction of the latter variable. First, Granger causality is defined informally and formally. Next, the standard hypothesis tests used to evaluate the concept are presented. Third, the interpretations of these tests for Granger (non)causality are discussed. Then, some caveats and limitations are presented before turning to some common extensions and applications.

The statistical concept of Granger causality is related directly to the idea of causality and causal inference in the social sciences. In the (social) sciences, it is the case where two variables are causally related if

- the change in one variable temporally precedes that of the variable it causes,
- there is a nonzero correlation among the two (or more) variables, and
- the relationship among the variables is logically nonspurious.

Granger causality assesses the first two of these using a statistical test, leaving the third to the justification of the analyst. Granger causality analysis asks whether a variable helps in predicting another, which requires both temporal precedence and correlation. One of Clive Granger’s seminal

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See also Comparative Politics; Governance, Administration Policies; Governance, Good; Neo-Corporatism; New Public Management

Further Readings


time-series papers on this topic developed the statement of the concept and presented the most common statistical tests used to assess causality.

If a variable \( Z \) at Time \( t \) Granger causes a variable \( X \) at Time \( t \) or \( Z \), Granger causes \( X \), then the following three statements are logically equivalent:

1. \( Z \) helps predict \( X \) (i.e., it lowers the error of the prediction),
2. \( Z \) is not exogenous of \( X \),
3. \( Z \) is linearly informative about future \( X \).

The assumption that makes these three statements equivalent is that there is a linear relationship between \( Z \) and \( X \). Granger causality can be defined more generally and can also encompass nonlinear relationships. In this case, only the first two statements are relevant.

The formal definition of Granger causality is actually a statement of noncausality. A variable \( Z \) is Granger noncausal for \( X \) if the past values of \( Z \) do not help predict the current (or future) values of \( X \) over a prediction based on the past history of \( X \) alone. Under the assumption of linearity, then, this is the same as analyzing a dynamic regression of \( X \) on past values of \( X \) and \( Z \), or

\[
X_t = d + \sum_{i=1}^{p} \alpha_i X_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{p} \beta_i Z_{t-i} + \epsilon_t,
\]

where \( d \) is a constant, \( \alpha_i \)'s are the coefficients for the \( p \) lagged values of \( X \), and \( \beta_i \)'s are the coefficients for the \( p \) lagged values of \( Z \). If \( Z \) Granger causes \( X \), then some of the \( \beta_i \)'s coefficients are different from zero. Note that by including the lagged values of \( X \), the variable \( Z \) must add more to the prediction of \( X \) than its own past (and thus help minimize the prediction error \( \epsilon_t \)) to deem it causal. Testing whether these are equal to zero is thus a test of Granger noncausality.

Statistical tests of Granger (non) causality depend on comparing the residuals of the model in the above equation with those of a model where \( X \) only depends on its past values, or where one assumes that \( \beta_i = 0 \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, p \).

Finding that one Granger variable causes another depends on the information set or the variables that are included in a model. So if one were to introduce a variable \( Y \) that is causal for \( X \), and
correlated with \( Z_t \), one could find that the effects of \( Z_t \) on \( X_t \) work through this new variable. The same is not necessarily true for findings of Granger noncausality, since the existence of a variable that would turn a noncausal relationship into a causal one is nearly impossible.

It is important to note that tests for Granger (non)causality do not assess the direction of the causal relationship. The null hypothesis is that the past values of the variable \( Z_t \) do not help with predicting \( X_t \). Rejecting this hypothesis could occur if there were a positive or negative correlation among the past values of \( Z_t \) and the current \( X_t \). To interpret the causal direction of the effects of \( Z_t \) on \( X_t \), one typically employs a vector autoregression model or computes the dynamic effects of changes in past \( Z_t \) on contemporaneous \( X_t \). This is where theory helps identify that the relationship is nonspurious and provides some ideas about the expected direction of the effects of one variable for forecasting the other. Formally, impulse response functions or the vector moving average interpretation of a vector autoregression model are used to determine the direction of these effects. The vector autoregression model and its estimated effects will demonstrate the same causal relationships identified with a Granger causality test and provide the magnitude and direction of any causal effects.

The above definition of Granger causality is what is known as bivariate Granger causality. The concept can also be extended in several ways. The first involves the multivariate case. Suppose now that \( Z_t \) and \( X_t \) are vectors of observations at time \( t \). Then, we say that \( Z_t \) is non-Granger causal or block exogenous of \( X_t \) if the past values of the matrix \( Z_t \) do not help in predicting the current values of \( X_t \). The earlier test statistics can then be extended to their matrix equivalents and used to assess whether the past \( Z_t \) values help predict \( X_t \).

A second extension is what is known as contemporaneous Granger causality. A variable \( Z_t \) instantaneously causes Granger \( X_t \) if the contemporaneous and leading or future values of \( Z_t \) help in predicting the current value of \( X_t \). To test this hypothesis, one looks at the contemporaneous relationships (the \( e_t \) and \( u_t \) residuals for the vector autoregression) to see if there is a correlation among the current values of the series.

The third possible extension is to move beyond the assumption of minimizing one-step prediction errors. Multistep Granger causality can be defined by looking at the \( h \)-step residuals for a regression of \( X_t \) on past \( X_t \) and \( Z_t \). If past \( Z_t \) minimize the \( h \) periods of forecast errors in \( X_t \) better than the past \( X_t \) alone, then \( Z_t \) is said to be multistep Granger causal for \( X_t \). A final extension is to panel data. One can extend the same ideas used in assessing Granger causality in time-series data to collections of time series that are part of a panel of time series.

Granger causality is a useful test and tool for determining which variables help predict each other in multivariate time-series models. It is used commonly to justify which variables are included in a vector autoregression or other multivariate time-series models since it allows the analyst to justify different (weak) exogeneity assumptions. The point of a Granger causality test analysis is that one uses the results to support an argument about the predictive power of a variable on another in a time-series model.

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See also Causality; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian; Time-Series Analysis

Further Readings

**Graphics, Statistical**

Statistical graphics provide visual displays of quantitative information. While graphs have been an
important tool in the statistical sciences, their role and applications have evolved over time. In the past, graphical displays were generally employed for pedagogical purposes and to present the final results of an analysis. Currently, graphs are being incorporated more directly into data analysis itself, where they are used to provide insights and directions for further investigation. In this entry, the basic elements, major advantages, and recent developments of statistical graphics are presented.

Statistical graphs are used for several purposes. First, they provide a tool for exploring the contents of a data set; in effect, graphical displays enable researchers to interact directly with the “raw material” for their analyses. Second, graphs enable researchers to look for structure in their data; they provide a ready means to identify interesting features such as concentrations of observations at particular data values, covariance across variables, outliers in distributions, and so on. Third, graphical displays are useful for checking the assumptions of statistical models; for example, they can be used to examine distributional shapes of constituent variables or to search for systematic patterns among model residuals. Fourth, graphs remain an excellent vehicle for communicating the results of statistical analyses; they provide fairly intuitive representations of complex models that can be understood by broad audiences.

Of course, all of the preceding objectives could also be achieved through numerical methods, such as equations and tabular representations. But graphs have several advantages. For one thing, an enormous amount of information can be represented directly or summarized in a single well-constructed graph; therefore, graphical displays are useful for depicting large, complex data sets. At the same time, graphs are not as reliant on underlying assumptions as are numerical summaries of data such as descriptive statistics or model coefficients. And graphs almost inherently encourage greater interaction between the researcher and the data; interesting features stand out immediately and graphs provide the means to pursue them to gain further insights.

**Historical Evolution**

The earliest “modern” graphical displays, generated during the Enlightenment period of the 17th and 18th centuries, downplayed depictions of empirical data in favor of graphing the abstract functions that seemed to describe the dynamics of the observable universe. But a minor scientific revolution occurred at the end of the 18th century, when an iconoclastic Scottish political commentator, William Playfair, published *The Commercial and Political Atlas* (various editions were produced between 1786 and 1801) and the *Statistical Breviary* (1801). The substantive objective for each of these books was to provide information about the British economy, relative to other nations. But they are remembered largely because Playfair developed a number of graphical displays to illustrate his data and support his arguments. Playfair’s innovations would be recognizable immediately to a modern reader; they include bar charts, pie charts, and line charts.

During the 19th century, graphs were used widely in scientific communications. This period is characterized by the use of creative pictorial devices to convey information as efficiently as possible. For example, a famous map by French engineer Charles Joseph Minard depicts Napoleon’s march during the Russian campaign of 1812. It has been hailed as the finest statistical graphic, in large part because it encodes information about six different variables into a single display. Graphical representations of empirical information waned once again during the first half of the 20th century. During this period, statisticians turned their attention to confirmatory methods and hypothesis testing. These are strategies where the characteristics of the data need to be well understood before the tests are applied to gain insight about the values of specific parameters. And since assumptions about the processes that generated the data precede the tests, graphical displays tend to be less useful.

Beginning in the 1950s, and continuing through the first decade of the 21st century, there has been a strong resurgence of interest in statistical graphics. There are several reasons for this recent trend. First, there has been an increasing emphasis on exploratory methods, through the influence of the late John Tukey and his followers. Second, there has been productive research on the psychology of graphical perception, so there is greater understanding of the ways that people process visual information. Third, there have been major advances in graphical methodologies, providing new tools.
for pictorial representations of numeric information. Fourth, the widespread availability of powerful computing equipment and high-resolution, fast-refreshing, graphical displays means that scientists now have the means to render graphs quickly and easily. And fifth, the “data explosion” of recent years has encouraged broader reliance on graphical strategies for coping with the sheer volume of information confronting many researchers.

**Graphical Information and Human Perception**

A graph can be effective only if the information contained therein can be extracted easily and accurately by its intended audience. Understanding how to accomplish this requires some understanding of human graphical perception. An influential theory developed by William S. Cleveland holds that interpretation of graphs comprises two fundamental tasks: table lookup and pattern perception. Table lookup refers to the process of moving from the displayed geometric rendering of the data back to the numerical values that generated the display. This process is facilitated through careful attention to the axes and scales that define the plotting region(s) of a graphical display.

Pattern perception is, itself, composed of three more fundamental perceptual tasks: First, detection refers to the ability to perceive the individual elements of the data in a graph; it usually involves the selection of suitable plotting symbols to represent data points. Second, assembly refers to the ability to combine separate elements together in a way that facilitates recognition of nonrandom structure within the data—for example, the shape of a univariate distribution or functional dependence of one variable’s values on another variable’s values. Third, estimation is the ability to make quantitative comparisons across the geometric elements in a graphical display. For example, observers can typically make quite accurate judgments about relative differences when data points are plotted along a common scale. But it is more difficult to make similarly accurate comparisons of quantities that are represented as differences in angles, areas of geometric shapes, or gradations in color.

Theories of graphical perception are important because they provide standards for judging the quality of graphical displays. Relying on Cleveland’s theory, the objective is to encode the data with geometric devices that optimize the three components of pattern perception. However, compromises are almost always necessary; for example, emphasizing the individual data points facilitates detection but may impede assembly. As a result, there is seldom any single best display for a given data set. Instead, different graphs may provide different useful perspectives on the same basic information.

**Types of Graphical Displays**

There are many situations in which the analyst is confronted with labeled quantitative values, such as the raw data values associated with individual observations or summary values calculated for subgroups within a data set (e.g., the conditional means on a variable or the percentage of observations within each subset). For such data, pie charts, bar charts, and dot plots can be used. Pie charts require relatively inaccurate visual judgments of angles and areas, while accurate interpretation of bar charts can be impeded by the arbitrary location of the origin on the scale that defines the lengths of the bars. Carefully constructed dot plots can overcome these problems, and they can be adapted to a wide variety of specific situations. Therefore, they are the preferred analytic graphical display for labeled data values.

Graphical displays for univariate data enable visual assessments of a distribution’s most important features—center, spread, shape, and outliers. Again, there are several possibilities, including univariate scatterplots, histograms, smoothed histograms, quantile plots, and box plots. Univariate histograms are simple to construct and interpret; however, they are effectively limited to small data sets. Histograms are familiar and easy to interpret. However, the contents of a histogram can be affected by the definitions of the categories (or “bins”) used to delineate its bars. Smoothed histograms overcome the problems caused by bin definitions, but they are similarly affected by technical aspects of the smoothing process. Quantile plots overcome all of the preceding problems, but they are cognitively demanding and probably not familiar to many social scientists. Box plots focus on the most important quantiles of a data distribution; they are easily interpreted and are especially useful for comparing univariate distributions.
There is really only one type of graphical display for bivariate data: the scatterplot. But careful attention to the details is critical for optimizing the information conveyed by this type of display. For example, the plotting symbol used to represent individual observations must be visually prominent and resistant to overplotting effects. And the plotting region should be fully enclosed by the scale rectangle, with none of the data points colliding with any of the axes. Grid lines should not be included within the plotting region. And if the objective of the graphical display is to assess the relationship between two variables, then there is usually no need to include point labels. Finally, a scatterplot smoother (i.e., a curve that traces out the conditional mean of the variable plotted on the vertical axis across the range of data values on the horizontal axis) can be used to summarize the relationship between the variables plotted in the display.

Multivariate data pose particular challenges for statistical graphics. While it is possible to draw a three-dimensional scatterplot, using an oblique orientation on the data space to simulate a perspective view, such displays are generally not very effective. Instead, other devices have been employed to represent multiple dimensions of variability in a two-dimensional display medium. For example, a scatterplot matrix is the graphical analog of a correlation matrix, showing scatterplots between all possible pairs of variables arranged in a regular, square layout. Conditioning plots and trellis displays show one- or two-dimensional graphical displays for subsets of a data set, where the subsets are defined by intervals of values on other variables. And finally, there are a number of related strategies for “touring” high-dimensional data, by taking projections of the data points into a smaller dimensioned subspace that can be visualized directly.

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See also Data Visualization; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions

Further Readings
Summit, NJ: Hobart Press.


Greek Philosophy

Greek philosophy is often taken as synonymous with ancient Western philosophy, or as thought in the age of classical Athens, represented by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Strictly speaking, however, it means the thoughts expressed and transmitted in Greek before the Byzantine period, except for Christian writings. It covers the period from the early 6th century BCE to 529 CE (the year of the closure of the Academy [a school founded by Plato around 385 BCE] by Justinian I). In a long tradition, it has formed our ways of thinking about the world and human beings and is therefore regarded as the basis of Western civilization. This entry first examines the essence of Greek philosophy and then reviews the development of Greek philosophy from its origin to the classical period, particularly the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

Greek philosophy has four stages: (1) early Greek (or so-called Presocratic) philosophy (early 6th to mid-5th century BCE), (2) classical philosophy (late 5th to 4th century BCE), (3) Hellenistic philosophy (3rd to 1st century BCE), and (4) the philosophy of late antiquity (1st to early 6th century CE). In the first two stages, philosophers were active mainly in the Eastern Mediterranean region (Asia Minor, Greece, and southern Italy), and in the latter two, their activities were extended to the Near East and the whole Mediterranean region. It should be remembered that many philosophers living in the Roman Empire wrote their works in Greek (e.g., Plutarch, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Plotinus, Galen, and Sextus Empiricus).

What we possess is the transmitted body of Greek philosophical texts, mostly of the classical
Greek Philosophy

and the Roman periods. While a large portion of the ancient books were lost, some have been transmitted to us first in manuscripts (earlier in papyri and later in codices) and then in printed books. Quotations or references included in those books are also edited as “fragments” or “testimonies” of Greek philosophers, for example, the Presocratics (Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker by Hermann Diels) and the Stoics (Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, by Hans von Arnim). Luckily, a few important texts are also preserved in papyri, inscriptions, and so on. Therefore, studies of Greek philosophy consist of the intellectual excavation of original thoughts and the reexamination of their heritage.

Greek philosophy is by no means monolithic, but rather, it is characterized by variety and competitiveness. Greek philosophers provided polar ideas such as “monism versus pluralism,” “materialism versus idealism,” “absolutism, relativism, and skepticism versus agnosticism,” “free will versus determinism,” and “eudaimonism and hedonism versus asceticism.” Nevertheless, they shared some essential features: inquiry into nature and being and open debate between different positions. Their philosophical inquiry was based on experience and reason—that is, the pursuit of truth through argument (logos). By pursuing rationality and universality, Greek philosophy achieved systematization of science and knowledge and thus participated in shaping political science. This feature dissociates it from the preceding cultures of Egypt and Babylonia and from the other cultures outside Europe. Therefore, Greek philosophy is often evoked as a source of the cultural identity of Europe and the West.

The Beginning of Philosophy

Philosophy (Greek philosophia, meaning “aspiring for wisdom”) is generally thought to have started in Greece in the beginning of the 6th century BCE, with Thales of the Ionian city Miletus, whom Aristotle calls “the founder of philosophy.” Although Thales, one of the Seven Wise Men, probably left no writings, he and his compatriots, Anaximander and Anaximenes, started a philosophical inquiry (historia) into nature. The early philosophers were interested mainly, but not exclusively, in natural phenomena, such as celestial motions and the structure of the universe. They asked what the “origin” or “principle” (archê) of the world and all things is and presented different candidates: water (Thales), fire (Heraclitus), air (Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia), the unlimited (Anaximander), and the unchanging One (Parmenides). In the mid-4th century BCE, Empedocles from Sicily established the four-element theory (fire, air, water, and earth) and thereon explained the cycle of change of the universe, in terms of mixture and separation, by means of the two powers, love and strife. As Empedocles composed the religious poem called Purifications and the cosmological one called On Nature, arguably in a single work, inquiry into nature and moral thinking came together in the early philosophers. They often used metaphorical expressions, but the first crucial step can be clearly observed: They sought one or the smallest number of principles to explain the whole world.

The Ionian tradition of inquiry developed both natural sciences (astronomy, mathematics, and medicine) and social sciences (geography and history). Herodotus, in the investigation into the causes of the Greco-Persian Wars, collected a wide range of geographical and cultural information about the regions of Egypt, Asia, and Europe. His Histories (Historiai, meaning “inquiries”) provided ample examples of the conflicting ethical and legal values adopted by different peoples and societies and thus introduced a multicultural and relativistic way of looking at the world, which was further developed by the Sophists.

The first stage of Greek philosophy is often characterized as a progression from mythos (myth) to logos (reason). This means that the way of understanding the world changed from mythical stories based on Greek religion to more rational or scientific explanation. Yet the actual development was not so straightforward. Philosophical theories and explanations still contain many mythical or irrational factors but philosophers at least share interest in the program of rational inquiry, and on this basis, they compete with each other to attain the truth.

The Sophists and Socrates

In the mid-5th century BCE, when Athens experienced democracy and prosperity under Pericles, professional thinkers and teachers called Sophists
appeared and became influential in the society. These intellectuals played an important role in the democratic society, where free citizens sought power by cultivating their own ability and the Sophists taught young people how to succeed in society.

The greatest Sophist, Protagoras of Abdera, propagated the famous “Man measure thesis”: “Man is the measure of all things: of those which are, that they are, and of things which are not, that they are not.” This thesis, which bases moral values not on gods but on human beings, promoted a radical relativism fitting for democracy. Protagoras was successfully teaching virtues—that is, political excellence.

What the Sophists actually taught was rhetoric—the art or skills of speech—for it was crucial in the court or the assembly to speak persuasively in front of a large audience. Gorgias from Sicily developed the technique of public speech and reflected on the power of speech (logos), noting that it can move people and the country and therefore becomes a source of political power. The Sophists’ appeal to the power of speech attracted people but was regarded as radical and dangerous to traditional morality.

The Sophists investigated the basis of society and the political system. One of their inventions was the contrast of nomos and physis (law or custom and nature), and based on this contrast, they put forward a social contract theory. This theory initially tried to explain how and why social and moral systems differ in societies, but it was later used to attack the current customs and morality. Antiphon, the Athenian politician, teacher of rhetoric and Sophist (though there is a controversy over his identity), wrote a treatise called On Truth (of which three large fragments have been preserved in papyri), where he insisted that while it is human nature to do harm to others in order to get more, laws and customs prevent one from doing so.

The work of Herodotus and Thucydides in their Histories contains the origin of Greek political thought. Their description and comparison of Persia, Sparta, and Athens reflected the serious discussions and controversies over the different political systems in the late 5th century BCE: monarchy, oligarchy (also called aristocracy, i.e., rule of the best), democracy, and tyranny. Several comparative studies on the Athenian and Spartan constitutions (politeiai) were written and circulated in this period. It is noteworthy that in democratic Athens, the oligarchic system of Sparta was popular among the intellectuals, including Socrates, Critias, Xenophon, and Plato.

Critias was an oligarchic politician and political thinker influenced by the Sophistic movement. A fragment of the tragedy Sisyphus, attributed to him, claims that gods were invented by a clever man to deceive people into obeying laws. The Sophist Prodicus expressed a similar rationalistic view on the origin of religion—that gods are personifications of the useful things and heroes. By casting radical doubts on traditional values, the Sophistic enlightenment movement contributed to re-forming the ideas of politics and ethics as distinct from those of traditional religion and to considering them objectively and scientifically.

Socrates belongs to the same generation as the Sophists and was regarded as a major Sophist by his contemporaries (as depicted in Aristophanes’s comedy Clouds). It was his pupils, above all Plato, who distinguished him from the other Sophists and natural philosophers. Since Socrates did not write anything, it is difficult to determine his original thought, but a few philosophical contributions are generally ascribed to him. First, Socrates raised questions on moral issues, such as courage, justice, and goodness. He often began his inquiries with a request for a definition, and in doing so, he often revealed his interlocutors’ ignorance. Second, he often drew a conclusion from a series of examples, thus making use of the logic of induction. Third, by this cross-examination, he urged people to take care of the soul (psychê)—that is, one’s own self. However, his radical way of questioning was seen as dangerous and subversive of ordinary beliefs and traditional morality. Socrates was convicted of impiety and for corrupting youth and was executed in 399 BCE. But his way of life became a major subject of the later philosophers, and Socrates was made the model philosopher for Cynics, Stoics, Cyrenaics, and skeptics of the Academy.

Plato

Plato was born in a famous Athenian family, and in his youth, he wished to be active in politics, as was usual in his society. His life was changed by his encounter with Socrates, and particularly after
seeing the trial and death of Socrates, he kept his distance from Athenian politics and concentrated on philosophy and scientific research in the Academy. It is reported that Plato visited Syracuse a few times to convert the despot Dionysius to philosophy, but in vain. Plato wrote some 30 works in the form of dialogues, most of which feature Socrates as the main speaker.

Plato made full use of the dialogue form. The author himself never appears or speaks in the dialogues. Readers are urged to think for themselves about the issues discussed in the dialogue. While it is often assumed that the main character, Socrates (or a few others), speaks for Plato’s position, the opposition often has a good point to make. For example, when in the Gorgias, Callicles, the young Athenian, challenged Socrates and defended the life of politics by an appeal to “natural justice,” some readers strongly sympathized with Callicles’s position, despite Socrates’s eventual refutation. Friedrich Nietzsche is an obvious example of a later philosopher whose work reflects the perspective taken by Callicles. Nietzsche openly defended the “will to power” and tried to overturn Platonist morality. It is sometimes suggested that Plato himself experienced such a tension and conflict between the life of philosophy and the life of politics as depicted in the dialogue.

Plato’s dialogues put forward several paradoxical arguments of Socrates—for example, that no one willingly does wrong and that it is better to suffer injustice than to do injustice. His emphasis on the need for a thorough examination of moral concepts and values appeared to ordinary men to turn their lives upside down. In urging people to take care of the soul, Plato makes a sharp distinction between the soul and the body and its desires. Then, the soul in itself is able to contemplate the essence of each thing—what it essentially is, or what Plato calls its “Form.” The Forms are distinct from sensible things, and cause their being, while the sensible things partake of the transcendent Forms. For example, “Beauty” itself is different from beautiful things but makes things beautiful. This is Plato’s theory of Forms, presented in the dialogues, including the Phaedo, Symposium, Republic, and so on.

Socrates himself was probably not interested in politics and lived a nonpolitical life as a private citizen. However, Plato’s dialogues understand his life as engaging in true politics and present him as the ideal statesman. The trial of Socrates is reinterpreted as fundamentally political. His cross-examination of his accusers at his trial and his constant advice to his fellow citizens to take care of the soul and virtue, instead of the body, money, and reputation, constituted a true political activity to make the polis better, but they gave rise to misunderstanding and hatred toward Socrates and eventually led to his death.

Through the Socratic dialogues, Plato explores the tension between politics and philosophy and expresses the principle that justice in all its forms can be understood only through philosophy. In this way, the famous idea of philosopher-kings or philosopher-rulers is conceived and proposed in the Republic (the Greek title Politeia meaning the being of a state or a constitution). The main question of the dialogue is what justice is and whether a just person lives a happy life. The Sophist Thrasymachus first raises a radical claim of justice as the “advantage for the stronger”—that the stronger people exploit the weaker in the name of law and justice. Following him, Glaucon and Adematus (Plato’s older brothers) reformulate this claim into a formidable challenge to morality: that people obey the law and do justice only because they think it necessary (while wanting to avoid it) on the basis of the social contract. Against this, Socrates has to demonstrate that justice is good both in itself and for its results. To consider justice and injustice more clearly, Socrates then suggests that they construct a state (polis) in argument and compare its justice with that of the soul. The basic principle of founding the state is that everyone does one’s own work (labor division according to one’s nature). If each class, namely, rulers, warriors, and producers, does its own work, the state is just. On the other hand, when someone transgresses this boundary, various types of injustice occur. The just state is discussed to show by analogy the justice of the soul. When the three parts of the soul, namely, reason, spirit, and appetite, harmonize to make a single whole, the soul is just. Thus, the Republic deals with political philosophy in the context of discussing justice.

The conditions of the ideal state are a focus in the central books of the Politeia (Books 5–7), where some original proposals are discussed, such as equality of men and women in ruling, abolition
of the family, and a common property system. Socrates’ most challenging proposal for realizing the ideal state in this world is to unite philosophy and politics by either making the philosopher a ruler of the state or making the present ruler a philosopher, since the philosopher, who has knowledge of “Justice,” “Goodness,” and the other Forms, alone can make a state just and good in the proper way. To become a philosopher, however, one needs a long course of education and hard training, first in general education in literature and physical training and second in the mathematical sciences. The final stage consists of training in dialectic (the art of dialogue), which is said to deal with the reality or the Forms by logos (reason) alone.

Plato’s idea of political science was criticized by his contemporaries and by later philosophers. Isocrates, Plato’s rival teacher of rhetoric, insists that sound judgment is more important than the theoretical sciences, such as mathematics, in making one a good citizen and politician. Aristotle also criticizes Plato’s idea of unity in Book 2 of the Politics. A state should not seek a strict singleness as proposed in the Republic but should be realized in a harmony of diverse elements. This echoes the modern criticisms of Plato as totalitarian. According to Karl Popper and other critics, Plato’s notions of dictatorship, the “noble lie,” eugenics, and censorship resemble the modern totalitarian ideologies of Nazism and Stalinism. Whereas in the 19th century Plato’s Republic was read as a “utopian” work, in the 20th, there was greater emphasis on its political implications. However, it should be noted that Plato’s main aim lies not in the political blueprint but in the ethical contrast between the tyrant, who rules for his own interest and greed, and the true philosopher.

Plato places the Form of the “Good” in the highest position in the realm of reality. This implies that the natural world and human activities have a common basis. This idea is developed in his later dialogue, the Timaeus, in which the origin and structure of the universe are explained as the god’s (Demiurge’s) creation by means of mathematical principles. Goodness and beauty are regarded there as the foundation principles of the universe. Plato’s cosmology (which he called “a likely myth”) was influential in late antiquity and the Middle Ages as a part of his political thought.

Plato wrote two other dialogues that deal with political philosophy: the Statesman (Politicus) and the Laws (Nomoi). The Statesman defines the art or knowledge of statesmanship as the interweaving of different elements in a state, particularly courage and temperance. Plato’s last work, the Laws, discusses the principles and laws of a new colonial state. Although the differences between Plato’s ideas in the Republic, Statesman, and Laws are matters of much debate among modern scholars, it is clear that Plato examines political science as a major subject in his whole system of philosophy.

Aristotle

Aristotle was born in Macedonia, the son of a medical doctor. Probably because of this background, he was more interested in biology and other natural sciences than in mathematics (which Plato ranks high as a more abstract and academic science). He joined Plato’s Academy as a youth to study philosophy. After his master’s death, Aristotle founded his own school, the Lyceum, and led scientific projects in biology and political science. Although he tutored the young Alexander the Great for some years, it is uncertain what influence he had on the prince.

While all his published works were lost, his lectures fortunately survived and were edited by Andronicus of Rhodes, the Peripatetic philosopher of the 1st century BCE. The Corpus Aristotelicum (Works of Aristotle) is the transmitted body of texts from this edition, and it is normally assumed that the order of treatises more or less represents Aristotle’s original scheme of sciences: namely, logic, physics (natural philosophy), metaphysics, ethics, politics, rhetoric, and poetics. On the other hand, one must be cautious in using the lectures, since they are often sketchy and may seem to contradict each other. Modern scholars have tried to distinguish the different layers of composition within the Corpus, but no agreement has been reached so far.

Aristotle founds the logical system of syllogisms and discusses epistemology as the basis of the whole of science. In the Posterior Analytics, he defines the scientific demonstration as necessary reasoning from the true and primary premises. Whereas it remains controversial how much of this principle he applies to particular sciences, such as physics and ethics, the idea of a demonstrative and
Green parties first emerged in several Western European countries in the 1970s accompanied by a more general generational change toward postmaterialist values. They were mostly concerned with environmental issues, such as the antinuclear movement, but also with peace and women’s issues. Since then, the electoral as well as the parliamentary performance of green parties has improved remarkably in many democratic societies (mostly, however, in European countries). Thus, green parties were not just a temporary phenomenon—as many political observers had suggested in the early 1980s—but have developed into a stable element of many party systems around the world. In 2001, the green parties created a “global network” that consists of 61 member parties.

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See also Normative Theory in International Relations; Political Philosophy; Political Theory

Further Readings

Green Parties

Green and alternative movements first emerged in several Western European countries in the 1970s accompanied by a more general generational change toward postmaterialist values. They were mostly concerned with environmental issues, such as the antinuclear movement, but also with peace and women’s issues. Since then, the electoral as well as the parliamentary performance of green parties has improved remarkably in many democratic societies (mostly, however, in European countries). Thus, green parties were not just a temporary phenomenon—as many political observers had suggested in the early 1980s—but have developed into a stable element of many party systems around the world. In 2001, the green parties created a “global network” that consists of 61 member parties.
Most of these movements emerged spontaneously from politically independent citizen initiative groups. These groups were generally interested in specific issues such as the provision of parks, and they protested against urban renewal, new highways, or the construction of nuclear power plants. They mobilized public opinion via unconventional political behavior characteristic of earlier student movements, such as demonstrations and occasional sit-ins, information campaigns, and other similar tactics.

In the mid-1970s, one particular issue became dominant in several European countries: nuclear energy. At this time, heavily influenced by the oil crisis, most European governments had decided to expand their nuclear energy programs. It was precisely the issue of nuclear power that stimulated the rise of environmental movements at the national level, since governmental decisions on nuclear power expansion could not be resolved at the local level. Thus, more and more local action groups formed national “anti–nuclear power” umbrella organizations to concentrate their impact on policy making. In addition to issues of nuclear energy and environmental protection, the debate over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) dual-track decision on intermediate nuclear forces and the stationing of cruise missiles and Pershing II rockets in Western Europe in the late 1970s strengthened these movements. This debate created considerable solidarity among the new social movements across Europe.

In the early 1980s, most national social movements expected the established left-wing parties to act as effective safeguards against unlimited growth, environmental degradation, and the deployment of nuclear weapons. Yet, for different reasons, these parties could not accommodate these demands. Hence, one of the main reasons for the foundation of the Greens was their negative experience with existing left-wing parties, as well as the perceived inability of established political parties and institutions to come up with a fundamentally different policy approach.

**Political Profile**

Green parties in Western Europe can be characterized by three elements: First, most of these parties follow the idea of the concept of New Politics

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**From Social Movements to Green Parties**

The early 1970s saw the rise of new social movements in many countries of the Western world.

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15 from Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, and South Africa;
12 from the Americas: Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia (2), Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela;
14 from the Asia-Pacific region: Australia, Japan, Mongolia, Nepal, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan, Philippines, Polynesia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Vanuatu; and
32 from Europe: Austria, Belgium (2), Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands (2), Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.
Green Parties

(Emphasizing quality of life, citizen participation, and self-actualization rather than material affluence and economic growth). They generally embrace a left-wing standpoint consisting of fervent egalitarianism (equal rights for minorities), strong ecological and antinuclear power orientation, and solidarity with the Third World. They campaign for a genuine sharing of wealth between rich and poor nations and for assistance to underprivileged countries in creating their own self-sufficient economies, free of financial domination by industrial nations. In a nutshell, green parties introduced a new form of programmatic and ideological thinking that is less consistent with the traditional ideological Left–Right dimension. Instead, they offer a set of alternative values that differ significantly from the established parties.

Second, green parties display a much stronger preference for participatory party organization than established parties. Their organizational structure gives local party branches more autonomy in decision making and a maximum of interest articulation from grassroots initiatives. Thus, the process of decentralization is considered an essential precondition for meaningful participation.

The third and last characteristic that sets green parties apart is that they have an electorate with attributes that differ significantly from those of established parties. Comparative data on the electorate of the Greens have, for instance, shown that followers of new social movements are among the majority of green party voters. They are for the most part young, highly educated, and occupy white-collar and government jobs where the traditional class conflict is virtually nonexistent.

Although there was some diversity in the programmatic demands, and in the degree of participatory party organization, green parties developed rapidly: Between 1980 and 1984, new green parties were founded in 12 Western European countries. By the late 1980s, these parties had gained significant electoral and (in some countries) parliamentary success.

Electoral and Parliamentary Performance

The electoral performance of green parties in Western Europe has varied markedly across countries over the past 3 decades. Most of these parties have participated by now in six or more national elections and have therefore stabilized their electoral performance in major European countries. Overall, the average electoral results of green parties range between 1.5% and 7.3% of the total suffrage. In six countries, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, electoral support for the Greens was higher than 5% of the overall vote in the past three national elections.

This comparably low electoral support for the Greens is also reflected in their parliamentary representation. During the period ranging from 1978 to 1984, only three green parties (in Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland) have succeeded in passing the electoral threshold for gaining representation in national parliaments. Between 1985 and 1997, the number of green parties in parliaments has increased from three to nine: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. Meanwhile, green parties were also represented in the Italian, Irish, Greek, Czech, and Portuguese parliaments. However, compared with most other parties, the absolute number of green party members in parliament is rather low. The average parliamentary strength ranges from 0.3% in Greece to 6.5% in Luxembourg. In sum, the electoral and parliamentary performance of green parties in Europe has remained marginal except for the green parties in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland.

Participation in National Governments

The majority of green parties in national parliaments serve as opposition parties and therefore have no impact on government formation or policy making. Outside Europe, the Greens in Brazil are the only green party to have participated in government after the 2002 national elections. In Europe, seven green parties have entered governments as coalition partners: The Greens in Finland were the first to become a member of the ruling government coalition (1995), followed by the Greens in Italy (1996), France (1997), Germany (1998), Belgium (1999), Ireland (2007), and, last, the Czech Republic (2007). Interestingly, the parliamentary duration of these parties prior to government participation varied substantially. The Greens in Belgium and Ireland held the longest representation in national governments (18 years each), followed by the German Greens (15 years),
the Finnish Greens (12 years), and the Italian Greens (9 years). The French and the Czech Greens were immediately invited to participate in government after having entered parliament in a national election. Thus, we can differentiate between three types of governing green parties: First, the professionals, defined as green parties with a long duration of pre-parliamentary and parliamentary participation before entering government (e.g., in Germany and Finland); second, the parliamentary experienced Greens who have accumulated long experiences of parliamentary participation but low duration in pre-parliamentary activities (e.g., Belgium, Italy, and Ireland); third, the pre-parliamentary experienced Greens who had some extraparliamentary experience before entering parliament and government (e.g., in France and the Czech Republic).

The Impact of Green Parties

The individual and collective political relevance of the green parties can be summarized in two points: First, green parties mobilize many citizens with new value orientations by making it possible for them to find expressions for their views at the ballot box. The Greens therefore serve as political vehicles for those citizens whose grievances have been ignored by the larger established parties. By making themselves the spokespeople of the dissatisfied, green parties also stimulate a process of change of party loyalties and are paving the way for increasing volatility within Western European party systems. Second, green parties affect political issues and the tone of political life by bringing controversial matters into the public debate. If the issues prove popular, they are adopted by one or more of the larger established parties. This led to changes in the programs of major European parties. Finally, and by means of conclusion, the political impact of green parties to a very large extent depends on the emergence of New Politics issues influencing mass public opinion and the inability of larger left-wing or right-wing established parties to harness these issues and integrate them into their political agenda.

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See also Environmental Issues; Postmaterialism; Social Movements

Further Readings


GROUNDDED THEORY

Developed by the sociologists Anselm L. Strauss and Barney Glaser at the University of California at San Francisco in the late 1960s, grounded theory (GT) has become one of the foremost research styles in qualitative and interpretative social, political, and educational research. Aiming at empirically GT generation rather than at theory testing or mere description, GT provides the researcher with a rich set of research heuristics, the so-called constant comparative method. GT is, unlike ethnography or interviewing, not a method of data generation. It is also, despite its somewhat confusing name, not a theory. Instead, it is a general model for certain types of research designs, the results of which are substantive theories of the field under scrutiny. This entry discusses the origins of GT, basic procedures, its role in political science, and recent developments.
Origins

Epistemologically, as well as in terms of social theory, the origins of GT are primarily in early American pragmatism and interactionism as represented by Strauss. At the sociology department of the University of Chicago, he was trained in the pragmatist logic of inquiry (of Charles Peirce, John Dewey, and George H. Mead), with its strong notion of reality being brought forth constantly in interactively dealing with the physical and social restraints of the “world out there.” By the same token, Strauss was influenced by the empirical fieldwork practice of E. C. Hughes, a descendent of Robert E. Park’s human ecology approach. A second strand of origin lies in the Columbia School and its leanings toward the development of middle-range theories—a heritage brought into the project by Glaser, who was trained under Robert K. Merton before he worked with Strauss in San Francisco. While Strauss advocated the need of a research style that allows for creativity to be brought into the scientific process, Glaser represented the call for rigor in qualitative and interpretative research and theory development.

Developed in practice during an organizational ethnography on death and dying in hospital wards, the first monograph on GT, instead of being a method textbook, served more as a political statement against the orthodox consensus of structural-functionalist theories and logico-hypothetical methods. Published in 1967, amid the political uprisings of the civil rights and student movements, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, and its methodological statement, was meant to support these new ways of thinking among young researchers. Since GT was among the first qualitative research styles spelled out in its practical details and at the same time offered a way to systematically develop empirically grounded scientific theories, it was quickly adopted by a broader group of social science researchers. While originally developed in the field of medical sociology, GT has gained a standing in most areas of sociology, psychology, education, ethnography, and social anthropology.

Basic Procedures and Heuristics

Though advocating rigor in theory development, the most basic rule of GT is that it is not to be understood as a rigid set of rules. Researchers are meant to grasp the general guidelines of GT in an interpretative and flexible manner in order to adapt its heuristics to the circumstances of practical research. Among these basic guidelines is the call for understanding the entire case—that is, instead of either comparing single items on various cases (as in quantitative research) or interpreting in depth single cases (as in hermeneutic approaches), GT developed a heuristic that integrates key features of both strategies into its constant comparative method. A second basic rule underlines not only the inevitability but also the need for and the advantage of the researchers’ subjectivity and creativity. Following Dewey’s notion of research as iterations of problem-solving cycles, it is the creativity of abductive processes that bridges the gap between a problem systematically laid out in processes of logical reasoning and results obtained in experimental practice. The notion of creativity goes hand in hand with the pragmatist claim that there is no universal reality to discover. Third, research is seen as a joint endeavor of a community of practice comprising not only the research team but also the scientific community. In terms of GT, this endeavor is understood as a work in progress, which gives scientific activities a down-to-earth flavor of practical day-to-day activities that need to be organized and articulated interactively among research participants. Finally, GT assumes social reality to consist of complex phenomena requiring a similarly rich theoretical understanding that primarily accounts for variation. This includes the notion of theory as a never-ending process.

In GT, both analysis and theory building start immediately with scrutinizing the material produced in investigating a first case. Thus, analysis here is thought of as a continual interplay of data generation, data inspection, and theoretical reasoning in an iterative-cyclical procedure. Single incidents of phenomena occurring in the data are compared with each other to develop a conceptual, theoretical understanding of what these incidents mean with respect to the research question under scrutiny. No a priori hypothesis drives this process. The researcher starts from a research question that in the beginning is more like a vague research curiosity: What is going on here? It is the interplay of data analysis and conceptual thinking that at the same time allows for
a step-by-step stating of the research question more precisely.

The comparative analytical mode employed in GT is called coding—that is, occurrences of a certain phenomenon in the data are compared with other occurrences of the same or a similar phenomenon. Here, two comparative heuristics alternate. Whereas in the first phase the analyst compares incidents where the phenomenon occurs that are as similar as possible (homogeneous cases), in the second step, he or she will compare these with incidents as different from the first ones as possible (heterogeneous cases). The first step serves to develop the theoretically relevant properties of the concept to be constructed on the basis of the empirical data. While still adding to the development of properties, the second step is more dedicated to determining the scope of the concept. The aim is to find out under which conditions and in which contexts the concept still holds and which variations of the concept are necessary in order to account for the complexity of the phenomenon in reality. This scope is called conceptual representativeness.

The coding process consists of different modes. As the GT procedures of Strauss and Glaser have been developed in different directions over time, there is a Glaserian two-mode procedure and a Straussian three-mode procedure. Both Glaser and Strauss start with open coding, which tries to break up the data in a line-by-line analysis and develop those units into theoretical concepts that in light of the research question appear to be relevant. Glaser on his part continues with a coding mode called theoretical coding. Here, the concepts derived inductively from the data are compared with and linked with theoretical codes chosen among a larger number of code families (e.g., dimensions, cultures, and types). The aim of this procedural step is for the researcher to come up with a central core category. Viewed from the perspective of this core category, the analytical structure developed in the course of the project should answer the research question. Strauss in his more widely used approach instead suggests two further coding modes: axial and selective coding. In axial coding, researchers seek to establish empirically grounded relations between different concepts, often by using a so-called coding paradigm that offers a set of basic questions to answer for a phenomenon under scrutiny. These questions serve to account for contexts, intervening conditions, causalities, strategies, and consequences. Though not operating with theoretical code families, selective coding likewise aims at discovering a core category, thereby integrating the variety of concepts into a coherent theoretical perspective.

As analysis does not limit itself to a single case, empirical material on further cases is integrated in a step-by-step procedure called theoretical sampling. Different from random sampling, this selection strategy draws on the basic findings of the theory under construction. By posing generative questions derived from open ends in the theory-building process, the researcher determines which material on which types of cases is needed to continue the relevant comparative strategies at a certain point in the project. Thus, not only homogeneous and heterogeneous sampling strategies on cases and materials but also on incidents within the material alternate flexibly. The criterion for switching from one strategy to the other is called theoretical saturation. A certain comparative step ends when the researcher does not gain any more conceptually relevant insights from it.

An important issue in most qualitative strategies is the question of how to deal with previous practical and theoretical knowledge. Right from the beginning, GT has underscored the importance of studying social phenomena unbiased from pregiven theoretical frameworks and has encouraged researchers to start their empirical investigations right away. At times, this has been critically interpreted as a tabula rasa—a critique that was encouraged by the late Glaser’s naïve inductivism. However, even in the early writings, Glaser and Strauss denied starting with a tabula rasa and Strauss for his part repeatedly advocated the advantages of a knowledge-based theoretical sensitivity as opposed to the definiteness of pregiven theoretical frameworks.

Grounded Theory and Political Science Research

Compared with other social sciences, the usage of GT in political sciences is less widespread. This is true not only for GT but also for all kinds of sound and systematic qualitative research methods. Overall, qualitative research is not yet well established in political science. This might be due to the fact that this field has a long tradition of normative,
value-driven theorizing, which fits well both with theory-testing procedures—as a test whether the reality of political systems indeed behaves as maintained in normative theories (e.g., theories of democracy)—and with presenting exemplary evidence in an illustrative manner. The place of GT, in contrast, lies in the domain of developing explanatory theories of interactions between political actors as representatives of, for example, political parties, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), legal institutions, or lay groups. It can be observed, however, that young scholars from the field of political science are increasingly attracted by GT, for example, for studying policy making, community power structures, or empowerment processes.

Variants and Add-Ons of Grounded Theory

Over the more than 40 years of its existence, GT has developed into a number of variants: some of them challenging the original claim, others representing add-ons to the basic model. The most important split happened between the two originators of GT during the early 1990s, when Glaser accused Strauss and his coresearcher Juliet Corbin of forcing the data into preconceived concepts (e.g., by using the coding paradigm). Glaser himself proposed a purely inductive version of GT and rejected both the use of previous knowledge and the verification of data. Strauss on his part regards previous knowledge as an inevitable and useful precondition of empirical research but only when it is used in a sensitizing instead of a definitive manner. Also, he insisted on the need for a constant process of experimental verification to come up with scientific theories based on which predictions of future developments can be made. Recently, some of Strauss’s students came up with alternative or additional concepts of how to do GT. Adele Clarke, for example, suggests further developing GT into a situational analysis by using a set of mapping techniques to better represent the various perspectives occurring in the data. Another strand of discussion introduced by Kathy Charmaz centers on the notion of a constructivist GT as opposed to older, objectivist versions of GT.

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See also Case Studies; Constructivism; Hermeneutics; Qualitative Versus Quantitative Methods

Further Readings


GROUPTHINK

The rather Orwellian-sounding word groupthink is one of those pieces of social-scientific terminology that has entered popular usage, where it is now used rather loosely and colloquially to refer to defective or dysfunctional group decision making in general; the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee concluded in 2004, for instance, that there was evidence of groupthink in the mistaken assessment that there were weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq prior to the 2003 American invasion. The chairs of that committee were using the term to refer to a kind of generalized or collective misperception. In the study of public policy, foreign policy analysis, psychology, and management, however, groupthink has a rather more precise usage. It was originated by the late social psychologist Irving Janis in his book Victims of Groupthink, first published in 1972 and later reissued in a revised form 10 years later as simply Groupthink. Although Janis himself did apply his theory to domestic cases such as the Watergate scandal—and the theory has also been used to explain management fiascoes such as the 1986 decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger—within political science it has exerted
its greatest impact on the study of foreign policy decision making. The theory has been heavily criticized in recent years for reasons that are detailed below, but Janis’s basic assumption that individual behavior can be altered by group pressure is supported by a substantial body of empirical research.

Janis defined the groupthink phenomenon as a process through which a group reaches a hasty or premature consensus and then becomes closed to outside ideas or alternative thoughts within. The effort to achieve unanimity and agreement overcomes the desire to consider a full range of policy alternatives. High group cohesion or excessive camaraderie lies at the heart of the groupthink phenomenon and may develop where the members think too much alike or have developed powerful links of friendship or collegiality that inhibit the challenging of assumptions. While Janis did not feel that groupthink was inevitable in such a situation, he maintained that this kind of group can fall victim to groupthink where members of the group come to prize “concurrence seeking” (unanimity or agreement) over the comprehensive, rational consideration of all available courses of action.

According to Janis, groupthink has a number of antecedent conditions in addition to high group cohesiveness. For instance, it is encouraged where the group is insulated from outside advice, where an aggressive or opinionated leader prevents meaningful debate, where norms requiring the use of methodical procedures are absent, where most members of the group come from a similar social and educational background and/or think alike, where the group is confronting high levels of stress, and where its members are experiencing temporarily low levels of self-esteem. Janis also identifies a number of symptoms that can be used to diagnose the presence of groupthink. These include the presence of an illusion of invulnerability among the group; collective rationalization about the risks of a chosen option; a belief in the inherent morality of the group, in which members come to believe in the exclusive moral righteousness of their cause; the appearance of stereotyped views of outgroups or “the enemy”; the exertion of direct pressure on those who dissent from the majority opinion; self-censorship, where doubters fail to express their true feelings; the false perception of unanimity, where in fact some members may harbor personal doubts about the policy option chosen; and finally, the emergence of self-appointed “mind guards,” where members of the group take it on themselves to protect the group and its leader from dissenting views (guarding minds much as a bodyguard guards us physically).

It is important to realize that groupthink is essentially a theory about the policy process; it does not necessarily tell us about the outcomes of decision making. In other words, a process free of groupthink will not guarantee policy success, nor will procedures fraught with groupthink necessarily lead to policy disaster (although Janis argued that the likelihood of an undesirable outcome was greatly increased by the presence of groupthink). It is possible that sheer luck, for instance, will intervene in a rather fortuitous fashion to break the general causal chain between process and outcome.

In the years since Janis’s book was first published, the theory of groupthink has been subjected to a variety of criticisms, and it has been adapted and reformulated in various ways. Probably the most common criticism of Janis’s theory is that it is too vague and imprecise—allowing almost anything that might be labeled poor collective decision making to be categorized as an instance of groupthink—and some have criticized the theoretical coherence of the model Janis developed. As Philip Tetlock and his colleagues have suggested, four broad criticisms can be raised against Janis’s work in this vein: First of all, Janis relied on qualitative case studies, a method that
frequently tempts the researcher to emphasize evidence that “fits” a theory; second, there is a suspicious correlation between the presence of groupthink and flawed decision making in Janis’s book, even though Janis concedes that process is not everything; third, critics have noted an equally suspicious all-or-nothing quality to the way in which Janis’s case fits so conveniently into the categories of groupthink or vigilant decision making; and last, there are various conceptual problems with the model itself, especially those having to do with distinguishing the causes from the consequences of groupthink. Certainly, Janis lumps together a bewildering variety of factors; some have questioned the inclusion of a belief in the inherent morality of the group and the stereotyped views of outgroups in his list of antecedent factors, for instance, since these appear to have little to do with consensus formation.

Others have critiqued the model on empirical grounds, and later analysts have challenged Janis’s interpretation of the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam case studies, the two centerpieces of the book Groupthink. The contention that Lyndon Johnson did not receive competing advice on Vietnam, or that he and others felt “an illusion of invulnerability” on this issue, has been strongly questioned in recent years. The evidence we now have suggests that Johnson himself agonized quite extensively over the decision to escalate the war. The recent declassification of secretly taped phone calls that Johnson made in late 1964 and throughout 1965 reveals a president who was deeply troubled by the issue of Vietnam and quite pessimistic about the chances of winning the war. Similarly, it has also been argued that Janis’s interpretation of the Bay of Pigs episode sits poorly with what we now know. In giving the go-ahead for the invasion of Cuba, John F. Kennedy and his advisers may have been influenced not so much by a feeling that they could not fail as they were by faulty (and perhaps deliberately misleading) intelligence assessments provided by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). Rather than being influenced by group processes, Kennedy may have simply believed that a great World War II general like Dwight Eisenhower would not have advised him to go ahead with a plan that had little chance of success.

One response to these kinds of criticisms has been to reformulate Janis’s original argument in the effort to lend it more theoretical rigor. Some have attempted to better specify the kind of leadership behavior that gives rise to groupthink. Paul ’t Hart, on the other hand, argues in his study of the Iran–Contra decision making under the Reagan administration that groupthink is not one phenomenon but two. Noting that the decision makers in some of Janis’s cases do not appear to be laboring under an illusion of invulnerability, ’t Hart distinguishes between what he calls Type I Groupthink (or Collective Avoidance) and Type II Groupthink (Collective Overoptimism). ’t Hart argues that the first kind of groupthink occurs when members perceive that the likelihood of successfully resolving the problem confronting the group is low, while the latter occurs when the likelihood of success is seen as high. Prompted by the desire to “look beyond groupthink,” analysts of foreign policy decision making have also reexamined the wider literature on group behaviors within social psychology for clues as to how other theoretical frameworks might be developed. One such approach has become known as the new-group syndrome. Paul ’t Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, the theory’s major advocates, have proposed that in ad hoc or newly formed groups, the lack of well-agreed norms and the absence of any existing organizational culture create uncertainty among the members. Group conformity is especially likely under such circumstances, they argue, and members are particularly likely to accept strong direction from a leader or other dominant individuals.

Nevertheless, Janis’s theory has also been supported by a large body of empirical research that has essentially confirmed his original claims about the ways in which group cohesion can lead to defective decision making. Perhaps the greatest strength of this approach is that it highlights the fact that groups are more than the sum total of the individuals who compose them; once policymakers form a group, the resultant body subsumes (and may overwhelm) its members. Individuals often behave differently in groups from how they do on their own, and the greatest contribution of groupthink has been the way in which it highlights the
fact that even the “best and the brightest” can fall prey to dysfunctional group dynamics.

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See also Consensus; Foreign Policy Analysis; Leadership; Policy Process, Models of

Further Readings


Health Policy

Health policy denotes normative and procedural dimensions of assuring physical, mental, and social well-being, including but transcending medical care. Spanning normatively and empirically contested domains, however, health policy means different things to different people. Sometimes it concerns content such as financing or organizing health services; sometimes it emphasizes the process by which valued ends are sought and occasionally attained; and sometimes it implies power and whatever else may influence the formation and implementation of health-related activities. This entry describes the values and practices intrinsic to health policy, focusing on six areas: (1) definitions of health, (2) values underlying responsibility for health, (3) the context of health care practices, (4) political actors in the health policy process, (5) options in providing health care, and (6) reforms in health care systems.

Definitions

Definitions of health range from perfect well-being through functional capacity to psychological perceptions. According to the World Health Organization, health is considered a state of physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. For the functionalist Talcott Parsons (1964), “Health is a state of optimum capacity of an individual for the effective performance of the roles and tasks for which he has been socialized” (p. 274). For the postmodernist Walsh McDermott (1977), “Health is a relative state that represents the degree to which an individual can operate effectively within the circumstances of his hereditary and his physical and cultural environment” (p. 136).

Health was originally an individual concern, then a concern of the family, and then of larger collectivities up to and including society. Given the changes in technology, health moved beyond physical encounters (the germ theory of disease) to socioeconomic concerns (contributions to productivity) and postmodern reconstruction of well-being (cultural coping with chronic disability).

Different societies perceive health in different ways and differ about the meaning of disease and ill health. Beliefs about health, disease, and illness also differ according to gender, socioeconomic status, profession, and social role. As definitions of health change over time, perceived health needs of people change. Paradigms about what constitutes health have been broadened by scientific investigations as well as the emergence of new ideas.

Prevention of illness is the first line of defense; restoration or rehabilitation of health through medical intervention is the remedial approach; and capacity to cope with chronic conditions is a third method. Systems of health services (which include a gamut of opportunities and interventions ranging from psychosocial supports through episodic pharmaceuticals to invasive therapies such as surgery) are valued in all societies and provide an arena within which occur struggles over the allocation of
values as well as the pursuit and exercise of power that represent both policy and politics.

**Values**

Anthropologists note that the most important thing to know about people is what they take for granted. Unarticulated values guide behavior and generate consensus about its intrinsic propriety. Only when challenged by other deeply held views do such basic orientations become manifest—and then perhaps only dimly. But although elusive and pervasive, basic orientations serve as selective filters that inhibit or distort comprehension of alternative viewpoints based on other equally basic but unarticulated values.

Common values and beliefs determine the demands made on health policymakers. The more widely values and beliefs are shared, the easier and greater the public’s acceptance of proposed policies. Public opinion sets the boundaries and direction of health policy, while the social system sensitizes policymakers about health demands and supports. Most countries share basic goals in health policy: universal (or near-universal) access to health services, equity in sharing the financial burden of illness, and good-quality health care. Given the ever-larger share of public money in funding health care, governments are increasingly concerned about cost control and efficiency. Patient satisfaction, patient choice, and autonomy of professionals are important goals too.

Normative preferences about responsibility for health care range from a commitment to individualism, where a person is the only one responsible for his or her well-being, to an abiding concern for general welfare, where the state (acting on behalf of all of society) ensures an all-inclusive system of health care for all. Empirical practice involves three dimensions of health care services: (1) equitable access, (2) effective quality, and (3) efficient production.

One cleavage that informs health policy divides those who stress an essential solidarity among all humans (at least those within a delimited territory) from those who espouse the individual responsibility of each human being (with perhaps concessions for age-specific categories such as children and the elderly). The former view is egalitarian or solidaristic; the latter is characteristic of libertarianism or radical individualism. As modern communications globalize Western orientations, their spread elicits challenges and responses from non-Western societies about how to regard, amend, or replace these values. “Great” traditions (to use Robert Redfield’s term) such as the Confucian and Islamic as well as “little” traditions such as regional variants and local folkways provide options as they interact with the globalized values of a secularized Judeo-Christian culture.

**Context**

Health policy cannot be divorced from the situational and historical context in which it is made. The legacy of previous policies, including the absence of such policies altogether, provides a contextual limit on policy options. The situational environment provides demands for policy action plus support for as well as constraints on what policymakers can do. The environment within which policy is made as well as the substantive processes that underlie the formation and implementation of specific health policies must be understood.

Health policy analysis is applicable to all societies. Regularities in the policy process and similarities among actors who try to influence it transcend differences in levels or degrees of development. Within government are policymakers including politicians, advisers, judges, and administrators. Outside governments are groups with major stakes in policies that affect them; these range from organized institutions to social forces and latent interests, and even foreign entities. How far such groups participate in policy making depends on how open or closed the political system is. Even if the array of problems and their solutions are different, procedures and routines in policy making are comparable.

While empirical experience with goals and means for health policy indicates potential global convergence on patterns of performance, countries implement changes within their own historical legacies and within the constraints of existing national institutions and political boundaries. The timing and speed of change vary as well. Some governments implement major changes rapidly whereas others, including those characterized by well-organized stakeholders, adjust, delay, or even abandon health policies.
The health sector comprises a major share of the economy in each country. It employs many workers, accounts for a considerable portion of gross national product (GNP), absorbs large amounts of resources (including often unrecorded payments out of pocket), and generates vested interests. Since any expenditure is income for someone else, a “penny saved” deprives someone somewhere of his or her earnings.

Health is also influenced by public policies that initially appear to be unconnected with health care or services. Civic insecurity, political instability, environmental pollution, revenue generation, and economic regulation—all affect changes in morbidity and mortality, not to mention the provision of health services per se. Health policy draws on many sectors whose relevance is not at first glance self-evident.

Health policy is of global concern beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Efforts to promote health cannot be restricted to a particular country because diseases do not confine themselves within geographical borders. They are transferred from one place to another through travel, migration, commerce, and social exchange. Efforts to prevent disease and to promote health require cooperation and collaboration among agencies at local, national, and international levels.

**Actors**

Structures and procedures of political institutions have important consequences for the adoption and content of health policy. Enduring institutions—both governmental and nongovernmental—interact in the policy-making process. Policy actors are individuals and groups, both formal and informal, that seek to influence the creation and implementation of public policies. Potentially such actors include everyone, but degrees of activity over time vary. Some potential players never enter the game; others dominate almost every stage of play. In the health sector, actors include branches of government, governmental agencies, commercial enterprises, nongovernmental institutions, organized interest groups, and professional associations. The role each actor plays, in combination with relationships among actors in formal and informal settings, determines health policy outcomes.

Interest groups are fundamental partners in policy making. To the extent that health policy interests are shared, collective pressure allows greater policy influence. But the dynamic of interest groups is not simple. While salient interests are represented by groups, the strength of representation is not tied to the salience of an issue. Some groups are already vested due to past history, and salience itself may be a consequence of interest group action. The study of health policy must identify the policy actors and their political resources. Common resources include information and bureaucratic knowledge, a network of contacts, citizen support (including size as well as strategic location of constituency), an ability to make political contributions, and an ability to mount a public relations campaign. While few groups ever use all such resources at all times, the profile of an organized group’s ability to make use of some combination of them is critical for policy influence.

In addition to organized interests, political legacies matter as do key political processes. For example, the United States developed a health care system that relies on private financing and voluntary hospitals for the provision of health services. Public sector responsibility is confined to targeted financing for the poor, the elderly, and a limited public hospital network. Subsequent efforts to reform the American health system face increasingly vested interests and widely accepted routines of private health care.

Significantly for health policy, the American system of government is built on an enduring Madisonian system of checks and balances that gives well-mobilized interests the ability to impede or block policy initiatives. The American health system has numerous groups powerful enough to oppose any reform that might harm their own economic interests.

Robert Alford’s classic conceptualization of health policy posits three categories of actors engaging in “dynamics without change”: (1) professional monopolists, (2) corporate rationalizers, and (3) citizen-consumers—the latter getting the proverbial short end of the stick. While institutions of representation, government, policy making, and intergovernmental relations may be stable, processes by which health policy are shaped and implemented have undergone marked changes during recent decades. These changes challenge the
notion that health policy is made by a unified center or by coordinated pillars at the helm of representative political regimes.

Options
Health care systems are characterized by country-specific mixes of public and private funding, contracting, and modes of providing services. The five main sources of funding are (1) taxation (general revenues, earmarked taxes, and tax expenditure), (2) public insurance, (3) private insurance, (4) direct patient payments (copayments, coinsurance, deductibles, and uninsured services), and (5) voluntary contributions. For some low-income countries, external aid is a major source as well.

Among the three basic contracting models, the integrated version places funding and ownership of services under the same (public or private) responsibility. The best known example is the British National Health Service (NHS) that provides tax-funded health care for all. The second contracting model allows governments or third-party payers (often administrative agencies for social health insurance but sometimes private health insurers) to negotiate long-term contracts with health care providers. The third model, common in private insurance, is reimbursement when a patient pays the provider and then seeks reimbursement from the insurance agency. Therefore, the ownership and management of health services can be public, private (both for-profit and not-for-profit), or a mix of those. Moreover, there are country-specific mixes of formal and informal care, traditional and modern medicine, and medical and related social services.

Combinations of those core elements—funding, contracting (including payment modes), and ownership—determine the allocation of financial risks and decision-making power among the main players in health care. Government ownership and tax-funded services require strong government influence, whereas private funding (insurance and direct patient payments) combined with legally independent providers restricts the role of the state even though governments can—and often do—impose rules to protect patients or safeguard the quality of and access to health care.

National arrangements for financing health care vary. In Scandinavia, Italy, and the United Kingdom, the major share of health care funding is financed by general taxation, whereas systems of health insurance are the major source of funds in Germany, France, and other continental countries. In all countries, patients are expected to pay a proportion of health care costs out of their own pockets through copayments or deductibles. In most cases, however, governments mitigate the effects of user fees by exempting certain groups or by setting annual limits on how much families must pay.

Variations in funding and contracting models in health care can be traced to country-specific historical developments, but two events in Europe played a crucial role as models for policy. The first was the introduction of mandatory social health insurance for industrial workers and their families in Germany in 1883. Several other countries in Europe followed the German example of state-sponsored (but not state-administered) mandatory social insurance to protect the family income of industrial workers against the risks of illness, disability, unemployment, and old age. Mandatory membership enforced by social insurance meant that the so-called sickness funds had stable revenue streams and could create wider pools of shared risk. In the past decades, these nongovernmental funds became core actors in the public policy arena by sharing the responsibility for social policy making but under ever-greater government regulation.

The second major innovation in the funding of health care was the establishment of Britain’s NHS in 1948. The NHS extended the German insurance model by providing coverage to the entire population with costs paid out of general taxation. Although hospitals in the United Kingdom were nationalized, family physicians remained independent as practitioners. Postwar reconstruction in Europe was characterized by popular support for the expansion of state-sponsored schemes. Some countries followed the German example of employment-based schemes; others preferred the population-based NHS model.

The spread of the two models was not restricted to Europe. Nations throughout the world sought to implement policies to protect the incomes of their populations (or population groups) against the financial risks of illness, disability, and old age. By the end of the 20th century, funding for health care in most countries had become hybridized by adopting elements from both the British and German models. Employment-based arrangements for
certain categories of workers were combined with population-wide and tax-based universal schemes.

**Reforms**

The 1970s saw a shift from expansion and popular support for welfare state arrangements to reassessment and retrenchment. Economic, demographic, and ideological factors contributed to the reshaping of the popular notion of the welfare state as a solution for social problems to that of an economic burden and a cause of economic stagnation. After the oil crisis, economic stagflation with persistently high levels of unemployment meant that state revenues stagnated or declined while public expenditures continued to grow. Moreover, as the end of the postwar baby boom became visible, demographers revised earlier demographic projections downward and future pension outlays upward.

Ideological views about the role of the state also changed. On both the left and right of the political spectrum, critics agreed that state powers had become too intrusive in the lives of individuals. Discontent over fiscal burdens and disappointing results of public programs, rising consumerism, and patient advocacy groups claiming a stronger say in the allocation and organization of health care—all challenged existing arrangements for providing welfare. Governments sought alternative models of governance to reduce the dominant role of the state and decentralize decision making, with more space for choice and entrepreneurial ideas. Some countries introduced market competition in health care by reducing state control over the funding and planning of health care services. They also sought to broaden patients’ choice of provider and health plan. Other countries turned to traditional tools of controlling public expenditure by setting strict budgets, reducing the scope of public insurance, and increasing direct patient payments.

During the past few decades, attempts to change health policy have been stimulated by economic recession and by severe fiscal problems in the state treasury rather than by an ideologically driven taste for reform, although the 2010 health reform bill in the United States was intended to address not only economic concerns but also issues of social justice. Declining government budgets have adversely affected service delivery, even in countries that previously had reasonably well-performing systems for the public delivery of health services. Pressures for changes in health policy often emanate from central ministries such as finance and planning. In many cases, the ministries of health struggle to reinterpret and to respond to policy directives outside their control.

Economic realities of recession and fiscal crises affect not only the types of policies that are implemented but also reactions to them by the users, beneficiaries, and citizens. The stage of raising revenue through the introduction of user fees to supplement government budgetary resources was critical for many governments because of the endemic economic crisis. But the success of the policy, however logical in theory, was constrained by the dwindling capacity of citizens to pay for health care. Furthermore, the administrative cost of collecting user fees and of monitoring exempted categories of users often exceeds the revenue collected. Although well intended, the initial policy had not considered inevitable transaction costs.

For several decades, health policy reforms have been premised on the assumption that improving the ability of government to manage its business will lead to improved social and economic progress. The first generation of reforms sought to cut public expenditures and to revive the private sector. Measures included budget cuts, tax reforms, limited privatization, liberalization of prices, and, most conspicuously, efforts to downsize the public sector. The latter was invariably described as bloated and in need of surgery followed by a strictly enforced diet.

When it became evident that the transformation of government would require a long time and that the savings from reduced bureaucratic costs would be insufficient to provide even basic levels of public services, a second generation of policy reforms sought to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government. While the first-generation reforms stressed downsizing, contracting, and improved control over budgeting and public expenditures, the second generation advocated decentralization to subnational levels, creation of semiautonomous agencies in the central government, and reforms of human resource management (recruitment, selection, and training).

Recently, the agenda of health policy refocused yet again as a third generation of reforms seeks to improve social outcomes through better service
delivery. This strategy emphasizes sectorwide approaches, particularly in health and education, to produce a coherent program for delivery of services that involves both governmental and nongovernmental organizations. While these generations of policy reforms are overlapping rather than strictly sequential, all have been driven by a combination of external and internal agencies. Multilateral and bilateral aid entails conditionalities that require a (commitment to) change in governmental behavior before money can be transferred. In turn, national planning commissions and ministries of finance require line agencies to adopt reforms that may include a combination of these generations.

Policy reforms range across a repertoire of instruments: streamlined budgets, staff reductions, raised tariffs, contracting out, and other forms of privatization. Reform of the health sector has focused on four main options, none of which is mutually exclusive and all of which may occur at the same time. These are the establishment of autonomous organizations, introduction of user fees, contracting out of services, and the enablement and regulation of the private sector.

While these issues characterize features of health care systems and health policy, they do not explain the causes or effects of policy change. To understand why countries embark on particular reform paths, not only external and internal pressures for change must be investigated but also structural features of social policy making that enable politicians and policy entrepreneurs to change the system despite the fact that institutional legacies and popular support for existing policy arrangements create barriers to change.

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See also Functionalism; Individualism; Institutions and Institutionalism; Interest Groups; Libertarianism; Policy Analysis; Policy Community; Policy Cycle; Policy Learning; Policy Network; Reform; Responsibility; Solidarity; Values; Welfare State

Further Readings


Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831)

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born in Stuttgart, Germany, on August 27, 1770. His political writings, including those on political philosophy, owed much to his reactions to the fragmentary nature of the German territories within the Holy Roman Empire and Napoleon’s attempted forced unification of them under a common civil
code, between the early 1790s and the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. Hegel’s trenchant critique of the abstract universalism of the French revolutionaries in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) did not prevent him from celebrating every Bastille Day until his death on November 14, 1831. His alternative was a form of civic nationalism based on shared traditions and cultural attachments, an ideal that he championed against the ethnic nationalism espoused at the time by many German romantics. In itself, the fact that Hegel allied himself so clearly with the civic nationalists in this particular dispute should do much to unsettle the received picture of him as an apologist for Prussian authoritarianism and a forerunner of Nazism.

Today, Hegel is notorious for his claim, made most famously in the Philosophy of History (1831), that history is the gradual revelation of Geist (translated as “Spirit” or “Mind” and synonymous with God’s temporal self-manifestation) in the world, a dialectical process that critics allege he believes occurs without the knowledge of individual human agents and largely through the brutal intervention of quasi-mystical “world-historical individuals.” The meaning and significance of such claims are easily misunderstood and, in certain cases, apparently deliberately distorted. Hegel approaches the historical record as a philosopher, and in this role, he seeks to discover the rationality underlying the shifting events of the past. He explicitly distinguishes this “philosophical history” from the other forms of history, including those undertaken by the early chroniclers and those who would now be seen as historians, both of whom he acknowledges have legitimate functions to perform in providing an understanding of the past. The philosopher’s primary task, however, is to try to arrive at knowledge of the fundamental processes at work in the world. According to Hegel, knowledge can only be of a rational system of related concepts and propositions; hence, knowledge of the fundamental structural processes of human action must presuppose the ultimate rationality of the world. It is partly because he holds this view that Hegel claims, most notably in the Preface to Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1821), that “what is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational.” Knowledge is of reality and, Hegel argues, everyone presupposes reality to be structured by a coherent system of fundamental principles or laws. To “comprehend” something is to understand that particular thing as being underpinned in particular ways by such a coherent system of laws. A philosophical history attempts to discover those laws as they have been revealed through past actions and events.

This presupposition informs every branch of Hegel’s philosophical system. Hence, in the preface to Elements of the Philosophy of Right, he states that the fundamental task of his political philosophy is “to comprehend and portray the state [Staat] as an inherently rational entity” [italics added]. It is this project that has led a great many critics to allege that Hegel is simply an apologist for the Prussian state. In reality, Hegel is seeking to discover the ideal type of the Staat that is implicit within the self-image of the world’s most developed empirical politically organized communities. This project necessitates an attempt to rationalize certain negative features of the world, not least war. Nevertheless, the project has a profoundly critical thrust, in that some elements of empirically observable states do not cohere with the majority of the other elements of those states. In this sense, these wayward features of empirical states cannot be included within a conception of the state as an ideal type. The irrational elements must be excluded, which in practice means that the incongruent features of the world should be reformed, a process that may require radical changes to existent states. Hegel’s most significant analysis of an incoherent social practice concerns slavery, in Phenomenology of Spirit. While the master treats the slave as a thing that can be owned and used, in giving him orders he treats him also as a being with capacities for cognition and practical reason—that is, as a person. More than this, the master seeks to gain a sense of his own power and status by dominating the slave. Yet he can never be satisfied with recognition from a lesser being. Similarly, the slave is denied the recognition that he seeks innately from his master. Hence, the master–slave relationship is self-contradictory and unsatisfying for both parties; the situation tends to drive each to destroy the other or to try to reconstruct their relationship on a more egalitarian footing. This struggle for recognition is the primary motor of human progress.

Hegel’s project would have profound implications even if he had restricted his conception of the
proper subject matter of political philosophy (the Staat) to the state as it is understood by many contemporary political scientists and philosophers: the formal legal-political organs, including the legislature, executive, judiciary, civil service, police, army, and so on. In fact, Hegel adopts a wider conception of the Staat understood as an order that encompasses conventional sociopolitical, economic, and legal practices and institutions in such a manner that, in essence, it represents a thoroughly modernized ideal of the ancient Greek polis. Elements of the Philosophy of Right analyses the relationships within the ideal type of the modern state through the interactions of its three “moments”: (1) the individual will, (2) Moralität (translates very loosely as “morality”), and (3) Sittlichkeit (usually translated as the “ethical life”). In Hegel’s view, the individual will is free when the agent acknowledges the determinate action that results from that will as an expression of a law that he (the individual) has set for himself. (Hegel is concerned with men, not women, as commented on below.) Institutions and practices are justified to the extent that they facilitate such freedom. Hegel explores this claim through his discussion of the individual right to private property, which he analyses as the means for the facilitation of the determinate expression of the individual’s will in the world. This discussion leads him to an analysis of contract as a moment of the interaction of the wills of different persons. This leads him to the discussion of wrong action and the first stage of his analysis of punishment as the annulment of crime. Hegel conceives this “cancellation” of wrong action as the reharmonization of the individual’s will with itself and with the social practices and institutions that provide the will with its initial content (its socialization) and background. Underlying Hegel’s theory is a proposition that recurs throughout his writings: The reality of an object—in this case, the determinate individual will—is constituted by the coherent principles underlying it. If existent states were to embody their ideal type, then the criminal act would represent of necessity an internal contradiction within the individual. Punishment enables the individual’s rational will to reassert itself in practice, by communicating the Staat’s disapproval thereby “reminding” the individual of the nature and legitimacy of the presupposed meanings and values that form the basis of his rational will.

Hegel titles this part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right as “Abstract Right.” He argues that the lack of determinacy in such a (logical rather than temporal) “moment” is overcome through Moralität. Yet even this second “moment” is limited because it lacks an external referent, being concerned solely as it is with the individual’s internal moral life, the qualities of his particular character, virtue, and conscience. The individual can overcome these limitations only by being an active participant in the Sittlichkeit (“ethical life”) of his community. The first facet of ethical life in which the individual participates is the family. This is the realm of love and hence the unreflective honoring of one’s duties to the members of one’s family. In essence, in the family the individual acts without asking why or what is required of him; in this sense, Hegel calls the family the realm of “immediacy.” This realm is limited, however, in that the person is treated as a facet of a group, rather than as an individual with his or her own desires, beliefs, values, plans, and will. The person moves closer to expressing his or her individuality through participation in civil society. In Hegel’s view, this nonpolitical public realm encompasses the economic system, voluntary associations, and the like. The fruits of private property are realized here in the “system of needs,” partly through employment and self-expression through work. (Yet Hegel appreciates that these fruits are associated with unemployment and poverty.) In civil society as a whole, individuals face each other as self-interested agents, bound together by contracts that they have entered into self-consciously and deliberately. In this sense, it is a realm of mediated action.

In spite of any appearance of pure self-determination, the individual’s actions in civil society are necessarily conceived and executed within a shared framework of common modes of action, norms, conventions, and, ultimately, civil laws. These underlying structures are maintained through the action of the state, conceived as living interactions of citizens in the context of the formalized legal and political organs. To the extent that the state embodies its ideal, it enjoys the self-conscious loyalty of its citizens. This is true patriotism: the self-conscious emotional identification of individual citizens with the community as the latter is
embodied in the state, with this identification being based on an uncoerced recognition that one’s own highest good is realized through respecting the good of one’s Staat. Elements of the Philosophy of Right concludes with pregnant discussions of the tragic inevitability of war and various forms of imperialism, with the latter in particular anticipating many Marxist theories. Finally, Hegel argues that progress is inherently tragic, in the sense that human development is driven by world-historical individuals, such as Napoleon, and world-historical states (here, one might think of the contemporary United States), who in driving the world forward, inevitably bring about their own fall from grace.

Hegel’s claim that the Staat should be conceived organically has led many to argue that he sees individual human beings as mere adjuncts of the state qua political-legal institutions or as organs and limbs to be directed not by their own individual wills but by the automatic functioning of the state as some form of collective whole. On this view, Hegel held the state to be the determining agent and the individual to be valuable only to the extent that he or she served the state’s interests and will. This unappealing picture is crowned literally by Hegel’s retention of the monarch as the embodiment of the state, exercising the sole function of signing bills into law. In reality, Hegel holds that individuals in a well-ordered state would be active, self-conscious, and critical patriots; organized through various civil society associations; and represented politically through their membership of corporations that are integrated formally into the state apparatus. To the extent that they fail to be so in practice, the particular state fails to live up to its ideal. Throughout, the guiding principle of Hegel’s political philosophy is “to be a person, and respect others as persons” (Philosophy of Right, Part 1, sec. 36).

Certainly, problems remain. Even though Hegel describes polygamy as slavery for women, he excludes women from full citizenship, claiming that they are incapable of freedom in that they are guided by emotion rather than reason. Other critics have baulked at his corporatism and retention of the monarch, even if in only a largely ceremonial role. Hegel himself acknowledges different contradictions within his rationalization of the world: Free economic activity seems to result inevitably in poverty for some respectable workers, and self-interested states remain the primary actors in an international system thereby destined for conflict and war. Despite the claims of both friends, such as Alexandre Kojève, and critics, such as Karl Popper, Hegel never claimed that the world that we have now is perfect. Rather than believing that we have reached the “End of History,” Hegel insists that philosophical insight always comes too late: The philosopher can only rationalize a stage of the world when it is in its death throes.

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See also Citizenship; Civil Society; Constitutionalism; Idealism; Identity, Social and Political; Individualism; Liberty; Nationalism; State

Further Readings

HEGEMONY

Hegemony derives from the Greek term ἡγεμονία (ἡγεμονία), referring to the predominance of one of the city states (e.g., Sparta or Athens) over the others and its related leadership in issues of common interest. In modern times, it has come to be used
in reference more generally to the predominance of one actor over others. In contemporary political science, we can distinguish two traditions in the use of the term *hegemony*. In international relations theory, hegemony has been used more or less directly in reference to the original Greek meaning, where it refers to the predominance (primarily in terms of economic and military power) of one state over others. Alternatively, in Marxist-inspired political science, hegemony refers to the predominance (especially in an ideological sense) of one social group over others. Finally, Robert Cox has established an approach in critical international relations theory in which the differences between these two traditions are transcended.

**Hegemony in International Relations Theory**

In international relations theory, the concept of hegemony has been applied to the phenomenon of one state’s being strong enough to maintain an international order that is beneficial to (most) other states as well. Two main traditions can be distinguished here, the neorealist theory of hegemonic stability and the theory of historical cycles of global hegemony and leadership.

**Hegemonic Stability**

The theory of hegemonic stability (developed in the 1970s by Charles Kindleberger and subsequently subscribed to by many neorealist authors) argues that the interstate system will be relatively peaceful and stable if there is a hegemonic state that provides certain public goods to the system (most basically prosperity and security). A state will be a *hegemon* if it has both the capability and the will to perform this function. The capability of a state depends on the (relative) size and level of development of its economy, its ability to dominate certain key technological sectors, and its political and military power. During much of the 19th century, Great Britain dominated the world economically, politically, and militarily. Through its role as a stabilizer in the European balance of power and through its management of the gold standard, it was able to secure a measure of stability in interstate relations, which was beneficial to the growth of a liberal world economy. Similarly, after 1945 the United States became the hegemon: It emerged out of the war as by far the strongest military and economic power, and it used its power to create the institutional framework (the Bretton Woods system), which facilitated the unprecedented expansion of the world economy in the following decades.

When the Bretton Woods system collapsed in the early 1970s and the hegemony of the United States weakened, hegemonic stability theory predicted the erosion of the liberal regime established by the hegemon as well. However, no such development took place. This gave rise to an alternative interpretation. In his *After Hegemony* (1984), Robert Keohane argued that collaboration between states needs to be based not only on the exercise of hegemony but also on the recognition by states that voluntary cooperation can be beneficial to them. Crucial to this approach is the concept of complex interdependence, which explains why states engage in cooperation through the creation and reproduction of international regimes.

**World Systems Theory**

Very similar conceptions of hegemony have been developed by scholars who started theorizing interstate hegemony from adjoining disciplines such as historical sociology (e.g., Immanuel Wallerstein) or political geography (e.g., Giovanni Arrighi and Peter Taylor). Wallerstein (1980), the intellectual founder of world systems theory, defines hegemony as that “short moment in time when a given core power can manifest simultaneously productive, commercial and financial superiority over all other core powers” (pp. 38–39). According to Wallerstein, there have been three instances of hegemony in the history of the capitalist world economy: (1) the United Provinces (1620–1672), (2) England (1815–1873), and (3) the United States of America (1945–1967). All these powers displayed some common characteristics. First, they initially achieved a relative advantage in agro-industrial production, then in commerce, and finally in finance. Second, hegemonic powers tended to be advocates of global “liberalism” in economic and political terms. Finally, in all three cases military power rested primarily on naval capabilities. The conditions that determine the rise of a particular country to hegemony in the system are manifold: Geographic location and size, the strength of the state apparatus,
the availability of new technologies capable of giving the country in question a competitive advantage over other core powers, the availability of sufficient investment capital and human capital (skilled labor), and a productive agricultural sector can all contribute to the attainment of hegemony.

Some authors with intellectual roots in international relations, such as George Modelski and William R. Thompson, have taken a historical view and arrived at insights very similar to those of world systems theory (although without using the word hegemony). Modelski’s “long cycle of world leadership” consists of four phases: the phase of (1) global war among major powers in the system, resulting in the emergence of a (2) world power assuming the leadership role; after a period of 2 to 3 decades, the world power’s leadership starts to wane in the phase of (3) delegitimation so that eventually a strong challenger rises in the phase of (4) deconcentration, whose challenge results in a new global war. According to Modelski, there have been five such cycles in the history of the world system: the Portuguese cycle (1494–1580), the Dutch cycle (1581–1688), the first (1689–1791) and second (1792–1913) British cycles, and finally the American cycle (1914–present). Decisive for the attainment of world leadership is the “capacity for global reach”: The aspiring power must be securely located, preferably on an ocean; it must possess ocean-going sea power (potentially more than half of all available sea power); it must have sufficient financial resources to pay for its navy; and it must have a political structure that can lend coherence to a global enterprise. The principal challengers have been land powers: The French challenged the Dutch leadership only to find the English taking over the lead, and similarly the French and German challenges eventuated in leadership by (again) Britain and the United States.

Ultimately, these different approaches to hegemony are in agreement on one fundamental point: They all conceptualize hegemony as a relationship between states. This contrasts sharply with the original definition of hegemony in Marxist thought.

**Hegemony in Marxist Political Theory**

*Hegemony* in the Marxist tradition is usually associated with the name of Antonio Gramsci, the leader of the Italian Communist Party between 1924 and 1926, when he was arrested by the Fascist regime. In fact, the term was already used extensively by various Russian socialist leaders in the decades leading up to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. In this early debate, hegemony referred to the leading role that the proletariat might play in the revolutionary struggle against the feudal order, provided it could transcend its internal divisions and develop a coherent ideological project. Gramsci was concerned to rethink political strategy in light of the very different experiences of the Russian and the West European revolutions of 1917–1919. In Russia, the capture of state power gave the revolutionary forces a sufficient grip on society at large to implement their political program. In the West (as the failed revolutions in Germany and Italy showed), the political power of the ruling class did not rest primarily on the control of the coercive apparatus of the state but was diffused and situated in the myriad institutions and relationships in civil society. In reflecting on these historical experiences, Gramsci developed his understanding of hegemony beyond its early forms by emphasizing the importance of intellectual and moral leadership and of the hegemonic group being able to bind other social groups and by recognizing the possibility of hegemony being exercised by any social class (in particular the bourgeoisie).

No social group can rule by force alone. In any class society, the ruling class, that is, the social group that has the ultimate control over the primary means of production, organizes, reproduces, and reinforces its position of economic power through a complex mix of noneconomic mechanisms. These include ideological or religious power, institutional forms, and ultimately the (threat of the) use of force. Under certain historical conditions, the balance between force and persuasion can move from one end of the continuum to the other (without either ever completely disappearing). Hegemony, in the classic Gramscian sense, is then defined as a form of class rule based primarily on consent by the subordinate groups (produced by the political, intellectual, and moral leadership of the hegemonic group) rather than on coercion (resting on the application of physical force).

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have critiqued Gramsci’s thought, and in particular the adoption of Gramsci’s ideas by more recent
Marxist authors, as being marred by a lingering materialist determinism. They have argued for a radical reinterpretation of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony on the basis of discourse theory: Hegemony then becomes a strictly subjective phenomenon. Their intervention has led to continuing debate in Marxist thought between those committed to further developing historical materialism and those arguing for a constructivist (or post-structuralist) turn.

**Transnational Hegemony**

Robert Cox became the founder of an approach that became known as neo-Gramscianism or transnational historical materialism in which he brought the earlier two traditions together by applying Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony to the analysis of international politics. He argued that to understand global politics we need to abandon the idea that is central to the classic paradigm in international relations theory, namely, that the state is the key unit of analysis. Basing himself on a materialist position, he argued that it is social relations of production that are key and that therefore the basic unit of analysis should be the state–society complex rather than the state conceived as a black box. Cox enlarged the scope of his project by making the crucial claim that Gramsci’s core ideas can fruitfully be applied to the analysis of a globalizing international capitalism even though Gramsci himself was primarily concerned with analyzing politics in national contexts.

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Hegemony, in Cox’s understanding, is simultaneously a relationship between social forces as well as a relationship between states: The international hegemony of states such as Great Britain and the United States is in fact the outward projection of the domestically grounded hegemony of a particular configuration of social forces. American hegemony in the post-1945 era was grounded in the hegemony of the class coalition (or in Gramsci’s terminology historic bloc) of internationally oriented transnational corporations and the organized industrial working class. The longer-term historical dynamics of the global system are determined by the patterns of interaction of hegemonic and nonhegemonic state-society complexes: societies characterized by the predominance of consensual and coercive forms of class rule, respectively. The international order can be characterized as hegemonic when a specific national configuration of class forces is able to project its predominant influence externally, thus supporting a leading role for its state; or it can be characterized as nonhegemonic (Cox speaks of “rival imperialisms”) when such leading class coalitions remain “domestic” because they are too weak to project their influence outwardly.

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**See also** Civil Society; Class, Social; Constructivism; Interdependence; International Regimes; Marxism; Power; World Systems Theory

**Further Readings**


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**Hermeneutics**

As one might expect of a concept and tradition of thought that traverses vast expanses of history and a variety of disciplines, the term *hermeneutics* is inaducive to short summary or univocal definition. In the broadest of terms, hermeneutics refers to the theory and methodology of interpretation, that is, the theory and methods of understanding, or making sense of, an object of investigation. The proper objects of interpretation are taken to be
texts” or “text analogues” whose meanings are unclear, strange, puzzling, confused, fragmentary, incomplete, or seemingly contradictory. The primary aim of hermeneutical investigation is to provide a reading or interpretation of the text that removes or mitigates its obscurity or puzzling aspects by disclosing its underlying meaning and coherence. Additionally, hermeneutical inquiry involves systematic reflection on questions about the very nature of interpretation: What is interpretation? What makes one interpretation better or more correct than another? What is the proper scope of interpretive inquiry? What are its social and political implications? One’s stance on these and other questions will decisively shape one’s conception of hermeneutics. This entry discusses its history, various meanings, and possible applications in political science.

### History and Meanings
Consistent with the varied contemporary understandings of the term, the etymological roots of the word hermeneutics are equally rich and complex. The word first appears in ancient Greek as the verb hermēneuein (“to interpret”) and the noun hermēneia (“interpretation”). Specifically, its origins point to Hermes, the wing-footed herald of the gods who traveled between the mortal and immortal worlds, delivering messages from the latter to the former. As such, Hermes is associated with activities that are later regarded as central to the hermeneutical enterprise, namely, the activities of interpreting and illuminating alien or opaque systems of meaning (in Greek, a hermēneus was an interpreter), of translating meanings from one world or language into another, and of mediating between different people or worlds. At the same time, Hermes’s reputation as the discoverer of writing, music, and poetry points to the strong emphasis that advocates of hermeneutics place on the role of language in human life. Coming to an understanding of some phenomenon, hermeneuticians contend, inevitably requires a grasp of the linguistic practices and symbolic systems through which the meaning of that phenomenon is expressed. Finally, the connection between hermeneutics, interpretation, and language is apparent in the title of Aristotle’s work on the relationship between language and logic, Peri Hermeneias, which was later translated into Latin as De Interpretatione.

Although originating in the classical world, the concept of hermeneutics is sharply altered during the modern period. With the advent of the Protestant Reformation and its shift of responsibility for interpreting the Bible from the Church Fathers to individual Christians, hermeneutics, especially in Germany, becomes increasingly identified with efforts to expound the proper principles and methods of Biblical interpretation. This notion is broadened over time to include methods of philological and legal interpretation but nonetheless remains the dominant understanding of hermeneutics into the 19th century, when the philosopher and theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher advances a view of hermeneutics as a universal discipline that encompasses all fields of study in which the interpretation of texts (in the extended sense of the term) is a central concern. According to Schleiermacher, universal hermeneutics aims to articulate the general principles of all understanding that constitute the foundation of the specialized fields of hermeneutical inquiry.

Perhaps the most significant shift of meaning occurs in the late 19th century, when the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey conceives of hermeneutics as providing the methodological and epistemological foundation of the Geisteswissenschaften (the social sciences and humanities). Contending that the central task of the Geisteswissenschaften is to understand lived experience in all of its abundant richness and diversity, Dilthey differentiates the mechanistic and nomological forms of explanation characteristic of the natural sciences from the types of hermeneutical understanding that in his view constitute the methodological and epistemological foundations of the human sciences. While the former strive to explain the behavior of physical objects through the discovery of causal laws, the proper aim of the latter, Dilthey argues, is to understand the historically constituted mental life and lived experience that is an essential aspect of human reality.

Consequently, the human sciences are both irreducible to and partly independent of the sciences of nature. Not only is their subject matter ontologically distinct from that of the natural sciences, but this ontological difference yields a methodological distinction. One of Dilthey’s central projects was to
Hermeneutics

develop a view of hermeneutics as providing the proper methods for the study of human existence. This project is taken up and variously reformulated by several leading representatives of hermeneutical thought in the late 19th and 20th centuries, including figures as diverse as Max Weber, Robin George Collingwood, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin Heidegger, Peter Winch, Paul Ricoeur, Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Clifford Geertz, and Quentin Skinner.

Hermeneutics and Political Science

Although Dilthey is the first writer to argue that hermeneutics, or interpretation, provides a firm foundation for the human sciences and constitutes its central task, it is only during the later decades of the 20th century that hermeneutical perspectives become a significant part of the discourse of Anglophone political science. Largely in response to the growing prominence of positivist epistemologies, the champions of hermeneutics simultaneously criticized many of the central claims of positivism and outlined their own post-positivist conceptions of political inquiry. Importantly, hermeneutical critics held that positivist orthodoxies not only sustained a model of scientific explanation that was inappropriate for the social sciences, but they also obfuscated important issues of power and politics that could only be identified through careful attention to the interpretive dimensions of political affairs.

On the one hand, hermeneuticists challenged the central commitments of positivism: that the covering-law model of explanation constitutes the only valid model of scientific explanation; that sense data can be directly perceived and represented in a neutral, noninterpretive observation language; that empirical data can be neatly divorced from theoretical frameworks; that scientific explanations are necessarily value-free; and that the methods of the mature natural sciences provide the proper model for the study of political affairs. Although articulated in various ways, the hermeneutical critique of positivism generally turns on an analysis of a key task of social and political inquiry that has no echo in the physical sciences, namely, the radically reflexive and doubly hermeneutical task of interpreting self-interpretations. Because human beings are self-interpreting animals whose individual and social self-interpretations constitute an essential part of social reality, no investigation of social or political phenomena can neglect this task on pain of distorting the phenomena it purports to explain or understand.

At a minimum, hermeneuticists maintain, social and political inquiry must begin by understanding agents’ self-understandings and self-interpretations. It is only on the basis of such understanding that one can, first, identify properly what stands in need of explanation and, second, combat the often fatal tendency of social scientists and laypersons to project their own languages of understanding onto the agents, cultures, traditions, and practices they study. More generally, because self-interpretations partly constitute human and social reality yet typically change over time and vary across cultures, the conceptual unity that is a central feature of the covering law model and a necessary condition of precise prediction rarely, if ever, obtains in social science. In short, the inherent mutability and instability of social reality undermines the positivist imperative to develop a nomological and predictive science of society and politics.

On the other hand, hermeneuticists have developed their own accounts of the proper practices of political inquiry. The central premise of hermeneutical approaches is that interpretation takes place within specific backgrounds or contexts that are conceived, for example, as traditions, webs of meaning and belief, constellations of social relations, or practices embedded in what Ludwig Wittgenstein calls a “form of life.” In the act of interpretation, both the interpreter and the text (or text-analog) are “situated” within one or more of these contexts or backgrounds. The relationship between them is therefore not one of a disinterested, disembodied observer in search of objective, context-free knowledge. Rather, it involves a dialogical and fallible process of navigating within and between often disparate linguistic, cultural, historical, and political contexts to better understand or make sense of the text or texts under investigation.

Most significantly, interpretation involves movement within what is called the hermeneutic circle. Hermeneuticists contend that an adequate interpretation of the meaning or sense of a text requires an analysis that is circular in a double sense: first, any effort to establish the meaning of a text must proceed by moving back and forth between a reading of particular parts of the text
and the text as a whole, with the latter being read in light of the former and vice versa; and, second, both the individual parts of the text and the text as a whole must be located within a larger context, background, or field of conventions and assumptions from which they derive their meaning and to which they contribute. The process is therefore unavoidably holistic and circular—there is no privileged standpoint outside the circle of meanings from which one might establish the meaning of a single element within the text or of the text as a whole. This, however, does not imply that the standards for assessing interpretations are subjective or arbitrary. Because even individual beliefs and attitudes are only intelligible against a background of publicly available “intersubjective” and “common” meanings, the latter provide a publicly accessible evidential basis for evaluating the adequacy of an interpretation.

Although hermeneutical writers argue that interpretation is an indispensable part of all social inquiry, the deliberate appropriation of hermeneutical methods is more common in some areas of political inquiry than in others. Hermeneutical approaches are most frequently deployed in political theory and legal interpretation and in scholarship that examines the historical development and transformation of ideas, concepts, and institutions. They have also gained considerable currency in areas of comparative politics and international relations where scholars explore issues of nationhood and national attachments, the politics of recognition, and a host of problems involving cultural, ethnic, religious, and class differences and conflicts. Finally, they have acquired prominence among a wide range of scholars—including scholars who use multiple or mixed methods—who investigate the multiple dimensions of empowerment and disempowerment that reside in language, social practice, and the complex legacies of cultural and political traditions. These scholars have found hermeneutics to be a valuable resource for analyzing how language can conceal and distort relations of power yet also open new possibilities for enhanced understanding, resistance, social transformation, and political renewal.

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See also Constructivism; Discourse Analysis; Methodology; Positivism; Thick Description

Further Readings

Hierarchical/Multilevel Models

See Multilevel Analysis

Hinduism

Hinduism is more a civilization than a religion: not only because it is associated with a full-fledged social system, the caste system, but also because it is closely linked with an ancient culture spread over a clear-cut territory (today’s India) and endowed with a language (Sanskrit). As a civilization, Hinduism does not display much cohesion and homogeneity. At first sight, it seems to possess the classic duality between what Robert Redfield calls a “great tradition” and a “little tradition,” which one may call “popular Hinduism,” composed of local practices. According to Shyama Charan Dube, however, this schema is complicated in the Hindu case by the lack of unity in the great tradition itself.

A Religion of “Unity in Diversity”

Most Hindus traditionally share a common belief in reincarnation, consider the seven sacred cities
(Ayodhya, Mathura, Haridwar, Benares, Kanchipuram, Ujjain, and Dwarka) as pilgrimage centers, worship god according to similar rituals in their respective temples (pujas), and celebrate the same festivals, including the Kumbh Mela, for which people gather together in millions every 9 or 12 years. Yet Hinduism does not have an orthodoxy enshrined in one book and guarded by an ecclesiastical body but encompasses several religious streams founded by gurus who pay obeisance to any one of the many gods of the Hindu pantheon (Shiva, Vishnu, or one of his avatars, or the Shaktas, who worship the Goddess under one form or another). Thus, the Hinduism of the great tradition appears as a “conglomeration of sects” (Romila Thapar, 1989, p. 207), known as sampradaya (from the Sanskrit samprada, to transmit); indeed, the essence of the sect lies in “the uninterrupted transmission from one master to another” (Catherine Clémentin-Ojha, 1990, p. 19) of the message of the founding guru, which itself derives from a revelation. (However, a Hindu sect may also take the form of a panth [way], where the founder is not considered as having been the recipient of a divine revelation.) Isolated from one another, these sects are also rivals to the extent that they compete for patronage and for the preeminence of their particular teachings.

The main, if not the only, current of Hinduism—which became formalized in a way that approximates to an “ecclesiastical structure” (Thapar, 1985, p. 17)—was that of Shankara. This ascetic reformer of the 8th century responded to the spread of Buddhism by establishing monasteries (math) in the four corners of India—Sringeri in the south, Dwarka in the west, Badri in the north, and Puri in the east—at the head of which were placed shankaracharyas, ordained to exercise a spiritual authority comparable with that of the Buddhist clergy.

The Making of Hinduism

In spite of the common features listed above, the remarkable diversity of Hinduism prevailed for centuries, to such an extent that until the 16th century there was no single religious tradition known as “Hinduism.” The development of a collective Hindu consciousness was inhibited not only by the extreme social and religious differentiation within Hinduism but also by a tendency to discount the importance of the Other and therefore to ignore the need for solidarity in the face of that Other. In the process of sociocultural integration, a capacity for assimilation in the caste system is revealed: Insofar as the hierarchy represents a system of gradation based on the notion of ritual purity, everyone can find a place in it, below the Brahmans, according to the degree of conformity with the exalted values personified by Brahmans. As a result, invaders such as the Huns found themselves classed as Kshatriyas (warriors), observing the ritual practices prescribed for these castes and recognizing the authority of the Brahmans.

Paradoxically, the ability to integrate newcomers also reflected an inability to recognize the Other as such. Brahminal texts assume that the indigenous social order has a homologous relationship to the cosmic order, the dharma; and it is the preservation of this relationship in equilibrium that tends to demand the assimilation of foreign elements into the social system. The same texts describe this society as endowed with a language and territory with unique attributes and thus enable the rites necessary to perpetuate the dharmic order to be performed. Sanskrit is that language par excellence, and other languages are seen as, at best, degraded forms of it. Parallel to this, North India—Aryavarta—is considered to be the land where the rites necessary for the maintenance of dharma are fulfilled.

This belief in a privileged connection between India and dharma underlies the logic of the social system of the varnas, which consists of Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas (merchants and artisans), and Shudras (the servile castes). In a foundational myth of the Vedas—the basis of the Brahanical great tradition—these varnas are described as owing their origin to the sacrificial dismemberment of the cosmic Primeval Man, the Virat Purushan, when the Brahma proceeded from this mouth, the Kshatriya from his arms, the Vaishya from his thighs, and the Shudra from his feet. This division of the social structure into four parts reflects the belief in a correspondence between Hindu society and the totality of the cosmic order, a correspondence that hampers the development of a distinct identity. Nothing outside it can have any meaning or be worthy of interest. In the absence of “them,” there cannot be “we” and “us.”
The term Hindu was originally derived from the name Indus and was used successively by the Achaemenids, the Greeks, and the Muslims to denote the population living beyond that river. However, it was not appropriated by the people who themselves bore this designation, nor did they use it themselves till the medieval period. This development has to be seen in conjunction with the penetration of the subcontinent by Muslim invaders, who were the first to put up a sustained resistance to the capacity of the indigenous culture for assimilation. For example, to be integrated into the Kshatriya varna, Muslim leaders would have been obliged to recognize the natural superiority of the Brahmins; in fact, they refused to give up the practices required by Islam and indeed were prepared in certain circumstances to clash with the Hindus, such as over cow slaughter. Such antagonism contributed to the emergence of a Hindu consciousness.

The Hindu consciousness apparently found its principal expression in the 17th and 18th centuries in the empire of Shivaji and then in the Maratha confederation. In 1720, Brahmins took over the latter kingdom, in which they had formerly served as chief ministers (Peshvas—a name they retained when they became the ruling dynasty) and military chiefs. These two political institutions were formed in Maharashtra in opposition to the Mughal Empire and in the name of dharma; the slaughter of cows, which the Muslims sometimes offered as a sacrifice, was thus forbidden there. However, according to Christopher Bayly, the conquests of the Marathas in the direction of the Gangetic plain were not examples of religious war based on ethnic or communal consciousness. They resulted from a motivation that was ritual in character—to restore to the Hindus certain holy places, such as Varanasi, which were revered throughout India.

From Hinduism to Neo-Hinduism

Things changed after the establishment of the British Raj in the mid-19th century. The proselytizing activities of the Christian missionaries and the (selective) reformist zeal of the administration fostered a reaction from the Hindu upper castes, mostly from the Brahmins, who were the custodians of the Hindu tradition.

The Brahmo Samaj was founded in 1828 not as a conservative movement but as the instrument of Hindu revivalism. Admitting that Hinduism had lost its pristine purity—as the European Orientalists were arguing since the 18th century—its leaders claimed that it could regain it through a reform process drawing its inspiration from a Golden Age that was associated with the Vedic period. This invention of tradition was the touchstone of a new Hindu nationalism that acquired its definitive shape in the late 19th century and early 20th century. In 1875, the Arya Samaj claimed that the Hindus descended from the first people of the earth—the Aryans—whose language, Sanskrit, was the mother of all languages. In 1915, this movement was the crucible of the first Hindu nationalist party, the Hindu Mahasabha. A few years later, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar gave an ideological charter to Hindu nationalism in a book called Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? (1923).

The Muslim mobilization in defense of the Khilafat (caliphate) had a catalytic effect, and from then on, the Muslim minority was the real bête noire of the Hindu nationalists because of its Pan-Islamic solidarities and its reluctance to assimilate into the Hindu civilization. The Hindu identity had crystallized primarily in reaction to this so-called threatening Other. Its contours were further hardened by the census operations, which enumerated religious communities from 1871 onward, and by the politicization of religion under the impulse of populist politicians.

The erosion of the traditional inner diversity of Hinduism continued during the 20th century under the influence of these different forces. Among them, the most powerful was—and still is—the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (The National Volunteers Corps), which was founded in 1925 and has developed several fronts after independence, including a student union, a labor union, and a political party, the Jana Sangh, whose heir, the Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party), led the ruling coalition from 1998 to 2004. While Hindu nationalism has stagnated in the early 21st century, its social activities (including free medicine and education) and its proselytizing zeal (aiming to reconvert Christian communities especially) have increased.

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See also Buddhism; Christianity; Islam; Religion
Further Readings


**Historical Memory**

The concept of “historical memory,” often expressed as “collective memory,” “social memory,” or for political scientists, “the politics of memory,” refers to the ways in which groups, collectivities, and nations construct and identify with particular narratives about historical periods or events. Historical memories are foundational to social and political identities and are also often reshaped in relation to the present historical-political moment. In this entry, the origins and uses of this concept in contemporary political science are discussed. This applies particularly to recent transitions from authoritarian rule and the formation of newly democratizing political cultures.

The study of memory has a long tradition in other social science disciplines. Yet until fairly recently, political scientists tended to dismiss historical memory as a conceptual or research arena. There seemed to be three general reasons for this: First, political scientists saw memory as too subjective, as properly the realm of psychology, difficult to measure, quantify, and operationalize in ways that could be compared and generalized. Second, political scientists tended to hold that “relevant” memory belongs to the discipline of history, of sorting facts, validity, and particularities, and that particularities were simply not what was driving the discipline of political science. It was for the historians to decide what constituted the dividing line between memory and history. Third, political scientists tended to view collective memories as codified in social and political institutions, and therefore it was more useful to study institutions than memories. Institutions enshrine memories.

Despite these biases against the study of memory as a lens on politics, political scientists have come to appreciate that historical memories powerfully influence politics in observable as well as subjective ways; that they are constructions of fact, myth, and interpretation; and that they fall outside the rubric of institutions as usefully understood. Historical memories are the less conventionally institutionalized dimensions of politics—symbols and sites for contestation, associations, palpably expressed through representations, testimonials, imagery, the media, public opinion, and political discourse.

In political contexts that involve transitions from conflict, war, and repression, all of which involve traumatic individual and collective experiences, collective memories prove difficult to ignore politically. Memories often become mobilized to challenge opponents, including the state. States themselves can be aggressive as purveyors of national memory, illustrated by the recent proliferation of officially sponsored truth commissions and “museums of memory” around the globe. Implicitly, the nation-state has always been preoccupied with developing a national memory that exudes unity, continuity, stability, and purpose. This is often expressed through commemoration, educational textbooks, and official political rhetoric. There is a significant and growing set of debates on statecraft, the nation and memory, or the memory-nation.

**History of the Term**

The French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs is widely regarded as the founding father of collective memory studies. His work *On Collective Memory*, originally published in 1925, broke new
ground in the sociology of knowledge. Halbwachs emphasized social interaction as foundational to individual memory—as formed in relation to groups and collectivities—and remembering itself as a process subject to the needs of society as a whole. Both classic and more contemporary works in sociology and history argue persuasively that memory is reconstructed over generations to fit particular social and political contexts.

Following this vein in the 1980s, the French historian Pierre Nora made a major contribution to reawakening interest in Europe concerning the relationships between memory and history. Together with a team of well-known researchers, Nora produced a seven-volume study locating and classifying a host of French lieux de mémoire, or “sites of memory,” that evoke or symbolize, in an emotive sense, the modern French nation. In the past, according to Nora, history and memory blended together fairly seamlessly. Historic lieux de mémoire, including monuments, the national flag, school history textbooks, commemorative dates, national museums, and others, served to project a shared sense of civic values and an allegiance to the French Republic. Nevertheless, Nora claimed that such cohesive projections had given way in postmodernity to particularistic, fragmented, subnational identity sites. Nora claims that a psychologization of memory, an individual psychology of remembering, has increasingly replaced the memory-nation and the social rituals and emotive symbols that accompany a shared, master past.

Memory scholars often charge that Nora’s analysis leans toward sentimentalizing the notion of a national memory or lamenting the loss of shared national narratives, of some kind of master memory. Postcolonial, subaltern studies scholars note with irony such lament or nostalgia. Scholarly work on voices and memories of the subaltern, including memories of the French colonial past and French practices in Algeria, Haiti, and elsewhere, prove powerful correctives to any tendency to romanticize the French nation. In addition, studies of Vichy France, including most prominently that of the French historian Henry Rousso, emphasize the deliberate efforts of the post–World War II political elite to recraft a national memory of French collusion with the Nazi regime as a memory of resistance to Nazism. In his history of the evolution of memories regarding France and World War II, Rousso termed the French preoccupation with this period the Vichy syndrome, a constantly erupting societal neurosis about French failure to prevent or, for the most part, even to challenge the fascist takeover of government.

The British international relations theorist Jenny Edkins emphasizes the violent production and reproduction of the state through commemoration, particularly in the aftermath of wars, genocides, famines, and terrorism, when states attempt to erase memories of atrocities committed and compelled by the state as well as against other states. Yet Edkins also shows that citizens do not accept such erasures lightly. Edkins’s work on World War I, the Vietnam War, the Holocaust, and September 11, 2001, demonstrates how in spite of states’ intentions, families and groups in society frequently challenge states to mourn and to be held accountable for atrocities. Edkins terms societal challenges to state erasures an encircling of traumatic memory. Recent historical memory scholarship warns against neat divisions between state and society in battles over memory. Rather, scholars emphasize negotiation, tense collaborations, complementarities, as well as struggles within civil society over memory itself.

Historical Memory and Transitions From Authoritarian Rule

Historical memory began to make an impact in political science when it came to be recognized as an important dimension in regime transition during the latest “wave” of democratization since the 1970s. The first political science transitions theorist to study historical memory in an intensive way was the Spanish scholar Paloma Aguilar, who documented how political discourse was gradually reinvented to allow for a more consensualist elite interpretation of past conflicts across the political spectrum, thereby facilitating the mid-1970s Spanish transition from authoritarianism to democracy, involving a consensus between the moderates on both sides—the “old” elite and the opposition. More than a quarter century after the Spanish transition from Franco (1939–1975), however, long-repressed memories of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) have resurfaced and produced a range of collective action, debate, and
legislation. This is illustrative of the nonlinear nature of historical memory, where generations-old events and phenomena can be recalled and deployed as if they occurred far more recently.

Scholarly debates on the politics of memory have emerged in several transitioning regions of the world, including Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet republics. In the case of Chile, for example, the American political scientist Brian Loveman and the Chilean social psychologist Elizabeth Lira traced a powerful pattern of conflict and subsequent political elite amnesia, manifested chiefly as postconflict congressional declarations of amnesty, from the 19th century to the very recent past. Drawing a good deal from Holocaust studies, the Argentinian sociologist Elizabeth Jelin conceptualized and led a major collective memory social science research initiative. The project produced 12 volumes on what Jelin framed as “state repression and the labors of memory” in the aftermath of dictatorships in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil, as well as in Peru at the close of the Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) regime. The purpose of the project was both to define a memory studies field in Latin America’s Southern Cone, Brazil, and Peru and, implicitly, to contribute to rebuilding the social sciences in the wake of their devastation by dictatorship. Like most scholarship on historical memory, the agenda was thus ethical and practical as well as intellectual and interdisciplinary.

Historical memory studies emphasize the fitful process of what is (or as Nietzsche once said, what must be) forgotten to forge a viable politics of the present. Framed in an instrumentalist way, historical memory is at the service of political actors and institutional processes. Embedded in many of the historical memory studies, however, is a serious critique of officialist approaches and policies of “forget” to move on. Common to historical memory works are at least three arguments: first, that different generations are entirely capable of interpreting the same political events differently; second, that political ideology or partisanship continues to weigh heavily on interpretations of past political events; and third, that in the aftermath of traumatic conflict, a significant number of both citizens and political elites profoundly desire consensual collective memory images, crafted by the political class, that convey national unity and peace. Such consensual images can have the ability to overcome ideologically driven memory divides, at least for a while. The studies remind us that though national political trauma may have occurred decades ago, memories of such trauma continue to influence politics at several levels.

At the same time, memories can be powerfully enduring in spite of social change or dominant political discursive attenuation. Official memories can be perceived as being imposed far more than embraced. And on the ground, in countries such as Chile, state actors and institutions are in constant reactive mode to grassroots memory mobilizing. Social historians document how individual and collective memories part dramatically and are not obviously reconcilable and that distinct communities temporalize traumatic memories quite distinctly.

While calls to remember atrocious pasts have been consistently embraced by grassroots sectors, there is also considerable a desire to forget. This desire is not limited to the political elite, for whom resurrecting painful pasts can prove contentious and costly. The wish to forget can also be heard from communities affected most directly by armed conflict, including formerly displaced families that have lost loved ones and are uncertain whether they can return either physically to their former communities or mentally and spiritually to their memories of violence and loss.

In their studies of communities in Ayacucho, Peru, the region in which confrontations between the Peruvian military and the Shining Path most frequently occurred (1980–2000), the scholars Ponciano del Pino and Kimberly Theidon reveal a pattern of narration in indigenous accountings of the recent past that they have termed toxic memory. Toxic memory emerges from experiences of intense, direct violence within a community for which there is no recourse, no sense of the possibility of social justice, or remorse from the perpetrators. Public memory debates in such settings are explicitly constrained by the knowledge of what violence particular agents are capable of exacting and by power dynamics that make no guarantees that such violence will be prevented in the future.

Today, the term politics of memory is most often associated with studies that assess human rights politics and policies—prosecutions, truth telling, commemoration, reparations—as well as
Historical Memory

with what is commonly referred to as the “transitional justice” literature. Transitional justice studies analyze how particular political institutions, policies, and actors hold human rights violators of previous regimes accountable for their crimes. Such studies focus on the judiciary, the military, and civil society organizations, as well as the executive and legislature. Government-sponsored truth-telling processes, for example, are largely symbolic exercises to produce official and societal acknowledgment of past atrocities and to drive home the message of never again. Such processes are fraught with debate over political intent: What truths should be privileged and what downplayed? Where should remembering begin? Should testimonies be private or public? Can witnesses be subpoenaed? How will the findings be deployed? Truth-telling designs have significant political implications, some anticipated, but some, such as the irruptions of memories themselves, unanticipated.

The anthropologist Richard Wilson argues that government-sponsored truth commissions attempt to craft narratives of the past that render the present more governable and that “manufacture bureaucratic legitimacy” for the state. At first glance, such would appear to be the case for the truth commissions of Chile (1991) and Peru (2003), both of which include the term reconciliation in their official titles, suggesting an intention to build consensus and foster national unity. The United Nations–sponsored Guatemalan truth commission, in contrast, defines itself as a body for “historical clarification,” explicit in its intent to examine long histories of violence and injustice that make even the concept of reconciliation more distant. The proliferation of truth commissions, memory debates, and the like can be interpreted as a sign of leaders striving for a new kind of credibility. In contrast to an earlier period in which political leaders attempted to move on, to “turn the page” on painful memories, politicians are increasingly resorting to political manipulations of memory, championing explorations of the past, and instrumentalizing memory to serve their agendas or to enhance their status.

The transitional justice literature brings international institutions and actors deliberately to the fore, marrying international influences with local power dynamics. Yet a politics of memory literature is a more apt conceptual frame than transitional justice for such policies, given that much of the movement to hold human rights violators accountable, and to bring an important measure of justice, is taking place in posttransitional rather than transitional contexts. In addition, a politics of memory frame allows us both to reach back in historical terms and at the same time, therefore, to reach beyond the focus on human rights violations of repressive regimes, to violence and/or dramatic phenomena that mark distinct temporalities for distinct collectivities. It is clear in the Chilean case, for example, that the indigenous Mapuche communities possess deep historical understandings of what constitutes trauma, as well as what constitutes continuity in Chile. In contrast, the Chilean right consistently evokes memories of the 1960s land reform and takeovers during a democratic regime as a haunting traumatic memory. Politics of memory studies heighten our analytical sensitivity to distinct temporalities as well as more broadly to the role of timing in political processes.

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See also Accountability; Conflict Resolution; Democratization; Genocide; Human Rights, Comparative Perspectives; Political Culture; Transition

Further Readings


History and sociology have been, since the 19th century, two completely separate fields based on different views of society. History was supposed to deal only with the main political or military events, with important people shaping the world, its battles, its diplomatic quarrels, while sociology was supposed to be concerned with the evolution of the society as a collective body changing through various stages. Sociology was frequently ahistorical, neglecting individuals and their values, outlining, on the contrary, the structures and the functions of crucial institutions, their role within the process of modernization leading all societies toward some kind of progress. History and sociology were competing, excluding each other from the realm of social science. History was the noble science, often building a kind of philosophical approach accepted by everyone on the meaning and the destiny of random events. Increasingly, though, these two fields have intersected, resulting in the discipline of historical sociology, which studies sociology within a historical framework. This entry describes the historical foundations and the contemporary historical sociology, including its subfields, is discussed.

**Historical Foundations**

From Auguste Comte to Émile Durkheim, sociology was mainly based on positivism and an objective knowledge of society excluding ideologies, values, and even cultures from the variables explaining social phenomena. Even though Durkheim, the father of contemporary sociology, once said that sociologists need historians trained as sociologists, he nevertheless saw history as a chronology of dates and singular events unrelated to any more general social laws. For example, in a comparative study of suicide, Durkheim acknowledged the role played by religion; however, his explanation of the rate of suicide did not consider the role of history or of political crises.

The Marxist tradition was also built outside any real historical explanation. Historical materialism, a theory explaining changes based on contradictions occurring between class interests structured by capitalism, did not in fact focus on the impact of specific historical events but instead simply described these contradictions as created by the nature of ownership. History was therefore seen as an objective result of social contradictions. Karl Marx, like Durkheim, was also a positivist and advocated a form of functionalism. He did not deal with religion, regarding it as a means of alienating the working class; he did not compare religions and their influence on the emergence of a specific kind of capitalism or political system. His work, like Durkheim’s analysis, did not contain any serious comparative research that would have shown how, in the long run, cultures, religions, and values shape almost all social phenomena, such as the state and the public realm, the occurrence of conflicts or revolutions, the process of secularization, the nature of education, and even different kinds of capitalism. Although Marx was aware of this need for a historical and comparative dimension, and although he looked seriously at the values of various individuals in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* (1852) and short articles written for various newspapers, he ignored history and culture in his main works, such as *Das Kapital* (1867). Thus, the Marxist movement’s neglect of crucial variables such as states and religions resulted in a reluctance to look seriously at other elements of culture, such as loyalty to a nation, which is shared by most citizens; deeply rooted traditions and the molding of cultures; and the values and behavior of all individuals, regardless of their position in the economic structure. This weakness had important consequences for contemporary sociology, which was largely shaped by Marxism or by a Durkheimian positivist view looking at correlations between purely morphological variables.

Therefore, to find traces of historical sociology in previous centuries, one must look at Alexis de...
Tocqueville’s work. During the first part of the 19th century, far from his own society, Tocqueville discovered the culture, history, and religion of the United States. He also traveled to Algeria and Ireland. He was keen to learn as much as he could about India’s caste system and values. At the core of his work is a historical comparative sociology dealing with different kinds of states, religions, and cultures and numerous interpretations of individualism and even of liberty and equality within societies based on almost the same kind of capitalism. In his main book *Democracy in America* (1835), Tocqueville implicitly compared France with the United States and showed that everything was quite different within the same socioeconomic system; comparative histories (presence or complete absence of feudalism and therefore of nobility) and cultures (Catholicism vs. Protestantism) therefore matter deeply. Tocqueville also raised the kind of issues that are much discussed today: Is it possible to import some institutions, such as democracy, into another culture molded by a different religion? At what cost? With what kind of collective movement leading, in reaction, toward nationalist anger? He foresaw this crucial contemporary discussion related to the importation and exportation, through soft or military means, of various regimes and institutions in societies shaped by contradictory histories and values. Tocqueville was mainly a politician; unfortunately, he never built a systematic model laying the foundation of historical sociology. He remained alone in his comparative historical attempt, and not until almost the end of the 19th century did the real birth of modern historical sociology appear through Max Weber’s work.

In Weber’s main books, such as *Economy and Society* (1920) or *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905), and in his numerous studies of ancient Judaism, China, Japan, or even the Muslim world (looking seriously at Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam), he was clearly comparing sociologically different societies shaped by various histories, religions, and cultures. Deeply concerned by the values of each actor, by their degree of rationality or irrationality, and looking at the interactions among all of them, the way they met and organized their world together, Weber can be seen as the founder of historical sociology. Among sociologists, he was the first to deal extensively with questions of power, state, and authority in different historical frameworks, from sultanism to feudalism, patrimonialism, and modern rational bureaucracy in the context of capitalism. Far from any positivist methodology and avoiding an evolutionist interpretation common among most authors studying the process of modernization, Weber permanently underlined the intentions of every individual and tried to understand his or her decision and his or her reasons for acting in a particular way. Weber’s interpretative approach to historical sociology finally provided a valuable comparative methodology. For example, Weber was the first to call attention to charismatic authority—the fact that some individuals possess personal and almost magical qualities that allow them to lead people, crowds, political parties, or even a nation. Neither Marxist economic analysis nor Durkheim’s positivist methodology was able to interpret this personal quality (charisma) of some leaders in ancient as well as modern societies and in authoritarian states as well as in democratic ones. Even though he argued that a process of rationalization or bureaucratization was increasingly shaping all modern societies, he kept a non-evolutionist view by outlining the unpredicted individual power of some individuals within different cultures.

**Contemporary Historical Sociology**

Weber’s interpretative sociology has many heirs and, today, one can argue that he remains at the core of contemporary historical sociology, which became, in the 1960s, a legitimate subfield. His influence on most issues is obvious. Four different fields within this subdiscipline are considered below.

**State**

Alone among the founding fathers of sociology, Weber gave us a convincing theory of the state as an institutionalized and differentiated institution serving the general interest, recruiting its own ruling elite through meritocratic competition, and concentrating in itself all means of violence previously controlled by specific social groups or by forces located at the periphery. Today, to bring back the state as a crucial variable, one can look either at Tocqueville or, even better, at Weber’s
analysis. The contemporary rediscovery of the state began, in fact, mainly thanks to a kind of revision of an evolutionist Marxism.

Immanuel Wallerstein and Perry Anderson then, while remaining Marxists, nevertheless were the first to introduce a strong comparative perspective into their work during the 1970s. Wallerstein, an American sociologist, in the three-volume *The Modern World System* (1974, 1980, 1989), described, on the one hand, the birth of the state located in the core of Europe, on its Atlantic facade, where the bourgeoisie needed a state to protect its economic interests and its wide-ranging foreign economic relations, and, on the other hand, Eastern Europe, unaware of either capitalism or the birth of the state. In his *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (1974), Perry Anderson, the director of *The New Left Review*, contrasted Western and Eastern Europe. He showed that the state was born before capitalism, in those Western regions where an intense feudalism, in the context of Roman law, led to an extreme pluralism favorable to the earlier differentiation of a state that made it easier to protect the dominant economic interests. In the East, on the other hand, a mighty nobility kept its power, using it against the peasantry’s revolts. These analyses, while keeping to an instrumentalist view of the state, clearly belong to comparative historical sociology; nevertheless, they remained quite schematic in their use of history, and they completely ignored the cultural element.

Stein Rokkan, a Norwegian sociologist, drew many conceptual maps of Europe based on two different axes: the first one, East/West, dealing both with the economy and, in a new approach, with territorial aspects and the second, North/South, based on a broad opposition between Protestantism, Catholicism, and regions of Counter-Reformation. It was immediately clear that the neo-Marxist conception of the state had been supplemented by a more rigorous, comparative, Weberian interpretation. Rokkan’s innovative work brought us to the core of historical sociology because he was able to compare different paths of state building in the context of meaningful territorial variations, thus raising a definitive argument against any kind of evolutionism. Rokkan was clearly following Weber’s comparative lesson when he described the absence of state building in the core of Europe, from Hamburg to Barcelona through Geneva, Bern, and Milan, where the market was predominant and each strong city was unable to conquer its surrounding territory. This comparative approach was also evident when he showed how Protestantism, in the North, allowed the early building of the nation through a common consensus while Catholicism led to an internal split of the nation in the South. However, Rokkan remained focused only on a sociological approach; his interest in history was still too limited.

Rokkan did not base his work on a deep knowledge of English, French, German, or Russian history. If he had, he likely would have shown, for instance, the incredible strength of the French state as a reaction against the formidable power of the Catholic Church; he would have acknowledged the weakness of the state in the strong and consensual English society; and he would have described more precisely, following Weber, different types of states. This task had been initiated by Charles Tilly in his comparative work on the European state-building process. Tilly, both a historian and a sociologist, showed the crucial influence of wars on the growth of the state’s bureaucracy. This perspective has also been taken by Samuel Finer, Shmuel Eisenstadt, Joseph R. Strayer, Theda Skocpol, and other specialists on the state. Thus, according to Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, one can use the broad opposition between strong and weak states as useful ideal types based on a comparative history of state-building processes explaining not only different kinds of strikes, collective actions, and new social movements but also various importation and exportation of types of states in another cultural context. At last, sociologists are themselves becoming historians, working like them on archives and primary resources while raising specific sociological questions.

**Citizenship**

The Weberian sociohistorical approach has also been applied to the question of citizenship. In a lecture in London given just after World War II, Thomas Humphrey Marshall, an English economist, presented a famous evolutionist interpretation of citizenship based on three dimensions of citizenship (civil, political, and social) corresponding more or less to three different centuries (the 18th, 19th, and 20th) and illustrating mainly the
British case. However, this model was criticized for not applying, for instance, to the German or French cases and for being even less applicable to Eastern European societies. In some societies, such as Germany, citizenship emerged first in the social dimension, while the civil and political dimensions emerged only recently, with the creation of the Federal Republic after World War II.

Other contemporary societies still ignore most dimensions of citizenship. Marshall’s notion of citizenship also implied a strong consensual and democratic nation with a near absence of strong political and religious cleavages, a weak state, and an efficient representative political system bringing a deep feeling of loyalty, with citizens sharing a common interest.

In France, on the contrary, serious internal cleavages led to deep ideological conflicts: among them, the permanent antagonism between the state and the Catholic Church, which led to a divided loyalty. Citizens were supposed to be loyal to the state, while confining their religious identity to the private sphere. Until the middle of the 20th century, some Catholics did not really feel at home in the strong republican universalist state. Moreover, a strong radical right arose, wishing to destroy the strong state that it viewed as an artificial source of French identity, while the real French identity was Catholic. The Jacobin culture battled against religious beliefs that challenged the nation’s common culture and that prompted the birth of a unique public space open to meritocratic procedure. In a context such as this, any private identity of the citizen is supposed to be hidden from the public realm. In such a historical context, one cannot hold two identities, such as French and Catholic, so far as public allegiance is concerned. Any multiculturalist identity is largely ignored and fought within such a strong republican state. For instance, in Turkey and in France, this militant notion of citizenship may explain the willingness to ban the veil from the public sphere.

Elites

The comparative study of the recruitment of elites to positions of power is also more and more bound to a historical sociology approach. To understand why the circulation of elites is shaped by a specific network, one must take a comparative approach in studying both the state and the ruling class. The stronger the institutionalization of the state, the stronger its differentiation; the weaker the penetration of business or private interests within the state structure and the state elites, the weaker the penetration of the political parties, of the churches, of any recruitment of the elites based on some kind of affirmative action. In such a secularized public realm, civil servants, like a strong civil army, are protected by their role and status within the state from any political, religious, or economic pressures coming from outside. The reverse is also true: The weaker the state, the stronger are those kinds of penetration within the elite. Thus, the horizontal circulation of elites is shaped by the actual presence of different kinds of states resulting from a long history.

To summarize this point, the stronger the state, the weaker and less homogeneous is the upper
(ruling) class. In addition, the stronger the state, the more open the vertical circulation. For example, where there is a state-owned educational system that is not subject to clientelist or other social intervention, there is greater meritocratic recruitment across all social strata. One can thus not only outline the remarkable differences in the elite recruitment circulation within almost the same capitalist societies but also study the recruitment, for instance, of political elites in African societies where even now, the state is often shaped by different long-term histories framed by thick cultures that have not experienced the process of differentiation.

Nationalism

Nationalism has also been studied through a new kind of historical sociology approach. According to some main theorists, nationalism is a normal and functional phenomenon within strong industrialized societies in which collective identity has been threatened by individualism and a process of atomization. Nationalism—as defined by the British sociologist Ernest Gellner and as viewed by most authors whose ideas have been framed by a developmentalist interpretation—is supposed to be a normal process of socialization controlled by the state in order to bring citizens together in a sort of nationalization of the mind owing to mass communication and the educational system. Gellner’s interpretations (and also the important contributions of Karl Deutsch and Elie Kedourie on nation building) are largely evolutionist, ignoring nationalism as a historical phenomenon implying the use of violence, the impact of ideologies, the cultural reaction against Enlightenment, or a contemporary colonial domination. Following the work of the English philosopher Isaiah Berlin, nationalism can, in fact, be described as a “bent twig” reaction based on a neglected cultural identity. Thus, to understand its appearance, one again needs a historical comparative approach explaining why German or Russian nationalism in the 19th century was mainly a cultural reaction against the French state imposing its domination in the name of Reason; why during the 20th century, the struggle for decolonization was also a kind of collective nationalist protest; and why, for instance, Algerian nationalism took such a bloody form in reaction to the violent form of colonization imposed by the strong French state while countries colonized by England or the Netherlands were more frequently able to liberate themselves without a violent reaction to violent repression. This approach can tell us the following: (a) why this type of nationalism may suddenly appear from within a society, as a collective reaction of a repressed culture usually organized by the radical right—a populist uprising against the establishment as a political target, seen as an almost foreign power cut off from native culture; (b) why one cannot find an obvious nationalism in pluralist societies, such as the United States, wherein populist collective actions are quickly exhausted; (c) why civic and ethnic forms of nationalism grow in different historical contexts; (d) why not only “imagined communities” but also realms of memory and rediscovery of the past feed nationalist movements and to what extent nationalism and patriotism are distinct phenomena; (e) why transnationalism can penetrate a society with a weak state that is more open to globalization than a strong nation-state; and (f) why loyalty to a diaspora remains more alive when immigrants are spread within weak state societies in which immigrants are able to keep their identity and are not required to assimilate into a homogeneous whole.

Nevertheless, historical sociology must avoid the pitfalls of relativism and culturalism. By outlining the impact of different cultures or types of states as a crucial factor, this comparative perspective must be careful not to invent a new kind of determinism conditioning each specific history. It must only try to discover regularities, collective behaviors, and processes initiated by various participants but occurring similarly even within different historical contexts.

Tocqueville and Weber used essentially historical secondary works to ask those comparative sociological questions. Today, as “sociology meets history,” to use Tilly’s famous phrase, social scientists must become increasingly aware of the necessity to build their work within a long-term historical framework. They themselves must look at various kinds of historical data, through which they can ask sociological questions. If, in turn, historians are to be trained as sociologists, in the spirit of the French Annales School, the two fields will meet more and more frequently, with historians
recently starting to study the transformation of contemporary societies.

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See also Citizenship; Durkheim, Émile; Elites; Nationalism; State; Weber, Max

Further Readings

**History of Political Science**

The idea of politics as a subject of science is as old as Aristotle, but, as Bernard Crick stressed, political science as a distinct academic discipline and branch of social science originated as a uniquely American invention. Although there were, in many respects, functionally equivalent studies of politics in other countries, the history of political science, from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century, was primarily a story of the “American science of politics.” Notwithstanding its universal scientific aspirations, its emigration, and export to other countries, especially subsequent to World War II, and the waves of foreign influence that have at times significantly contributed to shaping the field, political science has borne a unique relationship to American political life and to American democratic ideology. Although the history of the discipline could be written from many perspectives, an important dimension of that history is the democratic narrative. The field has always been committed to creating a truly scientific study of politics, but, despite changing images of science, there has been a consistent search for a discipline that would contribute to realizing and enhancing democratic values and institutions. In this respect, as well as with regard to matters of methodology, the genetic imprint of the American form has remained manifest in the extended speciation that now characterizes so many other countries within which the field has taken root and evolved.

There has, however, been a constant ambivalence about the discipline’s practical relationship to politics, and it has often been suggested that the simultaneous commitments to science and democracy have not always been in harmony. Although this tension has in part involved the problem of reconciling scientific and political criteria of judgment, it has also been the consequence of a longstanding assumption that only by remaining aloof from politics and establishing its claim to scientific objectivity could the discipline gain the cognitive authority that would facilitate practical purchase. Such distance was viewed as necessary in part because many, particularly in the late 19th century, who attempted to speak politically from the podium discovered that politics was often a dangerous object of inquiry, particularly when inquiry involved advocacy. Consequently, it is not surprising that some have suggested that the discipline has at times become alienated from the realities of political life, but self-consciousness about its relationship to politics has significantly informed political science’s successive crises of intellectual identity. Despite sometimes contradictory claims about the extent to which claims about politics and government produced by political science have influenced political ideas and behavior, the images produced by the discipline have, in various ways,
such as through diverse levels of pedagogy and through their influence on a variety of media, been reflected in the practices of citizens and political actors.

There was, from the point of the formation of the American Republic, a theoretical paradox that has been the central axis in discussions of popular government. This paradox, which was bequeathed to the field of political science, emerged with respect to validating American democracy—and validating America as a democracy. While it was assumed that a republican or democratic regime was predicated on the existence of an intelligible and autonomous people, it was, at the same time, difficult, after the American Revolution, to identify any such entity. This search for a “people,” and for democracy, was, and has been, through the end of the 20th century, confronted, and conducted, in two distinct ways. One approach has been to argue that, despite great social diversity, there is an American people that has been the author and subject of democratic government. The other approach has been to argue that the existence of such a national community is not necessary to achieve the ends of popular sovereignty. One persistent aspect of the democratic vision in America, represented in both of these approaches, has, however, been its accommodational character. The tendency has been to adapt the concept of democracy to changes in the perceived realities of American politics.

This paradox of democracy was first exemplified in the Federalist Papers, which were devoted to a defense of the proposed 1787 Constitution. While the authors maintained that the Constitution, manifesting the accrued wisdom of Western political thought regarding a science of politics, created a popular government that was republican, or representative, rather than purely democratic, they had difficulty clarifying and defending their continued allegiance to the basic idea of popular sovereignty. The concept of a people that had been at the core of revolutionary ideology, as well as essential to the arguments of certain of the anti-Federalist criticisms of the new document, seemed to have an anomalous ring when juxtaposed to the images of American politics advanced by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. The Federalists and anti-Federalists shared the worry that there was not an identifiable American people, which transcended the smaller communities of the various states. From one perspective, the genius of the authors of the Federalist was to invent the very idea of a unified people that encompassed more local constituencies and that was to be represented in and by the new national government. To the extent, however, that the oft-mentioned “people” had a concrete meaning for Madison, as voiced in Federalist No. 10, it seemed, in the end, to refer either to the sum of self-interested individuals or to diverse and divisive factions that were characterized by their attachment to their own rather than a public good. In place of the traditional republican notion of an organic people, Madison conceived of a virtual people that would arise out of an institutional and social balance of conflicting interests. He argued that the disease of republican, and now American, government was factionalism but that it could be transformed into its own cure through an intricate constitutional design combined with fortuitous demographic and geographical circumstances. Political discourse and commentary, however, kept alive the civic republican image of a people capable of, and the subject of, popular government, which lay beneath the surface of American diversity. The origins of political science were closely involved with vouchsafing that image.

The Science of the Democratic State

During the 19th century, academic publicists produced their own version of the people, which was represented in the concept of the “state.” While today many tend to look back on this concept as an archaic formalistic and legalistic artifact or as an intellectual reflection of American state building, it was in fact the nucleus of a theory of American democracy. Apart from a reference to the American states, the word state had, by the beginning of the 19th century, little currency in the language of American politics. The introduction of the concept of the state was largely through the work of the German émigré Francis Lieber, beginning about the time that his acquaintance, Alex de Tocqueville, visited America. Tocqueville had noted that the new world of American democracy demanded a “new science of politics,” and Lieber can reasonably be designated the founder of American political science. There was already a
nascent program of civic education within the traditional American college and university curriculum of moral philosophy, which was devoted to practical ethics and to educating the American elite in the principles and duties of public life. Lieber focused on expanding this field of study by integrating German, largely Kantian and Hegelian, philosophy and images of world history (Manual of Political Ethics, 1839). He applied that philosophy to the circumstances and traditions of the United States and to devising a solution to the perennial democratic paradox. His adaptation of the German philosophy of the state (Civil Liberty and Self-Government, 1853) paralleled the work of individuals such as the German theorist Johann K. Bluntschli (The Theory of the State, 1895), and, for nearly a century, it provided the intellectual, institutional, and professional foundation of academic political inquiry in the United States.

After a period in South Carolina, Lieber, who was a strong supporter of the Union cause, was appointed, in 1857, as the first professor of political science at Columbia College in New York. His work was perpetuated and refined by second-generation theorists such as Theodore Woolsey at Yale, Herbert B. Adams at Johns Hopkins, and, above all, John W. Burgess, who was Lieber’s successor at Columbia. What Lieber, and the later American state theorists, who were educated abroad and imbibed the German paradigm of Staatswissenschaft (in German, “political science”), created was the image of a democratic people as well as a history of democratic institutions that sprung from ancient Teutonic origins, passed through English government, and culminated in the American polity. Although Americans had at first been wary of the word democracy, it had, by the middle of the 19th century, been largely divested of its radical overtones and become a general term of approbation in the United States as well as in many places abroad. Unlike some of his European counterparts and correspondents, such as Edouard Laboulaye in France, as well as the American historian George Bancroft, who all commented extensively on American political society and contributed significantly to the 19th-century democratic narrative, Lieber, still feared “democratic absolutism” and, like Tocqueville, majoritarian rule. He inveighed against ideas such as women’s suffrage and tended to eschew the word democracy in favor of phrases such as self-government and hamarchy by which he basically meant representative institutions. His vision of the state, however, was essentially that of an associationally and institutionally diverse but organic people and its pedigree that gave theoretical substance to the idea of democracy.

Although the “state talk” of 19th-century political inquiry, as well as that of public intellectuals such as Orestes Brownson and Elisha Mulford, paralleled the discourse of democracy in political life, it remained, like many later constructions of political science, far removed from the language of politics in the United States. The most essential feature of the concept of the state during this long and formative period in the evolution of American political science was that it did not refer either to forms of government or to the institutions of government but rather to a community whose voice expressed a will and interest that was expressed through the agency of government but preceded, in both time and authority, both the constitution and the government. This vision often reflected and abetted the conservative ideology of theorists such as Burgess, who wished to propagate and justify limited government as well as to curtail democratic populism while maintaining the ethic of popular sovereignty, and it was in some ways both inspired by, and functioned to legitimate, the cause of the Union before and after the Civil War. But it was also embraced by social scientists on the political left, such as the economist Richard Ely, who perceived the state as authorizing government intervention in social life. The theory of the state provided a scientific identity for the discipline and sublimity for its subject matter, but, above all, it offered a distinct answer to the congenital paradox of American democratic theory, and it was an answer that extended well into the Progressive Era after the turn of the century. The 19th-century American state theorists, despite their attachment to a certain conception of individual natural rights, all rejected contract theory and its implications. They claimed that there was, from the outset, a primordial people who both authorized and placed limitations on government. Burgess (Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, 1891) validated this picture with a singular and ingenious account of American history. He argued that modern states, and particularly the United
States, were the prime examples of those founded on a national unity and that they represented a self-conscious democracy that was the apex of political history. Nations, as ethical and geographical units, he claimed, tended, at least in the West, to become states—that is, a people with a government—and the highest examples of the latter were those that had achieved the popular or democratic form.

Burgess’s interdisciplinary School of Political Science at Columbia (1880) represented an attempt to replicate the form of scientific education that characterized German universities, and his aim was both to educate an American administrative and political elite and to influence government policy. The imprint of this curriculum is still evident in contemporary political science programs, and Columbia produced the first professional journal of political science, Political Science Quarterly (1886), which was devoted to the assumption that the “domain of political science” was the study of the state and that among the social sciences concerned with this subject, political science occupied the “dominant position.” Similar institutional developments took place under Adams at Hopkins, which published Studies in History and Political Science and which was the site of the first professional Political Science Association, and in Europe, there was the beginning of institutions such as École Libre des Sciences Politiques in France and the London School of Economics in England. By this point, political scientists were still not always clearly distinguished, either intellectually or professionally, from historians and economists, but it was primarily the theory of the state that bound them together. The third generation of political scientists, which included Bernard Moses at Berkeley, Woodrow Wilson at Hopkins and Princeton, and Westel W. Willoughby at Hopkins, did much to institutionalize further the field of political science in American universities during the last years of the 19th century and early years of the 20th century, but by the last decade of the 19th century, a significant theoretical transformation had begun to take place. Theorists such as Wilson (The State, 1889), who established the department of politics at Princeton, continued in many ways to affirm some aspects of the traditional theory of the state, but, in part as a consequence of urging a more active administration, they began to blur the line between state and government. The problem, in a country of great and increasing complexity and multiplicity, was to specify the locus of the invisible community that putatively constituted the American people, and eventually, no one did more than Willoughby (An Examination of the Nature of the State, 1896) to empty the word state of its original theoretical meaning and transform it into an analytical or juristic category and synonym for government. This, however, precipitated a crisis in democratic theory.

Although it has often been assumed that there was a fundamental break between the state theory of the 19th century and the conceptions of both political inquiry and politics embraced by early-20th-century political scientists, the continuities in many respects exceeded the innovations. One might very well ask how the largely conservative academic culture that dominated 19th-century universities, such as Columbia, produced progressive, reform-minded scholars, such as the historian and political scientist Charles Beard and, particularly, Charles Merriam, who might well be considered the father of 20th-century political science and who contributed so significantly to transforming the discipline. In addition to retaining commitments both to the idea of scientific inquiry and to its application to practical ends, one thread of continuity was a persistent belief in, and dedication to, the national state as encompassing both government and community. During the early part of the 20th century, Progressive politics as well as political and social thought continued to be predicated on the belief, such as in the case of sociologist Charles Horton Cooley (Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind, 1909), that there was at least an incipient national political community or, like Herbert Croly (The Promise of American Life, 1910), that such a community could be created and mobilized and in whose name government could legitimately and authoritatively act. It was, however, eventually out of the ruins of both traditional state theory and the Progressive vision that a new account of democratic government in America emerged. The decline of the state as a theory of democracy was paralleled by the beginning and evolution of the theory of democratic pluralism and by the account of science and forms of research that the latter entailed.

During the last years of the 19th century, professional social science associations began to break
away from the umbrella of the American Social Science Association, which had its roots in a variety of reformist causes, such as the abolition of slavery, and to affiliate more directly with academic institutions, under the assumption that this would provide scientific authenticity and authority. The American Political Science Association (APSA), with the leadership of individuals such as Willoughby and its first president, Frank Goodnow, was formed in 1903, when it broke away from its affiliation with the more conservative American Historical Association, and the American Political Science Review began publication in 1906. The practical concerns of the previous generation were perpetuated in the creation of this organization, but it represented an emerging progressive ideology as well as a commitment to endow the discipline with yet greater scientific authority by embracing what was viewed as the methods of modern empirical science. For individuals such as Wilson and Goodnow, who were dedicated to more efficient and effective government, the goals were still ultimately practical. There was, however, something of a theoretical hiatus regarding both democracy and the nature of politics as the original concept of the state continued to wane, and, at the same time, departments of political science and government continued to emerge at major universities such as the University of California, Berkeley; University of Illinois; University of Wisconsin; Harvard University; and Stanford University.

Pluralism and the Liberal Science of Politics
The demise of the theory of the state was in part a reaction, in the context of World War I, to its German, and now allegedly authoritarian, origins, but it was also a consequence of the dimming Progressive hope of awakening or creating a democratic public, which could rise up and take power back from corrupt politicians and a capitalistic economic hegemony. Social scientists, in the wake of immigration and growing cultural and class differences, became overwhelmed with evidence of social and economic diversity and contentiousness. There was an increased sense that there was no homogeneous American public but rather only complex congeries of interests and groups that exceeded even Madison’s account. In 1907, Harvard historian Albert Bushnell Hart, after presenting an exhaustive account of discarded theories of popular government in the United States, noted that even though the idea of the state as the basis of a theory of popular sovereignty seemed to still hold sway, it really did not fit the present circumstances of American politics. Although he expressed faith that America was a democracy, he could no longer, any more than most of his contemporaries, account for it theoretically. To provide such an account was the task of pluralist theory as it evolved during the first third of the 20th century. Individuals such as Lawrence Lowell (Public Opinion and Popular Government, 1913), and, later, Walter Lippmann (The Phantom Public, 1925) questioned the existence of an actual public or even the reality of a public opinion that commentators such as James Bryce (The American Commonwealth, 1890) had emphasized as constituting the heart of democratic society in America.

Despite the publication of William James’s Pluralistic Universe (1904), the term pluralism had not, at this point, in any substantial manner, entered the discourse of American political science. Although Arthur Bentley’s pointed critique of the concept of the state and his analysis of interest groups as the essence of politics (Process of Government, 1908) would become a central reference for later pluralist theory, it had very little immediate impact, and Bentley never employed the term pluralism. It was during Harold Laski’s brief sojourn in the United States, subsequent to World War I, that the term was introduced into the conversation of political science, as part of his attack on the idea of state sovereignty and centralized authority and his propagation of the notion that the state was merely one association among many in society. Laski’s principal concern, as in the case of Tocqueville, was his own country, but he, as well as other English theorists such as Ernest Barker and A. D. Lindsay, helped instigate a debate about pluralism that focused on whether political reality consisted of anything more than an endless process of group interaction with the government functioning as anarbiter and whether this could add up, empirically and theoretically, to democracy. It was difficult, however, for American political scientists to give up the idea that the state was nothing more than government and that government was not the agent of a general popular will.
Merriam embraced certain democratic values associated with cultural diversity and political pluralism, but he was equally impressed with the divisiveness inherent in such difference and with the antidemocratic sentiments and practices of certain groups. He retained the assumption that democracy ultimately required unity, even if, in his view and that of his student Harold Lasswell, it was necessary to introduce it from the top down through social control, civic education, and even the judicious use of propaganda. They transferred their hopes for a democratic society to the actions of governmental elites informed by social-scientific knowledge, but no articulate image of American democracy and the American political system appeared, for example, in Merriam’s principal work of this period (e.g., *New Aspects of Politics*, 1925), even though he sponsored much of the research and modes of inquiry that seemed appropriate for a changing image of politics.

The strongest riposte to the normative theory of pluralism associated with Laski and other writers of the period, as well as to empirical political scientists and sociologists whose work increasingly lent support to the notion that politics was irreducibly pluralistic, was the work of William Yandell Elliott (*The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics*, 1928). He spoke for many of his generation when he argued that to give up the concept of the state as an organic public was, in effect, to give up democracy as well as the autonomy of political theory and political science. Elliott did not reject the reality of pluralism, but he believed that it tended to undermine the communal basis of democracy. He argued that in an age dominated by empiricism and pragmatism, as well as by the threat of foreign doctrines such as fascism and communism, it was still possible to perceive, and suggested that it was at least necessary to believe in, what he called a “co-organic” community in American political life, which was the basis of constitutional government. A somewhat similar, but ideologically different, position had been advanced by Mary Parker Follett (*The New State*, 1918). It was difficult, even for someone such as John Dewey (*The Public and Its Problems*, 1927), who along with Laski was perceived by Elliott as a purveyor of relativism and its destructive implications for democracy, to sever the idea of popular government from the existence of a national community that transcended the complexity of modern “great society.”

By the end of the 1920s, however, the concept of pluralism had become Americanized and formed the basis of an empirical account of American politics, a normative image of democratic practice, and closely connected to what G. E. G. Catlin, a transplanted British scholar who championed both pluralism and the work of Merriam, referred to as *The Science and Method of Politics* (1927). For the first time since Madison, a description of social diversity and conflict and of group pressures on government was transformed into a theory of popular government that would provide much of the content of a new and widely embraced image of democratic identity. The group theory of political reality became deeply entrenched in political science as it evolved into an argument about how the process of interest-group politics constituted a form of both democratic interaction and representation. This had been implied by the early research of individuals such as Pendelton Herring (*Group Representation Before Congress*, 1927), but, during the late 1920s and early 1930s, a number of individuals such as Peter Odegard (*The American Public Mind*, 1930) and John Dickinson (“Democratic Realities and Democratic Dogma,” *American Political Science Review*, 1930) elaborated a pluralist theory of democracy that contained all the essential theoretical elements that would be rearticulated and reconstructed a generation later in the work of individuals such as David Truman and Robert Dahl.

At the core of this theory was the claim that all societies consisted of groups seeking their self-interest and that this, at any stage of social evolution, required mechanisms for compromise and adjustment. In the context of modern society, such adjustment was achieved through the medium of government that functioned as an umpire acting pragmatically in response to the needs of the situation and with respect to matters of intervention and control. It was through participation in groups that individuals realized their goals and achieved identity, and it was through groups gaining access to influence, more than through formal institutions, that democratic representation was most essentially effected. Stability in society was achieved through a balance of conflicting social pressures constrained by appropriate enabling institutions.
and a basic consensus on the rules of the game. Majoritarian democracy was viewed as a myth that belied the fact that majorities were little more than aggregations of individual preference that were democratic only in the sense that they had the capacity, through elections, to effect a circulation of elites.

From the 1920s to the 1940s, political science continued to be institutionalized and expand as a part of higher education in the United States, and during this period, the membership of the APSA tripled. The work of Merriam and Lasswell, at the University of Chicago, represented the most important development, but early forms of political science were emerging in England, France, and Germany. During the later part of the 1930s, there was little in the way of a further explicit statement or elaboration of pluralist theory, but it became, in both politics and the academy, the basis of an account of the United States as a democratic society, and it was advanced as distinguishing the American polity from the growing number of totalitarian regimes that seemed to be characterized by excessive unity. The name for this new democratic identity was liberalism, and the manner in which pluralism was transfigured as liberalism is a crucial chapter in the story of the evolution of democratic theory in American political science.

Although common in Europe, the term liberalism had seldom been systematically invoked in either American politics or political science before the 1930s. While politicians such as Woodrow Wilson, and later Franklin Roosevelt, began tentatively to court this label for a variety of policy initiatives, everyone eventually seemed anxious to adopt this synonym for democracy. A variety of individuals, including Herbert Hoover, claimed to be the “true” liberal, but Roosevelt won the title, and his opponents eventually accepted the name he had originally pejoratively bestowed on them—Conservatives. The term liberalism gravitated into the language of political science, often via those such as Dewey who were sympathetic to the New Deal, but eventually political theorists, such as George Sabine in his paradigmatic A History of Political Theory (1937) emptied the concept of its concrete political meaning and began writing the history of Western political thought and institutions as a story of the progress of liberalism that, despite the temporary aberrations of totalitarianism, found full expression in American society. Although in the work of Dewey, as well as a number of political scientists, there continued to be a certain correspondence between the academic and lay visions of liberalism, two quite distinct traditions of discourse began to evolve as liberalism, in the language of political science, was reified, provided with a philosophy and history, and reimposed as a description of American politics. To the extent that liberalism had a definite conceptual meaning in the literature of political science and political theory, other than a name for American government and society, it tended to stand for pluralism and attendant values such as individualism, social freedom and difference, bargaining, and compromise. Philosophers, such as T. V. Smith at Chicago (The Promise of America, 1936) took the position that what characterized democracy was less any absolute doctrine and regime than a commitment to toleration and the propagation of diversity within a procedural framework for settling conflicts.

By the early 1940s, on the eve of World War II, the basic elements of this vision were extracted from the research of mainstream political science, systematized by individuals such as Herring, and presented as the Politics of Democracy (1940). Herring saw his task as taking all that was often considered bad about politics—from pressure groups to bosses and soft money—and demonstrating that they were all, if understood scientifically, part of a democratic process. One reason for the rearticulation of pluralism qua liberalism was to provide a response and counterideal to the doctrines of totalitarianism. For Lasswell, political science continued to be part of “The Developing Science of Democracy” (The Future of Government in the United States, edited by Leonard D. White, 1942).

The Behavioral Era and the Reconstitution of Science and Democracy

Just as the discipline was expanding in the United States after World War II, it was proliferating abroad. In 1949, the International Political Science Association (IPSA) was formed in Paris, which brought together national associations from numerous countries in Europe and elsewhere. The emerging national forms of the discipline were in many respects increasingly responsive to and reflective of the social and cultural milieu in which
they were situated, even though the American commitment to empirical and quantitative studies was widely accepted and promulgated along with more traditional historical and institutional forms of research. In the United States, David Easton’s *The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science* (1953) set the agenda for the next decade by defining political science as the study of the “authoritative allocation of values” and making the case for moving beyond mere factual research as well as traditional historical and institutional forms by advancing empirical theory and adopting the methods of natural science. The behavioral “revolution,” for which Easton was often the principal spokesperson, significantly transformed the practice of political science and increased in large measure the substantive and methodological contributions on a variety of subjects, including survey research and voting behavior. It was, however, in many respects, less a revolution than a recommitment to the visions of both the scientific study of politics and liberal democracy that had informed the discipline for nearly half a century, and it was also in part a response to the first significant challenge to those visions.

By the 1950s, the academic image of liberalism had become increasingly dominant as individuals such as Daniel Boorstin (*The Genius of American Politics*, 1953) and Louis Hartz (*The Liberal Tradition in America*, 1955) set out to demonstrate that although there might not be an American public, there was, for better or worse, in addition to the institutions that held the fragments of society together, a historically rooted liberal value consensus and tradition that gave credence to the concept of e pluribus unum. This notion of a liberal consensus that transcended and reconciled group differences became an essential element of the revived group theory of politics. The continuing attempt to give meaning to the idea of liberalism, and to equate liberalism with democracy, was, however, catalyzed and galvanized by a persistent but often still somewhat submerged attack on liberalism that had begun to influence what had been, since the 1920s, a thoroughly American political science. By the 1950s, liberalism, because of both doubts about interventionist government and events such as the McCarthy hearings, had become a highly contested concept in American politics. Often, for quite different reasons, it was also losing its positive valence in academic discourse as a somewhat subterranean critique of liberal democracy, and political science began to infiltrate the discipline and form a counterpoint to the postwar behavioral movement in political science and its rededication to a scientific study of politics based on emulating what was assumed to be the methods of natural science.

This critique, largely conceived and mounted by émigré scholars, was gaining a place in the literature of political theory, and it was manifest in journals such as the *Review of Politics* with its theological antiliberal perspective as well as in the perspective of the president, Robert Hutchins, and those involved in the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago who set themselves directly against the Chicago image of social science. What emerged was a new mode of political theory that would eventually lead a number of scholars to make an identity choice they had never previously been confronted with—that is, a choice between political science and political theory. The confrontation between this critique and the reconstituted pluralist account of liberal democracy in political science made up the dialectic of democracy in the postwar generation. At this point, what really separated mainstream political scientists from political theorists was less a commitment to science, as opposed to a commitment to normative theory, than holding two quite different ethical positions on the issue of democracy.

The predominantly German scholars who emigrated to the United States, beginning in the 1930s, were in many respects a philosophically and ideologically diverse group, which included Hans Morgenthau (*Scientific Man and Power Politics*, 1946), Eric Voegelin (*The New Science of Politics*, 1951), Leo Strauss (*Natural Right and History*, 1953), Hannah Arendt (*The Human Condition*, 1958), and members of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School such as Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Otto Kirchheimer, and Max Horkheimer. What they had in common, however, was a suspicion of, if not antipathy toward, liberalism, which as a political theory they believed was philosophically flawed and which as a political form, they claimed was inherently pathological and represented political institutions that historically, as in the case of Weimar Germany, were on the threshold of totalitarianism. This form of antimodernism, rooted in the
The Semisovereign People: A
The End of Liberalism (1961)

The Power Elite

Private

The Civic Culture

Who Governs?

Theory

Politics and intellectual context of early-20th-century Germany and in various transcendental philosophies such as that of Heidegger as well as forms of socialist thought, was a strange and difficult body of ideas for Americans to absorb. These theorists, who rejected scientism and who were wedded to images of the decline of Western civilization, represented a profound challenge to a conception of democracy based on commitments to empiricism, relativism, liberalism, and historical progress, which had characterized American political science for half a century. By the end of the 1950s, the work of these foreign scholars and indigenous fellow travelers had largely begun to define the subfield of political theory, which heretofore had been an integral dimension of mainstream American political science and the principal vehicle of its vision of democracy. This challenge, coupled with the continuing concern about presenting a coherent image of democracy as a counterpoint to totalitarianism, prompted the postwar reconstitution of group theory and the pluralist account of democracy.

David Truman’s The Governmental Process (1951) and Earl Latham’s The Group Basis of Politics (1952) revived the relevance of Bentley’s work, and Robert Dahl’s Preface to Democratic Theory (1955) established the genre of empirical democratic theory that was devoted to vouchsafing the image of pluralist democracy. The latter work was in one respect less a “preface” than an “epilogue” and codification of ideas that, during the 1930s, had become an essential part of the identity of political science. Dahl returned to Laski’s and Barker’s term polyarchy as a synonym for a form of democracy that Dahl contrasted both with majoritarian or “populist” types and with what he claimed was Madison’s excessive emphasis on constitutional checks and balances at the expense of adequate attention to the informal and social dimensions of group interaction where, in effect, minorities ruled. In Who Governs? (1961), Dahl explicitly embraced the term pluralism, and his theory of pluralist democracy was offered in part as a counter to the claims about elitism and the structure of community power advanced by individuals such as C. Wright Mills (The Power Elite, 1956) and various sociologists such as Floyd Hunter. But it was also an attempt, during the Cold War, to systematize and accentuate an image of Western liberal democracy that supported the faith of those who opposed the political ideas and institutions of the East. Dahl, like those after him such as Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (The Civic Culture, 1963), argued that we should begin by examining the character of those countries that we know to be democracies and by extracting an empirical basis for a normative theory that, Dahl claimed, was most fully represented in the “American hybrid.”

The critique of liberalism and pluralism was, however, perpetuated by a wide range of political theorists in the 1960s, and the “end of ideology,” which had been proclaimed by sociologists such as Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset as the future of the dominance of pluralist liberal democracy, failed to materialize. While the debate that precipitated between political theory and behavioral political science during this period has often been represented as a conflict between “scientific” and “traditional” theory, the underlying issue was the nature of democracy. The émigré-inspired critique was at this point joined by theorists such as Sheldon Wolin (Politics and Vision, 1960) as well as by the persistent progressive statist countertradition that had remained alongside pluralist theory in political science and that was now represented in a new form by individuals such as Elmer E. Schattschneider (The Semisovereign People: A Realist View of Democracy in America, 1960). Schattschneider argued that interest-group politics had an upper-class bias as well as a corrosive effect on party democracy. Grant McConnell (Private Power and American Democracy, 1966) and Theodore Lowi (The End of Liberalism, 1969) mounted sustained attacks on what they claimed democratic and institutional pathologies of the theory and practice of “interest-group liberalism.” Despite their similarities, the critiques of behaviorism and liberalism that were inspired by the émigré theorists and those that were rooted in the American tradition were sometimes uneasy allies, such as in the Straussian-inspired Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics (1961), but a growing intellectual split between political theory and mainstream political science characterized the 1960s and evolved through the 1980s.

From Postbehavioralism to the 21st Century

Although in 1961 Dahl had proclaimed that with respect to the behavioral movement it was possible
to write “An Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest,” both the commitment to pure science and the pluralist theory of democracy continued to be the target of widespread criticism from both political theorists and a number of more mainstream political scientists. This dissatisfaction sprang in part from what seemed to many to be political science’s lack of relevance for and attention to political events such as the Vietnam War, the crisis of American cities and problems of civil rights, and Cold War politics. The Caucus for a New Political Science challenged the authority of the APSA, and in 1969, Wolin pitted the “vocation of political theory” against what he claimed was the apolitical “methodism” of behavioral political science. At the same time, the president-elect, Easton, repudiated the tenets of much of what had represented the behavioral movement when he announced a “new revolution in political science,” a “postbehavioral revolution” that would recognize the deficiencies of the pluralist theory of democracy and embrace a new “credo of relevance” that would give precedence to research on pressing contemporary political issues rather than to the immediate advancement of scientific theories and methods.

By the early 1970s, concerns about practical issues led the mainstream discipline to seek an identity for the postbehavioral era by a return to what Lasswell had championed as policy science, and a more ecumenical spirit was apparent as the debate about behavioralism wound down and the issue of maintaining professional inclusiveness became more prominent. Although the controversy about behavioralism had created an intellectual breach between mainstream political science and the subfield of political theory, it also had the effect of relocating, or dislocating, the discussion of American political identity and democratic theory. While political science continued, in various ways and degrees, to validate the traditional liberal vision, it tended, after the 1970s, to concede to political theory the role of normative theorizing. The conversation about democracy and liberalism increasingly became the property of the interdisciplinary and relatively autonomous enterprise of political theory and absorbed into an eclectic conversation that was determined more by the reigning academic philosophical authorities than by any direct relevance to the particularities of American politics. Debates about liberalism, often centering on philosophical arguments such as those of John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Jürgen Habermas, and Richard Rorty, became a large part of the focus of political theory, while both political science as a whole and political theory as a subfield became increasingly pluralized.

By the mid-1980s, it was increasingly difficult to speak in general of political science as a discipline and of the history of the field as a whole. Although the debate about behavioralism had fractured the field, it had also constituted the terms of a common conversation that in some respects defined the discipline. The centrifugal forces of specialization, increased concerns about social and gender diversity within the profession, and other internal tendencies toward pluralization in the field were accentuated by the need to recognize the growing distinctions among national practices of political science. In 1982, the IPSA Study Group on the Comparative Sociology of Political Science was formed, and in 1986, it was supplemented by the International Committee for the Study of the Development of Political Science. These two groups merged in 1988, forming the IPSA Research Committee for the Study of Political Science as Discipline, which was formally recognized as IPSA Research Committee 3 (RC 33) in 1989. Since its formal establishment, RC 33 has been active in all of the IPSA Congresses, and it has also undertaken a number of inter-Congress workshops, conferences, research projects, and publications devoted both to the study of the history and character of political science in various countries as well as to features common to the field as a whole. The research sponsored by this endeavor has made it clear that despite many similar concerns and research programs, political science is no longer consistently the science of politics as it evolved in the United States.

The beginning of the 1990s was a watershed for political science. The public policy orientation inspired by the events of the 1960s began to fade, and many believed the growing popularity of what Anthony Downs had referred to as An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) and what came to be referred to as rational choice analysis promised a new methodological basis for disciplinary identity and a reconstruction of democratic theory. This trend, however, was paralleled, and challenged, by those who had begun to advocate new directions in institutional and historical research (e.g., Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich
Rueschemeyer, & Theda Skocpol, 1985). There were calls for more diverse approaches to the study of politics as the enthusiasm for rational choice declined (e.g., The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Assessment of the Theory of Rational Choice, edited by Kristen Monroe, 1991). The collapse of communism and the bipolar world of the Cold War also heightened the sense of plurality as the basic condition of both politics and political science, and it catalyzed a renewed concern with the theory of democracy as a variety of national communities sought to define, and redefine, themselves as democratic societies. In this context, pluralism emerged once again as a dominant theme. Not only had politics become internationally more diverse but concerns about multiculturalism and philosophies such as postmodernism accentuated the value and reality of diversity.

After its intellectual estrangement from mainstream political science, a unifying and driving force in the increasingly dispersed conversation of political theory continued to be a critique of the liberal/pluralist vision of democracy and an attempt to resurrect some version of participatory democracy. By the early 1990s, however, there was a subtle, but in some ways quite fundamental, shift in perspective. Although the idea that democracy must be rooted in unity was still evident in the work of individuals such as Robert Putnam (Bowling Alone, 2000), who stressed the importance of social capital and a communal basis of democracy, the concept of pluralism once again appeared in the discourse of political theory as the centerpiece of the democratic imagination. The concept was seldom any longer that of the interest-group liberalism of the 1950s, but theorists such as Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, despite some critical emendations, maintained their faith in social diversity as the ultimate value of democracy. Both John Rawls (Political Liberalism, 1993) and Jürgen Habermas (Facts and Norms, 1992) manifested an increased acceptance of the social realities of liberal democracy, and the many and various versions of both deliberative and radical democracy embraced the ethic of pluralism.

The manner in which the critique of pluralist liberalism by democratic theorists gave way, during the closing years of the 20th century, to the idea of pluralism as the core of democracy uncannily mirrored the path of conceptual transformation that occurred in the first quarter of the century. And the new pluralism, like the emergence of the old pluralism, seems in large measure to be a response to the ineluctable realities of the sociology of contemporary society. Dahl took it as a virtue that in a polyarchial society one might say that no one governs or that minorities govern, but the problem always was that if this is the case, then it also means that democracy, as the mediation of public decisions through the general citizenry, is difficult to identify. Plurality, one might argue, is surely a necessary condition of any realistic concept of democracy, but it may not be a sufficient condition. In the last analysis, the philosophical reconciliation of pluralism with democracy has been no easier than it was at the time of Madison.

By the beginning of the 21st century, it was difficult to discern any clear basis of unity in the discipline (Political Science: The State of the Discipline, edited by Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Ingram, 2002), and by the end of the first decade, it is still not easy to specify what trends may be most significant. In the United States, concerns about methodological diversity surfaced once again in what came to be known as the Perestroika debate, but, unlike the conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the issues appeared to be more professional than political. The discipline’s origins were closely tied to a definite practical mission of political reform and political education, and, like the meaning of democracy, the relationship between political science and politics remains unresolved. In addition to noting the continuing tendencies toward specialization within and among subfields, it is necessary to recognize that in taking account of the history and current practices of the field, the story of political science, despite some intimations to the contrary (A New Handbook of Political Science, edited by Robert Goodin & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 1996), is no longer simply the story of the American science of politics.

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See also Behavioralism; Democracy, Theories of; Interest Groups; Liberalism; Paradigms in Political Science; Pluralism; Political Science, International Institutionalization; Political Theory; State
Further Readings


**HOBES, THOMAS (1588–1679)**

Thomas Hobbes is regarded as one of the greatest political thinkers in the Western tradition for his contribution to the development of the concepts of political obligation and state sovereignty. His theory is often associated with absolutism in domestic politics and with realism in international relations. A long line of interpreters, however, have questioned such associations.

Hobbes was born in Malmesbury, England, on April 5, 1588. For much of our knowledge of Hobbes’s early life, we have to rely on the notes of his contemporary and friend John Aubrey. Hobbes was of humble origin; his education at Magdalen Hall in Oxford was sponsored by an uncle. For most of his life, Hobbes worked for the earls of Devonshire. In his capacity as tutor, he travelled extensively in Europe and came in contact with the finest minds of the time, including Galileo, Descartes, and Leibniz. Hobbes fled to France during the English Civil War and was tutor of mathematics to the future King Charles II, who was also in exile.

The intellectual context of 17th-century Europe inspired Hobbes to plan a comprehensive system of philosophy that explained everything that could be explained, resorting to one basic principle, namely, “motion.” Hobbes’s project was made up of three parts, the first on metaphysics, the second on man’s physiology and psychology, and the third on politics. The political crisis in his country induced Hobbes not to follow the order of the original project but to begin his investigation with the study of the rights and duties of citizens. Indeed, the political climate also explains why Hobbes translated Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War* in 1628. According to Hobbes, Thucydides’ work affords us important insights into the weaknesses of democracies and was relevant at a time when there were growing tensions between Charles I and Parliament.

It is not from history, however, that Hobbes thought that political science should take inspiration for its methodology. In *Brief Lives*, Aubrey relates an anecdote that sheds some light on the method that Hobbes used in his political writings. Apparently, Hobbes was 40 years old when by chance he came across the 47th proposition in the
first book of Euclid’s Elements. Although at first the proposition appeared counterintuitive to Hobbes, its demonstration convinced him of its truth. This, Aubrey tells us, was the beginning of Hobbes’s love affair with geometry.

Hobbes believed that it was possible to apply the formal rigor of geometry to the study of politics and demonstrate logically, proceeding from assumptions to conclusions, the causes of civil war and the conditions for “immortal” domestic peace. Hobbes firmly believed that he had succeeded in his endeavor, and he famously claimed that political science was not older than his book De Cive. The concepts and ideas put across in De Cive are very close to those expanded in Leviathan, which was published in English in 1651, after the execution of Charles I (in 1649). Leviathan is regarded as one of the masterpieces of Western political science. In addition to being brilliant in style, Leviathan brings to light in an unparalleled way the protection–obedience principle that lies at the foundation of the Western concept of political obligation: Citizens obey the political state in exchange for protection.

Hobbes explains the sources, nature, and limits of political obligation in three steps. In the first step, Hobbes describes some immutable characteristics of human nature. To begin with, he emphasizes that every man regards self-preservation as summum bonum and fears violent death at the hands of others “as the greatest mischief that can arrive to nature” (De Cive, Epistle Dedicatory); he stresses that all men are capable of rationality and that “every man by reasoning seeks out the most appropriate means to achieve his ends” (De Cive, chap. 14, sec. 16). Furthermore, he stresses the natural equality of men, in the sense that “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest” (Leviathan, chap. 13, sec. 1) and remarks that some men (who we cannot easily identify) are not satisfied with natural equality but want dominion over others and are in perpetual contention for power, honor, and riches.

In the second step, Hobbes imagines a state of nature where there is no authority, no private property, no industry, and no common definition of just and unjust, right and wrong. Under such conditions, everyone’s means of survival are very limited and unprotected. Hobbes puts it to his reader that the combined effect of the action of men living in such conditions is a war of all against all: Driven by a fear of being attacked, all individuals, who are rational and concerned with self-preservation, and who are equally vulnerable and equally dangerous, attack each other in anticipation. Hobbes points out that life in such conditions is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Leviathan, chap. 13, sec. 9). He claims that reason makes man understand the first and fundamental law of nature, namely, that he ought “to seek peace” (Leviathan, chap. 14, sec. 4) if he thinks he can obtain it, and that if he cannot obtain it, he may use his right of nature and defend his life by all means.

Finally, having argued that the result of the joint action of natural men and women living in the state of nature is a state of war “of everyone against everyone,” Hobbes examines the conditions that would bring about the opposite result, namely, a state of “immortal peace.” As the nature of man cannot be changed, Hobbes argues that the only way to avoid the horror of anarchy is for individuals to “lay down their right to all things,” to enter a social contract with one another, and to appoint a sovereign with the primary task of protecting their lives and bodily integrity. The sovereign, Hobbes stresses, is not part of the social contract but simply retains the original natural right to all things. Hobbes explains that sovereign power can reside in one man (or woman) or an assembly, but its characteristics are the same: It must be absolute, unconditional, unlimited, irrevocable, and indivisible. Hobbes maintains that it would be irrational to impose restrictions on the sovereign power as it would restrict its ability to protect its citizens. He also claims that if there were to be someone who could restrict the sovereign power, then this person would, in fact, be the sovereign. Hobbes leaves virtually no scope for resistance to the state: A Hobbesian citizen can only disobey to protect his own life. Because of his notion of sovereignty, Hobbes is regarded by many as the champion of the absolute state.

In the 20th century, David Gauthier led the camp of those who suggested that game theory (prisoners’ dilemmas, coordination games, supergames, etc.) sheds light on Hobbes’s political argument. On the one hand, game theory has been used to support Hobbes’s claim that from a set of undemanding assumptions he demonstrated that the
state of nature turns into a state of war; on the other hand, the game-theoretical armory has also been deployed to claim that Hobbes’s enterprise ultimately fails in that rational agents cannot escape from the state of war and cannot create the Leviathan in the way suggested by Hobbes.

Critics of game-theoretical applications to Leviathan have pointed out that Hobbes stresses that, historically, states are rarely born out of contracts. In this view, the state of nature is not meant to describe a state that precedes the creation of the political state but a state into which people might fall into as a consequence of civil disobedience. In other words, the state of nature describes a state of civil war.

There is textual evidence to support the view that, for Hobbes, fear of punishment alone cannot guarantee long-term order and stability and that citizens need to be educated. In Behemoth, Hobbes singles out popular ignorance as the primary cause of the English Civil War. The state of nature is a thought experiment used by Hobbes to teach citizens why we ought to remain in political associations and why bad governments are better than no governments at all.

In Chapter 13 of Leviathan, in addition to stating that the state of nature materializes into civil wars, Hobbes also claims that it occurs in some primitive societies and that it describes the relations between states. He famously compares states to “gladiators with their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another” (Leviathan, chap. 13, sec. 12) in a constant posture of hostility and war. Such remarks have induced some interpreters to claim that Hobbes is one of the founding fathers of realism. It has been claimed that Hobbes’s pessimistic view of human nature, his idea that men are self-interested and seek power after power, his concept of anarchy, and his notion of the sovereign state inspired the realist tradition of international relations.

Whereas there is universal agreement among interpreters of the importance of Hobbes’s contribution to the development of the concepts of political obligation and state sovereignty, no such agreement exists as to the association of Hobbes with absolutism and with realism. Points of contention among the interpreters are Hobbes’s views on natural law, morality, God, and religion. The dominant view maintains all or most of the following claims: (a) the laws of nature for Hobbes are prudential rules that recommend the creation of the absolute state; (b) the state is the source of all law, all justice, and all morality; (c) the detailed analysis of the Bible that occupies a large part of Leviathan is meant to support the claim that the ecclesiastical powers are totally subordinated to the civil power and that a citizen must obey the Leviathan in everything except if he or she is asked to renounce the belief that Jesus is the Christ.

In contrast to the above views, since the work of A. P. Taylor in 1938 and Howard Warrender in 1957, a long line of interpreters have argued that Hobbes’s laws of nature are not just samples of prudential morality, that Hobbes makes the Leviathan accountable to God, that the sovereign power is absolute but not arbitrary, that not all justice in Hobbes’s construct is legal justice, that Hobbes is ultimately committed to the individual and not to the state, and that the claim that Hobbes is a precursor of John Austin and legal positivism, or indeed a founding father of realism, is ungrounded.


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See also Realism in International Relations; Sovereignty; State

Further Readings
The term *human development* (HD) that came into prominence through the work of Amartya Sen denotes the development toward a more humane society in which a maximum number of people live in dignity. From a humanist position, a dignified life is a life that people have reason to value because they are free to shape it in accordance with their own and mutually agreed ideals. This notion of HD is inspired by an inherently emancipative idea of the “good life” that unifies republican, liberal, contractual, and democratic thought, as noted by David Held (2006). To be human in this perspective means to have the potential to reason, to judge, to choose, and, thus, to be an agent who is in control of one’s actions and life. The most humane life is an emancipative life that one lives in self-determination.

**Human Development as Emancipation**

Mastery, control, and autonomy are features of human emancipation emphasized in Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan’s psychological theory of self-determination (2002). In the evolution of our species, self-awareness became the most salient feature of the human intellect. Self-awareness creates a need to realize oneself in what one is doing, and this implies a need to act in self-determined ways. Self-determination is thought to become a dominant striving as soon as humans are existentially secure, so that the trying to thrive can replace the struggle to survive as the main director of human energies. Self-determination is an inherently emancipative striving that, if satisfied, creates feelings of being in unison with oneself. Because self-awareness is an evolution-shaped feature of *every* human being, self-determination is the most universally and most specifically human striving.

Sen also draws on the emancipative notion of HD in psychology, but he relates it to societies as the unit of reference. When the good life is an emancipated life, the good society is a society that makes a maximum number of people capable to live emancipative lives. Because, as members of the human race, all people are of equal existential value, every person has the same right to an emancipated life; opportunities to live in emancipation must be equally distributed in a humane society. In that sense, HD theory construes the ideals of freedom and equality as interdependent rather than contradictory.

Due to Sen’s capability approach, the HD of societies can be measured by how widely emancipative capabilities are distributed. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) follows the capability approach in its annual Human Development Report, which publishes a Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI summarizes on a per-country basis information on the average person’s life expectancy, educational attainment, and per capita income, assuming that longevity, education, and income increase ordinary people’s capabilities to live an emancipated life.

In the perspective of HD, democracy becomes an integral part of the definition of development for the following reasons: Human emancipation requires freedom of choice in private and public affairs, and such freedoms are granted through the civil and political rights that define democracy.

The emancipative notion of HD has been criticized as prescribing a Western view of the good life. But supporters of the HD approach note that this criticism is defensible only on two questionable premises: The potential to live an emancipated life is not a universal human potential but one that only Western people possess, and emancipation is not a universal human value because non-Western people do not desire it. Neither of these positions is tenable. First, the potential for emancipation is anchored in a most general feature of the human mind, namely, self-awareness, which is not the sole property of Westerners. Second, the claim that emancipation is not a valued feature of life among non-Westerners has been empirically disproven. Whether people value emancipation can be seen in whether feelings of being free in shaping their lives impact satisfaction with their lives. Only if freedom over their lives increases people’s satisfaction...
with their lives is emancipation of value for people. As Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have shown, feelings of freedom over their lives increase people’s life satisfaction in all cultures. Thus, HD’s emphasis on emancipation does not prescribe a specifically Western view of the good life. It champions a particularly humane view.

**The People Empowerment Framework**

Christian Welzel, Ronald Inglehart, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann widened the capability approach into a people empowerment framework (PEF). The PEF specifies how economic conditions, cultural norms, and institutional rules interact in empowering people, relating each of these three areas of social reality to human emancipation as a common underlying theme. Figure 1 depicts the PEF.

In line with the emancipative notion of HD, people empowerment denotes ordinary people’s potential to govern their lives themselves through the practice of personal freedoms in private matters as well as political freedoms in public affairs. The joint and equal emphasis on personal and political freedoms resonates with Isaiah Berlin’s notion of “negative” and “positive” freedom. To be truly free, people must have the right to follow their personal preferences in private matters and to make their political preferences known, bargained, and counted in public matters.

**Elements of People Power**

To make freedoms practicable for people, social reality must meet three criteria. First, ordinary people must have command over participatory resources that make them capable to exercise freedoms. Participatory resources include material means, cognitive skills, and connective opportunities; these resources empower people on the level of capabilities, widening their objective-action repertoire. Second, ordinary people must have internalized self-expression values that make them

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**Figure 1** Human Development as People Empowerment

strive to exercise freedoms. Self-expression values emphasize freedom of choice and equality of opportunities; they empower people on the level of ambitions, widening their subjective-action horizon. Third, ordinary people must be granted democratic rights that license them to practice freedoms. Democratic rights establish equal personal and political liberties; they empower people on the level of entitlements, widening their legal-action radius.

Participatory resources, self-expression values, and democratic rights constitute three distinct, though interdependent, elements of people power. The pattern of their interdependence is governed by the “utility logic of freedom.” This logic becomes evident when rethinking participatory resources, self-expression values, and democratic rights as, respectively, capabilities of, ambitions for, and entitlements to exercising freedoms. Doing so makes a number of logical connections obvious. For one, utility suggests that people become ambitious to exercise freedoms only insofar as they find themselves able to exercise them. The utility logic also suggests that entitlements to exercise freedoms come into wide and frequent use only insofar as people are able and willing to use them. Together, these propositions suggest that self-expression values grow in response to grown participatory resources and, then, that popular pressures for democratic rights grow in response to grown self-expression values and participatory resources.

The three elements of human empowerment are interdependent not on conceptual grounds only. Empirically, as shown by Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann (2003, pp. 368–369), the interdependence is reflected in very strong correlations between societal-level measures of participatory resources, self-expression values, and democratic rights. The three elements correlate so strongly that statistically speaking they reflect one and only one empirical dimension. Content-wise, this dimension represents people empowerment—which is a unity of empowering capabilities, mentalities, and entitlements. Because of their interdependence, the three elements of people empowerment establish equilibria that resemble vicious and virtuous cycles of HD. Most societies are found on either consistently low or consistently high levels of HD in all three elements. HD is a syndrome of developmental conditions that is not easily disentangled. This is part of the reason why it is so difficult to get development started: It needs a synchronized effort to trigger economic, cultural, and institutional changes, as they mutually condition each other.

Democracy represents the institutional element of people empowerment and as such is highly conditioned by the economic and cultural elements of empowerment. No question, democracy can be imposed from the outside by foreign powers, or it can be adopted from the inside by unilateral acts of domestic power holders—irrespective of the social conditions. But in such cases, one most likely deals with a socially aloof version of democracy, in which case the freedoms that define democracy are not coming into wide usage by most of the people. Only when ordinary people are capable of exercising freedoms and only when they are willing to do so will the freedoms granted by democracy come into wide use. Only then do we witness socially embedded democracy.

Sometimes one finds democratic freedoms institutionalized at a level that goes beyond most people’s capabilities and ambitions to struggle for these freedoms. When this is the case, power holders are free to corrupt formally enacted freedoms, and in general, they use this leeway to their benefit. Thus, when democracy is conceded by power holders in the absence of popular pressures, it is usually corrupted democracy. By contrast, when one finds democracy to be effective in the sense that its freedoms are really respected by those in power, this is usually a tribute to ordinary people’s capabilities and ambitions to practice freedoms and struggle for them.

**Strengths of Human Development Theory**

Compared with other concepts in the social sciences, HD theory offers a broad perspective by integrating economic, cultural, and institutional aspects of social reality into a common framework. This breadth of perspective does not come at the expense of the analytical focus. Instead, HD theory sharpens the analytical focus by relating all three aspects of social reality to the empowerment of people as the lead theme.

The HD framework is inspired by an emancipative idea of the good society and the good life. This
normative inspiration constitutes the framework’s integrative core. However, the normativity of the concept is limited to providing a standard against which to evaluate a factual state of affairs as desirable or undesirable. Having a standard to evaluate reality does by no means mean to prescribe reality. Rather, it provides a basis for interventions to change it.

The only other concept in the social sciences comparable with HD in its integrative potential is social capital (SC). With its emphasis on assets that facilitate collective action, SC theory sets a focus similar to HD theory’s emphasis on assets that empower ordinary people. Thus, the three assets championed in SC theory—networks, trust, and norms—resonate with the three assets highlighted in HD theory—capabilities, ambitions, and entitlements. However, SC theory lacks two properties of HD theory. First, SC theory lacks an evolutionary perspective that theorizes how development transforms different types of SC. Second, SC theory has little grounding in psychology and has hence difficulties to anchor SC in the human motivational system. By contrast, with its evolutionary perspective, grounding in psychology, and humanistic inspiration, HD theory offers an appealing integrative framework for the social sciences.

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See also Democracy, Quality; Democracy, Theories of; Development, Political; Development Administration; Human Rights, Comparative Perspectives; Participation; Social Capital; Values

Further Readings


HUMAN RIGHTS, COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

Human rights are inherently comparative. Empirical analysis on and advocacy for human rights are grounded in significant questions relating to human well-being and how such well-being varies across units, whether these units are individuals, groups, countries, or regions. Comparative politics is concerned with explaining variation in social and political phenomena across these very same units. Legal and normative frameworks for human rights have sought to establish rules and norms about how states and individuals ought to treat one another, and the human rights community has sought to make such a set of constraints on human behavior universal through the vehicle and mechanisms of public international law. Through the specification and testing of social theory on observed similarities and differences in the protection of human rights across individuals, groups, countries, and regions, comparative politics helps provide solutions to enhancing the promotion and protection of human rights. But it is crucial in this effort that comparison remains committed to methodological considerations of case selection and bias, measurement error and data availability, universality and particularity, and causal heterogeneity (see, e.g., Todd Landman, 2002). Absence of attention to these key issues can lead to insecure inferences and the possibility of perverse outcomes that can endanger human rights. This entry first examines issues related to methodology and describes some commonly used measures of human rights. It then discusses research on human rights and the contributions of comparative politics to such research. It concludes with a look at some of the challenges for future research in the field.

Methodological Considerations
Broadly speaking, comparative analysis variously includes large-N statistical analysis of many
countries over time and space, small-N qualitative or quantitative analysis of most similar or most different countries, or single-country studies of human rights developments at the national or subnational level. Such comparisons have struggled to overcome significant ontological, epistemological, and methodological challenges in order to provide valid, meaningful, and reliable inferences in this burgeoning subfield of research. But there is now, however, a distinct subfield and strong community of researchers specifically dedicated to the application of the theories and methods in social science to significant human rights problems and puzzles that includes systematic comparative analysis. The American Political Science Association (APSA), the International Political Science Association (IPSA), and the International Studies Association (ISA) have all established specialized human rights sections. The European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) hosted a joint workshop, The Systematic Study of Human Rights Violations, organized by Steve Poe and Sabine Carey in 2002; the *Journal of Peace Research* published a special issue dedicated to political science analysis of protecting human rights, while other mainstream journals in comparative politics and international relations have increasingly published empirical studies on human rights that adopt a comparative framework of some kind.

Comparative studies have tended to sidestep normative concerns over foundations for human rights and have adopted a pragmatic approach that seeks to conduct systematic research on the conditions under which such protections are (or are not) made possible. Such a focus can help us understand how best to prevent human beings from doing their worst to one another, as well as how to overcome some of the structural barriers to achieving greater human dignity for a larger cross section of humankind. Comparative analysis of human rights is thus essential for explaining and understanding the conditions under which human beings forge their existence, assert their dignity, and seek protections for their different identities, for the pursuit of self-determination, and for the exercise of agency and autonomy. Like the study of markets, social classes, and democracy, the study of human rights reveals much about human nature and the ways in which structure and agency interact to create extraordinarily different life experiences across the globe and provides valuable insights into the types of real protections that need to be in place.

**Measures of Human Rights**

Beyond its normative and ontological concerns, comparative analysis of human rights problems is predicated on the genesis and use of comparable measures of human rights either within states or across states. Such measures can be qualitative or quantitative, and both types of measures provide some gauge of the degree to which human rights are being respected, protected, and fulfilled by states (see Todd Landman & Edzia Carvalho, 2009). To date, such measures have included events-based data on violations of human rights, standards-based data on country protection of human rights in principle and in practice, survey-based data on perceptions and experiences of human rights, and socioeconomic and administrative statistics on government inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes that have a bearing on human rights. These measures still tend to be biased toward the protection of civil and political rights, but progress has been made recently on providing comparable measures of some socioeconomic rights (see Landman & Carvalho, 2009).

**Causes, Conditions, and Consequences of Human Rights**

In using these various measures, much comparative research has been carried out in an effort to explain and understand cross-national similarities and differences in the protection of human rights. There is now a large body of large-N quantitative studies, small-N qualitative and quantitative studies, as well as a vast array of single-country studies that examine the causes, conditions, and consequences of human rights protection around the world. Extant global comparative studies on human rights protection have tended to focus on a narrow set of civil and political rights and carried out diachronic and synchronic analyses to estimate the effects of a series of important explanatory variables that account for their variation. Such explanatory variables have included economic development, population and population growth, democracy and
democratization, multinational corporations, internal and external violent conflict, the end of the Cold War, U.S. and European foreign aid, domestic constitutional provisions, and religious differences and ethnic diversity. In addition to consideration of civil and political rights, other global comparative projects have focused on discrimination, minorities, and conflict; U.S. refugee policy; and the provision of basic human needs.

The most recent area of interest has been the examination of the growth and effectiveness of the international human rights regime. Linda Camp Keith (1999) and Oona Hathaway (2002) were the first scholars to analyze the relationship between ratification of human rights treaties and human rights protection, while controlling for a variety of other variables. Their analyses do not find robust support for such a relationship. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui (2007) added a layer of complexity to the relationship by specifying models that included an interaction effect between treaty ratification and democracy, which in turn has an effect on human rights protection. Landman’s (2005) analysis included the level and timing of democratization, a feedback process between treaty ratification and human right protection, as well as a weighted measure of treaty ratification that took into account the filing of reservations across the main international human rights treaties.

**Common Themes of Analysis**

Analyses of human rights problems and puzzles that use a relatively small and intentional selection of countries address a number of common themes and adopt a wide range of comparative methods. The dominant themes at this level of analysis include the struggle for rights and the relationship between social mobilization, political liberalization, and repression (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, & Kathryn Sikkink, 1999); the similarities and differences in the formation, function, outcomes and impact of truth commissions (e.g., Priscilla B. Hayner, 2002); the legacies of authoritarian rule (Luis Roniger & Mario Sznajder, 1999); nonstate violence, “uncivil” movements, and death squads (Leigh Payne, 2000); and the ways in which human rights norms have transcended state sovereignty through the use of transnational advocacy networks that help form alliances and informational networks between domestic and international human rights organizations that are able to put pressure on rights violating states (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). These various small-N studies have adopted a range of comparative-case or focused-comparison strategies, including most similar systems designs (MSSDs), which compare different human rights–related outcomes across similar cases; most different systems designs (MDSDs), which compare similar outcomes across different cases; and the mirror image of MSSDs, which compare similar variation across similar cases and even different outcomes across different cases.

**Comparative Strategies**

Single-country studies have long been an important part of comparative politics, and social science more generally, for their use in description and classification, in plausibility probes, in generating and testing hypotheses, and as crucial cases (i.e., the most likely and least likely examples) that can confirm, inform, or disconfirm existing theories. The human rights themes that are addressed in single-country studies vary little from those that have featured in the large-N and small-N comparative studies, but as in the comparison of a few countries, single-country analysis has allowed for much greater attention to process tracing and dynamic relationships between actors, conditions, and rights. The work of Darren G. Hawkins (2002) provides a good example of how process tracing provides a deeper insight into the causal mechanisms within a single county. In his study of authoritarianism in Chile and the response of the Pinochet regime to international human rights pressure, Hawkins shows that the rule-oriented factions within the regime grew increasingly wary of the possible delegitimizing power of international human rights pressure, gained ground over time, and were largely responsible for the various moves the regime made toward democratization and improvement in human rights protection; these lessons, as Hawkins shows, apply to an analysis of South Africa and Cuba.

Increasingly, the inferential logic of large-N studies has begun to be applied to single-country studies using subnational divisions within individual
countries, such as democracy and human rights in the federal systems of Mexico and India and democracy and political violence across the administrative districts of Nepal. In these studies, the use of states in a federal structure as the basic units of analysis allows for a large number of observations (or increased degrees of freedom) for the analysis of variation in human rights protection while, at the same time, controlling for similarities, since these units are all from the same country. In this way, comparative research in federal systems is a form of MSSD and offers tremendous promise for research in the field of human rights.

Taken together, there is a natural synergy between human rights and comparisons, and the field of comparative politics brings much to bear on our understanding of the conditions under which human rights can or cannot be protected in the ways that are outlined in the international law of human rights. Systematic analysis of human rights problems is a burgeoning subfield in comparative politics and in many ways is a natural place in the larger discipline of political science in which to locate such analysis. While the international human rights regime seeks to use the mechanism of international law to govern the ways in which states relate to their citizens, it is within states and it is across states that the promotion and protection of human rights varies. This variation, which makes a reference to an ideal standard outlined within the many international human rights norms and instruments, is best analyzed through the various methods available to comparativists. These methods, which have developed through the analysis of many areas of research outside any concern for human rights, have served and will serve human rights well for the future.

**Challenges**

Despite the many virtues of comparative analysis for human rights research, there are many challenges that remain in the field. Comparative politics does not have its own distinct theoretical tradition but engages in rationalist, structuralist, and cultural theorizing that can be developed more fully in ways that will prove fruitful for human rights research. The attention to rationalism in Neil Mitchell (2004) and Hawkins (2002) is laudable, especially since both afford an equally large role for ideational approaches. Mitchell’s “principals” are motivated by material self-interest, as well as ideology, and it is precisely the differences in these motivations that help explain the differences in levels of atrocity that he observes across his three cases. Moreover, the model that he develops ought to travel to other cases both in the past and in the contemporary period. In a similar fashion, the different factions in Hawkins’s analysis of the military regime in Chile are not only motivated by the quest to maintain power but also by a particular attachment to legal rules and standards both within and outside the Chilean constitutional order. This kind of innovative development and testing of theories is needed in future comparative research on human rights.

For example, the field has not yet developed a set of formal models of the kind found in the political economy literature that use the relative costs and benefits of attention to human rights to explain either domestic or international state behavior. At the international level, there are signaling and reputational factors that may explain why states ratify human rights treaties, while at the domestic level, human rights can be theorized as a set of public good for which states have different welfare functions. Moreover, spatial econometrics and simple gravity models can start to examine possible spillover and bandwagon effects, as well as the influence of large and powerful states on other states. In all of these examples, systematic comparative analysis of the variation in state behavior can provide the evidence base to test models that have been developed at a particular level of conceptual abstraction.

Finally, it is clear that more attention is needed on methodological issues. For questions of measurement, more attention is needed on the sources of human rights information, the procedures for coding human rights information, the development of measures of economic and social rights, and the provision of indicators that capture the many different dimensions of human rights (Landman & Carvalho, 2009). These measurement issues are pertinent to all forms of comparative analysis from large-N studies to single-country analysis. For studies that compare a few countries or a single country, more attention to the process of case selection is needed to avoid indeterminate research designs and severe forms of selection bias.
MSSDs and MDSDs offer good first solutions for case selection, while greater attention to negative cases and crucial cases is required to make the most of single-country studies of particular human rights problems. Human rights research is a field worthy of study within comparative politics, where the standards for high-quality and systematic rules of inquiry apply equally, while the need for a strong evidence base is paramount for policymakers and advocates interested in the promotion and protection of human rights across the world.

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See also Comparative Politics; Equality; Equality, Political; Human Development; Human Rights in International Relations; Liberty

Further Readings

Human rights is the soul of politics. The essence of human rights is the idea that all persons possess equal moral worth, that social order exists to preserve the essential humanity of its members, and that therefore the exercise of all forms of political authority is properly bounded by its impact on fundamental human dignity. In contemporary international society, this norm has become the theoretical basis for the legitimacy of all states—albeit poorly realized in practice. The emergence of the principle and practice of human rights is an essential area of international law, a hallmark of global civil society, and a response to the multilayered challenges of globalization, along with the persistence of state abuse. The politics of human rights also provides a fascinating test of the power of transnational citizen action and international cooperation to sporadically transform state sovereignty. This entry traces the evolution of this emerging norm, charts some systematic patterns of violation, assesses the range of international remedies, and discusses challenges to the concept and its application.

Historical Development and Emerging Consensus
While most cultures have had some historic standard of humane treatment for their members, the notion of universal and natural rights rises with modernity and increasing interactions across borders. The early arguments put forth by the Spanish theologian Bartolome de las Casas to recognize the essential humanity of the Indians of the Americas culminated several centuries later in the transatlantic movement against the African slave trade, which secured its abolition. During the 19th century, the
increase in costly collisions among the rising European powers led to recognition of the horrors of war as a violation of universal standards, the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the drafting of a series of codes of conduct for the treatment of civilians and prisoners: the Geneva Conventions (four treaties developed between 1864 and 1949). Meanwhile, new types of democratic regimes based on citizenship and social contract inscribed the protection of life and liberty as a requisite of rule within the state, a practice that was later exported. The British Magna Carta laid the foundation in limiting the sovereign’s powers of coercion, France’s Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen asserted rights that transcend social class and condition, while the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights established a normative hierarchy in which fundamental rights supersede even the democratic popular will.

The contemporary international human rights regime was established in reaction to the horrors of the Holocaust—the first modern-era genocide committed by modern means within Europe, coupled with border-crossing war crimes and international aggression. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed on December 10, 1948, is widely considered to mark the birth of the modern norm of international human rights. Over the following decades, a global architecture was constructed, consisting of an expanding body of international law, global and regional monitoring and sanctioning institutions, an emerging practice of humanitarian intervention, humanitarian and governance foreign assistance, and a growing global network of human rights movements. Jack Donnelly has calculated that more than 140 states now subscribe to the foundational documents that delimit human rights in theory: the Universal Declaration and two International Covenants—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).

While human rights began as a legal defense of the lives and physical integrity of political dissidents and religious or ethnic minorities from the malfeasance of dictatorships, its mandate has expanded in claims, subjects, and mechanisms. During the Cold War, the Western bloc sought to globalize civil and political rights via the ICCPR, while the socialist states emphasized social rights such as education and health care under the ICESCR. Meanwhile, developing nations added to the canon a concern with collective rights of development, identity, and, eventually, attempts to secure accountability of nonstate actors such as multinational corporations for abuses connected with globalization. From decolonization onward, the increasing presence of non-Western states in international society brought diverse calls for expansion of the human rights agenda to socially marginalized as well as politically oppressed groups, attention to government negligence as well as repression, and culturally based critiques of the liberal norms. Since the 1990s, the claims and subjects of human rights have been expanded to previously unrecognized groups such as children and indigenous peoples. Islamic and Confucian cultural critiques of the liberal Western basis of human rights were largely transcended at the global level at the 1993 United Nations’ (UN) Vienna Conference on Human Rights, which declared a consensus that human rights are “universal, indivisible, and interdependent” (although such challenges reappear regularly in selected states’ defenses against international criticism). By the 21st century, international human rights enforcement mechanisms had been strengthened significantly—but only in the core domain of massive and systematic violations of life and liberty by government action of pariah states.

**Defining Rights and Setting Standards**

Like other forms of international law, human rights standards are a mélange of explicit treaties, customary international law, pilot domestic standards, and scholarly interpretation. For example, in assessing Spain’s 1998 request for the extradition of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet from Britain to face charges of crimes against humanity, a British court considered its obligations under the Convention Against Torture, the European Court of Human Rights, Chile’s own amnesty and claims of sovereignty, British legislation, and expert testimony. The Universal Declaration and the twin International Covenants are considered to encompass a comprehensive foundation, with more specific standards and jurisdiction developed by the more widely subscribed phenomenon-based
treaties: the Geneva Conventions on war crimes, the Convention Against Torture, the Genocide Treaty, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Another set of treaties is linked to vulnerable populations; they establish valuable benchmarks and monitoring obligations but are less widely accepted and less effective sources of pressure on states: the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Refugee Convention. The most recent 21st-century international norms, the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability, establish new populations of international concern but still struggle for broad recognition.

The conceptual core of human rights standards is to provide protection and empowerment against evolving threats to human dignity. To meet this mandate, fundamental human rights must be universal and inalienable—immune from contingent variations in geography and political conditions. Such rights must be enforced by the international system that provides a safety net for uneven citizenship regimes, incorporates increasing numbers of displaced persons and noncitizens, and acts to check rogue states. But international rights are also meaningless without international duties. In this sense, the key emerging debate on enforcement is the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (approved by the UN in 2005), which proposes a broad but important obligation on member states to act collectively where the state cannot or will not, in cases of massive and gross violations of fundamental rights.

Patterns of Abuse

If human rights violations are a form of political pathology, the search for a remedy begins with the study of the symptoms and analysis of the causes. The study of patterns of abuse has become a subfield of international relations and several social sciences. Violations can be measured and monitored by a combination of testimonies of survivors and witnesses, government records, country case studies, statistical patterns of demographic records and potential correlations with determinants of abuse, and forensic anthropology of gravesites. War crimes such as massacres of civilians and torture of prisoners of war are often associated with counterinsurgency struggles and participation of paramilitary forces on both sides, which constitute an increasing proportion of conflicts. While state-sponsored slavery was almost eliminated by the 20th century through international cooperation, state-tolerated forced labor by private parties along with associated trafficking in persons has actually increased in the 21st century, in tandem with the pressures of globalization. Genocide, the attempt to systematically eliminate a population defined by identity characteristics, has also experienced a lamentable revival in the aftermath of the Cold War. Genocide is associated with recent defeat in international war, the collapse of hegemonic influence, and competitive political mobilization by “ethnic entrepreneurs”—and can rarely be attributed primarily to “ancient hatreds.” Moreover, mass expulsions of ethnic cleansing often spill across borders to create new zones of conflict, as Rwandan refugees contributed to the epochal war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Massive numbers of political prisoners and gulag-like prison complexes are characteristic of dictatorships, especially totalitarian regimes such as communist North Korea or theocratic Iran, and increasingly concentrated within such regimes. However, Amnesty International estimates that around half of all states practice torture with some regularity, and this includes some democracies—especially recent democracies in the developing world. High levels of social inequality and low levels of judicial accountability are the leading factors associated with the systematic occurrence of torture, especially in Latin America. Discrimination by race, religion, caste, gender, and national origin is still endemic and often state supported in South Asia and the Middle East, while even some democratic developed countries generally respectful of their own citizens have responded to high levels of migration with discriminatory policies that violate international standards.

Remedies: The International Human Rights Regime

The ensemble of local, national, and global human rights organizations has been labeled an “international human rights regime”—an issue-specific
pattern of global governance. There is no definitive enforcement of human rights, but critical combinations of various forms of transnational pressure have resulted in significant reforms, such as the demise of the apartheid system in South Africa. Human rights campaigns are often catalyzed by transnational issue networks that include social movements, international organizations, and experts, in fluid habitual exchanges that pressure states from above and below. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink depict human rights appeals as a “boomerang” launched by a powerless civil society that reaches around the state to secure transnational pressure, while Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink propose a phased “spiral model” in which such pressure evolves through phases of state denial, normative lip service without policy change, then limited local empowerment, more systematic reform, and eventual state socialization and internalization of human rights norms.

At the global level, standard setting and monitoring by international organizations depend mostly on “naming and shaming”—but the vigor of China’s efforts to avoid annual censure by the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHCR), including generous aid packages to influence the votes of member states, suggests that such symbolic diplomacy does have a diffuse impact on violators. In addition to the Commission (now Council), which considers country situations, each of the major treaties generates a member state reporting regime, such as the ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee. Issue-specific UN rapporteurs conduct field visits and issue reports on abuses such as forced disappearance, which can be influential in international or bilateral sanctions, or even secure the release of prisoners highlighted by the reports. At the regional level, the European Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the African Union also host Human Rights Commissions, which vary correspondingly from the highest to lowest level of activity, in accessibility to individual versus state complaints, and in mandated impact on member states’ domestic policies. Bilateral diplomacy can also serve as an important source of signaling, especially by superpowers with influence over abusive regimes, and seems particularly useful in occasionally freeing prominent political prisoners or protecting officially stigmatized ethnic or religious groups (such as Soviet Jews). However, diplomatic pressure alone has proven relatively unavailing in addressing broader patterns of repression imbedded in the dominance of the target regime.

Transnational legal processes run the gamut from a global, to a regional, to a bilateral exercise of universal jurisdiction. The International Criminal Court (ICC), following the UN’s postwar tribunals on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, is the only permanent universal body with jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Its combination of an autonomous Prosecutor and Security Council referral, with the standard safeguard that it can act only when domestic remedies are exhausted, has secured the participation of more than 100 member states—but not the United States. The ICC has been used mainly for war crimes in Africa since its 2002 activation. The EU and OAS also have human rights courts with contentious jurisdiction and the ability to levy sanctions against member states. Since treaties such as the Convention Against Torture and domestic mechanisms such as the U.S. Torture Victims’ Protection Act grant willing states universal jurisdiction to prosecute foreign nationals in their own domestic courts for crimes against humanity committed abroad, several states have also secured national-level criminal or civil judgments against fallen dictators and war criminals (such as Argentine generals). The Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón, who brought the Pinochet case, has been particularly active in testing the parameters of transnational legal accountability in a variety of cases.

Global economic sanctions have been issued in a few of the most egregious cases of gross violations by pariah states but have sometimes had a contradictory humanitarian impact even where consensus was achieved. Bilateral diplomacy and sanctions have been more widespread and influential, including trade and investment limitations, foreign aid conditionality, and limitations on military assistance to repressive regimes. While the U.S. Office of the Treasury sanctions dozens of states each year, only a proportion of sanctions are based on human rights violations—but they include gross violators such as Burma, North Korea, and Sudan. Although U.S. foreign assistance legislation, such as the Kennedy, Harkin, and Leahy
amendments, specifies that neither development nor military assistance should be given to violators, these limits have been very unevenly enforced and often overridden on national security grounds by the executive; however, the threat of suspension of aid has occasionally secured investigations, accountability, and even a reduction in violations by client states. The corresponding carrot for the stick of economic sanctions is human rights-directed foreign assistance, such as governance aid and support for global or recipient country human rights organizations. The Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Canada have vital and effective programs of human rights foreign aid, training, and civil society promotion.

The ultimate enforcement of human rights is armed intervention against the violating authority. While the UN Security Council can authorize intervention in response to massive crimes against humanity, in practice the UN has acted only in the aftermath of regime collapse or conflict resolution—and UN peacekeeping forces on the ground as violations unfolded notably failed to protect victims in Bosnia, Rwanda, or Timor. More muscular interventions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against abusive regimes did halt violence and contribute to subsequent return of refugees in Kosovo and Afghanistan but with controversial civilian casualties. Attempts to regionalize intervention in African conflicts have founndered most recently in Darfur. Unilateral interventions without multilateral consensus are often questioned as a selective rationalization of national interest on spurious humanitarian grounds, but it must be noted that the countervailing interests of neighboring powers afflicted by spillover violence have been the only check on some of the worst violations, such as the Cambodian genocide halted by a Vietnamese invasion or the murderous regime of Uganda’s Idi Amin displaced by Tanzania.

International human rights movements monitor, lobby, protest, and reform human rights around the world—usually in conjunction with local organizations and victims. The flagship global organization Amnesty International, established in 1961 to advocate for “prisoners of conscience,” now comprises millions of members in more than 150 countries—and has secured the freedom of around one third of its subjects from diverse regimes. Along with peers such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty’s nonpartisan annual reports on country conditions and monitoring of conflict situations and emerging abuses often influence global and bilateral condemnations and sanctions. Country-specific campaigns, increasingly mobilized via the Internet, are credited with shielding some local advocates and pressuring vulnerable repressive governments for limited reform. An additional element of advocacy mobilizes transnational identities, such as trade unionists defending their threatened colleagues in Colombia, Christians pressing for religious freedom in China, and women’s groups campaigning to have genocidal rape designated as a war crime by the International Criminal Court. Local human rights movements generally seek to transcend political and ascriptive identities and derive their power from a combination of Gandhian nonviolent collective action and globalized information politics. Such protests contributed strongly to transitions to democracy in many Latin American countries, South Africa, and the Philippines, and former political prisoners became the first democratic leaders of Poland, the Czech Republic, South Korea, and Timor. Human rights campaigns dedicated to identifying new genres of transnational abuse have introduced new forms of leverage through boycotts and new mechanisms of global governance such as codes of conduct for multinationals to limit labor abuses and an international certification scheme to stem the trade in “blood diamonds,” whose illicit export contributed to war crimes in several notorious African conflicts.

Human Rights Reform

When the international human rights regime is successful, states engage in human rights reform. Human rights reform can be studied from a policy design, comparative, or transnational perspective—since such reforms have often been diffused or implemented by global as well as national institutions. Retrospective accountability for abuses committed in a prior war or dictatorship is labeled “transitional justice” and generally consists of some combination of investigation (“truth commissions”), adjudication, and reparations. Human rights literature is replete with debates on the effectiveness and impact on regime stability of different
forms of transitional justice, from Argentina’s maximalist trials of former military rulers that led to rebellions to South Africa’s explicit trade-off of truth for justice. Postconflict accountability is increasingly implemented by a hybrid blend of global and national institutions, as in Cambodia and Sierra Leone, which marks an evolution of sovereignty and international law.

New democracies and regimes responding to civil rights campaigns against chronic discrimination also establish forward-looking institutions and policies to improve citizen rights. National human rights institutions for domestic monitoring of policies as well as practices relevant to human rights, mandated by the UN under the Paris Principles, were originally established by Western European democracies but have diffused to dozens of states in Latin America and Asia. Such human rights institutes sometimes overlap with and sometimes replace ombudsman offices, which are empowered to independently investigate and represent citizens (and in some cases, migrants) against allegations of abuse by any government agency. Finally, programs of human rights education for agents of authority, vulnerable groups, schoolchildren, or the general population are promoted by global agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, regional bodies such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s High Commissioner on National Minorities, and national governments seeking to implement international human rights norms.

Challenges

While the struggle for fundamental human dignity has advanced tremendously in the years since the Universal Declaration, challenges to the theory and practice of human rights continue. Since human rights are based in a liberal legal model of the primacy of the public individual, cultural, sociological, and even feminist critiques of universalism question the rights’ relevance for the pursuit of disparate collective social goals and identities. During eras of renewed conflict, especially the unconventional transnational threat of terrorism, states revive old arguments about national security trumping inalienable rights—and human rights scholarship contests the rationale and record of such logics. Critics and campaigners alike note the increasing salience of abuses committed by private actors who are not accountable under the “government and opposition” model the international human rights regime was created to address: from multinational sweatshops, to private security contractors, to patriarchal religious authorities. Moreover, many abusive situations result from a lack rather than a surfeit of state authority. Human rights advocates and theorists respond that these concerns suggest the need to expand human rights norms and mechanisms, not abandon them. While human rights has not halted “death by government” or other systematic abuses of power, it has proven to be a resilient tool for the voiceless and vulnerable to often endure and occasionally prevail.

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See also Civil Society; Ethics; Genocide; Governance, Global; Human Rights, Comparative Perspectives; Indigenous Peoples’ Rights; International Law; International Regimes; Intervention, Humanitarian; Normative Theory in International Relations; Rights; Rule of Law; Sovereignty

Further Readings

HYBRID REGIMES

The notion of hybrid regimes—that is, regimes that were characterized by the presence at the same time of key aspects of different models or types of regimes—has been present in the classic political science literature for years (Samuel E. Finer, 1970). The basic change in recent decades is the increase in the number and variety of hybrid regimes as a side effect of the widespread phenomenon of democratization in all areas of the world. This entry clarifies the notion, points out how to distinguish hybrid regimes from transitional phases, and builds on existing empirical research to show the varieties of hybridism in contemporary times.

Meaning

As regards the term regim e, consideration is given here to all government institutions and norms that are either formalized or are informally recognized as existing in a given territory with respect to a given population. While formal and informal institutions may no longer configure some form of nondemocracy and do not yet configure a complete democracy, they still bear traces of the previous political reality. In addition, to have something that may be labeled a regime, at least minimal stabilization is needed. This is the key aspect differentiating a regime from transition phases, which are characterized by short duration. The precise length of time that is considered necessary before classifying something as a regime rather than a transitional phase is arbitrarily—but reasonably—stipulated.

Such a regime does not fulfill the minimalist requirements of a democracy, such as (a) universal suffrage, both male and female; (b) free, competitive, recurrent, and fair elections; (c) more than one party; and (d) different and alternative media sources. One important aspect of this definition is that in the absence of just one of these requirements, or if at some point one of them is no longer met, there is no longer a democratic regime but another political and institutional setup marked by varying degrees of uncertainty and ambiguity. Moreover, in a democracy, be it only minimal, institutions and rights should not be subject to, or conditioned by, nonelected actors or exponents of other external regimes. The former refers to the armed forces, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, a hegemonic party, or even a monarch with pretensions to influencing decision-making processes or the overall functioning of the democracy; in the latter case, a regime might be conditioned by an external power that deprives the democracy of its independence and sovereignty by pursuing nondemocratic policies.

In addition, such a regime does not have the key aspects of nondemocratic regimes, and a basic reference must be made at least to traditional and authoritarian regimes. The former are based on the personal power of the sovereign, who binds his underlings in a relationship of fear and reward; they are typically legibus soluti regimes, where the sovereign’s arbitrary decisions are not limited by norms and do not need to be justified ideologically. Power is thus used in particularistic forms and for essentially private ends. In these regimes, the armed forces and police play a central role, while there is an evident lack of developed ideology and mass mobilization. Basically, then, the political setup is dominated by traditional elites and institutions. As for the authoritarian regimes, the definition advanced by Juan Linz is still the most useful one: a political system with limited, nonresponsible political pluralism; without an elaborated and guiding ideology but with distinctive mentalities; without either extensive or intense political mobilization, except at some points in their development; and in which a leader, or, occasionally, a small group, exercises power from within formally ill-defined, but actually quite predictable, limits. However, with respect to such a definition, which identifies five significant dimensions—limited pluralism, distinctive values, low political mobilization, a small leading group, ill-defined but predictable limits to citizens’ rights—we need to stress the constraints imposed on political pluralism within a society that has no recognized autonomy or independence as well as no effective political participation of the people, with the consequent exercise of various forms of state suppression.

Having considered definitions for minimalist democracy, traditional regime, and authoritarianism, it is now possible to define hybrid regimes. As suggested by Terry L. Karl (1995) in relation to some Latin American countries, they may be characterized by “uneven acquisition of procedural
requisites of democracy,” without “civilian control over the military,” with sectors of the population that “remain politically and economically disenfranchised” and with a “weak judiciary” (p. 80). But this definition refers only to authoritarianisms that partially lose some of their key characteristics, retain some authoritarian or traditional features, and at the same time acquire some of the characteristic institutions and procedures of democracy. A hybrid regime, on the other hand, may also have a set of institutions where, going down the inverse path, some key elements of democracy have been lost and authoritarian characteristics have been acquired. Thus, an adequate definition has to be completed by, for example, including some of the aspects that can be recurrent in authoritarian situation, such as the existence of incumbents who routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition fair media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate electoral results.

This discussion, however, prompts reflection about two elements. First, a hybrid regime is always a set of ambiguous institutions that maintain aspects of the past. Second, it is, consequently, a “corruption” of the preceding regime, lacking as it does one or more essential characteristics of that regime but also failing to acquire other characteristics that would make it fully democratic or authoritarian. Consequently, the term hybrid can be applied to all regimes preceded by a period of authoritarian or traditional rule followed by the beginnings of greater tolerance, liberalization, and a partial relaxation of the restrictions on pluralism or all regimes that, following a period of minimal democracy in the sense indicated above, are subject to the intervention of nonelected bodies—the military, above all—that place restrictions on competitive pluralism without, however, creating a more or less stable authoritarian regime. Moreover, in disentangling empirical realities that fit the previously formulated definition of the hybrid regime from different transitional situations, it should be stressed that there has been some sort of stabilization or duration, perhaps at least a decade, of those ambiguous, uncertain institutional setups. Consequently, to avoid a misleading analysis of democratization processes, a hybrid regime can be defined as a set of institutions that have been persistent, whether stable or unstable, for about a decade; have been preceded by authoritarian rule, a traditional regime (possibly with colonial characteristics), or even a minimal democracy; and are characterized by the breakup of limited pluralism and forms of independent, autonomous participation, but with the absence of at least one of the four aspects of a minimal democracy.

A Classification

On the basis of the previous definition, then, a crucial aspect of hybrid regimes is that there may be (or there may emerge) veto players—that is, individual or collective actors who are influential or decisive in maintaining the regime in its characteristic state of ambiguity and uncertainty. These actors may be an external, foreign power that interferes in the politics of the nation; a monarch or authoritarian ruler who has come to power through more or less violent means; the armed forces; a hegemonic party run by a small group or a single leader; religious hierarchies; economic oligarchies; and other powerful groups or a mixture of such actors, who are either unable or unwilling to eliminate other prodemocratic actors, assuming that in the majority of current hybrid regimes the alternative is between democracy and nondemocracy.

From this perspective, an effective classification should focus on the legacy of the previous regime and the constraints preventing a country from becoming a minimal democracy. Thus, the types of hybrid regimes that develop depend directly on the classifications of authoritarian regimes and democracies that have already been established and the factors that prevent democratic change. The core assumption of this typology is that traditional and democratic regimes can, by virtue of their characteristics, give rise to different results, while it is more likely that the survival of authoritarian veto players points toward a single solution.

However, when switching from theoretical hypotheses to empirical analysis (see Leonardo Morlino, 2009), three analytic axes emerge with clarity: a first one where electoral process, political pluralism and participation, freedom of expression and beliefs, and freedom of association and organization are grouped together closely; a second where state functioning stands alone; and a third one, conceptually close to the second one, where rule of law and personal autonomy are also strongly connected. Additional empirical analysis
Hypothesis Testing shows how three models can result by merging the second and third components also. Thus, the first model of hybrid regime, termed limited democracy, derives from the first component and is characterized by universal suffrage, a formally correct electoral procedure, and elective posts occupied on the basis of elections and a multiparty system but where civil rights are constrained by the police or other effective forms of suppression. Consequently, there is no actual political opposition and, above all, the media are compromised by a situation of monopoly to the point that part of the population is effectively prevented from exercising their rights. The notion of limited democracy is also well developed by Wigell (2008). The second empirical model is that of democracies without law or democracy without a state, as the state can be conceived of as a government based on the primacy of the law, where there are no relevant legacies or powerful veto players or any forms of state suppression or nonguarantee of rights but simply a situation of widespread illegality in which the state is incapable of performing properly due to poorly functioning institutions. Limited democracies and democracies without state are confirmed as empirically relevant classes for which different, contrasting elements need to be stressed: on the one hand, the lack of an effective guarantee of rights despite the presence of state institutions and, on the other hand, the lack of the rule of law and of a functioning state, with laws that are not applied because the judiciary has no effective independence, there is widespread corruption, and the bureaucracy is flawed and inefficient. The third model suggested by empirical research is that of quasi democracies characterized by regimes where all main aspects mentioned above are deeply rooted in ambiguity: There is illegality and at the same time partial constraints in the effective guarantee of rights. This model is the most empirically relevant one (see Morlino, 2009).

Conclusion
On the grounds of existing empirical analyses, hybrid regimes are a reality and empirically support an autonomous model of regime vis-à-vis democracy, authoritarianism, and the traditional regime. The three models of hybridism developed through empirical analysis suggest that the most significant empirical problem is to ensure the existence of institutions that are capable of performing their functions. Hence, there are countries where strengthening of the state and/or promoting more effective guarantee of rights might transform the regimes into democracies.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Democracy, Theories of; Democratization; International Regimes; Transition

Further Readings

Hypothesis Testing

The primary means of conveying the strength of empirical findings in political science is the null hypothesis significance test (NHST). This paradigm, along with its strengths and weaknesses, is therefore important for nearly every quantitative study in political science. This entry reviews the current hypothesis testing paradigm and its history, discusses the underused idea of statistical power from tests, and points out some common misinterpretations of hypothesis testing.

The Current Paradigm: Null Hypothesis Significance Testing
The current approach to hypothesis testing in all of the social sciences is a synthesis of the Fisher test of significance and the Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test. In this 20th-century procedure, two hypotheses are set forth: a null or restricted hypothesis, $H_0$, which is set against an alternative
or research hypothesis, $H_1$. Thus, they are supposed to describe two complementary notions about some political science phenomenon of interest. The research hypothesis is the probability model that describes the author’s belief about this phenomenon and is typically operationalized through statements about an unknown parameter $\theta \in \Theta$. In the most basic and common setup, the null hypothesis asserts that $\theta = 0$, and the research hypothesis asserts that $\theta \neq 0$. Such a two-sided test is the overwhelming default in assessing the statistical reliability of individual regression parameters.

Once the hypotheses are established, a test statistic $T$, some function of $\theta$ and the data, is calculated and assessed with the distribution under the assumption that $H_0$ is true. Commonly used test statistics are sample means, $X$; chi-square statistics from tabular analysis, $\chi^2$; and $t$ statistics in linear and generalized linear models. Note that the sample space of the test statistic must correspond to the support of the specified null and alternative distributions.

The test procedure assigns one of two decisions, $D_0$ and $D_1$, to all possible values in the sample space of the statistic $T$, corresponding to supporting either $H_0$ or $H_1$, respectively. The $p$ value (also called the associated probability) is equal to the area in the tail (or tails) of the assumed distribution under $H_0$, which starts at the point determined by $T$ on the horizontal axis and continues to positive or negative infinity. If a predetermined significance level $\alpha$ has been specified, then $H_0$ is rejected for $p$ values less than $\alpha$; otherwise, the $p$ value itself is reported. More formally, the sample space of $T$ is split into two complementary regions, $S_0$ and $S_1$, such that the probability that $T$ falls in $S_1$, causing decision $D_1$, is either a predetermined null hypothesis cumulative distribution function (CDF) level ($\alpha = \text{size of the test, Neyman-Pearson}$) or the CDF level corresponding to the value of the test statistic under $H_0$ is reported as follows:

$$p \text{ value } = \int_{S_1} P_{H_0}(T = t)dt \quad \text{(Fisher)}.$$

Thus, decision $D_1$ is made if the test statistic is sufficiently atypical given the distribution under $H_0$. This process is illustrated for a one-tailed test at $\alpha = .05$ in Figure 1.

### Historical Background

The current NHST is a blend of two extremely important but incompatible schools of thought in 20th-century statistics. R. A. Fisher developed a procedure that gives significance levels from the data with the intention of possibly “nullifying” a straw man hypothesis, but Neyman and Pearson set up a very rigid decision-making process to arrive at one of two possible competing conclusions.

### Fisher's Test of Significance

Originally Fisher, in 1935, developed his test of significance in the context of randomized experiments, where the physical act of randomization of units to treatment and control group is the basis for unbiased inference. Fisher posited a single and sharp null hypothesis, $H_0$. The simplest and most popular $H_0$ is that the treatment effect is zero for all units. Note that this $H_0$ is more restrictive than the usually tested null hypothesis that the average effect is zero across the sample. Under the sharp $H_0$, all (potential) values of the outcome variable under treatment and control can be either observed or inferred for each unit. Hence, the distribution of...
the statistic $T$ is assumed to be known. Since the distribution of $T$ is solely determined by randomization, it is called the randomization distribution of $T$. Using this distribution, one can compare the observed test statistic against its distribution under the null hypothesis. An observed value that is “very unlikely,” given the null hypothesis and the implied randomization distribution, is taken as evidence against the null hypothesis in what is essentially a stochastic version of the “proof by contradiction,” according to Guido Imbens and Don Rubin. More specifically, as the statistic moves away from its conditional expected value, $E(T|H_0)$, $H_0$ becomes progressively less plausible (less likely to occur by chance). However, as is shown below, the stochastic nature of this proof by contradiction creates some logical fallacies. The relationship between $T$ and the level of significance produced by the test is established by the density outside the threshold established by $T$ (one- or two-tailed), going away from the density region containing the expected value of $T$ given $H_0$. The outside density is the $p$ value, also called the achieved significance level. Fisher hypothesis testing is therefore summarized by the following steps:

1. Identify the null hypothesis.
2. Determine the appropriate test statistic and its distribution under the assumption that the null hypothesis is true.
3. Calculate the test statistic from the data.
4. Determine the achieved significance level that corresponds to the test statistic using the distribution under the assumption that the null hypothesis is true.
5. Reject $H_0$ if the achieved significance level is sufficiently small. Otherwise, reach no firm conclusion.

The Fisher construct naturally leads to the question of what $p$ value is sufficiently small as to warrant rejection of the null hypothesis. This measure of extremeness or what is considered as unlikely should be based on the specific application but involves necessarily some arbitrary judgments. Fisher established the CDF thresholds of .10, .05, and .01 as “convenient” and nothing more. Therefore, there is absolutely no scientific basis for making hypothesis test decisions at these levels whatsoever; they have merely become convention. This suggests a great amount of caution about making decisions about, say, .049 versus .051, a difference that is typically swamped by measurement error in the social sciences anyway.

### Neyman and Pearson Hypothesis Testing

During the same period when Fisher was developing his exact test of significance based on the sharp $H_0$, Neyman and Pearson were interested in methods to estimate average treatment effects, such as $\theta = 0$ over the sample, and to construct confidence intervals around this estimate. They rejected Fisher’s idea that only the sharp null hypothesis needs to be tested. Since only the assumption of the sharp null hypothesis allowed Fisher to derive the exact randomization distribution of $T$, Neyman and Pearson can only derive certain properties of this distribution. This is the price they have to pay to allow “nonsharp” hypotheses about average differences between, say, treatment and control groups. Neyman and Pearson argue that a more useful procedure is to propose two complementary hypotheses: $\Theta_A$ and $\Theta_B$ (or a class of $\Theta_B$ such that $\Theta_A \cup \Theta_B = \Theta$), which need not be labeled “null” or “alternative” but often are purely for convenience. Furthermore, Neyman and Pearson point out that one can posit a hypothesis and consecutively test multiple admissible alternatives against this hypothesis. Since there are now two competing hypotheses in any one test, Neyman and Pearson can define an $a$ priori–selected $\alpha$, the probability of falsely rejecting $\Theta_A$ under the assumption that $H_0$ is true, and $\beta$, the probability of failing to reject $\Theta_A$ when $H_0$ is false. By convention, the first mistake is called a Type I error, and the second mistake is called a Type II error. Note that $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are probabilities conditional on two mutually exclusive events: $\alpha$ is conditional on the null hypothesis being true, and $\beta$ is conditional on the null hypothesis being false. A more useful quantity than $\beta$ is $1 - \beta$, which Neyman and Pearson (1933, 1936) call the power of the test: the long-run probability of accurately rejecting a false null hypothesis given a point alternative hypothesis.

In this setup, we want to develop the test that has the highest power for a given a priori $\alpha$. To
state this more precisely, let the test function \( \phi \) take on the values 1 if \( D_1 \) is reached under \( \Theta_B \) and 0 if \( D_0 \) is reached under \( \Theta_A \). Hence, the set of data points or values of \( T \) for which \( \phi = 1 \) is equal to the region of rejection (this is only approximately true for randomization tests). For a given significance level \( \alpha \), the problem is to select a test \( \phi \) such that \( 1 - \beta \) is maximized for all \( \theta \) belonging to \( \Theta_B \) subject to the condition that \( E_A[\phi] \leq \alpha \) for all \( \theta \) belonging to \( \Theta_A \).

To accomplish this goal, the researcher considers the fixed sample size, the desired significance level, and the research hypothesis, then employs the test with the greatest power. Neyman and Pearson’s famous lemma shows that under certain conditions (a sufficient condition is that the probability density tested has a monotone likelihood ratio) there exists a “uniformly most powerful” test that has the greatest possible probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis in favor of a point alternative hypothesis, compared with other tests. Formally, this comparison employs the power function that is based on Type I and Type II error rates. Again, the probability of a Type I and Type II error can be stated as follows:

\[
P(\text{Type I error}) = P(\text{reject } \Theta_A | \Theta_A \text{ is true})
\]

\[
P(\text{Type II error}) = P(\text{accept } \Theta_A | \Theta_B \text{ is true})
= 1 - P(\text{reject } \Theta_A | \Theta_B \text{ is true}).
\]

The last expression gives the probability to reject \( \Theta_A \) as a function of \( \theta \) and builds the basis for the power function. If \( \theta \) belongs to \( \Theta_B \) then the power function gives the probability of making the right decision, that is, reject \( \Theta_A \). If \( \theta \) belongs to \( \Theta_B \), then the power function gives the probability of a Type I error rate, which is smaller than or equal to \( \alpha \).

Ideally, a power function of a one-sided test would be a step function, equaling 0 as long as \( \theta \) belongs to \( \Theta_A \) and equaling 1 as soon as \( \theta \) belongs to \( \Theta_B \). It is already clear from the discussion above that this sharp and error-free distinction between \( \Theta_A \) and \( \Theta_B \) is impossible. However, the better a test, the steeper the slope of the power function between accepting \( \Theta_A \) and accepting \( \Theta_B \). In general, the power of a test increases with the preset level \( \alpha \), the sample size, and greater difference between values from \( \Theta_A \) and \( \Theta_B \). Figure 2 illustrates the power functions for a one-sided test. We use a normally distributed sample of size \( N = 10 \). We estimate the power function at \( \mu = 105 \) for \( \Theta_A \): \( \mu = 100 \) against \( \Theta_B \); \( \mu > 100 \) with a standard deviation of \( \sigma = 10 \) and varying values for \( \alpha \) (.05, .01, .001).

Figure 3 illustrates the power functions for a normally distributed sample of varying size with \( N = 10, 20, \) and 100. Again, we estimate the power function at \( \mu = 105 \) for \( \Theta_A \): \( \mu = 100 \) against \( \Theta_B \); \( \mu > 100 \) with a standard deviation of \( \sigma = 10 \) and a fixed \( \alpha = .05 \). Again, the power functions are based on a one-sided test. The influence of the sample size on power is further discussed below.

In comparing the Neyman-Pearson approach with Fisher’s exact test of significance, note how different the following steps are from Fisher’s previously described steps:

1. Identify a hypothesis of interest, \( \Theta_B \), and a complementary hypothesis, \( \Theta_A \).
2. Determine the appropriate test statistic and its distribution under the assumption that \( \Theta_A \) is true.
3. Specify a significance level (\( \alpha \)) and determine the corresponding critical value of the test statistic under the assumption that \( \Theta_A \) is true.
4. Calculate the test statistic from the data.

5. Reject $\Theta_A$ and accept $\Theta_B$ if the test statistic is more extreme than the critical value from the expected value of the test statistic (calculated under the assumption that $\Theta_A$ is true). Otherwise, accept $\Theta_A$.

The Neyman-Pearson approach is important in the context of decision theory where the decision in the final step above is assigned a risk function computed as the expected loss from making an error. Most political scientists are surprised to see the word accept in this context since they are trained not to accept a null hypothesis, but Neyman and Pearson do not have a null; they have a partition of the decision space.

**The Synthesis of Fisher and Neyman-Pearson**

The NHST attempts to combine the two approaches described above giving a synthesized approach. There is no attributed authorship for this notion, and it appears to have come from textbook writers in the mid-20th century who may have been afraid to offend either Fisher or Neyman-Pearson (the conversation between these powerful voices was unusually vitriolic).

Neyman and Pearson’s hypothesis test defines the significance level a priori as a function of the testing procedure and not as a function of the data. Conversely, Fisher’s test of significance defines the significance level afterward as function of the data after the test. The current paradigm in the social sciences mixes these two approaches by pretending to select $\alpha$ a priori but actually using $p$ values (or asterisks next to test statistics indicating ranges of $p$ values) to evaluate the strength of the evidence. Thus, the NHST allows inclusion of the alternate hypothesis but precludes a search for a more powerful test.

The NHST also tries to reconcile the two differing perspectives on how the hypotheses are actually defined. It adopts the Neyman-Pearson convention of two explicitly stated rival hypotheses, but one is always labeled as the null hypothesis as in the Fisher test. In some introductory texts, the null hypothesis is presented only as a null relationship: $\theta = 0$ (no effect), whereas Fisher intended the null hypothesis simply as a straw man to be “nullified.” The NHST pretends to use the Neyman-Pearson
decision process except that failing to reject the null hypothesis is treated as a quasi decision: “modest” support for the null hypothesis assertion. There is also confusion in the synthesized test about \( p \) values as long-run probabilities. Since the \( p \) value or range of \( p \) values, indicated by asterisks, is not set a priori, it is not the long-run probability of making a Type I error but is typically treated as such, even with a single sample and a single test. Neither Fisher nor Neyman and Pearson would have been satisfied with the synthesis. Fisher objected to Neyman and Pearson’s preselection of the significance level as well as the mandatory two-outcome decision process. Neyman and Pearson disagreed with Fisher’s interpretation of \( p \) values.

**Underlying Problems With the Null Hypothesis Significance Test**

The basis of the NHST rests on the logical argument of *modus tollens* (denying the consequent) but adds a necessary probabilistic aspect:

If \( X \), then \( Y \) is highly likely.

\( Y \) is not observed.

Therefore, \( X \) is highly unlikely.

This logic seems at first to be plausible. Yet it is a fallacy to assert that obtaining data that are atypical under a given assumption implies that the assumption is likely false: Almost a contradiction of the null hypothesis does not imply that the null hypothesis is almost false. This means that the NHST rests on a fundamentally flawed logical basis. The remaining issues in this section are merely common misinterpretations.

**The Inverse Probability Problem**

A common interpretive problem with null hypothesis significance testing is a misunderstanding of the order of the conditional probability. Many people have a belief, which stems directly from Fisher’s perspective, that the smaller the \( p \) value, the greater the probability that the null hypothesis is false. This incorrect interpretation is that the NHST produces \( P(H_0|D) \): the probability of \( H_0 \) being true given the observed data \( D \). But the NHST first posits \( H_0 \) as true and then asks what the probability of observing these or more extreme data is. This is clearly \( P(D|H_0) \). In fact, a more desirable test would be one that produces \( P(H_0|D) \), because then we could simply search for the hypothesis with the greatest probability of being true given some observed data. Bayes’s law clarifies the difference between these two unequal probabilities:

\[
P(H_0|D) = \frac{P(H_0)P(D|H_0)}{P(D)}.
\]

The two quantities, \( P(D|H_0) \) and \( P(H_0|D) \), are equal only if \( P(H_0) = P(D) \), and there is absolutely no theoretical justification supporting such an equality.

**Significance Driven by Sample Size**

There are two misinterpretations about the role of sample size in null hypothesis significance testing. First is the belief that statistical significance in a large sample study implies real-world importance. Many have observed that an NHST based on a large sample size almost always results in statistical significance (Macdonald, 1997). This is a concern in political science research since we do not want to infer that some subfields have greater legitimacy just because the corresponding data sets tend to produce smaller \( p \) values: “a prejudice against the null” (Greenwald, 1975, p. 1).

The second misinterpretation is that for a given \( p \) value in a study that rejects the null hypothesis, larger sample sizes imply more reliable results. This is false: Two studies that reject the null with the same \( p \) value are equally likely to make a Type I error even if they have dramatically different sample sizes. This mistake results from a poor understanding of Type II errors. Unlike the case above, two studies that fail to reject the null hypothesis are identical in every way except that the sample sizes are qualitatively different. The test with the larger sample size is less likely to make a Type II error since the sample size is always in the denominator of the equation for statistical significance. To show why this is true, Figure 4 displays two tests for \( H_0 \): \( \mu = 0 \) versus \( H_1 \): \( \mu > 0 \), with sample sizes of 9 and 12, respectively, and the true distribution normal (3, 3). The shaded region is the area under the true sampling distribution of \( X \) to the left of the area determined
by setting $\alpha = .05$ under the false assumption that $H_0$ is true.

Thus, the shaded region is the probability we would fail to reject the false $H_0$ (i.e., $\beta = P(\text{Type II error})$). It is clear from Figure 4 that the probability of a Type II error is much lower for the test with a larger sample size, even though the probability of a Type I error is identical. The area under the true sampling distribution of $X$ in either panel of Figure 4 not shaded is equal to $1 - \beta = 1 - P(\text{Type II error})$, which is the power of the test. It follows from above that the second test with a larger sample size has greater power.

**Replication Fallacy**

Another misinterpretation of null hypothesis significance testing is the belief that one minus the $p$ value is the probability of replication (producing significant results in repeated iterations of the same study). This is equivalent to the two misconceptions: $P(H_0) = \alpha$ and $P(H_1) = 1 - \alpha$. The term *replication fallacy* describes the wrong belief that a low $p$ value such as $p = .05$ implies that 95 out of 100 replications will be statistically significant. The error is obvious when one recalls that $p = P(D|H_0)$ and is thus a function of a single data set producing a single test statistic.

**Asymmetry and Accepting the Null Hypothesis**

Failing to reject the null hypothesis does not rule out an infinite number of other competing research hypotheses. Null hypothesis significance testing is asymmetric: If the test statistic is sufficiently atypical given the null hypothesis then the null hypothesis is rejected, but if the test statistic is insufficiently atypical given the null hypothesis then the null hypothesis is not accepted. This is a double standard: $H_1$ is held innocent until proven guilty, and $H_0$ is held guilty until proven innocent. Despite the fact that it is very risky to accept implicitly or
expressly the conclusion from a nonrejected null hypothesis, such instances are common.

There are two problems that develop as a result of asymmetry. The first is a misinterpretation of the asymmetry to assert that finding a nonstatistically significant difference or effect is evidence that it is equal to zero or nearly zero. This acceptance of the null hypothesis is damaging because it inhibits the exploration of competing research hypotheses. The second problem pertains to the correct interpretation of failing to reject the null hypotheses. Failing to reject the null hypothesis essentially provides almost no information about the state of the world. It simply means that given the evidence at hand one cannot make an assertion about a relationship: All you can conclude is that you can’t conclude that the null was false (Cohen, 1962).

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See also
Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Sampling, Random and Nonrandom; Statistical Significance; Statistics: Overview

Further Readings
As a category in metaphysics, “idealism” usually refers at the most general level to the proposition that “reality” is in some sense mental rather than material. In political philosophy/theory, idealism refers to theories that hold concepts and propositions to be the constitutive and determining factors in politics, a claim that includes the belief that “material” processes are actually mental at root. Normatively, idealists tend to hold that the values by which personal and political conduct should be judged are in some sense “spiritual,” usually founded on some notion of human nature that individuals are innately driven to realize in their daily lives. They also tend to reject utilitarianism, claiming that it celebrates man’s animality rather than his inchoate humanity or, in many cases, immanent “divinity.” That noted, idealists have tended to hold theological beliefs that were heterodox at best or even atheistic. Beyond these very general claims, little is shared by those political theories that are commonly labeled “idealist,” aside from certain common misinterpretations made by nonidealists. For example, there is no necessary requirement to understand the world “idealistically”—that is, as ultimately “good,” peaceful, or providentially ordered. Similarly, there is no common tendency to deny the existence of the external world outside of thought (the denial that is most associated with Berkeleyan solipsism). Instead, what is characteristically at issue is one’s understanding of the concept of “reality,” especially social reality. Idealists tend to hold that the closest one can get to any mind-independent world “out there” are the various (interpreted) sensations excited by (it seems) that world in our consciousnesses. Consequently, one can only analyze with even a modicum of precision those sensations and the ideas to which they give rise. Hence, the realms of human conduct such as social life, politics, aesthetics, and economics are constructs of the mind but are no less real for that (in fact, they are real because they are such constructions). Counterfactually, humans have no direct access to an underlying material world, meaning that the only “reality” that one can become aware of and can analyze and criticize rationally is the mental reality of interpreted thought.

Plato (ca. 428–348 BCE) was the first recorded idealist political philosopher. He claimed the world that we perceive is made up of imperfect ideas, which are themselves copies of a world of purely mental entities, each of which forms part of a single eternal coherent system of concepts, ordered with reference to the “Form of the Good.” Only that single system is real, and our actual, imperfect ideas at best imitate what is real, and do so only to the extent that they reproduce elements of that system. To the extent that our beliefs do not match the eternal system of concepts, they trap us in mere opinion and error. This claim has highly significant ethical and political implications. According to Plato, the good life is one lived in accordance with the virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice, with the last of these being achieved through the correct
ordering of the first three virtues within the individual's soul and within the life of the ancient Greek city-state or polis. Possibly on grounds of its impracticality rather than on philosophical grounds, Plato's later political works (The Laws and The Statesman) replaced the Republic's system of rule by "guardians" with systems relying on greater constitutional checks. Nevertheless, many scholars have seen even these later books as totalitarian models.

There were many philosophically significant idealists in the centuries after Plato, most notably Neo-Platonists such as Plotinus (ca. 205–270 CE) and Iamblichus (ca. 250–325 CE), Cambridge Platonists including Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688) and Richard Cumberland (1631–1718), and the solipsistic idealist Bishop George Berkeley (1685–1753). Nevertheless, after Plato, the next significant idealist political philosopher was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) sought to develop what he saw as the leading "spirit" of Kant's critical philosophy, placing particular stress on the significance of the self-expressing will as the basis of practical reason. His early individualism gave way to an increasingly collectivist political position, reinforcing Kant's earlier rejection of Fichte's self-proclaimed discipleship. Fichte's Closed Commercial State (1800) advocated an autarkic, corporatist, quasi-military state, while his Addresses to the German Nation (1808) stressed the need for state control of education as a precondition of the orderly development of the German people, the (allegedly predetermined) stages of which he set out in his Characteristics of the Present Age (1806). Idealism's next great philosopher was the much misunderstood Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831).

Idealism was imported into the United States via the writings of the St Louis Hegelians, whose most important political philosophers were William Torrey Harris (1835–1909), Denton J. Snider (1841–1925), and Thomas Davidson (1840–1900). Their greatly modified form of Hegelianism emphasized the role of education in creating the conditions for the individual to enjoy a stable and worthwhile social existence. Yet members disagreed over the relative weight to be given to individual will and conscience, on the one hand, and social conventions and norms, on the other, and the movement dissolved into its current obscurity.

A more lasting idealist heritage is found in Britain. Even though there were some idealist philosophers with an interest in politics in England in the 19th century—most notably, John Grote (1813–1866) and John Hutchison Stirling (1820–1909)—idealism first held sway in Anglo-American political philosophy for approximately 50 years from the 1870s to the 1920s) through the dominance of British idealism. The origins of this tradition as an identifiable intellectual movement can be traced to Oxford University, especially the writings of Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882). His Prolegomena to Ethics and "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation" were published posthumously (in 1883 and 1886, respectively). Green defended a perfectionist ethics developed along the lines of Fichte's early philosophy. This ethics was founded on the claim that individuals experienced an inherent if often imperfectly articulated need and drive to develop their higher capacities through social citizenship and an active commitment to the Aristotelian virtues of temperance, wisdom, courage, and justice, with the latter spelled out as the honoring of Kant's categorical imperative and the realization of a "kingdom of ends" in a society orientated around a determinate ethically and aesthetically enriching common good (what later idealists called a "concrete universal"). In this way, Green claimed that individuals would manifest the "eternal consciousness" (which he saw as an immanent God) within their individual minds. This ethical perfectionism did not issue in a political perfectionism, however, largely because Green held that no one can be forced to act ethically. The most the state or any other group or individual can do is help foster the conditions under which individuals can develop, primarily through educational opportunities for all, employment contracts, and temperance reform. He invoked the medieval notion of a legitimate (according to Green, enabling) political order as a "societies of societies," much in the way that John Rawls was to invoke it 100 years later.

Green's preference for local democratic politics and his endorsement of the "rights recognition thesis" were shared by followers such as Bernard Bosanquet (1848–1923) and David George Ritchie (1853–1903). Bosanquet was especially sensitive to the individual character's vulnerability to state interference, whereas Ritchie saw more danger
coming from socioeconomic factors and thereby saw more opportunities for beneficial state action. Ritchie sought to combine some form of utilitarianism with evolutionary theory, as a socialist alternative to the social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer, and in this sense his thought pointed toward the New Liberalism of Leonard Hobhouse and John Hobson. It is notable that Bosanquet’s analysis of the ideal type of the modern state anticipated much of the contemporary literature on the state versus failed or quasi states.

Outside its Oxford heartland, idealism was also influential through the Coleridgean idealism of Frederick Denison Maurice (1805–1872), the quasi Hegelianism of John McTaggart (1866–1925), and the personal idealism of Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (1856–1931), James Seth (1860–1924), and Hastings Rashdall (1858–1924), among others. Idealist philosophy was also influential in the subsequent decades in India (primarily through Sir Brajendra Nath Seal [1864–1938], whose humanism emphasized the parity of Eastern and Western cultures, and the philosopher and statesman Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan [1888–1975], who emphasized intuition over the rational consciousness of the earlier idealists), Canada (primarily through John Watson [1847–1939] and Leslie Armour [born 1931]), Australia (primarily through Francis Anderson [1858–1941], Mungo MacCallum [1854–1942], Ernest Burgmann [1885–1965], and Garnet Portus [1883–1954]), and South Africa (primarily through Arthur Ritchie Lord [1880–1941]). The leading Italian idealists differed significantly in their political persuasions: Benedetto Croce (1866–1952) was an outspoken liberal who was persecuted by Mussolini; Giovanni Gentile (1875–1944) was explicitly the philosopher of fascism, with his Theory of Mind as Pure Act (1916) being an attempted philosophical justification of the authoritarian nation-state as the protector of the people and the developer of their being as a corporate person.

Even though John Dewey defended Greenian ethics when young, at this time America’s most significant defender of idealist political philosophy was Josiah Royce (1855–1916). While Royce denied any significant debts to either Hegel or Green, he acknowledged similarities between his own position and those of Green and Kant. Royce held conflict and struggle to be preconditions not merely of an ethical life for the individual but of a meaningful life. Only by orientating one’s life around some worthwhile end could life be given purpose and value and even then only if that orientation is made freely by the individuals themselves. The end, however, must be one valued within one’s community, for in that way one’s orientation toward it represents an act of loyalty, which Royce argued was a necessary feature of a worthwhile life. Ultimately, Royce held that every valuable human society developed through the action of a spirit within it that transcended the minds of individual citizens.

Several subsequent political philosophers have exhibited idealist tendencies, most notably Robin George Collingwood (1889–1943) and Michael Oakeshott (1901–1990) in Britain, both of whom, along with the other British idealists, attract significant scholarly attention today. The main themes defended by these idealist philosophers form the heart of much contemporary political philosophy and social theory, including the social construction of reality; the interrelationship of personal self-realization and cultural forms; the politics of recognition and identity politics; the state as an ideal type (in opposition to what is now called the “quasi state” or “failed state”); the defense of the participatory enabling, welfare state against attacks from advocates of the competition state; and the critique of utilitarianism as a dehumanizing theory of public policy. What is most remarkable is the extent to which many of the idealists discussed above provide more extensive and deeper insights into these very live political issues than one finds in most mainstream contemporary political philosophy.

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See also Citizenship; Common Goods; Communitarianism; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Hermeneutics; Individualism; Kant, Immanuel; Liberalism; Normative Political Theory; Patriotism; Rights; State

Further Readings
Idealism in International Relations

Idealism in the field of international relations has usually been identified with the perspectives, theories, and methods derived from the Wilsonian tradition. Referring to the ideals espoused by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, idealist perspectives such as liberalism and neo-conservatism assume that there are universal political and economic ideals that humans should aspire for. In international politics, these ideals are said to be liberty, freedom, democratic systems of representation, free markets, and capitalist trading systems. Certain forms of idealism also see international institutions (economic and political) as ensuring transparency and reinforcing the incentives for states to cooperate. Post–World War II idealism also incorporated some of the tenets of scientific positivism in the hope of first studying and then isolating variables that contaminated the ability of nation-states to cooperate so that such variables could be eliminated over time. For much of idealism’s history, it has been contrasted with realist international relations theory, which sees national ideals as relative and pluralist, derived from an anarchical order of international politics founded on power and an order that cannot be transcended. There are two forms of idealist approaches usually considered in international relations—liberalism and neo-conservatism. This entry discusses these two approaches as well as the relationship between idealism and realism and the political nature of the term idealism.

Idealist Approaches

Liberalism

Liberalism assumes that while states operate within anarchy, and that states are indeed primarily self-interested, this self-interest lends itself to cooperation rather than conflict. Since the end of World War II, liberal idealism has had three branches. Institutional liberalism posits that international organizations and regimes facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty among states and increasing transparency. Some institutional idealists, sometimes termed neoliberal institutionalists or even institutionalists, may not even consider themselves “liberal” in the sense that they would argue that international institutions can facilitate cooperation regardless of the type of domestic political system of a nation-state. Economic or commercial liberalism asserts that open trading systems make cooperation more likely because the benefits of trade outweigh the costs of going to war. Political liberalism assesses the likelihood of cooperation or conflict as based on the nature of a country’s political system. Political liberalism has developed into a separate research program of democratic peace theory—which posits that democratic countries are less likely to go to war with one another because of the structural and cultural nature of democratic decision making. While many liberals would disagree with the “idealist” moniker, they still see certain ideals as universally valid and posit that an international community where those ideals were allowed to flourish would be a much more peaceful and stable one than the unstable one we currently have.

Neo-Conservatism

Neo-conservatism began as a domestic political movement in U.S. politics, but toward the conclusion of the Vietnam War and thereafter it became an approach to U.S. foreign policy and has now emerged as an approach to international politics. Neo-conservative argues that the United States bears a “special burden” because of its unique status as a nation-state and eventual great power. What has made the United States unique is the moral vision on which it was founded—liberty, human rights, democracy. These are universal principles, unlike those constituting past great power enterprises. Furthermore, these principles
have made the United States powerful by—as the neo-conservative sees it—“right making might.”

Neo-conservative idealism differs, however, in two major respects from liberal idealism. First, the neo-conservative emphasizes action—in U.S. politics it is sometimes termed movement conservatism. The United States’ imperative to act may sometimes outweigh its imperative to cooperate with multilateral organizations, which constrain nation-states in their abilities to act. Against threats not only to U.S. national security but also to the ideals of Western civilization, neo-conservatives argue that certain liberal institutional restraints can be dangerous in that they get in the way of an effective, expedient, and forceful American action. Second, neo-conservatism maintains a skeptical stance toward the scientific positivism of liberals. Neo-conservatives argue that while scientific studies can provide us with generalizations, and even statistical evaluations, they do not give meaning to these evaluations, nor could such studies serve as a guide toward moral action. In using “value-free” lenses in these scientific studies, such studies missed certain qualitative features of emerging threats, such as ideological and cultural attributes that made certain regimes or groups more of a challenge to the West than others. Furthermore, such scientific evaluation, and judicious reflection in general, could get in the way of action. Nevertheless, some of the most prominent neo-conservatives in both policy circles (such as Paul Wolfowitz) and intellectual circles (such as Joshua Muravchik) readily admit the connections between neo-conservatism and liberalism.

Idealism and Realism

The term idealism in international relations is an old one. Idealism emerged as a dominant force in thinking about the world largely as a reaction to the World War I. In that conflict’s wake, it was assumed that war was senseless and hardly effective at obtaining national objectives. This thinking became a centerpiece during the so-called First Debate among international relations theorists between realists and idealists during the interwar period of 1919 to 1939. Idealism permeated many of the peace movements, the push and eventual construction of the League of Nations, as well as some of the political initiatives (such as the Kellogg-Briand pact) to use legal means to outlaw war. This First Debate has been depicted as one in which idealists, putting their faith in Enlightenment principles such as reason, naively assumed that war could be legislated or collectively securitized away through international organizations such as the League of Nations. Ultimately, the depiction goes, interwar realists such as Edward Carr and Reinhold Niebuhr, and post–World War II ones such as Hans Morgenthau, John Herz, Arnold Wolfers, and Kenneth Osgood, “won” this debate when World War II disconfirmed much of the basis of interwar idealism.

Morgenthau, in Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, positioned scientific approaches to international relations as a form of idealist theory. Morgenthau asserted that such approaches approximated particularist bourgeois ideals (liberty, property, wealth, etc.) as universals, using those as a barometer to measure the “progress” of nations in global politics. According to Morgenthau, because these were abstract ideals, the study of these by the social scientist ignored the realities of power politics. Nevertheless, these scientific approaches toward the study of international relations became dominant during the 1950s and 1960s behavioral revolution of American social science, and thus, positivist frameworks because of their “problem-solving” approach to social action are considered by many classical realists to be another form of idealism.

Neo-conservative Joshua Muravchik has justified calling both liberalism and neo-conservatism forms of Wilsonianism with the helpful binary of possession versus milieu goals. Realists argue that the ordering principle of international politics—anarchy—by definition implies that there is no overarching or policing supranational authority. Thus, nation-states have possession goals—they seek to acquire as much power as possible to ensure their own survival. Both neo-conservatives and liberals, on the contrary, argue that the environment of international politics is subject to change if the political and economic institutions of members change; therefore, democratic states, such as the United States, can and should have milieu goals that seek change in the international environment. That is, a world constituted by economically and politically liberal democracies is much more stable and inclined to cooperation than a world constituted by totalitarian or authoritarian
regimes. Or, in another realm, a world where international trade can occur openly without tariffs or other forms of national economic protectionism is one where cooperation is more likely than in a world where trade occurs in isolated pockets, if at all.

As such, both liberalism and neo-conservatism have at their core a faith in the idealist “democratic peace” account, which posits that democratic countries are less likely to go to war with one another because of the structural and cultural nature of democratic decision making. They have also spawned a number of evaluative institutions, such as Freedom House and Transparency International, which assess nation-states’ economic and political development trajectories using operationalized liberal ideals as a metric.

Realist scholars and analysts have issued vibrant criticisms of both liberal and neo-conservative assumptions and policies. In addition to the realist–idealist debate in the interwar period, debates between realists and liberals in the 1980s and 1990s centered on the primary motives of nation-states and the implications such motives had for cooperation. Liberals posited that nation-states sought absolute gains and thus would cooperate with other states in certain interactions (such as trade) so long as both would gain, even if certain states gained more than others. Realists argued that nation-states sought gains relative to other states, and thus nation-states were more cooperation-averse because power was more important to nation-states in relative terms rather than absolute terms.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, realists and neo-conservatives have disagreed about the conception of U.S. foreign policy interests and acutely quarreled over the strategy of U.S.-led democratization of nondemocratic areas. Realists have argued that democratization is a fool’s errand, one that wastes U.S. resources for little, if any, strategic gains. Ideals such as freedom, liberty, and capitalism are complex, arising in the West from a particular constellation of factors, and thus, such ideals are hardly transferable to every global region. Neo-conservatives posit that fostering democratic regimes, which sometimes necessitates U.S. assistance through force, not only promotes universal ideals but also serves as a demonstration to the international community that these ideals are worth fighting for. This realist/neo-conservative debate over democratization as a U.S. foreign policy strategy can be considered part of the larger debate realists have had with all forms of idealism over the past century.

**Political Nature of the Term**

It should be noted that many liberals and neo-conservatives would eschew the label “idealist.” Often, idealism has been equated to a naive form of belief that peace is just around the corner if certain principles were implemented to amend the anarchical state of international politics. Both liberals and neo-conservatives have argued against their realist critics that their views, far from being naive, are derived from pragmatic social and historical patterns of human existence. For example, liberal democratic peace proponents would point to the many statistical studies proving that no two fully formed democracies have ever gone to war with one another. Neo-conservatives have also suggested that there is very little about realism that is “realistic,” since it fails to recognize the inherent threats to U.S. interests that pure power calculations cannot predict—for instance, the hostility that originates within and from volatile rogue regimes.

As evidence for the political purpose behind the label *idealism*, one can consider that the term was deployed in the 1990s by realist scholars, such as John Mearsheimer, against the then emerging perspective of constructivism in international relations. Other scholars have argued that constructivism, which sees intersubjective understandings, identities, perceptions, discourse, and social structures as central to international relations, reflects a liberal bias. While it is highly debatable that constructivism is a form of idealism, this attempt by realists and other scholars to label it as such is reflective of the more generally pejorative aura the term *idealism* still conjures in some circles of international relations. This is problematic, simply because all international relations perspectives, even realism, can be considered idealist in the sense that they approximate a world of particular ideals and seek mechanisms through which humans can realize those ideals for a more stable existence.

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See also Conservatism; Constructivism; Democratic Peace; Democratization; Realism in International Relations

Further Readings

IDENTITY, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL

*Identity* is a somewhat ambiguous term and a contentious concept. With regard to individuals, groups, and societies, a differentiation between personal, social, and collective identity is common. In popular language and essentialist concepts, *personal identity* is used to denote an individual’s self-concept: certain typical traits and meanings that are perceived as relatively stable over different situations and over time and that distinguish the self from other persons. Although some have questioned the universality of this concept, the idea of an essential inner self of the individual dominates at least contemporary Western concepts of the person. *Social identity* refers to societal or cultural influences on the development of the self, to memberships of individuals along a continuum of interaction groups (e.g., families, sports teams, political parties, and other networks), and to social categories (e.g., according to social roles such as mothers, teachers, sports fans). As such, social identity is also part of the personal identity. The terms *cultural identity* and *collective identity* mostly denote social identities of a large scale (e.g., gender, age, ethnicity, class) and sometimes are also used to describe a relatively long enduring stability of values, institutions, symbols, and aims of a group, a society, or a nation-state (e.g., represented in national consciousness).

*National identity* is a special form of a collective, political identity, which consists mostly of a self-image based on certain assumptions about common features as descent, history, language, culture, subjective feelings of belonging, and/or citizenship. Furthermore, the term *identity* is used not only with regard to the microlevel and its aggregates but also to describe certain traits at the meso- or macrolevel (e.g., the identity of the Americans, the British Empire, or the Eastern world).

For some, *identity* means absolute sameness of human beings; thus, if used in a social or political context, it carries connotations of strong homogeneity between persons and a collective. From a normative democratic perspective, this meaning is rejected because it is linked to ideas of a homogeneous people, authoritative leadership, and dictatorship as well as a sharp definition of insiders and outsiders and a demarcation of friend and foe.

Others use *identity* to depict scientific concepts that play a certain role in the humanities and social sciences. Most of them point to the fact that identity usually has multiple facets, which can gain different salience in different situations and thus may also change over time in intensity and meaning. In addition, the term *identification* is used to denote a feeling of sameness with another person or group and loyalty toward its motives, ideals, aims, leaders, and so on.

Since, in the human sciences, there are many differing concepts of social and political identity, this entry concentrates on concepts referring to the levels of individuals and groups as holders of identity. After a few remarks concerning the historical roots of the concept of identity and a brief mention of some concepts referring to personal identity, the entry discusses selected major approaches to social identity. The final section deals with questions of political identity with respect to societies, especially at the level of national identity, and considers its relationship to subnational and supranational units of identification. Other aspects of political identity such as party identification or identity of social and political movements are not dealt with here. Similarly, this entry also does not deal with identity politics at the macrolevel (e.g., affirmative action in multicultural societies).
Historical Roots of Identity Research

Early concepts of identity primarily dealt with the self as personal identity from a psychological perspective and concentrated on the development and consistency of the psyche. By contrast, sociology is concerned with social identity and its structural determinants, and social-psychological research focuses on human fundamentals in differing social contexts and thus on the interplay between cognitive, affective, and evaluative processes and social, cultural, and political influences and on their respective consequences for subsequent behavior.

The history of concepts of social identity in modern social sciences begins toward the first third of the 20th century. Early protagonists such as William James, Charles Horton Cooley, and George Herbert Mead had in common the view of identity as a product of constructions and perceptions of reality in social interactions. This was a main basis for the theoretical link between the individual and society. They argued that consciousness and self-knowledge are not natural, a priori characteristics of human behavior but features that both originate from and influence the processes of social interaction. Cooley’s metaphor of a “looking glass self” describes how persons take their ideas about themselves from their perceptions of other persons’ opinions about them. Somewhat later, James and Mead differentiated the self into the components “I” (internal perspective) and “Me” (external perspective). The component “Me” is determined by culture and society; it reflects social roles and expectations from others toward the person. These are learned and internalized in processes of socialization and identification with other persons or collectives. The component “I” means the spontaneous, active, more autonomous part of the self, which is not only a presupposition for the ability to identify with others and to learn social roles but also a necessary condition for the ability to keep a critical distance to the social self. This approach was further developed in theories of symbolic interactionism and phenomenology. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann conceptualized the socialization process as a dialectical one between identification by others (objective) and by self (subjective); they see this process as a mirror of a broader societal dialectic between subjective and objective reality.

In subsequent research, some authors concentrated on the “I” (personal identity) and linked this to ethno-methodological concepts, such as that of Alfred Schütz, or to the cognitive-structural approach of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. These approaches also distinguish an “ideal self,” which means culturally framed ideas of how the self ought to be. The fit between these normative ideas and the perception of how the self actually is strongly affects a person’s self-esteem.

Another approach, schema theory (e.g., Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor), in part also deals with personal identity and its cognitive components. Schemata are highly generalized and organized cognitive structures in memory that guide perceptions and interpretations of new information and memory recall and thus help reduce the amount of necessary cognitive processes of orientation. Identity is defined as a system of possibly hierarchically and context specifically ordered self-concepts. Situations that fit an individual’s self-schemata are more likely than contrary information to be processed and stored in memory and thus form a consistent and relatively stable self-schema. Research shows that individuals’ schematic identities are different in intensity and amount. Highly complex, multifaceted self-schemata may contribute to psychological health in situations that threaten part of the identity (e.g., if a person’s identity as a worker is threatened because of unemployment, the psychological activation of other identities such as being a good father and a gifted singer in church might help uphold his self-esteem). Critics of schema theory argue that—because of its emphasis on learning effects and automatic cognitive processes—it leads to a too passive and static perspective of identity.

Cognitive dissonance theory (Leon Festinger) and social attribution theory (Philip E. Tetlock) additionally integrate the affective motivational basis of identity, namely, the desire for a positive self-esteem, in their models of information processing. Thus, if cognitions or attitudes become dissonant with each other or with behavior because of new information, individuals try to reach consonance by cognitive strategies such as downplaying the inconsistent new information or changing its meaning. In this way, an individual’s self-serving bias is activated when positive events or outcomes of actions are attributed to the self, whereas for negative ones the situation or others are blamed.
Social Identity

Approaches of Role Identity

Other authors concentrated on the “Me” component of the self. In this context, Ervin Goffman laid the foundations of role theory. He distinguished between a personal identity (individual uniqueness of life experiences) and a social identity (role expectations and roles) of the individual. Both confront the individual with demands in daily interaction, which he conceptualized as a kind of role play on stage. It is assumed that persons do not identify totally with their different roles, because of ever-changing social interactions. A reflexive and somewhat distant relationship toward one’s own role identities is seen as especially characteristic for modernity. Thus, in traditional, relatively static societies, the “I” is strongly determined by the identification with (often primordial) social collectives (e.g., family, tribe, and guild) and, therefore, keeps close to the “Me,” possibly throughout one’s entire life. In modern societies, as Norbert Elias has argued, processes of social change, societal differentiation, and mobilization as well as globalization lead to an ongoing individualization. On the one hand, this is linked to rising freedom for the “I.” There are more role models to choose from, identity facets can change often from situation to situation, and multiple aspects of identity can coexist. On the other hand, they can also compete or even come into conflict with each other and thus result in identity crises. Erik Erikson defines a (healthy) identity as one that guarantees sameness and continuity of the self throughout life in one’s own perception and that includes the expectation that others will recognize this self. But modern societies can also produce problems such as a negative identity (e.g., identification with roles that are evaluated negatively by society and the individual him- or herself, because a positively evaluated role takeover was too difficult and failed) or competing identities (diverging structures of personality because of status inconsistencies in complex societies). Thus, modern societies produce more dangers and uncertainties concerning an individual’s identity and thus create the need for life-long reflection about the relationship between the “Me” and the “I.”

Some criticisms of this approach were directed toward the differentiation between personal identity as an ostensibly “true” one and role/social identity as a “false” one or as a “calculating” perspective on the self.

Whereas in earlier concepts the self was related to interactions with other persons, in role theory the self is related to features of the social structure. Role identity depicts a certain position or status within a social system. All role theories share the assumption that society is differentiated into social roles, which carry behavioral norms, and that identity entails the internalization of these roles by individuals laying the ground for patterned, structured, and routinized action. In their concepts of identity, some theorists combine the symbolic interactionism approach with role theory. In this kind of theory, society is seen as a rather stable structure that results from repeated patterns of behavior of individuals and groups. Macrolevel structures are seen as the product of the multiple roles that individuals perform in day-to-day interactions. The self and its identity are created by these interactions and by the meanings that the multiple roles have for the actors, and—in a reflexive process—identities provide the meanings of the roles.

There are various approaches for a systematization of multiple roles and identities. For instance, Peter Burke’s taxonomy is oriented along different social situations: Person identities denote self-meanings, the meanings that characterize the individuality (as being active or passive, ambitioned or unpretentious). Individuals carry around these identities across different situations and they are activated frequently. Role identities are activated in specific situations where individuals perform in certain functions (e.g., being a daughter, a mother, a wife, an artist, or a sports fan). The meanings linked to such roles or functions are determined by culture and socialization as well as the individual perceptions and assessments of these roles. Social identities emerge from the identification of individuals with social groups or categories. They define the belonging of insiders as well as of the outsiders on the basis of similarity/difference and they may lead to common bonds and actions. Individuals have identities of all three types and usually more than one of these types is invoked in social interactions.

Peter J. Burke and others also examine internal processes of an individual concerning his or her identity and its influence on behavior. Identities
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here are seen as meanings attached to the self. The process of identity invoking is conceptualized as a perpetual control system, a circular process of self-definitions of identity meanings and their attachment to experiences in a feedback loop. This is assumed to lead to a permanent verification of the meanings of one’s identity. Behavior is thought of as a function of the relationship between situations and identities.

Sheldon Stryker’s analyses of the psychological organization of identities led him to a hierarchical concept of saliency and commitment. The main idea is that an individual’s behavior is shaped by how often and how intensively his or her identities are activated. Identity salience refers to the probability that a specific identity is activated by others or by oneself. A salient identity is one that is invoked frequently and across different situations and contexts. The saliency of an identity determines the probability that the individual will enact roles that are consistent with this identity, that he or she will interpret situations as suitable to perform such roles, and even that an individual will seek opportunities to perform these roles. Identity commitment refers to the dependency of an individual’s relationships to others on certain roles. The strength of the commitment defines the extent and intensity of an individual’s attachment to other persons to whom he or she is linked by an identity. Strength of commitment and saliency usually go hand in hand, and the higher the position of an identity in the hierarchy, the greater is the probability the identity will be activated and thus shape behavior, which in turn reinforces its salience.

Others concentrate more on social positions as basis of roles and identity. George McCall and Jerry Laird Simmons distinguish between a conventional and an idiosyncratic component of role identity (similar to Erving Goffmann’s distinction between social and personal aspects). The conventional component refers to expectations and internalized meanings linked to social positions; the idiosyncratic component refers to the individual meanings the respective roles have for the person. In this approach, a prominence hierarchy orders the identities according to their importance for an ideal self, which is seen as a result of the support an individual gains from others for a certain identity, an individual’s commitment to an identity and reward for activating an identity. A salience hierarchy is seen as a function of the identity prominence, a psychological need for support and rewards, and the perceived opportunities for the activation of identities in specific situations and thus is important for concrete behavior.

Social Identity Theory and Social Categorization Theory

Two other closely related theories in social psychology have gained much importance in identity research, namely, the so-called social identity theory by Henry Tajfel and the social categorization theory by John Turner and colleagues, both together often denoted as the social identity approach. This approach was developed in the 1960s as a cognitive theory of group identity to explain prejudice, discrimination, and conflicts between members of social categories or groups and has since generated a huge body of research to test its basic assumptions and to generate new hypotheses. In part, it rests on earlier research and also shares some assumptions with other approaches to explain prejudice and conflict, but in other aspects it clearly departs from them.

Earlier research to explain prejudice focused on psychological traits and defects of the unconscious of individuals (e.g., the concept of the authoritarian personality in the work by Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt Sandford) or on attitudinal predispositions learned in early childhood (as in the concept of symbolic racism of Donald Kinder and David Sears). But both approaches are limited with respect to identity insofar as they remain restricted to the personal level and cannot explain changes in discrimination and conflict. Another concept, the theory of social dominance (e.g., James Sidanius), not only goes beyond personal identity but also has difficulties in explaining why and under what conditions discrimination and conflicts arise in certain situations. It claims that all societies are hierarchical and have at least one hegemonic and one subordinate group that usually hold prejudices against each other. This social dominance orientation reflects a normal psychological desire to belong to a high-status group. Thus, individual and institutionalized discrimination is seen as a normal feature of societies, which are perpetuated by processes of social identification, self-esteem
maintenance, and social comparison. Realistic group conflict theory (e.g., Muzafer Sherif) assumes that conflicts between groups are based on competition for scarce resources and thus follow the principle of individual rationality. The conflicts are seen as the basis for ingroup identification and for ongoing psychological processes of stereotyping and discrimination of the outgroup. A recommended solution for such conflicts is to alter the group identification by imposing superordinate common goals. Critiques of this approach emphasize that the framing of the group conflict and the proposed solution undermine its rational choice basis. Furthermore, a change of identity by imposing superordinate goals may be possible only in very restricted situations, not in real-life conflicts of a broad range such as conflicts between ethnic groups or even nation-states, which may lead to war.

The social identity approach suggests that identification with an ingroup and distinction from/discrimination against outgroups are two sides of one coin and that competition for scarce resources is not a necessary condition for these processes. The empirical roots of this research are based on the minimal group paradigm. Here, in laboratory experiments, artificial groups were formed on the basis of overtly senseless tests (e.g., whether somebody preferred Paul Klee or Wassily Kandinsky as a painter) or even by lot, which was known by the participants. The participants had no interaction, there was no competition, and they did not know anything about each other. When asked to reward members of their own and of the other group, they consistently favored their own group and thus showed bias against the other group. Moreover, this ingroup favoritism did not occur in a way that maximized the benefit for one’s own group (which would have supported the realistic group conflict model), but led to a maximum difference between both groups. Thus, a distinction of groups based on purely cognitive belonging produced ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination.

Social identity theory also rests on claims about psychological needs: Individuals strive for positive self-esteem, which leads them to identify with groups that will enhance their self-image. This is only possible if the ingroup is distinct from other relevant groups in a positive way. Moreover, a need to reduce uncertainty compels persons to compare and categorize groups as well as the self in relation to such groups. This social-psychological approach also takes a perspective on identity that differs from the sociological symbolic interactionist concept, because it does not conceptualize all identities as inherently social. Rather, it argues that group identity is formed in contrast to personal identity, claiming a continuum between both, along which behavior can move. Thus it assumes that group psychology and behavior are qualitatively distinct from the intra-individual and individual ones. The central aim is to explain under what conditions and how group bias occurs. For this process, three main tenets have been defined—namely, the salience of group membership, the situational context, and the individual’s beliefs. Thus, for a social identity to affect perceptions, cognitions, attitudes, and behavior, the mere awareness of group membership is not enough. As long as the personal identity is more salient than social identity, the individual will behave in an interpersonal manner that takes account of personal traits and relationships between the actors. But if social identity becomes psychologically more salient, group behavior will occur. Since everybody develops multiple group memberships and corresponding social identities, the objective context is also relevant for defining which special social identity fits the situation best. Subjective interpretations of the situation as well as beliefs about the group memberships intervene in this process. The most important beliefs refer to chances for individual mobility or chances for social change, both of which represent the poles of a continuum. These imply corresponding strategies, if the outcome of a comparison between one’s own membership group and another one is negative. For example, if a person thinks that it is possible to leave the ingroup and become a member of a comparable group with a higher status, he or she will act in this direction. This presupposes a belief in an open social structure or society. By contrast, if the personal strategy does not promise an enhancement of self-esteem, an action as a group member will be undertaken to change collectively the status of the ingroup, which includes a high saliency of social identity. Such actions can include social creativity (e.g., a change of the dimension of comparison, a change of the evaluation of the compared attributes, or a change of the group of comparison) or social competition/confrontation.
Whereas the ingroup favoritism/outgroup bias has been demonstrated consistently, empirical support for the self-esteem motive has been less strong. This may have contributed to a rise in interest in the cognitive dimension of the theory during the 1980s in the work of John Turner et al. They understand their self-categorization theory as an extension and elaboration of the social identity theory. Here, social identity is defined as a set of cognitive representations of the self. Two contributions are mentioned here, namely, the concept of multiple levels of inclusiveness and that of prototypicality. The idea is that self representations are organized along a hierarchy of categories, which are defined by similarity within classes and dissimilarity between classes, based on the metacontrast principle (this means, the interesting dimensions of categorization are classified in a way that minimizes the differences within a category and maximizes them with regard to other categories). Meaningful comparisons and classifications presuppose a similarity of the interesting traits and respective categories at a higher level. Thus—instead of a continuum between the personal and the social self—they suggest at least three main levels of identity. The most inclusive and therefore superordinate level is that of human beings against other forms of life (animals, plants); the intermediate level comprises membership in social groups as against other comparison groups (e.g., men and women, Europeans and Americans, the political Left and Right); and the subordinate level focuses on the individual and the differences from other ingroup members. Obviously, on the level of social groups, these again can show different patterns of inclusiveness, which can be seen as hierarchical or nested patterns (e.g., women, European women, left-oriented European women as against their respective counterparts). A group prototype is someone who shows the highest value of metacontrast on a certain dimension of comparison. Thus, prototypicality can change depending on the situation. Prototypes can serve as a model for other group members and thus can foster self-stereotyping of ingroup members and stereotyping outgroups. This depersonalization contributes to ingroup homogeneity and distinctiveness as well as to outgroup bias and is seen as central to all group processes.

From a sociological point of view, a general critique is that the ontological assumption of an independent person fluctuating between personal and social identities restricts the possibilities to account for social processes, especially with respect to the influences of political and economic macrofactors, because these can only be taken into account as specific traits of the situation. Another problem is that most research in this field relies on laboratory experiments and thus cannot simulate the complexity of the real-life world, which questions the external validity of such findings. From the perspective of political science, another deficit is the relative neglect of motivational factors and emotions linked to identities and their consequences.

Narrativity of Social Identity

Recent research in understanding social identity is also linked to social constructivism and the discursive approach, resting on poststructuralist perspectives and the interpretive paradigm. It is not concerned with individual or social-psychological processes of identity but concentrates on narrative, linguistic constructions of identity. A central assumption is that a person’s identity is not a stable outcome and entity but has to be conceptualized as a permanent process of construction in language and talk in changing situations. Within this process, prevailing ideologies are said to be powerful mechanisms to determine identity so that an individual only has the illusion of an actively and freely chosen concept of the self. An example is Michael Billig’s work on the link between thinking and arguing. Narratives are also seen as a person’s self-representation toward others, which may appear stable and continuous but in fact can change (e.g., Kenneth Gergen and Mary Gergen). On the whole, these different approaches toward social identity have laid the ground for and can contribute ever more to the understanding of political identity as well.

Political Identity

National identity is one among other collective identities, and—in contrast to many other political identities—it is linked to a political as well as a territorial point of reference, a political community at the level of the nation-state. This community usually is thought of as one that encompasses people of both sexes, from all age-groups, and from all
social strata. Typically, national identity also rests on beliefs about certain commonalities among the members of the group, such as a common ancestry, ethnicity, language, religion, culture, and values; a sense of belonging; political rights; participation, and so on. These are often thought to overcome contrasting and competing utilitarian interests of the members (e.g., those between different classes) and thus are crucial for the integration of society. Some of these characteristics also apply to sub- (local, smaller regional) and supranational identities (encompassing more than one nation in bigger regions ranging from border areas over continents to the whole human race or referring to supranational political units such as the European Union [EU]). Problems of national identity are most prominent in research, whereas sub- and supranational identities are often discussed only in their relation to national identities.

In political science, diverse subdisciplines deal with national identity, national movements, nationalism, and nation-building processes. With respect to national identity in the more restricted sense of the topic, research is based mainly on political sociological and political cultural approaches resting on behaviorism and working with surveys, although it is less linked than the topic of social identity to certain authors or research schools. In contrast to sociology and social psychology, political science is also less concerned with the cognitive basis of identity and more with affective components and its determinants and consequences. Moreover, identity is rarely treated as a cognitive categorization but rather as an attitude, as identification. Especially when dealing with national identity on a microlevel, the purely cognitive categorization seems self-evident, because there is almost no one who does not know to which nation he or she belongs. But categorization processes become a topic when dealing with stereotyping between different nationalities within a country or between countries. Here, questions concern the intensity of collective identification, the relationships between identifications with different collectives, and reference objects as the content and meaning of identity.

**Intensity of Political Identification**

People have been and still are ready to fight for their country. Wars in the name of country and nation again and again have shown unbelievable cruelties and destruction. Usually the losses and pains are not only on the side of the losers but also on the side of the winners. So the question is why people fight voluntarily and willingly in wars. Yet all nations and societies can function only for a time on the basis of common instrumental aims and interests; in the long run, they probably need a basis of common values and norms, which underlie a common identity. Moreover, most interests and identities are not mutually exclusive but work as reinforcing foundations of integration. Without these forces of integration any nation will fall apart, inner conflicts may arise, and civil war can be a consequence.

The different scenarios of war between nations or civil war within a nation may depict the poles of a spectrum from extreme national identification (highly salient cognitive national identity and strong affective identification) to a total loss of a common national identification (be it against a background of other interests or identities, such as in class struggles, race riots, or religious confrontations, or against a background of other national identities, such as in secessionism and separatist movements). Diverse national as well as cross-national survey research findings show that a purely cognitive identification with a nation (knowledge about one’s national belonging, also called national consciousness) usually does not go along with a bias for one’s own nation and aggressiveness toward others. Yet a purely cognitive identification is seldom seen. More often national consciousness is accompanied by positive feelings toward one’s nation—for example, those expressed in national pride. In most, but not all countries and periods of research (also depending on the kind of measurement and the indicators used), the strength of positive feelings toward one’s own nation shows links to ingroup bias and outgroup discrimination. Thus, for example, with the increasing intensity of national identification, it is not only the probability of constructive patriotism (seen as critical loyalty to one’s own nation) that increases but also the probability of blind nationalism (designating an attitude that puts one’s own nation on top of everything, regardless of its state of affairs: “Right or wrong, my country”). Moreover, this often coincides with skeptical or hostile attitudes toward immigrants and immigration per se and mistrust of
other countries and peoples. Research has also shown that an extremely strong national identification often is accompanied by low identification with other political collectives and social groups and even more private roles—a loss of other identities giving place to the national one or the national one replacing the others. With regard to determining factors, within Western democracies a high level of education and a favorable socioeconomic position often lead to only moderate levels of national identification, at least in times of peace. By contrast, fast social change, feelings of anomie, and sometimes feelings of relative deprivation foster national and nationalistic attitudes. A perceived threat from immigrants and from other nations often contribute to a rise in national identification. This also points to the fact that national identification is also dependent on the political context. Thus, for instance, in Eastern European countries, national identification today is much stronger than in most Western countries as a consequence of their newly won freedom from the former Soviet empire. Similarly, intellectuals and higher status groups in non-Western societies, as in the Middle East, often exhibit a higher level of nationalism (or religious fundamentalism) because of feelings of relative deprivation and of being dominated by the West, as noted by Bettina Westle and Paolo Segatti (2011). Historical facts and contextual events may also lead to periods where great parts of the population show only low levels of national identification or even negative feelings toward their own nation. This has been observed in countries that have been occupied or were defeated in war (e.g., Belgium) and in countries where many in the population felt guilty or ashamed about former wars and war crimes (e.g., West Germany).

Thus, all in all, it is known that some collective national identification is necessary for the inner cohesion of nation-states, but there is no straightforward answer to the question of how much intensity of national identification is needed and at which point it might become harmful. It can be said that the possible effect of national identification not only depends on the intensity of these feelings but also on the question of how far the national identity is accompanied by other identities or is exclusive. Moreover, it varies with the self-image of the nation, the content, meaning, or objects of national pride (which reflect the dimensions of the ingroup definition). Finally, strong positive feelings toward one’s own nation are a precondition for nationalistic attitudes, but such feelings do not automatically result in nationalistic attitudes. And those feelings are per se neither helpful nor harmful, unless they become politically mobilized and lead to action. In Western democracies, mostly populist and right-wing parties mobilize traditional nationalistic attitudes on the basis of economic problems, which then typically are not directed against other countries but against the perceived cause of the economic problems—for example, immigrants or, in Europe, the European Union.

**Relationships Between Nonpolitical and Political/National Identifications**

National identity usually coexists with other diverse social and political identities. As political psychology shows, one can feel, for example, as a woman, a mother, a scientist, a dancer, and a member of a nation. Such identities belong to different domains of life and therefore usually do not compete or conflict with each other. Rather, they can be activated differently in diverse situations; for example, talking with children will activate one’s identity as a mother, going to a party will highlight the salience of one’s identification as a dancer and probably as a woman, teaching students a lesson will activate one’s identity as a scientist, and getting confronted with the problems of foreign students or going to an international meeting may activate not only one’s identity as a scientist but also one’s own national identity. In the same way, national identity is compatible with various other political identities within a country, such as party identification or being a trade unionist, and even with identities that go beyond the nation-state, such as being a member of Amnesty International or identifying with Greenpeace. In the latter cases, the activation of the international identity may compete with the national identity, but it also can strengthen it, depending on the concrete conditions of the situation. Because national identity is rather close to the collective end of the continuum of possible identities between personal and collective, it can include many other identities. But situations that will primarily or even exclusively activate national identity are rather rare, as in the case of a national celebration or in cases of international conflicts.
**Relationships Between Different Political/National Identifications and Between Subnational and National Identities**

More difficult are the relationships between national identity and other political identities, which also refer to nationality and/or to potential or real territorial-political collectives. Thus, there are many countries that can be called multinational states, because people who identify with more than one nation live within such countries. This is caused by different historical developments, which often underlie different situations and relationships between the respective nationalities.

A typical example for a historically multinational country is Switzerland, where French, German, and Italian populations (and even a small Ladino one) live together, in different parts of the country, with a great deal of autonomy and without major problems. Most of the Swiss citizens feel as though they are Swiss citizens, though they may have French-, German-, or Italian-Swiss identities as well. Another example is Belgium, with a Walloon (French speaking), a Flemish (Dutch speaking), and a small German-speaking population. Though these populations live in different parts of the country and there are highly complex political institutions for representation, conflicts between Wallonia and Flanders arise again and again. One example of aggressive conflicts and the desire for separation is Northern Ireland, though Britain has decentralized its political structures. Spain is another example where decentralization of political structures was undertaken to give people of different historically rooted nationalities, who also live in different parts of the country, more autonomy. This was partly successful, for example, in Catalonia. But other parts now also strive for more autonomy, and Euskadi (the Basque part) especially has a separatist movement, with the aim of creating a separate state together with the Basques living in France. On an individual level, these examples show that citizens tend to identify more intensively or even exclusively with their (officially) subnational identity than with their national one and sometimes strive to form a sovereign nation of their own. Historically rooted feelings of national identity that accompany contemporary distinguishing features with regard to other parts of the population or that even lead to political cleavages (e.g., a different religion or language, translated into politics) and/or that go along with feelings of economic deprivation are factors that often lead to inner conflicts and secessionist or separatist movements. But a favorable economic situation can also contribute to the wish for more national autonomy to avoid having to share welfare benefits with the poorer parts of a country, as is the case with northern Italy. Yet to satisfy the desires associated with such political identities through institutions of territorial autonomy is evidently possible only if the respective populations with a common we-feeling live predominantly in different internally homogeneous parts of the country or belong to a diaspora in which national minorities live in adjacent territories of another country.

In countries that are made up of many different ethnicities/nationalities and/or in countries where the populations of different nationalities are spread over the territory, such solutions are not possible. Such countries also show quite different histories and current situations with respect to questions of national identity. One typical situation is produced by nation-building processes in postcolonial countries. Often boundaries were drawn that did not respect traditional (prenational) we-feelings, such as in Africa, and therefore may lead to inner conflicts as well as to conflicts between countries. In other postcolonial cases, such as in India, huge populations with quite different ethnicities, traditions, languages, and cultural customs have succeeded in forming a common political identity. Another constellation could be found after the dissolution of greater political entities, as in Eastern Europe in the 1990s with the breakdown of the Soviet empire. The Soviets have tried for almost a century to build a common communist identity that should overcome earlier ethnic and national identities. Yet this was only partly successful, and today these countries attempt to rebuild their earlier national identities in a situation of newly gained political sovereignty. This situation also produced new national, territorially concentrated, as well as dispersed minorities and diasporas. Thus, the split of former Czechoslovakia into two states is an example of a peaceful solution for the national self-determination of two populations with different identities and living in different parts of a country. The Baltic countries are an example of relatively peaceful ways of dealing with
minorities, especially the large Russian minorities (mainly members of the former military and their families) by granting them certain minority rights and possibilities to gain full citizenship. By contrast, in the former Yugoslavia, extremely violent conflicts especially between (mainly Catholic) Croats, (mainly Orthodox) Serbs, and (mainly Muslim) Bosniaks developed, which destroyed the country and led to a division into several parts.

Other typical contexts in which different national identities play a role are caused by migration. Today there are so-called immigration countries—those where immigrants dominate an indigenous population, such as Australia, or where national subcommunities are formed from different subpopulations, including indigenous populations, descendants from early settlers, and new immigrants, as in the French- and English-speaking regions of Canada. Another example is the United States, where the population includes not only the indigenous American Indian population but also the descendants of immigrants from Europe, Latin America, and Asia, as well as the descendants of African slaves. These different populations come together with quite different backgrounds with respect to their identities—in some cases with a strong national identity, in others with a negative national identity with regard to their countries of descent, and in some with a nonnational but mainly ethnic identity based on race, language, or religion. Against this background of different ethnic or national identities and the feeling that a common political national identity is necessary to guarantee societal integration and stability of the political system, different ideas have developed (which in more or less moderated forms also have influenced other immigration countries): the perspective of a melting pot; the concept of a multicultural, ethnic pluralist society; and the group dominance and assimilation perspective. The melting pot concept suggests that all citizens regardless of their ethnic or ancestral national background form a common political identity and in the long run mingle with each other in such a way that the different identity backgrounds lose importance and form a new common composite identity. The multicultural concept, often associated with the metaphor of a salad bowl or mosaic, implies that the different ethnic and national groups keep their distinctive characteristics and identities but are respected as equal and as complementary reinforcing loyalties. The group dominance concept articulates that in multiethnic and immigration countries, there is one dominant group that claims to have preeminent rights and can legitimately expect newcomers to adapt to their rules and lifestyle and in the long run adopt the dominant group’s national identity. These ideas are also linked to different identity politics. The melting pot concept disregards ethnic and former national identities. By contrast, the multicultural concept is linked to policies such as affirmative action in order to support the different identities, especially in cases where some groups have historically been deprived of social or political rights and chances of economic advancement. The assimilation concept is linked to politics that promote but also demand that immigrants adapt to the dominant group. As different and contrary as these concepts are, they all are intended to ensure peaceful relations between groups with different identities. However, there is no uncontested evidence that shows which concept works best. For example, in some cases the respect and support of different identities have helped pacify conflicts between groups, but in others they have led to a reinforcement of ethnic, exclusive identities with aggressive potential toward groups of other identities. Also, when individuals and groups keep their former national identification in addition to the new one, their national loyalty may be questioned, especially if the country of origin and the country of immigration should become involved in a conflict. Thus, identity politics in multiethnic and multinational contexts (with dispersed settlement) may involve a choice between two hazardous alternatives—like the one the sailors confronted between Scylla and Charybdis.

Finally, a new form of multiple national identity seems to arise with processes of globalization and migration, namely, so-called transnational identities. They may become characteristic for persons who live in more than one country, perhaps because they work in more than one country or because they have their family in one country and work in another, who migrate and re-migrate. With regard to multicultural societies, evidence and speculations about this kind of multiple identity are rather diverse, reaching from the expectation that for such individuals national identity will
lose any relevance and they will develop into cosmopolitans to the contrary expectation that the different identities may reinforce each other permanently or to the expectation that those identities permanently will conflict with each other and cause individual identity crises.

**Relationship Between National and Supranational Identity: The European Union**

The idea of a cosmopolitan identity as well as concepts of a supranational identity mostly remained apolitical, because they did not have any specific political object of identification. Yet this is changing in the EU, as it develops from a mainly economic community to a political unit. Protagonists of European integration increasingly see a European identity as necessary for the chances and stability of this multilevel political community. A crucial difference from other situations such as nation-building or immigration countries is that the EU consists of countries that have developed their national identities for a long time. Thus, if a common European identity is to develop, it should not be in competition with the primarily ethnic or ancestral national identities but should be formed against the background of current national identities. Therefore, and before the foundation of the European Community (EC) was based on the aim of overcoming national rivalries and securing peace between its members, many supporters of the EC/EU expected that the national identities would lose importance for the sake of a developing European identity. Yet empirical data (mainly collected in the Eurobarometer surveys) show no decrease in nationalloyalties and no rise of European identity. They also reveal, from country to country and time to time, differing relationships between national and European identifications, with correlations ranging from negative to none to positive. Thus, the idea of a compatibility of national and European identity gained ground, which some researchers conceptualize as a hierarchical system (similar to identifications with one’s town, one’s region, and one’s nation in federal countries) and others as a nested structure (like a Russian matryoshka doll), which is more apolitical and refers to territories, or as a structure like a marble cake, in which national and European components might mix and blend. Although compatibility of both identities can be shown for most of the member countries, the national identities until now remain by far stronger than the European one. Moreover, it seems as if changes in the relationship between the two identities follow a pattern, which has to do with the EU policy itself. Times of enforced integration and policies, which bring to mind a competition between member countries or between the national and the EU level, tend to reduce the European identification and to strengthen the national ones perhaps because of fears about a loss of national achievements. Thus, it is still an open question how far the existing European identity may reach in times of stress, and there are doubts about an EU-wide loyalty, for instance, in case of redistribution policies. Reasons for the difficulties in developing a strong European identification are manifold—for instance, the absence of a common history, a common language, culture, religion, media system, and so on, as well as the absence of clear boundaries and a clear aim with regard to common political structures. Researchers who conceptualize European identity in strong analogy to national identities therefore are mostly pessimistic about its chances, whereas others hope for the possibility that a common democratic culture might arise out of the heterogeneous general cultures and that this demos-based identity can be become sufficient for future political cohesion.

**Content and Meanings of Political Identities**

The intensities of national, subnational, and supranational identifications and the links between them tell something about the relevance of these identities but nothing about their content or meaning. For a long time, answers to the question about the meaning of national identity were primarily informed by historical and macrosociological research. These mostly formulated dichotomous typologies, for instance, state-building nations versus nation-building states, cultural versus political nations, or ethnic versus civic nations. Sometimes, the former were linked to an Eastern model and the latter to a Western model. Additionally, the former ones are seen as less compatible than the latter ones with democracy, with openness toward immigration and with peaceful relations to other countries. Thus, the ethnic nation is associated with a high potential for aggressive nationalism,
whereas the civic nation is linked to a loyal and constructive, but not fanatical, patriotism. Although these dichotomies have become somewhat contested in recent years, on the individual level they are mirrored, albeit not in a perfect way, as shown by diverse national survey data and by two studies in 1995 and 2003 of the International Social Science Programme (ISSP). An ethnic national identity mostly refers to primordial, ascribed features such as ancestry (“blood”), place of birth, and place of living and religion, whereas a civic identity builds on achievable and voluntary characteristics such as subjective feelings of belonging and political rights and institutions. Additionally, both kinds of identity can be linked to cultural objects, for example, language and way of life. Yet these types of identity do not distinguish between nations but rather between different strata of the population within countries. Furthermore, in some countries something like a postnational identity, denying the relevance of nationality and instead referring to the humanity as such, can be found. In any case, the ethnic type of national identity tends to go along with a more closed concept of the nation, in respect to immigrants as well as to other nations and supranational communities.

Finally, recent research questions also deals with the meaning of European identity. Some works on public narratives and discourse analyses find that national identity and European identity are intertwined in a strong way. Either they assume that the image of Europe has already influenced nation building in the early historical phases, or others find that different narratives about Europe are built into the national narratives. But again, analyses of ordinary citizens’ thoughts about their national identity and their European identity (on the basis of the Europe-wide survey data of the project “Integrated and United” in 2008 and 2009) do not support these assumptions. Thus, both the national and the European identity concepts, and the links between them, do not distinguish different nations but rather different groups of individuals within nations. An ascribed national identity mostly goes along with a concept of European identity, which rests on the same characteristics, as is the case with religion as a basis of both identities and political rights, whereas cultural features are seen as a dimension that differs in the respective nations and in Europe as a whole. With the ongoing processes of modernization, internationalization, and globalization, the meanings of political identities and their consequences will remain a major field of research in the future.

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See also Citizenship; Civil Society; Democratization; Ethnicity; European Integration; Individualism; Multiculturalism; Nation Building; Nationalism; Nationalist Movements; Patriotism; Political Culture; Political Integration; Political Socialization; Racism; Regional Integration (Supranational); Secession; Social Cohesion

Further Readings


Ideology

The word ideology was coined by the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy, who defined it as the “science” of the “intellectual faculties” of animals, therefore as a component of zoology but a component crucial for man, an animal for whom thought is fundamental. What Destutt de Tracy called idéologie, he might have named psychology (psyche, “soul” in Greek) if, as an empiricist and a utilitarian, he had not disapproved of this term. Ideology as he meant it was not just a general grammar but a form of logic that should enable men to think better and therefore to live better together in society. This entry first examines the evolution of ideology in Marxist thought. It then describes the development of the concept of ideology in 20th-century thought—for example, in the analysis of education, the elaboration of structuralism from a Marxism perspective, the explanation of totalitarianism, and the analysis of the relationships between ideology, science, and religion.

Ideology in Marxist Thought

This meaning was radically transformed by Karl Marx (and Friedrich Engels). In their theory—devised for the political purpose of bringing about a liberating revolution—ideology constitutes a sphere of society to be conceptually distinguished from the other two spheres, the economy and politics. Marx took up the word ideology and used it negatively to criticize the understanding that the driving force of history is ideas; Marx claimed that the driving force is not ideology but labor. Dividing thinkers into idealists and materialists, Marx declared that ideology was the idealist’s illusion. However, despite the fact that society depended on the economy, ideological illusion was an essential part of that society, necessary to its operation. According to Marx, professional thinkers—that is, philosophers, clerics, jurists—believed that the world is governed by ideas. This belief had to be overturned, for in fact effective history was the history of production, labor, and modes of production. Men’s consciousness, which was formalized in philosophy, religion, and law, amounted to a mystifying derivative of their material practices. In sum, Marx explained, ideology was “false consciousness,” and in their false perception, men turned reality upside down: “If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process” (Marx, The German Ideology, Pt. 1, sec. A). The error could be corrected, but the victims of the illusion were caught in a formidable trap: They did not know they were under the spell of false representations—hence Marx’s stigmatizing of religion as “the opium of the people.” The same applied to belief in political representation (universal suffrage, elections, parliaments); such belief mystified men by denying the reality of class differences. Marx’s theory of ideology is thus inseparable from a theory of domination (Herrschaft): Ideology works to stabilize the existing social order, wherein one group necessarily dominates all others. The dominant class dominates economically (as the labor-exploiting class), politically (it holds state power), and ideologically (its ideas impose themselves as a general belief system).

The Concept of Ideology in 20th-Century Thought

Marx’s analysis of ideology as illusion was explicitly reused by Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron in their theory of how pedagogical and political authority is legitimated. The initial target of their critique was the ideology of giftedness, a
model for their critique of ideology as legitimation of authority. In the modern French educational system, Bourdieu and Passeron explained, teachers, pupils, and parents all believe that scholastic success depends on having a gift, when in fact it depends on the “cultural capital” a person has inherited. False belief in giftedness was what enabled the system to function, objectifying the failure of some pupils and legitimating the success of others in psychological terms when in fact that success was the product of the schooling system’s “symbolic violence.” Domination is all the more effective because the social mass of “the dominated” is blind to the principle of domination. Theories of ideology thus became linked to theories working to criticize and combat illusion and alienation.

In Marx’s thinking, the polemic aspect was crucial because while criticism was an active practice amounting to revolutionary mobilization, it was also an intellectual one (the subtitle of Capital is “Critique of Political Economy”). Ideology was to be criticized in the name of science, which combated ideas that were derived not from true knowledge but from mere opinion (or the doxa, a Greek term Bourdieu liked to use). But ideology was not just false; it was also linked to the interests of the respective classes battling each other. The ideology of the nobility in ancien régime France (according to which the social order was founded on three hierarchically ranked groups: the nobility, on top, followed by the clergy, and then the third estate) ran up against the ideology of the bourgeoisie, a class fighting in favor of its own understanding—corresponding to its own interests—that all men had equal rights. This egalitarian, individualist ideology triumphed with the French Revolution, and it allowed the market system to develop and spread. But the revolutionary proletariat, declared Marx, could free itself from all such illusions and attain true knowledge. The various Marxist theories could therefore present themselves as true knowledge that coincided with the only true ideology: the ideology of the proletariat.

While ideologies divided society, they also played a functional role: It was precisely because ideology was an illusion that it enabled the given social order to maintain itself. In Louis Althusser’s structural Marxist perspective, developed in the mid-1960s, ideology is the sphere of representation, and it could be an efficient cause of some forms of social organization, though in the last analysis, that role was determined by economic organization. An example of this relation between the sphere of representation and the economic sphere is Christianity in the feudal mode of production. The feudal arrangement known as the corvée amounted to blatant exploitation in that the serf had to work for the feudal lord for a certain amount of time every year, receiving nothing in exchange. By sanctifying this social order, Christianity enabled the feudal system of extorting “surplus value” to remain in place, whereas in the capitalist economy, that same extortion was masked by the form known as the wage. Moreover, in the capitalist economy, the ideology of equal human rights allowed for the perpetuation of a system based on radical inequality—the inequality between those who had to sell their labor power and those who were in a position to buy it. Revolutionary struggle, then, in Marx’s understanding, was first and foremost an ideological battle whose ultimate purpose was to dispel illusion.

The understanding that ideology stabilizes existing social power relations was used in various forms by all communist regimes. In these regimes, ideology—in the form of propaganda and dogma that can be changed at any moment by the political power—would promote “true” doctrine. This in turn explains why for Hannah Arendt and Carl J. Friedrich, the existence of a single mass party with an official ideology was one defining attribute of the totalitarian syndrome. There was no need for people to believe in the ideology; in a totalitarian system, ideology of itself forbade all discourse except the one emanating from the party, and it did not matter that people knew that discourse to be a false one. Here, ideology has been virtually emptied of content, becoming little more than an obligation to lie and to acclaim the party and its leader.

In Maoism, on the other hand, ideology was conceived of as the ultimate condition for the triumph of the revolution. Ideological combat was the driving force of Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution, launched in 1966. The understanding here was that the political and economic revolution had not been enough to transform China radically, lastingly; what was needed was a revolution in belief that would replace the bourgeois
ideology with a new, people’s ideology (wherein a sense of the collective would put down individualism, for example). As Mao saw it, having pure, radical revolutionary ideas was more important than having experience or expert knowledge. The ideological superstructure was presented as a force with the power either to slow down the revolution or to drive it forward. This explains the attacks in Mao’s China against such doctrines as revisionism and Confucianism and also the violence against people who bore these “deviations” or traditions within them: They were stigmatized as—and treated like—vermin that had to be eradicated. In this way, Maoism actually reversed Marxism: The structure of social power relations was understood to depend on representations—that is, doctrinal purity. The Chinese Cultural Revolution can be understood as a war waged by one component of the political elite against other components, but it did not bring ideological struggle to an end; it continues in post-Maoist China. The party’s hold on the means and content of communication has been the determinant for keeping it in power, and it does not hesitate to use strong coercive means. In any case, the collapse of Soviet communism definitively devalued the prestige of communism in the West. The “end of ideology” announced by Daniel Bell in 1960—namely, the end of the prestige of communist millenarianism—affected not only communist sympathizers but also the communist parties themselves. Some authors say that religious belief has returned to fill the void left by communist ideology, as if a society needed ideology. The claim leads to establishing an equivalency between a political program such as communism and systems of representation that are not necessarily linked to programs for transforming the world. This brings up the question of the political meaning of Islamism and its relation to theocratic programs.

The role played by Marxism as dogma in the Soviet regime led analysts to describe it as an “ideocracy”: Because the communist party and its leaders had to justify any and all decisions with reference to an absolute truth whose prescriptions had to be followed in all circumstances, communist ideology has been described as a millenarian religious thought system. The same term has been applied to Nazism, but this disregards the real difference between the rudimentary totalitarian language of Nazism—the Nazi Weltanschaung, comprising Führerprinzip, hatred of democracy and Marxism, and anti-Semitism—and communist ideology, structured by abundant and in some cases sophisticated doctrines and numerous cultural references. Communist ideology has been compared with church ideology, and the term ideocracy has been extended to include power systems such as Islam in which religion structures social life. The anthropologist and political thinker Ernest Gellner grouped together communism and Islamism as ideocracies but specified that Islamic regimes do not impose a single economic form on their societies (as communist regimes did) and, thus, they allow the development of the market and industrial society. From this perspective, ideology appears a universal social dimension that can take a variety of forms, depending on the content of its doctrine and institutions. For example, scriptural religions such as Protestantism, where all individuals are called on to read the Bible in their vernacular language, have an effect on the social system as a whole: They foster national cultural homogeneity in countries where they are the dominant religion. The social sciences’ use of the notion of ideology presents insoluble epistemological problems. Distinguishing ideology from true scientific knowledge presupposes that those who set out to do so (such as Althusser and Bourdieu) are in possession of a differentiation criterion. Marx believed he had one; he believed that history itself was the movement of a self- affirming, self-deploying truth. As Bourdieu saw it, sociology—which implies doing sociology of sociology—would provide such a criterion. This claim may seem similar to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s that he possessed absolute knowledge in the form of “the science of science.” The belief that ideology stands opposed to true knowledge, that it is false consciousness as opposed to knowledge of objective truth, may thus appear the result of a paradox, since what is assumed to be science (historical materialism for Marx and Marxists, critical sociology for Bourdieu and Bourdieusians) is understood to be beyond critical suspicion.

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Immigration Policy

The migration of people from one territory to another is one of the oldest practices of mankind. However, immigration policy is a broad label encompassing a range of different and formally unrelated issues as diverse as the Viking settlement of Anglo-Saxon England following the Roman withdrawal in 410 CE; the triangular trade in slaves up to the 19th century; European immigration to the New World in the 19th and 20th centuries, and large-scale resettlements following conflicts such as World War II, the 1947 India–Pakistan War, and the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The first part of this contribution sets out what these issues are in the countries listed above before moving on to consider how they have been analyzed in political science.

Defining Immigration Policy

Conventionally, immigration policy is considered to refer primarily to the responses of governments in developed countries to migratory pressures from less developed countries post-1945. These essentially “rich” developed countries can be further subdivided into three broad categories. First, predominantly Anglo-Saxon immigration countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have traditions of accepting immigration that long predate 1945. Second, Western European countries have since 1945 been transformed from countries of emigration to countries of immigration. This transformation has not been uniform: Thus, France, the United Kingdom (UK), West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria all experienced large-scale immigration during the 1950s and 1960s, while countries such as Spain, Italy, and Ireland have only become destinations for immigration since the end of the Cold War. Lastly, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have themselves also become destinations for migration since the turn of the millennium and especially since becoming member states of the European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007. Notably, the developed countries of Asia, particularly Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, have only experienced comparatively minimal levels of immigration.

Despite constituting just a relatively small element of human migrations both historically and contemporarily, immigration to developed countries has become one of the most sensitive, controversial, and therefore important domestic political issues. For this reason, the area has attracted increasing attention from scholars across a range of cognate disciplines, including economics, sociology, development studies, anthropology, geography, demography, history, education, psychology, and political science. Within political science, scholars of public policy, political theory, comparative politics, political economy, and international relations have all contributed to our understanding of this field.

At its most elementary level, immigration policy addresses the control of entry to a state’s territory. The physical control of borders, through passport controls, visa requirements, or quite simply a barrier, remains one of the key deliverables for any government and indeed constitutes one of the fundamental elements of state sovereignty. In this context, the EU’s policy in recent decades of removing border checks between its member states (the so-called Schengen Agreement) and replacing them with a closely guarded external border vis-à-vis third countries is particularly significant. However, and especially in the modern age of global travel, a high degree of control over frontiers, although frequently promised in election
Immigration Policy campaigns, is seldom easy to deliver, and borders, whether they are the U.S. border with Mexico, the Israeli border with Gaza, or the EU’s external borders in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, are notoriously porous. In consequence, illegal immigration remains a major challenge, both from a humanitarian perspective of human trafficking and in the context of enforcement. Prevention and return have become a top priority in international diplomacy: Thus, the EU has signed readmission agreements with a range of countries, as well as seeking the cooperation of countries such as Libya in preventing boats from leaving for southern Italy in the first place.

Five Dimensions of Immigration Policy
When it comes to managing and shaping migration flows, as opposed to simply controlling their entry, it is possible to identify five principal constituent elements of this field: labor migration, the increased importance of political asylum, the growth of immigration of dependents, ethnic immigration, and issues related to the integration of immigrants into the host country.

Labor Migration
First, labor migration has perhaps been the single most important element of immigration policy, and it underpins much of the migration that developed countries have received over the past 60-odd years. This is hardly surprising given the existing and indeed growing differences in wealth between developed countries and their neighbors. The desire to work is also a major driving force behind illegal immigration and residence. While the authorities in developed countries do formally seek to clamp down on such activities, for instance, by raiding building sites and farms where illegal immigrants are known to work, they are also often tacitly tolerated as a useful contribution to the economy. Several countries, such as Spain, Italy, and the United States, have also instituted amnesties, sometimes repeatedly, to regularize the status of illegal immigrants.

Labor migration can be both high skilled and low skilled. For instance, much of the labor migration to Western Europe up to the early 1970s, which numbered millions of people, was low skilled, largely from Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. In some countries, notably West Germany, such migration was explicitly expected to be temporary in nature, leading to the coining of the (pejorative) term Gastarbeiter (“guest worker”). Labor migration was radically cut back during the 1970s and 1980s, but high-skilled migration has witnessed a resurgence since the late 1990s, with a range of countries now introducing points-based immigration systems originally pioneered in Australia and Canada.

This resurgence has been linked to two key developments in Western societies: first, the twin phenomena of increasing life expectancy and falling birthrates has created a demographic imbalance and the prospect of falling populations in many countries, especially Germany, Italy, Spain, and Eastern European countries, and labor migration is one key option for redressing this. Thus, the UK’s decision not to close its labor market to the new member states of the EU in 2004 led to large-scale labor migration of up to 1 million persons, as a result of which the UK’s population is projected to increase rather than decrease over the coming decades. Similarly, the comparatively dynamic state of the U.S. population is also largely down to recent immigration. The second key development is skills shortages, which have emerged in a range of sectors, most notably information technology.

Political Asylum
The second element of immigration policy has been the rise in importance of political asylum. Asylum is a humanitarian policy designed to afford protection to those persecuted for their political views in their home countries and its legal expression, the 1951 Geneva Convention, constitutes one of the best known cornerstones of international law. With low numbers of claimants globally until the end of the 1970s, the ability to seek political asylum was initially largely notional. However, since then, numbers have risen strongly, generally affecting those countries with an already existing sizeable immigrant population. Thus, West Germany was the principal destination for asylum seekers in Europe during the 1980s; since then, the UK, France, Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, and
Belgium have also all emerged as major recipient countries. With rising numbers have come rising costs and not infrequently social tensions, which in turn have propelled asylum up the political agenda. In response, governments have introduced a range of measures to restrict the ability of refugees to lodge asylum claims, such as visa restrictions for major countries of origin, the principle of the “safe third country” (i.e., transit country), and the “safe country of origin” principle. Refugee organizations such as the UNHCR (the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) criticize that such measures undermine the spirit, if not the letter, of the Geneva Convention.

The annual numbers of asylum seekers have fluctuated widely over the years. The early and late 1990s were major periods of asylum migration, although, since the early 2000s, applications have dropped back. In the case of Germany, which had hitherto been the world’s most significant destinations for asylum seekers, these are now historically low levels. In processing asylum cases, government agencies have generally tended to take a restrictive view of claims, and initial recognition rates have generally been around 25%, although in some countries they are as low as 5%. Nonetheless, the tendency of rejected asylum seekers to appeal their decision through the courts, plus logistical difficulties in physically deporting such persons once legal avenues have been exhausted, has meant that many asylum claims take years to complete, which has in turn led to a considerable backlog of cases in many countries.

**Immigration of Dependents**

Third, most developed countries have since the 1970s experienced a rapid growth in the immigration of dependents. Such migration is considered "secondary" because it cannot take place without the immigration of a "primary" migrant—typically a labor migrant but also potentially a recognized refugee. The quantitative dimension of such secondary migration should not be underestimated, and dependent migration currently constitutes the largest form of legal migration to developed countries, exceeding both asylum and labor migration. Crucially, dependent migration is generally regarded as a human right and in consequence, many countries have not found it easy to impose restrictions on this form of migration. Nonetheless, the right to family reunification has certainly been circumscribed in recent years, with countries imposing conditions such as minimum living space, maximum ages for dependent children, and, most recently, the introduction by several European countries of pre-entry requirements such as the successful completion of language and integration courses.

**Ethnic Immigration**

The fourth aspect is ethnic immigration, which broadly speaking refers to privileged entry conditions sometimes granted by countries to persons of specific ethnic and/or cultural origins. For instance, Israel guarantees residence to Jews from all over the world, regardless of whether they have any active ties to Israel. Likewise, the origins of the Green Card Lottery in the United States (through which 50,000 permanent green cards are issued annually on the basis of computer-generated random selection) lie in a decision by Congress to privilege immigration from Ireland. But the single largest instance of this immigration has been to Germany, with more than 4 million ethnic Germans having immigrated since 1950. Initially, these came from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, but since the late 1980s these have come overwhelmingly from the countries of the former Soviet Union. Typically, such ethnic Germans had been living in these countries for centuries but had then experienced persecution at the hands of the communist authorities. Germany initially offered generous immigration conditions, including extensive financial assistance, but the very large numbers that arrived between 1989 and 1993 (more than 1.4 million) led to this being sharply curtailed. The relative weakness of the German economy since 2000 has caused ethnic German migration to fall back to much lower levels.

**Integration of Immigrants**

The final aspect of policy to be considered here is in fact one of the most difficult: the successful integration of immigrants into their new host societies. Strictly speaking, integration is not related to the process of immigration itself; however, because integration arises as a direct consequence
of immigration, the two are conventionally viewed under the same rubric. The principal policy challenge here is that immigrants across the developed world broadly speaking show similar socioeconomic deficits compared with the indigenous population, including higher unemployment, lower educational outcomes, lower wages, and substandard housing. That said, there are significant differences in the socioeconomic profile of immigrant groups: For instance, in the UK, people of Indian origin are generally better integrated socioeconomically than those of Bangladeshi origin.

The challenge of integration encompasses a particularly wide range of policy fields, including education, labor market, housing, health, and law and order. It includes not only residence policy but also citizenship and naturalization policy. What is more, integration is a highly symbolic area and touches on powerful mobilizers such as cultural identity and belonging. For instance, the question of Muslim headscarves in France, and especially in its schools, has polarized public opinion for more than 20 years and is considered by some to be challenging the Republican emphasis on secularism. Similarly, populist politicians such as Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, and Jörg Haider in Austria and the French Front National, have often politicized what they see as incompatibility between Islam and the respective indigenous culture. In this way, integration covers both substantive and symbolic issues, and in political debate, perhaps unsurprisingly, the two often get (deliberately) blurred.

Certainly, since 2000, governments across Europe have imposed new, largely symbolic restrictions on the acquisition of citizenship by foreigners. Thus, most countries now require applicants for naturalization to pass a citizenship test and to attend a citizenship ceremony, often involving an oath of allegiance as well. Such practices are of course well established in traditional countries of immigration such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, and indeed these countries’ experiences have explicitly served as a template for the introduction of these citizenship policies in Europe. At the same time, there has been a general liberalizing trend across Europe in the acquisition of citizenship at birth, with countries increasingly using *ius soli* (the territorial principle) as well as *ius sanguinis* (the principle of descent). In parallel, dual citizenship, which once was widely rejected in European citizenship policies, is increasingly accepted, if not formally then through far-reaching exemptions.

**Political Science and Immigration Policy**

Together, then, these five key dimensions illustrate the complexity and the multifaceted nature of this controversial policy field of immigration policy. Arguably, this explains why scholars have struggled so far to develop an integrated, multidisciplinary perspective on immigration that can address the holistic aspect of the field while still capturing the specificities of its individual constituent elements. Indeed, the dominant explanations for migration and integration have come from economics and sociology, respectively. For instance, economists argue that wage differentials between economies create incentives for labor migration from the lower wage (or poorer) country to the higher wage (or richer) country. Certainly, this is a powerful explanation and helps account for both formal and informal labor migration over the decades, including the guest worker migration to West Germany, illegal migration from Mexico to the United States, and Polish migration to the UK after its 2004 accession to the EU. But equally, straight economics encounters difficulties in fully accounting for why some countries receive more asylum seekers than others.

From the perspective of political science and its several subdisciplines, including public policy analysis, immigration policy is a relatively new object of study, and scholars have yet to bring its full analytical toolkit to bear on its various elements. To date, though, a number of key approaches can be identified in the literature. The first approach is grounded in political economy, regulation, and welfare, with Gary Freeman as its leading exponent. In his work, he emphasizes the role that organized interests, and especially business interests, play in structuring immigration policy, thereby creating a clear pressure toward liberalization. A second approach draws on the role universal human rights play in requiring states to accept “unwanted” immigration, including dependent migration. At the same time, as Christian Joppke (1999) points out, states have proved to be quite activist in responding to such challenges; for instance, Germany’s 1993 constitutional amendment to limit asylum can be
seen as a prima facie example of a state wresting back control over a policy are.

Joppke’s analysis is particularly germane to the issue of state sovereignty, which in turn has underpinned the contribution of international relations to our understanding of immigration policy. Here, the question of control and the ability of states to exercise it have traditionally been dominant. However, more recently, other aspects have come to the fore, in particular globalization, as Saskia Sassen points out, and increasingly security, as Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Japp de Wilde have described. Indeed, Samuel Huntington took the latter argument several steps further in an (in)famous article mapping out a “clash of civilizations” between Christianity and Islam—a relationship that of course lies at the heart of much of the debate, at least in Europe, about integration.

Beyond international relations and political economy, a number of seminal contributions have been grounded in political theory, reflecting the fact that asylum and citizenship are two issues that directly intersect with notions of equality, justice, ethics, and pluralism. As well as discussions of asylum from this perspective (e.g., Matthew Gibney, 2004), multiculturalism has emerged from the pluralist stable as an influential model for immigrant integration (Bhikhu Parekh, 2005). However, although multiculturalism remains popular in the New World and especially Canada and Australia, it has found fewer devotees in Europe: On the contrary, recent debates in the Netherlands and Germany have reemphasized the more assimilatory nature of integration.

Elsewhere in the study of citizenship and integration, Adrian Favell’s exploration of the philosophies of integration in the UK and France remains an indispensable point of reference, as does Yasemin Soysal’s provocative discussion of “personhood” and its implications for the “hollowing out” of national citizenships in Western Europe. Other authors, such as Randall Hansen (2000) and Simon Green (2004), emphasize the importance of history and path dependence in understanding the evolution and operation of citizenship policy in France, Germany, and the UK.

Last but not the least, a thriving subfield has sprung up in recent years examining the development and role of the EU in immigration policy. The creation of the Schengen area plus the importance of some common labor market policies has made immigration within the EU a more important concern. As well as important overviews of this field, especially that of Andrew Geddes (2008), security has been the focus of extensive attention.

Conclusion

Although a brief overview such as this cannot hope to do full justice either to the complexities of the field of immigration policy or to the rich variety of the scholarly canon dealing with this policy, this entry has sought to do two things. First, it has sketched out in broad terms the nature and challenges of immigration policy as well as political actors’ and institutions’ responses to it in comparative perspective. Second, it has introduced the principal scholarly contributions of political science to our understanding of immigration policy in all its forms. There is no doubt that collectively these contributions have served to emphasize the centrality of the discipline to the purpose of understanding this vital policy field more broadly. At the same time, much remains to be done. Leaving aside the perhaps rather lofty aspiration of developing an integrated, cross-disciplinary model of immigration, the challenge for political scientists in this field is to provide further insights at all levels, to include the roots of party political positions on immigration, psephological aspects of immigrant voters, the formulation processes of government policy, the development of cross-national migration responses, the evolution and formalization of citizenship and integration policy, and the process of administration of these policies.

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See also Citizenship; Path Dependence; Racism; Security Apparatus; Sovereignty

Further Readings

The concept of policy impacts refers to the effects and consequences of public policy on individuals, groups, the broader society, and the natural world in which we live. All policies have intended targets but are more or less successful in attaining their stated goals. This entry examines the nature of public policy in political science, discusses several taxonomies for understanding the targets for public policy, and also discusses the linkages between the design of policies and their final outcomes.

**Public Policy and Political Science**

Public policies are the mechanisms used by governing authorities to allocate benefits, burdens, and regulations for the society. Public policies are what governments and their agents produce, including statutes, budgets, resolutions, proclamations, programs, and direct contacts with people. Policies must be understood as nested in one another. Thus, the U.S. Constitution is a fundamental public policy. Statutes passed by Congress or state legislatures also are policies, as are the guidelines written by agencies as policy is implemented. Court rulings may change a statute, and thus court rulings also are public policies. A program established by a local government to regulate or provide services is itself a part of the public policy chain. These policies are revealed as texts and also in the actual practices and discourse of those involved in crafting or implementing public policy. Policy as written may not be the way it actually is perceived and may or may not be put in place exactly as written. Policy may have intended as well as unintended consequences: direct effects and indirect ones.

Although the effects of public policy have always been of concern to political science, this field was slow to develop. Part of the reason is the sheer complexity of policy content and the difficulty in finding common elements across different levels and types of policy. Another reason for the slow development of theory about policy impacts is the assumption that policy consequences are guided mainly by policy-specific theory, which often is simply not an accurate understanding of policy effects. So, for example, it is sometimes assumed that the impact of environmental policy depends on what theory of the environment is embedded in the policy rather than on theories of human behavior and values.

During the past 20 years, however, political science has embraced the study of policy consequences to the point that some are advocating a “policy-centric” approach to the study of politics in which two major questions dominate the field. The first is how to explain and understand how and why governments produce the kinds of policy designs that they have, and the second is how to understand the impacts of those designs.

**Theories of Policy Consequences**

Theodore Lowi is generally credited with being the first to offer a systematic theory of policy impacts. He popularized the phrase policy creates politics, thereby reversing the common causal pattern in political science. Lowi contends that there are characteristics of policy that encourage affected people to mobilize and that without these characteristics, elites will dominate. His typology is based on two dimensions: the probability of coercion and whether the policy identifies specific targets or...
consists of general rules that affect the environment of groups. From these dimensions, he posits four types of policy: distributive, regulatory, redistributive, and constituent. Regulatory policy, involving the imposition of costs in the environment, will produce pluralist competition according to Lowi. Policy becomes a temporary compromise between competing groups, but if policy becomes too harsh on some, they are expected to mobilize and change the governing officials or change the policy. Redistributive policy, such as welfare policy, Lowi contends, does not produce pluralist forms of subsequent participation but instead is dominated by elites who lead major segments of society who act to insure social stability. Distributive policy is the classic pork barrel and is inherently elitist, according to Lowi’s framework. His fourth type, constituent policy, produces individualistic claims on government.

James Wilson proposed an alternative to Lowi’s typology. Wilson’s typology begins with whether benefits are narrowly focused or broadly cast, and whether costs are narrowly focused or dispersed broadly among the public. When benefits are broadly distributed (e.g., national defense) and costs are broadly distributed (e.g., taxes supporting national defense), then all people have about equal incentives to incorporate this policy into their behavior. The result is majoritarian politics. In majoritarian politics, elected officials pay special attention to what the majority wants. When benefits are concentrated on just a few (such as welfare recipients) but costs are distributed widely among taxpayers, there is little incentive for those bearing the costs to pay attention to the policy itself but great advantage to potential beneficiaries. This produces what Wilson called a clientist style of politics in which elected leaders distribute favors to their clients while apathetic taxpayers do not pay attention. A third type of politics, entrepreneurial politics, occurs when small portions of society pay the costs to benefit large groups—for example, education. This type of politics results in virtually uncontrolled growth because of the strong political payoffs for distributing numerous benefits at the expense of so few. Since most policies are either entrepreneurial or clientist, government grows until it becomes inefficient and produces more goods and services than people actually want.

A third typology, which seems to explain more about attitudes and participation patterns, was developed by Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram. Their theory recognizes that public policy involves far more than the allocation of benefits and burdens, and that all aspects of policy design may be important. Policy design refers to the empirical characteristics of a statute, agency guidelines, or practices of street-level officials. They contend that policies contain common observable elements that influence the types of impacts of the policy. Policies typically have target populations—the people affected positively or negatively by the policy, goals or problems to be solved, benefits or costs or both that are being allocated, and rules that guide or constrain action or specify who is to do what to whom, when, and with what resources. Policies also contain tools that motivate agents or members of the general public to take the action recommended by the policy and rationales embedded in the policy text or used to legitimate the policy. Policies typically have an implementation “chain” in which one level of policy directs the actions of another at a “lower” level. Hence, policies contain people, whose behavior impinges on policy consequences. Policies also contain underlying assumptions about how people behave and what motivates them, about cause and effect, about scientific knowledge, and about the values that should be pursued.

Policies are not simply instrumental means, however, and contain symbolic and interpretive elements that are important in understanding their impacts. For example, policies that impose burdens on people may simultaneously show their respect for these people. Or policies that impose burdens may denigrate the target groups and blame them for their own plight. The consequences of these two types of policy are quite different.

Schneider and Ingram’s theory contends that policy designs are sometimes produced in institutions dominated by divisive social constructions that stigmatize some and extol the virtues of others. These social constructions interact with vastly unequal political power of target populations producing policy designs that, in turn, produce distinctive political attitudes and participation. Schneider and Ingram posit four types of target populations. Advantaged populations have considerable political power and positive social constructions, such as being “deserving,” “intelligent,”
hardworking,” and so on. Advantaged groups mainly receive benefits from government, but even if regulations are imposed, they tend to be those supported by the advantaged populations themselves as necessary to sustain their social position. Politics is a “game,” but it is winnable if played by the rules. Advantaged groups have high levels of traditional political participation.

Contenders also have a great deal of political power but carry negative social constructions. Contenders know that they are controversial and that their interests clash with others. The types of policy they receive tend to provide significant benefits that are however well disguised and protected from public view. The consequences of such designs are that contenders become suspicious and vigilant. They believe that the political game involves the raw use of power and is often crooked. Their participation patterns tend toward low mobilization but high levels of financial assistance to candidates and office holders, along with intense lobbying.

A third type of target group Schneider and Ingram called disadvantaged in that they have almost no political power and are socially constructed as helpless, needy, and unable to function effectively in a highly competitive society. Public officials need to be careful with disadvantaged groups, because there would be political damage if an official appears to be mean spirited; on the other hand, there is nothing much to be gained by providing benefits to these people. Hence, policy tends toward paternalistic assistance and considerable rhetoric about the needs of these people but inadequate resources to meet their needs. The results of such policy designs is that disadvantaged people come to believe that they are helpless and needy; that government “wants” to assist but does not have the resources to do so; and that their problems are best resolved through religious organizations, nonprofits, and local government. Traditional participation tends to be very low—low turnout, lack of contacting officials, and not much participation in interest groups.

The fourth type of target groups are deviants—people with almost no political power who are viewed negatively as dangerous, violent, a threat to “our way of life.” Policy directed at these groups tends to be overly punitive, as policymakers realize that considerable political capital can be gained by punishing these groups and holding them responsible for most of society’s problems, and the groups themselves have so little credibility that they are unable to respond. Traditional participation among deviants is very low but other forms—strikes, demonstrations, riots, terrorist attacks—will occur.

This typology also is useful in understanding policy consequences for social justice. The dynamics of degenerative democracy produces too many benefits for advantaged groups. The groups themselves support public officials who provide them with desired policy, and others will not complain because the positive social construction of advantaged groups means that they are viewed as “deserving.” Often, their interests are characterized as being necessary for the public good. And punishment for deviants will also become excessive as political leaders seek to outdo one another in being “tough.” In degenerative politics, where divisive social constructions interact with power to produce distinctive types of designs, disadvantaged people continue to suffer from limited access to opportunities—poor schools and unemployment producing a continuing underclass.

One primary contribution of political science to the study of policy impacts has been to broaden the discussion beyond the narrow emphasis on whether policy has been successful in solving problems or achieving its instrumental goals. Deborah Stone, for example, has been especially influential in addressing the many complexities of policy consequences. Policies typically have multiple goals, some of which may be in conflict with others. The question remains, however: Are there any systematic characteristics of policy designs that increase the likelihood of policy producing desired outcomes? Implementation scholars disagree over this question, as some such as Paul Sabatier argue that strong statutes are more likely to produce desired outcomes. Strong statutes contain clear statements of objectives, strong tools such as mandates, and little or no discretion for lower level agents. Others contend that policy designs must be fit into context and that designs that permit greater discretion at lower levels enable local officials to use local knowledge and are more likely to produce desired results. Still others focus on an analysis of
the context itself and argue that the characteristics of policy at a higher level need to differ, depending on context. For example, if cause and effect theory is uncertain or weak, or if the context varies extensively across locales, then policy should encompass a learning mode sometimes called adaptive management so that local-level agencies can adjust the policy as they learn more about its consequences.

Some political scientists question what constitutes “good” public policy. Many focus on economic criteria such as efficiency, although complexities in measuring societal benefits and costs typically prevent most policies being assessed in efficiency terms. Some propose that effectiveness is a guide—in the sense that it is effective in addressing problems. As mentioned above, however, there may be many different indicators of effectiveness and little agreement on which are more important. Others have added that justice (fairness) must be considered when assessing the desired consequences of policy and that support for citizenship and institutions also must be ascertained. Unintended consequences must be considered and weighed against the positive effects.

To summarize, political science has made major contributions to the study of policy impacts, particularly in proposing a more complex way of conceptualizing what is meant by public policy and by broadening the discussion beyond the narrow view that policy serves only to solve a specific problem. Policy has many consequences for democracy, and theories of policy impact need to embrace them.

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See also Implementation

Further Readings

Imperialism

The term *imperialism* contains the prefix *imperial*, at once an adjective and a noun. As an adjective, *imperial* means pertaining to empire or the ruler, an emperor or empress, and this is used to refer to characteristics that befit a ruler, such as majesty, regality, or grandeur. The term *imperial* also conveys the character of rule by a sovereign state over its dependencies or a commanding quality or manner of that rule. For these reasons, the term *imperial* has been associated with despotic, high-handed, and/or authoritarian rule. As a noun and in the context of political authority, an *imperial* is a member of imperial party, including troops. Imperialism in the senses above implies the pursuit of grandeur or the desire, policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and dominion of one political entity over another. From the above perspectives, imperialism has a long ancestry in multiple traditions and thus may be found historically to exist on many continents. One could reasonably speak of imperialism in the contexts of historic China and France, the Moguls in India, the Roman and Holy Roman empires, the Ottoman, Mali, and Mayan empires, and the like. In most of these contexts, an imperialist would mean an adherent of an emperor or empress or an advocate of such an adherence. The associated irredentist processes and forms constituted imperialism in its present understanding. For instance, these empires necessarily originated from a locality before outward expansions that required the dismantling of competing governments and the subordination of the resident authorities. Still, their ideologies, policies, systems of law, and organizing principles and norms emerged from contexts that are different from those of modern imperialisms.

The shift toward modern imperialism began under Pax Britannica, the period when Great Britain set the terms of the European order (and by
extension world order) owing to its defeat of France at Waterloo in 1815, its unchallenged sea power, and control of the key naval trade routes. Pax Britannica coincided with scientific and industrial revolutions, the rise of finance capital and consumer society, transformations in the material conditions of states, and advances in warfare and bureaucracy that set the context for unprecedented overseas British expansionism in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Subsequently, Britain came to dominate overseas markets and managed to project its “influence” over most regions of the world. The terms and conditions of British expansionism gave modern imperialism its distinctive characteristics. Above all, the new British expansionism involved a worldwide colonial system. From Waterloo in 1815 to the 1870 Franco-Prussian War to the beginning of World War I in 1914, Great Britain helped set in motion processes, structures, and relationships under a colonial order consisting of zones of influence, colonies, protectorates, trusteeships, and the like. Moreover, Britain associated its own dominions (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa), other European powers, most notably France, and Japan and the United States in the management of this order under distinct colonial systems. For the above reasons, the expansionist activities of the era extending from the 19th century to the early 20th century were dubbed the New Imperialism.

There is a long-standing debate in Britain and the West, particularly among politicians and academics, about the motivation, wisdom, and utility of imperialism as well as the usefulness of the term itself. Most authors would trace the debate back to John Hobson’s 1902 critique of imperialism and questions raised about the factors contributing to the New Imperialism. Accordingly, the roots of the New Imperialism are found in policies linked to the resolutions of the following problems: the maldistribution of wealth and underconsumption, the requirements of finance capitalism; commercial competition among rival industrialized countries; the erosion of British hegemony and the subsequent breakdown of the concert of Europe; challenges to Britain’s dominance in world trade; quest for a supply of cheap raw materials to support home industries as a means to recovery from the Long Depression of 1873 to 1896 and beyond; the abandonment of free trade by rival European powers; and the need to overcome the constraints of domestic markets through export opportunities. Furthermore, it has been argued that imperialism was an instrument of national cohesion in the face of domestic restlessness, working-class militancy, and the emergence of radical left-leaning parties after the Depression. For others still, the New Imperialism was a matter of national pride (France after defeat in the Franco-Prussian war): a sign of national grandeur and manifest destiny (Germany on industrialization and the United States under the Monroe Doctrine) or a marker of racial equality and non-discrimination (Japan after Meiji).

The New Imperialism soon turned into formal colonial regimes under which imperial powers took administrative control of “foreign” lands and turned them into colonies and dependencies. Initially, imperial powers established control through chartered companies such as the British East India Company. These corporations were afforded semisovereign status under letter patents that afforded them rights and titles allowing them to acquire territories outside of Europe and to exercise within them the total monopoly of power. The transition to formal imperialism in India and elsewhere was thus effected when companies transferred their prior administrative functions to European governments. The new administrative arrangements also associated trained natives as civil service for colonial rule. Thereafter, Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, the United States, and others proclaimed sovereignty or overlordship of foreign populations under diminished legal and political capacities. Formal imperialism in Africa began dramatically with the Berlin Conference (1884–1885), which moderated competition between colonial powers by defining “effective occupation” as the criterion for international recognition of territorial claims. The Sykes-Picot (-Sazonov) Agreement of 1916 was the moral equivalent of the Berlin Agreement for the Ottoman provinces of the Arab World. A secret agreement, it defined the respective spheres of influence of the United Kingdom and France in West Asia with the assent of Imperial Russia and in anticipation of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. The post–World War I mandate system revived the mythical “White man’s burden” under a so-called sacred trust as the means to incorporate former German colonies into existing imperial orders.
Among observers and scholars, these activities led to multiple explanations about the advent of imperialism. Conservatives favored political and psychological factors and therefore linked imperialism to the need to preserve the social order. Liberals who had been reluctant backers of imperialism nonetheless branded its economic benefits despite contravening free trade. Marxists, however, were struck by the rivalry and mutual suspicion that characterized international diplomacy throughout the era. Imperialist ambitions and rivalries in East Asia inevitably came to focus on the vast empire of China whose sovereignty barely survived the unequal treaties imposed on it by European powers. In any case, some Marxists attributed World War I to imperial ambitions and rivalries. Among them, Vladimir Lenin (1916) advanced the thesis that imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism.

Since Lenin, the debate on imperialism crystallized around two central questions. First is the extent to which imperialism was necessary and inevitable given the nature of the international order and the uneven capacities of states and economic agents. The second, favored by some Marxists, gravitates around the preposition of a necessary relationship between capitalist developments and imperialism. The relevant theses have been taken up in different contexts by world system theorists who view imperialism as part of a general, gradual extension of capital investment from the “core” of the industrial countries to a less developed “periphery.” With the globalization of capital and the ubiquitous importance of civil society, other Marxists puzzled about the persistence of critical dimensions of imperialism under Pax Americana (the relative peace in the Western Hemisphere as a result of U.S. leadership during the second half of the 20th century). They turned to Antonio Gramsci’s theses on the advent of hegemony, particularly on the role of “spontaneous consent” in perpetuating what might reasonably be called imperialism. They also drew attention to the ideological function of education in order to gain insight into the expansion of capitalism and the associated market institutions and modes of government.

On decolonization and the formal transfer of power to the newly created independent states, increasing numbers of scholars and politicians have dismissed the utility of the notion of imperialism in today’s world. The dismissal is founded on two orders of deficiencies. The first, found in conservative and liberal theories, is the focus placed on the outward bureaucratic and organizational dimensions of imperialism at the time of creation and maintenance of domination and subordination. The second, found in Marxism and other radical theories, is the focus on dated historical events, for instance, the modes of expansions that established unequal economic, cultural, and territorial relationships between imperial states and their formal dominions. Indeed, it is hard today to entertain the possibility of direct or outright imperialism in which any power could claim to be justified by law or providence to take over the government of a territory other than its own. Nor could any power insist on a right to unequal relations with other political entities.

Indeed, the focus on state identity and ideology or culture and discourses may be misplaced today. To be sure, the novelty of the New Imperialism and the formal colonial empires that followed it had to do with the scale of the colonial order. The construction of empire required a domestic ideology associated with state identity and rationalizing narratives (of destiny and providence). The imperial project also required self-justification—for instance, to right the wrongs done by others or to improve the lot through trusteeships or mandates. In these regards, imperialism had the backing of elements of civil society. These elements successfully articulated their own private desires, passions, and motives of acquisition, enrichment, and self-aggrandizement as the national interest and then caused legislators and executives to spring into colonial adventures as means of defending the latter. These private interests were comforted in their positions by ideologues such as consumer advocates seeking to advance the good life, liberal progressives (who once engineered mandate systems under the sacred trust), and so-called cosmopolitans and internationalists. Science helped define conceptions of the moral qualities of subjects, the status of individual societies within the moral order, and the entitlements or deserts due to them. International law, legal doctrines, and jurisprudence completed the discourses of the emergent international order by providing the norms and instruments of empire. Each discourse played a part in defining the morality and ethics of war and peace.
Thus conceived, imperialism is not an arbitrary act. Historically, it remains a reflex or realism that has been guided, according to material conditions, by the available logics of power, the permissible modes of interventions, the applicable political and ethical traditions, and a recurrent theology and ideology of a preordained but singular hierarchical order lodged in the West. From this sovereignty flow inherent rights and privileges, a notion of predestined leadership, an assumed legitimacy of interests, an a priori and necessary absolution of sins against others, and a singular expectation of access to the necessary resources of its chosen lifestyle, presently the good life. These imperial claims, which were once contested within colonial empires, are yet to disappear from international relations today. Indeed, real and aspiring imperial states continue to demand deference from others even in the postcolonial world. This is not done without contestations, but to underscore the point, we still witness occasional unilateral political and military interventions to remind us of the lingering presence of the imperium.

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See also Power; Power and International Politics; Superpower

Further Readings

IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation refers to the carrying out of policy or authoritative actions in support of policy goals. Implementation is closely affiliated with the classic political function of executing laws, but implementation research also focuses on the execution of authoritative policies other than laws, such as administrative rules issued by government and policies made by local governments. Several stages, factors, and actors are involved in the implementation process and affect its results. Implementation is a continuation of the policy formation process, but it also involves new actors. The implementation process and its results depend on whether the policy design is valid and on what policy instruments have been selected. Also, the number and interests of the actors that are involved in carrying out the policy and the relationships between them affect the implementation process and results. Managers have an important but difficult task in transforming and communicating the policy down to the frontline workers. Because of the discretion that these workers typically have, they play a key role in delivering the policy to citizens or firms and enforcing the rules associated with it.

While most implementation studies analyze the implementation of one particular policy or a set of related policies, some bottom-up implementation scholars are more interested in local problem solving. These problems are typically defined by the researchers themselves, for example, Christopher Hull and Benny Hjern. They would often focus on a set of policies that have an impact on a given policy problem, for example, chronic youth unemployment or helping small firms grow. The relevance of this kind of research depends on whether the reader accepts the definition of the problem. This entry focuses on official public policy goals and mandates as a standard for implementation is warranted from a democratic effectiveness perspective. Democracy concerns not only how policies are made but also whether or not they are executed. Policy goals formulated in legislatures, governments, and local governments have a particular legitimate status and are relevant for holding government accountable.

The start of implementation research was stimulated by evaluation research. President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society social policy reforms in United States in the 1960s and 1970s fostered a lot of evaluation research. The effects of the new welfare state programs were assessed and improvements in social engineering suggested. As most
evaluation studies actually showed little or no effect of the social program interventions, the first interpretation suggested that the program was a failure and based on wrong program theory. However, gradually, another interpretation emerged that the causal theory behind the planned policy intervention might after all be valid, but the intervention had not taken place as intended. This led to an interest in studying the relation between planned and actual interventions and the administrative process in between policy making and social interventions.

Most people consider Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky’s 1973 book *Implementation* to be the first major piece of implementation research. It was a case study of a federal economic development program in Oakland, California, that had been created to enhance minority employment. It failed to do so, however, due to the complexity of many actors having to work together and because it was based on an invalid causal theory of how to stimulate minority employment. The book certainly opened the field of implementation research, yet some pieces of earlier research by, for example, Herbert Kaufman and Jerome Murphy had actually focused on implementation problems.

The organization of this entry is based not on a chronological review of the implementation literature but on the Integrated Implementation Model (Figure 1). The model was developed by Søren Winter to integrate some of the theoretically most promising implementation factors identified by various implementation scholars into a common analytical framework.

For dependent variables, the model focuses on both the actions of implementers in delivering policies and the societal outcomes in relation to the official policy objectives. Implementation research was long dominated by stories of implementation failures. The implementation of policies typically failed to achieve the planned outcomes, and implementers failed to deliver the mandated services or in enforcing regulations. Or the process suffered from serious delays. Implementation research focused mainly on barriers to successful implementation. However, gradually, more optimistic studies were made. One of the important insights was that time horizons matter. Often, policy programs suffer from start-up problems that are gradually ameliorated over the years on the basis of experience. Sometimes, it may take a decade or more to carry out a successful implementation. Implementation results also tend to vary among localities at any given point in time.

The first set of factors, which affects implementation results, is the policy design. Even perfect implementation processes and outputs are not likely to be successful if the expected causal relationship between policy objectives and means is invalid. Second, implementation is affected by the commitment of authorities and organizations that are involved in implementing policies and by the interorganizational relations between them. Third, managers’ transmission of organizational policies to the staff is crucial. While management matters, it is no simple matter! Fourth, this complexity is due to the discretionary behaviors of street-level bureaucrats in their interactions with target groups. These bureaucrats typically enjoy some autonomy vis-à-vis the legislation and their managers. Fifth, target groups not only are passive recipients of public policies but are often active in affecting implementation outputs as well as outcomes. Sixth, implementation results are conditioned by socioeconomic factors. What makes organizations, street-level bureaucrats, and target groups important political actors in the implementation process is that their contributions to implementation are affected by their action models, which for all three sets of actors analytically are made up of actor interests and the resources the actors master. After presenting the theoretical implementation framework in the following, some major implementation research strategies and methodologies will be discussed before the entry is concluded.

**Policy Design**

Too many implementation researchers have erroneously put the whole blame for any lack of goal achievement on implementation. This is in sharp contrast to the early evaluation scholars who had blamed the policy design for any lack of effect. As noted by Peter May, well-designed policies are necessary but not sufficient for improving implementation prospects. A policy design typically contains a set of goals, a mix of instruments for obtaining these goals, a designation of governmental or nongovernmental entities charged with carrying out the goals, and an allocation of resources for the
requisite tasks. Policy design, and particular policy instruments, has received substantial research interest since the 1980s, for example, by Stephen Linder and Guy Peters, Lester Salamon, and May.

According to this literature, any policy can be disaggregated into one or a mix of few generic policy instruments. Unfortunately, the common research interest has not led to agreement on any typology of instruments. One simple classification focuses on rules (often combined with sanctions for noncompliance), economic incentives, and information, all of which aim at affecting the behavior of either target groups or intermediaries (implementers).

Policy designs may affect the implementation process and results in various ways. The pioneers of implementation research saw goal clarity as the key to implementation success. However, according to later research, conflicting, unclear, and ambiguous goals are the rule rather than the exception in public policies, and decent implementation results can be achieved even in these circumstances. Different mixes of instruments are not equally effective in obtaining a given policy objective. In summarizing the scant empirical evidence in the field, May suggests that policy designs are important in affecting the incentives of intermediaries to carry out their requisite tasks, particularly through affecting their commitment and capacity and by signaling desired actions.

The selected instruments may also affect the overall implementation structure and process because certain instruments tend to favor the formation of particular implementation structures.
Mandates aimed at regulating the behavior of target groups normally require a staff for inspecting and enforcing the mandate and a set of sanctions. Information strategies and use of economic incentives such as environmental taxes can sometimes be implemented with less staff, although there is no one-to-one relationship between instruments and staff requirements. Some taxes are relatively automatic and easy to collect, such as an environmental tax per unit of gasoline sold, while others require a substantial staff for inspection and enforcing, for example, taxing diffuse pollution.

However, while, as already indicated by Pressman and Wildavsky, the validity of the causal theory linking instruments to objectives is crucial, the research documentation of instrument effects is still meager. One reason is that effects of instruments on implementation often depend on the context, including the political context. Consequently, designing good policies is not a simple, technocratic process such as selecting the best types of materials for building a bridge.

Policy design also involves organizational design, that is, what types of organizations are to be involved in implementing the policy, and what types of incentives can be used to increase their commitment to the policy and its objectives? Organizational implementation structures are often quite messy and uncoordinated. Some top-down implementation scholars like Daniel Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier hold quite optimistic views on the ability of policy proponents to structure the implementation process to provide more commitment and loyal implementation. Critics of their viewpoint, however, argue that policies are often political compromises that also include policy opponents with little interest in making an effective implementation structure.

The roots of problematic policy designs and implementation problems can often be found in the prior policy formulation process. For instance, conflicts in this process often create a policy with conflicting and ambiguous goals and an invalid causal theory embedded in a policy design that does not adequately connect the goals to the means. Furthermore, symbolic policies are sometimes adopted to address a policy problem without actually offering the means that could achieve the stated objectives. And as first claimed by Eugene Bardach, conflicts in policy formation often continue in the subsequent implementation process. It is important to understand that ineffective policy designs are not always due to lack of knowledge on the part of the policy designers. According to Terry Moe, policy design of instruments and organizational structure is first of all a political process, in which political actors—including both policy proponents and opponents—try to maximize their own interests. This includes the selection of an organizational structure that will maximize their long-term control of the implementation process.

Unfortunately, the research evidence on how different organizational arrangements contribute to implementation success or failure is rather modest. For example, we have very little evidence on the effectiveness or efficiency of using federal or state government field offices, local governments, nonprofit organization, or private firms for delivering public services. One study found that Danish central government field offices pay more attention to, are more committed to, and comply more completely with, the national employment policy rules on emphasizing quick job placements than is the case for local government agencies. May and collaborators show not only that cooperative regulatory strategies adopted by central or state governments toward local governments can provide more commitment and compliance at the local level by preventing flooding but also that these strategies can backfire for particular “bad apples.”

According to many studies, outsourcing relatively technical public tasks is in most cases more efficient than public provision of services. However, the research on the effects of outsourcing of more classic social services to for-profit or nonprofit providers is much more limited and has more inconsistent findings. When comparing the effects of employment service provision of public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations in the United States, Carolyn Heinrich and colleagues did not find any difference, while Danish analyses find that for-profit and nonprofit providers deliver both poorer outputs (e.g., in terms of job emphasis) and poorer employment outcomes with much higher unit costs than public providers. However, the overpricing may be due to large subsidies of outsourcing applied by the Danish government. More research is needed on how various types of organizations contribute to implementation success.
Interorganizational Relations

Implementation processes are characterized by organizational and interorganizational behaviors that represent different degrees of commitment and coordination. In their seminal implementation study, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) focused on the “complexity of joint action,” according to which successful implementation is likely to be negatively related to the number of actors, the diversity of their interests and perspectives, and the number of decision and veto points. Given the great number of actors, subsequent decisions, and veto points that is typical in policy implementation, Pressman and Wildavsky stated in their book *Implementation* that the fact that federal policies work at all is amazing. As an illustration, they suggested a series of subsequent implementation decisions with a relative high probability of success in each of, say, 90%. Yet, according to Pressman and Wildavsky, it only takes seven decisions to lower the cumulated chance of success to less than 50%.

One of their key insights was that the complexity of joint actions is not found only when implementing organizations fundamentally disagree with the policy objectives or with each other; it even takes place when implementing organizations generally agree about the reform goals but have slightly different perspectives on the implementation. For some authorities or organizations with implementation tasks, contributing positively to the implementation may be at odds with other commitments, or they may simply prefer other tasks that are more crucial to the core tasks of the organization. Or it may just be that organizations have different time lines for contributing to the implementation assembly process. However, serious conflicts of interest and bureaucratic politics tend to make implementation even more difficult.

Thus, how organizations contribute to the implementation process is strongly affected by their action model, which consists of their interests and their resources for pursuing them. Implementing organizations may have interests that are identical with the public policy. They agree both with its goals and means. Their interests may also be convergent. Although not agreeing with the goals, they agree with the means. An implementation success is more likely if organizations have interests that are identical or at least converge with the policy. However, implementation prospects are based not only on interests but also on the resources that organizations can use for pursuing their interests.

Bardach describes the implementation process as a series of “implementation games” that organizations play for promoting their own interests. The complexity of joint action and implementation games may lead to implementation failures, delays, or biases in the implementation outputs and outcomes that are produced. The notion of “the complexity of joint action” seems related to the proverb of “too many cooks spoil the broth.” However, according to Laurence O’Toole, this problem applies only to certain kinds of interorganizational implementation settings. Decision points are not independent of each other. An early agreement on basic understandings can enhance implementation success by promoting “bandwagon effects” in later decisions, and decisions can be merged by crafting “package deals.”

Implementation prospects also depend on the type of resource dependencies among participating organizations. The “complexity of joint action” is most relevant for a chain of sequential relations. Here, a particular organization, A, cannot produce its implementation contribution without receiving outputs from another organization, B, while B does not need any outputs from A. It is like Christmas tree lights where one dead bulb can put out all bulbs if they are connected on series rather than in parallel. The parallel connection resembles pooled relations where multiple organizations can produce implementation outputs independently of each other. This can produce relatively good implementation results although the coordination may not be optimal. Finally, reciprocal relations—where two or more organizations are dependent on each other—can decrease the likelihood of veto points because both organizations have incentives to cooperate. Reciprocal relations can be created based on exchange of services or money. Accordingly, better implementation results can sometimes be obtained by replacing sequential relations by reciprocal or pooled ones.

Interorganizational relations and the role of outsourcing and third parties in implementation have stimulated a substantial research interest under the labels of policy networks, governance networks, or implementation regimes. A common
theme is the dependency of public authorities on resources from the private sector—for example, interest groups, associations, and firms—for implementing public policies. Perceived benefits for policymakers and implementers may be expertise, information, legitimization, or more cost-effective ways of providing services or enforcing regulations. In some countries—particularly the United States—private for-profit and nonprofit actors are involved so much in policy implementation that Brinton Milward talks about the “hollowing out of the state.” Network studies focus on the character of networks and interdependencies, why networks are created, if and how they are sustained over time, and the democratic and participatory consequences of networks. This is also a key interest in corporatist research that studies the formal integration of major interest organizations into public policy making and implementation. Given the enormous research interest in networks, surprisingly few studies have so far examined the effects of different types of networks on implementation outputs or outcomes.

While interorganizational implementation research focuses on commitment and collaboration at the organizational level, managers have important roles in bridging inter- and intra-organizational levels when supervising street-level bureaucrats. However, much of the normatively based management literature fails to acknowledge the difficulties involved in this managerial task. The role of managers is considered below after discussion of the role of street-level bureaucrats in the implementation process.

Street-Level Bureaucracy

After the first group of implementation studies had focused mainly on the role of organizations in policy implementation, in 1980, Michael Lipsky turned the policy process upside down. He claimed that street-level bureaucrats are the real policymakers. His theory of “street-level bureaucracy” focuses on the discretionary decisions that each frontline worker is making when delivering policies to individual citizens. Often such decisions are made in face-to-face interactions with clients behind closed office doors or in the field as when an environmental inspector is inspecting a farm. It is not easy for managers to monitor bureaucratic behaviors in such encounters. Their discretion makes street-level bureaucrats essential actors in implementing public policies.

Although Lipsky emphasizes the individual role of street-level bureaucrats in implementing public policies, it is an ironic aspect of the theory that their similar working conditions make all street-level bureaucrats apply similar behaviors whether they are teachers, police officers, nurses, doctors, or social workers. It also means that organizational differences and bureaucrats’ individual attitudes are not expected to have important implications for their behaviors.

Although trying to do their best, street-level bureaucrats are experiencing a gap between the demands they meet from legislative mandates, managers, and citizens on one side and their high workload on the other. In this situation, they all apply a number of coping mechanisms that systematically distort their work in relation to the intentions of the legislation. They ration services; make priorities between their tasks; process their clients through simple, standardized procedures, tending to favor the easier and more resourceful clients (creaming); and seek to control clients. Over time, street-level bureaucrats develop more cynical perceptions of the clients and modify the policy objectives that are the basis of their work. These coping strategies imply that the implementation of public policies is systematically biased compared with legislative mandates, for example, for individualized, yet equal treatment. According to Lipsky, even increasing staff resources is no solution to coping problems because more resources may lead to more demand for services.

A group of implementation scholars has a strong focus on these frontline workers. What unites them is a conviction that the behaviors of these workers have important implications for implementation that are inversely related to these workers’ rank in the hierarchy. While Lipsky focuses on similarities in street-level bureaucratic behaviors, some implementation scholars seek to explain variation in the behaviors of these bureaucrats. They typically differ with respect to the aspects of frontline workers’ behaviors they consider as dependent variables and to the concepts they apply. While Lipsky’s coping strategies are reporting supposedly dysfunctional behaviors, John Brehm and Scott Gates suggest that street-level bureaucrats work, shirk, or
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sabotage. Bureaucrats persistently and loyally implement public policies when working. They do too little when shirking—either for leisure or because they disagree with the policy. Sabotage is a conscious attempt to actively counteract the aims of the public policy because these bureaucrats disagree with the policy mandate and follow another course of line. In their empirical work, Brehm and Gates find that street-level bureaucrats actually do work—not because of managerial directives and control—but because they fundamentally agree with the policy (refer to text below).

Other implementation studies examine the actions of these frontline bureaucrats, for example, in terms of the effort that they spend, the choices they make on what kind of clients and what aspects of their behaviors to focus on, and the tools that they employ, as well as the decisions they make. Particularly in regulation research, some research has focused on the styles that inspectors employ in day-to-day interactions with target groups (regulatees). Inspectors may, for example, differ in how legalistic versus flexible they are and how coercive versus trusting they are. However, style also seems to be a useful concept for social policy implementation, for example, when analyzing caseworkers’ professional distance to the client versus personal involvement in addition to the above style dimensions. Studies of street-level bureaucrats typically find considerable variation in their behaviors, including both coping and styles.

This raises the crucial question of how this variation can be explained. Again, studies vary in the explanatory variables they consider. Some focus on the organizational norms by which frontline workers are socialized, which form their basis for treating clients. This research tradition has participants from both sociology (e.g., Pierre Bourdieu, Erving Goffmann, and Margaretha Järvinen) and political science (e.g., Jodi Sandfort, Steven Maynard-Moody, and Michael Musheno). Some studies within that tradition pay particular attention to how bureaucrats, often unconsciously, use power to make citizens comply with their directives. Through identity work, bureaucrats are trying to make citizens accept their identity and diagnosis as are specified by the bureaucrat. Citizens must accept the frontline worker’s definition of their problematic behavior and cooperate and improve to be perceived as a deserving client, which is often a precondition for receiving services. Thus, a client is “created.” The function of identity work is to make each client fit the repertoire of measures that are available to the worker. These “institutionalization processes” are based on the norms of the organization.

While this perspective emphasizes the role of organizations for individual behaviors, other perspectives focus on the role of people. With inspiration from the classic theory of representative bureaucracy by Donald Kingsley, some studies suggest that street-level bureaucrats’ behaviors are affected by their social background, for example, socioeconomic, ethnic, and gender as well as educational background. According to the classic theory on representative bureaucracy, the actions of public administration reflect the values of the social strata from where bureaucrats come. The theory was refuted for decades by studies of bureaucrats particularly in central government. However, recently some scholars—for example, Kenneth Meier and collaborators—have claimed that the theory might have more relevance at the front lines. Thus, social background and norms are likely to be more relevant when services are delivered and regulations enforced in direct interactions with citizens and firms and where bureaucrats typically have substantial discretion. According to some studies, gender does matter, for example, for prosecution and conviction in rape cases. By the same token, some studies indicate that minority students perform better in schools with a minority representation among teachers above a certain threshold.

Whereas the previous perspectives assume some kind of collective impact on the behaviors of street-level bureaucrats—that is, from the very job functions of street-level bureaucrats in general, organizational norms, or earlier socialization into the norms of a certain social group—some studies focus on the effects of individual differences among street-level bureaucrats in terms of their abilities and attitudes. Peter May and Søren Winter have found some empirical support for the importance of individual factors. They report substantially greater variation in caseworker behaviors within local employment service agencies than between these agencies. They also found that street-level bureaucrats’ knowledge and attitudes have a considerable influence on the extent to
which their behaviors are reflecting the policy mandate.

According to Winter, several kinds of attitudes can affect street-level bureaucratic behaviors, that is, their attitudes on (a) the policy, (b) the effectiveness of the tools that are available, (c) the target groups, and (d) their perceived workload. Bureaucrats’ attitudes on the factors that are most closely related to their daily work—such as how they perceive and evaluate various tools, their clients, and their workload—appear to have stronger behavioral effects than their ideological—and more abstract—view on the overall policy. How street-level bureaucrats perceive the adequacy of their workload seems to have stronger behavioral effects—for coping and other kinds of behaviors—than have differences in their actual workload.

According to this research perspective, street-level bureaucrats are even more important as policymakers than implied by Lipsky’s and the other street-level bureaucracy perspectives above because individual street-level bureaucrats are making important authoritative decisions on the content of the policies, which are delivered to citizens and firms, based on the bureaucrats’ own individual preferences. However, although there is a substantial variation in their behaviors, Winter and May also found that Danish street-level bureaucrats show a considerable loyalty to the law.

Management

As indicated by the above analysis, managerial control of street-level bureaucrats is no easy task. The very nature of street-level bureaucrats’ practices implies that they exercise considerable discretion in encounters with target groups that are normally not very visible to managers. While bookstores abound with simple recipes for excellent management, these are rarely based on systematic empirical research on public management. And the existing evidence is limited and suggests that managing street-level bureaucrats is by no means a simple but a difficult and complex task.

In a meta-analysis, George Boyne finds surprisingly few studies on effects of management on performance or outcomes. Yet he finds some evidence that management does matter. However, because such studies measure the direct link between management and outcomes, it is hard to know through what kinds of street-level bureaucratic practices managers can bring about better outcomes. Some causal links are missing. Unfortunately, so far, very few studies have examined the effects of management on street-level bureaucratic behaviors. Most studies indicate that these effects are limited and context contingent. The research challenge is to specify to what extent and how management affects street-level bureaucratic behaviors in given contexts. Such research has just begun, however. Some preliminary findings from studies of the implementation of employment policy by May, Winter, and associates can be mentioned.

Principal–agent theory offers a promising way for studying these relationships. According to its basic assumptions, a principal (manager) and his or her bureaucratic agents may not share all preferences, and the relationship is characterized by information asymmetry that systematically disadvantage principals. When applied to the management of street-level bureaucrats, managers’ influence seems to vary with the visibility of street-level bureaucratic practices. Some are quite transparent and easy to measure and monitor, for example, social caseworkers’ application of sanctions when clients are absent from mandatory employment promoting measures with no good cause. Other kinds of behaviors are more invisible, for example, coping behaviors and to what extent employment service bureaucrats emphasize immediate jobs in conversations with clients. Managerial objectives are likely to be better reflected in frontline practices when these are relatively visible.

Having an effective manager does not always result in better implementation. Sometimes street-level bureaucrats experience a multiple principal problem. Their local managers are not always loyal to the letter and spirit of the law. This may be reinforced if local political bodies resist national policies. Managerial tools also vary in the extent to which they are goal directed or capacity building. While capacity building through increasing staff or general information provision might generally improve the implementation of national policies, the effect of using the more goal-directed management tools may depend on whether local policies support or oppose national ones. Examples of highly goal-directed management tools are managers’ clear signals of their expectations for frontline behaviors and recruitment of workers with a better
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fit with the goals of the organization. Greater application of such managerial instruments tends to induce poorer implementation of national policies among street-level bureaucrats when local policies resist national ones.

Finally, management is relational. This implies that the effect of management practices on street-level bureaucratic behaviors is often contingent on the characteristics of individual street-level bureaucrats, including their expertise, motivation, and perception of the applied management tools. In a study of the implementation of Danish employment policy, May and Winter found that all managerial effects on the extent to which caseworkers emphasized jobs in conversations with clients were contingent on caseworkers’ perceived professional knowledge—for example, delegation improves implementation when workers have knowledge but weakens it when they do not. Similarly, in line with Bruno Frey’s theory on motivation crowding in and out, Danish studies by Lotte Andersen and Thomas Pallesen show that performance pay and regulation of university faculty have positive effects on research publication productivity only if the faculty perceives these instruments as supportive of professional norms rather than as monitoring or control.

Although the direct and contingent effects of management on the behavior of street-level bureaucrats are often limited, indirect effects must also be taken into account. These include the impact that managers have on the attitudes of their frontline workers and on in-service training and the way in which managers by designing or changing organizational structures can shape bureaucratic attitudes and behaviors.

Target Groups

The target groups of a public policy have important roles both for the production of implementation outputs and outcomes. Target groups affect the implementation behaviors of agencies and street-level bureaucrats, and outcomes that achieve policy goals often require that target groups change their behaviors.

In depictions of the classic ideal type of the democratic chain of control, citizens are active when articulating political demands and electing political representatives but relatively passive and law-abiding subjects when it comes to the execution of the law. However, as much service production and regulatory enforcement take place in interactions between street-level bureaucrats and target populations, citizens and firms do often play an active role in shaping implementation outputs in a kind of coproduction of services and enforcement.

As noted above, clients can be relatively powerless in processes of coping, identity work, and creation of clients, but the power of target populations in implementation processes varies across and within policy areas. There is a huge difference between the position of nonunionized welfare minority clients in welfare and employment policy implementation on one hand and organized farmers in the implementation of agricultural support and environmental programs on the other hand. As is the case for street-level bureaucrats, the role of target populations in policy implementation depends on their action model in terms of their preferences and abilities. Relevant resources are cognitive skills, expertise, wealth, affiliation with other actors with resources including powerful interest groups (whether the group has a positive or negative social construction), and institutional arrangements and norms.

For decades it has been debated in the regulatory literature whether regulated industries tend to capture the public regulatory enforcement apparatus to make it a servant rather than a master. While capture was earlier the dominating research position, for the last couple of decades, the capture theory has found less theoretical and empirical support. The role of interest groups in implementation processes varies among political systems. Often strong interest representation is found in implementing committees in some European countries with strong corporatist traditions. According to Scandinavian studies, interest organizations still have a strong role in policy implementation, even though their formal inclusion in the policy-making process has been reduced during the past few decades, when their position apparently has weakened when compared with that of legislative bodies. In some more pluralistic political systems such as the United States, interest groups tend to be more fragmented in terms of representation, are generally less formally involved in policy making and implementation, and more often act as external pressure groups. Yet some recent research indicates that the
role of U.S. interest groups in implementation—including administrative rule making—may be stronger than previously expected.

As Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen has found, the resources that individual firms and organizations can engage in conversations with regulatory inspectors can put pressure on these inspectors. This may affect their enforcement directly but also indirectly through the formation of the informal rules of the game for such interactions, which in turn affect how regulations are enforced. She found that regulations are more leniently enforced for public institutions, which speak the same language as the regulators, than for private firms. Also, big firms with substantial expertise in the regulatory area as well as local economic importance—tend to be more successful than small ones in negotiating enforcement terms.

For social policy implementation, some theories claim that clients with few personal resources are systematically disadvantaged in their interactions with the administrative system. According to the access theory originally developed by Bernhard Schaffer and Huang Wen-hsien, clients have to cross three thresholds to get access to the services to which they are entitled. The first is the registration threshold. For many services, eligible clients must apply themselves, which tends to disadvantage clients with poor educational background, poor knowledge about their rights, and low social status. This can be reinforced by some emotional factors, including stigmatizing. Some clients do not perceive themselves as deserving assistance, or they may hold personal ideals of dignity in fending for themselves.

Second, clients must cross the competence threshold, which requires that one can handle the interaction with the bureaucracy, including being acquainted with the formal and informal rules of the game and applied decision criteria and being able to formulate one’s thoughts. This again disadvantages clients with a poor educational and social background. Finally, clients must be able to cross the efficiency threshold, and some do not make it because they do not fit with staffs’ perceptions on how available services would be most effectively distributed among clients. Also, the efficiency threshold tends to bias the implementation systematically to the benefit of clients with more resources but disadvantages clients with a poor educational and social background (refer also to Lipsky’s concept of “creaming” earlier).

Target groups have also important roles in relation to implementation outcomes. Most public policies aim at changing the problematic behaviors of—or conditions for—citizens or firms by either regulating their behaviors or providing services for them that will help them do better. Most policies build on an explicit—or often implicit—causal theory on how these behaviors and conditions can be changed by public intervention. However, as indicated above these causal theories are not always valid. Unfortunately, political science research has not paid much attention to the outcomes of public policies and the mechanisms that affect how citizens and firms respond to public policies and the way in which they are implemented. Some attention to these issues has been paid in regulation research in the borderline between sociology, economics, psychology, and political science. While developed for regulatory policies, the theorizing seems to have some relevance for social policies as well.

Citizens’ and firms’ responses to public policy implementation are based on their individual action model according to which their behaviors are influenced by their ability and motivations (refer to the above text). Among abilities, cognitive skills are very important. This first includes knowledge of the rules, which may be one of the most important factors in explaining how citizens and firms respond. When people do not comply with regulations or get their rights, it is often not because of lack of will but lack of knowledge of the rules. For decades, many parents of handicapped children in Denmark have not been compensated for taking care of their child at home because they are not aware of their legal rights. Second, favorable outcomes also depend on whether people know how to translate rules into concrete action. Farmers may know the agro-environmental rules but may not know what a particular rule implies for their farming practices. Financial capacity and resilience can also be important—not least for firms in regulatory policies.

Three main types of motivations can be identified. Economic motivation concerns the perceived net utility of different courses of action including compliance/noncompliance. For regulatory and criminal policies, deterrence theory involves a
calculation of costs and benefits of not complying. Into that calculus enter both the perceived risk of being detected and the risk of being punished if violating the law, the costs of required additional investments and other production costs for complying, and the expected profits from different courses of action. Studies seem to converge on finding substantial effects of perceived detection risk, while most studies find no or weak effects of perceived sanction risk. Economic motivations also seem relevant for target groups in several social policies.

Social motivation builds on the wish of citizens and firms to get respect and social recognition from peers by following their social expectations. Thus, people comply not because they agree with the policy but because “significant others” expect them to comply. Those may be peers, friends and family, or customers and other firms, for example, trade organizations. For example, the fact that drunk driving has become socially less acceptable has helped the implementation of anti–drunk-driving programs. By the same token, some anti–drunk-driving information campaigns have successfully targeted young women rather than young men to encourage women to tell male drivers to avoid drunk driving.

Even street-level bureaucrats may affect the behaviors of target groups by setting up social expectations, for example, based on their styles of interaction with clients or firms. Legalistic rather than flexible enforcement styles may signal to regulatees that rules and instructions must be taken seriously, and legalistic styles may provide more certainty for firms when making decisions on investments in technology that would allow more compliance.

Normative motivation is based on moral and conscience. People or firms follow the law not because significant others expect them to do so but because they agree with the law or because they at least feel a general moral duty to obey laws even if they do not agree. The latter civic duty varies substantially between and within countries and is important for achieving policy goals. Because of the role of different motivations and resources in shaping citizens’ and firms’ action models, target populations’ responses to policy implementation can involve a complex weighing of economic, social, and normative motivation along with abilities.

One implication of the different types of motivations is that public agencies and their street-level bureaucrats may not always be the most effective agents for implementing public policies. Third parties may sometimes be perceived as more important, competent, or trustworthy by target groups, and third parties may trigger more social and normative motivation. The anti–drunk-driving information campaign above with young girls as a third party is one example. Another is that in a study on agro-environmental regulation in Denmark, Winter and May found that advice from third parties (e.g., farmers’ associations and their agricultural consultants, who are highly respected among farmers) enhance farmers’ normative motivation to comply with the rules. In contrast, similar advice from public inspectors did not have such effect even when farmers listened to them.

Socioeconomic Environment

The task environment in terms of socioeconomic conditions is important for implementation processes and successes. It is quite a different challenge to implement an employment policy program in a recession than in a boom, and often substantial regional variations can be found as well at any given point in time. It is also a different challenge to implement an agro-environmental program in areas with a high livestock density with many large pig farms and a much greater risk of nitrate pollution than in areas with little animal husbandry. Consequently, it is important to isolate the effects of implementation from effects of task environments. As an example, no less than 60% of the variation in labor market integration of refugees and immigrants among Danish municipalities in the beginning of this century can be explained by differences in task environments. This is because the social composition of the target groups and the local labor market situation varied substantially among local governments.

Research Strategies and Methodologies

In the early 1980s, two opposing implementation research strategies were developed. Top-down implementation scholars with Mazmanian and Sabatier as the leading ones saw implementation as a control problem. They typically focused on the
implementation of one particular law according to its official goals. These scholars tended to focus on the role of organizations in the implementation process and on how policy statutes could be structured to increase the clarity of goals and the commitment of implementing organizations.

Bottom-up researchers on the other hand examined mainly interactions between street-level bureaucrats and citizens or firms in a given problem area. Some of the leading scholars were Benny Hjern and Richard Elmore. They focused on the capacity of street-level bureaucrats to change the problematic behaviors of or conditions for citizens or firms. This capacity includes an experience-based knowledge of the incentives and conditions that operate on citizens or firms. While such information is crucial for problem solving, it is rarely systematically provided and used in lawmaking and implementation processes at higher levels. They also focused on the discretion and autonomy that these street-level bureaucrats have versus higher level officials. They emphasized the lack of central control over the decisive implementation processes that are taking place at the bottom. As mentioned above, some bottom-up scholars even disregarded official policy goals as an evaluation standard and instead used problem solving as defined by themselves or local actors as a standard.

A problem for these research strategies was that top-down scholars tended to ignore the bottom—particularly the discretionary role of street-level bureaucrats—and that bottom-up scholars tended to remain at the bottom and rarely got far enough up to focus on implementation mechanisms at an organizational level of analysis. Many bottom-up studies were very descriptive and added little to theory building. In the debate between the two contending perspectives, theoretical, methodological, and normative arguments were mingled together. Attempts of synthesizing the two strategies were made without much success, and the theoretical conflict among implementation scholars was not very fruitful for theory development. Although the integrated implementation model that has organized the previous part of this entry focuses on both top and bottom, it is not a real synthesis of the two strategies. It rather seeks to integrate some of the most promising theoretical elements from the implementation literature into a common framework.

The first generation of implementation studies relied on case studies, and most of these used mainly qualitative research methods such as document analysis and loosely structured interviews. These were sometimes combined with quantitative analyses of, for example, program intake and the social situation of target groups after program participation. Exploratory case studies were natural in an early stage of implementation research when knowledge about implementation mechanisms was very limited and when the main purpose of the research was to generate hypotheses and research ideas.

However, as first claimed by Malcolm Goggin, the case study tradition gradually became a barrier to theory testing, generalization, and the accumulation of theory and knowledge on implementation. Most implementation studies focused on many explanatory variables. As an example, the implementation model by Mazmanian and Sabatier has 21 different variables. Often key variables varied from one study to another. Implementation research ran into the “too many variables but too few cases problem.” The single-case-study methodology did not allow isolating the crucial variables for implementation success. Accordingly, Goggin recommended greater use of comparative case studies and big “n” studies to allow for statistical control for third variables.

From the mid-1980s, more quantitative research designs with many cases and the application of statistical designs have gradually been employed in implementation research and in the affiliated research fields of public management, regulatory enforcement and compliance, and recently also in a few network studies. This has lead to more systematic testing of theories and hypotheses with control for third variables including task environment. Gradually, statistical methods have become more advanced with the introduction of methods that take the hierarchical or multilevel character of data into consideration (e.g., street-level bureaucrats nested in organizations), use of instrumental variables, and time-series data for examining causal directions.

However, the case study tradition still continues parallel to the application of quantitative research designs. It is particularly popular in network studies and in studies of power relations between street-level bureaucrats and clients.
Conclusion
Policy implementation is neither an automatic nor dull process. It is a genuine political process for which the achievement of outputs or outcomes that match policy objectives cannot be taken for granted. Implementation results are affected by the chosen policy design and the validity of the causal theory behind it. The results are also affected by the commitment and cooperation of organizations that are involved in the process. Managers have a difficult role in transmitting policies to street-level bureaucrats that have a key discretionary role when delivering policies to target populations. The latter are not passive subjects but participate in shaping implementation outputs as well as outcomes.

Parallel analytic action models have been constructed for explaining the behaviors of implementation actors and target groups based on the interests and resources of the actors. Particularly in the first decades of implementation research, scholars sought to take steps to create a general implementation theory. This process led to very diverse analytical frameworks and research strategies but to little theory accumulation. Implementation is too complex to be accounted for by one theory. Different theories are relevant for explaining different stages or parts of the implementation process, outputs, and outcomes. Rather than a general theory of implementation, the integrated implementation model presented here can be perceived as a framework for analysis or as a series of spotlights that shed light at some key aspects of the implementation process that are worth examining more closely if one wants to understand what implementation is about.

Some observers have claimed that after a peak in the early 1980s, implementation research has come to an end. However, as shown by Harald Sætren, this is far from the case. The number of publications on implementation using that term has continued to grow exponentially since the 1970s. However, the growth has taken place particularly in journals and publications outside the core of political science, public policy, and public administration. Implementation studies have become widespread in education, health, environment, law, and economics and much more so than in the former core publications. However, even within the core journals, the number of implementation articles applying the implementation term has stabilized at a level not far below the peak of the 1980s.

However, implementation research as it has been presented here is often performed under labels other than “implementation,” such as (new) governance, policy design and instruments, network studies, outsourcing, public–private partnerships, street-level bureaucracy, management, “new public management,” principal–agent studies, performance, regulatory enforcement, and compliance. Accordingly, the total amount of implementation relevant research has increased considerably and continues to do so yet under various labels. At least two reasons for the described development can be identified. First, fashions are important for research interests and how they are labeled. Second, when for good reasons more and more implementation scholars gave up constructing the general implementation theory, several scholars got interested in partial aspects of implementation under various labels.

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See also Bureaucracy; Bureaucracy, Street-Level; Collaboration; Effectiveness, Bureaucratic; Performance; Regulation

Further Readings
The concept of “indigenous” as used in United Nations (UN) documents seeks to clarify a diffuse relationship between the modern sovereign state and a special type of traditional community that does not itself constitute a political entity. A report to the UN by Martinez Cobo in 1987 describes indigenous peoples as people who have a historical continuity with preinvasion or precolonial societies, who consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, who form at present nondominant sectors of society, and who are determined to preserve and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories and ethnic identity. This early description is rephrased in different forms maintaining the core criteria of priority in time, cultural distinctiveness, experience of marginalization and dispossession, and self-identification. The terms first nations, first people, and aboriginal convey a similar meaning. This entry analyzes the notion of indigenous peoples’ rights, its global recognition, why they contest rights, the legal use and control of territories, and the most recent developments.

The Two Rights

The notion of indigenous peoples’ rights may be interpreted in two ways. Most generally, it refers to a moral entitlement, perceived as restoration and redress of previous wrongs, and as such it has developed as a part of the decolonialization process and the global agenda for human rights. These rights are expressed most clearly in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, passed by the General Assembly in September 2007. This nonbinding declaration states that indigenous peoples have the individual and collective right to the full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the charter of the UN, and other human rights mechanisms, and that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination.

A second understanding refers to the legal rights most clearly expressed in the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 of 1989, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, which is binding for the signatories and sets out procedures for how rights should be implemented in agreement between the state and its citizens. Rights granted within the legal structures of sovereign states through treaties and court decisions are creating a precedence expressed as a customary international law.

Global Recognition

The two kinds of rights are mutually reinforcing. The driving force behind a global recognition has been an indigenous movement initiated from the 1970s onwards among American Indians, Sami, Inuit, Maori, and Australian Aborigines, who found similarities in their situation across widely different continents and historical contexts. A common theme among emerging national and transnational organizations was the experience that the expanding social and economic domain of modern states ignored the life ways and livelihood of indigenous minorities; hence the first claim was for recognition.

A seminal event in the debate on indigenous rights was the establishment of the UN Working Group for Indigenous Populations (WGIP) in Geneva in 1982. The Working Group proper consisted of five experts who met yearly in July and allowed representatives from indigenous peoples worldwide to attend and give brief presentations. These meetings developed as significant meeting places for hundreds of delegates and advocacy organizations, which spoke at the plenary session and used the corridors and lounges and meeting rooms to forge new networks, exchange experiences, and
develop strategies. By 1993, the WGIP had developed a draft for the Declaration on Indigenous Rights, and indigenous issues were raised in documents from conferences such as the Rio Conference on Sustainable Development (1992) and the World Conference Against Racism in Durban 2001. A Special Rapporteur position on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples was created in 2002. The same year saw the establishment of the UN Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues in New York composed of eight state representatives and eight delegates from indigenous organizations.

Contested Rights

The rights of indigenous peoples are contested in many ways. It has been relatively easy to identify who are indigenous on continents where colonizers arrived from across the water as in the Americas and Australia. But Africa and much of Asia represent special conceptual challenges. The dominant position of White colonial forces left all of Black Africa in a subordinate position that in many respects was similar to the position of indigenous peoples elsewhere, as first comers, nondominant and different in culture from the White intruders. The important difference from most settler states is that formally White colonial forces withdrew from Africa. Accordingly, many politicians argue that all Africans are indigenous, or alternatively, that this distinction does not apply to the African continent.

In addition to inevitable problems, then, in defining who are indigenous, another challenge is that any procedure for singling out one group for special treatment or affirmative action goes against a cherished liberal principle of equal treatment of all citizens. It goes against administrative preferences for clear-cut and unambiguous target groups and routines for equal treatment. Some opponents claim that indigenous rights represent a new form for racism, distributing favors according to descent, while the main argument for special rights is a compensation for previous injustice.

Legal Rights

A crucial aspect of indigenous rights relates to the use and control over territories. The ILO Convention No. 169 goes far in recognizing, in Article 14, “the rights of ownership and possession.” However, this convention has so far been ratified by only 20 countries and has occasioned extensive legal debates on implementation.

In a few cases, indigenous groups have been delegated control over larger territories and formed a governing body/parliament. The Inuit of Greenland achieved home rule as early as 1979. Nunavut was separated from the Northern Territory in Canada in 1999 with jurisdiction over territorial matters. Some northern indigenous peoples of Siberia control their own autonomous republics within the Russian state.

Land rights issues most commonly come up in negotiations with governments or are taken to the courts. An important judgment in Australia, the Mabo case in 1992, established the concept of “native title.” Native or aboriginal title reflects the entitlement of the indigenous inhabitants, in accordance with their laws and customs, to their traditional lands, in the cases where it has not been explicitly extinguished. The judgment thus denounced the doctrine of terra nullius—that before the colonization the land belonged to nobody. The subsequent Native Title Act 1993 attracted considerable international interest and established a precedent that has been argued in court cases in many parts of the world, even though later amendments reduced its scope.

In New Zealand, the Court of Appeal, in a case in 1987 that revisited the interpretation of the rights inherent in the Treaty of Waitangi from 1840, laid down the notion of “fairness” as a guiding principle for relations between the Maori and the Crown.

In Canada, forms of self-determination have been recognized in a series of treaties. The Nisga’a of British Columba went to court in 1969 for a declaration that their title to land had never been surrendered by treaty or otherwise extinguished. An agreement in support of aboriginal title was reached in 2000. The James Bay Cree reached an agreement with the Government of Quebec in 2002 in a treaty symbolically perceived as a nation-to-nation agreement.

Another case with wider impact was the decision by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 2001 in the case of Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua. The Court found that the Nicaraguan government had granted concessions to a foreign
transnational company for logging on traditional lands without prior consultation and consent from the community. Thus Nicaragua had failed to implement the land rights provision of its own laws, and in violation of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. The decision set a regional precedent that is potentially applicable to similar struggles elsewhere against the incursion of transnational corporate interests.

In Botswana, a group of San indigenous peoples took the government to court after they were relocated from their traditional territory, the Central Kalahari Game Reserve. In 2006, the court ruled in favor of the applicants that they were lawfully in possession of the land they occupied and that they were deprived of it forcefully and without their consent. This was seen as a victory, as the case was argued as an “indigenous rights” case. However, while the verdict recognized rights based on continuous occupation, the Botswana government’s violation of existing statutory laws was the main justification. In effect, a ruling that prohibited access to water in a desert environment has prevented the enjoyment of “possession.”

In many of these cases, the courts have stressed the significant connection between indigenous land rights and indigenous identity. It is in the nature of these cases that the court has ruled against aspects of the development policies of their own governments, and verdicts may be counteracted by state policies. But such cases are supported by—and contribute to—an emerging body of international law. As argued, for instance, by James Anaya, the essence in this process cannot be reduced to a set of rules with fixed meanings but is a normative system that has developed “however grudgingly and imperfectly” to support indigenous peoples’ demands.

Further Developments

Indigenous peoples are tied to their land by way of making a living. They also have spiritual connections to territories where ancestors are buried, and harvesting, herding, or hunting creates ties between people and nature and enhances a sense of belonging. An enduring and dynamic relation to land is best achieved through a measure of self-determination. The struggle for recognition of territorial rights (of ownership or possession) is an ongoing concern that has brought tangible results in some cases, while in other parts of the world it has only just begun.

However, this option is not always possible to implement. In many cases, the mix of indigenous and settler populations is such that it will not be possible to identify an indigenous ownership without discriminating against nonindigenous neighbors. Moreover, economic factors increasingly mean that the exercise of traditional adaptations often on a reduced territory can only carry a small population. Indigenous peoples find themselves as part of the global migration from countryside to urban areas and part of the pool of landless laborers and squatters.

The challenge for the future, then, in following up the intentions of self-determination as captured in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples will be to find ways to develop instruments for nonterritorialized self-determination. This will mean devolution of power within defined areas of activities, most obviously matters of language, culture, and education, but theoretically a broad range of areas can be included. Procedures for election of a representative body would have to be worked out based on self-identification and some criteria of descent. Such systems are in operation, for instance, for elections to the Sami assemblies in Scandinavia.

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See also Human Rights in International Relations; Identity, Social and Political; International Law; Multiculturalism; Self-Determination; Sovereignty

Further Readings

Individualism

The concept of individualism comprises at least three basic ideas in the political realm. First is the dignity of man: Following the Kantian formula, each individual being exists as an end in himself or herself and not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will. Second, the idea of autonomy holds that an individual’s thought and action are his or her own and not determined by agencies or causes outside his or her control. Third comes privacy, according to which each human being should enjoy a private life, an area in which the individual should be untroubled by others and able to act and think in accordance with his or her own free will.

This concept of individualism is indissociably bound up with the tenets of modernity and with the conviction that meaning, truth, and value originate in—and exist for the benefit of—mankind. What we call our “modern societies” are no longer holistic, to use Louis Dumont’s term. Holistic societies were understood as the units that existed before the individual, in which individuals had only to occupy their designated place. In individualistic societies, this relationship is turned on its head: Man’s role is to grow into his or her autonomy and to learn to judge independently by detaching himself or herself from entrenched customs and prejudices.

However, this first brief overview of the concept should not hide the fact that individualism continues, as it always has, to lend itself to widely divergent interpretations. In a seminal book on this topic, Steven Lukes identified not less than 11 forms of individualism and added that they were not mutually exclusive or jointly exhaustive. As Pierre Birnbaum and Jean Leca have also shown, the notion of individualism can be interpreted in innumerable different ways that are not always in harmony with one another, whether we are referring to utilitarian individualism—a vision of independent units motivated by a common quest for well-being, romantic individualism—that of individuals inspired by their search for the most authentic form of the self, juridical individualism—which makes the individual the source and end of all law, ethical individualism—taking individual conscience as the supreme judge of the validity of moral norms, sociological individualism—emphasizing the distance between the subject and the plurality of his social functions, or, finally, epistemological individualism—which makes the individual a conscious subject distinct from his object.

This entry proceeds in four steps. The first two parts sketch a series of semantic histories that reveal alternative uses of the concept of individualism, ranging from a pejorative meaning to a positive conception associated with the defense of autonomy and the spirit of individuality. Both of these interpretations continue to feed into contemporary discussion. The next section proposes an explanation of methodological individualism since the concept has a distinct meaning when it is used in an epistemological sense. Finally, the fourth part examines the current debate on the relationship between political liberalism and individualism.

Individualism and the Dissolution of Society

As shown by Lukes, individualism has long carried and still carries a pejorative connotation, a strong suggestion that to elevate the individual is to harm the superior interest of society. The first uses of the term in the French form individualisme grew out of the general European reaction to the French Revolution and to its alleged intellectual source, Enlightenment thought. The Catholic counterrevolutionary Joseph de Maistre might have coined the term when, in 1820, he spoke of this “deep and frightening division of minds, the infinite fragmentation of all doctrines, political Protestantism carried to the most absolute individualism.” It was the followers of Henri de Saint-Simon who were the first to use the term systematically and associate it with the perceived evils of the contemporary age—namely, disorder, antagonism, atheism, and anarchy. In that sense, Saint-Simonians shared the counterrevolutionaries’ critique of the celebration of the individual and their revulsion for social
atomization. However, unlike the counterrevolutionaries, they applied these ideas in a historically progressive direction: Social order was to be not the ecclesiastical and feudal regime of the past but rather the industrial order of the future. As pointed out by Koenraad Swart, these anti-individualists held that the 18th century had been successful in breaking down the traditional values but had failed in developing a new positive philosophy. In part because of the great influence of Saint-Simonian ideas, individualism came to be a widely used term over the course of the 19th century to describe a serious evil undermining social and political order.

However, it was a liberal thinker, Alexis de Tocqueville (2009), who was to give the most comprehensive definition of individualism. In Democracy in America, he opposed the egoism of our fathers—"a passionate and exaggerated love of oneself"—with individualism,

which is a considered and peaceful sentiment that disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and to withdraw to the side with his family and friends; so that after thus creating a small society for his own use, he willingly abandons the large society to itself. (Book 2, sec. 2, chap. 2)

Above all, we owe to Tocqueville the idea that individualism would be inextricably bound up with democratic revolution: "Aristocracy had made all citizens into a long chain that went from the peasant up to the king; democracy breaks the chain and sets each link apart" (Book 2, sec. 2, chap. 2). Tocqueville was also one of the first to call attention to the paradox of democratic times: the combination of individualization (in the sense of a withdrawal into the self) and conformism (the subjection of all individuals to identical codes of behavior). While pointing out the danger of isolation inherent in increasing individualism, Tocqueville therefore also took care to counterbalance this term with a celebration of what he saw as its opposite: the spirit of individuality.

In a similarly pejorative vein, socialists such as Pierre Leroux have contrasted individualism with an ideal cooperative social order. Identified with the twin concepts of anomie and egoism, individualism came, for these authors, to encapsulate the social, moral, and political isolation of individuals and their dissolution from social purposes.

This usage of the term—associating individualism with a form of conformist withdrawal into the self—continues to hold sway in contemporary literature. In The Lonely Crowd, David Riesman thus described mass conformism by positing three character types—tradition-directed, inner-directed, and other-directed individuals—linked to three models of society. The last type relies on the judgment of other individuals, basing their conduct on that of those around them and on the model of mass communication. This hypothesis was critiqued by Richard Sennett, who argues for a reversal of Riesman’s schema: Rather than moving from an inner-directed to an outer-directed model, the West—according to Sennett—is in transition between a society directed by others to a society ruled by the desires of individuals’ inner life. According to this analysis, the risk today is that the predominance of individual private life might eventually destroy the public sphere.

This diagnosis is echoed by Christopher Lasch’s theory of the narcissistic individual, which notes that society is being taken over by the “self” and particularly by a new form of therapeutic sensitivity in which individuals are excessively preoccupied with their own health, safety, and well-being. According to these thinkers, the danger of our times is that collective life might gradually wither away with the rise of the individual. In addition, they hold that the modern democratic wave has elevated the individual to ever new heights, leading to neglect of the collective effort that democracy should properly involve. Individualism is amalgamated in this view with a form of social atomism believed to destroy all possibility of social cohesion, as well as all democratic and civic participation in community life. In a similar vein, a number of theorists have recently challenged individualism in the name of community, with its appeal to rootedness, belonging, fraternity, and harmony. It is interesting to note the high degree of convergence between different critiques of individualism coming from disconnected historical periods and completely opposing political stances—one need only point out that the critiques outlined above come from thinkers as different as De Maistre, Karl Marx, and Carl Schmitt or contemporary communitarian thinkers.
Autonomy and the Spirit of Individuality

Nevertheless, individualism is not always understood in the sense of conformist egocentrism described above. It may also take in the ideas of a quest for autonomy and defense of a spirit of individuality. Defined in terms of autonomy, individualism is understood as the conviction that no natural subordination of the human being is possible and that every individual must be free to decide for himself or herself in the face of moral, religious, and political authority. This unlimited sovereignty of the individual is consequently based on a conception of human nature as being “individuated” before being social. In other words, every human being is a unique individuality with the capacity for self-definition, reasoning, and autonomous decision. The thesis at the heart of this individualism, originating in the English Protestant tradition of the 17th century—Milton, Hobbes, Locke—and continuing, in different incarnations, in the work of Rousseau, Paine, Kant, Jefferson, or Madison—is that every one of us is, partially at least, independent of our positioning in a particular social context and capable of freeing ourselves from it. Norms thus originate in the individual and not the group, an idea that legitimates the right to resistance against political power. The conception of the individual as a pre-social being is not to be taken in a descriptive, temporal, or historical sense: It would be clearly absurd to deny that human beings need a social context in order to develop. The principle has a merely normative meaning, as a thought experiment that allows (at least partial) independence of the human being from his or her social group to be asserted as a legal principle.

The defense of a form of individualism adapted to democratic times, meanwhile, can be found in the work of many different authors. Tocqueville, for instance, distinguished two forms of individualism. The first indicates the withdrawal of individuals into their own private sphere; the second, however, introduces the idea that individuals may be led, by way of personal interest, to devote themselves to the public good. As Tocqueville demonstrated in his analysis of the rise of associations in the United States, “You first get involved in the general interest by necessity, and then by choice; what was calculation becomes instinct; and by working for the good of your fellow citizens, you finally acquire the habit and taste of serving them” (Vol. 3, Pt. 1, chap. 4a).

It is John Stuart Mill above all who must be credited with the idea, outlined in his book-manifesto On Liberty (1859), that the free development of individuality is one of the first requirements for the well-being of humanity and the condition for civilization, instruction, education, and culture. Mill transforms the atomist notion of the individual by emphasizing the collective advantages inherent in the development of individuality and diverse points of view: Pluralism is thus seen as indissociable from the defense of the individual, since it is the only state of affairs that allows every individual to exercise truly free choice. Mill thus opens the way to a form of individualism that is not only social but also encourages solidarity: What he advocates is not a denial of the relationship between individual and society but instead an optimization of this relationship to ensure the free development of all individualities. In the 19th century, socialists such as Louis Blanc similarly saw individualism as a major cultural principle. Like many other concepts, individualism was initially introduced by its opponents but gradually adopted by its tenants. The disciples of Charles Fourier denied any basic opposition between individualism and socialism and Joseph Proudhon openly claimed himself as an individualist. At the end of the century, Jean Jaurès posited that socialism was the logical completion of individualism. Less than a century later, Lukes likewise argued that a humane form of socialism would be the only viable means of realizing the values of individualism.

The output of John Rawls can also be situated in the tradition of Mill. The principles formulated in A Theory of Justice (1971) are highly individu-alist in that they are based on an absolute priority accorded to individual liberty, which Rawls argues must not be sacrificed to the broader well-being of society. However, Rawlsian principles are also egalitarian; they envisage a system of cooperation based on an equitable distribution of opportunities between individuals and acknowledge that the success of justice in a given society must be judged on the situation of the least privileged. In a similar vein, other authors have attempted to clarify the conditions for individual autonomy. The writings of Zygmunt Bauman, for instance, emphasize the
Individualism and de facto: For individuals to be capable in real terms of choosing a life path and acting autonomously, the lack of provisions for collective protection of those in insecure situations must be remedied.

In more recent times, other more optimistic approaches than those outlined in the first section have been formulated, emphasizing the link between individualism and democracy. Anthony Giddens, for instance, argues that the erosion of traditional modes of coherence also generates democratic effects. The progress of gender equality and sexual tolerance should encourage us to relativize worries about individualism, since individualization should not be confused with selfishness. The crisis of the political domain is thus explained less by the apathy of individuals than by a mismatch between traditional politics and more societal, postmaterialist aspirations (environment, sexuality, etc.).

Methodological Individualism

One should be aware that individualism has a very different meaning when it occurs in the context of ethics or sociology from when it is used in an epistemological sense. In ethical terms, individualism is a doctrine that holds the person to be the supreme point of reference. Sociologically speaking, we define a society as individualist if its law, customs, and social constraints grant a broad autonomy to individuals. The methodological interpretation of individualism, meanwhile, is completely distinct from other forms: It is an attribute of the researcher and his or her methodology, not of the object of study. Elaborated primarily by Karl Popper and subsequently systematized by authors such as Raymond Boudon, the theory of methodological individualism posits that to explain a given social phenomenon—whether in the domain of methodology, political science, sociology, or any other branch of social science—it is essential to reconstruct the motivations of the individuals concerned by the phenomenon in question and to understand it as the outcome of an aggregation of individual actions governed by these motivations. In this sense, as Jon Elster has written, methodological individualism is a form of reductionism since it holds that any social phenomenon can be explained by the characteristics of the individuals who make it up. For Elster, explanation always works by opening up “black boxes,” and this can only be done at the level of interacting individuals.

One should clear up two common misunderstandings. First, methodological individualism is not the same thing as an atomist concept of society: It may very well demonstrate that individual actions have meaning only in a specific social context and that individuals judge, decide, and act according to the social situation in which they find themselves. As pointed out by Lukes, explaining phenomena in terms of the microlevel does not preclude reference to holistically characterized causes. In another sense, however, it is true that methodological individualism is clearly distinct from methodological holism in that it rejects any representation of social structures as real and autonomous collective beings. Second, methodological individualism does not mean adhering to economic liberalism or ethical individualism. Boudon and Elster demonstrated that Marxist theory, for instance, often draws on a typically individualist methodology: Social phenomena are analyzed as the consequences of aggregation and interference effects between the actions of individuals each pursuing his or her own interest. One should therefore underline, as Birnbaum and Leca do, that employing an individualist methodology is not the same thing as suggesting that all societal forms are governed by individualist values. Conversely, arguing that modern society is imbued with individualist ideology does not preclude using a holistic methodology. There is therefore no reason why one might not reject methodological individualism while remaining a firm believer in the supreme importance of respecting persons and valuing their autonomy, privacy, and self-development.

Individualism and Political Liberalism

Despite these caveats, methodological individualism has often been reduced to an economic (monetary or rational choice) model, elevated to the status of a theory that is not merely explanatory but also prescriptive of a comprehensive system of social mechanisms. Over the past half-century, individualism has thus come to encapsulate a cluster of ideas propagated by libertarians or neo-liberals. For Cold War liberal thinkers such as Friedrich
Individualism was considered as a protective bulwark against the dangers of ideological thinking from both right and left. Consequently, authors such as Lukes now consider that defense of individualism’s core values inherent in the ideals of liberty and equality has been hijacked and harnessed to various doctrines that embody libertarian thinking and promote market-favoring policies. The argument suggests that libertarians have captured the high moral ground from which liberal critiques of the market and arguments for redistribution can come to look concessionary and defensive. Colin Bird goes a step further in claiming that it makes no sense to clarify liberal values as individualist (rather than collectivist) in the first instance and ends up declaring the unhelpfulness of the dominant idiom of individualism and even the obsolescence of the label “liberal individualism.” Lukes also views individualism as an ideological construct in the double sense that it embodies and conveys illusions and that these illusions serve partisan interests.

However, it is one thing to say that liberalism need not be identified with an atomistic model of human conduct and that there is no single or eternal view of the relation between the individual and society—that the liberal distinction between public and private spheres is neither permanent nor unalterable since, in Judith Shklar’s words, the important point for liberalism is not so much where the line is drawn as that it be drawn somewhere, and under no circumstances be ignored or forgotten. It is quite another thing to claim that the individualist/collectivist dichotomy should be discarded altogether, as if it were possible to conceive of political liberalism without a firm commitment to individualism seen in its fullest sense.

Consequently, some liberals argue that the neoliberal approach is an incorrect interpretation of individualism and that the liberal commitment to individuality has resources that can be opposed to the libertarianism of economic conservatives. For instance, this commitment might be reformulated—as Jeremy Waldron did with the concept of liberty—as a commitment to equal individualism. This would give rise to a principle justifying social policies that do not infringe on the primacy of the individual but that rather—quite the opposite—aim at creating the necessary conditions for the full development of individuality by all persons concerned.

In a similar vein, George Kateb argues that a proper perspective should include two types of individualism. The first is the individualism of personal and political rights; the second is democratic individuality. These two types of individualism are closely connected since democratic individuality is, according to Kateb, the best achievement that can grow out of a culture in which personal and political rights are recognized. Put differently, democratic individuality could not exist without rights-based individualism, and any attack on the centrality of rights should be considered as an attack on democratic individuality.

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See also Anomia; Citizenship; Communitarianism; Democracy, Types of; Equality; Human Rights, Comparative Perspectives; Liberalism; Libertarianism; Tocqueville, Alexis de

Further Readings
Inequality, Economic

Inequality is a complex multidimensional phenomenon, depending on many factors and lending itself to a great variety of explanations and evaluations. The existence, shape, and origins of inequalities are significant both from a positive perspective, owing to the fact that the economic, political, and psychological attitudes and behavior of individuals or groups are affected by the relative position they occupy in the distribution of meaningful resources, and from a normative one, as a consequence of the fact that in general a situation characterized by inequalities compares unfavorably with one of equality or with lesser inequalities. In this entry, a brief overall survey is provided that can be summarized in the following questions: Inequality of what? How large are the inequalities? Inequality among whom? Inequalities due to which causes?

Inequality of What and How Large?

The qualification of inequalities as economic lends itself to various interpretations: In a narrow sense, it regards the differences in the levels of personal income or wealth; in a broader sense, it includes all the values that directly or indirectly derive from economic activities, which can be used in obtaining them or can be exchanged with them. In the first case, its interpretation is straightforward, in the second, it requires the integration of different systems of inequality that include, besides income and wealth, elements such as health, knowledge, power, or availability of public services, and so on, whose distribution among individuals does not coincide with that of income. In the case of income and wealth, the size of the inequalities can be determined in terms of monetary units and in ways that are sufficiently precise, although not stable and exposed to a certain margin of error. For other aspects that can be broadly termed economic, this is not possible, and the differences between the positions can be described only in ordinal terms of larger and smaller (possibly with qualifications such as much larger or much smaller); in still other cases, even this is impossible, and one is limited to an incomplete or partial ordering. The measuring of inequalities raises problems even in the case of items that are directly expressed in monetary terms: In international comparisons, the per capita incomes of different countries are usually translated into a single currency through purchasing power exchange rates, whose value is affected by the choice of national baskets of representative consumption goods. Even more serious are the problems arising from the presence of externalities and of goods whose production counts as income when they are sold in the market but not when they are consumed by the producer or within his or her family, an occurrence that is usually more frequent in poorer countries or among lower income groups. To face these problems, a number of alternative and broader notions of economic welfare have been suggested, among them that of net economic welfare, proposed by Joseph Stiglitz, which adjusts gross domestic product (GDP) by subtracting from it negative factors (“bads”) such as pollution and by adding the contribution of beneficial nonmarket activities such as leisure, household production, child care, or looking after sick people.

There are good reasons both for treating the inequalities existing in the various spheres separately and for pooling them in a single comprehensive notion of economic inequality. The reason for treating them separately is that the pattern of inequalities of one sphere does not coincide with those of others; that their economic and political consequences as well as the moral criteria for evaluating them are different, according to Michael Walzer, and that the instruments available for redressing them are usually specific to each sphere (redistributing income has no immediate impact on inequalities in health, education, or power). The reasons for pooling them is that the shortcomings in one sphere can, at least partly, be compensated...
for by advantages in another and that the overall condition of people depends on the positions they have in each of the relevant ones.

There have been many attempts at finding criteria for combining the individual positions in a number of separate spheres to form an overall indicator of their standing both in absolute terms and relative to each other. One of the most relevant of these is the one proposed by Amartya Sen (1993) with the term capabilities, defined as "combinations of functionings a person can achieve, and from which he or she can choose one collection" (p. 31), which represents an all-encompassing notion of what has value for an individual and covers the whole range of possible valuable life experiences that are within reach of a person (including alternatives that are mutually exclusive). The solution Sen put forward can be applied both to individuals and to groups or whole populations; in this second form it has inspired the adoption by the United Nations of the Human Development Index (HDI), as a benchmark for the evaluation of social policies and policies for development, an index that is calculated for each country on the basis of data concerning income per head, the expectation of life at birth, and the level of education. For each of these variables, each country is given a score corresponding to the point in which it is placed in the interval that separates the position of the country that ranks first from that of the country that ranks last, the general index being formed by the simple average of the indexes concerning the individual variables.

Inequality Among Whom?

A system of inequalities is defined

1. by the choice of the particular sphere, or groups of spheres, to be considered;
2. by the identification of the population about which the comparisons are made and of the units within it whose positions are compared; and
3. by the specification of the moment or span of time that is taken into consideration.

For the sake of simplicity, we shall limit ourselves to consider a single sphere of value (that of income) and to a static approach, considering a single moment in time. The definition of the population for which inequalities are assessed requires on the one hand that its members have a sufficient number of elements in common to make it relevant, and on the other that they present sufficient differences to make it interesting; both conditions depend on the nature of the problems examined.

The most frequent cases are those in which the population is defined on a national level, but Branko Milanovic notes that an increasing number of studies make reference to the broadest possible definition of the population, which of course corresponds to the whole of humanity. At the other extreme are populations that are formed by specific groups (such as the workforce of a single factory or the members of a single union), local communities, or even single families. As a general (but by no means universal) rule, we can say that the size of the inequalities increases with the size of the population but that its significance can move in the opposite direction, because individuals or groups living close together or having much in common tend to have a sharper perception of what makes them different.

We have a disaggregated representation of inequalities when the population is seen as formed by single individuals and an aggregate one when it is seen as formed by groups of individuals having in common certain characteristics such as gender, age, living in the same area, working in the same sector, having a similar professional qualification, belonging to the same ethnic group, or even belonging to the same bracket or fraction (decile, quintile, etc.) in the distribution of income. The case of families is in some ways ambiguous in that they can be considered both as elementary units and as groups. Aggregation is of course a matter of degree insofar as any group can be split into a number of subgroups or lumped together with others to form a wider group. When the aggregate approach is adopted, the systems of inequalities present both an external and an internal side: In the first case, the position of a group is considered in terms of a representative figure or parameter (typically the average or the median value) and compared with that of other groups; in the second, comparison is made of the position of each single individual or subgroup with those of other individuals or subgroups that make up the larger one.
The aggregate and disaggregate approaches are more often complementary than alternative, given that the position of single individuals in the larger populations is usually the joint result of factors affecting the position of the group to which they belong compared with that of other groups and of factors affecting their personal position in the former. The choice of an aggregate or disaggregate approach is far from neutral and can have relevant ethical and political implications: Presenting world income inequalities in aggregate terms through a comparison of the per capita incomes of different countries leads naturally to development policies that work through transfers of resources to governments; more disaggregate approaches lead to policies that are directly targeted to individuals or local communities. Similarly, policies of affirmative action addressed to disadvantaged groups (like women or ethnic minorities) often take the forms of reserving to members of those groups coveted positions or privileged conditions for obtaining them, measures that do in fact improve the average position of the targeted group but tend to increase the inequalities within it and often do little to improve the conditions of its most disadvantaged members.

Another meaningful distinction, according to Larry Temkin, is that between analytical and synthetic representations of inequalities. In the first case, we have a set of separate data regarding the differences between the position of every single element (individual or group) into which the population has been divided and that of each of the others; for a population of $N$ elements, this representation takes the form of an $N \times N$ symmetrical matrix. The synthetic versions take the form of a single numerical indicator, whose value reflects the dispersion of the positions of the various elements, or more exactly the extent to which the distribution of values within the population diverges from equality. The most well-known and frequently used measure is the Gini index, which is especially sensitive to the variations of the extreme positions and takes on a zero value in the case of full equality and a value of 1 in the case of maximum inequality, when all resources belong to just one individual or group.

Synthetic representations may be thought of as the expression of inequalities in the singular, describing properties of entire populations or collective entities: analytical representations, on the other hand, as expressions of inequality in the plural, describing the relative positions of different individuals or groups. Analytical representations are closer to what might be called the direct perception of inequalities, that is, the actual conditions of individuals and the way they compare themselves with other individuals: Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, for example, have shown that individuals are often more concerned with how much more or less than others they earn than with the absolute level of their income and that less wealth can be as painful (or even more painful) than actual poverty. The empirical descriptions of systems of inequalities combine in general synthetic and analytical aspects, as well as aggregate and disaggregate ones.

The systems of inequalities characterizing a given population can show at the same time stability and variability: stability, as the pattern of relative positions remains basically the same, and variability, as the individuals occupying the different positions keep changing all the time. A high degree of variability or mobility tends to dampen significantly the economic, social, political, and psychological impact of any given system of inequalities.

The Causes of Inequalities

The factors that give shape to a raw system of economic inequalities among individuals, by which is meant those that precede any corrective intervention by the state or other authorities, normally operate within a general competitive framework and can be grouped into three broad categories:

1. macrofactors, which determine the relative levels of average incomes of whole communities (typically countries);
2. personal factors, which determine the relative positions that individuals living in the same country can attain through their choices and actions; and
3. microfactors, which correspond to gaps in the general framework and provide privileged conditions for particular organizations or individuals within them.

The individual positions in a given system of inequalities are to a varying degree affected by each of the aforementioned factors.
The general framework is that of a competitive capitalist market economy in which the income people earn broadly corresponds to the contribution they have given to marketable production through their work and the resources they have made available. The rule applies fully and directly only to units (persons or firms) that sell their products in the market and are motivated by the maximization of income (or profit, in the case of firms). When production is organized by public bodies, or by nonprofit organizations, the rules are different, but still subject to the indirect influence of those of the capitalist sector, owing to the fact that individuals and resources can move or be transferred from one to the other. Before reaching individuals, the flows of income (mainly capital income but to a certain extent even incomes from labor) deriving from the sale of production can be partially modified by intermediate actors (corporations, financial institutions, insurance companies, families, etc.), which pool different flows and redistribute them among their members or associates.

The macrofactors are those that affect the position of a country in the world economy; they include the nature of the goods it produces, their prices, the efficiency of its firms compared with those of other countries, and its currency’s exchange rate; they play a crucial role in determining the relative level of its per capita income and, owing to their frequent fluctuations, its variation through time. Each of them has a direct positive effect on relative per capita income that is sometimes accompanied by indirect negative ones; an appreciation of the exchange rate, for instance, reduces the competitiveness of national firms, making the goods they produce more expensive in terms of foreign currencies.

The personal factors are those that determine the precise position of individuals and the roles they perform in the economic system of the country they live in; these include their natural gifts (in terms of intelligence, health, and physical dexterity), the social milieu in which they were born and grew up, the choices they made regarding their development and during their working life, how much they worked and the effort and commitment they put in, how much they saved, the risks they took, and the luck they had. Mainstream explanations of income inequalities among persons living in the same country see them as arising from competitive market interactions of individuals having different personal characteristics.

The microfactors are mainly sociological and usually “local,” in the sense of having a direct influence on specific sectors or locations; they reflect the structure of organizations (firms, unions, etc.) or networks within which and between which elements of power, monopoly, and discrimination play a significant role: They typically offer to insiders privileged channels of access to valuable resources from which outsiders are excluded or that they face obstacles in accessing. The inequalities they produce are sheltered from the competitive forces that are characteristic of the basic framework and have a “durable” nature insofar as they affect individuals’ conditions throughout their lives and are often transmitted vertically through generations and horizontally among persons who share some easily recognizable and permanent traits (such as gender, ethnic origin, or faith).

These microfactors can be grouped into the three broad categories of hierarchization, exclusion, and exploitation, which perform different but often complementary roles, according to Charles Tilly.

Hierarchization has been defined by Göran Therborn (2006) as “institutionalized ranking of social actors”: The subjects occupying the higher ranking positions, usually limited in number, have at their disposal a variety of resources (finances, prestige, power, etc.), the access to which is subject to their control and approval, or from which those of lower rank are excluded; inequalities of this kind are generally codified by rules that are both formal and stable in time, and sometimes transmitted to designated heirs.

Exclusion occurs when access to positions associated with wealth and prestige is barred to subjects who would otherwise qualify, on the basis of characteristics such as gender, race, or religion, which are easily ascertained by the insiders and cannot easily be modified by the excluded.

Exploitation has been examined from various points of view: the Marxist one, for which every relationship based on the separation between workers and the means of production involves exploitation, is both too broad and insufficiently comprehensive; more limited versions refer to the presence of elements of monopoly and/or of coercion, which alter the distribution of the fruits of labor to the advantage of those who control them.
According to Tilly’s version, similar to Marx’s but more sociological and not limited to relationships between capital and labor, exploitation “operates when powerful, connected people command resources from which they draw significantly increased returns by coordinating the effort of outsiders whom they exclude from the full value added by that effort” (*Durable Inequality*, p. 10). Common to all these versions is the idea of a systematic and long-lasting distortion of relationships in favor of the exploiter, which (a) could be removed without significant loss of efficiency and (b) is accompanied by forms of “categorical inequality,” that is, by the attribution to the exploited and exploiter of distinctive characteristics (in terms of race, gender, culture, or class) that tend to both consolidate and justify the exploitation. Alongside exploitation, and sharing some of its traits, Tilly proposes the category of “opportunity hoarding,” which arises when groups of people sharing some recognizable characteristic establish preferential relationships that ensure them the control of resources, which they take advantage of to the exclusion of outsiders but without exploiting the latter.

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See also Class, Social; Inequality, Political; Social Stratification

Further Readings


**Inequality, Political**

Political inequality is the unequal influence of the citizens on the collective decisions. It stems from a situation in which one person or one group within a community differs in its impact on the decisions that affect the whole community. Defined as an antonym, political inequality is the absence of political equality, a fundamental attribute of democracy. The principle of political equality departs from the idea that decisions can only be adopted by the persons who are subject to them, and that all preferences must be taken into account before deciding. From the point of view of the quality of democracy, addressing the levels of political inequality in a democracy is therefore essential. There are, however, two contradictory conceptions of political inequality, which frame differently the study of democratic quality. After a brief contextualization, this entry reconsiders these two main conceptions of political inequality and underlines the principal implications for the quality of democracy.

Discussions on the concept of political equality are intrinsically linked to democratic discourse. As such, the scope of political equality has gradually been changed, in parallel to the development of Western democracies. In the early 19th century, few men and almost no women were usually entitled to participate in the political sphere. Political equality existed but only for a reduced group of men from the high socioeconomic strata. It was not put into question, however, that suffrage should be extended to women, slaves, or the lower social classes. Only late in the 19th century was universal suffrage steadily introduced in most democracies and political rights expanded to the whole population. The new status of citizenship enabled all citizens to be political equal. Although by the end of the 20th century most societies labeled as democracies had incorporated universal suffrage as a basic norm, the ideal of political equality is far from being realized in many countries, and there are significant differences across them. Political inequality remains for that reason a major field of research.

**Formal Versus Substantial Inequality**

Further development of the liberal and republican theories resulted in two competing understandings
of political inequality, which roughly reflect the distinction between formal and substantial inequality.

**Formal Inequality**

For formalists, universal suffrage and universal entitlement to participate in public matters are the basic features of political equality—a set of rights that allows citizens to equally influence collective decisions. Political equality is legally and formally guaranteed through the existence of these rights. In most democracies, indeed, the law endorses all citizens with the same rights and the same opportunities to participate in political decisions, and public institutions and administrations are prevented to avoid any type of discrimination against any of the citizens. Following this conception, political equality is equivalent to liberty, as the freedom to choose whether to participate or not. Once political equality is formally established, citizens might freely decide to become politically unequal. Freedom provides in fact with the opportunity to become unequal. As a logical result, freedom is only possible if there is political inequality; in other words, political inequality is a reflection of the citizen’s decisions, an expression of their liberty. From this theoretical perspective, the principle of freedom is clearly superior to the equality principle.

**Substantial Inequality**

From a drastically different perspective, political inequality basically refers to the unequal distribution of political resources among the citizens. It comprehends not only formal equality but also substantive equality. Hence, formal equality is not a sufficient condition in a democracy, as its existence does not guarantee effective influence in the collective decisions of all the citizens. Unequal distribution of political resources—based on differences of income, education, skills, gender, race, and so on—undermines political equality; those who collect more political resources have a greater capacity to affect political decisions. Political inequality in this second meaning is inextricably linked to social inequality and social stratification. Because there normally is correspondence between a citizen’s position in the stratification scale and his or her capacity to influence politics, there is an overlap of the concept of political inequality with social inequality. As an attempt to delimitate the former from the later, political inequality has been defined as the sum of three components: participatory inequality, unequal responsiveness, and unequal policy delivery. Participatory inequality is unequal political participation among the citizens, which might be caused by unequal rights to participate (formal equality), unequal capacity to participate (unequal distribution of resources), or unequal disposition to participate. Unequal responsiveness is uneven attention by the government, biased because of economic, ideological, or political factors. Unequal policy delivery is asymmetrical redistribution of favorable policies among the citizens, benefiting some groups more than others.

**Implications for the Quality of Democracy**

Addressing political inequality from either a formal or a substantive point of view has important implications with respect to the quality of democracy, regarding both how it should be measured and what goals should be attained through political equality.

Measures of formal political equality are based on objective indicators of the available rights and freedoms in a given society. Higher democratic standards can be achieved if there exist more alternatives to participate in collective decisions, if there are more freedoms and rights that citizens can enjoy, and if these rights and freedoms are more inclusive. Most democracies qualify high in this dimension, which is an indicator that formal equality is broadly extended.

However, a measure of the quality of democracy in terms of formal political equality has an important limitation with respect to political participation. There may be citizens who would like to participate in political decisions, who have the will to participate and freely decide to do so, but who lack the necessary resources to do so—they may not know how to participate, they may not have the time, and so on. A country may have a high degree of formal political equality, but there may be no guarantee that all citizens who wish to influence politics can effectively participate. There must be a minimal standard of life to ensure that all citizens are able to make their democratic choices. Restricting political inequality to a formal conception might therefore provide a partial picture of democratic quality.
When the substantive dimension is added to the definition of political inequality, measures of the quality of democracy are confronted by further critical dilemmas. Assessing levels of substantive political inequality is an extremely complex task, as measures of political inequality rely most of the time on subjective interpretations, which make them more difficult to control. Two indicators have generally been used to measure substantive inequality: levels of political participation (turnout, number of people working for a party, number of people who demonstrate, etc.) and political concentration (the extent to which office holding is monopolized by a group of individuals). Contrary to the measure of formal political inequality, though, many countries with relatively high ranks of formal equality rank relatively low on substantive political equality, with low levels of participation and high levels of political concentration. Formal equality does not in fact guarantee substantive equality.

Nevertheless, increasing substantive equality might also have a negative impact on the quality of democracy. Two main arguments have been developed against an increase in effective participation. First, the quality of the decisions is questioned. If all citizens are obliged to participate in the decision-making process, those with little interest in politics and low levels of education will be entitled to a voice. It is not certain, then, that they will be able to choose what is best for the whole community. A second concern is that increasing equality might endanger a basic principle of democracy: freedom. There are two possible ways to increase equality: Either citizens’ socioeconomic status is equalized to avoid inequality based on unfair distribution of political resources, or citizens are obliged to participate. Although empirical studies are not always consistent in their results, the first option seems unfeasible in a reasonable period of time. The only sound option for increasing participation, therefore, is to make participation compulsory. Yet compulsory participation directly damages freedom, because it constrains individual liberties. In this situation, citizens do not freely decide whether or not to participate, but they are obliged to do so by the state; put differently, political participation—an act that is meant to be the expression of maximum liberty—is transformed into an obligation. Compulsory participation is hardly reconcilable with freedom, as it is extremely difficult to find the limits that do not harm individuals’ liberties. There is, therefore, an unsolvable contradiction between increasing equality and ensuring freedom.

Inequality, Citizenship, and Immigration

A final issue concerning political inequality deals with the concept of citizenship and, as an extension, with immigration. Whether from a formal or substantive perspective, political inequality is at the core of the debate on citizenship. First, the status of citizenship is required to enjoy political equality. Political rights and freedoms are guaranteed only to the citizens, those who belong to the community and are legally recognized as such. Although substantive political equality cannot be ensured by the state, in contemporary democracies all people who have full citizenship formally should enjoy the same rights and freedoms. Second, and as a consequence, because immigrants do not have full citizenship, they constitute a specific, sometimes very large, group in the community that lacks basic political rights, such as the right to vote. While much discussion has been done on the extent to which political rights should be expanded to immigrants—that is, on the inclusiveness of the political rights—the right to vote is normally restricted to citizens. Formal inequality is therefore a feature of many democracies. Indeed, even if immigrants belong to the political community, they are not entitled to the status of citizens. Accordingly, and from the point of view of the quality of democracy, political inequality in a democracy may be addressed from three alternative outlooks: (1) Is there formal equality for citizens? (2) Is there formal equality for citizens and noncitizens? (3) Is there both formal and substantive equality?

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See also Citizenship; Democracy, Quality; Equality, Political; Liberty

Further Readings
The ecological inference problem is a long-standing problem that encompasses a rich set of intriguing puzzles. Scholars with diverse backgrounds and interests have a stake in approaches to ecological inference problems, which appear as frequently in political science as they do in medicine, geography, economics, or sociology. The problem occurs, for instance, when one is interested in the behavior of individuals, but has data only at an aggregated level (e.g., precincts, hospital wards, counties). In other words, a data limitation creates a situation where the behavior of individuals must be surmised from data on aggregated sets of individuals rather than on individuals themselves. Since the goal is to make inferences from aggregate units that are often derived from an “environmental level” (i.e., geographical/ecological units such as a county or precinct), the term ecological inference is used to describe this type of analysis. More generally, the problem manifests itself whenever one has data at one level of aggregation (e.g., the state level) but is interested in inferences at another level of data aggregation (e.g., the county level). Accordingly, the term cross-level inference is often used as a synonym for ecological inference. This entry discusses the nature and implications of this problem.

A classic example of the ecological inference problem in political science occurs when one tries to determine how members of different racial groups cast their ballots. Because the United States employs the secret ballot, the only data available for solving this inquiry are at the precinct level, where vote totals and racial demographics can be obtained but not vote totals broken down by racial categories. Epidemiologists confront identical methodological issues when they seek to explain which environmental factors influence disease susceptibility using only data from counties or hospital wards, rather than individual patients. Economists studying consumer demand and marketing strategies might need to infer individual spending habits with an analysis of sales data from a specific region and the aggregate characteristics of individuals in that region, rather than from data on individuals’ characteristics and purchases. These different queries are substantively varied, and it would be simple to identify a host of other equally unique queries that fit into the ecological inference mold.

In addition to substantive applications that span many fields, the mathematics of the ecological inference problem are also related, sometimes isomorphic, to inferential problems in other disciplines, even when the subject matter is not substantially related. For instance, geographers have long been intrigued with the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP). MAUP occurs when the estimates at one level of aggregation are different from the estimates obtained at a different level of aggregation. Many statisticians and mathematicians have been captivated by Simpson’s paradox, which is the reversal in direction of association between two variables when a third (“lurking”) variable is controlled. Described in this way, Simpson’s paradox (and consequently ecological inference) is akin to the omitted variable problem discussed in virtually all econometrics and regression texts. While notation and terminology may differ, the similarities of the underlying problems cannot be denied.

The main difficulty with cross-level inference is that not only might the estimates at different levels
of aggregation be different, they could be substantially different and even lead to different conclusions. William Robinson (1950) was among the first to point out this conundrum with correlation coefficients. He examined the relationship between nativity and illiteracy. At the individual level, the correlation coefficient was .118. If the data were aggregated at the state level, the correlation coefficient reverses sign and becomes −.526. If the data were aggregated at the census geographic divisions, the correlation coefficient remains negative at −.619. The same phenomenon occurs when race and illiteracy are examined. The correlation at the individual level is .203. At the census division level, the correlation is .946. At the state level, the correlation is .773. While these correlation coefficients do not change sign, they vary widely and imply different substantive conclusions. In fact, such wide discrepancies are common, and worse, in a given application, a researcher is unable to determine if his or her aggregated results bear similarity to the true individual-level relationship.

Let us consider the challenge of inferring how individuals voted from election returns aggregated at the precinct level. Because U.S. elections employ the secret ballot, individual vote choices are unknown. Election returns, however, are reported at the precinct level, and aggregate individual racial categorizations can usually be obtained and merged with the voting data. Hence, for any given precinct, the available data include how many votes each candidate received as well as the precinct’s racial composition. The simplified problem can be summed up with a 2 × 2 contingency table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate 1</th>
<th>Candidate 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group 1</td>
<td>( \beta_{11} z_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2</td>
<td>( \beta_{21} z_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( y_1 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The known elements of this problem are the proportion of voters in each group, \( z_1 \) and \( z_2 \), and the proportion of votes received by each candidate, \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \). The unknown elements are the proportions of each group that voted for each candidate, \( \beta_{11}, \beta_{12}, \beta_{21}, \text{ and } \beta_{22} \). If we assume that Group 1 and Group 2 are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, then \( z_i \) is simply \((1 - z_j)\). Similarly, if we assume that all votes were cast for either Candidate 1 or Candidate 2 and there were no abstentions, then \( y_2 = (1 - y_1) \). Such contingency tables are usually available to describe each areal unit in the data set. In our voting application, since a set of precincts comprises the voting district in question, one might index these values with a further subscript to identify the precinct. For each precinct \( i \), then, we have the following relationship:

\[
y_{1i} = \beta_{11} z_{1i} + \beta_{21}(1 - z_{1i}).
\]

This relationship holds exactly for each of the \( I \) precincts in the district, yielding a system with \( I \) equations (one for each precinct) and \( 2I \) unknowns (two parameters, \( \beta_{11} \) and \( \beta_{21} \), for each precinct).

From basic algebraic properties, we know that there is not enough information to solve for these parameters given these equations. The fundamental indeterminacy is that multiple values of the parameters satisfy these restrictions. Note as well that adding observations of further precincts does not change the indeterminacy. Each new precinct adds one more equation to the system and two more parameters to be inferred.

The ecological inference problem is an example of an ill-posed inverse problem, or an inverse problem with many “solutions,” that is, a problem that encompasses a fundamental indeterminacy. Although one may wish to obtain a point estimate or “solution” to the problem, there is not enough information to narrow down the feasible set of estimates to one particular point estimate. This type of problem has been described as “partially identified” because while the available information does not allow one to identify the parameter of interest without the imposition of strong assumptions, it does often allow one to identify a “region” within which the parameters must lie, thus partially identifying the problem. How to proceed with partially identified problems such as the ecological inference problem is not obvious.

There are various strategies for pursuing problems of the partially identified ilk. However, for any particular application, how to proceed in identifying an estimation strategy is not straightforward and rarely obvious on the basis of theory alone. The key criterion involves the costs and benefits associated with different types of inferential errors. Every assumption involves an acceptance of potential
error in estimation. Some of these assumptions may be more palatable than others. Importantly, one must never allow excitement over the possibility of a point estimate to override careful and explicit consideration of attendant assumptions. There are no pat answers, no generic solutions.

Many methods have been proposed for obtaining estimates for ecological inference problems. Although the multifarious approaches to this problem have been distinct, they can be seen as lying along a continuum. The left end of the continuum is characterized by a lack of assumptions and, concomitantly, high credibility. Even when no assumptions are imposed, the data can allow one to narrow the range in which the true values of the parameters of interest lie. The best known procedure for obtaining a range of possible estimates comes from Oris Duncan and Beverly Davis’s method of bounds. The ideal situation occurs if the bounds are sufficiently informative. If they are not, one might choose to move along this continuum, but then assumptions, which may or may not be true, must be made. At the right end of the continuum are approaches that lead to a precise point estimate for each parameter. There are, to be sure, many different approaches clustered on the right, in the region of strong and numerous assumptions. Indeed, the bulk of the effort has been directed toward obtaining point estimates or to somehow identify a problem that is only partially identified. In general, one cannot zero in on precise estimates without making restrictive assumptions and thus trading reduced credibility for increased precision. Empirical researchers should be aware that no solution comes free. Every method yielding point estimates necessarily rests on assumptions that are strong enough to remove the indeterminacy of ecological inference. Researchers contemplating application of any method should carefully consider whether the associated assumptions are credible in their applications.

In practice, it is rare that one can accept point-identifying assumptions with great confidence. The prudent researcher should then resist the temptation to embrace any particular estimation method. Instead, the analysis of aggregate data should be a process. First, one should determine what one can learn from the data alone without imposing any assumptions. Then, one should consider various assumptions that have identifying power. A productive approach is to “layer” the assumptions, imposing them sequentially in order of decreasing plausibility. As more assumptions are imposed, one will be able to draw conclusions that are increasingly sharp but decreasingly believable. This process of inference illuminates the respective roles that data and assumptions play in empirical research. Moreover, it enables both researchers and their consumers to adjudicate how best to reconcile the inevitable tension between the strength of conclusions and their credibility in ecological inference problems.

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See also Aggregate Data Analysis; Measurement, Levels; Multilevel Analysis; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian

Further Readings

INFORMATION, POLITICAL

See Political Communication

INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

Institutional theory has been grappling with one major problem: how to explain the dynamics of
change in institutions. Scholars in the three long-standing “new institutionalisms”—(1) rational choice institutionalism (RI), (2) historical institutionalism (HI), and (3) sociological institutionalism (SI)—have increasingly sought to “endogenize” change, that is, explain it “from the inside.” In response to criticisms that their analytic frameworks could account for continuity but not for change, which they explained mainly “from the outside,” as the result of exogenous shocks, these neo-institutionalists have increasingly sought to explain the origins of and shifts in interest-based preferences, historical paths, or cultural frames. Whereas many of these scholars have sought explanations using one or other of the two existing alternative approaches, others have turned instead to ideas and discourse. For some of these neo-institutionalists, this was but a brief encounter, in particular for RI scholars, since taking ideas and discourse “seriously” undermined many of the very premises of their approaches. Others, however, broke with some of the fundamental premises of their own institutionalist tradition with their turn to ideas and discourse. Because these latter scholars have come to have as much if not more in common with one another than with those in the institutionalist tradition from which they emerged, they have come to be seen as part of a fourth new institutionalism, discursive institutionalism (DI)—sometimes also called the ideational turn or constructivist institutionalism.

The three long-standing neo-institutionalisms, although very different, tend to share one common assumption: Institutions serve primarily as constraints. RI focuses on rational actors who pursue their preferences following a logic of calculation within political institutions, defined as structures of incentives; HI details the development of political institutions, described as regularized patterns and routinized practices subject to a logic of path dependence; and SI concentrates on social agents who act according to a logic of appropriateness within political institutions, defined as socially constituted and culturally framed rules and norms. By contrast, DI focuses on sentient agents who convey substantive ideas through the interactive processes of discourse in given meaning to contexts following (contextualized) logics of communication. Institutions, here, rather than static external rule-following structures, are dynamic structures and constructs of meaning internal to agents who have the ability not only to create (and maintain) institutions but also to communicate critically about them and to change (or maintain) them through collective action. But while institutional context in DI therefore refers first and foremost to the structure, construction, and communication of meaning, it can also be understood in terms of the background information provided by the other three neo-institutionalisms in political science, with which discursive institutionalists may engage and from which they often emerge. This background information is all about the structures, understood in terms of historical institutional rules and regularities, sociological institutionalist cultural rules and frames, and rational choice institutionalist incentives and power asymmetries, that constitute the context within which collective action occurs and that affect the ways in which discursive institutionalist meaning structures are constructed.

Thus, the four institutionalisms share with one another a core focus on the importance of institutions, but they differ in their definitions of institutions, in their objects and logics of explanation, and in the ways in which they deal with change (see Table 1). This entry turns first to the examination of attempts to endogenize change and the move to ideas in RI, next in HI, and then in SI, before exploring the same in DI, in particular through the interactive dimension of discourse. The entry concludes with a consideration of the interrelationships among the four new institutionalisms.

**Endogenizing Change in Rational Choice Institutionalism**

RI posits rational actors with fixed preferences who calculate strategically to maximize their preferences and for whom institutions represent the incentive structures that reduce the uncertainties resulting from the multiplicity of individual preferences and issues. The very premises of RI about the fixed nature of preferences and the stability of institutions ensured that preference formation was long of little interest to RI scholars, while institutional change was ruled out analytically a priori, given equilibrium-based assumptions that entailed that change could only come from the outside, through exogenous shocks. The inability of RI to deal with institutional change from the inside and
In their attempts to find new ways to account for preference formation and institutional shifts, RI scholars have mostly looked to political coalition formation, although they have also sometimes sought a rapprochement with HI. Those RI scholars concerned with political coalitions often focus on formal electoral institutions, arguing that these act as incentive structures to produce the political coalitions that implement certain kinds of policies. But whatever the value of this insight within purely RI analytics, the problem is that it remains highly deterministic, as institutions are portrayed as determining politics, which in turn determine

its difficulties in accounting for preference formation have led scholars in the RI tradition in recent years to seek to endogenize change. For some, this has meant remaining within RI and seeking to explain change through shifts in political coalitions. For others, it has also entailed looking to HI approaches for the origins of preference formation, in particular for the origins of institutions, and for trajectories of change. For yet other scholars, however, endogenizing change has involved the turn to ideas—with most doing so in ways that did not undermine RI basic premises and a few moving to DI.
political outcomes, and it still cannot explain the origins of the institutions or of the political coalitions that created them, let alone why institutions or policies might change over time. When RI scholars try to respond to the question of origins by turning to HI, they often go back to the founding moments of the electoral institutions. But in this case, institutional foundations serve to explain contemporary political institutions that explain current political coalitions that explain current policies. And where is endogenous change?

Instead of using HI to enhance substantive theorizing, RI scholars sometimes seek to build HI insights into game-theoretic analysis. Avner Greif and David Laitin, for example, redefine the goal of institutions—from self-enforcing to self-reinforcing or self-undermining institutions—and their effects as parametric in the short term, meaning exogenous and fixed for agents who act on self-enforcing beliefs, but only quasi-parametric in the long run, meaning endogenous and variable as individuals are led to act in a manner that does not reproduce the associated beliefs. The problem here is that although this may better account for change over time in game-theoretic terms, we are still left with the irrationality of the choice of institutions to begin with; the deterministic trajectory of change over time, now for better or for worse; and the limited rationality of these supposedly rational actors at any given point in time.

Relatively few RI scholars have turned to ideas to solve the problem of institutional change. Among those who have, the most significant RI engagement with ideas began in the 1990s, although it has remained rather circumscribed ever since. It never took ideas very seriously, since ideational explanation was deemed useful only when and if explanation in terms of objective or material interests was insufficient. This, RI scholars argued, would occur if ideas come before interests, as road maps—in which case ideas are little more than mechanisms for choosing among interests; if ideas come after interests, acting as focal points—in which case ideas serve at best as switches for interests; if ideas are embedded in institutions, in which case it is the institutions rather than the ideas that really matter; if ideas are after the fact legitimization of actors’ interest-based action—in which case ideas are not really taken seriously at all; or even if, following the work of Douglas North, ideas are “shared mental modes”—in which case ideas would necessarily have an effect on the content of interests, undermining the very RI definitions of interests as separate from ideas.

The problem for RI scholars, then, and the reason most quickly abandoned the pursuit of ideas, is that they could not continue to maintain the artificial separation of objective interests from subjective ideas about interests, that is, beliefs and desires. Such subjective interests threatened to overwhelm the objective ones that are at the basis of the rationalists’ thin model of rationality, by undermining the fixed nature of preferences and the notion of outcomes as a function of preexisting preferences. And without fixed preferences as well as neutral institutional incentive structures, RI scholars lose the parsimony of the approach and everything that follows from it, including the ability to mathematically model games rational actors play as opposed to, in the words of Fritz Scharpf, the “games real actors play.” This helps explain why the foray into ideas for most dyed-in-the-wool RI scholars was short-lived. For those who persisted, however, a whole new approach to the explanation of interests and institutions has opened up.

For DI scholars engaged with the RI tradition, subjective interests replace the objective ones of RI, as ideas about interests that bring in a much wider range of strategic ideas and social norms. And these must be explained in terms of their meaning to the actors within a given meaning context rather than in terms of some set of universally identifiable interests. Material interests, economic in particular, which are at the basis of much of the institutional incentives in the rational choice institutionalist literature, are not ignored. But DI scholars tend to separate material interests analytically into material reality and interests rather than to conflate them, such that material reality constitutes the setting within which or in response to which agents may conceive of their interests. This makes for a DI ontology that is largely constructivist, much as in SI (see below), by contrast with the materialist ontology of most RI scholars, who assume that they can attribute material interests to actors, regardless of how those actors themselves construct their own ideas about their interests. And it makes for a different approach to epistemological questions of knowledge and certainty.
In DI, the kind of knowledge and degree of certainty agents may have with regard to their ideas about material reality may differ, depending on the aspect of material reality with which they are concerned. Illustrative of this epistemological observation is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s little noticed distinction in *On Certainty* between language games based on our everyday experiences in the world, which tend to admit few doubts or mistakes, and language games based on our (social) scientific pictures of the world, which may always allow for doubts, mistakes, and even gestalt switches. A problem with RI is that it tends to develop (social) scientific pictures games of the world that it treats as if they had the certainty of experience games.

Analyzed using the terms of RI, Mark Blyth suggests that the problem is that RI scholars assume that most phenomena are explainable in terms of “Knightian risk,” as part of a directly observable world in which agents can calculate the subjective probability of the likely outcomes of their preferences, such as in the U.S. Congress. But much of the phenomena that RI scholars seek to explain are not directly observable and are much closer to “Knightian uncertainty” because of the impossibility of knowing let alone statistically predicting the effects of all the forces that may have an impact on economic and political realities. For these phenomena, agents are not simply unsure about how to achieve their interests but also unsure of what their interests are, given that the uncertainties are too great, the moment unique, prediction impossible, and agents’ interests always structurally underdetermined. Thus, for example, the Great Depression of the 1930s and the economic crisis following the oil shocks of the 1970s were both cases of Knightian uncertainty, as governments, business, and labor at these critical junctures all sought to reconstitute interests through alternative narratives and causal stories about the reasons for the crisis, seeking to produce new political coalitions for collective action, with new ideas about how to replace existing institutions.

Needless to say, the economic crisis that began in 2008 is a similar moment of Knightian uncertainty, when the economists’ predictive models of rationalist behavior proved unable to cope not simply because they wrongly predicted but because their use actually altered the market, by acting, in the words of Donald Mackenzie, as an “engine” transforming the environment, not a “camera” recording it. It is important to note, however, that while the predictive failure of economists’ picture games contributed to the radical uncertainties of the economic crisis, where bankers went very wrong is when they ignored what they knew with a high degree of certainty from their cumulative experiences of lending and of assessing the reliability of risk, creditworthiness, and the likelihood of repayment over time and turned instead to predictive models that they believed were more certain because they were based on “scientific” methods.

Knightian uncertainty need not always be connected to such dramatic moments, however. DI scholars in the RI tradition have identified numerous cases in which ideas about interests may be in question under more everyday circumstances. For example, actors may not know what their interests are because they are in a new area of activity and thus have to determine which utility to maximize (interests), how to maximize it (strategies), and to what end (goals). Alternatively, long-standing ideas about interests may come into question at a critical juncture, say, when a central figure in a system signals an idea that leads to a shift in belief system. In both of these instances, scholars challenge RI logics only in special circumstances—with new ideas in new areas of activity or when old ideas are questioned. In both cases, however, by limiting the importance of ideas to the period of uncertainty between the end of the old institutional “game” and the beginning of the newly agreed institutional “game,” DI scholars risk making it appear that DI is significant only at the critical moment of changing DI ideas, which is preceded and followed by RI-crystallized preferences and frozen institutions. Institutions, however, also change over time as the ideas that infuse them change, as other DI scholars in the RI tradition suggest. This is because institutions themselves are not neutral structures of incentives but, rather, as Bo Rothstein suggests, may be the carriers of ideas or collective memories that make them objects of trust or mistrust and changeable over time as actors’ ideas and discourse about them change in tandem with changes in their performance.

DI scholars who engage with the RI tradition, then, like RI scholars, speak the language of interests, incentive structures, and collective action. But they see these as infused with a wide range of ideas
Endogenizing Change in Historical Institutionalism

HI explores how institutions, understood as sets of regularized practices with rulelike qualities, structure action and outcomes. It emphasizes not just the operation and development of institutions but also the path dependencies and unintended consequences that result from such historical development. The emphasis of HI on macrostructures and path dependence means that it has no agency built into it, making it difficult for it to explain why change may occur other than exogenously. And by focusing on critical junctures, with big bangs followed by path-dependent continuities, HI can be as equilibrium based as RI—which is even more problematic for an approach that purportedly explains “history.” HI’s inability to explain change from the inside along with its lack of agents has spurred scholars in the HI tradition to seek to endogenize change. And here, whereas for some this meant remaining within HI to theorize incremental change and/or to turn for agency to RI, for others it has meant a turn to SI and, increasingly, to DI.

In their attempts to introduce agency, HI scholars have most often looked to RI for the microfoundations to their macro-patterns. But in so doing, they have often simply reinforced the immobility of institutions. One example of this is the varieties of capitalism (VOC) school pioneered by Peter Hall and David Soskice, which explicitly married the two frameworks in its analysis of the binary division of capitalism into liberal and coordinated market economies. VOC is HI in its definition of the historically grounded macro-institutional rules and regularized practices of the two different capitalist varieties, RI in its focus on the rationally based, microfoundational logic of coordination games among firms and other relevant actors. But, however valuable the insight into the rationalist logics of complementarities among components and coordinating mechanisms among corporate actors within different macro-institutional contexts, the result is a very static depiction of capitalism that critics have also found overly functionalist and unable to account for the changing conditions resulting from global and regional economic and institutional forces.

Recent revisionist approaches to HI led by Kathleen Thelen and Wolfgang Streeck, which describe incremental change in institutions through endogenous processes of layering of new elements onto the old, through conversion by means of reinterpretation or redirection, or by drifting through deliberate neglect or exhaustion, do offer a way out of the HI statics of VOC. But they do this at the expense of VOC’s theoretical RI logic, since allowing for incremental change by definition makes for unfixed preferences and unstable institutions. Their “soft” RI framework of strategic actors trying to achieve advantage by interpreting or redirecting institutions enables them at best to provide empirical accounts of rationalist behavior. And they still cannot explain preference formation or why any given institution was the object of layering or conversion in one or another way, although they can describe it. Peter Hall and Kathleen Thelen do more to explain preference formation, with a clearer theoretical picture of the use of RI for HI incremental change, when they cast institutions as the target of rationalist strategic action by economic actors, who use them as resources to achieve their goals, with change depending on deliberative interaction, defection, and reinterpretation. But if actors are engaged in constant deliberation and reinterpretation of their perceived—read subjective—interests, then here too, the use of RI cannot go very far in theoretical terms because preferences are not fixed, are subjective rather than objective, and institutions are not stable enough to theorize as incentives. And once preferences are seen as subjective, with agency consisting of deliberation and reinterpretation, the way is open to taking seriously the role of ideas in altering agents’ perceptions of their preferences and of discourse in deliberating and reinterpreting agents’ institutions.

The HI analytic framework is generally more open to the turn to ideas than RI. This is because whereas RI has certain ontological and epistemological presuppositions about agency that clash
with those of DI, HI has none, since it lacks agency. As a result, whereas RI scholars have largely resisted the turn to ideas, HI scholars have been divided over how far to go with regard to ideas. The question here is where the tipping point is between HI scholars who continue to see institutions as constitutive of ideas and those who might better be called DI scholars within an HI tradition because they see ideas as constitutive of institutions even if shaped by them. Interestingly enough, even foundational books that are purportedly exclusively HI often contain chapters that can be seen as DI, whether because they focus on the role of ideas and knowledge in the making of policy, add to RI explanations of interest calculations a focus on processes of power and persuasion, or mix HI and DI (in the HI or SI tradition). These may involve showing how policy actors may consciously layer new policy ideas onto the old or illustrating how battles over ideas generate new institutional paths of development.

But if HI and DI approaches can be found in the same articles and chapters, then the question needs to be raised about how to reconcile HI and DI. For some DI scholars in the HI tradition, HI and DI can fit easily together, with HI providing structures, DI agency. Often, this is formulated as actors' ideas and discourse set the goals and indicate motivation while the (historical) institutional context provide the constraints for actions that also structure political openings for mobilization and articulation of interests. The problem with this mix is that it risks papering over some very real differences between HI and DI, in particular that HI portrays institutions as constraining structures external to actors whereas DI defines institutions as internal ideational constructs and structures (discussed as follows). Moreover, it leaves open the question of whether there can be a specifically HI approach to agency.

Recent endogenous approaches to agency in HI have tended to borrow from evolutionary biology to explain institutional change in terms of how populations’ genetic predispositions, combined with environmental factors, make for the success, replication, proliferation, and genetic feedback of certain preferences. The problem with this approach, from a DI perspective, is that it appears mechanistic, with no sense of the critical thinking of sentient agents (read real people) consciously changing their institutions—for better or for worse—through deliberation and contestation, as well as consensus building around ideas. Sven Steinmo is arguably the only HI scholar who has managed to combine DI with an HI approach to agency through evolutionary biology, when he provides evolutionary narratives of the trajectories of change in states’ economic and social systems that show not only how human institutions evolve but also how human agents who are creative, have ideas, and communicate with one another about what they are doing are also a key element in this approach, along with the unanticipated consequences to purposive behavior, and the fact that what they do occurs within evolving institutional context. This, then, is a mix of HI and DI, but one in which the HI tends to predominate.

But how, then, to give each analytic framework its due? Some scholars separate the HI examination of the institutional context of historical rules and regularities, critical junctures, and incremental change from the DI analysis, in which they then use the results of the HI investigation as background information. This helps show how sentient agents may infuse HI rules with contextualized meanings, construct understandings and responses to critical moments, or come up with the ideas that lead to the layering of one institution over another, the reinterpretation of an institution, or the conversion of agents to another institution. Other DI scholars interweave HI and DI together in discussions of evolutionary changes across time, while giving primacy to the ways in which evolving ideas affect changes in institutions.

This said, DI does not purport to explain all change—this would be a big mistake since “stuff happens,” events outside of people’s control occur all the time, material conditions do change, actions often have unintended consequences, and actors often act without prior ideas and discourse about what it is they will do. As HI scholars remind us, processes of change are often unconscious—as people may act without any clear sense of what they are doing, creating new practices, renewing old rules, or destroying them through drifting or exhaustion. DI, however, shows that much change can and should be explained in terms of sentient agents’ ideas about what to change (or continue)—if nothing else, in response to occurrences on the outside—that is, to the stuff that happens.
DI scholars who engage with the HI tradition, then, like HI scholars, also speak the language of institutional rules and regularities, critical moments, and incremental change. It is just that they infuse these structures with agency by focusing on the ideas of real actors that help explain changes in institutions or continuities, at critical moments or incrementally over time.

**Endogenizing Change in Sociological Institutionalism**

SI focuses on the forms and procedures of organizational life stemming from culturally specific practices, with institutions cast as the norms, cognitive frames, scripts, and meaning systems that guide human action according to a logic of appropriateness. In SI, therefore, one cannot talk about a turn to ideas as such, since ideas have always been at the basis of the approach—as norms, frames, and meaning systems—and constructivism as opposed to RI’s positivism as the generally accepted view of the nature of reality. One can, however, nevertheless talk about a split in SI between those whom we could continue to label as SI scholars because they see ideas more as static ideational structures, as norms and identities constituted by culture that frame agents’ actions and identities, and those whom we could call DI scholars in the SI tradition, because they see agents’ ideas as constituting culture and framing action.

DI scholars who engage with the SI tradition, then, like SI scholars, also speak the language of cultural framing, ideas, and discourse. It is just that they ensure that these are more dynamic and, thereby, better able to explain institutional change (and continuity). Importantly, DI scholars go beyond the SI scholars who put ideas into cultural context to put them into their “meaning” context as well—that is, by treating ideas as empirical subjects to be studied in their own right. And such meaning contexts constitute very different kinds of institutions from those of RI, HI, and SI.

For the three older neo-institutionalisms, institutions are structures external to agents that constitute rules about acting in the world that serve mainly as constraints—whether by way of rationalist incentives that structure action, historical paths that shape action, or cultural norms that frame action. For DI, by contrast, institutions are internal to sentient agents, serving both as structures (of thinking and acting) that constrain action and as constructs (of thinking and acting) created and changed by those actors. This internal capacity to create and maintain institutions derives from what Vivien Schmidt defines as agents’ *background ideational abilities*. This is a generic term for what John Searle defines as the *background abilities* that encompass human capacities, dispositions, and know-how related to how the world works and how to cope with it or for what Pierre Bourdieu describes in the *Logic of Practice* as the *habitus* in which humans beings act “following the intuitions of a ‘logic of practice.’” But the psychology of cognitive dissonance is also relevant here, which shows that people generally act without thinking and become conscious of the rules that might apply only if they are in contradiction. These background ideational abilities underpin agents’ ability to make sense in a given meaning context, that is, to “get it right” in terms of the ideational rules or rationality of a given discursive institutional setting.

But how, then, do we theorize about the process through which sentient agents get it right or, better, manage to bring about change in the ideational rules? Theoretical approaches in DI on how to plot change in ideas remain underdeveloped, despite much empirical analysis on changes in ideas.

Some of the most popular theories of ideational change focus on the notion of paradigm shift, building on Thomas Kuhn’s seminal work in the philosophy of science. Peter Hall, who has produced one of the most influential such analyses in terms of paradigms, formalized the process of ideational change by identifying three orders of change in paradigms: minor first-order change of policy instruments, moderate second-order change of policy instruments and objectives, and revolutionary third-order change of instruments, objectives, and core ideas. The first two orders of change suggest evolutionary development within a paradigm through first-order renewal and second-order recasting of ideas, while the third order of change is revolutionary, since it would replace one paradigm with another. This approach takes us a lot farther than HI’s critical juncture approach, by looking into the moment of crisis to explain where the ideas came from, who picked them up, and whether or not this produced a major change in ideas. But
however evocative the concept of paradigm shift may be as a metaphor for change, the theory itself still has problems similar to the HI critical juncture literature. It does not theorize closely enough the conceptual processes of ideational change, that is, how old ideas fail and new ideas come to the fore; the reasons for ideational change, that is, why certain ideas are taken up rather than others; the agency in ideational change, that is, who is projecting the ideas and how; and the defining moment(s) of transformation, since paradigm theory’s emphasis on abrupt shifts in ideas rules out not only evolutionary change but also revolutionary change in ideas that is not abrupt.

One promising way forward is to build on the work of discourse analysts who can be loosely seen as DI scholars in the SI tradition. Discourse analysts theorize the process of ideational continuity and change by showing how different elements may be added to ideas embedded in discourse, thereby bringing about change in ideas incrementally even in times of stability, and not just at critical junctures during paradigm shifts. The theoretical concepts of the various discourse analysis schools—once translated from the sometimes difficultly accessible and internally referential language—can provide added value to the analysis of ideas. For example, discourse analyses that build on Michel Foucault can offer insights into how to investigate the “archeology” of what was acceptable in a given discursive formation over time, from one period’s episteme to the next, through examination of networks of rules establishing what is meaningful at any given time. Conversely, discourse theories built on the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe can point to different ways in which concepts may be employed, such as nodal points from which all other ideas take their meanings in an ideological system, for example, how communism in Central and Eastern Europe served to distinguish between “real” (communist) democracy and “bourgeois” democracy.

There is one final problem with this focus on ideas, which is that we have yet to fully explain the dynamics of institutional change through agency. Although concentrating on ideas gets us closer to why institutional changes occur, they still do not explain how such institutional changes occur, that is, how the ideas themselves promote institutional change. For this, however, we need to consider another aspect of DI, which is the interactive side of discourse. How ideas are generated among policy actors and communicated to the public by political actors through discourse is the key to explaining institutional change (and continuity).

Endogenizing Change in Discursive Institutionalism

DI is an umbrella concept for the vast range of works in political science that take account of the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed and exchanged through discourse. So far, we have mainly focused on the substantive dimension of ideas and discourse. But even here, we have only touched on the surface of the range of discursive institutionalist approaches. DI scholars consider ideas and discourse at different levels of generality, going from policy ideas to programmatic ideas or paradigms to deeper philosophical ideas. They also consider different types of ideas, including cognitive ideas justified in terms of interest-based logics and necessity and normative ideas legitimated through appeal to values and appropriateness. And they consider different forms of ideas and discourse, including frames, narratives, myths, story lines, collective memories, scripts, argumentative practices, discursive struggles, and more. Many of these approaches tend to refer to agency, but often in a residual manner, through reference to the carriers of ideas. But the interactive dimension of discourse, which focuses on agents who communicate ideas, is equally important to the endogenization of change in DI.

Studies of the interactive dimension of discourse also come in many forms. They may be divided into those focused on what Vivien Schmidt has called the discursive construction of ideas in the “coordinative” policy sphere or the discursive communication of ideas in a “communicative” political sphere. The coordinative discourse encompasses the wide range of policy actors engaged in policy construction who may be organized in epistemic communities of elites with shared ideas, in advocacy coalitions of elites with shared ideas and policy access, and advocacy networks of activists contesting ideas in international politics or who may act as entrepreneurs who serve as catalysts for the ideas of such discursive communities. The
communicative discourse encompasses the wide range of political actors who bring the ideas developed in the context of the coordinative discourse to the public for deliberation and legitimation. These actors may include political leaders involved in the top-down mass electoral process of public persuasion, in public debates or in policy forums of informed publics. Or they may be members of civil society engaged in the bottom-up discursive interactions of grassroots organizations, of social movements, or local participatory governance and of citizens whose voices are heard not only in opinion polls but also in votes—where actions speak even more loudly than words.

This interactive dimension is key to the endogenousization of change in DI. Without discourse understood as the exchange of ideas, it is very difficult to explain how ideas go from individual thought to collective action. We do not, after all, know what people are thinking or why they act the way they do until they say it. And we do not for the most part engage in collective action or in collective (re)thinking of our actions without the articulation, discussion, deliberation, and legitimization of our ideas about our actions. This is why, in addition to the background ideational abilities that explain the internal processes by which institutions are created and maintained, we need to recognize the importance of what Schmidt has called the foreground discursive abilities through which sentient agents may change (or maintain) their institutions following a logic of communication. This is a generic term for what Jürgen Habermas calls communicative action, and it is at the basis of theories about deliberative and discursive democracy, about public debate, as well as about coordinative discourses of policy construction and communicative discourses of political communication.

These foreground discursive abilities are essential to explaining institutional change because they refer to people’s ability to think outside the institutions in which they continue to act, to talk about such institutions in a critical way, to communicate and deliberate about them, to persuade themselves as well as others to change their minds about their institutions, and then to take action to change them, whether by building discursive coalitions for reform against entrenched interests in the coordinative policy sphere or informing and orienting the public in the communicative political sphere. Conveying “good” policy ideas through a persuasive discourse helps political actors win elections and gives policy actors a mandate to implement their ideas.

Scholars in the SI tradition have little difficulty with this approach to discourse, especially since, as we have already seen, discourse analyses of all kinds are loosely seen as part of SI. Moreover, even when the word discourse is not used, DI scholars in the SI tradition often elucidate its interactive effects, as in recent work on contentious politics, which weds organizational and social movements theory and offers evidence of how leaders, social movement activists, and the everyday public spur change through ideas that persuade through discourse.

Scholars in the HI tradition also have little difficulty with discourse, since DI can add dynamics to the historical processes of ideational change, by focusing on who talks to whom, where, and when. Differentiating between a coordinative discourse in the policy sphere and a communicative discourse in the political sphere implicitly acknowledges the importance of institutional structures as well as practices. By the same token, however, HI can provide additional structure to DI by describing the formal institutional contexts that shape interactive patterns of discourse.

Scholars in the RI tradition have the greatest difficulty dealing with the interactive process of discourse, or taking the exchange of ideas in public debates seriously, because talk is by definition cheap while instrumental actions are assumed to speak more loudly than words. But can the substance of ideas not matter, as part of the persuasive power of discourse? Margaret Levi, in her presidential address at the American Political Society Association (APSA) in 2006, tacitly acknowledged this when she called for research on leaders’ communication because leaders have the power to inspire change as well as the capacity to change constituents’ beliefs—although she never engaged with DI work on leadership, discourse, or deliberative democracy.

RI’s problems with ideas, discourse, and deliberation follow from its restricted definition of agency and rationality. In RI, agents are rational in an unthinking manner, meaning that they respond to incentive structures in ways that maximize their interests (expected utility), pursuing their goals in accordance with their beliefs about the facts. In DI,
agents are rational in a thinking manner: They also pursue their goals in accordance with their beliefs about the facts, but—as already noted—they are not only able to think, say, and act but also to think about their thoughts, reflect on their actions, state their intentions, alter their actions as a result of their thoughts about their actions, say what they are thinking of doing, and change their minds in response to persuasion by others regarding what they are thinking, saying, and doing. Such self-consciousness and self-knowledge along with the ability to express it is summed up in the term sentient when used to define agents in DI (scholars also use the term reflexive), who may change their minds based on persuasion—by contrast with RI’s rational agents, for whom interaction is based on manipulation, as agents calculate how they will influence others to serve their own interests. A problem for RI scholars as a result of their definition of interaction as manipulation is that they cannot explain how one overcomes entrenched interests—that is, ones that cannot be coerced, tricked, or bribed into changing their actions.

DI approaches focused on deliberative democracy in particular have elaborated on such insights related to communicative action. Deliberative democracy is seen to occur when parties are reasonable and use evidence-based arguments to reach agreement, where persuasion is the key to creating shared understandings and building consensus, and in which the process itself is based on inclusive, open, trusting, and consensual interaction. Deliberative democracy is considered to be a better form of decision making because open dialogue may unlock untapped knowledge, generate new skills and know-how, produce higher quality reasoning for more legitimate policies, and create new, more collaborative interrelationships among the parties to the deliberation. Deliberation need not be limited to idealized communication situations, however, especially since power and interests cannot easily be eliminated from deliberations, although being aware of these may help minimize the potential effects of domination. But awareness of power and interests or even manipulation is no guarantee of discursive success.

Deliberation on its own, in other words, does not necessarily ensure a more democratic outcome. Power and position do matter. The question is how to define power and position in such a way as to also take account of the power of ideas and discourse. The problem with RI and HI is that they tend to reify questions of power and position by assuming that power is a function of position and that strategic interests derive primarily from agents’ power and position. DI holds instead that power cannot be defined by (objective) position alone, since ideas and values infuse the exercise of power and (subjective) perceptions of position. Moreover, actors can gain power from their ideas even where they may lack the power of position—as in the case of social movements or entrepreneurial actors who set the agenda for reform in policy or political spheres. Power itself, moreover, derives not only from position, meaning actors’ ability to wield power, but also purpose, since actors’ ideas and discourse about how they can and should wield that power (i.e., not just in their own strategic interests but in the general interest) may reinforce or undermine the power they derive from their position, depending on the responses of their audience to their stated purposes. This is the essence of political leadership.

Further support for the view that discourse and deliberation are necessary complements to investigations of power, position, and interests also comes from experimental political psychology, which seeks to probe the nature and limits of (RI defined) human rationality, in particular with regard to framing effects. Framing effects occur when different but logically equivalent phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences irrationally (in RI terms), for example, when people reject a policy program when told about its negative effects (e.g., it leads to 5% unemployment) and accept it when told of its positive effects (e.g., it leads to 95% employment). This represents a blow to RI, which assumes total information on the part of rational actors, at the same time that it provides an opening for DI. This is because framing effects are shown to be moderated by contextual forces involving elite competition and rhetoric that result, as James Druckman has shown, in a process of framing and counterframing (DI’s communicative discourse), interpersonal conversation in heterogeneous groups among citizens (DI’s deliberative democracy), or discussions among homogeneous groups of experts (DI’s coordinative discourse). This said, experimental political psychology also demonstrates the limits of deliberative effectiveness and the importance of
not idealizing deliberation, given principles of human cognition that point to limited attention spans, cases in which communication may reduce participants’ persuasiveness, and the importance of power relationships.

One final illustration of the value of DI approaches to the explanation of change (and continuity) comes from the insights it can lend to the use of the different forms of institutionalism. RI accounts tend to present human responses to given incentive structures as inevitable. This can be seen as part of a normative discursive strategy to get the reader to accept this, or to rebel against it, as in the case of globalization and convergence to a single neoliberal model. HI accounts of path-dependent institutions, in particular where they combine with RI, may add the inexorable to the inevitable. With regard to the globalization of capitalism, it can be seen as part of a normative discursive strategy to suggest that there is no convergence in capitalism since there are two different variables that will continue into perpetuity. SI accounts of cultural framing may dispute both RI inevitability and HI inexorability by claiming that cultural embeddedness makes all national cultures incomparable. This can in itself be part of a normative discursive strategy to resist attempts to impose any kind of internationalized order on national economies. And what kinds of ideas and normative discourse are embedded in DI, then? That there is nothing inevitable, inexorable, or incomparable in this world, because the future is open to new ideas conveyed by discourse. With regard to capitalism, it would dispute the inevitability of neoliberal convergence, the inexorability of a binary split in capitalism, and the incomparability of culturally embedded forms of capitalism. Instead, DI shows that rationalist logics, historical path dependencies, and cultural frames are conditional on public choices that result not just from the power clash among interests, the prerogatives of position, or the scripts of culture but from the battle of ideas through discourse and deliberation. The global economic meltdown clearly demonstrates the ideational underpinnings of many views of capitalism.

**Conclusion**

While some scholars have moved from one of the older neo-institutionalisms to DI, others straddle institutionalisms, and yet others remain squarely within one or another institutionalist approach. To get a sense of how all of this fits together in a very general way, Figure 1 situates many of the scholars’ works cited above within each of the four institutionalisms while arraying these along a horizontal continuum from interests to culture, with history in between—and along a vertical continuum from statics to dynamics, with interests, history, and culture at the static end, ideas and discourse at the dynamic end. HI sits between RI and SI, mainly because RI and SI are largely incompatible, whereas HI can go to either side when it adds agency. DI comes underneath all three because, although it is distinctive, it can rest on the insights of any one of the three and because scholars often see themselves as continuing to fit into one or another of the traditions even as they cross the line into DI.

This leaves one final question: what is the added value of approaches that take ideas and discourse seriously, by contrast with the other three new institutionalisms? DI endogenizes change, explaining much of how and why public actors bring about institutional change through public action. With regard to the other institutionalisms, moreover, the discursive approach helps explain the actual preferences and strategies of actors in RI and HI, and it helps to explain changes in the normative orientations emphasized by SI. Where DI can go wrong is when it considers ideas and discourse to the exclusion of issues of power (read RI instrumental rationality) and position (read HI institutional structures), when it assumes that DI deliberation necessarily trumps RI manipulation, or when it

![Figure 1](link_to_image)

**Figure 1**  A Visual Map of the Four Institutionalisms

*Note: DI = discursive institutionalism; HI = historical institutionalism; RI = rational choice institutionalism; SI = sociological institutionalism.*
overdetermines the role of ideas and discourse by forgetting that “stuff happens” or that historical institutions and cultural frames affect the ways in which ideas are expressed and discourse conveyed. We should not forget that ideas and discourse that seek to promote change often have little effect on the crystallized ideas about rationalist interests and cultural norms or on the frozen landscapes of rationalist incentives, historical paths, and cultural frames. The research agenda for political scientists concerned with explaining institutional change endogenously, therefore, should be to use DI to show empirically how, when, where, and why ideas and discourse matter for institutional change, and when they do not, that is, when RI, HI, and SI may be sufficient because change can be explained better exogenously.

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See also Advocacy Coalition Framework; Constructivism; Discourse Analysis; Discursive Institutionalism; Rational Choice

Further Readings


**Institutionalization**

Institutionalization is the process by which organizations acquire identity and legitimacy. Institutionalization involves more than building formal structures and processes. For organizations to become institutions, structures need to be, as famously noted by Philip Selznick (1957), “infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand” (p. 22). This is true for corporations and churches as much as for political parties and government agencies or for entire political systems. Institutionalization means members begin to value the organization for itself; it elicits a normative, value-based commitment or is supported by deeply held cultural beliefs in its mission. The result is a high degree of legitimacy with both members and external stakeholders in the organization’s environment. Internally, institutionalization involves achieving a consensus on the organization’s mission and goals (identity) beyond the acquisition of necessary resources and skills. Externally, a highly institutionalized organization enjoys a high degree of social acceptability with key constituencies or the public at large (legitimacy). Institutionalization is a process with different stages: Once an organization has developed effective working practices, these are transformed into norms that get accepted and then embedded in organizational life. However,
institutionalization is not a linear process. Being, or rather becoming, an institution is a matter of degree. Organizations or political systems for that matter exhibit different degrees of institutionalization. Importantly, over time, institutionalization may move in both directions—that is, increase or erode (deinstitutionalization), or simply stall.

The concept of institutionalization has been developed mainly by organizational sociologists who emphasize that individual action is shaped by, and embedded in, larger social structures. Political scientists have tended to look at institutions as given, fixed frameworks for political behavior but have shown less interest in their emergence, with the exception of constitutional design. The origin of public organizations in particular remains a neglected area of research for which the concept of institutionalization can serve as a useful analytical tool. This entry first reviews different concepts and mechanisms of institutionalization and then presents typical criteria of institutionalization before discussing some constraints and challenges of institutionalization faced by public sector organizations.

Concepts and Mechanisms of Institutionalization

Any discussion of institutionalization needs to be based on an understanding of the term institution. At the most general level, we can think of institutions as “patterned behavior,” as relatively stable, valued sets of formal and informal rules, norms, and practices that constrain but also enable political behavior. In short, institutions give structure to political life, but they also emerge from actor-based social and political processes. A key question for political scientists then is not only to what extent institutional structures shape or even determine individual political behavior and processes but also to what degree actors can purposefully create, design, or mold institutions to serve their needs or interests. This duality of actor (or agency) and structure lies at the heart of institutionalization research.

There is considerable disagreement among different schools of new institutionalism about the role of institutions and about the drivers and mechanisms of institutionalization. The most important divide runs between rational choice institutionalism and sociological (or organizational or normative) institutionalism. In the rational choice approach, institutions are essentially “rules of the game” that emerge as the result of political choice by self-interested actors, be it to solve collective action problems or to advance specific interests. This suggests that institutional arrangements are rather malleable and open to design. A typical approach in this vein is the principal–agent framework: Political principals create and delegate powers to administrative or international agents to perform certain functions or to entrench their policy preferences. Yet organizational arrangements can be stabilized, or institutionalized, through mechanisms of “lock-in,” based on the logic of increasing returns: Actors have an incentive to stay on a path of institutional development once it is chosen not because it is functionally superior but because they are rewarded by positive feedbacks, such as learning and coordination benefits. Historical institutionalism makes a similar argument about the lock-in effect of choices (at critical junctures) in the formative period of institutions (“path dependency”). However, it gives more importance to the role of ideas in sustaining institutional trajectories. This constructivist component brings historical institutionalism closer to sociological institutionalism.

The sociological approach views individual behavior as governed by norms and rules that define appropriate (as opposed to instrumental) behavior according to certain values. The key mechanism of institutionalization is an increase of normative commitment to the organization. In this account, formal structures and processes, which are the center of many rational choice approaches, are only a thin layer; “thick institutionalization” (as Selznick says) occurs when value-based commitment of internal and external stakeholders is solidified, as expressed in unifying ideologies or rituals or in the administrative entrenchment of the organization’s mission. A more strongly constructivist strand of the sociological approach holds that culturally determined cognitive beliefs, rather than values, are the main factor in the institutionalization process. Certain organizational practices are “objectified”—that is, they are institutionalized in the sense of being taken for granted as social facts. This is the most powerful form of institutionalization as it does not depend on incentives or shared values any more.
The different institutionalisms shed light on different dimensions and two stages of the institutionalization process. Rational choice approaches take an actor perspective and focus on the initial creation of a formal organization for a specific purpose. This perspective runs the risk of explaining institutional creation by exclusive reference to functional needs and rational calculation. It may overestimate the room for rational design and neglect obstacles to sustained institutionalization. Constructivist schools insist on the overriding importance of the second, more complex step to imbue formal structures with values and beliefs. Conversely, this structural approach leaves open questions as to how the various actors and interests populating the volatile world of politics relate to abstract processes of norm routinization or harmonization (politics of institutionalization).

Criteria of Institutionalization

How can we assess the degree to which an organization has been institutionalized? At a general level, the degree of standardization of organizational procedures and practices is an important indicator. However, routinization of behavior may in practice be disconnected from “value infusion”—that is, from the degree of legitimacy that the organization can command. Samuel Huntington proposed four more specific criteria or attributes: (1) adaptability refers to the extent to which organizations have learned to adapt to, and deal with, a dynamic environment, which is largely a function of age and experience; (2) complexity (the internal equivalent of adaptability) refers to the capacity of the organization to develop differentiated internal structures (diversification) that create stability and help it thrive in a changing environment; (3) autonomy is not only the most interesting criterion from a public organization’s perspective but also the most difficult to measure; it seeks to capture the extent to which an organization is independent and able to make its own decisions based on protection from external influence and control over its resources; (4) coherence refers to the degree of internal discipline and unity, the level of consensus on institutional purposes and procedures; more coherence results in more effective ways of working.

The profile of a highly institutionalized organization or entity, then, would include the following features: advanced internal differentiation of structures as well as solid consensus and coherence, control over decisions, including resources, and the capacity to manage the boundaries with the organization’s environment.

In the case of public sector entities, however, institutionalization, defined as the attempt to maintain some autonomy from the environment through internal differentiation and external boundary management seems particularly difficult to achieve—and not always desirable from a perspective of democratic control. Unless the organization in question occupies a monopoly or a similarly privileged position (National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA] is a good example), there are many constraints holding back public sector organizations in their quest to fully institutionalize.

Constraints and Challenges of Institutionalization in the Public Sector

First, public organizations often operate under a rigid mandate that imposes complex and mutually exclusive goals. The use of public authority and associated norms of accountability and predictability demand that public organizations formalize their practices to a higher degree and demonstrate sufficient congruence with the social environment that they are supposed to serve or regulate. Ambitious expectations, set by a political process that has to accommodate various interests, are often not matched by sufficient resources. Politicians may be loath to delegate sufficient powers and discretion. The political process is highly volatile, and especially a start-up organization may not be granted sufficient time by impatient constituencies to prove itself and consolidate. Second, newcomers often face tough competition for turf in a crowded institutional space. Successful institutionalization may even require the dismantling or deinstitutionalization of competing structures or organizations. Third, there is the normative concern in democratic societies about “runaway bureaucracies”—public organizations that abuse autonomy by placing their own interests above the public mission. However, keeping public entities strictly accountable and responsive may curtail their ability to develop their own identity and ambition; there might be a trade-off between internal identity and external legitimacy.
Given all these constraints, how is successful institutionalization at all possible? The public administration literature is indeed replete with accounts of failed institutionalization and pathologies of misguided institutionalization. At the same time, successfully institutionalized public organizations do exist. A functional account that explains the origin of public organizations by the needs they purportedly serve (to cope with new tasks or conditions) is clearly inadequate as it ignores the complex politics of institutionalization that is conditioned by existing institutional orders and power distributions. First, contingent events, such as the occurrence of crises, can be an important factor to explain the success of an institution: It manages to position itself as the adequate, even necessary, response to an urgent situation. Second, some institutional newcomers benefit from fashionable trends in public sector organization, such as the creation of agencies at arm’s length from political executives. Start-ups that conform to these “isomorphic pressures” are more likely to overcome obstacles to institutionalization. Third, and finally, the role of leadership deserves further study, as suggested by Arjen Boin and Tom Christensen: leaders not in the sense of charismatic visionaries but leaders as facilitators of process who guide the emerging entity through the different stages of institutionalization, striking the right balance between internal development and external demands.

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See also Agencies; Autonomy, Administrative;  
Bureaucracy; Change, Institutional; Institutional  
Theory; Institutions and Institutionalism; Organization  
Theory

Further Readings


**INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONALISM**

Most fundamentally, the social sciences have defined institutions as human made. As they were created by men and women, institutions order social, political, economic, and even cultural intercourse. Indeed, institutions constitute the very basis for human interaction. Consequently, institutions bear within them equally the potential danger of the most deep-seated social control as well as the promise of human liberation from both the social bond and the constraints of nature. Institutionalism is the study of the origins, effects, and potential for reform of institutions.

**Definitions**

The meaning of the term *institution* is wide ranging, from more restricted to more elaborate and also along several dimensions. One dimension is the degree of formalization of an institution. At the most informal pole, it is common to speak of habits, customs, or conventions. A habit is any action whose repetitive nature comes to be recognized by a self-conscious actor and thus is internally represented. A custom is a habit that is shared by members of a collectivity and hence social. A convention is any agreed-on procedure. Language itself is a convention, as both the meanings of words and syntactical structures require social agreement for communication. The same is true for other social “codes” such as myths and rituals that both embody, and thus communicate, social ideas and ideals but yet require some understanding of such collective representations for their decoding. To the extent that a convention is adopted by ever larger numbers of people and comes to be collectively
binding, it is eventually described as an institution. This movement from an informal to a formal setup is termed institutionalization. As it entails a shift from an individual to a society and from freedom to constraint, it can be viewed as a transition from nature to culture.

The degree to which institutions are collectively binding, however, constitutes a second dimension of variation. A tradition or folkway has been followed over time and by a particular group, such that an individual’s cultural identity may incline him or her to adhere to a given custom. The French term moeurs and the English mores, which correspond to the German Sitte, connote slightly more social obligation. A norm, which may be defined as an internalized belief, is more strongly binding, because its transgression is open to moral or social sanction. The Hegelian distinction between Sittlichkeit and Moralität is based on the isolation of the moral rule from the original moral community (Gemeinschaft) and its transfer to the society (Gesellschaft), after which, ultimately, it undergoes a synthesis through the state (Staat). A law is a collectively binding decision whose interpretation is subject to adjudication only in specialized juridical bodies and by breaking which one is subjected to punishment, again by public institutions with a monopoly on the exertion of legitimate force, as pointed out by Max Weber. Consequently, the workings of some institutions may depend on other institutions or on institutionalized settings. As discussed in classical political theory, the establishment of the state or Leviathan is the decisive shift accomplished by the move from the state of nature to civil society.

In a similar vein, institutions vary with regard to whether they are self-reinforcing or require intervention by some sort of meta-institutions. If a certain rule is adhered to by all relevant actors because it is in their self-interest to conform, the rule is termed to be self-enforcing. However, some perspectives on institutions claim that rules need to be elaborated for actors to be able to understand how to follow them—or indeed to calculate their self-interest—such that cultural and social guidelines as to what is appropriate behavior must flesh out the skeletal “rules of the game.” Furthermore, some sets of preferences and rules (such as majority rule) may not necessarily produce stable outcomes. Instead, more elaborate procedures may set limits to the possibility of choosing, such that one may speak of institutional or structure-induced equilibrium, as opposed to a natural or preference-induced equilibrium. This is the subject both of public choice or rational choice theory and of institutional economics. Here, we see that the study of institutions may extend from a narrowly defined set of rules to, first, a more elaborated context necessary for understanding the workings of these institutions and, second, as T. R. Voss emphasizes, to an analysis of the equilibrium outcomes produced by these institutions and institutional contexts.

The term institution refers to the action of introducing an institution, to the identity of the actor (Instituteur) that introduced the institution, and to the thing that has been introduced. Institutions can be introduced by religious and secular authorities as well as by groups and communities, as in canonical institutions, institutions of inheritance, and social institutions. Institutions are created by divine or mortal beings and, hence, set apart from nature. Institutions may produce a person of high morality, a group, or a regime. Even Charles de Montesquieu defined laws very broadly to include both the institutions of the legislature and the mores and manners of the nation, in general. Thus, institutions include the totality of social forms and structures and may be established by law or custom. Consequently, three types of institutions are especially important: (1) social institutions, such as kinship, marriage, family, and inheritance; (2) constitutions, which are the written or unwritten law governing the exercise of public power and the procedures for making laws themselves; and (3) regimes, which refers to the process of giving something the character of an institution. Social institutions govern relationships among individuals within societies and hence establish a social order. Constitutions regulate the relationships among citizens, political representatives, and the state and hence create a political order. Regimes are often found in the international arena, where, being beyond the reach of the sovereignty of nation-states, international agreements are used to create international regimes or international orders, and international organizations with the legitimacy and normative weight of an institution are active in the implementation of the agreed-on normative order or international norms.
To **institutionalize** something or the **institutionalization** of something may refer to the frequency, permanence, or widespread nature of a habit, a virtue, or even a vice—the granting of an official status as institution to a custom or procedure. **Institution** also refers to the inculcation, indoctrination, or introduction of norms, habits, and knowledge in various forms of instruction, education, or upbringing. In addition, **institution or institute** may refer to the corporate body or building from which such instruction is imparted, such as a private institution or institute of scientific study. Institutions meant for instruction or induction (e.g., the military, clerical institutions) form and regulate individuals and hence should (in theory) be reliable. Closed or total institutions are responsible for psychic and physical healing, such as hospitals or psychiatric institutions. Financial institutions and institutional investors hold money in trust for large numbers of individuals and should (again, in theory) be held accountable to their investors. Individuals who have fully imbibed and internalized such instruction and are employees of such institutions are known as professionals. In each of these trust relationships, there is a potential for betrayal of trust, which has been the focus of much social scientific analysis of institutions and professions.

Financial institutions, institutional investors, and the governmental framework for monetary transactions all form markets. Political institutions and constitutions frame public policies. Social institutions help socialize individuals; different psychological stages, pedagogy, and social relations help form the psyche. The study of these institutional effects is known as institutionalism. Unlike institutions that are viewed as arbitrary, institutionalism is by nature a relativistic approach: Institutions that may have been introduced as arbitrary results of contingent events may have unintended consequences for human nature, societies, politics, and markets. Consequently, institutionalists view developments in these spheres as artifacts of institutions, and hence, they are neither natural nor necessarily desirable.

**Institutions and Institutionalism**

**Spanning the Social Sciences**

The study of institutions and institutional effects spans the social sciences. In the areas of philosophy of knowledge, philosophy of right, and political philosophy, institutions have been viewed both as mental representations and concrete political structures. As cognitive representations, institutions help structure thought, thus constituting perceptual lenses or schema. The origins and legitimacy of social and political institutions has been a perennial problem, being divided into historical or empirical and rational views. The historical view shared by classical authors such as Georg Friedrich Hegel sees traditions, customs, norms, laws, and institutions as inheritances that have achieved legitimacy (if they have indeed achieved it) by standing the test of time. Moreover, their functioning rests on this historical context. The rational view, by contrast, aims to distill the essence of an institution via logical analysis, often through recourse to a hypothetical account of institutional origins or the use of a particular procedure, as in the contract theory of Thomas Hobbes or John Locke. The work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau bridges these extremes by taking a historical, anthropological view of the development of social institutions but a contract view of institutional legitimacy; freedom is defined as living under a rule one makes for oneself. Such procedural legitimacy is further developed by Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas but has been called into question in the so-called communitarianism debate.

One strand of the sociological and anthropological tradition views institutions as cultural products that substitute for instinct and thus confer an evolutionary advantage for human societies with particular institutions. More generally, institutions create social order both by specific sets of positive and negative sanctions imposed to prevent social deviance and by giving symbolic expression to the social order, for example, through myths and rituals. Indeed, the very categories of thought, such as notions of time and space, are socially contingent and linked to social organization. Thus, the sociological meaning of the term **institution** ranges from concrete social practices or structures to ideas, representations, and even socially contingent interpretations of ideas and categories, as we observe in the social thought of Émile Durkheim.

A central division deals with whether institutions are functional and hence have evolved from universal human needs, even if the exact institutional
configurations vary from society to society, or whether institutions are more aptly viewed as historical residues and products of social interpretation. A second problematic concerns the issue of free will versus determinism (also referred to as agency vs. structure): Do institutions determine behavior or simply make some courses of action more likely because they appear to be “normal” or “appropriate” and may be sanctioned by punishment or social disapproval if not followed? Talcott Parsons’s theory of action proposed that previous patterns of behavior serve as points of orientation for actors, for example, in establishing a repertoire of social roles, but that individuals are free to conform or deviate from these expected patterns.

The lines between sociological, social-psychological, and psychological views on institutions are blurred, as all share a focus on mental representations, of which language and cognitive operations are central. Here, the idea that the meaning of sounds is arbitrary and that meaning arises from the juxtaposition of phonetic oppositions as well as the focus on classificatory systems, binary codes, and cognitive routines from the fields of computer science and artificial intelligence have been quite influential. These representations or routines not only mediate between the individual subject and the external world but are also formed or canalized through these interactions, as in Jean Piaget’s theories of developmental stages or Sigmund Freud’s focus on early childhood traumas. Given the potentially arbitrary nature of these historic residues, an emancipatory program in social psychology is possible—although its adherents, such as Erich Fromm or Herbert Marcuse, vary in the extent to which they stress social and economic versus purely psychological causes for personality (and societal) deformation.

The institutional tradition in economics stresses the “embeddedness” of economic transactions in social structures and culture. In contrast to Adam Smith’s claim that “man” has a “natural” tendency to “truck, barter and exchange,” economic institutionalists emphasize the cultural, social, and even normative bases for exchange as well as the ways in which social and cultural motivations and practices—such as striving for social honor—shape and even distort economic behavior. Some examples include Torsten Veblen’s “conspicuous consumption” of the leisure class, John Commons’s analysis of the impact of historical experience and government policies on the organization of industrial relations, and Max Weber’s classic analysis in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Even Joseph Schumpeter, who coined the phrase *methodological individualism* and drafted the economic model of democracy, stressed the ways in which historic residues predating the capitalist era buttressed capitalist economic arrangements and argued that as these precapitalist foundations are on a decline, capitalism itself will become unstable. Similarly, the work of Karl Polanyi analyses the economic and political instability resulting from the historically unique effort of capitalism to disembed the market from social arrangements and institutions.

In law and political science, political institutions were long understood in terms of the norms embodied in constitutions. Nevertheless, both the social context for political institutions and the rise of the modern state, as well as the impact of institutional arrangements on the behavior of politicians and voting patterns, were considered by classic political institutionalists, such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Max Weber.

**Behavioralism Versus Institutionalism**

In the aftermath of World War II, however, a behavioralist revolution swept through the social sciences, pushing institutions and institutionalist analysis into the background. Though more popular in the United States than in Europe and other parts of the world, behavioralism focused on assumed universal regularities of behavior: In psychology, Burrhus Frederic Skinner studied scientific stimulus and response; in sociology, Talcott Parsons proposed structural functionalist requirements and a universal movement from traditional to modern society; in economics, the neoclassical model with its universal uniformities of market behavior rose to undisputed dominance; in political science, pluralists including Robert Dahl and David Truman, among others, focused on the observable behavior of voters and interest groups. By the end of the 1960s, however, limitations of these behavioralist models led to a rediscovery of institutions, which James March and Johan Olsen labeled the *new institutionalism*. 
Rational Choice and the New Institutional Economics

Rational choice theorists and new institutionalist economists understand institutions as a response to dilemmas of collective choice and collective action. Assuming human actors to be rational, self-interested utility maximizers, these scholars investigate the irrational or suboptimal consequences of such rational action when outcomes depend on the decisions of more than one actor; that is, they study strategic action.

Rational choice studies of legislative decision making are based on the Condorcet Paradox or Arrow impossibility theorem, which demonstrates that even when individuals possess transitive preference orderings (e.g., preferring Restaurant A to Restaurant B to Restaurant C), group decision making may not result in a stable choice. As a result, majority rule is inherently unstable, and these institutionalists study both the conditions for democratic stability and the ways in which institutional rules, such as the agenda-setting privilege of the political executive or the veto powers of parliamentary chambers or committees, allow stable political choices to be made. Spatial models of preferences serve as an important tool for this type of analysis. Game theory is simply a method of economic analysis based on the payoff functions of the actors (or players) and the rules for their choices (or moves). Such games often result in suboptimal outcomes, as in the famous prisoners’ dilemma, in which both prisoners confess to a crime out of fear that their co-conspirator will betray them. Institutional rules or particular strategies may be of some help in improving these outcomes, for example, by turning a noncooperative game, such as the tragedy of the commons, into a cooperative one.

The new institutionalist economics explores the origins of economic institutions and their effects, especially the legal framework for the market, which directly affects the distribution of property rights and the calculation of transaction costs. Some influential models for understanding the development of institutions are transaction cost economics, which postulates that institutions develop to minimize all costs related to economic transactions, including information costs and the dangers of mutual dependence; principal–agent theory, which understands contracts and organizational structures as responses to the need of “principals” to control their “agents,” such as owners–managers, governments–bureaucracies, and voters–politicians; and path dependency, which uses the concepts of sunk costs and increasing returns to explain why initial contingent events lead to inefficient but stable paths of economic or political development. Central issues deal with whether or not socialized or disembedded individuals can be taken as the point of departure for these models, whether institutional arrangements can be modeled as if emerging from a state of nature, and whether historically given institutional starting points are necessary.

Sociological Institutionalism and Economic Sociology

As sociology deals with the social order, the entire field can be said to be institutional. Nevertheless, a distinct group of sociologists have built on the behavioral psychology and organization theory to elaborate a view of individual cognition and collective decision making within organizations that they have termed sociological institutionalism. Here, cognitive limits on human capacities for gathering and processing information (bounded rationality) result in various coping mechanisms, such as accepting the first more or less acceptable alternative (satisficing) in place of maximizing utility or reliance on standard operating procedures that reduce choice and thereby structure and coordinate action. Routines and scripts may produce patterns of organizational behavior that can be termed quasi-chaotic, as in the garbage can model, which posits that choices within organized anarchies are largely random. Newer applications of this perspective have focused on the reliance of myth and ceremony even in modern business organizations, the socialization in time of various managerial cohorts, and the role of organizational isomorphism between political systems and organizations of immigrants to produce particular cultural patterns of postmodern citizenship. Social constructivist approaches have stressed especially the socially contingent development of norms, ideas, and institutions, even in the international arena. Economic sociology also focuses on the social and cultural bases of economic institutions and concepts, such as inheritance or the household, thus adhering to the institutionalist tradition in economics more faithfully than the
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new institutional economics or new economics of organization.

**Historical Institutionalism**

The concepts of economic sociology, also found in the corporatism and other varieties of capitalism literature, focus on the historical, social, and organizational conditions for alternate modes of capitalist economic formation. Historical institutionalism, more generally, follows the research program of Max Weber in understanding economy, politics, and society in terms of historically contingent, particular developmental paths, whose meanings depend on the subjective interpretations of human actors. Some historical institutionalists emphasize path dependency, sequences, and temporal orderings. Others argue that the historical approach may give us leverage precisely on questions of human agency and configurational causality. The main problem with this approach is related to the causes of institutional stability and change. Its main methods are process tracing and thick description as well as, in some cases, analytic narratives.

**Current Debates**

Institution is so fundamental to the social sciences that it is not surprising that the definition of and research on institutions spans an enormously broad range of concepts, methods, and topics. Nevertheless, the study of institutions deals with the formation and impact of stable social arrangements, even if these may range from ideas and normative concepts to actual local, national, and international organizations, associations, and states. The central cleavages within institutionalist analysis help study whether a state of nature can be posited or whether particular culturally and historically grounded starting points must be addressed, whether institutions evolve or are products of conscious human design, and whether institutionalist outcomes are functional or historically contingent, and if so, what normative consequence follows from the artifactuality of institutions and their impact on social life.

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See also Behaviorism; Change, Institutional; Constructivism; Discursive Institutionalism; Institutional Theory; Institutionalization; Logic of Appropriateness; Path Dependence; Process Tracing; Rational Choice; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Schema; Script; Veto Player; Weber, Max

**Further Readings**


**INTELLIGENTSIA**

See Political Integration

**INTELLECTUALS**

The concept of intellectual as a category emerged in the late 19th century and bloomed with the political phenomena of the 20th century. Before that, as in the work of the medieval historian Jacques Le Goff, for example, the term referred to clerics. Intellectuals appeared in France during the Dreyfus Affair of 1894, in which Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a French artillery officer of Jewish descent, was tried and falsely convicted of treason; he was later exonerated and, in 1906, received a full pardon. The term *Dreyfus Affair* was coined by the writer Maurice Barrès in 1898 to designate the writers, scholars, and publicists who were convinced of Dreyfus’s innocence. It is thus at the intersection of science and public debate that the intellectual stands. Throughout the 20th century, intellectuals emerged as major players in politics and public affairs. If one speaks in the plural, intellectuals designate a group of scholars and artists whose intervention in public space finds its legitimacy in their expertise and knowledge. Very soon, the figure of the intellectual also appeared in the singular as a symbol of political idealism or commitment in the political struggles of the century. Today, they are represented by writers such as Salman Rushdie, who have been persecuted for their beliefs and writings and have become symbols of freedom of expression. During the last quarter of the 20th century, intellectuals played a major role in the interpretation of the Holocaust and in the debates on how to deal with this legacy in public discourses, as in Germany, and also in the interpretation of the Nazi phenomenon and its German roots (see the *Historikerstreit* in 1986 between the historian Ernst Nolte and the philosopher Jürgen Habermas). Intellectuals have attempted to provide an existential reflection, as in Primo Levi’s works. They have been similarly involved not only in the debate against racial discrimination in America in the 1960s (Hannah Arendt and Toni Morrison) and in Third World struggles for independence (Frantz Fanon) but also in the assertion of former colonized cultures—for example, Aimé Césaire and Leopold Sedar Senghor, the spokesmen for Negritude, or more recently, Raphaël Confiant and Patrick Chamoiseau for Creole.

One of the most important influences of intellectuals on political life was the challenging role played by dissidents in the Soviet Union and other communist states. Long persecuted, imprisoned by the Soviet regime, and silenced, they asserted themselves in favor of change in the climate of international relations. The Helsinki Accords of
1975 allowed the appearance of the Charter 77 movement led by Jan Patocka and Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, which placed the defense of human rights at the heart of its approach and appealed to the West, and similar movements in Poland, where intellectuals played a central role in the Solidarnocz movement as also in the round table discussions that allowed the nonviolent transition toward democracy in the late 1980s.

**Intellectuals and the End of History**

The events of 1989, the year of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet empire, would seem to corroborate theories that shook the global intellectual debate since the political scientist Francis Fukuyama in an article, based on a Hegelian reading of history, described the final victory of liberal democracy over totalitarian regimes as “the end of history.” By contrast, Samuel Huntington, who propagated the idea of a “clash of civilizations,” which the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, seemed to confirm, shaped the global debate in a different way.

One of the striking influences that intellectuals have had over the past 20 years concerns the role played by neo-conservatives in the United States. The meeting of a group of students at City College of New York, including Irving Kristol, Daniel Bell, and Irving Howe, led to the birth of neo-conservatism; they combined the anticommunism of the Cold War period and the theories of the philosopher Leo Strauss, who had emigrated to the United States to escape the Nazi regime. Neo-conservatism affirms the equal responsibility of intellectuals and political leaders. Neo-conservatives argue that to combat terrorism, the United States should assert its power internationally to promote the development of democracies. This theory had considerable resonance after the September 11, 2001, attacks. It was on this basis that American forces intervened in Iraq in 2003 to create a new political order.

**New Theoretical Objects**

Recent years have seen the intellectuals expanding the scope of their study to new objects as well as the emergence of new voices. Following the theories of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice, 1971), the Indian economist Amartya Sen, recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1998, and the Bangladeshi Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Peace Prize laureate in 2006, have played a central role not only in the renewal of economic theory but also in stressing the importance of equality and justice in international relations. This movement signals the new role of today’s intellectuals who raise questions of public interest concerning the future of the planet such as the principle of responsibility expounded by philosopher Hans Jonas in the early 1960s about the nuclear threat and now dealing with environmental policies, besides public health and bioethical issues.

Intellectuals are also faced with this question: What is the nature of social change to come? Whether postcolonial thinkers, theorists of the “multitude,” representatives of gay theory, or philosophers of recognition, their answers are often combined with a strong critique of democracy. The debate concerns both the nature of power in contemporary societies and the possibility for formerly oppressed groups to express themselves. It allows the renewal of old theories (Marxism, anarchism) at the same time as the emergence of new objects. In recent years, intellectuals dealt with questions of law and justice (Jürgen Habermas, Giorgio Agamben, and Roberto Unger), media and communication (Noam Chomsky), ecology (Vandana Shiva and Peter Singer), or HIV/AIDS. They have especially sought to bring in new players in the line of subaltern studies that developed predominantly in India or Latin America or postcolonial studies (Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, and Paul Gilroy). These theories, postulated by women scholars such as Judith Butler or Gayatri Spivak, were based on the result of gender studies and the formation of identities as ideological constructs. Theorists of recognition (Axel Honneth, Seyla Benhabib, and Nancy Frazer) refer to Charles Taylor’s theories of justice as a basis for classifying recognition as a political category.

**Politics at the Heart of Intellectuals’ Reflection**

The current relationship between intellectuals and politics has developed into a more complex form than it had throughout the 20th century. The links between intellectuals and politics assert themselves as more deeply embedded than ever. One could
indeed imagine in the early 1970s that the complexity of our societies and the development of globalization heralded the disappearance of intellectuals and their replacement by competent experts and scientists, while new trends such as globalization asserted the primacy of the economy at the expense of politics. Nevertheless, a number of intellectuals today enjoy an international reputation further enhanced by the circulation of ideas, globalization of information, use of the Internet, and mobility of students.

At the international level, the most burning issues remain political. If in Western democratic societies intellectuals agree with the criticism of capitalism, they must nevertheless remember that their existence is linked to the practice of democracy. It is this battle that is waged today by intellectuals in all countries where freedom of expression is restricted. Dissidents under repressive regimes have struggled for historical truth and the recognition of different communities that make up society. The other big question now concerns the dynamics of political and religious radicalization. A number of intellectuals, for example, call for a modernized reading of Islam.

The past decades have discredited the idea of a peaceful unification of the planet and confronted intellectuals with all forms of conflict, from the most global to the most local, bringing out old nationalist confrontations but also religious clashes. “What is most peculiar about our age is the conviction that evil is installed at the core of history and our frenetic rejection of that conviction” (Thérèse Delpech, 2007, p. 175). If they want to meet the challenges of democracy, intellectuals have a long way ahead

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See also Agenda Setting; Civil Society; Critical Theory; Globalization; Neoliberalism; Political Philosophy

Further Readings


Intelligence

Intelligence refers to an awareness that leaders hope to have about the threats or opportunities that face their nation, either internally or from abroad. Armed with this information, they may make better decisions about how to protect and advance the national interest. An understanding of threats and opportunities can be reliably acquired only through the careful collection and study of information about domestic and foreign situations, such as plotting by internal subversives or the machinations of external terrorist factions and rival nations. This gathering of information, along with the interpretation of its meaning, lies at the heart of intelligence.

Stated more formally, intelligence is the knowledge and foreknowledge of dangers and opportunities—both domestic and foreign—as a prelude to decision and action by a nation’s leaders. Strategic intelligence refers to the objective of achieving a global understanding of dangers and opportunities; tactical intelligence is concerned more with threats and opportunities on specific battlefields or theaters of war.

The academic study of intelligence has progressed by leaps and bounds in recent years. The most important developments in the field are efforts to move beyond spy memoirs and to apply rigorous research standards to the questions of how nations gather and analyze information on world affairs and engage in other intelligence activities. More and more studies are presenting empirical data, testable hypotheses, and theoretical frameworks. Scholars in the field have also been conducting in-depth interviews with practitioners and have benefitted from
the extensive number of intelligence documents that have been released in recent decades. In the United States, such documents include the Church Committee reports (1975–1976) as well as reports from government panels examining intelligence such as the Aspin-Brown Commission (1995–1996), the Kean Commission (2004), and the Silberman-Robb Commission (2005). This entry considers the nature of intelligence, highlighting some key examples involving covert action and counterintelligence activities on the part of the United States. It then examines the results of intelligence activities and notes some distinctive features of intelligence in democratic regimes.

The Nature of Intelligence

Intelligence may be considered a process, a product, a set of organizations, and a set of missions.

Intelligence as a Process

As a process, intelligence is a series of interactive phases whereby government officials plan what information to collect from around the globe, use machines and human agents to gather the information, assign experts ("analysts") to make sense of the information, and finally, distribute the findings to decision makers. This sequence of activities is known as the intelligence cycle.

Intelligence as a Product

As a product, intelligence consists of facts and interpretive reports about homeland, world, or battlefield conditions. In the United States, for example, the most prestigious intelligence report is the President's Daily Brief (PDB), a succinct summary of global events over the past 24 hours, delivered to the president and a few other top policy officials each morning. Important, as well, in the United States, is the National Intelligence Estimate or NIE, which attempts to make more lengthy long-range forecasts about world events and relies on detailed research.

Intelligence as a Set of Organizations

As a set of organizations, a nation’s intelligence “community” focuses on a number of responsibilities: code-breaking and electronic-eavesdropping organization, the gathering and interpretation of photography from satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, the interpretation of military information gathered by intelligence units within the uniformed services, and their gathering of tactical information in theaters of combat.

Intelligence as a Set of Missions

Collection and Analysis

As a set of missions, intelligence refers first of all to the range of activities encompassed within the intelligence cycle, known in short as “collection and analysis.” This is Mission Number One for a nation’s intelligence agencies, that is, the duty to place on the desktops of prominent leaders the best information possible to help illuminate the domestic and foreign security situations they face. In the United States and most other affluent nations, the intelligence agencies have two additional responsibilities: (1) covert action and (2) counterintelligence (CI).

Covert Action

Covert action is a secret activity designed to influence events in other nations in a direction favorable to a nation’s best interests, not simply gather information abroad. This mission expanded rapidly in the democracies during the Cold War as a means for combating the aggressive use of intelligence operations by the Soviet Union to spread communism around the world.

Covert action is often grouped into four categories: (1) propaganda, (2) political, (3) economic, and (4) paramilitary activities. Propaganda, sometimes called psychological warfare or simply “psy war,” is the most extensively used form of covert action. During the Cold War, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) secretly produced a flood of worldwide propaganda disseminated by way of its vast, hidden network of “media assets”—foreign newspaper editors and reporters, television correspondents, magazine editors, and book editors. This source of “perception management” (in the intelligence euphemism) was meant to supplement the normal overt sources of information about the United States distributed through official channels, such as White House press releases and State Department public bulletins.
During the Cold War and till today, political covert action includes secret financial aid to friendly politicians and governmental officials abroad—what British intelligence officers refer to as “King George’s cavalry.” During the 1960s, the CIA provided covert funding to the Christian Democratic Party in Italy for its behind-the-scenes political battles against the Soviet-sponsored Italian Communist Party. Normally, propaganda and political covert action work together hand in glove.

Covert action in the form of secret economic operations can also be used to undermine adversaries abroad, for example, by encouraging labor unrest (as in Chile during the 1970s) or by sabotaging electrical power lines and mining harbors (approaches used by the United States against Nicaragua during the 1980s). Paramilitary (PM) activities are the most extreme, and controversial, form of covert action. Adopting this approach, a country will enter into warlike operations against an adversary—everything from weapons supplies to one of the sides that is engaged in a foreign civil war to large-scale “secret” (or, at any rate, never officially acknowledged) wars or assassination plots aimed against foreign leaders. Classic illustrations of PM wars are the failed Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba in 1961 and the struggle against communist forces in Laos from 1962 to 1968, with the CIA advising and arming the indigenous anticomunist Hmong tribesmen.

Before assassination as an instrument of U.S. intelligence was prohibited by an executive order signed by President Gerald Ford in 1976, and reaffirmed by every American president since, the White House instructed the CIA to carry out plots to kill Fidel Castro of Cuba and Patrice Lumumba of Congo, among other leaders of small nations caught in the tug-of-war between the United States and the Soviet Union. None of the plots was successful. Despite the executive order against assassinations, a waiver exists in times of authorized war, and as a consequence, the White House ordered CIA plots against the lives of Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Osama bin Laden of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization in the early years of the 21st century. None succeeded. Overt U.S. forces eventually captured Hussein during the Second Persian Gulf War that began in 2003; he was tried and executed by provisional Iraqi authorities. Bin Laden remains at large.

Counterintelligence

The third core intelligence mission is known as counterintelligence (CI). As with covert action, this mission is rarely mentioned in a nation’s official documents. Yet CI grew quickly as a mission during the Cold War in the face of the rising confrontation between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union. The purpose of CI (of which counterterrorism is an important subset) is to thwart the hostile activities of foreign intelligence services and terrorist organizations directed against the homeland.

The practice of CI entails both security and counterespionage (CE). Security is the passive or defensive side of CI and relies on static safeguards such as security clearances, polygraphs (lie detection machines), codes, fences, sentries, alarms, badges and passes, curfews, restricted areas, and checkpoints. CE is the aggressive or offensive side of the mission. The ultimate goal is to infiltrate the hostile intelligence service with an agent (or “mole”), a ploy known as a “penetration.” With a penetration agent inside the enemy’s camp, one can possibly learn what moles the enemy has managed to burrow inside one’s own camp. The Soviets successfully used this approach against the United States during the 1980s and 1990s by secretly recruiting Aldrich Ames of the CIA and Robert Hanssen of the FBI, who revealed to their masters in Moscow the names of CIA moles inside Soviet intelligence and other information that undermined the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence operations against the Soviet Union. Other major democracies also experienced Soviet penetrations of their political and intelligence agencies.

Results of Intelligence Actions

In each of these missions—collection and analysis, covert action, and CI—nations have registered successes and failures. In the United States, for example, the CIA successfully tracked the development of Soviet weapons systems by way of surveillance machines and human agents. Yet the agency failed to warn the nation of the Al Qaeda attack of September 11, 2001, against the United States and incorrectly concluded in 2002 that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, thereby helping precipitate the Second Persian Gulf War.
With respect to covert action, the CIA successfully overthrew leaders in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954) who were deemed unfriendly to the United States. Yet presidents would soon find out that this secret approach to foreign policy often failed, as with the Bay of Pigs operation during the Kennedy administration. Another failure occurred with the Iran-Contra scandal during the Reagan administration, when—despite an express law that prohibited such activities—the National Security Council staff worked illegally with elements of the CIA to conduct paramilitary operations in Nicaragua (where the anticommunist Contras were at war against a Marxist regime). During the Reagan years, the United States also experienced covert action successes in Afghanistan, when the CIA helped drive the Soviets out of that country. Once more in Afghanistan, this time in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the second Bush administration enjoyed covert action success when the CIA helped rout the Taliban regime that had provided a haven for the Al Qaeda terrorists who had struck Washington, D.C., and New York City.

Similarly, on the CI front, the United States has caught many spies, including those who stole the secret of the atom bomb and gave it to Moscow; but Washington suffered the failures of Ames, Hanssen, and several other Soviet and Chinese penetrations during the Cold War. In the United Kingdom, Harold “Kim” Philby spied for the Soviet Union at the highest levels during the Cold War. With respect to all three intelligence missions, one can expect ongoing successes and—conducted as they are by mere mortals—inevitable failures, too.

The intelligence agencies of the United States are distinct in some ways from those of other nations. They are large and technically advanced, and they are dispersed in their organization and management far more than is usually the case even in other democracies. The U.S. secret agencies also share common traits with their counterparts abroad, such as an inability to foresee and collect all the information that national leaders may need, a periodic misinterpretation of information by analysts and (sometimes intentionally to further their own political agenda) by decision makers, and from time to time critical failures of CI.

In democratic regimes, another aspect of intelligence has garnered much attention: maintaining accountability over secret agencies as a guard against their abuse of secret power. In the United States, for example, journalists and lawmakers discovered during the 1970s that the CIA and its companion agencies had been misused by politicians to spy against American citizens—chiefly anti-Vietnam War dissenters and civil rights activists. This led to a reform movement and the establishment in Congress of specific intelligence oversight committees with the responsibility of keeping an eye on the secret agencies and rein in any wrongdoing. Compared with the time of benign neglect before the reform movement, the new intelligence accountability has provided a serious check against the abuse of secret power. Critics argue, however, that overseers on Capitol Hill have failed to consistently supervise the intelligence agencies. Moreover, disputes have arisen over whether the second Bush administration misused the agencies once again for spying against American citizens, especially by tapping their telephone conversations without proper warrants. The search continues in the United States and other democracies for the proper balance between efficient intelligence services, on the one hand, and the exercise of proper accountability to preserve liberty, on the other.

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See also Accountability; Leadership; Liberty; Prediction and Forecasting; Secret Services; Security and Defense Policy; Security Apparatus; Strategic (Security) Studies; Terrorism, International

Further Readings
INTERACTION EFFECTS

Many hypotheses in political science are conditional in nature. Institutional theories typically argue that actors respond differently to similar stimuli when they inhabit different institutional environments. Political culture arguments typically come down to the claim that the ways citizens behave depends on the environment in which they were socialized. Approaches that emphasize strategic interaction identify equilibrium responses that depend on key parameters; when a key parameter is above some critical level, one strategy combination is an equilibrium, while entirely different behavior (as encapsulated in a different comparative static relationship between key variables) is expected when that parameter falls below the critical value. However, many context-conditional claims are tested as if they were unconditional claims. Robert Franzese and Cindy Kam, for example, show that 54% of the articles appearing over a period of 5 years in journals covering three disciplines used statistical methods but only 24% of these used interaction terms in their empirical analysis. The review of the literature by Thomas Brambor, Robert Clark, and Matt Golder is even more discouraging. Examining three leading political science journals over 5 years, they found that more than 90% of the articles that actually specified conditional tests made at least one of the common errors those authors warn about. Some ways to test for interaction effects are presented below.

To get a sense of how multiplicative interaction models allow one to test context-conditional claims, consider the simplest case, where $X$ is hypothesized to be associated with a continuous variable $Y$ in the presence of condition $Z$ but not in its absence. Assume $Y$ and $X$ to be continuous variables and $Z$ is defined such that $Z = 1$ when the factor in question is present and $Z = 0$ otherwise. The multiplicative interaction effect approach to testing such a claim is to estimate using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression as follows:

$$ Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 Z + \beta_3 XZ + \varepsilon. \quad (1) $$

To see how this model can be used to capture a context-conditional claim, examine the case where the condition is absent—that is, when $Z = 0$. Equation 1 would, therefore become

$$ Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2(0) + \beta_3 X(0) + \varepsilon, $$

which simplifies to

$$ Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \varepsilon. $$

Thus, $\beta_0$ and $\beta_1$ serve as estimates for the intercept and slope, respectively, in a linear model of the relationship between $X$ and $Y$ in the absence of condition $Z$. Similarly, Equation 1 allows us to estimate the relationship between these variables when $Z$ is present (i.e., when $Z = 1$). Once again, substituting the value of the modifying variable into Equation 1, we get

$$ Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2(1) + \beta_3 X(1) + \varepsilon, $$

which simplifies to

$$ Y = (\beta_0 + \beta_2) + (\beta_1 + \beta_3) X + \varepsilon, $$

which shows that Equation 1 allows us to estimate the intercept ($\beta_0 + \beta_2$) and slope ($\beta_1 + \beta_3$) of the linear relationship between $X$ and $Y$ for the case where the hypothesized condition is met as well as when the condition is not met—and the ability to compare those estimates in a straightforward manner—that makes multiplicative interaction effects models a powerful tool for analyzing context-conditional claims.

The promise offered by interactive models has, more often than not, gone unfulfilled as a result of careless application despite the relative simplicity of the technique. Brambor, Clark, and Golder argue that the most common errors found in the literature related to multiplicative interaction models are (a) the failure to include them when appropriate, (b) omission of the individual terms that make up the interaction, (c) failure to calculate the theoretically relevant quantity of interest, and (d) the standard error of the same.

The previous discussion assumed that the modifying variable, $Z$, was dichotomous, but it need not be so. In general, we can examine how the
relationship between $X$ and $Y$ depends on $Z$ by taking the partial derivative of (1) with respect to $X$:

$$\frac{\partial Y}{\partial X} = \beta_1 + \beta_3 Z,$$

and we can see that according to (1) the relationship between $X$ and $Y$ is a linear function of $Z$. This derivative is often referred to as the marginal effect of $X$ on $Y$ at some level of $Z$. When $Z$ is equal to zero, the effect of $X$ on $Y$ is $\beta_1$. But the magnitude and sign of the marginal effect of $X$ on $Y$ can change as $Z$ changes (to the extent that $\beta_3$ is nonzero).

This simple setup allows the researcher to test many types of context-conditional claims. For example, the modifying variable, $Z$, can either augment or inhibit the relationship between $X$ and $Y$. Typically, if $Z$ is an augmenting variable, the sign of the coefficient on interaction term ($\beta_3$) will have the same sign as the coefficient on the variable being modified ($\beta_1$), but if $Z$ is an inhibitor, the sign of the coefficient on the interaction term will have the opposite sign of the coefficient on the variable being modified. If the theory being tested claims that $Z$ either augments or inhibits the effect of $X$ on $Y$, then it is also useful to check to see if $X$ actually has the hypothesized effect on $Y$ at some levels of $Z$. To do this, one can calculate the marginal effect of $X$ on $Y$ across the observed range of $Z$ and compare these conditional marginal effects with their associated standard errors to determine if the marginal effect is (a) ever statistically distinguishable from zero, (b) always statistically distinguishable from zero, or (c) is only statistically distinguishable from zero at certain values of $Z$. If the modifying variable is either dichotomous or ordinal, it is easy to report the effect of $X$ on $Y$ in a simple table of marginal effects and their associated standard errors—a set for each of the values that $Z$ takes on. If $Z$ is a continuous variable, it may be easier to present this information by plotting the line $\beta_1 + \beta_3 Z$ and its associated confidence interval over the full range of $Z$.

The practical implications are likely to be quite different depending on which of these three situations is the case. For example, if $Y$ is some factor that is considered desirable and one believes that it is brought about by an increase in $X$ but only in the presence of $Z$, it should be the case that $\beta_3$ is greater than zero and $\beta_1 + \beta_3 Z$ is greater than zero when $Z$ is sufficiently high. It is possible that, consistent with its role as an augmenting modifying variable, $\beta_3$ is significantly greater than zero but that $\beta_1 + \beta_3 Z$ is not significantly greater than zero over any of the observed ranges of $Z$. If this is true, then there is no evidence of a relationship between $X$ and $Y$ for $Z$ to modify, and there would be no basis to argue for supplying $Z$ because it encourages the beneficial consequences of $X$.

In addition to inhibiting or augmenting a relationship between $X$ and $Y$, the simple model in Equation 1 can be used to capture the case where the modifying variable changes the sign on the marginal effect capturing the relationship between $X$ and $Y$. It is possible that for some values of $Z$, $X$ is positively associated with $Y$, while for other values of $Z$, it is negatively associated with $Y$. Evidence of this would be found if $\beta_1 + \beta_3 Z$ is significantly greater than zero for some values of $Z$ and significantly less than zero for other values of $Z$.

It should be noted that the basic logic of interaction outlined here can be extended to other types of modifying relationships and to estimators other than OLS. For example, the effect of $X$ on $Y$ may depend on the value of $X$ itself (as in quadratic, cubic, and higher order specifications). The effect of $X$ may depend on the value of more than one modifying variable and even the interaction between some or all of those modifying variables. The method is quite flexible and one should, with some creativity, be able to specify a model that with some additional calculation will produce the quantity of interest implied by the theory being evaluated.

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See also: Causality; Regression; Statistics: Overview

Further Readings
In political science, interdependence refers to independent social actors who wish to preserve their identity but who are structurally affected by one another’s behavior, whether they like it or not. The actors are involved in each other’s affairs (functional or integrative interdependence), or they are part of the same system (systemic interdependence). These two types of interdependence do not exclude one another: If actors are part of the same system, they are indirectly involved in one another’s affairs, and conversely, social systems are based on the involvement of actors with each other. In terms of the structure–agency debate, however, it makes sense to distinguish systemic interdependence from the behavioral, more policy-dependent, types (see Figure 1).

The structural effect can be operationalized into three qualitative dimensions (see Figure 2). They express how given actors can be mutually affected by one another’s behavior. The first dimension concerns the degree of mutual involvement. This relates both to the quantitative characteristics of the intertwinement and to the existential value of the relationship for the actors.

The second dimension concerns the character of mutual involvement: confrontational versus constructional interdependence. The difference is related to two connotations of the term dependence: subordination, and need or want. The more idealist expressions of interdependence rhetoric generally refer to the second connotation: interdependence as the consequence of a mutually perceived necessity of cooperation or interdependence as a symbiosis—two can do more than one. Sometimes this is referred to as positive interdependence. Cooperation creates a surplus value. Especially, economic interdependence is often emphasized in this context. However, interdependence can also be the consequence of a mutually perceived necessity of obstruction or competition. There is a stalemate: Due to the other(s), neither side can reach its goals. Confrontational interdependence is typical for a balance of power. One classical example is the Cold War situation of Mutual Assured Destruction between the United States and the former USSR.

The third dimension concerns the (a)symmetry of mutual involvement: the distribution of costs and benefits. Even in the case of a surplus value, there tends to be conflict about the price to be paid. This can relate to the contractual conditions, as is the case in conflicts between employers and labor unions. It can also relate to structural asymmetries in the world economy, as is the case in North–South relations. It can relate to the uneven distribution of costs of preventive measures versus costs of failing measures, as in many environmental issues (e.g., the price for preventing upstream pollution vs. the price of cleaning costs downstream). Additionally, distributional issues are about free-rider dilemmas. It can also relate to issue linkages, for example, the impact of functional and integrative interdependence on the identities of the participating actors. Finally, the existential value of the relationship can be asymmetrical. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr.
Interdependence (2001) distinguish in this context between sensitivity costs and vulnerability costs. Some actors may be able to develop alternatives for the lost profit, whereas other actors may lack such options.

The concept of interdependence has a long history in political science, but it is seldom defined carefully. Often, it serves rhetorical purposes, emphasizing a need for cooperation, even (or especially) when conflicts are paramount. As such, it can be traced back in the academic literature to the late 19th century, when the first generation of scholars started to talk about globalization and its consequences.

Generally, the rhetoric of interdependence is associated with progressive liberal thought, in which trade relations and social contract are valued as mutually profitable for those involved. Particularly in the work of Sir Norman Angell, this is developed into one of the first interdependence theories. But left-wing syndicalists, such as Francis Delaisi, also expected that economic interdependence would provide a structure that would end political myths about the ideal of the nation-state. In Les contradictions du monde moderne, published in 1925, he emphasized the need to manage interdependence by means of permanent international institutions. This comes close to the theory of functionalism as developed by David Mitrany and the pluralist theories of Charles Merriam. A more neutral early attempt to develop interdependence as an analytical concept can be found in The Interdependent World and Its Problems, published in 1933 by the historian Ramsay Muir.

All of this literature shares a normative concern about the need to manage globalization: Interdependence means trouble but only when it is neglected. At the same time, the literature has a word of admiration for the achieved levels of globalization. There is a hope for, and a belief in, the possibility of social learning. Therefore, interdependence theories are generally put in the idealist tradition in international relations, even though they are far from utopian.

The contemporary interest in the concept originates in the book Power and Interdependence, first published in 1977 by Keohane and Nye. They worked on the same themes as the first generation of theorists: the functional development of international organization in response to (transnational) globalization processes. An important difference is empirical: When Norman Angell, in 1918, argued for the need to create a protective union of democracies, this was a utopian idea, whereas NATO had existed for almost 3 decades when Keohane...
and Nye reflected on existing international regimes in 1972 and 1977. In addition, they emphasized the consequences of conscious manipulation of interdependencies for purposes of political power. Especially in terms of soft power, a term later coined by Nye in 1990, asymmetries in the intertwinement will be contested and can be exploited by the stronger side. The limit of this type of relational power, however, is set by the reciprocity inherent in interdependence: The continued existence of the relationship is a precondition for exploitation of its political power.

Also, in political rhetoric, both the 1970s and the 1990s showed waves of popular use of the term. Politicians, especially those working for international organizations, appeal to interdependence to silence their opposition: Global interests should take precedence over local, ethnocentric interests; or, one step further, the local, ethnocentric interests in the long term require that immediate priority is given to the global interest. In this speech–act capacity, interdependence asks for solidarity where it is lacking (North–South context), for cooperation where it is lacking (East–West context during the Cold War), and for common action where it is lacking (global challenges, e.g., in the environmental realm).

A rather different approach to interdependence has been developed by the sociologist Norbert Elias. His insights are especially relevant for understanding the social impact of the complexity that is typical for situations of complex interdependence, as well as the interdependences created by a division of labor (functional differentiation). In line with Mitrany’s findings, Elias emphasizes that increasing interdependence leads simultaneously to increased collectivization and increased individualization.

Isolationism is the first policy response to the discovery of complexity and dependence—an attempt to reduce costs and complexity by neglecting other actors and by pulling out (e.g., U.S. policies toward Europe and Japan after World War I). When this does not work, the second response is imperialism—an attempt to reduce costs and complexity by controlling or conquering other actors (e.g., German and Japanese policies after World War I). Only when this does not work either does a third response emerge: the acceptance of pluralism and a willingness to compromise in face of shared overarching interests (e.g., the creation of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods system after World War II). This tension between the structural dimension of interdependence (i.e., a practical impossibility to achieve aims unilaterally) and the cognitive dimension of interdependence (i.e., the interpretation of the structure by the actors involved) is at the heart of the academic and social-political discourses on interdependence. Overall, the concept of interdependence has discursive functions in trying to show that actors cannot avoid dealing with one another and analytical functions in trying to map out the structure of world politics.

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See also Globalization, Power; Power and International Politics; Sovereignty

Further Readings
Interest Groups

Interest groups are formal organizations, usually based on individual voluntary membership, that seek to influence public policies without assuming government responsibility. The majority of interest groups do not have primarily political goals. They are normally engaged in a disparate range of activities—work, recreational, philanthropic, humanitarian, and cultural—that develop independently in society. Such groups enter the political arena when they require some form of public intervention (financial, administrative, etc.) to support their interests or when they wish to influence the adoption or implementation of government decisions so as to secure some advantage or to protect the interests they represent. The goals of interest groups may be very specific or may be intended to make an impact on the entire political community. The strategies used to influence decision makers involve the combination of a repertoire of tactics, the breadth of which varies in relation to each group’s organizational resources. In this entry, the origins and types of such groups and their respective functions in political decision-making processes are discussed. Their role with regard to the quality of democracy is also critically examined.

Since the end of the 19th century, there has been an exponential growth in the number of interest groups, prompted by the changes that have contributed to shaping the contemporary world. Industrialization has played a decisive role in this respect, favoring a specialization of production and services that has in turn given a strong impulse to the establishment of myriad groups with differentiated social interests. The formation and consolidation of nation-states has been equally important. Industrialization and the emergence of nation-states also engendered numerous conflicts of a social, political, and cultural nature that contributed to generating collective movements, interest groups, and parties. The further development of interest groups was encouraged by the extraordinary conditions created by the two world wars, which forced governments to involve the organizations of civil society in managing the emergency created by the wars. The establishment of new groups was also stimulated by the increasingly pervasive role of the state in society in the wake of the development of the welfare state, which created new needs and new interests.

The type of political regime that offers the most opportunities for groups to organize themselves independently and to influence decision makers is liberal democracy. By contrast, in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, interest groups are established, controlled, or backed by a single party or state and often used exclusively as instruments for mobilizing consensus. This entry deals only with interest groups active in contemporary democracies, as, indeed, does virtually all the literature devoted to these political actors. Particular attention is given to examining the general functions of interest groups in the political system and the obstacles and opportunities they encounter in the various phases of the process involved in influencing public decisions.

Definition

The above definition indicates three distinctive traits of interest groups. First, they are described as formal organizations—in other words, fairly permanent structures governed by clearly defined rules and with an identifiable membership and leadership. These characteristics are absent in informal associations—for example, certain groups of influential citizens, anomic groups, professional elites—which are sometimes included in the family of interest groups. This should, however, be avoided, because the intrinsic difficulties of ascertaining the presence of informal groups would make any reliable census of groups active in different policy arenas impossible, and an analysis of the inner workings of such nebulous associations would be no less problematic.

The second distinctive feature of interest groups is that they are made up of individuals who join on a voluntary basis. Members usually enter freely, participate in the group’s activities, and discuss the objectives proposed by the leaders. If they are dissatisfied, they leave the organization. Analysis of the internal functioning of groups clarifies the conditions that favor or discourage participation and collective action. It should also be added that there is a type of interest group where membership is not entirely voluntary. These are institutional interest groups, which, as discussed herewith, are not vehicles for democratic participation.
The third qualifying element of interest groups is the particular way in which they try to influence policy making. They do so without seeking government office; indeed, they do not present electoral lists. In this respect, interest groups differ from political parties, for whom it is important to take part in elections in order to be able to exercise political power. As interest groups usually represent fairly circumscribed interests, they cannot hope to win elections and so prefer to convince the elected representatives rather than the voters of the validity of their case. This difference between political parties and interest groups seems to be at least partly contradicted in the real world by the frequent presence of small, single-issue political parties and large interest groups—for instance, trade unions—that have a wide range of concerns. It is also true that political parties appear to be increasingly incapable of representing general concerns, tending instead to turn into vehicles of economic interests. Nevertheless, it is precisely to offset their diminished ability to aggregate political demands that parties tend to increase their delegative powers by occupying public offices, while interest groups limit themselves to supporting, during electoral campaigns, those parties that declare a willingness to respond to their requests; alternatively, they might endorse individual politicians or place some of their representatives in a party’s list of candidates.

Types of Interest Groups

The most common typology of interest groups employed in the literature distinguishes between sectional or economic groups and promotional or cause groups, which are organized to express particular policy objectives. Economic groups reflect the major “interests” of society and represent people who join the organization mainly because of their occupation. The three main types of economic interest groups are trade unions, business (employers), and professional organizations representing lawyers, doctors, engineers, and so on.

Cause groups consist of organizations that pursue goals not directly related to the material interests of their members. These groups are voluntary organizations formed by people who share some common aspiration unrelated to their jobs. The cause group category can potentially be divided into a multitude of subgroups, because it encompasses all sorts of voluntary organizations. Cause groups include cultural, religious, and recreational associations; organizations for the promotion of human rights and the welfare state; charities; and environmental and peace groups. Many of them are also public interest groups—namely, organizations that seek to promote collective goods by securing the approval of policies whose benefits may be shared equally by all people, irrespective of their membership or support of a given group. The development of public interest groups from the 1960s onward was a consequence of more widespread education, the adoption of more sophisticated means of mass communication, social protest, and the introduction of extensive social welfare programs.

Among cause groups, another category that deserves mention are the “not in my backyard” groups, otherwise known as NIMBYs, due to their widespread growth in recent years in many countries. NIMBYs are hybrid groups because the motivation of members is basically material and brings immediate benefits for members of that group only. The main goal of NIMBYs is almost always to defend the area in which their membership lives. Typical demands, often accompanied by highly visible forms of protest, are that a nuclear power station or a radioactive waste dump, prison, airport, or main road be built anywhere else rather than “in my backyard.” The objectives of NIMBYs may also find support among people outside the “threatened” area, in the name of a wider, shared cause such as environmental conservation or the battle to create alternative energy sources. In this respect, NIMBYs can be related to cause groups and among these, in some cases, to public interest groups.

The distinction between economic and cause groups has led to the formulation of various hypotheses about how they function and their relationship with decision makers. It has been argued, for example, that economic groups are more long lasting because there are material incentives at stake for the membership that cause groups are less likely to be able to offer (see below). It has also been claimed that cause groups, even those with a large following, have a limited impact on policy making because they are barred from the corridors of power, while economic groups, in particular business groups, have easier access. This claim has been contested by Wyn Grant, who distinguishes between insider groups, which are consulted regularly by government.
bodies, and outsider groups, which do not want or are unable to establish privileged relationships with policymakers. According to Grant, cause groups may also become insiders, forging special relations with public officials. A further source of debate is the notion that insiders are more influential than outsiders; this too has come in for criticism on the grounds that, in many cases, the latter are also capable of conditioning the political agenda.

Mention must also be made of institutional interest groups, which may be either public or private. Institutional public groups are local or regional governments and the various branches of central government, which compete with each other to influence the political process to their own advantage. Institutional private groups are social organizations—industrial and financial companies, universities, churches, and hospitals—which, in certain circumstances, may commit a proportion of their resources to influencing the decision-making process.

As has already been said, the issue of democratic participation is largely extraneous to institutional groups. Unlike economic and cause groups, institutional groups are hierarchical organizations run in a managerial fashion by leaders whose main concern is to ensure the continuity of their institution irrespective of the specific interests of the membership. The decision to enter the political arena is generally taken by leaders without prior consultation of the membership, whether they are blue- or white-collar workers, shareholders, worshippers, or patients. In other words, in contrast to economic and cause groups, institutional groups have less need to obtain the approval of their membership to justify their political engagement or to address their needs and concerns, according to Robert Salisbury (1984). Institutional groups occupy an important position in the branch of literature devoted to the analysis of policy making. This is inevitable, because they have always had a dominant role in U.S. policy making, at both state and federal levels; are always widely present in policy networks active in the European Union; and manage, obviously, to condition the choices of the various national governments.

Levels of Organizational Complexity

Many interest groups have a simple organizational structure. Their political action begins and ends inside the boundaries defined by the local territory in which they operate. For instance, many public interest groups involved in environmental preservation have as their exclusive political targets the city council and/or the regional public authorities. Other groups have a more complex organizational structure with basic units embedded in a national structure. These second-level organizations help shape and unify the disparate demands of first-level organizations, the advantage being that it is possible to supply decision makers with aggregate information and to formulate more effective requests.

Third, there are also “umbrella” organizations called peak associations, which coordinate the activities of various second-level associations from different sectors. For example, in Germany, the main unions of the various categories of workers belong to the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), which is analogous to the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) in the United States or the Trade Union Congress in the United Kingdom. In the EU, workers and employers alike are usually represented by second-level associations and by intersectorial peak associations. But many big corporations that represent themselves directly can also be found. There is also an associative level that includes, under a broad umbrella, the peak associations of different member states, giving rise, for example, to the European Trade Union Confederation and the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe.

Second-level and peak organizations are widespread among economic interest groups but are rare among cause groups, perhaps, as Salisbury (1975, p. 187) suggests, because the latter have a shorter lifetime. For this reason, they do not reach the degree of organizational complexity that leads to the formation of second-level and peak associations.

Interest Groups and Public Policy Making: Pluralist and Neo-Corporatist Approaches

The two most important approaches that have been adopted in the literature on interest groups are pluralism and neo-corporatism. Pluralism actually started in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century as a reaction to the monistic theory of the
state. However, it was principally developed in the United States as an empirical approach to the analysis of political phenomena, through a series of works on the American political system published between the 1920s and the 1960s. Later adaptations have enabled pluralism to survive the numerous criticisms received in the second half of the century, when the major weaknesses of the approach were highlighted.

According to pluralists, the political process is driven by competition between many interacting groups that tend to self-limit their requests, thereby making the political system more stable. Competition is compatible with democracy because negotiation between many interests favors the dispersion of power, and so, according to David Truman, no one group is able to permanently get the better of the others. Robert Dahl concedes that some groups are stronger than others but argues that the dispersion of political power between the host of government institutions offers the possibility of access to weaker groups, which then have a chance of obtaining a hearing in some crucial phase of the decision-making process. According to pluralists, the competition between groups offers not only stability and democratic compatibility but also the possibility of making a decisive contribution to shaping public policies that have a broad consensus among citizens. Pluralists do not believe in the abstract concept of the general interest because this presupposes that its constituent parts form an indivisible whole, while empirical evidence suggests that many interacting interests influence government decisions, leading the way, but only in a transient fashion, to what is significant for all.

The pluralist approach has been heavily criticized for having presented an erroneous picture of the political system capable of regulating itself exclusively by virtue of the competition and compromises between groups. This view neglects the fact that the relations between groups are not balanced because some exercise a permanent influence while others are marginal or insignificant in the process of decision making. The idea of leaving the adoption of shared policies up to an agreement between partisan interests appears, then, to be both unrealistic and uneven. Their legitimacy would be based on existing power relations between the groups, and their implementation would be to the detriment of the weaker ones. The pluralist illusion of being able to explain the functioning of the political system in terms of the self-regulatory activities of interest groups involves a weakened state authority. In the real world, however, state intervention is indispensable for redressing imbalances in opportunities for access to decision-making arenas. The cogency of these criticisms forced the pluralists to abandon the idea of attributing to interest groups the ability to ensure the governability of the political system. This idea was, however, resumed in Europe by the neo-corporative approach in its reassessment of the role of the state.

Neo-corporatism is the institutionalized participation of interest groups in government activities that favors the elaboration of policies agreed on jointly by major organized groups and decision makers. Some features of neo-corporatist agreements can also be found in the state corporatism established in authoritarian regimes, such as in Portugal and Spain between the two world wars. However, neo-corporatism can be distinguished from state corporatism because, according to Philippe Schmitter, the former is a societal corporatism that is not imposed from above but arises in a voluntary fashion from within society and is compatible with the system of democratic representation. Instances of a neo-corporatist system were identified in various continental European countries in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, in Scandinavia and Austria. Subsequently, the number of studies based on the neo-corporatist approach diminished considerably, because the changes that have occurred in the international economic system have forced many governments to prefer public policy strategies centered on the market rather than agreements stipulated between groups, which are the most distinctive trait of neo-corporatism.

In a neo-corporatist agreement, the protagonists of tripartite negotiations with a government are the representatives of capital and labor; the policies adopted are economic and relate in particular to the control of prices and salaries. For the neo-corporatists, the state, in contrast to the way in which it is depicted by the pluralists, possesses extensive powers that are used to authorize, regulate, and sanction the activities of organizations to ensure that they respect stipulated agreements and collaborate—sometimes by exercising delegated public functions—to implement agreed policies.
Unions and employers’ associations respect commitments undertaken with government because they have a monopoly on representation in their sector and exercise effective control over their members, who are often obliged to lend their support, because respect for various binding norms is a condition of membership. The importance of the control functions assumed by groups over their membership has led neo-corporatists to replace the traditional expression *representation of interests* with the term *intermediation of interests*.

A favorable condition for trilateral negotiations is the presence of a prolabor party in the government. Unions take part because they feel supported by the left-wing party, which offers, in return for moderate wage claims, measures to boost employment and a commitment to maintaining the welfare state. In turn, employers’ associations accept negotiations because they expect the government to maintain a low level of union conflict, thanks to their influence over the unions, and to support investment in industry. The factors that enable trilateral negotiations, according to neo-corporatist scholars, make it possible to produce better and socially more equitable public policies than those implemented by executives operating without the institutionalized collaboration of large, organized interest groups.

Neo-corporatism has greater theoretical ambitions than pluralism, but these have not been achieved because no generally accepted theory has ever been provided regarding the nature of neo-corporative agreements. Are they an extension, within the state machine, of the pluralist representation of interests? Or have they been “captured” by the state, subordinating them to state control? Furthermore, the numerous political and socioeconomic prerequisites necessary for the establishment of a neo-corporatist system have inevitably meant that the empirical cases are limited to the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and, to a more limited degree, Germany. Neo-corporatism cannot, therefore, be viewed as a general theory of the action of interest groups in contemporary democracies. Finally, neo-corporatism lacks a theory of the representation of groups that explains, logically and normatively, the privileged access to decision-making spheres of certain groups (unions and employers’ associations) rather than others.

**Mobilization**

The study of the conditions for collective action is probably the field of interest group research in which there has been the greatest progress. Various contributions have examined the fundamental reasons that lead an individual to join a given organization, the means adopted by leaders to recruit members, and the contextual factors that influence mobilization. The preliminary theoretical basis for this strand of literature was provided by Mancur Olson Jr. in his book *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965). Olson revolutionized previous work on the conditions of collective action and laid the foundations for the development of a coherent body of knowledge. He demonstrated, thereby refuting a pluralist claim, that there is no automatic correspondence between the need of a given social group or category of people to manifest a policy preference and the transformation of that need into organized action. The latter can only occur under certain conditions and with certain resources. Groups that operate in unfavorable conditions and without adequate resources will be penalized in their efforts to influence the shape and outcome of public decisions.

According to Olson, in the most frequently occurring situations, it is not rational for an individual to support an organization that pursues a collective good even if he or she wishes to obtain it. The collective good, for example, the conservation of nature or the improvement of urban transport, is an indivisible good from which everyone can benefit. For this reason, the beneficiaries of collective goods will tend to avoid paying the costs of sustaining the organization (membership fees, participation in meetings and demonstrations, etc.) and act as free riders instead, waiting to reap the benefits of other people’s efforts. Furthermore, rational individuals calculate that the contribution of their own effort to the success of a large organization’s initiatives will be substantially irrelevant. Moreover, they take advantage of the scale of the organization, concealing their opportunistic behavior behind the anonymity of large numbers.

To overcome the difficulties deriving from the obstructive attitude of free riders, organizations are forced, according to Olson, to come up with selective incentives for its members (insurance policies, legal assistance, etc.) or alternatively to threaten imposing sanctions, a strategy resorted to
by many unions in the United States and the UK. Invoking closed-shop legislation, they demand that firms only employ workers who are already union members or willing to become members. Among economic interest groups, Olson adds, it should be easier for smaller organizations to obtain support, because they can offer their membership particularly selective incentives. For example, groups representing farmers or artisans can increase their membership by offering advantageous medical insurance or convenient individual retirement schemes. Olson clarifies that his analysis mainly explains the behavior of economic interest groups, while it applies poorly to associations that do not offer incentives readily translatable into material benefits.

Following the path taken by Olson, James Wilson identified solidarity and purposive incentives in addition to material ones, going on to formulate a theory of collective action applicable to all kinds of interest group organizations. Solidarity incentives offer supporters the gratification that comes from feeling part of a group, while purposive incentives induce the members of an organization to actively promote some good that might also benefit a wider spectrum of nonmembers. Each of the three types of incentives is of varying importance, in relation to the other two, in fuelling individual support for an organization. Individuals join and support organizations for a variety of reasons that are often hard to distinguish from one another. It should, therefore, be taken into account that support for an organization is often the result of a combination of all three types of incentives.

Wilson’s theory, with the importance it attributes to solidarity and purposive incentives, gave fresh credit to the widespread conviction that collective action is also motivated by ideals, without any expectation of a material reward. The greatest, and by no means negligible, weakness of this typology is that solidarity and purposive incentives, unlike material ones, are hard to distinguish and measure, making it difficult in turn to assess their specific weight. The subsequent development of the theory of incentives has, however, continued to focus on nonmaterial incentives, without, as a consequence, dispelling doubts stemming from theoretical assumptions that have not been adequately measured and checked.

Olson’s theory of selective incentives paved the way for a fuller understanding of the conditions that facilitate or penalize the mobilization of different types of interest groups. Public interest groups such as pacifist, environmental, and child protection organizations are among those that are penalized, making it harder for them to enter the political arena. They have a very wide potential membership, but the incentives are almost exclusively purposive, with little intrinsic value. As the only major investment required is essentially emotional, people join but also abandon such organizations with considerable ease, making them highly unstable. In this respect, they are similar to collective movements. By contrast, economic groups, which have a more limited potential membership and can offer quite considerable material incentives and returns, find it easier to enter the political arena and establish themselves as key interlocutors for public decision makers.

Access

What difficulties and advantages must be taken into account by interest groups when seeking to establish useful contacts with decision makers? An examination of the issue of access does not clarify how groups manage to be influential in the decision-making process but does help ascertain the more or less favorable conditions for exercising influence. In liberal democracies, the possibility of access is conditioned by both variable and permanent factors. Variable factors include the resources available to a group (size of membership, expertise, money, existing contacts with political elites, good reputation, etc.) or the existence or otherwise of a public opinion favorable to the issues interest groups wish to submit to decision makers and the political significance of those issues.

The permanent factors that have a bearing on access include the nature of a country’s institutional structure and its policy style. A democracy with a unitary institutional system has fewer access points than a federal democracy, because in the former, power is fairly concentrated, while in the latter, it is distributed among a larger number of independent decision-making bodies. The number of access points in the United States, for instance, is particularly high, due to the nation’s federal structure, the division of government between the president and Congress, the powerful congressional
committees, and a judicial system with constitutional powers to intervene in legislation. It is also high in the EU, which, like the United States, has an institutional system that separates powers both vertically and horizontally.

The varying degree of accessibility is influenced by the country’s prevailing policy style. Every liberal democracy has its own particular policy style, which is perhaps not uniformly discernable in all policy areas but is prevalent in many of them. Policy style is the set of standard procedures generally adopted by institutions to devise and implement public policies, according to Jeremy Richardson, Gunnel Gustafsson, and Grant Jordan (1982). The access of groups to many areas of policy is easier when governments adopt a reactive policy style, because decision-making powers are not concentrated, and public bureaucracies depend in large measure on the technical information supplied by the groups. In these cases, the state usually avoids coercive measures that may discourage the setting up of new groups and reduce the fragmentation of existing ones. Public policies take the form of ad hoc measures uncoordinated with previous decisions and are mostly designed to satisfy the short-term demands of groups with ease of access to public bureaucracies, as noted by Michael Atkinson and William Coleman (1989). The access of groups is more selectively filtered when centralized governments and independent bureaucracies adopt an anticipatory policy style, using intrusive policy methods, without excluding coercion, the aim being to effect significant change in society and the economy.

Governments that adopt an anticipatory policy style may disregard interest groups while pursuing their public policy goals or may involve only broadly representative organizations capable of ensuring that their membership adheres to agreements stipulated by the state. The result, in this case, is greater selectivity in access, which benefits more well-organized groups.

Nowhere in the real world do governments adopt a purely reactive or anticipatory style. Both should therefore be seen as ideal types that represent the opposite extremes of a spectrum of possible combinations, including the various policy styles of the liberal democracies, some closer to the anticipatory model and others to the reactive one.

### Lobbying

The main objective of interest groups is to influence governments in order to obtain favorable policy outcomes. However, influence is a continuous and unresolved political process, which by its very nature is unmeasurable. Furthermore, other factors may influence legislators’ policy decisions more than interest groups—for instance, other legislators, party leaders, the personal convictions of the legislator, the media, and so on. Faced with the difficulty of measuring influence, scholars have tended to focus on the phenomenon of lobbying, extending the original meaning of the term to encompass the whole set of strategies and tactics used by interest groups to influence policy making.

Lobbying was initially understood in quite specific terms as one or more face-to-face meetings between representatives of an interest group and legislators, sought by the former so as to influence the decisions of the latter in a way that benefits the group’s preferences. To be effective, a lobbyist—who may either be a member of the group or an expert hired specifically for the purpose—must establish a relationship of trust with the policy-maker, supplying data and information that facilitate the adoption of policies favorable also to the interest group. In its broader reformulation, lobbying involves a much wider range of initiatives, including contacts with bureaucratic bodies, the premier’s office, the courts and parliament, the use of the mass media, the preparation of memoranda, the forging of links with individual functionaries, and so forth.

Lobbying has been extensively studied in the United States, where it is widespread. This is due to the multiple points of access offered by the institutional system, the weakness and relative lack of representativity of the political parties, and a dominant political culture that favors pragmatic, nonideological dealings between citizens and legislators. American literature in this field can boast hundreds of case studies devoted to the lobbying activities of pressure groups. However, they have made little contribution to furthering an understanding of the phenomenon because they lack a shared theoretical basis. According to Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech (1998), scholars tend to use their own method of measuring the impact of lobbying and a generally narrow analytic
interest groups per perspective without adopting a comparative approach or making any attempt to build on previous work.

The results of the large-scale surveys of lobbying in Washington, D.C., and the state capitals in the second half of the 1980s have been more useful. These studies, which are more theoretical, refer to a large number of cases and consider the context; they have shown that the tactic used most widely by lobbyists is to cultivate face-to-face contacts with public bureaucrats, seeking, at the same time, to extend the range of their contacts among public decision makers and those capable of influencing them in order to exchange information, establish cooperative strategies, and anticipate the moves of competitors. Furthermore, the gamut of strategies used varies according to the issue in question and whether it has a moderate or high political saliency or level of conflict. The position occupied by the group in the political process also seems to have considerable bearing on the choice of strategy. Groups operating within the political process adopt inside strategies that involve lobbying legislators and bureaucrats, taking legal action, and supporting certain candidates in elections. Marginal groups use outside strategies such as public forms of protest and organizing meetings to promote their cause. The media are resorted to in equal measure in both inside and outside strategies.

Lobbying is less developed in Europe than it is in the United States, because the conditions for lobbying are less favorable. In particular, the prevalence of unitary state systems reduces the number of access points and limits the legislative power of parliaments; these are mainly used by representatives of interest groups as a channel for drawing the attention of the media and the government to issues that concern them. Moreover, European scholars have displayed little interest in the theme of lobbying due to the importance attributed in interest group literature to the neo-corporatist approach, which takes it for granted that there is continuing collusion between policymakers and the representatives of economic interests while largely ignoring the lobbying activities of noneconomic groups. Despite these limits, the number of studies of lobbying in different European nations has increased in the past decades. In particular, there has been a steady growth in the amount of research devoted to lobbying in the EU, which has a multilevel institutional structure offering many direct points of access for individual groups and national associations. Both invariably maintain close contacts with national ministers present in Brussels, who often act as intermediaries between interest groups and European institutions.

The majority of interest groups employ one of the many lobbying agencies based in Brussels. At the beginning of the 1990s, it was estimated that more than 10,000 individuals were employed in such agencies, for the most part run by British or American consultants, who generally had more expertise than colleagues from elsewhere in Europe. The result of the lobbying of European institutions is the preponderance of large European industrial groups and their associations in the technical committees set up by the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. Public interest groups are underrepresented or excluded. However, they have greater success with the European Parliament, which is generally more receptive to broader interests. European lobbying seems to be less adversarial and more inclined to favor compromise policy solutions, while in the United States there tends to be just one winner, often the main interest group that has financed the election campaign of the decision makers. Furthermore, in the multilevel system of the EU, lobbying on a certain issue may continue at national, regional, and local levels while the adopted policy is being implemented.

Critical Reappraisals in the Study of Interest Groups

Policy Networks Approach

Since the second half of the 1980s, pluralism and neo-corporatism have come under fire on the grounds that they offer an inaccurate image of the key characteristics of policy making. Critics have noted that in the United States, the prototype of the pluralist political system, a small number of groups adopt collaborative and collusive behaviors in certain areas of policy that are very similar to those described by neo-corporatists. Conversely, in political systems traditionally associated with neo-corporatist agreements, where one would expect cooperation between a small number of groups to be the dominant feature, scholars have identified policy areas corresponding to the pluralist model of a large number of competing groups. To overcome
the incongruent features of pluralism and neo-corporatism, European scholars developed the policy network approach. This focuses on the way groups are conditioned by certain characteristics of the state and of policy making. The state has turned into a network of independent administrative apparatuses that forge permanent ties with groups that are recipients of their decisions, while policy making is sectorialized into various different specialized policy areas. As a consequence of this conditioning, the activities of interest groups are channeled into different policy networks, each of which is made up of the public and private actors interested in formulating and implementing given policies.

The task of research is to examine and classify the different types of policy networks that pluralism and neo-corporatism, according to the policy network approach, erroneously reduce to a single typology of policy making. On the contrary, policy making is sectorialized into different areas of policy within which various policy networks may be active. These are differentiated depending on the number of actors, their stability, the degree of rigidity of their boundaries, and various other dimensions. Apart from the differences, the different types of policy networks also have some features in common: The actors cultivate nonhierarchical relations and promote interests that may at times be conflictual but are interdependent, because there is a mutually beneficial exchange of information, expertise, and, with time, trust.

The two most common types of policy networks are policy communities and issue networks. The former comprise a limited number of groups, are stable over time, have quite rigid boundaries, and are characterized by a consensual decision-making style and a fairly balanced internal distribution of power. By contrast, issue networks are fairly unstable, have uncertain boundaries, are potentially conflictual in terms of interaction, and have an unequal distribution of power.

The limitations of the policy network approach include the absence of shared definitions, the limited operational value of various dimensions used to distinguish the different types of network, the lack of attention devoted to conditions that might lead to the transformation of a network, and the failure to integrate it with any theory of the distribution of power. As regards this final point, however, it should be stressed that the policy network approach seems compatible with pluralism, not only because it admits the existence of an oligopolistic political market dominated by policy communities impenetrable to “unrecognized” groups but also because it emphasizes that policy networks are never entirely closed, that no one interest dominates broad areas of policy, and that policy making takes place within a variety of policy networks characterized by close relations between different interests and different government offices.

The theory of policy networks has the advantage of being a more precise analytic tool than the one proposed by the pluralists and neo-corporatists. What’s more, it bridges the gap between studies on interest groups and those on public policies, sharing with the latter an interest in the characteristics of the social and temporal context in which groups operate. The attention to context has enabled the policy network approach to distinguish between issues that provide incentives for participation and those that mobilize a small number of actors. This in turn has made it possible to formulate some useful hypotheses about the differing propensities of groups to participate and the different levels of conflict within networks.

**Historical Institutionalism**

Historical institutionalism overturns the vision of the relations between interest groups and institutions delineated by pluralism and neo-pluralists who would like to see the state reinforced so as to avoid policy making being dominated by interest groups. Institutionalists hold that the margins for independent initiative on the part of interest groups are actually more limited than neo-pluralists believe, because lobbying must necessarily take place within existing political institutions. The possibility for groups to succeed in influencing public decision makers depends on the structure and functional logic of the institutions that offer highly conditioning restrictions and opportunities. If significant changes take place in institutions, interest groups are obliged to adapt to the new margins of initiative offered by the revamped institutions.

An example of the institutional conditioning of interest group activities is provided by Ellen Immergut in her comparative analysis of health reform policies adopted in three European nations.
Immergut points out that doctors’ associations in France, Switzerland, and Sweden tried to prevent the expansion of state control over the medical profession and the establishment of a public health service. The numerous veto points posed by institutions in Switzerland and in France during the Fourth Republic enabled minority, but well-organized, groups to block legislative initiatives in favor of a public service. By contrast, the institutional situation in Sweden and during the Fifth Republic in France favored the formation of governments that were unconditioned by medical associations and their allies and that were thus able to introduce health reforms. Despite the novelty of its proposed analytic criteria, historic institutionalism is not an alternative approach to pluralism and its subsequent reworkings, because the relatively low number of research studies carried out do not provide adequate grounds for empirically justifying its explicative assumptions. Moreover, these do not appear to be entirely incompatible with the basic ideas of pluralism. Rather, they seem to be useful tools that can be used in the crowded field of neo-pluralist studies.

**Interest Groups and Democracy**

Can interest groups improve the quality of democracy and enhance the development of citizens’ representation and good government? Groups promote democracy if they help citizens win better opportunities for representation. And they contribute to good government if they give citizens the possibility of preventing or punishing abuses of power by making governments accountable for their actions toward the political community.

**Group Representation in Liberal Democracies**

The interest group system favors political equality if it promotes wider representation, so as to prevent governments equipped with partial information about citizens’ preferences from favoring the expectations of a minority. However, research conducted in the United States during the 20th century and the early 21st century demonstrates the existence of a permanent imbalance in representation, because business groups and professional associations find it easier to organize themselves than cause groups. They can act more rapidly when they feel threatened, and they represent people with a high social status, income, and education. They are also dominant in areas of policy that have particular strategic significance for the whole political community.

In Europe, a permanent representational imbalance has been detected both within the EU and in individual member states. Large economic groups occupy a preponderant position within European institutions, even though the number of organizations present in Brussels grew continually in the past 2 decades of the 20th century. In member states, permanent representational imbalances were generated by neo-corporatist experiments that benefited business groups and unions and marginalized less organized social categories from policy making. Permanent imbalances have also been detected in policy communities that are dominated by economic interest groups and are inaccessible to citizens.

Therefore, there is a good deal of converging empirical evidence suggesting that interest groups have a limited ability to favor balanced representation in the decision-making process. However, many scholars take a less negative view of the dynamics of representation, stressing that the characteristics of policy making vary in relation to time, area of policy, and the issue at stake. It may be that the relative degree of representational imbalance is more significant in a certain period in a specific area of policy and less so in the same area at a later time. Furthermore, certain decision-making processes prompt the mobilization of just one of the potential parties involved, while others generate disputes in which hundreds of interest groups take part. The variations in the number of actors participating in the decision-making process suggest that the imbalance is probably less uniform and rigid than it has frequently been made out to be and may be susceptible to attenuation.

Pluralists who have advanced such arguments support their case by pointing to the surge in political participation that took place during the collective movements that sprang up in the 1960s and 1970s. The increase in the number of groups also contributed to “opening up” policy communities, which is why the notion of issue networks was developed in the United States to emphasize that the number of actors participating in decision-making processes had grown. More in general, the
Crowding of the policy-making scene has also made the outcome of decisions more uncertain for business groups. Their omnipresence in the various decision-making arenas is not necessarily proof of their strength but may be the result of a defensive reaction to the wider range of public regulative interventions regarding issues directly affecting their interests. Moreover, the business community is also split by internal divisions that make problematic the formation of unified coalitions for promoting common lobbying strategies.

None of the criticisms leveled at the thesis of representational imbalance denies that it exists. Instead, they stress that this imbalance is an unavoidable result of group competition, and it may be mitigated when competition becomes greater. The debate on representational imbalance suggests that the system of interest groups is relatively open because it enables new actors to enter policy arenas, especially in periods of increased competition and allows many disparate interests to get a hearing from governments. Nevertheless, the group system is characterized by permanent imbalances that penalize citizens and the less organized associations. In this respect, they mirror existing inequalities in society.

Groups and Democratic Accountability

Various factors contribute to defining citizens’ political judgment of governments. One of these is the degree of accountability of government action. In the liberal democracies, voters punish abuses of power by voting governments out of office or reelect them if they consider that the government has respected the law and acted in their interests. To monitor the actions of decision makers in the interval between elections, citizens rely on organizations, which are generally better equipped to ascertain when the abuse of power gets the better of responsibility.

The public organizations that monitor government actions are parliament, the judiciary, and various bureaucratic agencies. The most important private ones are the political parties, the media, and interest groups. The latter have an interest in preventing the abuse of power so as to ensure fair competition between all the players in the field and to avoid some groups obtaining an unfair advantage in the decision-making process. Moreover, groups are forced to follow the governmental process very closely because the final decisions on the different issues are highly unpredictable. This explains why researchers have discovered that a large part of group lobbying is devoted to the gathering of information in the face of uncertainty about the intentions of political elites and other players involved in the preparation of ongoing legislation. The need to achieve fair competition and to gather information for reducing their uncertainty about legislators’ preferences makes interest groups a sort of watchdog of public officials. In this respect, there is more than a point of convergence among the groups’ special interests and those of ordinary citizens for an effective control of decision makers.

But conversely, insofar as they represent particular interests, groups have also the temptation to cultivate confidential relations with governments, and this sometimes leads to collusion. When this happens, the correct functioning of the democratic process is compromised, because it induces decision makers to identify their public mission with the taking of decisions favorable to groups with which they are in collusion. The risk can be reduced when both the groups and governments operate within a system that has effective cross-checks. This works well in liberal democracies if there are strong political parties; a parliament that exercises its powers of control over the executive; an independent judicial system; an efficient, autonomous bureaucracy; and civil society and media that are autonomous from the state. What emerges from the above is that interest group competition enhances the development of open but permanently unbalanced political representation and that the contribution of interest groups to the control of political elites can be effective if carried out in the context of democratic regimes that exhibit high qualitative standards.

As a closing remark, it should be remembered that there are some findings that represent a largely uncontroversial view of interest groups’ contribution to democracy. First of all, these judgments emphasize that groups offer significant opportunities for communicating with governments, enabling citizens to influence public decisions more effectively than if they acted individually and limited themselves to exercising their right to vote. In addition, the variety, number, and presence of groups at all levels of the government process guarantees
the vitality and capacity for renewal of liberal democracies. Groups contribute by helping produce better citizens and motivating them to participate in elections and engage with issues of public interest. Moreover, the great diversity of views expressed by groups give governments an accurate picture of the worries and concerns of civil society, permitting minorities to voice certain of their key needs on specific issues that distracted majorities resulting from elections might otherwise neglect to represent. Finally, it should not be forgotten that, in collaboration with other political actors—public and private—groups can help create rights and obligations protected by the law and often provide expertise that contributes to improving the quality of policy making.

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See also Accountability; Collective Security; Democracy, Quality; Neo-Corporatism; Parties; Pluralism; Policy Network; Representation

Further Readings


Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalism seeks to understand the reasons why states join together and to provide a realistic approach to the analysis of regional integration mechanisms. It tries to overcome the contradiction between Hobbes’s vision of a competition among sovereign states and the modern process of regional and global integration. This entry explores how this concept emerged in connection with European integration and has been expanded to analyze forms of political and economic cooperation more generally.

Intergovernmentalism first found expression in the 1960s in the work of Stanley Hoffmann, who took a realistic view of the construction of Europe. Hoffmann, who taught at Harvard and Sciences Po in Paris, attempted to explain why states as nationalistic as France could bring themselves to give up certain sovereign powers in order to promote the common market, while at the same time opposing the strategies of the European Commission (EC). European integration cannot be explained simply in terms of the neo-functionalist spillover effect, according to which successful integration opens the way for new cooperation. Although it is true that Europe developed from an initially common, then enlarged market, the single market was only created when the political decision to set up a
single currency was made. Intergovernmentalism thus represented a criticism of both functionalist methods and institutionalist approaches. The former give priority to the process of integration, while the latter stress the significant role of institutions in governing interstate relations.

First, as regards the functionalist theories, it is clear that, as noted by Hoffmann, the interests of political elites do not necessarily coincide with those of the EC bureaucracy and that national elites may use their veto to block any transfer of power affecting their sovereignty; integration cannot be conceived of as a functional process that would be spontaneously built up, as postulated by functionalism. The Empty Chair Crisis, in which President Charles de Gaulle boycotted meetings of the Council of the EC in opposition to the EC’s attempt to reduce the scope of application of the veto and increase the EC’s own resources, and subsequently the Luxembourg Compromise that ended the crisis in 1966, deciding in favor of France and maintaining unanimity rule, symbolized this resilience of the state. Moreover, again in opposition to functionalism, not all sectors are integrated at the same rate. Some key matters remain within the exclusive domain of intergovernmental cooperation (the second pillar of the Public Environmental Center for Sustainable Development [PECSD], one of the constitutive pillars of the Union—as they were defined by the Treaty of Maastricht, which defied the European “architecture” in 1992—devoted here to defense and security), while others are governed by the simultaneous imperatives of cooperation and integration, as with the fourth pillar (economy and finance) in which the European Central Bank (in charge of integration) coexists with the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin Council; in charge of cooperation).

As regards institutionalist approaches, intergovernmentalism suggests that international institutions favor negotiation by reducing transaction costs but that it is more effective in the technical fields of “low politics.” In “high-politics” areas of sovereignty, including the most prestigious prerogatives of a sovereign state, states endeavor to protect their powers and thus delegate them with the greatest parsimony. There is, therefore, a major contradiction between technical matters that could be fully integrated and the more political matters in which cooperation requires unanimous agreement and recourse to the veto.

Intergovernmentalism therefore proposes an approach to regional integration through which states accept the principle of cooperation depending on which common interests are at stake. As Morten Kelstrup has shown, the realistic approach becomes compatible with regional integration that allows the sharing of common gains, and thus the external relationships of the states involved are strengthened. Not only do states have an interest in associating, they also remain the chief players in the cooperation or integration policy for this purpose. The successes of the European Union (EU) could thus be explained by the proper functioning of states capable of fostering the opening of civil society and waiving certain attributes of their sovereignty. Intergovernmentalism is therefore more directly concerned with the decision processes used by states in defining and then facing their interests before defining the area of agreement opened up by the relative powers of the parties.

Hence, the integration process must be based first on the awareness that neighboring states have converging interests, a fact that can be attributed to the accelerated maturity of an international anarchy in which sovereign states are in a free competition. In such conditions, interstate cooperation is envisaged as a rational solution to optimize the use of means pooled by the member states. This is why the veto was progressively dropped in favor of a decision-making mechanism via a qualified majority. Sovereignty did not disappear but instead became pooled sovereignty. The European Economic Community was thus envisaged as a multiplier of power for weakened states. The international organizations institutionalized the technique of interstate bargaining. Their decisions became the lowest common denominator on which states could agree. In this ongoing negotiation, the great powers took precedence, but all states were strengthened by their participation in the organization. Contrary to the functionalist or federalist theories, which postulate a metasovereign integration, intergovernmentalism thus suggested that the transfer of power strengthened states internationally and bolstered the political elites with respect to their domestic public opinion.

This initial approach was completed in the 1990s by Andrew Moravcsik, who developed the
idea of liberal intergovernmentalism. Like Hoffmann, Moravcsik considered that the decisions of international organizations resulted from bargaining between rational states. The interest of this approach is its liberal aspect, which is revealed by national choices. States always seek to impose their national interests, but these are no longer envisaged purely through the reductionist view of general interest as embodied in a neutral power. On the contrary, the national preferences expressed by government members in regional organizations for cooperation or integration are the result of the demands of social players who have succeeded in imposing their opinions in national administrative and political circles. Liberal intergovernmentalism thus appears to be a method for combining Robert Putnam’s internal and external levels and doubly strengthening governmental powers: The external constraints give the executive a means whereby to influence domestic public opinion, and the internal constraints are used to put pressure on the external partners that prefer to reach an agreement rather than face failure. The negotiation that could be complicated by this two-level game is in fact simplified by transparent institutional mechanisms that reduce the transaction costs, fostering trust by guaranteeing mutual respect, and turn out to be effective aids to decision making. Based on Nash’s equilibrium, liberal intergovernmentalism explains why and how states manage to come to an agreement by reducing their demands out of fear of marginalization or fear that they will be held liable for failure. The result is that the state, and also the executive, is strengthened by participation in regional organizations of which it controls the agenda, the procedures, the information, and the instruments of legitimation.

Intergovernmentalism is not, however, the only explanation for the construction of Europe. First, it would be an exaggeration to suppose that the integration of the Old World was the sole initiative of the hard core of the EU, constituted by France and Germany. Although these countries played a major role, that should not obscure the fact that horizontal agreements were concluded between the smaller states to oppose this hegemony. Moreover, the United Kingdom balanced things out by backing agreements when it suited its interests. Moreover, while intergovernmentalism provides a good explanation for the role of states in intergovernmental conferences preparing the founding treaties of the EU, it should be noted that the Commission has the power of initiative and that, since the Single Act, which was concluded in 1986 to amend the Rome Treaty and deepen European integration, it is the Commission that has fixed the European agenda. The loss of influence of the Council of General Affairs and External Relations, which for many years was the political hub of Europe, and the rise in importance of the technical councils symbolize the rise of the experts who handle EU business day to day and apply the treaties. Nor is it enough to reduce Europe to the two-level game since, on the contrary, it demonstrates multilevel governance, by which many nonstate players are freed from state interference and develop multiple transnational cooperaions that weaken the states. Finally, the overly positivist definition of national preferences taken into account by intergovernmentalism is also criticized by constructivist approaches.

The theory of intergovernmentalism also includes the realist school, which has markedly changed under the influence of these multiple instances of international cooperation. As a result, realism has been modified by four elements. First, the interstate relationship was revisited and appeared as more complex than the traditional jungle, now seen as a mixture of competition, cooperation, and friendship. Second, international anarchy has become the raison d’être of cooperation, since states seek to join forces in a threatening environment. Third, the ongoing bargaining between states provides a satisfactory answer to Joseph Grieco’s question as to whether states refuse to conclude agreements from fear that their neighbor might obtain higher relative gains. Finally, intergovernmentalism has become part of a realism that has abandoned the former balance of power in favor of a balance of threat or balance of interests. This neoclassical realism is thus resolutely optimistic since, according to Charles Glazer, cooperation has become the instrument of self-help.

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See also Cooperation; European Integration; Institutionalization; Multilevel Analysis; Realism in International Relations; Regionalism; Transaction Costs
Further Readings


INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

See International Organizations

INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

See International Law

INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law is a system of law that is predominantly created by, and designed to govern the actions of, states. Public international law, the subject of this entry, can be distinguished from private international law, which addresses aspects of private legal relationships that span national borders. International law is a horizontal system of law in which states, at least in legal theory, enjoy sovereign equality. Lacking a legislative body or a law enforcement agency, international law functions very differently than a system of law in a modern liberal democracy. International law has grown enormously in scope and complexity since World War II. The number of states has expanded through decolonization and disintegration, international law has come to address a far wider range of subjects than ever before, and there has been a considerable increase in the number of international courts and tribunals. This entry first looks at how international law is created and enforced, and reviews some of the most significant recent developments in specific fields of international law, before considering competing explanations of the impact of international law on the behavior of states and the attitude toward international law of developing countries, the United States, Europe, and China.

Some scholars consider that the predictable patterns discernible in the interstate relations of the ancient world, including the Greek city-states and Mesopotamia, could be regarded as forerunners to the current system of international law, and systems of international law are also said to have developed in precolonial Africa and South Asia. The modern system of international law is, however, usually dated from the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, and the term international law did not come into use until the late 18th century. By the 20th century, international law had evolved into a global system of law. There are contrasting views as to the political significance of the contemporary system. Since the emergence of international relations as a field of study in the early 20th century, the dominant realist paradigm has downplayed the impact of international law on the course of world events. Liberalism assumes an important role for international law as an agent of world peace, but World War II stymied hopes that international law could triumph over military might, especially where accompanied by a political determination to use violence. As international law continues to grow in sophistication, so we are seeing more nuanced theoretical approaches to explicating its impact.

Sources of International Law

There are at least three ways in which the term source is used in relation to international law.

Legal Positivism and the Source of Legal Obligation

States have a legal obligation to comply with international law. The theoretical source of this obligation is state consent. Legal positivism, the
philosophical foundation of international law since the 19th century, assumes that law is made through human agency as opposed to deriving from the metaphysical or religious realms. States are bound by international law because they have agreed to be bound by that law. Although legal positivism underpins the “real world” of international law, it has plenty of critics in the academy, who regard it as inadequate for the contemporary world. Particularly in the 1990s, much of the scholarship critical of legal positivism and the system of international law founded on legal positivism went under the banners of “critical international legal studies” and “new approaches to international law.” This scholarship emphasized the indeterminacy of legal argument and found fault with legal positivism for not taking sufficient account of the role of nonstate actors, the concerns of women, those in postcolonial societies, and indigenous peoples. Heightened awareness of the masculinist bias of international law has given rise to changes in specific fields of international law, including refugee law and international humanitarian law. Liberal scholarship in international law emphasizes the plurality of actors in the international sphere, including transnational networks of judges and government officials.

Formal Sources

The formal sources specify the ways in which international law is made. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which sets out the sources of international law that the Court is to apply, is usually understood more generally as a statement of the formal sources of international law. Although the statute specifies no hierarchy, the order in which the three sources are listed provides a guide as to the relative practical importance of each source. Listed first are conventions, or treaties, which are legally binding agreements between states and, to a lesser extent, between states and intergovernmental organizations. Second is customary international law. States create custom through their actions, where that practice is accompanied by opinio juris, a belief that international law requires the state to behave in that way. The third of the formal sources is general principles of international law. The formal sources of international law permit us to distinguish between rules, principles, and concepts that are, strictly speaking, part of international law and those that are not. Article 38 also specifies two subsidiary means for determining what international law permits or does not permit on a certain subject. These are the writings of distinguished international lawyers and judgments of international courts and tribunals.

Material Sources

If the formal sources elucidate the ways in which international law can be made, the material sources are the specific documents in which a particular point of law is set out—the Charter of the United Nations (UN) or a resolution of the General Assembly, for example. To state that a text constitutes a material source of international law is not to assume that it has legal status as a formal source of international law: The material source may have set out a rule that then becomes binding through another process.

Change Within International Law

The doctrine of sources suggests the processes by which international law evolves. There is no single formal source of international law that serves as the motor of change. International customary law is often codified into treaties. The Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, for example, put into written form international law that had already emerged in custom. Usually in such cases, however, the treaty not only codifies custom but also represents the “progressive development” of international law; through this process, international law is updated. Two general principles of law are relevant here: Where the terms of two material sources of international law appear contradictory, the more recent prevails, and where apparently contradicting law can be found both in specific and broadly applicable instruments, the more specific overrides the more general.

Compliance and Enforcement of International Law

Compliance with international law is aided by the fact that, at least in theory, states choose the law
to which they wish to be bound. States are not bound by a rule of customary law if they have been persistently objecting to the emergent rule, although, in practice, the crystallization of a rule may be clear only in retrospect. States are bound only by those treaties to which they agree to be bound. Participants in treaty negotiations have an opportunity to help shape the terms of the agreement, although in large-scale negotiations the impact of any one delegation may not be as significant as the theory of state consent might suggest. Compliance with international law is also enhanced by the fact that multilateral treaties commonly permit reservations, which allow states to exclude from their undertakings any provisions with which they disagree. Even those states that have signed a treaty can choose not to proceed to ratify and hence not be bound by the final text of the treaty. The fact that international law is a horizontal system means that one of the most important factors promoting compliance is reciprocity: If one party to a conflict treats the prisoners of war of the other combatant according to international humanitarian law, it is much more likely that its own nationals will in turn be treated appropriately.

There are two alternative approaches to maximizing compliance with international law, and each has its supporters within the academy. One approach takes as its starting point the assumption that states have a propensity to comply and generally only fail to do so when there are financial or bureaucratic impediments. This, the managerial approach, is associated with the writing of Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (1995) and emphasizes the continuity of policy choices, to which changes are made only incrementally when perceived as necessary. The second approach is that of enforcement, by which it is assumed that states will only comply where they see a direct benefit from doing so. If a decision to comply is the product of a cost–benefit analysis on the part of national decision makers, rates of compliance should be significantly affected by the presence or absence of enforcement mechanisms. In practice, most fields of international law contain elements of both the “carrot” and the “stick” approach.

There are several methodological problems associated with attempting to determine with precision the rate of compliance with international law—most basically, the fact that there may not be a clear divide between compliance and noncompliance. Many treaty provisions are worded in such a way that it is a matter of interpretation as to whether a particular party has complied with its obligations. It is not difficult to assess whether a state has or has not complied with an obligation to submit a report on its implementation of a human rights treaty, for example, but it may be more difficult to assess on the basis of that report whether the state has implemented the treaty fully, in both letter and spirit.

A notable feature of the system of international law over recent decades has been the growth in the number of international courts and courtlike bodies. Historically, states—or at least their decision-making elite—have been far from keen on the idea of being required to abide by the outcome of a third-party decision in relation to issues with high political stakes. The dispute resolution process within the World Trade Organization stands out because it is compulsory. Any member state that believes that another member has breached an agreement can initiate a case. The dispute is heard by a panel whose report is then adopted by the Dispute Resolution Body unless there is a consensus against adoption. Appeals are heard by an appellate body. Should a member not comply with the outcome of this process, retaliatory trade sanctions may be imposed. Despite the fact that a considerable proportion of trade disputes are settled informally, there is strong scholarly interest in the workings of the dispute resolution process because its establishment in an intergovernmental organization with such large membership is a historically significant development.

The two international courts with the greatest potential impact on world politics are the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The International Court of Justice

The ICJ is one of the principal organs of the UN. The ICJ can hear cases on any subject matter brought to the Court by states, so long as it finds that the states concerned have consented to the jurisdiction of the Court. Expressions of consent may have been open-ended or relate only to the case in question. The Court can issue an order for
provisional measures—the equivalent of an interim injunction—which are designed to protect the rights of parties during the period before the Court decides on the case itself. The Court has averaged less than three cases per year but has become increasingly busy in recent years. States have complied with the judgments of the Court in a majority of, though not all, contentious cases, but compliance with provisional measures has not been good. In its 2001 decision in the LaGrand Case, the Court confirmed that orders of the Court indicating provisional measures are binding. Should a party to a dispute heard by the Court not comply with the decision of the Court, the other party/parties may request the assistance of the Security Council in obtaining compliance. This would clearly politicize the question and would not be useful if the grievance were against one of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Council has never formally declared that it is acting to enforce a decision of the ICJ.

In addition to hearing contentious cases brought by states, the ICJ can respond to requests by certain bodies within the UN for advisory opinions. These are nonbinding responses to questions of law. Examples include the 1995 opinion on the legality of the threat of use of nuclear weapons and the 2003 opinion on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory.

The International Criminal Court

The establishment of the ICC in 1998 was one of the most momentous international law developments of the late 20th century. The ICC exercises jurisdiction over individuals who commit serious breaches of international law through the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and/or crimes against humanity, and it will have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a definition of the crime has been agreed on. A key principle in the statute is that of complementarity; the ICC was not intended to replace national courts but to operate in situations in which states are either unable or unwilling to act. The ICC is set to have significant political impact, in large part because, despite its having jurisdiction over individuals rather than states, this necessarily gives rise to broader political implications. This is particularly evident in the case of aggression. Aggression was included in the Statute of the ICC at the insistence of developing countries, but there was no agreement during the negotiations as to how aggression was to be defined. Historically, aggression has been considered a crime committed by states, but the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals after World War II declared that individuals were accountable for crimes against peace. It would be very difficult for the Court to find that an individual had committed the crime of aggression without passing judgment on the actions of the state in question.

The issue is similar in relation to the trigger mechanisms by which a case can be brought before the Court. A situation may be referred to the ICC Prosecutor by a state party or initiated by the prosecutor with the authorization of a pretrial chamber. In both these situations, the state in whose territory the conduct in question occurred or of which the person accused of the crime is a national must have given its consent. A situation can also be referred to the prosecutor by the Security Council, and if brought by this means, the Court will have jurisdiction even if the crime was committed in a nonstate party by a national of a nonstate party and in the absence of consent by the territorial state or the state of nationality of the accused. The United States has not become a party to the statute of the Court, one of its principal objections being that, contrary to the principle of state consent, the Court can hear a case against an individual whose country is not party to the statute. The United States did not, however, veto Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005), which referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC despite Sudan being a nonparty to the statute. The first four situations referred to the Court were all African.

The ICC complements the work of national courts as well as other types of bodies, including criminal courts established on an ad hoc basis and truth and reconciliation commissions. Truth commissions have no prosecutorial powers and are not courts. They attempt to acknowledge and document a history of human rights abuses within a particular country or area—often those that took place under a regime, or during a period of turmoil or civil war—as a step toward healing wounds within that society. They represent a midpoint between a blanket amnesty for perpetrators of human rights and international humanitarian law
violations and formal criminal trial. More than 20 truth commissions have been established since 1970, including in Uganda, Nepal, and South Africa. Both a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a special court established jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the UN operated concurrently in Sierra Leone in the wake of its civil war. Other ad hoc tribunals include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Both Timor and Cambodia have hybrid courts in which criminal justice is being pursued through what can be understood as internationalized domestic courts.

The Substantive Content of International Law

International law can be divided into a number of overlapping subfields or regimes. While this is useful as a way of classifying the vast and growing amount of international law, it should be remembered that any single material source may well have relevance to more than one of these fields. Enforcement methods vary between fields and in their mix of carrot and stick approaches.

International Law and the Use of Force

This field of international law specifies the circumstances under which a state may or may not use force against another state. One of the most striking features of the current system of international law is its incorporation of a general prohibition on the threat and use of force in interstate relations. The Covenant of the League of Nations attempted to delay and, if possible, avoid a state resorting to war, but the Charter of the UN goes further and permits states to use force only in self-defense or if authorized to do so by the Security Council. The Charter recognizes the inherent right of a state to self-defense if it is a victim of an armed attack. Having responded in self-defense, the state concerned is expected to report its actions to the Security Council, and it is assumed that the Security Council will then take appropriate action. Although the initial plan was for individual states to make military forces available to the UN, this has not occurred, and in practice, the Council authorizes others to use force on its behalf. What had previously been regarded as the sovereign right of a state to choose to go to war in pursuit of its political objectives was removed by the Charter and in its place was established a system of collective security in which the whole international community is to work together to prevent, and respond to, threats to international peace and security.

The international law of the use of force is not so clear as to how states should respond to acts of violence by nonstate actors, including terrorists. Nor is it well equipped to deal with internal wars. The Charter of the UN upheld sovereignty as a fundamental principle of the international system; according to Article 2(7), the UN is not to interfere in the domestic affairs of states. While a strong affirmation of sovereignty is welcome from the perspective of a developing country being able to strengthen its position against external meddling in its political and economic affairs, it is less useful in safeguarding human rights. This raises the controversial question of the legality of humanitarian intervention. Although the vast majority of international lawyers would agree that humanitarian intervention authorized by the Security Council in response to a threat to international security is legal, only a few believe that contemporary international law permits unilateral acts of humanitarian intervention. Those who do believe that humanitarian intervention is not covered by the general prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter generally seek support for their views in international customary law.

International legal scholarship in this field examines particular instances of the use of force to assess their legality and any likely possible impact on customary international law. In recent years, for example, a focus on the legality of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) use of force during the Kosovo crisis was followed by debate regarding Operation Enduring Freedom as a response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the scope for a state to justify the use of military force in response to a terrorist attack as a valid act of self-defense. Such debate was then overshadowed by the 2003 Iraq War, which most legal scholars deem to have been illegal. While the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), and Australia claimed to derive authority for their use of force from Security Council Resolution 678 (1990), the vast majority of international lawyers...
question the assertion that Iraqi noncompliance with Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) could have reactivated the Council’s authorization for the First Gulf War. Indeed, both the United States and the UK had written letters to the Council regarding Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002), in which they emphasized that any further Iraqi noncompliance would need to be considered again by the Council.

One of the criticisms most commonly leveled at international law within political science is its apparent inability to enforce rules, particularly those concerning the use of force, against the most powerful. This was a recognized weakness of the UN Charter from its earliest days. Security Council enforcement can ensure compliance on the part of less powerful states and those without an ally among the permanent members of the Council, but international law arguably relies on “carrots” to ensure the compliance of the most powerful. The illegality of the 2003 invasion of Iraq became so clear that, for example, it served to delegitimize and weaken international support for U.S. foreign policy.

International Economic Law

International economic law (IEL) regulates international economic activity. While many aspects of international law have economic implications, IEL is generally understood as incorporating those legal regimes with the most direct economic consequences, such as the international law of trade, investment, currency, and finance. The growth of this field of international law is reflected in the establishment in 2008 of a Society of International Economic Law. International trade law is the most developed branch of IEL. The breakdown of the Doha Round of negotiations in the World Trade Organization and the associated turn to bilateral and regional trade negotiating processes is one of the most significant recent developments in IEL.

For many years, few other than the specialists kept track of what was happening in the periodic negotiating rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization. The protests at the 1999 ministerial meeting in Seattle marked a new era. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization have moved to enhance their accountability through increased transparency, and some legal scholars are promoting the need to develop a body of international administrative law to address governance questions in intergovernmental institutions. IEL regulates multinational corporations only indirectly, and developing countries have since at least the 1970s called for more effective regulation of the behavior of multinational corporations, especially in relation to human rights and environmental matters.

International Environmental Law

As a field of international law, international environmental law is relatively recent. Key global treaties include the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its 1987 Montreal Protocol, the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, and the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. Climate change is arguably the most significant issue in international environmental law today, with considerable scholarly focus being directed toward the architecture of the post-Kyoto regime and the implications of climate change for other fields of international law, including the international law of human rights and the law of the sea.

There are clear implications of measures taken to protect the environment for international economic relations, and from the perspective of a developing country, this field of law has often been criticized for perpetuating Western colonial dominance. Where an environmental issue—such as ozone depletion—is of a truly global nature, developing countries have, however, found themselves in a stronger negotiating position and able to secure differentiated responsibilities. Types of differentiated responsibilities have included, inter alia, those that distinguish between industrial and developing countries with respect to the central obligations contained in the treaty and those addressing aspects of implementation, such as delayed compliance schedules, and financial and technological assistance.

The Law of the Sea

This is a far older branch of international law and addresses all aspects of ocean use. Historically,
customary international law evolved to address navigation and fishing. One of the most fundamental principles in the law of the sea is that of the “freedom of the seas,” by which the oceans are a global commons available for use by all. Naval powers—the United States now as with the UK before it—emphasize the importance of this principle. Over time, however, coastal states have increased the extent of their regulatory reach into the oceans adjacent to their territory. The primary material source of international law on the oceans is the 1982 Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which entered into force in 1994 and sets out just who has what sort of rights in which parts of the ocean and seabed. It defines a number of zones, including those of the territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone. The United States has not ratified the Convention but respects most of its provisions, which are also found in customary international law. Topical within the study of the law of the sea in recent years have been questions of maritime boundary determination, protection of fish stocks from overfishing, delimiting the outer edge of the continental shelf, and maritime security. Climate change is raising new questions, including those relating to the melting of polar ice and the future of the maritime zones associated with states that may disappear as sea levels rise.

**International Human Rights Law**

International human rights law (IHRL) is concerned primarily with the protection of individuals from threats to their human rights stemming from the state. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, together with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights together make up what is informally referred to as the International Bill of Rights. There are a considerable number of more specific human rights treaties at a global level, including the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Global IHRL is complemented by many regional treaties.

Human rights law has traditionally assumed a distinction between public and private spheres of human activity and focused on the first of these to the detriment of those who suffer human rights abuses in the private sphere. Recent years have seen increased recognition within IHRL of the need to increase human rights accountability for corporations, international organizations, multilateral development banks, multinational peacekeeping operations, and individuals. Compliance mechanisms in IHRL often consist of a regularized collection of self-reported data, with review by an international committee. The number of human rights treaties continues to increase, but the focus has shifted to the need to work for better compliance with existing human rights treaties rather than their continued proliferation.

**International Humanitarian Law**

International humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the international law of armed conflict, addresses human rights in wartime and thus overlaps with IHRL as well as with international criminal law. Traditional means of ensuring compliance with IHL include appeals by the International Committee of the Red Cross, prosecution before international tribunals, training programs in military academies, and condemnation by other states. The war on terror launched by the Bush administration gave extra vigor to debate regarding the relevance of IHL to conflicts involving fighters not representing states and a perceived need to rethink ways of ensuring respect for IHL. The increasing privatization of war has also raised questions regarding the IHL accountability of private security firms.

**International Criminal Law**

International criminal law (ICL) overlaps both IHRL and IHL as well as other fields such as the law of the sea—consider, for example, the crime of piracy. Transnational offences addressed by international criminal law include drug trafficking, money laundering, and cybercrime. Some actions are specified as international crimes in the relevant treaty. Article 1 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide states in that the Contracting Parties “confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.” Other treaties, including the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, do not explicitly describe the conduct in question as an international crime but require all parties to make the offence a crime in national law and/or to prosecute or extradite the alleged offender.

There is no agreed definition of terrorism in international law, but a number of counterterrorism conventions have been negotiated in response to particular forms and acts of terrorism. These include the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, the 1998 UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, and the 2000 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Most counterterrorism conventions define the elements of the offence and incorporate provisions requiring the state in which an alleged offender is found to proceed with extradition or prosecution.

The Impact of International Law on the Behavior of States

Amazing as it may seem to most international lawyers, political scientists are divided over whether international law does or does not influence the way in which states conduct their affairs, particularly as regards the “high-politics” issues of war versus peace and even in relation to “middle-range” political issues in which some degree of national interest is at stake. Fundamental questions concerning state behavior in relation to international law necessarily reflect broader theoretical positions regarding the relationship of international law to world politics. At the time when the discipline of international relations emerged after World War I, liberal internationalists painted a picture of the possibility of a world in which war was not inevitable and promoted international law and institutions as the way to achieve such a world. The idealists shared a moralistic, optimistic outlook on world affairs. The establishment of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice could be regarded as embodiments of this idealist perspective. But as the inevitability of world war became apparent in the late 1930s, Edward Hallett Carr spoke out against what by then appeared to be the utopian dreams of the liberal internationalists. In The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939, Carr claimed that it is not that ethics and international law have no place in world politics but that the bottom line is always power.

World War II ushered in an era in which realism dominated the discipline. The United States has functioned as the hegemon of the international relations discipline since World War II, and in the United States, the discipline of international relations is firmly embedded in political science (rather than, e.g., history or philosophy). The leading postwar U.S. realist, Hans Morgenthau, had been disillusioned by the failure of international law to prevent World War II, and the focus of classical realism on power politics and national interest typically leaves little room for international law. Where realists do refer to international law, it is generally to downplay any independent influence of international law on the course of world politics. Realists believe that they deal with the world as it really is rather than as it ought to be.

The seeming mismatch between the hard-line approach of Cold War realism and the reality as lived by government international lawyers encouraged some lawyers to seek to demonstrate that international law did have a real-world impact. One approach was to recount the experiences of foreign policy legal advisers. It appears that there is a wide range of experiences here, from being intimately involved in the decision-making process, as was the case in the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis, to not even being consulted before a major policy decision with legal ramifications is taken. The role of foreign policy legal advisers can be characterized as generally being that of a neutral professional when first asked for advice on the legality of a proposed course of action, with that role shifting to one of a policy advocate once a policy decision has been taken.

Another approach toward demonstrating the relevance of international law was to speak in terms of the “functions” or “roles” of international law. U.S. scholars tended to focus on crisis situations, at which times international law was shown to be valuable in choosing between and legitimizing policy options and in providing language and institutions through which the parties
could communicate with each other. Hedley Bull, associated with the so-called English School of International Relations, believed that despite the anarchical nature of the international system, there is such a thing as international society. According to Bull (1994), international law serves to identify the idea of a society of sovereign states, state the basic rules of coexistence, and help mobilize compliance with the rules of international society. International lawyers, and those international relations scholars with an interest in international law, have generally not needed to justify their respect for international law as much in the UK and Europe as in the United States.

Regime theory flourished in the United States and elsewhere in the 1980s and early 1990s. Regime theory began as an approach to analyzing processes of international cooperation that may or may not incorporate a formal organizational structure of which the particular focus of much research was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Recognizing that intangibles are integral to processes of formalized and less formal processes of international cooperation, regime theorists referred to norms, principles, rules, and decision-making procedures. The fact that international regimes are generally founded by multilateral treaty opened up possibilities for interdisciplinary cooperation, although there is no single regime theory approach to international law because the regime vehicle has been used by theorists across the spectrum, including those of an essentially realist persuasion.

The primary ongoing use of regime theory is in relation to questions of regime design and effectiveness in the study of environmental cooperation. Even perfect compliance may not mean that a treaty is effective if the provisions it contains are inadequate to meet the objectives for which it was established. It is generally accepted, for example, that even if all parties were to fully comply with their Kyoto commitments, the emissions reduction targets in the treaty were inadequate to make a significant impact on the problem. Names associated with regime theory include Kenneth Abbott, Stephen Krasner, Duncan Snidal, Volker Rittberger, Jørgen Wettestad, and Oran Young.

From the perspective of those who view international law as a largely coherent system of law, much of the international relations literature that does recognize norms—including within a regime framework—remains inadequate because it does not attempt to distinguish a legal norm from any other norm. In 2000, a special issue of the U.S. journal *International Organization* presented a framework within which to analyze “legalization,” the increasing amount of law evident in international institutions and process. Current research questions on legalization include those of its causes and consequences and why it is that governments favor legalization in some institutions, issue areas, and regions more than in others. Europe, for example, is much more highly legalized than some other regions of the world.

In recent years, scholarship on the political functioning of international law has been influenced by constructivism. Although, as with realism and liberalism, there are many variants of constructivism, they share a perspective on norms and identity as central to the social and political sphere. Constructivists break down the divide between social structures and agency, regarding structure as being continually recreated by agency, just as norms create identity and expectations. Constructivists acknowledge the interrelationship between international law and world politics. They do not deny the functions of international law as identified by liberals but more consciously point to international law as having a socially constitutive function.

The Global Distribution of Power and Attitudes Toward International Law

Many of the most ardent advocates of international law have been inspired by the ideal of a rule of law functioning in the international sphere to the benefit of all states and people. Given the increasing scope and complexity of international law in the early years of the 21st century, it is thus timely to consider the attitude toward international law of those most and least powerful in the international political system.

Developing Countries and International Law

The rapid process of decolonization resulted in many new states joining the system of international law as political and legal entities in their own right. Acutely aware that their formal legal equality as sovereign states did not equate with
economic equality, these states in the 1970s launched a campaign for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO agenda included recognition of the right of every country to adopt the economic and social system that it deems most appropriate for its own development, full permanent sovereignty of every state over its natural resources and all economic activities, and the regulation and supervision of the activities of transnational corporations. The campaign failed, although a number of its elements have resurfaced in other contexts. Developing countries are finding new levels of negotiating weight in areas in which their consent and participation are essential to the industrialized world, including in global environmental regimes. Although they have not yet been able to steer the international economic agenda in the direction that they would like it to go, developing countries are now more able to recognize the implications and resist some of the demands of the developed world. It is, nevertheless, necessary to distinguish among developing countries. While the leading developing countries are increasingly becoming active participants in international dispute resolution bodies and in the development of new legal regimes, the least developed simply do not have the legal expertise and financial resources at their disposal to play a full role in international law.

There remains a clear North American and European dominance in international legal scholarship, but there have been a number of influential international lawyers who have voiced a developing world perspective on international law. Most of these scholars prefer to retain the term Third World. Some of those who established a strong tradition of Third World scholarship on international law include Georges Abi-Saab, Francisco García-Amador, R. P. Anand, Mohammed Bedjaoui, and Taslim Elias. In recent years, a number of scholars, including Anthony Angheie, B. S. Chimni, Makau Mutua, and B. Rajagopal, have self-identified their work as TWAIL or Third World Approaches to International Law. They have been influenced by postcolonial theory and critical approaches to international law and have contributed to reinvigorated interest in the history of the discipline and its subject matter. TWAIL scholars have emphasized that colonialism was not simply an unfortunate episode in the history of international law but rather constitutive of international law and that international law cannot be separated from its colonial past.

**The United States and International Law**

The United States played a leading role in establishing most of the key institutions that make up the contemporary international order, including those of the UN, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. From 2001 to 2009, under President George W. Bush, the United States came under considerable criticism for what was seen as an increased tendency toward unilateralism and associated decline in support for international law and institutions. Evidence for this charge included U.S. failure to support the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Some practices of the United States for which it came under criticism, such as that of ratifying human rights treaties only to the extent that their provisions corresponded with rights already existing within the U.S. legal system, were not new to the Bush administration. President Barack Obama, elected to office in 2008, recognized that his administration would need to work hard to restore the reputation of the United States so far as its commitment to international law and institutions was concerned. To further this goal, at the time of this writing, the Obama administration was seeking Senate approval for ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

**Europe and International Law**

Europe was the birthplace of modern international law. During the administration of George W. Bush, some observers contrasted what appeared to be strong European support for international law with the more instrumentalist approach of the United States. The United States was accused of using international law as a tool when it chose to do so, without lending its weight to strengthening universal support for human rights and respect for the international rule of law as something far greater than a U.S. policy tool. The allegedly undesirable U.S. attitude toward international law can be seen reflected in several strands of U.S. scholarship, including recent applications to international
law of rational choice and game theory that purport to prove that international law serves as no more than a weak exogenous constraint on state action. And yet, if the U.S. attitude is attributable to its position of hegemony, so could European attitudes be interpreted as a product of relative power. From this perspective, Europe has been determined to shore up its moral and legal weight because it is unable to match the United States in terms of sheer military and economic muscle. Setting aside transatlantic tensions, it cannot be denied that the European Union has a highly effective legal system and the most highly developed system of human rights protection in the world and that Europe remains a bastion of intellectual support for an international law that purports to be of universal value.

**China and International Law**

With its rising power, China and its attitude toward international law are subjects of increasing interest and speculation. In common with most developing countries, China places greater emphasis on sovereignty than does the rhetoric of Western liberal democracy, but China has nevertheless been supportive of multilateralism and collective security. Some critical commentators see China as drawing on its dual identities of major power and developing country to accept many of the benefits of its increasing economic weight without an associated cost. Cynics also suggest that the apparent commitment of China to multilateralism may be a function of its relative power, a strategy to be pursued until China’s position in the international order is such that it can operate unilaterally if it so chooses. And yet, particularly given that nondemocratic countries are generally assumed less likely than democratic countries to uphold international law, China’s attitude toward international law and the extent of its integration into the international system have been noteworthy.

**Increasing Complexity and Possible Fragmentation of International Law**

International law is transforming from a minimalist body of law addressing selected aspects of interstate relations toward a much more dense web of law affecting all aspects and levels of governance and under increasing pressure to tackle issues of normative and institutional hierarchy. Some fields of international law, notably IHRL, do not seek to regulate the external conduct of states but set standards for the internal functioning of states, and international law is thereby permeating domestic legal systems to an increasing degree. The growth in the number of international courts and courtlike bodies is creating the potential for states to “forum shop” as well as for competition between legal regimes. Tensions between, for example, international trade and human rights or the environment may be exacerbated by the degree to which the state’s actions in one of the regimes in question—in this case, trade—are subjected to third-party dispute resolution.

One contemporary approach to international law and its place within world politics that is arguably responding to the growing complexity and centrality to world politics of international law is that of international constitutionalism. Writers on international constitutionalism have in common the use of constitutional language derived from the domestic context to interpret the growing complexity of the contemporary system of international law and its constituent regimes. While the language of constitution has long been used within international law—the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Convention has often been referred to as a “constitution for the oceans,” for example—the constitutional metaphor is now being employed much more tightly and, in many cases, with a more clearly normative agenda. Theorists differ as to the extent to which international law is able to function independently of the international distribution of power, but few, if any, would claim that it could disengage completely from fundamental geopolitical shifts in the balance of power. This suggests that with the rise of Asia, including China and India, international law is set to undergo further significant change in the 21st century.

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**See also** Compliance; Constructivism in International Relations; Idealism in International Relations; International Organizations; International Regimes; International Society; Liberalism in International Relations; United Nations
Further Readings


**INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF)**

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a voluntary organization of 187 member countries that operates as a major multilateral institution. Its goals include promoting international monetary cooperation and stability of the exchange rate, thus aiding the expansion of international trade and economic well-being of its member states.

In March 2010, the European Union decided that there might be a need to call the IMF in case one of the members of the eurozone needed financial assistance. In July 2007, less than 3 years before Dominique Strauss-Kahn was appointed managing director of the IMF, the institution had fallen into disrepute and was widely regarded as almost useless; indeed, the primary task of the new managing director seemed to be to cut costs and reduce personnel. There appeared to be no role, in the new world of “great moderation” of the early 21st century, for an institution that had been created in 1944 to police exchange rates and that had progressively become the firefighter and police officer of international financial crises. The global financial crisis that had started as a U.S. banking crisis only weeks before Strauss-Kahn took office radically changed the outlook: Not only was the IMF needed again for emergency lending to countries faced with sudden liquidity shortages, this time mostly in Europe, but its expertise was widely sought in determining the extent of damage in the global banking sector, helping with fiscal consolidation plans in the worst hit economies, and elaborating reform proposals under the mandate of the newly created G20. Just as in the aftermath of each international financial crisis, the IMF is alive and back in business—but in a different business. This entry describes the complex evolution of the IMF,
first examining the role of the Washington Consensus and taking into account the 2008–2009 crisis and then investigating the problems that are at stake for the institution.

Structure and Governance

The IMF was created, along with the World Bank, at the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944, only weeks after the landing of allied troops in Normandy. It was initially conceived as the cornerstone of the international monetary system of fixed exchange rates that was to be instituted in the aftermath of World War II. The consensus among the Allied forces at that time was that a fixed exchange rate system was needed to prevent the reappearance of the kind of “competitive devaluation” and other beggar-thy-neighbor policies that had prevailed as reactions to the financial crisis of 1929 and were then widely regarded as having played a major part in the depth and length of the Great Depression of the 1930s. The initial British plan, put forth by John Maynard Keynes, was to institute a world exchange system based on a new world liquidity instrument, the bancor, which would be issued and managed by a genuine world central bank. This plan had been rejected by the U.S. delegation which favored the so-called gold exchange standard: All currencies have to be convertible and have a fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, which by itself is convertible into gold at a fixed parity of $35 (U.S.) per ounce.

In December 1945, when the first Articles of Agreement were signed, the IMF counted 29 member countries. Membership progressively expanded to 187 countries in 2010. Its main governing body is the Board of Governors, which meets once a year, where all member countries are represented by a governor, who is usually the head of the central bank. Most executive tasks are, however, delegated to the executive board, which comprises 24 members. Only large economies have their own representative, the others being distributed in regional groups and electing representatives. In both boards, voting rights are distributed unevenly in broad accordance with relative weights in the world economy (see the last section of this entry). As of August 2010, eight countries had their own representatives in the Executive Board: The percentage of voting rights for the United States of America is 16.74; Japan, 6.01; Germany, 5.87; France, 4.85; the United Kingdom (UK), 4.85; China, 3.65; Saudi Arabia, 3.16; and the Russian Federation, 2.69. The least represented region is sub-Saharan Africa, with only two representatives for 43 countries and a total of 4.35% of voting rights.

From Surveillance to Structural Adjustment

In the original Bretton Woods system, the role of the IMF was essentially one of macroeconomic surveillance: making sure that countries with—partially—convertible currencies (i.e., essentially developed countries of the West and Japan) were managing their economies in a manner broadly in line with the requirements of a fixed exchange rate system—that is, maintaining balance-of-payments disequilibria within reasonable limits in a world of strictly limited and state-controlled international capital movements. In principle, the IMF also had to ensure that enough international liquidity is provided, but in practice, this role was taken over by the United States, which issues the international reserve currency and holds a blocking minority share in the qualified-majority voting mechanism of the Fund. In 1969, the creation of a new reserve instrument, the Special Drawing Rights (SDR), was supposed to give the Fund more leeway. This was initially limited by the U.S. opposition and later became defunct because of the relative abundance and autonomy of international liquidity in the world of global finance in the 1990s. The SDRs were in fact never really used on a significant scale. There were two major allocations of SDRs: In August 2009, a general allocation of 161.2 billion was made to all member countries, and in September, a special allocation was made to members who had joined after 1981 and who had not benefited from the previous allocations. As of August 2010, the total amount of SDRs allocated amounted to 204.1 billion, equivalent to approximately $317 billion (U.S.).

Until the end of the Bretton Woods era (symbolically proclaimed in August 1971 by U.S. President Richard Nixon, who officially suspended the dollar convertibility into gold), the IMF was thus largely confined to making sure that exchange rate adjustments by members would remain infrequent and not too large and that balance-of-payments disequilibria were not excessive, at least
outside the United States. It did intervene in a few European countries—most visibly Italy and the UK in 1977—to provide liquidity and assistance in cases of serious difficulties and to gain access to international, private financing. The Jamaica Agreements, in 1976, sealed the end of the Bretton Woods era, by officially admitting the plurality of exchange rate regimes and eliminating gold as a reference in the international monetary system. By the same token, these agreements signaled the weakening of the IMF.

The irresistible rise in international short-term capital flows and international lending, consequent to the generalized floating exchange rate system and to the external-accounts surpluses generated by the first oil shock in Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries, led to a first wave of sovereign borrowing during the second half of the 1970s, mostly in Latin America, which was then widely regarded as the promised land of economic growth. After the U-turn in U.S. monetary policy in 1979–1981, under Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker, to fight two-digit domestic inflation and the second oil shock, Mexico defaulted on its foreign loans in August 1982, thereby signaling the start of a long series of external debt crises. The IMF did not play a major role in the resolution of these crises—the U.S. Treasury acted almost unilaterally to solve a problem that primarily concerned U.S. commercial banks—but emergency lending to distressed sovereign borrowers and technical assistance for adjustment plans became a part and parcel of the IMF's new role in international finance.

The Washington Consensus in Question
One of the major tasks of the IMF was to counsel governments in countries needing structural economic reforms. After the introduction of reforms and the collapse of the Soviet economy, the consequent transition of former centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe provided the Fund’s teams with a king-size experiment to elaborate and test ambitious and wide-ranging transformation and adjustment plans that would soon become known as the Washington Consensus: a cocktail of structural reforms usually involving tax reforms, public employment reduction, cuts in social expenditures, privatizations and liberalization of external financial transactions, and standard predicaments for macroeconomic adjustment—fiscal consolidation and tight monetary policy.

The massive privatization movement that ensued in the first half of the 1990s fueled the expansion and globalization of financial markets along with the rise of private borrowing. In parallel, many countries had been moving away from floating exchange rates, which had proved to be a source of instability rather than being the means of national monetary sovereignty. Pegging the exchange rate to a foreign currency became the norm again, not only in Europe but also in Asia and Latin America. This environment led to overconfidence and indeed to excessive reliance on external financing in many countries. The second Mexican crisis in 1994 and the Asian crisis of 1997, soon followed by the Russian and Latin American crises, led the IMF to further increase lending facilities and provided a large-scale experiment for its structural adjustment plans. The social and political costs incurred by national governments, together with the severity of the subsequent recessions, aroused strong criticism of the doctrine on which IMF interventions were based and forced most emerging economies to turn away from external financing. Instead, with policies of pegging their currencies with an undervalued exchange rate, they aimed at external surpluses and foreign exchange reserve accumulation and tried to build regional banks to free themselves from the tutorship of the Fund and rely on a form of “self-insurance.”

From Lending to the Poor to Lending to the Rich?
The global crisis of 2008 to 2009 radically changed the outlook. The G20 took over global leadership as of November 2008 and had to rely on existing institutions for expertise and for conducting rescue operations for the worst hit economies. Hence, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the IMF regained influence, even though their legitimacy could be questioned, not least by the large emerging economies. The IMF became the promoter of coordinated fiscal stimulus plans to prevent generalized deflation and depression; it moved further in the direction of nonorthodox predicaments by advocating a light-handed approach to fiscal consolidation in the
aftermath of the crisis, both by pressing governments not to start consolidating too early, which might destroy the fragile recovery, and by suggesting that central banks accept slightly higher inflation targets to ease fiscal adjustment.

In April 2009, at the London Summit of the G20, reforms were announced in diverse areas such as surveillance and monitoring of global financial risks, transparency and the fight against tax havens, and emergency interventions for financially distressed economies, most particularly in Europe. For this purpose, the decision was made to increase the Fund’s lending capacity to U.S.$750 billion. Half of this additional funding came from EU countries, and it was soon to be drawn on by other European countries—both from the EU (Hungary, Estonia, and Romania) and from outside the EU (Iceland). Though a few poor countries did get aid from the IMF, it clearly appeared that the larger lending facilities had been designed to help relatively rich countries and incidentally to help the EU Commission and national governments to restore macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline in economies that had very close links with the core of the EU—that is, the eurozone. In doing so, the IMF also reasserted the structural adjustment plans that had characterized the Washington Consensus, though with apparently greater care for social expenditures. And in March 2010, when the Greek public debt crisis reached a climax, the EU leaders could not agree on a bail-out plan unless the IMF were part of the lending-of-last-resort mechanism, the German government counting on its expertise and the severity of its predicaments to impose discipline on the Greek government or indeed any eurozone member that might, later on, fall victim to speculative attacks on purportedly unsustainable debt.

A New Role in Preventing Financial Instability

Solving the current crisis, which had started in 2008, is only a part of the renewed mandate of the IMF; preventing future ones by reforming international financial governance has also been set high on the G20 agenda, and the IMF is, along with the Basel Committee and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)—the coordination institutions for major central banks and the major source of the prudential regulation doctrine for commercial banking—a major actor in the new global effort to reduce systemic risk. Thus, the Forum for Financial Stability, a coordination committee within the Fund, has been turned into a full-fledged and permanent Council of Financial Stability, with a mandate to monitor global financial developments and issue early warning signals in case of perceived mounting imbalances and excessive risk accumulation. And the IMF has been entrusted with the mission to study new instruments of banking regulation, including taxation on risk taking, and possible limitations on the free movement of capital, at least for short-term, speculative capital flows. This could clearly yield a radical change in financial globalization. But how far will national governments be willing to go?

Which Legitimacy?

One of the major weaknesses of the IMF lies in its own governance structure and is apparent in its highest ranking officials: Traditionally, while the Chairman of the World Bank is a U.S. citizen, the General Director of the IMF is a European. This dominance of Europe is even reinforced in the current top-ranking management by the fact that, alongside Strauss-Kahn, the chief economist is Olivier Blanchard, a French-born professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This governance structure itself reflects the distribution of capital and voting rights among member countries. Initially justified by the overwhelming domination of the United States and the European economies in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the country-wise distribution is increasingly being contested, especially by large emerging economies. The latest reform, implemented in 2006, redistributed about 5.4% of voting rights to the benefit of 54 countries; among those who have gained the most are China, Korea, Brazil, and Turkey. However, the United States still possesses nearly 17% of voting rights, which amounts to a veto power, and the EU countries, taken together, have about 32% of voting rights, whereas China has only 3.65%, India 1.89%, and Brazil 1.38%.

At the G20 summit of April 2009, it was decided to reallocate 5% of voting rights. Yet this would not suffice to yield a system of representation more in line with economic and financial
weights of countries in the global economy. This very slow change in the IMF governance and practices may well be a major factor in the current acceleration of regional plans, especially in Asia, to organize monetary and financial stability independently of worldwide institutions that appear to be too closely controlled by Western countries. The pending and highly sensitive issue of exchange rates among major international currencies and the evolutions required to facilitate the return to a more balanced international economy still makes the task of the IMF more complex and further weakens the legitimacy of its current governance.

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See also Central Banks; International Political Economy; Multilateralism; World Bank

Further Readings

Bretton Woods Project: http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org
International Monetary Fund: http://www.imf.org

International Organizations (IOs) have three defining features: (1) they are constituted by members from more than one state, usually more than two; (2) they are oriented toward the pursuit of common goals, at least initially; and (3) they have a certain level of explicit formal structure, usually established by a treaty or constituent document. IOs are material entities, usually with offices and personnel. In most cases, they have a legal personality, and thus, they can function as actors in national and international politics. In general, organizations exhibit higher levels of goal specificity and formalization than other types of collectivities, such as social movements, informal networks, or more or less diffuse communities.

There are many different types of IOs. The main distinction is between the IOs constituted by states and those that are constituted by other actors. The former are known as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and the latter as international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs or sometimes simply NGOs). Some INGOs have individual members, some have a combination of individuals and locally or nationally organized groups as members, and some are umbrella organizations for national nongovernmental organizations.

IGOs have several formal characteristics in common. Since they are established by governments, they have a formal document serving as their “constitution”—usually a formal treaty in line with requisitions in international law. Moreover, they usually have headquarters with permanent staff, regular meetings of representatives of member states, and rules for decision making and other organizational processes. IGOs also differ in important respects, such as competence and membership. Membership is open to all countries or restricted according to geographical, functional, or other criteria. Competence can be wide, covering a broad range of issues, or restricted to a narrow domain.

The category of INGOs is often subdivided into profit- and nonprofit-oriented organizations. Profit-oriented organizations are mostly multinational companies, such as Nike or Shell Oil Company, or various kinds of business organizations representing such companies directly or indirectly, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Nonprofit organizations cover wide areas of specific group interests, such as peace, human rights (e.g., Amnesty International), and environmental protection (e.g., World Wildlife Federation [WWF]).

This entry, unless otherwise stated, focuses exclusively on IGOs. A final section, though, is devoted to INGOs. In the following two sections, brief overviews of the historical development of IGOs and the study of IGOs are provided. Subsequent sections examine in some depth three
aspects of IOs and institutions that have been particularly prominent in international relations (IR) research: Why are IOs established? What do they do? What impact do they have?

The IGO System: Patterns of Development

International cooperation has taken place as long as states have existed, but the first institution that met the conventional defining characteristics of an IGO was the Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine (CCNR), which was established in 1815. Another 4 decades would pass before the next IGO was established, for the river Donau. The Industrial Revolution and the increase in various forms of communication and transaction across borders led to a more rapid increase from the 1860s. Most of these organizations were established to solve well-defined coordination challenges. Examples include the International Telegraphic Bureau (later International Telegraphic Union), established in 1868; the General Postal Union (later Universal Postal Union), established in 1874; and the International Bureau of Weight and Measures, established in 1875. More than two thirds of the IGOs established before World War I dealt with technical coordination and/or economic activities. Since the end of World War II, growth has been higher for IGOs operating within social and cultural domains. The two world wars reduced the population of the IGOs to some extent, but the first decade or two following the peace settlements saw particularly high growth rates. As the total number of IGOs has increased, the average organization has become more specialized in functional terms and more narrow in terms of its membership base. According to Cheryl Shanks, Harold Jacobson, and Jeffery Kaplan (1996) the involvement in the activities of IGOs differs substantially: “Older” states tend to participate more than “young” ones, rich states more than poor, democracies more than authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, and large countries more than small.

Describing the development of the IGO “population” in numbers is a less straightforward task than one might think. The reason is simply that numbers depend on the precise definition applied. For example, some overviews include only organizations established directly by governments while others also include organizations created by one or more IGOs. The authoritative source is the Yearbook of International Organizations, which is published by the Union of International Associations. Table 1 is based on this database and applies this definition.

The total number of IGOs also includes organizations that are created by other IGOs. Shanks et al. (1996) found that these emanations constituted 70% of the total IGO population in the early 1990s, thus bringing the total number up to more than 1,100. The legal status of IGOs that are created by other IGOs is not very clear. New rules were defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations (VCLTIO), which opened for signature in 1986. At the time of writing, this convention is not yet in force. Questions about their legal status notwithstanding, there can be no doubt that this type of IGO also plays an important role in international relations.

The development of IGOs has been driven partly by changes in the fabric of the international system itself. Two aspects seem particularly important: (1) changes in networks of interdependence and (2) increase in the number of states.

In essence, cooperation is an effort to manage interdependence. The more sensitive or vulnerable one actor is to the activities of others, the stronger its incentives to try to influence their behavior. For

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cooperation to emerge, this interest must be mutual so that both (all) parties see some possibility of improving outcomes by exchanging commitments with prospective partners. Taken together, these observations suggest that the scope and level of cooperation will reflect the strength and configuration of interdependence relationships.

This is a complex hypothesis, and previous research provides only partial tests. In bivariate analysis, conventional measures of interdependence—such as volumes of international trade, investment, and several forms of communication—correlate positively with the number of IGOs. Results are, however, sensitive to the choice of operational definitions of the key variables. The best “fit” is achieved when we link interdependence measured in terms of absolute volumes of transactions to the total IGO population, including also emanations. However, the basic argument refers to sensitivity and vulnerability, and these are concepts pointing toward relative measures of interdependence. Thus, a country’s sensitivity to external economic events is primarily a function of the importance of foreign trade to its national income (measured as foreign trade in proportion to gross domestic product [GDP]). When we replace absolute with relative measures, we find that the population of IGOs has grown at a much higher rate than the level of interdependence. Moreover, the argument linking interdependence to organizations puts as much weight on configurations of interdependence as on aggregate volumes of transactions. A survey of the case study literature would bring out many observations that support—at least indirectly—the latter proposition. As far as we know, however, no existing database provides the kind of data required for more extensive and refined testing. The upshot of all this is that while we may safely conclude that interdependence is a major factor generating incentives (demand) for cooperation, we cannot claim to understand equally well supply-side mechanisms and the interactive dynamics of the demand–supply relationship.

As the first shots were fired in World War I, the number of sovereign states had not yet reached 50. Today, there are about 200 such states. This increase can be expected to lead to more IGOs for at least two reasons. First, as the number of states increases, the average state is left with jurisdiction over a declining share of the world population and world resources. This reduces its capacity to serve its people through purely unilateral measures. Second, as the number of actors increases, so does the number of potential partnerships. This effect is amplified by the fact that states that have recently escaped the rule of their former masters often are particularly eager to engage in cooperative ventures with new partners.

The development of the IGO system also seems to reflect changes in the fabric of national political systems as well. Two features seem particularly important. One is the expansion and upgrading of public policy in relatively “new” domains, such as social security and environmental protection. The other is the tendency for national administrative systems to become increasingly specialized and differentiated. The development of the IGO population, particularly over the second half of the 20th century, reflects both of these changes to a significant degree.

The Study of IGOs

In the first decade or two after World War II, the United Nations (UN) became a special case of IOs as its universal membership and increasing scope of competences made it appear more important than any other IO. Its uniqueness and importance attracted scholars to conduct a number of studies of the internal functions of the UN, such as the voting patterns in the General Assembly and the recruitment of staff to the Secretariat. Pioneers in this field such as Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson studied IOs as bureaucracies with the aim of understanding the decision-making and other political processes taking place within the IOs. This approach provided quite sophisticated classifications of structural and functional aspects and much empirical insight into the work of IOs. It did not to the same degree generate testable propositions linking these taxonomies to variance in performance or impact.

Disillusioned by external developments—the failure of the UN Security Council to deal with pressing issues such as the nuclear arms race and the Vietnam War and occasional setbacks in major regional integration projects—and left with a research program that did not effectively get at the underlying causes of these difficulties, many scholars reoriented their agenda to move away from IGO structures and procedures toward institutions that were defined as
sets of rules and norms governing certain activities. The existence of formal organizations was, of course, recognized, but international regimes—defined by Stephen Krasner as the rules, norms, principles, and procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area—emerged as a new and more exciting topic. The interest in international institutions was also driven by a growing critique of the dominant grand theory in the study of international relations: realism. The new emphasis on institutions challenged a core assumption of realism. It did so in part by claiming that states may establish international institutions even if short-term self-interest would be better served by free riding and that these institutions tend to acquire a life of their own by influencing state behavior in their own right. It also did so by suggesting that nonstate actors could significantly influence government policies and outcomes of international processes.

Over the past 10 years or so, there has been a renewed interest in the study of IOs. The constructivist turn of much IR research has inspired some reformulation of the research agenda, highlighting, inter alia, the role of IOs as providers and custodians of norms and rules serving as frames of legitimacy for the behavior of states as well as groups and individuals. It has also led some to revisit “old” questions. For example, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore have studied the bureaucratic features of IOs in a somewhat different framework and succeeded in providing new insight into the importance of these features in shaping international politics more broadly.

The split between the study of organization and the study of regimes, though, is by no means total. Many scholars see regimes and organizations as two subgroups of international institutions. Moreover, in real life, organizations and regimes are often intertwined. Starting from the regime tradition, one could say that regimes are often served by organizations; starting from the IO tradition, one could say that organizations often play important roles in developing and managing regimes.

Why and How Do States Establish IOs?

The institutional turn in studies of IOs made the study of international institutions an integral part of the study of international cooperation. International institutions can help states solve common problems through coordinated action. The realist tradition has always pointed to the anarchical structure of the international system as compelling states to be deeply concerned about security and (relative) power. The international system was described as a self-help system where states have to be very cautious about getting involved in cooperative ventures that could benefit others more than themselves. Moreover, they will expect others to free ride as long as they can get away with it. Institutional theory challenges this understanding by, inter alia, pointing to institutional “services” that can reduce uncertainty and help parties negotiate as well as enforce agreements. An IO can, for example, help establish a base of consensual knowledge, facilitate negotiations, and develop operational standards against which performance can be measured and compliance monitored.

Research following this functional approach, first developed by Robert Keohane, has explored how different configurations of preferences can shape outcomes. Much interest has been devoted to the malignant configuration known as the prisoners’ dilemma game. If played only once, or a finite number of rounds known in advance, the dominant strategy for each party will be to defect. Evidence from experimental research indicates that individuals playing this game tend to cooperate more than static game theory predicts. Moreover, Robert Axelrod and others have used computational modeling to study the evolution of cooperation in reiterated games and found that certain strategies of conditional cooperation do better than strategies relying more primarily on defection. By acknowledging the political malignancy of certain configurations of interests and at the same time demonstrating how regimes and organizations can inspire and facilitate cooperation, research pursuing the “functional” approach helped bridge the gap between the realist school and the institutionalists. The role of IOs tends, though, to vary with the problem structure. Fortunately, many of the common challenges facing governments generate less malignant configurations than that constituting the prisoners’ dilemma game.

The realist tradition claims, in essence, that powerful states will create institutions that serve their interests. IOs that contradict the interests of
powerful states will either not be established or, if they are, have little or no impact. The hegemonic stability theory suggests that a “hegemon” is essential for the establishment of strong international institutions and IOs. A dominant actor will have a higher interest in the collective good in question and at the same time possess the capabilities to provide (much of) that good by unilateral action. Now, power defined as the ability to get others to do what they would otherwise not have done can be exercised by various means. In the literature on international institutions, various forms of leadership have been discussed, such as structural leadership, where more general power resources are activated; intellectual leadership, where knowledge is activated in order to facilitate solutions to common problems; or entrepreneurial leadership, where the ability to identify solutions and find compromises is activated. All these various resources or abilities on behalf of individual actors can be important in establishing and maintaining international institutions.

Decision makers as well as students of international cooperation have long recognized that a base of consensual knowledge is a necessary condition for negotiations to succeed. The Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC)—a formal IGO—was established to translate findings from scientific research into usable knowledge for policymakers. The work of the IPCC also illustrates how political conflict can threaten to contaminate such processes and how a combination of organizational design and leadership may provide fairly good protection. More generally, cooperation often builds on a broadly accepted ideational foundation. IGOs and INGOs often play a role in disseminating causal and normative beliefs that shape the perceptions of international problems. In some cases, they may even contribute to the development of collective identities. Various mechanisms may be at work, but two examples are often in focus. First, an image of a common enemy might increase the actors’ perception of common interests and thus strengthen incentives for cooperation. Second, states engaged in cooperation might find themselves to be perceived as a model for others, an effect that might increase the self-confidence of the cooperating parties and lead to further cooperation. Even in the absence of such profound change, ideas can make a significant difference. Particular attention has been given to the role of transnational networks of experts—often referred to as “epistemic communities”—in developing common problem descriptions and diagnoses, combined with ideas about effective “cures.”

What Do IOs Do and How Do They Do It?
As pointed out at the beginning, IOs are created for some purpose—usually to achieve goals that their members find it hard to achieve (as effectively) on their own. More specifically, four roles have attracted particular attention.

One is the role of providing an arena for exchange of information, negotiation, and related processes. As an arena, an organization establishes a meeting place, specifies the activities to take place under its auspices, and provides rules regulating these activities. As arenas for exchange of information and ideas, IGOs, INGOs, and sometimes even informal networks often facilitate learning and other types of policy diffusion. Although IOs are not the only possible way to establish communication among parties, they have some characteristics that make them efficient in this respect. IOs have some degree of autonomy from the parties involved and can thus be seen as impartial. An IO serves as a place where the parties can meet on neutral ground for negotiations. A prominent example of this is how the secretary-general of the UN is assigned a role where he can offer conflicting parties the use of his “good offices.” In general, leaders of secretariats of IOs are often assigned the role of chairing international negotiations. This can imply a more active role than simply providing an arena for negotiations. The assumed impartiality and the expectation that secretariat leaders represent common interests of members make them suited for such assignments. The arena role of IOs makes it possible, at least to some extent, to regulate the access of actors to problems and the access of problems to decision games. And, finally, IOs serve as independent actors in specifying the official purpose as well as the rules, location, and timing of negotiations among the parties.

IOs not only serve as an arena for members to exchange information but also play an active role in providing information themselves. We can
distinguish between factual information about the world in general and about characteristics of the member countries, information about actors’ behavior, and information that elucidate causal connections—that is, the potential effects of the IO’s decisions. Many IOs serve as providers of all these kinds of information in their respective field. The importance of information is connected with the consequences of uncertainty in the relationship between states. Rational actors are assumed to behave purposively on the basis of the information available to them. Thus, the information actors possess about other actors’ interests can be a critical determinant of their own behavior. The more information the IOs provide, the less likely it is that there will be misperception and misunderstanding among the member states.

The second aspect is the role of the IOs in creating decision-making rules that affect the subsequent outcome of the interaction of members or other actors. The formation of actors’ interests is influenced by various constraints, which will be dealt with in the subsection on framing of decisions below. Here, the focus is on how actors’ behaviors that enable them to realize given interests are influenced by constraints caused by decision rules. The decision rule is an important determinant of the capacity of the IO to aggregate divergent preferences. Other things being equal, aggregation capacity reaches its maximum in strictly hierarchical structures and is at its minimum in systems requiring agreement (unanimity). Decision rules in IGOS are affected by the anarchic structure of the international system and accompanying principle of the sovereignty of states. Since there is no formal authority that can enforce decisions, states are only committed to decisions they agree to. Thus, compared with lawmaking in national political systems, the role of international law in general is weak. Consensus is the most common decision-making rule in actual use in IGOS. It is also a very demanding decision rule, leaving the burden of proof with those who want new measures taken and giving a veto to any significant party that is opposed. The majority-voting rule produces more ambitious decisions, but it does so at the risk of more defection in the implementation stage.

In most IGOS, formal decision rules tend to favor small member states. This is most evident where unanimity or consensus is required and also where decisions are made by voting based on the principle of one state, one vote (e.g., the UN General Assembly). Even where votes are weighted, the small will most often be overrepresented. In the EU Council, for example, votes are distributed so that 1 citizen of Luxembourg balances about 24 citizens of Germany. Now, Germany’s voting power still trumps that of Luxembourg by a wide margin (29 to 4), and Germany leads by an even larger margin when it comes to power in basic games such as trade and investment. Moreover, if we look at the total population of IGOS, we will find that rich countries participate more than poor, large more than small, democratic states more than authoritarian, and old states more than young. In this respect, the IGO system reflects the social stratification of world society. Although originally made in a different context, Stein Rokkan’s well-known observation that “votes count but resources decide” carries an important lesson about IGO politics as well.

The decision rule also influences the relationship between the IO and major powers. Unanimity is likely to produce compliance at a low cost, since the decisions will be self-enforcing compared with a situation where major powers would have to enforce the decision made in the IO. Although the formal decision rule is unanimity, the actual decision making in several IGOS is of course influenced by the distribution of power among the members outside the IO. For instance, in the case of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), large producers such as Saudi Arabia can easily undermine most production decisions of the organization by unilateral market behavior. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia enjoys a stronger influence on OPEC decision than what follows from the one country one vote rule.

IOs are essential for creating rules and regulations for states’ behavior in the international system. Sovereign states would be very reluctant to submit themselves to behavior rules if nobody else made similar commitments. When treaties or conventions are negotiated, they are normally subject to subsequent ratification by member states. When a certain number of states have ratified the treaty, it enters into force. This system ensures that the individual state that signs the treaty is only committed when a number of others join. IOs provide an efficient way to promote such
conditional cooperation among states in an anarchical system.

The third aspect is the role of IOs in establishing a common perception of problems and solutions. Decision making through negotiations among parties is heavily influenced by the way in which the actors think about their problem. The variation among parties in their perception of the situation, beliefs about their own and others’ interests, and cognition of the world in general makes it harder to reach common solutions. In the short run, self-interested actors are influenced by constraints imposed on policy choices by agreed-on rules. In the long run, conceptions of self-interest may be reshaped as a result, in part, of practices engaged in over a period of time. An IO can influence the actors’ perceptions of the situation surrounding their decisions; in other words, the organization can frame member states’ decisions. International institutions can also play a role in the formation of interests and collective identity among members. An important premise for this aspect is the assumption that states’ interests are not exogenously given but are endogenous to interaction among states.

Increased cooperative behavior might come about as a result of several different processes of identity formation performed by the IOs. First, there can be various intersubjective systemic structures consisting of shared understandings, expectations, and social knowledge embedded in international institutions, in terms of which states define their identities and interests. Second, there are systemic processes in the external context of state action that lead to increased interdependence and also imply both an increase in the “dynamic density” of interactions and the emergence of a “common Other.” This reduces states’ ability to act unilaterally and increases the extent to which actors share a common fate and, thus, their willingness to form international institutions. Third, strategic behavioral practice has two effects on identities and interests: Through interaction, actors form identities by learning, which makes them see themselves as others do, and by engaging in cooperative behavior, an actor gradually changes its own beliefs about what it is, thus helping internalize the new identity.

The fourth aspect is the role of IOs in performing politics on behalf of its members. Volker Rittberger and Berhard Zangl identify five types of IO operations: First, norms and rules usually require further specification and codification to be implemented in practice. This is often done by the member states that have the potential for various interpretations of the practical consequences of the rules and regulations. In several cases, the IO takes responsibility for specifying the rules agreed to by the members. In the EU, this is a task often handled by the EU Commission, and in the World Bank, detailed plans for conditionality of various funds are left in the hands of the World Bank bureaucracy. Second, in a number of areas, the implementation of IO decisions is simply carried out by the IO itself. Several special agencies of the UN are entirely devoted to this kind of operative tasks, particularly in the field of economics and sociology, such as humanitarian relief and development aid, but also in security affairs, when the UN deploys peacekeeping forces. Third, when members themselves implement decisions, the need for independent monitoring arises, particularly to verify accusations of members’ defection. Only with a reliable system of monitoring the other parties will the individual members implement their own commitments. This also has a positive feedback on their willingness to make credible commitments in the first place. In case of disagreement among members regarding their compliance, the IO can also perform a role in adjudication. Fourth, if monitoring and adjudication do not make members abide by the rules, sanctions will have to be imposed. These can take the form of verbal or written condemnation, economic sanctions, or the use of force. In many cases, it is the member states that have to exercise the sanctions, but in some cases, the IOs themselves can perform some of the sanctioning acts.

**Measuring and Explaining Effects**

The importance of IGOs has long been a matter of some controversy in the study of international relations. Realists have consistently argued that IGOs reflect rather than shape configurations of state interests and power and therefore merit attention primarily as tools rather than actors. The fortune of an organization—and ultimately its survival—depends on the extent to which powerful members see it as serving their interests. A somewhat similar argument has been made by scholars inspired by Marxist notions of class conflict. Others, adopting what is often referred to as a
sociological approach, have argued that IOs and regimes can best be understood as embedded in, and in important respects also constituted by, normative “deep structures” of international society. A common denominator for all these lines of reasoning is the proposition that IOs grow out of, and therefore also reflect, some more fundamental and important structure of the international political system or international society. In the aggregate, and over the long haul, they may modify or reinforce the structures in which they are embedded, but overall, IOs can best be understood as “intervening” variables, reflecting at least as much as shaping the international system. Some organizations will be actively involved in international political processes, but few will, by their own weight, leave a distinct and significant imprint on important outcomes.

This pessimistic conclusion has been challenged by scholars working within an institutionalist framework. Grossly simplified, the essence of their arguments may be summarized as follows. First, for an IGO to serve as a useful tool (“agent”), it will need some amount of independence from its “principals.” Rational principals understand this and will therefore grant that much autonomy. Second, even without the approval of its principals, an agent—for example, an international secretariat—will often succeed in obtaining some “slack.” This slack is likely to be largest for secretariats that work for a politically homogeneous group of members and that have been able to build up substantial expertise or possess other relevant resources. Moreover, an agent is likely to develop its own interpretation of its mission and base its behavior on that interpretation as long as it is not explicitly overruled. Third, over time, most organizations and regimes establish rules and develop practices into which participants—also representatives of member countries—will to some degree be enmeshed and socialized. As these structures and practices mature, they often acquire the status of default options or standard operating procedures.

Despite occasional skirmishes, a fairly broad consensus has emerged that there is at least some merit in all these propositions. A closer scrutiny will show that they, to some extent, refer to different dependent variables, different policy domains, or different causal mechanisms. The realist argument focuses on individual IGOs as actors in “high politics” and measures importance mainly in terms of the extent to which they influence state interests, the distribution of power, or the basic ordering principle of the international political system (anarchy). By this standard, the vast majority of IGOs do indeed obtain a low score, particularly when compared with the great powers that occupy center stage in (neo)realist theory. The so-called functionalist theory focuses on the role of IGOs in managing networks of international interdependence. Growing interdependence is seen as involving increasing sensitivity and vulnerability, which generates new demands for coordination and collaboration—first within “low-politics” domains such as trade and investment, transport and communication, labor market regulations, and health and environment. The IGOs are established and designed to supply coordination services and facilitate collaboration. To the extent that they perform these functions effectively, organizations contribute to further development of interdependence networks, which in turn may generate new demands for IGO services—in part, by changing domestic configurations of interests and influence.

Early functionalist theory sent an upbeat message that this dynamic interaction of demand and supply would eventually lead to the build-up of supranational systems of governance. Empirical evidence and refinement of causal models soon showed that there is nothing compelling about that trajectory; in fact, interactive feedback loops similar to those that generate momentum can also lead to cascading collapse. This does not imply that the basic mechanisms highlighted by (neo-)functionalist theory are not at work; rather, the main lesson seems to be that we are dealing with more complex systems, involving nonlinear relationships, conditional effects, and interplay. Finally, the sociological approach calls attention to IGOs and INGOs as arenas for, and facilitators of, socialization and transnational diffusion of ideas and norms. Most studies examine the role of particular organizations in legitimizing or spreading a more or less well-defined set of ideas, but some take on the demanding challenge of determining the aggregate effect of the universe of organizations on complex macrolevel variables, such as world culture.

The best way to make sense of such diversity is to sort answers and propositions by the questions to which they refer. With a wide range of research
interests, this exercise will generate a fairly complex matrix. All we can offer here is a selective and brief overview, focusing on some of the effects that have been subject to extensive study. Although not explicitly used in much of the empirical literature, the distinction introduced earlier between organizations as arenas and organizations as actors may serve as a crude organizing device.

As pointed out in the previous section, IOs can serve as arenas for exchange of information and ideas between member states. Several studies indicate that organizations often enhance policy convergence even in the absence of formal agreement by exposing members to new information and ideas that lead to unilateral adjustments. Others find that individuals who participate actively in the work of an organization over an extended period of time tend to develop a stronger identification with the organization itself and its mission, norms, and values. The strength of this socialization function seems, though, to be moderate. A recent study found that even in a relatively powerful and prestigious bureaucracy (the European Commission), 39% of the staff members interviewed saw themselves as “very attached” to their own nation, while only 25% said the same about Europe. Moreover, socialization seems to leave the greatest impact on staff members recruited to the organization at an early and formative stage of their career before some other identity has been firmly established.

Research aimed at determining the importance of IGOs as actors has pursued two main strategies. One has focused on the capacity to act. Capacity has been defined in somewhat different terms, but most definitions point to at least two components—autonomy and resources. The interest in autonomy is premised on the assumption that independence from member states and other actors is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for influence. Autonomy is sometimes measured in terms of organizational properties such as decision-making procedures, the existence of a supranational bureaucracy, and the existence of some binding dispute settlement mechanism. One study combines these indicators in a 7-point ordinal scale and applies this index to a sample of 30 regional integration “arrangements.” Of their cases, 67% fall within the lower range (0–2) and only 17% within the upper range (4–6). Consistent with functionalist logic, economic interdependence has a positive and significant effect on the autonomy of IGOs. Consistent with institutionalist arguments, IGOs tend to become more independent as they mature over time. Other studies measure autonomy in behavioral terms, in most cases by studying the role(s) played by specific bodies, in particular the secretariat. The most comprehensive study of international environmental regimes found that secretariats have little or no independence in 41% of the cases included. Another study reported that secretariats are confined to functions of office keeping, and information gathering and dissemination in nearly 60% of the cases included in their database. The main conclusion seems to be that a large majority of IGOs obtain a low or, at best, moderate score on structural as well as behavioral indicators of autonomy.

A survey of the resources of IGOs would show a very wide range of variance; the European Union (EU) and the International Whaling Commission clearly play in very different “leagues.” And they do so by resource endowments as well as constitutional design.

The other approach is more direct, trying to determine the actual influence of one or more IGOs on particular processes or outcomes. Much of this literature focuses on one or a few cases, most often one of the large and presumably important organizations (such as the UN, the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], or World Trade Organization [WTO]). A survey of this literature will first of all confirm that IGOs vary substantially in terms of what they achieve as well as how they operate. It will, however, also indicate certain patterns; for example, influence seems to vary with constitutional provisions, resource endowments, and “positive” interdependence among member states. It also provides interesting insights into the roles played by specific bodies or individual leaders. For example, secretariats can exert influence by performing quite different functions—ranging from contributions to the development of a base of consensual knowledge to high-profile political initiatives. The former do not make headlines but may over the long haul be as important. Even a “technical bureaucracy” can make a nontrivial difference by facilitating negotiations or monitoring performance.

The case study literature is rich in interesting observations and important insights, but most
refer to one or a few specific organizations or issues. Over the past 2 decades, an increasing number of studies have used large databases that provide a more solid basis for general conclusions. Many of these studies have examined the role of IGOs in managing conflict and fostering or maintaining peace. Findings sometimes diverge, but one may at least conclude that IGOs sometimes contribute significantly. Thus, one study, relying on data covering the period 1946 to 2000, found IGOs to be more successful than any other type of third party in mediating negotiated settlement of military disputes. While this study and several others concentrate on specific functions (such as mediation), others take a broader view and try to determine the overall contribution of IGOs to building or maintaining peace. Much of this research is inspired by Immanuel Kant’s vision of “eternal peace,” which identified three pillars, today often referred to as democracy, interdependence, and international law and organization. Overall, the findings from previous research support the propositions that democracy and interdependence are positively associated with peace, but results for IGOs vary—some are, in fact, negative. This has led some scholars to suggest that only certain types of IGOs enhance peace—notably, those that are composed largely of democratic states. A study published in 2006 finds robust support for this revised hypothesis. This finding points to a more conditional and less independent role for IGOs in fostering and maintaining peace; the main mechanism at work seems to be one of interplay in which “densely democratic” IGOs serve to amplify the positive impact of member state democracy.

Other studies indicate that there are more mechanisms at work linking IGOs to democratic political systems. States in transition to democracy tend to join IGOs at higher rates than any other group of states. Moreover, democratizing states show a strong preference for IGOs in which most other members are established democracies. Third, it seems that membership and active participation in such organizations tend to reduce the risk of backsliding. All this suggests that IGOs composed largely of established democracies can play a significant role in helping consolidate new and fragile democratic systems. And since relations among democracies are the most peaceful, contributions to consolidating new democratic systems can have a positive, albeit marginal, and indirect effect on world peace. The EU is probably the most well-known example, but the basic proposition is supported also by large-N studies, indicating that there is a more general effect.

The research literature is less sanguine about the effect on established democracies of active involvement in the activities of IGOs. Several studies indicate that IGOs sometimes operate in ways that tend to enhance the influence of the executive branch, privilege technical and, in some cases, “scientific” expertise, and in other ways remove decision-making processes from arenas where the ordinary citizen can play an active role. Other studies have found that these effects are at least to some extent offset by other democracy-enhancing features, such as constraints on the power of domestic special interest groups and protection of individual rights. The latter effects seem to be most evident for countries that do not (yet) achieve top scores on democracy scales.

**International Nongovernmental Organizations**

This entry has so far focused on IGOs. Much of the cooperation that takes place across borders is, however, initiated and conducted by individuals, voluntary associations, or other nongovernmental actors. Civil society seems as involved in cooperative projects with partners in other countries. To develop and manage such areas of cooperation, they often establish international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), or transnational organizations (TNOs). The UN Economic and Social Council (UNECOSOC) considers all organizations that are not established through formal agreement between or among governments as nongovernmental. Most of the research literature has adopted a more narrow definition requiring that a majority of the members be private parties. Today, INGOs outnumber IGOs by a wide margin, and the growth rate is higher in the nongovernmental sphere. To be sure, most INGOs have small budgets, limited staff, and little or no political influence. But others are impressive organizational complexes. The Catholic Church counts more than a billion “members.” Several humanitarian organizations have billion-euro budgets and thousands of employees. Taken together, the 200
largest transnational companies account for about one fourth of the world production of commercial goods and services. In multiple ways, TNOs can indeed be important actors.

In international relations research, INGOs have been studied particularly in their performance of three different functions. One is that of managing activities that most governments do not consider public policy domains. For example, while governments accept overall responsibility for law and order, few, if any, see this responsibility as involving a duty to establish and enforce internal rules for particular sports or proclaim and interpret principles of religious faith. Within the arena of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), most governments would see the production and distribution of private goods as activities to be undertaken mainly by the private sector (albeit subject to public regulation). Another function performed by many INGOs is that of advocacy, including activities ranging from high-publicity campaigns to confidential lobbying. Third, some INGOs engage in activities for which most governments accept at least some responsibility. Most important is the area of humanitarian assistance, but INGOs are involved also in what might be called private regulation—most often in the form of standard setting, “enforced” by mobilizing the market power of concerned customers or through public naming-and-shaming campaigns.

Although often studied as different from IGOs, important propositions from research focusing on IGOs apply also to INGOs. Both merit attention as arenas as well as actors. Patterns of growth are strongly correlated (about .80, depending on the exact specification of the model). So are patterns of participation; in fact, INGOs tend to be even more dominated by wealthy and liberal democracies. For both types of organizations, autonomy, resources, and leadership are important determinants of influence. And although INGOs often make headlines by criticizing or opposing governments, relationships are often friendly and supportive. Thus, for many humanitarian organizations, grants from governments and IGOs constitute important sources of income. And in many campaigns, INGOs, governments, and IGOs work side by side—for as well as against a particular cause.

Social science research often portrays (l)NGOs rooted in civil society as, overall, a positive transformative force. At least three more specific propositions to that effect can be found in the research literature. One suggests that TNOs by and large tend to have more democratic internal structures and procedures than their IGO counterparts, providing individual members better opportunities for active participation and real influence. This observation is no doubt true for a number of INGOs, though not for all. The aggregate effect will, however, depend also on who exactly are empowered through these organizations. Even an organization with a perfectly democratic internal structure may speak for only a small fragment of civil society. And as far as it can be determined, the social stratification of world society is reflected as clearly in the nongovernmental sphere as within the IGO system. A second proposition sees transnational cooperation as a worldwide mobilization of concerned citizens in defense of universal values (such as basic human rights) or profoundly important collective goods (such as nature’s life support systems). Again, it is easy to identify a number of INGOs that fit this description well. Yet if one looks at aggregate figures, one will also find that the largest group of TNOs consists of those that are established to serve interests related to economic activities. Finally, some scholars, notably John Boli and George Thomas, have suggested that organized transnational cooperation serves, in the aggregate, as a transformative force shaping a new world culture characterized by more inclusive identities (“world citizen”) and widespread acceptance of reason and voluntarism as fundamental pillars of authority. This is a bold and interesting hypothesis, but at this point, it seems prudent to postpone judgment until more comprehensive and solid evidence becomes available.

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See also Constructivism in International Relations; Cooperation; Governance, Global; International Law; International Regimes; International Relations, Theory; Neoliberal Institutionalism; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Realism in International Relations
Further Readings

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

The field of international political economy (IPE) requires two definitions since it is both a subject, a field of study, and an object, a thing to study. Defining IPE as a thing to study, as an object, is quite straightforward. It refers to the global or international distribution of power, wealth, and prestige among state and nonstate actors. IPE as a field of study, as a subject, in contrast, has at least two different histories and as such requires a more complex explication.

This entry traces the evolution of these twin histories of IPE. The first history pertains to the so-called American school of IPE that emerged during the early to mid-1970s in the context of the oil crises and breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. The second history pertains to the contrasting British school of IPE that has altogether different origins. Rather than forming one body of knowledge, these two schools have developed distinct research trajectories, agendas, and methodological orientations. IPE as a field of study is therefore plural.

In brief, the American school has, over time, become an increasingly analytically coherent and methodologically homogeneous body of scholarship. It emerged during the mid-1970s to analyze a purported crisis of U.S. hegemony and then evolved into a particular set of arguments concerning the importance of institutions, credibility, contracts, and commitment in IPE. The British school has, in contrast, blossomed into a multidisciplinary exercise that is both methodologically plural and decidedly lacking in defined boundaries. The British school began long before the 1970s and has drawn on the contributions of historians, economists, journalists, and geographers. Recently, both schools have had to accommodate still other bodies of scholarship with a claim to be IPE. Contemporary IPE is at the very least, plural.

The Development of American IPE

The Cold War and Political Science

Foundations of American IPE

What makes the contrast between the American and British schools of IPE salient is the relationship of American IPE to its parent discipline of political science and the politics of the Cold War, a relationship that does not exist in the UK or elsewhere. American political science has only relatively recently come to embrace political economy as a distinct approach concerned with the core question of distribution. After World War II, American political science was behavioralist and functionalist in its orientation. Its behaviorism developed as a result of the focus of political science after pre–World War II on the formal institutions of society—constitutions and the like. Since this focus failed to anticipate the collapse of interwar democracy in Germany and the emergence of fascism, the
lesson learned was to focus on actor behavior, not constitutional form. Second, the United States emerged from World War II as a superpower intimately concerned with the relationship between knowledge and national security—hence the focus of early postwar American political science on policy-relevant scientific knowledge.

While behavioralism dominated the study of American politics, the study of the societies outside the Western core demanded a different analysis. The thrust of these “modernization” arguments was to extend the teleological logic of Talcott Parsons’s functionalism to the developmental trajectories of the non-Western world, which was expected to develop in a sequence like that already undergone by the West, especially the United States.

American political science in its moment of refounding the Cold War developed a fourfold division of the field where American politics analyzed the putative end of history for all developing states—the American present; comparative politics analyzed current real-world deviations from that trend and thus how far other countries had to travel to get to that end; international relations situated these processes in the bipolar structure of the Cold War; and political theory, the fourth subfield, kept the Marxists out and the liberals in.

As a consequence, in the early years of the Cold War, the structure of political science in America left very little room for political economy, international or not. In part, because it smacked of Marxism, but also because the move toward ever greater formalism in its sister discipline of economics in this period that depoliticized the subject in another way, IPE as “a way of thinking” had to wait for events to make room for (international) political economy to come back to political science.

That moment arrived in the 1970s when the developed world underwent its first major recession while the experience of the United States in Vietnam tempered belief in its ability to command the world. Stagflation, oil shocks, unemployment, and low growth, coming on the heels of civil right rebellions at home and revolutions abroad, shook the self-confidence of American political science. In this moment of crisis, a few American political scientists began to argue that the separation of politics and markets, especially the sideling of questions of distribution in international relations and economics, was perhaps part of the problem. It was in this context that the American school of IPE emerged. Where economics retreated, political scientists began to ask a series of questions that would define what IPE (as a subject) was and what it should investigate (as an object) for the next decade and a half; a distinct IPE then began to take shape.

Orienting Issues and Questions of American IPE

The first concern of these theorists was the notion that the United States was in decline. With the U.S. growth rate slowing, its industrial base shrinking, and its deficits rising, Europe and Japan seemed to be in the ascendance, while the United States was falling by the wayside. Yet if the United States was in decline, how could global order be provided in an environment of multiple players, all with different interests? Moreover, if the United States no longer set the terms for the other players in the system, which states would prosper and which would fail in this new world?

Taking up these concerns were scholars such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, whose idea of “complex interdependence” challenged traditional realist notions of state interests and state action. Keohane and Nye argued that as the problems faced by states became more complex and less amenable to unilateral solutions, so the focus of scholars had to be shifted outward from the traditional “high politics” of international relations (qua security politics) to the political economy politics of, for example, trade protectionism and economic development. Such a stance argued for attention to the complexity of ties that bind states and a focus on how markets are important predicates of, as well as arenas for, state action. Such a stance was not without its realist critics to be sure, but this intervention made possible a broader opening of the agenda of American political science to questions of economic governance and distribution; it made room for IPE in the United States.

When complex interdependence was juxtaposed with the question of the decline of the United States, the result was a set of theories called hegemonic stability theory (HST). What animated this scholarship was, in large part, a particular reading of the monetary history of the 20th century inspired by the work of Charles Kindleberger.
Kindleberger’s key idea was that a single stabilizer was needed to stabilize the world economy. Drawing this conclusion from a study of the monetary relations of the interwar period, he developed a theory of hegemonic transition that spoke directly to U.S. declinist fears.

**From Hegemonic Stability to Regimes**

The basic story of HST was that following World War I, the United Kingdom (UK)—once the world’s biggest market, banker, and power—emerged severely weakened. While willing to assume the burdens of leadership—that is, act as a lender of last resort, provide a market for distressed goods, and lend countercyclically to promote stability—the UK was simply unable to do so given its diminished capabilities. The United States on the other hand was able to do the same by the 1920s, but it was, because of its domestic politics, unwilling to do so. Lacking such leadership, trade collapsed, nationalism followed, and the turmoil of the 1930s and 1940s ensued. Could the same thing happen again now that the United States was in decline—especially when, unlike the last time, there was no obvious candidate to replace it?

The theoretical lesson drawn from Kindleberger’s analysis rested on a classic public goods undersupply argument: a single, large hegemonic state being the only type of state able and willing to take on the cost of providing the public good of financial order because the majority of benefits flowed to itself. Smaller states may benefit from such order, but they have an incentive to free ride in terms of its provision. As such, “no hegemon, no order, big problem” became the lesson American IPE drew from Kindleberger, but it could have been worse.

Taking their cue from the same scholarship, but framing it with a realist analysis, scholars such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Gilpin paid attention to the costs and benefits of being the hegemon and suggested that when costs rise and benefits fall in the hegemonic state, with more nimble “challenger states” rising more quickly and seeking to change the distribution of benefits in the system, the result was usually a hegemonic war. The future then, according to this emergent school of American IPE, was bleak if the United States really was in decline.

So how does one save the system from itself in the absence of a hegemon? American IPE scholars, seeking this answer, began to investigate how system governance could be provided in the absence of a hegemon. One solution quickly became dominant: the provision of global public goods either by a limited number of key actors or through the “demand” for “regimes” that could act as functional fillers for systemic governance. This body of work, which became known as regime theory, and later as the turn to the study of international institutions, was a direct consequence of the attempt to puzzle a way through the predicaments of HST.

**From Regimes to Institutions and Compliance**

For much of IPE, given the purported centrality of a hegemon for stability, cooperation in the face of free riding became a core problem to be explained. Regime theory seemingly offered a way out. The basic idea behind regime theory was that where unilateral state action fails, coordinated action through issue-specific regimes—principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures to promote the convergence of expectations—might work. By giving a focal point to such expectations and by reducing uncertainty and transaction costs, cooperation between states (in terms of mutual policy adjustment) may become easier by acting through regimes. As such, regimes were seen as issue-specific informational networks that intervened between interests and outcomes, providing stability in the face of hegemonic decline.

Where regimes came from was, however, another issue. The very public goods undersupply argument that drove HST also haunted regime theory. One could appeal to state interests to supply regimes to be sure, but by the logic of HST, such supply should decline over time as hegemonic state capabilities waned. Moreover, why should states comply with regime dictates?

One set of theories that “solved” this puzzle by virtue of the rationalist logic it employed was the literature that developed out of regime theory in the early 1990s and that went on to become the mainstay of contemporary American IPE research: the literature on international institutions. Following a game-theoretic logic, these theorists argued that self-interested states would comply with regimes to the extent that doing so lengthened the “shadow of the future” for cooperation, thus lessening the present discounted pay-off to free riding in the present.
As such, cooperation via institutions becomes a Nash equilibrium (self-reinforcing) strategy.

Building on this insight, American scholars working in this tradition have highlighted how uncertainty about the future forms a barrier to cooperation. Consequently, what international institutions (G20 meetings, the Basel Agreements, etc.) do is reduce the opacity of the system through the provision of information, which lowers uncertainty and increases the possibility of cooperation and the density of ties, thus making side payments and monitoring possible, thus furthering cooperation still more. Rules thereby act not as limits to state action that states would resist but as resources that allow states to credibly commit to each other, thus lengthening the shadow of the future further.

This move beyond the impasse of regime theory and HST defines the main thrust of American IPE scholarship today. A focus on rules (legalization) and how they are related to bargaining positions, enforcement costs, and credibility have become the touchstones of contemporary analysis across a huge number of issue areas. From questions of institutional design to a generalized use of open-economy macroeconomics as the basic framework for contemporary work harnessed to microeconomic logics and statistical techniques, American IPE has narrowed in its methodological orientation, developing a preference for analytic rigor and theoretical coherence over traditional "big questions" such as America's decline or, contemporaneously, the rise of China. It remains, however, at least in the opinion of its protagonists, the very definition of what IPE is. Regardless of what other practitioners in other places happen to think they are doing, the rationalist study of institutions, bargaining, and commitment is IPE, "American style."

**The Other American School(s)**

Yet not all American IPE scholars fit so easily into this particular representation of IPE. Realist analyses have hardly given up the field. Work by David Andrews and Jonathan Kirshner on the relationship between power and money in IPE stresses realism's continuing relevance. Similarly, as Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons contend, there is also a rich vein of constructivist scholarship within American IPE that deals with issues that are seemingly "off the radar" of mainstream rationalist work. For example, how nationalist and neoliberal ideologies affect state behavior, choice of currency regimes, and even the behavior of international organizations has become grist to this constructivist mill.

Most important in generating this other strand of American IPE has been the existence of the Cornell Series in Political Economy as a publication outlet and the pioneering work of Peter Katzenstein, the editor of this series. If scholars such as Keohane and Krasner were instrumental in giving voice to the mainstream of American IPE, Katzenstein's contribution was critical in opening up space for this "other" American scholarship.

Katzenstein's work has always evidenced a strong concern with the interaction of domestic structures and IPE. However, rather than reducing these factors to a study of legislatures, coalitions, and bargaining, as do most mainstream American IPE scholars, Katzenstein developed an understanding of the role of states in IPE that drew on more historical institutionalist understandings of politics. This different approach to what IPE is, in combination with the focus of the Cornell Series on cognitive and ideational factors as explanatory variables, opened the door for American scholars who do not sit so easily in the mainstream of U.S. IPE research. In sum, while it is often lambasted as narrow and insular, American IPE contains within it more diversity than its protagonists often admit.

**The Development of British IPE**

**Origins of British IPE**

Britain may have also fought the Cold War, but the Cold War did not define its scholarship as it did in the United States. Moreover, skepticism regarding the scientific pretentions of the study of politics runs deep in the UK—hence, in part, its innate methodological pluralism and analytic eclecticism. But what is of critical significance here in understanding British IPE's different orientations are two factors: (1) the failure of British political science to replicate the "four-field" structure of American political science and (2) the very different history of economic and political decline in the UK.

First of all, according to Ben Clift and Ben Rosamond, while the events of the 1970s may have provided the intellectual opening for American IPE, this moment does not mark the critical opening for
IPE scholars in the UK, since British IPE has a far longer lineage than can be ascribed to the economic dislocations of the early 1970s. Second, there never has been a “parent discipline” for British IPE; it has always been a multidisciplinary exercise. British political science neither saw itself as the end of the developmental telos nor sought to “keep the Marxists out.” Nor was there any necessary connection to international relations theory in political science.

These differences are themselves explained by the four “drivers” of the British school of IPE. First, there is a long tradition of scholarship that deals with the political economy of British imperialism, which has given much of British social science a particular historicist cast. Second, there is the postwar literature on decolonization and the global role of sterling in that period, which is IPE in all but overt self-identification. Third, there is the enormous literature on the UK’s own economic decline, especially the international determinants thereof, which makes the boundary cast in the United States between IPE and comparative political economy much more permeable in the UK. Fourth, there has been a continuing concern with the centrality of the state in both domestic and international economic relations.

As a result of these very different lineages of scholarship, for Rosamond and Clift, the main question has less to do with problems such as the domestic preference formation of states rather than the degree to which the historical resolution of social and economic struggles have become inscribed on the state and predispose it to certain types of action. This view of British IPE gives us an understanding of not just how but why British IPE differs from its American namesake.

In short, lacking the concerns that animated American scholarship and grappling with its own particulars, British IPE has become more historically focused and more open to a variety of perspectives than its American counterpart. It has as its point of departure a basic skepticism of the worldviews that underlie American IPE and the models of cognition and causation that they enshrine. It has never been a subfield of political science, nor is it particularly beholden to political science as a field. IPE in the UK exists in departments of politics, sociology, geography, and anthropology. If American IPE is a subfield of political science, British IPE can (almost) lay claim to being a field of the social sciences in its own right, or at least a reinvention thereof focused on questions of global distribution and power.

**The Other Transatlantic Bridge**

As well as different material drivers, British IPE has a different set of intellectual progenitors that go beyond the confines of Britain itself but do not include the United States. As Randell Germain has argued, the legacy of the Canadian scholar Robert Cox looms large in this regard. The difference that Cox made was that due to his influence, while historical materialist approaches were marginalized in the United States, in Canada, such “critical” perspectives were constitutive of a very different type of mainstream of research. As such, there was a transatlantic bridge for IPE, but it ran from Canada to the UK and bypassed the United States.

In the UK itself, Benjamin Cohen highlights the influence of Susan Strange as the main protagonist for the development of a British version of IPE. Rather than simply focus on the power structure, as American realists are wont to do, or focus on the informational environment, as American neo-liberals are fond of doing, Strange developed a more nuanced conception of power that operated through global knowledge and production as well as military and financial structures. This view of power was relational as well as material, and it paid close attention to the ideological. Strange also stressed the importance of finance for understanding IPE and competition between different global authorities, including private authorities, as key aspects of global governance. She took seriously the notion of IPE as an “open range” where a plethora of approaches should coexist, and in doing so, she anticipated much of what British IPE scholars were to produce over the next 2 decades.

Taken together then, Cox, Strange, and the very different political and institutional legacies of British development and decline gave rise to a distinct and different British school of IPE. This school was not simply a reaction to, or a rejection of, American IPE. Rather, it was a school of thought that had set up its own stall and carried on as if the Americans didn’t really exist. The result has been a research community animated by an entirely different set of concerns. This is demonstrated by comparing the
publication themes of the two schools in their respective American and British journals.

Comparing American and British IPE

Taking the U.S.-based journal *International Studies Quarterly* (*ISQ*) as representative of American IPE beyond the rationalist mainstream and the British journal *New Political Economy* (*NPE*) as representative of British IPE yields the following comparisons. Of the 372 articles published in *ISQ* over the period 1997 to 2008, 31% were identifiable as “liberal approaches,” 17% were “realist,” 9% were “mixed,” and the rest were scattered across the categories of constructivism, feminism, poststructuralism, and neo-Marxism, which hardly suggests a disciplinary monotheism. Since American IPE exists as a part of political science, it is not really surprising when the biggest single category that emerges from the *ISQ* sample is “questions directly related to existing debates in IR theory,” while the second is “security studies,” Cohen’s (2008) twin cores of U.S. international relations (IR) theory.

Repeating this exercise for *NPE* gives quite different results. Few, if any, of the contributions to *NPE* speak of the core issues of IR theory. Instead, they cluster around three topic areas: (1) the evolution of advanced capitalist states (17%), (2) development (17%), and (3) globalization (14%). The remainder are similarly scattered among various topic areas. Many of *NPE*’s articles would sit well in journals such as *Comparative Studies in International Development*. Given this, what do British scholars publish and research under these rubrics that is so different from the work of American scholars? Several areas stand out in contemporary British IPE that are largely absent in American IPE: a concern with ontology and philosophical foundations, a focus on normative concerns and ethics, critiques of finance capitalism and globalization, and historical materialist, Gramscian poststructuralist, feminist, and “everyday” IPE.

The “Critical” Concerns of British IPE

Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan put it well when they argue that the differences between American and British IPE can be summed up in the quip that in the American school “data and observation are so unproblematic we can accept them as real,” while in the British school “data and observation are so problematic that we can dispense with them altogether” (2009, p. 123). However, for the British school, data derive from methods, and prior to methodological choices lie ontological, epistemological, and general philosophical concerns.

Lacking the scientism of their American peers and embracing Cox’s injunction that the point of theory is critique, British IPE views the role of IPE as taking the measure of the world rather than simply measuring it: to judge and to evaluate, to be a “critical” body of theory. Doing so necessarily breaks the distinction between positive and normative theory that American IPE relies on and instead opens up British IPE to questions of legitimacy and ethics.

For example, although American IPE scholars have certainly been active in the area of understanding international finance, British scholars have been far more critical in their examination of international finance. From Strange’s *Mad Money* (1998) to Paul Langley’s concern with the construction of the “ethical investor,” British writing on finance has developed a far more critical view of finance in IPE.

Pushing this critical edge still further are the various Marxist scholars who form an important part of British IPE—a species almost extinct in the United States. Building on the legacy of Robert Cox, a new generation of British historical materialists has sought to engage IPE from their own particular intellectual angle. In the hands of these scholars, the notion of hegemony radically departs from its American meaning of simple “dominance” by a state toward its original Gramscian meaning of “intellectual leadership and subordination” by transnational class forces and historic blocs.

Finally, there are scholars within British IPE who try to transcend the very notion of IPE itself. Feminist scholars form one such community within British IPE. Their focus on social reproduction—that is, how the division of labor in capitalism rests on a prior division of labor of the household and how such gendered structures are replicated through the practices of IPE—forms the core of this enterprise.

In a similar manner, the so-called everyday IPE scholars contest the notion of a state-centric IPE. For most IPE scholars, the answer to the question of “who governs?” in IPE is usually “some sort of set of elite actors.” In contrast, for “everyday” scholars
such as Leonard Seabrooke, non-elite actors, the masses, not the elites, their patterns of consumption and production, and crucially their ability to confer legitimacy on or withhold it from elite actions, all come to the fore as explanatory factors in the world economy. Scholarship in this vein has engaged issues as diverse as pension reform, the relationship between housing finance and global financial power, and the ability of microstate tax havens to persist despite OECD efforts to shut them down from this interdisciplinary “bottom-up” rather than “top-down” perspective.

In sum, British IPE is quite a different species from American IPE. It has different origins, orientations, logics, philosophical concerns, targets, agendas, and even views of causation and matter. It is not simply a variation on a theme, it is quite a different beast; hence the claim that IPE is plural. But it may be worse than that, for beyond the United States and the UK, there lie many claims to IPE that can just as easily be recognized as such, even if the authors use different labels.

Asian IPE

The United States and Britain (or more correctly Britain and Canada) are not the only places that have made a contribution to IPE scholarship. As Walden Bello has argued, the distinctive contribution that scholarship “in and about” East Asia has added to IPE is the literature on the developmental state. That is, a literature developed in and about East Asia that focuses on the state as an active agent in economic development. Moreover, there was, argues Bello, a strong normative edge to such scholarship that argued “for” states in development against the neoliberal inclination of American scholarship. From its inception, these models were set up as a challenge to scholarship that sees universalist processes as stemming from the Western experience.

The distinctive focus of this literature on the state-as-actor enables it to open up issues that Western, especially American, IPE approaches miss due to their relegation of such processes to “domestic politics.” As such, the economically positive “legacy-effects” of colonialism, the role of labor repression (and the lack of democracy) in state-led industrialization efforts, the importance of equalitarian land reform, and how the politics of firm–state relations changed over time, all come into focus. By tying the actual developmental history of the East Asian states into the story of the evolution of East Asian/developmental state scholarship, Bello argues convincingly that this literature is itself an important contribution to contemporary IPE—a contribution that belongs to neither the United States nor the UK.

Underdevelopment and IPE: France and Latin America

IPE is then not only constituted by what its U.S. and British partisans think it is. There are Asian contributions, and there are also telling absences. Turning first to the lack of IPE in continental Europe, particularly France, Nicolas Jabko highlights three main reasons why IPE remains “underdeveloped” in France. First, in France, heterodox economists, rather than political scientists, tend to be the political economists in France. Particularly important here is the work of the economists of the French “regulation school,” who tend to concentrate on the internal dynamics of capitalist economies. As such, both politics and the notion of the “international” as a distinct sphere of action are underplayed. Second, there is a strong bias against importing U.S. scholarship. Third is the relationship to Marxism. While both the UK and France have long-standing legacies of Marxist scholarship, there was, in the postwar period in France, a general flight from Marxism in economics and political science rather than the embrace of it as in the British case. As such, IPE in France, and in Europe, in general, remains, as Jabko puts it, “underdeveloped.”

A similar story exists in Latin America, where a strong indigenous theory of IPE—dependency theory—offered a powerful alternative theory of international political and economic processes. Dependency theory argued that capitalism is a system of unequal exchange that locked peripheral economies into exploitative relationships with the core states of the rich North. Rather than stimulate the development of the whole economy and generate broad-based growth, international economic relations retarded the growth of peripheral economies while promoting export enclaves. This in turn produced a politics of inequality domestically that could only be held in check by repressive forces. Jose Gabriel Palma argues that these once popular IPE literatures turned pathological when, over
time, the fit between the facts generated by the world economy and the theory diverged so much that the goal of dependency theorists became saving the theory at the expense of reality. As such, the theory lost its relevance, and a genuine Latin American contribution to IPE disappeared and left the field to other approaches.

IPE in All but Name? Sociologists and Economic Historians

One consequence of not being able to “bind” IPE is that one is bound to run into other academics who are doing essentially the same thing, but do not call what they do IPE. So the question becomes to what extent there is any IPE beyond self-described IPE scholars. John Campbell, for example, argues that international political sociologists have for many years been IPE scholars. Such sociologists have studied topics such as the diffusion of norms on an international level, how neoliberalism has been transmitted around the world, how the international division of labor is structured, and how the comparative economic performance of different states is explainable by regime type: literatures that are “IPE in all but name.” Michael Oliver provides a second example of “IPE in all but name” in the work of economic historians. Oliver notes that economic historians tend to differ from IPE scholars in two ways. First of all, most economic historians seek neither empirical laws nor narrow methodological perspectives. Yet, despite this difference in approach, there exists a strong similarity between economic history and IPE. In short, some of the biggest names in IPE are economic historians in the broadest sense of the term, in that they use historical sources and construct historical narratives, so there is a natural overlap.

Is the Future of IPE Fractured?

IPE as an object can be reasonably well defined; IPE as a subject, as a way of knowing practiced by a community of scholars sharing a common branch of scholarship, is far more fractured. There is a distinctive American school, based in political science, that is becoming more distinctive over time with its common focus on “open-economy politics,” allied to statistical and formal methods centering on questions of institutional design, compliance, and credibility. Yet within this supposed monolith is a thriving IPE scholarship of a different stripe.

There is also a distinctive British school. Its origins and concerns are quite different from those of the American school, and rather than the methodological narrowing we see in the American school, British IPE threatens to become not just an “inter-discipline” but the veritable reinvention of the social sciences. Beyond America and Britain (plus Canada), there are claims to be made for an Asian IPE based on the literature on the developmental state and for the importation of work by sociologists and economic historians. In one sense then, the future of IPE is bright. Monocultures get wiped out by rare events, but hybridized systems do not, and IPE seen globally is certainly hybrid. But in another sense, there are dangers on the horizon.

Although diversified on a global level, local pockets of IPE, especially the American school, are extremely homologous and badly hedged. They constitute a local monoculture that seemed to be on a high for several years, but the recent financial crisis has thrown their methods (the utility of time-series analysis) and insights (the ubiquity of transparency and information as stabilizing technologies) into question in some quarters. Moreover, if the orientation of the project overall is to “become more like economics,” then the school risks redundancy, since many scholars do this already and do it better. They are called economists.

The British school, while well diversified, faces a different type of redundancy. If the many different research communities of British IPE “let a thousand flowers bloom,” in doing such important work, techniques and technologies established in other fields become rather pointlessly rehashed and reinvented. There is a very real risk that British IPE ethicists skim the philosophy enough to be thinly informed, that everyday British IPE scholars reinvent a weak-kneed sociology of practice, and that British Marxists haul out Louis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci once again without making any actual progress.

In sum, if the boundaries of IPE are not drawn narrowly, it becomes increasingly difficult to say what IPE is, and what it is not. If other fields such as sociology and economic history (and geography) are included, then it has to be defined as an interdisciplinary field in its own right. But doing so has its own costs in terms of coherence and stability, as
in any field of knowledge. On the other hand, drawing boundaries too tightly puts at risk its very existence as a field of knowledge.

In many ways, the British school has less at stake. If the orientation of the field is toward “a thousand flowers,” then cross-pollination and what Strange calls “open range” are virtues. British IPE will persist no matter what form it takes because its precise form is less important than its (hybridized) content. In contrast, the American school has much more at stake, but this stake rests on a series of rather narrow technologies and theories that may not be as transcendentally appropriate as many of its protagonists think. By either measure, IPE is (at least) a plural field of study with an interesting future.

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See also Economic Policy; Hegemony; Liberalism; Power;
Realism in International Relations

Further Readings


**International Public Opinion**

Three points structure this consideration of international public opinion. First, international public opinion research relies on statistical methods used in domestic marketing and polling research. Second, public diplomacy is closely related to consideration of public opinion dynamics in international affairs. Finally, international public opinion research has rested on a particular understanding of the organization of the international system. As information technologies change the nature of community and individual identity formation, we should expect concomitant changes in the organization and analysis of public opinion.

The utility of opinion metrics, both in business and politics, is found in the ability to reveal projected variation in cognitive and affective responses to variation in product design, price points (when relevant), or other changes in key stimulus features, regardless of whether they are commercial or political in nature. Do changes in some sort of stimuli produce changes in attitudes about the object of matter at hand? Whether we are considering a “new and improved” product or a new campaign slogan, precise public opinion metrics offer an important means of evaluating variation in design, availability, and product presentation.

With respect to international public opinion, the analytical specificity that undergirds market research (target marketing of micropopulations facilitated by data mining and computer analysis) and public opinion polling in political and policy domains (often with the same level of specificity found in consumer marketing) is often lost. In domestic spheres in advanced market economies in Europe, North America, and elsewhere in the world, consumer data and survey data are used to populate statistical programs that create groupings or clusters of consumers (or voters or any other germane activity). Niche media markets are then used (and often created) to reach precisely constructed market niches. The reader can see evidence of this phenomenon by visiting a local magazine distributor and noting the numerous and often esoteric variety of magazines catering to every taste, hobby, or habit. Magazines devoted to sailing, for example, aggregate consumers who share this interest, and in doing so, they provide a platform for advertisers to efficiently reach that precise audience. Similarly, users of online booksellers will be met by an opening web page that is populated by book suggestions that are uniquely tailored to that person according to his or her past purchases.

As we move away from the specification of niche populations according to complex mathematical analyses of demographic data concerning the minutiae of economic behavior, lifestyles, and political life, we usually lose this degree of specificity. Instead, we tend to see aggregations involving more general features of entire nation-states and regions. Analyses are less nuanced. The degree of specification changes, in part, owing to the enormous costs associated with multinational data collection and analysis. It is also limited by challenges associated with variations in language, culture, and economic systems, all of which put strains on both the internal and the external reliability of statistical analyses. External validity, for example, concerns the extent to which one might safely generalize the causal inference—first, from the sample studied to the defined target population and, second, to other populations that exist across time and space. Put in less technical terms, serious questions arise as to whether we can, with any confidence, speak of public attitudes about culturally specified concepts such as freedom, democracy, and rights in large-scale multinational studies.

There are, however, several noteworthy studies that have attempted to do serious transnational comparative survey work. One of the more important efforts at overcoming these limitations is the Pew
Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. As of 2009, Pew has conducted more than 175,000 interviews in 55 countries. Another example is found in WorldPublicOpinion.org, a consortium of domestic polling organizations from around the world that was organized and managed by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland. At the time of this writing, the consortium includes research centers in more than 25 countries across all the major continents. A number of associations and academic organizations are also involved in the analysis of international public opinion. One of the oldest is the World Association for Public Opinion Research, founded in 1947.

Noteworthy efforts such as these aside, the scale of international public opinion measurement tends to limit the practical application of metrics. Publics in international public opinion are most often defined by the commonality of manageable geographical space, usually defined in terms of the nation-state and its subdivisions in provinces, states, or districts. That is, statistically and demographically specified subgroups, as found in commercial or domestic political marketing, are not found in most publicly available analyses of international public opinion. Instead, pollsters, policymakers, scholars, and politicians speak of larger aggregations, such as American, Japanese, Russian, or other nationally defined collective of common identity.

Besides its broader nature, international public opinion is also more likely to be concerned with the dynamics of international public standing of nation-states and closely related questions about the effectiveness of various public diplomacy programs intended to affect those standings. Clarifying this idea requires a brief detour into public diplomacy.

Whereas traditional diplomacy involves negotiations, démarches, and other forms of official communication between representatives of nation-states, public diplomacy by contrast focuses on the ways in which a government of one country communicates with and therefore influences (or so it is assumed) publics in another country or region. The term public diplomacy was first used in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, then dean of Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He defined it as the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy . . . [including] the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another . . . (and) the transnational flow of information and ideas. (From an early brochure of the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, Fletcher School, Tufts University)

There is, however, no generally accepted or broadly shared definition of public diplomacy. For example, it isn’t clear whether it involves only international broadcasting (and today Internet outreach) or if it also properly includes educational and cultural exchange programs, disaster relief and aid programs, and other forms of international communication of cultural, political, and policy intent. Nor is there a well-specified social science theory or set of theories that serve to ground the expectations some observers have concerning what public diplomacy can realistically achieve by affecting international public opinion. Therefore, those responsible for public diplomacy may lay out ambitious goals such as improving international opinion toward the United States, when in fact there are major methodological challenges associated with measuring the extent of such change. It is not clear how one might go about finding communication stimuli capable of producing a measurable cognitive effect in a generally specified foreign audience over the short term. As Robert Entman has made clear, political communication and social psychological research findings do not support such an optimistic expectation.

In sum, international public opinion is often contextualized by an undertheorized discussion about international public opinion concerning broad aggregations, such as the standing of the United States in world opinion. Unlike the analysis of domestic public opinion in politics and economics, methodological, logistical, and theoretical encumbrances limit the sorts of data collected and questions asked. Generally, international public opinion analysis tends to follow the contours of geopolitically drawn maps: We are presented with aggregate statistics about opinion profiles according to national identity.

Target marketing strategies that rely on rich streams of demographic and lifestyles data point to
forms of aggregating “publics” that do not necessarily rest in geopolitically determined identities. Put differently, an underlying premise in international public opinion research is that publics, by nature, can be understood or conceived of only in terms of the coincidental sharing of geographical space. Where one is born is, along with socialization, a fundamental element to public opinion. International public opinion is therefore analyzed according to a particular understanding of the nature of the international system itself. Comparative opinion profiles according to national boundaries are most often understood as defining the parameters of the concept itself. We can speak of how a given nation-state is held in good (or low) regard by the citizens of an array of other nation-states.

But as Benedict Anderson has taught us, aggregations of this sort, as natural as they may seem, are synthetic and, relatively speaking, quite new to human history. Anderson (1991) defines a nation as “an imagined political community [that is] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (p. 7). An imagined community is different from an actual community because it is not (and cannot be) based on everyday face-to-face interaction between its members. Such a thing is possible only in communities rooted in a shared and small geographical space. Instead, in a nation-state, members hold in their minds a mental image of their affinity. We are “Americans,” “Germans,” or “Russians” not because we know all of our kinsmen but rather because of a mental state that defines the contours of a mapped affinity group—the nation.

The formation of such an imagined affinity group became feasible only with the rise of print capitalism. Anderson (1991) notes that the basic structure of two forms of imagining that first flowered in Europe in the 18th century were the novel and the newspaper. “For these forms provided the technical means for ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imagined community that is the nation.” (p. 25). The nature of possible imagined communities is associated with the nature of communication systems.

The information environment of the first decade of the 21st century, where communities and individuals across the globe are knitted together by high-speed and low-cost computer and telecommunication links, opens the door to new forms of imagined communities constituted by aggregations rooted in cyber rather than physical space. As with imagined communities qua nation-states, the basis of collective affinity is a sense of communicated and shared values and norms. But whereas newspapers and, to a lesser degree, books were confined to a fixed geographical space, communication today is uprooted from both space and time. Communication appears everywhere in real time.

James Rosenau’s work, especially Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier and Distant Proximities, has led the way in helping us think about the international system in this new way. An alternative model to the geocentric understandings of the public and public opinion is therefore found in the consideration of affinity groups consisting of individuals working collaboratively according to shared norms and values, though not necessarily in shared physical space. In this way, one might even say that we move away from international—where the nation is still the central organizing principle—public opinion to global public opinion.

One expression of global public opinion, understood in this way, can be found in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or what Ann Florini calls a third force in the international system. Between 1973 and 1983, the number of transnational human rights organizations doubled from 41 to 89. In the next decade, the number doubled again. Between 1973 and 2000, the number of NGOs working for women’s rights increased by 300%, a figure that probably underestimates the larger number of organizations that work for women’s rights but not exclusively. There is little doubt that NGOs of all types—working for human rights, environmental issues, nuclear nonproliferation, economic development, and many other causes and concerns—are a growing factor in international affairs. The point here is that transnational advocacy organizations and social movements constitute an expression of a nongeographically rooted public created by a set of values and norms that are shared across the globe through new media. Supporters and constituent elements of transnational NGOs are members of a community of shared beliefs and values—publics—without necessarily being members of a shared geographically defined community. They constitute a new type of international public opinion.

But their importance is perhaps found not in the growth of their individual numbers but rather in
the growth of their coordination and cooperation. In domestic politics, it is often said that public opinion exerts pressure to create particular outcomes. In international affairs, communities of like-minded individuals and organizations may achieve something similar. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) define transnational advocacy networks (TANs) as “characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange” (p. 8). Networks are “communicative structures.” Communication structures create new forms of imagined communities, as Anderson argued. This opens up fascinating new ways to conceptualize and study international public opinion.

This entry has reviewed international public opinion in the context of the more precise domestic analysis of opinion research. It has also noted the close relationship between international public opinion and public diplomacy. Finally, this entry has reviewed recent thinking among international affairs scholars with regard to the changing nature of the organization of the international system. New information technologies open up the possibility of imagined communities that are not rooted in geographical space but rather in cyberspace. In short, we may now consider the public opinion measurement of communities consisting of those who share similar values and norms and organize themselves into communities accordingly but who do not share common physical space.

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See also International Solidarity; Political Communication; Public Opinion

Further Readings


Unlike many concepts in international relations, there is broad agreement on the definition of international regimes. Stephen Krasner (1983) provided the standard definition, according to which international regimes are “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (p. 1). Regime theorists generally try to explain the emergence, persistence, change, and decline of these relatively stable patterns of international collaboration and coordination. International regimes are to be distinguished from national regimes, which describe the formal and informal structure of political power in a country.

All major theoretical schools of international relations are represented in the study of regimes. The first articulations of the realist theory of hegemonic stability and of (neo)liberal institutionalism appeared in the early 1970s. Arguably, the first coherent expressions of constructivism in international relations also appeared in this period and treated the diffusion and use of knowledge in relation to technology transfer. The study of international regimes experienced its golden age from the early 1980s to the late 1990s, but the remarkable productivity of the research program has since shifted the focus of inquiry to the related normative questions of global governance and toward disaggregating regime theory to include the influence of domestic interests on the international delegation of authority and sovereignty.

International Regimes

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**Realists’ Regimes**

Many realists see in international regimes an extension of the power politics that suffice all international political life and apply economic rationality to explain the creation and demise of regimes. According to the hegemonic stability theory of international regimes, only powerful states can supply regimes as public goods, and they will do so only when they expect a net gain in their relative power positions as a result. Other states are then able to act as free riders by benefitting from the regime without contributing to its provision, or they can be caught as forced consumers if they do not desire the regime but cannot escape its scope. Though the hegemonic stability theory of international regimes can explain the demand for and supply of regimes, it has been criticized with the observation that many regimes are not strictly public goods because they are excludable and potentially rivals. Moreover, a group of states might be able to supply the regime jointly in the absence of a hegemon, as is the case with the small minority of states that provides the vast majority of the United Nations’ (UN’s) budget.

Some scholars have modified this realist account by positing that states are not uniformly sensitive to gains reaped by others. A given state is less likely to measure its own gains relative to those of an ally or a small and distant state than to those of a rival or powerful neighbor. Weighing relative gains implies that all states, rather than a lone hegemon, will seek to create and maintain regimes as long as they assess their own benefit to be greater than the benefit accrued by other relevant states. The resurgence of classical realism, which is less reliant on an economic concept of rationality, also provides a modified institutionalist explanation according to which dominant states will establish regimes with rules congenial to themselves in order to create an institution whose normative and regulatory inertia will benefit them even after their power begins to wane. That the five great power victors of World War II have the only seats on the UN Security Council endowed with permanence, veto power, and a UN-sanctioned right to possess nuclear weapons serves as an example. Other variables, such as whether a state is revisionist or satisfied with the status quo as well as the polarity of the international system, can also be integrated into such analyses.

**Neoliberals’ Regimes**

Neoliberal theories also heavily incorporate microeconomic analogies. Liberal theories of international regimes that focus on domestic preference aggregation and upward causality also exist, but they tend to be less well developed than the neoliberal theories. The core theses of the neoliberal account are that regimes would be unnecessary were it not for the “market failures” of an anarchical system, that international regimes are not mere epiphenomena of power, and that many states are interdependent, such that the advantage to the one depends on the success of the others. Specifically, market failures include the lack of an authoritative international legal framework, imperfect information, and transaction costs, all of which inhibit states from having confidence in contracts. Regimes alleviate this problem by providing states with more and better information about others’ activities, reducing transaction costs by providing a single standard for all rather than many bilateral standards, and extending the shadow of the future so that defectors can be punished.

The neoliberal literature relevant to international regimes is vast, but there are several common elements. Among these are the analytical assumption of states as unitary, utility-maximizing actors and the use of game-theoretic analogies to formalize the collective action problems that give rise to regimes. Briefly, there are assurance games in which all parties prefer the same outcome and for which no regime is required, coordination games in which there are multiple outcomes that the parties find acceptable and that will often require a mere convention, and collaboration games in which the parties must forgo their maximum strategies to achieve the optimal outcome. Examples of these would include food safety (where there is little or no incentive to cheat), a common language for international flight personnel (where several coordination points are effectively equivalent), and the nuclear nonproliferation regime (where there are strong incentives to cheat), respectively.

The microeconomic logic used in neoliberal regime analysis provides a parsimonious framework,
but it naturally assumes knowledge of actors’ interests, which are in turn a function of their preferences. However, this framework provides no insight about the sources or form of these preferences, and the neoliberal approach has been criticized for imposing definitions of utility on actors rather than discovering them. The assumption of a single, definitive preference ranking for each actor and a neglect of the normative consequences of regimes are further sources of criticism.

Constructivists’ Regimes

Whereas the realist and neoliberal approaches assume unitary actors with clear and singular preference structures, the constructivist approach problematizes these and seeks to ascertain actor preferences rather than assign them. Instead of assuming that actors follow a logic of consequences, which is based on their assessments of the costs and benefits of different courses of action, constructivists would argue that decision makers follow a logic of appropriateness, in which they choose a course of action based on their perception of the situation and of their roles in it. Accordingly, the way in which an issue is framed and the inputs of the domestic and international political processes are important determinants of the final regime outcome.

One source of input that can operate at domestic and international levels is epistemic communities. These are networks of professional experts with technical knowledge about the problem a regime could solve. For example, the Bretton Woods institutions would have been anathema to both the protectionist and liberal Ricardian ideas that had dominated before World War II, but institutional innovation was clearly required to rebuild the world economy in its wake. As Keynesian liberal interventionism gained currency among economic experts, however, the victors were able to agree on institutions that would allow both free trade and an active industrial policy, though such institutions had been previously unthinkable. Without changing the physical nature of the problem or the constitution of the actors, new knowledge can substantially recast actors’ understanding of a problem and their likely courses of action.

Many constructivists would argue that cooperation in the context of regimes presumes a preexisting repertoire of shared normative concepts and communicative deeds. Taking this line of argument further, some constructivists problematize the normative structures and social institutions that, they would argue, provide the conditions of possibility for concepts such as rationality, legitimacy, and cooperation in the first place. Hypothesizing such malleability in international institutions has led many critical theorists to question whether the current configuration of international regimes could not be recast to become more just by making them less reflective of the prevailing power and distributive structures. The constructivist approach has been criticized for lacking some elements that would support a cumulative research agenda, such as a falsifiable corpus of theory and hypothesis-generating research questions.

Empirical Analysis and Open Questions

In the empirical study of regimes, qualitative methods dominate because though there are some regime characteristics that most studies seek to explain, such as effectiveness, robustness, and change over time, the issue areas and characteristics of particular regimes differ too much for the construction of data sets and quantitative methods to be practical. Where theoretically applicable, researchers often devise a formal model, such as a game-theoretic matrix; derive hypotheses from the model; and try to show the similarities between the model and the case in question. Where comparison between regimes is sensible, comparative case studies are also widely used. One recent project has produced the International Regimes Database, which includes data pertaining to 23 regimes and 172 regime elements. The researchers involved hope that this will allow others to analyze certain dimensions of regimes across cases and to develop broadly valid hypotheses and generalizations. Because comparison between regimes is often not sensible, it has also been suggested that counterfactuals could be an appropriate tool to isolate the independent effects of regimes. In fact, a proposal has even been made to study international nonregimes—that is, issue areas in which the conditions
indicate that a regime would be likely to occur but none is present.

Despite these innovative proposals, scholarly interest has somewhat migrated away from the study of international regimes as such. This change shows that regime theory is partially a victim of its own success. The research program has served to move the debate beyond the crude conceptions of international anarchy that had previously dominated it, but attention has now broadly shifted to the normative consequences of different forms of international and global governance and the closer examination of mechanisms within and below regimes. Specifically, much research in the rationalist framework has begun to examine how authority is delegated from various domestic structures and processes to international and supranational decision-making fora. Constructivist research is now primarily concerned with the legitimacy of the authority thus delegated and how to make the resulting decisions and policies more representative of interest groups at all levels. Recent studies have also begun to consider the transnational aspects of international regimes more closely by investigating when and how private entities, such as firms and cartels, have developed regulatory regimes among themselves. This trend is also visible in the research treating the governance implications of public–private partnerships, in which governments and private firms contract to perform some function.

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See also Anarchy; Constructivism in International Relations; Cooperation; Delegation; Governance, Global; International Organizations; International Political Economy; International System; Market Failure; Neoliberal Institutionalism; Public Goods; Realism in International Relations

Further Readings

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, HISTORY

The academic field of international relations (IR) is barely a century old. Its roots, however, go much further back. This entry exposes some of these historical roots before it describes the emergence of academic IR—with its university departments, specialized courses, and plethora of journals and books devoted to the causes of war and the preconditions for a lasting peace.

The entry pays much attention to the evolution of IR in the aftermath of World War I and the emergence of its distinctive issues and approaches. Then, it follows the growth of IR as a more mature, multiparadigmatic social science in the wake of World War II. The final sections of the entry emphasize the tempestuous discussions that have marked scholarly IR after the end of the Cold War.

Philosophical Forebears

When did the science of IR emerge? According to the popular foundation myth formulated by Edward Hallett Carr in the late 1930s, it emerged from World War I, driven by a wish to create a peaceful world. Myths are not wrong, but they are not historical descriptions either. The science of IR has a more complicated birth than this. Its subject matter has been adumbrated by scholars, statesmen, and soldiers for centuries.

What is the subject matter of IR? At its core lie discussions of war and peace—not only from the standpoint of single states but also as properties of a larger society or system of states. Thus defined, foreshadowings of IR are found already in antiquity—in the West, most famously in Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian Wars (ca. 550 BCE) and in the East, in Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra (ca. 300 BCE). However, as antique state structures unraveled or
were swallowed up by empires, discussions of interstate relations disappeared; early-medieval authors like Cassiodorus, Procopius, and al-Shaybānī discussed both war and diplomacy, but relations among states were not in their purview.

Discussions of interstate relations reappeared, however, in the postimperial age. The rise of city-states in Italy and the rediscovery of classical authors like Thucydides were attended by probing discussions of war and peace and relations among states. In Florence, for example, authors like Niccolò Machiavelli and Francisco Guicciardini reintroduced antique themes of power and princely leadership and applied them to the affairs of their own times.

Renaissance discussions tended to concern philosophical issues such as the nature of the good society and the qualities of political leadership. In the wake of the Reformation, the scholarly discussions grew more descriptive and practical, partly because of the advent of more effective state structures ruled by powerful dynasties that concentrated political power, religious authority, and military command in royal hands and partly because of the emergence of new concepts and secular theories.

Sovereignty, Contract, and Perpetual Peace

The important concept of sovereignty emerges in the late Renaissance. It received its classic formulation by Jean Bodin. The social and political implications of the concept were explored by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, who wrote a learned treatise titled *Law of War and Peace* (1625), which discussed IR in light of natural law and human egarousness. The English social philosopher Thomas Hobbes presented a different view. He argued in his *Leviathan* (1651) that rational individuals safeguard their interests by agreeing to establish a powerful state that will establish laws and protect them all. No such arrangement exists among states, however; states exist in a lawless “state of nature.”

Such discussions evolved hand in hand with the 16th- and 17th-century evolution of the modern state—by the development of fiscal and military structures, by the concentration of power in the hands of powerful monarchs, and by growth in international trade. New political concepts and theories emerged, many of them grafted on to the theories of social contract expressed by Hobbes during the English civil wars and, later, by John Locke during the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

Hobbes and Locke based their political philosophies on the same thought experiment: They imagined what relations among sovereign human actors might have looked like in the absence of any overarching state authority. The resulting vision—the imaginary “state of nature”—opened up a new way of conceptualizing relations among sovereign political units, on the individual as well as the collective level. Subsequent authors applied this vision to relations among sovereign states. The Dutch philosopher Benedict de Spinoza evolved from Hobbes’s argument a bleak description of interstate relations in terms of jealous sovereign actors that pursued their interests in ruthlessly egotistical ways. Christian Wolff and Émeric Vatell pursued the vision of Locke and developed a more harmonious view of rational actors that pursued their individual goals yet also understood the role played by common interests and cooperation.

These two attitudes to the world—the Hobbesian and the Lockean—evolved and interwove in subsequent years. A new step in the history of IR began during the Enlightenment, when the early notions of conflict and cooperation gave way to a more widely shared systemic perspective on the interrelations among sovereign actors.

This perspective was first expressed in two discourses that emerged in the 18th century: one orbiting the concept of balance of power and the other concerning plans for a perpetual peace. The notion of political balance is old—it was noted by Thucydides and invoked by Renaissance scholars like Francesco Guicciardini. These early authors, however, tended to apply the notion to the policy of single states (later called “containment”) or to relations between pairs of states (later called “counterpoise”). But a new notion appeared during the wars of Louis XIV, when authors like Francois Fénelon noted that the order of all of Europe was maintained by a principle of balance. In 1713, the diplomats who wrote the Treaty of Utrecht noted that their aim was to establish “a durable balance” in Europe. These examples suggest a new understanding of the balance of power as a mechanism that would bring order to Europe’s state relations. They indicate that Europe’s macro-political scene is seen as a unity composed of several sovereign states.
This portrayal of Europe as a system of states evolved in subsequent decades. It reached its mature form in the work of William Robertson, who set out to explain both the origins of balance-of-power policies and the mechanisms of its operation. Robertson’s explanation was very influential. On the basis of it, Edward Gibbon argued that balance-of-power dynamics have prevented the multistate system of Europe from sliding back into empire. Gibbon, thus, drew an analytical distinction between a balance-of-power system of sovereign states and an empire.

The notion of a perpetual peace, too, has long forbears—its roots can be traced back to religious thinkers like Augustine, Aquinas, Dante, and Erasmus. During the Enlightenment, however, secular scenarios for a new and peaceful world order were expressed by thinkers who relied on appeals to human reason, natural rights of freedom, the reality of historical progress, and an implied notion of Europe as a system of sovereign states. Duc de Sully was among the first thinkers to propose a way of establishing peaceful relations among the sovereign states of Europe. Abbé de St. Pierre was another important contributor.

When major Enlightenment philosophers began to wrestle with the question of peace and cultivated new cosmopolitan ideals, the theoretical trickle became a flood: The cosmopolitan approach held that human beings are rational and peaceful and that conflict and war are the result of dysfunctional regime types. This attitude was expressed most famously by Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant in his essay *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795).

**The Turn-of-the-Century Breakthrough**

Balance-of-power theories and perpetual-peace plans were products of the early Enlightenment and were infused with the optimism of the age. Both theories invoked the use of reason in the service of a better world. By the 19th century, their themes and concepts were applied by soldiers, statesmen, and scholars in various fields—in history, in law, and in the new social sciences (geography, economics, sociology, and political science). Two developments helped pave the way for a more mature notion of IR.

First, there emerged a clearer notion of Europe as a system of states. The German historian Leopold von Ranke contributed to this by introducing the concept of “the Great Powers.” It simplified the discussion because it reduced the Western system of states to a few formative states—*die grossen Mächte*—that drove the process and imposed their rules of conduct on the system at large.

Second, historians began to explore the interstate affairs of the very recent past and, even, current events. In England, John Seeley and Edward Freeman made the case for “contemporary history” as a worthy object of study. In Germany, Heinrich von Treitschke examined the nature and evolution of states. In his extremely popular lecture series on politics, Treitschke included some thoughts on the contemporary relations among states, during which he noted that there existed two basic approaches to the subject: The first was the “moralizing doctrine” of the British advocates of free trade; the other was the “naturalistic” approach, anchored in social philosophers like Machiavelli and Hobbes. Treitschke ridiculed the first and condoned the second.

Geographers began, in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, to view the state in light of biological theories—Friedrich Ratzel and Johan Rudolf Kjellén saw states as organisms and interstate relations as competition for scarce resources and living space. Economists observed novel relations in international trade. French writers were quick to observe these new relations. The economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu wrote an influential book on colonialism, *De la colonisation chez des peoples modernes* (Of Colonization Among Modern Nations, 1874); the sociologist Jacques Novicow sought to capture interstate relations in social science terms in his *Politique internationale* (International Politics, 1886). International questions were discussed in magazines—first in the many monthlies and quarterlies that emerged in the final decades of the century (*The North American Review, The Review of Reviews, Journal des deux mondes* [Review of the Two Worlds], and many others) and then in professional social science journals (*Political Science Quarterly, American Political Science Review, and Journal of Race Development*).

A most significant contributor to the evolution of IR theory was a new movement in international law. It was explicitly cosmopolitan and sponsored by an international network of legal activists. They
founded a journal, *Revue de droit international et legislation compareé* (RDI; *Journal of International and Comparative Law*), as well as the Institute of International Law in Ghent. They were wedded to the idea that international conflict could be avoided by the elaboration of international law—indeed, they believed that conflicts could be solved by the establishment of international institutions devoted to adjudication and arbitration.

One of them, the Scottish scholar James Lorimer, wrote an essay that reduced centuries of scholarly speculation to a few basic points. In an essay for the *RDI* in 1871, titled “Final Problem in International Law,” Lorimer explained that international politics is played out in a community of states whose members are sovereign and that it, as a result, lacks a central body of legislation. It is, thus, a lawless society—an “anarchy,” as Lorimer dubbed it. Lawlessness is, however, not the same as orderlessness, continued Lorimer. Order is imposed on this anarchical society by two mechanisms: (1) the political principle of balance of power and (2) the economic principle of interdependence. Since neither result in a stable order, it will be necessary to add a third ordering principle—namely, a centralized legislature and mechanisms that can enforce its laws.

In the liberal states of the West, other activists entertained similar views. A growing number of people joined organizations that opposed war and promoted peace. Members of national assemblies established the Inter-Parliamentary Union (1889) designed to solve conflicts and ease international tensions. Such efforts contributed greatly to the Peace Conference in Hague in 1899, which, in turn, established the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This Hague conference was attended by nearly all the sovereign states in the world. And it was eagerly supported by more than 400 peace organizations.

This optimistic atmosphere waned during the final years of the century by the new and darker mood of *Realpolitik*. The German historian Heinrich von Treitschke expressed this new sentiment with his portrayal of politics as a competition among territorial states for power and influence. This change was noted by the American historian and diplomat Paul Reinsch in *World Politics* (1900). The “age of reason” was in his opinion replaced by an “age of force.” The change was, according to Reinsch, hastened by the Franco-Prussian War (1871), which led to the unification of Germany and to the alteration of Europe’s established political relations. It was also hastened by the growth of industrialism and nationalism.

The new zeitgeist was well represented by the advent of social Darwinism and by the new imperialism, which Reinsch held to be one of the most influential ideas of the age. Other ideas also emerged in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War and affected scholarly discussions of war and peace. Among them were liberal and radical ideas that protested the new militarism and warned against new wars on the continent. Critical voices were carried by members of the evolving social sciences: geography, economics, sociology, and political science all made their imprint on the systematic study of war, peace, and IR. Norman Angell’s *Great Illusion* (1910), for example, drew on liberal theories of finance and trade to warn against war in the industrial age and to condemn statesmen who foolishly still imagined that wars could be won. Weapons systems are now so destructive and industrial nations are so tightly tied together in webs of interdependence that war among them would bring disaster on them all.

**World War I and After**

The debate about IR has a long prehistory. World War I converted this debate into a field of scholarly study. It happened quickly, as a sudden burst when the war deteriorated, counter to all military opinions, into a stalemate of deadly trench warfare. Between 1914 and 1917, the vast armies of Europe’s industrial states shelled each other senseless at the average cost of 100,000 young soldiers’ lives per week. How could this meaningless slaughter happen? How could it be brought to an end? What could be done to prevent a similar catastrophe in the future? Statesmen and scholars struggled to answer these questions. And the scholarly study of IR emerged as one of the results.

Similar questions had long been discussed by historians, lawyers, and antiwar activists. Two additional groups added their voices and helped boost the scholarly study of IR. The first group consisted of wealthy industrialists who had sponsored research on war and education for peace before World War I—men like Alfred Nobel,
Andrew Carnegie, and Richard Garton. The second group consisted of political operatives—men like James Bryce and Philip Noel Baker in England and Woodrow Wilson in the United States. For with the senseless destruction of World War I, civil servants, diplomats, statesmen, and their advisers also grew increasingly concerned with issues of war and peace.

**War as a Catalyst**

The outbreak of war in 1914 spurred a flurry of attempts to explain its causes and identify the conditions for a lasting postwar peace. G. Lowes Dickinson, a classics scholar at Cambridge University, argued that although Prussian militarism was an immediate cause of the war, the deeper cause was the lawless or “anarchic” state of affairs among sovereign states. He justified his claim in a slim 1916 book, *The European Anarchy*.

Other authors and activists, too, designed proposals for such ordering organizations. In the United States, Yale mathematician Irving Fisher presented an idea for a “league of peace.” A most influential scheme was presented by Leonard Woolf, a British civil servant turned author and publisher. His *International Government* (1916) deeply influenced diplomats and statesmen like Robert Cecil, Jan Smuts, and Woodrow Wilson. At the Peace Conference in Paris (1919), President Wilson relied on Woolf’s argument to push for a League of Nations.

Wilson’s initiative transformed international politics. His arguments at the Paris Peace Conference challenged the views of old statesmen. His vision of a League of Nations appealed greatly to the broad public. It formulated, among other things, a need for research and education in international affairs.

While Wilson met with other statesmen in Paris to convince them of his vision for a postwar League, legal experts and scholarly advisers met to discuss postwar collaboration in international research and education. The world’s first Department of International Politics was established at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, in 1919—financed by a generous endowment from the wealthy industrialist David Davies. Institutes of International Affairs were founded in Britain and the United States in 1920. The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) established a department of IR (1924). In the United States, comparable departments were established at Georgetown University (Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, 1919), University of Southern California (School of International Relations, 1924), and University of Chicago (The Committee on International Relations, 1928), to mention but a few. The impression left by this development is that the scholarly study of IR emerged during the 1920s as an English-language discipline—in spite of the fact that Switzerland established the first school entirely devoted to IR (Geneva’s Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1927).

Early IR continued the perpetual peace tradition. Kant’s famous essay *Perpetual Peace* was a central text in many early reading lists that were steeped in a liberal faith in free trade, popular democracy, and collective security. Contemporary popular textbooks were written by Ernest Satow, David P. Heatley, S. H. Allen, and P. Potter. They tended to discuss the causes of war and the preconditions for peace—and commonly saw the causes of war as irrationality or ill will and the preconditions for peace in rational diplomacy with an eye toward establishing norms, rules, and international institutions.

**Idealism and the First Great Debate**

These first years of scholarly IR were conducted in President Wilson’s shadow. This is easy to understand: In the wake of a shockingly destructive war, the tired populations of the West cleaved to Wilson and his League as their one great hope (he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1919 and was generally hailed as a worthy recipient). Also, the League was in its earliest years an active and apparently effective organization. The foreign ministers of the Great Powers attended League meetings and used the League machinery to improve relations and settle their differences.

Not all observers, however, shared this general confidence in human reason, trade, and international law. Some still saw world events through prisms of competition and power. Their case was strengthened as world events were marked by deepening economic crises and interstate competition, and the League met with declining success. The League could not prevent the Chaco War, Japan’s occupation of Manchuria, Italy’s invasion
of Abyssinia, or Germany’s rearmament. The changing relations among the Great Powers, combined with the advent of insistent rhetoric drawn from strong political ideologies, altered the political climate. And the study of IR altered with it.

There emerged authors who, invoking the apparent ineffectiveness of the League, criticized its cosmopolitan advocates and called them “idealist” or “utopian.” In the name of “realism,” they rejected the idea that international organizations such as the League could prevent war. Authors like Frederick L. Schuman, Frank H. Simonds, and James T. Shotwell rejected the assumption that undergirded liberal internationalism—that human beings are inherently pacific and, if left to their own devices, would establish peaceful relations with one another. Many authors held that humans are basically self-interested and that, although they pursue their egotistical goals in rational ways, they will inevitably enter into conflicts with one another. Others argued that humans are not fully rational. Still others claimed that evil and sinful impulses have corrupted human reason and behavior.

The American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr drew on all these arguments. In *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1932), Niebuhr argued that individual humans may be both well-meaning and rational but that these qualities do not apply to human collectivities—such as states—whose behaviors tend to be both amoral and irrational. He also argued that the Idealist and the Romantic fail to understand the brutal character of the behavior of all human collectives and the power of self-interest and collective egoism in all intergroup relations.

Such bleak assumptions were commonly held by refugees from Europe’s illiberal states. Among them were Jewish scholars who fled Nazi Germany in the 1930s and settled in Britain or the United States. Some of them—for example, John Herz and Hans Morgenthau—found teaching jobs at U.S. universities. Arnold Wolfers, who taught at Yale in the late 1930s, argued that the discipline of IR was suspended between two poles or traditions—a liberal tradition rooted in Locke and Vatell and a realist tradition informed by Machiavelli and Hobbes.

This idea of two traditions received a particularly influential formulation by Carr. He taught IR at the University of Wales in the late 1930s and divided the evolution of the scientific study of IR into two phases: first a utopian, League-focused phase that emerged in the wake of World War I and then a second, realist phase that emerged in the 1930s after a critical Great Debate. Carr expressed his two-phased account in *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* (1939). The book was immensely influential and his thesis of considerable didactical value.

The French philosopher Alexandre Kojève presented an alternative account. And if Carr influenced a generation of English IR scholars, then Kojève influenced a generation of French social philosophers. Kojève was, like Carr, a Hegelian and argued that ideological strife ended with the French Revolution and that after Napoleon, the Enlightenment ideals of reason, rights, and equal recognition were universally accepted in the West. History was, in his view, at an end. His opponents begged to differ. They argued that world events were, in fact, deeply affected by ideological strife between liberalism, communism, and fascism. This clash was all the more serious, they argued, as each ideology had a Great Power behind it to back it up.

This late-interwar discussion included a broad range of perspectives. Liberal internationalism was beleaguered. On its left were socialist and communist parties and labor unions whose discussions about war and peace were informed by an alternative internationalism. Socialists and communists drew on Marxist political economy, elaborated in the shadow of Nikolai Bukharin’s and Vladimir Lenin’s theories of imperialism. On the far right were nationalist and fascist arguments, often informed by a social Darwinism that saw IR as a perpetual struggle among countries and races for power and living space. The fascist movement was largely anti-intellectual and poor on theory; however, there were exceptions—the antiliberal arguments of the German lawyer Carl Schmitt being a notable case.

**World War II and After**

By the end of the 1930s, liberal internationalism had lost its luster, squeezed between realism and radical approaches—both of which saw international politics as a struggle for power.

The war also added geopolitical dimensions to IR theorizing. Whereas World War I had largely been a European civil war, World War II was a global struggle. Also, World War II was fast paced: If the fighting paused in one theatre, it flared up in
another region. Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin fought the war with maps of Europe in hand; Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt consulted globes in their offices.

The United States emerged as the preeminent Great Power during the course of the war. President Roosevelt had two wartime aims: (1) to bring Germany and Japan to unconditional surrender and (2) to build a strong antifascist alliance of states—the United Nations (UN)—which would last beyond the war and provide the stable basis for a postwar world order. Roosevelt worked hard to achieve both goals. Like Wilson before him, Roosevelt established a worldwide political organization based on the principle of collective security, the United Nations Organization (UNO). In addition, he worked to establish economic organizations to coordinate the world’s commercial relations. In 1944, delegates from the UN alliance met in the New Hampshire town of Bretton Woods and established the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and a liberal set of trade rules (GATT). This Bretton Woods system was meant to secure a postwar world of open, democratic states in free pursuit of commercial ventures. Roosevelt’s scheme was, in other words, informed by a liberal vision of order and peace.

Just as American politicians emerged as leaders of the liberal world in the wake of World War II, so also did American scholars emerge as leading practitioners of scholarly IR. Quincy Wright was one of them. In 1941, he published *The Study of War*—an encyclopedic tome of more than 1,000 pages. Bernhard Brodie of Yale University was another of these leading scholars. Soon after the war, Brodie published *The Absolute Weapon* (1946), a book that discussed the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and assessed the impact of atomic weapons on IR. Its message was that atomic power will change the way we think about strategy and diplomacy, and war and peace. Would atomic weapons destroy the world, or would they inaugurate an era of stable world peace, wondered Brodie, echoing Kant’s question of 150 years before.

**Realism and the Second Debate**

The realist approach was entrenched when relations between the United States and the former USSR descended into enmity and competition in the wake of World War II. The U.S. diplomat George Kennan relied on traditional Realpolitik when he reassessed the U.S.–Soviet relationship in 1946 and recommended that President Harry Truman adopt a foreign policy stance based on a doctrine of unwavering containment.

Morgenthau, too, advocated a realist approach. His *Politics Among Nations* (1947) quickly became a basic textbook in IR. It exercised an immense influence in the United States and elsewhere. Realism was also embraced by other influential scholars, like Georg Schwartzzenberger in Great Britain and Raymond Aron in France. All saw IR as a high-stakes game played out in a system of sovereign, self-interested states who all seek to maximize power, security, and chances of survival.

Although realism dominated postwar scholarship, it was not the only approach. Realism was well suited to capture the deteriorating postwar relations between the United States and the former USSR, but it was hard to view other state relations through those very same realist lenses. It was difficult to grasp the development issues of non-Western states—their efforts to achieve political independence, economic growth, and peaceful interrelations did not suit the realist vocabulary well. It was also hard to capture some Western issues. Relations between North and South America were a case in point; communication or discussion in this context was often phrased in radical—sometimes even Marxist—terms of exploitation and repression. Relations among the United States and Western Europe were also hard to grasp in realist terms; they were commonly discussed in terms of liberal internationalism instead. Postwar relations among the states of Western Europe were also marked by a degree of cooperation and coordination insufficiently captured by the old realist concepts of “alliance” and “league.” Politicians like Jean Monnet and academics like Ernest Haas used terms such as integration and federation to describe new, tighter, and more peaceful forms of interstate relations.

Also, realism showed signs of deteriorating. It provided a convenient discourse for warning against Soviet expansionism, but leading realist scholars (like Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Kennan) cautioned against the uncritical use of terms such as balance and containment to justify ideological crusades against communism. Another movement
emerged in the United States whose members criticized the realists for their excessive reliance on “wisdom” and on the anecdotal use of historical “interpretation.” They argued that IR should be studied through more scientific approaches with an eye to establishing patterns or regularities in interstate behavior. They compiled data sets on conflicts and wars and used statistics to identify regularities and patterns in them. This, it was argued, would enable IR to establish general propositions about interstate behavior and escape the old “interpretive” approaches.

Wright had paved the way: His painstakingly compiled data of centuries of past wars and his statistical analyses provided the basis for his encyclopedic Study of War (1941)—this substantial tome was equipped with figures, charts, and fold-out tables. The advocacy of quantitative methods triggered a new “great debate” in the IR community. This debate was part of a larger “behaviorist” orientation in the social sciences and related to the development of computer technologies and the hope of subjecting vast data sets to statistical analyses.

**New Schools and Approaches**

This Second Great Debate found its classic representation in an exchange between J. David Singer and Hedley Bull. Singer was a behavioralist from the University of Michigan and an early compiler of data on conflicts and war—such as the important Correlates of War Project. Bull was an influential traditionalist scholar from the LSE and Oxford and a member of the British Committee on International Relations, the members of which had developed an alternative approach that stressed cooperation over confrontation—an English School that had Grotius and his notions of law and society as major sources of inspiration.

The debate between the two was largely a discussion of methodology. Other issues were soon pulled into its wake, however. One such issue concerned the value of IR as a field of knowledge; the other its proper object of study.

Kenneth Waltz touched on all these issues in his book Man, the State, and War (1959). Waltz sought to identify and map the main arguments that philosophers and statesmen had applied to the study of IR through the ages. He isolated their theoretical cores and categorized them according to three “images”—that is, whether they were located at the individual, the social, or the systemic level of analysis.

Waltz’ book anchored IR theory in history and defined the scholarly field as part of a rich tradition of political ideas. LSE professor Martin Wight did much of the same thing. He too identified three schools of thought in IR and called them realism, rationalism, and revolutionism. Each school represented a distinct ontology, argued Wight—a distinct view of the world. Realism sees the world in terms of states, state interests, and power; rationalism perceives the world as inhabited by rational humans driven toward cooperation; and revolutionism observes the world through the lenses of right and wrong and dreams of a peaceful and unified world. Each approach constituted a distinct school of thought, sustained by a distinct tradition, argued Wight. He demonstrated how philosophers like Hobbes, Grotius, Kant, and others had contributed to these schools in various ways.

As the 1950s evolved into the 1960s, new controversies were added to the scholarly debate. For a time, the influential schemes of Waltz and Wight helped keep a certain order on the debate. But controversies soon emerged that defied easy categorization. Within the scientist camp, for example, there emerged a political dividing line. On one side were scientists who were concerned with issues of security. These scientists collaborated with the U.S. government and established a new field of security studies; among them were scholars like Albert Wohlstetter and Thomas Schelling, who were associated with the RAND Corporation, a private research center that was largely funded by the U.S. Air Force. On the other side were social scientists who were concerned with justice and peace; among them were the economist Kenneth Boulding and the sociologist Johan Galtung. These scholars updated the old banner of the peace movement to include opposition against atomic weapons and claimed a new field of peace research.

These two scientific communities contributed importantly to IR over subsequent decades. They were very similar in methodological orientation, but they disagreed strongly on epistemological and ontological issues. They were matching bookends, enclosing the social-scientific approaches to issues
of war and peace but from opposite sides, disagreeing strongly on the ultimate nature of politics and the reasons for studying it.

**Systems and Structures**

Political discussions intensified as the Cold War entered a new phase. In the wake of World War II, colonies in Africa and Asia had demanded self-government. As the old imperial powers were reluctant to grant such independence, the locals organized liberation movements to fight for sovereignty and self-rule. The 1960s saw a growing number of armed struggles directed against French and British rule.

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev observed that armed rebels challenged the imperialist powers of the capitalist West and began to support them. The Americans responded, predictably, by trying to contain what they saw as Soviet expansionism. This quickly involved U.S. forces in conflicts around the world, and American statesmen and scholars were confronted with a horrible dilemma.

The U.S. containment of anticolonial movements in the Third World led the United States to side with the old colonial powers of Europe and seriously undermined America’s liberal advocacy of free trade and anticolonialism. This became painfully obvious as the United States increased its support for the French war effort against anticolonial rebels in Indochina. In 1954, the French pulled out, and the United States continued the war in Vietnam on its own.

The escalation of the Vietnam War changed the world’s perception of the United States and fueled criticism of U.S. policies. Members of the profession engaged in the general debate on colonial independence, sovereignty, development, and the reasons behind U.S. engagements in foreign wars. Professors and students drew on increasingly radical perspectives that portrayed U.S. behavior as driven by the internal needs of the capitalist system and portrayed the United States as a prowling, neo-imperialist Great Power. Some added, invoking the Marxist notion of false consciousness, that the capitalists legitimized their expansion through the production of false ideology and presented it as universal truth. Such radical arguments were also voiced by non-Western political leaders—Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro, “Che” Guevara, and Ho Chi Minh. They gained adherents among radical IR scholars.

One effect of this development was to boost what Wight had called the revolutionary approach to IR and elevate it on par with the two established traditions of realism and rationalism. By 1970, IR was commonly presented as having three rivaling approaches or schools or—involving Thomas Kuhn’s fashionable term—three “paradigms,” each with its own distinct ontology.

Another effect was to challenge the traditional concept of power—one of the key concepts of IR. The traditional definition viewed power in terms of specific resources—as the outcome of a systematic application of force, wealth, or propaganda. Discussions about colonialism and conflict, and wars and wealth in the Third World pulled alternative definitions of power in its wake. Power could, for example, be seen in terms of social relationships—a state possesses power by virtue of its position in a social structure or its ability to define the main rules of interaction. By this view, the Great Powers of the West derived their superior resources and privileges from their ability to maintain an international world economy that enriched them while they exploited, impoverished, and repressed everyone else.

A third effect of this was to direct attention toward what Waltz had called the systemic level of analysis. Revolutionist theorists included sweeping discussions of the inherent needs of the capitalist system. They developed new theories of imperialism. André Gunder Frank portrayed the United States as a metropole and other countries as satellites and identified the mechanisms that enriched the first but impoverished the second. Immanuel Wallerstein’s *Modern World System* (1974) presented 500 years of world history in terms of interactions between a powerful and wealthy world core and a poor periphery. This analysis of the modern world economy had a deep and long-lasting influence on IR scholarship.

Realist authors, too, developed systemic approaches. Waltz defined the interstate system in terms of the distribution of capabilities among major power centers or “poles.” His *Theory of International Politics* (1979) presented a reformulation of the old balance-of-power theory, anchoring it in sociological theory and in microeconomic reasoning. Robert Gilpin presented a similar argument...
in his *War and Change* (1981). He argued that Great Powers always sought to impose their own rules on international games in an effort to bring about a world order that suited their own interests. He then portrayed the history of the modern world as a system in which Great Powers had regularly risen to and fallen from hegemonic status, igniting major “hegemonic wars” in the process, with each new hegemon imposing its own order on the post-war world. George Modelski and William Thompson followed up this idea and developed a theory of long cycles or waves of hegemonic leadership.

Authors from the rationalist tradition followed suit. Robert Keohane presented a systemic alternative to Waltz and Gilpin’s neorealism. The fall of a Great Power is not necessarily attended by war and followed by a new world order, he argued. If U.S. hegemony were to unravel, the system that the United States established after World War II is so rational and serves everyone so well that it will not be essentially changed by America’s demise, argued Keohane in *After Hegemony* (1984). The demise of the United States will, in other words, not necessarily cause strife and conflict.

By the mid-1980s, then, the scholarly field of IR was dominated by three main approaches, each with grand, systemic theories at its core. These theories were all affected by economic reasoning: the radical approach most directly, as it relied on concepts and arguments from classical political economy, and the realist and rationalist approaches more subtly. Waltz drew on theories of neoclassical oligopolistic competition, while Keohane drew on neo-institutionalist economics. Both incorporated game theory. Scholars who explored these two traditions further found so much similar ground that they began to transcend the ancient rivalry of realism and rationalism and merged into a so-called neo-neosynthesis.

**The End of the Cold War and the Ideational Turn**

Systemic theories met with much skepticism. Realists claimed that such theories were static and could not easily account for change. Rationalists argued that they were abstract and excluded human elements. International politics involve people who make decisions and shape events, they argued. States do not balance; statesmen do. And when statesmen decide to balance, they do not heedlessly react to abstract concepts such as “capabilities”; they balance against what they perceive as concrete and tangible threats.

Some scholars retorted that statesmen may well act on perceptions, but such perceptions are in turn part of larger systems—of “epistemological communities”—that socialize statesmen into the collective norms of distinct societies and thus condition their perceptions of the world.

This was the vantage point of Richard Ashley whose “Poverty of Neorealism” (1984) amounted to a sweeping condemnation of Waltz. Neorealist theory is a distinct epistemic system, argued Ashley; it is totalizing and repressive and invokes the authority of “science” to justify its claim for objective knowledge where no such claim could exist, he argued. Other writers added their voices to this critical charge. Neither neorealism nor any other IR theory offer objective knowledge of the world. They are all mere reflections of distinct epistemic communities and contingent on particular conditions in time and space. This was the message of the scholars who contributed to James Der Derian’s book *International/Intertextual Relations* (1989). They portrayed IR as resting on a flimsy foundation of subjective assumptions that belonged to a narrow group of privileged, largely White, middle-class males who forced their articulations on more marginalized others, whose voices were consequently silenced by the imposition.

This criticism was not new. But whereas earlier criticism had flowed from materialist social science theories (e.g., from the Marxist false-ideology thesis), the critical claims of the 1980s hinged on ideational philosophies—on, for example, semiotics, linguistics, or symbolic interactionism (often inspired by Parisian postmodernists). These philosophies became a springboard of the poststructuralist turn that affected the social sciences in the 1990s.

**Globalization and Change**

Several long-term trends conspired to enhance the force of this poststructuralist turn in IR. Two of them are indicated by the terms *communication revolution* and *globalization*. The means and modes of international transport were changed by new technologies. Goods, money, text, and images
were brought faster and cheaper around the world, fueling a steady expansion of commerce and credit. Easier travel encouraged increased migration, and whereas earlier waves of migration had brought Europeans out into the world, a new wave brought non-Europeans in. Such trends were long studied in terms of the old IR concept of interdependence. During the 1980s, however, when the introduction of relatively inexpensive personal computers represented a quantum leap in worldwide interconnectedness, new concepts and theories were applied—such as textual interrelationships, symbolic interaction, and multiple identities. The liberal democracies of the West adapted to globalization. They did not always do it peacefully—national groups with traditional truth claims and monocultural assumptions clashed with immigrant demands for tolerance and understanding. Communist dictatorships, however, did not adapt well. Around 1990, the Soviet Union collapsed—for a variety of reasons; the refusal to adapt to the communication revolution for fear of losing political control was, perhaps, the most important one. The Soviet collapse altered world politics. When Russia, the former USSR's crisis-ridden and non-communist successor, was in no shape to assume the role of America’s superpower rival, the Cold War ended. The collapse also altered the perception of world politics. On the one hand, it reduced the relevance of neorealism and revolutionism—the fall of the former USSR weakened neorealism by striking at its assumption of a bipolar balance; revelations of the cruelties and the deep illegitimacy of the Soviet system weakened the ideological appeal of revolutionism. On the other hand, the Soviet collapse enhanced the relevance of ideational approaches. For it was not only the material capabilities of the old USSR that collapsed around 1991, it was also the Stalinist system, and it was the exhaustion of the old communist outlook that altered the international climate and ended the Cold War. Many observers concluded that ideas shape policy and that power capabilities may be the foreign policy tools of states but that ideas define the uses to which the tools are put. Alexander Wendt made this point in a much discussed 1992 article, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It.”

Finally, the Soviet collapse embarrassed the more formal or scientific approaches to IR. It came as a total surprise to scholars who had long argued that the scientific method could produce general explanations of the past as well as predictions for the future. Their failure to predict the Soviet collapse embarrassed them and made their scientific approach vulnerable to criticism. A new Great Debate ensued. It was all the more heated as IR’s entire philosophy of science was suddenly questioned.

Fragmentation, Realignment, and Ideational Approaches

The conceptual toolbox of IR became richer and more diverse during the 1990s. It was filled with new approaches imported from other disciplines—neo-institutionalism, gender theory, culture studies, postcolonial analysis, and literary criticism among them. The substantial foci of IR, however, changed less. One of the established issues, the relationship of the Great Powers, reemerged in the wake of the Cold War: With the dissolution of the USSR, the world was no longer a bipolar system, but what kind of system was it? The United States emerged from the Cold War as the only remaining superpower, but what kind of power did it have?

Joseph Nye adumbrated an answer in Bound to Lead (1990): namely, that the United States led a unipolar system by virtue of its ideas, ideals, and example—that is, by its “soft power.” Other authors made similar points. Samuel Huntington argued in The Clash of Civilizations (1993) that the Soviet collapse would be followed by an age deeply affected by conflicts of faith and civilizational ideas and ideals. Robert Kaplan wrote influential reports from regions of conflict—Soldiers of God (1990), Balkans Ghosts (1993), and The Ends of the Earth (1996)—and described these conflicts as driven by religious faith and ethnic identities.

Such claims stirred much debate. Francis Fukuyama protested the notion that future wars would be civilizational in nature. He argued instead that war would steadily diminish in the post–Cold War world and that there was now only one sustainable route to modernity: the liberal-democratic path. With communism on the ropes, liberal democracy had emerged dominant. Liberal definitions of reason, rights, and equal recognition
were striking roots everywhere, pushing religion, nationalism, and other philosophical relics into the dustbin of history. The age of the great ideational struggles was over, argued Fukuyama. Not only is the Cold War at an end, history itself is at an end, he concluded in *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992)—with a nod to Friedrich Hegel and Alexandre Kojève. Bruce Russett formulated a similar argument but from a scientist’s perspective—and with a nod to Kant. In *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (1993), he argued that democratic states trade with one another, evolve interdependencies, and common interests. Democracies do not go to war with each other. By this logic, the spread of democracy was practical peace work.

Fukuyama and Russett were right about one thing: The number of interstate wars dropped after the Cold War. But Huntington and Kaplan, too, had a valid point: There were regions in the world that did not conform to the worldwide trend of growing order and peace. Conflict and war still marked an area between the eastern Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean—a vast region from the Balkans via the Middle East, along the Caucasus and the Hindu Kush, to the Bay of Bengal. Some of its conflicts were related to the retreat of the former USSR and some to the expansion of the United States. Most of them involved national and religious identities.

This was worrisome. For this vast and varied region of sustained conflict also contained the world’s richest stores of oil; Western statesmen feared that conflict would disrupt its extraction and smooth transport. This region was also predominantly Muslim; Western analysts feared that conflict might produce new and radical mutations of political Islam as well as proliferation of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—especially if crisis-ridden Russia lost control of its old Soviet WMD stockpiles.

Such fears soared to new heights on September 11, 2001, when Islamist terrorists crashed hijacked passenger jets into the Pentagon near Washington, D.C., and into Manhattan’s World Trade Center. The newly elected president George W. Bush responded by striking out against Afghanistan, ousting its Islamist government, and installing a friendly regime in its stead. In the fall of 2003, President Bush ordered an invasion of Iraq. Amid loud protests and shrill warnings, he declared a “war on terror,” arguing that Iraq’s dictatorial regime had stockpiles of WMDs and nursed terrorist connections.

No WMDs were found in Iraq. No terrorist connections were convincingly established. Many in the world, including IR scholars, argued that the Bush administration had invaded Iraq either as the result of panic or confusion, or as a calculated effort to secure access to the region’s oil reserves. Regardless of reason, the faraway and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wasted America’s soft power and weakened its standing in the world—partly by its ongoing costly military exploits and by its policy of cutting taxes while increasing spending. In the first years of the new millennium, America’s role in the post–Cold War world was increasingly described in terms of empire rather than hegemon: The United States was more commonly seen as an imperialist than as a democratizing force.

Turmoil and wars in the Middle East and Central Asia sparked new energy debates. The Great Powers of the world—with the significant exception of Russia—were deeply reliant on foreign oil, and their dependence presented a serious security risk for each of them. Also, the continued consumption of fossil fuels represented a security risk for them all: Many scientists claim that the burning of oil released such large amounts of carbon gases that it altered the composition of the earth’s atmosphere and changed the global climate—and thus created a security risk of another kind. By the end of Bush’s second term, the United States was still the world’s most powerful country, but it was deeply distrusted. When the American economy entered a deep economic crisis, its image as a leading world power was on the rocks. Fareed Zakaria spoke on behalf of many observers when, in *The Post-American World* (2007), he portrayed the international system as increasingly multipolar, where countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China might represent new centers of power alongside an enfeebled and distrusted United States.

**Conclusion**

The contours of scholarly IR that emerged in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) grew more defined during the subsequent years of imperialist expansion. It came into its own as a scholarly field during World War I, emerging as a branch of
the social sciences in the wake of that Great War. It was then preoccupied with the causes of war and the preconditions for a stable peace.

IR has since added other concerns to its scholarly ambit and evolved as a more varied scholarly field. It has become too varied, according to some observers—especially as IR scholars have engaged in abstract philosophy-of-science theorizing. True, IR may no longer have a sharp and single focus. However, its core concerns are still apparent as a set of overlapping issues, such as war and peace, wealth, and power. And these are maintained by the disciplinary history that marks IR as a scholarly field.

Also, the theoretical foundation of IR has remained fairly constant over time. IR scholars still hang on to their old notion of a pluralist field composed of opposing approaches. The two classic approaches—the Hobbes-based realism and the Locke-derived rationalism—are still dominating the scholarly debate (although both have adapted to the changing world). A third approach has drifted in and out of the field, advocating change and revolution—now in world affairs, now in scholarly approaches, but it has always sought to introduce critical, collectivist, and, one is tempted to add, romantic perspectives to the field. At the beginning of the 21st century, the basic approaches of IR, then, still conform to the three perspectives described by James Lorimer at the end of the 19th century.

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See also Balance of Power; International Law; Liberalism; Realism in International Relations; War and Peace; Westphalian Ideal State

Further Readings

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THEORY

International relations (IR) theory is an area of social theory that seeks to account for international or world political events, patterns, relations, and interactions. Traditionally, as the concept implies, the focus of IR theory has been on the study of interstate relations and interactions: mainly on why states go to war with each other and why, under certain conditions, they may refrain from doing so. Yet it is important to note that in recent decades, the meaning, scope, and the interests driving IR theorists have expanded significantly beyond traditional interstate concerns. This expansion has been driven by the increased awareness of challenging new issues in international politics, such as globalization, human rights, global poverty, environmental threats, and global gender hierarchies. Interest in these issue areas has not only stimulated developments within traditional IR-theoretical approaches, such as realism and liberalism, but it has also seen a significant pluralization within the field to include a host of new perspectives.

When considering the history of IR theory, a subject that first emerged in the aftermath of
World War I and became consolidated in the post–World War II environment, it is notable that the meaning of the notion “IR theory” has developed in two distinct senses over the years: in terms of the perceptions scholars have of the scope of “IR” and, simultaneously, in terms of the meanings attached to the notion “theory.”

Having been a part and parcel of historical, economic, philosophical, or political inquiry during earlier centuries, in the 20th century, IR theory came gradually to form a disciplinary field distinct from other subfields of political science, such as political theory, or a base for theorizing in other social science disciplines, such as sociology, history, or economics. IR theory, as conceived by many commentators in the mid-20th century, focused primarily on state interactions on the level of the international system (not within the state) and in reference, by and large, to political relations (not economic or social relations). However, driven by the increasingly transnational and crosscutting nature of global problems, the boundaries between IR theory and other social sciences have been progressively reconceived by IR theorists during the past few decades. Many IR theorists now analyze phenomena beyond interstate relations and often use concepts and theoretical premises usually characteristic of other fields, whether it be economic analysis, the study of domestic social relations, or ethical or philosophical inquiry. Hence, it is not surprising that the nature of IR theory as a discrete academic subfield has been under some debate recently.

It should also be noted that while the scope of IR has expanded, the meaning of what counts as theory has at the same time shifted within the field. A number of so-called postpositivist scholars have in recent decades turned away from explanatory science, traditionally IR theorists’ main focus, in favor of understanding meanings and ideas in international politics. Thus, different views have arisen of the very meaning of theory. While for some it entails explanatory theory aimed at trying to establish the causes of world political developments, for others it is concerned with interpretive theory, seeking an understanding of why specific ideas or discursive systems of meaning have come to proliferate. In addition, some scholars make the argument that IR theory should primarily be viewed as normative theory (i.e., dealing with questions of “ought” and not just “is”), while others argue that it should function as critical theory (i.e., challenging existing systems of power and oppression in world politics).

Given the contestation over the scope of the subject matter of IR theory and the meaning and purpose of theorizing itself, there is thus no singular conception of IR theory that we can turn to but rather a number of contested visions of it. In view of this, it is important to understand the plurality of ways of framing IR theorizing today. Whereas 40 years ago, three theories of IR were commonly referred to as exhausting the field—realism, liberalism, and either the English School or Marxism—today, a number of critical and postpositivist traditions of thought have entered this field, such as constructivism, critical theory, normative theory, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, feminism, and green theory.

This entry first discusses, in historical perspective, how theoretical arguments have developed around the idea of IR. Second, it discusses the distinct theoretical schools of thought, or isms, commonly conceived to be characteristic of IR theory today, highlighting key issues and themes on which theorists agree and disagree. This discussion is followed, finally, by a brief assessment of key developments in IR theory, with a view to deciphering where future interests and fault lines of IR theorizing might lie.

**IR Theory in Historical Perspective**

The idea that there should be such a thing as IR theory at all is of a relatively recent origin, being in many ways a 20th-century invention. IR theory is a term that arose in the early and mid-20th century with the attempt by a specific set of, mostly Anglo-American, academics to develop systematic theoretical thought to serve as the basis for a newly emerging (sub)field of the social sciences—IR or international politics. While initially conceived as a subject matter for historians, lawyers, or political theorists, the professionalization and institutionalization of academic disciplines during this period also led scholars interested in the empirical domain of IR to establish a discipline of their own, including a set of specific theoretical assumptions and concepts appropriate to its study.

These concepts did not arise from nowhere, however. In fact, many 20th-century IR theorists
have taken their cue from much earlier thinkers. It could be argued that IR theory—that is, the attempt to systematically understand why states or political units go to war with each other or engage in other international forms of social interaction—was first developed in ancient Greece by Thucydides in his account of the Peloponnesian wars. IR was also clearly theorized in the medieval and early-modern periods in various scholastic and republican tracts, perhaps most notably in Niccolo Machiavelli’s writings and in the treatises of those interested in the ethics and legality of war, such as Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius. From these early writings on IR arise not only many of the patterns of thought that continue to characterize IR today, such as the view of IR as power politics, but also many concepts used in current theory, such as the notions of sovereignty or just war. Yet these texts were not explicitly IR-theoretical: They were seen as part and parcel of wider historical, legal, political, or ethical reasoning.

The theorization of IR as we tend to understand it today arose in the 20th century. It is closely tied to the rise of the discipline of IR, which arose also in a very specific context, since it was “invented” to address the problem of war in the aftermath of World Wars I and II. After World War I, an impetus arose to address, urgently and systematically, the question of why states ended up engaging in destructive wars. To study this subject, the first Chair of International Politics was established at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, in 1919, and in the 1920s and 1930s at a few other universities. The focus of postwar IR specialists was thus on developing a systematic understanding of why wars occurred, specifically with the aim of allowing the international society to avoid them in the future. A number of commentators, such as Alfred Zimmern and Leonard Woolf, developed and argued for notions of collective security capable of averting the kind of disaster that World War I had been.

However, the most famous IR theory text that was to arise in the first part of the 20th century came in reply to the interwar commentators. It was written by Edward Carr, the Chair in International Politics at Aberystwyth at this time, and was called the *Twenty Years’ Crisis*. Carr was one of the early key scholars seeking specifically to establish a theoretical understanding of IR. In so doing, he drew attention to the failings of the interwar commentators. He argued that they had been far too “idealistic,” prioritizing normative and utopian ideals instead of recognizing the “realities” of power politics. Carr dismissed these idealists in favor of the development of “realist” theorizing, which took seriously the sources of conflict between states, the role of national interest in shaping states’ actions, and the role of power politics in IR more widely.

Carr played a key role in setting out the theoretical parameters of what became known as realist IR theory, and it is also fair to say that he was instrumental in establishing realism in the post–World War II context. Realist thinking was also strengthened by the onset of the Cold War, which seemed to prove the importance of power politics, as well as by the influence that Hans Morgenthau came to have during this period. In *Politics Amongst Nations*, he argued that international politics is shaped by objective laws based on human nature and, crucially, that the key to understanding IR lies in the idea of interest defined in terms of power. Unlike liberal idealists, he claimed that the actions of states should not be judged in terms of universal moral standards but with reference to the specific interests that states hold and by the need for prudential action on the part of their leaders. Power politics may be necessary in international politics in defense of the national interest.

It is the centrality of power in these early realist analyses that initiated a whole set of fascinating work on the core dilemmas in international politics, notably on the idea of security dilemma, explored initially, for example, by John Herz: How can states cooperate when the attempts of some to gain security inevitably create insecurity in other states?

Although realism became the core strand of thought in Anglo-American IR theory during these years, it was substantially modified as a theoretical system by Kenneth Waltz, who in 1979 made a radical break with the classical realist tradition by modeling the international system in accordance with the methods of positivist science. He characterized this system as one of anarchy, within which all states are conceived as “like units,” interested ultimately in nothing but their own survival. This structural, or neorealist, argument set a new standard in IR. Not only did it reshape realist thought, but it also influenced the work of the new brand of
liberal internationalists in the 1970s, such as Robert Keohane—even though Keohane believed that the self-help logic could be mitigated in international politics through the development of international institutions. In its more classical forms, realism also strongly influenced the so-called English School developed in the United Kingdom (UK); for while the focus here was on the idea of an international society, the realist prioritization of state relations still formed the core of this school.

It is important to note that realists, many liberals, and many English School thinkers share certain important assumptions about what IR theory is and should consist of. Paradoxically, the best statement of this notion of IR theory is provided in Martin Wight’s essay “Why is there no international theory?” Wight was skeptical of the possibility of international theory because of the perception of war as recurrent and inevitable by many and because of the attractions among political scientists of political theory conceived in terms of the “good life”—patterns of thought that, in his view, seemed far removed from the realities of international politics. Yet Wight gave a very clear account of what IR theory should be: It should be concerned exclusively with international and not domestic politics, and it should be able to deal with, although possibly also look beyond, the endless recurrence of war. This was precisely the sort of theory that Edward Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Hedley Bull, Kenneth Waltz, and others developed for the discipline. Despite some methodological disagreements between scholars (the so-called second debate) throughout the 1950s and 1960s, there was substantial agreement on the meaning of the focal point of IR theory, at least in terms of its object of study—state behavior and the explanation of the causes of war and conditions for cooperation. This consensus on the theory of IR broke down, however, in the 1970s and 1980s with the rise of the interparadigm debate and, subsequently, the fourth debate.

The interparadigm debate in the 1970s challenged the classical understandings of IR theory in terms of what the field should focus on. In light of both the oil and the financial crises in the 1970s, two new perspectives gained currency: complex interdependence theory and Marxism. These paradigms were conceived to challenge the realist focus in two respects: First, while accepting the state as a key actor, both refused to reduce all international politics to the pursuit of national interests, instead looking beyond the state to the role of economic factors and nonstate actors; second, they challenged the negative conclusions of the realists, arguing instead that forms of cooperation beyond mere constant struggle for survival was possible. This entailed a challenge to both the dominance of realism and the realist theoretical obsession with survival and brute (military) power; there was now a need also to explain why states cooperated and, for Marxists, why certain patterns of inequality outside mere military relations continued to persist and structure IR.

These echoes critical of realism were picked up and developed even further in the 1980s when a variety of so-called postpositivist theorists started to criticize realism, not just on the basis of its theoretical assumptions about the state but also because of its philosophical, normative, and political leanings. Philosophically, realist theory was accused of positivism in its attempt to establish laws and regularities in international politics as well as objective scientific knowledge of human affairs—goals that were viewed as unfeasible and inappropriate within the social sciences. In addition, realism was condemned normatively and politically for constituting a conservative bulwark for statists and Great Power apologists; it was seen to be reproducing a negative and cynical vision of the world and one that unfairly prioritized the interests of great powers over other parts of the world. Critical theorists extended this criticism to include many liberals as well—those who had accepted some central assumptions of realism, notably with a focus on the self-interested state.

Critical theorists emphasized the need to go beyond problem-solving theory (perceived as central for realists, liberals, and even some Marxists), by unraveling the ways in which theories of IR reproduced particular ideological interests and power relations in the world.

The postpositivist criticism led to the proliferation of a whole new set of IR theories—feminism, constructivism, poststructuralism, and critical theory—and caused the onset of a more theoretically pluralist way of approaching IR theory. Indeed, whereas in the 1970s and mid-1980s many IR theory textbooks highlighted just three traditions of IR theory (realism, liberalism, and either the
English School or Marxism as a third option), today IR theory textbooks cover anywhere between 8 and 14 different theoretical approaches (see Scott Burchill et al., 2005; Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, & Steve Smith, 2007).

IR Theories
Given the plurality of approaches that exists today in IR theory, we must, to understand contemporary IR theory, engage with the theoretical pluralism in the field. With this in mind, this section examines some of the core isms in IR theory today and the issues and debates that divide them.

The Isms
To characterize any field in terms of a set of “isms” is hugely problematic, although often also attractive for cognitive reasons. While this approach is used here, because such a terminology is seen to have distinct advantages in clarifying some of the key divisions of thought on IR theory, this usage also has important problems that need to be kept in mind.

First, it must be remembered that it can be historically misleading to characterize the thought of specific individuals as belonging to unified isms. Thus, for example, as historians of the discipline have noted, idealists in the interwar period were not necessarily unified in their frameworks of thought constituting an ism, and nor were they necessarily idealists. Indeed, the use of the ism label can be a useful way of rhetorically dismissing or sidelining thinkers, and Carr’s attack on idealism can be seen as one such rhetorical attack. Second, it is important to note that isms may be identified on very different grounds in analyses. Thus, in IR theory, some isms may be strictly IR-theoretical isms, such as realism, but others may have much wider meanings alongside their meanings in IR (e.g., constructivism in philosophy and social theory, liberalism in political theory and economic science) or meanings entirely beyond IR (e.g., critical realism in philosophy). Third, and perhaps most crucially, the isms approach to any subject creates the problem of specifying which isms “count.” Talking in terms of isms is one way of justifying and legitimizing some approaches over others and simultaneously of excluding some of them. Now, the approach adopted here to IR theories is expansive, yet it by no means includes within it all the approaches that could be considered IR-theoretical. For example, anarchism is not treated here as a distinct IR-theoretical school, although grounds exist for saying that it might constitute one. It should also be noted that within the approaches adopted here, there are various subdivisions and also that not all authors have consistently throughout their career sought to serve a single and unified idea of an ism.

With all the above caveats in mind, the isms that are discussed here are realism, liberalism, the English School, Marxism, critical theory, feminism, constructivism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, green theory, and normative theory. These constitute the core theoretical strands of thought currently commonly referred to and developed in IR, although they are not isms in the same sense (normative theory, e.g., may be conceived as a subfield of study and poststructuralism as an ethos rather than a theory).

Realism
As pointed out earlier, realism provides the core reference point for much of IR theory. This is not because realism is necessarily correct but because it has played a significant role in the rise of the idea of IR theory and because the very idea of IR conceptually remains tied to key realist assumptions. The core realist assumptions can be defined as threefold. Realist IR theory argues (a) that the state is the core unit of international politics, (b) that the national interests of the state play a crucial role in defining the shape of international politics, and (c) that because of the emphasis of states on survival and self-interest, cooperation between states is difficult to maintain, and war between states is always a danger and likely to be recurrent. While these constitute core assumptions that most realists would agree on, there are important subdivisions within realist thought that need to be considered.

Neorealism is a term coined to refer to those realists who follow Waltz’s reformulation of realism—that is, a theory that bases its analysis on the postulation of a structural impediment to state cooperation, the structure of anarchy in the international system. Given the structural constraint of anarchy, states are predisposed toward self-help
behavior. Classical realists, whom Waltz criticized, explain the causes of war in terms of individualistic or state-based levels or, like Ned Lebow, have turned to the language and theoretical explanations of classical Greeks rather than modern social science to generate explanations of current affairs. Offensive and defensive realisms are strands of thought that both often follow a neorealist or structural-realist theoretical framework, yet they disagree on how states are likely to act in the pursuit of their interests. Defensive realists emphasize that self-help states can satisfy their security by pursuing defensive postures by seeking to balance against rising powers. Offensive realists, drawing on John Mearsheimer’s work, argue that states in a self-help system always strive to maximize their power and to dominate the system and, thus, are inherently offensive in their posture.

**Liberalism**

Liberalism is another core IR theory school. Its basic principles arise from liberal political theory but are extended to the international realm, albeit as with realism, in a variety of different forms. Classical liberals tend to advocate a form of liberal internationalism, believing that the expansion of liberal principles, when more universally embraced, result in more peaceful international interactions. One core doctrine that has arisen from classical liberalism is democratic peace theory, which—drawing on Immanuel Kant’s thought—argues that democratic states are unlikely to wage war with other democratic states.

There are also, however, other strands of liberal IR theorizing. Complex interdependence is a concept launched by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the 1970s. They argued that states by this time had become so interdependent with one another in nonmilitary issue areas, such as the economy and the environment, that this entailed that the typical hierarchization of national security and military capabilities was not necessarily any longer regarded as a top priority on the part of states or that cooperation between states in the other areas was impossible. Neoliberal institutionalism, developed by Keohane and others in the mid-1980s, was, on the other hand, based on the claim that even if one accepts the neorealists’ prioritization of self-interest and anarchy as a given structural condition, it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that states will not cooperate with one another. This is in large part because states often prioritize absolute gains over relative gains and hence can be persuaded to pursue cooperative endeavors in ways that contravene the realist logic. In the case of the European Union, for example, the neoliberals argue that a preference for absolute gains and mutual cooperation has overridden the relative gains logic of the realists.

**The English School**

The English School is a tradition of thought associated with a number of English or U.K.-based scholars who have shared a certain set of methodological and conceptual starting points in the analysis of IR. Key figures here include Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, and John Vincent, and more recently Barry Buzan, Robert Jackson, Nicholas Wheeler, and Tim Dunne. The English School thinkers share a historical and interpretivist approach to IR; that is, they do not tend to apply quantitative methods to the study of IR as many realists and liberals do, but rather, they emphasize the interpretation of the motives, norms, and understandings of actors.

Crucially, they focus conceptually on the theme of international society: The English School conceives of international politics in terms of a rule-bound society of states, which forms an international society in which a set of rules, norms, and institutions are mutually agreed on. English School thinkers are not necessarily cosmopolitans or postrealists, however. In fact, the English School is subdivided into solidarist and pluralist strands. While the solidarists accept the idea of human rights and humanitarian intervention as increasingly important, with mutually accepted rules defining the nature of international society, pluralists continue to maintain a belief in nonintervention and sovereignty as the key principles of international society.

**Marxism and Historical Materialism**

Although Marxism has its roots in the 19th-century writings of Karl Marx, within IR theory, it made a somewhat belated appearance compared with the other social sciences. Although some realists had an interest in Marxism early on (notably
Carr), Marxism entered IR theory debates only in the late 1970s. At that time, it came to be associated in particular with the so-called world systems theory developed by Immanuel Wallerstein. Contra the realists, he argued that the driving dynamics of world politics was economic in nature: The structure of the capitalist mode of production globally is what positioned states within international politics and influenced their interactions. Wallerstein divided the world into the core (West), the semiperiphery (East Asia), and the periphery (the developing world), each zone possessing distinct functions in the global capitalist system of production and hence also in the state system.

World systems theory was heavily criticized for what many perceived to be its overly structural and economistic focus. Yet Marxist ideas have also been developed by others, notably the so-called neo-Gramscian school drawing on Robert Cox and other historical materialists, such as Justin Rosenberg and Mark Rupert. The neo-Gramscian strand of thought is most famous in extending the politico-economic understanding of IR to the analysis of hegemony—that is, the way in which ideological consensus is created and reproduced in IR and how this is tied to specific class or economic interests.

Critical Theory

Critical theory is a multifaceted set of ideas associated with the idea of emancipation and one with origins in the so-called Frankfurt School theory of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Jürgen Habermas. Critical theorists in IR have tended to emphasize the idea of critical theory as distinct from problem-solving theory. Cox famously argued that problem-solving theory fails in being unable to transcend existing social reality by narrowing its focus merely to solving specific technical problems within the parameters of otherwise unquestioned social conditions, whether it be the capitalist system of production, patriarchal gender relations, or narrowly electoral systems of democracy. Contrary to such traditional theorizing, critical theorizing has the aim of challenging and rethinking the ideological premises that exist for the dominant perceptions of reality that make societies function as they do and that blind us to many forms of oppression that we live with on an everyday basis. Critical theory thus aims to go deeper in its critique of societal underpinnings: It seeks the emancipation of people from societal and structural systems of oppression that often go unnoticed in realist and liberal problem-solving theorization. In IR theory, these themes have been developed most notably by Andrew Linklater.

Constructivism

Constructivism starts from the premise that social reality, rather than being fixed and natural, is premised on and depends on the thinking and intersubjective agreement of human actors. This means that social reality, including international political social reality, is socially constructed.

In IR theory, there have been numerous extensions and applications of constructivist theoretical ideas. Wendt’s argument that international anarchy is socially constructed has been one important development of constructivism. Wendt argued that we cannot assume, as the realists do, that the lack of international government necessitates a self-help system. Instead, anarchy is what “states make of it”: That is, those states that have developed relations of trust and shared norms between them are likely to interact in “friendly” ways with each other, even if other states have been socialized into distrust and hence to realist politics of self-help. Others, such as Jeffrey Checkel and Friedrich Kratochwil, have applied constructivism to explain developments such as the end of the Cold War, whereas Martha Finnemore has used it in understanding the expansion of human rights norms. In the post–Cold War setting, constructivism has provided a fruitful way of developing dynamic interpretations of change in world politics.

Yet it is important to note that constructivist ideas can be developed and applied in very different ways. While Wendt’s constructivism is explicitly moderate and seeks to build bridges with the positivist realist and liberal IR scholars, other constructivists, such as Friedrich Kratochwil and Karin Fierke, argue for more extensive interpretive and linguistic forms of constructivism, where the idea of social construction is recognized as a deep-running aspect not just of social forms “out there” but also of our explanatory categories themselves. Constructivism, we must recognize then, is no united theoretical camp, and indeed, various subdivisions have been
recognized to exist within this broad school (moderate or “thin” constructivism vs. radical or “thick” constructivism; American vs. continental constructivism).

**Feminism**

Feminism emerged in IR in the late 1980s but has been a rather contested addition to the field. This is because feminism tends not to study IR as classically conceived. Cynthia Enloe famously argued that feminists are concerned not only with the international but also with the way in which the international is penetrated and constituted by the personal. International power relations for feminists are built on a whole set of global and domestic interpersonal power relations. Thus, relations between husband and wife in a diplomatic family or between Western consumer women and women working in the “feminized” garment industry in Indonesia are global relations of power too and important for making the world of international politics go around as it does.

Feminists argue that if social actors are really socially constructed, as many constructivists and others have argued, then IR theorists must also recognize that social actors and social relations are also constructed in gendered ways. Indeed, IR, feminists argue, has been constructed as a field of masculine actors pursuing masculine aims. Not only have women been silent in the discipline and practice of diplomacy, but they have also been an uninteresting area of study and simply do not seem to matter for IR theory as traditionally conceived. However, if theory and IR are conceptualized differently—as analysis interpersonally constituted in the form of global (rather than merely international) relations of power—then perhaps there is much more to IR and many more layers of power than traditional IR theory recognizes. This is what the feminists, through various interesting studies of war, tourism, the sex industry, and peace building, have tried to demonstrate.

**Poststructuralism**

Poststructuralism has been an influential force in the field since the 1980s, especially in Europe. Yet this is a difficult approach to label, in that many of its advocates reject any *ism* label as a valid description of their approach. Nevertheless, scholars such as James Der Derian, Jenny Edkins, David Campbell, and R. B. J. Walker do seem to share certain assumptions that distinguish them from other IR theorists and that could be termed poststructuralist in nature. Their key contribution is that they take the epistemological critique of positivist knowledge to its fullest conclusion: They highlight that instead of an analysis of international politics “out there” (the ontology of international politics), we should study the discourses that make particular realities (or ontologies) seem natural. In short, for them, international politics is what it is because people accept particular discursive ways of understanding what IR consists of. This is why IR theorists should be aware of how international political actors and IR theorists themselves, by working with particular theoretical notions, come to reproduce or bring into existence particular “realities.” This insight has been applied in fruitful ways: Poststructuralists have studied, for example, how discourses of “othering” create enemies in IR or how discourses of nationalism and ethnicity construct wars and civil strife.

Another key aspect of this theoretical stance is its refusal to advocate a specific set of political or policy convictions; positive, “truth-bound” ethical and political positions characteristic of realist, liberal, and Marxist and critical theory schools of thought are seen as dangerous in world politics. Instead, they advocate an attitude of critique and inquiry over assertive statements of truth, knowledge, and action. Thus, as Campbell has argued, poststructuralism is not a specific theoretical or political account of what world politics should look like but rather a critical ethos of approaching the analysis of IR, which places emphasis on deconstructing existing schools of thought (see Campbell in Dunne et al., 2007).

**Postcolonialism**

Postcolonialism is a line of thought that in many ways shares in the poststructuralist skepticism of “true” and “objective” knowledge claims. Knowledge claims, they argue, have tended to exclude and marginalize many parts of the world as “uncivilized,” “barbaric,” and hence legitimately “governed,” with significant consequences for the colonized or the developing states and
populations. Postcolonialism has as its building block the realization that knowledge is always produced from somewhere, from particular social and political conditions, and that knowledge makers can often be unaware of the way in which their knowledge creates the “self” and the “other”—that is, how it constructs visions of ourselves and how it might exclude or silence “the others.” Edward Said famously argued that in Western knowledge of the Middle East, for example, an Oriental subject was considered as a particular kind of inferior, barbaric individual, while the West was idealized as civilized, peaceful, and educated. The key aim of postcolonialism is to challenge such biased readings, whether it be in international law, democratization, or gender relations/analysis.

Green Theory

Green theory provides another important, and for many a timely, corrective to the way in which IR theorists have framed and thought about the nature of world politics. Green theorists challenge the assumption that the “high politics” of international politics concerns matters of interstate war, highlighting instead the inherent and deeply challenging nature of environmental risks as a crucial aspect of contemporary world politics. Green theorists also challenge the ecology-blind or ecology-unfriendly frameworks of theoretical thought that have dominated the discipline. They seek to direct us to consider the ways in which anthropocentric assumptions about humans and nature have informed IR theorizing to the exclusion of values of interconnectivity with nature. There are various strands of green thought and theorizing, extending from more limited engagements with environmental thinking to “deep ecological” frameworks.

Normative Theory

Normative theory is a subfield of IR theorizing (rather than a specific school of thought as such) that specializes in understanding the different normative and ethical underpinnings that are given for actions or interpretations in IR. Normative theory was ignored in the discipline by the realists and neoliberals, who conceived of the study of international politics in purely explanatory and value-neutral terms. Normative theorists have been at pains to point out that normative assumptions about what is desirable or good are constantly made by IR scholars—even when theorists are incognizant of such normative assumptions. Thus, normative theorists have pointed out, for example, that realists argue not just for a particular explanatory account of the causes of war but also implicitly in so doing for a communitarian ethic, which sees the state as a key moral community in international politics. Normative theory scholarship sometimes also goes under the title *international political theory or international ethics*, terms that, while not interchangeable with the idea of normative theory, also indicate the considerations and intersections of normative thought with political theory and international law as well as ethics. One of the key issues in international political theory and in international ethics has been the question of just war: that is, what constitutes just behavior in conditions of war and in justifications for war. Other key questions concern global poverty and the duties of redistribution of wealth globally, as well as an engagement with the normative implications of dealing with climate change.

Themes That Divide IR Theorists

As seen above, there are a number of and diverging approaches that one can take in theorizing about IR. This section briefly highlights the core differences between these on certain key issues.

The Scope of the Field

As previously mentioned, a key line of division in IR theory during the past few decades has concerned the scope of the study of IR. The classical thinkers, realists, liberals, and the English School thinkers had a clear sense of the scope of the discipline: It focused exclusively on the question—the core focus of IR—of why states go to war or why they decide to cooperate. Yet in the 1980s, a plurality of challenges to the state centrim of IR theorizing emerged. Critics, from feminists, to poststructuralists, to postcolonialists, have argued that IR encompasses not just interstate relations but also the transnational politics of trade, the ideological construction of states, the nature of policies and polities, and interpersonal global relations of power.
With this development, there has also been a strong tendency in recent years to import into IR theory assumptions, knowledge, data, and models from other social sciences. This is evident both from the increased popularity of positivist approaches, within which rational choice theorizing, an interdisciplinary movement in the social sciences, has played an important role, and from the emergence of feminist, Marxist, and poststructuralist forms of thought. There has been an expansion within all these theoretical schools in cross- and interdisciplinary research, although some doubts still remain as to just how much IR theorists are listened to in other fields.

These interdisciplinary moves have generally been welcomed within IR, but they have also led to discussions about the boundaries of IR. Indeed, what is IR theory today as opposed to economic, sociological, or political theory? There is no fixed answer among IR theorists at present, which has given IR theory as a discipline something of a brittle basis. Indeed, some have argued that IR theory as a project has failed and that we would be better off doing away with the idea of IR theory as a separate body of thought and to engage in general social theorizing instead. Alternatively, many argue, we should rename the field and its theories by using the terms world politics or global sociology. So displeased have some scholars become with the parochial insistence of some IR theorists on the discreteness of the field that they have abandoned the discipline to engage theoretically with sociologists, economists, lawyers, or historians instead.

Yet the social structure of IR persists. As Ole Wæver has suggested, IR theory is not just an abstract academic exercise but also a social structure within academia. IR labels, approaches, and positions continue to structure the research of academic scholarship, arguments, and careers, as well as teaching. Indeed, given the deep entrenchment of IR and IR-theoretical “identities” in academia as well the intellectual benefits of teaching IR in terms of a set of discreet theoretical perspectives, IR theory still exists and continues to be framed as by and large distinct if linked to other social-scientific perspectives.

Philosophy of Science, Methods, and Epistemology

Another clear line of division in IR theory has revolved around the idea of positivism—that is, around the claim that IR can and should be studied by means of scientific methods aimed at finding regular patterns of behavior and interaction and that IR scholarship can and ought to be objective and value-neutral. The methods of knowledge construction in IR have always been a subject of debate in IR, and positivism has not always been influential. Carr and Morgenthau, for example, were strong advocates of a historical and interpretivist approach and adverse to positivist attempts to systematize IR into a study of regular patterns and variables. It was only by the 1960s and 1970s that a positivist (or behavioralist) worldview obtained a strong foothold in American IR, and as a result, there has been a distinct turn within it toward systematization and the observational testing of theories.

Despite the central position of positivism within IR, the postpositivist movement of recent decades has posed a strong challenge to this philosophy of science. Indeed, the third and fourth debates in IR were brought on by the head-on collision between mainstream American IR scholars’ advocacy of positivist language and methods, on the one hand, and the claim by many critical theorists (many of them outside the United States), on the other, that this view of science was blind to many important theoretical developments and unfairly delegitimized approaches that did not conform to its research agenda.

The sharp dichotomization on how to generate knowledge in IR (a question that involves differences in philosophy of science, epistemology, and methodology) was given both an explanation and in some senses a justification by Martin Hollis and Steve Smith’s famous Explaining and Understanding International Relations, which argued that there is a fundamental philosophical dualism at work in the social sciences, including IR, which makes it impossible to reach an agreement on whether the aim of IR should be generalization (positivism) or interpretive understanding (postpositivism). Both approaches, Hollis and Smith argued, have their strengths and their weaknesses, but they remain mutually exclusive. Hollis and Smith’s “two-stories account” has had a strong impact during the past few decades, especially in Europe. Nevertheless, it has been challenged, notably in the form of the so-called critical-realist movement, which seeks to transcend the polarization of positivist and postpositivist
scholarship by advancing a new philosophy of science that is critical of both the objectivism of positivism and the relativist excesses of some forms of postpositivism.

**Theory Versus Practice**

There has also been a deep disagreement among IR theorists about the aims of IR theorizing. Notably, there is a division in the discipline between those that see a strong policy-making role for IR theory and those who would like to refrain from excessive interaction with policymakers and their particular interests.

A famous exchange between William Wallace, Ken Booth, and Steve Smith during 1996 to 1997 brought out the dynamics of the theory-versus-practice debate very well. While for Wallace IR as a discipline had become too abstractly theoretical, with many (especially critical) theorists retreating to their ivory towers and disengaging from policy making, for Booth and Smith the problem was that (a) not all academics, from all theoretical schools of thought, would be freely invited to engage with policymakers because of the inherent biases and interests that drive decision making and (b) the practice of teaching and creating alternative views of knowledge could itself be seen as a form of political practice, potentially being more influential than entering into the halls of power.

There seems to be no solution to the theory–practice dilemma in contemporary IR theory, but the accusation that IR theory is too abstract to be useful continues to be made by some scholars and policymakers. At the same time, some theorists complain of policymakers’ lack of interest in alternative ways of framing and understanding problems. The picture is in other words mixed: While some IR theorists are closely engaged in policy making, others have decided not to engage with, or are pushed out from, policy-making circles.

**Trends in IR Theory**

As emphasized and exemplified above, IR theory is strongly characterized by theoretical pluralism. But what are the key debates in IR theory at present and what are they likely to be in the future? This is a difficult question, for it depends on whom one asks and where one looks.

Interestingly, it seems that there are distinct geographical differences in what kinds of IR theory are seen as preponderant or promising. In the United States, it is fair to say that realism and liberalism in their neo-forms, as well as increasingly in their more classical forms (neoclassical realism and Kantian liberalism), play a key role. Realism and liberalism are arguably dominant also in debates on IR in China and Russia. In addition, constructivist analysis is increasingly being taken seriously in the mainstream American context. Indeed, it seems that currently these three theoretical schools—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—usefully cross-fertilize each other.

Yet, curiously, while this triumvirate of theoretical approaches dominates and frames debates in key journals such as *International Organization* and *International Studies Quarterly*, it could also be argued that increasingly, theoretical debates are currently being conducted largely *within* and not just between these theoretical schools. Indeed, much of realist debate at present concentrates on arguments between offensive and defensive realists, and neoliberals have also turned inward to discuss different ways of understanding institutional logics. Thus, there is a curious fragmentation of debates in IR, as Wæver has pointed out (see his chapter in Dunne et al., 2007).

Different perspectives tend to dominate in Europe. First, it is notable that constructivism is very popular in Europe, especially in Germany but also within the UK. Yet in both the UK and on the Continent the scene is also more varied. Realists tend to be few, while critical theorists of various persuasions have a strong position in the field. In the UK, for example, Marxism and Gramscian thought still play key roles in debates, as does critical theory, both in its classical and poststructuralist formulations.

IR theory, albeit sometimes in fragmented forms, continues to be developed and reconfigured. However, it seems to develop in different ways in different geographical contexts. This is partly because IR theory does not develop in a vacuum: Like any social theory, it is tied to specific social and political contexts and interests. With this in mind, it is important to note that IR theory continues to be mainly an Anglo-American discipline and that theoretical voices from Latin America, Africa, or Asia are rarely listened to, and
they certainly do not structure the field (but often seek to fit in it).

In any case, and despite its many failings and silences, IR theory is by no means on its deathbed. As Alexander Wendt and Duncan Snidal, the editors of the new International Theory journal, have argued, in many ways international theorizing is at its liveliest at the present juncture: There is a great deal of work being done in different traditions, and different theoretical tools are used by the scholars involved. Moreover, IR theory continues to be firmly embedded in the social and institutional structures of academia. In other words, it continues in being a placeholder—even if a contested one—for many scholars trying to grapple with international and world political trends as well as with the plurality of approaches being used by their colleagues to explain these.

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See also Anarchy; Constructivism in International Relations; Critical Theory in International Relations; Feminist Theory in International Relations; Idealism in International Relations; History; International Relations as a Field of Study; Liberalism in International Relations; Positivism; Realism in International Relations; War and Peace

Further Readings

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A FIELD OF STUDY

The field of international relations (commonly abbreviated IR) focuses on a variety of subjects. The many connotations that are usually associated with the term *relations* (one of the most under-specified terms in the field itself) and the aesthetic quality that accompanies relating the name of the field (IR) to a broad set of subjects subsumed under the same term in lowercase letters, “international relations,”

Note: Due to limitations of space, the number of references had to be restricted. A fully referenced version of this article is available at http://www.soz.uni-frankfurt.de/hellmann/mat/IPSA.pdf.
relations,” help explain why both IR and international relations are still widely accepted. Of course, this is not to say that there is consensus. Both the name of the field and the description of its subject matter(s) have always been contested. Different observers have argued that international ought to be replaced by interstate, transnational, or global—to name just a few. Others would like to see relations replaced by studies or politics. A brief look at some of these alternative combinations—for example, “interstate relations,” “transnational politics,” or “global studies”—would give any reader a quick idea as far as different emphases are concerned, even if he or she is not familiar with the normative and theoretical underpinnings that inform these alternative descriptions of the field of study and its subject matter(s). For this reason, conceptual contestation is unsurprising; it is already an expression of the inevitable and recurring ascertainment of the borders of a field of study by the community of scholars belonging to it and claiming it as their own.

In the case of IR, contestation extends well beyond the question of how a rather loosely defined field of study—or “fragmented ‘nonfield’” (James Rosenau, 1993)—is to be properly named. Especially in the English-speaking world, IR is sometimes defined in terms of an academic discipline of its own, separate from political science, or as a multidisciplinary field of study. On a global scale, however, this is not normally the case. Here, it is usually considered to be one of the major subfields (or subdisciplines) of political science. Even if the term discipline may sometimes be used interchangeably with field of study, it is meant in the sense of a more loosely defined field that keeps the outer borderlines both fairly fluid and permeable while, at the same time, emphasizing that its core is more clearly demarcated and in some ways also more stable. Of course, any such characterization of the field is in itself contestable. More specifically, two caveats need to be kept in mind with regard to any exercise in “mapping” a field of study. First, as Hilary Putnam put it, any such overview necessarily involves a particular “view from somewhere” that is shaped by specific individual and cultural formative experiences. Even if this view of IR is shaped by an environment that allows for pluralism with regard to normative commitments, theoretical orientations, and methodological preferences, it is inevitably limited by what IR scholarship is actually accessible via particular languages and academic infrastructures. The academic infrastructure of IR is lacking in crucial respects when measured against the ideal of a global discipline that is living up to the spread, reach, and interconnections of its subject matter. Second, there is also an inevitable temporal dimension of contestation. Any overview of IR as a field of study necessarily resembles a snapshot of the field at a particular point in time and will, almost inevitably, be the view of how the discipline used to operate in the past. This notion of IR as an evolving and historically situated field becomes strikingly clear when one compares similar overviews of the field in approximately 10-year intervals from the early 1920s onward. Not only do descriptions of the subject matter change. Rather, change is ubiquitous with regard to the borderlines drawn to other (sub)fields and the names used to denote and demarcate the field’s most prominent theories. Therefore, this overview ought to be seen as a “disciplining” exercise in the dual sense of the word. It is supposed to provide a perspective on the structure of the discipline and familiarize the reader with some of the prominent conventions, theories, and practices of the field of IR as they are currently viewed in the field in terms of a history of the present. At the same time, it ought to be kept in mind that the very concept of scholarship points at moving beyond these conventions, theories, and practices. By de-emphasizing disciplinary stability in favor of an evolutionary perspective, this way of proceeding does not deny that a structural view of the discipline may be useful. As a matter of fact, it is—and such a structural perspective will be applied in the first section of this overview. However, looking at the discipline with a bird’s-eye perspective necessarily emphasizes the big picture and will thus almost inevitably appear fairly static. The second, shorter section of this entry therefore applies a more historical and dynamic perspective depicting the field as an expanding one along many frontiers simultaneously.

The Structure of Global International Relations

What a field is made up of in terms of intellectual substance—that is, its conceptualization of the subject matter, its theories, and its understandings
of appropriate procedures in producing knowledge—is not dictated by the subject matter itself. Rather, it results from the interplay of specific social structures (such as institutional arrangements along disciplinary lines within universities or structures of communication in the form of journals, etc.) and intellectual structures (i.e., what counts as knowledge and how different bodies of knowledge connect to make up a discipline). Both are closely interconnected. As far as the social structure of IR is concerned, Ole Wæver (2007) has argued that it is best viewed as “a mix of a U.S./global system and national/regional ones with varying degrees of independence” (p. 296). Thus, two elements are characteristic of IR in terms of its global structure. First, IR in the United States is predominantly North American IR and global IR. Second, other IR communities show a great variety in terms of size and intellectual traditions. However, what is most noticeable from a global perspective is the extent to which they relate to IR in the United States. This is another way of saying that Stanley Hoffmann’s (1977) famous line about IR being “an American social science” reverberates until today. Yet although the dominance of American IR remains clearly visible, a broad-brush global perspective on disciplinary developments would stress the distinction between the West and the non-West rather than the United States versus the rest. One of the distinguishing marks of the current developmental stage of IR from a global and evolutionary perspective may well be its post-Western and its post-Westphalian character. However, from a bird’s-eye view of the structures of the discipline, the West seems very well entrenched.

Size and Power

Admittedly, the IR community in the United States still plays in a league of its own. Just in terms of sheer size, it easily outdistances that of any other country by multiples. A 2009 survey by Richard Jordan, Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson, and Michael Tierney counted more than 4,100 IR scholars in the United States with an active affiliation with a university, college, or professional school. (As of early 2009, the American Political Science Association listed close to 4,700 members who had identified IR as their “general field.”) Although similarly detailed figures are not available for many countries, a very rough estimate based on a variety of sources would probably put the U.S. share of IR scholars around the world at approximately 25% to 30%. Another 15% to 25% could probably be added for Canada, Europe, Israel, and Australasia, putting the Western share of global IR production capacity at 40% to 55% overall.

Although the size of academic communities is an important structural feature, in and of itself it says little about the global structure of IR in terms of institutional, structural, and productive power. Yet even if one adds such a perspective, it is fairly clear that the United States occupies the most influential position at the center, with European IR communities plus Israel and Australasia forming an appendix to the core that tries to establish a somewhat more independent profile (and has partly succeeded in doing so). Three observations are noteworthy in this context. First, the institutional and structural power of U.S. IR is reflected in how IR scholars in other parts relate to it. For IR scholars in Western Europe, Israel, and South Asia, and to a lesser degree in East-Central Europe and some parts of Latin America, gaining recognition in the United States (i.e., in U.S.–based IR journals in particular) continues to be a crucial element for professional advancement compared with IR scholars elsewhere. Since the editors of key journals are drawn largely from the IR community in the United States, scholars aiming at being published in these journals have to address the concerns of this community. Yet as many studies have shown, the theoretical debates in the United States are largely driven by American foreign policy concerns, not broader global concerns. A 2009 survey by Tom Biersteker of the assigned or required readings for PhD candidates specializing in IR in the 10 leading U.S. departments of political science showed that, on average, 94% of the assigned readings were written by scholars who have spent most or all of their careers in the United States. As a result, the segment of global IR scholarship that aims at the most prestigious journals in the field will inevitably face editors whose academic careers have been largely shaped by U.S. concerns. Non-American Western IR scholars are more likely to be able to meet the expectations of these editors, and to the extent that their work is actually being published, it is therefore also more likely to speak
to an agenda shared by Western societies and states. The same applies vice versa for the increasing number of U.S. scholars being published in European peer-reviewed journals such as *European Journal of International Relations* and *Journal of International Relations and Development*. Although the differences between the United States, on the one hand, and Europe and Australasia, on the other, are noteworthy and have often been described, these differences fade away against the many similarities if one contrasts IR research practices and priorities in the West as a whole with those in the non-West.

The second observation extends the emphasis on disciplinary autonomy within largely national borders from the United States to the global level. Although the orientation toward the United States and its standards of IR scholarship in a fairly small (though influential) set of countries reinforces American dominance, it is by far not a universal phenomenon. A global structure dominated by Western standards of science and thematic agendas coexists with significant degrees of local autonomy in IR communities around the world, according to Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver. For a field focusing on phenomena that by their very nature transcend national boundaries, it is noteworthy how parochial (or detached from a truly global discourse) all IR communities are around the world. This is amply visible in an almost universal preoccupation with the foreign policy agendas of the respective countries. In the context of the United States and intellectually linked IR communities such as Europe, this concern is embedded in or dominated by an explicit theoretical framing of specific problems. In many other countries where the intellectual structure of the discipline is less dominated by the imperatives of theory production, these foreign policy agendas often translate quite directly into research agendas. Therefore, a certain parochialism seems to be an almost inevitable and universal characteristic of IR globally. In part, this is also due to the fact that the social structures of the academy have their own life and in many ways follow national patterns. Sometimes national IR communities may be clustered into regional groups with distinct characteristics, such as an “Anglo-American” way of doing IR or a “Continental” one. However, national profiles often remain clearly visible. For instance, even a quick look at the social and intellectual structure of IR in Italy, France, Germany, and the Netherlands immediately reveals remarkable differences as well as similarities in the relatively narrow space of the European continent. In a longer historical perspective, however, the patterns of academic institutionalization and professionalization of IR during the 20th century have also converged, often following the American model of treating IR as a more or less integral part or subdiscipline of political science.

Third, it certainly matters whether one pursues (more or less parochial) IR concerns in the United States, Britain, Denmark, China, Thailand, Nigeria, or Brazil, to name just a few sites. Although this entry is not the place for a detailed analysis of the global social structure of IR (on this, see Tickner & Wæver, 2009), three layers of IR communities can be distinguished in terms of power, international connectedness, and international visibility.

**International Relations as a Three-Tiered Discipline**

**The Dominance of U.S.–American IR**

As mentioned before, first, the IR community in the United States stands out in terms of size and power. In the United States, whether or not an IR scholar engages with or is knowledgeable about IR elsewhere has little influence with regard to professional advancement, and thus, U.S. scholars may neglect the rest of the IR world. Second, to the extent that other IR communities relate to U.S. discourses, many largely emulate or implicitly follow the U.S. model and the theories propagated there. This can be taken by some IR scholars as evidence of the institutional and productive power exercised by American IR or even as evidence that the American way of doing IR is the “right” way. Third, to the extent that IR communities in other countries are essentially decoupled from U.S. (and thus globally dominant) discourses, this is mostly due to the fact that local political concerns dominate research agendas and that theory (as defined in the U.S.-dominated discourse) is largely irrelevant. Therefore, IR scholars from the United States may find little incentive to investigate IR in such states. Against this background, it is worth emphasizing that the International Studies Association (ISA)—the most important professional organization of
IR/international studies around the globe that originated in the United States and still largely comprises U.S. scholars as members—has been quite supportive of efforts to build up professional structures of academic communication beyond it. Yet despite these efforts, ISA conventions—one of the premier sites of intellectual exchange about IR on the global stage—have largely remained intra-Western scholarly exchanges. Whereas a systematic analysis of attendance patterns at the ISA conventions in Toronto (1997), Portland (2003), and New York (2009), based on the institutional origin of the respective scholars attending, shows a noteworthy increase of European Union–European scholars (16% in 1997, 15% in 2003, and 25% in 2009) relative to North American scholars (United States plus Canada: 76% in 1997, 74% in 2003, and 62% in 2009), there was essentially no change if one compared attendance along a Western versus non-Western distinction (see Figure 1).

The Second Tier of Semivisible IR Communities

Compared with U.S. insularity, the situation is quite different if one looks at IR from a global perspective with regard to a second category of IR communities, such as Britain, China, Denmark, or Canada. As different as these IR communities are in terms of university systems, professional incentive structures, and national traditions and as much as the American dominance may be resented in some quarters there, many of the influential IR scholars in these countries do (have to) relate to American IR in one way or another, if only by distancing themselves as to the way IR is done in the United States. Therefore, what distinguishes these communities from the U.S. IR community, on the one hand, and a third category of peripheral IR communities, on the other, is a medium level of international visibility. International visibility (defined in terms of a certain amount of recognition by other scholars around the world) may result from very different sources, such as the natural advantage of communicating in the lingua franca (as in the case of British IR) and/or the recognition by significant others that the work published in these communities matters, be it for purely academic reasons or due to other considerations.

a. Among the latter, one can single out the phenomenon of national “schools” of IR, which provide for a specific variant of this second type of IR communities with a medium level of international visibility. The so-called English School, for instance, represents a conscious effort on the part of scholars in the United Kingdom (UK) to establish the idea of an international “society of states” as a distinct theoretical concept synthesizing elements that have been assigned in American IR to competing (realist and liberal) schools of thought. In contrast to American IR, the English School scholarship exhibits a deep-seated skepticism vis-à-vis the “scientific” study of international relations and accordingly pays much more attention to historical processes. These substantive differences notwithstanding, insiders have argued that the English School essentially marks “a delayed response to Britain’s loss of Empire and world status” (Richard Little, 2008, pp. 685–686). In forming such a school, however, Britain’s IR community has not only tried to come to terms with the changed international role of the UK. It has also left a mark of distinction vis-à-vis the quasi-hegemonic U.S. discourse, thereby establishing a widely recognized corporate IR identity globally. IR communities in
other countries that are habitually ranked among the “great powers” (e.g., Russia, Japan, and China) are increasingly engaged in debates whether or not to establish national schools similar to the English School (even South Korea is contemplating such a strategic move). China is the most obvious and most noteworthy case, both because of the size of the country and due to the Eastern tradition. Influential Chinese scholars nowadays openly advocate the establishment of a “Chinese School of IR Theory” as an “inevitable” step in the maturation of Chinese IR (Yaquing Qin, 2007). Yet as in the case of the English School, the emphasis on building such a distinct Chinese school on a set of core assumptions about the “material world” and the “speculative world,” distinct from dominant IR theories in the West in general and the United States in particular, only reinforces the picture of the global preeminence of a particular U.S.-led type of theorizing centered on realist theory and its competitors as well as on rationalist and constructivist approaches to doing IR from an epistemological and/or methodological point of view. It is against this background that scholars from non-Western IR communities feel at least uncomfortable if not offended if they are asked why they have not yet come up with some IR theory of their own. A special issue of the journal International Relations of the Asia-Pacific carried the question “Why is there no non-Western IR theory?” quite prominently in the title (Amitav Acharya & Barren Buzan, 2007). To be sure, the whole thrust of the project was based on the intention to stimulate a debate about and the development of non-Western IR theory in Asia. Yet the way the question was framed already carried a specific understanding as to what good IR is all about—that is, that it ought to put a premium on theory, that it is fairly obvious what distinguishes theory from nontheory, and that IR communities in states such as China are not (yet) doing enough good theory. Judging from recent trends, some segments in countries such as China appear willing to take up this challenge. In part, this is due to a spreading realization among IR scholars that IR theories (broadly defined) do not only structure our view of the world in a very basic sense but that they are also tools for governing the world. In this analysis, both the world and IR often appear as if governed by the United States. Empirical analyses by Chinese scholars show that this power of disciplinary socialization via Western, especially U.S., theory discourses works even in a country such as China with a large IR community and a very distinct and old tradition of its own. For instance, with the exception of one book, all of the 86 IR books translated into Chinese by five leading publishers since 1990 were originally written in English, and the overwhelming majority of these books had American IR scholars as authors. Thus, even if a Chinese school of IR drawing heavily on distinctly Chinese traditions emerges eventually, it will have been mediated via theory as practiced in the English-speaking, mostly U.S.-dominated, Western world of IR.

b. A similar mixture of orientation toward American IR while tying IR scholarship back to local concerns and intellectual traditions is observable in a second variant of internationally more visible IR communities. Some IR communities in Western and East-Central Europe and in Israel belong to this group. What unites them in terms of institutional, structural, and productive power is that they can only draw in rather limited ways on the advantages that the British or the Chinese IR communities enjoy. While IR scholars in significant numbers in these communities publish in English, this is certainly not the case for all of them (as is the case in the UK). Also, in contrast to China, none of these states are expected to play a crucial role politically in the years to come in order to pay special attention to their possibly unique ways of doing IR research. Moreover, in contrast to the UK or China, most of these IR communities neither have the size nor the ambition to establish distinct national schools of IR. Still, in some countries, substantive research programs, such as the Copenhagen School of security studies, have gained international recognition as distinct approaches well beyond the regional context. In the case of the Copenhagen School’s “securitization” research program, distinction was achieved with a more focused approach (in terms of both the theoretical scope and the substantive ground covered as far as the subject matter was concerned) than what is usually subsumed under the much broader label of a “paradigm” in the U.S. context. Debates in such communities are similar to those in the United States in putting a premium on theoretical work. However, even though theory debates in the
United States are at least taken note of in most of these, they are not (or no longer) simply replicated. Rather, an increasing amount of IR in Europe, Australia, New Zealand, or Canada is by now often inspired by philosophical and/or social science traditions and research practices distinct from those present in IR debates in the United States. Here, they are increasingly dominated by rational choice and formal modeling. Since these are not easily exportable, dominant U.S. theory preferences entail a “de-Americanization of IR elsewhere” (Wæver, 1998). Another way to put this is to point to an ever-present, often largely ignored and now rediscovered, cultural specificity (e.g., in French IR); an intra–Anglo-Saxon divide between “post-Imperial ‘crimson’ locales,” on the one hand (made up essentially of Britain, Canada, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand), and the United States, on the other; and, more generally, the newfound “autonomy” in Europe of a specific “Continental” brand of Western IR or at least a claim of an “intrafamilial emancipation” (e.g., in Germany). To the extent that this type of work gains international recognition, this is seldom due to the size of the respective IR community, the respective country’s global political significance, or other such factors pointed to by science studies. Rather, genuine intellectual appeal and/or resonance appears to be more closely associated with quantitative as well as qualitative output resulting from comparative advantages in terms of sheer resources available and devoted to the task (as in the field of European studies) and the fact that some of the original theory products travel fairly easily to other regions (as in the case of securitization theory). Moreover, in the European context, in particular, the international visibility of European studies and distinct approaches such as the Copenhagen School has been enhanced by the establishment of several new journals (many of which are published in English). Some of these, such as the European Journal of International Relations, have quickly established themselves among the leading journals in the field globally. These successes and differences between the United States and other Western IR communities notwithstanding, it needs to be emphasized that the non-U.S. West offers a broad variety of intellectual profiles, not all of which are as much interested in connecting via English-language publications internationally as are, for instance, IR scholars in the English-speaking world, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, or Germany. As a matter of fact, sizable communities with original theoretical work, such as the French, are quite detached from the rest of the West and have fairly little impact globally. Thus, geographical location is not necessarily a good indicator of whether an IR community may achieve international visibility.

In any case, from a power perspective, few non-Western IR communities can be counted to the semiperiphery of the second tier. Even Japan, with its sizable IR community and conscious institutional efforts at increasing its visibility globally—recently by establishing the peer-reviewed English-language journal International Relations of the Asia-Pacific—neither has much of an impact globally nor has succeeded in establishing a distinct Japanese IR profile, according to Takashi Inoguchi. China currently seems to be the only serious candidate for such a rise to the semiperiphery, or to put it less pejoratively, only China appears able in the medium to long term to engage in competition with the West for productive power in actually “constructing the world” in a language and in theories that are distinctly Chinese. Yet even sympathetic observers remain somewhat skeptical about whether a distinct and globally visible Chinese school of IR might indeed be established.

The Third Tier: Sizable and (Self-)Marginalized

The third group of IR communities is both the largest (in terms of the number of national IR communities belonging to it) and the most isolated and marginalized (in terms of international visibility and power). As a matter of fact, one of the expressions of its marginalization is that much less “is known” about these IR communities compared with the two other groups. In part, this is because scholars from the other two groups, who are usually instrumental in producing such international visibility due to disciplinary power structures, normally pay little attention to the research conducted there. Indeed, one could easily turn the complaint (sometimes heard in the non-U.S. West) that American IR treats research originating in Europe, Canada, or Australasia with indifference against the plaintiffs themselves since the same pattern of ignorance may be observed in their relationship to
most IR communities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (many of which have, of course, suffered through European colonization). In part, however, marginalization also results from the self-conscious separation or self-reliance of IR communities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America or from these countries simply refraining from engaging in IR research. Some of the IR communities in this third group (such as the Indian or Brazilian) are fairly sizable, though not necessarily tightly organized professionally, as their counterparts are in the United States or Europe. Many others are tiny, with no professional organization whatsoever. In quite a few third-tier countries, IR as an academic (sub)discipline is not even present at universities or—to the extent that it actually is present—is largely characterized by the dominance of research questions that reflect the respective countries’ foreign policy agenda. As a matter of fact, there is often a very close connection between the foreign policy establishments and official state institutions in these countries, on the one hand, and IR departments, on the other, since the latter often exist primarily because they are expected to supply future diplomats for the respective foreign services. Theory-oriented research as practiced and cherished in the West does not play much of a role here. Theory—conceived of in very general terms as a necessary precondition for reality-constituting observation—is ever present. Yet it transpires largely implicitly in empirical analyses. The prime research objective is seldom theorizing as such. Moreover, against the foil of Western theory discourses, this implicit form of theory application carries more realist than nonrealist themes. A similar observation can be made with regard to the role of methods. Where the role models of Western IR scholarship call for methodological reflection at a minimum (and often excel in offering highly sophisticated methods that are understood and applied by very small communities of scholars), the requirements for methodological rigor and metareflection in third-tier countries are much less stringent. Typically, academic publications display a combination of some form of institutional and/or historical analysis without engaging in a justificatory argument as to why a particular method or form of presentation has been chosen or rejected.

From a structural perspective, there is fairly little intellectual exchange both among third-tier communities and between them and IR communities from the first and second tiers. Moreover, some of the interaction that can be observed is stimulated by foundations located in the West that (often unintentionally) tend to reproduce existing uneven global structures of knowledge production. For instance, as the volume by Tickner and Wæver (2009) has shown, the funding provided by Western foundations (such as Ford) in countries such as India, East-Central Europe, Latin America, or South Africa has often been very influential in developing local IR communities. One key reason was simply that state funding was limited. Yet since the type of research that was funded primarily addressed questions of more immediate local policy relevance, the overall effect was to reinforce the global intellectual division of labor whereby theory is “produced in the center and consumed and applied in and by the periphery” (p. 332). These effects are particularly surprising for countries (e.g., India) that have both a comparatively old and large IR community and a philosophical tradition of their own. As a matter of fact, the Indian political philosopher Chanakya (ca. 350–283 BCE), who is usually known in the West by the name Kautilya and who is sometimes claimed among Western scholars as one of the founders of realism, is apparently not even taught in any principal IR theory course in India itself, according to Navnita Behera (2007). Similar patterns of forgetfulness and/or neglect of homegrown traditions can be observed in Japan and recently also in China. From a postcolonial point of view, this devaluation of homegrown traditions is just one (often unreflected) expression of a “colonized” mind-set that stems from a discipline of IR that is at its very core an “expression of the Western theory of progress” (David Blaney & Naem Inayatullah, 2008, p. 672). This postcolonial message starts to resonate even among scholars from third-tier countries who have been socialized into Western IR thinking.

The Social Structure of the Discipline

The overall picture that emerges by looking at the social structure of IR from a global perspective is much more one of intellectual segmentation and stratification than one of intellectual integration, which one might think the subject matter itself to be suggesting. This impression of a three-tiered...
system is reinforced if one examines another dimension of the social structure of the discipline—that is, its publication system in general and its hierarchy of journals in particular. If access limitations (as measured in terms of journal acceptance rates) are accepted as a measure of reputation, clearly the most competitive journals of the discipline are published in the United States and Europe. In the United States and several European countries, getting published in these top journals is of central importance to climb the academic career ladder. Most of the highest ranking journals are still published in the United States and/or controlled by American IR scholars. As a matter of fact, a recent survey in the IR communities of 10 English-speaking countries found that at least four tiers can be distinguished when IR scholars from these countries are called on to list those journals “that publish articles with the greatest influence on the way IR scholars think about international relations” (Jordan et al., 2009, p. 49): (1) *International Organization* is in a league of its own and is mentioned by 73% of the scholars questioned; (2) the second group is made up of *International Security* (45%) and *International Studies Quarterly* (44%); (3) *American Political Science Review*, *World Politics*, and *Foreign Affairs*, mentioned by 28%, form the third group; and (4) *European Journal of International Relations* and *Review of International Studies* are the only non-American journals mentioned alongside *Journal of Conflict Resolution* with a mere 14% (for *European Journal of International Relations* in particular, the ranking is much better if one follows the Social Science Citation Index). Thus, interdependence structures are still quite asymmetrical within the West, with U.S. journals clearly outdistancing the top European journals.

In other parts of the world (including some parts of the West), publishing in internationally recognized journals is important. Figure 2 shows the distribution of authorship in leading Western International Relations journals.

![Figure 2: Authorship in Western International Relations Journals](source)


**Note:** Solid bar is 2000; dotted bar is 2005.
journals is not as central for recruitment practices and academic success. At the same time, the “international” profile of non-Western IR journals is much more pronounced than in the West, as a survey of selected non-Western journals shows, in contrast to a similar survey conducted for Western journals. For instance, more than 80% of the articles published in *International Organization* or *International Studies Quarterly* in 2000 and 2005 have been published by authors located in the United States or Canada (see Figure 2).

For the Turkish IR journal *Alternatives*, the *South African Journal of International Relations*, and the journal *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, the number of national authors has often been lower than the number of international authors, even decreasing between 2000 and 2005 (see Figure 3). Also, the number of non-Western authors (including national authors) being published in these journals has been increasing in most of these journals recently. This is in stark contrast to Western IR journals, which largely remain outlets for scholarship from Western IR scholars in general and scholars from the United States in particular. In other words, whereas the West remains fairly closed off from the rest of the world, there is much more of a balance between national and international authorship in non-Western IR journals.

### The Intellectual Structure of the Discipline

Another characteristic of the publication system of Western IR is the distinct profile of mixing theory and empirical analysis. All of the IR journals ranked among the top 20 of all political science journals in the Social Science Citation Index distinguish themselves as theory-oriented journals in this sense. As Kjell Goldmann (1996) pointed out in a comparison of Western IR journals from the early 1970s and early 1990s, as far as “methodological approaches” are concerned, ever more articles published in the 1990s combined some form of theorizing with empirical observation. If anything, this trend has been reinforced during the past decade. Again, the contrast with non-Western IR journals is noticeable: With the possible exception of the Japanese journal *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, all of these journals primarily publish articles that eschew explicit theoretical discussion (see Figure 4).

**Figure 3**  Authorship in Non-Western International Relations Journals

*Note:* Solid bar is 2000; dotted bar is 2005.
Paradigmatism and Great Debates

One of the oldest features of the intellectual structure of the discipline is paradigmatism. In IR, it has come to be understood as a disciplinary preoccupation with and segregation into separate “metascientific constructs” with distinct ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies (Yosef Lapid, 1989). Although the allusion to Thomas Kuhn’s paradigmatic view of the evolutionary development of scientific disciplines only spread in IR in the 1970s, the phenomenon as such has been a core feature of the discipline’s intellectual structure (at least in its Western segment) since the mid-20th century. Realism, idealism, rationalism, and constructivism are usually mentioned as examples of such paradigms. Surpassed only by questions of epistemology and methodology, such “paradigmatic” differentiation continues to generate the most division among Western IR scholars (Jordan et al., 2009). What is more, IR scholars in 10 English-speaking countries, surveyed by Jordan and colleagues (2009), estimate that almost 90% of all IR literature is devoted to some form of paradigmatic analysis. Yet although one out of four considers his or her own work to be falling outside any paradigmatic frame, more than three quarters of the time is devoted to IR paradigms in IR introductory courses taught by these scholars. In other words, the intellectual structure of discipline continues to be reproduced along paradigmatic lines even though many IR scholars do not believe that such a focus is particularly useful in their own research.

This gap in (Western) IR between the prominence of paradigmaticism in teaching and that in individual research reflects on what sociologists call “task uncertainty”—that is, the extent to which scholars in a discipline agree on what rules are to be followed and what work techniques are acceptable in producing knowledge (Wæver, 2007). In IR, the level of task uncertainty is quite high since there is fairly little agreement as to what the overarching disciplinary questions are or how one should go about tackling them. The TRIP survey found that two thirds of IR scholars questioned believe that methods and epistemology generate the most division in the discipline. Yet despite this diversity, there has at least been a widespread (if sometimes only implicit) understanding that paradigms as such are a key instrument for organizing
the discipline, especially as far as IR’s recurring great debates are concerned. This not only shows in how the discipline’s history is usually told or how IR is taught but is also evident in textbooks and handbooks—that is, in works that are supposed to introduce novices to the field or that provide summaries and syntheses of what is normally claimed to be disciplinary knowledge. Two recent examples are illustrative. As the subtitle of *International Relations Theory: Discipline and Diversity* (Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, & Steve Smith, 2007) indicates, the editors are keen to emphasize both the necessity of a certain disciplinary coherence and its diversity. Yet the organization of the book around nine “distinct theories of International relations—realism/structural realism, liberalism/neoliberalism, the English School, constructivism, Marxism and critical theory, feminism, poststructuralism, green theory, postcolonialism” (p. 3) shows that diversity is expressed not in the form of theoretical controversies over core substantive questions of international relations (e.g., what causes war, what causes poverty) or methods but through paradigms. The same understanding is reflected in a 2008 handbook by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, where the presentation of a somewhat different set of nine “major theoretical perspectives” takes up almost half the space of the volume (the theories discussed here include (1) realism, (2) Marxism, (3) neoliberal institutionalism, (4) the new liberalism, (5) the English School, (6) constructivism, (7) critical theory, (8) postmodernism, and (9) feminism). In other words, whereas IR scholars may disagree sharply as to the particular value of different paradigms, there at least seems to be widespread agreement that it is useful to conceive of the discipline in terms of paradigmatic differentiation and great debates.

However, from a longer historical perspective, the period during which paradigmatism and great debates were widely acknowledged as dominant features of the discipline’s intellectual structure may come to an end. Recent self-reflective observations of the historiography of the discipline have convincingly shown that even in Western IR, the focus on great debates may have been as much a reflection of the perceived need of a novel academic field to identify a disciplinary core as a reflection of a common tendency in the social sciences to delimit the number of basic rival positions to a low number of macrolevel theories. As a matter of fact, the invocation of great debates as a typical characterization of overarching disciplinary divides did not begin until Hans Morgenthau introduced the term in the early 1950s to depict what soon came to be known as the debate between realism and idealism. Moreover, it reached its pinnacle with the announcement of a second great debate in the 1960s pitting traditionalists against behavioralists (or scientists) in a clash over what methods IR scholars ought to use in studying international phenomena. It was in this context that Kuhn’s concept of a paradigm was first combined with the focus on great debates, most explicitly (if somewhat misleadingly) in an article by Arendt Lijphardt (1974) in which he identified the second great debate as “a dichotomous one between two opposing paradigms” (p. 18). Yet the third debate marked the end of agreement over how to describe what it was supposedly all about. Alternatively, it was framed as a debate between realism and globalism; between realism, pluralism, and structuralism; between positivists and post-positivists; or between “a broad body of interdisciplinary literature commonly (and often indiscriminately) labeled ‘critical theory,’ ‘post positivism,’ ‘discourse analysis,’” or “‘post-structuralism,’” on the one hand, and “the intellectual imperialism of the modern, post-Cartesian ‘scientific’ approach to knowledge and society,” on the other (Jim George, 1989, p. 270). Others suggested that the latter two descriptions marked the fourth debate, which in itself could be subdivided into two subdebates between reflectivists and rationalists, on the one hand, and between neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists, on the other. Thus, not only the intervals between debates have become longer since the first debate was invented, but after the second debate, there has also been ever more contention as to whether a third and/or fourth great debate actually took place and, if so, what it was all about. In any case, no fifth debate currently appears to be forthcoming.

Even if great debates were indeed a thing of the past, paradigmatism appears to be more resilient. In Andrew Abbott’s reading of “generational paradigms,” the emphasis on the economizing strategies of informational overload suggests a certain disciplinary immaturity in coming up with more sophisticated and adequate coping strategies. More
critical readings—such as Niklas Luhmann’s related lamentation about “multiple paradigmatis-
sis” in sociology—in contrast highlight the unforced ignorance vis-à-vis large segments of knowledge that necessarily accompanies paradigmatic self-restriction. This latter perspective has recently won more recognition. Two prominent representatives of rationalism and constructivism, for instance, have joined voices in rejecting the implicit offer to conduct another “battle of analytical paradigms,” since any such battle would “at the very least . . . encourage scholars to be method-driven rather than problem-driven in their research” (James Fearon & Alexander Wendt, 2002, p. 52). Rather than looking at the relationship between rationalism and constructivism in terms of a “debate,” they pleaded for looking at it in terms of a “conversation” between two approaches that, “when understood pragmatically, [are] largely either complementary or overlapping” (Fearon & Wendt, 2002, p. 68). Similarly, the recent Oxford Handbook of International Relations prominently positioned the chapter “Eclectic Theorizing in the Study and Practice of International Relations” at the very beginning of the section that presented the nine “major theoretical perspectives” referred to above (Peter Katzenstein & Rudra Sil, 2008). In it, the authors advocate analytic eclecticism, an approach to research in IR that replaces paradigm-driven research with a strategy drawing widely on seemingly divergent research traditions built on distinct concepts, methods, analytics, and empirics.

Thus, although the intellectual structure of the discipline continues to be shaped by distinctions drawn in terms of paradigms (or the equivalent major theoretical perspectives, etc.), paradigmatism as such has been losing some of its grip. To the extent that there is an inherent tension between method-driven approaches or paradigmatism, on the one hand, and a focus on a problem-driven approach, on the other, the shift toward the latter can be seen as a sign of maturation. To be sure, a loss of disciplinary coherence may loom as a downside if IR loses its traditional paradigmatic signposts, according to Wæver (2007). Yet the same development can also be interpreted as an advance toward a more self-confident academic profession that need no longer engage in stylized battles to distinguish itself from adjacent (and presumably more reputable) disciplines such as history, law, economics, or sociology. Moreover, such a move can also be justified epistemologically since the earlier rationalization for paradigmatic separation—the usual reference to the idea of “incommensurability” in Kuhn’s theoretical vocabulary—has hence been problematized in the philosophy of science. For a long time, Kuhn’s term of incommensurability was understood to mean that the theoretical vocabularies of separate paradigms were not intertranslatable. Yet as Richard Rorty (1991), among others, has argued, “untranslatability does not entail unlearnability” and “learnability is all that is required to make discussability possible” (p. 48). Paradigmatic separation, therefore, is a disciplinary convention, not an epistemological necessity. Recently, this approach to “interparadigm” debates has been spreading in IR at least subliminally, if not explicitly, according to Colin Wight. Irrespective of whether one welcomes or criticizes such a development, it is yet another sign of a much broader development in the discipline: its expansion along many dimensions.

**The Expansion of International Relations**

Thus far, the discipline has been examined largely in terms of its social and intellectual structures. This inevitably entails a rather static view that does not sufficiently acknowledge the tremendous dynamism of IR. Yet the dynamic development of the field is perhaps the most striking feature of the discipline. Ever since the early days of modern IR in the early 20th century, the discipline has been expanding. Although this intellectual expansion may resemble earlier colonial practices of the West in some respects (and may therefore also be described in diverse vocabularies), the phenomenon as such appears to be largely uncontroversial.

Four dimensions of intellectual expansion can be distinguished:

1. territorial expansion (or spread) from a largely Western core to other countries;
2. disciplinary expansion within political science as measured in terms of chairs designated with denominations that are normally considered to be IR;
3. substantive expansion as measured in research problems being taken up by scholars identifying themselves as doing IR and in interaction with the latter; and
4. theoretical and methodological expansion.

Of course, none of these expanding moves ought to be imagined as linear or unidirectional. When knowledge travels, it always intermingles and, thereby, transforms. John Agnew notes refers to the image of a marketplace where Western IR is “exported” to non-Western regions and countries or where IR “imports” from other disciplines such as philosophy or where economics misconstrues knowledge as a commodity changing hands without being affected by the very transaction. If we take this transformational dimension into account, however, the metaphor of expansion quite cogently describes a phenomenon that is as familiar as a subject matter to the IR scholar as it is ubiquitous if one looks at the dynamic development of the discipline.

Given the limits of space and the earlier discussion of the global structure of IR, the territorial and disciplinary expansion can be kept short. As mentioned earlier, territorial expansion was for a long time characterized (and in many ways still is characterized) by the discipline’s failure to engage with the non-Western world. To the extent that such engagement did take place, it often followed general patterns of colonial interaction. Western IR presented its way of practicing the craft as exemplary, while scholars in non-Western regions would either emulate Western IR practices (thereby, perhaps, gaining some recognition from abroad) or keep to whatever local forms of scholarship were deemed suitable to study things “international” (and remain largely marginalized). In the late 20th century and early 21st century, there has been quite a bit of change with respect to the quantitative enlargement of IR communities outside the West and a much more self-conscious redefinition of what it may mean to conduct IR in places such as China, India, Kenya, or Mexico. This expansion has been aided by global shifts in power as well as theoretical innovation (e.g., postcolonialism). The World International Studies Committee (WISC), an organization of national International Studies associations that has been active since the turn of the century, has certainly helped as well. Measured in terms of chairs in IR, the discipline even seems to be expanding much more rapidly in non-Western regions, Latin America, and Asia in particular (see the 2009 special issue of International Relations of the Asia-Pacific). Nevertheless, even though almost no comparative data are available on the number of chairs in IR around the globe or relative to other disciplines in political science, Hans-Dieter Klingemann notes that IR appears to be growing numerically even in Europe and North America, if only at the expense of other subdisciplines.

The Expansion of the IR Research Agenda

By most accounts (Western) IR is essentially an invention of the 20th century (for a contrasting perspective, see William Olson & John Groom, 1991). Even if some of its origins may have been romanticized in one way or another, it is widely accepted as common knowledge among IR scholars that the primary subjects of study in the first half of the 20th century were almost exclusively related to governmental activities crossing national boundaries. Against the background of the two World Wars, the question of war and peace loomed large. Accordingly, early (Western) IR framed its research agenda mainly in the vocabulary of international law and diplomatic history. The methods and approaches associated with these disciplines were thought to offer the best hope for “the problem of international governmental reorganization and practice” (Pitman Potter, 1923, p. 391), without necessarily succumbing to the sort of “idealist internationalism” for which the discipline was later chastised by realists in particular (Olson & Groom, 1991). In the middle of the 20th century, the agenda was broadened to include international economics and all those aspects of international relations that could be “described in terms of decision-making by identifiable individuals or groups of individuals” (Frederick Dunn, 1948, p. 145). More important, ever more scholars seemed ready to subscribe to the view that international politics rather than international organization constituted the core of a slowly maturing discipline. While the latter was said to have been approached predominantly with a constitutional frame, the image of an international system made up of states that were interacting “almost like
International Relations as a Field of Study

Leibnizian monads” (Morton Kaplan, 1961) and the accompanying clash of national interests and power were considered to be more properly dealt with in a political framework (William Fox, 1949). The first great debate was an expression of this shift.

The war experience (which had involved all those countries crucial for the discipline’s development in the 1950s and 1960s) and the spreading realization that the advent of the nuclear age would not only revolutionize warfare but also affect the very survival of humankind pushed the expanding research agenda of IR scholarship into the field of strategic studies with its focus on state practices such as deterrence thinking and arms control negotiations. While essentially remaining in the classical IR domain of state-based international politics, the novel process of European integration at least offered a paradigmatic alternative to the traditional focus on great-power competition. It not only inspired a series of similar political projects in other parts of the world but also helped stimulate a new and vibrant field of study focused on comparative regional integration. In addition, the process of decolonization laid the foundation for expanding both the territorial reach of IR research beyond the confines of the Western world as well as the disciplinary focus on politics by intensifying the link with economics. Paradigmatically, though, the two major alternatives of the emerging development studies, modernization theory and dependency theory, continued to draw almost exclusively on the Western tradition. (Neo-)Marxist-inspired analyses of capitalism’s contribution to the “underdevelopment” of non-Western regions by scholars such as André Gunder Frank, a University of Chicago–trained economist, helped pave the way for international political economy to fully establish itself as one of the major subfields of IR, starting in the 1970s. On a parallel track, the study of foreign policy, which had been one of the major sections in any North American IR/political science curriculum, continued to thrive as an ever more “scientific,” increasingly separate and differentiating field. Foreign policy analysis (or FPA) was the prime subfield of IR, expanding into those neighboring disciplines (such as psychology and sociology) that were deemed useful in coming up with theoretical and methodological tools for making sense of group decision-making processes under routine bureaucratic or crisis situations.

With the advent of the East–West détente and the 1973 oil crisis, the disciplinary horizon broadened further. Although the classical focus on “high-politics” security issues kept its prominent place, other issues gained in importance or were added anew to the IR research agenda. First, the introduction of the concept of “transnational politics” at the end of the 1960s contained an unveiled critique of the state centrism of classical IR. It also foreshadowed the broadening of the more narrowly circumscribed foreign policy perspective during the 1970s and 1980s by also looking at nonstate actors and their activities and interactions at the systemic level. Second, the Club of Rome’s “The Limits to Growth” report of 1972, the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in the same year, and the oil crisis in the following year set the stage for environmental issues to be added to the IR research agenda. Third, transnational relations and environmental politics both fitted in neatly with perhaps the most prominent new theme in IR since the 1970s: the spreading interest in the phenomenon of interdependence and globalization. This image of an increasingly globalizing world that affected every corner of the globe and reached across all issue areas in turn helped push a final expansion of the research agenda: the inclusion of an ever-larger group of nonstate actors, to use the mainstream IR vocabulary. Alternatively, critical, postmodern, feminist, and/or postcolonial theories identified a huge, highly diverse, and often indiscernible group that they called the marginalized: victims of war, poverty, or colonialism; women; or, more generally, all human beings who had become mere objects of structures and practices of power rather than being political subjects. At the beginning of the 21st century, there are, thus, few phenomena that cannot be framed in one way or another as legitimate objects of study under the heading of IR. Indeed, some even argue that the discipline has to rename itself in order to do justice to the causal and constitutive connections that link so many levels of political action in global society.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that both the structure of the most influential professional organization in the field of international studies, the International Studies Association, and the most
recent comprehensive survey of the major topics of the field appear to cover essentially any phenomenon of politically relevant social action transcending state borders. The book version of the ISA “compendium” encompasses 12 volumes and more than 8,000 pages of text (Robert Denemark, 2010). The open-ended online compendium is even more voluminous. The same applies as far as the structure of the ISA is concerned. The 24 sections are impressive not only for their breadth but also for the fact that paradigmatism is much less visible at this level of organization. Section themes include professional and pedagogical concerns (as in the sections “Women’s Caucus” and “Active Learning in IS”) and epistemological and methodological concerns (as in the sections “Comparative Interdisciplinary Studies” and “Scientific Study of International Processes”), but most often, they cover a broad range of substantive issues (e.g., “Diplomatic Studies”; “Environmental Studies”; “Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Migration Studies”; “Feminist Theory and Gender Studies”; “Foreign Policy Analysis”; “Global Development Studies”; “Human Rights; “Intelligence Studies”; “International Communication”; “International Education”; “International Ethics”; “International Law”; “International Organization”; “International Political Economy”; “International Political Sociology”; “International Security Studies”; “Peace Studies”; “Political Demography”; and “Post Communist States in International Relations”). The only exception as far as a paradigmatic orientation is concerned relates to the section “English School.”

**Theoretical and Methodological Expansion**

Theoretical and methodological sophistication is almost universally accepted as a key criterion for judging the quality and status of a scholarly discipline. In both respects, IR has seen tremendous, sometimes even exponential, growth. If we concentrate on the 20th century, the formative period of IR up to the 1950s was largely marked by an understanding of theory and method common among the (usually much older) disciplines from which IR was drawing its new talents: (diplomatic) history, (international) law, economics, what is nowadays called area studies, and the study of (domestic) politics. Many of these were considered to be part of the humanities rather than the (social) sciences. Accordingly, the distinction between the empirical and the normative, drawn in a particularly strong fashion in the course of the “behavioral revolution,” was mostly not deemed appropriate then. To be sure, “science” was already cherished among IR novices. Yet it was not yet as strongly associated with a notion of the natural sciences as was the case in the 1960s and 1970s.

The revolutionary shift to the new mantra of “applying scientific methods” was perhaps best captured in the transition from the 1st edition (published in 1961) to the 2nd edition of *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, a textbook edited by Rosenau (1969), who, perhaps along with Hayward Alker, is himself an exemplar of the shifting epistemological, theoretical, and methodological currents of the discipline over the past 50 years. In introducing the 57 chapters of the 2nd edition, Rosenau apologized for including “only 9 percent of the original selections” even though he himself had stated in 1961 that “articles were included ‘only if they seemed likely to be useful in twenty years.’” Yet rather than taking this to be a “cause for embarrassment,” he saw “cause for satisfaction” due to the “remarkable growth in the scope and pace of the theoretical enterprise” and the “increasingly sophisticated penetration of the mysteries of international life” (Rosenau, 1969, p. xvii). The book contained 25 articles on 14 different types of “theories and approaches” as well as 17 articles on different “research techniques and orientations.” For many older IR scholars, this was a misguided fixation on an ideal of science that was wholly inadequate for the subject matter of international politics. Yet Rosenau’s candid assessment and selections illustrate the predominant mood and trends in the 1960s and 1970s quite well. Although “classical” approaches and methods continued to have their followers—and actually benefitted themselves from the behavioral revolution—the wave of the future seemed to be an understanding of “science” that required “an articulated secondary language that permits reasonable precision and replicability” (Kaplan, 1966, p. 4) as well as sophisticated techniques for gathering and processing data.

Mere listing of all the new methods and techniques that were invented and/or imported in IR
during that phase could spread out over a couple of pages. Suffice it to say that such a list would include almost the whole range of tools applied in other academic disciplines—ranging all the way from some of the humanities to other social sciences and the natural sciences. Nevertheless, even some of its initial adherents later granted that “the promises of behavioralism were not fulfilled” (Rosenau, 1993, p. 459). Against this background, among others, the third (or fourth) debate in particular represented a move beyond methodology by digging deeper to address the underlying epistemological and ontological questions. Yet rather than shrinking the space, this debate enlarged it further through reinvigorating reflection on the reach and uses of qualitative methods and by problematizing the very basis of theory formation. In many ways, the qualitative label reinforced an encroaching dualistic conception of methodology—with a quantitative pole on the other side. Of course, some influential theories and/or methods (e.g., rational choice and other formal methods) that actually thrived during the 1980s and 1990s in American IR could not easily be subsumed under such a dualistic conception. However, influential publications that reached far beyond IR (e.g., Gary King, Robert Keohane, & Sydney Verba, 1994) actually tried to ease the tension by arguing that there is a unified logic of scientific inference across a large spectrum of different methodologies. While this proposition was hardly acceptable to everyone, it did mirror a widespread understanding of scientific analysis among IR scholars according to which the essence of scholarship lay in “linking theory to evidence.” In the 2002 Handbook of International Relations, this is the title of the single explicitly methodological chapter covering the whole spectrum from rationalist to constructivist theories, the latter even including critical theory. One set of methods that thrived in IR since the 1980s, the so-called case study methods—which were actually put at the center of qualitative methods by some more “scientifically” inclined scholars—actually expressed this understanding most clearly and, for many IR scholars, convincingly.

While it certainly mirrored “mainstream” understandings, the fixation on somehow linking theory and evidence with the help of certain methods had its critics—and increasingly so. As a matter of fact, since the early 1980s, an ever-larger number of scholars subscribed to a variety of postpositivist approaches that all posited the mutual impregnation of theory, reality, and descriptions thereof (evidence). Most important, from a methodological point of view, theories such as feminism, postmodernism, poststructuralism, critical theory, pragmatism, and postcolonialism all questioned whether “social facts” could indeed be treated like “natural facts,” as implicitly assumed by the mainstream approaches (Friedrich Kratochwil, 2008). The answer was an outright “No.” Since nature did not “speak,” concepts and even whole vocabularies had to be invented in order to relate to “the world out there” when one wanted to describe and explain how even small parts of it (not to mention everything) actually hang together. In this view, the issue was not whether (and if so, how) one would come up with the “correct” description to work within the actual business of explanation. Rather, one of the key questions was how we came to describe the world in a particular vocabulary in the first place and what this description did to our being in and relating to the world.

This amounted to a radical critique of the whole enterprise of how the “science” of international relations was practiced by positivists. In a sense, the weight of the charge was equivalent to the one that scientists had leveled against traditionalists during the second debate: the charge of actually misconstruing what scholarship about the international was all about. Methods, however, were not relegated to the dustbin as charges about “anything goes” seemed to indicate. Indeed, if anything, the third (or fourth) debate helped further broaden the theoretical and methodological horizon of the discipline by opening it for a rediscovery of earlier roots in international law and normative theory and by more explicitly incorporating sociological perspectives (as illustrated by the founding of the journal International Political Sociology in 2007). To be sure, few of its adherents would claim that a switch to a postpositivist stance would be rewarded with any of the earlier promises of “cumulation of knowledge” or “progress” (the latter is at least kept as an option in a Lakatosian assessment of different IR research agendas). Yet leaving behind the straitjacket of “method-drivenness”—which has even become a dirty word for the self-proclaimed positivists (Fearon & Wendt, 2002)—seems to be enough in
terms of gratification for them. In sum, even if the discipline may not have advanced much on the path of cumulation and progress, it seems to have progressed steadily on the path of theoretical and methodological sophistication.

**Conclusion**

The story of the field of international relations could be told in an analogous fashion to the story of “the expansion of international society.” It may well be that a casual reader of this entry 20 or 50 years from now might actually have precisely that impression—with all the critical undertones that a postcolonial perspective would want to add. Yet this probably is how “the state of the art” appears to a big group of practitioners of IR scholarship today. As has been discussed above, the discipline is in many ways not up to the task (yet?) of tackling, not to mention overcoming, its many awkward parochialisms. These are all the more glaring given the almost universal expression of an ever more globalizing world—irrespective of how one may define the phenomenon of globalization—and the fact that the discipline itself lays claim to actually analyzing these processes and features within its purview.

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**See also** International Law; International Political Economy; International Relations, History; International Relations, Theory; Normative Theory in International Relations

**Further Readings**


The concept of “international society” was first elaborated as a key concept for international relations analysis in Charles Manning’s book *The Nature of International Society* (1962). Manning’s younger colleague at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Martin Wight, produced a series of works that largely remained unpublished during his lifetime; in these, he elaborated on what he called a society of states, which he juxtaposed with a system of states. Besides Manning, with whom he remained at intellectual loggerheads, Wight was indebted to the deliberations of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, of which he was a founder member since 1958, for his ideas. These ideas found further fertile ground in the mind of Hedley Bull (1977), who juxtaposed Wight’s two key concepts in a double definition, whereby “a system of states is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions to behave at least in some measure—as parts of a whole” (pp. 9–10). “A society of states (or international society),” on the other hand, exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions. (p. 13)

These foundational definitions, along with a number of others, are to be found in what remains the major text on international society—namely, *The Anarchical Society*. Indeed, Bull’s concept of international society has since been given so much attention, particularly in Britain, Australia, and South Africa, but also in Scandinavia and Italy, that there has evolved a self-conscious tradition or school of thought that refers to itself as the English School of international relations or indeed the international society approach. The English School forms a separate section within the International Studies Association and has its own website. The question of who is in and who is out of this school has been discussed at narcissistic length. For an overview of this matter, the reader is referred to Chapter 2 of Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami’s book *The English School of International Relations* (2006), a book that is also an excellent introduction. Timothy Dunne and Brunello Vigezzi are the school’s own principal historians.
There has been extensive debate within the English School about whether the concept of international society may best be understood as a stylization of historical sequences or as a functional construct. James Mayall (1990) sees it as basically historical, Alan James would see it as basically theoretical, whereas Barry Buzan once saw it as a hybridization, arguing that the emergence of international society may be understood as an ideational process turning on a meaning that is inextricably tied up with the functional emergence of an international system. In a later work, however, Buzan (2004) did away with the distinction altogether. There is a strong case for doing so. As Max Weber had already pointed out, the most instrumental action is still imbued with meaning, and the most symbolic action also has some instrumentality. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine that two polities would be aware of one another, let alone communicate, without a modicum of shared meaning and some regularity in the quality of interaction. Ontically, the difference between international system and international society seems unsustainable. As demonstrated by the output of the school, however, it has proven itself to be a nice analytical tool, which means that we may recognize it as an analytical concept on pragmatic grounds.

Bull was very interested in discussing different existing and possible world orders. Building on Wight’s (1977) historical work, the school has evolved a body of work on the comparative sociology of status systems that includes a hypothesis that world history oscillates between periods of empire and periods of state systems, a study of interaction between different polities over a period of 60,000 years, and a study of how European international society expanded to the world at large (Bull & Watson, 1984).

If an international society exists when states are conscious of common interests and values and share in the working of common institutions, then the places to look for it are surely in people’s thinking about international relations as well as in the patterned practices of states as they exist in specific fields. Note that international society should, therefore, seemingly be understood as a kind of structure that may only be studied through its effects and that is, by the same token, constituted by those effects. Dunne called his history of the school’s origins *Inventing International Society* to underline precisely this imagined nature of international society as well as the constitutive, and hence political, role played in its invention of imagination by those working within the confines of the school. The two following sections of this entry look at the institutions and the thinking that are said to be constitutive of international society. A final section discusses the significance of the school.

**The Institutions**

To some scholars, it is clear that international society has the philosophical status of a structure. One of the characteristic traits of the English School, however, is its unwillingness to deal with the philosophy of science (see section on significance below). It is, therefore, far from clear what kind of status the several members of the school seem to give to the various phenomena that they discuss. To Wight, who offered a number of different lists detailing what kinds of institutions international relations were made of, institutions seem to be social practices, and so constitutive. Wight also insisted that diplomacy, understood as the system and the art of communication between powers, was the master institution of international relations. To Bull, who refined Wight’s taxonomy and concentrated on five institutions—the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and great power (concert)—these institutions do not seem to be constitutive of international society but reflective of it. In his view, what constitutes order are the primary goals of states—security, the sanctity of agreements (*pacta sunt servanda*), and territorial property rights—and international society is no more than the form a particular order happens to take. In this way, diplomacy and international society are framed simply as ideational and reflective of international order and begin to take on an epiphenomenal hue.

There exist book-length studies of four of the five institutions postulated by Bull that are variously informed by the international society perspective. Richard Little traced the emergence of the concept of the balance of power and discussed its centrality for international society. His is the treatment that sticks closest to the concept of international society. Buzan’s (2004) treatment of great powers focuses on the present time, giving pride of
place to the United States. James Der Derian’s study of diplomacy breaks with previous work of the school by drawing extensively on continental social theory, arguing that the emergence of the institution of diplomacy may be alternatively understood as humankind’s negotiation of alienation. Evan Luard’s discussion of war in international society is more of a preliminary study that may serve as a platform for an international society–inspired analysis. Adam Roberts and others have conducted a number of international society–based shorter studies of how law constitutes international society.

The Thinking and the Thinkers

It is another characteristic of the school that it is more concerned with the thinkers of international society than with the thinking of international society. Whether we should think of this as a consequence of methodological individualism is a moot question in the school’s own terms, for on this point, as elsewhere, the school does not dwell on the status of the phenomena it discusses. In Bull and Watson’s coedited Expansion of International Society (1984), Bull fruitfully uses the concept of an international political culture to discuss the diffusion of ideas and practices and in his evaluation of the extent to which “The Revolt Against the West” challenged world order at large. There exist important studies of how specific themes have been thought up against international society: for example, Nationalism and International Society (Mayall, 1990), which argues that mainstream liberal thinking over the past 200 years or so was both statist and nationalist, and Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (David Armstrong, 1993), which generalizes that revolutionary regimes will initially break with the idea of an international society, only to come back at some later point. John Vincent mapped the historical case for nonintervention, leaving Nick Wheeler to set out the case for humanitarian intervention.

These remain exceptions, however. The school has mainly preoccupied itself with how specific philosophers and statesmen have conceptualized global politics, particularly the degree to which and the way in which they have dwelled on the existence of a possible international society. Rather than following the lead of Manning, who looked at patterns of thought, the school has followed Wight, whose interest was what he called traditions of thought. Wight (1966) contrasted political theory with what he refers to as international theory. Whereas the former consists of a succession of classics from Jean Bodin to John Mill, there is no succession of first-rate books about the states system and diplomacy. As pointed out by Suganami, inasmuch as “politics” concerns the working of the polis—that is, the working of a social collective that strives to maintain its boundaries toward the outside, there can be no such thing as international politics. As a response to this situation, Wight fastened on the concept of “diplomats” as a more accurate and more technically correct way of referring to his preferred object of study than “the international” of everyday speech. Everything that is not politics, then, is diplomacy, but by the same token, everything that has nothing to do with the internal life of the state and with the specific relations between states is ruled out as an object of study.

In a standard lecture course that has served as a template for many a later school lecturer, Wight (1991) postulated three traditions of diplomacy for all international intercourse, its purposes and objects, in times of peace. These were the Machiavellian (or, to Bull, Hobbesian), the Grotian, and the Kantian. As is evident from the use of the names of specific philosophers, these traditions were conceptualized as chains of specific philosophers and statesmen who shared an affinity for conceptualizing international in one of three ways. Sometimes a fourth is added to make room for the principle that he traced back to Giuseppe Mazzini—namely, that the world may be divided into national states. Since this is definitely a prescriptive idea of how global politics should be ordered, nationalism does in this sense give rise to an international doctrine—namely, that the subjects of global politics should be nation-states.

The school’s three traditions—with Hobbesians arguing that covenants without the sword are but words, Grotians arguing that pacta sunt servanda (treaties should be observed), and Kantians arguing in favor of cosmopolitanism—clearly have heuristic value. Given the way discourse about the international realm is still set up, they also have a certain predictive value, since one may readily expect that debates about any problem that arises
(say, a humanitarian intervention or the setting up of a new international organization [IO]) will include voices growing out of these three broad representations of which duties, if any, transcend borders. As Wight himself acknowledged, however, it is also the great weakness of the scheme that it cannot be a proper categorization in terms of covering all possibilities. Specific dates will, by necessity, come with their own specific colorations. One may add that Wight’s historiosophy, which saw what happened in the international realm as endless repetition, precluded him from thinking about more basic change.

International society is conceived as an anarchical society. As Émile Durkheim pointed out, however, societies are despotic, in the sense that they lay down what should count as normal behavior and so may be seen as a structure of power (systems are arrangements through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society, as David Easton would have it). The tension between anarchy, on the one hand, and society, on the other, is the constitutive tension of the school. By dint of an internal logic, then, the Grotian tradition seems to be the broad home for the school itself. According to the school, it comes in two variants: pluralist and solidarist. Pluralists celebrate the cultural pluralism displayed throughout international society, giving pride of place to the importance of systems maintenance. One recognizes an affinity to the prudence of the Hobbesian tradition. Solidarists, on the other hand, concentrate on how international society should be strengthened by forging ever new ties between its members, giving rise to new institutions and conventions that warrant the forging of minimum standards binding on all. Here, one recognizes an affinity to Kantian cosmopolitanism.

Note that these are self-reflective normative concerns; the school is tied together by the celebration of a real-existing international society and divided by debates about how far this celebration should be taken. Solidarist tendencies usually come with an interest in how international society, conceptualized as a society of states, is related to world society, conceptualized as a society of sundry agents. While maintaining that states make up the dominant system of units, the school has sought to incorporate the further complication of nonstate actors more fully within its theoretical schema—an aim it shares with the existing global polity theory. Just as states make up a system, nonstate actors are theorized increasingly to make up a nonstate system of their own (although this, it is maintained, depends ultimately on the state system). This system is embedded in a nonstate set of norms, rules, values, and conventions—that is, a “world system” of nonstate actors is embedded in a “world society” of nonstate values, rules, institutions, and so on (Buzan, 2004).

**Significance**

Much like the body of literature on geopolitics, the major significance of the literature on international society is to allow a wide-ranging investigation of some deeply pertinent questions that are key to the discipline of international relations at large. Again, like geopolitics, the claims that emerge from these investigations tend to be rather sweeping. Unlike geopolitics, however, the style is historical and empirical, and the methodology is implicit and commonsensical. The English School is English not least in its empiricism. Some scholars believe that Dunne is right in stressing that the invention of an interpretative approach to the history of ideas about international relations is a constitutive as well as a crowning achievement of the school. However, when compared with other and parallel attempts to invent such approaches in the social sciences, some think that the school comes up a bit short. In Germany, there emerged concurrently with the first English School writings, in the early 1960s, a tradition of conceptual history led by Reinhart Koselleck. This work has resulted in multivolume treatments of the German and French political languages. Meanwhile, in France, Michel Foucault initiated a number of studies where the history of ideas is paired to social history in a different but comparable manner. Finally, in the very same university where the British Committee met, at the same time, and out of the same broadly empirical Anglo-American tradition to which the English School itself belongs, there emerged an undertaking spearheaded by Cambridge historians such as Quentin Skinner to write the history of the past in terms of the ideas that animated it. This undertaking has resulted in a number of meticulously researched monographs as well as methodological essays. Alexander Wendt’s work, where the school’s concept of the
three traditions of thinking about international relations is modified and applied in his theorizing of how international society may mature, demonstrates how this body of work may be paired up with wider theorizing to produce new insights.

Nowhere is the historical bent of the international society tradition more on display than in a book with the telling title *The Expansion of International Society* (Bull & Watson, 1984). Suganami noted in his contribution on Japan’s entry into international society how Admiral Perry used deliberate mistranslation of a key treaty to secure the United States permanent representation in Japan. Expansion is a power-laden process. This fact is not adequately on display in works on international society.

Expansion is also a process that is imagined as spreading outward from a center. Although there may be setbacks and even reversions, the conception is of a process where one party imposes its order on the other, with little or no residue and without being itself changed by the experience. It is of course true that European international society has expanded to cover the entire globe, so in terms of teleology, this perspective on history is not unwarranted. The problem is, however, that it is not relational. It does not invite scrutiny of the relations that went into producing the result of European expansion. This is scientifically problematic, for we want to know what kinds of tensions and conflicts gave rise to the consequences of European expansion. It is also politically problematic, for it invites a reading where an “us” expands at “their” expense rather than demonstrating the power asymmetries and hybridizations that marked the process.

Manning criticized Wight for not empathizing with his aim of establishing international relations as a social science. Similar critiques have accompanied the school at every turn since then. The school would have come off on an even better footing if it had followed Manning’s aspiration to write works that were both studies of international relations and contributions that were explicitly dialogical in their relation to the (rest of the) literature on social phenomena. The school has followed Wight’s lead and styled its work as a series of comments on the general flow of history, instead of Manning’s competing vision of doing something more in the vein of the sociology of knowledge of international relations. What the English School seems to need at the present juncture is to complement in many ways the unique historical and taxonomic work already carried out by sustained, theory-led studies that may bring the school closer to the general style of work in the social sciences.

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See also Balance of Power; International Relations, Theory; State

Further Readings
English School of International Relations Theory: http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/research/international-relations-security/english-school
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International Solidarity

Solidarity is a type of social relation as old as the first societies. Whether based on family, friendship, religion, corporate bodies, or trade, solidarity takes multiple forms, but all forms have in common a relation in which groups and/or people bring, not necessarily reciprocally, a particular assistance. Every social order supposes a minimal level of solidarity between its elements and, conversely, every social relation acts as an indicator of a certain social order, according to Émile Durkheim. Therefore, there is no study of societies without considering the forms of solidarity they enclose. At an international level, the question is more delicate: The existence of solidarity is disputed given the fact that the very existence of a society is much debated.

In the tradition of international realism, the world is perceived as a general competition of powers, and solidarity is expressed only through military alliances. Actually, one should speak of functional policies oriented toward maintaining the balance of power—the only principle that is able to regulate the international anarchy—rather than of solidarity. Theoretical approaches competing with realism in international studies (liberalism, functionalism, transnationalism, and constructivism) are more attentive to demonstrations of solidarity in international relations. In highlighting what binds actors as much as what divides them, realists admit the existence of an international order that entails relations of cooperation and assistance. Among these approaches, the British school of international relations has contributed more than any other to the development of the concept of “international society.” The latter, mainly composed of states, is organized around norms and institutions that secure a minimal order for the common interest of its members and enable the pursuit of shared objectives. According to Hedley Bull, such a conceptualization of the international system supposes necessarily the existence of relations of solidarity and fully supports their analysis.

From a historic and empirical point of view, demonstrations of international solidarity are quite undisputable. Under various names—support, assistance, mutual aid, and so on—actors have always joined together to defend their interests and promote their causes. These practices have involved states as well as nonstate actors. But the densification, that is, the increased number and complexity, of relationships between societies (what is called “interdependence”) has led to a new dynamic.

Three dimensions of international solidarity are considered here. The most traditional one refers to a political will to form alliances for mutual empowerment. Second, since the beginning of the 20th century, international solidarity has also been used as an instrument for building up an international order. International solidarity is in fact a doctrine of international peace. But, parallel with the development of the means of communication and the greater sensitivity of societies, international solidarity has also turned into a strong means of international contest of the global inequalities. Thus, there is a third dimension in which actors of international solidarity are nonstate actors that contest state policies. Each of these dimensions has its own characteristics and aims, but all speak for the fact that international solidarities are at the heart of the political, economic, and social history of international relations.

A Rationale of Power

Let us consider the first dimension: mutual empowerment. In a context of partially competitive relations, the actors of the international system seek naturally to decrease their vulnerability to pressures from other nations and to enhance their strength and build on their assets. Solidarity therefore consists in appealing to presumed common ties and shared objectives to build a union that will reinforce the capacities of each of the parties and the strength of all. This classical function of international solidarity as a power multiplier may assume several shapes. The first one is that of military alliances that tend to maximize the security of their members through reciprocal assistance (e.g., Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] treaty) or through various means of bilateral cooperation. The creation of regional unions with multiple vocations illustrates a second form of mobilization of solidarity aimed at benefiting from the (economic and diplomatic) advantages of an actor of international scale (e.g., the European Union). Third, the organization of some economic lobbies also expresses a form of solidarity in the defense and the
promotion of sector-based interests at the service of the power of concerned states (e.g., Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC]). Eventually, a fourth form of solidarity resides in the elaboration of political alliances, the aim of which is to promote a cause or a position on the international scene (e.g., the Non-Aligned Movement).

In all cases of solidarity in this first form, solidarity may be value grounded, but it is mainly an instrument of power and influence. If states usually are the main actors and benefactors, nonstate actors also know how to benefit from this type of mobilization to strengthen their capacity for action. The International Workingmen’s Association, known as the First International, which was created to defend the workers and to reinforce their organizations, is a famous historical example of the way nonstate solidarity was invited to demonstrate its strength. Many other international mobilizations were to follow this path.

All these practices of solidarity result in a paradoxical situation: All solidarities are favorable to unity, but all define themselves in rivalry and confrontation. In this power rationale, solidarity is as much a factor of cooperation as one of conflict.

A Doctrine of International Peace

Let us now turn to the second dimension of international solidarity: international order. A very different conception of solidarity emerges as early as the end of the 19th century. The “first globalization” (1860–1914), characterized by a spectacular development of trade relations and communication means, substantiates the idea that the world is becoming more and more interdependent. World War I and the 1929 economic crisis reinforce the same image of a shrinking world. No state, and specifically not in its economic and social development, appears to be able to act on its own; all seem more or less dependent on the others. Their interdependence is perceived as a reality that the first “technical” international organizations (telegraphs, post, transports, etc.) account for, and it is in part independent of the actors’ own will. Thus, solidarity is no longer the result of an act willfully undertaken by states but has become a social fact perceived by actors as such. The interdependence hereby created reaches beyond the acts of solidarity undertaken.

Léon Bourgeois (1851–1925) was one of the first to transform this empirical recording into a political doctrine (solidarism). Conceived at the level of society as a third path between liberalism and collectivist socialism, solidarism calls for a certain degree of social intervention to guarantee a liberal and just order. At an international level, according to Bourgeois, this doctrine supports the resort to international organizations to ensure peace and justice. David Mitrany notes that many authors were to encourage this perspective, which consists in increasing and regulating interdependences between states to better pacify their relations, through the mediation of international organizations.

Parallel to the development of sector-based international organizations, the creation of the League of Nations and then the formation of the United Nations (UN) carries further the efforts and tends to ground international order in a global political solidarity. The tragic experience of the two World Wars acted as a determining factor. With various successes, multilateralism imposed itself as a method of negotiation between several parties and aimed at gathering states around shared values. After 1945, multilateralism spread to almost all fields (monetary, economic, trade, social, etc.) at the world as well as the regional (the European construction) levels. The mobilization of concrete solidarities in the service of a global solidarity from which all may benefit became the official doctrine of multilateralism. It was strengthened after decolonization and under the growing influence of countries from the Global South. However, just as at the time of the League of Nations and despite the reinforced authority of the UN Security Council, practices of solidarity remain limited. The assessment is incomplete regarding functional cooperation (technical cooperation, development aid, etc.). Such solidarity is limited with respect to political and military cooperation. The Cold War cannot be held as the only element responsible for these limitations. Collective security, as envisioned by the UN Charter, proved impossible to accomplish and therefore is considered a major failure with regard to international solidarity, which should have preceded over the implementation of Security Council decisions. Another failure derives from an interstate conception of international solidarity within the UN. Solidarity is reduced to the interests of the most powerful states although, as phrased at the
beginning of the Charter ("We the People of the United Nations"), it was officially addressed to the societies of the member states. The UN, as it functions, consecrates an interstate order that favors powerful states instead of being an instrument of solidarity between societies.

A Social Dynamic of Contest
Let us finally turn to the third dimension of international solidarity: the emergence of international social movements that contest the established interstate order. As early as the 19th century, international solidarity has been extended to the relations between societies in reaction to state policies: The actors of this form of international solidarity are nonstate actors. Taking advantage of the development of means of communication, many social groups grew conscious of the resources they could draw from their solidarity in the defense and the promotion of common causes. Mobilizations of solidarity multiplied (abolitionists, suffragettes, pacifists), for instance, the international movements of workers or the action of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in fields neglected by states. In parallel to rising multilateralism, a new form of solidarity was born on the international scene: both social and transnational. After a period, when it fell back at the eve of World War II (despite the singular episode of the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War), the dynamic strengthened itself globally through the creation of a growing number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) having an international vocation in domains as various as humanitarian emergency, human rights, development aid, environment, and so on. This activism of solidarity now adds up to that of transnational social movements, which inscribes itself even more clearly in a perspective of contesting state policies (as the action of groups claiming themselves as partisans of an alternativaglobalization and the brutal response of authorities in Seattle in 1999 or Genoa in 2001 have testified). Using various means (global campaigns, lobby, boycott, countersummits, etc.), the mobilized social bases have become more diversified while the organizations have transformed, thanks to the Internet, into broad networks of correspondents (even if they remain located mainly in the North), as noted by Marco Giugni and Florence Passy.

The acceleration of communications and the media exposure of international events have led to an intensification of relations between societies. However, transnational solidarities remain fragile. They are primarily anchored in local and national levels of action and therefore strive to embody global objectives. They often remain fragmented and virtual. They interfere in interstate relations but are no substitute for them.

Trapped between diverse conceptions and practices, international solidarity remains an ambivalent notion. It reveals a certain state of international order and also designates one of the elements of its transformation.

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See also Advocacy Networks, Transnational; International Organizations; International Society; Multilateralism; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Peace; Power

Further Readings

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The international system is made up of individual, constituent units and an ordering principle that arranges the structure of those units, together forming a whole toward an outside environment.
A third defining characteristic of the international system is the interaction that continuously occurs between the level of the individual units and the overall structural level. This notion, comprising three basic elements (units, structure, and unit–structure interaction), suffices to describe a limited, structural conceptualization of the international system. An alternative definition that also encompasses the connections between the units (units, structure, unit–structure interaction, and unit–unit relations) may be referred to as a broader, relational conceptualization of the international system. The use of the concept, in either version, is justified as soon as the system exhibits properties that individual units do not.

After a brief note on the intellectual heritage of the concept of the international system, this entry offers a discussion of four sets of issues found pertinent to the subject in contemporary political science and international relations scholarship. The four sets of issues that will help elucidate key aspects of the concept of the international system are (1) the properties of units and structure; (2) its origins and historical evolution; (3) understandings of change, transformation, and breakdown; and (4) the inherent potential and limitations of the concept.

When it comes to the basic figure of thought, it can be argued that some idea of an international system was envisaged in the Amarna letters of ancient Egypt during the Late Bronze Age and is implicit in the classical writings of Thucydides, Kautilya, Sun Tzu, and others who commented on the subjects of diplomacy, trade, and war. Several of these authors described periods of rather intense interaction between political units and a wider political or economic structure, outside of which there was significantly less such interaction. The international system, however, is a concept that emerged in the early-modern era in the treatises of prominent lawyers and philosophers. Following in the footsteps of Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and Thomas Hobbes and their respective works on sovereignty, state equality, and political order, Samuel Pufendorf explicitly referred to the states system as several states that are connected as to seem to constitute one body but whose members retain sovereignty. During the 20th century, the rise of new academic disciplines made its mark on all concepts containing the component “system,” and structuralist authors of organicist, process-oriented, or functionalist persuasion subsequently applied systems theories to virtually all branches of the nascent social sciences. Arguably, this intellectual trend had a profound effect on the academic field of international relations.

Properties of Units and Structure
Relational concepts of the international system ascribe most importance and explanatory power to the units that together form a whole, as well as to the mutual bonds that are forged among them. Realist balance-of-power theories provide a good illustration of this, as do liberal theories that attribute significance to the internal organization of political units such as city-states, empires, or (modern) states. The idea inherent to the latter is that the internal organization of individual political entities affects the way in which they interact and conduct business with their peer entities.

Structural concepts of the international system assume that unit-level action is essentially shaped and conditioned by the overarching incentive structure, which is why causes are difficult to locate at lower levels of analysis (and abstraction). At the unit level, we merely find the attributes and interactions of the constituent parts. At the system level, a powerful structuring principle arranges the positions of the units and thereby predisposes the mode of interaction among them.

Depending on the characteristics of the particular theory, the international system is a concept infused with some ontological premise as to its purpose, function, or design. This aspect was underdeveloped in much realist theorizing during the post-1945 period but has received more attention in recent years. The same theoretical neglect long applied to the system/environment distinction and to the means of upholding that difference.

Origins and Historical Evolution
The differentiation between the international system and its environment, the latter typically involving peripheral/nonrecognized units and asymmetric/low-density interaction, is critical to any account of the origins of that system. Some have argued that a trade relationship constitutes a prerequisite for other types of ties between political
entities (units). Others believe that political or strategic ambitions may be just as common as the first step toward creating a significant level of interaction and therefore toward a new unit joining the international system. Once established, many agree, the system is self-reproducing in that units sustain (boundaries between) themselves and fend off systemic intrusion.

Several important contributions regarding the origins and historical evolution of the international system were provided by scholars associated with the so-called English School of international relations. Informed by diplomatic history accounts of political relations, these scholars described how the international system arose in Renaissance Italy and then progressively expanded via Western Europe to North America, Turkey, and other Middle East countries and later to Asia, Australia, Africa, and South America.

Key protagonists of the English School nevertheless felt that the structural conception of the international system strongly downplays the social dimension of interaction and launched a relational notion called international society. They insisted that the latter reflects a more demanding level of political and diplomatic exchange than a “mere system,” in that states perceive that they are bound by a common set of rules and institutions.

Most of today’s scholars do not heed this distinction but appear to have subsumed part of the arguments forwarded by the English School into more nuanced understandings of the international system. Indeed, even structural realists who stress material factors and interests of powerful actors as explanatory variables operate with some notion of socialization and cognitive adaptation to the actions and preferences of other actors.

Another increasingly influential body of work highlights the constitutive role of legal precepts, interstate accords, international organizations, and jurisprudence in fashioning the institutional framework within which governments and other actors pursue interests and promote values. An older view of international law as little more than positive morality, akin to the dress code of a private club (as one philosopher put it), is thus giving way for a more comprehensive understanding that acknowledges the expanding body of private and public law in the international realm. It is further accepted that the United Nations, for all its flaws and limitations, has played a constructive and at times crucial role in de-escalating conflicts between great powers.

Theoretical Understandings of Change, Transformation, and Breakdown

One of the chief criticisms of structural conceptions of the international system concerns its weak explanation of change or major transformation. According to the most influential account, the international system is anarchic, lacking an institution of central authority, and can only shift to a hierarchical system if functional differentiation among political entities is greatly enhanced and the distribution of capabilities (powers) becomes more even.

That prospect, though, is theoretically implausible. Instead, the law of inertia perpetuates the existing international system, with minor fluctuations on the margins. New members are socialized into the system through learning and mimicking the practices of more successful peer entities. Even though the present international system is characterized by an unprecedented degree of interaction, trade, and communication, proponents of a structural conception of the former maintain that most signs are of continuity and incremental change, the latter induced by states or possibly by transnational advocacy networks and international organizations.

Advocates of relational concepts of international system, in contrast, are more open to the possibility of large-scale change induced by interacting units. Transformative processes, some say, have occurred in connection with the two World Wars of the 20th century and can ensue whenever major powers fundamentally alter the way in which they deal with each other. More radical perspectives project the eclipse of U.S. preeminence within the next 20 to 25 years and believe that a new constellation of powers led by China will become predominant by that time. In fact, some doubt that 21st-century citizens will remain loyal to a single state or nation and predict the onset of an era of cosmopolitanism or “new medievalism.”

A new medievalism with overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties would not necessarily be turbulent or violent, but the latter notion gently approaches the most dramatic type of scenario, that of a breakdown of the international system. Two alternative tragic visions of the future seem to
have gained currency in recent years, and inform the security and defense policies of many individual states (especially in the West). One is that of an epic confrontation along religious, cultural, and/or civilizational lines, pitting the Euro-American transatlantic community of countries against challengers predominantly in Asia and the Middle East.

The second tragic vision is that of ecological disaster on a scale not previously experienced. While this is a devastating prospect, the difference lies in the nonantagonistic character of the latter threat. A breakdown of the international system prompted by environmental damage could conceivably therefore help usher in a new era of global cooperation over and beyond previous political boundaries, jurisdictions, and mandates.

Inherent Potential and Limitations of the Concept

The international system is one of several theoretical notions that paved the way for studies with a global reach by playing down the importance of political borders and helping wind down the methodological nationalism characteristic of older social science. The structural conception of the international system, though subject to critique in this entry, was clearly instrumental in widening this research agenda to what used to be viewed as peripheral regions and issues. Relational conceptualizations, meanwhile, are less likely to reify structure or overemphasize the system level at the expense of explanations that account for unit-level actors and institutions.

The “international” element in the concept of international system, however, cannot reasonably transcend the state-oriented focus associated with either version of the argument. And just as states and governments are privileged as unit-level actors, both the structural and the relational conceptions typically rely on an implicit notion of the primacy of politics. In that sense, the international system is a concept that may not remain analytically relevant in the 21st century to the same degree as in the 20th, as the realities it was created to depict have altered substantively.

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See also Anarchy; Balance of Power; Diplomacy; International Society

Further Readings


International Trade

International trade is the exchange of goods and services across borders. However, the boundaries between trade and investment have become increasingly blurred. Many services can only be delivered across borders through a foreign commercial presence, implying foreign direct investment. An increasing share of world trade also takes place within multinational firms or through international production networks in which multinationals play a central role.

The political analysis of international trade has centered on two closely related issues: (1) the determinants of free trade and protection at the national level and (2) the determinants of international cooperation on trade issues, including through multilateral organizations. The first section of this entry provides an overview of models of free trade and protection at the domestic level, focusing first on interest-based approaches and then introducing collective action problems and the role of institutions. The second section examines some of the core issues in the international politics of trade, including the central features of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) regime and the growth of regional arrangements. Brief mention is also made of the long-standing literature linking trade to security considerations and conflict. The conclusion considers future research
directions that are emerging from new developments in trade theory, including the role of multinational firms, the enduring role of geography, and the political economy of agglomeration.

**Models of Free Trade and Protection**

In their basic assumptions, political economy models of free trade and protection resemble other models of public policy and regulation. Voters and interest groups constitute the “demand side” of the political market with their preferences driven by the effects of trade and trade policy on income and assets. The extent of interest group organization and the willingness to expend resources to secure protection (so-called rent-seeking behavior) are key variables in many political economy models.

Politicians, in turn, supply trade policy in return for votes and campaign contributions (both legal and illegal). Bureaucratic agents can also play an independent role in trade policy where they exercise discretion; an example would be the bribery of a customs agent. The behavior of both politicians and bureaucrats will also be affected by the design of electoral and other political institutions.

**The Role of Interests**

The early literature on the political economy of trade focused on the structure of protection at the national level, that is, the levels of tariff and non-tariff barriers across industries. Virtually all of this work was on advanced industrial states, and the United States in particular. Early empirical models explored a variety of factors that might be consequential, including the growth of output and employment and exposure to import competition at the industry level. However, the logical underpinning for this analysis was to use trade theory to identify the characteristics of industries (and ultimately investors and workers) that would make them more or less likely to support free trade.

Classic trade theory offered up two, quite different approaches in this regard. In the Heckscher-Ohlin setup, factors of production—capital and labor in the simplest two-factor variant—move costlessly across industries and returns to them therefore tend to equalize across the economy. Going back to David Ricardo’s classic formulation of comparative advantage, countries (and regions within them) will export goods that intensively use abundant factors and will import goods intensive in the scarce factor. Trade thus benefits owners of abundant factors and harms the scarce factor. In capital-abundant economies, capital should therefore favor free trade while labor should oppose it; in labor-abundant economies, the opposite would be the case.

In a sweeping application of the Heckscher-Ohlin approach, Ronald Rogowski’s *Commerce and Coalitions* (1990) attempted to show how changes in the costs of trade in the late 19th century influenced not only the politics of trade but wider social cleavages in a number of countries. In recent years, studies of protection at the industry level using a Heckscher-Ohlin motivation have been supplemented by survey research that trace preferences down to the individual level. For example, Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter found that the level of education, taken as a proxy for skills, was positively correlated with individual preferences for free trade.

The Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that the interests of factors will align; in a two-factor setup, capital and labor should have opposing trade policy interests. This model could not explain the anomaly that capital and labor frequently seemed allied with one another in opposing free trade in the advanced industrial states, for example, in declining sectors such as steel and textiles. In the specific factors or Ricardo-Viner model, factors are not mobile across alternative uses. Once investments are made in industry-specific physical and human capital, those investments are not easily redeployed. As a result, trade policy coalitions form not along factoral lines but by sector depending on the level of exposure to international trade. Export-oriented and import-competing industries constitute the dominant cleavage.

The interest group foundations underlying both the mobile and fixed factor models had an important limitation in not capturing the constraints on politicians in acceding to rent-seeking demands. Trade theory is useful in outlining the distributive consequences of policy, but it also underlines the distortions and welfare losses associated with protectionism. Indeed, if free trade is welfare enhancing, politicians responding to the median voter should consistently support free trade. In an influential article, Helen Milner and Keiko Kubota
show that democratic developing countries were more likely to liberalize trade beginning in the 1980s than their authoritarian counterparts.

In a highly influential synthesis, Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman model politicians as seeking to maximize their chances of election by balancing two considerations: (1) the political contributions coming from factor-specific lobbies and (2) the aggregate social welfare gains and losses associated with any trade policy choices, which should affect the support of voters at the margin. A core element of the Grossman-Helpman model is the extent of industry organization; protection increases with the extent to which sectors are organized.

**Collective-Action Problems**

A central problem with both the Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner approaches is that they are ultimately theories of trade policy preferences, not effective influence or outcomes. For preferences to be translated into policy, groups must be organized and politicians must respond to them.

Several early empirical studies found that organizational factors, proxied by measures of industry concentration, had a more powerful effect on trade policy than measures that capture preferences, such as the factor intensity of output. High levels of industry or geographic concentration may have influence by lowering the transaction costs of forming effective organizations and mobilizing support.

But high levels of industry and spatial concentration may reflect other factors, such as the specificity of assets, and can even dilute the electoral impact of an industry. An industry that is concentrated in a particular district commands the full attention of its political representatives. However, if the industry is spatially concentrated in a small number of districts, it is unlikely to command wider legislative support. Electorally dispersed industries are typically assumed to have more political clout since more legislators will care about the fate of such industries.

A more direct way to get at industry influence is to move beyond economic proxies such as concentration to more direct measures of organization and influence. Beginning in the 2000s, several studies exploited data on campaign contributions and found them to be positively correlated with protectionist outcomes at the sectoral level.

These studies still begged the question of why some groups are better organized than others. Moreover, there is a strong case that interest groups are endogenous. Anne Krueger’s famous model of rent seeking argued not that rents were the result of lobbying but rather that rent seeking arose as a result of various forms of government intervention (and could presumably be reduced if governments credibly swore off such interventions).

To date, there has been surprisingly little work on the determinants of interest group organization around trade. It is commonly believed that protectionist interests enjoy advantages in solving collective-action problems because of the concentrated nature of the benefits they can realize when compared with the diffuse gains to highly dispersed consumers. However, importers of intermediate goods, firms engaged in intrafirm trade, and concentrated retailers, such as the American retail giant Walmart, do not have these organizational disabilities. The political strength of these “concentrated consumers” is undoubtedly a factor in the continuing liberalization of world trade.

**Introducing Political Institutions**

The work by economists on the determinants of trade policy tended to be institution free, in part perhaps because these studies were often undertaken within the context of a given country in which institutions were invariant. However, the Milner and Kubota findings on regime type suggest that institutions matter; more competitive political systems are more responsive to the median voter than to special interests and thus have freer trade. This finding is consonant with the Grossman-Helpman model but underlines that institutions may affect the trade-off between securing campaign contributions and appealing to the median voter.

One line of research on institutions and trade policy in democracies looks at the effects of electoral rules. For example, proportional representation (PR) electoral rules are accompanied by larger electoral districts, which are more heterogeneous and thus less prone to capture by special interests. On the other hand, majoritarian systems have features that might induce free trade as well, including the tendency for parties to converge on median voter interests. In a useful synthesis, Fiona McGillivray notes that the empirical work on the
effects of electoral rules on protection has proven ambiguous and that their effects may be contingent on other factors such as the geographic concentration of industries. For example, a highly concentrated industry in a swing district that is crucial for winning the presidency or securing a parliamentary majority will have a clout that far exceeds what is predicted by its level of organization alone.

The effect of institutions on trade policy is by no means limited to their effect on legislative votes. Delegation also plays a crucial role in trade policy. In both the United States and the European Union (EU), legislatures have delegated substantial authority to executives (the president and the European Commission, respectively) to negotiate trade agreements. The means through which this delegation is structured can strongly influence policy outcomes. The literature on trade policy in the United States places particular weight on the liberalizing effect of delegation to the president under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and subsequent innovations, such as fast-track authority, that limit the ability of Congress to amend trade agreements once negotiated (legislators are constrained to vote them up or down).

Delegation also plays a role in the growth of administrative channels for securing protection. Prevailing international trade law permits countries to protect industries in response to unfair trade practices (subsidies and dumping) and in the face of fair trade practices that threaten significant disruption to the industry (the so-called escape clause). Relief under these provisions is typically not legislated on a case-by-case basis but through quasi-judicial processes that can be either more or less favorable to industries seeking protection. For example, these processes might allow standing to adversely affected interests, thus balancing protectionist claims. The ability to make filings may be more or less difficult, both substantively and administratively. A growing body of empirical literature, particularly on antidumping/countervailing duty cases, shows that administrative bodies are responsive to political pressures emanating from the legislature and interest groups. The details of administrative procedure have become a central issue in disciplining the growth of administrative protection.

The International Politics of Trade

The Bretton Woods Conference (1944), which led to the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, also introduced the idea of creating the International Trade Organization (ITO). As governments engaged in the complex negotiations over the ITO, 15 states negotiated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a forum to reduce tariffs in the short run. Once the ITO failed to secure ratification from the United States, only the GATT agreement—a very much thinner organization—was left in place. Not until 1995 was the GATT replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the interim, however, regional trade agreements—most notably the EU—as well as bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) have proliferated rapidly, making them a central feature of the international politics of world trade.

The GATT/WTO and the Logic of Multilateralism

The role of the GATT and WTO in liberalizing trade is frequently misunderstood. As an organization, the GATT/WTO has very little authority in structuring the negotiating agenda or influencing outcomes. Nor does the organization seek to negotiate a common tariff structure across countries (harmonization) or vote on liberalization measures. Rather, the GATT/WTO is primarily a forum in which countries trade “concessions”: Countries offer reductions in their own trade barriers in exchange for reductions in the barriers of others. The process of trading concessions has an important political effect at the domestic level. For export-oriented industries to secure advantages abroad, the country must be willing to make corresponding or reciprocal concessions. The very fact of negotiating a trade agreement thus changes the politics of trade; as export interests are politically mobilized to influence the course of trade talks, they constitute a counterweight to protectionist forces.

Although nominally a multilateral institution with a consensus decision-making structure, the GATT/WTO has in fact operated through bilateral deals among the major trading countries or among small groups of countries. This procedure dominates in part not only because of the difficulty of reaching a consensus among a growing number of
parties but also because power in the organization is effectively exercised through the ability to make concessions. As a result, the demands and concessions of the major trading powers typically drive the agenda and ultimate outcome of the negotiations.

A distinctive feature of the negotiations, however, is the concept of nondiscrimination, under which any concessions that are extended to any one party are multilateralized to all members of the organization through the most favored nation (MFN) principle. The nondiscrimination norm has been a significant institutional feature of the GATT/WTO system and has almost certainly contributed to the liberalization of world trade in the postwar period.

Nonetheless, as with the controversy over the governance of the international financial institutions, there has been significant debate about the extent to which the GATT/WTO also embodies biases of various sorts. On the one hand, the major trading partners effectively control the agenda by structuring the issues and products over which negotiations occur. In its early days, the organization focused overwhelmingly on trade in manufactures that were of interest at the time mainly to the developed economies. Products of primary interest to developing countries, including agriculture, received little attention.

On the other hand, the power of the advanced industrial states was also due to the fact that many developing countries opted out of the organization altogether or argued successfully that they should enjoy special and differential status within it, effectively exempted from making concessions. As the developing countries began to undertake reforms and as their industrial capability increased, they entered the organization in large numbers and began to change the nature of the negotiations.

During the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) and current Doha Round (launched in 2001), developing countries brought new issues onto the agenda. The advanced industrial states sought to push negotiations on issues in which they enjoyed comparative advantage, including trade in services, investment, and the protection of intellectual property. Developing countries, by contrast, sought concessions on trade in labor-intensive products (most notably textiles and apparel), agriculture, and a strengthening of the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM).

The reform of the DSM was a major development of the Uruguay Round negotiations that led to the creation of the WTO. Under the prior DSM structure, plaintiffs faced an uphill battle in securing relief because prevailing rules effectively gave the defendant the ability to veto investigations. The new DSM is much more legalized, with a highly structured process for the empowerment of review panels. Despite the fact that the ultimate enforcement mechanism is retaliation, and large countries should therefore continue to enjoy advantages over small countries, there is evidence that larger parties tend to comply with rulings that go against them. Current legal research on the DSM is considering the extent to which it may become the foundation for judicial lawmaking through the establishment of precedent, rather than a process that is limited to the interpretation of statute.

The Rise of Regionalism

Regional trade arrangements got a bad name during the interwar period, as Japan and Germany sought to carve out exclusive trade zones. Britain and France also strengthened preferential trading zones with their colonies, contributing to the fragmentation of the international trading system. The strong commitment to the nondiscrimination norm in the GATT/WTO system was motivated in large part by the desire to avoid such outcomes in the future.

However, the dramatic economic success of the European Community raised the question of whether regional agreements were necessarily incompatible with liberalization at the international level. The negotiation of the Single European Act in 1985 and subsequent developments following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 set Europe on the course of deeper integration through completion of the common market and ultimately monetary union. The United States also pursued a regional option through the U.S.–Canada Free Trade Agreement (1988) and its extension to Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1994). Beginning in the 1990s, regional arrangements and bilateral FTAs began to proliferate rapidly and became a major research topic in the political economy of trade.
On the one hand, a number of arguments suggested that regional agreements could be the building blocks of multilateral liberalization. Strong regional agreements could provide the template for deepening cooperation through the GATT/WTO and could even be used to leverage multilateral agreements. U.S. commitment to the NAFTA had an important effect on European participation in the Uruguay Round. A distinctive feature of U.S.-led FTAs has been the inclusion of environmental and labor standards, provisions that have also been mirrored in the web of agreements surrounding the EU.

On the other hand, there is increasing concern that the multiplication of regional agreements—now numbering more than 400—will increasingly complicate the politics of international trade. Almost by definition, free trade agreements are discriminatory; even if they do not raise trade barriers to outsiders, they nonetheless extend preferences that give insiders advantage. Once created, regional agreements have the result of creating vested interests that will resist expansion. In both the Western Hemisphere and particularly in East Asia, there have been growing debates about how existing arrangements—such as the NAFTA in North America and the Mercosur (centered on Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay)—might be reconciled.

“Low” and “High” Politics: The Strategic Dimensions of International Trade

The politics of international trade is by no means limited to economic issues narrowly conceived. Beginning with Albert Hirschmann’s *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*, an important strand of research underlined how large powers could use asymmetric trade relations as an instrument of political influence. Such considerations played a role in the emergence of dependency theory in the 1960s, which not only questioned the economic benefits of international trade but also noted how trade and investment ties might lead to political influence in developing countries as well.

Strategic considerations were by no means limited to North–South trade relations. Another important strand of research has examined the extent to which foreign trade was related to broader political relations, such as alliances. Alliance commitments were of obvious importance in structuring the post-war trading system, with its strong initial focus on the deepening of North Atlantic trade in conjunction with American commitments to Western Europe and the self-imposed exile of the Soviet bloc from the world trading system.

A final strand of research in this vein centers on the long-standing question of whether trade acts as a deterrent to military conflict; Etel Solingen has provided the most compelling recent synthesis of these arguments. Countries dominated by export-oriented coalitions are likely to favor conciliation and multilateral cooperation. Those with more closed economies are likely to be more hostile to international cooperation, in part because of the direct threat posed to vested interests in the closed economy. Isolating the effects of trade in such models is difficult, since more open economies also tend to be more democratic and democratic policies appear more pacific, at least toward one another. Nonetheless, these debates have strong policy implications as analysts consider the possible consequences of the rise of new powers such as China, which combine increasing economic openness with persistent elements of statism and authoritarian rule.

New Directions

The political economy of trade constitutes a very dynamic area of research, yet significant gaps are emerging between developments in the economics of trade and work in political economy. The Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner models of trade had appeal because of their apparent ability to explain the protectionism associated with the rapid growth of North–South trade in manufactures beginning in the 1960s. Yet even with the rise of the China and other middle-income countries, the majority of world trade continues to take place among the advanced industrial states. As early as the 1970s, it was recognized that this trade could not be explained by standard models and that consideration had to be given to the effects of increasing returns, product differentiation, and the corresponding emergence of intra-industry trade patterns. This trade appeared to be less vulnerable to protection than the interindustry trade characteristic of North–South relations.
The remarkable growth of foreign direct investment since 1980 has also exercised a strong influence on the political economy of trade. In contrast to earlier expectations that North–South trade would necessarily generate protectionist pressures, the organization of international production networks controlled by lead firms from the advanced industrial states has probably had important countervailing effects.

More recently, the so-called new trade theory has focused attention on the geography of trade. Borders still create much larger barriers to trade than was previously appreciated; intracountry trade still dominates international trade by a large margin. Despite the revolutions in transport and communications, distance remains a serious deterrent to trade as well. These facts suggest that there are substantial fixed as well as marginal costs to entering international trade with important implications for the ability of developing countries to benefit from specialization. The new trade theory has also emphasized the way the benefits of trade, and production more generally, tend to cluster or agglomerate in particular locations raising important questions of how such clustering arises in the first place. These new issues—the role of multinational corporations, the enduring influence of borders and distance, and the role of agglomeration economies—constitute important frontiers for the political economy of trade.

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See also Dependency Theory; Developing World and International Relations; Domestic Politics and International Relations; Economic Statecraft; European Integration; Globalization; Governance, Global; International Political Economy; Multinational Corporations (MNCs); Regional Integration (Supranational); Regionalism; Trade Liberalization; World Trade Organization (WTO)

Further Readings


**INTERVENTION**

An intervention is a coercive action taken by one international actor to affect the political authority of another. This entry examines the concept of intervention and then discusses the balance between the protection of human rights and respect for state sovereignty, the legal basis for humanitarian intervention, and the issues related to the strategies employed in humanitarian intervention.

The notion of intervention is notoriously elusive and controversial. In what remains the most relevant conceptual work on the issue, James Rosenau proposed to delimit the notion in two ways. First, an intervention is a coercive action, implying a sharp break from previous, conventional, behavior. This sudden interruption in the course of established relations between political units is finite and transitory. It has a beginning (the usual modes of behavior are abandoned) and an end (these modes of behavior are reestablished or, because they persist, they become conventional in turn). Military intervention—either directly or indirectly, such as the support of subversive or terrorist-armed activities—is an especially conspicuous and significant form of coercive action, but it is not the only one. There are other types of measures, either diplomatic or economic, that can constitute a forcible interference and provoke a sharp break in preestablished relations. Second, an
Intervention is not just any type of break: It is directed at affecting (changing or preserving) the political authority of another actor. Political authority notably refers to the actors and the processes that enable a political community to choose its own political, economic, social, and cultural system as well as its foreign policy. The target is thus deprived, at least momentarily, of its capacity for self-determination.

Interventions are therefore different from the foreign policies that imply a continuous presence in the target society. For example, the presence since 1945 of U.S. troops in Europe and in Northeast Asia is not considered today as an intervention, a sharp break with long-standing relations. On the contrary, this military presence is integrated and largely taken for granted. The continuous exercise of regular diplomatic and economic influence is not considered as an intervention either. Similarly, colonialism and imperialism imply a long-standing presence of the colonizer and expand well beyond the notion of intervention. Interventions are also distinct from the numerous external actions that have as their main goal an influence that is not focused on structures of political authority. For example, measures favoring investment abroad, an international public relation campaign to promote the candidacy of a city to host the Olympic Games, the expulsion of diplomats, or the signing of an alliance all alter previous behavior. But the main goal of these actions is to affect the capacity of other international actors, not directly their authority structure (even if, in the long run, authority structures might be somewhat affected).

Both practically and theoretically, the notion of intervention is one of the most disputed in international relations for two main reasons. First, the phenomenon touches on some of the core issues, notably the imperatives of order and justice (sovereignty and individual rights), of a variety of legal, normative, political, and strategic/military perspectives. As a consequence, different practitioners of international politics (diplomats, soldiers, lawyers, human rights advocates, etc.) as well as several academic disciplines are simultaneously interested, which leads not only to a proliferation of studies and approaches but also to a disconnect between these relatively autonomous debates. Second, for international relations practitioners and analysts, the notion of intervention is at the root of a key issue, the evolving divide between the domestic, especially the domestic politics that enable each person to work out his or her own destiny, and the international. The changing reach of international relations and the concerns that these changes generate are at the core of the debates on intervention, linked to states’ sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence. Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) provides, “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” The UN Charter affirms the inviolability of state boundaries, but the content of the “matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” has been continually disputed. What are the matters and concerns that are within the reach of the society of states and what are the matters and concerns (if any) that are off-limits, that is, for the political communities to decide?

Since the end of the Cold War, with the rise of human rights norms in international affairs, numerous crises brought back to the fore the issue of intervention, notably humanitarian intervention. The general context of a globalizing international system has favored porous borders and greater intrusions into what was considered as the domestic jurisdiction of states. On the one hand, these trends have been perceived as a unique opportunity to prevent, and to respond to, massive violations of human rights. On the other, however, they have posed a growing threat to the right of distinct political communities to work out their own political arrangements. Humanitarian military interventions have been at the forefront of debates about when military force should be used, and they have influenced local conflict, aid organizations, and military strategy. The tension between the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention to protect civilians from harm and the continued respect for state sovereignty as well as the recognition of the danger and cost of the enterprise have been at the center of controversial decisions and nondecisions about Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Rwanda, East Timor, Sudan (Darfur), and many other places. In earlier cases, which might have been humanitarian interventions, the states justified their action primarily as
self-defense, notably the intervention of India in East Pakistan (1971), of Vietnam in Cambodia to overthrow Pol Pot (1978), and of Tanzania in Uganda to overthrow Idi Amin (1979). Since the establishment of safe havens to protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq in 1991, the No-Fly Zones in Northern and Southern Iraq, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) Kosovo operation in 1999, the use of force to prevent humanitarian atrocities has been more frequent.

While, from an international law perspective, the notion that there is a right to intervene to avert an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe remains disputable, there is a stronger legal and political basis for forcible humanitarian intervention with the authorization of the Security Council under Chapter VII or VIII of the UN Charter. Formulated in 2001, by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) set up by the Canadian government, the notion of responsibility to protect showed that international society has evolved to recognize the norm of humanitarian intervention as a legitimate exception to the principle of nonintervention. The ICISS also listed six criteria, inspired by just war principles, that would constitute a legitimate (but not necessarily legal) humanitarian intervention: (1) right cause, (2) right intention, (3) right authority, (4) last resort, (5) proportionate means, and (6) reasonable prospects. The responsibility to protect has been endorsed by the 2004 UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Changes. Its report, Our Common Future, noted that there is an emerging norm of collective international responsibility to protect,

exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. (UN Department of Public Information, 2004)

In the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the Heads of State and Government made a significant political commitment to take action, through the Security Council, in case of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. However, the opposition of Russia and China to action against Myanmar and Zimbabwe indicate some of the potential limits of the responsibility to protect.

Legal and normative justifications are, however, not the only significant aspects of humanitarian interventions. Humanitarian interventions are an act of strategy, and it is important to examine their ends, means, operational practice, and effectiveness. As humanitarian claims become more widespread and, to an extent, more legitimate, they became part of the art of coercion. The emerging norm of humanitarian intervention affects the ways in which states commit themselves to intervention and persuade their adversaries and allies; it affects the manipulation of risk by local and international actors as well as the idiom of military action, that is, the specific ways in which force is used to fulfill the main goal of these interventions—saving the lives of civilians at risk. Humanitarian motives and the responsibility to protect can be, and actually are, strategically manipulated. Many governments, particularly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, see the responsibility to protect as a legitimation of military intervention by strong states, using their technologically advanced weapons, against weak ones. While some of these concerns might be exaggerated, humanitarian and political objectives have been often blurred, for example, when the goal of UN-led operations in Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was to alleviate human suffering as well as to promote a political resolution to the crisis. There is a thin line between the protection of fundamental human rights in extreme circumstances and the protection or promotion of civil and political rights. Moreover, by raising expectations of diplomatic and military intervention to protect, the emerging norm has been criticized for unintentionally fostering rebellion by lowering its expected cost and increasing its likelihood of success. Convinced, rightly or wrongly, that they will get international support on humanitarian ground, vulnerable groups rebelled, triggering major retaliations and reinforcing the human suffering. The prospect of humanitarian intervention and the intervention itself can feed wars. Moreover, as Taylor Seybolt pointed out, the strategy employed by the intervener under the appropriate circumstances is a central determinant of success, defined as saving lives by preventing or ending violent attacks on unarmed civilians.
and/or assisting the delivery of aid. His analysis of 17 military operations in six conflict areas that were the defining cases of the 1990s—Northern Iraq after the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor—shows that the majority were successful. The intervening states employed four types of strategy: (1) helping deliver emergency aid, (2) protecting aid operations, (3) saving the victims of violence, and (4) defeating the perpetrators of violence. In sum, in the long history of legal and normative debates about interventions, in general, and humanitarian interventions, in particular, principles and strategies should be connected.

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See also Diplomacy; Normative Political Theory; Normative Theory in International Relations; Peace; Protectionism; Responsibility; Self-Determination; Sovereignty; Strategic (Security) Studies; Territory

Further Readings


**INTERVENTION, HUMANITARIAN**

Humanitarian intervention refers to coercive action, involving the use of military force, in the affairs of one state by another state, group of states, or international organization with the express purpose of addressing massive human rights violations or widespread human suffering. Two aspects of this definition are worth noting. First, humanitarian intervention is distinct from the broader category of “humanitarian action,” which might include a range of activities (both military and nonmilitary) designed to address humanitarian emergencies. Second, the explicit and most prominent purpose of the military action must be humanitarian—even if additional objectives are achieved through the use of force.

There are alternative definitions of humanitarian intervention that attempt to narrow the concept still further. Most legal conceptions, for example, insist that the term humanitarian intervention encompasses only those coercive actions that do not involve the consent or invitation of the host country. However, in practice, this definition is difficult to maintain. In many cases where military force has been used for humanitarian purposes, consent from the government of the target state has been either coerced (as it was in the case of Indonesian consent for intervention in East Timor in 1999) or ambiguous (as it was in the case of Bosnia during the Balkan wars of the 1990s). In other instances, such as Somalia in 1992, the breakdown of order within a country makes it difficult to identify authorities who would provide consent for outside action.

Humanitarian intervention has been the subject of controversy, for both scholars and policymakers, because of two tensions that it invokes. The first is between international society’s commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and nonintervention and its commitment to upholding and promoting individual human rights. Both of these goals are enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter. The second tension is between the objective of protecting individuals from extreme persecution and violence and the use of coercive means (which can involve the death of soldiers and civilians) to achieve that goal. For many nongovernmental organizations involved in the delivery of aid and
humanitarian assistance, the very term humanitarian intervention is a contradiction in terms.

Origins and Evolution of the Practice of Humanitarian Intervention

The origins of humanitarian intervention, and the tensions that it raises, date back to at least the 17th century and to the writings of the international jurist Hugo Grotius on the legality and morality of war. Grotius was attempting to reconcile his belief that war could be justly waged by one sovereign on behalf of peoples facing oppression by another with his wider concern to curtail the right of sovereigns to engage in conflict over religious differences. The latter notion became more deeply embedded in international society during the 18th century, largely through the writings of positivist international lawyers such as Emmerich de Vattel and Christian Wolff, who championed the principle of nonintervention as an essential component of state sovereignty. The objective of these jurists was to limit the causes of war that could be considered “just” and to sanction outside intervention only in situations of civil war where clear lines could be drawn between a ruler and his or her people.

In the 19th century, humanitarian intervention became more prominent as a political practice, as European states intervened in the internal affairs of other countries either to rescue their own citizens from harm or to protect religious and national minorities who were subject to persecution. Enshrining this practice as a right in international law, however, continued to be strongly opposed. By the time of the UN Charter, signed in the aftermath of World War II, a destructive global conflict, the overwhelming objective of state leaders was to outlaw aggression and to circumscribe the grounds on which armed force could be used. As a result, the Charter itself remains silent on the question of whether humanitarian intervention is a legitimate practice. Moreover, for most of the Cold War period, the UN Security Council proved unwilling to consider or discuss humanitarian crises as part of its remit for managing peace and security, and individual states were reluctant to accept humanitarian rationale as legitimate justifications for the use of force.

A series of developments during the latter part of the 20th century created a more permissive context for intervention by outside actors in the face of grave humanitarian crises. These include, inter alia, the rise of international human rights instruments, the increased vulnerability of civilians in the context of civil conflict, the global and instantaneous access to information that heightened popular awareness of human suffering, and the greater willingness of the Security Council to define instances where mass atrocities are occurring as threats to international peace and security (as it did in Northern Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, and East Timor during the 1990s). In addition, the delayed and inadequate response of the international community to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 led many to argue that intervention for humanitarian purposes could be justified as part of the requirements of a more just international order.

Opposition to Humanitarian Intervention

Despite this more permissive context, the assertion that there is a new right of humanitarian intervention has been opposed on both legal and moral grounds. The legal skeptics start with the basic presumption that the use of force is illegal as indicated in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The only legitimate exceptions to this rule are military actions taken in the name of either self-defense (Article 51) or collective security (in which case the Security Council authorizes the use of force explicitly through a resolution adopted under Chapter VII). Those who favor a new right of humanitarian intervention make two kinds of claims. First, they suggest that exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force in the Charter should be widened to accommodate other important principles of the UN, such as the promotion and protection of human rights. Second, they assert that there is emerging customary law on humanitarian intervention that runs parallel to the Charter, based on a series of interventions carried out by Western governments during the 1990s and early years of the 21st century.

In reply, the skeptics have argued that neither treaty nor customary law supports a change in priorities between the different goals of the UN; while there have been significant developments in the measures designed to protect human rights over the past 50 years, these have not influenced the interpretation of Article 2(4) or the broader commitment...
in international society to limiting the legitimate justifications for war. They also question whether the new customary law is developing, since much of non-Western legal opinion does not support the view that humanitarian intervention is becoming a more acceptable practice in international society. This opposition derives from a suspicion that humanitarian intervention would not operate in the way prescribed by its advocates but instead would legitimate self-interested intervention by the powerful under the guise of humanitarianism.

The ethical objections to humanitarian intervention fall broadly into two types. The first argument, best articulated by the political philosopher Michael Walzer, claims that sovereign states provide the protective shell for the process of self-determination and the exercise of human freedom. In fulfilling these functions, they become moral entities that should enjoy the presumptive right of nonintervention. While this norm of nonintervention is intended to apply to all communities equally, in practice it has had particular purchase for developing countries and former colonies. By emphasizing the connection of nonintervention with self-determination, such countries have sought to protect themselves from stronger powers seeking to further their own interests through intervention.

The second set of ethical objections to interventionism is consequentialist and emphasizes the negative outcomes (both anticipated and unanticipated) that can result from the use of military force. There are two main consequentialist arguments at work. First, those from the so-called realist school of international relations contend that intervention in the name of humanitarianism is likely to create more problems than it solves and could therefore compromise the more important goal of furthering the national interest. Opposition may be created on the ground in the course of engaging in military action, or expectations may be inflated among those suffering from oppression elsewhere, who will quickly accuse the international community of bias if there is no intervention to support their cause. Furthermore, it is impossible to know beforehand if intervention will succeed in meeting its humanitarian objectives or whether it will lead to an acceptable level of casualties. This has raised the larger question of how the success of humanitarian intervention should be determined: by the achievement of short-term goals (such as the alleviation of hunger or suffering and the return of refugees to their homes) or by addressing the underlying causes of suffering through the reconstruction of stable and well-functioning states.

A second version of consequentialism alleges that any use of force, no matter how well intentioned, can undermine the broader goal of preserving international peace and stability. The international relations theorist Robert Jackson has argued that while states have a responsibility to pursue international justice where they can, they should not jeopardize other fundamental values in the process. In balancing these considerations, international peace should have particular weight, since it is in situations of war—particularly war between great powers—that humanitarian values are most likely to come under attack. The second position is a belief that the consensus that underpins international society is much more procedural than substantive. It is confined to agreements on how states should behave outside their borders and does not extend to a common view on deeper political or economic values. According to this view, sovereign states are unlikely to converge on what counts as injustice or oppression inside a state and hence unlikely to agree when interventions to address humanitarian crises would be justified.

Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect

While a diversity of political and economic values continues to characterize international society in the 21st century, a consensus has emerged that certain actions against individuals and groups—such as the commission of genocide—are sufficiently grave to constitute “crimes against humanity” as a whole. In these extreme cases, those raising ethical objections to humanitarian intervention often allow for some suspension of the nonintervention rule. So, for example, Michael Walzer acknowledges that when the rights of people within a community are seriously threatened such that they can no longer be said to be truly self-determining, outside intervention to protect basic individual rights is morally defensible.

This kind of reasoning has inspired diplomatic efforts to enshrine a new principle in international society, known as the responsibility to protect. In
Interviewing

Interviewing is a commonly used research method throughout the social sciences. Approaches vary, with some types of interviews conducted in an informal and open-ended manner and other types of interviews designed to be much more strictly structured and controlled. Regardless of the approach, interviews by definition always involve one person asking questions of another. The researchers (or staff members working for the researcher) seek information through conversation with their research participants. Although political scientists often use interviews to collect information about their topics, interviewing methods have been developed primarily within other disciplines—including anthropology, sociology, and journalism. Political scientists have taken these methods and adapted them to their own purposes. This entry provides an overview of the types of interviews most commonly used in political science and reviews some of the most important methodological issues associated with interviews as data sources for political scientists.

In the early 20th century, the study of political science was restricted mainly to the library, with analysis of legal rulings and of the structures of government that the primary methods used. The shift to a behavioral approach to politics—looking at what actually happens in government rather than simply what the laws say should happen—meant that political scientists would need to observe and collect information about the activities of government officials and the interactions of government officials and the public. Interviewing was one of the first ways in which this new information was collected, and in the 1920s, political scientists like Pendleton Herring and Elmer Eric Weiss, T. G. (2007). Humanitarian intervention: Ideas in action. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

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See also Genocide; Human Rights, Comparative Perspectives; Human Rights in International Relations; Intervention; Realism in International Relations; Self-Determination; Sovereignty

Further Readings
Schattschneider began conducting fieldwork in Washington, D.C., interviewing government officials and representatives from groups and businesses to be able to better describe the workings of government and how it interacted with organized interests. Today, interviewing remains a common data collection technique, especially for scholars who study political elites.

Types of Interviews There are several styles of interviewing, each appropriate for different informational needs. These styles exist along a continuum: At one end are interviewing techniques that use extremely directed, closed-ended questions, such as those in a survey, and at the other are interpretive techniques in which questions are extremely open-ended and subject to change depending on the guidance of those being interviewed.

When researchers do not know very much about the topic at hand, or when they want to capture an insider perspective on the topic, they often turn to an ethnographic style of interviewing. This approach, borrowed from anthropology, involves long interviews in which the interview subject (sometimes referred to as the interview consultant) helps direct the interviewer. The questions are open-ended. Rather than requiring the respondent to select an answer from a list written ahead of time and requiring the respondent to limit the answer to those options, an open-ended question may be answered in whatever way the respondent chooses. This often provides the researcher with an opportunity to learn about previously unknown aspects of a topic. The interview consultant is treated as the expert, as the guide, in this process. The goal of the interviewer is to guide the interview subject as little as possible, so as to elicit the unbiased views of the interview subject. Such unstructured interviewing techniques are often combined with participant observation, in which interviewers spend time in, and among those they wish to, study. Ethnographic interviews such as these often provide new and unexpected insights, but as a result of how open they are to new directions, they have a tendency to drift away from the researcher's original topic. Thus, they are not the best way to measure concepts reliably across multiple respondents or across multiple field settings, as each interview will be unique. This unique insight is both the advantage and the disadvantage of this type of interviewing.

At the opposite extreme are closed-ended interviewing techniques in which the questions and the possible responses have been predetermined by the interviewer. Outside of political science, both journalists and courtroom litigators often use closed-ended questions. In the courtroom, respondents are often limited to responding “yes” or “no” to the questions posed to them. The trial lawyer seeks to control what information is put before the jury by keeping a tight rein on the questions posed to witnesses. Trial lawyers do this because they are not interviewing to collect new information—they are supposed to have learned the answers already during their depositions of the witnesses. Likewise, political scientists use closed-ended questions when they already know a great deal about the topic at hand. The most common application of this type of interview in political science is the mass opinion survey, such as those conducted biennially by the American National Election Studies. While some surveys are self-administered—that is, survey respondents fill out the questionnaires themselves, either on paper or online—survey interviews are conducted by an interviewer, either in person or on the phone. To write closed-ended questions, the political scientist must already know what the important issues are and what the possible responses could be. The only thing that remains to be learned from the interview is how many people will end up in each response category. This, of course, is an ideal type, and in practice, surveys that are conducted in person by an interviewer also include a number of open-ended questions. In general, however, control over possible responses is fairly tight, and the goal is to make the responses as easily comparable across respondents as possible. Data that result from interviewing using closed-ended questions are much more likely to be reliably compared across participants and across field settings. These data are often used for hypothesis testing, but the closed-ended nature of the questions means that answers will be limited to the answers the interviewer could imagine before the study began and is not likely to be the source of new ways of looking at political phenomena. Whatever errors exist in the researcher's theoretical approach at the beginning are likely to remain after the study is completed.
When political scientists today think about interviewing as used in political science, they most likely are talking about a form of interviewing that strikes a balance between these two extremes. Semistructured interviews with open-ended questions are designed to focus the interview on a particular research topic and to ensure that particular questions are answered, but the interviewee is allowed a great deal of latitude in how he or she responds. Interviews with members of a parliament or Congress, or staff members of those legislators, usually are conducted as semistructured interviews. Questions are aimed at getting the respondent to talk about a topic fairly naturally in order to help capture the specialized knowledge that the respondent has. “Describe to me what happened during the debate about proposal X” is an example of an open-ended question that might be used. What makes the semistructured interview different from the ethnographic interview, however, is how the interviewer works to control the interview once it has begun. While the ethnographic interviewer might allow the respondent to decide what is most important to relate about proposal X, the researcher conducting the semistructured interview will have a predetermined list (written or mental) of questions called “prompts.” This type of semistructured interviewing is also sometimes referred to as “elite” interviewing because it is most often used to collect information from elected and appointed government officials and other highly educated, highly knowledgeable respondents (who might chafe at being forced to pigeonhole their responses into the preordained categories of a mass survey instrument).

Methodological Concerns
Like all data collection methods, interviewing poses potential methodological pitfalls that must be avoided if the data are to be valid and reliable. Interviewers should remember that the order in which questions are asked, as well as the way in which they are asked, may affect the content of the answers. An early question about gun control, for example, may increase respondents’ tendency to name “gun control” when asked later in an interview what they view as the most important issues facing the nation. Survey research has shown that small changes in question wording sometimes create large changes in responses, and similar effects may result from changes in interview questions. The effects of question order and question wording are arguably not as severe in elite interviews as they are in mass surveys, however, since interview respondents answer in their own words and can be prompted for more information. Sticking to exact wording and question ordering does not always work in an elite interview. For instance, the interviewer needs to be willing to drop a question if the respondent has already volunteered that information in response to an earlier question. The interviewer can adapt the question, asking whether there is anything else besides what the respondent has already mentioned, but the interviewer needs to show that he or she is paying attention and heard the earlier response. Otherwise the interviewer risks losing rapport with the interviewee, and answers may become less candid and less complete. For the most part, exact wording and exact question order are less important than rapport and getting the respondent talking in an elite, semistructured interview. The idea is that the open-ended, semistructured nature of the questions will allow a more “true” and complete answer.

As is the case with surveys, the data one collects from interviews are only as good as the people being interviewed. People are fallible and may give incorrect or incomplete answers. People may seek to please the interviewer rather than answer honestly. Finally, even in the case of interview subjects who seem very reliable, the relationship between what they say and what they do may be tenuous. People are not always self-aware enough to be able to describe their behaviors with complete accuracy or to give true insight into the reasons why they do what they do. Nevertheless, it is often difficult or impossible to learn about political beliefs and attitudes in any way other than asking about them, and political elites often have firsthand knowledge of events that cannot be discovered in any other way. Some of the methodological shortcomings of interviews can be lessened by making sure to interview multiple sources and use multiple data collection methods (e.g., consulting historical documents or using experimental methods) whenever possible.

Despite the potential drawbacks, interviews provide an invaluable method of collecting information about a wide range of political phenomena, from political attitudes to political history.
What political scientists have learned through open-ended and semistructured interviews in particular has often led to new research hypotheses that then are tested using other research methods. Because interview-based research is labor-intensive and time-consuming, it is unlikely to become the dominant data collection method in political science, but it will remain an important one.

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See also Ethnographic Methods; Interviews, Elite; Interviews, Expert; Survey Research

Further Readings

Objectives of Elite Interviews
Elite interviews may be conducted to satisfy different objectives of inquiry. Broadly, one purpose of elite interviewing is to tell a story about a process, to relate how events or a set of events unfolded so as to ascertain proximate causality, or to ascertain influence relations among actors. These often produce case studies more likely to be predominantly qualitative in method. A second purpose of elite interviewing is to discover characteristics, perceptions, and opinions of the actors themselves. In this use, the members of the particular elite stratum become the units of analysis. Hence, the focus is on the actors themselves, their attitudes, perspectives, career paths, and backgrounds. Therefore, it becomes especially vital to have samples that are representative of the populations to which inferences are being made.

Case Studies
Typically, when the objectives of elite interviewing are to understand how a process or set of events has unfolded, the number of individuals to
be interviewed may be relatively small and conducted with the narrative as the foremost objective. One purpose is to evaluate different versions of an event from the various perches that elite actors occupy and to assess the extent to which a common or differentiated picture is being held by the various actors. In some instances, interviews may start out with the purpose of snowballing to find other actors whose perspectives or roles in events may be particularly important and who are thereby recommended by those whom the investigator starts off interviewing. Typically, each interview is somewhat unique as the investigator seeks to fill in elements of a process or event. Thus, these interviews are usually relatively unstructured as the interviewer adjusts to new information and cues as to possible new informants. It is not unusual in complex systems that the best informants about process may be the facilitators rather than the principals. Staff personnel may often be better informants than the principals themselves in the sense of knowing more of the actual details of what occurred. And they are typically more accessible as well.

**Elites as Units of Analysis**

An entirely different kind of study involves using individual members of an elite to assess its aggregate characteristics, show its coherence or divisions, and examine differences relevant to roles or to settings. In this case, sampling reliability, uniformity of stimuli (or at least cross-validation of the stimuli), and missing data issues are all pertinent. It is essential that samples be representative. In some instances, for example, a legislative chamber, one can know in advance many of the basic parameters of the population such as distributions by party, region, age, gender, and metropolitan-rural distinctions. Other populations may be less well defined, for example, business executives or even civil servants or political officials of the executive branch of government. Willingness on the part of the individuals to participate tends to be inversely related to their organizational status. The higher up they are, the harder they are to get.

Whereas interviews undertaken for the purposes of analyzing a case may be less systematic in design, in part because of the need to adjust in the field and follow leads supplied by elite informants, interviews undertaken for the purposes of characterizing an elite population must be systematically designed at the outset with correspondingly less adjustment in the field. Adjustments that may seem sensible as the result of learning from the field experience, nevertheless, may introduce contaminating nonuniform stimuli that could induce unknown bias or error in responses.

**The Hybrid**

A few studies have made use of elite interviewing for the purposes of collecting information about a population’s behavior as well as to flesh out information about particular cases so that each form of information gathering sheds light on the other. By providing independent sources of information, the particulars of a case study may be confirmed by the more general attitudes of the relevant elites. Equally, the expressed attitudes of elites may be assessed through the behavioral patterns manifested in the cases.

**Definitions of the Elite Universe**

Two definitions of an elite population exist—one defined by the power or influence of a set of individuals and the other by definitional or institutional roles. The problem with the first definition is that the influence any set of individuals or a group exercises is based either on reputation or on behavior. It is hard to disprove reputation since that is based on an assumption that repute is either equivalent to behavior or that it reduces the propensity for opposition to arise. By contrast, behavior may be shown only by the influence that some set of individuals’ exercises over decisions that may vary depending on which individuals are involved regarding a specific set of decisions. Because such behavior can be assessed only after the fact, political scientists are especially likely to use formal institutional roles as a basis for defining a political elite and for analyzing them as a population. However, individual influence is likely to vary within a given institution. Party leaders, more senior members, and heads of committees are likely to play a more substantial role than backbenchers in a legislature, for example. Influence also may vary across institutions. Legislative bodies, for example, vary greatly across political systems in the
authority they are able to wield. They are not equally influential in decision making. Where the executive and legislative bodies are separated, as in the United States, the legislature typically is more directly influential in policy decisions. In parliamentary systems, the pool of people likely to become more influential, for example, cabinet ministers, will be drawn from the members of parliament even where the parliament itself may exert relatively little independent policy-making influence.

Access to the Elites

Typically, it is helpful for the interviewer to have some institutional or personal credentials in order to gain access to elite populations. Sometimes, having an interlocutor to speak for the investigator’s credentials can be an advantage, at least with some elements of the elite. Some elite populations are more willing to be interviewed than others and often look forward to the opportunity to express their views. Typically, these are underaccessed populations. Politicians, especially legislators, tend to be overaccessed, whereas, for example, civil servants traditionally have been underaccessed. For plenty of reasons, including busy schedules and security measures, top-level political elites are typically very hard to interview, at least while they are in office. The passage of time, however, frequently eases accessibility even when talking about controversial history and the subject’s participation in it. Interviews with small numbers of primary actors in events long past, and with actors long past their prime in the public spotlight, become possible, impeded only by the mortality or decrepitude of the participants in those events.

Accessibility to governmental elites has become more complicated as a result of the security precautions that have become increasingly commonplace in public buildings. Therefore, proper introductory credentials are increasingly essential, and onsite interviews require that the interviewer’s identification papers be in order.

Structured and Nonstructured Interviews

Whether an investigator should have a high level of structure over the interview protocol or a looser structure depends greatly on the objectives of the inquiry. To the extent that the investigator is looking to discover a process, it may be wise to begin with a relatively less structured interview protocol that allows different perspectives to be revealed. Those perspectives can then be used to narrow questions as more elements of the process become identified and the pathways of inquiry can be more clearly developed. This also, of course, assumes that the investigator begins the inquiry along lines that are more inductive than deductive.

Alternatively, if the investigator is seeking attitudinal responses, it is important that the interviews proceed along a relatively fixed course. There should be as well opportunities to assess convergent validation of attitudes by asking the same question in somewhat different forms across different places in the interview. Elites like to be treated as the sophisticated individuals they often are. A menu of fully closed-ended questions is likely to bore them and will possibly lead to a desire to end the interview. The interviewer must be alert to changes in mood, to signs of restlessness on the part of the respondent, to hyperinterest that may lead to an exhaustingly lengthy interview, and to a respondent’s tendency to careen away from the subject matter the interviewer is focused on to a special topic that the respondent wants to discuss. Above all, the interviewer needs to be aware of time management during the course of the interview. Managing time is usually less of a problem in the unstructured interview than in the structured interview protocol. In adapting to problems of time management, the investigator may need to indicate to the interviewer, in instances where they are not one and the same, which sets of questions are fundamental and which are optional. In some instances, it may be necessary to tie questions together to present a logical follow-up to a respondent’s prior answer. That is partly to maximize the efficient use of time and partly to treat the respondents as the elites they are, even though this may sporadically violate the canons of maintaining question placement.

In either case, unstructured or structured interviews, interviewer experience and adaptiveness (within limits) are key elements in creating a context where the respondent is comfortable with the interview situation and where the interviewer can be prepared for the multitude of possible interruptions that can eat into the time available for the interview, including the occasional need to bring a
respondent back on track when he or she goes off on a time-consuming tangent.

**Conclusion**

It is likely becoming more difficult to obtain interviews with current officeholding elites than in decades past. Security measures have made it more difficult to roam through official buildings after one interview in order to set up another. Also, the use of electronic or digital recording equipment may be impermissible in some installations. Yet elite interviewing is an essential part of understanding events from the varied perspectives of the actors and intimate observers and of understanding the views of the elites themselves. Nevertheless, to a surprising degree, elites are often amenable to the entreaties of well-prepared researchers. And interviewing them is typically an illuminating exercise. But for these opportunities to be optimally rewarding, investigators must be well prepared.

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**See also** Elites; Interviewing; Interviews, Expert

**Further Readings**


**INTERVIEWS, EXPERT**

An expert interview is a semistandardized interview by one or more interviewers with a person identified as a so-called expert and serves to generate data in a research context. This raises the following questions: What constitutes an expert? Why are experts of such particular interest in a social and/or political scientific research setting? The answer lies primarily in the knowledge that they have acquired in the course of their (professional) activities. Experts not only have (a) specialist professional or technical knowledge and (b) knowledge of organizational procedures and processes, but they also have (c) interpretative and background knowledge (“know-how” and “know-why”) in their particular field. Such professional/technical knowledge and process knowledge are generally explicit knowledge, which experts can usually communicate in a systematic and deliberate manner. Interpretive and background knowledge is predominantly tacit and draws on the relevant individual experiences, organizational social practices, or collective interpretive patterns encountered by an expert in professional practice. People with this kind of broad knowledge are usually to be found on the middle and upper—occasionally also on the lower—levels of the organizational hierarchy. Given their position in the organizational and functional context, experts often have at least a partial chance of putting their knowledge and action to practical use, that is, accomplishing their own interests and ideas and, thus, making a decisive contribution to what goes on both inside and outside the organization. This ability to assert themselves and shape events is generally linked to their position and permits experts to speak as a representative of an organization and be recognized as such. In this entry, the history, use, and specific problems of expert interviews are discussed in greater detail.
**The History of Expert Interviews**

Expert interviews were first encountered primarily in German-speaking countries, where they have been used increasingly in social, economic, and political science research since the 1980s. However, it was not until the early 1990s that they slowly began to establish and distinguish themselves as a specific qualitative social research method. In the meantime, a number of books have been published on the methodology and methods of interviewing experts, and most pertinent, newer German-language books on qualitative research methods now also include expert interviews. The situation is quite different in their English-language counterparts, where—unlike interviews with the elite—expert interviews are rarely mentioned. In fact, there are many similarities between these two interview forms, from the sampling and difficulties of gaining access to the field through to the actual specifics of the interview process. However, the key difference lies in their target groups: the elite are the powerful, top echelon of a society. Indeed, the label “elite” is ascribed to a person or group/class of persons with high social, educational, and economic status and, thus, the power to make (or at least the possibility of making) a significant impact on society. From a sociology of knowledge perspective, the elite can also be seen as experts with expert knowledge, but more precisely as experts who have particular power. In essence, they are top company executives and members of corporate supervisory bodies, senior civil servants, or high-ranking government officials. The actual person who will be able to provide the best information for a particular research topic, the type of knowledge sought, and the position of the interviewees in their hierarchy will ultimately always depend on the specific research context.

**Using Expert Interviews**

Depending on the research design and topic(s) being researched, expert interviews can be used for the following different purposes:

1. Exploratory expert interviews are used to obtain an overview of and access to a less familiar field.
2. Systematizing expert interviews serve to systematically reconstruct “objective,” specialized technical and procedural knowledge in a particular field.
3. Theory-generating expert interviews focus not just on specialized expert knowledge but also on the tacit and subjective interpretative and background knowledge gained through (professional) experience.

Many research projects combine the use of expert interviews with other methods (mixed methods or triangulation of methods). In political science research, for example, expert interviews are often used in combination with document analysis to ascertain the history behind certain documents. This is usually done less with a view to validating the data and results but more often to establish a broad picture of social practices in a specific field.

**Sampling and Access Problems**

Selecting the appropriate interviewees for a particular research project depends greatly on the actual research topic(s) and specific field of research. There are often only a limited number of experts in a given field. In such cases, it is best (where possible) to interview all relevant experts, particularly since they will often have their own networks. Such networks can help encourage experts to participate in an interview to ensure their views are included. Altruism, or even a desire to enhance their own status, can also be a possible motive for agreeing to an interview. The first step in the sampling process involves analyzing literature or media reports and talking to relevant sources—people who are familiar with the field—to identify the key experts. The original sample should then be extended in the interview phase by asking the interviewees themselves to recommend further experts.

Time restrictions and a general lack of willingness to provide information can frequently be a problem when seeking access to experts, so it is particularly important that the first contact—either in writing or by phone—is carefully prepared. To encourage experts to participate in an interview, the first contact with them should briefly outline the goals and relevance (e.g., innovativeness) of the research and explain how important it is that they participate. Interviews should be
calculated to last no longer than 45 minutes (even if they ultimately take longer in reality). If a face-to-face meeting cannot be arranged, an interview can also be conducted by phone. One problem with this option is the lack of control over the interview situation: The interviewee might, for example, be distracted by other tasks. Similarly, no account can be taken of body language or gestures.

**Interview Guidelines/Topic Guide**

Drawing up a set of interview guidelines is an essential part of the preparation for an expert interview and familiarization with the relevant vocabulary and field of research. Such guidelines should structure the central topics in line with the expected course of the interview and can be sent to any experts who request information about the interview prior to the event. Nonetheless, to ensure that the interviews flow as authentically as possible, the guidelines should not be overly detailed. In the actual interview, they serve as an aide-mémoire and prevent the interviewer from overlooking any important questions. However, they should only be used as guidelines and not worked through rigidly point for point: Interviewees should be given the maximum opportunity to express their own opinions and ideas. The more an interviewer succeeds in getting an expert to talk, for example, through a narrative generating introductory questions and request for concrete examples the greater the chance that tacit knowledge (in the form of interpretive and background knowledge) will emerge in the interview. This knowledge is particularly relevant for reconstructing social practices in a particular field.

**Interaction Situations and Effects**

Expert interviews are—like all interviews—a form of social interaction. The basic intent is to get the interviewees to say what they think needs to be said in a given situation. “What” they say and “how” they say it depends on many different elements of the interaction—from expectations and motives for participation to situational aspects such as time pressure, sympathy or antipathy, and trust or mistrust. The interviewee’s capacity to remember and the interviewer’s interviewing skills, way of asking questions, openness, inquisitiveness, self-assurance, and so on will also influence the conversation. Gender relations can also play a twofold role in the interview. First, most of the experts are men, as there are relatively few women in management positions. Second, the probability of the participants “doing gender” (i.e., assuming gender-specific roles, particularly in a mixed-gender setting) becomes highly likely. Of particular relevance for interaction in an expert interview setting are the status and relationships the interviewee accords the interviewer. The latter is typically perceived as a co-expert, a potential critic, an accomplice, a controlling authority, or a layperson. These associations affect the interviewee’s behavior, willingness to communicate and manner of communication, attitude, and so on. Interview effects resulting from an individual interview constellation cannot be avoided and are not necessarily disadvantageous. They may even be of strategic benefit. For example, if they consider the interviewer a layperson, interviewees may well be more willing to provide information about their field of expertise and experience. Interviewers should also be aware that even research-related interviews are a form of social interaction and do not permit a “pure” or even objective gathering of data.

**Analysis**

There is no standard procedure for analyzing expert interviews. In principle, all qualitative social research analysis methods can be used, for example, the code-based procedures common in grounded theory or qualitative content analysis, or the sequential analyses applied in hermeneutic sociology of knowledge or objective hermeneutics. A combination of different methods is also admissible. The most suitable form of analysis ultimately depends on the actual research project. Computer-assisted analysis using special qualitative data management programs can help but cannot automatically complete the data analysis. Even if computers are used to assist with data analysis, it remains the task of the researchers to interpret the data in a transparent, plausible, and comprehensible manner.

**Ethics**

Given their prominent position in what is often a small and clear field, it can be difficult to keep the
identity of experts hidden. Consequently, the researcher should always clarify how much of the information obtained from the interviewee can be published in a nonanonymous form (e.g., as quotations). In some cases, it may be necessary to have the interviewee expressly authorize the use of the minutes or interview transcript for analysis or publication purposes. The expert should, in all cases, be given the assurance that all data will be treated in confidence.

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See also Elites; Grounded Theory; Interviewing;
Interviews, Elite; Mixed Methods

Further Readings


Irredentism

The term irredentism is derived from the Italian word irredenta (unredeemed). It originally referred to an Italian political movement during the late 1800s and early 1900s that sought to detach predominantly Italian-speaking areas from Switzerland and the Austro-Hungarian Empire and incorporate these territories into the new Italian state, thus “redeeming” these territories. Modern usage denotes territorial claims based on a national, ethnic, or historical basis. In many cases, an irredentist movement is referred to as creating a “Greater X,” with the “X” being the name of a nation or state—for example, the quest for a Greater Serbia was in part responsible for the Wars of Yugoslav Succession during the 1990s, and the Greater Romania project (România Mare) was partially responsible for Romania siding with the Axis powers during World War II. It is related to, but distinct from, secession: Irredentism is the process by which a part of an existing state breaks away and merges with another, whereas in secession merging does not take place. The importance of irredentism in international relations is based on the intersection between nationalism and the causes of war; because such a movement invariably means taking land from another state, irredentist claims have been known to provoke ethnic conflicts and territorial aggression. The continued discord between nations and states means that the potential for irredentist wars remains serious. This entry identifies some notable cases, provides examples of how irredentist claims are sometimes enshrined in state constitutions, and reviews the literature on this phenomenon.

Notable examples of irredentism include Nazi Germany’s claims on the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia; the “Megali Idea” that sought to create a Greater Greece; China’s desire to reincorporate the territories lost during periods of historical weakness; Somalia’s invasion of Ethiopia during the Ogaden War of 1977–1978; the attempt by Hungary to reverse the 1920 Treaty of Trianon and reclaim territories in Slovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia during World War II; and the continuing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh region. More questionable cases include those without a direct ethnic component but rather based solely on historical claims, such as Argentina’s invasion of the British-populated Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) in 1982 or Serbian claims to Kosovo, which was the birthplace of Serbian nationalism but is now populated overwhelmingly by ethnic Albanians. However, these territories could also be considered “unredeemed,” and therefore, these cases can fall under the category of irredentism.

In some instances, states have gone so far as to incorporate irredentist claims directly into their constitution. For example, Argentina claims that
recovering the Falkland Islands is “a permanent and unrelinquished goal of the Argentine people,” and China considers Taiwan to be part of the country’s “sacred territory.” The 1937 Irish constitution originally laid claim to the entire island of Ireland, but this was changed following the 1998 Good Friday Agreement resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Despite the numerous potential cases of irredentism, and the long history of these claims sparking armed conflict, there has been surprisingly little scholarly research done on this topic, and no consensus position on its causes, dynamics, or resolution has emerged. However, five explanatory categories can be identified: (1) structural, (2) realist, (3) rational choice, (4) domestic, and (5) constructivist. Given the complexity of irredentism, there are likely multiple and overlapping explanations for any particular case.

Structural explanations argue that the international or regional context within which the potentially irredentist state operates will play a large role in determining whether such a project is initiated and the conditions under which it ends. In most cases, this focuses on the relative support in the international system for state sovereignty versus national self-determination. If the latter is emphasized, then nationalist claims will be allowed to override the inviolability of sovereign borders; if the former is emphasized, then the legitimacy of irredentist claims will be widely rejected. The dramatic increase in irredentist conflicts during periods of major international upheaval and normative reordering is seen as important evidence in favor of this position.

Realist arguments emphasize the relative balance of power between the irredentist state in question and either the target state or the international community. In the first case, military weakness vis-à-vis the target state will force the irredentist country to relinquish its claims; in contrast, relative military strength will precipitate such a project. A weak Albania had little chance of forcibly altering its border with Yugoslavia, but a strong Nazi Germany could pressure France and Great Britain to force territorial revisions on Czechoslovakia. The latter argument takes the balance of power to a higher level by examining the degree to which relevant international actors (states or international organizations) acquiesce in or tolerate the policies of specific irredentist states. The more tolerant they are, the more an irredentist state can get away with; if they are less tolerant, then an irredentist state is forced to temper or restrict its policies. During the early years of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession, the international community did little other than rhetorical condemnation to stop Croatia’s and Serbia’s irredentist projects. However, once key states (particularly the United States) adopted a more robust and muscular stance, then both countries recognized the prewar borders of the Yugoslav republics.

Rational choice accounts examine the decision-making processes of elites that initiate an irredentist conflict for instrumental purposes. Two arguments fall under this rubric: elite conflict and diversionary theory. Under the first explanation, decision makers will initiate an irredentist conflict to divert the attention of their population from domestic problems. Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands to prop up the military junta is often considered a classic case of diversionary war theory.

Domestic-level explanations also come in two forms: demographics and regime type. The first argument holds that ethnically homogeneous states are more likely to be irredentist because the populations of ethnically divided states will be unwilling to support a project that benefits only one group and might have the effect of altering the ethnic balance of the state if successful. For example, Slobodan Milošević used irredentist claims in Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to rise to political preeminence in Serbia. According to the latter argument, leaders will initiate an irredentist conflict to divert the attention of their population from domestic problems. Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands to prop up the military junta is often considered a classic case of diversionary war theory.
Islam

Why is Islam, which is a religious faith and a local culture, placed as an entry in an encyclopedia for political science? This discipline is not supposed to deal with religion and culture but instead with the polity and government. The subject matter is a religious faith that assembles nearly 1.6 billion people of humankind as an umma (community) that consists of a great variety of local Islamic cultures. These are, however, related to one another in terms of shared values and worldview. On these grounds, there is a resemblance that unites all Muslims to one civilization. Cultural diversity exists in Islam within the unity of one Islamic civilization. In view of this cultural diversity, there is no monolith named Islam.

The answer to the question concerning the legitimacy of this entry is that Islamic civilization matters as the defenders of Europe against Islam, helped fuel the quest for a Greater Serbia. By contrast, Germany’s renunciation of aggression after World War II and the self-described role of facilitator of Pan-European cooperation precluded adjustments in the country’s post–World War II borders.

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See also Diaspora; Ethnicity; Nationalism; War and Peace

Further Readings

Treaty Organization [NATO] or the European Union); and the dynamics of democratic peace theory, in which democratic states tend to resolve their disputes peacefully. The reduction in tensions between Hungary, on the one hand, and Romania and Slovakia, on the other, was associated with the consolidation of democracy in these countries, whereas nearly all irredentist conflicts were initiated by authoritarian regimes.

The final explanation for irredentism is derived from the insights of constructivism, which holds generally that the social construction of ideas and concepts is instrumental in determining political outcomes. When applied to the issue of irredentism, two arguments emerge. The first asserts that the type of national identity that is dominant in a particular state or nation will influence the degree to which it will become irredentist: An ethnic identity emphasizes the unity of the culturally based nation across political boundaries and lends itself to the promotion of altering borders to realize a physical union of the nation; a civic national identity is political in nature, usually tied to a preexisting state, and is therefore more easily limited to status quo boundaries. Some 25 million ethnic Russians found themselves as minorities scattered throughout the former Soviet Union on its collapse. However, despite the fact that many of these Russians were in territories contiguous to Russia itself, the association of the Russian Federation (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya) with the concept of rossiiski (civic) rather than russkii (ethnic) dampened the legitimacy of an irredentist project aimed at creating a Greater Russia in the 1990s. By contrast, ethnically based national identities, such as that found in Nazi Germany, more easily lend themselves toward a desire for unification. The second constructivist argument focuses on the ways in which the irredentist claims are justified in a society. This justification includes the arguments that assert the group’s right and obligation to unify the nation and the proper means by which to achieve this goal. The potential for irredentism can be reduced if this justification is somehow undermined, perhaps by reconceptualizing the nation’s history, the physical boundaries of the nation, or the place of the nation in the international community. The belief that Serbia was obligated to protect its fellow Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, when mixed with the conception of the Serb nation as the defenders of Europe against Islam, helped fuel the quest for a Greater Serbia. By contrast, Germany’s renunciation of aggression after World War II and the self-described role of facilitator of Pan-European cooperation precluded adjustments in the country’s post–World War II borders.
to politics since the great changes in the world around the end of the previous century, particularly with respect to decolonization and globalization. Islam at the beginning of the 21st century is a major factor in politics on two political levels. First, on the state level, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) unites 57 states with an Islamic majority population. Second, there are Islamic non-state actors (e.g., Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood) that engage on all levels of politics.

The politicization of the religion of Islam is connected with the claim that Islam is not only a faith but also a constructed system of government. The idea of an Islamic state is based on sharia law, believed to be the constitution legislated by Allah for a divine order. This political interpretation of Islam makes from this religion an ideology of Islamism that leads to inner conflicts within Islamic civilization. The political theorist John Brenkman characterizes this issue as a “civil war” within Islam (e.g., the fight between the secular Kemalists and Islamists in Turkey). The spillover of this process to world politics assumes a geopolitical dimension with the related effects on world politics.

The politicization of Islam suggests a more complex relation between religion and politics on all three levels: local, regional, and international/global. The major issue is a return of Islam to politics that indicates the failure of the secularization process in contemporary Islamic civilization. This failure is, among other things, related to the crisis of the secular nation-state as a crisis of development.

**The Roots of Politics in Islam**

At issue is political Islam, not the Islamic faith based on religious-cultural meaning inherent in a cultural system. In short, Islamic politics matter to political science. This politicized Islam serves as a political ideology often used as a device for political legitimacy. This is not a novelty to Islam, since it is a peculiarity of this religion to have had a close relation to politics and war from its birth onward. The novelty is, however, the recent phenomenon of Islamism and its idea of an Islamic state. To understand the distinction, one has first to look at the past. Islamic revelation started spiritually in Mecca in the year 610. It was not until the creation of the polity of the umma (i.e., community, not the Islamic state, as Islamists today wrongly contend) in Medina in 622 that Islam was intermingled with politics. In that year Islamic history commences, and therefore, in their calendar, Muslims number 622 as the year 1. This is the Islamic hijra calendar. Therefore, hijra (migration) has a specific meaning in Islam: A Muslim is supposed to migrate in pursuit of the spread of Islam. In the year 622, Prophet Mohammed migrated from Mecca to Medina and engaged in political activity to spread Islam. For Muslims, this is a binding precedent. In his new location, the Prophet made political decisions and also fought wars. Therefore, the late French scholar of Islam, Maxime Rodinson, characterized Prophet Mohammed as a combination of Jesus and Charlemagne. However, neither the holy book of the Muslims, the Koran, nor the tradition of Prophet Mohammed, that is, the scripture of the Hadith, ever made provisions for how to rule the polity. It follows that there is no provisioned system of government in the authoritative scripture of Islam. In short, the idea of an Islamic rule is a construction made after the death of the Prophet. One has also to add that the system of the caliphate, established after the death of the Prophet (in 632), should not to be conflated with the Islamic state for which Islamists at present fight. These are distinctly different issues.

In 632, the aristocracy of Mecca, which was composed of elders of the Islamized tribe of Quraysh, established three tenets: (1) the Islamic ruler should be a successor, that is, a caliph, of the Prophet; (2) the caliph should be descended from the tribe of Quraysh—a requirement that contradicts the Islamic provision that all Muslims form one community that transcends tribes and creates a transtribal umma in which tribal affiliations are abolished; and (3) the caliph should be close to the Prophet and to the tradition he established. In this khilafa (meaning “caliphate”) system, selection of the caliph was based on merit and descent in the formative years of Islamic rule from 632 through 661. There were four Qurayshi leaders—Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman, and Ali—who were selected to rule as caliphs. Three of these righteous (rashidun) caliphs, including the last one, Ali, were brutally assassinated. Despite this bloody feature, the rashidun age is considered to date to be the model for emulation with regard to political rule.

Following the assassination of Caliph Ali in 661, the Islamic umma experienced a violent
schism between the Sunnis and Shiites. The Omaiyyads usurped the caliphate and established dynastic rule. In so doing, they transformed the caliphate from selective to hereditary rule. They also shifted the capital of Islam from Medina/ Mecca to Damascus. This first imperial rule of Islam, named the Omayyad caliphate, successfully led global jihad wars. This Islamic expansion resulted in an Islamic empire that stretched from China to Spain. In Islamic history, two other such imperial caliphates followed successively, namely, the Abasside of Baghdad and the Ottoman of Istanbul. In this imperial history, which lasted until 1924, Islam was not only a faith practiced in a great variety of local cultures but also the basis for a cross-cultural civilization and for the legitimacy of imperial rule (or caliphate). This rule is considered to be the Islamic system of government. Muslims fought jihad wars from the 7th through the 17th centuries in pursuit of an Islamic expansion envisioned to map the entire globe into Dar al-Islam (realm, or house, of Islam).

History did not follow this course prescribed by Islam. The world was mapped into another system, namely, the Westphalian one of sovereign states that was established in 1648. This system continues to be the basis of the modern international system.

The End of Islamic Expansion and the International System

For Islam, the Peace of Westphalia matters with respect to both the past and the present. The roots for the launching of a competitive globalization project are related to the rise of the West with its “military revolution” (1500–1800), based on the industrialization of warfare. This rise interrupted the Islamic expansion and replaced it with its own European expansion, which is the crux of the relation between Islam and politics. In the past, the rise of the West halted Islamic expansion. At present, the Westphalian system of states maps the entire world of Islam. The Islamic revolt against the West is not only a revolt against this system but an attempt to reverse history.

After their failure to capture Vienna in 1683, the Muslim armies retreated and lost all the ensuing wars. The importation of European military practices into Muslim armies did not remedy the existing deficiencies. European powers not only stopped Islam from further invading Europe and pushed it back from Europe, but they also invaded the world of Islam itself. The third and last global Islamic caliphate of the Ottoman Empire declined. After a successful revolution, Kemal Atatürk abolished the caliphate in 1924, following the declaration of the secular republic of Turkey. Turkey is the only secular republic in the world of Islam that enshrines secularism in its constitution. One year after the abolition of the caliphate, the Al-Azhar scholar Ali Abdel-Raziq (1888–1966) published his book *al-Islam wa usul al-hukm* (Islam and the Origins of Government), in which he argues that Islam was just a religious faith and was wrongly used to legitimate political rule. This depoliticization of Islam was strongly contested by Muslims. As punishment, Abdel-Raziq was fired from his position at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, and he died in poverty in 1966. Like Turkey, most Islamic states underwent various forms of secularization, without, however, a formal adoption of secularism. The transitory period of colonial rule in most of the former provinces of the Ottoman Empire ended in the building of independent, secular nation-states throughout the world of Islam. These states were mapped into the Westphalian system of sovereign states and became a part of the modern international system. This was the age of secular politics in the world of Islam, which lasted from 1924 to 1967. The Six-Day War of 1967 launched in its effects the return of Islam to politics. This process was facilitated by the fact that the new secular nation-states had a weak legitimacy and lacked political capacities. This weakness was emphasized by the 1967 defeat, and Arab states appeared as “nominal nation-states,” even as “tribes with national flags.” The lack of institutions that would have been shaped within the national cultures of these countries resulted in a dangerous lack of legitimacy.

Islamic Politics and Islamic States

In the historical period between the abolition of the caliphate in 1924 and the Six-Day War of 1967, Islam receded by and large from the political arena. The Muslim Brotherhood movement was established in 1928 in Cairo, but despite their activity, such movements were by then mostly at
the fringe of politics. Secularism prevailed in a variety of forms in most Muslim countries—of course, not in Wahhabi Saudi Arabia but especially in the staunchly secular republic of Turkey. Also, the Pan-Arab Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser had a secular legitimacy, as did the largest nation of Islam in Southeast Asia—Indonesia—under the rule of the secular Ahmed Sukarno. The Arab defeat in the Six-Day War of 1967 had repercussions that led to a delegitimation of secular regimes, first in the Middle East and then in the rest of the Islamic world. Among the consequences was the ascendency of political Islam (Islamism), which moved from the fringe to the core of politics. For a number of reasons, the effects of this process spilled over from the Arab Middle East to the rest of the world of Islam. One of the factors that promoted the spillover effects is related to the Arab part of Islamic civilization being recognized as its core. It generates cultural-religious influence over the rest of the world of Islam. For instance, the Middle East influences Southeast Asia and not the other way around, even though Indonesia’s population is about three times greater than that of Egypt.

The connection between Islam and politics is established today by the Islamist movements that reclaim an Islamic order (*nizam Islami*) following a global trend that gives a more important role to religion in politics. Today, it is Sunni Arab Islam and not the Shiite revolution in Iran that generates (a) jihad in the new understanding of an Islamic world revolution; (b) shariatization of politics, based on a new understanding of Islamic law; and (c) a call for the return to the golden age of Islam in a messianic perspective that appeals to people who feel frustrated and deprived after the breakdown of communism and the end of the East–West conflict. The uprising of 2011 against the existing authoritarian order of the state, which began in January in the Arab world, first in Tunisia and followed by Egypt and Libya, is to be placed in this context.

Islam’s return to the forefront, in the shape of Islamism, creates a bipolarity between the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds and is accompanied by Islam’s conflicts with modernity. Islam is a civilization subjected to a politicization that is also—in terms of world politics—a politicization of what Raymond Aron called the “heterogeneity of civilizations.” This process leads to an intercivilizational conflict. The reader is reminded of the distinction that a conflict is not a clash: A conflict can be peacefully resolved in a negotiation process that could assume the shape of a dialogue between civilizations, whereas a clash is based on an essentializing view and on the fault lines of polarization. The pertinence of Islam to political science and also to international relations is related to the fact that religion and politics have become intertwined in the countries of Islamic civilization. Religion is among the new sources of conflict. The articulation of needs in religious language first generates real cultural tensions, which later become political. There are many levels in this conflict. The first level is an inner-Islamic conflict over the secular nation-state. Under conditions of globalization, this conflict within Islam is then extended to an international one. The conflict escalates with the rise of powerful Islamist movements that challenge the existing nation-states in the world of Islam, with the aim of replacing them with an Islamic state. This claim leads to tensions and conflicts, first within Islam and then through spillover effects to the international and intercivilizational level. The inner-Islamic and international levels intermingle with one another.

The call for an Islamic state is not to be conflated with the aim of restoring the caliphate, as some pundits contend. There is a novelty, next to the fact that politics is becoming religionized and religion is subjected to politicization. This novelty is the idea of an Islamic order that incorporates the Islamic state. This particularism promotes tensions that ignite conflict. These are also related to images of the self and of the other. Of course, there are socioeconomic and political constraints underlying the political conflict articulated in religious terms. This articulation in religious terms matters to the analysis in the sense that political, social, and economic concerns become religionized. The reference to Islam is not merely a cover, nor does it happen instrumentally, as some Western pundits contend. The religionization of conflict gives politics a new shape. Conflict becomes intractable because beliefs are not negotiable. Some students of Islamic politics argue that these Islamist Muslims are virtually secular, because they use, or abuse, religion for nonreligious ends. However, fieldwork shows that Islamists act in good faith as believers. Their good faith is not to be confused with cynicism. Many
Westerners fail to understand the place of culture and religion in post-bipolar politics.

**Areas of Concern in Islam and Politics**

The contemporary view of Islamism as an embodiment of religionized politics relates Islam to the areas of knowledge of politics and law and also human rights in a contestation of the secularization of the world of Islam. Political scientists are expected in their study of Islam to be wary of and to avoid the biased debate in which accusations of Orientalism replace scholarly analysis. Empirical evidence, however, has shown that cultural tensions related to Islam lead to political conflict.

The study of religion and politics covers all religions, but the pivotal place given to Islam in this analysis is related to the following assertions:

1. Islam as a religion invades the public sphere, teaching that the primary unit of society is the *umma*, the international brotherhood of believers.
2. Islam forces people to follow sharia laws. If this law is elevated to state law in a process of shariatization of politics, then conflicts based on a religious component are likely. These are much harder to solve than purely political conflicts. The involvement of religion in politics makes conflict intractable.
3. Political Islam is central to post-bipolar world politics through the transformation of Islamic universalism—in the course of a process of politicization—into a politics that leads to a religion-based internationalism. This contemporary Islamist internationalism should not be conflated with the Pan-Islamism of the 19th century’s Islamic revival since from it emerges the claim of a new world order based on Islamic tenets, which may provide an explanation for “Islam’s geopolitical war,” which some political theorists posit in their linking of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to post-bipolar politics. Surely, this assertion is also a contested translation of the role of the jihad, which must be more exactly defined as the effort by believers to get closer to the will of God. Therefore, one needs to establish a distinction between traditional jihad and Islamist jihadism.

The contention that there is a model of an Islamist state matters to political science. In international relations of the post-bipolar politics, the competition among different cultural models generates political tensions that develop domestically, regionally, and internationally. Islam’s problems with cultural modernity are central in this context. The ignited tensions occur not only among Muslims but also in their relations to the “non-Muslim other” in an international environment of crisis.

**Conclusion**

Political scientists involved in peace studies and in mediation are challenged to relate civilizational encounters to the study of conflict from the point of view of conflict resolution. However, preventing the clash of civilizations cannot dispense with the study of intra- and intercivilizational conflict. Some political scientists have gone to the other extreme of a constructed *convergence of civilizations*. Western political science needs a better understanding of Islam and politics and the related conflicts. Again, one should remember that a conflict is not a clash.

The study of religion and violence in Islam also matters to political science in its reference to the place of jihad and jihadism in politics. Many believe that there can be a democratic response to terrorism to replace the war on terror pursued in the name of security. The political interpretation of jihad as a “world revolution,” as advocated by Sayyid Qutb, allows—as jihadism—the resort to violence in an irregular war. This is also among the areas of concern in the study of Islam and politics.

The political theorist John Brenkman states that Islam is in the midst of a civil war. Then, he boldly ascertains that most of the dangers are emerging from the Muslim world. Today, such views are often qualified as an expression of Orientalism, but the concern articulated in the above statement matters to political scientists. The study of conflicts generated between radical Muslims themselves, on the one hand, and with the West, on the other, is a concern of political science. The cultural analysis of political conflict is not a culturalism. The conflict within Islam is ignited by political Islam that uses Islam not only to gain legitimacy in its Islamist movements but also as a concept of order. The study of issues such as the resolution of
intra- and intercivilizational conflicts and the combination of Islam and democracy is the business of political science. Another area of study is the history of political ideas. In medieval Hellenized Islam, there existed a rational political philosophy established by Farabi (870–950) that lasted until Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406). This Islamic humanism helps establish a bridge between the civilizations.

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See also Fundamentalism; Fundamentalist Movements, Islamic; Orientalism; Religion

Further Readings


Islamist Movements

In recent decades, Islamist movements have become an important social and (sometimes) political force in many Arab countries. They share three major characteristics:

1. Islamists are critical of prevailing societal conditions in Arab countries, which they describe interchangeably as decadent, underdeveloped, or unjust.

2. They blame authoritarian ruling establishments for these societal conditions and therefore consider political change as the first crucial step toward altering Arab reality. Islamist movements operating in the Arab world differ from missionary groups and Islamic charitable organizations, which see change as a long-term process of Islamizing societies that takes place outside of the realm of politics.

3. They legitimize their practices and create popular appeal for their movements by basing them on religious norms and values, which serve as the ultimate ideological frame of reference for society and politics.

Within the broad category of Islamist movements, groups can be differentiated by their attitudes toward violence and their perceptions of politics. Militant groups such as the Egyptian Jihad and the Algerian Islamic Group use violence and seek to establish theocratic states as the sole means of changing conditions in Islamic societies. Their sources of inspiration are either idealized interpretations of past moments in Islamic history or contemporary models of Islamic republics, be they in Iran, Sudan, or even Afghanistan. Mainstream
Islamists reject violence and endorse competition through pluralistic politics. They exclude radical strategies as options for political transformation and see gradual democratic openings as the only viable way to challenge repressive authoritarian regimes in the Islamic world.

This mainstream position is relatively new. In the 1980s and 1990s, mainstream movements still had not accepted the value of democratic governance. Caught in the iron grip of regime oppression and continuous radicalization at the outer edges of the Islamist spectrum, these movements were sometimes forced out of the official political sphere or violently banned and denied any public role. In a few countries such as Morocco, where Islamists were partly integrated in the political process, Islamists’ preoccupation with rhetorically sound though politically unattainable goals—Islamization of legislative environments and educational systems—did not help them overcome general doubts about their real objectives. By the end of the 1990s, Arab Islamists had failed to change political realities in their homelands despite considerable popular support. This failure prompted various revisionist trends that gathered momentum in the past few years. As a result, mainstream Islamists have become increasingly receptive to democratic procedures.

**Three Paradigms of Islamist Participation**

In this context, it is possible to identify three major modes of mainstream Islamist participation in politics. The first comprises the Iraqi, Lebanese, and Palestinian cases. While the Islamist movements in these instances operate with relative organizational freedom in the context of political party plurality, these experiences also take place in a climate of relative chaos, whether because foreign occupation has wrought the collapse of the institutions of government and public security or because an ongoing intractable crisis of internal discord so hampers the efficacy of government as to constantly threaten the stability of the political system and encourage the prevalence of monopolistic/exclusivist tendencies that conflict with the spirit and substance of peaceful participation.

The Islamist movements in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine are characterized by hierarchical internal structures, possession of the means to exercise violence, and a tendency to resort to, or threaten to resort to, violence to resolve their political conflicts. The inclusion of such Islamist movements in plural politics, at a time when they have yet to develop a full commitment to peaceful participation and when such participation is perhaps only a tactic within the framework of a greater strategy, reduces or even eliminates the chances of propelling political plurality forward through a process of democratization.

In sharp contrast to these instances, the second mode of Islamist participation in politics adopts participation as its one and only strategic option. The campaign motto “participation comes first” typifies the attitude of these Islamists who are prominent in some Arab countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Whereas Islamists form small parts of the governments of Algeria and Kuwait, their counterparts in Morocco and Bahrain lead the opposition camps. More significantly, some of these movements have succeeded in formulating a functional separation between religious proselytizing activities and politics, thereby transforming themselves into solely political organizations guided by an Islamist code but run by professional politicians and the activities of which steer clear of the rhetoric and activities of a proselytizing movement.

In spite of qualitative differences between their movements, the Islamists who follow the motto “participation comes first” share several fundamental characteristics. Above all, they honor the legitimacy of the nation-state to which they belong, and they respect that state’s governing institutions, the principle of equality among all citizens, and the pluralistic, competitive nature of political life. This attitude, which they have generally adopted as much in spirit as in form, has led to the decline in exclusionist rhetoric, whether directed toward ruling establishments or to the liberal and leftist opposition. It has also resulted in a gradual shift away from ideological diatribes and categorical judgments and toward the formulation of practical political platforms and constructive attempts to influence public policy, whether as minor partners in government or as members of the opposition.

The third mode of Islamist participation is epitomized by the cases of Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, and Yemen. In spite of the considerable differences between them, Islamist movements in these
countries have persisted in the face of a volatile political space and the fragility of their relationship with the ruling establishments. If in Egypt and Jordan, Islamists have been given some room to participate in pluralistic mechanisms, in legislative elections, in professional syndicates, and in other areas of civil society, the sword of the security forces is constantly hanging over their heads. By contrast, the Islamist movements in Sudan and Yemen throw into relief the danger of the nondemocratic accommodations Islamists have struck with paramilitary ruling establishments and the negative impact of such alliances on political life and on the internal dynamics of the Islamists themselves.

The motto of these Islamists may be described as “participation until further notice.” They may have adopted a strategy of peaceful participation, but it is no more than a strategy. In view of the perpetual fluctuation of their role in the political life of Egypt and Jordan or the swings in their positions from partners in authoritarian governments to antagonists, in the case of Sudan and Yemen, their leaders and followers continue to hover in the abstract heights of ideology, social narratives, and megapolicy (the role of religion in public life, the implementation of the Islamic Law, and the recreation of the Muslim nation) while ignoring the need to evolve a culture that values consensus making and constructive mechanisms for influencing public policy.

**Challenges of Islamist Political Participation**

When examining the three modes of Islamist participation in politics, special attention has to be given to the impact of participation on the organizational complexity of Islamist movements, the separation between religious proselytizing and civil-political components, and finally the balance between Islamist interest in public policy matters and in ideological and moral issues.

Essentially, the relatively stable experiences of Islamists in the political process, as in Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, and Bahrain, contributed to the rapid development of the Islamists’ organizational units. They now have increasing functional specialization and variation, distinct institutional separation between religious and civil components, and a core emphasis on public policies. However, the volatile experiences of Islamists in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen have prevented the materialization of equally successful trajectories, despite the fact that some elements of progress can be noted.

The Islamists’ experience in Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, and Bahrain testifies to the existence of a direct relationship between the stability of the available realm for political participation, as a result of the decline in the government’s recourse to the security pretext to exclude or repress them, and a relatively rapid rise in their resolve to respect and play by the rules of the game and to reach consensual agreements over the conduct of public affairs in a nonconfrontational manner. Nevertheless, these Islamists still face a number of tests of their intent. On the one hand, they have yet to demonstrate their unconditional commitment to the mechanisms of a pluralistic form of government, even if those mechanisms produce policies that do not conform to their religious beliefs. On the other, they must continue to convince their constituencies of the efficacy of peaceful participation at a time when authoritarian ruling establishments have yet to shed their suspicions of the Islamists and to accustom themselves fully to their participation in politics.

Notwithstanding the fact that mainstream Islamists have developed in general a strategic commitment to the peaceful participation option, the constant flux that defined their experiences in Egypt and Jordan or their shift from active participants in authoritarian governments to semi-opposition entities—as is the case in Sudan and Yemen—contributed to the erosion of their popular support or the emergence of a confused mentality among their leaders. Naturally, both of these consequences negatively affected the capacity of the Islamist movements to take meaningful advantage of the participation option.

Because their participation lacks the relative stability of Islamists’ experiences in Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, and Bahrain, Egyptian and Jordanian Islamists have remained preoccupied with the traditional mix of normative, social, and political issues with no discernable evolutionary trajectory toward more pragmatism. Both movements have constantly demonstrated various signs of internal dissent and infighting between participation-friendly and participation-critical leaders and members.
And although participation-critical voices inside Egyptian and Jordanian Islamist movements have not been pushing for giving up their commitment to nonviolence, they have been putting forward two alternatives that are worth noting and bear potential risks: (1) retreat from politics to the social sphere and (2) increased confrontational attitudes toward the ruling establishments. The notion of retreating to the social sphere has never lost its appeal to Islamists, especially in moments of political exclusion and prosecution, as a temporary strategy to regroup and revitalize their movements. However, in Egypt and Jordan today, calls to leave politics and retreat to society are increasingly articulated in a definite way that attests to the internal fatigue and frustration of Islamists. In contrast, other voices have been pushing for assuming more hard-line stances toward official policies and for using whatever political space Islamists can sustain to confront the ruling establishments. Looking at the ongoing polarization of Egyptian and Jordanian politics, primarily driven by ruling establishment/Islamist conflicts, this is clearly a recipe for instability and reform freeze.

The current challenges facing Islamist movements are inextricably intertwined with the overall distortions that define the contemporary Arab political reality. The participation of Islamists in and of itself does not prolong the realization of a healthy democratic order, nor for that matter does it bring their polities closer to that order.

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See also Fundamentalism; Islam; Religious Movements; Social Movements

Further Readings


**Item–Response (Rasch) Models**

Item–response models define a set of data reduction techniques that relate observed discrete variables to a much smaller set of unobserved latent variables. These models are primarily used in political science to relate observed votes on legislative roll calls to legislators’ unobserved ideology. Originally developed in the context of educational testing, these models were designed to recover characteristics of test questions (items) and the “abilities” of student test takers. Consequently, much of the model description and interpretation retains education terminology. The data involves N test takers (indexed by i) answering M test questions (indexed by j), with an answer (response) by student i on question j (yij) equal to one if correct, zero otherwise. In legislative voting, the “test takers” are the legislators, the “items” are the roll calls, and the “ability” is the legislator’s ideology. The canonical model for the answers posits the following probability model:

\[
\text{Pr}(y_{ij} = 1) = \frac{\exp(x_i \beta_j - \alpha_j)}{1 + \exp(x_i \beta_j - \alpha_j)},
\]

where \(x_i\) is the student’s ability and parameters \(\beta_j\) and \(\alpha_j\) characterize the question. This is simply a logit model of a correct answer as a function of one independent variable, the ability measured by the test, with the additional complication that the independent variable is unobserved. Of course, other cumulative density functions can be used instead (e.g., the normal for a probit model). This is a latent variable model, similar to factor analysis. The test items are all observable indicators (manifest variables) of the unobservable common factor \(x\), with \(\beta\) analogous to a factor loading. In the item–response case, all the indicators are binary, whereas they are continuous in factor analysis.
The probability model is frequently reformulated as

$$\Pr(y_{ij} = 1) = \frac{\exp(\beta_j(x_i - \kappa_j))}{1 + \exp(\beta_j(x_i - \kappa_j))},$$

with specific interpretations to each item parameter. The slope coefficients $\beta_j$ are the discrimination parameters and the values of $\kappa_j$ are difficulty parameters. Discrimination is the extent to which a test question separates students with higher and lower levels of abilities. If $\beta_j = 0$, then the test question does not measure the ability gauged by the test. Higher values of $\kappa_j$ indicate a more difficult question. $\kappa_j$ represents the ability level of a student who has a 50% probability of answering the question correctly and 50% answering incorrectly. Note, $\kappa_j$ and $x_i$ are on the same scale; if $x_i = \kappa_j$, $\Pr(y_{ij} = 1) = .5$.

Other Item–Response Models

A special case is the one-parameter model, known as the Rasch model (after Georg Rasch):

$$\Pr(y_{ij} = 1) = \frac{\exp(x_i - \kappa_j)}{1 + \exp(x_i - \kappa_j)}.$$ 

This model assumes that every item discriminates abilities equally well ($\beta_j = 1$ for all questions $j$). In this model, all the observed information is contained in the total score, the number of correct responses: an extremely desirable property for tests. This property is only true for the logistic one-parameter model though.

A generalization of the two-parameter model is the three-parameter model:

$$\Pr(y_{ij} = 1) = \gamma_j + (1 - \gamma_j) \frac{\exp(\beta_j(x_i - \kappa_j))}{1 + \exp(\beta_j(x_i - \kappa_j))},$$

where $\gamma_j$ is a “pseudoguessing” parameter. It allows for the absolute worst student (with ability approaching negative infinity) to have a positive probability of answering a question correctly; that is, a student answers a question correctly, not because of a higher level of ability but because he or she happened to mark the answer correctly. The “pseudo” aspect of guessing is that students do not necessarily guess but use reasoning processes unrelated to their ability (sometimes actually worse than pure guessing).

Political Science Applications

The original application of the model is educational testing, but the item–response model represents a general latent variable model for any application that posits an abstract, unobserved concept recoverable from observed manifest binary variables. One prominent application in political science is the estimation of legislator ideal points. In the spatial model of voting, legislators choose between “yea” and “nay” alternatives, with the “nay” alternative typically representing the status quo and “yea” a change to the status quo. The utility of each choice depends on how far each alternative is from the legislator’s “ideal” policy. The legislator votes for whichever is closer to the legislator’s ideal point. This model also applies to other actors who take announced positions, such as Supreme Court justices or members of the boards of independent agencies. Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers demonstrate that when assuming a particular functional form for this utility, the model for this decision reduces to the standard item–response model from educational tests. The discrimination parameter indicates the extent to which a particular vote relates to an underlying liberal–conservative dimension. In educational testing, $\beta_j \geq 0$, since test questions that students with lower ability have a higher probability of answering correctly than those with higher abilities are counterproductive to the purpose of the test. In the legislator context though, the sign of $\beta_j$ indicates whether a “yea” vote is liberal (negative) or conservative (positive). The difficulty parameter is the “cut point” between the two choices, that is, the ideal point for a legislator who is completely indifferent between the alternatives.

While item–response models are frequently described as unidimensional, the model can also be multidimensional. Instead of a general liberal–conservative dimension, one could specify policy preferences over multiple areas (e.g., economic
policy, social policy, and foreign affairs). The rotational indeterminacy that affects factor analysis is also present in this model. To recover the parameters, some restrictions must be implemented. Specific legislators can be fixed to specific positions in the ideological space, with estimates of other parameters relative to these positions. More useful in these applications are restrictions on $\beta_j$, similar to those restrictions found in confirmatory factor analysis, such as restricting some votes to loading on only one of the policy areas (with the discrimination parameters of other issues restricted to zero).

**Estimation**

Since $\beta_j$, $\kappa_j$, and $x_i$ are all unobserved, estimation can be tricky. An additional complication is the large number of parameters to estimate. For a one-dimensional model, there are $2M + N$ parameters. In the legislative case, that can easily exceed 1,000 parameters. Maximizing the likelihood over all parameters is actually not recommended, since it does not provide consistent estimates of the parameters. In educational testing, the dominant approach estimates only the item parameters, which are used to calibrate standardized tests; estimates of the abilities are less consequential. Marginal maximum likelihood assumes that the latent variable parameter $x$ is normally distributed and then “averages out” (integrates over) to produce a model with only the item parameters. Estimates of the ability parameters can be obtained a posteriori by calculating the expected value given the answers and item parameters.

In political science, recovering estimates of the latent variables is actually more important. To simultaneously estimate the item parameters and the latent variables, Bayesian approaches are used. Assuming a priori the parameters follow certain distributions (some of the same assumptions used in the marginal maximum likelihood approach) and the model of the data produces the joint distribution of item and ability parameters. These parameters can be summarized by simulating from this distribution using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. The Rasch model is much easier to estimate through maximum likelihood conditional on the total score. The three-parameter model is estimated using the same methods as the two-parameter model, but the pseudoguessing parameter can be difficult to estimate. As a result, restrictions on $\gamma_j$ in the three-parameter model are often implemented.

**Other Types of Data**

While the standard item–response model is fitted to binary (correct/incorrect, yea/nay) responses, the model is extendable to polytomous data. One application involves nominal responses from multiple-choice tests. Instead of coding answers as merely correct or incorrect, responses to the separate correct and incorrect responses are modeled. The model is the same as the binary case, except that the probability function is analogous to a multinomial logit model for each multiple-choice question. While there have been political science applications of this model, political science researchers are more often confronted with ordered responses.

In educational testing, ordered models are used for the grading of short answers and essays or any question for which partial credit is granted. In most instances where political scientists use factor analysis, the ordered-item/response model will be a more appropriate choice, especially for the Likert-type scales found in most surveys. Applications include the estimation of survey respondent ideology, policy preferences, or political knowledge. The model is applicable to any circumstance where a latent variable of interest is measured using ordinal variables. For instance, when the unit of analysis is countries, one can recover from ordinal items the level of democracy in these countries, as well as numerous other characteristics of government and society, such as the economic development, corruption, or adherence to human rights.

There are also item–response models using non-multinomial probability models. For instance, the responses can be frequencies or relative frequencies. In political science, such models have been used to estimate the ideological positions of parties or legislators. For parties, the responses are relative word frequencies in party platforms; for legislators, relative word frequencies in speeches. The number of times observation $i$ uses word $j(y_{ij})$ follows a Poisson distribution, with mean number
of counts $\lambda_{ij} = \exp(x_i\beta_j - \alpha_i)$, which specifies a count regression model.

The item–response model also allows for some more unique data structures, such as multiple-rater data. $J$ raters evaluate each of $N$ observations based on $M$ characteristics (items). The raters place the observations on each of the (typical ordered) items. The models produce estimates of the observations’ latent quantity, as well as item- and rater-specific parameters. This approach allows researchers to incorporate evaluations from multiple experts to create more accurate measures. For example, researchers can collect through expert surveys the evaluations of scholars in bureaucracy to measure the ideology of agencies or ratings from comparative politics experts to estimate the ideology of political parties or the level of democracy of a country.

**Conclusion**

The item–response model, while developed for educational testing, is a general measurement model for many different types of discrete data, with many potential extensions. It is particularly well suited for political science applications, which use many abstract theoretical concepts measured with discrete-level data.

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*See also* Categorical Response Data; Factor Analysis; Logit and Probit Analyses; Measurement; Spatial Models of Politics

**Further Readings**


The joint-decision trap is the name for a particular situation that arises in the making of public policy. It is relevant for systems that are divided into layers of government where decisions are made jointly by the central and lower levels. These systems may turn into traps, in the sense that changes from the status quo are difficult. Actors are caught in a deadlock. The joint-decision trap model has had the most impact on the understanding of politics in the European Union (EU) and the German federal system but is relevant for a wide range of multilevel systems.

The joint-decision trap was identified by the German scholar Fritz W. Scharpf, first in German federalism and later in policy making in the EU. Scharpf developed the thesis in the early 1980s on the basis of many years of studies of institutional rigidities in German federal politics. The German version of the thesis was published in the mid-1980s, and the English version followed a few years later. The thesis was notable for two reasons. First, it was one of the first neo-institutional analyses of policy making in the EU. As such, it helped pave the way for, or even spearheaded the breakthrough of the neo-institutional paradigm into, studies of the EU. Second, the thesis avoided the sui generis approach to the EU that until then had tended to isolate studies of European integration from mainstream social science. Scharpf’s approach was comparative. He sought to understand policy dynamics in the EU by comparing it with German federalism.

The joint-decision trap is a designation for a specific, but far from uncommon, institutional setting for policy making. Two institutional conditions are specified: (1) central government decisions must be directly dependent on the agreement of constituent governments and (2) the agreement of constituent governments must be unanimous or nearly unanimous. These conditions fit the cases of German federal politics and the EU reasonably well, at least at the time when Scharpf was writing. A logic of action follows from these conditions that leads to a stalemate and a severe bias in favor of the status quo. Whenever a proposed change of policy has a negative impact on just one actor, this actor will want to oppose the change unless it is compensated for the loss. Since all actors possess (near-)veto rights and because adequate compensation is often difficult, policy changes will often be blocked. In most cases, existing policy cannot be changed as long as it is preferred even by one or a few participants. In a dynamic environment, this is critical. The quality of public policy will gradually worsen. The result will be the continuation of past policies in the face of a changing policy environment and policies that are suboptimal even by their own original criteria.

To make matters worse, the joint-decision trap is also a trap in another sense. It not only leads to pathological policy choices, but it also blocks its own further institutional evolution. The present institutional setup represents the local optimum in the actors’ cost–benefit calculation. It is a Nash equilibrium. There is thus no way that joint-decision systems may transform themselves into institutional
arrangements of greater policy potential. Institutional change would require external intervention. All in all, the joint-decision trap paints a pessimistic picture of modern political systems and is close to structural determinism.

The joint-decision trap is an abstract analytical model that may be used in a variety of settings. Scharpf originally suggested that the logic might apply to settings as diverse as political coalitions, military alliances, and neo-corporatist arrangements. In the original version, however, the trap has had most resonance in studies within its own empirical field—namely, intergovernmental relations in modern political systems. It has been used to understand systems in several countries—for instance, Canada and Denmark. But its most profound influence has probably been within studies of German federalism, where it is used almost as a matter of routine today, and in studies of policy making in the EU, where it is standard material for textbooks.

The joint-decision trap’s influence on EU studies may strike one as paradoxical. The trap was identified and the thesis developed after a long period of “eurosclerosis.” According to many observers, the 1970s and early 1980s were a period of stagnation for the EU where the hopes from the 1950s and 1960s for further integration were strangled in a quagmire of stagnation and policy deadlocks. Scharpf’s joint-decision trap was widely acknowledged as an explanation of this development. However, the 20 years that have passed since the publication of Scharpf’s article in 1988 have been a period of unparalleled dynamism and creative policy making in the EU. Through a series of treaty changes, the EU has experienced several rounds of enlargement, the number of policy areas covered by the EU has increased, and the number of member states has now increased to 27, and although unanimity to qualified majority voting in most areas, and the European Parliament has become a full co-legislator in most areas.

At first sight, these changes might be considered a refutation of the logic of the joint-decision trap. However, the development has spurred investigations into ways in which decision makers may avoid joint-decision traps. B. Guy Peters argues that segmentation of policy making at levels below the Council of Ministers and the influence of policy entrepreneurs may help actors avoid the trap. Adrienne Heritier finds that actors in the EU system engage in politics of subterfuge and creatively use strategies of compensation, compromise, and package deals to avoid stalemates. Jens Blom-Hansen argues that traps need not be inherent in joint-decision systems. If the central government has an exit option in its relations with subcentral governments, it may switch between arenas and use both “exit” and “voice” options to pursue its interests. In this way, joint-decision systems may turn into an asset.

Scharpf, in a reevaluation of the joint-decision trap 20 years after it was first proposed, argues that such an exit option is in fact also available to the central decision maker in the EU. Rule making may follow the well-known community method according to which the Commission presents proposals, and the Council of Ministers and, in selected areas, the European Parliament enact them. This is the area where the joint-decision trap is operative. However, rule making may also follow the “supranational-hierarchical mode.” This takes place in the judicial arena. To use it, the Commission exploits the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect of European law. To make rules, the Commission only needs to assert that a particular rule should have direct effect and that certain laws or practices in member states are in violation of it. If these arguments are then upheld by the European Court of Justice, the interpretation will be the law of the land in all member states without any further action by governments or parliaments. In short, the Commission may strategically use both the traditional community method and the “supranational-hierarchical” way to change the status quo.

However, although the agenda-setting powers of the Commission and rule making by use of the European Court of Justice may reduce the impact of the joint-decision trap, it is still likely to be operative in EU politics. The number of member states has now increased to 27, and although unanimity is no longer necessary in the Council, qualified majority voting is still quite a demanding decision rule. As a result, decision making in the EU is still cumbersome, difficult to manage, and easily blocked. Scharpf’s thesis on joint-decision traps helps us understand why.

More broadly, Scharpf’s contribution highlights how easily two-level decision systems where the
central level is dependent on the (near-)unanimous agreement of the constituent levels fall prey to stalemate and institutional deadlock. Since almost all countries are divided into several layers of government, there is wide scope for empirical application of the thesis. Not only has the joint-decision trap increased our understanding of the empirical world, but it has also stimulated further theoretical development in the social sciences. This holds for both theorizing on institutional deadlock, such as veto player theory, and theorizing on circumventing deadlocks.

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See also Federalism; Institutional Theory; Intergovernmentalism; Veto Player

Further Readings

JUDAISM

Judaism is the religion, philosophy, and culture of the Jewish people. This entry presents the basic beliefs and practices of the Jewish religion, its adaptation to exile, its relationships with other religions, its Ashkenaz and Sepharad components, and the role of rabbis; then, following emancipation, new religious and secular developments; and, in conclusion, contemporary challenges.

Judaism is the first monotheistic religion. It appeared with the Hebrew Patriarchs—Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—and the Matriarchs—Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel, and Leah—some 3,500 years ago. Judaism crystallized with Moses, with emphasis on the exodus from Egypt, freedom from bondage, and the revelation of the Ten Commandments. In Judaism, God is transcendent—beyond representation—omnipotent, benevolent. He created the world, revealed himself, and will lead to redemption. The covenant between God and Abraham, renewed at Mount Sinai between God and the Children of Israel, is an eternal one: Jews exist as a representative of the deity (kingdom of priests, holy people: Exodus 19:5–6), God exists because Jews proclaim Him. Basic monotheistic beliefs are embodied in the commandments: 248 positive and 365 prohibitive or negative, for a total of 613. Gentiles, to share the world to come, must keep the Seven Noahide Laws (prohibition of idolatry, blasphemy, bloodshed, sexual sins, theft, and eating of flesh from a living animal and establishment of a fair legal system). From the conquest of Canaan, the establishment of a Jewish sovereignty, until the destruction of the Second Temple by Titus in 70 CE, Judaism is the religion of a specific people with a specific belief, monotheism.

This explains the savagery of the war between Rome and Jerusalem. The Roman Empire, to impose its rule on a defeated people, mandated that Caesar be worshipped as divine. Judeans could not accept a god other than the Only One. Wars continued for close to a century; Jerusalem was captured; the Temple destroyed; and the very name of the country, Judea, replaced by Palestine to erase any memory of a people and a religion so different from that of Rome.

Faced with a new situation, disappearance of its political and religious institutions, exile, and minority status, Judaism had no other choice but to adapt. The first innovation was to write down what had been until then the Oral Law, explanations and comments on the Written Law, Deuteronomy (the fifth book of the Torah, the Hebrew Bible). This massive effort gave birth to the Talmud, which would become the authoritative interpretation of
Judaism, its source of jurisprudence and education. The only group of Jews who had no knowledge of the Talmud was the group in Ethiopia. The second innovation was an increased value accorded to religion as compensation for lost sovereignty. Such reliance on religion has been the mark of other oppressed peoples (Poles, Irish, Thai, etc.).

Exilic Judaism, with its synagogues as substitutes for the Temple of Jerusalem and the Talmud as its basic source of knowledge, dominated the following 2,000 years. Halacha, Jewish Law, was the core of Judaism, a code of laws, practices, and observances. Based on the Pentateuch, Talmud, and the decisions of sages and rabbis until contemporary times, Halacha is binding for the Orthodox, though not for other groups within Judaism.

Relationship with the two other monotheistic religions, Christianity and Islam, became crucial. Both have their origin in Judaism and believe that they have superseded Judaism. Most Jews were living either in Christian Europe or in Muslim North Africa and the Middle East. Both Christianity and Islam tried to impose conversion but eventually accepted the presence of Jews, if only as a despised minority, their inferior status presented as a proof that they were no longer the Chosen People of the Living God. With great differences according to varying times and places, Jews played a significant, even if usually not recognized, role in the development of Christian and Muslim cultures. comparatively few Jews settled in nonmonotheistic countries such as India and China, where, although their religion seemed strange, they were not subjected to persecution or accorded any special status.

In exile, a distinction appeared between Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews. Ashkenaz, who first settled along the Rhine River, circa 1000 CE, expanded toward Central and Eastern Europe, then to the New World. Sepharad, originally from Muslim Spain, formed new communities around the Mediterranean Sea after the 1492 expulsion. Today, Sephardim are usually linked with Edot Hamizrah, Oriental Jews (Iran, Yemen, Kurdistan, etc.). The major differences are historical—with most Ashkenaz living in Christian countries, most Sepharad in Muslim ones—and liturgical. In most places, for generations, down to the present day, as soon as Jews from a certain geographic area have constituted a critical mass, they have opened their own synagogues. Due to migrations, most major communities have both Ashkenazi and Sephardi synagogues, but they are often united at the religious services level (Kosher food, rabbinical courts, etc.).

In Israel, the Chief Rabbinate is legally headed by two chief rabbis, one Ashkenazi and one Sephardi. The liturgical distinction has become politicized. From a strictly religious one, it has become a social one (Ashkenazi dominance in the old elite, challenged by Sephardim) and eventually a political distinction. Of the three major religious parties, one is Ashkenazi, one is Sephardi, and one is mixed.

Around the 11th century, a new actor emerged in Judaism: the rabbi. The general custom had been to have a learned man, versed in Jewish law and engaged in worldly endeavors, to serve as a religious interpreter of the law. The new rabbis became experts in that field, engaged and paid by Jewish communities and recognized as the official religious leaders (rabbi means “my master”). They had to compete with dayanim, religious judges involved in judicial matters and not in community ones, and, later, with the directors of yeshivot, institutes of higher Talmudic studies. The modern trend, either on a voluntary basis or imposed by institutions, is to belong to a rabbinical association. They offer a common philosophical ground, following the various streams of Judaism, a consultation place, and services such as health insurance, pensions, and so on. In contemporary times, the rabbinate as an institution is more a professional association than a political force within the Jewish community.

Emancipation and democratization were the hallmarks of modernity for Jews. With emancipation, European Jewry underwent a transformation: Whereas previously there were structured, autonomous Jewish “nations,” recognized as such by the sovereign, with their social institutions and tribunals imposing norms on Jewish communities, now affiliation to any kind of Jewish institution, including religious ones, became a voluntary association. New forms of Judaism appeared. As for other people, nothing impeded Jews who did not want to follow the beliefs and practices of their religion. Some Jews wanted a Judaism with no national component, no dream of returning to Jerusalem to rebuild the Temple, and no customs too different from those of their Catholic and Protestant neighbors. Reform Judaism appeared in the 19th century
in Germany and flourished in the United States. To answer this new trend, neo-orthodoxy, also in Germany, offered a mixture of strict adherence to Jewish religious laws—hence “orthodoxy”—but within modern society, science, and democracy—hence “neo.” (In the United States, these congregations refer to themselves as Modern Orthodox.) Other Orthodox groups did not want to change anything in their approach to religion and the world and stressed strict adherence to Judaism alongside or outside modern society but not within. Both Hasidism, a new orthodox trend that emerged in the 19th century, with a rebbe, a charismatic leader, at the center of the group, and their opponents wanted a return to premodern times. Between Reform and Orthodox, a third group, Conservative, tried to amalgamate a respect for tradition and a will to adapt it to modern conditions. As there is no central authority in Judaism, anyone may offer a new vision and try to create a new form of Judaism.

Two ideologies threatened the centrality of religion in Jewish life, socialism and Zionism. Socialism, under the banner of Bund, was a Jewish component of the struggle for power by the proletariat. Based on Jewish ethics, favorable to the poor and the destitute, and on Jewish customs such as Yiddish, Bund became a force mostly in Central and Eastern Europe. Decimated by the Shoah (Holocaust), attacked by Stalin and his successors, Bund has, for all intents and purposes, disappeared. Zionism transformed the Return to Zion from a eschatological perspective to a political program. It relied on centuries of longing for Jerusalem omnipresent in liturgy, from everyday prayers “Bless be You who rebuilds Jerusalem” to the annual cycle of festivals, all of them centered on Jerusalem and culminating at the end of Yom Kippur, and during the Passover Seder with “Next year, in Jerusalem.” Throughout the life cycle, from birth to death, Jerusalem was evoked. What followed was a deeply ambivalent relationship between Judaism and political Zionism, inspired by the same set of beliefs and customs but differing in their modern implications. Some chose to combine both in Religious Zionism. Many religious leaders were reluctant to support, if not outright hostile to, the new nonreligious ideology that was making rapid headway among the Jewish masses. The non-Zionists and anti-Zionists were from both Reform Judaism, which did not recognize Jews as a people but only as a religion, and Orthodox Judaism, which was opposed, like Catholicism, to any new secular philosophy. Eventually, following the Shoah and the creation of Israel, most religious opposition to Zionism disappeared. Approximately half of the surviving Hasidic leaders live in the United States, half in Israel; with a few exceptions, they participate in Israeli elections.

Judaism in the 21st century faces a number of challenges:

- to strengthen its leadership, which is scattered, its streams divided on both theological issues (Deuteronomy as divine revelation or human text) and practical ones (continuity through matrilineal descent for Orthodox and Conservative, through patrilineal descent for Reform), often marginalized by secular Jewish leaders;
- to create new scholarship and provide new answers in a domain not probed for centuries, regarding religious decisions linked to Jewish sovereignty and not limited to the Jewish community as a minority;
- to navigate between a Judaism that follows societal trends and a Judaism that rejects the modern world;
- to be sensitive to gender issues; Reform and Conservative streams have female rabbis and the Orthodox has none, but there is already a shift within Orthodox Judaism, such as tohaniot bet din, female specialists in divorce religious laws, being accepted as quasi advocates by Israeli rabbinical courts;
- to respond to an unprecedented situation in which, regardless of migrations, the Jewish population outside Israel is declining while within Israel it is growing; the absolute number and, even more, the proportion of Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox is on the increase everywhere, and it becomes necessary for the diminishing majority to accommodate Judaism in its Orthodox expressions and for religious authorities to offer leadership not only to their own limited communities but also to all those searching for Jewish values; and
- to offer, as a monotheistic religion, answers to scientific and biogenetic advances with ethical consequences.
In contemporary times, Judaism is an expression of Jewish identity, a privileged means to transmit it.

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*See also* Christianity; Diaspora; Ethics; Islam; Religion; Zionism

### Further Readings


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**Judicial Decision Making**

While the executive and legislative branches are the most visible aspects of government, the third branch—the judicial branch—is in many ways more important. In many countries, it is the judiciary that rules on whether the actions of the other branches are constitutional and, thus, permissible. Thus, while judicial decision making (JDM) tends to occur in private settings, out of the spotlight, it would be a mistake to conclude that the decisions made by judges are not consequential.

This entry discusses two fundamental questions: (1) How do judges make decisions? (2) What impact do those decisions have on governments and societies? The latter question is especially important for individual rights as well as broader political issues. Most empirical research on courts and JDM has been done in the United States because of the unique role of the U.S. Supreme Court (USSC) in the American system of government; however, many recent studies examine courts comparatively. The theoretical perspectives and approaches used to study courts and judges are normative, legal, behavioral, neo-institutional, based on rational choice, and sociological. This entry provides a broad introduction to these approaches, with a special emphasis on the USSC.

Normative approaches to JDM focus on how law ought to be interpreted. Often emphasis is placed on purely legal factors, such as the language of the law passed by the legislature, the wording of constitutions or founding documents, and, in common law systems, precedent (previous cases decided by courts). The focus on normative jurisprudence is not what judges personally decide but what the law demands. Normative jurisprudence tends to think of the law as a puzzle to be unlocked and the correct answer revealed, not a malleable concept with many possible arguments and answers. A normative legal approach can be seen in the classic writings of William Blackstone, Learned Hand, and the founding fathers of the United States (especially James Madison and Alexander Hamilton), who were heavily influenced by enlightenment thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Baron de Montesquieu.

Although the modern study of JDM has moved from a normative to a positivist approach, many scholars continue to recognize the importance of legal factors in explaining judicial decisions. These studies tend to focus on the importance of case facts on the outcomes of various types of cases. However, while it is clear that “the law” matters for some case outcomes, it is also clear that many judicial decisions are affected by nonnormative considerations. Indeed, it may be most useful to consider the normative as more prescriptive than descriptive. That is, it may explain what we think judges ought to do (more factors they should take into account when they decide cases), but it is less useful is describing what actually occurs (what factors actually matter to judges).

The level of court being studied also matters. For example, in trial courts, where judges have to rule on evidentiary matters, charge the jurors, and so on, it is likely that the normative/legal model is generally applicable. These judges are constrained by appellate judges above them, and if they were to make rulings inconsistent with the facts and the law, they
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would likely be overruled. However, for judges in courts of last resort, the situation is quite different. First, these judges have no higher court that can overrule their decision. Second, these courts tend to hear cases that are much more difficult. By difficult, we mean that reasonable people can disagree as to the proper outcome. If the facts and the law could support both opposing outcomes, then it is not hard to see how judges can be constrained in this way.

**Behavioralism**

Eventually, scholars began to notice that normative legal factors did not explain all judicial decisions. Not all legal decisions are clear-cut, and judicial preferences and ideologies help explain the formation of voting coalitions on courts, especially high-level appellate courts engaged in lower court review. The work of early behaviorists such as C. Herman Pritchett and Glendon Schubert was expanded on by others, most notably Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth in *The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model*. Behavioralism takes into account the role of ideological preferences on the decision making of judges and has found considerable evidence that judges are influenced by their personal ideology, especially in the USSC context. Of course, to be able to explore the impact of preferences, reliable and accurate measures of judges’ preferences must be available.

Measures of judicial ideology have been created for most judges in the United States. Measures of the ideology of U.S. Supreme Court justices include those developed by Jeffrey Segal and Albert Cover (1989) and Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn (2002). Segal and Cover used newspaper articles written at the time of a justice’s confirmation to have an independent indicator of voting. This allowed them to avoid the endogeneity problems that plagued other measures that used past votes to predict future votes. Martin and Quinn used Bayesian analysis to develop a dynamic model of the ideal point of judges using their votes on past cases. Other measures have been developed for federal appellate and state court judges in the United States.

**Neo-Institutionalism and Rational Choice**

Judicial scholars also explore the impact that institutional configurations and other actors have on JDM, in addition to the traditional legal and behavioral factors. Institutional influences can be either internal or external in nature. Internal structural factors, such as term length, docket control, and the like, affect judges’ behavior, often allowing them (or requiring them) to be strategic when making decisions. Neo-institutional interpretations are also prominent in separation-of-powers studies, which focus on the external relationship between courts and other political actors. The neo-institutional orientation is often used when studying state courts in the United States because the diverse nature of institutional configurations lends itself well to such explanations, but it is also promising as an orientation for comparative research. Although institutionalism is a traditional theory of government, it is only since the 1990s or so that neo-institutionalism has been regularly applied to integrated research designs of contemporary legal studies. Current institutional and rational choice studies trace their theoretical roots to the early strategic work of Walter Murphy, who argued that judicial decisions were not always based purely on political preferences.

**Comparative Judicial Behavior**

There are many possible ways to approach comparative judicial politics. Typically, studies focus on one of three aspects: (1) structural differences and sociological impacts, (2) judicial independence, and (3) judicial legitimacy. The study by Herbert Jacob, Erhard Blankenburg, Herbert Kritzer, Doris Marie Provine, and Joseph Sanders in 1996 is particularly comprehensive and examines the structures and impacts of eight different judicial systems. Such global studies are relatively rare as most studies focus on one country or area.

Charles Epp’s *The Rights Revolution* is a particularly noteworthy work focusing on the sociological and practical political impact court decisions have on the rights of citizens. Epp’s study examines the impact courts can have on individual rights in four different common law countries, including the United States, Britain, Canada, and India. It is an important addition to the literature on the sociological impact of court decisions as he makes a solid argument demonstrating the need for a group-driven support structure, in addition to basic constitutional, judicial, and structural factors.
Judicial independence is an important topic, particularly in countries with a long history of political instability or authoritarian regimes. Independence studies often focus on Latin America, Russian, Japan, or Italy. There is extensive evidence of the challenges facing courts in countries without a history of a strong rule of law and clear indications of fundamental differences in how citizens use courts in such countries.

Legitimacy is an important issue for courts the world over. All courts face obstacles to the implementation of their decisions, especially when the legitimacy of the court or of the decisions themselves is questioned. While scholars of American politics do not typically focus on legitimacy, given the unusually strong position enjoyed by the USSC, legitimacy is an important research topic for other courts. Prominent scholars include Vanessa Barid, Gregory Caldeira, and James Gibson. Much of the legitimacy research finds that courts outside the United States typically have little legitimacy, in large part due to a lack of information about courts. This raises serious concerns about compliance with judicial decisions. Interestingly, studies also find that courts have the potential to build institutional legitimacy through court rulings, even in countries (e.g., the former German Democratic Republic [East Germany]) that have had little experience with a professional judiciary.

**Supranational Judicial Behavior: The European Court of Justice**

As the European Union has evolved over time, so has the role of the union’s highest court, the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Literature on the ECJ generally examines the role of the ECJ in promoting European integration as a unique supranational institution. Paralleling theoretical orientations in comparative politics generally, ECJ studies tend to be either intergovernmentalist or neo-functionalist in their orientation. Intergovernmentalists argue that the court is actually a weak actor in promoting the integration of European countries into a strong centralized supranational government. Neo-functionalsists instead pointed to the court’s role in enhancing loyalties to its decisions, thereby cementing its role in the integration process.

**Conclusion**

There is much more to say about courts and JDM than can be said in one brief essay, so this entry has limited its survey of the nature of JDM, both in the United States and in other countries. Most basically, the studies discussed here commonly try to determine what factors influence judges’ decisions and how those decisions affect society. Most of this research has focused on courts in the United States because of their unprecedented influence as coequal third branches with expansive powers of judicial review; however, many recent studies have begun to examine courts comparatively. Indeed, the comparative study of courts and judges has been an area of rapid growth since the 1990s.

Moreover, while the studies cited above answer important questions, there are a host of other questions that have not been mentioned owing to space constraints, such as judicial selection, retirement, compliance with judicial decisions, and resource inequalities between litigants. In addition to the topics discussed above, scholars have been studying questions such as these, which are fundamental to an understanding of the judicial system.

Finally, it should be clear that the study of courts and judges is characterized by diversity. The theoretical approaches used by scholars were normative, legal, behavioral, neo-institutional, based on rational choice, and sociological. Scholars study courts of last resort as well as intermediate appellate courts, trial courts, and even transnational courts. Topics include the law, the preferences of judges, and the institutional arrangements under which decisions take place. While some may say that this diversity has hindered the development of general knowledge about the judiciary, the authors agree with scholars such as Lawrence Baum, who argue that such diversity in approaches is welcome because it is most likely to lead to a more complete understanding of judicial behavior.

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See also Judicial Independence; Judicial Review
Judicial Independence

Judicial independence is a notoriously difficult concept to define, to the point that some scholars have questioned whether the concept serves any useful analytical purpose. In a literal sense, judicial independence refers to the ability of courts and judges to perform their duties free of influence or control by other actors. However, the term is more often used in a normative sense to refer to the kind of independence that is considered desirable for courts and judges to possess. Consequently, there are two sources of confusion over its meaning. The first is conceptual, in the form of a lack of clarity regarding the kinds of independence that courts and judges are capable of possessing. The second is normative, in the form of disagreement over what kind of independence courts and judges ought to possess.

As a practical matter, the type of judicial independence that is widely considered both the most important and the most difficult to achieve is independence from other government actors. On the one hand, this type of judicial independence is highly valued among those who impute to courts a special responsibility for ensuring that individuals and minorities do not suffer illegal treatment at the hands of the government or a tyrannous majority.

On the other hand, this type is also considered especially difficult to achieve because the other branches of government ordinarily possess the power to disobey or thwart the enforcement of judicial decisions, if not also to retaliate against the courts for decisions that they oppose. In Alexander Hamilton’s famous formulation, the judiciary is the “least dangerous” branch, having “no influence over either the sword or the purse” and is therefore least capable of defending itself against the other branches.

Formal guarantees of judicial independence from government control date back to at least as far as England’s Act of Settlement of 1701, which gave judges explicit protection from unilateral removal by the Crown in the context of a larger shift of power toward the parliament and the courts. Today, the idea of judicial independence has such broad and powerful normative appeal that even states that do not honor it in practice are wont to profess a commitment to it. Two thirds of the world’s current written constitutions contain some form of explicit protection for the independence of the judiciary, and the proportion of constitutional documents that contain such protections has been rising over time. Judicial independence has been formally endorsed at the international level as well, for example, in the form of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the United Nations in 1985. Empirical research suggests, however, that the existence of formal constitutional guarantees of judicial independence is poorly correlated with actual respect for judicial independence in practice.

Any comprehensive and coherent definition of judicial independence must address several questions. The first is the question of independence for whom; the second is the question of independence from whom; and the third is the question of independence from what. To supply satisfying answers to these questions, however, demands resorting to some normative theory, explicit or otherwise, of why judicial independence is valuable and what it is supposed to accomplish. In other words, it is also necessary to address the question of independence for what purpose.

Independence for Whom?

Judicial independence can be defined as a characteristic of individual judges or as a characteristic of
the judiciary as a whole. Neither conception is indisputably preferable to the other as a practical matter. On the one hand, if judicial independence is guaranteed at the institutional level but not the individual level, individual judges can be forced to obey the wishes of the leadership of the judiciary, which may result in a less-than-wholehearted enforcement of the rule of law. In Chile and Japan, for example, the extent to which the judiciary as an institution commands obedience and conformity from its members has been blamed for producing timid judges who are unwilling or unable to rule against the government. On the other hand, if judicial independence is ensured at the individual level, individual judges will find themselves at liberty to pursue their individual preferences. Not only does unchecked discretion of this kind invite abuse, but it also raises the likelihood that judges will decide cases in inconsistent ways, with the potential effect of undermining the predictability and stability of the law.

**Independence From Whom?**

The existence and adequacy of judicial independence become matters of practical concern only when a court decides a dispute involving the interests of some actor or institution with potential or actual power over the court. Generally speaking, the more powerful the actor whose interests are at stake, the greater is the need to protect the independence of the court from that actor. If both sides to the dispute are powerful, however, that symmetry of power may provide part or all of the necessary protection.

The three scenarios that a court may encounter are

1. disputes between private actors,
2. disputes between government actors, and
3. disputes between private actors and government actors.

In the first scenario, the court must strive to remain independent from the parties, who may attempt to undermine its independence by a variety of means, such as bribery or intimidation. In this situation, the government is a friend of judicial independence: It can be expected to defend the independence of the court from the efforts of the parties.

In the second scenario, the prospects for judicial independence are again relatively favorable. The court is asked not to face down a powerful actor on behalf of a weak one but, rather, to choose sides between two powerful actors in an impartial way. Whichever side the court chooses, the result will be a two-against-one dynamic that ought to provide the court a degree of protection from retaliation. The government does not pose a meaningful threat to judicial independence in such cases because it is at war with itself.

In the third scenario, the government does pose a potent threat to judicial independence, but this threat may be either counteracted or compounded by the public. Suppose, for instance, that a ruler seeks to extend his or her own term of office in an illegal fashion. In this case, the court faces a threat to its independence from the government, but its ability to withstand this threat is greatly improved to the extent that it can count on public support if it rules against the government. As long as the court is in the position of siding with either the government or the public, its independence enjoys protection: Either should be capable of providing the court with the support that it needs to withstand attacks from the other. In other situations, however, the court may be asked to take a position that is antagonistic to that of both the government and the public, as in the case of illegal government discrimination against an unpopular minority. Here the prospects for judicial independence are at their nadir: The judiciary is called on to demonstrate independence from both the government and the public, yet it lacks the help of a powerful ally to withstand the pressures that it faces.

There are various ways to protect judicial independence in the face of such threats. Common strategies include limiting government discretion over judicial salaries, placing heavy restrictions on the removal of judges from office, fixing the minimum jurisdiction that courts are to possess, and relieving judges of personal liability for acts performed in the course of their duties. Less obviously, the internal organization of a judiciary can also have a profound effect on its susceptibility to external influence. The organization of the Japanese judiciary, for example, renders lower court judges highly obedient to an administrative bureaucracy.
Judicial Independence

controlled by the chief justice, who in turn is invariably appointed close to mandatory retirement age. As a result, the government can influence the ideological direction of the entire judiciary simply by availing itself of the relatively frequent opportunity to replace a specific judge. A decentralized organizational structure that grants greater autonomy to individual judges, by contrast, may make it harder for the government to capture or co-opt the judiciary as a whole.

In the long run, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, to create a perfectly independent judiciary that is completely insulated from all forms of political and popular influence. The relatively lengthy experience of the U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, suggests that even a highly independent court is likely over time both to be reshaped by political forces and to accommodate the wishes of a durable political majority. It is optimistic to think that a handful of judges, lacking the power of either the purse or the sword, can consistently defy more powerful actors and institutions without ever suffering any consequences, no matter what formal protections they may enjoy. There are limits to what can be accomplished simply by adjusting the institutional characteristics of the judiciary or enacting solemn declarations about the inviolability of judicial independence. Ultimately, the prospects for attaining even moderate levels of judicial independence are likely to depend on political and historical conditions that are exogenous to the judiciary and may lie beyond reach, such as the existence of a stable, competitive, multiparty democracy.

Independence From What?

Not all forms of influence over judicial decision making constitute threats to judicial independence. While some activities aimed at influencing courts, such as bribery and physical intimidation, may be inappropriate under any plausible conception of judicial independence, others can only be evaluated on the basis of a contestable normative judgment. Consider, for example, public protests in front of courthouses. One view might be that such protests should be privileged as a form of political expression and that judges in a democracy are permitted or even obligated to take public opinion into account. Alternatively, one might take the view that judges should be shielded from such expressions of public opinion, much as jurors are sequestered, to ensure that their deliberations are not tainted by considerations that ought to be irrelevant. Likewise, a public campaign to deny a judge reelection because he or she has ruled in unpopular ways on controversial issues can be characterized as either a healthy manifestation of democracy or a threat to judicial independence.

Whether such efforts to influence judicial decision making are consistent with judicial independence cannot be answered by fiat. To define the requirements of judicial independence in such cases demands instead a normative theory of what courts are supposed to take into account when deciding cases, what judicial independence is supposed to achieve, and to what extent judicial independence can and should be balanced against other objectives and considerations.

Independence for What Purpose?

Judicial independence is generally considered a means to an end, rather than an end in and of itself. Most would probably agree that the ultimate goal can be described as the fair and impartial adjudication of disputes in accordance with law. If that is indeed the goal, however, then the pursuit of judicial independence is open to several objections.

One objection is that the goal itself is unattainable because it rests on a misconception of the nature of both law and adjudication. It is a commonly held view among legal theorists that the law is frequently indeterminate and that it is therefore impossible for judges to decide disputes simply by applying preexisting law. Rather, it is said, the act of adjudication requires judges to make the very law that they purport merely to apply. Yet if adjudication necessarily entails lawmaking, then, judicial independence does not simply protect the ability of judges to decide disputes in accordance with law but instead licenses them to make and impose whatever laws they see fit, which is a prospect that many consider incompatible with either the appropriate role of judges in a democracy or the idea of separation of powers.

Another objection is that judicial independence is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure impartial adjudication in accordance with law and may even undermine that goal if left unchecked. On the
one hand, it is possible for a judge who faces potential retaliation to nevertheless decide cases in an impartial manner. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that giving judges the freedom to decide cases as they wish means that they will choose to do so fairly and in accordance with law. Even if it were possible to create a judiciary that is completely free from both popular and political control, what would then prevent the judges from deciding cases on the basis of personal prejudice or self-interest? It is on the basis of such concerns that many consider it essential to balance judicial independence against judicial accountability and to distinguish appropriate forms of influence over the judiciary from inappropriate forms. However, any mechanism that might be devised for preventing or punishing judicial abuse of power is itself likely to prove susceptible to abuse. The resulting question of how to oversee the judges who are responsible for overseeing the government—"quis custodiet ipsos custodes"—has long vexed constitutional and political theorists and admits of no simple solution.

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See also Constitutionalism; Democracy, Theories of; Judicial Review; Rule of Law; Separation of Powers

Further Readings


JUDICIAL REVIEW

The term judicial review refers to the practice of judges deciding whether or not to declare void a statute or an executive order on the grounds of conflict with a higher law. This entry first describes two sorts of judicial review and also the political logic by which the institution of judicial review is criticized and that by which it is defended. It then discusses the history of the adoption and spread of the practice of judicial review. Finally, it describes the kinds of judicial review that are now prevalent in the world.

When the judge declares void an order from an executive branch official on the grounds that the official has transgressed the bounds of his or her statutory authority, the practice of judicial review is not particularly controversial. It is necessitated by the idea that the rule of law is preferable to the unchecked rule of individual will. (This version is sometimes called administrative review to distinguish it from the review of the statutes themselves.) A judicial power to declare void the acts of elected legislatures, however, is more controversial, especially in systems where judges are not elected. The criticism of this sort of higher law judicial review is that it substitutes the will of non–electorally accountable persons for the will of the people’s elected representatives. The defense of it relies on the premise that the legislators will not be inclined to police themselves to stay within the constitutional bounds of their authority and on the premise that persons independent of political pressures and incentives and trained in the law—judges—will be able to uphold better the legal limits on governmental power.

Judicial review began in the courts of American states under the Articles of Confederation, perhaps influenced by the fact that the British Privy Council had wielded a veto power over colonial legislation; at first, the practice aroused considerable opposition. At that time, most of the states had constitutions written and adopted by the legislature, so judges looked to natural law or the law of nations
or Anglo-American common law for the higher law to which they claimed statutes must conform. Some opposing attorneys argued that an appeal beyond statutes was illegitimate, and some judges on the bench made similar claims. It also provoked popular mass protest meetings, legislative censures, attempts to outlaw it, and serious efforts to impeach judges for engaging in it.

A man named Thomas Tudor Tucker, writing in 1784 under the pen name of Philodemus (friend of the people, in Greek), in a pamphlet titled “Conciliatory Hints,” developed the idea that the legislatively adopted constitution of his state, South Carolina, should be replaced by one written by a constitutional convention specially elected by the people and that the people should ratify it in an election, thereby giving their express consent. Moreover, the constitution should state that it is paramount to ordinary legislation and not changeable merely by the legislature. Finally, and crucially, Tucker suggested that a peaceful rather than violent solution to abuses of power by legislatures would be to have the constitution state that no act of the legislature contravening it can be valid, and this declaration could be enforced in the courts of law. Thus was born the system of judicial review for safeguarding a popularly ratified constitution as higher law.

The idea spread quickly to other states, and members of the Constitutional Convention treated this power as something the federal courts would have. They did not explicitly characterize it as a power over law adopted by Congress but merely implied that federal courts would have such power (by including constitutional prohibitions on certain kinds of laws and allowing the courts to take cases “arising under the Constitution”). As to state laws, the U.S. Constitution was explicit. Article VI says plainly that the national constitution, national laws, and national treaties “shall be the supreme law of the land; and judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.” Therefore, judges in the United States were obliged to throw out any state-level law that conflicted with a federal-level higher law. The fourth U.S. Supreme Court chief justice, John Marshall, explicitly developed and applied the implied power to declare void a federal-level statute for the first time in 1803, in the case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137.

Switzerland’s 1848 constitution also spelled out a power in its Supreme Tribunal to declare void cantonal law on grounds of conflict with the national constitution. On the other hand, it refrained from allowing judicial review over laws produced by the national parliament. Instead, such laws could be challenged by a process of national referendum.

The Argentina Constitution of 1853, closely modeled on the U.S. Constitution, and then also its amended version in 1860, allowed for judicial review of national-level law. The Argentine Supreme Court plainly so interpreted it in 1864, in the case Fiscal v. Calvete, 1 Fallos 340, and did declare void a congressional statute in 1888 (in Municipalidad de la Capital v. Elortondo, 33 Fallos 162). This court then implemented its power on a regular basis until 1930, but from 1930 to 1983, the country was frequently ruled by a military dictatorship that in some periods dominated the court.

Then in 1866, via judicial precedent, the judiciary of Norway acquired the power of judicial review over national legislation. As of World War I, then, the courts of the United States, Norway, and Argentina had this power. (Icelandic courts did strike down a royal decree in 1877 but did not strike down a national statute until 1943.) In the interwar period, the Weimar Republic, Austria, Spain, and some of the states of Central/Eastern Europe had specialized constitutional courts to exercise judicial review, but all these were ended by the wartime constitutions. The paucity of countries with judicial review changed after World War II, at first gradually and then quite rapidly.

During the 1940s and 1950s, there was a postwar wave of reconstruction constitutions that instituted judicial review; these included the constitutions of Austria, Italy, Germany, France, and Japan. The decolonization of Africa and Asia in the 1950s and 1960s brought judicial review in several of the newly independent constitutions in Africa and Asia. Democratization in Southern Europe brought judicial review to Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the 1970s and, then, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to new democracies in the Republic of South Africa and in several Latin American countries. Yet another wave came along in the 1990s, as the Soviet, Soviet bloc, and Yugoslavian republics adopted liberal democratic constitutions that
Judicial Review

included judicial review. As part of no specific trend, several additional countries in the period between 1979 and 1994 adopted new constitutions or new constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights to be enforced via judicial review. These included Sweden (1979), Egypt (1980), Canada (1982), Belgium (1985), New Zealand (1990), Mexico (1994), and Israel (1992–1995). By 2004, 80 countries in the world had adopted a system of judicial review.

There are two basic types of intracountry judicial review. The first follows the U.S. model, allowing all judges to declare void a law that conflicts with the constitution. The second was designed by Hans Kelsen for Austria in the interwar years. This model sets aside a particular specialized court or council, the Constitutional Court, which is given a monopoly on the power of judicial review and which exists only to exercise that power. Until the late 1970s, the U.S. type of judicial review was the more prevalent, being used in about three fourths of the judicial review countries. Since that time, the more recent democracies have tended toward the Kelsenian approach, adopting a single constitutional court.

In the 1960s, yet another form of judicial review burst forth on the world—judicial review by a transnational court. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) had been established to enforce the three 1950s treaties that bound together the European Communities (since 1992, called the European Union [EU]): The European Coal and Steel Treaty of 1952 formed the European Coal and Steel Community; the Treaty of Rome of 1957 formed the European Economic Community; and the Euratom Treaty of 1957 formed the European Atomic Energy Community. This court, the ECJ, declared in the case *Costa v. ENEL* (1964) not only that the treaties had wiped out any prior conflicting legislation of the member countries but also that these treaties now would function as higher law, making void also any subsequent member country legislation contrary to them. In 1970, the case of *International Handelsgesellschaft v. EVGF* extended this principle even to member-country constitutional provisions that might conflict with any of the European Community treaties. According to these rulings of the ECJ, ordinary judges in the member countries, even in countries that did not previously allow judicial review of statutes, were now obliged to give European-level law “precedence” over conflicting member-state law. And they did. As of 2008, there are 27 members in the EU.

Then, in 1998, the European Court of Human Rights, which is the court for upholding the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe (a 47-member body that stretches from the United Kingdom and Ireland to Azerbaijan and Russia, and from Norway to Greece and Turkey), was made a permanent court with compulsory jurisdiction over each member country and to whom individuals with human rights complaints were given direct access. Since that time, this court too has been exercising genuinely effective judicial review of a transnational variety with power to demand legislative remedies to Convention violations in the member countries as well as the power to insist that member governments issue financial compensation to litigants whose human rights have been violated.

These two European courts exercise most plainly the power of transnational judicial review, but there are some two dozen other international courts, many of whom, to one degree or another, exercise softer versions of judicial review. Judicial review on the world stage is a rapidly evolving phenomenon as of the 21st century and will warrant the attention of political scientists well into the future.

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See also Constitutionalism; Judicial Decision Making; Judicial Independence; Judicial Systems; Judicialization of International Relations; Judiciary; Rights; Rule of Law

Further Readings
Judicial Systems

Although the core of judicial systems is the trial, pretrial practices dispose of most potential litigation. Social, economic, or political pressures or lack of knowledge or resources will inhibit most aggrieved parties from bringing suits. Even among those suits seriously contemplated or filed, most will be resolved by voluntary settlement, plea bargaining, mediation, arbitration, consent decrees, administrative hearings, or decision by clan, guild, village, market, business, or religious “courts” that either operate parallel to or are embedded in the official judicial system.

Access to trial is also typically narrowed by “standing” (only those who can show that they have been directly and seriously injured may sue the alleged wrongdoer) and other rules, such as a requirement that those in dispute with the government exhaust their administrative remedies before resorting to the judiciary or that suits be filed within a certain time after the injury or offense (statutes of limitations). In some legal systems, under certain circumstances, however, standing rules may be relaxed or not applied at all, for instance, when a party alleges that a particular statute violates constitutionally protected individual rights or some action harms the environment.

The economic, social, and psychological costs to persons brought to criminal trials is so severe, even if they are not convicted, that many criminal justice systems provide for some kind of “trial before the trial” to determine whether actual prosecution is justified, such as grand jury indictment, arraignment, or preliminary investigation by a judge.

Trial courts may consist of a moot or whole community sitting as judge, a single professional or lay judge, a panel of professional or lay judges, a mixture of professionals and lay persons, or a judge and jury. Practices may be designed to bring all factual and legal issues together at a single time and place to be resolved in an oral proceeding, or a trial may be a file of papers developed over an extended time period as written records of witness statements, investigative reports, and relevant documents such as deeds and contracts until final disposition occurs through the delivery of a judicial verdict in court.

Proceedings are typically governed by rules specifying who may participate in what order, rules of decorum, rules of evidence defining what testimony and documents will be admitted as sufficiently reliable, and relevant standards of proof such as the “beyond reasonable doubt” rule or the Islamic rule that conviction requires testimony of guilt by two witnesses. Confessions, either voluntary or induced by coercive practices, are a major feature of most criminal justice systems. Such systems are often classified as adversarial or inquisitorial depending on the degree to which the case is developed by the prosecutor and defense counsel or by the judges themselves. Both civil and criminal justice systems have historically varied enormously in the degree to which judges actively intervene in case development. In Imperial China, lawyers did not exist, and the magistrate was solely responsible for case development with even the parties playing little role except as severely coerced witnesses. In the United States, judges are expected to remain largely passive recipients of the lawyers’ presentations. In other systems such as the English, lawyers present the cases for each side, but judges intervene fairly actively.

Judicial systems are often organized in a single pyramid or hierarchy with many local trial courts, a certain number of which are clustered under an appeals court; these intermediate appeals courts are clustered under the highest appellate court. Sometimes there are separate hierarchical systems of civil, criminal, administrative, commercial, labor, and/or religious courts or separate trial courts, such as small-claims or juvenile courts, under the supervision of the general courts. In
Judicial Systems

In some instances, there is a separate court with exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional issues, and some higher courts also serve as trial courts for particularly important matters such as impeachment of government officials or suits between two member states of a federal system. Appellate courts almost always consist of a panel of three or more judges. One function of appeal is to protect parties against trial court errors. Another is to serve central political authorities by ensuring that laws made by them are effectively and uniformly enforced by the web of local trial courts.

The principal function of courts is often said to be the resolution of disputes between two parties, deciding that one party was right and the other wrong, according to preexisting legal rules. In reality, many cases really involve not simply two individuals but large clashing social, economic, or political interests; many are resolved by intermediate decisions under which both parties gain something and lose something, and some are resolved by rules that the judges have just constructed. Judicial discretion in the making of new legal rules is greatly constrained by many factors, including the need to explain their decisions in published “opinions,” the existence of other more politically powerful lawmakers such as legislatures and executives, public opinion, courts’ extremely limited means of enforcing their judgments, the degree of completeness and specificity of existing legal rules, and professional or craft standards of permissible legal reasoning and judicial creativity. Nevertheless, in many polities, judicial systems have been a significant source of new public policies and thus sometimes of political controversy.

Some degree of judicial law making characterizes all judicial systems, not necessarily because judges consciously seek law-making power but because acceptance of judicial decisions is most likely when they are purportedly the judicial application of preexisting legal rules rather than judicial fiat. Thus, in cases where there is no relevant pre-existing law or that law is too general or unclear to prescribe the outcome, judges themselves will be moved to generate a decisive legal rule attributing its origin not to themselves but to judicial “interpretation” of the body of preexisting law.

Because courts are necessarily simultaneously dispute resolvers and lawmakers, judicial selection is difficult. Judicial neutrality and independence would seem essential if courts are to successfully resolve disputes. Yet, as lawmakers, judges ought not to be independent but rather politically responsible to the people or their elected representatives in a democracy and to whoever holds political authority in nondemocracies. This insoluble paradox results in judicial selection processes that range from direct election for short terms of judicial candidates nominated by political parties to appointment and dismissal of judges at the pleasure of an authoritarian ruler or selection for life terms by an independent council consisting of incumbent judges and distinguished legal scholars, with every imaginable combination of independence leaning and political accountability devices in between.

It is often claimed that judicial systems are separate from political systems, but more realistically speaking, they are treated as subsystems of the political. While courts are frequently associated with the protection of individual rights, most political regimes, even those with little regard for such rights, have invested in judicial services. They do so not only because conflict resolution fosters economic activity and social peace but because courts serve as instruments of social control enforcing whatever policies the regime enacts into law. The appellate hierarchies described earlier are channels for transmitting to the localities and enforcing laws made by central political authorities. To the extent that judges themselves make law, they themselves are active participants in the public policymaking—that is, the political—process. There is a perennial argument over how active judges ought to be in policy making, but some level of judicial lawmaking, and thus judicial politics, is inevitable.

It is argued by some that judges engage in a unique and superior method of decision making. Because they proceed case by case with regard for stability, continuity, and consistency in the case law, their decisions are claimed to be pragmatically rooted in the particular, concrete realities presented in individual cases rather than generated by abstract and general prognostication not rooted in reality. Because they know that the rule they announce in one case will probably be used in subsequent cases and because most serve for relatively long terms, they are said, unlike politicians desperately concerned to survive the next election or crisis, to pursue long-term public values rather than their personal, immediate survival in office. Others
argue that case-by-case decision making is simply the judicial version of the incremental decision strategies used by all public policymakers, that precisely because judges know that the rule they make in one case today may be used in future, somewhat different, and somewhat unpredictable cases, they mix concrete, immediate considerations with more general, probabilistic considerations of how a current rule might work in the future just as legislators, administrators, and political executives do, and that even those judges who anticipate long terms are subject to the pressures of immediate events and current crises that play on other lawmakers. There is certainly much empirical data indicating that judges’ decision making is significantly influenced by their political ideologies and affiliations and their personal policy preferences, but such studies do not resolve the question of whether judges enjoy a decision method different from or superior to those of other lawmakers.

Effective judicial systems are often touted as routes to economic and political development because they provide security of expectations for investors and protect individual rights. Yet, under some circumstances, investment can be attracted by the expectation of high returns even in the absence of court-provided security, and authoritarian regimes can use judicial processes for repression rather than protection of individuals.

It is widely believed that, beginning in the latter half of the 20th century, the courts have played an increasingly active role in public policy making (the so-called judicialization of politics) through their powers of constitutional judicial review, review of the lawfulness of administrative actions, and general statutory interpretation, although it is not clear that courts were less active in earlier periods.

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See also International Law; Judicial Decision Making; Natural Law; Rule of Law; Soft Law; Voting Rules, Legislative

Further Readings


Judicialization of International Relations

The judicialization of international relations refers to the political reality that judicial actors are increasingly involved in defining what international agreements mean. Judicialization is an aspect of legalization of policy and politics in which politicians conceive of their policy and legislative options as bounded by what is legally allowed and where citizens, organizations, and firms see law as conferring on them rights that others may not abrogate. Judicialization occurs when courts gain authority to define what the law means. Where judges have the authority to say what the law means and where litigation becomes a useful way to reopen political agreements, judges become de facto lawmakers. Negotiations among actors become debates about what is legally permissible, and politics takes place in the shadow of courts with the lurking possibility of litigation shaping actor demands and political outcomes.

Most people used to think that law only existed where there was coercive power to enforce it, and thus, judicialization of politics was only possible within states. But increasingly, international relations have become both legalized and judicialized. This entry reviews how international relations came to be part of the domain of courts, discusses how the judicialization of international relations has changed international politics, and identifies where judicialized international relations are more and less prevalent.

How Did International Relations Become Judicialized?

In the age of monarchies, what we today call international law consisted primarily of agreements among kings and queens, enforceable through reciprocity by state leaders. This old conception of international law still exists in public law theory
The result of these trends is that international law increasingly speaks about how governments should treat their citizens, which goods are allowed into national markets and on what terms, how many environmentally destructive products states should allow their firms and people to create, and so on. While we count on governments to implement these rules, increasingly substate actors are going to the source of the rules, invoking international laws and regulations directly in national contexts. If individuals, nongovernmental organizations, and firms see governments as having duties and themselves as having rights based on international law, and if governments start to interact with substate actors as if they have rights under international law, then both domestic and international politics move into the new terrain of legalized international politics.

The second shift is a result of the growth of multilateral institutions. In very real and concrete ways, multilateral institutions have gained governance roles. As executive bodies, multilateral institutions propose legislation and convene meetings where representatives of states agree to collective rules that, once ratified, can become binding both on signatories and nonsignatories alike. Some multilateral institutions at the regional level (e.g., the European Union [EU]) have legislative abilities wherein councils of state representatives can pass legislation that does not require the traditional step of national ratification for its authority and that exists largely outside of domestic judicial oversight.

These two factors have contributed to the growth of creating and using international courts (ICs). It used to be that domestic courts were the primary enforcers of international rules. Even with the rise of powerful and active constitutional courts in many countries, domestic enforcement remains uneven because national judges are
inclined to see international law as external to the national legal order and international relations as falling into the realm of executive prerogative. As multilateral institutions have gained more powers, states have turned to ICs to oversee the exercise of this power.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a revolution in the creation and use of ICs. It disrupted traditional alliances. Former Soviet satellites rushed to join the international institutions of Western states, and states that had relied on Soviet support had to seek new patrons. Around the world, states embraced the trappings of liberal democracy—free markets, human rights, and open trading systems. These changes led to the creation of a slew of new ICs, reforms to existing ICs, and an expansion of membership in a number of international legal institutions.

We can literally see the judicialization of international politics. In 1985, there were eight ICs that met the Project on International Courts and Tribunals’ definition of an IC as

1. a permanent legal body,
2. composed of independent judges,
3. hearing legal cases in which one of the parties is a state actor or an international organization (IO),
4. deciding on the basis of predetermined rules, and
5. issuing binding legal rulings.

By 2009, there were 20 active ICs meeting this definition and 8 more in various stages of development. These “new” ICs are not only recent creations, but they are also qualitatively different entities. Newer ICs are more likely to have compulsory jurisdiction, meaning states do not need to consent to litigation for the case to proceed. They also tend to allow private access or access for international nonstate actors to initiate litigation, even though most observers agree that these design features make ICs more independent and more likely to make a ruling on cases in which a government is an unwilling participant. The new ICs are far more likely to be activated, which explains in part why IC usage has also increased. By 2007, ICs had issued more than 30,000 binding legal rulings where an IO or state actor was the defendant. These rulings are not only mostly routine, but they also fill gaps in the law and, at times, radically reinterpret law on the books so that ICs end up as lawmakers with significant power to influence domestic and international outcomes.

The ingredients for judicialized international relations are now in place. We have an extensive body of binding and fairly precise international legal rules. We have state and nonstate actors who see these rules as conferring rights and duties on state actors. We have courts—both domestic and international—with the capacity to interpret and enforce these rules in cases raised by states, private firms, individuals, and international prosecutor-type actors.

How Does the Judicialization of International Relations Affect International Politics?

It is important to recognize that judicialized politics is not the same thing as courtroom politics. Legalized politics involves the extension of legal rhetoric and legal calculations into the larger realm of politics. When courts start to issue decisions that interpret rules, judicialized politics extends to politicking over new rules, actor decisions regarding different courses of law-compliant action, and negotiations to resolve disagreements about existing rules.

During treaty negotiations, judicialization of international relations mainly affects politics by creating a web of commitments that constrain new policy making. Certain international treaties exert a constitutional influence over bilateral and multilateral treaty negotiations and domestic policy making. For example, the World Trade Organization’s framework for free trade casts a shadow over domestic and international negotiations regarding trade issues because any new agreement that conflicts with the rules of the World Trade Organization can give rise to a legal challenge. International human rights law also exerts a constitutional influence in that new international and domestic policies must respect what are seen as elemental individual rights.

Judicialized politics play an even larger role during the implementation stage, when actors are applying existing rules on a case-by-case basis.
Legalization’s largest although least perceptible influence is in shaping how actors make choices. For most actors, the first step involves figuring out what the law allows or requires. People usually choose legal action because law provides a starting place to make decisions and because law-compliant behavior is safe. Following the law becomes the default condition; one usually needs a reason to choose a riskier illegal action over what the law prescribes. Even when actors choose to violate the law, they will attempt to bring legal understandings with them. For example, when the U.S. government under the leadership of President George W. Bush sought to escape well-understood legal obligations under the Geneva Conventions (1949) and the UN Convention Against Torture, it asked for legal briefs that suggested that its policy choices were actually consistent with what the law required.

Law also becomes a tool used by parties when disagreements arise. At this point, state discretion can be constrained by judges (domestic and international) interpreting and enforcing the law as they see it. Law becomes a framework that the parties use to figure out what arrangements are reasonable. Law prescribes the duties owed and the rights that can be claimed. Again, we see that judicialized politics are not per se courtroom politics. Litigation is meant to be a last resort and a fairly rare phenomenon. Instead, the prospect of litigating a disagreement casts a shadow over out-of-court negotiations regarding legal compliance. Actors are supposed to adjust their behaviors both because they prefer to be law-abiding (being law-abiding is seen as more legitimate) and to avoid a legal suit. Where legal violations exist, threatening litigation becomes a useful bargaining tactic, as most actors will prefer settlement rather than public legal sanction and with it a binding legal precedent. Judicialized politics is therefore present in the many debates and arguments over what the existing set of rules do and do not allow.

A proportionally small number of disputes will end up in front of legal enforcement bodies—international or domestic courts, monitoring and enforcement bodies, or arbitral bodies. Rising litigation rates involving international agreements suggest that litigation is a useful political tool, but it is hard to assess how effective litigation is. The effects of litigation cannot really be measured because the many suits that settle out of court are systematically excluded in any examination of compliance with the law. The cases we can observe—those that reach the legal ruling stage in a court—tend to be the most difficult, those where the parties refuse a settlement, and thus where compliance with the law is the least likely. Studies on compliance with IC rulings find that a vast majority of IC rulings elicit full or partial compliance. Even if rulings do not elicit immediate or full compliance, IC actions cast a shadow over subsequent politics. The fact that an IC has declared one interpretation of the rules “legal” and another “illegal” affects perceptions regarding the rectitude of certain behaviors. State and nonstate actors may become less willing to abide by bargains and policies that have been named illegal. Over time, law-breakers may find that it is simply easier to create a legal solution to end a conflict. The legal solution may involve compliance with the law as interpreted by the IC, writing new legislation to create a new definition of what is “legal,” or creating a side bargain in which the victims of the legal breach are compensated in exchange for dropping their legal claims. All of these shifts from straight-out noncompliance—settlement, changing the law to unseat a court ruling, compensation, and compliance—reflect judicialized international relations.

Where Are Judicialized International Relations More and Less Likely?

A well-known saying is that “all’s fair in love and war.” But with judicialized politics, actors who break a love contract or who engage in war can face costly litigation. This aphorism does, however, capture the reality that certain domains are more law constrained than others.

Judicialized politics are less prevalent with respect to new-issue areas where there are few existing legal rules. The Internet, for example, experienced a period of time without legal regulation where there were only norms of conduct but not legal rights and duties. While there is much discussion about international environmental accords, the environment remains another domain in which international legal obligations barely exist.

In tightly knit social settings where social mores matter more than law, and around the fringes of political life where social opprobrium counts for
little, social interactions tend to be less constrained by law. Thus, we find that in many areas of the world, local custom matters more than international human rights law. We also find that illegal realms, such as the black market or drug and human trafficking, operate largely outside the law and legalized discourse.

The realm of security has fewer rules limiting state discretion, although over time this policy domain has also become judicialized. State actors who indulge in violence across borders, who violate promises that have been codified via international agreements, or who commit atrocities against noncombatants may be recipients of legally authorized sanctions. Other states may refuse alleged war criminals, the citizens of states engaged in war, or the regular courtesies of international life, such as international travel, the landing of airplanes, and trade across borders. With the rise of universal jurisdiction and the creation of the International Criminal Court, perpetrators of war crimes can even find themselves being brought to court.

In international economic relations, interstate interaction is highly legalized and judicialized. The rules for creating barriers to the movement of goods and services are detailed and known. (World Trade Organization rules constituted a starting template for most international trade regimes.) A state that violates these rules will usually be confronted with legal claims, legal threats, and even litigation.

The final area of international politics that is increasingly judicialized is human rights. Nongovernmental actors increasingly monitor state actions, using legal claims and legalized strategies as they expose violations of individual and group rights. While activists may fail to sway a determined government, outside groups would have no right or leverage were it not for the existence of binding international duties and obligations. Meanwhile, domestic and ICs around the world are increasingly willing to help protect human rights.

This discussion reveals that judicialized politics is not defined by law obedience. Instead, judicialized politics is defined by legal politics, where the fights are about what constitutes obedience to the law. Where politics is judicialized, judges have political power because they have been given the final authority to say what the law means. Judges do not, however, get to determine what the law ultimately becomes. If enough actors are unhappy with the state of the law, they will change the law. Judges will then get another chance to interpret what the new law means. Through a recursive interaction among judges, lawyers, policymakers, and the people ultimately called on to respect the law, the meaning of the law gets contested, defined, and reshaped. Judicialized politics means that judges have inserted themselves into this recursive political dynamic and that the political status quo can be destabilized by litigants making legal appeals to judges.

Conclusion

Today international agreements are negotiated by executive branches, written down and registered, and then implemented by state bureaucracies. Bureaucracies usually apply existing rules in cases involving individuals. Following the law is nearly always the simplest and safest course of action, which is why bureaucracies will follow the law, unless there is a compelling reason not to.

Before courts were involved in interpreting international rules, bureaucracies had significant discretion to define what the law meant. By shaping bureaucratic behavior, governments controlled how international law affected domestic policy. The growing trend of having legal bodies—domestic and international—interpret and apply international rules has contributed to the judicialization of international politics. Government bureaucracies are increasingly swayed by the possibility of international review of their decisions; thus they are increasingly willing to follow IC interpretations of the law even if their government has not explicitly directed them to do so. Now that courts can pronounce on the law and even review the actions of state bureaucracies, state discretion has diminished.

Legal obligations exist where legal rules exist. Legislative bodies make legal rules, and where there are no rules, actors retain discretion. This means that through their legislation, legislative bodies drive where and when international relations become legalized. But when courts became involved in interpreting international law, judges start to create law to fill in lacunae that legal suits expose, and states begin to lose discretion and
control over how legal rules are understood. Political actors will need either to make codified law that is more to their liking or to let judges define the law. The ultimate import of the judicialization of international relations will depend on the interaction between existing laws, the willingness of litigants to invoke the law and pursue litigation, and the behavior of judges.

This realm of judicialized politics has been spreading in an accelerated fashion. Many factors account for its spread. Democracy and the growth of professional bureaucracy increase the number of actors who participate in policy making and who have a stake in the rule of law, both domestic and international. Technology aids in the dissemination of information and the coordination of actors across borders. A rising trend of delegating authority to international legal bodies increases the venues available for litigating. The increasing willingness of national courts to weigh in regarding international legal issues has also increased the prevalence of bargaining in the shadow of a court.

At this point, even if governments decided to stop using law and litigation as a tool of dispute resolution, there would still be judicialized international relations. Legal rights are hard to take back. International law provides a right for outsiders to peek over borders and to criticize what governments do in their own backyard, and judges have gained jurisdiction regarding international legal issues. At the same time, the rule of law—both domestic and international—is far from monolithic. There are always territories and issues where one finds social order that is not defined by law. The next challenge for students of judicialized international relations is to determine where and when law plays a greater role in everyday international relations and to better understand the factors that shape how judicialized international politics plays out.

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Further Readings
middle of the 20th century, the significance of the judiciary has increased, leading to the phenomenon defined as “the judicialization of politics.”

The Judiciary in Constitutional States
The role of the judiciary in a political system cannot be analyzed without taking into consideration the institutional function of the judge: adjudication. Adjudication is a type of dispute resolution that relies on an externally appointed judge acting as the third party and where the parties to the dispute must comply with the judge’s decision, even though they have no control over the choice of judge, who is appointed by the state. Thus, judges are inherently placed in a difficult position. They must resolve cases without the main element that makes the triad an effective means of resolving disputes: the willingness of the participants to submit to both the proceedings and the involvement of the third party. To address this weakness, the judicial process tends to include a number of principles creating the appearance of and reinforcing judicial impartiality. More specifically, the need to guarantee judicial impartiality implies that judges must be independent from the parties in dispute and protected from interference by them. Such independence is a necessary condition as any judge who is dependent in some way on one of the parties cannot be, and cannot appear to be, impartial.

In the political development of Europe, the incorporation of judges into the machinery of the state and the superiority of government-appointed judges over other types of judges—for example, feudal or city judges—have largely guaranteed judicial independence from the parties in dispute. However, the incorporation of the judge into the state organization creates the need to redefine judicial impartiality when one of the parties is the state itself or one of its representatives. Only by defining judicial independence in relation to the state can the judge act as an impartial third party in disputes between the state and citizens (e.g., in criminal trials). Judges can then become an effective check on the way in which public functions are performed since guarantees of independence allow them to resolve such disputes and interpret the relevant laws without coming under pressure from the state. Thus, the protection of judicial impartiality through strong guarantees of judicial independence has become one of the most important traits of constitutionalism since one of its main objectives is to limit the arbitrary exercise of political power and make it legally accountable.

The strength of the judiciary is influenced by whether it is in a civil law or common law country. In a civil law country, legislative law takes precedence over case law, and judges are bound by civil codes without regard to previous judicial decisions; in contrast, judicial rulings take precedence over civil law (legislation) in common law countries, and judges are bound by previous rulings issued by higher-level courts (stare decisis). Historically, judges in civil law countries have enjoyed less independence, and their role has tended to be less politically significant. Mistrust of the judiciary has always been high and judicial power considered an important power to be checked. Traditionally, continental judges tend to act in a subordinate way to the political branches and to the norms they enact. This reflects a historical interpretation of the “separation of powers” principle that assigns a privileged role to the legislature since it represents the popular will. Therefore, for a long period, any form of judicial review of legislation was ruled out.

The situation in England and many of the former British colonies, including the United States, is different. In England, the centralization of political authority resulted in the hegemony of one institution—Parliament—but in a more polycentric setting: The political branches do not monopolize the creation of legal norms. As a result, English judges have been able to maintain some autonomy in relation to parliamentary statutes, and common law principles developed by judges still remain one of the basic elements of English law. In the United States, a written constitution combined with judicial review of legislation has ensured from the outset that the judiciary would not be subordinate to the political branches.

Therefore, in any constitutional state whose main objective is to safeguard the rights of citizens, judicial independence is primarily aimed at guaranteeing and supporting judicial impartiality in the adjudication process. As a consequence, its main point of reference must be the state and its institutions, particularly the executive, which directly or
indirectly is most often a party to such adjudication, as in criminal trials where one of the parties is usually the public prosecutor. With the introduction of judicial review of legislation, the legislature also becomes a point of reference for judicial independence. The judiciary is considered a power on the same level as the legislative and the executive: It becomes a veritable third branch of government, as it is often defined in the United States.

This picture emerges even more clearly from a comparison of the status of judges in authoritarian states with that of judges in totalitarian states. As a rule, the judiciary in authoritarian regimes plays a minor role in the political system. Political repression is usually entrusted to special politically appointed courts or dealt with directly by the police or other security forces. The ordinary judiciary is only marginally involved in the policies of the regime and usually retains a modest degree of independence (as in Spain under Franco or in Portugal under Salazar). On the other hand, totalitarian regimes invariably try to enlist the judiciary in their attempts to implement deep social and political changes. In these regimes, judicial independence is extremely low if not nonexistent, with judges appointed and dismissed at the pleasure of the regime. These judges are part of the state apparatus, and the judiciary is usually a strong hierarchical organization made up of members of the totalitarian party. Judicial elections, when present, only ratify the choice of the political leadership. Hence, the judges are politicized, and their values necessarily mirror those of the regime.

Bureaucratic and Professional Judiciaries

All democratic constitutional systems protect judicial independence, but differences emerge when considering the status that judges enjoy in practice. The most significant elements concern appointments, salary, transfers, disciplinary proceedings, and career patterns, with the last factor being the most important variable characterizing the organizational structure of the judiciary. All of them determine the position of individual judges in relation to their colleagues and those responsible for decisions affecting their professional lives. Taken as a whole, these elements can be used to assess the extent of both internal and external judicial independence. While external independence refers to the relations between the judiciary and other branches of government, internal independence focuses on guarantees aimed at protecting individual judges from undue pressures from within the judiciary: fellow judges and, above all, superiors. The role played by organizational hierarchies is crucial for understanding the internal dynamics of the judiciary, which in turn affect the actual degree of judicial autonomy.

Broadly speaking, two types of judiciary can be distinguished: (1) bureaucratic, to which civil law judiciaries tend to belong, and (2) professional, characteristic of common law judiciaries. This is obviously an “ideal–typical” distinction since actual cases are more complex. But judiciaries in democratic countries can be placed on a continuum defined at either end by these two types. The French judiciary has traditionally represented the bureaucratic model, while the English judiciary has most closely reflected the professional model.

The defining elements of a bureaucratic judiciary include the following:

1. Selection of judges is made on a technical basis through examinations at a young age, usually immediately after university, with little or no emphasis placed on candidates’ previous professional experience.
2. Training takes place primarily within the judiciary.
3. A hierarchy of ranks determines organizational roles. Advancement up the career ladder is competitive, and promotions are granted according to formal criteria combining seniority and merit. Hierarchical superiors have wide discretion in determining merit.
4. Judges are supposed to be capable of performing all organizational roles associated with their rank (e.g., to be able to adjudicate criminal, bankruptcy, family law, and fiscal cases, or to act as a public prosecutor). They are therefore recruited not for a specific position but for a wide set of roles and, in the course of their careers, will tend to change jobs often. This makes guarantees of independence more problematic because of the influence hierarchical superiors (or, in some cases, the government itself) have over these moves.
5. Judicial guarantees of independence tend to be weaker, especially because judges tend to enjoy a lower degree of internal independence.

On the other hand, the following are the defining elements of a professional judiciary:

1. Judges are appointed only after having acquired professional legal experience. In some instances, this experience is taken into account in recruitment for specific judicial positions.

2. This experience usually, but not always, involves being a legal advocate. In the United States, for example, legal academics are often appointed to the federal bench.

3. There are no formal provisions for advancement, although higher ranking judges (especially in England) often exert some influence in both the initial appointment process and the promotion of judges from the lower ranks.

4. Judges are recruited for specific positions. Promotions are not widespread, and on the whole, there are much weaker internal controls over judges by their higher ranking colleagues.

5. Stronger guarantees of both internal and external judicial independence exist.

Both civil and common law judiciaries have checks to ensure that their members pursue institutional goals, but the approaches are different. Since Anglo-American judiciaries tend to employ individuals with lengthy legal experience outside the judiciary, there is less emphasis on internal controls. In contrast, because continental judges are recruited without significant professional experience, young judges are placed at the bottom of the judicial pyramid, and their organizational socialization is constantly monitored through a career based on moving up a hierarchical ladder. The organizational setup also affects the “reference group” of judges—those individuals and groups judges take into account when reaching a decision. In bureaucratic judiciaries, the reference group lies mainly inside the judiciary, where judges tend to be professionally socialized. The hierarchical structure enables senior judges to influence the behavior of lower ranking judges since they control promotions, transfers, and discipline. In professional or common law judiciaries, a similar type of hierarchy does not exist, and reference groups tend to lie outside the judiciary. However, there is a difference between the English judiciary, which traditionally had a small professional reference group (the Bar), and the American judiciary, which has a much more diverse composition and a recruitment process that incorporates different types of professional and political influences.

Changes in the Judicial Organization

Since the mid-20th century, significant changes have characterized the judiciaries in several countries. In England, in 2006, the institution of a Judicial Appointing Commission—an independent body in charge of proposing appointments to the Lord Chancellor—has circumscribed the traditional powers of the executive. However, the most important change has been the creation of judicial councils in several civil law countries since it has considerably increased the political significance of the judiciary. Judicial councils are collegiate bodies—composed of judges and lay members—in charge of administering the status of judges. Their impact has been a more or less radical alteration of bureaucratic judiciaries by strengthening judicial independence and, at the same time, fostering new connections with the political system. In this process, the powers and composition of these bodies are critical factors. The more extensive their functions, the stronger their role will be, and judicial independence tends to be stronger when there is a higher ratio of members chosen directly by and from the judiciary.

One of the main consequences of creating judicial councils is to increase the external independence of the judiciary by decreasing the traditional power of the executive. But since no judicial council is composed solely of judges, an important role remains for the institution in charge of appointing the nonjudicial members. This is usually assigned to parliament, which allows political parties to bypass the minister of justice and influence the judiciary directly. The creation of a judicial council also has consequences for the internal independence of the judiciary. Entrusting the promotion and appointment of judges to a collegial body where normally all judicial ranks are represented
contradicts the traditional hierarchical principle, whereby only higher ranking judges are entitled to evaluate lower ranking colleagues. In this way, the lower ranks acquire a new power since they can participate in the process of choosing higher ranking judges. As a result, challenges to the very idea of a judicial career by the lower ranks have often been successful. It is not coincidental that in countries with judicial councils, the number of judicial ranks has been reduced, and the influence of senior judges’ assessments of lower ranking judges seems to be declining.

The erosion of hierarchical links is particularly relevant to the general expansion of judicial power. With the creation of judicial councils, the reference group of judges has become more varied. Traditional members of the reference group, such as legal academics and senior judges, have decreased in importance since they no longer enjoy a monopoly over evaluations for judicial promotion. Thus, the professional criteria of the judiciary have also begun to shift: Technical legal knowledge (and ideological conformity) is no longer the determinative element in promotions. Views of others outside the judicial system (e.g., political parties in parliament and also unions and interest groups) have gained in importance. Similarly, the interests of the media and the judiciary increasingly overlap, as judicial actions provide the media with news. In return, the media are able to support and publicize the actions of judges (and prosecutors). Inside the judiciary itself, judicial councils have increased the role of judicial associations since they organize the electoral participation of judges. On the other hand, since the council is also composed of political appointees, their point of view also has to be taken into account. In fact, as judicial actions gain political significance, the council may become the main institution where the judiciary’s elected representatives can meet political representatives. As the experience of Latin European countries suggests, the creation of judicial councils is capable of producing a radical change in the judiciary’s traditional setting; this in turn can diversify the judiciary’s reference group, which is becoming more horizontal and, at least in part, placed outside the judiciary. As a result, more activist conceptions of the judicial role tend to prevail.

The expansion of judicial guarantees of independence has also involved public prosecutors. This process has been stronger in those countries in which judges and prosecutors form a single professional group. In Italy, prosecutors enjoy the same guarantees as judges and, together with judges, elect the majority of the members of the judicial council. Their autonomy is extremely high: The executive cannot in any way issue instructions to them. Also, in France, where the ministry of justice has been able, at least so far, to keep most of its traditional powers, the autonomy of public prosecutors is growing and the executive has often been unable to exert all its institutional powers on public prosecution.

While these changes have affected the position of the judiciary in several states of Latin and Eastern Europe, other countries have seen little alteration of their judicial setting. In Germany, judges and prosecutors remain organized along hierarchical lines that allow the minister of justice, higher ranking judges, and senior prosecutors to influence their careers. Although the 1949 Basic Law introduced judicial review—entrusted to a politically appointed Constitutional Court—judges still regard their relatively passive role as a professional barrier against possible political interference and carefully protect their reputation as guardians of the law. The role of judicial councils and judicial associations remains limited, at least in comparison with other countries.

The Judiciary in the Political System

In the second part of the 20th century, a trend toward a general expansion of judicial power can be singled out in most democratic regimes, a development often described as the judicialization of politics. The rise of judicial power has involved both the civil and the common law worlds, although it has been stronger in some countries than in others. The reasons behind these developments are several. First of all, the antiauthoritarian backlash has supported a new constitutionalism with the institution of forms of judicial review of legislation as well as the strengthening of guarantees of judicial—and prosecutorial—independence. In this process, the supranational dimension of constitutionalism has to be taken into account: For instance, the increased activism of national judiciaries has often found support in the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.
An additional factor of judicialization can be found in the growth of welfare policies. The consequent proliferation of legislation increases judicial significance: Where a legal rule exists, sooner or later a judge will be asked to interpret and apply it. Gaps remain despite, and perhaps because of, the growing number of laws, and judges are called to fill them. Another supporting element has been changes in the legal culture. A new emphasis on citizens’ rights and entitlements and the emergence of an instrumental approach to law—understood as a tool for advancing individual or collective goals—have become common traits of contemporary societies. Today, there is virtually no area of social life immune from public regulation, and thus, no area can be excluded from judicial intervention. Thus, the demand for individual and collective rights, fueled by the development of both constitutionalism and welfare policies, has meant that individuals and groups increasingly seek out the judicial system with the aim of obtaining an authoritative decision in their favor.

However, there are significant cross-national differences in the political prominence taken by the judiciary. Bureaucratic judiciaries, when freed from hierarchical and executive influence, have seen a significant increase of their role in the political process. As for the political context, fragmentation tends to support judicialization. In this case, the lower decisional effectiveness of political structures leads to interests having an incentive in putting pressure elsewhere, for instance, on courts. On the other hand, for fragmented political institutions, it is more difficult to confront judicialization—that is, to assemble the political majorities in order to curb judicial power, for example, by overruling unwelcome judicial decisions, reducing judicial independence, or appointing accommodating judges.

Political fragmentation is obviously related to a corresponding institutional setting. Strong separation of powers, making easier the advent of divided government, is a case in point, as is true bicameralism—leading to disalignments between the two chambers—or a proportional electoral law, making a multiparty governing coalition more likely. Also federalism, by pitting the central government against the states, supports fragmentation. In turn, a fragmented setting is likely to be the by-product of a political transition in which no actor is able to impose its preferences, trust tends to be low, and the uncertainty about the future is high. In this case, judicial power offers an insurance policy for prospective losers in the electoral arena.

The judicialization of politics has given new life to the traditional debate on the democratic legitimacy of an independent judiciary. The increasing role of independent judges in the policy process has been criticized. Some critics argue that to the extent to which judges are no longer constrained by law, an irresponsible policymaker seems to emerge. To this view, a different interpretation of the judicial role has been opposed: In a constitutional state, judges are bound to follow the constitution rather than statutes. Sometimes, it has also been argued that judges have no discretion since there is always one right answer to the case they have to decide. In fact, discretion seems to be an unavoidable trait of judicial decision making. So political power results inevitably from increased judicial independence. However, the expansion of judicial power is also the by-product of specific decisions taken by democratically responsible bodies. The fact that judicial decisions can go against the will of political majorities is inherent in the institutional template of constitutionalism: It is an inevitable price to pay. However, it seems unlikely that the judiciary will remain out of step for long with the political branches. As long as courts become politically significant, politicians become interested in exerting influence on them through judicial appointments (especially in the highest courts), through jurisdictional reforms (e.g., removing politically significant cases from courts), or by influencing judicial careers—through the powers of the ministry of justice or of a politically influenced judicial council. However, although it is not certain whether long-term political influence on judges is likely to succeed, in the short run, the political role of the judiciary has become—and is likely to remain—significant.

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See also Constitutionalism; Judicial Decision Making; Judicial Independence; Judicial Review; Judicial Systems; Rule of Law
Justice constitutes a normative cornerstone of political society. Classical and contemporary philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle to John Rawls, have seen it as the main guiding principle for regulating political power. They disagree about what counts as justice, but they agree that justice counts for much in shaping, maintaining, and improving political order. The asymmetry of wide agreement on its importance and deep disagreement on its content, however, creates difficulties with the idea of justice. To restore the credibility of this idea, its complicated structure must be elucidated. This entry attempts to provide such an elucidation by exploring the competing ideas of justice, comparing the various philosophical grounds that have been advanced for the universalization of justice, and analyzing the legitimation of political decisions in society.

Is Justice an Empty Idea?

The deep and persistent disputes over what counts as justice have generated skepticism about the philosophical significance of the agreement that justice counts. Value relativism, which applies to values in general, including justice, is a part of this skepticism but not the whole of it. The distinctive skepticism that is evoked toward justice by the aforementioned asymmetry of its widely acknowledged importance and deeply disputed content is the suspicion that justice is an empty concept. Those who harbor this suspicion hold that the endless controversy about the nature of justice exists not because it is an unfathomably profound idea but because it is an empty magical formula that we can fill with whatever content we may think useful for rationalizing our claims to what we want and dismissing the competing claims made by others. Hans Kelsen, a representative positivist legal philosopher in the 20th century, is a notable example of such critics of justice.

To dispel this suspicion, attempts have been made to identify the common conceptual core of justice. The starting point is the distinction between the concept of justice and conceptions of justice. The concept of justice represents the meaning of justice, or what we mean by saying about something that “it is just.” Conceptions of justice specify the criteria by which we can judge whether and when the adjective just is applicable to something. Each conception constructs a theory to defend its own distinctive criterion (or set of criteria) against other competing conceptions, which expound different criteria (or different sets of criteria). For example, utilitarianism and individual-rights theories are two competing groups of conceptions of justice, each with its own competing varieties, such as direct and indirect utilitarianism and libertarian- and egalitarian-rights theories, respectively. The chief purpose of this distinction is to stress the point that there can be genuine conflicts between competing conceptions of justice because and only if they present different (sets of) criteria for the same concept of justice. If they were expounding different (sets of) criteria for different concepts, they could not be conflicting but only at cross-purposes with each other.

This point can be supported by the general semantic thesis that criterial conflicts about a word are possible only if the same meaning is
attributed to it as well as by the hermeneutical thesis that interpretive conflicts are possible only if the same concept is interpreted in different ways. Whether the semantic and hermeneutic theses are generally applicable or not, however, the aforementioned point is hard to deny as far as justice is concerned. For example, there is a genuine conflict between *talio*, the ancient conception of retributive justice that stipulates “an eye for an eye,” and the modern utilitarian conception of corrective justice, which approves of less (or more) harmful punishments than the harms inflicted on victims by wrongdoers if such punishments are sufficient (or necessary) to bring about the optimum deterrence effect, which is calculated taking punishment costs into consideration. But suppose that while an advocate of *lex talionis* and a utilitarian were having a debate with each other, a devout Christian moralist said to both of them, “If someone slaps you on the cheek, turn your other cheek to him.” Has the Christian joined in the debate, adding a new view on the issue in question? Certainly she has not. Rather, she has changed the subject matter. Her standpoint is at cross-purposes with those of the *talio*-retributivist and the utilitarian. This is because her criterion for the appropriate response to the other person’s wrongdoing is one not for the concept of justice but for a different concept, love. What she has propounded is a Christian conception of love, not a conception of justice that competes with the other two. By changing the subject matter to love, she has gone beyond the conceptual space of justice. There is a genuine conflict between *talio*-retributivism and utilitarianism just because they belong to the same conceptual space of justice. This shows that justice has a conceptual core that delineates the range of competing conceptions of justice and makes their rivalry possible.

It is one thing to show that there must be some conceptual content that the conflicting conceptions of justice have in common. It is quite another to be able to tell what it is. How is it possible to identify the normative content of the concept of justice that underlies the conflicting conceptions of justice as their common matrix? There are two methodological approaches to this problem, each resulting in a distinctive view on the common normative content of the concept of justice. They may be called the inductive and negative approaches.

The following two sections provide an overview and comparison of the two approaches.

**The Inductive Approach: Justice as the Demand for Regularization**

A paradigmatic form of the inductive approach can be found in the work of Chaim Perelman, a Belgian legal philosopher noted for his theory of rhetoric, who pioneered the development of philosophical awareness of the distinction between the concept and conceptions of justice in his article “De la Justice,” published in 1945.

According to this approach, the first step is to collect, as data for theory building, a variety of specific formulas of justice that were set forth by different political ideologies. Among them are “To each according to his merits,” “To each according to his works,” “To each according to his needs,” “To each according to his rank,” “To each according to his entitlements,” and so on. The second step is to abstract (or “induce”) the common formal structure from them. All the specific justice formulas share the form: To (or from) each according to x. Different conceptions of justice expressed in different justice formulas substitute different values for the variable x, which specify what type of attributes or situations of agents are relevant to the distribution of benefits and assignment of burdens and responsibilities to them. The constant part of the common form, especially “according to,” symbolizes the common concept of justice, which Perelman calls the formal idea of justice. It requires us to treat all agents not in an ad hoc way but in such a rule-governed way that the same treatment should be given to all agents if their attributes or situations belong to the same relevant type. The demand for regularization (treatment according to type features) is the core of the common concept of justice that the inductive approach identifies with the formal idea of justice, presented as its classic formulation, “Treat like cases alike,” called the Justinian principle because of its roots in the Code (*Corpus Juris Civilis*) issued by the Roman emperor Justinian.

The formal idea of justice in the above sense is not Perelman’s invention but a logical reconstruction of a widely shared understanding of the Justinian principle as a formulation of the common concept of justice. It seems to be free from the controversy that pervades competing conceptions of
justice, but this is because it does not give us any substantive guide for judging what norms are relevant to questions of justice. Consequently, positivist philosophers such as Hans Kelsen and Alf Ross criticized it as an empty formula that hides its emptiness. This criticism is not wholly fair. The formal idea of justice implies an important constraint on politics: Political power must be exercised in a rule-governed way that assures its subjects of its predictability. This constraint can hardly be rejected as trivial because without it, people would be unable to seek security by adjusting their conduct on the basis of prudential calculation of the interference of political power in their lives. The importance of the rule-governed exercise of power is fully appreciated and emphasized by Lon Fuller in his conception of the rule of law as the internal morality of law, which he derived from his concept of law as the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.

Although there is some basis for regarding the formal idea of justice as empty, it nevertheless has some element of truth. The formal idea of justice as a demand for regularization is too thin to capture the normative aspirations underlying the concept of justice. It does not provide a guide for distinguishing between the permissible and nonpermissible kinds of discrimination to which justice cannot be indifferent.

The Negative Approach: Justice as the Demand for Universalization

The negative approach looks to our intuition about what is unjust for a key to answering the question “What is justice?” In his Nicomachean Ethics, for example, Aristotle recommended that if we want to understand what justice is, we should begin with the analysis of unjust people. This approach has had a persistent hold over many later thinkers who do not necessarily share Aristotle’s answer to the question of what is justice. At least three reasons underlie the appeal of Aristotle’s recommendation.

First, our sense of justice is more strongly aroused and more sharply focused when we react against the actual injustices that we experience than when we think abstractly about what justice is. We express our deep-felt sense of (in)justice when we exclaim, “That’s not fair!” Even a relativist philosopher who cynically asserts that there is no right answer to the question of what justice is would vehemently object to an injustice done to him (e.g., another author’s plagiarism of his work), thereby betraying the presence of a sense of justice. Our sense of justice is basically revealed and exercised as our sense of injustice. Second, injustices invite our indignation not only when they are done to us or our family and friends but also when we see them inflicted on perfect strangers. Although the discourse on justice can be manipulated to rationalize our self-interest, our sense of injustice seems to be propelled more by our sense of fairness to others than by self-interested motivation. Third, and most important in the present context, there are examples of injustices such as killing and torturing innocent people that are commonly condemned as unjust by those who hold competing conceptions of justice. Our judgments seem to be more convergent when we react against injustices than when we try to define what is just.

If the negative approach is to be taken to the task of identifying the common concept of justice, the question to be asked is this: What is the common feature of the conduct that competing conceptions of justice concur in rejecting as unjust? The natural answer would be that it is egoism. No conception of justice can defend egoism as such. To be sure, there may be a conception of justice based on Bernard Mandeville’s doctrine of “private vices” as “public virtues,” which approves of egoism on the ground that it brings about the consequence that serves public interest. Likewise, utilitarians take the self-interested motives of individuals into account when they judge which institutional design would bring about the maximum utility. But even these conceptions of justice exclude egoism from their evaluative grounds and rely on some conception of public interest. Actually, utilitarianism does not hesitate to require severe self-sacrifice from individuals if such a measure is necessary to maximize the aggregate utility of the whole society.

It must be noted with haste here, however, that egoism in the sense relevant to this context is not simply the pursuit of self-interest; justice may well be said to constitute fair rules of the game among agents seeking their own interests. The egoism that justice excludes is rather the lack of disinterested impartial treatment of the other agents—that is, my self-centered discrimination against the other person, which is ultimately reduced to my claim that
my interests outweigh the other's interests because my interests are mine while the other person's interests are not. This means that the core of the concept of justice revealed by our shared sense of injustice is the prohibition of nonuniversalizable discrimination against others, which ultimately depends only on the difference in individual identity between me and the other person. In other words, our sense of injustice is rooted in the notion that if one is treated differently from someone else, there must be a morally relevant reason for the difference.

The Justinian principle that like cases should be treated alike, presented above as a classic formulation of justice as the demand for regularization, can also be interpreted as the demand for universalization. But it is necessary to emphasize here that demands for regularization and universalization are not equivalent. The demand for universalization is normatively stronger than the demand for regularization because it rejects as unjust those rules of type-differentiated treatment that are not justifiable in universalizable terms.

For example, the practices that involve free riding, vested interests, and collective egoism are rejected as unjust even if they can be set up to be following some rules for type differentiation. This is because they privilege some particular agent and discriminate against the others in a nonuniversalizable way. Free riding is unjust in that a free rider refuses to share with others the cost of maintaining a public resource benefiting all of them, simply because it is he, not the others, who is thereby advantaged. Vested interests are seen as unjust because they, too, privilege a particular agent and discriminate against others simply on the basis of one agent’s personal stake in a given case. Collective egoism gives precedence to the collective interest over individual interests and thus seeks pseudopublic interests, but it is unjust because collective egoists seek their own special group interests at the expense of the wider society, even when there is no difference between their situations and those of the outsiders except for the fact that the advantaged group is theirs while the disadvantaged ones are not.

The universalization criterion allows us to judge social discrimination based on general classifications such as race and gender to be unjust even when they are just according to the regularization criterion. This is so because what universalization requires is not only that the discriminative practices should follow some general patterns but also that they should be justified on universalizable grounds. Claims that are unjust according to the universalizable criterion are often based on incorrect empirical assumptions. For example, a manager may discriminate against female employees in promotions, believing that women are too easily swayed by emotion to be effective managers. Justifications for discrimination may also be based on circular assumptions, for example, about the kind of behavior to be preferred.

Since the demand for universalization offers a fundamental normative test for eliminating the privileges and discriminations that any conception of justice is bound to reject as unjust, it is a more appropriate representation of the common concept of justice than the demand for regularization, which is too formal to provide such a test. This point can be supported by the fact that many philosophers and thinkers have shown their appreciation of the basic importance of the demand for universalization, though they have given different theoretical expressions and scopes to this demand. There are important conceptions of justice that do not focus on universalization; for example, utilitarians suggest that justice ultimately consists in maximizing aggregate welfare, while libertarians focus on the importance of limiting state authority and maximizing the individual's freedom from coercion and governmental intervention. However, universalization seems to have a central role in our common understanding of what is fair and unfair, just and unjust. The remainder of this entry examines some notable examples of the analysis of the concept of justice in terms of universalization and then explores the implication of these theories for public morality and political legitimacy.

**Philosophical Expressions of the Demand for Universalization**

**The General Will in Rousseau**

In the history of political thought, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s doctrine of the general will, advocated in his treatise on the social contract, is a precursor of the development of the concept of justice as the demand for universalization. He distinguishes the general will not only from the particular will but also from the will of all. This is intelligible only if attention is focused on his view that the general will is general with reference to its object. By this,
he means that the general will can pursue not particular interests but only common interests. Even the will of all is a particular will if it is a unanimous decision that all parties accept not as a result of deliberation about the common interest of the whole society but simply out of consideration for their own particular interests. But how can we distinguish the pursuit of the common interest from that of particular interests? Rousseau gave a revealing answer to this question by identifying a test to make this distinction. According to him, our will can be said to be the general will in the pursuit of the common interest only if it meets the following requirement: “Each necessarily subjects himself to the conditions that he imposes on the others.” He holds that this requirement brings about what he calls “an admirable accord of justice and interest that gives a character of equity to common deliberations” (The Social Contract, Book 2, chap. 4). This means that we can pursue our interests in accordance with justice only if we do not exempt ourselves from the burdens and costs that we require the others to bear in the same situations that we are placed in. Here, Rousseau showed an insight into the conceptual core of justice as the prohibition of nonuniversalizable discrimination against others.

The Categorical Imperative in Kant

Immanuel Kant restated Rousseau’s test of justice for the general will with some of his well-known multiple formulations of the categorical imperative, which he set as the second-order requirement that our first-order practical judgments must meet if they are to be moral judgments. This can be clearly seen in his first formulation of the categorical imperative: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”

What Kant meant by this is the following: You cannot exempt yourself from the universal laws that are applicable to everyone. Likewise, you cannot exempt yourself from the same duties that your maxims impose on others if they are to have the status of moral judgments that transcend prudential and technical norms (hypothetical imperatives) that merely show the means to advance your self-interest. Here, Kant gave an emphatic and solemn (though somewhat abstruse) expression to the demand for universalization that Rousseau presented in plain and casual language in his doctrine of the general will.

It may be said, however, that Kant differs from Rousseau not only stylistically but also substantially. While Rousseau presented the demand for universalization as the demand of justice, Kant made it the fundamental criterion for moral action more generally, arguing that only when people act on the basis of laws that they can rationally will as universal laws are their actions morally right. If Kant’s concept of morality is a broader and more generic one than the concept of justice as a distinctive value of political morality, this difference is certainly nonnegligible. But in fact, Kant elaborates the categorical imperative in a way that enables it to be a foundation of political morality, through his concept of the kingdom of ends. Kant holds that human beings belong to what he calls a kingdom of ends—that is, an idealized association of autonomous and rational agents who treat each other not merely as the means to their specific ends but as “the ends themselves” under the common law, which makes their exercise of rational autonomy compatible. So it is not impossible to interpret the Kantian concept of morality to be coextensive with justice as the underlying regulative principle for the public morality of political society.

It is useful here to distinguish contexts where justice is central from those in which it is out of place to demand universalization in nonpolitical, purely personal relationships such as love. In such relationships, we are not only allowed but are even required to make nonuniversalizable discriminations. To say, “I love you because you happen to meet better than anyone else the right kind of qualification that anyone must meet to deserve my love” is tantamount to saying, “I would love another person if he met that qualification better than you.” This attitude may be “fair,” but it would surely destroy love. What a genuine lover is supposed to say is “I love you because you are you, not the others.” Love requires existential commitment to the loved individual, which involves nonuniversalizable discrimination against the others. The demand for universalization is appropriate only for the aspect of our life that justice is expected to govern, namely, our political relationships, in which we exercise power (governmental power and politically authorized private power,
such as rights, sheer violence, etc.) over others and are required to justify our exercise of power to the others who are affected by it. Rousseau is right in applying the demand for universalization to the political order that justice inherent in the general will is to govern.

**The Veil of Ignorance in Rawls**

In his theory of justice as fairness, Rawls (2001, pp. 42–43) attempts to define a just distribution of benefits and burdens within a state by identifying the principles that would be chosen by a rational, self-interested person who has no knowledge of her personal situation. He argues that a such a person in this hypothetical decision-making situation would choose a society in which social and economic inequalities satisfy two conditions: First, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and, second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (the difference principle).

To understand the role of the universalization demand in Rawls’s theory correctly, care must be taken not to be misled by his terminology. In his theory, the demand for universalization as distinguished from regularization is implanted in the “veil of ignorance,” which Rawls stipulated as the most crucial one of the conditions constitutive of “the original position,” which is his contractarian model of the counterfactual setting for choosing the principles of justice to be applied to the basic structure of political society.

In the original position, all parties to the contractarian choice are indifferent to each other’s interests and seek to advance their own interests. But their choice is constrained by the condition of the veil of ignorance, under which they are deprived of all information about themselves that would enable them to know their special situations. They do not know whether they are talented or disabled, whether they are rich or poor, to what race or ethnicity they belong, what their religious backgrounds and attitudes to religions are, what gender and what sexual orientation they have, and so on. This constraint has two implications. First, all parties can seek to optimize only their share of primary goods that are absolutely necessary for pursuing whatever conception of the good life they have. They cannot seek the special goods that they would have wanted if they had known the special facts about themselves that the veil of ignorance hides from them. Second, since they do not know what circumstances they will find themselves in once the veil of ignorance is lifted, they cannot help choosing the principles of justice that they could accept irrespective of whatever lot might fall on them—that is, the principles that all can accept as fair irrespective of their different payoffs.

The veil of ignorance is a device for inducing self-interested individuals to choose a principle (or a set of principles) of justice that treats others as fairly as themselves. Although Rawls characterized his theory as an attempt to apply Kantian constructivism to political morality, his use of the veil of ignorance reflects a strong influence of Rousseau, who, as noted earlier, tried to bring about “an admirable accord of justice and interest” by imposing on the citizenry as the sovereign political ruler the requirement of the general will: “Each necessarily subjects himself to the conditions that he imposes on the others.” The veil of ignorance can generate a similar accord between justice and the self-interested choice of the parties in the original position by virtue of the demand for universalization that it represents just as Rousseau’s test for the general will does.

The aim of the veil of ignorance is to disable every party in the original position from choosing a principle in consideration of the fact that the chosen principle is in her favor because of her special situation. To achieve this aim, it is not necessary to deprive the parties of special information as such—namely, the special facts about the individual members of the political society to which the chosen principle is to be applied. All that is necessary is to deprive every party of the knowledge of the identity of the individuals in question—namely, the knowledge of which individual she is. Separated from the information about the individual identity, special information does not spoil the aforementioned aim of the veil of ignorance. Moreover, it may be the case that full special information about the distinctive urgent needs and particular vulnerabilities of the individual members of a political society is needed to elaborate the adequate-priority rule for the rights assigned to them by the principles of justice applied to that society. Whether the latter point can hold true or not, it can be said that the normative essence
of the veil of ignorance can be revealed most correctly if it is reformulated as the demand for universalization, which prohibits us from favoring ourselves and discriminating against others on the basis of differences between us and the others in terms of the individual identity.

Further Demands of Justice: Reversibility and Public Reasons

The normative force of the requirement that the concept of justice be rooted in universalization can be more fully appreciated if light is thrown on its deeper implication: the demand for reversibility. Prohibition of nonuniversalizable discrimination implies that if my claim against another agent is to be just, I must recognize that the agent could justly make the same claim against me if he were I and if I were he. Otherwise I would discriminate against him because he is not I, that is, because he and I are different simply in individual identity. The claims about justice must be such that they would be acceptable even if the claimer and the claim addressee were reversed. This is the demand for reversibility. It applies not only to the claim itself but also to the reasons for the claim that the claimer advances to the claim addressee. The claims about justice must be justifiable for reasons that would be acceptable even if the roles of claimer and claim addressee were reversed. The aforementioned typical examples of injustice (free riding, vested interests, and collective egoism) are unjust because those who enjoy advantages in these examples all fail to pass the test of reversibility in some way or other.

The demand for reversibility is not a novel idea at all. It finds its classical expression in the Christian Golden Rule: “Do to others as you would be done by.” The same idea is expressed by the Confucian maxim “Do not do to others what you would not like to be done to yourself.” But the reversibility demand requires further refinement to forestall its distortion. Here, we can use it to examine a reductio ad absurdum argument that may be made against it. The argument goes as follows. Suppose, for example, that you are a masochist. The reversibility demand would require you to abuse others because that is what you would like to be done to yourself. This conclusion is absurd. Therefore, the reversibility demand must be rejected.

The fundamental problem with this argument is that it misinterprets the reversibility demand as the requirement that we should reverse only our circumstantial positions while keeping our perspectives unreversed. In the above example, you are supposed to reverse positions with others while carrying your masochist perspective with you into their positions. But the counterfactual conditional “if you were they” involved in the reversibility demand presupposes that they are not you. And the fact that they are not you implies that their perspectives are not necessarily the same as yours. To replace their distinct perspectives with your own is to give a privileged moral status to your perspective simply because it is yours. It runs counter to the prohibition of nonuniversalizable discrimination that underlies the demand for reversibility. In the moral thought-experiment of reversibility, therefore, you have to test not only the positional reversibility but also the perspectival reversibility of your claims against others. You have to ask whether your claim against others would be acceptable even if your perspective as well as your position were reversed with theirs. If you as a masochist conducted this moral experiment on yourself, you would not accept as just the abuse of other, nonmasochist persons. The reductio ad absurdum argument refutes not the reversibility demand itself but the misinterpretation of it as a mere positional reversibility demand.

The reversibility demand has a further important implication: the demand for public reasons. As discussed above, the reversibility test applies not only to our claims against others but also to the reasons that we give to justify our claims to them. Since the test requires perspectival reversibility, we have to justify our claims to our claim addressees with perspectively reversible reasons—reasons that we could accept even if our perspectives were reversed with theirs. Such reasons can be called public reasons because they are reasons that would be acceptable not only from our own perspective but also from the different perspectives of others, thereby being distinguishable from private reasons, which are unacceptable or even unintelligible to those who do not share our idiosyncratic perspective. It may be objected that the perspectival reversibility test cannot screen public reasons because it requires that we should abandon our private reasons only to yield to the private
reasons of other agents to whom we are required to justify our claims. This objection fails to hold because the other agents are also required to conduct the test of perspectival reversibility on their counterclaims. The public reasons required by the perspectival reversibility test, to put it more precisely, are the reasons for our claims against others that would be acceptable even from their perspectives provided they seek and subject themselves to the reasons that would be acceptable even if their perspectives were reversed with ours.

A philosophically thornier objection against the demand for perspectival reversibility and public reasons is this. It is impossible for you to know the perspectives of others. When you imagine that you are adopting their perspectives, you are simply projecting your perspectives onto theirs. This objection can be a sobering warning against our tendency to make hasty, prejudiced, and self-deceptive presumptions about what others think and how they feel, but it is a half-truth whose negative implication should not be exaggerated. It is true that “other minds” are not transparent to me and that my perceptions about the thoughts and feelings of others are mine, not theirs. But it does not follow that it makes no moral difference for me to make an honest endeavor toward understanding and paying due attention to their perspectives. Certainly, the self-regarding perspective, from which I care only about myself, and the other-regarding perspective, from which I care about the perspectives of others as well as mine, are both my perspectives, but there is a big difference between these two perspectives in terms of their moral quality. Even if I cannot go beyond my perspective, I can bring about moral transformation of my perspective from within through the process of self-critical reflection to which I subject myself in the dialogue with others who challenge me about the justice of my claims.

This point was intimated by Rousseau in his distinction between the particular and the general will. If this distinction is to be intelligible, it must be interpreted to be concerned more with the moral status of the object of the will (to what purpose?) than with the subject of the will (whose will?) as was seen above. The particular and the general will are, in this interpretation, not the wills of ontologically differentiated agents (e.g., the individual and the collective agent, the parts and the whole of society) but the two morally differentiated perspectives immanent and latent in each individual’s will. What Rousseau called “common deliberation” is expected to bring about the moral transformation of the perspective of each individual from the particular to the general will.

The problem of the cognitive opacity of others in morality was more consciously and explicitly addressed and solved by Adam Smith in his classic work The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Although the principle of sympathy constitutes a foundation for his moral theory, from the beginning of this work, Smith conceded with a surprising candidness that since “we have no immediate experience of what other men feel,” the sympathy we expect from others can be nothing more than the product of our imagination about “what we ourselves should feel in the like situation” (Pt. 1, sec. 1, chap. 1). Paradoxically enough, this concession did not prevent him from developing a moral theory in which the crucial test of the justice of our conduct is whether our conduct would be able to gain the sympathy of spectators. The paradox is dissolved when it is seen that he idealized the spectator as impartial and internalized him in our perspectives. While Smith regarded the sympathy of others as the product of our imagination, he distinguished this imagination of ours from our raw feelings and instinctive desires. Our imagination detaches us from such feelings and desires and generates the normative perspective of impartiality within us by subjecting us to critical self-examination. This is why he referred to the impartial spectator as “the imagined man within.” Although Smith was keenly aware that we cannot transcend ourselves to have an immediate experience of the perspectives of others, he realized that by exercising our imagination to care about their perspective, we can transform our perspective from within so that it will grow from the sheer self-centered one in the pre-imaginative stage into something morally higher that is open to the sense of impartiality and fairness to other persons.

Justice and Legitimacy

Our moral imagination can transform our motivation so as to seek public reasons acceptable to others whose perspectives are different from ours. But it does not follow that we can reach a consensus
about which public reason should prevail. Even if our moral imagination is fostered through our common deliberation, there is no guarantee that our judgments about public reasons will converge. Actually, part of the condition of human life is the existence of persistent disagreements among those who sincerely seek the public reasons required by justice. This is not surprising. Judgments about public reasons are guided by different competing conceptions of justice, and the universalizability demand, which entails the demand for public reasons, imposes only negative constraints on admissible conceptions of justice without uniquely specifying which is the best conception. Furthermore, the more sincere our commitment to public reasons is, the more difficult it is for us to make nonprincipled strategic compromises.

Rousseau did not have to worry very much about the disagreement that remains even after all individuals have adopted the perspective of the general will. This is because the polity he had in mind was a small-scale, face-to-face homogeneous community where there is a solid consensus among the citizens, even though his favorite Greek polis, Lacedaemon (Sparta), may not be appropriate as a historical model of such a polity given the fact that it was not immune from internal strife. Whether Rousseau’s ideal polity is sustainable or not, however, the divergence of public reasons raises a serious problem in contemporary large-scale pluralist societies. Contemporary advocates of deliberative democracy tend to make light of this problem because they are generally optimistic about the possibility of reaching a rational consensus through common deliberation. There is no ground for this optimism, however. There is every reason to think that free, rational, and mutually critical discussions will bring about a proliferation of divergent views rather than their convergence. Rawls located the common basis of public reason in the idea of an “overlapping consensus” on constitutional essentials and basic matters of justice among competing reasonable, “comprehensive doctrines” after he converted to political liberalism as distinguished from philosophical (or comprehensive) liberalism, but his attempt failed to attain his aim because he simply rejected the dissenting comprehensive doctrines as unreasonable by resorting to his own very controversial philosophical standpoint about what counts as reasonable.

The nature of this problem is well captured by Jeremy Waldron in his explication of what he calls the circumstances of politics, which have the following two features. First, the circumstances of politics are contrasted to what Rawls calls the subjective circumstances of justice, where our conceptions of the good life are so divergent that they must meet the condition of what he calls the primacy of justice over the good, which is the requirement that conceptions of justice, if they are to be the common principle of the basic structure of our political society, should be justifiable independently of any specific conception of the good life and should constrain the latter. In the circumstances of politics, there is a deeper conflict: Not only our conceptions of the good life but also our conceptions of justice are divided so that the primacy of justice over the good is not enough to sift out the common political principle that can govern the basic structure of our society.

Second, whereas it is possible to give a “let’s agree to disagree” solution to the problem of the conflict in the conceptions of the good life by endowing individuals with the right to choose their conception of the good life autonomously, it is impossible to apply this solution to the conflict in the circumstances of politics. Since the conflicting conceptions of justice are competing to get control of the political order of the same society, conflict resolution in this case can be brought about only by a collective decision of the political society (hereafter referred to as political decision for short) that binds not only the supporters of its content but also the dissenters who object to it. As an example, although we can let each individual choose freely her religion according to her own conception of the good life, we cannot let each individual choose the tax system according to her own conception of distributive justice. We have to make a political decision about whether our tax system should be shaped along the utilitarian aggregate-welfare-maximization line, the libertarian primacy-of-property line, the Rawlsian difference-principle line, or the lines of some other conceptions of distributive justice, not despite but because of the absence of agreement on the matter.

The circumstances of politics as presented above raise the problem of legitimacy: How is it possible for us to respect as legitimately binding on us the political decision that we hold to be
wrong according to our conceptions of justice? The problem of legitimacy so stated may appear to imply that the idea of justice is totally irrelevant to it. But this is not the case. Although we cannot resort to any specific conception of justice as a criterion of legitimacy, the common concept of justice as the universalization demand can offer a guide for solving the problem of legitimacy. Because legitimacy is concerned with the fact that we have to respect whichever conception of justice we may consider the best, it can be illuminated by the concept of justice as the common normative constraint on competing conceptions of justice. The following two points are especially important in this connection.

First, the way democracy can give legitimacy to a political decision can be reconceived in light of the concept of justice. In his answer to the question of legitimacy, Waldron rejected constitutional constraints on democracy, such as judicial review, in favor of simple majoritarian democracy. This position is difficult to sustain. Democratic decisions can have legitimacy only when the losers (especially marginal minorities who cannot hope to be winners) in the political strife of the democratic process can respect the resultant decisions as the public decisions of their own political society instead of regarding them as mere products of the majority’s private will, to which the minority acquiesces simply out of prudential considerations. This would be impossible unless losers are given some institutional guarantee against the danger of the winning majority’s refusal to subject themselves to the test of reversibility, which requires them to examine sincerely whether the decisions that they succeeded in imposing on the losers could be justifiable had they themselves been the losers. Such an institutional guarantee can and should be embodied in constitutional arrangements for facilitating power change so as to secure actual reversibility of the positions of political winners and losers, compensating for the handicap of marginal minorities in their political resources for effective democratic participation, preventing the government from denying equal rights to politically powerless victims of social discrimination, and so on. This is the real significance of the distinction between the role and the holder of the role and the normative background of the political institutions.

Second, a further ground for legitimacy can be explained by reconstructing the fair-play argument for political obligation in the light of the concept of justice. By claiming that your conception of justice should be incorporated in the political decision binding on others who have competing conceptions of justice, you also claim that they should bear the moral cost of compromising their own conceptions of justice to sustain the political system of collective decision making. Therefore, you should bear the same moral cost when their conceptions, not yours, succeed in being incorporated in the political decision. You should acknowledge the legitimacy of the political decision that you hold wrong in the light of your conception of justice, thereby accepting the political obligation to defer to it. Otherwise, you would be a moral free rider who violates the demand for reversibility inherent in the concept of justice.

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See also Constitutionalism; Contract Theory; Deliberative Policy Making; Democracy, Theories of; Discrimination; Equality; Equality, Political; Ethics; Judicial Review; Kant, Immanuel; Legitimacy; Liberalism; Libertarianism; Rights; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Rule of Law; Social Choice Theory; Utilitarianism

Further Readings


Immanuel Kant (born in Eastern Prussia, now Kaliningrad) is one of the leading philosophers of the Enlightenment and has had a lasting impact on modern philosophy. His major works include *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*Critique of Pure Reason*), first published in 1781, an attack on traditional metaphysics and epistemology; *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (*Critique of Practical Reason*), 1788, concerned with the philosophical foundations of ethics; and *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (*Critique of Judgment*), 1790, dealing with aesthetics and teleology. This entry discusses his “political philosophy,” even though none of his works has appeared under this title. His major work on political ethics and the international order is *Zum Ewigen Frieden* (*Perpetual Peace*), 1795.

Kant breaks with the Aristotelian tradition of political philosophy (*Politiká*), including his “political economy” (“Aristotle,” I 8–13) and deals with these subjects only under the perspective of Roman law and natural law, which he forms into a law of reason. Whereas for Aristotle politics means the realization of human beings as political beings (“zoon politikón”) and is oriented toward the nature (“phýsis”) of men, for Kant politics is always related to a system of law endowed with the power of physical force. Politicians and political acts are judged according to norms in the legal system. Politics is judged positively when it conforms as an executive power (“ausübende Rechtslehre,” VIII 370) to the standards of law.

The goal of political acts in “status civilis” is the realization of the ultimate political good, stable peace (VI 355, VIII 386). Peace only can be attained in a cosmopolitan order. With this idea, which is still very relevant today, Kant follows, on the one hand, stoicism, a Hellenistic school of philosophy, and, on the other, reflections on the French Revolution, leading to his conclusion that only republics with separation of powers are peaceful (VIII 341–386).

Political acts can be judged according to the criterion of “publicness” (VIII 381–386). The duty that a politician performs can, but need not, be of an ethical nature; it is founded on the special legal duty to lead an honest life (*boneste vive*) that all human beings have (VI 236). There is no external sanction, as with other legal duties, nor is there necessarily an internal motivation to act according to this duty. Even those who become politicians out of sheer vanity can (and should) fulfill these duties. Similarly, peace is a result of the ethical virtues of citizens. For this reason, the promotion of an appropriate infrastructure and education on which men are dependent to become ethical human beings is a part of politics. Therefore, politics must ensure that citizens receive the education they need to become ethical human beings and must create the infrastructure needed to support it.

The actions of politicians are judged negatively if they are not oriented toward the law but are based on interests of power and an alleged knowledge of human nature (VIII 374). Implicitly, Kant thus turns against Aristotle’s concept of politics,
which presupposes knowledge of human nature. Kant, like John Locke before him, denies the possibility of knowing human nature empirically. In his critical philosophy, neither an empirical nor a “rational” knowledge of human nature derived from “pure” reason can serve as a foundation of norms for political action and ethics, and the rule of law cannot be justified anthropologically. Only when both are perceived from pure reason can this knowledge be applied to human beings.

Kant’s image of politicians in a pejorative sense has been influenced by Niccolò Machiavelli’s _Principe_ (1513):

Our politicians act, as far as they can, like [the Jewish prophets] and are as skilful in their prophecies. We must, they say, take human beings as they are, and not as some ignorant pedants or well-meaning phantasts dream what they should be. _As they are_ then means: to what we have made them through unjust force and treacherous acts of the government, namely stubborn and rebellious. Then, of course, when the tight reins are loosened, sad things happen which fulfil the prophecies of these “wise statesmen.” (VII 80)

A politician who is not guided by law but by his alleged knowledge of human nature is incapable of realizing in certain phenomena, for example, the French Revolution, the signs of reason and a better future and to act accordingly. In _Perpetual Peace_, Kant calls the Machiavellist a “political moralist” and a person conscious of the law a “moral politician” (VIII 377).

So far, the definition of politics and law seems to be possible without any problem. This becomes more difficult when two specificities of the Kantian theory of law and philosophy of history are taken into account: In his theory of law (first part of _Die Metaphysik der Sitten_ [The Metaphysics of Morals], 1797), the state does not implement the law of reason in its pure form, as demonstrated in the two sections on private law, but the state practices a version modified for its purposes. In the third section (VI 296ff.), it is shown that the perceptions of “law in itself” have to be restricted to be at all realized by a state. This is demonstrated by the example of some court decisions that deviate from the “law in itself” so that the court and, therefore, the state can come to quick and solid decisions. This applies, for example, to the respect of property rights when products have been purchased in the market according to legal norms (VI 300–303), even if they are stolen items or (not mentioned by Kant) products from a slave plantation. The state also can apply “tortura spiritualis,” confessions under oath, even if this contradicts the “law in itself” (VI 303–305). Strictly speaking, politics here commits an injustice, because of the constraints of the state that lead to a restriction of the “law in itself” in its implementation. In the interpretation of Kantian legal and political philosophy, this antinomy has not sufficiently been taken into account so far.

In the philosophy of history, another peculiarity can be noted. Whereas political economy in the sense in which Aristotle used it takes the same nature, the _phyxis_, of men as the guiding principle (Politiká I), for Kant a negative anthropology is the real source of political and economic prosperity. Ethics and politics do not coincide, as already diagnosed by Bernard de Mandeville in his _The Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Public Benefits_. There, the result was that if politicians really take moral laws seriously, they would regress economically and would have to retreat from modernity into the woods!

Kant follows Mandeville and describes both in his philosophy of history and in his anthropology the moving forces of the common good as the unfettered instincts of greed, vanity, and power (VIII 21, VII 271). This triad is already a firm constellation for Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan I, II: “Riches, Honour, Command”), and not by chance, because these are the moral vices that are opposed to the first three cardinal virtues in Plato’s _Politeia_. The “modestia” of peasants is opposed by their greed, the “fortitudo” of soldiers by their ambition for honor, and the “prudentia” of kings by their lust for power. Whereas in antiquity and the Middle Ages the naturally good _polis_ or city was founded on the virtues (including the fourth one, justice) and the evil city (“città cattiva”) was subjected to the opposite vices, in modern times this judgment is turned around: The vices are now the necessary forces that maintain and foster the state economically and politically. This corresponds also to the view of Giambattista Vico, who considers it inevitable that a well-functioning society is based
on “ferocia, avarizia, ambizione,” the “tre vizi” that have accompanied mankind since its eviction from paradise (*La scienza nuova*, second edition, II 7). Kant’s diagnosis of historical and political reality is the same. What about this dilemma in Kant’s view of current politics? Must a politician for moral reasons introduce and maintain laws that will ruin the state, or does he or she have to tolerate vices or even promote them because of the “raison d’état”? This is, of course, a very topical question even in the present day. Kant himself has not addressed this dilemma. His solution may be as follows: A moral politician in a liberal society with an efficient economy in the sense of Adam Smith (*The Wealth of Nations*) would not interfere with the internal motives of actors and ban vices as long as the external frame of law is maintained. The rules of the law of reason restrict greedy, vain, and power-seeking actors but enable them to secure their profits. That private profits will lead to welfare for all lies not only for Adam Smith but also for Kant in the nature of things (“the invisible hand”). “As an old merchant said: create good roads, mint good money, exchange currencies quickly, etc. but apart from that ‘let us do!’” (VII 19–20). This “laissez-faire, laissez-aller” policy is the solution for Kantian economic policy. Politicians should not intervene in self-regulating trade. Johann Gottlieb Fichte as well as Karl Marx would have stood against this liberal economic policy; Kant closed his eyes to the devastating consequences of a liberated economy in Europe, internal exploitation, and exploitation of the economically weaker countries by the stronger ones in the colonial territories. Kant believed that these problems would resolve themselves in the long run.

Kant does not comment on the day-to-day politics of his time, neither in his publications nor in his notes or letters. The central event of his time is the French Revolution after 1789, which marked the turn from despotism to a republic (not the “Declaration of Independence” in Virginia in 1776) and which was seen by other authors as a parallel event to Kant’s own “Copernican Revolution” of breaking with ancient and medieval metaphysics (III 12, 14). For Kant, it is evident that men legally can only pursue reforms, not a forceful revolution, but the French Revolution had demonstrated the feasibility of a republic—this event “will not be forgotten” (VII 88).

Author’s note: References to Kant’s works refer to the volumes and pagination of the Akademie edition, Berlin, Germany, 1990ff.

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See also Hobbes, Thomas; Justice; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Marx, Karl; Peace

Further Readings

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Labor Movement

The concept of labor movement refers to the development of workers’ organizations driven by collective mobilization. It consequently implies some degree of coexistence between two distinct processes subject to close analysis in political science: (1) interest representation and (2) social mobilization. Descriptions of labor movements that emphasize the former process usually focus on trade unions, these being associations that represent the labor force as well as organizations that play wider economic and political roles. By contrast, descriptions that emphasize the latter process concentrate on the dynamics of social movements and therefore center on the construction of a social identity, the forms assumed by collective mobilization, and its eventual institutionalization.

This entry first outlines the main “classical” theories concerning the labor movement. It then shows how the labor movement has evolved amid constant tension between collective mobilization and institutional forms of labor representation. Next, it discusses how trade unions work to represent workers’ interests, as well as acting as partners to employers and the state in collective bargaining and tripartite concertation. A brief conclusion considers the role the labor movement may play in the near future.

In Search of a Theory of the Labor Movement

Labor movements are phenomena both complex and, in a sense, contradictory. They first arose as groups organized to improve conditions in capitalist industry. But they have often pursued the much more ambitious goal of changing society as a whole. Everywhere, they have bred organizations that gradually came to accept the rules applied by the economic and political systems in which they had to operate but still pursued long-term goals that frequently conflicted with those rules. Although these organizations manage industrial and social conflict, the integration of large masses of workers into the economic, social, and political systems of industrial democracies would have been very different in nature—and perhaps impossible—without them.

While contemporary social sciences have conducted detailed analyses of labor movements, more general discussions of them are still largely couched in conceptual terms drawn from theories developed several decades ago that may be termed classic. The explanatory capacity of these theories is dubious and erratic, but their continuing interest for social scientists stems from rather different factors. Each of them has been put forward as a general theory but has centered on only one of the different alternatives faced by labor movements across countries and historical periods. Yet it is precisely for this reason that these theories have become important as self-interpretations by different components of the international labor movement, thereby influencing the latter’s perception of itself and its goals. Hence, these theories are simultaneously analytical instruments and ideologies.

From this point of view, Marxism—which developed the most powerful theoretical apparatus—also can be seen as the dominant ideology shaping
socialist positions within labor movements. Its contribution to the analysis of such movements, however, is still relevant in many respects. First, by framing labor movements in the context of a structurally divided class society, it helps remedy the shortcomings of merely psychological or behavioral explanations of their origins and goals. Second, by explaining industrial conflict in light of a theory of social change, Marxism suggests that analysis should extend beyond the short-term objectives of such conflict and consider the aspirations latent within it to achieve a different social order, which may cyclically orient collective action. Finally, by viewing unionism as one—albeit the most important—of the many different forms assumed historically by labor organization, it allows the latter to be seen in relation to other types of action available to workers rather than as the sole natural expression of their needs and culture.

While the Marxist socialist tradition—in its social-democratic and communist versions alike—has by far outweighed any others in the history of labor movements, a significant role has nevertheless been also played in several countries by the “revolutionary syndicalist” tradition. This tradition’s departure from Marxist theories has been evident ever since the early work of its major proponent, Georges Sorel, who envisaged workers’ autonomy embodied in trade unions as a “global society” with its own economy, organizational forms, and culture, which contrasted with the decaying bourgeois society. Sorel’s theory was based on a view of the social structure as sharply divided into two classes. It was the purpose of the general strike—the key form of action in the revolutionary syndicalist tradition—to expose this dichotomy. Sorel’s theory was also based on a simplistic view of political structures and institutions. Nevertheless, like Marxism, in late-19th- and early-20th-century Europe, it expressed the ambition of a rising working class to become the hegemonic class and therefore to go beyond its activity, confined to the labor market, to address more general societal problems.

From this point of view, theories of the labor movement developed in the Anglo-American countries stand in sharp contrast with those described above. Their differences notwithstanding, they have never proposed far-reaching projects for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society. Their objectives have been more modest, in that they have concerned themselves with the analysis of the actual role performed by the labor movement in the existing society rather than with scenarios for social change. The major theoreticians of British trade unionism, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, developed what can be regarded as a functionalist approach. Trade unions were merely means to achieve specific goals. And they were so in a two-fold sense: (1) because their function was defined within the strict limits of workers’ defense against the workings of the market and (2) because such activity had to be compatible with the systemic imperatives of firm productivity and economic development. A more general implication was that the labor movement’s legitimacy should be assessed not only in terms of its utility to workers but also in terms of its contribution to creating a more democratic though efficient society.

Selig Perlman’s view—which can be considered the theoretical basis for North American “business unionism”—differed sharply from that of the Webbs. Perlman maintained that the mentality of workers and militants was dominated by their awareness of the scarcity of jobs. Far from being based on class consciousness, therefore, actual labor movements were based on the consciousness of the competitive nature of the job market. While intellectuals in trade unions sought to give them anticapitalist objectives, the main purpose of workers’ self-organization was to claim the collective ownership of available jobs so that they could be shared among the members of the union. Workers were uninterested in the endeavor to reform the capitalist system and in mass political action. Nevertheless, the long history of the labor movement demonstrates that Perlman’s theory, too, unduly generalized values dominant in specific periods and countries, besides assuming the existence of a universal “workers’ psychology,” which, as shown by a large body of research, is instead strictly determined by the specific culture and historical context.

None of the classic theories, therefore, addressed—let alone answered—the crucial question for a theory of the labor movement: Under what conditions are the different components of the working class and their organizations induced to behave as fragmented interest groups or, conversely, as unified collective actors pursuing economic and social goals? Despite
decades of comparative work in the social sciences, this question is still largely unanswered. A large amount of evidence has been collected to account for developments in individual countries, but a convincing theory with general explanatory power is still far from being developed.

**Collective Mobilization and Its Fate**

In several countries, the origin of labor movements was twofold in nature: (1) as a form of solidarity and defense of workers and (2) as a revolt against the capitalist mode of production and society. The former tendency led to the creation of various types of friendly societies, cooperatives, and, later, trade unions. The outcomes of the latter ranged from Luddism to workers’ councils, to different forms of political mobilization and organization for the achievement of citizenship rights. Both these tendencies sprang essentially from the exclusion of a young working class from the management of the economy and society in countries undergoing rapid industrialization and development. Both tendencies embodied contradictory aims: workers’ rejection of the existing society and their endeavor to build an autonomous culture, on the one hand, and their aspirations to full industrial and political citizenship, on the other.

In the early stages of the Industrial Revolution, the more educated and resourceful skilled workers also acted as a politicized vanguard. They saw socialism as an opportunity to regain control over the means of production, which had been expropriated from craftsmen. However, technological innovations and the rationalization of production soon rendered obsolete the skills that gave those workers their market power. At the same time, because they increased the rigidity of production and interdependency among jobs, they endowed unskilled workers with unprecedented disruptive power. Moreover, just as technology and rationalization broke the monopolistic position of skilled workers and enabled the mass of workers to organize, so too did the peasant origin of the latter rupture the traditional political subcultures with their strong identities and revolutionary projects.

Generalizing and simplifying somewhat, it can be argued that the more a labor movement grows and expands its role in society, the more its ideological tension comes under severe strain. Its main activity becomes collective bargaining, rather than political mobilization or expressive action. Besides enlarging their rank and file, this helps trade unions develop their organizational strength. Problems to do with bureaucratization arise, and more generally, organizational concerns tend to prevail over those typical of a social movement. Partly for this reason and partly because the political recognition of labor movements (first in the West and then in other, developing areas of the world) gives workers full political and social citizenship, the revolutionary impetus has dwindled. The economic action of labor movements is increasingly restricted to negotiation within a framework of shared rules, while political action takes the form of pressure politics or support for prolabor reformist parties.

Of course, what has just been outlined is only a very general pattern that applies to a greater or lesser extent to labor movements in different countries. Today, the main differences among their behaviors are apparent in the diverse structures assumed by collective bargaining or in the relative importance of this form of action compared with political action. To some extent, all labor movements use both instruments. But some of them (e.g., in the United States) by tradition place overwhelming emphasis on the former. Through negotiation with companies, they seek to achieve the joint regulation of labor. Bargaining focuses principally on wages and working conditions, but it may extend to many other aspects of workers’ lives—pensions, health insurance, and so on. By contrast, many European and Latin American labor movements have given greater priority to political action. Trade unions have long worked in close alliance with “brother” (socialist or labor) parties to support reformist programs, and they have a direct interest in labor and social legislation. In the post–World War II period, moreover, most of them also engaged, for shorter or longer periods, in concertation with governments to design economic and social policies.

Hence, the evolution of labor movements shows that a revolutionary and globalistic approach may prevail, especially when workers uprooted from their communities and not yet integrated in industrial society are rapidly introduced into modern production. When, conversely, workers are rather well integrated into society, labor movements are
less able to provide their members with identity incentives. They are more concerned to seek particularistic advantages than to strive after the ideal of an alternative society. This observation, however, should not be mistaken for an evolutionary theory. Even less should it be taken as the obituary for the labor movement that diverse theorists in different periods have been wont to write. Industrial societies may cyclically reproduce the phenomena described. They continue to generate new groups in the labor market and in society at large that lack adequate representation of their interests and therefore occupy marginal positions in the industrial relations and political systems. Moreover, as new countries set off along the road of rapid economic development, their labor movements are likely to exhibit similar patterns.

### Trade Unions as Representative Organizations

In several countries, trade unions became powerful organizations that entirely assimilated the requirements of capitalist systems and their workings but still appealed to a collective identity that often embodied long-term goals in conflict with those systems. Today, trade unions are widely regarded by companies as rent-seeking bodies. Nevertheless, they often perform key productive functions by providing workforce cooperation, participating in income policies, and more generally contributing to the regulation of work.

Research in the social sciences has identified three main dimensions of unionism. The first dimension consists in the role of trade unions as associations representing collective interests. The second comprises the problems and opportunities facing trade unions as organizations. The third dimension concerns their role as economic and political actors.

A trade union is an association of individual members whose functional interests it seeks to represent collectively. The drawback of the collective representation of functional interests is that rank-and-file demands are inevitably altered by the association that expresses them. In fact, any trade union association must first collect and interpret workforce demands, giving voice to what are often vaguely expressed needs or grievances. Second, the requirements of consistency, organizational stability, and recognition prevent even highly representative associations from expressing demands that contrast with their long-term strategy. Third, if a trade union is to gain concrete benefits for its members, it must make such demands negotiable, and for this purpose it must transform expressive behavior into instrumental claims. Finally, to represent interests collectively, it must aggregate individual demands that are normally dispersed and potentially contradictory. It is these factors that explain why, regardless of the quality of a trade union’s internal democracy and the responsiveness of its leadership, it inevitably filters, and even profoundly changes, the demands put forward by the employees that it seeks to represent. Furthermore, for a trade union to be considered a reliable partner by the companies or public institutions with which it reaches agreements, it must control and to some extent police its members to ensure that they comply with the rules agreed on.

This may give rise to “crises of representation,” which unions must be able to control if they are to survive and maintain their role. The rate of unionization, or “union density”—that is, the percentage of union members in the workforce—is usually considered to be the best indicator of a trade union’s ability to represent employees’ interests, and indeed of its strength. However, a large body of research has shown that the variation in union density across countries is closely conditioned by several other factors, among them the role of trade unions as providers of services. Moreover, union density is strongly affected by the varying “coverage” of collective bargaining: In several countries, this is established by law, so that collective agreements apply to all employees irrespective of whether they are members of the unions signatory to those agreements.

Yet trade unions are not simply associations formed if and when employees feel a need for collective representation of their interests. After an initial formative period, they have everywhere grown into stable organizations, which pursue as much the goal of maintaining and enlarging their power vis-à-vis other organizations as the original one of representing their members’ interests. This logic of action induces trade unions to try to optimize their resources whenever they must find solutions for the dilemmas they encounter.
The first of these dilemmas for a trade union is how to define its sphere of representation or, in other words, the boundaries of the interest group whose demands it intends to advance. Historically, the main options have been to act as an “associational” or as a “class” union. A union of the former kind chooses to restrict its sphere of representation to the members that it actually recruits. The latter kind of union claims to speak on behalf of all workers, whether or not they are its members. The second dilemma for a trade union is how to define its sphere of action: Should it give priority to action in the market, addressing demands to companies and negotiating with them, or should it give priority to action in the state, addressing public institutions as the main targets of its claims and its main partners? However a trade union may define whom it wants to represent and with whom it wants to interact, it still has several further choices to make. One such choice is among the instruments for action, which can range from conflict, to collective bargaining, to various forms of joint management, to tripartite concertation. Another concerns the level of action, which may be centralized at the industry or cross-industry level or decentralized to the company or territorial level.

In addition to acting as associations that represent collective interests and large-scale organizations, trade unions have grown into important actors in several political economies. Where they have moved beyond an exclusively distributive function, they have come to perform a wider role in economic development. On the one hand, in fact, they may be decisive factors in labor market rigidity and an excessively generous social expenditure that generates huge public deficits. On the other, they may perform positive functions for companies by organizing the workforce’s cooperation with the new modes of production and contributing to its skill formation. They can also help governments improve economic performance by coordinating wage dynamics in accordance with an income policy and by contributing to labor market and welfare reforms.

Open Questions and Scenarios

Today, the issue that concerns all countries is the new meaning and scope of solidarity among workers or, to put it bluntly, the capacity of the labor movement itself to construct social and political solidarity. If a labor movement decides to do no more than represent only traditional workers, it will continue to enjoy the advantages of participating in the economic and political systems. But it will do so at the cost of seeing its status reduced to that of just one interest group among others, and it will probably have to deal with the rise of new representative organizations in competition with it. It may alternatively decide to offer interest representation to newly formed social groups as well, although these often mobilize around nonnegotiable, or at least radical, demands. If it does so, it will probably extend its political influence and assume the features of a social movement but at the cost of losing some or most of the benefits stemming from its economic and political integration.

Whether we regard trade unions as primarily associations for interest representation, as organizations, or as economic and political actors, the importance that they acquired in most advanced economies in the latter part of the 20th century is increasingly challenged by various developments. The most important of these is perhaps the continuing fragmentation of employees’ interests and demands due to processes such as the reorganization of production, the search for flexibility, and the growth of the service sector and of nonmanual and atypical work. Trade unions may find it increasingly difficult to build their demands around key professional figures such as the assembly-line worker in the Fordist factory. Not only has it become more difficult to aggregate demands and identify “general class interests,” but as individual workers identify increasingly less with the “working class” as a whole—and with the projects for economic and political reform historically pursued by the labor movement—they also tend to identify more with the company or production unit to which they belong. In other words, the traditional endeavor by trade union organizations to impose uniform protection standards on employers is now regarded by many employees as an oversimplification of their needs and capabilities.

In conclusion, the labor movement in the new millennium seems to be faced with various difficulties but also with new opportunities. The former indubitably include the reduction of trade unions’ scope for action within the economic system due
to industrial restructuring and the greater precariousness of labor markets. Among the more general difficulties is the disappearance of a certain type of solidarity based on homogeneous working and living conditions, ideology, and the ability to standardize demands. On the other hand, the new opportunities open to labor movements seemingly depend above all on their capacity to interpret and mediate the need of management for closer workforce involvement in companies by qualifying the cooperation/involvement requested and subordinating it to the fulfillment of workers’ general interests and objectives. From this point of view, it may become of great importance for labor movements to develop the ability to induce companies and institutions to relinquish market strategies based exclusively on costs and to adopt, instead, a competitiveness model based on product quality and a highly skilled workforce—that is, a model centered on the full development of human resources.

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See also Neocorporatism; Social Movements; Socialism; Socialist Parties

Further Readings


growth of behavioral studies, which put the transformation of political leadership at the core of the empirical analysis of politics. The current phase is dominated by attention being newly paid to the problem of the complexity of political leadership in a different geographical area.

From Weber to Lasswell: Classic Reflections on the Nature of Political Leadership

All the theoretical assessments of political leadership refer to the well-known tripartite typology developed by Max Weber, which is very often labeled as an ideal-typical classification of political leadership—traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic rule. Actually, this celebrated piece of work is an analysis of legitimated rule—not of leadership. Indeed, Weber’s influence is due to his intuition about the growing presence within modern leadership of peculiar elements, which determine the leader’s capability to “change history.” According to Weber, charismatic authority is that particular feature of leadership which explains the development of single figures and new styles of command, justifying exceptional changes in political life. Legal-rational rule, on the other hand, is the ideal type of continuity, constraining the behaviors of the innovators. Moving from this argument, the study of leadership within the democratic environment has been expanded all along the course of the 20th century, focusing on the causal links between democratization, crises, transitions, and types of legitimate rule.

If Weber’s work is a crucial step in the analysis of the link between leaders and power, other classic social scientists of the 20th century have renovated the study of the link between political leadership and political personality. Probably the first modern attempt to define the qualities pertaining to political leadership can be found in the work of Robert Michels, who critiques and illuminates the characters of leaders from the Platonic tradition to the 19th century—initially focusing on the art of rhetoric. However, it was Harold Lasswell who provided an important basis for the empirical study of leadership behaviors. According to Lasswell, whose theories had been initially influenced by classic elite theorists and by Freud’s psychoanalysis, personality is a crucial variable shaped by a system of interactions between the values of the social and the political system at the macrolevel and the cultural and social/familial environment at the individual level. Although Lasswell was never concerned with the notion of leadership, his work had much influence on future reflections on such a notion, and his call for a more attentive study of biographies and social connections of political leaders was decisive in the development of behavioralism.

Empirical Studies in Political Leadership

The impetus provided by Lasswell for an analytical study of political leadership has resulted in a significant growth of knowledge. Especially during the 1960s and the 1970s, the refinement of the comparative method and awareness that a nonparochial analysis of politics was necessary paved the way for accurate explorations of the manifold empirical dimensions of political leadership. The use of behavioral theories and support from research in various disciplines of the social sciences, including political psychology, sociology, and history, have enabled us to fathom the hidden dispositions of our rulers. The works of James MacGregor Burns (1978), grounded in the notion of transformational leadership, for instance, were fundamental in understanding the usefulness of intensive biographical studies aimed at creating taxonomies of leaders based on their different capabilities of interaction. In the same period, Glenn Paige (1977) put the notion of political leadership at the center of a complex multidisciplinary framework that explains the variance in the behavior of leaders by using a number of macro variables, including personality, role, organization, values, and capability of interaction.

A large number of studies were then undertaken in different disciplinary environments, focusing on different definitions of political leadership. In particular, the analytical dimensions of leader’s ambition and leader’s style gained immediate relevance for the new generation of political scientists. These dimensions of variation were at first studied above all in the United States. However, the seminal works of scholars like Arthur Schlesinger Jr., James Barber, and Lewis Edinger became a fundamental starting point for a discussion that soon spread to Europe, leading
to new important studies in a few years. More or less at the same time, institutional analysis considered the relevance of leadership positions in assessing the different nature and performance of political systems. One should mention here that many important theories were developed between the 1970s and the 1980s on the nature of chief executives and the institutional environments in which they act.

Later, works on political leadership were focusing on different aspects of the phenomenon, also including the relationships between leaders and public opinion. Jean Blondel provides a general assessment of the role and the impact of political leaders in the contemporary world. In terms of empirical analysis, this work suggests a new typology of political leaders based on two dimensions: the extent of their concern with maintenance or change in the society and the scope of the political message they want to introduce in the political system. Working within such a conceptual grid, it is possible to assess the role of a wide set of leaders, from the anonymous managers (specialized reformers aiming at maintenance, such as ministers who deal with day-to-day administration) to the famous ideologues of the 20th century—for instance Mao or Hitler—who carried out important societal changes with a strong political message.

**Leader Democracy? Transforming the Link Between Representation and Leaders**

Decades of empirical studies have provided a significant understanding of the dynamics of contemporary political leadership. However, we still lack a comprehensive and agreed-on definition of what leadership is, and scholars are still divided about the correlation between (strong) leadership and (good) democracy. Moreover, the rapid transformation of democratic politics raises a number of new questions about the meaning of political leadership. The focus seems to have shifted away from the interpretation of classic puzzles, like the duration of leaders and measurement of their charisma, to the extent of a leader’s role in policy making, communication, and electoral performance. Political theorists, in particular, have stressed the trade-off between the decline (transformation) of representative democracy and the emergence of a strong leadership influence in specific policy sectors and processes. Bernard Manin (1997) argues that the partial independence of representatives has been reinforced—in what he calls audience democracy—by an electoral link built on images rather than programs. This would increase the capability of single leaders to conduct policy processes and shape political discourse.

The changing link between representatives and the represented is also seen as an element of a broader change, connected to an evolutionary phenomenon that involves political processes and the functions of democracy. According to Andras Köröseny, the meaning of political representation tends to be more and more differentiated from the two traditional images of deliberation and mirroring since what is at the core of political representation is “acting and supplying new policies, creating a new quality”—that is to say, leadership. The selection of leaders who would be really free to make changes is therefore the very function of democratic rule. Leaders are expected to represent the people in a qualitative rather than in a mechanical way. In empirical terms, a lot of implications can be derived from such a statement: They refer, respectively, to the spheres of democratic institutions and political discourse.

Concerning the effects of leadership in terms of institutional change, many recent studies have converged to support the argument that core executives or chief executives have been incrementally more motivated to turn specific policies in new directions. The thesis of presidentialization of politics is grounded in the development of the role of guidance and coordination among a number of policymakers who are much more evidently subordinated to the leader. In a similar way, the processes of vertical governance shift, which would determine phenomena such as globalization or the Europeanization of domestic politics, envisage the emergence of more room for maneuver for national leaders, who are therefore not only free to shape policy processes but also to have an impact on public opinion.

Finally, an open question that lies at the center of a vivid discussion concerns the influence of current political leaders on political discourse and electoral outcomes. Conventional wisdom suggests that such a role is growing due to the effects of less well-identified phenomena such as “leaderization” and/or personalization of politics. However, not
all the implications of this conventional view are true. According to Anthony King (2002), democratic polities are not necessarily personality oriented; partisan preferences and party politics still count—more than the personal features of a party’s own leaders—although a great deal of variation can be seen if one observes the electoral outcomes of a number of political leaders in advanced democracies. Similarly, a high degree of variation has been noted by Jean Blondel and Jean-Louis Thiebault (2009), who conducted research on 11 recent political leaders. According to them, the relevance of personality in political leadership has increased during the last 50 years, balancing the decline in importance of relevant variables such as social stratification, class, and religious affiliation. Personalization of leadership is therefore a real phenomenon, although its impact seems to be strongly influenced by historical and country-specific variables. Therefore, “personalized leadership” seems to differ from one case to another.

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See also Cabinets; Elites; Elitism; Executive; Parliaments; Parties

Further Readings

LEGALIZATION OF POLICY

One of the significant elements of the transformation of governance and public policy across the world is its increasingly juridical character. This process of legalization refers to the transfer of public policy making to judicial institutions, the increasingly juridical and rule-governed processes of policy making, the central role of administrative law in the governance of public policy, and the growing importance of independent regulatory bodies in areas such as finance and health. The legalization of public policy is driven by an increasing fragmentation of interests and institutions within the state; a specific strategy of core executives and dominant social and political coalitions is to protect their interests, control subordinate authorities, and move contentious issues into nonpolitical arenas, which is often a strategy promoted by international organizations and agents. Legalization brings with it an array of new actors—courts, public interests lawyers, and regulatory institutions—using a wide array of new instruments of state authority such as contracts and audits.

What is intriguing is that this legalization has gone in tandem with programs of market reform across the developed and developing world. As noted by Kanishka Jayasuriya, market reforms have led to new forms of regulatory governance. It is clear that the credit crisis of 2008 will further accelerate the development of regulatory governance. One of the significant features of this regulatory governance is its increasingly juridical character, in that it is rule governed—relies on judicial, quasi-judicial, or independent agencies, for its implementation—and uses a range of regulatory techniques, which include the use of standard-establishing procedures for the operation of policy and the use of contractualism and audit.

Mechanisms of Legalization
Five main mechanisms of legalization of public policy can be identified:

1. Legalization has been driven by the increasing fragmentation of institutions as well as actors providing incentives for political elites to legalize various areas of public policy. It does this, in part, because by making public policy rule governed, it places the core executive at a distance from the competing interests of subordinate institutions and actors in areas as diverse as communications and agriculture. Even in authoritarian systems,
Legalization has become a desired option: For example, the Chinese Communist Party now faces pressures from competing clients on issues such as environmental and economic regulation. In these circumstances, legalization becomes an attractive option because it moves the adjudication of contentious issues to a seemingly neutral arena.

2. Legalization, especially through the judicialization of politics and policy making, provides the basis on which the threatened élites and vested interests can protect their assets from encroachment by assertive political forces within the democratic political process. For example, the Thai Constitution of 2007, which further accelerated judicial policy making, reflected the desire of sections of the middle-class nongovernmental organizations, some professional groups, and the Thai monarchy to protect their interests from populist forces with majority electoral support.

3. Legalization facilitates a process of meta-governance that allows the core executive to control the structural process of governance rather than the actual conduct of policy. Hence, for example, the rules, actors, and issues of network governance—an important tool of public policy—are controlled by higher level public or even private agencies. As another example of meta-governance, take the case of the Indonesian Constitutional Court, which has been active in asserting control over various aspects of local political processes, such as electoral laws.

4. Legalization has been driven by the fact that symbolic and cultural political disputes cannot easily be resolved by the cut and thrust of electoral politics, which are amenable to distributive politics. For example, the protection and recognition of multiculturalism in the constitutionally enshrined Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has been an important influence in both policy formulation and implementation.

5. Legalization has been driven by international forces, which increasingly work not through treaty of hard law but through soft forms of internal governmental regulation. Hence, for example, some bilateral trade agreements establish investor mechanisms that legalize what otherwise would be in the domestic arena of governance. Similarly, the advent of global administrative law—that is, the rules and regulations of global governance located within national policy-making institutions—has served to legalize areas of domestic economic and social governance.

Actors in the Legalization of Policy
Judicial organizations have taken on a key role in the legalization of public policy. These include constitutional or appellate courts that increasingly set the parameters of public policy, which in turn include regional courts such as the European Court of Justice but also courts such as the Supreme Court of India. All these have become assertive through the category of public interest litigation (PIL). PIL allows courts to dilute the requirements of locus standi and allow social activists, lawyers, and even letters of complaint as the basis for the investigation and resolution of policy and political disputes over environmental and other issues.

New institutions have been set up to oversee the legalization of public policy. For example, the regulation of sport has become increasingly juridical through the complex dispute settlement processes in the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS). This body adjudicates disputes over issues such as performance-enhancing drugs or the observance of criteria for team selections. In addition to international policies, legalization of policy has also occurred in many areas at the national level. For instance, in 1995, with the agreement of all Australian governments—federal, state, and territories—the National Competition Policy in Australia has articulated competitive principles to be applied to all legislation. These new rules were to be enforced by a new independent agency called the National Competition Council. In the case of the competition policy, legalization is designed to ensure economic order and competitiveness. In effect, this amounts to the subordination of regulatory rule making to economic imperatives, and what matters are not the specific rules as such but the justification of policy decisions framed in terms of economic criteria.

Legalization of public policy and the other actions of courts require the existence, mobilization, and support of a wide range of lawyers, activists, and other state actors. In China, the functioning of the administrative law regime requires the participation
Legalization of Policy

of lawyers and other state officials to give the administrative court system some legitimacy. Legalization of public policy requires the embedding of judicial institutions within a complex set of relationships between those actors and the legal and nongovernmental organizations.

There has been a shift toward autonomous dependent state agencies that are independent of the political executive. This is best illustrated by the increased independence of central banks from political institutions. For example, the Bank of Korea (BOK) Act effectively entrenches the autonomy of the BOK from the Ministry of Finance. Although mechanisms of consultation between the ministry and the BOK have been established, the executive is unable to impose a particular course of monetary policy on the monetary board, thereby diminishing the capacity of central economic agencies to direct the kind of industry policies followed, which has been a marked feature of the developmental state.

Instruments

Rules Versus Discretionary Policy

Increased independence for state agencies has been accompanied by a rule-based rather than a discretionary policy-making process—often in a juridical form. Economic governance has become increasingly focused on the implementation of rules (often with a legal basis) that govern economic policy. These rules are legalized to the extent that they stipulate more specifically the principles or standards to be applied, making the observance of these standards or rules mandatory, and delegate their enforcement to an independent agency or dispute resolution mechanism.

Even in what once was the paradigm case of discretionary policy making in East Asia, a more assertive legalism has emerged in public policy. The panoply of administrative guidance and executive discretionary power of the developmental state has given way to the flowering of a growing and assertive legalism and constitutionalism in economic and political decision making. One such important regulatory institution is the Financial Supervisory Commission, which operates autonomously and has been given considerable power to regulate and monitor the Korean financial system.

Proceduralism

Legalization is often directed not at specifically influencing the behavior or conduct of individuals or policy but rather at attempting to provide the framework or principles through which policy making is undertaken. In this respect, governance consists of a procedural regulation for setting the broad procedures and mandates for policy making. Through proceduralism, autonomous sites of governance come to be constituted not by direct application of state law, regulation, or authority but through more indirect means that enhance or generate the capacities of these sites of governance for self-regulation.

Consequently, these processes specify procedures to be followed by individuals or corporate bodies complying with regulatory rules. For example, a corporate regulator, such as the Australian Competition Council, will institute compliance processes within the corporate entities rather than directly intervene to enforce rules. The objective of the agency is to create a system of metagovernance to monitor the extent to which regulated entities have put in place a process of regulatory compliance.

Contractualism and Audit

A key instrument of legalization is through a contract-like relationship between public agents, the deliverers of policy (i.e., those who implement policies), and clients. The agents operating these frameworks—be they individuals or local/national government, civil society actors, or even transnational agencies—are required to meet certain standards of performance and conduct as a condition for the receipt of a grant or a benefit. What is more, the performances of these standards are monitored, and there are specified mechanisms of enforcement. For instance, employment and welfare programs in the UK provide an excellent illustration of contractualism. They exemplify governing through contracts either directly with individual welfare recipients or with private providers of public services. In fact, this enrollment of private individuals or agencies in a pervasive system of regulatory governance is one of the distinguishing elements of contractual governance of public policy.

One of the consequences of this contractualist governance is the proliferation of audits, such as quality assurance audits in public education and
health. Many of these audits and auditing agencies have statutory powers. As private agencies or public–private partnerships can take on enhanced governance functions, they are subject to increasingly stringent audit and inspections mechanisms. In other words, the firm or the university itself becomes the site of self-regulation. Far from being in retreat, this contractual governance reaches deeper into civil society than was the case during the peak of the postwar welfare state.

**Conclusion**

The distinguishing feature of the emerging forms of regulatory governance is that that challenges our conventional understanding of public governance and accountability. This new governance turns away from the traditional command-and-control system of regulation by public administration agencies in favor of independent agencies and judicial authorities using new forms of regulatory techniques that are increasingly juridical in character. Political analysts are now obliged to pay greater attention to the ways in which politics are played out in these various regulatory arenas—be they in monetary policy or corporate governance. This highlights, above all, the need for a more rigorous analysis of the new kinds of actors, institutions, and arenas that have been unleashed by the legalization of public policy.

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**See also** Accountability; Central Banks; Compliance; Discretion; Judiciary; Policy Instruments

**Further Readings**


**LEGITIMACY**

The legitimacy of any system of power, including that of its individual power holders, lies in the degree to which it is acknowledged as rightful, both by those involved with and subject to it and by third parties whose support and recognition it may depend on. Although the definition of legitimacy as rightful power or authority is a widely agreed-on one, much else about the subject is strongly contested:

How significant is legitimacy to the maintenance and effectiveness of power relations?

Who are the key audiences for legitimacy claims?

What exactly is it that makes power rightful?

How is legitimacy created and maintained?

What are the key features differentiating the legitimacy of different political systems, and what are their respective strengths and vulnerabilities?

This entry treats these main points of disagreement in turn.

A useful starting point is to distinguish between a philosophical and a social-scientific approach to the study of legitimacy. Throughout human history,
those occupying positions of power, and especially political power, have sought to ground their authority in a principle of legitimacy, which shows why their access to, and exercise of, power is rightful and why those subject to it have a corresponding duty to obey. These claims have been elaborated by apologists in narrative form and by iconographers in pictorial and artistic representations. However, where the possession or exercise of power has been challenged or contested, critical reflection and argument about what makes power rightful has taken place. It has usually been the task of philosophers to elaborate such reflection into a considered theory or theories and to test legitimacy claims against accepted standards of normative validity and discursive argument. From at least the time of the ancient Greeks onward, the study of legitimacy has been central to the practice of political philosophy, through its analysis of normative principles of the right and the good.

The study of legitimacy as a subject for political science, by contrast, is comparatively recent, dating from the early 20th century. In contrast to political philosophy, its focus is more empirical than normative, more on processes and outcomes than on abstract principles. Its concern is less with the reasoned validity of legitimacy claims than with the degree of their recognition by the relevant social agents and with the consequences that follow from that recognition for the stability of a system of power or rule and for the manner in which it is organized. It was the German sociologist Max Weber who was first responsible for elaborating a social-scientific account of legitimacy and for exploring its significance for power relations in his work *Economy and Society*. Most of the key debates in political science since then have stemmed from Weber’s work, and this entry will return to it at a number of points.

**The Significance of Legitimacy for the Exercise of Power**

According to Weber, wherever power holders are acknowledged as legitimate or rightful, they can count on those subordinate to them obeying their commands and following their instructions without the widespread use of coercion or the constant fear of disobedience or subversion. This is because people will recognize a duty to obey and not merely an interest or advantage in doing so. As Weber argued, motives of personal advantage, solidarity, custom, or whatever are not a sufficiently reliable basis for power relations. In addition, there is normally a further element—the belief in legitimacy. Every system of power, therefore, attempts to establish and cultivate the belief in its legitimacy and to demonstrate a moral authority going beyond any purely coercive capacity.

While most later authors agree on the significance of legitimacy for the reliability and durability of a system of power, they are divided on the question of who constitutes the key audience for legitimacy claims. If we distinguish between the key power holders, their enforcement and administrative agents, and the wider population that is subordinate to them, then, one school of thought holds that a belief in legitimacy is necessary only for the first two of these. It is the powerful who most need to believe in their own rightfulness if they are to have the self-confidence to rule effectively, and their administrative staff must believe likewise if they are to be effective and reliable enforcers of their superiors’ policies. In this view, it matters little what wider strata of the subordinate believe since it is primarily a recognition of their own impotence in the face of the powerful—a sense of “dull compulsion,” not any sense of duty—that typically keeps them in line. By the same token, it is only when those in power, or their administrative staff, come to lose confidence in their own legitimacy that the power structure comes to be critically weakened. And it is divisions within a ruling elite, not the loss of legitimacy among a wider public, that holds the key to the decline and fall of regimes.

Now, it is certainly true, and Weber acknowledged as much, that both historically and in the contemporary world, we can point to examples of power structures where the obedience of those subject to them has been maintained simply through coercion and a sense of their own impotence. However, to limit the significance of legitimacy merely to those who exercise power and administer it can be challenged on two grounds. First, where power over a population depends on coercion alone, it requires a costly apparatus of enforcement and surveillance to maintain it, extending to the agents of enforcement themselves, who may, as in the late Roman Empire, simply sell
themselves to the highest bidder. Moreover, the system of power now has only one line of defense—that of force—and it can therefore collapse very rapidly if the coercion is insufficient or if people believe that those in power have lost the capacity or the will to use it. Once Premier Mikhail Gorbachev made clear that the former USSR would no longer intervene militarily in Eastern Europe, the writing was on the wall for the Communist regimes there since their loss of internal legitimacy meant that they were only kept in place by the threat of Soviet invasion.

So first, then, a wider acknowledgment of legitimacy enhances the stability of a system of power, as well as its economy of operation, through the recognition of the subordinates that they have a corresponding duty to obey and cooperate with it and that they do not merely have a contingent interest in doing so. People expect power holders to meet certain moral or normative conditions in their access to and exercise of power, and the loss of moral authority consequent on their failure to meet these can lead to widespread disobedience or resistance, reaching into the coercive agencies themselves. It would be a mistake therefore to see a regime crisis as originating in divisions within the ruling apparatus alone and not in the attitudes and behavior of a wider population. The collapse of the Shah of Iran’s regime in 1979 is a particularly spectacular example of the erosion of an army’s loyalty in the face of repeated mass protests, resulting from the regime’s loss of moral authority in the eyes of the population at large.

A second reason why acknowledgment of a power regime’s legitimacy by those subordinate to it is important is that those power structures are much more able to achieve their purposes when these depend on the willing cooperation of those subject to them. Once again, the exceptions or limiting cases prove the rule. For example, there have been purely coercive labor regimes, such as slave societies or early industrial capitalism, where the subordinates were regarded as objects (e.g., chattels, hands), readily dispensable for new recruits, and the quality of their cooperation did not greatly matter. In these cases, the elaborate justifications constructed to legitimate these arrangements were not intended for those subjected to them but for the wealthy and powerful themselves and for the other elite audiences whose cooperation they might need.

However, the more a power structure is dependent on a settled subordinate population for the achievement of its purposes, and especially where the quality of the performance matters, the more essential it is that the relationship is constructed according to an acknowledgment of reciprocal rights and duties, such as that only a principle of legitimacy can provide. This entails that the power relation is defined as a normative and not just a de facto one and that this definition sets limits to the scope of the powerful as well as to the obligations of the subordinate. Where the legitimacy of the powerful is widely acknowledged, to that extent will the powerful be able to rely on the cooperation of the subordinate necessary to achieve their purposes. This issue is particularly pertinent to the modern state, which requires those subject to its authority not only to obey its laws but also to pay their taxes, cooperate with its policies, and even to fight in its defense.

Some simple examples will serve to demonstrate the point. No one likes paying taxes. But it makes an enormous difference to a system of tax collection if people acknowledge the right of the state to tax them and accept the system as broadly fair. Then, the vast majority will pay up without resistance. Naturally, the administrative arrangements will have to be efficient, and there will have to be compulsion at the margin to deal with backsliders and to convince the rest that there are no free riders. But a state where people recognize no duty to pay taxes will have to engage in enormously expensive systems of enforcement, which will substantially reduce the overall take and may even compromise the capacity to raise taxes altogether. It follows that the effectiveness and the legitimacy of a system of power are not unconnected features, as many writers have supposed. This is because the capacity of political authorities is also dependent on their moral authority or standing among those whose cooperation is required for them to achieve their purposes.

Another example we could take is that of policing. Where policing is based on consent, that is, where the police are recognized as broadly working for the benefit of the population as a whole, treating people fairly and with restraint, and where there is confidence in the system of complaint and redress in the event of abuse, then, people will cooperate with the police in the prevention, reporting, and
investigation of crime. To that extent, the police will be enabled to carry out their function effectively. Or take the mundane example of a classroom teacher. If pupils do not share a belief in the purpose or value of education, on which the justification of the teacher’s authority is based, he or she will have to devote correspondingly greater energies to maintaining order than to teaching. To that extent, the purposes for which power is held will not be achieved, and this may lead in turn to a further erosion of legitimacy.

Enhanced order, stability, and effectiveness—these are the typical strengths of a legitimate system of power as a result of the obligations on subordinates that follow from their recognition of its legitimacy. As already mentioned, there may indeed be examples of power systems where the audience for legitimation claims is confined to the powerful themselves and their immediate associates, and legitimacy is needed only for their internal self-belief and cohesion in the face of a population compelled to brute obedience. Yet these are only limiting cases. More typically, legitimacy matters for both the rulers and the ruled, for power holders and those subordinate to them, and their relationship is constructed as a normative and not merely a de facto one, with legitimating norms establishing mutual ties of obligation and performance between them.

A final potential audience for legitimacy claims should be mentioned here—that is, third parties who stand outside a given system of power but on whose recognition and cooperation it may depend. It is difficult to generalize about these since contexts vary so widely. Yet it can happen that a refusal by an outside body to recognize a given power as legitimate can have significant repercussions for it internally, especially when withdrawal of necessary cooperation or some other sanction follows. For example, the international sanctions imposed on the apartheid regime in South Africa because of its violation of internationally established norms against race discrimination made their own contribution to the loss of self-confidence on the part of the regime and to the success of the internal liberation struggle. The role of internationally accepted norms in sustaining or eroding the legitimacy of states or their governments in the contemporary world will be discussed more fully later on.

What Exactly Makes Power Legitimate?

According to Max Weber, what makes power legitimate in a social-scientific analysis is not what meets the political philosopher’s independently validated principles of rightful authority but what is accepted by the relevant agents as legitimate in their context. Legitimacy for the social scientist is simply the belief in legitimacy since it is this that determines people’s behavior. Moreover, legitimating beliefs will vary enormously from one historical period or societal type to another. We may regard the divine right of kings as philosophically groundless, but the task of the social scientist is to understand how people came to believe it, how the belief was reproduced and disseminated, and by whom and what followed from it for how a given system of rule was organized and for how people related to it. In other words, the critique of ideas has to give way to a sociology of knowledge if we are to explain the key features of any given system of power that we wish to study.

Some philosophers have objected to what they see as a completely reductionist definition of legitimacy, equating it with the purely subjective belief in legitimacy; to the dismissal of ideas as simply ideology, myth, ruling formula, and so on; and to the substitution of the study of the origin, reproduction, and dissemination of beliefs for a critical analysis of their content. The implication seems to be that people can be brought to believe almost anything, however preposterous, by those who control the production and dissemination of ideas. Should we then treat power as legitimate simply because enough people have by one means or another come to believe that it is?

Now, it is true that a social-scientific analysis of ideas has to start from a relativizing standpoint and that a historian or political scientist can only understand the ideas of a different age or society to the extent that he or she stands back from his or her own beliefs and the assumption of their self-evident truth. Yet such an understanding of a different set of beliefs is only possible through a careful analysis of their content and internal logic as well as of the circumstances of their production and dissemination. In the case of legitimacy, despite all the historical variability of legitimating ideas, it can be shown that they all share a common and distinctive threefold structure to their content. Power, and especially political power, is
recognized as legitimate to the extent that the following conditions are satisfied:

1. It is acquired and exercised according to established rules. This is the level of legality, whether or not the rules take an informal, conventional, or explicitly legal form. On its own, however, legality is insufficient since the rules have to be underpinned by normative principles that justify them. Hence, we also have the following.

2. The rules of power are justifiable according to accepted beliefs about (a) the rightful source of authority, which determines who is qualified to exercise power and how they are appointed and (b) the proper ends or purposes of power and standards in its exercise. This is the level of normative justifiability. There is a further dimension still, however, and that is the following.

3. Positions of authority are publicly acknowledged by relevant subordinates through actions that confirm their acceptance and recognition of it. This is the level of legitimation.

These three levels are not alternatives since all contribute to legitimacy; together they provide the subordinate with moral grounds for compliance or cooperation with authority. The fact that all are required can be shown by the different negative words used to express the different ways in which power may lack legitimacy. If there is a manifest breach of the rules, we use the term illegitimacy. If the rules are only weakly supported by societal beliefs or are deeply contested, we can talk of a legitimacy deficit. If consent or recognition is publicly withdrawn or withheld, we speak of delegitimation.

If we take the subject of political power, the most extreme example of illegitimacy is usurpation or coup d’etat—power attained in violation of the rules. Examples of legitimacy deficit are enormously varied, from situations where changing societal beliefs leave existing institutional arrangements unsupported or where people have widely diverging beliefs—say, about which state they should belong to—to situations where government is chronically unable to meet the basic purposes, such as welfare or security, which people expect it to. Legitimacy deficits usually only become critical when some performance failure of government exposes a fundamental doubt about its rightful source of authority. Examples of delegitimation include acts of widespread public opposition to a regime, of which revolutionary mobilization is the most extreme example. Revolutions follow a typical course from chronic legitimacy deficit of the regime (doubtful or disputed source of authority compounded by performance failure), through its delegitimation by mass oppositional mobilization, which splits the governing apparatus, to an illegitimate seizure of power, which heralds its reconstruction under a new set of legitimating rules and principles.

The different levels or dimensions of legitimacy outlined above constitute only the most general or abstract framework, the specific content of which has to be filled in, so to speak, for each historical society or example of rule. They provide a heuristic tool to guide analysis. Is political authority valid according to the rules? The relevant rules have to be identified, their conventional or legal form established, the mode of adjudication appropriate to them determined for the given context, and so on. Are the rules justifiable in terms of the beliefs and norms of the particular society, and are these norms relatively uncontested? We need to examine the specific beliefs current in the society about the rightful source of authority, on the one hand (divine approval, dynastic inheritance, privileged knowledge, ethnic membership, the people, etc.), and the proper ends of government, on the other (conquest, security, welfare, salvation, or whatever), all of which assume the fulfillment of a general interest beyond the narrow interests of those exercising power. Are there, finally, actions expressive of consent or public affirmation on the part of those qualified to give it? Who counts as qualified and what actions count as appropriate (e.g., oaths of allegiance, acclamation, and election) will be determined by the conventions of the given society or system of power. Underlying all these historical differences, there is a common structure to legitimacy to guide analysis.

This common structure of legitimacy is not arbitrary or accidental since each component relates to a different aspect of power that is socially problematic. All power over others, and especially
political power with its access to the means of violence, is potentially disruptive of and intrusive into people’s lives and well-being. Therefore, its acquisition and exercise cries out to be rule governed and located in the most imposing source of authority acknowledged by the society. Since those who exercise power enjoy great status and privilege, they have to be shown to merit it and to use it to serve a more general interest than merely their own advantage. Finally, since power entails the capacity to get others to do what otherwise they would not choose to do, the loss of freedom involved is validated by public acts of acknowledgment, which serve to bind in subjects and subordinates to obedience. These are the elements, therefore, which combine to make power rightful or legitimate.

The recognition that legitimacy is multidimensional and a knowledge of what these dimensions are moves social science away from treating the subjective belief in legitimacy as if it were totally content free—that just any belief will do—and closer to the philosopher’s discursive analysis of the content of ideas. In particular, it shows how social science and political philosophy share a common subject of enquiry, with recognizably common features. Yet a crucial difference remains between them, as already indicated. For the social and political scientist, legitimating ideas and practices derive their force from the beliefs, conventions, and procedures current in and specific to a given historical society or political system. And the focus of enquiry is always an empirical one: How are legitimating ideas reproduced and disseminated? Through what agency? What effects do they have and on whom? Above all, what makes them credible in the given social context, and why, if they do so, do they come to lose their credibility?

In answering these questions, we need to get away from the view that the only processes that require examination are those involving the ideologists, who develop and disseminate ideas, and the institutions that reproduce them. Of course these are important. But we also need to examine the way in which the very structuring of power makes certain legitimating ideas credible or believable. It is a notable feature of power relations that they are themselves capable of generating the evidence required for their own legitimation.

Two recurrent ways in which this occurs can be identified. One is the way in which the evidence of superiority and inferiority, which justifies the difference of fates and inequalities of condition between dominant and subordinate, is itself largely the product of this condition. Those who are excluded from key positions, activities, or resources are thereby denied the opportunity to acquire or demonstrate the capacities and characteristics appropriate to their occupation and exercise, so justifying their subordinate position. Throughout history, the exclusion of women from privileged positions or activities monopolized by men has prevented them from acquiring the capacities necessary for their occupancy or exercise. Their inferiority thus appears naturally rather than socially constructed, serving to justify their exclusion in a self-fulfilling manner.

Second, there is the way in which the idea that the powerful serve a general interest gains credibility from the structuring of power itself. Once some necessary social resource or activity comes to be controlled by a particular group, it follows that the interests of society at large can only be met through satisfying the interests of that group and on terms acceptable to them. Those who have historically controlled the means of production or subsistence, by violence or administration, have been in a position to ensure that general needs for welfare, employment, or security could only be met through the power relations that simultaneously secured their own privileges. To this extent, their claims to serve the general interest have had an evidential basis deriving from the structure of power itself.

We could take today’s international bankers as an example. To be sure, their claims to legitimacy have had an ideological basis, in the self-regulating market doctrine that has justified their activities becoming less and less rule governed—a doctrine with its exponents in the economics departments of universities and its disseminators among politicians as well as among the bankers themselves. Yet the very fact that the economy of every society depends on the credit that only banks supply has given credibility to the claim that their activities together serve an essential public interest. And the very complexity and global reach of their operations have reinforced the idea that they are uniquely qualified to understand and manage the processes involved and that their indispensability justifies the enormous salaries and bonuses to which they lay claim.
Of course, the near collapse of the banking system in the credit crunch of 2008 demonstrated that much of this legitimating fabric was illusory. The free market was exposed as far from self-regulating, many of the bankers’ activities were shown to be not merely socially useless but also socially and economically damaging, and their claim to possess an esoteric knowledge available only to the initiated was punctured by the revelation that even they did not understand the complex instruments in which they were trading. They suffered a legitimacy crisis of epic proportions. What remains to be explained is why the active process of popular delegitimation that typically follows such a crisis did not fully materialize. Apart from a few broken windows, no bankers’ houses were burnt down; nor were any bankers strung up from the lamp-posts. One reason may be that the institutions in which they work were difficult to penetrate. Another may be that the governments which, as third parties, endorsed the legitimacy of the bankers’ activities and rewards, proved to be more accessible targets of popular anger, whether through mass mobilization, as in Iceland; through the sanction of electoral process, as in the United States; or through the public humiliation of parliament in an expenses scandal, as in the United Kingdom (UK). Yet the cost of the bankers’ insulation from the full impact of popular anger and of their avoidance of a thorough-going process of delegitimation was shown in the all too rapid return to business as usual and in the displacement of the costs of the crisis from the financial to the political domain.

A social-scientific analysis of legitimacy, then, involves understanding the ideas and processes that legitimate a given system of power in its context; exploring the different dimensions of legality, normative justifiability, and legitimation that contribute to the acknowledgment of power as rightful by the relevant actors; identifying both the agents of ideological production and dissemination and the aspects of a power system that give legitimating ideas their credibility; and finally, exploring the processes that may lead to their erosion. The next section will use the framework developed here to delineate the legitimating principles and procedures of the main types of political systems of the 20th century and identify their typical points of vulnerability.

The Legitimacy of Different Regime Types

A third issue that Weber’s analysis of legitimacy initiated ongoing debate about was the relation between legitimating principles and the way systems of power are organized. He argued that the kind of legitimacy being claimed had a determining effect on the mode of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the manner of exercising authority, all of which would differ according to their different legitimating principles. It followed that types of power systems could be classified according to the kind of claim to legitimacy typically made by each. He then proceeded to differentiate between three types of legitimating claims and their respective grounds, which he termed traditional (belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions), rational-legal (belief in the legality of enacted and rationally justifiable law), and charismatic (belief in the exceptional qualities of an individual and the normative principles ordained by him). He used this typology to structure his political sociology and as the basis for detailed studies of patrimonial authority, bureaucracy, and religious movements, respectively.

There is no doubt that this threefold typology, and Weber’s development of it, has proved historically illuminating. For example, in any study of the process of modernization, Weber’s characterization of the shift from traditional to rational-legal modes of legitimation—from personal to impersonal relationships of rule, from status distinctions to rights-based authority, from dependency to citizenship, together with the separation of public finances from the private household of the ruler—has been indispensable. Weber’s analysis of the appearance of charismatic figures in times of distress, social dislocation, or revolution and the routinization of their charisma in a subsequent order is also valuable. However, as a basis for constructing a typology of political regimes in the 20th century, Weber’s types have proved something of a distraction for political scientists. It is not particularly useful to be told that both liberal democracy and fascism are different variants of charismatic authority, one more rule governed than the other, or that communist systems comprised a combination of the traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic modes of legitimacy.

At this point, the structure of legitimacy outlined in the previous section—comprising legality,
normative justifiability, and public affirmation—can be used to provide a more coherent basis for distinguishing between the different regime types of the 20th century: traditional, fascist, communist, liberal-democratic, and theocratic. For each, their distinctive form of law, source of authority and ends of government, and mode of public affirmation can be identified. These are shown in summary form in Table 1.

Military and other forms of dictatorship have been included as a limiting case of a nonlegitimate political order, born of illegitimacy and lacking both a rightful source of authority and any mode of expressed consent or public affirmation. Such legitimacy as military regimes have is based entirely on their purpose or mission—to save society from chaos or corruption—and is typically defined as transitional, to promote the restoration of a normal political order. Like all regimes whose legitimacy is limited to the dimension of performance, they are vulnerable once performance falters, and their failure exposes their lack of any valid source of authority. Legitimate political orders, in contrast, which are secure in their source of authority, are able to withstand shocks and performance failures and to effect routine changes of administration that do not threaten the legitimacy of the system itself.

The different political regimes in Table 1 are, like Weber’s, constructed as pure or ideal types, and mixed forms combining more than one mode of legitimation can readily occur. For example, a number of recently established democracies, particularly in the South, have persisting elements of tradition-based legitimacy, whether in customary forms of law, chieftain- or clan-based authorities, or the persistence of personal favoritisms and dependencies within a formally rule-based democratic regime. Depending on the form these take, a traditional legitimacy may serve to strengthen the legitimacy of more recently established democratic institutions or come to weaken or undermine them. Of the theocratic systems, to take a different example, Iran has developed an electoral mode of legitimation, albeit flawed, while Saudi Arabia’s system is based on the allegiance of a traditional and hereditary social elite. Such combinations and transitions are not uncommon but are best analyzed by starting with clearly defined types.

Table 1 provokes an obvious question: Why is it that the liberal democratic mode of legitimacy, and form of political system, has become globally prevalent by the start of the 21st century? This is partly for negative reasons—namely, that other forms of legitimate political order have proved to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Form of Law</th>
<th>Source of Authority</th>
<th>Ends of Government</th>
<th>Mode of Public Affirmation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>Custom/precedent</td>
<td>Heredity/the past</td>
<td>Well-being within traditional order</td>
<td>Assembly of social elite</td>
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<td>Fascist</td>
<td>Sovereign decisionism</td>
<td>Leadership principle</td>
<td>National purity/expansion</td>
<td>Mass mobilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>Codification of the collective will</td>
<td>Party monopoly of truth and representation</td>
<td>Building communist future</td>
<td>Mass mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal-democratic</td>
<td>Constitutional rule of law</td>
<td>The people through competitive election</td>
<td>Individual rights protection and advancement</td>
<td>Electoral endorsement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theocratic</td>
<td>Sacred texts and canons</td>
<td>Divine will interpreted by hierarchy</td>
<td>Purifying society’s moral order</td>
<td>Various of the above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dictatorial</td>
<td>Decree</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Restore order and national unity</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
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be ill adapted to some key aspect of contemporary economic and social conditions and have found their legitimacy to have been eroded. The hereditary monopoly of political authority characteristic of traditional systems has proved to be vulnerable to the modern requirement of a career open to talent and to popular demands for inclusion in the political process. The Communist Party’s claim to represent workers’ interests proved to be increasingly out of step with its members’ own perceptions of them; its claim to exclusive truth lost credibility, and its goal of a realizable communist society came up against the limits of its system of economic planning. The fascist pursuit of expansionary national goals typically led to self-destructive wars, or, where these were avoided, an authority vested in the person of an individual leader proved unable to survive his death. Theocracies have proved vulnerable to fundamentalisms that have quickly forfeited popularity, or else they have provoked adherents of other faiths to open disaffection. Each system has had its own internal crisis tendencies, inherent in its legitimating principles and procedures, which have in most cases proved to be terminal.

The prevalence of liberal democracy, in contrast, is due to the fact that it has proved to be the only sustainable legitimate order compatible with the conditions of market capitalism, on the one hand, and with popular demands for freedom and full inclusion in the political process, on the other. Market capitalism’s antipaternalist principles—individuals are the best judge of their own interests, are responsible for their own fate, and are sovereign in the consumer market—have over time led to the demand for people to be sovereign in the political sphere also and have undermined paternalist forms of legitimacy, especially as education has become more widespread. At the same time, the increasingly global dimensions of communication have made closed political systems, claiming a monopoly of information and ideology, unsustainable without levels of repression that provoke popular resistance. The People’s Republic of China stands out, however, as a potential test of these assumptions. It remains an open question whether the post-Tiananmen combination of performance legitimacy through rapid economic growth and strenuous reinvention of the party’s justifying ideology will carry conviction over time beyond the ranks of its own cadres.

This is not to say that liberal democracy does not have its own characteristic crisis tendencies, deriving from some of its legitimating principles and procedures. The electoral competition for power, with its winner-take-all outcome, gives ruling leaders and parties a powerful incentive to curtail basic rights and freedoms for opponents or to skew the registration and electoral process in their favor. Democracy’s majoritarian principle can lead to the permanent exclusion of significant minorities from any share in power, provoking secessionist tendencies if not outright civil war. Also, the inescapable tension between the economic and social inequalities intrinsic to market capitalism and the equality of citizenship and political voice, which democracy promises, contains the potential for disruptive social conflict. Any of these challenges can lead to authoritarian and exclusionary deformations of democracy, in which democratic norms and procedures become more of a legitimating façade than a genuinely operative and regulating set of ideas.

However, the fact that even authoritarian regimes now claim the mantle of democratic legitimacy points to a striking feature of the international political landscape since the collapse of communist regimes in 1989. Democracy is now the only form of legitimate political order that has wide attractiveness across borders and whose norms have become endorsed at an international level. This endorsement provides a strong external legitimation to domestic political forces engaged in a struggle for democracy within a country. It is also given practical effect through positive measures of democracy support between countries and negative pressure where aid, trade, and debt interdependencies are involved. Democracy promotion in one form or another on the part of established democracies in their dealings with recent or less secure ones has become a major enterprise since its inception in the early 1990s.

Yet it is also necessary to recognize the limits to democracy promotion and the point where it comes up against other legitimating ideas and norms. Most obvious of these is the force of nationalism and the principle of national sovereignty or autonomy. Since the late 18th century, the idea of nationhood, as solidarity between a people sharing key markers of identity, has inspired political movements for national unification across
borders, secession from within them, and independence from imperial powers alike. The principle of nationalism does not provide the specification for any one kind of political system but only its appropriate spatial reach. It can best be regarded as a background legitimating condition for the rulers of any and every regime in the modern world—that they should share the national identity of the ruled and should not act as agents of, or be subordinate to, an external power. Nationalism can also, of course, become foregrounded as a means to compensate for some significant legitimacy deficit in other aspects of a given regime.

Democracy promotion, then, comes up against one limit when it is perceived as an instrument for the national interests of the promoting power or powers and, above all, when its promotion infringes on national self-determination, as in attempts to impose democracy by force. Another limit, already mentioned, is set by the persisting legitimacy of traditional norms and practices, especially where democratic institutions are seen to displace or undermine these, rather than achieve an acceptable mode of coexistence with them. The transition from one type to the other is necessarily a gradual process, requiring a generational shift in the underlying beliefs supportive of a new order. In this context, it is worth noting that in the UK, it has taken until the 21st century for the hereditary component in the upper chamber of parliament, based on a traditional principle of legitimacy, to be finally abolished.

A further limit to the project of democracy promotion, specific to Islamic countries, lies in the attraction of a competing principle of legitimacy—that of a political order based on sharia law and interpreted by a religious hierarchy. Although the installation of such an order at state level has over time proved divisive and unpopular, the idea has been a potent source of support for opposition movements mobilizing against only weakly legitimated regimes in the Arab world and beyond.

All three of these alternative sources of legitimacy limiting the effectiveness of democracy promotion were combined in Afghanistan. The lengthy military occupation weakened the legitimacy of democratic institutions, already compromised by electoral fraud, with the taint of foreign imposition. These institutions were both distorted and challenged by clan-based forms of traditional authority to which people owe their primary allegiance. And both these elements were used by the insurgent Taliban to gain support for its alternative theocratic agenda. Given such a combination, it is hard to imagine a more unfavorable terrain for a democratizing project.

**Legitimacy Beyond the State**

Any analysis of the legitimating principles of contemporary regimes has to take into account the way in which forces beyond the nation-state act to constrain its decisional autonomy and compromise its claim to sovereignty. These forces may include the actions of other states, pressures from the financial and economic markets, or the rulings of international treaty bodies and other international organizations. Since the actions of the latter are becoming both more pervasive and more intrusive, for good and ill alike, the basis for their legitimacy is becoming an important subject of analysis and debate.

The legitimacy of the international organizations set up in the aftermath of World War II, and the decisions and resolutions taken by these bodies, has historically derived from the participation of member state governments and the process of agreement between them required for a binding decision. However, in more recent times, that legitimacy has increasingly been called into question on the grounds that voting rights have been skewed toward the major powers in the developed world and have not reflected either emerging powers or the weight of their populations. This is most obvious with the United Nations (UN) itself, whose permanent members of the Security Council with veto powers constitute a historical anomaly dating from the 1940s and 1950s. With similar effect, voting rights in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank depend on the amount of capital a country contributes not on equality of state membership. And even with a body like the World Trade Organization, whose members states are formally equal, decisions in practice were for a long time predetermined in so-called green room meetings of the larger trading nations and influenced by the much greater research capacity available to their delegations. The cumulative outcome of these procedural inequalities has been policies and agreements that have benefited the developed world more than the developing one.
In the changed conditions of the 21st century, it is now widely recognized that full legitimacy and the respect necessary for effective global cooperation can only be restored to these institutions by reform of their membership rules and procedures. However, there is considerable disagreement about what this should entail. If we take the UN itself, there are at least three contending views. The first holds that the basic idea of the Security Council, consisting of permanent members plus rotating temporary ones, is still necessary to ensure that the major powers have an incentive to take part in the organization rather than bypass it. From this viewpoint, what is needed is to extend the permanent membership to include states that better reflect today’s configuration of power, such as Brazil, Germany, India, and South Africa.

A second view holds that the whole idea of privileged membership of the Security Council is anachronistic and can no longer be justified. Any criterion of fairness would require equal opportunity for states to participate in the Council, albeit with some adjustment mechanism to reflect differences in size. The latter principle could also be extended to the General Assembly by assigning differential voting power according to the size of a member state’s population.

A third more radical view, associated with proponents of cosmopolitan democracy, holds that the legitimacy deficit of international organizations consists in the fact that they represent only states and their interests, not peoples. In this view, reformed intergovernmental organs of the UN should be complemented by a people’s assembly, directly elected from all the peoples of the world. They point out that the UN has already begun moving in this direction by recognizing nongovernmental organizations and advocacy groups at its world conferences and as participants in international treaty negotiations. A move to a more formalized system of popular representation would constitute a more equitable and transparent extension of this practice.

These differences of view show that there are no agreed and settled criteria for establishing what counts as legitimacy in respect of international bodies. Nowhere has the issue been more contested than in debates about the legitimacy deficit or democratic deficit of the European Union (EU). All depends on what kind of political animal one considers the EU to be. If one considers it as a quasi state, then its lack of any single decision-making institution as the focus for accountability and the lack of any developed “demos” with powers to hold it accountable through the electoral process are major legitimacy deficits. If one considers it primarily as an intergovernmental organization, then the lack of transparency in the decision making of the council of ministers and of adequate democratic oversight of these ministers through national parliaments are major deficits. If, finally, one argues that the EU is a sui generis construction, with careful balancing of powers and accountabilities between its different institutions, then, there is less evidence of a serious deficit than under the first two assumptions. Indeed, it can be pointed out that the EU already possesses all the features that the most radical reformers of the UN wish to see for that organization, including council voting weighted by population, a directly elected parliamentary assembly, and a powerful court to enforce legislative decisions.

One further position in the debate on the EU deserves mention here because it rests on a form of legitimacy that is quite generalized in modern societies, both within and beyond the political domain. This is the view that since the prime function of the EU is that of economic, social, and legal regulation, it is entirely appropriate that its decision making should be entrusted to a technocratic body such as the European Commission and the technical committees representing national bureaucracies that work for it. After all, in most political systems, regulatory activity is undertaken by independent bodies—courts of law, administrative tribunals, regulatory bodies of all kinds—whose judgments are more effective precisely because they are not subject to political or electoral pressure. Their source of legitimacy stems from the authority of professional expertise in a knowledge-based society and their ability to give reasoned justifications for their decisions, which can withstand the scrutiny of their professional peers.

Whatever the merits of this view in respect of the EU—and it is difficult to maintain that its functions are merely regulatory and not also redistributive and therefore highly political—the wider point about the legitimacy of professional expertise is an important one for understanding the
Legitimacy

Legitimacy is the principal source of social authority. It is the condition or status of being accorded legitimacy. The legitimacy of a system of power—deriving moral authority from a socially recognized source and serving the societal ends or purposes expected of it, according to accepted conventions or standards, whatever these happen to be—to that extent will those subordinate to it not have to be bribed or coerced into obedience and the more likely that they will cooperate in helping it achieve its purposes, where their cooperation is necessary to achieve these. In sum, legitimacy can be seen as a form of public good, which carries distinctive benefits for rulers and the ruled alike.

Research on legitimacy is now moving beyond the governmental sphere to areas of authority outside it—to economic institutions, nongovernmental organizations, criminal justice systems, international bodies of all kinds, and to other authority domains. Attempts are being made to quantify the degree of legitimacy of different regimes and to explore more deeply the psychological processes involved in legitimation. Moreover, with the check being experienced to the so-called third wave of democracy, interest is being revived in exploring the legitimating bases of authoritarian regimes, on the assumption that they cannot be understood as either premature or failed democracies but need to be analyzed on their own terms. All these developments promise an even richer research agenda for the study of legitimacy in the future.

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See also Communist Systems; Democratization; Dictatorship; European Integration; Fascism; International Organizations; Nationalism; Power; Revolution; Theocracy; Traditional Rule; Weber, Max

Further Readings
LIBERAL PARTIES

Liberal parties (LPs) represent one of the major party “families,” such as the conservative, socialist, and nationalist parties originating from the 19th- and early-20th-century cleavages and party systems, in the context of which they have to be placed. The major characteristics of LPs include a social background in bourgeois groups, which advocate individual and property rights and the rule of law, in opposition to feudal and autocratic forms of the state. This entry discusses the historical roots, social bases, ideological orientations, and contemporary developments of LPs.

Terminology
There are two kinds of terminological variety. In the first case, liberal can have rather different meanings concerning ideological orientations or a party’s position within the party system. Whereas in the European tradition liberal usually refers to parties in the middle of the political spectrum, in the North American context, liberal has a more left-wing, or social-democratic, meaning. In the second case, LPs come with many different names. Whereas in the 19th-century LP labels were more consistent with basic ideological features, after 1945, this clarity began to diminish. Basically, the term originated after the French Revolution, when the term liberal had first been used by Spanish constitutionalists around 1812. Only in the second half of the 19th century did larger parties in Britain (in the Whig tradition) and Canada call themselves the Liberal Party, whereas in France or Italy terms such as republicans or radicals were more prominent. In some countries freedom labels prevail (e.g., Free Democrats in Switzerland, and later in Germany, and Party for Freedom and Democracy in the Netherlands). Examples of democratic parties exist, for example, in Luxemburg, whereas the U.S. Democrats show a mix of liberal but also social-democratic ideology. In Denmark, the term venstre (Left) is still in current use. Some (agrarian) center parties, such as those in the Scandinavian countries, were also close to liberalism. By contrast, parties with a definitely conservative character labeling themselves liberal party must not be included in the LP family, such as the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan or the Liberal Party in Australia, which for decades has been the conservative counterpart of Labour. After 1945, and particularly during the past decades, a stronger tendency can be observed to use liberal as a party label rather at random (e.g., the right-wing populist Liberal Democrats in Russia after 1991).

History
Early liberal movements developed, between the mid-18th and mid-19th centuries, from the cleavage between feudal society and an autocratic state, on the one hand, and commercial economy and bourgeois property and liberty interests, on the other. Economic and personal liberties, the rule of law, and parliamentary representation were core goals in the unfolding party competition with conservative ideologies and organizations. A second “classical” period has been characterized by success in parliamentary elections, development of stronger party organization, and even governmental majorities in several countries of Europe (e.g., in Great Britain) and elsewhere in the last third of the 19th century up to World War I and until some time after. A third period of decline of LPs, after World War I and during the 1930s, saw the rise of socialist/labor parties on one side and populist/fascist forces and regimes on the other. In a fourth period, after 1945, political system values in Western liberal democracies converged with party ideology, which weakened the specific profile and function of LPs. In many countries, they could only secure a minor position in the party systems.

Liberalism and LPs had their primary origin and relevance in Europe and some other regions such as North America. While Russia and China were dominated by communism, large parts of other continents, particularly Africa and Asia, have mainly been concerned with liberation from colonial rule. Only some Latin American countries developed conditions for liberal or “radical” parties; since the 1930s, military and populist authoritarian regimes created cycles of suppression and revolt unfriendly to LPs.

Ideology
Early liberal ideas focused on free, economically independent, enlightened individuals against an
autocratic state, a feudal social order, and the moral and intellectual authoritarianism of the Catholic Church. Political values evolved around republican or at least constitutional principles, the rule of law, and limited state functions and political representation, quite often with concepts of limited suffrage. Economic principles highlight market economy, property and commercial freedoms of independent producers, industrial progress, economic growth, and free trade. Capitalist development produced tensions between securing competition by antitrust laws and other means and accepting capital concentration and corporate firms. Trade unions as a counterforce have been accepted only reluctantly.

In social terms, formal equality often gave way to equal opportunity and accepting factual inequality, class polarization, and economic domination by corporations and the wealthy. Supporting equality by education, however, has become a continuous program feature of LPs. Welfare state institutions have long been neglected but finally seen as inevitable to a limited degree.

In the course of history, a growing “ambivalence of liberalism” and tensions inside LPs or between different LPs developed between the liberal-conservative and liberal-radical or social-liberal currents, with radicals or liberal-radicals advocating more republican, democratic, and secular values. These tensions intensified under the pressure of rising socialist or social-democratic parties before and after World War I, in the face of corporate capitalism, and within less polarized party systems after World War II, when LPs in many countries leaned toward liberal-conservative positions rather than liberal-radical or social-liberal ones.

Party Organization
Traditionally, party organization in terms of membership and professional organization of LPs has been rather weak. While representing independent middle-class groups, a cadre, or elite, structure prevailed. Strong links with large special-interest organizations have been more scarce. In addition, a culture of individualistic attitudes has been prevalent in liberal circles, even more so in recent times of growing individualism. LPs rely heavily on members who are lawyers or doctors, independent businesspeople, and in the education services and tend to be less member than voter parties. For party finances, they often depend on state sources or strong economic interests.

Electoral Base, Government Participation
In the period after 1945, LPs had, at least in Europe, on the average, a minor electoral position. Their record of government participation, however, was considerably stronger in the form of coalition parties. Only in a few European countries could the LPs establish a strong government position such as in Luxemburg (Democratic Party), Denmark (Venstre), Switzerland (Free Democratic Party [Freie Demokratische Partei]), and for some time in France (Union for French Democracy [Union pour la Democratie Francaise, UDF], a merger party in the 1970s and 1980s). Medium-sized parties such as the Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD), the Belgian Party for Freedom and Progress (Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang, PVV/Parti de la Liberté et du Progrès, PLP), or small parties such as the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) in Germany, the Liberal Party in Norway, the Radicale Venstre in Denmark, and the Dutch D’66 could also participate in coalition governments for longer periods of time. Outside Europe, only the Liberal Party in Canada maintained itself as the most important national government party for decades, from the late 19th century and also after 1945.

The main factors for the structural weakness of most LPs are party systems dominated by conservative or Christian-democratic parties and social-democratic ones, with only moderate left/right polarization, in a context of declining ideologies. In addition, Western liberal democracies strongly integrated liberal values into their constitutional structure and weakened the ideological profile of LPs. In terms of the electoral base, problems arose from social structural changes: The decline of the old middle class of independent businesses necessitated moves toward the employed service class of middle-level employees against much external competition and internal tensions. Since the 1980s, Green parties have emerged as a new competitor for young, urban, and well-educated social groups. Thus, unless LPs could operate from a well-established governmental position (such as in
Canada and some European countries), structural conditions changed rather unfavorably in the 1960s and 1970s. Since the 1970s, ideological developments toward neoliberalism have moved LPs into a closer relationship and, at the same time, stronger competition with modernizing conservative parties.

Contemporary Developments

In the context of the recent waves of democratization (1970s to 1990s), one would have expected that the LPs would play stronger roles owing to their affinity with liberal democracy. In fact, during these transformation periods, some parties with liberal ideology or name emerged, but they turned out to remain rather weak and often could not survive under a polarization between left-wing liberation movements and conservative or even reactionary forces.

The fall of military or other dictatorships in Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s only restored small currents of liberal organizations, somewhat stronger in Argentina’s radical tradition (Radical Civic Union). A special case developed in South Africa in the concluding phase of the apartheid regime (Democratic Alliance).

In Russia and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, the fall of communist regimes finally opened up new opportunities for LPs, which, however, only materialized to a small degree. The double transformation toward liberal economic and political systems with their high economic and social costs for the population, in combination with increasing electoral barriers and missing structural traditions of a liberal class, has been unfavorable for sustainable LPs. Thus, early offshoots soon reduced in size, such as Yabloko in Russia, or transformed ideologically (in a conservative direction, such as the Civic Union in the Czech Republic, or even to right-wing populist, such as FIDESZ in Hungary). Some potential developed in Slovenia and, after several electoral turnabouts, in Poland, where the Civic Union as a liberal-conservative governing party could emerge from the 2007 election.

Since the 1980s, globalized capitalism has converged with ideological currents of neoliberalism, which has led LPs in many countries to advocate deregulation, low taxes, and downgrading welfare state and public sector functions, with a stronger affinity to conservative (neoconservative) parties and coalitions. The consequences of the dramatic worldwide financial and economic crisis of 2008 may, however, leave them entrapped and in need of strategic reorientation.

Apart from economic liberalism, currently, LPs are once again stressing the values of religious tolerance and secularism as well as protection of lifestyle minorities. In addition, the new technological capacities for surveillance put the limitation of state powers back on the agenda of LPs.

Transnational Networks

In 1947, LPs formed the Liberal International (http://www.liberal-international.org) for fostering ideological coherence, cooperation, and support for emerging parties. Their membership list, sometimes with new entries and expulsions, provides at least an indicator for identifying LPs in times of decreasing clarity of labels. On a regional basis, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in Europe and its caucus in the European Parliament and in the Council of Europe represent a further step in transnational organization.

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See also Liberalism; Neoliberalism; Parties

Further Readings


LIBERALISM

Liberalism offers a prescription of how the state is to deal with citizens: Loosely speaking, the state is
to address citizens as equal individuals. The rise of liberalism therefore requires the prior or more or less simultaneous development of a strong principle and practice of individualism. There is a considerable literature on the roles of individualism and of individualist Protestantism in the development of capitalism but a far less rich discussion of its role in the development of political liberalism. This is not a little odd, because political liberalism is defined specifically for a society of individuals, and it requires constitutional protections of individual citizens against intrusions by the state. These three concepts—individualism, constitutionalism, and liberalism—are closely related historically, causally, and conceptually. Before turning to the structure or content of liberalism, there are two major preliminary issues to discuss here: an explanation of why liberalism came to its central place in political theory and practice when and where it did and some account of how it can be protected or enforced.

**Individualism**

Political liberalism is inherently a philosophy and practice of protecting individuals to live and act as they please, so long as they do not harm others; without individualism, therefore, it has no point. The central figure in the history of a vision of the place of individualism in political theory is Thomas Hobbes, who assumes individualism in his account of social order and the state. One might suppose that his assumption of individualism is normative or libertarian. But for him, in fact, it is much more explicitly a descriptive and causal issue just as Karl Marx’s or Max Weber’s account of economic motivation is causal. Descriptively, individualism is based on an assumption about human nature. Causally, therefore, it is a necessary part of the explanation of human behavior and, by implication, of political institutions that are designed to deal with individuals. We are self-interested; therefore, to explain our behavior, one must start from the assumption of self-interest.

Historians continue to debate when, where, and why individualism first arose. The most common view is that peasants in England were communally organized and held together by the fetters of the kinship group, and their land was collectively, not individually, owned. Economic progress required what Weber calls “defamilization.” Richard H. Tawney observes that most people in England in the 16th century “have never seen more than a hundred separate individuals in the course of their whole lives, where most households live by tilling their great-grandfather’s fields with their great-grandfather’s plough” (quoted in Alan Macfarlane, 1978/1979, pp. 53–54). In its Greek origin, economy means household management, and until recent centuries, that would still have been its apt meaning in most of Europe. For the overwhelming majority of people, there was little exchange and virtually no money or commerce; there was at best merely self-sufficiency in a subsistence agrarian society. In a society under these conditions, liberalism is irrelevant.

Major historians of the relevant periods, such as Thomas B. Macaulay, among the greatest of liberals, commonly do not include individualism in their indexes, whereas the idea runs through the work of the great liberal theorist Leonard T. Hobhouse. In reading the historians who frequently delve into political theory, one often wonders where Hobbes has gone. Not surprisingly, Friedrich A. Hayek makes a major issue of individualism and, implicitly, of Hobbesism. For many liberal theorists, the world of Hayek and Hobbes is in principle our world. In fairness, many other scholars address individualism, although somewhat obliquely, through discussions of Puritanism and Calvinism and the role of individualist Protestant religions more generally in the development of capitalism. While these individualist religions are surely causally important, secular aspects of social life in these centuries and even the secularizing tendencies of the individualist religious beliefs provide the final force for remaking English social and economic relations well ahead of continental Europe.

Liberalism is widely recognized as a magnificent social invention, perhaps the greatest political invention of modern history, not least because it effectively created political modernity. Its development required one of the greatest changes in social structure ever experienced. Elements of it or local instances of its elements precede modern times, but the real transformation begins in a big way only in the 17th-century era of the spectacular efflorescence of—especially—Anglo-Saxon political theory. Hobbes is arguably the most important figure...
in this movement in part because he is the most insistent on the individualist focus. He is much less concerned with property than with social order. Indeed, he treats property and its protection as required for social order as well as for prosperity. One could rightly say that order must precede finer issues of wealth and prosperity, so that liberalism depends on order. And one should note that Hobbes wrote against the background of brutal wars that likely informed his vision. Later writers, such as John Locke and the grand economists in the line of Adam Smith, could focus on economic growth and “the wealth of nations.” Hobbes’s case shows that the two strains of liberalism—individualism and constitutional protections—can be separated in theory, and the English case shows that they can be at least piecemeal separated in the institutions that make them work in practice.

Why did liberalism come so late in history? Its appeal seems almost obvious. But social structures virtually blocked it through most of history. Pervasive, brutal poverty got in the way of concern for liberty, so much so that much of the vocabulary of liberalism is a late invention. Rather than a concern with liberty, which must have been hollow, with its implication of a right to starve a few centuries ago, rural families must sooner have focused on collective family welfare and fears of famine and sickness. The development of the transformative concern with individualism came first in England, and therefore, the idea of liberalism seems English, although it is soon followed by a somewhat different French conception.

Anarchists such as William Godwin might hold the optimistic view that individualism could drive a liberal society through the loosely coordinated individual efforts of large numbers of people without an overbearing government. But autocracy is a more likely form of government—the form that has controlled most lives historically. While continental monarchies, especially in France and Spain, increasingly passed into greater despotism, the English became more liberal over many centuries. There were retrograde moves, such as the proclamation of the doctrine of the divine right of kings and the introduction of the Star Chamber. The final reign of autocracy in England was the monarchy of the Stuart, Charles I, who, oddly, signed the strikingly liberal “Petition of Rights” but then went on to ignore its agreed constraints on his actions.

**Constitutionalism**

The 1787 U.S. Constitution, one of the greatest liberal documents, written in light of English experience, ironically, did not include explicit statements of many of the protections that liberals and what would now be called constitutionalists wanted. Many of these, including freedoms of the press and of religious conscience, were added to the constitution in its first 10 amendments, the “Bill of Rights.” It may seem peculiar to create government in order, at least in part, to protect individuals against government when that government is implicitly enabled to act against individuals as readily as to act for them. There is no theoretical guarantee that a supposedly liberal state will or must rein itself in. Constitutionalism is therefore at best a pragmatic move that might work or that might fail. In the vocabulary of The Federalist Papers, a constitution is only a parchment barrier that is implicitly no barrier at all. In the history of this and many constitutions, such barriers have often been overridden, even trampled by powerful office holders. When constitutions succeed in regulating conduct, they do so for social psychological reasons and through James Madison’s device of countering ambition with ambition.

The rise of constitutionalism has been a long-drawn-out process. The set of liberties to be protected has grown, and support for protection of many of these is virtually universal in liberal states today. Historical struggles over protection of freedoms of the press and speech more generally are typical of several other protections of civil liberties and civil rights. Historically, the most important issue for initial constitutionalism is the protection of freedom of religious conscience and practice. This is the issue that tore societies apart and that still plays a fundamental role in the development of liberalism. Diverse Christian sects were the chief problem in the United States in 1787. Islam, especially militant Islam, is regarded as a problem in much of Europe and North America today. Hobbes noted the near impossibility of assessing or controlling variant religious beliefs in an era in which, for example, England and Holland were increasingly diverse in their religious commitments. Still, he allowed enforcement of religious practices as supposedly necessary for maintaining order. The wreckage caused by religious conflicts in England in his time arguably licenses his illiberal views on this issue.
The Harm Principle

The harm principle says that I may do anything I please so long as I do not harm others. This principle, which has been stated over many centuries by many people in varied ways, has been elevated with its seductive and almost self-defining label by John Stuart Mill, who has perhaps, therefore, come to own the idea despite its common currency. One could say that this principle is the central commitment of liberalism: Do not interfere in the deliberate actions of others whose actions do no harm to us. Mill calls it a very simple principle, but the remarkably extensive commentary on it suggests, rightly, that it has subtle nuances and complex potential meanings. Mill argues against many state regulations, some of them offensively intrusive and some ostensibly beneficial. For example, to go back to the early foundation of liberalism, the state should not impose religious beliefs, qualifications, or practices on its citizens.

Strong defenders of the principle mean it to imply that, if you clearly know that what you are doing is harmful mainly to yourself alone, neither the state nor I should interfere; we should let you harm yourself. When this view is stated in the abstract, it offends many people because it seems to be cruel. But in actual fact, Mill is descriptively right: We commonly act on the strong form of the principle. For example, we do not prevent you from killing yourself through harmful or risky actions such as smoking, skydiving, and experimenting with powerful drugs. It is your life even if you wish to destroy it or to risk doing so. We might even be barred from interfering in your choice to commit suicide. Here, one of the difficult nuances pops up. We might suppose that your suicidal urge is somehow a mistake or a brief and aberrant psychological urge and that you would be grateful tomorrow for our interference today. If we confidently hold these views, what should we do?

Rule of Law

It is hard to read the early history of England without stumbling into surprising, brutal issues of unequal treatment under the law and of high-handed actions by the powerful that are not grounded in law. What today would be legal matters were formerly matters to be resolved by politics, power, and even murder. If the monarch or a baron wanted you out of the way, you had little recourse other than flight. Women, slaves, and serfs were often treated with brutality. In early medieval times, different status groups were subject to different laws and, especially, different punishments for the same offense. The rule of law includes a crude principle of fairness according to which all are subject to the same law and under which there can be no separate statuses for citizens.

In its first article, the 1789 version of the French revolutionary Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen stipulates, “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights; social distinctions may be based only upon general usefulness.” This vision may be taken as the ultimate guiding principle of the rule of law. The main target of such a principle is arbitrary government, and the main resolution of this principle is to guarantee that everyone will be treated in accordance with the law. To make this work, there must be general social order and institutions to control officers of the government.

Commitment to the rule of law is of a piece with concern to limit government, which is the main point of constitutionalism. Liberalism and constitutionalism are interdependent defining features of political modernity. If a constitution does not limit government, it is a failed constitution. In this respect, yet again, constitutionalism, liberalism, and individualism are joined together. Already at the height of concern with the rule of law and limited government, however, Jeremy Bentham concludes that government is a close corporation with a vested interest that is potentially hostile to the collective welfare of its society, a view echoed later by John C. Calhoun. Their view is that democracy in England and America is increasingly turning corporatist. As is often more generally true, Bentham is prescient on this development, which must have distressed him deeply because it must undermine his belief in democracy as essentially utilitarian. This conclusion casts a pall over modern democratic society. If democracy is not utilitarian, there is little hope for a generally good form of government. Bentham’s great utilitarian book, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, virtually trumpets the association of democracy with utilitarianism. The book is unusual in the identification of its personal moral theory with its political theory: These do not live in separate
worlds, as they otherwise typically do in most of normative theory. Their separation is deplored by David Hume and Jeremy Bentham.

**Religion**

Protection of religious freedom is the fundamental concern that has driven political theory since well before Hobbes. In the United States, the principal obstacle to government enforcement of particular beliefs has been the radical fractioning of beliefs, which nicely sets up a resolution of conflicts over religion in the United States, where the sheer numbers of sects fuels widespread opposition to selecting any sect as the national religion. The only workable compromise in 1787 was to rule out any official recognition of religion and especially to rule against establishing a state church. The problem of religion, which led to heated debates during the constitutional era in the United States, was virtually settled by this provision of the constitution. Indeed, the first Supreme Court case on religion, *Reynolds v. United States* (1878), came before the Court 90 years after the adoption of the constitution. This decision ruled against the Mormon practice of polygamy on pragmatic rather than on religious grounds. The judgment in *Reynolds* is that under religious freedom, one may believe whatever one may, but one cannot act in any way one chooses. It might seem to be hard to formulate an objection to polygamy from the harm principle, but many people do object that the practice of polygamy harms the status of women generally.

**Multiculturalism and Group Rights**

Over the past few decades, a multiculturalist movement has grown. This is both a matter of claims of particular groups and claims of academic theorists who take themselves to be defending the cultural rights of various minority cultural groups. Liberalism has no resources for dealing with groups, especially large groups well beyond the scale of the family, except to treat them as individuals aggregated into groups. But the features of the aggregations or of the groups play no role in standard liberal treatment of them. Indeed, standard liberal theory often conflicts with claims by the advocates or actual members of the groups themselves. Such theory has invariably been framed for individuals, and on the evidence of the weak, supposedly liberal arguments of academic defenders of the liberal nature of such groups, the liberal theory cannot easily be recast for groups. The greatest conflict commonly arises from certain groups’ extremely illiberal treatment of their own children and of women in the groups.

Among the demands that such groups make is to limit their children’s education, often so severely as to cripple any chances those children might have to survive outside the groups. In some cultures, girls are not educated at all, and boys are educated primarily in religious texts, such as the Talmud or the Koran. Another common demand is to have public agencies and schools speak in the native languages of the groups. Apart from Spanish, perhaps no other language is common enough across the United States for dual language policies to work at reasonable cost.

A liberal perspective on subgroups with which people are free to identify within a society is not strategically analogous to standard individualist political and economic liberalism. Such a “group liberalism” violates the strategic logic of liberalism. A policy to maintain a cultural group’s autonomy and distinctive norms is not likely to motivate the most politically important groups in liberal societies. In particular, if a state attempts to maintain a cultural subgroup’s autonomy, the state takes the risk of creating a politically influential class. Nor are resolutions of group problems likely to be self-enforcing, for example, in the ways in which the old liberalisms, once in place, are self-enforcing or a workable constitution is self-enforcing.

The greatest threat to the survival of an immigrant cultural subgroup’s ways and norms is the next generation of the group itself. Their interests are often not served by the group’s static values and norms. In this, group liberalism has failed. To preserve the group’s character, the state would most likely have to intervene to coerce that generation into line. This coercion need not be so draconian as that of the Saudi Arabian morality enforcement squads (the *mutawa*), but it would be dispiriting for many people in the group. It would violate most aspects of liberalism, including the harm principle, and very likely, if the culture discriminates by gender, it would violate the rule of
law that requires equal treatment under law. In many of the cases argued in the recent explosion of multicultural arguments, it seems also likely to violate individualism and religious freedom.

At its worst, the violation of religious freedom is astonishing. For example, in the view of many Islamic clerics, apostasy from Islam is a capital offense. Therefore, Salman Rushdie was threatened with murder under a fatwa. It is a remarkable and distressing feature of claims for protecting culture or so-called group rights that they commonly do not address the reality of those claims and, in particular, their violation of the fundamental principles of liberalism. One can reject liberalism in defense of these claims, but it is perverse and wrong to suppose that these claims are or can be reformulated in liberal terms. They cannot be. There might be good moral defenses of various subcultural group practices, but liberalism cannot be distorted enough to provide a defense that merits the hallowed label liberal.

Incidentally, “group rights” is at least half an oxymoron. The individualism of rights collapses under the weight of a group. Moreover, groups of any numerical significance are sure to be very indistinct and poorly definable. Does Rushdie continue to be a member of the community of Muslims when he ceases to believe or when Islamic leaders target him for murder?

Liberalism in Moral Theories

With its individualist focus, liberalism seems consonant with the two leading moral theories of our time: utilitarianism and Kantianism. Kantianism might require a lot of groundwork to fit it to what is rightly framed as a consequentialist theory. Immanuel Kant famously asserted that justification of actions from their consequences is immoral, but he was not consistent in this odd view that would virtually rule out any serious understanding or justification of political institutions, whose usual purpose is to effect good consequences.

Writers from Bentham to Hobhouse have argued for a strong connection between liberal and utilitarian principles. Indeed, Bentham essentially derives liberalism from utilitarianism. The harm principle is readily seen as utilitarian, as are the rule of law and freedom of religious conscience, which are conceived of as individualist principles. Insofar as Kantian theories focus on the individual, they too must honor these principles.

Individualism and liberalism have often been associated with utilitarianism, perhaps merely because Mill and others took up all of these. But Mill would likely insist that they are logically coupled. Insofar as Kantian theory is individualist, it too tends to fit with liberalism through its implications for individual autonomy, which, with liberty, is an individual concern. Other moral theories generally do not seem to generalize straightforwardly to a political theory.

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See also Constitutionalism; Hobbes, Thomas; Individualism; Neoliberalism; Political Philosophy; Utilitarianism

Further Readings


This entry presents an overview of recent trends and developments in liberal international relations theory—both empirical and normative. An effort is made to highlight the link between contemporary liberal scholarship on international relations and the thought of classical liberal figures such as John Locke, Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, Giuseppe Mazzini, and John Stuart Mill. The first part of the essay introduces key liberal principles and ideas and identifies three different traditions of liberal thought on international relations. Thereafter, we discuss classical and contemporary theories on the relationship between liberal democracy and international peace, followed by an overview of related, recent scholarship on global governance and international cooperation among democracies. The final part of the essay briefly discusses two alternative liberal approaches to the ethics of military intervention and shows, in particular, how liberal theorists, while they all share a fundamental attachment to representative governance and human rights, can fundamentally differ in their support for coercive regime change.

Basic Liberal Principles and Institutions

Liberalism resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics—such as individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity—that all liberal democratic societies, by definition, share to some degree. Political theorists identify liberalism with an essential principle: the importance of the freedom of the individual. Above all, this is a belief in the importance of moral freedom, of the right to be treated and a duty to treat others as ethical subjects and not as objects or means only.

The ideal version of liberalism is marked by a shared commitment to four essential institutions. First, citizens possess juridical equality and other fundamental civic rights such as freedom of religion and the press. Second, the effective sovereigns of the state are representative legislatures deriving their authority from the consent of the electorate and exercising their representative authority free from all restraint apart from the requirement that basic civic rights be preserved. Most pertinent, for the impact of liberalism on foreign affairs, the state is subject to neither the external authority of other states nor the internal authority of special prerogatives held, for example, by monarchs or military bureaucracies over foreign policy. Third, the economy rests on a recognition of the rights of private property, including the ownership of means of production. Property is justified by individual acquisition (e.g., by labor) or by social agreement or social utility. This excludes state socialism or state capitalism, but it need not exclude market socialism or various forms of the mixed economy. Fourth, economic decisions are predominantly shaped by the forces of supply and demand, domestically and internationally, and are free from strict control by bureaucracies.

Locke, Smith, and Kant: Three Pillars of Liberal Internationalism

Liberal internationalism consists, at its most fundamental level, in the attempt to promote the aforementioned principles and institutions across national borders and apply variations thereof to international relations. The classical realists from Thucydides onward described an international state of war that could be mitigated, but not overcome, short of a world Leviathan. The classical liberals, with important variations, broke with this skeptical tradition and announced the possibility of a state of peace among independent, sovereign states.

Contemporary scholarship on liberalism and international relations looks back at three distinct traditions of liberalism, attributable to three groups of theorists: John Locke—the great founder of modern liberal individualism, who claimed that states have themselves rights derived from individual rights to life and liberty (political independence) and property (territorial integrity), thereby providing the liberal foundations of international law; Adam Smith, Baron de Montesquieu, and Joseph Schumpeter—brilliant explicators of commercial liberalism and what they saw as its natural result, liberal pacifism; and finally, Immanuel Kant and Giuseppe Mazzini—liberal republicans who theorized an internationalism that institutes peace among fellow liberal republics. The liberal republican tradition, while incorporating to some degree
both liberal individualism and commercial liberalism, has exerted the greatest influence on contemporary liberal international relations theory. It argues that liberal democracy leaves a coherent international legacy on foreign affairs: a separate peace. Liberal states are peaceful with each other, but they are also prone to make war on nonliberal states.

A Separate Peace Among Liberal Democracies

The claim that liberal constitutional states behave differently in their foreign relations goes back at least as far as Immanuel Kant and Thomas Paine, but attempts to demonstrate it empirically are more recent. In the 20th century, Clarence Streit (1938) first pointed out the tendency of modern liberal democracies to maintain peace among themselves, and Dean V. Babst (1972) was the first to find statistical support for the hypothesis. Over the past 3 decades, scholars have found strong empirical evidence for the existence of a separate peace among liberal democracies but not between democracies and nondemocracies. Critiques of the separate-peace proposition have focused largely on the underlying causal argument, suggesting that the interdemocratic peace might be simply a byproduct of bipolarity and related strategic alliance patterns during the Cold War (see, e.g., Henry Farber & Joanne Gowa, 1997).

Michael Doyle, in his 1997 book Ways of War and Peace, argues that two centuries of separate peace among liberal democracies cannot be dismissed as an epiphenomenon, or by-product, of strategic alliances; in fact, stable international alliance patterns among liberal democracies appear to be largely a consequence of shared liberal values and domestic institutions. Doyle develops an original explanation of the separate peace among liberal democracies based on Kant’s essay “Perpetual Peace.” In Doyle’s interpretation, Kant’s hypothetical peace treaty shows how liberal republics lead to a dichotomous international politics: peaceful relations—a pacific union—among similarly liberal states and a state of war between liberals and nondemocrats.

First, Kant viewed the republic, based on constitutionalism and popular representation, as the ideal form of government; he understood that republican governments would introduce various institutional restraints on foreign policy and ingrain the habit of respect for individual rights. Of course, we know today that domestic republican restraints do not automatically end war. (If they did, liberal states would not be warlike, which is far from the case.) Kant seems to have been well aware of this: He pointed out that institutional restraints merely introduce republican caution, or hesitation, in place of monarchical caprice. In line with this intuition, modern democratic liberalism does not need to assume either that public opinion directly rules foreign policy or that the entire governmental elite is liberal. It can instead assume that the elite typically manages public affairs but that potentially nonliberal members of the elite have reason to doubt that illiberal policies would be electorally sustained and endorsed by the majority of the democratic public. In other words, liberal states fight only for popular, ostensibly liberal purposes since elites need to be constantly concerned about domestic support for the war effort.

Second, Kant foresaw that liberal republics would progressively establish peace among themselves by means of the pacific union described in his Second Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace. Kant probably had in mind a mutual nonaggression pact or perhaps a collective security agreement with a rudimentary court of arbitration. Complementing the constitutional guarantee of caution, international law adds a second source—a pledge of peaceful respect. As republics emerge (the first source) and as culture progresses, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play; and this, now that caution characterizes policy, sets up the moral foundations for the liberal peace. Correspondingly, international law highlights the importance of Kantian publicity. Domestically, publicity helps ensure that the officials of republics act according to the principles they profess to hold just and the interests of the citizens they claim to represent. Internationally, free speech and the effective communication of accurate conceptions of the political life of foreign peoples are essential to establish and preserve the understanding on which the guarantee of respect depends.

Kant’s categorical imperative of course requires that all statesmen and liberal republics reject imperialism and international aggression on moral
grounds. But liberal republics cannot simply assume reciprocal peace with all other states; instead, they understand that states subject to international anarchy are potentially aggressive. Only republics tend to be consensual and constrained, and they are therefore presumed capable by other republics of reliable mutual accommodation. The experience of cooperation among republics helps engender further cooperative behavior when the consequences of state policy are unclear but (potentially) mutually beneficial. In short, fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity. Both presumptions may be accurate. Each, however, may in particular cases also be self-fulfilling.

Finally, Kant’s cosmopolitan law, discussed in his “Third Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace,” adds material incentives to moral commitments. The cosmopolitan law and the related right to hospitality permit the spirit of commerce to take hold of every nation sooner or later, thus creating incentives for states to promote peace and try to avert war. Building on this classical liberal intuition, modern economic theory holds that under a cooperative international division of labor and free trade according to comparative advantage, each national economy is better off than it would have been under autarchy—hence, each participant acquires an incentive to solve disputes peacefully and avoid policies that would lead others to break mutually advantageous economic ties. Furthermore, the international market removes difficult decisions of production and distribution from the direct sphere of state policy. As a result, a foreign state does not appear to be directly responsible for unfavorable economic outcomes—states can stand aside from, and to some degree above, contentious market rivalries and be ready to step in to resolve crises. Finally, the interdependence of commerce and the related international contacts of state officials help create crosscutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation. The variety of ties among liberal states across numerous issue areas also ensures that no single conflict sour an entire relationship by setting off a spiral of reciprocated retaliation.

In recent years, some scholars, such as Georg Cavallar and John MacMillan, have taken issue with Doyle’s interpretation of Kant as the father of modern democratic peace theory. According to these critics, Kant’s pacific union, the foedus pacificum outlined in his second definitive article, was probably intended to include all states and not just liberal republics. Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati (2009) go one step further and suggest that the first to explicitly anticipate the emergence of a separate peace among constitutional democracies, based on a defensive pact of alliance against despotic states, was not Kant but Giuseppe Mazzini, the 19th-century revolutionary thinker and democratic political activist.

Against these views, Doyle holds that there are good reasons to view Kant as the founding figure of modern democratic peace theory, and he interprets Kant as requiring that peace must be established by a rightful constitution involving all three definitive articles. Most current scholarship on the democratic peace focuses either exclusively on the role of liberal-democratic institutions, liberal norms, or economic interdependence. But Kantian liberal peace theory, as developed by Doyle, is neither solely institutional, nor solely ideological, nor solely economic: It is only together that the three specific strands of liberal institutions, liberal ideas, and the transnational ties that follow from them plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace among states that meet the three criteria embedded in the three definitive articles. Statistical data sets on the liberal peace do not adequately code for these three factors together. As noted by Bruce Russett and John Oneal, the most thorough recent empirical test of the liberal peace hypothesis confirms the separate positive effects of democratic institutions and international trade (as well as membership in international organizations), but it does not separately code for liberal norms and related interdemocratic trust, which may indeed be difficult to measure through quantitative analysis.

**Global Governance and Cooperation Among Democracies**

Classical liberals such as Bentham, Kant, and Mazzini anticipated that international institutions (especially arbitration courts but also more advanced international federations with their own parliamentary assemblies) would reduce uncertainty and improve mutual trust among states,
thereby attenuating the security dilemma and actively promoting international cooperation and world peace. In recent decades, international relations theorists have systematically developed and corroborated this intuition.

Relying on new insights from game theory, scholars during the 1980s and 1990s emphasized that so-called international regimes, consisting of agreed-upon international norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, can help states effectively coordinate their policies and collaborate in the production of international public goods, such as free trade, arms control, and environmental protection. Especially, if embedded in formal multilateral institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), regimes crucially improve the availability of information among states in a given issue area, thereby promoting reciprocity and enhancing the reputational costs of noncompliance. As noted by Robert Keohane, institutionalized multilateralism also reduces strategic competition over relative gains and thus further advances international cooperation.

Most international regime theorists accepted Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) neorealist assumption of states as black boxes—that is, unitary and rational actors with given interests. Little or no attention was paid to the impact on international cooperation of domestic political processes and dynamics. Likewise, regime scholarship largely disregarded the arguably crucial question of whether prolonged interaction in an institutionalized international setting can fundamentally change states’ interests or preferences over outcomes (as opposed to preferences over strategies), thus engendering positive feedback loops of increased overall cooperation. For these reasons, international regime theory is not, properly speaking, liberal, and the term neoliberal institutionalism frequently used to identify it is somewhat misleading.

It is only over the past decade or so that liberal international relations theorists have begun to systematically study the relationship between domestic politics and institutionalized international cooperation or global governance. This new scholarship seeks to explain in particular the close international cooperation among liberal democracies as well as higher-than-average levels of delegation by democracies to complex multilateral bodies, such as the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NAFTA, and the WTO (see, e.g., John Ikenberry, 2001; Helen Milner & Andrew Moravcsik, 2009). The reasons that make liberal democracies particularly enthusiastic about international cooperation are manifold: First, transnational actors such as nongovernmental organizations and private corporations thrive in liberal democracies, and they frequently advocate increased international cooperation; second, elected democratic officials rely on delegation to multilateral bodies such as the WTO or the EU to commit to a stable policy line and to internationally lock in fragile domestic policies and constitutional arrangements; and finally, powerful liberal democracies, such as the United States and its allies, voluntarily bind themselves into complex global governance arrangements to demonstrate strategic restraint and create incentives for other states to cooperate, thereby reducing the costs for maintaining international order.

Recent scholarship, such as that of Charles Boehmer and colleagues, has also confirmed the classical liberal intuition that formal international institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) or NATO, independently contribute to peace, especially when they are endowed with sophisticated administrative structures and information-gathering capacities. In short, research on global governance and especially on the relationship between democracy and international cooperation is thriving, and it usefully complements liberal scholarship on the democratic peace.

The Ethics of Military Intervention: Should Liberal Democracy Be Imposed?

Liberal thinkers on international relations have always displayed a keen interest in the ethical dimension of foreign policy, based on the assumption that ideas, as well as material interests, ultimately determine state behavior. Thus, questions about the admissibility and desirability of military intervention to spread or uphold liberal values abroad were central to the political thought of seminal figures, such as Kant, Mazzini, and Mill. The classical realists, for their part, did not necessarily dismiss normative concerns entirely (unlike their contemporary followers); yet they were skeptical about the possibility for moral behavior in an
Contemporary liberal theory on military intervention consciously builds on the classics. At the risk of oversimplification, one can identify two groups of liberal scholars in the ongoing normative debate on military intervention and regime change: cosmopolitan interventionists, on the one hand, and liberal internationalists, on the other.

Cosmopolitan interventionists typically build on Kant’s moral theory, but they only loosely follow his political thought. They assert that everyone who has the ability to intervene militarily in the face of systematic human rights violations also has a moral duty to do so, subject to criteria of effectiveness and/or proportionality. For cosmopolitans, if a state is tyrannical and systematically oppresses its own population, it “forfeits any respect for its independence.” As noted by Brian Barry (1998), by implication, “international [military] intervention to displace the government and, if necessary, place the country under international trusteeship” (p. 160) is always prima facie morally justified and indeed required, although prudential considerations might ultimately counsel against the use of force. (See also David Luban, 1980.)

Liberal internationalists, on the other hand, have tended to place greater value on state sovereignty and the attendant international duty of nonintervention. Kant favored absolute nonintervention as a matter of principle: He thought it necessary to stabilize international relations and to ensure that each political community could freely determine its own way of life. Mazzini and Mill were not categorically opposed to military intervention (e.g., they justified it to end protracted civil wars and to save helpless populations from outright slaughter); yet they vigorously opposed the use of force for the purpose of promoting liberty and democracy more generally. They sensed that unless tyranny was defeated domestically, with economic and diplomatic assistance from the outside but crucially without foreign military intervention, any liberty achieved would remain exceedingly fragile and could be hardly sustained in the long run.

Contemporary liberal internationalists such as Michael Walzer (1977) and John Rawls (1999) typically justify (but contrary to the cosmopolitan interventionists do not require) humanitarian military intervention as a last resort in the face of the worst human rights violations, such as state-sponsored slaughter or genocide, suggesting that sovereignty can be disregarded under similar circumstances. But they crucially insist that military intervention ought to be multilaterally authorized and overseen, ideally by the UN Security Council, if it is to be legitimate. The underlying assumption is that collective authorization and oversight reduce the risk of usurpation by powerful states (Doyle, 2006). Most contemporary liberal internationalists follow their classical forebears and reject policies of forcible democratization on both principled and consequentialist grounds. Democratic transformation is best fostered peacefully and indirectly through trade, investment, and foreign aid. These can help diversify societies, and diversified, growing societies tend to demand responsive governance in the long run.

Finally, most contemporary liberals agree that becoming a democracy is hardly a cure-all. Research suggests that overall and on average, the diffusion and consolidation of liberal democracy within countries reduces the chances of both international and civil war. However, there is also evidence that transitions to democracy often produce political turmoil at the domestic level, unless they are carefully managed. Where the rule of law and public institutions are weak, political elites will be tempted to use nationalist rhetoric and violence to achieve and hold office, which may result in international or civil war. Furthermore, as Doyle (1983) pointed out, the very respect for individual rights and shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among liberal democracies may establish grounds for additional conflict in relations between liberal and nonliberal societies. Evidence of this can be found today in relations between the United States and its liberal allies, on the one hand, and a resurgent Russia, emerging China, or defiant Iran, on the other. In short, liberal internationalism is no recipe: It merely offers a set of normative guidelines and empirical hypotheses—some of which are indeed supported by solid evidence—and it needs constant, prudent vigilance to avoid crusades and misguided interventions.

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Liberalization

Liberalization is a process that reduces state control over the lives of persons subject to the authority of a state. It may have both economic and political dimensions. Economic liberalization reduces state intervention in the marketplace. Political liberalization expands individual liberty and rights, including the right to speak freely against state authorities and to organize with others to oppose those authorities. Economic and political liberalization may or may not go together. Political liberalization may or may not lead to democratization, which also enables a broadly inclusive electorate to unseat an incumbent government.

The concept of liberalization must be understood in the context of liberalism, the dominant modern political philosophy. Liberalism first emerged in the 17th century as a challenge to the notion that monarchs had God-given, absolute authority. Thomas Hobbes defended absolute authority but grounded it not in divine will but rather in the hypothetical agreement of the subjects to yield entirely to a sovereign their natural rights to defend life and property.

John Locke rejected Hobbes's argument. While agreeing that governmental authority is indeed grounded in the consent of the governed, Locke held that people would leave the state of nature and set up a commonwealth only if they could thereby protect their natural rights to life, liberty, and property. Rather than cede their natural rights to a sovereign, the people became the sovereign by virtue of the social contract through which they established the commonwealth. Monarchs were no more than magistrates who could be removed by the sovereign people if they failed to protect natural rights.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in turn, rejected Locke’s emphasis on individual rights, returning instead to the Hobbesian concept of ceding natural rights to an absolute sovereign. But Rousseau also rejected Hobbes’s idea of a sovereign separate from the people. He envisioned the whole people, acting together, a radically democratic polity in which individual rights had no place. Locke’s liberalism was thus bracketed by two absolutisms.

Liberalism after Locke remained committed to protecting individual liberty, but it left behind the
conventional device of the social contract. From the late 18th through the 19th centuries, liberals developed the idea of utility, or usefulness, as the central tool for discerning the good. Jeremy Bentham produced the most systematic formulation of utilitarianism as a means of judging what is good and bad. Adam Smith developed the quintessential defense of the free market as the best way to maximize productivity in the economic sphere. John Stuart Mill, the most influential liberal of the 19th century, elaborated utilitarianism as the foundation for a classic defense of individual liberty as well as for the enfranchisement of workers and women in a representative government.

Liberalism began with the project of defending individual liberties against encroachment by the state. The American Declaration of Independence is a classic statement of that sort of liberalism. Increasingly, though, liberalism was also concerned with the growing problem of democracy. The American Constitution, taking the form of an explicit contract among the people to set up a government, is just as concerned with protection from majority tyranny as it is with guarding against individual or oligarchic despotism. And John Stuart Mill, for all his advocacy of expanded suffrage, feared the tyranny of an unenlightened mass.

Liberalism thus betrays a fundamental tension. It denies God-given or traditional rank and privilege and posits the equality of all persons, yet enshrines a free marketplace that leads inexorably to capitalism and growing inequality of power and of wealth. Political liberalism presumes equality and opens the way to democracy but fears the threat to liberty posed by majority rule.

Liberalization, then, should be seen as movement toward liberalism, complete with the contradictions and tensions we have just explored. Its contemporary usage in political science may pertain either to the adoption of economic policies that reduce state intervention or to the opening of political processes to broader exercise of individual rights and liberties.

One major controversy concerns the extent of the association between economic and political liberalization. During the 1980s and 1990s, advocates of the Washington Consensus (the set of economic policies to be implemented by government in countries that are in a situation of economic crisis and recommended by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, both of them based in Washington, D.C.) expected that adoption of stringent economic liberalization (i.e., neoliberalism) would lead inevitably to political liberalization and democratization. This expectation was supported by the strong historical correlation between capitalist economic development and political democracy.

Nevertheless, recent evidence on this issue is far from conclusive. The heyday of the Washington Consensus did coincide with a substantial wave of democratization during the same period. On the other hand, a good case can be made that stringent economic liberalization imposes severe stresses on the society and thereby challenges the incumbent government. Many of those incumbent governments in the 1980s and 1990s were authoritarian; implementing economic liberalization tended to increase opposition and bring pressure for liberalization and eventual democratization. However, in other cases, such as the newly democratic Russia in the 1990s, economic liberalization promoted renewed movement in an authoritarian direction.

Two outstanding examples of rapid economic development strongly suggest that there is no association between economic and political liberalization. Singapore has had a vigorous capitalist economy since independence while maintaining an authoritarian regime with relatively low levels of repression but no serious challenge to the regime. And China, since the death of Mao Zedong in 1978, has seen a hugely successful economic liberalization coupled with maintenance of authoritarian control by the Chinese Communist Party, with no significant political liberalization.

A second issue concerns the relationship between liberalization and democratization. The earliest democracies (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) all went from political liberalization to democratization over decades. The same may be said about some later-emerging democracies, such as Costa Rica, South Korea, or Taiwan. Even in these cases of successful democratization, liberalization was sometimes used by incumbent rulers in attempts to reduce pressure for democratization, as in Costa Rica in the 1940s. Where democratization was successful, it was often in spite of such prophylactic liberalization.
Liberalization

There have also been successful cases of prophylactic liberalization—notably Mexico and Botswana. Mexico arguably had the most successful authoritarian regime of the 20th century, with one ruling party (the Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI) in power for more than 70 years. The regime used repression when it had to, but fundamentally, the party’s survival depended on a façade of regular elections, which were invariably won by the PRI without egregiously obvious fraud, and substantial freedom of speech and press. Only toward the end of its rule, from 1988 to 2000, did it become obvious that the party had to use fraud and coercion to win. It was at that point that the PRI finally lost the presidency to an opposition candidate.

A similar pattern may be seen in Botswana, which was long cited as Africa’s most successful democracy (until the South African transition to majority rule in 1996). As in Mexico, the same party has ruled the country for decades (since independence in 1966), but it operates through a regime with regular elections and substantial political liberties. In Botswana, the ruling party keeps winning because there is simply no viable opposition alternative. Fraud and repression play a smaller role here than in Mexico, but Botswana is still a one-party-dominant, liberalized regime and not a full-fledged democracy.

A final issue concerns the variables that promote or retard political liberalization. A substantial literature on transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes focuses on the conditions of liberalization. A key question is the balance between internal and external pressures. An authoritarian regime that faces no organized internal opposition is extremely unlikely to liberalize, much less democratize. On the other hand, an opposition that is strong and unwilling to compromise with the regime may lead the latter to dig in and refuse to liberalize. As Adam Przeworski formulated the problem, liberalization is most likely when there are powerful regime elements that incline toward liberalizing reforms as a means of keeping power, while powerful opposition elements favor negotiating with the regime for liberalization, hoping that greater political openness will lead to democratization. An inclination toward reform may result from deteriorating economic conditions or other chronic problems that render the authoritarian regime less secure. In such a situation, regime reformers will favor liberalization as a prophylactic against democratization, while opposition moderates will see it as a step toward democratization. Each side may well think it has deceived and used the other, but they can nonetheless agree on moves toward liberalization.

Liberalization may also be a response to external pressures. Samuel Huntington showed that there have been three major global waves of democratization since the early 19th century, separated by periods in which democracy was in retreat. The waves were powered by great power policies in favor of democracy as well as political contagion from neighboring countries. For example, the Third Wave, running from the 1970s to the 1990s, saw the United States and its European allies strongly pushing for democratization of authoritarian regimes in Latin America in the 1980s and in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Facing such pressure, even authoritarian regimes that did not face powerful internal opposition were nonetheless constrained, at a minimum, to liberalize.

In conclusion, liberalization is a movement toward either economic or political liberalism, enacted by an incumbent government. Economic liberalization is typically enacted under outside pressure, with the hope that a relatively unfettered market will benefit all, even the least advantaged. Political liberalization may respond to internal pressure or external pressure and is typically enacted in hopes of heading off full-fledged democratization. More often than not, however, liberalization opens the way to democratization.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Democratization; Globalization; Liberalism; Locke, John; Military Rule; Neoliberalism; Opposition; Rights; State; Trade Liberalization; Utilitarianism

Further Readings
Libertarianism refers to a normative political theory that gives top priority to the value of freedom of choice over other competing political values; moreover, libertarianism understands a person to possess freedom of choice so long as no other agent coercively interferes with his or her choices. Since the state characteristically acts by defining laws and coercively enforcing them, libertarians' hostility to coercion typically leads them to conclude that only a very minimal state is legitimate—namely, a state whose only purposes are to protect citizens against acts of coercion (murder, assault, theft, and so on) and acts of fraud in a system of free enterprise. As a result, libertarians regard the modern welfare state to be illegitimate.

Defined in this way, libertarianism names a family of political theories rather than a single theory; diversity among libertarian political theories arises depending on just how strong a priority is given to the value of freedom of choice (a stronger priority tending to push libertarianism in the direction of anarchist political theories, such as anarcho-capitalism). Diversity among libertarian political theories also arises depending on the type of argument a libertarian uses to justify assigning this priority to freedom of choice. Some libertarians justify this priority in a consequentialist fashion—that is, by appealing to the beneficial consequences (understood in terms of happiness or efficiency) of allowing individuals the freedom to act on their choices. By contrast, non-consequentialist libertarians adopt a rights-based approach to justifying libertarianism: Some regard a natural right to freedom of choice to be an intuitively obvious moral truth, whereas others purport to derive this right from an even more basic moral principle, such as a principle of self-ownership (i.e., full ownership of one's body and labor). These different foundational choices will in some cases lead to differences in practical recommendations (e.g., regarding how to treat economic monopolies, how to raise funds for legitimate government activities, and how to deal with pollution and other environmental issues).

Historically, many libertarians trace their roots back to the seminal writings of John Locke, in particular his *Second Treatise on Government* (1689), a founding text of liberalism, which from a principle of self-ownership argues in favor of strong rights to property and in favor of limited government (though it is a matter of scholarly dispute exactly how limited a Lockean state would be). In light of this claimed historical pedigree and further historical connections with past influential thinkers, such as Adam Smith, some libertarians prefer to call themselves *classical liberals*, as distinct from *egalitarian liberals*, who depart from classical liberalism's strong defense of free markets and property rights. Indeed, some libertarians refuse to apply the term *liberal* to anyone but classical liberals, regarding egalitarian liberal as a corruption of the term insofar as it envisions an expansive role for the state; meanwhile, some egalitarian liberals return the favor by refusing to consider libertarians as liberals, on the grounds that libertarianism in principle permits economic inequalities of such a size as to make a mockery of liberalism's core commitment to equal citizenship. What can be safely said is that libertarians and egalitarian liberals share both the core liberal commitment to constitutionalism, understood as government under the rule of law, and the core liberal commitment to the robust protection of civil liberties such as freedom of expression, religion, and association. In this sense, both libertarians and egalitarian liberals are heirs to the intellectual tradition that has its roots in thinkers such as Locke.
Natural Rights Libertarianism

Perhaps reflecting libertarianism’s Lockean heritage, the most familiar form of libertarianism is the form (mentioned above) that appeals to a natural right to freedom of choice grounded in a moral principle of self-ownership, according to which we have a property right to our body and labor. Those who accept such a principle of self-ownership find it appealing for its ability to explain, in one fell swoop, the wrongness of phenomena such as slavery, murder, rape, and other forms of bodily assault as well as the wrongness of horrifying hypothetical cases such as the forced harvesting of, say, kidneys and eyes in order to meet the need for donor organs. Indeed, this principle establishes an extremely strong moral presumption against any use of nonconsensual physical force, the one permissible exception being said to be the use of nonconsensual physical force to prevent or punish violations of the self-ownership principle itself. On this basis, libertarians conclude that governments must limit their functions exclusively to the prevention of force and fraud. (Fraud is understood as the breaking of a contract. Libertarians do not judge the coercion inherent in enforcing contracts to be objectionable since in making a contract, signatories have consented to be liable to coercion in case of noncompliance.) A government that adopts functions beyond the prevention of force and fraud violates the moral presumption against coercion. Thus, for instance, a government that bans the consumption of recreational drugs has violated the principle of self-ownership, which permits individuals to do to their bodies whatever they please, so long as they do not violate others’ self-ownership rights.

Less obvious, but no less true, according to libertarians, is the claim that individuals’ self-ownership rights are violated when a government builds a park or library or provides some other public good. For provision of these goods requires resources, and since a state acquires its resources via coercive taxation, libertarians argue that such state-supplied goods in effect conscript citizens into working to supply such goods, whether they desire them or not. Hence, the famous claim of Robert Locke, one of the 20th century’s best known libertarians, that “taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor” (Robert Nozick, 1974, p. 169). Along similar lines, libertarians frequently denounce taxation as a form of state-sponsored theft, at least when the taxes are used for ends other than the prevention of force and fraud.

This condemnation of taxation as a form of theft, however, presumes that a person has a natural property right to retain in full whatever he or she comes to possess as a result of economic transactions or gift giving—a right that is violated when a state appropriates a portion of these possessions for its own purposes. In response, critics of libertarianism argue that a natural property right to external possessions does not straightaway follow from rights of ownership to one’s body and labor. And if in counterreply libertarians assert that owning one’s labor entitles one to sell it in exchange for some external good (such as money), critics will insist that this merely pushes the question back a level, for it must be asked how the person from whom one acquired the external good came himself or herself to possess a property right to that good. Perhaps the answer is that this person acquired it in exchange with an even earlier possessor. But then the same question can be asked of the earlier possessor. And so on. It follows that a chain of economic and gift transactions must stretch back into time and at some point terminate in an act whereby a person comes to acquire some previously unowned resource (say, a hitherto uninhabited piece of land). According to critics of libertarianism, this act of original acquisition is left unexplained by a principle of self-ownership, for it is unclear how ownership of one’s body and labor could create a title to some previously unowned external good distinct from one’s body.

Undoubtedly, the most famous attempt to use the principle of self-ownership to justify the original acquisition of unowned resources is Locke’s own attempt. In what has come to be known as the labor-mixing argument, Locke in essence argued that since you own your labor, it follows that when you mix your labor with some previously unowned resource (tilling the soil, say, or gathering apples from a tree), you come to own the resulting mixture (cultivated land, a bushel of apples, etc.). Well-known objections to this argument exist, however; Locke himself worried about excessive acquisition and insisted in response to this worry that an act of acquisition must leave “enough and as good” of unowned resources for others to acquire. Assessing the labor-mixing argument as
well as the more general challenge of justifying the original acquisition of unowned goods remains an active area of debate. Indeed, within this debate, a group of political theorists who call themselves left-libertarians has arisen. Such theorists accept the principle of self-ownership of one’s body and labor but argue that external goods initially belong to everyone in an egalitarian manner. On this view, private appropriation is permissible, but individuals who appropriate more than their equal share of external goods owe others compensation. On these grounds, some left-libertarians have even endorsed a measure of income redistribution as a form of compensation for hitherto uncompensated past acts of appropriation.

**Consequentialist Libertarianism**

As earlier indicated, not all libertarians base their theory on a principle of self-ownership or on any other principle from which a natural right to freedom of choice is said to flow. Instead of looking to an abstract principle of rights, these libertarians argue that a minimal government restricted to preventing force and fraud leads to better overall future consequences than do more expansive governments: Resources will be used more efficiently, markets will respond rationally to people’s needs, people will do a better job of looking after themselves, and hence, the society will in general be more happy and prosperous. This style of reasoning is consequentialist in nature, consequentialism being the name for the moral doctrine according to which the right action to perform is the one with the best overall consequences. (Utilitarianism is the best known, but not the only, consequentialist moral theory.)

The main consequentialist arguments for libertarianism comprise arguments based on incentives and an argument based on the practical constraints faced by governments. Those who appeal to incentives argue that the public provision of goods found in welfare states dampens private incentives to work and to invest in one’s skills; they argue that holding property in common reduces individual incentives to care for it (the so-called tragedy of the commons) and that, by contrast, a competitive free market (which entails both the promise of profit and the peril of being outdone by one’s rivals) creates incentives for firms to use the most efficient means to produce goods that consumers desire and creates incentives for individuals to acquire skills that are of use in this production.

A second, related consequentialist argument for libertarianism stresses the practical problems that governments face in gathering the information they need to make good decisions; this argument is most famously associated with Friedrich August Hayek. Hayek noted that prices in a competitive market function as signals, widely dispersing useful information to potential producers (e.g., a sharp rise in price means a valued product is undersupplied). Prices also give people an incentive to respond to this information by changing production patterns. For instance, a good that is undersupplied relative to demand can fetch a high price, thereby giving producers incentive to supply more of the good, whereas a good that is oversupplied will experience a drop in price, thereby giving producers of that good incentive to switch production to more desired goods. Hayek argued that no individual or group of individuals (such as the planning board of a socialist economy) could possibly replicate the informational and incentive effects of a free market system of competitively determined prices; he concluded from this that the free market was the most rational system of allocating goods.

These consequentialist arguments have been tremendously influential among mainstream economists, though most such economists do not end up endorsing as pure a form of laissez-faire capitalism as libertarians desire. For a large body of economic doctrine is devoted to the topic of market failures—situations in which the market fails to respond to need or fails to allocate resources efficiently—and many economists conclude on consequentialist grounds that such failures call for government intervention. Examples of market failure discussed in the literature include natural monopolies, externalities (a term that refers to costs of production that producers externalize, i.e., push off onto others—pollution being a key example), and public goods that are undersupplied by the free market owing to the free-rider problem (when the costs and benefits of common resources are not shared fairly). Consequentialist libertarians respond to these worries either by proposing market solutions to these issues (thereby denying that they are genuine cases of market failure) or by agreeing that
markets are less than wholly efficient in such cases but then arguing that government interventions would be even more wasteful (a line of argument most closely associated with the public choice school of economics).

**Criticisms of Libertarianism**

Libertarians face criticism from both the Right and the Left. Right-leaning critics who are anarcho-capitalists object to libertarianism’s willingness to endorse any state at all, whereas Left-leaning critics argue that libertarianism’s case for the minimal state assumes a flawed account of freedom, fails to recognize competing values such as fairness and the meeting of basic needs, and ignores the social inputs that are a necessary part of any system of production, so that one’s possessions are never purely the fruits of one’s own labor. While of course these are not the only criticisms made of libertarianism, they are among the most prominent, and each will be discussed in turn.

**Anarcho-Capitalism**

Anarcho-capitalists such as Murray Rothbard argue that the functions performed by a libertarian minimal state can and ought to be performed instead by private firms operating in a capitalist free market system. Hence, instead of a public system of police, law, and courts, anarcho-capitalists envision a competitive market of private defense agencies, each offering potential customers its own code of protection, complete with its own security agents to enforce this code and its own courtlike procedures for interpreting and applying it. Nor, according to anarcho-capitalists, would there be need for a government to print and regulate currency; there would likewise be a competitive market of private currencies. And so on for the remaining functions typically associated with government. In short, anarcho-capitalists argue that insofar as libertarianism approves of a minimal state rather than trusting individuals to meet all their needs through a system of free exchange, it shows insufficient regard for freedom of choice.

Consequentialist libertarians have an easier time replying to the criticisms of anarcho-capitalists than do natural rights libertarians, for consequentialists can simply argue that a minimal state would in fact do a better job of preventing violence than would private defensive agencies (who may end up fighting each other)—or at least, that it is not sufficiently clear that anarcho-capitalism would deliver better results to make it worth the risks of dismantling the state entirely. By contrast, natural rights libertarians must argue that the minimal state does not violate the economic rights of entrepreneurs who would like to set up their own private defense agency to compete with the public system of police and courts, but who are denied this opportunity by the minimal state’s coercively enforced monopoly on the supply of protection.

One celebrated libertarian argument in this regard was made by Nozick, who in his book *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* argued that in a competitive market of private defense agencies, a dominant defense agency would eventually arise and establish a monopoly; hence, a minimal state would in essence naturally arise from within an anarcho-capitalist system.

**Criticisms of Libertarian Liberty**

Some critics from the Left argue against libertarians’ account of freedom of choice. One form of this criticism argues that libertarianism’s exclusive focus on physical coercion is too narrow, for concentrated economic power can itself be a form of coercive power: Monopolists can charge exorbitant prices for their goods, and business owners can wield their threat of firing to extort actions from desperate employees that the employees would never otherwise consent to perform. In this view, freedom does not necessarily increase as government shrinks, for without antitrust laws, employee protections, and other legal instruments, many individuals may find themselves the unfree victims of economic coercion.

Another criticism of the libertarian account of freedom of choice argues against libertarianism’s definition of freedom exclusively in terms of the absence of coercive interference. Freedom so defined is referred to as negative liberty, and the critics in question argue that freedom is instead best understood as autonomy or positive liberty, where the autonomy or positive liberty to perform some action requires not just the absence of coercive interference blocking that action but also the presence of a genuine ability to perform that
action. On this definition, for instance, a person who is too poor to afford a university education is not free to attend university and a wheelchair-bound person is not free to work at a second-story business if there are no elevators. Accordingly, these nonlibertarians conclude that overall liberty is enhanced by a state that relieves poverty through redistributive taxation or that requires accommodations for the disabled.

Libertarians typically respond to these criticisms by denying that economic power amounts to a form of coercive power and by arguing that it is a mistake to define liberty in terms of ability. For instance, in support of this latter claim, a libertarian might argue that although most people lack the mental ability to become physics professors, it would be misleading to conclude (as proponents of positive liberty apparently must) that most people lack the freedom to become physics professors.

**Competing Values**

Libertarianism is also criticized for assigning freedom of choice priority over all other values, it being argued instead that in some contexts values such as fairness or the meeting of basic needs ought to take priority over freedom. Regarding the value of fairness, for instance, critics point out that libertarians reject equal opportunity provisions, such as antidiscrimination employment laws and publicly financed primary and secondary schools; these critics then argue that without such provisions, one’s life prospects could be unfairly diminished by accidents of birth, such as one’s race or sex or one’s family’s socioeconomic class. Regarding the value of meeting basic needs, critics, for example, argue that the health needs of a large number of individuals would go unmet in a libertarian society since no health insurance firm can make a profit by insuring individuals with known chronic and serious health problems. A common libertarian reply to these charges is to argue that private charity is the best response to these problems of poverty and health care need.

**Society as a Partner in Production**

Some critics of libertarianism defend the legitimacy of taxation by challenging the libertarian claim that individuals have a right to retain in full whatever they come to possess by exchange in a market system. This challenge proceeds by arguing that a person’s possessions are not the result of exclusively individual efforts but result instead from individual efforts conjoined with a set of social conditions that make the individual’s prosperity possible. According to this view, one person’s success is never wholly self-made but depends on factors such as the prevailing level of education in one’s society, the prevailing level of technology, and the prevailing level of wealth; also crucial are the levels of government investment in infrastructure (e.g., highways and utilities), government stabilization of the economy (e.g., controlling the money supply), and more generally, the cultural capital of one’s society (by which is meant the benign cultural practices and social institutions that ensure that the daily interactions of thousands, or millions, of one’s fellow citizens are by and large peaceful). For these reasons, according to these critics, society should be viewed as a silent partner that is ever present alongside individual efforts of production; taxation thus represents society’s due return on its contribution to production. If society (through its duly elected representatives in government) decides to spend this social wage on additional purposes over and above those of preventing force and fraud, such as the construction of parks and libraries and support for the arts, say, then according to these critics, that is its prerogative. Libertarians commonly respond that the notion of society employed in this argument is at best a vague and unhelpful generalization and at worst a collectivist illusion denying the moral primacy of the individual.

**Conclusion**

Debates between libertarians and their critics were a vibrant part of 20th-century political theory, and the debate looks set to last throughout the 21st century and beyond, in part owing to developments such as an increasingly global economy. Many libertarians welcome this development, viewing a world of free economic agents as an appealing prospect. By contrast, many non-libertarians view economic globalization with alarm, seeing it as a threat to values such as fairness and autonomy. As such, the stage is set for
the development of new arguments and ideas in this long-running debate.

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See also Anarchy; Capitalism; Equality; Justice; Liberalism; Liberty; Locke, John; Market Failure; Normative Political Theory; Property; Rights; Utilitarianism; Welfare State

Further Readings

**LIBERTY**

Two postulates encapsulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of particular instances of freedom and unfreedom, respectively:

F Postulate: A person is free to $\varphi$ if and only if he is able to $\varphi$. (Alternative formulations of this postulate are “A person is free to $\varphi$ if and only if it is possible for him to $\varphi$” and “A person is free to $\varphi$ if and only if he is unprevented from $\varphi$-ing.”)

U Postulate: A person is unfree to $\varphi$ if and only if both of the following conditions obtain: (1) he would be able to $\varphi$ in the absence of the second of these conditions and (2) irrespective of whether he actually endeavors to $\varphi$, he is directly or indirectly prevented from $\varphi$-ing by some action(s) or some disposition(s) to perform some action(s) on the part of some other person(s).

In each of these formulations, the Greek letter $\varphi$ (which stands for any germane verb or set of verbs plus any accompanying words) can denote one’s performance of some action, one’s existence in some condition, or one’s undergoing of some process. Throughout this entry, incidentally, the terms *freedom* and *liberty* are used interchangeably.

These two postulates, which will be explicated further below, are associated with the idea of negative liberty. The principal concern of this entry is to distinguish negative liberty from certain other types of freedom. After an initial elaboration of the nature of negative liberty itself through some amplification of the F and U Postulates, this entry will draw four principal contrasts: between negative liberty and positive liberty, between negative liberty and moralized liberty, between negative liberty and republican liberty, and between physical freedom and deontic freedom.

**Negative Liberty: Two Postulates**

The F Postulate distills the nature of negative liberty as it exists in particular instantiations. However, the U Postulate does not comprehend all the situations in which particular instances of negative liberty are absent. That is, the two postulates are not jointly exhaustive in their coverage. Apart from being free to $\varphi$ or being unfree to $\varphi$, somebody can be simply not free to $\varphi$. In other words, *is not free* and *is unfree* are not equivalent; the latter predicate entails the former, but not vice versa. (What are equivalent are the predicates *is not free* and *is unable.*) Likewise, the predicates *is free* and *is not unfree* are not equivalent. The former entails the latter but not vice versa.

For example, although Joe is not able to run a mile under 3 minutes and is therefore not free to run a mile under 3 minutes, it is not the case that
he is unfree to run a mile in such a short span of
time. His lack of freedom to run a mile so rapidly
is a mere inability rather than an instance of
unfreedom. It is a mere inability because it is not
due to any action(s) or disposition(s) to perform
some action(s) on the part of anyone else. Instead,
it is a purely natural limitation.

Hence, the concept of freedom as explicated
here is trivalent rather than bivalent. Instead of
separating people’s abilities and inabilities dichot-
omously into freedoms and unfreedoms, it sepa-
rates them trichotomously into freedoms, unfree-
doms, and mere inabilities. The mere inabilities are
infinitely expansive in their scope, for most of the
countless ways in which any person falls short of
omnipotence are due to natural limitations rather
than to the conduct of other people.

Why should a trivalent conception of freedom
be favored over a bivalent conception? To glimpse
the answer to this question, we have to take
account of another feature of the F and U Postulates.
Those postulates deal with particular instances of
freedom and unfreedom, rather than with any-
one’s overall quantity of liberty. A particular free-
dom is an ability to engage in a certain mode of
conduct, to be in a certain condition, or to alter
one’s situation in a certain way. Any particular
freedom has a content that differentiates it from
other particular freedoms. A person’s overall level
of liberty is a complicated aggregate of his or her
myriad particular freedoms and also of his or her
myriad particular unfreedoms. This entry will not
concern itself with the details of the complex cal-
culations by which each person’s freedoms and
unfreedoms (or, rather, each person’s combina-
tions of freedoms and combinations of unfree-
doms) are aggregated. Rather, the key point for
present purposes is that, although the F and U
Postulates are concerned only with particular lib-
erties and unfreedoms, they have been formulated
with an eye toward the ultimate aggregation of
those liberties and unfreedoms. That is, if an
understanding of particular freedoms and unfree-
doms is to be compatible with the aim of establish-
ing that the overall liberty of each person is a
measurable property, a trivalent conception of
particular freedoms and unfreedoms is essential.

Given that this entry will not recount the intri-
cacies of measuring people’s levels of overall lib-
erty, the unique suitability of a trivalent conception
of freedoms and unfreedoms cannot be fully sub-
stantiated here. Nonetheless, the gist of the matter
resides in the fact that the calculation of the level
of anyone’s overall liberty proceeds through a
complicated fraction. If mere inabilities were not
distinguished from freedoms and unfreedoms, then
the numerator or the denominator of the afore-
mentioned fraction would be infinitely large,
respectively. After all, as has been stated, anyone’s
natural inabilities are infinitely expansive in their
scope. For example, each person is not only unable
to fly around the Milky Way Galaxy once, but is
also unable to fly around it twice or thrice or any
other number of times. Mere inabilities are limit-
less. Thus, if those inabilities were to be classified
as liberties, both the numerator and the denomina-
tor of the fraction for measuring each person’s
overall liberty would be infinitely large. If mere
inabilities were instead to be classified as unfree-
doms, the denominator of that fraction would be
infinitely large. In either case, then, the project of
measuring anyone’s overall freedom would be
fatally undermined in principle as well as in prac-
tice. To avoid such an upshot, a theory of liberty
needs to distinguish mere inabilities both from
freedoms and from unfreedoms. The requisite dis-
tinctions are in effect drawn by the F Postulate and
the U Postulate together.

One other aspect of the U Postulate is in need of
elucidation. What is meant by the notion that
somebody’s dispositions to perform actions can
prevent other people from doing various things?
Plainly, a sheer disposition, which will remain
unmanifested if the circumstances that would acti-
vate it never arise, does not in itself prevent any-
ting through the actual application of force or the
actual introduction of material obstacles. Never-
theless, dispositions to perform actions can be
preventive factors because they will lead to the
actual application of force or the actual introduc-
tion of material obstacles in the event that certain
triggering circumstances do materialize.

In other words, each person’s freedom or
unfreedom is affected not only by what other
people in fact do but also by what those other
people would have done if events had unfolded
differently. Dispositions bear crucially on the free-
dom and unfreedom of each person since those
dispositions play a key role in determining whether
the abilities and inabilities of each person would
continue as such if the person’s conduct or situation were altered in various respects. Only by asking how far those abilities and inabilities reach—past actual events into counterfactual events—can a theorist ascertain the extent of each person’s overall liberty and the existence of many of his or her particular liberties. Until we know whether people would or would not have acted in certain ways if a given person had sought to do X, we cannot know whether that person was free to do X. Nor can we know whether the person was free to perform X in combination with manifold subsequent actions.

A simple example can serve to highlight the effects of people’s dispositions on other people’s freedoms and unfreedoms. Suppose that Jim is sitting in a room. Just outside the door of the room are four people with submachine guns who will shoot and kill him if he seeks to exit through the door. If Jim does not seek to leave the room, then the homicidal dispositions of the four people outside the door will not be activated. Let us suppose that he in fact does not leave the room and that there is consequently no occasion for the other four people to harm him. All the same, he is unfree to exit the room. If any theory of freedom were to lead to a contrary conclusion—that is, if any theory of freedom were to pretermit the four people’s unmanifested dispositions and conclude that Jim has not been prevented from exiting—it would pro tanto be defective. Opportunities get closed off to individuals not only because of the actual application of force or the actual erection of material barriers but also because of the readiness of other people to exert such force or to erect such barriers (even if no occasion arises for the activation of their readiness).

Of course, the explicit mention of dispositions in the U Postulate should not be taken to indicate that they are productive only of unfreedoms. Other people’s dispositions are also centrally involved in the establishment and sustainment of countless freedoms. Suppose, for example, that Julia lives in a well-fortified apartment building in the middle of New York City. Whenever a resident of the building wishes to leave through the front doors—the only set of doors—a security guard has to release the computerized locks. Because no resident knows how to operate the locks, the guard’s cooperative-ness is essential for each resident’s ability to leave the building. Now, if Julia relaxes lazily in her apartment one morning and thus makes no attempt to go out before noon, the security guard during the morning will have no occasion to act on his disposition to release the locks for her. Nonetheless, if the guard would have released the locks in the event that Julia had indeed sought to exit from the building, then Julia has been free throughout the morning to leave via the front doors. Because of the guard’s preparedness to open those doors if Julia should endeavor to depart—and only because of his preparedness—she is unprevented from departing. She is free in that respect. In this context, as in myriad other contexts, her particular freedoms are dependent on the inclinations of other people.

Negative Versus Positive Liberty

Especially since the writings of Isaiah Berlin in the 1950s and 1960s, the most famous contrast pertaining to freedom lies between negative liberty and positive liberty. As is evident from what has been said so far, negative liberty consists in opportunities. To be negatively free to φ is to be able to φ and is thus to be unprevented from φ-ing. If somebody is negatively free to φ, then neither internal incapacities nor external impediments have made his φ-ing impossible. Hence, to be negatively free to φ is to have opportunities to φ, whether or not one avails oneself of those opportunities.

Positive liberty is very different. Instead of consisting in opportunities, it consists in the following of certain codes of conduct, the attainment of certain objectives, or the purification of one’s motivations and outlook. Being presented with various opportunities is not sufficient for positive freedom; in addition, a person must take advantage of some of those opportunities in certain ways. Whereas negative liberty is a matter of unpreventedness, positive liberty is a matter of accomplishments.

As is suggested by the vagueness of these descriptions, numerous divergent accounts of positive liberty have been propounded from the time of Plato onward. Some theorists maintain that a person becomes truly free only when she or he has persistently exercised certain faculties, such as her capacity to reason and deliberate. Others contend that people are truly free only when they interact regularly in democratic institutions with their fellow
citizens. Still other proponents of positive liberty submit that people attain freedom only if they rid themselves of certain ignoble desires or only if they subject their sundry desires and inclinations to rational scrutiny and refinement. Many other varieties of positive-liberty theories have likewise emerged over the centuries.

Although negative-liberty theorists have sustainedly criticized various doctrines of positive freedom, nobody should think that the very use of the terms freedom or liberty by the advocates of those doctrines is itself mistaken. Their errors are errors of substantive political philosophy rather than linguistic lapses. For example, it is not an abuse of language to declare that a person who achieves a high degree of autonomy has thereby become free in the sense of having liberated himself from the sway of the influences that might have kept him in a heteronomous condition. Such a characterization is not optimally clear and precise but is far from ridiculous or unintelligible. Similarly, it is hardly ridiculous or solemnitistic to assert that people who together shape their destiny through institutions of democratic decision making are thereby keeping themselves free by avoiding subjection to mandates that they have not themselves collectively fashioned. Though the conception of freedom that is operative in such a claim is plainly not equivalent to the negative-liberty conception, the classification of the democratic state of affairs as freedom is by no means an outlandish linguistic slip.

Still, although any accusations of linguistic errors would be misguided, doctrines of positive liberty are themselves misconceived in a number of respects. While a full exploration of the shortcomings of such doctrines as theories of freedom is not possible within the confines of this entry, two of those shortcomings should be noted here.

First, a key problem for any doctrine of positive liberty is that it generates untenable ascriptions of freedoms and unfreedoms. For example, suppose that one such doctrine (which can be labeled here as the Aesthetic Thesis) proclaims that each person becomes truly free only by developing his or her aesthetic abilities to the maximal degree. Suppose further that Kevin is a gifted pianist whose tendency to become distracted by nonaesthetic pursuits will thwart his development of his musical talents unless he is chained to his immobile instrument for several hours every day. Now, according to the Aesthetic Thesis, any opportunities that do not facilitate the maximal development of a person’s aesthetic abilities are not freedoms at all. Hence, the countless opportunities closed off to Kevin by his being shackled to his piano are not freedoms of which he has been deprived; they are not freedoms, period. Instead, according to the Aesthetic Thesis, they are obstacles to the realization of his true freedom—obstacles that his chains have enabled him to overcome. His shackles will have helped bring about his freedom without causing him to lose even the slightest instance of liberty. Because the severe curbs on his mobility involve no sacrifices of any particular freedoms, he has not been rendered unfree by those curbs in any respect. So the supporters of the Aesthetic Thesis must contend.

While the scenario of Kevin and his piano is contrivedly vivid, it well illustrates the far-fetched conclusions that are generated by any positive-liberty credo. Every such credo, which affirms that true freedom resides in a person’s exertion of certain faculties, or his or her performance of certain actions or following of certain procedures, will commit its advocates to the view that any opportunities inconsistent with the relevant exertions or performances or procedures can be removed wholesale with no loss of any particular freedoms. Instead of characterizing the removal of those opportunities as the elimination of some of a person’s liberties for the sake of increasing her overall liberty, the positive-freedom theorists are obliged to maintain that no liberties have been removed at all. Their position in that respect is not self-contradictory or unintelligible, but it is indefensibly sinister. It should be rejected, as a substantive matter of political philosophy. Although some of the objectives favored by positive-freedom theorists are undoubtedly worthy of pursuit, no one should pretend that sacrifices of liberties are not involved when various opportunities are closed off in furtherance of those objectives.

A second main shortcoming of positive-liberty theories pertains to the very objectives that they aim to promote. Whereas the phenomenon that the negative-liberty theorists designate as freedom or liberty cannot be recharacterized in an illuminating fashion, there are numerous more precise designations for the phenomenon that positive-liberty theorists label as true freedom. To denote the condition of negative liberty, some rather awkward
and uncommon terms such as unpreventedness and unprecludedness would be necessary as replacements for freedom and liberty. The only adequate common substitute would be ability, which is less effective than liberty or freedom in highlighting the relational character of the designated phenomenon (i.e., the fact that the designated phenomenon consists not only in a person’s possession of capacities but also in his or her being unprevented from exercising those capacities). For discussions focused on the conceptual space carved out by the negative-liberty theorists, the language of liberty and freedom is singularly apposite.

A very different situation obtains when we turn our attention to positive liberty. While the sundry versions of the positive-liberty ideal will warrant the application of a variety of terms—most of which will be appropriate for only some of those versions—there are indeed many pertinent designations available. Terms and phrases such as self-fulfillment, self-realization, self-expression, self-mastery, autonomy, self-reliance, self-control, self-determination, flourishing, self-development, self-direction, popular political participation, and active citizenship can each figure saliently in one or more of the major positive-liberty credos. Moreover, when wielded aptly, each of those terms and phrases will typically be much more exact—and probably more vivid—than freedom or liberty as a means of pinpointing the state or process that is posited as a fundamental human desideratum. Hence, not only will little or nothing be lost if the positive uses of freedom and liberty are eschewed, but in addition, the avoidance of those terms as designations for the positive-liberty writers’ objectives will promote theoretical precision. Freedom and liberty in their positive senses are superfluous since the potential replacements for them are myriad, and those replacements are generally superior in denoting the specificities of the ideals that the positive-liberty theorists extol.

Of course, as has been remarked above, nobody should doubt that many of the aforementioned ideals are worthy of pursuit. What is objectionable about positive-liberty doctrines is not (in many cases) the objectives that they uphold but instead their characterizing of those objectives as true freedom. For example, when theories of autonomy, democracy, or active citizenship present themselves as accounts of those desiderata rather than of liberty, they may well be admirable. Whether they are indeed admirable is of course dependent on the specifics of their arguments and analyses; however, when they are not misleadingly packaged as theories of freedom, they at any rate stand a chance of being admirable.

Note that the comments in this section about the appropriate senses of the terms freedom and liberty are concerned with the employment of those designations in the rigorous theorizing that constitutes political philosophy. It would be quite foolish to aim to regiment the multifarious patterns of usage that occur in the much less rigorous discourses of everyday life. In many of those discourses, where consistency, subtlety, clarity, and precision are of far less importance than in philosophical writing, one’s labeling of self-fulfillment as the attainment of true freedom might be apt. Plainly, as has already been remarked, there is nothing semantically illicit about the use of such terminology. Given that the language of freedom or liberty is intelligible and coherent and given that the inexactitude of its application does not greatly matter in the to-and-fro of quotidian deliberations and exhortations, there are no grounds for reining in the multiple senses that might attach to freedom and liberty in a host of ordinary contexts. Such an endeavor would be patently futile in any event.

Not at all futile or ridiculous, however, is an effort to enhance the rigor and precision of philosophical thinking about freedom. If the aim is to come up with a theory that carefully distinguishes the concept of freedom from other major political and moral concepts while capturing its myriad complexities, then some degree of terminological regimentation is inevitable. Some uses of freedom or liberty countenanced in day-to-day parlance have to fall by the wayside when a painstaking philosophical investigation of freedom seeks to elaborate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of any proposition “P is free to φ.” For the purposes of such an investigation, the inexactitude and misleadingness and inconsistency of many of those ordinary uses are to be shunned. Philosophical analysis proceeds by clarifying and refining the concepts that are invoked in relatively unreflective modes of thought and discourse, as it aspires to transcend the murkiness and looseness of those familiar modes of speaking. The tasks of conceptual clarification and purification can
scarcely go ahead without some notable tightening of everyday terminology. To insist as much, however, is not at all to insist that a similar tightening is advisable or feasible in everyday discourses themselves.

**Negative Versus Moralized Liberty**

In some prominent respects—though by no means all respects—moralized conceptions of freedom are similar to positive-liberty theories. Although moralized conceptions of freedom are usually focused on opportunities rather than on achievements, every such conception affirms one or both of the following theses:

1. the preclusion of some action or some state of affairs does not eliminate any particular liberties unless the preclusion is illegitimate or
2. the preclusion of some action or some state of affairs does not eliminate any particular liberties unless the stymied action or state of affairs would have been legitimate.

Under the first of these two theses, the prevention of a person from θ-ing will count as a pro tanto curb on his freedom only if he had a moral right against the sort of interference that thwarted him from θ-ing. Under the second thesis, the prevention of a person from θ-ing will count as a pro tanto curb on his freedom only if he had no moral obligation to refrain from θ-ing. In either case, a moralized conception of freedom will decline to classify some eliminated liberties as eliminated liberties.

Thus, for example, if Alec’s prevention of Susan from wantonly setting fire to a neighbor’s house is morally legitimate, then Alec does not deprive Susan of any freedoms at all when he manages to avert the arson by grabbing and restraining her. If she struggles to reach the neighbor’s premises so fiercely that she has to pin her to the ground and even bind her hands and feet, she will still not have been deprived of any freedoms. Such is the view taken by the proponents of moralized conceptions of freedom. Whereas the F Postulate and U Postulate explicate the concepts of freedom and unfreedom by reference to one’s abilities and to the causes of one’s inabilities, a moralized account explicates those concepts by reference to the moral status of one’s inabilities or to the moral status of one’s exertions of one’s abilities— that is, the moral legitimacy or illegitimacy of the causes of one’s inabilities or the moral legitimacy or illegitimacy of one’s exertions of one’s abilities.

In other words, every moralized account of freedom insists that even the severest constraints on a person’s latitude might not remove any of a person’s freedoms. No such removal will have taken place unless the constraints are illegitimate or unless the prevented conduct would have been legitimate. Consequently, if the placement of a highly dangerous man in chains or a straitjacket is legitimate because of his uncontrollably violent behavior, neither of those means of immobilization will deprive him of any liberties. A theory that generates such a conclusion can hardly claim to be cogently illuminating.

Moreover, with reference to any situation in which some person P has been deprived of the freedom to φ, a moralized conception of freedom must submit either that any questions about the illegitimacy of the deprivation are pointlessly pleonastic or that any questions about the legitimacy of P’s φ-ing are pointlessly pleonastic. If the restrictions on P’s φ-ing are indeed restrictions on his liberty, then either ipso facto they are illegitimate or ipso facto his φ-ing would have been legitimate. So the proponents of moralized conceptions of freedom are logically committed to maintaining. Hence, any moralized conception whisks out of existence an array of perfectly ordinary inquiries.

Perhaps even more unsettling is that, when a moralized account is focused on the illegitimacy of preventive constraints, it strips freedom of any independence as a factor that can militate either in favor of various sociopolitical arrangements or against them. Because the only constraints on human conduct that will count as limitations on liberty are unjust constraints, a denunciation of certain institutions as restrictive of liberty will add nothing to a denunciation of them as unjust. Likewise, because such a moralized account construes freedom as nothing more than the absence of illegitimate constraints, a commendation of certain institutions as promotive of freedom will add nothing to a commendation of them as legitimate and fair. In short, the fostering or impairing of freedom (as understood by a moralized theory of this type) will have ceased to be a consideration that might carry some independent justificatory or
condemnatory weight. The redundancy of that fostering or impairing as a justificatory or condemnatory factor stems from the status of freedom as a mere facet of some substantive moral ideal—an ideal on which the whole burden of justification or condemnation rests. Though moralized approaches to liberty that are focused on the illegitimacy of obstacles might seem to elevate the status of liberty by imbuing it with a morally favorable tenor, they in fact eliminate liberty as an independent phenomenon by reducing all questions of greater or lesser freedom to questions of greater or lesser rectitude. For anyone who wishes to appraise sociopolitical arrangements not only on the basis of their justice or injustice but also (separately) on the basis of their conduciveness or inconduciveness to high levels of overall liberty, a moralized conception of freedom should be forsworn. For anyone who believes that liberty and justice can sometimes conflict—in a clash between liberty and equality, for example—a moralized conception of freedom should be forsworn.

Negative Versus Republican Liberty

During the past couple of decades, the longstanding controversies between negative and positive conceptions of liberty have become somewhat overshadowed by controversies between negative-liberty theorists and civic-republican theorists. The latter theorists generally subscribe to the negative conception of freedom in opposition to positive-liberty doctrines, but they hold that the negative conception has been construed too narrowly by most of its exponents. In two chief respects, they take themselves to have gone salutarily beyond those exponents.

First, civic republicans are keenly alert to the role of public virtue and public service in bolstering institutions that provide high levels of freedom for individuals. They maintain that, in the absence of active civic participation on the part of all or most of the adult citizens in a country, the reigning government and its elite supporters will very likely amass autocratic powers that will extinguish many of the precious liberties that the citizens theretofore enjoyed. Individuals who wish to retain their freedoms must frequently put aside their private affairs to participate collaboratively in holding governmental leaders to account. Republican theorists believe that their attentiveness to the crucial role of civic virtue in securing the enjoyment of freedoms is at variance with the perceived emphasis of modern negative-liberty theorists on the sanctity of the private spheres of individuals. Whereas the latter theorists are said to be primarily concerned with drawing clear limits past which any government cannot legitimately intrude into people’s lives, republicans are principally concerned with stimulating people to engage robustly with the institutions that govern them.

The contrast just outlined between civic republicanism and modern negative-liberty theories has been advanced with considerable erudition by Quentin Skinner in his essays on liberty during the 1980s and early 1990s. Nevertheless, the contrast is largely misconceived. After all, the positing of an instrumental connection between extensive popular political participation and the safeguarding of individuals’ liberties is perfectly consistent with negative-liberty theories. Of course, what would be inconsistent with those theories is any claim that the extensive popular political participation is itself true freedom. Such a claim, envisaging a relationship of equivalence between civic involvement and liberty, would be expressive of one prominent positive-liberty doctrine. It would therefore clash in most respects with negative-liberty theories. However, as Skinner himself emphasizes, the civic-republican writers have not in fact embraced any doctrines of positive liberty. When they have highlighted the instrumental links between the political engagedness of citizens and the security of individuals’ freedoms, they have been propounding a thesis about negative liberty rather than about positive liberty. Accordingly, they have not been affirming any propositions that are inconsistent with those affirmed by negative-liberty theorists. Indeed, their thesis about the aforementioned instrumental links is a commonplace among most modern political thinkers, including the exponents of negative liberty. Civic-republican theorists undoubtedly articulate that thesis adeptly, but they do not thereby establish any substantive difference between themselves and the negative-liberty philosophers.

A second respect in which civic republicanism supposedly goes beyond negative-liberty doctrines has been elaborated since the mid-1990s by Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit (as well as by
others whom they have influenced). According to these modern civic-republican writers, their very conception of freedom is more capacious than the standard conception within the negative-liberty tradition. Instead of concentrating on freedom as the absence of the actual application of force, republicans concentrate on freedom as the absence of domination. Domination occurs through the actual application of force—by a government or by some other powerful party—but it also occurs through the maintenance of background conditions of intimidatory control that render any actual application of force unnecessary. Skinner and Pettit assert that unless a conception of freedom takes account of the full range of ways in which people can be hemmed in by domination, it will obscure more than it illuminates. It will fail to reveal all the debilitatingly confining effects of social and economic arrangements that subordinate some people to others.

As has been argued in response by contemporary negative-liberty theorists, all the insights of civic republicans are easily accommodated by a proper exposition of the notion of negative liberty. Perhaps some negative-liberty theorists in the past have believed that the only type of constraint on anyone’s freedom is the actual application of force by others, but such a view does not pass muster among contemporary negative-liberty philosophers. Such philosophers recognize and indeed insist that the constraints on people’s liberty include all the background conditions of domination identified by civic-republican writers. As is apparent from the U Postulate’s inclusion of dispositions among the potential constraints on human freedom, the actual application of force is not a necessary condition for the curtailment of anybody’s liberty. The freedom-limiting effects of the dispositions and actions that constitute situations of domination are all captured by the U Postulate.

A key point in support of what has just been said is that the units over which the modern negative-liberty theorists aggregate when they measure anyone’s freedom are combinations of conjunctively exercisable options. (The aggregation also covers anyone’s combinations of consistent unfreedoms. That element can be omitted in the present discussion.) A combination of conjunctively exercisable options is a set of liberties that can all be exercised together simultaneously or sequentially. When a person is subject to domination by some other party, many of the combinations of conjunctively exercisable freedoms that would have been available to him or her are not available. For example, her liberty to act at odds with the directives of the dominant party will not be conjunctively exercisable with her liberty to do anything that the dominant party’s punitive response to her disobedience would prevent her from doing. Because a relationship of domination removes many combinations of conjunctively exercisable freedoms that would otherwise have been available to the person(s) subordinated in that relationship, it pro tanto reduces the overall liberty of the person(s) in question. This insight into the freedom-constricting effects of domination has been expounded rigorously by contemporary negative-liberty theorists; an awareness of those effects is hardly unique to the civic-republican tradition.

Still, although the virtues of civic republicanism are also characteristic of modern negative-liberty theories, the republican conception of liberty and the negative conception of it are not identical. As negative-liberty philosophers have contended, the republican conception of freedom championed by Skinner and Pettit is plagued by a number of shortcomings that do not similarly afflict the negative conception. For one thing, Skinner appears to take the view that a person is unfree to \( \varphi \) only if he or she knows that he or she has been prevented from \( \varphi \)-ing. No such untenable restriction figures in the negative account of liberty. Pettit imposes another such restriction when he declares that unfreedom is caused only by conduct that is intended to produce such an effect. No similar insistence on intentionality or deliberateness is included in the U Postulate since the reasons invoked by Pettit in support of such an insistence are in fact supportive of a focus on any human conduct that gives rise to constraints (whether the constraints are imposed deliberately or unwittingly and whether they are imposed wrongly or innocently).

Even more important, the civic-republican approach mishandles any situation—however rare—in which someone strong enough to mistreat and exploit others is resolutely disinclined to do so. In any such set of circumstances, where the probability of serious encroachments by the dominant person on the overall liberty of his or her contemporaries is practically nil, the redoubtable
might of that person (whether bodily strength or some other form of power) does not lessen anyone else’s overall liberty significantly. For example, their lineage or talents can make them someone to whom many other people would eagerly attach themselves as loyal subordinates if the former were to allow them to do so.

Because of his or her reclusive diffidence and, consequently, firm unwillingness to take advantage of his or her superiority, the dominant person does not oblige other people to adjust their behavior to his or her desires. Uncommon though such a situation may be, it is plainly possible. Civic republicans, who assert that anyone’s sheer possession of the capacity to dominate is sufficient to deprive his or her contemporaries of their freedom, are committed to the view that the diffident recluse in the envisaged situation has severely curtailed the freedom enjoyed by the people in his or her vicinity. Such an analysis of the situation is distortive rather than illuminating.

Still more distortive is the republican approach in application to a scenario of a dominator who is subordinated by someone whom he himself could oppress. Suppose that Lennie is mightily capable of prodigious feats of strength, while George—who is much smaller and weaker than Lennie—is possessed of domineering tough mindedness that offsets his physical deficiencies. (Lennie and George bear a considerable resemblance, though not a perfect resemblance, to their namesakes in John Steinbeck’s *Of Mice and Men.*) Although Lennie is physically much more powerful than George and although the intellectual disparity between the two men is not vast, the differences between their temperaments eventuate in the general domination of the more brawny man by the more diminutive. George continually browbeats Lennie into performing countless menial tasks that serve George’s needs and comfort, and he insists on getting his way whenever Lennie forms intentions that are at odds with his own. He terrorizes Lennie with his fits of temper and his piercing insults; Lennie, thoroughly overmastered and intimidated by George, is his dutiful servant. Now, even if this scenario were to be moderated by the addition of some ties of friendship and protection between the two men, the basic point illustrated by it would remain prominent. Somebody fully capable of dominating another person—somebody, therefore, whom the civic republicans will classify as a dominator—can turn out to be exploited and bullied by that other person. If we were to describe George as having been made unfree by Lennie’s dominating strength, we would be distorting his situation markedly.

Admittedly, it might be that George’s irascible and imperious behavior is itself necessary to ward off domination by Lennie. If George’s aggressively tyrannical conduct is indeed a means of defending his own overall liberty, then that liberty has been diminished by Lennie’s daunting presence. After all, were George to abstain from his domineering surliness under such circumstances, he would very quickly render himself unfree to undertake any projects or activities that will have been precluded by Lennie’s assumption of the ascendant posture in their relationship. Under such circumstances, that is, Lennie’s latent disposition to exert his might has extinguished the conjunctive exercisability of many of George’s liberties. Nonetheless, this feature of the situation is purely contingent. A softening of George’s demeanor might instead produce less dramatic effects. Perhaps, it would not induce any substantial changes at all in the subordinate posture of Lennie, who might be unshakably habituated to George’s dominance. Or, what is slightly more plausible, the growing emollience of George might simply induce Lennie to become less dutiful and subservient without actually prompting him to act despotically toward George. Instead of inverting the previous relationship of mastery and submission, Lennie might simply opt to live alongside George as an equal or perhaps he would separate from George and go his own way. Whatever might be the precise outcome of a marked alteration in George’s authoritarian mien, it would not necessarily involve any significant loss of liberty for George himself (especially if the baseline for measuring the loss is a situation in which neither of the two men dominates the other). In that case, his currently overbearing behavior is not a means of safeguarding his own freedom against the potential dominance of Lennie but is straightforwardly a means of coercing and manipulating the bulkier man. Such a state of affairs can obtain even though the civic republicans’ analyses of unfreedom clearly generate the conclusion that Lennie is a dominator. Someone can qualify as a dominator—given how
that status is defined by the civic republicans—without significantly impairing the overall freedom of anyone else.

In short, in the rare circumstances where the capacity to dominate genuinely involves extremely low probabilities of nontrivial encroachments on the freedom of the people over whom that capacity could be exerted, the sheer susceptibility of those people to the exercise of that capacity is not to be classified as a state of wide-ranging unfreedom. Neither a diffidently reclusive mighty person nor Lennie in his relationship with George is significantly abridging the overall freedom of anyone to whom he is hugely superior in strength. Civic republicans, with their insistence that the capacity to dominate is itself sufficient to produce dependence and consequent unfreedom, do not provide satisfactory accounts of the situations discussed in the previous few paragraphs.

Most of these remarks about the curtailment or noncurtailment of overall freedom are applicable mutatis mutandis to the inexistence or existence of particular freedoms. If somebody with the capacity to dominate is firmly disposed to use his or her ascendancy to prevent a subordinate person S from φ-ing in the event that S endeavors to φ, then observers are warranted in saying that S is unfree to φ. For most purposes, any probabilistic qualification attached to such an ascription of unfreedom can be left implicit. By contrast, if the likelihood of the powerful person’s prevention of S from φ-ing in the event of S’s endeavoring to φ is lower but still significant, then statements about S’s unfreedom to φ should be overtly probabilistic. Finally, if the likelihood of the powerful person’s prevention of S from φ-ing in the event of S’s endeavoring to φ is exceedingly small, then observers are warranted in affirming that S is free to φ (vis-à-vis the powerful person). Once again, any probabilistic qualification can for most purposes be left implicit. In other words, with regard to the reduction or nonreduction of a person’s overall freedom and with regard to the inexistence or existence of any of a person’s particular freedoms, the basic focus of observers in any context marked by someone’s dominant strength should be the same. The crucial consideration in such a context is not the sheer presence of the dominant strength but the probability that that strength will result in the prevention of sundry actions or sundry combinations of actions.

Physical Versus Deontic Liberty

Both in the F Postulate and in the U Postulate, the chief concepts are modal rather than deontic. That is, they concern what can or cannot occur rather than what should or should not occur. They concern what each person is able or unable to do rather than what each person is permitted or forbidden to do. They, thus, pertain to physical freedoms and unfreedoms rather than to deontic freedoms and unfreedoms. Someone is physically free to φ if and only if he or she is physically unprevented from φ-ing, and he or she is physically unfree to φ if and only if he or she is physically prevented from φ-ing as a result of some actions or dispositions to perform actions on the part of some other person(s). Here, physically is not to be understood in contrast with mentally or psychologically; rather, the relevant contrast is between physically and normatively.

Deontic freedom, contrariwise, consists not in physical unpreventedness but instead in permittedness or unforbiddenness. If somebody is deontically free to φ, then he or she is allowed to φ by any applicable authoritative norms, such as legal mandates, moral principles, or institutional rules. Conversely, if somebody is deontically unfree to φ, then he or she is prohibited from φ-ing by one or more of those authoritative norms. When we ask whether somebody is deontically free to φ, we are not asking whether he or she is capable of φ-ing; we are asking whether he is entitled to φ.

Physical liberty and deontic liberty differ in a number of respects that derive in various ways from the basic modal/deontic difference just recounted. For one thing, the predicates “is deontically free” and “is deontically unfree” are contraries rather than merely contraries, and thus the predicates “is deontically unfree” and “is not free deontically” are equivalent. In other words, the concept of deontic freedom is bivalent rather than trivalent. Someone is deontically free to φ if and only if he or she is not deontically unfree to φ. In regard to such freedom, there is no category that corresponds to the category of mere inabilities.

Perhaps the most obvious dissimilarity between the concept of physical freedom and the concept of deontic freedom is their extensional nonequivalence. That is, a person will often be deontically free to φ without being physically free to φ, and vice versa. For example, although Norma is both
legally and morally permitted to run a mile under 4 minutes, she is not physically able to do so; her deontic liberty to run at that speed is not accompanied by a corresponding physical liberty. Conversely, although she is physically able to assault unprovokedly the person standing directly ahead of her in a queue, she is neither legally nor morally permitted to do so. Her physical freedom to commit the assault is not accompanied by a corresponding deontic freedom. Permissibility and ability can coincide and very frequently do coincide, but they likewise frequently diverge.

A more subtle dissimilarity between physical liberty and deontic liberty pertains to the isolability of actions. The removal of someone's physical freedom to \( \varphi \) will often require the removal of his or her physical freedoms to do things that are crucially prerequisite to \( \varphi \)-ing, whereas the removal of his or her deontic freedoms to do things that are crucially prerequisite to \( \varphi \)-ing never requires the removal of any of his or her deontic freedoms to do anything that is physically indispensable for \( \varphi \)-ing. If people remain physically free to take steps that would immediately antecede their \( \varphi \)-ing, then the prevention of their \( \varphi \)-ing will typically depend on monitoring and rapid interventions by other people. In connection with some activities, such monitoring and interventions will be feasible; in connection with many other activities, however, those last-minute preventive intrusions will not be realistically possible. An intervention at an earlier stage is sometimes essential if a person's physical freedom to \( \varphi \) is genuinely to be eliminated. Nothing similar is ever essential for the removal of someone's deontic liberty to \( \varphi \). Precisely because the elimination of any person's deontic freedom to \( \varphi \) concerns what is impermissible rather than what is impossible, that elimination is perfectly consistent with a situation in which the person is deontically free to do virtually everything that is physically indispensable for his or her \( \varphi \)-ing.

A further difference between physical liberty and deontic liberty is centered on the avoidability of actions. A person whose mind has not been completely taken over by someone else in a science fiction scenario or by certain severe mental illnesses will retain the physical freedom to eschew any particular action. At the very least, such a person will always have the option of surrendering in a wholly passive manner to the operations of external forces. Accordingly, there is no such thing as a physically unavoidable action. When we cross from the realm of the physical to the realm of the deontic, however, we encounter a very different situation. Anybody can be deontically unfree to forgo certain types or instances of conduct. For example, a person whose income is subject to taxation will typically be legally unfree—and probably also morally unfree—to abstain from writing his or her name on any income tax forms that require his or her signature. Though the person is physically free to refrain from signing those forms in a timely fashion, he or she is not deontically free to refrain and is legally obligated, and probably also morally obligated, to sign the relevant documents. In this case, as in multitudinous other cases, legal or moral requirements can make the performance of certain actions mandatory. In that respect, legal or moral mandatoriness differs from the material impediments that limit somebody’s physical freedom.

Of course, these several divergences between physical liberty and deontic liberty should not induce anyone to overlook the many affinities between them. Liberty of each type consists in an absence of constraints. Though physical constraints differ from deontic constraints in the sundry ways that have just been recounted, unconstrainedness is the essence of deontic freedom just as it is of physical freedom. Freedom of either type is negative rather than positive.

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See also Liberalism; Libertarianism; Republicanism

Further Readings
Lobbying

Lobbying is the interaction of an individual, group, interest, or organization with government to influence current policy or create a situation conducive to shaping future policy. It is a fundamental and omnipresent aspect of all political systems, from liberal to elitist democracies, to authoritarian and even totalitarian regimes. Yet although there are common elements to lobbying across all political systems, the particular form that the lobbying process takes in a country, state, province, city, or even internationally, is shaped by several governmental, political, and cultural elements. Furthermore, lobbying is inextricably bound with the activities of lobbyists—that is, those representing individuals, collective interests, and interest groups to government.

This entry draws on research on lobbying across all political systems but focuses mainly on established liberal democracies and developing democracies. First, we look at the relationship between practical politics and political science work on lobbying, followed by the common denominators of lobbying and its ubiquitous nature. Next, the major theoretical explanations are discussed, followed by how institutional structure affects lobbying. Then, we consider the types and role of lobbyists in the United States and other Western democracies, followed by the issue of lobby regulation. Finally, we look at some trends in lobbying across the world.

Development of Lobbying

Research and Theory

Even though lobbying has always been a fixture of virtually all groups and governments, only in the past 100 years has it been recognized by scholars as a fundamental, prominent, and crucial part of policy making. Studies of lobbying did not occupy a major place in American political science until after the work of David Truman (The Governmental Process, 1951). The increased academic interest in lobbying in the United States from the 1960s onward was also due to the advocacy explosion, first in Washington, D.C., and later in the American states, as more and more interests and interest groups began to lobby and expanded their range of lobbying techniques.

Yet as late as the mid-1950s, many scholars saw lobbying and lobbyists as a purely American phenomenon—a product of the separation-of-powers system and not an aspect of parliamentary systems. In Anonymous Empire, Samuel Finer showed this to be an erroneous view of British politics, and work on lobbying in other parliamentary systems followed. As late as the 1970s, however, many texts on the politics of countries such as Britain, France, Germany, and Australia did not include the terms lobbying, lobbyist, or even interest groups (or pressure groups as they were often called) in their indexes. Even today, these terms do not appear in many treatments of the politics of developing and reemerging democracies, such as those in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

Despite the late development of academic interest in lobbying and lobbyists, extensive research and some theories now exist. The lessons and characteristics of this research can be summed up in the following six points:

1. While there are thousands of studies, mainly case studies, from around the world, there is no general theory of lobbying and lobbyists. Even so, there is general agreement among scholars on the other five points.

2. There are three interrelated factors, in particular, that shape the lobbying environment in a place: the degree of political pluralism or
authoritarianism, the structure of governmental institutions regarding centralization or fragmentation of the policy process, and the political culture.

3. Lobbyists exist in all political systems but take on different guises in different systems.

4. The last 40 years or so have seen the use of an increasing range of lobbying strategies and tactics, not only in developed pluralist democracies but also in developing democracies and even authoritarian systems.

5. Largely because of the popular belief that lobbying and lobbyists benefit existing powerful interests at the expense of the rest of society and because of corruption scandals associated with lobbying activity, lobbying and lobbyists are held in low regard around the world. Ironically, however, and especially in democracies, hundreds of millions of citizens belong to interest groups.

6. Because of the potential for abuse and for undermining the goals of authoritarian regimes, the regulation of lobbying and lobbyists has been an aspect of public policy around the world.

The Nature of Lobbying

When two or more people get together, particularly in large groups and in countries, they want to influence others largely to secure economic, political, or other benefits for themselves, their group, or society as a whole. This is the motive for lobbying and why it has always been a central part of human society.

Common Denominators of Lobbying

The most fundamental processes involved in lobbying to achieve a benefit at any group, state, national, or international level consist of three interrelated activities. First, it requires getting access to the person or persons who can make the decision; second, it requires building a relationship with these people and, third, influencing them—exerting power.

Whether it is the Roman Empire, the court of Louis XIV of France, Stalin’s Soviet Union, a modern liberal democracy such as the United States or New Zealand, an emerging democracy such as Kenya or Vietnam, or a closed authoritarian regime such as North Korea or Myanmar, these three stages of lobbying occur in some form at various times. In nonpluralist systems, however, they may not occur in all policy situations and may not be very obvious.

The Ubiquitousness of Lobbying

If lobbying takes place in all groups and political systems, why is it that until recently, it was seen to occur in the United States only and was seen as virtually nonexistent in authoritarian political systems? The answer to this question lies in the difference between officially recognized and visible lobbying and unofficial and behind-the-scenes lobbying.

In the United States, much of the lobbying is open to view and officially sanctioned by the Constitution and various laws. Until recently, in most other democracies and in organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the United Nations, it was less public (which should not necessarily be equated with illegal or underhanded) and thus not seen to be performed by people called lobbyists. Nevertheless, lobbying and lobbyists have always been very much a part of these political systems. And even though in authoritarian regimes lobbying and related organizations were either banned (as under many military regimes in Latin America) or not seen to be necessary (as in communist countries), individuals close to the leaders, such as military personnel or their close friends and allies, engaged in lobbying to get their policies enacted or to block the political goals of their opponents.

Explaining Variations in Lobbying Processes

Thus, just because it appears that lobbying is not taking place in a particular government does not mean that lobbying is absent. The actual process of lobbying, however—namely, the avenues of access, forging relationships with policymakers, and influencing them—varies across political jurisdictions according to the three factors identified earlier.

First, the more pluralist the political system, and particularly the institutionalization and acceptance of political opposition, the more visible and formalized lobbying and the activities of lobbyists are...
likely to be and, in most circumstances, the wider the range of strategies and tactics employed. In contrast, in a more authoritarian system, lobbying will include little more than personal contacts with the monarch or dictator.

Second, institutional structure determines the power or decision points that lobbyists need to focus on in their lobbying effort. This structure is usually very clear in authoritarian systems, but it can be more complex in pluralist democracies. In the U.S. separation-of-powers system, where there is often bipartisanship on some issues, power is fragmented between the three branches of government and also between the federal and state levels. In parliamentary systems with strong political parties, however, power is much more concentrated in the executive, even in federal systems such as Germany. Another factor is the extent of neocorporatism or pluralism in liberal democracies, particularly those in Western Europe.

Third, while research on how political culture—the political values of the governed and those in government—affects lobbying is not extensive and rather inconclusive, a good case can still be made that this factor may be the most important determinant of the activity of lobbying and lobbyists. Broad acceptance of the existence of interest groups and the legitimacy of their activities, as in most liberal democracies, leads to mass group membership and the necessity, openness, and formalization of lobbying, albeit with some skepticism, in a pluralist democracy. In contrast, no or minimal public and policymaker legitimization of lobbying and lobbyists, as in authoritarian and many developing democracies, leads to low group membership and continued and less formalized and open lobbying processes.

Lobbying in the United States: An Aberrant Case

An irony of the lobbying system in the United States is that, although it was once seen as the only place where lobbying took place and is often held as a benchmark for being the most advanced of lobbying systems, in many ways, it is an aberration compared with the lobbying systems in other liberal democracies. This is because its institutional structure and political culture have influenced lobbying in some unique ways.

The U.S. political system was designed to prevent precipitous actions such as the American colonies had experienced under George III of England. So the separation-of-powers system, in which the Congress and the President share legislative power, was born. Later, the courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, also acquired a policy role by being able to interpret and strike down the acts of the other two branches. Add to this the federal system (i.e., the federal agencies that make up the “administrative state”) and the fact that ideology has never been as strong in the United States as in Europe, resulting in less disciplined political parties, and the product is a fragmented—very pluralistic—policy process with many power points. As more and more groups and interests got involved in lobbying from the 1960s onward, it led to hyperpluralism—that is, more and more lobbying forces competing for the attention of the same number of policymakers. In turn, this was an impetus to the development of new and indirect lobbying techniques, such as grassroots lobbying, media campaigns, and political action committees (organizations that contribute money to candidates’ election campaigns), in an effort to gain access to and influence policymakers.

While not all the processes of lobbying in other democracies are in contrast to those in the United States, there are some notable differences. With centralized policy-making processes shaped by the executive branch in most of these countries, there is much less political benefit from lobbying the parliament or using the courts. Plus, much lobbying is done through political parties and can be especially productive for those associated with the party or coalition in power. With various degrees of corporatist arrangements, from the very liberal democracies of Scandinavia to the reemerging democracies of Latin America, there is not the same degree of hyperpluralism in these countries and thus not the same need for the broad range of lobbying techniques used in the United States. For a combination of all these reasons and because lobbying was not seen as part of these systems until very recently, the U.S. lobbying profession has not developed in the same way as in other democracies.

Theories of Lobbying in Liberal Democracies

Like the rest of political science, interest group studies from the 1960s onward were influenced by
the behavioralist and empirical approaches to research. Since then, even though no general theory of lobbying or one that integrates existing theoretical approaches has been developed, quantitative and qualitative techniques and a combination of the two have been used to produce theoretical explanations of lobbying. Virtually every major research approach in the social sciences has been used, including decision theory, rational choice theory, cost–benefit analysis, game theory, exchange theory, and new institutionalism.

One particularly enlightening theory is that developed by John R. Wright using communications theory. Although Wright’s research focused on the U.S. Congress, it likely has general application for lobbying around the world. The assumption that lobbyists are primarily information providers is at the root of his theory. After Wright establishes that legislators generally have three overarching goals—reelection, the desire to make good public policy, and to exercise some power—he argues that legislators are forced to pursue these goals in a very uncertain and ever-changing environment. This is where lobbyists and lobbying come in with a mutual legislator–lobbyist benefit to the communication of information. On the one hand, this information will influence government officials to the benefit of the group or organization the lobbyist represents. On the other, this information reduces uncertainty and helps legislators learn how best to achieve their goals. This, to Wright, is not only the core of the lobbying process but the major form of influence.

This theory certainly hits on a key element in lobbying. Yet other research, especially on the 50 states in the United States by Clive Thomas and Ronald Hrebenar, argues that there are other key elements in the lobbying process and lobbying influence. The 2 major elements of the 12 that Thomas and Hrebenar identify are the extent to which policymakers need the group or organization lobbying them and lobbyist–policymaker relations. The more a policymaker needs a group—the more a group can build up a sense of need or obligation—because of votes, money, information, or whatever, the more likely the policymaker is to support the group and its cause. Good lobbyist–policymaker relations built on credibility and trust also appear to be key, and the longer the relationship, the more likely the lobbyist is to influence the policymaker. Furthermore, this lobbyist–policymaker contact is the essence of lobbying and determines the ultimate success or failure of an issue. This has always been the case and likely always will be.

What is needed is an integration of various lobbying theories to provide a comprehensive understanding. This is inhibited, however, by the diverse nature of interest group studies and the fact that several scholars are wedded to one research method to the exclusion of others.

### Lobbyists in the United States and Around the World

Earlier, we defined a lobbyist as someone who represents individuals, collective interests, and interest groups to government. A more comprehensive definition, developed by Thomas, which embraces lobbyists around the world is as follows: A lobbyist is a person designated by an interest group to facilitate influencing public policy in that group’s favor by performing one or more of the following for the group: (1) directly contacting public officials, (2) monitoring political and governmental activity, (3) advising on political strategies and tactics, and (4) developing and orchestrating the group’s lobbying effort.

This definition succinctly embraces the four major roles that lobbyists perform. Not all lobbyists perform all four tasks. This depends on the organization and on the issue at hand.

### Types of Lobbyists and Alternative Designations

The word lobbyist is often used as if all lobbyists were the same. In fact, there are different types of lobbyists from different backgrounds, which often affects their power base—their ability to be effective. Until recently, varying designations were used to distinguish between types of lobbyists, including independent lobbyists and professional lobbyist, both of which were sometimes also referred to as hired guns because they are paid specifically to lobby. These designations were sometimes contrasted with amateur lobbyist, though it was often unclear whether the term amateur meant unpaid or not well versed in lobbying techniques. In the United States, by the late 1980s, a standard terminology of types of lobbyists emerged among
scholars and political practitioners. There are now seen to be five types of lobbyists:

1. Contract lobbyists are hired on contract for a fee specifically to lobby. They often represent more than one client and are likely to be former elected officials or staffers who are purveying to their clients their contacts with decision makers built up over many years.

2. In-house lobbyists are employees of an association, organization, or business, who as part or all of their job act as lobbyists. They represent only one client—their employer—and are likely to have come from the business or profession they represent. Their major asset is unequaled knowledge in their field, such as education, the environment, or issues and laws affecting the disabled.

3. Legislative liaisons are employees of government agencies who represent their agency to the legislative and executive branches of government. They also represent only one client—their agency. They tend to be career bureaucrats or former legislative or executive staff and have an intimate knowledge of their policy area.

4. Volunteer or cause lobbyists are those who represent citizen and community organizations or informal groups. They rarely represent more than one interest and are usually not paid. Their power base, as much as they have one, is founded on their commitment to the cause and their tenacity.

5. Private individual lobbyists are those acting on their own behalf and not designated by any organization as an official representative. Unless these are prominent citizens, such as those who own sports teams, these will not have much of a power base.

Partly because of the negative attitude toward lobbyists and lobbying, lobbyists are often referred to by other euphemistic designations. These include political consultant, government affairs representative, public affairs representative, and so on. And because of the negative perception of lobbying in other Western democracies and because they have only recently recognized the role of interest groups and lobbyists, there is no agreed-on nomenclature for lobbyists outside the United States. Euphemistic designations similar to those used in the United States are used for lobbyists in these countries.

One major difference between the United States and other democracies is the role of the hired or contract lobbyist (the term contract lobbyist is rarely used outside the United States, and they are sometimes referred to as commercial lobbyists). In most countries, including Australia, Canada, and those in the EU, these individuals are less likely to contact government officials directly but act as group advisors, monitor activity affecting the group, and act as facilitators arranging meetings of group officials with policymakers (hence the broader definition of a lobbyist set out above). In fact, in some cases, it is somewhat of a misnomer to call these individuals group “representatives” as some of them rarely advocate the group’s position directly to government. Nevertheless, these people are intimately involved in the process of lobbying as defined above and should be considered as part of the lobbyist community in their respective country.

In considering the types and role of lobbyists, the aberrant nature of the U.S. political system is once again evident. While lobbyists in the United States, particularly Washington, D.C. (where they are referred to as Washington representatives), have long had the most visibility and their role is often viewed as a benchmark, in several ways, they are not typical of lobbyists around the world.

**Regulation of Lobbying**

Regarding liberal democracies, while the most extensive regulation has been developed in the United States, most liberal democracies have enacted some form of lobbying and lobbyist regulation. Such regulations have resulted from a combination of negative public attitudes toward lobbying and those who perform it, a populist desire to even up the political playing field against powerful special interests, and as the result of lobbying scandals involving corruption and illegality. It is the latter that is most often responsible for the enactment of regulation, such as what occurred in the 1990s in the United States, in several countries in Western Europe, and in the EU.
There are, however, several problems with lobby regulation, and its results have been mixed across liberal democracies. One is that regulation often runs up against the right of free speech and the right to petition government, as in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and this restricts the extent of regulation. A second problem is that the public and policymakers, often, are not clear on what the goals of regulation are: Some hope to even up the political playing field, while others want to publicize the actions of lobbying among other goals. A third point is that regulation cannot make hitherto weak groups powerful—only increased resources and political acumen can do that.

The most that regulation can do is to monitor the activities of lobbying organizations and lobbyists and put pressure on them and the policymakers they deal with not to engage in corrupt activities. However extensive regulation is or might become, it will never entirely root out corruption and nefarious activities in lobbying (and politics in general) as long as the stakes are so high, as they often are in many lobbying campaigns, with many peoples’ livelihoods and futures at stake.

Conclusion

While lobbying has always existed and probably always will, several recent trends can be detected regarding this most basic of political activities and the lobbyists who perform it. Three are particularly noteworthy and interrelated.

First, since the rise of the third wave of democracy in the mid-1980s, an internationalization or globalization of lobbying techniques has taken place. This is not to say that all the new techniques in the United States are appropriate to all other political systems, but these techniques are often used when expedient around the world. Second, a reduction of the role of the state in many countries, especially in Western Europe, has undermined the neo-corporatist approach to lobbying and increased the level of pluralism. The first two trends have produced what might be considered an “Americanization” of lobbying across advanced liberal democracies and increasingly in developing democracies. However, this is not because these systems are trying to emulate or mimic the U.S. system exhibiting many characteristics of a highly pluralistic lobbying system.

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See also Accountability; Corporativism; Corruption; Democracy, Theories of; Interest Groups; Parliamentary Systems; Pluralism; Pluralist Interest Intermediation; Representation

Further Readings


LOCAL GOVERNMENT

While intending to give a comprehensive introduction to local government, the entry will largely focus
on local government systems in Europe in its empirical references. Such focus seems justified and promising for two reasons. For one, it would be feasible, given the limited space, to give an account on local government in a global perspective and coverage. Second, because of the structure and variance which local governments in European countries exhibit they might provide insights into general issues and trends which may well relate and be “extrapolated” to local government developments in other regions of the world. Because a truly comprehensive account of the variations and trends in local governments throughout the world would require far more space than is available here, this entry provides an introduction to local government by focusing on the varieties and differences among local government systems in Europe. Such a review of variations in local governmental structure in European countries can offer insights into general issues and trends, which may then be extrapolated to developments in local government in other regions of the world.

Here, the term local (self-)government, which originated and is used in the English-speaking world, will also be applied to the other countries under consideration. The reader should keep in mind, however, that the variance in country-specific terminology, such as kommunale Selbstverwaltung (local self-administration) in Germany, libre administration (free/autonomous administration) in France, or sälvestyrelse (self-steering) in Sweden, conveys not only linguistic but also the underlying country-specific conceptual and institutional differences.

**Intergovernmental Setting**

A distinction between decentralization and deconcentration should be made with regard to the arrangement and distribution of powers, functions, and responsibilities in the intergovernmental setting. Decentralization is an intrinsically political concept as it revolves around the devolution of powers and responsibilities from the upper government level to a subnational level with democratically elected and politically accountable decision-making and administrative bodies of its own. By contrast, deconcentration is an essentially administrative concept as it aims at transferring administrative functions from an upper to a lower administrative level.

**Regionalization**

Historically, in (unitary) countries, the intergovernmental architecture comprised two levels—the central government and the local government—with the exception of federal states where, historically, an intermediate/regional governmental level has been in place—in the German case, in fact, preceding the creation of the national state.

In recent years, in some hitherto unitary European countries, particularly the larger ones, the intergovernmental setting has been shaped by the formation of regions on the intermediary level—placed between the central government and the existing local government levels. Among continental European countries, the hitherto unitary (Napoleonic) states have shown remarkable variance in the degree of regionalization. The factually most advanced case is Spain where, when democratic government was reestablished after 1978, the regions (comunidades autónomas) were created with significant legislative powers and fiscal resources of their own. In Italy, the regions were given legislative and operative competences to a degree that has been termed quasi-federal. By contrast, in France, where as an element of decentralization in 1982 regions were introduced, it was decided to keep them at a simple, local government status (as a third level of collectivités locales).

The United Kingdom (UK), too, abandoned its path-dependent unitary trajectory in that, in 1998 and 1999, Scotland and Wales gained regional status (with elected regional assemblies of their own). Currently, however, the UK has also entered the “road towards quasi-federalism” (David Wilson & Chris Game, 2006), which has remained “asymmetrical,” though, as with England (which has 85% of the UK population), remaining (highly) centralized.

Whereas regionalization, particularly in its quasi-federal nuances, has strengthened the democratic as well as the operative potential of the intermediate/regional level, its implications for the local government levels have been somewhat problematic. The politically and functionally empowered regional level, while proclaiming decentralism vis-à-vis the central government level, may be disposed to take a centralist posture in relation to the local government levels. The somewhat hierarchical influence, which in Germany’s federal system the regional states (Länder) tend to exercise over the local level, hints at a paradox of decentralization.
Similarly Spain’s regions (comunidades autónomas) have exhibited some dominant stand vis-à-vis the country’s local level.

**Local Government Level**

In most countries, the local government levels are historically made up of two tiers, called, for instance, counties and boroughs or districts in the UK, Kreise and Gemeinden/Städte in Germany, départements and communes in France, and lands- sting kommuner and kommuner in Sweden. In the following, the terms counties and municipalities will be generally applied.

In some countries (single tier) local authorities have been formed, which combine municipal and county responsibilities. The German–Austrian local government tradition has long since known such single-tier local authorities (called county free cities, kreisfreie Städte) as the organizational base particularly of larger cities. Similarly, in the English local government tradition, the scheme of single-tier county boroughs was in place until 1972 and was resumed, under the new label unitary authorities, particularly since the 1990s; by now, in most urban areas, including the major cities, single-tier unitaries have been formed. In central Eastern European countries also, such as in Poland and Hungary, the concept of single-tier local authorities has been put to work.

**Intercommunal Bodies**

In countries in which, in the absence of territorial reforms, the territorial structure is marked by a multitude of small-scale municipalities, an additional layer of intercommunal bodies has been created or has come into existence, which are meant to provide the institutional frame and encouragement for intercommunal cooperation.

**Territorial Organization**

The European countries show a conspicuous variance in the average size of their municipalities. On one end of the continuum, there is a group of countries with municipalities with populations averaging more than 30,000, such as the UK (with an average size of 139,000 inhabitants), Denmark (with 55,000), and Sweden (with 31,000). At the other end, there are countries with municipalities having average populations of less than 10,000, particularly France (1,720), Hungary (3,170), Spain (5,400), and Italy (7,200) (see Dexia, 2008, p. 41).

**Territorial Reforms**

The current territorial structure of municipalities largely depends on whether the countries have, in the past, carried out territorial reform and on the underlying political and cultural factors that shaped the decision to carry out or not to carry out territorial reforms.

In the first group of countries, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, territorial reforms were guided and driven by the goal, typical of the (rationalist) zeitgeist of that period, of massively redrawing the historically small-size boundaries of the municipalities in order to modernize them and make them administratively more amenable and operationally more effective in conducting the multiple tasks conveyed on the local government level by the (then expansive Welfare) State. Labeled by Alan Norton (1994) as the “North European pattern,” in view of the countries in question, this reform strategy was marked by the political determination of the governments concerned to carry out the reforms, possibly against the will of and in the face of protests by the local population, using coercive parliamentary legislation as a last resort. According to John Stewart (2000), particularly in England, the scale of amalgamation has been criticized as being oversized (“sizeism”), fostering political alienation of local citizens (as shown by the low voter turnout).

In other countries (with small municipalities), no territorial reforms have occurred. In France and Italy, in the early 1970s, the national governments attempted, in line with the zeitgeist of the era, to territorially reform the small municipalities (in the French case averaging 1,700 inhabitants). Yet these reform moves almost entirely failed because the governments, adhering to the country’s political culture value of “voluntariness,” made amalgamation contingent on the approval of the local population, and such a local consensus was not reached.

In Central East European countries (and similarly in East German Länder), after the downfall of the Communist regimes, most postsocialist governments decided to do without amalgamation of the small municipalities in order not to impair the newly created (small) local democracies (in
Hungary, the number of municipalities even jumped after 1990, from 1,600 to 3,170).

**Intercommunal Bodies (Inter-Communalité)**

In countries in which territorial reforms of the municipal level did not come to pass, different strategies and approaches were followed to institutionally encourage and enable the multitude of small-scale municipalities to engage in intercommunal cooperation, for instance, in the provision of services for the local population. Against the background of the very small size and very large number of municipalities (communes), France, not surprisingly, was the first and exemplary country to create the legal framework—the first as early as 1890—for a great number of such intercommunal bodies, called *inter-communalité*, at first in the form of *syndicats*, then, since the 1960s, in the form of communal unions (*communautés*), with the most important ones being the *communautés urbaines* (in the meantime) in 16 metropolitan areas. As a crucial institutional innovation, the communal unions have been provided with a taxing power of their own (*fiscalité propre*). In line with the traditional principle of voluntariness (*voluntariat*), most of these intercommunal bodies have been formed on a voluntary basis. In other countries (without territorial reforms), similar institutional developments have got under way, for instance, in Italy (with the formation of *consorzi*, in part by binding legislation) and in some German Länder (with the establishment of *Verwaltungsgemeinschaften* [administrative unions], formed also, last resort, by binding legislation). Most recently, a new round of territorial consolidation has gained momentum. Further, on the one hand, quite massive territorial amalgamation strategies have been inaugurated, such as in Denmark (2007) and Lithuania, both arriving at municipalities averaging 55,000 inhabitants. On the other hand, political initiatives have been undertaken to further consolidate the intercommunal networks.

**Political Institutions**

**Local Democracy**

Local self-government hinges on the idea and imperative that the local citizens govern themselves in all matters relevant to their local community. In its purest form, local self-government is realized through institutions of direct democracy when the local citizens meet directly to make the relevant decisions. In Europe, the mother country of direct local democracy still is Switzerland, where in some cantons, and even in major cities, citizens meet periodically to make relevant decisions, including those on local taxation. For the rest, in all other European countries, the institutions and procedures of representative democracy prevail, according to which the key political right of citizens is to elect the local councilors, while the elected local council is the supreme and sole local decision-making body.

Political parties made their entry into local politics quite late, when national parties discovered the local level as a relevant political arena to mobilize political support and to recruit political leaders. Recently, however, as noted by Marion Reiser and Everhard Holtmann (2008), there are indications of a “farewell to the party model” in local politics.

In recent years, the dominance of representative local democracy and preponderance of the elected local council as the prime local decision maker has been challenged as, since the 1990s, in a number of countries (such as Germany and Italy), binding local referendums have been introduced as a complement and corrective to the elected local councils. Significant impulses came from Central Eastern European countries (including East German Länder) when, after the collapse of the communist systems, the introduction of direct democratic procedures were seen as a crucial step to move toward reestablishing and reinforcing democratic systems.

**Local Political Systems**

Among the local institutional arrangements in European countries, two systems can historically be distinguished. For one, essentially in the UK and in Scandinavian countries, monistic local government systems have developed in which decision making (as well the direction of local administration) is ideally the collective responsibility of the elected council, which, in turn, has delegated this monistic responsibility to sector committees (government by committees). From this followed the notion that the executive function (which combines
decision making and executive functions) should be entrusted to (sectoral) committees formed by the (plenary) council (government by committee).

This monistic government by committee system is contrasted with the dualistic local government system, which has emerged in Continental European countries. It is premised on the (dualistic) distinction made between the local council as the prime local (local parliament type) decision-making body, on the one hand, and as an executive body with, as a rule, a mayor elected by the council, on the other hand, in a division-of-function scheme reminiscent of a (local) parliamentary system. In most countries, the mayor was elected by the council. Both local government “families” have seen significant institutional changes in recent years, which were triggered by mounting criticism.

In the UK, the traditional government-by-committee system was attacked for lacking clearly identifiable accountability and for fostering policy fragmentation. The Local Government Act of 2000 provided for a reform that was undertaken in England and is the option chosen by most councils. It amounts to a kind of “parliamentarization” of the local government system, in that most of the decision-making and executive powers are transferred to one of the committees (the “executive committee” with “executive councilors” as the local “parliamentary cabinet”); there is a (council elected) leader of the committee who serves as a kind of local “prime minister,” while the plenary of the council and its councilors are assigned a scrutinizing function. Sweden, too, has moved toward a quasi parliamentarization of the local government system, stopping short, however, of abandoning the collective responsibility of sector committees.

In continental European countries, the existing dualistic system, with a council-elected executive mayor, was chiefly criticized for constraining the emergence of a local leadership and also because the mayor lacked democratic accountability. Since the 1990s, many European countries (German Länder, Italy, central Eastern European countries) have moved toward the direct election of the mayor, which is reminiscent of a local presidential system. To put a political check on the (possibly domineering) mayor, in most German Länder, a procedure to recall the sitting, directly elected mayor by way of local referendum has been installed.

Functions

The local government levels have historically taken on an ever-broader multifunctional profile as local authorities, responding to mounting social and infrastructural needs, assumed responsibility for social services and public utilities (water, sewage, energy, etc.) in what conservatives sneered at as municipal socialism and which in fact amounted to a local embryonic version of the emergent welfare state. With the advances of national welfare states, which climaxed after 1945 well into the 1970s, local government levels were increasingly put in charge by central governments to implement national welfare state and interventionist policies.

In all countries, the local government levels have been responsible for the provision of social services, urban planning, and for the provision of utilities. Moreover, the concern for cultural and recreational matters ranked high on the local government agenda.

The most important intercountry functional variations are related to education and health services. While, for instance, in Sweden and England, the running of (primary and secondary) schools falls under the operational and financial responsibility of the local government levels, in continental European countries, education, by tradition, is firmly a state matter. In some countries, the local government levels (in Scandinavian countries) or the regions (in Italy) are operationally and financially involved in the public health system. Recently, in reaction to neoliberal (lean state) and marketization demands as well under budgetary pressure, the traditional public sector model and with it the multifunctional municipal sector profile have experienced significant retrenchment and cutbacks both in functions and in personnel, thus putting the traditional local government model at stake (see below).

The significant, in part preponderant, functional weight that the subnational levels, particularly the local government levels, have so far acquired in the respective countries is indicated by the high proportion of personnel at these levels compared with the total number of public sector personnel.

Among the unitary countries, the list is topped by Scandinavian countries, with local government personnel constituting up to 83% (in the case of Sweden) of the total number of public sector personnel.
employees (see Dexia, 2008, p. 64), and also by some Central East European countries (such as Hungary with 65%) and by the UK (with 56%). The percentage of state personnel is correspondingly small (e.g., 17% in Sweden). While in France the percentage of local government personnel has expanded (to 30%) since the beginning of decentralization in 1982, the share of state personnel continues to be surprisingly strong (some 50% with another 20% in public hospitals). In Italy, the central state continues, despite the decentralization since the 1990s, to employ 58% of the total public sector. Thus, notwithstanding decentralization in these two countries, the central state, hinting at some path-dependent continuity of the Napoleonic state tradition, continues to be organizationally present at the subnational levels.

The picture in federal or quasi-federal countries is somewhat more complex. While in Germany the portion of federal personnel is just 12% and in Spain 23% and the rest are employed by the subnational levels, the lion’s share of public sector personnel is employed at the federal (53% in Germany) or the quasi-federal/regional levels (50% in Spain), with the local levels also showing considerable personnel strength (e.g., with 30% in Germany).

**Local Finances**

The status and standing of the local government in the intergovernmental setting essentially depends, of course, on the degree of its financial and budgetary autonomy. A valid indicator of this could be the degree to which local authorities, in order to cover their expenditures, may draw on local taxes of their own as opposed to relying on grants assigned to them at the state level. Historically, the local governments financed their spending almost entirely from local taxes, the “rate” levied by English local authorities being a classical example. Signaling the current fiscal dependence of local authorities is the fall in percentage of “own” tax revenues as compared with the entire local revenues in most countries. Sweden is a lone exception, in that 67% of their local revenues still come from the local (income) tax; France and Denmark are also remarkably close, with 49%. By contrast, in most other countries, the self-financing local tax margin is less than 20% (see the table in Dexia, 2008, p. 97). Correspondingly, the share of government grants (which can quite easily be changed and manipulated and could also come with strings attached) from the central government has conspicuously risen, standing, for instance, at 49% in the UK and 47% in Italy and Poland.

**Local Organizational Structures**

**Local Administration: Organization and Personnel**

Historically, in preindustrial times and in rural contexts, local matters were, as a rule, attended out by “laymen,” that is, by the local citizens at large in what literally was local self-administration. The layman practice in local administration was pursued, for instance, in Sweden well into the early 20th century and still exists in Switzerland in certain forms.

However, in countries that underwent early industrialization and urbanization, such as in the UK, an industrial front-runner, and somewhat later in Germany, the local authorities built up regular administrative structures with professionalized staff. In continental European countries, within a state tradition geared to legal, rule-bound hierarchical administration (often identified as the Max Weber bureaucracy model), local administration also showed a Weberian stance. Reflecting the advanced welfare state and its public sector–centered implementation model in some countries, such as in the UK and in Sweden, social services came to be almost entirely rendered (in-house) by public—that is, local government—personnel. In some countries, for instance, in Germany and Italy, traditionally following a subsidiarity principle, social services continued to be provided largely by nonprofit, nonprofit organizations.

Spearheaded by new public management (NPM) concepts, the Weberian model of legal, rule-bound hierarchical public administration was criticized for its inherent inflexibility and its neglect of economic efficiency and was sought to be replaced with managerialist concepts and instruments that, borrowed from the private business sector, aimed at making municipal administration and its personnel more flexible and more cost conscious. The impact that the NPM message had on the administrative world varied from country to country, depending on country-specific cultural and institutional conditions and traditions. It was most
noticeable in English-speaking countries, which, as in their Common Law tradition a legally defined distinction between the public and the private sphere is not made, appeared more receptive to the private sector–derived principles. By contrast, NPM had a more difficult access in most continental European countries, in which, against the backdrop of their Roman Law and Rule of Law (Rechtsstaat) traditions, the traditional administrative model was culturally more firmly entrenched. In retaining elements of the traditional model and in—at the same time—adopting and “translating” NPM concepts, these countries have, in their administrative model, not least in local administration, moved toward what has been called a neo-Weberian model.

Under the combined onslaught of (neoliberal) welfare state critique and budgetary squeeze, local governments in most countries have resorted to making deep cuts in their personnel over the past 15 years. Perhaps the most conspicuous case is Germany where, between 1991 and 2004, the total local government staff was cut by 30% (in East German Länder, it was even higher at 53%) and in the UK by 5%. By contrast, in France, the local government staff increased by 24%, obviously in the wake of decentralization since 1982.

Mounting Interorganizational Pluralization of Single-Purpose Actors

In the (horizontal) interorganizational setting, the traditional multifunctional leading position of local government in the local arena has been challenged through a number of powerful currents, particularly through the neoliberal policy message, through the NPM message (both becoming rampant during the 1980s), and increasingly (since the 1990s) through the market liberalization drive of the European Union.

First, inasmuch as the previously dominant conception of local government as the public sector/municipal sector–centered providers of public services was challenged and shattered, the local authorities proceeded to “outsource” the conduct of local government activities and the provision of public services to outside providers. While outsourcing was not an entirely new concept in local government practice, it gained momentum when, in the 1980s, compulsory competitive tendering became the battle cry of Britain’s Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher and almost irresistibly spilled over into the modernization agendas in other countries. The provision of social services has subsequently seen a pluralization of providers—public/municipal or semipublic, nonpublic, nonprofit, or, increasingly, private-commercial.

The other important field was the provision of public utilities, which, in some countries, has traditionally been the responsibility of local government and has often been carried out by them in an organizational in-house form. Under the market liberalization pressure, the local authorities have followed two options, which are described below.

First, they turned these activities, in what has been called formal (or organizational) privatization, over to newly created, still municipally owned, but organizationally and financially self-standing corporations. In some cases, such corporatization has been extended to a broad scope of local functions, sometimes with the intention of tailoring the entire administration to a private sector–derived holding (Konzern) scheme. Second, often beset by budgetary needs, the municipalities embarked on substantive (or asset) privatization by selling their local facilities (such as local energy or water companies) to outside providers, mostly of the large national or international corporation kind.

In sum, in the (horizontal) interorganizational setting of the local arena, public tasks, which, in the past, were attended by local government in-house or at arm’s length, have increasingly been taken over by, or outsourced to, local-level actors that operate outside the immediate realm and direct influence of local government in the local arena. They constitute the kind of actor networks that, in the currently dominant social science terminology, have been identified as governance. On the one hand, these local governance actors can be expected to bring their specific—financial, innovative, entrepreneurial, and so on—resources and skills to bear in the local arena. As they are typically single-purpose and specific-interest actors—that characteristically, first of all, seek to fulfill their own organizational goals and benefits possibly to the detriment and at the expense of other actors and their rivaling interests—their basically “private-regarding” action orientation is bound to pose a challenge to the role and mandate of the elected councils to be (ideally) the advocates and
Locke, John

See also Decentralization; Governance, Multilevel; Government; Organization Theory; Privatization; Regionalization

Further Readings


Locke, John (1632–1704)

As the father of modern empiricist epistemology, critic of innate ideas, and theorist of a conception of personal identity still very much in vogue in contemporary philosophy, Locke brings key concepts of constitutionalism and toleration to the modern political lexicon: individual rights and freedoms, the rule of law, the separation of powers and the division between private and public. Political power must justify its acts and choices and must practice the virtue of nonintervention in those areas of social life that possess some sort of internal and autonomous normativity, areas where the law of nature does not require the support of positive law. At the heart of Locke’s political theory lies a contractualist political model that opposes both the divine right of kings and the absolutist ramifications of Thomas Hobbes’s contractualism—a model that reconciles tradition and modernity and addresses both secular and religious concerns.

Between 1689 and 1690, as a troubled period in English history came to a close with the Glorious Revolution and the ascent of William of Orange to the throne, Locke published An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the Epistola de tolerantia, and the Two Treatises of Government. In many respects, these three works represent an intellectual program begun nearly 30 years earlier, in his juvenile manuscripts on the law of nature—a
program that focused on the limits of human understanding, the foundations of political obligation, and the use of reason in discovering the principles of natural law. Belief in past habits and traditions or in opinions supported by custom and convention may lead a person into grave error. Both ancient historians and the authors of modern travel diaries have attested to the great variety of human moral convictions and the impossibility of reducing them to a single, coherent system. Neither history, nor innate principles, nor a general human consensus can help people determine universal rules and principles. The only trustworthy tool in this endeavor is one's own reason, by which one can discover the order that derives from God's supreme will and transcend the multiplicity of traditions and opinions.

Locke places himself within the modern individualist tradition. He needs individualism and equality to challenge the hierarchical and patriarchal structure of feudal society but, unlike Hobbes, he also relates to them as fundamental premises for the creation of a lawful political power, rooted in consensus. Hobbes's atomistic and competitive individualism make it impossible to imagine a social and political order that is not the product of artifice, in the absence of which there is only chaos, anarchy, and bellum omnium contra omnes (war of all against all), a precarious and dreary condition in which there is neither mine nor thine, justice nor injustice. According to Hobbes, only the absolute, unlimited, and illimitable positive law of a sovereign can end the state of war between men and guarantee order, peace, and property. Conversely, the author of the *Second Treatise of Government* distinguishes, at the very outset, the state of perfect freedom of man in the state of nature from license and the state of nature from the state of war. In the state of nature, people are not unrelated atoms moved by instrumental and calculating reason but moral persons who seek relationships of mutual recognition and harbor feelings of benevolence and mutual cooperation. Moral norms exist even in the absence of positive laws, as a result of natural human sociability and a sense of kinship—as members of the same species—and finally, as a result of the theological premise that all men are equal because they are all God's workmanship, all His creatures, and all equally dependent on their common Creator, and called on to participate in his divine plan. This moral equality forbids their using one another in an instrumental fashion. Moreover, inasmuch as he is God's workmanship, man cannot take his own life or that of another but must strive for his survival and the survival of the entire species.

In the *First Treatise of Government*, in response to Filmer's *Patriarcha* (published posthumously in 1680, during the exclusion crisis), Locke denies that God's will, as expressed in the book of *Genesis*, mandates the reduction of men to a condition of natural slavery and subjection. God did not make Adam master of all men and sole owner of the Earth. He gave the Earth to Adam and Eve and, by extension, to all men, that they might multiply and improve the conditions of their lives. The necessity to improve the conditions of one's life and ensure one's survival justifies appropriation. God gave the world to all men in common, but they would die of starvation were each to await the consensus of the rest of humanity before consuming the fruits of nature. Property does not derive from consensus but from labor. Through their labor, men transform and improve nature, creating wealth. The law of nature does not allow natural resources to be used in a profligate manner. The inequalities that derive from the existence of private property and the accumulation of wealth, made possible by the introduction of money, are justified inasmuch as they constitute a general improvement in the human condition. If justice gives every man title to the product of his labor, charity gives one who is unable to support himself the right to assistance: The poor man is entitled to the surplusage of the rich.

The statement that every man is born free, equal, and independent—that is, capable of choosing his own destiny—entails many important consequences from a political perspective. Every man is responsible for his own actions: The sins of the fathers cannot be visited on the sons, no paternal act can deprive the son of life and liberty, and no pact undertaken by the father can be considered binding for future generations. Natural law and the moral equality of men make consent the only possible basis for lawful interaction between equals. The relationship between husband and wife is determined by a pact, which recognizes the legitimacy of divorce and even a woman’s right to negotiate the terms of custody of her children and
other, similar issues. Voluntary pacts govern interaction between religious associations and their believers, between master and servant, and between magistrate and citizens. The political compact, however, unlike all other pacts, is irrevocable: When a citizen has given his express consent to be part of the political community, he can no longer abandon it; he has no right to emigrate and join another state.

In the state of nature, every man possesses the executive power of the law of nature, which affords him the power to judge and punish, in a commensurate fashion, those who break the law of nature. One who infringes on the life, liberty, or property of another thereby places himself in a state of war with the rest of humanity. Justice in the state of nature fails only as a result of men’s passions, which may lead to excessive partiality in the application of sanctions. That is why men decide to abandon the state of nature and form a political community. In adhering to such a compact, they surrender to the state that executive power granted to them by the law of nature. The state’s monopoly over lawful violence is thus constrained to respect the limits within which it was legitimately exercised by every individual in the state of nature. The ramifications of this are far-reaching and concern even the relationship between states: No state has the right to initiate a war as an aggressor because the executive power of the law of nature that has been delegated to the state can only be exercised for the purposes of reparation and restraint. Locke, unlike Hobbes, may thus distinguish between just and unjust wars, conceiving limits to the contenders’ lawful conduct during a war, implicitly following Hugo Grotius’ distinction between *ius ad bellum* (the right to go to war) and *ius in bello* (right conduct in war).

The creation of a single judge would not be an improvement on the state of nature, were it not accompanied by the separation of powers and were the principles of the law of nature not fixed in established and impartial laws decided by the community itself. The compact by which every man authorizes the political community to make laws may not, therefore, institute absolute sovereignty. An absolute sovereign, *legibus solutus* and sole master of all powers, is still in a state of nature with his subjects or rather in that degenerate form of the state of nature that is the state of war. No man, Locke maintains, can be so foolish as to abandon the condition of perfect freedom of the state of nature in order to put himself under the absolute power of another man. In a civil society, legislative power and executive power derive from a fiduciary trust granted by the people. Since such power is founded on trust, it can be revoked by the very same people when its rulers systematically break the law. In response to repeated and widespread violations of individual rights by political power, when judiciary intervention is not feasible, there is always the so-called appeal to heaven. It is only in extreme cases, according to Locke, that people will have recourse to violence. The right of resistance may thus be seen more as a warning to those who govern, that they must obey the law, than as a real threat by the people.

In *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, Locke resorts once again to the strategy of separation that would later become the legacy of the entire liberal tradition, separating the legitimate field of action of the state from that of the churches, conceived as voluntary associations. Care for the soul is a private affair, pertaining only to the individual. Men will never reach an agreement on religious issues but will continue to divide and adhere to different churches. Locke is one of the first philosophers to seriously address the persistence and inevitability of disagreement on religious issues. Each and every believer will continue to consider his church the sole representative of religious orthodoxy. As the magistrate has no greater knowledge of the path to salvation than any individual citizen, he cannot impose his will in religious matters. The state, however, has no reason to fear religious pluralism. Religious citizens in fact possess social and moral virtues that can be useful to the state. Furthermore, as it welcomes the existence, in the social space, of a plurality of civil, commercial, and scientific associations, so the state should admit the presence of a plurality of religious associations. They are no more dangerous than other associations, as long as they are allowed to compete freely. Competition might also improve the moral conduct of each church, both internally and in its relations with other churches. It is atheists who represent a threat to the social order: Their word cannot be trusted because they do not believe in the existence of a God who can see and judge us even in the dark. A church, such
as the Catholic Church, that strives to unite in itself both spiritual and temporal power, remains a grave threat to the state and to the public order, as does a church that promulgates beliefs detrimental to human society, such as the belief that it is justified not to keep a promise to one who espouses unorthodox religious doctrines.

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See also Constitutionalism; Contract Theory; Hobbes, Thomas; Liberalism; Natural Law; Tolerance

Further Readings

Main Features and Key Concepts

The three main questions constituting the logic of appropriateness are the following:

1. First, what kind of situation am I actually facing as an actor (individually or institutionally)? This is a question of recognition.
2. Second, what is the main identity of my institution and what is my own main identity?
3. Third, what am I and my organization expected to do in a situation like this? That is, what are the rules connecting the situation and our identities?

A crucial question is how actors set about answering such questions in matching situations. One way is to learn from experience—experiential learning—either by looking at how the matching has been done recently or by finding out how the institution traditionally does this matching. A second way is to react cognitively or through categorization based on mental maps or else through what Karl Weick labels “sense-making.” A third way is to use the experience of others to match, either by stressing that the context is exactly the same as the one others have experienced (contextualization) or by arguing that the context belongs to a broad category that is typical for many organizations (decontextualization).

According to James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, the logic of appropriateness deals with
what is essential in a role, not with what is instrumentally or arbitrarily defined. Faced with different kinds of stimuli, actors respond in complex, standardized, and almost intuitive ways, without any immediate comprehensive analysis, problem solving, or discretion—the latter being features that become part of the logic over time. Appropriateness presupposes that actors have multiple identities or a repertoire of identities—and hence multiple rule options—and these become relevant according to the different situations actors face. One implicit assumption is that these identities and rules exist in relatively consistent sets to further systematic behavior.

**Identities, Rules, and Situations**

Identities are connected both to the individual actor and to institutions. For the individual, identity is a conceptualization of the self organized into rules in order to match action to situations. Identities are constructed by the individual actor, imposed by the environment, and influenced by a broader cultural context. Individual identities can be formed by two interwoven processes: a process of individualization, where the actor voluntarily chooses from self-imposed and self-selected roles and rules, and a process of socialization, where obligations, responsibilities, and commitment are learned and followed, not chosen.

Institutional identities are based on the evolution of common individual or group identities, resulting from the same type of experiences or from internal and external constraints, thereby creating similar attitudes, norms, and values. These are organized into broader social roles, and individual identities can be derived from them. Stephen Krasner describes the same phenomenon with his concept of “vertical depth” in the process of institutionalizing norms and values, referring to factors that are especially important for defining attitudes and activities.

The logic of appropriateness alludes more to informal than formal rules, but formal rules definitely influence informal ones, for example, concerning appropriateness in the civil service. Rules are defined independently of the individual actors who enact them, meaning that personal characteristics are of less importance and that different people in the same time period, position, and institution will match situations, identities, and rules in some of the same ways. Rule following can be seen as a kind of implicit contract or pact; if an actor behaves appropriately, he or she will also be treated appropriately. Rules are codified and standardized to a certain extent, as a precondition for channeling ideas and behavior, and may sometimes be inconsistent. They are meant to organize and regularize behavior and to further standardization instead of individual discretionary behavior. But because rules can be violated, are sometimes too inflexible, may disregard consequences, or may function as socially constructed myths, they may potentially have problems fulfilling these functions.

The theory of the logic of appropriateness is little concerned with what types of situations actors face when trying to connect or match rules, identities, and situations. Appropriateness is often connected with familiar and routine situations, but there are, of course, also appropriate ways to behave in poorly defined situations, such as turbulent or crisis periods. Matching is not only about stability but also takes place when both rules and situations are changing. Philip Selznick emphasizes in his cultural theory that so-called critical decisions are what change public institutions the most and are different from routine decisions.

One starting point for elaborating the logic of appropriateness is to underscore that actors, for example, in public organizations, are probably seldom in unambiguous situations where identities are clear-cut and where one identity is dominant. They have multiple individual and institutional identities. Their environment is often turbulent, with complex dependences, creating a complex attention structure, especially when a number of identities are significant and possibly in conflict. A civil servant can, for example, have identities relating to the specialization of the formal structure and the complexity of its cultural history, to professional competence, and to gender. Identities are further connected with employment in a certain ministry, in a specialized division or in a smaller unit, or else with certain specialized tasks and functions. Another set of identities is related to the interpretation of the cultural history and traditions of a public institution. Some civil servants may have a long tenure related to a subculture in the organization, while others may have a short tenure during which they have become socialized into general cultural norms and values.
And actors differ according to their professional backgrounds and the professional contexts they work in. All this illustrates that identities are numerous and characterized by complexity and varying degrees of consistency.

Variety can lead to ambiguity concerning identities or to situations with possibly competing logics of appropriateness; what is appropriate for one actor, individually or institutionally, may be inappropriate for another. Selznick’s analysis of cooptation in the Tennessee Valley Authority provides an example of this. When the leadership choose cooptation as a strategy to address business interests in the “task environment,” this could be seen as appropriate from a developmental perspective. But had they favored another type of appropriateness, attending to a more conservationist point of view, they would have probably chosen another, less inclusive strategy.

A general question is, therefore, what type of conditions are important for bringing some identities or some aspects of identities to the forefront and keeping others in the background in an actor’s allocation of attention. We would claim that identity related to the formal structure, role, and functions in public organizations is more dominant than culturally evolved identities inside organizations or external social status, which are subordinate to formal conditions and less relevant for decision making. Another answer points to the fact that organizations differ with respect to developing collective, institutional identities and, therefore, also with respect to the ease with which members can base their thoughts and actions on such identities. March and Olsen emphasize that some organizations can have strong integrative features, creating a feeling of common goals and destiny among citizens, politicians, or civil servants, while others are more aggregative and atomized.

One would expect the identities of most actors to be dominated by clear-cut formal rules but also to have informal rules or complex patterns of formal and informal rules, which are either consistent or inconsistent, as their main guidelines for action. But rules can also be said to evolve during the process of matching; the matching process also involves creating new rules and identities, not only selecting from preexisting ones. Sometimes rules and identities undergo a transformation or editing process when they are confronted with new or complex situations.

Consequentiality and Appropriateness

The logic of consequentiality is based on a rational instrumental tradition, where utilitarian reasoning about cost and effects is an important part of the equation. The logic of consequentiality may be seen as competing with the logic of appropriateness, but it is more often seen as only one version of rule following; in other words, rationality is one rule that is connected to reasoning about consequences. In the logic of appropriateness, contrary to the logic of consequentiality, preferences and expectations about the consequences of action are not the most important consideration; the main thing is to identify what is appropriate. Rules can be followed even if the consequences are negative—with regard to self-interest, for example. But what is appropriate can also reflect a history of negotiations, consensus building, or winning coalitions.

Although analytically distinguishable, it is often difficult to separate arguments of appropriateness from arguments of consequentiality in concrete decision-making processes. The main reason for this is that the extensive application of rationality and the logic of consequentiality is a very strong ideology permeating modern organizations, to such an extent that behaving appropriately often means demonstrating clearly that one is acting in accordance with this logic. Some aspects of the puzzling mixture of arguments of appropriateness and consequentiality find expression in the creation of rationalized myths (i.e., popular ideas about how to build and change modern organizations) and in the interpretation of their effects.

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See also Civil Service; Governance, Informal; Institutional Theory; Leadership; Organization Theory; Path Dependence; Values

Further Readings


Logit and Probit Analyses

Logit and probit models are designed to analyze research questions where the dependent variable is binary. Examples of these kinds of problems are studies of voter turnout (where each individual might vote or abstain), legislative voting on a bill (where each legislator might vote yes or no), and war (where each country might choose to go to war or stay at peace). In practice, there is little difference between the logit and probit models, and these models are interchangeable in almost all research settings. Logit and probit models fall into the category of discrete choice models, so named because the political agents we are studying are making choices from among a finite set of distinct options. In this entry, the derivation and interpretation of such models are discussed.

Deriving the Logit and Probit Models

Perhaps the most straightforward way to derive the logit and probit models is to assume that a political agent’s choice is determined by some continuous underlying rating of a political item or a propensity to engage in some behavior known as a latent variable. Each political agent’s position on this latent variable (y_i*) is assumed to be a linear function of a set of some observed variables and coefficients (X\beta) and some unobserved stochastic influences (\varepsilon_i). Thus, a political agent’s latent choice preference is given by

\[ y_i^* = X\beta + \varepsilon_i \]

If \( y_i^* \) was observed, we could simply estimate this equation via linear regression. However, in a binary choice setting, the agent’s position on this latent variable is unobserved. Instead, a choice threshold \( \tau \) divides the latent variable into two categories, and we only observe \( y \), which indicates which choice category the agent selected. We observe \( y_i = 0 \) for agents who are at or below \( \tau \) and \( y_i = 1 \) for agents above the threshold. For instance, a country might have an underlying propensity to fight with its neighbors, but we can only observe this country in one of two discrete choice categories: war or peace.

Since \( y_i^* \) is latent, we must make several identifying assumptions to estimate the probability that a political agent makes a particular choice. Although these identifying assumptions are arbitrary, they do not influence the estimate of the relationship between the \( X \)’s and choice behavior. The first of these assumptions is to set \( \tau = 0 \). We make this assumption because we cannot obtain a unique estimate for both \( \tau \) and the constant term in the model: Since \( y^* \) is unobserved, we could add an arbitrary constant to both \( \tau \) and the constant term and still generate the same probability of an observed outcome. With this assumption, and noting that \( y_i^* = X\beta + \varepsilon_i \), the probability that an agent selects the choice category represented by \( y = 1 \) given the observed variables \( X_i \) is

\[ \Pr(y_i = 1 \mid X_i) = \Pr(X\beta + \varepsilon_i > 0 \mid X_i). \]

This equation reveals that the probability that political agents select the choice category denoted by \( y = 1 \) will depend in part on the unobserved error term \( \varepsilon_i \). By subtracting \( X\beta \) from both sides of the inequality and assuming that the distribution of \( \varepsilon_i \) is symmetric, we can rearrange this equation to read as follows:

\[ \Pr(y_i = 1 \mid X_i) = \Pr(\varepsilon_i \leq X\beta \mid X_i). \]

This equation is simply the evaluation of the cumulative density function (CDF) of \( \varepsilon_i \) at \( X\beta \), which we can express as \( \Pr(y_i = 1 \mid X_i) = F(X\beta) \).

The probability that we will observe \( y_i = 1 \) given \( X \) can now be estimated once we make some identifying assumptions about the distribution and the variance of the error term \( \varepsilon_i \). Almost any distribution can be assumed—for instance, we could assume that this error term follows a uniform distribution and derive a linear probability model. However, in practice, we typically assume one of two distributions.

One common assumption is that the error term is drawn from an independently and identically
distributed (IID) normal distribution. This results in the probit model:

\[ \Pr(y_i = 1 | X) = \Phi(X \beta), \]

where \( \Phi \) is the CDF of the normal distribution. As \( y_i^* \) is unobserved, we cannot estimate the variance of the error term as we can with a linear regression. Thus, a standard assumption for probit models is that \( \text{Var}(\varepsilon_i) = 1 \).

Another common assumption is that the error term follows an IID logistic distribution. The logistic distribution is very similar to a normal distribution but with slightly more probability in the tails. This results in the logit model:

\[ \Pr(y_i = 1 | X) = \exp(\mu X \beta) / [1 + \exp(\mu X \beta)], \]

where \( \exp \) indicates that we are taking the exponential of the term in parentheses, and \( \mu \) is a positive scale parameter. As with the probit model, we must make an assumption about the variance of this CDF: In this case, we assume \( \mu = 1 \), which is equivalent to assuming that \( \text{Var}(\varepsilon_i) = \pi^2/3 \). Thus, the estimation of a logit model will produce estimates of \( \beta \) that are approximately \( \sqrt{\pi^2/3} \approx 1.81 \) times larger than the corresponding estimates from a probit model. This difference is due solely to the different assumptions made about the variance of the error term in the two models. In practice, there is almost never a substantive difference between the logit and probit models, and either choice is valid in virtually all cases.

Both the logit and probit models produce a nonlinear relationship between the \( X \)'s and the choice probabilities. If the probability of observing \( y = 1 \) increases as some variable \( X \) increases, then graphing \( \Pr(y = 1 | X) \) against \( X \) will produce the well-known S-shaped probability curve characteristic of these models (the mirror image of this curve is produced if the probability of observing \( y = 1 \) decreases as the variable \( X \) increases).

### Estimation

Logit and probit models are not estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS) due to the nonlinearity discussed above. Instead, these models are estimated through maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). This is done by first creating a likelihood function and then taking the natural log of this function to create a log-likelihood function (we take the natural log of the likelihood function because it is easier to work with).

For instance, the log likelihood of the probit model is

\[ \ln L = \sum_i y_i \ln \Phi(X_i \beta) + (1 - y_i) \ln[1 - \Phi(X_i \beta)]. \]

Maximizing this log-likelihood means maximizing the sum of the predicted probabilities assigned to the choices that political agents in fact made. This is done by estimating \( \beta \) to have values such that \( X \beta \) tends to be large when \( y_i = 1 \) and small when \( y_i = 0 \).

One difficulty that can arise in the estimation of logit and probit models is known as separation, which occurs when an independent variable perfectly predicts the binary dependent variable. In these cases, the coefficient and standard error on the independent variable will be infinite. For example, by many commonly used definitions of war, there are no instances where two nuclear states have gone to war with each other. Including a variable indicating that a state is a nuclear power in a logit or probit model with war as the dependent variable would create a separation problem as the nuclear power variable perfectly predicts peace. Researchers sometimes solve these kinds of separation problems by omitting the problematic independent variable, adding random noise to their data, or adopting a penalized likelihood estimation approach.

In general, however, the log-likelihood functions for both the logit and probit models are relatively easy to maximize, with most statistical software packages reaching the solution in seconds. However, note that the consistency, normality, and efficiency of MLE depends on asymptotic arguments—the small-sample properties of MLE are largely unknown. Thus, researchers should be cautious when estimating logit or probit models with small samples.

### Interpretation

A simple examination of the coefficients in logit and probit models reveals whether an independent variable had a positive or negative effect on the
Logit and Probit Analyses

probability of observing \( y = 1 \) and whether that variable was statistically significant. However, interpretation of the substantive effect of an independent variable in these models is more difficult than the interpretation of linear regression models as the relationship between \( X\beta \) and the choice probabilities depends on a nonlinear function. The effect of a one-unit change in one independent variable on the choice probabilities will depend on the values of the other independent variables in the model. This means that we cannot interpret the \( \beta \)s in logit and probit models as we would interpret them in an OLS setting.

The most common method for interpreting the substantive effects of coefficients in logit and probit models in political science is through the use of a hypothetical observation. The researcher begins by selecting values for the independent variables in the model that are representative of some case of interest in the study. Setting variables to their mean or modal values is common, although this is not the only possibility. Often, the researcher will select values for the independent variables that reflect some case of substantive interest. Then, using the estimated values of \( \beta \) and the selected values of \( X \), a baseline probability for \( y = 1 \) is calculated. For instance, we would interpret the coefficients in a probit model by calculating \( \Pr(y = 1|X) = \Phi(X\beta) \), where \( X \) represents the selected values for the independent variables. The influence of a particular independent variable on the probability that \( y = 1 \) can then be examined by changing the value of this variable while holding all other independent variables constant at \( X \) and recalculating \( \Pr(y = 1|X) \).

As these predicted probabilities are based on our model estimate and are thus themselves estimates, it is usually desirable to calculate standard errors for these probabilities. In political science, this is most commonly done through simulation. Hundreds or thousands of draws are taken from the multivariate normal distribution defined by the coefficients and covariance matrix estimated by the logit or probit model, a predicted probability is calculated for each draw, and the mean and standard deviation of this set of predicted probabilities is reported.

Related Discrete Choice Models

Ordered logit and ordered probit models are derived from the logit and probit models by adding additional choice thresholds to the latent variable and were developed for research questions where the dependent variable consists of more than two ordered categories. Multinomial logit and multinomial probit models have been developed to study research questions where the dependent variable consists of more than two unordered categories.

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See also Maximum Likelihood; Nonlinear Models; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Regression

Further Readings

LONGITUDINAL DATA
See Panel Data Analysis; Time-Series Cross-Section Data and Methods

LOT, AS A SELECTION METHOD
See Election by Lot
Machiavelli, Niccolò  
(1469–1527)

Machiavellism commonly refers to a cynical, amoral view of power and human relations and also to a politics of force and of calculated arbitrariness. In his major works, The Prince and Discourses on Livy, the political philosopher and diplomat Niccolò Machiavelli took the scandalous liberty of speaking well of evil: namely, of cruelty, obscenity, treachery, lies, avarice, disbelief, irreligion, craftiness, and boldness. His name has been consequently charged with the abstract and moral notion of evil, particularly in politics. This was certainly a way to render his theories illicit and detestable; nonetheless, a strong interest in them has never diminished. Machiavelli remains one of the most widely published authors of the past 5 centuries and one of the rare ones, along with the Marquis de Sade and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, to have his name substantiated for describing scary and excessive behaviors. This entry presents, first, some of Machiavelli’s most controversial concepts and, second, major events concerning his life.

Machiavelli as Political Thinker

For political science, Machiavelli has symbolized the advent of a realist approach to politics and society. “Realist” means both the criticism of any utopian and transcendental conception of politics and a demystifying analysis of human history. One could insist that medieval jurists, such as Bartolus of Sassoferrato who, in commenting on Aristotle’s Politics, opposed the moral philosophers of his times, anticipated such an approach. But Machiavelli’s oft-quoted formula, according to which it is more appropriate to go behind appearances to the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination thereof (The Prince, 15), brought something different to the debate. Machiavelli proposed analytic tools for an evaluation of the political world as it is essentially and not as it appears to be superficially by immediate experience or by moral assumption. His realism, however, is not a skeptical submission to the existing state of things and to the authority of tradition and the powerful. It is based on a constant dialogue between his own experience of the events of his times and his continual study of antiquity. This is the condition for a theoretical understanding of what can and cannot be possible. The notion that humankind is the same throughout history does not imply that the order of things cannot be changed, nor does it imply that an invisible hand rules it. It makes possible, to the contrary, the intelligibility of political experience.

Philosophically trained by his early work on the ancient poet Lucretius’s antireligious On the Nature of Things, Machiavelli aimed at rendering men the artisans of their own fortune (The Prince, 25). He was the first to propose to everyone, in a bold, clear style, a kind of knowledge about power that was previously reserved for an elite educated in thorny juridical casuistry and in the practice of political affairs. He has been both condemned and
praised for having unveiled the “mysteries of the state” and the tools of its authority, potentially acquainting the masses with the inner workings of politics. Until the advent of the age of revolutions, from Jean Bodin to John Adams, Machiavelli was reasonably considered as the founder of a plebeian political philosophy. He introduced the topic of political equality and the equal political ability of all men without consideration of rank, riches, and lineage at the same time as he introduced the concept of a class division of “desire” between the aristocracy (grandi) and the people. The aristocracy is moved by its desire to oppress the people and the people by their desire not to be oppressed by the aristocracy (The Prince, 9). Tyranny, in Machiavelli’s thinking, is set in motion by the ambition of the aristocracy, which considers itself above the laws and tends to weaken society in order to make it submit it to its own purposes (Discourses, I 40, III 28). According to his agonistic and dynamic vision of social institutions, which suggests that popular discord makes society free and powerful, the people appear to be the best guardians of liberty (Discourses, I 4–5, 58). By giving voice to even the most extremist discourse of the rebellious working classes (the ciompi) Machiavelli granted it a literary and political dignity (Florentine Histories, III 13). Added to his consideration that it may sometimes be necessary to extinguish the aristocracy in order to establish a republic (Discourses, I 55), the scandalous rupture this anti-elitist political stance introduced into political philosophy forced most successive political theorists to measure themselves, explicitly or not, against his thought. In spite of the censure exerted by the Catholic Church on his works and personal history, most of the great philosophical and political ideas of the past 5 centuries had their beginnings in Machiavelli. His works had a positive influence on Bodin, Montaigne, Bacon, Vanini, Spinoza, Sidney, Bayle, Montesquieu, the Encyclopedists, the Federalists, Hegel, Marx, Weber, and Gramsci, among many others.

The Florentine World
The third son of an attorney and his wife, Niccolò Machiavelli was born in Florence, Tuscany, into a territorial state shaped by heavy political, social, and economic contradictions. The banking and mercantile aristocracy of Florence, who controlled the state’s economic and financial organization, had built a fiscal system in which its contributions took the form of loans bearing interest. By contrast, the inhabitants of Florentine’s subject territories and the masses of the Florentine people carried the weight of taxes, from which a big part was absorbed by the service of the state debt. In 1494, with the beginning of the Italian Wars, the Medici regime, which had consolidated the financial system in favor of the aristocracy, collapsed. A popular government was established with one third of the Florentine householders qualifying to participate in the assembly of the Great Council. It had to face the disaggregation of the territories, which had rebelled against the previous forms of subjection. As Machiavelli asserted, the Florentine ruling class decided to disarm the people in order to enjoy the immediate usefulness of being able to plunder them (Discourses, II 30). The intimate link between public debt, the employment of mercenary troops, and aristocratic interests (whose tremendous negative social consequences appeared clearly when an external threat arose, as after 1494) is constitutive of Machiavelli’s political thought and activity. He directed most of his energy, both in practice and in theory, to “arm the people” for the independence of the republic.

Machiavelli’s Life and Works
In June 1498, during a period of heavy political conflicts caused by a major financial and institutional crisis, Machiavelli, then 29 years old, was elected head of the Second Chancery of the Florentine government, in charge of administering the city’s territories; he was soon after nominated to serve the office for military affairs. Involved for the next 14 years in numerous diplomatic missions in Italy and abroad, he nonetheless dedicated most of his time to territorial affairs and to the organization of the militia. The institution of the militia, enacted in December 1506, drew strong opposition from the Florentine aristocracy. The militia’s major achievement was the defeat of the protracted Pisan rebellion (June 1509). Its major failure was its inefficiency in the face of the Spanish armies at Prato (August 1512). But internal conflicts within the Florentine republic and its incapacity to grant forms of citizenship to its territorial
subjects had already prevented the consolidation and development of the militia in Tuscany. Machiavelli emphasizes in the *Art of War* (published in 1521 and the most neutral among his major works) that his concept of the people in arms harbored broader ambitions than he could actualize or even express. The fall of Prato led to the overthrow of the republican regime and to the return of the Medici to Florence. In October 1512, Machiavelli attempted in vain to convince the Medici to build an alliance with the people against the aristocracy (*A Caution to the Medici*). In November 1512, he was one of the few members of the Chancery dismissed from his functions. A few months later, imprisoned under the accusation of conspiracy, he was tortured, but he confessed nothing and ultimately benefited from the amnesty that followed the election of Giovanni de Medici as Pope (Leo X).

Over the next years, Machiavelli seemed to play a kind of double game. In attempting to get closer to the Medici, he dedicated to one of them the manuscript of his *Prince*, apparently a satire of the literature directed at the moral instruction of princes, in which he maintained the central idea expressed in his *Caution to the Medici*. But he also frequented those who developed, under his teaching, a radical resistance to the new tyrants of Florence. His *Discourses on Livy*, composed of materials assembled over 20 years, conserves part of this teaching. Published posthumously in 1531, it appeared to be dedicated to one of these radical opponents. The attitudes of those opponents and of the Medici themselves toward Machiavelli, even after the failed anti-Medicean conspiracy of 1522 in which he was not directly involved, indicated that neither ever doubted Machiavelli’s continuous attachment to the former republic. In 1521, in his *Discourse on Reforming the State of Florence*, Machiavelli had proposed to Leo X a constitutional reform, at that time considered eccentric, by which the dissolution of the Medici regime would be followed by the reconstruction of a popular state. Machiavelli was then commissioned by Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici—later Pope Clement VII—to write the *Florentine Histories*, presented in 1525 and published posthumously (1532). This book draws a ferocious portrait of the rulers of late medieval Florence, the Medici included, in accord with Machiavelli’s political theory. In May 1527, with the Sack of Rome, the Medici lost Florence and the republic was restored. Machiavelli was not recalled to his old functions, as he and his republican friends had wanted. He died soon after. Nonetheless, his idea that the militia could strengthen solidarity among the people and also serve as a bit in the mouth of the aristocracy quickly became the official declaration of the last Florentine republic. After the republic’s fall in 1530, Clement VII authorized the publication of Machiavelli’s unpublished works. It is said that, while reading *The Prince* (published in 1532), he laughed about ideas of Machiavelli that were so contrary to the building of the Medicean hegemony.

Machiavelli’s ensuing reputation followed along lines already established during his lifetime, even before he had written *The Prince* (1513–1514). While organizing the militia in 1505 to 1506, Machiavelli was accused by some members of the Florentine aristocracy of being a lower-class scoundrel and someone who wished to establish a tyranny in Florence. But he was also seen as a new Moses, an emancipator of the people, and a philosopher who was not for fools to understand.

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**See also** Class, Social; Conflicts; Equality, Political; Utopianism; Violence

**Further Readings**


**Maoism**

Maoism is a body of doctrine developed by Mao Zedong (formerly transliterated as “Mao Tse-Tung,”
1893–1976) and his associates in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for Chinese revolution and socialist construction from the 1920s until Mao’s death in 1976. It is composed of many different kinds of ideas and ideology, and strategy and tactics and is believed to be the creative result of applying Marxism–Leninism to China, a semi-feudal and semicolonial country without modern industrial developments. Mao Zedong is the principal Chinese Marxist theorist, a Communist statesman who contributed to the founding of the CCP in 1921, the Communist Army in 1927, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 after a long period of military struggle. In contrast with Karl Marx spending his most of life in reading and writing as an editor, reporter, and scholar, Mao had taken part in almost all military struggles, political conflicts, and social movements during his time. He emerged as a supreme leader in 1935 in the CCP because his smart ideas and successful tactics were adopted by most of the CCP leaders. He was chairman of the PRC from 1949 to 1959 and chairman of the CCP until his death in 1976.

After a bloody split in April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, dismantled the united front with the Communist Party against the warlord government in Beijing and broke with his allies in the Communist Party. In the following campaigns, many communist organizations were destroyed, and a large number of communist leaders and members killed. Mao led several peasant uprisings in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces and established the communist military bases during the early 1930s. Based on these experiences, Mao realized the importance of Chinese peasantry in the Chinese communist revolution. In October 1934, Mao and the communists retreated from Jiangxi under the strong military attack by Chiang’s Nationalist Army and started their epic Long March to the new base in Shanxi province. By making use of the second united front with the Nationalist Party against Japan, Mao and his communist comrades had not only consolidated their base and expanded their sphere of influence but also formulated a set of ideology and methodology for Chinese revolution, which was officially described as Maoism in 1945. In a new civil war between the Communists and Nationalists from 1946 to 1949, the Nationalist government ruled by Chiang was defeated and retreated to Taiwan. As a result, the Communist Party ascended to power and Mao Zedong declared the founding of the PRC in Beijing on October 1, 1949.

According to the logic of Marxist socialism, socialism based on it would succeed only after the capitalist commodity economy developed fully and highly. After the communist revolution succeeded and the Communist Party came to power in 1949 in China, Mao Zedong and the communist leaders decided to implement and promote the socialist transformation of Chinese economy and society, ignoring the basic facts about underdevelopment and dreaming that their country would immediately leap forward into communism. Therefore, to build socialism and realize communism as soon as possible, they conducted radical and drastic reforms in socialist practice in the light of Marxist theory, especially Stalinist theory. They tried to eliminate private ownership and establish public ownership, reduced free competition, developed the planned economy, limited the role of capital in distribution of resources, and promoted egalitarianism to eradicate economic exploitation and suppression. To promote the socialist transformation and build a new socialist country, the Communist Party must always keep the power in the hand of the proletarian class, take the class struggle as basic line, and consolidate the central leadership. After 8 years of socialist transformation, Mao Zedong declared confidently in 1957 that China was building socialism, that the petty bourgeoisie in agriculture and handicrafts and the bourgeoisie in industry and commerce had both experienced changes, that the individual economy had been transformed into a collective economy, and that capitalist private ownership had been transformed into socialist public ownership.

In search of its own socialist model after Stalin was criticized on the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1956, China under Mao Zedong adopted many radical policies and launched mass movements one after another. The most important were the Great Leap Forward (GLF, 1958–1960) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). During the period of the GLF, in rural areas of China, 750,000 higher-stage cooperatives were merged into 25,000 people’s communes with multifunction to transform the private farmers into collective peasants and to pursue
egalitarian ideals. A huge amount of labor power had been mobilized to build the famous backyard steel furnaces and irrigation works. China’s leaders were eager to catch up with Britain, and eventually with the United States, and, at least for a brief moment, were willing to believe that utopian methods worked and would produce more steel and food. The GLF caused a great deal of waste in the development of socialist economy. Also, because this policy emphasized accumulation rather than consumption, the meager development of heavy industry came at the huge cost of little or no improvement in people’s quality of life. The GLF caused an immense famine, and the death rate rose from 18.12 per thousand in 1957 to 44.60 per thousand in 1960—the consequence not only of declining harvests but also of excessive requisitioning of grain, based on false reports that far more grain had been produced than was actually the case. Many years later, official sources admitted that 8 million people had died of causes related to the GLF; unofficial sources estimated the figure at between 12 million and 20 million.

During the period of the Cultural Revolution, under the banner of a proletariat revolution, Mao took the class struggle as fundamental. He believed that the main goal of the Cultural Revolution was to save Chinese socialism from the threat of “revisionism” by purging his lieutenants who, as in the case of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, attached greater importance to economic efficiency than to ideological purity. The Cultural Revolution placed emphasis on purifying the superstructure rather than changing the economic conditions, because Maoists believed that purification would give a push to economic development in which the bureaucrats would engage directly and to which the masses, imbued with revolutionary ideals, would exert themselves on behalf of collective undertakings. Meanwhile, with the ideal of egalitarianism, a leftist “wind” swept through the country, resulting in the curtailing of private landholding, a free market, and other personal rights. As a result, however, Chinese society in 1976 was neither more efficient nor more equitable.

Although Maoism contains many different and sometime contradictory elements in the different stages of Chinese revolution and socialist construction, several salient features can be found in Mao’s works and experiences. Primary is his emphasis on the importance of peasant issues in Chinese revolution and socialist construction. The Marxist–Leninist tradition treated peasants as incapable of revolutionary initiative and only marginally useful in backing urban proletarian revolution. Based on his life experiences and his analysis of the rural situation in China, Mao came to recognize the potential power of China’s hundreds of millions of peasants and decided to establish his base in rural areas instead of in big cities. The peasants constituted the vast majority of China’s population, and most of them were the most hard-pressed of all citizens and lived in extreme poverty. According to Mao, they were very receptive to revolutionary agitation and could become a revolutionary force if fully mobilized and properly guided. Proceeding from this belief, Mao proposed to instill in them a revolutionary consciousness and make their force alone suffice for revolution. By so doing, Mao led the Chinese revolution to success and gradually formed a special attachment to peasants. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao sent many city workers, intellectuals, and bureaucrats to rural areas and forced them to receive reeducation through agricultural labor together with peasants because he believed that big cities were a corrupting influence for many.

In Mao Zedong’s thinking, there were longstanding populist elements and continuous emphasis on the “mass line.” The mass line means the emphasis on the interests and preferences of the common people and demands that the government be responsive to them. It was first created in the revolutionary period, based on the idea of class struggle. The idea of the disadvantaged classes overthrowing the privileged classes through inter-class struggle naturally entailed the idea of mobilizing the oppressed masses to fight for their own interests against those of the oppressing classes. Thus, the notion of class struggle led to Mao Zedong’s stress on the importance of the masses and mass movements and to what Mao explicitly labeled as the “mass line” in the Yan’an period (late 1930s and early 1940s) and extolled as one of the vital traditions in Communist history. Therefore, it is common to assert that the mass line is a style of leadership, which is, at its best, a democratic style of leadership. Mao believed that even the vanguard party needed to be rectified and reformed through criticism from the people it led
and that the masses of China should be encouraged to become involved in even the highest affairs of state. In the Cultural Revolution of 1966 to 1976, the masses had been mobilized so broadly and deeply that the country verged on anarchy.

In spite of political disorder and economic depression in China, Maoism developed into a worldwide movement in the 1960s and thereafter. All Maoists expressed fidelity to the thought of Mao Zedong. But at a practical level, self-identified Maoist political formations differed considerably. In parts of Asia where conditions were similar to those that prevailed in China before 1949, Maoism was largely a peasant movement, engaging in guerrilla warfare and establishing bases in rural areas, and, if successful, surrounding the cities and seizing state power. Elsewhere in the Third World, especially in Latin America, facing very different conditions, Maoists had to modify classical Maoist forms of revolutionary struggle. In the developed capitalist countries, Maoism meant something very different. Western Maoism was particularly attractive to young people during the 1960s only for its ostensible purity and populist nature. Although Maoism has been upheld as one of the major guiding principles in the CCP and other left-wing parties, it has gradually lost its appeal in China and other parts of the world since China adopted its new “Opening and Reform” policy in 1978.

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See also Communism; Marxism; Socialism

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Market Economy

In the 1940s and 1950s, two types of economy were frequently contrasted: the market economy (sometimes also called the “free market” economy) and the centrally planned economy such as that of the former Soviet Union. Whereas in the latter, prices and production decisions were set by administrative decision, in the former, they emerged as a result of the interactions of myriad firms and individuals who negotiate, buy, sell, and set prices for goods and services.

However, since the 1960s, political science has developed a more sophisticated analysis than this simple dichotomy. It has perhaps returned to political economy traditions of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, with concerns about how institutions and norms create markets and indeed lead to different types of market economy. The starting point of analysis is the argument that markets are socially created, through formal institutions such as law, and informal institutions that govern exchanges, such as norms and trust, so that markets are in fact embedded in societies and marked by historical developments. Given this, the interesting questions become: Which kind of market economies exist? Why? How do they change and develop? What are the effects of different kinds of market economy?

Debates about these questions are frequently linked to broader normative questions about the distribution of power and wealth and indeed issues about democracy. At the same time, in practice, they have (with some delay) been influenced by events in markets and governance. Hence “market economy” is not only a complex concept but one intimately linked with both broader questions in political science and the evolution of markets in practice.

Debates in the 1960s and 1970s

Although many debates in the 1960s and 1970s were dominated by Marxism–pluralism conflicts,
at least two sets of analyses were undertaken that remain relevant today. The first concerned problems with “free markets” and was chiefly based in the United States. Political scientists began to study the effects of free markets on the distribution of power, both among social groups and classes and in the political arena. They worried that the power of business, especially large firms, was excessive. Business enjoyed not only great lobbying power but also systemic power: Politicians needed a well-functioning economy and, even without organized pressure, they would seek to protect business interests. The dangers of “capture” of regulators, especially by large concentrated suppliers, was underlined, as these firms could lobby and through votes and/or money could “buy” regulation that would distort the free market through entry restrictions and other protective measures that would allow them to earn rents.

Meanwhile, in Europe, the stark division between planned and market economies became blurred as political scientists mapped out both different forms of capitalism and also the ways in which governments structured markets. Thus, for instance, British and French state roles in markets differed—the latter’s ability to plan and intervene on matters from investment to prices was contrasted with the former’s more limited, arm’s-length role. Thereafter, work on corporatism examined the formal and informal linkages between governments, firms, and organized labor that were particularly strong in northern European countries and used to decide matters such as wage increases, the division of growth between capital and labor, or public spending. Corporatism was linked to the capacity of certain states to pursue high economic growth and a large welfare state. It was often heralded as a means of cooperation and negotiation between different interests that allowed them to shape and control markets.

**Regulatory Reform and the Continuing Role of the State**

Just as political scientists were discovering non-market forms of control and the power of large firms, a major turn toward “the market” took place both in academic study and in policy making. Political science “rediscovered” the market, as it analyzed worldwide moves toward “regulatory reform.” Many state-owned strategic industries were sold, such as network industries, banking, extraction industries, and suppliers in public ownership from the 19th century. Privatization was frequently accompanied by liberalization as, contrary to the predictions of the capture theorists, incumbent suppliers failed to prevent the ending of their legal monopolies. Instead, competition was permitted and indeed encouraged even in industries previously seen as “natural monopolies,” such as energy, telecommunications, and postal services.

The changes gave rise to vigorous debates. One concerned explanations for these “market reforms.” One argument was that they were driven by technological and economic developments, which made state ownership and monopolies untenable. However, such an explanation lacked political mechanisms and suffered from problems similar to those associated with the technological determinism of the 1950s and 1960s. Another framework of analysis underlined the interests of key actors—elected politicians in the proceeds of privatization, managers able to enjoy greater freedom and rewards, consultants, and lawyers—in promoting change. However, the spread of liberal ideas has been another argument, as changes needed to be accepted and legitimated. Finally, however, the reforms can be seen as part of a long cycle of reforms as the pendulum of policy swings between “state” and “market,” due to endogenous developments that undermine each. Hence, the post-1945 move to “collectivism” had engendered inefficiencies and dissatisfactions and thus pressures for more individualism.

However, the extent and nature of the changes were also contested. “Market-oriented” reforms were accompanied by the growth of organizations and rules governing competition. Governments created a series of economic regulators, often in the form of IRAs (independent regulatory authorities)—both sectoral regulators and general competition authorities—and delegated powers to them. In addition, “social regulation” (and regulators) concerning matters such as health and safety grew. Moreover, supranational regulation expanded, notably by the European Union and World Trade Organization. As a result, although U.S. scholars dubbed it “deregulation,” in fact, reform involved the creation of a “regulatory state,” as increased competition went hand in hand with reregulation.
Globalization and Varieties of Capitalism

Liberalization was accompanied by startling increases in cross-border capital flows. Political scientists responded by looking at their effects on national economic policies and institutions. Some argued that these flows of capital reduced the power and autonomy of nation-states. Strong globalizationists indeed claimed that to attract “footloose capital,” and driven by economic efficiency, all countries would have to follow a neoliberal path toward a market economy with a smaller state, less powerful trade unions, and greater attention to the needs of international firms.

However, these claims were vigorously attacked by the “varieties of capitalism” literature, which pointed out that there were several different possible forms of markets and indeed of capitalism. It argues that market players, such as managers, investors, and workers, face coordination problems, which can be resolved through either competition or cooperation. Using the notion of institutional complementarities, whereby institutional arrangements in different spheres are linked, it claims that there are two models of a market economy—liberal market economies and coordinated market economies. Other work on models of capitalism has added further types, such as statist market economies, based on a leading role for the public sector. The literature on varieties of capitalism claims that a diversity of market economies can exist and indeed flourish in the face of globalization, as each has its distinct strengths and weaknesses and there is no single, most efficient market economy.

Current Debates and Trends

Much political science work on “the market” has assumed that market institutions are largely static. Current debates largely center on changes in market institutions. One debate concerns the speed and extent of change. Whereas the varieties-of-capitalism literature, which was closely linked to historical institutionalism, largely claimed or assumed that national market economies remained stable, more recent work has suggested that major change does occur but incrementally and by building on existing institutions so that countries move toward liberalism while maintaining their distinctive heritages.

A further contribution concerns the role of international factors within domestic settings and their role in the spread of “liberal market” institutions such as privatization, liberalization, and independent regulatory agencies. One argument is that change has taken place through diffusion rather than rational choice and calculation. Owing to mechanisms of coercion and emulation, liberal market institutions have spread regardless of their efficacy. Another is that certain forms of internationalization lead to change in market institutions whereas others do not. Thus, for instance, transnational technological and economic developments may create pressures for change, but these can be resisted, whereas other international forces such as overseas reforms or supranational regulation may lead to the spread of “liberal” institutions because of their impact on policy making, notably legitimating change. A further line of development is to look at relationships as much as at formal institutions and hence to see whether, even if the latter change, enduring patterns of behavior remain that differ sharply across types of economy. Hence, the claim is that even if nations adopt similar “liberal” market institutions, these operate in very diverse ways due to informal institutions.

To many, the recent financial and economic crisis offers challenges to the supposed superiority of competition and hence to many normative underpinnings of the market economy. However, at least most political science work does not assume that only one type of market economy exists and does not neglect the crucial roles of the institutions, relationships, and the state in shaping market economies.

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See also Capitalism; Globalization; Regulation

Further Readings


Market Failure

Market failure can be seen along a continuum. There is a wider and a narrower definition: the wider and imprecise one implying lack of output or even utter skepticism concerning the performance and functioning of markets and the narrower one limiting the term to deficiencies of the market. In this entry, the description of market failure and its basic model is followed by a discussion of market failures resulting from a wide variety of factors including asymmetrical information, monopolies, and external effects. Next, the entry examines public goods deficiencies as the narrower category of market failure. The last section discusses the distinction between market failure and economic crises.

With the worldwide financial and economic crisis that began in 2008, market failure has become a renewed focus of public discussion. Yet there is no need to let the state do what the market can do better—for example, organize free exchange relationships and produce consumer goods. Time-dependent public opinion creates shifts to and from more advocacy of state economic activities in creating an extended infrastructure for transport and goods such as public health and education and, nowadays, a heavy control and regulation of the financial sector. Irrespective of such tendencies, the “golden path”—apart from producing the “social goods proper” (see below)—is a combination of an effective judicial infrastructure respecting individual rights and property rights, market competition, the supervision of free access to markets, and avoidance of misuses by monopolies.

Market failure denotes situations where the result of market transactions is not equivalent to a Pareto optimal allocation. With such an allocation, no individual position could be improved while diminishing that of another person. Market failure thus implies a nonoptimal use of scarce resources. In neoclassical theorizing, which focuses on allocation issues rather than issues of distribution, market failure as a pure deficit in allocation stems from factors such as lack of information, external effects, market power, or the character of public goods, also called collective goods.

A basic causal model of market failure is presented in Figure 1. Market power is a background factor to informational asymmetry (as are other factors omitted here). Market power has a direct effect on market failure and an indirect one via external effects. As argued by Richard Musgrave (1959), the failure to produce public goods is the key component of market failure. The first three factors are instances of market deficiencies that can be healed to some extent by appropriate institutional devices. Public goods, by definition, cannot be created in a market since citizens cannot be excluded from consumption and are thus not willing to pay, therefore private production fails to emerge. One could also argue that the lack of public goods production is a cause for market failure just as much as a consequence. We leave this debate unresolved here, with just a line between the two variables to indicate the different nature of the variable “public goods” compared with the other three causal variables, which, in turn, could also be consequences of market failure.

Public goods, just as much as “public bads,” are characterized by nonrivalry in consumption and by the lack of excludability—that is, the ability to exclude others from consuming a good (e.g., security of a country). Partially, this is a case of positive externality. Free riding is tempting when potential consumers cannot be excluded from consuming the good without paying. A lack of effective demand is the result. Here the state can organize the provision of such public goods, yet often without sufficient information as to the adequate amount of such a good. Gathering such information is costly, however. Also the limitation of public goods would in itself be Pareto inefficient. Neoclassical economists argue that the state should interfere only in cases of market failure but not beyond and not for political goals.

Following the specifications of Musgrave and thus opting for a more limited definition of market failure, allocation problems in a market economy can be either market imperfections (market power
and external costs/effects) or market failure (insufficient supply of public goods).

Usually, market failure is limited to a specific market. Market failure calls for state intervention. The counterposition is that state interventionism could lead to state failure. With the state increasingly being engaged in the economy, information scarcity increases due to the absence of fungible markets. Individuals might be treated as if they all had the same preferences. The greater the differences in their preferences are, the greater the welfare losses become. Citizens might be confronted with package solutions they would not agree to in their entirety, or coalitions may go for solutions other than those initially proclaimed by individual parties.

Consequently, the Austrian school of economics (e.g., Friedrich Hayek, 1944; Murray Rothbard, 1962) even denies such a thing as market failure, since markets are instruments of individual discovery with no preassigned collective goals. According to Hayek, the market is a context of discovery, whereas planned state economies never make discoveries stemming from the spontaneous coordination of individual actors in a market. Yet on many occasions, Hayek does not question the standard theory of public goods.

Instances of Market Failure
Among the factors that may bring about market failure are the ones related to asymmetrical information, monopolies, and external effects.

Asymmetrical Information
Asymmetrical information occurs when the potential contract partners do not have equal information about the supplied goods, services, or risks to be insured. George Akerlof (1970) argues that uncertainty about the quality of goods on the part of consumers drives out good products (e.g., cars just as much as hard currencies in the case of Gresham’s law) and leaves only the bad ones on the market. This “lemon” principle leaves only the poorest suppliers able to sell their cars. There is no market clearing, and a negative selection takes place.

Guarantees on the part of the suppliers or independent institutions monitoring the quality of goods as well as legal guarantees could help in mitigating this information asymmetry. The discipline of new institutional economics emphasizes the importance of appropriate incentives from and controls by institutions. The protection of patents is another instance of information asymmetry. Here the trade-off is between quickly disseminating new knowledge versus protecting research and the economic incentives that are derived from particular knowledge, at least for some time.

In addition to adverse selection, as in the “lemon” cases, asymmetrical information may also arise when a contract between partners provides that both should have symmetrical information, but, subsequently, one party is unable to observe the behavior of the other. When such a situation arises after contract formation, it creates
Market Failure

Monopolies

Market power stems from three factors: unique technological inventions, the limitation of competition, and the indivisibility of the production apparatus. Under a monopoly, production is inefficient (a lower amount of goods is turned out at higher prices). A monopolist maximizing his or her market power is selling products at a price above the marginal costs (Cournot point) and not where the marginal returns equal those of the marginal production costs, as in a competitive market (a higher turnout of goods at lower prices).

Remedies against monopolistic markets are antitrust policies and, in cases of indivisibilities and natural monopolies, tax and subvention policies. The indivisibility of the production apparatus (e.g., networks for electric power and gas, the canal system railways) leads to scale effects and thus to lower average costs but also to larger sunk costs, that is, past costs that cannot be recovered when being confronted with new competitors. If only one supplier can do it efficiently, this is called a natural monopoly.

If there is a Pareto efficient situation, state intervention by necessity will violate that equilibrium, often for the sake of redistribution issues that are decided politically through majority voting. The median position of the voter in democracies with an interest in redistribution from the rich to the poor and the activities of lobby groups are key factors in such a view. The underlying factor is rent seeking—securing incomes above those in a free and competitive market—by private groups, government bureaucracies, and politicians. (The latter two entities point to the principal-agent problem.) Here, “market failure” is often defined in the reverse sense as an effect of state regulation and interference with otherwise free markets.

Adherents of public choice theorizing point to lack of causal evidence when bringing in the state to remedy situations of market failure. They argue that the costs of state failure could be even higher than those of market failure. Market failure can be closely linked to state failure, not just in case of the communist collapse but also in the market rule distortions created through the networks and influence of the financial sector on politicians to loosen rules on the financial markets. Oliver Blanchard (2009) succinctly lists these failures of the past decade:

The underestimation of risk contained in newly issued assets; the opacity of the derived securities on the balance sheets of financial institutions; the interconnection of financial institutions, both within and across countries; and the high degree of leverage of the financial system as a whole . . . all combined to create the perfect (financial) storm. (pp. 38–39)

External Effects

External effects occur in two variants. Negative external effects occur where the economic activities of two partners cause damage to a third one (e.g., toxic emissions into the air). Sometimes positive external effects—benefits (e.g., beautifying the environment)—are created by economic contractors. The internalization of external costs is theoretically possible, for example, via Coase negotiations. The Coase theorem states that, under clearly defined property rights, perfect rationality and no-transaction-costs bargaining may occur in such a way that external effects will be internalized by market participants. For future generations, such a condition is absent, however. By means of the Pigou tax, the state places a tax on the producer equal to the external costs. The latter must be known, however, and again transaction costs are not allowed.

Negative external effects (e.g., environmental degradation) are the most often quoted instances of market failure. Firms externalize their costs of production onto third parties (so that customers of respective firms do not have to pay directly) or, in the widest instance, onto the global environment, turning everyone into a victim.

Positive external effects occur in cases where a good is underproduced, because the supplier does not receive adequate compensation for the external rewards that would be provided if full production capacity were used. Other examples come from the health sector where a general vaccination could have external benefits for society at large, but costs for poor people might be too high, thus creating negative external effects of undersupply.
The educational sector offers another instance, in which the provision of a good education nationwide provides many additional advantages for society at large. The provision of subventions for an increasing demand for these goods may, however, be inefficient and create issues of moral hazard (e.g., downgrading one’s own private learning efforts since the education does not cost anything).

Public Goods Provision

Deficiencies in producing public goods are often listed as further instances of market failure. Public goods, such as clean air, are ones from which individuals cannot be excluded. Therefore, unlike private goods, public goods cannot be produced effectively through the private market. Following the logic of Musgrave and thus requiring more precise argumentation, they comprise the second and narrower category of market failure, in which the market fails entirely. In the cases dealt with thus far, gradual deficiencies of markets occurred. While the market is functioning in principle, there is, however, too much or too little of goods produced. But in the more basic case of complete market failure, some goods are not produced at all, even though the optimal allocation of goods requires them. Goods with only external returns, those with returns only to consumers and not to producers, are heavily undersupplied. The lighthouse is a classic example. Although the lighthouse provides strong external benefits for seafaring, there is no individual incentive to build it. The lighthouse is a public or collective good that is characterized by two features: There is no rivalry in consumption and no excludability (that is, one person’s use of a good such as a lighthouse does not reduce the availability of the good to others). Free riding is a consequence of such a constellation. As long as individuals do not reveal how strong their preferences for public goods are, there will be no production of such goods unless the state steps in. The state monopoly of the legitimate use of force, external defense, levees, and the judicial institutional framework are also examples of public goods (what Musgrave describes as “social goods proper”). According to James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), the real task of the state is to protect property rights.

Crossing the two criteria of rivalry and exclusion in Figure 2, four types emerge.

The two pure types of goods—private goods (Case 1 in Figure 2) and public goods (Case 4 in Figure 2)—have already been discussed. With respect to the mixed goods in Case 2, consumers can be excluded by imposing fees on the consumption of these goods. Even though there is little or no rivalry in consumption (e.g., of streets, bridges, sports events, pipelines, or even cable TV—goods resembling the so-called toll goods), there is a tendency for underproduction of those goods (resulting in, e.g., traffic congestion). With decreasing average production costs, there is also an inherent tendency toward monopoly in such situations. Supervision of market tendencies by independent authorities and/or subsidies to consumers could counteract such tendencies toward underproduction.

With mixed goods in Case 3, where rivalry but no exclusion exists, the reverse instance of overusage emerges, as, for example, in the tragedy of the commons, described by Elinor Ostrom. By defining rights of usage for natural resources such free riding might be controlled. Other means of regulation could be mutual controls or by an agent, sanctions when violating rules, reciprocity, and mutual trust.

The mixed goods in Cases 2 and 3 show some resemblance to the cases of external effects

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<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Private goods, e.g., bread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mixed goods with tendency of underproduction, e.g., highways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mixed goods with tendency of overusing, e.g., the commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Public goods, e.g., external security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 Exclusion and Rivalry With Public Goods, Mixed Goods, and Private Goods
discussed earlier. While external effects are market imperfections, (pure) public goods as such are not produced by the market at all.

With the state producing such goods on its own, at least two challenges arise. First, the state produces at costs that are too high (which can be counteracted by employing market means in the whole production process wherever possible). Second, consumers may waste resources because the state produces them at no cost to the consumers, creating an ethical issue. Also, consumer sovereignty can be limited through state production of the wrong goods or in wrong quantities (crowding out). The production of so-called merit goods, such as health, education, and high culture, is a fiat usually set by political/economic elites and rarely by majority opinion. In other markets, allocation of goods may suffer.

In the opposite cases of demerit goods, the state again could work with legal provisions and prohibitions, taxes, and subventions and with tradable certificates to introduce market elements—for example, in controlling environmental deterioration. Here economically inefficient and ecologically aberrant rules from the past create no incentives for technological progress. They can be substituted by technological progress the external costs of which are addressed better by auctions and by the selling of certificates. In the long run, overregulation of and by the state may be a crucial factor contributing to market failure, just as much as the lack of monopoly of violence and failure to guard property rights to begin with are.

**Economic Crises**

Analytically and empirically, one has to distinguish an economic crisis from situations of market failure. Situations of market failure (lack of public goods production) and market imperfection can be the causes as well as the correlates and consequences of economic crises. Yet economic crises in terms of supply shocks (e.g., the oil shocks of 1973 and 1980), or simply the overproduction of goods (as, e.g., in the automotive industry today), as well as demand shocks (e.g., in cases of natural catastrophes and poor harvests) must be distinguished from the cases and analyses of market failures. In a sloppy colloquial sense, the term market failure is often applied here but for incorrect and inconsistent theoretical reasons. An economic crisis basically means that producers have miscalculated the amount and type of goods consumers are willing to buy. The consequence is an uncleared market and, in case of a deepening crisis, a further extension of unsold products. This cumulative downward process (see Knut Wicksell, 1898) of overproduction and falling prices stops when consumers anticipate higher prices in the future and start buying again. Thus, a normal economic crisis has the character of a cleansing crisis, wiping out unproductive suppliers.

Such economic crises can be caused and intensified by financial crises (just as much as they can be alleviated through built-in stabilizers as in the European social market economies from 2008 onward; see Joseph Stiglitz, 2010). The Great Depression with the financial crises emerging in the early 1930s is a case in point. Institutional adjustments in the financial sector then included repealing the liberalization measures of the Glass-Steagall Act and separating commercial activities of banks from their investment activities, giving the Federal Bank a stronger leeway in raising liabilities for banks yet with very little Keynesian reflation of the economy. In the crisis after 2008, institutional adjustments included increased liability for banks and other financial agents, more transparency with hedge funds, better control of the stock exchanges and of rating agencies, elimination of speculative deals such as short sales, tax on financial transactions, higher taxing of banks, separation of investment banks from retail and commercial banks, breaking down banks that are “too big to fail,” and the socialization of private losses via a bailout through the taxpayer; these were intended to prevent financial bubbles (and the oversupply of goods such as housing) in the future. At the same time, from 2008 on there was a heavy reflation of the major economies to avoid the procyclical monetary and fiscal policies of the 1930s. Yet as noted by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2009), underlying factors such as human speculation and miscalculation as well as greed will always contribute to economic crises so that the very basic features of the next bubble will not be so different from those of previous ones. The economic fallout of both the Great Depression and the current crisis coming close to a breakdown of the financial engine of the free market system is
grave enough. It is, however, even in its magnified effects, an instance of absent or failing institutional regulations. Given human creativity and greed, one will have to reckon with further such imbalances. They are instances of far-reaching contractions of markets due to a lack of institutional safeguards. Market failure in a more theoretically strict sense has, however, to be distinguished from these grave challenges.

Nevertheless, the failure of the institutional framework (creation of a public bad in not containing the financial speculation and letting it transgress into the goods and services markets) is a clear case of de facto market failure in the present financial and economic crisis. At the global level, there are no adequate rules to allow for the separation of real growth effects of financial transactions from cases of gross overspeculation. (Some economists argue that there could never be such a separation between sound and unsound financial transactions since every speculator is always met by a countertrader.) Legitimacy for a market society has been strongly undermined, fortunately in the absence of other more repressive system alternatives as present and tried in the 1930s.

Given the high debt burdens, the global market power, informational asymmetries, the externalization of costs, environmental damages, moral risks, and rent seeking in all its varieties, market failures may become more likely. The market does better than the state in providing incentives and competition, in allocating scarce resources, and in controlling economic and, thus often, political power. For these functions, state activities cannot be a substitute for the market. With historically unseen market extensions in a fully globalized economy, however, it may become more difficult to establish rules of consent shared worldwide. There are always some externalities involved, be they only in the form of misperceptions of one’s own long-term advantages with respect to, for example, issues of global warming and other climate changes. The failed Copenhagen Climate Change Conference of 2009, just as much as the current financial crisis with dramatic public debt, not only figures in European, American, and the majority of Asian states but also speaks just as dramatically to new (potential) mixtures of market failures cum failures of political systems, whether they are organized around autocratic principles or around the preferences of the median voter, or occur in emergent systems such as the European Union and the eurozone. The temptations for free riding may have become higher under global economic markets, but so have external costs and burdens on future generations. There is a lag in ordered structures for global markets to function without creating excessive external costs.

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See also Market Economy; State Failure

Further Readings


Marx, Karl (1818–1883)

Karl Marx is among the most famous and influential theorists of the modern age, from whom the socialist or communist movements derived their ideas. He is not only a political thinker but also a
social philosopher and economist, whose research ranged widely over many fields. Marx has had a profound impact on the thoughts and actions of people in many countries since the mid-19th century, and in the 21st century, he is still regarded as the greatest instructor by the political left, including the adherents of communist parties, and derided as a source of political and social chaos by the political right. The ideas and programs developed by Karl Marx in cooperation with Friedrich Engels have been generally called Marxism.

Born in Trier, Germany, into a Jewish family on May 5, 1818, Marx received a good education and displayed great potential as an outstanding student. At the universities of Bonn and Berlin, Marx studied history and philosophy, took a strong interest in the works of the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and joined a student-professor group called the Young Hegelians. Marx submitted his doctoral thesis at the University of Jena in 1840 and received a doctoral degree the following year. After an initial and unsuccessful effort to establish an academic career, his liberal political views led him to find employment as an editor of a radical magazine in Cologne, *Rheinische Zeitung*. Because of his journalistic abilities and radical beliefs, Marx was well received in liberal circles in Germany and quickly promoted to editor of the magazine. This radical publication, under Marx’s guidance, had to face the problem of censorship by the authoritative Prussian government and was finally suppressed after the printing of Marx’s article on the poverty of farmers in the Mosel Valley.

In 1843, Marx married his girlfriend Jenny von Westphalen and emigrated to Paris with her to escape political persecution. There he made the acquaintance of French socialist thinkers and began to witness firsthand the living conditions of people in poverty by socializing with working-class people. More important, he came into contact for the first time and subsequently established his lifelong friendship with Engels, the author of the classical work *The Conditions of the Working Class in England* published in 1844. As a result of his economic and philosophical research, Marx wrote *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* in 1844, in which he showed great concern for the dignity and freedom of the individual. In February 1844, Marx started a new journal, the *Franco-German Annals*, together with the philosopher and political writer Arnold Ruge, in which he published articles on a broad range of matters, such as philosophy, politics, and society.

Based on his experiences living among working-class people and his comprehensive researches on history, economics, politics, and philosophy, Marx became an ardent communist. He proposed his ideas about communism by criticizing the alienation of labor under capitalism. According to Marx, under capitalism, the working class invests its creative labor while the capitalist class appropriates the results of this labor in exchange for wages. This means that the human world created by the proletariat does not belong to them but is instead owned by a class of nonlaboring owners.

His radical ideas were not tolerated in France. When Marx published an article on capitalism in the *Franco-German Annals*, he upset his partner Ruge, and the journal was banned in France and Germany. In January 1845, Marx was expelled from Paris by Premier François Guizot at the instance of the Prussian government and moved to Brussels, Belgium. During his stay in Brussels, Marx exchanged polemics with the Hegelians, Feuerbach, Stirner, and the “True Socialists” and finished two important works, *The Holy Family* and *The German Ideology*, in collaboration with Engels. In *The German Ideology*, Marx provided a historical and material basis for his radical views and insisted that the nature of individuals depended on the material conditions determining their own productions. According to his interpretations of history, the sum total of the relations of production forms the real basis of society, on which a legal and political superstructure is established. In 1847, Marx started another polemical exchange with Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and wrote *The Poverty of Philosophy*, in which he developed the fundamental propositions of his economic interpretation of history.

By early 1846, Marx had established the Communist Correspondence Committee to connect all of Europe’s socialist leaders. The following year, the socialists held a conference in London and established the Communist League. Marx went to attend the Communist League meeting and wrote *The Communist Manifesto* together with Engels, inspired by Engels’s *The Principles of Communism*. *The Communist Manifesto*, originally written as
the platform of the Communist League, has become one of the most radical and influential books since it was first published on February 1848. It begins with the famous proposition “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle” and contains a summary of Marxist theory. For example, one of the major points is the need to abolish private property and implement public ownership of the economy. The theory of the Communists may perhaps be summed up in the single phrase: abolition of private property. Another aim is to bring the proletariat to power and annihilate the exploiting class, especially the bourgeoisie, in politics. According to Marx and Engels, the first step toward the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class in order to win the battle of democracy. The Communist Party as the avant-garde of the proletariat then comes to power after winning the struggle against the old classes, such as landowners and the bourgeoisie. The third is to envision a classless society in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. On its publication in 1848, The Communist Manifesto quickly became the credo of the poor and oppressed all over the world, which led to the greatest political upheavals of the 19th and 20th centuries and to the establishment of the communist governments that ruled half the globe for several decades.

After the Manifesto came to light, even the relatively tolerant Belgian government served Marx with an expulsion order. The revolutionary atmosphere in Germany in 1848 enabled him to return to Cologne where he persuaded some liberal industrialists to back a new version of his old journal, the Neue Rheinische Zeitung. Under Marx’s editorship, it became extremely radical and antigovernment and was suppressed again by the authorities. Marx printed the last issue of the Zeitung in red ink. For this reason, he was arrested for press offenses and incitement to armed insurrection. But after a long and powerful speech at his trial, Marx was acquitted by a jury in Cologne. Faced with expulsion from Cologne and suppression of his journal, Marx visited Paris again as a representative of German democracy before the Paris National Assembly but was similarly served with an expulsion order from Paris.

In 1849, Marx moved to London, where he lived with his large and devoted family until his death. Although Marx was a correspondent to the New York Tribune from 1852 to 1861, for the most part he was financially dependent on generous support from Engels. His typical workday, from 10 a.m. to 7 p.m., was spent in the reading room of the British Museum, where wrote many volumes on different subjects. Sometimes he lacked money for postage to send his manuscripts to the publishers. Afflicted with boils, eye and liver trouble, and a contentious and uncompromising temper, Marx was not a prepossessing sight during his last years. Although virtually unknown in England, he enjoyed great popularity on the Continent, especially in liberal circles and among the working people. In 1864, the International Workingmen’s Association was founded at a meeting in St. Martin’s Hall, London, and Marx was invited to draw up the inaugural address. In 1867, the first volume of Marx’s greatest work, Capital (Das Kapital), was published. The second, third, and incomplete fourth volumes did not come out until after Marx’s death in 1883.

In Capital, Marx analyzed the secret of capitalist production by focusing on the concept of surplus value and formulated his revolutionary theory by revealing the injustice of the capitalist system. According to Marx, labor is a commodity like any other; therefore, following the labor theory of value, it must be valued by the man-hours devoted to its “production”—that is, to feeding, clothing, and sheltering the worker in order to maintain life at subsistence level. In the capitalist system, labor is bought just like any other commodity. But, unlike any other commodity, labor is not consumed in a clearly determined period of time. A laborer is bought for the price of sustaining him physically, prorated in hours or days or weeks. But he may produce the equivalent of the price in economic value in 6 or 8 hours of work, whereas the factories of Marx’s day kept men going for 10, 12, or 14 hours a day. The difference between what the worker does and what he is paid is surplus value, the source of all capitalist profits. In the capitalist society that is divided into the capitalist class with the means of production and the proletariat without the means of production, the injustice heaped on the workers is not the result of bad men but of a particular system. Reform within the system, however well intentioned, is doomed to failure.
Only revolutionary overthrow of the whole capitalist system can succeed.

Marx died on March 14, 1883, and was buried in Highgate Cemetery, London, with a tombstone epitaph reading “Workers of all lands unite,” the last slogan in The Communist Manifesto. In the years following Marx’s death, Engels edited and translated his works and in many ways continued their friendship until his own death in 1895. Although Marx spent most of his life in reading and writing as a student and scholar, he has had a strong influence not only on modern ideas but also on political practices and social movements in many countries all over the world. Even today, his works are reprinted and read widely, and his ideas are discussed and debated in philosophy, sociology, and political science.

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See also Communism; Marxism; Socialism

Further Readings


Theoretical Sources

Marx developed his eponymous theoretical system from three major sources: German philosophy, French politics, and English economics. Marx showed great interest in law and philosophy in his early works; his later works were more concerned with political economy and political strategy.

The German philosophy on which Marx drew was primarily that of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel but also included the Young Hegelians and Ludwig Feuerbach’s materialism. During his student days at the universities of Bonn and Berlin, Marx studied history and philosophy, took a strong interest in the works of the philosopher Hegel, and joined a student–professor group called the Young Hegelians. Many of Marx’s basic ideas, such as his critique of civil society and private property, emerged when he was writing Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. He asserts that religion is the “opium of the people” and calls for an “uprising of the proletariat” to realize the conceptions of philosophy, a point also made in Theses on Feuerbach (1845). Marx had been strongly influenced by Hegel’s Logic and dialectical method, and his great work Capital is imbued with intellectual categories derived from Hegel.

French politics and socialist movements played an important role in shaping Marx’s thoughts. Marx’s father-in-law, Baron von Westphalen, and his teachers were all strongly influenced by the French Enlightenment. Marx was also strongly influenced by the French Revolution and by French thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau. After he emigrated to Paris together with his wife to escape
political persecution by German authorities, Marx became acquainted with French socialist thinkers and began to witness the living conditions of people in poverty by socializing with working-class people. French socialism enabled Marx to break with Hegel’s teleological approach to history, to develop a broad-ranging social economy, to understand the social and personal impact of modern industry, and to grasp the significance of socialism. After studying the development of Bonapartism and commenting on the nature and significance of the Paris Commune, Marx completed several political works (Class Struggles in France and The Eighteenth Brumaire) and expounded his major political ideas about the state and revolution.

The third major source of Marx’s theory was English economics, exemplified by writers such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Thomas Malthus. It was during his years in Paris that Marx began his study of English economics; from the early 1840s, he made an increasingly detailed study of the works of English economists. After moving to London, Marx undertook deep and systematic research on the development of the capitalist mode of production in England. In writing the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx relied extensively on the work of Adam Smith, especially his views on the division of labor, rent, subsistence wages, and the three stages of society. Once he became acquainted with Ricardo’s work, Principles of Political Economy, Marx abandoned the economic theory developed in the 1844 Manuscripts. His critique of The Poverty of Philosophy was Ricardian in character. By absorbing the ideas in the works of classic political economists and analyzing the capitalist development in England, Marx established his own status as a political economist.

Although Marx drew on various sources, he did not merely combine them mechanically. A distinctive feature of Marx’s theory is his creative synthesizing ability. A thorough study of German philosophy, French politics, and English economics allowed Marx to develop his own philosophical, economic, social, and political theory.

**Historical Materialism and Social Development**

Marx’s unique contribution to historical philosophy is his historical materialism and theory of social development. According to his explanations in The German Ideology (1846) and The Critique of Political Economy (1859), the nature of individuals depends on the material conditions determining their productions. In the social production of their existence, people enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will. According to Marx,

> These relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic foundation of society on which there arise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. (Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Preface)

> The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and intellectual processes of life:

> It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production come eventually into conflict with the existing relations of production. [...] From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of economic foundation the entire immense superstructure [...] is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic condition of production [...] and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic, philosophical, in short, ideological transformation. (Critique of Political Economy, Preface)

All ideological transformations “must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social forces of production and the relations of productions” (Critique of Political Economy, Preface). Therefore, the legal relations as well as the forms of state could neither be understood by themselves nor explained by the so-called general progress of the human
mind; they are rooted in the material conditions of life.

Since every society is divided into various groups, a strong minority tends to use their economic power in order to exploit the mass population for their own benefit. This inherently conflicting situation gives rise to a class struggle that centers on the ownership and control of the means of production. The social group that controls the means of production forms the ruling class, and the group without the means of production constitutes the ruled class. All political institutions and cultural beliefs are shaped by the ruling class so as to bolster the unequal distribution of resources. The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. According to Marx,

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted [. . . ] fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society or in the common ruin of the contending classes. (Section I, Communist Manifesto)

Based on the conflict between the forces of production and the relations of production, the history of mankind progresses through revolutions to the next higher stage. In the Marxist view of history, the primitive agrarian society was followed by the slave society of the ancient world, the feudal society, the capitalist society, and finally the communist society. The progress is made by inevitable and ultimately uncontrollable material forces, rather than human thought and initiative. This is sometimes summarized as so-called economic determinism. In fact, while Marx emphasized the crucial role of material forces in social development, he also analyzed the important and strong influences of political superstructure and human initiative on history.

Capitalist Crisis and Surplus Value

In February 1848, Marx and Engels published the well-known pamphlet, Communist Manifesto. It is usually regarded as a public statement of general theory and political principle of Marxism and a call for general cooperation among different workers’ organizations. According to their analysis, capitalism as a revolutionary mode of production was fundamentally changing the course of civilization. It introduced market relations and cash nexus into all spheres of society and throughout the world. The market kept ever growing, the demand ever rising. This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication. The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. By continually modernizing the forces of production and promoting the division of labor, capitalism prepared the material conditions necessary for social cooperation and planned management in economic life. Despite the ever-increasing social character of capitalist production or socialization of the forces of production, the capitalist system was operated for private profit under private ownership. The search for private profit imposed fetters on the further development of production. The capitalist relations of production came finally into conflict with its forces of production. While a huge sum of wealth was accumulated in the hands of capitalists, its direct producers were impoverished. Lack of demand coexisting with unsold goods produced ever-worsening economic crises. This dynamic of capitalism created conditions of its own overthrown.

Moreover, capitalism was creating the industrial proletariat as its own grave diggers. As capitalism destroyed precapitalist modes of production at home and abroad, other classes were eliminated and the proletariat expanded. According to Marx,

With the development of industry the proletariat not only increased in number; in became concentrated in greater masses, its strength grew, and it felt that strength more. The various interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat were more and more equalized, in proportion as machinery obliterated all distinctions of labor, and nearly everywhere reduced wages to the same low level. (Section I, Communist Manifesto)

As individual workers, then groups of workers in a factory or trade, and eventually all workers in a
nation-state or even the world economy mobilized to resist capitalist exploitation, the proletariat would grow more conscious of their shared class position and their common interest in the overthrow of capitalism. When their economic struggles encountered resistance of the state as well as individual capitalists and groups of employers, the working class would develop a revolutionary consciousness and move from trade unionism to political party. With economic crisis deepening and the proletariat gaining in strength, revolution would be inevitable.

In 1867, the first volume of Marx’s greatest work, *Capital (Das Kapital)*, was published. The second, third, and incomplete fourth volumes did not come out until after Marx’s death in 1883. In *Capital*, Marx analyzed the secret of capitalist production by focusing on the concept of surplus value and formulated his revolutionary theory by revealing the injustice of capitalist system. According to Marx, labor is a commodity like any other commodity; therefore, following the labor theory of value, it must be valued by the man-hours devoted to its “production”—that is, to feeding, clothing, and sheltering the worker in order to maintain life at subsistence level. In the capitalist system, labor is bought just like any other commodity. But, unlike any other commodity, labor is not consumed in a clearly determined period of time. Labor is bought for the price of sustaining the laborer physically, prorated in hours or days or weeks. But he may produce the equivalent of the price in economic value in 6 or 8 hours of work, whereas the factories of Marx’s day kept men going for 10, 12, or 14 hours a day. The difference between what the worker does and what he is paid is surplus value, the source of all capitalist profits. In the capitalist society that is divided into the capitalist class with the means of production and the proletariat without the means of production, the injustice heaped on the workers is not the result of bad men, but of a particular system. Reform within the system, however well intentioned, is doomed to failure. Only revolutionary overthrow of the whole capitalist system can succeed.

**Communist Revolution and Classless Society**

Since the revolution is an inevitable historical product as the result of the conflict between the forces of production and the relations of production, and especially class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in capitalist society, neither Marx nor Engels paid attention to the means of revolution, especially political leadership and political strategy, which would be explained and expounded by their followers such as Lenin and Mao Zedong. They also said little about what would happen after the revolution. It was believed that it would be absurd to predict the future society in detail. Nonetheless, some major ideas about communism can be found in the classic works of Marx and Engels.

When revolution breaks out, the proletariat seizes the power of the state and transforms the means of production in the first instance into state property. As Marx and Engels suggested, the revolutionary measures in the most advanced countries would include abolition of private property, a heavy progressive or graduated income tax, abolition of all right of inheritance, confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels, centralization of credit in the hands of the state, centralization of the means of communication, and transport in the hands of the state. By doing so, it puts an end to itself as the proletariat, it puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms, and it puts an end to the state as state. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the process of production. The state is not “abolished”; it withers away. But in a few places, Marx and Engels referred to the transitional stage as “the dictatorship of proletariat.” The existence of classes is bound up with particular historic phases in the development of production; the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society.

With regard to postrevolutionary politics, Marx cited the experience of the Paris Commune and talked about the possibility of bridging the gap between the state and civil society that had been opened up by capitalist democracy. As an instance of the abolition of the division of labor in politics, Marx welcomed the Commune’s proposal to have all officials, including judges, elected by universal suffrage and revocable at any time; to pay officials the same wages as manual laborers; to replace the standing army by the armed people; and to divest the police and clergy of their political influence.
The initiative of the Commune could yield a decentralized, federal political structure and an economy based on cooperatives united by a common plan. According to Marx's explanation and prediction, the fundamental features of communism include at least the following elements:

- The first is to eliminate the private property and implement the public ownership in economy. The theory of the Communists may be summed up in a single phrase: abolition of private property.
- The second is to limit free competition and carry out economic planning. The classic socialist believes that capitalist-free competition may lead to economic disorder and increasing inequality. Only after all economic activities are placed under the comprehensive economic plan can economic development be promoted and economic crisis avoided.
- The third is to distribute the economic surplus based on labor and need. In contrast to the capitalism in which capital plays the most important role in the process of distribution, the Communists insist that labor and need are the most important factors in distributing social wealth.
- Finally, the state as a tool of rule by the ruling class would wither away and would gradually be replaced by the administration of public affairs. In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, there shall be an association, in which the conditions for the free development of one are the conditions for the free development of all.

**Marxism After Marx**

The classic Marxist theory was expounded and elaborated based on the historical developments in the Western industrialized countries such as England, France, and Germany. After economic, social, and political changes took place, many social theorists and political leaders tried to redefine and develop Marxism based on the new situations.

**Revisionist Marxism**

During the period of economic depression and political repression in the 1880s, Marxism became dominant in the German Social Democratic Party. Karl Kautsky explained and defended the theories of surplus value, class struggle, and capitalist crisis. His works defined Marxism for the generation after Marx and constituted the fundament of "orthodox Marxism." Another theorist, Eduard Bernstein, launched the revisionist attack on "orthodox Marxism" and directly refuted the theories of surplus value, impoverishment, capital concentration, and crisis. According to Bernstein, workers were not becoming poorer; the numbers of peasants was not declining; a new middle class was growing in size and importance; share ownership refuted the claim of capital concentration; and capitalism was developing mechanisms to reduce competition and remove recurrent economic crisis.

**Western Marxism**

The term Western Marxism normally excludes orthodox communists of strict Marxist obedience and is confined to the collection of thinkers that centered on the work of Georg Lukacs and Karl Korsch in Central Europe, Antonio Gramsci in Italy, and the Frankfurt school in Germany. Unlike the previous generation of Marxist theorists, most of the Western Marxist thinkers were not important figures in political parties. They tended to be academics rather than activists, writing in a period of declining working-class movements due to capitalist democratic and economic developments. Western Marxism is a philosophical meditation on the defeat of Marxism in the West. Although some people might question whether Western Marxism is real Marxism, the modes of thought in Western Marxism undoubtedly extended the horizons of Marxist discussion beyond the rather limited perspective of the Second International and Leninist orthodox. Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony and its consequences for political culture, the treatment of Sigmund Freud by Herbert Marcuse, the drastic critique of the Enlightenment by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, all these attempts to remedy weakness or gaps in the classical Marxist tradition have produced meaningful and insightful works on philosophy, politics, and society.

**Leninism**

Contrary to Marx's expectations, the socialist countries were not founded in the Western
advanced countries but in some underdeveloped countries such as Russia and China. After the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917, the first socialist country was established in Russia under the strong leadership of Vladimir Lenin. To lead the proletarian revolution, Lenin contributed a lot to Marxist theory in his theory of the party and his concept of capitalistic imperialism. In the process of building the first socialist country, Lenin had been searching for several models of socialism, such as War Communism and the New Economic Policy, in the face of foreign invasion and domestic hardship. In comparison with the comprehensive state direction and management of the economy in War Communism, the New Economic Policy was the strategic retreat in which the state withdrew from the ownership and management of small and medium enterprises, retaining only the very large-scale, strategically important parts of industry and communications. Freedom for peasants and traders to market their goods was extended as the state withdrew. However, after Joseph Stalin ascended to the top of the party-state in Soviet Union, he proceeded to announce radical plans for the rapid industrialization of the country and the collectivization of agriculture.

Maoism and the Theory of Deng Xiaoping

Mao Zedong, the principal Chinese Marxist theorist, was the Communist statesman who contributed to the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, the Communist Army in 1927, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 after a long period of military struggle. Maoism is composed of many different kinds of ideas and ideology and strategy and tactics and believed to be the creative results of applying Marxism–Leninism to China, a semifeudal and semicolonial country without modern industrial developments. The most salient feature of Maoism is his emphasis on the importance of the peasant issue in Chinese revolution and socialist construction. The Marxist–Leninist tradition treated peasants as incapable of revolutionary initiative and only marginally useful in backing urban proletarian revolution. Based on his living experiences and his analysis of the rural situation in China, Mao came to recognize the potential power of China’s hundreds of millions of peasants and decided to establish his base in rural areas instead of big cities. The peasants constituted the vast majority of China’s population, but most of them were hard-pressed and lived in extreme poverty. According to Mao, they were very receptive to revolutionary agitation and could become a revolutionary force if fully mobilized and properly guided. Proceeding from this belief, Mao proposed to instill in them a revolutionary consciousness and make their force alone suffice for revolution. By so doing, Mao led Chinese revolution to succeed and gradually formed a special sentiment for peasants. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao sent many city workers, intellectuals, and bureaucrats to rural areas and forced them to receive reeducation through agricultural labor together with peasants because Mao believed that many of them began to become corrupt in the big cities.

After the death of Mao and the end of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping emerged as the new supreme leader and began to review and revise the basic line adopted by Mao. Deng Xiaoping thought it was imperative to give a new perspective on socialism and make a breakthrough on socialist theory under the banner of “emancipating the mind” and “seeking the truth from the facts.” The new theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics has been expounded and enriched by Deng Xiaoping and other Communist leaders during the past 3 decades. At the beginning of 1992, Deng Xiaoping made a famous southern tour in which he talked a lot about the nature of socialism and redefined it as “liberating productivity, developing productivity, eradicating exploitation, getting rid of the polarization between rich and poor, and finally getting rich together.” According to Deng, the planned economy is not equal to socialism, and there are plans also in capitalist countries. The market economy is not equal to capitalism, and there are markets also in socialist countries. The criteria for socialism or capitalism are not that there are more markets or more plans but whether it is helpful to develop productivity, enhance the comprehensive national power, and improve living standards for the common people. In contrast with the traditional socialist theory that rejected commodity economy and market mechanism, the new theory of socialist market economy insisted on the coexistence of socialism and market economy because socialism has been redefined as
the grandiose schemes for developing productivity and getting rich, and market has been regarded as the mere means to organize and regulate economic relations. Deng Xiaoping’s theory has been called Marxism of contemporary China, the latest product of applying Marxism to China’s socialist practice.

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See also Communism; Marx, Karl; Socialism; Maoism

Further Readings

Masses

The concept of masses is intricately interwoven with the concept of elites. Both concepts were introduced into the social sciences during the period of industrialization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. With the demise of feudal society, new social categories emerged that defied the traditional classifications of the old corporative state. Just as modern elites do not coincide with traditional aristocracies, masses do not coincide with the third estate. Neither was the Marxist concept of class appropriate for grasping the socially heterogeneous composition of mass electorates and social movements. In this entry, the origins of this concept, its major proponents and critics, the respective empirical evidence, and its contemporary relevance are discussed.

Social philosophers and social scientists writing about masses have mostly referred to their large numbers and their lack of structure. The rise of masses was seen as a consequence of industrialization and urbanization. The German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies argued that the increasing division of labor would replace primary interpersonal relations with indirect, secondary relations, thus leading to an erosion of the traditional social bonds of family, kinship, and neighborhood. This development is aptly captured by his dichotomy of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Since that period was also one of mass political mobilization and the political enfranchisement of ever larger parts of the population, the concept of masses also played a role in the political debate about the effects of universal suffrage. Earlier critics such as Edmund Burke and Alexis de Tocqueville had primarily raised concerns that this might impair the quality of political leadership and governance. The classic elite theorists Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels instead argued that democratization, rather than increasing the political influence of ordinary citizens, would lead to a centralization of political power in the hands of a small elite. Mosca and Michels explained this with the inability of large groups to organize for effective political action and the personal and organizational advantages enjoyed by the elites. During the first half of the 20th century, the rise of communist and fascist totalitarian mass movements showed that some of the concerns raised by the older authors were not unfounded. However, when the success of representative democracy proved that most of their dire predictions did not materialize, the preoccupation with the presumed dangers of mass politics gradually subsided. Today, the term masses is mostly used interchangeably with ordinary citizens, mass publics, or nonelites.

In his 2002 book Against the Masses, Joseph Femia analyzed three major lines of reasoning against mass democracy:

1. The perversity thesis holds that democratization is not capable of achieving its main objective of transferring political power from a small aristocracy to the majority of the people but will instead achieve the opposite—namely, a centralization of power that makes popularly
elected elites even more dominant than the old aristocracy ever was.

2. The *futility thesis* emphasizes the inevitability of elite rule and argues that the natural inequality of human beings and the functional necessities of organizations will thwart any attempt to empower the masses.

3. The *jeopardy thesis* finally points to the conflict between democracy on one side and other important social values, in particular liberty, social cohesion, and economic development, on the other.

While the proponents of the futility thesis shared a pessimistic view of human nature and expected that both democratic elites and masses pursued particularistic interests, proponents of the perversity and jeopardy theses were critical of the political changes brought about by democratization. They believed in the superiority of the traditional republican model of government by a deliberative representative assembly elected by limited suffrage, whose members are primarily motivated by the intention to serve their country. They were therefore afraid that universal suffrage would require the formation of organized political parties and interest groups that would primarily pursue their particularistic interests. The observed shortcomings of representative democracy were thus compared with an idealized model of a pre-democratic political order that had rarely existed in reality.

The critics of mass democracy also emphasized the inability of masses to understand the complexities of political life as well as their lack of motivation to devote much time to public affairs. They argued that the classic conception of democracy as self-government by the people made unrealistic assumptions about the masses. Joseph Schumpeter and others took up these arguments and developed a more realistic theory of representative democracy that acknowledges the limited political role of ordinary citizens and instead relies on competitive elections and institutional constraints for enforcing the political accountability of elected leaders. Under these relaxed assumptions, most of the problems predicted by the critics of mass democracy turned out to be much less severe in practice than in theory.

While the simple dichotomy of elites and masses made by the classics of elite theory has given way to more differentiated analyses that treat neither elites nor masses as unitary actors, three basic theoretical questions raised by these writers are of continuing relevance. These are the motivation and qualification of mass publics to participate in public affairs, their susceptibility to manipulation by elites, and finally the ways in which citizen demands are transmitted into the political decision-making process.

**Political Involvement and Political Beliefs**

Michels and Schumpeter were the first to provide an in-depth analysis of the division of labor between politicians and ordinary citizens in representative democracies. They argued that the overwhelming majority of citizens are only marginally involved in political affairs. While Michels tried to demonstrate the existence of an iron law of oligarchy governing all organizational life, Schumpeter developed a new model of democracy as electoral competition among political parties, thereby attempting to reconcile democracy and elite rule. Both assumed a division of labor among voters and elected representatives, thereby claiming an active role for politicians in determining the political agenda and a largely passive role for citizens.

Public opinion research has confirmed that the number of citizens who are continually involved in public affairs is relatively small. Philip Converse and others have repeatedly claimed that only about 10% to 20% of citizens possess a high level of political sophistication. However, empirical research has also demonstrated the existence of a large degree of variation in political interest and involvement among citizens, ranging from the politically apathetic to well-informed political activists. It is, therefore, more appropriate to assume the existence of a hierarchy of political involvement rather than a dichotomy of political elites and mass publics. Finally, public opinion surveys in consolidated democracies have also provided evidence on differences in political values and beliefs between political elites and mass publics. While both elites and citizens overwhelmingly support fundamental principles of democracy—such as general elections and free speech—support for minority rights, civil liberties, limits on governmental power, or the
right of due process are much lower among mass publics than among elites. These differences are especially large where respondents are confronted with a choice between those rights and other highly valued political goals such as public safety or economic well-being. As noted by Ian McAllister (1991), the political issue attitudes of elites are finally more polarized, especially when they are related to the traditional cleavage lines of a party system.

Based on the limited support of mass publics for democratic values, some political scientists, most notably Herbert McClosky, concluded that mass political culture is of only minor relevance for the consolidation and sustenance of democracy. However, libertarian value orientations are considerably higher among the highly educated and politically involved. It would therefore be wrong to assume that only elites can be considered as the carriers of the democratic creed, as McClosky concluded. Rather than relying on the existence of elite competition as a sufficient barrier against nondemocratic tendencies, the role of active citizens as political watchdogs against elite transgressions should not be underestimated. They provide the crucial link between political leaders and passive citizens and are therefore indispensable for enforcing political accountability.

**Psychological Characteristics of Masses**

Cultural critics have frequently emphasized that modernization inevitably leads to an erosion of traditional social bonds of family, kinship, ethnicity, castes, and so on and will ultimately result in an atomization of society. Gustave Le Bon’s still popular work on the psychology of crowds is an example of the dangers such critics have associated with the twin developments of modernization and democratization. Le Bon claimed that crowds—understood as large gatherings of individuals—are susceptible to persuasion by political agitators and therefore prone to participating in political actions that their individual members would never consider for themselves. He emphasized their lack of critical judgment and their potential for irresponsible and destructive behavior.

Some of Le Bon’s observations have been partly confirmed by social psychological experiments dealing with the phenomenon of **risky shift** in group decision making; in other words, a tendency for groups to engage in riskier decisions than individuals. While there is solid empirical evidence that risky shifts do indeed occur, this is not necessarily the case. Based on a review of several decades of social psychological research, Daniel Isenberg concluded that group decisions are influenced by a variety of factors, of which the most important were the initial preferences of the group members, the plausibility of the arguments brought forward for different courses of action, and the social status of the individuals advocating different solutions. Risky shifts can, therefore, only be considered as a special case of **choice shifts** and are by no means the inevitable result of collective decision making.

Moreover, although collective violence by crowds (e.g., lynchings) and political riots are not uncommon, such incidents are nothing peculiar to modern societies. Le Bon’s assumption that even mass electorates and parliaments are susceptible to crowdlike behavior is especially vastly overdrawn and cannot be sustained empirically. Electoral research has instead shown that voters are exposed to a variety of contradictory influences by primary and secondary groups as well as the mass media. Moreover, although the relevance of short-term factors has increased, social structural (social class, religion, ethnicity) and psychological (party identification) commitments continue to be relevant determinants of voting behavior. Le Bon did not adequately take into account the persistence of such particularistic loyalties and even less so the capacity of individuals to form independent opinions.

**Theories of Mass Society**

In his 1959 book *The Politics of Mass Society*, William Kornhauser attempted to integrate the assumptions of aristocratic and democratic critics of modern society into a comprehensive theory of society. Based on their patterns of elite–mass relations, Kornhauser distinguished four ideal types of society: communal (traditional), pluralist, mass, and totalitarian. The bottom-up perspective involves the accessibility of elites for mass demands, the top-down perspective the availability of non-elites for elite domination and manipulation. This yields a fourfold table (Table 1).
Kornhauser argued that pluralist society is characterized by a high degree of responsiveness of elites to citizen demands as well as a high degree of elite autonomy from public pressures. Citizen demands are transmitted into the political decision-making arena through a dense web of intermediary associations (political parties, labor unions, etc.) via institutionalized channels of interest articulation rather than through direct mass action. Mass society is instead characterized by a lack of voluntary associations, which implies that elite and nonelite interactions become precarious. Elites are put under undue pressure to accede to mass demands articulated by direct political action, while citizens become objects of elite manipulation. Although Kornhauser emphasized the distinction between mass society and totalitarian society, he argued that mass society is vulnerable to totalitarianism because atomized individuals have no means of influencing politics other than through participation in direct political action.

Kornhauser’s theory is but one example of a long-standing tradition of theories emphasizing the crucial function of intermediary associations for societal integration, ranging from theories of pluralism to more recent approaches such as communitarianism or theories of civil society or social capital. Many of these writers have also warned of the dangers associated with the decline of traditional mass membership organizations such as political parties and labor unions tends to neglect or underestimate the rise of new types of associations (e.g., nongovernmental organizations, third-sector organizations) that may serve as functional equivalents. The fact that they are different does not necessarily imply that they are incapable of fulfilling the functions of their older counterparts.

### Table 1: Four Ideal Types of Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accessibility of Elites</th>
<th>Availability of Nonelites</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Communal society, Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Pluralist society, High</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totalitarian society, High</td>
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</table>


During the period of industrialization paved the way for the formation of a wealth of business and professional associations as well as labor unions. Moreover, the expansion of the suffrage in the 19th century required the formation of political parties as instruments for mobilizing political support among newly enfranchised voters. As pluralist theorists later showed, rather than becoming atomized, industrial societies were characterized by the existence of an intense network of intermediary associations. Likewise, preoccupation with the current decline in membership among traditional mass membership organizations such as political parties and labor unions tends to neglect or underestimate the rise of new types of associations (e.g., nongovernmental organizations, third-sector organizations) that may serve as functional equivalents. The fact that they are different does not necessarily imply that they are incapable of fulfilling the functions of their older counterparts.

**Continued Relevance or Obsolescence of the Concept?**

In emphasizing the inevitability of power and elites, the classic elite theorists replaced the dichotomous class model of Marxism by an equally crude dichotomy between elites and masses. Nevertheless, some of their insights are of continuing relevance and have contributed to the development of a revised model of democratic politics. Representative democracy has institutionalized a pluralist elite structure with competing political parties, thus enforcing political accountability of elected representatives. Likewise, nonelites are not necessarily tantamount to atomized masses. Modern democracies are instead characterized by the existence of a multitude of voluntary associations and private interest groups performing a crucial linkage function between elites and nonelites. While their leaders belong to the elites, they are internally stratified according to the degree of involvement of their members.

Moreover, empirical research has demonstrated that the assumption that mass electorates are characterized by low levels of political sophistication and involvement in public affairs and susceptibility to manipulation by populist elites grossly misrepresents the reality of modern democracies, even though most voters may not live up to the classic...
ideal of citizenship. Simply comparing elites and masses therefore provides a simplified portrait of modern democracies that disregards the complex structure of both elites and mass publics.

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See also Civil Society; Communitarianism; Elites; Pluralism; Political Culture; Representation; Social Capital

Further Readings

MATCHING

Matching is a statistical method that can be used to estimate quantities of interest that depend on missing, that is, unobserved, values of some variable Y. (As is made clear later in this entry, the variables with missing values in causal inference applications are subtly different from the observed outcome variable, which is commonly referred to as Y.) Schematically, matching works as follows. For each observation with a missing value of Y, find another observation that does not have a missing Y value but that is otherwise maximally similar to the initial observation in question. This similar observation is said to match the observation with the missing Y value. Now use the observed Y value from the matched observation to fill in the missing Y value. Matching can be done by selecting matching observations with or without replacement from the original dataset. It is also possible to match many observations to a single missing observation, in which case the mean of Y from the matching observations is typically used to fill in the missing Y value.

Matching can be applied to a variety of missing data problems—from estimating the population mean of Y to estimating causal effects. Examples below make this clearer. Matching is not a panacea. Matching methods rely on assumptions that can only be tested given auxiliary data and/or assumptions. The key assumptions of conditional ignorability and overlap are discussed later in this entry. There are a wide variety of ways that matching can be implemented by. A discussion of particular matching methods and their statistical properties is beyond the scope of this entry.

Examples
The easiest way to begin to understand how matching works is to walk through some relatively simple examples.

**Estimating a Population Mean**

Consider a situation where we are interested in estimating the fraction of Republicans in a population. We sample 20 individuals from this population and administer a face-to-face survey. The pollster records the respondent’s gender (0 = male, 1 = female), race (0 = nonwhite, 1 = white), and partisanship (0 = non-Republican, 1 = Republican). All respondents report their gender and race accurately; however, some respondents do not report their partisanship. Respondents who report their partisanship will be called reporters and those who do not report their partisanship will be called nonreporters. These data are summarized in Table 1.

We would like to use our sample data to estimate the fraction of individuals in the population who self-identify as Republicans. The simplest way to do this is to take the sample average of the partisanship variable among the reporters. Doing so,
we would estimate that 44% of the population are Republican identifiers. Note that if individuals who are more likely to be Republicans answer the partisanship question more often, this simple approach will generally yield estimates of Republican partisanship that are falsely high. Looking at the true (but partially unobserved) partisanship of each individual in Table 1 and the associated sample average, we see that the simple approach of ignoring the missing data yields an estimate that is 9 percentage points too high.

While it is clearly not the case that the average partisanship of reporters and nonreporters is equal—hence the 9-percentage-point difference—if it is the case that (a) the distribution of reporters’ partisanship is equal to that of nonreporters within each race–gender combination and (b) each race–gender combination that has nonreporters also has at least one reporter, then one can use matching to produce better estimates of partisanship. Condition (a) is sometimes called the conditional ignorability assumption, and condition (b) is sometimes called the overlap assumption.

Looking at Table 1, we see that we do not observe the partisanship variable for Observation 1. The only observation that has the same race and gender values as Observation 1 and that has an observed partisanship value is Observation 4. We can thus match Observation 4 to Observation 1 to impute Observation 1’s partisanship. Observation 4

**Table 1 Hypothetical Missing Data Example in Which One-to-One Matching With Replacement Is Used to Estimate Average Partisanship**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>True Partisanship</th>
<th>Observed Partisanship</th>
<th>Imputed Partisanship</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Gender</th>
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Average 0.35 0.44 0.35

*Note: Sample average of observed partisanship is not equal to the sample average of true partisanship because of missing data. Using matching to impute partisanship produces a sample average that is correct.*
is also matched to Observations 2 and 3. A more interesting situation lies in how to deal with the missing partisanship of Observation 6. Here, three other observations—5, 7, and 8—have the same race and gender values as Observation 6. Here, we would randomly pick one of these three observations to be the match for Observation 6. Doing this, we pick Observation 8, which implies that the imputed partisanship for Observation 6 is 1. Note that while this is not equal to Observation 6’s true partisanship, randomly choosing matches from among the observations with $1 = \text{race}$ and $0 = \text{gender}$ and observed partisanship will be correct in expectation because of the conditional ignorability assumption. Thus, while individual-level values may be incorrect, sample averages will be correct in expectation. Imputing data in this way is sometimes referred to as hot-deck imputation. We continue to impute the partisanship variable in this way until it is completely filled in. After doing this, we see that the sample average of the imputed partisanship variable is equal to the true sample average of 0.35. In actual applications, the average based on the imputed partisanship variable will only equal the true sample average in expectation.

**Estimating Average Treatment Effects**

Most recent applications of matching in the social sciences have been within the context of estimating average treatment—that is, causal—effects. To see how matching works in such situations, we consider a simple example. Let $X = 0, 1$ denote the treatment variable, $Z1$ and $Z2$ denote the measured confounders, and $Y$ denotes the outcome variable. We are interested in the average treatment effect (ATE), that is, the difference between the average value of $Y$ in a world where all units get treatment ($X = 1$) and the average value of $Y$ in a world where all units do not get treatment (control) ($X = 0$). To formalize this, let $Y(1)$ denote the $Y$ value of a randomly chosen unit if it were assigned treatment ($X = 1$) and let $Y(0)$ denote the $Y$ value of a randomly chosen unit if it were assigned to the control condition ($X = 0$). The ATE is $E[Y(1) - Y(0)] = E[Y(1)] - E[Y(0)]$. In an abuse of notation, we will, at some point below, refer to the $Y(0)$ and/or $Y(1)$ values of a particular unit without subscripting the potential outcomes.

If one is willing to make assumptions that ensure that the potential outcomes $Y(1)$ and $Y(0)$ are well-defined, then the estimation of the ATE requires solving two missing data problems that are analogous to the simple example of estimating a population mean in the presence of missing values. Note that we need to estimate $E[Y(1)]$ and $E[Y(0)]$ where the expectations are taken over all units in the population. We get to observe $Y(1)$ for units that received treatment but we do not get to observe $Y(0)$ for these units. Conversely, we get to observe $Y(0)$ for units that were in the control group, but we do not get to observe $Y(1)$ for these units. Table 2 presents a simple data set that makes this clearer. Column (a) displays the true, but unobserved, potential outcomes for all units in the study. Here, we see that the average value of $Y$ under treatment is 0.85 and the average value of $Y$ under control conditions is 0.70. Thus, the true ATE in this sample is 0.15. Life is complicated because we do not get to observe all of the information in Column (a). Instead, we only get to observe the information in Column (b). Again, we can match units that have maximally similar values of the measured confounders—$Z1$ and $Z2$—to impute the missing values of $Y(0)$ and $Y(1)$.

To see how this works, look at Unit 11, which, having received treatment, is missing its $Y(0)$ value. Units 7, 8, 9, and 10 received control and have the same $Z1$ and $Z2$ values as Unit 11. They are thus potential matches. Half of these units have $Y(0) = 0$ and half have $Y(0) = 1$. There should thus be a 50% chance that Unit 11’s value of $Y(0)$ is 0 and a 50% chance it is 1. Suppose we match Unit 11 to Unit 9. Then $Y(0)$ for Unit 11 is 0. This is reported in Column (c). Again, note that this is not equal to Unit 11’s true value of $Y(0)$ that we see in Column (a). However, the 50% chance of being matched to a $Y(0) = 0$ unit is correct for all units with $X = 1$, $Z1 = 0$, and $Z2 = 1$ (Units 11 and 12), which keeps the sample average of $Y(0)$ among the $Z1 = 0$, $Z2 = 1$ units correct in expectation. Using this same sort of matching procedure to fill in the remaining missing $Y(0)$ values and the missing $Y(1)$ values, we arrive at the imputed potential outcomes in Column (c). Taking the averages of these variables and then taking the difference of the averages gives us an estimate of ATE that is in line with the true value reported in Column (a).
Why Does Matching Work?

As noted above, standard matching methods rely on two important assumptions—conditional ignorability and overlap. Each is briefly discussed as follows.

Understanding the Conditional Ignorability Assumption

There are multiple versions of the conditional ignorability assumption. Here we will focus on a fairly weak version—conditional mean ignorability—that is relatively easy to understand. Conditional mean ignorability states that, among observations with the same values of measured covariates, the mean of the missing $Y$ values is the same as the mean of the observed $Y$ values. In causal inference applications similar to that represented in Table 2, missingness is completely determined by the treatment assignment $X$. Thus, conditional mean ignorability also implies that, among units with the same values of measured covariates, the mean of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>True $Y(0)$</th>
<th>True $Y(1)$</th>
<th>Observed $Y(0)$</th>
<th>Observed $Y(1)$</th>
<th>Imputed $Y(0)$</th>
<th>Imputed $Y(1)$</th>
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<th>$Z1$</th>
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Estimated ATE 0.15 0.30 0.15

Table 2 Hypothetical Causal Inference Example Where One-to-One Matching Is Used to Estimate the Average Treatment Effect (ATE)

Note: Because units with $Y(0) = 0$ are more likely to be assigned to the control group than the treatment group and units with $Y(1) = 0$ are also more likely to be in the control rather than the treatment group, the estimate of ATE in Column (b) is incorrect. Imputing data via matching on $Z1$ and $Z2$ solves this problem in Column (c).
the potential outcome \( Y(1) \)—the value of \( Y \) under a hypothetical assignment of a unit to the treatment \( (X = 1) \) condition—does not depend on whether a unit actually received treatment or control. The same is true for the mean of the potential outcome \( Y(0) \). Assuming conditional mean ignorability allows one to estimate the mean of \( Y \) when some \( Y \) values are missing because it states exactly how the expected value of the missing data relates to observed values of \( Y \).

**Understanding the Overlap Assumption**

Of course, for a conditional ignorability assumption to be useful, it must be the case that observations exist with observed \( Y \) values that are appropriate matches for observations with missing \( Y \) values. The overlap assumption is a formal statement of this need for good matches. While the examples above make use of exact matches, it is not necessary to obtain exact matches for the matching to be effective. For instance, it is possible to eliminate bias by matching on a unidimensional summary of the relationship between measured covariates and the missingness pattern. In situations where overlap does not hold, it is common—especially in causal inference applications—to change the quantity of interest to one for which there is good overlap.

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*See also* Causality; Data, Missing; Selection Bias

**Further Readings**


**Maximum Likelihood**

Maximum likelihood is a general method for estimating parameters in a statistical model. Given a known probability distribution \( Y \) with known probability density function (pdf), assume that we have a random sample, \( y_1, \ldots, y_n \) from \( Y \), where \( \theta \) is an unknown population parameter associated with \( Y \). The likelihood function \( L(\theta) \) is the product of the pdf for each value evaluated on the \( n \) sample points:

\[
L(\theta) = f(y_1) f(y_2) \cdots f(y_n) | \theta \cdot = \prod_{i=1}^{n} f(y_i | \theta).
\]

Maximum likelihood chooses the estimate of the parameter \( \theta \) that maximizes the likelihood of the observed data. Joint pdfs and likelihoods appear to be quite similar, but the two differ in an important respect. A joint pdf is a function of the data where the parameter is assumed to be known, while the likelihood is assumed to be a function of the unknown parameter \( \theta \) and not the data. The value of \( \theta \) that maximizes the likelihood function is the maximum likelihood estimate for \( \theta \). Common estimators such as ordinary least squares and the sample mean and proportion are in fact maximum likelihood estimators. Maximum likelihood possesses a number of desirable properties that account for its widespread use in statistical estimation. Maximum likelihood is widely used in political science to estimate logit and probit models, count models, and event history or survival models among others. In this entry, the origins, properties, and possible applications of this method are discussed.

**Origins**

likelihood began with his derivation of the principle of “absolute criterion” in a paper he published as a third-year undergraduate. While this paper contains the origins of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), there is little in the paper that many readers would recognize as MLE. In later papers, he developed the concept of likelihood as distinct from probability. Then, in 1922, Fisher united several earlier streams of his research and was the first to use the term maximum likelihood for a class of estimators as an alternative to Bayesian or method of moments estimators. In the same paper, Fisher proposes that maximum likelihood estimators have properties of efficiency, sufficiency, and consistency. Later work by other statisticians would establish the properties of MLE more rigorously.

A simple example is helpful for understanding the principles of MLE. Let us say we wish to estimate the sample proportion for a set of data. Assume we have a random sample of data \( y_1, \ldots, y_n \) with \( n \) observations randomly drawn from a binomial distribution with common parameter \( p \), where \( 0 < p < 1 \) and each \( y \) is either 1 for success or 0 for failure. For these \( n \) independent and identically distributed variables \( y_1, \ldots, y_n \), the density of each observation is

\[
\binom{n}{k} p^k (1-p)^{n-k}.
\]

We next write the likelihood function, which is the density evaluated at the data as a function of the parameter \( p \). However, because the binomial coefficient does not depend on the parameter of interest, \( p \), we can omit it from our derivation of the maximum likelihood estimator. The likelihood function is the product of the individual densities for each observed data point:

\[
L(p) = P(Y_1 = y_1, Y_2 = y_2, \ldots, Y_n = y_n) = p^{y_1}(1-p)^{1-y_1} \times \cdots \times p^{y_n}(1-p)^{1-y_n} = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p^{y_i}(1-p)^{n-y_i}.
\]

Due to the independence of observations, we can write the likelihood as the product of the \( n \) binomial densities. The maximum likelihood estimate for \( p \) is the value of \( p \) that maximizes this likelihood function. To find the maximum, we take the first derivative of the likelihood function, set the derivative equal to zero, and solve for \( p \). It is often easier to work with the logarithm of the likelihood function. Since the likelihood function is a monotonic function, taking the log of it will not affect the estimate of \( p \). The log-likelihood function takes the following form:

\[
\ln L(p) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i \ln p + n - \sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i \ln(1 - p).
\]

Differentiating the log-likelihood with respect to \( p \) returns,

\[
\frac{d}{dp} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{y_i}{p} - n \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{1}{1 - p} \right).
\]

We set the derivative of the log-likelihood equal to zero and solve:

\[
\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i}{p} - n \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{1}{1 - p} \right) = 0,
\]

\[
\hat{p} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i}{n}.
\]

The maximum likelihood estimate for \( p \) then is simply the proportion of successes we observe in the sample.

**Properties of Maximum Likelihood Estimators**

Maximum likelihood estimators have a number of desirable properties. The properties were outlined by Fisher in an informal way but were not proven rigorously until later. The properties of maximum likelihood estimators require a set of regularity conditions.

These regularity conditions are as follows:

- The values of \( y \) for which \( f(y|\theta) > 0 \) (i.e., the sample space) do not depend on \( \theta \).
- \( f(y|\theta) \) is twice differentiable with respect to \( \theta, \forall \theta \in \Theta \subseteq \mathbb{R}^k \).
- The information matrix is positive definite and bounded.
The first three partial derivatives of the likelihood function with respect to \( \theta \) are bounded, and the bounds on the third such derivative do not depend on \( \theta \).

Subject to these regularity conditions, the properties of maximum likelihood estimators come in two forms: finite sample and asymptotic properties. The finite sample properties hold regardless of the sample size used for estimation. Asymptotic properties hold as the sample size increases. The finite sample properties hold as the sample size used for estimation. Asymptotic properties come in two forms: finite sample and asymptotic properties. As an example, let us return to the maximum likelihood estimator for the sample proportion. One might ask whether it is a minimum variance unbiased estimator. We need to compare the relevant quantity from the Cramer-Rao lower bound. The second derivative of the log-likelihood for the sample proportion is

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \ln f(y, p)}{\partial p^2} = -\frac{y}{p^2} - \frac{1-y}{(1-p)^2}.
\]

The expected value of this second derivative is the following quantity:

\[
E \left[ \frac{\partial^2 \ln L(p)}{\partial p^2} \right] = -\frac{p}{p^2} - \frac{1-p}{(1-p)^2} = -\frac{1}{p(1-p)}.
\]

We next take the inverse and multiplying by \(-n\):

\[
\frac{1}{-n \left[ -\frac{1}{p(1-p)} \right]} = \frac{p(1-p)}{n}.
\]

This quantity is equal to the variance for maximum likelihood estimator for the sample proportion. Therefore the maximum likelihood estimator for the sample proportion is not only unbiased but no other estimator for the proportion has a smaller variance.

Other than ordinary least squares, which is a special case of maximum likelihood, no other estimator is more widely used in political science. MLE is especially important for the analysis of categorical variables. For example, vote outcomes are quite often measured with nominal variables that record which candidate or political party receives an individual’s vote. Such variables are analyzed with models where maximum likelihood is the usual estimation method. Other types of political variables typically analyzed with models that use maximum likelihood for estimation are counts of political conflict, length of political conflict, duration of governments, and voter turnout among others. In almost every area of political science, analysts will encounter categorical variables that are often analyzed with models estimated by maximum likelihood. Even for analysts that embrace the Bayesian tradition, the likelihood function remains a critical part of their analyses. Maximum likelihood is also used for the
estimation of propensity scores, which are important for matching estimators.

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See also Event History Analysis; Hierarchical/Multilevel Models; Logit and Probit Analyses; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian

Further Readings


MEASUREMENT

Measurement may be defined as the process that connects theoretical concepts with empirical indicator(s) designed to represent those concepts. As such, it is vitally important to social science research. This entry presents the most important properties of measurement, validity, and reliability, in their various forms. In addition, measurement levels, scales, indices, and related statistical techniques are briefly discussed.

It has been argued that inadequate measurement, more than mistaken concepts or faulty hypotheses, has hindered progress in the social sciences. The sources of inadequate measurement are complex but may be rooted in an oft-cited definition of measurement. In 1951, Stanley Smith Stevens characterized measurement as assigning numbers to objects or events according to particular rules. This is in itself an inadequate conceptualization of the process. It presents measurement as an empirical, almost mechanistic process that overlooks the important role of theory in social science research. Until researchers have worked through their measurement problems, they may not really have a theory capable of generating testable hypotheses. The difficult process of measuring theoretical concepts can make theories clearer, richer, and more subject to empirical investigation. A fuller and more appropriate definition of measurement, then, is the representation of abstract, theoretical concepts with concrete, empirical indicators. This is accomplished through the process of construct building by linking abstract, theoretical, and unobservable concepts with empirical indicators for which researchers have direct observations. This definition involves both theoretical and empirical considerations. Empirically, the focus is on the observable response—answers on a questionnaire, observed behavior in an experiment, material from an archive. Theoretically, the interest is in the underlying unobservable (and not directly measurable) concept that is used in the explanation of some social phenomenon and is represented by the response.

When the relationship between the theoretical concept and the observable response is strong, analysis of empirical indicators can lead to useful inferences about the relationships among the underlying concepts and a greater understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. When the relationship between concept and indicator is weak or faulty, analysis of the indicators leads to incorrect inferences and misleading conclusions concerning the underlying concepts. From this perspective, the auxiliary theory specifying the relationship between concepts and indicators is as important to social research as the substantive theory linking concepts to one another.

Measurement issues arise in many contexts within political science. For example, when respondents are asked in public opinion surveys which party or candidate they voted for in the previous election, questions of measurement are immediately apparent. Do some of the respondents who voted for the losing party or candidate systematically misremember and claim that they voted for the winner? If so, then, as we will see below, this evidence
would raise serious questions about the validity of recall questions that purport to measure previous voting behavior. Other measurement issues arise with instruments such as that used in the Polity Project, which codes the authority characteristics of states in the world system for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis. Coders are instructed to assign yearly scores to all major, independent states in the global system, measuring features of these regimes such as constraints on executive authority, openness of political competition, and peaceful changes in government. Obviously, a crucial concern in this project is the degree to which different coders assign identical or widely different scores when evaluating these characteristics of these countries, an issue of reliability as we will also see below. These examples illustrate the ubiquitous nature of measurement in the social sciences generally and political science in particular.

Properties of Measurement

There are two key properties of measurement: validity and reliability. Validity is the most important property of measurement. Validity focuses on whether a measure represents the phenomenon it is claimed to measure. This is fundamental to any inferences that can be drawn about the relationships between the theoretical concepts. If empirical indicators do not measure the theoretical concept at issue, it is not a valid measure of that concept and any inferences concerning the relationships between concepts will be problematic if not downright wrong.

Reliability is the extent to which an experiment, test, or any measuring procedure yields the same results on repeated trials. It is concerned with the consistency of a measure over repeated observations. Reliability focuses on random error—all of the chance factors that confound the measurement of any phenomenon. If, on the one hand, an indicator is a reliable indicator of a theoretical concept, that indicator will produce consistent results on repeated observations because the random error is not great enough to cause notable fluctuation from one observation to the next. On the other hand, an unreliable indicator will produce inconsistent readings from one measurement to another. Thus, the greater the random error, the less reliable is the measure. For example, if an automobile speedometer registers the speed of the car at 3 kilometers more than the true speed on Monday, 6 kilometers less than the true speed on Tuesday, and 10 kilometers more than the true speed on Wednesday, the readings of the car’s speed are being affected by random error and the reliability of the speedometer is low.

There is a second basic type of error that affects empirical measurements: nonrandom error. Nonrandom error, or systematic error, has no effect on a measure’s reliability. For example, if an automobile speedometer always registers the speed of the auto as 5 kilometers per hour more than the true speed, it is a reliable or consistent indicator. The error in this case is not random, indeed, it is quite nonrandom—it is consistently 5 kilometers per hour too high every time. In this case, the measure is perfectly reliable, but it is not a valid measure. It does not measure the true speed of the automobile. The scale does not measure what it is intended to measure.

Validity

Validity is the extent to which any measuring instrument measures what it purports to measure rather than reflecting some other phenomenon, some source of nonrandom measurement error. The use to which one puts the test must always be considered when assessing validity. That is, an eye examination may be valid for determining the quality of one’s vision, but it will not be valid at all for determining one’s body temperature. Validity is always an argument between competing theoretical claims. Because of this, what is validated is not the instrument itself but the instrument in relation to the purpose for which it is being used.

There are several types of validity that are appropriate in social science research. Each takes a slightly different approach in assessing the degree to which a measure is valid. One may find references in the literature to internal validity, statistical validity, construct validity, convergent validity, discriminant validity, cross-validation, face validity, concurrent validity, external validity, content validity, sampling validity, criterion validity, predictive validity, and empirical validity. Some of these types of validity overlap. Face validity is sometimes discussed as a separate type of validity and sometimes as a subtype of content validity.
Some are the same only with different names, for example, criterion-related and empirical validity are used to mean the same thing. Some are used to denote subtypes of a main type of validity. For example, both concurrent validity and predictive validity are subtypes of criterion-related validity. Convergent validity, discriminant validity, and cross-validation are used to denote types of construct validity. This discussion presents the three most basic types of validity—content validity, criterion-related validity, and construct validity—and their relevance to social science.

But before discussing these three types of validity, we first need to consider the difference between internal and external validity. **Internal validity** concerns the extent to which causal inferences from a given set of cases are correct for those cases. In experimental research, the question of internal validity relates to whether the experimental treatment made a difference in this specific experimental instance. In nonexperimental research, the question focuses on whether the independent variable causes a given change in the dependent variable. In both types of research, the fundamental issue related to internal validity is whether there is a strong logical and empirical basis for establishing causal inferences. **External validity**, by contrast, focuses on generalizability—that is, the extent to which causal inferences about a given set of cases can be applied to other cases. External validity concerns what populations, settings, treatment variables, and measurement variables the established causal inference apply to. From the perspective of this distinction, all the three types of validity discussed below relate to internal validity.

**Content Validity**

Content validity focuses on the extent to which a particular empirical measure reflects a specific domain of content. That is, does the set of items adequately and comprehensively represent what it is supposed to measure? The items are said to be content valid if they reflect this full domain of content. For example, a driver’s test that consisted only of right turns and excluded left turns, parking, stopping, and an understanding of traffic signals would not be content valid.

Obtaining content validity involves two interrelated steps. First, the researcher must be able to specify the entire domain of content that is relevant to a particular measurement situation. In the example of the driver’s test, everything that one needs to know to operate an automobile safely and legally is contained in the state’s driver’s manual. This is the domain. It is much more difficult to demarcate the full domain of social science concepts. Take, for example, the concept of democracy. Minimally, the researcher would need to include an indicator that represents free, fair, and competitive elections. But it might also need to include an indicator of a free press, which is often considered fundamental to democratic rule.

The second step involves selecting, or constructing, the specific items that are used in the measure. For example, a written driver’s test contains a sample of items from the driver’s manual. In this example, specification and selection procedures are relatively straightforward. This is more complex in the social sciences. Specification of the domain of content for abstract concepts such as ideology or alienation is a formidable task. One would begin by consulting the literature on the subject to come to an understanding of the concept. Once the researcher has a general understanding, the researcher would then construct items that reflect the meaning of particular aspects of the phenomenon under study. It is impossible to state a general rule for the number of items that should be included to represent any particular domain of content. It is always preferable to include too many indicators because deficient items can be dropped, while it is much harder (and sometimes impossible) to add new or better items at a later stage in the research.

Establishing a content-valid measure of a concept used in social science such as ideology or alienation is a very difficult task, much more complex than developing a content-valid measure of driving proficiency. When dealing with abstract concepts, it is difficult to establish the domain of content relevant to the phenomenon, as most theoretical concepts in the social sciences have not been described with the required exactness. Further, when measuring most concepts in the social sciences, it is impossible to sample content. A researcher chooses one or a set of items that are intended to reflect the content of a given theoretical concept. Without a random sampling of content, however, it is impossible to ensure the representativeness of the particular chosen items.
Thus, there are two fundamental limitations of content validity as applied to the social sciences. First, the domain of content must define the variable of interest. But as easy as this may be to achieve with regard to some tests, such as proficiency tests, it is extremely difficult to accomplish for more abstract phenomena that tend to characterize the social sciences. The second limitation of content validity is the lack of agreed-on criteria for determining the extent to which a measure has attained content validity. This leaves the researcher with the task of providing a plausible rationale for accepting his or her version of what constitutes the domain of content and for believing that the items included in the measure have been satisfactorily sampled. Because of these limitations, content validity is not a fully satisfactory means of assessing the validity of social science measures.

**Criterion-Related Validity**

Criterion-related validity is a second type of validity, and it is more closely related to what is usually meant in everyday usage of the term. This type of validity concerns the correlation between a measure and some criterion variable of interest. Using criterion-related validity, one can validate a driver’s test by demonstrating that the test is a good predictor of the ability of a well-defined group of subjects to drive a car. Criterion-related validity is fully determined by the degree of correspondence between the measure, or test, and its criterion. If the correlation is high, the measure is valid for that criterion. If the test does not correlate significantly with the criterion, it is not valid for that criterion and thus useless for that particular purpose. The higher the correlation, the more valid a measure for a specific criterion. For criterion-related validity, this is all that matters. It is the only evidence that is relevant. It does not matter if the test makes no theoretical sense as a predictor of the criterion. If the accuracy of one’s horseshoe pitching is found to be highly correlated with college success, then horseshoe pitching would be a valid measure for predicting success using criterion-related validity. There is also no single validity coefficient. There are as many coefficients as there are criteria for a particular measure.

Criterion-related validity can be differentiated into two types. If the criterion exists in the present, then one can assess concurrent validity by correlating the measure and the criterion at the same point in time. For example, a verbal report of voting behavior could be correlated with participation in an election, as revealed by official voting records. Predictive validity, by contrast, concerns a future criterion that is correlated with the relevant measure. Using the (formerly known as) Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) as a predictor of success in college is an example. Scores on the SAT could be correlated with a student’s subsequent performance in college to demonstrate the predictive validity of the SAT. The logic of concurrent and predictive validity is the same. The only difference between them concerns the current or future existence of the criterion variable.

What is sometimes overlooked in assessing criterion-related validation procedures is that the scientific and practical utility of criterion validity depends as much on the measurement of the criterion as it does on the quality of the measuring instrument itself. For example, in many different types of training programs, much effort and expense goes into the development of a test for predicting who will benefit from the program in terms of subsequent job performance. However, the measurement of subsequent performance, the criterion, is often given very little attention. Job performance is very difficult to assess. Thus, those using criterion-related validation procedures should provide independent evidence of the extent to which the measurement of the criterion is valid. While criterion validation is intuitively appealing, it has a major limitation with regard to the social sciences. For many if not most measures in the social sciences, no relevant criterion variables exist. It is not clear, for example, what an appropriate criterion variable would be for political ideology. Thus, criterion-related validation has limited usefulness in the social sciences. Further, the more abstract the concept, the more difficult it is to find an appropriate criterion.

**Construct Validity**

The third basic type of validity is construct validity. Construct validity is concerned with the relationship between the measure under consideration and theoretical expectations about that measure.
Construct validity is important when there is no universally agreed-on domain of content for the phenomenon under investigation and no relevant criteria for its assessment. This is the typical situation in the social sciences. Thus, construct validity is theory driven. Using theory, the researcher formulates theoretical predictions, types, directions, and degrees of relationship that are used to validate the construct empirically. If the empirically observed outcomes are predicted by the theory, then the measure is said to be construct valid. This type of validity is more pertinent in the social sciences than either criterion-related validity or content validity.

There are three distinct steps involved in construct validation. First, the theoretical relationship between the concepts themselves must be specified. Second, the empirical relationship between the measures of the concepts must be examined. Finally, the empirical evidence must be interpreted in terms of how it clarifies the construct validity of the particular measure. A researcher might specify that political ideology is related to social class, such that those respondents with lower social status would more likely be leftist in political orientation, whereas those with higher status would more likely be on the right. If income was employed as the measure of social status, and attitudes toward the government provision of health care were used as the measure of political ideology, then the researcher could calculate the relationship between these variables. If the correlation between these variables was statistically significant in the expected direction, then this correlation would constitute one piece of evidence supporting the construct validity of the measure of political ideology.

Thus, the fundamental feature of construct validation is theory. There must be a theoretical framework that is relevant to the concept or it will be impossible to validate the measure. Without this theoretical framework, it is impossible to generate theoretical predictions that, in turn, lead directly to empirical tests involving a measure of the concept. What is required, then, is that the researcher must be able to investigate several theoretically derived hypotheses involving the particular concept. Construct validity is not established by confirming a single prediction on different occasions or confirming many predictions in a single study. Instead, construct validation ideally requires a pattern of consistent findings involving different researchers across different studies involving a variety of diverse but theoretically relevant variables. Only if and when these conditions are met can one speak with confidence about the construct validity of a particular measure.

A problem exists if the theoretically derived predictions and the empirical relationships are inconsistent with each other—that is, the evidence relevant to construct validity is negative. This negative evidence typically indicates that the measure lacks construct validity. That is, the indicator does not measure what it purports to measure—the construct of interest. The accumulation of negative evidence leads to the conclusion that the measure is not construct valid and should not be used as an empirical representation of that concept in future research. Previous research using that particular measure of the concept is also called into doubt. There are, however, other conclusions that are consistent with this sort of negative evidence. One could interpret it as meaning that the theoretical framework used to generate the empirical predictions is incorrect, that is, the theory is wrong. Another interpretation is that the statistical method or technique used to test the theoretically derived hypotheses is faulty or inappropriate or that the researcher could be using it incorrectly. Finally, negative evidence could be interpreted as being due to the lack of construct validity or the unreliability of some other variable(s) in the analysis. It is a very subtle point, but when one assesses the construct validity of the measure of interest, one is also evaluating simultaneously the construct validity of measures of other theoretical concepts. Thus, it could be the case that the construct validity of the measure is quite high, but the measure hypothesized to correlate with that measure is invalid.

There is no foolproof procedure for determining which one (or more) of these interpretations of negative evidence is correct in any given instance. The first interpretation, that the measure lacks construct validity, becomes increasingly compelling as grounds for accepting the other interpretations become untenable. To the extent possible, one should assess the construct validity of a particular measure in situations characterized by the use of strong theory, appropriate methodological procedures, and other well-measured variables. Only in these situations can one confidently
conclude that negative evidence is probably due to the absence of construct validity of a particular measure of a given theoretical concept. One can see from this discussion that construct validity is the most appropriate and generally applicable type of validity used to assess measures in the social sciences. The researcher can assess the construct validity of an empirical measurement if the measure can be placed in theoretical context. That is, this type of validity, unlike other types, focuses on the extent to which a measure performs in accordance with theoretical expectations.

Reliability

Classical Test Theory

Classical test theory is used to assess random measurement error. By determining the amount of random error, one can estimate reliability. Random error is present in any measure. Indeed, estimating random error and eliminating it to the extent possible is fundamental to measurement. In classical test theory, the observed score is equal to the true score so that it applies to the variance of the single observed score, true score, and random error:

\[ X = t + e, \]

where \( X \) is the observed score, \( t \) is the true score, and \( e \) is the random error component, or random disturbance.

The true score is the unobservable quantity that cannot be directly measured. Theoretically, it is the average that would be obtained if a phenomenon were measured repeatedly over an infinite number of times. The random error component, or random disturbance, indicates the differences between observed score and the true score. For example, an individual’s observed score may be a little above the true score on one observation and a little below on another.

We make the following assumptions about measurement error (Frederic Lord & Melvin Novick, 1968, p. 36):

Assumption 1: The expected error score is zero, \( E(e) = 0 \).

Assumption 2: The correlation between the true score and errors is zero, \( \rho_{te} = 0 \).

Assumption 3: The correlation between the errors on one measurement and the true score on a second measurement is zero, \( \rho_{e_1e_2} = 0 \).

Assumption 4: The correlation between the errors on distinct measurements is zero, \( \rho_{e_1e_2} = 0 \).

Next, using these assumptions, we see that the expected value of the observed score is equal to the expected value of the true score:

\[ E(X) = E(t) + E(e). \]

And following Assumption 1, the expected value of \( e \) is zero or \( E(e) = 0 \), then, \( E(X) = E(t) \).

This formula applies to repeated measurements of a single variable for a single person. But reliability refers to the consistency of repeated measurements across persons and not within a single person, and, therefore, we make a simple transformation. We rewrite the equation for the observed score so that it applies to the variance of the single observed score, true score, and random error:

\[ \text{Var}(X) = \text{Var}(t + e) = \text{Var}(t) + 2\text{Cov}(t,e) + \text{Var}(e). \]

Since Assumption 2 above states that the correlation between the true score and error is zero, then \( 2\text{Cov}(t,e) = 0 \), and \( \text{Var}(x) = \text{Var}(t) + \text{Var}(e) \).

So the observed score variance equals the sum of the true score variance and the random error score variance. To calculate reliability, we compute the ratio of the true score variance to the observed score variance:

\[ \rho_s = \frac{\text{Var}(t)}{\text{Var}(X)}. \]

Thus, \( \rho_s \), is the reliability of \( X \) as a measure of \( T \). Alternatively, reliability can be expressed in terms of the error variance:

\[ \rho_s = 1 - \frac{[\text{Var}(e)/\text{Var}(X)]= \text{reliability}. \]

Parallel Measurements

One estimate of a measure’s reliability can be obtained by correlating parallel measurements. Two measurements are defined as parallel if they have identical true scores and equal variances. Thus, \( X \) and \( X' \) are parallel if \( X = t + e \) and \( X' = t + e' \) where \( \text{Var}(e) = \text{Var}(e') \) and \( t = t \). Parallel measures are functions of the same true score
where the differences between these measures result from purely random error.

**Assessing Reliability**

There are four basic methods for estimating the reliability of empirical measurements. These are the retest method, the alternative-form method, the split-halves method, and the internal consistency method.

**Retest Method**

Perhaps the most common method of assessing reliability is to correlate the same measures administered at different points in time. Figure 1 shows a representation of the retest method.

The equations for the tests at Times 1 and 2 can be written thus:

\[
X_1 = X_t + e_1, \\
X_2 = X_t + e_2.
\]

Since in parallel measures \( t = t \) and \( \text{Var}(e_1) = \text{Var}(e_2) \), and by Assumption 3, \( \rho_{(e_1,e_2)} = 0 \) and by Assumption 4, \( \rho_{(e_1,e_2)} = 0 \), it follows that \( \rho_x = \rho_{x_1x_2} \).

So reliability in this case is the correlation between the scores on the same test obtained at two points in time. If the retest reliability coefficient is exactly 1.0, the results on the two administrations of the test are the same. However, because there is almost always random measurement error, the correlations across time will not be perfect.

Although the test–retest method is a simple and intuitively appealing way to assess reliability, it has some serious problems and limitations. First, often researchers can obtain a measure of a given theoretical concept at only a single point in time. It may be too expensive or impractical to measure some phenomenon at multiple points. And if the test–retest correlations are low, it may not indicate unreliability but the possibility that, in the interim between tests, the theoretical concept of interest has undergone a fundamental change. Another problem that affects test–retest correlations and lowers reliability estimates is reactivity. Sometimes the very act of measuring a phenomenon can induce change in the phenomenon itself. A person may become sensitized to the concept being measured and may answer the question on the second administration of the test based only on the earlier measurement. Lowered reliability estimates are not the only effects. If the period between Time 1 and Time 2 is short enough, the participant may remember his or her answer at Time 1 and appear more consistent than he or she actually is. These memory effects can inflate reliability estimates.

**Alternative-Form Method**

Another method for assessing reliability is used widely in education to estimate the reliability of all types of tests. It is called the alternative-form method and is similar to the retest method in that it requires administering a test to the same people at different points in time. The difference between this method and the retest method is that an alternative form of the same test is given on the second testing. The two forms of the same test are intended to measure the same theoretical concept. The two forms should not differ systematically from each other. Using random procedures to select items for the different forms of the test can ensure that this does not happen. In this case, the reliability is the correlation between the alternative forms of the test. The two forms should be administered about 2 weeks apart to allow for day-to-day fluctuations in the individual to occur.

The alternative-form method for assessing reliability is superior to the retest method because it reduces the extent to which an individual’s memory can inflate the reliability estimate. Like the
Measurement retest method, the alternative-form method, when used at only two points in time, does not allow the researcher to distinguish true change from the unreliability of the measure. Therefore, the results of alternative-form reliability studies are easier to interpret if the phenomenon being measured is relatively enduring and not subject to rapid and radical alteration. A limitation of this method is the impracticality of designing alternative forms of measures that are truly parallel. This is easier to do in education where achievement tests are widely employed but much more difficult to accomplish in other social sciences where researchers typically focus on measuring abstract theoretical concepts.

Split-Halves Method

Reliability estimated by using the split-halves method, unlike the retest or alternative-form methods, can be conducted on only one occasion. The total set of items is divided in half, and the scores on the halves are correlated to yield an estimate of reliability. The halves can be considered approximations to alternative forms. The correlations between the two halves would be the reliability for each half of the test and not for the total test. To estimate the reliability of the entire test, we must estimate a statistical correction, called the Spearman–Brown prophecy formula. Since the total test is twice as long as each half, the Spearman–Brown prophecy formula is

\[ \rho_{xx'} = \frac{2 \rho_{xx'}}{1 + \rho_{xx'}}. \]

where \( \rho_{xx'} \) is the reliability coefficient for the whole test and \( \rho_{xx} \) is the split-half correlation.

The more general version of the Spearman–Brown prophecy formula is

\[ \rho_{xx'} = N \rho_{xx}/[1 + (N - 1) \rho_{xx}]. \]

This general formula gives the reliability of a scale that is \( N \) times longer than the original scale.

A researcher can also use this Spearman–Brown prophecy formula to determine the number of items that would be needed to attain a given reliability and test length. To estimate the number of items required to obtain a particular reliability, one uses the following formula:

\[ N = \rho_{xx'}(1 - \rho_{xx})/\rho_{xx'}(1 - \rho_{xx'}), \]

where \( \rho_{xx'} \) = the desired reliability, \( \rho_{xx} \) = the reliability of the existing test, and \( N \) = the number of times the test would be lengthened to obtain reliability of \( \rho_{xx'} \).

There is some degree of indeterminacy in using the split-halves technique to estimate reliability due to the different ways that the items can be grouped into halves. The most typical way to divide the items is to place the even-numbered items in one group and the odd-numbered items in the other group. But other ways of partitioning the total item set are also used including separately scoring the first and second halves of the items and randomly dividing the items into two groups. For a 10-item scale, there are 126 different splits, and each will probably result in a slightly different correlation between the two halves, which will lead to a different reliability estimate. It is therefore possible to obtain different reliability estimates even if the same items are administered to the same individuals.

Internal Consistency Methods

The aforementioned methods of estimating reliability require either the splitting or repeating of measures and thus have distinct theoretical and practical limitations. An alternative approach to estimating reliability focuses on the internal consistency of measurements. The most popular of these coefficients for assessing internal consistency is Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach’s alpha is equal to the average of all possible split-half correlations for a composite scale \( 2N \) items long and is calculated from the variance–covariance matrix as follows:

\[ \alpha = \frac{N}{N - 1} \left[ 1 - \frac{\sum \text{Var}(Y_i)}{\text{Var}_x} \right], \]

where \( N \) = the number of items, \( \sum \text{Var}(Y_i) \) = the sum of the item variances, and \( \text{Var}_x \) = the variance of the total composite.
If one is using the correlation matrix rather than the variance–covariance matrix, the formula becomes

$$\alpha = \frac{a}{a - 1} \left[ 1 - \frac{a}{a + 2b} \right],$$

where $a$ = the number of items in the composite and $b$ = the sum of the correlations among the items.

Coefficient alpha thus depends on the number of items in the scale and the intercorrelations among those items. Generally speaking, longer scales with higher intercorrelations are more reliable than comparable scales composed of fewer items that are less highly intercorrelated. Alpha is a lower bound to the reliability of a scale of $N$ items where each item contributes equally to the scale. Representing a lower bound, the reliability of the scale is always equal to or greater than alpha. It is equal to the reliability if the items are parallel. The reliability of a scale can never be lower than alpha even if the items depart substantially from being parallel measurements. Thus, alpha is a conservative estimate of reliability.

Cronbach’s alpha is a generalization of Kuder and Richardson’s procedure designed to estimate the reliability of scales composed of dichotomously scored items. These items are scored either zero or one depending on whether the individual possesses the particular characteristic of interest. Because Cronbach’s alpha can handle multiply scored or dichotomously scored items, because it encompasses the Spearman–Brown prophecy formula, because it makes use of all of the information contained in the items, and because it is easy to compute, it has become widely used as a measure of reliability.

**Correction for Attenuation**

No matter which specific method a researcher uses to compute an estimate of reliability, one of the estimate’s most important uses is to “correct” correlations for unreliability due to random measurement error. If we can estimate the reliability of each variable, we can use these estimates to determine what the correlation between the two variables would be if they were perfectly reliable. This process is called correction for attenuation. The formula for the correction for attenuation is

$$\rho_{x,y'} = \frac{\rho_{x,y}}{\sqrt{\rho_{xx} \rho_{yy}}},$$

where $\rho_{x,y}$ = the correlation corrected for attenuation, $\rho_{x,y}$ = the observed correlation, $\rho_{xx}$ = the reliability of $X$, $\rho_{yy}$ = the reliability of $Y$.

The resulting correlation—the observed correlation purged of random measurement error—might be thought of as the correlation between theoretical concepts that have been measured with perfect reliability.

**Levels of Measurement**

Because of the fundamental importance of measurement in making inferences, drawing conclusions, and formulating hypotheses about theoretical concepts, it is essential to be as precise in our measurement of these concepts as possible. The statistical techniques that a researcher can use in a particular analysis depend on the level of precision at which variables are measured. More precise measures allow the researcher to use more sophisticated and rigorous statistical techniques and to have more confidence in the results. The precision of an indicator depends on the level at which it is measured. Stevens identified four levels into which we can classify measures. In order from least precise to most precise, they are nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio. Each level has particular characteristics that set it apart from the others. By determining the level of the measures available, a researcher can determine which statistical techniques are appropriate for the analysis and which are not.

A variable measured at the nominal level represents a typology in which the attributes of a variable are classified into various categories. The categories of a nominal variable are mutually exclusive and together they exhaust the possibilities—that is, there is one and only one category for every possible attribute. Thus, a grandparent can be classified as either a grandmother or grandfather. This is the least precise of the levels of measurement, and for that reason, the researcher is limited in the quantitative techniques applicable to those appropriate to variables measured by
unordered categories, for example, frequency distributions and determining the mode.

The next most precise level of measurement is at the ordinal level. Ordinal-level variables possess the characteristics of the nominal-level variables and add the property that the attributes can be ordered from less of an attribute to more of that attribute. More sophisticated statistical procedures can be used with variables measured at the ordinal level. Determining the median, percentiles, Spearman’s rho, and gamma are examples of statistical techniques that can be applied to variables measured at the ordinal level.

In our hierarchy of measurement, the next step toward more precision is the interval level. In addition to having all of the characteristics of nominal- and ordinal-level variables, the intervals between each of the categories are equal. This was not a requirement of the ordinal level. To move up from nominal to ordinal, a variable’s categories had to have a logical order, but the distances between those categories did not have to be equal. Now, to move from ordinal to interval, those intervals must be equal. Statistical techniques that are appropriate for variables measured at the interval level are very sophisticated and include adding, subtracting, and computing the mean, standard deviation, and Pearson’s product moment correlation. Finally, the most precise level of measurement is the ratio level. It differs from the interval level in that a ratio level variable contains a natural zero point. Because of this zero point, we can express categories as ratios, for example, someone who is in a particular category has twice as much of the attribute as someone who falls into another category.

Multiple-Indicator Measures

As we have said, measurement involves a process whereby abstract, theoretical concepts are represented by concrete, empirical indicators. These complex concepts are more appropriately measured by using a composite of multiple indicators rather than a single indicator. Estimating reliability using a single indicator is almost always impossible without having some a priori information that is usually unavailable. And even if the reliability of a single indicator can be estimated, it will usually be affected by random error more than a composite and thus have a lower estimated reliability. Multiple-indicator measures, or multiple-item measures, are indices made up of more than one item. They are ubiquitous in the social sciences. They are used to measure attitudes, opinions, emotions, personality, and many other social science concepts.

There are many reasons why a composite measure is preferable to a single item. First, many of the theoretical concepts being measured are complex, broad, and abstract and, as a result, cannot be adequately represented by a single item. This is a question of validity as discussed earlier. Does the empirical measure actually provide an adequate representation of the theoretical concept? As a simple example, no one would argue that an individual true/false question on an American government examination is a valid measure of the degree of knowledge of American government possessed by a student. If several questions concerning the subject are summed, we get a better estimate of the student’s understanding of American government. To take another example, a person’s level of anxiety cannot be measured adequately by a single item in a clinical evaluation but is routinely done so with a battery of questions.

Another reason to use multiple-item measures is accuracy. Single items lack precision because they may not distinguish subtle distinctions of an attribute. If the item is dichotomous, it will only recognize two levels of the attribute. The final reason for using multiple-item measures is reliability. Single items include more random error than multiple-item measures because the latter allow random error to cancel out because of the multiple measurements. Because they are constructed of more than one indicator of a particular phenomenon, multiple-item measures increase the reliability of an empirical representation of a concept that would be attainable if single indicators were used in analysis. In other words, combining several individual items into a single multiple-item composite indicator will generally decrease random error.

Scale

A scale is a composite measure used to measure some underlying concept. Many phenomena in social science are theoretical constructs that cannot be directly measured by a single variable. To understand the causes, effects, and implications of
these phenomena, the researcher must develop a valid and reliable empirical indicator of these concepts. This empirical indicator is called a scale. In this sense, the scale is composed of a set of measurable items that capture empirically the essential meaning of the theoretical construct. Good scales are data reduction devices that simplify the information and, in one composite measure, articulate the direction and intensity of the concept. They are usually constructed at the ordinal level of measurement, although some can be at the interval level. Because they are constructed of more than one indicator of a particular phenomenon, they increase both the reliability and validity that would be attainable if the individual indicators were used in analysis.

There are three related but distinct purposes for scaling. In the first case, scaling may be intended to test a specific hypothesis, for example, that a single dimension, party identification, structures voters' choice of presidential candidates. In this case, the scaling model is used as a criterion to evaluate the relative fit of a given set of observed data to a specific model. Another purpose for scaling is to describe a data structure. For example, a political scientist might use a scale to discover the underlying social, economic, and cultural dimensions of the U.S. electoral system. This would be an exploratory analysis rather than a hypothesis-testing approach. Finally, scaling can be used to construct a measure on which individuals can be placed and their scores related on that scale to other measures of interest.

There are several possible models that can be used to combine items into a scale. These include Likert scaling, Thurstone scaling, and Guttman scaling. The method chosen depends on the purpose that the scale is intended to serve. Scaling models may be used to scale persons, stimuli, or both persons and stimuli.

The Likert scale is a scaling model that scales only subjects. Broadly, any scale obtained by summing the response scores of its constituent items is called a Likert or summative scale or a linear composite. An examination in a mathematics class is an example of a linear composite. The scale (test) score is found by adding the number of correct answers to the individual items (questions). The composite score on the scale (test) is a better indicator of the student’s knowledge of the material than is any single item (question).

Louis Thurstone’s interest lay in measuring and comparing stimuli when there is no evident logical structure. The Thurstone scaling model is an attempt to identify an empirical structure among the stimuli. To do this Thurstone scaling uses human judgments. Individuals are given multiple statements, maybe as many as 100. These “judges” order the statements along an underlying dimension. Those statements that produce the most agreement among the judges are selected as the items to be included in the scale. These remaining items (approximately 20) should cover the entire latent continuum. These items are then presented to subjects who are asked to identify those that they accept or agree with. The average scale value of those items chosen represents the person’s attitude toward the object in question.

A unidimensional structure exists in those situations where a single, fundamental dimension underlies a set of observations. Examples of this condition are measures used to evaluate the qualifications of political candidates, a scale of political activism, or a measure designed to describe a single personality trait. The presumption is that there is a single common dimension on which the candidates, or citizens, or personality traits are arrayed. Many theoretical constructs used in the social sciences are quite complex. A single, homogeneous, underlying dimension may not be adequate to express these complex concepts. This complexity may require us to turn to more elaborate explanations of the variables’ behavior in which more than one latent dimension underlies a set of empirical observations. This is multidimensionality. The task of the researcher is to uncover these multiple dimensions. We hypothesize their existence because theory suggests that they should exist, or we can predict these latent dimensions because of the variation in the empirical observations at hand. Almost all hypotheses in the social sciences concern relationships between concepts. The more abstract these concepts, the more likely they are to be multidimensional.

Louis Guttman developed a method of scaling as an alternative to other scaling methods that did not account for the dimensionality of the phenomena being measured. Using this method, one can establish that a series of items belong on a specifically unidimensional continuum. Guttman’s method
orders both items and subjects with regard to some underlying cumulative dimension according to intensity. Guttman scaling, also known as scalogram analysis and cumulative scaling, is cumulative in the sense that if the researcher knows that a respondent’s score is, for example, 3, the researcher knows not only that the respondent answered three items “correctly” but also knows that the items answered “correctly” were Items 1, 2, and 3. A perfect Guttman scale is rarely achieved in practice; indeed, scalogram analysis anticipates that this ideal model will be violated. It then becomes a question of the degree of deviation that one is willing to tolerate before conceding that the empirical data cannot be adequately represented by a single quantitative variable on an underlying unidimensional continuum.

There are two principal methods used to determine this degree of deviation from the ideal: minimization of error proposed by Guttman and deviation from perfect reproducibility based on work by Allen Edwards. According to the minimization-of-error technique, the number of errors is the least number of positive responses that must be changed to negative or negative responses that must be changed to positive for the observed response to be transformed into an ideal response pattern. The method of deviation from perfect reproducibility begins with a perfect model and counts the number of responses that are inconsistent with that pattern. Error counting based on deviations from perfect reproducibility will result in more errors than the minimization-of-error technique. It provides an accurate description of the data based on scalogram theory and for this reason is superior to the minimization-of-error method.

While agreeing that the Guttman scale is intuitively appealing, Jum Nunnally argues that it is impractical for several reasons. First, because it is a deterministic model, having no measurement error, there are very few, if any, sets of items that fit the model’s requirements. Second, the perfect pattern of responses is a necessary but not sufficient condition for establishing a scale’s unidimensionality and therefore the items may not all belong to the same factor. Moreover, the fewer the number of items in the scale, the easier it is to manipulate the model to get the proper pattern of responses. Finally, the goal of the Guttman model is to develop only ordinal, not interval, scales.

Index

An index is a measure in which the researcher combines more than one indicator of some abstract theoretical concept into a single summary score. In this regard, a scale is a type of index. Often, researchers use the terms index and scale interchangeably. But whereas scales arrange individuals on the basis of patterns in the data, an index is typically simply an additive composite of several indicators, called items. Unlike a scale, there is no theoretical specification of a measurement model in the construction of an index. For this reason, scales are more difficult to construct. While indexes, or indices, may generally seem valid and reliable, because of the lack of an underlying measurement model, these properties are not usually examined in depth.

Further, an index may not be unidimensional. For example, political scientists use a 7-point index to measure party identification in the United States. This index is arranged along a continuum as follows: strong Democrat, weak Democrat, Independent leaning toward Democrat, Independent, Independent leaning toward Republican, weak Republican, strong Republican. One can easily see that this index consists of two separate dimensions. The first is a directional dimension, from Democrat through Independent to Republican. However, there also exists an intensity dimension, going from strong through weak, independent, weak, and back to strong.

Frequently, governments use indexes of official statistics to measure aspects of the country. For example, the consumer price index is used as a measure of the level of prices that consumers pay for goods and services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s crime index is the sum of the seven so-called index crime rates and is used as an indicator of overall crime in the United States. Another example is the Human Development Index compiled annually by the United Nations Development Programme, which combines rates of average life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy for all United Nations member states.

Multidimensional Scaling

Scaling models may differ with regard to several characteristics—the purpose for which the scale is being used, the phenomena being scaled, whether
the model is deterministic or probabilistic, the type of data used, and whether the model is unidimensional or multidimensional. Dimensionality is a complex issue and can take on different meanings for different scaling models. A unidimensional scale is appropriate in those situations where there exists a single, fundamental dimension that underlies a set of observations. Examples could include a scale to evaluate the qualifications of political candidates or a scale designed to measure a single personality trait. The presumption is that there is a single common dimension on which the candidates or personality traits are arrayed.

Many theoretical concepts used in the social sciences, however, are quite complex and may not be amenable to being expressed on a simple, homogeneous, unidimensional scale. Multidimensional scaling models are used when more than one dimension underlies a set of observations. Multidimensional scaling techniques are mathematical methods used to model the similarity (or dissimilarity) of a set of data points to uncover the underlying structure of those data. The objects under study are placed on a “map,” a representation of the points in a spatial, or geometric, form simultaneously along more than one dimension, which can then be interpreted by the researcher.

In multidimensional scaling, respondents judge the similarity or difference among a set of stimuli. In that regard, this is an extension of the unidimensional scaling of stimuli represented by the Thurstone scale. A subject must compare stimuli and determine which are more similar to each other. If a researcher wanted to measure the weight of different objects but did not possess a scale, he or she could present pairs of the objects to respondents and ask which of the two is heavier, then compare the heavier with another object in the set and so on until all of the objects are arrayed from lightest to heaviest. Construction of a multidimensional scale may proceed in the same manner except that the subject would be asked to make the judgment of similarity but would not be presented with a dimension along which to order the objects. Thus, some subjects may array the objects along a dimension of weight, while others may group them on a dimension of size. Multidimensional scaling can be used when the researcher does not know the structure of the observations—that is, the underlying dimensions may be unknown. These methods can also be used when the researcher has developed and then tests specific hypotheses about what dimensions underlie the data.

A related method used to uncover the underlying dimensions of data is factor analysis. Factor analysis focuses on the measurement of latent variables. The technique attempts to statistically reduce the number of variables to a minimum number of underlying dimensions (latent variables or factors) that underlie the covariation among the observed variables. Each observed variable is linked to one or more unobserved factor. These links are called factor loadings and can be thought of as a correlation between the observed variable and the unobserved factor. There are two types of factor analysis: exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).

When a researcher has no (or not much) a priori knowledge of the latent factors underlying a set of variables, EFA can be used to uncover that structure. The correlation between each observed variable and each unobserved factor is estimated and the observed variables that have high loadings are said to define the latent variable. Using the factor loadings as weights, the researcher can construct measures of the latent variables and use them in subsequent analyses. CFA is an inferential process that can be used to test specific hypotheses about the latent factors underlying a set of observed variables. That is, based on theory or prior empirical study, the hypothesis may be that Variables 1, 2, and 3 define a factor, Factor 1, and Variables 4, 5, and 6 define a second factor, Factor 2. The adequacy of this model’s representation of the observed data can be assessed by a variety of goodness-of-fit indexes.

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See also Measurement, Levels; Measurement, Scales; Statistics: Overview; Variables, Latent

Further Readings
In its basic form, research is about the relationships between concepts measured as variables. Researchers make inferences, draw conclusions, and form new hypotheses based on the patterns they detect in these relationships. It is important, therefore, for researchers to be as precise in their measurement of concepts as possible. The statistical techniques that can be applied to a set of variables are contingent on the level of precision at which the variables are measured. The more precise a measure, the more sophisticated statistical techniques can be employed in the analysis, and the stronger the conclusions that can be drawn. In this entry, the major levels of measurement, the appropriate statistical procedures based on them, and a few concrete examples are discussed.

Measurement is usually discussed in terms of four levels, as stated by S. S. Stevens (1946). Moving from least precise to most precise, they are nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio. Nominal measures simply classify members based on particular attributes. These must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. For example, gender is a nominal variable. It is made up of the mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories of (a) male and (b) female or (a) female and (b) male (neglecting other possible distinctions). It makes no difference how numbers are assigned to the categories because there is no judgment made as to how much of a variable is possessed by an attribute. That is, male is not higher than female, or vice versa. It is simply a way to categorize a sample or population, and neither male nor female possess more of the quality of gender than the other.

For instance, suppose we have a population in which everyone belongs to one of four religions: Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, or Protestantism. Then, religion is a variable—that is, it is mutually exclusive and exhaustive (at least with reference to our example population). Everyone is classified into one of the four categories. However, none is higher on the scale. Protestant is not more or less religious than any of the others, nor is Catholic, Jewish, or Muslim. The only quantitative techniques we can use with nominal variables are those based on the categories—that is, frequency distributions and the mode. We cannot perform statistical procedures—for instance, take a mean or find a standard deviation—using this variable. We cannot add or subtract them. Statistical procedures must turn these variables into binary (“dummy”) variables to be able to use them; this is discussed below. Many examples of nominal variables exist in social science, such as race, ethnicity, region, marital status, and occupation.

The next level of measurement is the ordinal level. Ordinal variables, like nominal variables, allow the researcher to classify attributes into mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories, but, unlike nominal variables, the attributes categorized in ordinal variables can be ordered so that they run from less of an attribute to more of that attribute. Big, bigger, biggest is an example of a logical order. Ordinal variables are quite common.
in social sciences. Agree/disagree questions measure on an ordinal scale. For example, “The world is flat. Do you (a) strongly disagree, (b) disagree, (c) neutral, (d) agree, or (e) strongly agree?” This answering scheme produces an ordinal measure because there is a logical ordering from strongly agree (with the statement) to strongly disagree. A “feeling thermometer” is an ordinal variable. For example, on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being very cold and 100 being very warm, one can ask, “How do you feel about Barack Obama? John McCain?” Statistical measures that one can use when the variables are measured at the ordinal level are the median, percentiles, Spearman’s rho, and gamma. Other examples of ordinal variables used in social science are variables with answer patterns running from like to dislike and variables measuring attitudes.

Moving up the continuum of levels of measurement, the third level of measurement is the interval level. Interval-level variables allow one to classify attributes into mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories, like nominal and ordinal levels. Like ordinal variables, they possess a natural order. But, now, the intervals between the ordered categories are equal. In the earlier example of the variables with the categories, strongly agree through strongly disagree, the distances between each of these categories are not equal; indeed, they are not even known. One respondent may interpret them as equal, while another may interpret the distance between strongly agree and agree to be shorter than the distance between agree and neutral, or vice versa. There is no way to know. All that is known is that this is the order of the responses. If a variable is measured at the interval level, the distances are all equal. The usual example given of an interval variable is temperature. Every degree is equal to every other degree. For example, 30 degrees is 10 degrees colder than 40 degrees, and 80 degrees is 10 degrees colder than 90 degrees. Because of this property, the statistical techniques that can be used on variables measured at the interval level are more of the most sophisticated known. Analysts can add and subtract, determine the mean and standard deviation, and compute a Pearson’s product-moment correlation or regression coefficient.

The property that interval-level measures lack is a natural zero point, or origin. Temperature, which we have already classified as an interval scale, has a zero point—on the Celsius scale, it is the freezing point of water; on the Fahrenheit scale, it is 32 degrees below the freezing point of water. The fact that there are two scales with different points labeled 0 is illustrative of why temperature is not a ratio scale. Neither 0 degrees Celsius nor 0 degrees Fahrenheit means the absence of temperature. Zero in this case is simply an arbitrary point on the scale. We can measure temperature below zero. What matters in this case is the interval. Each interval is the same size. That is, any interval (degree) on the Fahrenheit scale is equal to every other interval (degree) on the Fahrenheit scale, and any interval on the Celsius scale is equal to every other interval on the Celsius scale. Of course, an interval on the Fahrenheit scale is not equal to an interval on the Celsius scale. But, a reading of 10 degrees on a Fahrenheit or Celsius scale is not twice as much as 5 degrees or half as much as 20 degrees. One cannot say that when the temperature is 100 degrees, the temperature is twice the temperature as when the temperature is 50 degrees. In the big, bigger, biggest example, one cannot say that big is half as big as bigger. These comparisons make no sense because there is no zero and no starting point. Examples of interval-level variables in social science are standardized tests such as IQ (intelligence quotient) tests or SATs (formerly known as Scholastic Assessment Tests), crime rates, and voter turnout.

A true zero point allows researchers to form ratios, and this leads to the most sophisticated level of measurement of all, the ratio scale. The ratio scale is classificatory, the categories can be ordered, the intervals between categories are equal, and the scale has a natural, or true, zero. Using ratio-level variables one can form ratios—for example, the amount of money in my bank account is half as much as it was yesterday. It can be described this way only because there is a zero, a starting point. One can say that family income is 4 times what it was in 1970 or that A is twice as tall as B. Money, income, and height are examples of ratio variables. There are many examples of ratio-level variables in social science, such as the number of children one has, the number of times one has been married, the number of years of education that one has had, the number of times one attends church in a week, and the number of murders that have occurred in a particular jurisdiction.
in a year. With ratio-level variables, analysts can use statistics such as the geometric mean and the coefficient of variation, a ratio itself.

When designing research, it is desirable for researchers to give much thought to the kinds of conclusions they would like to draw and how they want to state them. The way findings are presented is a result of the level of measurement at which researchers collect their data. If they intend to give broad, general conclusions, nominal variables may be acceptable. Usually, however, researchers want to give specific, precise statements of their findings. This will probably entail collecting their data at the highest possible level.

It is possible to aggregate a higher-level variable into a lower-level variable. For example, we could measure age by asking how old the respondent is in calendar years. This would be a ratio scale because it classifies orders with equal intervals and has at least a theoretical zero. In our analysis, we may group the years into several groups, for example, less than 18 years old, from 18 to 21 years old, from 22 to 25 years old, and so on up to more than 65 years old. This would be an ordinal variable—the first and last groups are not equal to the others. The ordinal level may be exactly what we want in this case. However, we may want to address another hypothesis using the original variable in years. This is the sort of question to be addressed before data collection begins. It is a simple matter to group calendar years into groups; however, it is impossible to disaggregate data into finer grained categories if the data have been collected in groups in the first place. A rule of thumb is to collect data in the most disaggregated form that time and budget will permit.

It is also possible to transform nominal variables into variables that can be used as interval variables. These are called dummy variables. Dummy variables are binary variables in that they have two categories—presence of the attribute and absence of the attribute. In the nominal variable discussed earlier, religion, we classified our population into four groups—Catholic, Jew, Muslim, and Protestant. As a nominal variable, we can show a frequency distribution or report a mode, but that is about all. If we transform the variable, we may be able to use the resulting dummies in higher level statistical techniques. In this case, we would create four dummies—one for each category. Our original variable was mutually exclusive and exhaustive, so all respondents are in one and only one category. We compute a dummy variable for the Catholic group—1 if Catholic and 0 if not. We do the same for the other three categories. When the process is completed, we have created four new variables that tell us whether someone is Catholic (yes/no), Jewish (yes/no), Muslim (yes/no), or Protestant (yes/no). We can then use these dummy variables in statistical procedures such as multiple regression analysis.

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See also Measurement, Scales; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Statistics: Overview

Further Readings


**Measurement, Scales**

In the natural sciences, scaling is usually very precise, and a single measure is often sufficient to describe a dimension—for example, when measuring temperature in Celsius, weight in grams, or

**Measurement, Scales**

In the natural sciences, scaling is usually very precise, and a single measure is often sufficient to describe a dimension—for example, when measuring temperature in Celsius, weight in grams, or
distances in meters. In these cases, the assignment is quite simple: Distances can be measured by a ruler, temperature by a thermometer, and weight by a scale. The situation in economics is somewhat different. One of the most important indicators in international finance is the purchasing-power parity. The validity of this measure depends on the choice of an appropriate “basket” of consumer goods, which is not the same in all countries. In 1986, The Economist magazine introduced “Burgernomics” and has been publishing since then annually the prices of McDonald’s Big Mac hamburgers in different countries. The advantage of the Big Mac is that it is produced and consumed around the world; the unique basket consists of prices for beef, cheese, lettuce, onions, and bread—and since the recipe is the same worldwide, there are (almost) no differences in the share of these five ingredients among countries. Note that the one-dimensional Big Mac Index consists of several indicators that have different weights—there is, for example, a higher share of beef than onions in a hamburger.

In the social sciences, scaling is the process of measuring or ordering entities with respect to quantitative attributes. While natural scientists use instruments that are as precise as possible, social and political scientists use survey research methods such as face-to-face or telephone interviews to evaluate the attitudes and beliefs of the population. In the following, some examples from large data sets such as the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the World Value Surveys (WVS), and the American Nationwide Election Studies (ANES) are shown to illustrate problems of frequently used measurement scales such as Likert or Guttman scales.

Typical research questions include the discussion of latent variables (dimensions, factors) such as the level of national identity or the level of political efficacy and trust. The validity of the measures depends on the quality of the instruments: It is not possible to measure the correct length with a broken ruler, and it is not possible to measure true attitudes and beliefs with poorly worded questions. Starting with a single question, closest to a metric variable might be a feeling barometer that runs from 0 to 100. The ANES 2004 provides the following question: “Where on that thermometer would you rate George W. Bush?” The problem with this kind of question is that respondents are not able to differentiate between values such as 43 and 44; most are not even able to differentiate between scores such as 62 and 76. An alternative is to reduce the scale to values between 0 and 10 or, for getting an easy-to-catch midpoint, to values between −5 and 5, as is done, for example, in the German Politbarometer. Although it is probably easier to respond to an 11-point scale than to a 101-point scale, it is still difficult to differentiate between categories such as 2 and 3.

While it is possible to evaluate political parties and politicians by a single question, for estimating the level of a complex phenomenon such as political trust and efficacy, one has to use a larger set of items. In the ISSP 2004, participants were asked to grade the following six statements on a 5-point scale running from strongly agree to strongly disagree:

1. People like me don’t have any say about what the government does.
2. I don’t think the government cares much what people like me think.
3. I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing [country].
4. I think most people in [country] are better informed about politics and government than I am.
5. Most of the time, we can trust people in government to do what is right.
6. Most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of it personally.

A first approach to analyze this kind of items has been formulated by Rensis Likert (1932); his ideas are known under the terms summative scaling, Likert scaling, and technique of summated ratings. They can be summarized in three steps: First, collecting a large set (approximately 100) of positively and negatively formulated items, which are possible indicators of the dimension of interest, say political efficacy and trust; all of them running from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Second, rating the items: Respondents in a sample that is representative of the target population have to rate how strong they are in favor (disfavor) of each statement. Then, items are selected by excluding...
those to which very different respondents gave the same answers and those to which very similar respondents gave very different responses, only keeping the items that differentiate most clearly between the top and bottom quarter of the respondents. The set of remaining items, say 10, should have high item-total correlations, that is, high correlations with the sum score of all items, and high discrimination values. In the third step, these finally selected items are used in the main survey. The mean values of the item scores reflect the level of political efficacy and trust of each respondent. Note that values of negatively/positively formulated items have to be reversed so that high values always refer to a high/low level of political efficacy and trust.

There are several drawbacks to just adding the scores of such items. Let us take a 5-point scale running from 1 to 5, from strongly agree to strongly disagree. First, the extreme points, say 1, are relatively easy to reconstruct, while other values can be the result of very different responses; for example, giving a 3 two times produces the same mean as 2 and 4, 4 and 2, 1 and 5, and 5 and 1—that is, very different answers result in the same scale values. Second, in case of 5-point items, the mean categories, often verbalized as “neither–nor,” have two meanings: On the one hand, they are used as real “neither–nor” and, on the other hand, as a substitute for “I don’t know” (Jörg Blasius & Victor Thiessen, 2001). Third, there may be respondent-specific answer formats: While some people use the extreme categories quite often, others are more careful, for example, using agree more often than strongly agree. Fourth, all items have the same weight, for example, all items determine the latent variable to the same degree. All these problems are well known; applying principal component analysis (PCA) provides different values for the items and solves the fourth problem. Even better is applying categorical PCA, which provides different weights for the single-item categories, solving the first problem at least partly. For solving the second and third problem, dichotomized items are often used—with the drawback of receiving less information from the single indicators.

Before discussing dichotomous items, we introduce ordinal variables with categories that are not in symmetric order: for example, there has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. I am going to read you a short list of opinions. Please tell me which one of the opinions best agrees with your view? . . . : 1. By law, abortion should never be permitted. 2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman’s life is in danger. 3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established. 4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. (ANES, 2004, http://www.electionstudies.org)

In this example, there is an implicit order of responses, but it includes four categories only. Considering an additional response such as “the law should permit abortion in cases when the child’s life is in danger” would pose the problem where to place it—between Categories 2 and 3 or between Categories 3 and 4? Another frequently discussed example is religious beliefs; here, as an example, are seven items from the WVS 1996 to which respondents could either agree or disagree: (1) Do you believe in God? (2) Do you believe people have a soul? (3) Do you believe in sin? (4) Do you believe in life after death? (5) Do you believe the Devil exists? (7) Do you believe in hell?

In the 1940s, Louis Guttman (1944, 1950) developed a method based on a set of dichotomous variables as the one above, which is known as scale analysis, cumulative scaling, or Guttman scaling. His idea was to construct a set of items that has an inherent order, say, in religious beliefs. If the order of the items is perfect, every respondent should agree with the items as long as they are below their own level of difficulty. Thereby, difficulty is reflected by the share of agreements: The fewer agreements an item receives, the more difficult it is. With respect to the WVS 1996, Wijbrandt van Schuur and Jörg Blasius (2006) found for the Netherlands an empirical order of soul, God, sin, life after death, heaven, Devil, and hell; that is, it was most difficult for the respondents to believe in hell and easiest to believe in soul. In a perfect Guttman scale, nobody was expected, for example, to believe in God without believing in soul; and somebody who believes in hell should believe in all
the other religious items. The level of religious beliefs for all respondents is equal to their number of agreements, which are in case of a perfect Guttman scale the ranking places of their most difficult items. The measurement error of the scale is the share of misplaced zeros, for example, the share of neglected items between two accepted items.

The main problem of this scale is that all items receive the same weight; the respondent scores are equal to the number of agreements. An extension of this method is Rasch scaling where it is assumed that the items follow a probabilistic distribution instead of a deterministic one. In Rasch scaling, the distances between the items and their weights are not equal; they are estimated by using the logistic distribution.

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See also Interviewing; Measurement; Survey Research

Further Readings


Measures of Association

See Cross-Tabular Analysis

Media, Electronic

The word medium denotes an intermediary agency that enables communication, by which is meant the production and transmission to other parties of messages, information, knowledge, discourses, and culture in the broad sense. Historically, the first electronic media—the telegraph and the telephone—arose at the height of the Industrial Revolution, together with the electrification that gradually came to replace steam power. These media had the capacity to restructure people’s perceptions of time and space. Electronic media today, in the fullest sense, are radio, television, and the so-called new media (in this entry designated as “online” media). These media have various features in common:

1. they transmit knowledge to a heterogeneous and potentially limitless audience,
2. they are typical products of late modernity,
3. they are important agents of socialization, and
4. they perform an essential role in democratic processes.

Only with the development of electronic media has it been possible to speak properly of the “rise of mass communication.” Communication media in early modernity disseminated knowledge, culture, and ideas—such as books, newspapers, the theatre, architecture, painting, and sculpture—but widespread illiteracy and generalized poverty prevented access to them for the bulk of the population. Although printing had been invented in the 15th century, books and newspapers could only find a “mass market” after political, social, and economic conditions had radically changed. Moreover, in the 20th century, cinema, radio, and then television also became more easily available and were associated with the leisure and entertainment that Europeans had attained through social struggles in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These characteristics ensured that mass media indeed became ubiquitous.

This entry first outlines the history of the electronic media, paying particular attention to the early development of radio, television, and the
Internet. This is followed by a survey of some of the main theories espoused in research on mass communication—in particular, the mass communication research derived from studies on political communication conducted in the United States during the 1940s and 1950s and media studies in Great Britain during the 1970s and 1980s. Next, the role of the electronic media in the political dynamics of contemporary democracies is analyzed. This topic will be addressed from two points of view: The first concerns the influence and impact of electronic media on political attitudes and behavior—an issue explored by the first analyses in communication research and even today one of its main fields of inquiry. The second aspect deals with the effects of the electronic media on the political system, which are commonly identified with the “mediatization of politics.”

**The Rise of Electronic Media**

*Radio*

From a technological point of view, the radio evolved out of the telegraph and the telephone. A decisive advance in the development of the radio as we know it today occurred in June 1896, when Guglielmo Marconi presented in Great Britain the progress achieved in the study of electromagnetic waves for the production, transmission, and reception of acoustic signals. The subsequent evolution of applied studies on radio broadcasting led to the medium’s first application in business and public administration and subsequently to its use for military communications during World War I. The radio gradually entered private homes from the 1920s onward, first in the United States and then in Great Britain and the Netherlands. Beginning with the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) in 1922, followed by the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) in 1925 and the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) in 1927, the institutionalization of companies able to organize and produce programs for a broad public transformed radio broadcasting into a full-fledged form of mass communication.

Political powers understood the potential of radio as early as the 1930s; from that period until the outbreak of World War II, the radio became a powerful instrument with which to manipulate the mass public. In that decade, in fact, authoritarian regimes in Europe controlled and used radio broadcasting for the purposes of propaganda. The Soviet Union was the first regime to exploit the radio systematically so that its voice could penetrate homes in even the remotest regions. The same propaganda system was adopted in Nazi Germany, where Joseph Goebbels played a decisive role in its development, first as chief of Nazi propaganda and then as Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (*Volksaufklärung*). In fascist Italy, too, the radio became the voice of the regime, first with the creation of a central body for the control of information and propaganda and then with government measures to increase collective radio listening in public places. The radio was given the delegated power of amplification and persuasion. In democratic countries, American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt used the radio to deliver his “fireside chats”: talks that were broadcast every week throughout the country and in which Roosevelt directly addressed American citizens, his purpose also being to create and strengthen a favorable climate of public opinion during the Depression and subsequently to boost the nation’s morale during World War II. From the end of the 1960s onward, radio lost its position as the principal mass medium as a result of the diffusion of television.

The massive use of radio in homes and public places, the growth of the organizations that produced its programs, and its use for political propaganda purposes also aroused strong interest among academic researchers. It was mainly in U.S. communication research that the first pioneering studies on radio were conducted, with the focus, in particular, on the effects produced on the audience. The political scientist Harold D. Lasswell also concentrated on the content of messages by analyzing key symbols in Radio Moscow’s propaganda broadcasts. From a more sociological perspective, the social impact of radio broadcasting was studied as early as 1940. The Princeton Radio Project, for example, challenged beliefs concerning the medium’s purportedly excessive power. These were market analyses of a quantitative type based mainly on opinion polls. One of the first and best known of these studies examined the public’s reactions to Orson Welles’s dramatization of *The War of the Worlds* broadcast as part of the CBS Mercury Theatre radio series. This program was
reported to have caused panic among its listeners, many of whom believed that the simulation of an invasion from Mars was real. However, research showed that these effects had been mediated by numerous other factors not dependent on the medium.

**Television**

Like the radio, television as a means of communication first came into use in Great Britain and the United States and then spread through other European countries. The technological development of this medium is more difficult to reconstruct, because diverse research groups, countries, and companies already consolidated in other sectors (from photography to the cinema) contributed to its success. A decisive step in the diffusion of this new medium, with its combination of sounds and images, came during the mid-1930s in Great Britain, where this service began to be offered to a limited public and was resumed in 1946 after the interruption of World War II. In the meantime, television had also developed in the United States, where already in the early 1950s there were 10 million television sets in American homes. The linkage between radio and television services has been one of the distinctive features of the development of television. In fact, organizations such as the BBC in Great Britain, and CBS and NBC in the United States, have been the vehicles through which television has been strengthened, spread, and entrenched in the everyday habits of millions of consumers. The advent of television brought about one of the greatest social, cultural, and political changes of the 20th century. Academic studies on communication, which had already acquired strong legitimacy in pretelevision social research, were mobilized to examine the characteristics and effects of this change. The result was a large and diversified scientific output, with an abundance of theoretical perspectives and methodologies, as well as empirical data and interpretative paradigms. Now that television had grown into a global phenomenon, the study of mass communication became internationalized, and American communication research was supplemented by British media studies, French poststructuralist theories, and other, minor, schools of thought. In this period, moreover, media analysts began to examine the other actors involved in the communication process: not only the receiver but also the transmitter and the content that was transmitted. It was during the late 1970s and early 1980s that a large body of studies concerned with the routines and logics determining the production of information were conducted, which provided a detailed analysis of the content of television programs. As research extended to include the other components of the communication process, questions were raised as to the effect of television on its audience. The impact and ubiquity of the medium aroused fears that it influenced the public excessively in terms of voting behavior, consumption, lifestyle choices, and the construction of frames of meaning to interpret reality.

Not coincidentally, it was precisely in this period that “political communication”—a specific area of communication studies—acquired greater autonomy and further academic legitimacy, both in political science and sociology. The link between the development of electronic media and the practices of political communication has been well evidenced in the work of Jay Blumler and Dennis Kavanagh, who have identified three phases in political communication since World War II. The first phase, which lasted until the 1950s, saw the dominance of the political scene by parties that fed on the social cleavages and dynamics typical of the reconstruction years. In that phase, political communication was subordinate to a system of institutions and solid political loyalties. Citizens responded to party-political communications by strengthening the opinions and attitudes already manifest in their strong political allegiances. The second phase, from the 1960s through the 1980s,
was marked by the spread of television. It was during this period that, albeit to a different extent in the existing democracies, traditional political loyalties increasingly faded. A weakening of the public’s selection mechanisms exposed it to the messages of all political leaders, major and minor, whether during electoral campaigns or otherwise. Television, moreover, enabled politicians to reach sections of the electorate that had made scant use of the old media and had been consequently unaffected by party-political communication. Television formats and languages had an impact not only on the public but also on the time frames, languages, and forms of presentation of politics. The third phase began in the 1990s and, since then, has consisted of five main processes: (1) professionalization of the relationship with public opinion, (2) increased competition between media contents and political communication, (3) populism, (4) centrifugal communication, and (5) sporadic consumption of political communication. The growth and spread of online media, especially the Internet, have prompted academic studies to envisage the onset of a fourth phase of political communication, which is discussed in the following section.

In the second half of the 1990s, technological development also decisively altered the way in which television was conceived. The media scenario radically changed because traditional analogue terrestrial television was now supplemented by satellite and digital broadcasting. Today, digitization is having three major consequences: (1) growth in multimedia and convergent practices in production and consumption, (2) proliferation of mono/multimedia channels, and (3) the internationalization and globalization of content (with a small and well-identifiable group of media companies acting as global leaders).

The Internet

The gestation and early development of the Internet were much slower than those of radio and television, but thereafter, technological progress meant that this new medium underwent rapid and tumultuous growth. It still harbors numerous surprises, especially in the applicative domain. The Internet came into being at the end of the 1950s, but for 20 years its use was restricted to military communications in the United States. During the Cold War, the creation of the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) in 1958 to research and develop new technologies led to the setting up of Arpanet, a system that linked the agency’s computers. With time, this network—which closely resembled telephony because it was designed for one-to-one communication, as opposed to the one-to-many system of radio and television—also created connections with civil and nonmilitary users (universities and research centers), giving rise to the network of networks today known as the Internet. The closure of Arpanet in 1989 enabled the expansion and commercialization of the Internet, so that users belonging to neither the armed forces nor research centers could access it. Thereafter, with the advent of the World Wide Web, the Internet underwent extremely rapid development, which definitively changed it from military to civil use and increasingly enlarged its boundaries. Since the 1990s, access to and use of the Internet has also been favored by technological upgrading. Greater speed of transmission and increased content have been followed by technologies that facilitate Internet access and connection (broadband, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth). These successive technological advances have given rise to phenomena that have radically changed not only Internet use but the entire media system as well. The process of multimedia convergence, which had already come about in television, was driven by the growth of quality and the contents transmissible via the Internet. Moreover, because of these technological changes, the use of the Internet is now becoming increasingly interactive.

Academic research in the field immediately grasped the importance of this new communication medium. But the interest of social research increased especially during the transition from the so-called Web 1.0 to the Web 2.0 and subsequently intensified with the further transition to Web 3.0. The term Web 1.0 indicates merely passive use of the tool: access to use the contents offered by the Internet. Web 2.0 denotes the evolution that led to greater interaction in the use of Internet content, with users being able to leave comments and provide feedback. The next development has been termed the convergence culture driven by the spread of Web logs (blogs) and the creation of social networks (Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, among others). Studies on the political implications
of these technological changes have suggested that a fourth phase of political communication can be added to the three already identified. This interpretation, however, is anything but unanimously held, and opinions have polarized between two extremes. On the one hand, there are those who maintain that this technological revolution is producing an electronic democracy in which grassroots practices create a public sphere in which citizens can advocate their own issues, build alternative frames for institutional political communication, mobilize public opinion on certain themes, and act as “watchdogs” on the public powers. On the other hand, there are those who argue that the development of the Internet and the opening of spaces in which users can express their opinions strengthens the power of those who already possess it, primarily because in this way disintermediation channels can be activated: Politics has preferential forms of communication with the electorate and can thus bypass mediation by the more traditional media (television and newspapers). The mass of content and opinions on the Internet makes it possible to monitor the mood of the electorate just as—and in certain cases better than—any type of quantitative survey can.

Applied Research Versus Critical Theory

The principal theories employed in the study of media in general and the electronic media in particular—and especially their effects on the public—can be related to two particular periods: the 1940s onward with the development of the sociology of communication in the United States and the mid-1960s with the birth of “media studies” in Great Britain.

The first of these two periods was characterized by the distinction between “applied research” and “critical theory.” Applied research originated in U.S. communication research—which was the first of all contexts in which study began on the electronic media (which did not yet include television). As its founder Paul Lazarsfeld defined it, applied research was academic work in the service of external public or private customers, and it developed techniques to gather and analyze information on attitudes toward the mass media (especially radio, print media, and film). It is significant that the first research undertaken in this area started from opposite questions and suggestions concerning the results obtained. During the 1940s, the electronic media were regarded as exercising an almost unlimited power over the public. The period between the two world wars, in fact, was dominated by an almost universal agreement as to the capacity of the media to exert influence. The literature that reconstructs the successive theories on media effects identifies this period as that of the “hypodermic needle” model: The media were viewed as needles able to penetrate directly the “skin” of their audiences. This theory—which had no specific founder but was more akin to a “mood” concerning how the mass public received and internalized media contents—was also partly motivated by the above-described intensive use made of the radio by the authoritarian regimes of Europe.

The applied strand of U.S. communication research has been distinguished by the work of the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University in New York—whence its name as the “Columbia school”—directed by Lazarsfeld. Here, it is necessary to distinguish between two different lines of inquiry, which collected complementary results but used different methodologies: the experimental psychology–based approach and the empirical sociology–based one. There were two main similarities between these two lines of inquiry: First, they were driven by a particular interest in how the media in general, and the electronic media in particular, operate during election campaigns (i.e., how they influence voters); second, both of them led to the definitive superseding of the behaviorist stimulus–response model typical of the hypodermic needle theory.

The experimental psychological approach must be considered as an autonomous sector of communication research. In this case, too, it was applied mainly in the area of political communication, where research showed that the audiences of the electronic and print media filter their contents selectively. This selectivity depends on several factors: the interest in acquiring information (indifference to certain themes creates impermeability to the messages received), selective exposure (the audience tends to expose itself to information congenial with its attitudes and to avoid messages that are not), selective perception (existing predispositions influence the way in which messages are
received), and selective retention (contents that match the audience’s predispositions are remembered more easily). This type of inquiry did not focus solely on intermediary factors relative to the public; it also examined those relative to the message, seeking to understand the characteristics that a message must have to be effectively influential on its audience. The factors identified were, among others, the credibility of the communicator, the order of arguments (on some occasions the initial arguments are more effective and on others those expounded at the end are), the completeness of the overall argument, and the clarity of the conclusions. With the introduction of intermediary factors, therefore, it was established that the media constitute just one component of political persuasion and work in ways very different from that feared in keeping with the hypodermic needle theory.

The sociological approach definitively structured the history of communication research. The body of studies conducted in this area was, for the U.S. social and political context of the time, so exhaustive and convincing that in 1959 Bernard Berelson—one of the most prestigious members of the Columbia school, on par with Robert K. Merton and Elihu Katz—declared that analysis of media effects could be considered complete. This research had the merit of linking the processes of mass communication with the characteristics of the social context in which they occurred. For this reason, too, a further step forward was taken from the notion arising from psychological inquiry that the media are a source of persuasion. They, indeed, have an influence; but it is a limited influence always mediated by the context and the social relationships in which media users are embedded. The best known studies conducted by the Columbia school were The People’s Choice (1944), Voting (1954), and Personal Influence (1955) (the first two dealt with communicative dynamics during the presidential election campaigns of 1940 and 1948, respectively). In the results of these studies, three theories embracing the sociological dimensions of the effects of media communication can be identified, which add to the selectivity of the psychological approach:

1. **Social determinism**: Social characteristics determine political preferences; voting is an individual behavior regulated by collective norms.

2. **The limited effect of election campaigns**: Change in voting intentions in response to messages received during the election campaign is restricted to a small group.

3. **Social influence**: Messages and ideas imparted by the mass media reach the “opinion leaders,” who act as intermediaries for the less active members of the electorate.

In short, the media are dependent variables in the process of influence.

The first studies on television then, however, reversed this vision of the limited effects of the media. Using the theoretical framework developed within communication research, Jay G. Blumler and Denis McQuail studied the 1964 British election campaign, showing that voters/televiewers did indeed expose themselves to messages to have their opinions confirmed. But, to a statistically very significant extent, they did so to know whom to vote for, to keep up with the campaign, and to gain an idea of how one party or the other was behaving.

The counterpoint to the empirical approach adopted by much U.S. research—and also typical of other schools, such as the “voting studies” carried out at the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan—was critical theory. This theory, which sought to uncover power relations in cultural phenomena, is historically identified with the group of scholars at the Institut für Sozialforschung of Frankfurt—better known as the Frankfurt School—who greatly influenced culture and research in Europe and the United States. The advent of Nazism forced some members of the school to move to the United States, where they made contact with the Columbia school. A close intellectual relationship developed between Theodor Adorno and Paul Lazarsfeld, and they frequently engaged in joint research. The attention of the Frankfurt School in the United States at the New School of Social Research in New York shifted to the phenomenon of the “massification” of culture. The intention of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse was to bring social research back to a theory of society understood as a whole. They consequently criticized communication research for conducting what they regarded as spectral studies. They focused on the new dynamics characterizing society at that time: in particular the birth and growth of the culture industry, in which
the electronic media predominated. For the Frankfurt School, the mass market compelled standardization and uniformity: The tastes and needs of the public imposed stereotypes and poor quality. The logic of the production system that created and disseminated “mass culture” was that of ideological hegemony and manipulation of the public, which lost all its autonomy. The individual envisaged by critical theory was no longer able to select among media messages; rather, she or he was compelled to adjust uncritically to imposed values and consequently forced into a subordinate role.

Despite the numerous criticisms brought against critical theory—indeed, many of its contentions became obsolete owing to social changes and to other lines of inquiry—it had the merit of shifting the focus of attention among media analysts. Research no longer concentrated solely on media effects but extended its scope to include the role of the media in society. This approach was not new, however, for it had precedents in the U.S. functionalist branch of communication research developed by Merton in the 1960s, which originally sprang from the studies on the functions of the media conducted in the 1930s by Lasswell. The functionalist theory of the media had numerous proponents, and it had important consequences for communication studies. It showed that, although the media were not a sufficient cause for changes in people’s opinions and behavior, they nevertheless performed an important social role. One theoretical development that arose from this framework was the analysis conducted in the mid-1980s by Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz of “media events.” These are ceremonials (such as the Olympic Games or the Football World Cup) given solemn coverage by television and that interrupt normal schedules. The function of these important media events is ritual unification of the viewers’ experiences. They unite the individuals watching the event at home, so that the entire society is involved in a collective celebration. These events, therefore, affirm a shared identity.

The earlier hypotheses and suggestions concerning the strong influence of the media on their audiences had been abandoned in light of the findings of U.S. communication research. But they returned during the 1970s—by which time both the media and society had substantially changed. There were now two major differences: first, the apotheosis of television and second, the decline of the political parties. Of particular interest are the two strands of analysis that addressed, with different outcomes, this changed situation. Both arose within British media studies during the 1970s: “cultural studies”—particularly the section devoted to audience studies—and the “political economy” of the media. Although these two strands sprang from a Marxist tradition, their respective research trajectories yielded very different results.

Starting from a more complex vision of the dynamics of mass communication, cultural studies analyzed a specific form of the social process: the one by which the public makes sense of reality through its use of media contents. The focus was, therefore, on shared social practices and on a common stock of meanings. It was assumed that the use of contents transmitted by the electronic media involved values, meanings, and practices and that the media were active elements in those constructs. Investigation was therefore made of the structures whereby the institutions of mass communication sustain and reproduce social and cultural stability. But for cultural studies, this process did not come about smoothly; rather, it was negotiated and contradictory because social and cultural stability had necessarily to adjust to constant conflicting pressures. Cultural studies developed in two different directions, analyzing, on the one hand, the production of media contents (paying special attention to news making and thus combining analysis of the electronic and the print media) and, on the other, media consumption as the locus of negotiation among diverse communicative practices. It was in the evolution of the latter research trajectory that, despite numerous differences in methodology and theory, the results matched those already obtained by U.S. communication research. Studies conducted in this area highlighted (a) the ambiguous and contradictory nature of media texts (especially televised ones, although some studies also analyzed the cinema), which, although they are never completely overt, at least have a “structured polysemy,” and (b) the public reconceptualized as an active audience able to produce meanings through its use of media contents. These findings thus entailed a more cautious evaluation of the allegedly strong influence of the media.

The political economy theory was part of the “radical approach.” While cultural studies reevaluated the practices of the audience, the political
economy of the media scaled down the specificity of the cultural-ideological dimension. It regarded economic dynamics as furnishing the necessary explanation—in some cases sufficient—to understand the process of media effects. Here, the focus was on the power exerted by the owners of organizations on both the production process and consumers. This approach concentrated on two aspects in particular: ownership and the size of the market. The idea with regard to ownership was that the owners of communications media were able to control them, so that they also exerted strong influence on the public’s habits and tastes. As regards the size of markets, the political economy approach highlighted the progressive concentration of the electronic media market, arguing that this diminished the plurality of supply. These economic variables, therefore, reduced the users of media content to subservience while strengthening the positions of those who already wielded power in society.

Media and Political Behavior

As mentioned above, academic research on the media on the two sides of the Atlantic has often addressed themes and issues that concern the sphere of politics. Interest in the impact of the media with regard to the exercise of political power first arose when presidents and governments sought to know public opinion so that they could influence it or when political parties and candidates wanted to use the media effectively for propaganda purposes during election campaigns. Both the Columbia school and the field of voting studies investigated the role of not only the mass media but also social networks in the dynamics of influence on political attitudes, opinions, and behavior. This was the area of inquiry that analyzed the psychosocial effects of the media, as opposed to the systemic effects discussed below. Turning to the most recent period, that of the so-called third phase of political communication, the current state of scientific knowledge suggests that the least amount of influence attributable to the media is due to their being the principal sources of political knowledge and political information. However desirable it may be to reduce the influence of the media, it is indisputable that for citizens they are essential vehicles of knowledge about political affairs. The media, in their twofold form as electronic and print media, often initiate processes of individual or interpersonal knowledge processing. Despite the massive growth of information and its delivery through new channels, to state that the media are the main sources of political knowledge is not to imply that the current phase of political communication has seen the advent of a rational citizen informed on all political facts. Numerous studies have shown that civic commitment in the mature democracies coincides with low knowledge gathering. The U.S. scholar Michael Schudson has introduced the notion of the “monitorial citizen.” Such citizens are substantially uninterested in political information and action, they monitor events, and they mobilize when a problem of particular interest to them arises. The information used by monitorial citizens comes in small doses; it is the “soft news,” which may be considered insufficient but is all that they feel they need.

With regard to political knowledge, a second level in the degree of influence exerted by the media is that at which they supply clues with which to interpret political reality. The media should not be considered merely as sources of knowledge and information but, on the contrary, as vehicles of meanings, emotions, and visions of the world. The frames through which the media treat events significantly influence people’s attitudes, beliefs, and preferences. A third level is the one emphasized by the agenda-setting theory: The media are able to determine what people should know simply by giving coverage to some facts and ignoring others. The greater the exposure of the public to information, the more intense the agenda-setting effect becomes.

Studies more specifically concerned with the influence of the media on political behavior—be it participation or voting—can be divided between two opposing groups: those that are pessimistic and those that are optimistic. Lazarsfeld and Merton had already spoken in communication research of the “narcotizing effect” of the media. As already emphasized, their attitude toward the media did not consist of a preconceived and ideological aversion. Instead, their judgment arose from the observation that increasing doses of mass media content sap the energy that individuals reserve for active participation. These considerations still did
not take account of television, which would become a decisive factor—both in the United States and Europe—in reinvigorating the notion that the diffusion of the electronic media deflected political participation. It was Robert Putnam who argued that television privatizes civic activity and discourages social interaction and individual civic commitment.

Contrary to these pessimistic views are those that instead see the increased circulation of political information as an important stimulus to participation. This position has been bolstered by the spread of the online media and the consequent proliferation and fragmentation of information channels. The Internet, in fact, has on several occasions proved to be an important resource for mobilization, even on a global scale.

Research has not yet reached clear and firm conclusions with regard to media influence on voting choices. Although such influence cannot be ruled out, it is still difficult, if not impossible according to some authors, to produce clear-cut empirical evidence for it. The media share their influence with numerous other determinants of voting behavior, which international research has listed as follows: party identification, the positions of parties and candidates on issues, negative political preference, and the image of the party leader. In addition, this is connected with informal networks of social interaction.

A great deal of research has focused on television’s influence on the outcomes of elections, but once again, the results have been contradictory because the forms of influence observed in one country are not directly applicable to others, given the differences in political culture, traditions of electoral behavior, media systems, and styles and habits of television consumption. Television certainly has a great capacity to shape visions of the world and therefore political opinions, but it is not clear whether this capacity operates in the brief period of an election campaign or in the long period of formation of political beliefs and attitudes. Sociological prudence à la Lazarsfeld requires distinctions to be drawn among these diverse effects according to the degrees of political conviction among citizen electors. The sections of the electorate that are either undecided or do not regularly consume television information seem more susceptible to the influence of television messages during election campaigns, while voters with strong political allegiances are more resistant to the action of television. In short, television—like other media, electronic or otherwise—does not have magical powers that give omnipotence to those who use or control it—at least, not in a context of a healthy democracy and sufficient pluralism in information sources and media. In a situation where channels for the circulation of information and ideas proliferate by virtue of new technologies—digital television, satellite broadcasting, mobile telephony with its numerous and versatile uses, Internet applications (blogs, forums, social networks, and the like)—it is difficult to attribute influence precisely to any particular electronic medium. But what is certain is that all these media are today important tools of political communication.

**Media and the Political System**

Although the media, and the electronic media in particular, have uncertain effects on the behavior of individuals, they have nonetheless produced significant changes in the political process. They have influenced political systems, the formation of leadership, and the ways in which politicians communicate to such an extent that it is difficult to describe the workings of a political system or the dynamics of a polity without considering their media-driven dimensions. Scientific analysis has highlighted what is termed the *mediatization of politics*, the contemporary process whereby public political action takes place within the media arena and that depends to a significant extent on the action of the media. The systemic perspective on the influence of the electronic media has generated a large body of studies mainly concerned with the effects of television. During the 1990s, fears were voiced that a “videocracy” was imminent—especially when the political success of the television mogul Silvio Berlusconi was analyzed. Among the theorists of this drift toward a videocracy is the leading Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori, who has argued that television has turned politics into a “videopolitics” that tends to replace, if not to destroy, the political parties, at least in their mass organized form. Videopolitics is, however, also an attitude: the “videodependency” of the political parties, which concern themselves increasingly less with genuine events and increasingly more with media events.
The effects exerted by the media on politics are generally grouped into two categories: media-driven and political. The former concern the media aspects of political communication, the latter the nature and functions of the political system.

Media-Driven Effects

For some years, research on the role of the media in civil society and politics has emphasized the changes that have taken place in political discourse and in the ways political messages are produced, expressed, and transmitted. Television especially, despite its control by certain governments (in Europe and elsewhere), has managed to exert influence on politics directly with more aggressive forms of investigative journalism and indirectly with the force of popular culture and the language of images. Political actors have had to adjust to the invasive and uncontrollable presence of television. The predominant logic of this electronic medium is commercial: Television companies—including the public ones in Europe—respond to industrial imperatives in order to remain in the market. This means that they must cater to popular tastes and demands, producing political information intended to satisfy the needs of the audience rather than those of political leaders, or of a government. The scientific literature has often pointed to infotainment, “soft news,” “media populism,” and the popularization of politics (“pop politics”) as the responses by the televised representation of politics to the commercial logic of the electronic media.

There are three media-driven effects on political discourse. The first is the spectacularization of politics. Television has heightened the traditional tendency of politics to dramatization. Under its spotlights, political activity has come to lose its sacred aura and has been forced to adapt its traditional forms to the new languages and the new tastes of television. The rhetoric of mass mobilization has given way to the rhetoric of seduction. Today, no politician can communicate effectively without couching his or her message in the grammar of television. The spectacularization of political discourse is a circular process whereby the media dramatize politics, emphasizing its more marketable aspects, and the politicians—in search of consensus—obey the rules of the game by adopting communicative strategies that secure the attention of the media.

A second effect is that of “agenda shaping,” the ability of the media to select, and also to impose, the important issues in the public debate—those that politicians cannot ignore and on which they must take a stance. It is true, however, that not always and not everywhere are the media able to set the political agenda, for this depends on the type of power relations that exist between the political system and the information system. Where the relationship is that of subordination of the latter to the former, the agenda is more likely still firmly in the hands of the government and the parties.

The third media-driven effect in the relationship between media and politics is the fragmentation of political discourse. Television has reduced the public and political debate to its minimal terms, precisely because of the production constraints imposed by the media industry. American democracy of the mid-19th century was epitomized by the debates between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas. For the debate of August 21, 1858, the two contenders agreed that Douglas should first speak for an hour; Lincoln would then have an hour and a half to reply; and Douglas would finally have a further half hour to respond. This agreement was reached to drastically reduce the usual length of the debate! In the simultaneity offered by the electronic media, political discourse instead consists of sound bites and ready-made quotes perfectly suited to the urgent pace of television news or talk shows.

Political Effects

As regards political effects, the most significant and evident of them in modern, and all the more so in postmodern, politics is the “personalization” or “individualization” of politics. As a medium that prefers to give faces to ideas and issues, television has changed the ways in which politics is conducted by politicians and perceived by citizens. The mediatization process has led to representation of the politician as no longer an exponent of a party or an ideology but as a person with his or her own personal, professional, and familial peculiarities. The private dimension is no longer disregarded by the media; rather, it forms a part, often a large one, of the narration of politics.

This effect cannot entirely be attributed to the electronic media alone. Personalization is also the result of the loss of centrality of party organizations.
The importance of personae—be they presidents, heads of government, leaders of parties, or election candidates—has increased in concomitance with the decline of the great ideologies and with the transformation of parties into electoral machines at the service of actions and programs linked with specific political personalities. The second political effect frequently reported by research on political communication is the personalization of leadership, which is often closely connected with the just discussed individualization of political representation. Democracy headed by a leader is the form best suited to modernization in the Western democracies, and especially to mass communication. The media, with their peculiar coverage of the political events and their celebrity-building processes, represent a crucial variable in the personalization of leadership that adds to the institutional variables (e.g., the constitutional order).

The third and final political effect of mediatization concerns the selection of political elites. As a result of the loss of importance by party organizations, the mechanisms for recruitment of the political class have been transferred from the party machines to agents external to the party-political system, which operate outside the control of the traditional party selectors. Often predominant among these external agents are the media, whose preference for telegenic personalities skilled in debate and with a ready wit has given rise to the so-called winnowing effect: the choice of candidates who perform best in the arenas constituted by the media. The news media seek to dramatize election campaigns, and they give intense coverage to the most mediagenic personalities, creating candidate-celebrities to the detriment of those left out of the spotlight. In this regard, the United States provides a good example of the power to select political elites exercised by the media in the political arena. This effect is becoming increasingly evident in other countries and political contexts as well.

Conclusion

The electronic media, in their diverse forms as radio; television; terrestrial and satellite broadcasting networks, both analogue and digital; fiction; entertainment; journalism; online services; and systems of public and commercial media, are crucial determinants of modern and postmodern cultures and societies, as well as important actors in political contexts and systems. The media–politics interaction characterizes political life, shapes the public debate, and conditions the actions of governments, leaders, parties, and movements. It is today impossible to imagine and study politics without considering the influence of the media and their contents on national political cultures and, in an increasingly globalized world, also on the policies and the communication strategies of the great international political actors. Since television’s advent on the domestic and international political stage, it has often been (a) the co-protagonist, together with political actors of great historical events, from the Kennedy–Nixon debates to the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe; (b) the sometimes unwilling witness to dreadful events, from natural catastrophes to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon; and (c) itself an agent of great and small changes, simply by being present in places and situations where it has conditioned the behavior of those using it as actors or spectators.

The current development of television, and the great popularity of the new interactive media with their constantly new technologies and modes of consumption, suggests that the electronic media will continue to be decisive actors in politics. In particular, the diffusive many-to-many nature of social networks resists attempts to control them by governments, especially those of an authoritarian and repressive type, and they can be viewed as vehicles for the democratic empowerment of citizens unimaginable in the age of one-to-many mass communication.

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See also Agenda Setting; Censorship; Information, Political; Leadership; Media, Print; Party Identification; Political Communication; Popular Culture; Public Opinion

Further Readings

The print media have long been key players in politics. Newspapers, periodicals, and individually produced publications engage the public and elites by providing information and analyses. In the process, they influence the decisions and perceptions of the entire range of political actors. The print media and their journalists and editors are engaged in all aspects of the political process, and the political institutions and players are occupied, in different ways, in determining what appears in the media. The print media are also an economic force in societies, although they account for only a small percentage of media usage even in highly literate and wealthy countries. In this entry, their more general political impact and their role in different types of political systems are discussed.

The role of the print media in politics is determined by the political system in which they work, the initial ways in which the press worked in that system, the available technology, and the demographic and economic character of the state’s population. That role has changed as new broadcasting technologies have developed. But the print media remain paramount in local news as well as in significant national discussions. They are also more likely than broadcast media to be focused on specific groups rather than aimed at a general audience. Within the print media, there are clear differences between media focused on drawing a mass readership and media aimed at the educated and affluent. It is in the print media that the focus on the latter is most feasible and common, while the mass audience has shifted predominantly to television as its source of information and entertainment.

The print media, as they are traditionally known, normally consist of newspapers and periodicals, although other print media such as books and flyers also have played a role in politics. The traditional print media are produced by a staff of journalists and editors, who usually develop, edit, and place the articles on various issues in the publication and put it together. In addition, to reach a large audience, printing equipment and distribution channels are needed. To provide ongoing national and international information, most print media rely not only on their own staff but also on outside contributors and wire services, for instance, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) or Agence France Press, which are public, and private agencies such as Associated Press. The funding this requires ties the media to a sponsoring organization, to the state, or to private owners, to whom the print media are to give their profits. The simplicity of the production of the most basic print media also has allowed its use by opponents of a regime more readily than radio or television. Finally, in areas where the literacy level is low, print media are used to present images to the population and also as ways to increase literacy and, in turn, activate citizens.
The development of technology has been significant in the transformation of the print media in the political and social arena. Initially, getting information and then producing and distributing print media were very slow processes. As a result, they were used only for commercial purposes, to list the dates ships were due and their cargo, or to present ideas. After the telegraph was invented, the speed with which information could be transferred began to increase exponentially. Developments in photography and in printing technology also brought events and images to audiences increasingly rapidly and with greater emotional impact. Consequently, the role of the print media shifted from announcing what was planned to reporting on events that had happened and engaging people's interest.

Beginning after the 1920s (the "golden age" of the press in the United States), the development and increasing range of the broadcast media (radio and then television) resulted, over time, in a shift in the role of the print media away from being the prime source of information on events outside an individual's personal experiences. The pattern came to be that television news introduced and highlighted events and issues and the daily press and periodicals provided in-depth information. The print media became an agenda setter and a source of analysis. This function has been furthered by the ever-increasing speed and immediacy with which news can be reported on the broadcast media and by the development of the Internet and other technologies. In response, the print media first moved to provide both paper copies and Internet versions and then, to maintain readership levels that would bring in advertising revenues, shifted to continual updating of reports and analyses. Gradually, though, the print media, even in their online editions, have lost audiences and revenue as individuals and groups have been able to produce the news through blogs and special sites. This means that more information and opinion are not being filtered through professionals who are committed and have the resources to investigate and present a balanced analysis. Without the print media's editorial leadership, issues are increasingly presented on the Internet by unnamed or biased sources without market or professional controls on the accuracy of what is said or how it is presented. Unlike the print media, these broadcast and Internet sources reach across national boundaries and can circulate far more rapidly while avoiding government control.

**Theories of the Relationship Between the Print Media and Government**

The initial set of models of the relationship between the print media and government focused on the initial uses of the press by those in power. The models in Fred Seaton Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm's seminal 1963 work, *Four Theories of the Press*, were as follows:

1. the "authoritarian model" of the early European monarchies, in which the rulers controlled the print media to support and advance their policies;
2. the "libertarian model" of the American press and European democracies, in which the print media were a separate institution free from state influence and were engaged in informing and entertaining the public, with the profit-making incentive ensuring that the print media worked to provide "the truth";
3. the "social responsibility model" of the United States and European democracies in the 20th century, which includes all the roles of the "libertarian model" and in which the media deliberately serve as a forum for open discussions; and
4. the "Soviet-totalitarian model," in which the media were used by the rulers to mobilize and control their societies.

In the authoritarian model and the Soviet-totalitarian model, the print media are closely controlled and directed. In the libertarian and social responsibility models, the print media are self-directing, and "control" emerges through competition. Later theories of government–media relations have focused on the impact of the political processes themselves, how the print media influence politics, and the nature of the print media that emerges.

**Democratic Media Systems**

Democratic media systems in the developed world differ in the nature of pluralism in the print media,
the role of the market versus the state in funding and directing the print media, and the nature of the journalism profession itself. The model developed by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini essentially divides the print media into three different categories:

1. In the Anglo-American “liberal model,” where there was early democratization and a more individualized system of representation, there is a long-established commercial press that seeks to appeal to the broadest audience by presenting neutral information oriented to the public interest. In this model, market mechanisms and commercial media dominate. Although party papers (those tied to a specific social or political group) are significant in Britain, most publications are deliberately less ideological in their coverage, often providing commentary across the political spectrum. In most cases, editorial opinion is distinct from news coverage. Journalism is highly professionalized and self-regulating.

2. In Central Europe and Scandinavia, where there was also early democratization, with a historic emphasis on consensus, pluralism, and social welfare, the “democratic corporatist model” holds. In this model, the print media have high circulations. Historically, particularly in the national press, party papers were strong; but there has also long been a more neutral commercial press. Journalists belong to powerful professional organizations. The state provides subsidies and regulates the work conditions for journalists. But freedom of the press is also well protected.

3. In France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, the “politically pluralized model” holds. These states were marked by later democratization and strong roles for political parties, alternating with periods of authoritarianism. In this model, the print media have focused on the elites, not on mass circulation, and they are characterized by a high degree of political partisanship. Government intervention is greater, with press subsidies and periods of government censorship.

**Communist Media Systems**

Communist media systems were based on the Leninist adage that the press should be a collective organizer, agitator, and propagandist. Providing information and news was incidental to that role. These media systems were orchestrated, to a greater or lesser degree depending on the interests of the regime, by the Communist Party. In the Soviet and East European media systems, individual print media were aimed at specific audiences and interests. The themes to be covered were set out in advance by Communist Party authorities in both general and individual plans. They also controlled the resources, circulation, and coverage options of each publication. Reporting was to reflect positively on the system as a whole and also reveal individual problems. Control was exercised by the official censors’ review of what was to be printed; by the editors based on the directions they were given; or, after publication, by the Party’s press departments. Journalists sometimes used coded language to give more information or present a veiled critique. Readers also interpreted what was said in the print media by “reading between the lines” and looking for telling differences in what was said, as well as comparing what they read with what they experienced directly.

In times of weakness and division among the leadership, the print media have been the bellwether in these countries. Increasingly critical reporting and analyses, as well as different positions appearing in the press, signaled the possibility of more openness and triggered further public discussion. When the print media grew increasingly open and critical, there was increased dissension. By the end of the 1980s, the openness of the media and, in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, public action contributed to the dissension prior to the collapse of the communist systems. In the post-Stalin period, in some countries including the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, an independent samizdat (self-published) print media developed. While such publication and distribution of print materials without state approval was illegal and those involved were sanctioned, these materials provided an important outlet for the exchange of alternative views, information, and literature that could not be published in the legal media. They served as the central work of those opposed to the system.

The Chinese model under Mao Zedong was different from the Soviet model. It put even less emphasis on information and much more on the
press as a mobilizer. The traditional print media, in this period, had a far smaller role to play. Instead, banners, flyers, and publications of slogans and Maoist statements were considered important in stimulating people to get engaged in various campaigns and to attack the evils in the society as perceived by the regime.

In the transition from communism, the print media shifted to reporting the news and scandals not publishable earlier. There also remained a tendency on the part of journalists to try to direct people’s thinking on political issues. Where separate parties emerged, they established their own print media organs. Where they did not, as in China, the media have diversified while remaining within the permissible boundaries. The journalism profession was also affected by the increasing financial pressures that came with privatization.

Print Media in the Developing World

The print media play different roles in the developing nations, where wealth and literacy are more limited. They tend to be less significant for the vast majority of the population in these countries because of low literacy levels and the inability of people with marginal incomes to buy the published material. They also have tended to be weaker in their reporting and coverage simply because of the high cost of international or even national reporting. As a result, their political significance is limited largely to the educated classes and to government programs to educate the larger population.

The Uses of the Print Media:
Individuals, Elites, and Scholars

Research on the specific impact of the print media on political knowledge and behavior has been indicative rather than definitive. Those who use the print media tend to be more educated and affluent than television viewers. The influence of the print media on their attitudes and knowledge tends to be gradual and depends on their cognitive skills. In addition, research shows that individuals tend to expose themselves to media and subjects that reflect their preexisting beliefs. They interpret messages in a way that makes them consistent with those beliefs. And they are most likely to retain information that fits with that belief set, often forgetting specific facts and remembering the broad principles. There is also some evidence that newspaper readers have higher levels of social capital than those not exposed to media reports. It also appears that regular exposure to negative reports about politicians and politics tend to result in more negative perceptions of politics and politicians than individuals would have otherwise.

The print media do play a major role in agenda setting by both politicians and the public. In evaluating what issues are politically salient, politicians often use highly respected print media not only to get their messages out but also to identify the people’s concerns and make policy decisions based on them. Research also shows that the media’s presentation of issues as social rather than personal, for example, unemployment, causes people to see their personal problems as larger societal problems. Finally, the context in which print media place an issue affects how seriously individuals consider the issue and how it is incorporated into their broader priorities and beliefs.

Exposure to any media gives individuals a greater sense of the world and their position in it. Although the print media were less easily accessible until they began to appear on the Internet, for the educated populace, the print media provide the most information and analysis. Exposure to international media, particularly broadcast media but also print, also allows people who do not have direct contact with the rest of the world to see how others live and make comparisons with their own lives. This can create a sense of relative deprivation, which stimulates popular demand for improvements in the system.

For scholars of politics, the print media are often the most accessible resource for looking at what has been said and how. Therefore, they are the most used source for research on what happened in a given case or what information people had access to at the time of a given political incident or on a given political topic.

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See also Censorship; Information, Political; Media, Electronic; Political Communication; Public Opinion
The international environment of the 21st century, much more so than its predecessors, is experiencing conflict and violence both within states and between states. Such conflict is costly, destructive, and highly dangerous for individuals, communities, and regions of the world. In addition to conflicts between well-defined actors, other forms of violence (such as terrorism) and serious threats (such as environmental degradation) pose a major risk to the very viability of the international system. Clearly, these conflicts and issues have to be resolved. Mediation is fast becoming one of the most effective ways of responding to proliferating conflicts and the numerous threats that we face in international relations today.

The Charter of the United Nations (UN) is quite explicit on the diplomatic structures that can, and should, be used to deal with these problems. Article 2(3) of the UN Charter proscribes any form of violence and exhorts, “All member states shall settle their international disputes in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.” The available methods of peaceful settlement of international conflicts are numerous and varied. They are listed in Article 33 of the UN Charter, which requests that

the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice.

The UN Charter highlights three basic diplomatic structures to deal peacefully with international and other conflicts: (1) direct negotiation between parties to a conflict, (2) various forms of mediation, and (3) binding methods of third-party intervention (e.g., arbitration and adjudication). Each of these methods has its own characteristics, strengths, and disadvantages, and each has an important role in the practice of modern diplomacy. Whatever differences there may be between these methods, they all exemplify the peaceful nature of diplomacy and the desire to avoid the use of force. This entry discusses mediation, which is growing in popularity as a method for resolving such issues. Indeed, there is considerable empirical evidence to suggest that mediation has been the most popular way of dealing with international conflicts since 1945. The following sections describe its unique features, explain what mediators actually do, and posit some conditions that may help or hinder the process of international mediation.

Mediation: Definition and Features

For many years, the study of mediation has suffered from conceptual imprecision and a startling lack of information. Practitioners of mediation, formal or informal, in the domestic or international arena were keen to sustain its image as a mysterious practice, akin to some art form, taking place behind closed doors. Scholars of mediation, on the other hand, did not think their field of study was susceptible to a systematic analysis. In short, neither group believed that it could discern any pattern of behavior in mediation’s various forms or that any generalizations could be made about the practice in general.

The prevalent agnosticism toward analysis and the desire to maintain the mystery and uniqueness of mediation acted like something of a ghost that haunted many scholars and practitioners for too long. There may be little consensus on how best to study or practice mediation. Mercifully, there is now a very broad agreement that this particular...
ghost should be exorcised. Mediation can, should, and must be studied properly, and the lessons derived from such a study should serve as signposts in the quest for a better understanding of the process and more effective conflict management.

Etymologically, mediation comes from the Latin root *for to halve*, but different definitions of mediation purport to (a) capture the gist of what mediators do or hope to achieve, (b) distinguish between mediation and related processes of third-party intervention (i.e., arbitration), and (c) describe mediators’ attributes. Some see mediation as purposeful action designed to remove any misunderstanding, others may see it as an extension of negotiation, and yet other scholars may prefer to emphasize the neutral and impartial nature of all mediators.

The many approaches to definition are simply indicative of the enormous scope of mediation. Mediation may take place in conflicts between states, within states, between groups of states or organizations, and between individuals. Mediators enter a conflict to help those involved achieve a better outcome than they would be able to achieve by themselves. Once involved in a conflict, mediators may use a wide variety of behaviors to achieve this objective. Some mediators make suggestions for a settlement, others refrain from doing so. Some mediators are interested in achieving a compromise, others are decidedly not. This is why a comprehensive definition of mediation is a prerequisite for understanding this complex reality. The following broad definition provides suitable criteria for inclusion (and exclusion) and serves as a basis for identifying differences and similarities. Mediation is here defined as a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behavior and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law.

This may be a broad definition, but it is one that can be generally and widely applied. It forces us to recognize, as surely we must, that any mediation situation comprises (a) parties in conflict, (b) a mediator, (c) a process of mediation, and (d) the context of mediation. All these elements are important in mediation. Together they determine its nature, quality, and effectiveness, as well as why some mediation efforts succeed while others fail.

What, then, are the main features or characteristics of mediation across levels? A number of these are listed as follows:

- Mediation is an extension and continuation of peaceful conflict management.
- Mediation involves the intervention of an outsider—an individual, a group, or an organization—into a conflict between two or more states or other actors.
- Mediation is a noncoercive, nonviolent, and, ultimately, nonbinding form of intervention.
- Mediators enter a conflict, whether internal or international, to affect it, change it, resolve it, modify it, or influence it in some way.
- Mediators bring with them, consciously or otherwise, ideas, knowledge, resources, and interests of their own or of the group or organization they represent. Mediators often have their own assumptions and agendas about the conflict in question.
- Mediation is a voluntary form of conflict management. The actors involved retain control over the outcome (if not always over the process) of their conflict, as well as the freedom to accept or reject mediation or mediators’ proposals.
- Mediation operates on an ad hoc basis only.
- Mediation in international relations is particularly appropriate when a conflict is long-drawn-out and complex, when the parties’ own efforts have failed or reached an impasse, and when both parties are prepared to cooperate to avoid further loss of life.

**Mediation Behavior**

What is it that mediators do to achieve a cessation of violence and a political agreement? Considerable attention has been given to this subject, and it seems apt to suggest that in general mediators enter a conflict (whether they are invited or not) to change its structure, dynamics, and termination. They do so by first trying to understand the conflict (i.e., understand the issues involved, the history and causes of the conflict, and the parties involved in the conflict and their relationship); then arranging for some communication between the parties (directly or indirectly), establishing some protocol,
Mediation in International Relations

and delineating an agenda to discuss; and finally helping the parties save face by rewarding the concessions made by each party and recommending possible solutions. These types of behavior correspond roughly to three broad strategies that the literature suggests mediators may engage in—that is, facilitation-communication behavior, formulative behavior, and directive behavior.

As to the question of how involved a mediator can or should be, we can say that mediator behavior may range along a spectrum of increasing levels of intervention. In some cases, a mediator may engage only in facilitative behavior, while in others, a more radical intervention may be required if the parties are to be nudged from their inflexible positions. Thus, we may speak of a facilitative mediator, a formulative mediator, and a directive (or better still, a power) mediator, each of whom creates different circumstances and produces different outcomes.

The strategy mediators adopt, and the way they behave in each international conflict, is rarely random. Mediators do not just happen to choose a strategy. Mediator behavior is influenced by factors such as conflict intensity and fatalities (e.g., high-intensity conflicts may call for more active strategies), time pressure (when time is pressing, there is a higher need for more directive strategies), mediator rank (high-ranking mediators, such as heads of state, can use more resources and strategies), and previous relations between the parties (where parties have a history of friendly relations, facilitative strategies may be sufficient). The actual process of international mediation is one of reciprocal relationship between a mediator, the conflict itself, and the parties involved. At times, mediators can be quite active and use significant resources, at other times, all they can do is act as the go-between. Effective mediators know how best to identify actors in conflict, the nature of a conflict, which strategy to use, what resources to marshal, and just how much control to exercise over the parties.

Whichever strategy mediators use, their underlying objectives in any conflict are to change the following:

a. the physical environment of conflict management (e.g., by maintaining secrecy or imposing time limits, as U.S. President Carter did at Camp David during Israeli–Palestinian negotiations);

b. the perception of what is at stake (e.g., by structuring an agenda and/or identifying and packaging new issues); and

c. the parties’ motivation to reach a peaceful outcome by, for example, using subtle pressure.

Any international conflict presents opportunities for some form of mediation. To be effective, however, mediation strategies must reflect the reality of the conflict and the resources of the mediator. To that extent, international mediation is truly a contingent and reciprocal political activity. It depends on, and is shaped by, the parties, their conflict, and the conflict environment.

Success and Failure in International Mediation

When is international mediation most likely to be successful? This is a question that practitioners and scholars have been asking for many years. Some guidelines may now be offered.

To be successful, international mediation must take place at the right, or the ripe, moment. By this we mean that a mediator must ensure that parties to a conflict are genuinely ready to tackle their conflict. This usually occurs when the parties find themselves in a situation that they both dislike and yet cannot escape from or when they recognize some opportunities for a mutually beneficial settlement. An experienced mediator can convince the parties that continuing to engage in violence will be futile and that the moment is ripe for resolution. The timing of mediation and a perception among the parties that opportunities may be lost if they fail to recognize their mutually hurting behavior is a crucial factor affecting mediation success in international relations.

Closely related to this is a strong and genuine motivation by each of the parties to engage in serious mediation. If the belligerents approach mediation merely in an attempt to buy time or forestall a possible defeat, then any mediation effort, whether undertaken by the UN or a state, will be doomed to failure. Mediation works best when both parties are willing, interested, and genuinely committed to the process. Here again, a mediator can create the conditions, in the early phases of a mediation, where both parties are optimistic about the process and truly committed to it.
Mediation also appears to work best in international relations where there are no major power disparities between the parties, when both states are small or medium powers (rather than superpowers), and when both states hold similar political values. Shared norms, political similarity, and relative equality in military and economic power enhance the likelihood of successful mediation.

In addition to these factors, we also note that certain kinds of mediators and mediator behavior are more likely to succeed. Although much is made of the potential of regional and international organizations, the reality is that the more successful mediators tend to be the larger states with more leverage and resources. Mediation is an attempt to change the parties’ perception and/or behavior; hence, it stands to reason that more powerful countries, with more resources, prestige, and leverage possibilities, are more likely to succeed in this attempt. And, of course, related to that, we can see that mediators who can influence the parties through a wide range of interventions from the least directive to the most directive are the ones most likely to succeed.

Other factors may have an impact on the success or failure of international mediation (e.g., relationship between the parties, nature of conflict between them) and must be taken into account. What is important about international mediation is that it is part of the political process. It is a voluntary process, yet one in which states may use mediation as an extension of their foreign policy, or they may use it out of a genuinely altruistic desire to resolve a conflict. Whichever their motives, mediation is a powerful, important, and often successful tool in resolving international conflicts.

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See also Conflict Resolution; Conflicts; Negotiation; Peacekeeping; United Nations; War and Peace

Further Readings


MERCANTILISM

The rise of early-modern states in the form of strong monarchies provided the historical context for economic writers who have been named mercantilists—members of a particular “mercantilism school” of political economy. Among them are writers between the late 16th and mid-18th centuries who published pamphlets and tracts on economic issues, especially regarding international trade, money, finance, and beneficial governance. They were state bureaucrats, merchants, and politicians from all over Europe, from Spain to northern Scandinavia, during the so-called early-modern period. They generally believed that economic wealth and income could be increased through the capture of foreign trade and commerce. Perhaps not all of them agreed that the creation of wealth was a zero-sum game, but many of them came quite close to believing so.

The concept of système mercantil was first used in print by the Marquis de Mirabeau in 1763. However, it was Adam Smith, who in his Wealth of Nations in 1776 called it the “mercantile system” and made it famous. Yet, to what extent mercantilism is really a “system” or “school” of economic thinking has been a hotly debated issue ever since. The bulk of what is commonly known as “mercantilist literature” appeared in Great Britain from the 1620s up until the middle of the 18th century. Perhaps the most well-known English mercantilists were Thomas Mun (1571–1641), writing in the 1620s, and James Steuart’s (1713–1780) whose Principles of Political Oeconomy (1767) is regarded as perhaps the last major mercantilist

Mercantilism

work. Other English economic writers regarded as belonging to the mercantilist school are Josiah Child (1630–1699), Charles Davenant (1656–1714), and Nicholas Barbon (1640–1698). According to the main inventor of the “mercantile system,” Adam Smith, the core of the “commercial” (mercantile) system consisted of the popular folly of confusing wealth with money. Hence, their suggestion that a country must export more than it imports leading to a net inflow of bullion, the “positive balance of trade” theory.

According to Smith, mercantilist theory and practice served as a cloak for a special interest that used the idea of a positive balance of trade to propagate a protective trade policy in general, including duties on imports, tariffs, and bounties. The mercantile system implied a giant conspiracy on the part of master manufacturers and merchants to skin the public and the consumers. From Smith onward, the view of the mercantile system as state dirigisme (particularly export and import protection) to support a special interest with the aid of the ideology of the positive balance of trade developed into its present status as the canonical interpretation of 17th- and 18th-century economic thinking and writing. David Hume had made his specie-flow theory public in 1750, arguing that the favorable-balance theory was an intellectual error (a net inflow of bullion must certainly mean a relative rise in prices, which, through the export and import mechanism, will tend to correct itself). Smith then drew the conclusion that the argument for protection and against free trade in general was based on a mere intellectual mistake.

Undoubtedly, the fixation of a mercantile system—or mercantilism—became an important part of the story that liberal political economy during the 19th century sought to explicate. Up until 1776—according to its stylized version—the thinking as well as the practical policy making of the 17th and 18th centuries was dominated by dirigiste and protectionist ideas. After this intervention by Smith, a new, more scientific version of economics developed that emphasized the role of the “invisible hand” and free trade as a motor of economic growth and prosperity. The overturn of the mercantilist school became part of a wider “Whiggish” interpretation of history, which used Great Britain as an ideal type for depicting the development of free trade and minimal government as a natural force in history. Without doubt, such a simplistic version seldom receives enthusiastic applause today. On the contrary, it is most often argued nowadays that the step from “mercantilists” such as Steuart to the “liberal” Smith was not as big as it was once described. Hence, many scholars—for example, the English writers before 1776—were ready to admit the advantages of market liberalization, free trade, and even the existence of an invisible hand. Indeed, very few of them made the mistake of identifying wealth with gold and silver. Likewise, none of the members of the so-called classical political school in the beginning of the 19th century was a free trader or a libertarian in any modern sense of the world. Many of them admitted to the positive role of state intervention, and some, even, were reluctant to propagate for free trade as long as not all countries were ready to abolish their tariffs and duties.

Perhaps the most important concern with the Whig interpretation, however, is that it needs to be seen in its historical context. The world that economic writers during the 17th and 18th century contemplated was characterized by an often violent and competitive struggle for power and influence. From the late-medieval period, it had been well understood that the economic strength of a state required a powerful political and military position. One method to increase the wealth of a ruler was to conquer more land plowed by peasants who could pay taxes and land rents to the Crown. Exceedingly, however, it was perceived that more income could be gained by taxing profitable trading operations, to introduce indirect taxes and excises (excise duties). Against this background, competition over trade and trade routes became an ever more important princely occupation. It was generally believed that a country that could capture important trade routes as well as establish colonies, or “plantations,” would have an advantage in times of military conflict and political power struggles. Moreover, during the 17th century, a view increasingly emerged among rulers that it was most favorable to establish domestic industry in order to use up raw materials instead of exporting them. By encouraging manufactories, more hands could be employed while at the same time industrious manufacturers and merchants could earn more profits, which would lead to even more production and employment—resulting in
more taxes, of course. Hence, wealth creation could be cumulative and not only a consequence of zero-sum activities. However, without a strong state with an ability to keep up a trade monopoly, such gainful spirals of income creation were always threatened and insecure.

Certainly, the political economy of the relationship between economic means and power politics goes back at least to the Florentine political thinkers of the Renaissance period, including Niccolò Machiavelli. As is well-known, Florence’s republicanism was a broad tradition that recognized the role of patriotism and other manly values in a well-governed and virtuous state. In England, during the 17th and early 18th century, such patriotic thinking focused strongly first on the Dutch republic and later, after 1660, on France. Holland, especially, was a showcase for those who wanted to emphasize the wealth-producing effects of capturing international commerce and establishing manufactories. It was on that basis that this tiny country was able to house such a plentiful population that was a cornerstone of political power and military strength. In the early years of the 17th century, the Dutch had snatched the Baltic fishing industry from under the nose of the English, as the mercantilist writer Thomas Mun wrote in the 1620s. It was time to take it back as well as to capture more of the international trade in grain and other products that flowed from East to West and from the Baltic to the North Sea.

Clearly, the position of a specific state in the international competitive struggle for power and influence is a key to understanding the writings of the mercantilists in their respective countries. Antonio Serra in Naples would ponder over how a small nation without domestic resources in silver and gold could be able to survive and even gain from this fact. In 1613, he suggested that Naples should export to cover both the importation of necessities and luxuries as well as the importation of money (silver). In turn, this meant that Naples had to develop a “favorable balance of trade.” Pamphleteers in states that felt they were in the same position, such as England in the 1620s, lent an ear to Serra and themselves became proponents of a favorable balance of trade.

In Spain, on the other hand, a shortage of silver and gold was not a major disturbance during the 16th and 17th centuries. Such wealth in awesome proportions was amply provided by the Spanish imperial forces and shipped over from the Americas protected by a potent navy. Already, by the end of the 16th century, it was well known that this bullion had not brought riches to Spain but, rather, poverty. Already, by 1556, Martín de Azpilcueta had formulated the famous so-called quantity theory of money (that a great influx of silver and gold implies that the value of money will fall). In fact, the so-called price revolution and its dire effects was a well-known phenomenon among contemporary Europeans. When the price level increased in Spain, domestic industries as well as agriculture suffered from cheap foreign competition. In the 1580s in Spain, Luis Ortiz, controller of the public finance, argued for a strict ban to prevent Spaniards from exporting their money and buying foreign goods—a policy that had been used by many states since the medieval period and that in England was called the Statute of Employment.

In France, a policy of economic nationalism was developed from the beginning of the 17th century onward. Around 1600, the valet du chambre to King Henry IV, Berthélemy Laffemas, published tracts in which he advocated the establishment of manufacturing in France to avoid “unnecessary” imports. In a highly aggressive tone some decades later, the message that foreign imports should be banned and the ugly face of foreigners forever deported from la belle France was reinforced by the writer Antoine de Montchretien (who was the first to use the concept “political economy”). His argument for strong protectionist measures taken by a dirigiste state became after 1660 the backbone of the so-called Colbert system, after Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Louis XIV’s minister of finance, who greatly provoked the English at the end of the same century.

Hence, the historical context in which the mercantilists wrote and advised was perhaps better understood by 19th-century German scholars such as Gustav Schmoller (belonging to the German historical school), who identified mercantilism as an expression of nation building during the early-modern period, than by 19th-century British liberalism. Nevertheless, Smith’s definition of mercantilism as a specific school of economic theory building on flawed views of the true relationship between commerce and wealth is still widely acknowledged. To what extent the straw man of a
The meta-analysis research design involves analyzing many individual cases or research reports and looking for commonalities and discrepancies in the published findings. In this design, a group of previously researched cases is selected and subjected to comparative analysis. Gene V. Glass (1976) introduced the technique as a “rigorous alternative to the casual, narrative discussions of research studies which typify our attempts to make sense of the rapidly expanding research literature” (p. 3).

Meta-analysis is an observational technique used to summarize and compare the results of studies produced by other researchers. Objectives for meta case research include establishing the state of research findings on a subject and providing an overview of what others are saying about the subject. Referred to as an analysis of analyses, the method involves statistical analysis of a large collection of individual case studies for the purpose of integrating the findings of the total set. Below, the advantages and disadvantages of meta-analysis and the requisite steps are discussed in greater detail.

Meta-analyses should only be applied to empirical research reports—that is, studies that have analyzed primary quantitative data collected by researchers who prepared the original reports. The findings of previously prepared research reports are compared or evaluated using such statistical processes as regression and correlation analyses. A recent example of the design is the Chris Doucouliagos and Mehmet Ali Ulabaçoğlu (2008) meta-analysis of 84 published studies of the hypothesized relationship between political democracy and economic growth. The individual results were spread across a continuum of positive, negative, and insignificant findings, leading them to conclude that while democracy does not have a direct impact on economic growth, an inconclusive relationship is common across the studies. Their meta-analysis resulted in three key points:

1. It provided a comprehensive analysis of the democracy–growth research based on the entire body of published cases.
2. Their quantitative analysis made it possible to make inferences based on the significance of the democracy–growth relationship.
3. It revealed the heterogeneity of the results in previous individual studies.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Meta-Analysis

Measurement and statistics researchers at the University of Maryland identified what may be the single most important advantage of meta-analysis: The human mind may be unable to effectively process and evaluate a large number of alternatives; a meta-analysis resolves this issue. Individuals have a difficult time when asked to evaluate the results of, say, 20 similar studies. When the number of studies is increased to 200—a not untypical number in many meta-analyses—the mind reels. Fortunately, statistical methods and software are readily available for coping with the complexity inherent in large numbers of cases.
Mark W. Lipsey and David B. Wilson identified four additional advantages of a meta-analysis. First, the process of coding and establishing criteria for selecting studies (a survey protocol), reading the study reports, coding the material, and subjecting it to a rigid statistical analysis imposes a discipline on the researcher that is sometimes missing in qualitative summarizations and comparative analyses. Second, the summaries of research on similar topics may produce finer measurement gradations of themes that might have otherwise been missed with a design using only one or a few cases. The application of common statistical tests across all the studies can correct for wide differences in sample size. Third, because the meta-analysis examines many case studies, it may be possible to find effects or associations that one or a smaller number of other comparative case analyses may have missed. Fourth, the meta-analysis process provides a way to organize and structure diverse information from a wide variety of study findings.

Meta-analysis is not without its disadvantages. A few of the criticisms that have been identified for the method include the following:

1. The large amount of effort and expertise it requires is an often-cited disadvantage of the method. A meta-analysis takes considerably more time than a conventional research literature review and may require specialized knowledge of case information that the researcher may not have.

2. The original may have missed some important issues, including but not limited to the social context of the study, theoretical influences and implications, methodological quality, design issues, and procedures.

3. The mix of studies combined into larger groups may hide subtle differences seen in individual studies.

4. Inclusion of studies that are methodologically weak can detract from the findings in the strong studies included in the analysis.

The Meta-Analysis Method

A meta-analysis follows the same system of procedures as single-case research. Researchers first identify a research question (the purpose for the review) and establish their objectives for the study. Second, they select an organizational framework for the analysis—that is, they determine what variables they will measure across the entire sample of cases. Third, they select a sample of case studies and specify why the individual cases (sample elements) will be chosen for the meta-analysis. Fourth, researchers collect, code, and tabulate the data; this involves investigating and reporting on the relationships found between the studies included in the review. Reporting the findings involves connecting the findings back to the study question, purpose, and objectives of the analysis. The following describes the complete process in greater detail.

Formulating the Problem

The first step involves identifying the reason for doing the research: defining the research problem. In a meta-analytical study, the core task is deciding what questions or hypotheses should be examined and what evidence should be included in the review of the selected cases. Formulating the problem means deciding what research results should be examined.

Criteria for Selecting Cases

Criteria for selecting cases to be included in the analysis might include characteristics of the client population, geographic location, history and/or experience level of the delivering organization and/or its sponsoring government agency, or research method used by the case writer. Each selected case should add to the research question knowledge base. A good meta-analysis is not concerned with drawing a representative sample of the literature on the topic; rather, it seeks to include the entire population of published studies on the topic of interest.

Standardizing the Points for Analysis

Since the meta-analysis design involves analysis of analyses and all analyses are different in some way, this is one of the most problematic steps of meta-analysis. Glass referred to this as the “apples and oranges” problem. The cases selected are studies of different aspects of a phenomenon: They
involve different subjects, are done at different times by different researchers, and often involve different research methods. Therefore, they are not all studies of “apples” or studies of “oranges.” To get around the difficulties that these differences entail, the researcher must examine the same element in every case, ignoring findings peculiar to the one case alone.

**Standardizing the Analysis Procedure**

Here, the emphasis is on method rather than focus. The analysis procedure usually involves standard statistical techniques such as regression and correlation analysis. However, the techniques and procedures used in the individual cases studied are often specific to that research question or political science subdiscipline. The meta-analysis reviewer must differentiate between what the original report writer supposed and what the results of the study indicate.

**Selecting a Coding Scheme**

Coding of variables for comparison or tabulation must be consistent across the body of literature reviewed in the meta-analysis. There are few rules for coding, other than to retain consistency. Numeric coding is the preferred approach since most researchers will use computers and statistical software for their analysis.

**Describing the Statistical Processes Used**

A guide to follow in describing the statistical processes used in meta-analysis is to refer to the available statistical software. Much of this software has been available free. Meta-Stat, from the University of Maryland, is an example of meta-analysis software. Statistical analysis described in this software ranges from simple descriptive statistics and correlation analysis to regression analysis and analysis of variance, to name just a few of the popular tests included. Meta-analysis is facilitated using a meta-analytic schedule or cross-case table. Rows are cases; columns are the results of the analysis on the items or attributes of interest. Cell entries may be brief summaries of the findings or as simple as a check mark. The schedule makes it easy to record and communicate analysis results.

**Analyzing the Data and Writing the Report**

Data analysis is a product of the statistical software used by the researcher and, as such, is rather straightforward. Writing the report, however, introduces a subjective element to the study. The researcher must decide how much information to include and how much to leave out of the report. Care must be taken to control for issues of validity, although statistical inferences are generally not made with meta-analysis findings. Because meta-analysis involves the interpretation of materials written by others, great care is needed in preparing the final report of the analysis.

Meta-analysis analysis has been found to be facilitated by following the principles of hermeneutic analysis. Hermeneutics is a method of analyzing all types of data, but it is particularly relevant for the analysis of written material such as that found in case studies. Hermeneutics follows a set of principles that requires the analyst to (a) decipher the meaning in the texts through the eyes and intent of the writer or creator, (b) frame the meaning in the time period of the case research and writing (often referred to as the context within which the document was prepared), and (c) determine the meaning considering the political and social environments at the time of the creation of the text or artifact.

**A Final Caveat**

Although use of the meta-analysis technique has grown dramatically since its adoption in 1976, Glass suggested in 2000 that, despite this increasing popularity, it might be time to replace meta-analysis with an approach that reflects more closely the nature of modern research in social science.

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*Note:* This entry contains some material from D. E. McNabb’s *Case Research in Public Management*, published by M. E. Sharpe, Inc.; it is used here with permission of the publisher.

*See also* Comparative Methods; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods
Further Readings


**Metagovernance**

Metagovernance refers to the need of formal public organizations to exercise some control over devolved and decentralized decision-making organizations. In line with the common use of the prefix *meta-* which means over and beyond, the shortest definition of the term metagovernance is the governance of governance. Just as the meaning of metaphysics is determined by the definition of physics, the meaning of metagovernance in practice depends on how the term governance is defined. It is generally accepted that three ideal-typical styles of governance can be distinguished, which usually form combinations: hierarchical, network, and market governance. When one style dominates, the other two often run in the background. Other forms of governance, such as public–private partnerships and the European Union’s open method of coordination, can be considered as hybrids of the three basic styles.

Each of the ideal types has a clear and distinct internal logic. The central value of hierarchical governance is authority; therefore an authoritative and legitimate form of governance is sought. The central values of network governance are empathy and trust, and therefore, the results are preferably based on consensus. Market governance is based on competition and price, which makes it logical that the best results are the most competitive and cheapest products.

This most used threefold concept of governance leads to defining metagovernance as the governance of hierarchies, networks, and markets. More precisely, metagovernance is that which produces some degree of coordinated governance, by designing and managing sound combinations of hierarchical, market, and network governance, to achieve the best possible outcomes from the viewpoint of those responsible for public sector performance. Metagovernance is not a supegoverance style but an attitude and an approach that is expected to help overcome some of the typical failures of each of the governance styles and of their combinations.

**Variations of Metagovernance**

The term metagovernance was coined by Bob Jessop in 1997. He argued that the three ideal-typical governance styles can be mutually undermining and that they each have their typical failures. He proposed metagovernance as a required coordination mechanism. After having investigated reforms of the Australian public sector, Lynn Davis and Rod Rhodes (2000) confirmed this argument: Creating effective mixtures of the three styles if they undermine each other is an important challenge for the public sector. Another reason why the concept of metagovernance may be useful is that each of the three styles has such a distinct logic that it is quite tempting to consider it as a solution for everything—a panacea—while neglecting the inherent failures of the style and the mitigating characteristics of the other styles.

A last reason is that devising successful approaches to governance has become more difficult since our societies have become more complex. With the emergence of Manuel Castells’s
network society and the acceptance of network governance as the third main style, the dilemma of dealing with two major approaches, hierarchy and market, evolved into a triple dilemma, or tri-lemma. The proponents of metagovernance argue that applying metagovernance as judiciously intervening in governance style mixtures, taking a bird’s-eye perspective, increases the capability of public sector organizations to deal with complex societal problems or opportunities.

The three ideal types of governance are value laden. Using metagovernance implies deliberately taking a situational view: What is best is determined by the type of problem, the organizational culture, and the level of pressure of stakeholders, for example. The concept has a light normative dimension, because the underlying concept of governance has inherent assumptions, for example, that the intention is to solve collective problems, not for individual profit but for the common good.

Some scholars use the term metagovernance in the meaning of the governance of one specific governance style. This form of metagovernance can be called first-order metagovernance, compared with the then second-order metagovernance of hierarchies, networks, and markets. Following this line of thought, Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing (2007) define metagovernance as a way to enhance network governance, by use of hierarchical mechanisms or instruments, such as introducing house rules in a network or producing a legal framework in which network processes should occur. This makes sense when the field of research is democratic network governance, where the main tensions are between participative and bureaucratic forms of democracy. Others, such as Josie Kelly (2006), define metagovernance as an attempt to regain state control over new forms of governance. They observe that hierarchical governance emerges in a new form to coordinate network and market styles of governance. This secures governmental influence in the form of command and control within network and market style governance regimes. As Mark Whitehead (2002) notes, metagovernance is then a counterprocess to governance of networks.

The Metagovernor’s Rationale

The role of metagovernor can be taken up by any public manager or politician in charge of finding solutions for societal problems or creating new societal opportunities. When such responsible agents design and intervene in governance style mixtures, they may have a specific logic of action or rationale. The question is how they can govern from the center while also maintaining enough autonomy (market governance) and involvement (network governance)? A comparative research showed that public managers used three metagovernance strategies:

1. The first strategy is combining styles. Combining the styles not only prevents conflicts but also creates synergy. Hierarchy brings structure and market governance enriches a network with efficiency and entrepreneurship. Network governance may secure just enough empathy in a new public management approach (which is a combination of the two rational ideal types—hierarchy and market).

2. The second strategy is switching between styles when the situation requires this. A policy project may start with a network approach and then introduce hierarchy by establishing rules, while the next phase may be dominated by market mechanisms such as efficiency-driven autonomous activities of the involved stakeholders. A hierarchical phase may be necessary to secure the results, after which a new network phase may start.

3. The third strategy is maintenance of situationally successful governance-style mixtures. This is a second-order strategy and complements the combining and switching of strategies. For example, conflicts are prevented by isolation—separating a team’s approach to prevent it from being undermined by the characteristics of the other styles—or empowerment—giving the team a sufficient high degree of discretion. Maintenance requires awareness of the weaknesses of the three ideal types. During a crisis, for example, the almost unlimited discretion may lead to abuse.

Another dimension of the metagovernor’s rationale is the understanding of five framework conditions that influence the feasibility of metagovernance:

1. The first condition concerns the culture, traditions, and history of the administrative and societal
system. National underlying preferences for a governance style influence the composition of governance mixtures to a certain extent but do not predict a specific style combination. However, they seem to predict the first style to be considered—the "default style"—which is, for example, market governance in the United Kingdom, network governance in the Netherlands, and hierarchical governance in Germany. The other styles are only applied when the default style turns out to be inappropriate.

2. The second condition is the personal affinity of the responsible politician with one of the ideal types.

3. The third condition regards societal expectations of the role(s) of governmental organizations. Civil society may lobby for network arrangements, whereas enterprises typically strive for a combination of market and hierarchical governance.

4. The fourth condition concerns organizational characteristics. The organizational culture may be open or closed, professional or task oriented, and the dominant style of leadership may be command and control, coaching, or enabling.

5. The fifth framework condition is the type of problem. This codetermines which style would serve best as the dominant one. If the policy problem is defined as an urgent matter, the rationale is to choose a hierarchical approach. If it is a routine issue that should be dealt with as efficiently as possible, market governance often works best, and for complex problems, network governance has a lot to offer.

Together the strategies and the framework conditions constitute the metagovernor’s rationale.

**Practical Implications and Feasibility**

Metagovernance provides an analytical framework that enables discussions between professionals with different belief systems and can, to a certain extent, be used for the design and management of governance approaches. This applies to both policy making and organizational design.

In addition, the broad version of metagovernance may provide useful insights for the design of management development programs. Such programs usually mirror the dominant style of an organization. The problem is that a hierarchical conception of management development implies training subordinates only to listen well and obey authority, a market-oriented training program promotes clients to become more entrepreneurial, and network training concentrates on helping colleagues create effective dialogues. Management development programs based on the concept of metagovernance would be based on different assumptions. They would teach managers to apply governance styles for which they feel no personal affinity. They would stimulate personal development toward being able to reflect on all governance styles and having enough self-insight to understand their own biases. In addition, they would include training in management techniques that are typical for the three styles: (1) line and project management for hierarchy, (2) business management for market governance, and (3) process management for network governance. They would also involve training in investigating and assessing the governance environment, to be able to deal with the framework conditions distinguished earlier.

Advocates of each of the three governance styles have different assessments of the feasibility of metagovernance. From a network perspective, metagovernance may seem a rational attempt to steer “unsteerable,” chaotic situations, which implies that the feasibility is low. Taking the more rational perspective of hierarchical and market governance, there is no fundamental reason to doubt whether metagovernance can be done; however, the problem may have a normative character. For those who take this perspective, introducing metagovernance implies that also the softer, nonrational network approach must be taken into consideration, which might make the governance system messy and slow. Metagovernance does not suggest a rational bias but a perspective over and beyond the rationality versus chaos discussion.

To conclude, metagovernance as mixing hierarchical, network, and market governance provides a bird’s-eye view of public issues. The concrete feasibility of metagovernance of the three ideal-typical styles depends on the (metagovern)ability of key people and on the framework conditions distinguished above. Scholars concentrating on this concept hope that such a reflexive, multiperspective
view may prevent the public sector from running into unnecessary problems.

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See also Governance; Hierarchical/Multilevel Models; Networks; New Public Management

Further Readings

Methodology

Political methodology deals with all issues related to empirical political research (nonempirical work, such as pure formal or normative theory, is excluded here). Methodology, as it is understood here, simply refers to the ways in which we acquire knowledge and comprises a multitude of specific methods and techniques. As such, it is embedded in an epistemological tradition of “critical rationalism” (Karl Popper) and “scientific realism.” This has been summarized as the “twofold conviction that the world consists of causal mechanisms that exist independently of our study—or even awareness—of them, and that the methods of science hold our best possibility of our grasping their true character” (Ian Shapiro, 2005, pp. 8–9). While it is often confused with narrower topics such as statistics, methodology is a broad area that deals with every aspect of political research, both quantitative and qualitative. While some methodological issues are more relevant to certain subfields or types of research, all political science is subject to similar standards and logic. While political methodology is related to more general social science methodology, there are specific issues that distinguish political methodology, while there is, of course, a shared logic and standards across the empirical social sciences. Since political science is itself defined by substantive questions, there is much importing of methods from other disciplines into political science. Questions of what is imported and the relevance of imported methods are important issues in political methodology. This entry discusses some of the major advances in this field.

While political methodology deals with empirical research, there cannot be any purely empirical research. Every empirical study involves some relationship between a theoretical concept and its empirical referent. Even very narrow empirical research, such as the measurement of electoral turnout in a given locality in a given period, requires a theoretical assessment of what is electoral turnout. For example, are people who are of legal age to vote but excluded from the process because of a prior felony (as some are in the United States) counted in the denominator? While empirical studies of voting turnout are less complex theoretically than studies of, say, whether a democracy causes a nation to be more pacific, both studies involve a mix of theoretical and empirical analysis and both can be assessed using the same logic. Thus, issues of measurement are always critical; such issues have become even more critical as technology makes new forms of data (video, blogs) available, or it makes it possible to easily analyze data that we have always used but found hard to deal with (text). The ability to deal with new sources of very complicated data and, with modern computers, the ability to code massive amounts of nonquantitative data, as well as the ability to collect individual data via the Internet, are among the most exciting developments in political methodology. Along with this, there has been much progress on issues of measurement.

Similarly, there can be no difference in the underlying logic of qualitative and quantitative
research. While obviously the specific tools will be different, if the question of interest is why countries have differing regulatory systems, we may pursue this in a number of ways. But, in the end, all such studies must be able to answer whether the evidence used leads to the conclusion asserted. While process tracing through official papers of decision makers is different from regressing regulatory rules on political variables, both may use one type of quantitative method, while students of cross-national comparative politics may use another type; these subfields are also subject to the same fundamental logic. This point has been forcefully made in recent years in important books by Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba and by Henry Brady and David Collier. The interrelationship (both similarities and dissimilarities) between quantitative and qualitative analysis, and how to combine both types to improve research, is another research area in political methodology that is seeing much discussion.

Some political science research is purely descriptive: how many people vote, whether more people voted the previous year than this year, and the like. As noted, even for this simple issue, serious measurement issues arise: What kind of people vote, and what does it mean to vote? Obviously, such issues are simpler than asking how many countries are democracies, but the methodological logic does not change. Most political science research, however, is not simply descriptive. While sometimes we care only about associations, much research uses causal language, metaphors, and ideas. Thus, while we might be interested only in whether there is a correlation between being a democracy and the amount of public goods provided, we are often more interested in whether there is a causal relationship, such that being a democracy leads to more public goods being provided. In purely associational studies, the variables are all treated symmetrically; when using the language of causality, there is always a variable that is being caused and one or more variables doing the causing. Issues of assessing causality are in the forefront of current discussions of political methodology, whether quantitative or qualitative. These issues can all be considered under the heading of research design.

Finally, when the above issues have been dealt with, there is the issue of how to get the data to speak clearly and how to assess what inferences can be drawn from the data (be it qualitative or quantitative). This is the realm of statistics (for quantitative studies). Obviously, the use of sophisticated statistical methods has mushroomed in political science, at least partly as a function of the increased computer power that is now commonly available. But while this part of methodology is often seen as highly mathematical and complicated, it is usually the simplest part of political methodology. It is also the case that the most sophisticated statistics cannot save a poor research design or poor measurement; by contrast, good research design often leads to simple statistical analysis. This entry begins with developments in data and measurement, proceeds to research design and measurement, and concludes with a discussion of statistical methods.

**Data and Measurement**

Empirical research, of course, deals with data (observations), and earliest empirical work, that of Aristotle on constitutions, took as data the various Greek constitutions. Data are gathered in a multitude of ways, ranging from reading diaries or internal records of decision making, to conducting field observations and (unstructured or semistructured) interviews with local leaders, to analyzing carefully collected economic statistics or a variety of highly structured survey data. Every type of research has certain types of data that are more commonly used, but all types of data are subject to the same standards and issues. There is a difference between journalism and political science, and much of that difference has to do with standards for data. Both journalists and political scientists may interview political leaders, but the way they collect and code that information is usually quite different.

Modern technological developments have had an enormous impact on political science data. Much of the data we use are textual (laws, party manifestos, records of debate and deliberation, court decisions, newspaper accounts, and minutes and records of administrative procedures, among many others). Our discipline has always used such data, but coding these data was extremely difficult and time-consuming, leading to such data being underused. Now, much of these data come in machine-readable form, and any data available in
hard copy can be scanned and put into such form. Thus, it is now relatively easy to code documents for the use of different types of words (or themes or tropes or whatever one likes). Machines can quickly search the records of various newspapers to code for various types of political events, a task that used to require a large team of graduate students and a very large budget. With modern computations, it is relatively easy for any investigator to code these textual data in a way that meets the needs of an individual research project. This is one of the most exciting advances in data collection in our discipline, an advance that is well under way. The possibilities for the analysis of textual data are almost limitless.

The analysis of surveys has been a mainstay in our discipline for the past half century or more. Until recently, analysts were at the mercy of the survey organization; conducting a survey was a multimillion-dollar task. Thus, electoral analysts in each country worked with the same standard survey collected by some national research organization; research could not go beyond the questions asked by that organization. With modern advances in communications and computers, it is now relatively easy for researchers to design their own surveys to suit the needs of a specific research project. We are also seeing more standardized surveys, so students of elections can now analyze a similar set of questions in almost any European country (and there are similar efforts in other parts of the world, with the Afrobarometer and the Latinoobarómetro and the World Values Survey). At the same time, a researcher wanting to study a specific event can put a survey in the field in a short space of time and at a reasonable cost. Larger survey houses can monitor populations over the course of an election and even change or add questions as issues arise over the course of a campaign. Critical to this is the ability to monitor a survey on a day-to-day basis. In earlier times it would have been months or years until survey data became available; with the new technology such data are available on a daily basis. Thus, for example, it was possible to track changes in the British electorate in 2010 and their responses to the introduction of debates into the British campaign soon after or almost immediately.

Modern technology also makes it easy to embed experiments into a survey. Thus, one can give different respondents different scenarios or different question wordings or whatever else one likes, and these different treatments can be chosen randomly. This technology has greatly increased the use of field experiments. The incredible growth of the Internet has been extremely important here. Various survey organizations in many countries give the researcher access to a huge pool of respondents, as well as the tools to quickly design a survey instrument and to allow the researcher to take advantage of experimental manipulation in the questions (subject only to ethical constraints on such manipulation). Internet surveys can be undertaken at very low cost and are within the budget even of students. While there are still many issues on the use of the Internet in this manner, we are clearly seeing more and more use of the Internet (both for reasons of cost and sample size and because other modes of interviewing are becoming more problematic).

Once data are collected, numbers must be assigned. This is the process of measurement, which relies both on concept formation and (for quantitative studies) various methods often associated with psychometrics. Qualitative scholars have paid much attention to concept formation, and, in conjunction with tools such as Charles Ragin’s “Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” much progress has been made. Students of comparative politics have paid much attention to how concepts generalize across geographic locations and to how we can generalize across locations without having too much “conceptual stretching.”

At the same time, statistical and computing advances have allowed researchers to move beyond the psychometric techniques available 20 years ago. Today, there is vibrant activity in multidimensional analysis, and in recent years, scaling techniques, both uni- and multidimensional, have been put on a much firmer theoretical basis. The new textual data have brought to the forefront issues such as how to locate political parties in a multidimensional issue space, and new statistical methods have allowed for great advances in the location of individual legislators in such a space.

The past decade has seen a great increase in the amount of data sharing (largely through the impetus of funding agencies) as well as in journals requiring authors to make replication data sets available. While this works very well for quantitative data, it
is more problematic for qualitative data (interviews, field observation notebooks, and the like). However, as it becomes easier to either collect these data in digitized format, or to convert them to such format, it can be expected that it will be as easy to make qualitative data publicly available as it now is for quantitative data (though obviously there are more issues of confidentiality and the like).

Research Design

Political scientists have relied heavily on observational studies (whether quantitative or qualitative). However, while there is some interest in pure description, there is usually more interest in making causal interpretations from the data. Thus, while we begin with simply observing that pairs of democracies usually do not go to war, we are more interested in the question of whether, as countries democratize, they become less likely to go to war. Finally, we try to deepen the explanation, asking what facet of democracy makes democracies less likely to fight each other.

The question of how we can infer causality from observational data has vexed philosophers as long as there have been philosophers. The meaning of causality is a vibrant topic in modern philosophy. Applied researchers have attempted to find ways to assess causality and, at a minimum, to attempt to rule out other, noncausal explanations for findings. In the above example, being a democracy may not really be the causal variable; perhaps, instead, the real causal variable is economic development and richer countries are simply more likely to be democracies. Thus, the observed association (correlation) between democracy and peacefulness could be artifactual or spurious. Both quantitative and qualitative researchers have devoted enormous attention to this issue.

On the purely qualitative side, researchers have paid great attention to J. S. Mill’s methods. Thus, we see large numbers of comparative case studies, with researchers choosing the cases so as to obtain variation on the key dependent variable and the causal variable but little or no variation on other variables. Researchers also choose cases for theory testing based on the cases that are likely to prove hardest for the theory to explain. Researchers are also taking advantage of difference in designs where two cases are compared at two different times: where the cases were originally similar but a key variable (and preferably only that key variable) has changed in one case but not in the other.

Moving to larger numbers of cases, researchers have used various configurational techniques to see how variables are related to each other and to study complicated causal paths. Great attention has been paid to necessary and sufficient conditions and to designs that can distinguish whether a condition is necessary, sufficient, or both or in some more complicated relationship to a variable of interest.

Qualitative researchers have often chosen their cases based on issues of research design or the importance of their cases; quantitative researchers, conversely, have often chosen cases to maximize generalizability, either via national surveys or via large cross-country analyses. But trends in quantitative research are tending to blur the difference between qualitative and quantitative designs (with both designs subject to similar standards about inferring causality). All of these are attempts to bring experimental insights into political science.

One relatively new development that shows the convergence of various approaches is the “analytic narrative.” Here, researchers attempt to show how some important development in history can be explained by modern analytic theory. While these analytic narratives cannot test analytic theories, they can make such theories more or less plausible. There is much controversy about whether this tool can really be used to either help validate a theory or to explain an important historical event: can a clever user of the tool explain anything, or, as Jon Elster put it, are they simply “just so” stories? However, this joining of modern analytic (usually formal) theory and careful historical evidence shows how two very different traditions can be combined in a potentially fruitful manner.

Political science studies are most frequently observational. Other fields, such as medicine, rely more heavily (though far from exclusively) on experiments. In medicine, the gold standard is the clinical trial, where subjects in a selected pool are randomly assigned to either a “treatment” or “control” group and where, under appropriate conditions, one can infer whether the treatment causes a better outcome.

Experiments are much harder in political science. We cannot assign countries randomly to be
either democracies or not, nor can we assign voters to be randomly rich or poor. We can, however, set up a laboratory and then randomly assign participants in an experiment to a treatment or control condition. Thus, for example, we can study whether people prefer “fair outcomes” by having pairs of subjects bargain, where each pair is randomly assigned to some initial endowment or price system. While this is an exciting new area of political science, issues of generalizing from experiments to the real world (external validity) will always limit the use of laboratory experiments in our discipline. However, where experiments are possible, we can be much more certain about assessing whether some political treatment had a causal (and not spurious) effect on an outcome of interest. Experiments may be particularly useful for testing formal theories of politics, since those theories are themselves highly abstract representations of the political universe.

Experiments need not be limited to a laboratory; it is perfectly possible (and now with modern technology even easier) to conduct field experiments. The move from the laboratory to the field increases external validity at the cost of our being less certain about our causal inferences (internal validity). Perhaps the first examples of this came in conjunction with surveys, where different people could randomly receive different question wordings or question orders. It was easy to move beyond this to providing different people different information randomly (subject of course to ethical guidelines on dealing with human subjects, which do not permit, at a minimum, misleading them). Perhaps the most common field experiments have to do with the effect of various attempts to motivate people to vote and to what extent voting turnout can be influenced by various communications strategies.

Field experiments are now also common in the assessment of various interventions. Thus, if we want to know if certain types of political interventions (say national-level monitoring of local corruption) have an effect, and if the area of intervention is chosen randomly (because the state cannot monitor all localities), it is then relatively easy to study the impact of the anticorruption intervention. Of course, this depends on the willingness of the state to intervene randomly, something they are not always (or often) willing to do. On a simple level, we can often study things such as educational reforms by comparing students who were randomly selected for the reform with those who applied but were not selected in a lottery. New programs that are oversubscribed often choose participants in this way. Of course, if we simply compare those in the program with those not in the program, we do not know if the program, or factors that led people to choose to be in the program, led to the observed outcome, and so no causal inference is possible. But there is more and more demand for careful evaluation of programs (such as aid programs sponsored by various large foundations), and so, this type of approach will become more and more common. This is a major step for applied researchers who want to see whether innovations actually work.

A somewhat different, but related, strategy is to keep laboratory control but move the laboratory from the research university to real-world settings. In a university laboratory, we can study how undergraduates in research universities bargain. In field laboratories (again made possible by technological innovations) we can study how a wider group of people bargains. Researchers can also embed more “real-world” features in these experiments. Thus, in some particularly exciting experiments on the role of ethnicity and trust, some people bargained with people of their own ethnic group, while others simply bargained with a randomly selected person. Thus, we can now make advances in studying group trust with studies that are both at least somewhat externally valid while still allowing for reliable causal inference.

Perhaps the strongest convergence of qualitative and quantitative thinking comes in what Donald T. Campbell and Julian Stanley called “quasi experiments” in their pathbreaking 1963 book on research design. Unlike experiments, some external force (political or natural) has “assigned” one group to a treatment and another to a control. Since this is not a true randomized experiment, researchers must show that the treatment was assigned in such a way that the assignment process was independent of the outcome. For example, the British drew boundaries in Africa as if they were random (i.e., following various geographical markers); thus, one ethnic group might be divided between two countries, and one can then see whether there are differences
in the behavior of the same ethnic group in the two countries. In the actual study of Daniel Posner, there were two ethnic groups split across two countries, with the division into countries being “as if” random; Posner could then see whether political and social rivalries between the two groups differed as a function of the larger political structures in each country. We are seeing more and more such designs. These research designs obviously have high external validity, though they lack the clear ability to show causal effects, since the assignment to groups was not totally random. But researchers are taking advantage of “almost random” natural assignments to study the effects of changing laws (with laws cutting natural labor markets artificially, the effect of, say, a change in the minimum wage law in half the labor market can be compared with what happened in the same labor market not subject to the change). This approach is very exciting, though of course one must work hard to show that the assignment process was effectively random. From a methodological standpoint, it does not matter whether the data collected from the two groups are quantitative or qualitative, and, in general, both types are collected. But even if the data from the two groups come from large surveys, we are still comparing only two groups.

A related research design that brings together both quantitative and qualitative researchers is the difference-in-difference design. In a simple before-and-after comparison, we do not know if the intervention between the observations caused the observed change. If we simply compare two units, one with an intervention and one without, we do not know if the intervention or something else caused the observed difference. The difference-in-difference design asks the researcher to find two similar units where one unit had an intervention (e.g., a change in a law) and the other did not. We need to be able to observe both units both before and after the intervention in one unit. If there is a bigger difference in the unit with the intervention, then we have evidence that the intervention had a causal impact. As before, this design has good external validity, but it does not rule out all other causal explanations. And, as before, we can compare many units, leading to a quantitative design (so long as the units were similar beforehand), or we can do a simpler two-cases difference-in-difference design, allowing for more in-depth analysis of the two before-and-after cases.

The study of causality has also been a big issue in statistical analysis. But even without statistical innovations, all empirical researchers have clearly been affected by new thinking about using good research design to infer causality.

**Statistics**

Multiple regression is clearly the workhorse of the quantitative political scientist. But political scientists have been quick to use related methods that better fit the data analyzed. A quarter of a century ago researchers still found methods such as logit and probit for dichotomous dependent variables to be either just at or just beyond their grasp. Today, these methods are commonplace. Similarly, researchers with ordered dependent variables, event count–dependent variables, or length-of-time–dependent variables, typically, know how to find the correct methods (and all commonly used software makes it easy to use these methods in practice). While the gains here are often, but not always, small, they usually come at no price, so there is no question that researchers should match their choice of method to the type of data being analyzed. These issues, typically important in cross-sectional research, are, by and large, now solved problems.

Similar strides have been made in the analysis of time series. While in the past the important issues of time series (which often have enormous consequences for results) were ignored, over the past quarter of a century the discipline has become much more sophisticated. Thus, most researchers analyzing time series get the technical details right. Econometricians, at the same time, have made great strides in studying data that are trending (or, more technically, nonstationary). Political scientists have been quick to pick up on this, and we see much fewer spurious regressions. So while the issues here are more complicated, and there are still open issues about trending series, as with cross-sectional analyses, time-series analyses in political science are now done reasonably well.

In comparative politics, we have data that consist of time series observed over a number of countries: time-series cross-sectional data. Many articles now analyze such data, and the discipline
has become good at analyzing such data. Similarly, we can have cross-sectional surveys with repeated observations on each individual: panel data. The analysis of such data has also become commonplace, with the appropriate methods often used. Finally, there have been great advances in data where individuals are observed over multiple units (e.g., common surveys in different countries): multilevel data. Again, there have been great strides recently in the analysis of such data, and the correct analysis of multilevel data has also become more common.

This is not to say that all statistical issues have been solved. Most current methods assume that observations in one unit are independent of observations in other units. But this assumption is clearly false for political science. What goes on in one country affects its neighbors and trading partners; a dyad going to war must have impacts on a large number of other dyads. Recently, political methodologists have been investigating methods for modeling spatially dependent data, and great strides are being made in this area.

Another active area of research is on ecological data, that is, data where interest is on individuals but only aggregate data are observed. Political science is rich with aggregate data, particularly voting data collected at the precinct level. But, often, interest is at the individual level. For example, who voted for the National Socialist Party in Germany in the 1930s? We have lots of data on aggregate vote at the precinct level and some knowledge of the social characteristics of such precincts. Obviously, we would like to do surveys, but these are impossible for events in the past. Since William Robinson’s classic 1950 work on the “ecological fallacy,” we have known that it is not simple to make inferences about individuals from data collected at a higher level of aggregation. However, recent advances have shown that we can use such data to gain insights into individual data (and also to show when the data cannot support such insights).

An important issue that is currently the subject of much discussion is how to interpret statistical results. Political science has been dominated by the null hypothesis–testing framework, where we calculate the probability of obtaining the data observed if the null hypothesis (almost always that two or more variables are unrelated) is correct. If this probability is low enough, we “reject” the null hypothesis, otherwise we do not reject it. This approach is highly problematic, since rejecting the null hypothesis does not imply that there is a strong relationship between variables, and failing to reject the null hypothesis does not mean that there is no relationship between variables.

In the past few years, there has been much discussion of moving to a Bayesian paradigm. Much of this is driven by the computing power, rather than the interpretive possibilities, made possible by a Bayesian approach. Bayesian interpretation assumes we know something about the world, expressed as a statistical “prior distribution” on some parameters of interest. This prior distribution is combined with the information in the data—the “likelihood”—to produce a posterior distribution. Statements about the parameters of interest can be made based on this posterior distribution. There is much controversy on how to use prior information and on the issue of different scholars having different priors. But this is a very active area of current research, both in political methodology and beyond, and Bayesians ideas (as well as computational methods) are making strong inroads in political science.

**Statistics and Causality**

Regression and its maximum likelihood cousins (limited dependent variables, event counts, event history, and time series) estimate a model of a dependent variable conditional on an observed set of independent variables; these independent variables are assumed to be exogenous—that is, they are determined outside the system being modeled and hence can be taken as given. For pure description, this is fine. But we generally want to make causal inferences. To take the simplest regression case (and all holds in the more complicated cases mentioned above), we believe the data were generated for unit $i$ by the process

$$y_i = \beta x_i + \epsilon_i,$$

where $x$ refers to either a single independent variable or a vector of such variables, and $\epsilon$ is a standard unknown error term. Clearly, $\beta$ can be interpreted descriptively—that is, as the slope of a line (or plane) that best fits the points. But can it
be interpreted causally—that is, do we believe that if for a given unit $x$ increases by one point, then $y$ will increase by $\beta$ points? (Obviously, we will have to use an estimate of $\beta$, but this discussion holds even if we know the value of $\beta$ for sure. This is not an issue of estimation.)

There are a number of reasons why the relationship between $x$ and $y$ could be noncausal. The simplest is that there is some other variable, $z$, that causes both $x$ and $y$. For example, there may be a good-sized $\beta$ in a regression of spending on public goods on democracy, but it may be that it is really how rich a country is that is causing both spending on public goods and democracy; there may be no causal relationship between democracy and spending on public goods in the sense that simply making a country more democratic, but keeping everything else the same, may lead to no increase in spending on public goods.

Traditionally, this was dealt with by including $z$ in the regression and seeing if the coefficient on $x$ has changed. This is not an unreasonable way to proceed. However, it can be problematic. First, it assumes that the effect of $x$ and $z$ on $y$ are linear and additive. For just the two variables, this means that we are assuming that

$$y_i = \gamma x_i + \delta z_i + \varepsilon_i,$$

where $x$ and $z$ are now scalars. While the details are a bit more complicated, this procedure estimates the effect of $x$ on $y$ by subtracting off from each observation $\delta z_i$. But if the effect of $x$ on $y$ varies with $z$, or if the linear additive model is otherwise incorrect, this correction is, alas, not correct.

This is not the only problem. Let us say $x$ is binary (democracy/nondemocracy) and let $z$ be national income. Can we make a poor autocracy comparable (in terms of public goods spending) with a rich democracy by simply adding $\delta z$ ($z$ is income) to its $y$ (spending on public goods)? Given that there are few rich autocracies or poor democracies, this approach depends a lot on extrapolation well outside the data and so depends on a strong belief that the linear additive assumptions are correct.

Recently, researchers have proceeded in a different way, at least for the binary $x$ case. For each democracy, they attempt to find one or more autocracies that are very close on various exogenous variables that might influence $x$ and $z$ (what Judea Pearl has called backdoor paths between $x$ and $y$ and what Paul Rubin has called confounders). If one has eliminated all potential “confounders” by matching them, then the difference in means between the democracies and autocracies will give us the effect of democracy on $y$. Of course, this means that the various confounders must be observable and measured in the data set (and, of course, there are many technical issues that must be resolved by the researcher).

What if we cannot match all the democracies with autocracies? These unmatched cases are simply dropped from the analysis. Thus, we do not have to extrapolate well beyond the data, but this limits us to studying causal impacts in comparable cases; thus, for example, we cannot say what would happen if Denmark were to become an autocracy. This is almost certainly the right degree of modesty.

This matching literature is undergoing rapid development at the current time. Issues that must be studied include how to handle continuous (or multivalued) $x$s and how to deal with studies where we cannot focus solely on one independent variable of interest. There are also many technical issues that are continually being dealt with, such as what does it mean for two cases to match and how many and which cases should be dropped from an analysis because they do not match. But clearly, this approach is often superior to multiple regression (and when multiple regression is correct, it provides roughly the same answer).

Perhaps more important, even if one decides to continue to run regressions, the insights of the matching and causality literatures are of great value. There are two difficult issues in multiple regression on which statistics give few insights: which independent variables to include in the regression and which cases should be studied. The matching approach suggests that only variables that are on backdoor paths between the key independent variable and the dependent variable should be included in the regression. Equally important, variables on front door paths, where $x$ causes $z$ and $y$, should not be included in the regression. Thus, if some variable is a consequence of $x$, if we include it in the regression, we may incorrectly conclude that $x$ has no causal impact on $y$. 

In terms of which cases to include in a regression, the matching literature tells us that, for any given potential causal variable, some cases give us no leverage because it is impossible to match cases where the causal variable is present to those where it is absent. This is often not a problem in survey analysis but can be a major problem in the study of comparative and international politics. We often analyze a group of countries because they belong to a data-reporting organization; the matching approach gives a more principled way of starting to think about which cases should be included in an analysis. And, just as important, the cases to include vary with the causal variable being studied. But, as with simple matching, we then must remember that the causal effect that is estimated is a function of which cases are studied.

The matching approach (and multiple regression) assumes that we can observe the various confounders that impede causal inference. But what if they cannot be observed? There are several approaches that are promising, though, as with any method, they must be used with care. One is to model what is known as selection and the other is to use what are known as instrumental variables. These deal with issues of selection bias and endogeneity.

Selection bias is a critical empirical issue. In applied work, if we want to see if, say, some new type of school provides better outcomes, and we compare outcomes of those who attend the new school against a sample from other schools, we may find that the new type of school seems to work either because better students choose to go there or because students who have knowledge of themselves and who have good reason to believe that the new type of school will work for them choose the new school. The former problem is always critical, while the latter is critical if we wish to encourage everyone to use the new type of school.

This problem was formalized by the Nobel Prize-winning economist James Heckman in the 1980s. He was interested in the returns to education (in terms of wages) of women; we only observe the wages of women who choose to enter the labor market. This may lead to underestimating the effect of education on women’s wages, since women with less education may only enter the labor market if they have some reason to know that they will do well in that market. Alas, such reasons are usually not observable in a data set.

In political science, we may be interested in the effect of being involved in a scandal on the electoral success of incumbents running for reelection. But those who see little chance of reelection may choose not to run, and those who were involved in a scandal but chose to run anyway may have private reasons to know that they are likely to do well. Are campaign ads effective? Perhaps people who already like a candidate are more likely to see that candidate’s ads.

Similarly, in international relations, if we only study the outcomes of wars, many nations that are militarily weak may simply choose not to fight; thus, the weak will fight only if they have some private information that they have a chance of winning, and so we may underestimate the effect of military strength on winning a war. Similarly, does international mediation actually help solve conflicts? Perhaps mediators only take on their task when they think success is likely. In comparative politics, autocrats who believe that they can remain in power if they liberalize are perhaps more likely to liberalize. These are just a few examples, but selection bias is pervasive in observational studies.

One solution is to match those who select some treatment (war, watching an ad, etc.) with those who chose not to do so. But if the data set does not contain enough information to match on critical variables (nations that are militarily weak but have other, unobserved, private reasons to believe that war is in their interest), this approach does not work. Heckman suggested a two-equation model, one for selection and one for the outcome-given selection, with the errors in the two equations correlated (so that nations that should not have gone to war but did for unobservable [error term] reasons will also be more likely to do better, again for reasons that are in the error term). Note also that the various research design issues (experiments, quasi experiments, and such) can also be a critical tool for dealing with selection bias. But even if there is no statistical solution available, and we are not lucky enough to observe a good quasi-experimental situation, understanding the nature of the problem is critical for causal inference.

The other issue is endogeneity. Does high income lead to good institutions or do good institutions
lead to high income? Do voters who like some candidate assume his or her position to be close to theirs or does closeness on issues lead voters to choose that candidate? Disentangling whether $x$ causes $y$ or $y$ causes $x$ is critical to political science; and observational data on cross-sections cannot help answer this question, since, as is well known, association tells us nothing about causation. For the above two examples, we would observe the same exact data regardless of the causal process. The research design tools discussed previously can sort out these issues; if $x$ changed for some reason external to the system (perhaps because of some natural event), then we could study whether $x$ causes $y$ and is not simply associated with it.

In the 1950s, economists associated with the Cowles Foundation at Yale thought they could solve the problem by estimating a series of equations, one for $x$ and one for $y$. Of course, these had to be estimated jointly, and this technique came to be known as the estimation of simultaneous equations. Interest in this approach waned as it became obvious that we simply lacked strong enough theory to allow the estimation of such equations. This theory, at a minimum, was necessary to tell us that there was some exogenous $z$ that affected $y$ and not $x$ and some other exogenous $w$ that affected $x$ and not $y$. At least in political science, it seemed hard to find such exogenous variables with such asymmetrical effects.

Interest in part of this approach—instrumental variables—started to reappear in the 1990s and now has become an extremely active area of research. The basic idea is that we are interested in the causal impact of, say, economic growth on having a civil war. However, in a cross-sectional study, we would worry that civil wars hurt economic growth. The instrumental-variable approach is to find some exogenous variable that affects growth but only affects civil wars through its link with economic growth. In an ingenious study, Ted Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti decided that, for southern Africa, rainfall would be a good instrument. They had to convince themselves that rainfall affected the outbreak of civil war only through economic growth (since it is clear that rainfall is exogenous). The method of instrumental variables, in its simplest form, then regressed both civil wars and economic growth on rainfall (both regressions are fine since rainfall is exogenous). Having the effect of rainfall on both variables, we can divide these effects and then obtain a good estimate of the impact of economic growth on civil wars without worrying about the reverse direction of causality.

Research on instrumental variables, both on the theory on when they are useful and also in various applications, is one of the most vibrant current research areas in political science. It is hard, but not impossible, to find good instruments. There is much current research on what properties a good instrument should possess and if and how empirical researchers can test whether a given instrument is a good one.

**Conclusion**

Political methodology was not even considered a field for research 30 years ago. The world has changed remarkably. The American Political Science Association has subfield groups for both quantitative and qualitative methodology; these groups are among the largest such groups in the association. The past few years have seen a huge increase in specialized short courses in methodology, both quantitative and qualitative, worldwide. Almost all departments of political science now require methods training for all of their PhD students.

Thirty years ago, the focus was on statistical inference. While many still focus on that issue, the advances over the past 30 years have made the estimation of many complicated models quite easy. Today, there is an incredible revolution in data collection and measurement, and renewed interest in research design, especially as it relates to making causal inferences. There has been huge growth in thinking about experimental and quasi-experimental approaches to studying critical questions.

While qualitative and quantitative researchers often go their separate ways, there is surely renewed interest in what these two approaches have in common methodologically (and where they appropriately differ). In short, political methodology has been one of the great success stories of our discipline over the past 30 years.

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See also Causality; Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods; Statistics: Overview

Further Readings

Migration

Migration is a topic that is characterized by an interdisciplinary approach, both theoretically and empirically. It crosses several disciplines, including demography, geography, sociology, anthropology, economy, history, and political science. Social scientists do not study migration from a shared paradigm but from a variety of competing theoretical viewpoints that are fragmented across disciplines. Migration emerged as a field of research in political science in the mid-20th century, and in the 1980s to 1990s, it had already become a major research topic. It is now one of the major political issues facing the 21st century. It has taken time for migration to acquire legitimacy as a research topic in the discipline. Several factors contributed to create this delay, among which are the absence of a political theory of international migration, a lack of cohesion between macro- and microanalysis, and the fact that the problematics raised by migrations are constantly evolving.

The term migration refers to human mobility: A migrant is someone who has left his or her country of birth and who is living in another country. A migrant differs from a foreigner, the latter being defined juridically as a “nonnational.” There are internal and external migrations. Most international migrants are foreigners, and most foreigners are migrants, but not automatically so. Today, we are facing the second wave of world migration since the mid-19th century, when millions of Europeans left Europe for the New World to find work (United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Latin America), to colonize and conquer (Asia and Africa), for trade, or as missionaries. The number of migrants (200 million, 3% of the world population) has tripled since 1970, and globalization, the transnationalization of networks, and push-and-pull factors have made individuals mobile internationally. Together, these factors challenge national borders, the sovereignty of states, and the notion of citizenship, which in turn affects international relations (IR) and political identities.

Most political science research that focuses on migration tends to deal with either the role of the nation-state in controlling its borders, the making of immigration policy, the impact of migration on sovereignty (including foreign and national security), or issues of citizenship (dissociation between nationality and citizenship, identity, allegiances, and political inclusion). Such research draws on several disciplines, including IR, public policies, and the sociology of political behavior. Research conducted within the field of migration studies takes two main directions: on the one hand, the study of flows (migration policies and comparative and international analysis), which focuses on macrolevel issues, and on the other hand, the study of stocks (on living together and political incorporation), which focuses mainly on microlevel issues. Placing emphasis on the existence/the study of social ties, some political scientists have proposed a “mesolevel” of analysis. Some problematics remain unexplored, and gaps in the
research include topics such as emigration policies (rules of exit), the “diplomacy of migration” led by emigration countries, or the root causes of the establishment of regional or world migration systems. Many political scientists have studied the respective impact of political decision making and of other competing factors, such as economic liberalization and securitization, on the opening and closing of borders. Others have focused on the relation between citizenship and the political inclusion of migrants. However, only a few have analyzed the link between immigration flows, incorporation (integration) policies, and political behavior.

If migration has become an object of analysis encompassing local, regional, national, and international levels, it has also weakened the two central pillars of the international political system: (1) sovereignty and (2) citizenship. Migration brings anomie to the national and international realms, where the state would want to remain the exclusive actor. Nation-states are currently threatened from above by globalization and from below by multiculturalism. In the following sections, we will analyze to what extent migration, as it blurs the frontiers between sovereignty and citizenship, undermines the external and the internal political order.

Migration and Sovereignty

Difficulties of Border Control

Despite the development of transnationalism, mainstream scholars have continued to view the state as a unitary and rational actor and to place it at the center of their analyses. The first question that is raised by migration in relation to the issue of sovereignty is linked to border control. Migration challenges the Weberian notion of sovereignty, in that it questions the relation between population, territorial space, and monopoly of power. In the past, many states viewed migration as a break of allegiances, and they fought against nomadism to control their territories. Today, several factors undermine state sovereignty, notably the inability of states to control the flow of illegal immigrants across their borders, the capacity of states to rule migrations through regional agreements and international rules, and the fact that heterogeneous populations and minorities now contribute to define national identity. In a context where the vast majority of the world is sedentary, migration appears as an exception that has rapidly grown due to fluid exchanges (transportation, and information facilities and networks). The right to mobility is itself becoming a human value. The main difference between the first world migration wave of 1880–1920 and the second one of 1980–2000 lies in the border control of immigration and emigration countries. A century ago, it was as difficult for one to leave one’s own country (because borders were closed from inside) as it was easy for one to enter another country (because there were at that time only few controls and passports). The population was a state’s main resource, and its movement was either prohibited or strictly controlled. On the other hand, in countries of arrival, new populations were welcome to work and to settle. Now, the situation has reversed, even in countries such as the former USSR, China, and most Third World countries, where the change took longer to settle. Opened borders are now commonplace in countries of departure, which see emigration as a good thing for them. On the other hand, it has become very difficult to enter countries that are attempting to fight undesired immigration flows.

Markets and Mobility Rights

Liberal democracies in particular have difficulties in controlling immigration. The notion of sovereignty and its emphasis on upholding political order and a feeling of political community within borders is challenged by a liberal commitment to the free flow of goods, money, and people across borders. Migrations exacerbate the relations between states and markets: Sometimes the state is brought back in, and sometimes the gap between actual migration flows and migration policies deepens. James Hollifield has called this the “liberal paradox.” Pressure on immigration policy comes from numerous organized and contradictory interest groups such as political parties, trade unions, employers, associations of human rights, and countries of origin. However, it is difficult to conciliate control in democratic societies. Why, then, do states “risk” migration? They risk migration for economic, demographic, and human rights reasons (asylum). Why, on the contrary, do states close their borders? The states close their
could be managed through global governance on the legal basis set out in international rules, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families of 1990. In such a system, multilateral decision making would guarantee well-balanced mobility. The human rights regime that is currently taking shape goes beyond states. It is a postnational regime within which international conventions will grant migrants an international legal status.

Transnational Networks Another factor that is currently challenging the sovereignty of the nation-state is the growing importance of social networks that link sending and receiving countries together. States are no longer the sole actors of international migrations: firms, individuals, and transnational communities bypass the regulatory authority of sovereign states. While the world is going through a process of individualization, states are experiencing deterritorialization. Transnational networks challenge the international order of nation-states. Not being able to control migrants, nation-states are not the most legitimate actors of IR anymore. The development of transnational economies led to the creation of transnational social links, and increased communications rendered national migration policies nearly obsolete. These policies are now challenged by networks and by migrants themselves. Alejandro Portes developed the notion of “transnational communities” to explain the logic of international migration flows and patterns of immigrant incorporation. While the international economy pushes for borders to be more open, internal policy pushes for their closure. As Saskia Sassen has observed, globalization has led to the rise of a structural demand for foreign labor and to a loss of border control. Demand for foreign labor is “structurally embedded” (Wayne Cornelius, 1994) in the more advanced industrial societies that cannot function without a cheap labor force. As a result, little space is left for states and national regulations, and the state is marginalized in its efforts to structure international migration. Transnational networks and transnational communities also contribute to strengthening economic globalization: Through remittances ($300 billion in 2007), migrants become the main actors of development in their country of origin; ethnic entrepreneurship creates gray areas where goods, people, and money can circulate freely; family
reunification and transnational marriages represent half of the legal entries in most immigration countries, and ethnic minorities are a new factor of transnational citizenship. Diasporas and quasi diasporas collectively contribute to instill more fluidity in the world of nation-states and closed borders.

**Blurred Boundaries Between Internal and External Political Order**

As Zolberg and his colleagues note, migration blurs the distinction between the internal and the external political order. The theory of globalization, which takes inspiration from the sociology of IR, introduces with migration a bottom-up analysis of the social texture of IR. It is well recognized that external factors may have an impact on internal political orders. For example, conflicts abroad affect refugees, displaced persons, and economic and demographic gaps; and environmental issues affect population movements. Receiving and sending countries often settle bilateral or multilateral agreements that can involve trading raw materials or labor force against legalization procedures, as was the case between Mexico and the United States. Along the same lines, France has been granting residence cards to elites of poor countries and promised development policies in exchange for the repatriation of illegal migrants. Some emigration countries such as Morocco, Turkey, and Mexico are now pursuing a “diplomacy of migration” with rich neighboring countries: Dual nationals, who became voters and were sometimes elected in immigration countries, are being used to influence and sometimes to intrude in some delicate matters such as the practice of Islam within host societies, plural allegiances, or multiple belongings of new citizens. The security approach to migration has contributed to an increasing mix of internal and external politics, leaving little space for state and national regulations while favoring regional agreements such as those addressing the security of European borders. Migration previously dealt with “low politics,” but it is now regulated through “high” IR politics, which traditionally deals with war and peace, national security, foreign policy, and regional equilibriums. However, pressures to put international migration higher on the IR agenda did not succeed before the late 1990s. Some IR theorists who were initially interested in international security questions turned to issues related to population control and terrorism instead and began to assert that international population movements and transnational networks can have a dramatic impact on the security and sovereignty of states.

**Migration and Citizenship**

**Migrants as Political Actors in a Multidimensional Political Space**

With migration in the foreground, citizenship cannot be understood in its traditional context anymore. Initial research introducing migration as a research object of political science focused on migrants as future citizens (from political acculturation to political participation); on migrants who were mostly concerned with politics in their country of origin, either because they were refugees or because, on the contrary, they hoped to return to their home country; or on migrants as politically alienated individuals, eventually involved in social mobilizations around housing issues or at work ( politicization of nonpolitical matters). Such research was rooted altogether in sociology (theories of incorporation), economics (labor market analysis of migrants as short-term guest workers), and law (prohibition of any political expression for migrants coming from dictatorships or from former colonized territories). In the workplace, most migrants were integrated. They progressively gained equal representation in firms and trade unions, putting forward claims for freedom of association and for the right to political representation. In Northern European countries, where they were granted local political rights while still being denied full citizenship, migrants became, in Tomas Hammar’s term, denizens. Albert Hirschman’s (1970) treatise Exit, Voice and Loyalty illustrates this situation well.

**Evolution of the Concept of Citizenship**

The notion of citizenship became part of the political analysis of migration in the 1980s. Since then, migration progressively altered the very content of citizenship, most notably through dissociating citizenship from nationality. Studies of the long-term settlement of immigrants in Canada and Australia, and, through comparative approaches,
in European countries, examined how far migration was altering the content of citizenship and to what extent citizenship was raising new issues in the field of migration. Field research showed that the emergence of migrants—mostly second-generation migrants—in the political sphere raised the questions of “membership” and “belonging” in immigration countries and of a “double presence” through immigration. Some years later, the idea of a “double presence” affecting citizenship (through double citizenship, multiple allegiances, and plural citizenship) could indeed be substituted for Abdelmalek Sayad’s concept of a “double absence” of migrant workers from both their home and host countries. As new nationals of immigrant origin take part in the local civic life, citizenship is seen more as a participative matter rather than being limited to the act of voting. This constitutes a return of the concept of citizenship as was understood during the French Revolution of 1789 (e.g., in the Constitution of 1793, participation in, and adhesion to, the new ideals were considered more important than the question of whether one was or was not a national).

Dissociation Between Nationality, Citizenship, and Dual Citizenship

The dissociation between nationality and citizenship is the most important issue that has been raised by increasing migration and integration among European states. The granting of local voting rights to all foreigners in some Northern European countries followed by the granting of local voting rights to all European citizens living in a different European country (European citizenship) showed that one can be a citizen without being a national of a country, as a result of involvement in local political affairs. In the past, some nationals were not considered full citizens (colonial indigenous people, women, those condemned to prison or to death, the disabled, and soldiers). Approaches to citizenship have evolved through time, and citizenship and nationality have only recently been associated with the rise of the nation-state. The newly found importance of the local manifests itself through the emergence of the notion of “residence citizenship” and through the use of *jus soli* by immigration countries that needed to include the new citizens. In France, the “*beur* movement” added meaning to the classical understanding of citizenship when it introduced the idea of “new citizenship.” “New citizenship” is a mix of localism, grassroots participation in inner-city communities, multiple allegiances, and respect for republican values while expressing collective claims to, and identification with, ethnicity and Islam. The idea is that one can be a citizen while being culturally different from other citizens. In the 1990s, most European countries faced widespread debates concerning the reform of their nationality codes. States reacted by introducing elements of *jus soli* into their nationality codes that traditionally rested on *jus sanguinis*. Rogers Brubaker theorized the relations between immigration and citizenship and showed that naturalization law and policies affect the rate at which newcomers are politically incorporated. *Jus sanguinis* immigration countries that were most reluctant to open their nationality codes to newcomers now offer some opportunities to include them as future citizens. In most cases, degrees of political rights and of incorporation can be pictured as a series of concentric circles: At the center are national citizens who are granted the whole range of political rights, and at the outskirts are illegal immigrants and asylum seekers who have no means of political action apart from holding hunger strikes or other protests on the streets. Even in a country such as Japan, which refuses to change its criteria for Japanese identity in order to preserve “racial purity,” the nationality code now includes various hierarchized categories of migrants. The transnational nature of migration has also led to situations of “dual citizenship,” with *jus sanguinis* being the rule in the country of origin of first-generation migrants and *jus soli* being applied in the country of birth of following generations. With such massive increases in migration, this concept of dual citizenship will develop throughout the world. New realities further stem from this context: Individuals now have plural allegiances to several political spheres; countries of origin attempt to increase their political power by using their own nationals who live abroad and who became citizens in the host country as a potential collective force; diasporic states use displaced persons and refugees living abroad as part of an “influence diplomacy.” New citizens (e.g., Latinos in the United States, Germans of Turkish origin in Germany, French from the so-called diversity in France, and
Commonwealth citizens in the United Kingdom are cherished by most political parties, which are always in need of new voters to extend their political base. Indeed, these new citizens do not necessarily form a voting bloc based on ethnicity or other common identity. In that sense, Islam has somehow introduced new types of relationships between citizenship and religion, leading to a plural citizenship, related to two different nation-states, that created an alternative to voting on an ethnic or on a religious basis.

**Multicultural and Transnational Citizenship**

Citizenship can no longer be understood in the traditional context of a unified culture. Some countries such as Canada and Australia, where citizenship used to be based on the myth of national homogeneity, have now included multiculturalism as part of the very definition of citizenship. As a result, ethnicity is now a constitutive part of the identity of host societies. In the same way as liberalism and multiculturalism are understood to be working hand in hand, citizenship is now necessarily linked to multiculturalism in countries with large immigrant populations. Over the past few decades, transnationalism has become an important conceptual approach, and, as noted by Rainer Bauböck, transnational citizenship is now accepted as characterizing most or all postmodern states. The nation-state is overwhelmed by such an expression of citizenship across borders: It is unable to both confront the political consequences of the world economy and respond to the challenge of ethnicity. As mobility becomes a way of life and as the free movement of people and cross-national relations intensify, new forms of transnational citizenship increasingly contribute to reshape traditional models of citizenship.

**The Individual Migrant as an Actor**

At the international level, citizenship has also been transformed through the emergence of migrants as individual actors on the international scene. Migrants are at the cross-point between identities of states and blurred boundaries of territories. As they struggle to achieve their individual goals and to reshape their own life, they become “actors of the future” par excellence: They no longer feel doomed just because they were born in a misgoverned and poor country. Through remittances, migrants also have an effect on the lives of individuals in their country of origin. Further, various transnational practices of migrants challenge the international order that was created by, and served to, nation-states with a large immigrant population.

At the internal level, the existence of discrimination and diversity complicate the issue of citizenship. Also, as noted above, Islam, which is a minority religion in most immigration countries, introduces a system of plural allegiances. This system differs from the former model of citizenship, which implied citizens’ exclusive allegiance to the nation-state. Ethnic diversity breaks the myth of a homogeneous nation, in which citizenship would rest on a social contract and where cultural practices and values of citizens would only be expressed in a “private sphere,” while the public sphere would be freed from such practices and values. Minority religions, poverty, and ethnicity often lead to discrimination. Discrimination in turn casts doubt on the effectiveness of declarative citizenship rights that neither question citizens’ unequal access to rights nor their unequal treatment by institutions. Thanks to migration, diversity is seen as a value in itself that should be considered as an integral part of modern citizenship; and modern citizenship has become plural, transnational, multicultural, and antidiscriminative.

**Migration and the Field of Political Science**

Migration, by nature, is multidisciplinary; thus, it took a long time for political scientists to include it as a legitimate political science object of study. Migration’s main contribution to the field of political science lies in the way it challenges the state as the main actor that regulates borders, identity, and citizenship. Migration places individuals on the forefront: Through it, they become actors of IR. Transnational ties have become the most important networks, and migrants, who play an active role in managing mobility, have become multilateral decision makers. By creating new values for living together in a political community, migration enriches citizenship. Illegal immigrants are now campaigning for the consecration of a right to mobility as a human right. In a world of free movement and blurred borders, such a right
Military Rule

For most of human history, attaching “military” to “rule” would have been redundant, because almost all political regimes in large-scale societies of the premodern period fused military, religious, economic, and monarchical power. The separation of military and civilian powers and the development of professional, bureaucratic armed forces in European states in the 18th and 19th centuries gave birth to the contemporary understanding of military rule. The most useful definition of the term is a political regime in which the military as an organization holds a preponderance of power. Military rule in this definition is synonymous with military regime and refers to a subtype of authoritarian regime. Other definitions can be useful for exploring specific issues. For example, military rule is sometimes defined as a political regime in which the head of the executive is an active-duty member of the armed forces. Another definition restricts military rule to a regime in which the executive is ruled by a Latin American–style junta consisting of commanders of each of the branches of the armed forces. Nevertheless, the broad organizational definition given above is probably the most useful. It allows for the exploration of a form of rule that has been both common and—frequently—violently repressive. This entry discusses the following important issues related to military rule: the factors that lead to military rule; how militaries mobilize support and exercise power; why and how military rule comes to an end; and what sorts of political arrangements are most likely to diminish military rule, now and in the future.

Not all authoritarian regimes involve military rule. In the 20th century, the most repressive nondemocratic regimes, most notably the Nazis in Germany and the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union, were party dictatorships in which civilian control of the military was well established. Other types of authoritarian rule distinct from military rule include traditional (e.g., absolutist monarchies) and personalistic or “sultanistic” regimes.

Military rule since the end of World War II has occurred almost exclusively in countries of the so-called developing world. Explanations of the phenomenon vary. Some scholars explain various
aspects of military rule largely in terms of political economy and specifically to the position of a given country in the global capitalist system as well as its domestic class structure. This is a hallmark, for example, of studies of “bureaucratic–authoritarian” military regimes or military rule marked by a high degree of state capacity both in managing the economy and demobilizing and repressing civil society. Other explanations rely more on geopolitical dynamics, including the international alliances within which military regimes are embedded. Studies of Cold War “clients” of the two superpowers, many of which were military regimes, are an example of this approach. A third perspective ascribes military rule to specific national and regional cultures. Finally, a fourth, institutionalist perspective sees military rule as an outcome of more or less rational and more or less historically conditioned responses to specific challenges of economic development and political legitimacy in the developing world.

Origins of Military Rule

Militaries are part of the state apparatus but enjoy a high degree of relative autonomy because of their control over the means of coercion. (This control, while still significant in most places, does not necessarily represent a monopoly, owing to the prevalence of irregular armed forces in the developing world.) However, militaries do not constitute a monolithic, single actor. They are hierarchically divided between a high command, junior officers, and enlisted personnel, and horizontal competition and rivalry between the different service branches (typically the Army, Navy, and Air Force) can be intense. Further, they are often divided along class, regional, and gender lines (although militaries in most developing countries still allow very limited roles for women). In ethnically divided societies, variation in rates of military recruitment across the major ethnic groups can result in the armed forces being seen as constituted by, or representing, one ethnic group against others. All these divisions tend to be exacerbated when the military comes to power, and many military regimes have foun-dered due to their inability to manage them.

Modernization theorists, influential in the 1950s and 1960s, were initially confident that

the newly independent nations of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia (as well as Latin America) would evolve into capitalist democracies, with civilian control over the military. These expectations were dashed by a wave of military coups d’état that reached its height in the 1960s and 1970s. The army was usually the most important actor in these actions. Uncovering the mechanisms of coups is difficult, since of course the necessity of surprise requires coup plotters to work in secret. Coups have been common in modern politics. One study claims that since 1945 there have been 345 successful military coups around the world (see Paul Collier, 2009, p. 8) on an average of more than five per year. But for each successful coup, there were several attempted coups and coup plots that were foiled before they could be carried out, making the phe-

nomenon even more ubiquitous. Factors that have been associated with successful coups include acceptance of the coup by a hegemonic regional power, the military’s cultivation of key civilian allies, the exploitation of the weakness or absence of the deposed leader, the speed and decisiveness of the coup, the seizure and use of the major means of communication to justify the coup and establish the new regime, and purges of opponents in the armed forces, the rest of the state, and civil society.

A key moment after a military coup is in the intervening weeks and months, when the new leaders establish their political regime. Military regimes are usually marked by one or more of the following characteristics:

key political leadership held by military officers;

the lack of central, civilian political control over the armed forces;

the application of military law to civilians; and

the threat or use of extrajudicial repression (such as torture, disappearances, and killings) by the state’s security forces.

Military rule can be either temporary or long term. It can also revolve around a single strong man or woman and his or her followers or develop a more corporate and institutionalized ethos. The rise of military regimes elicited a reaction from modernization theorists, some of whom decried
the trend, while others identified the military as a preeminent “modernizing” institution and praised the armed forces’ allegedly unique capacity to achieve economic development and political stability. However, cross-national statistical work has not found a correlation between military rule and high economic growth rates. While examples of successful economic management, such as that of the Park Chung-hee regime in South Korea (1961–1979) exist, there are also many examples of military regimes whose economic record is less than stellar.

Analyses of the rise of military rule in developing countries abound. Large-$$n$$ empirical studies suggest that there is no direct correlation between the size of the military or its budget and its propensity to seize power. Further, the reasons for hierarchical coups (led by the high command) tend to be different from those for coups led by junior officers (those with the rank of, or equivalent to, Army captain or below). Rather more useful is the distinction between factors internal to the armed forces, domestic political variables, and international influences. In the first category, violations of military hierarchy by civilian politicians, an expansion of the military’s capacity and/or sense of mission, and a heightened sense of threat can all trigger coups. With regard to domestic politics, high degrees of political conflict (especially ethnic and religious conflict), economic crises, weak political parties (especially right-wing parties), and low-capacity state institutions have been observed to precede military takeovers. Significant in this category is also the image of the military in national politics and in particular the degree of popular identification of the military with certain positive national values. Internationally, the threat of or defeat in war, foreign political and military assistance, and an enabling international environment, including military rule in neighboring countries and international recognition of military regimes, can facilitate coups. A “cascade effect” has been observed in some regions, whereby military rule, first established in a single country, occurs elsewhere in subsequent years, leading to cooperation between military regimes. (For example, the 1964 coup in Brazil was followed by a coup in 1966 in Argentina, coups in 1973 in Chile and Uruguay, and again in Argentina in 1976.)

In general, there has been a shift in recent decades away from macrohistorical explanations of military rule to studies that emphasize the importance of contingency, strategic interaction, and short-term factors. Nevertheless, much recent work suggests that an important structural variable is causally connected to the rise and decline of military rule: superpower competition during the Cold War. Large amounts of military assistance from the United States and the Soviet Union strengthened military capacity within allied or “client” states. Within the U.S. sphere of influence, the increased emphasis on internal security threats in the wake of the Cuban Revolution (1959) contributed to an increase in direct military involvement in politics. Since the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, there has been a marked decline in the number of military regimes in the developing world. This decline had already begun during the so-called third wave of democratization that started in the mid-1970s, continued with the fading of the Cold War in the 1980s, and extended into the post–Cold War period of the 1990s and 2000s.

**Mechanisms and Impacts of Military Rule**

Militaries are hierarchical organizations that specialize in the deployment of violence, so it is often assumed that militaries rule by force and force alone. However, military rule often involves complicated attempts to secure some measure of consent from the governed. Some military regimes, for example, have permitted elections to national and subnational representative bodies. Others have used judiciaries, of varying degrees of independence, to approximate or simulate the rule of law. Still others have promulgated, and sometimes actually adhered to, constitutions.

Unsurprisingly, empirical studies suggest that military regimes are likely to increase military budgets more than their civilian counterparts. Similarly, they tend to engage in more human rights abuses than do civilian regimes. Military rulers usually confront a “coercion problem,” in which they not only require security forces to engage in repression but also need to monitor those security forces, something they can do in
different ways, each of which has costs. When it comes to regime legitimation, most military rulers take pains to present their intervention in politics as being compelled by some sort of crisis (of corruption, economic instability, succession, or the like) and carried out strictly in the service of the nation. “Nation building” has often been a key goal of military rule in the developing world. In several instances, military regimes lacked a legitimating ideology of their own, describing their rule as a temporary interlude necessary for restoring “order” before restoring power to civilians. This led Juan Linz (1974) to call such instances of military rule “authoritarian situations” rather than “authoritarian regimes.”

Military rule increases the probability of subsequent military coups and attempted coups. The rewards of direct rule often increase competition and conflict within the armed forces. Some military regimes attempt to manage this competition by, for example, allocating the spoils of office equitably between the different service branches. (This was true of the 1976–1983 military regime in Argentina.) Other military regimes carefully monitor and purge personnel within the armed forces and/or the state as a whole.

Military regimes have also been linked to militarism or the glorification of war and military prowess. Many military leaders see politics as a continuation of war by other means. This leads them to resort to force in the resolution of conflicts. Military rulers may also demand that civilian organizations develop hierarchical and disciplined configurations along military lines.

Such demands can backfire. Some military regimes have inadvertently stimulated a flowering of oppositional cultural and political activity, as artists, students, religious leaders, dissidents, and others express themselves in new ways in opposition to the authoritarianism inherent in military rule. The attempted imposition of martial standards of behavior on recalcitrant populations can produce rare moments of political electricity in which large numbers of people are united in defiance of the generals. The popularity of Fela Anikulapo Kuti (1938–1997), the outspoken musician and critic of military rule in Nigeria, or the participation of many of the most popular artists of the day in the “direct elections now” campaign (diretas-já) in Brazil in 1984 are cases in point. Such groundswells of cohesive, broad-based opposition usually dissolve once military rule has ended, however.

Transitions From Military Rule

Most military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s became civilian in subsequent decades. Analysts distinguish between regime liberalization, or the lifting of repression and the restoration of various civil liberties, and democratization, or the reestablishment of a civilian multiparty regime with accompanying democratic rights. There is some debate over whether the first process leads inevitably to the second. Regime transitions presided over by the military, in which democracy is the ostensible end goal, have been especially problematic because militaries have tended to periodically interfere in the process in order to produce their desired outcome. An example of this is Nigeria, where the military regime of Ibrahim Babangida (1985–1993) initially promised to return the country to civilian rule by 1990, pushed that deadline back to 1992 after a coup attempt, and then annulled the presidential elections of 1993. The Babangida “transition” ended in a coup led by General Sani Abacha in 1993.

Alfred Stepan (1988) makes the important distinction between the military as government (usually a president and his advisors), the security forces, and the military government (the chain of command of the active-duty military). He argues that the long, complicated transition to civilian rule overseen by the Brazilian military regime (1964–1985) involved a tacit pact between the first and third of those organizations with moderate opponents of the regime. Hardliners in the security forces and radical opponents of military rule were both marginalized in a transition marked by a high degree of institutional conservatism and continuity of political leadership.

Military regimes have ended in a variety of ways. Some have collapsed after a failed military adventure (e.g., Greece in 1974 and Argentina in 1983) while others managed to negotiate their way out of power through the use of formal or informal agreements (an example of the former is the 1984 Naval Club Pact in Uruguay). In an unusual example, the Chilean military regime (1973–1990) was voted out of office in a 1988 plebiscite scheduled
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in its 1980 Constitution; this was followed by a 1989 election that restored civilian rule. The usual combination of mechanisms for establishing or reestablishing a civilian rule after a military regime is a collapse or insurrection, a pact, or holding of elections. Examples of all these mechanisms, including transitions that involved all three, can be found in the historical record. Not all transitions actually lead to civilian rule, of course. Military regimes are sometimes replaced by a new version of the same type of regime, as in Nigeria in 1993, when General Abacha replaced General Babangida.

Military prerogatives established under military rule can outlast the military regime itself. These prerogatives include army control over the police and/or a role for the military in internal public security; a special responsibility for “law and order” or the rule of law being bestowed on the armed forces in the constitution, giving it constitutional cover for political intervention; a fixed allotment of the national budget for the military; higher salaries for military officers than other state officials; control over the intelligence apparatus; control over civilian activities (such as civil aviation); economic privileges (such as special export–import licenses, direct control over state-owned firms, and the like); and military veto power over various decisions beyond national defense. An important question that can be asked of any civilian regime established after military rule is which of the state activities need military approval? The answer in some new democracies would comprise a lengthy list. Stable civilian rule is not synonymous with the reduction of military prerogatives, and indeed civil–military peace is sometimes purchased at the price of not reviewing or reforming any of these authoritarian enclaves or legacies of military rule.

Politics and the Future of Military Rule

In recent decades, there have been strong international pressures to civilianize military regimes and to avert or roll back military coups. The end of the Cold War and economic globalization have created an environment in which overt military rule is less accepted than it was in the past and in which military interventions and military regimes are more likely to falter or fade than they would previously. “Failed” coup attempts in Guatemala in 1993, Paraguay in 1996, and Ecuador in 2000 are cases in point (the degree of their failure is open to interpretation; in some instances, such as in Ecuador, coup participants did succeed in ousting an elected president). Similarly, the desire for admission into the European Union (EU) has led the Turkish military, which has engaged in frequent military interventions in the last few decades, to engage in a new kind of restraint in its interactions with civilian politicians. Another example is that of Pakistan where the regime of General Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008) was eventually replaced by an elected civilian regime. Despite these trends, the increased emphasis on security in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attack in the United States has enhanced the possibilities for military interventions and military regimes to falter or fade than their predecessors did. The military may therefore remain a powerful force behind the scenes in many different regimes.

There are few overt military regimes today. Even in Burma (Myanmar), which has been ruled by a military junta since 1962, the generals spoke of the possibility of elections in 2010. Similarly, the Thai military coup of 2006 that toppled Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra did not lead to a long-standing military regime. Elections were held at the end of 2007, and the military rule lasted for only 16 months. Military rule established after a coup in the West African country of Guinea (Conakry) in December 2008 also appears destined to be replaced by a civilian regime.

Debates exist as to how best to institutionalize civilian control over the military, once military rule is over. Some scholars assert that limiting militaries to a classic external defense role is the best recipe for success. By forbidding the military to engage in internal roles such as drug interdiction, social welfare programs, the building of infrastructure, and the like, civilians will curb, the reasoning goes, the military’s temptation to abuse its power and intervene in politics. Others take the opposite view and argue that expanded internal missions for the armed forces are healthy for democracy, in that they enhance the military’s image, focus officers’ minds on the country’s problems, and diminish the chances of coups. Others go beyond this particular debate to point to the importance of the development of civilian expertise on defense matters—not only in the Ministry of Defense and parliament or Congress but also in civil society.
The recent discussion of “hybrid” regimes (regimes with mixed authoritarian and democratic characteristics) is relevant to the analysis of military rule. While coups and overt military rule are less prevalent now than in the past, military influence is more likely to be exerted in subtle and disguised ways, as civilian state institutions are “hollowed out” and military forces take their place. Protected democracies, with strong military prerogatives and effective military veto power over issues outside national defense, are more common today than conventional military regimes.

The recent diminution of military rule in the developing world has been a significant and welcome development. Nevertheless, the international and domestic political circumstances that helped foster this transformation are not necessarily permanent. If military rule has become a kind of political taboo in international circles, the military’s control over the means of coercion still gives it significant power. This power could become more overt than it is now in moments of crisis. It is therefore too early to write the obituary for this type of regime.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Democratization; Hybrid Regimes; Regime (Comparative Politics); Security Apparatus; Transition; Violence

Further Readings

Militias

The term militia can have multiple meanings ranging from the legal to the historical, but in general, it denotes a military force composed of ordinary citizens. A militia may be used to provide defense, law and order, or security during emergencies. It may be a way for the state to fulfill a legal obligation to provide defense activities to protect a community, its territory, property, or laws. In some countries or cultures, a militia may consist of volunteers who are able-bodied citizens, including women, whereas in other countries or cultures, it may be a reserve force composed of citizens/soldiers. It can also be a private, nonstate force with or without government sanction. The term militia can also refer to a national police force, as in Nazi Germany or in former communist states such as the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. This entry discusses the empirical meaning of the concept and the phenomenon and the role of public and private militias in a number of countries.

Definition and Early Examples

Etymologically, the term militia is derived from the Latin miles, implying soldiers; the suffix itia
denotes a state, activity, quality, or condition of being. Hence, the term militia (miles + ita) implies a military service. Although the classical Latin meaning of militia implied soldiers in service of a sovereign or a state, today it means “a military force raised from the civilian population of a country or region, especially to supplement regular army in an emergency, distinguished from mercenaries or professional soldiers” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2002). It is important to distinguish militia composed of professional soldiers in paid service from those made of persons giving voluntary or unpaid service on an ad hoc basis.

Its history can be traced back at least as far as the early colonial period in the United States, when there were many examples of groups of able-bodied males who were ready to fight in any emergency. In fact, the militia was the first permanent armed military force in the 13 colonies. George Washington, then adjutant general of the Virginia militia, called on the militia to respond to a frontier Indian attack. Article VI of the Articles of Confederation (1777) stated,

Every State shall always keep up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered and shall always provide and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage.

Similarly, militia turned out with great alacrity in Maryland and Pennsylvania, where they performed the role of internal police and looked out for people with suspect allegiances. Militias continued to be raised following the Revolutionary War but often lacked traditional military values. Officers were commonly selected on the basis of popularity rather than their military training, experiences, or ethos. The public was also reluctant to support the militia through taxation. The militia was seen as a peacetime army outside civilian control. For instance, in 1794, a militia comprising about 13,000 people was raised by President George Washington to quell the Whiskey Rebellion in the state of Pennsylvania. In 1802, the federal academy at West Point was established to rectify some of the flaws in the training of the militia and to inculcate in them a greater sense of discipline.

After the end of the U.S. Civil War, the role of “policing the southern states” fell to provisional militia. A significant number of these troops were black, and constant tension prevailed between the official and unofficial, permanent and ad hoc, white and black, and male and female sections of the militia. In 1903, a Militia Act was passed that allowed various states to maintain a reserve military force known as the National Guard. Their primary job was to assist the soldiers and the military police. It was composed of able-bodied men in the age group of 17 to 45 years. Today, the age limit for enlistment with no prior service is 35 years for the Army National Guard and 40 years for the Air Force National Guard. For the Army and Air Force National Guards, the maximum age for enlistment for those with prior service is 59 years, as long as the member has enough years of prior service to be able to complete 20 years of creditable service for retirement by 60 years of age.

Militias in the Contemporary World

The role of the modern militia can be seen both as a service and as a duty. It can be organized or unorganized. There are also private militias formed of nonorganized individuals based on their own concept of militia. In Austria, the multiple militias became affiliated with certain political parties after World War I. For instance, the Heimwehr (Home Defense) became affiliated with the Christian Socialist Party. In Canada, too, the term militia was associated with the reserve force of the Canadian Army in earlier times. Today, Canadian militias have no official standing but are essentially private armies. In China, there were militias of varying abilities. Their prime motto was to seek certain concessions from the British rulers during the colonial period, such as inheritance, property, or marriage rights for the indigenous peoples. In Denmark, the Danish Militia played a crucial role in repelling an attack from Sweden on Copenhagen in 1659. In Iran, the Basij Militia founded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in November 1979, shortly after the removal of the Shah, was composed of 90,000 regular soldiers and 300,000 reservists. Today, it has more than 11 million members.

Similarly, in Iraq, we find several armed militias engaged in defending their respective cultures and
Militias

Private Militias

Private militias are armed groups of civilians not necessarily recognized by the federal or state governments. Today, about 50% of the states in the United States of America forbid private militias to parade and exercise in public, though the formation of private militias is not forbidden per se.

In the United States, some private militias participated in the tax protestor movement during the 1970s and 1980s. Today, the militias may support presidential candidates and oppose certain political parties or pressure groups. Other private militias in the United States have expressed sentiments against globalization and the “new world order” and are often right-wing extremist groups whose leaders consider the U.S. federal government illegitimate. It is difficult to estimate the number of U.S. militia groups; however, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), a civil rights group that monitors hate crimes, estimated that militia groups existed in 20 states in 1994, 42 states by late 1995, and all 50 states by 1996. The SPLC has also reported a resurgence in “patriot groups” or militias and other extremist groups that see the federal government as their enemy.

Even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan are said to be relying on illegal militia, often run by warlords responsible for human rights abuses and drug trafficking. NATO is said to be using private militias not only to guard their camps and convoys but also for “black ops.” These militias function outside Afghan law, which bans unlicensed armed groups. Many of them compete with the state authority and are usually run by former military commanders responsible for antisocial activities. Many governments are now financing private militias as alternative power structures to fulfill their short-term security needs, but this practice can have very bad repercussions in the long term. Once the private militias are financed and armed, it becomes difficult to disarm them, and those hired to provide security can become the very source of “new threats” to the state by indulging in antisocial activities.

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See also Military Rule; Police; Security Apparatus; Security Cooperation

Further Readings

**Misspecification**

Misspecification is a fundamental problem in empirical modeling. The origins of this problem can be found in the theoretical exercise of using a statistical model from a sample to make inferences about an unobservable population of interest. Any deviation from the true population model in the sample model means that the sample model is misspecified. This, in turn, means that the inferences from the sample model about the population are suspect.

The importance of problems of misspecification is underscored by the amount of attention paid to different types of misspecification in introductory texts on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. As an example, consider Damodar Gujarati’s widely used textbook, *Basic Econometrics*. Gujarati’s treatment of OLS is centered around 10 assumptions of the linear regression model. Six of these 10 assumptions are statements that the model does not contain one or more types of misspecification.

Discussed throughout this entry is misspecification in OLS. The logic and importance of misspecification in OLS extends directly to other, more complicated types of models. Almost all such models contain some equation that indicates the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable is dictated. Getting this equation wrong means that the model is misspecified.

As the Gujarati example shows, misspecification can take on many different forms. In the sections that follow are discussions of several of the most common forms of misspecification, the detection of statistical problems caused by misspecification, and strategies for avoiding misspecification.

**Types of Misspecification**

The purpose of empirical model specification is to try to develop an accurate model of relationships in an unobservable population with observed sample data. In OLS, we can represent the population regression model as

\[
Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \varepsilon_i,
\]

and the sample regression model as

\[
Y_i = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 X_i + \hat{\beta}_2 Z_i + \hat{\varepsilon}_i,
\]

where \(Y\) is the dependent variable; \(X\) and \(Z\) are the independent variables, \(\alpha, \beta_1, \) and \(\beta_2\) are sample estimates of the population parameters \(\alpha, \beta_1, \) and \(\beta_2\); and \(\hat{\varepsilon}_i\) is the sample estimate of the population stochastic term \(\varepsilon_i\).

If any element of the population model is not appropriately represented in the sample regression model, then the inferences about the population model from the sample model may be problematic. The entry now turns to more in-depth discussions of four of the most common forms of misspecification.

**Omitted Variable Bias**

One of the most common critiques of empirical work is that the authors have left a relevant independent variable out of their model specification. This problem associated with this critique is known as “omitted variable bias.” For example, if the population regression model is

\[
Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \varepsilon_i
\]

but the sample regression model is specified as

\[
Y_i = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 X_i + \varepsilon_i
\]

then there is a strong possibility that the sample model is prone to omitted variable bias. To illustrate the nature of this problem, consider what happens to the parameter estimate for the effect of \(X\) on \(Y\), \(\hat{\beta}_1\). In summation notation, the OLS formula for this parameter estimate is

\[
\hat{\beta}_1 = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} (X_i - \overline{X})(Y_i - \overline{Y})}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} (X_i - \overline{X})^2},
\]

and because one of the properties of OLS is that the resulting regression line (or plane in the case of a model with two independent variables) goes through the mean of each variable, we know that

\[
(Y_i - \overline{Y}) = \beta_1 (X_i - \overline{X}) + \beta_2 (Z_i - \overline{Z})
\]

\[
+ (\varepsilon_i - \overline{\varepsilon});
\]

where 

\[
\overline{X} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i, \quad \overline{Z} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} Z_i,
\]

\[
\overline{Y} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} Y_i, \quad \overline{\varepsilon} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \varepsilon_i.
\]
we can see that the expected value of \( \hat{\beta}_1, E(\hat{\beta}_1) \), under these circumstances is

\[
E(\hat{\beta}_1) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(X_i - \bar{X})(Z_i - \bar{Z})}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(X_i - \bar{X})^2}.
\]

Any time the expected value of the parameter estimate is not equal to the population value, we have a biased estimator. In this circumstance, \( E(\hat{\beta}_1) = \beta_1 \) only if

\[
\beta_2 \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(X_i - \bar{X})(Z_i - \bar{Z})}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(X_i - \bar{X})^2} = 0,
\]

and this will occur only if either one of two things is true:

1. The covariance between \( X \) and \( Z \) is equal to zero,
   \[
   \text{COV}_{XZ} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(X_i - \bar{X})(Z_i - \bar{Z})}{n} = 0.
   \]
2. The true impact of \( Z \) on \( Y \) is equal to zero,
   \[
   \beta_2 = 0.
   \]

If neither of these conditions holds, then the estimated impact of \( X \) on \( Y \) is biased due to the omission of \( Z \) from the model.

**Unnecessary Extra Variables**

In the previous section, we saw the problems that can occur when a variable that should be in a model is left out. The problem of “unnecessary extra variables” is the reverse of the problem of omitted variable bias, in the sense that variables that are not in the unobservable population model have been included in the sample model. Note, however, that we do not call this problem a form of “bias.” This is because the presence of unnecessary extra variables does not bias the estimates of the parameters for variables that should be in the model. Instead, the impact of unnecessary extra variables is that they artificially drive up the model’s \( R^2 \)-squared statistic and chew up extra degrees of freedom.

For example, if the population regression model is

\[
Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \varepsilon_i,
\]

but the sample regression model is specified as

\[
Y_i = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 X_i + \hat{\beta}_2 Z_i + \hat{\varepsilon}_i,
\]

the inclusion of the variable \( W_i \) in the model is unnecessary.

**Wrong Functional Form**

Another common form of misspecification occurs when the model specification fails to properly take into account the underlying relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable.

For example, if the population regression model is

\[
Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i^2 + \varepsilon_i,
\]

but the sample regression model is specified as

\[
Y_i = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 X_i + \hat{\beta}_2 Z_i + \hat{\varepsilon}_i,
\]

this model will not give us an accurate estimate of \( \beta_2 \).

**Failure to Include Interactions**

Political scientists have increasingly become aware of interactive relationships. Although researchers frequently expressed their theoretical ideas about the relationships between variables in a way that implies interactive relationships, they have often failed to specify their models as such.

For example, if the population regression model is

\[
Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \beta_3 X_i Z_i + \varepsilon_i,
\]

the sample regression model is specified as

\[
Y_i = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 X_i + \hat{\beta}_2 Z_i + \hat{\varepsilon}_i.
\]

**Detecting Misspecification**

Detecting misspecification is not an easy process. There is no direct way of testing for all types of model misspecification. Instead, there are a variety of different ways to test for specific symptoms of misspecification. Most of the procedures for doing this involve visual and/or statistical examinations...
of the estimated stochastic components or residuals after the original model has been estimated. These tests amount to using residuals, \( \hat{\varepsilon}_i \), to make inferences about the unobserved population stochastic components, \( \varepsilon_i \).

**Tests for Autocorrelation and Heteroskedasticity**

The use of numerical tests for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity has become standard practice. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are often symptoms of model misspecification (although this is often overlooked). Consider, for instance, Gujarati's discussion of the sources of heteroskedasticity (pp. 389–391) and autocorrelation (pp. 442–448). Each of the eight sources of heteroskedasticity (failure to account for learning processes, failure to account for income differences, failure to account for improvements in the measurement of data across settings, outliers, incorrect model specification, failure to account for skewness, incorrect data transformation, and incorrect functional form) and each of the eight sources of autocorrelation (inertia, excluded variables, incorrect functional form, the cobweb problem, failure to include lags, improper manipulation of data, improper transformation of data, and failure to account for nonstationarity) can be classified as a type of model misspecification.

The general logic of these tests is best seen through a discussion of the omega (\( \Omega \)) matrix. The \( \Omega \) matrix contains the expected covariation between population stochastic components across observations,

\[
E(\mathbf{\mu} \mathbf{\mu}^\prime) = \Omega = \begin{pmatrix}
\operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_1) & \operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2) & \cdots & \operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_n) \\
\operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_1) & \operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_2) & \cdots & \operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_n) \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
\operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon_n, \varepsilon_1) & \operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon_n, \varepsilon_2) & \cdots & \operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon_n, \varepsilon_n)
\end{pmatrix},
\]

which can be rewritten as

\[
E(\mathbf{\mu} \mathbf{\mu}^\prime) = \Omega = \begin{pmatrix}
\operatorname{var}(\varepsilon_1) & \operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2) & \cdots & \operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_n) \\
\operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_1) & \operatorname{var}(\varepsilon_2) & \cdots & \operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_n) \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
\operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon_n, \varepsilon_1) & \operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon_n, \varepsilon_2) & \cdots & \operatorname{var}(\varepsilon_n)
\end{pmatrix},
\]

Two of the assumptions that are implicit in the use of OLS are that of no autocorrelation and that of no heteroskedasticity. A general expression of the assumption of no autocorrelation is

\[
\operatorname{cov}_{\varepsilon_i \varepsilon_j} = 0 \quad \forall \ i \neq j,
\]

which means that we do not expect to see evidence of covariation between any pair of population stochastic components. A general expression of the assumption of no heteroskedasticity is

\[
\operatorname{var}_{\varepsilon_i} = \sigma^2 \quad \forall \ i,
\]

which means that we do not expect to see evidence of unequal variance across population stochastic components. If both of these assumptions hold, then

\[
\Omega = \begin{pmatrix}
\sigma^2 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
0 & \sigma^2 & \cdots & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & \cdots & \sigma^2
\end{pmatrix},
\]

which can be rewritten as \( \Omega = \sigma^2 I \).

The \( \Omega \) matrix and the assumptions that we make about it are important because they are used to estimate the variance of OLS parameter estimates,

\[
\operatorname{var}(\hat{\beta}) = (X'X)^{-1}X' \mathbf{E}(\Omega)X(X'X)^{-1}.
\]

If we make the OLS assumptions about the stochastic component, then this means substituting in \( E(\Omega) = \sigma^2 I \). We can then substitute in

\[
\hat{\sigma}^2 = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \hat{\varepsilon}_i^2}{n - k}.
\]

Because we use \( \operatorname{var}(\hat{\beta}) \) to test our theoretically derived hypotheses about the relationships between variables, if our assumptions about no autocorrelation and no heteroskedasticity are invalid, we run the risk of falsely accepting or falsely rejecting the null hypothesis and thereby arriving at faulty conclusions about our causal theories.
Because of the importance of knowing about the presence of evidence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, there are now a wide range of statistical tests that can be used to diagnose these problems. All of these tests, either implicitly or explicitly, use information from sample model residuals contained in $\hat{\Omega}$ to make hypothesis-testing inferences about $\Omega$. Most of these tests do so by looking for specific forms of autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity.

For instance, tests for first-order serial autocorrelation in time-series data look for evidence that $\varepsilon_t = \rho \varepsilon_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$, which would show up in an $\hat{\Omega}$ matrix as

$$
\hat{\Omega} = \sigma^2 \begin{pmatrix}
1 & \rho & \rho^2 & \ldots & \rho^{n-1} \\
\rho & 1 & \rho & \ldots & \rho^{n-2} \\
\ldots & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots \\
\rho^{n-1} & \rho^{n-2} & \ldots & \rho & 1
\end{pmatrix},
$$

while tests for spatial autocorrelation test the hypothesis that

$$
\hat{\Omega} = \sigma^2 \begin{pmatrix}
1 & \rho_{12} & \ldots & \rho_{1n} \\
\rho_{21} & 1 & \ldots & \rho_{2n} \\
\ldots & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots \\
\rho_{n1} & \rho_{n2} & \ldots & 1
\end{pmatrix}.
$$

Tests for heteroskedasticity test the hypothesis that

$$
\Omega = \begin{pmatrix}
\sigma_1^2 & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\
0 & \sigma_2^2 & \ldots & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & \ldots & \sigma_n^2
\end{pmatrix}.
$$

Tests for “Unnecessary” Variables

There are a variety of different statistical tests that are designed to help researchers decide whether or not they should add one or more variables to their model specification. These tests follow the logic that if the new variable or group of variables does not significantly increase the explanatory power, then they are unnecessary and therefore should not be added. While these tests can be helpful guides for keeping a model specification parsimonious, the discussion in the section “Omitted Variable Bias” should not be forgotten when considering the usefulness of these tests.

One of the most common tests along these lines is an $F$ test, for which the null hypothesis is that the $R^2$ statistic for a model is not improved when one or more new variables are added to the specification. This test statistic is calculated by going through the following steps:

1. Estimate the original model, which we'll call Model 1, and obtain the $R^2$ statistic from this model, $R^2_1$.
2. Estimate the original model with the new variable(s) included, which we'll call Model 2, and obtain the $R^2$ statistic from this model, $R^2_2$.
3. Using the $R^2_1$, $R^2_2$ statistics, the number of degrees of freedom from Model 1 ($k_1$) and from Model 2 ($k_2$) to calculate

$$
F_{k_1, k_2} = \frac{(R^2_2 - R^2_1)/(k_2 - k_1)}{1 - R^2_2/(n - k_2)}.
$$

Correcting for Misspecification

As discussed above, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation get a lot of attention in books and classes that introduce OLS regression models. In practice, most empirical researchers tend to view heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation as statistical diseases that can be cured by statistical procedures such as feasible generalized least squares (FGLS; discussed in the following section). This type of cookbook approach is popular, but it has come under attack in recent years. As noted above, most of the sources of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are one form or another of misspecification. When these symptoms of misspecification are “cured” by FGLS, opportunities may be missed.

FGLS Procedures

In the presence of evidence that $E(\Omega) \neq \sigma^2 I$ many scholars turn to a set of procedures known as FGLS. The logic of FGLS procedures is to diagnose the specific type of violation of the OLS assumptions about $\Omega$ by estimating $\hat{\Omega}$ and then to
correct for them by using the estimated nature of the problem contained in $\hat{\Omega}$.

In regular OLS, the matrix algebra formula for the parameter estimates is $\hat{\beta}_{\text{OLS}} = (X'X)^{-1}X'Y$. With FGLS, this formula becomes

$$\hat{\beta}_{\text{FGLS}} = \left( X' \hat{\Omega}^{-1} X \right)^{-1} X' \hat{\Omega}^{-1} Y.$$

The formula for the variance of the parameter estimates is

$$\text{var}(\hat{\beta}) = (X'X)^{-1} X' E(\Omega) X (X'X)^{-1}$$

in both models, but $E(\Omega) = \sigma^2 I$ in OLS.

It is worth noting that with real-world data, we never see $\Omega$ but we make inferences from our OLS estimates of $\hat{\Omega}$. When we find evidence of violations in the OLS assumptions about $\Omega$ in our estimated matrix $\hat{\Omega}$, we use FGLS to correct them. This is a leap of faith from $\hat{\Omega}$ to $\hat{\Omega}$ and is worth keeping in mind as we use it to adjust our estimates.

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See also Interaction Effects; Logit and Probit Analyses; Model Specification; Nonlinear Models

Further Readings

Mixed Methods

Variants of mixed-methods research design, that is, the combination of qualitative and quantitative components within one single research design, have been practiced since the beginnings of the social and related sciences and before the complex construct mixed-methods research was conceived. It could be argued that in the first half of the 20th century, the combination within one research project of what was subsequently referred to as qualitative and quantitative research was not unusual, at least for well-known studies such as Samuel A. Stouffer and colleagues’ American Soldier (1949), Theodor Adorno and colleagues’ Authoritarian Personality (1950), and most types of psychometric measurement and scaling procedures during this time. Only in the 1990s did researchers begin to systematize this research approach and design to the extent to which it became explicitly and systematically studied and applied. In this second wave of conceptualization and application, Abbas Tashakkori, Charles Teddlie, John Creswell, Julia Brannen, and Alan Bryman were most influential in establishing this type of research design. It is often proclaimed that a third generation of mixed-methods studies is about to emerge. Some optimistic predictions include the replacement of mono-method studies by mixed-methods studies, research becoming more ethical or democratic due to the integration of different methods and perspectives, the ability to access a phenomenon under investigation objectively due to the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, and new ways of conceiving, collecting, and analyzing data that are no longer identifiable as qualitative or quantitative in nature. The field of mixed-methods research is indeed changing, but the third generation is most likely to rectify some of the simplifications and misconceptions that have established themselves in the past 3 decades, due in part to various attempts to establish separate, that is, qualitative and quantitative “paradigms” and the resulting incompatibility thesis. This entry discusses definitions, forms, applications, and further developments of mixed-methods research.

Nomenclature

Although now well established, the use of the term mixed-methods design is not ubiquitous. One contender is methods triangulation. A shortcoming of this term is that it implies only studies in which the results of the qualitative and quantitative parts
converge or verify each other. Under certain circumstances, this may indeed be of interest, but there are other possibilities of mixing methods unrelated to triangulation. Another alternative is using words such as combining, blending, synthesizing, or merging instead of mixing because, strictly speaking, qualitative and quantitative methods are not mixed but rather combined in different ways and for different purposes. Despite these alternative proposals, mixed-methods research design is now the accepted nomenclature for this kind of design.

Two related designs should be mentioned briefly. Multimethod design is the label given to research designs that combine at least two different quantitative or two different qualitative methods within one research project. Accordingly, a multimethod quantitative design consists of at least two distinct quantitative components, while multimethod qualitative design consists of distinct qualitative components within one research design. Finally, mixed model design describes a research design that combines quantitative and qualitative components across all phases of the research process, where it ostensibly is no longer possible to clearly distinguish between the qualitative and quantitative contributions to the overall research results. However, it is questionable whether the research components that most authors refer to in this context can indeed be clearly attributed to the quantitative or qualitative component. Thus, mixed model design is best used for research designs where the quantitative and qualitative components are intertwined such that they are no longer clearly separable or where the line of demarcation between quantitative and qualitative research components becomes indistinguishable.

**Justifications**

Among the many interrelated reasons listed in the literature on the improvement of mixed-methods research on mono-method research designs are that some research questions are better answered by using the strengths of qualitative and quantitative research approaches; mixed-methods designs may help control for a methods bias inherent in mono-method approaches, and results from different methods may cross-validate each other; a combination of methods may allow for a greater diversity of theoretical and empirical approaches or it may contribute to a more holistic perspective on a given research problem; and mixed-methods designs may improve the ecological and external validity as well as the internal consistency of a study. Most reasons, however, can be summarized into three families: (1) convergence, (2) complementarity, and (3) holism.

**Convergence**

The first set of justifications for a mixed-methods research design relates to the traditional idea of methods triangulation, where researchers use qualitative and quantitative approaches to cross-validate their findings. For instance, clinical interviews often aim at verifying whether the score of a formal psychometric test converges with clinicians’ assessments. In voting participation studies, researchers may use semistructured interviews to assess the convergence of the interview data with the responses in a survey on various reasons for the types and degrees of political participation. Given that survey or test items are structured such that respondents merely take position to the researcher-generated items, and given that in a semistructured or clinical interview, interviewees are able to present their own perspective on a particular issue, a convergence of these two sets of data may indeed contribute to the triangulation and thus validation of research findings.

**Complementarity**

The second set of justifications for employing mixed-methods research design relates to the idea that different methods may contribute additional insights into a phenomenon under investigation. In this sense, the qualitative and quantitative parts complement each other to produce a particular answer to a research question. In other words, the results would not have emerged from employing either a qualitative or a quantitative approach. For instance, before a standardized scale can be established, the phenomena underlying the scale may have to be explored in a nonstandardized, exploratory manner. This procedure is well established in measurement theory in psychometrics, and it is also often applied in questionnaire design. In this sense, political scientists
may want to first explore the way in which members of a population of interest think and behave in relation to political participation before selecting different survey items for their study. Alternatively, the same researchers may find interesting or surprising relations between variables during their statistical analysis. Rather than engaging in post hoc hypothesizing, it may be interesting to also conduct a few exploratory interviews to help generate explanations or hypotheses for future studies.

**Holism**

A number of important texts on mixed-methods design go as far as to claim that the ultimate goal of mixed-methods research should be the examination of a particular phenomenon from all possible positions, be it all theories potentially suitable for the investigation of a phenomenon, all data available, or all possible analyses of these data. Starting from the argument that qualitative and quantitative methods have different strengths and weaknesses relating to ontology, epistemology, axiology, the ability to identify general causal laws, and so on, their combination may help draw from the strengths of the other types of methods. Detailed analyses of all relevant data from all possible theoretical positions and with all possible analytic methods ostensibly produce many different pieces of information. Sometimes the metaphor of a puzzle is used in this context. If assembled correctly, the different results produce objective findings, that is, findings that are devoid of any form of bias. In this context, John Brewer and Albert Hunter refer to not only two kinds of principal research methods—qualitative and quantitative—but four: (1) fieldwork, (2) survey research, (3) experimentation, and (4) nonreactive research. Within this framework, fieldwork would provide ecologically valid and testable hypotheses relating to a phenomenon under investigation, survey research would examine the extent to which the phenomenon is generalizable, experiments would determine the causes of the phenomenon, and in the nonreactive portion of the research, investigators would examine “naturally occurring” data, that is, data unbiased by the data collection process. In the end, all theories, data, results from analyses, and different interpretations ought to converge. However, it is unlikely that collecting many data sets, employing all possible methods, and subjecting data collection and analyses to all possible theoretical frameworks will lead to a single valid answer to a research question. Thus, this third family of reasons for employing a mixed-methods design is reminiscent of pre-Popperian positivism. Holism is unlikely to lead to successful research outcomes, because, among other reasons, research methods do not combine in the manner envisioned by their proponents and because such an undertaking would be impossibly complex, expensive, labor intensive, and unfocused.

**Forms of Mixed-Methods Research Designs**

Creswell and his colleagues have specialized in the identification of various forms of mixed-methods design. For illustrative purposes, only three families of mixed-methods design are covered here.

**Sequential Mixed-Methods Design**

Sequential mixed-methods design includes at least one qualitative and one quantitative research component, which take place in a temporal sequence. For example, the exploratory investigation of appropriate wording or phrasing of survey questions in the form of semistructured interviews implies a sequence of data collection and analysis, that is, exploratory interviews, analysis of the interviews, wording and phrasing of survey questions using some of the findings of the interviews, and, finally, the survey research. It is also possible to use survey research and interviews in a reverse order, that is, analyze survey data and, based on some of the findings, conduct exploratory or semistructured interviews, which may help in interpreting some of the findings from the statistical analysis of the survey data. The findings from these interviews could lead to a further link in the sequence by, for instance, formally testing some of the hypotheses that emerge from the post hoc interviews.

**Concurrent or Parallel Mixed-Methods Research Design**

Concurrent or parallel mixed-methods research design describes a family of approaches, which include relatively separate qualitative and quantitative strands within one research project. Focus
groups or nonparticipant observations may produce data for qualitative analysis on political decision making with a given set of stakeholders. The link of these findings to their voting records or responses on surveys may be fruitfully explored in a convergent or complementary mixed-methods framework.

**Nested Mixed-Methods Design**

Nested mixed-methods design describes a set of designs in which either the qualitative or the quantitative part of the research project is nested in the quantitative or qualitative part, respectively. For instance, the main part of a study may focus on a specific group of people who refuse to vote. A dominant, qualitative research design may focus on identifying the dimensionality of their justifications for nonvoting as well as alternative forms of political participation. The embedded quantitative part of the research may quantify the extent of the phenomenon under investigation as far as this is possible with available data, for example, nonvoting among a specific subgroup of a population and its relations to demographic characteristics.

**Fields of Applications**

The uptake of mixed-methods research design varies tremendously between the social and related sciences as well as between the different fields of interest within the disciplines. Currently, the most frequent applications can be found in education, public health, nursing, sociology, media studies, management studies, and evaluation. Interestingly, political science and psychology are currently underrepresented in this emergent design, even though, in principle, both have well-developed qualitative and quantitative traditions. Other fields not represented due to a traditional preference for qualitative or quantitative methods are social anthropology, social work, gender studies, geography, and economics. It could be argued that these disciplines are still engaged in the oft-proclaimed paradigm war, where proponents on both sides are still attempting to argue the overall superiority of one type of method over another. With the rise of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research, however, more researchers are likely to embrace mixed-methods research designs within and across disciplines. The few published examples that can be found on topics relating to political science include reception studies of political campaign messages, political alienation of voters, gender and political power, social justice in relation to action research, and appropriateness of welfare policy in different contexts.

**Limitations and Misuses**

The mixed-methods research design has numerous limitations. First, it is a far more complicated research design than a mono-methods design. Not only do researchers have to engage in qualitative and quantitative research—and most empirical researchers are not specialized in more than one family of methods—but they also have to combine results in a convincing way. Even or especially when research teams work in groups divided by methods competence, the combination of results may turn out to be nearly impossible because of the lack of communication skills and understanding between them. Second, unfocused research often leads to different data collection and analysis possibilities. Rather than finding or deciding on a well-focused research question, many researchers and especially research teams prefer to leave options open and, thus, believe that a mixed-methods design gives them the justification and tools to pursue unfocused research. What often results from this is a number of disparate research results around a research theme. This, however, is not mixed-methods research. Third, it is often believed that a mixed-methods research design can bridge the gap between different epistemological and ontological positions. This, too, is not the case because it does not make sense to frame the qualitative part of the research in a constructivist framework and the quantitative part in a (post-) positivistic framework. At fault here are the problematic assumptions underlying qualitative and quantitative research, which were, in part, a result of the influence of French social theorists on qualitative research from the 1970s. Fourth, and connected to this point, is the claim that the mixed-methods research design is a third paradigm and separable from qualitative and quantitative paradigms. It is questionable whether the use of the term paradigm is suitable for the tremendous variability within the family of qualitative methods or quantitative methods. As, on closer
inspection, it is extremely difficult to describe the core characteristics of all qualitative methods, on the one hand, and of all quantitative methods, on the other, stating that mixed-methods research is systematically different due to its ability to deal with heterogeneous theoretical and empirical approaches is unconvincing to some researchers. Fifth, many texts on mixed-methods research inadvertently and often unintentionally defend the use of this design to obtain more valid (in the problematic sense of objective and positivistic) research results. Some of the better known forms of biases may indeed be detected, using different analysis methods. However, much of the current literature on this design subordinates qualitative exploratory research to quantitative research and formal hypothesis testing. It thus practically neglects the possibility of conducting mixed-methods research in a constructivist and exploratory framework.

Conclusion

Mixed-methods research design is a label that applies to a large family of research designs that can integrate diverse theoretical and empirical approaches in empirical research and evaluation. It is suitable for all social and related sciences but not to all research questions. Some research questions will remain best answered with a well-focused mono-method design. The answers to other research questions will be enriched by the possibilities of linking qualitative and quantitative methods. But the mere application of a method that is both qualitative and quantitative to explore a research topic is a necessary but insufficient condition for mixed-methods research. In practice, the flexibility of this design leads many inexperienced researchers to conduct unfocused research. However, due to its flexibility and capacity to enrich both mono- and interdisciplinary research, it is not surprising that this type of research approach and design has enjoyed so much popularity throughout the history of the social and related sciences. Now, at the end of the second generation of mixed-methods research, which mainly aimed at incorporating assumptions about the possibilities and limits of mono-method approaches, documenting different types of mixed-methods design, and cataloguing good-practice examples, the next generation of mixed-methods literature is likely to turn away from carrying baggage left over from the paradigm wars and attempting to address some of the inconsistencies by referring to a vague form of pragmatism. Instead, mixed-methods research is likely to become even more dominant in applied research within and between fields, playing out its strength particularly in inter- and transdisciplinary research.

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See also Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions

Further Readings


Mobilization, Political

Political mobilization is the process of organizing groups, social networks, crowds, and social units for political goals. Challengers to the status quo mobilize to redress grievances and for reforms when conventional political institutions fail to
respond. Regimes mobilize to realize a political program, subdue adversaries, and counter mobilization by challengers when they need popular support. Resources for mobilization are manpower and funds (often from volunteers), commitment and solidarity of supporters, and shared beliefs and values. By mobilizing, a group gains power against an adversary. Political goals tend to be collective goods whose attainment in large groups entails organization costs and free-rider tendencies, as Mancur Olson (1965) theorized for interest groups and voluntary associations. When political mobilization is countered by the authorities with repression, obstacles are even higher. Nevertheless, in a 1990 empirical study of political mobilization by 53 challenging groups in the 19th- and 20th-century United States, William Gamson found that the Olson theory is a useful starting point for explaining both conventional lobbying and unconventional modes of collective action. Charles Tilly (1978), Anthony Oberschall (1993), Sidney Tarrow (1994), Bert Klandermans (1997), and Mayer Zald and John McCarthy (1987) have added key insights, terms, and processes to the theory that have increased its explanatory power.

There are hundreds of empirical studies of political mobilization in particular instances, many of ethnic and religious minorities around the world and many others of advocacy groups (e.g., environmentalist, feminist, and antiabortion). Two core dimensions that provide theoretical coherence to these studies are micromobilization and mobilizing structures.

Micromobilization

Micromobilization explains participation with five pivotal variables: \( P \), \( V \), \( N \), \( S \), and \( C \):

\[
P \text{ is the expected probability of success for collective action;}\]
\[
V \text{ is the value of the goal, collective good, or issue for the participant (e.g., justice for a minority);}\]
\[
N \text{ is the expected number of participants or contributors;}\]
\[
S \text{ is the selective incentive or personal benefit from participation; and}\]
\[
C \text{ is the expected cost of participation.}\]

The theory hypothesizes that for participants, \( P \) times \( V \) (value expectancy or benefit) plus \( S \) is greater than \( C \); that is, \( PV + S - C > 0 \).

\( V \) is distributed in a population from the most positive values (true believers) to most negative (opponents). \( V \) is not necessarily a personal experience—for example, justice for a minority may be valued by some who are themselves not targets of injustice. \( V \) is fought over in the court of public opinion by adversaries who package issues in media frames for persuasive communication. Framing situates and connects events, people, and groups into a meaningful narrative in which beliefs and explanations are communicated persuasively using metaphors, catchphrases, and symbols. It colors judgment about the truth of beliefs and legitimacy of causes.

\( N \), the expected number of participants, enters the expression because both \( P(N) \) and \( C(N) \) are a function of \( N \): Expectation of success increases and expected cost decreases ("safety in numbers") with the number of participants. \( P \) and \( C \) functions, called production functions, are not linear with \( N \). Their shape varies with the type of collective action and other circumstances, and they influence the strategies and tactics of confrontation used by the adversaries. Some tactics require only small numbers of participants for achieving what participants define as "success"—for example, a vigil by dissidents. Others require huge numbers, sometimes in the hundreds of thousands, to achieve success, as in the case of a petition drive or a demonstration. Critical mass is a number or range of turnout at which the participants and opponents judge the collective action to be successful. Turnout is therefore contested by the adversaries, who engage in a battle over numbers in the court of public opinion.

\( S \) stands for rewards and benefits that are obtained by participation that free riders don’t get. For challengers, \( S \) tends to be social, moral, and ideological rewards of standing up for a cause. \( C \) is the cost in time and resources of contribution to collective action and expected cost due to social control such as arrest and marginalization. In contrast, regime mobilization is well placed to lower \( C \) and increase \( S \) with material and political benefits to supporters. At an extreme, repressive regimes target adversaries, with license to their followers to attack and loot (\( S \) is positive) adversaries without police interference (\( C \) is zero).
Mobilization, Political

The five variables are socially constructed by the challengers and their adversaries during contention and confrontation. If $V$ is a collective good such as nondiscrimination legislation, the motivation for $V$ comes for varied social psychological reasons: anger at injustice, belief that justice for all is a moral imperative, solidarity with an oppressed group, personal experience of discrimination, and others. Activists argue and publicize their cause through moral and ideological appeals to increase $V$. Because social and political movements have limited resources to provide tangible, selective incentives for participants, they build a sense of community among kindred souls that makes participation itself a source of satisfaction (increase $S$). Ritual, drama, and entertainment provided by rock bands and celebrities sharing the stage at mass gatherings build a sense of community and reward those who turned out with a memorable public spectacle that free riders don’t get. Survey research on participants in diverse settings has found that such moral appeals and selective incentives overcome free riding and boost participation.

To apply micromobilization, consider dissidents in a repressive regime. There are few members ($N$ is low). They mount a vigil or some other symbolic protest in a crowded square during rush hour. Only a few participants are needed to unfurl a banner or hold up signs before they are arrested (C is high). They define success as visibility to many people and the media: $P$ as a function of $N$ increases steeply and is close to 1 for small N. A dozen well-placed protesters can do it; two or three may not be enough; more than a dozen does not add to visibility and leads only to unnecessary arrests. $V$, the value for them of standing up for freedom or a cause, is very high. $S$ consists principally of the respect and social standing earned among their peers for courage. Thus, $PV$ plus $S$ minus $C$ for small $N$ can be positive for the vigil. Contrast symbolic protest to a petition campaign in a democratic society. Signing the petition is close to cost free to the signer. For success, $N$ has to be large (possibly tens of thousands) for a positive effect on the public, the media, and legislators. $P$ as a function of $N$ is a $J$ curve. Because $S$ for signing is low, organizers may give away a free pen or sticker with an icon as a token to boost $S$. Because many signers are needed, the organizers can’t simply sign up the high-$V$ public but must appeal to the mid- to low-$V$ sympathizers through advocacy and create high $N$ expectations. Opponents will attempt to confuse the public by claiming that the petition has all sorts of hidden costs and undesired consequences: $V$ is not what the advocates claim, and there are negative $C$. These are two quite different modes of political mobilization, in two very different political settings, for which micromobilization applies. Other types of collective action have their own production functions, such as for demonstrations, inclined $S$ shape, and $P$ increasing with $N$, then decreasing beyond a critical mass. Whether one analyzes petition drives, strikes, marches, demonstrations, sit-ins, building occupations, selective buying campaigns, contributions for a cause, or vigils, the same five-variable micromobilization model for participation in collective action is salient.

Mobilizing Structure

Olson assumed that obtaining a collective good voluntarily in a large group requires considerable costs of organizing and that collective good incentives are not sufficient for participation. Coercion is needed for supplying collective goods. Coercive powers such as a state enjoys with compulsory taxation is, however, beyond the reach of voluntary groups.

The 1960s witnessed an outburst of social and political movements in the United States and Western Europe that succeeded in mobilizing large numbers of participants in large populations: the civil rights movement; the anti–Vietnam War and other peace movements; youth and counterculture movements; environmentalist, feminist, and ethnic minority movements, and so on. Empirical study of these movements discovered a variety of mobilizing structures that were omitted in Olson’s theory. Large populations are not made up of isolated persons who had to be recruited at a considerable cost by a large organization. On the contrary, many populations are thick with associations, communities, groups, and networks. There exist structures with leaders, members, internal links, communication networks, and resources for collective action, such as African American churches and the student governments in historically black colleges in the South. The leadership and members of such groups committed to political goals in the
1960s (e.g., ending segregation) and joined local autonomous units such as churches or campus student associations into a federated overarching structure called a social movement organization (SMO), as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee became. Preexisting structures make federation into an SMO possible. “Bloc” recruitment takes place; that is, blocs of persons already networked and sharing an identity are recruited, instead of individuals one at a time. Shared identity activates a “grievance multiplier” (V increases) when a perceived injustice to a member of a group or category is experienced as a collective injustice by others as well. Resources such as funds for action campaigns, leadership training centers, volunteer programs, and the like are provided by nonbeneficiary “outsiders” who are moved by their values and conscience to support a cause. Federated structures, bloc recruitment, grievance multipliers, and nonbeneficiary support lower organization costs and weaken free-rider tendencies.

Other research on the anti-Vietnam war and New Left student and counterculture movements found that dynamic mobilization emerges during confrontations in a loose structure that adapts to opportunities against opposition. Loosely structured collective action characterizes a coalition of activists, part-timers, and sympathizers whose boundaries are ill-defined and shifting; who lack a shared, central leadership and organization; and who use the mass media as a tool for communicating to potential supporters in lieu of a strong grassroots base. In a loose structure, mobilization costs are kept low through a division of labor that links a small leadership cadre of full-time activists to a much larger pool of part-time teams who contribute their presence episodically in short-lived campaigns for a cause—for example, a campus sit-in. Supporting them is a larger “conscience constituency” that contributes funds and public opinion support. Beyond them is a much larger bystander public that is attentive to the issue but initially indifferent or nonpartisan. Loose structure makes for low-cost mobilization and flexible tactics as the leadership responds to its adversary’s moves: shifting from confrontations with transitory teams to legislative lobbying, to fund raising for the next confrontation campaign, and peaking with a massive peaceful gathering for which the conscience constituency and bystanders are mobilized in addition to the activists.

The effectiveness of political mobilization has been empirically studied, most completely in the Netherlands with respect to new social movements (NSM), such as the peace, women’s, and environmental movements. Public opinion polls measure the sentiment pool for an issue and identify the sympathizers. When activists organize a campaign for a petition, a march, or other collective action, survey research measures what proportion of sympathizers was reached, was motivated to act, and actually participated. The overall effectiveness of the campaign can thus be measured as well as that of various targeting tactics such as door-to-door canvassing, telephoning, media appeals, and so on. Further statistical analysis clarifies the effects of V, S, C, and P and N on participation and which components of mobilizing structure are effective. Hanspeter Kriesi (1993) compared the effectiveness of mobilization across five NSMs and compared NSM mobilization with that of political parties and trade unions. Among his conclusions is that political values, V, are the crucial determinants of the level of mobilization.

Diffusion

Large-scale collective action has taken place in autocratic regimes that curb opposition and has on occasion toppled regimes long thought to be powerful, as in Eastern Europe in 1989. How can tens of thousands of people coordinate their actions without a central organizing mechanism? Protests spontaneously spread from the capital to other cities and from one country to another, and the authorities were helpless to stop the diffusion. Diffusion was also typical in the 1960s movements of the United States, when students seized campus buildings at many universities after the initial Columbia University student protests in the spring of 1968, the Harvard protest a year later, and the diffusion of the African American sit-in movement in 1960 throughout the South.

To understand diffusion, further specification of underlying mechanisms for micromobilization and mobilizing structures are needed: focal point, repertoire of collective action, signaling, pacesetter–follower dynamics, political opportunity, and assurance or uncertainty reduction. Focal point is
the key to understanding coordination of action with only minimal communication and without leadership. It requires common knowledge embedded in political culture—for example, knowledge by citizens that in the past, for momentous political events, crowds gathered at a certain date in a historic square demanding freedom or reforms. They also know what flags, songs, and other symbols to carry and sing, signaling unity of commitment and purpose. The shared symbols and behavior codes that are embedded in the political culture and well known to participants is called the repertoire of collective action. The important matter is that not only do most people know the focal point and repertoire, but they also know that others know the same thing and will respond in the same way to “when and where we all assemble, and what we do there.”

The contemporary protest repertoire par excellence of large crowds is the demonstration and march that winds its way through the major avenues and landmarks of the capital city. Repertoires create expectations for the adversaries and bystander public and provide some predictability for action; yet some spontaneous actions also take place. New repertoires are invented and tailor-made for specific purposes.

Collective action depends on expectations for $P$, $C$, and $N$, which are uncertain. To trigger convergence on a focal point and activate the repertoire, what is needed is a political opportunity signal to many people simultaneously that $N$ is expected to be large, $P$ is increasing, and $C$ is decreasing. The signal might be a lack of support for a regime by an important ally, as when the Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev signaled in 1989 to East European communist regimes that they were on their own, or a successful challenge in neighbor states, as when Prague crowds witnessed the collapse next door of the East German regime. When political opportunity is judged to be favorable, a potential participant who estimates $P$, $C$, and $N$ has some assurance that he or she will not be at the demonstrations with only a few others. Research has shown that an assurance process takes place in neighborhood, peer, work, and civic groups whose members communicate with one another and build confidence and commitment to participation. The assurance process has also been conveyed in recent years on websites, through cell phones and e-mail, text messaging, and other modes of electronic communication. Assurance reduces uncertainty, which inhibits collective action. Thus, the turnout is thousands, not just a few.

When protest starts at a focal point, it diffuses to other places and social units with pacesetter-follower dynamics. By virtue of history, culture, and geography, a mobilizing structure has a center-periphery structure: What happens in the capital is a wake-up call to provincial cities, and what happens at a prominent university campus triggers followers in peripheral colleges. Diffusion is explained by changing expectations about $P$, $C$, and $N$ by potential followers depending on the outcome of confrontations at the pacesetter and at other sites that have already acted. The diffusion dynamic explains the spatial and temporal sequence of collective action because proximity and similarity are salient signals for expectations. The waxing and waning of participation at a particular site, be it the center or periphery, can also be thus modeled.

**Violence Specialists**

Much political mobilization researched in the 1960s through the 1980s was that of social and political movements using unconventional modes of collective action that were by and large nonviolent. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been many insurgencies for the overthrow of a government by violent means and terrorism. In response, regimes mobilized paramilitaries and special forces that not only fought armed enemies but assaulted the civilian population suspected of sympathy with the opposition. The issues at contention were state formation, secession, political autonomy, and power sharing in ethnically deeply divided societies. Research has found that micro-mobilization and mobilization structure models explain insurgent and regime mobilization in violent conflicts.

Ethnic and religious communities provide a mobilizing infrastructure of ethnic associations, kin networks, churches, mosques or temples, religious schools, funding and welfare organizations, an ideology, a shared culture, and leaders. Insurgents, fighters, and terrorists are recruited, trained, armed, and indoctrinated within this infrastructure, get social support, and are shielded from the authorities. Resources are obtained from
external sponsors, including states that provide weapons, funding, safe places, and bases across a border. Just as for peaceful movements, the Internet, websites, and electronic modes of communication have made loose mobilizing structures possible.

Studies of insurgents and terrorists cannot rely on survey research with participants and on other routine social science methods. Nevertheless, court records from trials, interrogations of captured militants, informers, captured data from computer hard drives, and confessions from those who give up insurgency enable one to piece together the contours of micromobilization and mobilizing structure. Marc Sageman (2004) reports that for more than 400 Al Qaeda terrorists, the conversion to jihad was not a solitary decision but came about through interpersonal relations and with social support. Jihadists formed links with others like themselves and congregated in the same mosques, students associations, neighborhood clubs, and Islamic bookshops and often lived together. In these local communities, they became radicalized militants who advocated the violent overthrow of corrupt Arab regimes and other Islamist causes. These findings are in line with existing models and theories.

Mobilization of regime by violence specialists for ethnic cleansing, mass purges, and killings rests on a four-legged structure: (1) a radical elite and cadres running a party-state, (2) bands of armed militants and paramilitaries, (3) core constituencies who vote for the regime and keep it in power, and (4) a bystander public swayed or confused by propaganda. The armed bands, who perpetrate much of the violence against civilians, are recruited, organized, financed, trained, and indoctrinated by political parties and state security forces. The pattern is top-down mobilization by the regime elites for violence specialists and bottom-up for the core constituency and bystander public. The armed bands become distinct and privileged formations that serve the regime more reliably and loyally than the regular police and army. Their members are attracted by the racist and extreme nationalist ideologies of leaders who manipulate perceived threats, fears, and hate against target groups, often minorities. Although opportunists are attracted by the prospects for loot ($S$), many are convinced by propaganda that their cause is patriotic and morally justified ($V$) and that a preemptive strike against unarmed civilians of the target groups is actually saving their society from subversion and destruction. An example is the Interahamwe village militias organized by “Hutu Power” leaders in the Rwanda genocide. Similarly, paramilitary bands in the Yugoslav Wars were organized by political parties, criminal groups, local crisis committees, and the authorities and were responsible for much ethnic cleansing and massacres of civilians.

According to Donald Horowitz (2001), studies of ethnic, religious, and sectarian riots around the world (e.g., Hindu–Muslim riots in Indian cities) found a similar pattern of top-down, bottom-up mobilization as for insurgents and for regime mobilization. Political parties, factions, individual politicians, extremist organizations, and secret societies organize criminal gangs and train young men and women for fighting; these people are in the forefront of rioting, burning, and looting shops and attacking innocent people. These bands are joined by ordinary people who attack a target group, burn their homes and shops, and commit atrocities in passionate killings.

Elaborations of micromobilization and mobilizing structure models have to be made in these applications. The social psychology of motivation for a suicide attacker is going to be more complex than for a petition signer or a protest marcher. Clandestine insurgent organization is going to be different and more complex than a legal association that advocates a clean environment. Nevertheless, the five pivotal variables ($P$, $V$, $N$, $S$, and $C$), focal points, signaling, uncertainty reduction, diffusion dynamic, loose structure, external allies, and other key terms and processes in political mobilization are useful for theory development for all manner of mobilization, covering both democratic polities and autocratic regimes, by regimes and by opponents of the authorities, using unconventional modes of contention and confrontation, both nonviolent and violent.

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See also Collective Security; Common Goods; Participation; Parties; Social Movements; Violence
Further Readings


**Model Specification**

Model specification refers to the process of expressing a theory in mathematical (functional) form. The choice of model specification affects the validity of causal inferences. Arguably, severe specification errors impede the validity of inferences more than the choice of a suboptimal estimator. Yet applied researchers rarely follow a strategy when trying to develop and potentially improve the specification of their model. Rather, the choice of a model specification usually depends on a crude mixture of what is common in the field of research, methodological fads, and individual intuition. Misspecification occurs when the assumptions underlying an empirical analysis deviate from the true data-generating process. Nonrandom sampling, measurement error, model uncertainty, and a lack of independence of observations rank most prominently among the sources for model misspecification. Since researchers hardly, if ever, know the true model, most models analyzed in the social sciences will, necessarily, be misspecified. The most common misspecifications result from insufficient theoretical guidance. The resulting model uncertainty usually implies that researchers do not know the correct set of regressors (independent variables), their optimal operationalization, or the accurate functional form. This entry discusses the origins and types of specification problems and reviews the standard solutions to misspecification. The entry concludes with a discussion of the way in which researchers deal with specification issues.

**Model Uncertainty**

Model uncertainty results from underspecified theories. In the social sciences, theories aim at simplifying reality, therefore making generous use of ceteris paribus clauses and of highly stylized assumptions. In other words, theories neither provide full guidance about model specification to applied researchers nor do they aim at providing such information. Usually, they do not say much about which variables to include in the list of regressors, which functional form relates the right-hand-side variables to the dependent variable, the existence of conditional effects, and the existence and correct specification of temporal and spatial dependence. This section discusses the resulting specification problems in turn.

**Model Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis**

Model uncertainty has multiple origins; it occurs when researchers do not know the correct set of right-hand-side variables, the correct functional form that relates the dependent to the independent variables, the correct structure of conditionality between exogenous variables (those whose values are independent of the states of other variables in the system under study), and/or the causal dependences between exogenous variables, to mention just a few model uncertainties. Logically, researchers need to start with identifying all exogenous factors that influence the variation of the dependent variable across observations. Both the inclusion of too few or too many regressors may cause bias and will render inferences potentially invalid.
Assume, as an example for the “too many” case, that researchers intend to estimate the effect of income on vote choice but include the vote intention into the model. Since vote intentions depend on structural factors such as income and education, the inclusion of the vote intention variable causes right-hand-side endogeneity (i.e., regressors may not be independent of the dependent variable or the error term; see below). If this endogeneity is not correctly modeled, it makes the correct interpretation of results impossible. Indeed, the vote intention variable will capture much of the influence of income and education on vote choice, but researchers cannot separate the two causal mechanisms unless they estimate a simultaneous equation model or unless they drop vote intention from the list of regressors, hoping that income and education fully determine vote intentions.

In the absence of perfect knowledge of the true set of explanatory variables, researchers may conduct a sensitivity analysis to validate inferences. A sensitivity analysis distinguishes three types of explanatory variables: (1) the variable(s) of interest, (2) consensual determinants, and (3) contested determinants. Researchers then follow a quasi-Monte Carlo approach in which they estimate a large number of models, which always include the first two sets of variables and randomly draw a fixed number of “contested determinants” (typically three) into each single model. While methodologists agree on the structure of these sensitivity tests, they disagree on the criterion under which an effect may be considered to be robust. Suggestions include the condition that an effect is robust if and only if the estimated coefficients of all iterations have the same sign and remain significantly different from zero. A more generous definition ignores the significance criterion. Finally, an even more relaxed definition of robustness in sensitivity tests accepts an effect as robust if it generates the same sign in 95% of the iterations. Unfortunately, none of these criteria are fully convincing since the estimation will almost certainly be misspecified in a large number of the iterations. For example, when (at least) two regressors are highly correlated, the parameter estimate will become inefficient, and the point estimate can produce almost any result. As a consequence, sensitivity analyses are telling when they bring about robust results, but they are not when they do not. If a hypothesis does not find robust support, it is not necessarily wrong. There may just have been too many misspecified models among the iterations.

Functional Form and Conditionality

Exceptions may exist, but the huge majority of social science theories do not predict the functional form of an effect. The absence of theoretical guidance stimulates empirical researchers to simply assume a linear function or to take the logarithm of either the independent variable alone or of both the independent and dependent variables. While this arbitrariness gives researchers some influence over estimation results, the true functional form can greatly differ from all the above standard assumptions. Curve fitting offers an obvious, but inherently a theoretical, way to deal with this problem. Adding the squared term and possibly the cubic term (and so on) of a variable to the list of regressors allows for a sufficiently unconstrained functional form that allows the right-hand-side variables to “fit” the variance of the dependent variable. Yet curve fitting not only leads to overconfidence because it shrinks standard errors, but it can also result in vastly wrong estimates if the functional form is not the only specification problem. In the presence of other misspecifications, the higher power terms will undoubtedly pick up some variance of the other specification problem, thereby vastly increasing the bias of the estimate.

Whether or not a variable influences the dependent variable often depends on certain conditions. For example, the response to international tax competition depends on the degree to which political institutions, other political actors, and the voters constrain the government. Failure to model conditionality has the same consequences as omitted variable bias and biases at least the conditional variables. Researchers can easily mistake a misspecified functional form or an omitted variable for conditionality, as these misspecifications have very similar consequences for the residuals. If researchers cannot distinguish between a misspecified functional form and an unmodeled conditionality, a semiparametric analysis of the potentially misspecified variables may help. In such an analysis, researchers estimate a model using dummies of different combinations of variables x and z rather
than including the two variables and their product separately. For example, if both variables $x$ and $z$ can be conveniently split into three categories (low, middle, and high) each, researchers either include these nine categories and estimate without intercept or include eight of the nine categories and estimate with intercept.

Incomplete Models and Unit Heterogeneity

Omitted variables usually reveal their existence in the form of structure in the residuals, suggesting that the Gauss-Markov conditions have been violated. Panel data help detect structure in the residuals because errors must be simultaneously independent and identically distributed across both space and time, which is more demanding than the same assumption for either simple cross-sectional or single time-series data. While structure in the residuals indicates model misspecification, it reveals little about the true causes of model misspecification. For example, in panel data, the sum of residuals for a single unit often deviates from zero. Econometricians interpret this structure as unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity, which is but one of the possible reasons. However, this violation of Gauss-Markov conditions can result from most types of model misspecification, including omitted time-varying variables, a wrongly specified functional form, unmodeled conditionality, and so on.

Panel data textbooks suggest a radical “solution” to the problem of panel heteroskedasticity (i.e., unequal variance in the regression errors). When the estimated model does not fully explain the cross-sectional variation, econometricians suggest completely ignoring all cross-sectional variation (the so-called between variation). However, this common solution may lead to an improvement as well as a deterioration in the ex ante validity of causal inferences. In fact, inferences tend to become less reliable when the eliminated variation largely exceeds the remaining variation. In this case, the decline in analytical efficiency reduces the ex ante reliability of the analysis more than the potential decline in bias improves the validity of the analysis. In addition, when the model omits both time-varying and time-invariant variables, the elimination of all between-variation may actually increase the bias from the omitted time-varying variable.

Dependence

Regression models assume independent observations. Yet strict independence appears illusory in the social sciences, where individual action usually depends on past actions (temporal dependence) and on what other actors do or have done in the past (spatial dependence). As a consequence, most social science data sets violate the assumption of independence. Fortunately, this problem can be solved or at least moderated. Solutions to the problem of dynamic misspecification require the existence of time series. To account for temporal dependence, researchers would usually need to observe at least 30 sufficiently independent periods per case. The more within-variation can be collected, the more reliable the results eventually will become. If it is possible to gather sufficient variation over time, temporal dependence can be modeled in numerous ways ranging from serially correlated errors through the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable or a Prais-Winsten transformation, distributed lags models to more demanding models involving panel co-integration. The choice of the optimal dynamic specification for solving this problem depends on the degree of serial correlation, whether researchers have a theoretical interest in short- or long-term adjustment (or both), and whether the dynamics of different included regressors are sufficiently similar to justify simple techniques.

Spatial misspecification can take three different forms. First, the dependent variable in the unit of analysis depends on the value of the dependent variable in other units of analysis (not necessarily in all other units of analysis). Second, the dependent variable can depend on the value of explanatory variables in other units. Finally, the errors may be spatially correlated due to some form of unobserved spatial heterogeneity such as common shocks or common trends. The standard solution to spatial dependence requires the inclusion of a correctly specified “spatial lag” in the empirical model, which often needs to be instrumented (or analyzed by spatial-ML methods [a markup scheme for representing places mentioned in text and their relationships]) to account for endogeneity (see below). Yet the existence of numerous solutions to problems of temporal and spatial dependence creates a new, higher-order problem. Since applied researchers have very different solutions available—model
specifications that solve the problem of temporal and spatial dependence—the choice of the solution becomes a specification issue in itself. Econometric theory offers little guidance here, and different solutions may lead to substantively different results. Specifically, the impossibility of testing the weighting matrix independently from the spatial autoregressive term leaves applied researchers with important arbitrary decisions. Other issues, such as the choice of the correct functional form for the continuous weighting matrices, further add to these important specification problems.

**Sampling and Data Imperfections**

Sampling usually attracts major attention in empirical research. Indeed, a sample is optimal if it represents the population and if, at the same time, it is large enough. When researchers are able to observe a sufficiently large number of observations, random sampling appears to be the ultimate strategy. Any possible selection bias should be carefully avoided or—if this proves to be impossible—be accounted for. The following sections discuss, first, the impossibility of perfect random sampling; second, they examine the specification issues and research designs in the presence of (systematic) data imperfections; and third, they discuss unit heterogeneity.

**Nonrandom Sampling**

While econometricians often assume that researchers analyze a random sample drawn from the population, applied researchers seldom analyze a sample that represents the population. This problem also occurs when researchers analyze a “random draw” from a preselected sample, which is unlikely to represent the population. However, the population consists of all cases about which a theory makes predictions. It is this population from which cases must be drawn to constitute a true random sample. For example, a random draw from the record of British telephone landlines in 2009 is not a random sample of the population of cases on which a voting theory makes predictions. First of all, this theory claims validity not just for the British electorate but certainly for all democracies. Second, the theory’s validity does not begin in 2009 and end in 2010.

Nonrandom sampling occurs frequently in comparative politics and international relations, where scholars have to deal with the mere existence of 24 typical Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, roughly 60 typical democracies, and a total of 120 countries for which reliable data are available. Standard samples cannot be drawn from a larger population of countries (which does not exist), but the existing country-years do not constitute the population about which a theory makes predictions. Nonrandom sampling limits the generalizability of findings and may invalidate inferences. Yet social scientists have to live with these consequences. Unless social scientists formulate theories of rather limited scope, samples will never be truly random. The consequence of the absence of true random samples is clear: external validity remains limited. Yet the positive message is that this validity varies with the quality of the research design and with the extent to which researchers take nonrandom sampling and model uncertainty seriously.

**Data Imperfections**

In the social sciences, the limited quality of measurement may lead to serious problems. Many phenomena that social scientists need to measure cannot be directly observed. Take, for example, the “measurement” of per capita income. First of all, per capita income is a composite measure that divides the gross domestic product by population size. Second, to compute the gross domestic product of a country, one would have to aggregate all economic transactions. Yet whether a transaction is economic or a gift exchange depends on social standards. Likewise, the relative share of black market and illegal transactions depends on the scope of market distortions. Third, in the absence of a common currency, conversion rates between countries can be arbitrary. Fourth, population measures result from census data. Population counts are imprecise in censuses, and between census years, they are simply estimates. Neither the census count nor the estimates in between can be precise because illegal immigrants and undisclosed emigrants cause measurement error. Neither part of the measurement error appears to be unsystematic. Rather, social, economic, political, and cultural factors influence the accuracy of measures of
per capita income heavily. As a consequence, a comparison of per capita income between countries gives an idea of per capita income in an international comparison, but analysts using this information need to understand that their data come with potentially significant measurement error.

Applied empirical research too often ignores measurement error. With the rise of Bayesian methods, however, attention to uncertainties became more common in the social sciences. Bayesian econometrics clearly paved the way, but frequentist approaches followed suit. Both methodological paradigms allow researchers to estimate models in a way that generates measures of the uncertainty of an estimate. For example, using standard econometric measures, scholars can repeatedly estimate a model with measurement error and randomly add this to the variable of interest that likely suffers from measurement error. This procedure gives a distribution of coefficients. If this distribution includes the zero, the measurement error is strong enough to influence inferences.

Yet the limits to observability lead not just to measurement error but also to censoring, truncation, and selection. Over the past decades, econometricians have developed a fine-grained set of estimation tools that help deal with very different kinds of sample selection issues. Censoring arises when the dependent variable is measured exactly only above (or below, or both) a certain threshold. As a consequence, researchers know only parts of the distribution. Income data, for example, may be measured exactly above the poverty line, while lower income is reported at the poverty line. Models for censored data deal with the problem of censoring by estimating a replacement for the censored observations.

Truncation arises when the dependent variable is observed only above (or below or both) a certain threshold. The information on both the dependent and the independent variables can be truncated. In this case, researchers may fit a regression model from the sample drawn from the restricted part of the population. Under the assumption that the error terms in the truncated regression have a truncated normal distribution, a correction for the truncation becomes possible.

Other conditions may limit the observability of the dependent variable in a subset of the population. Not all countries report socioeconomic information to international organizations. Obviously, the sample of nonreporting countries deviates largely from the sample of reporting countries. Usually, governments in less democratic and poorer countries are significantly less likely to provide information. Nonresponse in survey studies creates similar problems for researchers. Heckman selection models correct for sample selection if researchers are able to specify a model that explains selection. The estimated nonselection hazard is then used in the final stage of the estimator to correct for the selection process.

More recently, econometricians modeled solutions for very specific selection processes. For example, selection may occur but cannot be directly observed. Fishing at a pond in a park provides the standard example. Since the number of fish caught is not observed reliably at the pond but only at the gate of the park, zeros can be caused by either not fishing or by failure to catch fish. The zero-inflated Poisson or negative binomial model generates most promising results in situations such as this. However, the model does not correct for the possibility that visitors spend a very different amount of time fishing. This problem cannot be solved by a zero-inflated model unless somehow miraculously the time visitors spend fishing can be observed through the number of fish caught. This problem should similarly apply in most applications of the zero-inflated Poisson model.

Endogeneity and Simultaneity

In the social sciences, almost nothing is truly exogenous. Social sciences are concerned with choices. Actors choose between options by calculating the consequences of their options. The criteria on which actors base their decisions are often the consequence of other intentional actions. As a consequence, social interactions shape the basis on which decisions rest, but these decisions provide parts of the basis of other decisions. For example, participatory political institutions have a higher probability of survival in relatively affluent societies. At the same time, political institutions and political stability influence economic growth. Therefore, estimating the effects of political institutions on socioeconomic factors is hampered by endogeneity.
Classical Endogeneity

Endogeneity is often defined in a narrow sense meaning that at least one of the regressors is not independent of the dependent variable. To use a famous example, simple estimates of the effect of political institutions on economic growth are likely to be biased by the fact that the choice of institutions depends to a certain degree on economic performance. At the very least, social conflict and cleavage structures codetermine political institutions and economic performance. In a broader sense, endogeneity is defined by its consequences: the correlation between the error term and one regressor. In this definition, omitted variables, measurement error, or a misspecified functional form exclude conditionality and so cause endogeneity.

This problem can be solved in three classical ways. First, researchers may be able to find an exogenous proxy for the endogenous right-hand-side variable. Of course, a good proxy often does not exist. A second, more popular solution requires the use of instruments for the endogenous variables. Instruments need to satisfy two criteria. They have to explain as much as possible of the endogenous right-hand-side variable (the instrumented variable) and need to be uncorrelated with the error term. Applied researchers often generously ignore the first condition and exclusively pay attention to the second. For example, political institutions have been instrumented by settler mortality rates, because settlers only invested in good political institutions where mortality was low. While the argument seems convincing, settler mortality data do not provide a good instrument for institutional quality. Institutions may change slowly, but they change. Using historic settler mortality data as the sole instrument, however, only captures the time-invariant exogenous part of political institutions. In addition, while settler mortality may influence the choice of institutions, economic growth and settler mortality are hardly the only influences on political institutions. Yet the choice of poor instruments largely reduces the efficiency of the parameter estimate, and it may easily result in unreliable point estimates. The use of poor instruments then leads to less reliable estimates than estimating a model that ignores existing endogeneity issues.

Endogeneity, thus, is a serious problem in the social sciences. “Solving” endogeneity problems with weak instruments generates an even more serious problem. A weak instrument is a variable that is not correlated with the error term but only weakly correlated with the endogenous variable. Estimates with weak instruments are always less efficient than estimates that ignore the endogeneity, and they can, at the same time, be even more biased. In these cases, the cure is worse than the disease. This result, though known since the early 1990s, contrasts starkly with claims that the instrumental variable (IV) model allows causal inferences in a nonexperimental setting.

Right-Hand-Side Endogeneity

Misspecification also occurs when one regressor (partly) depends on at least one other regressor. In this case, estimates, first, suffer from inefficiency caused by multicollinearity. As a consequence, inferences become less reliable. Second, researchers may find it difficult to interpret the effects of the two correlated right-hand-side variables. When two or more regressors depend on each other, parts of the effect of one variable are captured by the other variable. If researchers are not aware of the dependence, serious misinterpretations become likely. To solve the problem of right-hand-side endogeneity, solutions that also deal with reversed causality are feasible. As before, using instruments for one of the right-hand-side endogenous variables or estimating a simultaneous equation model that explicitly models the endogeneity between the regressors provides a solution.

“Solving” Specification Issues: A Cautionary Note

Though model misspecifications bias estimation results and may lead to invalid inferences, methodologists and applied researchers tend to take some specification issues more seriously than others. The extreme importance of unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity relative to time-varying heterogeneity seems unreasonable unless one understands that methodologists believe that they have a solution to the former but not to the latter problem. Are solvable specification problems more common than unsolvable ones? Certainly not, but at least researchers can deal with them.

Specification problems are fads and deeply embedded in the cultures of various disciplines. A
serious problem for one discipline might easily be a nuisance for another discipline. To mention just another example, over the last decade, economists appeared to be obsessed with endogeneity and thus with instrumental variable models. At the same time, researchers working in other disciplines were much more likely to ignore endogeneity. Who is right? The answer is that it depends on the quality of the instruments, which is more an assumption than a known entity. Too many IV models are certainly not any better than too few. And this result is generalizable: Too much effort to solve even the most obscure potentially existing specification problem is as costly as the ignorance of specification problems. And often, this holds even if the solutions work in the desired direction. This is because these solutions come at a price. Currently, econometricians suggest two standard solutions, which can be defined as

1. removing “bad variation” and
2. removing “bad observations.”

Both standard solutions (which can of course be combined) and their costs are discussed in turn. Fixed effects models and instrumental equations are the most common techniques when researchers seek to eliminate parts of the variation to improve proper variable “identification.” Fixed effects models assume that a part of the variation of the dependent variable is explained by an unobserved factor, which is correlated with one of the regressors. If researchers do not find a way to account for the unobserved regressor, the existence of this unobserved omitted variable will bias the estimates of all correlated regressors. Similarly, instrumental equation models assume that the dependent variable explains an unknown but positive quantity of the variation of at least one of the regressors. In both cases, researchers would like to perfectly account for the problematic parts of the variation. Unfortunately, this is not what fixed effects models do, and instrumental variable models are, at best, unlikely to just strip the problematic variation of the instrumented variable. In fact, the fixed effects model does not use variation between units at all, and instruments typically explain less than the “unproblematic part” of the endogenous variable.

As a consequence, researchers live with what many think is the second best option: a model that throws away too much variation. In the standard econometric textbook world, researchers pay an almost irrelevant price because econometricians are mainly interested in asymptotic properties; that is, they ask, “How do we get the optimal estimate when we have an infinite amount of information?” In this world, throwing away, say, half of the variation does not matter, because half of infinity still gives infinity. But applied researchers do not live in this convenient world. They have limited amounts of information at their disposal, and when they want to make the best of it (i.e., the most reliable causal inferences), throwing away more than necessary may really be costly.

More recently, methodologists have developed research designs that “solve” specification issues not by eliminating variation but by “intelligent” sampling techniques. For example, rather than estimating a fixed model, researchers could also sample observations that do not seem to have significant unobserved unit heterogeneity. Of course, both techniques should give relatively similar results—but this hardly ever happens with real data. In principle, however, by eliminating observations from the sample, researchers can account for the influence of some problematic regressors. In this case, researchers may use matching techniques to make the distribution of the problematic variable more similar across groups. This technique thus clearly accounts for misspecified functional forms, but it cannot reduce bias from a wrongly specified model, and it comes at the price of reduced efficiency and dubious external validity.

Experiments provide a more radical solution to the problem of model uncertainty. If researchers are able to design controlled situations in which all but one (potential) influence on a variable are held constant, they can get close to identifying the true effect of the variable. Yet in the social sciences, one usually cannot hold variables constant without losing external validity. For example, holding gender constant will reduce the extent to which the experiment’s results can be generalized to the true world in which different genders exist. However, experimental design can hold the distribution of variables stable between different groups. In experiments, researchers usually randomize the treatment and then hope that the distribution of confounding factors is identical in the treatment
and control groups. Whether this assumption holds depends on the number of independent experimental observations as well as the distribution of the potential confounding factors. The rarer a confounding factor is, the stronger its influence, and the larger the number of groups, the greater the number of experimental observations needed to guarantee a sufficient approximation to equal distribution.

To give but one example, assume that social scientists conduct a decision experiment with 1,000 participants—a number larger than what we usually see in the social science experiments. Five hundred participants receive a treatment, and the remaining 500 get a placebo (or some other non-treatment). Now, assume the existence of an important genetic property, which occurs in 1% of the population. This leads to two questions: First, what is the probability that 1% of the participants have this defect? And second, what is the probability that the defect occurs equally among the participants in both groups? The answer to the first question is that if the sample is drawn from the population, roughly $100 \pm 10\%$ will have the defect. Of course, there is a roughly 5% probability that the sample includes fewer than 80 or more than 120 participants of this type. The second question proves to be more important. The probability that both the treated and the control group include the same number of participants of this type is only marginally above zero. On average, the difference will be 6.66. Accordingly, if the experimental design controls confounding factors by randomization, bias will be different from zero unless the sample size approaches infinity. Thus, experiments identify the “true effect” only asymptotically and fail to do so in all real-world experiments. However, experiments still have a clear advantage over estimation—namely, that the true model does not need to be known. The price researchers pay for this advantage is a sharp decline in external validity.

Robustness tests offer a radical alternative to the logic of removing variation or removing observations. Rather than solving specification problems, robustness tests seek to provide an estimate of the importance of specification issues for causal inference. Robustness tests identify areas in which the true specification remains unknown and then vary the model specification in a way that accounts for the model uncertainty. For example, when measurement errors reduce the validity of point estimates, researchers can generate additional controlled measurement error (using Monte Carlo techniques) to analyze the influence of measurement error on parameter estimates. In this case, the parameters will vary across the iterations of this experiment, but this variation may not affect causal inferences and thus demonstrates the robustness of the results. Further robustness tests include groupwise jack-knives, bootstrapping, sensitivity analysis, semiparametric techniques, the choice of alternative estimators, and many more. Robustness tests do not try to solve specification problems when solutions appear to be too costly. And they do not claim to produce certainty where of course there can be none. After all, even the best solution to the most pressing specification problem can give unbiased results if and only if the model is otherwise perfectly specified.

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See also Causality; Data, Spatial; Experiments, Laboratory; Matching; Misspecification; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Robust Statistics; Selection Bias; Variables, Instrumental

Further Readings
**Models, Computational/Agent-Based**

All models of politics are models in the colloquial sense of being simplified “miniature” artifacts that their creators believe represent some important aspect of the real world. The hope is that manipulating moving parts of the model gives useful intuitions about how the real world works. “Useful” in this sense means something that is a valid inference from the model, nonobvious, and, at least a priori, empirically plausible. *Theoretical* models are constructed from abstract statements about the real world. Useful general propositions about the real world may be derived *analytically* by “solving” the model using some form of logical manipulation. For example, if one knows the radius \( r \) of a circle and wants to know its area, \( A \), he or she can make use of an ancient analytical result: \( A = \pi r^2 \). This result derives from a formal mathematical proof and is always and forever true in a Euclidean space.

The same result could be derived from a well-designed *computational* experiment:

1. Scatter \( p \) dots at random on a Euclidean plane, in a uniform distribution; every locus on the plane is equally likely to have a dot on it.
2. Randomly select a locus \((x, y)\) on the plane; draw a circle with radius \( r \) centered on \((x, y)\), picking values of \( x \), \( y \), and \( r \) at random; count \( n \), the number of scattered dots inside the circle; \( n \) is a computed estimate of \( A \), the area of the circle.
3. Iterate (1) and (2) above \( m \) times.

Careful analysis of observations from this experiment would reveal, among other things, that \( n \) is completely uncorrelated to the values of \( x \) and \( y \), the coordinates of the center of the circle; the best-fit prediction of \( n \) is \( n = \pi r^2 \). The *precision* of this estimate will depend on the number of dots scattered, \( d \), and the number of times the scattering is done, \( m \). In other words, it depends on the amount of computational resources deployed on the problem—the more the better. All this computation would be an utterly pointless waste of resources. It is known analytically that \( n \approx A = \pi r^2 \).

Very often, however, empirically plausible models of real-world processes that actually interest researchers are analytically “difficult” or “intractable,” leaving them unable to generate the formal proofs that they would very much like, because they cannot solve the model analytically. An intractable model is one that researchers know cannot be solved analytically. A difficult model is one that researchers do not know cannot be solved analytically, but they do know that it has not yet been solved, and they do not yet know how to solve. There are two basic solutions to this very common intellectual problem. The first is to make the model tractable by simplifying its representation of the real world. The resulting model looks less like the real world, but at least it can be solved analytically. The second solution is to use computational methods to investigate and in some sense “solve” difficult or intractable models. In this entry, the strengths and limitations of computational modeling and its possible applications in political science are discussed.

**Computation and Analysis**

Consider a two-dimensional policy space in which voters’ preferences are described in terms of “ideal points.” Assume that these ideal points have a symmetric bivariate normal distribution with a mean at the origin of the space. We want to estimate the number of ideal points (dots) located within a circle of radius \( r \) from an arbitrary point \((x, y)\) in the space—for example, the number of voters within distance \( r \) of some party policy position. This problem, while precisely specified, is at the very least difficult to solve analytically since we cannot use the analytical result \( n = A = \pi r^2 \). This is because, given the bivariate normal distribution of ideal points, the number of ideal points in a circle of given radius now depends critically on the locus of its center. Generalize the problem further to any arbitrary, or even unknown, distribution of voter ideal points. The problem becomes increasingly difficult, if not intractable, analytically. One solution is to simplify the model by assuming the arbitrary distribution of ideal points to be uniform, restoring access to the analytical result \( n = \pi r^2 \). The gain would be analytical rigor, in some odd sense, but the cost would be realism and thus empirically valid intuition. The “rigor” of the
result would depend on assuming something we knew for certain to be false. The other solution would be to run the very simple computational experiment outlined in Items 1 to 3 above, ridiculous with a uniform distribution of ideal points but now powerful in allowing us to estimate, in a transparent way, the number of points within a circle with radius $r$ and center $(x, y)$, for any arbitrary distribution of ideal points. More generally, a computational experiment can be designed to retrieve any analytical result, but computational experiments can also be designed to retrieve results that can never, or cannot yet, be derived analytically.

Such computational work does not at all depend on using electronic computers; all computations could in theory be carried out by hand. In practice, the relatively low cost of electronic computers and the increasing sophistication of the programs that run on them mean that nearly all computational work is now done on computers. In the same way, analytical results are in practice not at all derived using a pencil and paper. Computer programs may be used to solve difficult systems of equations. Unseen inside the program, these solutions may involve simulations, while program output, and thus computer-assisted formal “proofs,” may or may not be amenable to checking by the human analyst.

Theoretical Intractability, Decision Heuristics, and Agent-Based Modeling

A famous and intensively studied intractable problem that is simply stated is the Traveling Salesmen Problem (TSP). Given $n$ cities arbitrarily located on a map, find the shortest route that visits all of them and returns to the starting point. This cannot be solved analytically for the general case with an arbitrary number of cities at arbitrary locations. Any particular example of the TSP can in theory be “smashed” computationally by elaborating every possible route, computing the length of each, and picking the shortest route. However, the number of different possible routes between $n$ cities is $(n - 1)!/2$, which expands at an explosive rate with the number of cities. The number of different routes between “only” 100 cities is about $4.666 	imes 10^{115}$. This problem cannot in practice be smashed with feasible finite computing resources. Since the TSP is a real problem for real humans, for example, when they devise travel itineraries or vehicle delivery routes, its analytical intractability has important implications, both for actual decision making by real humans and for the representation of real humans as agents in models.

In the absence of a formally provable best solution to the problem, any analyst—including the decision-making agents whose behavior is being modeled—must rely on informal decision heuristics or rules of thumb. These are decision rules that have been generally found, through a process of experimentation and learning, to produce good solutions to the problem at hand but that cannot be proved to be optimal and may indeed be highly suboptimal in certain cases. One heuristic for attacking the TSP, for example, is “start with a random city; visit the closest unvisited city; iterate until all cities have been visited.” This is a “greedy algorithm,” doing what looks best at any given stage in the search and performs well in many circumstances. It often finds something “close” to the shortest route in easy cases where the shortest route is known from having smashed the problem. But particular examples can easily be constructed for which this algorithm produces disastrous results. Thus, the search for efficient heuristics for attacking the TSP is an important ongoing project in computer science.

Political science is, of its essence, concerned with many analytically intractable problems. One mainstream example concerns the search by party leaders for vote-maximizing party policy positions in a multidimensional policy space, in a setting where all voters support their closest party. This is a special case, in a political context, of the more general mathematical problem of competitive spatial location, a problem that has also been shown to be formally intractable in a space of more than one dimension. Despite formal intractability of this problem, party leaders must still set party policy positions. One response to this, very common in political science, is to simplify the model of party competition in ways that allow the derivation of an analytical result. A very common simplification is to assume, not $n$ parties and $m$ dimensions, but one dimension and a small number of parties, possibly even only two. This gives access to a portfolio of well-known analytical results, for example, about the role of the “median” voter on the solitary dimension. These results may
be considered intuitively useful if the empirical setting under investigation can plausibly be described as having only one policy dimension and a small number of parties. If researchers are intrinsically interested in competition in multiparty systems with multidimensional policy spaces, however, they will not find one-dimensional analytical results intuitively useful. Formal intractability of the problem of competitive spatial location in multidimensional spaces tells researchers, further, that these one-dimensional analytical results do not generalize and suggests the use of computational methods to attack the problem.

Moving beyond methods that might be used to attack interesting but intractable problems, a far deeper substantive implication of intractability concerns the behavior of real humans. In the absence of formally provable best-response strategies for setting party positions in multidimensional policy spaces, for example, and given that such positions must nonetheless be set, party leaders must use informal decision heuristics. This is a very good example of the type of problem that can usefully be analyzed using agent-based modeling. Agent-based models (ABMs) are bottom-up models that, typically, assume settings with a fairly large set of autonomous decision-making agents, each agent using some well-specified decision rule. The modeling exercise is to elaborate the patterns that emerge when these agents interact with each other. The essence of agent-based modeling is conveyed clearly in a simple but powerful model of spatial segregation put forward by Thomas Schelling in the 1970s. The original Schelling model was computational but was implemented with coins on a chessboard, not an electronic computer. Scatter some pennies and nickels, say 20 of each, at random on the chessboard; move each coin to the center of its closest square. Each coin has eight adjacent (neighboring) squares. (Coins on the edge squares are different but this does not affect the result.) Coins represent people, and people have two different colors. Assume that people have some view about the color of their neighbors. This is expressed by a preference parameter \( p \), the minimum proportion of people on neighboring squares I would like to be the same color as me. This preference can be very mild. If \( p = .25 \), for example, I am unhappy only if less than a quarter of my neighbors are the same color as me; if \( p = .5 \), I am unhappy if less than half of my neighbors are the same color. The modeled behavior is simply that unhappy agents move to a randomly chosen nearby empty square. A model run begins with agents scattered at random; agent behavior is then implemented iteratively using this rule until no unhappy agent wants to move.

Figure 1 shows an example of the surprisingly strong patterns of spatial segregation that emerge from this simple model, implemented on a computer using the agent-based modeling environment NetLogo. The left panel shows a starting configuration with 1,000 gray and 1,000 white agents scattered at random on a 51 \( \times \) 51 square “chessboard.” At the beginning of the run, given this particular scatter, on average, agents find that 50% of their neighbors are the same color. Agents in this model run were given a \( p = .50 \); those finding themselves in a location where less than 50% of their neighbors were the same color moved to a new location. The right panel of Figure 1 shows the steady-state configuration of agent locations that was the outcome of this particular run. The emergent pattern of spatial segregation can be seen very clearly. The surprising result is that, on average, 88% of each agent’s neighbors are now the same color. This social interaction generated a much more intense pattern of spatial segregation than any individual agent prefers. Even very mild preferences about neighbors can increase spatial segregation. From the same random start shown in Figure 1, setting \( p = .25 \) increases the mean percentage of similar neighbors from 50% to about 60%. In other words, even if people only move when less than a quarter of their neighbors are the same as them, segregation will increase. This was an unexpected and counterintuitive result that continues to be debated.

The striking Schelling segregation results would be, at the very least, difficult to derive analytically; yet a simple computer program gives full access to them. A theorist approaching this problem with the tools of classical formal analysis, for example, would in essence have to model strategic location decisions made by each of 2,000 agents, each decision taking into account what each of the other 1,999 agents is likely to do. This, of course, would also be making a preposterous assumption about the behavior of real humans. The Schelling ABM in effect makes the “satisficing” behavioral
assumption that people in such complex settings stay put if they are happy, defining happy in some precise way, and move if they are not. This is a classic example of a “win-stay lose-shift” decision rule that is a common behavioral assumption for ABMs. His computational model then systematically elaborates interactions between large numbers of agents using this rule. Thus, while ABMs do deploy decision heuristics as methodological devices to attack analytically intractable problems, the fundamental motivation for using ABMs is a behavioral assumption that, given the complex settings in which they find themselves forced to make decisions, real humans use rules of thumb when they must pick a course of action. ABMs are much better justified as plausible models of real behavior than as methodological responses to intractability.

Trade-Offs Between Rigor, Realism, and Parsimony

There are thus two quite distinct epistemological dimensions that distinguish agent-based modeling from classical formal analysis in political science. The first is methodological and contrasts formal analysis with carefully designed computational experiments as distinctive ways of deriving general results. The second is behavioral and contrasts the forward-looking strategic analysis that is assumed by formal game theorists to be performed by real humans, for example, with the deployment of simple decision rules, which is the typical behavioral assumption of agent-based modelers. The complexity of the problem under investigation may well dictate the trade-offs that are made within this epistemological space. In a simple setting that is analytically tractable, formal analysis can yield easily accessible yet rigorous results. Given this, further, it may seem reasonable to assume, behaviorally, that real humans can perform the same analyses as the modeler. This convergence of method and behavioral assumption is pleasing, since a sophisticated analyst is then not assuming that real humans can do things that the analyst cannot do himself or herself. In such cases, there is little point in using computational methods or ABMs.

Typically, however, the real political problem under investigation is complex, and analysts face hard trade-offs. One response, as noted above, is to simplify the model to a point at which it is tractable, by making assumptions that are, inevitably, less realistic. (If they were more realistic, there would be no point in the more complex model.) Typically, though not inevitably, in the case of game theoretic models in political science, such simplifying assumptions concern the setting being modeled not the rationality of the agents. An intrinsically dynamic setting is assumed to be static—for example, the dimensionality of the preference space is reduced; only a very small subset of actors is modeled, and so on. Set against the benefits arising from analytical rigor, given the simplifying assumptions, the costs arise because the model is now less realistic. A contradiction
arises, further, if real agents are now assumed to apply a sophisticated strategic decision-making model to an assumed setting, which, if they were indeed sophisticated, they would know is far more complex than the one being modeled. In a nutshell, agents may be assumed to be smart enough to perform complex strategic calculations in a one-dimensional space, for example, but not smart enough to see that the real space is not one-dimensional, and their calculations are thus pointless. The pleasing conjunction of method and behavioral assumption has been lost in the search for rigorous analytical results in intractable complex settings.

In complex settings involving many agents, the desire to attack substantively interesting problems may more or less mandate computational methods if even a semblance of empirical realism is to be retained. Considering the spatial segregation problem illustrated in Figure 1, for example, most people would feel that the core intuition would be lost by simplifying this down to a fabulously rigorous formal model of strategic location decisions made by five agents in a one-dimensional space. The fundamental substantive interest of this problem is that it is at least two-dimensional and involves unintended consequences of interactions between large numbers of agents. Riots, revolutions, and indeed voting in large electorates are other examples of this type of problem. While we can easily specify a formal game played between “a rioter” and “a government,” most people would probably feel this misses the entire point about riots, which concerns how interactions between people in large groups are in some important sense different. The inevitable price paid for all computational work is that computation, of its essence, involves observing outcomes of particular model runs, conditional on particular parameter settings. An analytical result, if general, is good for all conceivable valid parameter settings. Strictly speaking, computational results are only valid for those points in a model’s parameter space that have actually been investigated. Inferences about parameter settings that have not been investigated are, in effect, interpolations.

This focuses attention on two matters of primary concern to those engaged in computational work that is carefully designed and rigorously executed. The first concerns sampling from the model’s parameter space; the second concerns the techniques used to draw general inferences from particular observations. Computational work in essence generates simulated data about model outcomes, conditional on model parameter settings. Viewed in this way, it is closely analogous to empirical work, which collects “real” data about outcomes under investigation, together with associated values of independent variables of theoretical interest. In each case, collecting more (unbiased) data is always better, while it is vital to match techniques of statistical inference to the underlying data-generating process. In the case of computational analysis, therefore, analysts become more confident in their inferences, the more “data” they have, and this is achieved by having more model runs that investigate more points in the parameter space. A single model run tells researchers rather little—very much like an election study that interviews a single individual. One thousand model runs, sampling 1,000 points at random from the model’s parameter space would, in contrast, tell researchers quite a lot. Of course, there is always the possibility that there is an unsampled parameter vector that would generate a “peculiar” result, but two distinct things happen as the size of the sample is increased. First, the probability of failing to sample some peculiar point in the parameter space is driven down. Second, even if analysts do fail to sample some peculiar point, they become more confident that the inference drawn from their sample is in some sense a good representation of model outcomes and that the hypothetical unsampled peculiarity is an anomaly. If analysts really do worry about unsampled parameter points that might have blown up the inferences had the analysts only sampled them, the solution is simple—increase the size of the sample. Analysts can, if they wish to reduce the possibility of undiscovered anomalies, conduct a million model runs. The only matter at issue is the opportunity cost of doing something more productive with their time and computing resources. It is thus perfectly possible to design “heavy-duty” computational work, which, combined with rigorous statistical analysis of model outcomes, enables confident and replicable inferences to be drawn about the effects of all the model’s moving parts. At the end of the day, these are precisely the same
types of inference that emerge from classical analytical modeling.

Finally, it is important to note that the ability to derive intuitions from any model, computational or analytic, depends on the model being parsimonious, in the sense of having a transparent logic and relatively few parameters. Parsimonious models tend not only to be easier to analyze than complicated models, but also their substantive implications are typically much easier to interpret. To set against this, the price paid for a more parsimonious model is that it may be less realistic than a richer (more complicated) model of the same process. In the realm of classical analysis, parsimony is to a large extent self-policing. There are few incentives to complicate a parsimonious model that has been solved with some difficulty and seems to be doing a good job at explaining something of interest. It is typically very easy, by contrast, to take a computational model and graft on layer after layer of complication, each layer added in a quest for enhanced realism. Parsimony is not self-policing, and, if model outcomes do indeed seem more realistic as a result of the added complication, the trade-off between parsimonious but less realistic models, as opposed to complicated but more realistic ones, is drawn in much sharper relief. The matter of whether more realistic and complicated or more parsimonious but less realistic computational models provide better intuitions about real politics is to a large extent a matter of taste, however, since there is no gold standard for good intuition in political science.

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See also Formal Theory; Game Theory

Further Readings

MODERNIZATION THEORY

The analysis of modernity—of the modern social order and civilization—has constituted a basic core in the modern intellectual discussion of the development of modernity in sociological, anthropological, and historical scholarship. In sociology, the analysis of modernity constituted the focus of the major early evolutionists, such as Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer. In different ways, such analysis was also the central focus of the discussion of modernity in the works of Karl Marx, Alexis de Tocqueville, Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies, and many others. This entry traces the evolution of modernity from the theories of the 1950s through the present time, focusing especially on the varied forms that modernity has taken and its relationship to changing concepts of power and the legitimacy of the nation-state. The entry concludes with a look at the impact of globalization and at the negative aspects of modernity.

Classical Theories

The “classical” theories of modernization of the 1950s have indeed identified the core characteristics of modernity and of modern society, such as the decomposition of older “closed” institutional frameworks; the development of new structural, institutional, and cultural features and formations; and, to use the terminology of Karl Deutsch, the growing potential for social mobilization. The most important structural dimension of modernity attesting to the decomposition of former relatively narrow formations was seen in the growing tendency for structural differentiation—manifested, for example, in growing urbanization; commodification of the economy; and in the continual development of distinctive channels of communication and agencies of education. On the institutional level, such decomposition gave rise to the development of new institutional formations—such as the modern state, modern national collectivities, and new market (especially capitalist) economies—that were perceived or defined to some extent at least as autonomous and that were indeed regulated by specific, distinct mechanisms—such as rules of the market, of bureaucratic organization, and the like.
In some later formulations, it was the development of such distinct autonomous spheres, each regulated by its own logic, that was very often defined in the essence of modern institutional formations. Concomitantly, modernity was seen as bearing a distinct cultural program and shaping a distinct type of personality characteristic.

These theories, as well as classical sociological analyses of Marx, Durkheim, and to a large extent even of Weber (or at least one reading of him), have implicitly or explicitly conflated the structural and cultural major dimensions of modernity, as they saw it developing in the West. A very strong, even if implicit, assumption of the studies of modernization was that the cultural dimensions or aspects of modernization—the “secular” rational worldview, including a strong individualistic orientation—are inherently and necessarily interwoven with the structural ones. Accordingly, most of the classics of sociology as well as the studies of modernization of the 1940s and 1950s and the closely related studies of convergence of industrial societies have assumed, even if only implicitly, that the basic institutional formations, the definitions of the institutional arenas, the modes of their regulation and integration that developed in European modernity, and the cultural program of modernity as it developed in the West will “naturally” be ultimately taken over, with possibly local variations, in all—or at least in the “successful”—modernizing societies. It is further assumed that this project of modernity, with its hegemonic and homogenizing tendencies, will continue in the West and, with the expansion of modernity, will prevail throughout the world.

Multiple Modernities
The reality that emerged proved to be radically different. Modernity has indeed spread to most of the world, but it did not give rise to a single institutional pattern or to a single modern civilization but, rather, led to the development of several continually changing modern civilizations or at least civilizational patterns—that is, of societies or civilizations that do indeed share some central core characteristics but that nevertheless tend to develop different, even if cognate, ideological and institutional dynamics. Moreover, far-reaching changes that go beyond the original premises of modernity have been taking place also in Western societies.

At the same time, the institutional formations that developed in most societies of the world have been distinctively modern even if their dynamics have been greatly influenced by their own distinctive cultural premises, traditions, and historical experiences. This of course runs contrary to the view that the best way to understand the dynamics of different “modernizing” societies is to see them as continuations, even if in new ways, of their traditions and of their traditional institutional patterns and dynamics—a view that was to some extent revived in the context of the contemporary scene as the theory of the “clash of civilizations.” Of special importance in this context was the fact that the most important social and political movements that became predominant in these societies—such as the nationalistic ones and, later on, even the fundamentalistic ones, which often promulgated strong anti-Western or even antimodern ideas—were basically distinctively modern ones, promulgating distinctive interpretations of modernity.

Concomitantly with the growing recognition of the great complexity and variability of modern and contemporary societies, a much more complex picture of modernity emerged. From the very beginning of the discourse about modernity, there developed two opposing evaluations, attesting to the inherent contradictions of modernity: One such evaluation, implicit also in theories of modernization and those of “convergence and of industrial societies” of the 1950s and early 1960s, saw modernity as a positive, emancipating, progressive force epitomizing promises of a better, inclusive, emancipating world. The other such evaluation that developed first from within the very core of the first European societies and later found strong resonance in non-Western European societies espoused a negative or at least a highly ambivalent approach to modernity—seeing it as a morally destructive force—and emphasized the negative effects of some of its core characteristics, be it technology or the empowerment of egoistic and hedonistic attitudes and goals.

All these developments have yielded a continual reexamination of theories of modernization, giving rise to the idea or concept of multiple modernities as the best way to understand the contemporary world. Thus, to explain the history of modernity is to see it as a story of continual constitution and
reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs and cultural patterns of modernity.

One of the most important implications of the term *multiple modernities* is that modernity and Westernization are not identical; Western patterns of modernity are not the only “authentic” modernities, though they enjoy historical precedence and continue to be a basic reference point for others.

This view of multiple modernities entails certain assumptions about the nature of modernity. The first such assumption is that modernity is to be viewed as a distinct civilization, with distinct institutional and cultural characteristics. According to this view, the core of modernity is the crystallization and development of a mode or modes of interpretation of the world or, to follow Cornelius Castoriadis’s terminology, of a distinct social “imaginaire,” indeed of the ontological vision, of a distinct cultural program, combined with the development of a set or sets of new institutional formations—the central core of both being an unprecedented “openness” and uncertainty.

This civilization, the distinct cultural program with its institutional implications, crystallized first in Western Europe and then expanded to other parts of Europe, to the Americas, and later on throughout the world, giving rise to continually changing cultural and institutional patterns, which constituted different responses to the challenges and possibilities inherent in the core characteristics of the distinct civilizational premises of modernity.

The core of this program has been that the premises and legitimation of the social, ontological, and political order were no longer taken for granted. Consequently, there developed an intensive reflexivity around the basic ontological premises as well as around the bases of social and political order of authority of society—a reflexivity that was shared even by the most radical critics of this program, who in principle denied the legitimacy of such reflexivity. Politics became a matter for discussion, even if it was then reputed to be based on rationality.

In conjunction with these conceptions, there developed the belief in the possibility of active formation of society by conscious human activity. Two basic complementary but also potentially contradictory tendencies about the best ways in which such construction could take place developed within this program. The first such tendency was that the program, as it crystallized above all in the major revolutions in which people claimed to lead the political change, gave rise, perhaps for the first time in the history of humanity, to the belief in the possibility of bridging the gap between the transcendental and mundane orders, of realizing through conscious human actions in the mundane orders, in social life, some of the utopian, eschatological visions. The second tendency was rooted in the growing recognition of the legitimacy of multiple individual and group goals and interests and of multiple interpretations of the common good.

The modern program entailed also a radical transformation of the conceptions and premises of the major institutional arenas—the political and economic ones as well as those of collective identities, social hierarchy, and economy. The core of this transformation was the breakdown of traditional legitimation of the political and social order, the concomitant opening up of different possibilities of construction of such order, and the consequent contestation about the ways in which political order was to be constructed by human actors. A strong emphasis on at least the potential active participation of the periphery, of “society,” and of all its members in the political arena combined with orientations of rebellion and intellectual antinomianism, together with strong orientations to center formation and institution building, giving rise to social movements and movements of protest as a continual component of the political process.

Moreover, the concrete contours of the different cultural and institutional patterns of modernity as they crystallized in different societies have indeed been continually changing due to the combination of the tensions inherent in the cultural and political program of modernity and the continual institutional, social, political, and economic developments attendant on the development and expansion of modernity.

The institutional and cultural contours of modernity were continually changing because the very expansion of modernity, beginning in Europe, entailed a confrontation between the concrete premises and institutional formations as they developed
in Europe, later in the Americas, and then in Asia—in the Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, and Japanese civilizations. The manifestations of modernity were shaped, above all, by the internal dynamics of the technological, economic, political, and cultural arenas as they developed in different societies and expanded beyond them. Second, they were a result of the central struggle between different centers of political and economic power that constituted a continual component, first, of the formation of European modernity and, later, the continual expansion of European, American, and Japanese modernities. This struggle took place in a context of shifting hegemonies in the different international systems that developed in the wake of the continual developments in the economic, political, technological, and cultural arenas, and in centers thereof. The manifestation of modernity was shaped by these forces, along with the continual confrontations between interpretations promulgated by different centers, elites, and movements, and the concrete developments, conflicts, and displacements attendant on the institutionalization of these premises. Such confrontations developed already within Europe with the crystallization of the modern European state system and became further intensified with the crystallization of “world systems” from the 16th or 17th centuries onward.

Modernity, Globalization, and the Nation-State

The multiple and divergent modernities of the “classical” age of modernity crystallized during the 19th century and above all during the first 6 or 7 decades of the 20th century in the different territorial nation-states and revolutionary states and in the social movements that developed in Europe, in the Americas, and in Asian and African societies after World War II. These contours—institutional, symbolic, and ideological contours of the modern national and revolutionary states and movements, which were seen as the epitome of modernity—have changed drastically on the contemporary scene with the intensification of tendencies to globalization, as manifest in growing movements of autonomy of world capitalist forces, intense movements of international migrations, and the concomitant development on an international scale of social problems, such as prostitution and delinquency, all of which reduce the control of the nation-state over its own economic and political affairs, despite the continual strengthening of the “technocratic” rational secular policies in various arenas—be it in education or family planning. At the same time, the nation-states lost some of their—always only partial—monopoly of internal and international violence to many local and international groups of separatists or terrorists without any nation-state or the concerted activities of nation-states being able to control the continually recurring occurrences of such violence. Concomitantly, the processes of globalization were closely connected in the cultural arena, with the expansion especially through the major media in many countries around the world, including Western ones such as those of Europe or Canada, of what were seemingly uniform hegemonic American cultural programs or visions.

Above all, the ideological and symbolic centrality of the nation and revolutionary state, of its being perceived as the charismatic locus of the major components of the cultural program of modernity and of collective identity, became weakened, and new political, social, and civilizational visions and visions of collective identity developed. These new visions and identities were promulgated by several types of new social movements. Such “new” social movements, which developed in most Western countries (e.g., the women’s and ecological movements), were closely related to or rooted in the student and anti–Vietnam War movements of the late 1960s and 1970s.

These movements developed in tandem with the crystallization of new social settings and frameworks that also went beyond the “classical” model of the nation-state. Among these settings—new especially to the Muslim, Chinese, and Indian diasporas—were new types of ethnic minorities, such as the Russian ones, which emerged in many of the successor states of the Soviet Union. In these, and in many other settings, new types of collective identities emerged, often in movements whose focus was no longer the nation-state. Many of these hitherto seemingly “subdued” identities—ethnic, regional, local, and transnational alike—moved naturally, though in a highly reconstructed way, into the centers of their respective societies.
and also often into the international arena. They contested the hegemony of the older homogenizing programs, claiming their own autonomous places in central institutional arenas—educational programs, public communications, or the media—and very often, they also made far-reaching claims with respect to the redefinition of citizenship and the rights and entitlements connected with it. In these settings, local dimensions were often brought together in new ways beyond the model of the classical nation-state, with transnational ones, such as the European Union, or with broad religious identities—many of them rooted in the great religions, such as Islam, Buddhism, or different branches of Christianity, but reformulated in new modern ways. In parallel fashion, continuous shifts occurred in the relative hegemony of different centers of modernity—first European and U.S. ones, moving to East Asia—shifts that became continually connected with the growing contestations between such centers around their presumed hegemonic standing.

**Destructive Dimensions of Modernity**

Contrary to the optimistic views of modernity as progress, the development and expansion of modernity was not peaceful. It also bore within it very destructive possibilities—which were indeed voiced, and also often promulgated, by some of its most radical critics, who saw modernity as a morally destructive force and emphasized the negative effects of some of its core characteristics. The crystallization of the first and the development of later modernities were continually interwoven with internal conflicts and confrontations, rooted in the contradictions and tensions attendant on the development of capitalism and, in the political arena, the growing demands for democratization and with international conflicts in the framework of the modern state and imperialist systems. Above all, the evolution of modernity was closely interwoven with wars, and genocides, repressions, and exclusions constituted continual components thereof. Wars and genocide were not, of course, new in the history of mankind. But they became radically transformed and intensified, generating continuous tendencies to specifically modern barbarism, the most important manifestation of which was the ideologization of violence, terror, and war—manifest most vividly first in the French Revolution. Such ideologization emerged out of the interweaving of wars with the basic constitutions of the nation-states, with those states becoming the most important agent—and arena—of constitution of citizenship and symbols of collective identity, with the crystallization of the modern European state system and of European expansion beyond Europe and with the intensification of the technologies of communication and of war.

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**See also** Functionalism; Development, Political; Political Theory; State

**Further Readings**


MONARCHY

The *Concise Oxford English Dictionary* defines monarchy as a “state under monarchical government” where a monarch is a “sovereign with title of king, queen, emperor, empress or equivalent.” Although this definition has the merit of describing popular usage in the English language, it is readily apparent that it is indeterminate. It amounts to saying that monarchy is what monarchs do, and it leaves open what other titles might be equivalent (in the masculine forms) to king or emperor.

Etymology—and the classical Greek origin of the word—offers an approach that initially seems more determinate: Monarchy is the rule of a single person. This can be contrasted with aristocracy—the rule of the “best” or the “elite”—and democracy—variously the rule of all the people or the “ordinary” people. However, common usage in English and several other languages has come to invest the idea of monarchy with at least the additional criterion of hereditary acquisition. In fact, the hereditary principle lies at the heart of the popular image of monarchy, even though some of the most notable monarchies in history, including the Roman Empire and its supposed successor the Holy Roman Empire were, at least nominally, nonhereditary, the latter being elected by seven “Electors,” most of whom did acquire their right of franchise through the hereditary principle. The contemporary Malaysian monarchy is rotated among 12 provincial sultans, normally for a 5-year term, and each new incumbent must be ratified by parliament. It would be easy to argue that many modern monarchies, often incorrectly—or at least confusingly—called “constitutional” monarchies where the monarch is the head of state but does not wield executive power, are much less like monarchies in the Greek sense than is the papacy or a regime such as that of the Haitian dictator François “Papa Doc” Duvalier, who caused himself to be declared “president for life” in 1964.

Thus, the question of how many monarchs have survived into the 21st century is not a straightforward, factual one as it might first appear. The answer depends partly on whether separate monarchical traditions within the same state are distinguished, the obvious example being England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Principality of Wales, the Isle of Man, the Bailiwick of Guernsey, and the States of Jersey within the British Isles. Some dependent territories of the United Kingdom offer similar counting problems, and there is the comparable case of a federated multiple monarchy, such as the United Arab Emirates: Is it one monarchy or seven? The answer would also depend on whether you include nonstandard and nonhereditary forms of monarchy such as the papacy, lifetime dictators, or republics with a local monarchical element, such as acknowledged tribal leaders within some African states. It is not normally assumed that the answer depends on the extent to which a monarch has any executive power; the United Kingdom, where the monarch has possessed powers that have been small and diminishing since the 17th century, and Morocco, where King Mohamed VI determines much policy, are both considered to be monarchies to the same degree. Nor is it considered relevant that in many cases the continued existence of the monarchy is assumed to be dependent on the popular will. In most countries that are monarchies but have democratically elected governments, it would be accepted that a referendum on a transition to a republic might be held and that in the event of a vote for such a transition, it would occur peacefully. The Greek monarchy was finally abolished as the result of a plebiscite in 1974, while in Australia in 1999 the change was rejected. However, the assumption that such a change could occur “merely on account of the number of votes”—to borrow a phrase from a monarch (Queen Victoria in her *Diaries*)—might be thought to erode the nature of monarchy in its original sense.

The answer to the question of how many monarchies remain therefore varies from around 25 to 50. Either of these figures might come as a surprise to the many political observers who have, over the past 2 centuries, predicted the complete demise of monarchy. They might be less surprised to discover that about 25 states had the same monarch, Queen Elizabeth II of England. This entry discusses the debate about monarchy and its aftermath as well as the political science research on monarchy.

The Early Modern Debate About Monarchy and Its Aftermath

Monarchy was at the heart of early modern debates about politics and government, which
were primarily normative debates. The issue was sometimes whether monarchy was a legitimate (or the legitimate) form of government, but more often, the debates were about the form monarchy should take, the rules of succession, the limits on monarchical authority, and the subjects’ duties of obedience to monarchs and rights of rebellion against them. All this can be portrayed as a crisis of legitimacy in which states and their apologists desperately sought to establish their legitimacy and thus their right to govern. It would be wrong to portray this crisis as something new and “modern” in the sense of post-Renaissance or post-Reformation: One would only have to read the 10 plays of Shakespeare on English historical topics to realize that the nature of kingship and its succession were always contested. But there was a new element, insofar as there was no longer an accepted religious source of authority providing a natural counterbalance to the claims of monarchs.

It would also be an oversimplification to portray the debate about government in the 17th and 18th centuries as a contest between the ideas of sovereignty as vested in “the Lord’s Anointed” versus its being vested in “the people.” The main complication is the appearance of religion on both sides. In the English Civil War, for example, both sides referred ultimately to religious authority to justify their actions. The men who signed the death warrant of Charles I in 1649 were, for the most part, no more believers in popular sovereignty than he was, and they did go on to suppress those who did believe in it, including the “Levellers.”

In this context, it is important to distinguish between the development of monarchy in France and in Great Britain, both in terms of the working of the institution and the justifications offered for it. In France, kings continued to claim executive power and to rule by “divine right,” justified by apologists such as the prelate Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet. They increasingly ignored ancient representative institutions such as the parlements and the états. But in Britain, following the Civil War and the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, the monarchy developed as a more limited institution with diminished and diminishing executive powers. This has often been referred to as “constitutional monarchy,” but there is at least an element of paradox about the use of this phrase because it is also widely stated that Britain has not had a constitution. This is true if what is meant by “constitution” is the sort of coherent, codified document that the United States of America and France (in several different versions) developed after their revolutions.

Proponents of the British monarchy tended to defend a more limited form of the institution and to put their case in a more secular mode. (Even after the French Revolution, defenders of monarchy such as Joseph de Maistre tended to remain religious and fundamentalist rather than consequentialist in their defense of the institution.) As an extreme case, one might cite Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha (1657). At first sight, it seems to be a fundamentalist case for monarchy written under a failing republic. Filmer argues that legitimate monarchs have a God-given right to rule comparable with—and an extension of—the God-given authority of husband–fathers as heads of households. Filmer’s account of the proper order of things is overtly religious, but it has often been pointed out that his argument can easily be reproduced in a purely secular form as an account of the organic existence of society whose natural bonds give it stability and determine its proper leadership: The King is the father of the nation. This can also be seen as the forerunner of later defenses of a limited monarchy, including those by Edmund Burke and Walter Bagehot, in which the monarch is, respectively, the core of a system of institutions that cannot be radically changed without incurring disaster and is something that is necessary at the symbolic level of politics rather than the rational level.

In the 18th century, the commercial success and relative political stability of Great Britain—a parliamentary government under Hanoverian kings—attracted new defenses of limited monarchy. To the Baron de Montesquieu, it was an example of “mixed government,” its different institutions being based on separate and even conflicting principles, relating to each other with a kind of creative tension. But his analysis of the working of British government as being based on a “separation of powers” was even more inaccurate than John Locke’s 50 years earlier: The powers—as opposed to the forms and symbols—were now overwhelmingly on one side. But the most intellectually unencumbered and radical defense of the monarchical status quo came from the Scottish philosopher David Hume. In his essays, especially “Of the
Origin of Government,” “Of the Original Contract,” and “Of Passive Obedience,” Hume scornfully dismissed the rival Tory and Whig claims to explain political obligation and legitimacy. It was nonsense to claim that government was based on any form of “contract,” just as it was nonsense to claim that we had an absolute obligation to obey royal government. Hanoverian stability and prosperity, for which Hume was duly grateful, came about partly because the regime was incapable of providing a theoretical justification for its existence, and it should be judged on its consequences, not on its origins. In the final chapter of his *History of England* (Vol. 6, chap. 81), Hume contrasts William of Orange, who, in the name of his wife Mary, usurped the English throne in 1689, sending James II into exile. James was the more virtuous man of the two, remarks Hume, and his claim to the throne was a superior one. But the consequences of the usurpation were better than the alternative, because of certain negative virtues that William possessed: He was not a Catholic, and the very weakness of his claim was a strength in a limited monarchy. Of the “Glorious Revolution,” Hume concludes that “it gave such an ascendant to popular principles” and “this island, have ever since enjoyed . . . at least the most entire system of liberty.”

It should not be inferred that Hume favored the Hanoverian arrangements because they were popular government in disguise. Like many of those who devised the constitution of the United States, Hume was clearly of the view that popular sovereignty as an overriding principle was as dangerous as the divine right of kings. His necessary condition of liberty was that no principle be overriding and that monarchy must remain to ensure this, at least in Great Britain.

The French Revolution and the excesses it engendered advanced and renewed the arguments in favor of monarchy in Britain. Some Englishmen, including Tom Paine and Richard Price, were enthusiastic in wanting Britain to follow France in a republican direction. William Wordsworth expressed the enthusiasm of a generation: “Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive” (*The Prelude*, Book 11). But this initial enthusiasm soon faded as France moved toward the Reign of Terror, and war broke out between the two countries. Edmund Burke argued in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* in 1790 that if “revolution” was taken to mean what the French seemed to mean by it—the radical reconstruction of society along lines suggested by abstract reason—then it was doomed to degenerate into failure and tyranny. This was not true of the more modest form of revolution that had occurred in England in 1789 and in America in 1776, both revolutions that Burke favored. He argued that the “real rights of men” existed only as properly recognized and developed systems of obligation in well-established and well-ordered societies. The liberties of the English were part of a slowly developing system of government and society of which monarchy was an integral part. Thus, liberty and monarchy were part of one another, and there was little chance of sustained liberty in a popular republic that was based on abstract principles. The utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham was even more emphatic in his condemnation of the revolutionaries. In *Anarchical Fallacies*, he attacked the very nature of the French revolutionary doctrines such as “the natural rights of man,” arguing that they failed both ontological and ethical tests and were, therefore, “nonsense on stilts.” But Bentham was a very strict and self-conscious consequentialist, so his support for monarchy was necessarily more contingent and mutable than was Burke’s.

In short, the defenses of British monarchy by Montesquieu, Hume, Burke, and Bentham were different, but had in common the view that by combining parliamentary power with royal sovereignty British government was “limited,” “moderate,” or “mixed” in ways that were conducive to sustaining liberty. Such government was compared favorably with republican government in which there was no natural balance to the popular will or limit to abstract principles. All of them might argue that “natural rights” or “popular sovereignty” were, if anything, slightly less nonsensical than “the divine right of kings,” but in the circumstances they found themselves, the latter was the less dangerous doctrine.

The normative argument in favor of limited monarchy took a new turn with the publication of Walter Bagehot’s book *The English Constitution* in 1867. Bagehot attacked the idea that government could be understood only in terms of power and the making of decisions, arguing, in effect, that such accounts were one-dimensional:
In such constitutions there are two parts . . . first, those which excite and preserve the reverence of the population—the dignified parts, . . . ; and next, the efficient parts—those by which it, in fact, works and rules . . . every constitution must first gain authority, and then use authority; it must first win the loyalty and homage of mankind and then employ that homage in the work of government. . . . The dignified parts of the government are those which bring it force—which attract its native power. . . . The Queen is only at the head of the dignified part of the constitution. The prime minister is at the head of the efficient part. (pp. 3ff)

“Dignity,” in Bagehot’s sense, humanizes and personalizes our relationship with the state, allowing us to identify it with a family, a history, and a nation. This is unselfconsciously, but entirely, a functionalist account of the working of government, and its predecessors therefore include the accounts of “the body politic” going back to Plato and Aristotle while its successors include 20th-century systems analysts such as David Easton and Oran Young. It remains an important argument on several levels including the defense of monarchy and the general understanding of political systems.

Monarchy and Political Science in the 20th Century

Bagehot’s theory of the working of a limited monarchy has been widely quoted, accepted, and taught. It has acquired some of the properties of a self-fulfilling prophecy, influencing both the way in which British monarchs have conducted themselves and the perception of monarchy in the population as a whole. For example, socialist politicians have been surprisingly easily persuaded that the existence of monarchy is compatible with their egalitarian principles—a compatibility that would seem unlikely prima facie. Moreover, they have often made the judgment that there are fewer obstacles to their policy proposals under a monarchy than there would be with a formal, written constitution. In any case, monarchy as a political issue would likely be highly emotive and distracting; like abortion, it would be an unlikely issue for a rational career politician to choose to be involved in. As a result, the existence of the monarchy has been kept off the main political agenda in Britain, and it is only slightly less rare that the precise role of the monarchy has been debated.

Of course, what applies to Britain also applies to different degrees in a number of Commonwealth countries. It is interesting to note that monarchy has been more of an issue in Australia than it has in Canada, though in the Canadian version, the role of the monarchy is more circumscribed, and there has been no equivalent of the events in Australia in 1975 when the Queen’s representative, the Governor-General Sir John Kerr, played an active part in dismissing the government of the day during what has been described as the greatest constitutional crisis in Australian history. But it is also the case that Bagehot’s theory of the role of monarchy applies at least in part to other monarchies, because in these cases as well, the monarchy can be seen as located in a different dimension from normal politics. The Allied (principally American) decision to allow Emperor Hirohito of Japan to continue as head of state after the Japanese surrender in 1945 falls into this category and almost certainly facilitated the legitimate and peaceful postwar development of the country. In Spain, the restoration of the monarchy in 1975 also proved similarly to facilitate reconciliation and legitimation. In one sense, Spain had been a monarchy since the end of the Civil War in 1939, but it was a monarchy without a monarch, with Generalissimo Francisco Franco as “Caudillo” and acting head of state. To see the Spanish monarchy in this Bagehotian light is surprising, given that monarchy had remained an ideological issue in Spain, but King Juan Carlos I has proved adept at working with elected politicians of all persuasions in the British style. He enhanced his reputation considerably by acting decisively against an attempted military coup in 1981.

The case of Thailand is more difficult to assess. The country has had a constitutional monarch since 1932, and King Bhumibol (as it happens, a native of Massachusetts) has been in office since 1946. The monarchy is revered in Thailand, and the monarch has a religious status as the spiritual leader and highest level of being within the national form of Buddhism. But Thailand has not experienced political stability; it has had a cycle of military coups and democratic restorations with the longest period of sustained democratic government
being 1992 to 2006. Spain and Thailand can be seen as the inverse of each other: In Spain, the monarchy has helped provide the conditions for reconciliation and democratization despite the institution being initially divisive, whereas in Thailand, the monarchy is revered as “above” politics but has been unable to prevent political instability. But one could argue that without the monarchy Thailand’s divisions would have been expressed much more violently and its sense of national solidarity lost completely. Thus, it is not out of the question to argue for the Bagehotian functionalist role of monarchy even in the Thai case. It may be that without monarchy, Thailand would have experienced more bloodshed and less economic progress.

In all these cases, it is at least arguable that monarchy has been very important politically, principally by providing the context in which politics takes place. So it is surprising to report that there has been very little attention in the academic study of politics to the institution of monarchy. Bagehot’s account of the institution, though well known, has barely been refined or developed. The subject has been left to journalists and historians, and it is instructive to consider why this should have been so. It is even the case that most university courses on British politics do not discuss the monarchy as such.

First, there is the question of what James March called “the power of power.” The concept of power combines the appeal of “the glories of classical mechanics” with that of “the cynicism of Realpolitik.” And concern with it has been a defining condition of the modern study of politics. “Politics is about power” is the mantra, which appears to specifically exclude the study of “constitutional” monarchs. But the distinction between the powerful and the formal can never be completely impermeable as is shown by the incidents in Spain in 1981. It is possible to imagine a constitutional crisis in the United Kingdom in which the monarch would assume a similarly important role. In any case, in Bagehot’s account of monarchy, the monarch retains certain residual political rights—to warn, to advise, and to be consulted—which may generate influence, particularly when an experienced monarch is dealing with a relatively inexperienced politician.

Second, in the case of those monarchies that retain executive power, the methodological constraints on research are considerable. To investigate the Moroccan monarchy or any of those in the Arabian peninsula would present a Western political researcher with obstacles of language, culture, access, censorship, and coercion. In any case, since there is only a limited set of monarchies, even effective research might appear contingent and anecdotal with little or nothing to say about monarchy per se.

Third, there is also the case of progressivism, whether in its Whig or Marxist forms. That is, although monarchy may exist and be thriving now, forms of developmental model relegate monarchy to the past. Research in the social sciences is naturally more oriented to the present and the future rather than the past. We could argue that 20th-century political science devoted too much attention to unanswerable and superficial questions about public opinion and too little to monarchy.

Fourth—and finally—there is the undeniable effect that research feeds on research and generates fashions. Monarchy is not studied partly because nobody ever makes an attempt to study it, and it would be a brave young researcher who announced that he or she was going to devote his or her career to studying monarchy.

The absence of a political science of monarchy is more complete at the microscopic level than at the macroscopic. At the broad level, some political scientists have accorded at least a curious attention to the effects of monarchy on political culture and thus on the working of political systems. In particular, Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) has contrasted the cultural condition of American republicanism with the more deferential and “governable” characteristics of Canada and European monarchies. Contemporary monarchists might argue, based on this research, that monarchies as a whole remain generally more stable and more prosperous than republics as a whole, but the obvious response would be to point out that this is a spurious correlation dependent on the further observation that most monarchies are either in Northern Europe or the Commonwealth. They would be on firmer ground in saying that the principal advantage of monarchy, especially when compared with executive presidencies, is that it furnishes a state with a head who did not seek the role and whose identity is
bound up with that of the society, rather than an ambitious politician with executive responsibilities whom at least a substantial minority of the population are likely to dislike.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Democracy, Theories of; Republic; Traditional Rule

Further Readings


MONETARY RELATIONS

International “monetary relations” refers to the efforts of sovereign states to influence the conditions of cross-border flows of money and other financial assets, especially money flows that are not the direct counterpart of real exchanges of goods and services. These conditions include but are not limited to exchange rate regimes and levels, capital and investment controls, foreign debt contracts, the use of reserve currencies, regulation of multinational banks and nonbank financial institutions, and balance-of-payments crisis management. After situating the topic in its theoretical and historical contexts, this entry discusses the relationship of monetary legitimacy to state power, the ambiguous nature of global monetary governance, and the contemporary monetary issues of greatest concern. A final section highlights the range of theoretical and methodological perspectives in use.

Theory and History

Neoclassical economists typically make a number of assumptions when examining the international monetary system, among the most significant being that financial firms and investors act independently of one another, that multinational banks have little home bias in their lending and investing decisions, and that, under fully liberalized global capital markets, firms and countries with objectively similar economic profiles will face homogeneous credit, insurance, and bankruptcy conditions. These analysts model the global monetary system as a decentralized, self-equilibrating market. Within this cognitive framing, national decisions to depart from fully liberalized capital accounts appear suboptimal. Yet the neoclassical approach ignores the role played by states in constituting the rules and institutions within which market transactions occur.

Political scientists in contrast assume an international political economy. World markets are embedded in and permeated by social institutions, including formal international governmental organizations (IGOs; with membership limited to sovereign states) as well as informal clubs and processes, each associated with norms, laws, or rules,
and standardized procedures. Yet there is neither a world government nor a collective and authoritative enforcement mechanism for global market transactions. Those who defy the “rules” of exchange (honor contracts, represent merchandise honestly, don’t bribe, and don’t manipulate prices) may be punished by the market in the form of reputational losses. Powerful states also possess a host of additional punishments and inducements, particularly access to their home markets, that core country governments may deploy to get the rules, compliance from others, and occasional exceptions for themselves that they desire. Neoclassical economics does not model these non-trivial special privileges.

International monetary transactions over the past century and a half have occurred within four broad monetary eras. Three were characterized by sets of rules and social institutions designed and enforced by representatives of a dominant state or states, while the fourth period was an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to establish a durable regime.

During the classical gold standard era, roughly 1870 to 1914, the major trading states pegged their paper currencies (fiat monies) to gold, with incumbent governments promising to redeem this paper on demand. The system’s anchor was the credibility of the promises of key states, particularly Britain, to exchange intrinsically valueless paper for a preset quantity of precious metal.

The second period was the two interwar decades of unsuccessful attempts to reconstruct the prewar gold standard. With its industrial economy decimated by World War I, Britain especially tried to reestablish sterling convertibility at the prewar gold parity but gave up in 1931. Barry Eichengreen observes that the major industrial capitalist states, responding to pressure from demobilized soldiers, all quickly instituted universal male suffrage following World War I, subsequently making it politically very difficult to reimpose the rigid and harsh automatic-adjustment procedures built into the gold standard. In a contrasting explanation for the failure to establish a durable monetary regime, Charles Kindleberger famously contended that the crucial brake on interwar monetary stability was that the only state with sufficient economic and political resources to lead, the United States, was insufficiently committed to doing so. There was no solution until after World War II.

The key outlines of the postwar multilateral economic institutions negotiated by the soon-to-be victors reflected the generally liberal economic preferences of the United States, which emerged from the war even more relatively powerful than previously. The Bretton Woods regime, named after the New England resort where the conference met in late 1944, had the goal of free currency convertibility on the current account of the balance of payments, so that the inability of would-be importers to get a license to purchase foreign exchange would not serve as an undeclared trade barrier. However, the Bretton Woods negotiators saw liberal convertibility for the capital account—corresponding to cross-border investment flows lacking a direct trade counterpart—as dangerous and destabilizing. Another key provision was the historically unprecedented creation of two multilateral banks offering loans to sovereign governments: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), providing foreign exchange to countries whose currency was under attack, and the World Bank, to extend longer-term credits for war reconstruction and infrastructure development. The final pillar of the postwar monetary regime was a mostly fixed exchange rate among major currencies. This was the adjustable peg, to be moved only through formal application to the IMF, which was hardly ever done in practice. Only the U.S. dollar, the system’s linchpin, was convertible into gold. The United States’ strong postwar economy meant that its business community initially accepted low import tariffs, even when trading partners did not reciprocate. But America’s postwar trade surplus eventually disappeared. In 1971, and without consultation with the United States’ European allies, U.S. President Richard Nixon ended convertibility and imposed a 10% across-the-board import surcharge, effectively devaluing the dollar by an equivalent amount. By the mid-1970s, all the major industrial democracies had responded by floating their currencies.

The post-Bretton Woods regime, or financial globalization era, extends from the mid-1970s to the present. Its dominant themes have been removal of capital controls and dismantling of a wide variety of financial regulatory barriers, such as U.S. legislation prohibiting commercial banks from operating in securities markets. Deregulation led to heightened integration of previously segmented
national financial markets and a dramatic expansion of the profits and size of the financial sector in the advanced economies. The period also has coincided with an increase in financial crises, often both balance-of-payments (exchange rate) crises and domestic banking crashes. Crises occurred most often in developing and transitional countries, with the notable exception of 1991–1992’s large crisis in Western Europe’s Exchange Rate Mechanism. Members of the European Union (EU) then sought to protect themselves from financial uncertainty by the dramatic step of adopting a common currency. Their Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) entered into full effect in January 2002, although without the participation of the United Kingdom and Sweden.

Until 2008, most expected the United States, the center of world financial innovation and possessor of the dominant global reserve currency, to remain immune from serious financial crisis. Yet the U.S. and worldwide financial crisis of 2008–2009 was the worst since the 1930s, leading the global economy to shrink by almost 3% in 2009. The neoliberal model of ever-freer global finance has been at least partially discredited. Robert Wade is hardly the only observer to ask whether a new era of international monetary relations is in the process of being born.

**Money and State Power**

As recently as the late 19th century it was not uncommon for multiple currencies, including both coins (specie) and paper obligations of public and private entities, to circulate freely in a national territory. Yet from the early 20th century onward, possession of a unique national currency operating as sole legal tender within the geographical extent of the territory came to be seen as an indispensable component of sovereignty. Because fiat money depends on the public’s trust of the issuer, currency strength is closely linked to state legitimacy and strength. Niall Ferguson claims that it was early-modern England’s superior ability to construct effective public debt markets, encouraging voluntary loans to the state from wealthy private citizens, that allowed England to surpass France in military and political power. Rodney Bruce Hall investigates how national, and ultimately global, monetary credibility is socially constructed in the contemporary world, locating central banks at the core of this process. Leonard Seabrooke emphasizes the critical role of mass publics in the wealthy democracies in sustaining belief in national money and finance. Key to this has been what John Gerard Ruggie baptized the compromise of “embedded liberalism” or support by the advanced capitalist democracies for comparatively open, liberal international economic relations coupled with buffering of their domestic populations from economic downturns via extensive welfare networks and capital controls.

National monetary strength in turn becomes a source of international influence, allowing states to employ financial levers to achieve both preferred global financial governance outcomes and unrelated foreign policy goals. David M. Andrews points to the 1956 Suez Canal crisis, in which the United States informed Britain that it would not lend its support to the sterling, then under market pressure, until the British and French changed their policy and agreed to withdraw from Egypt. Contributors brought together by Eric Helleiner and Jonathan Kirshner worry about the problem of global imbalances—specifically the United States’ persistent and ever-growing current account deficit mirrored by the similarly “structural” surpluses of China and others—and what the gradual redistribution of monetary capabilities toward large emerging powers such as China might mean for the dollar-centric global economic governance system still managed by, and some would claim for, the major advanced industrial economies. In mid-2009, all the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) were among the 10 largest holders of official foreign exchange reserves. There were only two advanced industrial democracies on the list: Japan, number two after China, and Germany, number nine.

**The Amorphous Global Financial Architecture**

Throughout the Bretton Woods and financial globalization eras the scope, goals, and membership of the international governance regimes for international money and finance have been, in Jacqueline Best’s felicitous phrase, notably “ambiguous.” One possibility raised by Benjamin J. Cohen is that today’s sophisticated monetary relations are
qualitatively distinct from those in most other international arenas: It is the market itself that increasingly “governs,” limiting the actions of states. On the other hand, the monetary regime does possess formal organizations. The IMF and World Bank are official membership institutions with wide authority over their borrowers, although since the early 1980s, their borrowers have mostly been developing countries and post–centrally planned economies. In the years following the mid-1970s breakdown of fixed exchange rates among the major economies of the day, it has been the Group of Seven (G7, initially the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan, later joined by Italy and Canada) that has exercised real international monetary governance authority, managing sometimes acrimonious exchange rate negotiations among the dominant capitalist economies, coping with international financial crises, and promoting (or vetoing) multilateral and transnational innovations in collaborative financial and monetary regulation, irrespective of the formal venues for regulatory negotiations. As Andrew Baker explains, the G7 is a “process,” at present consisting of quarterly meetings of finance ministers and central bank presidents along with annual heads-of-state summits, rather than a formal organization with a headquartered building and permanent staff. Membership in this exclusive club is on the basis of power, in the dual senses of latent capabilities and realized influence, although whether this is overall global power or monetary regime-specific power is not always clear. Overall power is a necessary but not sufficient membership qualification, assisted by international assertiveness, yet underlying friendly relations, with the leading economies. Thus, Italy successfully demanded inclusion for itself in the mid-1980s by threatening to close American airbases. In the early 1990s, the newly independent Russia was invited to the heads-of-state summit process (the G8) but not for the technical monetary consultations, a move widely understood as a concession to Russia’s global importance and nuclear weapons status.

Even the G7 has been to some degree a fiction: In both the Latin American peso/“tequila” crisis of 1994–1995 and the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, U.S. officials in the Treasury, White House, and Federal Reserve brushed aside the preferences of their Western European and Japanese G7 partners. Moreover monetary governance in the sense of regulatory innovation and multilateral or collaborative supervision of cross-border financial flows takes place even further below the radar of public scrutiny, in technical committees associated with the Bank of International Settlements—an invitation-only membership association of the central banks of systemically important countries and other countries they choose to include—and in a host of public–private transnational bodies associated with various branches of the financial industry, such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions and the International Accounting Standards Board. By comparison, the global trade regime, which is often accused of being biased against developing countries in its operation, nonetheless is headed by a formal organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose members include a majority of countries. The WTO has democratic voting procedures, formal rules for trade agreements, a complaint and adjudication process, and ongoing negotiations over agreed-on agendas. The de facto global monetary governance regime lacks all these qualities.

Monetary Relations of the Status Quo Powers

It may be that the combination of ambiguity and centralization in monetary relations has served the world well. There has been steady expansion in the world economy since the Bretton Woods system came into being, although the rate of world growth has been notably slower since the breakdown of its fixed exchange rate component. Prior to 2008–2009, there had been no truly systemic international financial crisis since the 1930s. The consensus of policymakers in the G7 countries as of late 2009 was that collaborative crisis management was working, and world growth would recover in 2010. A repeat of the Great Depression had been averted, at least in the core capitalist economies. As international monetary conditions apparently returned to normal, the attention of both policymakers and scholars in advanced industrial countries refocused on their traditional concerns, including exchange rate negotiations, the degree of autonomy from political oversight to
be accorded to central banks, financial regulation and supervision, and the desirability and feasibility of multilateral macroeconomic coordination.

Many of the theoretical contributions of political scientists are related to these topics. Eric Helleiner and Benjamin J. Cohen, respectively, have clarified the political economy of capital account liberalization (CAL) and that of the “unholy trinity” of CAL: exchange rate stability under a floating rate regime and autonomous domestic monetary policy. Jeffry A. Frieden has been at the center of a group in pursuit of a parsimonious theory of domestic exchange rate preferences, employing, on the one hand, interest-group categories such as exporters versus importers, producers of tradables in contrast to producers of nontradables, liquid- or fixed-asset holders, and sectors with or without foreign debt, and on the other hand, political institution variables such as majoritarian versus plurality systems and measures of central bank independence. Explaining the decision of a majority of Western European states to yield up their national currencies by joining the EMU has been a dominant task for political scientists investigating exchange rate politics.

Other scholars analyze the negotiating strategies employed by major states and their use of international monetary power to achieve state goals. In general, countries prefer to have their trading partners make the necessary adjustments rather than having to intervene to move the level of their home currency. Thus, during the G7 negotiations in the mid-1980s known as the Plaza and Louvre Accords, all parties agreed that the U.S. dollar was objectively overvalued. But the Europeans wanted the United States to find a way to rein in government budget and trade deficits, while the Americans argued that, since their reserve currency position made it impractical for them to encourage the markets to let the dollar depreciate, it was up to the European and Japanese to push their currencies up. The United States and China had similar disagreements in 2008 to 2009.

Additional Concerns of Emerging Powers and Peripheral States

The world of the very early 21st century remains unipolar, with only a single superpower. But the trend is toward the emergence of new powers, particularly China. Opinion on Europe splits sharply between observers who identify countries such as Britain, France, and even Germany as states of declining global significance and those who perceive the inevitability of the United States of Europe and thus anticipate future bipolarity or tripollarity with the United States and China. Japan’s future status is similarly debated. What is clear is that since sometime in the 1990s, several emerging powers plausibly are approaching members of the G7 in global prominence, particularly if one employs economic size as the single most critical component of relative capabilities. New countries push to be included in global monetary deliberations. The U.S. President George W. Bush in the final months of his administration in late 2008 convened the first heads-of-state summit of the countries of the Group of Twenty (financial G20, not to be confused with the trade G20 of developing countries), until then a peripheral albeit multilateral process initially organized by the United States in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis. Besides the G7, G20 members included Australia and a geographically representative selection of larger emerging economies friendly to the United States. Meanwhile the BRICs countries, formally organized by Russia, had begun meeting at the heads-of-state level in early 2008, cognizant that their main common interest lay in joint pressure for inclusion in the more exclusive clubs for global governance but pragmatically seeking to develop other collective negotiating aims. From the initial summit of the financial G20 (or “larger economies group”) in November 2008 onward, the G20 swiftly moved to supplant the G7. Meanwhile the four BRICs countries have made increasingly bold, if still guarded, statements about the need to replace the dollar with a truly global currency, perhaps based on the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights.

Global monetary and financial reform proposals important to developing countries, yet long brushed aside by G7 policymakers and academics, finally have entered the elite economic discourse. These include topics such as recognition that countries with prudent macroeconomic and financial regulatory policies may be victims of financial contagion, that there may be a legitimate role for the state in overcoming both national and global market failures in financial markets, that “host” rather
than “home” state regulation of multinational banks may better protect investor and borrower rights, and that multinational insurance and stabilization funds for commodity producers might be economically sound concepts. More generally, entirely free markets, particularly in money and securitized assets, may be neither self-equilibrating nor socially desirable. In the terminology of international relations, some states in the developing world, particularly those possessed of objective power resources or influence relevant to the global monetary governance regime, have begun to demand the extension of the protections of embedded liberalism to their citizens. Many of these themes were echoed in a 2009 international commission of experts put together at the behest of the president of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and headed by Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank and fierce critic of the IMF. Interestingly, the UNGA documents criticize the financial G20 as insufficiently democratic and representative in its composition.

**Contending Political Perspectives on Global Money**

The conceptual lenses through which political scientists analyze international monetary relations are extraordinarily heterogeneous. In one intellectual corner, associated with several of the most prestigious U.S.-based journals, are scholars who define their task as the application of the dominant methodology of contemporary neoclassical economics—sophisticated statistics—to explore, for example, the relationship between hourly electoral results in a wealthy democracy and the fluctuating value of benchmark global bonds. Elsewhere, students of philosophy, social trust, or of the psychology of panics are fascinated with the mystique of money, in its modern and nearly entirely electronic form—the epitome of accelerating globalization. Practitioners of traditional diplomatic history are finding monetary negotiations to be increasingly central to interstate security relations. Last but hardly least are Marx’s contemporary heirs: for example, authors in the volume edited by Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings make a compelling case that the current international financial architecture directly reflects the interests of the United States’ private financial sector. One almost might conclude that money is as ubiquitous as power in international relations—or that the two are the same.

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See also Economic Statecraft; International Political Economy; International Trade; Multinational Corporations (MNCs); World Bank; World Trade Organization (WTO)

**Further Readings**


Monitoring can be defined as a systematic and continuous surveillance of a series of events. Monitoring is practiced to secure that the activities inside an organization, or the outputs of an organization, are according to established goals. Monitoring thus refers to the control of organizations. In politics, monitoring takes place both between politicians (versus bureaucrats) and within the public administration; in the latter form, it deals with organizational control. Monitoring and evaluation are closely linked; both focus on examining the procedures and processes involved and gathering information about the level of performance. In government practice, the two concepts overlap, as when, for example, the follow-up of a government program can be called either monitoring or evaluation without a major difference. It is also possible to see monitoring as a basic form of evaluation when we add some “how and why” questions, such as why a given program is lagging behind its goals or how certain societal results can be explained by certain policy measures.

Some evaluation scholars do not make a distinction between monitoring and evaluation. Others argue that monitoring does not include judging the worth and value of performance, and hence, evaluation consists of more than monitoring or accounting. In addition, the focus on theory separates evaluation research from other forms of evaluation, such as monitoring. A central concept related to monitoring is accountability. Politico-administrative systems are built on a hierarchical structure, which gives the citizens the right to control the parliament; the parliament the right to control the government; the government, the public administration; and the upper levels of bureaucracy, the lower levels. Much has been written on the possibilities and limitations of parliaments and cabinet members in controlling bureaucracy. Although bureaucrats may be subject to political surveillance, they know how to use their often long (at least in comparative terms) experience, expertise, and isolation from political battles to bypass and make strategic use of any monitoring efforts directed toward them. Whether monitoring reaches the ultimate points of delivery, where street-level bureaucrats deal with various sorts of clients, is an important issue as well, not least from the viewpoint of democracy. Finally, monitoring may be used when governments finance various external projects, as, for example, with development aid. Monitoring can even refer to the control of governmental outlays for typically outsourced projects.

The theory and methodology of monitoring are closely linked to organizational science. Organizations are collective efforts, and large organizations always need to control the unity of the organization. The theoretical issues around the concept thus deal with questions such as what kind of monitoring tools work in what kind of organizations, what motives underlie the use of monitoring, and to what extent governments are using similar or different kinds of monitoring tools and why. As noted earlier, monitoring is tied to characteristics of the organization in question. A small organization, a club, or an association can usually maintain order or homogeneity simply by exchanging communication through face-to-face interaction. Larger and more complex organizations, such as major hospitals, political parties, religious bodies such as the Catholic Church, or national bureaucracies, have a much greater need for ensuring that what the members of the organization do corresponds with the overall will of the leaders of the organization, be they outside or inside the organization.

Alternative Organizational Models

The way the researchers conceptualize monitoring depends on the specific organization model, or metaphor, that they are using. Traditionally, in what we could call the old institutionalism, the politico-administrative system is seen as constituted of rules and organizational arrangements that aim to cement the tasks and responsibilities—the
division of labor—within the public administration. The pioneering sociologist Max Weber depicted bureaucracies as rational systems compared with the earlier historical forms of state. The prominent features of this system were specification of jobs with detailed rights, obligations, responsibilities, scope of authority, and a system of supervision and subordination. Monitoring in this context served to ensure that the rules were followed and malpractices would be discovered and stopped. Hierarchic and bureaucratic modes imply the use of coercion or threat to ensure compliance with authoritative rules. In some cases, this monitoring by rules and regulations may lead to an overemphasis on caution and slow, multifaceted processing of issues. Today, we also think of bureaucracies as inefficient, slow, and generally bad. Thus, the concept of bureaucracy has through the years been interpreted in a variety of ways.

Later on, however, the Weberian model of public administration was modified, if not replaced, by a number of other models.

First, a theory contrary to the Weberian rational model is that bureaucratic officials, like all other agents in society, are significantly, though not solely, motivated by self-interest. This theory follows the tradition of economic thought from Adam Smith onward. One influential model in this area is the principal–agent model. The model treats the difficulties that arise under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information when a principal (e.g., parliament) hires an agent (government department). In this situation, the two may not have the same interests, even though the principal is presumably hiring the agent to its interests. While perhaps not fitting the public administration per se, the model seems to catch the problems embedded in contractual relationships, in which the public authority aims at defining in the form of a contract the liabilities and sanctions dealing with a private agent. The question is whether the agents, say individual bureaucrats, strive for selfish benefits or are servants of the public. Solving this question can be difficult because in reality, bureaucrats whose aim is to expand their organizations may serve both their own and the public interest. In any case, adding the possibility of selfish, individual interests to the picture increases and somewhat complicates the monitoring task.

Second, a (neo-)institutional approach would place the actors in context and predict, for example, that doctors have a particular, professional way of legitimizing their activities, and an outsider (the principal) demanding scrutiny may be in a frustrating or weak position. In addition, organizational change, such as adjusting to new forms of performance monitoring, may not depend on the deliberate decisions made by the organization’s leaders but on the fit or misfit between the reform and the norms of the organization. It is well known that the various reforms originating from the new public management paradigm have been implemented in ways reflecting the specific historical, societal, and political culture of a country.

Performance Management

Monitoring the Weberian rule of law emphasizes the avoidance of mistakes but does not emphasize or require results. Poor performance was not really a question in the fiscal accounting system. Now, however, monitoring has widened to include a program element, and likewise, researchers have shifted their focus to questions of performance management. A central issue in research concerns the possibilities and limitations of measuring performance within public administration. One debate focuses on the nature of public policies. It has been determined that performance targets are often quantitative, and this causes bureaucrats to neglect the qualitative, nonmeasured aspects of their performance. Public policies, further, are often services or societal interventions, which make it difficult to point out exactly what the influence of the output is. On top of that, so-called performance indicators often do not measure outcomes but outputs—as, for example, where the police aim at making as many arrests as possible, while the fundamental societal goal is to diminish criminality. In addition, performance indicators have been criticized because of their rigidity. The use of performance indicators can have dysfunctional effects on an organization’s performance if it does not react to changes or surprising events. Finally, monitoring performance can be a complicated task. More and more public policies are produced not by single organizations but by several ones in concert. These policy networks or partnerships often follow their own situation-bound, autonomous norms but at
the same time form a part of the public authority. The question of accountability becomes more difficult the more actors are involved and can be more accurately called multiple accountability. In recent years, there has been a lively debate on governance—for example, concerning a new form, or account, of public policy making, which emphasizes the interaction between private actors and public authorities on various levels. The implications for monitoring are obvious: Instead of coercion and authority, concepts such as trust, custom, and solidarity play an important role.

At a deeper level, performance monitoring reflects questions of ethics and trust. In the Weberian system, it was widely accepted that malpractices need to be identified and omitted. Performance monitoring raises the question of why organizational rules, information from different sources, and professional education are not considered sufficient to guarantee a well-functioning public administration. It suggests that the organizational model in use assumes that bureaucrats are selfish and lazy. Devoted professionals prepared to further develop their policy areas may become disillusioned because of the straightforward simplification of progress into numeric indicators. The central question is how organizations function and to what extent their coherence is based on trust versus control. As mentioned earlier, excessive monitoring in the form of frequently demanded reports, control of communication, time limits for tasks, and so forth can also demand an excessive workload. Thus, one research task in this area is to find and argue for a healthy balance between trust and control, whether based on the organization’s size and structure or the type of organization.

Monitoring and Public Policy
Loosening top-down control, a strict way of monitoring, may raise questions of democratic accountability. Democracy is often seen from a narrow perspective as properly expressed only through aggregative representation. Flexible, interactive forms of public policy making can be justified with the help of democracy theory too. At the same time, the transformation of public policy making may radically change the overall opportunities of monitoring by upper levels of government. The move away from this traditional linear interpretation of the policy cycle and toward a more nuanced conceptualization of the policy process reflects a general recent trend toward “post-positivist” modes of analysis in policy science as a whole. Research on monitoring cannot avoid the changes caused by the transformation of monitoring itself.

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See also Evaluation Research; Performance Management

Further Readings

Monte Carlo Methods

Monte Carlo methods describe a set of computer simulation techniques that rely on random number generation to solve complex optimization and integration problems arising in statistics and its related fields. The term Monte Carlo is a reference to the probabilistic rules underlying casino games of chance, and though the theoretical underpinnings for their use emerged in the postwar period, it is the advent of inexpensive, modern computing that enabled their widespread adoption for practical problem solving.

Typically presented as an alternative to time-consuming analytical efforts, Monte Carlo methods allow researchers more freedom to posit models and make more subtle inferences from them—that is, they no longer need to rely on standard, but unrealistic, assumptions about complex (causal) processes that ensure a tractable solution exists.
This has proved particularly important in Bayesian analysis, where quantities of interest are available in principal by complex integration operations, yet can be (well) approximated via simulation. Precisely because such techniques have proved popular in political science, this integration aspect of Monte Carlo methods is the focus here. This entry begins with a discussion of the basic integration operation; then, it moves to the importance of random number generation and methods of sampling before considering Markov chain Monte Carlo methods. This latter set of techniques has proved extremely popular in political science over the past 10 years or so, especially for applying item–response models to obtain “ideal points” from roll call data. There are also large literatures dealing with optimization via Monte Carlo procedures and integration via (nonsimulation) deterministic numerical approaches; these are not discussed here.

Classical Monte Carlo Integration

To keep matters simple, consider the evaluation of the following integral:

\[ I = \int xg(x)dx, \]  

(1)

where \( g(x) \) is a probability density function. As presented, the integral will yield the expectation of the random variable \( X \) denoted \( E(X) \). But performing the operation may be difficult, perhaps because the integral has no closed form. A helpful alternative to this effort is to generate a sample of size \( m \) from the density \( g(x) \) and then to compute the empirical average,

\[ \hat{I} = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} x_i. \]  

(2)

As \( m \) increases, by the strong law of large numbers, \( \hat{I} \) converges almost surely to the true value of \( I \)—and thus, the true value of \( E(X) \). Denoted the Monte Carlo method, the idea is more general. We can replace \( x \) in Equation 1 with some arbitrary function of \( x \), denoted \( h(x) \). This might be the median or some other percentile. And we can assess definite integrals so long as we can produce a sample of \( x \) values between the specified bounds.

The variance of \( \hat{I} \) is decreasing in \( m \). When \( \text{var}(m) \) is finite, the central limit theorem applies as the sample size increases, and we can place bounds on our estimates. Moreover, asymptotically, it is possible to obtain quantities that can be used to assess convergence directly.

This simulated integration takes on an important role in Bayesian statistics, since we often want to perform a variant on Equation 1. In particular, we are concerned with characteristics—such as the mean or median—of the posterior distribution \( \pi(\theta|y) \), where \( \theta \) is an unknown parameter and \( y \) the observations. In that case, we need

\[ E(h(\theta)) = \int \pi(\theta|x)b(\theta)d\theta, \]

which we approximate as \( (1/m)\sum_{i=1}^{m} b(\theta) \). For many regular cases, this simple approach works well, though more efficient alternatives typically exist that do not require being able to directly simulate samples from \( g(x) \).

Random Number Generation and Sampling

All methods of simulation necessitate the generation of random numbers; in the case of simple Monte Carlo integration, those random numbers were from some probability function \( g(x) \). For a very broad range of functions (the \( g(x) \) and \( \pi(\theta|y) \) above), at base, the task requires the production of uniform random variables on the unit interval. We then obtain draws from \( g(x) \) via the inverse transform. Though there are some cases where nonuniform random number generation can be used, the techniques are difficult to generalize outside of specific distributions. What constitutes an optimal or efficient random number generator is debatable and often subjective.

The inverse transform may not be available, or may not work well, for many distributions. An alternative is to use accept–reject methods (also known as rejection methods or rejection sampling) that rely on a fundamental result involving the uniform distribution. Recall that we wish to generate variates from \( g(x) \), which we will assume has bounded support. Imagine now that the random variable \( X \) is jointly distributed with an auxiliary variable \( U \) such that any hypothetical pair of values drawn will have an \( x \) component with some
corresponding $g(x)$ and $u$ component that is strictly less than the $g(x)$ and yet nonzero. To obtain that $u$ value, we simply generate from the uniform bounded by 0 and $g(x)$. Yet in doing this, we have, in fact, generated a draw from $f(x)$: For a given value of $x$, our uniform draw $u$ must be “under the curve” described by $g$.

Clearly, we need an $x$ value to evaluate $g(x)$, but this cannot be sampled directly from $g(x)$ itself (since this is assumed unavailable to us). In practice then, for a one-dimensional density, we sample the $x$ value from a uniform between zero and the maximum of $g(x)$ and the $u$ value from a uniform that has a range identical to (the relevant part of) $g(x)$. Notice that these two intervals draw a “box” around the density $g(x)$. It must be the case that some of these pairs are points in two-dimensional space that fall under the curve $g(x)$, and we will “accept” these. By contrast, some must fall elsewhere, and we will “reject” those.

The accept–reject approach can be used more generally for cases where neither the maximum nor the support of $g$ are bounded, so long as simulating uniform variates over the implied larger space is possible. The key is to find another density function $f(x)$ such that for every possible value of $x$, $g(x) \leq Mf(x)$, where $M$ is a constant greater than or equal to one. Now, we begin by generating $x_i$ values from our “envelope” density $f(x)$. We then take a single draw $u$ from a uniform $U[0, 1]$. If the value of $u$ is less than $g(x_i)/Mf(x_i)$, the $x_i$ is accepted as a sample from $g(x)$. If not, we reject the candidate $x_i$. This approach has an important implication for Bayesian analysis, because we do not need to know the normalizing constant for $g$ to sample from it. Yet this is precisely the situation when dealing with a posterior that is proportional to the prior multiplied by the likelihood: $\pi(\theta|x) \mu p(\theta) g(x|\theta)$. Thus, we can draw samples from $\pi(\theta|x)$ without calculating the normalizing constant.

For some problems, accept–reject sampling can be very inefficient. To reduce the variance in simulations, an alternative is to choose an approximate distribution $f$ and then weight the resulting draws according to the probability that they represent a sampled point from the target distribution $g$. This idea is known as importance sampling. The beauty of this sampling scheme is that there is very little restriction on the choice of the instrumental distribution $f$, and so it can be chosen such that it is easy to sample from (e.g., a multivariate normal).

**Markov Chain Monte Carlo**

As described above, Monte Carlo methods produce independent draws from some density $g(x)$. By contrast, Markov chain Monte Carlo methods produce simulated values that are dependent on previous draws from the distribution in question. Recall that a Markov chain is a sequence of random variables with the Markov property, meaning that the present state $\theta^{(t)}$ depends only on the immediately preceding one $\theta^{(t-1)}$. Note that the chain is defined with respect to a state space $\Theta$ that constrains the possible values for the variables, and its moves around this space are probabilistically controlled by the chain’s kernel. So long as the chain possesses certain properties (among them ergodicity, recurrence, and irreducibility), it will eventually reach a stationary distribution $\pi$ and stay there. That is, in this limiting distribution, every draw is from $\pi$. More important, analogous to Equation 2, the average converges to the expectation we seek.

Markov chain Monte Carlo methods are preferred to simple Monte Carlo methods, including importance sampling, because they are often more efficient, especially for complex problems that involve very high-dimensional integrals. With Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithms, the researcher can spend less time finding the “right” instrumental distribution; rather, simulations from $g$ can be generated from essentially any arbitrary distribution $f$. The most widespread procedure in use is the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm, which relies on a random walk. The basics are straightforward: Suppose we are interested in a single parameter $\theta$ for which the posterior is thus $\pi(\theta)$. After some starting point, at each step $t$ in the chain, we propose a candidate value of $\theta$, denoted $\theta'$. In practice, $\theta'$ is a draw from a proposal (or jumping) distribution $q(\theta' | \theta^{(t-1)})$, where $\theta^{(t-1)}$ is the prevailing value of $\theta$ from the previous step in the chain.

The restrictions on the proposal distribution are not especially onerous, and it is often chosen such that it is easy to sample from, with a normal distribution centered at $\theta^{(t-1)}$ being a common choice.
We accept the proposal $\theta'$ as the value for $\theta^{(t)}$ if $u$, a draw from $U[0, 1]$, is less than the ratio of the posteriors evaluated at the different proposals (assuming $q(\cdot)$ is symmetric). If the proposal is not accepted, $\theta^{(t)}$ is simply $\theta^{(t-1)}$, and the process starts again.

The primary concern with Markov chain Monte Carlo techniques is that it is not obvious how many of these updating steps are needed. That is, although we are guaranteed that an ergodic chain will eventually reach its stationary state—and thus that we will be sampling from the posterior we seek—we cannot know beforehand how long this “mixing” will take. A large literature exists on diagnosing nonconvergence, and the methods therein generally rely on monitoring the chain over time, or monitoring the performance of chains with different starting points. Related to this endeavor, researchers typically dispose of early, nonstationary chain values as “burn-in.” A special case of the Metropolis–Hasting approach, popular in political science and elsewhere, is the Gibbs sampler. This requires that researchers have the relevant conditional distributions for the posterior $\pi(\theta)$ available to sample from. When feasible, Gibbs sampling is more efficient than a more general Metropolis–Hasting approach since the candidate values are accepted with probability 1 every time. Free software for specifically fitting models using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods is widely available.

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See also Bayesian Analysis; Sampling, Random and Nonrandom

Further Readings


MULTICOLLINEARITY

See Regression

MULTICULTURALISM

Multiculturalism as a concept, principle, and policy has become, since the 1980s, one of the most controversial issues in social sciences and humanities. The term refers to countries with territorial and/or linguistic minorities and those formed as a result of the migration of religious or racial and/or ethnic groups. Minority claims for equality have given rise to what the philosopher Charles Taylor (1992) has called the politics of recognition, relating it to the “democratic defense of cultural diversity within a universalistic perspective.” Recognition policies along with differentiated group rights are at the core of a “multicultural citizenship” elaborated by Will Kymlicka. For defenders of the principle, multiculturalism matches with the public recognition of cultural identities, with equal rights for ethnic, racial, religious, or national minorities. It therefore constitutes the foundation of democracy. For those who oppose the principle, it leads, on the contrary, to the “disunion” of the nation and to isolated communities in the political arena, and it is therefore perceived as a challenge to the national unity guaranteed by the state. For some, it serves to thwart nationalism and for others, inversely, it serves as the basis of national sentiments and expressions.

The debates oppose those who defend a liberal vision against a republican vision of pluralist society that recognizes citizen identity only on the grounds of social justice. While liberal multiculturalism looks for a response to the management of cultural diversity as a means of equal inclusion of minorities in the political community, the republican view represents multiculturalism as politics, turning the society into a battleground where common values
are transformed into particular interests and where identities perceived as majority or minority compete with each other in search of public resources and representation. As a whole, multiculturalism is fundamentally concerned with both universalistic ideology and the idea of a common civic space of political participation for all groups; it questions how to reconcile the integration of minorities into a common civic culture with the protection of the most vulnerable groups. The process has transformed an anthropological perspective of cultural diversity into a normative vision of plural societies. Multiculturalism is thus systematically associated with the question of national unity and its integrative capacity.

Each state has its own understanding of minority and elaborates specific relations with its minorities. Progress in the judicial sphere now involves questions regarding the cultural and religious rights of minorities in their fight against all forms of discrimination. That does not resolve the issue of whether to define a minority in territorial or nonterritorial terms. Definitions continue to remain ambiguous and differ according to national experiences that define the relations between states and minorities. In Canada, the confrontation between the French and English languages, because of Quebec’s status and the debates around a bilingual and bicultural society, defined as such by the Royal Commission on Multiculturalism, gave political legitimacy to the concept, thanks to the constitutional multiculturalism used in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enacted by the British Parliament and signed by Queen Elizabeth II as part of the Canada Act in 1982, which was thus officially accepted as the fundamental characteristic of the Canadian state. In the United States, the concept has been grounded on the civil rights movement of the 1960s. It took a political and legal shape with the establishment of affirmative action starting in 1965, as a way of increasing the access of members of historically disadvantaged groups to benefits such as employment, college or university admission, and the granting of government contracts. These measures sought to reduce racial or ethnic inequalities and historical injustices by trying to repair the effect of past policies, notably slavery and racial segregation.

In Europe, the term *multiculturalism* is used to refer to various situations according to the structure of the state and the recognition of regional and linguistic particularities and of the minorities. Some countries in continental Europe have institutionalized pluralism through the creation of regions granted limited power, as in Italy and Spain; others have built the state on linguistic pluralism, as in Belgium and Switzerland, where the linguistic and territorial communities each have their own institutions. In Eastern Europe, the presence of some populations on a border of the neighbor state has led to the elaboration of minority rights in kin states, such as for Hungarians in Romania. But in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, the term *multiculturalism* refers to immigrant populations organized around a common nationality or religion (or both) and their demand for specific voices in the public sphere, as with ethnic minorities or Native Americans and African Americans in the United States.

To some extent, similar situations entail recourse to concepts that, used in different national contexts, require new definitions and different policies. In Western Europe, the use of the term *multiculturalism* marks the shift from temporary economic immigration to the permanent presence of immigrant populations and their political participations. From the state perspective, this implies the extension of the welfare state to a new realm—that of immigration and identity—with the establishment of social policies to guarantee integration of these minorities in the larger society. In Germany, the city of Frankfurt created a bureau of multicultural affairs, whose head advocated a “multicultural democracy” inspired by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social contract. In France, too, during the same period, the media as a political class described French society as “multiracial,” “multicultural,” “plural,” and “pluri-cultural.” This terminology found legitimacy in a political discourse that privileged “the right to difference,” established in 1981. In Great Britain, the Commission for Racial Equality promulgated in 1976 the Race Relations Act. The main objectives were to fight racism, to eliminate discrimination, and to ensure equality of opportunity and thus establish good relations among different racial groups. The targeted discrimination against Muslims in Britain today has led sociologists to argue for the inclusion of religion—mainly Islam—in ethnic and racial policy and its consideration by antidiscrimination laws.
In the Netherlands in the 1980s, a minority policy took the objective of “promoting multiculturalism and the emancipation of ethnic communities.”

Whatever the discourse or the practice and whatever the definition of a minority, gradually all European countries have converged in a sort of “applied multiculturalism.” The question is then what are the cultures and groups entitled to recognition? What group rights would be legitimate to recognize? In Europe, multiculturalist policies refer mainly to Islam—the religion of the majority of postcolonial immigrants as new minorities—and to its institutional and legal recognition. The perception of Islam as not separating politics and religion challenges secularist European states, while not recognizing Muslims as a minority is an obstacle to equal inclusion of differences. Its legitimacy stems from equal representation of religions in liberal democratic societies; and, as Bhiku Parekh (2000) suggests, it comes as the extension of existing institutions in a way to include the newly emerging Islam and to promote at the same time a common membership and a common civic culture, allowing citizens to find adequate identification. Here is one of the paradoxes of multiculturalism: political and institutional integration of differences into democratic values to claim the recognition of some cultural particularities of groups that question their compatibility.

Critics of multiculturalism have emphasized the radicalization of Muslim minorities in Europe. Myths, claims, and discourses of such groups perceived as a threat to universal democratic values came to justify the retreat from multiculturalism in countries such as Great Britain, the Netherlands, and even Canada, where, as Charles Joppke notes, the accommodation of minorities has been the core of the integration policy. Arguments are grounded on the effect of multiculturalism on the economic, cultural, and political isolation of communities; ethnic violence, perceived as a result of identity politics that have failed to ensure civic harmony; and a fear of the global transnational forces that penetrate national societies and create a competition between cultural-religious communities expanded beyond the borders and the territorially bounded national-secular community. In the Netherlands, the assassinations by extremist groups of politician Pim Fortuyn and filmmaker Theo van Gogh have engendered a radical change in politics and opinions toward minorities, with an emphasis on the failure of the politics of difference that did not lead to the expected economic integration of migrants but, on the contrary, isolated them culturally and politically. Great Britain has also changed its policy after the terrorist attacks on London’s public transportation system in London on July 7, 2005, realizing that the society is getting away from Bhiku Parekh’s aspiration for a community of communities and a community of citizens at the same time. In Canada, the attempt to establish a sharia court in Ontario brought the debate to a legal and constitutional level and has created a dilemma on the search for equal justice and the limits of toleration.

Despite the retreat of liberal democracies from multiculturalism, the principle and the discourse are now diffused on international and supranational levels within European institutions and beyond. The question is associated with minority rights, more specifically with national minorities and indigenous populations; it does not concern immigrants and nonterritorial ethnic groups. As noted by Kymlicka (2007), the principle is interpreted as an extension of human rights. In 1966, Article 27 of the United Nations (UN) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Human Rights Committee) stipulated that

in those states in which ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.

In 1992, the UN adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and began to debate in 2007 the rights of indigenous people. After the Cold War, at the first summit of the Council of Europe in Vienna in 1993, states seemed to rush things by advocating “to draft with minimum delay a framework convention specifying the principles which contracting States commit themselves to respect, in order to assure the protection of national minorities. This instrument would also be open for signature by non-member States.”

The establishment of minority rights as an international standard through normative institutions
as well as “policy networks”—the nongovernmental organizations, intellectuals, media, and actors themselves—is accepted on a discursive level by many states (Kymlicka, 2007). Their objective is to adopt effective policies in a timely manner regarding cultural diversity and ethnic and/or religious conflict in their respective societies. It becomes a sign of democratization for non-Western states. This does not mean, however, that states—Western or non-Western—accept multiculturalism as a principle or as a norm. Each state acts with regard to the complexity of situations, to the variety of minorities, and to their specific historical relations. At stake are peaceful coexistence of ethnically diverse populations, national security, and civic harmony.

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See also Identity, Social and Political; Racism; Tolerance

Further Readings

**Multilateralism**

In everyday language, the term *multilateralism* is often used synonymously with *international cooperation*. Among diplomats, it refers to certain cooperative diplomatic practices, and, according to a common scholarly definition, multilateralism is simply international cooperation that includes three or more states. This minimalist conception is sometimes supplemented by a number of conditions, including the idea that cooperation between states should be based on generalized principles of behavior. Given this plethora of different meanings, it seems not unfair to say that the term *multilateralism* is a convenient yet potentially confusing shorthand “tip of the iceberg” concept, representing and connoting a multitude of phenomena. This entry reviews three major different ways of referring to multilateralism, for which reason it is introduced as an institutional system, a foreign policy strategy, and as political ideology.

The Multilateral System

In *a longue durée* perspective—that is, a temporal perspective spanning centuries—we have seen the emergence of an increasingly dense network of multilateral institutions and agreements. This network is frequently called the multilateral system and has essentially developed through four main phases. During the first phase, reaching back to the early 19th century, the system was characterized by the first experiments in collective diplomacy. This form of diplomacy was a feature of the post-Napoleonic era and was cultivated by European diplomats and heads of state meeting in 1815 at the Vienna Congress to determine the future European order. Subsequently, a series of more than 30 conferences, called the Concert of Europe, constituted the first example of recurrent collective diplomacy. This form of diplomacy was a feature of the post-Napoleonic era and was cultivated by European diplomats and heads of state meeting in 1815 at the Vienna Congress to determine the future European order. Subsequently, a series of more than 30 conferences, called the Concert of Europe, constituted the first example of recurrent collective diplomacy. In this context, “collective” does not refer to all interested states—the Concert was characterized by special great-power roles and responsibilities. The first phase also included the introduction of international conflict resolution by means of legal instruments, especially arbitration and negotiation, essentially the precursor for the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Notably, the first phase also saw the creation of the first proper international organization, specifically the launch of the International Telegraphic Union in 1865. Subsequently, other specialized international organizations were initiated, and by 1900 about a dozen had been created. All these origins represent the beginning of a novel and
Multilateralism increasingly institutionalized feature being introduced to the international states system.

The second phase starts with the establishment of the multipurpose and, in principle, global League of Nations after World War I. Membership in the league consisted mainly of the European states, thereby reflecting the colonial times in which it was established, the eurocentrism of the international states system, and the reluctance of the United States to engage in international politics. The creation of the league was a deliberate attempt to avoid future major wars, for which reason a system of collective security was introduced. Apart from the league, some further specific organizations were created, including the International Labour Organization (1919). The League—and perhaps foremost its member states—clearly failed in the key objective of securing the peace, yet as failure is one source of experience and knowledge, the lessons learned were used when states designed the successor organization during and after World War II.

The third phase begins with the creation of the United Nations (UN) and an increasingly broad range of so-called functional agencies, including the World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). During this phase, not all intended organizational projects were feasible, as demonstrated by the aborted International Trade Organization (ITO; replaced by the less ambitious trade regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]) and by the never fully ratified European Defence Community (EDC), which was substituted later by the Western European Union (WEU). In turn, the WEU never got to play a significant defense role, as this function was provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Similarly, the Cold War context did not allow the UN to function as intended, and the full potential of the organization never came to fruition. The third phase is also characterized by experiments in terms of regional integration and organizations, most significantly the European Community. Other examples include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Arab League, the Nordic Council, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the (failed) East African Common Market.

The fourth phase starts with the end of the Cold War and is characterized by a relaunch of the UN (now freed from the constraints of the Cold War), a new wave of international organizations (e.g., World Trade Organization [WTO], African Union [AU], Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], Common Market of the South [Mercado Común del Sur; MERCOSUR], Asia Pacific Economic Community [APEC]), and a series of reforms of the European Community, notably its transformation into the European Union (EU). Subsequently, the EU aims at playing a role in international organizations, not any longer wishing to be just an international organization among others. In summary, it is striking that each new phase of international organization begins as a more or less collective political response to fatal crossroads situations at the end of major wars. Combined, the many international organizations constitute an increasingly dense network of organizations, each based on treaties or agreements characterized by specified sets of principles, norms, and rules. Some analysts call the outcome global governance, whereas others prefer the concept of a fragmentary world state.

Formal organizations do not constitute the only feature of the multilateral system. To realize better the diversity of institutions, it is useful to make a distinction between international (governmental) organizations, international regimes, and international conventions. Whereas organizations are characterized by a postal address, employed bureaucrats, and budgets, international regimes can be seen as agreements, whether formal or informal, about very specific issues. Examples of such specific issues comprise the EU’s regulation of the import of bananas, regimes concerning the export of missile technology control (MTCR), and the former trade regime, the GATT (being institutionalized in the mid-1990s and, thus, becoming the WTO). Regimes have always been an important part of the multilateral system, but their development is more difficult to categorize in phases. Concerning informal nonbinding agreements, states have a clear advantage in the sense of not being constrained by the agreement. The problem is that other states enjoy a similar advantage for which reason their future behavior becomes less predictable.
Finally, international norms or conventions (notably spelled with a small c) refer to implicit rules and tacit understandings. Such conventions are customs and habits, and both allow us to have expectations about likely behavior or interpretations of agreements. In this sense, conventions or norms are informal institutions that can exist for centuries without being codified. Often, international treaties and agreements are little more than codifications of previous conventional understandings. Hence, there is a complex and intimate interplay between conventions, regimes, and organizations. Often, these institutional forms are closely intertwined in reality, and their separation is foremost analytically convenient. This feature can be illustrated by the example of the field of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is a field characterized by a number of formal agreements—that is, treaties of nonproliferation, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. In addition, a group of states have created a handful of export control regimes, including the MTCR, which helps these states specify and reach the objective of nonproliferation. The number of contracting states is rather limited, yet many states adhere to the principles of the regimes as if they were members. Further, some international organizations have been assigned specific tasks in the field, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Finally, throughout most of the 20th century, there has been an international convention, a custom, not to use chemical weapons, and in 1997, a formal agreement, the Chemical Weapons Convention, came into force.

In a wider international system perspective, the multilateral system can be seen as a historically new feature of the international states system or, differently conceptualized, as a fundamental institution of international society. The multilateral system is often said to be strongly state-centric; the reason being that states create, reproduce, and, sometimes, terminate the life of multilateral institutions. Further, states are usually exclusive members of such institutions; they negotiate and sign international agreements that materialize in international regimes. States also engage in reproducing the principles, norms, and rules underpinning both organizations and regimes, thereby securing that they are alive and working and not just dead letters in a written agreement. Paradoxically, the multilateral system is so state-centric that the EU, not being a state, experiences severe difficulties in performing as an international actor pursuing European interests. However, while states might have been exclusive players in the past, transnational actors (TNAs) play an increasingly significant role in the contemporary multilateral system. TNAs frequently contribute to agenda setting, sometimes provide intellectual leadership, push for some international agreements, and campaign against other agreements. Prominent examples include the creation of the International Criminal Court and the international treaty banning landmines, both initiatives being sponsored by the EU and NGOs working in the field of human rights. The enduring significance of TNAs in global governance remains an empirical question, yet it is beyond discussion that they, even if not formal members, increasingly contribute to the politics of multilateralism.

Multilateral Foreign Policy

Multilateral institutions have states as members and therefore need these states to engage in some political gardening to keep the institutions on track and on mission. Hence, the foreign policy of states requires a more or less prominent multilateral dimension. Multilateralism is one option among a range of foreign policy strategies. Multilateral foreign policy strategies prioritize the promotion of and commitment to international institutions, including the resources it takes to cultivate these multilateral institutions. The United States opted for this strategy after the end of World War II and also immediately after the end of the Cold War. At other times, the commitment to multilateral institutions has been more ambivalent. One of the stated strategic objectives of European foreign policy is to promote effective multilateralism. Other great powers have been more reluctant or simply unable to shape the multilateral system or its individual institutions. Thus, Russia, China, India, and Japan have had a modest impact on the development of the system. It is telling that the international financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank thrived during the Cold War partly due to the fact that the
Soviet Union decided not to join. By contrast, middle powers such as Canada and the Nordic states have traditionally been keen supporters of multilateralism: In some cases, they almost fully comply with their international obligations; that is, they ratify the international treaties they sign and subsequently display few infringements against the treaties they have signed.

To further specify the meaning and characteristics of multilateral foreign policy, it is useful to proceed ex negativo, or to explain what it is not. The antonym to multilateralism is unilateralism, a “going-it-alone” foreign policy strategy. Application of the strategy implies that a given state essentially does what it wants to do, abandoning consultations, coordination, or cooperation with allies or third parties and employing an approach that is characterized by the absence of international legal or political constraints. However, proponents of a “going-it-alone” strategy sometimes advance their arguments on the basis of a narrow understanding of international customary law. Especially, great powers enjoy the option of unilateral action. During the George W. Bush administration, the United States was prone to unilateral action, diplomatically labeled à la carte multilateralism. Though having a preference for multilateral foreign policy, the EU is no stranger to unilateral action, as demonstrated by the rather frequent use of sanctions— that is, in cases where the EU acts like a unitary actor. However, the invasions of Kuwait by Iraq and the Falkland Islands by Argentina suggest that it is not only the great powers that enjoy the privilege or temptations of unilateral military action.

Like unilateralism, bilateralism is also not multilateralism as it only takes two to cultivate a bilateral relationship. An illustrative example is Japan and the United States cultivating a broad range of bilateral agreements, including defense and security. Sometimes bilateralism and multilateral arrangements are intertwined, for example, France and Germany cultivating a close bilateral relationship, yet within the context of the EU. Also the United States and the EU can be said to cultivate an exclusive bilateralism within the context of a multilateral WTO, in turn triggering opposition coalitions such as the Cairns Group.

The three strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Thus, unilateral diplomatic action can provide the necessary conditions for a major breakthrough in otherwise stalled multilateral negotiations, and bilateral relations sometimes function as the innovative undergrowth, providing the leadership, coalition building, and preparatory work that secure an agreement within multilateral diplomacy, characterized by a large number of participants. Reaching international agreements by a select subgrouping of a larger multilateral organization or regime, which are subsequently adopted by other states, is known as minilateralism. Hence, minilateralism is characterized by an exclusive group of key states within a specific issue area reaching an agreement that is subsequently accepted within a larger multilateral setting. One example is the policy by France and the United Kingdom vis-à-vis the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, a policy that was accepted by partners within the EU and subsequently adopted by the UN Security Council. Minilateralism should not be conflated with plurilateral agreements being concluded by a small select grouping of states and subsequently adhered to by a larger segment of international society. A reference to the plurilateral instrument was made after the 2003 WTO Doha Round meltdown in Cancun, when the EU suggested that given the multilateral deadlock, perhaps a plurilateral approach would be a desirable, attractive, or, at least, possible alternative.

**Multilateralism as Political Ideology**

In certain contexts, multilateralism should be seen as an ideology that exists in both positive and negative versions. These versions share the view that the qualities of multilateralism are a matter of belief or faith and therefore beyond debate and examination. In the first place, multilateralism is seen as morally superior to other foreign policy strategies. Further, multilateralism tends to be seen as an end in itself, for which reason the instrumental dimension is systematically downplayed. Being multilateral is what counts and, even if nothing can be achieved, it remains imperative to keep the multilateral machinery in place. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, this attitude characterized the European approach to the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) process. Finally, in some understandings, multilateralism and the UN are simply synonymous. Due to its global membership, only the UN is considered a
genuine example of multilateralism. Interestingly, the authors of the European Commission’s annual report seem to take this stance. The positive version has also been called globalism, and adherents argue that global agreements should be prioritized even if the number of veto players almost guarantees that no agreement is the likely outcome. The alternative, in terms of an agreement concluded by the, say, 14 most important states for global climate, is dismissed and accompanied by references to problems of legitimacy. Similarly, plurilateral agreements are also dismissed because they are by their nature essentially exclusive.

According to the dystopian ideology of multilateralism, multilateral approaches are synonymous with inaction, unwarranted constraints on state action, or both. One argument is that it would be irresponsible to leave decisions concerning crucial issues to multilateral institutions as inaction and nondecision is often the likely outcome. If states nevertheless opt for multilateralism, it is because they use multilateral institutions instrumentally to cover for inaction. In this perspective, multilateral agreements function as window dressing—for example, the commitment to 0.7% gross domestic product (GDP) on development, a commitment that very few states seem to adhere to. By contrast, the Millennium Development Goals have not been met due to a wider set of failings, including donor shortfalls, recipient shortcomings, and organizational malfunction. A second argument is that powerful states should not constrain themselves by getting embroiled in a web of rules and obligations. A third argument, for instance, used by opponents of European integration, is that small states should not give up the formal and symbolic dimensions of independence or autonomous decision-making power. Finally, proponents of an exclusive league of democracies to replace the UN argue that universalism triggers a fundamental problem as nondemocratic states are given too much of a voice.

**Theoretical Reflections on Multilateralism**

Major theoretical debates in the discipline of international relations concern the promise of international institutions and the multilateral system. Four issues constitute the backbone of these debates especially. In the first place, some theorists claim that multilateral institutions should be seen as mere arenas on which (strong) states engage in international politics. Such arenas have no independent or significant impact on the script or on what is being played. In contrast, other analysts emphasize that the level of institutionalization in the international system has an impact on state behavior, that international organizations sometimes teach states about their interests, and that organizations can be seen as agents that are not entirely controlled by their principals. In various ways, all these approaches emphasize that the arena approach is most misleading and largely unfounded by evidence.

Second, there is an enduring issue concerning the instrumentality of international organizations. While some theorists are keen to theorize what international organizations can do and what difference they can possibly make to international politics, other theorists focus on instrumental action. As Inis Claude has famously emphasized, we should ask not what the UN can do but what the UN can be used for.

Third, some theorists claim that, at best, multilateral institutions reflect the changing distribution of power and, at worst, trigger naive and dangerous illusions about their potential, making us forget those few but important things that really make a difference in international politics. If, indeed, the impact of multilateral institutions is epiphenomenal to power politics, then why waste time analyzing something that essentially is derived from more powerful explanatory variables? By contrast, other theorists claim that the institutionalization of world politics mold international anarchy, thereby reducing the power of power politics and making a more peaceful world possible. These scholars emphasize that there is a linkage between the growth of multilateral institutions and the pronounced decline in interstate war.

Finally, many scholars tend to take the positive qualities of international institutions for granted, a tendency that is particularly strong among those theorists who regard multilateralism a means toward cooperation and peace. By contrast, other analysts claim that multilateral institutions frequently display an alarming degree of dysfunctional or, worse, pathological features—that is, characteristics that potentially undermine whatever legitimacy these institutions might have and, in
any case, provide significant obstacles to reaching global solutions to urgent global problems.

### Crises of Multilateralism

The development of the multilateral system and its international institutions has frequently been characterized by crises, ranging from the failure of the League of Nations to the less than perfect performance of the UN during the Cold War and the doldrums of the European Community during the 1970s. However, the contemporary crisis of multilateralism appears to be more profound than previous crises, and it seems to have several sources. Thus, several major multilateral institutions were created during the Cold War, and, as the world has subsequently changed, they are in severe need of more or less comprehensive reform. Further, the international institutions are characterized by an ever more present trade-off between inclusion, legitimacy, and effectiveness. As the number of participant state members increases, so does the number of veto players. At the same time, there is an increasing imbalance between the provision of leadership, which is lacking, and an ever-broader portfolio of global demands and tasks to handle. It does not help that several key states pay lip service to their obligations toward international institutions or act as custodians insisting on yesterday’s arrangements, not necessarily because they are perfect or efficient but because they represent a certain distribution of power, pride, and prestige. In the UN, the Group of 77 (G77), controlling the budget and personnel, has shown little interest in administrative reform. Finally, multilateral institutions are characterized by an ever-wider expectation–investment gap, triggering, in turn, frustration, apathy, or cynicism concerning absent expected deliverables. Examples of the crisis abound, ranging from the stalled UN reform process, via the dire straits of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, to the stalled WTO Doha Round. It is clear that sustainable solutions to the crisis require some exquisite intellectual innovative thinking and strong political leadership and, it is hoped, not another calamitous external shock to the system to provoke change.

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### Further Readings


### Multilevel Analysis

Multilevel modeling is used in the analysis of data that have a clustered structure. Such data arise in various fields—for instance, in educational research, where pupils are nested in classes; in medical research, where patients are nested within hospitals; and also in political research, where individuals are nested in a social context. A crucial problem in the statistical analysis of clustered data is the dependencies between individual observations. For example, voters from the same city are not independent from one another, because they are all influenced by local policy. The statistical analysis performed on clustered data should account for this dependency. However, statistical analysis can also benefit from such dependency. The characteristics of different levels can be combined into one explanatory model and conclusions can be drawn about their effects, both at each level and in interaction. In the following sections,
the multilevel model is explained and illustrated by means of a political example.

The starting point for explaining the multilevel regression model is the idea that the dependent variable, allocated at the lowest level, is thought to be influenced by all distinguished levels. With respect to a two-level model, this principle can be seen in the following equation (the intercept-only model):

\[ Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}. \]  

(1)

The dependent variable \(Y\) of an individual \(i\) in group \(j\) is decomposed into three different parts. Because there are no explanatory variables in the model yet, the explanatory part of the model consists only of the grand mean \(\gamma_{00}\). The unexplained part of the model consists of two parts: an error at the highest level \(u_{0j}\) and an error at the lowest level \(e_{ij}\). This means that the total variance of the dependent variable is decomposed into two parts: the error variance at the lowest level \(\sigma^2_{eij}\) and the error variance at the second level \(\sigma^2_{u_{0j}}\). A good explanation of the dependent variable is therefore based on both levels. Of course, one should keep in mind that the division over both levels can differ per variable. The more error variance there is at the lowest level, the less important the second level will be.

Adding explanatory variables of both levels gives the following equation:

\[ Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \sum_p \gamma_{p0} X_{pij} + \sum_q \gamma_{pq} Z_{qij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}. \]  

(2)

In this equation, \(p\) explanatory variables of the lower level and \(q\) explanatory variables of the second level are added to the model. Interactions between variables of the lowest level are also called \(p\), and interactions between variables of the second level are called \(q\). Because these variables will explain a part of the variance at both levels, the errors will become smaller and the explained variance in the dependent variable can be calculated.

Interactions between variables of different levels take up a special position in the model. The influence of a lower-level variable on the dependent variable may depend on a second-level variable. This is called a cross-level interaction (or moderator effect). Adding cross-level interactions to the model, gives the final, and most elaborated, multilevel model:

\[ Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \sum_p \gamma_{p0} X_{pij} + \sum_q \gamma_{pq} Z_{qij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}. \]

\[ + \sum_q \sum_p \gamma_{pq} Z_{qij} X_{pij} + \sum_p u_{pj} X_{pij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}. \]  

(3)

Looking at this equation, one can see that not only are the cross-level interactions added to the model but there also are \(p\) extra error terms in the model: \(u_{pj} X_{pij}\). The errors \(u_{pj}\), the unexplained parts of the regression coefficients of the lowest level, are multiplied with the lowest-level variables and are therefore different for different values of the \(X\) variables. This is called heteroskedasticity. In ordinary regression analysis, homoskedasticity is assumed, which means that the variance of the errors is independent of the values of the explanatory variables. Therefore, analyzing the model presented in Equation 3 requires a multilevel analysis. The variance of the errors \(u_{pj}\) is \(\sigma^2_{upj}\).

The assumptions of the most commonly used multilevel regression model are that the residuals at the lowest level \(e_{ij}\) are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a common variance \(\sigma^2\) in all groups. The second-level residuals \(u_{0j}\) and \(u_{pj}\) are assumed to be independent from the lowest-level errors \(e_{ij}\) and to have a multivariate normal distribution with means of zero. Other assumptions, identical to the common assumptions of ordinary multiple regression analysis, are fixed predictors and linear relationships. Most multilevel software assumes by default that the variance of the residual errors \(e_{ij}\) is the same for all second-level units. However, certain forms of heteroskedasticity can be explicitly modeled.

Estimation of the parameters (regression coefficients and variance components) is generally done using maximum likelihood. The restricted maximum likelihood method maximizes a likelihood function that is invariant for the fixed effects and therefore leads, in theory, to better estimates of the variance components than the full maximum likelihood method in which both the regression coefficients and the variance components are included in the likelihood function. In practice, the differences between the two methods usually are not large.

Assume that we have data from a random sample of cities and also data from a random sample of
inhabitants of these cities. We are interested in explaining involvement of individuals with local policy, measured on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely). We use the variable gender as an explanatory variable at the lowest level, assuming that men are more interested in politics than women, and the variable local political activities (measured on a scale from 1 [almost none] to 7 [very often]) as an explanatory variable at the second level, assuming that, in cities with more local political activities, individuals are more interested and involved in political issues. We have data from 2000 individuals from 100 cities (see Table 1). The first model that is specified is the intercept-only model. The total variance of the dependent variable is decomposed into two independent parts: one at the individual level and one at the city level. Because there are no explanatory variables in the model, the variance found at each level is error variance. The percentage variance at the second level, calculated by dividing the error variance of the second level by the total error variance, is 31.85%. This means that almost one third of the total variance in the political involvement of city members lies at the second level. Multilevel analysis is therefore used not only to account for dependency but also for building an explanatory model containing variables from both levels and their interactions.

In the second model, the explanatory variables gender and local political activities are added to the model. Both variables are significant. The regression coefficient of gender is .88. This means that men score almost 1 point higher on political involvement than women (controlling for local political activities). This is not only a significant but also a relevant result: almost 1 point on the 10-point scale of political involvement. The regression coefficient of local political activities is .22. The interquartile range of the local political activities

Table 1  Multilevel Analysis on the Political Involvement of Individuals in Different Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Model 1: Intercept Only</th>
<th>Model 2: With Predictors</th>
<th>Model 3: With Random Slope Gender</th>
<th>Model 4: With Cross-Level Interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed part</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>4.92 (0.07)</td>
<td>4.48 (0.05)</td>
<td>4.47 (0.04)</td>
<td>4.47 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.88 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.86 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.85 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.85 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local political activities</td>
<td>0.22 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.20 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender × local political activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.09 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random part</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^2_e$</td>
<td>0.95 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.79 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.68 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.68 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^2_{u0}$</td>
<td>0.44 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^2_{u1}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.47 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.43 (0.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{u01}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$-0.05$ (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td>5802.67</td>
<td>53338.78</td>
<td>5145.00</td>
<td>5138.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
variable is 4, meaning that for this range the maximum difference on political involvement is 4 times .22, which is .88. This also seems quite relevant. Another measure for relevance is the explained variance. The explained variance is calculated by subtracting the error variance of the model with the explanatory variables (Model 2) from the error variance of the model without explanatory variables (Model 1: the intercept-only model) and dividing by the total error variance of the intercept-only model. On the individual level, the explained variance is 17%; on the city level, 70% is explained. Both are really relevant.

In the third model, the question to be answered is whether the influence of gender is the same in all cities. The answer to this question is no; there is variation between cities for this effect (slope variance is 0.47). The next step is to explain this variation (Model 4). For the explanation, the interaction between gender and local political activities is included in the model. The effect is significant and positive. This means that men benefit more from local political activities than women (see Figure 1; for statistical reasons, the variable local political activities is centered on the grand mean). The explained slope variance is 10%. The difference between political involvement of men and women is almost 2 times as large when there are a lot of local political activities—in comparison with when there are almost no local political activities.

The example discussed in the previous section shows that multilevel analysis is the appropriate way to answer research questions concerning data with a clustered structure. Multilevel analysis not only accounts for dependency in data, but it also takes advantage of the clustered structure. The individual political involvement is explained with an individual characteristic (gender), a city characteristic (local political activities), and the interaction between these two characteristics. Multilevel analysis provides an optimal use of all available information.

In this short introduction to multilevel analysis, many other possibilities have not been discussed. For instance, the model discussed assumes a continuous dependent variable and normally distributed residuals. The check of these assumptions is not discussed. Of course, this check should always be carried out, but it is beyond the scope of this entry. When the response variable is a dichotomous variable or a proportion, both the aforementioned assumptions of continuous scores and the normal distributed errors are violated. Multilevel logistic regression gives the solution to this problem. Other possibilities are, for instance, longitudinal multilevel analysis, the multilevel approach to meta-analysis, cross-classified models, and multilevel structural equation models.

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See also Aggregate Data Analysis; Inference, Ecological; Maximum Likelihood; Measurement, Levels

Further Readings

**MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (MNCs)**

Multinational corporations fascinate many international political economy scholars. Scholars disagree about their significance and their impact but continue to analyze their dynamic evolution in the global economy. Multinational corporations are private firms that operate in multiple countries. Their primary motivation is economic profit. They may engage in investment, sales, production, services, extractive processes, or any combination of these. Multinational corporations’ activities propel economic globalization. They may invest, set up shop, or even buy existing domestic firms as the multinational expands. This entry addresses first the broad views about multinational corporations and then the corporations’ motivations to go abroad. The entry continues with a historical overview and concludes with controversies surrounding multinational corporations.

Multinational corporations are incorporated in a home country and are chartered according to the home country’s laws and regulations. Analysts have debated the extent to which home country regulations shape multinational corporations’ outward conduct. Some argue that such regulations make a major difference in corporations’ behavior and standards abroad. Others see multinational corporations as footloose harbingers of global capitalism with no particular state-based allegiances. Realist scholars, who emphasize the supremacy of state power, emphasize corporations’ subordination to state laws, jurisdiction, and policies. They tend to cite instances in which the state took actions against the wishes of particular corporate interests—for example, favoring national security over economic considerations. Other analysts suggest that corporations can be more powerful than states and that states may be actually in retreat in the face of rapid economic integration and globalization. These analysts note the increase in the size and role of the private sector at the expense of the public sector. Beginning in the 1980s, many states delegated an ever-greater range of once publicly supported activities to private actors. Private companies have come to run schools, jails, hospitals, municipal water systems, and have even provided security in conflict zones.

**Why Firms Go Abroad**

Given the risks and costs associated with initiating multinational operations, one must understand firms’ motives to do so. In the case of extractive industries, the logic is quite straightforward. Natural resource firms need to establish themselves at the site of the resources—gold, oil, copper, diamonds, cobalt, and so on. Service firms may seek to be closer to customers and be able to adapt to and serve local markets better. Manufacturing firms may seek to get behind tariff walls, producing and selling their goods within regions protected by high import taxes. These examples demonstrate firms’ motivations to leverage location-specific advantages. Another class of motivations is asset specific. Often, asset-specific advantages are reputation-based or trademark related. Obvious examples of firms seeking to leverage asset-specific advantages would be Coca-Cola and McDonald’s, entertainment companies (e.g., Disney), and brand-name luxury goods producers and distributors.

**Historical Perspectives**

While some analysts write about multinational corporations as if they were relatively recent phenomena, in fact, private companies engaged in economic activity abroad date back at least to the age of empires in the early 17th century. European countries competing for colonies often sent companies, which the rulers chartered, to distant shores to establish a presence and engage in economic activity. Charter companies such as the British East India Company and the Dutch East India Company facilitated European expansion
beyond what the countries’ militaries alone could accomplish. In this way, these companies and their governments participated in a symbiotic relationship that helped fuel both imperial expansion and economic growth. Historical appreciation of the age of mercantilism puts claims of the novelty of private sector power and the stark separation between states and markets into question. In the colonial era, power and wealth were inextricably bound together.

By the late 19th century, firms such as General Electric and Singer Sewing Machines were operating abroad. At the end of World War I, many more companies began to invest and build plants in war-ravaged Europe. Latin American, Middle Eastern, and African countries attracted investors in various extractive and natural resource industries. After World War II, manufacturing firms invested abroad and often set up turnkey plants (fully built and ready to operate with the turn of a key) for production, and service industries established branches abroad. The extractive natural resources industries would integrate their business operations vertically, exercising control over all stages of production and processing. They sought to reduce risk by maximizing control. By contrast, manufacturing and service firms tend to be horizontally integrated and replicate themselves across countries. Their subsidiaries produce the same products or provide the same service in plants and branches in different countries. They are motivated to expand or defend market shares by getting behind tariff walls (producing for or servicing the host country’s domestic market) or following their competitors abroad.

In the wake of decolonization, until about 1960, foreign corporations were often the primary source of capital and technology in newly independent countries. Eager to promote industrialization in the face of, or to counterbalance, large numbers of imported goods, many newly independent countries welcomed foreign investment into their economies. Over time, however, foreign companies became a critical target; Marxist-inflected dependency theory took root in Latin American countries and highlighted some of the more exploitative aspects of multinational corporate operations. Critics of multinational corporations complained that they did very little to help develop the host economy. In the 1960s and 1970s, many countries in Central and Latin America adopted measures designed to channel foreign investment into domestic capacity building. For example, governments could limit foreign ownership to less than 50% of a domestic firm or require foreign firms to hire a certain percentage of domestic labor or reinvest a set percentage of profits into the domestic economy.

The spread of multinational corporations heightened scholarly attention to their activities and the implications of their global reach. Political scientists began to examine whether the power and influence of multinational corporations was surpassing that of states. Economic interdependence and dependence on natural resources such as oil sharpened the focus on this question. In 1971, Raymond Vernon published *Sovereignty at Bay*; the title captured some observers’ anxiety about multinational corporations. Political scientists recognized such corporations as important actors in international politics. Realists maintained that sovereign states were still the most important actors and pointed out that states could expropriate private property and eject foreign companies. Economic liberals celebrated the spread of multinational corporations as vehicles for deepening economic integration and interdependence. Liberals believed that interdependence could lead to peace. Assertive state efforts in developing countries to channel or control their activities and academic criticism of multinational corporations faded out over the course of the late 1970s and 1980s. High oil prices and a devastating debt crisis meant that bank lending was scarce. Multinational corporations became important sources of capital and investment, so formerly resistant countries rapidly dismantled restrictive foreign investment regimes in an effort to attract multinational investment.

**Controversies**

Scholars analyzed the role of multinational corporations in the political process. A number of scholars highlighted their bargaining role as one leg of a tripod between home government, host government, and corporation. Other scholars adopted a more nuanced view, rejecting binary views of firms versus states, and instead focused on the mutual interaction between states’ and firms’ preferences. The globalization literature of the 1990s and 2000s has examined the exercise of private authority in
the global political economy, and particularly corporations, in standard setting, economic integration, and norm creation. One set of debates has addressed the so-called race to the bottom, in which multinational corporations seek the lowest cost or the least restrictive venues. Critics of multinational corporations focus on races to the bottom to highlight their contribution to environmental degradation, the creation of sweatshops, child labor, and gendered exploitation in export-processing zones. Critics of “race-to-the-bottom” arguments counter by demonstrating “races to the top,” in which firms export the more stringent or environmentally responsible standards when they establish operations abroad.

Many nongovernmental organizations have highlighted multinational corporations’ exploitative practices and have launched naming and shaming campaigns against sweatshops, child labor, and environmentally unsustainable production. These campaigns have targeted high-profile companies with easily recognizable brand names such as Nike, The Home Depot, and Starbucks. In response to these campaigns, multinational corporations have increasingly embraced a “corporate social responsibility” approach to dampen criticism and to improve their reputations. The United Nations launched the Global Compact—a voluntary reporting program in which multinational corporations pledge to uphold certain standards of good conduct. Corporate social responsibility initiatives are all voluntary. Critics have contended that they are ineffective in altering corporate conduct and only serve as public relations exercises designed to prevent stricter government regulation. Supporters of corporate social responsibility initiatives argue that they are having a positive, albeit incremental, impact.

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See also Globalization; Interdependence; International Political Economy; Privatization; Sovereignty

Further Readings


NATION BUILDING

Nation-states are mostly multiethnic and composed of various subnations. Nation building is a process of building a social community within a nation-state. It is closely related to the formation of states in postconflict situations after regime change, after decolonization, or after wars. The nation-building process is particularly important in multinational states in Africa. African colonies were formed by the colonial powers without regarding their ethnic and linguistic cleavages. With independence, the process of state building had to be strengthened by social and cultural cohesion. National symbols such as national anthems, national flags, national holidays, and national myths were used to overcome tribalism and ethnic and social rivalries. Nation building of this kind is a cultural foundation for state building and is necessary for economic and social development. Processes of nation building also became important with the breakdown of the Socialist bloc and state and nation failure in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and the former Yugoslavia. Nation building is primarily an indigenous process, and external assistance often fails. It is meant to reinforce states and prevent secession. Nation building is related to sentiments of national identity, which internally have positive effects of social cohesion by bridging and bonding but which may have negative consequences in the form of xenophobia against noncitizens. Externally, the emphasis on national identity can also reinforce aggression against neighboring countries. This entry discusses the various forms of historical and contemporary nation building and its ongoing problems.

Nation Building: Etymology and Definition

Etymologically, the word nation is derived from the Latin natio, which stands for “the act of being born.” So, a nation is usually defined as a set of people and tribes. Natio originally was strongly connected with a term such as ethnos (a people based on the idea of a common descent), in contrast to demos (a population defined by common citizenship). Nations are socially constructed, so it is unclear who is included and who is excluded. This unclear social cultural definition is expressed in Benedict Anderson’s concept of a nation as socially constructed “imagined communities.” The broader, “territorial” concept of the nation-state produces a clearer definition. Nation building is a process of collective identity formation to assert power in a certain territory. It refers to existing institutions, customs, and traditions, and it redefines national characteristics. The process of state building depends on this uniqueness and sovereignty. The building of a nation is based mostly on values and beliefs that enhance support for and the legitimacy of the (new) state.
Nation building as a process of developing a national identity can be seen as the cultural foundation for the nation-state and its supralocal power structure. If this cultural projection of a nation is no longer valid, the social contract between the state and individual citizens or groups of citizens may be destroyed and violence may be triggered. This can be seen in the breakup and collapse of a state such as Yugoslavia, leading to civil wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s.

The existence of nation-states can be seen as a safeguard for security and stability. Nation-states act as the basis for economic and social development. According to Eric Hobsbawm (1990), national identity and national pride are created by a feeling of one's supremacy, and they provide a basis for nation building. All forms of national identity (national pride, patriotism, etc.) can become problematic and are related to outgroup hostility.

State Building
Interaction between different ethnic groups is a prerequisite for a successful and sustainable nation-building process. For this reason, the social, economic, and cultural aspects of nation building are important. New forms of cultural discourses representing the nation as a whole become significant. In this respect, aspects such as a common lingua franca, a common literature, sports events, and so on are relevant. Finally, a national infrastructure and national space and communication between different relevant groups have to be developed. Civic education programs and information strengthen the education of citizens and democratic nation building. Administratively, nation building also needs an effective state apparatus.

Nation failure can be seen as an aggravated form of state failure in multicomunity states. Different subnations define themselves by shared class, religion, language, or ethnicity. Too many cleavages will make it difficult to build a state and may even destroy the social contract between citizens and the state. This situation makes it unlikely that government decisions will be accepted or adhered to.

State failure is the breakdown of public institutions meant to deliver political goods to citizens. This may undermine the legitimacy of the state and lead to failing states characterized by disharmony between communities, criminal violence, corrupt institutions, and a decaying infrastructure, as well as inability to control the borders.

State building is the establishment of political structure and policies in a territory. It is organized by sovereign actors as an expression of collective power without the use of coercive measures and physical force.

Nationalism
Nation building needs an integrated ideology that derives from a national identity. National identity is one pattern of orientation within a set of multiple social identities that become relevant in different contexts. It concurs with other identity narratives. All are important for the cohesion of social groups and for the fostering of individual self-esteem. Identities are constructed, and they may be deconstructed as well. Identity may occur in the form of chauvinistic nationalism and outgroup hostility. It may also be defined and constructed as a kind of constitutional patriotism, as pride in the social welfare state or as pride in social-inclusion policies. In democracies, pride in democratic performance, in societal values, and in peaceful policies becomes important.

In his seminal work, Karl Deutsch (1954) highlights the construction of identities and nationalism as well as its latent problems: “A nation is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of the neighbors” (p. 3). He defines nationalism as a doctrine whereby people believe that their culture, history, institutions, religion, or principles are distinct and aspire for self-rule under a political system that expresses and protects those distinct characteristics.

Banal Nationalism
According to Michael Billig (1995), the usage of symbols and common narratives can be seen as a kind of banal nationalism. National identity can be related to national symbols such as flags, anthems, and other symbols. In the cultural field, a country’s pride in its “achievement in the arts and literature” is significant, but more often banal nationalism is related to sports events. This “sportive nationalism”
is well-known in mega sport events such as soccer (football) world cups and the Olympics. In these events, national symbols such as anthems and flags are used. Pride in the country’s “achievements in sports” is expressed as a form of patriotism. Nevertheless, as Hannah Arendt pointed out, banal nationalism is not necessarily harmless or benign. It is always only a small step from benign national identity to aggressive xenophobic nationalism.

National identity is also related to national performance and pride in different domains, such as “political nationalism.” Pride in “the way democracy works,” pride in the “social security system,” and pride in a country’s “fair and equal treatment of all groups in society” are other domains within democratic “patriotism.” Pride in a country’s “political influence in the world” and pride in “the armed forces” are more nationalistic. Pride in a country’s “economic achievement” and pride in its “scientific and technological achievements” are more peaceful expressions of national pride.

Nation building is related to national identity. Identity is a complex phenomenon; in the setting of multiple identities, different forms of belongings compete. National identity competes with different local identities and, increasingly, with supranational identities (e.g., in the European Union). There is also the question of who is included and who is excluded.

Banal nationalism is strongly related to the state- and nation-building process, which is obvious in multiethnic states such as South Africa. South Africa has one of the most complex national identities. Currently, various identity narratives exist. The divisions between the “self” and the “other” are regarded as phenomena characterized by cleavages in ethnicity and race, as well as language and religion. Banal nationalism as a governmental strategy is obvious. Although group identities are strong, South Africa is a country with a very high level of nationalism, national pride, and sports patriotism. This development of national identity is strongly related to nation-building ideologies and strategies. In 1995, 1 year after the first democratic elections, the rugby World Cup victory produced slogans such as the Rainbow Nation and Simunye (“We are one”). The common support for the rugby team (in the past mainly a “White” sport) was seen as a triumph of national reconciliation between Blacks and Whites. During the 2010 football World Cup in South Africa, the use of national symbols was openly regarded as part of a broader nation-building strategy.

**History of Nation Building**

Efforts of nation building are strong in times of regime change. In the different waves of democratization as well as with the winds of change accompanying the independence of African countries, nation building became a central aspect. But historically, nation-building processes are much older.

In traditional societies, political power structures were mostly oriented toward regional and local demands in relatively autonomous rural village structures. The process of nation building destroyed most of the existing local traditional systems of clientelism and personal rule. The centrifugal shift of power toward the regional or national level can be seen as a process of conflict. Cultural, social, political, and economic dominance have to be redefined.

In general, the birth of states and nations took place in conflict situations. As primordial traditional communities shared similar values and language, states existed before the nations themselves developed.

In the foundation phase of most multiethnic states, the ruling power reinforces the development of the national state by not only using oppression but also providing strong economic incentives and implementing cultural policies aimed at cultural homogeneity (language policy, religion, policies in primary and secondary education, etc.)

In the early phases of nation building, political leaders are often interested in financial extraction from their constituencies. They often impose a state apparatus. They also have to act against new social movements and groups agitating for more democratic rights and devolution and/or secession.

**Regional Characteristics**

Stein Rokkan analyzed the territorial centralization and unification that took place during the period after the Thirty Years War ending in 1648 in Europe. He highlights the role of language mobilization in unification and centralization. In Europe, the large, old dynasties and monarchies encompassed different ethnic and regional entities and used oppression and personal clientelistic networks.
to develop nation-states, often based on a common religion (*cuius regio, eius religio* [whose realm, his religion]). The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 can be seen as the beginning of the modern state. It redefined new regimes, although most remained monarchies. In this regard, the spatial and temporal contingency of the nation-state in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries was still significant. The Industrial Revolution reinforced centralization and the development of cultural harmonization and a common ideology. This was inculcated by nationwide school systems, the media, and so on. In the late 19th century and in the 20th century during the interwar period, many new states were formed after the breakdown of the former empires. In most countries, multiethnic states developed, which resulted in different nation-building processes, such as consensus-oriented strategies (e.g., in Switzerland and later also in the Netherlands). Some conflicts have, however, persisted (e.g., in Belgium or Spain). In the 1990s, after the breakdown of the Eastern bloc, new nations emerged. The breakup of Yugoslavia as well as of Czechoslovakia showed that nation building under socialist rule had not been successful either.

Most Asian states had been subjected to British, Dutch, or French colonial rule. After independence—mostly after World War II, with some exceptions such as the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan as well as the independence of some small island states—nation building was not seriously questioned. This is due to the fact that most of these countries became nondemocratic, authoritarian, or socialist states, suppressing any attempts at secession.

In South America, with the exception of Brazil (1880), countries achieved independence early in the 19th century. Local elites rebelled against the Spanish or Portuguese colonial powers. State formation mostly followed the previous colonial administrative divisions. With very few exceptions these were no longer questioned. In most countries relatively strong “national” identities emerged with some remaining ethnic, racial, and regional divisions. By contrast, African countries have experienced many problems with regard to state and nation building. At the Berlin Conference of 1884, the European powers agreed on a division of Africa. The African colonies were formed without any respect for existing ethnic or linguistic cleavages. With independence, most African states inherited a very heterogeneous sociocultural and ethnic structure. The colonial state had been held together mostly by oppression of the colonial power. The democratic multiparty systems installed by the departing colonial powers were often immediately restructured after independence. Most African countries introduced strong presidential one-party systems in the name of national unity. Presidents often attempted to become lifetime presidents, and many considered themselves as father figures for disunited nations. This trend toward one-party systems was supported during the Cold War as the two blocs discouraged secessions and favored stability. Some authoritarian regimes, supported by the United States and its allies, as well as African socialist regimes, often supported by either the former USSR or China, used the ideology of one party/one nation-state to strengthen their power. In fact, the constitutional reforms toward centralization and a strong executive were seen as instruments against secession.

With the end of the Cold War and the wave of democracy that swept over the African continent in the early 1990s, some of these authoritarian and socialist regimes came to an end. Secession of some regions (e.g., Eritrea and Somaliland) and new waves of civil war (as in Rwanda and Sudan) made it obvious that the nation-building process was still not completed. The latest new state, which was formed after a referendum in 2011, is South Sudan. New forms of power sharing came into place, because many political groups would not accept defeat during elections, in which the winning party takes it all. National governments are often seen as a temporary solution while a new constitution is drawn up and elections are organized. But these are not quick-fix solutions for the lack of a national identity.

In Africa, in spite of the artificiality of state formation and the ethnic heterogeneity in many countries, the number of separatist movements has remained relatively small. Separatist movements base their claims on existing administrative divisions: in the former Eastern Nigeria (Biafra), Casamance in Senegal, Eritrea, Somaliland, the three separatist provinces in Sudan, Katanga in the Congo, and the Anglophone region of Cameroon. Separatist movements such as in the Comoros and
in Zanzibar have been reinvigorated in the new millennium. In many countries, ethnic groups also have become co-opted, incorporated, and included in the new political systems. Under certain rules and agreements, de-ethnicized territorial nationalism coexists quite harmoniously with ethnic politicization (see, e.g., South Africa [Zulu], Nigeria [Igbo and Yoruba], and Ethiopia [Oromo]).

**Instruments of Nation Building and Constitutional Identity Building**

In democratic systems, constitutional identity building is an important factor for nation building. Constitutional processes are often seen as the enshrining of political values in a basic document. Jürgen Habermas as well as Francis Fukuyama championed the idea of constitutional patriotism, where the constitution itself becomes the center of strong collective loyalties. It is a base for identification and identity; older, authoritarian, traditional forms of identity are replaced and become less relevant.

Constitutional processes today are regarded as important steps in nation building; however, they often follow an unrealistic procedure. The constitutional process usually starts with the election of a national assembly by the people to “write” the constitution. The constitution will then be officially adopted by a referendum. This ideal type of constitutional process is often based on wrong assumptions. Nation building frequently happens in postconflict situations, where elections and referenda are neither feasible nor desirable. In many postconflict societies, the former undemocratic bureaucracy has to implement a referendum in a postauthoritarian situation. Early general elections may culminate in the marginalization and alienation of minority groups that had been neglected in the former regimes. This often triggers civil unrest and hinders the development of a broad acceptance of the new constitution. Postconflict situations require other forms of early nation-building processes with deadlock-breaking mechanisms as well as other instruments of reaffirmation and conflict resolution. An agreement on general constitutional principles or a referendum at the beginning of the process may have a reassuring effect.

States may consist of different nations, and there are also multination states. The drafting of the constitution must reflect the diversity of existing traditional values and norms. Multinational fragmented societies should aim for a broad representation and a strong devolution of power to the local and regional levels.

The process of the constitutional discourse as well as the constitutional text itself should include traditional institutions, symbols, and values that highlight the deep collective identity to enhance constitutional patriotism in order to build the united nation.

In postwar societies with regime changes (e.g., Germany after World War II, Afghanistan, and Iraq in the 2000s), nation building often is regarded as a process that can be supported by external actors. This support can take place through development aid and investment in the form of resources, personal assistance, and economic contributions by the external power. Military support may also be given for the new state to maintain order in the transition period. Nation building is, however, basically an indigenous process of identity formation. The ability of outsiders to influence nation building is often overestimated. The idea of injecting certain values and concepts often fails because the development of a national identity is a long-term process. Both external hegemons and supranational institutions such as the United Nations often fail in their overconfident search for a quick solution. The new states tend to fail before they are formed.

Nation building is more successful when the external power realizes that short-term strategies are unlikely to succeed in a country with strong religious, ethnic, and economic cleavages. In such cases, the intervening external power has to identify allies that support its ideas or ideology. This process of transformation and nation building has to be supported by institutional development and new political structures. Although it is often problematic, it is crucial to remove political leaders from key positions. Nevertheless, most postsocialist regimes are characterized by a “pacted transition” process, where the former regime’s state apparatus must be integrated in the formation process of the new nation. A strategy of acceptance of the values of the people instead of insensitive intervention seems to be more successful. National building is based on national identity as the cohesive force that holds nation-states together.
Internally, it can be used benignly and harmlessly in the nation-building process. But this ingroup solidarity encompasses the risk of outgroup hostility. In some cases, it may directly lead to external aggression. But strong nationalism also encompasses other problems. On the other hand, nation building can be used as a form of repression by the majority ethnic group within the same community. This can lead to conflicts oriented toward secession. The politicization of national identities and ethnic conflicts remains a risk.

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See also Colonialism; Ethnicity; Identity, Social and Political; Nationalism; Nationalist Movements; Patriotism; Secession; State Failure; State Formation

Further Readings

NATIONAL INTEREST

The concept of the national interest has long been central to the conduct and the analysis of state action, and particularly of foreign policy. The concept is so central because it is assumed that the notion of interest captures the motives that drive states, or their decision makers, to act. Calling it the national interest is, of course, something of a misnomer, as the interest in question belongs to the state—assumed to be a nation-state—in its interactions with other states. Governments, and specifically their foreign policy decision makers, determine the substantive content of the national interest. Although this content changes over time and varies across space, the term generally denotes the state’s most important foreign policy aims, ones that require extensive resources and even, in the extreme case, the sacrifice of lives. Since World War II, national security has frequently been posited as the most salient national interest, which captures the idea that, ultimately, the primary interest of the state has to be the protection of its existence through the defense of its sovereignty and its territory.

How the Concept Is Deployed
As a concept, the national interest is both ubiquitous and divisive. It is ubiquitous because it is deployed in at least three important and overlapping ways, which serve distinct purposes. First, for scholars of international relations and foreign policy, the concept is understood to be explanatory. Scholars thus invoke the national interest to explain, for instance, why the United States entered World War II (e.g., it was in the U.S. national interest to prevent German expansion in Europe), why the United States fought the Vietnam war (e.g., it was contrary to U.S. national interests to allow South Vietnam to fall to communism), and why the Taliban had to be removed from power in Afghanistan in 2001 (e.g., it is in the U.S. national interest both to promote democracy and to fight terrorism). In this usage, the national interest is invoked causally, to explain policy decisions and the attendant state actions.

Second, the national interest can also be thought of as the language of foreign policy decision making or, more generally, of state action. It is through the notion of the national interest that foreign policy decision makers seek to determine what the aims of their foreign policies should be. The national interest thus forms the practical basis for state action in international politics. This adds a normative dimension to the concept, in that decision makers generally assume that they ought to
act in the national interest. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, for example, Tony Blair’s government in the United Kingdom (UK) determined that it was in the British national interest—that is, that Britain ought—to support the Bush administration’s global war on terror, support the U.S. war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and participate in producing regime change in Iraq in 2003. In this second conception of the national interest, as defined by decision makers, it provides the practical aims or goals of state action.

Third, the national interest serves a prominent legitimating function. It is routinely deployed by both politicians and commentators to justify foreign policy decisions and state actions. The national interest is a powerful rhetorical tool, which, in addressing its audience as members of a nation, asks them to agree to policies in their own—that is, national—interest. Most starkly, when states require soldiers to put their lives in jeopardy in the service of foreign policy, this is done in the name of the national interest. The national interest, on this third, rhetorical usage, thus contributes to the creation of public consent to and support for foreign policy and state action.

As several of the examples above already indicate, in addition to being ubiquitous, claims to the national interest are often divisive. This is because the actual content of the national interest is inevitably political: It depends on and reproduces differential power relations and differentially affects diverse publics. As a result, the content of the national interest is both inevitably contestable in principle and often contested in practice. For instance, the prosecution of the U.S. war in Vietnam during the Cold War precipitated mass protest as diverse publics and elites in the United States challenged the claim that fighting communism in South Vietnam was actually in their national interest. Similarly, protests in the UK since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 demonstrate that many Britons, both among the public and among elites, question whether either the invasion of Iraq or the close alliance with the United States are in fact in their national interest.

Although a variety of different theoretical approaches can and do deploy the concept of the national interest, at least two broad and distinctly different approaches can be identified. The first treats national interests in a positivist manner as objective, as given by the international system and by power relations among states. The second treats national interests in a postpositivist manner as social constructions, as socially constituted in relation to identity. These different understandings of the character of the national interest lead to divergent analyses of foreign policy and international politics.

Comparison of Theoretical Approaches

Theoretical approaches to the study of foreign policy and international relations such as both realism (and its variants) and liberalism (and its variants) treat national interests as objective and as given. Political realism provides a good example of such a conceptualization. In this approach, it is assumed that an international system made up of sovereign states is anarchic, without overarching or legitimate authority. States must therefore provide for their own security. Uncertainty about the behavior of other states means that the fundamental interest of any state must be to amass enough power to protect itself from the threat potentially posed by other states. The most basic national interest—amassing power to ensure the state’s survival—is thus objectively given by the nature of the international system. Since the actual survival of states is rarely at risk, more specific national interests are determined through—read off of—the realistic assessment of objective power relations and potential external threats. In the face of a threatening powerful neighbor, for example, a small state has a national interest in allying with other states. In the face of its objective geographical location, Russia has a national interest in access to warm-water ports. In the face of a relative decline in economic efficiency, the national interest in protectionist measures increases. And in the face of international terrorism, a global war on terror becomes the national interest. In each case, the concrete national interest is given; it is determined by objective external threats and conditions. Interests, therefore, are assumed to follow from external and objectively identifiable threats and are directly accessible to policy makers and analysts alike.

Theoretical approaches such as constructivism and poststructuralism, in contrast, take a fundamentally different approach. Rather than treating national interests as objective and given, they treat national interests as socially constructed in relation
to identity. One constructivist version of this argument begins with the understanding that the social world is constituted through discursive practices—that is, practices that produce social meaning, including identities, whether individual or collective. Foreign policy discourse, for example, constitutes the state as a particular state, constitutes the diverse identities of other states, and defines interests in relation to those identities. It was thus a particular U.S. state—constituted as democratic and freedom loving rather than, say, as aggressive and imperialist—that had the Cold War national interest in leading its allies in the free world in the grand strategy of containing the totalitarian Soviet threat. From this viewpoint, threats to states and the interests of states in the face of those threats are fundamentally matters of interpretation. Nuclear weapons provide an example. It is not the physical fact that nuclear weapons can vaporize cities that makes them threats. British, U.S., and Israeli nuclear capabilities are not interpreted in that way by many states. Nuclear weapons only become threats to, say, U.S. interests—necessitating their removal (e.g., from Cuba) or the prevention of their development (e.g., by Iran)—when their existence, or the possibility of their existence, is interpreted as dangerous because they are wielded by communists, by rogue states, or by other dangerous identities. That is, threats are socially constructed as such in discourse—they are not obvious or given. In this approach, the same is true of interests.

These two distinct approaches to the national interest issue result in divergent analyses of foreign policy and international politics. Contrasting them also highlights the inevitably political nature of the identification and deployment of the national interest within either perspective.

Briefly sketching the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 from within the first approach—of given, objective interests—highlights the deployment in Cuba of Soviet nuclear-capable missiles and the need for a U.S. policy response. On this view, the situation faced by the United States and its allies in October 1962 was one in which power relations had changed significantly. The initially secret Soviet deployment meant that the former Soviet Union now had at least 40 more nuclear weapons and that these weapons could strike targets in North and South America. These offensive missiles posed an objective threat to the United States for several (albeit debated) reasons: They altered the strategic balance; they gave the Soviet Union a military bridgehead in the Caribbean; and they provided a bargaining chip to force a settlement in West Berlin and in Germany as a whole. The U.S. national interest in response to this changed situation was indisputable: The missiles had to be removed.

Briefly sketching the missile crisis from the second perspective—that of interests socially constructed in relation to identity—provides a different analysis. This approach asks: How was this particular national interest constructed and in relation to which identities? How did the removal of the missiles come to be understood as the U.S. national interest? It examines the construction in U.S. foreign policy discourse, by both foreign policy decision makers and analysts, of a democratic and freedom-loving United States leading the free world (its allied others) in the fight against the Soviet Union (the evil, totalitarian other). In Cold War discourse, U.S. leadership was always defensive: Whether in Berlin, Korea, Vietnam, or Cuba, it protected freedom from an aggressive and totalitarian international communism led by the Soviet Union. In this context, the missiles were interpreted as necessarily offensive and the interest in their removal confirmed. However, missiles are not inherently offensive or defensive; rather, they must be constructed as such. Moreover, interpreting them as offensive dismissed from the outset Soviet and Cuban claims that the missiles were deployed legally to defend Cuba from a second Bay of Pigs invasion. But other constructions—that the missiles were annoying but legal or that they were irrelevant as the United States did not intend to invade Cuba—were in fact possible. Within this approach, the U.S. national interest in response to the Soviet missile deployment was not indisputable and might have allowed the United States to make no policy response at all.

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See also Constructivism; Constructivism in International Relations; Foreign Policy Analysis; Liberalism in International Relations; Positivism; Power and International Politics; Realism in International Relations
Nationalism

Nationalism is one of the most difficult and contested concepts in social science. There are fundamental disagreements on its definition, origins, historical location, and normative status. This entry examines the concept of nationalism and explores these disagreements on how it should be understood.

Definition

In a very general sense, nationalism implies a strong attachment to the nation as a human collective. In the social sciences, however, it tends to be defined more strictly as the belief that the nation should form the basis for political order. At one time, it was common to define it as a movement in search of its own state or to extend the reach and power of an existing state. In recent years, it has been recognized that nationalists may pursue other forms of polity, including that of their own decentralized or federal region. Attention has also extended from nationalisms seeking to change the political order to nationalism as an everyday mechanism for sustaining the existing political order of the nation-state, as in Michael Billig's "banal nationalism."

This still leaves the question of how the nation itself is defined. For some, the nation is a politicized ethnicity, but this merely begs the equally difficult question of what an ethnic group is. Besides, whatever definition of ethnic group we use, many of them are not organized as nations nor would their members recognize them as such. There appears to be no one single characteristic that would qualify a group as a nation, be it culture, institutions, territory, or history. In many cases, indeed, the idea that a particular group is a nation is contested. There are various ways out of this conundrum. One is to divide nationalisms into different types qualified with prefixes or adjectives, but this risks losing the central concept altogether. A second is to treat the nation as bearing resemblance to a family rather than one with a single core meaning. This allows us to cope with the complexity and variety of nationalisms and to compare aspects of each, rather than forcing them into the same mold. A third way is to see the nation as a subjective category, so that if people feel they are a nation, then, they are. A fourth is to treat nationhood as a claim made both as to the existence of a group and to a set of rights that pertain to nationality, rather than as a sociological category. These central definitional problems have made it impossible to arrive at a general theory of nationalism applicable in all contexts and at all times. Most of the literature therefore looks at particular nationalisms or tries to generalize from specific cases, with decidedly mixed results.

Origins

The origins and causes of nationalism are equally disputed. It is common to place primordialists and perennialists at one extreme and constructivists and modernists at the other. A primordialist would believe that nations have their origins in essential features of humanity that are difficult if not impossible to change. Some nationalists themselves have subscribed to this view, especially in the late 19th century when biological theories of race were developing. Nationality is presented here as an essential characteristic bred into individuals. Very few nationalists and fewer social scientists nowadays would admit to being primordialists, although some sociobiologists seek to derive the nation from the human need for collectivities and the instinct for territory and mutual protection. Whatever the merits of this as a theory of human behavior, however, it can scarcely explain why communities
should take the form of nations in general or of specific nations in particular. It thus fails as a theory of nationalism. Perennialists are not primordialists, in that they do not believe that nations are part of the hardwiring of the human being and rather emphasize culture and deeply ingrained social habits. They insist that nations go back a long way in time and are not as easily manipulated or rebuilt as constructivists and, especially, instrumentalists would think. They will cite the existence of things looking very like nations in antiquity and locate the origins of European nations in premodern times.

Constructivists, on the other hand, see nations as the work of human volition and interaction. Although they could logically be constructivists and perennialists, locating the construction of nations in the past, they are almost invariably modernists, insisting that nations and nationalism are the product precisely of modernization and that it makes no sense to talk of them before, at the earliest, the late 18th century. Some modernists such as Ernest Gellner are sociological and functionalist in their approach, seeking the principle of the nation in the needs of modern industrial society for literacy, communication, and mobilization and the breaking down of old barriers to social and geographical mobility. Benedict Anderson is famous for the phrase “imagined communities,” by which he meant not that nations are imaginary and somehow false but that since members of a nation cannot know each other personally, they have to imagine the collectivity (in fact, the idea had earlier been suggested by Hans Kohn). This was not possible before the invention of print media. Sociological modernists have been criticized as teleological or functionalist, seeing the function that nationalism serves as somehow explaining why it came about without specifying the mechanism or the agent, although Anderson makes more of an effort. The timing and geography are also problematic, given that some nations and nationalisms appear to have emerged before industrialization and in nonindustrial societies.

More political approaches agree with John Breuilly that nationalism is essentially a form of politics, especially modern politics. Often it is linked to mass politics and democratization. A key legacy is that of the French Revolution, which proclaimed the sovereignty of the people. This made it necessary to define the people in some way short of the entire human species, and the nation was the result. In exporting their revolution, the French invited other peoples to throw off their rulers and proclaim their own sovereignty, with the ironic result that they turned against their French liberators and forged national movements of their own.

Instrumentalists stress the role of elites, whether state rulers or their challengers, in creating nations to mobilize mass populations in the modern era. They insist that there is nothing natural about nations and that they are manufactured for specific purposes, although sometimes they take on a life of their own. While perennialists believe that it is nations that create states, instrumentalists will often stress the role of states in creating nations using the socialization tools that they possess, including control over education, the media, civic ceremonial military service, and the welfare state, to create shared identities and solidarities. Other scholars believe that either route is possible, so that we must distinguish between those cases where the nation created the state and those where the reverse occurred. Instrumentalists, in their turn, have been criticized on the grounds that nation builders need something preexisting to work with and cannot create communities of such power and durability ex nihilo.

In favor of the modernist argument is the fact that the 19th century was an era of marked nationalism. The French Revolution, which took a century to work itself out, was a profoundly national affair, and it is argued that it created Frenchmen out of the population of a dynastic state with no previous sense of popular unity. The message was taken up in Germany and Italy, where nationalism was harnessed by leaders seeking to enlarge their states and, for the first time, inviting the people into the enterprise. Across the great empires (German, Habsburg, Ottoman, Russian, and British), there was an “awakening of the nationalities” as movements emerged demanding self-government. Most of these sought a measure of autonomy within their imperial systems, but some wanted full independence; with the collapse of the empires in World War I, independent statehood seemed the only option. The problem, however, was that there were not, and could not be, enough states to satisfy all the demands being made, which were often focused on the same territories. So the nation-state
principle could triumph only in restricted parts of the European continent.

Against the modernist argument is the fact that many European nations can trace their origins back to an earlier period. Adrian Hastings and Liah Greenfeld cite England as an example of early nationhood, certainly by the 16th century. Scotland, having resisted incorporation into the English Crown, was another example, complete with an early doctrinal justification for its independence. We may rightly be skeptical of the claims of nationalist historians about the antiquity of France or its continuity with earlier polities in the same region, but the French state can trace a long lineage all the same. Probably the best way of resolving the question “When was the nation?“ is to tie it to the question “What is the nation?“ Then, we can accept that there were indeed proto-nations in premodern times while confining the meaning of the nation and of nationalism in its modern sense to the modern era.

An effort to bridge the primordialist/constructivist and perennialist/modernist divides is the ethnosymbolism of Anthony Smith. Nations, in this vision, are built on ethnic cores or ethnies, which themselves are rather ancient and hard but which expand to incorporate peripheral territories, usually through the agency of the state, so creating modern civic nations. The notion of an ethnic core, however, is problematic and difficult to operationalize. The center–periphery model of nation building is a common device in macro history, but endowing the center with an ethnic element is another matter. In the case of England and then Britain (one of Smith’s examples), the core, in the southeast of England, was an ethnic melting pot of Anglo-Saxons, Norman-French, and Danes. Softening the concept of ethnic group by labeling it as an ethnie does not resolve the essential difficulties of this concept, which seems to have no core meaning but refers to a range of traits, including language, culture, kinship, and proximity, none of which is either necessary or sufficient. Showing that modern nations had earlier predecessors does not prove the case either since there were myriad collective identities in premodern times, the great majority of which did not evolve into nations. So, like the argument about the need for community and belonging, this does not explain the modern nation in general or in particular.

**Nationalist Doctrine**

Nationalism has often been criticized for lacking a core doctrine or great thinkers. It is true that there have been few grand normative theories and that scholars writing about nationalism have often tended to be skeptical if not outright condemnatory, as is Elie Kedourie. It is also argued that an overall doctrine of nationalism is impossible since it is based essentially on a fiction (the existence of nations) and that it is not universalizable since nationalisms are by definition opposed to each other. There is an element of truth in this, but nationalism is no more or less constructed than other sociological concepts like class. Nineteenth-century nationalists such as Giuseppe Mazzini and Johann Gottfried von Herder did try to universalize their ideas, albeit with very limited success. The principle of national self-determination has enjoyed a measure of international support since the mid-20th century, recognized by the United Nations but tightly circumscribed to apply only to existing states or to colonial territories (by the “salt water doctrine” whereby colonies are by definition separated from the colonizer by a sea) and not to nationalist movements within consolidated states, especially when these are democracies. Beyond that, the view has prevailed that a universal doctrine right of self-determination would be unworkable, given the overlapping and competing claims and an invitation for opportunists to create their own national movements.

The doctrines employed by nationalist movements also adapt themselves to the times and to prevailing ideas of legitimacy. So in the 19th century, the concept of race was used rather freely, together with primordialist ideas since these were also being deployed by states. In recent years, many nationalist movements have sought to stress their liberal democratic credentials and the voluntarist conception of the nation as a union of citizens, in line with prevailing norms. With the collapse of the central empires in Europe, nationalism became a doctrine of separatism, inspired partly by Woodrow Wilson’s apparent endorsement of the doctrine of self-determination. In the late 20th century, however, other movements adopted postsovereignist ideas about self-determination within larger entities like federations, confederations, or supranational orders such as the European Union.
Classifying Nationalisms

Given the difficulties in identifying a core meaning or doctrine for nationalism, it is not surprising that scholars have sought to define nationalism according to different types. This enterprise has also proved frustrating for a number of reasons, not least that the concepts employed often have a strong normative loading. There is a practical distinction between the nationalism of established states and that of movements seeking to create their own states or otherwise advance self-determination claims. As noted, this underpins the international norm upholding the former but not the latter. It is less clear that this represents a difference in principle. Now that the nation-state has been demystified and its sovereignty curtailed by transnational integration, its moral and practical supremacy can no longer be taken for granted, and it must justify itself on the same principles as its challengers. A distinction is also drawn between aggressive nationalisms, seeking domination over other nations, and defensive nationalisms, seeking only to run their own affairs. This looks like both a practical and a normative distinction, but where nationality claims are entangled and overlapping, as in the Balkans, it does not always yield a definitive solution.

Perhaps the most enduring dichotomy is that between civic and ethnic nationalism. This originated in 19th-century comparisons of France and Spain and was articulated in Hans Kohn’s distinction between Eastern and Western nationalisms. The former, which included Germany, were portrayed as inward looking and backward looking, defining the nation on narrowly ascriptive grounds and prone to xenophobia and aggression. Western nationalisms, by contrast, were built on the civic, territorial state, open to all within their borders and founded on democratic principles. John Plamenatz made a similar distinction between liberal nationalism developing in England and the nationalisms of continental Europe, although he mostly placed Germany on the civic side of the line. The geographical distinction has been criticized as questionable and as arising from stereotyping and is based on a border that changes with the various authors. It is easily used as an ideological justification for the Western powers to assert their superiority. The idea, however, keeps coming back. Recent authors have retained the ethnic–civic distinction while seeing examples of both in all parts of Europe. Others, such as Maurizio Viroli, have reframed the distinction as that between nationalism and patriotism. The same distinction has been tapped by differentiating inclusive from exclusive nationalism and cultural from political nationalism or from territorial nationalism. While subtly different, these distinctions are similar in tendency, and all encompass both analytical and normative elements. They have been criticized in turn on the ground that there are no pure examples of either the civic or the ethnic (or their various approximations). This objection is beside the point if the categories are taken not as a taxonomy of real cases but as ideal types, or end points on a spectrum, to which real cases approximate to a greater or lesser degree. It is, however, necessary to specify the characteristics to which these labels refer, and here there is considerable confusion.

The central distinction in all of this is between a nationalism that defines the nation by strictly ascriptive criteria (which is what ethnicity means in this context) and one that is more open and in which nationality can be acquired. The most common ascriptive criterion is ancestry, so that it is not possible for somebody to join the nation. Citizenship laws, for example, are often seen as indicators for ethnic or civic conceptions of nationhood, with *ius sanguinis* (citizenship by descent) seen as ethnic and *ius soli* (by birth in the territory) as civic. Certainly *ius soli* is more inclusive, but one can argue that both are ascriptive criteria for membership. The real question is whether people satisfying neither of these criteria can join the nation legally through naturalization and, even if they can, whether they are accepted socially as conationals. Another mechanism is culture and language, with nationalisms insisting on a particular culture said to be exclusive and ethnic. This is also not clear in practice since languages can be acquired, and in some cases, such as the United States, insistence on a single language is defended as a mechanism for inclusion of immigrants rather than exclusion; the same argument is made in Québec and Catalonia. Rather than fix on particular mechanisms, then, it might be helpful to focus on the intent of specific practices and whether, how, and whom they tend to include or exclude, accepting that any nationalism by definition includes some people and excludes others. For all these difficulties, however, there...
does seem to be a difference in nationalist practices in specific contexts between those that seek to unite the whole community within a given territorial boundary and subject to common institutions and those that seek to redraw boundaries and institutions to fit preexisting conceptions of community. Some national communities are open to incomers, at least in the second generation, while others are more restrictive.

Sometimes this distinction is mapped onto that between the nationalism of existing states, often assumed to be civic and inclusive, and the nationalism of component territories and groups, assumed to be ethnic and exclusive. There seems to be little justification for this other than a predisposition to existing order since nationalisms at both levels can be more or less exclusive.

The distinction is often given a strong normative charge, with civic nationalism seen as liberal and democratic and ethnic nationalism as antidemocratic. Civic nationalism is individualist and based on voluntary adhesion; ethnic nationalism is collectivist and forced. In practice, however, membership and exit from the nation is rarely a matter of individual choice, and Liah Greenfeld argues that civic nationalism itself may take individualist or collectivist forms. The concept of civic nationalism is sometimes further stretched to cover republicanism (an order based on political commitment of citizens toward the polity), Jürgen Habermas’s constitutional patriotism (the idea that order can be based on support for constitutional values without an ethnic component), or even multiculturalism (the idea that the state should not impose a single culture). This is to miss the point that even civic nationalism is a form of nationalism, albeit shorn of ascriptive requirements. It may point to a single language, shared values, and socialization through state and society into a single identity, as long as these are available to all within the territory.

### The Ethics of Nationalism

Nationalism has historically been associated with liberalism and the advance of democracy through popular sovereignty and with totalitarianism. It has been a force for liberation from foreign domination and for conquest. In the 19th century, John Stuart Mill advocated nationally integrated societies (through socialization rather than ethnic exclusion) as necessary for the trust that underpins liberal democracy. Lord Acton, in contrast, saw in the congruence between nation and state the potential for tyranny and preferred the multinational society with its balance of interests. The issue was reopened in the late 20th century with the debate on liberal nationalism, a concept first introduced by Yael Tamir. It was argued, in Millian fashion, that shared nationality could underpin democracy as long as it was not construed in a narrow ethnic fashion. Others noted that stateless nations could equally be the sites for liberal and civic nation building. David Miller and others have more recently rehabilitated nationality as a principle for social solidarity, so underpinning the social-democratic project and previous conceptions of socialism, which, in theory if not in practice, had been cosmopolitan. It was not clear in these writings what the exact link between nationality and nationalism is, but it was agreed that the state had a legitimate interest in promoting common identities. This idea has been widely taken up in Europe in the face of immigration and a questioning of the ideal of multiculturalism. As the state itself is challenged and demystified in the face of global change and transnational integration as well as challenges from internal communities (whether these are labeled as regions or stateless nations), it can no longer rely on the implicit normative supremacy it had in the past and, having to legitimate itself, has fallen back on the nationality principle.

Nationalist movements, whether at the state, the substate, or the transnational level, are still making incompatible claims about the proper boundaries of political community. In the present day, however, they tend to subscribe to the same principles, eschewing purely ethnic arguments and insisting on more political ones based on the right of democratic self-determination. They also tend to stress their democratic credentials, if only on the basis that they represent the “people.” This is perhaps a form of ideological isomorphism as nationality claims reflect the normative principles regarded as legitimate at the time. So “race” is abandoned and “self-determination” comes in. The result, however, is once again a set of principles for defining political community that produce no determinate outcome since the claims are often competing and almost always overlapping. Some theorists seek to adjudicate among these claims...
based on which of them have the best liberal democratic credentials. Others regard this as presumptuous and unrealistic since there is no supranational authority to enforce such adjudications. Most observers have concluded that nationality issues can never be resolved by redrawing political boundaries. At best, they can be managed by recognizing different conceptions of the nation and of the division of political authority.

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See also Decentralization; Ethnicity; Federalism; Parties; Social Movements

Further Readings

**NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS**

Nationalist movements are (often utopian) political campaigns to “build” nations that correspond to state boundaries. “Nation” is notoriously difficult to define, and “nationalists” often attempt to convince or force people to assume identities about which they were previously unaware of or with which they may be uncomfortable. Attempts to make nations congruent with state boundaries often fail; in many cases, such attempts result in efforts to claim national homogeneity by ignoring or oppressing other ethnic or national groups within the territory of the “nation-state.” This entry discusses problems of definition, varying historical conditions, and the continuing political relevance of nationalist movements.

**Definition of Nationalism**

The failure of most nation-building projects in modern history raises the question of why nationalist movements have long been so influential and, in many parts of the world, remain so today. The belief that every nation should have a state—and that every state should be a nation—has been the most widely accepted form of legitimation for modern states since the French Revolution. French nationalists themselves devoted much effort, particularly in the 19th century, to creating a common cultural and political identity, a process that Eugen Weber (1976) famously termed “turning peasants into Frenchmen.” Weber argued that popular consciousness of being part of the French nation was weakly developed in the rural areas, with elites using the school curriculum and also universal conscription to instill a strong sense of nationality in the country’s provinces.

Only a few other countries can be seen to have successfully imitated this French example of “successful” assimilation, among them Sweden and Japan. In the 20th century, this assimilationist project grew more difficult, even in venerable states like Spain. Here, substate nationalisms flourished, particularly among the Basques and the Catalans. Arguably, few nation-states were successfully created in the last century, with almost all developing countries that emerged from colonialism being multinational or at least multietnic and multicultural states. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) have proposed that it would be more empirically accurate to speak of “state-nations” (multicultural and often multinational) that still manage to command the loyalty of their citizens despite the lack of a homogeneous nation underpinning the state. Among state-nations there are
those in which robustly politicized nationalist movements are active, such as in Belgium, Spain, or Sudan. Other state-nations, however, have managed to create a strong sense of common identity despite multiculturalism (such as Singapore, Switzerland, and the United States). Yet the belief in the necessity of nation-state building by nationalist movements persists, making the task of achieving legitimacy through the establishment of tolerant state-nations more difficult.

Nationalists mostly adhere to the “ideal” of state boundaries being or becoming congruent with the nation (for Ernest Gellner, 1983, this is the defining feature of nationalism). This means that from a nationalist perspective, many states are “too large,” that is multinational, or “too small,” so-called rump states that were formerly a part of larger states. In interwar Eastern Europe, examples of the former were the newly created states of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Cases of the latter were Austria (many Austrians then considered themselves German, developing a separate identity only after World War II) and Hungary (where many ethnic Hungarians were living outside of the state boundaries). Nation building, the attempt to make national loyalties and state boundaries correspond, thus ran into the awkward problem of ethnic minorities. Either minorities within the state stood in the way of national homogeneity, or they lived outside the boundaries of the mother state with which they shared a common nationality. These two types of minorities often overlapped with an ethnic minority in a multinational state and often were of the same nationality that was the dominant group in an adjoining country. Attempts by oversized states in interwar Eastern Europe to strengthen national identity were often perceived as discriminatory by minorities; nationalism in undersized states led to irredentist claims against (or, in the case of Austria, hopes for merger with) a neighboring state or states.

Nationalism can, thus, play a major role in undermining and discrediting democracy when the logics of nation building and crafting democracies clash. Excessive emphasis by nationalist movements on nation building encourages the rise of extreme nationalism that can doom simultaneous efforts to craft democracies. Political democracy requires the acceptance of societal pluralism. Extreme nationalism, on the other hand, claims a common interest based on shared nationality that overrides all other social divisions. When a nation-building project leads to a conflict with national minorities or with neighboring countries, it tends to create an environment in which all internal opposition is considered antinational and thus nothing less than treason. These developments break the original French connection between national identity and democratic government. When national unity is stressed at the expense of political pluralism, a democratic polity can be severely weakened or even undermined.

Stalin’s notorious effort to find a definition of a nation relied on supposedly objective criteria: a people’s common history, territory, language, economics, and culture. While there are nations that lack a common language (multilingual nationalities such as the Indians and the Swiss), a common religious or ethnic culture (such as the multiethnic and religiously diverse Singaporeans), or a common territory (such as those with a Kurdish identity who are spread across several states), this primordialist view remains influential among nationalists to the present day. Subjective interpretations of the nation are more plausible, at least from a scholarly point of view. Benedict Anderson famously claimed that nations are but “imagined communities” (1983/2006)—social constructions in which people imagine themselves to be part of a group. This view, in turn, has been criticized for not adequately specifying under what conditions people are likely to come to have this feeling of national commonality, which has led some scholars to combine the two perspectives.

In English and all languages derived from Latin the word nation is related to “being born” and “native.” But the word natio in Latin referred to units like tribes, clans, and families, not the territorial nations we think of today. The idea that “nation” should apply only to a specific territory and a particular people is a modern idea. Thus, although much recent research has pointed to the often ancient roots of recurring national traditions (influential perennialists are Armstrong, 1982; Smith, 1995), nationalist movements are a modern phenomenon.

Nationalism and Modernity

The relationship between nationalist movements and modernity has been a source of controversy
among scholars. Ernest Gellner influentially argued that nationalism played a critical role in modernization. In the “agro-literate” stage of history, rulers had little reason to impose uniformity on their subjects. But with the division of labor in modern times, with work becoming increasingly technical, a need for cultural standardization and context-free communication arose. Nationalist movements helped provide the conditions necessary to create workforces suited to such industrial modernity, making peasants into moderns. In an age of industrialization and bureaucratization, territories became more precisely defined, with national identities used to justify state boundaries. The long conflict between Germany and France over Alsace-Lorraine saw the Germans and French each making claims on the territory based on different national narratives (the fact that the natives spoke a dialect of German was posed against the counterargument that the inhabitants identified themselves as French citizens). This national competition was also a battle over resources among rapidly industrializing neighbors.

Gellner’s approach has been criticized for being overly functionalist (modernity cannot work properly without the nation), failing to account for the rise of nationalism in preindustrial societies, and being unable to account for the passions that nationalism arouses (soldiers dying willingly for their nation). But the link between nationalism and modernity is undeniable, even if it is less direct than Gellner suggests. To criticize nationalist movements thus seems to involve criticizing modernity itself. Yet this should not lead the hardships caused by nationalist movements to minority groups to be relativized. Regular media reports about state-perpetuated violations of minority groups’ human rights (be it of the Uyghurs and Tibetans in China or Black, non-Muslims in southern Sudan, for example) can be linked to national movements using state power to enforce their vision of a nation-state.

By praising the nation as the most valuable identity (raising it above class, region, gender, or other identities), many nationalist movements in the 19th and 20th centuries became “secular religions.” They developed complex “theologies” that stressed supposed commonalities of the “nation” while overlooking or even ignoring the territorial, ethnic, religious, and other forms of diversity their movement faced in realizing its goal of a homogeneous nation. By stressing the interest of their nation, they sacrificed the interests of other competing nationalities, leading to chauvinism, war, and often ethnic cleansing, which was seen in Europe as recently as 1990s in the Yugoslav wars.

Nationalist movements have not been ideologically exclusive, however. They have combined or formed hybrids with liberal, socialist, and conservative ideas and causes. Liberals were among the earliest advocates of nationalism in the 19th century. During the revolution of 1848, some delegates to St. Paul’s Church in Frankfurt argued that everyone who lived on German territory was a German and that national identity was not determined by one’s ethnic background or language but was a political organism defined through the state, making nationalism a political concept not an ethnic one. This soon became a minority position in Germany, in much of the rest of Europe, and in many other places in the world where ethnic, particularistic, and collective conceptions of the nation replaced humanistic, universalist, and individualistic ones.

Early socialist movements adopted the nationalist agenda only implicitly (but later ones, such as Mao in China and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, intertwined nationalism and socialism so closely that they cannot be separated in their thought and actions). Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels argued that class conflict was more important than the differences between nations. Yet they still supported several nationalist movements against oppressive empires (particularly struggles against the Russian and the Habsburg empires but also the Irish independence fight against the British). But Engels, in particular, suggested that only “great, historic nations” would survive into the modern world, advancing the cause of socialism, while smaller nations would be counterrevolutionary, doomed to wither away. An important exception to the chauvinist orientation of many socialist thinkers behind a façade of internationalism was the Austro-Marxists. In 1907, Otto Bauer advocated a program of “cultural–national autonomy” to lessen tensions between nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a multinational territory under Habsburg rule while maintaining the solidarity of the working class. Rather than repudiating nationalism, he advocated that socialists
should embrace national differences and work to allow the flowering of each national culture in a socialist state. Bauer’s tolerant, state-nation approach drew contempt from Lenin and other orthodox Marxists, foreshadowing the dogmatism and oppressiveness of the Soviet Union in regard to national minorities. Benito Mussolini was a socialist who became a fanatical nationalist during World War I. While he was disavowed by the socialist movement, he had exploited the chauvinist side of many socialist thinkers to create what became known as fascism. The fanaticism of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, who perpetrated one of the worst mass murders in the post–World War II period, was fueled by a deadly mixture of socialism and nativist nationalism.

Initially, conservatives were the slowest to recognize the potential power of nationalism for their political purposes, instinctively fearing the mobilization of the masses. But when they did make this discovery, the consequences were often terrifying. Militarist Japan in the 1930s and early 1940s is one well-known example. While Japanese propagandists justified their country’s conquest of much of Asia through a vague notion of Pan-Asianism, a sense of national superiority and a corresponding contempt for other nations underlay this aggression, creating lasting bitterness toward Japan in the region, up to the present (not helped by the unwillingness of some Japanese conservatives to acknowledge the country’s war crimes). National intolerance reached its pinnacle under Nazi rule in Germany and their conquest of much of the rest of Europe during World War II. Although the Holocaust has been attributed to the Nazis’ racist ideology, nationalist appeals were key to mobilizing initial support for National Socialism in Germany.

Following the famous historian Friedrich Meinecke who distinguished between state and cultural nationalism, the great scholar of comparative nationalism Hans Kohn (1944) made a distinction between the earlier universalist French nationalism that was a product of the Enlightenment and the later particularistic German, Russian, and Eastern European nationalism that stressed cultural particularism. In a more recent effort that draws on Kohn’s insights, Liah Greenfeld (1993) has argued that nationalist movements have followed different “routes to modernity.” Individualist and civic nationalism arose first in Britain and the United States; then, collective but civic nationalism took hold in France; and finally collective and ethnic nationalism shaped the politics of Russia and Germany. Ethnocollectivist types of nationalism tend to be authoritarian, with a high degree of inequality between nationalist elites and the disempowered masses. In short, efforts to create a nationally defined people have been compatible with democracy in the more individualistic, civic versions of nationalist movements. In other cases, however, nationalist movements that have appealed to collective, ethnic identities leave little room for individual rights, including those of ethnonational minorities.

Contemporary Nationalist Movements

One disturbing recent development among nationalist movements has been the rise of citizen groups accusing the state of insufficiently upholding the national interest. Whether it be in China where nationalist “netizens” have used the Internet to attack the Communist Party’s supposed weak pursuit of the national interest (particularly vs. Japan), in Thailand where for domestic political reasons “yellow shirt” protests reopened a border dispute with Cambodia that was long thought to be resolved, or among Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka demanding stronger action against Tamil rebels, such societal nationalism has increased internal and external conflicts and made nationalism more extremist. As discussed above, this is highly unfavorable for an existing democracy or for democratic transitions in the future. Such civil societal nationalism has also weakened government efforts to harness nationalism to issues such as national development as this risks allowing societal groups to seize on it to accuse the government of being insincere in its commitment to “genuine” nationalism.

The countries of the European Union (EU) have prided themselves on defusing the impact of rival nationalisms within their community. Post–World War II reconciliation between Germany and France, in which competing nationalisms led to a bloody rivalry between these two European powers, was a crucial milestone. But the postnationalist age that many European politicians have hoped for has yet to dawn. National interests still strongly
drive the behavior of European community countries; on the periphery of the EU, Greek nationalism continues to clash with Turkish national claims. Yet Western Europe has arguably come furthest in healing the old wounds inflicted by nationalist movements. By contrast, Eastern Europe (where the short war between Georgia and Russia in 2009 showed how such tensions can quickly erupt into war) remains a region full of nationalist conflicts despite the end of the Yugoslav war. In Black Africa and Latin America, by contrast, nationalist-based conflicts have subsided on the whole (with the exception of a continuing ethnic-based civil war in Sudan and recent nationalist tensions between Venezuela and Colombia). In the Middle East, the age of Pan-Arabism has passed (which reached its peak during the 1960s), with Arab nationalism now focused on the Palestinian conflict with Israel. A series of Arab regimes originally legitimized by national movements that seized power, such as Nasserism in Egypt, have lost legitimacy as economic performance declined, with Islamist groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood replacing nationalists as the strongest source of opposition. In South Asia, nationalist tensions between Pakistan and India remain high, with the dispute over Kashmir a perennial source of conflict. In Sri Lanka, a decades-long civil war recently ended with the defeat of the Tamil Tiger rebel group, but reconciliation still seems far off as there is little indication that the victorious majority Sinhalese are willing to take the key steps necessary to make the country more tolerant toward the Tamil minority. In Northeast Asia, conflicts over disputed islands (as well as the wounds left from the experience of World War II) between China and Japan remain a major source of potential conflict as does the ongoing dispute between China and Taiwan, with the former warning that it will invade if the latter declares independence (as some Taiwanese nationalist activists nonetheless wish to do). In Southeast Asia, the military government in Burma/Myanmar has reached accords with most rebel groups representing non-Burman nationalities after a long-running civil war, but these were based on its own despotic rules, not a genuine spirit of accommodation. Indonesia appears to be a contrasting case: Releasing East Timor (Timor-Leste) into independence in 2002—and overcoming ethnic conflict in the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of the long-ruling dictator Suharto in 1998—has helped this country, the world’s largest archipelago state, to become the most stable democracy in the region.

But nationalist movements will continue to thrive in areas in which inhabitants feel oppressed. In this sense, nationalism retains its liberationist impulse that it so famously developed during the French Revolution but also, for example, in the Greek struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. One of the paradoxes of modern nationalism is how progressive causes in opposition to ruling empires often degenerate into new forms of political oppression once control over the state is achieved. Here, the experience of the countries of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is instructive. Nationalist movements were at the forefront of opposition to (post)totalitarian states. Once these multinational autocracies had collapsed, however, the new nation-states that replaced them often proved to be intolerant. The war in the former Yugoslavia along ethnonational lines is only the most extreme example, with Serbian nationalists justifying war in the name of greater Serbia (Croatian nationalism was less destructive only because its state power was weaker). But in the Soviet Union, even some of the most enlightened, democratic countries—the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia—have, sometimes openly but often covertly, discriminated against their ethnic Russian populations. Ethnic heterogeneity remains the specter that haunts many states claiming to be homogeneous nations.

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See also Citizenship; Ethnicity; Irredentism; Modernization Theory; Nation Building; Nationalism; State Failure; State Formation

Further Readings
The notion of “natural law” is a prime and enduring one in the Western philosophical and political tradition. In antiquity, the doctrine of natural law was based on a conception of nature as a primary ordering force in which every being was ascribed a place. In contemporary times, the doctrine has been reformulated under the guise of “natural rights,” meaning that laws should respect inherent human values. Such a multimillennial history could not but entail major variations over time in the meaning, the purpose, and the place of natural law. For this reason, any comprehensive approach to it must make room for the remarkable permanence of some traits of what is called natural law as well as for dramatic changes in its object and definition.

For the Greeks and then the Romans, who crafted the notion of natural law in a doctrine sometimes referred to as *jus naturalism* (from the Latin, *jus naturale*, which means natural law), the concept of law—*nomos* in Greek and *lex* in Latin—is grounded in a cosmological perspective according to which the universe is organized on a definite pattern that everyone has to follow. Such a conception extends its reach far beyond the realm of humanity and embraces animals and even the inanimate. In Aristotle’s perspective, for instance, the natural place of a stone is the ground where it stays naturally, while in any other place it would fall. Such is the case with human beings. The city is organized through natural ties of subordination and exchanges, and laws should respect nature in the social bonds thus dispatched. The minuities with which Plato in *The Republic* or in *The Laws* and Aristotle in his *Politics* describe under which conditions—of climate, population, relations between sexes, and so on—a successful city can thrive reflects a general preoccupation. This establishes the good law as the one respecting natural conditions, which range from the demography of a city to the actual ties of subordination between men and women, free citizens and slaves, and classes in society.

Despite pretensions to the contrary, ancient conceptions of natural law did not form an actual coherent body of doctrine. Authors were keen on disputing what was according to nature or against nature; while the principle of natural law was well established, what it tangibly meant was open to continual discussion. There is probably not a single law, rule, or moral obligation of the antique world that has not been submitted to critical scrutiny and challenged or reasserted on the grounds of what is natural or not: The precedence of family duties over city laws (as is the case in the famous Antigone myth, where Antigone refuses to obey her uncle, the local tyrant, who forbade the proper burial of her brother, but also as in Plato’s dialogue, *Euthyphro*, where Socrates critiques a son suing his father for the death of a murderer), the issue of slavery (whether it is natural or not, and under which circumstances, was a constant debate), the question of appropriate leadership (who is the natural leader in a city?), the separation of classes, or what it is proper to do or not do—all these could be subjected to dispute in the name of nature.

As Leo Strauss contended, these continuing and multiform disputes over what is against or according to nature supposed that nature was an object of inquiry in an exercise of reflection and dialogue akin to philosophy. Natural law, to that extent, favors the exercise of personal critical reason by insisting on the fact that human beings should not be forced to comply with rules that are repugnant to reason. As Cicero put it in a famous sentence of the third book of his *De Republica*:

There is a true law, a right reason, conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the good respect its injunctions,
and the wicked treat them with indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal law of justice.

Natural law conforms to reason because it is discovered by reason and satisfies the demands of reason, which, in its turn, is nothing else but the discovery of the preexisting order of nature.

Quite surprisingly, considering how intimately it was initially linked to a pagan conception of the world, the doctrine of natural law found its place among Christian conceptions. Theoretically, though, the development of Christianity constituted a deadly challenge to this doctrine. For Christians, nature is no more than a creation of God, who is the ultimate reason and sense of the world as the Gospel of John bears it: “All things were made by [God]; and without him was not any thing made that was made” (1:3). Nature as “all the things” is second to God’s decision to create it. Far from representing the achieved order of the world, nature is flawed with imperfection since only God is perfect. There is worse: This imperfection means that nature can be regarded as the source of sin. For thinkers like Augustine (354–430), the fact that nature in man is marked by the fate of death is a testimony to its corruption and sinful condition from which only redemption beyond the natural condition of humanity can save us.

Despite this potential tension, the cultural context in which the primitive church developed was so strongly influenced by classical theories that the reference to natural law was spontaneously maintained, as shown, for instance, in Paul’s Letter to the Romans: “Sometimes [Gentiles, i.e., non-Jews or pagans] do naturally what the law orders. So they have a law in themselves, although they do not have the law” (2:14). Obviously, the law of God may be followed out of a “natural,” inner sense of good and right, thus bridging the gap between revelation and natural law. Centuries later, in a major integration of natural law in Christian conceptions, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) develops the point in his *Theological Summa* (Part 1, Question 91): Natural law is the “participation” of the rational creature—man—in the law of God, and reason is thus the way to participate in divine law through natural law. Far from disqualifying it as a model of law, creation establishes nature as God’s order in the world and must be followed by men.

The absorption of the conception of natural law inherited from the pagan past in Christian doctrines did not stabilize a consensual understanding of it but elicited new questions eventually provoking a divide sometimes referred to as the opposition between two conceptions of *jus naturalism*: classic and modern. One key element has been a radical transformation of the meaning of “nature,” progressively denoting the inscription of nature in man and no more the insertion of man in the whole order of the universe. Illustrating the evolution in his *Spirit of the Laws*, Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755) states that “the laws of nature are the laws that derive from our constitution.” Natural law, which the ancients considered as part of a cosmology, has become the outcome of a new anthropology insisting on the value of the individual and his personal relation to nature.

Spanning centuries, the transformation of natural law eventually acquired a definition during the Enlightenment, when natural law slowly made room for a conception of individual natural rights, which led to the declarations of the American and French revolutions in 1776 and 1789. The causes and the forms of this revision of the sense of “natural law” are many. It has long been considered that the change occurred briskly in the 18th century. Modern historiography tends rather to agree on an evolutionary process originating in the Middle Ages, with William of Ockham (1285–1349) being often, though controversially, cited as the instigator of this development in the wake of the work of the French historian of law Michel Villey (1914–1988). But it is certain that in the 18th century, natural law eventually came to mean that laws must respect equality and freedom in men (the issue of women was debated), which are considered to be natural features of humanity. This is what the notion of “rights” grants, despite infinite variations over centuries in the definition of these rights among modern and contemporary authors—no less keen in the modern age on discussing natural rights than their ancient predecessors had been on disputing over what is natural or not.

Beyond historical fractures, *jus naturalism* rests today on a fundamental set of convictions regarding
the essence of law, the first one being that laws are not arbitrary. Opposing positivist juridical conceptions, which assert that a law is no more than a norm regarded as legal, *jus naturalism* is a reminder that masses could be massively unjust, and the will of the prince or the leader can be detached from any common sense of justice. The theme of natural law thus assumes a normative role as well as a critical one. On the normative side is the idea that nature commands certain actions and forbids others: The appeal to natural law can serve the purpose of justifying laws or justifying the call for new laws by considering them as requisites from nature. By the same token, the reference to natural law also represents a powerful critical tool to contest the validity of laws that would appear to go against nature. This is the basis of one of the most important features in *jus naturalist* conceptions: the distinction between natural law, which is the source of justice, and conventional laws—the laws of a collectivity—which, in the best cases, obey or translate natural law but in the worst situations may well violate any natural sense of justice.

In all its conceptions, natural law addresses the fundamental paradox in human laws, whether understood in a specifically legal or in a broader moral sense. On the one hand, norms vary greatly: What seems “natural” to one human group might well be considered deviant or even strictly forbidden in another one. On the other hand, rules are often felt to be “natural” by their followers, a fact that gives way to uncertainty or bewilderment when they are challenged by the existence of other potentially contradictory rules. To that extent, obedience to rules corresponds to a natural sense of justice. For centuries, the notion of natural law has translated this sense in the theory of law.

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See also Political Philosophy; Rights; Rule of Law

Further Readings

action problem, Hardin argued that finite natural resources that were jointly used would eventually be exhausted. Since no single resource user has an incentive to limit his or her outtake from the resource, the resource would soon suffer from overexploitation. Because most natural resources are collectively owned, Hardin’s prediction was that the world’s natural resources were on the brink of depletion, unless they could be brought under either private or governmental ownership.

The situation described in the “Tragedy of the Commons” continued to be the mainstream model for understanding interactions between society and natural systems until the next seminal work in natural resources management appeared in 1990. Elinor Ostrom’s path-breaking classic Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action built on the fundamental problem of jointly used resources and the resulting overutilization assumed by Hardin but argued that the depletion of the resource was not an unavoidable outcome. One of Ostrom’s core contributions is the conceptual distinction between common property (resources owned jointly) and common pool resources (CPRs—resources that are highly subtractable and have high exclusion costs associated with them). Relying on evidence from multiple case studies and game theoretical models, Ostrom pointed out that natural resource users may solve the commons dilemma through self-organizing institutions that regulate access and resource extraction activities. However, simply setting up an institution is not a panacea for the problem of sustainable natural resource management. Since the very act of constructing an institution is a collective action problem in itself, creating the institution in many cases poses an insurmountable challenge. Moreover, even with the institution in place there is still a large amount of variation in how well different types of institutional configurations are able to achieve sustainable resource use. Factors such as power asymmetries and levels of trust among users, the ability to control access to the resource, whether or not resource units are easily distinguishable, and the degree of volatility in the resource system itself are all highly influential factors for successful management.

The combined legacy of Hardin and Ostrom has securely placed the study of natural resource management in an overall theoretical and methodological framework of rational-choice institutionalism. Most of the work that followed in the wake of Governing the Commons can be placed within this paradigm, as also a good deal of the policy recommendations that were based on the findings from CPR studies. Moreover, most contemporary work in natural resource studies has retained many of Ostrom’s core notions, such as the pivotal role of institutions and the importance of considering the characteristics of the resource itself.

**Contemporary Directions in Natural Resource Management**

At least two broad themes can be discerned in contemporary research on natural resource management. The first theme emphasizes the inherent complexity of natural resource systems and argues that this precludes any strong notions of actually governing natural resources. Complete and exhaustive knowledge about the dynamics of a given ecosystem is simply beyond the reach of scientific inquiry, and it is therefore not possible to govern resource systems based on rationalistic and exact templates such as sustainable yield or carrying capacity as these concepts can never be estimated in any precise sense. As a consequence, new management paradigms such as adaptive management or adaptive comanagement are put forward as necessary readjustments of how natural resources should be governed. Such management approaches typically stress the role of learning, innovation, local knowledge, stakeholder participation, and flexibility as core virtues of resource management.

There is also a tendency to view policy making as trial and error or as a constantly ongoing experiment, rather than as the pursuit of specific pre-determined goals. Critics argue that adaptive management and adaptive comanagement are built on overly optimistic assumptions about the effect of stakeholder involvement, self-organization, and participation in policy making, while downplaying problems such as power and resource asymmetries and the need for accountability and predictability of public policies.

The second theme problematizes the dichotomous conception of nature and society—in which the latter governs the former—by arguing that ecological systems and social and political systems in reality are highly interlinked, constituting so-called social–ecological systems. The social–ecological
systems view of natural resource management proposes that rather than studying the effects of social organization on natural resources, analyses must be based on the realization that society and nature are locked into coupled causal relationships, which means that they cannot be studied in isolation from each other. Closely linked to this approach are studies concerned with issues of adaptability and vulnerability. Against the backdrop of ongoing processes of global environmental change, such as biodiversity loss and climate change, scholars in this area seek to understand how the vulnerability of people situated in different social–ecological systems can be reduced through processes of adaptation to novel circumstances.

**Comparative and International Perspectives**

Due to the strong emphasis on understanding linkages between institutional factors and natural systems, most empirical studies of natural resource management tend to take the form of comparative case studies of small or medium-sized CPRs. There is, however, a smaller subset of large-N comparative studies in which nation-level political factors are used to explain cross-national variation in natural resource management performance. An example of a widely discussed topic is the impact of corruption on natural resource management. Some studies have identified a negative effect of corruption on indicators of natural resource management, whereas other authors argue that corruption obstructs more effective resource exploitation.

Studies of the effect of democracy on natural resource management show a similar pattern: Some studies assert that stronger and more encompassing democratic regimes generally perform better in managing and protecting their natural resources, while other studies claim that democracy, due to its intimate relationship with market economies and the need for sustained economic growth, inevitably leads to mismanagement of natural resources.

The effect of decentralization has also been studied in a comparative perspective, focusing on the issue of a possible race-to-the-bottom effect of reforms aiming at a more decentralized management of natural resources. Some studies support the existence of such an effect, whereas others argue that there is a race to the top.

A further topic of comparative natural resource management has to do with the relationship between the market economy and nature. The key notion is that the relationship between market economy and resource degradation, when viewed over time, can be thought of as an inverted U-shaped curve. Economies in the early stages of industrialization rely heavily on the extraction of natural resources for growth generation and therefore have a large impact on ecological systems. This phase of economic development is also marked by the use of inefficient and crude technologies that contribute to further environmental damage. This relationship between nature and economy persists until a certain point of economic wealth is reached, beyond which the curve starts to slope downward. In this new phase, economic growth is increasingly generated through the production of services and the development of new technologies, which lessens the need for extraction of crude natural resources. In addition, some scholars have argued that people in more affluent societies start to value things other than material wealth, a process that again serves to weaken the relationship between economic growth and environmental degradation. The environmental Kuznets curve theory (according to which environmental degradation increases while a country is developing but decreases as the GDP rises) has not gone unchallenged, and some argue that it is only valid for a smaller class of end-of-pipe type of emissions, whereas other negative impacts on natural systems such as biodiversity loss, carbon dioxide emissions, and the spread of toxins follow the level of economic development in a roughly linear fashion. Another criticism holds that the environmental Kuznets curve theory might be less applicable to currently developing countries due to their access to already available clean technologies.

As many natural resources are located on regional or even global scales (e.g., migratory birds, sea mammals, and global fish stocks), the politics of natural resources is also to be found in the international arena. A central concept for many scholars studying international natural resource politics is that of environmental regimes. This concept is similar to the concept of institutions in CPR studies but is normally used in studies of how international treaties and organizations influence the behavior of actors in the international environmental arena.
Research in this field has focused on understanding mechanisms underlying regime effectiveness as well as on how regimes are constructed and evolve over time.

**Emerging Themes in Natural Resource Management Research**

A number of significant themes are currently emerging in natural resource management research. An already ongoing shift is the gradual move away from the institution as the central unit of analysis. Instead, theoretical models and research designs are increasingly framed in terms of systems theory or, more specifically, in terms of socioecological systems. The heightened interest in how social–ecological systems are able to adapt to novel circumstances caused by global environmental change in turn tends to play down focus on action problems related to natural resource management. This redirection also signals a renewed interest in complex systems theory as well as in notions of resilience in social–ecological systems. Another topic of recent debate concerns methodologies in CPR research. The dominance of qualitative case study methods has recently been complemented with more quantitative methods, including systems modeling and social network analysis. A final emerging theme in natural resource management research relates to ongoing shifts toward more governance-oriented forms of policy making, which is likely to have wide-ranging repercussions for the way in which natural resources are governed.

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See also Complexity; Environmental Issues; Environmental Policy; Environmental Security Studies; Institutional Theory

**Further Readings**


**Negotiation**

See Diplomacy

**Neo-Corporatism**

Corporatism is an idea that has been present in political and social life for at least 9 to 10 centuries. Its origins are indisputably European and related to differing conceptions of how the Roman Catholic Church and medieval cities should be governed. Its popularity, however, has had an erratic fate—both as a practice in political life and as a concept in political theory. It has been heralded as a novel and promising way of ensuring harmony between conflicting social groups, and it has also been condemned as a reactionary and antidemocratic formula for suppressing the demands of autonomous associations and movements. In other words, corporatism has always been politically controversial and conceptually ambiguous. There is no better evidence for this than the frequency with which it is so often preceded by contradictory qualifying adjectives or prefixes: state or societal, liberal or authoritarian, archeo- or neo-, Catholic or secular, macro- or meso-, voluntary or compulsory, social democratic or conservative, and, most recently, national or supranational.

The Sites of Neo-Corporatism

After the defeat of fascism in Italy, National Socialism in Germany, and various other authoritarian regimes that flourished in Europe during the interwar period (1919–1939)—almost all of which claimed to be practicing some form of corporatism—the concept disappeared from the
lexicon of respectable political discourse, except in Franco’s Spain and Salazar’s Portugal, where the practice was left anachronistically on display until both countries transitioned to democracy in the mid-1970s.

At almost the same time, scholars from several countries and academic disciplines revived the concept to describe certain features of the politics of advanced democratic polities that did not seem adequately accounted for by the dominant model that had been applied to state–society relations—namely, pluralism. Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and tiny Luxembourg were singled out as archetypical “neo-corporatist” countries that had become deeply penetrated by this type of interest politics since the end of World War II. Important traces of its practice on a less centralized or more erratic basis have been observed in the politics of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and even in postauthoritarian Portugal and Spain. Great Britain and Australia have attempted to establish similar arrangements without success. Elsewhere among the advanced capitalist democracies, neo-corporatism seems confined to specific sectors (especially agriculture). The United States, Canada, and New Zealand, for example, have never even tried to practice it at the macro or national level; France has only resorted to it in exceptional circumstances, as an emergency (and short-lived) measure.

At the core of this variation in practice were two political prerequisites. Unless they were simultaneously present (and this was a relatively rare occurrence), neo-corporatism in its most centralized and effective form would not emerge: (a) a relative balance of class forces between capital and labor and (b) an active disposition by state agencies to promote it. War and its aftermath provided one favorable context, as did the proto-revolutionary situation induced by protracted economic depression. Social-democratic or socialist party dominance in government, especially without serious competition from far left communist parties, was another. Both of these contributed to overcoming a major impediment—namely, the reluctance of capitalists and their associations to participate in and to be bound by such arrangements. Only when the alternative pluralist course of action was not viable did they embrace neo-corporatism and even willingly seek to exploit it to their benefit. Once these constraints waned, as both did in the 1970s and 1980s in Western Europe, so did neo-corporatist policy making—usually due to the defection of business interests. Neither the relative balance of class forces nor the simultaneous success of left-wing parties characterized North America or the countries of the White Commonwealth as much and, hence, its almost complete absence in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—except, interestingly enough, for a brief flirtation with something like it during the American New Deal.

**Definitions of Neo-Corporatism**

While corporatism has been defined as an ideology, a variant of political culture, a type of state, a form of economy, or even as a kind of society, the most productive approach has been to consider it as one of several possible arrangements through which organized interests can intermediate between their members (individuals, families, firms, communities, groups) and various interlocutors. Representatives of capital and labor were initially assigned the most prominent role, although more recent versions have extended participation to include representatives of other interests such as women, consumers, environmentalists, neighborhoods, youth, and so forth. Agents of the state or government are omnipresent in such arrangements but usually in a facilitative rather than a protagonistic role. They may or may not be overtly present at the table, but those who are there know that legitimate coercion may be necessary for implementing the agreements they reach and may be brought to bear if they fail to reach a consensus. Central to all these negotiating processes in the contemporary context is the role of class, sectoral, or professional associations, permanently established and staffed, that specialize in identifying, advancing, and defending the interests of their members by negotiating agreements directly with organized representatives of conflicting interests and/or by influencing and contesting the policies of public authorities. Unlike political parties—the other principle intermediaries in modern politics—these organizations neither present candidates for electoral approval nor accept overt responsibility for forming governments.

The definition of modern corporatism that initiated much of the contemporary discussion is that of Philippe Schmitter (1974):
A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports. (pp. 93–94)

This approach emphasizes almost exclusively the input side, that is, the organizational structure of interest associations. Gerhard Lehmbruch (1979) defined what he called “liberal corporatism” more from the perspective of decisional outputs as

an institutionalized pattern of policy-formation in which large interest organizations cooperate with each other and with public authorities not only in the articulation (or even “intermediation”) of interests, but—in its developed forms—in the “authoritative allocation of values” and in the implementation of such policies. (p. 94)

As Alan Cawson (1986) and Peter Williamson (1985) note, subsequent definitions tended to combine both the input and output dimensions, and it became virtually axiomatic that successful neo-corporatism required their coincidence. Only where the interests involved were organized hierarchically into monopolistic and comprehensive associations was it thought to be possible to reach and to implement voluntary agreements on such crucial matters.

The Success and Failure of Neo-Corporatism

Once the authoritarian-fascist-statist variety of corporatism had been virtually extinguished—first, by the post–World War II wave of democratizations and, later, by the post-1974 one—it became increasingly clear which were the polities most successful in practicing the “societal” version of neo-corporatism: small European countries with well-organized, relatively centralized class-based associations and highly vulnerable, internationalized economies. The tendency was all the more marked if they also had strong social-democratic parties, stable electoral preferences and ruling coalitions, relative cultural homogeneity, and neutral foreign policies. Indeed, those that had the most difficulty sustaining such social pacts had weaker social democracies, more volatile electorates, and deeper divisions over military and security issues, for example, the Netherlands and Denmark. Belgium’s relative lack of success in reaching such voluntary macrosocial contracts could be traced to its division into rival linguistic groups.

In retrospect, it became clear that neo-corporatism had reached its apex more or less at the very same time when it was discovered and labeled as such by social scientists. During the rest of the 1970s, the 1980s, and well into the 1990s, its practice seemed to be in irrevocable decline. A number of knowledgeable scholars, such as Scott Lash and John Urry (1987) and Mark Gobeyn (1993), even declared it defunct on the grounds that “post-Fordist” systems of production, the decline in political commitment to full employment, the demise of Keynesian economics, the rise of neoliberal ideology, and the growing weakness of trade unions—not to mention the growing significance of globalization and Europeanization—all conspired against its viability. When Swedish capitalists noisily withdrew in 1991 from all policy-making instances they shared with organized labor, its death warrant was thought to have been issued. Prior to this—and for a period stretching back to the late 1930s—Sweden was rightfully regarded as the archetypal practitioner of neo-corporatism.

The Resurgence and Transformation of Neo-Corporatism

And then, just as it was supposed to disappear altogether, neo-corporatism dramatically reemerged toward the end of the 1990s, leading at least two observers to predict that maybe neo-corporatism was a cyclical product related to the vicissitudes of capitalist performance and the public’s shifting involvement with public and private goods and, hence, destined to revive—Sisyphus like—every 20 to 25 years or so, only to fail again at the end of a similar period. European integration, which had been considered a negative factor because it tended to impose a neoliberal bias on policy making and reduced the degrees of freedom available to national
politicians, suddenly became a positive factor as a series of countries used neo-corporatist mechanisms to prepare themselves for entry into the Eurozone and to improve their competitive advantage when other policy alternatives had been eliminated. Scholars competed with each other to explain why policy concertation and tripartism had again become so appealing (Giuseppe Fajertag & Phillipe Pochet, 1997).

Closer observation of this revival would reveal some important differences. In a few cases, it involved reanimating tripartite bargaining arrangements that had existed in the recent past with the participation of more or less the same actors. The Netherlands, Denmark, and Finland were cases in point; even in the much trumpeted case of Sweden, elements of neo-corporatism seemed to have crept back into its policy practices at a lower and less visible level of aggregation, especially after the return of the Social Democrats to power. What was definitely novel, however, was its emergence in countries that had either not practiced it at all or done so on an erratic basis. Moreover, the participants in these cases (Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece) were not organized “properly” according to prevailing theory. The associations representing capital and labor in these negotiations were often weak in membership density, poorly coordinated at the national level, fragmented into competing ideological units, and manifestly less capable of ensuring the compliance of the firms and individuals in their respective categories. And, in some instances, the old tripartite formula gave way to a multipartite one in which representatives of other social interests (and even passions) were allowed to sit at the table: agriculturists, feminists, consumers, environmentalists, local governments, youths, and other assorted groups of “policy takers.” As if this was not enough, the subject matter being negotiated was less focused on inflation, wage contention, social peace, and redistributive side payments than with things such as restructuring welfare systems, introducing more flexible work procedures, reducing national budget deficits, improving competitiveness at the sectoral or plant level, meeting environmental standards, and ensuring gender equality. And agents of the state played a much more active and visible role in convoking these negotiations and pressuring the participants to reach agreement. Increasingly, they were even prepared to decree the results and make them publicly binding when faced with dissent, especially by trade unions.

The change in policy content may explain why neo-corporatist policy making could produce results after the revival of the 1990s without the collaboration of neo-corporatist interest intermediaries. The growing imbalance of forces between capital and labor due to globalization had already put the latter on the defensive and, therefore, more likely to agree to negotiate in retreat in defense of existing jobs, wages, and benefits under the impending threat of “delocalization.” It may also have lessened their opposition to including new participants on the grounds that farmers, consumers, and environmentalists might prove to be allies on specific issues. But the real difference has involved the increased role of firms and state agencies. The burden of implementing most of these “new” policies no longer rests on the autonomous capacity of class associations to deliver the compliance of their members. Many are only “recommended standards” or “voluntary guidelines” at the macro or meso levels, and their implementation is largely at the discretion of individual enterprises or plant-level works councils at the microlevel. Also, those that are intended to be binding on all those affected can be imposed by the government through “legitimate coercion.” This has become much more credible since the convergence in programs and policies between Right and Left parties ensures that these policies will not vary with rotations in power. The former association of neo-corporatism with social-democratic or left-center governing coalitions has become less relevant. Indeed, analysts have argued that it has either become indifferent to the party in power or that it is the favored practice when weak, multiparty coalitions rule, on the grounds that, under such centrist governments, neither capital or labor can rely on especially favored treatment by the legislature or the executive, and therefore they have to resort to the second-best alternative of negotiating compromises.

So substantial have been these changes to the practice of neo-corporatism since the late 1990s that it is certainly legitimate to question whether the same label should be attached to it.

**The Performance of Neo-Corporatism**

Protracted neo-corporatism at the national or macroeconomic level has been convincingly linked
to certain desirable outcomes during the post-war period until the mid-1970s: less unruliness of the citizenry, lower strike rates, more balanced budgets, greater fiscal effectiveness, lower rates of inflation, less unemployment, less income inequality, less instability at the level of political elites, and less of a tendency to exploit the “political business cycle”—all of which suggested that countries scoring high on this property were likely to be more governable. Subsequent econometric studies with more recent data have questioned these findings, and no one has ever been able to show that neo-corporatist systems have been capable of higher rates of economic growth. In the turbulent times at the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of this century, as we have noted above, policy concentration among social classes, sectors, and professions has shifted toward matters such as improving productivity, encouraging worker flexibility, and reforming welfare systems.

Regardless of its effects on the economy and society, neo-corporatism has long had an ambiguous and contestable relation to the polity—especially with regard to democracy. From its rediscovery in the mid-1970s, corporatism has borne the burden of its past association with fascism and other forms of authoritarian rule. To describe a polity or practice as “corporatist” was practically synonymous with accusing it of being undemocratic. Moreover, some of its enduring features seemed to confirm this suspicion: Organizations replaced persons as the principal agents in political life; specialized professional representatives gained at the expense of generally interested citizens and broadly aggregative political parties; privileged (if not exclusive) access was accorded to particular associations; monopolies were recognized and even extolled at the expense of overlapping and competing intermediaries; organizational hierarchies reaching up to very comprehensive national peak associations diminished the autonomy of more local and specialized organizations; and decisions were made by secretive negotiations, rather than by public tallying of votes.

As inquiry into corporatism expanded, however, judgment about its impact on democracy shifted. For one thing, many of the countries that are manifestly corporatist are also obviously democratic in the sense that they protect the full range of civic freedoms, define citizenship in the broadest fashion, hold regular competitive elections of uncertain outcome, render political authorities accountable for their actions, and pursue public policies that seem responsive to popular demands. Some of them, especially those in Scandinavia, have even been in the vanguard of experimentation, with such advanced democratic measures as worker participation in management, open disclosure of policy processes, ombudsman arrangements for hearing citizen complaints, public financing of political parties, and even wage-earner funds for extending popular ownership of the economy.

Also, it soon became apparent that corporatist arrangements have a substantial impact on the conditions under which competing interests can participate to influence the process. The spontaneous, voluntaristic, and episodic relations of pluralism seem freer in principle, but in practice they produce a greater inequality of access to those in power. Privileged groups with smaller numbers, concentrated resources, and more compact location have a natural advantage over larger and dispersed ones such as workers and consumers. Corporatism tends to even out the distribution of resources across more comprehensively organized categories and to guarantee at least a formal parity of access to the making of decisions. Moreover, the direct incorporation of associations into subsequent implementation processes may ensure greater responsiveness to group needs than the “arms length” relationship that separates the public and the private realm under pluralism.

Evaluating the impact of corporatism on democracy depends very much on which qualities of democracy one chooses to use. Seen from the classical perspective of encouraging the participation of individuals in the decisions that collectively affect them and of ensuring that all public authorities accord equal accessibility to citizen demands, these arrangements have a negative effect. But when viewed from a more output-oriented perspective that asks whether those in power can be held effectively accountable for their actions and whether these actions are likely to be responsive to citizen needs, the judgment of corporatism is bound to be more positive. Its impact on the central mechanism of democracy—competitiveness—is more ambiguous. On the one hand, this is diminished by eliminating the struggle between rival associations for membership and access. On the other hand, it is
enhanced by encouraging rival conceptions of common interest to express themselves within the same association. One can conclude that modern democracies are being transformed by the practice of modern corporatism. Organizations are becoming citizens alongside, if not in the place of, individuals. Accountability and responsiveness are increasing but at the expense of participation and access. Competitiveness is less interorganizational and more intraorganizational. The pace is uneven, the acceptance is unequal, and the outcome is by no means unequivocal, but democracy in almost all modern societies is becoming more interested, more organized, and more indirect.

**The Future of Neo-Corporatism**

With the dramatic crash of late 2008, the conditions that have previously promoted or impeded neo-corporatism, tripartism, policy concentration, and social pacting, or whatever it should be called, have radically altered. After years of decline in the balance of forces between capital and labor in favor of the former, the terms of encounter are suddenly no longer the same. The hegemony of business interests has been seriously undermined by the collapse of neoliberal ideology as well as the revelations of fraud and misconduct by financial interests. Materially speaking, many enterprises have been devastated in their balance sheets, and their recovery to profitability will require the willing cooperation of labor. Whether mass unemployment will reach the levels of the 1930s and trigger a potentially disruptive collective response by workers and citizens has yet to be seen. Moreover, the initial reaction by state authorities—even in regimes dominated by conservative parties—demonstrates that they are not just disposed but anxious to intervene. So far, their emergency measures have involved distributing massive welfare to capitalists and no high-level negotiations with labor. There has simply not been sufficient time for tripartite policy concentration. But eventually—if the past scenario is any guide to the future—this combination of factors could well lead to yet another revival of it, especially in small, relatively homogeneous and internationally vulnerable countries. The only safe prediction, however, is that, if and when it returns, it will not be the same in either form or substance. Perhaps, then, we can finally declare that neo-corporatism is dead and gone, and begin calling it something else.

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**Further Readings**


**Neoliberal Institutionalism**

Neoliberal institutionalism (NLI) is an umbrella term for liberal research programs in the study of international relations (IR) that focus on the cooperative role of institutions. At its core, NLI argues that international cooperation is possible and most readily achievable, with the creation and
maintenance of international institutions broadly defined. Both formal and informal institutional arrangements are the subjects of NLI analysis. Formal institutions include multilateral organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the European Union (EU). States create and voluntarily submit to such institutions, which possess collective goals and establish mechanisms to achieve them. Informal institutional arrangements, or regimes, are also voluntarily created by states and constitute sets of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and procedures around which actor’s expectations converge in a particular issue area. A well-established regime exists in the issue area of capitalist free trade, for example, since both formal institutions and implicit, collectively shared principles, norms, rules, and procedures are foundational to such activity.

NLI argues that both formal institutions and regimes have the potential to create lasting bonds between nation-states. They do so by facilitating iterated interaction, diffusing information, heightening transparency, and lessening the ability of actors to defect from institutional agreements. By normalizing rules and regulations in this way, institutions promote an environment of trust in which nation-states can obtain a variety of collective gains that they would otherwise eschew. Thus, institutions aid in efficiently solving collective action dilemmas, particularly in areas that do not involve security issues.

As the term indicates, NLI is part of the larger theoretical category of IR liberalism, and it is premised on basic liberal assumptions about the importance of rationality, information, iteration, and institutional arrangements to cooperative outcomes in IR. NLI also constitutes a renewed confrontation with realism—hence its “neo” status. It emerged in the late 1970s as a theoretical competitor to neorealism, which argues that there are debilitating constraints on the efficacy of international cooperation in an anarchic world of self-interested, egocentric nation-states. In neorealist analyses, the anarchic international environment fosters uncertainty and suspicion, which then produce frequent security dilemmas, volatile alliances, and ongoing trade and military competition. In such an environment, international cooperation is difficult to obtain, even when both parties would gain from the effort, due to fear that any relatively greater gains will be employed for competitive purposes. Thus, NLI’s theoretical competitor tends to underscore the dangers of defection by highlighting the distrust between actors engaged in potential agreements with one another.

NLI challenges the pessimistic conclusions of neorealist analysis, but it does so by adopting many of the same analytical assumptions. It is for this reason that neorealism and NLI are sometimes categorized together epistemologically and why NLI can be distinguished from earlier liberal variants such as pluralism. Both NLI and neorealist scholars agree that the international system is anarchic, which means that there is no international authority or government to force states to comply with demands or cooperate with one another. As a result, states must help themselves and look out for their own individual survival. NLI concurs that international cooperation will be difficult to obtain in an anarchic international environment that induces fear and uncertainty. Both theories focus on the state as the main actor in international affairs. While NLI and neorealist scholars recognize that other international actors do exist and can influence international affairs, each theoretical lens views the state as the primary mover of international politics. And both perspectives view the state as a rational, utility-maximizing, and self-interested governing entity. In doing so, both are heavily indebted to the study of economics, and NLI is sometimes referred to as rational-choice institutionalism as a result.

NLI and neorealism differ, however, over whether the fear of relative gains is a primary inhibitor in international cooperation. NLI argues that states can be motivated to cooperate in order to achieve absolute gains (or the totality of gains achieved by an actor regardless of the relative gains of others) if their fears of being cheated by one another can be mitigated. This is where institutions play a key role in NLI analysis. NLI scholars argue that institutions mitigate the effects of anarchy, thereby making the realization of absolute gains, and hence the possibility of international cooperation, more likely. Institutions do so because they reflect mutually accepted rules and regulations that are created by the institutional actors themselves. Because actors have a say in what is allowed, and disapproved of, there is an
assumption that actors will not agree to terms that they cannot meet, thus making institutional agreements fairly straightforward and easy to uphold. Institutions also foster transparency and information sharing. They provide actors with access to data about other institutional partners to which the former would not normally be privy. The more information that actors possess the better, as this diminishes feelings of anxiety, apprehension, and distrust. And, because the rules of the game are well specified in institutional arrangements, actors are well aware of the institutional expectations that exist. The more information actors have, the better they feel about taking part in an international agreement that makes them dependent on other actors and, arguably, more vulnerable.

NLI also stresses the importance of long-term gains. NLI scholars note that institutions provide a forum for repeated interaction, and they argue that actors engaged in repeated, continuous interactions are less likely to defect from cooperative arrangements. In making this argument, NLI borrows from game theory and the multiple game scenarios (prisoners’ dilemma, chicken, tit-for-tat) that materialize when actors seek to engage in bilateral and multilateral agreements. These can be distinguished from one-shot-only interactions, which, NLI argues, is the assumption of neorealist analysis. Alternatively, NLI argues that once actors submit to an institutional agreement, they become locked in. Actor interaction becomes more frequent and common.

Institutions are thus viewed as mechanisms that can create long-term and long-lasting benefits for states in areas related to security, human rights, health, and the international political economy. NLI views iterated interaction as a positive spill-over effect of institutional agreements. The more actors interact, the more they come to trust one another and learn the preferences that others possess. Iterated interaction, therefore, catalyzes cooperation among divergent actors. Actors are less likely to engage in hostile interaction because they “know” one another. More important, institutional arrangements lead actors to depend on one another. This dependence lessens the desire among actors to defect or cheat because they too can be hurt—economically and politically—by this misbehavior. Consequently, defectors are left vulnerable because they can no longer depend on the actions of others to fill the institutional needs that had been previously met.

Finally, NLI argues that institutions diminish the ability of actors to free ride. Free riding occurs when one actor benefits from the actions of other actors without paying the price or anteing up. Institutions not only spell out requirements that actors are expected to abide by and uphold but also delineate punishments for failing to comply with one’s institutional mandate. This reduces the ability, or desire, of other actors to cheat or free ride in turn because there are known consequences for noncompliance, like sanctions or institutional shunning. Although it can be difficult to enforce institutional punishments, the mere fact that such mechanisms exist can dissuade some potential institutional dissenters.

For NLI scholars, institutional agreements do not impede state sovereignty because states still retain final authority over foreign and domestic policy decisions. Instead, NLI notes that institutions reduce the autonomy of states to act unilaterally, which means that states are forced to consider the needs and interests of other actors if they wish to obtain their own interests in turn. This creates a more pacifistic and harmonious international environment because states will not make irrational decisions based solely on their own desires and wants. Instead, they learn to compromise and take into account other actors while at the same time obtaining their own long-term interests.

Although institutions can mitigate the effects of anarchy in these ways, NLI acknowledges that IR prior to the 20th century conformed to neorealist expectations. Two historical developments created a window of opportunity for the spread of formal and informal institutions in the 20th century. The first was the development of complex interdependence. Thanks to modern technological and industrial advances, nation-states have become more entwined at almost every level and issue area. This has produced multiple channels of interaction between state and nonstate actors, and this allows actors to more easily identify their common interests, overcome barriers to collective action, and reach cooperative agreements to obtain common interests. It has also encouraged nonmilitary problem solving in areas such as environmental degradation, health crises, and human rights abuses.

The second historical development that encouraged the spread of international institutions was
Neoliberalism

that of the United States playing the role of a hegemon after World War II. Borrowing again from the study of international economics, NLI scholars argue that the support of a very powerful state is usually necessary for nation-states to have confidence in and engage with free trade. The United States created and promoted a variety of multilateral institutions, thereby producing a period of hegemonic stability in the latter half of the 20th century. While this promotion was driven by self-interest, it served as the necessary foundation for the subsequent growth of international institutions and regimes and the cooperative benefits they provide.

It is important to acknowledge that NLI does not posit that institutions always matter. This is because institutions are not infallible. Institutions can aid in achieving but do not guarantee collective gains. NLI scholars are cognizant of the fact that institutions can break down or fail to achieve a desired collective action outcome; therefore, how institutions are designed—or the rational design of institutions—is an important focus and research agenda within NLI. Another emerging branch of NLI, known as principal–agent theory, examines how nation-states delegate tasks and authority to international institutions and whether this achieves the desired objectives.

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See also Cooperation; Game Theory; Interdependence; International Organizations; International Regimes; International Relations, Theory; Liberalism in International Relations; Rational Choice; Realism in International Relations; World Trade Organization (WTO)

Further Readings


Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism, as the prefix neo suggests, is an old concept that reemerged as a policy response to the crisis of Keynesianism and was made popular by the political ascendancy of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While neoliberalism has become a central concept in the social sciences describing the structural changes in the global economy since the 1970s, the concept is much contested. At the most fundamental level, neoliberalism builds on the classical liberal notion implying the triumph of market forces and individual autonomy over state power. But there is a considerable normative divergence between advocates of neoliberal ideas, who celebrate the ascendancy of the market, and those who suggest that the policies of neoliberalism are associated with global inequality, economic disparity, growth of unemployment, social exclusion, environmental destruction, and cultural homogeneity. Optimists stipulate that unfettered market forces will result in global prosperity, freedom, democracy, and peace. For pessimists, neoliberalism has become an ideological construct associated with radical market fundamentalism based on the universal imperatives of competitive deregulation, liberalization, and privatization. This latter interpretation is often used synonymously with the concept of an exploitative form of neoliberal economic globalization.

Defining neoliberalism is all the more difficult because the concept as it emerged first in the 1930s differs fundamentally from the form in which it reemerged in the 1970s. In fact, Andreas Renner, of the Walter Eucken Institute in Germany, suggests that there are two neoliberalisms. One is a
Historical Origin of Continental European Neoliberalism and Anglo-Saxon Laissez-Faire Liberalism

According to the German economist Wilhelm Röpke, the term neoliberalism was coined in Paris in 1938 at a Colloque Walter Lippmann, a symposium held to discuss Walter Lippmann’s recently released book, The Good Society. The participants at the Paris meeting chose the term neoliberalism to signal the creation of a new liberal movement against the laissez-faire liberalism of the 19th century. The historical importance of this neoliberal circle—consisting of members such as Wilhelm Röpke, Alfred Müller-Armack, Alexander Rüstow, Walter Eucken, and Franz Böhm—is that these ideas and norms became the basis for the continental social market economy of the 1950s. While not all members endorsed the term neoliberalism, it nevertheless became an umbrella designation for different trends of liberalism developed under its roof, of which the Freiburger school, also referred to as Ordoliberalism, is the most well-known group with Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm as its most renowned representatives.

The exponents of this neoliberal circle united in rejecting the economic reductionism they perceived as central to the ideas of 19th-century laissez-faire liberalism. Instead, they emphasized a normative-ethical foundation of economics, delineating an important role for governments to set the institutional parameters for economic competition in order to serve the larger interests of society. These intellectual proponents of neoliberalism combined economic efficiency with human decency to achieve a just and stable social order. As suggested by the term social market economy, which developed from the earlier neoliberal circle and is still used today to describe some of the continental European economic models, the belief in the self-regulatory capacity of the market was rejected.

In contrast to the continental European school of neoliberalism, Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire philosophers and economists—such as Jeremy Bentham, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, Edmund Burke, and, from the Austrian economic school, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August von Hayek—developed the theoretical foundation for claiming the superiority of economic freedom over public intervention. Characteristic of laissez-faire liberalism as practiced in the early 20th century was a market system based on competitive labor markets, the automatic gold standard, and free trade. Laissez-faire intellectuals postulated that unfettered economic competition was superior to any form of state guidance in coordinating human efforts. But precisely the very belief in the naturalness of the market and the self-regulating power of market forces was disputed in Karl Polanyi’s narrative of the historical transformation from a traditional socially embedded economy to a laissez-faire system during the 19th century. The introduction of a market economy necessitated deliberate state action and, contrary to the theories of laissez-faire, did not result from natural market forces.

In summary, the continental European development of neoliberalism in the 1930s was an outright challenge to the 19th-century Anglo-Saxon belief in self-regulating markets. In rejecting the laissez-faire liberalism with its emphasis on creating the largest possible space for the self-determination of individuals, the proponents of neoliberalism questioned the fundamental separation between the political spheres and economic spheres. Seen from this historical perspective, the later reemergence of neoliberalism in the 1970s has more in common with the belief system of laissez-faire liberalism of the 19th century than with the original meaning of...
neoliberalism in the 1930s. In fact, when Anthony Giddens advocates a “third way” between a laissez-faire neoliberal orientation and a top-down bureaucratic state management, he in fact comes close to the norms, ideology, and practices championed by the original intellectuals of the 1930 continental European neoliberalism.

The Reemergence of Neoliberalism in the 1970s

In contrast to the intellectuals of the 1930s who united under the umbrella of neoliberalism and identified themselves as part of a new neoliberal movement, the reemergence of neoliberalism in the latter part of the 20th century lacks any group affiliation or identity with a larger neoliberal movement. Intellectuals most closely identified with the new norms of market fundamentalism are Friedrich August von Hayek and his student Milton Friedman. However, Hayek’s teachings are much closer to the laissez-faire ideas of his teacher and mentor, Ludwig von Mises, than to the original meaning of neoliberalism and later the ordoliberalism of the Freiburg school in Germany. It is thus not surprising that Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman do not use the term neoliberalism in their writings, preferring instead the concept of laissez-faire liberalism.

Today the term neoliberalism is used to describe global economic processes of governance systems that fundamentally reconfigure contemporary economic and social systems around the globe. Neoliberal economic ideas emerged as a result of the economic stagflation of the 1970s. This in turn led to a rejection of the postwar consensus of Keynesian demand management. Most prominently, Margaret Thatcher and subsequently Ronald Reagan popularized a radical market-oriented system based on supply side economics and rejecting state intervention in the economy. The closest approximation today of a neoliberal socioeconomic model in the real world is the United States.

Twenty-five years later, there is still no shared consensus on the meanings of neoliberalism and neoliberal globalization. At the most fundamental level, these terms convey a rebalancing of state and market, tilting to the privatization of cross-border governance. But these processes are enormously contested. Proponents suggest that measures such as liberalization, deregulation, and privatization remove barriers to trade and financial cross-border transactions and thereby unleash the productive forces of capitalism. In this context, liberalization is to allow the unfettered cross-border movements of capital, labor, services, and goods, while deregulation is geared to remove unwanted government control that interferes with market processes, and privatization transfers previously publicly provided services to the private sector. Critics of neoliberal discourse and practice, on the other hand, argue that the rise and power of global finance and mobile capital as the dominant force in this governance framework have a negative impact on state-societal relations. The diminished capacity of the state to sustain public policies has increased the progressive detachment of individuals from social networks. Since public authorities are faced with dwindling resources to fulfill their traditional mandates, welfare is increasingly provided through market mechanisms. The result is an increase in the individualization of risks.

One of the most contentious intellectual debates concerns the role of the state in neoliberalism. Earlier proponents of neoliberalism envisaged the retreat of the state since they assumed that the market was the most efficient allocator of resources. However, scholars from the Left pointed out that the state was a central actor in creating the emerging transnational governance system. In the process of acting as a supposed midwife to a new neoliberal order, the state also changed from a distributive to a more internationally competitive actor. Other key players who are identified with the norms and practices of market fundamentalism are the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. These organizations were maligned for imposing the Washington Consensus in developing countries facing liquidity problems. The policy doctrine of structural adjustment involves macroeconomic stabilization through fiscal austerity programs, trade liberalization, and removing barriers to capital movements. More than any other policy, the Structural Adjustment Programs of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank came to represent all that is wrong with neoliberal market fundamentalism. Critics from developing countries point to the damaging effects of neoliberal transformation, including the depletion
and destruction of the local ecological and biological systems that sustain life and nature. Studies have pointed out that many poor and low-skilled women in developing countries have borne the brunt of the negative effects of neoliberal global transformation.

Stephen Gill has gone the farthest to theorize the neoliberal transformation with its commitment to liberal governmental and market reforms as a shift from embedded liberalism to disciplinary neoliberalism. The change toward disciplinary neoliberalism points to the disciplinary social mechanism used to lock in the market-based commitments to prevent future governments from undoing the reforms. The result is a new constitutionalism as a means to consolidate the market-based governance framework. Whether the 2008 financial and economic crisis, the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s, spells the demise of the neoliberal norms, ideas, and practices dominant since the 1970s is an open question. It is true that even erstwhile proponents of neoliberal private governance have voted to “bring the state back in” in order to stabilize the global financial and banking systems. But whether this signals a shift from neoliberalism to postneoliberalism cannot be determined at this time.

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See also Globalization; Liberalism; Liberty; Political Philosophy

Further Readings


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**Neo-Patrimonialism**

The term *neo-patrimonialism* refers to a hybrid mode of rule in which informal political ties and exchanges suffuse the management of a state. In a neo-patrimonial regime, the political chief executive and his agents exercise authority mainly through personal whim and material incentive rather than through ideology or the rule of law. Within the state, the distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred, and officials occupy bureaucratic posts less to deliver public goods and services than to acquire personal wealth and status. While elements of such self-serving practice can be found under various political regimes, neo-patrimonial rule is a defining characteristic of personal autocracies in the world’s most underdeveloped states.

As with other building blocks of social science, the concept’s origins lie in the ideas of great German sociologist Max Weber. In his opus *Economy and Society*, Weber sought to understand how political leaders justify the exercise of political power. He proposed a threefold classification of types of authority (*Herrschaft*) based on the sources of a leader’s claim to political legitimacy: tradition, charisma, or legality. Implicit in the Weberian schema is the recognition that these types of authority are ideal constructs whose essential features are abstracted from empirical observation but unlikely to exist in pure forms in the real world. From the outset, therefore, Weber entertained the likelihood that, in practice, actual political systems would operate according to mixed, or hybrid, principles. While Weber never spoke of neo-patrimonialism—the concept is a late-20th-century one developed by Shmuel Eisenstadt in 1973, Jean-François Médard in 1982, and Christopher Clapham in 1985)—he did anticipate an acute form of bureaucratized patrimonial rule.

In short, neo-patrimonialism is an amalgam. It mixes traditional (specifically, patrimonial) and legal (or bureaucratic) authority. The first component—patrimonial authority—is based on a ruler’s claim to exercise intimate personal control over members of society, much as a father does over a household. As a form of traditional authority, patrimonial rule is justified in terms of inherited customs that have
been sanctified since time immemorial. To the extent that patrimonial authority is vested in older males, it is also associated with gerontocracy and patriarchal command over women and children. The second component is legal authority, a form of governance based on written constitutional rules and the routines of bureaucratic organization. To Weber, this rational (i.e., knowledge driven) form of authority was quintessentially modern. Insofar as citizens owe obedience, they do so not to individual leaders but to professional office holders in a rule-governed political order. Administration is impersonal, and power is constrained by the rule of law.

Patrimonial and legal-rational forms of authority are commonly juxtaposed in postcolonial situations. On the one hand, agrarian societies—especially in sub-Saharan Africa but also in parts of Asia and Latin America—are governed by informal customary norms exercised by traditional chieftains or feudal landlords. On the other hand, newly independent countries possess the formal apparatus of statehood, even if the empirical coverage of the state’s legal and bureaucratic rules constitutes little more than a thin veneer. One origin of such dualistic polities, as noted by Mahmood Mamdani, can be found in the colonial policy of indirect rule as practiced in South Asia and West Africa, in which imperial overlords whose resources were strained devolved local responsibilities to extant traditional authorities. In short, neo-patrimonial rule was born in the political encounter between industrial empires and agrarian societies and is manifest today in the uneasy coexistence of formal-legal and patrimonial modes of rule.

Patrimony and bureaucracy are both based on a principle of hierarchy but, when they coexist, the ultimate source of legitimacy becomes blurred and contested. Is the state the personal property of the ruler or is it an impersonal instrument of constitutional rule? Are citizens required to obey the supreme leader because they owe him political loyalty or because they are required to defer to a rule of law?

The resolution of such tensions gives rise to neo-patrimonial rule. The educated generation of nationalist leaders that rose to power in the mid-20th century with the dissolution of the European empires adapted to their surroundings. Unable or unwilling to satisfy mass demands for rapidly ending poverty, these leaders instead devised forms of rule that aimed mainly at consolidating a hold on office. On the one hand, as pointed out by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg (1982), leaders claimed legal authority by virtue of the sovereign status of their countries under international law, and they greatly expanded the scope of state responsibilities by embarking on ambitious national development plans and increasing the size of the public bureaucracy. On the other hand, they treated the state as if it were a private preserve: They appropriated public resources for personal gain, to build political followings, and to establish “official” political parties. Some leaders even invested in a cult of personality, emphasizing themes such as “father of the nation.” Characteristically, all neo-patrimonial leaders awarded loyal followers with special favors, both within the state (public sector jobs) and across society (licenses, contracts, and projects). In return for material benefits, clients mobilized political support and referred all decisions upward as a mark of deference to patrons.

This new (neo) form of rule differed from classic patrimonialism in that its venue and instrument was a modern state. But the process of constructing neo-patrimonial rule also distorted beyond recognition the classic features of Weberian bureaucracy. The top leader and his subordinate barons seldom make important decisions on the basis of written rules or objective knowledge, preferring instead to maximize their own subjective discretion. They routinely violate Weber’s rule that officials should be separated from the ownership of the means of administration, instead turning public means to personal ends. Political loyalty more than technical qualification becomes the criterion for appointing office holders. And these appointees are compensated not only with fixed salaries but also with opportunities to secure illicit rents. Most important, the bureaucratic principle of equality of treatment for clients is narrowed and targeted to political favorites, often defined along lines of ethnic or other communal solidarities.

Indeed, the formal architecture of the state is thoroughly penetrated and often superseded by informal networks of power and privilege. The supremo appoints loyal cronies to strategic positions in key institutions and outlying regions, conceding to them the authority to deploy resources from their own fiefdoms. As long as these barons
contribute to the incumbent’s goal of retaining political power, they are assured of impunity from charges of corruption. A pyramid of such local networks stretches down from the center to the locality through formal structures such as ruling parties and local governments and through informal links to traditional authorities and even youth militias. As Diana Cammack (2007) notes, to the extent that political loyalty is rewarded with material benefit, neo-patrimonial networks operate according to an informal logic that is resistant to well-meaning efforts at legal reform promoted by international donors, opposition parties, or civic organizations.

This is not to say that neo-patrimonial rulers never employ the formal powers of public law when it suits them to do so. Often lacking the capacity to govern all corners of their territories, such leaders insist vociferously on the international legal principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. They tend to retain restrictive colonial-era constitutions when these documents allow the concentration of powers in the hands of a political chief executive and offer instruments for suppressing political opposition. At the same time, bowing to the waves of democratization that have swept the non-Western world in recent decades, neo-patrimonial leaders seek to wrap themselves in the legitimating mantle of democracy. Even autocrats now subject themselves to election on regular cycles mandated in national constitutions. To be sure, they often use the powers of incumbency to manipulate such elections—through gerrymandering, intimidation, vote buying, or ballot stuffing—but they nonetheless recognize that, in a modern world, political legitimacy inexorably rests on seeming to abide by constitutional and electoral laws. In sum, neo-patrimonial rulers employ universal rules in defense of particular privilege.

This unorthodox fusion of governance strategies is found in differing degrees in various types of contemporary political regimes. Neo-patrimonialism is largely absent in liberal democracies but can serve as a governing strategy in electoral democracies; it is the core modus operandi in electoral autocracies, and it resembles original forms of patrimonialism in traditional monarchies and unreformed autocracies. Neo-patrimonial exchanges can be found in both civilian and military regimes, especially in one-party systems with a dominant leader who prefers adulatory plebiscites to genuinely competitive elections. The model reached its zenith in the personalistic administrations of strongman presidents like Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), 1965–1997; Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, 1965–1986; and Anastasio Somoza Debayle of Nicaragua, 1967–1979. Contemporary examples include the electoral authoritarian regimes of Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela who, by 2011, had enjoyed an unbroken hold on power since 1980 and 1998, respectively.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Bureaucracy; Clientelism; Governance, Informal; Personalization of Politics; State

Further Readings

The term neo-Weberian has a variety of applications in the literature of political science, sociology, and organization theory as well as in public and business administration. In most cases, it is based on variants of the Weberian model and employs the methods of analysis used by the German sociologist
and economist Max Weber. The term neo-Weberian usually refers to the application of Weberian principles to a modern state or organization. The label neo-Weberian state (NWS) was introduced by Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert in 2004 in the second edition of their groundbreaking book, *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis*. NWS refers to traditional (Weberian) administrative systems that are in the process of modernization but retain distinctive public service qualities.

NWS was originally intended as a descriptive concept based on the empirical evidence of public management reforms. It was an attempt at finding common denominators in Continental European developments while acknowledging numerous variations within the region. Turning to a more explanatory mode, NWS could be interpreted as a political response to globalization and political de-alignment in the rich, strong liberal-democratic regimes of Western Europe. Thus, according to Pollitt, the pursuit of an NWS-like solution could be seen as an attempt to protect the “European social model” from the depredations of global markets and neoliberal ideology. Also, NWS appears to receive the attention of the European Commission. Having been originally set up according to the French model, it began to reform in the 1990s, aiming to make itself more externally oriented and consultative, more professional and more efficient, and yet at the same time refusing to abandon key Weberian principles.

NWS challenges the Anglo-American new public management (NPM) model, which aims to import business and market principles and management techniques from the private into the public sector and is based on a neoliberal understanding of the state. NPM, an initiative launched during the 1980s, envisaged an entrepreneurial, market-oriented society, with a tiny government on top, and is characterized by marketization and competition, including large-scale privatization and contracting out, contractual appointments, “client-orientedness,” and performance-related management tools. The American equivalent of these reforms was the National Partnership for Reinventing Government, a task force formed during the Clinton administration.

NWS was developed in a context of concerns about NPM shortcomings and other managerial reforms; it is, therefore, a post-NPM concept. Meanwhile, NWS co-opts the positive characteristics of NPM on a Weberian foundation (rather than adding Weberian elements to NPM). Table 1 sums up the NWS model by incorporating the “neo” elements (NPM influence) and the characteristics of traditional public administration (“Weberian” foundation).

The purpose of NWS is not simply to criticize NPM but to present a coherent and up-to-date alternative, which appears to be the answer of continental European governments to the NPM paradigm. According to Pollitt, the ideas of political power and modernization are the two main dimensions of the original NWS concept. On the one hand, compared with Anglo-American governments, the continental Europeans hold a more optimistic attitude regarding the future role of the state. Thus, their objective is not the minimal state but a state that retains a strong steering and regulatory presence in society. The state is not seen as a burden on the economy and society or as a necessary evil. Rather, it is the guarantor and partner of both a strong economy and a socially cohesive society. It initiates or facilitates a range of democratic mechanisms, both representative and direct. Continental European governments continue to regard the state as the irreplaceable integrative force in society, with a legal personality and operational value system that cannot be reduced to the private sector discourse of efficiency, competitiveness, and client satisfaction.

On the other hand, the state is steadily modernizing, professionalizing, and improving its efficiency. Such changes typically include results-based budget reforms, more flexible personnel policies (which, however, do not amount to abandoning a distinctive career public service), extensive decentralization and devolution of authority from central ministries and agencies, a greater emphasis on strategic planning, selective and gradual privatization, and a strengthened commitment to improving the quality of public service provision. Yet it is far from an assumption that copying the private sector is the only way for governments to improve their efficiency, performance, and professionalism. Private sector methods may be adopted on some occasions, in certain types of organizations, and for specific policies, but they have no automatic priority or superiority. Consequently, NWS has led to some changes, whose effect, however, is often dampened by existing structures and traditions and which are
more concerned with democratization and modernization than with entrepreneurial government or blindly copying private sector practices.

Although the NWS was originally intended as an empirical–analytical model and not as a normative one, in recent years the concept has also assumed a strong normative meaning, in particular, for new democracies (which, incidentally, were not the focus of Pollitt and Bouckaert’s original analysis). It has often been proposed that the key for administrative development in new democracies is first to make sure that the Weberian foundation of the NWS model is present and only then to start gradually introducing the “neo” elements (modern management tools). Guy Peters argues that despite the appeal of the NPM ideas of deregulation and flexibility, governments attempting, at the same time, to build democracy and effective administration must place a much greater emphasis on formal requirements, rules, and strong ethical standards. The values of efficiency and effectiveness are important, but in the short run they should take second place to fostering fairness and responsibility. The NWS paradigm also includes a reaffirmation of the role of administrative law. In addition to preserving the basic principles pertaining to the citizen–state relationship—the law should be an anchor of predictability, reliability, and legitimacy in the chaotic political and administrative environment of new democracies. Of particular relevance for new democracies are the NWS’s (Weberian) elements that promote the unity of public administration and common public service culture, such as the preservation (or first of all, the creation) of a public service with a distinct status, culture, and terms and conditions important, but in the short run they should take second place to fostering fairness and responsibility. The NWS paradigm also includes a reaffirmation of the role of administrative law. In addition to preserving the basic principles pertaining to the citizen–state relationship—the law should be an anchor of predictability, reliability, and legitimacy in the chaotic political and administrative environment of new democracies. Of particular relevance for new democracies are the NWS’s (Weberian) elements that promote the unity of public administration and common public service culture, such as the preservation (or first of all, the creation) of a public service with a distinct status, culture, and terms and conditions.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neo-Weberian State</th>
<th>Weberian</th>
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<tr>
<td>Shift from an internal orientation toward bureaucratic rules to an external orientation toward meeting citizens’ needs and wishes; the primary route to achieving this is not the employment of market mechanisms (although they may occasionally come in handy) but the creation of a professional culture of quality and service</td>
<td>[but:] Reaffirmation of the role of the state as the main facilitator of solutions to the new problems of globalization, technological change, shifting demographics, and environmental threat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supplementation (not replacement) of the role of representative democracy by a range of devices for consultation with, and direct representation of, citizens’ views</td>
<td>[but:] Reaffirmation of the role of representative democracy (central, regional, and local) as the legitimating element within the state apparatus</td>
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<tr>
<td>In the management of resources within government, a modernization of the relevant laws to encourage a greater orientation on the achievements of results rather than merely the correct following of procedure; this is expressed partly in a shift from ex ante to ex post controls but not a complete abandonment of the former</td>
<td>[but:] Reaffirmation of administrative law—suitably modernized—in preserving the basic principles pertaining to the citizen–state relationship, including equality before the law, legal security, and the availability of specialized legal scrutiny of state actions</td>
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<tr>
<td>A professionalization of the public service, so that the bureaucrat becomes not simply an expert in the law relevant to his or her sphere of activity but also a professional manager, oriented to meeting the needs of his or her citizen/users</td>
<td>[but:] Preservation of the idea of a public service with a distinct status, culture, and terms and conditions</td>
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*Source: Adapted from Pollitt & Bouckaert (2004, pp. 99–100).*
Weberian foundation. This makes NWS a sound basis for reform strategies in these countries. The NWS model presents interesting opportunities for both policy makers and researchers. For example, Lawrence Lynn has developed the NWS model further from a theoretical point of view by proposing NWS as either an independent variable or a dependent variable. While the NWS implies a positive synthesis of the new and the traditional, neo-Weberian administration has also been viewed critically by Lynn as a threat to liberal democracy, by which organizations could be subverted by informal and illegitimate patterns of authority and decision making, thus reducing their legitimacy. This is why some less democratic countries could also support the idea of a strong modernizing state that underlies the NWS model. Therefore, it could be argued that, normatively speaking, the implementation of NWS also presupposes, in addition to the Weberian bureaucracy, a viable liberal democracy.

The economic crisis has radically altered the context in which public administration operates: The state is again playing a part in the economy. The crisis thus casts public institutions as enablers of (rather than barriers to) growth and innovation. Peter Evans and James Rauch have demonstrated that there is a connection between Weberianism and sustained economic growth. Wolfgang Drechsler has developed the NWS model further by linking it to innovation, economic growth, and information technology. Effective public administration is seen as a sine qua non condition for economic growth and innovation, as innovation-based society draws on and requires a highly competent, long-term–oriented, and dedicated civil service to implement it—features aimed for by the NWS model. In addition, recent research has shown that information and communication technology (ICT), especially e-governance, which was long associated with NPM because of its parallel occurrence, is actually just as conducive (if not even more so) to the NWS and in turn is promoted by it as well. And beyond crisis and ICT, whatever the future leading technologies will be—nanotech, biotech, convergence, or something completely different—their setup will require a particularly capable state actor and a science and technology policy implemented by a civil service that is characterized by long-term thinking as well as by tolerance of mistakes—characteristics that are not enabled by NPM. In other words, the period in history that we are now entering is bound to be more state friendly than the 1990s, and NWS seems to be one of the most interesting theoretical and normative answers to the question of how a complex innovation-based society should be governed.

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See also New Public Management; Weber, Max

Further Readings

**Network Analysis**

Network analysis systematically quantifies and visualizes relationships between actors, such as knowledge transfer or resource flow. The underlying formal concepts of graph theory make network analysis both a theoretical approach and a toolkit of formal approaches. Social network analysis is an emerging field that combines contributions from different disciplines, such as sociology, anthropology, mathematics, statistics, and, recently, physics and biology. The research approach has recently...
inspired several books, such as Duncan Watts’s *Six Degrees of Separation*, Albert-László Barabási’s *Linked*, and Nikolas Christakis and James Fowler’s *Connected*. This entry first briefly describes the goals and historical developments of network analysis. Then, the research questions, research design strategies, data collection procedures, and basic formal data analysis mechanisms are discussed. The entry concludes with a look at recent and future developments of network analysis.

**Definition of Networks**

Networks are social relational systems characterized by a set of actors and their social ties. They consist of a finite set of identifiable nodes; the relationships among these nodes (actors) are represented as ties (edges). Ties are dichotomous: present or absent, or unordered (undirected) or ordered (directed ties). The nodes represent a single entity that potentially may take part in the relationships under study. A network analysis takes the characteristics of nodes and the characteristics of the relations connecting the nodes into account. Attributes—additional information about the actors—are characteristics, such as the behavior, attitudes, or other properties of actors. Networks are represented as a (social) graph, which is defined by a set of nodes together with the set of pairwise relationships among them. Networks present an opportunity and constraint structure: on the one hand offering access to resources flowing through the ties and, on the other hand, restricting choices and controlling behavior.

**Definition and Goals of Network Analysis**

Network analysis is an interdisciplinary field of research with a history in sociology and anthropology. It provides the formal mechanisms for representation, measurement, and modeling of relational structure and is based on the assumption that actions and decisions of actors are dependent on the context and the actions of other actors. The social structure is an area of (inter)action in which emergent patterns of behavior can be observed, and structural variables help analyze the resulting interactions. Generally, a network consists of actors (nodes) that are connected with each other through ties (edges). The actors can represent people, organizations, countries, or other entities. The relations and ties are conduits for the flow of resources in the form of knowledge, finances, collaboration, and so on. The units of analysis are, therefore, the interactions between the actors.

In a network analytical approach different types of data can be distinguished:

- attributes, which are descriptors of the individual actors in the network, such as age, sex, profession, or political affiliation;
- relational data that are derived from the interactions of at least two actors, such as Country A imports Product x from Country B; and
- structural characteristics of the overall network that can be derived from the relational characteristics of all studied actors, such as density or centralization.

The main goal of network analysis is to understand the emergence of the network structure and its consequences by description, visualization, and statistical modeling. In more formal terms, network analysts analyze which independent variables have led to the observed structure and how the social structure influences other emerging social processes. In this form of “structural analysis,” the relationships among actors become the first priority, and individuals’ properties are secondary in the study of the flow of structural regularities that might influence actors’ choices and their resulting behavior. The result is an approximation to the structure of a more complex system for purposes of studying a particular property (such as the diffusion of a disease in a community). Ultimately, complex situations can be represented using multiple relationships (multiplexity), such as group membership, friendship, hate relationships within the group, hierarchy and reporting structure among the group, and the strengths and frequencies of interactions. There are different ways of looking at the social structure. The researcher can either look at the outcomes of the existing network structure, at the emergent behavioral patterns, or the characteristics of the overall structure.

**Brief History of Network Analysis**

The first accounts of network analysis can be traced back to the 1930s when Jacob Moreno
used sociograms as a form of analysis to visualize the complex structure of social interactions. Sociograms are a method of mapping or graphically representing individuals’ perceptions of a complex social structure. Matrix algebra and graph theory were used in the 1940s and 1950s as a mechanism of formalizing social structure. Alex Bavelas added new insights into the functioning of small groups by conducting experiments on communication networks. The experiments were used to understand the speed and accuracy of centralized and decentralized structures to find the shortest path a message can take through different forms of social structures. Stanley Milgram added his “Six degrees of separation” research and Harrison White looked at structural equivalence as a form of similar incoming and outgoing ties to form a new and reduced network in the 1970s. Mark Granovetter then developed his strength-of-weak-ties theory; he showed that strong contacts tend to have very similar information, whereas weak contacts could be the source of innovative information. Based on this theory, Ron Burt developed his notion of structural holes in the 1980s and 1990s and applied it to the benefits of bridging and bonding ties.

**Basic Assumptions of Network Analysis**

The basic underlying assumption of a network analytical approach is based on the notion that different types of ties serve as conduits for flow of resources through the network. Ties are either absent or present. In most network research, an absent tie needs to be interpreted as this implies that resources are not flowing through the nonexistent tie. Moreover, ties can either be directed or undirected: Directed ties hint at asymmetric relationships between actors, with resources only flowing in one direction. Undirected ties are symmetric and represent either a confirmed relationship or a relationship in which both actors have to be present.

The common assumption of independent observations does not hold in networks. Multiple ties to and from actors are related, and so it cannot be assumed that the tie between A and B is independent of C. In addition, the assumption of continuous, normally distributed variables does not hold when tie variables are binary, nominal, ordinal, or count variables. Moreover, two observations are usually available for each pair of actors (dyads) and are assumed to be correlated actor-wise.

There are two different forms of research questions. First, a network analytic approach can aim to use independent variables to explain the emergence of the social structure. Second, the social structure itself can also be used as an explanatory variable to understand specific outcomes, such as voting behavior. Generally, two research design strategies can be distinguished: The researcher needs to decide whether to use ego-centered personal networks or complete (whole) networks. In an ego-centered network approach, network data are usually collected from a sample of actors (egos) reporting on the ties with and between other people (alters). Here, it is important to obtain as complete a picture of the respondents’ networks as possible. Name generators are used to collect ego-centered data by providing a clear definition of which persons known by ego qualify as a network member (or alter) of ego. The relational system is then assumed to be composed of the sampled egos and reported alters and their ties as well as possible additional actor and tie information. In a second phase, the alters will be asked about their relationships among each other and with ego. A complete or whole network approach includes a well-defined group of actors who report on their ties with all other actors in this preset group. A high response rate of actors is needed to get a close-to-complete picture of the interactions. It can be assumed that the ties reported by actors are not usually independent.

After defining the research question and framing the goal and empirical context of the network analysis, the next step is to define who should be included in the final network and from whom network data will be solicited. Simply said, this decision will set the limits on the social relations to be collected. While there are different schools of thoughts on this topic, two approaches seem to be dominant: realist and nominalist philosophies of boundary specifications highlighted by David Knoke. The realist approach assumes that the subjects identified by the researchers know best who should be nominated as part of the network. In comparison, a nominalist approach assumes an upfront theoretical or practical limit to the boundaries of a network. The researcher has either developed a set of theoretical hypotheses that define
clearly who is in and who is outside the network boundaries, or it is not practical or doable to collect network data from the whole universe. An example of a nominalist approach is to use defined roles in organizational hierarchical settings, such as all CEOs of Fortune 500 companies. Both strategies have advantages and disadvantages: Clearly, a too extensive inclusion will impose a burden on the data collection process, and a forced exclusiveness might omit important actors and therefore bias the results.

In addition, researchers distinguish between positional and relational boundary specification strategies that are closely linked to the previous decisions. A positional approach defines the network membership based on the formal position an actor assumes in a given social circle, such as the formal affiliation as a team member of a specific department. The relational approach—which is sometimes also called a snowball sampling approach—emerges similar to the realist approach based on nominations by already included subjects: Additional subjects are recovered by the current subject, and their relationships to the emerging network actors are taken into account. Moreover, a researcher might decide to look at participation of specific actors in an incident to answer a research question such as “Which organizations participated in the Iran election protests?” This event-based strategy is different from formal affiliations and memberships and can help identify relevant groups and subjects.

In a network analytical approach, four different data collection strategies are distinguished:

1. collection of the formal structure of the network,
2. collection of data on the content of the ties,
3. collection of data on the frequency or intensity of interactions, and
4. data collected that focus on the perceived connection.

Complete or whole networks are also called total personal networks. In this approach, the network boundaries are well defined, and it is assumed that all listed network actors either know each other or have at least heard of each other (e.g., all members of one department). This macrolevel of analysis has the goal of using every type of relationship in a given network and of representing the network in its entirety. The special focus in whole networks is, therefore, mainly on the identification of specific roles and positions or on the similarities of these roles played by different actors.

There are several different ways in which network data of a whole network can be solicited:

- unrestricted choices (where the subjects are asked to list everyone they know in the network),
- ranking with respect to attractiveness (the subjects rank the most important contacts),
- paired comparison (a range of choices have to be compared),
- free recall rosters (where no names are provided, and the subjects have to nominate the actors they remember),
- fixed number of nominations (“name the five most important actors in this network”), and
- name roster with full network (where all actors are provided, and the subject can choose among the full list).

Data Collection of Egocentric Networks

Egocentric networks describe the relationship a focal subject (ego) has to third parties (alters). Egocentered networks of social relations around a particular individual are also called partial networks and focus on specific types of relationships. These relationships can be multiplex, where there are multiple overlapping relationships that can be used to describe the quality of the relationships. The standard approach to collecting egocentric network data focuses on the question of whom the focal person is connected to and results in a list of dyadic interactions. In addition, attribute data on each of the alters can be collected, and the ego can be asked to record his or her perceptions about the interactions among his or her alters to derive the cognitive structure of the network. Overlaps among different egocentric networks will result in larger networks than just the star formation of a single egocentric network. The goal of an egocentric network analysis is to understand the global features of the universe. Researchers have discovered the need to conceptualize specific aspects of the total network that resulted in ego-centered network research.
Data collection on egocentric networks is used to identify family structures or group compositions, such as friendship structures or problem-solving groups. The challenges of an egocentric approach are to (a) identify the appropriate egos that are representative so as to describe generalizable dimensions of the overall network and (b) delimit the number of alters at the right upper boundary without excluding too many potential alters and still receive meaningful results. Specific name generators are usually used in egocentric network analysis approaches to derive the perceived network structure but also to solicit information about the number of actors that have to be included in the analysis.

The most common method is to use name generators, where the names of the alters are elicited from the ego to understand from his or her perspective what the social structure around him or her looks like. In a second round based on the names collected with the help of a name generator instrument, a name interpreter is used, and the ego is asked to highlight details in the form of attributes about the alters (such as age and relationship type to ego). As opposed to asking who is connected to whom to explore the formal structure of networks, the content of ties can be identified by asking the following questions:

What are people talking about?
Why are they connected?
What is the nature of their relationship?

Table 1 shows the different qualities of interactions: Question 1 asks for the professional support network, Question 2 asks for the social support network, and Question 3 highlights the purely instrumental network.

Instead of asking which actors in a focal network are connected to each other, researchers might want to find out how intense these relationships are. The interaction is already established (1/0); in addition, it might be of interest what the quality of the interaction is, to understand whether an interaction constitutes a strong or weak tie. Table 2 shows an example of a questionnaire that includes the frequency of the interaction.

The result of each of the questions is usually a dichotomous matrix in which an existing or present tie is denoted by a 1 and a missing tie by a 0. The cells indicating the relationships between actors x and y can also be filled with a numerical value indicating the frequency or intensity of the relationship. In this symmetric adjacency matrix, the diagonal is not defined, indicating that actors do not have ties with themselves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 1</th>
<th>Question 2</th>
<th>Question 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We talk about problems at work</td>
<td>We talk about problems with our kids</td>
<td>We only exchange professional information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor a</th>
<th>Actor b</th>
<th>Actor c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How often do you talk to the following actors</th>
<th>At least once per day (3)</th>
<th>At least once per week (2)</th>
<th>Only once per month (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Actor b</td>
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<td>Actor c</td>
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Network Analytical Concepts

The most prominent form of network analysis is descriptive, following Linton Freeman’s approach to use analysis procedures often based on the decomposition of the adjacency matrix. An adjacency matrix is an $n \times n$ representation of the nodes in a social graph that are next to each other. Actors are compared on the basis of their tie variables and by taking their actor characteristics (attributes) into account. The relationships—and even nonexistent ties—represent nomination patterns among actors in a network. The more often a focal actor is nominated by other actors in the network, the more central the actor becomes. Centrality is an indicator of prominence, importance, reputation, or power within the overall structure and generally describes the number of times an actor is chosen by other actors. Centrality shows the level of influence specific actors have in the network when it comes to power in the network. Some examples of network research questions that can be answered using centrality measures are the following: How are political opinions adopted, and how do they diffuse through social groups? or How are diseases spreading in a classroom, school, or other social circles?

Different forms of centrality can be distinguished. Degree centrality is the sum of the number of ties a node has. It can be distinguished into in-degree centrality (the number of incoming ties) and out-degree centrality (the number of times the actor itself nominates other actors). Closeness centrality represents the total distance of a node from all other nodes. A larger value indicates a less central actor, while a smaller value indicates a more central actor. On the whole network level, this measure is called centralization and is usually used as a comparative measure. The Freeman “betweenness centrality” measures the number of times a node needs a given node to reach another node—or in other words, the number of shortest paths that pass through a given node. This form of centrality shows how strategically important an actor is to connect different parts of the overall network that might otherwise be disconnected. It might also indicate the resource dependences and interdependencies between individual actors.

The density of a network is represented by the number of links divided by the number of possible links. It is an indicator of the overall connectedness of the social graph. In a complete graph, every node is connected with every other node, and the density is 1. Smaller numbers indicate a less well-connected network. Moreover, it might be interesting for a researcher to understand whether there are distinct subgroups within the overall network that restrict access or connectedness. Components in a network represent a subset of actors, with the characteristic that there is a path between any node and any other one in this subset. The whole graph forms one component and is therefore called totally connected. Cliques are subgraphs in which any node is directly connected to any other node of the subgraph.

Sociograms

Another way to interpret the social structure is to use sociograms—a visual two-dimensional representation of the relationships between all actors in the network. A sociogram is a reduction of the complex relationships to a single dimension at one specific point in time, on a well-defined set of discrete components with strictly dyadic relationships. A sociogram represents the formal properties of the social configuration. Sociograms as a form of visual exploration of the social structure are one form of network analysis and help interpret the structure without necessarily using formal analytical methods. Figure 1 shows a sociogram, where nodes are connected to each other through ties.
Applications of Network Analysis

Networks can be useful in different analytical settings. Policy networks explain outcomes such as policy decisions and the interactions between the different parties involved in the preparation and decision-making processes. Networks can also be used to explain the spread of political opinions and how these might result in specific voting behavior. The spread of diseases and also the most central hubs in a diffusion network can be identified, and measures can be targeted directly to the central node. Network analysis has recently become a method to fight terrorism and increase national security. The capture of Saddam Hussein is, for example, attributed to a network analytical approach. Recently, network analysis has also gained some momentum in resilience research to understand how well connected communities are and how they might rebuild or restructure when central nodes are removed.

In the future, network analysis will be used more and more to predict how the future structure of a network might develop based on the past interactions of its actors and what might influence the social structure. First models have been developed but are not widely accepted at the moment. Moreover, network analysis is used for new forms of networks found in online social networking services, mobile phone networks, or other forms of online networks, such as the link connections of the World Wide Web.

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See also Elites; Networks; Policy Network

Further Readings


**NETWORKS**

Networks are about relations. Accordingly, rather than the properties and attributes held by actors, it is the ties connecting any two, three, or more individuals, organizations, or institutions that form the basic unit of analysis.

In the most general terms, the emergence of the network paradigm during recent decades can be attributed to the following:

- transformations in the reality of states, markets, and societies as perceived by competent observers (e.g., the emergence of organized society; the events of functional differentiation, decentralization, and fragmentation; and the growing interdependence and complexity of virtually all societal spheres);
- changes in conceptual and theoretical developments in the respective disciplines dealing with these systems of order (e.g., increasing attention drawn toward informal arrangements in politics, new modes of governance and public–private alliances, and a shift from hierarchical control toward horizontal coordination); and
- the development of a methodological apparatus for relational analysis as a result of a more pronounced structural approach in the social sciences (e.g., formal analysis of relational configurations, new statistical procedures, advancements in available software programs).

The boom in network research in sociology, organization theory, and political science must be understood as part of a general shift, beginning in the second half of the 20th century, away from individualist, essentialist, and atomistic explanations toward more relational, contextual, and systemic
understandings. This entry first presents the historical background of this trend in the social sciences and then discusses some of the methods used in that area of inquiry. Next, it turns to those disciplines that have embraced network approaches most often and successfully and addresses the use made of them in political science and policy analysis.

Epistemological and Historical Background

In the history of science, there has been a shift from the analysis of substance and essence toward analysis of relations and connections. More than 60 years ago, in a series of papers on epistemology and logic, two eminent political philosophers/scientists, John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, outlined three historic levels of paradigmatic organization of the social sciences. In order of chronological appearance, these advancements, presented almost as a secular trend, underwent three major transformations in perspective—self-action, interaction, and transaction. The first two of these are labeled substantialist, while the latter could today be recast in terms of relational thinking. The perspective of self-action is described as a prescientific concept regarding humans and things as possessing powers of their own that initiate or cause their actions. It was most characteristic of ancient and medieval philosophy and of the Christian doctrine of the soul. In the second version of substantialism—interaction—the relevant action takes place among the entities themselves. Yet much like billiard balls or the particles in Newtonian mechanics, these entities remain fixed and unchanged throughout such interactions. It is only in the perspective of transactionalism, fundamentally opposed to both variants of substantialism, does scientific inquiry turn to aspects and phases of action, without final attribution to elements or other independent entities and without isolation of presumably detachable relations from such independent elements.

By reinterpreting and contextualizing this early contribution, its classificatory scheme was later refurbished by Mustafa Emirbayer (1997) in a manifesto for a relational sociology. In particular, the author draws attention to the units of analysis inherent in and dominating social science models of more recent derivations. Methodological individualism, norm-based approaches, and variants of structuralism are all assigned to the paradigm of self-action. The first, in its rational-choice version, takes individual human action as the elementary unit of social life. In the game-theoretic version, pregiven entities are seen to generate self-action—that is, actors engage in games with others without their underlying interests and identities encountering substantial change. In norm-based approaches, individuals are depicted as self-propelling, self-subsistent entities pursuing internalized norms, with the latter actually forming the basic unit of analysis. Finally, structuralism does not posit individuals but self-subsistent societies, or social systems, as the exclusive sources of action. Accordingly, it is durable, coherent entities that constitute the starting point of inquiry. The second variant of substantialism—interaction—is present today in the form of conventional survey research and historical–comparative analysis. It is the so-called variable-centered approach, including methods such as multiple regression and factor analysis, that best represents this variant. Providing merely the empty settings within which causation occurs, it is not the substances or actors in question that do the acting according to this particular view but, rather, the very variable attributes themselves.

What Dewey and Bentley have called transactionalism actually represents the cornerstone for the type of relational perspective adopted and methodologically elaborated by various strands of network theory and analysis. These strands have a number of origins. The prehistory of the approach developed through a process of accumulation of knowledge over approximately 40 to 50 years. Some have detected its origins in the empirical and conceptual work of Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942), Georg Simmel (1858–1918), Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955), and Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009), while others refer to important methodological contributions in the tradition of Jacob Moreno (1889–1974). In any case, both the method and its theoretical underpinnings have emerged from the multidisciplinary efforts of a whole range of scholars in anthropology, social psychology, and sociology. Key advancements and topics addressed include structural functionalism, theories of social structure, gift giving, systems of specific and generalized forms of reciprocity, and social exchange.
networks (anthropology); Gestalt psychology, field theory, cognitive balance, and sociometry (social psychology); and tertium gaudens ("the third who benefits"), friendship and informal relations of assistance at the workplace, community research, and social exchange theory (sociology). This prehistory of today's network analysis culminated in what some have called the Harvard breakthrough, achieved by scholars such as Harrison White and his associates in the late 1960s and early 1970s. White's contribution to relational analysis is manifold both methodologically (structural equivalence, positional and role analysis, block modeling) and in terms of the imprints it has left on various disciplines, including sociology, political science, and economics.

Units of Analysis and Methodological Tools

Because network analysis is explicitly interested in the interrelatedness of social units, network data are stored in a rectangular matrix where the columns generally contain the same variables as the rows. These can be individual actors, such as directors occupying positions on different company boards, or organizations, such as government departments or private corporate actors. The dependences among them are measured using structural variables. Compared with conventional attribute-based measures, a focus on such variables opens up a different range of possibilities for, and constraints on, data analysis and model building. Leaning on specific mathematical and algebraic procedures, the methods employed provide explicit formal statements about structural phenomena that might otherwise be defined only in metaphorical terms. Metaphors, present in much of the qualitative literature, include phrases such as webs of relationships, closely knit networks of relations, social role, social position, group, clique, popularity, isolation, prestige, prominence, and so on. In social network analysis, these can be quantified and made subject to interpersonal verification. Analysis normally starts with delimiting a particular group of people or organizations according to what is called boundary specification—a procedure following either a realist (based on snowball sampling techniques or reputational analysis) or a nominalist (based on the researcher's own conceptual framework and understanding) strategy.

Indices and procedures most frequently used include measures of degree and betweenness, centrality, density, clique analysis, structural equivalence and block modeling, multidimensional scaling, hierarchical cluster analysis, and so forth. The most useful and widely diffused handbooks of network analysis are the ones by John Scott (1991), and Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust (1994). Important software programs for the storing, processing, and visualization of relational data include Ucinet, Gradap, Krackplot, Netdraw, Visone, and Pajek.

Networks in Sociology and Organization Theory

Sociology, management, and organization theory are the disciplines where network models have been employed most successfully. The fields of application and the main topics addressed by that literature comprise a whole range of different dimensions. These include, among others, the impact of urbanization on individual well-being, the world political and economic system, community elite decision making, social support, communitarian forms of collective action, group problem solving, the role of strong versus weak ties for group and intergroup cohesion, diffusion and adoption of innovations, corporate interlocking, belief systems, cognition or social perception, interfirm alliances, trust among competitors, forms of social and political exchange and power, and consensus and social influence. The volume of social network research in these fields has increased radically and exponentially in recent years, as presented in Figure 1, which shows articles indexed by Sociological Abstracts containing the words “social network” in the abstract or title.

Political scientists and network analysts interested in gaining insights from adjacent disciplines, where relational thinking is both more pronounced and longer established, are advised to consult the handbook on organizations edited by Joel Baum (2002). Comprising the contributions of some 50 influential international scholars, the volume’s tour de force through intraorganizational, organizational, and interorganizational levels represents the state-of-the-art current research in that area. Networks figure prominently in this all-encompassing treatment where relations form the principal units of analysis throughout.
Political Networks and Policy Domain Networks

These developments have been noted relatively little in mainstream political science. Even scholars working on state–society relations and in international relations somehow remained unaffected by transactionalist thinking. In other words, although they were dealing with connections between entities and actors of different societal spheres, scholars treated these spheres separately. The reciprocal influence exerted by entities on relations and, vice versa, by relations on entities, has not formed an explicit part of these research programs for quite some time. A major breakthrough then occurred with the emergence of interorganizational research and the neo-corporatist paradigm in the late 1970s. Focusing on entities such as organized interests and the state, including the attributes of these entities, and on relations, especially in the form of interest intermediation and political exchange, neo-corporatist authors tended to adopt a transactional perspective. This was most obvious in their conceptualization of two logics to which associations of both capital and labor had to adhere in the interest of organizational reproduction and survival—the logic of influence and the logic of membership.

Not by chance, the first major attempt to empirically verify the relevance of large corporate actors in state policy making occurred at a time when the neo-corporatist debate reached its height toward the mid-1980s. It was Edward O. Laumann’s and David Knoke’s seminal study on *The Organizational State* (1987) that, for the first time, exposed the power of empirical network analysis to a wider public in political science and political sociology. The authors adopted a policy domain perspective—that is, they aggregated different policies and policy events in the health (e.g., drugs regulation, Medicare and Medicaid funding) and the energy domains (e.g., nuclear waste disposal, strip-mining control) to study the configuration, power, and behavior of diverse actors within these organizational fields. These actors’ issue interests, monitoring resources, and influence reputation were treated as antecedent variables ultimately affecting positions in communication and resource exchange networks. Together, these five variables jointly affect the range of core organizations’ efforts to influence the outcomes of policy events in the two domains. What was important was that the volume combined structural with dynamic analysis and took account of actors’ beliefs, frame disputes, and reinterpretations, thus avoiding the indeterminacy present in much earlier work while at the same time anticipating parts of the research program of the advocacy coalition framework. The database used for these studies was impressive. After boundary specification and a reduction of the lists of resulting organizations to an empirically manageable number, the authors ended up with a total of 333 public and private actors, which were then approached with the help of questionnaires. The number of analyzed policy events was 166. Although interview schedules and lists comprised about 80 pages (see the appendix to the Laumann and Knoke volume), the overall response rate amounted to 92.3%. Figures like this remained unmatched by other attempts of comparing policy processes across domains and countries. At the same time, this also resulted in an initial reluctance of established types of research vis-à-vis network-analytic approaches. The sheer number of ties and relations, in terms of contacts and resource exchanges generated by such a high number of actors, together with the intricacy of analyzing them in algebraic terms led many scholars to question the benefit of and value added by such a painstaking...
procedure. Overall, the study of political and policy domain networks considers state and society in their complexity and comprises the entire range of policies, politics, and the polity. Its focus is essentially on influence and domination as determinants of different types of power (coercive, authoritative, egalitarian, persuasive) and, in its most advanced form, on the role of power differentials in the predictions of future policy outcomes and courses of action (Knoke, 1990).

**Policy Network Analysis**

Compared with the analysis of political networks in the broader sense, which share quite a number of questions and of terminology with organizational sociology, there is a considerably higher number of publications in the field of policy network analysis—a field that started to boom in the early 1990s. In logical terms, the latter actually represents a subcategory of the former. It also rests on a different research tradition, namely on public policy analysis. Beginning in the early 1990s, there has been a steady increase in the number of both qualitative and quantitative publications. Compared to the absolute figures of relevant publications in organizational sociology for the year 2000 (about 440), the development of policy network analysis (about 50) appears to be relatively modest. Within the narrower field of political science, however, its expansion is impressive.

In one of the first publications opening the debate on policy networks, a research program was sketched out that soon became a growth industry for the following two decades. It was most vigorously exposed in the contribution by Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider (1991) to an edited volume on policy networks that assembled theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions. The authors argued that policy analysis and network analysis possess an important potential for cross-fertilization. Network analysis was introduced as a technical tool applicable to any form of social or political exchange. At the same time, networks were also said to represent a kind of broad societal governance structure—that is, to reflect real changes in the way policy processes unfolded in highly modern settings. New modes of governance, characterized by an increasing blurring of boundaries dividing the public and the private spheres in a number of advanced countries, have indeed emerged more or less simultaneously with the network paradigm. After 20 years, since that early observation about a simultaneous occurrence in advancements in methods and transformations in empirical reality, the question must be asked as to whether such a compound understanding of networks has really enriched the new subdiscipline. At least, it has given way to an endless debate on the actual meaning of networks in politics and on the usefulness of the concept’s application to concrete cases.

Views by most scholars today converge on the image of a semisovereign state of increasing ungovernability, of demand overload, and of the subsequent emergence of public–private alliances and networks in agenda setting, decision making, and the implementation of policies. For most of the 1990s, nonetheless, a large fraction of the literature became entangled in attempts at categorizing existing approaches, mostly according to rather subjective criteria, rather than embarking on the empirical study of specific policies. Networks were thought of by many as reflecting properties alternative to established organizations and forms of organizing social life and, hence, were held to be empowering, enfranchising, and socially desirable, thus, ultimately undermining inflexible, deadlocked, and irresponsive authority structures. One of the issues frequently addressed was the relationship between the so-called issue networks, policy communities, and policy networks—all concepts differently characterized and classified according to personal taste and proclivity. Another schism was linked to an assumed dichotomy of vertically versus horizontally structured configurations. While the governance school claimed networks to be equalizing instruments for the pursuit of efficiency enhancement in the delivery of public services, empirical analysis all too often found relational structures exhibiting power differentials and vertical forms of subordination of all sorts. Some authors treated networks as quasi-organizations, with a sort of membership statute and a corporate identity of their own, deliberately built up and, therefore, subject to network management strategies. Conversely, others maintained that networks could only be identified by an outside observer with the help of boundary specification and other empirical tools since sample members were frequently not aware of forming part of a
network altogether. Finally, another view had it that policy networks would only emerge under very specific conditions most often linked to high degrees of societal modernization, while others claimed networks to be a ubiquitous phenomenon independent of any particular political environment.

Overall, no single review article has managed to structure the field in a coherent and empirically grounded way. This unsustainable condition has now been rectified. In a 2007 study, Leifeld takes both the extensive growth rates of the literature and the conceptual disorder characterizing the field as a rationale for presenting a systematic and empirically based classification. He draws on a structured bibliography of 1,014 publications related to political networks. With a view to empirical (nonconceptual) contributions alone (746 entries), the final analysis yields the following insights: In terms of decreasing relative frequency, the areas of inquiry most often addressed are governance/public policy; Europeanization; local, urban, and rural studies; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements; international relations; electoral systems and voting; civil society; elite networks; social capital; globalization; and democracy. Regarding the policy domains studied by policy network analysts, the rank ordering is as follows: environment, health, agriculture, social policy, labor, telecommunications, economy, regional policy, domestic affairs, energy, research and technology, industry, science and education, gender issues, chemicals, migration, and transport. The bulk of empirical research focuses on Europe rather than the United States, with Germany and the United Kingdom attracting the most attention. Both of these are closely followed by studies of policy processes at the level of the European Union. Considering only strictly quantitative contributions, the author has found that the following methods and indices are the ones that are most often used (decreasing relative frequency): centrality, density, multidimensional scaling, block modeling, cluster analysis, and clique analysis. Administration, governments, and parliaments lead the list in terms of main governmental targets under scrutiny, while trade associations, trade unions, companies, NGOs, political parties, think tanks, and social movements figure most prominently in the category of private actors. The most frequently analyzed types of relations are information exchange, contact, cooperation, influence reputation, resource exchange, alliance, mutual issue interest, and conflict.

An extensive cocitation analysis of the quantitative policy-analytic literature, itself being pursued in a network-analytic fashion, reveals the existence of four clearly distinguished thematic clusters (i.e., epistemic communities or invisible colleges): first, political exchange in the organizational state; second, elite networks in North America and world systems theory; third, participation and social capital; and fourth, governance and interest intermediation. As Leifeld notes, a further and slowly emerging fifth cluster includes culture-based approaches essentially centered on the advocacy coalition framework.

**Conclusion**

Even if there should be something like a secular trend pointing toward an increasing relevance of relational research, it is far too early to speak of a comprehensive paradigm shift with respect to the growing attractiveness of network analysis. Mainstream political science, at least, continues to be concerned with heuristics, being more traditional, and prefers working within clearly delimited disciplinary boundaries that can be traced back to the perspectives of self-action and interaction. Nonetheless, the current move toward the study of new forms of governance, in conjunction with network models and approaches, may lay the foundations for a relational political science—or structural “politology”—capable of addressing the evolution of complex organizational ecologies (intraorganizational, organizational, and interorganizational) and forms of societal order (state, market, and society) at the subnational, national, European, and international levels. The theoretical and methodological bridges and connections for the emergence of such a theory, at least, are ready for use. They just need to be picked up.

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**See also** Advocacy Coalition Framework; Advocacy Networks, Transnational; Interest Groups; Lobbying; Network Analysis; Organization Theory; Policy Network
Neutrality

Neutrality refers to a fundamental foreign and security policy orientation of a state: A neutral state will not take part either directly or indirectly in any forthcoming war between third-party states. Neutrality consists of a legal core—neutrality law—and political guidance notes—neutrality policy. It contains both realistic assumptions about state survival and idealistic commitments to nonviolent means of conflict resolution. Until the rise of collective security, neutrality was seen as the only viable security policy alternative to membership in a military alliance available to small states. This entry begins with a historical overview and an introduction to neutrality law and neutrality policy. This is followed by a comparison of neutrality and collective security as well as some final reflections on the significance of neutrality in the modern era of globalization.

Historical Origin

Taken literally, neutrality means neither-nor (from the Latin ne-uter). Its origin as a foreign and security policy orientation dates back to a time when European nation states were commonly fighting each other. The concept of state sovereignty emerged in the same period. The right to wage war was constitutive of that international order. Neutrality correlated to this right: it offered the possibility of abstaining from war in an environment in which not taking sides would otherwise be viewed as opportunism or even cowardice.

Neutrality was mainly a survival strategy for especially small states, which were in permanent danger of being overrun by larger ones. Smaller states were not usually primary targets, but conquering them was a way of preventing them from either falling to one side or freely siding with the other. Thus, neutrality’s original purpose was to help states defend their interests in an international environment marked by interstate conflicts. Besides this realistic perspective, neutrality has also represented a traditionally idealistic approach to international relations; a neutral state’s claim to abstain from war was also a commitment not to add violence to existing conflicts. Even though it was originally conceived of as a survival strategy, neutrality inspired ways of thinking linked to a non-violent approach to international conflicts. One example was the concept of neo-neutrality put forth by Georg Cohn in the period between World Wars I and II. It advocated active and collective disqualification of war parties by all neutral states, including the use of sanctions. Neutrals would stay outside the war, and it was stipulated that their sanctions should not be of a military nature.

This idealistic connotation of neutrality was reinforced through the tendency of neutral states to compensate for their military absenteeism by strengthening their political engagement to diminish the suffering caused by war. This engagement could take the form of humanitarian actions or attempts to end military conflicts. It was usually not pursued out of idealism or as a peace strategy but out of a perceived need to show solidarity with the war parties and the difficulties and costs they incurred.
Neutrality Law

The legal rights and obligations of neutrality are rooted in the Hague Conventions of 1907 and in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on international humanitarian law. Neutral states are required not to participate in war either directly or indirectly. They should not support war parties with military means nor should they make their territory available to such parties, supply them with weapons or funds, or restrict private weapon exports in a one-sided way. Neutrals are also required to defend themselves autonomously against violations of their neutrality. Neutrality excludes the right to belong to a military alliance since such a membership would entail the exact opposite of neutrality: While neutrality raises the expectation that a state will not participate in a future military conflict, participation in a military alliance includes the obligation that a state will support its fellow members in a potential military conflict. Thus, according to international law, neutrality is a clearly and narrowly defined status. If a state adopts an extensive neutrality policy, this occurs out of political considerations and not out of legal obligations.

Neutrality Policy

To fulfill its function, neutrality demands acceptance by third parties. This leads to a minimum degree of credibility. Neutrality policy comprehends the measures a state takes to guarantee the efficiency and credibility of its neutrality. In contrast to neutrality law, neutrality policy is not legally regulated. Neutrality policy may be defined in line with the interests of each individual neutral state. States that qualify themselves as permanently neutral obligate themselves to conduct a foreign policy, even in peace time, that enables them to remain neutral in a potential conflict. This is based on what are called the pre-effects of neutrality.

Active neutrality refers to a policy stance that underscores that neutrality does not necessarily need to be equated with foreign policy abstention. Neutral states have often interpreted their neutrality as providing them with both an option of assuming and an obligation to assume specific tasks in international relations. Switzerland has followed a policy of so-called good offices since the end of the 19th century. Such offices attempt to bring parties in conflict closer together. They exert no political influence or pressure, striving instead to assume protective power mandates, provide conference space, or offer arbitration assistance. Other West European neutrals such as Austria, Finland, Ireland, or Sweden have a long tradition of active engagement with United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. During the Cold War, all neutral states played an important role in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Together with the nonaligned states, they formed the so-called Neutral and Nonaligned group, which strived to be a third actor between the Western and Eastern blocs.

Neutrality policies have varied considerably across time and states. Switzerland has adopted a rather comprehensive neutrality policy. It did not even join the UN until 2002 because it saw the obligations of collective security as incompatible with its neutrality obligations. The other Western European neutrals, however, had no second thoughts about being members of that worldwide organization.

The situation was different in regard to the European integration process: With the exception of Ireland, no neutral Western European state joined the European Community (EC) during the Cold War. They considered this type of political and trade cooperation as incompatible with their neutrality policy. From a legal point of view, there would have been no obstacles as the EC was not a military alliance. After the Cold War had ended, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the European Union in 1995.

Neutrality and Collective Security

The core objectives of collective security and neutrality are similar: Both want to regulate and limit the use of force in interstate relations. But they differ in regard to the means: Whereas collective security builds on active commitment and participation of all states, neutrality is based on individual abstention.

Neutrality and collective security may be seen as concurrent concepts: If there were a perfectly working system of collective security, there would be no need for neutrality. The international community would deal with any international aggression. However, as no perfect collective security system has yet emerged, neutrality may be seen as
complementary to collective security: The better collective security works, the less neutrality is needed, and vice versa. In history, this has repeatedly confronted neutral states with difficult choices.

With the emergence of the League of Nations in 1920, neutral states had to decide whether to join the newly created organization of collective security. All of them opted for participation in the League. Switzerland distinguished between its readiness to participate in the League’s economic sanctions and its reservations toward potential military sanctions, for which participation was excluded. The term *differential neutrality* was coined to cover this nuance. After the failure of the League, the country returned to its *integral neutrality*.

Today, all neutral states are members of the UN. Military interventions led or approved by the UN are not considered as traditional interstate wars but as supranational police actions in which the international community sanctions the transgression of international norms by one or several of its members. Such measures do not qualify as traditional wars and therefore neutrality law does not apply to them. However, neutrality remains relevant in the case of international interventions that are not decided by the UN. Examples of such interventions were the NATO-led intervention in Serbia/Kosovo in 1999 and the U.S. Iraq intervention in 2003.

**Neutrality and Globalization**

Neutrality reflects an attitude toward military conflicts between third-party states. It does not apply to intrastate conflicts nor to transnational forms of conflicts such as terrorism. Neutrality is not relevant to global nonmilitary perils: It provides no answer regarding problems of global health, climate change, or international financial stability. Thus, neutrality has lost much of its traditional core significance in the era of globalization. It provides no guidance regarding some of the most relevant issues in international relations.

However, neutrality still qualifies as a foreign policy role conception: In countries with a neutrality tradition, it provides political legitimacy for the respective foreign policy inside the country. It also allows third parties to have certain expectations in regard to the country’s foreign policy behavior: They may expect that a neutral state—compared with other countries—will have a stronger tendency to refrain from the use of military means in international affairs. A neutral state will also show a natural inclination to promote international conflict resolution. Owing to their track records, neutral countries have comparative advantages as honest brokers.

These attributes of neutrality and also its contribution to a nation’s political identity build on neutrality’s political core and not on its legal dimension. Neutrality was at the origin of both realistic and idealistic role conceptions. The first emanated from neutral states’ military absenteeism, the second from the basic commitment of neutral states to regulate and limit the use of force. The relative importance of both categories depends on the international structure in which neutral states operate. In a state system characterized by a clear reduction in interstate military conflicts, the idealistic role conception has gained significance compared with the realistic one. Neutrality’s role as a foreign policy identity provider has become its most important function since the end of the Cold War. It is based on what used to be neutrality’s secondary function—namely, its idealism or missionary belief. Neutral states used to be experts in compensating for their lack of military force and engagement with other power and activity dimensions. Neutrality may keep this function as long as neutral states actively contribute to the promotion of peaceful international relations. It should not be seen as encouraging passive contemplation of injustice, violence, and oppression. Nor was neutrality defined as a neutral attitude toward attempts to prevent military conflicts.

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*See also* Foreign Policy Analysis; International Law; Security Cooperation; War and Peace

**Further Readings**

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

New public management (NPM) is a general concept denoting a global wave of administrative reform that has had an impact on the public sectors of many countries for more than 2 decades. It is inspired by a broad neoliberal ideology and a particular set of normative values whose main focus is on increasing efficiency. In this sense, NPM is rather one dimensional and produces some tensions with other norms and values within the public sector.

The concept was launched by Christopher Hood in an article published in 1991. Most NPM reform efforts have had similar goals: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector, enhance the responsiveness of public agencies to their clients and customers, reduce public expenditure, and improve managerial accountability.

Definition of NPM

One primary characteristic of NPM involves public organizations adopting the management and organizational forms used by private companies. It challenges two traditional doctrines of public administration: that public sector organizations are “insulated” from the private sector in terms of personnel, structure, and business methods and that they operate in accordance with a precise set of rules limiting the freedom of public officials in handling money, staff, contracts, and so on. In contrast, the NPM movement subscribes to the principle that the formal organization of the public and private sectors should be similar and that managers in public sector organizations should have discretion and leeway in their daily work, so as to make efficient use of allocated resources.

NPM in a Theoretical Context

NPM reforms are not based on one theoretical foundation but are a collection of reform elements sharing several common characteristics. When NPM reforms are said to be typically theoretical, this often means that contractualism and economic theories dominate. Examples are public-choice theories, principal–agent models, and transaction-cost models. NPM, with its economic performance and market focus, sees other values and considerations embedded in the civil service as more or less unproblematic and not generally threatened or negatively affected by the efficiency and economy focus of NPM.
The second set of ideas comes from the managerialist school of thought, which focuses on the need to reestablish the primacy of managerial principles in the bureaucracy. This concentration on enhancing the capacity of managers to take action requires attention to decentralization, devolution, and delegation.

The tensions arising from the hybrid character of NPM, which combines economic organization theory and management theory, are well known. These tensions result from the contradiction between the centralizing tendencies inherent in contractualism and the devolutionary tendencies of managerialism. NPM is something of a hybrid, advocating both decentralization (let the managers manage) and centralization (make the managers manage). NPM thus prescribes both more autonomy and more central control at the same time.

Many of the most important and problematic reform elements, such as the relationship between public managers and elected officials, reflect the potential tensions in the way these reform elements are combined. Through devolution and contracting out, NPM has sought to separate policy making more clearly from policy administration and implementation. Policy makers make policy and then delegate its implementation to managers and hold them accountable by contract.

Driving Forces Behind NPM

There is no one-factor explanation for the emergence of NPM. The driving forces behind such reforms are partly ideological, but they are also marked by administrative culture, characteristics of the political-administrative system, and the fiscal situation of the country in question. The institutional dynamics of reforms can best be interpreted as a complex mixture of environmental pressure, polity features, and historical-institutional context. These factors define how much leeway political leaders have in making choices about reforms—that is, they both further and hinder NPM reforms.

One school of thought regards NPM primarily as a response to external pressure. This environmental determinism can be of two kinds. In the first instance, a country may adopt internationally based norms and beliefs about how a civil service system should be organized and run, simply because these have become the prevailing doctrine. NPM had its origins in certain English-speaking countries and international organizations, like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), where a kind of reform myth took hold, became ideologically dominant, and diffused all over the world. This diffusion process implied isomorphic elements, creating pressure for similar reforms and structural changes in many countries.

In the second instance, NPM may be seen as the optimal solution to widespread technical problems—that is, it has been adopted to solve problems created by a lack of instrumental performance or by economic competition and market pressure. In this instance, NPM reforms were adopted not because of their ideological hegemony but because of their technical efficiency.

Another view holds that reforms are primarily a product of the national historical-institutional context. Different countries have different historical-cultural traditions, and their reforms are path dependent, meaning that national reforms have unique features. The reform roads taken reflect the main features of national institutional processes, where institutional “roots” determine the path followed in a gradual adaptation to internal and external pressure. This view stresses institutional autonomy and internal dynamics. The greater the consistency between the values underlying the reforms and the values on which the existing administrative system is based, the more likely that the reforms will be successful.

A third view emphasizes that different countries have different constitutional features and political-administrative structures and that these factors go some way in explaining how they handle national problems and reform processes. The main features of the polity, the form of government, and the formal structure of decision making within the political-administrative system may all affect a country’s capacity to realize administrative reforms. From a structural or instrumental point of view, the reforms may generally be seen as conscious organizational design. This perspective is based on the assumption that political and administrative leaders use the structural design of public entities as instruments to fulfill public goals. The major preconditions for this are that the leaders have a relatively large degree of control over change or
New Public Management

reform processes and that they score high on rational calculation or means–end thinking.

Thus, external reform components and programs are filtered, interpreted, and modified by a combination of two further nationally based features. One feature involves the national political-administrative history, culture, traditions, and style of government. The other involves national polity features, as expressed in constitutional and structural factors. Within these constraints political and managerial executives have varying amounts of leeway to launch NPM reforms via an active administrative policy.

**NPM Diffusion: Convergence, Divergence, or Both?**

According to the OECD, NPM represents a global change of paradigm concerning the control and organization of public service. This convergence thesis is, however, contested. NPM has led to major changes in the public sector in many countries. However, the process of reform has not been the same everywhere. In some countries there might be a strong element of diffusion of NPM ideas from outside, whereas in others the reform process might be more a result of national or local initiatives that have subsequently acquired an NPM label. Thus, the spread of NPM is a complex process, going through different stages and packaged in different ways in different countries, with each country following its own reform trajectory within a broader framework. NPM is not a neat package of reform elements having a specific starting point and following a specific path toward a common destination.

NPM ideas have been implemented to different degrees, at different paces, and with differing emphases on the various elements of the reform package in different countries and sectors. A general finding is that the degree of variation between countries and also between policy areas increases when we move away from the world of ideas, discussion, and policy programs and look at specific decisions, and this increase is even more apparent when we consider the implementation and impact of the reforms. It is debatable whether NPM has led to the convergence of administrative systems in different countries, but there is much to suggest that ideas and policy programs resemble one another more than the corresponding practices do.

Even though countries to some extent present their reforms in similar terms and support some of the same general administrative doctrines, closer scrutiny reveals considerable variation. Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert distinguish among four groups of NPM reformers: the maintainers, the modernizers, the marketizers, and the minimal state category. Countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand fit the marketizer profile. Continental Europeans are more skeptical about NPM, except for the Scandinavian countries, which are somewhere in between.

Having begun in Britain, the reform wave has become strongest in Anglo-American countries. In Westminster-style parliamentarian systems, NPM reforms fell on fertile ground and were therefore implemented early and had far-reaching effects. This was due, on the one hand, to strong external economic and institutional pressure and, on the other, to few constitutional and administrative obstacles, a compatible culture, and parliamentary conditions that favored a radical strategy and reform entrepreneurs. By contrast, the Scandinavian countries were reluctant to implement reforms. Environmental pressure was weaker, their Rechtsstaat culture and strong egalitarian norms were less compatible with the values of NPM, there were more obvious constitutional obstacles, and parliamentary conditions often characterized by minority coalition governments made a radical reform strategy difficult to pursue.

Thus, there is no consistent movement toward a new isomorphic model of civil service systems. Most governments still share some main elements of the traditional system of public administration. However, some strong common trends in modernizing public services have emerged across groups of countries. One of these is a reduction in the differences between the public and private sectors. Nevertheless, the story is not only one of convergence, meaning that all countries are moving in the same direction, nor is it a story only of divergence, whereby all countries follow their own trajectories constrained by their specific context, legacy, and tradition. Instead, what we are seeing is a complex mixture of robustness and flexibility and of reform paths that can hardly be explained by using a single-perspective approach.

Variations in reform practice from one country to another are the rule rather than the exception.
Different countries and governments face different contexts, risks, and problems and start out with different values and norms. In other words, they have different starting points, are at different stages of reform, and face different external and internal constraints. What we might see is two trajectories. One is represented by civil services that have been modernized within state traditions and are therefore rather closed and resistant to external pressure. Here, the reform process is more hesitant and does not involve major shifts. The other trajectory is represented by civil services that are more vulnerable to external pressure and more open to NPM concepts, resulting in more radical reforms. The first instance is typical of the Scandinavian welfare state; the second characterizes Australia and New Zealand.

Effects of NPM Reforms
The main hypothesis of NPM reforms is that increased market orientation and management focus lead to increased efficiency, without causing negative side effects for other goals and concerns. But this hypothesis is far from having been confirmed as evidence-based knowledge. It might be right under specific conditions but not as a general characteristic of NPM reforms everywhere and at all times.

Effects are often assumed or promised, but there are few systematic and reliable studies of the effects of NPM reforms. Hard evidence is often lacking. Often strategies, plans, and selective success stories are the focus of attention rather than systematic analyses of results. Research has generally focused more on answering questions about why reform happens than on trying to reveal the effects of initiatives.

We know less about external political learning and societal effects than about internal administrative effects on efficiency. One finding is that vertical and horizontal specialization through structural devolution and the establishment of single-purpose organizations have led to fragmentation in public administration and thus increased coordination problems. Another finding is that NPM reforms in some cases can have positive effects on efficiency, but the efficiency gains also vary according to the tasks and services in question. Competition might bring savings on costs, more efficient production, and more flexible and user-friendly services. But there might also be negative side effects in the form of increased social problems.

The effects on efficiency are usually less than what reform advocates have predicted. This is partly because transaction costs as well as administration and operational costs of the new arrangements may not have been taken into consideration. NPM reforms have led to increased efficiency in some public sector organizations, at least in the short term. Responsiveness to users tends to be improved by NPM reforms, but there are also clear indications of a reduction in equality. It appears that improved efficiency and responsiveness have been achieved at the expense of equal treatment. On the other hand, NPM reforms have had a positive effect on the freedom of choice of services.

A fundamental dilemma for many NPM reforms is the tension between autonomy and control. Organizations should have enough freedom to be run in an efficient way, yet not be so free that superior levels of leadership lose power and control. The aim is to achieve more freedom and greater control simultaneously. Whether or not NPM strengthens political control and leads to better political steering is an open question. Some claim that NPM reforms will reduce political steering and control and transfer power and influence to state-owned companies and autonomous agencies, and there is some evidence for that. But there are also studies indicating that NPM tools like performance management have improved top-level executive control. The new organizational forms have led to changes in how public organizations are controlled. The traditional, ex ante, informal, internal, collegial, and trust-based forms of control are waning, and the more ex post, formal, external, professional, and distrust-based forms of control are waxing.

One conclusion to be drawn is that the design of various NPM reforms may vary considerably across countries, tasks, sectors, and administrative levels and will have consequences for effects studies. The implication is that discussions of the effects of reform must strive for exceedingly precise terminology and must not be conducted at a general level.

In sum, it is hard to say unequivocally what the effects of NPM reforms are. NPM’s results are disputed and uncertain. The paradox as stated by Pollitt and Bouckaert is that these kinds of reforms do not seem to need results to fuel their onward march.
Future Development and Application

There is a need to look beyond NPM—what has been termed transcending new public management. The central question being asked is whether NPM is finished. While some, citing the crises that NPM has experienced, proclaim that it is indeed dead, others tend to support the view that this is by no means so. It has, however, been challenged: New types of reforms have been added to those already in place, and there have been some reversals, especially when it comes to the disaggregation components of NPM. The new reforms tend, however, not to replace the old. They represent readjustments, modifications, and supplements rather than radical change. Priorities have shifted from a drive to create agencies and autonomous bodies that enhance efficiency to a quest to find the right balance between accountability and autonomy by focusing on weak coordination devices, lack of governing capacity, and weak accountability mechanisms.

The reforms that were undertaken under the NPM label paved the way for further reforms and transformations in the post-NPM era. Market solutions and market ideology now seem to have become more or less institutionalized within the public sector, albeit without erasing major Weberian features of the Old System, and a certain amount of deregulation has taken place in recent years. The trend toward single-purpose organizations is another feature of NPM reforms that recent reforms have modified by introducing more coordination and collaboration across and within political-administrative systems. A third element of NPM was structural devolution, which resulted in the autonomization and agencification of public sector organizations. However, in recent years this has been countered by a reassertion of the center and a strengthening of central state capacity.

A main finding in the research in this area is that administrative reforms have not taken place along a single dimension. In practice, we face mixed models and increased complexity. It is fair to say that NPM is still very much alive in many countries and that NPM reforms have normally not been replaced by new reforms but rather revised or supplemented by post-NPM reforms. The pace and comprehensiveness of these trends has varied significantly from one country to another and from one policy area to another, and reform activities embrace a wide spectrum. Even though NPM in certain ways has been a success, it is too early to conclude that the old public administration model is unsustainable. It has considerable capacity to adapt and is both robust and flexible, even after a long period of NPM reforms and emerging post-NPM reforms.

Typical for the NPM reforms was that the formal structural system changed from an integrated to a fragmented one. The formal levers of steering were weakened, the distance to the agencies grew, political signals became weaker, and horizontal specialization increased according to different principles. The second generation of reforms uses formal structures to regain control or modify the loss of political influence by making them more centralized, complex, and varied.

Formal structural instruments have been used to modify not only devolution and vertical specialization but also horizontal fragmentation and specialization, especially in Australia and New Zealand. Vertical control and levers of control are increasingly being applied, while a “whole-of-government” approach uses new coordination instruments and cross-sector programs and projects to modify horizontal fragmentation.

The spread and diffusion of agency or regulatory agency forms across countries in the first wave of reforms may be seen as an institutional standard, script, or prescription with symbolic value. This applies just as much to the second generation of modern reforms, where the fashion is now to have “whole-of-government” or “joined-up government” models that foster more coordination and control. The question is whether these trends are more about symbols than about reality and whether they really constitute a clear break with NPM.

What kind of further trends might we expect in countries that have implemented elements of NPM? A first scenario is the idea of a linear process toward more market, management, and efficiency. A second scenario is a cyclical development implying that, after a period of NPM, there will be a reaction to the norms and values that the reform is built on leading to a return to some of the main features of “old public management” and a rediscovery of the Weberian bureaucracy.

A third scenario is a more dialectical process under which public services become more complex. Institutional change is a sedimentation process in which new administrative reforms do not replace old forms but supplement them. There is a layering and mixture of old public administration, NPM, and
post-NPM reforms producing hybrid organizational forms. The changes we have seen in recent years tend to come closer to the third scenario than to the first.

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See also Accountability; Audit Society; Autonomy, Administrative; Deregulation; Empowerment

Further Readings


Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

The origin of the term nongovernmental organization lies in the need for those drafting the United Nations (UN) Charter in 1945 to make a distinction between the procedures for the UN’s relations with other intergovernmental organizations linked to the UN as specialized agencies and its relations with international organizations that had not been established by intergovernmental agreement. Under Article 70, the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC) was to make arrangements for representatives of the agencies “to participate, without vote, in its deliberations,” whereas under Article 71 NGOs would have a secondary status:

The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned. (Article 71 of the UN Charter)

Gradually the term nongovernmental organization passed from the diplomatic world into general usage. However, its meaning at the UN and its meaning in popular discourse are not the same.

At the UN, an NGO is any organization that has been granted consultative status by ECOSOC or, by extension, any organization that may be eligible for consultative status. In the early years of the UN, various criteria were adopted by the council to establish which organizations would be accredited and what participation rights they would have. The initial decisions were reviewed and consolidated into an NGO Statute by ECOSOC Resolution 288 B (X) of February 27, 1950. It was revised by Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of May 23, 1968, and again by Resolution 1996/31 of July 25, 1996. Most of the text of the current statute has remained unchanged since the first resolutions in 1946. The implied assumption in 1945 was that ECOSOC would accredit a small number of large, well-established global organizations. In particular, for 50 years, very few exceptions were made to the rule that only international NGOs rather than national NGOs should be accepted. Despite this restriction, it was soon apparent that many more NGOs than were initially expected would wish to participate in the UN’s work. The numbers increased steadily from 197 in 1950, to 334 in
1960, and 419 in 1970. They then increased more substantially in the 1970s, reaching 608 in 1980 and 893 in 1990, and increased even more after 1990 to 1,995 in 2000 and 3,413 in 2010. As practice has evolved, it has become apparent that the official criteria are not applied and conversely some criteria not in the statute are consistently applied. Thus, with very few exceptions, any private organization will gain consultative status provided that it is not a commercial company, it does not use or advocate the use of violence, and it does not violate the diplomatic norm of noninterference in the internal affairs of individual countries. This norm finds one expression in not accepting a political party for accreditation as an NGO. The restrictions on companies and political parties do not prevent non-profit-making international associations representing commercial interests or international federations of political parties from being accepted.

The norm of noninterference was, until the 1970s, a severe restriction on the discussion of human rights in all bodies of the UN. A second expression of this norm was added to the NGO statute in 1968: Human rights NGOs “should have a general international concern with this matter, not restricted to the interests of a particular group of persons, a single nationality or the situation in a single State or restricted group of States” (ECOSOC Resolution 1296, para. 17). In 1996, this text was replaced by a more vague, general assertion that they should act “in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.” Despite this change, the 1968 principles are still invoked when any government attempts to block the accreditation of an NGO that is critical of their human rights record. As a result, the Indian government has been able to block the World Sikh Congress, and the Chinese government has blocked any NGO that focuses on Tibet. Nevertheless, such governments cannot prevent criticism in the UN from the large global human rights NGOs, who have consultative status. The accreditation of human rights NGOs has often been a matter of great controversy; even when they are initially rejected, however, they do eventually win a vote in their favor in ECOSOC, provided they conform to the statute, including the discarded text from 1968.

In all versions of the statute, there have been two vague general clauses specifying that an NGO must be concerned with questions within the competence of ECOSOC, and its aims “shall be in conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles” of the UN Charter. This might have been a basis for a process of prohibiting access to certain types of NGOs on specific political grounds. The only field in which such censorship has been applied is in the field of human sexuality. The International Planned Parenthood Federation was not able to gain access to the UN system until the mid-1960s, a decade after it was founded. Human Life International, an antiabortion organization, was rejected on the technical grounds that it was hostile to UNICEF, but a few antiabortion NGOs have now been accepted. Most dramatically of all, a special session of ECOSOC was convened in 1994 solely for the purpose of withdrawing consultative status from the International Lesbian and Gay Association, when it became public that one of their constituent organizations promoted pedophilia.

Since 1945, there has been a slow but consistent expansion in the role of NGOs in policy making within the UN system, to the point where the outcomes in all areas of multilateral diplomacy, including security questions, can no longer be explained without analyzing the influence exercised by NGOs. They have also greatly increased their status in international law, to the point where it can be argued that those with ECOSOC consultative status have international legal personality. Their most significant impact has been in the creation of the Internet. NGOs made two essential contributions to the conversion of communications technology from disparate unconnected private networks to the contemporary Internet as a global public communications system. In the 1980s, they established the first Internet service providers and linked them together to provide global coverage. Also, they were the first to create gateways to link all the diverse networks to each other.

In popular discourse, an NGO is often presumed to be a voluntary organization acting in the public interest. Sometimes, distinctions are made between operational NGOs, which raise money and spend it on projects to assist the needy and the vulnerable, and campaigning NGOs, which seek to articulate the concerns of disempowered and marginalized people. Such an approach brings to mind
NGOs concerned with development, humanitarian relief, women’s rights, human rights, peace, and environmental questions. However, it is confusing and misleading to conceptualize NGOs in such a restricted manner. All these fields of global politics are also influenced by other NGOs that would not be primarily identified either as operational or campaigning NGOs in such fields. At the UN, the 3,000-plus organizations that have consultative status as NGOs include religious bodies, trade unions, business groups, scientific and technical bodies, professional associations, youth organizations, and parliamentarians. Many of these also make their own specialist contributions on global issues. Some, such as religious bodies (also calling themselves faith communities) and trade unions, actively object to being called NGOs. Nevertheless, within the UN, all legitimate nonstate actors gain access through becoming accredited as NGOs.

In the domestic politics of individual countries, NGOs are more commonly referred to as interest groups, pressure groups, lobbies, or private voluntary organizations. However, as noted above, the term NGO may still be used to refer to a more limited range of public interest groups and/or groups that engage in transnational activities. NGOs vary greatly in the geographical scope of their structure and their activities. Some may be highly local, community groups in which all those involved know each other personally. Others are organized in individual towns or cities, within a larger area, or over a whole country, while some cover a continent or have a presence throughout the world. The scope of their structure does not necessarily relate to the scope of their activities. Local groups may be completely parochial, or they may concern themselves with issues affecting the other side of the world—for example, when a small community decides to raise money for the victims of an earthquake. National NGOs often have a minimal organizational structure outside their home country but engage in extensive transnational cooperation with other NGOs around the world. One of the most important features of NGOs is that many of them break down the distinction between domestic and international politics by simultaneously operating at both levels. Initially, local and national NGOs could influence global politics only through the membership of international NGOs. With the expansion of global communications, in particular the development of the World Wide Web since 1993, any NGO can now easily have a transnational impact. In addition, the only major amendment to the UN’s NGO statute was the decision in 1996 to allow accreditation to national NGOs. The prime reason for this decision was to encourage participation by NGOs from developing countries.

There is great variety in the structures of NGOs. Some decide policy through democratic processes open to all their members, but others rely on supporters who merely have an indirect influence on policy, by increasing or reducing their level of support; some are formed by individual people, but some consist of separate independent NGOs who form an umbrella organization to cooperate; some relate to members and/or supporters directly through a centralized structure, but others have complex hierarchies or a federal structure. NGOs also have a diverse range of political roles. Some are altruistic, but others represent the interests of their members; some have charitable status and obtain tax concessions from governments, but others are not eligible; some represent a very small number of people, but others have an active membership measured in millions; some are highly specialized, but others are concerned with issues that affect a wide range of social, political, and economic questions; some have no public profile, but others obtain regular media coverage; some have no desire to engage in politics, but others are campaigning organizations; some are insiders in government policy making, but others are outsiders, concentrating on mass mobilization; some are progressive or Left wing, some identify themselves as being apolitical, and some are Right wing. It is impossible for any individual to support all NGOs, except by arbitrarily defining some as not being true NGOs. There is no such thing as a typical NGO.

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See also Advocacy Networks, Transnational; Civil Society; Constructivism in International Relations; Epistemic Communities; Governance, Global; Human Rights in International Relations; Interest Groups; Nonstate Actors; Social Movements; United Nations
Nonlinear Models

In political science, as in many other disciplines, linear regression is the workhorse tool for statistical analysis. It is easy to interpret, and under many conditions the estimates it provides are unbiased and efficient. Unfortunately, many of the theories in the social sciences imply a nonlinear relationship between variables. In those cases, it is inappropriate to use a classic linear regression model because, at a minimum, one of the assumptions of the model would be violated.

This entry discusses two types of linear models: first, those that through a relatively simple process can be transformed in a way that allows running of a classical linear regression model; second, those that are essentially nonlinear, for which a transformation is not possible. In that situation, nonlinear least squares estimation is necessary.

The linear regression model specifies a linear relationship between a response—or dependent—variable and an explanatory—or independent—variable. It is assumed that a vector of response variables, \( y \), can be approximated by a linear function of the vector of explanatory variables \( X \):

\[
y = X\beta + \varepsilon, \tag{1}
\]

which can be expressed more generally as

\[
y = F(X) + \varepsilon. \tag{2}
\]

While in the linear model \( F \) is a linear function and the error is additive, in nonlinear models \( F \) can take other functional forms such as exponential, logistic, or other, more complicated forms, though the setup still assumes that the error is additive.

It is perhaps easier to understand the difference between linear and nonlinear models if we think of a regression model, in scalar form, with only one explanatory variable and no disturbance:

\[
y = \alpha + \beta x. \tag{3}
\]

The marginal effect of the explanatory variable, \( x \), on the response variable, \( y \), or, in other words, the effect of a one-unit increase of \( x \) in \( y \), can be estimated by taking the partial derivative with respect to \( x \):

\[
\frac{dy}{dx} = \beta. \tag{4}
\]

In the classical linear model, when \( x \) increases by one unit, the effect on \( y \) is always a constant, \( \beta \), regardless of the current level of \( x \). In contrast, in a nonlinear model, the marginal impact of the explanatory variable, \( x \), on the response variable, \( y \), is dependent on the level of \( x \). In other words, \( \beta \) is not necessarily a constant, but instead \( dy/dx \) is a function of \( x \).

A more complicated model has \( y \) as a nonadditive function of the independent variables and the disturbances, that is,

\[
y = F(X, \varepsilon). \tag{5}
\]

While in general this can cause problems, there are some cases where this can be transformed away. For example, if we assume that the response function that describes \( y \) is,

\[
y = \exp(\alpha + \beta x + \varepsilon), \tag{6}
\]

we can linearize the model by first taking the logarithms obtaining a linear response function and rewrite the equation such that

\[
\ln\left(\frac{y}{1 - y}\right) = \alpha + \beta x + \varepsilon. \tag{7}
\]

The response variable is now \( \ln(y/(1 - y)) \), a quantity known as the logit, and the response
function is linear. Note here that \( y \) is continuous; if it is binary, the standard logit model is not the same. The procedure is similar for other transformations that fall in the category of generalized linear models.

However, there are some models for which slightly more complicated procedures are necessary to make the linear model appropriate. One of the most common is the Box-Cox transformation, where transformations are indexed by \( \lambda \), an unknown parameter, and all the parameters in the model are estimated by standard methods of inference. The transformation is

\[
y^\lambda = \frac{y^\lambda - 1}{\lambda}
\]

when \( \lambda \neq 0 \) and

\[
y^\lambda = \ln(y)
\]

when \( \lambda = 0 \). It is assumed that for each \( \lambda \), \( y^\lambda \) is a monotonic function of \( y \) over the admissible range and that for some unknown \( \lambda \), the transformed observations, \( y^\lambda \), satisfy the linear model assumptions.

The Box-Cox transformation can also be used to discriminate among alternative functional forms (log linear, quadratic, etc.). The process works by estimating the values of the transformation parameters. If \( \lambda \) is one, a linear model is appropriate. If it is near zero, a logarithmic model is appropriate. And if it is near two, a quadratic model is appropriate. Thus, analysts no longer have to prespecify the nature of the nonlinear transformation since the Box-Cox model can be estimated using nonlinear squares.

Unfortunately, some of our theories lead us to models that cannot be made linear in parameters. In this case, it is appropriate to use nonlinear least squares (NLS) regression. With the exception of linearity, all the other assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression apply. Conceptually, the process is the same: to find the values of parameters that minimize the sum of squared residuals. Numerically, the process is much more intensive. If we assume the same model notation from Equation 1, then

\[
\varepsilon = y - X\beta.
\]

We estimate \( \beta \) by finding the \( \hat{\beta} \) values that minimize the sum-of-squares residuals:

\[
S = \sum(y - X\hat{\beta}).
\]

For any estimate of \( \beta \), Equation 2 allows the calculation of a residual, and we can minimize the sum of squared residuals. While the maximization process is more complicated than for linear regression, the underlying process is similar, and the estimated coefficients have similar properties. In particular, they are consistent and asymptotically normal, so the usual testing procedures apply. This process is a part of most statistical packages used by social scientists.

There are some caveats about NLS. First, it is possible to get similarly good fits with very different-looking functions. Also, different models will produce different predictions when extrapolating, and multiple minima are possible.

As a general conclusion, for real-world data it is hard to believe that linear specifications can characterize the relationships between all variables in political science studies. However, through the transformation of variables—either to a generalized linear model or a Box-Cox transformation—or by using modified modeling strategies such as nonlinear least squares regression, it is possible to test many of the theories that do not easily fit a linear model.

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Nonparametric Methods

Nonparametric methods are a class of statistical techniques that use minimal assumptions for both testing and estimation. Here, standard statistical assumptions are often replaced with computationally intensive calculations. Nonparametric methods provide a valuable alternative to classical parametric techniques. They are often called weak assumption statistics because the assumptions required for validity are quite general compared with classical parametric techniques. In many cases, even the weak assumptions made can be further relaxed. As such, conclusions based on nonparametric techniques need not be tempered by qualifying statements about the underlying assumptions. Other advantages are that they (a) are often easy to understand and apply, (b) are especially good for small samples, (c) are frequently appropriate for discrete data, and (d) may be robust with incomplete or imprecise data. Nonparametric techniques date back to 1710 when John Arbuthnott introduced the sign test. More widespread development of nonparametric techniques did not occur until the 1940s when Frank Wilcoxon developed rank-based tests. Nonparametric statistical techniques come in many different forms. Below, three different types of nonparametric techniques are highlighted. The first is the bootstrap, a method for replacing distributional assumptions in statistical tests. The second is an example of a classical nonparametric test. The final technique is that of nonparametric regression.

Bootstrap

The bootstrap relies on resampling. While it has many applications, it is often used when errors in a regression model are nonnormal. Assume that one estimates the following simple regression model:

\[ y = \alpha + \beta x + \varepsilon. \]

In this model, we assume that the errors, \( \varepsilon \), follow a normal distribution. We can relax this assumption using the bootstrap. The bootstrap simulates the sampling distribution for \( \beta \) through sampling from the original data with replacement. In short, we treat the sample as the population and then sample from it. For example, assume that the sample size for this regression model is 100 cases. For the bootstrap, we would take a random sample of size 100 with replacement from the original data. Since we sample with replacement, some data points will appear in this sample more than once. We then reestimate the original model using this new sample and save the new estimate of \( \beta \). We repeat this process a large number of times. Typically, we would resample and estimate the model from 1,000 to 5,000 times. This results in 1,000 to 5,000 estimates of \( \beta \). This new set of \( \beta \) estimates serves as an empirical sampling distribution for this parameter. Percentiles of this distribution can serve as confidence intervals for the parameter. With minor adjustments, one can also calculate a \( p \) value to test hypotheses about \( \beta \). The bootstrap is nonparametric since we use an empirical estimate for the sampling distribution instead of assuming that the test statistic is from a \( t \) distribution. One strength of the bootstrap stems from the fact that this basic algorithm can be used to provide inferences for a wide class of statistics.

Classical Nonparametric Test

Another common nonparametric technique is the rank-sum test, which is an alternative to the classical two-sample \( t \) test of location. Consider an experiment where we select seven students to play a divide-the-dollar game with a computer program. Three of the students are randomly chosen to receive the treatment, a prime expected to make them more altruistic. If the treatment is effective, we would expect that the students who receive it would give away more of their money. If the treatment is without effect, we would expect no such difference across the two sets of students. Relying on the classical parametric techniques, we might translate these expectations into a \( t \) test, comparing the mean difference we observe with a null of no mean difference. We would then calculate a \( p \) value using the critical value from a \( t \) distribution with five degrees of freedom. For this inference, we must assume that the test statistic follows a parametric \( t \) distribution—a distribution that can be characterized with parameters for the mean, variance, and other higher moments. As an alternative, we can use the nonparametric rank-sum test to derive the test from the randomization of treatment assignment and avoid the parametric assumption.
Our expectation, again, is that treated students should give away more than nontreated students. The best evidence that the prime increases altruistic behavior would be obtained if the three students who received the treatment rank 1, 2, and 3 in terms of the amount given away. So we might ask: What is the probability that the three students in the treatment group would happen to rank 1, 2, and 3 in terms of the amount given away if the null hypothesis were true? To develop a probability statement about this hypothesis that hinges on the composition of the treatment and control groups—the feature that was assigned by a random process—we turn to basic combinatorics. Knowing that the number of ways of selecting $r$ objects from a set of $n$ is $n!/[r!(n - r)!]$ tells us that there are 35 ways to select three students from a set of seven. If the treatment had no effect, and simple chance were the only factor governing which students were in the control group and which were in the treatment group, then each of these 35 combinations would be equally likely. Since only one of the 35 outcomes is congruent with ranks of 1, 2, and 3 in the treatment group, this tells us that there is a 1/35 or approximately 0.0286 chance that we would observe the best evidence case if the null were true. That is, if the treatment has no effect, the chance that random assignment will produce this exact outcome is 1/35. This $p$ value indicates that the best evidence outcome indeed enables us to be fairly confident that the prime has an effect on student behavior in our divide-the-dollar game.

We can make this approach to hypothesis testing more general by introducing a summary statistic that enables us to translate ranks into a single measurement of the outcome among the treatment subjects. One possible statistic for this purpose is the sum of the ranks of the treated subjects. This statistic will be lower if the treated subjects are generally higher in their giving than the control subjects and higher if they are not. The subjects could just as easily be ranked in the opposite manner, and then higher rank sums would be associated with higher amounts given. Using this statistic, we can answer the question of what the chance is of observing an outcome of a specific degree (or smaller/larger) among the treatment subjects if the treatment actually has no effect. For example, suppose the outcome we observed among the treated subjects was the ranks 1, 2, and 7. Our summary statistic would be 10 ($= 1 + 2 + 7$). This seems close to the best evidence outcome we just considered, where the sum of the ranks would be $1 + 2 + 3 = 6$, but is it close enough to be convincing evidence of a treatment effect? To answer this question, we work out the probability of observing a rank sum of the same amount or less than the one we observed under the null hypothesis—that the treatment had no effect on giving—by returning to our enumeration of all 35 possible combinations of the three ranks and calculating the rank sum for each combination. Four of the 35 possible rank combinations produce a sum of 10, 3 more produce a sum of 9, 2 result in a sum of 8, 1 set sums to 7, and another to 6. Thus, if the treatment had no effect, the chance of observing an outcome like the one we did or smaller would be $p = 11/35$ or approximately 0.314. Put another way, if the prime has no effect, we could expect to see a value for the summed ranks as low as or lower than the one we observed 31 out of every 100 times we randomly assigned the treatment to these particular subjects. Using the traditional threshold of .05, the $p$ value we calculated would not allow us to reject the null hypothesis; the observed outcome did not provide sufficient evidence that the prime had an effect on the behavior of our subjects. This demonstrates the logic of the rank-sum test and nonparametric methods more generally, where we are able to test a hypothesis about a treatment effect without the parametric assumption necessary for the $t$ test.

**Nonparametric Regression**

Smoothed regression is a common nonparametric estimation technique. This approach to regression is based on the belief that standard parametric regression models are often misspecified due to an incorrect functional form. Smoothing and nonparametric regression are generally interchangeable terms for a set of statistical techniques used to summarize bivariate relationships in scatterplots. With more commonly used parametric statistical techniques, the relationship between two variables, $x$ and $y$, is summarized with a parameter such as a regression coefficient. With nonparametric regression, there is no single parameter; instead, the statistical relationship between $x$ and $y$ is summarized with a line drawing. Given that there is no
single parameter produced by the statistical model, these models are nonparametric. A more specific comparison between the parametric and nonparametric approaches to regression clarifies the differences between these methods.

Assume that we have \( y \) and \( x \), two continuous variables, and we wish to estimate the mean of \( y \) conditional on the regressor \( x \). We can write this relationship formally as

\[
\frac{y}{x} = f(x) + \epsilon.
\]

The term \( f \) refers to the functional form for the relationship between \( y \) and \( x \), and we assume that \( f \) is some function that is smooth. The familiar linear functional form is a special case where the following is true:

\[
f = \alpha + \beta x.
\]

Since a linear relationship is a smooth function, it is a part of the family of smooth functions that comprise \( f \). The linear regression model is parametric because the parameter \( \beta \) summarizes the statistical dependence between \( x \) and \( y \).

With nonparametric regression, we estimate the functional form \( f \) from the data. Therefore, the a priori assumption of linearity is replaced with the much weaker assumption of a smooth population function. The usual parametric estimate is considered global since a single parameter, \( \beta \), based on all the data summarizes the statistical relationship. There are a number of methods for estimating nonparametric regression models. All of these methods use a series of local estimates, estimates based on a subset of the entire sample, to form a nonparametric estimate.

The following provides a simple example of one method for estimating nonparametric regression models. Say we are interested in estimating the association between incumbent vote share and incumbent spending. We suspect that the relationship is nonlinear and thus the usual linear regression model will be misspecified since the functional form is incorrect. One form of nonparametric regression we might use is the moving average smoother. First, the data must be sorted according to \( x \)—here incumbent spending. We can obtain the nonparametric estimate by calculating the mean of the incumbent vote share within ordered intervals of spending. That is, we calculate the average incumbent vote share for a small range of \( x \), perhaps the first 5% of the data. We repeat this across the range of incumbent spending. Once this process is complete we have a series of local averages.

Plotting these local averages in a line graph summarizes the statistical dependence between incumbent vote share and incumbent spending. These local averages may increase linearly. If so, the nonparametric estimate is nearly equivalent to an ordinary least squares estimate. What is important is, however, that these local averages are not constrained to be linear and can produce a highly nonlinear statistical estimate. Matching estimators, which have gained popularity as of late, are another form of nonparametric regression.

The local estimator need not be based on the mean. Least squares regression can replace the mean as the local estimator. Here, the predicted value from a regression model becomes the local point estimate. Nonparametric regression methods such as LOESS and LOWESS are based on local regression models. Basing the local estimate on a regression model produces a nonparametric estimate with less bias. Splines are another frequently used form of nonparametric estimators based on a series of joined local regression estimates.

Due to the weak assumptions needed for nonparametric tests, they are less efficient than classical parametric tests if the assumptions for the parametric tests hold. For example, the rank test will be less efficient than a \( t \) test if the data are normal. However, if the data are nonnormal, the nonparametric alternative will be more powerful. Nonparametric tests are common in the statistical literature on causal inference. For example, nonparametric statistics are critical to the development of sensitivity analyses for matching estimators. In the causal inference literature, close attention is paid to statistical assumptions, and the goal is to weaken assumptions where possible. Nonparametric statistics allow this to a great extent.

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See also Cross-Tabular Analysis; Hypothesis Testing; Matching; Robust Statistics; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian
Further Readings


Nonstate Actors

The phrase *nonstate actors* arose in the study of world politics during the 1970s in the context of a transnationalist critique of the then prevailing realist orthodoxy. Realist theory of international relations holds that only states are and can be actors in politics beyond the national realm. In contrast, transnationalist analysis argues that other entities besides states—such as business enterprises, mass media organizations, civil society associations, and political parties—can also operate as actors in world politics.

An *actor* is a behavioral unit that can engage and influence its situation. A social actor can be either an individual person or a group of people assembled in a formal or informal collective body. Realism maintains that only one kind of actor—the state (i.e., a national-territorial government)—can affect relations between and among countries. Transnationalism affirms that multiple types of agents, including a variety of nonstate actors, can shape world politics. Some scholars therefore draw a distinction between international relations (among states) and transnational relations (involving a plurality of actors, both state and nonstate).

Realism and Transnationalism

From a realist perspective, nongovernmental bodies are always subject to state power in world politics. Hence, on a realist premise, business corporations cannot operate outside their base country except insofar as home and host states permit them to do so. Companies such as Coca-Cola, LUKOIL, and Microsoft would, on a realist understanding, always be subject to the full control of national governments. Likewise, for realists, civil society associations such as the human rights organization Amnesty International, the ecological lobby Greenpeace, and the religious movement Al Qaeda have no impact on world politics except when states allow it. Indeed, some realist analyses suggest that nonstate entities operate wholly and solely as tools of state policy. Thus, for example, a realist could argue that the humanitarian relief agency World Vision only acts inasmuch as it serves the interests of donor states in the Global North and recipient states in the Global South.

The realist (or “statist”) approach to action in world politics has never gained acceptance by all scholars. For example, from Karl Marx onward, historical materialists have maintained that states serve capital rather than the other way around and that workers need to unite across borders in order to achieve social transformation. Liberal internationalists, too, suggested already in the 19th and early 20th centuries that citizen movements (e.g., of feminists, pacifists, religious revivalists) could affect the course of interstate relations. In the 1920s and 1930s, political and sociological research on world affairs regularly considered nongovernmental as well as governmental actors.

Between the 1940s and the 1960s, however, most students of international relations took the realist position that nonstate actors play no autonomous role in world politics. In the context of World War II and the subsequent Cold War, it appeared—particularly to scholars in North America and Western Europe—that world affairs were reducible to state action. After all, entire societies were subordinated to state direction in World War II. Similarly, both sides in the Cold War marshaled their respective business sectors, mass media, political parties, and civil societies in the bipolar struggle.

Yet even during this period of heightened interstate conflict, it was not always evident that states were the sole actors in world politics. For example, many anticolonial movements at this time successfully exploited transnational links to promote their causes. Likewise, the continued global expansion
of major oil corporations in the third quarter of the 20th century was not merely a reflection of state policy. Indeed, then as now, firms sometimes used states to further their investments abroad. For instance, the U.S. government intervention in Guatemala in 1954 came largely at the behest of the United Fruit Company.

Such circumstances where nonstate entities exercised influence in world politics became increasingly visible as colonial empires receded and Cold War tensions eased. From the early 1970s, a number of scholars began to assert that the realist conception of actors was overly narrow. The term transnational relations gained popularity as a description of a situation where plural actors engage in world politics. Similarly, researchers who have since the 1980s adopted concepts of “global politics” and “globalization” usually argue that nonstate players figure importantly in world affairs.

Today, in the early 21st century, it seems incontrovertible that nonstate entities in world politics can have powers beyond those of national governments. Many companies, media organizations, civil society associations, political parties, and individuals can act on the world stage at least partly in their own right. If the statist premises of realist theory were questionable even at the height of the Cold War, they are certainly unsustainable in current world politics.

Types of Nonstate Actors
According to the World Investment Report 2008, transnational corporations (TNCs) now number 79,000 (as against around 200 states). Between them, these companies own some 790,000 subsidiaries outside their base country. TNCs collectively hold about US$15 trillion in foreign direct investment (FDI) and generate annual sales of US$31 trillion. The largest TNCs have a yearly turnover that exceeds the GDP of a majority of countries. A substantial proportion of cross-border commerce (estimates range from a quarter to a third of the total) involves intrafirm trade within TNCs. In the light of this significance of TNCs, all states now, to one degree or another, adjust their policies on regulation and taxation with a view to attracting and retaining FDI. States also struggle to monitor—let alone manage—the several trillion dollars’ worth of liquid financial flows that banks, securities firms, and hedge funds move (mostly electronically) around the globe each day. Moreover, some transnational companies are illicit traffickers of goods and people, and they make it their business to evade state laws altogether.

Mass media outlets, too, figure as important nonstate players in contemporary world politics. News agencies, such as Reuters and Inter Press Service, shape much of the information on world affairs that circulates in contemporary society. Certain newspapers and magazines, such as the Financial Times and Cosmopolitan, are distributed across the planet. World service radio stations have broadcast intercontinentally from the 1930s, while satellite television operators have, since their launch in the 1960s, reached hundreds of millions of households. Starting in 1992, the suitably named World Wide Web has offered a platform for countless online global information providers. Although states—and particularly stronger states—can exert substantial influence over transnationally operating mass media, it is hardly credible to argue on realist lines that CNN and YouTube are wholly subject to state control and nothing more than tools of foreign policy.

Likewise, civil society constitutes an important sphere of nonstate actors in world politics. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are associations of citizens that seek, from outside political parties, to shape the rules that govern society. Many CSOs are formally organized, legally registered, and professionally staffed advocacy bodies. Examples include business forums like the International Chamber of Commerce, consumer groups like Consumers International, democracy promoters like the Open Society Institute, development supporters like Oxfam, environmental activists like Friends of the Earth, faith assemblies like the Roman Catholic Church, farmer lobbies like Vía Campesina, health action networks like Médecins Sans Frontières, human rights advocates like the International Lesbian and Gay Association, labor unions like Public Services International, philanthropic foundations like the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and think tanks like the Club of Rome. Other civil society initiatives in world politics take shape as informal social movements, for instance, of anarchists, diaspora networks, indigenous peoples, peasants, religious revivalists, street vendors,
and youth. Indeed, some of the more prominent civil society actions in recent world politics have been ephemeral public demonstrations. Examples include street protests at the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999 and across the globe on February 15, 2003, against the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq.

In contrast to CSOs, who aim to influence politics from positions outside official circles, political parties have as their overriding goal the occupation of public office. Although these actors have traditionally centered their efforts on capturing state power (locally, provincially, and nationally), over recent decades, they have also held seats in several suprastate regional assemblies in Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Moreover, political parties with broadly shared visions have formed global associations such as the Socialist International (with origins in 1889), the Trotskyist Fourth International (founded in 1938), the Liberal International (created in 1947), the International Democrat Union (1983), and the Global Green Network (2001).

Other nonstate actors with influence in world politics operate as individuals rather than collective agents. For example, some persons such as Mahatma Gandhi, Che Guevara, and Wangari Maathai have shaped world affairs as charismatic visionaries from outside states. In addition, so-called celebrity diplomacy has figured with considerable prominence in several contemporary global campaigns regarding ecology, human rights, and poverty. Out of the limelight, countless other nonstate individuals have affected world politics as artists, athletes, bloggers, carers, entertainers, mercenaries, migrants, patients, pilgrims, programmers, scholars, terrorists, and tourists.

As the example of mercenaries indicates, nonstate actors can in some instances complement or even rival states in the execution of governance functions in world affairs. It is often assumed that governance (i.e., the formulation and implementation of societal rules) occurs only through the public sector of governments and intergovernmental agencies. However, in contemporary world politics, many regulatory processes are conducted at least partly through nonstate bodies. The many instances of private transnational governance include the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (for settlement of disputes involving TNCs), the Wolfsberg Group (for guidelines to prevent money laundering), and the Forestry Stewardship Council (for certification of sustainable logging).

In numerous other cases, governance of world affairs transpires through multistakeholder combinations of state and nonstate actors. Thus, for example, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has since 1920 operated as a triangular collaboration among governments, employer federations, and trade unions. More recently, created multistakeholder governance bodies include the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, for corporate social responsibility schemes), the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN, for the regulation of domain names), and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. In addition, most major interstate gatherings (such as United Nations conferences and Group of Eight summits) are nowadays accompanied by parallel meetings of nonstate actors.

The Future of Nonstate Actors

To be sure, nothing in the preceding discussion points to an approaching irrelevance of states in world politics. Especially from the 1970s to the 1990s, certain transnationalists and globalists have suggested that the proliferation and growth of nonstate actors entail a decline or even a demise of the state. Yet the situation is clearly not a zero-sum game. As the example of multistakeholder forums illustrates, states and nonstate actors are often in relationships of cooperation and mutual reinforcement. Indeed, many states have expanded and gained increased capacities at the same time that nonstate actors have grown and become more prominent. Bigger states in particular continue to be great powers in world affairs. Although some analysts have highlighted the prospect of so-called failed states, thus far only a handful of countries have even temporarily experienced a comprehensive state collapse. On the whole, states remain highly robust in a world that is also populated by nonstate actors.

Hence the issue is less whether nonstate entities matter in world politics and whether states will survive but more how and why state and nonstate bodies interact in the ways that they do. Dispensing with unrealistic statism, as the above discussion
has done, is rather straightforward. However, determining more precisely how and why nonstate actors are relevant in world affairs is more problematic and controversial. Widely divergent answers to this question are available, depending on whether one adopts a liberalist, constructivist, Marxist, feminist, poststructuralist, or other theoretical perspective on world politics. In particular, the different approaches relate actors (both state and nonstate) to contrasting conceptions of social structure and structural power. However, debates about agent–structure relations go beyond the scope of the present entry. Suffice it to say here that establishing that nonstate actors matter is only one step in a much larger endeavor of building knowledge of world politics.

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See also Civil Society; Globalization; International Relations as a Field of Study; Multinational Corporations (MNCs); Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Realism in International Relations

Further Readings


Normative Political Theory

Political theory deals with the creation of good governing institutions according to some principle and the assessment of what the institutions do. Virtually by definition, assessment of institutions requires resolving issues in political theory and more or less simultaneously issues in social science. Although in our time the two streams seldom merge, both are essential to the task of political theory. Normative political theory offers a framework for the evaluative component of this assessment. This entry first reviews the modern origins of normative political theory and its explanatory basis and then examines its main issues: equality, civil society, civil liberties, justice, democracy, and constitutionalism. Because these issues are often discussed in substantial isolation from each other or with the principal focus on one major issue, as in John Rawls’s book _A Theory of Justice_, one might conclude that there is no general normative theory that covers all of these. Most of them are often used purely descriptively without any normative weight. For example, democracy is a form of government that can be well described; or rather, it is several different forms, each of which can be described independently of its normative justification.

One could consider normative political thought in the classical era of Plato and Aristotle; in the medieval thought of Aquinas, Marsilius of Padua, and others; or in modern thought from Thomas Hobbes to the present. However, because of space limitations, this entry focuses on modern thought, which is the most relevant to an understanding of contemporary politics. Normative political theory must be empirically grounded if it is to have any bearing on the study of politics and political science; although classical and medieval theories may have been somewhat grounded in their own time, they are far less so today.

There are two overriding concerns in contemporary political theory: (1) that citizens be formally equal in various ways and (2) that government and collective decision making be democratic. These concerns are essentially modern. There is virtually universal agreement on these two normative positions, with one major exception: that the supposition of equality may not apply to economic status or resources, as is centrally at issue in theories of distributive justice and in economic libertarianism. There is, however, strong agreement that citizens should be formally equal in politics, as in the slogan “One person, one vote.” John Stuart Mill
argued that more intellectually and educationally qualified citizens should have extra votes; however, virtually no political or democratic theorist would defend this view today.

There are further normative commitments, many of which are social libertarian constraints on government actions. Articulate social libertarianism, such as that of Mill, however, is on the wane, especially in the United States, whose constitution can rightly be characterized as one of the truly great social libertarian documents and one that has had a massive impact around the world. Social libertarianism was earlier very nearly the American creed, although it never dominated any major political party, other than perhaps the Republican Party with William Howard Taft and later Robert Taft. Its popular decline in the United States today is not reflected in the writings of political theorists.

The modern era of political theory continues to contribute to the growth of explanatory political science as well as normative political theory. Indeed, because of the issues it must address, it must take into account the social science enterprise of explanation. In the struggle to master more or less normative issues, especially church–state relations, there is no well-defined boundary between normative and causal explanatory issues.

Starting the discussion of modern theory with Hobbes has an analytic point, not merely a historical one. Hobbes is the first major theorist who deliberately and systematically assumes that we are motivated primarily by our individual interests. He is committed to the centrality of individualism and self-interest. Contrary to many common views, he assumes that the only values of concern are individual interests and that there are no collective interests other than those that can be seen as aggregations of individual interests. This individualism has since been the basis of many arguments and counterarguments, to such an extent that the pros and cons of the individualist vision often dominate discussion in political theory. No one, therefore, can fully understand any major contemporary position in normative political theory without addressing individualism. Rawls shares this view, although he phrases the assumption in his own distinctive way. He supposes that we are “mutually disinterested” in the welfare of each other. The main point of this claim is to rule out envy over others’ shares of the collective provision.

Although the religious vision of politics has been important in the past, today this perspective is found mainly in Islam and in the Catholic, not the Aristotelian, half of the natural-law tradition.

Ironically, the classical era arguably has greater relevance to contemporary thought than does medieval thought because the former is de facto secular and in it there is presumed to be no higher authority than man. Hobbes dismisses reliance on supernatural inspiration, arguing that faith comes by hearing—that is to say, by being taught. In a sentence, he convincingly dismisses several centuries of political theorizing. Political theory had to begin almost de novo after leaving religious justifications behind. Although there are forerunners, we may take Hobbes as the de novo creative thinker who puts us on the path to modern political theory.

Normative political theory is in some respects an odd endeavor in that it is often carried on at the strictly theoretical level with little or no serious reference to our political experience, as for example in Plato’s Republic. Some authors refer to their work as “ideal theory.” This is apparently meant to be a defense of their approach. At its strongest, they can say that their position is aspirational. For example, one could concede that widespread egalitarian dispositions are not likely in our world at this time but still hold that egalitarian theorists should push our understanding of how to make egalitarianism work and how to refine the theory.

Modern Beginnings

Let us begin with two giants of social theory in the modern era: Thomas Hobbes and David Hume. Both Hobbes and Hume think that humans are primarily motivated by self-interest. Hume states this view with characteristic force in his Treatise on Human Nature: “Nothing is more certain, than that men are, in a great measure, governed by interest, and that even when they extend their concern beyond themselves, ’tis not to any great distance” (Pt. 2, sec. 7). This is Hume’s dominant claim about human nature in the Treatise. Holding this view seemingly must make his program to explain moral or mutually beneficial outcomes in the world of human and institutional action implausible. But that is his extraordinary program—to explain why it is that a large collection of substantially self-interested people could achieve justice and other
good social results, all without a primary or a religious commitment to acting morally.

Some moralists in Hume’s time assumed that moral views, moral character, and moral commitments were God-given. Hume, however, believed that our nature is not fundamentally moral; he further doubts all arguments for the truth of religious claims. Book 3 of Hume’s *Treatise* attempts to explain how we can act as though we were moral and how we can establish social rules, norms, and laws evidently without the necessary moral commitment to their working. A clue to his argument is that if we had characters such as the religious, moralistic, and pure-reason schools of thought suppose, we would not be much concerned with law because we would be well-ordered without its additional incentives. Hume argues that debate over law and moral issues is essentially proof that these visions are wrong and that we need tougher analysis.

Both Hobbes and Hume enunciate laws of nature, by which they both mean essentially sociological conclusions by which we must abide if we are to prosper. For example, both theorists hold that it is a law of nature that we should keep our promises (Hobbes more often speaks of covenants and contracts). Hobbes and, more clearly, Hume argue that it is in our interest to keep our promises. Why? Because if we do not, we will find it difficult to develop cooperative, promising relations with people whose cooperation would occasionally serve us well.

Both philosophers focus on the problem of social order, without which there will be turmoil, anarchy, and even violence, leading to a world in which all will be relatively destitute. Hume bases his own theory of social order on spontaneous coordination over centuries of social development. In essence, he invents and applies one of the greatest and most powerful theories in all of social theory: his theory of convention.

The most important difference between Hobbes and Hume is in how a sovereign is empowered ab initio. Hobbes recognizes that this is a difficult problem for him and his hypothetical account of the creation of government by collective agreement, or a “social contract.” In his discussion of the metaphor of the social contract, Hobbes does not address the issue of how individuals would transfer their power as physical selves to an all-powerful sovereign. Hume is notoriously hostile to the idea of a social contract, which he thinks is a philosopher’s perversely unrealistic, false, and implausible device. Hobbes himself soon abandons his own social contract.

**Explanatory Theory**

Hobbes does not present a general moral theory. He sees himself as the scientist of social order. John Locke, writing after Hobbes, assumes that people have natural rights, especially a right to own the property (land) with which they have mixed their labor. This intuitionist vision has had an enormous impact ever since, as in the work of Robert Nozick, although it has been repeatedly dismissed as ungrounded and irrelevant. It is a rare instance of intuitionism in political theory, although intuitionism is a major part of moral theory. On this score, political theory is far more solidly grounded. This account, however, cannot readily generalize into a fuller moral theory. Moreover, in a view that most of us might share, Hobbes and Hume reject any notion of property or ownership if there is no state to define and regulate them. Indeed, it is only by law that property is defined. In Locke’s vision, when you mix your labor with a bit of unowned land, it becomes yours even before there is a state to define ownership. The idea of mixing one’s labor may long predate Locke’s account. In old English property law, when you sell your land to me, I must shovel some of its soil as though symbolically to acknowledge its being transformed into my property. Locke’s theory elevates this odd English legal practice from a mere custom to the status of a moral principle. If the land has no prior owner, you may appropriate it according to the laws of the nation of which it is a part.

One of the great strengths of political philosophers such as Hobbes, Hume, Mill, and Rawls is that they take seriously and try to understand the world to which their theories are to apply, although Rawls largely passes on the burden of understanding the political and institutional world to others who, one hopes, wish to apply his theory of justice. Those others would have to include social scientists with deep understandings of institutions, how they work, and what they can be expected to accomplish. So far, those others have primarily been
moral philosophers who focus almost exclusively on the moral aspects of Rawls’s theory and claims rather than on the workability of the theory as a system of justice.

Rawls recognizes that institutional analysis is based on a normative theory. He supposes that relevant institutions will manage redistribution and inculcate a commitment to justice in the population. But these institutions must first be designed. There is a circular quality to this hope because without the widespread commitment to a just distribution, relevant institutions are unlikely to arise or be created. What set of just institutions could push, say, the U.S. Congress or the British Parliament aside? Is there a living Republican or Tory in government who would support policies of redistribution at such a level as to achieve a high degree of equality in American or British society? Some revolutionary movements would achieve near equality by impoverishing everyone, as Winstanley and the Diggers argued for England in their time. So far, no one has proposed a serious way to achieve greater equality without massive negative trade-offs. The workability of Rawls’s theory is therefore deeply in question. Suppose that the leadership of an advanced democratic industrial state tried to implement Rawls’s theory of justice. Is there any chance at all that it would significantly advance the society toward justice as fairness? If this empirical question cannot be answered, the enterprise is in default.

Hobbes tries to ground his theory in an account of how individuals act and an explanation of why they act this way, and he assertively sees himself as a scientist. He uses his account of human incentives to explain how the world works. This is an astonishingly grand move on his part. On the other hand, he sets himself a very restricted purpose—to ground social order and then to leave individuals to make their own “investments” in their own prosperity once there is order. Stylized brief readings of Hobbes restrict his concern to survival, thereby trivializing his theory. In fact, he gives far more space to order as the necessary enabler of individual prosperity through protecting individuals’ efforts on their own behalf against plundering and theft. In this vision, he foreshadows the later economic arguments of Adam Smith and others. His draconian dictator reduces the risks of planting our gardens or otherwise investing for our future. Even today, we might see Hobbes’s concern for order as an incontrovertible element of good government. People in the North Atlantic community, however, can typically take such an order for granted and may assume rather than explain it.

**Equality and Inequality**

It is commonly presumed that equality is prima facie preferable to inequality (this is, of course, a moral claim) but that it should be balanced against other considerations that may causally trade-off with it (an explanatory or causal claim). Moral and explanatory theories therefore come sharply together in the analysis of distributive justice and egalitarianism. There are at least five standard arguments about the interaction between inequality and trade-offs with production. In some of these, inequality enhances production, either because unequal incentives (such as higher salaries) or unequal power (as in hierarchy) is needed to organize the production of beneficial goods, both personal and collective. These two arguments generalize to macrolevel arguments about the organization of society:

1. Equality entails reduced incentives to those who are especially productive and leads to a trade-off between equality and efficiency of production and therefore lower average welfare.

2. Hierarchy, and likely therefore inequality, is virtually necessary for achieving many desirable social goals.

3. Those who have greater resources than others can be trailblazers who support innovations that eventually benefit almost everyone.

These three relationships all involve direct trade-offs through increasing the overall welfare at the price of reduced equality, or vice versa. There are also trade-offs of greater equality with other considerations. Two that are well argued in extensive literatures are as follows:

4. The political power to attempt to achieve equality entails the power to do much else, including very undesirable things such as suppression of thought and dissent. In 1934, Joseph Stalin declared that socialist realism, a gross misnomer, was the only legitimate style for artists. After not
enjoying a performance of Shostakovich’s music, he banned the gloriously patriotic composer for a while. Stalin’s tastes ruled. Many artists died or ended in the Gulag, and many of the great painters and poets of the era were suppressed. The effort to achieve equality has often gone badly awry in similar ways even in supposedly humane places, such as Tanzania under its founding prime minister, Julius Nyerere. Nyerere’s program of African socialism included an economic policy, *ujamaa*, that called for the collectivization of farms and forced relocation. Although the intention was to foster economic equality, the policy exacerbated poverty and proved to be unviable.

5. Equality in a single society requires autarky and risks the selective emigration of the especially productive individuals to nations where they can thrive better. The emigration is likely to be economically crippling for the society being abandoned, as it was in the former East Germany and Czechoslovakia under Soviet hegemony. In both these nations, as also in politically liberal India, deliberate policies of autarky hampered economic development. When India ended autarkic control of its economy in 1991, its economy exploded into very rapid growth. China’s economy has similarly boomed since it turned to economic liberalism while maintaining political autocracy.

With respect to the first three arguments, inequality de facto can typically benefit people other than merely those who are better-off. The negative side of inequality in the last two cases comes from the side effects of attempting to achieve equality and not from a direct trade-off between equality and welfare. But these patterns are all potentially relevant for the institutional structures for achieving distributive justice. The last two are at the institutional or societal level and should therefore be especially interesting to political scientists. They are at the normative core of political theory.

Each of these relationships involves a trade-off of equality for something else: productivity, successful organization, freedom of expression, economic viability, or innovation. All of these involve productivity in some way. In each of the five cases, although there might be disagreements about the scale of the trade-off of equality that we should bear, there is not likely to be disagreement that some trade-off is desirable or even almost logically necessary. These issues are especially important in the microcontexts of differential power of groups, such as those defined by gender and ethnicity, and in the macrocontexts of national and developing economies.

**Civil Society**

It is a broadly held view that democracy and liberalism require civil society. Discussions of civil society are both normative and causal. The normative claims are that we will be better people and that we will constitute better polities or societies if we have civil society. This sometimes sounds like nothing more than a definitional claim, but it is also sometimes a causal claim, such as those John Stuart Mill, Carole Pateman, and others make for a connection between liberal democracy and personal autonomy and development. But the most challenging and potentially interesting of the claims of exponents of civil society is the grand causal claim that we need it if we are to cohere politically and socially. This is often accompanied by the claim that we need broad trust in government if government is to serve us well.

Against these theses, there is a long tradition of distrust in government, especially in the United States. Why distrust? Because the experiences both of England for centuries before the U.S. Constitution and of the 13 states during their brief union under the Articles of Confederation were rent by government attempts to control the economy in often destructive ways. Often there were identifiable beneficiaries of the controls. Hence, given the power to intervene, one can be fairly sure that governments will often do so. The straightforward incentives of government agents are to arrange benefits for themselves through impositions on others. Such incentives are a recipe for distrust in the sense that those on the wrong end of the interventions can see that their own interests are sacrificed for those of others merely because someone has the power to intervene. Distrust is therefore not merely a theoretical stance; it is a clear response to experience. One need not have a theory of why any kind of government exceeds its bounds when one has extensive evidence that it does. In the 20th century, technological innovations radically increased the scope of governmental excess to include massive, murderous brutality.
Even before James Madison’s arguments for the U.S. Constitution, the recognition that governments were prone to abusing people in various ways was a central part of the development of liberal thought, especially in the work of Locke, Hume, and Smith. The original contributions of Madison to this long tradition were, first, to create a government that was self-regulated so that it could not easily overreach its authority and, second, to give that government very little authority while also diminishing the authority of the individual states. In Madison’s view, the states were the principal threat to individual liberty, both economic and social.

**Civil Liberties**

Liberty is the antithesis (and victim) of despotism. Securing civil liberties is the main point of constitutionalism and of court review of legislative and administrative acts. Historically, the defining issue in civil liberties in the nascent United States was the separation of church and state. One might even say that religion was the most important issue in English and U.S. political history and remains among the most important today, although apparently more in the United States than in the United Kingdom. England slowly followed the American solution despite having a state church that now has virtually no political role. The issue is perhaps most often cast as theoretical or normative. The principal issue on the ground for several centuries was, however, pragmatic. It was how to stop interference in politics and governance from the clergy, the church, and especially the Pope, all of whom acted as though they were hierarchically superior to secular political leaders, whom they even thought they had the God-given right to remove or force from office. Many English citizens and leaders long wanted such religious interference out of politics, and many were eventually willing to change their religious commitment in order to force the Catholic Church out of the political life of England.

Many thinkers also address the abuse of individuals by the church in its efforts to impose particular beliefs. Hobbes and Locke suppose that such efforts cannot succeed because they think that beliefs are not subject to choice, so that it is pointless to punish “wrong” beliefs. Hume would go further to say there is no way to establish the truth of religious views. In any case, punishing beliefs as wrong is an epistemological sin. If you have not chosen your Catholic or Protestant beliefs, you cannot sensibly be held responsible for them.

If they are politically empowered, conflicting religious views get in the way of social order, as in the European wars of religion. They also complicate constitutional arrangements, as Madison and Thomas Jefferson recognized. With a multiplicity of religions seeking special status, the only sensible move is to deny recognition to all sects. This is both normatively and pragmatically a compelling move. In the views of Hobbes, Locke, and many others, it is also epistemologically compelling. Reaction to centuries of brutal treatment of people for holding wrong beliefs is one of the fundamental causes of the rise of liberalism, along with reaction to the frequent arrogance and arbitrariness of government officials, especially monarchs.

John Locke and Samuel von Pufendorf largely address theoretical issues of religion and governance, as opposed to pragmatic issues of actual problems on the ground. Many English thinkers before and after them have been far more concerned with the latter, especially with papal and clerical interference in domestic politics. After much bloodshed, the church was subdued enough to be transformed into the far less intrusive Anglican church. The first major move, on largely pragmatic grounds, to take government out of religious hands altogether was the separation of state and church implied in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. French constitutional provisions were even stronger after the revolution and have led to banning the hijab in public facilities, such as schools, and even in public. These policies have overwhelming support in France, in part because overt religious display is severely contentious and has been since the revolution, which was as anti-Catholic as anti-aristocratic.

Nations in which a particular religion is given substantial political influence generally tend to be illiberal, as in the cases of Iran under the ayatollahs and Saudi Arabia under Wahabbist hegemony. In the latter, possessing a Bible is a capital offense. Under both these regimes, the harshest principles of sharia law are imposed.

The substantial separation of church and state seems to be a necessary step for creating a liberal
society. This is likely not a theoretical but only a pragmatic claim, but it fits the contemporary situation in many nations. Again, philosophy must be informed by causal understandings if it is to be relevant to contemporary debate on theory or practice.

There is another pragmatic objection to state sanction of individual beliefs. The multiplicity of faiths in the United States and many other nations makes establishment of a state religion very conflictive, although this is not an issue for Locke, who would establish a state church but would not punish those who do not follow its beliefs. As though the issue were strictly a matter of normative theory, too much of what is written today still neglects pragmatic objections to state involvement in religion, especially Madison.

Given all the debate in the United States surrounding the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, debate that suggests that this is a severely fraught issue, it is remarkable that there was apparently no constitutional test of any law on religious grounds for nearly a century after the adoption of the constitution. The case that finally went to the Supreme Court to test the meaning and scope of the principle of the separation of church and state was Reynolds v. United States (1879), in which the court allowed the constitutionality of laws that penalized bigamy even for those men who claimed that multiple marriages were part of their Mormon religious duty. The court quoted Jefferson as holding that “the legitimate powers of the government reach actions only, and not beliefs.” Hence, the government could regulate behavior, including behavior motivated and even supposedly required by religious beliefs. This position is causally consonant with the view of Hobbes that the state can act against behavior but that it should not attempt to “correct” beliefs, which one perhaps cannot even know a person has and which one cannot force the person to change, even under threat from the Grand Inquisitor.

The constitutional protection of positive individual rights, perhaps of the freedom of religion foremost, has changed over the centuries, and therefore, the legal conception of the content of religion has changed and broadened. Naturally, this has been especially true after Reynolds. For example, the doctrine of separation of church and state stands uneasily behind conscientious objection to military service. It is argued that one’s religious commitment to pacifism or objecting to killing on the battlefield is violated by requirements to serve in the military. Proof of one’s religious beliefs on this issue is prima facie demonstrated by membership in a church that has long preached pacifism, such as the Quakers and Jehovah’s Witnesses, but the idea has been broadened to include nonreligious moral objections.

### Distributive Justice

Hume famously, if too easily, dismisses the quest for “exact” equality. As Brian Barry argues in *Theories of Justice*, Rawls treats fairness as perhaps a secondary concern with welfare and its enhancement, as in his difference principle, which allows inequalities if they are produced by institutions that enhance the welfare of the worst-off class of people. Indeed, the issues in equality and its trade-offs with efficiency are at the core of Rawls’s theory. Thus, there are two parts of the theory: fairness and mutual advantage. The authors of the U.S. Constitution (1787) were worried that democracy would bring the majority, who were poor farmers, to power and that they would confiscate or tax away property to redistribute its value to themselves. In the most advanced nations, to which Rawls supposes his theory applies, there are virtually no remaining subsistence farmers, who a century ago still defined poverty for most people in many societies.

Recall Rawls’s theory of mutual disinterest in each other’s welfare. If the best distribution we can manage gives me fewer resources than it gives you, I am not concerned that you have done better than I have. If that is not true, we might degenerate into caring about how each of us ranks rather than our welfare per se.

If Rawls’s preferred social organization is to be achieved voluntarily rather than by forceful imposition, it seems implausible that anyone now living will see any significant progress toward it. Therefore, his theory seems at best to be an ideal theory in our time, and we can be morally certain that we will not see it put to work. Voluntary moves toward just distributions face a grand instance of the logic of collective action. The logic of collective action is devastating for the voluntary achievement of any large-scale provision. As Hume
says, it is impossible that people would contribute to a massive collective provision. *Impossible* is too strong a term, but only just barely so. That logic coupled with strong leanings toward self-interest implies that Rawls’s theory could be put into effect only through coercion or through radically altering human nature to override self-interest.

**Representative Democracy**

Democracy has taken many forms from its earliest rise as direct democracy with all citizens in the same forum, making decisions together. In contemporary societies, this is of course not feasible for national governance. Hence, the basic form that democracy must take is *representative* democracy, which is a new invention to handle large societies. Strictly speaking, only direct, face-to-face democracy is republican. The most important theorists of representative democracy are John Stuart Mill and Bernard Manin. Any ideal version of republicanism is doomed under modern conditions. Large size requires representative government with representatives who cannot possibly represent all of the diverse elements of their constituencies; frequent, short parliaments are desirable for republican values, with state and local elections every year. But all of this is impractical in our geographic and demographic conditions. Unfortunately, in a representative system, a strong parliament meeting frequently exacerbates the separation of the parliamentarians from the people, and representatives may come to resemble the rulers rather than the ruled.

Democratic practice is not without major flaws and serious failings. Briefly, let us consider a few problems in the working of representative democracy: First, deliberative democracy makes demands that go well beyond what is possible and at its worst descends to yelling and name calling when activists mobilize crowds to vent their ire at their opponents and elected officials. At its best, significant participation and deliberation beyond voting and talking with associates is restricted to proportionately very few people. Second, Anthony Downs argues convincingly that individuals generally have no interest in going to the trouble of voting. There is a vast literature both for and against his claims. Third, issues of equality and inequality suggest that the egalitarian core principle of democracy—one person, one vote—is de facto violated by massive spending and by differential mobilization, as in the antidemocratic disruptions of vote counting in Florida’s presidential election in 2000.

Finally, pause a moment to consider the perversion of the role of governors, as argued by John Calhoun. After leaving the national political stage a decade before the U.S. Civil War, Calhoun wrote *A Disquisition on Government*, which was an analysis of forces distorting the U.S. political system. In it, he stated that “those who exercise power and those subject to its exercise—the rulers and the ruled—stand in antagonistic relations to each other.” Calhoun described the rulers and the ruled as two hostile classes: “The advantages of possessing the control of the powers of government, and, thereby, of its honors and emoluments, are, of themselves, exclusive of all other considerations, ample to divide [any] community into two great hostile parties.” The division here is not only one of status but also one of emoluments. In essence, Calhoun argues that political officeholders are separated from the rest of the community; they are a class apart. The supposed trustee becomes independent from the persons reposing their trust. The creature is stronger than the creator; hence, we suffer a lack of confidence in the representative system.

**Constitutionalism**

The mechanical point of a constitution is to establish institutions of governance and to protect citizens from arbitrary state intrusions. In any given context, institutions could take many forms. Without prior order, a constitution cannot likely be made to work; indeed, without order, it might even be hard to engage some political body to write a constitution, although one might be promulgated by a current government, even an autocratic government. Having a prior history of successful government might be the best predictor of constitutional success. For example, the 13 American colonies had working governments and even, in some cases, articulate constitutions before the federal constitution of 1787. This prior experience, as well as the experience of living under a relatively orderly English government, enabled the constitutionalists of 1787 to write their constitution in relative quiet.

The main focuses of constitutionalism are to enable government and to constrain it. These
purposes sound contradictory, and they commonly are. Why create government to constrain government? As odd as the question sounds, it is easy to answer, so easy that its answers were likely taken for granted by the authors of the U.S. Constitution in 1787 and by its ratifiers in subsequent state conventions. In this particular case, the federal constitution was needed to override state constitutions, especially in economic policy, with free trade among the states and exclusive federal regulation and taxing of international trade. Thereby, the constitution established a nation. In many other cases, extant governments have been altered or replaced by newly created constitutions. Many of these extant governments were autocracies, usually monarchical or military.

The main constraint on government action from a strong constitution is the rule of law. The rule of law against arbitrary government is the high dogma of 17th-century English constitutionalists. It essentially involves limitations on the exercise of official power. This is now often seen as the main point of a constitution and the central principle of Anglo-American law. Nonarbitrariness implies equal treatment, in part by blocking arbitrary action by monarchs and political office holders. It appears that the rule of law does not require a written constitution, because England has none and yet its rulers have generally followed the liberal principle. Moreover, from the earliest times, Saxons in Germany lived under an unwritten “constitution” of liberty, a fact that distinguishes English political developments.

There are two general strategic approaches to constitutionalism, treating the issue as primarily one of contracting or one of coordinating. That there could be varied forms that the constitution for a particular society could take already suggests that the problem is at least partly one of coordination. With only modest changes, the very brief and often vague U.S. Constitution or the massively detailed Indian Constitution might both work in the sense that they define institutions that, when put in place, successfully govern their societies.

Perhaps the dominant school of thought on how government may be morally justified has been contractarianism, to which an enormous array of philosophers have contributed, including classical thinkers as well as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and countless others. There are subtle variations in contractarian arguments, but essentially they rely on a claim of consent that obligates us to obey the government to which we have consented. This is commonly framed as a moral argument. We are morally obligated by our prior consent. This is perhaps most clearly asserted by Locke, who is likely the most influential proponent of the social contract in the Anglo-Saxon world. Hobbes holds more simply that we collectively agree on election of a tyrant or dictator to coerce us into decent behavior. His is not an argument from ostensibly moral consent but from rational, self-interested consent. After taking this limited step of establishing government, there is no further project for the contractors to take on, and they have no further role in governing themselves.

Calling this contract theory can be seen as a grand instance of persuasive definition. If you and I contract legally, we commonly are morally bound to perform, unless we both agree not to do so. Hume mercilessly demolishes the implicit historical arguments of the development from a state of nature to a contracted government, as Hobbes posits while saying that such a state probably never existed. Hume notes simply that if we had contracted for or consented to our government, we would remember the event. Evidently none of us does remember, nor is there much of a record of our forebears having agreed. Worse still, many of us can hardly understand the contractarian claim. Contemporary constitutions are generally written by committees and voted into effect by some far less than unanimous part of the national population. Opponents of contractarians would argue that the masses cannot be morally obligated by such a process.

Having demolished the going theory in his time, Hume offers an alternative account, stating that government arises by convention. There was no start date, and there was most surely no conference room agreement. Our government evolves over time and may become dramatically different in form from one generation to the next. The form of the government is generally an unintended consequence of the disparate interests and inputs of the citizens, as portrayed in Charles McIlwain’s history of constitutionalism.

In this view, the “contract” in the social contract is generally seen as morally binding by analogy
with a standard ordinary contract agreed to by the parties and backed by the law. Coordination as in Hume’s theory is not morally binding; either it works or it does not. If there is a coordination convention, it might be immoral not to comply with it. For example, not driving on the right when there is a convention of driving on the right would be murderous and immoral as well as stupid. If I go to Australia, I will do my best to follow the Australian driving convention. But this choice does not turn on any prior agreement. My connection with the coordination is not a moral but a rational, self-interested commitment. We all act from our own interest by driving right in North America; without agreement or negotiation, we create a beneficial order for all. Similarly, Hume’s convention account of the state is not normative, and any state that arises by convention is neither right nor wrong in principle. In Hume’s vision, this is a plus. It is his great, persuasive move: creating collective benefits and good institutions from the self-interested motivations of individuals. Prior theorists almost uniformly think that self-interest is an obstacle to good government and social cooperation. In contrast, Hume sees it as central to the explanation of achieving good government.

In sum, a reason for or an appeal of social contractarianism is that it seemingly yields a moral reason to comply with its dictates. As François Guizot says, the hypothesis “of a primitive contract, as the only legitimate source of social law, rests upon an assumption that is necessarily false and impossible” (Pt. 1, Lecture 4). Unfortunately, on this issue, the theory fails. Its failure seems to be a source of nostalgia for many theorists who would like contractarianism to work and to cohere. Alas, it does neither. The vision of general consent is sweet but contrary to the possibilities of human nature in a world of scarcity of both status and goods. Again, Guizot states that the “necessary coexistence of society and government shows the absurdity of the hypothesis of the social contract” (Pt. 1, Lecture 6). It is astonishing that this cooperative vision is most famously argued by the nearly antisocial Rousseau. Guizot, who has done the massive work of cataloging the complicated, back-and-forth development, over more than a millennium, of constitutionalism and representative government in Europe, seems morally offended by the simplistic claims for a social contract as the standard of the right.

Conclusion

We have only three major, broadly developed normative schools of thought on this question: the liberal, utilitarian, and egalitarian schools. There is also a developing fairness school that has been classified as a theory only recently in the Rawlsian theory of distributive justice. We have yet to see how it will stand the test of time. Rawls’s followers often seem far more to fragment than to develop the theory. As noted above, what the theory most needs now is social-scientific analysis of institutions.

Utilitarianism is a general moral and political theory—in fact, the only one, Rawls says. Liberalism is a richly developed political theory that can live with almost any extant major moral theory; indeed, many of the great liberal writers, such as Mill, Hume, and Smith, generally brought individual morality and political theory together. In this combination seemingly across the two levels, utilitarianism and liberalism are especially richly developed. Many other, often ad hoc, arguments do not catch on to become genuine schools of thought. At its height, in the work of John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, and Leonard T. Hobhouse, liberalism was generally seen as at one with utilitarianism. Libertarianism is a limited version of liberalism, which has many followers, such as Nozick. Alternative approaches make little headway. For example, variants of Kantian liberalism, as in the Victorian writings of Thomas Hill Green, have virtually no strong contributors today. The extraordinarily deep moral vision of Kant and his school does not readily carry over to the study of political institutions, which seem not to interest most Kantians. Marxism is a partial political theory that still has many proponents, but its main focus has been economic, and its economic theory largely fails. It has essentially no moral theory adjunct; indeed, many Marxists reject standard views of morality, as though to say that all social relations are caused by natural forces, not by choices of free agents. Hence, in their view, choice and morality are not relevant to our explanations.

It would hardly make sense to discuss some problems in our social world without the use of at least verbal game theory, strategic analysis, or economic models. Debates over how a constitution comes into being or how it works once it is enacted are unlikely to be fruitful without the clarity of the game-theoretic argument for dividing the two
main positions on this issue into contract and coordination. Hume had a nearly miraculous gift for grasping strategic interactions entirely verbally. Thomas Schelling says he is not a game theorist, meaning one who contributes to the theory. Rather, he is a practitioner, using game structures to help clarify patterns of social interaction. Political theory needs such practitioners.

The beginnings of liberalism and liberal society are in the resolution of the dreadful conflict between civil order and religious beliefs. The church’s pervasive meddling in English politics provoked arguments that became general claims for further attaining civil liberties. Monarchs in England fought off the church, but they could not indefinitely fight off their own citizens. English history then informed debates in Philadelphia in 1787. Had the Church followed its own ideology, its minions would have rendered unto Caesar what was Caesar’s. Instead, they hastened the growth of liberty and liberalism, which went far toward destroying the Church. The ultimate move was the separation of church and state, which we might justly call the necessary constitutional liberty.

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See also Democracy, Theories of; Equality; Justice; Liberalism; Liberty; Political Philosophy; Political Theory; Rights

Further Readings


Normative Theory in International Relations

The theory of international relations (IR) is subdivided into an analytical field, which describes and explains international events, and a normative field, which prescribes conduct and formulates moral judgments. This second field aims at producing ideals regarding what IR ought to be.

This entry first reviews the evolution of normative theory as technological advances and the emergence of nation-states created the need for new norms to govern IR. During the past 3 decades, norms in IR have undergone a second period of expansion, as a result of increased interest on the part of academics, along with factors outside academia, including globalization, the end of bipolarity, and terrorist attacks. After exploring this development, the entry examines the dilemmas associated with war, including the question of how to define war and issues related to decisions in the aftermath of war. Is a military intervention necessary to protect victims of genocide? Should innocents be killed in the name of political community? Should soldiers’ duties end after victory? Next, problems arising in the context of global justice are discussed, with a focus on corrective, distributive, and environmental justice. The origin, the nature, and the extent of obligations in humanitarian law and in social redistribution are discussed, as well as new realms such as protection of the environment and the use of international sanctions. The entry concludes with a look at the possibility of a global world order in which national identities can be transcended in a postnational, global community characterized by cosmopolitan democracy. There are various conceptions of the global political order regarding the creation of a cosmopolitan democracy: Is the disjunction between modern liberty (focused on the private sphere) and the republican public sphere in democratic states even greater in a cosmopolitan democracy? Is the political unity of the world possible despite the plurality of cultures and of ways of life?

In taking a philosophical approach to IR, normative IR plays several roles. The first function of normative theory is to argue for epistemological transparency. Any scientific theory expresses the more or less hidden normative preferences of the analyst, and this can give rise to the development of ideologies in the public sphere. For many, this first function often leads to a deadlock. The second function of normative theory, which this entry explores, is related to orientation. The philosopher Immanuel Kant, to illustrate what he means by “orientation in thinking,” uses spatial indicators—the north, the south, the east, and then the west. Afterward, the same reasoning is applied to the world of logic. Orientation in thinking means to come of age, to be able to judge by oneself, to use one’s common sense to make the right choice. To achieve this, shadow zones or fault lines have to be identified. This is a major purpose of political theory, according to John Dunn (1996). He insists that political theory should consist in indicating “a series of sharp, and as yet very poorly recognized disjunctions” (p. 33). The issues discussed in this entry reveal points of tension between the universal and the particular and among liberals, communitarians, socialists, and pragmatists, with the aim of finding the right relationship among them.

The Resurgence of Normative Theory

In the 1960s, Stanley Hoffmann insisted that political philosophy was in a lamentable state. According to him, this weakness was the result of philosophers’ difficulties in applying their ideals at...
the international level. Martin Wight emphasizes the same issue when he distinguishes between a theory of good life (inside political entities) and a theory of survival (between political entities). Today, the situation is quite different for philosophy, which appears as an “old thought” in IR.

**An Old Thought**

The term *international* was first used by Jeremy Bentham in 1789. However, modern philosophies of IR were born in the Renaissance under the influence of two processes. The first corresponds to the transition from feudalism to the sovereign state. The question of resort to force became of great interest. Private wars conducted without the endorsement of the monarch were forbidden, and at the same time potenatitas was transferred from the Church to temporal power (through the creation of an interstate Law of War). The principle of sovereignty was built against foreign powers (the Pope and the Emperor), and rules were set up to implement a legitimate practice of war between states. The second process is related to the “great discoverers.” Galileo’s telescope, Copernicus’s astronomical system, and Columbus’s explorations led to a much broader understanding of human beings and their world. With this new recognition of human diversity came questions about the relationships among people. The entry into modernity was marked by a new awareness that the time of autarky was over.

Nevertheless, philosophy did exist before the construction of modern states. Even in ancient and medieval times, philosophers considered how to define otherness through the boundaries of churches, cities, and communities. Stoicism defended a moral universalism that transcended ethnic differences. In the Middle Ages, the concept of empire involved a pacific function that was theologically justified. Civic humanism, which first appeared in the Italian peninsula, would become one of the sources of foreign policies even in Great Britain and the United States. Thus, foreign relations came to be theorized by normative discourses, which reveal different ways of considering the boundaries between inside and outside.

With modernity and the rise of the nation-state, relations between states become a more complex issue that became visible through the constitution of political science as a new discipline. In 1919, the birth of IR as a science brought back these normative orientations. The first debate opposed liberals and realists. Liberals promoted not only Aufklärung but also “doux commerce” (Baron de Montesquieu), historical progress through education, and the peaceful virtues of democracy. These were the target of realists’ criticism, which stressed the role of the sovereign states and their competition and overshadowed biological and spiritual factors. However, the moral dimension of liberal thought was acknowledged by Hans Morgenthau himself, who is known as the father of an approach that separates morality from politics. As observers and judges, political scientists have to denounce wrong choices (as Morgenthau did during the Vietnam War). As practitioner, the statesman must adopt an ethic of “lesser evil,” which breaks with an idealist perspective without opting for an ethic that claims the absolute good, which is inaccessible. Contrary to the English school (Martin Wight), the major part of the following generation was strongly influenced by positivism, which was at its peak from the 1980s; the behavioralist moment has departed from these normative trends.

**Intra-Academic Factors in the Resurgence of Normative Theory**

The first intra-academic factor in favor of the development of normative theory lies at the heart of Western political theory. John Rawls’s opus magnum, *A Theory of Justice* (1971), gave to normative theory a second birth. Although Rawls did not directly tackle the issue of international justice in this early work, several commentators did, thus generating a broad consideration of the idea of global distributive justice.

The second factor lies within IR itself. In the 1980s, critics of new research on scientific realism (structural realism and neorealism) or liberalism broadened the basis of their critique and questioned the scientific authority of these works by means of philosophy. The return of norms, narrowly speaking (rules of international law) and in the wider sense (standards of conduct for public and private actors), is one of their best arguments. These approaches tended to explain the nature of international norms (their origin, implementation, and national integration and change) as well as
their impact on states’ behavior. But above all, they produced an ethical discourse on what global regulation ought to be that nourishes several sectors of the field—for example, humanitarian interventions and strategic cultures. This is why they deserve the designation of ideational turn. Such tendencies can be considered as a return to the origin of the field, as the first interparadigmatic debate between liberals and realists was taking into consideration the issue of norms.

**Extra-Academic Factors in the Resurgence of Normative Theory**

Three extra-academic factors are especially noteworthy in the resurgence of normative IR. First, the process of globalization became stronger. If the abolition of distances originates from the first phase of modernity (the Renaissance), wars and development in communication technologies have strengthened this process. In this regard, globalization is characterized by a density of networks, a greater velocity of information flows, and a complex interdependence that favors transnational participation. In such a context, at what level must the accurate meaning of political action be defined—at the national level or beyond?

Furthermore, the end of bipolarity, which had structured identities since 1917, strengthened the already existing uncertainties regarding the identity of human beings, and the delineation between self and other became increasingly ambiguous. David Boucher (1997) sums up this situation in his famous question “Who am I?” and adds, “the consequent politics of recognition, inclusion and exclusion bring into focus not only politics of the nation, state and cosmopolitanism, but also of gender, race, religion and ethnicity” (p. 173).

Finally, terrorist attacks brought a new urgency to normative IR. When an unpredictable event happens and seems to brutally interrupt the political and social processes, reflection is needed to find out to what extent “the thread of tradition has been broken,” to use Hannah Arendt’s expression. The attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as the terrorist assaults in Bali and Mombasa (2002) and Madrid (2004) are evidence of such a breakdown. Of course, it would be presumptuous to consider that the attacks in the United States have had the same consequences that Nazism and the Holocaust had on a whole generation of intellectuals, such as Theodor Adorno and Hannah Arendt. However, the global media coverage of these events has confronted both analysts and citizens with something tragic that calls for a meaning. In Robert Keohane’s view, the 9/11 attacks reemphasized the importance of integrating normative issues into political philosophy and research on IR. Keohane emphasizes that a basic function of a liberal state is to protect its citizens from the fear of cruelty and that helping people come to terms with terrorism is part of that task.

**Dilemmas of War**

Contrary to pessimistic expectations, the bipolar system of the Cold War era ended without military struggle. However, the collective euphoria vanished, and fears regarding the feasibility of setting up a peaceful world order have appeared. Today, irregular wars, civil wars that evolved into ethnic cleansing, and increasing military interventions outside the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s authorization all indicate a need for moral judgments. Thomas Hobbes’s world is coming back, whereas it seemed that we were living in Kant’s. But is war still the *ultima ratio legem* between political communities? We can distinguish three kinds of dilemmas regarding the nature, the justification, and the termination of war.

**Defining War**

Modernity draws on a specific definition of war: a struggle between enemies conceived as political entities. For example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau gives a definition of war in his *Social Contract*: It is “a relation, not between man and man, but between state and state, and individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers” (Book 1, chap. 4). This definition is the opposite of current conceptions of war, which go far beyond its first usage. Today, one speaks of a war against terrorism, war against poverty, or war between civilizations. First, the number of violent actors has increased. The state is not the unique gladiator anymore. Moreover, some states, and even intergovernmental institutions, call on private military societies to provide security. Such a practice is ambiguous: Do private
Normative Theory in International Relations

actors benefit from a right to kill? Several libertarians subscribe to this possibility and are delighted to see that security is becoming a good, among others. They stand in opposition not only to classical liberals but also to radical anarcho-capitalists, who agree with Adam Smith on this point—that wealth alone cannot ensure peace because harmony of interests between states cannot be achieved. However, in Milton Friedman’s opinion, states must develop their own defense posture in the nuclear era.

In addition, Clausewitzian logic, which subordinates the military to politics, would also be called into question. New actors would put aside negotiations and compromises and instead advocate an apocalyptic rhetoric. States, particularly Western states, would also resort to a new approach to war. They would act not to restrain their enemies’ will but to socialize them by punishing them, with the aim of changing their values. These post-bipolar interventions are known as policing wars. The “war against terrorism” as well, which critics have called a false expression at a conceptual and an operational level alike, fits in with this logic of a “postnational war.” The underlying goal would consist in achieving a global political homogeneity on the basis of the dominant parties’ values. This tension is all the more acute when resort to force in the name of universal values happens to be selective; for instance, the type of international intervention considered in Bosnia will not be considered for Chechnya. How can the dilemma between universal principles and specific cases be resolved? Does the just war tradition, which refuses to separate ethics from politics, still provide accurate orientations?

Elaborated by Saint Augustine, the doctrine of just war sets up criteria regarding the beginning and the progress of military interventions: (a) justa causa (intervention should aim at protecting life), (b) auctoritas principi (only duly constituted authorities may wage war), and (c) recta intentio (rules of law must be observed). To adapt it to the 20th century, Michael Walzer undertook a revision of just war theory. First, he refocused justa causa on self-determination and resistance to aggression (against the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of an independent state). The highest purpose of a state—or of a community threatened by a metropolitan government—is to defend a territory and a way of life (shared values). Thus, Walzer subscribes to the British utilitarian ideals of the beginning of the 19th century, according to which democracy cannot be imposed from outside but arises out of particular experiences. Moreover, when a community is threatened and has no power to struggle, as in Kosovo in 1999, military intervention is required. This is the only type of just war acknowledged by Walzer. Humanitarian intervention should be a form of mutual help that occurs only after the identification of an “unbearable” aggression and sufficient inadequacies in self-defense.

Second, Walzer argues that only a “supreme emergency exemption” can justify aggression that violates moral norms such as the principle of discrimination between civilians and combatants. The best example of such justifiable but immoral action (“dirty hands”) remains Winston Churchill’s decision to bomb German towns in 1940 to 1941 in order to create intolerable conditions for the population. Neither absolutist nor utilitarian moral theories can explain such cases. Absolutist theories hold that moral rules or principles do not admit of any exceptions; hence, there can be no justification in the name of “innocent victims.” Utilitarian theories deny the relevance of innocence applied to a part of a population as long as the consequences of an act can benefit the greatest number. Both approaches reveal weaknesses. The real question is “How can we support criminal
acts decided on by leaders without forgetting the ethical issues?" As long as the action is taken by duly elected political leaders and the survival of the community is at stake, such actions can be endorsed. However, this limits the application of the emergency exemption; it cannot be applied to terrorist practices and can be used only by duly elected political leaders. Even though terrorist movements may claim to be acting in the name of *justa causa*, they cannot endorse any legitimate authority or assume responsibility for actions that are morally unjustified. Thus, states have the monopoly on “dirty hands.” This pro-state bias is one of the major criticisms formulated against this theory. Critics argue that Walzer is applying a double standard, denying to terrorists what is acceptable when done by political leaders. Thus, critics have questioned whether such an approach is based on too much confidence in the moral rectitude of our leaders.

After 9/11, just war and its underlying moral dilemmas reappeared at two different levels. The first one regards the interpretation of Operation Iraqi Freedom: Was this a humanitarian intervention to end a tyrannical form of government? Several analyses challenge this view on the ground that humanitarian interventions cannot be carried out to change the nature of a regime but only when great atrocities are committed. Beyond the question of the support brought by the other democratic states (desirable but not mandatory for those who hold that intervention to end tyranny is acceptable, necessary for those who believe that it is justified only in the case of great atrocities), what is called into question here is the goal of such intervention. Several interpreters have disagreed with the rhetoric of a crusade or crusading spirit to justify the Iraqi operation, invoking one of the main features of just war theory. The case of Iraq promotes in-depth discussion on the ethical aspects of the resort to force against an indirect threat. International law distinguishes between preemptive and preventive war. In moral philosophy, there is a similar debate on preventive war and anticipatory attack. According to Walzer, anticipatory attack would be morally acceptable only if three cumulative elements are present: (1) an intent to cause harm by a “determined enemy” (whether in the present or in the past), (2) a degree of active preparation that turns this intent into a positive danger (e.g., building up offensive forces along the border), (3) and a situation in which waiting or doing anything other than fighting increases the risk of being attacked. Preventive war, on the contrary, is based on speculative arguments and is aimed at maintaining a balance of power. It cannot, therefore, rely on moral values.

The second level concerns the possibility of applying just war theory to the fight against terrorism. In the Augustinian tradition, some thinkers define terrorist actions as acts of war that justify resort to force against their authors. Again, the “dirty hands” issue arises. When a terrorist refuses to reveal information about an attack against a civilian population, the use of torture has been approved according to the paradigm of the “tick- ing bomb.” It stands for an extreme case where torture is justified so as to prevent harm to citizens. This argument is consequentialist in its appeal to the prevention of an imminent catastrophe and its application of the principle of cost–benefit analysis. Such a procedure must be visible, and those responsible must be held accountable to minimize the frequency and the severity of the practice. However, despite these measures of control, the practice of “dirty hands” can be excessive or may favor double standards (discriminatory interpretation of torture by the actor).

The deployment of armed forces abroad and the struggle against terrorism in the name of just war are not instances of actions taken in accordance with consensual principles. Are we required to think on a “case-by-case” basis? Pragmatism argues that we must do so.

**Ending War**

Kant argues that victory is not synonymous with moral superiority. Military victory changes the balance of power but not one’s moral commitment. Kant adopts a symmetric reasoning: If rules of *jus bellum* are not respected at the beginning of a war, they will not be respected after the war either. However, just war theory is rather silent with respect to the end of war. What does the post-conflict situation require from the winner, and what kind of dilemmas are highlighted here?

Once a war has ended, five principles should be applied to avoid grievances leading to acts of revenge:
1. the proportionality (the fairness of the terms of a treaty) and the publication of peace agreements;
2. the recognition of civil rights;
3. discrimination among leaders, soldiers, and civilians when imposing sanctions;
4. compensation (financial restitution, material reconstruction, etc.); and
5. civil and military rehabilitation (demilitarization and disarmament, police and judicial retraining, and human rights education).

However, can these obligations guarantee a just peace and renew the reflection on positive peace? A just peace implies a “thin” recognition of the other, conceived as an autonomous entity from a liberal standpoint; a “thick” recognition of the cultural identity of the other; the renunciation of armed violence; and the establishment of rules, rights, and duties and their formalization in a legal document. The point is to create a new common language between different communities. Liberals have criticized this idea because they define peace in strictly legal terms. In other words, peace can only have a legal dimension in the framework of the existing international rules. This restrictive definition is grounded in the “cultural neutrality” of liberalism in the public sphere. Identity is therefore a concept that belongs to private life and is not acknowledged in the framework of diplomatic negotiations.

The danger of neocolonialism represents a second dilemma if the change of political system becomes the goal of the post–World War II era. Historical examples (the Japanese and the German experience) as well as consequentialist arguments (a government’s change is the best way to ensure security) may rule out this danger. However, this danger will always exist. The imposition of democracy by force appears to be a revolutionary practice, all the more dangerous since it is based on a strategy of exportation that excludes any other way of implementing democracy.

Dilemmas of Global Justice

According to the Greco-Roman tradition, both corrective and distributive justice can flourish only inside political entities. By integrating *jus postbellum*, the just war theory has opened a new perspective in favor of international corrective justice, as the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) shows. The road to global justice gets wider as other directions (e.g., environment, sanctions) are being explored. Unfortunately, none of them have elaborated their own theory of justice.

Corrective Justice

The 20th century underwent two World Wars, colonial wars, and a good deal of civil warfare. Perhaps the main consequence of this consists in the development of public international law to regulate the relationships between states (the Geneva Convention) and, after conflicts, to judge those responsible (e.g., the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, ad hoc tribunals, and the ICC). This process bears out Kantian views according to which the painful experience of war arouses the need for unity relying on a morally grounded system. In the opinion of the first president of the Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia, Antonio Cass ese, it is more and more shameful not to be involved in this corrective justice effort. However, this trend has been called into question. Behind this kind of justice lies a paradox that the German jurist Carl Schmitt was the first to criticize.

Modernity produced a *Jus Publicum Europaeum*, a set of European rules produced in the 16th century to put an end to the wars of the Middle Ages and regulate the resort to force. This transformation created a new humanized “nomos of earth”; that is, a permanent principle of space distribution that usually consists in seizing, dividing, and exploiting territories. Modernity does allow hostility in the acquisition of new territory, but this practice must be regulated. Thus, within the new international law of the 20th century, war becomes illegal as a method for resolving the competition among states. The enemy becomes a criminal: On the one hand, no negotiations can take place with him; on the other hand, he must be punished. The relation that Carl Schmitt sees is the exact opposite of the league of states described by Kant. This change within the law has given rise to total wars; the denial of hostility is the root of absolute hostility. The goal of war is not to fight an enemy but to annihilate it under the assumption that the enemy
is guilty. In this view, Schmitt sees a correlation between the criminalization of the enemy and the increasing resort to depersonalized aerial wars, which leads to the suppression of the Other. Corrective justice becomes, therefore, an ideology that promotes inhumanity on behalf of humanity.

**Distributive Justice**

According to Dunn (1996), a sharp contrast can be seen between a world of mutually recognizing Nation States and conscientious agencies of putative international beneficence, created, funded and defended by those states, and a world of brutally unequal suffering and enjoyment in which vast masses of the poor have little, if any, prospect of a happier existence even for their children’s children. (p. 33)

Two bridges are conceived to fill up this gap and establish new transnational obligations toward the weakest states. The first one was conceived after the 1972 food crisis in Bangladesh by proponents of utilitarianism, who argued that responsibility is based not only on moral considerations but also on utilitarian ones. Passivity toward the pain of another moral agent involves a responsibility, which is identical to the pain we would feel if we had caused it ourselves. The pain of other moral agents creates a responsibility among others. This moral postulate is criticized because of its excessive requirements, which go far beyond “agent-centered prerogatives” and free consent. Yet such minimalist reactions define international aid as a question of charity rather than of justice. Other political analysts hold intermediary views and draw on Kant’s concept of imperfect obligation: Helping people in foreign countries does not depend on an agent’s arbitrary will, even though these agents decide the moment and conditions of its application. Once again, this third option entails imperfections: The decision to act is most of all individual here; hence, it will not necessarily meet the emergency. To tackle such issues, decisions must be taken by several actors.

The second bridge is proposed by left Rawlsians. They intend to overcome a weakness within the first postulate, which does not allow moral agents to meet each other (e.g., those who give and those who get). The ground of the argument here is the application of the entire Rawlsian theory at the international level. In this view, states find themselves in an “original position” from which they must determine principles of justice between states in the same way that individuals are to choose principles of justice independently of their specific position in society (i.e., independent of whether states are rich, poor, etc.). However, the framework used in the theory of justice is too narrow and needs to be enlarged to include public actors. Moreover, the two Rawlsian principles of maximal equal freedom and the differences that would be allowed by individuals behind a “veil of ignorance” are transferred to the international level. This extension is demanded by the historical context and brings out the development of constraining institutional mechanisms. In light of the unfair economical inequalities to which they contribute, well-off states have to subscribe to a consequentialist posture that compels them to set up new rules, especially in the field of taxation.

These two last perspectives, both of which are part of the cosmopolitan standpoint, meet the same challenge: Can distributive justice emerge outside a specific political framework? Liberals and communitarians are cautious, and their answer is “No.” Rawls attacks these views as misinterpretations: Distributive justice as defined in Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* must be experienced inside society; its setting cannot be global. Some communitarians share this point of view. They insist on the idea of *affective proximity*. No moral relationship can develop between agents without this element. They also stress that each mode of distribution depends on the community’s identity. Therefore, international redistribution does not result from any obligation but relies on the goodwill of rich people.

**New Frontiers**

Global justice enlarges its boundaries in three directions. The first means to integrate new dimensions, such as environmental justice, which is based on the “ecological footprint” principle. In this view, each of us leaves a footprint in the environment that is determined by the amount of resources we require and the pollution we contribute. This footprint may be very large in the case of
armed conflict, which is often very destructive of the environment. Understanding our moral obligation to the environment requires both deontological and consequentialist approaches. It strengthens Hans Jonas’s “responsibility principle” regarding future environmental degradation and natural disasters resulting from the development of new techniques. Such a principle draws on a “heuristic of fear,” which conveys moral awareness of anticipated human threats to the environment. Nevertheless, one source of environmental justice—political romanticism that promotes a “return to nature”—remains a major issue. Indeed, this doctrine is restricted to the damages caused by human beings only. Thus, this anthropocentrist bias tends to emphasize human pain resulting from environmental degradation.

The second direction relies on a post-bipolar trend: the increasing use of sanctions against states and transnational actors. Must we resort to sanctions, such as embargos, to compel agents to respect the rules of international law? Sanctions represent a third way, which lies between not responding to violence and launching a military intervention. Morality speaks in favor of sanctions. According to Woodrow Wilson, a sanction embodies a virtuous foreign policy. It is the ideal tool for the censor, and it can have a deadly impact on the target. However, its detractors put forward three arguments based on classical moral doctrines. First, sanctions call into question the discrimination principle of just war theory because they cause pain (physically and psychologically) to innocents. Second, civilians are transformed into a means of exerting pressure to shape political decisions, which contradicts the deontological ethic because such pressure is coercive. Third, sanctions cause damages to humans while not achieving their political goals, which is incompatible with utilitarian logic. All these critics benefit from a large audience, which leads today to an “abolitionist” standpoint with respect to sanctions. Most of all, they express the vivacity of contemporary ethical reflections regarding international punishment measures.

The third dimension of the current analysis aims at enlarging the boundaries between caution and cosmopolitanism. Could these two postures meet regarding the concept of negative obligations? That is the aim of the “no-harm” proponents. In IR, “Do no harm or cause prejudice” provides the basis for a moral consensus between cultures. These statements echo Judith Shklar’s “liberalism of fear,” which also involves universal features, as each of us can share an emotion that paralyzes the whole being in the face of cruelty. The do-no-harm principle is criticized because it is sometimes considered incomplete. It lacks positive obligations, such as the duty to rescue. Several of its defenders emphasize that no harm is a first step to building benevolence (positivity is therefore delayed but not ruled out). Besides, the fact of being aware of the vulnerability of “distant foreigners” helps develop an attachment to humanity. Thus, cosmopolitanism sets up a link between the principle of justice and the implementation of a world community, as discussed in the following section.

**Dilemmas of Global Political Order**

Political theory of IR deals with the emergence of a world community: how a political community becomes more and more inclusive. Can it eventually embody the whole of humanity? As such, the very idea of a world community calls into question the Westphalian order as well as the international order defined by Hobbes. This theory also conveys to us a universalism that transcends the diversity of cultural expressions.

**Universum/Pluriversum:**

**Two Emblematic Dualities**

When referring to a *civitas gentium maxima* in the 18th century, Christian Wolf had in mind a fiction gathering all human beings inside the same political unit. Three centuries later, his dream remains attractive. This emergence of a concrete world community gives rise to two main philosophical debates.

**Kojève/Strauss**

After Georg Hegel, Alexandre Kojève describes the “end of history,” which means the end of politics, defined as a state of conflictual interaction between states. A universal and homogeneous state emerges, and individual states become its federated components. Public international law becomes domestic law for members who share the
same way of being and thinking. The wise man is involved in this centralization process. He becomes the prince’s advisor because, historically, thinking is synonymous with improving efficiency. Leo Strauss challenges this idea in two ways. First, he tries to keep philosophy apart from history, especially from the instrumentalist deviation of political leaders. Indeed, the rulers of the universal state may attempt to provide wisdom to all and practice tyranny. Second, the idea of the universal state meets with two obstacles: (1) the irreducible plurality of political systems (they arise out of specific morals that cannot be imported) and (2) that an ideal system is not achievable at the world level (it remains a regulating idea).

Schmitt/Kelsen

These two lawyers often disagree regarding constitutional issues in modern states. They also have opposite views regarding IR. Hans Kelsen criticizes the “dogma of sovereignty,” a concept doomed to be overshadowed by the history of justice. Kelsen’s normativism draws a parallel between relationships among states and interindividual relationships. The creation of a third party in primitive tribes and of courts of law in states allowed the solving of disputes between individuals. These procedures stand for the foundation of the community. Likewise, the creation of international criminal justice mechanisms is the mainspring of the international community. The project proposed by Kelsen to the UN, therefore, gives precedence to a jurisdiction and not to the Security Council. Carl Schmitt states that such ideas draw on an Anglo-Saxon (belonging to English-speaking countries) framework that calls into question the jus publicum Europaeum. Theologically, the “one world” embodies the Antichrist. Indeed, universum means to achieve what cannot be achieved from a human standpoint. The Tower of Babel is an illusion, and we have to get rid of it. It is an expression of the secularization of the mind often pointed out by Carl Schmitt. Through universum, human beings try to put themselves in God’s place. At a political level, Schmitt contends that it is impossible to create a federal state at a world level. Such federal state lacks the most important feature of a state: homogeneity. Moreover, this project of unity forgets the underlying elements of politics: the struggle for power between small unities (empires in the 20th century).

These two approaches have nourished debates among political scientists and have given rise to a wide range of reactions, (e.g., Arendt). They also show how political views on universal and plurality can be different inside the same culture. These debates are still going on, especially regarding the idea of cosmopolitan democracy.

A Cosmopolitan Democracy

Cosmopolitan democracy’s program aims at reactualizing our understanding of Kant by inviting us to go beyond it. The Kantian project of perpetual peace consists of three articles. First, a civil constitution must be republican. Contrary to despotism, which imposes its political ideas and conception of happiness on everyone, the republic is synonymous with separation of powers, protection of freedom, and guarantees of peace, thanks to the general will of the people. The second article aims at implementing a peace treaty between states (mutual nonagression through institutional means). Such a treaty does not lead to the creation of a supranational state but rather to the recognition by each state of the sovereignty of the others: in other words, a confederation of free states. The third and last article introduces the idea of a cosmopolitan law based on universal hospitality. Thus, Kant insists that foreigners have the right to be treated without hostility in another state.

In Jürgen Habermas’s view, this project is contradictory, inconsequential, and inadequate. If Kant intends to create a cosmopolitan state, he does not call into question states’ autonomy. Kant does not foresee the adoption of a constitution that would make rules legally binding. The inconsistency of the Kantian position results from the lack of coherence between the cosmopolitan state and the confederal architecture. Ultimately, the nature of the latter is quite different from what Kant had first in mind: a world citizenship. Individuals keep depending on the state. Kant does not remain faithful to his individualistic and liberal philosophy. Finally, according to Habermas, Kant’s views are inadequate because they are mainly the expression of the conceptual and political reality of the 18th century.
Normative Theory in International Relations

Habermas revises this project in three ways: (1) he conducts a criticism of the nation-state, (2) he draws on the creation of a postnational identity, and (3) he transfers this identity to the global level. The nation-state is condemned as a political organization. It is unadapted to the globalization process and is a source of bloody conflicts. Moreover, the link between republic and nation is more sociopsychological than conceptual. It arises out of a historical process (a catalyst) and the individual’s mentality (sacrifice to protect the homeland).

Habermas explores the link between republic and nationality. He compares the liberty of the state with individual freedom. The latter is a right that is separate from the national conscience, as modern natural law suggests it. This separation allows the formation of a new supranational identity that articulates national identity (culture without any political dimension) and constitutional patriotism (universalization of human rights and democracy). Habermas contends to transform this identity into an association of free and equal cosmopolitans. An ethics of discussion is developed beyond borders thanks to intersubjectivity. This ethics is based on concrete situations (to see and to manage the state of unequality and/or distress experienced by individuals). Influenced by these views, David Held aims at strengthening a “robust political cosmopolitism” grounded on a multiscalar democracy, which occurs at two levels: decision taking on the one hand, citizenship on the other. So as to be legitimized but also efficient, public decisions must be taken at the more adapted level. Three criteria allow verification of (1) expanse (to assess the field of individuals whose life expectancy and chance of survival are affected by public choices), (2) intensity (to measure the impact of a public policy on a given group), and (3) compared efficiency (to determine the necessity of a regional or world intervention compared with an intervention at a local level). A concept of “differentiated sovereignty” emerges from Held’s thought. The subsidiary principle must be called on to determine what level is the most accurate. Held also introduces the idea of a multilevel citizenship that relies not solely on territorial community. Voting is no longer the unique expression of citizenship. To carry weight on decisions and to practice accountability, for instance, are other ways of exerting citizenship. Therefore, Held’s cosmopolitanism maintains the nation-state but invites going beyond it through new public commitments.

Reserves and Alternative Conceptions

Several criticisms have been formulated against this cosmopolitan democracy. These criticisms have not been limited to the utopian features underlying the latter and come from pluralistic traditions (liberal, communitarian, or socialist). From a practical standpoint, the deliberative activity characteristic of democracy arose out of a common political culture that has developed over time and has required many sacrifices. Considered in the light of the national construction process of the 19th century, it appears that a political culture results from the political institutions that produce culture and not the reverse. Outside this framework, citizenship is fragile and appears as an abstraction. In the second case, cosmopolitism would hide imperial temptations.

Ontologically, society is synonymous with plurality. Rawls holds this view when he analyzes the extension of the justice principle outside liberal societies. He challenges the idea of a unity of the world. There will always be different peoples (e.g., liberal people, decent people), and rogue states will always exist. Therefore, a law of peoples could be implemented but not cosmopolitanism itself.

Alternative conceptions draw on other frameworks. Thus, Walzer claims a pluralism of high density that controls states’ action through three kinds of agents—international institutions, non-governmental organizations, and regional unions. This order is midway between a unified world state (unrealistic and dangerous in case of authoritarian deviation) and a state of savage international anarchy (as much a threat as the unification of the world). Departing from this conception, Amitai Etzioni states that the international order must be built on persuasion. In his opinion, the world dynamic will achieve what he calls a “community of communities,” which is a source of order. Only imagined until now, this global community is likely to be effective. Indeed, states are adopting a new logic of responsibility and new diplomatic practices, which favor a transnational moral dialogue between individuals. Ultimately,
global safety authorities are called on: They share not only moral values and costs but also the power to struggle against traditional and non-traditional threats. However, such a trend has to cope with the U.S. leadership—often tempted by imperial adventures—and with the lack of power of the UN, characterized by Etzioni as the “old regime.”

Republicanism is at the source of another trend. The very idea of the republic challenges that of dominium (to possess the subjects’ or citizens’ bodies as the feudal lord did) and of imperium (the power of authority that relied on force). The republic aims at achieving civic liberty and at developing participation in the public sphere. This political model was associated with a defensive foreign policy by Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Montesquieu, and Rousseau in their description of a confederation of small republics. Too large, and republics are exposed to domestic discords. Too small, and they are threatened by their powerful neighbors. How can republics maintain their political unity? Through the restriction of their territory and the reinforcement of their military capacities, which are the main advantages of these confederations. Their foreign policies are reactive rather than aggressive. Thus, this ideal remains very close to the autarky of the Ancients. Moreover in Rousseau’s opinion, its transfer outside a specific setting—the Helvetic confederation—remains hazardous. Nevertheless, republicanism is still a source of inspiration today. In an economic globalization context, its critique of liberalism creates new interest. Overall, republicanism promotes values of public virtue and civic conscience that minimize the arbitrary exercise of power and the impacts on foreign policy, which becomes non-dominating. Thus, a global civic republicanism could provide new rules for interstate cooperation.

**Conclusion**

Fault lines regarding war, justice, or global order nourish many debates. Nevertheless, two main trends have appeared: The first claims to revise major political and ethical issues, while the second aims to create new ideas regarding current challenges. Nowadays, a third trend consists in decentering our philosophical standpoint by integrating ideas from non-Western cultures. But all these inquiries share the same questions and challenges: What is humanity? Does it stand for an idea that is becoming a norm, a set of concrete rules, or an ideal that influences action? Is it a source of bestiality or an appeal to mutual kindness? A group called to build a world political culture or a reduced community that must remain particular? Normative theories of IR will continue to provide different answers. Thus, these debates should not be tackled by Greek “garden philosophers,” withdrawn into the private sphere, but by philosophers open to the public sphere, who get to the heart of contemporary issues.

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See also Hobbes, Thomas; Idealism in International Relations; Intervention; Kant, Immanuel; Preemptive War; War and Peace

**Further Readings**


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**Nuclear Proliferation**

*See Arms Race*
Oligarchy

The concept of oligarchy repeatedly appears in political and common discourse from ancient Greece and up through modern times. Practically all reference sources provide similar definitions of oligarchy—rule of the few in their own interests and not in the interest of the majority or the public good. Etymology confirms this connotation: oligos = few, arche = rule (ancient Greek). From Aristotle comes the initial meaning of oligarchy—it is a “degeneration” of aristocracy as the form of rule; oligarchy is an “incorrect” and “spoilt” aristocracy when the few rule exclusively in their own interests. The notion of oligarchy can be found in the writings of Plato, Polybius, and their contemporaries and later in Niccolò Machiavelli. It has been used in modern social science by Moisei Ostrogorsky, Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels, and others. The term oligarchy is applied in political and nonpolitical contexts—political regimes and political parties, trade unions, church organizations, educational establishments. This entry presents the contemporary and classic meanings of the concept, the main existing theory, and its further development in post-Communist countries.

Who Are the “Few”?

From today’s point of view, one can say that the “few” who, according to the logic of the notion, form the backbone of oligarchy may actually represent very different groups—slave owners, landlords, nobility, the rich and wealthy, the top brass of any kind, party bureaucracy, and so on. Rule of the rich and wealthy (“plutocracy”) may be only one of the meanings of the notion of oligarchy. In economic science, the closest analogue of oligarchy is oligopoly: a situation in which only a few large-scale “players” dominate an economy and are practically independent of others who cannot compete with them on an equal footing.

Oligarchic rule is not necessarily dictatorship and arbitrariness. While one of the major characteristics of oligarchy is nonaccountability of power, it may in a way rely on law (i.e., be legal); however, this law is in the interests of the few. Similar to monarchies, oligarchic regimes may even be considered by some as legitimate, although their legitimacy does not rest on popular consent and support. An oligarchic regime, unlike personal dictatorship, may be partly predictable; it defines the limits of the politically permissible and the forbidden in terms of the critique and opposition. It is usually said that the oligarchs “rule but not manage”—they would seldom occupy official positions in government, but their opinion is crucial because of their power and influence (economic and other). There may be internal tensions and conflicts within the oligarchic system; this points to the importance for the oligarchs of the existence of an external arbiter who is accepted as such by them.

The term oligarchy is used widely today: however, more likely not as an analytical concept but as a descriptive image. From the point of view of modern political science, it is a relatively vague
and amorphous notion with clear negative evaluative connotations. Many critics consider the notion of oligarchy to be too reductive or even too poor for effective political analysis, with insufficient theoretical base.

In modern social science and historical literature, this notion is often used to describe very different historical and political phenomena—such as medieval oligarchy in China; the Venice republic in the 13th to 16th centuries, ruled by a few patrician families; England from the Glorious Revolution until the middle of the 19th century, with the Magna Carta guaranteeing the rights of the nobility (i.e., the rights of the oligarchy); colonial America until the 1776 revolution as a combination of democratic and oligarchic elements; the Meiji Restoration in Japan, and so on. Some authors apply the notion of oligarchy to the political regime in the former USSR after Stalin (and especially under Brezhnev’s so-called collective leadership), which was no longer a personal dictatorship but the rule of the privileged “nomenclatura.” South Africa under the apartheid system provides an example of racial oligarchy based on the rule of the White minority—about 20% of the population. In Latin America, various military-latifundist political regimes are often described as oligarchic. Some neo-Marxists argue that the majority of Western democracies, especially the United States, are actually “oligarchic democracies” (or “representative oligarchies”) where “big money” de facto determines the outcome of elections.

There are impressive case studies of political dynamics in various countries of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Hong Kong, South Korea) that demonstrate how oligarchic systems based on the economic power of several dozen families or corporate clans adapt to political change and economic reforms and reproduce themselves within a new context. The case of Indonesia after the collapse of Suharto’s New Order at the end of the 1990s may be a good example of the survival and reproduction of some basic structures of the oligarchic system of rule and power relationships irrespective of the ongoing reforms. Some research has registered oligarchic trends in a variety of large-scale organizations—such as political parties, trade unions, professional associations, educational systems, and clerical organizations.

The Existing Theories

To the extent that a “theory of oligarchy” exists, its classic form is that of Michels (1876–1936). In his analysis of the formation and evolution of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, he formulated the so-called iron law of oligarchy: “Who says organization, says oligarchy.” According to Michels, oligarchy is an unavoidable consequence of the functioning of all and sundry large social and political organizations. His logic is as follows: For effective management of any large organization, a professional bureaucratic elite with special managerial competencies is needed; this elite acquires specific social status and interests and becomes estranged from the rank-and-file members and nonaccountable to them; this elite believes that it knows better what is good and what is bad for the masses. Even when elected, the bureaucratic elite will try to keep its position or will pass it only to other elites (the influence of Mosca and particularly Pareto with his “circulation of elites” is obvious here). Michels argues that even democratic organizations eventually degenerate into oligarchy since they cannot exist without bureaucratic structures of management that eventually turn oligarchic. This thesis actually questions the basic principle of democratic representation, since, according to Michels, any elected representative will sooner or later turn into a master estranged from the electors.

For Michels, the roots of the emergence of oligarchy are not in personal psychological motivation or ill will but in general organizational logic and managerial technology: Professionalism of management and administration requires specific skills; those who acquire them become estranged from the masses and strive for preservation of their status. Thus, according to Michels, any organization, due to its internal logic, will sooner or later degenerate into oligarchy.

Some of Michels’s ideas were further developed by Maurice Duverger, who used a comparative approach to the analysis of different political parties in order to confirm the generic logic of “oligarchic degeneration”—leadership in all parties eventually becomes oligarchic; an isolated and closed “ruling strata” of professional bureaucrats emerges and tends to reproduce itself, irrespective of the ideological or political nature of the organization.
Today’s academic community responds to Michels’s theoretical heritage somewhat ambiguously. Some empirical research of large organizations seems to confirm his idea of oligarchic degeneration; other studies do not. However, even some empirically proved exceptions undermine the universal nature of the declared “iron law of oligarchy.” It is hardly possible to falsify this “law,” since it is based on the probabilistic assumption that any organization would “eventually” turn into oligarchy. Furthermore, today’s criticism of Michels’s theory underlines other vulnerable points, such as the amorphous nature of the notion of the “few” as a definition of the group of oligarchic leaders and the vagueness of the concept of “oligarchic tendencies” and its insufficiency for effective political analysis. Conceptual reevaluation of Michels in recent decades contributed to the growing interest in the theories of organizations, organizational logic, and organizational behavior and in the detailed analysis of mechanisms of influence, leadership, and submission.

The Theory Updated in the Postcommunist Era

The notion of oligarchy has acquired new circulation and popularity in the early 1990s as applied to a description of economic and political dynamics in Russia and some other post-Soviet Union countries. Its connotation became not simply negative but even pejorative and abusive: History’s largest predatory privatization of state property (“grabization”) in Russia was made possible only through governmental channels because of the “appointments” of a few new oligarchs by President Boris Yeltsin’s “clan” (the so-called family) and their merging with state power. The outcome of this process was the emergence in Russia of “oligarchic capitalism”—a common noun for the fusion of superbigr capital with the machinery of the state. The peculiarity of the situation in Russia is emphasized by the fact that state power itself has created the opportunity for the oligarchic system to emerge, since it was the state that had given out its former property to a few “confidants,” counting on their subsequent financial support. This support, indeed, became one of the important factors for the reelection of Yeltsin in 1996. Thus, the emergence of oligarchic capitalism in Russia is often perceived as very specific: In the Russian case, you have not the supremacy of big capital over state power but the other way around—state power is creating the superbigr private owners for the sake of its reproduction. Some analysts argue that the oligarchic system of patronage and clientelism in Russia at the federal and regional levels was created by the regime itself for the main purpose of securing financial support for its reproduction in democratic, even imitative, forms. Also, this was made possible in Russia during a period of economic recession, not during a time of economic growth, as in other contemporary cases of oligarchy coming into being. Various researches stress the absence of formal institutions and the informal character of ties between Russian oligarchs and state power. They also point to the fragmentary nature of Russian oligarchy with different and often conflicting interests, its noninstitutionalized character, and other aspects.

At the end of the 1990s, some political analysts even started to talk about the danger of the “oligarchic coup” in Russia. At least an important part of the massive support for Vladimir Putin in Russia in the early 2000s came from his “antioligarchic” rhetoric. However, many observers argue that the outcome of Putin’s so-called antioligarchic revolution was the replacement of Yeltsin-era oligarchs by new ones—largely originating from the security services and other “power” structures (so-called silogarchs—from the Russian word sila = power—or securocrats, i.e., coming from various security agencies). Some argue that the paradigm of “oligarchic capitalism” that emerged under Boris Yeltsin is reproduced in Russia under Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. Be that as it may, one should note that this concept of “oligarchic capitalism” with reference to Russia and some other post-Soviet countries needs further theoretical and experimental study.

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See also Bureaucracy; Dictatorship; Elitism; Organization Theory; Parties; Regime (Comparative Politics)
One-Party Dominance

There is no consensus on what constitutes one-party dominance, but two features stand out. First, a party becomes dominant when, over time, it is much more successful in elections, in parliament, and in the government than any other party. How such success is measured and for how long the party needs to be successful in order to qualify as a dominant party is debated. The threshold for time ranges from two elections won in a row to never losing a single election. The threshold for electoral success ranges from a plurality of votes to a supermajority of seats. Second, it matters how dominance is established. Does the ruling party enjoy genuine support in the population, or does it maintain its hold on power through nondemocratic means? In other words, we need to distinguish between dominant parties and dominant authoritarian parties. In the classic definition of the Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori, a dominant-party system exists when the same party wins at least three consecutive elections that are free, fair, and competitive. The dominant party needs to gain an absolute majority in parliament and govern alone. In case of a presidential system of government, the dominant party also needs to win the presidential elections. If the elections were not free, fair, or competitive, we are dealing with a dominant-authoritarian-party system.

Clearly, there are not many parties that manage to govern alone with a parliamentary majority behind them for more than 12 years. The classic case is the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, which has governed for almost the entire period after World War II. The Christian Democrats in Italy were the dominant force for 4 decades, always being in the government until the Second Republic ended in corruption scandals. However, these were coalition governments, so Italy is not a pure case of one-party dominance. Neither is Sweden, because the Socialists often had to form a minority government. The Canadian Liberals, although in power most of the time at the federal level, nonetheless lost at regular intervals. There are more cases of dominance at the regional level, for example, the Democratic South in the United States in the first half of the 20th century or the position of the Christian Social Union in Bavaria. Unfortunately, there are not many studies of subnational one-party dominance.

Even this brief overview of the best known examples of dominant parties suggests that one-party dominance is uncommon, and sustained one-party dominance is even more rare. In comparison, it is easier for dominant authoritarian parties to prolong their rule. The classic case is the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico, which managed to stay in power for most of the 20th century. When a dominant authoritarian party loses an election, it amounts to a democratic transition. Other recent examples are the Kuomintang in Taiwan and Kenya African National Union in Kenya.

The global spread of democracy since the mid-1970s has resulted in a proliferation of dominant parties, especially in Africa. Paradoxically, the (re)introduction of multiparty elections in sub-Saharan Africa has resulted in the dominance of dominant-party systems. The emblematic case is South Africa, where the African National Congress (ANC) has won all four elections since the end of apartheid with overwhelming victories, even to the point where it could change the constitution by itself. This has led observers to worry about the effect of one-party dominance on the prospects of democratic consolidation. Even in mature democracies, there are indications that domination by one party and the resulting lack of political competitiveness has consequences for the quality of...
democracy. The dominant parties of Japan and Italy are/were notorious for their factionalism and corruption. If parties are in power for so long, the lines between party and state are blurred, complacency replaces responsiveness, and infighting overshadows competition with the often fragmented and powerless opposition. If this is true for mature democracies (there is in fact little systematic evidence to support these accusations), how much more damaging will the effects of one-party dominance be for new democracies?

However, while dominant-party systems exhibit a low level of competitiveness, they do not necessarily lack political competition, understood as potential competitiveness, and the frequent talk about dominant parties as “de facto one-party states” is often misleading. It is too simple to equate one-party dominance with lack of democracy as done by scholars who use election outcomes to measure democracy. The ruling party in Botswana, in power since independence, has never lost an election. One influential measure of democracy takes this lack of alternation in government as proof that the election results were manipulated by a nondemocratic regime. It considers dominant parties as undemocratic until they lose power. This coding scheme puts the ANC in South Africa and Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe in the same category. Clearly, such a measure fails to distinguish between dominant parties and dominant authoritarian parties. While the ANC may be voted out of power at the next elections, Mugabe has shown that he will hang on to power by any means necessary.

There is some confusion about dominant parties and dominant-party systems. There is no doubt that the Italian Christian Democrats constituted a dominant party in the loose sense of a party that outdistances all others in popular support. However, Italy did not have a dominant-party system. The pattern of interactions between the political parties was shaped by the rivalry between the Christian Democrats and the Communists, who were regarded as an antisystem party. The Italian Communists always came in second place and were never invited to join the government but because of their sheer size forced other parties to form a coalition. The party system therefore has been characterized as “polarized pluralism.”

Likewise, even if the British Conservatives or Labour Party manage to win three elections in a row, as they have both done in the past 30 years, this does not change the character of the British two-party system. The key question, which has been insufficiently acknowledged and explored, is to what extent dominant parties create a dominant-party system. In other words: When and how do dominant parties come to shape the pattern of political competition?

No unified theory explains the emergence and longevity of dominant parties, but partial explanations have been offered, often tightly bound to a particular case or class of cases. First, access to state resources plays a role. This theory is especially helpful to explain the continued success of dominant authoritarian parties, such as the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico. Second, dominant parties may benefit from positioning themselves on key social cleavages. The ANC in South Africa would be a case in point. Third, political institutions, especially the electoral system, have an effect. The Liberal Democratic Party in Japan benefited from an unusual electoral system called the single nontransferable vote. Against this, dominant parties have thrived in a variety of electoral systems, from proportional representation (the ANC in South Africa and the SWAPO Party in Namibia) to plurality (the Botswana Democratic Party in Botswana). Fourth, there may be something special about dominant parties—an aura of invincibility, the sense of inevitability, an association with an epoch—that is hard to capture empirically but easily recognized by those familiar with the cases.

There is growing pluriformity in approaches to conceptualizing, measuring, and explaining one-party dominance. On the one hand, this analytical diversity may be regarded as disappointing after decades of theorizing and research on one-party dominance. On the other hand, the growing literature on this subject attests to the continuous development of our thinking and even a new vitality in the study of dominant parties. A particularly interesting development is the use of voting power indexes to measure the extent of dominance, especially when combined with the classic typologies. This innovation has the potential of bridging the divide between quantitative and qualitative
research on dominant parties and dominant-party systems.

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See also Party Linkage; Party Organization; Party System Fragmentation; Party Systems

Further Readings


Opposition

The term opposition comes from the Latin word opponere, meaning to put something in front of something else. An actor’s opponents are those who want to block his way. Such a conflicting situation may be a game with established rules in which the opponent accepts defeat. Some opponents may, however, try to end the game and set up new rules that work for their (exclusive) advantage. When the rules of game allow everyone to enter and to compete under fair conditions, players with limited skill may lose repeatedly or be excluded for not abiding by the rules. In other cases, games may exclude players arbitrarily, or the rules may be unfair.

Against this background, we can distinguish four types of fighting against a competitor:

1. Opposition refers to those trying to defeat a so far victorious competitor but following all rules of the game.
2. Extremists are those wanting to overthrow a fair and inclusive game.
3. Members of resistance are those trying to overthrow an unfair or exclusive game in order to establish a fair and inclusive one.
4. Rebels are those fighting for victory in an unfair or exclusive game without desiring to replace it by an inclusive and fair one.

When “game” is understood as a polity and “rules of the game” as a constitution or set of laws, then opposition is a generic concept for those engaging in politics to fight against unwelcome policies and politicians and accepting the constitution and laws even in spite of possible defeat. This entry analyzes the context and the actors of opposition; it also discusses Robert Dahl’s analytic framework, the functions of opposition, and finally, the most recent research developments.

Contexts

It is not self-evident that one should fight for political goals while accepting defeat. Regimes with a loyal opposition are, therefore, an exception. Certainly political dissent and nonviolent opposition were common in Democratic Athens, in Republican Rome, in some republics of medieval Italy, and within European Estate assemblies. But most of that disappeared with the advent of strong monarchic power.

The exception was England. First, the principle of “king in parliament” allowed even conflicts between the Crown and parliament to be understood as competition for the best of one single “body politic.” Second, the decline of monarchic power due to the civil war, the Glorious Revolution, and the specific relations of Sir Robert Walpole (1676–1745) with the two first kings of the Hanoverian dynasty led to the emergence of the new role of a “prime minister” with a personal power base in parliament. Patronage and benefits for allies were the central means to create support for the prime minister. Such “government by corruption” made parliament split: One side benefited from “their” prime minister and his policies; the other side advocated different policies and hoped to be part of the spoils system under a new prime minister.

In this situation, Walpole’s political adversary Henry St. John 1st Viscount Bolingbroke
(1678–1751) presented a first theory of political opposition that was very influential. According to this theory, opposition serves liberty and the common good by continually criticizing selfish or incompetent politics of the government; opposing the government does not mean disloyalty to the Crown or the constitution but only the desire to replace bad policies or politicians with better ones. Actually it has been one of the most important inventions in human history to implement, and to acknowledge, the practice of a legitimate and loyal opposition. Unfortunately, the concept was subsequently narrowed to a form of parliamentary activity and did not encompass phenomena such as political pluralism and separation of power. Moreover, it was put in the context of “ethically better alternatives,” claiming counterfactually a superior moral status for oppositional parties.

Who Is “the Opposition”?

Under the assumption that opposition proper is “parliamentary opposition,” typologies were created that distinguish parliamentary, extraparliamentary, and antiparliamentary opposition. But any split between opposition inside and outside parliament is artificial, and there is not even a clear line between the governing majority and the opposition in presidential systems. One more realistic typology was suggested by Philip Norton (2008). According to him, “the Opposition” means either the principle of opposition or the largest oppositional party in a parliamentary system. Opposition parties are, in a parliamentary system, parties that expressly do not support the government. Opposition covers different forms of conflicting relationships between the legislative and executive branches of government. Among them, as also noted by Norton, five “modes” can be distinguished, according to Anthony King (1976). In the opposition mode, cohesive parliamentary parties confront a governing party or coalition. In the intraparty mode, it comes to opposition within a (governing) party; that is, “faction building.” In the nonparty mode, parliamentarians cooperate outside party contexts, which allows for majority building while ignoring party lines. In the cross-party mode, governing and oppositional parties cooperate on some issues while disagreeing on others. Extraparliamentary opposition means all forms of political dissent and government-opposing activities outside (a chamber of) parliament.

The last category is, however, quite overcrowded. First, there are extraparliamentary party structures. These cannot reasonably be detached from parliamentary party groups, because local and regional party organizations are often led by members of parliament and work, throughout the country, as their combat groups. Second, there may be “higher houses” that act as a “second opposition,” in particular, if elections to them are used for expressing dissatisfaction with the government. Third, constitutional courts perform like an opposition if oppositional parties get them ruling on politically controversial issues. Fourth, actors from other levels of government may impede, or veto, a cabinet’s policy making in federal systems. This gives even small parties with regional strongholds significant oppositional power at a superior level of government. Fifth, nongovernmental organizations can accumulate and exert very significant oppositional power in liberal societies. Sixth, there is even potential for oppositional power within the executive branch of government if it comes to implement policy programs that are not regarded as administrable by civil servants.

Dahl’s Analytic Framework

Contemporary opposition theory started with Dahl (1966). Coining the concept of polyarchy, he put legitimate opposition, together with free political participation, at the center of liberal democracy. None of his analytical categories is restricted to parliamentary opposition (see Dahl, 1966, pp. 332–386). Going by his concept, the following questions must be asked to determine the nature of opposition:

1. How cohesively, or organizationally concentrated, do oppositional groups act?
2. How much loss of governmental power can be effectuated by how much increase in oppositional power?
3. What sites are available for encounters between the opposition and government? How fair is competition in which arena, and how important is which site for actual power politics?
4. How identifiable are, depending on those factors, oppositional groups in a political system?
5. What are the goals of which oppositional groups?
6. What are their strategies?

In addition, five “primary conditions” are claimed to explain which patterns of opposition will emerge:

1. constitutional structure and the electoral system;
2. widely shared cultural premises, in particular about cooperation and problem solving;
3. specific subcultures in a given society and its political culture (inclined toward violence and secession or toward proportional share of public goods);
4. the record of grievances against the government, out of which people learn about the regime’s responsiveness; and
5. the kind or extent of social and economic differences/cleavages in which the party system is rooted.

Two more specific factors intervene: a society’s individual pattern of cleavage, conflict, and agreement in attitudes and opinions and its extent of polarization. These primary conditions vary independently from each other, but not beyond certain limits; they may reinforce each other; and a big change in one of them will likely make an existing pattern of opposition change as well.

Based on similar considerations, Heinrich Oberreuter (1975, p. 20) has suggested a parsimonious typology of oppositional behavior patterns: issue-oriented ad hoc opposition, cooperative opposition, and competitive opposition, all of them possible inside or outside parliament.

Oppositional Functions

A function is a service rendered by a system for its environment. Criticism of a government’s programs, policies, and actors is the first service of the opposition for its regime: Issues are brought to public attention, incentives for policy learning are set, and otherwise neglected problems are put on the agenda. The next function is control, unfolded both as scrutiny of single measures and as checking the government’s general course. Effective control depends on the government’s responsibility before parliament and makes rational politicians avoid actions that might otherwise be undertaken. Offering alternatives encompasses different programs, policies, and persons to citizens and voters, thereby establishing pluralism. In this perspective, integration allows even those whose positions and leaders are minoritarian to identify with the polity and have the chance to become influential in the future. Without these advantages produced by an influential opposition, political systems will work less well than those with a legitimate and loyal opposition.

Research on Opposition

A straightforward framework such as Dahl’s should have inspired a large body of comparative empirical research, providing us with reliable knowledge on how to establish effective opposition as a means for better governance. However, as Klaus von Beyme (1987) has shown, research on opposition was scarce for a long while, although “protest movements” (oppositional), “new social movements,” or minorities struggling for a better legal or social status have attracted much scholarly attention. In the 1960s and later, one reason for such neglect was the revival of the mistaken thesis of “declining parliamentary power,” in the perspective of which parliamentary opposition becomes uninteresting as well (pp. 30–31). As recalled by Ludger Helms (2008, p. 8), the “governance turn” in comparative politics came next, with its focus on cooperative and corporatist forms of interaction between state and society. In this perspective, opposition looks rather negligible. Finally, confining opposition to parliamentary opposition deprives this concept of comparative power beyond parliamentary systems of government. For all these reasons, a more comprehensive theory of opposition should be worked out, and broad-scope comparative empirical research on opposition, seen as an element of pluralism, division of power, and good governance, should be encouraged.

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Organization theory is a field of study in which the phenomena of interest are related to organizations and organizing. The general aim is to understand what determines organizational forms and processes and the consequences of different types and aspects of organizational forms and processes. It is somewhat contested whether organization theory should be regarded as an academic discipline in its own right, since it draws heavily on concepts and ways of thinking from disciplines such as anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, and sociology. Nevertheless, organization theory may also contribute to the development of political science and other disciplines. In North America, a distinction is often made between organizational behavior and organization theory, roughly corresponding to an exploration of micro- and macro-organizational phenomena, respectively. Elsewhere, a broad notion of organization theory is more common, and it is also adopted here. Thus, organization theory is seen as the academic field (or discipline) specializing in the study of organizational phenomena (both micro and macro) and used as a synonym for organization studies. After a brief overview of the development of organization theory as an academic field, this entry reviews some important phenomena and relationships being examined in contemporary organization theory. Some notes on the relationship between organization theory and political science are then made, and finally some thoughts on future developments are offered.

**Historical Development**

The design and management of specific types of organizations have been practiced for several thousands of years and studied for a couple of centuries. Nevertheless, generalizations about organizations and the development of organization theory as an academic field are restricted to the post–World War II period. The actual phrase *organization theory* was most actively promoted by Herbert Simon from 1950 onward, being seen as a broad category that included many existing approaches, such as scientific management and industrial psychology. However, while organizations in these approaches were primarily seen as settings within which work was carried out, they were now seen as units of interest in their own right and analyzed as distinctive social systems and collective actors.

In what has retrospectively become known as classical organization theory, the emphasis was on universal principles of administration and management that could lead to goal achievement. While produced about a hundred years ago, elements of contributions from people such as Frederick Taylor on scientific management, Herbert Fayol on administrative theory, and Max Weber on the theory of bureaucracy are still evident in today’s organizations. However, since the 1950s, this rational- and closed-systems perspective on organizations has been supplemented by other types of perspectives. While classical organization theory indicated that there is one best way of organizational design and practice, contingency theory from the 1960s onward suggests that this depends on the characteristics of each situation. Thus, according to this kind of rational- and open-systems perspective, variations in the environments, tasks, and technologies of organizations...
imply variations in organizational forms and processes.

The human relations approach from the 1930s onward represented a natural-systems perspective, where the emphasis was not primarily on achieving goals but on organizational survival. Here, too, since the 1960s, characteristics of the environments of organizations have become increasingly important, representing a turn from closed- to open-systems perspectives. Moreover, in this latest period, social constructionist approaches have become more prominent. According to these approaches, the organization and its forms and processes do not exist as objects separate from people but are created and maintained as organizational members talk about what they think is happening and what needs to be done. Recently, postmodern approaches have also become popular among some organizational researchers; for example, in the study of language games and discourses involving organizations and organizing.

**Phenomena and Relationships**

Contemporary organization theory is characterized by a large variety of units of analysis, perspectives, and themes. Many researchers examine individual organizations, for example, how different organizational aspects affect performance. Some focus on organizations in a certain field, examining how they interact and affect each other. Moreover, population ecologists examine the dynamics of entire populations of organizations. In conferences, books, and journals in the field, there is a lively debate on the strengths and weaknesses of the various theoretical positions and the relevance of the various topics. Despite some disagreements, the phenomena and relationships reviewed here are commonly regarded as being among the most important ones.

**Organizational Structure**

The importance of structure for organizational behavior has been a central topic in the study of organizations throughout the history of this academic field. Questions such as how a given structure may constrain and enable instrumental rational action in and by organizations, and how it is possible to affect actual organizational behavior indirectly by structural design, have been discussed for a long time and remain highly relevant. According to the structural-instrumental perspective, organizations are regarded as tools for achieving certain goals. From this perspective, it is assumed that organizations and their members act with instrumental rationality in carrying out tasks and that the organizational structure is designed in accordance with means–ends assessments.

The formal structure of an organization consists of positions and rules that determine who shall or can do what and define how various tasks should be executed. Organizations are composed of a set of positions and subordinated units and can themselves fall under other larger units. In addition, organizational units can be divided up and coordinated in different ways. Vertical specialization concerns whether and how they consist of subordinate bodies, as well as how they are related to superior bodies. Horizontal specialization refers to how different tasks are thought to be allocated on a certain level by means of organizational structure. Thus, organizations may be based on certain principles of specialization, such as purpose, process, clientele, or geography. Through the superior–subordinate relationship between different levels in a hierarchy, there will be a great degree of vertical coordination within and between organizations. Hierarchy can also involve vertical specialization, in that different types of tasks are assigned to different levels in the organization or to organizations at different levels. Routines can constitute a form of coordination both vertically and horizontally. Procedural rules can be used as tools within an organization, but they can also be used to coordinate activities in a way that cuts across organizations.

A bureaucratic organizational form, as Max Weber described it, is marked by a high extent of hierarchy, horizontal specialization, and routines. Many types of organizational forms can be thought of as an alternative or as supplementary to a bureaucratic organizational form. At one extreme is a completely flat structure, that is, an organization without hierarchical ordering but with several positions and subunits at the same level. In a collegial structure, a board of directors or an advisory council can be set up instead of, or in addition to, the top leadership in the hierarchy. Another alternative is a matrix structure. Here, a position or subunit is subordinated to several superior units.
simultaneously. These superior units usually operate according to different principles of specialization. In addition to arrangements such as these, which are without time limitations, organizations may have temporary arrangements that extend beyond the bounds of bureaucratic organizational forms, such as task forces and project organizations. Boards of directors, advisory councils, task forces, and project organizations are all various forms of network structure that supplement the bureaucratic organizational form. This is not merely the case within individual organizations but also applies to relationships between organizations.

**Organizational Culture**

Organizational culture is concerned with the informal norms and values that are important for the activities of organizations. The emphasis is not on goals but on informal norms, values, and identities that develop gradually. The classic distinction made by Philip Selznick is between the organization, as an instrument for achieving goals, and the institution, whereby an organization, through the process of institutionalization, is “infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand” (1957, p. 17). Thus, in addition to solving tasks in an instrumental sense, an organization has then become a value-bearing institution with its own distinct identities and opinions about what the relevant problems and solutions are. This makes for a more complex organization, less flexible or adaptable to new demands but also one equipped with new and necessary qualities that will potentially help the organization to solve tasks more expediently and function well as a socially integrated unit. Thus, the organizational culture demarcates organizations from one another and, through mechanisms of socialization, strengthens cohesion and commitment among its members. Culture provides members of the organization with a sense of belonging to a community with a shared goal and mission.

**Organizational Environments**

In the study of organizations and the development of open-systems perspectives, a distinction is commonly made between technical and institutional environments. Technical environments can be defined either broadly as all aspects of the environment potentially relevant to goal setting and goal achievement or more narrowly as the sources for inputs and markets for outputs, competitors, and regulators. In the academic literature, several dimensions of technical environments affecting organizational uncertainty and dependence have been proposed and examined—for example, the degree of homogeneity/heterogeneity, the degree of stability/variability, and the degree of concentration/dispersion.

The technical environments of an organization are to a large extent determined by the type of tasks it performs. As with the case for the other aspects, the existing tasks may constrain and enable what an organization and its members are doing, and over time, tasks may be changed as a result of purposeful action.

Since the 1970s, an emphasis on what has been called the institutional environments has been added, stressing the importance of the symbolic aspects of environments. Institutional environments are characterized by the development of socially created norms to which individual organizations must conform in order to receive legitimacy and support. Thus, in institutional environments, organizations are rewarded for using what is seen as correct organizational forms and processes and not for the quantity and quality of their outputs, as in technical environments.

**Organizational Decision Making**

Studies of decision-making behavior within and by organizations have traditionally emphasized purposeful choice in accordance with a logic of consequences. According to this logic of action, organizations and their members are seen as assessing their existing goals, the alternatives for actions, and the future consequences in relation to the goals that might follow from each alternative. The concept of full instrumental rationality refers to an organization’s having clear and consistent goals, a full overview of all the alternatives, and full insight into the consequences that these alternatives will bring in relation to its goals. From this, it often follows that the organization chooses the alternative that gives the maximal degree of goal achievement. Even so, many empirical studies of how organizations act show that this is realistic only to a certain
degree. This is expressed through the concept of *bounded rationality*, which implies that an organization’s goals are diffuse, inconsistent, or unstable and that the problems it faces are complex. The concept also includes the idea that an organization has incomplete information about alternatives and consequences. From this, it follows that the organization chooses an alternative that yields a satisfactory degree of goal achievement.

Moreover, different individuals or groups within an organization can be committed to different goals and interests, and the organization or its individual parts must relate to other organizations that may have other goals and interests. Thus, organizations can be understood as coalitions. Every actor acts in a purposeful way, is motivated by interests, and can also enter into coalitions with actors outside the organization, who, according to their interests, act in similar ways. Interest distribution may be rooted in formal structures within and between organizations—for example, related to actors carrying out specialized tasks. Their resources for articulating their own interests may also be rooted in the formal structure, such as through superordination or subordination of actors and through horizontal coordination.

Conflicts of interest within and between organizations can be dealt with in different ways. First, a dominant coalition can choose between relevant alternatives of action and assert its own goals and interests. Second, the actors can negotiate a compromise between different interests, which in turn provides the basis for purposeful choice based on knowledge about alternatives and consequences. Third, the competing goals can be addressed sequentially, so as not to come into conflict with one another. Fourth, goals in different parts of an organization, or in different organizations, do not need to be viewed vis-à-vis each other but can be addressed independently. Conflicts of interest can also be dealt with by actors who come to an agreement on means.

More radical modifications of purposeful choice in organizational decision making are introduced in the garbage can model. Here, decisions are to a large extent seen as being produced by temporal linkages. Thus, time and attention are limited resources, and the arrival and coupling of independent, exogenous streams of problems, solutions, decision makers, and opportunities for choice are important for determining how decisions are made and interpreted.

The importance of organizational culture for decision making is related to its impact on what is seen as appropriate behavior in and by organizations. Over time, organizations develop distinctive identities. Faced with a new situation, they have to recognize the nature of that situation and find a rule for action that is consistent with their identity. Organizational culture entails a relatively consistent set of rules and identities, so such links are simple to make. What makes an action appropriate in a certain organization may be highly divergent from what is found in other organizations, depending on how an organizational culture has evolved and what its dominant informal norms and values are.

### Organizational Change

In the academic literature on organizational change, a distinction is often made between change through adaptation and through selection and between the transformation and evolution of organizations. To a large extent, the perspectives on change being employed reflect the various theoretical positions for the study of organizations in general.

Most students of organizational change examine how individual organizations adapt in response to changing circumstances, but these adaptations may take different forms. For example, contingency theory focuses on the alignment between various situational features (e.g., technical environment) and structural features (e.g., horizontal and vertical specialization). Thus, organizational change is expected if changes in the technical environments imply a misalignment with organizational structure. Rational adaptation is also emphasized in purposeful action approaches where organizations are seen as having some capacity to handle their dependency on environments or even change the environments. Moreover, approaches that emphasize the importance of institutional environments focus on how organizations adapt their structures to prevailing normatively endorsed modes of organizing. This also leads to a large extent of isomorphism in an organizational
field. On the other hand, there may be a decoupling between organizational structures and organizational activities, where changes in organizational structures reflect the myths embedded in the institutional environments and are not meant to affect organizational activities.

Organizational change through selection is most central in population ecology theory. Here, the focus is on the development of organizational forms at the population level. While variation through the birth of new organizational forms may happen by chance, those that survive are selected by the environment, based on their ability to compete with others in a niche. Finally, retention refers to the forces that maintain and perpetuate certain organizational forms.

While some researchers applying rational-systems perspectives analyze whether and how change agents can accomplish radical transformations of organizations, others emphasize the evolutionary and incremental character of structural change due to bounded rationality or organizations as coalitions. Some also combine purposeful transformation and evolution of organizational structure through ideas of punctuated equilibrium, where long periods of convergent change are interrupted by short periods of abrupt divergent change. Stability and evolution of organization are also focused on by researchers emphasizing the importance of organizational culture and appropriate behavior. When an attempt is made to introduce new organizational solutions, they will often be revealed as incompatible and unsuitable. Thus, if they are seen as clashing with the values an organization cares about and is committed to, they risk being rejected. Here, too, there may be a combination of transformation and evolution through ideas of punctuated equilibrium, where long periods of stability are interrupted by abrupt change in the case of major critical events.

Organization Theory and Political Science

Many of the most prominent early scholars in organization theory came from political science, and many of the earliest studies of organizations were studies of public administration. Thus, ideas of bounded rationality, pluralistic competition, muddling through, cooptation, resource dependence, garbage can decision processes, and loose coupling all emerged from studies of organizations in the public sector. However, from the 1960s onward, political science and organization theory were mainly characterized by parallel agendas but mutual disregard. This may be related to developments in the study of organizations: Most scholars in organization theory were located in business schools, and most research was on private sector organizations. It may also be related to developments in political science and the study of public administration, where other topics and perspectives became more prominent.

Nevertheless, in recent years, there are some tendencies toward rediscovering a lost tradition in public administration that combines three commitments: (1) understanding administrative practice, (2) contributing to a general understanding of organizations, and (3) illuminating political philosophy. Moreover, it may be argued that an organization theory for the public sector should be delimited from general organization theory. First, an organization theory for the public sector should contribute to clarifying the key organizational forms that exist within public administration, as well as those that exist between the public administration and various groups in society. Second, an organization theory of this kind should help clarify the types of selection different organizations make. This means the extent to which they attend to, are neutral toward, or opposed to values, situations, or interests within society. Third, it should help explain the existence of different forms of organization, with an emphasis on examining to what extent such forms are determined by public policy. Seen from the vantage point of an organization theory rooted in political science, it is not enough to concentrate attention on economy and efficiency. The way the public sector operates must be described, analyzed, and evaluated from a democratic-political vantage point. This means directing the focus toward the sector’s basis of values, knowledge, and power.

Future Development

The academic field of organization theory is embedded in its times. Just as the significant features of the field have been molded by certain critical
events, future developments will also be affected by coming events. This makes it a bit difficult to formulate expectations of what will happen.

Nevertheless, based on recent trends in organization theory and actual organizational forms and processes, some ideas on future developments may be presented. First, the increase of networks, public–private partnerships, and other organizational forms crossing the boundaries between the public and private sectors may stimulate an understanding of organizations and organizing beyond markets and hierarchies. Second, the global spread of certain organizational forms—in public sector organizations related to new public management or post–new public management doctrines—may stimulate an understanding of the adaptation of these forms across countries and policy areas. Third, the development of more complex organizational forms may stimulate the development of more complex theories of how organizations change and of the consequences of organizational change. Thus, there may be a mutual interplay of structural, cultural, and environmental features and also a two-way dynamic between organizational forms and actions. Fourth, there may be a two-way relationship between the development of organization theory and the development of new organizational forms as well as the popular understandings of organizations and organizing.

Summing up, this means that organization theory and political science may benefit from increased cross-fertilization. Empirical studies of decision making and change in public sector organizations will provide some observations and theoretical ideas that may be useful to students of politics. Increased attention toward organizations from students of politics is also likely to change organization theory. By focusing on organizational characteristics of parliaments, public administration, political parties, interest organizations, and social movements, as well as on themes such as conflict, power, justice, and equality and the development of norms, goals, and meanings, the academic field of organization theory may expand in ways that are relevant for political scientists.

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See also Bureaucracy; Contingency Theory; Institutional Theory; Logic of Appropriateness; New Public Management; Rationality, Bounded

Further Readings

Orientalism

The word Orientalism has several meanings. Specifically, it is the science that has for its subject matter “Oriental” languages and civilizations and, by extension, the taste for Oriental objects
and arts, as well as their use in Western artistic fields, particularly decoration, painting, and music. Orientalism was born in the 18th century, although the word was not commonly used before the 19th century. In the current, postcolonial era, the term orientalism and the concept of the Oriental have taken on pejorative connotations, especially among people of Asian and Middle Eastern descent. Recent scholarship, perhaps most notably that of the late Edward Said, points out the social psychological function of “Oriental” as a label whose use tacitly assumes the absolute primacy of a Eurocentric perspective, thereby categorically objectifying what is not European, rendering it exotic and essentially “other.” This entry examines the history of this concept, the different kinds of orientalism that must be taken into account, and the debates that have taken place around this concept.

Origins of Orientalism

Orientalism originated as the extension of Renaissance humanism to Oriental fields, which were then Turkish, Arabic, and Persian. Its aim was to constitute a universal literature by merging European and Oriental contributions. Its tremendous success was the translation of One Thousand and One Nights at the beginning of the 18th century, thus creating the Oriental literary genre. Meanwhile, Catholic missionaries created the first sinology, while travelers described the power and organization of large bureaucratic Oriental states under the name of despotism.

The great novelty of the 18th century was a willingness to accept the possibility of a comparative universal history of all human societies. The Orientalists of the Enlightenment were first and foremost philologists and scholars, but their works were taken up and popularized by philosophers. The advent of social sciences at the end of the century introduced an increasingly critical aspect of Oriental realities. While they had a scientific foundation, they were also useful in legitimizing the calling into question of an Oriental despotism, which from then on was defined as a source of powerlessness and decadence.

Comparative studies were linked to the appearance of the idea of progress. It turned the past of Europe and of the East into landmarks according to which one could define the movement of history. After 1750, the East was defined as a sort of “past in the present” insofar as it showed a bygone state of society compared with the new realities of Europe. As early as 1780, it was said that Europe was the future of the East. The former was now able to take over or dominate the big “Oriental” countries from the Mediterranean to India and soon to China and Japan. Its expansion was justified as being either a liberation or an improvement in the lot of the peoples subjected to Oriental despotism.

While the “practical” orientalism of the “dragomans”—translators and interpreters of Oriental realities—already existed, European expansion implied the management of Oriental populations and thus the constitution of a corpus of linguistic, legal, and social knowledge, crucial for European civil and military administrators.

Types of Orientalism

Classical Orientalism

At the beginning of the 19th century, orientalism was divided into several distinct but closely intertwined types. The first one was “classical” orientalism, gathering scholarly, philological, and archaeological knowledge about ancient Oriental societies. It was the product of several phenomenal discoveries of lost languages and civilizations—deciphering Egyptian hieroglyphs and cuneiform; the archaeological discovery of Assyria, Sumer, and the Hittites; learning of Sanskrit; and the birth of modern sinology and then of Japan studies.

Universal history was endowed with a few more millennia. More than ever, the medieval idea of Egypt and the Near East as the birthplace of human culture prevailed. The history of human progress had several versions. According to the first one, the arts and sciences were born in Egypt; moved to the Near East, then to Greece and to Rome, and from there to the Arabs; and ended up in Europe. The second version started from the discovery of a kinship between European and Indian languages that served to define the presence of a group of peoples called Indo-German, Aryan, or Indo-European. Simultaneously, the existence of a “Semitic” group was constructed, followed by that of a “Turanian” group. Those definitions quickly took on a racial
nature since language was supposed to contain a whole definition of the world. The opposition between Semites and Indo-Europeans was thus used to explain both the history of religions and the superiority of modern Europe.

Though the peoples of the Far East were not included in this pattern of analysis, the existence of two large cultural areas was recognized—India and China—and within them, so was the existence of distinct national personalities. Thus, Vietnam was part of the Chinese sphere of civilization, and Cambodia was part of the Hindu one, but each had its respective specific identity. In the same way, French Orientalists discovered the wonders of Angkor and gave to Cambodians a sense of historical continuity that they did not have before.

**Modern Orientalism**

The second type is modern orientalism, studying existing Oriental civilizations. Their precariousness was known, hence the necessity of describing them before their potential destruction caused by modernization/Westernization. Scholars rushed to take stock of the large corpus of texts already defined by those involved as “classics” and to turn them into the first printed scientific editions. If those texts were already known, they were given a more precise historical context, particularly thanks to philology and archaeology. This heritage-oriented form of orientalism ended in the setting up of museums for Oriental objects, first in Western countries and then in the countries where the works originated.

By successive waves, the Oriental literary and artistic heritage was massively introduced into 19th-century European and Western culture. It was one of the prime movers of major aesthetic transformations and artistic revolutions. The same applied a little later to the arts of Black Africa. Thus, artistic modernity will largely claim an Oriental element for itself.

**Practical Orientalism**

The third type is the practical orientalism of colonial administrators. If the latter presented themselves as the modernizers of the societies they dominated, they also sought to unify the traditional legal systems by resorting to the ancient sources, considered as the most authentic. Thus, the French limited the field of common laws and undertook the codification of a “Muslim” law that had never existed as such. In India, the British systematically used Sanskrit sources, which had been largely forgotten or neglected. More generally, practical Orientalists, for administrative convenience, tended to freeze realities that otherwise would have been naturally subject to continuing change, particularly religious and ethnic definitions. To do this, they relied on the works of modern Orientalists, while defining their superiority over the peoples they administered through the racial discourse stemming from classical orientalists.

This racial, philology-based discourse, also called linguistic ethnology, was first used to understand the origins of Europe and of Christianity. It was then used as a classifying tool so as to define the different ethnic groups as they were being reviewed—hence the quasi-indefinite extension of the Semitic group toward Black Africa and of the Touranian group toward Eastern Asia. A complete correspondence was established between linguistic subgroups and cultural entities, by finally endowing them with a history of their own. The prevailing scientism of the late 19th century added to it the measures established by physical anthropology, particularly by craniology. Some of the premises of craniology were pseudoscientific, making a simple equation between measures of cranial capacity and “intelligence,” with departures from cranial measurements of Europeans taken as evidence of racial primitivism or inferiority.

The racial discourse claimed to have a universal impact. It was first applied to Europe even if it was secondarily used to lay the foundations of the legitimacy of Western superiority over the rest of the world.

Nineteenth-century orientalism has since been reproached as having an “essentialist” vision of Oriental peoples, considered as unable to really change. By definition, orientalism is a “culturalist” approach, because it is founded on the literary and artistic heritage of the societies involved. At the same time, it sought to give the latter a meaning by
striving to historicize the contents of this heritage, thus redefining the historical paths of the societies involved. More often than not, those paths were defined along criteria borrowed from European history—religious tolerance, promotion of sciences, and so on. At the same time, it was also necessary to determine the causes of the “backwardness of the East” and European superiority, that is to say, contemporary deficits. The usual pattern was a combination of past golden age and present failings.

However absorbed in attaining a mastery of modern knowledge, the 19th-century Orientalist was also a creature of dialogue, constantly in contact with his informants, who were Oriental learned men, his partners in the reading of the ancient texts. He was the one who introduced and accompanied the “modernist” representatives of Oriental societies, particularly in the latter’s travels in the West.

**Current Issues**

Facing the social sciences, Orientalists can hardly hide their uneasiness. They have the feeling that concepts that were elaborated to fit Western realities are almost mechanically applied without taking heed of Oriental specificities. Indeed, Orientalists tend to reproduce rather than criticize the discourses that Orientals make about themselves, which is inevitable in any culturalist approach.

While Orientalists have given all the required justifications to colonial expansion, they have also provided the arms to fight it. It is by starting from historical definitions produced by orientalism that Oriental nationalisms were constructed. Nationalisms, be they Arab, Indian, Turkish, Persian, or Indochinese, have largely borrowed their historical and national discourses from European Orientalists. The ancient golden ages were turned into hopes of renewal, and current failings served as the basis of governmental programs.

In the 20th century, the role of Orientalists constantly diminished. While classical orientalism still lived, it was mainly about heritage, and public access was largely limited to exhibitions, touristic travels, and translations of masterpieces of ancient literature. Today, many of its missions have been taken up by academics of the countries involved, and Westerners are only partners, even if they have sometimes kept a training function. The most burning issue is the demand that museums and similar institutions in Western countries return objects of cultural significance to their countries of origin.

Modern orientalism is caught in a contradictory position. It continues its work of reassessment of historical paths, particularly that of the times directly preceding European domination, no longer defined as decadent. Historians broaden their concerns to economic and social fields and also integrate the research of anthropology and social sciences. It is no longer possible to talk about a purely philological and textual orientalism.

Decolonized countries were initially plunged into a premature and turbulent modernity, often with Marxist overtones. Orientalists had to reconsider their categories of analysis to be able to interpret these revolutionary ruptures. Newly independent nations came to see the moment of independence as the end of a long history and the promise of a new future.

A few years later, the majority discourses of the countries involved have shifted toward the defense of a largely imaginary cultural authenticity, with a discourse about the superiority of the endogenous over the exogenous, the restoration of Islamic, Indian, or Asian values. Islamist movements, through their willingness to go back to their roots, have reinvested fields that were formerly those of Islamologists. Often, Orientalists are faced with reified categories of their own knowledge, which they had judged to be obsolete and had abandoned. Faced with Orientals who themselves resort to essentialism, they tend either to remain silent or to practice contextualism so as to reject any continuity between the past and the present time. The word *orientalism* has become the equivalent of an insult. In its turn, it has become an ahistorical essence and a polemical accusation.

Practical orientalism disappeared with colonial administrators. It is not certain whether the experts working for the states and nongovernmental organizations as well as those responsible for development have a better knowledge of the societies involved. Globalization seems to bring peoples together, but the progress of communications reduces long-term stays and “immersions” “on the spot.” International English and its impoverished
vocabulary are not the equivalent of the former knowledge of “indigenous” languages.

In its lasting existence, orientalism has claimed to be a tool in the constitution of the universal. Comparative studies introduced the delicate question of the interpretation of what is different. Of course, Orientalists have served politicians, but they have also significantly shaped our vision of our globalized universe.

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See also Buddhism; Culturalism; Hinduism; Islam

Further Readings
Pacifism

Pacifism is both a political doctrine aimed at promoting or preserving peace and a political behavior adopted by opponents of violence and particularly of war as a means of settling disputes. The belief that violence is unacceptable and should be avoided has presumably existed throughout history and has been theorized over the past 2 millennia by diverse political, philosophical, and theological thinkers. Organized political opposition to violence has existed since the generalization of conscription during the 19th century and took place during both World Wars. The elaboration of the concept of pacifism dates back to the beginning of the 20th century and encompasses a variety of political thoughts and attitudes.

Pacifists differ on issues such as the inevitability and, more generally, the causes of war; the acceptability of violence as a suitable means toward peace; how to prevent war and resolve conflicts; and the very definition and conditions of peace itself. Those described as unconditional or absolute pacifists are committed to a principled rejection of violence, considered as deontologically wrong. Relative, conditional, contingent, or pragmatic pacifists—sometimes called pacificists—adopt a consequentialist view of pacifism; they consider violence to be counterproductive but believe that as a last resort, force is occasionally justified to advance the cause of peace. Besides the diversity of pacifist conceptions and behaviors, their historical evolutions, and their mutual influences and intricacies, one can distinguish between thinkers who concentrate on the individual and conceive pacifism as an appeal to people’s sense of fundamental human values and virtues and those who focus on pacifism as a goal for systemic, societal change, be it at a national, regional, or global level.

The Appeal to Individual Morality

According to thinkers privileging an individual conception of peace, violence and war are inherent to human nature but are morally wrong and can be reduced by promoting individual virtues and morality. This conception is shared by many political and religious thinkers.

Major religions advocate peace and mutual respect among human beings. However, both historical circumstances and religious exclusiveness have exacerbated tensions between and within religious communities and greatly influenced theological dogmas. No religion has been exempted from violence justified by religious purpose, and their positions range from absolute pacifism and nonviolence to just and even holy war.

All dharmic religions promote nonviolence (nonviolence), embodied by Gandhi, but to different extents. Buddhism and Jainism condemn killing in any form, be it human or not, and Buddhism defends nonresistance through tolerance to the enemy. Hinduism—and later Sikhism—justify war in defense of good, justice, and righteousness. When order and law have failed to maintain peace and security, just war (dharma yuddha) is to be
waged against those responsible, either Hindus or non-Hindus, in order to maintain peace and security within cosmic order. Warriors must belong to specific castes devoted to military action and have to respect the laws of war designed to ensure that warfare is conducted in a fair way. The use of weapons that cause unnecessary pain is prohibited, civilians shall not be harmed, and territory shall not be annexed.

Taoist religions do not rely on an absolute precept of nonviolence but rather consider violence to be a form of weakness that induces more violence and is thus counterproductive. Inaction (wu wei) is hence privileged, and if conflict cannot be avoided, one should try to resolve it without a direct confrontation. War can, however, be justified in self-defense or when a morally evil leader must be punished to deliver oppressed and exploited people.

Abrahamic religions praise peace while providing ambiguous answers to the question of violence, and they have developed the concept of just war as a major issue. The Hebrew Bible conveys an omnipresent violence sent by God and addressed in rituals and laws, as well as longings for peace. Judaism is committed to the ideal of peace and well-being (shalom) and provides containment rules such as the lex talionis of “an eye for an eye,” which aims at preventing escalation of violence, and prohibits murder (“You shall not kill,” Exodus 20:13). However, God sanctions and even commands holy wars (milhemet mitzvah) that shall lead to the annihilation of the enemy of the people of Israel (herem). Violence and war thus remain suitable options for self-defense and survival but should not be engaged in for proselytizing, revenge, or unprovoked aggression.

The New Testament emphasizes individual morality and relates the teachings of Jesus, such as those typified by the Sermon on the Mount (“Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God,” Matthew 5:9). Early Christianity promoted nonviolent resistance and martyrdom until it became the official religion of the Roman Empire under Emperor Constantine. Theologians such as Saint Augustine and later Francisco de Vitoria developed the just war theory, which establishes the right to wage war in certain circumstances (jus ad bellum) and specifies acceptable forms of warfare (jus in bello). If defensive wars are just wars by nature, offensive wars can be considered so if they are waged by legitimate authorities, for the righting of wrongs, and with common good intentions. This doctrine has been used to justify holy wars conducted to recover the Holy Land from Muslim domination during the Reconquista and the Crusades, persecutions of heretics during the Protestant Reformation, and imperial conquests. It has been contested by many reformed churches such as Brethren, Anabaptists, and Quakers, who advocate unconditional pacifism through conscientious objection and nonresistance. Over the past decades, the Roman Catholic Church has narrowed just war doctrine to the legitimation of defensive wars and the promotion of the right to interfere in case of human rights violations, but some theologians commend absolute pacifism on the grounds that modern technology, including nuclear weapons, prevents proportionate confrontations and generates intolerable casualties.

The Koran rests on the notion of effort (jihad). All Muslims must spiritually fight to overcome self-centeredness (jihad akbar, or greater jihad). They also have to extend the Islamic community through preaching and education, but holy war for, or in defense of, Islam (jihad bis-saif) must be carried out according to strict rules and is not recognized by some Muslim movements such as Sufism. Believers shall make every effort to ending conflict, including restorative justice and peacemaking (sulh).

The significance of individual morality in preserving and defending peace is shared by many Western political thinkers, but most of them, from Plato to Aristotle or later Kant and Baron de Montesquieu, include it in a broader reflection on natural law, society, state, or humanity. Writers such as Henry Thoreau, Leo Tolstoy, and Romain Rolland laud individual nonviolence. Psychoanalysts like Sigmund Freud urge that aggressiveness be channeled through the development of emotional and most of all cultural links between individuals. Some absolute pacifists condemn all kinds of taking of life, including capital punishment, euthanasia, abortion, meat eating, animal cruelty, or killing in self-defense. On the other hand, philosophers such as Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau argue that war can sometimes be useful, and a few
Pacifism

The Need for Systemic Change

Many thinkers conceive of pacifism at a more systemic level and insist on the necessity of transforming society at various levels to alleviate or eliminate violence. They differ on the means to be used for such a transformation, with proposals ranging from free trade to political regime, federalism, international law, collective security, disarmament, class solidarity, or social mobilizations.

In opposition to mercantilists who argue that war can be necessary for the consolidation of states, utilitarian philosophers such as David Hume or Jeremy Bentham insist on the cost of war and associate virtue and interest to show how free trade is useful both for stimulating economic health and for pacifying behaviors, as exchanges promote a shared belonging to the same community.

As political systems, empires can ensure an enduring peace but are not considered to be pacifist political systems because they maintain a domination of their subjects. Kant grounds his project for a “perpetual peace” on three levels of action, as peace occurs from a moral individual choice, best guaranteed by a republican regime, which represents and respects people’s choice, and at a more global level by a federation of republican states on a cosmopolitan basis.

This insistence on political regimes is shared by later advocates of the democratic peace theory, according to which democracies do not go to war with one another, unlike potentially warlike autocratic regimes driven by dynastic ambitions or power politics. However, some elitist thinkers regard democracies as potentially bellicose because their use of conscription and the irrationality of the masses can support nationalism and thus go beyond their recognition of a people’s right to self-determination. Federalism is also seen by numerous political thinkers as an answer for preserving and promoting regional or universal peace through a federation of states that share executive, legislative, and judicial powers and in some cases a common army, giving rise to contemporary reflections that could ultimately lead to regional integration.

International law extends the just law doctrines of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* to establish common rules to prevent, reduce, or judge violence between international actors. Since the end of the 19th century, various strategies have been tested, such as arbitration, conciliation, mediation, treaties (e.g., the Briand-Kellogg Pact, signed in 1928, which forbids war), or international courts (e.g., the International Criminal Court). Pacifist associations from various countries actively supported the creation of the League of Nations (1919) and of the United Nations (1945), based on the principle of collective security, and incomplete disarmament initiatives.

Claims for solidarity among the people across state boundaries spread among leftist workers movements and trade unions throughout the 19th century. For most of them, war mainly constrains the working classes and benefits the dominant classes. Their pacifism therefore associates internationalism with antimilitarism, since they advocate general strike against militarism as conveyed by the lyrics of *The Internationale* anthem, written in 1871 (“The kings make us drunk with their fumes / Peace among ourselves, war to the tyrants! / Let the armies go on strike / Guns in the air, and break ranks”). However, Marxists believe that peace is a remote goal, as the working-class mobilization for a classless society will abolish war through the decline of the state, but only through the use of violence.

Since 1945, social mobilizations have developed new arguments for peace on the grounds of the existence of a nuclear threat endangering the very existence of humanity, be it through political mobilizations, some of them led by communist internationalism (World Peace Council) during the Cold War, or the creation of environmental nongovernmental organizations concerned with broader ecological purposes.

Rejection of violence may be considered as one of the most commonly shared political ideas throughout history, though it takes widely different shapes, which make its identification complex and probably contributes to its not playing a major role within political theory.

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Panel data consist of a cross-section of “individuals” for which there are repeated observations over time. Individuals can be any cross-sectional unit of analysis, such as states, dyads, or survey respondents. Panel data sets are typically dichotomized between long panels, which have many measurement occasions relative to the size of the cross section, and short panels, which have many individuals in the cross section relative to the number of repeated measurement occasions, or “waves.” In general, the methods associated with the term panel data analysis or longitudinal analysis focus on short panels, while methods under the time-series cross section umbrella focus more on analyzing long panels. The key advantage of panel data is that such data offer the opportunity to better evaluate causal propositions than strictly cross-sectional data. Whereas cross-sectional data only allow the researcher to observe covariances, panel data further allow the researcher to observe whether a change in an input precedes a change in the outcome. In other words, since panel data consist of the same individuals over time, the analyst can observe a shift in responses as a reaction to an input. One example would be an evaluation of whether a state’s present behavior responds to the prior behavior of its neighbors. Another example might be using a survey panel, such as those often incorporated into the American National Election Studies, to assess how partisan strength influences campaign interest over time. Panel data have a number of features that can pose challenges to analysts. These issues include unit effects, serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation. Panels also have special problems of missingness. The remainder of this entry focuses on these issues and some remedies for each.

**Unit Effects**

Whenever individuals’ mean responses differ, unit effects are present in the data. Unit effects can pose serious problems for inference as failure to account for them in some way can produce bias in estimates akin to omitted variable bias. If the mean response varies cross-sectionally via unobserved unique means, but this difference is not modeled (and thereby left in the error term), then any cross-sectionally varying covariate will correlate with the error term. Such a situation produces endogeneity bias, that is, the independent variable is correlated with the error term in the model’s coefficients.

In the econometric tradition, two approaches are widely used to handle unit effects. One is the fixed-effects model, typically estimated with least squares dummy variables (LSDV). This approach estimates the desired model using ordinary least squares (OLS), including dummy variables for each individual, save a reference individual. This approach has the advantage of being computationally simple and accounting for a known source of variance in the model specification. However, individual dummies are perfectly collinear with any variable that varies only cross-sectionally. Hence, LSDV precludes the inclusion of time-invariant variables in a model. An alternative that does allow time-invariant covariates is a generalized least squares (GLS) model with a compound symmetry covariance structure, known as a random-effects model.
model. This model recognizes that repeated observations will covary, so the estimator accounts for this structure by including a term that forces all repeated observations to correlate at a constant level with each other.

It should be noted that the terms fixed and random effects have multiple meanings. Econometricians typically call a LSDV model a fixed-effects model and a GLS compound symmetry model a random-effects model. These terms take a different meaning when analyzing data from the view of hierarchical modeling. Specifically, a fixed effect refers to any model quantity estimated in the fitting of a model (i.e., obtained via least squares or maximum likelihood), while a random effect refers to any parameter that is unique to the individual but can be predicted separately. Mixed-effects models contain both fixed and random effects. Confusion can arise because a random-effects model is a special case of a mixed-effects model. For example, the general form of a linear mixed-effects model is

\[ Y_{ij} = X_{ij}'\beta + Z_{ij}'b_i + e_{ij}, \]

where \( Y_{ij} \) is the response value for individual \( i \) at time \( j \), \( X_{ij} \) is the vector of all covariate values for individual \( i \) at time \( j \), \( \beta \) is a vector of fixed effects—coefficients that apply to all individuals, \( Z_{ij} \) is a subset of \( X \) that may include any time-varying covariate or a constant, \( b_i \) is a vector of random effects for individual \( i \), and \( e_{ij} \) is the error term for individual \( i \) at time \( j \). One special case would be a model in which there is only a random intercept, which becomes

\[ Y_{ij} = X_{ij}'\beta + b_i + e_{ij}. \]

Each \( b_i \) is not estimated directly in the fitting of the model but can be predicted using empirical Bayes techniques. By decomposing the unexplained variance into \( b_i \) and \( e_{ij} \), which are independent of each other, the model successfully accounts for differences in the mean responses for individuals and the necessary correlation among observations. Hence, the random-effects model is seen as a special case of the more general mixed-effects model.

There are several practical considerations when deciding how to control for unit effects in a longitudinal model. Again, fixed-effects models cannot include time-invariant covariates. Further, when the number of individuals is large, especially relative to the number of waves, then estimating a LSDV model is inefficient. An alternative fixed-effects estimator to LSDV is the within estimator, wherein the outcome variable and the covariates are all rescaled as deviations from an individual’s mean of the variable. The within estimator avoids the inefficiency of estimating unique intercepts for each individual and yields the same coefficient estimates at LSDV; however, just like LSDV, it cannot accommodate time-invariant covariates.

The model of random effects for units allows for time-invariant covariates and avoids the inefficiency problem that could emerge from LSDV. Hence, with especially short panels or any model for which the effects of time-invariant covariates are to be estimated, random-effects models are probably the most practical option. However, this model assumes that unit effects are independent of all covariates. If the unit effects are correlated with any of the input variables, then the random-effects model is biased and inconsistent. Whether or not independent unit effects is a fair assumption can be evaluated with a Hausman test, under which the null hypothesis is that the unit effects are independent, implying that a random-effects model is consistent. Rejection of this null hypothesis implies that the random-effects model has problems of endogeneity bias. As a final, practical point on random-effects models, GLS models such as this require the analyst to specify how the errors of the model are correlated. However, the true correlation between the errors of individuals’ repeated measurements is unknown, so feasible GLS must be used. Feasible GLS (FGLS) is estimated with a multistep procedure whereby residuals of an initial model are used to estimate the correlation of errors, which is then inserted into a GLS estimator. For instance, the Cochrane-Orcutt FGLS estimator repeats this iterative process until the estimate of correlation of errors ceases to improve. All of this suggests that analysts must carefully weigh the structure of their data and the goals of their model when choosing how best to handle unit effects.

### Serial Correlation, Heteroskedasticity, and Contemporaneous Correlation

Serial correlation refers to the fact that repeated observations on the same individual are highly
correlated. In general, this correlation tends to be large and positive but diminishes as the time between measurements increases. Serial correlation violates the OLS assumption of uncorrelated errors. The solutions to this problem resemble the fixes for unit effects. One solution is to include a lagged response as a covariate, as this term often accounts for serial correlation and makes the remaining errors independent. Lagged outcome variables are more commonly used for long panels because the first wave of observations cannot be modeled with this approach, which is more costly when repeated observations are scarce. (It should be noted that while many argue that a lagged response most effectively accounts for unit effects and serial correlation, others maintain that an endogeneity bias can occur if the lagged term does not filter all of the serial correlation.) Another solution is to estimate a GLS model that includes a covariance pattern matrix, which estimates the covariances between each pair of time waves: The matrix may be unstructured or defined by a clear pattern, such as first-order autoregressive. Finally, mixed-effects models produce correlation matrices based on the variances and covariances of the random effects. Thus, a pattern of correlation can also be captured by random effects. It should be noted that in particularly short panels (e.g., three waves), serial correlation can be hard to account for with any of these methods: A lagged dependent variable costs one wave of data, covariance pattern matrices more complex than a simple random-effects model can be difficult to estimate, and very short panels do not allow for a lot of random parameters.

The methods for covariance patterns and random effects also can be incorporated into the general linear model framework, which means that remedies for unit effects and serial correlation also can be used for limited dependent variables (e.g., counts or binary outcomes). Marginal models, estimated with the generalized estimating equations, require the analyst to specify how repeated observations are associated and thereby resemble the covariance pattern GLS model for continuous outcomes. General linear mixed-effects models incorporate random effects into the specification and account for the correlation of repeated observations through the random effects.

Heteroskedasticity can be present in panel data if the unmodeled variance in outcomes differs from one individual to the next. This problem can be addressed through a GLS estimator that allows for unique variances among individuals, in addition to the correlation pattern. Contemporaneous correlation arises when individuals have similar errors at particular times. This may arise because some time-dependent factor is simultaneously influencing all individuals. In the presence of contemporaneous correlation, the error variance of linear coefficient estimates increases relative to the estimates of coefficients when Gauss-Markov assumptions hold. Regular standard errors do not account for this inefficiency, however. Rather, panel-corrected standard errors will better account for the larger error variance, thereby making statistical inference on coefficient estimates less prone to Type I errors (rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true).

**Missing Data**

With panel data, a key concern is that measuring each individual at every wave of observations may not be possible. One reason for this may be censoring that arises from the structure of the study. For example, if different individuals were recruited to participate in a study with staggered start times, but the study ended simultaneously for all, then late joiners would have fewer repeated observations. In this situation, the nonobservance of later waves for late joiners would be missing completely at random (MCAR), as qualities of the individuals had no bearing on how often they were observed. In this case, as with any panel data with observations MCAR, the data could be analyzed by complete-case analysis (analyzing only cases for which all waves are observed) or available-data analysis (i.e., methods that do not require response vectors of equal length).

Another, more serious cause of missing data in panels is attrition (also called dropout or panel mortality). Individuals who are part of the study may choose not to participate after a few observations, or the researcher may lose track of individuals and be unable to reach them for further study. Dropout specifically refers to the situation where, once an individual goes unobserved in one wave, he or she is not observed in any future wave. Whereas data that are missing due to censoring are nearly always MCAR, data missing due to dropout may not fit this criterion. If the data are at least
missing at random (MAR, meaning that the probability of missingness is conditional only on observable information), then imputation methods can yield unbiased estimates of model quantities. Many studies impute missing values from dropout by assuming all missing values of a response are equal to the last observed value. This method assumes, however, that the responses would not have changed since dropout, which is usually unrealistic.

A better alternative is multiple random imputation. One technique for multiple random imputation is to model the probability of missingness and match missing observations with observed observations that have similar probabilities of being missing, randomly drawing several observations with similar probabilities of being missing to impute the missing value. A second technique for multiple random imputation is to model the value of an observation at a particular time with the observed data and impute a value for the missing observation that is computed with known information about the subject plus a random disturbance. For individuals who later return to the study, observations at later waves—as well as early waves—should be used to impute missing middle values.

As a final consideration for attrition, a researcher may choose to refresh the sample by adding new observations toward the end of the study, these new observations being called a refreshment sample. Though this strategy does not directly remedy the problem of uneven panels, it does prevent the sample size from shrinking too much when constructing an overall response profile. Furthermore, refreshment allows the researcher to diagnose the severity of panel effects. This can be done by comparing variable means from the refreshment samples with the means of those still in the panel at a given wave to see how dropout is influencing the makeup of the sample. Furthermore, the process of being part of a panel study may influence an individual’s response over time, a process called panel conditioning. Refreshment samples allow for the possibility of adjusting for panel effects through techniques such as fractional pooling or two-stage auxiliary instrumental variables.

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See also Regression; Time-Series Analysis; Time-Series Cross-Section Data and Methods

Further Readings

PARADIGMS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

A paradigm is a constellation of scientific theories, values, and methods shared by the members of the scientific community, forging a disciplinary matrix and excluding any other theory. The word is of Greek origin and emerged in philosophical literature in the 15th century. The concept of a paradigm was formulated by Thomas Kuhn in his book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962). Today, this concept is accepted in the history of natural sciences and in the sociology of science. It is also frequently used in political science as in all social sciences in spite of the fact that Kuhn explained in the preface of his book that its use is not justified in the social sciences. In 1965, three years after the publication of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, the American Political Science Association (APSA) president, David Truman, thought that the paradigmatic explanation of scientific progress was not applicable to political science. Since then, the concept of a paradigm has nonetheless seduced many political scientists but much less so among comparativists than among other scholars. The word has even spread to mass media. Today it may be too late to expel
this word from the lexicon, but it can be specified. The basic question is the following: In political science, are there sudden overturnings, scientific breakthroughs involving a tabula rasa, comparable with those engendered by Nicolaus Copernicus, Isaac Newton, Charles Darwin, or Louis Pasteur? For the following reasons, the answer to such a question cannot be affirmative. What is involved here is the identity of political science as a science focusing on social diversity, social change, and cumulative growth and knowledge.

In all sciences, the extent of the innovation that any individual can produce is necessarily limited, for each individual must employ in research the tools that he or she acquires and cannot in his or her own lifetime replace them all (Kuhn, 1970). Progress does not arise in a vacuum but develops out of the scientific patrimony. It is difficult to find in the social sciences a virgin domain. Every decade that passes adds layer on layer to the patrimony. New explanations supersede older interpretations. Many examples of cumulative progress can be given. Even giants rely on patrimony. Karl Marx refers to Adam Smith in his Theory of Surplus Value. In this book, he draws on the work of his predecessor in more than one page out of every six. Ralf Dahrendorf cites Marx 160 times in his book Society and Democracy in Germany. Max Weber does not cite Marx, but many of his writings were in response to the thesis of his predecessor. He once noted that he could not have accomplished crucial parts of his work without the contributions of Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche. Darwin had recognized his debt to Thomas Robert Malthus; John Maynard Keynes would not have been able to write one of the most famous books of the 20th century without the incremental advances achieved by several generations of economists. The theory of development consists of a long chain of accumulated contributions in several disciplines. The literature on elites is a good example, among others, of cumulative knowledge. Many contributions emphasize the sedimentation of layers of knowledge. The work of Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto on elitism has become consolidated groundwork, and since then, important books have built an impressive patrimony.

The scope of social sciences is rarely the discovery of laws with universal validity; rather, it is the explanation of social diversity. In the social sciences, truth is not universal, it is contextual and plural. Social scientists do not make inventions and rarely make discoveries; what they do best is to observe regularities and exceptions (anomalies). It is for this reason that the most imaginative strategy in the social sciences is the comparative method. The patrimony is common property. Although every concept or theory or method has its creators and developers, they do not need to be cited every time the term is used. Even the identity of the originator may disappear into anonymity. We do not, and cannot, remember who used terms such as role, revolution, or social mobility for the first time. Given such a patrimony, scholars today can start their research at a much higher level than did their predecessors. Graduate students today know more than the founders of their field—even if they do not have the same capabilities of their forebears. Knowledge is largely acquired by accumulation.

Because the patrimony of political science results from progressively accumulated knowledge rather than from revolutionary leaps or bounds, because the discipline is deeply divided in specialties and in schools, and because one of its most productive research strategies is the comparative method, the mainstream of the discipline of political science cannot be labeled as paradigmatic. Other expressions are available: general framework, basic theories, encompassing synthesis, lasting postulates, and so on. None of the major trends in contemporary political science has the pretention of flying the paradigmatic flag. Many schools were and are innovative and seminal, but they directly contradict the concept of a paradigm dominating the entire discipline or its prominent domains.

There is a basic incompatibility between paradigmatic monoliths and comparative analyses. All great theories, concepts, and strategies in political science implicitly reject paradigmatic assumptions (except maybe the rational theory). The history of political science is a history of multiple competitive theories and methods: plural societies, behaviorism, structural functionalism, development, dependency, the role of the state and of civil society, the changing roles of institutions, electoral cleavages, religion and politics, civil culture, nationalism, social stratification, social class, alienation, legitimacy, trust, ethnocentrism, imperialism, hegemony, the clash of civilizations, and so on. The
Authoritarianism has two roots, one psychological and one ideological. It is often inadvertently interchangeable with despotism, autocracy, absolutism, dictatorship, and so on. Authority has been analyzed from different disciplinary perspectives by Bronislaw Malinowski, Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, Harold Lasswell, Abraham Kaplan, Bertrand de Jouvenel, and Carl Friedrich, among others. The concept of culture (civic, political, and national) has many variants: cultural convergence, cultural configuration, cultural evolution, cultural integration, cultural lag, cultural parallelism, cultural pluralism, cultural relativity, cultural system, postmaterialist culture. In the past 2 decades, political scientists have been very productive in this subfield.

Paradigms do not dialogue, they are mortal enemies; new ones replace old ones entirely. Introductory textbooks in physics or chemistry published 40 years ago rest now in the cemetery of books. On the contrary, in political science, dozens of books published long ago are still inspiring contemporary scholars: Max Weber, Karl Marx, Adam Smith, Vilfredo Pareto, Anthony Downs, Kenneth J. Arrow, Harold Lasswell, John Stuart Mill, Joseph Schumpeter, and many others, even Aristotle and Machiavelli, are still preeminent in the patrimony of political science, which advances by a process of accumulation of work within subfields and develops out of the patrimony by the scientist’s own insights. The history of political science is not a history of breakthrough discoveries as in physics or chemistry. It is an uninterrupted chain of advances, with many competitive schools, controversies, temporary syntheses, predecessors and successors, and methodological disputes.

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See also Normative Political Theory; Political Philosophy; Political Theory

Further Readings
Parliamentary government is a form of government where the executive derives its political legitimacy from the parliamentary representative body. From a historical point of view, it is a European invention and continues to be the most common form of government on this continent. Outside Europe, its diffusion has been limited, and presidential or semipresidential forms have often been preferred. This entry discusses the origins of parliamentary systems, the various forms they take, and current problems with respect to this form of government.

The Origins of Parliamentary Government

Parliamentary government is one of the possible solutions to a crucial liberal and democratic problem—the problem of how to ensure both the political legitimacy of the executive and, at the same time, its accountability. The basic idea behind this form of government is that the parliamentary institution, as the highest representative body of the political community, should hold the keys to the life of the executive. This constitutional idea is essentially implemented by giving the parliament the power to express a vote of no confidence in the executive if it does not approve its behavior and by obligating the executive to resign when faced with such a manifestation of political distrust.

The origins of this principle and of the institutional mechanisms used to implement it can be easily detected in European history of the past 2 centuries. Within the framework of limited monarchical government, that is, a political condition whereby the monarchy was balanced by a representative body, the increasingly strong political role of the latter has progressively produced a situation in which the executive nominated by the monarch could not survive without the political approval of the parliament. Criticisms, which the parliamentary body could not address against the king himself without getting into a situation of lèse-majesté and thus creating an unsolvable problem of political legitimacy, could be more freely directed against the government. In this case, a mutually acceptable solution could be for the king to dismiss the government, attributing to it all political responsibilities and thus preserving his own supremacy. On its side, the representative body could “obtain the head” of the prime minister and of his or her ministers while at the same leaving the authority of the king untouched. In this way, the executive, while originally chosen by the monarch and deriving from him its political legitimacy, could be gradually drawn into the sphere of the parliament until the monarchy ultimately lost every substantive political control over the executive and only retained a symbolic role.

With this transformation, the government and its components have been increasingly drawn into the sphere of electoral and party politics and have gained independence from the sphere of the court and of the state bureaucracy. The process leading to a full parliamentary control over the executive has been often difficult and nonlinear. The idea that the government should answer to elected politicians and become responsive to the opinions and passions of the populace was difficult to accept—both for the monarchy and for the state establishment that was loyal to the throne. For an extended period of time, in most European countries, the monarchs attempted to maintain some degree of political control over the formation of governments and over the selection of prime ministers and some ministers (particularly in the fields of foreign affairs and defense). They also sought to
influence some of the policy decisions. On a number of occasions, they even resorted to prematurely dissolving the parliament with the purpose of obtaining a more favorable position of the representatives with regard to their preferred cabinets. This resistance has delayed but not stopped the process of parliamentarization; in some cases, however, it has led to the downfall of the monarchy and to the (permanent or temporary) adoption of republican rule (e.g., in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). Where the monarchy has more smoothly accepted the new developments, it has survived, although with a more limited role. In these cases, it has accompanied the consolidation of a stable parliamentary government (Belgium, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and the United Kingdom [UK] are good examples of such a development).

The Basic Features of Parliamentary Government

As previously mentioned, the crucial and defining feature of a parliamentary government is the power of the parliament to express a vote of no confidence against the government. Corresponding to this power is the duty of the government to resign after such an event. As it had already been clearly noticed by Walter Bagehot in *The English Constitution* (1867), this produces a “close union of the executive and legislative powers.” The cabinet and the parliament, or more precisely the parliamentary majority, become closely interconnected. The other features of this form of government derive from the first feature. The second is that the executive does not have a fixed term of office. Its duration may coincide with a full parliamentary term, or even beyond, if a newly elected parliament continues to ensure its political support, but it may also be interrupted beforehand. The principle of collegial responsibility that typically characterizes parliamentary government is also strictly linked to the power of the parliament to express a vote of no confidence against the government. The government is a collective decision-making body and is collectively responsible in front of the parliament. This principle can, however, coexist with significant variations in the internal structure of the executive. The role and the authority of the head of the government can vary, as well as the degree of autonomy of the other ministers. In most cases, the duration of parliament is not fixed: The parliament can be dissolved before its normal conclusion and early elections can be called. This possibility is generally viewed by constitution makers as an exit strategy in situations where providing the required parliamentary support for a cabinet has proven to be a difficult task. With regard to the dissolution of parliament, it is particularly relevant to establish who has the substantive power to decide this. A further institutional feature of this form of government is that the head of state is clearly separated from the head of the government and that it mainly has a representative and procedural role rather than a governing one. Parliamentary government is, however, compatible with a variety of possibilities with regard to the selection of the head of state. Especially in Europe, a good number of parliamentary monarchies survive where the head of state is designated by the monarchical principle of inheritance within an established dynasty. In most of the other cases, when a republican solution is adopted, a president is elected by the parliament. In a few cases, a popular election takes place but, as opposed to presidential or semipresidential forms, this does not attribute to the president a governing role.

A crucial aspect of the parliamentary form is the formation of the government; unlike the presidential form of government, it is not formally decided by elections and thus requires a more complex procedure. Typically, this procedure entails the nomination of the government so that the parliament can express its support either explicitly (if a confidence vote is required at its inception) or implicitly (when such a vote is not required and support is presumed until proof of the contrary). With few exceptions, the role of nominating is in the hands of the head of state, who is called to perform this function after an election or the resignation of the government in office. Constitutional rules are usually not very specific about what the head of state (or another authority endowed with this power) should do, but it is rather obvious that the designation must be oriented toward producing a cabinet capable of obtaining the support of the parliament. Otherwise, it could later be struck by a negative vote of the representative body and thus nullified. The task of the head of state is, therefore, to find out the will of the parliamentary
majority, in terms of both the composition of the majority itself and the identification of the person to lead the new government. Depending on the electoral system and the configuration of the party system in the parliament, this step may be more or less simple. In some cases, electoral results so clearly define which party or coalition of parties has won and to whom the task of cabinet leader should be assigned that the head of state has practically no need to conduct a search and can proceed immediately to the nomination of the prime minister. In other cases, especially in multiparty systems, the process is less clear. After new elections or after the fall of an existing government, it may not be immediately obvious which parliamentary majority will be formed that is able to sustain a new government. To establish which parties will compose it and which leader will be acceptable may require a long and complicated process of negotiation. The head of state will typically assist the process through consultations with the political forces until a viable solution emerges. Under special circumstances, this role of facilitator may acquire a somewhat greater political significance. When parties cannot come to an agreement, the intervention of the head of state may help guide the process by either favouring one solution or creating obstacles for another one.

**Institutional Variations in Parliamentary Government**

Within this general scheme, there is great space for institutional variations. With regard to parliamentary confidence in the government, it has already been mentioned that while the power of the representative assembly to express a vote of no confidence is the common and defining feature of parliamentary governments, a positive confidence vote is not always required when a new government is formed. In many cases, the support is presumed unless proven otherwise. Other aspects deserve to be noted. When the parliament is bicameral, the power to provide or to deny the confidence to the government is generally reserved to only one of the chambers—the one with the broader democratic base. Only exceptionally, as in Italy under the constitution of 1948, is the positive confidence of both chambers required for a government to survive. Given its crucial influence on the stability of the executive, the vote of no confidence has been regulated with variable degrees of restrictions. Some of these rules, such as the requirement of a temporal delay before a motion of no confidence is put to a vote, are directed at preventing parliamentary “ambushes.” A more strict mechanism is the one introduced with the German Basic Law of 1949, which has since found some imitations. The so-called constructive vote of no confidence prescribes that the vote by the parliament against the government in office should simultaneously designate a new head of government (the chancellor in the German version). The purpose is to prevent negative coalitions that are only united by the purpose of bringing down a government and do not possess the willingness to unite in the formation of a new one. Differences can also be found in the process of government formation. If the normal rule is that the head of state nominates the prime minister, this duty may be transferred, as in Sweden after the constitutional reform of 1974, to the parliament’s speaker. Another solution, adopted in the German Basic Law, is to have the chancellor individually elected by the parliament (in fact by the Bundestag) on the proposal of the head of state.

With regard to legislative matters, further variations may concern the powers of the government and the head of state. The head of state may have the power to send back to the legislature a piece of legislation approved by parliament (in most of the cases of governmental initiative). Governments may have, as, for instance, in Italy, the power to enact decrees that enjoy immediately the same authority as laws but that must be subsequently ratified by parliament within a given period of time. The role of the government within parliament may also vary, especially with regard to the governance of the lawmaking process. Of special interest are its agenda-setting powers and the control it has of the parliamentary calendar.

The most important dimension of variation concerns the relative power and roles of ministers and prime minister. Parliamentary governments may oscillate between an extreme where the prime minister has a dominant role in guiding the cabinet and another extreme where his or her authority is much more limited and he or she is confined to a role of mediation among powerful “cabinet barons” (Giovanni Sartori, 1994). This only partially
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depends on formal constitutional rules; other factors that are essentially related to the electoral and party aspects of government formation have a much greater impact, and it is these factors that now need to be examined.

The Working of Parliamentary Government

On the basis of the constitutional rules defining it, the parliamentary form of government can be interpreted as a fairly straightforward “chain of delegation and accountability” (Kaare Strom, 2000). Through elections, citizens delegate the members of parliament; these in turn delegate the government, which then delegates the ministerial bureaucracies. Accountability runs in the opposite direction. Things, however, are a bit less simple and linear when political factors are introduced into this picture. Of crucial importance is the party variable with its two main dimensions: (1) the internal structure of parties and (2) the nature of the party system. The relationship between parliament and government can change significantly depending on these two aspects. The main reason is that the nature of the party system and the internal structure of parties have a direct bearing on the form and the cohesion of the parliamentary majority—the crucial linchpin in this form of government. The potential variations in the practical workings of the parliamentary government can be broad. At one extreme, we can find the situation, common in many countries at the origins of parliamentary government, in which parties were more or less nonexistent as organizations. In front of parliamentary aggregations with a weak degree of cohesion, the government (especially when backed by a monarch who had not yet abandoned the ambition to exert political influence) could easily manipulate majorities using the instruments of political patronage and, if needed, the threat of early elections. It is true that the government could also unexpectedly face a parliamentary ambush due to the volatility of parliamentary support. The consolidation of highly organized parties during the 20th century has deeply changed the relationship between executives and parliaments in most countries. Parties (and especially their extraparliamentary organizations and leadership) have become the crucial linchpin of this relationship. In practical terms, both the members of parliament and the executive became the delegates of parties’ leaderships. Parliamentary government became truly “party government” (Richard Katz, 1986), whereby party leaders define to a large extent the policy platforms to be followed by the government and select the persons to occupy ministerial positions. In this context, the parliamentary connotation means essentially that it is the “parliamentary size” of parties resulting from their electoral performance that determines their weight in this process. Depending on the variety of party organization models, the degree of parliamentarization of the party leadership can also vary, and this also reflects on the parliamentarization of the cabinet members. The current decline of external party organizations is opening the way to a situation where the government less strictly depends on party orders and in fact influences internal party dynamics. Thus, there is more of a two-way relationship between parties and government.

The structure of the party system and electoral dynamics combine to produce other important effects. Particularly relevant is the impact that these elements can have on the relationship between the electoral and the parliamentary moment of the process of delegation. A good example is the British one. Normally, the existence of a (de facto) two-party system, combined with the fact that elections determine which party controls a parliamentary majority and the fact that the leader of a party is also in principle the candidate for head of government, produces a kind of short circuit in the process of delegation. Although voters in principle only select the members of parliament, they also determine de facto the party that will govern and its leader. A “popular investiture” of the government is thus produced and the parliament cannot do anything but ratify it. Of course, this does not detract from other aspects of the parliamentary model: The members of parliament maintain the power to renege on their support for the government (and the government knows that it must work toward maintaining this support). Electoral mandate and parliamentary support are thus combined. Changes in the configuration of the party system and electoral results may, however, negate the possibility of a one-party government “mandated” by the electoral result and thus open the way to a coalition negotiated among the parties/parliamentary groups. In fact, this happened in
2010 in the UK, and it is the “normal way” in multiparty systems. In such situations, elections are not decisive; a process of coalition making can only begin among the parties represented after the parliament is formed. In this case, the delegation from the parliament (the parties) to the government becomes more evident. The government will receive its policy mandate and derive its personal composition from this process. The relationship between the government and its supporting coalition is then crucial. The government can only last if its supporting coalition holds together. The instruments for stabilizing the majority and regulating its internal working acquire an obvious importance, according to Wolfgang Müller and Kaare Strøm (2000). Among them, the coalition agreement deserves special attention. It is a document that specifies the broad goals of the coalition, its specific policy objectives, the allocation of ministries, and the instruments and the rules for the solution of conflicts. Other instruments can also help solve coalition conflicts during the life of the cabinet, such as coalition committees—“summits” of party leaders that are held to interpret or renegotiate the original agreement.

Two further situations must be considered. The first is when a coalition is formed before the elections. The second is when the government, based on one or more parties, does not have in parliament the support of a stable coalition holding the majority of seats. The first case can be seen in some way as an intermediate situation between a single-party government and a normal coalition government. If a preelectoral coalition wins the majority required to govern, the formation of the cabinet will be much speedier than is the case with a postelectoral coalition. Most of the policy and distributional questions will have been solved in advance. Moreover, the coalition and its leader will enjoy a sort of “direct investiture” by the people. However, as with any coalition government, this one will also be faced with the problem of maintaining its cohesion. This problem may become more serious if, with the approaching of new elections, any of the coalition members fears that its participation may not be rewarded by the voters and sees its chances better served by pursuing a different political path. The second case derives from the fact that in a parliamentary government the cabinet must not necessarily rely on a supporting majority. In fact, the most important thing is that there should not be a majority against it. This enables the creation of minority governments, made up of one or more parties that do not enjoy a majority in parliament but explicitly or implicitly receive the support of other parties either in a more stable way or on an ad hoc basis. The frequency of such governments is greater than expected: This suggests that participating in a cabinet with full ministerial responsibilities is sometimes more of a cost than a benefit.

Whenever a one-party government is not possible, the formation of (preelectoral or postelectoral) coalitions is obviously a crucial aspect in the working of parliamentary government. This has generated a whole sector of studies devoted to coalitions that, starting with the pathbreaking study of William Riker (1962), have analyzed the different types of coalitions with regard to their size (minimal winning, minority, oversize, etc.) and their ideological composition (connected/unconnected). Furthermore, these studies have explored different explanations (utilitarian calculus, ideological preferences, and policy orientations) for their formation and their ends.

Advantages and Disadvantages
Is the parliamentary form of government a better or worse form than the others, in particular the presidential form? This question has recurrently been at the center of discussions and has received varying answers. This is partly explained by the different points of view adopted and by the changing criteria of evaluation. It has also been due to the lack of systematic comparative empirical evidence; only in recent times has this obstacle been gradually overcome. Governmental instability has traditionally been one of the main points of criticism for parliamentary governments. The experiences of a number of European countries between the two World Wars seemed to suggest that parliamentary cabinets tend to be unstable and weak and that heads of government may lack authority, thus creating a situation that could open the road to nondemocratic consequences. In contrast, a presidential or semipresidential form of government has often been presented as a better solution. Putting the selection of the head of the executive directly into the hands of the voters and establishing a
fixed term for its duration seemed, to many scholars and observers, to be a recipe for overcoming the failures of parliamentary government. More recent contributions have retorted that parliamentary government, rather than being responsible for creating these problems, reflects a situation existing at the level of parties that would be dangerous to ignore. Moreover, it can be said that in such situations the parliamentary form of government allows a flexibility in the formation and change of governments that may reduce personalized zero-sum conflicts and open the road to compromises. On the contrary, presidential forms of government often are characterized by a rigidity that cannot easily provide alternative solutions if the adopted one fails. Whatever the conclusions of this scholarly and political debate are, it is worth noting that recently established democracies have increasingly attempted to combine elements of the parliamentary and presidential forms of government, adopting some form of semipresidentialism (or semiparliamentarianism).

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See also Accountability; Cabinets; Coalitions; Constitutional Engineering; Democracy, Types of; Electoral Systems; Government; Legitimacy; Parliaments; Parties; Party Systems; Presidentialism; Representation; Semipresidentialism

Further Readings


Parliaments

The notion of parliament has existed for almost as long as people have gathered to debate alternative viewpoints and take associated decisions. As the complexity and formality ascribed to these gatherings increased, the institution of parliament developed. It comes under a variety of names, from the most common assembly, legislature, or parliament to more regionally specific ones such as Storting or Diet. Parliaments are institutions that bring together formally recognized members to discuss and legitimize decisions on matters affecting the community at large. The level of formality and power credited to those discussions and decisions varies, as does the level of representation. This entry first describes how the role of parliaments has changed considerably since the 19th century. The factors affecting the role and power of parliaments are considered, and the key roles performed by these institutions are identified. Each of these roles—legislation, scrutiny, and representation—is assessed, and the organization of parliaments is described. The entry concludes by outlining the main areas on which research on parliaments has focused.

The history of parliaments is intrinsically linked to that of democracy. Each wave of democratization identified by Samuel Huntington has corresponded to stages in the development of parliaments. The first wave encompasses the spread of liberalism in 19th-century Europe. With this came the creation
of new parliamentary institutions, as well as the legitimization of their representative value and role in the decision-making process. As the value of representative democracy grew, parliaments became central institutions of political systems, particularly in Europe. With the 20th century came considerable changes that affected the power and role of parliaments. As democracy expanded with the emergence of newly independent countries (the second wave of democratization), so did its complexity. The changes affecting parliament were twofold. First was the development of mass parties; the expansion of the electoral franchise saw parties becoming key institutions in the representation process, acquiring an important role in the expression of policies and mediation of interests, which had been key roles of the original liberal parliaments. Second, there was an expansion of the state; the emergence of the welfare state saw legislation growing more complex, increasingly developing into a matter for the executive rather than parliament. By the mid-20th century, some parliamentary roles and powers had been transferred to other institutions. However, as the third wave of democratization started, in the 1970s, many authoritarian regimes turned to democracy, putting parliaments at the core of their transitions. Simultaneously, a wider range of parliamentary roles and powers started to be more fully recognized. This was a time when the paradigm of the decline of parliament gave way to the paradigm of the role of parliament. Besides representation and legislation, parliaments play a variety of other roles, from education to providing a safety valve, legitimation, and scrutiny. Never before have there been so many parliaments, not only at the national level but also locally, regionally, and supranationally. Since the end of the 20th century, parliaments have expanded considerably in number and in complexity.

The powers and roles of parliaments differ according to their political context—the type of political, electoral, and party systems. Being part of a parliamentary, hybrid, or presidential political system has implications for the separation of powers and the relationship between parliament and other institutions, especially the executive. Different electoral systems, and associated party systems, also affect parliaments by determining the number of parties present in parliament, the potential support base for government, the strength of party discipline, the type of representative mandate, and the parliament’s organization. Indeed, some parliaments are not elected at all and are not composed of party members. Therefore, parliaments have differing powers and roles according to the characteristics of these structural variables, though all, in varying degrees, make a link between citizens and governance.

The relationship with government is one of the key dimensions to understanding parliaments. Depending on the type of political system, parliament may have different tools with which to hold government to account, such as a motion of censure that could bring the government down if approved. But the relationship with the executive goes well beyond accountability. The main focus of that relationship usually revolves around the production of legislation, but it also concerns the scrutiny of government activity. It is generally accepted in the literature that the executive dominates this relationship, due to the support ensured through party discipline and governmental legislative powers. That said, the more checks and balances the system includes, the less likely it is that the executive will dominate parliament.

The main function traditionally associated with parliaments is legislation. However, most legislation produced today has little contact with parliament. Legislation has become so complex that parliaments have little capacity to deal with the detail and extent of today’s regulatory frameworks. Notwithstanding, parliaments do still hold a role in the legislative process. This role varies according to structural characteristics, as explained above, resulting in varying degrees of power in the capacity to initiate, amend, approve, and/or reject legislation. Many parliaments only have a legitimizing role of the legislative process, with little power to introduce legislation, let alone change it. They often act as the final stamp of approval, which explains why authors refer to rubber-stamp parliaments. As David Olson has famously stated, there is a general 90% rule in the legislative process, whereby the executive proposes 90% of the legislation and gets 90% of what it wants. Within the 10% leeway, many parliaments have the capacity and ability to change legislation, through formally approving amendments or informally influencing the final outcome. Occasionally, parliaments have the ability to reject government
legislation. When parliament regularly rejects government legislation, the relationship between the two institutions can break down, leading to new elections (or even a regime change). Regardless of the percentage of legislation on which parliament can act, one must also consider the focus and level of legislation (primary, secondary, or delegated). Some parliaments reserve the right to legislate on specific matters, which means that the whole of the bill is introduced, discussed, and approved in parliament; while in other cases the government has areas of reserved legislation through which it can legislate without having to go through parliament. Additionally, other institutions can intervene in the legislative process, such as supra-national parliaments.

Scrutiny is another of parliament’s main functions. It comes under different names such as oversight or parliamentary control and expresses itself in a wide range of activities and tools. Scrutiny plays a key part in the relationship between parliament and government and has increased in importance as parliament’s role in the legislative process has diminished. Scrutiny can focus on the application of legislation, on seeking information, or simply on keeping a check on governmental activity. Most parliaments have provision for asking questions of government, in writing and/or orally in the plenary chamber and/or in committee. The frequency of these questions and their response rate are key indicators to assess the effectiveness of these. Parliaments often provide for several formats for questions to the government according to the types of request and matters. Interpellations are another popular scrutiny tool. Usually more general in scope, these involve a small debate on the topic, with the participation of a wider number of representatives besides the proponent. Finally, committees of enquiry form the other main scrutiny tool used by parliaments. Despite exceptions, these tend to be set on an ad hoc basis when there is a serious matter to investigate. The ability to scrutinize and investigate government adequately depends greatly on parliament’s power to request information from the government and to summon the presence of members of the government and of the public administration, as well as the degree to which the opposition can use these powers.

As a key function for most parliaments, representation takes many forms and is closely linked to the type of electoral system through which the parliament is elected. Representation can be collective, where the party’s parliamentary group is the main representative entity, or individual, through members of parliament (MPs, also called deputies, legislators, or senators). The representative mandate is often linked to constituencies but can have a national basis. The strength of the link between representatives and constituencies depends on these factors. Parliaments elected through a first-past-the-post electoral system tend to encourage a more individual and constituency-based type of representation. Besides this, representatives may also follow a trustee approach to their mandate or a delegate one. In the trustee model, representatives make decisions by following their own judgment, whereas in the delegate model, MPs act foremost on behalf of a particular group. The delegate model tends to dominate today, and the debate is mainly about which group should prevail in that representation—the party, the constituency, or the nation.

With respect to their organization, parliaments can be unicameral, with only one chamber, or bicameral, with two chambers. Bicameral parliaments tend to exist in countries with a large territory, a federation, and/or great ethnic diversity. Some countries do not fall in any of these categories but have a second chamber for historical reasons. The role and powers of second chambers vary considerably, but they tend to complement the first chamber and to act as a check and balance. A key consideration is whether the second chamber is nominated, directly elected, or indirectly elected. Often, parliamentary activity is divided between the plenum—a chamber—and committees. The plenum is usually reserved for larger debates and committees for more detailed review and scrutiny. Normally, plenum debates are public, whereas committees can hold meetings behind closed doors. Today, committee work plays a considerable part in parliamentary activity. One final point to consider in parliamentary organization is the level of resources and staffing. These affect parliaments’ ability to play any of their roles.

Political scientists still know little about parliaments around the world. Most research focuses on a very few case studies, normally from Western democracies, and on limited dimensions of
parliamentary activity. The relationship between parliament and government, parliament’s role in the legislative process, and parliamentary voting behavior constitutes the main areas of research.

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See also Electoral Systems; Executive; Parties; Political Systems, Types; Representation

Further Readings

**Participant Observation**

Anyone doing empirical research into social activities and social reality has three basic options: (1) evaluating documents, (2) conducting a written or oral survey to gain information on the knowledge and the activities of subjects, or (3) participating in the everyday practices of the people of interest. The final method is called participant observation or ethnography. It has its roots in anthropology and ethnology; it is rarely used in political science. After a brief overview of the historical and theoretical development of participant observation, this entry demonstrates the opportunities and restrictions of participant observation as a research method in political science. It concludes with some advice on putting participant observation into practice.

**Historical Development**

The methodological development of participant observation dates back to the 1920s with the research of the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski as well as Robert Park, William Thomas, and Florian Znaniecki of the Chicago School of Sociology. Classics such as *Marienthal: The Sociography of an Unemployed Community* (1933) by Marie Jahoda and Paul Lazarsfeld or *Street Corner Society* (1943) by William Whyte indicate that participant observation has been part of the methodological instruments used in the social sciences from the start. However, in the beginning of the 1950s, such observation methods fell out of favor due to the further development of survey research and standardized statistical methods. In the 1980s, when the discussion about the usefulness of a qualitative research approach increased, interest in participant observation was revived.

In comparison with other disciplines such as sociology or education, participant observation has until now been neglected in political science. Not only has it been rarely used in political science research, but political scientists have not been involved in its methodological development. The work of Richard Fenno is one of the few exceptions. His description of his research strategy as “soaking and poking” has become standard terminology. Fenno observed members of the U.S. House of Representatives in their constituencies and inductively developed a theory of their working styles. He later also accompanied U.S. senators on their campaigns, and in several of his works, he reflected on the experiences he had while observing politicians in Washington, D.C., and in their home districts.

**Theory of Scientific Observation**

At the most basic level, observation orients us to our environment—it is something we do every day. It becomes scientific observation if it allows us to systematically examine certain assumptions with results that are repeatable and intersubjectively comprehensible. Scientific methods of observation can be divided into the following five categories:

1. covert versus open observation,
2. participant versus nonparticipant observation,
3. structured versus unstructured observation,
Participant Observation

4. observation in the field versus laboratory observation, and
5. introspection versus external observation.

In political science, participant observation is the most common variant. In general, this type of research is conducted openly, in a natural environment, and in the form of external observation. The extent of participation can be thought of as a continuum, since it can take a variety of forms, and the influence of the observer on the field can vary. For example, as a guest in committee meetings the political scientist is a quiet listener, but as a passenger in a politician’s car on the way to the next appointment he or she can also be asked for advice. Accordingly, participant observation is not to be understood only literally, since in many institutional contexts action primarily consists of verbal communication. Observing means communicating. In most cases, participant observation is therefore combined with other methods of data collection. Take, for example, the observation of a parliamentary committee. Here, observation does not only mean direct participation in the meeting for the purpose of describing its course and the actions of the legislators. Essential to the observation is researching background information on committee members or studying the agenda and the motions, informal conversations, as well as later interviews with representatives. After the meeting, the observations must be examined to determine whether they confirm previous assumptions and earlier observations or whether new hypotheses must be generated.

Participant observation is in many respects a process. On the one hand, the political scientist has to gain access to the field. On the other, the observation increasingly has to concentrate on those aspects that are essential to the research question. James Spradley distinguishes three phases: descriptive, focused, and selective observation. In the first phase, the researchers get their bearings and collect unspecific descriptions of the field. The complexity of the field is grasped as comprehensively as possible, and concrete research questions are developed. During focused observation, the perspective is narrowed and focused on the problems, processes, and persons that are of particular importance for the problem under investigation. At the end of the observation process, selective observation serves to find further proof and further examples for the previously found behavior.

Participant observation aims to understand its research subject from within. Through participant observation, subjective views, and interpretations (symbolic interactionism), interactive processes in which social reality is constructed (ethnomethodology) or the cultural and social rules that shape the perception and construction of social reality (structuralism) can be understood. The research principle that underlies participant observation is understanding. Typically, the starting point of participant observation is a singular case, from which one progresses to general or comparative statements. First, the individual case is reconstructed. Then, the analyses and results from other cases are checked for comparison, and finally a typology is developed. What is understood as a singular case depends on the theoretical viewpoint: subjects and their points of view, interactions, or social and cultural contexts. In all these, one message is pervasive: Reality, as it presents itself to the observer, is never a given but is constructed by the various (individual or collective) players.

Advantages and Restrictions of Participant Observation

The role of the observing political scientist is not very different from that of the ethnologist who works in alien cultures. By direct participation, the political scientist attempts to understand typical organizational conventions and the rules and everyday routines that form the cultural bases of functioning political institutions. The field researcher’s aim is the understanding of political institutions from an endogenous perspective. Observations of legislators show that the social processes and rules guiding communicative processes or everyday behavior are difficult to research through interviews because something that is taken for granted often remains unconscious. If you ask politicians which rules guide their work or which strategies they pursue to achieve their goals, the answers are often nondescript. For example, many legislators are not aware of the informal rules of parliamentary business, and they have seldom reflected on “how it is done” to enforce their positions. Participant observation makes it possible to discover the behavioral patterns of everyday
actions in addition to what the subject of the observation reveals.

Examining the influence of informal rules is another advantage of participant observation. Politicians are used to formulating their positions with the public in mind; this behavior comes through in interviews, from which the observer often learns more about the ideas of the politician interviewed and about how something ought to be rather than about his or her actual behavior and how things are. This is particularly true when examining sensitive areas, including informal actions, because these may be considered to be synonymous with “fiddling” and “shady deals.” The combination of interviews and observations offers the advantage of being able to correlate and connect the sphere of perceptions with that of actions. The results of the observations can be contrasted and compared with those of the interviews. Participant observation makes it possible to experience social players as they actually behave in social and political reality.

Political scientists involved in field research are not immune from the danger described in ethnology as “going native”: a process in which the observer loses the outside perspective of the alien in his fieldwork and adopts the views of the subjects under observation. This makes the systematic evaluation of gained insights more difficult. However, if the researcher is self-consciously aware of this problem, the closeness to the research object is of immense value. No other method allows a researcher to come so close to the object of his or her enquiry as participant observation. The research process is not clouded by theories developed beforehand, traditional views, or standardized procedures. Participant observation makes it possible to see the progress and the contradictions of political processes and, as Fenno put it, to see the world the way the agents see it.

Participant observation also has its disadvantages, and this explains why only a few political scientists use it. First, the method is highly time-consuming and therefore costly. Second, restricted access to the field limits the opportunities for scientific political field research. Third, the formalization of participant observation methodology is only possible to a limited degree. The method of participant observation is difficult to divide into systematic steps and to teach systematically. Because of this, it can be burdensome to researchers.

Advice for Conducting Practical Research

In conducting participant observations, the following recommendations may be helpful.

1. Participant observation is not about the casual collection of impressions. Therefore, the implementation of theoretical research questions has to be done carefully. An observation guideline (but not a detailed, limiting observation scheme) sensitizes the observers to the observed situation, ensures concentration on the research questions, and facilitates coordination between various researchers.

2. Restrictions to field access are an everyday occurrence for political scientists using the participant observation method, due to the fact that political decisions are often taken behind closed doors. However, sample selection should not be done with the anticipation of potential access problems. A hybrid approach is recommended here—that is, taking a random sample based on theoretical criteria that ought to be flexible enough to be extended and modified in the research process. Here, Barney Glaser’s and Anselm Strauss’s idea of “theoretical sampling” is instructive. The following methods may increase access to the field:

   • being perseverant and obstinate;
   • identifying “gatekeepers,” using hierarchies and mediators to open doors;
   • winning over members of institutions to function as mentors to mediate in the solution of problems that occur in the field;
   • avoiding academic jargon, because politicians are not interested in the formulation of scientific theories, and instead communicating meaning by formulating the usefulness of the research results to be expected in the language of politics; and
   • acting competently, sensitively, honestly, and neutrally because safe field access depends on how the researchers are perceived in the field.

3. Political scientists usually do research in contexts involving many documents and papers, so that drawing up field notes will go unnoticed. If the opportunity to write down extensive notes is not taken, one misses the chance to collect detailed
observation data, unadulterated by gaps in one’s memory. To ensure data quality, explicit observation records have to be made from the notes close to the actual time of the events. If too much time is allowed to elapse, the records will be increasingly imprecise. Thus, spare time for recording data should already be set aside when planning the fieldwork. In the observation of institutional bodies, common behavioral patterns will be discovered, depending on the organizational context, from which a recording guideline can be derived, which will structure and simplify the following recording.

4. Observation by several researchers offers an opportunity to ensure the reliability of observation data. One observer compiles an initial record, which is then worked over by the second one. That way, information can be complemented, contradictions reconciled, and interpretations checked. With the help of pretests, coordination among the observers can be improved. Another possibility for validating the results is to get feedback from the persons observed in the field.

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See also Ethnographic Methods; Interviewing; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods; Thick Description; Triangulation

Further Readings

**PARTICIPATION**

No society, be it traditional or modern, can exist and survive without the active engagement of its members in the various domains of life that have resulted from processes of social differentiation and that, in toto, constitute societies and polities at large. This does not imply that every member of any given society has to be active in each domain. What it means, however, is that each domain encompasses individuals (the microlevel), an intermediary structure (the mesolevel) linking individuals and institutions in that domain, and systemic elements crystallized in rules and institutions regulating the particular domain in question (the macrolevel). Especially in modern times, these three levels are complemented by a fourth overarching level linking units in various ways (globalization is a particular phenomenon resulting from such linking processes). Notwithstanding the fact that presently there is an ongoing debate in political science on the shrinking role of the nation-state, the nearly 200 nation-states in existence are the major macro-units of analysis in comparative political science, whether they are considered in full or as subsets and whether the core emphasis in systematic analyses is on the micro-, the meso-, or the macrolevel or any combination of them. Below, first, a definition of various aspects of participation is provided. This is followed by a discussion of the underlying methods and theoretical concepts. The various dimensions of political participation are then discussed in greater detail. In conclusion, some of the major current developments and consequences for contemporary democracies are pointed out.

Participation refers, first, to activities by individual members of any given meso- or macro-unit of analysis. Second, in the core of participation is the action itself—that is, individual behavior—even if attitudes as the antecedents of such behavior, as obtained in survey research, may also be of interest. Third, individuals never act in a social void; therefore, to understand why people act at all and in the way they do, one has to consider the embeddedness of individuals in a context conducive to action. This context can be the institutional arrangements on the macrolevel (e.g., for voting, the electoral law in a given country) or the social environment that an individual is part of. Fourth, modern social science is not only about structure and persistence but also about dynamics and change, with obvious implications for research designs. Fifth, and returning to the concept of
domains as subunits of sociopolitical systems resulting from processes of differentiation in contemporary societies, participation for the purpose of this entry is divided into a part on political participation and a—smaller—part on social participation (there are other fields worth looking at, e.g., cultural participation, but here the data situation is unsatisfactory, and to reach out beyond the two fields just alluded to would overstretch the scope of the entry).

**Methodology**

As mentioned above, participation of individual, collective, or institutional actors is a constituent feature of any kind of sociopolitical structures and processes, including nation-states. To study participation empirically as an individual property requires a particular set of research instruments of an obtrusive or unobtrusive nature, and among those undoubtedly the most prominent one is the representative sample survey that acquires information from individual members of any given meso- or macro-unit. These individuals need to be selected at random based on probability theory in order to permit generalizations from the sample to the population from which the sample was drawn. By now, survey research can be regarded as a well-established research methodology and does not require any elaboration here, although using this methodology comparatively is a challenge. It is not by chance that the worldwide spread of this methodology, which started in the 1950s, has helped make individual political participation one of the best researched fields in political science.

But there are other important factors conducive to this state of affairs. The first is, on the macro-level, the economic growth and modernization that have contributed to the development of a survey research industry, both academic and commercial, that is an important tool for self-observation in societies. Second, surveys in the early days of this research, especially in the academic realm, were a rare and costly resource; this is not the least of the reasons for the establishment of academic data archives. This situation did not simply improve over time as survey studies became more numerous; a more important change was the transition from one-shot cross-sectional surveys to systematic replications over time to create longitudinal databases capable of analyzing sociopolitical change, at least in the aggregate (panels that require the same individuals to be surveyed over time are a separate and more complicated issue and are therefore still quite rare). Third, starting in the 1980s, the scholarly community has conducted a broad set of comparative longitudinal academic cross-sectional surveys from which participation research has benefited enormously, such as the World Values Studies (WVS) and European Values Studies (EVS), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the European Social Survey (ESS), and the Cross-National Study of Electoral Systems (CNES), data sets from which many of the current analyses and findings have originated. In addition to these academically driven surveys, other comparative surveys had already been established already in the 1970s, such as the Eurobarometer surveys funded by the European Commission, surveys that were later complemented by other Barometer surveys in Africa, South America, and Asia.

Fourth, with the establishment of social science data archives since the 1960s that now, organized in the International Federation of Data Archives (IFDO), cover large parts of the world, the collected data are increasingly becoming quickly available to the research community (in part already through the Internet) in a well-documented fashion and at little or no cost, with a major impact on research, publications, PhD dissertations, and student training in social science research methodology. Finally, as the outreach of comparative surveys covers more and more countries (e.g., the WVS, which is by now conducted in more than 70 countries), the theoretical and analytical scope of research is beginning to be extended substantially through so-called multilevel analyses that permit the systematic assessment of the impact of macrofactors on individual behavior.

**Participation and Theories of Democracy**

The Austrian-born sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld escaped from the threat of fascism in the 1930s to the United States and became one of the major driving forces in the development of systematic theory-guided empirical social research. In addition to his work in media studies, he became interested in elections and conducted, at Columbia University, the first major election studies in the
United States. After World War II, a group of four political scientists at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan started a series of election studies that later developed into the still existing American National Election Studies (NES) project. Similar national longitudinal election study projects have come into being, especially in some parts of Europe and for studying elections to the European Parliament; these data are also freely available through the respective data archives. The Michigan scholars and their works paved the way for contextualizing them in empirical democratic theory and squared well with the variant of election-centered elite democratic theory formulated by Joseph Schumpeter in his classic book *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. Basically, Schumpeter’s notion was that voters’ most important role was to choose, in general elections, among those elites who stood for political office. Thus, it is not by chance that research on political participation initially was very much related to the electoral process and the role citizens play in this process. In contemporary social science parlance, the key normative issues involved here for democracy are not only how responsive the political system is to the needs and requests of the people (Jan Teorell, 2006) but also which political institutions safeguard accountability for the citizens (Pippa Norris, 2007).

This clearly limited citizen role was challenged in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the wake of the anti-Vietnam War demonstrations in the United States and student protests in many parts of the democratic world. Requests for an extended political role of the citizenry became louder; they culminated, at least in Europe, in expectations about the demise of the “late-capitalist state” (Max Kaase & Kenneth Newton, 1995). Thus, liberal-elitist democratic theory was extended in scope through the notion of participatory democracy, a notion that claimed direct political channels of influence for citizens going beyond the established modes of representative, indirect participation through parties and elections. In the seminal study *Political Action*, Samuel Barnes et al. (1979) spoke of an extended repertory of political action available to citizens and coined the terms *conventional* and *unconventional political participation* to combine elitist and participatory theories of democratic political participation.

The most recent variant of thinking about democracy and democratic participation comes under the label of deliberative democracy and owes much to the work of Jürgen Habermas and his followers as advocates of domination-free discourse. Teorell (2006) sums things up when he writes that deliberation is to be considered “as a process of opinion formation rather than a procedure for decision making” (p. 791). It is not by chance that one of the few viable instrumental efforts along such lines is the concept of deliberative polls, where a representative, randomly selected group of citizens gets together for a couple of days to deliberate, with pre- and postmeasurements, on critical issues to unfold the impact of a dynamic free political discourse on improving and legitimating political decision making.

Any normative theory of democracy has to be closely linked to the notions of equal representation and general accountability; this is why the liberal-elitist theory of democracy is attractive to many in politics and in political science. Moving beyond institutionalized political participation in the electoral process creates obvious theoretical and practical problems for participatory democracy on those two accounts, and this becomes even more visible as politics is forced to overcome national barriers and to deal with various institutionalized (e.g., the United Nations, the World Bank) or noninstitutionalized transnational institutions and networks of action (e.g., nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]). On the international level, though, the actors or institutions as units of analysis are usually quite clear and easily identifiable. The same cannot be said for those involved in deliberative discourses, not to speak of the problems of legitimating who is represented in such discourses and in relating deliberative discourses to accountable political decision making.

Recently, in an interesting reflection on problems of deliberative democracy, another facet to this debate has been added. It is argued that in deliberation, not only individuals or groups but also the full array of discourses on a particular problematic should be represented, for instance, through a Chamber of Discourses, formal or informal. Obviously, a variety of important problems is involved here, such as authorization, accountability, and criteria for selecting representatives (who, as actors, have to satisfy criteria related to discursive democracy,
which cannot do without individual actors). The scholarly discussion on such ideas has at best just started; these ideas have not yet found entry into the debate on (political) participation and are, therefore, not yet represented in the empirical study of participation.

This discussion should make one thing clear: The empirical study of participation is closely linked to normative theories of democracy and has to be understood in such terms. The voluntary, free, and consequential political involvement of citizens is a minimal condition sine qua non for any legitimate democratic political system, however developed it may be and however well it may satisfy the demands of particular strands of democratic theory. Needless to say, political and social participation also take place in authoritarian or totalitarian systems. But this is not the subject to be addressed in this entry, not the least because of the fact that scientific as well as commercial empirical social research in such systems, as historic examples have shown, is unlikely or even impossible when citizens cannot freely express their opinions.

Political Involvement

For political scientists as well as for all others involved directly or indirectly in the political process, interest in political matters is a given. The same can, though, not be said for all citizens even in democratic polities. Surveys such as the 2002 Round of the ESS (see Miki Kittilson, 2007), comparing the relative importance of various life domains, have demonstrated time and again that politics ranks very low compared with domains such as family, work, health, or even leisure. This makes it even more interesting to look at those who show political involvement and what consequences this has for political participation as active acts of engagement. In normative democratic theory, political involvement is the raison d'être of a citizen; nevertheless, as was pointed out, such involvement cannot be taken for granted.

Participation research concentrates on acts of participation—that is, on concrete behavior directed toward having influence on various outcomes of the political process (see below). By contrast, political involvement must be regarded as an individual psychological predisposition, and it is an empirical question to what extent and under which conditions such involvement precedes political action. In their political action study, Barnes et al. (1979) analyzed five out of the set of eight countries participating in the study and, in the concluding chapter, looked at those respondents who showed no political interest but showed a tendency to act politically anyway. This was called an expressive mode, and it was found that between 18% and 32% of the respondents fell into this category (p. 528). In their seminal study Voice and Equality, Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady (1995) also emphasize the impact of political engagement—as they call it—on participation in the sense of being mutually reinforcing, although they mention that the closeness of this relationship makes it less interesting for the study of participation.

In recent empirical studies, political involvement is operationalized in similar and fairly common ways, although standardization for the empirical assessment of this concept has not yet been established. Jan Van Deth (2008) proposes, based on 19 countries in Round 1 of the ESS, looking at four separate elements of the involvement concept: (1) political interest, (2) frequency of engaging in political discussions with friends and family, (3) the personal importance of politics, and (4) the saliency of politics (politics is the most important of the seven life domains). These four indicators are obviously more or less “demanding,” and it is not surprising that interest in politics is the least and saliency of politics the most demanding factor. One important finding is that the analyzed countries differ substantially in the degree of political involvement of their citizens, with Southern European countries (Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal) the least involved (van Deth, 2008, pp. 196–199). Such differences stimulate the search for macro and contextual factors as explanatory variables. However, “the attempts to account for cross-national differences in involvement with macro-level factors do not seem to be very promising . . . The multi-level models tested here underline the relevance of conventional individual-level factors,” such as education, age, gender, and external efficacy beliefs (van Deth, 2008, pp. 204–205, 215–216).

The Citizen, Involvement, Democracy (CID) survey conducted between 1999 and 2002 in
12 European countries (Germany for historical reasons was counted as two countries: West Germany and the area of the former German Democratic Republic) addresses a whole range of sociopolitical participatory activities (Jan van Deth, José Montero, & Anders Westholm, 2007). There also the topic of political involvement is covered, although in a slightly different vein as the analysis is only based on responses to two questions on political interest and political importance. First, four ideal types of citizenship based on democratic theory are developed: a decisionist, a liberal-representative, a participatory, and a unitary type. This typology is then operationalized by cross-tabulating the two involvement items of interest and importance: low importance and low interest make for the decisionist type, low importance and medium interest make for the liberal-representative type, high importance and high interest make for the participatory type, and high importance and low interest make for the unitary type. Whether this typological approach will survive the tides of time is an open question given the fact that the two involvement items are highly correlated, thereby challenging the empirical basis of the above typology. There are nevertheless two findings worth emphasizing: Looking at country clustering, the CID study, too, finds Southern European countries to be the least politicized (Newton & Montero, 2007), and the distinction between the liberal-representative type and the participatory type in terms of antecedents and level of participatory engagement is very clear-cut.

Both involvement studies fall short on one important dimension: changes over time. This is a very interesting problematic because the postwar period can be characterized not the least through the extension of educational systems to supply more and more people with a higher level of formal education, and it is well-known from all participation studies that political and social participation is positively related to higher levels of formal education. Russell Dalton (2008) brings the concept of increasing cognitive mobilization into play. His data for four countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States) indeed point to an increasing interest in politics from the 1950s onward. However, other analyses looking at levels of political discussion (which is, of course, a more demanding activity) in Europe for the 1973 to 1991 period based on Eurobarometer data no longer show an upward trend. In fact, there is no necessary relationship between rising levels of education and higher levels of political involvement because period effects may also interfere substantially.

Political Participation

Political participation refers simply to activity that is intended to influence government action—either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies. Voluntary activity means participation that is not obligatory—no one is forced to volunteer—and that receives no pay or only token financial compensation. This is an operationalization that is shared by a great deal of other, established participation studies. In this operationalization, the target of the activities covered is and remains policymakers, although by including protest activities such as participating in political demonstrations the authors extend the repertoire of activities. At this point, the scholars involved in the CID project propose an extension based on David Easton’s classical notion of politics as the authoritative allocation of values. On this basis, political participation is conceptualized to also capture activities by ordinary citizens not targeted at political authorities. The innovation the study proposes is to go beyond voting, party activity, protest activity, and contacting and to include consumer participation as a new category in the form of boycotts—declining to buy certain products—and buycotts—buying certain products, although the concept of politics here appears to be ambiguous and not very precise.

In the following, the various dimensions of political participation are discussed in greater detail.

Voting

In the spirit of liberal democratic theory, encompassing participation in free, equal, and secret political elections is the core legitimating mechanism by which representatives are chosen for a limited period of time to participate, in various functions, in accountable political decision making. Given the practical importance of elections for selecting those actors with the right to legitimately
exercise power and, therefore, the enormous public visibility of and interest in elections, it is not surprising that political sociology has early on studied electoral participation—election turnout and voting behavior. However, the early-20th-century studies usually concentrated on single elections, were based on aggregate voting statistics, and could, therefore, not contribute much to the understanding of why individual people voted or abstained in such elections and why they voted for a particular political party. This situation changed significantly with the establishment of the survey method, producing individual data that permitted a much better understanding of electoral participation and, as time went on, of the electoral process and its dynamics at large. Further enrichment came through international collaboration stimulated by American psephologists at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan since the 1960s, which over time helped create worldwide scholarly networks with integrated theoretical approaches.

An excellent documentation of the payoffs from a longitudinal comparative study of turnout is Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945 (Mark Franklin, 2004). This book addresses three major questions: (1) Why do people vote at all given that according to rational choice theory, individual votes have, for all practical purposes, no influence on the aggregate outcome of elections? (2) Is there a general decline in turnout, and, if so, what can one learn with respect to whether such a decline has happened because of changing civic virtues and political disaffection? (3) What are the major macro- and microfactors that influence variations in turnout within and across countries?

These questions cannot be answered here in any detail. A very important finding is that turnout in established democracies increased between 1950 and 1965 and then has gradually declined until the present period. André Blais (2007) calculates an 8-percentage-point decline for 106 countries and a 9-percentage-point decline for 29 established democracies. The statistically sophisticated analyses by Franklin shed a reliable light on the reasons for this decline in attributing it to three macrodevelopments: (1) changes in the size of the electorate through generational replacement with young cohorts less inclined to vote, (2) lowering of the voting age in many countries in the late 1960s, and (3) the degree and nature of party competition. These are excellent examples of processes that happen at the macrolevel of societies and then trickle down to aspects of individual behavior. This, in turn, indicates that micronotions of declining trust in institutions, decreases in the civic mindedness of citizens, and disaffection with democracy do not contribute to the observed decline.

A different story can be told with respect to differing average levels of turnout for any given country and for within-country variations over time. Regarding levels of turnout, there is a lot of path dependency in the sense that major ad hoc variations in turnout are unlikely, due to stable institutional factors such as electoral laws, registration rules, or compulsory voting. By contrast, within-country turnout changes are greatly affected, especially by the competitiveness of any given election, which makes the “every vote counts” notion more plausible. That this effect is weaker for established than for young cohorts cannot come as a surprise given the fact that socialization into politics takes time and is especially difficult for younger people, for whom a lot of other priorities such as finishing an education and starting a family take precedence. To sum up, then, to understand voting participation along the time dimension requires modeling the complex interaction of individual and systemic factors, requires a longitudinal database, and benefits most strongly from a combination of micro- and macrolevel information.

### Other Dimensions of Political Participation

Research on political participation going beyond turnout and party choice started in the 1960s with Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? (Lester Milbrath, 1965). Milbrath conceptualized political participation in the form of a unidimensional pyramid of electorally based attitudes, with the “easier,” more frequent items at the bottom and the more demanding ones toward the top. It is interesting to note that Milbrath already mentioned demonstrations but argued at the time that they “do not fit into the hierarchy of political involvement in the United States” (p. 18). In a later edition of the book, the reach has been extended to also include demonstrations.
A major step forward in the empirical analysis of political participation was a seven-nation study looking at the structure, antecedents, and consequences of political participation (Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, & Jae-On Kim, 1978). In this study, the concept of the unidimensionality of the participatory space was overcome, through factor analysis, by establishing four separate sets of activities: voting, campaign activity, (particul-ized) contacting of public officials, and communal activity. But this study did not yet cover the domain of protest politics; the authors state explicitly that “our concern is with activities ‘within the system’—ways of influencing politics that are generally recognized as legal and legitimate” (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 3).

The first large comparative survey study that explicitly reached out into the protest dimension was a political action study (Barnes et al., 1979) in eight Western democracies; of those, the Netherlands, (West) Germany, and the United States were revisited, in a panel study, between 1979 and 1981 (Kent Jennings & Jan van Deth, 1989). These studies were triggered by the rise in protest activities, in particular petitions and demonstrations, beginning in the mid-1960s especially in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. In the history of state building, protest—often violent in nature—was not unusual; however, political-democratic consolidation after World War II emphasized a “civic culture” and not a strongly participatory one (Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba, 1963) until a protest culture began to build up in the 1960s.

The political meaning of this development in the beginning was not quite clear. A great theoretical and methodological difficulty for a survey study looking at cross sections of the voting-age population was the relative scarcity of activities beyond the electoral realm at the time of the survey. This was the reason for the approach by the political action group—an approach later criticized by other scholars—to not only concentrate on concrete activities but also look at attitudes toward the behavior the group was interested in, resulting in the concept of protest potential. But the major achievement of the project was to redefine the participatory space by adding a dimension of uninstitutionalized participation, thus juxtaposing the two dimensions of conventional and unconventional participation. One of the first pertinent findings was that these two dimensions were positively correlated in all countries, thereby suggesting an increase in the political action repertoire of citizens and not the demise of liberal democracy. It is remarkable that this finding from 1974 was fully corroborated by other studies almost 3 decades later.

The second result was that the most important antecedents of protest potential were high levels of education and young age. In particular, the positive impact of education on protest attitudes squared well with the socioeconomic standard (SES) model developed by Verba and Nie (1972), which emphasized high levels of education, high income, and high social status as pertinent antecedents of political participation. Whether youthfulness was a permanent corollary of protest potential was impossible to assess at that time without the availability of longitudinal data. The second wave of the political action study (Jennings & van Deth, 1989) then corroborated the finding that education is a factor conducive to all modes of potential and real participation. However, the initial findings on the positive role of youthfulness had to be qualified in the sense that young age became less important as one moved from attitude closer to action, thereby pointing to the role of different elements in contextual mobilization. In a more recent study of participation in demonstrations in Belgium, the reduced role of youthfulness in protest participation was not confirmed, while the impact of education remained relevant. What is important to learn from the Belgian study is that the sociostructural and attitudinal participation profiles of demonstrators vary substantially depending on the event that triggered the demonstration.

The juxtaposition of conventional and unconventional participation in political action owed much to the relative scarcity of acts such as petitions, demonstrations, citizen initiatives, and boycotts at the time of the survey. However, in participation research there is now agreement that especially the term unconventional participation is no longer meaningful given the fact that through processes of sociopolitical change these acts have become a regular and legitimate part of citizens’ action repertoires. To overcome this problem, Norris (2007) proposes to introduce a distinction “between citizen-oriented actions, relating mainly
Participation to elections and parties, and cause-oriented repertoire, which focus attention upon specific issues and policy concerns (p. 639). Edeltraud Roller and Tatjana Rudi (2008) speak of electoral and nonelectoral participation; Kaase prefers the distinction between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized forms of participation. Ronald Inglehart, already in 1977, suggested the terms of elite-directed action (related to elections and parties) and elite-challenging action. The most recent proposal for terminological innovation comes from the CID group, which, based on a factor analysis of their participation items, finds four participatory dimensions (contacting, party activity, protest activity, consumer participation) and adds voting as the fifth dimension and organizes these types in a fivefold table, distinguishing between mechanisms of influence (exit or voice) and channels of expression (representational or extrarepresentational). These are all terminological-conceptual efforts without greatly changing the dimensional structure of the participatory space known from many previous studies, except for finding a place for a new type of involvement no longer exclusively directed at political authorities: consumer participation measured as buycotts or boycnets. All in all, the famous saying by Mao Zedong, “let a hundred flowers bloom,” may be good for culture; in political science, greater continuity in theoretical approaches and empirical work would certainly be of advantage, leading to a cumulative growth of knowledge.

Levels, Antecedents, and Consequences of Political Participation

One of the charms of the liberal-elitist model of democracy is its emphasis on equal participatory rights through general voting. If everyone or at least a large part of the population does indeed exercise the right to vote, it is a logical consequence that no particular individual factors can be detected that influence participation. As soon as one goes beyond the electoral realm, though, the differences between modes of action within and between countries become very large. In the CID study, for example, between 4% and 21% of the citizenry around the year 2000 engaged in at least one act of contacting, between 1% and 6% in a party-related activity, between 1% and 8% in an act of protest, and between 5% and 44% in at least one act of consumer buycott or boycott. A similar picture emerges, although with considerable differences due to the choice of indicators, with regard to both acts of participation and the countries of concern from the analysis of Round 1 of the ESS (Newton & Montero, 2007).

Concentrating first on individual-level factors, the initial SES model has now been replaced by a more sophisticated model: the civic voluntarism model (CVM). In a detailed step-by-step analysis, Verba et al. (1995) go beyond the SES model to analyze the explanatory links between SES and participation. The CVM includes the explanatory dimensions of education and language, income and time, civic skills and political engagement: “Political participation, then, is the result of political engagement and resources” (Verba et al., 1995, p. 354). The authors regard the CVM as a powerful instrument to predict political activity in general, and they further argue in favor of the strength and validity of the CVM because it applies to all modes of political activity and finds different weights for its predictors depending on the particular kind of activity to be explained.

As soon as one moves beyond the study of one individual country, however, one has the chance also to look at the impact of institutional (macro) variables and to study the effects of eventual interactions between micro- and macrovariables in a multilevel research design. Two such analyses are of interest here, both with data coming from the Round 1 of the ESS. In the first of these analyses, the authors have collected 22 macroproperties assessing the dimensions of political order, democratic effectiveness, wealth, government expenditure, and population and have regressed those against an encompassing composite country participation score. Of those macro indicators, rule of law (a complex measure provided by the World Bank) has turned out to be the most important variable for influencing levels of conventional political participation, whereas protest is most strongly related to a high level of economic development, according to Newton and Montero. Both findings are well in line with existing theoretical approaches to specify systemic conditions for the emergence and existence of various modes of participation.

The multilevel analysis by Roller and Rudi (2008) starts out with the individual variables of
the CVM plus measures of social capital to optimally exploit the potential for the micro explanation of electoral and nonelectoral participation. This analysis first confirms the findings of Verba et al. (1995) that the CVM can be used to explain both forms of participation, although the various components of the model do not equally contribute to explain the two forms. For the multilevel analysis, three macrofactors measured by eight indicators are introduced: (1) socioeconomic modernization, (2) the electoral system, and (3) measures of social capital composed from the aggregation of individual-level indicators. The findings for electoral and nonelectoral participation regarding the impact of systemic variables are, however, disappointing: The share of the total variance explained by contextual factors for electoral participation is just 8% and for nonelectoral participation, an even lower 6%, speaking again for the power of the individual CVM model. Nevertheless, modernization has the expected effect on levels of nonelectoral participation, while political-institutional factors have an impact on levels of electoral participation. These findings square well with the theoretical expectations.

Participatory theories of democracy emphasize the right and the need for citizens to have a direct and not only an indirect say in political decision making. One aspect derived from empirical participation studies, however, has been from the beginning that, other than the vote, citizen participation is biased along the lines of the CVM model; it is the most resourceful and engaged citizens who dominate involvement in acts of participation beyond the vote. Early on this has already created concerns about the fairness of the democratic process (Verba et al., 1978; Verba & Nie, 1972). What if the citizen and group voices heard most loudly in politics are biased against the needs and preferences of the population at large? In Voice and Equality (Verba et al., 1995), the authors address this problematic in a very detailed fashion. They conclude,

According to a liberal model of American democracy, the principal role of citizen participation is to transmit information to public authorities about activists’ self-interested objectives. This chapter demonstrated a consistent pattern when it comes to the participatory politics of self-interest. Whether we are considering attitudes on the economy, actual economic circumstances and needs, or opinions on government efforts to assist Blacks or Latinos, the process operates to bias participatory input in the direction of the needs and the preferences of the advantaged. (p. 506)

The question to be addressed next is to what extent the reported findings for the United States also pertain to a broader array of countries. Comparing the effect of education as a proxy for the command of resources for electoral and nonelectoral participation, the findings are very much in line with those for the United States: There is almost no effect of education on electoral participation, and a substantial effect on nonelectoral participation (Roller & Rudi, 2008). Moving to the multilevel analysis, contextual variables do not add much to explain the modes of participation studied. But there is one result that challenges traditional wisdom of political science: It is majority voting and majoritarian political institutions that reduce political inequality for both modes of participation (Roller & Rudi, 2008).

There are at least two weaknesses in participation research that need to be addressed. The first—a minor one—is the increasing use of the Internet as a means of political communication and mobilization, which will require more attention now. The second, more consequential one refers to the fact that inequality of participatory input into the political system does not per se justify the conclusion that the policy output suffers systematically from a similar bias. A further necessary differentiation concerns the levels of the political system to which participatory activities are directed. What will be necessary in the future, according to Norris, will be to assess reliably the relationship between participatory input from various groups of the citizenry and the policy output created by the institutionalized policy process on the various system levels.

There is, incidentally, one aspect in the analyses reported above that permits a friendlier interpretation of the observed inequalities. Since those citizens who are politically the most active are also well embedded in social networks and are highly resourceful, their engagement may help improve the overall quality of the democratic process, a
consideration leading back to aspects of deliberative democracy. This is another challenge for future research on political participation.

**Changes in Preferences for Different Modes of Political Participation**

While participation research in general does not suffer from a paucity of data and findings, there is one aspect that is not covered sufficiently: the longitudinal comparative study of developments in preferences for the various acts and modes of participation (one exception is turnout, but this field profits from the availability of aggregate voting statistics). There are some longitudinal data, though, that relate to items of elite-challenging actions derived from the 1974 political action study and replicated in four waves of the WVS between 1981 and 2000 (for details, see Inglehart & Catterberg, 2003). These data point to a noticeable increase over the past 3 decades in elite-challenging action in the eight political action countries and France—all Western democracies—an increase the authors attribute to an ongoing process of economic modernization. Unfortunately, the data situation does not permit an analysis of possible replacement effects between the various dimensions of political engagement. In particular, it would have been very interesting to see whether nonelectoral activities may have grown at the expense of electoral activities.

**Social Participation**

Other than political participation, social participation has not yet achieved the status of a well-defined social science subfield. Analogous to political participation, social participation can be defined as all activities by individual citizens in social contexts going beyond the inner circle of family and friendship relations that are not primarily directed toward influencing political outcomes. As such, social participation constitutes a core element of civil society. For a long time, in social research, the core representation of civil society was voluntary associations integrating individuals into the intermediary structures of society—the mesolevel. For example, the study of membership in organizations such as churches and trade unions was a normal part of electoral research under the assumption that social cleavages had been translated into party systems through the constant interaction of group and party elites. However, the major breakthrough in making social participation an independent field of study—even if closely related to concerns about democratic governance—came through the study *Making Democracy Work* (Robert Putnam, 1993), which looked at conditions favoring or hindering the overall administrative and economic performance of Italian regions. In pointing especially to the organizational underpinning of high economic performance through established cultural and economic groups working together in an environment of mutual trust and solidarity, Putnam employed the term *social capital* (a term already previously used by Pierre Bourdieu and, later, James Coleman) to characterize the reasons for the diversity of regional performance.

The concept of social capital became a major incentive for political science when this was related to the observation that in the United States a decline in social bonding was occurring that—recalling the Tocqueville tradition of American democracy—was a challenge to American democracy and democracy at large. Social capital can be regarded as a macroproperty of societies in the sense of systemic capital. The concept, however, has in the meantime also been transferred to microresearch through surveys. While there is no standard operationalization in empirical research, there is agreement that social capital has three major dimensions: (1) the degree to which people trust each other, (2) the acceptance of norms of reciprocity as cultural elements of social capital, and (3) the involvement in social networks, be it through voluntary associations or through other less formal regular contacts.

With regard to longitudinal comparative data sets reliably measuring social capital, the situation is not fully satisfactory, although information accumulated from a variety of data sources indicates that a general decline in social capital cannot be observed. In another study it is argued that elite-challenging participation is at least as important a constituent of social capital as is membership in voluntary associations. Longitudinal data from the WVS for 12 postindustrial societies support the argument that there is no measurable decrease in overall organizational membership between 1980
and 2000, although within this overall category sociotropic organizations have gained in membership, whereas membership in traditional organizations (e.g., trade unions) has slightly decreased or remained constant. Particularly interesting in the context of participation research, though, is the finding that good governance is much more strongly related to the level of elite-challenging action than to the level of associational membership.

One step away from the link between social participation and social capital is taken in the context of the CID study with the new concept of small-scale democracy in the sense of the potential option for citizens to control their own, personal life situation. There, small-scale (local) democracy is considered to be an important field because it offers insights into the overall state of any given society, including aspects of democratic governance; looks at trade-offs between small-scale and large-scale democracy; and pursues questions important also in social capital and participatory theory terms to what extent involvement in small-scale democracy activities enhances a sense of identity, self-esteem, and personal skills that may have payoffs also for large-scale democracy. To answer these questions, a broad roster of incentives, actions, and action consequences for the three fields of education, health care, and working life is looked at, fields that are highly relevant for the citizens’ daily lives. It will remain to be seen whether along those lines in the future a new field of systematic research will develop given the finding that involvement in the three domains is quite frequent across the CID countries. Such efforts may be encouraged by the fact that participation in small-scale democracies and in large-scale democracies, especially in the fields of contacting and consumer participation, according to the CID data, are positively correlated. Thus, the conclusion may be justified that in contemporary societies social and political participation are indeed fields related by an underlying general tendency to become involved.

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See also Electoral Behavior; Electoral Turnout; Democracy, Theories of; Participation, Contentious; Political Culture; Social Capital

Further Readings
Participation, Contentious

In the most conventional usage, contentious participation refers to forms of political participation that employ nonconventional, confrontational means of action in expressing collective interests, such as demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts. Contentious participation here represents an alternative to institutionalized channels of participation, such as election, interest group activities, and political parties. However, a growing number of scholars have been starting to use the concept of contentious participation to illustrate the contentious nature inherent in all forms of political action, which range from peaceful acts such as voting and lobbying to disruptive and oftentimes violent protest. This latter view highlights aspects of continuity in what have been conventionally understood to be categorically different forms of participation.

This changing interpretation of contentious participation mirrors the change in how the literature has come to understand protests and/or social movements. Previously, a social movement was commonly understood to be an action form carried out by outsiders of a political establishment—that is, those who lack power and resource and those who do not have regular access to the decision-making process. Those inside the system, many believed, would seek reform or policy change by expressing their voices through interest groups or political parties. Gradually, however, a new framework arose that drew attention to the fuzzy boundary dividing the two and to how social movements and institutionalized forms of participation are not mutually exclusive but complementary.

This latter view is predicated on the idea that, in essence, the basic principles of contentious participation and established forms of participatory institutions, such as elections, are not dissimilar. In fact, many established political parties, such as the Social Democratic parties in Western Europe, have had historical roots in social movements. Nowadays, many social movement groups employ conventional forms of action (e.g., lobbying and petitioning) in conjunction with their typical street repertoire, while many interest groups organize large public demonstrations to add leverage to their lobbying effort. They may look different on the surface, but in essence both contentious and institutionalized participation aim at getting the voices of the public to be heard and to be taken seriously by decision makers.

It seems as if there is a growing consensus over the overlap between contentious and institutionalized methods of participation. Still, it is important to note that not all societies are equipped with the same levels of institutionalized channels of participation. As a result, contentious participation may take different forms and carry different meanings across varying contexts. This is because forms of contentious participation are often mirror images of the political environment in which they operate.

Varying Contexts of Contentious Participation

In authoritarian regimes where channels of participation barely exist, any attempts at expressing a collective voice in the public arena are often driven
underground. The violent forms many social movements take under these circumstances reflect the highly exclusive and repressive nature of authoritarian regimes. The risks are high, but when a social movement mobilizes significant support and grows stronger, it often leads to democratic change that opens up opportunity for more equal and broader participation. This was the case in South Africa and a number of Latin American countries in the 1980s.

Nowadays, many authoritarian regimes offer limited political space, if only because they cannot command absolute control over the flow of information and movement of people. This is particularly so in authoritarian regimes with a relatively large economy and a population that is relatively highly educated. In these contexts, ordinary people try to take advantage of the limited political spaces in various attempts to voice their concerns and influence important policies. For example, women, students, teachers, and workers in Iran have created organizations and have worked with sympathetic allies in various public sectors to defend and to proactively claim new rights since the death of the charismatic leader Khomeini in 1989, which led to small cracks within the ruling elites. In China, since the late 1990s, workers and peasants have also been taking advantage of the limited openings made available by the post-Maoist reforms, which allowed them to lodge complaints to higher level officials and stage various forms of collective action to draw the government’s attention to local corruption and the hardships caused by the detrimental forces of the market economy.

In either case, participatory efforts were highly contentious but not to the extent of that of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. At the same time, these efforts were not submissive supplications asking the power holder for benign policies. On the contrary, they were meticulously designed campaigns to maximize the available political resources and were aimed at influencing the formation of crucial policies germane to their lives amid adverse political environments. These examples serve as the archetypes of contentious participation serving as an alternative to institutionalized channels, if only because such channels are highly limited. They also show that popular mobilization and institutionalized channels are not mutually exclusive means of political participation. This becomes more evident in Western democracies.

One of the characteristics of liberal democracy is the institutionalization of conflict through guaranteeing various rights and access points to decision making. Citizens in liberal democracies are guaranteed the rights to choose their own leaders or run for office through elections, form associations that serve as an organizational vehicle for pursuing the common interests of like-minded fellows, and have the right to freely express their opinions through various venues, including, but not limited to, publications, the media, and the Internet. Contentious forms of participation, such as demonstration, are also protected by law and are also considered legitimate means of political participation as a way to publicly express political views. With the various means of political participation available, explicitly contentious forms of participation, often the only means of participation in more restricted political systems, are but one among the many options in liberal democracies.

As a result, various forms of contentious participation are often combined with the routine working of formal institutions, and a greater overlap between contentious and institutionalized politics is observed. For example, in lobbying and petitioning their representatives in seeking their interests, many interest groups organize large public demonstrations to display their commitment and power and pressure decision makers to take their demands seriously. Likewise, radical activist groups may also adopt interest group tactics and engage in lobbying or petitioning while mobilizing thousands of people on the street. As these action patterns become institutionalized, solid connections between political parties and social movements often emerge. In the United States, the steady alliance between the Democratic Party and various social movements, including the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and the environmental movement, and between the Republican Party and the evangelical movement and prolife movements provide but a few examples. In many similar cases, various social groups and political parties enter an exchange relationship in which social groups provide the parties with votes and funds while the parties deliver on the policies these social groups favor.

The institutional devices and patterns of political participation in liberal democracies are meant
to absorb and neutralize the potentially harmful impacts of large-scale conflicts within the institutional setting by providing various ways for disgruntled groups to express their grievances and political demands. However, the use of institutional channels does not necessarily mean that the processes are peaceful and without conflict.

**Contentious Nature of Participation**

Political participation is necessarily a contentious process because there are competing interests in any society and any claim made in public will bear on someone else’s interest. It is extremely difficult to have a policy that everyone can agree on, and legislation often becomes a focal point of contention. The landmark U.S. Supreme Court ruling in *Roe v. Wade* acknowledging partial constitutional rights for abortion in 1973 and the subsequent contention over the issue of abortion in the United States represent a prime example. Despite the highly institutionalized court processes, the ruling was interpreted by many as a partial result of the strenuous campaigns by women activists who had voiced their demands for women’s right to make decisions concerning their own bodies. This triggered a countermovement against abortion and ignited a new cycle of contention on the issue. The debate over the issue took place in various public forums and in Congress but often involved disruptive and violent clashes on the streets as well. When social groups of competing convictions make participatory efforts at the same time, the process can turn highly contentious.

Similarly, despite the original intention to channel participation in a peaceful and orderly way, elections too often become focal points of conflict, especially when many hold suspicion over the fairness of the process. This was the case in Kenya after the election in late 2007, where unprecedented violence followed accusations of a rigged election. Many nascent democracies have suffered from damaging conflicts related to elections, but contest over electoral results may also emerge in established democracies, as was the case in the United States after the presidential elections in 2000. The specific ways in which contention over electoral results materialized in the United States and in Kenya may have been different, but they both show how ostensibly peaceful participatory mechanisms may be highly contentious in nature.

Another aspect that renders the nature of participation inherently contentious lies in the nature of democratic institutions, which are inclusive and exclusive at the same time. However inclusive they are at one point in time, democratic institutions tend to favor some actors over others and leave unheard some voices. In addition, as a society moves toward progress in democratic inclusion, there will always emerge new groups that will demand serious attention. The expansion of suffrage offers a good example. The expansion of voting rights to all males in Western Europe came only as a result of unrelenting contentious challenges to the order by those who were initially excluded, namely, the workers. When it happened, it left out women, who then started to organize campaigns to claim their rights. When women were allowed suffrage in most Western democracies by the early 19th century, many found that there were serious barriers for participation among groups along the lines of race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. Even to this day, many of these groups engage in contentious politics, calling for an end to discrimination and for full participation in many parts of the Western world and beyond. Participation invites more participation, and whenever this happens, it first takes the form of a contentious challenge to the status quo.

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See also Election Research; Interest Groups; Participation; Parties; Social Movements

Further Readings


The word *party* refers to one of the oldest concepts used in political science. Depending on the era chosen to determine the beginning of scientific analysis of political facts in the modern sense—for example, if one goes back to Arthur Bentley, James Bryce, Robert Lowell, or André Siegfried, that is, to the beginning of the 20th century—the concept of party can be older than that of political science. Its use in historical, philosophical, or polemical vocabulary appeared in the 17th century with the memoirs of Cardinal de Retz in France, Viscount Bolingbroke in England, and, above all, David Hume, who in the early 18th century initiated what was to become the analysis of parties. Nonetheless, the word has been used since the Middle Ages to refer to the opposite sides in a civil war, for example, York and Lancaster during the War of the Roses, and consequently has a strong connotation of conflict. Even the etymology of the word *party* is telling: *parti* in French, *Partei* in German, *partido* in Spanish, and even *partia* in Russian and Polish and in many other languages—derived from the verb *partir*, which in medieval French meant to split into parts or divide. All European languages, including Slavic ones that use other terms, such as *strana* in Czech or *stanka* in Croat or Serbian, use words meaning “side.” The idea is the same: to take sides or to choose one’s side, or one’s camp, in a political conflict. The definitions of the concept of party are, therefore, older and more numerous than for the concept of social class: There are more than 100 of them, provided by authors from Edmund Burke to Alan Ware, including Leon Epstein, Joseph LaPalombara, and Myron Weiner. All definitions can be grouped into three broad categories, which are sometimes combined. First of all, following Burke, parties can be defined according to the ideas that they convey. Then, following Max Weber, Robert Michels, and Maurice Duverger, one can define parties as organizations. Finally, the trend since the end of the 20th century has been to use the criterion of elections and the existence of a representative, or at least democratic, regime. A remark attributed to Max Weber—“parties are the children of democracy and universal suffrage”—is put forward to support this thesis. One should not, nevertheless, forget the classic definition given during the reign of George III by Edmund Burke: “A party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.” This definition remains the best, even if the subsequent evolution of political systems has made it imprecise, as it is now incomplete. Here, we propose to use the term in the following way:

A party is an organization of individuals engaged in collective action, in order to mobilize as many individuals as possible against other equally mobilized individuals in order to accede, either alone or in coalition, to the exercise of government functions. This engagement and this claim for power are justified by a particular conception of the national interest.

Below, this entry first discusses this definition in greater detail, next it turns to the historical origins and conceptualization of the concept in the European context, and, finally, it discusses contemporary forms of party organization and recent developments.

**Definitional Elements**

The above definition contains four major elements:

1. Parties are the product of a collective organized action that is permanent and continuous in time. It is therefore intended to outline the action of its founders and continue throughout history as long as it is able to mobilize the supporters that keep it alive. As an institution, parties present characteristics common to all organizations studied by organizational theory. Parties are in the category of association-type organizations—that is, based on voluntary membership and the choice of the actors: members, militants, elected representatives, and
leaders. If membership is automatically granted on the basis of birth, family, or clan, it is not a party.

2. Any organization is structured according to an objective, which, in the case of a party, is to accede to the different functions of government: national, regional, and local. Parties can exist that are limited to one or more of these levels of government, as is often the case in Canada, for example. A political organization that does not strive for power but merely for influence is not a party.

3. Claiming power is not an end in itself; it is justified for the sake of the national interest that the party intends to defend or promote depending on the particular conception of the actors involved. Claiming power in the name of a particular conception of the national interest constitutes the raison d’être of a party and a condition sine qua non for a political organization to be a party.

4. The way to reach the objective of the party to which its organization is rationally conditioned is the mobilization of as many individuals as possible. The most frequently used means is electoral mobilization, and most parties were born with the establishment of more or less competitive representative political systems.

Democratization whether gradual (e.g., United Kingdom [UK]) or brutal (e.g., France) gave rise to the development of parties. By contrast, in authoritarian systems, nonelectoral modes of organization and mobilization exist. These can be peaceful (e.g., meetings, demonstrations, strikes, and petitions, e.g., Chartism in Great Britain, Solidarity in Poland, and the Civic Forum in former Czechoslovakia) or violent (e.g., uprisings, revolutions). The common objective shared by electoral mobilization and other forms of party mobilization is the need to appeal to the popular masses, that is, to strive for popular support, according to LaPalombara and Weiner. Partisan mobilization is carried out against individuals who are also organized with a view to acceding to government in the name of a different, often opposite, conception of national interest. As we have seen, party means “part” (division) and therefore implies conflict. Jean Blondel (1978) sees behind every party “a protracted social conflict.”

As a corollary, both conflict and competition are essential:

1. It can be said that there are no parties without conflicts; they always convey either a current, active conflict of which they are agents or a past conflict of which they are witnesses, for example, the opposition between Fianna Fail and Fine Gael in Ireland, which corresponds historically to the struggle between anti-Treaty and anti–Free State Republicans in the bloody civil war of 1921 to 1922. One of the major aspects of the seminal contribution by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) is to have assigned to parties the function that summarizes all the others: agents of conflict and instruments of integration. The dialectic is the following: By expressing conflict, parties thus allow negotiation and contribute at the end of a more or less long evolution to pacifying political life.

2. Conflict and integration as well as the name party—or part—imply ipso facto plurality and competition between parties. The term parties means a system of parties and consequently that there are at least two of them. A single party is a contradiction in terms: It is impossible to be at the same time a single entity and a part. This obvious fact was stated at the beginning of the last century by Max Weber. The contradictory concept of a single party or a one-party system was nonetheless used at the time of the Cold War by eminent political scientists such as Gabriel Almond and Jean Blondel. The latter speaks of a “party of mobilization,” while Almond distinguishes between parties that are “one-party pluralistic,” modeled on the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) in Mexico before democratization, and those that are “one-party revolutionary, centralizing.” While contesting the logical pertinence of the concept of one-party system, Giovanni Sartori nonetheless admits this category as the first level of his seven-rank typology.

To clarify this debate, which has retained its historical pertinence, it is necessary to distinguish two totally different situations. On the one hand, there is the situation Max Weber described with the example of the Guelph party (parte Guelfa) in the medieval republic of Florence, where one party
eliminated its rivals to become incorporated in the apparatus of the state—the party changes and ceases to be a political party. It then falls under some other sociological concept. Raymond Aron, a disciple of Weber, applies this approach to the cases of fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism and speaks of “monopolistic parties,” which as soon as they come to power hasten to eliminate all the other parties and thus change their nature. Monopolistic parties that had changed their nature by eliminating their rivals have in most cases gone back to their original nature with the loss of power and the return to democracy. Thus today, Kuo Min Tang in Taiwan alternated in government with the independence movement, while the PRI in Mexico and the Communist Party in the Russian Federation embody the loyal opposition. Similarly, communist parties in Eastern Europe have been able to reconvert themselves.

On the other hand, there are so-called parties founded after a military or nonmilitary clique has taken over power. These are sham parties, such as those of certain totalitarian regimes formed to control the population, for example, the Popular Movement of Zaire at the time of President Mobutu (1967–1997). With the changes of regime and the return to democratic forms of power, these so-called single parties disappeared with the regimes that created them. This was not the case, however, with António de Oliveira Salazar’s National Union in Portugal or the National Movement created by Francisco Franco to support his dictatorship in Spain.

History

The history of the appearance and development of parties corresponds to that of the scientific study of the phenomenon. Lipset and Rokkan note four thresholds in the evolution of a party: legitimization, incorporation, representation, and majority power. One can apply these to every party and to every stage of the party systems.

Parties were not always considered to be legitimate. As a sign of conflict in societies seeking balance and harmony, they were associated with a form of evil. Political modernity, which developed with the disintegration of the feudal order in the Renaissance, was embodied in absolutist states, and parties only emerged in times of crisis and during civil or religious wars. Even with the establishment of a representative regime, the party was first perceived as something that divides and was equated with a faction. The timing of the legitimization of parties, the very idea of a party system, depends on the country. Thus, three men of action who were also political thinkers reflect the same perplexity toward parties in three countries during three different periods: Viscount Bolingbroke in early-18th-century England, James Madison at the time of the American Revolution, and Charles de Gaulle in France in the mid-20th century. All three of them in their own way were deeply concerned about parties and their struggles and advocated national unity against all the divisions, yet they finally became involved in the struggles of the parties themselves. As a necessary evil, the party is always the party of the other, and the temptation to find other democratic paths was present for a long time but was doomed to failure. This was the case of the “era of good feelings” desired by President James Monroe after 1816 to put an end to the opposition between the Federalists and the Republican–Democrats. For the United States, the American historian Richard Hofstadter situates the turning point between 1780 and 1840, after which the idea of legitimate opposition between parties was taken for granted. In Great Britain, the phenomenon appears earlier, and the writings of Hume bear witness to this fact, but here it remains within the elite, whereas in the United States it concerned the masses. The distinction between parties and factions is the determining criterion, and it is with Hume that this was clearly established.

The origin of parties and their existence before a representative regime depends on the definition. If we retain the three proposed criteria—a particular conception of the national interest, free organization, and mobilization—the Guelphs (13th century) were a party, even if their means of action were different from those of modern parties. Their fight against the Ghibellines, however, degenerated into a struggle between factions. The Cavaliers and the Roundheads, the Whigs and the Tories were also parties. Moreover, the process is not linear, and in the oligarchy that existed in England in the 18th century, as Sir Lewis Namier remarks, during the reign of George III a large number of members of parliament (MPs) were neither Whigs nor Tories. By contrast, “parties” at the time of the Ancient
Roman republic or those evoked by Niccolò Machiavelli in Florence at the time of the Medicis, and that existed in numerous other Italian cities during the Renaissance, were factions and family clans. When they were still badly organized, parties were discovered and studied by social scientists at first as *carriers of ideas*. Then, with the extension of the electoral franchise and civil rights, they were studied as *organizations*: James Bryce, Robert Michels, Moisey Ostrogorsky, and, above all, Max Weber laid down the foundations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Finally, the study of parties as the mobilization of *actors* began in the 20th century with Siegfried on electoral geography and Duverger on circles of participation in partisan activity. It branched out in many directions—militants, members, sympathizers, and voters—and was favored by the development of the various forms of sociological survey research, from opinion polls to the deep analyses of political attitudes. These divergent approaches are necessary and have to converge if one is to understand a given political party, a national system of parties, or, in a comparative manner, the classification of parties.

**Raison d’Être and Identity of Parties**

Devoted to the defense and the promotion of a particular conception of the national interest in Burke’s sense, many 19th- and 20th-century historians likened parties to the great schools of political thought: conservatism, liberalism, socialism, Christian democracy, communism, fascism, and so on. The links between the two phenomena are obvious except that parties, agents of conflict but also instruments of integration, are led in majority governments to betray their initial ambition and adapt themselves to the constraints of the exercise of power, to become institutionalized, and to change their program and sometimes their ideology in order to become catchall parties, according to Otto Kirchheimer. One must, therefore, observe the social interests that are expressed through these ideas and justify the “particular conceptions of national interest.”

**Socioeconomic Bases**

Duverger saw in parties the translation of two successive class struggles: the conflict between the land-owning nobility, expressed by the conservatives, and the capitalist bourgeoisie, represented by the liberals, on the one hand, and that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, organized by the socialists, social democrats, and labor parties, on the other. Liberals were confronted with the dilemma whether to ally themselves with their former conservative enemies against the peril represented by workers’ parties or to accept alliances with the social democrats, which was the case with the so-called radical parties. Duverger notes that some Christian Democratic parties in Catholic Europe or agrarian ones in some Nordic countries remained outside these class struggles on which the dualism between left and right is founded. It is the superimposition of dualisms that generates multi-party systems. Duverger thinks that using the Anglo-American majority vote—“first past the post”—facilitates the establishment of a two-party system opposing conservative liberals and social democrats.

The same inspiration can be found in Lipset, who in *Political Man* sees in parties the expression of social classes of which, for him, there are three: (1) the upper class, supported by the Church, which is expressed in conservative parties; (2) the secular middle class, expressed in liberal parties; and (3) the working class, expressed in labor, socialist, and social-democratic parties. The right, center, and left form a democratic spectrum to which corresponds an antidemocratic, extremist spectrum, including the communist extreme left and the authoritarian monarchist, clerical, and reactionary extreme right as the expression of a refusal of change by a threatened upper class, of which António Salazar in Portugal, Miklos Horthy in Hungary, Engelbert Dollfuss in Austria, and Francisco Franco in Spain were illustrations. The originality of Lipset is to show that the middle class also engendered an extreme center with Italian fascism and German Nazism, which was opposed to the extreme left and extreme right. Today, the concept of extreme center is enlightening in the description of parties such as the Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) in Austria or the National Front (Front National, FN) in France and in the definition of a clear relationship between fascism and the National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, AN) in Italy. It is more precise and more scientific than that of populism.
Lipset attenuated his position somewhat by remarking that certain traditional parties, such as Catholic parties, combine cultural conservatism with socioeconomic reformism and that new forces such as the green parties mix cultural liberalism and anti-industrialist reaction, thus constituting a neo-bourgeois ideology.

The approach exposed in Political Man remains the most fruitful but leaves aside the existence of interclass parties, which are nonetheless not catch-all parties. The most fitting example was the Italian Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana, DC), backed by a workers’ union, the Italian Confederation of Trade Unions (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori, CISL), but there were also certain employers grouping people with nothing in common other than the defense of the interests and values of the Catholic community. This approach included as many as nine tendencies (correnti) spreading from the pro-Marxist left to the traditionalist extreme right. This party, which was born out of antifascist resistance and anticommunism after World War II, broke up in an interesting way in the 1990s: The right was recovered by Silvio Berlusconi; its center right refused to join the people’s freedom party People of Liberty (Il Popolo della Libertà, PDL), created by Berlusconi in 2009; while its center-left and left merged with the former members of the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI) to found the Democratic Party in 2008. In fact, the DC met the same fate as the French Popular Republican Movement (Mouvement Républicain Populaire, MRP) 30 years earlier. The latter was also formed during the resistance and dispersed its forces to the right, the center, and the left. The Christian Democratic parties of the Benelux countries and Switzerland correspond to the same model as the Italian one. The same can be said about the German Zentrum party from 1871 to 1933 but not for the German Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU), which is no more clerical than Nicolas Sarkozy’s Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un movement populaire, UMP) in France. By contrast, in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, CSU) belonged to the tradition of classic, clerical conservatism, but clericalism also became contested within the party itself.

**Historical Cleavages**

Finally—if only to understand multiparty systems with more than six parties—it is necessary to use a multidimensional space as in the systematic model of the origin of parties in Europe set up by Lipset and Rokkan. For them, cleavages are neither ephemeral oppositions nor contingent divisions but structural effects resulting from the political translation of profound traumatic changes that affected the history of a country or a group of countries. These conflicting effects are exerted along two axes: the functional axis and the territorial-cultural axis. In the particular case of Europe, originally marked by Catholic Christianity, two revolutions—national revolutions and the Industrial Revolution—engendered four cleavages. The former broke the unity between countries born of the Reformation and those marked by the Catholic Counter-Reformation. It engendered two cleavages: (1) along the unitary center/periphery axis, opposing modernization to the resistance of the subjected cultures from the provinces and peripheral areas, and (2) along the functional axis of Church versus State, opposing the modernizing, secular elite to the defense of the interests of the Church in the fields of education and values. The Industrial Revolution generated the following cleavages: (3) along the territorial axis, primary versus secondary economy opposing landed interests to the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs, and (4) along the functional axis of employers versus owners, opposing the interests of property, capital, and business to the labor union movement, which defended the interests of wage earners.

These four cleavages are conveyed in the short term through the issues that oppose the parties and in the long term through the party systems. In Catholic and Protestant Europe on both sides of each cleavage, there arose, according to the country, families of parties that became established with the extension of suffrage and democratization. Since then, these cleavage-based party systems had become “frozen” for a considerable time. Depending on the period, one may add that a cleavage can dominate electoral parliamentary debate: Church versus State in Catholic countries in the 19th century and the primary versus secondary sector in Sweden at the same time, and the center versus periphery cleavage in the Basque country or in Ireland. However, the most important cleavage in
Western Europe since the crisis of 1929, and even before, was owners versus workers, which, apart from the two cases cited previously, forms the axis of the most frequent parliamentary constellations.

At the beginning of the 21st century, a majority of parties are based on the functional-economic owners versus workers cleavage. In other words, on the one hand, there are parties for the defense of owners that have formal and/or informal links with employers, companies, and the business community in general but with a much broader electoral base that includes the middle classes. This family unites former, previously opposed parties such as conservatives and liberals in Protestant countries, Switzerland, and the Benelux countries. It also includes parties of other origins from former Christian Democratic groups such as CDU/CSU in Germany or former nationalists such as UMP (this party includes former Gaullists, conservatives, and liberals), as well as new parties such as the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata, PSD) in Portugal, the post-Franco People’s Party (Partido Popular) in Spain, and Forward Italy (Forza Italia), which merged with the postfascist AN to form the people’s freedom party, PDL, a unified right-wing party.

On the other hand, since the 19th century, there has been a systematic development of parties for the defense of workers, which, historically, constitute the labor movements and maintain special links with labor unions. Their voters are salaried employees, mainly working class but also some white-collar workers and civil servants. They were born in the wake of the Industrial Revolution from the convergence of four forces: two ideologies, (1) the Jacobinism of the French Revolution and radical philosophy and (2) social Christianity in Protestant countries, and two forms of political organization, (3) the labor unions and cooperative movements and (4) the internationalism of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and their disciples. The combination of these four ingredients, in variable proportions depending on the country, created three genetic models in the sense of Angelo Panebianco, which developed into four traditions that are very visible today:

1. The Labour tradition, born out of the failure of Chartism, was translated into parties of ideological and religious pluralism, dominated organically by the labor unions in which, ideologically, social Christianity is slightly more important than radicalism, whereas the Socialist International and Marxism are in minority or even marginal.

2. The social-democratic tradition, in which trade unionism emanated from the party, was born in Germany and dominated by the Socialist International and Marxism. These parties have kept a controlled and solid organization that has particularly subsisted in the Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, SAP) and in the Austrian SPO.

3. The social-democratic tradition of the French Revolution of 1848 was marked by Jacobin radicalism and the republican and anticlerical struggle. These parties from the start came up against the distrust of the anarcho-syndicalist movement, which was hostile to any collaboration with parties. The anarcho-syndicalists combined theoretical anarchism founded on the rejection of the state and electoral politics, advocating a mutual benefits system, self-management, and federalism with practical bread-and-butter reformism within companies. Moreover, the union movement was divided by a new Christian labor movement that was equally wary of party politics and a communist labor movement that would ultimately supplant anarcho-syndicalism. The socialist-democratic tradition became embodied in weaker, intellectual parties and was neither controlling the labor movement nor being controlled by it. These socialist parties—French, Italian, and Spanish—would practice ideological extremism and give more than their due to Marxism while practicing shortsighted reformism.

4. The communist tradition is, in fact, a variant of the social democracy that was implanted in France and Italy, where it failed. It is a kind of radical social democracy that has accentuated its specific features: orthodox Marxism; a centralized organization adapted to the political struggle in authoritarian regimes (“democratic centralism”); control over the unions, which had become the “driving belts”; and, above all, the primacy of the Socialist International. With the Komintern, communist parties were the only party with an international dimension, devoted for many years to the interests of the USSR and presented under Joseph Stalin as the fatherland of socialism. The social-democratic sociology of communist parties favored their
parties incorporated into party systems, their unofficial social democratization including membership of the Socialist International.

The PCI, the Italian Communist Party, was the first to take this path, soon to be joined with the dissolution of the former USSR by the Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Lithuanians. The development of a Marxism sui generis adapted to Italy and the West thanks to Antonio Gramsci and to the strategic intelligence and political savoir faire of its leaders—Palmiro Togliatti and Enrico Berlinguer—anxious to promote “a national path toward socialism” helped this transformation of the PCI first into the Democratic Party of the Left (Partito Democratico della Sinistra, PDS) and then into the Democrats of the Left (Democratici di Sinistra, DS) and the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, or PD) with the gradual help of the Christian Democrats. The French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Français, PCF) remained Stalinist for a long time but was headed by leaders of no great stature—Maurice Thorez and Georges Marchais—and did not take the opportunity to return to social democracy. In the Scandinavian countries, where social democracy is strong, the extreme left is also of communist origin, with the Danish Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF), which broke off links with Moscow in 1956, and in Sweden the Communist Party became the Left Party. The situation has been the same in Finland since the end of the Soviet Union. By contrast, the left-wing socialists in Norway are a dissident movement of the Labor Party. The case of the Left (Die Linke) in Germany is more ambiguous: The former Communist Party of East Germany with its strong organization merged with social-democratic dissidents from the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD). The most original of all parties situated “on the left of the left” is the Dutch Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP), an anticapitalist protest party composed of former Maoists, which can win up to 10% of the votes.

Center–Periphery Cleavages

Outside the dominant socioeconomic cleavage, the other important cleavage is center–periphery, composed of parties for territorial defense, which is divided into two opposed families. On the one hand, there are the parties of centralized state nationalism corresponding historically to a unifying, imperialistic state nationalism that is economically protectionist and that, socially, carries policies that are favorable to a protective state. One is reminded of Bismarckism in Germany, which during the Weimar Republic became the German National People’s Party (Deutschnationalen Volkspartei, DNVP), and of Bonapartism in France, then the republican current from which Gaullism originated. These parties, concerned about the authority of the State, are inclined to deviate toward authoritarianism and have engendered some extreme versions: the total state that identifies nation, state, and leader in fascist totalitarianism in Italy and Nazism in Germany and has been emulated by many others. These extreme-center parties are wrongly assimilated to the extreme right and characteristically attract not only voters from the working class but also leaders from left-wing parties, such as Benito Mussolini, a former socialist in charge of the newspaper Avanti; Jacques Doriot, a former communist deputy and the founder of the French Popular Party (Parti Populaire Français, PPF); as well as the less conventional Oswald Mosley, a former Labor MP and the founder of the British Union of Fascists. World War II, with its cortege of horror and crimes against humanity, has discredited fascism, which is no longer portrayed as such, except by marginal groups that are not considered as parties.

Nevertheless, the ideological ground has remained fertile and able to produce analogous parties that out of caution tone down their discourse. Globalization, immigration, and the crisis since the end of the 1970s have favored the rebirth of postfascism in places where a previous tradition existed: the National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, the FPÖ (heir of the Pan-Germanic nationalist current) in Austria, and in some Länder in Germany, the National Democratic Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD). We may add in Flanders Vlaams Belang, the new name of Vlaams Blok, heir of the pro-Nazi Flemish National Union (Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond, VNV), which existed between the two World Wars. In other countries where there was no fascist tradition before, new movements have emerged with a similar sociology and a
less articulate discourse than fascism. Their creed resides in a radical xenophobia enhanced since the beginning of the 21st century by anti-Islamism.

The longest lasting case is the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF), but the most spectacular is to be found in the Netherlands. The fact that the founder and leader of the DF is a woman—Pia Kjaersgaard—and her Dutch counterpart in the Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) was a millionaire and a militant homosexual (he was assassinated by an animal rights activist) constitutes a break with fascism. However, it is a mistake to consider them as new parties: Their organization is new, yet the issues that fuel them—xenophobia and racism—have political roots that go back to the 19th century. Whether moderate or extremist, democratic or authoritarian, state-nationalist parties are—or were—authentic catchall parties.

The historical opponents of centralism are parties for the defense of the periphery, sometimes regionalist and federalist, sometimes nationalist and separatist. They are the expression of ethnic or linguistic minorities and have a territory that is quite easily definable. Their existence is not recent and most often corresponds to countries with an imperial structure: Austria–Hungary before 1919 had many such parties. Today, the oldest party to defend the periphery is the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV), founded in 1895, which identified with the cause of the language, culture, and democratic traditions of the Basque country, where it is the main party. The Swedish Popular Party in Finland is also an old organization—early 20th century—that holds the monopoly of representation of the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland, and for this reason it has participated in almost all government coalitions. The Scottish National Party, founded in 1925, only managed to break through in the 1960s, when it became alternately the second or third party in Scotland. Wales also has its nationalist organization, which is less strong and has fewer seats in Westminster: Plaid Cymru. Two parties that were created after World War II enjoy a majority in their region, though they are insignificant on a national scale: the popular party of South Tyrol (South Tyroleans People’s Party) in Alto Adige and the Val d’Aosta Union in Italy. In Flanders, the party defending the periphery, People’s Union (Volkunie), split in two, creating the more centrist New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, NVA) and SPIRIT, which is more social libertarian. Spain counts the largest number of parties of this type. In Euskadi as well as PNV, we must add the nationalist, left-wing Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna, EA). In Catalonia, both the autonomist–centrist democratic convergence of Catalonia and the left-wing separatists of the Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, ERC) can be included. Numerous Spanish regions have their autonomists. The periphery also has extremists, sometimes violent ones but that, unlike the terrorist movements of the 1970s, such as the Red Brigades, are endowed with a legal electoral voice that shows popular and even widespread support. This is the case in Northern Ireland, where the Irish Republican Army (IRA) is linked to Sinn Fein, and in the Basque country, where Basque Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA) was related with Batasuna until the party was prohibited by the Spanish courts. In Corsica, the situation is the same, but the nationalists are only represented at the regional and local levels. There is one special case: that of Northern League (Lega Nord) in Italy, which has gone from the defense of federalist positions to the instrumentalizing of xenophobia and from enthusiastic Europeanism to staunch Euroscepticism.

**Church and State Cleavage**

By contrast to the center–periphery opposition, another cleavage resulting from national revolution as defined by Rokkan is the cleavage between Church and State, which used to be of prime importance but now belongs to history. The Christian Democratic parties whose role was essential for European integration are experiencing an existential crisis: The major one, in Italy, broke up and now only exists as the Center Democratic Union with a marginal role. Their area of strength is limited to the Netherlands and the Benelux countries, where the Christian Democrats have lost a great deal of electoral weight, whereas they have collapsed dramatically in Switzerland. They were and still remain the best examples of interclass, horizontal parties, that is, covering all the ground from the right to the left—from fundamentalism to
progress through centrist. In fact, they reflected the sociology as much as the ideological structure of the Catholic subculture. They are not catchall parties because, even when they are nonconfessional, they embody the political will of believers and citizens steeped in Catholic culture. Christian Democratic programs as a result of a dialogue between their bourgeois, agricultural, and working-class tendencies constitute a useful compromise for setting up government coalitions with either the liberals or the social democrats. The latter explains their unparalleled longevity in government: Democrazia Christiana participated in all the coalitions of the first Italian republic, but the record is held by the Luxemburg Christian Democrats, with more than a century in power, followed closely by the Belgians and the Dutch, with almost 100 years. They are the axis both of the center–right, so-called conservative coalitions in Belgium and the Roman Blue in the Netherlands and of the so-called labor center-left coalitions in Belgium and the Roman Red in the Netherlands. Even the most conservative party in Austria, the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP), has most often participated—since 1945—in so-called Red–Black governments along with the Social Democrats in spite of its questionable alliance with the xenophobic nationalists of the FPÖ. It is interesting to note that in the Czech Republic the only noncommunist party to have lived through the Soviet era is the Czech People’s Party (Československá strana lidová, CSL), which participates in all coalition governments as it used to before 1938, its foundation dating back to the Austrian–Hungarian empire.

New Cleavages

In addition to the large families of parties, there is one small one—the greens. One thesis by Thomas Poguntke claims that the greens are the embodiment of New Politics based on postmaterialist issues such as quality of life, protection of nature, and libertarian individualism—in opposition to the supporters of Old Politics, based on materialistic issues and values such as wage increases and bread-and-butter issues in general. This idea was influenced by the work of Ronald Inglehart, who developed his theory of postmaterialism based on the proposition that the generation marked by the Great Depression followed by war and reconstruction was succeeded by a generation socialized in a context of prosperity, the “affluent society” of the “golden sixties.” The new post–Industrial Revolution era is said to have given rise to a new cleavage, that is, materialists versus postmaterialists, with the Greens occupying the postmaterialist side and the extreme right, the side of the materialists. The ecologists represent a new force, but the parties qualified as far right are as old as parliamentary democracy itself. In the 1980s, Lipset insisted on the importance of postmaterialism and saw, on the one hand, the emergence of a libertarian-style, neo-bourgeois ideology that divided left-wing parties upheld by intellectual circles from the more authoritarian traditionalist, materialist workers who valued morals. The postmaterialism adopted by social-democratic parties partly explains the success of extreme-center parties among workers. On the other hand, Lipset noted that the ecologists’ claims such as cultural liberalism are a luxury enjoyed by well-off citizens. In the same way, Lipset remarked that the Greens combine avant-garde themes opposed to traditional values with anti-industrialist themes for the defense of nature, which take part in a revolt against modernity that he qualifies as a “backlash.” Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair noted that the Greens participated in what the two authors called intrablock mobility within the left, that is, the workers’ side of the owners-versus-workers cleavage. Later events seem to have proved them right, with the experiences of the Greens in government first in Finland, then in Belgium, and finally in Germany and France in coalitions with social democrats. In France, they owe the few seats they won in parliament to electoral alliances with the socialists. However, in Belgium and Germany, local coalitions with the right have occurred since the beginning of this century. An intermediary hypothesis could be put forward, namely, that the Greens stem from a restructuring of the territorial–economic cleavage—primary sector versus secondary sector—setting the industrialized world in opposition to nature, which explains the mixture of postmodern and traditionalist features in the discourse. Concerning their closeness to the left, it can be considered as the result of their hostility to capitalism, which destroys the balance of nature.
Parties as Organizations

Parties are not biological organisms, nor do they have a lifetime association with a cleavage: They are autonomous forces. The German conservatives in the CDU are an excellent example of a change of cleavage and of realignment. It was created as a Christian Democratic Party and heir of the pre-1933 Catholic Zentrum. Its founding programs defined a third way between Marxist collectivism and liberal capitalism by a Christian socialism founded on personalism and a respect for property, the quest for the common good, and the principle of subsidiarity. The CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, had accepted anti-Nazi Protestant intellectuals from the “Confessing Church” (“Bekennende Kirche,” a Protestant antifascist movement). Under pressure from the Allies, who were concerned about the Soviet threat, and fearing the Marxism displayed by the SPD of 1945 to 1946, the CDU was forced to open its doors to Protestant conservatives who were not always former members of the Resistance. In the person of Konrad Adenauer, the former mayor of Cologne, a moderate, the CDU provided itself with a leader who turned out to be a true visionary both on the question of European integration and on the future of Germany. Certain that Germany would sooner or later be reunified and that in this context Catholics who were roughly equal in number to the Protestants in the West would once again become a minority, he reoriented the CDU along a more conservative line to take the place of the old Zentrum party and the German Right, which had been discredited for its support of Nazism. The party then allied itself with and later assimilated the conservatives of Lower Saxony in the German Party (Deutsche Partei, DP); it then did the same with the party representing refugees from former German territories in the east, the League of Expellees and Deprived of Rights (Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten, BHE). This was possible thanks to a moderate liberal program inspired by the new economic mentor of the CDU, Ludwig Erhard. This program, the social market economy, came up against the opposition of the social Christian Democrats. Adenauer won his bet, and the CDU/CSU became a party with a majority vocation, inspired by the catchall party defined by Otto Kirchheimer. As early as 1953, as Peter Merkl noted, the CDU/CSU became a conservative party dedicated to defending the interests of industry, business, and agriculture, with its popular voters (blue- and white-collar workers) taking advantage of the spin-off from prosperity. As for Christian socialism, it became a mere memory, and to many of the party leaders, it was not a pleasant one. However, the CDU was the first example of political realignment where the logic of organization took precedence over ideological considerations and program. The CDU/CSU was able to increase considerably the number of its new voters, while to a great extent keeping its traditional electorate, and was not affected by the growing secularization of society. It increased its score from 31% in the 1949 elections to 50% in 1957. For the change to be successful, the cleavage had to be followed by lasting electoral alignment as defined by V. O. Key. This requires good partisan organization. When within a party the requirements of organization—and therefore accession to power—are in contradiction to the preservation of its principles and identity, it either undergoes a refoundation or changes its identity and undergoes realignment toward an electorally more beneficial cleavage.

The organization of parties, therefore, conveys a different logic than ideas and cleavages and needs to be studied separately. The concept most commonly used to classify partisan organization is the opposition between mass parties and cadre parties. It is often attributed to Duverger, but he borrowed it from Weber and developed it. Duverger’s great contribution was to distinguish between parties of inside creation and parties of outside creation, depending on whether the founders were in parliament—a typical example is that of Whigs and Tories—or were outsiders who had no access to power, not even to parliament. The groups that can exist before the organization of the party can be labor unions, associations, Masonic lodges, or leagues—including terrorist ones. The cadre parties are therefore parliamentary parties resulting from the widening of the electorate, aimed at inciting new voters to enroll on the electoral register and support the party and the electoral committees of the candidates. Mass parties are created outside the spheres of power, and their only means of access is to have the largest possible number of voluntary activists and regular financial contributors.
More than the number of members, it is the criterion of funding that distinguishes mass parties. The regularity and registration of contributions is very important in mass parties whose internal legitimacy is embodied by its members rather than its electorate. It is necessary to add a characteristic that Duverger does not mention: the stability of leadership indifferent to the vagaries of the economic situation. Thus, during the whole of the 20th century, the Swedish social democrats had only five leaders, whereas other parties had many more. The Industrial Revolution; the expansion of means of transport, communication, and propaganda leading to the development of inexpensive newspapers and enabling national electoral campaigns; and the running of centralized national bodies favored the action and development of mass parties until the 1960s. Some cadre parties adapted to their competition, often parties organized later, such as the British and Scandinavian conservatives, who were organized by penetration from the center to the periphery, becoming, according to Angelo Panebianco, electoral parties—with professionals endowed with strong leadership qualities, recruiting large numbers of members, and above all oriented toward the opinion of their potential voters. The difference with mass parties is threefold. First, and regardless of the number of members—under Harold Macmillan, the British Conservative party had almost 1 million members—the funding of the party depends on gifts from business or from rich contributors and not on the members, who sometimes do not pay their fees but are not excluded. Second, legitimacy and power belong to parliamentarians and are vested in them by the voters, whose opinions are more important than those of members. Finally, the survival of the leaders depends on their success in the general elections.

Some parties have kept a more archaic organization: a federation of electoral committees composed of local personalities, headed by a much more undisciplined parliamentary party and with a weak leadership. These less developed cadre parties are to be found in countries such as France, Spain, Portugal, and, to a lesser degree, Italy. Jean Charlot suggests calling them *partis de notables*. Originally, they were the earliest parties to be organized, which corresponds to a model of organization by diffusion, that is, they were created on the initiative of constituency committees and by becoming closer and closer ultimately became federated from the bottom up. During the 100 years from 1860 to 1960, technical development favored mass parties that in certain cases—Catholic Zentrum and social democrats in Germany; Catholic and socialist parties in Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands; French and Italian Communists—managed, in the words of Siegmund Neumann, to “take charge of voters from the cradle to the grave.” These “rigid mass parties,” to use Duverger’s terminology, had a very large membership involved in a network of parallel organizations for women, children, young people, cooperatives, travel agencies, sport clubs, choirs, not to mention a party press. According to Neumann, these are “social integration parties,” and in Germany during the Weimar republic, they were even qualified as *Sozialghettoparteien* (social ghetto parties).

Not all mass parties reached such organizational perfection, and several were content to live off the voluntary work of their militants and are what Duverger calls “flexible mass parties.” But, as Blondel remarks, not attaining a large membership is always a failure for a party. In fact, whereas parties of social integration have a strong organizational culture that generates party patriotism or the attachment of members, and even voters and are more concerned with the organization itself than the idea that it embodies, flexible mass parties are in a perpetual debate over ideas, a source of divisions, and this is unproductive from an electoral point of view. Since the 1960s and the development of political communication centered on television and now the Internet, mass parties, and especially the most powerful among them, have experienced a crisis of adaptation brought about by a decreasing membership that has hit all the large social and political organizations characterized by the omnipotence of image and entertainment, ensuring a domination of form and appearance over substance, style over ideas, and the personality of the leader over the political party. Duverger thought—rightly at the time—that cadre parties were doomed, but thanks to a ruse of history, it is the mass parties that are the dinosaurs, and hic et nunc, it is the professional electoral parties, according to Panebianco, that have the wind in their sails in Europe: They are more reactive to variations in public opinion and
more personalized, and while easily disposing of leaders who fail, they are on the same wavelength as the media. As they lose more and more members, the old parties of integration tend to be reduced, to the advantage of their functionaries, to a large, permanent staff paid by the party. The latter can be qualified by the concept of “bureaucratic mass party,” proposed by Panebianco.

Moreover, the increasingly high costs of election campaigns, along with the development of the media and particularly television, have provoked a change in the organization of parties. First, whatever the social organization, individuals are less engaged in long-term action but are more willing to commit themselves in a limited way to a precise objective: Parties lose members, but so do labor unions, and there are fewer practicing members of the Church. This poses a vital problem to mass parties confronted with a decrease in the number of their contributors on the one hand and with the increasing cost of electoral campaigns on the other. They resort increasingly to funding by private enterprises, as other parties did, which changes their nature. As the mass parties were often unpopular with the business community, they were driven to use practices that in some countries are considered as corrupt and condemned by law. Consequently, states not only developed their legislation on parties but also replaced or limited private funding with public funds. Last, as television does not lend itself to a deepening of political discourse or to nuances, parties are forced to put on performances, which they have done since the 19th century but now do for television. That is, they have to embody themselves in a leader, who has to build an image of a prime minister or of a president, as, for example, in France. Countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, or Italy, which were governed by coalitions of parties and appointed their prime minister by a process of negotiation and arbitration between parties and the currents within a party, have had to resign themselves to personalization. The leading German parties were the first to go down this path by designating their candidates for the chancellor. In the UK, around 1965, the Conservative Party decided to have its leader elected by the members of parliament, whereas previously the appointment was the result of a secret process in which the outgoing leader played a substantial role. From the 1970s and 1980s, more and more parties, which until then had had their leaders elected by delegates at their congress or party conference, changed to direct election by paid-up party members. In 1995, the French Socialist Party did the same to choose its candidate for the presidential election, and so did the British Conservatives. In Italy and France, the left-wing coalition and the socialists tried to import the American system of primaries. The model setup in Italy appears to be the closest to the original, with the center, left, and extreme left taking part—but the ballot was organized privately within the offices of the parties. For the French Socialist Party, it was an internal election enlarged to accommodate members admitted for the circumstance in return for a reduced financial contribution. In both cases, the analogy with the American primaries resides in the fact that there was an internal election and even debates between the candidates. The aim was to attract the attention of the media and thus favor the campaigns of the parties concerned. This way of functioning does not correspond to the ideal of mass parties.

The distinction between professional electoral parties on the one hand and bureaucratic mass parties on the other has become blurred in numerous countries. They have become publicly financed institutions oriented toward the media and, according to Peter Mair, could even manage without members. Mair suggests that the reasons for maintaining the role of members in certain parties are of a symbolic nature. He has proposed a new mode of partisan organization, the cartel party, which since the 1970s has succeeded the hegemony of catchall parties, which had taken over from mass parties after replacing the elitist parties. The fact is that what Mair calls “parties in opinion” have taken precedence over the “central apparatus of the party” in an arena of dialogue with the “party in public office”—leader, government, parliamentary group—all by political professionals. Are there any alternatives to cartel parties? There is one in Italy—Forza Italia, devoted to the promotion and the defense of the interests of its founder, Silvio Berlusconi. Such a phenomenon was only made possible thanks to two “accidents,” the deregulation of television, which opened the doors to the establishment by Berlusconi of a television empire, and the collapse of the
first Italian Republic, which freed some space on the right of the political spectrum, that is, on the side of the defense of liberal capitalism.

Both the right and the democrats in Italy as well as a large number of parties in Europe are greatly influenced by the organizational models of the United States. However, the latter remain different and are based on various autonomous strata, either for the Democrats or for the Republicans. Since the seminal contribution of Key, scholars have analyzed American parties as tripartite structures: (1) the party in the electorate, (2) the party organization, and (3) the party in government. The party in the electorate refers to the loyalty and identification of the voters, and the party in government refers to public office holders from the president to local councilors; the party organization is structured in a manner defined by Sam Eldersveld (1982) as a stratarchy, which “is an organization with layers, or strata of control, rather than centralized leadership from the top down” (p. 106). American party organizations are far older than the European ones, and in spite of the decline of party identification, they still remain adapted to the various and numerous changes and evolutions affecting the practice of democratic government. This is obviously not the case in Europe, where political scientists may speak of a “crisis of parties.”

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See also Cleavages, Social and Political; Democratization; Party Finance; Party Identification; Party Organization; Party Systems

Further Readings


Party Finance

Parties need money if they are to be able to carry out their main political functions: to run election campaigns, to maintain organizations both within the legislature and outside it, and to carry out research into future policy. Party finance is a major component of political finance. The latter includes in addition the funding of lobby groups and of other aspects of political life. Party finance includes any costs of election campaigns that are the responsibility of party organizations. Where candidates run for public office independently of parties, election campaigns too are an aspect of political finance not covered by the term party finance. This entry discusses problems of party finance in terms of normative democratic criteria, current research, and attempts of regulation.

Problems of Party Finance

Party finance raises problems for three main reasons. First, parties with access to disproportionately large amounts of money for their election
campaigns potentially have a large advantage over poorer rivals. Insofar as high expenditure enables parties to gain votes, money may create unfair electoral advantages for parties with rich supporters. In a considerable number of countries in the Third World (including Thailand, the Philippines, and countries in Latin America), vote buying is a common feature of elections. In Nigeria, electoral officials reportedly have been bribed to falsify voting results. In countries such as the United States, money is characteristically spent on buying advertising time on television. Studies on electoral results in congressional elections in the United States and in parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom (UK) have suggested a clear link between the amount spent and the number of votes obtained.

A second problem is that parties’ need for money may make them reliant on donors who demand illegitimate benefits. Typically, these consist of public contracts, licenses, or legislation favorable to the givers. The demand for donations is a major cause of political corruption, both at the national and at the local level. Major scandals concerning party funding occur so regularly that any attempt to list them will soon be outdated. Scandals not only involve justified accusations against politicians and their aides but also unfounded but nevertheless powerful allegations.

Third, those desiring to become candidates for public office may need to spend considerable sums in obtaining party nominations. Primary elections and other internal party contests can be costly for those involved. The more expensive it is to gain a party nomination the lower will be the chances for persons without private resources to embark on political careers.

It is not only the demand for resources that affects political parties; the control of money has a significant impact on the structure of power within political parties. Robert Michels stressed in his classic study of the German Social Democrats in the early 20th century that party leaders tend to gain control of the purse strings of the party and that this has the effect of centralizing power. There is no single pattern of internal control over funding. In some countries, such as the United States, central party organizations do not have an overwhelming control where it comes to raising and spending money.

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**Issues in the Academic Study of Party Finance**

The study of party funding and of political finance generally has become an increasingly significant and popular field of political science. Members of the International Political Science Association’s Research Committee on Political Finance and Political Corruption (RC 20) have carried out some of the most significant work in this field. Herbert Alexander devoted his professional life to a long series of studies of the funding of presidential and other election campaigns in the United States. Among the most significant works in the comparative study of party finance are those of Arnold Heidenheimer, Khayyam Paltiel, Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, and Kevin Casas-Zamora. Heidenheimer’s pioneering study of 1963 attempted to compare the overall level of spending in a number of different countries. He then tried to explain why party politics costs so much more in some countries (e.g., the Philippines or Israel) than in others (e.g., the UK). In 2009, Nassmacher found that the pattern of high- and low-spending countries was largely unchanged. Like Casas-Zamora and Pinto-Duschinsky, he also cast doubts on the popular notion that the costs of politics have greatly risen as the result of spending by parties on modern campaigning techniques, in particular on television advertising.

However, the attempt to make reliable comparisons between the levels of spending in different countries has raised serious methodological and practical problems:

1. Though the financial accounts of parties are now published in many more countries than in the past, they often are inaccurate (works of fiction, as the French scholar Yves-Marie Doublet has called them). Moreover, accounts are drawn up in different ways, thereby making comparisons technically difficult.

2. The term *finance* needs to be considered carefully, for donations may come in the form of gifts in kind. Rather than supply money to enable a party to purchase vehicles or other forms of transport for electioneering by party leaders and candidates, donors may supply vehicles or the use of helicopters. Clearly, their value needs to be taken into account when reckoning the income and expenditures of a party.
In a large number of countries in the former Soviet Union, Africa, and elsewhere, in-kind donations to political parties come from the government. This is known in Eastern Europe as “administrative resources.” Typically, the government in office employs officials supposedly to carry out public duties but actually to provide political services to the party. Office facilities, telephones, and vehicles in government ministries, in the offices of legislators, or mayors’ offices are common forms of administrative resources.

The partisan use of public resources by political officeholders creates problems of research and measurement for political scientists. It also is a source of unfairness between governing parties and opposition parties. This imbalance is especially important in poor countries dependent on foreign assistance. Here the private sector of the economy frequently is very weak, and control of governmental resources is crucial.

3. Academic studies also confront the problem of definition of the term political party. In practice, there are “offshore islands” of parties: These are organizations that are legally independent of parties but are in practice linked to a party. An important example of organizations with such a status is the “political foundations” attached to each of the main parties in Germany. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation is “close to” the Christian Democrats, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation is “close to” the Social Democrats, and so on. Where newspapers are strongly connected to a political party, there arises the question of whether or not their incomes and expenditures are to be included in academic studies of party finance.

4. It is hard to measure the effects of expenditure on election results. In the case of spending by or on behalf of candidates for the legislature in countries that both have first-past-the-post electoral systems and require the disclosure of expenditures, it is possible to make statistical analyses of the relationship between spending and votes. The difficulties are that the official spending statistics may be incomplete or inaccurate and also that factors other than money need to be considered. For example, a local party organization with more members or more active members may raise relatively large sums of money. However, electoral success may stem from the work of the local activists rather than from the amount of money spent.

As a result of these problems, the main progress by political scientists has been in studies of party funding in single countries (e.g., Marcin Walecki’s study of Poland) and in the study of political finance laws (e.g., by the Congressional Research Services of the U.S. Library of Congress and by the GRECO [Group of States Against Corruption] unit of the Council of Europe).

Regulation and Subsidy

In recent decades, there has been a strong international tendency to increase legal regulation of both party funding and public subsidies. Arguably, there has been too much law and too little enforcement. This is partly because laws themselves are loosely worded and leave loopholes that can be exploited by donors and by political parties wishing to evade them. It is partly because electoral management bodies and law enforcement bodies have neither the technical capacity nor the will to challenge powerful political figures in major political parties. Where a body separate from the electoral management body, such as an anticorruption commission, is made responsible for the enforcement of laws relating to party funding, there may be a greater chance of active enforcement.

The main types of regulation include (a) requirements on parties and/or donors to declare financial accounts and donations to an electoral management authority; (b) requirements about the publication of such information (including, increasingly, publication on the World Wide Web); (c) requirements for disclosure of in-kind donations and of loans to parties; (d) requirements for elected politicians to declare their personal assets; (e) bans on particular sources of donations: for example, foreign donations and donations by companies, trade unions, or public contractors; (f) limits on permitted spending by parties or by candidates on election campaigns; (g) limits on the amounts that a donor is permitted to give—regulations concerning forms of disclosure are the most common around the world; and (h) bans on or regulation of party spending on advertising on television or radio.

The main forms of subsidy are (a) provision of free or subsidized time on television and radio...
(and, more occasionally, free or subsidized newspaper advertising) for parties and candidates to convey their campaign messages to the electors, (b) direct financial subsidies to parties for election campaign expenses and/or for routine organizational expenses, (c) financial and in-kind allowances for party groups in the legislature or for individual legislators, and (d) in-kind electoral facilities for parties from public funds—for example, use of public halls for electoral meetings and/or postage for electoral communications without cost.

The most common form of subsidy is the provision of free broadcasting opportunities. More than half the countries have some form of direct public funding. Political parties debate the effects of such subsidies. One fear is that they create an incentive for rival political parties to unite in defense of their common financial privileges. In the words of Richard Katz and Peter Mair, this creates “cartel parties.” Another criticism is that public funding fails to stem the demand of political parties for money and thus fails to provide a cure for corrupt funding. Public funding is popular among professional politicians—its main beneficiaries—but is generally unpopular with ordinary electors. Supporters of public funding argue that it provides greater fairness. They argue also that, combined with improved regulation, public funding does help decrease corruption even if it does not eliminate it.

International Standards

Several bodies, including the Council of Europe, have set out standards for the regulation and subsidy of political parties. Such standard-setting exercises present problems, though they may have their uses. There are essential differences of political philosophy between those who give priority to the need for fairness between parties and those whose main aim is to allow freedom of expression. Such freedom may mean allowing some parties to outspend others, thus creating a tension between the aims of freedom and fairness.

Even when the aim of transparency in party funding is considered, there are arguments in some circumstances for permitting donor privacy, especially in regimes where anyone known to give financial support to a party opposing the government may be subjected to harassment and even to violence.

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See also Corruption; Electoral Campaign; Parties; Party Organization

Further Readings


**Party Identification**

Parliamentary and presidential elections are regularly held every 3 to 5 years, and the behavior of the electorate is characterized by a certain inertia, sometimes more and sometimes less. This inertia at the aggregate level is the consequence of decisions of individual voters whose party attachments predispose them to elect candidates of the same party in a series of elections. Various terms are used as synonyms for this general idea of party attachment, such as *partisanship*, *party closeness*, *party loyalty*, and *party identification*. This type of enduring attachment has to be distinguished
from short-term party evaluations or from current party preference as the immediate, direct cause of voting behavior. Whereas party attachment is usually measured as attachment to one particular party, current party preference is sometimes operationalized as a preference order for a set of parties, from one’s least to most preferred party.

As used in voting behavior research, party identification differs from the other terms because the general idea of party attachment is embedded in a special theoretical approach. Its definition is more specific, and its causes and consequences are theoretically grounded. Party identification as a theoretical concept was developed by the Michigan social psychological school of political behavior. This concept is introduced in the first section, followed by a section on an alternative, revisionist concept. In the third section, a new conceptualization in the classical spirit and new challenges are discussed. The entry concludes with a fourth section on the applicability of the concept outside the United States.

The Michigan Social Psychological Concept

Party identification was originally defined in The American Voter by Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes (1960) as “the individual’s affective orientation to an important group object in his environment” (p. 121). In U.S. politics, with its stable two-party system, the Republican and Democratic parties function as these “important group objects,” offering political orientation to their supporters. Campbell et al. did not assume that this is self-evident but conceded that other groups are able to function as political reference groups as well, such as unions and religious or ethnic groups. Whether parties do indeed fulfill this orientation function for a large part of the national electorate is one of the questions that have to be answered when the original American concept is applied in other countries. The basic assumption of the Michigan approach is first of all that voters depend on such groups for political orientation, this being originally derived from reference group theory in mainstream social psychology of the 1940s and 1950s.

The classical Michigan concept of party identification became one of the cornerstones of voting research, first in the United States but to so some extent also in Europe and Japan. Its standard measure is asked in all American National Election Studies: “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?” The independents are then asked, whether they think of themselves as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party, leading to the support type of “leaners.” The self-identified Republicans and Democrats are further categorized as strong or weak, depending on their answer as to whether they think of themselves as strong or not very strong Republicans or Democrats. The end result is a categorization of the American electorate into seven groups, running from strong to weak Republicans, to Independents leaning toward the Republican Party, to Independents, to the equivalent groups on the Democratic side. Much of the literature focuses on the reliability of this measurement, which combines direction and strength of attachment in one scale. Not denying the importance of the respective methodological controversy, the basic question concerns the concept validity of the directional component: Do the various measures of identification with a party measure what they are supposed to measure?

There are some easy conditions that these measures have to fulfill in cross-sectional surveys. Thus one expects that the political attitudes of party identifiers are more in line with their party than those of leaners and that party identification has a consistent impact on voting behavior. But party identification is only a predisposition to elect a Republican or a Democratic candidate, so that elections differ in terms of this impact. In the American context, with changing presidential candidate constellations, vote deviations of identifiers from their party occur more frequently than in European parliamentary systems, where under proportional representation the electorate often has only a choice between closed party lists. These deviations in the United States are seen not as a weakness but as a strength of the concept if voters return to the party they identify with in later elections.

The crucial test of concept validity is the exogenous status of party identification in relation to short-term electoral forces such as issue and candidate orientations. People become passively attached to a party during their primary political socialization in their teens, as a result of the overwhelming influence of their parents, and the ties to their party become strengthened by a continuous voting
record. Thus, younger voters tend to deviate more than older ones. But in general, the inertia of the electorate in the medium term should be quite large. The theory allows only two exceptions. The first is sudden changes in critical elections when many voters reorient themselves politically, reacting to important events such as the world economic crisis in the early 1930s, and the other concerns gradual readjustments in parts of the electorate as in the U.S. South since the late 1960s. Here the successful civil rights movement led to the enfranchisement of the African American population, which voted overwhelmingly for the Democratic Party; as a result, many traditional Southern White Democrats crossed the party divide to maintain a racial divide.

The Revisionist Concept

In the U.S. context, the validity of the classical concept was well corroborated by empirical evidence collected by the Michigan school. Compared with other political attitudes, party identification proved to be more stable over time even at the individual level, as shown by long-wave panels spanning 4 years. But there remained doubts whether party identification was really the supposed unmoved mover, being stable and exogenous itself but influencing the evaluation of new political events, issues, and candidates. The finding that vote deviations from party identification weaken this predisposition and prevent it from returning to its former strength led to a slight revision of the concept. As soon as deviations are understood as more than mere episodes, the question arises as to what caused deviations in the first place. One possible answer was that there were retrospective evaluations of parties in government, rewarding them for good performance and punishing them for bad performance. Voters will remember parties’ performance not only at the moment of voting but more permanently. This consideration led Morris Fiorina (1981) to the reinterpretation of party identification “as a running tally of retrospective evaluations” (p. 89). Party identification at time $t$ influences identification at time $t + 1$; this is the aspect of continuity, but identification at $t + 1$ is also influenced by retrospective evaluations that are themselves not a simple consequence of the biased worldview of the identifiers. As a process of Bayesian updating of beliefs about parties, the affective component of the concept is downgraded in favor of cognitive content and information that is not selectively perceived to confirm one’s own attitudes. To what degree this is possible is a problem that is controversially discussed in the literature.

The implications of the revisionist concept for the aggregate level of the electorate are short-term fluctuations beyond sample errors that are not compatible with the classic version. As already mentioned, the latter does not postulate complete stability either but allows rare realigning elections or gradual movements due to generational turnover or reorientations in parts of the electorate such as the U.S. South. But fluctuations over time that correlate with performance indicators of the president or with the situation of the economy are definitely excluded. Not so by revisionist theory. Time-series analyses of the proportions of Republican and Democratic identifiers were introduced as studies of macropartisanship. Building on the revisionist concept, the task was to show, on the one hand, that its ups and downs were reduced compared with the performance indicators due to the stickiness of party identification and, on the other, that they correlated with the collective memory of the performance history of the parties’ presidents and of the respective economic situation. Applying an error correction model, Robert Erikson, Michael MacKuen, and James Stimson (2002) showed for the United States not only that current changes in macropartisanship are the consequences of current changes of performance indicators but that macropartisanship returns to its medium-term equilibrium and that these equilibria are themselves changing over time. They interpret this latter change as “the enduring impact of political and economic performance” (p. 132). This result did not remain unchallenged, one argument being that medium-term changes are the consequences of classical realignment processes, such as those during the Reagan administration that favored the Republican Party.

New Theoretical Foundations and New Challenges

Reference group theory being outdated in social psychology, the classic concept deserves a new
theoretical foundation that keeps its content as an affective party attachment. Such a new foundation is possible with social identity theory as developed by Henri Tajfel, who stresses that people bolster their self-esteem by membership in groups that they value positively and that are emotionally significant to them. Based on these assumptions, the social identity of a person is more than a mere cognitive self-categorization. A strong motivational content should guarantee selective perception of political events in favor of the respective political ingroup, accompanied by outgroup hostility. This theory fits well with the original concept of party identification, the only problem now being which party group people have in mind when “they think of themselves as Republicans, Democrats, etc.” or when they think of the party as an “important group object in their environment,” the party as an organization, or other identifiers of the same party. Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler (2002) argue for the latter interpretation and insist that it agrees best with the classic meaning. People are supposed to have an image of their fellow partisans, with whom they identify even if they have no contact whatsoever with the party organization or the party elite. Otherwise one could not explain the high percentages of regular voters who identify with parties.

This new theoretical foundation of the classical concept is important because it helps formulate adequate survey questions that tap the identity character of party identification. This is less a problem for the standard American question that qualifies well as an identity question than for the type of questions asked in some other countries. Questions asking whether one feels close to a party or whether one is an adherent of a party are less plausible as measures of identification with fellow partisans.

The identity approach is sometimes contrasted in the literature with the so-called attitudinal approach. John Bartle and Paolo Bellucci (2009) subsume the revisionist concept under this heading as well as strong party attitudes combining cognitive, emotional, and behavioral aspects of this positive—or negative—disposition toward a party as an attitude object. Indicators of the strength of an attitude are its durability and its impact on behavior or on other attitudes. These are the criteria that were also applied to check the construct validity of the classic concept. Thus, the general idea holding various versions of party identification together is its function as a political predisposition influencing short-term political preferences and evaluations. In a funnel of causality leading from background characteristics such as religion or class membership to the final vote, political predispositions enter early, being influenced themselves only by the background characteristics. A more general version of partisanship such as the revisionist concept allows for regular updating caused by new information, but it also implies higher durability than short-term political evaluations and an impact on evaluations of current political cues. Larger permissiveness concerning long-term stability means at the same time fewer challenges from the research front. Thus, it makes sense to focus on the challenges the identity approach has to cope with since it is the continuation of the demanding classic version of party identification.

From the beginning, the stability of party identification over time was the most demanding presupposition of the classic concept. Only durable identifications are able to function as unmove movers for short-term evaluations and issue preferences. Compared with other political attitudes, party identification turned out to be indeed relatively stable in the United States, and the stability is about at the same high level as for various ethnic, religious, or social class identities. The autocorrelations of identities over panel waves can be made even higher if one takes measurement error into account. An answer to a survey question is a mixture of the true value and an error term due to inattention, lack of understanding, coding mistakes, and so on. Multiwave panel data allow the identification of these errors and therefore the computation of correlations that are not attenuated by errors. Such autocorrelations reach values well above .90 for party identification in the United States.

A new challenge in this situation is posed by competing political predispositions, which can be as stable as party identification once measurement errors are taken into account for them, too. Such competing predispositions are ideological self-categorizations or policy-relevant value orientations. These concepts are more abstract than social identifications but are often measured in mass surveys with simple questions, one item for
each concept. State-of-the-art measurement would demand multiple items. There exist first results showing that issue preferences can be very stable over time if one can construct indices based on multiple items and if one takes measurement errors into account. Such results challenge the monopoly of party identification as the only promising candidate for the function of a political predisposition.

Another challenge related to this are doubts about the applicability and fruitfulness of the identity concept outside the United States. The best answer to this question can be given by acknowledging, first, the importance of political predispositions for opinion formation and voting behavior and by finding out, second, which type of predisposition has the best explanatory power in a specific country, given its political history and party system. Once more candidates for the predisposition part of the funnel of causality are available, there arises, of course, the new challenge of deciphering the mutual influences among them.

**Party Identification Outside the United States**

The most serious challenge of the classic or the identity concept of party identification accrues from research results on European party systems and voting behavior. After early attempts to transfer the core concept of the Michigan school to Britain, France, the Netherlands, and other European countries in the 1960s, one conclusion was that the concept, successful as it is in the United States, is less powerful or even nonapplicable in Europe. Some authors argue that it is indistinguishable from vote choice or is much less stable over time than in the United States or that there exist better alternatives that European voters can use for political orientation. Other researchers strongly disagree, coming to the opposite conclusion that, depending on certain conditions, the concept passed critical tests of construct validity.

A first condition is, of course, to come up with an equivalent question that taps the affective identification or the identity aspect. Richard Johnston (2006) compiled an overview of the questions used in various countries and found that only the questions in the English-speaking countries and in Japan fall back on the phrase whether one thinks of oneself as “Conservative, Labor, Liberal, or what,” as the British question is formulated. In other countries respondents are asked whether they consider themselves as adherents of a party (Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands), feel close to a party (France), or lean toward a party (Germany). The identity aspect decreases in this sequence. In most countries, researchers have agreed on a standard formulation that is asked regularly in national election studies.

For the crucial validity check of stability, panel studies are necessary, and in this respect most of the early results were disappointing compared with the stability of party identification in the United States. For the Netherlands, Jacques Thomassen even reported a higher stability of the vote than of party identification and corroborated this finding, together with Martin Rosema, recently (cited in Bartle & Belluci, 2009). But taking measurement error into account and applying statistical models appropriate for the respective measurement level of the data can change the overall impression of instability. Thus, Green and Schickler (cited in Bartle & Belluci, 2009) concluded that many of the reports on the instability of party identification in Europe are grossly exaggerated. They note at the same time that the identity concept does not imply stability under all circumstances. As one would expect, the party identifications of the Italian electorate became fluid in the 1990s, due to major changes in the Italian party system. A final conclusion concerning the stability of party identification in Europe, however, is not yet reached. The answers given depend on the methods used to measure stability. Error term corrections rely on classical measurement theory, which postulates random errors in an otherwise homogeneous population. Alternatively, one can assume a heterogeneous population consisting of movers and stayers that can be tested by latent class analysis. Such analyses show substantial dynamics and a class of movers in Britain, for example, of one third to two fifths of the electorate. These results do confirm the revisionist concept that Harold Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne Stewart, and Paul Whiteley call valenced partisanship (2004, p. 211). The transition probabilities between British parties are not random but show trends parallel to the “accumulated party and party leader performance evaluations.”
A condition at the macrolevel of the political system that may have an impact on partisanship, especially if some voters have multiple party identifications, is the coalition situation in a country. In some countries, there exist rather stable options for government formation. In Germany, for example, a left-wing government coalition is an option, but one can also have a grand coalition between Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, a government of the Social Democrats and the Liberals, or finally the option of a bourgeois (bürgerlich) government of Christian Democrats and Liberals. These types of coalition also serve as attitude objects competing with parties in their importance for the electorate.

The most discussed alternative of party identification as a political predisposition is ideology, often asked as ideological self-categorization as conservative or liberal in the United States or as left or right leaning in Europe. European voters have few problems in classifying parties as well as themselves on self-anchoring left–right scales. In some countries such as France, parties either change their names from time to time or enter and leave the party system altogether, so ideology can serve as a more stable orientation device than party identification. Both party identification and ideological self-categorization exist in France, the question being their reciprocal influences and their comparative impact on the vote. Recent research results based on panel surveys show that ideology influences the legislative vote (first round) more than party identification.

Such country-specific findings are sometimes criticized as distractions from a general theory of party identification. This critique is unjustified if the goal is to identify the conditions, especially at the macrolevel, that strengthen or dilute party identification as a political predisposition. The identity concept is based on firm theoretical grounds postulating the predispositional character of party identification, which is challenged empirically by findings on the dynamics of identification. Valenced partisanship, by contrast, is always in danger of crossing the divide between predispositions and short-term political attitudes.

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See also Attitudes, Political; Electoral Behavior; Identity, Social and Political; Ideology; Political Socialization

Further Readings

PARTY LINKAGE

The concept of party linkage refers to the ways in which political parties provide linkage to the state. In democratic theory, parties link citizens to the state, but linkage theory encompasses as well how parties link specific entities such as special interests and campaign donors to the state and how they sometimes develop stronger linkages to the state for themselves alone rather than for any other entities. Depending on what kind of linkage they provide, parties contribute to participatory democracy, responsive democracy, responsive oligarchic government, or coercive authoritarian government. They may also serve as agencies of prerevolutionary linkage or of market linkage. It is often possible to find various kinds of linkage by party within the same nation-state. This entry briefly examines each form of linkage by party in
turn and then examines work that helps explain why certain forms have become increasingly common while others seem to be falling into decline.

The use of the term party linkage is relatively new but is in fact an elaboration of the older concept of the party as a broker between citizens and the state, capable of aggregating specific interests, forming programs, and, when successful in electoral competition, placing representatives in office to carry them out. A similar approach conceived of parties as transmission belts, moving ideas through the body politic, transforming them into proposals for legislation and eventually into laws for implementation in the halls of governance.

These early metaphors, drawn from the boisterous world of industrial finance and production in the heyday of the Industrial Revolution and its aftermath, presented a uniquely positive and American point of view. It was not until after World War II that the term linkage was developed to extend the idea of parties as connectors to the state and to make it possible to consider the wider range of the kinds of connections that can be made by parties. The first effort to do so systematically was made in 1980 and identified four kinds of linkage by party: (1) participatory linkage, in which parties serve as agencies through which citizens can participate in government; (2) responsive linkage, in which parties serve as agencies that strive to ensure that government officials will be responsive to the views of rank-and-file voters; (3) clientelistic linkage, in which parties serve as channels for the exchange of votes for favors; and (4) coercive linkage, where parties help authoritarian governments maintain coercive control over their subjects.

Over time, research on parties as agencies of linkage has explored the applicability of this typology, often concentrating on the extent to which either participatory or responsive linkage is in fact being provided. Other studies have elaborated the typology, pointing out, for example, that parties may engage in selective linkage rather than collective linkage, may offer representative linkage to other organizations in exchange for electoral support, and may develop different forms and processes of linkage within complex and multilayered polities.

A particularly modern form of these kinds of linkage is market linkage. Market linkage is linkage for sale. In one sense, it is not new: Once in power, parties in government have always favored those who helped them to office and rewarded them for doing so. What makes market linkage different today is the overwhelming power of advertising and the consequent need for vast sums of money to win votes. In this form of linkage, parties link groups to the state by collecting funds and waging campaigns on behalf of the candidates selected by those groups; they seek to place their patrons’ candidates in office and thus become indispensable partners in power. Ordinary citizens are encouraged to believe that they will be the beneficiaries of responsive linkage, but their hopes and needs will be attended to, if at all, only after those of the patrons have been met. Their only hope in a system where market linkage is well entrenched is to form well-financed mass movements, that is, for citizens to become patrons themselves and for movements to take the place of parties as agencies of linkage (although movements never themselves move into positions of governance as parties successful in elections do).

The forms of linkage discussed so far focus, by and large, on contemporary parties in established democracies. More recent studies examining the relationship between parties and democracy in the past as well as in nondemocratic states have revealed another form of linkage by party, revolutionary linkage. Such linkage takes place in nations where there is neither democratic governance nor a legal party system, and citizens who find the autocratic rule intolerable join parties that have been outlawed or are forced to go underground or else form new, embryonic parties. The linkage the party provides in such a case is not to a state per se but to an imagined one, one that is seen as embodied in the words and deeds of its leader. For the followers, linkage to a legitimate state is the dream, but linkage to a charismatic leader and his or her entourage is the presently available reward for joining the battle for liberty.

Revolutionary linkage is found throughout history, including at the present time. A period of organized struggle for liberty is found in the history of every currently democratic state except those on whom democracy has been imposed by external conquest. As a contemporary phenomenon, it appears in states where democracy has not yet been established or where it has fallen and must be fought for all over again. In the latter case,
the illegal movements pursuing the dream may be parties that have been outlawed.

The six forms of linkage identified can readily be divided into those that foster democracy and those that work against it. Parties building linkage in prerevolutionary settings and those fostering participatory and responsive linkage in established democracies all offer prodemocracy forms of linkage (or at least purport to be doing so), whereas those that link only by clientelistic rewards, abetting agencies of oppression, or favoring their most generous contributors, use antidemocratic methods of creating linkage.

Recent studies of the relationship between parties and democracy suggest that the latter types of linkage are on the rise and that the former are weakening. Throughout the world, in long-established democracies, in new democracies, and in nations still only partially or not at all democratized, opportunities for participatory linkage via parties have diminished, responsive linkage has weakened, new forms of clientelistic and directive linkage have evolved, struggles for liberation via prerevolutionary linkage have been baffled and stalled, and market linkage has become ever more common.

External forces such as market globalization and the rising costs of effective campaigning with modern forms of communication, as well as stronger and more sophisticated oppression by dictatorial regimes, have provided pressure on parties to shift to (or continue to limit themselves to) the less democratic forms of linkage, and parties have responded. Recent studies of this process of de-democratization by party have identified many of the steps taken to move in this direction. (Specific examples, some of which are noted below, have been found in 46 nations, in the parties of North and Latin America, West and Eastern Europe, post-Soviet states, Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the Middle East.)

In nondictatorial regimes, the shift by parties from participatory or at least responsive linkage to less democratic forms of linkage is often difficult to isolate and identify, because the role parties play in de-democratization is frequently combined with other activities by the same parties that contribute to the maintenance of democratic forms of linkage. In such hybrid systems, parties are routinely considered accountable to a democratic electorate and may in fact still be so to a considerable extent. In addition, only a portion of a party’s leadership and supporters may engage in de-democratizing behavior, and its deleterious effects on democracy may be difficult to recognize. However, certain easily recognizable de-democratizing forms of party behavior, augmenting clientelistic and market forms of linkage within established democracies, have been pointed out and have been categorized, according to whether their effect is direct or indirect, as proactive and complicit. Examples of proactive linkage-changing behavior by parties include deliberately reducing the powers of the party base, overtly sponsoring or supporting legislation or judicial decisions that eliminate regulations protecting rights of political participation, and campaigning dishonestly, with no intention of implementing the promises made to the majority of supportive voters.

Parties are complicit in facilitating de-democratization when they aid those who proactively seek its accomplishment by seeking other goals. There are three subtypes of complicity: unconscious, venal, and ideological. Unconscious complicity refers to failure to recognize the likely de-democratizing effect of the proposals one supports. A legislator who votes for a new electoral law without recognizing that the implementation of one of its clauses will lead to the effective disenfranchisement of a portion of the population provides an example of unconscious complicity. Venal complicity is manifest in the behavior of party representatives who accept roles and rewards for themselves and in exchange engage in no actions contrary to the wishes of those who grant such perquisites. It is also seen in the behavior of those who vote strictly according to the wishes of their largest donors (a form more difficult to identify, as such votes may in fact be in accordance with the legislator’s own opinions). Ideological complicity takes place when a party rejects fundamental precepts of representation and accountability on principle. Extremist and racist parties preaching the exclusion of minority populations can be, without ever winning office, ideologically complicit in facilitating the shift to nondemocratic forms of linkage.

In dictatorial regimes, parties reduce the possibility of establishing democratic forms of linkage when they engage in venal complicity, accepting personal rewards for not pursuing the interests of
their supporters; offer clientelistic rewards in exchange for votes; or assist the regime in tactics of oppression (coercive linkage). They may also contribute to the entrenchment of nondemocratic forms of linkage with retreative behavior, as when parties that support democracy disband when defeated, heavily oppressed, or outlawed, behavior that may appear thoroughly reasonable and justified but nonetheless weakens the struggle to initiate democratic governance or maintain any progress made in that direction. All these forms of behavior have been clearly identified in many states in the contemporary Arab world but have also been noted throughout the world at various points in time.

These recent efforts to combine the study of de-democratization with the study of party linkage offer new perspectives on the nature of linkage today, a rich field of study for students of party as well as students of democracy.

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See also Clientelism; Democratization; Parties; Party Finance; Representation; Responsiveness; Revolution

Further Readings

**PARTY MANIFESTO**

A party manifesto or platform is the authoritative statement of party policy at the time of a general election. Many other pamphlets and policy documents may be issued by leaders, candidates, or different party organs around this time. However, the manifesto is unique in that it is the authoritative statement of the party position for that election, usually endorsed by a representative conference of party members, according to recognized procedures. This has implications for its content and presentation: Otherwise, they might not have been approved as authoritative. Manifests are not, therefore, just an arbitrarily selected policy document out of many available at that time. They are the documents that have been crafted for, and received, official approval. In the following, the significance of such documents is assessed for elections and the formation of coalitions, of party policies, and of democratic theory as a whole. In a few cases, this authoritative election statement of policy is made verbally by an authorized spokesman—party chair or leader—sometimes as a radio or TV speech (in Australia) or an interview for a leading newspaper (in Japan). In Scandinavia, the document may not be published as a whole; instead, different sections may be distributed to different groups. However, all these processes of transmission are carried out by designated spokespersons or party bodies. Fundamental programs—statements of party principle—are also approved from time to time by some parties but should not be confused with the action program or campaign platform endorsed for an election.

Usually issued as a booklet or pamphlet, the manifesto is normally presented at the beginning of the election campaign at a press conference designed to publicize its leading concerns. Not many electors read it; its influence is felt mainly through press and TV discussions where party representatives will be confronted with its statements. The manifesto thus functions as an equilibrium point around which party policy oscillates and to which it returns during the campaign.

Parties are the only organizations that issue such comprehensive medium-term programs for the whole of society. Until the middle of the post-war period, conventional wisdom was that manifestos did not count for much, as electors did not read them and parties, once elected, forgot about them and certainly did not wish to be bound by them. Were this critique true, it would constitute a devastating critique of representative democracy,
defined as a political system that makes a necessary connection between popular preferences and public policy. This is because party policies as outlined in their manifestos are what voters are asked to choose between. If manifestos do not get their message through, then the expression of popular preferences in the vote will be wayward and ill informed. Similarly, if parties ignore them once they are in office, popular preferences will not shape public policy.

A more positive evaluation of manifestos has emerged over the past 30 years. The mass media need them to structure their election discussions so that their main features and concerns get through to electors. Parties too need a basis for policy coordination and innovation once they get into government, which they are generally too busy to generate once they are there. They have, therefore, to fall back on the manifesto as a readily available and authoritative basis for action.

This is true even where coalition governments are formed. Either each party has carte blanche to do as it wishes inside the ministries and policy sectors assigned to it (in which case its manifesto serves as a basis for action there) or an overall coalition agreement is developed from the constituent party manifestos. Either way, the latter feed into government policy.

These reevaluations of the role of the manifesto have come about partly through the work of the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) and its successor project, the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), based at the Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin. The MRG, a grouping of about 20 mainly European political scientists, counted the (quasi) sentences of the manifestos of all significant parties in 25 countries in 56 categories covering the full range of party policy. Quasi sentences are defined as arguments or phrases that are the verbal expression of one idea or meaning. Where they do not coincide with a natural sentence, they are often marked off by bullet points, commas, or semicolons. Raw counts of these for each election manifesto are expressed as percentages to allow comparison of documents of varying lengths. These percentages can then be used to compare the policy concerns of different parties, to distinguish them ideologically, or to trace the evolution of their thinking over time.

Statistical analyses of these manifesto-derived data have also been useful for giving credibility and substance to the idea of a basic left–right division underlying democratic politics. This has emerged from several different types of analysis applied to the data. The MRG-CMP Left-Right scale contrasts policy concerns of the Left (intervention, welfare, and peace) with those of the Right (freedom, traditional values, and military strength). By subtracting the summed references to Left topics from those to Right topics, party positions and movements can be mapped across 54 countries for the postwar period (Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, & Ian Budge, 2007).

Quantifying manifesto texts in this way has also been essential in establishing relationships between party election programs and subsequent government action. Emphases in the manifestos can be linked to government expenditure to see if they get carried through. The answer is clearly that they do, thus upholding the validity of election results as a guide for government action.

For a more limited range of countries, other studies have examined the extent to which specific pledges made in the manifesto are actually fulfilled by governments. Again it appears that a substantial number support the idea of a party mandate from the electorate based on the manifesto. Manifestos and the data describing them are very important for the development of systematic political science because they are the main source of information on the preferences of the main political actors across countries and over time. The ability to measure such preferences in a fully comparable way enables political scientists to check the major theories and models of representation and party competition systematically in a way that was never conceived of before. Rational choice theories in particular, which depends crucially on assumptions about, and measurement of, preferences, can now be put directly to the test. Derived measures from the manifestos can be used to estimate government intentions and the preference of the median voter (Hee-Min Kim & Richard Fording, chap. 8, in Ian Budge, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, & Eric Tanenbaum, 2001). It is particularly useful to have the latter where direct survey evidence is lacking. Since manifestos state the party’s position in its own words and from its own point of view, they provide more direct evidence on its position than
experts’ judgments or electors’ perceptions of party positions do.

So far, the only quantified data from manifestos have been the MRG-CMP time series, based on manual coding of the documents. Because of their research importance, increasing efforts have been made to develop computerized analyses of the texts. Indeed, manifestos have become the focus and growth point for computerized analyses of political texts, not the least because the efforts of the MRG-CMP in collecting, storing, and scanning them make them easily accessible for all users. Clearly, therefore, manifestos offer a major source for political analyses of the central democratic processes, particularly for representational processes. Political parties are so crucial to these (both in organizing election choices for voters and in effecting the majority-supported preference in government) that the authoritative policy document they issue must be of central interest in studying both elections and governments. The combination of its major importance to the democratic political process and the fact that it can be relatively easily quantified using modern techniques gives it a key role in the future development of systematic political science. Central concepts and relationships that can be measured using the policy positions conveyed by manifestos in combination with other data (bracketed) include

- the median voter (party votes),
- congruence between popular preferences and government intentions (cabinet posts),
- long-term bias in government intentions compared with popular preferences, and
- the relationship between settled popular preferences and enacted government policy.

As indicated, representational processes are strongly shaped by the way parties behave in policy terms. Here again, manifestos, particularly in their quantified form, are important in systematically tracing policy movement over time and in relation to other parties. Particularly important in this regard have been the maps of left–right movement produced by the MRG-CMP published in recent years. Generally, these show little sign of party policy convergence on the center or on the median elector as predicted by some influential models of party behavior. Rather, they show parties as sticking fairly consistently to their own ideological space and thus maintaining the policy differentiation that is important in offering voters the kind of choice between alternative programs envisaged in the theory of the party mandate (Michael McDonald & Ian Budge, 2005). Some strategic or other forms of variation also occur in their positions over time. This has the effect of varying the policy options offered from election to election, another important element in democratic choice. It is paradoxical that political science, as opposed to normative political theory, has for so long neglected the systematic study of texts. Both the main inputs and the major outputs of political science are textual—reports, loans, budgets, circulars, and declarations. Central on the input side is the election program or manifesto. Perhaps the manifesto research described above will spill over into the analysis of other political texts in the not too distant future.

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See also Coalitions; Democracy, Theories of; Electoral Behavior; Parties

Further Readings


To study party organizations it is essential to draw all necessary analytical suggestions from organization theory and to adapt them to the special case of parties. Of course, this is not the only way of studying political parties. Many different points of view can be adopted. But this particular way provides the opportunity to explore the different ways in which the internal rules of the game, that is, the system of organizational incentives and opportunities, influence the actions of party members at the top levels, at the grassroots levels, and at the intermediate hierarchical levels.

An innovative definition of party organization is not needed. Political parties are formal organizations. Therefore, we can begin with a standard definition of formal organization as

a group of people formally constituted and endowed with an official mission, a hierarchy (more or less elaborated), as well as a structure of internal coordination, boundaries (more or less open), and some kind of task specialization (more or less developed).

A political party is a formal organization specialized in the presentation of candidates in local and/or national elections. In this perspective, the first and most important difference, according to Giovanni Sartori, is among parties operating in a competitive, namely, democratic environment and parties operating in a noncompetitive environment—that is, some modern authoritarian single-party system.

This entry investigates some aspects of the complex question of party organizations. It begins with some general suggestions about the historical evolution of political parties: their formation, their institutionalization, and path dependency effects. Next, it considers parties’ organizational structures (different kinds of hierarchies, different kinds of power structure) and the linkages between a party’s official goals and its organizational structure, the relations between parties’ organizations and their external environment, and the causal mechanisms at work when political parties experiment with organizational changes. Finally, this entry briefly examines some typologies of parties, summarizing the most relevant features of recent developments in party organization.

**Historical Evolution**

In a historical-institutionalist perspective, understanding party organization requires an analytical reconstruction of each political party’s origin and specific institutionalization. The features of parties’ organizations depend on past history: how the organizations originated and how they consolidated. Path dependency rules explain why every organization, and political parties too, bears the mark of its origin and consolidation (institutionalization) even several decades later. Reconstructing the genetic model (Angelo Panebianco, 1988) of political parties means considering three elements:

1. **The organizational development**: The birth of a party can be due to territorial penetration or territorial diffusion, or their combination. Penetration means that a “center” organizes, controls, and directs the development of a territorial “periphery.” Diffusion means that party organization is the product of the aggregation/federation of previous local groups and elites. In the first case, the party will probably become a strong, centralized organization controlled by a unified central oligarchy. In the second case, the party will be a decentralized organization with many diversified and competing groups: a stratarchy, as described by Samuel Eldersveld in 1964, in which every subgroup fights for power, making precarious and unstable compromises with other subgroups.

2. **The presence or absence of an external sponsor of an institution (a church, trade unions, the Comintern) as actual founder of the party**: If an external sponsor exists, the party is its “political weapon.” The external sponsor is the main center of loyalties and identifications for party followers and members as well as the source of legitimation for party leaders. Therefore, externally legitimated parties (confessional parties, labor parties, communist parties) and internally legitimated parties can be distinguished. This circumstance will influence all aspects of the future organizational developments.

3. **The presence or absence of a charismatic leader as founder of parties**: Charismatic parties have very special features. The leader holds the full
control of the party’s dominant coalition. He or she is the de facto owner of the party.

The characteristics of the genetic model influence the manner of institutionalization, the process of structural consolidation of parties. Institutionalization is the process by which an organization incorporates its founder’s values and aims, by which it becomes an institution—develops boundaries, an internal career system, a consolidated hierarchy, and a professionalized leadership. Two ideal types can be distinguished: strong institutionalization and weak institutionalization. Strong institutionalization means high autonomy from the environment and high interdependencies and coherence among its internal components. Weak institutionalization means low external autonomy and a low degree of internal interdependence. In the first case, the party will be a centralized, bureaucratic, organization led by a strong central oligarchy. It will hold the control of many external organizations (unions, interest groups, etc.), and it will adopt an aggressive, expansionist, policy toward the external environment.

In the second case, the party will be a decentralized organization, controlled by external groups (external organizations) and/or local notables, with a poorly developed internal administration system. It usually will be unable to develop aggressive policies toward the external environment.

Genetic model and institutionalization are related. A strong institution is mainly associated with territorial penetration and the absence of an external sponsor (with the notable exception of the communist parties in the 20th century). Weak institutionalization is mainly related to territorial diffusion and the existence of external sponsors. Finally, the presence of charismatic leaders as party founders is rarely associated with institutionalization (the routinization of charisma, in Max Weber’s terms). Only a few charismatic parties become institutions (e.g., the Gaullist party in the French Fifth Republic). The majority of them disappear with the end of the human and political journey of the leader.

Physiognomy of Party Organizations

The official mission comprises the ideological goals, the organizational constitution, and the power structure, which are the three (related) aspects that define the physiognomy of party organizations.

The official mission of the party, its manifest ideological goals, influences both its organizational structure and its culture (and its relations with the environment too). Many formal and informal rules depend on the features of the official mission. But the official mission is also too vague an indicator of the characteristics of party organizations. Moreover, the original official mission is usually transformed during the process of institutionalization and after. Robert Michels’s (1911) idea of “substitution of goals” may be exaggerated, given that a complete process of substitution of goals in a party is a rare occurrence. But usually, in the course of time, an “adaptation of goals” takes place: The goals are adjusted to the environmental circumstances, and as a consequence, they become vaguer.

Party members need to believe in those goals, and the capability of mobilization of followers by party leaders depends on their capacity to demonstrate themselves as zealous defenders of the ideological goals (as well as their capacity to distribute or promise material incentives and resources). But the role of the official mission will vary. For example, when parties are in power, there is less need of mobilizing members and followers and the official mission becomes less important. On the contrary, when parties are in the opposition, there is a greater urgency to mobilize people. In this case, the official mission, the ideological goals, will be emphatically affirmed.

The second aspect is the organizational constitution. The constitution defines the rules of the game: the distribution of formal authority in the party, the ways of coordination among the official party roles, the type of task specialization, and the organizational boundaries (who is a member and who is not). Sometimes, students of party organizations reduce the organizational analysis of parties to the description of their formal constitutions. But the constitution is only a fragment of a complex organizational whole.

The third aspect regards the power structure. In every party, there is a dominant coalition, a group of leaders who control the organization. The physiognomy of the dominant coalition is an essential defining feature of party organizations. In the case of the internally legitimated party, the dominant coalition comprises only party members.
In the case of externally legitimated parties, it includes the leaders of the external sponsor organizations: For example, the top officials of the British trade unions were, for a long time, members of the Labour Party’s dominant coalition.

Moreover, the dominant coalition leaders can hold positions of authority in the party (the general secretary, the members of the party national central committee, etc.), or they can be parliamentarians. Finally, the dominant coalition, in some cases, can include not only national leaders but also regional or local leaders (e.g., the secretaries of some important local federations).

Dominant coalitions can also be classified on the basis of their levels of cohesion/division and stability/instability. Both aspects are related to the power competition within the dominant coalition. If the subgroups of the dominant coalition are not organized, if they are only tendencies, as Richard Rose put it, the level of cohesion of the dominant coalition will be high. If the subgroups are strongly organized (factions), the level of cohesion will be low, and the dominant coalition will be divided.

The level of stability/instability refers to the capacity of members and subgroups of the dominant coalition to stipulate durable compromises among them. Therefore, cohesive-stable dominant coalitions (e.g., the communist parties), divided-stable dominant coalitions (the French socialist party of the time of Jean Jaurés and Léon Blum, the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] under Konrad Adenauer), and divided-instable dominant coalitions (the Italian Christian Democracy, 1953–1993) can be distinguished.

Furthermore, dominant coalitions can be oligarchies (cohesive and stable, without a single prominent leader), monocracies (a single leader, usually of the charismatic type, controlling the dominant coalition and, by consequence, the party), or poliarchies (divided and instable, usually a collection of factions).

**Parties and Their External Environment**

Like all other formal organizations, political parties interact; that is, they exchange vital resources with their external environment. The portions of the environment that are relevant for the party are its “task environment” or domain. First of all, there is a special portion of a party’s environment that the party identifies as its “hunting ground,” its privileged classe gardée, or reserved territory; it is that portion comprising the electors of the party and from which the party draws the majority of its members. The party’s official mission identifies the domain. Middle-class parties, manual workers’ parties, ethno-regional parties, and confessional parties are all denominations that make reference to those portions of the social territory that the official mission identifies as the privileged classe gardée of the organization. Changes and transformations of the social territory usually cause changes and transformations in the party. Alternatively, the leaders can deliberately manipulate and change the original official mission of the party to enlarge or change its domain.

The traditional sociology of political parties is usually concentrated on these aspects of the relations between parties and the environment. But the identification of the classe gardée does not entirely cover the topic. We should examine the question of the relations among parties and environments from a different perspective. In the case of parties operating in democratic, competitive regimes, it can be useful to divide the party environment into three main (interconnected) arenas: the electoral, the parliamentary, and the interorganizational (the set of relations between the party and interest groups, unions, etc.).

Different levels of complexity and different levels of stability/turbulence can be identified in each arena. On complexity, organization theory assumes that there are isomorphic pressures: The more complex the environment, the more complex the organization becomes. An increase in the complexity of the environment forces the organization to increase its internal specialization. In a complex arena (electoral, parliamentary, or interorganizational), the party is obliged to specialize its internal offices in order to face the different external pressures and threats.

As regards stability/turbulence, organization theory predicts (ceteris paribus) more decentralization in a stable environment and more centralization in a turbulent environment. In a stable, predictable environment, there are few external dangers: Parties adapt to the environment, the different subsections of the party have stable exchanges with different portions of the environment, and concentration of power is not a necessity. In a turbulent
environment, unpredictability is very high, and there are many external dangers: The organization must concentrate power at the top of the hierarchy to survive.

During the period from 1920 to 1960, the electoral arenas of Western Europe were highly stable. In consequence, party organizations too were stable or changed very slowly. By the late 1960s, the picture had changed: The European electoral arenas became more volatile and turbulent, and party organizations underwent important changes. Above all, concentration of power at the top level of the hierarchy became a necessity for all parties. For instance, the so-called personalization of party politics, the new relations between party leaders and the public, was not only brought about by the new role of the mass media but was also an aspect of power concentration processes in turbulent electoral environments. The theory predicts decadence (in the case of parties, severe, permanent, electoral losses) if the organization fails to adapt itself to the new environmental conditions.

**Organizational Changes**

Every organization can experience two different kinds of changes: (1) continuous, small, and incremental changes that do not modify the essential features of the organization (official mission, organizational constitution, power structure) and (2) rare and extraordinarily big transformations that happen suddenly, deeply modifying those features. The punctuated equilibrium model is a stylized representation of the process.

Major transformations of political parties are rare but do happen. The process can be broken down into three phases. The first phase is the rise of an organizational crisis. The crisis is usually the effect of environmental pressures. In the case of parties, a severe electoral defeat is the most frequent external challenge that can give rise to the organizational crisis. The second phase is a change in the composition of the dominant coalition: Old leaders are discredited and removed, and new leaders enter the coalition. There is a more or less brisk “circulation of elites.” The third phase sees a simultaneous change in the organizational constitution and the official mission. The (partially) changed dominant coalition must consolidate itself. Usually, it will introduce change in the physiognomy of the organizational structure and (partially) modify the official mission. A succession of ends (partial substitution of the old goals with new ones) is a consequence of the change in the composition of the dominant coalition. The final effect of the process will be a more or less deep transformation of the relations between the party and its task environments.

Two (related) regularities can be identified: (1) the stronger the environmental pressure, that is, the more dangerous the external threat, the more severe is the organizational crisis, and (2) the more severe the organizational crisis the deeper is the change in the composition of the dominant coalition and the transformations of both the organizational structure and the official mission as well. This ideal-typical, highly stylized representation of parties’ changes may be assumed as a quite useful analytical tool for empirically observing the transformations that parties sometimes experiment with.

**Typologies**

In his classic *Political Parties* (1951), Maurice Duverger proposed a famous classification of party organizations. In the Western historical experience, he identified four fundamental types: (1) the cadre party, (2) the mass party, (3) the cell party, and (4) the militia party. The first two types were the most important and diffuse. But Duverger’s analysis was not original. It followed the classical works of Moisey Ostrogorski, Robert Michels, Max Weber, and James Bryce.

The cadre party is the traditional bourgeois party: a loose electoral organization, without party discipline, financed by notables and controlled by the parliamentary elite. The mass party is a very strong organization. It is a membership party. Its organizational “inventions” are the territorial section, the membership card, the party bureaucracy, and the periodical congresses in which the leaders are officially selected and the political strategy is approved. An “inner circle” (the general secretary, the party headquarters) controls the mass party. Usually, the parliamentarians are dependent on the inner circle. The mass party is the organization that is able to proselytize among the popular classes of the society: manual workers, peasants, and artisans.

Duverger’s prophecy is well-known: The mass party would become the dominant type of party in
the mature Western democracies. Like Michels 40 years earlier, Duverger was influenced by the history of the European socialist parties. Sixteen years later, Otto Kirchheimer (1966) reversed the perspective. A new form of party was emerging: the catchall party. The catchall party was different from the mass party of the past. Its communicative style was pragmatic, not ideological, and its linkages with the traditional classe gardée (the manual workers, the religious voters) were declining. The transformation of the mass party into a catchall party was an effect of the social and political transformations of European societies: the economic development, the rise of mass education levels, the new role of the mass media, and so on.

Party organizations were changed too. New types of professional figures slowly took over the old mass party bureaucracy: mass media experts and marketing and fund-raising specialists, among others. The traditional role of the membership, so important in the old mass party, was declining. From an organizational viewpoint, the passage from the mass party to the catchall party has been synthesized as the transformation of the bureaucratic party into the professional electoral party (Panebianco, 1988).

After Duverger and Kirchheimer, there have been many attempts to identify the recent transformations of Western parties. The cartel party model (Richard Katz & Peter Mair, 1995) is one of these. In this perspective, the most important change is with regard to the “statization” of parties, their new symbiotic relationship with state agencies and its impact on the traditional party organization. Some empirical analyses confirm that cartelization is one of the possible transformations of Western political parties (Klaus Detterbeck, 2005).

In another interpretation, the Western political parties are becoming franchise systems: A central organization provides ideological arguments and material services to a lot of autonomous subparty organizations. The franchise model implies the end of the traditional internal party hierarchy. Stratarchies are everywhere replacing the traditional oligarchies (R. Kenneth Carty, 2004).

All these attempts to analyze contemporary trends and transformations are useful, but prudence is needed. It is inaccurate to imagine (like Duverger or Kirchheimer) that some type of party organization is becoming the dominant type and that all the existing parties will imitate that type. On the contrary, a plurality of very different party organizations always coexists in democracies. As we have seen, parties are influenced by their original missions, by the personality and roles of their founding leaders, and by the crucial organizational decisions that accompanied their birth and institutionalization. After the institutionalization, path dependency processes reduce both the leaders’ menu of choices and the probability of radical changes in the organization. Moreover, political parties are born in different historical moments, and all organizations are strongly influenced by the cultural models prevailing in those moments.

A second reason for prudence has to do with new political parties’ organizations in the new democracies. The picture is very differentiated, and a lot of empirical and comparative work is needed to understand the features and the evolutions of these new political organizations.

In the case of Europe, there is a third prudential consideration. The European integration process exerts pressures on national party organizations, but the effect is still largely unknown.

The organizational analysis of political parties is a “structural” kind of analysis. The assumption is that the organizational structure influences the behavior of actors (leaders, members, and followers). This assumption is common to the traditional organization theory and to the most recent neo-institutional theory. In any case, despite its correctness, this perspective tells only a part of the story. One must also take into consideration the freedom of action of the organizational actors.

An organization is a system of roles equipped with incentive and punishment mechanisms that influence actors’ behavior. It is also an arena in which actors compete for power, and the rules of competition depend on the arena characteristics. But “to influence” is not “to determine”: In real life, different actors can react differently to the same incentives. The organizational analysis is a useful starting point, but “structures” (including organizational structures) do not substitute for social actions. A theory of action is the indispensable complement of any analysis of a party’s organization.

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See also One-Party Dominance; Organization Theory; Parties; Party Finance; Party Identification; Party Linkage; Party Manifesto; Party System Fragmentation; Party Systems; Path Dependence

Further Readings


**PARTY SYSTEM FRAGMENTATION**

A party system is fragmented if it contains more than two parties, none of which comes close to obtaining an absolute majority in the representative assembly. Party system fragmentation thus has two aspects: the number of parties in the system and their relative size. A pure two-party system fails to meet both of these defining criteria. A system with many parties of which one is large enough to approach an absolute majority on its own also cannot be considered fragmented. In empirical terms, fragmentation in practice refers to those parties that gain representation. Parties without official representation are often difficult to observe and document. Moreover, most theories of the causes and consequences of party system fragmentation deal with parties with seats in a representative body. If the representative assembly of a country contains many fairly small parties and no party approaching majority status, the party system of that country can be considered fragmented. Several measures are available to determine varying degrees of fragmentation; they are strongly intercorrelated and can therefore be used interchangeably. The Laakso-Taagepera Index of the Effective Number of Parties is the most widely used measure. It is calculated as follows:

\[ N = \frac{1}{\sum p_i^2}, \]

where \( N \) stands for the effective number of parties and \( p_i \) denotes the fraction of the seats held by each party \( i \) in the assembly. All parties are accorded some weight, but the index weights the largest parties most. Theoretically, if there are 2 parties of exactly the same size, the effective number of parties is 2.0. Three parties of equal size render the index value 3.0, 10 such parties 10.0, and so on. The party systems of the United States, Sweden, and Finland can be used as empirical illustrations. The mean value of the Laakso-Taagepera Index for the U.S. House of Representatives since 1960 is 1.9. For Sweden, with a multiparty system where the Social Democrats have held around or more than 40% of the Riksdag seats, the corresponding figure is 3.6. In Finland, no party normally wins more than a quarter of the parliamentary seats; the mean effective number of parties is 5.2. The three cases represent a two-party system, a moderately fragmented multiparty system, and a highly fragmented system, respectively.

The numerical aspects of party systems have always been an important factor in the comparative literature on political parties. Claims that systems with many parties were less governable than two-party systems were presented already in the 19th century. As the interwar years saw the demise of democracy in a large number of European states, the criticism against multiparty government gained in prominence. Nevertheless, it is only with the emergence of comprehensive comparative
databases during recent decades that robust empirical generalizations have become possible.

The dynamics of electoral systems go a long way toward explaining why some countries have fragmented party systems while others do not. Single-member plurality (SMP) systems effectively reduce the number of parties that gain representation, while proportional (PR) list systems are conducive to fragmentation, especially when electoral districts are large. Among democratic countries with SMP systems, the mean effective number of parties since 1960 is 2.1, while the corresponding figure for democracies with PR list systems is 3.9. Countries with other electoral formulas, including mixed-member systems, usually attain values between these extremes. It is very difficult for parties other than the two largest ones to win seats in SMP systems, while proportional systems frequently allow even quite small parties to gain representation. Voters’ awareness of this mechanism reinforces its effect. If voters deem it highly unlikely that a vote for a minor party will result in the party’s winning a seat—as is the case in SMP systems—their propensity to vote for it becomes smaller. By the same token, a higher probability of a small party’s winning representation in PR systems will mean that voters are more likely to stay with their preferred party even if it is a minor one.

The number of politically relevant social cleavages is another important determinant of party system fragmentation. In most democracies, political parties can readily be placed on a left–right scale; this scale frequently coincides with the major socioeconomic divisions in the population. These divisions may give rise to, for example, conservative, left-wing, and centrist parties. If, however, other cleavages such as religion, language, or region cut across the left–right dimension, the result may be a considerably higher degree of party system fragmentation. The effect of multiple cleavages is particularly pronounced if the electoral system permits numerous parties to gain representation. A good example of this is Belgium, where the division between French and Flemish speakers cuts right across the left–right divide and where the PR list system presents few obstacles to minor parties’ gaining parliamentary seats. The mean effective number of parties in Belgium since 1960 is as high as 6.3.

The size of countries and other political units, whether measured by population or by geographic area, has an independent effect on party system fragmentation even after the effects of electoral systems, socioeconomic diversification, and cultural heterogeneity have been controlled for. This rule seems to apply at both the cross-national and the subnational levels. Large size is related to greater social distances, functional specialization, as well as organizational diversity and complexity. All these factors are conducive to greater attitudinal diversity, which in turn may enhance party system fragmentation.

Several other factors have been proposed as explanations of the variation in party system fragmentation. It has been suggested that bicameralism fosters party system fragmentation. The timing of elections at various governmental levels may also have an effect. If parliamentary, presidential, regional, and local elections are held at different points in time, the variety of issues and interests at stake in these elections may foster partly separate sets of political parties. Moreover, it has been proposed that strong presidential executives may reduce the incentive to maintain large, unified parties. On all these points, the empirical evidence cannot be considered conclusive yet.

The effects of party system fragmentation are particularly related to government formation and stability. While the winning party in a two-party system can form the postelection government based on a majority of its own, this alternative is not available in fragmented party systems. Instead, the choice must be made between a coalition of several parties or a minority cabinet. The incidence of both minority governments and coalition cabinets is positively associated with the degree of party system fragmentation; the latter association is particularly strong. Thus, although ideological and political factors naturally influence the way parties cooperate and interact with each other, the numerical criterion is an important general determinant of government type.

The internal functioning and prospects of a government are strongly affected by its type and status and are thus linked to party system fragmentation. One-party majorities are, ceteris paribus, the strongest government type. They have the necessary strength to get their agreed-on policies enacted and implemented; at the same time, they are not as frequently plagued by major internal differences like other types of governments. As fragmented
systems present the choice between minority status or coalition government (or both), the combination of strength and political unity is much rarer in these systems. While internally unified, one-party minorities are at all times at the mercy of the political majority outside the government. Coalition cabinets may find it difficult to reconcile the differences between the government parties, which frequently results in government crises. Consequently, cabinets in countries with fragmented party systems tend on the whole to be more short-lived than cabinets in countries where one-party majorities are the rule.

From the point of view of the citizen, party system fragmentation creates a problem when it comes to holding parties and politicians accountable for their accomplishments and failures. When governments are coalitions of several parties, it is not easy for voters to know whom to punish or reward for government policy. All government parties tend to claim credit for popular policies, while failures or unpopular decisions are claimed to be the fault of their partners in government. In fact, alternative coalitions are not always available in fragmented systems. If attaining majority status requires the participation of several parties, the chances are that at least some of the parties from the preceding coalition will be present in the next one as well. On the other hand, fragmented party systems present the voters with a wide range of partisan choices in elections. In these systems, voters can support the parties that they genuinely prefer without risking a large number of wasted votes—that is, votes for parties that do not gain any seats at all. In terms of democratic qualities, fragmented systems tend to perform poorly on accountability but well on representativeness.

Due to their tendency toward cabinet crises and short-lived governments, fragmented systems are often claimed to be vulnerable to pressures from non-democratic political forces. Besides the feebleness of governments as such, the fact that anti-system parties easily gain representation in fragmented systems is sometimes mentioned as a risk from the point of view of democratic viability. In connection with the economic and political crisis between the World Wars, party system fragmentation was among those factors that made it more difficult to sustain democracy in the face of pressure from extreme political movements. To be sure, examples of long-standing democratic stability despite a high degree of party system fragmentation are not difficult to find: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands. Still, countries where the democratic form of government is not yet entirely consolidated would be well advised to design their electoral institutions so as to discourage excessive party fragmentation, especially if there are numerous deeply entrenched social and cultural cleavages to be overcome.

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See also Cleavages, Social and Political; Coalitions; Electoral Systems; One-Party Dominance; Party Systems

Further Readings

Party Systems

Approaches to the study of party systems are multiple, as are their definitions. In its simplest form, the party system is conceived of as a set of patterned relationships between political parties competing for power in a given political system. Such a notion assumes the existence of rules, norms, and regularities in party interactions, concerning mainly coalition-building efforts and electoral competition. This implies also that a party system is composed,
as any other system, of distinguishable parts and the empirically testable quality of its “systemness.” Below, some major features of such systems, for example, the kinds and numbers of parties involved, their evolution and organization over time, their social bases and dynamic processes, and their relationship to institutional aspects of electoral systems and government formation, are discussed.

An ambitious understanding of a system assumes that it displays features that do not belong to a single entity, that is, to one element alone of the system, and that the system exists only if it hinges on the patterned relationships of its component parts, hence creating systemic boundaries, clearly indicating what belongs to it and what is located outside it. A system is always composed of interacting participant units, in which the action of each and every participant affects the actions of all other participants. A systemic approach reveals how everything at the level of the system and its structural properties differs from the level of the interacting units. Systemic traits structure the interactions between parties and the games that parties play. These interactions hinge on party resources, preferences, and the constraints they face. Moreover, this implies that the interdependence of the units or their attributes is ordered, in the sense that developments are predictable and that not just anything can happen. This order tends toward self-maintenance, which supports the delineation and freezing of the boundaries of the system within which patterned relationships take place. Consequently, parties create a system only when their component parts interact in a patterned systematic way. The system works when parties within the system are dependent on each other and each party, as Giovanni Sartori’s (1976) classic work puts it, “is a function (in the mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts competitively or otherwise, to the other parties” (p. 44). In short, a party system is a system of interactions resulting from interparty competition.

Analyses of parties have been made prior to deliberations on party systems. Parties as political institutions began to draw the attention of the social sciences from the second half of the 19th century, whereas interest in party systems increased in the second half of the 20th century. Without an understanding of the ontology of parties, the systemic features of their interactions cannot be depicted.

Three aspects of party systems should be mentioned. First, behind almost every classification of a party system is the idea that they are structures of representation. Second, an equally frequent proposal submits that they are institutionalized channels of articulation. Finally, they are conceived as means of governability. In other words, the three most important functions are (1) to recruit and present candidates for public office who are likely to be accepted by voters; (2) to offer distinguishable policy packages, programmatic and ideological alternatives that take into account the preferences and values of citizens; and (3) to implement policies effectively and contribute to the overall stability of the system. The composite units of party systems are the most influential manifestation of popular organizations that articulate and press demands and deliver support to those who govern in contemporary democracies. These diverse functions offer challenges as often they are in conflict with one another. Achieving quality representation calls for a large number of parties satisfying the aspirations of even small social groups with clearly defined narrow issue profiles and specific aspirations. The more parties there are, the better the policy fit between groups of voters and their institutional representatives. At the same time, such a party system contributes to polarization, divisiveness, and ultimately to poor governability. If, in turn, we wish to achieve effective governability, we should opt for one-party dominance, with a consensus-driven, pragmatic party oriented toward the mobilization of resources to satisfy the needs of the majority. Such a solution, with a single-party monopoly, would satisfy the needs of political effectiveness but at the same time violate other important democratic values: plurality, choice, and open competition. Consequently, in reality, party systems ought to compromise on maximizing each of their basic functions and adopt more moderate, optimal solutions guaranteeing the accomplishment of different goals.

Number and Size of Parties
Descriptions of party systems rely on their widely accepted, numerous attributes. One finds a rich array of proposals concerning these attributes and their relevance and importance for party systems, depicting at the same time both the essence and the
dynamics of a given party system. The most popular describe a party system with reference to the number and the size of parties considered relevant. Which parties should be considered relevant and/or successful enough for inclusion into the system is the single most important question students of party systems seek to answer. This is important because it has a direct effect on other significant systemic features, such as the relative size of parties and consequently the dominant logic and mechanisms of competition, the nature and durability of cooperation and alliances, the degree of polarization of the system, its center of ideological gravity, its stability and thus its predictability, and the way social strata and important social groups are represented in the overall political system.

Most scholars distinguish between one-party, two-party, and multiparty systems. The first type is questionable; for many it is an oxymoron, although scores of political systems of the world are still based on the existence of a single party, because other parties and representative organizations are legally forbidden. There exist, however, systems, in which one-party hegemony over a prolonged period of time is the rule, although legally opposition parties are not banned. Their permanent marginalization is determined by a combination of discriminatory practices, the harassment of citizens, and clientelistic relationships. Furthermore, several countries with clearly democratic credentials (e.g., Japan and Sweden) and a multiparty system design in reality experience a system in which one party dominates for a long period of time, even though the functioning of opposition parties is not constrained legally or in practice.

A fundamental distinction was made in the mid-20th century between two-party and multiparty systems, their causes, and consequences. The major cause was seen in the respective electoral laws: Simple plurality rules (first-past-the-post) applied in single-member districts tend to produce two-party systems, while two-round majoritarian and proportional rules favor the creation of multiparty constellations. The consequences, it was assumed, were essential as well: A two-party system was believed to create a stable political system, with moderate centripetal competition, based on clarity of responsibility and accurate attribution of accountability. Multiparty systems, by contrast, were believed to enhance extremism, centrifugal competition, limited alternation of governing parties, unclear accountability due to complex coalition formation procedures, and vague responsibility for the policies implemented.

This simple numerical criterion used in distinguishing party systems faces many problems, the crucial one being how parties should be counted. It is, and always has been, obvious that parties cannot be treated equally, mainly because of their divergent electoral support, legislative strength, and potential for entering coalitions, and the peculiarities of their social following. Scholars dealing with this problem are aware of the difficulty in finding adequate criteria by which to include or exclude parties or, alternatively, assign them a proper “weight.” In the mid-1970s, a solution seemed to be found; Giovanni Sartori offered the criterion of relevance of parties. To be relevant, a party had to disclose its coalition and/or blackmail potential. The first feature, the coalition potential, depends on whether a party is attractive enough, because of its size or a unique, pivotal position in the space of political competition, to effectively join governmental coalitions and share executive responsibility. The second, party blackmail potential, is less obvious as it refers to a specific factor that depends on our interpretations: A party exerts blackmail potential if it can influence the behavior of other systemic and relevant parties, despite the fact that it cannot itself participate in a coalition government. This applies to systems in which sizeable parties are excluded from mainstream politics by the other parties because of alleged antisystemic features or traits pointing to their radicalism and destabilizing potential. Good examples of such parties are the former Italian Communists or the contemporary Czech/Moravian Communist Party (Komunistická Strana Čech a Moravy, KSCM). In both instances, the parties enjoyed substantial, double-digit percentages of social support but were never allowed to participate in any executive responsibility at the national level.

Irrespective of how important the relevance criterion is, Sartori’s proposal still focuses on the number of parties and their respective ideological and programmatic distance as the main features of a party system. Combining these two criteria, the proposal allows us to distinguish between, what he calls, moderate (limited) pluralism and polarized (extreme) pluralism. In the first instance, a party
system consists usually of three to five parties and reveals relatively little ideological distance between them. In the second case (of polarized pluralism), the party system is usually composed of six or more parties and manifests significant ideological distance between the parties. The clear virtue of this proposal is its dynamic nature. The variables used interact with each other, allowing one to predict more or less accurately the development of a system in practice. For instance, moderate pluralism not only reveals a smaller number of relevant parties and lesser ideological distance, but it is also very likely to develop a centripetal direction of systemic competition between two clearly distinguishable blocs, whereas polarized pluralism is most likely to develop centrifugal competition with various opposition parties, leading to their irresponsible behavior, poor accountability mechanisms, and destabilizing effects.

**Policies, Programs, Ideological Divisions**

Party systems are frequently depicted using spatial metaphors, indicative of policy or ideological dimensions and divisions: Among them the left–right dimension is the most popular one. It is precisely this aspect of party systems that distinguishes one from another: the substance of policy and the number of salient dimensions that need to be taken into account in understanding and interpreting the logic of party system structure, development, and change.

Many scholars define the party system not only by referring to the number of parties and their patterned relationship but also by indicating their belonging to, or leaning toward, a particular *party family*. The latter, in turn, is defined as a group of parties in different countries that have similar ideologies and party programs. Each country has a unique party system: a unique combination of parties, ideological and programmatic profiles, size of electoral support, and coalitions. Nevertheless, certain patterns across countries are discernable.

The description of party systems from this point of view uses the language of *social divisions*, *dimensions of competition*, *political divides*, and *cleavages*. The terminological universe is complex and blurred by the inconsistent way scholars use these notions. At this point, let us reiterate that indeed society is differentiated by many factors and that these distinctions are more or less salient and durable and/or conflicting. If in addition to this salience and durability, they are politicized, one can speak of cleavages. Cleavages are a relatively stable product of social conflicts, but not all conflicts generate cleavages; the ones that do are intense and prolonged. For cleavages to exert structuring power over political developments, party formations, their stability, and patterned interactions, political camps have to be established on the basis of strong identifications and a visionary leadership that is able both to attract public attention with the appeals of their manifesto and to maintain the effective functioning of the party organization.

Only certain social divisions become politicized, where parties represent opposite sides. Parties concentrate on divisions and policy areas that show electoral volatility, that is, where voters, for different reasons, are responsive to party appeals. Other divides are, however, frozen; that is, voters are entrapped within a social relationship where there is no room for individual rationality and free choice. In such instances, cleavage mechanisms, group membership ties, and partisanship determine party support.

One of the crucial, though still unresolved, issues is the relationship between the number of parties and the number of societal divides or cleavages. In principle, the higher the number of salient divisions, the more room there is for the existence of divergent parties. This relationship, however, is far from universal; its fluidity hinges on the extent to which these divisions overlap and on the ability of parties to simplify the multidimensionality of the space of competition by reducing its number to two or three of the most salient ones. The limited cognitive abilities of citizens to process complex information create the necessity for such simplifications, and only those parties that effectively reduce the number of articulated policy alternatives enjoy an electoral advantage. Policy simplification arises also because of certain macrosocietal processes, that is, the growing middle class and/or redistributive successes of the welfare state, which allow for the simpler, one-dimensional appeal of a party manifesto.

Another essential distinction for understanding the different modes of party competition is the one between valence and positional issues. The
former concerns universally prized values or goods that most politicians and citizens agree on. The latter assumes clear differences between groups of people in policy stances and value orientations. Due to this, parties may offer divergent policies concerning some substantive issues, for example, taxes, health services, and welfare benefits. The relationship of the dominance of valence or positional modes of political competition with quality of representation and accountability as well as with clientelistic or programmatic politician-voter linkages is still vague and underscrutinized. Nevertheless, some claim that “candidate appeals play out in most instances into valence competition and only rarely as positional competition. Clientelistic accountability works mostly as valence competition among parties” (Herbert Kitschelt, 2009, p. 623).

**Party System Institutionalization**

The well-known saying “No parties, no democracy” has strong empirical support. So far, no example of a working modern democracy without parties exists. Contemporary global developments, since new Third Wave democracies in large numbers increased the family of democratic polities, call for more scrutiny and clear-cut indicators of what counts as a consolidated system of political parties. One of the most widely accepted proposals was introduced in the mid-1990s by scholars comparing the development of Latin American polities. Currently, the idea is widely shared by scholars focusing on other newly democratized countries and their inchoate party systems. At the most abstract level, institutionalization is a process by which organizations and procedures acquire value, stability, and consequently predictability. There are several major features of an institutionalized party system:

1. stability in interparty competition,
2. the existence of parties that have stable roots in society,
3. broad acceptance of elections and parties as legitimate institutions deciding who governs, and
4. the existence of parties as organizations governed by stable rules and structures.

A more detailed portrait of an institutionalized party system ought to emphasize the fact that the stability of interparty competition signifies relative stability and does not amount to a stagnant, frozen relationship. The stable roots of parties in society imply that some parties enjoy overproportional support from certain social strata, the labor market, and social or ethnic groups and that this support is stable from election to election. Parties differ in the extent to which voters identify with them as well as in the quality of the linkage between citizens and parties. Apart from this, parties still have to manifest firm and enduring ideological, programmatic, or policy positions for citizens to understand what they stand for. The broad acceptance of elections and the decisions taken by parties after the election (concerning, e.g., the formation of coalitions) as the only legitimate means of taking responsibility for governing and controlled access to power concerns mainly political elites and their attitudes and preferences. Finally, the stability of rules and structures points to the importance of the autonomy of parties, both from populist leaders and from other organizations or powerful groups, even those that might have historically been instrumental in their creation (e.g., the churches, trade unions, and businesses). Parties also have to be independent financially and to operate on the basis of highly routinized norms and procedures.

In short, this approach emphasizes party interactions that reveal stability, based on a well-developed connection between politicians and their voters; it also considers electoral volatility to be a fundamental indicator of the systemic nature of the party system.

There is, however, another approach to the structuring of the party system that concentrates on its most important attribute, namely, the competition for power. It comprises the core element and the main criterion for evaluating the mode of patterns of competition, that is, its open or closed nature. Whether a party system reveals stable and predictable party competition depends on several easily observable, empirical factors. *Alternation in government* is one, and it takes three forms: (1) *wholesale alternation*, when a governmental party is totally replaced by an opposition; (2) *partial alternation*, when the newly established government includes at least one party of the outgoing
government; and (3) nonalternation, when there is no change at all. The second factor is familiarity with government or innovation. This could indicate the degree to which parties tend to be in government in the same configurations, which signifies familiarity; or their combinations are new every time, which indicates innovation. Access to government is the third crucial factor; it focuses on whether all relevant parties in the system, over a long time period, had access to executive offices or whether there are some parties permanently excluded from power. It indicates whether access to government is widely or narrowly distributed. Based on these criteria, we arrive at two fundamental types of party competition. The first is the open structure, where alternations of governments take place and no stable governmental coalitions exist, accompanied by a highly dispersed and easy access to governmental positions for all or most relevant parties. The second type is the closed structure, which is in place when the reverse pattern occurs—that is, either there are no alternations or durable coalitions remain in power, with some relevant parties being permanently excluded.

Party System Change

Analyzing system change calls for terminological precision. The first problem concerns the distinction between changes within the system as opposed to a change of the system. The second problem, related to the first, pertains to the scope and level of change; in this regard, four abstract manifestations can be distinguished: (1) incidental swings, (2) limited change, (3) general change, and (4) alternation of the system. Incidental swings are usually temporary distortions in the patterned way a party system operates; this might have to do with the occurrence of a new (small) party, a change in the polarization of the system, the appearance of new salient issues, and similar factors. The particular trait of such a change is that it is minor in its effects; it does not alter the traditional logic of party competition and coalition formation. These swings are indeed incidental and short-lived, having a negligible effect on the main actors of the system.

Limited change is prolonged or even permanent; the change is nevertheless restricted either to one area or confined to the emergence of a party that replaces another one. Sometimes a party simply disappears; nevertheless, a new one is created simultaneously, which serves as its functional equivalent. Limited change might also mean a modification in the dynamic features of the system, for instance, an increase in its net, gross, or within-block volatility. Or the system may become more polarized. Nevertheless, all these “limited” changes do not alter the previous logic and stability of the system as a whole; it still falls into the same category.

General change is more serious and relates to several aspects, that is, the fact that changes are multifaceted, deep, and prolonged and that they concern salient features of the system. Moreover, these changes indicate the destabilization of the system and problems in achieving a (new) equilibrium. Such a change can lead to a significant shift in the relative strength of parties, the shape of coalitions, their fragmentation, and their polarization. Overall, such general changes raise the question of whether the system can still be categorized as before. Finally, the alternation of the system signifies a dramatic change in most of its aspects: the party composition; its strength, alliances, and leadership; and all other mechanisms by which it was governed before the alternation occurred. Transformations of this sort may also concern the nature of parties themselves (mass to catchall or catchall to cartel). Total alternations happen rarely and are usually related to extraordinary conditions or events (wars, revolutions, a severe economic crisis, the forming of an international alliance, and fundamental changes in social structure or similar occurrences).

Consequently, party system change may take a variety of forms, from marginal change to the alternation of essential features, necessitating its reclassification. In other words, change of the original nucleus of the party system can be seen as party system change, while marginal changes (usually) are not. Empirically, such a change signifies alternation of the direction of competition, major changes in structured alliances and cooperation, or the occurrence of a new governing formula.

Party systems also change their format due to long-term social and economic developments. The processes of dealignment or realignment of party affiliations result from structural demographic changes, accompanied by culture shifts. Previously excluded voters, new generations, and newly created sectors of the labor force come, at some point,
to decide on public policies and general values as well as lifestyle preferences. These processes affect parties; their programs, policy stances, and profiles; the nature of their leadership; and ultimately the nature and format of the entire party system.

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See also Cleavages, Social and Political; Electoral Systems; Parties; Party Organization; Party System Fragmentation

Further Readings

Path Dependence

Path dependence, a highly popular concept in social science, simply refers to a dynamic pattern or continuity that evolves as a result of its own past. As a historically sensitive approach, path dependence emphasizes the role of the timing and sequence of events in the social and political world. Small, accidental, or random occurrences happening at a certain time are expected to have long-lasting, self-reproducing patterns or paths. In other words, when things happen in a chain of events affects how they take place. Below, the importance and also some of the limitations of this concept are discussed.

Although path dependence simply asserts that particular choices and events that occur in the past mold the unfolding sequence of events (i.e., history matters), any continuity or sequence of events may not constitute a path-dependent process. Path emergence, maintenance, and breaking in a path-dependent process should have specific features. Regarding path emergence, contingent, accidental, brief occurrences or nonoccurrences launch event chains. In other words, initial conditions are treated as stochastic. Otherwise, path dependence would be nonfalsifiable because one can easily link any event to an antecedent or a temporarily distant cause. As a result, any outcome might be marked as path dependent. To avoid such a problem of endless flow of causally connected events (i.e., the trap of infinite regress), the historical event that launches the path is expected to have properties of contingency.

Once historical contingencies or junctures set into motion certain patterns or sequences, they lock themselves in, leading to inertia. In other words, paths become inflexible or rigid over time, making it difficult to shift to another path or return to the initial conditions. The processes or mechanisms that reproduce a path might be rather different from the processes producing the path. Although stochastic factors start a path, certain causal mechanisms reproduce it. A highly emphasized mechanism of path reproduction is increasing returns, defined as self-reinforcing positive feedback processes. The idea of increasing returns suggests that the growing benefits that a certain path cultivates with its continued adoption create further incentives for path maintenance, leading to dormancy over time. Learning and coordination effects, adaptive expectations, and large setup or fixed costs constitute some sources of positive feedback processes. Thus, a path may reproduce itself even in the absence of the dynamics and factors responsible for its creation.

With respect to change, path dependence expects it to be incremental and evolutionary (i.e., path following or change within a path). Substantial, pathbreaking changes (i.e., change to a new path) rarely happen after long periods of continuity. Such major changes require critical junctures or periods (also known as branching
Path Dependence

points) in which some externally driven contingent events, such as wars, economic crises, dramatic technological developments, natural disasters, or epidemics, make the extant path less attractive to follow. Thus, critical junctures unlock the existing path or equilibrium and generate a new one, leading to a new stasis (also referred to as punctuated equilibrium).

Pólya urn process, a simplified mathematical illustration, delineates the logic of path dependence quite well. Imagine an urn containing two colored balls, one yellow and one red. Let us draw one ball and then return it to the urn with an additional ball of the same color. If we repeat this process until we fill the urn completely, which balls will be the most frequent ones in the urn? Obviously, to a great extent this depends on the outcome of the initial draws (i.e., initial conditions). If we draw the red ball in the first round, then the likelihood of drawing a red ball increases in the following draw. Over time, the distribution would settle down to a majority of red balls. In other words, the ratio will eventually reach an equilibrium (i.e., the red one). This process indicates that sequence matters. In the beginning, we cannot say with certainty which color will lock itself in. We, however, know that the results of early draws in the sequence will have a substantial impact on which of the balls will be the dominant one at the end. Thus, early developments or events not only involve a substantial degree of randomness but also produce a large, determinative impact on subsequent developments. In other words, the impact of random occurrences early in a sequence of events does not cancel out. Instead, they exert a long-lasting influence on the evolution of the sequence of events (also known as nonergodicity).

It is important to indicate at this point that actors may not always follow the most efficient or beneficial path. In other words, despite conventional economic models in which rational actors are assumed to make efficient decisions and maximize profits, suboptimal outcomes or paths might also lock themselves in. A classical example of path inefficiency is the story of the QWERTY keyboard layout. Although it is widely acknowledged that this keyboard is less efficient than the one developed by August Dvorak, it was able to lock itself in. Why? It is put forward that the dominance of QWERTY was simply due to a historical accident. This keyboard layout was introduced in the late 19th century, while Dvorak's simplified keyboard was initiated in the 1930s. Due to technical interrelatedness, economies of scale, and the quasi irreversibility of investment, it became difficult to switch from the previously introduced keyboard to the new one, regardless of its relative efficiency. This case, too, indicates that the timing and sequence of events matter.

The idea of path dependence is a popular yet highly questioned notion on many accounts. Several studies, for instance, draw attention to its weaknesses in dealing with change. It is observed that path dependence has a bias toward stability. Other than that, it relies on an exogenous deus ex machina to explain substantial, pathbreaking change. In other words, change is explained by exogenously induced variation. This understanding is based on the assumption that institutions have self-reinforcing features, and changes in such structures should be driven by exogenous factors and dynamics. Critiques contend that such an understanding remains limited in accounting for the timing, direction, and mechanisms of the change process. For instance, it is asserted that the source of change may also be endogenous to institutions or sometimes both endogenous and exogenous. It is further argued that path dependence underestimates the role of incremental changes. Critiques propose that minor, small changes might be quite important because they may accumulate over time and create a sudden pathbreaking change. As a remedy for such weaknesses, path dependence is advised to have a stronger sense of agency.

This approach is also criticized for its materialist propensity. Although path dependence acknowledges that it is not always guaranteed to reach and maintain Pareto optimality (i.e., a state in which no one can be made better off without making someone worse off), it treats the cost–benefit calculus (i.e., increasing returns, positive feedback) as the main dynamic behind the continuation or the persistence of a path. The utilitarian, materialist bias, however, substantially limits the explanatory power of path dependence because there are also several cases in the institutional world where nonmaterial factors and considerations (i.e., ideas, values, and legitimacy concerns) constitute a path. It is suggested that once successfully institutionalized (i.e., taken for granted by actors), ideas shape
actors’ perceptions, goals, behaviors, and consequently political outcomes. As a result, some choices will be regarded as more favorable or appropriate than others. This process, in the long run, would lock in certain actions or policies while locking out others (also referred to as cognitive locking). Thus, actors may maintain a certain path not because of an expected utility down the path but because of simply believing in the appropriateness of certain ideas and values. Put differently, the main mechanism of self-reinforcement or path reproduction in such ideational continuities becomes taken for granted or legitimate rather than being due to cost–benefit assessments (i.e., increasing returns).

In response to these criticisms, recent studies employing path dependence have paid more attention to incremental, endogenous changes and the role of agency in path emergence, path maintenance, and path-breaking processes. Despite its shortcomings, it is important that a researcher have path dependence in his or her tool kit. The synchronic approaches, which are concerned with the impact of variance in current variables on political outcomes, provide us a “snapshot” view of political life. For a much better understanding, however, these approaches should be complemented with diachronic approaches, which are more sensitive to historical causes or conditions, triggering particular self-reproducing sequences of events.

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See also Historical Sociology; Institutional Theory; Policy Analysis

Further Readings


Patriotism

As Maurizio Viroli notes, patriotism (love of country) and nationalism (loyalty to one’s nation) are often taken to be synonymous. Indeed, for writers such as Ernest Geller, nationalism constitutes a distinctive expression of patriotism. Yet the origin of the concept can be traced back to the notion of patria in Greek and especially Roman antiquity, which links patriotism with the preservation of res publica and the protection of common liberty. It is only with the rise of nationalism in the 19th century that patriotism becomes associated with the exclusive attachment to a prepolitical, homogeneous, national community. Because of this association, patriotism has been frequently regarded as incompatible with a typically liberal commitment to universal human rights. However, recent scholarship has sought to disassociate patriotism from nationalism by emphasizing new forms of loyalty compatible with universal values, respect for human rights, and tolerance of ethnic and national differences, giving rise to concepts such as constitutional or cosmopolitan patriotism as well as contemporary restatements of the classical republican tradition.

Greek and especially Roman antiquity provide the roots for a political patriotism that conceives of political loyalty to the patria as loyalty to a political conception of the republic and is associated with the love of law and common liberty, the search for the common good, and the duty to behave justly toward one’s country. This classical Roman meaning of patria reemerges in the context of the Italian city republics of the 15th century. Here, patria stands for the common liberty of the
city, which can only be safeguarded by the citizens’ civic spirit. For Niccolò Machiavelli, the love of common liberty enables citizens to see their private and particular interests as part of the common good and helps them to resist corruption and tyranny and, if necessary, to fight to protect and preserve the political community. While this love of the city is typically intermixed with pride in her military strength and cultural superiority, it is the political institutions and way of life of the city that form the distinctive focal point of this kind of patriotic attachment. To love the city is to be willing to sacrifice one’s own good—including one’s life and, if need be, one’s soul—for the protection of common liberty.

In contrast to the classical republican conception of patriotism, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “Considerations on the Government of Poland” can be seen as an early example of the link between nationalism and patriotism. Yet while Rousseau advocates the love of the nation and the celebration of national culture, he believes that national culture is valuable primarily because it helps foster loyalty to the political fatherland. Thus, Rousseau’s nationalism stems from and serves his typically republican emphasis on securing citizens’ loyalty to their political institutions. A more explicit link between nationalism and patriotism can be found in the work of Johann Gottfried Herder. In Herder’s work, patriotism refers not to a political virtue but to a spiritual attachment to the nation. In this context, fatherland becomes synonymous with the nation and its distinct language and culture, which give it unity and coherence. Thus, instead of linking patriotism to the preservation of political liberty, Herder associates love of one’s country with the preservation of a common culture and the spiritual unity of a people. While in the classical republican tradition, “fatherland” is synonymous with political institutions, for Herder, the nation is prepolitical and love of one’s national culture is a natural inclination that allows a people to express their distinctive character. On this account, patriotism is associated with the exclusive attachment to one’s own culture and thus stands in opposition to cosmopolitanism and cultural assimilation. Freedom is equated not with the fight against political oppression but with the preservation of a unique people and patriotic sacrifice with the desire to secure the long-term survival of the nation.

This association between patriotism and the exclusive attachment to one’s nation has led critics like Martha Nussbaum to view the sentiment of patriotic pride as morally dangerous, giving rise to a chauvinism that is incompatible with cosmopolitan aspirations and the recognition of the equal moral worth of all human beings. Yet recent approaches to patriotism have sought to ground patriotism in new forms of loyalty that are compatible with universal values, respect for human rights, and tolerance of ethnic and national differences. At the heart of this renewed interest in patriotism lies the belief that to be stable, democratic societies require a strong sense of allegiance on the part of their citizens. Not only does the high degree of pluralism that characterizes contemporary societies potentially give rise to tensions and disagreements among citizens that may destabilize the polity, modern democratic states committed to a degree of equality rely on the willingness of citizens to make sacrifices for the common good, be it in terms of the everyday redistribution of income to meet welfare needs or the provision of collective goods and services such as education or health care. Hence, in the eyes of advocates of new forms of patriotism, stable democratic societies require a strong sense of solidarity.

The most prominent example of this search for new forms of solidarity is Jürgen Habermas’s notion of constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus), which seeks to ground the loyalty of citizens not in the idea of a prepolitical, homogeneous community but in a commitment to universal liberal principles as enshrined in the constitution of the modern liberal state. To ensure that citizens who subscribe to different cultural, ethnic, and religious forms of life can coexist in and identify with their own country on equal terms, Habermas argues that the modern constitutional state must ensure that its political culture does not favor or discriminate against any particular subculture. To achieve this, it is vital to differentiate the majority culture from a shared political culture grounded in respect for fundamental constitutional principles and basic law. On this account, membership of a nation of citizens no longer rests on an appeal to a shared language or a common ethical and cultural origin but merely reflects a shared political culture based on standard liberal constitutional principles.
Habermas’s attempt to ground patriotism in an attachment to universal liberal principles is also associated with what is at times referred to as cosmopolitan patriotism, which seeks to construct a postnational identity based on the recognition of democratic values and human rights as conceptualized within a particular constitutional tradition. Such cosmopolitan patriotism is said by advocates such as Kwame Anthony Appiah to give rise to a rooted cosmopolitanism that couples attachment to one’s homeland and cultural particularities with an appreciation of different places and different people and a robust respect for the equal moral worth of all human beings. Advocates of forms of constitutional patriotism often cite the United States as an example of a nonnational polity held together by an expressly political patriotism. John Schaar, for instance, refers to American patriotism as “covenanted patriotism,” a form of patriotic attachment characterized by a commitment to the principles and goals set out in the founding covenant and the duty to carry on the work of the Founding Fathers. Another strand of contemporary thought appeals to the classical republican principles of love of liberty, active citizenship, and self-sacrifice for the common good in their attempt to formulate new forms of solidarity that do not depend on the idea of a prepolitical, ethnically homogeneous nation. Maurizio Viroli writes in this tradition when he advocates a republican patriotism characterized by a political culture of liberty that emphasizes active citizenship and civic virtue and gives rise to a reflexive, self-critical love of country that aims to ensure that the polity lives up to its highest traditions and ideals.

However, critics of such attempts to generate new, nonexclusionary forms of solidarity have expressed doubts about the extent to which patriotic sentiments can be reconciled with a commitment to universal principles. While critics of constitutional patriotism have questioned the feasibility of Habermas’s attempt to decouple the political culture from the wider majority culture, pointing to the extent to which the political culture of even a culturally diverse society as America draws on national symbols and myths that are laden with prepolitical meanings, commentators like Margaret Canovan have argued that classical republican patriotism was much more illiberal and hostile to outsiders than modern proponents of the republican tradition suggest. According to Canovan, not only is the patriotic virtue celebrated in the classical republican tradition primarily a military virtue, the republican preoccupation with the education and socialization of citizens to systematically instill loyalty and commitment to the state is liable to be seen by many contemporary liberals as an unacceptable form of manipulation and indoctrination. Furthermore, advocates of both constitutional and modern republican patriotism typically presuppose the existence of established political boundaries and common political institutions that have their origins in the rise and consolidation of the nation-state. Thus, the extent to which patriotism can be reconciled with a commitment to universal values, respect for human rights, and tolerance of ethnic and national differences remains contested.

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See also Liberalism; Nationalism; Republicanism

Further Readings
Pay for performance (PFP; also known as merit pay or performance-related pay) involves the provision of a financial reward contingent on some indicator of individual (or less frequently, group) success. PFP has been a consistent reform in government since the 1980s and remains popular.

In an era when elected officials call for evidence-based policy and rigorous evaluations of program performance, PFP represents both an affirmation and an uncomfortable anomaly. On the one hand, it perfectly captures basic themes of the current era: Public actors should be held accountable for performance, rewarded for success, and punished for failure. At the same time, however, there is considerable evidence that PFP as implemented thus far has been ineffective. For example, the U.S. federal government has tried multiple iterations of PFP since 1978. New variations of PFP are proposed but with little effort to fix the fundamental problems that undermined the previous version.

Reasons for Failure
There are a variety of reasons why PFP systems have struggled in the public setting:

**Attribution difficulty:** For any moderately complex task, outcomes are generally the result of group effort, and the relative contribution of a single individual is difficult to discern.

**Measurement difficulty:** Attribution difficulty makes it difficult to come up with individual-level performance measures that connect well with organizational goals. As a result, PFP systems generally rely on subjective ratings of performance as determined by a supervisor. It is often unclear to employees how to do well on such scales beyond staying on the good side of their supervisor. From the supervisors’ perspective, they often lack the information necessary to provide an informed assessment.

**Grade inflation:** Employee ratings generally follow a fixed scale, for example, 1 is excellent and 5 is below expectations. The subjectivity of these scales, the lack of an incentive to critically differentiate between good and bad performers, and the discomfort of critically rating an individual result in the vast majority being graded as above average.

**Resources:** PFP systems have generally been underfunded. It seems that although politicians argue for high risk and high reward, in practice they cannot tolerate the potential media scrutiny that might arise if public servants earn genuinely high rewards. Public service unions, generally critical of PFP systems, also work to keep the size of the rewards small in order to ensure that members do not actually lose out under new systems. As a result, the rewards associated by PFP systems are generally too small to be effective motivators.

**Incorrect assumptions:** PFP systems are based on the assumption that individuals are motivated by financial rewards. But there is a substantial literature documenting the relatively high prevalence of intrinsic motivation among public sector workers. At the very least, it seems reasonable to assume that there will be heterogeneity in reward preferences among public employees and PFP systems will not be a strong motivator for many.

At a broader level, the poor record of PFP in the public sector may be the result of (a) failure to implement it properly, (b) a poor fit with the public setting, or (c) the fact that the theory simply does not work well in any setting. While some of the problems outlined above might be remedied with better implementation (e.g., better measurement systems or more resources), the nature of the public setting often makes such changes unlikely. Most public services are complex and hard to measure, and a reluctance to provide appropriate resources is tied to the political context of public services. There is also evidence that the presumed success of PFP in the private setting is overstated, which questions the basic validity of the theory behind PFP. The empirical evidence on PFP in the private setting is quite mixed, with success generally contingent on the factors—ease of measurement and attribution, resource adequacy—that make it difficult to implement in the public sector.

Costs of Pay for Performance
In addition to evidence that PFP tends to work only under some fairly specific circumstances that
are unusual in the public sector, there is also evidence that it generates costs. The most obvious are the transaction costs involved in creating and implementing an individualized performance appraisal system.

There are also unanticipated costs. One is distrust and conflict. In a standard salary system, supervisors have limited financial rewards to offer, which reduces the potential for complaints about favoritism or abuse of power. But in PFP systems, the reliance on subjective assessments, the limited availability of rewards, and the general belief among employees that they deserve rewards create the conditions where some employees will feel that favoritism is employed and that neither appraisal systems nor pay reflect their effort. PFP systems may also create tension between employees who view themselves as competing for a limited number of rewards.

Another potential cost is the crowding-out effect, which is centered on evidence that financial incentives can undermine intrinsic motivations. As individuals lose their sense of self-determination, and find that public service performance is monetized, some may become discouraged and withdraw effort. Over time, a reliance on extrinsic incentives also creates a selection process that reinforces crowding out, as those driven by intrinsic motivation become less likely to join or stay in contexts where PFP is dominant.

The final potential cost of PFP is that it can encourage perverse behavior, in the form of gaming and goal displacement. Faced with high-powered incentives, individuals may seek to manipulate performance measures (gaming) or to improve metrics at the expense of some unmeasured but important value (goal displacement). For example, many of the studies of PFP that show positive results are set in health care settings that allowed piece-rate compensation programs, where providers were rewarded for the number of services provided. While health care providers may approve of such system, it has been criticized as creating broader social costs, since it encourages the provision of unnecessary services and increases the overall cost of health care.

As awareness of unanticipated consequences grows, the tendency to underresource PFP systems identified above may not be a weakness but an unintended protection against the type of misbehavior that is encouraged by high-powered incentives. And some have argued that lower-powered incentives are actually optimal for individuals in the public sector.

Reasons for Adoption

Given its poor record of success, why does PFP remain durable? PFP has high intuitive and symbolic appeal. It is easy to understand, is believed to be successful in the private sector, and is assumed to provide an element of risk and competition that runs contrary to the image of bureaucracies. It communicates a desire to hold inefficient bureaucrats accountable for performance. Past failures of PFP can be dismissed as implementation failures. Of course, if the primary motivation is symbolic, concern about the actual success of the system is of little consequence.

PFP may also be viewed as a means by which political principals control agents. There is some circumstantial evidence to support this argument. PFP systems are more likely to be found in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries where there is no tradition of crossover between politics and bureaucracy, and political appointees tend to be supportive of PFP systems. But the functional utility of PFP as a means of control is limited when information asymmetry and measurement problems pervade conditions that underpin principal–agent problems in the first place.

As PFP has matured, it appears to have found greater application in performance contracts with third-party providers. In such settings, government principals do not face the same constraints in terms of civil service rules or bonus size, and so can create high-powered incentives. As with PFP systems in government, much of the success of such systems depends on the capacity to measure and specify complete contracts, with objectives that tie to reward. When contracts are incomplete, third-party providers have stronger incentives to engage in gaming and goal displacement, and fewer constraints to stop them.

As we look to the future, it is tempting to categorize PFP as an example of what H. L. Henry Mencken observed: “There is always a well-known solution to every human problem—neat, plausible, and wrong.” It is an appealing and durable idea, despite its record of failure. There will always be a
Peace

Peace has long been understood in political science in two quite distinct ways. The dominant conception of peace has been the absence of war. The very word *peace* (and the French *paix*) derives from the Latin *pax*, meaning an agreement—a pact—to refrain from hostilities. This is sometimes characterized as “negative peace” as opposed to “positive peace,” with the latter denoting not just the absence of direct violence but also the absence of indirect or structural violence, sometimes described as the presence of justice. This entry surveys the religious and normative context within which peace came to be understood, the various ways in which peace has been seen as a subject of research, and the diverse explanations offered by political science on the conditions for peace.

Given the implicit link between peace and war, peace was long understood largely through the lens of conflict and its management. During the Cold War, however, the “management” of conflict through mutually assured destruction and détente led to research on peace that meant more than just the avoidance of annihilation. This often embraced a constructivist perspective on peace, while realists tended to conceive of peace in terms of the interests of states, and idealists emphasized the role that norms and institutions could play.

**Norms and Religion**

Rules governing the conduct of war have existed in virtually every culture. The Aztecs, for example, developed elaborate rituals that preceded conflict, including dispatching ambassadors, providing an opportunity for a prospective foe to submit peacefully to Aztec rule. (Failure to accept three such offers was required before military operations could commence—even though the process meant abandoning all possibility of surprise and, since the ambassadors traditionally brought gifts of weapons, the opponent’s military capacity was increased.) War itself, however, was typically regarded as a natural state. Early Western philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato gave relatively little thought to war as an atypical phenomenon. The seeds of what is now the just war tradition, limiting not only the conduct of war but the recourse to war itself, lay in the transformed perception of war from being the norm to being an exceptional state that required justification.

Christian theology contributed much of the content of the just war tradition but only after literal interpretations of Christ’s injunction to “turn the other cheek”—on its face a doctrine of radical pacifism—could be rationalized by St. Ambrose and St. Augustine into a dualistic framework that...
separated inward disposition from outward action. This dualism lives on today in the principles of double-effect, right intention, and proportionality, each important to the modern legal framework for the use of force.

Religion has been significant at both ends of the spectrum of peace and war. Gandhi, among others, stuck to the utopian position of extreme nonviolence—adopted as a way of life rather than simply a tactic. Similar pacifist tendencies continue to inform much research on peace, despite some views relegating it to the margins of international affairs. At the other extreme, radical Islam has elevated the traditional Muslim notion of jihad (literally “struggle”) to a holy war against all infidels and any Muslim who collaborates with them.

The role of norms in constraining or shaping behavior is a contested area of political science. Yet in the area of war and peace, the most important normative transformation of the 20th century was the outlawing of war. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 “condemned recourse to war.” The United Nations (UN) Charter of 1945 more explicitly prohibited the “threat or use of force,” allowing exceptions only in the case of self-defense against an armed attack or authorization by the UN Security Council to deal with a threat to or breach of “the peace.” Though this manifestly did not end war, it is noteworthy that states attempted to justify virtually every use of force from 1945 under one of these exceptions.

The late 20th and early 21st centuries saw the UN Security Council expanding its understanding of “threats to international peace and security” as not merely embracing traditional interstate conflict but in some circumstances extending to internal disputes that might spill over into other states or are of such gravity in their humanitarian consequences that they warrant international intervention. This expansive interpretation of the role of supranational institutions was accompanied by the emergence of “human security” and the “responsibility to protect”—doctrines that further advanced the notion of peace as meaning much more than merely the absence of traditional interstate conflict.

Human security was an attempt to challenge traditional conceptions of security by arguing that the proper referent for security was the individual rather than the state. Building on the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Report, first published in 1994, human security argues that conflict and deprivation are linked; addressing insecurity thus requires addressing freedom from fear as well as freedom from want. In more elaborate formulations, this is said to include protection as well as empowerment strategies. Critics of human security challenge this approach on the basis that the concept is vague and not helpful in understanding the causes of conflict or formulating responses.

Responsibility to protect (frequently abbreviated to R2P) was the product of long-standing efforts to get beyond the humanitarian intervention debates of the 1990s. First coined by an International Commission in 2001, the doctrine was later adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly in 2005—a remarkably swift endorsement of a once controversial subject. In its watered-down form, it merely affirms that a state has the primary responsibility for protecting its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The failure of a state to act on this responsibility might be grounds for the Security Council to act, in exceptional circumstances, in the name of the international community—something the Council has already done on a handful of occasions.

**Peace as a Subject of Research**

Though war and peace had long been central to the study of international relations, the idea of studying peace as such gained traction only during the Cold War. This was not only driven by the unique security threats posed by nuclear weapons but also found encouragement in U.S. universities, in particular by opposition to the Vietnam War. Much early research took place in or was funded by Scandinavia: Norway’s International Peace Research Institute in Oslo was founded in 1959 and began publishing the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964; the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute was established in 1966. Peace studies became more popular in the 1980s, and today there are hundreds of such programs in universities and think tanks around the world.

The relevant literature encompasses much work on positive peace, with the dominant questions tending to remain those connected with explaining the conditions necessary to prevent conflict. As conflicts from the 1990s were increasingly internal rather than international, the distinction between
positive and negative peace has to some extent been elided by the finding that half of all countries emerging from civil war fall back into it within 5 years of a peace agreement being signed. The question of resolving one conflict has therefore become linked with the question of preventing another.

This in turn led to an expansive literature on peace building, an imprecise term that at times is used to describe virtually all forms of international assistance to countries that have experienced or are at risk of armed conflict. State building (sometime rendered as nation building in the United States) more narrowly refers to the construction or reconstruction of institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security. Most often conducted as part of UN peace operations, such activities have included many quasi-governmental activities ranging from electoral assistance and technical assistance to maintain human rights and the rule of law to the actual administration of territory in Kosovo and Timor-Leste.

Explanations of the Conditions for Peace

Despite increased attention to positive peace, a disproportionate amount of the literature focuses on conditions for peace in the narrow sense of avoiding war. The most important and widely debated tends to be the democratic peace thesis, but much has also been written on economic factors and their link with conflict. The shift from international to internal conflict as a major preoccupation has reduced the prominence of strategic considerations, though the “post–post–Cold War” era and the rise of militarily powerful China and Russia may suggest a return to strategic studies and great-power politics in the near future. Finally, the growing importance attributed to asymmetric threats such as those from terrorists groups of global reach has raised the question of what “peace” means when dealing with nonstate groups that may or may not behave as rational actors.

Democratic Peace

Much quantitative energy has been spent on the democratic peace thesis, which holds that democracies are statistically less likely to go to war than states that are undemocratic. Overemphasis on this empirical argument (which has itself been contested) obscures a secondary finding in the literature that an autocratic state in the process of democratization may in fact be more likely to descend into conflict, especially internal conflict. The more robust explanations of what scholars such as Michael Doyle term the liberal peace theory link it to three pillars: republican representation, an ideological commitment to fundamental human rights, and transnational interdependence. These correspond to the arguments first made by Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace.”

Economics

There is a long tradition of attributing economic causes to conflict. One of the most direct linkages that is often made is between the economic impositions on Germany following World War I and the planting of the seeds of World War II. Marxist theories of international relations drew more systematically on economics to explain the unfolding of historical stages, certain inevitable conflicts, influencing dependency theorists in particular. More recent work on civil wars offered counterintuitive suggestions that an abundance of natural resources may increase the probability and duration of conflict.

In the context of international armed conflict, economic activity in the form of cross-border economic flows has also been linked to peace—either because it raises the costs of severing those links or because it offers a more efficient path to growth than conquest. An early advocate of trade as a path to peace was the 19th-century British statesman Richard Cobden, though it has subsequently been discussed in the context of interdependence and, more recently, globalization.

The link between economics and peace is now well accepted. Since 1997, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been at the forefront of efforts to “mainstream” conflict prevention into donor development policies. What is now termed structural prevention (as opposed to operational prevention) seeks to bring development perspectives to bear on what were traditionally regarded as political and security problems.

Nevertheless, the “greed” versus “grievance” debates in the empirical literature revealed the dangers of reductive theories of conflict prevention. One-dimensional analysis has now largely given way
to more nuanced accounts that acknowledge a mix of economic, political, ethnic, and security dynamics.

**Strategic Studies**

Though much of the focus on peace today concerns positive peace and the problem of civil wars, strategic studies was a fertile area of research in the Cold War. Doctrines such as mutual assured destruction relied on the presumed rationality of one’s opponent and maintained the peace through a balance of terror.

Such perspectives enjoyed less prominence after the end of the Cold War, but with the rise of China and Russia as military powers and the potential for conflict over diminishing natural resources, such fields might experience a resurgence.

**Asymmetric Threats**

A phenomenon that is not new, but that has come to dominate discussion of conflict in many circles, is terrorism. The question of whether terrorist threats are appropriately addressed as a military rather than criminal matter is the subject of significant division in the literature and, indeed, the practice of states. The “war on terror” of the Bush administration in the United States was at times presented as an intergenerational conflict. Such language was subsequently dropped, among other reasons because of the difficulty of determining when such a “war” has been “won.”

**Conclusion**

One of the most important factors affecting the study of war and peace across historical periods has been whether war or peace was in fact the “normal” state of human affairs. It is perhaps ironic that the century that rendered meaningless the formal legal category of “war”—indicating a state of affairs where two sides may lawfully use force against one another—was the bloodiest in human history. At the beginning of a century that threatens to be no less bloody, this is a disquietingly uncertain conclusion.

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See also Democratic Peace; Interdependence; Nation Building; Pacifism; Positive Peace; Violence; War and Peace

**Further Readings**


**PEACE RESEARCH**

See War and Peace

**PEACEKEEPING**

Theories of war try to explain why war occurs, given that it is often an inefficient way to resolve disputes. Scholars have proposed several explanations, among them the lack of information about relative capabilities or resolve and the inability of the parties to reach a credible commitment to end their dispute without resorting to violence. Some
argue that, once war occurs, the only way to end it and ensure that there is no recurrence of violence is to have a decisive victory of one side as most negotiated settlements generate credible commitment problems. This is an argument of particular relevance to civil (or intrastate) wars, which are today the most common form of large-scale armed conflict. One of the striking stylized facts emerging from the literature on civil wars is that these wars last a long time, and when they end, they frequently restart. These insights from rationalist theories of interstate and intrastate war point to an important role for third parties in mediating and resolving disputes. Third-party intervention can help defuse conflicts before they become violent by providing information or external-security guarantees. When wars do occur, security guarantees to help support a transition to peace often take the form of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is how the international community, through its multilateral organizations, can reduce the risk that conflicts will escalate.

Today, peacekeeping is the multidimensional management of a complex peace operation, usually in a post–civil war context. Peacekeeping, authorized under Chapter VI of the United Nations (UN) Charter, is designed to provide interim security and assist parties to make those institutional, material, and ideational transformations that are essential to make a peace sustainable. It was not always this way. The record of UN peacekeeping begins during the Cold War with a limited activity, monitoring the performance of a truce by two hostile parties.

Contemporary peacekeeping doctrine is embodied in the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (2000; also known as the Brahimi Report) and the Report of the Secretary-General on “No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” (2001; also known as the “No Exit Without Strategy” Report), which expanded on Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report Agenda for Peace and its 1995 Supplement. The goal of peacekeeping today is to help parties achieve sustainable peace. This goal can be achieved by addressing the underlying root causes of hostility and by enhancing local capacities for institutional change and economic development. But peacekeeping requires the cooperation of the parties, which must realize that they cannot win a quick and decisive military victory. Once the parties have reached a settlement that defines the contours of a postwar political system, there is still danger that the implementation of the peace will fail. It is at that point that international capacities—a multidimensional peacekeeping force with a UN mandate and resources to help implement the settlement—can help allay the parties’ concerns by providing transparency on the peace-building process and each other’s observance of the terms of the settlement, by policing violations of the settlement by noncooperative parties or spoilers, and by helping jump-start the economy and offering technical expertise in the design of transformational postwar political institutions.

These goals represent a significant expansion of the scope of UN intervention in the post-1990 world. The Agenda for Peace envisioned a role for the UN in preventive diplomacy, to engage the parties before they get to war; peacemaking, to help warring parties reach an agreement; peacekeeping, to help police an agreement once it is in place; peace enforcement, to convince reticent parties to stop fighting through an application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter; and postconflict reconstruction, to help parties rebuild their economies when the war ends. In the early years of UN peace operations, the UN mainly aimed to separate combatants through the establishment of a buffer zone that it policed in what is now called a traditional peacekeeping mandate. Traditional peacekeeping referred to a UN presence in the field, with the consent of all the parties concerned, as a confidence-building measure to monitor a truce while diplomats negotiated a comprehensive peace. Peacekeeping was therefore designed as an interim arrangement where there was no formal determination of aggression, and it was frequently used to monitor a truce, establish and police a buffer zone, and assist the negotiation of a peace. Typically, it involved less well-armed troops, and it often resulted in freezing conflict in time rather than helping resolve the underlying causes.

Today, following a process of evolution of UN mandates and new strategic thinking about UN intervention, the model peace operation combines elements of diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, postconflict reconstruction, and at times also
peace enforcement, aiming to help build long-term foundations for stable, legitimate government (see Table 1). To do this, UN peace missions have a multidimensional role, which ranges from disarming noncooperative parties and repatriating refugees to monitoring elections and designing school curricula. Between 1987 and 1994, the Security Council quadrupled the number of resolutions it issued, tripled the peacekeeping operations it authorized, and multiplied by seven the number of economic sanctions it imposed per year. Military forces deployed in peacekeeping operations increased from fewer than 10,000 to more than 70,000. The annual peacekeeping budget skyrocketed correspondingly from $230 million to $3.6 billion in the same period, thus reaching about 3 times the UN’s regular operating budget of $1.2 billion. Yet even these high costs represent a fraction of the economic costs of a failed peace or a long war. Peacekeeping is not only potentially lifesaving, but it is also cost-effective.

Table 1  Principal United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, 1947–2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Peak Force Size</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNSCOB</td>
<td>1947–1952</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Monitor violations of Greek border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCI</td>
<td>1947–1951</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Observe Indonesian ceasefire and Dutch troop withdrawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>1948–present</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>Report on Arab–Israeli ceasefire and armistice violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>1949–present</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>Observe Kashmir ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF I</td>
<td>1956–1967</td>
<td>6,073</td>
<td>Observe, supervise troop withdrawal, and provide buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOGIL</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>Check on clandestine aid from Syria to Lebanon rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>1960–1964</td>
<td>19,828</td>
<td>Maintain order in the Congo, expel foreign forces, and prevent secession and outside intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSF</td>
<td>1962–1963</td>
<td>1,576</td>
<td>Maintain order during transfer of authority in New Guinea from Netherlands and Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNYOM</td>
<td>1963–1964</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>Supervise military disengagement in Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>1964–present</td>
<td>6,411</td>
<td>Prevent internal conflict in Cyprus and avert outside intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMREP</td>
<td>1965–1966</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Report ceasefire between domestic factions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIPOM</td>
<td>1965–1966</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>Observe India–Pakistan border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF II</td>
<td>1973–1979</td>
<td>6,973</td>
<td>Supervise ceasefire and troop disengagement and control buffer zone between Egypt and Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>1974–present</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>Patrol Syria–Israel border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>1978–present</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>Supervise Israeli troop withdrawal, maintain order, and help restore authority of Lebanese government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Peak Force Size</td>
<td>Function</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIMOG</td>
<td>1988–1991</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>Supervise ceasefire and mutual withdrawal of forces by Iran and Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>1989–1991</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Verify withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>1989–1990</td>
<td>4,493</td>
<td>Assist Namibia’s transition to independence and ensure free and fair elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUVEN</td>
<td>1989–1990</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Monitor Nicaraguan elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>1989–1992</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>Verify compliance by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua with agreement to disarm and neutralize irregular forces in the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUVEH</td>
<td>1990–1991</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>Observe elections in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>1991–2003</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>Monitor demilitarized zone between Kuwait and Iraq, removed with the occupation of Iraq by an American-led coalition (small observer group remains but technically nonfunctioning and awaiting Security Council action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>1991–1995</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>Verify compliance with Peace Accord to end civil strife in Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>1991–1995</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>Monitor ceasefire and human rights agreements in El Salvador’s civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>1991–present</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>Conduct referendum in Western Sahara on independence or union with Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>1991–1992</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>Assist Cambodian factions to keep ceasefire agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>1992–1995</td>
<td>21,980</td>
<td>Encourage ceasefire in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and protect relief programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>1992–1993</td>
<td>19,500</td>
<td>Demobilize armed forces of Cambodian factions, supervise interim government, and conduct free elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM I</td>
<td>1992–1993</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>Monitor ceasefire between Somali parties and protect shipments of relief supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>1992–1994</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Supervise internal peace accord in Mozambique, disarm combatants, establish a nonpartisan army, hold national elections, and conduct humanitarian program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>1993–present</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Verify ceasefire agreement with Abkhazia and observe CIS peacekeeping force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>1993–1995</td>
<td></td>
<td>UN mission in Somalia and peacemaking operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Peak Force Size</td>
<td>Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>1993–1996</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>Stop the massacre of the defenseless population of Rwanda, assist refugees, and report atrocities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>1993–1996</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>Mission in Haiti, pacification, and monitoring elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>1993–1997</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Observer group in Liberia and monitoring OAS peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNASOG</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Observer group in Aouzou Strip and Libya–Chad border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOT</td>
<td>1994–2000</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Investigate ceasefire violations and work with OSCE and CIS missions in Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>1995–2002</td>
<td>1,584</td>
<td>Monitor law enforcement in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>1995–1999</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>Preventive deployment force for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCRO</td>
<td>1995–1996</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Confidence restoration in Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOP</td>
<td>1996–2002</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Monitor demilitarization in Prevlaka Peninsula, Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>1996–1998</td>
<td>5,257</td>
<td>Facilitate demilitarization in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSMIH</td>
<td>1996–1997</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>Support Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTMIH</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Transition Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>Verification Mission in Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPONUH</td>
<td>1997–2000</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>Civilian Police Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>1997–1999</td>
<td>5,560</td>
<td>Observer Mission in Angola and a follow-on to UNAVEM III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCA</td>
<td>1998–2000</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>Help maintain and enhance security and stability in the Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>1998–present</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>Observe and report to the Security Council the military conditions in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>1999–present</td>
<td>5,537</td>
<td>Monitor ceasefire agreement and provide humanitarian assistance to the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK Kosovo</td>
<td>1999–present</td>
<td>40,000 (KFOR)</td>
<td>Combine efforts in pacification of Kosovo with KFOR/NATO forces (essentially a humanitarian assistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
<td>2000–present</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>Monitor cessation of hostilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The UN has a commendable record of success in multidimensional peace operations as diverse as those in Namibia (UNTAG [United Nations Transition Assistance Group]), El Salvador (ONUSAL [United Nations Observation Mission in El Salvador]), Cambodia (UNTAC [United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia]), Mozambique (ONUMOZ [The United Nations Operations in Mozambique]), and Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES [United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium]). Success is of course an ambiguous and contested term, and here, it implies an end to large-scale violence, undivided sovereignty for the government of the host state, and a modest degree of political openness. Using this standard, the best available evidence suggests that UN multidimensional, second-generation missions have been successful in helping countries transition from war to peace. The UN has been less successful in fighting wars, however. Enforcement operations, which draw on the authority of Charter Article 42, present a challenge for the UN, and the experiences in Bosnia and Somalia in the 1990s exposed the practical limitations that a multilateral organization such as the UN faces in peace enforcement. An international organization without an army must rely on the ongoing cooperation of troop-contributing states and donors for financing. This makes the organization too inflexible and underresourced to fight wars. The UN’s comparative advantage lies with the peace-enhancing role of its multidimensional missions. On average, these have been more successful than peacekeeping missions by other agencies and smaller regional organizations. Regional organizations (with the exception of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) may lack the technical expertise or resources for such complex missions, or they may be perceived as biased mediators by the parties.

If political conflict reaches the level of war, and if the war causes high numbers of deaths and extensive physical and economic destruction, and if parties to the war are many and incoherent, unable to implement a negotiated peace settlement, then UN peacekeeping may help shore up support for a lasting peace that is based on a mutually acceptable compromise.

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See also Peace; United Nations; War and Peace
Peasants’ Movements

Peasants’ movements have been important expressions of the formation of the modern world, and they still are. Whether resisting colonization of the commons, protesting capture of their granaries by merchants and rulers, disputing land claims, contesting with centralizing states over the unequal terms of their incorporation, or joining millenarian struggles, peasants have been compelled to respond to the array of forces attending the development of capitalist property relations. Why should this not be the case today? Conventional wisdom would have it that the world’s peasantries are destined to disappear in the face of competitive pressures from capital-intensive agriculture, expelling them into burgeoning urban labor forces. This development scenario embodies a modernity trope that modern civilization is centered on the city, as an escape from parochialism and the drudgery of rural life. Peasants, here understood in a wider sense as agricultural smallholders or laborers, but also including pastoralists or fishermen, are still a social force to reckon with. In the following, some of the regional and transnational forms are discussed that have gained a voice addressing major issues such as food security, ecological sustainability, and biodiversity.

While certainly the demographic composition of the world’s population is now majority urban, and peasant agriculture is evidently increasingly marginal in global-market terms, each of these indicators is deeply problematic. And it has taken the rise and consolidation of a contemporary peasants’ movement to underline the shortcomings of such seemingly commonsense observations. At present, there are more than 1 billion slum dwellers across the world, accounting for one in six of the world’s population. While many of these seemingly redundant people do work in sweatshops at the extreme end of corporate supply chains, or recycle urban waste, they are not absorbed by the urban-industrial jobs predicted by the development paradigm. Furthermore, the displacement of peasant agriculture is largely due to the withdrawal of protections and the opening up of domestic markets to cheap, subsidized (at below production cost) foodstuffs from the cereal-exporting regions of the global North and the role of Southern states in diverting land use for agro-exporting as a condition of debt rescheduling.

The role of agro-exporting has shaped agricultural policy in a neoliberal world, where food security has been redefined from a social-contract function to a global-market function. The shortcoming of this policy shift became clear during the 2007–2008 food crisis, when governments found national food security compromised by the interruption of their food import dependence. But the transnational peasants’ movement had already identified this problem, opposing neoliberal arguments for food security provided by food traders with the concept of food sovereignty, which proclaimed hunger as a problem of rights not of means. Initially, food sovereignty was defined as a territorial right to produce food premised on the notion that food is a source of nutrition first and only secondarily a trade item. This intervention underlined the vulnerability of agricultural producers to subsidy schemes favoring corporate agriculture in a highly uneven global market, maintaining that neoliberal multilateral and national policies privilege the rights of food traders and agribusiness over peasants and low-income consumers. And it made visible the dramatic dispossession of smallholders everywhere by the liberalization of agricultural trade.

The transnational peasant (pastoralist, fisherfolk, and rural workers) movement, La Vía Campesina, or the Peasants’ Way, articulated the concept of food sovereignty in the 1996 Rome World Food Summit, proclaiming the right of nations to self-sufficiency, and respect of cultural and productive diversity, as a direct critique of the market-driven definition of food security and its unrealized claim to feed the world with Northern food surpluses. Representing millions of farmers
through more than 150 organizations across more than 50 countries, La Vía Campesina is the prominent voice of a social force advocating for the survival of small producers claiming the right to produce staple foods, to reproduce society, and to manage local resources. In making these claims, the peasants’ movement calls into question a market episteme that governs the development vision. From the movement’s perspective, it is an episteme that assumes scale efficiency on questionable grounds: highly subsidized energy-intensive industrial agriculture that externalizes environmental costs (e.g., soil and genetic erosion, greenhouse gas emissions, and chemical pollution) and social impacts (e.g., displaced populations, food dependence, and pesticide contamination), supported by asymmetrical trade rules. In contrast, the United Nations (UN)–sponsored International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) Report (2008) noted, for example, that a half-hectare plot in Thailand produces 70 species of vegetables, fruits, and herbs, improving nutrition and feeding more people than a half-hectare plot of a high-yielding rice variety, and such biodiverse farming is far less energy intensive, replenishing soil and water nutrients and cycles and sustaining farming as a culture rather than supporting a remote business. This ontological distinction is central to the vision of La Vía Campesina, arguably the most politicized of the peasants’ movements today.

While highly diverse (respecting locally specific social and ecological projects), La Vía Campesina nevertheless has forged a historic and common politics of resistance to the commodification of land, seed, and food and to a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade regime premised on the efficiency calculus. As a transnational coalition, for example, it ranges from Brazil’s Landless Workers Movement (Movimiento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST), with its emphasis on resettling displaced rural people and favela dwellers in landed cooperatives; through the movement of rich farmers: the Karnataka State Farmers’ association (Karnataka Rajya Raita Sangha, KRRS) in India, opposed to biotechnology and global agribusiness as well as land reform, and the foundational Peasant Movement of the Philippines (Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, KMP) in the Philippines; to the European Farmer Co-ordination (Coordination Paysanne Européenne, CPE), dedicated to preserving seed sovereignty as the basis of farmer autonomy. The coalition is dedicated to respecting the different needs and conditions of its chapters, even as it unites on global campaigns. For example, the Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform (GCAR) has directly challenged the World Bank’s Market-Led Agrarian Reform (MLAR) development strategy, with some success in reshaping debates in the development institutions and maintaining pressure through land occupations, urban protests, and anti–genetically modified (anti-GM) crop activities. Networking allies such as the Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN), focusing on land rights, and the Land Research and Action Network (LRAN) constitute a combined mobilization around land and food sovereignty.

The principle of food sovereignty, while appealing to a Westphalian concept as a strategic intervention, arguably forms a vision of a different future. First, it politicizes the global food system, revealing its capture by corporations for which food is just another investment portfolio. Second, it challenges the ontology of economism, which erases the viability of small producers, physically expelling them from their territories and epistemologically removing them from history. By linking the food trade with dispossession, the peasants’ movement reveals the relationship between de-peasantization and the formation of a flexible surplus labor force for global industry. Third, the ontology of the food sovereignty movement encourages the reevaluation of agriculture, rurality, and food as foundational to general social and ecological sustainability. And fourth, the social force leading this charge is a politicized peasantry—not simply reviving “tradition” but drawing on tacit knowledge of ecological relations and customary principles of social cooperation as the bedrock of human survival in an era of climatic and environmental emergency.

Of course, the transnational peasants’ movement cannot change the world on its own. But this movement is changing the way we think about the world, and its future possibilities. By giving voice to the world’s remaining peasants, the movement denaturalizes the vision of food security via agro-industrialization. This in turn resonates with growing concern over food safety, food miles, and the environmental degradation associated with energy-intensive agriculture. The peasants’ movement
thus connects with new social movements concerned with reconfiguring societies around reducing social distance and carbon emissions, eco-agriculture, and renaturalizing food. Here, the alternative political coordinates of the bioregion concept depends on reducing the social and physical divide between urban and rural and reconnecting social reproduction with its natural foundations. Food sovereignty, as a political slogan and platform, reasserts both the self-organizing capacity of communities of people and the centrality of agriculture to human survival.

The transnational peasants’ movement is uneven and differentiated. Its strongest regions are Latin America and Southeast Asia, whereas African farmers are still developing organizational capacity. Organizations rise and fall—for example, the Central American Peasant Coalition (Asociación de Organizaciones Campesinas de Centroamérica para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo, ASOCODE) was a powerful regional coalition in the 1990s, funded by European nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and dedicated to forming indigenous peasant networks and coordinating activities with the Central American Farmer to Farmer (Campesino a Campesino) Movement (peasant-based extension). La Vía Campesina emerged in this context, its durability depending on its political autonomy and its distrust of NGO alliances. This stemmed from the need for self-representation in an environment of skepticism toward smallholders—reinforced by the conservative, rich-farmer organization, the International Federation of Agricultural Producers, which has until now monopolized access to organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and its branch, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The slogan “not about us without us” became essential to the insertion of a peasant voice in global civil society, especially as neoliberal development projects impinged on peasant futures. Thus, the recent Plan Puebla-Panamá, an industrial corridor linking southern Mexico to Panama to mobilize indigenous labor, spawned two quite different peasant networks (representing various peasant unions) to negotiate or contest it, respectively: the Mesoamerican Initiative for Trade, Integration and Sustainable Development and the Mesoamerican Peasant Platform.

Farther south, in Brazil, the Movement of Small Farmers (Movimiento de Pequeños Agricultores), a peasant union, has mobilized more than 10,000 families in more than a dozen states to oppose agribusiness plantations of soy, sugar, and eucalyptus works, while the more substantial and iconic Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (Movimento Dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST) in Brazil has managed to settle roughly half a million peasants and landless workers on seized, unused land to produce food for Brazil’s working poor and broaden the meaning of citizenship to agrarian social projects. Meanwhile, in Africa, the Network of Farmers’ and Agricultural Producers’ Organizations of West Africa (Reteau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs Agricoles de l’Afrique de Le’Ouest, ROPPA) is developing methods of documenting flexible seed selection by farming women in West Africa as a form of drought management (with climate change), and the Agriculture Peasant and Modernisation Network–Mondial (Reseau Mondial Agricultures, Paysannes, Alimentation et Mondialisation, APM Mondial), formerly a regional network in Africa and now organizationally transnational, is developing ties with the Chinese peasantry, the last of the peasantries to be drawn into the movement.

Under pressure everywhere, peasants are self-organizing to protect their rights and, with allies, are building networks and consolidating a voice in global development fora, including demanding a reformed UN and alternative multilateral institutions such as a Convention on Food Sovereignty and Trade in Food and Agriculture and a World Commission on Sustainable Agriculture and Food Sovereignty. Today, peasants’ movements are strengthening through mobilization as well as a public realization of environmental limits. In this sense, the significance of peasants’ movements lies in the recentering of agriculture as a process of reterritorializing modernity—that is, reversing the marginalization of land-based culture and directing the world’s attention to securing its ecological nest as a survival strategy.

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See also Social Movements; Tragedy of the Commons
Further Readings


Performance

At the most general level, performance refers to two dimensions of an action: the doing of it (descriptive aspect) and how well or badly the actor is doing something (evaluative aspect). In political science literature, political performance is defined in broad and narrow ways, both building on the general definition outlined above. Broadly defined, political performance comprises the activities of political actors (descriptive) as well as the evaluation of these activities and their outcomes. Hence, it concerns the description of particular activities such as passing bills and spending money as well as the assessment of whether political actors make public policies (the activity), for example, in efficient ways and whether they achieve intended goals (outcomes) such as wealth or liberty. Narrowly understood, political performance is only an evaluative concept, referring to the evaluation of what political actors do and what the outcomes of their actions are. This narrow definition, dominating in scientific research, is the one adopted here. Some authors suggest a further narrowing of the concept by focusing on the evaluation of governments or, more specifically, on the evaluation of democratic governments. In this case, the terms quality of government or good government are synonyms for political performance. Here, such a specification is renounced in favor of a more comprehensive understanding of the concept applicable to all political actors.

This entry outlines the different theoretical and historical contexts of research on political performance, classifies criteria for evaluating political performance, discusses issues of measurement, reviews theories and research explaining political performance, and, finally, suggests future research perspectives.

Theoretical and Historical Contexts

The idea of evaluating political systems is a core concern in classical political science literature. Criteria of political performance such as liberty and equality dominated the writings of classical political theorists (e.g., Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau) in their search for good types of government. Additionally, performance criteria such as the common good and stability served as central yardsticks for scholars of comparative government, from Aristotle to Karl Loewenstein, in describing and comparing different nondemocratic and democratic regimes. This preliminary stage in the debate on political performance, however, is characterized by the fact that its protagonists did not make explicit use of the term political performance. Furthermore, they mainly relied on theoretical arguments and unsystematic empirical observations to assess the merits of different systems.

The first systematic theoretical and empirical work on political performance was not presented until the 1970s. At this point, two crucial obstacles had been overcome. The first obstacle concerns the availability of cross-national data. It became less of an obstacle with the collection and documentation of a wide range of social and political indicators for many independent countries of the world. First editions of several data handbooks appeared during the 1960s (e.g., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators). The second obstacle concerns the deliberate avoidance of evaluation by empirically oriented political scientists. This was revised when political scientists dared to make explicit and systematic appraisals of concrete political systems on the basis of empirical data. The outset of this phase can be dated to 1971, when Harry Eckstein developed and justified theoretical criteria for evaluating political systems and when Ted Gurr with Muriel McClelland made a first systematic attempt to empirically translate and apply these criteria to a sample of democratic and nondemocratic countries. In 1978, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell developed the most influential
and lasting concept of political performance emerging from this phase. In the context of systems theory, they suggested their concept of political productivity, enclosing eight different political goods: (1) system maintenance, (2) system adaptation, (3) participation, (4) compliance and support, (5) procedural justice, (6) welfare, (7) security, and (8) liberty. Additionally, they empirically studied the attainment of some of these goods in several democratic and nondemocratic countries. This first and early stage of performance research, however, provoked only a few isolated studies. These studies mainly used systems theory as a frame of reference and analyzed empirically democratic and nondemocratic systems.

In the aftermath, research on political performance advanced significantly and resulted in the establishment of an independent research area in the 1990s. At least two reasons account for this advancement—one historical, the other theoretical. Historically, the collapse of the state socialist systems in Central and Eastern Europe, resulting in the abolition of the most important alternative to democracy, turned the attention of comparative politics to quality differences within democracies, more specifically to quality differences between various types of democratic governments. Theoretically, the rise of new institutionalism in the 1980s, with its central premise that different institutional arrangements produce different results (institutions matter), directed the attention to political performance. Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work (1993) and Arend Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy (1999) are among the most important and influential works in this period. Putnam suggested responsiveness and effectiveness as central criteria in evaluating the performance of democratic government; he, furthermore, introduced social capital in addition to the already existing factors explaining political performance—namely, political institutions and socioeconomic modernity. Lijphart, on the other hand, is interested in the performance of so-called majoritarian and consensus democracy. He asks which type works best, and he offers the most comprehensive empirical analysis, covering 36 democracies and 32 performance indicators categorized into four areas (macroeconomic management, control of violence, quality of government, and kinder and gentler policy areas: welfare state, environmental policy, criminal justice, and foreign aid).

While these and other studies mainly focus on the policy performance of democracies, the issue of democratic quality or the quality of democracy itself gained interest since 2000. Since then, democratic criteria such as accountability, responsiveness, freedom, and equality are increasingly considered and studied empirically in the research on political performance.

Presently, political performance is an established field of research in political science. It is mainly concerned with evaluating different types of democratic governments such as majoritarian and consensus democracies or presidential and parliamentary democracies, on the one hand, and in evaluating specific democratic institutions such as electoral systems, party systems, and federalism, on the other. At first sight, this focus on evaluating political institutions seems to contradict the adopted definition of political performance referring to political actors. This definition, however, is consistent with new institutional theory. According to this theory, only actors—not political institutions—can act. Political institutions exert an influence on individual or collective actors by constituting constraints on their actions.

A Typology of Criteria of Political Performance

Normative criteria are essential for an explicit and systematic evaluation of political performance; they function as yardsticks against which the activities of political actors can be assessed. To be able to evaluate different political systems, these normative criteria should represent universal values. Furthermore, there should be consensus that these values embody legitimate obligations of political systems, which means, on the one hand, that these values guide what political actors do and, on the other hand, that citizens demand from government the attainment of these values. Finally, these universal values should be justified theoretically.

Most authors propose individual concepts of performance consisting of a list of criteria without referring to those of others. As a result, a multiplicity of heterogeneous criteria of political performance exists, and there is little convergence between the different lists proposed by different authors. With the help of a typology of performance criteria suggested by Edeltraud Roller (2005), the most
important types of criteria can be identified. The typology refers to the performance of liberal democracies and is based on two dimensions:

- The first dimension distinguishes between goal-oriented and general performance. Goal-oriented or substantive performance aims at the attainment of particular goals such as welfare or liberty. General or procedural performance is independent of these particular goals; it helps promote the attainment of any particular goals. Examples are stability or efficient use of resources.

- The second dimension differentiates between systemic and democratic performance. It conceptualizes different normative expectations that exist with regard to political systems in general and with regard to democratic systems in particular. Systemic performance refers to achievements every political system must generate for society, such as economic growth and stability. Democratic performance refers to specific criteria that are to be ensured by democratic systems, such as liberty, responsiveness, and accountability.

By combining these two dimensions, four types of performance criteria can be established. Both goal-oriented and general political performance can be distinguished according to whether they are to be provided by democracies either in their function as political system in general or in their function as democratic system in particular. Examples for goal-oriented, systemic criteria are security and welfare; examples for goal-oriented, democratic criteria are liberty and equality; examples for general, systemic criteria are efficiency and stability; and examples for general, democratic criteria are accountability and participation.

Applying this typology, one-dimensional and multidimensional concepts of political performance can be distinguished. While one-dimensional concepts rely on a single type of performance criteria, multidimensional concepts combine different types of criteria. For example, Harry Eckstein suggested a one-dimensional concept of general performance valid for all political systems. It includes durability, civil order, legitimacy, and decisional efficacy. Roller’s normative model of political effectiveness is also a one-dimensional concept aiming at a complete list of goal-related, systemic performance criteria. It covers international security, domestic security, wealth, socioeconomic security and socioeconomic equality, and environmental protection. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (2005) developed a two-dimensional concept of quality of democracy covering two general (rule of law and accountability) and three goal-oriented (responsiveness, liberty, and equality) criteria. Finally, Almond and Powells’s concept of political productivity (1978) is a truly multidimensional concept covering all four types of criteria: (1) goal-related, systemic criteria (welfare and security); (2) goal-related, democratic criteria (liberty); (3) general, systemic criteria (system maintenance, system adaptation, compliance, and support); and (4) general, democratic criteria (participation and procedural justice).

These and other suggested concepts of political performance share the assumption that different values cannot be attained simultaneously. They assume trade-offs or conflictual relationships, meaning that one value can be attained only at the cost of another value. Trade-offs are proposed between different types of performance criteria (e.g., policy performance and democratic quality) as well as within types of performance criteria (e.g., wealth and socioeconomic equality). Authors differ, however, with respect to the proposed trade-offs. Their ideological position often determines whether specific performance criteria are seen as incompatible or mutually compatible. Irrespective of the assumed type of relationship, any assessment of performance should entail an analysis of the trade-offs between different values.

Finally, as far as the theoretical justification of performance criteria is concerned, most authors tend to select their criteria arbitrarily. If they justify them at all, they refer to different theories depending on the type of performance criteria. In the case of democratic criteria, whether goal-oriented or general, normative democratic theory (e.g., liberal democracy) is used. In the case of systemic criteria, especially goal-oriented criteria such as security, wealth, and environmental protection, empirical political theories, especially theories on the development of policies or the expansion of the role of government, are used to justify performance criteria.
Measurement

The measurement of political performance necessarily requires a comparative approach. Political performance is either assessed in relation to theoretically defined normative criteria (e.g., a literacy rate of 100%) or in comparison with empirically defined maximum or minimum values (e.g., relative to the country with the best and/or the worst literacy rate). Most often, the second type of comparison is used in empirical research.

In general, the measurement of political performance raises several issues, which are discussed as follows.

Structure Versus Process

Although authors agree that political performance refers to the evaluation of the political process—that is, what political actors actually do—some authors measure political performance at the level of political structure. This is especially true in the case of democratic performance. While measures of democratic structure identify whether a democratic structure exists and is actually working in a country or not (e.g., universal suffrage and competitive elections), measures of democratic quality presuppose such a democratic structure and assess to what extent democratic performance is given (e.g., responsiveness and accountability). Obviously, there is a fundamental theoretical difference between structure and process, and valid measures of political performance should refer to the political process. Nevertheless, while the difference is clear in conceptual terms, it is rather difficult to separate between both dimensions empirically.

Outputs Versus Outcomes

Conceptually, performance does not refer to actions or efforts to reach goals, whether in the form of laws, personal spending, or state spending, but to the outcomes or actual results of these actions. Rather than using output indicators (e.g., the degree of redistribution measured on the basis of social expenditures), outcome indicators should be used (e.g., poverty rate). While outcomes are the real test as to whether the outputs have produced the intended results or not, usually they cannot be directly controlled by political actors. Hence, the question has been raised whether one can speak of political performance here at all. To avoid this problem, some authors consciously decide to use outputs rather than outcomes as measure for political performance. For example, Putnam’s Index of Institutional Performance primarily measures outputs such as the number of day care centers and health expenditures rather than, say, mortality rates. This is convincing only on condition that outputs could serve as valid proxies for outcomes. But this is a much disputed assumption. In their attempts to measure performance, other scholars deliberately focus on actual results or outcomes rather than mere efforts to reach goals. For example, Roller’s Index of Effectiveness of Democracies is designed as a pure measure of outcomes covering indicators such as poverty, infant mortality, and unemployment rate.

Objective Versus Subjective Measures

In principle, political performance can be measured either on the basis of objective measures (e.g., the rate of unemployment and the extent of congruence between voters’ policy preferences and government’s ideological stances) or on the basis of subjective evaluations of citizens (e.g., citizens’ satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and citizens’ perception of the degree of government’s responsiveness to people’s demands). Whether objective or subjective measures should be used is a theoretical decision depending on the research question. It is equally valid to ask for the quality of government on the basis of objective criteria and to ask for citizens’ evaluation of the quality of government. Due to the substantial difference between both dimensions, however, objective measures of political performance cannot be used as proxies for subjective measures and vice versa.

Single Versus Composite Measures

Normally, studies on political performance are interested not only in the assessment of several specific criteria (e.g., unemployment rate and poverty) but also in the overall level of performance of political actors. The most efficient method to gauge the overall level of political performance is to construct a composite measure integrating and summarizing evaluations of several performance dimensions. The available composite measures
mainly refer to policy performance. The well-known Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) represents one example for such a measure. It subsumes three dimensions of welfare—a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living—and relies on four indicators (life expectancy, adult literacy rate, gross enrollment in school, and gross domestic product). It assesses the average achievements in a country in these dimensions of welfare. Roller’s Index of Effectiveness of Democracies represents another composite measure aiming at the policy level. It takes a broad view, encompassing effectiveness in all domestic policy areas: domestic security policy, economic policy, social policy, and environmental policy. Each policy area is measured by a composite measure, and these four measures are integrated into an overall Index of Effectiveness. Altogether, it is composed of 14 indicators (e.g., murder and manslaughter, gross domestic product, infant mortality, emissions of sulfur oxides, etc.). Examples of composite measures aiming at general or procedural performance are the good governance indicators of the World Bank. These indicators cover composite measures for six performance dimensions—(1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability and absence of violence, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law, and (6) control of corruption—and an overall composite measure comprising these six dimensions. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance by experts and ordinary citizens as well (e.g., press freedom index, risk of political instability, quality of bureaucracy, foreign investment, violent crime, frequency of corruption, etc.). Constructing composite measures implies decisions about the techniques of standardization, weighting, and aggregation of individual values. Different statistical procedures of standardization (e.g., z-score transformation and indexing), weighting (e.g., equal and unequal), and aggregation (e.g., arithmetic mean and unobserved-components model) are used, and their relative merits are discussed intensively.

Explaining Political Performance

Research on political performance also aims to explain differences between countries and why some governments are more successful than others. National political institutions take center stage with regard to this question. This is for two different reasons, one theoretical and the other practical. Knowledge about the effect of political institutions is of theoretical interest because the idea that institutions matter is the central premise of the new institutionalism paradigm. This knowledge is also of great practical importance. If political institutions reveal a direct and unidirectional effect on political performance, recommendations can be made as to which kinds of constitutions should be implemented in new democracies (constitutional engineering) and what kind of institutional reforms should be conducted in established democracies to enhance political performance. Besides political institutions, cultural factors (e.g., social capital), socioeconomic modernity (e.g., wealth), globalization (e.g., foreign trade), and, particularly, preferences of political actors (e.g., the ideological orientation of governmental parties) are suggested as other factors explaining political performance.

Empirical research focuses on the effect of democratic institutions, either on the effect of types of democracies (e.g., majoritarian or consensus democracies, presidential or parliamentary democracies) or on the effect of specific democratic institutions (e.g., majoritarian or proportional electoral systems, federal or unitary states). The core question is whether diffusion or concentration of power results in higher levels of political performance. Numerous studies dealt with the performance of consensus and majoritarian democracies. Empirical analyses of Lijphart indicate that consensus democracies enjoy higher levels of political performance than majoritarian democracies and that these institutional settings themselves display a direct and unidirectional effect on political performance. Replications and additional studies can also show that democratic institutions indeed matter for political performance (e.g., Roller, 2005). But they matter only sometimes and to a limited degree, and their effect is less direct and less unidirectional than assumed so far. It seems that political institutions interact with other factors, especially with the preferences of political actors such as governments. Therefore, the theoretically and practically attractive hypothesis stating direct and unidirectional effects of political institutions on political performance is open to challenge.
Research Perspectives

Although we are able to now witness an established research area of political performance, its achievements are far from being solid, comprehensive, and cumulative. This is true for several reasons. First, the available studies refer to a multiplicity of heterogeneous criteria of political performance; a consensus on relevant criteria is still to evolve. Second, theoretical work and empirical work on political performance are only loosely coupled. Theoretical work focusing on the deduction and justification of criteria of performance tends to ignore the task of specifying empirical indicators that could flow from its normative criteria. In turn, empirical work tends to disregard theoretical reasoning on performance criteria. Third, empirical research is mainly devoted to the evaluation of democracies, especially to Western democracies. It rarely pays attention to the performance of Asian, African, and Latin American democracies. Fourth, systematic comparisons of contemporary democratic and non-democratic systems are still in a very early stage.

To make progress, it might be helpful to focus on the four types of performance criteria presented above. This could open up the possibility of developing common theoretical, methodological, and empirical foundations for each of these four types, and this could provide a basis for cumulative knowledge. Additionally, one question should be investigated more in depth in future: How political institutions exert their influence on political performance and how they interact with other factors, political actors in particular. Up to now, theoretical and empirical knowledge about this central question is too provisional and incomplete.

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See also Democracy, Types of; Electoral Systems; Globalization; Government; Institutional Theory; Institutions and Institutionalism; Modernization Theory; Parliamentary Systems; Parties; Party Systems; Political Culture; Presidentialism; Social Capital

Further Readings


Performance Management

Performance management involves managing organizations as well as managing the entire machinery of government. More precisely, it is a process of establishing goals and regularly checking the progress made toward achieving those goals. It incorporates continual feedback and is based on the principle of management by contract rather than by command. This entry examines the concept of performance management, its theoretical context, and related developments and applications.

Conceptual Overview

Performance management includes activities to ensure that goals are being met in an effective and efficient manner; thus, it becomes a mechanism for
accountability. The managerial tradition of the past several decades has focused on performance as a part of management practice in the public sector of Western countries. Governments have supported administrative reforms from old public administration rules and procedures to modern managerial models, within the framework of the new public management doctrine.

As public values, efficiency, productivity, and service orientation have become more important. Bureaucrats have been forced to transform from their traditional roles into more managerial roles and to become more concerned with performance.

Generally speaking, many ideas concerning reform have been borrowed from the private sector. Evaluation has focused more on economic issues than on political ones. Egoistic interests, competition and contracting, cost-effectiveness, and the role of customers are discussed more and more in the core of public domain.

Performance management is important in both the private and the public sectors. By using performance management, governments are searching for better performance in their public sector organizations. The use of market mechanisms in public administration is one means of increasing competition with the private sector and improving the efficiency of public services. Service delivery is expected to be more transparent and accountable. In the redefined and new governance, administrative control is transformed from traditional action controls to modern output controls.

However, performance management is currently faced with many challenges. Sometimes it is difficult to implement in the public sector due to politically unstable and multiple goals, vague outputs, and complexity of services. These challenges raise the question of whether performance management is more a myth than a reality in modernizing public organizations. Another issue is how to reform performance measurement, which should be more than simply accounting exercises. As John Halligan and Geert Bouckaert (2009) ask, is there a gap between rhetoric and practice with respect to performance management?

In the performance management debate, warnings are given about the dysfunctions and unintended consequences of performance management practices that may result in a decline rather than an improvement in the performance of organizations. According to Frank Verbeeten (2008, p. 430), such effects may include the following:

- a. growth of internal bureaucracy,
- b. lack of innovation,
- c. reduction of system or process responsibility,
- d. tunnel vision,
- e. suboptimization,
- f. gaming of performance measures, and
- g. measure fixation.

How should we understand performance management? In performance management, targets are defined, expectations are set, processes are measured and evaluated, and, if all these are fulfilled, top management is rewarded. Performance management is both a management tool and an umbrella for a variety of different management techniques. Performance management is connected to several other management techniques, such as the stakeholder approach, a balanced scorecard, and even quality management. In national applications, performance management is called management for results or management by objectives and results. In some cases, the separate nature of steering and managing is being emphasized.

As Zoe Radnor and Mary McGuire (2004) note, the two terms performance measurement and performance management are often used interchangeably. The basic idea in performance management is measuring performance and defining aims and goals. Through the management process, strategies are selected to achieve the goals in an efficient way. Performance-related pay for groups or individuals is also used in performance management.

In the process of performance management, an agency involves its employees, as individuals and members of a group, in improving organizational effectiveness in the accomplishment of the agency mission. According to John Mwita (2000), the factors that affect performance are personal factors (e.g., motivation and commitment), leadership factors (encouragement, guidance, and support), team factors (support of colleagues), system factors (instruments of labor), and contextual factors (changes of internal and external environment).

Performance management is basically a control system as well, with both the process and the outputs being controlled. Different opinions are
presented about the nature of the control function. For example, the control function is considered to be either a universal and highly general or a detailed, highly specialized function.

**Theoretical Context**

In public administration literature, the doctrine of performance management is referred to by several theorists, such as Amitai Etzioni, Herbert Simon, James March, and Henry Mintzberg. For instance, Max Weber’s model of bureaucracy is considered as a machine organization. A bureaucratic organization is efficient, routinized, and predictable. Sometimes customer organizations, both in the public and the private sector, are designed like machines, and their employees are expected to behave as if they were components of machines. Thus, currently, key concerns in performance management are the change from measuring performance to managing performance and expanding the performance management from an economic perspective to others, such as social and citizen perspectives.

In a politico-administrative process, governance and management are broader, including different stakeholders in the democratic system, such as elected officials and citizens. Commonly shared values are based on the public interest and political accountability. If the engagement of citizens is very limited in performance processes, performance management as a system will not know what people care about in their different roles as voters, taxpayers, customers, and so on.

As Amber Wichowsky and Donald Moynihan state, in a well-functioning democracy, citizens are capable of self-governance, they are treated with equal respect and dignity, and they are responsible to their communities and participate actively in political life.

According to Paul Epstein, Lyle Wray, and Courtney Harding (2006), in a performance management process, potential citizen roles are, for instance, framing issues and setting the agenda (planning and setting goals and performance targeting), as stakeholders and collaborators (implementing policies), and as evaluators (measuring and reporting results).

Public sector leaders encounter numerous requirements in managing the performance measurement of government services. These include (a) understanding better the real nature of service delivery systems; (b) having the capability of agreeing on strategic objectives, providing incentives, and evaluating programs; and (c) collecting, analyzing, and presenting performance management data.

In the workplaces of public organizations, personnel are aware of the purposes of performance management. By measuring and managing performance, it is expected that managers and employees are learning to improve their performance. Citizens also want to know for what purposes their money is spent. Besides, in large-scale branches of administration, massive amounts of performance data are collected. Effective exploitation of performance information is a challenge because expectations might be very high. Effective ways of implementing and rational decisions on improving performance are both needed.

**Development and Application**

An example of the development of performance management is the system existing in Finland, which is in line with practices in other Western countries. Within the public administration establishment in Finland, reform began in the late 1980s. These public sector reforms were mainly influenced by administrative and management reforms in other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Steering and budgetary systems, including laws, rules, and procedures, were reformed. New management techniques were implemented in the central, regional, and local government.

According to the definition in the Finnish *Handbook on Performance Management* (2006), performance management is an agreement-based interactive control model. Its operational core lies in the ability of the involved parties to find the appropriate balance between the available resources and the results to be attained using them. The basic idea of performance management in operations is to balance resources and targets, on the one hand, and efficiency and quality, on the other, and to ensure that the desired effects are achieved in a cost-effective manner.

In formal performance management systems, performance targets are discussed, agreed on, and set between the ministry and the subordinate
agency. The performance criteria are used in setting targets and in reporting operations. If the system is to have legitimacy, the targets must be measurable, clear, and based on systematic and reliable evaluation. Performance criteria consist of policy effectiveness, operational efficiency, outputs, quality management, and management of human resources.

Another challenge for performance applications is the use of performance criteria. Performance criteria should be developed by applying incentive systems. In other words, who receives praise or criticism? If the criteria are determined for evaluating the performance of lower level public servants in their daily interactions with users of public services, the decision process will be much easier than it is for higher level officials.

In Finland, performance management is implemented through performance agreements between the ministry and the agency. The agreement is a control tool in the interaction of the parties involved. Because performance is reported, there are consequences for both good and poor performance. For instance, in the Finnish university sector, the Ministry of Education and all 20 state-run universities sign a performance agreement defining the objectives: the number of degrees to be awarded, the development projects, and the level of funding. The agreement is signed for 3 years but is reviewed in the yearly negotiations between the ministry and a single university. In line with the ministry-university negotiations, each university arranges its own performance negotiations between the rector and the faculties.

The example of Finnish universities illustrates the fundamental character of performance management. Despite the problems of measurement and implementation, this approach to management has developed as a major method for management and accountability.

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See also Evaluation Research; New Public Management

Further Readings

PERSONALIZATION OF POLITICS

Personalization of politics refers to a shift from collective to individual actors and institutions. Its scope and degree can vary according to regime type, national and cultural environments, and the time span under consideration. However, personalization is commonly considered as an emerging trait in a number of relevant arenas: from voting behavior to governmental steering and from electoral campaigning to party organization. Most studies emphasize the role of leadership and media as the key determinants of political personalization, though it certainly partakes of the more general trend toward an individualized society. This entry discusses recent trends and major implications for contemporary democracies.

The most visible aspect of political personalization concerns the transformation of electoral campaigning, with the rise of candidate-centered politics. This transformation affects the whole consent mobilization process. The media, in the first place, have become the main intermediary channel between candidates and their constituencies. With
traditional party structures losing their grip on the electorate, candidates tend to rely on old as well as new media to spell out their programs and contact potential voters, especially in large-scale elections—for governors, prime ministers, or presidents—where TV and the Internet offer invaluable shortcuts to reaching mass audiences. To best exploit the media, candidates use media language and logic, which put a premium on individual personality.

This has led to a thorough reorganization of campaign strategies and funding, with the main focus on the media image and performance of the candidates. In the wake of the famous TV debate in 1960 between U.S. presidential candidates Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy, which was held responsible for the victory of Kennedy, the Democratic nominee, the media have become the key investment of all major electoral campaigns. Several empirical studies have questioned whether the actual impact of personalized politics fully matches the vision and aims of campaign managers and spin doctors. However, while issues have remained important and party identification still plays a role in voting behavior, it is a widespread opinion that voters, today, are more heavily influenced by the personality factor than they were 20 years ago.

Though less visible and less debated than the personalization of elections, a no less important area of political personalization is the strengthening of monocratic government. Whether in presidential, semipresidential, or parliamentary regimes, the chief executive has gained more power and authority with respect to three arenas: (1) the government as a whole, (2) the party, and (3) the wider public. Personalization in government has been described as a process of presidentialization. That is, prime ministers in old as well as new democracies are now stronger with respect to the collegial bodies they chair, performing several functions that were once the prerogative of the U.S. presidential model. Increase in prime ministerial power concerns the normative as well as the organizational sphere. With the expansion of delegated legislation and emergency regulation, a large share of legislative activity has shifted from parliament to the executive and, within the executive, to the prime ministerial office. This, in turn, has grown both in human resources and in the scope of intervention, a trend that in many ways resembles the transformation of the U.S. presidency following Franklin D. Roosevelt’s reforms. Prime ministers have also gained better control over the governmental agenda and the overall decision-making process, thus taking more direct responsibility for their electoral mandate.

In only a few instances, the emerging of prime ministerial dominance is the result of outright constitutional changes. In most cases, the transformation has occurred through new rules and procedures regulating the relationship between the legislative and the executive branch, as well as through the adoption of laws providing for an overall reorganization of the prime minister’s office. As a consequence, the traditional constitutional divide between presidential and parliamentary regimes has been to some extent blurred by what could be considered a silent institutional revolution.

A major contribution to this end has come from the personalization of party control. Parties have long been the stronghold of collective decision making and responsibility, largely concurring with the preeminence of legislatures as collegial bodies. In many Western democracies as well as in the Soviet bloc, the prevalent form of party rule has been oligarchic, by a system of elite cooptation. In the past 2 decades, party leadership has become more associated with individual personalities. The change has been heralded by countries as different as Margaret Thatcher’s United Kingdom and Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet Union, soon to become the format of most political regimes.

Party personalization can vary according to several factors. In old, established parties, the process is contrasted by the entrenched nomenclature. It took 12 years for Tony Blair to successfully take over the Labour party in the United Kingdom and impress his own brand on the New Labour. Helmut Kohl’s primacy in the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU) in Germany was mainly related to the extraordinary opportunities of Germany’s reunification. On the whole, the German party system, also as a legacy of the Nazi era, remains a hostile environment to one-man rule. Yet whenever new parties are formed, there is a diffused tendency that they be promoted and controlled by individual leaders. The ideal-typical case is Silvio Berlusconi’s Forward Italy (Forza Italia). Banking
on the favorable conditions created by the collapse of the governing parties, Berlusconi immensely benefited from his corporate empire to found his own personal party. As a media tycoon and one of the wealthiest men in the world, he could rely on a highly skilled professional apparatus as well as on huge financial means to set up, within less than 6 months, a vote-generating machine.

A key aspect of Berlusconi’s success was his extensive use of TV, with the new infomercial techniques he borrowed from Ross Perot’s 1992 presidential campaign in the United States, thus bypassing journalists’ intermediation and directly targeting his audiences. Direct appeal to the masses, together with a constant focus on charismatic leadership, is the main trait of the so-called media populism, a phenomenon strongly associated with party personalization. From Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela to Vladimir Putin’s Russia, political and/or economic control of the media has become a decisive factor for the rise of one-man-dominated parties with a large popular following.

The Internet, too, has greatly contributed to political personalization. While the broadcasting media, such as radio and TV, require big budgets and complex scheduling and cannot be aimed at specific population segments, creating one’s own website, blog, and direct mailing system is a much easier and less costly undertaking. More and more politicians use the Internet to promote their message and interact with their constituencies on a personal basis, thus contributing to rendering party channels obsolete. In most cases, Internet personalization operates on a smaller scale than the TV-based marketing of political leadership. However, the two media can be used to feed and reinforce one another, as in Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign. Thanks to the web, Obama’s organization reached millions of supporters with daily updates on the most controversial issues and invitations to join virtual or real-life debates, thus motivating participation and spurring donations. The money raised through the Internet was, in turn, devoted to a massive use of TV advertising.

In spite of its overwhelming presence in contemporary politics, measuring the real impact of political personalization on strictly empirical grounds is not easy. Research frameworks have been slow to adapt to a phenomenon that affects so many arenas. With a few relevant exceptions, there is a lack of comparative and longitudinal studies, the more so as the most striking trait of political personalization consists of its cutting across different disciplinary subdomains. Studies of electoral behavior rarely venture into the analysis of the transformation of party organizations, and most accounts of the rise of stronger executives only focus on the governmental institutional setting.

This is not to say that empirical investigation is not possible or necessary. The relevance of this topic looms even larger in a wider theoretical and historical perspective. In what has become the mainstream definition of political power, Max Weber distinguished three types of legitimate authority. Two types, the traditional and the charismatic, were grounded in personal resources. Yet Weber considered the third type of legal-rational authority, with its emphasis on bureaucratic procedures and collective decision making, as the pillar of modern society, both in the political and in the economic realms. Traditional and charismatic power was mainly treated as a remnant of the past, inevitably bound to be superseded by the advent of legal-rational authority. Moreover, in dealing with traditional and charismatic power, Weber’s tendency was to present these two patterns as separate, occurring in different historical and cultural contexts. Quite to the contrary, one of the major characteristics of contemporary personal power is the interaction and cumulation of these two elements. The modern process of personalization of politics results, to a large extent, from the combination of patrimonial and charismatic resources. This combination becomes all the more stronger when it can use—and possibly merge into—the key central institutions of a democratic regime.

Political personalization thus appears as a mix of old and new forces. The main novelty consists in the role of the media and their natural focus on individuals and their personality. This has led to a revival of charisma in an electronic form. Media charisma may have little if any of the extraordinary gift of grace that characterized charismatic leaders in the past, with their mass religious followings. Yet on various occasions, media charisma has proved to be a key factor in the rise of powerful leaders. The comeback of personal power also reflects the resilience, in industrialized societies, of cultural traits long considered bygones. The tendency to rely once again on personal rather than collective
and impersonal attributes is a sign of weaker social cohesion and increased instability. On the positive side, one may consider that the process of political personalization, today, largely falls within the routines, discourse, and boundaries of democratic politics. The nightmare of personal power getting out of control seems to belong to the past.

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See also Charisma; Electoral Campaigns; Executive; Power; Presidentialism

Further Readings

Pillarization

Pillarization of society means the vertical integration of a subcultural community in a system of political representation. More often than not, this kind of integration is considered as necessary for a minority to politically participate and survive when democratization of a polity is under way or more or less completed by means of electoral rights (e.g., universal suffrage) and the establishment of a party system (at the national level). Pillarized political systems emerged in a limited number of cases only and strongly correlate with a specific type of parliamentary democracy: “consociational” systems (Arend Lijphart) in which agreements among the elites of the respective pillars bridge their divisions. In the following sections, the characteristics of such pillars as they occur in the major cases, their political relevance, and recent tendencies of depillarization are discussed.

Characteristics and Political Relevance

The term pillar (verzuiling in Dutch and Flemish and Lager in German) is sociologically defined as strong political-cultural submilieus based on ethnic-linguistic, religious, or similar cleavages with a strong internal organization and a relatively high level of external autonomy. Under such circumstances, you can spend much of your life within the networks of such pillars, often including schools, media, political parties, and so on. These organized submilieus are politically relevant for understanding the stability and survival of democracy in (deeply) divided societies. Lijphart mentions five criteria to measure the degree of pillarization:

1. the role of ideology (more often than not cleavage related) within the pillar,
2. the size and density of the organized network representing the pillar,
3. the (institutionalized) cohesiveness of the pillar’s network,
4. the extent of “enclosure” of the pillar (or the absence of cross-cultural relations), and
5. the extent to which pillarized behavior is encouraged and directed by its elites.

The application of these criteria to West European democracies shows that there are four polities that indeed qualify as being pillarized: Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The last is seen as the least pillarized. Others, for example, Gerhard Lehbruch, have claimed that the Federal Republic of Germany belongs to the pillarized community, too. This is questionable because Lehmburch focused on the organization of the German postwar party system and its ramifications for decision making at the federal level. His explanation rested more
on the cleavage-related mechanisms and the complexities of organizing representation in a federation. Hence, the working of the German polity showed some of the features of a pillarized system.

Switzerland can also be considered as a borderline case. Rather than being the well-organized and cohesive pillars (as defined here), the extant cleavages in Swiss politics—religious/secular, language/territory divisions, and the rural/urban divide—accounted for the development of consociational practices through the mechanisms of the party system dynamics. For example, Pascal Sciarini and Simon Hug claim that pillarization in Switzerland is weak because it only plays a role in finding amicable agreement based on cleavages and by means of proportionality on the federal level. Pillarized networks are not the main agents but rather national political parties that are in turn checked and balanced by institutional safeguards through cantonal representation and the referendum instrument.

The other cases mentioned also show differences. Belgium is complex in terms of its pillarization because it is strongly influenced by two cleavages. One is secular/religious and the other is language/territory. While the former is not more relevant than in many other (European) party systems, the latter is: Since the 1960s, this conflict is rising high on the political agenda; it has been conducive to the federalization of the Belgian state and was preceded by the bifurcation of the nationwide party system.

Austria and the Netherlands stand out as the strongest examples of politicized pillarization. This can be explained by two factors: One, the minorities are not geographically concentrated, but their “members” reside throughout the entire territory. Precisely for this reason, a socially cohesive network reinforcing the control of membership was deemed necessary. Two, only by means of elite politics and the proportional-representation (PR) electoral system—registering the relative strength of each pillar—was it feasible to establish accommodation between the pillarized communities.

Other cases of pillarization have been mentioned, but mostly defined post hoc, to explain the relative stability of the emerging political system. Examples are Czechoslovakia (1989–1993), Lebanon (during the 1960s), and Colombia.

Pillarization, as it has emerged and existed, is strongly correlated to a particular form of democracy: consociationalism. This can explain the paradox of the occurrence of stable democracies with strong political divisions between minorities. A consociational democratic system is characterized by the fact that there is no majority party but only minority parties that are by and large representing pillarized communities. In contrast to the theory of pluralism that predicts political instability under such circumstances, many (but not all) democracies appear capable of consensual and effective decision making. This paradox was solved by developing institutional mechanisms and conventions that allowed for cooperation between elites (representing the various pillars): (a) the introduction of a proportional electoral system that secured access for each pillarized party; (b) securing the autonomy of each pillar within society (often by means of basic laws, as is the case in Austria and the Netherlands, or by carefully describing the degrees of self-regulation by subnational territories, as in Germany and Switzerland as well as in Belgium of late); and (c) a careful but often complex procedure regarding the formation of government coalitions (which were often all-inclusive or at least broad in composition). These mechanisms enabled elites to find agreement and to avoid open conflict over substantial issues that directly concerned the ideology or subcultural differences that had led to pillarization. Hence, the political consequences of pillarization—that is, deep-seated conflict—could be overcome by means of elite appeasement and (often secret) agreements, proportional payoffs, and (often) depoliticization of contested policy issues.

It should be noticed, however, that consociational democracy cannot be considered as a universal recipe. Lijphart, for instance, showed that in other cases, primarily outside Western Europe, this type of democracy did not develop or last long under the same circumstances (e.g., Lebanon, Colombia, and perhaps contemporary Belgium). Furthermore, critics of the consociational model have pointed to certain flaws, namely, the fact that the minorities had to be roughly of the same size or that these subcultural groups were insufficiently organized and therefore less loyal to their political elites. Finally, the political practice often depended on other factors such as social and economic development (e.g., the effective equalization of resources across segments of the population). Finally, the
question arose whether or not consociational success—that is, a stable and effective government for all communities—did in fact produce its own disappearance over time. This last argument seems to be correct, for consociationalism can be considered as a historical phenomenon for the simple reason that most pillarized political systems have indeed faded away or failed.

**Depillarization**

Depillarization is a sociological process that has taken place since the 1970s and is considered, first of all, as a result of modernization (e.g., in terms of developments in communication such as information and communication technologies [ICT], which impair forms of social control), secularization (e.g., de-confessionalization, which weakens the loyalty of members of a pillar), globalization (e.g., due to de-industrialization being conducive to a changing class composition), and changes in elite behavior—all resulting in less cohesiveness and relaxing organizational ties within the pillars.

Politically, this process can be observed in terms of high degrees of electoral volatility, indicating changing behavior and a willingness to vote on the basis of motives other than being a member of a pillar. It is illustrative that during the 1960s the cross-European level of electoral volatility was 8%, but in pillarized countries, this was 3.3% lower. Yet from 1990 onward, this has changed dramatically: On average, electoral volatility increased by 3 points in Europe, but in the five pillarized countries, it rose to an unprecedented level of 22.3%, a growth of 16.8% (Peter Mair, 2008).

Second, the emergence of new parties that challenge pillarized parties and are mainly nonpillarized has contributed to these developments. Examples are the Greens and right-wing parties: Both party families have become particularly strong in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. During the 1960s, electoral support for all new parties in pillarized societies was below the cross-European average, being around 4.4%, whereas their support grew to 10% above the cross-European level in 2000. Third, the politics of accommodation as indicated inter alia by the type of government coalitions has also changed: Instead of broad coalitions, one finds more often than not minimal winning coalitions (apart from Switzerland, due to its magic formula, which is, however, under pressure), with parties included in government coalitions that had not been participating before, such as in Austria, the Netherlands, and Germany.

All this points to a process of depillarization affecting a changing profile of organizational cohesiveness, electoral representation, and traditional cleavage politics. Finally, the impact of (party) elites diminished as well. Pillarization, taken in its political-sociological meaning, seems to have faded away and with it the typical features of consociational democracy.

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See also: Cleavages, Social and Political; Democracy, Consociational; Elections, Volatility; Electoral Systems

**Further Readings**


Planning is deciding about future decisions, either in the sense of defining what has to be decided or in the sense of deciding how to decide. This entry discusses alternative conceptions of planning, its place in social science theories, and some of the applications of planning in governing. After a consideration of planning as a fundamental human activity, the entry explains the rational-comprehensive model of planning and its limitations and then examines alternative approaches to planning, including procedural models, systems theory, and strategic planning. It then discusses the place of planning in social-scientific theories and some of the applications of planning to governance.

The Activity of Planning
Planning is a very common activity. We plan courses of action so that we can achieve goals. However, it is important to distinguish between the concept of decision—the choice between different courses of actions whose consequences it is possible to forecast—and the notion of planning. The latter concept, in fact, encompasses several elements, namely, that

- to reach the goal or purpose of the activity, the decision maker has to take into consideration a set (and possibly a sequence) of different decisions;
- usually there is the need to allocate scarce resources between different goals; and
- central to the notion of planning is the concept of public policy, alternatively defined as the set of actions linked to the solution of a collective problem, a program of action, or a system of goals.

Planning, then, can be defined as the attempt to secure the coherence of a set or a sequence of decisions in relation to a specific problem—that is, a public policy. Therefore, even if we often find a plan or a program—that is, a document spelling out, in more or less detail, the content of the decisions to be taken and/or the procedures to adopt to this end—planning in itself cannot be identified with the decision to approve the said document; rather, it is a continuous activity, a process through which the future actions are organized and described.

The theory and practice of planning affect a plurality of different policy fields. For instance, the first university chair of urban planning was created in Liverpool in the United Kingdom in 1909, thus recognizing the existence of a specific discipline, distinct from architecture, geography, and the social sciences. But the socialist and communist movements in the 1920 to 1940 period gave popularity to the concept and practice of economic planning—that is, the adoption by the political power of a detailed and binding blueprint of the way in which the economic life has to be organized, by prescribing the type and quantity of goods and services to be produced in a given society in a given period of time. In the years following World War II, planning became widespread and was equated with rational and “scientific” decision making. This was also a consequence of the development of new methodologies of analysis (from cost–benefit analysis to operation research and linear programming) holding the promise of being able to inform public decision making. The meteoric rise of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) in the U.S. federal government in the 1960s (and the subsequent demise of the PPBS program in the U.S. military in the early 1970s) is a good example of the importance of this approach in that period. Even today, planning is sometimes still presented as the true answer to all policy problems, as the “right way” to organize the exercise of political power in public policies.

It is interesting to note that even politicians and scholars who share a common belief in the virtues of market and democracy, and consequently strongly oppose any form of socialism and planned economy, seem to advocate more planning when it comes to public policy making, possibly as a way to constrain political and administrative discretion.
and certainly to increase the level of coherence and predictability of governmental interventions. This basically means that the value of planning is seen as a way to improve the content of the decisions by making them more “rational.”

**Alternative Conceptions of Planning**

**The Rational-Comprehensive Model**

The starting point of the whole debate on the virtues of planning in policy making and policy implementation is therefore the idea that it is possible, indeed desirable, to base all decisions on a scientific analysis of the consequences of the available alternatives. This implies the following postulates:

1. It is possible to analyze the costs and benefits of all the different courses of action open to the public decision maker.
2. It is possible in a democratic society to use intellectual abilities in order to identify a system of goals related to the public interest or the common good.

It is clear that these two elements represent the basis of what Charles Lindblom has called the rational-comprehensive or rational-synoptic model of decision making, whose ideological roots are to be traced back to the 18th-century Enlightenment and 19th-century positivist philosophy, with their faith in the reason and in the intellectual capacities of the citizens or at least of the elites.

The two aforementioned postulates, however, have been widely criticized. Starting from the first postulate, as early as 1947, Herbert Simon has pointed out how the idea that all alternatives and all their consequences are known is highly unrealistic. No decision maker (and no planner) has all the time, the information, and the cognitive abilities required by the rational model of decision making. The consequence is that the maximum that can be achieved is to strive for a limited form of rationality, organizing the decision through a sequential search of the different alternatives and choosing the solution that is considered “good enough”—that is, that meets the “satisficing” criterion. Often this implies the necessity of not taking into consideration the consequences of the preferred alternative for all the desirable goals, and therefore, it contravenes one of the basic requirements of rational planning—that is, the idea that everything should be coordinated. But even if the subjective aspect of the postulate is satisfied (i.e., the decision makers have all the relevant knowledge), one has to remember that because planning is about future decisions and behaviors, an inherent level of uncertainty exists, as external shocks can alter some basic elements and forecasts can prove radically wrong. And finally, especially in contemporary welfare states, citizens have the tendency to raise issues or problems for which there is no clear-cut solution available (e.g., drug addiction or long-term unemployment). In such cases, it is obvious that a process of rational choice is not possible and that the attempt of the planners to allocate the “right” amount of resources required for the achievement of the goals is particularly difficult.

**Preferences-Guided Decision Making**

These examples of intractable problems call into question the second postulate mentioned above—that it is possible to use the knowledge and the intellectual skills of the ruling elite in order to identify a set of goals able to maximize the common good. The objection here has to do with the distinction, again introduced by Lindblom, between two different views of the society: the intellectually driven society and the preferences-guided society. In the first type of society, the faith in human intellect is such that a theory of social change is shared, there is no conflict between the needs of the individuals composing the society, and therefore synoptic planning is possible and indeed necessary to secure progress. In the second type of society, the recognition of the limitation of human intellect and the fact that conflicts are not only inevitable but also valuable in securing progress makes it impossible to use the same type of approach. In the latter type of societies, the poliarchies, the solution of the collective problems can be informed by analysis but is eventually determined through the processes of social interaction, based on the preferences expressed by the members of the society. In the preferences-guided society, in which political power is shared by a plurality of actors and institutions, the basic criterion for policy choice is the agreement between the relevant actors—in Lindblom’s
words, the mutual adjustment between them—and therefore, planning as described above is virtually impossible. Not only is reliable knowledge about the expected and likely outcomes of the decisions absent, but even more fundamentally, there is not necessarily agreement on the very purpose(s) of the planning exercise(s)—that is, the goals and priorities to be attained through public actions. Actually, Lindblom contends that this does not mean that in the preferences-guided society there is no planning but that a different form of planning, labeled strategic planning, is needed. However, from the examples he proposes, it is apparent that the ability to unequivocally shape future choices—a basic element of the definition of planning proposed above—is drastically limited. According to his vision, policy making in pluralistic societies is necessarily incremental, each decision departing only slightly from the status quo. To steer the process of decision making in the desired direction, the “planner” can only try to anticipate the reactions of the other actors, adapting his or her own choices, possibly by adopting a piecemeal approach to complex problems. In this way, it will be possible to minimize the oppositions in the short run and reach a more advanced equilibrium from which to start the construction of the next stage of policy development. As one Dutch minister once said—and one has to remember that in the Netherlands a highly sophisticated machinery for policy planning has been in operation for a long time—the true definition of a plan is “what we can agree upon”—the task of political power consisting in the ability to pave the road toward the next plan. Therefore, even if Lindblom’s strategic planning is fundamentally different from what is generally understood as planning, from its proponent point of view, it is far from being a useless exercise. This style of policy making, as shown in Lindblom’s The Intelligence of Democracy, is not only considered more desirable from the normative point of view but also is seen as being more effective in securing progress and development than any other alternative, since it is more adaptable to the complexities of contemporary society.

**Systems Theory**

An even more radical critique of rational planning—albeit developed at a different and higher level of abstraction—is the one put forward by Niklas Luhmann (1995) in the context of his systems theory. Basically, says Luhmann, planning will never work as intended because “in planning the system reacts not only to the conditions that are attained, to the success or failure of planning, but also to the planning itself” (p. 470). The mere existence of planning modifies the behaviors that it was aiming to shape by establishing their premises and, therefore, is structurally unable to reach its goals. Furthermore, planning introduces a necessarily simplified model of the complexity of the system into the system itself.

Considering these devastating critiques, one could be tempted to simply give in and abandon the very idea of planning defined as the attempt to secure the coherence of a set or a sequence of decisions in relation to a public policy, following the conclusion, reached by Aaron Wildavsky already at the beginning of the 1970s that “if planning is everything, may be it’s nothing.” The problem, however, remains: As already pointed out, planning is a very common activity, but it is also somewhat necessary because of the need to give a meaning to the present activities by shaping future choices. Hence, several attempts have been made to propose alternative forms of planning that are able to overcome the previous objections.

**Procedural Approaches to Planning**

One set of ideas is linked to the possibility of focusing the planning exercises not so much on the content of the future decisions but on the way(s) in which they should be reached, by prescribing the procedures of the decision-making process. This can be done with two different purposes in mind. In the first place, and more in line with tradition, the prescribed procedures might try to force the participants to consider more carefully the likely consequences of their preferred choices through, for instance, cost–benefit analysis or similar techniques. Using such tools in a multi-actor context, it is assumed, can have the effect of decreasing the danger of negative externalities, improving policy coordination, and, in general, reaching more “rational” decisions. Unfortunately, as Fritz Scharpf (1986) remarked more than 20 years ago, the “improvement of the policy making through better meta-policy . . . is littered with the skeletons of too
many practical failures of perfectly logical improvements of policy making institutions and procedures” (p. 182). The reason, he contends, quoting Wildavsky, is that “no amount of procedural innovation [is] able to exorcise the inherently political character of public policy choices” (p. 182).

Applications of Planning in Governing

The second purpose of a procedural approach to planning is more subtle. Bearing in mind the observation made by Lindblom that procedures are highly valuable in pluralistic political systems, as a way of preserving personal liberties and popular control, Melvin Webber has redefined the effectiveness of planning by saying that it does not lie in the fact that the plan gives the “right answers” to policy problems but rather in its ability to improve the process of public debate and public decision. Its purpose is therefore to help hierarchies make policy choices in an acceptable (and accepted) way. The value of planning as a set of procedural rules adapted to the problematic situations they have to tackle is therefore also an end in itself, as it enhances the democratic character of a given society. This approach has been influential in recent years—in its different versions variously labeled as communicative planning, participatory planning, collaborative planning, and deliberative planning—and has gained widespread acceptance in the urban and territorial planners community. However, even the most enthusiastic supporters of this approach cannot deny that this opening up of the planning process might actually entail the danger of powerful self-interested actors being able to influence the process away from the pursuit of common good in order to maximize their own short-term goals, thus frustrating the democratic value of the entire exercise.

Strategic Planning

At a different level, an attempt to revive the discourse on planning as a way of shaping future choice is the notion of strategic planning recently proposed in organizational theory and in territorial planning. This proposal is rather different from the one put forward by Lindblom, being basically centered on the concept of framing. Frames are, according to Donald Schon and Martin Rein, systems of meaning that organize what we know and provide conceptual coherence, direction of action, and a basis of persuasion. Strategies, therefore, are emergent social products and conscious attempts to create and discover such frames and are able to shape future actions through the persuasive power of their core concepts, as pointed out by Patsy Healey, following the work of Henry Mintzberg in organizational theory.

Planning, in its original meaning of deciding about future decisions, becomes again possible, taking into consideration both the problem of insufficient knowledge and the complexity of contemporary political systems. The clearest application of this line of reasoning is likely found in the practice of strategic planning at the metropolitan level as it emerged in the past 20 years. By and large, and with some variation across the cities, strategic plans are exercises based on the mobilization of all relevant actors in a given urban area, on the production of a shared long-term vision of the desirable future, and on an action plan for immediate action. The idea is that cities are not able to innovate and, therefore, run the risk of decline, both because they lack a clear direction and because of diffuse veto powers and a lack of trust between the relevant actors. The ability to produce a shared vision—that is, a sufficiently precise and distinctive image of the desirable future, whose value is immediately tested in the preparation of the action plan (i.e., a list of projects coherent with the vision and needing the cooperation of the main institutional, economic, and social actors)—can overcome the inertia and solve at the same time the knowledge problem (the uncertainty about consequences) and the political problem (the need to make the decision). The value of linking long-term vision with short-term projects, in fact, lies not only in testing the viability of a coherent and distinctive idea of a desirable future but also in the projects of the action plan that can represent quick wins that are able to show the value of cooperation and, therefore, to overcome distrust and increase social capital.

This reemergence of planning in the context of modern complex governance systems should not be overemphasized. These attempts are very difficult, certainly fragile because of unanticipated external shocks, and necessarily based on a segmentation of the problems either by policy sector
or territorially, as in the case of urban plans. The strategic-framing approach, according to its proponents and followers, is in no way devoid of risk and uncertainty, and its practitioners should therefore act with modesty and prudence.

But the idea of the rational, comprehensive plan that is able to allocate scarce resources in the most efficient way to the relevant societal priorities has been shown as what it is, a mythological notion, impossible to achieve, dangerous in its consequences, and, if one has to follow the postmodernist school of thought, a mere way of suffocating conflict by concealing the all-pervasiveness of political power and special interests.

**The Future of Planning**

However, like the mythological phoenix, planning in its more top-down, synoptic, and comprehensive version is perpetually reborn from its ashes, as one can easily see in business studies, new public management discourse, and political rhetoric. Despite more than 50 years of accumulation of knowledge, and the very apparent failures of those exercises, the myth of the “intellectually driven society,” to use Lindblom’s terms, in which comprehensiveness and perfect coordination of policy efforts can and indeed should be achieved, continues. This possibly means that, on the one hand, the “desirable imperfections” of democracy in contemporary complex governance systems have not been fully appreciated and, on the other, that the quest for neutral guidance through science and technology is deeply embedded in modern society and cannot be exorcized by any amount of social and political inquiry.

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See also Coordination; Participation; Public Budgeting; Rationality, Bounded

**Further Readings**


**Pluralism**

*Pluralism*, a term first used by Christian Wolff and Immanuel Kant, gained currency as a philosophical view of the universe in the early 20th century. American pragmatism, developed by William James, conceived the world in pluralistic rather than in monistic terms: interconnected but irreducible to unity, its parts self-governed, not a “block universe” but rather a “federal republic.” Philosophical pluralism, as John Dewey had observed earlier, acknowledged the possibilities of variety, of freedom, and of change. The concept’s applicability to political and cultural contexts was rapidly noticed by English and American thinkers: James’s pluralistic universe could be construed as a polity where groups, possessing inherent rights not conceded by the state, elicited individual loyalties and pursued social ends. The approach came to assume central significance both for Harold Laski’s pluralistic theory of the state and for Horace Kallen’s vision of a commonwealth of different ethnic groups and their cultures. Pluralism offered an analytical and a normative notion that responded to
the increasingly associative character of society, the rise of governmental interventionism, the lobbying activities of organized groups, the nascent of immigrant subcultures, and the maldistribution of political resources. This entry explains the concept of pluralism as it is used in political and cultural contexts. It then considers alternative conceptions that lead further into the theory of interest representation. The entry concludes with a look at the relevance of pluralism in the 21st century, particularly with respect to ethno-cultural groups and to all forms of inequality.

Positively, the concept establishes, first, the existence of a plurality of interests and corresponding social groups that, as latent centers of power, may organize into associations and, second, the transformation of this diversity into public policies through pressure exerted on each other and on governments. Normatively, the concept endorses the process of individuals turning to organization, the resulting formation of interest groups as subjects of democratic politics, and the sequence of group conflict, bargaining, and compromise that characterizes the shaping of public policies, on condition that basic rights and the principles of justice remain respected and protected.

Pluralism may thus be defined as both a descriptive and a prescriptive theory of individual participation by social association in the political process. Groups, in other words, are envisaged to operate as instruments, representing individuals rather than replacing them in the political process, thereby enhancing their chances for individual-centered democracy in a world of increasingly complex sociopolitical interaction. Political man acting through and in control of his freely established associations: That has been pluralism’s normative vision.

As with every representative arrangement, however, inbuilt tensions remain between the original individual interests and eventual group (i.e., leadership) action. To the extent that such group action today has come to be treated as a substitute for individual action in reaching political outcomes, the chances for individual-centered democracy are diminished. This inference is especially relevant because political resources enter the picture as a second pivotal element. Their grossly unequal distribution skews the political process in favor of powerful minorities. More often than not, from the viewpoint of the theory and practice of democracy, noncommitted or indoctrinated citizens who are caught in a web of hierarchical organizations are indicative of a less than satisfactory reality.

Over time, pluralism has vacillated between diagnosing severe democratic deficits in the political process and accepting the ongoing results of that process. Discussions of ethno-cultural pluralism have evolved largely separately from the debate on political pluralism and have raised additional thorny problems, which are discussed below.

**Political Pluralism**

Borrowed from James’s pragmatist philosophy, the term pluralism was first introduced into political science by the British Labour Party intellectual Harold Laski in a 1915 lecture delivered at Columbia University. Even before World War I, business corporations and industrial combines—the first multinationals among them—had risen to prominence, underscoring the unequal distribution of power between labor and capital. However, if continuing entrepreneurial hegemony seemed assured, a labor movement had, after bitter struggles, also emerged. Unions had been organized, and in most industrialized countries, the right to strike had been won.

Concurrently, the 19th century’s rigid class structure had started to dissolve. The working class was segmenting into numerous blue- and white-collar strata—groups, in fact—differentiated by vocation and attitude, by income and education, and, again, by grossly unequal influence and control both economically and politically.

The intellectual climate seemed to be ready for a “new” political concept, reformulating the notions of freedom and democracy in a determined attempt to attain the “good society” in the context provided by organized capitalism and the large nation-state. The answer was a theory of groups and associations; of positive, interventionist government; and of industrial democracy as a complement of political democracy, which Laski put forward between 1915 and 1925.

Laski’s thinking was considerably influenced by the ideas of the Fabian Society, an intellectual circle of “respectable” socialists—established, among others, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb and George Bernard Shaw—that had taken part in the formation of the British Labour Party. Another significant
influence was the argument of the guild socialists ("young rebels" in the Fabian ranks, building on French anarcho-syndicalism), particularly George D. H. Cole, who held that associations sprang up in society according to the logic of functional differentiation and that self-government, consequently, was identical with functional representation on every social level. That definitely included the workplace, the factory, the enterprise; in a nutshell, it represented the control of production by worker organizations, since individuals (having, by steps, been enfranchised in the political sphere) had remained "enslaved" by industrial autocracy in the economic sector.

Like Cole, Laski remained convinced that no political democracy could be without real being underpinned by an economic democracy. His concept focused on control (rather than on ownership) of the means of production and on the enfranchisement of the citizens (blue- and white-collar employees) of the political body that was and is the modern enterprise—its proper “stakeholders,” in today’s parlance. Nationalizations would leave the position of these employees unchaged. What they needed was a share in the actual decision making.

It required the Great Depression of 1929 and the circumstances of the formation of the British National Government in 1931 for Laski to move more clearly in a Marxist direction, without, however, as has been erroneously suggested, “rejecting” pluralism. Rather, by combining pluralism and Marxism, he proposed in 1937 to transcend the capitalist system, envisaging not violent action but, in a term Laski (1948) was to coin during World War II, a revolution by consent. Only in a classless society, he now contended, could authority be “pluralistic both in form and expression” (p. xii).

**Cultural Pluralism**

Likewise inspired by James’s philosophy, Kallen introduced the term cultural pluralism into the American debate in 1924. Immigrant subcultures were by then flourishing in the eastern United States, after nearly 15 million immigrants—mostly from Southern and Eastern Europe—had been admitted to the country between 1901 and 1920. Writing—not unlike Laski—between 1915 and 1924 and arguing against assimilating pressures and melting pot conformity, Kallen offered his vision of a federated republic of different nationalities. Convinced that self-government was impossible without self-realization, that the latter—in the sense of personal identity—hinged on the assertion of ethnic differences, and that society’s creativity would benefit from such heterogeneous strains, he proposed granting equal treatment to each ethnocultural tradition.

Both Kallen’s and Laski’s agendas favored a politics of inclusion, in the sense that policy making in pluralist democracies should embrace, on an equitable basis, as many societal interests as possible. Both were rediscovered—in substance, if not through explicit recourse—after World War II. Laski’s was rediscovered by the American political scientist Robert Dahl, who in his later works returned to pluralism the democratizing dimension that the British thinker had first supplied (industrial self-government—an employee-controlled economy—as the main prerequisite of a more participatory democracy). Kallen’s ideas were rediscovered by a succession of theorists, such as Tariq Modood in Britain and Will Kymlicka in Canada, who supported progressing toward multicultural acceptance, avoiding both fragmentation and conformity (a plural state, informed by a “politics of recognition,” as the vehicle for achieving true multicultural citizenship).

Even before Laski and Kallen, Arthur Bentley had presented an approach that essentially reduced human behavior to group action. Describing his effort as “strictly empirical,” rejecting both individualism and institutionalism, Bentley in his 1908 treatise *The Process of Government* aimed at introducing the group as the central analytical category. If the immediate impact of his book was negligible, that situation would change after a considerable number of pressure group studies had been published in the United States between World War I and World War II and after the New Deal reform period had finally established organized labor and organized agriculture as political players alongside business in bargaining for political benefits. Bentley’s work was resuscitated in the early 1950s by David Truman, Earl Latham, and other group theorists who judged that organized interest groups made up the principal ingredient of present-day government.

At the same time, against the backdrop of the Cold War, the need was felt for a “legitimating discourse,” according to Richard Merelman,
designed to explain and justify the political systems of the free world, meaning the United States and Western Europe. Stripped of most of its prescriptive implications, elevated to the status of an antitotalitarian (rather than antimonist) public philosophy, the concept of pluralism seemed to serve the purpose perfectly. The 1950s to 1970s were the heyday of the academic and political discourse on pluralist democracy.

In its entirety, the approach resembled nothing more than a modified marketplace model ("interest-group liberalism," in Theodore Lowi’s designation), with the individual replaced by organizational competition. Such “liberal” pluralism, while claiming to disregard considerations of a normative kind (and thus contrasting with Laski’s “radical” variety), was admittedly biased toward group leadership. It was, in fact, an elite concept, according to which leaders of associations conducted the process of organized pressure and bargaining, thereby controlling each other. Control among leaders, however, provided but one significant attribute of the political process. A second was control of leaders by means of periodic elections, holding them accountable to party or interest-group members and to the electorate at large.

Both Truman and Dahl (even in his early works) conceded that control of group leaders and access to government were determined, to a considerable extent, by income, education, and status. Crosspressures, resulting from conflicting group loyalties, might lead to political apathy. Political resources were unequally distributed, most conspicuously between business and labor. Capitalist democracies offered extensive opportunities for “pyramiding” such resources into structures of social power and political influence.

**Conceptual Alternatives**

In view of these limitations, two avenues for further theorizing suggested themselves. Both were pursued from the mid-1970s. One was to unequivocally embrace “realistic” Schumpeterianism—that is, fitting groups into a model of elitist democracy where governments would explicitly privilege the organizations of capital and labor as “partners” in policy formulation and implementation over associations with weaker political resources. Group leaders would manufacture consent for policies resulting from institutionalized “interest intermediation,” by which group leaders are able to reshape social interests in order to make them compatible with public policies. Group members would consequently be mobilized and controlled in a top-down process. Such conceptions of liberal (or neo-) corporatism, as they came to be labeled, were particularly developed in, and focused on, Western Europe, with Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch in the forefront of neo-corporatist writers.

Consequently, the neo-corporatist school of thought has insisted that the socioeconomic attributes around which interests organize are indeed unequally distributed; that existing inequalities are further reinforced by the politics of interest associations, not the least because certain associations, particularly organized business and organized labor, are granted privileged access to governmental decision making; and that political processes typically take the form of oligarchically structured interest intermediation through bargaining among leaders.

Proponents of corporatism and liberal pluralism alike have usually conceded that, more often than not, pluralist and corporatist arrangements may be found in mixed combinations (Germany provides a typical example). Both varieties may, in fact, not perform too differently, considering what liberal pluralism had to say about bargaining among leaders and about the possible pyramiding of unequally distributed political resources.

Because trade unions typically have difficulty in gaining the support of their members on agreements, the involvement of social-democratic parties as predominant players, able to secure trade union support, has been considered a salient requirement of corporatist structures. To the extent that governments led by social-democratic parties, accepting the notion of international competitiveness as the new social and economic orthodoxy, have joined conservative administrations in attempts at mediating the consequences of globalization by the pursuit of deregulatory and privatization policies, the social-democratic/trade union alliance has been eroded.

Neo-corporatism, moreover, always remained very much a Europeanist concept. With regard to the United States, observers continued to note that because of the political strength of corporate
business and the corresponding weakness of labor, no genuine interest in such an arrangement existed on the part of the American business elite.

The second conceptual alternative, according to Dahl, consisted in raising the normative question of how one might remedy the defects of pluralism. This meant conceiving pluralism in terms of a normative concept of democratic transformation as it had earlier emerged in England. Looking for possible solutions to what “authority in a good society” might be like, Dahl—ever more critical of institutional rigidity, social inequality, and political apathy—suggested a radical alternative to the present status quo. The large business corporation and the politically privileged position of corporate executives—the latter, as held by Dahl and his fellow critic Charles Lindblom, being subject to neither effective internal control by stockholders nor effective external control by governments and markets—became the major targets for the proposed participatory reforms. In a way reminiscent of Laski’s earlier efforts, but more systematically, Dahl argued that control over the political body, which the modern business enterprise has in fact become, should no longer rest with investors or managers but rather with blue- and white-collar employees. Starting from the premise that unequal social resources will translate into unequal political resources, Dahl’s program focused on diminishing the discretionary exercise of organizational power by the economically privileged minorities.

**Ethno-Cultural Pluralism**

Such radical pluralist propositions have been merging into the larger, more comprehensive debate on democratization, a spillover of democratic norms onto economy and society. The attribute “political” has thus been reconceptualized, now relating to any form of group decision making, whose democratization would be intended (as Amitai Etzioni has emphasized) to make all sectors of society more responsive to their members. As a caveat, it should be added, however, that the extent to which such visions of increased citizen competence and control might be accepted, internalized, and practiced by increasing segments of present-day consumption-oriented societies is far from clear.

On top of that, neoliberal maxims have become firmly entrenched with the progress of financial and economic globalization. Bent on cutting business regulation and welfare expenditure, and opting for the privatization of public services, governmental and market players alike have worked at reducing the size of government. The “reform” label has been put to service as a facade for such programs. Ongoing globalization has not simply diminished governance capabilities due to the pressure of multinational investors and foreign competition—it is governments themselves that have determinedly been restricting their performance. Such promarket state intervention urgently calls for institutional and attitudinal changes that would again reinforce political pluralism.

Concurrently, the migration component, which the process of globalization involves, has been further pluralizing and diversifying Western-type societies along ethno-cultural lines. Once again, the pattern of societal cleavages and linkages has been changing. The fragmentation of interests is being advanced, and traditional institutional loyalties are put in jeopardy. Socioeconomic inequalities and insecurities rank high among the factors that have been fueling the rediscovery of ethnic-based identification as a source of belonging among these increasingly multicultural populations.

When Kallen proclaimed a “democracy of nationalities” as the desired goal of cultural pluralism, he wanted individuals in every ethnic group to realize their inherent possibilities according to that group’s cultural traditions rather than being discriminated against by culturally privileged majorities. Two generations later, Giovanni Sartori stressed that pluralism, because it considered diversity a pivotal value, should first and foremost focus on cultural diversity, aiming at a “cross-fertilized” rather than a “tribalized” culture. Pluralist policies should accept (recognize) the cultural, religious, and linguistic heterogeneity of different ethnic groups, without inviting further societal segmentalization.

Strategies of differentiated group treatment (e.g., affirmative action procedures in employment and education, introduction of official multilingualism, a composition of political bodies reflecting the existence of various ethnic groups) may work to reinforce cultural pluralism. However, these policies do not maintain neutrality toward ethno-cultural differences. Remaining neutral would imply that discrimination on ethnic grounds
is legally prohibited while benefits are solely provided according to individual eligibility.

Most of the relevant debate has centered on the controversial question of how to balance individual against group rights. Might not any determined movement in the direction of group rights work to endanger individual autonomy and to bar individuals from opting out of their group if they wish to adopt ideas and practices running counter to their ethno-cultural heritage? To be effective, need not policies of differentiated group treatment show an awareness of the connection between economic and cultural power? A more equitable distribution of social and political resources might help individuals make meaningful choices, including the choice to exit a group perceived as confining.

A pluralist politics informed by a spirit of both political participation and social justice clearly would concede ethno-cultural groups some political standing and legal rights—but to what extent? Available options for overcoming ethnic cleavages include legal protection and public funding for the expression of cultural peculiarities, federalism as a form of self-government, and finally, group-based political representation, up to the complex arrangements of consociationalism (in which representatives of varied groups share decision-making power). However, consociational government has been shown to favor elite (group leader) predominance, arcane negotiations, and political immobilism rather than a more vibrant pluralist democracy.

**Pluralism in the 21st Century**

Persisting inequalities of socioeconomic (and, in addition, ethno-cultural) influence and control, equivalent to so many embedded participatory barriers, have keep resurfacing during this overview of research on pluralism and democracy. Resulting in unequal chances for the organized representation of interests and, hence, in limits to more robust redistributive and regulatory public policies, they will remain among the major issues bedeviling 21st-century democracy. As a powerful approach to inquiring into these issues, pluralism will be of continuing relevance, provided it retains the role of a critical political theory—critical, as it sporadically has been, of the status quo of concentrated economic, political, and cultural power. This, in tum, requires that two problems remain foremost among the concerns addressed by political science: first, securing broader societal participation—and thus, again, a more equitable representation of social interests—in the shaping of public policies and, second, reducing disparities in control over political resources to ensure the accessibility, accountability, and (in the final instance) legitimacy of a representative democratic government.

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**See also** Corporativism; Multiculturalism; Participation

**Further Readings**


**PLURALIST INTEREST INTERMEDIATION**

Modern democracies are determined by a great number of diverse interests. That is why structures and actors that show and assert individual social interests are necessary. Nevertheless, although
interests can be articulated individually, a collective and organized representation of interests, called interest intermediation, promises greater success. Because of this, organized interest intermediation plays an increasingly decisive role in the political process. It belongs to democracy “like the piston belongs to the cylinder” (Ralf Kleinfeld, 2007, p. 7), because without organized aggregation and articulation of interests, modern societies and democratic forms of government would not be able to act. Modern democracies show very different structures of interest intermediation. Corporate and pluralistic systems of interest intermediation can be distinguished. The interest of political science in this process lies, in particular, in the identification of regular patterns of interest intermediation and conflict resolution. However, before the process of interest intermediation is dealt with in more detail, the concept of interest must first be defined. This is followed by a discussion of major actors, their patterns of interaction, and the respective concepts in political science.

According to Carola Schulz (1984), interests can be defined as “action-relevant consolidations of needs which arise from the subjective perception of situations where a distinct feeling of want is present” (p. 15). For citizens’ needs to find their way into the political system, they must be articulated and organized. It is exactly here that political interest intermediation applies. Since political systems are social systems that make collectively binding decisions, it is helpful to bring in a theoretical perspective from systems theory in order to illustrate the process of interest intermediation more closely. Here, the classic model developed by David Easton can serve as a basis. To be sure, Easton’s model expresses a concept of democratic ideals, but it facilitates a brief representation of the procedural character of interest intermediation. For Easton, the decisive actors of the political system are the parties and interest groups, on the one hand, and government and the administration, on the other. Interactions between these actors are aimed at generating collectively binding decisions. Demands for such decisions are brought into the political system as inputs, processed where appropriate, and converted into outputs. At best, these outputs result in the fulfillment of these demands and thus enhance the legitimization of the political actors and therefore the political system itself. In turn, this may lead to new demands being brought into the political system in a feedback cycle. For this reason, Easton places both political demands and political support on the input side. In this context, politics can be defined as the process of the production and enforcement of obligatory cross-societal decisions.

Political demands are the necessary raw material for the political process. During their processing, however, problems can occur since, on the one hand, not all demands can be integrated and, on the other, not each demand for a collectively binding decision can be fulfilled. Demands can contradict each other, and a state’s resources are limited. According to Easton, for demands to enter the political system at all, structural mechanisms such as parties and organized interest groups are necessary. As such, they have an intermediate function between the political system and society at large.

**Actors of Political Interest Intermediation**

In modern democracies, various actors apart from political parties assume the task of aggregating and articulating the interests of the population. In this way, it can be ensured that the political system remains stable and can adapt to new tasks at the same time. Modern democracies rely on highly effective forms of interest intermediation from both a normative and a functional point of view. The high complexity of political interests and social demands makes the work of specialized actors of interest intermediation indispensable. An efficient system of political interest intermediation is the central precondition for the legitimacy of collectively binding decisions. Ideally, political interest intermediation, therefore, connects the contents of politics to the will of the sovereign and facilitates political decision making by reducing complexity.

Political parties continuously fulfill the function of interest intermediation since they are the only ones to work on cross-societal problems; but associations, churches, unions, social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other groups also represent important interests—even more so if they succeed in representing the total interest of their organized members. While individual interest associations usually attempt to influence the political process through lobbying, social movements attempt to prevent or reverse decisions or create social change through unconventional
actions. In addition, since the 1990s, in many countries, NGOs have played an increasingly stronger role in the intermediation of social interests. Similar to social movements, many NGOs claim to be committed to broader social values, but they also can be distinguished from social movements by their higher degree of organization.

The conditions of political interest intermediation have been changing more recently, however. Both exogenous and endogenous changes are responsible for this. On the one hand, the number of political-administrative actors has expanded (and thus the possibility for influence) through the formation of supranational institutions, such as the European Union. On the other hand, individualization and pluralization of social interests complicate their integration and organization. Thus, it is no surprise that a pluralization of the representations of interests can be observed, which is accompanied by a certain loss of importance of major traditional intermediate actors such as unions or employers’ associations.

Political Interest Intermediation as a Subject of Political Science

If we want to abstract from the actors and analyze interest intermediation from a political science point of view, it is useful to distinguish aspects of policy, polity, and politics. Since the intermediation of interests can be regarded as a permanent political process, it falls into the procedural dimension of politics. Yet the basis for interest intermediation lies in the principle of a liberal political order—the polity dimension. In this respect, basic freedoms are the freedoms of expression and association as well as the right to vote. The policy dimension is equally affected by social interest intermediation since government policies are strongly influenced by the interests of society (Ulrich von Alemann, 1987).

Due to the variety and conflicting nature of interests and the scarcity of resources, a pluralist democratic political process is continuously antagonistic. Although the disputes concerning the distribution of benefits, the satisfaction of needs, or the pursuit of ideals thus mean permanent conflicts, these must, however, not be conducted in violent ways, endangering the system as a whole.

This is an essential task of political interest intermediation. Thus, in political science, a conflict-regulating function is ascribed to the process of interest intermediation from which stability and legitimacy in Easton’s sense can arise.

Pluralist Interest Intermediation

A general distinction in political science is made between pluralism and corporatism as the two essential strategies of political interest intermediation. The concept of pluralism regards interest articulation, aggregation, and the fulfillment of demands as a continuous process. In the long run, this dynamic process leads, in the view of the protagonists of such concepts, to the achievement and maintenance of the common good for society. Pluralism in this sense can be defined according to Philippe Schmitter (1974) as

a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchical, ordered and self-determined (as to type of scope of interest) categories (and), which are not subsidized, specially licensed, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories. (p. 96)

On the one hand, Schmitter thus emphasizes the structure of interest intermediation determined by competition. On the other hand, he stresses the fact that such actors are neither supported nor controlled by the state. Pluralistic interest intermediation is, therefore, characterized by the voluntarism, spontaneity, and autonomy of the interest groups. Unlike corporatism, pluralist interest intermediation is not based on the agreed-on forms of negotiation between interest groups and the political-administrative bodies but rather on competition and conflict. From a pluralistic point of view, politics can therefore be regarded as resulting from social interests and the respective power of the mediating interest groups. In this process, the actors can compete relatively autonomously for the enforcement of their interests and take advantage of the resources available to them.
In this respect, interests that are capable of dealing with conflict and easy to organize have an advantage. This in turn leads to a decisive problem from the point of view of a normative theory of democracy: Interests that are difficult to organize and the interests of groups of lower significance have only a small chance of representation and intermediation. So, due to real existing pluralistic structures, capital and labor interests are favored in particular, and interests are not represented according to their importance for society as a whole. As opposed to the thesis of balanced interest implementation as a basis of the pluralist theory of democracy proposed by Robert Dahl, in particular, the fact remains that representation of interests in modern democracies is not balanced—and cannot be balanced due to their complexity and variety. Thus, it is not possible in the process of collective decision making for every citizen to have the same opportunity to express his or her interests. Such a representation (as complete as is possible) of interests of different social groups is, however, a condition of pluralist interest intermediation. Considerable legitimization problems can, therefore, result from the unbalanced interest representation of pluralistic structures. So the possibility exists that, on the one hand, the results of political decision making are no longer accepted and, on the other, that this disappointment can lead to the refusal of established forms of participation and intermediation mechanisms.

Here, it must be considered that the greater success of interests that are well organized is not necessarily a dysfunction of the political system but is rather the product of a pluralistic competitive democracy. The political administrative addressees of pluralistic interest intermediation have themselves the ability to guarantee, however, by means of law, a minimum of fairness in this competition for influence. Conditions of action for interest groups can be legally regulated, for instance, in the procedure of consultation in Switzerland. This procedure is part of the legislative process in which all important interest groups are to be consulted independently of their negotiating power.

For functional reasons, a corporate interest intermediation also can fulfill only a selective consideration of interests and thus perform only an inadequate representation. Here, the negotiation process is also determined by those interest groups having the strongest influence. The difference lies only in the mutual cooperation of interest organizations with the political-administrative actors. The problem of underrepresentation of certain interests, therefore, remains not only unsolved in this way but would moreover become firmly institutionalized.

The difference with regard to the pluralist interest intermediation lies rather in the enforcement of interests between the actors—which has less potential for conflict due to lack of competition. Because of this, an integrative effect for society can also be achieved by corporate interest intermediation, which is not subject to majority decisions. Furthermore, this mode of interest intermediation succeeds in providing a peaceful solution to class conflicts via collective negotiations between the state, employers, and trade unions. By contrast, the sluggishness, inflexibility, and status quo orientation of corporate interest intermediation is often criticized since it can lead to a blocking of reforms with many veto players. Corporate structures are, however, only partially possible in situations where social interests can be integrated on a high organizational level. As a result, the available corporate structures are often part of a more comprehensive pluralist system of mediation. In the literature, pluralism is usually regarded as a strategy superior to corporatism for the overcoming of socioeconomic crises and as a relative stability guarantee for democratic governments.

Since pluralism and corporatism are not only procedural strategies but are integrated into a country’s political culture via the context of ideological acceptance, a concrete form of interest intermediation cannot be imposed without consideration of the political culture. Yet the guiding values of compromise and consensus anchored in the political culture, and thus also in political socialization, further complicate interest intermediation in the sense of pluralistic competition.

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See also Corporativism; Interest Groups; Pluralism; Social Movements; Systems Theory
Further Readings


**Police**

The police is the institution in charge of protecting public order and repressing crime, and it is entitled to use physical force in order to meet these functions. Police institutions are the product of a long-term historical trend toward differentiation and specialization. Before the beginning of the 19th century, differentiation as a contemporary function of policing (e.g., keeping peace and combating crime and disorder) was in the hands of watchmen appointed from households or by family or tribal constables. This “private” policing occurred in several areas (e.g., China, main parts of Africa, and South America) before the Europe-led colonization process. Autonomous, professional, permanent—and in most cases local—police forces arose in the wake of urban growth and urban disorders, industrial disputes and riots, and crime fears. This institutionalization process accompanies a specialization process in the countries of continental Europe, where police imposed an ensemble of norms, rules, and measures to regulate the entire urban existence, from public hygiene to passport control, from milk inspection to supervision of libraries, and so on. If not in the hands of watchmen or private forces, such as dock bosses’ militia, the control of crime and disorder was only a small part of the duties of what then constituted the police. During the 19th century in continental Europe, police could specialize only in these functions because administrative law and jurisdiction regulated other aspects of social life at that time. This entry discusses the main distinctive features of police, especially in connection with the use of force; the trend toward specialization, especially with relation to efficiency; some of the most recent transformations; and the organizational differences between a central organization and a local organization.

**Key Distinctive Features**

From a more theoretical point of view, the police institution has two distinctive features. First, it is wholly instrumental: It is meant to perform a definite task, linked to crime and disorder, under civil supervision (i.e., the functional dimension of the police). Second, it is defined by its capacity to use physical force (i.e., the substantive dimension of the police). A crucial dimension of police relies therefore on its intimate relationship with the monopoly on physical force that Max Weber sees as the distinctive feature of the state. But this crucial dimension is at the same time oxymoronic, since (contrary to the military use of force), police force is expected to be legitimate (i.e., reasonable, proportionate, and based on consent). Robert Reiner (2000) asserts that, with respect to police action, the two terms consent and force are antagonists. The police can use force either in the context of a local breach of order (a contested arrest, an unlawful strike, or a riot) or in the context of a broader social or political breakdown resulting in great hostility against the regime in place. However, police legitimacy relies on consent from the public and/or the ruling regime.

On a more sociological level, the substantial affinity between force and the police has been questioned. Empirical evidence clearly shows that
the actual use of force is rather rare. Some police officers never use physical force throughout their career. On the other hand, trying to list and rationalize all the tasks ever performed by police officers is nearly impossible. Therefore, some theorists like John-Paul Brodeur (2007) are inclined to define the police as the only public organization aimed at “doing everything.” To do so, they use means that are illegal or unlawful if taken by ordinary citizens (from driving the wrong way on a one-way street to bugging phone devices).

Nevertheless, use of physical force is a central issue in police organizations because cases of abuse of force weaken the political legitimacy of the police. The beating of the African American motorist Rodney King in Los Angeles in 1991 by White police officers (and their acquittal on charges of excessive force 1 year later) led to urban riots in the United States. The death of two minority youths in France in 2005, who allegedly fled from the police into a power substation, where they were accidentally electrocuted, led to a 3-week-long period of urban unrest. Abusive arrests and stops-and-searches in London, Birmingham, and Liverpool also led to urban riots in British cities from the end of the 1970s to the mid-1980s. It is difficult to assess if substantial changes occurred as a result of these episodes of scandal and protest. Nevertheless, police organizations faced a legitimation crisis in the course of the 1970s, due to the emergence of urban disorders and/or race riots (in the United States, England, and France), on the one hand, and to the rise of property crime, on the other.

**Specialization Versus Efficiency?**

Contemporary evolutions of police organizations contribute to the empirical and theoretical dispute over the accurate definition of police. First, from the initial wave of modernization and professionalization (from the early 1970s onward), police institutions have experienced both an increased specialization and a commodification of the services they are expected to deliver. Both phenomena are closely linked with a legitimation crisis that occurred during the 1970s. Overspecialization has been implemented to cope with different aspects of crime and delinquency, leading police organizations to become an archipelago of diverse and isolated occupations (from drug squads to environmental crime enforcement and from juvenile delinquency units to transnational police experts). The increased use of surveillance devices and technologies has played a major role in this process. This evolution toward more segmentation into specialized operations and the increased importance of surveillance and proactive activities tend to make physical force a secondary if not purely metaphorical aspect of police work. Some analysts have underlined this phenomenon in stating that police are not violence workers but “knowledge workers,” noting the massive amount of data and information police officers are expected to sort out and analyze in order to conduct their tasks.

This trend toward an overspecialization, specifically in the most diverse domains of crime fighting, has not prevented a decline of police efficiency. Therefore, police organizations have commmunalized a certain amount of tasks, the implementation of which may differ among nations. Since the 1990s, there has been a trend toward a kind of network policing in which diverse private and public institutions or agencies are brought together to combat and prevent crime and urban disorder. Police officers are now civil servants confronted with private and public agents in different kinds of negotiation arenas. Several labels have been employed to describe these evolutions. The notion of “problems-solving policing” was first introduced at the beginning of the 1980s to encourage the police to tackle daily local problems such as loitering or drinking in public spaces, domestic violence, noise disturbances, and so on. Thus, police institutions began to focus on broader social issues rather than solely on major crimes. Facing the difficulty of implementing internal police reforms, local or (more rarely) central governments developed programs such as community policing and neighborhood policing, aimed at integrating police organizations into larger institutional structures and, therefore, at resisting police organizations’ tendency toward insularity and self-agenda. Moreover, the increasing pluralization of policing (the growth of private security forces, informal policing, vigilantism, the introduction of local police forces competing with state police forces, etc.) threatens the monopoly of the police in the prevention and repression of disorder. Network policing programs, such as community policing, provide an opportunity for the police
to become an integral part of the larger institutional structures and to work collaboratively within these structures to combat crime.

Recent Transformations

Other transformations have cropped up in the course of these evolutions. The first has been the introduction of regulations and guidelines issued from the new public management perspective into police organizations during the 1990s, in the wake of the broader public policy reforms initiated by the Clinton administration in the United States and the government of Tony Blair in the United Kingdom. A major focus has been control over police officers, the stress of individual accountability, and the diffusion of “better with less” management policies. As a result, police chiefs and captains devote a major part of their time to crime and activity statistics to comply with political and public expectations. Such management systems, whose real ability to cope with crime and security has been widely discussed in the literature on policing, have been exported throughout the world and adopted by countries and cities in very different ways. As in other agencies, one effect of this management system is the development of strategies that may lead to an increase in the bureaucratic insularity of police organizations and to a further public concern with the ability of police organizations to cope with real crime.

The second trend is the rising importance of law-and-order policies in the political agenda of many Western countries. Proving one’s ability to deal with crime and lead police forces tends to be a major personal asset in the political game. The fight against terrorism and international crime is vital to this trend. In combination with the gaming strategies developed within police organizations, this tendency sheds light on the fact that the police have a symbolic role that seems more and more important in today’s political systems.

Central and Local Organization

Police are in fact a part of the political system, in which they help consolidate the political legitimacy and resources of the (local or national) government. One must distinguish here between regimes in which police organizations are centralized under the direct command of the government (as in France) and countries in which police forces are essentially municipal (as in United States) or regional forces (as in Germany and Great Britain), with some specialized forces devoted to federal issues (e.g., organized crime, terrorism, and intelligence). Contrary to a widespread assumption in political science, the degree of centralization of forces is not correlated to the degree of corruption of the police by political forces. The Napoleonic model in France offers a striking example of police organizations heading numerous and opulent political intelligence and antiriot sections under the immediate leadership of the Ministry of Interior, which is always devoted to the political tasks of repressing protests, preventing public disorder, and influencing or shaping the political landscape. Municipal police systems in the United States, on the other hand, are characterized by a high level of what the U.S. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (the Wickersham Commission) in 1931 called “lawlessness in law enforcement,” because such police forces are considered to be part of the local political system and are under the direction of the mayor or supervisors of the municipality. The wave of reform of police forces during the 1950s resulted in a high level of “professionalism”—that is, quasi-military police departments with high standards of integrity. As it appears, the nature of the political involvement of police organizations is strongly linked to the organization of the political system.

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See also Bureaucracy, Street-Level; Governance, Urban; Institutionalization; Judiciary; Legitimacy; New Public Management; Performance Management; Rights; Violence

Further Readings

Policy, Constructivist Models

Social constructivists depart from the assumption that reality is what Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann call social reality. To say that reality is socially constructed is to say that social reality is the product of human ways of knowing and communicating. Social constructivists, therefore, draw attention to the processes and ways through which the world is represented in language. They feel that the access we have to a reality outside human symbol systems is highly problematic. This entry describes the relevance of this perspective for understanding public policy.

Language, to take the most obvious symbol system, does not simply report facts. Things get their meanings through language, irrespective of whether they exist outside language. And the meaning of anything always exists in particular social contexts; meaning is always contextual, contingent, and historical. Since human beings always depend on their symbol systems—and the theoretical frames they build with the help of these—to make sense of the world that surrounds them, the way they interact with the world is the result of socialization and, more generally, of human history. We act toward things on the basis of the meaning they have to us. We tend to forget the contingencies of the social constructs and the forces that shaped them. Therefore, constructivists remind us that social reality is always in flux, even if the processes through which change comes about might be slow at times.

Kinds of Social Constructivism

Social constructivist thinking started from the sociology of knowledge and has spread through the social sciences. Since the 1960s, it has flourished and has been further elaborated on with the help of a wide variety of (sometimes conflicting) insights from—among others—Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistics, the phenomenology and hermeneutics of Edmund Husserl and Hans-Georg Gadamer, the poststructuralist thinking of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, and the pragmatism of Richard Rorty. There are “stronger” and “weaker” forms of constructivism, differing in their theories on realities beyond the social. Strong constructivism claims that a reality beyond the socially constructed ones might exist but that it is not relevant to talk about it in terms of an objective reality because we cannot have direct, unmediated access to it; it believes in “multiple truths.” A weaker form of constructivism holds on to the idea of an objective reality (of brute facts and/or of “one truth”) that is within reach of human knowing. It is important to keep in mind that it is not the (material) world, as such, that is referred to when we talk about social constructions but the perceptions of this (material) world. Material objects, including all of nature and human artifacts, are assigned a certain place in the social process of the construction of meaning.

Social constructivism can also be situated in terms of the position of the subject who knows and the object that can be known. If one claims that the knower and knowledge are somehow separable, one takes a dualist position. Social constructivists often take a monistic position. That is, they argue that the knower and the world that the knower tries to understand are part of the same. Put differently, the findings are the result of an interaction between the knower and what there is to be known. Crucial in this interaction is the process through which the knower crafts observations into meaningful fact with the help of a theoretical framework. This leads social constructivists to suggest that there is no Archimedean point, “no view from nowhere,” from which we could see the essence of the things that make up our social realities. We can only see reality from a cultural, social, political, historical, or other perspective. This is why we encounter multiple social realities, each of which is created and sustained with the help of a particular set of values and shared only by the members of a certain interpretive community.

Social Constructivist Research

Various kinds of constructivism are in use in policy science. The most well-known are frame analysis,
narrative analysis, and discourse analysis. Although the levels of analysis vary, all three have a common focus on sense making and a special interest in language. Their aim is to uncover, understand, and possibly explain sense-making practices (e.g., voting and warfare), processes (e.g., crises), and institutions (e.g., agencies, governments, and nations) in political life.

Framing is the effort of drawing attention to some parts of situations while ignoring others. As such, it becomes a central part of the political act of problem setting. Problem definitions inevitably predispose certain solutions, and vice versa. Narrative analysis, often inspired by literary theory and philosophers like Mark Johnson and Alasdair MacIntyre and historians like William Whyte, starts from the idea that sense making is often done with the help of storytelling; through stories, people enact themselves and their context. In stories, characters who engage in actions in a certain setting can be identified. Some characters might be given the role of villains, while others are depicted as heroes, victims, or innocent bystanders. At the same time, acts are attributed to human beings or other entities. The depiction of the relevant setting, for instance, a crisis situation, also helps shape the story. The way the various elements of a story are ordered creates a plot that can help the audience grasp what is going on. With the help of frames and narratives, political actors describe and explain reality in conflicting ways, arguing for often opposite courses of action. In policy analysis, scholars like Emery Roe and Michel van Eeten designed and used tools (e.g., reframing problems and creating metanarratives) that help actors in the policy process to set new agendas, create understanding of other actors, and overcome conflicts and intractable policy issues.

Discourse analysts, often building on poststructuralist efforts such as that of Foucault or on post-Marxism versions developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, have engaged in critical analyses of political practices, often at a more abstract level than those using frames or narrative. A discourse can be defined as a set of ideas, concepts, or categories that is produced in certain social practices. A discourse analysis shows which discursive objects and subjects emerge in social practices and which conceptualizations are used. Consequently, what is left out in social practices also emerges. Since it is not the purpose of discourse analysis to retrieve what actors exactly meant or felt when writing or speaking but more to focus on the effects of texts on other texts, there is usually not much space for agency; this is called decentering of the subject. Many discourse analyses are historical, like Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical studies. There are also social constructivists who have worked on metaphor analysis and category analysis—for instance, in the deconstruction of ethnicity categories in policy making.

Social Constructivist Policy Making

Social constructivism, nowadays, plays a role in various social science disciplines, such as political science, public administration, and policy studies. In public administration, it was fueled by postmodernism, which was introduced in 1988 by a group of scholars who were members of Public Administration Theory Network (PAT-Net) and published in the journal Administrative Theory and Praxis. Feminist thinking has also been a strong stand in constructivist thinking. The rise of social constructivism in the policy sciences can be traced to roughly the same period. While Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln introduced a constructivist approach to evaluation, Deborah Stone and Giandomenico Majone kicked off the “argumentative turn” in policy sciences in their books on the role of rhetoric in policy. This perspective was further elaborated on in a volume edited by Frank Fischer and John Forester and has been developing ever since.

But how does one put a social constructivist view on policy making into practice? John Dryzek was one of the first to answer that question. In a seminal contribution to the field, he opposed instrumental rationality (i.e., the belief that it is possible to find the right means to the just ends) and the related objectivism (i.e., the belief that neutral standards exist for doing so). Instrumental rationality and objectivism not only lead to Max Weber’s iron cage and Jürgen Habermas’s colonization of the lifeworld but are also unable to supply usable policy analyses, and they actually obstruct progress in the social sciences, in Dryzek’s view. The alternative method of policy making is what Dryzek calls discursive and democratic rationality based on practical reason instead of on power. Participatory democracy should make this possible.
Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram think that “degenerate policy making” is the root of all evil. Degenerate policy making is the manipulation of images for the politician’s personal interests. It leads to the construction and punishing/rewarding of ingroups and outgroups and to the abuse of science for political reasons. Invoking science also leads to apathy and alienation among the citizens, as the experts come to monopolize the debate. Schneider and Ingram’s own approach, which they called policy design, is based on seven principles that should mend these faults.

Also concerned with the dysfunctional role of the expert in the policy process is Fischer. Based on John Dewey’s argument, Fischer argues that the role of the expert is to help the citizen decide and not to decide in his or her place. The expert should try to design deliberative forums in which citizens, with the help of experts, can participate in constructing policy. More recent contributions to deliberative policy analysis argue for a “decentered governance” by networks of stakeholders. Those engaged in this project strive to map such policy making in all its varieties, analyzing it without looking for general laws or essences.

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See also Constructivism; Deliberative Policy Making; Discourse Analysis; Policy, Discourse Models; Policy Framing

Further Readings


Policy, Discourse Models

Discourse analysis draws on central insights from post-Marxism, poststructuralism, and radical versions of interpretative analysis and pragmatist philosophy. Discourse analysis aims to transcend the objectivist, reductionist, and rationalist bias in mainstream social science theory by emphasizing the role of discourse in shaping social, political, and economic relations. Discourse is commonly defined as a more or less stable and well-defined system of rules, norms, and significant differences that is produced in and through political struggles and provides a contingent horizon for the construction of any meaningful subject, object, or action. Many discourse theorists have been preoccupied with developing a sophisticated theoretical framework, but a growing number of discourse analysts have become interested in applying the concepts and arguments of discourse theory in problem-driven empirical analysis, and the study of policy and policy making is at the top of the agenda.

A discourse approach to policy analysis can help us better understand the discursive conditions of possibility for formulating particular policies, and it draws our attention to the role of identity construction and the negotiation of meaning in policy implementation. In contrast to mainstream policy analysis, discourse analysis highlights the semantic, performative, and rhetorical aspects of public policy making. Moreover, it insists that policy problems, policy solutions, and governmental rationalities are discursively constructed and therefore contingent. Finally, it aims to uncover the power struggles and political conflicts that shape the discursive conditions for the formulation and implementation of public policy. Whereas discourse models inspired by the works of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas tend to focus on the role of public deliberation and tend to see power and conflict as a source of distorted communication,
discourse models inspired by the French philosopher Michel Foucault tend to view power and conflicts as constitutive of policy discourse.

Traditional approaches to policy analysis hold that interests and institutional constraints provide the key to understanding the formulation and implementation of policy. As such, it is often assumed that policy can be explained in terms of the interests of rational and resourceful actors and the institutional rules, norms, and procedures that constrain the choice of rational actors. Discourse models of policy take a different approach in arguing that interests are incomplete, ambiguous, and shaped by the contingent discourses in which they are embedded. Likewise, discourse models tend to define institutions not only as a recursively validated system of regulative and normative constraints but also as a broad set of values, symbols, rituals, forms of knowledge, codes, and vocabularies that facilitate and guide action. This means that interests cannot be taken for granted and that institutions are not only staging the choice and interaction of the relevant policy actors but also seem to be scripting their actions.

There are several important precursors to the development of a constructivist discourse approach to policy analysis. Some rational choice theorists have relaxed the classical assumptions about full information and unlimited cognitive capacities and have elaborated the traditional model of individual choice subject to institutional constraints. Douglas North, for example, has introduced the notion of "mental models" to explain the choice and action of the entrepreneurs who are responsible for constructing and changing institutions. The feasible options and their payoffs are determined not only by institutional rules and norms but also by the subjective perceptions (mental models) of the institutional entrepreneurs. Mental models are acquired through processes of socialization and learning, and they help rational actors interpret and explain their changing environment. However, the relation between the objective interest of rational actors and their subjective perceptions remains unclear, and if the latter is constitutive of the former, it becomes difficult to maintain the basic assumption that choice is derived from interests. Moreover, if the mental models are shaped by collective ideas and ideologies, the methodological individualism at the heart of rational choice institutionalism is undermined.

While most rational choice institutionalists are reluctant to embrace the idea of objective interests being shaped by subjective perceptions, Paul Sabatier (1988) goes all the way in viewing policy output as a result of political decisions informed by competing advocacy coalitions that are composed of public and private actors sharing a set of normative and causal beliefs. The value priorities and causal assumptions that unify a particular advocacy coalition are transformed by policy learning, which is instrumental for generating new insights that will only be incorporated into the core beliefs of an advocacy coalition if they further its main policy objectives. Although the notion of advocacy coalitions clearly emphasizes the role of ideas and beliefs in interactive policy making, there is hardly any account of the discursive construction of the ideas and beliefs. Hence, there is no explanation of what regulates the production and advancement of particular ideas and beliefs.

Historical institutionalists have also emphasized the role of ideas in public policy. Ideas tend to replace interests as drivers of political action, and institutions are seen as a constraint on the impact of ideas on policy making. New ideas are adopted to the extent that they respond to concrete policy problems, resonate with the interest and ideas of key actors, and are brought to the attention of relevant public agencies that can implement new ideas. As such, the reception of new ideas is explained with reference to objective socioeconomic and sociopolitical conditions. However, the discursive embeddedness of new policy ideas, the struggles about the content of the new ideas, and their rhetorical and argumentative framing are not really taken into account.

Sociological, or organizational, institutionalism breaks with the idea that social and political action is driven by the actors’ calculation of the consequences of alternative options and offers a cultural approach that emphasizes the role of normative and cognitive frames and meaning systems in defining appropriate action. Policy change is seen as a result of a bricolage, through which concepts, rituals, scripts, and values are recombined. In the development of new policies, legitimacy plays a pivotal role. The basic assertion that interests, rationality, and information are socially constructed within a
particular institutional context is shared with the new discourse models of policy, but a major difference is that whereas sociological institutionalism tends to treat cultural conditions of action as a static equilibrium, the discourse approach to policy analysis is more interested in accounting for the formation and transformation of discursive structures through conflicts.

Ideational institutionalism is a new branch of institutionalism that focuses on the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes through which these ideas are generated and communicated to the public (Colin Hay, 2001). Rather than seeing ideas as constituted by specific cultures, ideational institutionalists view ideas in relation to the discourses that provide the resources for legitimizing particular ideas. Ideas are shaped by discourses, which are in turn shaped by institutions that determine who talks to whom about what, when, and where. In state-centered polities, ideas and discourses are communicated to the public to secure support, whereas in decentered polities the relevant actors must first establish consensus about the content of the policy discourse and its embedded ideas. By placing ideas within a broader discourse, ideational institutionalism provides a crucial stepping stone to discourse models of policy. However, foregrounding singular ideas and the conception of institutions as an extradiscursive constraint separates ideational institutionalism from a discourse theoretical approach that focuses on the impact of discourses constructed through hegemonic struggles, which take place in a sedimented institutional context that is dislocated by new events.

Discourse models of policy focus on the structural power exercised when the formulation and implementation of policy are conditioned by hegemonic discourses that are shaped and contested by political strategies. Foucault’s governmentality theory provides a good starting point for analyzing the discursive contexts for policy making. Governmentality theory aims to answer the key question of “how to govern and be governed” by studying how government, in the sense of the “conduct of conduct,” has been problematized in modern society and how successive problematizations have transformed the collective and institutionalized mentalities, rationalities, and technologies. Governmentality defines a particular “art of government” that conditions the concrete “acts of government.”

The object of regulation, the regulating and regulated subjectivities, the implicit telos of regulation, and the available governance techniques are formed by the ruling governmentality (Mitchell Dean, 1999). Foucauldians use the archaeological method to analyze governmental discourse and deploy the genealogical method to analyze how governmentali
ties are constructed in and through myriad struggles that include and exclude particular concepts, identities, and practices.

Another important discourse approach to policy analysis is provided by critical discourse analysis (CDA), which has been used in studies of policy responses to globalization and the politics of New Labour in Britain. According to Norman Fairclough (2001), CDA aims to address social and political issues and problems by conducting a close study of texts, interactions, and other forms of semiotic material in order to detect the changes taking place around key issues. CDA emphasizes the role and impact of ideology in policy making. Ideology is not defined in terms of the comprehensive and coherent worldviews but in terms of a discursive naturalization of contingently constructed meanings and identities. Particular groups and elites may have an interest in reproducing and propagating particular ideologies as they might help them maintain, or even enhance, their political power.

Whereas Foucault’s governmentality theory and Fairclough’s ideology analysis study affect the discursive contexts of policies, the theories associated with the “argumentative turn” in policy analysis focus on discursive strategies that shape the form and content of public policy and guide its implementation. Discourse frames policy problems and policy solutions, and the political actors struggle to include and exclude particular themes, concepts, and ideas. In the discursive battle, institutionally situated actors advance particular arguments and aim for acceptance of these arguments from other actors by mobilizing their ability to argue a persuasive case (logos), their reputation and credibility as speakers (ethos), and the rhetorical skills that arouse particular emotions (pathos). A hegemonic policy discourse can structure the context in which particular phenomena are understood and defined (“discourse structuration”). Over time, the hegemonic discourse may become sedimented into a set of concepts and organizational practices that are taken for granted by social and political actors.
(“discourse institutionalization”). The crux of the argument is that hegemonic discourses often hinge on the construction of a story line that provides a short, condensed, and often metaphorical expression of how the policy discourse defines problems and solutions. A story line simplifies the discursive space and helps bring about discursive closure. Social and political actors who subscribe to a particular story line form a discourse coalition. Adherence to a particular story line tends to facilitate mutual learning and compromises while excluding competing problem definitions and alternative policy solutions.

Poststructuralist discourse theory, synthesized by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and summarized by Jacob Torfing (1999), offers a conceptual and argumentative framework that further develops the ideas implicit to the argumentative turn. First, the notion of “floating signifiers” helps analyze instances of conceptual ambiguity where an expression has different contents and meanings and therefore enables policy actors to use the same vocabulary to talk about different things. Second, the notion of “articulation” provides an understanding of how meaning is partially fixed within discourse through practices that establish a relation between elements such that their identity is mutually modified. Finally, the concept of “social antagonism” identifies how policy discourses are unified with reference to a threatening otherness that both tends to stabilize the discursive system and provides a source of potential disruption.

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See also Advocacy Coalition Framework; Policy Analysis

Further Readings


Policy, Employment

The realm of employment policy includes a diverse set of public programs and regulations that seek to improve a population’s employment experience. In particular, employment policy attempts to reduce employment-related risks for the population, to improve the overall quantity of employment opportunities available, and to promote the quality of established employment relationships. Within employment policy, one commonly distinguishes between “passive” and “active” labor market policies: While passive policies focus on attenuating the consequences of market rule, for example, through offering unemployment insurance that guarantees income support during periods of unemployment, active policies intervene in the labor market to help the unemployed gain employment. Conceptually in between, labor laws regulate diverse aspects of the employment relationship, including issues such as nondiscrimination and unfair dismissal.

Seen through a sociological lens, employment policies are an integral part of any stable labor market. Given the strong empirical and conceptual links of employment policies with education and social security policies, as well as with the regulation of industrial–labor relations, the boundaries between these policy realms are quite fluid. This entry first reviews the functional needs for employment policy in theoretical terms and then describes the evolution of employment policy making in the advanced industrialized countries from its early beginnings in the 19th century through the tumultuous interwar period, the golden age of welfare capitalism in the 1960s, the stagflation of the 1970s, and, finally, the contemporary period.
**Functional Needs for Employment Policy**

In contrast to simple product markets, the labor market requires special employment policies that help sustain the market’s legitimacy in the eyes of the population and produce a high level of economic performance. Indeed, while standard products can easily be allocated as commodities through market mechanisms, this is far more difficult in the case of labor. The units of the labor market neither are created for the purpose of exchange nor can they be treated as disembedded from their social surroundings; instead, they are human beings with social and physical needs. As such, labor is a rather imperfect “commodity,” with a supply function that is very different from standard, less socially embedded commodities. For instance, at both ends of the supply spectrum, labor supply tends to show a negative correlation between prices and quantity, which is the opposite of the standard relationship: At the bottom end, wage reductions can prompt workers to work longer hours in pursuit of the particular income level necessary for a desired living standard; at the higher end, wage increases can induce workers to choose more leisure. But such behavior is not the only deviation from standard commodity markets. Equally crucial for policy making and unusual compared with other commodities, employers cannot autonomously decide how to use their purchased labor; instead, they always depend on the repeated and active collaboration of their workers.

Given these characteristics, all advanced capitalist countries have created social protection mechanisms in their labor markets to reduce the dislocations associated with market allocation, safeguard the stability of society at large, and thus support the long-term viability of the labor market as an allocation device. Moreover, governments have also tended to allow for the formation of unions as workers’ collective organizations, the establishment of collective wage-bargaining systems, and the creation of mechanisms for exercising stakeholder voice within the firm. Such measures have reduced the frequency and scale of worker revolts, which were once common.

In capitalist democracies, the functional requirements for employment policy are particularly high, because employment policy plays an important role in “decontesting” the organizing principles of capitalism and those of democracy. Employment policy serves as a means to make compatible (a) employers’ attempts to effectively and efficiently use human resources and (b) the upholding of civil and social rights that democracies guarantee to all their citizen. At times, policy solutions can be found that simultaneously serve both democratic and capitalist logics, such as with governments’ recent attempts to broaden access to higher education, which serves to increase the equality of citizens’ opportunity as well as to provide companies with more much needed human capital. However, in other instances, democratic goals have taken clear precedence, such as when some countries sought to promote “workplace democracy” and the “humanization of work” or when citizens are unconditionally guaranteed basic income support that might undercut work incentives.

Finally, employment policies have an important role to play in improving economic performance. Consider, for example, workers’ investments in the acquisition of skills that can only be used in particular economic activities. The success of individual companies and whole sectors depends on the availability of such specific skills; however, without institutional guarantees by companies or governments that reduce the risks associated with specific-skill investments, specific skills might be undersupplied, and workers might choose to invest in general skills instead. Institutional guarantees that can encourage specific-skill investments include employment protection rules supporting long-term employment, a collective wage–bargaining system buttressing real-wage stability, and an unemployment insurance system providing workers with wage-related unemployment benefits in case of job loss and releasing them from the need to accept any available job.

In summary, by helping the population deal with employment-related risks, employment policies are the basis for a stable labor market, and if designed well, they can contribute to the effective and efficient employment of the population.

**A Short History of Employment Policy**

Public employment policies have their roots in the establishment of large-scale labor markets during industrialization. The goals and content of these policies have since then evolved, driven by the development of new political answers to changing
socioeconomic challenges. As such, the evolution of employment policies has been at the center of the changing character of statehood and the shifting regulation of large parts of social life. Importantly, even though individual countries’ responses to common challenges have always included similar features, each country has traveled on a distinct and contingent national developmental trajectory, in which feedback from earlier policies has tended to bound policy innovations in later periods. The next section highlights both common trends and national particularities.

**Building Welfare States**

Industrialization during the 19th century gave rise to the “social question” of how economic progress could be maintained in the face of the political and ethical threats emanating from the abysmal conditions under which the working class was employed. The answer was the progressive development of welfare states, with employment policy being a core part of a new active form of statehood. Over time, and framed around the nation as the community of fate, prudent political leaders set up social protection institutions to provide collective mechanisms for covering the costs of progress and to manage employment-related risks. The first labor market regulations and social insurance programs were set up before the end of the 19th century; by the 1930s, unemployment insurance and the first active labor market policies were established.

Some governments addressed new social needs more quickly and some more slowly, some to preempt pressure from below, some in reaction to such pressure, and some out of ethical conviction. A leader in the expansion of suffrage, Britain had established labor market regulations, such as on working conditions in certain industries, maximum working hours, and age thresholds for legal employment by the later part of the century. At the same time, Germany’s monarchist government sought to calm revolutionary impulses through carrot-and-stick policies that included both the outlawing of the Social Democratic Party’s activities (1878–1890) and the introduction of statutory social insurance schemes for health (1883), accidents (1884), and disability and old age (1889).

The establishment of national unemployment insurance systems took a little longer. In the United Kingdom, a mandatory public unemployment scheme was established in 1911. In Germany, an unemployment insurance scheme was introduced in 1927, replacing a system of income support set up in 1911. In the United States, national unemployment insurance was established in the mid-1930s as part of the Social Security Act, a piece of legislation conceived to limit what were seen as the dangers of modern American life. But the eligibility and disbursement of unemployment benefits can also be organized in another way: Named after the Belgian city where it was first implemented, the Ghent system is a voluntary scheme that grants unions the responsibility to administer unemployment benefits. With the exception of Norway, the Scandinavian countries run Ghent unemployment insurance systems to this day, although the regulation and financing of these systems has changed over the years, with the countries’ national governments regulating and subsidizing union-administered funds.

Active labor market policies were introduced on a larger scale in the interwar years, prompted by widespread unemployment in the wake of the Great Depression. For instance, in the United States, several New Deal agencies were set up to provide employment until the economy improved. One of these agencies, the Works Progress Administration (WPA), became the nation’s largest employer. Offering almost 8 million jobs between 1935 and 1943, the WPA carried out public works projects all over the country, from constructing new public buildings and roads to running arts and literacy projects. Only the country’s entry into World War II brought an end to the efforts of the WPA and other agencies.

Parallel developments were under way in Europe, albeit under very different political auspices. In Germany, a democratic government introduced a voluntary labor service in 1931 as a means to reduce unemployment. A few years later, the National Socialists established a 6-month mandatory scheme that all young men, and after 1939 also all women, had to join. Finally, facing totalitarian threats from both the East and the South, the Scandinavian countries completely reoriented their national economic policy regimes around a more interventionist state during the 1930s. Based on explicit political deals between Social Democrats and agricultural parties, policy solutions were
developed that served both the struggling working class and farmers. For instance, in Denmark, the so-called Kanslergade Agreement laid the foundation for extending the length of collective agreements for currently employed workers without wage reductions, initiating public works programs and winter relief for the unemployed and their families, granting farmers both an export-stimulating currency devaluation and agricultural price supports, and consolidating the existing social insurance and poverty relief measures into a comprehensive program of old-age pensions and health, unemployment, and accident insurance.

The Golden Age

The postwar period brought a 30-year-long economic boom and the golden age of welfare capitalism. Nurtured by a broad discourse about social rights, of which the 1944 Beveridge Report in Britain was just one example, and sustained by system competition with communism, the workers in Western democracies received their peace dividend in the consolidation of the mixed-economy welfare state, which sought to combine economic growth, full employment, social partnership between capital and labor, and universal welfare programs. Based on the efficiency increases and employment opportunities provided by the widespread adoption of Fordist mass production techniques within industry and supported by political commitments to wage compression in the economy more generally, the pleasures of middle-class life became accessible to broad majorities of the population, even for those workers without higher levels of education.

Within the realm of employment policy, macroeconomic Keynesian demand management was put into the service of guaranteeing the full employment of all willing man power. This was feasible because the newly founded international economic regime around the Bretton Woods institutions tolerated policy making geared toward domestic concerns and allowed for cheap public borrowing at rates of interest below those of economic growth. Moreover, in part, Keynesian demand management was also necessary: Having replaced the traditional craft organizations with Taylorist principles internally, companies recast themselves as vertically integrated corporations, geared to making use of economies of scale and “pushing” standardized products into the market over long production runs. Such large-scale manufacturing came with a degree of rigidity in the economy, with drops in demand being difficult to absorb for companies, leaving the potential for initial downturns in demand to accumulate into bigger crises.

Reacting to Stagflation

With the collapse of the international financial regime and simultaneous increases in unemployment and inflation, the 1970s heralded the end of the Keynesian era. A series of increases in oil prices provided the advanced economies with negative supply shocks, which traditional methods of economic policy making could not effectively address. Keen to get wage-push inflation under control, many governments experimented with income policy that sought to provide a ceiling for wage increases. Moreover, in exchange for wage moderation in the short term, some governments offered increased pension levels that would provide workers with delayed benefits in the long term. In these quests, countries’ relative success depended very much on how much their macroeconomic institutions facilitated strategic coordination between the government, organized labor, and capital, as well as the country’s interest rate–setting central bank. Here, countries with strong macro-corporatist institutions had certain advantages.

Particularly, in the pluralist English-speaking countries, which were institutionally least equipped for effective tripartite coordination between the government and the organized social partners, conservatives’ ideas about how to proceed became increasingly popular. Conservatives located the source of current economic problems in welfare states’ institutions themselves. Moreover, the advanced democracies’ populations were increasingly tired of shouldering the tax increases associated with states’ weakening finances, and tax revolts occurred in places as far apart as California and Denmark. Talk about sclerotic institutions and the problems of bureaucracy eventually became mainstream. On that basis, government action was increasingly seen as the problem rather than the solution; moreover, rather than being perceived as positive agents for increasing worker welfare, unions came to be seen as self-interested,
rent-seeking, and, ultimately, harmful lobbies. These ideas helped bring Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan to power; in moderated form, they animated the election victories of the political center-right in other countries.

Breaking with demand-side-oriented policies during the postwar period, the advanced democracies’ governments sought to improve their economies’ supply sides through deregulation throughout the 1980s. Often, however, liberating market forces and retrenching the welfare state proved to be a more difficult undertaking than imagined, because electorates continued to support many social insurance programs. In this context, it was symptomatic that the U.S. Social Security retirement program in the United States became known as the “third rail of American politics,” promising certain political death to those who would seek to reduce it. While cuts were eventually made even in Social Security, these remained comparatively moderate in contrast to the cuts in employment policy programs that primarily benefited the poorer and politically less vocal strata of the population. Labor market programs that were linked to the U.S. War on Poverty during the 1960s and to the public employment initiatives launched in the 1970s fared particularly badly, as they came to be easy targets for politicians who framed the former as special-interest policies for racial minorities and the latter as vehicles for corruption.

While it was broadly agreed that welfare states had grown to their limits, countries diverged in how staunchly they walked the deregulation walk. For instance, the policy record of Germany’s center-right government at the time was quite different from that of Thatcher or Reagan. In line with some other countries, Germany strongly embraced early-retirement policies as a means to reduce long-term unemployment and to buy peace in labor relations. In the early 1980s, policymakers introduced the possibility for people aged 60-plus to claim a full pension, as long as they had been unemployed for more than a year. Helped by such regulations, overall employment in Germany declined by an average of 0.3% annually from 1980 to 1990; by 1988, less than one out of every three German men between the ages of 60 and 64 still worked. Finally, when hit by the seismic shock of unification in 1990, the government followed a familiar adjustment pattern, unburdening the East German labor market of excess labor through early retirement, job creation, and training schemes that brought down the official East German unemployment rate to half of what it would otherwise have been.

**Increasing Labor Market Flexibility**

Driven by the continued deepening of economic globalization, economies’ turn toward services, and—maybe above all other reasons—persistent long-term unemployment, the debates about necessary reforms of employment policies further intensified throughout the 1990s. Inspired by neoclassical economic analysis that saw labor market rigidities at the root of Europe’s unemployment problems, international experts—including those from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—recommended increasing the flexibility of labor markets. Given that the future of economic growth depended strongly on further increases in labor productivity, some analysts called for the removal of regulations that stood in the way of the most efficient employment of labor resources, including employment protection rules. Others stressed the importance of increasing labor market participation, partially as a means to support economic growth but also to increase the ratio of the active to the inactive population. The latter was seen as necessary to sustain the working population’s continued ability to finance social security benefits and services for those unable to work in the context of rapid population aging. Finally, while most discussions about flexibility tended to stress the importance of expanding employers’ choice sets, changing employment patterns had also prompted workers to demand employment regulations that offered increased flexibility for themselves: For instance, with double-earner households having replaced male-breadwinner arrangements as the norm, parents have been looking for innovative ways to combine work and family life.

These discussions prompted a series of complex changes, the breadth of which is probably best illustrated in the European Employment Strategy: Through a continued monitoring and benchmarking process, the European Union seeks to encourage its member states to increase the role of preventive labor market policy, put in place measures that
strengthen workers’ employability and adaptability, equalize employment opportunities for men and women, as well as invest in education and lifelong learning.

The biggest change in employment policy across all rich countries has occurred in how states treat their unemployed workers, with governments of all colors having embraced new measures that seek to activate the unemployed and reduce the time they spend in unemployment. Moreover, the changes have been so far-reaching that many sociologists see them as heralding a lasting transformation in the character of the state, that is, one in which the state withdraws from its commitment to guarantee comprehensive welfare independent of the market and moves toward a commitment to support individuals’ attempts to succeed in the market.

Emphasizing that citizens do not only have rights to claim but also responsibilities to fulfill, politicians strengthened job search requirements for the unemployed and introduced stronger penalties for the repeated rejection of job offers. In many countries, unemployment benefits have become less of an entitlement geared toward sustaining a family’s lifestyle and ever more a basic job seeker’s allowance (to use the official British term). Finally, workers on benefits are increasingly expected to quickly accept job offers that pay below—or offer fewer responsibilities than—what former employment positions had provided. This is an important change from earlier practices that gave workers more time to look for employment appropriate to their professional status and level or focus of education.

Importantly, the implementation of activation policies differs strongly between countries. While activation in some countries can often be quite punitive, more progressive versions of “workfare” policies seek to empower individuals through providing extensive placement services, setting up individual action plans, and offering training opportunities. For instance, in the United States with its (neo)liberal institutions, the welfare-to-work regime set up in 1996 has strong elements of control and punishment, which some critics view as being harsh on benefit claimants. In contrast, running a workfare policy regime within the context of a social democratic universal welfare state, Denmark seeks to reach all potential workers, not just benefit claimants; moreover, caseworkers are supposed to offer activation options that can increase individuals’ capabilities. Finally, Germany as a Christian democratic country falls probably somewhere in the middle, offering more substantial income support than the U.S. system but having strongly cut back on training offers for the long-term unemployed. Common to activation approaches in all countries is the adoption of new public management techniques in the public employment services that administer activation policies.

As this overview about employment policy has sought to show, the history of employment policy has been both long and full of changes. Cutting-edge political science work on employment policy seeks to uncover the political drivers of diverging national developments and to conceptualize the links between the neighboring policy realms of employment, welfare, and education.

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See also Neo-Corporatism; Welfare Policies; Welfare State

Further Readings


Policy advice does not exist in a vacuum. If it did, it would be irrelevant to political affairs, of only abstract interest. Instead, policy advice can only be understood in relational terms. It is offered by some to others. Therefore, a number of central—and closely interrelated—questions can be asked:

1. What is public policy advice?
2. To whom is such advice provided and why?
3. Who offers policy advice?
4. Why is policy advice needed?
5. How is policy advice provided?
6. What constitutes “good” policy advice?

What Is Public Policy Advice?

Policy advice is a generic term referring to a wide range of activities within the processes of governmental policy making. These include research, both formal and informal; the writing and presentation of policy memoranda laying out policy choices and options; discussions and negotiations on public policy issues; and the monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of policies.

Policy advice may usefully be distinguished from political advice, though there is no clear and unambiguous distinction but rather shades of gray. Whereas policy advice relates to the content of public policy, and may often address complex technical issues, political advice comprises counsel that addresses considerations of political costs and benefits that may be borne by those policymakers who hold elected office in liberal democratic societies. All high-level policy advisers are usually required to be sensitive to the political context of the advice they provide.

For heuristic purposes, the so-called public policy process is often depicted as a policy cycle moving sequentially from problem definition, to policy formulation, to policy implementation, to policy evaluation, and then perhaps back to problem redefinition and policy reformulation, and so on. In reality, the process is usually not that tidy, and various stages of the cycle can occur simultaneously rather than sequentially. As the American political scientist Carl Friedrich (1940) famously put it, “Public policy is being formed as it is being executed, and it is likewise being executed as it is being formed” (p. 6). Nevertheless, policy advice can be directed at one or all of these stages of public policy making, and advisers may be specialists in particular areas, most notably perhaps in policy formulation, in policy implementation, or in policy evaluation.

To Whom Is Policy Advice Provided?

The principal answer is that policy advice is provided to those whose formal responsibility it is to make public policy. Generally speaking, in parliamentary systems, this is the main function of the political executive, headed by a prime minister whose government must enjoy the confidence of the legislature, from which it is drawn; and in republican constitutional systems, in which the executive and legislative arms of government are formally separate, it is the president and his or her top executives. It also includes members of the legislature in both types of system, whose role is to scrutinize and debate public policy and to pass the laws that enact it.

Again, as indicated by Friedrich’s observation, some policy advisers may simultaneously be the recipients of advice, especially those who hold senior bureaucratic offices. They themselves will often be receiving policy advice from their organizational subordinates.

Who Offers Policy Advice?

In Western democracies, just about anyone can offer policy advice. A policy advice continuum could show that at one extreme are citizens who make their views known to governments on public policy issues and at the other extreme are those who earn their living by offering policy advice to
governments. The former may have no expertise in a policy field except—and it can be an important exception—the “expertise” embodied in their own understanding of their interests and aspirations and their personal familiarity with a particular policy’s effect on them. The latter is dominated by bureaucratic officials and policy analysts and advisers working in government agencies.

Between these two loosely defined extremities can be found a wide range of people who offer policy advice to government decision makers. These people include, in particular, academics in tertiary education institutions, researchers in various nongovernmental policy think tanks, analysts and lobbyists working for interest groups, and independent private consultants. In the case of academic researchers, those most likely to offer policy advice to governmental authorities are those who engage in what James Coleman (1972) calls “decision-oriented,” as distinct from “conclusion-oriented,” research. The former is an explicit guide to action, attempting to connect the academic world with the world of political action. This is often a fraught endeavor for both parties.

Why Is Policy Advice Needed?
The total absence of public policy advice in any political system would imply the existence of a single dictator dependent solely on his or her own counsel for the decisions that he or she takes. That has probably never been the case anywhere.

Instead, policy advice is needed to better inform the policy decisions taken and to try to ensure that the prospects for policy effectiveness are maximized and the risk of policy failure minimized. This is because public policy is purposive in nature, at least in its most explicit form, rationally designed to attain intended and finite outcomes or to achieve, modify, or maintain certain standards of performance over time. Governments universally are required to formulate public policies, often in the face of high levels of technical complexity and uncertainty, and in doing so, they must depend heavily—but by no means exclusively—on often sophisticated bodies of theoretical knowledge, much of which will be generated by technological and scientific research. For these reasons, there has been a huge growth over the past several decades in most Western democracies, particularly in the United States, of what might be called the “policy analysis industry”—producing rapidly increasing numbers of policy analysts and advisers in public organizations who have been trained and educated in public policy and associated disciplines in tertiary education institutions. Whereas before World War II the study of public policy focused largely on why and how governments made policy, analysis of policy, since then the focus has become much more normative and prescriptive, analysis for policy.

How Is Policy Advice Offered?
Policy advice can be offered formally or informally. Most of what has been said above refers to the formal offering of policy advice through established and managed institutional arrangements, such as those between, in parliamentary systems, cabinet ministers and their senior bureaucratic advisers, or in a republican system, such as that of the United States, between the president and his or her top appointees in executive agencies. Advice can be offered in formal memoranda or verbally (which has perhaps become a more common practice because what was once considered confidential advice is now more publicly accessible through official disclosure legislation).

Decision makers seeking policy advice can, however, do so outside the formal institutional arrangements, at their discretion (and with sensitivity to political risk). The bureaucratic reforms that took place in several Westminster parliamentary systems in the 1980s and 1990s—such as New Zealand and Australia—were intended, among other things, to render policy advice more “contestable,” that is, to ensure that cabinet ministers were less dependent on the counsel provided by their top bureaucratic advisers.

What Is “Good” Policy Advice?
Policy advice in liberal democracies ideally aspires to satisfy two main criteria: to be open and politically contestable, on the one hand, and to be rational, on the other. The two are not necessarily always compatible. In his seminal article, “The Science of Muddling Through,” Charles Lindblom (1959) recognized this tension in arguing that the test of “good” policy itself can be that it achieves its objectives or that those contributing to
its formulation can agree to act together, even though they may not agree on the objectives a policy is intended to achieve.

Thus, good policy advice can be demonstrably instrumental in shaping “successful” policy, in that the desired objectives are achieved; or in securing political coalitions of the “policy willing” to ensure that action itself takes place; or in achieving some combination of both. Policy advice may be seen to be good in political terms—by a government, by a cabinet member, or by a minister—but not by others, whether they be policy analytical peers or people affected by or who have an interest in the particular policy.

As Lindblom (1977) shrewdly observed, “A good defense for a bad policy will be that it is the result of a process in which everyone was heard” (p. 256). This insight speaks to the importance of genuine consultation in democratic policy processes, in the interests of effective coalition building. Consultation can itself be an important form of research, involving the interviewing and surveying of interested and affected parties, carried out by policy analysts and advisers.

The word policy itself may suggest that in contradistinction to politics, policy is apolitical. But such a claim cannot be sustained. Peter Jackson (2007) forcefully argues that “policy advice and its knowledge bases are ideological in nature and it is pure obscurantism, pretence and conceit to suggest that it is ‘objective’ knowledge, that it is independent of political or social interests and without moral considerations” (p. 263). While this assertion may be seen by those of a more technocratic, or antipolitical, disposition as extravagant, it is not difficult to defend.

The clients of policy advisers more often than not have to march to the beat of a political drum, which is not always well understood by those who find it difficult to understand the inevitable tensions between the norms of democracy and rationality. Often politicians may be less inclined to hear arguments that run counter to what they “know” to be true or desirable, even when those arguments are supported by logical reasoning and impeccable evidence. These latter qualities, as desirable as they are in themselves, cannot always carry the day.

Policy making is generally based as much on beliefs as it is on evidence. The politicians who are held publicly responsible for it are required to act, more often than not, rather than to reflect and may—for reasons perfectly rational in themselves—bemoan what they see as “paralysis by analysis.” For their part, policy advisers soon learn that their craft demands a willingness to make acceptable trade-offs between the need to be technically dispassionate and objective and the requirement that they also be politically relevant. They may not always admire politicians, but they must learn to understand them. The converse is equally true.

Neither quantitative nor qualitative methods of analysis and research have any monopoly on the quality of policy advice. Rigorous analysis that can form the basis of sound policy advice, however assessed, is not confined to the application of quantitative techniques. Disciplined and rigorous thinking is also a central requirement in qualitative research—for example, in applying the “lessons” of history to current policy issues (Richard Neustadt & Ernest May, 1986). In any event, good policy advice will depend on grounded experience, discerning judgment, and intuitional wisdom as much as on rigorous analysis.

Finally, policy advice must be kept open to revision in the light of changing circumstances, unfounded assumptions, and poor judgment. It should embody a capacity for ongoing learning, resisting any tendency to become self-fulfilling in its effects. And while it may aspire to wisdom, as a category that transcends data, information, and knowledge, it may also reflect some understanding that wisdom itself inheres in an intuitive sense of the interconnectedness of things in the complex and uncertain world of public policy making.

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See also Constitutionalism; Historical Memory; Ideology; Interest Groups; Judicial Decision Making; Parliamentary Systems; Policy Analysis; Policy Cycle; Policy Evaluation; Policy Formulation; Policy Process, Models of

Further Readings
Policy Analysis

Policy analysis is a term that is applied to a wide variety of practices and intellectual approaches and that cannot be reduced to a neat definition. The relationship between intellectual approaches and practice is not clear. Certainly, there is a dominant paradigm that sees policy analysis as an exercise in applied social science, in which the analytic method of the social sciences is mobilized to enable governments to make the optimal choice, and graduate programs in policy (particularly in North America) elaborate and refine the knowledge and skills required for policy analysis in this sense. But even those who are trained and employed as policy analysts find a disjunction between the methodology in which they have been trained and the demands of the job, and there is an undercurrent of anxiety among analysts about the extent to which their analysis is used and uncertainty about whether, and in what way, they should involve themselves in policy practice. So it is difficult to give an unambiguous definition of policy analysis as a field of study or of practice. It is conventional to distinguish between analysis of policy and the analysis for policy, and we will begin with this distinction. But it will become clear that the diversity of perceptions of policy analysis reflects the different ways in which we think about policy, mobilizing multiple and overlapping frameworks of meaning to make sense of what we see and what we do, so we will need to dig deeper to get a fuller understanding of policy analysis. Working through these various usages of the term will be like peeling an onion, though we hope to do it without too many tears.

Analysis of Policy or for Policy?

The distinction between analysis of and analysis for reflects an attempt to separate observation from practice and, in particular, to distinguish policy analysis as a specific form of applied social science from the broader field of the study of government. Analysis of has tended to be the less significant branch, perhaps because its focus on the analysis of process made it hard to distinguish from traditional political science. At one point, there was a tendency for the study of government to be renamed “public policy,” with the work of government being seen as the production of policy and the study of the process being “policy analysis.” This rested on a perception of policy as a process of official problem solving, which was widely shared but which later came under scrutiny from what was called the critical or interpretive approach to policy analysis (which is discussed further in this entry). It was also challenged (less directly) by the governmentality approach deriving from the work of Michel Foucault, which looked beyond the implied question of “what is the best way for the government to solve this problem” to ask how situations became problems, who could or should address them, what modes of practice are seen as appropriate responses, and in what way these situations recede from the ranks of problems that claim public attention.

Policy Fields

Much of the analysis of was focused on specific policy fields: health policy, transportation policy, environment policy, and so on. This interpretation of policy analysis shares the assumption that government is a process of official problem solving, and the task of policy analysis is to identify the problems, the participants, the responses, and the outcomes. The analyst is seen as the source of expert knowledge on what has been done and could be done, and the focus is on what is described as the “substance” of policy—problems and putative solutions—rather than on the process. Here, the distinction between analysis of and analysis for has tended to fade, as the outside observers who become expert in what has been done are often seen as sources of advice about what should be done (and in any case, tend to have strong views on this topic whether they are asked or not). At the same time, those employed as policy analysts tend
to become more specialized, experts in a particular field (and increasingly, engaged in it and committed to particular approaches) rather than detached technicians used to compare policy alternatives with one another and concerned to give an “objective” answer. This perception of policy analysis as “knowing about” a particular policy field is widely shared—among academics, practitioners, and the wider public—and underlies much of the writing with policy in the title.

The Call for a Policy Science

But the main game in policy analysis has not been about the subject matter but about method. The origins of policy analysis as an intellectual approach and a field of practice are often traced back to the United States in the aftermath of World War II, when Harold Lasswell called for a “policy science” that would be problem focused, interdisciplinary, and explicitly normative. The focus on policy and analysis would, it was felt, “lift the game” of the American political system so that it would be driven by a focus on problems and outcomes rather than by techno-bureaucratic inertia and partisan allocation and become both more transparent and effectively democratic. The policy analyst, by applying the social sciences, would produce expert and objective advice on the questions confronting government. At the same time, the existence of this technology of critique would empower the “outsiders” in government, strengthening their ability to challenge the operations of government by creating a discourse of instrumental rationality in relatively transparent terms.

Policy Analysis as a Field of Study

Through the 1950s and 1960s, policy analysis took root in the United States, both as a body of knowledge and as a field of practice. The early policy analysts were likely to have PhDs in economics or operations research and to come from institutions such as RAND in California. But soon graduate schools of public policy emerged, offering master's degrees (comparable with MBA). These graduate programs were more oriented to political science, but the core courses in policy analysis that they usually offered elaborated a technology of choice grounded in economics, with the task of the policy analysis being to identify a number of options; to estimate their feasibility, cost, and likely impact; and by making the appropriate calculations, to determine the optimal course of action. The methodology was grounded in (usually unspoken) assumptions—that policy activity consists of dealing with discrete and context-free problems, that government is composed of “decision makers” who are recognized as being responsible for any given problem, that their sole concern is to solve the problem, and that calculations from welfare economics are recognized as determinant in arguments about the best course of action. The work of the policy analyst was to use this methodology to determine the optimal course of action and to communicate this to the “policymakers”—”speaking truth to power,” as Aaron Wildavsky, the founding dean of the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley, put it. The teaching of these institutions was supplemented by conferences, journals, and the formation of a professional association, the Association for Public Policy and Management (APPAM). APPAM conferences became major meeting places for the intersection of policy analysis as a field of study with policy analysis as a field of practice, and its journal has been a showcase for exercises in the systematic evaluation of options. By the turn of the century, it was confidently claimed that policy analysis in the United States had “come of age.”

Policy Analysis as a Field of Practice

What was less clear, though, was just what it was that these policy analysts were doing. The initial perception had been that they would be detached scientific experts who could be called in when required, or if they were to have a permanent presence, it would be in a small unit close to the top, where they would be “advising the Prince.” This was the way Robert McNamara sought to use policy analysis as U.S. Secretary of Defense in the 1960s, seeing it as offering a systematic and impartial appraisal of the ambitions of the military chiefs. But this could set in motion a dispersal of policy analysis through the wider world of governing: If chief executives were using policy analysis as the basis for their choices, it would be only sensible for executives at the next lower level to employ their own policy analysts to try to negotiate with the
For this reason, policy analysts became common at lower levels in the organization, and in business associations and nonprofit organizations, to facilitate their dealings with government. Increasingly, policy analysts found themselves not so much advising the prince as negotiating with policy analysts from other organizations. Rather than being experts in choosing between courses of action, they became experts in particular fields of action, such as child care or urban mass transportation, and, increasingly, advocates of particular approaches to these areas of concern. The technologies of choice in which they had been trained became not recognized ways of identifying the optimal course of action but “dueling swords” to be used as resources in encounters with policy analysts and others from other organizations. And the work of policy analysts was often only loosely connected to advising decision makers, covering everything from background research for legislators to public education campaigns to lobbying for particular public policies.

Policy Analysis and Policy Advising

In the development of policy analysis, the focus was on the application of the canons of the social sciences to generate the basis for a decision maker to make the optimal choice. It was assumed that this would be what the decision maker wanted, and policy analysts expressed frustration when their carefully crafted solution was not adopted. But leaders in government found that “problems” were not neatly set up for them to address like a golf ball on a tee but were part of a continuing flow of activity involving a range of participants who might have divergent perceptions of the nature of the problem, its significance, and what response would be appropriate and whose responses were in any case shaped by their experience of past dealings with the other participants and their expectations about future dealings. These leaders might feel that the knowledge that they needed was not so much a calculation of the optimal outcome as guidance about the best way to manage an ambiguous, contested, and continuing field of activity. Policy workers found that they were concerned as much with the strategic management of the policy issue as with the systematic comparison of options, and in many cases, their work was described as “policy advising.” Some writers have stressed the importance of distinguishing between analysis (seen as detached and scientific) and advising (seen as more engaged, experiential, and judgmental). Others built the diversity and conflict into the analysis, looking for formulae that would incorporate the divergent perceptions and agendas of the participants into the calculations in the hope that they would accept the outcome because their views had been “taken into account,” although it was commonly found that trying to resolve conflict through formulae was not successful because the conflicting parties simply used the data from the analysis as ammunition in the continuing conflict. But this extension of policy analysis into the management of policy conflict was done through formulae or advising based on criteria drawn from experience: It raised for policy workers the question of whether they saw policy analysis as a technical input into the policy process or as a continuing and committed engagement with it.

For some policy workers (and writers), the technical skill of policy analysis is seen in terms of the analyst’s understanding of the process—the situation as well as the problem—and the task for analysis as “in these circumstances, how can we achieve the most satisfactory outcome?” Policy analysis becomes less the selection of the optimal outcomes and more an exercise in skilful maneuvering in a crowded terrain, involving an understanding of the participants, stances, and structured processes as well as the substance of the policy issue, with policy analysis as a more or less formal exercise that might be mobilized in support. In this perspective, books on policy analysis are less concerned with analytic method than with street-smart guidance for the practitioner, though recently there has been more research (particularly in Europe) on how policy workers approach the task of making these strategic appreciations of the question and the extent to which this generates an experience-based analysis that might counter the instrumental calculations and projects of traditional American policy analysis.

Evaluation: The Policy Analysis That Got Away

The first generation of policy analysts in the United States was trained in the expert appraisal of
alternative courses of action, and the methodology for making these appraisals became a standard part of the graduate programs in policy that emerged in the United States. It was essentially based on welfare economics and sought to calculate the net utility gain from each of a limited number of alternatives—usually before the event (ex ante) and sometimes after it (ex post). This developed into a distinct field of knowledge and practice called evaluation. It can be argued that this had its origins in the assessment of educational practice, but it gained its impetus in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in the United States, as the instrumental use of grants by governments (particularly central governments) became more common and was increasingly accompanied by requirements that the performance of the grantee agency be subject to independent evaluation. This reflected the increasing appeal of principal–agent theory in government. It had been common for governments to give financial support in various ways to, for instance, religious or community bodies carrying out charitable works, but in the later years of the 20th century, this support was seen as the means for government to contract with agents to achieve known and specified outcomes. The charitable bodies were defined as the agents of government, and evaluation was seen as the means whereby governments could check that what they had paid for had been delivered. The methodology of these evaluations drew broadly on the research methods of the social sciences, applied in a framework of instrumental rationality: What were the objectives of the program? How could these be measured? Were the specified outcomes achieved? In this way, it was argued, the systematic analysis of the social sciences could be mobilized in support of the pursuit of policy goals.

But as with policy analysis, beneath the development of methodologies for evaluation lay the tension between detachment and engagement: Is the evaluator to be an inspector (a detached part of the apparatus of control) or a coach (a committed part of the team)? The central officials who commission evaluation may see it as a means of exercising control over the evaluated, but on the ground, inspectors tend to enter into trading relationships and develop shared understandings with the subjects of their scrutiny. Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln (1989) have argued that there has been a shift over time, from a detached inspectorial form of evaluation, which they called “third-generation evaluation,” to a more supportive and negotiated “fourth-generation” type, but while there is some evidence to support this argument, it is challenged by the increased use of quasi-contractual relationships in government and the demand for “objective” measures of performance, which suggest that the inspectorial evaluation is alive and well. The explanation seems to be that there is an inherent tension between inspection and collaboration, but both have their part to play in the action, with the internal logic pointing to practices of collaboration and the external logic calling for the presentation of evaluation in terms of detached inspection.

**Policy Analysis as Applied Knowledge**

The last subcategory of analysis for might be called applied knowledge—that is, where policy analysis is seen as generating the sort of knowledge that is needed for decision making. Certainly, there are often research bureaus established within government in specific areas such as health policy, industry policy, or agriculture policy, and this can be seen as evidence of a need for specialized analysis of policy areas. In some cases, though, there seems to be a tendency to wind down specialist units within government and rely more on the ad hoc use of consultants. Also, the evidence that political leaders seek the advice of the subject experts within the tent, or that it constitutes a distinct form of analysis, is not very strong, and institutional analysts like James March and Johan Olsen would argue that this sort of explicit gathering of knowledge is not so much to inform the decision makers as to reassure the audience that the decision was appropriately made.

Perhaps more significant is policy analysis as oversight: the mobilization of analysis for a more comprehensive and overarching interrogation of the work of government. Sometimes high-level policy analysis and review units are established in government, such as the United Kingdom (UK)’s Central Policy Review Staff in the 1970s. The argument is that a small unit, not involved in the operations of government and reporting to the top-level leaders, will be able to generate an analysis that takes in the whole of government activity, identifies
the interconnections, and focuses on outcomes and alternatives. This may be so, but there are not many examples of these units, they tend not to be very long-lived, and it is difficult to discern a distinctive mode of analysis emerging from them. Often, governments prefer to commission a one-off independent review of a policy area (to which they can pay as much or as little attention as they like) rather than to have systematic review built into the normal expectations of government. It can also be argued that now the claims for the merits of overarching policy analysis carried out ad hoc by high-level special units have been supplanted by the broader based advocacy of evidence-based policy as part of normal expectations.

Practicing Analysis, Analyzing Practice

Clearly, policy analysis is a term applied to a diversity of intellectual approaches and forms of practice. Because it is a concept that is mobilized in practice, its meaning will reflect its utility in facilitating practice as well as in its contribution to the analysis of practice. The idea of policy analysis is important in validating the activity of government, part of a set of rituals by which society assures itself that human existence is built around intelligent choice. But the forms of practice that count as policy analysis vary, reflecting the fact that “policy” itself is made up of a complex overlap of meanings that are manifest in an interplay of accounts. Hal Colebatch argues (2009) that it is helpful to see policy in terms of the interplay of accounts of authoritative choice, structured interaction, and social construction. Authoritative choice accounts present policy in terms of governments making decisions, structured interaction accounts see it more as the outcome of continuing interaction by stakeholders, and social construction accounts focus on the “collective puzzling” about what is normal and what is problematic, what demands action, and what sorts of action are appropriate. Each of these accounts of policy makes meaningful and legitimate a distinct array of practices, to all of which the term policy analysis can legitimately be applied. To make sense of this diversity of practices, then, we need to consider the nature of these accounts and the sort of policy analysis that they validate.

Policy Analysis in an Authoritative Choice Account

The dominant account of policy is that it is an exercise in authoritative choice: It is whatever government decides to do or not to do. This focuses on the episodes of attention in governing that give rise to rituals of choice—making decisions, authorizing programs, allocating resources, and so on—and underpins the perception of policy analysis as a technology of intelligent choice: gathering data on the problem, identifying alternative ways of responding to it, calculating the costs and benefits of these alternatives, systematically comparing options, and advising the decision makers of this information to enable them to make the optimal choice. Once the choice has been made, the same technology can be applied to assess whether the action solved the problem—evaluation.

In general, policy analysis is seen as an activity that precedes the choice (or that, in the case of evaluation, follows closely in its footsteps). Its knowledge base is the technology of selection, and its focus is on the decision process, not on the functional knowledge of the operational staff that tends to be relegated to a secondary place: The functional experts may propose, but the policy analyst is needed to evaluate their proposals, drawing on skills of selection and choice. But the separation of the technology of choice from operational knowledge can never be complete, and the demand for evidence-based policy links the field knowledge of the functional expert to the choice expertise of the specialist policy analyst, imposing on the functional specialist a requirement to demonstrate the instrumental efficacy of the proposed course of action and on the analyst a demand to identify the optimal course of action. The complexity of government also gives rise to a supporting role in policy analysis for the “process manager,” the expert in procedure who can identify the steps that need to be taken in order to translate a decision to act into a correctly formulated and approved act of state.

Policy Analysis in a Structured Interaction Account

The authoritative choice account sees the task for analysis as enabling the policymakers (unspecified) to make the optimal informed decision. The
structured interaction account, though, focuses on the variety of participants, all of whom contribute to the process, but few can bring it to a close with a “decision.” These participants are likely to have distinct perceptions of the nature of the problem being addressed, what could be done about it, and how important it is. In this account, the task for analysis is to identify the participants and their stances, discover the extent of shared meanings and understandings and divergent and conflicting ones, and explore the discourses, practices, and locations through which mutually acceptable outcomes could be pursued. It is more like diplomacy than laboratory science, seeking to discover a basis for concerted action among participants who are not necessarily seeking to solve the same problem. It is concerned to facilitate consultation and negotiation, and here it overlaps with the process work of inter-organizational communication, which has in many cases become a cottage industry in its own right, with consulting firms becoming adept at organizing “public consultation” exercises in which policy concerns or (more commonly) proposals are subject to structured discussion by nonofficials.

Here, we can see that the cognitive and the social element of policy analysis are closely related to one another: Sharing an understanding of the policy problem makes it easier to work together toward an agreed outcome, and people who are accustomed to working together are likely to develop shared understandings. In the 1970s, scientific concern about the climatic implications of the emerging hole in the earth’s ozone layer led, extremely quickly, to international agreements to prohibit the use of chlorofluorocarbons in refrigerators. Peter Haas argued that this remarkable piece of policy development was due to the policy activity of an international network of scientists who shared an understanding of the problem and were all able to convince their home governments to act in concert with the rest of the world; he called this an “epistemic community” (from the Greek episteme—“knowledge”): The knowledge defined the community. But we can also see that in any policy area, there will be a range of participants who are all interested in the policy area but from diverse perspectives and knowledge bases. In agriculture policy, for instance, there will be agriculture bureaucrats, farmers’ organizations, unions of agricultural workers, transporters, marketers, journalists, academics, and so on. Groupings such as this are not epistemic communities in Haas’s terms, because they do not start from a common body of knowledge, but the more they work together over time, the more they develop shared understandings about who should be involved in the policy field, how to talk about it, and what sorts of action can be contemplated, and as this happens, they come to form a “policy community” of participants who recognize one another’s legitimate expectation of a place at the table and who share an interest in securing a mutually acceptable outcome and a form of discourse that is likely to lead to this. In cases such as this, the forces for social cohesion lead to the development of modes of discourse that in turn strengthen the cohesion.

The recognition of the importance in the policy process of shared understandings has sparked a distinct school of interpretive or discursive policy analysis, which argues that much of the work of policy analysis is concerned with the negotiation of meaning, often in contested and ambiguous situations, and focuses attention on the way that meaning is constructed and communicated in policy work. Studies of relatively low-level workers (e.g., town planners, police, or social workers) find them engaged in constructing the links and negotiating the meaning through which governing is accomplished and argue that this communication and meaning construction is an integral part of policy making. Beryl Radin found that while U.S. policy analysts tend to define their role as “advising the Secretary,” they often spend most of their time negotiating with policy analysts from other agencies, with the policy analysis techniques they learned in graduate school being deployed as “dueling swords” in these encounters, and she argues that policy analysis has moved from an ambition to “speak truth to power” to developing the capacity to speak truths to multiple powers.

Policy Analysis in a Social Construction Account

Policy cannot be reduced to decisions by “the authorities” (authoritative choice) or deals between stakeholders (structured interaction) but rests on shared perceptions of what is normal and what demands action, who can speak with authority, what sorts of action are appropriate, and who can be held responsible—that is, it rests on a bed of
socially constructed problematization. The development of policy on climate change, for instance, has not been a matter of governments simply recognizing a problem but of an extended process of argumentation among scientists, activists, officials, industrialists, and commentators about how to interpret phenomena and to relate them to patterns of governing. It has been a continuing and contested process across constitutional and national boundaries, a pattern of meaning construction to which government players could contribute but that they cannot control. Indeed, when the former U.S. Vice President Al Gore won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in raising the public consciousness on climate change, there was a demand for him to return to politics as a candidate for the presidency, but he resisted this, and it was suggested that he had come to realize that even the president could not change U.S. policy on climate change until public opinion had come to accept both the policy problem and the implications for corporate and individual practice.

In this context, then, policy analysis (both of and for policy) has to do with the construction and maintenance of the problematic. Analysis for is concerned with the development of an account of practice that focuses attention on a problem, validates ways of thinking about it and appropriate responses, and allocates responsibility for action. In this respect, the work of policy analysis is more like that of a lawyer than a laboratory scientist: It is finding good reasons for doing things. When Tony Blair was prime minister of the UK, there was in his press office an official called the Head of Story Development, whose task was to ensure that what was being done in government made “a good story.”

But to say that policy analysis is concerned with framing the action suggests that there may be more than one way of doing this and that the analysis will have to contend with competing frameworks of meaning. Policy workers in health, for instance, recognizing that the available resources—hospitals and doctors—are preempted by the ever-expanding claims of “illness response” at the expense of activities that would contribute more to health, try to strengthen the discourses on health maintenance and self-care (rather than illness treatment) and the position of the participants who engage in these discourses. Policy workers closely analyze the wording in official discourse and try to make sure that the words used will bear the interpretation that they want to put on them and, if not, will seek to replace them with words that are more convenient. And the framing is not only done with words: Titles, uniforms, and the architecture of buildings can be powerful symbols that convey the meaning of policy.

So from a social construction perspective, analysis for policy is not a technical exercise conducted in advance but part of the continuing strategic judgment of the participants, as they frame the world (and react to the framings of others) in a way that makes sense both to themselves and to other participants. This means that they must be sensitive to the different framings that are in use at any point and make the appropriate responses. Tim Tenbensel, drawing on Aristotle, argues that within the one policy context, there are likely to be discourses grounded in knowledge from study (Aristotle’s episteme), in knowledge from practice (techne), and in ethical-practical judgment (phronesis) and shows that an important skill in policy work is the ability to analyze the policy setting, discern the nature of the discourse in use, and engage in it with the appropriate language. This brings us back to a recurring theme in the discussion of analysis for policy: Is the task to do the analysis or to bring it into use in the shaping of policy outcomes?

**Conclusion**

Policy analysis is a concept in practice, and what it means reflects the way in which it is used. The intellectual foundations of the concept lay not only in political science but also in economics and operations research, and as it developed as a conceptual field, concerns about organizational dynamics, problematization, and the construction of meaning were added. As a component of practice, it is used to describe a wide variety of activities. The question is not so much “What does policy analysis mean?” as “How is the term policy analysis used to characterize and validate activity?”

Initially, it was seen as a distinct and prior stage in the process of governing, a form of intellectual activity that would precede the exercise of authority. This presentation was part of a modernist account of government as a form of systematic
collective instrumentality, in which the government identified problems and decided what to do about them. The argument ran that by hitching the investigative techniques of social science to the operational capacity of government, governments would be better informed about the nature of the problem and the likely outcomes of alternative responses open to government. Its advocates saw it as a source of scientific and unbiased answers to contested questions in government.

In this respect, the experience was somewhat disappointing. Formal modes of the identification and comparison of alternative courses of action were elaborated, taught in graduate programs, and reported in the literature (e.g., “Optimal Compensating Wages for Military Personnel” or “The Impact of State Tax Credits in Stimulating R&D”). But often, those doing the analysis felt that it had little impact on the decision process and that sometimes the decision had been made before the analysis was called for. One response sees this as a “two-cultures” problem and calls for policy analysts to be more “user-friendly,” less concerned with adding to the systematic body of academic knowledge, and more concerned with the quick delivery of answers to urgent policy questions, even if this means ignoring the methodological canons of good social science: Analysis that is “quick and dirty” might be what is needed in policy. This response also calls for policy analysts to pay more attention to the communication of their findings, writing shorter and more accessible texts that focus on the immediate implications for policy. This raises the question of the extent to which policy analysts should involve themselves in “marketing” their analysis to increase the likelihood of it being used in the policy process. Should they be advocates for their own findings? Should they, in carrying out their analysis, cultivate relationships that are likely to strengthen the chances of its acceptance or to neutralize potential opposition? In other words, are they to be detached scientists or active participants in the policy process?

This has not been a topic for abstract debate but has reflected the way in which policy analysis became institutionalized in and around government, particularly in the United States. Radin, who has been both a participant in and an observer of this process, found that policy workers tended to become specialists in particular policy fields rather than general-purpose analysts and that while they have been trained in the systematic comparison of policy alternatives and see this as the real work of policy analysis, they find that they are likely to be spending more of their time talking not to policymakers looking for guidance but to policy analysts in other organizations, each primarily concerned with protecting the interests of his or her own organization. She argues that in practice, policy analysis has moved from being a purportedly objective judgment that could resolve policy arguments to being the vehicle through which they could be continued. It has become a mode of discourse mediating relations between the various participants in the policy process—not simply between policy analysts from different agencies but also between elected leaders, officials, and activists. Officials call for analysis to question and delegitimize the projects of elected leaders, leaders commission analysis to defend these projects against bureaucratic scrutiny, and activists table analysis to support their demands and to establish their credibility as serious players in the policy process. Policy participants were interested in policy analysis not because it would deliver the self-evidently correct answer to a policy problem but because it could facilitate interaction by giving the contending participants a shared language.

This evident development in policy practice (analysis for) has been paralleled by a growing interest in interpretive modes of policy analysis (analysis of), which focus attention on the construction of meaning and the way it is related to patterns of interaction. The relationship is (as Anthony Giddens puts it) “recursive”: The accepted construction of meaning indicates who the appropriate participants are and how they should act and interact, and who participates and how they interact determines the meaning of the question. Interpretive policy analysis directs attention to the ways in which meaning is constructed from the competing interpretations (story lines) available: What is the policy about? Is policy on child care, for instance, about the reconstruction of gender relations, increasing workforce participation, promoting socialization, or the education of the young? These are all valid policy aspirations, but how significant they are in any specific context is likely to depend on which participants are involved, and the various participants are all concerned with ensuring that their perception of the problem is
reflected in the policy statement. Interpretive policy analysis draws attention to the way in which participation and meaning interact with one another.

At the same time that analysis of policy has been broadening its gaze and recognizing the ambiguity of purpose in policy, there has been among some practitioners a strong move in the other direction, back in search of more clarity and a policy analysis that will identify the right policy to choose—in a sense, returning to the spirit of Lasswell’s 1951 call for a policy science and the American graduate programs that it inspired. This perspective on the function of analysis has been boosted by the application of principal–agent theory in government, which underlies the enthusiasm for purchaser–provider splits, the contracting out of functions, and quasi-market relations between the center and the operational arms of government. In this context, the function of policy analysis was to clarify what it was that the center should be seeking and to verify whether the operational arms were delivering it.

By the turn of the century, this model of arm’s-length trading was being supplanted by discourses of partnership and governance, but there was a growing demand for evidence-based policy, which also looked to policy analysis to reduce uncertainty in the policy process. This followed pressure in the health sector for evidence-based medicine, stemming from a realization that while systematic comparison of alternatives had played a large part in the advance of medical science, there was little comparative evaluation of the standard operating procedures of medical practice. This concern resulted in the formation of the Cochrane Collaboration as a forum for scrutinizing the evidence on the efficacy of different forms of treatment, with the randomized controlled trial as the gold standard of analytic methods. This movement was paralleled in policy analysis by the establishment of the Campbell Collaboration, which aimed to establish definitively what works in policy, and this gave new life to traditional American policy analysis, with its focus on the definition of the problem, the identification of options, and the systematic comparison of alternatives.

So policy analysis is characterized by two major tensions. One is the tension between scholarship and practice: To what extent is policy analysis the generation of scientific knowledge, and to what extent is it a contribution to governmental practice? The second tension is between the two divergent paradigms of policy on which it draws. One is the paradigm of instrumental rationality from which policy analysis emerged, which portrays a world in which the problem is clear and there is a single decision maker, a known hierarchy of values and objectives, and certainty of outcomes. In this world, the role of the policy analyst is to calculate which course of action will best achieve the values of the policymaker. This is countered by an alternative paradigm that sees policy as emerging from a world characterized by diversity: multiple participants, conflicting agendas, dispute over values and objectives, and uncertainty about the outcomes that might be achieved or how these would be evaluated. In this paradigm, policy analysis is a part of the game, mobilized by the participants as part of the continuing struggle for support. These two paradigms are not entirely separate; rather, one tends to assume the other. There is an awareness of diversity and also a yearning for cohesion. Policy participants recognize the multiple voices in the process of governing but at the same time find it difficult not to use a single-voiced narrative in which an actor called the government makes decisions that resolve conflicts by the creation of policy. The question for participants is to what extent policy analysis is seen as a vehicle for accomplishing the purposes of the government and to what extent it operates as a device for facilitating the achievement of some degree of concerted action among the diverse and fractious players in the game, with statements of objectives (or about the problem itself) being means for the achievement of collaboration rather than evidence of its existence.

And for the academic observers, the question is how much they take policy analysis on its own terms, as the careful documentation of an exercise in instrumental rationality, and how much they see it as a part of the process that they are attempting to analyze.

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See also Causality; Concept Formation; Evidence-Based Policy; Governance; Paradigms in Political Science; Policy, Discourse Models
Further Readings


Policy Community

In current conversational use, policy community refers to the population of organizations with a stake in an area of public policy. In its more technical sense, it refers to interorganizational structures exhibiting a close, stable, cooperative relationship between a limited number of, mainly self-selected, interest groups and “partnering” elements of the governmental machinery. This entry describes the development of this term and also discusses the numerous critiques that have been made concerning it.

Developments

The term policy community appeared in the literature independently in several sources in the 1970s (e.g., Jeremy John Richardson & A. Grant Jordan, 1979), and this timing reflected the shift in focus in political science away from formal legal and legislature-based study to tracking empirical policy biography. Empirical research found that the effective locus of decision making was not the legislature, cabinets, or politician-led committees but group/bureaucrat arenas. The term recorded the conclusion that much policy evolution was not the result of ideological struggle between conflicting political parties with distinctive ideologies and agendas but of apolitical (or at least nonpartisan) discussion and information exchange.

It was thus one of a family of concepts capturing segmented policy-making features—for example, group subgovernment, corporate pluralism, and iron triangles. The characteristics of a generic subsystem approach include the following: the expectation of bargaining in stable (sectoral) environments, the evolution of stable coalitions, the low visibility of decisions, well-defined and uncontested policy jurisdiction, the narrow and low scope of conflict, a small number of participants, and some restriction of access to the process.

In real-life settings, policy communities are not black-and-white arrangements with gatekeepers and badges of admission. The policy community was not intended as a one-size-fits-all policy explanation. What it intended to capture was a sense of surprise (reflecting a wave of case study research) that policy making was to a substantial degree the result of non-legislature-based bargaining.

Whereas in party and parliamentary venues policy differences are exaggerated in adversarial fashion for political advantage, in policy subsystems, there is a premium on minimizing differences and underplaying the apparent significance of the outcome. Participants resolve issues within the network in the belief that it is counterproductive to highlight grievances (attracting other competing perspectives). The suppression of competing interests is reinforced by presenting issues as humdrum or technical. Trumpeting the importance of one’s concerns might just attract attention. So it would be difficult to get an impression of the number and importance of these arrangements from, say, a sampling of press articles or ministerial speeches. The policy community premium is in avoiding such attention.

The Main Critiques

The concept has found little empirical application and instead has generated debate about what it
implies rather than demonstrations of its usefulness or otherwise.

Its original usage in the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) was remarkably congruent. In the UK, Richardson and Jordan’s *Governing Under Pressure* sought to reorient attention in policy-making studies toward a

special type of stable network which has advantages in encouraging bargaining in policy resolution ... where there are effective shared “community” views on the problem. Where there are no such shared attitudes no policy community exists. (Jordan, 1990, p. 327)

However, while the policy community was seen as being a set of participants with shared understandings, this did not mean a lack of conflict: *Community* deliberately implied a sort of “circumscribed conflict,” not its absence.

Its usage in the UK stood as an implicit rejection of Arendt Lijphart’s majoritarianism that suggested that British policy making was top-down—using stable parliamentary majorities to drive through manifesto-based policy. It suggested instead that policy is normally built up through agreement in constituencies of affected interests. A theoretical capacity for policy imposition is actually marginalized by the political benefits of building consensus and implementing them through cooperation.

The general assumption in these sources is that much policy making is in effect subcontracted to informal institutions of the relevant civil servants and affected interests. For example, Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin, writing about the United States, observed that most of the policy making with which subgovernments engage consists of routine matters resolved in fairly restricted and consensual settings. Thus, an assumption underpinning these policy resolution “institutions” is that the breadth and complexity of the government agenda require the disaggregation of policy into more manageable subissues involving a smaller number of relevant and knowledgeable participants. The fragmentation of policy takes decisions to a level of particularity where few are interested enough to mobilize or have the time or resources to become involved. Those with an interest look for acceptable outcomes.

As suggested by Keith Dowding, the original concept was no more than metaphorical, useful in signaling as important a particular set of (nonparty political) participants and suggesting a community-like quality to these relationships. Others have been more ambitious for the concept—but mainly those exaggerating its ambitions to prove a weakness. Critics have generated a caricaturing process. Martin Smith criticized as being “too vague” Richardson and Jordan’s assertion that policy communities developed in response to complexity in the wider political system. Smith’s claim fails to distinguish between a definition that is vague and a reasonably precise definition of uncertainty.

The attention by politicians to a handful of high-profile areas (not necessarily the most vital) implies that they have to neglect the vast majority of the policy mix. It is argued in the policy community literature that many (but by no means all) of the numerous remaining areas fall to policy community–type resolution. There is, however, a preliminary assumption that it makes sense for participants to try to deal with matters in the milieu of consultation rather than electoral politics. It is not a deficiency of a model of routine decision making that it does not very well accommodate nonroutine decisions.

Another criticism of the policy community model is that it fails to account for change. For example, Wyn Grant (2005) cites Richardson to the effect that the main weakness of the concept is the implication of stable policies, relationships, and membership. This does not seem a particularly strong criticism—akin to complaining that a map of Washington is a poor guide to Montreal: The policy community sketch was not meant to account for change but to explain enduring stability.

Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (1993, p. 6) used the term *policy monopoly* to label informal policy structures very similar to policy communities. Their term referred to the “monopoly on political understandings,” that is, the ability of certain groups to maintain a dominant policy framing. The policy community is in essence the venue or institutional arrangement that reflects and reinforces the dominant understandings of which Baumgartner and Jones wrote in their work on agenda. They suggested that policy making is often unlike the pluralist idea of mobilization and countermobilization, and instead monopoly/community arrangements
are seen primarily as instruments of mutual noninterference in the “absence of serious opposing voices” (p. 14).

Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech supplied a sense of scale about what they call “policy bandwagons”—political issues generating widespread group interest. These they proved to be atypical. They identified a random sample of 137 cases of lobbying and looked at high- and low-conflict proportions. They found extreme polarization, with the top four issues accounting for more than a third of all interest-group activity. Twenty-six issues out of 137 captured 81% of the lobbying. The reverse is of course that 111 cases reflected 19%. This confirms two things: (1) that not all lobbying events are the same and (2) that many of them are low profile, with few people participating. It would be a leap to say that all the cases with a small number of participants were examples of policy communities, but the data at least underline that much political processing is low-participant activity.

As argued by Grant Jordan and William Maloney, the arrangements exist because there is a “logic” to building cooperation about delivery by preconsulting relevant interests. Organizations trade or exchange information/advice to secure access to, and influence within, decision procedures. The logic of this relationship holds, regardless of the political persuasion controlling the government. Therefore, radical policy shift is rare and does not routinely follow a change of government.

Critics tend to define the policy community concept in a comprehensive, rigid way that can be demonstrated as not fitting real-life cases. In fact, the articulation may have itself overencouraged ideas about institutional formality. In real-life policy development, participants are not clearly identified. It is conspicuous and significant that pro-policy community authors fail to give definitive lists of their examples. This may not be because the concept is vague but because it tries to capture a phenomenon that lacks formality and certainty about a list of participants. Policy community “structures” may be less important than the “logic of accommodation” procedures that they exhibit but do not monopolize. Even where the policy-making arrangements do not make a policy community description appropriate, the process “borrows” some of the conflict reduction features because policy communities are part of the search for policy resolution but not the only aspect.

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See also Policy Analysis; Policy Formulation; Policy Framing; Policy Instruments; Policy Process, Models of

Further Readings

Policy Cycle

Policy cycle refers to the process whereby political actors attempt to shape the definition of problems, the setting of a policy agenda, the formulation of policy alternatives, the adoption and implementation of policy decisions, and the evaluation of policy outcomes. This perspective is underpinned by a linear, problem-oriented, rationalist, and systemic view of the policy process. In the conventional conception of the policy cycle, policy problems are identified by policy advocates and other political actors and then put onto the policy agenda; politicians and officials then develop policy measures to address these problems and adopt the best possible alternative to tackle the problems after considering the likely impact of these alternatives; and evaluation would be done after the policy is implemented, and the responses and reactions to
such evaluation would be fed back into the policy process.

**Policy Process**

The emphasis of the policy cycle perspective is on the process of policy actions and interactions involving many different political and bureaucratic players. Hence, it has gone beyond the study of formal political institutions or the input side of politics, such as interest-group activities and political participation, which were once the main concerns of political science. The conception of the policy cycle could be traced to Harold Lasswell’s seven prescriptive steps in policy making, namely, (1) intelligence, (2) promotion, (3) prescription, (4) invocation, (5) application, (6) termination, and (7) appraisal. Nonetheless, his prescriptive conception focuses mainly on policy making within government, without taking into account the impact of other political actors and the external environment. Major texts published in the 1970s and 1980s by Garry Brewer and Peter DeLeon, Charles O. Jones, and James E. Anderson have further contributed to the policy cycle framework. While the most commonly recognized stages of the policy cycle include problem definition and agenda setting, policy making, implementation, and evaluation, other formulations have proposed somewhat different, but still largely similar, stages, such as initiation, estimation, selection, adoption, legitimation, implementation, evaluation, and termination. The terms policy cycle and policy stage are often used interchangeably in the literature, hence this is also called the stages approach to the policy process. The cyclical metaphor, however, highlights the role of feedback in linking the input and output phases of policy making, as in David Easton’s system model, and hence emphasizes the continuous evolution of the policy process.

**Criticisms of the Policy Cycle Concept**

The policy cycle perspective is perhaps the most widely adopted and long-standing framework used in organizing major texts on policy making and policy analysis because it simplifies the complicated, amorphous processes into distinct and easily identifiable stages. Its contribution to the conceptual organization of the policy process should not be underestimated. However, despite its widespread usage, it has come under criticism from various angles, ranging from critique of its empirical relevance to its promise as a policy theory. First, one key criticism is that the policy cycle is not a causal theory or model. It does not offer an explanation of the entire policy process, even though the perspective encompasses the most prominent aspects of public policy making. It fails to clearly identify a set of key variables that explains the process, which is considered not conducive to the further development of policy theory. Nor does it specify the relationship between these variables or generate a hypothesis for testing its claims. In the eyes of the critics, the policy cycle at best provides a descriptive account and an analytical framework of the policy process rather than a theoretical explanation of how the policy process proceeds in the way suggested by its proponents. Hank Jenkins-Smith and Paul Sabatier prefer to call it the “stages heuristic,” namely, just a learning device.

Second, another major criticism argues that the policy cycle presumes a linear, unidirectional conception of the policy process, as if one stage will lead to another, which does not resemble the real political world. In reality, interactions among different stages of the policy process often take place, and the interplay of politics and the influence of the external environment are critical in shaping the twists and turns of the policy process. Third, the sequence of stages in the policy cycle is often considered as empirically inaccurate because different phases of the cycle may take place at the same time and policies do not always proceed as suggested in the framework. For instance, the evaluation of existing policies affects agenda setting and policy making, and the unintended outcome of one policy may pose a problem that needs to be addressed by another policy. While the different phases or stages of the policy cycle are conceived as discrete steps clearly differentiated from each other, it is often not easy to delineate the different phases neatly in reality. Policies are proposed in the context of other existing policies, and they are usually amended or revised continuously.

Fourth, the policy cycle takes into account policy evaluation but not policy learning, although many studies have studied how policy analysis and policy learning can be integrated into the policy process. Fifth, some critics further argue that the
framework may incorrectly highlight the policy cycle as the unit of analysis. Instead of having only one cycle, many different, interacting policy cycles concerning a multitude of diverse policy measures initiated at different governmental levels may be proposed at the same time, especially in big, federal political systems such as the United States.

Sixth, a top-down, legalistic bias is also implicit in the policy cycle because its focus is on the adoption, promulgation, and implementation of government legislation rather than the interactions between different aspects of the policy process or the politics between governmental and societal players. Politics, whether within the government in the form of bureaucratic politics or in the community at large, however, are often powerful determinants of the dynamics of the policy process. Such a deficiency was later explicitly addressed in other competing theoretical frameworks of the policy process.

Last but not least, the policy cycle cannot fully capture the multifaceted political dynamics of the policy process, which is more critical than the rational calculus in determining policy outputs and outcomes. The seminal contribution on agenda setting by John Kingdon (1984), for instance, aptly emphasizes the importance of the coupling of the three streams, namely, the problem, the policy, and political streams, in shaping the policy process. According to Kingdon, the problem stream refers to the perception and definition of problems as worthy of further attention and action by policy actors; the policy stream refers to the ongoing policy deliberation among the policy actors and the emergence of policy proposals within the policy community; and the political stream refers to the major developments in the political arena, such as the changes in the national mood, turnovers in administration, and personnel reshuffling. The combination of these three forces constitutes a powerful factor in opening the policy window that will usher in policy decisions or policy change. By emphasizing the interplay of political as well as ideational factors, Kingdon’s view contrasts sharply with the more ideal-typical, simplified procession of stages in the policy cycle perspective.

**Contributions to the Study of Public Policy**

The policy cycle framework is clearly not embedded in a casual theory, but is it completely inadequate as an important scholarly contribution to the study of public policy except in its service as a learning device? On balance, the framework has helped organize research by highlighting significant, generic features of the policy process, even though it has not postulated a policy theory. Indeed, the specification of the key stages of the policy process in this framework is both a strength and a weakness. If a sound theoretical explanation of policy evolution is to be formulated, there is a need to put the framework within specific institutional contexts in order to take into account the impact of political structures, the multiple layers of government and their interactions, or the specific constitutional arrangements in shaping policy politics in different national contexts. At the same time, the overarching concepts of the policy cycle do highlight comparable features of the policy process that can be easily identified in different political systems, even though the actual characteristics of each phase vary across nations. Such a conceptual space is especially critical in fostering comparative research, particularly because the literature on public policy primarily focuses on the United States and other developed democracies.

Most major scholarly works on public policy in the 1990s do not attempt to develop a theory of the entire policy process; rather, they tend to examine the dynamics of each of the constituent phases of the policy cycle in much greater depth and with increasing methodological sophistication. For instance, many studies investigate how problems come to the attention of policymakers (e.g., John Kingdon), how political systems process information and prioritize problems (e.g., Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner), and how policy agendas have evolved and changed over time (e.g., Jones and Baumgartner). Others have analyzed how competing advocacy coalitions sharing basic policy beliefs within a policy subsystem have organized to change policies (e.g., Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith) and how public policies are implemented (e.g., Michael Hill and Peter Hupe). Scholars have also studied how policy design has affected the behavior and interests of target clients of policies (e.g., Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram). Moreover, while investigating one policy phase involving a piece of policy legislation may require a relatively shorter period of time, some major studies have taken a long view of the policy cycle.
to take into account the effects of implementation and policy learning. For instance, research on the advocacy coalition framework has studied policy change and learning over a decade (researchers include Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier), and the punctuated equilibrium theory studies changes in the American policy agenda over many decades (researchers include Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner). The duration of a policy cycle is critical if a more thorough analysis of the entire policy cycle is to be attempted.

Since the actual policy process concerns highly complex, fluid, and strategic interactions between many political actors over time, the simplicity of the policy cycle continues to offer not only a sound heuristic device but also a very effective framework to stimulate thinking and organize research on public policy. In fact, disaggregating the policy process into stages constitutes a critical first step that facilitates further conceptual refinement, theoretical inquiry, and empirical research. Research hypotheses within specific stages of the policy cycle, such as agenda setting and policy making, or across these stages, for instance, could be generated for further theory building. Such hypotheses would then be made amenable for empirical testing or refutation. Therefore, in spite of the lack of a core theoretical argument, the policy cycle perspective has not limited the conceptual and methodological advancement in the study of the policy process.

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See also Advocacy Coalition Framework; Agenda Setting; Implementation; Policy Evaluation; Policy Formulation; Policy Framing; Policy Network; Policy Process, Models of

Further Readings


Policy Evaluation

Policy evaluation concerns the estimation of the effectiveness of public policies, programs, or projects and their management and implementation. Because policy is about change, policy evaluation should explain what factors or determinants led citizens or groups to do things or take actions that otherwise they would not do (e.g., quit smoking, recycle products, practice sustainable behavior, end domestic violence, retain students in school, attract investments, reduce unemployment). To implement such policies, governments have created programs with specific achievement goals. The role of policy evaluators is to give educated estimates of the effects of changes in government policies. From a public administration perspective, program evaluation is a scientific activity that entails the use of scientific methods to measure the outputs, implementation, and outcomes of programs for decision-making purposes. But beyond all this, the key question in policy evaluation is the following: What does government do to improve the quality of life of individuals-citizens? It is also important for policy evaluators to decide if it is better to do something than do nothing to resolve a problem. This entry examines approaches to policy evaluation, the political role of evaluation, and some of the techniques used for policy evaluation.

Historically, the role of social scientists and program evaluators in governments has been at the forefront of the debate on the relevance of normative versus empirical research in the decision-making process. The opposition between those who favor the “scientifization” of politics and those for the “politicization” of science has created two classes of program evaluators: those who think that we can bring social changes by looking at and comparing the action taken by several governmental entities to resolve social problems and those who believe that everything remains normative and the support of
stakeholders is essential for the implementation purposes. Looking back on the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Beveridge Report, the Coleman Report of education, and the War on Poverty, all these policy initiatives led to several actions and new programs to respond to social issues.

Therefore, policy evaluation refers also to the broad idea of social engineering, meaning the capacity of evaluators to resolve social problems and to find superior solutions. The evaluators’ role in governing is also to suggest the best policy alternatives to resolve a social problem. Decision makers need to understand the impact of their actions; therefore, policy, program, and project evaluations as a knowledge activity contribute to the rationalization of decision making by determining the best course of action and the limitations of governmental interventions (Lee Sechrest & Aurelio Figueredo, 1993; Evert Vedung, 1997). Thus, evaluators are not mere technicians measuring what government has been doing but also are intimately connected to making and improving public policies.

The Role of Policy/Program Evaluators in a Changing Environment

The concept of “experimenting societies,” that is, trying to test social theories and hypotheses in our social environment, in many ways poses a challenge and a burden on program evaluators (Donald Campbell & Jean Russo, 1999). How can program evaluators improve the well-being of citizens? How can they reduce the social risks associated with unemployment and slow economic growth, poverty, and income inequalities? How can they improve the social status of unprivileged groups? To bring about such changes, evaluators realized that the state is only one of many sources of power in society. Governments have to compete with many actors—interest groups, social groups, nongovernmental organizations—who want to participate in the policy process. Furthermore, in addition to competition, the public sector also now engages in extensive cooperation with actors in the private sector in the provision of public services.

One difficult task for program evaluators is to convince decision makers that the social and political risks of inaction are often more costly than taking action to provide a remedy to a problem. Evaluators have to tell politicians not only what they are supposed to do but also what they ought to do. If governments wait too long to repair bridges, the lives of citizens can be threatened and important economic and social consequences may ensue. Evaluators have to establish clearly the consequences of change or no change—which are often the cause of fear, inertia, and conservatism—on the future of society. Social changes or policy/program changes cannot be implemented without an overall social or organizational consensus about the necessity of such a transformation. The determination of the appropriate change criteria based on the goals and objectives of programs is at the heart of establishing the indicators of performance and both the economic and the political feasibility of programs.

From a methodological viewpoint, a discussion about the “best” research protocol or research design and the use of reliable measuring instruments are essential elements of any evaluation to establish either the success or the failure of any governmental program. The task of evaluators is to operationalize the program goals, to specify the indicators to measure the social changes associated with the program, and to suggest the appropriate policy instruments to achieve the programs goals. Evaluators are concerned not only with outcomes measurement but also with the implementation process. Therefore, putting in place within governments or organizations a monitoring-tracking system—to evaluate regularly changes in the program outcomes and the processes through which results are supposed to be obtained—is also a crucial element of the evaluation function.

Thus, evaluators are first of all researchers, with policy evaluation remaining a scientific activity. However, some scholars have suggested that evaluators can also become “agents” of social change and, in some cases, policy advisers do devise the most effective strategies for achieving program goals. From this perspective, evaluators constitute a class of “new social scientists” who understand what governments do (governance), what are the key determinants of the decision-making process (public administration), what are the best policy instruments to use, and how to evaluate the impact or outcomes of decisions (public policy). The task of evaluators therefore is enormous and focuses on the multifaceted nature of governmental activities.
Governance and Policy Evaluation Processes

If in the United States, program evaluation was developed largely outside government, being firmly rooted in the experimental tradition of the social sciences and at the border between public policy and public administration, this was not the case in most industrial countries. In the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, the evaluation function has developed and evolved within governmental institutions, departments, and agencies. In other countries, such as France and Germany, program evaluation is still perceived as a means of administrative control, and the line between program evaluation and audit remains fuzzy. Therefore, the policy evaluation processes have followed different paths and have been carried out by different stakeholders.

Sometimes, program evaluation is perceived not as a part of the field of public policy or of public administration but simply as a function within the government management and monitoring system. It is a means used by decision makers to move toward good governance. The development of policy evaluation was also perceived as a part of the budgetary process since the implementation of the Programming, Planning, and Budgeting System (PPBS) by the Lyndon B. Johnson administration in the United States; it is also considered as an element of the accountability of government. That led to confusion between the functions of evaluation and audit and between cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis. If program evaluation is a careful assessment of government interventions, internal audit is more concerned about the use of the financial resources of the public sector. Nevertheless, both can play complementary roles in determining the criteria leading to good governance and improve the delivery of programs to citizens.

In recent years, program evaluation as a field of research has been under heavy criticism, with several scholars arguing that over the years no substantive knowledge has been attached to program evaluation. The main reason for a situation of this kind to have developed was that program evaluation operates in a highly politicized context and has become part of the political process where program evaluators are embedded in the program itself (Eleanor Chelimsky, 1997). Therefore, it was proposed to distinguish formative from summative evaluation, the former leading to managerial change in the delivery of programs while the latter looks at the factors leading to the success of programs. Furthermore, when new governments take over, the origins and outcomes of the public programs of the previous government are forgotten.

The Science of Program Evaluation

Policy evaluation was clearly an outgrowth of the development of the welfare state and one of its principal consequences: the increase of governmental expenditures. Even if there are several theoretical elements beyond policy evaluation, the central theory is to model governmental change (Marvin Alkin, 2004). In 1959, when Charles Lindblom wrote his seminal article “The Science of Muddling Through,” he suggested that in any incremental analysis, social scientists should distinguish small budgetary changes (simple incrementalism) from the complex (disjointed incrementalism) and very complex situations (strategic analysis). For Lindblom, incrementalism is simply a method of analysis and action—the most effective way is to respond to bureaucrats’ and voters’ demands. From his perspective, nonincremental policies are simply irrational and politically irrelevant because their consequences are unforeseeable for any political system. Leaders who want to stay in power will be wiser to bring small budgetary changes and introduce small adjustments. In some ways, incrementalism can be perceived as an outbreak of rational decision making.

Therefore, incrementalism became a central concept of public policy and decision-making processes, and it was defined as a mutual adjustment process that may produce small ranges of budgetary outputs. If this concept is widely accepted among scholars, it is, however, inadequate to explain policy changes, especially in periods of rapid political and social transformations. The study of incremental change also led several studies to determine if the type of political and party system influences the budgetary process. Also, questions related to the impact of newly elected governments and the increase of departments’, ministries’, or agencies’ budgets as a factor leading to changes in public policies (Niskanen theory on bureaucracies) became part of the task of explaining governmental growth. Thus, with the election of new leaders and political parties, some policy adjustments and some partisan mutual adjustment processes in the policy goals and objectives can be expected. If the traditional incrementalist school
suggests that political elites have a small influence on the policy process and its outputs, some scholars, on the contrary, think that to measure the impact of policy, political analysts should look beyond the “muddling through” process. Therefore, the purpose of policy evaluation is, basically, to understand the role and functions of governments in our societies.

**Incrementalism and Social Transformations**

The postulate of incrementalism is that the observed policy change in a given time period is determined by the preceding time period. In other words, a good part of the change observed is highly dependent on the existing situation. In the case of budgetary change, annual budgets represent incremental decisions because political leaders, bureaucrats, and appropriate committees are concerned only with small changes in the budget year after year. Therefore, governmental policies, programs, and budgets are never completely reviewed as a whole because of the incremental calculations from the actors, and the value of all programs is never completely compared with other policy alternatives. In the case of the budgetary process, the previous year’s budget is the main reference to fix the appropriations of the next year. The incrementalists do not assume that cuts and reductions in budgets and programs are impossible from year to year but that decision makers are only interested in the increments—small increases or decreases. Then, it is possible to observe some incremental cuts in departmental budgets or programs.

From a public administration perspective, the increment approach refers to the difference between what the administrators of a department or program request in a specific year and what they actually received in the prior year. If a department or program receives less than it had in the previous year, policy analysts talk about a decrement instead of an increment. However, such decrements are rarely observed directly and in some ways represent deviant cases in public administration. In other words, since most policies and program budgets are rarely controversial, the budgetary base does not really change from one budget to the successive ones. However, if the budget of a program remains the same over time, one can argue that there are actually incremental cuts because program expenses are not following the normal inflation growth pattern. Aaron Wildavsky, for example, gives another definition of the budgetary base. For him, the policy analyst should take into account the expectations of the stakeholders. Rarely, decision makers will ask for a decrease of their program budgets, and therefore the base represents “the commonly held expectations among participants in budgeting that programs will be carried out at close to the going level of expenditures” (Wildavsky, 1986, p. 11).

If these concepts (e.g., incremental change, increment–decrement, budgetary base) are accepted among policy analysts, it is more their applicability for decision-making purposes that is challenged. Some authors have criticized the normative character of the incrementalist theory because of the perceived conservative trend in this approach and the absence of any reflection about the policy implementation process of new policies. The theory and the models proposed are essentially too stochastic. Also, because changes are only marginally different from the status quo, the hypothesis that policy administrators and politicians will adopt incremental behavior is merely descriptive. It should also be proven that the base actually represents the status quo. In other words, measuring change is not easy and depends on the evaluators’ reference standards before the evaluators can establish the size of the change observed.

The last issue concerning incrementalism is to define it empirically. It is difficult to determine what an incremental (small) change is. At which level can budgetary changes be considered significant—5%, 10%, or 30% of the program budget? And what are the characteristics of such changes? It is suggested that policy evaluation should be able to make the distinction between mandatory requests—the new expenditures needed to keep a program operating at the same level—and programmatic requests for initiating new programs. The first type of budgetary change is perceived as incremental but not the second one. It is also suggested that in any budget, there is a part that is controllable and a part that is uncontrollable and includes all expenditures not regulated by the legislation.

**Policy Processes and Bureaucratic Changes**

According to Lindblom (1959), “democracies change their policies almost entirely through
incremental adjustments” (p. 84). In democracies, it is easier for political leaders to focus just on incremental changes. The effect of such behavior is that the value of the status quo is constantly reinforced. A high degree of social stability and continuity is necessary in any political system to allow bureaucrats to follow the muddling through approach; in periods of rapid social changes, this method becomes inadequate. If incrementalism confines the bureaucrats in the day-to-day routine and reduces their motivation and their capacity to innovate, then incrementalism is a way to reinforce the pro-inertia ideology and support the tendency of organizations to resist change. Therefore, the central question is how to define the status quo (the baseline measurement) and how to measure small changes from the status quo. Also, do small changes really reinforce the status quo?

However, Lindblom remains skeptical about the argument that his policy model supports the antimotivation forces existing in any organization. If the rational-comprehensive model seeks to stimulate the administrators and bureaucrats, he cannot foresee how his model can be seen as a tactic for conservatism. He argued that fast-moving sequences of small changes can bring about policy changes more rapidly than can only infrequent redefinition of policies. Lindblom argues that in periods of political crises, the value of incremental changes is that they can be implemented rapidly and that decision makers and bureaucrats are in general less ideologically oriented since their main goals is to serve the public interest. Consequently, one important element of the incrementalist theory is that the bureaucracy is relatively autonomous within the political system and immune to pressure coming from interest groups and stakeholders.

Therefore, incremental politics offers to democratic societies the best way to introduce the changes requested by citizens. The model proposed by Lindblom and others suggests that governmental budgets and the changes observed (reductions, increases) are the result of incrementalism. For stakeholders, when the decisions made are only incrementally, it is not only easy for them to anticipate the policy direction, but they can also develop their own strategy accordingly. In the case of complex social problems, when opposite values are at stake, decisions makers and bureaucrats will focus mainly on the feasible changes in the short run. A strategic policy approach will imply the development of the best possible alternatives to respond to the stakeholders’ expectations through a mutual adjustment process. It then can be argued that incrementalism is an outgrowth of pluralism.

As some critics have mentioned, the incremental approach does not describe the policy evaluation process by which public policies or programs are modified and implemented. Several authors have also argued that one difficulty with incrementalism is that it detaches administrative concepts from the context of constitutional and political theory. With regard to budget appropriations, it is clear that over the years this function has become much more specialized, and in many countries, the budgetary process has become more isolated within governments and in some way removed from political and judicial controls. Policy evaluation becomes a complex enterprise in light of the different programs and activities developed within each governmental entity. It was also noted that national priorities have often been determined, based on evaluations, analyses, and reports, by bureaucrats, who are isolated from the political sphere. This has raised several important questions about good governance and the accountability of governments.

**Performance Measurement**

The issue of how to measure the effect of a policy, a program, or a social intervention has been a recurrent methodological question in policy evaluation. In 1963, Chester Harris published a seminal work titled *Problems in Measuring Change*, where contributors propose several approaches on how to study change. By definition, the study of change involves two or more measurements of the same variable over time to provide the basis for inferring whether change has or has not taken place. The general principle is to predict status in the absence of policy intervention and to calculate the added value of such action. In practice, the idea of policy modeling is to offer policy-making elements for judging the nature and expected impact of policy intervention. This also raises the question about the linear, curvilinear, or exponential nature of the expected impact. Fundamentally,
any decision should be based on real observations and data.

One of the first problems indentified was related to the lack of valid and reliable sources of data. If measurement is defined as the “process of linking abstract concepts to empirical indicators,” the first task of policy evaluators is to provide policymakers accurate representation of the concepts used. If the goals of programs are to reduce poverty and inequalities, increase productivity, improve students’ performance, improve quality of life, and so on, then all these abstract notions should be translated into questions that reflect a domain of content. Over time, several critics have asserted that theoretical concepts in policy analysis have not been described with the required exactness. This issue, which has been termed construct validity, refers to the efforts by evaluators to use impact indicators that can provide an accurate measure of the effect of a policy. The measure of the true social attitude or policy impact can also be affected by the social or political desirability of an intervention. Therefore, the choice of the right criteria for determining the success or failure of a policy intervention is also at the heart of policy evaluation.

In the field of policy performance measurement, which is the regular measurement of performance indicators, many issues/problems have been identified that might lead to faulty conclusions in policy evaluation (Carolyn Heinrich, 2007). The inadequate definition of a concept, the sensitivity of measures, and the use of a single measure (monoperationalization) or a single line of evidence (monomethod bias) are all threats to conclusion validity. In recent years, governments have made efforts to put in place some results-based measurement frameworks by asking departments to develop their own indicators of performance and to establish what they judge to be a successful intervention. In other words, research protocol should be sufficiently precise and powerful to be able to detect the effects of policies, programs, and/or projects. To put it simply, policy evaluation can be a risky business, especially if evaluators conclude that a program has some tangible effect when in fact it does not (Type I error) or conclude that a program effect does not exist when it does (Type II error). The reliability of performance indicators is also crucial. Do the research design and the methods used yield the same results on repeated interventions? Is it possible that the measurement instruments (indicators, scales) used have some systematic biases, underestimating or overestimating the net impact of a policy? To assess the reliability of the observed results, evaluators should compare evaluation results with the results of similar studies. Measurement is a key element in policy evaluation, and systematic effort to define the concepts and develop the appropriate performance indicators remains at the heart of evaluation.

Since the early works on measuring changes, the field of policy evaluation has seen an increase in the number of books and articles on methods and approaches. In general, three methods have been suggested. The first approach is to randomize participants between experimental and control groups in order to be able to differentiate the expected normal growth patterns from the net impact of a policy/program. Second, some baseline measurements can be taken prior to a policy/program intervention to evaluate if there are, for example, age or income variations and to be able to determine the value added of an intervention over specific groups. A third approach is to use reference standards such as health statistics. For example, it is known that growth patterns differ for boys and girls. If a child has a growth deficiency, doctors are able to compare the individual situation with what is known as the “normal” growth pattern. The challenge for a policy evaluator is therefore to differentiate what is “normal” change over time and to see if a governmental intervention can accelerate or decelerate the patterns of change.

Finally, many social and environmental phenomena do not occur in a linear way. In general, people expect change to occur in a linear fashion. A well-known example of this point was the study of governmental expenditures. Contrary to expectations, especially in the postwar period, the growth of governmental expenditure follows a nonlinear pattern. Data should be properly analyzed, otherwise there may be a systematic bias that policy evaluators’ statistical methods will not be able to capture. In recent years, this became even more evident in the case of environmental policy because many patterns of growth are exponential. It is essential to know the exact pattern of change before conducting an evaluation.
Measuring the Impact of Government Policies

Policy Evaluation Design and Research Strategy

The purpose of policy/program evaluation is to develop research tools to be able to measure the relationships between the objectives of a program, its activities, and its impact. Of the issues related to the development of systematic approaches or analytical procedures, the evolution of program evaluation as a scientific activity has been critical. For an evaluator, it is essential to distinguish between the condition that led to the implementation of a program, the type of activities proposed to achieve the program goals, and the particular factors or threats that might limit the evaluator’s capacity to get an unbiased estimate of the “real” versus the “observed” impact of a program (Richard Hurteau, Vincent Lachapelle, & Guillaume Houle, 2006).

The first step before conducting any policy evaluation is to have a clear indication of the policy goals. Over the years, evaluators have complained about governmental officials and their inability to define precisely the goals and expected impact of their policies. Imprecise and diffuse goals—some of which may not even be stated—make evaluators’ work extremely difficult. Governments might want to reduce the level of poverty or put in place a minimum-income policy without specific achievement goals to indicate whether the policy has attained its objectives. Before any evaluation is conducted, evaluators have to communicate with administrators to establish the expected effects of the policy/program.

The second step before deciding what type of research design should be used is to have a clear knowledge about the definition of a particular concept and the conceptual universe related to it (Richard Bingham & Claire Felbinger, 1989; John Owen & Patricia Rogers, 1999). If the goal of a program is to reduce inequalities, to measure policy innovation, or to improve participants’ abilities, a clear and undisputed definition of the concepts as well as general acceptance of the idea (content and construct validity) are prerequisites for conducting any fieldwork. Issues such as measure sensitivity and the relationship between concepts and measurement lead to this fundamental question: Does the measurement tool measure what it was intended to measure? Extraneous sources of error might result in biased estimates.

The third step is to look at plausible rival hypotheses or explanations of the observed impacts of a program. This is never an easy task; it is quite often difficult to determine cause-and-effect relationships or how societal change has been caused by policy action. Several outside explanations—which evaluators have described as “validity threats”—should be studied to determine how they can affect or have affected the conduct of the evaluation. The evaluation design should minimize the impact of these threats to validity to be able to conclude that the statistical association observed between the program intervention and its measured impact can reasonably be considered a causal relationship. As Thomas Cook and Donald Campbell (1979) have emphasized, the evaluator has to systematically think through how each of the internal validity threats may have influenced the data and to test which threats can be ruled out. Threats such as history, maturation, and selection have been well documented as factors that might affect the outcome measurement. Sometimes, pre-evaluation or the pretest experience (the halo effect) of participants may produce attitudinal or behavioral changes that can be confounded with the policy/program impact.

Nevertheless, different strategies can be used in policy evaluation. This entry now describes the four main approaches or research strategies generally used in policy evaluation: (1) observational study, (2) strategic management and meta-analysis, (3) experimental and quasi-experimental studies, and (4) postevaluation and monitoring studies. Each of these four has some real advantages and also some potential costs that should be considered when choosing strategies for evaluation as well as for policy interventions.

Level 1 Evaluation: Observational Study

The goal of observational study is to evaluate the policy objectives and means among a small number of citizens, usually up to 30 participants. As Lawrence Mohr (1995) pointed out, observational study is defined as one in which “no central authority decides which subjects are to receive the treatment and which are not, or what intensity of treatment each is to receive” (p. 229). The goal of such Level 1 evaluation is to determine if the course
of action is appropriate, that the policy/program does not harm participants in any way (socially, politically, morally, or physically), how they react with the policy tools used, and if the relative impact of a policy/program project can be estimated. At this stage, evaluators might want to measure the effects of different policy instruments (e.g., level of taxation, financial incentives, and training methods) on the policy goals or to look over the “best” case study. Methods such as benchmarking can be used to assess why some programs were successful while others were unable to reach their objectives. 

The evaluator can observe and record the reaction of different cohorts or use case–control to study and determine the expected benefits for participants. At this point, evaluators are interested in observing the associations/correlations between the policy/program effects on participants and the outcome measures. Evaluators can then propose to relevant decision makers the appropriate course of action to be followed. In such a situation, there are two key questions: (1) Are there better ways to resolve and/or prevent a policy problem? (2) What approaches should be implemented?

Participatory evaluation can certainly be used as a means to gather information from the stakeholders—the key social and political actors who should be involved in a policy/program. For several authors, policy evaluation can be a means to improve the democratic debate about governmental decisions, with the goal of achieving social consensus and offering new perspectives and solutions.

Level 2 Evaluation: Strategic Management and Meta-Analysis

As soon as decision makers have chosen a strategy to follow and have determined the type of policy/program (treatments) that will be implemented, evaluators have the task of assessing its implementation. At this point, it is important to determine whether various types of policy interventions are working or not, and why. For this type of study, evaluators usually look for larger groups of respondents.

Probabilistic measures are often employed at this stage to measure the potential effects and consequences of programs. As such, feasibility studies seek to determine if a policy/program is capable of achieving its goals and which factors can impede the achievement of the goals. Once a tentative policy/program plan has been developed, decision makers will often invest in this type of evaluation to ensure that the assumptions underlying the program plan are correct and that there are no unforeseen issues that might affect the program outcomes. Economic feasibility studies can provide a clear assessment of the capacity of a program to achieve its desired outcomes given the resources available to the program. Is the allocated budget sufficient to allow the program to function as intended? For example, if governments want to launch a vaccination campaign to respond rapidly to the challenges of the H1N1 virus epidemic, this would mean ascertaining the cost and availability of the vaccine and the required medical equipment, the cost of hiring personnel (doctors and nurses), and any other costs. The public safety authorities may implement the vaccination program on a small scale to evaluate the most efficient strategy and to identify unexpected expenses. Another type of study is risk analysis, the identification and measurement of factors that could potentially prevent a program from achieving its goals. Risk involves the possibility of harm/loss and uncertainty. The conduct of risk analysis requires the prioritization of policy/program goals, identification of the potential risks of the adopted strategy, and measurement of such risk.

Finally, one useful research method for policy evaluation is a meta-evaluation or meta-analysis of all relevant randomized evaluation (John Chang et al., 2004). Evaluators might judge that a review of all the studies pertinent to a specific policy problem is necessary for a clear appreciation of the solutions to a social problem. One strategy is to look at all successful programs and measure the “effectiveness factor” of each strategy on specific groups or cohorts. This type of approach provides additional insight about the effect of a policy by applying a global multivariate model, allowing for assessment of the relative effectiveness of each intervention component while controlling for the effect of other components in multifactor interventions across all studies.

Level 3 Evaluation: Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Studies

The use of experimental protocol or randomized controlled trial remains the ideal in evaluation
methodology. Participants are randomly assigned to an experimental group (those who participate in the program) or to a control group (those who do not participate in the program). To be able to assess the observed change due to the program (treatment), the two groups should be comparable throughout the evaluation experimentation. What have been described as validity threats are the plausible rival hypotheses or explanations of the observed impacts of a program that can explain the change observed between participants (experimental group) and nonparticipants (control group) in the program. For this type of study, evaluators usually perform multicenter analysis, comparing outcomes in different settings (e.g., schools, hospitals, and communities) on larger groups of respondents.

The purpose of an evaluation design is to minimize the threats to validity to be able to assess the real impact of the program. This type of design has an advantage in political terms: It is scientifically approved and therefore can be justified to the public. Research protocols or terms of references describe in general the objectives of the evaluation study, the research designs that will be employed—the use of multiple lines of evidence strategy—the methodology, and other organizational aspects concerning the timing of the policy/program evaluation. Several strategies can be employed in designing the evaluation protocol. Research design such as randomized controlled evaluation, double-blind study, or placebo-controlled evaluation can be used to measure the policy/program impact. The goal is to compare the recipients of a program (treatment group) with a comparable group (control group) to be able to measure the changes that occur due to the intervention.

In the case of quasi experimentation, policy/program evaluators want to approximate the experimental method by trying to identify the consequences of social changes, to provide controls for confounding variables, and then to probe for causal dependencies. There are several types of research designs that can be used to infer the impact of policy and programs on society. Among them are the nonequivalent control group design, the field experiment design, and the interrupted or multiple-time-series design. In these cases, policy researchers manipulate the independent variables to identify the main determinants and to look for patterns of causality. Policy research, however, always is conducted in a politicized environment, in which it is difficult to control many of the factors that threaten validity.

In addition to these results from evaluation studies, the evaluator has to consider the unintended consequences of policy interventions. Most evaluation research does not consider these unintended consequences, although they are certainly significant for the politics of policy. There are, however, relatively few effective means for combining the intended and unintended consequences of programs, except for economic instruments that combine costs and benefits. The political consequences of programs may be more significant than even the intended ones if they are more visible and more immediate, so the politics of evaluation requires careful consideration of the full range of outcomes.

Level 4 Evaluation: Postevaluation Study and the Implementation of a Policy/Program Monitoring System

At this level, evaluators can conduct a summative evaluation, which is a comprehensive assessment of the degree of success or failure achieved by policies—programs, to discuss the overall benefits of the program in light of its initial goals. At this point, evaluators should be more concerned about the impacts of a program on its stakeholders. The evaluators should also be able to conduct a formative evaluation assessing whether the program has been implemented and whether improvements, radical change, or termination is required (Peter DeLeon & Linda DeLeon, 2002). The focus of such comprehensive evaluation is on the four Es of any policy/program—efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and equality—in comparison with alternative strategies to those being implemented. Such an evaluation should also provide additional information and periodic and continuous feedback concerning the implementation of the program.

Program Monitoring: The Short- and Long-Term Impact of Policies–Programs

This analysis of evaluation also raises an important question about the short- versus long-term impact of a policy/program. Fundamentally, policymakers need to know how to answer the following question often asked by politicians, journalists,
and the public: How long will it take to find out if a program has achieved its objectives? First of all, some policy initiatives have an immediate impact—for example, increases in consumer taxes and university tuition fees—while some policy initiatives may take several years before significant change is observed. The impact of free trade policies or environmental policies (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol) is difficult to measure in the short term because such policies imply a multi-action strategy over a longer period of time to achieve their goals. Some people may condemn such policies because they do not see their immediate effects or because the political benefits cannot be identified during an electoral mandate. Governments may choose to focus on policies that have rapid outcomes since they are seeking reelection in the short term. Nevertheless, the role of policy evaluators is not to predict but to offer an educated analysis of the short-, medium-, and long-term benefits of any policy intervention. Therefore, several governments have decided that all policies or interventions be revised at least once every 5 years. The external validity of the policy research refers to the idea that the strategy adopted to resolve a social problem can be used in different settings and is replicable and that observations can be generalized to other policies or programs.

Finally, at this level, it is essential for future evaluations to have some periodic collection of data about the policy/program’s processes and outcomes. Program monitoring involves not only collecting data during and after the implementation of a program but also providing basic facts about the services provided and its participants (Huey-Tsyh Chen, 2005). The main objective of program monitoring is to determine whether the participants’ well-being has improved, deteriorated, or remained the same after the implementation of the program. However, it can hardly explain why this happens or if the observed results should be essentially attributed to the policy/program’s intervention. Monitoring also implies a more or less continuous collection of data about the programs in question so that feedback and adjustments can also be relatively rapid.

Two main methods are suggested to monitor government programs: (1) process monitoring and (2) outcome monitoring. Process monitoring involves the collection of data about the basic elements of the program’s implementation, such as the participants’ age and socioeconomic status, risk factors, and the services delivered. The objective for decision makers is to determine whether the program considers the targeted population, their needs, and their success rates in completing the expected tasks. Based on this information, decision makers can decide about the future of a policy/program. In the case of outcome monitoring, the goal is to assess the state of the participants before and after the program and if they are doing better, worse, or the same after receiving the services provided by a program.

These tasks, to regularly collect information about the processes and outcomes of programs, should normally be given to a monitoring board and be institutionalized within the evaluation branch of the government or department. The functions of such boards are first to see if within an organization the appropriate measures have been implemented, and in the case of an evaluation if all the fundamental research principles have been followed by the policy/program evaluators. Collecting input from participants, stakeholders, and decision makers may also be judged to be important for determining future policy action.

**Conclusion**

Evaluation is a difficult and demanding enterprise. It calls for substantial imagination, tenacity, a systematic research protocol, and the development of research skills and ability. Effective evaluation also involves a good deal of political skill because evaluation involves working within the political system to improve the programs. Even if different applied research strategies or frameworks can be employed for policy evaluation, the central function of evaluators is to keep citizens and governments informed about how well programs are working. They should also suggest ways of improving the existing programs. Policy evaluation has become a means and a tool for decision makers not only to respond to citizens’ demands for greater accountability but also to support the action of those who are involved in their own social environment (Frank Fischer, 2003). Citizens want governments to offer better programs, to be more effective in their social interventions, and to not waste resources from the public purse. For all these reasons, policy evaluation is a tool for both
policymakers and the public to understand what governments do.

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See also Evaluation Research; Monitoring; Policy Process, Models of

Further Readings

Policy Formulation

In plain language, a policy is a statement of intent or goal, or simply a decision to act. The crucial questions in public policy making are as follows: Who make(s) policy and how? Where does power lie in the policy process? What interests and demands are taken into account? Who ultimately benefits from policy decisions and outcomes?

Different policy models and theories capture the understanding and reality of policy formulation differently. Some doubt whether policy occurs entirely prior to action or, at times, is a post hoc rationalization of action already taken. Others question the scientific rationality of policy formulation. Aaron
Wildavsky considers policy analysis an art: While seeking to delineate a field of discipline for policy science, public policy needs to incorporate more awareness of the human aspect of policy making, emphasizing the political choices made in a competitive environment and the social relations that sustain them. In practice, policy formulation has to be both a science and an art. It has to pay attention to a genuine process of identifying problems and issues, looking for cost-effective solutions, and formulating deliverable implementation measures to get things done. At the same time, it needs to recognize the reality that public policy is an interactive process among political actors in the selection of goals and the means to achieve them within institutional, resource, and power constraints. Policy actors and institutions are both important and so are the agenda-setting processes of incorporating problems and ideas into policy formulation and the subsequent implementation of decisions by the bureaucracy.

Scope of Policy Process

The study of policy varies from the analysis of policy (to understand its nature and content, how it is made and implemented, and policy as a political process) to the analysis for policy (i.e., policy research, information and advice that can lead to a case for action to be taken). The identification and recognition of problems in the policy formulation process can be conceptualized as a predecision, as agenda setting serves to limit the number of subjects attracting attention and getting on the decision makers' agenda. Exclusion of a subject from the agenda is in itself a negative decision as far as the subject is concerned, since agenda setting is as important as, if not more important than, decision making itself.

Conceptually, policy formulation can be separated from policy execution or implementation, but there is a growing literature that sees the two as highly intermingled and being part of a policy continuum. The rationalist approach sees policy as an outcome of a rational—even scientific, technical, and nonproblematic—decision-making process within a relatively controlled environment based on an instrumental “means–ends” causality, leading problems to their solutions and decisions to their implementation. Implementation is similarly taken as nonproblematic, technical, and highly directed and controlled. In contrast, the realist or political approach sees policy as essentially an outcome of negotiation among political actors and institutions based on their competing values, interests, agendas, strategies, and power resources within an uncertain, conflictual, and, at times, turbulent environment. In the real world, the actual process of policy formulation is shaped and defined by the policy institutions and bound by the external policy-making environment and prevailing trends—local, national, regional, as well as global. Policy formulation is triggered by the need to either formulate new policy or change existing policy in order to deal with newly identified or redefined problems. Policy change thus captures a spectrum of types from policy innovation and succession to maintenance and termination. Sometimes policy learning, diffusion, and transformation also generate the need for policy formulation.

Policy analysts also study the policy capacity of any polity, government, and public institution, which refers to its ability or competence to bring together information and decision-making power to make intelligent choices and set strategic directions. Choices are related to values. In the formulation of public policy, apart from the necessity to find solutions to solve problems, it is often argued that it has to adhere to some core values that are relevant to all public policies, such as the five Es (economy, efficiency, effectiveness, efficacy, and equity); some would add a sixth E (electability) to indicate the need for any policy to respond to public demands and hence secure the support of the electorate. These values may conflict with one another; achieving the best balance tests the political skills as well as priorities of policymakers. Hence, policy formulation is not an exact science or purely a matter of economic rationality.

Policy Models

Broadly speaking, there are two diverse ways of interpreting decision making: (1) the rationalist versus (2) the realist understanding of policy making and implementation. The former sees policy as intention, while the latter considers policy more as outcome. The former sees policy formulation as a linear process, whereas the latter considers it as an interactive process. The former confines policy
formulation to policy choice in response to a problem, but the latter also includes problem recognition and agenda setting, as well as policy implementation, which delivers the real impact of the policy decision made. Within this spectrum, four major approaches to policy formulation have been developed in the policy literature over the past several decades, namely, (1) the rational model, (2) the incrementalist model, (3) the garbage can model, and (4) the institutionalist model.

**Rational Model**

The purest form of rationalism is the rational comprehensive model, which assumes some “perfect” conditions for rational policy making to be scientific, somewhat akin to rational choice in economic theory. Such conditions are premised on a clearly instrumental logic and sequence of reasoning—namely, defining and ranking values, specifying objectives and subobjectives with regard to the problem, identifying alternative means or options for solving the problem, calculating all the consequences of adopting each option, ranking the various options according to set criteria consistent with specified values and objectives, and finally, choosing the most effective option that maximizes benefits and minimizes costs. The rational model possesses attractive theoretical clarity but lacks behavioral realism. Its comprehensive form suffers from cognitive limitations (lack of knowledge, imagination, and skills), psychological limitations (fear of uncertainty, selective perceptions), organizational limitations (limited goals and horizons due to fixed jurisdictions and standard operating procedures), and resource limitations (lack of resources and time).

Herbert Simon and others argue that these shortcomings could not be made up by more diligent and comprehensive analysis. Decision makers are limited in computational capacity and can only search very selectively through large volumes of possibilities to discover what alternatives of action are available and what the consequences of each of these alternatives are. The search is bound to be incomplete and inadequate, based on uncertain information and partial ignorance, and is usually terminated with the discovery of satisfactory, not optimal, courses of action. Hence, they should go for the bounded rationality of *homo psychologicus* in place of the full rational choice of *homo economicus* and seek to “satisfice” rather than to “maximize.”

**Incrementalist Model**

The opposite of the rationalist policy model is the incrementalist model, made famous by Charles Lindblom’s science of muddling through. This model sees decision making as interaction among actors, hence it is a political rather than a rational process per se. It regards the future as a linear function of the past, somewhat similar to path dependence theory. According to Lindblom, goals and values are rarely clear or predetermined. They change according to available resources and as we learn about the problem through analysis. Hence, in practice, we do not review and analyze all possible options but make successive limited comparisons with current policy and situation. Lindblom’s theory, sometimes known as disjointed incrementalism, seeks not only to describe the reality of policy making but also to prescribe incrementalism as a better science. Problem solving is seen as iterative (step by step). His pragmatic advice is to avoid being comprehensive and exhaustive but to look after your part of the problem and let others look after those parts that are assigned to them. Policymakers are urged to define and redefine values and objectives in light of experience and to deal only with solvable problems; they should look at solutions only marginally different from the status quo, apply “feasibility” as the key decision criterion, and adopt a remedial approach (to fix what is wrong with current policy).

Critics of incrementalism contend that it is inherently conservative and pro status quo, so it can cope only with stable, not changing, situations or crises and is ill equipped to help with new, unfamiliar problems or to define problems or solutions that are unconventional or that fall outside the circle of proximate policymakers. Some even accuse it of accurately describing the “worst practice” but not prescribing the “best practice” and being at best applicable to policy succession instead of policy innovation activities.

Between the utopian and realist poles, some have sought to find a middle ground to embrace both the innovative side of the rational model and the pragmatic side of incrementalism. For example,
Amitai Etzioni argues for a third approach in the form of mixed scanning. Scanning refers to the search, collection, processing, and evaluation of information, as well as the drawing of conclusions. In mixed scanning, policy making takes place at two levels—a broad, high-level overview of problems and directions (the “fundamental” problems, which call for the rational approach) and a detailed examination of specific problem areas (the “incremental” problems, which call for the incrementalist approach). This approach has the benefit of both a comprehensive overview that requires full-range and in-depth analysis (back to first principles) and taking incremental steps, which requires incremental and low-level adaptations and “fixing up.” It is less demanding than the full search for all possible options under rationalism but more strategic and innovative than incrementalism. While it seems to have an intuitive appeal, even Etzioni himself admits that the merit of mixed scanning remains to be empirically substantiated.

**Garbage Can Model**

The garbage can model—advanced by Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen (1972)—is sometimes known as the temporary sorting model. It is premised on certain assumptions about the ambiguity of goals and values, the uncertainty in knowledge and technology, and the political symbolism of policy making, such as political rules and procedures. It emphasizes organizational irrationality or what Cohen et al. call organized anarchies. According to them, an organization is a loose collection of ideas rather than a coherent structure. It discovers preferences through action more than it acts on the basis of preset preferences, as implied in linear rational planning. In the process, it is often choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations, and solutions looking for issues, rather than the other way around. In this model, four variables are presumed to be interacting in a rather complex or even random manner: (1) a stream of choices, (2) a stream of problems, (3) a rate flow of solutions, and (4) a stream of energy from participants. The garbage can process is one in which problems, solutions, and participants move from one choice opportunity or situation to another. Such conception of policy formulation may well score high on model realism and applicability; however, it is weak in terms of deductive power.

**Institutionalist Model**

Finally, the institutionalist model tries to steer a more independent role for political institutions in policy making without playing down the importance of both the social context of politics and the motives and active intervention of individual actors. It sees organizational change as a contested process involving accidental outcomes and random activity, suggesting that results cannot be predicted and change cannot be controlled by fiat, thus claiming institutional coherence and autonomy. Institutions matter not only because they dispose authority and power but also because they provide the physical, cognitive, and moral frames for joint action, as well as the capacity for intervention. At the same time, institutions also represent certain collective conceptions of interpretation, agenda, memory, rights and duties, and even values, symbolism, and justice. As such, there is a relevant degree of institutional consistency and continuity that affects the process and outcome of policy formulation.

**Policy and Polity**

Different theories of the state (or polity) provide different interpretations of the power dimension of the policy process. The pluralist theory sees society as made up of diverse individual and group interests, some organized and others more diffused. Government decisions are an outcome of competition and bargained compromise or consensus among competing demands and interests operating within a liberal democratic system. Policy making is thus incremental and a process of mutual accommodation of interests. Most would agree that the political real world is more elitist and less inclusive than is implied or advocated by the pluralist doctrine. The elitist theory sees modern industrial society as built around large, hierarchical, and usually corporate interests. Politics operate in the form of an oligarchy; political or policy elites exist who engage in the actual bargaining and policy making.

As a particular form of elitist theory popular in the 1980s, the corporatist theory sees the state as
part of a structure of interest group representation, where it accords exclusive corporate groups (usually peak employers and employee associations) a monopoly over representing dominant social interests (viz., capital and labor, and sometimes also agriculture), resulting in a de facto arrangement existing alongside a constitutional system of representative government. Decision making and consent building take place through consultation, negotiation, and coordination among such peak bodies. Government boards and commissions, and “iron triangles” in the case of the United States (i.e., the nexus existing among congressional committees, government departments, and major interest bodies), would provide the formal channels for the processing and intermediation of corporate interests to reach a collective decision or a consensus. The success of corporatist policy making depends on voluntary cooperation between elites who are capable of withdrawing from any bargains struck. Norms and informal rules emerge from such voluntary bargaining that ought to be observed by the corporate interests concerned.

Opposed to the liberal democratic political tradition is the Marxist theory, which was popular in the 1960s and 1970s but has since waned. It is premised on class-based rationality and argues that the capitalist state exists to serve the interest of capital (though not necessarily the interests of individual capitalists) by creating the conditions for capital accumulation through support for markets and social control (the instrumentalist model). Neo-Marxists have added that the capitalist state also supplies goods and services for collective consumption so as to manufacture the “legitimation” of the capitalist order (the functionalist model). The state autonomy model, on the other hand, presumes a state-independent policy-making approach, where state officials act on their own preferences with regard to what is best for society, based on technocratic and bureaucratic rationality. This may depict a more authoritarian form of polity of either the extreme right (fascist, military dictatorship) or the extreme left (communist) of the ideological divide.

**From Problems and Ideas to Policy**

According to John Kingdon, problems, politics, and participants all contribute to agenda setting. Not all adverse conditions get recognized as problems that warrant something be done about them. Problem identification is about perception and interpretation. It entails political competition among various interests seeking their “preferred” condition to be recognized and defined as a problem. The act of translating a condition into a problem makes use of the changing values in society (the degree of mismatch between the observed conditions and one’s conception of an ideal state), comparisons (the relative gap or disparity as compared with others, such as cross-national comparisons and international benchmarking, to give it a sense of legitimacy), and recategorization (so that the previously unrecognized condition can be reconstituted to structure people’s perception of it). Problems may arise as a result of a focusing event (e.g., a major disaster or crisis), social indicators, change of government or leadership, or a combination of these factors. However, there is a limit to the span of attention of the public as well as policymakers, which is normally short-lived. Like fashion, problems come and go. If there is a failure to address the problem, the result may be frustration, and after a while, people would tend to shift their focus to other competing issues and problems.

Ideas are important in policy formulation because they provide new ways of looking at the existing situation (e.g., making some conditions previously considered acceptable as unacceptable according to the new standards) as well as innovative solutions to problems. A good example is the rise of privatization policies in the 1980s due to new economic rationalist ideas and the work of neoliberal think tanks that operated actively on governments and parties. The real world of politics abounds in policy entrepreneurs of all kinds—consultants, politicians, campaigners, policy advocates, and think tanks. These people engage in idea promotion and problem redefinition all the time through publicity, advocacy, persuasion, and bargaining. To the extent that a condition only gets recognized as a problem if a solution is available, policy entrepreneurs who come up with ready solutions help facilitate building the consensus needed for problem recognition. Policy advising is becoming a booming activity in modern-day policy making, but it is effective only if the policy climate is conducive and receptive policymakers are willing to take up external advice and prescriptions.
The Politics of Decision

The garbage can model suggests that policy formulation very often takes the form of solutions chasing the problems; unless solutions are readily available, policymakers would be reluctant to recognize conditions as problems. Kingdon, too, argues that policy making depends on the coupling of problems and policy solutions and of problems and politics.

Problems are recognized and defined according to the processes that are different from the ways policies are developed or political events unfold. Policy proposals emerge according to their own incentives and selection criteria, irrespective of whether they are solutions to problems or responsive to particular political consideration. On the other hand, political events move on their own schedule and according to their own rules and dynamics, with no necessary or even logical relationship to problems or proposals. The three streams (problem, policy, and politics) run parallel and independently of each other until a window of opportunity occurs in a situation where they are joined or coupled—a pressing problem demands attention and a policy proposal is somehow around that is coupled to the problem as a solution; or an event in the political stream (e.g., a change of government or a major focusing event in the form of a calamity) calls for different direction. At that point, proposals that fit with that political event come to be recognized and are coupled with the ripe political climate. Similarly, problems that fit available policies are acknowledged, while others remain to be neglected politically.

Given that policy formulation is an interactive process, the policy demanders (i.e., clients and the interest groups), policy entrepreneurs/advocates, and policy implementors (i.e., the bureaucracy) have a role to play in shaping the policy process and its outcome. Contemporary policy discourse recognizes the strong influence of pressure groups, policy communities, policy and issue networks, and what are known as iron triangles or subgovernments in the United States. A policy community can be either a formal structure or informal network characterized by restricted membership, stable relationships, vertical interdependence, and insulation from other networks and institutions. Policy and issue networks, on the other hand, comprise a larger number of participants with varying degrees of mutual commitment or dependence on others in their environment. Most policy issues and disputes are resolved in the relatively private and specialized worlds of the policy sectors through the relevant policy “professionals” from both government agencies and interest groups. In other words, there has been a bureaucratization or professionalization of policy formulation, whereby civil servants and interest group officials work together as policy elite to produce mutually satisfactory outcomes.

The notion of iron triangles and subgovernments presumes a stable and largely autonomous set of participants, coalesced to control fairly narrow policy programs and operating to further the direct economic interest of each party to the alliance of this small circle. A related model is the advocacy coalition framework, which recognizes two to four advocacy coalitions, typically active in a particular policy domain where groups coalesce around a shared set of values and interests. Policy brokers would mediate the competition among these coalitions within relatively stable systems and based on certain ground rules. Similar to corporatist policy making, decisions tend to be reached through a process of negotiation, by accommodating established interests and reaching a consensus, while maintaining existing forms of relations between interest groups and government agencies within the particular policy community. Hence, as A. Grant Jordan and Jeremy Richardson observe, changes in policy are always marginal, and decision making is essentially incremental.

State managers (whether general or professional bureaucracies) are a key party to such an alliance, because without their involvement, it would be difficult to secure any problem recognition in the agenda-setting process. They are also the ones who eventually implement policy decisions and are thus in a position to influence policy formulation in a backward-mapping manner. For these state actors, entering into formal or informal alliance/network with other stakeholders helps ensure that the policy process is managed and within control, giving them greater clout when advising their political masters. As well documented in the literature on bureaucracy, state managers are not just passive instruments of implementation. They seek to influence policy making through defining the problems and the range of policy options, determining what can be done and what cannot be implemented for
various technical and administrative reasons, and in general tendering policy advice in anonymity.

Finally, the recent rise of civil society activists and new Internet platforms such as Facebook and Twitter has brought about large numbers of unconventional and unorganized participants, breaking down the existing rules and norms that govern policy communities and networks. This makes the policy scene more diverse and overcrowded and poses an unexpected challenge to the hitherto corporatist nature of policy making.

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See also Advocacy Coalition Framework; Agenda Setting; Implementation; Policy Advice; Policy Analysis; Policy Community; Policy Cycle; Policy Evaluation; Policy Instruments; Policy Learning; Policy Network; Policy Process, Models of; Rationalism, Critical; Rationality, Bounded; Think Tanks

Further Readings


**Policy Framing**

Policy framing is a concept used in public policy and social movement theory to explain the process by which actors seek to understand and act on complex situations. The policy framing process involves policy actors (a) confronting a situation where the understanding is problematic and uncertain, (b) creating an understanding or story that helps analyze and make sense of the situation, and (c) then acting (and persuading others to act) on it. Its basic premise refutes the notion that different individuals can observe the same social and natural phenomena and necessarily arrive at the same conclusions. Because the framing of the situation requires the assessment of the potential roles of other policy actors, framing will define the degree to which other potential actors are included and benefit from the policy process and policy decisions. Marginalized groups are more likely to contest a particular frame and promote a counterframe.

Policy framing is a midrange ideational concept that focuses on how humans conceptualize the world and how the elements of the world engage with each other and the policy actors themselves. It captures a notion of ideas that is more focused on the intersubjective understanding by a group of policy actors as compared with ideas, observations, and arguments held and posed by individuals. It is also focused on particular policy problems and situations when compared with the more encompassing focus on wider ideologies and philosophies.

Policy framing is a concept that places an emphasis on the dynamics of change and the constantly changing and contested notion of policy reality. In this, it contrasts strongly with policy concepts such as institutions, which tend to emphasize rules and norms that are slow to change over
time. Conflicting policy frames mobilize policy actors to contest the status quo. Policy frame analysis also has a fundamentally different set of assumptions from the rational choice perspectives that tend to assume that while circumstances may change, how actors calculate their interest will not. The framing approach would not dismiss the importance of interest calculation, as will be explained below, but it would emphasize how actors may “key” on different core elements at different times.

Framing has been used in a wide range of disciplines, including psychiatry and psychology. The concept of framing has attracted considerable interest in public policy analysis as well as social movement studies in sociology and politics because it incorporates constructivist understandings of how actors shape the meanings of their experiences. At the same time, it operates on a level that is not much distant from more positivist methodologies and approaches to political and social action. Thus, some scholars have used the frame approach in combination with other, more constructivist or positivist approaches, such as institutionalism and advocacy coalitions, as well as positivist methodologies. For example, there is a tradition in the study of political behavior of examining framing, focusing on topics such as quantitative studies of how the media shape public opinion.

In the public policy field, scholars have used the framing concept to study efforts by decision makers to shape understanding and courses of action in areas where knowledge is uncertain and/or where there are substantial differences and conflicts over interpretation and action. Thus, policy framing has featured significantly in studies of environmental policy, contested social policies such as refugee and women’s rights, economic policy, knowledge-intensive areas, media and public opinion, health policy, racial policy, foreign policy, agricultural policy, poverty and education, and so forth.

This entry examines the two key strands of the framing approach (the public policy and social movement conceptualization of framing), focusing on the key intellectual propositions and methodologies. While not strictly devoted to policy analysis, the social movement research provides a number of insights on how politics and policy are shaped by groups in contestation. Because of the focus on essentially the same concept, these two literatures provide insights for each other. At the same time, scholars from both communities sometimes can speak past each other because their main reference points are in their own groups, so it is helpful to understand the development and arguments of both approaches.

The Evolution of the Framing Concept
John Noakes and Hank Johnston give credit to Gregory Bateson for first using the term in a discussion of epistemology and animal behavior. Erving Goffman’s 1974 monograph first brought the concept of framing onto the social science agenda. For Goffman, frames were cognitive structures that humans generated to explain events and their involvement in them. Frame approaches have evolved in analytical depth and focus since Goffman’s original statement of the concept. This formulation assumed that humans were for the most part unconscious of the framing process, which was constituted by rituals of everyday life that defined individuals and their relations to others. Much analysis focuses on how individuals key on specific elements of an event to understand what is going on and how they should behave; it nevertheless also emphasizes that humans have the ability to transform their realities.

Both in sociology and political science, the emphasis has moved toward understanding how actors actively and consciously seek to build and defend frames and how they project their frames onto others. This enables the policy frame analysis to be used as a critical theory, highlighting actors’ efforts to refute a particular representation of social reality.

Social Movement Framing
Arguably, the academics using this sociological approach, when compared with public policy scholars, have made earlier advances in developing a more systematic elaboration of the concepts of framing. Social movement theorists use the frame concept to explain how actors in a movement define what is happening in a situation to mobilize collective action by the movement. This approach supplanted much of the rationalist and organizational approaches in the 1980s and became one of the core approaches to social movements in the
1990s. Noakes and Johnston credit William Gamson, David Snow, Robert Benford and their various collaborators who have sought to systematize this process.

In their 1988 statement on framing, Snow and Benford provided the most prevalent typology of frames. To mobilize individuals to act in a social movement, the framing process involves three framing activities. First, there must be a diagnostic framing of current events that seeks to discredit the prevailing framing and offer a new interpretation. Second, prognostic framing involves the creation of a solution to the problem/situation that the movement can take forward. Finally, motivational framing focuses on the conceptualization that actually triggers people to join the social movement, making the assumption that such communication and persuasion are necessary beyond the first two framing actions.

Using such conceptual tools, social movement scholars expect entrepreneurial leaders to take on such framing roles to arouse the wider public. In doing so, these leaders will seek to link particular actions and events as evidence of injustice or some other unsatisfactory reality and to frame an appropriate response. The leadership will also endeavor to highlight particular aspects of the frames to make them resonate more with the potential followers of the movement. This notion of social movement framing resonating with the followers depends on a number of different elements, including, for example, how credible the arguments and linkage seem to the potential membership and how closely this social movement frame chimes with the belief systems of the targeted audience.

Various kinds of research have been undertaken to study the framing processes at work. The work has tended to take the form of case studies of particular social movements at particular junctures. The overall tendency reflects the epistemological assumptions of much of this field, with its attempt to understand collective beliefs about reality, as well as the ambiguity inherent in such assumptions.

Accordingly, there has been a general concern to push for a more systematic examination of processes while acknowledging the tendency toward proliferation of concepts, often used in a largely descriptive fashion. Nevertheless, in the early 21st century, a significant body of literature on political behavior sought to empirically isolate these frames and processes and determine their impact through quantitative analysis of data from surveys or experiments.

**Policy Framing Concepts**

In the 1980s and early 1990s, Martin Rein and Donald Schön provided many of the key statements that triggered the interest in policy analysis for framing. The context of their effort was a belief that the more rationalist orientation of policy studies was unable to get at core aspects of policy decision making. A core puzzle for them was the intractable policy controversy that no presentation of facts and evidence could reconcile.

Rein and Schön attribute this inability to reconcile such policy positions to the existence of conflicting policy frames. These frames involve stories or structures of understanding defined by human belief and perception. Faced with a contested or uncertain policy problem, different actors will seize on different elements and linkages between these elements to construct very different views of reality. Part of the difficulty in inducing a reconciliation of such frames is their tacit nature, which prevents them from being actively scrutinized and assessed by both their proponents and opponents. Furthermore, because the frames will view different events and observations as central, there appears to be no objective reality and, therefore, no potential for falsifying a particular frame in favor of another. This reality gives one insight into the difficulty that climate change policy activists face in persuading climate change “deniers” to accept the evidence of the anthropogenic changes to Earth’s atmosphere and the difficulty the deniers face in winning over the activists. Actors tend to take such frames for granted and are unaware of how they define the policy position they adopt.

Of course this notion of contesting realities existed long before in policy analysis under a different terminology. Since the 1970s, researchers on agenda setting, such as Robert Cobb and Charles Elder, have emphasized the importance of understanding how the definition of a problem shapes the subsequent policy outcome. In the 1990s, a number of scholars found a window of opportunity for the policy frame concept as a way to
bridge the constructivist and positivist divide, an approach that was furthered by Rein and Schön’s incorporation of notions of discourse.

Delving into Rein and Schön’s 1994 conceptualization more deeply, the authors accept that there is an important role for actor interests and how they relate to actor frames; this inherent ambiguity, the relationship between interests and ideas, is an enduring question for all policy analysis. Rein and Schön do not assume that these concepts are identical, but they accept that frames may help define interests and that frames may be undertaken to benefit particular interests. Nevertheless, the core reality is that the frames will be instrumental to defining what is in the interest of the actors. Institutions and other organizations push a particular frame or set of frames because individual members sponsor those frames.

Policy discourse is the mechanism by which frames contest the understanding of a policy problem within any policy forum. Rein and Schön define this as essentially the dialogue that exists between different parties over a particular issue. They differentiate two forms of policy discourse and two associated frames. The first discourse involves the policy debate in which the different policy contestants seek to prevail with their policy stories and frames through various rhetorical efforts involving persuasion, evidence, and symbols. Rhetorical frames will underpin the arguments in the policy debate. The second discourse involves the debate over policy practice in which the actors argue and develop policy stories that influence the creation of procedures, particular policy instruments, and so forth to deliver the policy. Action frames inform this discourse.

Within action frames, Rein and Schön differentiate three types: (1) policy frames, (2) institutional action frames, and (3) metacultural frames. Policy frames are those created by institutional actors to define the problem in a particular policy situation. Institutional action frames represent the more general action frame used by institutional actors to structure a wide range of policy situations—this institutional action frame concept bears some resemblance to policy styles and even standard operating procedures. The institution has characteristic ways of addressing policy problems that the public can anticipate. A metacultural frame, the broadest concept, is essentially the worldview adopted by a particular culture or community. These metacultural frames shape the policy stories that inform both the rhetorical and the action frames.

Rein and Schön view the key policy act as individuals becoming aware of their rhetorical and action frames, a process they defined in 1994 as the “construction” of the frame. They urge policy actors to develop a higher degree of reflection, seeking to learn more about their actions during the process of making decisions. This should lead actors to a process of reframing in which they use reflection and discourse in a manner that leads to a resolution of policy controversies and conflict. When actors engage with their situation and with each other through discourse, they may recognize incongruities, creating a situation that forces people to reflect on their beliefs and frames.

As Falk Daviter has noted, this emphasis on the potential for rational consensus building contrasts with policy approaches that focus on the policy outcomes occurring through conflict and competition. Rein and Schön do not take this rational process of frame reflection for granted. They expect it to be extremely difficult and recognize that frame reflection may not lead to reframing, nor will reframing necessarily require it. The authors formulate the possibility that academics can aid practitioners in developing reciprocal frame reflective processes as well as the mutual trust required for practitioners to expose themselves to such processes.

Methods

The core of understanding in any given frame involves deconstructing key elements from the policy rhetoric and actual policy documents and instruments as well as accounts of individual players (and also the characteristics and interests of these players). In these sources, students can discern the policy stories that the various actors use to analyze particular policy situations and isolate the frames accordingly. Because any given policy frame and policy situation (particularly conflictual ones) are too complex to be understood by one individual and are subject to multiple interpretations, researchers must develop an account of the policy situation from a number of perspectives. As one would expect, the inherent difficulty of isolating
intersubjective constructions of reality by its very nature poses enormous practical problems for the researcher. How does one, for instance, differentiate a dissembling rhetorical frame from the core action frame when the actors themselves may come to believe their own rhetorical devices? What happens when frames are translated and reshaped at various different levels of a policy system—or when there are conflicts between those who operate within a particular frame? An overarching frame does not have to be uniform and indeed is unlikely to be so. Perhaps equally significant, the researchers themselves necessarily bring their own frames, which shape how they perceive and analyze these phenomena, into such a research endeavor.

The basic policy approach that scholars have taken involves isolating both the policy rhetoric and policy actions over time and across all the relevant levels of governance. These demands for policy detail and nuance have led to the bulk of the policy research using the qualitative method of a detailed case study. Given the effort involved in studying such processes over time and multiple levels, the research in this area has generally taken the form of a very limited number of case studies, which are also in evidence in the social movement research. Much of this research is clear in its view that framing indeed matters and drives policy.

However, as also witnessed in the social movement research, a substantial body of literature tends to use the framing terminology to express a basic metaphor, much in the same way that some scholars use the concept of networks as descriptive shorthand to refer to people who interact over time in a particular political setting. As noted earlier, numerous scholars tend to use framing as part of a larger analytical construct, such as institutional analysis, advocacy coalitions, garbage can models, and so forth. This entry emphatically does not dismiss such efforts as, for instance, framing and reframing seem to require more theorizing about intersubjective activity between like-minded parties and more conflicting actors. How are frames inserted into institutional processes by various actors and groups of actors? Whether this takes the form of discourse coalitions, epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions, or some other concept, some form of networking processes is required.

While the descriptive and the multiconceptual approaches can enhance our insights about particular policy problems, there is a danger that the elaboration and evaluation of the concept will remain largely at a general conceptual stage. Systematic studies of multiple cases seem to be the next step to isolate key elements of the framing process and determine how particular conditions shape their evolution.

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See also Agenda Setting; Constructivism; Discursive Policy Analysis; Ideology; Policy, Constructivist Models; Policy, Discourse Models; Policy Analysis; Policy Formulation; Social Movements

Further Readings
Policy Instruments

The study of policy instruments dates from the early 1970s, though much had been written previously, especially in economics, about government intervention in relation to market imperfections. A policy instrument refers to the means of government intervention in markets or, from a broader perspective, society to accomplish goals or to solve problems. The behavioral assumption underlying a policy instrument is that it attempts to get people do things that they might not otherwise have done. Since the 1960s, there has been a transformation not only in the scope and scale of the role of the government but also in the proliferation of tools that it has at its disposal for public action. In retrospect, a distinction can be made between three partly overlapping arenas in the study of policy instruments.

This entry starts with a discussion of several approaches to defining what policy instruments are. Policy instruments are not isolated but exist in relationship to objectives as well as resources; taking this into account, the next section of the entry considers theories about how a policy instrument should be chosen. A classification of policy instruments is presented, differentiating between three families of policy instruments. Next, the entry examines the choice of policy tools (policy design), the application of policy tools (policy implementation), and the second generation of less coercive and more indirect policy instruments inspired by the limited impact of earlier policy tools. The assessment of the impact of policy instruments (policy evaluation) is complicated by the fact that they often come as part of a policy mix; the entry describes policy evaluation, noting that effectiveness is just one of the many criteria by which to measure performance. The entry concludes with a look at the way ahead.

Approaches to Policy Instruments

The classical approach to defining policy instruments (1970–1985), rooted in the instrumentalist school of thought, has been largely supplanted because of its top-down and mechanical view of the world. It put quite some effort into a rather semantic discussion about the definition of a policy instrument, the risk of metaphors and reification, and the classification of policy instruments on the basis of their intrinsic characteristics. It claimed that the selection and consequently the application of instruments are made mainly on the basis of the characteristics of a specific instrument and its effects in terms of goal attainment. Soon it became clear that goal attainment cannot be attributed solely to the characteristics of instruments but that the characteristics of the context should also be taken into account.

The instrument–context approach (1985–1995) focused on the development of a theory of policy instruments that would enable policymakers to select the appropriate policy instrument for the problem at hand. The basis for selection of a policy instrument is not only the “logic of consequence” but also the “logic of appropriateness,” which includes “goodness of fit.” The attention for the context has led to what may be labeled “refined instrumentalism.”

Finally, instruments are considered one of the many variables in the contextual approach (1995–present) that takes policy implementation as a point of departure. The study of policy instruments merges with the study of implementation. The study of policy instruments has been affected as such by the developments in the field of implementation, notably the shift from implementation to governance.

Policy Theory

A policy instrument comes not in isolation but as part of intervention theory. It can be further specified by identifying the form of the intervention, that is, a policy, a program, or a reform. In this context, attention is paid to a policy theory, that is, the set of assumptions underlying a policy instrument. A policy theory, following Andries Hoogerwerf, consists of assumptions about three kinds of relations:

1. normative relations between what “is” and what “ought to be,”
2. relations between the objectives and means to accomplish these objectives, and
3. more in-depth relations between causes and effects.
The study of policy considers the causal relationship between a policy instrument and the purpose for which it is used. To put it differently, goal attainment is considered to be the dependent variable while instruments are seen as one of the independent variables. It should be underscored, though, that a policy theory does not reflect a scientific theory in the traditional sense of a universal law that has been empirically tested. The external validity of the findings of a policy theory is fairly low. A policy theory provides guidelines for action and is, as such, ideographic rather than nomologic in nature. As they are often in conflict, a policy theory is often the outcome of a trade-off and consequently suboptimal in nature. The quality of a policy theory—coherence, reliability, validity—is an important source of a policy fiasco.

Shapes and Sizes
The means of tackling policy problems are often called policy instruments or policy solutions. The labels are not without risks. A comparison of a policy instrument with a hammer, a pair of pincers, or a screwdriver may be misleading because it attributes qualities to means that they do not have in reality. Consequently, it may lead to unintended and unforeseen problems that may even overshadow the original problems. The same applies for the term policy solutions as it gives the wrong impression that problems may be solved once and for all. In reality, problems are solved at best partly and temporarily. Moreover, the solution of one problem may create another problem, as Aaron Wildavsky has argued: Policies deal less with events in society than with the consequences of policies from the past. Instead of permanent solutions, one should think of permanent problems in the sense that one problem always succeeds and replaces another. A policy is, according to Deborah Stone, more like an endless game of Monopoly than a bicycle repair.

Three Families of Instruments
The study of policy instruments has been long dominated by efforts to put together a classification of policy instruments on the basis of their characteristics. One of the first is a typology by Christopher Hood that makes a distinction between instruments for the collection of information (detectors) and instruments directed to influence development in society (effectors). A quick scan of the literature reveals that the study of policy instruments is almost exclusively focused on the latter. A survey provided by Frans van der Doelen identifies three families of policy instruments, also referred to as “sticks, carrots and sermons.” The first family consists of regulatory instruments, such as orders and prohibitions (licenses, permits, and regulations). Rules may also establish rights. Rights must rest on authoritative rules from the state, but they are distinctive in their reliance on citizens for enforcement. The second family embraces financial means, providing incentives. They may be positive (grants, subsidies) as well as negative (taxes, user charges) from a consumer’s perspective. The third family includes communicative tools, the development of which has received a boost with the advance of the digital age. Such tools may be directed at increasing as well as decreasing the amount of information on the other party.

In addition, a fourth family, organizations, can be distinguished, referring to direct government, that is, the provision of goods and services including treatment. The classification of policy instruments is further elaborated by Michael Howlett in a spectrum of “substantive” policy instruments on the basis of the level of state provision, with direct provision of goods and services by the state at one end of the continuum and provision of goods and services by the family and community with no state involvement at the other. In addition, “procedural” instruments can be distinguished that are primarily intended to alter the policy process

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<td>Regulatory</td>
<td>Prescriptions</td>
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<td>Economic</td>
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<td>Communicative</td>
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rather than the mix of goods and services provided to society.

The typology of policy instruments is not without controversy; for instance, the use of symbols as policy instruments—“words that succeed and policies that fail” to quote the subtitle of Murray Edelman’s book *Political Language*—does not fit into the typology. In most cases, hardly any attention is paid to the internal instruments used to influence administrative processes, even though they might be preferable from a control or management perspective. The focus is almost exclusively on external instruments geared to a change of the environment of the government—that is, the developments in society. Besides, there is no place for informal instruments to shape a policy according to a government’s preferences for changes in the membership or size of the decision-making body, through bargaining and negotiation, and by mobilization of political support. In response to these and other drawbacks, several other typologies have been offered in the literature, for instance, on the basis of the degree of the following:

- **Coercion**: The extent to which a policy tool restricts behavior as opposed to being merely encouraging or discouraging
- **Directness**: The extent to which a public agency is involved in all stages of the policy process
- **Automaticity**: The extent to which a policy tool uses the existing administrative structure
- **Visibility**: The extent to which the resources attributed to a policy tool show up in the budget-end program review

The degree of coercion is considered to be the main criterion; according to Lester Salamon, a variety of factors have put a premium on tools that are automatic but indirect and invisible. Unfortunately, no criterion is completely exhaustive or mutually exclusive.

Last but not least, policy instruments rarely appear in a pure form. They come bundled in programs combining various tools, each being a package containing a type of good or activity, a vehicle for the delivery of this good or activity, and a delivery system. A prohibition, for instance, may be delivered by a public agency in the form of a rule.

The diversity of policy instruments should be considered as a benefit rather than a drawback, according to Ross Ashby’s law of requisite variety—the greater the variety within a system, the greater is its ability to absorb differences without system failure; in this case, variety in policy instruments increases the effectiveness of government intervention by enabling it to address a greater variety of environmental situations.

**Policy Design: The Selection**

The selection of policy instruments is often associated with a tool kit from which the government is free to choose a policy instrument. In practice, there is no such tool kit, and at the same time, the government is not always free to choose. On the contrary, a subsidy is not simply a “bag of money” but represents an organizational unit, too. A third party may have preferences of its own. A specific policy instrument, for instance, may provide discretionary power and, therefore, room to maneuver. The same applies for the target group, because interest groups that oppose the implementation of a policy have tools at their disposal that may frustrate a potentially effective policy instrument.

The choice of policy tools, according to B. Guy Peters, is driven by what he calls the Five I’s, which combine together to constitute a checklist of factors that should be taken into consideration:

1. ideas and ideologies that may shape the selection of policy instruments, giving preference to a specific tool above other tools;
2. interests that refer to the assumption that individuals try to maximize their personal utilities;
3. institutions that may have preferences for instruments over which they have control and with which they are familiar;
4. individuals pointing at the role of political entrepreneurs to win support for a new policy; and
5. international environment as shown by the consequences of the process of globalization.

In reality, policy instruments are often chosen for all but rational arguments, that is, the assessment of their positive and negative effects (impact
A policy instrument is often chosen because of extrarational arguments. The following are two such arguments:

**The normative or political dimension of a policy instrument**: A policy instrument is not just a tool. Contrary to the well-known statement by Niccolò Machiavelli, the ends do not justify the means, as Arthur Ringeling has argued correctly. The choice of a policy instrument is not value free as it may reflect an ideological stance. Besides, a policy instrument may strengthen or weaken the position of an actor.

**Path dependency**: The institutionalization of policy instruments as the selection of a policy instrument may be subject to path dependency. A policy instrument that works is also adopted in other fields. The bias a policymaker has toward a specific policy instrument may even go so far that the problem at hand is shaped in such a way that it can be solved, at least potentially, by the policy instruments of his or her choice.

Last but not least, a policy instrument may be chosen because it is in vogue, as illustrated by the deregulation movement of the 1980s, which seems to have been more an expression of a prejudice against the government or a preference for the market than the outcome of a careful scrutiny of the pros and cons of regulation. Rules and standards have been abolished in favor of financial incentives. Only recently has there been a movement backward in favor of re-regulation.

**Policy Implementation: The Application**

The application of instruments, often referred to as policy implementation, has been long directed by what Herman van Gunsteren calls the rational central-rule approach, based on the superior analytical insights of an elite and on centrally controlled implementation. It assumes that actors who are involved in the enforcement of a rule are puppets on strings. In reality, they are neither willless nor powerless, as illustrated by the famous study by Jeffrey Pressmann and Aaron Wildavsky on the implementation of a program to hire the hardcore unemployed minorities of Oakland, titled “Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; or Why It’s Amazing That Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes.”

The study of policy instruments has been affected by developments in the field of policy implementation. The confrontation between the top-down and the bottom-up approach has induced a more horizontal mode of policy implementation often referred to as governance. The shift from hierarchy to markets and networks has substantially changed the role of the government. The government is just one of the actors, though a prominent one—the government has a monopoly on the utilization of power and more resources at its disposal and often serves as network manager—each pursuing its own interests and strategy. Being dependent on each other for the accomplishment of their objectives, actors are involved in a multi-actor game of wheeling and dealing. A policy is, as such, a compromise, the outcome of the interaction between these actors or, to put it differently, the result of the coproduction of various actors rather than something imposed by one single actor—that is, the government.

**The Second Generation of Policy Instruments**

The shift in governance from hierarchy to markets and networks gave birth to what De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof have called the second generation of policy instruments. A multi-actor game requires other features beyond the conventional tools, notably multilateral instruments such as covenants, public–private partnerships, and voluntary agreements. Contrary to the first generation of policy instruments, the second generation of policy instruments anticipates the potential resistance of the stakeholders by taking into account the characteristics of a network, notably the autonomy or isolation of the target group and the interdependency of the actors, as well as the pluriformity of society.

With the second generation of policy instruments, the government takes a more remote stance. Instead of directing, the government facilitates
development in society (steering from a distance). The new tools are highly indirect and rely heavily on a wide assortment of third parties for the implementation of a policy. In addition, they are characterized by a high degree of relativism and voluntarism. It is left to the target group to take action and to change its behavior.

The development of a second generation of policy instruments does not mean that the first generation of policy instruments suddenly becomes obsolete. To the contrary, second-generation instruments supplement rather than replace the first-generation ones. In many cases, vertical instruments are still appropriate, even in a network setting. The introduction of more horizontal instruments may be seen as fine-tuning for a new situation. In practice, the difference is not that great. The “new” policy instruments often go under the same label as the “old” ones, although the emphasis is more on the bilateral or even multilateral aspect than on the unilateral aspect of governance.

**Policy Evaluation**

The performance of the government is often measured in terms of goal attainment and effectiveness. The effectiveness of tools—the contribution of policy instrument to goal attainment—may be blurred by external or intervening variables, such as the financial crisis, that are beyond the control of the government. Consequently, an effective tool may not lead to goal attainment, whereas goal attainment may conceal an ineffective tool.

The review of policy instruments is further complicated by a number of circumstances that make it difficult to be conclusive:

1. Goals are not set once and for all but may be subject to goal displacement. The assessment of a policy instrument in terms of the original goals may be methodologically sound but not of much practical relevance.

2. It may be hard to measure the effect of a policy instrument as they often come and go as part of a policy mix. A subsidy, for instance, is often shaped as a regulation containing additional conditions. A regulation is usually backed up by sanctions, and inducements are predicated on rules for handing out rewards or punishments. The packaging could be threefold:

   - **horizontal** packaging, which is used if two or more policy instruments are directed simultaneously at the same agent;
   - **vertical** packaging, which refers to the application of a policy instrument to facilitate the implementation of another policy instrument; and
   - **chronological** packaging, which implies a sequence in the selection or application of diverse policy tools.

The packaging of instruments makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to sort out the precise effects of an individual policy instrument and, therefore, its contribution to the accomplishment of objectives.

3. The effect of a policy instrument may be “hollowed-out,” according to Roeland in ’t Veld, by the law of diminishing effectiveness, which states that a policy instrument may become obsolete after some time because stakeholders learn how to cope with its negative or unwelcome effects.

4. Last but not least, it should be noted that the effectiveness of a policy instrument is just one of the many criteria that may be used to evaluate a policy. The call for improvement in the efficiency of the public sector in the past few years has been at the expense of equity in the distribution of goods and services. Lately, the accountability, legitimacy, and responsiveness of government have become issues.

**The Way Ahead: Old Wine in New Bottles?**

The reinvention of government not only has put the government back in the spotlight but also has induced other changes (steering, not rowing, is the device). Borrowing insight from the new public management movement, attention has shifted away from the primary toward the secondary process in public organizations. Public management has replaced public policy at the heart of public administration. It has induced a change in vocabulary. In today’s jargon, instruments are referred to as outputs, underscoring that the provision of goods and services may also be considered a policy
Policy Learning

Learning is a process whereby cognitive frameworks or behavior changes occur as a result of new information, knowledge, and experiences. The various levels at which learning happens are individual, organizational, governmental, and even societal. Policy learning involves all these levels, but it is typically focused on governmental or societal learning about specific policy issues or broad conceptual frameworks that guide government action in different policy fields. There is a vast literature on the psychology of individual learning, as well as a management literature on the dynamics of organizational learning. The literature on policy learning started in the 1960s, with the growing realization that policy making was not simply about power but also about collective puzzling under conditions of uncertainty.

Learning in Public Policy

Learning is a preoccupation in the study of public policy for several reasons. First, there is a presumption that policy making is not entirely a matter of self-interested politics or power. Obviously, the policy process involves interest groups, political parties, social movements, classes, and other forces—and they battle for the supremacy of their agendas and their interests. But there is also the sense that policy making is about pursuing—in some large measure—the public interest. This means that policy is intended to contribute to the public good and that therefore it should be monitored (evaluated) regularly as conditions and information change, and improved if possible. This requires learning. Second, every model of the policy process assumes that policies (and their constituent programs) are intended to deal with public problems and therefore require a careful definition of exactly what the key features of the problem are, as well as its underlying causal factors. This requires reflection, research, and learning. Third, every model of the policy process also assumes a stage of evaluation, where policies are assessed for their effectiveness and efficiency and are modified and improved if possible. Evaluation is intrinsically a learning function.

The successful avoidance, or at least minimization, of mistakes is crucial for public policy and requires a capacity to learn. Part of the challenge of policy learning is that capacity is often blocked by a combination of factors. Uncertainty marks all policy fields, some more than others. Climate change science, for example, is enormously complicated...
Policy Learning

and was being seriously debated even into the 1990s. When governments around the world began massive bailouts and spending programs in 2009 to deal with the global financial crisis, no one was entirely sure what the impacts would actually be. Sometimes the evidence to assess policy interventions takes years to appear (e.g., poverty reduction programs in developing countries). Other policy fields, such as abortion or same-sex marriage, are driven more by moral or ethical perspectives than by scientific research and data. For these and other reasons, policy actors have to rely on policy issue frames or belief systems that consist of a reasonably consistent mix of data, information, research, values, interests, and deeply held assumptions or beliefs. These can operate in various ways, as broadly consistent worldviews of competing players in the policy process (e.g., environmental vs. economic development groups), as paradigms that are broadly accepted by most stakeholders in a policy field, or even broadly at the societal level (e.g., the reality and danger of global warming). So policy learning is not simply a matter of processing clear information or unambiguous experiences. Belief systems and paradigms are often deeply embedded among social actors or institutions and are internally consistent enough that they can resist contradictory evidence.

Organizational Learning

This raises the question of whether organizations can actually learn, as distinct from the individuals that make them up. It is important not to anthropomorphize institutions—they do not exist as separate entities. However, enormous efforts take place in almost all institutions to provide both collective memory and learning. Policy manuals and standard operating procedures (SOPs) mark almost every organization. Organizations—from local day care centers to the military—have retreats and special meetings to breathe, get focused, and act as one. The larger the organization, the more challenging is the learning process. Can states—possibly the largest organizations we know—learn, and can they learn policy lessons? The current record is mixed. The financial crisis of 2008–2009 had the U.S. Federal Reserve and other national banks intervene to keep their economies afloat. Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, who was a student of the Great Depression of the 1930s, learned those lessons and was in a position to apply them with a massive stimulus package. He was an individual in charge of an organization, and the organization and the state absorbed the lesson to a degree. By 2010, the new challenge was deficits, and various state organizations—primarily central banks and finance departments—were attempting to shift from stimulus to cuts. Learning is not a static condition—it requires adaptation, shift, and change. That is why it is difficult.

So can states learn? In principle, yes, if we deanthropomorphize the organizations, ministries, and offices that make them up and see leaders who look dispassionately at the evidence and move on. On the other hand, policy-making systems and the states within which they are embedded face at least six impediments to learning. First, while making mistakes is the best path to learning how to do better, mistakes are often political suicide. Second, the larger the organization, the more reliant it is on SOPs. States are big—SOPs are important and often helpful, but they become impediments to fresh thinking. Third, stakeholders fight for and cling grimly to the status quo. They are not necessarily the enemies of learning, but they are stalwart defenders of any conventional wisdom that serves their interests. Fourth, many political systems do not have well-developed “cognitive capacities” (e.g., think tanks, foundations, and university departments of political science or public policy). Fifth, there is the invisible human dimension of state organizations (ministries)—the fluid companionship of experienced seniors and enthusiastic recruits. Mentorship—much understudied in the literature—is a crucial mechanism of organizational learning, but it often happens haphazardly. Sixth, in policy areas that concern the safety or security of the public, if things go wrong, there is almost unbearable pressure to “do something.” In other words, agencies have to react immediately rather than learn from the experience—terrorist attacks are a perfect illustration. The policy reactions to the attempt to blow up a plane destined to the United States from Amsterdam on Christmas Day in 2009 were clearly designed to “tightly secure,” even if that was largely meaningless in terms of a real capacity to stop terrorists.

However, at the same time, the Obama administration ordered a review of agency practices in
light of the fact that there had not been an intelligence failure but instead a failure to “connect the dots” of existing information. Interestingly, the first response by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was defensive—the “system had worked.” In subsequent days, the administration made it clear that it wanted to know (to learn) what had gone wrong.

Theoretical Approaches

Since learning and policy change evidently take place, various theoretical approaches to understanding policy learning have emphasized the idea of “levels” of belief systems or paradigms that are more or less susceptible to alteration. At the most microscopic level, there is a steady stream of indicators and data that wash through the policy system and trigger attention if they seem anomalous or unexpected. This represents learning from the environment, from feedback signals, and may not generate substantial changes in policy but simply intensified responses based on preexisting policy (e.g., new cases of avian flu). Another approach sees social learning composed of three orders. First-order learning absorbs new information as a basis for making changes in policy settings, such as incremental adjustments in tax rates if the economy seems to be slowing down. Second-order learning occurs when it appears that the policy environment has changed in a substantial way, when it seems that existing policy interventions are not achieving their objectives. In this case, governments will change the kinds of policy instruments that they use—for example, from direct welfare payments to vouchers. Third-order learning is the deepest and most challenging and reflects such an accumulation of anomalies and unexplained or unexpected events and circumstances that an entire policy paradigm—a combination of deep assumptions and the policy instruments that express them—collapses and is replaced by another. A key example is the ascendancy of monetarism over Keynesianism in the 1980s. A more recent example is the global financial crisis of late 2008. Governments around the world that had favored markets and had been skeptical of state intervention suddenly championed massive public spending, nationalization, and effectively state-managed capitalist economies.

The most elaborate version of this multilayered learning model is the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). The ACF oversees policy change and policy learning usually requiring a decade or more and views change and learning in terms of “policy subsystems,” which are dominated by competing advocacy coalitions that share causal and normative beliefs. Most important, it interprets policies and programs as belief systems consisting of value priorities and causal assumptions. A distinctive feature of the ACF is its emphasis on the role of ideas and values in the policy process. The ACF assumes that both policy actors and the policies themselves can be understood in terms of the structure of their belief systems. These systems have three key elements. The first is the deep or normative core, which consists of fundamental axioms about human nature, justice, and priorities among values such as security, health, and life. These ideas are very difficult to change through policy arguments. The second set of ideas is the near (policy) core, and it comprises notions about the proper scope of government activity, distributions of power and authority, orientations on substantive policy conflicts, and basic choices about policy instruments. These are difficult to change but can be altered if experience seriously differs from theory. The final set contains secondary aspects and consists of instrumental decisions needed to implement the policy core, such as decisions about administrative rules, budgetary allocations, and statutory interpretation. These are comparatively easy to shift or change and constitute the bulk of technical policy argumentation.

The ACF also has several distinct hypotheses about how policy subsystems operate. Among them are the following: (a) in any subsystem, the lineup of allies and opponents is stable over periods of a decade or so; (b) there is more consensus within coalitions on core beliefs than on secondary ones; (c) government policies rarely change if the original sponsoring coalition is still in power; (d) policies for which there are quantitative data are more amenable to policy learning than areas distinguished by qualitative data; and (e) policy learning across belief systems is more likely when there exists a prestigious forum that forces professionals from all sides to participate. This highlights the way in which policy learning can take place at different rates and intensity, depending on the characteristics of policy subsystems.
The approaches above focused on policy learning and change within a single political system. In the 1990s, research began to focus on policy learning between and among different political jurisdictions (also referred to as policy transfer and policy diffusion). There are varieties of diffusion and learning: lesson drawing (where governments see a problem and borrow an existing solution), legitimation (referring to other international examples to satisfy domestic critics), and harmonization. The latter is facilitated by international governmental institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank. Researchers have emphasized that “borrowing” or “learning” can be voluntary but sometimes can be imposed if third parties have financial or other forms of leverage (such as the International Monetary Fund). Moreover, in a globalized and competitive world, countries increasingly aspire to meet or exceed common governance or policy standards. The OECD is a distinctive example. Even without any coercive powers over its 30 member states, it establishes through its research and publications a variety of policy gold standards (e.g., in educational performance or science and technology policy), which countries study and then often use as guides for their own policy development.

More recent work in critical policy studies has emphasized the microdynamics of policy diffusion and learning. The original diffusion literature thought of policies as “things” or “packages” that were transported and implemented in different regimes. But policies are complex constructs, and their penetration and adoption involves a process of “translation” and epistemic recalibration. The transfer of a “model,” for example (whatever it might be—education, city transport, or refuse collection), involves persuasion, coalition building, organizational development, and mobilization. Diffusion, from this perspective, is much more fluid, episodic, fragmented, discursive, and contingent. It is not as much about “learning” as it is about active, social recogitation and realignment.

Effective Policy Learning in a Globalized World

A final issue is a more practical one: how to enhance effective policy learning? One of the best ways to learn is by making mistakes, but this is hardly politically attractive, and governments are naturally reluctant to publicize their errors. Consequently, it is important to institutionalize transparency and challenge functions within a political system and within policy-making organizations. Policy-making institutions are made up of people, and learning will be enhanced if those people are encouraged to exchange information and be continually learning at the individual level. Within policy subsystems, accessibility to outside actors, standards of open discussion and debate, and the development of reasonably consensual policy measures and indicators will enhance learning. Generally speaking, in both organizations and subsystems, network structures, flexibility, and adaptability are key ingredients in effective learning. Hierarchy in the face of a crisis, stress, or emergency is inferior to network structures that both push decision making down and keep information flow open. Modern armies, for example, are increasingly functioning this way to enhance the collective capacity to respond to threats on the ground and learn from accumulated information.

Policy learning remains hugely difficult. At the human, individual level, people seem to make mistakes all the time and hardly seem capable of learning from them. Organizations struggle constantly to induce their members to learn, in the face of inertia and SOPs. States and their policy-making systems are riven with politics and all the forces that encourage routine and stasis. The international system is pressing more and more countries to “learn,” but the transfer process is complicated. Many “receiving” states are doing so only to cash in on development aid. Most others are “translating” rather than simply transferring. Most important, many states—developed and developing—are engaged in a global conversation that engages them collectively in both learning and transferring ideas. The Copenhagen Climate Change conference is a case in point—it did not achieve an “agreement” in any meaningful sense, but it contributed to a messy and disjointed conversation that will continue for decades.

Policy learning is a key factor in effective policy change and program improvement in democracies. While it is constrained by both politics and the limits of human cognition, it is becoming increasingly important in a globalized world where
stresses coming from the environment—natural, social, economic—are mounting and demand a reasoned response.

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See also Policy Network

Further Readings


Policy Network

Policy networks comprise international and national governmental and nongovernmental interconnected actors in a given policy space. The climate change policy network, for example, would include United Nations (UN) agencies, government departments of the environment, Greenpeace, Al Gore (founder and current chair of the Alliance for Climate Protection), and David Suzuki (Japanese Canadian academic, science broadcaster, environmental activist, and founder of David Suzuki Foundation). Network members need not agree with each other. They share a common language and a set of reference points and so can argue or disagree within a consensual frame of discourse.

The backdrop to the origins of network analyses is a concern with understanding the relationship between state and society and, in particular, the organization of interests in society. The early postwar history of political science and public policy wrestled with the best way to theorize the connections. While the Marxist literature addressed itself to the importance of class, the non-Marxist literature eventually settled on the notion of interest group pluralism. Work in the 1950s focused on the limitless array of interests that could mobilize around the equally limitless range of policy issues. If people shared interests, they would likely form groups. If policy issues arose that affected those interests, then the groups would politicize and lobby government. The pluralist tradition de-emphasizes the state or policy-making institutions and stresses the influence of lobbies and interest-groups politics.

There are four major sources of inspiration for the concept of networks in political science. One of the first breaks with pluralism was over its portrait of the associational system. Empirical studies in that period showed that associational patterns were much more stable and relationships far more closed than the pluralists had suggested. Policy making took place not in the legislature or the executive but in “iron triangles,” which truly were subgovernments in that they might all be operating according to different principles, with different rhythms and often conflicting outcomes. By the mid-1970s, the notion of iron triangles seemed like a caricature too, and a new concept of “issue networks” arose.

A second important source of work on networks came from comparative research on industrial performance and economic policy. A key conditioning factor of foreign policy was the structure of domestic interests and institutions. This branch of research had offshoots that remain highly relevant to the work on policy networks today. Work on state structures argued that states had a clear pattern of associational and state institutions. For example, corporatist states had highly centralized associational systems, working in tandem with governments to develop and implement policy.

A third source of inspiration for network analysis was the growing work on new social movements and public interest groups. Social movement organizations rarely act alone, and they connect through various types of networks. The distinction between the movement and the organizations built
on it is important and gives a clue as to why the network idea spontaneously arose in this field of research. Any movement (e.g., environmental, consumers’, women’s) is bound to spawn a variety of organizations that address different aspects of its agenda, but those organizations will have a common cause and will seek to cooperate in order to maximize their policy impact.

A final source of inspiration for the network concept has been modernity itself. Policy domains are increasingly crowded with organizations, and they spontaneously connect to each other, both as antagonists and as allies. The line between public and private is increasingly blurred, particularly since the global financial crisis of 2009. Domestic politics increasingly is leveraged to the international plane, from whaling to the environment. The result is that states increasingly rely on networks of external actors that are not under their control.

Policy Network/Community Analysis

Early models of policy communities/networks divided them into subgovernments and the attentive public. Actual decision making takes place in the subgovernment, which is dominated by large institutions, groups, and core government agencies. Players in the subgovernment often try to limit participation from outsiders. The attentive public is the outsiders, whose main influence on the process is to generate ideas and discussion through conferences, publications, and occasional lobbying. There are several limitations to this way of thinking about policy communities: It is largely static and does not travel well across policy fields. Some areas are indeed dominated by government agencies. But many others are increasingly open to pressure from the attentive public, and that public is not prepared to be polite. In social and educational policy, and increasingly in municipal policy, for example, fundamental assumptions about the role of governments are constantly being posed.

Some of these limitations have been addressed in more recent models of policy networks. There is a structural approach to network analysis, for example, that focuses on patterns of relations among actors, patterns that can be mapped and are to some degree distinct from the beliefs or ideas of policy actors. The degree of organization here means analytic capacity, access to important data and information, the ability to act unilaterally, coordination, focus on long- or short-term issues, and a reactive or anticipatory policy stance. This depiction of policy network types has the advantage of variety.

Most of the policy network literature has been applied to economic policy fields and assumes that concentration plus organization equals policy-capable systems. While this makes some intuitive sense, it needs to be treated cautiously. For one thing, it has a vaguely undemocratic flavor. The more hierarchical, coordinated, and tidy the policy sector, the fewer opportunities there will be for the attentive public to get into the act. Current policy thinking is that the wider the networks and the more competition among players, the better policy outcomes will be. For another, as policy sectors get more complex and more globalized, the demand for information from all sectors and connections among the players rises exponentially. The tightly coordinated policy networks recommended in this literature may not be adequate to the new dynamics of modern policy process.

Practical Applications

The network idea itself can be seen as a response to changing political realities. Concepts related to policy communities and networks began to multiply and develop around the time that associational systems were becoming more complex. The idea of issue networks was designed to capture the idea of a more fluid, information-based policy system in which government departments and industry players were no longer dominant. While there are no reliable data on broad trends in the past decade, there is no doubt that groups continue to multiply across most sectors.

The range of global policy actors is increasing exponentially. The most visible are international governmental organizations such as the UN, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the World Trade Organization. Yet another layer consists of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) active on the global level but connected to domestic concerns (the environment, human rights). The result is a diffuse system of transnational networks of loosely coordinated governance, as well as of networks of protest and opposition to that governance.
Technology makes these networks possible—the technology of travel, of communications, or of the transfer and circulation of information. Before the advent of cell phones, laptops, PDAs, Google, Blackberrys, Twitter, and e-mail, NGO activists attending UN conferences would have had to queue at the phones to make long-distance calls to their colleagues at home. That has all obviously changed, and the next wave will build on these platforms and create even more empowered network capabilities.

Policy networks are important today not only because they represent interests that have to be integrated into the policy process or information that is crucial to analysis but because they are important sinews for implementation and delivery. The concept of working partnerships for the development and delivery of services implies a very different set of relationships than is typically envisaged in the communities/networks literature. That literature focuses more on the political dynamics of interest representation, whereas the challenges of partnerships focus more on the logistics of joint action to achieve common goals.

The preceding suggests a somewhat confusing array of forces that serve to make policy communities and networks—domestic and global—even more important than they have been in the past but also perhaps more challenging to integrate into the policy process. The associational system shows no signs of shrinking, and some elements of it, such as those involved in the delivery of public services, may face considerable pressure to expand. Information technologies make possible even wider, global connections of interests and communities. Movements such as human rights, environment, and women’s issues are truly global in scope. At the same time, some policy issues get driven further down, and so some networks that would have had their center of gravity at the national level now become truly local or regional.

The contemporary importance of policy networks and communities has not diminished; indeed, it has grown. However, the realities of the policy process continue to change the nature and dynamic of those communities and networks, posing challenges for policymakers. A core responsibility for any public manager is the improvement of learning and adaptive capacities, leading to higher levels of policy debate and relevant policy expertise. What this entails in practice depends on the type of policy community or network in question and its specific needs. Capacity building for intellectual communities may mean enhancing informational resources and communication abilities. For communities involved in policy delivery, it may mean development of organizational capacity through training. The governance dynamics of small, dense networks will be different from the dynamics of networks with a large number of members. Thinking about the policy networks and communities relevant to one’s policy responsibilities should be a key focus for public managers.

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See also Policy Learning

Further Readings


model stands for a mathematical formula. More broadly conceived, the term involves some kind of metaphor used to picture a phenomenon in social reality. In the study of government, both sorts of definitions occur, in several variants. All share the aim of offering a cognitive representation of real-world phenomena.

The stages model of the policy process structures analytically the range of activities involved in the collective endeavors to turn public intentions into public achievements. In both the theory and the practice of modern government, this model—as it is called—has been widely adopted. Because of its prevalence, the stages model of the policy process is the point of departure in this entry. The outline of the latter can be summarized as follows. First, questions are explored about which variants of the stages model can be distinguished and what kind of functions these fulfill. Next, the methodological status of the stages model as a representation of the policy process is addressed. In a more narrow definition, it turns out to be a metatheoretical heuristic. It is an analytical framework, rather than a causal model. However, other ways of studying the policy process can be identified. Under the heading of governance research, analytical frameworks are available that can serve as metatheoretical alternatives to the stages model. What the frameworks addressed in the governance section have in common is that they enable the systematic study of government in action. Two of them stem from the field called policy studies, policy science, or the policy sciences, itself. In particular, the multiple stages and multiple governance frameworks have been developed as a critique to the stages model. The other two frameworks come from institutionally different parts of the study of government, particularly public management (nested games and the logic of governance) and institutional rational choice (institutional analysis and development). These alternative frameworks allow the decomposition of the policy process into different elements rather than in stages and in a greater variety rather than as just sets of activities. In fact, the four metatheoretical frameworks provide other ways of structuring the multiplicity of aspects in the analysis of the practice of modern government. The conclusion then is that such an analysis has evolved beyond the stages model of the policy process.

The Stages Model

Variants

The term stages implies a picture of the process of public policy making as a chronological sequence of distinct sets of activities. First, problems in society are brought to governments for solution. Next, governmental institutions conceptualize the problems, formulate alternatives, and select policy solutions. Accordingly, those solutions are implemented. When finally evaluated, they may be revised. These are the successive elements Paul Sabatier distinguishes when describing the stages model. The first element concerns agenda setting. Then, policy design and decision making take place, together usually addressed as policy formation. What follows is implementation. The sequence is concluded by evaluation. Each of these nouns refers to an identifiable cluster of activities. The nouns are the common nominators for the major stages in what since Harold Lasswell has been labeled as the policy process. As the founding father of policy studies, Lasswell uses the term phases or stages while indicating a range of separate and successive steps. Policy is thought of as being made, in principle, in a chronological order. That order starts with initiative and goes via formulation and decision on to evaluation and possibly termination. Lasswell distinguishes between seven stages of what he calls the decision process. As such, he identifies (1) intelligence, (2) promotion, (3) prescription, (4) invocation, (5) application, (6) termination, and (7) appraisal. The last stage offering feedback inputs to the process again indicates a cyclical character of the latter. Therefore, the terms policy process and policy cycle are synonyms.

Lasswell speaks of a conceptual map, meant to provide a guide to obtaining a generalized image of the major phases of any collective act. Since Lasswell’s sevenfold distinction, there have been many variants of the stages model of the policy process. Each specifies the separate stages and/or their number a little differently. In fact, all these definitions concern variants of what James Anderson views as a sequential pattern of action involving a number of functional categories of activity that can be analytically distinguished. In his and in many other textbooks, the stages model has been used to structure the range of accounts on the study of the policy process. Given the complexities
of the object, the contemporary study of the policy process appears to go in various directions. Wayne Parsons calls the field rich, both in academic disciplines and in approaches. It is wealthy in models (heuristic and causal) as well as in metaphors and maps. The stages model then offers a structure to bring analytical order to this wealth.

**Characteristics**

The succession of steps thought of in a chronological order as implied by the stages model has aspects that can be called universal. As such, the stages notion has occurred before and beyond the study of public policy. For instance, Herbert Simon distinguished intelligence, design, and choice as the successive stages in the way people in general reach decisions. What, however, makes the stages model of the policy process more than a reference to a chronological or logical order, thought of as universal, is its connection with the modern state and its institutions. Policy implementation is supposed to follow policy formation. Means are chosen, while ends are given. Administration takes care of those means, after politics has spoken. Woodrow Wilson was once president of the United States. He is also seen as founder of the modern study of public administration, having coined the classic politics/administration dichotomy. In this context, that dichotomy can be seen as a stagist model avant la lettre. Despite the cyclical logic, normatively, a hierarchy is at stake. It embodies a view about the primacy of politics.

The policy orientation was introduced by Lasswell in the 1950s. Policy is directed on what John Dewey once described as the combination of the public and its problems. This problem focus distinguishes the public policy perspective from that of public administration or public management. Connected with the problem-solving objectives of the welfare state, this orientation implies both a rational view on knowledge and an instrumental use of it. In the policy orientation, knowledge from social science can be used to improve society. It also should be used, via public policies, as a form of social engineering. Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh show how the separate stages in the policy cycle each refer to a part of applied problem solving. Agenda setting then corresponds with problem recognition. Policy formulation stands for the proposal of a solution. Decision making means the choice of a specific solution. Policy implementation implies putting the chosen solution into effect; and policy evaluation refers to monitoring results. Policy making thus means problem processing. Deborah Stone speaks of a policy process as a production process. Public policy is the result of what happens in what may be likened to an assembly line.

Its widespread use makes the stages model of the policy process universal as well as modern. Especially during the period of growth of welfare states after World War II, the notion of stages has accompanied the term public policy like a shadow. It has since been adopted widely, both in theory and in practice. An element of that widespread adoption is what Michael Hill and Peter Hupe call the primacy of policy on paper. The assumption is that once one knows the good intentions as laid down in a law or official policy document, one can infer the results from it to be realized in the real world in a one-to-one relationship. This assumption forms part of the explanation of the functions the stages model of the policy process fulfils.

**Functions**

As a comprehensive picture of the policy process, the stages model is the most prevalent one. It fulfils societal, practical, analytical, and programmatic functions. In the public debate and in society in general, the stages model of the policy process stands for an orientation toward problem solving, or at least problem processing. Linking the public and its problems, as Dewey indicated, in the public discourse, it has an enduring normative appeal. In political-administrative practice, the stages model invites and legitimizes a certain division of labor. This particularly involves the relation between two categories of actors. The first category concerns the actors and institutions formulating and legitimately deciding on public intentions. The second category comprises the ones responsible for turning those intentions into factual public achievements. When the problem has been stated and the decisions on necessary measures have been taken, the rest is implementation. That implementation is expected to follow the policy as documented in a one-to-one relationship. If things turn out to be different, the logical distinction between the stages
appears to be reified. Especially in situations of a crisis or disaster, the stages model in the practice of public administration may function as a way of shifting the blame. Journalists revealing what they label as policy fiascos mirror this labor division. For instance, in the case of an employment policy, the results of the implementation stage may be obviously disappointing. Journalists may relate these results to the policy intentions concerning job growth as laid down in the policy statutory concerned—the result of the policy formation stage. In the practice of public administration, now and then, such politics of blaming can be observed. Actually, the stages are logical constructions. In situations such as these, however, the stages have become reified.

With its (chrono)logical character, the stages model fulfils an analytical function. It provides a way of rationally ordering the complexities of the reality of government. This being so for political-administrative actors and the public in general, in academia, the functionality of the stages model primarily is a didactic one. In teaching modules and handbooks, it functions as a way to structure the presentation of insights on the policy process. Because of this use, the model is called the textbook approach. The stages model also has a function in academic research. Similar to its function in the practice of public administration, the stages model enables a labor division in academic work. Each of the stages, from agenda setting to evaluation, has grown into a scholarly theme of its own. With its programmatic function, the stages model has set the agenda for research, leading to a variety of classic texts on each of these themes. One could think, for example, of the studies of John Kingdon on agenda setting, Charles Lindblom on policy formation and William Dunn on methods of policy analysis, Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky on implementation, Michael Lipsky on the related theme of street-level bureaucracy, and Frank Fischer on evaluation. The stages model enhanced the development of distinguished approaches such as the advocacy coalition framework developed by Paul Sabatier, Hank Jenkins-Smith, and others. Focusing on the analysis of what is happening in a specific stage of the policy process, theoretical approaches such as these are not an alternative to the stages model. The advocacy coalition model, for instance, instead concerns theory formation on what happens particularly in one stage—in this case, agenda setting.

**Limitations**

The functions the stages model of the policy process fulfils involve a broad usage of the term *model*. That usage goes beyond the more narrow methodological requirements the term *model* in science may imply. It is exactly this that has invited severe criticism from scholars. Peter John, for instance, is positive about the functions the stages model fulfils in society. Where public policy is often justified in rational terms, the metaphor of stages is helpful. Journalists and citizens try to make sense of the complexities of public policies. They expect the policy process to work in stages. John also acknowledges that the stages model still can be used as a heuristic or learning device. At the same time, however, John sees serious constraints in using the stages metaphor in research. There the stages idea confuses more than it illuminates. There are no neat divisions between different types of activities; policy is continuous. For analysis, John sees the stages metaphor as too simplified to capture enough of reality.

In several publications, Sabatier has expressed similar criticisms. It made him prefer the term *stages heuristic* as proposed by himself and Jenkins-Smith. Those criticisms entail the following. First, the stages model is not a causal theory. It does not enable the causal explanation of empirical variation. Second, the assumed sequence of stages is inadequate in a descriptive sense. Implementing ambiguous laws, for instance, may imply actual policy formulation and even decision making. Third, the stages model has a top-down bias and focuses on major pieces of legislation. It neglects the interaction among a variety of such pieces, including smaller ones. Fourth, the focus on the cycle of one policy-making process shows indifference to actual empirical reality. Within a given policy domain, multiple interacting cycles can be observed. This complexity involves, as Sabatier stresses, numerous policy proposals and statutes emerging from multiple layers of government.

It is in theoretical-empirical research that a model is ultimately put to the test. In the case of the stages model, then, some methodological limitations appear to be inherent. The first one was
already indicated previously: the reification of each separate stage. Instead of empirically observing that policy making in fact goes on in the subsequent stages, and of investigating how, the separation between the stages is taken for granted on normative grounds. Furthermore, a certain stage as a specific set of activities is automatically treated as connected with a specific spot—the second methodological limitation. When, for instance, the legitimate formulation of a specific policy has taken place on the layer of the ministry concerned, the subsequent implementation of that policy is seen as consequentially taking place on the layer of local government under it. It may be the case, however, that on the latter layer policy formation (formulation plus decision making) can be observed. This concerns an empirical question. The stages model induces research in which what actors do and where they do it, a priori, are supposed as coinciding. In such instances, Hill and Hupe speak of the methodological fallacy of the wrong layer. Instead, activities (focus) and layers (locus) could be observed independently.

As a third methodological limitation of the stages model, the same authors speak of the control trap. With that label, they highlight a specific implication of the stages model, the inducement of quick judgments on implementation failures and policy fiascos. The stages discourse implies a normative hierarchy. To what extent empirically observed action can be judged as legitimate is as a normative matter. Researchers may not always reflect on the methodological consequences of the top-down bias stemming from that fact. This may be the case, for example, when seeking to do contract research. The implicit adoption of a view from the top may lead to confusing the normative and the empirical. Observations of behavior are treated as judgments on deviance from the standard norm. Instead, an open observation of what happens is to be distinguished from a judgment on the legitimacy of what is observed. After all, for public servants and other practitioners, there is always a necessity to interpret ambiguous legislation. Also, in circumstances that may have been unforeseen by the legislator, there is a need to act. Hupe and Hill speak of an action imperative here. In the research of policy processes, it calls for distinguishing between clinical observation and normative judgments.

**Representations of the Policy Process**

**A Model**

The *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* provides three main categories of meanings for the noun *model*. The term can refer to a representation of structure, a type of design, and an object of imitation. Within a range of, in total, 13 definitions, the ones standing for both the narrow and the broad meanings, as referred to above, can be found. In a narrow sense, the term *model* is defined as a set of entities that satisfies all the formulae of a given formal or axiomatic system. In the broad sense, the term *model* is used as a conceptual or mental representation of something. The *Dictionary* speaks of a simplified description of a system, process, and so on, put forward as a basis for theoretical or empirical understanding.

In his textbook on public policy, Parsons addresses the variety of meanings of the term *model* and other related terms as an issue in itself. He states that in a complex world, people need to simplify. They seek to organize their ideas and concepts. Models, maps, and metaphors—as the title of the section expresses—provide ways to do so. Parsons calls them frameworks, which enable people to think and explain. The activity of theorizing about public policy is like drawing a map. People need such a map, but it must in some respect distort their impression of the territory it represents. Parsons stresses that the way people see and interpret the world of public policy depends on the kinds of models and frameworks they employ. A map may claim to explain but may at the same time be heavily normative and prescriptive.

Parsons refers to the way Graham Allison analyzed American decision making in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In *Essence of Decision* (1971), the latter uses three models or lenses. Allison analyzes this one decision-making process in terms of the rational actor, in terms of organizational processes, and in terms of bureaucratic politics. Each provides a very different kind of interpretation of the same events in reality. Allison’s study shows how the analysis of decision making involves an awareness of the different frames that can be employed to interpret events. Such awareness concerns the way the observed object of study exists in the context of a variety of contending interpretations.
Models, Theories, and Frameworks

The most important criticism of the stages model is that it is not a causal theory. It is also necessary to ask what it means to call it a model. Like Parsons, Elinor Ostrom has addressed this issue of the meaning of the term *model*. Parsons makes a point of the constructivist effect of using specific lenses—reality is not just out there. He treats the labels for such lenses largely as synonyms. Ostrom, however, makes a plea for distinguishing explicitly between models, theories, and frameworks. Speaking of an often overlooked distinction, she positions these three in a specific way. In her view, models make precise assumptions about a limited set of parameters and variables. Theories, according to Ostrom, enable the analyst to specify which elements of a broader framework are particularly relevant to certain kinds of questions. A framework helps identify the elements needed for more systematic analysis. It provides a list of variables and a vocabulary that can be used to compare theories. Several theories are usually compatible with any framework.

Models, theories, and frameworks vary on the generality scale. Models are the least comprehensive but the most specified. They entail particular sets of expected relationships between limited variables. Frameworks are the most robust but substantively are rather empty. They enable theory formation and model building by providing a metatheoretical language. Theories are in between. They address a certain phenomenon in empirical reality with a more-or-less universal character. Inviting assumptions to be made about elements of that phenomenon, theories enable the analyst to diagnose a phenomenon, explain its processes, and predict outcomes.

By positioning the stages model in this threefold classification, some of the criticisms mentioned above can be tested. First, regarding treatment as a model, in the narrow sense, critics are surely right that it is not. The stages model may fulfill functions as a heuristic device, but for acting as a causal model, it is too general. It leaves too many parameters implicit. At the same time, the stages model is not a theory. To meet Ostrom’s definition, it would need more explanatory power. The stages model does enhance the identification of certain elements and variables relevant for the study of public policy. Therefore, it can be called an analytical framework.

At a metatheoretical level, the stages model in research functions as a map. Around it, theory formation and model building may take place. We then need to ask for the requirements for an adequate framework. Comprehensiveness, enhancing middle-range theory formation, and empirical openness can be identified as relevant criteria here. First, an analytical framework must have the capacity to encompass conceptually the multidimensional character of public policy processes. It must enable the identification of the variety of actors, actions, and interactions involved. The stages model indeed aims at comprehensiveness. It claims to conceptualize an entire policy process. However, the focus is singularly on activities, while the locus of a specific set of such activities (e.g., implementation) correspondingly is presupposed. Second, not being a theory itself, the stages model as a heuristic tends to be seen as inviting theory formation. The classic texts on each of the stages are proofs of that function. Third, meeting the criterion of empirical openness for the stages model is difficult. Policy implementation, for instance, is addressed as normatively subordinate to policy formation. Such a hierarchical view may prevent the analyst from observing what happens and explaining why, before expressing judgments on the legitimacy of what is recorded. An analysis normatively biased in this way may lead to less than well-grounded advice to practitioners. To the extent this is the case, it may be counterproductive in the end. Neither the scientific nor the normative goals may then be achieved.

Thus, the stages model meets the criteria of comprehensiveness, to a certain degree, and of enhancing theory formation. It has difficulty, however, in meeting the criterion of empirical openness. The conclusion is that it is a general framework in Ostrom’s sense, albeit one with shortcomings. It is this character that lies at the basis of its functioning in academia. The so-called model functions as a robust, rather empty, framework and heuristic device facilitating teaching and research. As a general map for the analysis of policy processes, it is conceptually neither multidimensional nor empirically open enough to do much more than provide a starting point for systematic theoretical-empirical research.

Theoretical Approaches

Public policy scholars have sought to develop various forms of representations of phenomena in and around public policy. Some of those, such as the advocacy coalition framework mentioned above, imply theoretical approaches. They focus
on aspects of one particular stage rather than providing an alternative to the stages model as an analytical framework at the metatheoretical level.

Sabatier searched for alternatives to the stages model. In *Theories of the Policy Process*, he collected eight contributions he calls “more promising.” This edited volume contains chapters on (1) the institutional analysis and development framework, (2) the multiple streams framework, (3) social construction and policy design, (4) the networks approach, (5) punctuated-equilibrium theory, (6) the advocacy coalition framework, (7) innovation and diffusion models, and (8) the policy process and large-N comparative studies. What the the contributions pictured in the eight chapters have in common is that they aim at (causal) explanation, in particular by relating elements of policy processes to other elements. Besides, all have led to subsequent empirical research. This being so, the contributions show differences. First, there is variety in what is seen as needing explanation. For some contributions, this *explanandum* regards policy change; for others, it regards variation in policy outputs. The innovation and diffusion models look at policy adoption. Second, the level or unit of analysis differs in a range going from that of a single policy, via a policy domain, to that of a (nation-)state. Third, and most important here, the eight contributions, collected as theories, are labeled differently. One of them is called a *theory* (punctuated equilibrium) and four a *framework* (institutional rational choice, multiple streams, social construction and policy design, and advocacy coalition). The heading of one chapter includes the term *models*, that of another one the term *studies*, while there is also a chapter with the term *approach* in its title.

The variety of labels for these contributions as expressed in the chapter titles do not preclude similarities. At the same time, however, there is a difference between the common denominator of theories, on the one hand, and the variety of contribution headings, on the other. This does underline Ostrom’s plea for precision. A systematic application of her requirements for each type of academic work would specify the particular characteristics of these collected theoretical contributions. Some of them then might appear to involve the elaboration of a framework in Ostrom’s sense—like the one developed by herself—and some to provide a model. For several contributions, the term *theoretical approaches or conceptual lenses* would seem appropriate. These are steps toward the formation of a theory. In any case, all the contributions in Sabatier’s volume differ from the stages model, assessed as it is above as a metatheoretical framework with shortcomings.

### Governance Research

Relatively early in research on the policy process Jon Pierre and Guy Peters have explored the consequences of the concept of governance. Related to the Latin verb *gubernare* (steering), the origins of the term lay in the past. In the last decade of the 20th century, however, the concept moved to the forefront of both public discourse and the study of government. Public tasks today are being fulfilled in a broader variety of forms than before. As Pierre and Peters indicate, the term *governance* covers the whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing. Nevertheless, in a democracy, the rule of law is working. Therefore, it is still government that normatively has the appropriate legitimacy to steer society. Providing direction to society, whether directly or indirectly, is what Pierre and Peters consider to be the activity of central governance.

Looking at shared sets of problem definitions and proposed solutions, Hill and Hupe speak of a current *governance paradigm*. This is seen as being different from previous ones, including the policy implementation paradigm, as prevalent particularly in the 1970s. As characteristics of the governance paradigm, the authors distinguish an awareness of context, a reassessment of traditional public values, a rehabilitation of the hierarchical mode of governing, and a renewed attention to issues of accountability. Perhaps the most prevalent feature of the governance paradigm is the attention to action. Public officials do not just rely on the intentions stated by agents and other actors in the public domain. Rather, they want to secure a view on what those actors are actually doing and on what works.

To a certain extent, labels such as governance imply the use of different lenses to look at the world. The term *governance* is meant to capture the reality of government in the beginning of the 3rd millennium. *The Oxford Handbook of Public Management* and similar publications reflect the state of the art in the study of government. It is there that authors try to assess changes in the object of
study, different ways of looking at that object, and the implications of relating the two. In particular, scholars like Geert Bouckaert, George Frederickson, Christopher Hood, Laurence Lynn, and Christopher Pollitt have addressed the issue of positioning paradigmatic concepts such as new public management and governance in the actual study of government. Their assessments are attempts to position new developments in the field of study overall.

Next to this, several academics have reflected on the operational implications the concept of governance might have for theoretical-empirical research. As in the present practice of public administration, researchers, too, are inclined to search behind the policy on paper. This may certainly be the case when using an empirical research design aimed at causal explanation. In the view of Laurence O'Toole, the distinguishing feature of the concept of governance is that it incorporates a more complete understanding of the multiple levels of action and kinds of variables that can be expected to influence governmental performance. As a consequence, the analysis of government in action becomes multidimensional. Such an analysis fundamentally comprises both perceived action and rhetorical justification. It looks at unintended consequences as well as official documents. The focus is on both observed actual situations and original good intentions. Almost by definition, levels of analysis different from the one looked at play a role. Hence, the study of government in action implicates governance research, with its multidimensional perspective.

The consequence then is that researchers see themselves confronted with an overwhelming array of factors. Each of these can be expected to contribute, one way or another, to the explanation of what is observed as happening. Therefore, the aim to explain empirical variation implies a need to structure the vast range of candidate explanatory variables. This is a characteristic of multiple multidimensionality in particular. It seems to make social science at least as complex as natural science. In research, the isolation of a few variables, necessary and unavoidable, goes hand in hand with leaving aside the impact of factors held constant under a ceteris paribus clause. Studying government in action entails, by definition, more than one level of analysis. In a nested configuration, factors play a role from different scales of aggregation. In a given research, focus may be on explaining the relations between only a few variables. Even then, explicitly or implicitly, the impact of a vast range of intermediary factors on various dimensions is presupposed. This variety may be nominated as contextual factors. They may have, however, a possible influence reaching far beyond that general label, and it is often difficult to treat them as held constant.

Aiming at enhancing scientific rigor, analysts of government in action explore various options. In implementation theory and research, authors tried to close the top-down/bottom-up controversy by making a case for developing synthesizing approaches. The sources for identifying relevant factors were no longer to be confined to either the top or the bottom of the policy process. Scholars like O’Toole and Kenneth Meier have pointed to the fact that the number of such variables hence grew to unmanageable proportions. Their plea for parsimony made them develop a formal model of public management containing hypotheses on relations between a limited number of variables. Since then, Meier and O’Toole have been testing this model successfully on large aggregates of data.

**Studying the Policy Process as Governance Research**

*The Study of Government in Action*

The concept of governance can be seen as an umbrella concept aimed at capturing the complexities of public policy beyond the rationalist assumptions of the stages model. If that stance is adopted, the study of the policy process in the contemporary world can be conceived as governance research.

In addressing the question of what is needed for such research, the three criteria for an analytical framework, mentioned above, need to be elaborated. Comprehensiveness then refers to an orientation toward capturing the whole range of elements involved in the collective endeavors to turn public intentions into public achievements. The shortcomings of the stages model have been identified above. Serving as an alternative, an analytical framework should provide the possibility of categorizing and positioning relevant factors that both influence and are influenced by actions taken by actors involved in governmental affairs. Parsons speaks of the need to deal in research with multiframed activity while mapping the wider contexts
of problems, social processes, values, and institutions in which policy making takes place.

Enhancing theory formation, the second criterion for an analytical framework, means the pursuit of scientific rigor by grounding and testing theoretical suppositions while explaining causal relations. The third criterion, empirical openness, implies specification and differentiation regarding all aspects of the empirical cycle. Most analysts in social science will concur with the normative principles of the rule of law, democracy, and perhaps also the welfare state. Also, many analysts will underline the necessity of observing and explaining social reality in academic research, in a way as normatively unbiased as possible. After all, improving the world can benefit from understanding it.

Both in practice and in theory, the notion of stages may remain prevalent. It is a metaphorical picture fitted to sketch the range of activities actors in governmental affairs engage in. Nevertheless, some authors have attempted to provide alternative general frameworks. With those frameworks, questions for research can be asked and answered while enabling the systematic study of government in action. When put alongside the criteria mentioned above, four of such alternative frameworks can be identified. The contributions to be addressed here come from different scholarly backgrounds. In particular, these include the study of public management (Laurence Lynn, Carolyn Heinrich, and Carolyn Hill), public choice (Ostrom), and public policy (Parsons, Hill, and Hupe).

Multiple Stages

Parsons divides his almost 700-page textbook *Public Policy* into four parts. He calls them meta-analysis, meso-analysis, decision analysis, and delivery analysis. The first part is on analyzing analysis (meta-analysis). After that, Parsons distinguishes three levels or dimensions of analysis, both broad and partly overlapping. Meso-analysis deals with the way in which issues and problems are defined and policy agendas are set; theoretical approaches categorized as meso link the input side and output side of the policy-making process. Decision analysis refers to approaches looking at how decisions are taken, policies are formed, and analysis is used. In Parsons's conceptualization, delivery analysis refers to how policies are administered, managed, implemented, evaluated, and possibly terminated. The author stresses that the parts of the book are not to be read as a set of stages. There is no sequence, because in the real world there are no defined or distinct phases. Parsons suggests reading his textbook in an iterative rather than linear way, by going backward and forward.

Nested Games and the Logic of Governance

In *The Power Elite*, C. Wright Mills (1956) distinguishes between the top, the middle, and the bottom levels of power. Characterizing governmental activity, Lynn refers to that insight while distinguishing three different elements he calls policy games. They relate to each other in a nested configuration. The high game involves deciding whether there is a role for government in a given situation. In the middle game, the direction of the policy is determined. The low game concerns the practical side of policy making, where implementation is central.

More recently, Lynn has related these levels of the game to governance. With Carolyn Heinrich and Carolyn Hill, he provides what they call a logic for governance research. The authors have developed an aggregated framework, aimed at directing attention to the dynamic relations within and between the institutional, managerial, and operational levels of governance. Lynn and his colleagues argue that the logic of governance involves a hierarchy of relationships that carry over from one level to the next: those between (a) citizen preferences and legislative choice; (b) legislative preferences and formal structures and processes of public agencies; (c) formal authority and the organization and management of agencies, programs, and administrative activities; (d) organization, management, and administration and the core technologies and primary work of public agencies; (e) primary work and consequences, outputs, or results; (f) outputs or results and stakeholder assessments of agency or program performance; and (g) stakeholder assessments and political preferences and interests. The results of governmental activity mentioned in (f) are measured in terms of the availability, quality, and cost of publicly sponsored goods and services. Lynn et al. stress that this is a heuristic framework. It enables the identification of relationships potentially influencing governmental performance. When the authors first presented the framework, they
explicitly stated that it should not be called a unified theory of governance. They stressed that making statements about the actual influence of the identified relationships requires theory, models, and data.

**Institutional Analysis and Development**

In a lifelong career, Ostrom has been interested in how institutions affect the incentives confronting individuals and their resultant behavior. Standing in the tradition of institutional analysis from a microeconomic perspective, in an article written with Larry Kiser, she presented the institutional analysis and development framework. Kiser and Ostrom speak of a multitier conceptual map. Indeed, it is a metatheoretical framework meant to order various sorts of institutional analysis. The authors refer to three tiers of decision making: constitutional choice, collective choice, and operational decisions. Together, these form what is addressed as the three worlds of action. The constitutional level explains the design of mechanisms of collective choice. At the level of collective choice itself, collective decisions are made by officials, including citizens acting as officials. These decisions are aimed at influencing actions in one way or another. The decision making at this level includes the authority to impose sanctions. At the operational level, individuals take direct action, sometimes without prior agreement with other individuals. This framework has a nested structure. Decisions at one level are linked to those at the other levels. Constitutional decisions establish institutional arrangements. Within given institutional arrangements, collective choices regarding specific issues are made. These decisions are meant to guide individual action, in particular at the operational level. Collective decisions are enforceable against non-conforming individuals.

**Multiple Governance**

The distinction between the three tiers of decision making refers to different sets of actions. It leaves open, however, where and by whom this action is performed. This characteristic of the institutional analysis and development framework was adopted by Hill and Hupe and applied to the study of governance. Seeking to develop an analytical framework as an alternative to the stages model, they propose the following metaquestion to precede governance research: Who acts where, doing what, on which scale, and how? A policy process is viewed as positioned in a multidimensional setting of government in action. Each part of the question refers to an element of that setting. Successively—although not in a chronological order—these elements concern actors (who), administrative layers (where), sets of activities (what), action situations and action scales (on which scale), and political-administrative craftsmanship (how). Thus, the authors frame the policy process in terms of governance. They do so taking their lead from both the three worlds of action as conceptualized by Kiser and Ostrom and the governance perspective of Pierre and Peters. In the meaning of government in action, governance consists of three broad sets of activities called constitutive, directional, and operational governance. Constitutive governance concerns the fundamental decisions about the creation of institutional settings. Within given settings, actors provide direction. Directional governance stands for the formulation of and decision making about collectively desired outcomes. Operational governance concerns the actual managing of the realization of those outcomes. Hence, the multiple governance framework gives attention to dimensions of structure, content, and process. The distinction between creating settings, giving direction, and getting things done is addressed as the trinity of governing, or *trias gubernandi*.

The multidimensional character of the framework implies that in research, the specific focus and locus are to be expressed separately. The position of and relations between the sets of activities comprising government in action are neither hierarchically nor chronologically predetermined. Those activities can be performed at any spot in the public domain. A series of empirical questions follows: Who are the actors, looked at on which scale (individuals, organizations, aggregate systems), acting on which administrative layer, de facto engaged in what kind of activities here and now, and with which degree of craftsmanship? When implementation is conceived of as operational governance, research, for instance, entails the question whether the concretely observed action concerns rule application or, rather, rule setting. Thus, factual policy formation may be traced where policy implementation was expected.
Alternatives to the Stages Model

Above, the theoretical approaches of the policy process were addressed that Sabatier characterized as more promising than the stages model. All show a sophisticated level of elaboration and have been applied in several research projects. As such, they meet the requirements for being included in the edited volume. Ostrom’s contribution appears to meet her own criteria for a general analytical framework. That is why her institutional analysis and development framework were included above, as well. Also, the logic of governance framework and the multiple governance framework show the characteristics of general analytical frameworks. Parsons’s distinction, labeled as multiple stages, seems to have been primarily intended to function in a didactic setting. Aiming at comprehensiveness (the first criterion), the four frameworks share a metatheoretical character rather than providing a substantive grand theory themselves. At the same time, they may function as a heuristic toward the formation of such theories (the second criterion). As far as empirical openness, the third criterion, is concerned, the frameworks invite specifying what needs explanation. All four enable the identification and differentiation of different sorts of actors, activities or actions, layers, and other elements (comprehensiveness). In particular, the frameworks metatheoretically specify the relations between those elements, even if they are thought of as a hierarchy (theory formation). Finally, the frameworks make it possible to structure the multiple dimensions of social reality in an analytical rather than a prescribing way (empirical openness). In research, understanding implementation deficits prevails over condemning them. In any case, the observation and explanation of specified behavior precede judgments on general shortcomings.

Conclusion

O’Toole described the subject matter of implementation studies as what happens between the establishment of policy and its impact in the world of action. He did so in an assessment of research on policy implementation. In a certain sense, this description goes for the object of what has been presented earlier as governance research, overall. Thus, describing the object of the study of government in action in general presupposes a specific conceptualization of governance. In the O’Toole definition, the latter concept is designed to incorporate a more complete understanding of the multiple levels of action and kinds of variables that can be expected to influence performance. When governance is conceptualized in this way, it has consequences for research. Among others, it opens the view on perspectives beyond policy studies in the narrow sense.

In the realm of “what happens,” so many factors and mechanisms are active that a device is needed to structure the multiple varieties of dimensions of the research object. This being true in general, it is even more applicable inasmuch as analysts of government aim at enhancing scientific rigor. Against that background, the analytical frameworks identified here can function as alternatives to the stages model. They enable researchers to explore more systematically what they want to know, how to frame that, and which accumulated insights can be deemed relevant to incorporate. The orientation in such research may shift away from merely a vertical one. Confronting public achievements with the public intentions as laid down in the concerned official policy document will not always be the research objective. Governance research implies explaining variation in actual behavior and its impact on all sorts of governmental performance. Questions aimed at explanation will be at the forefront. They will not replace judgments on public policy results as disappointing but may sometimes postpone them. At least, answering such questions will provide a more solid ground for any judgment.

Analytical frameworks such as the ones presented earlier may not immediately appeal to practitioners as broadly as the stages model has done thus far. At the same time, the frameworks respond to the criticisms of that model concerning its usefulness in research. The alternative frameworks may enhance the formation of (middle range) theories and the development and testing of causal models. Then, they would contribute to making the study of government more theory driven. In that perspective, the discovery of the nested character of the study of government in action can be welcomed as an important insight. The gain of explanatory power particularly will be greater to the degree
researchers succeed in the coweighing of factors from more than one level of analysis.

The range of activities involved in the collective is structured analytically with the intention of turning public intentions into public achievements. Thus, the stages model of the policy process was defined at the beginning of this entry. That so-called model appears to fulfill functions going far beyond causal explanation. In fact, this academic function proved to be the least developed. At the same time, alternatives appeared to be available.

A pertinent element in the notion of the stages model regards the wish to have complexity reduced to linearity. Since Lasswell introduced the policy orientation, particularly in the 1990s, the multidimensional character of action in government has been acknowledged. This is the case not only in policy studies but also in institutionally different parts of social science. The aim for methodical rigor is now more widely embraced. Multidimensionality-cum-nonlinearity seems to have become the leading principle in governance research.

Both Dewey’s focus on the public and its problems and Lasswell’s policy orientation seek to help government in dealing with societal issues. The current developments in research stress academic specificities. Therefore, the wish to contribute to those practical aims seems to have been put aside. In fact, this is not the case. The gains can be deduced not only scientifically but from a normative perspective as well. Society looks to becoming ever more complex. In such a context, improving government needs a better understanding of that government in action. Although partly perhaps under different headings, the best years for the study of the policy process are likely still to come.

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See also Advocacy Coalition Framework; Europeanization of Policy; Governance, Administration Policies; Policy Community; Policy Cycle; Stages Model of Policy Making; State

Further Readings
social groups. It also contends that the members of this group share common views and interests and act with a relatively high degree of cohesiveness. The theory of the political class posits the study of this phenomenon as a crucial instrument for the understanding of political life. The main questions that have been developed within this broad theoretical field are as follows: Who are the members of the political class? What determines their special status? How and on what bases are they recruited? What are the links that keep them united? What are the forces that drive their behavior? And what determines the decline of a political class and its substitution by another one? In this entry, the origins, definitions, empirical studies, and contemporary relevance of the concept of political class are discussed.

Origin of the Theory of Political Class

The concept of political class has acquired a well-established status among crucial concepts of modern political science since Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941). In his first major work, Teorica Dei Governi E Governo Parlamentare (the title can be literally translated as “A Theory of Political Regimes and the Parliamentary Government”), published in 1883 when he was only 24 years old, the Italian scholar proposed the concept of political class as the key to a new innovative approach to the study of political phenomena. Mosca’s ambitions were not only of a substantive nature—to explore a political phenomenon that supposedly was not yet well understood—but also epistemological and methodological. An admirer of the extraordinary developments of the natural sciences during the 19th century, he aimed to overcome the unsatisfactory state of political studies and to attain a more scientific level that would put them on the same level with the more established disciplines. The key to this was to be found first in the development of a sound base of empirical observations to support the formulation of scientific propositions and then in the ability to capture the true substance of the political phenomena and move beyond the mere appearances that often mislead the observers.

To achieve the first objective, Mosca set out to exploit the rich treasures of historical knowledge that in the course of the 19th century had made enormous advances and to draw from them the empirical materials for a comparative analysis of political phenomena. With regard to the second objective, which was to become the focal point of his research, the proposal he advanced was to go beyond the images of politics currently offered by the dominant ideologies (both democratic and traditionalist) and to look for the real power holders, that is, the small minorities, or what he defined as the “political class.” That power is always in the hands of small groups of people was the fundamental postulate of Mosca’s theory of the political class. According to his analysis, neither large numbers of people, such as a democratic demos, nor single individuals, such as monarchs, who are often described by current interpretations of politics (and especially by ideologies) as the rulers of different political regimes, are the real power holders. They always need a relatively small number of organized people to conduct (in their name) the business of government.

The concept of class, which Mosca sought to adapt to the analysis of political reality, had become a frequently used instrument for the analysis of society in the 19th century, thanks to the works of sociologists and economists. Among them, Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) had gained special prominence because of their intellectual influence on the socialist movement and because of the enormous political impact of some of their ideas. The same had happened to their theory, which centered on the idea of class as a social group based on the economic processes of production but also stressed the role played in defining such a group by the consciousness achieved by its members of their specific condition. Marx and Engels were not the only scholars working with this concept. Two other important figures of modern sociology, Henri de Saint Simon (1760–1825) and Auguste Comte (1798–1857), had already given the concept of class an important place in their social theories. The attention of the two French authors was directed toward the new upper strata of the industrializing society, which were viewed as being in the process of taking the place of the old aristocratic and clerical ruling classes. In particular, they considered the technical and managerial skills developing with the modern model of industrial production to be the crucial features of the new ruling class. As these
two authors focused their attention on the role in society of relatively small groups in the top positions, they contributed even more than Marx and Engels to paving the way for the theory of the political class as developed by Mosca and other social scientists of his time. However, similar to Marx’s theory, their interpretation left little room for the political dimension and was fundamentally inspired by a reductionism of politics to economics.

Other authors had paid more attention to the political dimension and, often combining the descriptive and the prescriptive perspective, had made use of similar concepts as instruments for understanding (and evaluating) politics. Among them, one might recall Edmund Burke (1729–1797) and his analysis of “natural aristocracies”; Lorenz von Stein (1815–1890), who not only theorized but also promoted the reform of the governing elites of Prussia; or Hippolyte Taine (1828–1893), with his criticism of professional politicians and of their corruption and the exaltation of a class of natural leaders. With his discussion of the party machine and the role of the political managers, the American scholar and politician John Calhoun (1782–1850) anticipated many future analyses of the new democratic elites. One may remember also the American Commonwealth (1888) by the British scholar James Bryce (1838–1922), who began to systematically analyze the new type of professional politicians operating in the American parties and saw their role as not incompatible with the principles of democracy. The writings of these and other authors suggest that the idea was starting to gain ground; none of them, however, gave to this theme such a central place as Mosca did and as Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels would do later on.

While scholars such as Saint Simon, Comte, and Marx looked at society in general, in his first work, Mosca was already focusing his analysis on the specific developments of the political system. His attention was particularly attracted to the development of parliamentary government in Italy as in many other European countries and to the striking contradictions between the (democratic) theory of the regime and the (oligarchic) practice it displayed. At the same time, a central preoccupation of Mosca, when he started developing his theory of the political class, was to establish the study of politics on more solid grounds. Writing at the time of great advances in the natural sciences and when economics was well on its way to becoming an increasingly professionalized discipline, Mosca deplored the underdevelopment of a true science of politics. On the one hand, he criticized the predominant weight of “vulgar beliefs”: a priori judgments based on prejudices and non-systematic evidence. On the other hand, he expressed his disapproval of the excessive influence of the legal disciplines, with their attention on the purely formal dimension of rules, or of ideologies (in particular the democratic ones). In his view, the scientific study of politics needed a profound renewal and should aim at identifying the general laws of political phenomena. This would require a rich empirical basis of observations as well as more sophisticated conceptual and theoretical tools. With regard to the problem of empirical evidence, Mosca thought that the great advances made by historical studies during the 19th century could be instrumental in providing a systematic source of data. The idea that political science could directly produce its own data was not yet in his mind. The problem was to make good use of these empirical materials, and the key to accomplishing this was to discover behind appearances and purely legal schemes what the true mechanisms of political life were.

Starting from a criticism of the traditional Aristotelian classification of regimes based on the number of rulers, Mosca formulated a sort of iron law of politics. According to this “law,” all regimes, in spite of their variable legal formulations and institutional arrangements, were ruled by a “political class.” What characterized the political class was the relatively small number of its members, the superiority of their moral resources, and, in particular, the organizational factor that enabled a cohesive minority to prevail over the “great numbers” who were lacking the organizational instruments needed to act purposively and cohesively (Teorica dei Governi, chap. 1). Having affirmed that these were the common features of all political classes, Mosca then specified that variations were essentially determined by the peculiar qualities of each political class. If membership to a political class is always motivated by a natural passion for power, the special resources or qualities that enable an individual to be a part of that class vary according to the stages of civilization. Different types of political classes are
defined by the specific resources—military force, economic wealth, family ties, personal merit, and ability to win the support of the voters—that characterize them. In his first work, Mosca developed also another important theme for the theory of the political class, what he called the “political formula” (formula politica). With this concept, he designated the specific discourse that any political class uses to justify its political power and to establish its legitimacy. Mosca was keen to affirm that, contrary to commonly held beliefs, these legal, moral, and political arguments were not the real bases of political power. In fact, they served more as instruments for disguising the real source of power. At the same time, they played a far from negligible role in promoting broader bases of consent for an existing power arrangement.

These original ideas were further developed by Mosca in his later work (Elementi di Scienza Politica [The Ruling Class], 1895/1923) but without many fundamental changes. There, he more clearly stated his criticism against traditional classifications of regimes such as those that consider the possibility that one person (monarchy) or the majority of the people (democracy) rule a country. In both cases, this is only the appearance, while the reality is that of a government by a small group that either enables the monarch to actually govern a country or takes the place of the people in the real conduct of decisions (Pt. 1, chap. 2). The circulation of political classes is another important topic in the theory of the political class. If old political classes decline and new ones take their place, how is this process to be explained? According to Mosca’s perspective, this discussion hinges on the analysis of the specific resources that characterize each political class. The crucial factor for the continuity of a political class is the ability of the ruling class to maintain its control over critical resources. Conversely, what determines its substitution is the ruling class’s inability to face the challenge of a new class, which in turn proves more able to exploit new, more effective resources. Political classes tend to close themselves to external influences and thus run the risk of a progressive impoverishment; this leaves space for the rise of new groups that control the new resources that have become more important following the changes in the state of civilization. In this discussion, the temporal perspective adopted is grandiose: It stretches from the antiquity of Assyrians, Greeks, and Romans to the feudal ages, to recent developments of representative democracy. It is not the small changes taking place over the years or decades but the macrotransformations developing over centuries that stimulated the interest of Mosca.

In the second part of his later and more mature work, the Elementi di Scienza Politica, Mosca addressed a possible criticism of his theory of the political class—that is, that it was based on an extreme level of generalization. If every political system is, by definition, ruled by a political class that also determines its life and death, the risk of ending up in a circular and dogmatic reasoning may indeed be significant. To avoid this, Mosca suggested that further systematic studies be done to analyze both the constant and the variable features of political classes. Mosca felt that such studies would have highlighted the differences among political classes and would have revealed the reasons for their duration or their downfall (Elementi, Pt. 2, chap. 1). In the chapters that followed, Mosca started to explore the development of different political classes but still on a very broad historical scale. In his analysis, Mosca used four conceptual categories (autocratic, liberal, aristocratic, and democratic) and proposed two pairs of alternatives (autocratic/liberal and aristocratic/democratic). With the first pair, Mosca distinguished between a regime based on power originating from above (autocracy) and one based on power originating from below (liberalism); with the second pair, he distinguished between regimes based on the tendency of the ruling class to be closed toward the outside (the aristocratic principle) or to be open to new entrants (the democratic principle).

In about the same period, another Italian scholar proposed a not too different version of the theory of the political class. The sociologist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), a former business manager with a scientific background, developed an ambitious general theory of society in his Trattato di Sociologia Generale (The Mind and Society; 1916). Some of the basic points had been already anticipated by him in a 1903 book, Les systèmes socialistes (The Socialist Systems), as well as in other articles, and he and Mosca contended rather polemically about the original authorship of
the idea. Pareto, who preferred the term *elite* to that of *political class*, attempted a more formalized and systematic theory of societies and of the corresponding elites. His theory started from an analysis of individual behavior and incorporated many elements of a psychology of social action. Yet, in spite of all the differences, he shared with Mosca (and with some of his contemporaries) some central features and themes, such as the need to distinguish between reality and the ideological embellishment of it, the “grand theory” approach embracing the whole known history of mankind as a source of evidence, and many ideas about the circulation of elites/political classes. While Mosca had stressed the significance of the organizational factor for the predominance of the political class, Pareto was keener to discuss the different types of qualities (*residui* as he defined them) that different elites would share. Not very dissimilar from Mosca, he too developed the theme of the instruments of justification (which he called *derivazioni*) that elites use to manipulate the masses and to strengthen their domination over them.

The grand theory approach adopted by both Mosca and Pareto was indeed fascinating and probably contributed to the appeal of their concepts. However, it also produced some significant shortcomings that reduced the final impact of their contribution to contemporary political science. Probably the most important one is that the level of abstraction of their analysis was such that a true empirical testing and refutation of their “laws” proved almost impossible. Moreover, the evidence used by the two authors was essentially secondary and was drawn from historical researches of a very broad range. Their analysis thus depended essentially on “data” that had not been collected with their specific purpose in mind and therefore were not always really suitable for offering a sound empirical support to their theories. This lack of empirical data collected explicitly for the analysis of the political class was a particularly serious handicap for a correct interpretation of the new developments of political life that were taking place as a result of the processes of democratization and parliamentarization (which both Mosca and Pareto observed with a high degree of skepticism). It must also be added that their theory, which started from a well-grounded criticism of the legalistic analysis of institutions, went too far in the opposite direction and therefore missed a crucial element for the understanding of the new democratic regimes: the interrelationships between institutions and political actors. The seminal importance of their ideas remains, however, unaffected by these shortcomings, and the theory of the political class contributed to producing a true revolution in the study of politics.

Around the same time, other authors were applying their basic ideas to a more middle-range level of analysis and thus brought the theory of the political class closer to empirical reality. Moisei Ostrogorski (*La Democratie Et Les Partis Politiques* [Democracy and Political Parties], 1902) and Robert Michels (*Soziologie des Parteiwesens* [On the Sociology of Political Parties], 1911) most significantly contributed to the development of a systematic analysis of the new phenomenon of the organized mass parties that were beginning to leave a strong mark on political life in the United States and in some countries of Europe. In the analysis of these new political actors, these authors paid special attention to the “political class” that was produced within the parties and to the novel features it displayed. Michels’s contribution had a particularly significant impact on the growing debate about the nature and working of modern democracy and the role within it of one of its crucial actors, the party. His book on the sociology of the political party was a work drawing on the direct observation of real parties and thus based on empirical evidence that was much closer to real-life politics than that used by Mosca and Pareto. Taking the socialist parties and in particular the German Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD*) as the main source of his evidence, the German Italian author sought to demonstrate that even in the most apparently democratic parties, the predominance of a small group of more powerful people could not be avoided. He thus found a sounder empirical support for Mosca’s and Pareto’s ideas. Michels highlighted that while “in theory” the whole governing process in the socialist parties was regulated according to democratic principles, in practice the elected officials who ruled these large organizations were “driving” the democratic process of selection and, thanks to their resources and position, could manipulate the choices of the great mass of party members. Organization and its logic were, in fact,
prevailing over democracy in the real working of the party. Michels, then, making good use of his deep insider’s knowledge of the working of the socialist parties of Europe, could show the concrete mechanisms that were offering the leaders an overwhelming position of advantage vis-à-vis the common members. Elements such as duration in office, better education, and technical competence all contributed to the creation of a strong power differential between the party professionals and the rank and file.

Some of the consequences for democracy that Michels had inferred from his findings have been since then seriously questioned. In particular, the skeptical conclusions about the possibility of democracy that he derived on the basis of his observation of the inner life of parties have been found to be insufficiently grounded (e.g., by Seymour Lipset in his 1962 introduction to the American translation of Michels’s book). An important stream of reflections on the working mechanisms of contemporary democracy, developed in the wake of Joseph Schumpeter by Robert Dahl, Giovanni Sartori, and Juan Linz, have highlighted the need to distinguish between “democracy within a party” and “democracy among the parties.” If democracy within the parties may indeed be contradicted by the existence of an internal oligarchy, democracy as a system of responsible and responsive government, instead, depends on the existence of healthy competition among parties, which makes them responsive to the demands of the electorate. The theory of competitive democracy can therefore incorporate the existence of elites/political classes, provided that their pluralism is ensured and that all the institutional mechanisms of electoral competition are fully working. Whatever the shortcomings of his analysis, it can be rightly said that Michels’s work has made a crucial contribution to the empirical study of parties and of their organization, a field that has become one of the major areas of contemporary political science.

Along not too dissimilar lines and around the same time, in his lecture at the University of Munich on Politik als Beruf (Politics as a Vocation, 1918), Max Weber (1864–1920) was bringing into light the role of the professional politician. In his view, both the modern state and representative government increasingly needed a stratum of politicians fully dedicated to the performance of public functions. In modern representative systems, to count on “rentiers” and “amateurs” as the preferential recruitment pool of politicians, as had been common in the past, was for a number of reasons becoming both impossible and unacceptable. The situation required the development of a class of professional politicians living not only “for politics” but also “off politics”—drawing their economic resources from paid public office. In the requirements of the large organizations of modern times, Weber saw the development of a new class of politicians who would find in politics not only their main engagement but also a very concrete economic interest. Politics was, in many ways, becoming a profession, thus coming to share some of the typical features of any other professional career.

After the “Classics”

In Europe, these early developments of a new political science and of themes crucial for the understanding of modern political regimes were to a large extent stymied by the advent of totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, which made the life of this scientific discipline increasingly difficult. In the United States, however, the development of political science could continue uninterrupted, and some of the stimuli of the theories of the political class could find a fertile terrain. Harold Lasswell’s book Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (1936) and James Burnham’s The Machiavellians (1943) were very much under this influence. After World War II, a rediscovery of the “elitists,” as they were sometimes collectively called, also became possible in Europe. This rediscovery had to overcome some not entirely unfounded criticisms about their alleged sympathies for authoritarian leaders and their more well-documented skepticism about democracy. But the themes they had addressed soon regained the foreground in contemporary political science.

The new developments of what we may call the “postclassic studies of the political class” took two different directions. On the one hand, there was a continuation of macropolitical analyses of contemporary societies guided by the aspiration to detect which were their “ruling minorities” and to discuss how much this phenomenon could be seen as compatible with democracy. This line of research
has had important spillovers on the scientific debate about the interpretation of contemporary democracy and the understanding of its central mechanisms. On the other hand, a new stream of micropolitical analyses of the components of the political classes of democratic regimes (but also of some nondemocratic regimes) and of their distinguishing features began to burgeon. This second stream could take advantage of the behavioral revolution and of its program of quantitatively oriented empirical analysis conducted on the individual level.

In the first direction, a series of studies flourished in the 1950s and 1960s that were intent on detecting who were the real rulers of Western societies behind the appearances of democracy. C. Wright Mills’s book *The Power Elite* (1956) had a special influence on this perspective. Contrary to the pluralist theories describing an equilibrium among a broad range of interests, Mills tried to demonstrate that a coalition of top managers of economic firms, high-level military officers, and government politicians, closely linked by similar social backgrounds and institutional proximity, was creating a new “superelite” that was able to dominate the political life of the United States. This type of studies had to face criticisms that are not too dissimilar from those addressed to the classics of elitism. Among them, particularly relevant is the criticism pointing at the difficulty of empirically validating or invalidating the central hypothesis of these studies—that is, the existence of a united group of rulers acting cohesively. Other works have tried to challenge Mills’s theory by way of a more empirical analysis of concrete political situations. An example of special importance was the book *Who Governs?* by Dahl (1961), which moved the analysis more clearly toward the empirical ground and could be seen as a response to Mills. Other books (e.g., *Who Rules America?* by G. William Domhoff, 1967) and discussions followed, but this stream of studies has progressively exhausted itself.

Partially linked to this discussion is the debate about the nature of contemporary democracy that developed after World War II. The central theme of the debate has concerned the defining elements of this political regime and the compatibility between the existence of a relatively small number of individuals (elite/political class) who occupy the positions of power and thus rule over the greatest mass of people and the deontological tenets of the democratic idea. Against the positions of those who see in the existence of elites a denial of the principles of equality and popular government and consequently of democracy itself, there emerges the theory of “competitive democracy.” This theory argues for the need to reformulate the concept of democracy from that of “a government of the people” to that of “a government controlled by the people,” wherein the existence of a political class is not an obstacle provided that it has a plural character. When these conditions are satisfied, competition among the components of the political class enables the citizens to have a choice and thus to trigger the mechanism of responsiveness by which the rulers are compelled to respond to the demands of the people. The activation of this response mechanism becomes the real substance of modern democracy. This new concept of democracy, which finds its foundations in Schumpeter’s original formulation (*Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 1942) and is further developed by, among others, Sartori (*Theory of Democracy Revisited*, 1987), has become the predominant paradigm in contemporary political science and has originated a large stream of theoretical and empirical research elaborating on the relationship between rulers and the ruled.

On a somewhat less general level of analysis, we must also highlight the persisting exchanges between the theory of the political class and the study of parties. This is not new, as the two domains of research have shown a significant degree of proximity since Ostrogorski and Michels. The reasons are rather evident: Parties as crucial actors in contemporary democracies contribute significantly to the formation, selection, and structuring of the political class. While Michels concentrated his attention on the (oligarchic) structure that party elites acquired in the mass parties, other approaches have focused on the variable features that the leading party personnel display. These approaches have used this facet as a crucial element for identifying different party types. Starting with Weber and his analysis of the party of notables (the *Honoratioren Partei*), a stream of political scientists from Maurice Duverger to Otto Kirchheimer, Angelo Panebianco, and finally Richard Katz and Peter Mair have highlighted the parallels between changes in the modes of electoral representation, patterns of social
embeddedness, and linkages with democratic institutions that characterize the different types of parties (the parliamentary party, the organized mass party, the catchall party, the electoral-professional party, and the cartel party) and the types of politicians they produce (notables, party bureaucrats, professionals of electoral and media techniques, politicians entrenched in public office, etc.). Such typological exercises have opened the way to interesting explorations on the mutable resources, constraints, perspectives, and goals that characterize the different types of party politicians and contribute to explaining their behavior and that of their parties.

**Empirical Studies of the Political Class**

In a more strictly empirical direction, the theory of the political class has stimulated a large stream of studies that have engaged in the analysis of the components of the stratum of politicians who occupy the top places of democracies and other regimes. From the high peaks of the grand theory of the “classics,” these studies have descended to explore the terrain of the specific individuals who compose the political class and of their observable features. The highly abstract hypotheses and generalizations of Mosca and Pareto have been translated into empirical puzzles. For understandable reasons and particularly for their greater openness to public scrutiny, the political classes of democratic regimes have received a comparatively greater coverage. But some important studies of the communist elites, or of military rulers, have also been conducted.

A crucial problem that empirical studies of the political class have had to face is that of the identification of its components. Who are the members of the political class? Where are the borders to be drawn between those who belong to it and those who do not? How large is its membership? These questions have an obvious methodological dimension: When we want to study the political class of a country and analyze its specific features, how can we identify its components? To solve these dilemmas, empirical studies have typically adopted one of three methods: the positional, the reputational, and the decisional one. According to the first method, members of the political class are essentially defined by the position(s) they hold: a seat in parliament, a ministerial office, membership of a party executive committee, and so on. According to the second, the reputation is the best way to ascertain who are the members of the political class: By asking people who are knowledgeable and close to the top to indicate those who exert the greatest influence in a given country and by selecting the names that obtain the greatest numbers of nominations, it is possible to identify the members of the ruling elite. The third method identifies the members of the political class by looking at the decision-making processes and finding out who takes a dominant part in it. The three approaches are based on somewhat different theoretical interpretations of politics itself, and each of them has practical advantages and shortcomings. The positional method is based on the idea that political power in advanced societies is typically embedded in institutions and that institutional positions are thus fairly dependable indicators of a powerful role. An obvious advantage of this method is that, in general, it is fairly easy to identify the positions and the persons occupying them. This method, however, underestimates the potential relevance of noninstitutional positions, of informal power, and may then run the risk of overestimating the importance of some formal positions. The reputational method rests on the assumption that influence is based on an informal relational system rather than on the holding of formal positions of authority and that its reality is well perceived by informed observers. This method seems better suited to catch the “real” dimension of power and to avoid some of the pitfalls of the other method; it enables the observer to go beyond the formal appearances that exist in every regime and get to the true substance of power. However, it is much more laborious than the positional method, and the quality of its results obviously depends on the good selection of those asked to nominate the elite members. Reputations can also be inflated and may not always fully correspond to the reality of power. As for the decisional method, it is based on the idea that power is best evidenced by the ability to take part in decisions and to influence them. A careful analysis of decision-making processes generally enables us to identify, with sufficient precision, those who play a leading role. The main problem with this method is that the number of decisions taken in any political system is high and scrutinizing all of them (or even a sample) is a very demanding process.
task. In the end, in spite of some of its weaknesses, the positional approach has in fact dominated the empirical studies of the political class, particularly when they are applied on a large, comparative, and diachronic scale. The other methods have found greater usefulness for studies of an intensive nature conducted on a smaller scale, such as community studies or policy studies.

When concerned with democratic political systems, empirical studies have predominantly, although not exclusively, concentrated their attention on the holders of positions in elected assemblies. Because of their seats in the highest democratic institution, endowed with functions of representation, lawmaking, and executive oversight, and because of their role in the electoral process, members of parliaments are quite obviously an interesting target for the study of the political class. At the same time, because of the public role of parliamentary institutions, information about the backgrounds, careers, personal features, and preferences of members is generally quite abundant and easy to exploit for the purpose of large-scale studies. As a consequence, in most of the advanced democracies, systematic studies of legislators have been conducted from the 1960s onward. These studies have typically explored the variables pertaining to personal information and the social lives of politicians, such as age, gender, education, professional background, regional origin, and religious affiliation, or to aspects of their political professionalization, such as party affiliation, steps in the local and national political career, seniority in office, and so on (Robert Putnam, 1976). The availability of a rich series of comparative and longitudinal studies of members of parliament has enabled us to discover the existence of significant variations in the features of the members of the political class across countries and political parties over time. The empirical data derived from these studies can be used to identify and explore the factors at work in the recruitment process through which the political class is reproduced (Pippa Norris, 1997) as well as its degree of stability and change. In a more general sense, they provide useful indicators for exploring the transformations of political representation and of the relationships between citizens and rulers (Maurizio Cotta & Heinrich Best, 2007).

Whereas studies adopting what we may call the “input perspective” (who are the members of the political class and to what extent do they represent/mirror society) have been numerous and systematic, at least for established democracies, the empirical coverage of the “output perspective” (what they think and how they behave) has been much less complete. The attitudes and preferences of elected politicians have been the object of empirical research but typically on a single-country basis and without longitudinal continuity: Such studies are obviously more costly as they require interviews or content analysis. Studies systematically comparing attitudes across countries are much rarer. The same can be said about the attempts to explicitly study the output side and to analyze the consequences in the field of policy making of the variable features of the parliamentary elites. At this level, our knowledge is still extremely limited, but some interesting advances have been made recently with regard to the effects of the presence of women in parliamentary assemblies on policy making.

Empirical studies have also explored the features of other groups that may be legitimately included in the concept of political class, for instance, party leaders and party cadres that do not have parliamentary positions or the high strata of public bureaucracies (Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, & Bert Rockman, 1981). Such studies, however, have typically been less comprehensive than those dealing with parliamentarians as the information about these categories is much less handy and systematic.

Conclusion

A comprehensive evaluation of the impact of the concept and theory of the political class on the study of politics would require specific and systematic research, which is yet to be done. Some tentative remarks can, however, be advanced here. There are not many doubts that the basic idea that “the men [and increasingly the women] at the top” are a crucial object of study for anyone who wants to understand the functioning of political life has been a milestone in political science. And the same can be said about the contention that we cannot be happy with the study of the legal definition of governing institutions alone and that we must look at the individuals who make them work. In this sense, the classical theorists of the political class have anticipated some of what, half a century later,
has been among the central components of the “manifesto” of the behavioral revolution of the 1950s. The aspiration of Mosca and Pareto to build a general theory of politics based on the concept of political class has, however, proven less easy to attain than expected. To move from the high level of generality of the basic proposition that the “organized few” are able to prevail over the “nonorganized many” to a set of interconnected propositions, establishing the relationships between the features of the political class and the different models of political life, has proven much more exacting than anticipated. We do not have yet a general empirical theory of politics based on this idea. However, thanks to this stimulus, we have gained a much wider knowledge about who the members of the political class are, where they come from, how they are recruited, what their views and ambitions are, and how they behave. We have also gained a much better view of the degree of variation in the basic features of the political classes across different periods, countries, and regimes. We know also a lot more about the internal dynamics of pluralist political classes. Moreover, important elements of a theory of the political class have been incorporated into the predominant interpretation of contemporary democracy as a regime based on competition among the elites.

Finally, and with regard to more recent theoretical developments in political science, it is not completely unwarranted to draw some significant connections between the theory of the political class and the rational choice approach, which in the past decades has acquired an increasing importance in political science. This may not be immediately clear, but a closer look at some of the crucial aspects of the rational choice theory can show some of the connections between this more recent development in political science and the “old theory” of the political class. On a rather general level, we can observe that in both cases there is the ambition of building an encompassing theoretical paradigm for the understanding of political life. Moreover, rational choice also prescribes that we should probe beyond the formal crust of political entities to analyze the motives and objectives of the concrete individuals existing behind them. On a more specific point, we can add that rational choice theory has in fact found its greatest successes when applied to the sphere of politicians, of those who live for politics—that is, the political class—rather than for the common people. This has to do with the basic assumption on which this theory has been built, that of rational action: The general (but in itself empty) principle that the behavior of individuals is guided by the choice of the means that will maximize utility becomes much more relevant when the preferences (and the goals) of the individuals can be well specified and when it is possible to assume that the individuals will have a sufficient knowledge of the situation (i.e., of the constraints, the means that can produce the expected ends, etc.). This is clearly a much more realistic description of the situation of the political class (i.e., of the most professionalized section of the political system) than that of the great mass of other individuals who devote much more limited attention to the political processes and have much lower levels of purposiveness in their actions. The theory of rational choice is then particularly interesting for interpreting the games the political class plays: the coalition-making games in parliamentary governments with multiparty systems and the lawmaking games within legislatures or, on the international scene, the strategic games between countries. If this is true, the relevance of the theory of the political class is still alive.

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See also Accountability; Democracy, Theories of; Elites; Elitism; Interviews, Elite; Masses; Parties; Party Organization; Pluralism; Pluralist Interest Intermediation; Representation; Responsiveness

Further Readings

**Political Communication**

It is not easy to define the boundaries of the field of political communication. The existing literature tries to limit the field as being characterized by the interaction of three main actors: political actors, the mass media, and the public. A fourth dimension is usually added to better define the field: The subjects of the exchange that takes place in political communication are related to matters of general interest. But even with this last addition, the field remains uncertain and difficult to be captured within a single definition. Indeed, all the different dimensions that are used remain vague and ambiguous and may be the subjects of different approaches and theoretical fields: How do we define political actors? Who are they? Are union leaders political actors? And what about interest group spokespersons? Are they political actors? Does what these actors accomplish concern the field of political communication? Or does it belong to the field of public relations? Similar questions may be raised with regard to each of the other defining dimensions. This entry discusses the development of political communication as a subfield of political science, its relationship to neighboring disciplines, and recent tendencies with regard to technological changes and their impact on different spheres of political life.

Because of the vagueness of the dimensions that have been mentioned above, very often political communication is defined, even if with different words in relation to the specific approaches that are chosen, as a field placed at the intersection of the four dimensions just listed: That is, political communication regards the exchange of contents on matters of public interest that involve citizens, social actors, and the mass media. The components of this tentative definition are not self-exclusive—that is, even if one of these components is missing, we can still be facing “a political communication event.” Citizens can be absent in a particular event, and notwithstanding that, media and political actors may interact on issues of general interest. Similarly, political actors may be involved in an exchange with citizens on issues of general interest, but this interaction may take place without the mass media.

In spite of its general character that, as we shall see later, leaves the field open to different interpretations that may include a plurality of social events and situations, this definition is marked by a characteristic that seems to be more important than that of the others: Political communication deals with issues of general interest or at least with issues that may gain some sort of relevance in public interest. It may be too easy to state that political communication deals with “ruling the community,” but this seems to be its inner nature. Affairs of general interest can be treated by different actors and in different ways so that the other defining components may be useful as they help restrict and define better the field of pertinence.

_The Nerves of Government_ is the title of a seminal work by Karl Deutsch published in 1963. This book clearly shows the importance of communication in government, not just as an expression of conflicting interests but as an essential instrument to rule the community, to produce an informed citizenry, and to reach a higher level of social efficiency. Even if some scholars do not see this book as such, _The Nerves of Government_ can be viewed as a text of political communication that without any doubt demonstrates the narrow links
existing between political communication and themes of general interest: Ruling the community implies necessarily a continuous activity of communication either when it implies conflict or when it is aimed at a better level of social efficiency. Government needs an appropriate communication strategy that may help in solving the problems of the society. *The Nerves of Government* may have a dubious placement within the field of political communication as the matters it deals with do not imply conflict. Indeed, for most scholars, political communication presents another important feature: It deals with controversial issues about which there are different and conflicting views and positions. For some scholars, this is what differentiates political communication from other forms of communication and specifically from what is defined to be “public communication”; Political communication deals with controversial issues about which conflicting views exist, whereas public or institutional communication regards issues about which there is a wider general agreement.

To conclude this defining attempt, political communication is about power. It deals with the distribution of power among different competing views, actors, and interests. Power is what mostly differentiates political communication from other forms of communications: Advertising is about goods and audience, journalism is about news (even if with many overlaps with political communication), and so on. Political communication is about power in society. The narrow relationship of political communication with power implies either a struggle or, as happens mostly in democracies, some sort of negotiation and reciprocal adjustment between competing needs, requests, and interests. Therefore, political communication always implies an exchange: Either it prepares the ground for possible negotiations or its final product is an agreement that comes out of a process of negotiation that takes place through different means of communication.

This brief discussion highlights one main point: Political communication is a very broad field that can be dealt with from different points of view and that may involve different aspects. From a scholarly point of view (i.e., from the point of view of those who study political communication), there are three main areas within the broader field: communication processes, structural tendencies, and production aspects. The area of *communication processes* represents the most traditional and deeply rooted area as it deals with the analysis of communicative exchanges. Indeed, it is possible to include here all those exchanges that take place between the three actors mentioned at the beginning: political actors, citizens, and mass media, even if all of them do not necessarily have to be included at the same time in each exchange situation.

The result of each communication event may influence the allocation of power in society, and this is why this specific area has always been the core of every political communication approach. Indeed, it is possible to include within this area all the most prominent aspects of the field, from political socialization to election campaigns, from persuasion to rhetoric, and from interpersonal communication to chat groups on the Internet. In particular, two main domains seem to constitute the core of this area: (1) the study of the content and (2) the study of the effects. Both these domains have featured most prominently in political communication research since its inception following different approaches: The forms, structures, and content of political communication have been the main subjects of many scholars. The research by Harold Lasswell on the symbols and the language of politics has strongly contributed to establish the field of political science as such. More recently, Murray Edelman has further developed this kind of research on the importance of symbols in politics, while other scholars have focused their interest on quantitative content analysis of political messages.

The study of the effects of messages has occasioned the establishment of a new discipline: communication studies. The effects of political communication were among the fields most covered by those who contributed to establishing the new discipline: Paul Lazarsfeld, for example, is a prominent figure in the history of the social sciences. His works largely focused on political communication: *The People’s Choice*, written with Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet in 1944, and *Personal Influence*, written with Elihu Katz in 1995, are milestones not just in political communication research but in media studies and sociology in general. In the first book, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet point out the essentially confirmatory role that mass communication has on voters’ behavior, while the second book contributed to
overcoming the previous view of the so-called powerful media, pointing out how the mass media were acting in a more complicated way than was previously thought: The message does not reach the citizen directly but involves other figures as well, in particular the so-called opinion leaders.

Under the label structural tendencies, it is possible to list all the research that focuses on the changes that political communication is undergoing. The main tendency appears to be toward the so-called mediatization of politics: The logic of the mass media strongly affects the structures and the discourse of politics in a way that is even changing political participation. In the view of Gianpetro Mazzoleni and Winfried Schultz, mediatized politics is politics that has lost its autonomy, has become dependent in its central functions on mass media, and is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media.

In the most recent period, scholars have stressed different evolutions related to the mediatization of politics: Political communication is changing because a process of professionalization is taking place. This is a very dramatic change because it stresses also an even more important change in the way in which social interests are organized and represented. Indeed, professionalization of political communication is taking place as the traditional mass parties are weakening and almost disappearing in some cases: Politics itself is changing. Political parties often are no longer able to support candidates during election campaigns, and they are not linked any more to citizens/voters through the “affiliation vote,” which established solid and long-lasting channels of communication between mass parties and citizens. Angelo Panebianco summarized this shift under the label “electoral–professional party”: Progressively, the most traditional, Western-type mass parties were losing ground in the face of a new form of political aggregation, the electoral–professional party. The intervention of professionals particularly skilled in communication and polling is required to reach the citizen/voter, who acts and decides to no longer be bound to mass parties through stable links but to essentially be placed in a situation that many define as a “market,” in which the traditional instruments of the market are required and used. Marketing strategies and professionals able to apply these strategies are required.

Other tendencies emerge as well. First of all, there is general agreement about the increasing personalization of politics. Individual politicians are taking the place so far occupied by political parties. This tendency, too, highlights the process of transformation of mass parties: Their weakening leaves room for the personalization of politics, which is enhanced also by the increasing role of the mass media, and particularly of television, as agents of political socialization. This process of personalization of politics is said to be a part of the so-called Americanization of politics, which affects different political communication activities linked to the electoral choice. Together with the process of personalization of politics, many scholars have devoted their attention to a similar process taking place in the equilibrium of political power: The process of presidentialization highlights how powers are shifting from parliament and government to the single figure of the president. Beyond the reasons related to the structural transformations in government, many scholars stress the increasing role of the mass media that allows the president to talk and interact directly with the people, which, in turn, focuses the main attention of the mass media on the president.

Production aspects include all research that looks at how political communication is conceived and produced. Production aspects concern mainly, but not exclusively, the area of journalism and its relationship with the political system. News gathering and news processing are important moments in the production of political news: the moment of the interaction with sources of information (news gathering) and the moment in which news items are selected and become stories for the print and electronic media (news processing).

Many other studies have been conducted on how election campaigns are run: which communication strategies are adopted, how decisions are taken, which kinds of professionals are involved, and how the messages are decided, conceived, and passed on to the public. Much of this research has a very important comparative focus, trying to stress the differences and similarities among countries. In this area as well, Americanization seems to be a very widespread interpretive hypothesis: Election campaigns worldwide seem to have become more and more similar as they are applying all the strategies and procedures already used in the United States.
The Approaches

From what has been said so far, it may appear clear that political communication research represents an interdisciplinary endeavor as it deals with different areas of society and with more general processes of change. Since its beginnings, scholars from different disciplines had devoted their attention to the field that today is called political communication. Indeed, the first look at this field was by psychologists and students of propaganda. The seminal study by Sergei Tchackhotine originally published in 1938 may be considered as the first work entirely devoted to the analysis of propaganda techniques; it was strongly affected by behaviorism, an approach that in those years was influencing the entire field of psychology. Many works by other psychologists were then devoted to what in those years was not yet called political communication. The propaganda label was indeed coming from the perception, very diffuse in those years, of the enormous power of the new propaganda techniques that political structures and systems in different countries were developing. This perception was the fruit of both the behaviorist approach that was used to observe this phenomenon (which stressed the causal relationship between a single stimulus and its consequence) and the experience that the entire world was passing through in those years. Indeed, the works by Tchackhotine and those by many other scholars were devoting a lot of attention to the propaganda machines of Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. To many observers, these experiences seemed to stress the enormous power of persuasion reached through the use of new techniques such as cinema and radio, with the support of suggestions coming from developments in psychology.

In those first years, persuasion and propaganda were the catchall words used to designate what today is called political communication. Of course, there were differences both in the way in which these phenomena were observed and studied and in the way the communication process itself was taking place. Psychologists were among the first scholars to study how political power was trying to influence the life of citizens, and for many years, psychology was the main approach employed to observe communication processes in government and politics. The sociological approach to political communication was born out of psychology. As already mentioned, the founding fathers of the discipline themselves were deeply affected by psychology: Paul Lazarsfeld in his first works was influenced by the works of the psychologists Harold Lasswell and Carl Howland. All of them devoted great attention to political communication while studying other forms of communication as well. Both psychology and sociology look at the interactions between single persons and between persons and means of communication, but from different points of view: Psychology is interested in looking at the inner motives that push single persons and groups to react in a particular way to the message; sociology gives to these processes a more cumulative view, looking for the variables existing in the social structure that may affect a particular reaction. Moreover, sociology looks at the consequences and the transformations produced by political communication in the society at large.

Political scientists, too, devote great attention to political communication. In a way, it can be said that the field of political communication research itself, as we know it today, was established by political scientists. Indeed, their focus has been on the relationship between political institutions and communication: They have been interested in the consequences produced by political communication on political institutions and in the way in which political institutions communicate and organize to communicate. While sociologists studying political communication look at variables derived from the observation of society at large, including political variables, political scientists give communication a more focused attention: They look essentially at the way in which communication affects the distribution of power in society.

Semiotics and linguistics also have paid attention to political communication. In particular, both these approaches have been interested in looking at the content and structure of political messages, developing specific methods, such as discourse analysis, aimed at the analysis of these kinds of messages. While both these approaches have been able to highlight specific features of political communication, their interaction with other scientific domains has been limited in spite of the fact that their results could be very useful to integrate and complete the outcome of other approaches. Indeed, political communication is undoubtedly an interdisciplinary field placed at the
intersection of different social forces and activities producing consequences that relate to different scientific domains.

**Three Phases of Political Communication**

Political communication has dramatically changed over the years. This change has become even more rapid following the introduction of new technologies. In 1999, Jay Blumler and Dennis Kavanagh proposed a distinction between three main phases in the evolution of political communication that has been adopted by many other scholars and that can also illustrate the more recent tendencies in the field even if the original Blumler and Kavanagh formulation was not able to take into account the dramatic and fast changes created by the Internet. The first phase covers the first 2 decades after World War II, which many political scientists also define as “the golden age of mass parties.” Indeed, this period was characterized by the important role played by mass parties: These were organizational machines with thousands of employees and activists, with offices spread all over the national territory. These organizations also performed important communication functions: publishing newspapers, organizing meetings and demonstrations, and carrying out general networking. During this period, interpersonal communication was the main way to reach citizens and party activists, and party employees played the main role in diffusing the ideas of political parties and in mobilizing consensus. Even if other means of communication (e.g., radio or newspapers, very often bound to the party organizations themselves) existed, nevertheless, local circuits of relationships were very important and interpersonal relations represented the main channel to reach citizens who were linked to party organizations by deep-rooted and well-established ideological and cultural affiliations. Party offices and meetings and organizations in charge of a wide range of activities, from sports to culture and from leisure organizations to educational structures, represented the occasions for establishing and reinforcing networks that were mostly based on interpersonal knowledge and recognition. In these instances, communication was mostly aimed at reinforcing the existing links and opinions as voters rarely changed their electoral decisions. Messages had little innovative content: They were limited to repeating what citizens already knew and shared; they also attacked and painted in the worst possible manner the competitors, reinforcing the already existing feelings and opinions.

In spite of the widespread use of what today is called “negative campaigning” and determined by this continuous attempt to reinforce preexisting feelings, political institutions, both government and political parties, enjoyed a high level of confidence and trust. They were not just important organizational machines but also represented trustworthy organizations to which citizens turned for support in a plurality of different situations. Voter volatility was limited, and ideological changes were not very frequent: Political values were quite stable and well rooted in political imagery.

Just as the first phase has been termed the golden age of mass parties, the second one may be called “the age of television.” While progressively the mass media have replaced interpersonal communication as the principal sources of political socialization, television has achieved prominence among these sources. Structures and forms of political communication change dramatically because society is changing as well: The process of secularization and greater social mobility weaken the role of mass parties that transfer to the mass media, and particularly to television, the communication and socialization functions they were performing previously. This has a major consequence: The existing links between citizens and party organizations lose ground, and therefore, communication strategies that up to that moment were basically aimed at reinforcement change direction. Now, the main aim of communication is to reach and persuade voters who are no longer firmly linked to a particular party. The notion of a voters’ market enters the political arena: Citizens become willing to buy, among a number of similar products, the best “political offers” in the same way as they buy goods. Communication strategies follow this change: Messages are essentially aimed at conquering a “buyer” who is linked to particular information sources.

This change is not limited to elections, but the entire political life and government activities are affected by this change; the intrusiveness of the mass media forces many organizations to be better equipped to face the competition from other institutions and the mass media. The first consequence is the process of professionalization of political
communication: The traditional figures of political activists and party bureaucrats are now substituted by professionals who are trained in different communication branches. Their expertise is no longer political; their links with political and government institutions are not based on their own political preferences. They are hired because they possess those skills and expertise that party machines are no longer able to offer to candidates competing for public positions. Government and public institutions, too, look for professionals to support their desire to win public support. This tendency is greatly enhanced by technological developments that make possible many new activities but that require specific skills that are no longer provided by traditional political organizations. Words such as political consultant, pollster, fund-raiser, spin doctor, and so on become common in political communication as political parties lose ground and single candidates need to be supported by their own electoral machines. Scholars have described this as a shift from “labor-intensive campaigns” to “capital-intensive campaigns”; while in the first phase, the support of party members and activists was essential to run a campaign, in the second phase, money becomes essential to pay all those professionals who are able to get the best possible result out of new technologies and media communication. Most important, money becomes essential to buy airtime for political advertisements.

These changes do not concern election campaigns alone, but the entire spectrum of political and government institutions is deeply affected by the increasing role of mass media and particularly of television. At the same time, the idea of “permanent campaign” emphasizes that the new media environment does not allow communication strategies to be limited to the electoral momentum: candidates, political and government institutions, and public administrations are placed under the control of mass media at all times and not just when they are competing for public offices. The continuous flow of opinion polls also represents an instrument through which all those who are interested in gaining public support can gauge how they are perceived by the people and then take the appropriate initiatives. Permanent campaigning indicates that support building is a continuous process that cannot be limited just to specific moments in time, such as elections.

The word Americanization has often been used to indicate these changes. Americanization can have a double meaning: On the one hand, it indicates that these changes took place first in the American political scene and that they have then been adopted in other social contexts; on the other hand, it indicates that there is some kind of influence either explicitly or implicitly played by the United States in exporting their cultural and political practices to other parts of the world, thus changing local cultures. Many studies have been carried out on the adoption of “American” techniques abroad and mostly on the involvement of American political consultants in other parts of the world, essentially in countries that are culturally and politically close to the United States.

Another tendency that emerged in the second phase of political communication and that becomes even more important in the third one is personalization. The progressive weakening of mass parties pushes the focus of political communication toward individual politicians. The ideological links that existed between party apparatuses and citizens are now replaced by the emotional and sympathetic feelings that leaders may establish with the citizens. The entire political life becomes organized around the figures of individual politicians: Political communication reinforces this tendency, which moves the focus of the political debate from ideology and programs to the individual features of those who animate public life. The existing borders between private and public life become blurred, and the electoral decision seems to be moved essentially by personal leadership characteristics. Political candidates are no longer judged on the basis of their political competencies and skills and on their leadership in running the government but, essentially, on their ability to meet the requirements of television discourse.

There are different reasons for this change: Institutionally, personalization is fostered by the changes taking place in electoral systems that in many countries place political figures at the center of electoral choice. For many scholars, mass communication plays a major role in this shift: The development of televised political advertisements makes it possible for individual candidates to enter the electoral arena even without the support of political parties. Candidates with their own money or with money coming from their supporters can
buy directly from the networks the airtime that is necessary to reach the voters, and in this way, they can talk directly to them without the intermediation of party organizations. In many cases, candidates are even competing against the choices made by their own parties. In this way, the role of political parties is undermined, and the road toward personalization is fostered. The market-driven logic that moves the mass media system is another reason for the personalization of politics, as they are able to reach a wider audience. Personalization represents another component of the Americanization of politics and more precisely the Americanization of political communication. Indeed, while in Europe political parties still play a major role in influencing citizens’ behavior and choice, weak political parties are a particular feature of the American political system, influencing the evolution of other political systems worldwide. All communication strategies are built around single political figures in a way that was first experienced in the United States.

For Blumler and Kavanagh, the third phase of political communication is characterized by the fragmentation of both the means of communication and the audiences. First of all, television offers many more channels: Everywhere, satellite TV, cable TV, and other forms of television come alongside the traditional terrestrial networks. There is also an increase in the television formats within which political communication takes place: Talk shows, infotainment, and docudramas offer politicians new opportunities to address their audience. For politicians, it is just a matter of choosing in which transmissions to appear, but at the same time, the opportunity to exercise control over other politicians also increases. It is essentially the development of the Internet that characterizes the third phase and that offers citizens many more opportunities to receive news and get in touch with other people. The increase in the number of sources of information determines the fragmentation of the audience with the development of different “publics” either interested in specific topics, attitudes, and problems or particularly linked to specific sources of information. The idea and the practice of a coherent mass audience that already during the second phase had undergone a process of fragmentation into different target groups are now almost completely disappearing: There are many publics in relationship to the increasing number of communication outlets. Each of these has different messages, producing an even more dramatic volatility of party affiliation and ideological and symbolical constructions.

**Is Everything Alright With Political Communication Today?**

In liberal theory, the major goal of political communication is to construct an informed citizenry that is able to consciously take the decisions regarding the ruling of the community. Is political communication able to accomplish this task? Political communication research demonstrates that there exist several problems in reaching this goal. An initial problem arises from the abundance of sources of information: There are too many messages in circulation that compete with each other to gain the attention of the citizens. In many cases, the consequence is a “lost” citizen unable to select among the plurality of messages that he or she gets every day. Very frequently, these messages are contradictory; they do not just compete with each other as is necessary in a democracy. Citizens are lost and confused because they are flooded with a very large number of messages from which they are not able to select the proper one or judge their reliability. The problem becomes even more serious with the Internet, which increases the number of sources of information whose reliability is even less verifiable.

To be noticed among this enormous quantity, each message tends to be increasingly simple and, at the same time, emotional: *Amusing Ourselves to Death* was the title of a book by Neil Postman that has become one of the most important reference books in all communication sciences. Even if Postman was not dealing just with political communication, his book gave a very valuable insight on how the tendency toward entertainment, derived from the increasingly important role of the mass media, and particularly television, was changing the entire society. Following this line, other scholars have stressed the tendency toward dramatization and spectacularization of political communication. Citizens are transformed into spectators: Progressively they lose any active role, instead being transformed into passive spectators of something staged in front of them by political competitors.
argumentation becomes simpler, shorter, and more and more filled with emotional discourse now made available by the electronic media.

Negative campaigning is another tendency that in the view of many scholars undermines the role of political communication in fostering democracy. Very often, political competitors find it much easier to denigrate the opponent than to propose programs or solutions for existing problems. Denigration is not just more emotionally involving, but it can catch the attention of the news media very easily and therefore get a wider attention from the general public. Tom Patterson clearly demonstrated how negative campaigning meets the needs of the media to reach a wider audience. At the same time, the mass media should exercise their control function, which is supposed to be among the founding principles of liberal democracy. At the end, because of this wave of negativism, this control function is “out of work”; it does not support the development of a more mature democracy.

Jürgen Habermas, in his seminal work *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, has opened a field for scholars of political communication, directing their attention to the way the public sphere is organized in each society and the way in which it may foster democracy. Today, a great deal of political communication research is focused on his concept of the public sphere. At the same time, Habermas has clearly shown that the commercialization of the public sphere can undermine a rational debate on affairs of public interest, and this seems to be the most important challenge that political communication faces today.

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See also *Democracy, Quality; Electoral Campaigns; Media, Electronic; Media, Print; Party Identification; Personalization of Politics*

Further Readings


**Political Culture**

Political culture consists of a relatively coherent repertoire of cognitive and evaluative models that enable members of a political community to give sense to their role as political actors, to other political actors, to the community they belong to, and to the institutional structure in which they live. Thanks to this framework, they can decide which objectives to pursue and shape their actions and behaviors accordingly. Political culture has the following features:

a. it is a shared legacy accumulated over time;
b. it consists of a collection of solutions that have proved, with experience, to be effective in solving problems concerning human survival, adaptation to the external environment, and internal integration; and
c. it is transmitted to new members of the political community through socialization.

Political culture has two fundamental constituents:

1. *Cognitive models*—that is, a population of concepts enabling the imposition of an order on the world through a rational process of critical objectivization—and

2. *Evaluative models*, which make it possible to attribute meaning to the world through identification with particular values that separate what is good, right, and desirable from what is bad, wrong, and to be avoided.
The first section of this entry deals with the scientific context in which the concept of political culture was introduced into political science, the questions it seeks to answer, and the operational definitions used in empirical studies. In the second section, there is a description of the main theoretical and empirical developments in comparative studies on political culture, conducted by means of representative sample surveys in an increasing number of countries. This is followed by a section devoted to a discussion of such research design and the methodological and epistemological presuppositions that are involved. The fourth and fifth sections cover different research designs regarding political culture and related concepts. A critical discussion of the analogies and differences between various research designs is presented in the final section, where emphasis is placed on the need to consider the depth of the historic roots of every cultural pattern and, thus, of each political culture.

Like broader cultural orientations, political culture is largely experienced unconsciously by individuals, who are first and foremost carriers and users. To put it in another way, the set of cognitive and evaluative models that make up political culture are, according to Edgard Schein’s definition, “assumptions taken for granted.” Individuals who share a specific political culture consider such cognitive and evaluative models to be common sense—the obvious and natural way to give meaning to the political sphere, to its actors and institutions, as well as to its boundaries—what is politics and what is not. As anthropologists have observed in relation to cultural models in general, there is nothing objective or natural in the way in which the content of political culture is defined. It has a pragmatic basis and depends on the challenges and problems that human beings have to handle. So political culture is not just a mental construction of assumptions that are taken for granted. These assumptions form the background and the basis for the political behavior of actors—that is, the framework within which individuals act in what is considered a politically appropriate way. This involves excluding actions considered to be inappropriate or deplorable and deciding whether or not to take part in elections, to cooperate with institutions or act in a clandestine fashion, or to organize peaceful demonstrations or take part in violent protests.

Political culture is, therefore, molded by the accumulated experience of a political community and is a constraint that is very durable over time. There is debate among scholars as to how far one must go back to find the roots of today’s political culture. This problem is discussed in more detail below. However, there is a general consensus that change in political culture, as in all forms of cultural change, is a slower and more difficult process than institutional, economic, and social change. This is the reason why political culture is characterized by a certain amount of ambiguity. On the one hand, it is a valuable collective resource in that it makes perceptions, beliefs, and individual attitudes toward political institutions and actors relatively homogeneous. On the other hand, it represents an obstacle in the face of social and economic changes. In such cases, political culture may offer solutions that prove ineffective when coping with problems of adaptation to new challenges from outside or from within a given society.

Special consideration is given to the analytic, methodological, and empirical contribution made by studies of social capital, a concept that in the past 2 decades has prompted extensive research into the relationship of norms, beliefs, and social organization with the effectiveness of democracy and economic development. The concept of political culture is also compared with that of nation building, as used in comparative studies of European political development, according to a research design that is complementary in many respects to the one based on representative sample surveys. Finally, this entry discusses the concept that in a political culture that is adequate for an effective democracy, there needs to be a balance between two different components—on the one hand, an emphasis on individual well-being and self-realization and, on the other, a commitment and fairness toward institutions and a moral obligation toward one’s local community and nation.

A New Scientific Concept and Its Operational Definitions

Unlike conceptual innovations in everyday life, in the field of scientific research, each conceptual innovation is carefully recorded due to the complete institutionalization of science. The concept of political culture was introduced by Gabriel Almond
and Sidney Verba at the beginning of the 1960s in their book *The Civic Culture*. This work was part of an extensive program of theoretical discussion and empirical research into the major processes of political development that had started in the 1950s. The tragedy of the two World Wars and of the totalitarianisms in Europe, the birth of new democracies in the three nations defeated in World War II (Germany, Italy, and Japan), the establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the founding of new states in Africa and Asia following the end of the French and British colonial empires—all these gave rise to a series of important research issues regarding the stability of the new political regimes, in particular the new democracies. According to the new functionalist and behaviorist approaches of this period, it was imperative for political science to study the cultural orientations of individuals, especially their attitudes to democracy, as these are crucial for the stability of democratic political systems.

*The Civic Culture* stressed the importance of political culture as a dimension capable of influencing, if not determining, the stability and performance of democratic regimes. The new concept built on an illustrious tradition. In the history of political thought, many authors have emphasized the importance of the cultural and moral orientations of citizens for the prosperity and power of states. The terms may vary, but the meanings are similar: civic virtues (Aristotle), values and feelings of identity and commitment (Niccolò Machiavelli), morality and customs (Jean-Jacques Rousseau), and above all the “habits of the heart,” which, according to Alexis de Tocqueville, animated the citizens of the United States in the first few decades after independence and were the foundation of American democracy.

To shed light on the subjective components of politics, the new concept of political culture drew on these classic contributions, producing a new paradigm for empirical research in political science that still underpins the majority of studies in political culture. This new paradigm is based on four of the most significant theoretical and analytic sources for the social sciences in the first half of the 20th century:

1. *The contributions of Max Weber’s sociology in the theory of action and in defining a typology of criteria according to which individuals consider political authority legitimate and agree to comply with its rules*: On the one hand, the importance of values in orienting individual behavior is stressed by Weber’s distinction between goal rationality—that is, decisions based on a calculation of possible individual benefits—and value rationality, namely, decisions based on value orientations, irrespective of, or contrary to, one’s own interests. On the other hand, Weber defines three ideal types of political authority: traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic. Each is supported by different beliefs: the belief in its conformity to the past, the belief in its conformity to established rules, and the belief in the particular personal qualities of a leader. In other words, legitimation depends on one of three different values: tradition, the institutional structure in use, or a single, extraordinary person. The first two values support political continuity, while the latter can contribute to political change.

2. *The four conceptual pairs (the so-called pattern variables) defined by Talcott Parsons in relation to the theoretical foundations of his functionalist approach: universalism versus particularism, achievement motivation versus ascriptive-ness, specificity versus diffuseness, and affective neutrality versus affectivity*: The first term in each pair is considered a typical trait of modernity, while the second is a feature of traditional orientations. This set of opposing categories is the basis for all subsequent studies of modernization processes in both the political and the economic realm.

3. *The empirical analysis of attitudes developed by social psychologists such as Louis Guttman, Rensis Likert, and Charles Osgood in the context of the new behavioral approach*: Different attitude scales were designed to collect systematic and comparable data on mass opinions, beliefs, and value orientations through face-to-face interviews.

4. *The influence of Freudian theories on American psycho-anthropology, with the notion of the “basic personality structure,” and the importance attributed to socialization processes not only in childhood but throughout the life cycle*.

These four analytic contributions were then combined with the new methodology of public opinion polls, which make it possible to collect data on opinions and attitudes in representative...
samples of citizens. Indeed, the research design of *The Civic Culture* applies the operational definition of political culture in sample surveys in five democracies: the United States, Mexico, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy.

According to the new paradigm established in *The Civic Culture*, political culture has four characteristics: (1) it consists of the set of subjective orientations toward politics of the individual citizens of a nation; (2) it consists of knowledge and beliefs about politics and a commitment to certain political values; (3) it is the result both of a socialization process that begins in childhood and continues through one’s education and exposure to the mass media and also of direct experience acquired during adulthood with regard to the performance of political institutions and actors; and (4) it has an influence on, even if it does not determine, the performance of political institutions, due to a two-way causal link between culture and institutional performance. In general, political culture has an impact on the quality of democracy, but the latter also contributes to orienting the political culture of a nation’s citizens.

The study revealed the existence of three different types of political culture: parochial, subject, and participative. Parochial culture is characterized by a prevalence of attitudes based on particularism, localism, short-range trust, and a subjective separation from the state and politics. The main features of the second ideal type are compliance and confidence in the legal authority of the state, its administrative order, and its decisions—the output, according to a systemic view. Participative political culture is based on the active political engagement of citizens who fuel the input side through the creation of free associations, in keeping with Tocqueville’s classic reflections.

“Civic culture,” which consists of a balance between these ideal types, is considered to be the most suitable cultural foundation for a stable democracy. Of the five political systems taken into consideration, the United States and Great Britain had a civic culture, while Germany and Italy were considered democracies with a high risk of instability at the time when the data for the *The Civic Culture* had been collected toward the end of the 1950s. Germany was deemed to have a predominantly subject-based political culture, while Italy was largely parochial.

### Changes in Political Culture: The Rise of Postmaterialist Values

Some of the most important findings of *The Civic Culture* were reviewed and criticized 20 years later by Almond and Verba themselves. They pointed to the growth of a participatory culture in Germany, the reduction of subject attitudes, and an increase in the levels of dissatisfaction and distrust in Britain and the United States. In the meantime, a host of other investigations had been conducted, revealing a drop in the degree of confidence in democratic institutions and increasing disaffection and political protest in Western democracies and Japan.

The observed changes in value orientations are of particular interest. On the basis of a comparative study of six European nations carried out in 1970, Ronald Inglehart noted that the youth protest movements were primarily concerned with issues neglected by the traditional political parties, for instance, environmental conservation, disarmament, and needs associated with individual self-fulfilment rather than economic improvement. Inglehart considered these value orientations to be the effects of the situation of economic well-being in which the socialization of young people had taken place in Western European countries, which had reached an unprecedented level of wealth since World War II. With the modification of political priorities, cultural change was fueled by the demographic replacement of the population due to the arrival of generations with more postmaterialist orientations than the older ones, which gradually disappeared from the scene.

Inglehart based his thesis on the theory of motivation developed by the psychologist Abraham Maslow, who considers the gratification of needs to be as decisive for human action as the classic principle of deprivation. According to this theory, the fundamental needs of human beings are organized into a hierarchy consisting of four ascending levels: (1) basic physiological needs; (2) the need for safety and stability; (3) the need for affection, self-esteem, and a sense of belonging; and at the highest level (4) the need for self-realization. Satisfaction of a need pertaining to a lower level brings to the fore the one relating to the next level. According to Maslow, this framework is an organizational model of the individual personality.

Inglehart turned it into an explanatory model of the changes in political culture: The older
generations, who grew up amid the poverty and insecurity generated before and during the two World Wars, were oriented toward the materialist values induced by survival and safety needs. By contrast, young Europeans born after World War II are oriented toward postmaterialist values—that is, values such as belonging, self-esteem, and self-realization. Having grown up in a period of unprecedented economic prosperity, they tend to take a certain level of material comfort for granted and therefore develop the value priorities typical of higher levels of prosperity. As a result, they are more oriented toward themes such as personal fulfillment, individual freedom, and the conservation of nature. This difference between young people’s values and those of their parents leads to cultural change since, according to the Freudian concept of the “basic personality structure” developed by Ralph Linton and Abraham Kardiner, individuals tend to maintain in the course of their adult life the value priorities adopted in a deep sense during the formative phases of their childhood and youth.

The operational definition used by Inglehart to collect data on materialist and postmaterialist value priorities is an inventory of 12 possible political goals. Representative samples from Western countries were asked to choose the most important political goals from the following items:

**Material goals:** maintain order in the nation; fight rising prices; maintain a high rate of economic growth; make sure the country has strong defense forces; maintain a stable economy; and fight against crime

**Postmaterial goals:** give people more say in the decisions of government; protect freedom of speech; give people more say in how things are decided at work and in their community; try to make our cities and countryside more beautiful; move toward a friendlier, less impersonal society; and move toward a society where ideas count more than money

Respondents were then classified as materialists or postmaterialists depending on whether they favor one of the two kinds of goals consistently.

**A Worldwide Research Program**

The operational definition used by Inglehart to measure value change has become a standard tool in the proliferating studies of political culture, along with questions aimed at surveying interpersonal and institutional trust, preference for democracy or autocracy, life satisfaction, and other similar issues. This series of studies followed the research design originally adopted in *The Civic Culture*. The design has three main characteristics: (1) a sample survey: data collection on political opinions, attitudes, beliefs, and values conducted by means of structured interviews with representative samples of citizens; (2) a comparative design: the same questionnaire is applied in different political systems in the same period. In other words, the same operational definitions are used in different countries, favoring comparability of data and permitting the testing of hypotheses at an individual as well as a national level; and (3) a longitudinal design: if possible, the same questionnaires—or the same subsets of closed questions—are applied in the same countries in different years, creating a rising number of time series for many political culture variables, such as levels of institutional trust, satisfaction with democratic performance, support for leaders, national pride, and so on.

A number of agencies have been established in recent decades to monitor public opinion orientations and political attitudes. The Eurobarometer program of the European Union was set up in 1973 and since 1974 has supplied twice-yearly data on opinions and attitudes for each member or candidate-member of the Union. Similar survey programs have recently been set up. The New Democracies Barometer, established in 1991, covers 12 East European countries; the Latinobarometer covers 19 countries from 1996 onward; while Afrobarometer covers more than 12 states since 1999. Cooperation between different research centers around the world has led to an increase in the number of nations for which data on political culture indicators are available. Increasingly, extensive networks have been built up, making it possible to conduct the same research project at the same time in an ever greater number of nations. In particular, the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey have conducted five waves in a steadily rising number of countries. After the first wave in 1981, successive waves of data collection were carried out in 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005, covering countries on all continents (with more than 100 in the most recent wave). A further advantage has
been the setting up of efficient data archives. Coupled with new data transmission tools, these archives facilitate secondary analyses—that is, the research and empirical testing of hypotheses by researchers who have not taken part in gathering and analysing the original data.

All these developments have resulted in a strong growth in the degree of institutionalization and standardization of research into mass orientations. One of the most recent, and ambitious, findings of this research programme is illustrated in Figure 1. It was produced by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel on the basis of data collected in the first four waves of the World Values Survey.

Figure 1 shows the position of 80 states with respect to two variables. The vertical axis is an index of the quality of democracy in the different countries and takes into account not only the existence or otherwise of free elections but also the moral integrity of the political elites as measured by the “control of corruption” scores provided by the World Bank and other organizations. Corruption among elites is in fact the main factor preventing respect for the equality of rights and the law and therefore for an effective democracy. The lower values on the scale relate to nondemocratic countries with corrupt elites, while the higher scores are obtained by democracies with political elites that guarantee the rule of law and equal rights.

The horizontal axis shows the average values for each country on an index that measures the spread of a cultural orientation based on the predominance of values associated with individual self-realization and self well-being. It is a direct evolution of Inglehart’s first postmaterialism scale. This new cultural syndrome is surveyed by five indicators:

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Figure 1  The Impact of Self-Expression Values on Effective Democracy, Controlling for Each Country’s Percentage of Solid Democrats

1. postmaterialist liberty aspirations (give people more say in the decisions of government, protect freedom of speech, and give people more say in how things are decided at work and in their community);

2. forms of political protest, such as signing petitions;

3. tolerance of homosexuality and sexual liberty;

4. interpersonal trust; and

5. life satisfaction.

The relation between the two variables in Figure 1 is measured controlling for the percentage of respondents who prefer democracy over autocracy, to exclude spurious effects due to merely instrumental prodemocratic motives. Countries where self-expression values are relatively less widespread than mere support for democracy would suggest are those where the political regime violates the rule of law and equal rights more than levels of mere support for democracy would suggest (see bottom left-hand corner). In the opposite corner, countries where self-expression values are relatively more widespread than mere support for democracy would suggest are those where democracy is more effective than mere support for democracy would suggest.

In short, Figure 1 shows the strong linkage between a peculiar syndrome of political culture—self-expression values—and the level of effective democracy: Near the top right-hand corner are the small democracies of Protestant Northern Europe, with England and the English-speaking democracies (the United States, Canada, and Australia). Near the opposite corner are some African and Asian states, with Yugoslavia (at the time formed by Serbia and Montenegro) ranking as the lowest European country on both variables.

The Limits of the Comparative Survey Approach

The application and extension of the research design of *The Civic Culture* in the 40-year period since it was first published has enabled the international political science community to build up a large number of comparable data sets on a growing number of nations. The availability of statistical packages and powerful, low-cost computers, combined with the Internet infrastructure, has facilitated the empirical testing of many hypotheses by means of complex multivariate models. Important changes in political attitudes and beliefs have been monitored over time and compared in different countries. Like any scientific method, technique, or decision, this research design also has certain limitations. As with all research tools, the capacity of sample surveys to achieve objectives depends on the degree to which they offer a simplification of the world, the complexity of which cannot be grasped by any one tool.

The sample survey research design in the comparative study of political culture is no exception to this rule. In particular, it tends to emphasize the orientations of mass political culture rather than those of the elites. Similarly, the wide-ranging comparative design makes it easier to concentrate on mass attitudes relating to the polity and politics levels instead of the policy level, which is more context dependent. Scholars have stressed these limits together with others that stem largely from the basic assumptions of the two main approaches that gave rise to this paradigm: functionalism and behaviorism.

The functionalist approach has two limits. On the one hand, there is a tendency to regard politics as a clearly defined sphere with respect to society and the economy, which is easily recognizable even in very different social systems. On the other hand, functionalism tends to favor a synchronic perspective, with a consequent reduction in the attention devoted to the diachronic dimension and in piecing together the historic origins of the observed processes. As seen above, in the paradigm of the comparative research survey, the temporal dimension is only taken into account through the collection of successive “snapshots”—that is, the various waves of sample surveys.

The behaviorist approach, whose roots lie in experimental psychology, has greatly stimulated the operational definition of citizens’ opinions, attitudes, and value orientations. However, it is based on the individualist and atomist assumption that the whole equals the sum of its individual parts. The critical point is, therefore, the link between the microlevel (a sample of individuals interviewed) and the macrolevel. The political culture of a country is viewed as a statistical aggregation of the opinions and attitudes of individual citizens.
In addition to these limitations, which derive from the epistemological features of functionalism and behaviorism, representative sample surveys also have several methodological limitations:

- Actual behaviors, which are the overt output of cultural orientations, are not observed but only inferred by verbal answers to questions.
- It is assumed that the meanings of questions and answers are the same in different countries and languages—a necessary assumption if one is to consider the answers of interviewees to be comparable.
- The number of interviews in national samples is usually too small to guarantee the statistical representativeness of subnational samples. This makes it impossible to explore the regional differences in political culture within a given country.
- Surveys also often have difficulties of grasping the unconscious and “things taken for granted,” as pointed out above.

The following sections deal with two different contributions to the study of political culture that can be regarded as complementary to the paradigm established by *The Civic Culture*, in that they pursue different research designs or strategies of inquiry, each of which overcomes some of the limits described above, though in different ways.

**Social Capital and Democracy**

One of the principal conceptual innovations in political science and sociology over the past 20 years is the notion of social capital, introduced in the 1960s by the economists Gary Becker and James Loury. The concept of social capital became popular in political science as a result of the analytic work of James Coleman, who related it to social networks, and the research of Robert Putnam into the institutional performance of Italian regional governments in *Making Democracy Work*. According to Putnam’s definition, social capital “refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (p. 167).

In other words, social capital is a collective resource and has some of the features of a public good: It offers advantages to all the members of a group, but no one can appropriate it in an exclusive way. If one person benefits from social capital, this does not reduce its availability for others. On the contrary, social capital has a radically anti-economic feature: The more it is used, the more it becomes available for the entire community. Social capital, therefore, offers a solution to the dilemmas of collective action posed by scholars such as Mancur Olson and Elinor Ostrom. As a form of social organization, social capital also has positive effects on economic development in that it contributes to creating a favorable environment for market exchanges thanks to cooperation, trustworthiness, honesty, and compliance with formal and informal rules. The notion of social capital is closely related to that of civic culture. They have a common ancestor, Tocqueville, who attributed great importance to the trustworthiness of citizens and the significance of free associations. The two concepts also share concern about the relation between culture and effective democracy.

Putnam’s research on Italian regions exploited the opportunity to apply an experimental design. In the 1970s, the newly introduced regional institutions began to operate within the same nation-state. The research question was which variables explain the differences in the output of the new regional governments in the common context. According to Putnam’s findings, the marked differences in the economic development of the Northern and Southern regions tend to coincide with great differences in institutional efficiency. However, this turned out to be a spurious correlation. The independent variable, when introduced as a control variable that, in fact, explains the differences in both economic development and institutional performance is the amount of social capital present in the various Italian regions at the end of the 19th century. The Northern regions had the same level of poverty as the Southern regions but appreciably higher levels of social capital. Seventy years later, in postwar Italy, social capital or the “civic community” (Figure 2) explains both the difference in economic development and the difference in institutional performance. The well-known economic cleavage between the North and South (i.e., the *Mezzogiorno*) is only one aspect of a multifaceted divide that sets regions with a high social capital and high institutional performance apart from...
regions with limited social capital and inefficient local institutions.

As Figure 2 suggests, Putnam’s point of departure is similar to Inglehart and Welzel’s, but the research design differs on many significant points:

1. There is no comparison between different nations but an analysis of a single nation, Italy, with various research techniques. The comparative design regards the Italian regions, thereby emphasizing within-state differences and reducing the risk of comparing cases that are too heterogeneous.

2. The nature of the civic community is measured not only by means of elite and mass surveys but also by gathering data on observable and documentable behavior (involvement in voluntary or other associations, newspaper circulation figures, and election turnout).

3. Data gathered from official documents and historical archives also make it possible to make intertemporal comparisons during almost a century.

4. Differences within the same country are highlighted and their historic origins reconstructed using data and findings relating to the Italian tradition of electoral studies.

5. By conducting a comparative analysis within a single nation, it is possible to make reliable predictions on the basis of dynamic models. The differences between the Northern and Southern regions are not only significant but above all are hard to eliminate, in that they tend to create two opposing conditions of equilibrium. Regions with civic communities display virtuous circles of trust, participation, effective institutions, and economic development. By contrast, regions with uncivic communities are entrapped in a vicious circle of distrust, defection, inefficient institutions, and economic stagnation.

**Political Culture, Nation Building, and State Formation**

Putnam’s conclusions confirm, on the one hand, the importance of political culture for the quality of democracy and, on the other hand, specify the particularity of Italy, as had been observed in the 1950s and 1960s not only in *The Civic Culture* but also in the contemporary ethnographic fieldwork of Edward Banfield in *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (referring to a community in Southern Italy), which shed light on the syndrome of “amoral familism.” Italy is a case of a divided political culture in which the divisions are to a large extent geographical. In Northern Italy, the civic community, which corresponds to a participant political culture, tends to prevail. In the Southern regions, there tends to be a prevalence of parochialism characterized by localist and familialistic loyalties—that is, the vicious circle of the uncivic community.

This latter set of concepts emphasizes a further aspect of political culture, namely, that political culture also consists of beliefs and attitudes that do not have an explicit political content. The political meaning and consequences of familism and parochialism are implicit and embedded. Nonetheless, they are just as important as the explicit political content of participant and subject cultures. More specifically, it can be said that parochial culture is the consequence of historic processes marked by limited social and political mobilization on the part of the elites.

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**Figure 2** The Civic Community and Institutional Performance

As Karl Deutsch argued, mobilization is a process of change that involves, entirely or partially, the population of countries that are undergoing modernization. In the early stages, this tends to lead to changes in the employment and residence of individuals while, subsequently, it also radically modifies their perceptions, expectations, beliefs, memories, and sense of identity. In other words, the process of mobilization changes the assumptions that people take for granted, in that it changes behavior and the problems that need to be coped with. Sectors of the population that are less affected by this process maintain to a greater degree the traditional set of assumptions and beliefs that political scientists label as parochialism or familism.

Social and political mobilization also lies at the heart of Stein Rokkan’s study of state formation and nation-building processes in Europe, starting from the collapse of the Roman Empire. In general, the political development of Western Europe has taken place in four phases, which can be summed up as follows: (1) state formation, which involves the establishment of politically centralized control over a given territory, which is defend from external or internal attack and administered in a uniform way by civil and military bureaucracies; (2) nation building, promoted through a process of cultural standardization with the imposition of a common language, a single religion, and rituals and myths that lend legitimacy to the power of the monarch or elites; (3) democratization, through the granting of suffrage to increasingly large portions of the population; and (4) the creation of the welfare state—that is, a state that looks after its citizens, guaranteeing them health care, education, and protection against the risks of poverty.

The ways in which this occurred and the time it has taken for different states to meet these four challenges has had a lasting effect on the quality and stability of democratic regimes. The older states, formed prior to the Peace of Westphalia (1648), have proved to be the most stable democracies in the 20th century. Typical cases are England, Sweden, and Denmark. At the opposite extreme, there is the case of Italy and, to a lesser extent, Germany, which only became unified states in the 1860s and 1870s, after the beginning of a process of social, political, and economic mobilization fueled throughout the continent by the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. These new states have had to overcome the four challenges in less than a century. In both cases, the liberal and democratic state collapsed in the period between the two World Wars, with the rise of the fascist and Nazi regimes.

According to this line of research, in Europe, the culture of a country derives from the interaction between three fundamental components: ethnic-linguistic identity, religious faith, and the outcome of processes of cultural standardization activated by nation builders through the education system, compulsory military service, and so on. Political culture is, therefore, profoundly influenced by the timing and the modalities of state formation and nation-building processes. Moreover, the outcomes of these two processes create the patterns that define a feature of political culture that Weber had already considered as decisive for the stability of a regime: the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by political institutions. These may in fact be regarded as positive values—symbols with which to identify as members of a nation—or negative values—that is, symbols of a political regime that has little legitimacy and arouses distrust and suspicion. This top-down schema of the relationship between political culture and institutional architecture assigns a fundamental role to the elites of nation builders and places the origins of modern-day political cultures much farther back in the past.

Rokkan’s schema of political development also highlights cases of countries with nonuniform political cultures. This lack of uniformity may be due to resistance on the part of some peripheral areas to the process of cultural standardization promoted by the center or to shortcomings or delays in the state formation process. Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy are three examples of countries that have experienced nation-building difficulties as a result of cultural differences within their frontiers. Spain is a case of early state formation, but it has been unable to overcome the resistance of peripheral areas with considerable economic resources, which have managed to maintain linguistic and cultural autonomy. After the transition to democracy in the 1970s, the new constitution, introduced in 1978, recognizes the existence of a plurality of nations within the Kingdom of Spain.

The Netherlands are an example of a country with different subcultures resulting from linguistic or religious cleavages. These cultural cleavages
have been successfully bridged by the concept of consociational democracy founded on “pillarization,” involving cooperation of the elites across cleavages. This institutional accommodation is effective to the extent that it recognizes, confirms, and reassures each of the different cultural identities (Catholic, Protestant, and secular). Incidentally, the dramatic developments following the collapse of the Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s testify that this accommodation is very difficult to adopt, even within 21st-century Europe, if the countries involved do not have a democratic political culture.

Italy is an example of late state formation carried out by a secularized elite of nation builders that was weak and isolated with respect to the twofold opposition of the Catholic and socialist movements. These movements created strong antistate subcultures, thus contributing to the democratic breakdown in 1922. Here, too, there is a general lesson to be learned: The historic legacy of an element of weakness—strong antistate subcultures—can become a resource once the political and institutional framework and the international context have changed. In postwar Italy, it was the networks of these two subcultures—the unions, cooperatives, voluntary associations, religious groups, and local savings banks—that provided the organizational basis of the civic community of Northern Italy as described by Putnam.

Two Necessary Components of Political Culture

The question about the relationship between political culture and democracy has been answered in many ways over the past few decades and has opened up various research perspectives. Three different research strategies, among the most influential and well-known, have been presented in detail. Of the three, the paradigm of comparative survey research into political culture orientations adopts methods and techniques that differ greatly from those used by Rokkan in his theory about the conditions and processes that led to the birth of democracy in Western Europe. There are four main differences:

1. With each new wave, the World Values Survey has tended to enlarge the number of countries covered by the representative sample surveys, without, however, taking into account the growing variance in the level of economic development, the literacy of the population, and the duration of the democratic regime. By contrast, Rokkan focused on a more limited area that is relatively homogeneous in terms of historical, cultural, political, and economic development.

2. The first paradigm seeks to explain the differences in opinions, beliefs, and values by resorting to multivariate models capable of producing high correlation coefficients. The second pieces together the complex, centuries-old web of social, political, economic, and cultural processes with typologies that can explain the individual national versions of European democracy.

3. The first paradigm alternates between individual- and state-level analyses. The second is interested in detecting the existence of specific territorial cultures within states, interpreting them as aspects of a peculiar path of state formation and national building.

4. The first paradigm recognizes the two-way relation between political culture and the effectiveness of democracy. However, the rising number of countries considered under a synchronic perspective tends to privilege the spread of civic and self-expression values as the causal factor that makes democracy work, according to a bottom-up schema. The second paradigm tends instead to emphasize a top-down schema, analyzing the different nation-building capacities of state institutions—that is, their ability to define political culture.

On all four points, the work of Putnam and his colleagues lies in an intermediate position, resorting as it does to a comparative approach limited to a homogeneous area, stressing the historical roots of the differences between the cases considered and recognizing virtuous or vicious circles between effective institutions and civic community.

Almost paradoxically, the two most distant paradigms yield analogous results. The countries that the series of World Values Surveys have shown to be characterized by the greatest democratic effectiveness and a more self-expression-oriented political culture include the European countries that, on the basis of Rokkan’s analysis, were the first to achieve a stable democracy, having concluded the
state formation and nation-building phases prior to the French Revolution. These are the two oldest and most powerful Protestant monarchies of Northern Europe (England and Sweden), and the consociational democracies are situated at the source and the estuary of the Rhine in Switzerland and the Netherlands, respectively. More generally, the West European nations reveal a greater presence of postmaterialist values and more democratic effectiveness than the East European countries. Rokkan’s schema, which in the 1970s aimed to explain the historical process of democratization in Europe, is therefore a good predictor of the results obtained by Inglehart and Welzel in sample surveys conducted over the past 2 decades to measure the current content of political culture and recent changes. This convergence of results suggests that the two research strategies, though they differ greatly, are not alternatives but are supplementary with regard to the characteristics required of a political culture in terms of democratic effectiveness. There is a continuity between early and successful state formation and nation building and the rise of postmaterialist and self-expression values.

Such a convergence is by no means obvious, because the process of nation building involves the spread of altruistic values and the subordination of individual interests to those of the community—which runs counter to the emphasis placed by postmaterialist values on the primacy of individual liberty and self-expression.

Analytically, the opposition between the cultural outcomes of successful nation building and the syndrome of self-expression values becomes evident if one bears in mind the process that led to the expansion of citizenship rights, as charted by Thomas Marshall. According to a cumulative schema, citizens’ rights first saw the light of day in the 18th century with the establishment of the rule of law, whereby the civil rights of all citizens were recognized and guaranteed by impartial courts. The following century saw the development of political rights, quintessentially symbolized by the increasing role of independent parliaments. The 20th century was marked by the introduction of a new family of rights: social rights, with the establishment of compulsory education, public health, and so on.

This threefold typology corresponds, significantly but partially, to the four stages of political development defined by Rokkan, as shown in Table 1.

The succession of the three types of rights corresponds to three of Rokkan’s four phases, with the lower row corresponding to the institutional structure of Western European democracies after World War II: a generous welfare state that guarantees social rights and satisfies the material and security needs of its citizens. There is an empty box alongside the nation-building phase, for which there is no corresponding family of rights. In fact, nation building does not presuppose the recognition of citizenship rights. On the contrary, individuals have duties and obligations toward the nation. There is, then, a shift from the preeminence of individuals to that of the community as a whole. The establishment of individual rights is a fundamental feature of European political identity. The concept of the nation relates not so much to an individualistic as to a holistic perspective, according to which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, as is well expressed by the value of fraternité (fraternity) in the motto of the French Revolution.

The United States does not lend itself to comparison with Western Europe. But even in the case of American political culture, scholars have found a similar equilibrium between opposing values: individual freedom on the one hand and communitarian bonds, loyalty, and commitment to institutions on the other. As Robert Bellah has observed, Americans consider individualism to be the preeminent and distinguishing value of their culture. However, this individualism is counterbalanced by

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two opposing moral orientations: civic republican-
ism and the Biblical tradition. Both value sets
relate to the holistic nature of the community—
respect for the dignity of all human beings and an
invocation of the moral goals that guided the
Founding Fathers, which place on each citizen
responsibility for the common good.

In both Western Europe and the United States,
freedom and individual rights are accompanied by
solidarity values and subordination to the common
good. A political culture in which just one of these
components prevails becomes a risk for democratic
stability. An effective democracy needs a political
culture with a balance between postmaterialist val-
ues, which stress the participation, tolerance, and
self-expression of individuals, and the values of
successful nation building, such as loyalty toward
institutions, considered an effective means of guar-
anteeing the safety and well-being of citizens.

Participant postmaterialist citizens stimulate the
renewal of democracies and prompt them to find
effective institutional solutions to deal with new
forms of inequality relating to gender, ethnic ori-
gin, sexual orientation, and so on. However, these
value orientations are associated with the privi-
leged sectors of society, especially educated young
people. Seymour Lipset and Jason Lakin have
recently observed that an excessive number of par-
ticipant citizens create the risk of provoking a
dangerous overload of political demands, thereby
generating zero-sum conflicts. By contrast, schol-
ars such as Robert Putnam, Theda Skocpol, and
Russell Dalton have stressed the decline of civic
engagement in Western democracies, even in
younger cohorts.

Democracies have to find a way to adapt to the
new attitudes and behavior of Western citizens,
who are more critical and less confident than
before. Democracies owe their legitimacy to their
ability to simultaneously guarantee both the self-
fulfilment needs of the more educated, secularized,
and postmaterialist sectors of society and the
safety and physical needs of the majority of citi-
zens, who share the more traditional and material-
ist values and are unwilling to engage in stronger
forms of political commitment.

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See also Democratization; Nation Building; Path
Dependence; Pillarization; Political Socialization;
Public Opinion; Social Capital; State Formation;
Survey Research; Values

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Political Economy

Political economy can be understood in numerous
ways, depending on the discipline of study. Economists and, more recently, some political sci-
entists define political economy as the study of politics
using economics. Yet within political science, it is
more commonly understood as the study of the relationship between states and markets. The two approaches are not conflicting but can be quite dissimilar. Here, political economy is understood as the study of the interdependency of economics and politics, as this is the approach used by the majority of political scientists. This entry emphasizes the interdependency of politics and economics and its impact on several aspects of political performance.

How economics and politics determine each other has been a driving question in political economy for centuries. According to John Roemer, Adam Smith was well aware of the mutual interdependency of economics and politics. In *The Wealth of Nations*, he discusses how politically determined tax mixes (a range of sources of income, with a mix of part-time jobs, self-employment, and full-time jobs) on wages and goods have diverse economic effects. The political causes of tax mixes, and of economic and social welfare policies, in general, are still at the heart of the study of political economy, especially as the provision of public services and goods has reached unprecedented levels. Scholars within the field of political economy study the impact of political competition on economic outcomes and in turn on how underlying economic conditions, such as income and skill distribution or the generosity of social insurance, affect political behavior and political competition.

Common questions raised within the field of political economy are as follows: Why do taxes, state pensions, or levels of public debt vary between countries? Do political parties deliver distinguishable economic policies? Under what conditions do politicians raise taxes? In turn, how do economic policies and the underlying economic relations affect preferences for redistribution and institutional change, such as electoral system reforms?

Theoretical models and empirical research have come a long way in answering these questions. However, controversies still exist, primarily due to the lack of extensive data outside the relatively small group of the rich Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. In the rest of this entry, major theoretical and empirical contributions in the field of political economy are reviewed. The first part looks at how the economy shapes policy preferences. The second part is an examination of how the institutional characteristics of polities (their electoral and party systems) aggregate preferences into political action. Third, distribution and redistribution as direct outcomes of political competition are described. Finally, in the last part, causation from economics to politics is reversed to explain the origins of electoral institutions on the grounds of underlying economic relations.

**Economic Preferences**

Voters’ or political parties’ policy preferences are the starting point of formal political economy models. Relying on the assumption of self-interested actors who wish to maximize the utility they get from consumption and leisure, political economists commonly assume that voters with higher incomes prefer less redistribution than citizens with lower incomes. Similarly, personal income endowments determine voters’ preferences over macroeconomic outcomes such as inflation and unemployment. Kenneth Scheve has shown that those who have more savings prefer lower inflation, even at the cost of higher unemployment, in contrast to those who do not have savings.

Thus, the distribution of income in a society is a determining factor of fiscal, monetary, and tax policies. For example, the Meltzer-Richard model predicts that in societies with high levels of income inequality, taxes and, thus, redistribution should be higher than in societies with low-income inequality. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels relied on similar assumptions since they believed that once workers were given the right to vote, dramatic redistribution would be achieved.

Yet reality is more complex than that. Among the economically developed countries, income inequality is highest in the United States and redistribution is among the lowest. Why is there not more pressure from voters to redistribute more? To start with, it is possible that some societies value economic equality more than other societies. Indeed, Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote show that there is a strong correlation between a nation’s belief that luck determines income and the levels of social spending as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP). In countries where people believe that the poor have been unlucky, social spending (and thus taxes) is higher. Thus, assuming that voters simply
want to maximize their utility from consumption is too simplistic.

Similarly simplistic is the assumption that one’s vote is solely driven by financial position. Often voters care about other issues than redistribution, such as abortion, the environment, the role of women in the economy, and so no. If this is the case, then one’s income does not determine one’s vote, and in fact, it is possible that redistribution is not placed highly on the policy agenda of competing political parties. Another complication is that in unequal societies, rich voters are likely to have more political influence on political parties than poorer voters. For example, it is established that voter turnout is higher among high-income earners than among low-income earners.

Things get even more complicated when we take into account the underlying economic relations in a polity. Production systems can shape economic preferences independently of the distribution of income. Not all holders of capital prefer low redistribution, and not all workers prefer more redistribution. Redistribution preferences, and particularly preferences for social protection, are rather formed by the type of economic production. The varieties of capitalism approaches have moved the discipline forward by showing that preference formation among economic actors and citizens is not universal across different economic systems. The type of the economy and, particularly, the mode of production in an economy largely determine policy preferences.

In economies where workers are required to invest in firm- or industry-specific skills, employers have incentives to lobby for higher social protection and thus side with the trade unions. In contrast, in economies where workers have general skills and employers do not invest in their training, employers tend to lobby for lower social protection than the trade unions. More generally, it has been shown that distinguishing between general and special skills helps explain variations in the levels and type of social protection. For example, Torben Iversen and David Soskice show that citizens who have specific skills favor more generous unemployment insurance than do those who have general skills, as the latter can more easily switch and find jobs.

To recap, the discipline has made tremendous progress in identifying the factors that shape voters’ preferences. Yet this is only the beginning of putting together all the constitutive parts of a political-economic model. One still needs to study the conditions under which political parties are responsive to the existing distribution of preferences.

Formal Models of Political Party Competition in Two-Party Systems

Do citizens’ economic preferences affect policy outcomes? According to a view of democracy where the majority rules, economic outcomes should reflect the will of the electoral majority. In other words, if the majority of voters demands lower taxes, politicians should deliver lower taxes. However, one cannot assume this straightforward association; a number of issues need to be clarified, and most important, the role of political parties must be considered. Assumptions about the nature of political parties, whether they represent particular economic classes, interest groups, or simply their own interests, need to be made. Moreover, other characteristics of the political party system are also critical: How many political parties compete for office? Is political competition centered only on the question of taxes? And how are votes translated into parliamentary seats? Without taking all these matters into account, one cannot reliably predict policy outcomes given a certain distribution of preferences within the electorate.

Formal models of political party competition are relatively recent. Erik Lindahl was the first to show that the supply of public goods is determined by the relative power of political parties in a polity where two political parties represent two classes of citizens with heterogeneous marginal utilities over a public good. In his seminal paper, he briefly mentions the possibility of partisan policy outcomes as power shifts from one political party to the other. Nonetheless, Lindahl’s work did not lead to further development of bargaining models on the distribution of public goods until much later.

Instead, the most well-known formal model in political science is the median voter theorem. The theorem, popularized by Anthony Downs in his Economic Theory of Democracy, predicts that when two parties compete on a single policy dimension, they will both converge to the median voter’s most ideal policy point. If the policy under question is the level of income tax rate, then both parties will propose the tax rate that is preferred by the median
voter. The result is easily explained: Parties are office seeking (which means that they are primarily driven by their objective to win office rather than by their ideology) and thus adopt whichever policy will win them the majority of votes. When voters’ preferences are normally distributed, the only reasonable position for parties to move to is the median.

The median voter theorem initiated a new era of research in political economy. For example, the Meltzer-Richard model of redistribution and theories of electoral business cycles rely on the median voter theorem. In practice, however, parties tend to diverge in their policy choices rather than converge. To start with, it is rare that parties will propose similar tax rates at elections. If anything, when elections are contested primarily on economic issues, social-democratic parties propose higher taxes for the delivery of better public services, while parties on the right propose lower taxes and smaller governments. Similarly, public opinion research testifies that voters identify with parties on the grounds of personal characteristics, such as their socioeconomic status, religion, and so on. For example, those with savings who prefer lower inflation tend to self-identify with right-wing parties, while those who prioritize employment over low inflation tend to identify with left-wing parties.

Donald Wittman proposed a model of party competition where parties are solely policy seeking: They compete on the premise of distinguishable policies. His model then predicts that parties will diverge in their policies as long as there is some level of uncertainty as to who the winner in the next election will be. While Wittman assumes that parties are exogenous (i.e., they are not the agents of citizens), his model has been the main alternative to the median voter theorem. Empirically, the literature has found evidence of partisan policy outcomes, for example, with respect to inflation and social spending, but these findings remain contested. It has been shown that policies are often conditioned by other economic and political institutions as well as by the underlying economic conditions, both domestically and abroad.

**Formal Models of Political Party Competition in Multiparty Systems**

While the median and partisan models of two-party competition discussed above have made the largest impact in the discipline with respect to party competition, the majority of democracies are multiparty systems. This means that the two most well-known models of political competition are not suitable for the analysis of party competition in the majority of cases. More recently, new models of political party competition have been developed to include three political parties competing at elections. For example, David Austin-Smith and Jeffrey Banks developed a model where three office-seeking parties compete and coalition governments are formed after elections. Their model predicts that parties take divergent policy positions to attract votes, and as a result, governments consisting of a large and a small party deliver partisan policies. Another notable example is David Baron’s model of electoral competition of three policy-seeking parties. Baron’s model is a two-stage model: In the first stage, parties compete at elections, and in the second, postelectoral stage, they bargain over policy. The coalition governments that form as a result of this two-stage process deliver ideologically partisan policies.

Postelectoral bargaining in parliamentary democracies is of critical significance in policy outcomes in multiparty governments. Given that the majority of parliamentary countries do not form single-party governments, postelectoral bargaining delivers to a great extent the government’s future policy program. Models of government formation are prominent in the field of political economy. Not only do they address the important theoretical and empirical question of which government we should expect to form after elections have failed to provide a clear winner, they also provide predictions on the policy outcomes that one should expect in a given government, as the Austin-Smith and Banks and Baron models illustrate.

One of the most well-known models of government formation in multiparty systems is the Laver-Shelpse model, based on the concept of the core within the tradition of cooperative game theory. The Laver-Shelpse model predicts that policies will reflect the policy preferences of the ministers who hold the specific ministerial departments and who represent the median voter’s preference in that specific dimension. In other words, if the policy space is multidimensional, the party that represents the median voter in each dimension will control the relevant ministry; thus, policy will be located at the multidimensional median.
The Laver-Shepsle model was a breakthrough in the study of parliamentary democracies as it offered a unified framework of analysis of government formation, duration, and policy implementation. Yet it has its limitations, both on the theoretical front (since it relies on the restrictive concept of the core, which can be found only in a three-party, two-dimensional space) and on the empirical front (since the model assumes that ministers and parties do not negotiate prior to or during the government’s life). Alternative models of government formation based on noncooperative game theory prove that when parties are policy and office seeking, different governments can form as a result of bargaining over policy and side payments. Yet they do not make any specific claims about the portfolio allocation process, like Laver and Shepsle do. As a result, most of our knowledge regarding portfolio allocation and its impact on policy comes from empirical studies conducted by scholars who study coalition governments.

The Electoral System: A Critical Intervening Factor Between Preferences and Policies

The electoral system is another intervening factor that significantly determines the distribution of political power and thus indirectly determines economic policies. The main direct effect of the electoral system on policy is via its effect on electoral competition at the district level. In single-member district plurality (SMDP) electoral systems, elections are won over marginal districts because parties do not have to worry about safe districts. This motivates parties to target voters and interest groups in these districts. In contrast, in proportional electoral systems where electoral districts are large and can be as few as one (e.g., in the Netherlands), political parties have incentives to target groups of voters instead of districts. As a result, in SMDP systems, there is less social spending but more public spending in the form of targeted goods, such as roads and hospitals.

The effects of electoral system on spending go beyond the district level. Since, as Maurice Duverger showed, the electoral system largely determines the number of parties in the political system, the electoral system has an indirect effect on policy preference aggregation via the number of parties elected in the parliament and in government. In more proportional electoral systems, more voices are represented in the government via multiparty governments as well as via strong parliamentary committees. G. Bingham Powell shows that the median voter is better represented in countries with proportional electoral systems, which have multiparty governments and give a voice to opposition parties in the parliament.

Another important empirical finding is that multiparty governments are larger governments (having higher public spending) simply because they represent more social groups than single-party governments. For this reason, some researchers have argued that multiparty governments are less economically efficient than single-party governments. In multiparty governments, every party has an incentive to spend on its own voters as much as it can since everyone draws from the same pool of money. Yet other researchers, such as Peter Katzenstein or Arend Lijphart, have argued that multiparty governments can more successfully undertake unpopular economic reforms because they can better achieve political and societal consensus.

The work briefly reviewed in the preceding paragraphs is certainly not exhaustive of the rich literature on the role of formal political and electoral institutions in the aggregation of interests and in policy outcomes. It is rather indicative of the complexity and interdependence of the processes that take place at the economic and political spheres. The following section of this entry focuses on how economic conditions affect the choice of formal political institutions.

Types of Economy and the Origins of Formal Political Institutions

One of the growing areas of research investigates the source of electoral institutions. Currently, it is believed that political parties, primarily of the right, chose the electoral institutions that would best ensure their continued power, based on their knowledge of the effects of electoral institutions on electoral behavior and government formation. The best known argument, made by Stein Rokkan and, more recently, by Carles Boix, purports that when the ruling right-wing parties were united and/or confronted with a weak opposition, they chose to keep the existing plurality electoral systems. This favored single-party governments. On the contrary, right-wing
parties that were afraid that they would be ousted out of power due to growing socialist dominance chose proportional representation (PR). Under PR systems, the Left would not be able to form strong majority single-party governments, and thus the Right would still have power in the political system. These arguments then suggest that the underlying social cleavages and political parties’ survival strategies determined the choice of electoral institutions.

More recently, alternative theories of the origins of electoral systems have been put forward. Here, we focus on a theoretical account that links the underlying production and labor relations with the origins of electoral systems. According to this account, advanced by Thomas Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice, the ruling right-wing parties acted as agents of the groups they represented, which were employers’ organizations. In economies where employers’ organizations had already established networks of cooperation and coordination with trade unions, the ruling right-wing parties chose PR electoral systems. The reason was that since PR systems encourage coalition governments and consensus building between the government and the opposition, both employers and trade unions would be guaranteed representation in the policy-making process. Only under a PR system could the existing cooperation between the holders of capital and workers be further fostered. Thus, in countries that had established coordinated forms of capitalism (corporatist systems), the ruling parties chose PR electoral systems. In contrast, where unions and employers did not cooperate, the ruling right-wing parties chose to retain the existing plurality electoral systems.

### Other and Future Research in Political Economy

The debate on the origins of formal political institutions is likely to continue in the future. In the meantime, other important questions still need to be addressed within the field of political economy. Questions of the democratic legitimacy of economic and political institutions that make up our contemporary expert democracies (such as central banks and various regulatory agencies) have not been addressed sufficiently. Does economic efficiency legitimize reducing democratic rights to vote on the economy? This question is becoming particularly relevant as economic globalization empowers transnational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund or the European Central Bank. Scholars of political economy will have to seriously study the role of such institutions in domestic politics as they are becoming relevant players and even “partners” in governments’ policy decisions in areas such as taxation and social welfare.

If the conduct of economic policy is changing thanks to economic globalization, do voters’ preferences and evaluations change as well, or do they remain strongly determined by their local and national realities? How do voters evaluate their leaders when they implement policies that have been “imposed” on them? Do we see a new cosmopolitan versus national cleavage in electoral politics? Such questions cannot be adequately answered until the role of international actors is integrated into the study of domestic economic decision making.

Scholars who work primarily within the field of international political economy have looked at how domestic politics affect foreign economic policy (e.g., Beth Simmons) or the international financial architecture (e.g., Barry Eichengreen). In addition, important work has been done by scholars who work in the intersection of international and comparative political economy, such as Bill Clark or Ronald Rogowski, who study how the global economy constrains national economic policy making. Unfortunately, there is no space here to present this important work. The challenge for political economy in the 21st century is to devise models that capture the tension between global economics and national politics and, particularly, the tension between global market forces and domestic political competition.

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*See also* Development, Political; International Political Economy; Mercantilism; Power and International Politics; Public Office, Rewards

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*Further Readings*

Political Integration

Political integration refers to the integration of components within political systems; the integration of political systems with economic, social, and other human systems; and the political processes by which social, economic, and political systems become integrated. The context in which the term political integration is used indicates which of these three dimensions of political integration is being referenced. A country may have a highly integrated political system and yet have little control over its economic, social, and regional systems. Dictatorships often have tightly controlled political elites but cannot dominate the economy and society. Regions made up of several countries engaged in political processes of creating common institutions for both security and trade are often poorly integrated as political systems. The Southern Common Market of four countries of Latin America (Mercado Común del Sur [Mercosur]: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, founded in 1991) is in the process of strengthening by electing a parliament and expanding membership, while the North American Free Trade Association of three countries (NAFTA; Canada, Mexico, and the United States, formed in 1993) is stagnating or weakening.

The core meaning of integration is connectedness. The theoretical context is systems and the integration of its components. Integration is a general characteristic of the relationships among the components of all systems: physical, living, and social.

Human systems have dynamic processes of becoming more or less integrated, and that happens not only through political processes but also through social and economic ones accompanied by patterns of stabilization and destabilization. More than 80% of human societies identified by archaeological research have disintegrated. Integration is part of discussions of the decline and fall of empires, states, and civilizations.

Connectedness of components refers to the strength of the relationships among the components, the inclusiveness of each of the component’s relationships, and the proportion of the properties of each component that is affected by those relationships. At one extreme are systems where a change in any characteristic of any component will change all characteristics of all other components with near certainty. An example is a finely tooled clock. At the other extreme are disconnected components where each component behaves independently of the others. This is a set of random elements. In the first case, the system is nearly “perfectly” integrated, and in the second case, there is a random collection of items, not a system. The integration of systems along these three dimensions can be assessed as a probability ranging from 0, or randomness, no relationships at all, to 1, a totally determined system.

A 20th-Century Concept

The idea of political integration is old, but its “modern” conceptual foundations were established in the 20th century. Before then, the concept of political integration referred to several kinds of strengthening political systems. Empire building...
through force from a center to the peripheries was a dominant form of political organization for around 8,000 years. Empires remain shadows of a past since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Versions of European states with “parliaments” and “bureaucracies” pervade the world, using threats, rewards, communications, and nationalism to enhance their control. Federations are as old as our knowledge about political entities attempting to expand beyond assemblies of families, clans, and villages. They persist into the 21st century, if only in a symbolic form of sharing authority between localities and a central government. Some of the most influential countries of this century are federations—Russia, Australia, Canada, the United States, and so on, the United States being among the oldest.

The concept of political systems had taken over from that of states as the defining subject matter of modern political science by the 1950s. The idea of political integration referred to cities, countries, transnational regions, and “security” communities, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Political systems were more general than states, and most social systems had political systems—families, schools, universities, churches—that were marked by identifiable hierarchies that could make binding, authoritative-collective, decisions. The concept of a political system raised the question of the level and the dynamics of its integration. This shift to general theories of political systems was set back in the 1970s by efforts “to bring the state back in” political science rather than seeing the state as one kind of a variety of political systems.

Hierarchical Systems and Democracy

Political integration is theoretically challenging because political systems are hierarchical and can never be highly integrated systems as though they were finely tooled machines or highly cohesive societies. All hierarchical systems cut and direct relations with the structural principle of subordination and superordination, at the minimum the rulers (fewer) and the ruled (more), attenuating information through vertical flows and controls through intermediaries. The component at the top of the hierarchy has access to all other components through intermediaries, while those at the bottom have only one or two connections, just a level above them. The challenge is democracy, in which information and control should be nonhierarchical but in which reliance on administrative hierarchies to pursue democratic decisions effectively is also required. The democratic aspiration of “self-governing societies,” “participatory democracy,” and elections of governmental officials have not successfully addressed the issues of complexity and efficiencies of scale necessary for the responsiveness of institutions of governance to democratic political participation.

Political, Economic, and Social Integration

Since the 16th century, the conceptual distinction between the society, the polity, and the economy has advanced to near permanence in the social sciences. This tripartite separation of political systems of countries is the definition of the liberal or liberal-democratic state, distinguished from totalitarian states with their asserted monolithic control of all individual and groups and from socialist states with government ownership and control of the economy but not the society.

Social integration is the oldest of the modern concepts of integration attributed to the “father” of modern sociology, Émile Durkheim (1858–1917). He distinguished between two basic types of social integration: mechanical and organic solidarity. The first is based on similarities in outlook, belief, and characteristics, exemplified by feudal, peasant societies. The second derives from a modern society with division of labor and “functional interdependence” among groups, classes, and individuals. In both cases, social integration is social cohesion. The relationships among the components of a society in which each is dependent on others in ways that become more complex constitute social development.

Economic integration, like political integration, does not appear in writings on economics until the 1950s. Unlike political and social integration, it has a clear operational meaning in that it is defined as the absence of barriers, primarily political, to exchange and trade and is tantamount to the world becoming a single economic system with an unencumbered open market.

The term political integration is not found in writings on nationalism or state formation until the middle of the 1950s. Nationalism was, however,
one of the major forces for political integration in the 150 years or so before the end of World War II, after which it spread throughout the processes of decolonization in Africa and Asia. It was also a strong force for disintegration under the principle of “self-determination of peoples” directed against the polyethnic empires, the Soviet Union being the last of the large ones. The idea of political integration was that it would be the dominant process for creating larger, perhaps more viable, effective, and, indeed, more peaceful political entities out of thousands of localities and feuding language and ethnic. States would emerge through persuasion rather than conquest, which defined empires that provided peace and prosperity in the past.

Political integration confronts more complex phenomena than either social cohesion or open economic systems. Political systems are defined by a string of several characteristics, at least one of which must be present—the principle of superordination and subordination—in a modern context: hierarchy with authority. For theoretical reasons, additional characteristics may include legitimacy, collective decision capacity, and rules of withdrawal. Nevertheless, political systems must have hierarchy, and hierarchies have limits to their degree of integration by the very presence of intermediaries. As political systems expand or are involved in social and economic changes, their level of integration decreases. In addition, as the economy and society become more integrated and more responsive to each other, the political system will lose its relative control over them. That is, the appeal of the short-term maxim for political leaders to “divide and rule.” Changes as well as social and economic integration diminish the core logic of hierarchical control of a political system to select and pursue collective goals.

Political Development and the European Union

One of the two main projects of political science to promote political integration was the political development of the newly independent states to establish the post–World War II order of a decolonized world. Political development became the focus for inducing change to establish political systems in newly independent states that could command and control processes of economic and social development. Political integration was taken as one of the conditions of political development. The instruments of political integration were a common political culture, political institutions, and “modern” values. These instrumentalities were applied to authoritarian, military, as well as democratic systems. Nation building, however, took time and patterns of success were mixed, especially in parts of Africa and Asia. Political development lost its theoretical prominence in political science in the late 1960s as the tensions of the Cold War intensified. It might regain that position as a challenge conceived as the democratic political development of all political systems and not just of new democracies.

The second political integration project was European integration to create a common security zone both among European countries and between them and an ascendant, threatening Soviet Union. That project attracted a variety of theories about political integration, one of the better known of which was the spillover theory of learning cooperation from narrow sectors, such as steel production, that could expand to other areas and, eventually, to common political institutions. The European Union, although its trajectory of political integration may have peaked in the first decade of the 21st century, stands as one of the triumphs of political thinking and theory in changing the world. That knowledge is engaged in addressing the problems of global political integration.

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See also Democracy, Theories of; Development, Political; European Integration; Political Systems, Types; Regime (Comparative Politics)

Further Readings

Political Philosophy is the part of philosophy dealing with politics and government, that unstable mix of war and foedus (treaty), conflictual division, and authoritative union. As “philosophy,” it is part of the vita contemplativa, which is pure thinking; as “political,” it has to do with vita activa, which is action and praxis in a world that exists with its own rules and language games before any philosophical attempt is made to make that world the embodiment of a theory, as did Plato. Philosophy, like science, is about truth, whereas politics is about power or, in a more sophisticated view, the constrained use of social power that reintroduces truth into the possible constraints alongside rhetoric, persuasion, compromise, and negotiation. Vita activa may be viewed either as a part of the philosophical activity, the “theory of praxis,” until philosophy disappears only to be “realized” in politics, itself bound to wither away in a completely new age, as in Marx’s construction, or, more commonly, as a necessary topic of political philosophy (Michael Walzer, 2007). It has also been held that political philosophy is concerned with the core concepts that issue from both the human condition and the cultural models whose change is beyond the scope of conscious collective choices, whereas political theory, closer to vita activa, should deal with what is the object, at least partially, of choice and willful collective action. In any case, the “real talk” in politics is far away from the “ideal speech” in philosophy as well as from the “crucial experiment” in science; it is endless and never stops (Walzer, 2007) and, in fact, even concludes with an “evaluation,” unless a stronger power, whether it is a dictator, a majority, or the “judgment of history,” decides to put an end to it for a time. After defining the field, this entry examines how political philosophy got its autonomy and its professionalization and then describes its epistemological background. Finally, this entry deals with the challenges to an universalist political philosophy represented by the claims of identities and the slow emergence of non-Western political philosophies.

The Domains of Political Philosophy

However important the tensions between the respective requirements of vita contemplativa and vita activa, political philosophy is now thriving in political science as “thought,” “theory,” or “philosophy.” Textbooks, collections, encyclopedias, treatises, and essays about political philosophy flourish, suggesting a need for connecting the knowledge gained through political science to a concern for a better life and human emancipation. This work suggests, too, that political scientists were definitely convinced that the scientific study of politics is far from providing a sufficient and adequate knowledge of politics and that critical theorists, and especially Jürgen Habermas, had been right at least in stating that a mere cognitive interest in objective “facts” divorced from any concern for a better life and human emancipation produced a deeply flawed “science.” Political philosophies, which are historically variable, share in the common endeavor to elaborate, make explicit, and assess the taken-for-granted conceptions of an age, with political philosophy being viewed by Michael Oakeshott as an “abridgment of a tradition.” The historicists hold that philosophies are never above the political battles but are part and parcel of them. Admittedly, such a view, albeit dominant, gives rise to many debates, even among historians. It may also be claimed that a philosopher can and must reject historicism, escape from the confines of a historical context, and interpret all historical realities by taking as a starting point the rejection of violence and the liberty of each one within the confines of the satisfaction of all. The “good” is not to be considered as a social construction but as an objective reality, thus putting some rigorous order in the messy state of political opinions, however thoughtful (Leo Strauss, 1959; Eric Weil, 1971). In any case, philosophy, pertaining to episteme, is not the servant of the doxa of opinions, endowed with the status of objective
reality through the intensive use of scientific surveys, since its aim is to convince people that they can and must change their opinion, an arduous and sometimes very perilous task (Strauss, 1959). The combat of liberal political philosophy can be taken as an example, including Muslim philosophy’s criticism of the widely popular use of the most rigid interpretations of Islamic shariah in political, criminal, and family matters. Even the Straussian brand of Islamic philosophy goes through the same predicament (Charles Butterworth, 2002).

These are some, among many, troubling problems confronting contemporary political philosophy in its quest for the relations between the realm of well-grounded principles and the realms of actual institutions and behaviors. Political philosophy, like empirical political science, deals with what John Searle names “institutional reality.” Yet that does not mean that institutional reality depends on our linguistic fancies. It has, as Max Weber put it, a “cultural arbitrary nature,” but that means only that other political arrangements are possible and the current ones may become unreal, not that language is simply a way to take our beliefs, intentions, or desires and broadcast them aloud. Once the ontological categories are created by, and accepted in, the language, the reality they show becomes analogous to the noninstitutional reality, and the Fregean distinction between meaning and reference applies. That is why political philosophy cannot be the ideal construction of a well-meaning solitary philosopher.

Since the 1970s, political philosophy has been considered as the part of political theory that, being neither empirical nor formal (“positive”), is not scientific. Bhikhu Parekh (1968) sorts out its three domains: (1) political ontology (e.g., Aristotle’s polis, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s general will, and Oakeshott’s modes of experience), (2) political epistemology (political knowledge’s structure, instruments, and practical utility), and (3) political logic (argument, language, and principles of strategy). It is a valid mode of knowledge different from scientific knowledge yet not contradictory to it. It is not disputed that in certain cases it is even possible to derive “ought” from “is.” Political philosophy treats empirical data in a nonempirical way; it elicits their essential structure and puts them within a coherent framework. It is both a model of and a model for reality, the main goal of which is more logic than empiricism, so its premises and goals are first of all evaluative regardless of the standards of evaluation used. This raises the issue of justification when the idea of foundation, rational, or other, is missing. Admittedly, this view is not shared by those influenced by the neurosciences and neo-Darwinism, who hold that science does not need philosophy to promote normative and praxeological principles, nor by those to whom politics cannot be an object of science and thus does not need it. It is, however, still dominant despite the early assault of analytical philosophy. The hard version of analytical philosophy used to deem political philosophy meaningless: If philosophy is a second-order activity—that is, neither empirical nor evaluative but aiming exclusively at testing the logical coherence of the meaning of concepts and statements—it ensues that political principles, precisely because they are evaluative—that is, neither true nor false—cannot be philosophically justified. Political philosophy must be confined to what Felix Oppenheim calls the “reconstruction” of concepts and must get rid of illogical assumptions such as the ideas that ethics has no relation to facts, that science has no relation to values, and that it is contradictory to claim that ethics involves both value judgments and scientific theory. Yet since John Rawls’s integration of a normative perspective in his analysis of justice, analytical philosophers have accepted political philosophers into their ranks, and conversely, empirical theorists are no longer declaring political philosophy “dead” for lack of empirical content, as was suggested in the 1950s by David Easton, Peter Laslett, and Robert Dahl.

Philosophy was long considered to be synonymous with true science. Likewise, political philosophy was the fount of theoretical political knowledge and thus of political science. In the ancient and medieval conception of “practical philosophy,” this knowledge was also practical since it aimed at the synthesis of philosophical principles and empirical observations, distinct from both the analysis of processes as “objects” and the abstract deduction more geometrico from first principles taken as the foundation of reality. Politics was considered basically as a process of government to be both empirically known and normatively assessed in order to improve through
education the rulers’ moral virtues and ability to perform their task and the contenders’ moral and technical bases to contest the incumbents’ positions. Political philosophy was then the performance of that endeavor, whether or not the members of a polity, be it a tribe, a city, a kingdom, or an empire, used the term politics or thought of its rules as a separate domain, distinct from religious or ethnic rules. By the same token, political philosophy need not have been named as such since the term philosophy points to the rational quest for wisdom and has to be ignored or demeaned in societies ruled by the belief in a natural order of things or a supreme knowledge submitting reason to the revelation of a god-given law. Political thought was never absent from the world of classical Islam, yet falsafa (Islamic thought founded on interpretations of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism) was always less developed and authoritative than sunna (the knowledge derived from the study of the Holy Koran), despite the great names of Averroes (Ibn Rushd) or Al-Farabi being associated with it. In the Catholic Church’s doctrine, philosophy was deemed “the servant of theology,” and though René Descartes in a very Aristotelian fashion put philosophy at the root of all kinds of knowledge, it was because it still appeared possible to marry a specific philosophy to Christian theology, despite Blaise Pascal’s admonitions against philosophies. Admittedly, a problem had to arise if religions were torn apart by religious (fitna in Islamic parlance) and not merely by economic, ethnic, and dynastic deadly conflicts, together with the symmetric problem of the relations between peoples of different religions that claim to be universal and aim for the conversion of nonbelievers to the religion reigning in a definite area. It was thus necessary to coexist and haggle with the “significant others” since they could not (and for certain theologians, such as the Italian Jesuits in China, should not) be converted right away. In those cases, a philosophy of some sort, as well as a corpus of laws (the Roman jus gentium), was needed to justify different practices, from war to peaceful cooperation, on a basis sounder than the mere empirical fact that, until the final conversion of the whole world to the true faith, a political compromise had to be passed between empires even though they were waging war on one another. Usually, such a philosophy took the form of some natural law common to different religions, a view still largely held today, when “religions” are complemented or replaced by “cultures” and “civilizations.”

Contemporary Political Philosophy and Its Professionalization

The fundamental change occurred as the outcome of two processes: the autonomization of political reason, contemporary to the European religious wars, and the autonomization of philosophy, following the evolution of the concept of science.

In the realm of government, after the age of god-kings in large units came the age of an ontological vision, including the notion of a basic tension between the transcendental and mundane orders articulated by elites that carried models of a cultural order centered on the belief in the creation of the world according to some transcendental vision and command (Shmuel Eisenstadt, 1986). Hence, the “clerical” idea that the “sword,” albeit responsible for restructuring the political order, was accountable before a higher authority, be it God or divine law, represented by the “pen.” This model was slowly thrown down with the emergence of the sovereign state, which had to be justified and legitimated for its own sake. In Strauss’s curious and creative interpretation of Thomas Hobbes, nature and God went radically beyond the reach of Reason’s intelligence, and the only “natural law” (the “desire of liberty”—i.e., of survival) that makes the world of the “state of nature” unbearable by each one also makes the political world of “civil society” bearable by all. This led to the de jure separation of the legitimacy of an order given and revealed by a “comprehensive moral doctrine” (in Rawls’s parlance) and the legitimacy of a constructed artificial order founded on the necessity of peaceful coexistence between individuals and groups divided by an irrepressible mutual distrust and prone to resort to violence to avoid being unjustly subjugated by others. The safety of physical bodies came to be seen as more important than the salvation of souls. The move was spotted by Strauss in Niccolò Machiavelli’s work. Strauss thought that such a sea change justified political “ferociousness,” whereas Isaiah Berlin found it morally valid as a part of civic humanism. This marked the beginning of a trend
leading to the assertion that the two principles of legitimacy (religious and political) should be kept separated as a consequence of the necessary supremacy of the state’s sovereignty. In the political realm, the logic of sovereignty had to prevail, and the sovereign’s authority, according to Hobbes, was *jure divino* (divine law), whereas the clerks’ authority was only *jure civili* (civil law).

Be it the mark of the new age of “self-assertion,” breaking with any revealed theology or foundational philosophy, or, as it is still held by some, the permanence of a political theology masquerading under a new guise (Carl Schmitt, 1988), the original feature of the new ontology was not first secularization, since religion did not immediately lose its grip on public life to be replaced by an improbable, even to this day, “naked public space,” but the progressive appearance of a public sphere governed by the primacy of politics and a public morality within the limits of the political order. This does not mean that moral requirements disappeared altogether from the depths of society, since morality is a universal feature, although it is doubtful whether a substantive “thick” universal morality does exist, or that the sovereign governed by “reason of state” is devoid of any morality. Nor did morality depend on the sovereign’s self-interest since norms and values do not exist just for efficiency reasons.

For these reasons, the ontology of the axial age faded away in Western political spheres and only there. It is still more alive and deep-rooted than ever in Islamic modernity, where a host of self-styled revolutionary reformers maintain the subjection of politics to justice—that is, a God-given morality under which the individual cannot but be genuinely free since Islamic law and human nature are in perfect harmony, which requires a type of Islamic politics where the individual could be both free and governed. In the Western world, it did not wither away in the moral sphere, divine law being at times merely replaced by human rights, global justice, or biodiversity, all things supposed to be located above politics yet interacting with it and imposing duties on peoples and governments (which may induce the revival of the old and permanent temptation to devise a monist political theory similar to the Islamic one). When Baron de Montesquieu, later followed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Alexis de Tocqueville, diagnosed the emergence of a “new political science,” outlined in *L’Esprit des lois* (The Spirit of the Laws), he both rejected the direct criticism of political practice for moral reasons and advocated a morality not to be left to the decision of sentiments. He emphasized openly the need for a political philosophy that had been slowly developing and expanding since the 16th century, namely, the search for the relationship between power politics and moral character. Hence, the great divide, still very topical, between the “civil Enlightenment” of Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf, where political authority is based on its desacralization and on conventions binding physical bodies governed by the *conatus esse preservandi* (self-preservation), and the “metaphysical Enlightenment” of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Immanuel Kant, “resacralizing” the political realm by basing it not on theology but on a philosophy of the “kingdom of ends” (Ian Hunter, 2001). The first Enlightenment gives preeminence to the legal system and leaves ethics to the private sphere, which may pave the way for moral relativism since many legal rules disciplining practices need not be based on deep philosophical reasoning but only on historical conventions and political convenience, defining for a time what kind of behavior cannot be tolerated. The second Enlightenment expounds the necessary relation between the legal and moral systems, a point stressed today by the varieties of republicanism, which may lead to the determination of a single moral system as the universally best way, a subject of most of the controversies on the relationship between multiculturalism, universalism, and equality in liberal democracy. Therefore, political philosophy is today always more or less in tension with moral philosophy and more generally with different realms—esthetic, religious, economic, and so on.

With the appearance of a new conception of natural science and its later extension to the ideational, linguistic, material, and strategic interactions between human beings in specific physical, ecological, and economic contexts, philosophy acquired a new meaning.

Science has always been viewed as a cumulative way to reach the objective truth through formal argument and regulated observation made available to everyone (depending on the political contexts) rather than by revelation, persuasion, or rhetoric, but it was still conceived as a way to be
the mirror of reality, a “natural philosophy” confirming the order and beauty of a god-made world. Yet science was becoming divorced from this concern, and in the realm of politics it came to be seen as no longer paving the way for the discovery and prediction of what a “good polity” was and should be in every conceivable case. Admittedly, there are still attempts to solve Montesquieu’s problem by reducing philosophy to scientific psychology, as advocated by Dahl in the 1950s; to devise a theory of democracy by bringing empirical and formal theories closer; to use the social welfare function to determine the proper domain of a good government; to elicit the conditions making majority rule both logical and legitimate; and above all to explain why democracy is the only good regime today, a statement that for the moment lacks an indisputable scientific foundation, democracy being actually less valued than the security brought about by a real and effective state and the economic prosperity brought about by good institutions. However, several psychological studies have to admit that it is impossible to disentangle the logics of “appropriation” (avoiding the “gaffes”) and utility maximization, and it is necessary to rely on a “sense of fairness” close to Aristotle’s concept of justice, which can be observed through surveys but, given its variegated meanings in specific contexts, cannot be conceptualized without resorting to a philosophy taking into account the “public culture” of a given society (Rawls, 1971, 1993, 2001).

For that reason, most of these attempts are based on implicit or explicit philosophical foundations despite their use of empirical or formal (rational choice) scientific research. Several democratic empirical theories actually depend on grand narratives that treat history as a whole as the grand theories of big science treat the evolutionary nature of physical realities, and they do so by moralizing the events. It is because political science today has built-in democratic features—roughly, the “bottom” explains the “top,” the “micro” explains the “macro,” and the individual is a well-meaning and rational being—that it comes to hold that democracy is the best political regime and not because the “value-free” scientific research (a contested concept) has decisively proved that democracy is the one best way, which is merely confusing the causes and the consequences of the statement.

The reverse—a “neutral” position on the evaluation of democracy—seems closer to the facts because both the “strong program” of sociology of science and liberalism (as both an intellectual climate and a philosophy) hold that empirical political science can flourish only when there is a pluralism that does not treat democracy as the best way.

Besides, with the waning of general theories aiming at lawlike generalizations applicable to the whole society without leaving anything outside their explanatory system (organicism and holism—both of them still upheld in the natural sciences—and functionalism, systems analysis, and historicism), political science has come to be perceived as the systematic study of institutions and social mechanisms in a state of permanent disequilibrium and provisional equilibrium, viewed as a game’s stable outcome achieved through institutions grown by rational actors in a context not finalized by the market. The mechanisms and models are simplifications of reality, not because they are not observable in real life but because they are always embedded in a specific combination of other mechanisms. So, between the mere historical narrative and the nomological ambition, social science aims at the fine-grained analysis of a given society and regime through the use of abstract causal models that may be exported from a given context to another but cannot be considered as “laws” since, in real life, two mechanisms may logically coexist while being contrary to each other. For example, a state may have a formal commitment to democracy, yet it might exhibit authoritarian behaviors in its operation. Moreover, mechanisms are always “local,” that is, particular and limited by borders, and so causality is equally local and cannot be replicated but only adapted to fit empirical observations. Jon Elster’s two laws of pseudoscience—“everything is a little bit like everything else” and “everything is causally related to everything else”—are no longer taken seriously. Only functionalism still withstands the assault of analytical sociology, at least in so far as it is carefully “situated.”

This move toward a science of embedded and combined mechanisms has deprived political science of the claim, still maintained in certain departments of economics, of being able to forecast the future as a whole. But lest the science of politics become the art of entertainment and storytelling, it
had to revive the plea for political relevance, long ago taken for granted, then thriving in the 19th-century “noble science of politics” and later openly voiced as a reaction to behavioralism. Not that empirical science lacks a certain political relevance. For example, the elucidation of mechanisms and the findings of behavioral economics, by helping us better understand the causes and (often unintended) consequences of our actions, may lead to an assessment of the conditions of the possibility of political actions and then to an intelligent practical action. But unless those prescriptions are based on a comprehensive philosophical view of the world as a whole, they remain limited to specific and local cases.

So the revival of political philosophy was marked by “the return of grand theory” (Quentin Skinner, 1990). The main obstacle to philosophy as a rational endeavor was long erected by the natural sciences since, as Bernard Williams has noted, the pursuit of scientific truth alone leads to a disconnection between reason, on the one hand, and individual and collective goals, on the other. But if social sciences do not pursue that fantastic endeavor or pursue it in a more modest way, philosophy regains some ground. If the good polity made by good citizens, good institutions, and good rulers is to be from now on beyond the reach of empirical political science despite the valuable efforts made to work out new theories of government, both descriptive and prescriptive, it remains nevertheless a highly relevant endeavor and philosophy. At least in its practical and prudential form, it has to thrive again to restructure political space in order to annul for a moment political time by encompassing it in a worldview. So political philosophy has revived what was called with some contempt the “traditional theory,” combining perennial questions (What should man be for the political order to be livable? What should the political order be for man to live a “good life”?) and historical contexts (the diagnosis of a social disease, outline of a better future order, or reinsertion of politics into a wider order). Today, political philosophy figures in some introductory courses of political science as a part of the political theory canon identifying the main domains of scientific research of which it is a necessary input: order, democracy, community, equality, legitimacy, justice, and narrativity.

Political philosophy stays in some respect aloof from apocalyptic or revolutionary utterances since, contrary to the opinion of Max Weber, the different quests for a better world and an axiological rationality are not doomed to lead to a “war of gods.” Even though we have long and too well known that the collusion of ultimate values may lead to murderous, and unfortunately necessary and even “just,” wars (suffice it to recall the real stake of World War II), such a violent outcome is by no means fatal since such a collision is also a permanent feature of a pluralist and peaceful view of politics (Berlin, 1962), and it may be restricted and kept under control in a “cold war.” If it is true that several worlds are indeed conceivable and equally good, it is impossible to have the best of all of them, and political philosophy has to put up with this imperfect state of affairs without lapsing into the perspective of “the extreme case” through the subjection of politics to a “methodological exceptionalism” of some sort, where the “exception” (the crisis) is part of the “rule” (ordinary politics)—that is, a “warlike” framework from which all the other political states should be derived (Schmitt, 1972, 1988).

Philosophy can perform that task in two entirely different ways that have long been the watershed of the discipline. The first one, from Plato to Karl Marx, Friedrich von Hayek, and Robert Nozick, considers politics as something awkward, superficial, and empty since, like the state itself, it cannot be reduced by an iconography of order. Therefore, the genuine reality must be located elsewhere, in “society,” biology, religion, law, economy, philosophy, and so on. Politics is then a social misformation that should, and could, disappear some day from this world. The alternative, dating back to Aristotle, is to view politics with all its “patterned disorder” as a constitutive dimension of the human condition (Walzer, 2007), the frontiers and values of which may widely vary and be expanded or displaced, as evidenced today by the various feminist political philosophies insisting, for instance, on completing “justice” by replacing it with “care” as the foundation of a fair political community. This entails substantial changes in the assessment of past political philosophies and political science itself. A third way has recently appeared, stating that we are currently witnessing the transformation of the idea of political community
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inherited from European history and its Wesphalian turn, which may lead to a revival of cosmopolitics, with notions worked out by empirical as well as philosophical theories such as global citizenship, global civil society, transnational governance, world government, global state, and world-state, reminiscent of Dante’s universal “Empire” expounded in Monarchia and Alexandre Kojève’s comparable concept of a universal homogeneous state. Although the idea of a world-state is sometimes rejected by cosmopolitans and has been strongly criticized by Walzer as a dystopian top-down tyranny (the opposite of the Kantian advocacy of a league of small republics), those ideas are alive since many of them stem from the contention that politics should not be viewed as the taming of the social war and the containment of violent conflicts opposing virtual enemies. Rather, striving to address problems such as climate change and poverty by addressing the factors generating them is the only proper task of politics since politics is first of all about the production of public goods and the implementation of global justice. Although the last position is strongly denied by those holding that social justice can only be conceptualized within domestic politics—that is, the state—globalism requires other virtues such as the Kantian duty to assist those who need it the most. The same problem surfaces when one moves from social to economic justice, raised, among others, by “the more Rawlsian than Rawls,” such as Thomas Pogge. Actually, the plausibility of such a turn does not depend on philosophical arguments but on the psycho-sociological consequences of those global changes: If, as it seems almost certain, they entail a vastly unequal distribution of costs and benefits among different areas, then the “common enemy” will not unite humankind but will turn certain frustrated human groups against others and philosophy shall be back to square one.

This leads at times to the fading of the Hobbesian divide. On the one hand, the realist theory of international relations holds that, whatever the preferences of reason, conflict is the order itself and, accordingly, virtual wars are always possible in a metaphoric state of nature, which does not mean that realism is averse to international law and morality. So war may be legitimized by self-defense against aggression, which keeps alive the issue of the moral legitimacy of war, a very ancient concern of Christian, Muslim, Indian, Buddhist, and Chinese political thought, especially in the thorny issues of the preventive use of force and armed humanitarian interventions without the mandate of the United Nations. On the other hand, the liberal philosophy of domestic relations, where war is banished, civility within conflict should reign, and conflict, albeit a necessary component of a vibrant polity, has its magnitude and severity limited by the requirements of order, may question the necessity of a sovereign to reach that goal, one of the most pressing issues of contemporary political science and philosophy since it encompasses all the claims to the obsolescence of the Hobbesian divide. Rawls has attempted to take into account the resilience of the Hobbesian divide by devising another “veil of ignorance” applicable to the construction of justice in the “international community” while getting rid of the concept of (an implicitly “sovereign”) “state” (replaced by “people”) (Rawls, 1999).

Whatever the life chances of those opposing viewpoints, the professionalization of political philosophy, different according to each historical context, should not be construed as making irrelevant other forms of political reflections derived from religious beliefs and above all from works of art, such as Homer’s epic poetry, Greek tragedy, Shakespeare’s plays, or, closer to our times, the works of Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Robert Musil, George Orwell, or Alexandr Solzhenitsyn. It may even be claimed that political philosophy and any form of political thought have a “literary dimension,” with Martha Nussbaum stressing that the texts always express the linkage between what is said and how it is said and Stanley Cavell viewing autobiography as intrinsic to all interesting philosophical writing. Of course, philosophy remains bound to seek self-understanding and the understanding of human culture by using logical reasoning instead of an edifying narrative. Yet it remains possible that in such a sense it may miss something vital in politics if it is a knowledge not born of pain and passion since those passions and emotions cannot be tamed by pure reason or even instrumental rationality, so reason cannot rule unfettered in the human world. As Williams noticed, philosophy’s shortcoming may be having kept the traces, dating back to the 5th century BCE and earlier, of an Epicurean conscience not yet superseded by Plato’s...
and Aristotle’s endeavors to make our relation to the world fully intelligible.

Although a significant part of contemporary political philosophy appears dedicated to keeping political tragedy at bay, a sense of tragedy lingers, due to the Senecan conflict between the individual will to excel in the practice of self-domination and the political and institutional conventions of the city and also to a conflict involving the meaning and foundation of different values within the same set of conventions. In this respect, the warnings of green political theory are, sometimes unwittingly, not devoid of a tragic character, and, especially but not only in international relations, the practical tensions between restorative justice (righting the wrongs of the past) and peace (ensuring harmony in the present) are more complex than several philosophers seem to think. An idealist and heroic effort to deny any place to tragedy lies at the heart of many contemporary philosophies of democracy: such as economic, deliberative, judicialized, communication based and Kantian republican, educative, without enemies, strong, and cosmopolitan.

Most of them (the economic theories being the obvious exception) extol the virtues of rational and peaceful dialogue as a necessary and sometimes sufficient condition not only of philosophical practice but also of real-world democratic politics, forgetting too often that an ideal dialogue leading to consensus is only one of the many features of a complex process that brings about interaction, understanding, and mutual agreement through a host of creative proceedings, majority decisions, negotiation, compromise, lawmaking, jurisprudence, economic innovation, and so on (Walzer, 2007). Likewise, the opposite concept, the will of the majority, does not exist as a plain empirical fact, and Dahl’s concept of polyarchy is closer to facts, although it leaves out the issue of the necessary decision stressed by Weber. It may even be dangerous if taken as the dogma of the will of the people. The people as a plurality (the Aristotelian multitude) has no unified will except the universal (and universalist) banality that every human being wants to live in the tranquillitas ordinis (tranquility of order) of a just and safe society protected against “outsiders,” which leads more to interpretive divisions than to political consensus, as evidenced in collapsing states where different peoples want to make up a people without agreeing on its identity, one of the main issues of secession and self-determination. Yet a majority is neither useless nor devoid of validity. It, along with deliberation, is one of the many practical devices invented to reach an acceptable decision. Both of them need prior conditions to function smoothly.

A Tentative Normative Epistemology of Contemporary Political Philosophy

That leads one to venture out into a bit of normative epistemology. First, like historical sociology, political philosophy must eschew both the illusion of “historical inevitability” (the present is already written in the past) and the “fallacy of discontinuity” (the present is radically new yet bound to happen).

Second, although philosophy resembles science in so far as it has to rely on argument without claiming any longer to be the mirror of nature, the validity of political philosophy’s discoveries should be viewed as different from scientific discoveries. Because philosophical “truths” cannot claim the monopoly held by vindicated scientific theories (at least provisionally until they are falsified by a new scientific discovery), they do have the same status as scientific ones. Political philosophy seeks a balance, depending on practical contexts, between values, for instance, “negative” and “positive” liberty or the “politics of faith” and the “politics of skepticism.” Far from being a weakness, this is the enduring strength of contemporary political philosophy: not to edict a theory of everything and to accept as a truth the plurality of reality and so the reasonable pluralism of different philosophies, by nature partial and incomplete, without falling into the relativism of mere opinions. As Williams says about Berlin, being “truthful” is perhaps the only way to be true.

Third, political philosophy should stay away from both sociological and philosophical reductionisms (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 1983). Sociological reductionism makes philosophical statements and their reception a secondary effect of social determinations; therefore, they need not be studied in themselves but can be explained away as prescientific. Yet sociology properly understood may account for the emergence of ideas and their context of discovery, but it does not
follow that the context of justification and justification itself can be disposed of by the same method. On the other hand, philosophical reductionism as a narrative drawing a stylized and idealized picture of politics is flawed, not so much because it may presuppose a human being “floating” above history and untied from any social relation but because it excludes from empirical reality everything that does not conform to its philosophical requisites. As Walzer (2007) puts it, “Habermas argues for unconstrained communication, but he means only to exclude the constraints of force and fraud, deference, fear, flattery and ignorance” (p. 26). Paradoxically, such a reductionism substitutes opinions and impressions for sound empirical knowledge. This does not by any means entail the banishment of utopia from political philosophy: Utopia is not the depiction of an actual perfect future but the present depiction of what shall never be. It is a “transcendental horizon” we should always keep in mind to help us stay alert when dealing with the actual political arrangements of today.

Last, political philosophers should be aware that they operate in different contexts and temporalities than political actors. Walzer (2007) suggests that perhaps philosophy is politics construed in tranquility, while politics is philosophy implemented in confusion. This does not mean that philosophers should ignore real politics or symmetrically agree to become politicians (or claim to be their masters). Quite the opposite—according to Walzer, they should be aware that their discourse has no value if they do not care for the details of the problems and situations they are commenting on, provided they refrain from playing the philosopher-king. For once, it is not the Devil who is in the details; it is humility and the absence of arrogance.

**Universalism, Localism, and the Challenge of Identities**

Contemporary political philosophy, constrained by the duty to be contemplative and reflexive, yet practical and prescriptive, is also facing the unavoidable challenge to say something universally valid at least “in reach,” in Rawls’s parlance, while being “municipal” and interpretative of the local conventions of an age or a civilization. Western philosophy with its various brands—contractarian, utilitarian, republican, even communitarian, or pragmatic and ironic—occupies most of the field, and most controversies take place within the general framework of political liberalism and democracy. Some important issues include the requirements of a moral life in liberalism, the nature of political obligation, the justification of economic liberalism, the logical consistency of a liberal social justice and democratic equality, the logical requisites of justice and equality, the possibility of a “civic liberalism,” the rules governing institutional design in a democratic context, the role of random selection (“sortition”) in resource allocation and more generally in the improvement of democratic processes in various domains, and, finally, the debates around the right normative framework for justifying democracy, whereby collective decision-making procedures should be justified in terms of their epistemic value—that is, their ability to produce the “right” solution for collective problems to achieve political equality, the fundamental standard of evaluation of procedures and outcomes being political equality. Two requisites are opposed: epistemic proceduralism versus a particular substantive theory of justice, the first one being conceived as escaping the accusation of ethnocentrism confining democracy in a predetermined set of standards.

One should mention here the powerful critiques of Alastair MacIntyre, a critic of analytical philosophy coming from its ranks, and the deconstructionist assaults of Michel Foucault. Foucault is more appreciated for his insistence on the microfoundations of power in the depths of modern society, disciplined and subjected to governmentality, than for his philosophical ideas on the status of truth and ethics. His statements on “a political history of truth” are ambiguous enough to go beyond a mere social history of science (and morality) to be suspected of unfettered relativism, which would render void his own statements. Actually, Foucault has an ethical sensitivity. He may be right in criticizing the definitive finding of substances such as transcendental truth and morality beyond the contingency of identities, but that does not exonerate him from the duty to search for the truth, without which any agreement should be considered an agreement about truth. As for Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Emmanuel Levinas (the latter being more included by others
in political philosophy than claiming to belong to the tribe), they oscillate between the deconstruction of liberal philosophy, a metapolitical philosophy, and a philosophy of metapolitics.

Therefore, the dominant Western philosophy remains the legatee of the diverse kinds of Enlightenment. One of the only noticeable exceptions is the antiliberalism represented by the Straussian pocket of resistance. Strauss, in his American period, had moved to an untimely liberalism and, albeit careful to distinguish between “ancient” and “modern” liberalisms, paid his respects to modern liberal education. The other two exceptions are the legacy of Joseph de Maistre, and Donoso-Cortès and Carl Schmitt and the conservative thought. The first one is almost outside the borders of “professional” political philosophy, and the second one may claim that being “conservative” it does not deign to be a philosophy. As for nationalism, flourishing under various guises, secular or religious, it must be taken seriously by a political philosophy not entranced by the charms of cosmopolitanism. There may be important arguments about the different types of nationalism or the liberal flavor of certain nationalisms and their compatibility with liberal values, but it cannot be the core of a political philosophy since a nationalist philosophy would be a contradiction in itself.

This apparent dominance of a philosophy born in areas that do not make up more than 15% of the world population and to which the fall of the Berlin Wall marks the beginning of an epochal change in political philosophy brings about its logical and sociological backlash, namely, its indictment of spurious universalism based on a local conception of what an individual is and what his or her concept of liberty, quest for justice, and, more broadly, rationality may mean. To be sure, this small part of the world had once dominated the entire world by founding huge overseas empires, the mere existence and success of which incited many intellectuals belonging to colonized peoples to desert the ranks of traditional thinkers and join the troop of “organic intellectuals,” espousing the basic tenets of the conquerors’ public philosophy to turn it against their imperial endeavor. But despite, or perhaps more accurately because of, the universal success of decolonization and its major theme, anticolonialism, the dual nature of the West, liberal inside and dictatorial outside, came to be seen not as a logically inconsistent yet sociologically explicable combination of two sets of contrary values but as a whole package of values. This gave rise to Occidentalism (the term was coined after Edward Said’s famous Orientalism to depict a distorted image of the real object)—all the more so as Marxism, which had long been a powerful tool to convince the colonized elites that they could stick to the Enlightenment while getting rid of its racist and colonialist side, had lost most of its appeal, hence the search for new public philosophies to pursue the unfinished struggle against Western intellectual hegemony and to gain a better understanding of what the subaltern needs and visions actually are.

Such an offhand yet plausible sociology should have nothing to do with a serious philosophical and scientific debate. Yet it is a powerful input that paves the way for new inquiries into the meaning of concepts in areas until now left out of Western philosophical concerns and confined to anthropological and ethnological researches not devoid of biases—hence, the renewed interest in, for example, civil society or freedom. Even more important is the surge of concern for “identities” that deeply modify the usual debates about justice by shifting them from redistribution to recognition. The quarrels over “positive discrimination” lie at the heart of the dilemma of the universal welfare state, trapped in the dual duty of providing services to all on an equal footing and promoting particular categories. They become bitterer when the relevant groups are characterized by their location in a social stratification not based on the division of labor and material reward but on ascriptive traits (religion, ethnicity, and even gender). This may lead to a justification based on a compensating rationality and restorative justice, sometimes curiously put forward to claim that groups whose identities have been excluded, suppressed, or marginalized have a right to the recognition and public toleration of their own intolerant practices. So a combination of cultural relativism and respect for the rights of cultural communities pretends, under the guise of empirical descriptions, to be the political philosophy of our age.

Still more debatable are the assaults against current political philosophy and, by implication, political science. Starting with the now (rightly or wrongly) taken-for-granted demise of sovereignty
as a sociological concept (which it has never been, being a legal concept) and of the “old” theory of the modern nation-state, caricatured as the superposition of one territory, one people, one sovereignty, one constitution, and one homogeneous political space relating directly the individual to the state, they deny most of the value of liberal and republican philosophy when applied to other areas than those where they were born. Parekh, after exposing the cultural particularity of liberal democracy and exacerbating the poverty of contemporary Indian political thought, has set himself the task of explaining why Western philosophy stands no chance of succeeding in countries where, for the historical reasons already mentioned above, political institutions of the past are reenacted as alive or revived. Thus, in these societies, according to Parekh (2003), the political imagination is less “disciplined” (a Foucauldian allusion), bolder, more reckless, and prone to explore a broader range of possibilities than in the West.

Parekh’s eulogy can be seen as nothing other than the reverse of the famous “Orientalist” descriptions (perhaps grounded in Hegelian philosophy) that considered non-Western peoples as alien peoples deprived of the values of modern civilization and thus unable to contribute to historical development. A thesis such as Parekh’s suffers from two basic flaws. It does not give us any idea about what such new philosophies might look like, once we have disposed of the Foucauldian fancy of a new “political spirituality,” to which he refers when interpreting the Iranian revolution. One can ask whether the idea of Islamic human rights betters the usual idea of universal human rights or which is the more creative and imaginative of the two conceptions of the relations between religion and politics and the modern role of Muslim legacy that mark the epistemological divide in Islamic political thought: the transcendence of justice as an intangible and eternal trait of the good society versus the historicity of reason. The first epistemology favors revolutionary conceptions of Islam based on ontological premises adverse to political freedom, whereas the second relies precisely on freedom to criticize the first one’s tenets.

In addition, Parekh neglects the necessary combination of universalism and particularism offered by Walzer’s (2007) concept of reiteration. Walzer begins with a distinction between two universalisms or rather two dimensions of universalism. In the covering law universalism, there is one and only one law, one justice, and one correct understanding of the good life, the good society, or the good regime. In the reiterative universalism, taking seriously what it means to have a history, every universalist principle is inevitably reiterated in a particular way in its historical existence; even the will to reproduce a principle and to replicate its application brings about some historical singularity. It ensues that the second universalism makes no prediction about the substance of the successive reiterations. Such a line of reasoning provides a solid basis for a moral universalism opposing the obligation to recognize and include groups whose morality is radically at odds with the requirements of a Rawlsian reasonable pluralism and thus freeing the state from its duty of indifference while recognizing at the same time that liberalism is not averse to, and even promotes, the rights of minority cultures. By the same token, political (nonmetaphysical) secularism can be judged as a universal value, provided that it is not restricted to a particular conception sometimes attributed to Western secularism and mainly conceived from a Protestant culture (a position held by Hobbes, Locke, and Voltaire but certainly not by Kant, Tocqueville, or Rawls) and that it does not rely on a rationalist conception of reason, ignoring its plurality and imposing unjustified limits on the manners in which issues are to be brought into the public domain (Rajeev Bhargava, 1998).

To be fair, let us recognize that Parekh’s position is not restricted to an excessive indictment of Western political theory when it ventures overseas. Not only does the empirical basis of Parekh’s theory seem quite defensible and supply a theoretical justification for its call to take into account the comprehensive moral doctrines and reconsider the foundations of an autonomous political philosophy, but it also offers some wise advice to do so. Philosophers must confront those doctrines, expose their logical flaws and their inadmissible moral and political implications, and found their own political theory on a reasonably convincing conception of man and the world. However, this is a very difficult task: If the philosopher is involved in politics, he or she cannot start a deep theoretical inquiry for lack of time. According to Parekh
(2003), if the philosopher wants to escape from *vita activa*, the intellectual liberty required by political theory is missing in societies dominated by the religious, ethnic, or ideological orthodoxies, and even in free societies such as India, the inhibition stems from the fear to question the dominant ideological consensus and so to encourage various forms of extremism. The point is very well taken, and Strauss would have been sensitive to those disenchanted reflections.

At least in countries that are “disciplined” by other means and where a relative freedom of opinion and expression still reigns, one could expect political science and political philosophy to eschew the strange dual efforts to (1) accommodate the idea of singular cultural outlooks, irreducible to one another, and the idea of a world community endowed with common values (short of reducing them to market economy rules) and (2) substantiate the idea that the static identities engendering territorial and cultural boundaries are nothing other than the outmoded legacies of nationalism and imperialism while holding at the same time the opposite idea that the cultural minorities and the borderless nations must be institutionally protected, which supposes that identities are somewhat static and worth perpetuating.

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**See also** Liberalism; Marxism; Normative Political Theory; Political Science, International Institutionalization; Political Theory

**Further Readings**


Political Psychology

The relationships between psychology and politics are complex and have generated both controversy and a substantial amount of research. This entry discusses these relationships, which have been the focus of research in the subfield of political psychology in recent decades. They include personality aspects, group and mass phenomena, emotional intelligence, and political symbolism.

In simplistic terms, sociology refers to collective behaviors and psychology to individual ones. Therefore, it might be expected that political researchers who adopt a collective or structural approach toward political relationships would be the most reluctant to acknowledge the relevance of political psychology, while those who support an individualistic approach would be more likely to recognize its usefulness or even to claim its necessity. But this has not occurred. Political psychology has met with much opposition from both sides. Why? After all, Alexis de Tocqueville, whose work is still highly valued by political scientists in both America and Europe, devoted significant attention to psychological considerations of the way in which political systems work. In the 1930s, Harold Lasswell creatively investigated the links between psychopathology and politics, particularly as regards the motivations behind political involvement.

For a long time, however, strong objections to political psychology prevailed as political science became more and more meticulous and rigorous in its methodological practices. Many works in political psychology were speculative essays without valuable data or detailed theoretical frameworks. In Europe, these weaknesses were most apparent in the macrolevel literature devoted to crowd psychology or the ethnic temper of particular nations. Among the concepts in this literature that have been rejected by political scientists are the notion of “collective unconscious” coined by Carl Jung, a psychoanalyst who competed with Sigmund Freud; the cliché of the irrational crowd moved by its “collective soul” put forward by Gustave Le Bon, who considered himself the founder of crowd psychology; the “herd mentality,” which was described as a human instinct by Wilfred Trotter; and the approximations of the psychology of various peoples and “national character” that so often appeared in works of the first half of the 20th century. All of these superficial considerations tended to cause confusion and suspicion over the use of psychology in politics. As for the psychology of individual actors, most sociologists have denied its relevance, arguing either that the real motivations of personal behaviors remain inaccessible to knowledge by scientific standards or that investigating these is pointless since social structures or the valorization of social roles (a set of expectations involved in an individual’s social status) are the major explanatory factors. Some of these arguments against the use of psychology have merit, but it must be added that a lack of information or a culture predisposed against the psychological field may also explain, at least partially, the refusal of political researchers to borrow frameworks from this discipline.

What is political psychology? It is not a genuine discipline in its own right, nor is it a branch of psychology because it shows no special interest in generalizing about human behavior beyond the political arena. Rather, it is an interdisciplinary academic field intended to provide insights into the way in which politics functions. In fact, each kind of collective behavior, each political event is an outcome of individual actions aggregated and interacting, as Max Weber strongly asserted. So it is not possible to avoid some theory about the cognitive and emotional processing of man in social life when thinking about politics. But if social structures emerge from personal behaviors, personalities are also socially shaped. Moreover, the macrosocial dimensions of politics strengthen the importance of institutional factors to the detriment of free will. This implies, as Erving Goffman has stated, that we need a psychology for sociologists, very different from that for psychologists and, in many respects, quite restricted. Nevertheless, it is useful and even necessary to avoid neglecting contributions and
concepts from the neurosciences, cognitive psychology, developmental or community psychology, and, maybe, psychoanalysis. But the relevance of each of these approaches depends on the nature of the fields perceived as psychosociological. And it just so happens that these are very different.

**Personality Psychology and Politics**

Personality is usually defined as an organized, dynamic but relatively enduring set of characteristics that affects how an individual responds in various situations. In the study of politics, a focus on this concept seems to make sense above all when a limited number of key persons are involved in a process of decision making. For example, it would be important to know whether political leaders are proactive or reactive, conciliatory or aggressive, open-minded or close-minded. But personality psychology strongly matters if, and only if, it is believed that the will of a few policymakers—and particularly that of the political leadership—can overcome the hurdles imposed on the policy-making process and successfully implement their will. This rarely occurs. In most cases, leaders are compelled to search for compromises, to face internal power struggles as well as demands from pressure groups, and to come to terms with the expectations imposed on them by their elite status. So they are obliged to curb their desires, and instead of expressing their genuine motivations (or following what drives them), they adopt behaviors strictly dictated by the power games at play. Thus, it is unsurprising that many sociologists see such psychological approaches as groundless. The real explanatory factors may be elsewhere.

This is all true, but three additional points must be taken into consideration. First, as Fred Greenstein noticed, it may happen that the competing forces of power are so well balanced and under such fluid circumstances that there is space for a key decision maker to make a genuinely free choice among policy options. In this case, psychological characteristics matter. Of course, this situation is much more infrequent in democratic regimes than in dictatorships. Furthermore, in either government structure, leaders are dependent to some degree on the will of their followers and the nature of the alliances they have forged. Second, even if free choice is highly restricted, the fact remains that personal psychology affects the style of governance adopted and particularly the way in which leaders appeal to citizens, supporters, and opponents. This has a great deal of influence on the course of political life. A charismatic style versus a sober tone or a bright versus a stoic appearance can make all the difference in the electoral process—as we saw in the competition between Silvio Berlusconi and Romano Prodi in Italy (2008) or among Barack Obama and several of his challengers in the United States primaries of the same year. Third, personality factors are relevant for leaders acting in situations where strong emotions are triggered, as Betty Glad claims, citing the case of Jimmy Carter handling the Iranian hostage crisis or Ronald Reagan’s inability to directly confront people he liked, which hindered his dealings with Menachem Begin at the time of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Investigating the effects of character on role performance is never pointless.

Throughout the 20th century, research in personal psychology dealt with the motivations of politicians and/or their followers. Since the 1950s, many biographical works have emphasized the idea that politicians are qualitatively different from other humans because, as Carol Barner-Barry noted, political behavior is strongly related to making choices between disputed alternatives, strongly oriented toward losing or winning, and often motivated by feelings of justice or fairness. So in these biographers’ minds, political involvement derives from special incentives. James Payne (and his associates) have uncovered five main political motivations: the quest for status or prestige, the need to work on concrete issues, the need to have conviviality and friendship, the fulfillment of moral obligations, and the pleasure of competing aggressively in political games. Their research shows how skeptical citizens ought to be about the assertions of politicians, who tend to idealize their motivations. But, even if Payne’s list is useful to later analysis, it is too short. Obviously, activists and politicians share other common emotional drives, such as the desire to overcome low self-esteem by public self-realization or to escape the monotony of life through stimulating social games, not just aggressive ones. In the last few decades, several authors also tried to build ideal types of personality. When applied to leaders, such classifications aim not only to make their behaviors more predictable to
observers but also to uncover the mechanisms by which they charm their followers (or threaten their opponents). Of course, the appeal of revolutionary ascetics or moral masochists differs from that of absolute narcissists or catchall seducers. Moreover, we may expect that revolutionary (and stressing) situations produce different types of leaders than do ordinary democratic times.

Other authors were interested in designing typologies of ordinary citizens. In this field, the most famous investigation was carried out by Theodor Adorno and a team of psychologists and psychoanalysts; their book *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950) later inspired much subsequent field research in political science. In their view, authoritarian personalities are characterized by traits that result from childhood experiences and become stabilized for life. Harsh and punitive parents produce adults whose personalities are defined by authoritarian submission, conventionalism, destructiveness, superstition and stereotypy, and fear of intraception (the ability to delve into one’s deep feelings and attitudes). They used this syndrome to help explain right-wing ideology, prefascism, and fascism. This thesis was widely criticized for methodological flaws, particularly blindness about the characteristics of left-wing authoritarian personalities. But the main objection here is the very use of the concept of personality. Adorno’s research implies that political opinions, choices, and behaviors are primarily the outcome of psychological factors since personality is perceived as the center at which such choices are made. It also tends to exaggerate the consistency of individual responses to the challenges of life. Individuals sometimes undergo sudden psychological changes in attitudes, related to changing circumstances such as fear of war, local unrest, or economic decline. For instance, in such trying circumstances, individuals may abandon cooperation strategies in favor of more competitive or defensive ones. In his classic monograph, *Personality and Assessment* (1968), Walter Mischel asserts that personal psychology searches for consistency in the wrong places (e.g., seeking stable responses in cross-situational behaviors). Because the individual’s behavior is highly dependent on situational cues, his or her consistency is found in stable patterns of the “if–then” variety—doing A when X but B when Y. So, for instance, similar aggressive personalities can differ dramatically in the types of situations in which they are agressed. So without dismissing some of the psychological insights put forward by Adorno or Milton Rokeach (author of the famous *The Open and Closed Mind*, 1960), it is better to see personality psychology as complementing rather than supplanting sociological approaches.

Today, there is a shift in political psychology toward other conceptualizations borrowed from behaviorist or cognitive psychology. Both underscore the role of external stimuli and their effects on personal behavior. Burrhus Skinner, a very influential behaviorist, has demonstrated that everyone develops habits of thinking and acting that are reinforced by their effectiveness in earlier situations. Cognitive processes involve adaptive selectivity. In the political field, this means, for instance, that the development of Adolf Hitler’s or Joseph Stalin’s personality was itself a process, strongly related to the course of their political rise and sharpening instrumental tendencies with every victorious step. Moreover, it can be said that the economical, cultural, and political circumstances of their days—a humiliating defeat in World War I for Germany, and civil war and the triumph of the one-party system in Russia—played a role in the later selection of these types of personalities as omnipotent leaders. These personality types fit well with the kinds of crises that their respective countries were confronting. Many political scientists may argue that the critical question is not “Which personality?” but “Under which circumstances did particular persons establish themselves as the leader of a country?” Though this argument underlines the importance of social and political considerations, it would be wrong to entirely dismiss the role of personal psychology because it has a significant impact in other ways.

**Interactionist Psychology and Groupthink**

Rather than focusing solely on factors shaping a person, political psychology must also take into
account interactions between thoughts and feelings that link individuals to each other in a given situation. Cognitive processes such as thinking and judging political events are not affected only by macrosocial influences. Of course, early socialization, economic and cultural status, and religious, ethnic, or political affiliations all shape the ways in which citizens make up their minds in a voting booth or engage in political activities. However, the inner circle—family, friends, highly respected figures—matters, too. And, in this circle, emotional relationships play a significant role. Feelings of confidence or mistrust, a tendency to judge others, the degree of empathy or ambivalence toward relatives, or a fear of annoying them—these kinds of relations can modify a specific behavior like choosing a candidate in an election. It is for this reason that when family or tribal links are strong, as is the case in rural areas or in many non-Western cultures, electoral processes are shaped by factors other than those in more individualistic cultures. Pressure from other members of the “tribe” may compel individuals to endorse particular opinions. In addition, the appearance of competitors may awaken emotional tensions resulting from relationships between parents and children, especially between fathers and sons. A great deal of research shows that these tensions in turn influence the reproduction process of inherited political attitudes.

The influence of these psychological interrelations at a microsocial level is most visible and most consequential for the course of political life when studying decision-making processes. With his theory of groupthink, Irving Janis describes how systematic errors result from psychological biases held by small groups of policymakers taking collective decisions in a very closed (and stressful) environment. The more a group is cohesive, due to its homogeneity of social background and ideology, the more its members value unanimity of thoughts, which in turn may override a realistic perception of facts and alternative interpretations of issues. The risk occurs when the situational context is highly provocative because of recent policy failures or very serious external threats, noticeably in the field of security. The debate can, in these cases, become overloaded with implicit (or sometimes explicit) emotion. Wrong decisions, Janis claims, result from self-censorship of ideas that deviate from the apparent group consensus—each of the members fearing being dubbed “disloyal” to the leader—and from channels that shield the group from disturbing information in order to prevent too much anxiety. To get rid of these biases, Janis advocates some kind of reorganization of the decision-making process, particularly by setting up several independent groups working on the same issue and by increasing the involvement of outside experts. So we can see that certain methods of political management are—or should be—responses to psychological challenges. Much subsequent research has tried to test Janis’s thesis in laboratory experiments or in the field. In a broad survey of post-Janis research, Robert Baron claims that groupthink is even more ubiquitous than Janis asserted. In particular, it occurs even if there are neither external threats nor much anxiety present. So in Baron’s opinion, such an approach must not be underestimated for explaining political mistakes and misunderstandings of the challenges to be resolved.

Interactionist psychology investigates phenomena such as the way in which political judgment is shaped among members of think tanks, associations, and parties. In political life, engagement means sharing values and goals with others within an organization and, above all, self-identification with those ideas. Politicians and grassroots activists claim an identity that supposedly summarizes what they think and what they are going to do. They call themselves either Republican or Democrat, right wing or left wing. Even within a party, they often claim an affiliation to one faction. This self-categorization or political identity puts big constraints on their actions: first on the kind of labels with which they can describe a situation and, second, on the set of issues they can take for consideration. The rank and file have to represent the positions traditionally taken by their organization in order to avoid accusations of disloyalty, prevent reproaches from their entourage, and avoid being marginalized—which may be painful. This pressure is stronger where organizations are well established and their members allegedly share mutual friendships, based on a past history of political struggles. Sometimes blind allegiance causes a process of real de-individuation: for example, a loss of self-awareness and personal
evaluation made about political events and leaders. In this regard, if the authoritarian management of a party mostly attracts persons who completely identify with the leader, this generates feedback reinforcing authoritarian management. A process of isolation and insulation from society may result, as many examples of extremist parties (right wing or left wing) demonstrate.

As for leaders, if they have space to undertake initiatives and formulate political judgments of their own, they can work in a more or less polarized world. If the outgroups they confront are particularly despised (which is the case when competition is high), positions issued by political leaders may be greatly—and negatively— influenced by their opponents’ stances. “What differentiates your program from your competitor’s?” is a common question leaders have to address. But the distinctions these individuals demonstrate from each other may not only be political. We may consider that, in democratic regimes, political action is as much affected by emotions as formal political allegiances. The degree to which one sees his or her opponents as friends or enemies or the degree to which one treats them with deep respect or equally deep disgust colors political life with a touch of psychology.

Mass Belief Systems in Electoral Processes
How do citizens make decisions in the voting booth? This classic question in political science draws much attention. Some researchers argue that votes are generally consistent with the beliefs and political frames with which the voter grew up. In this regard, the so-called Michigan paradigm, identified with the publication of the influential The American Voter (1960), was seminal. This book insists on the long-standing effects of socialization by neighborhood, education, ethnic, religious, and class affiliation. It puts forward party identification as a decisive variable in voting. A second line of thinking sees citizens as relatively naïve individuals, relying heavily on wrong, irrelevant, or incomplete information. This research is interested in the way volatile (or nonexistent) opinions are influenced by media coverage in electoral campaigns, above all when real political knowledge is lacking. A third stream of research, closely related to the theory of public choice, underscores the tactical ability of voters to pursue rational goals. Voters are portrayed as consumers searching for the most efficient costs/benefits choice.

All these explanations rely on implicit or, much less often, explicit psychological considerations, even if they are tightly intertwined with sociological and political ones. Contributors to The American Voter like Philip Converse, a social psychologist, accept this. Whether people have “sticky” preferences that discriminate according to partisan affiliations or remain independent and open-minded and whether they are prone to trust, or not to trust, political parties, governmental agencies, union leaders, and so on, are significantly related to psychological factors. What may be at stake, for instance, are the degree of self-protection involved and the ways and means of keeping oneself safe. Those who score high on attitudinal scales measuring anxiety are more likely to adopt vigilant behavior and show a strictly selected confidence in a few authorities. As soon as the political situation becomes tense, they view the public arena as divided and feel confronted by merciless foes. By contrast, a strong self-esteem makes an individual more open to opposite views without fearing destabilization, more able to understand others’ points of view, and eventually, more likely to adopt conciliatory or balanced opinions and behavior.

Political scientists have always known that political choices are related to ideological values in a country’s cultural environment. But they seldom investigate this subject in great depth, making it more difficult for them to understand all the various roles ideology plays in thinking and judging. Rationalizing an action through purported values rewards the Ego, helping individuals keep a sense of self-consistency and self-esteem. This idealizes a given behavior with rationalizing explanations; conceals less glorious motivations for action, such as envy, jealousy, and hate; and confirms linkages between individuals—which are of the utmost importance for individuals participating in political organizations. In this respect, ideological and psychological factors are strongly related to each other but in a complex way that needs to be explored. Voters may cast a ballot for a party candidate because they think that he or she is the best or the least distasteful among the choices; but they may also have in mind a desire to show what kind of citizen they are—a responsible democrat, an
enthusiastic patriot, a justice seeker, or even an inflexible rebel—no matter what their real personality may be. Framed early on by socialization and strengthened by the daily influence of an individual’s social location, this self-affirmation, ostensibly relying on internalized values, induces a ballot choice that is relatively independent from the real stakes of the polling day (such as policy relevance or candidate competence). It is the reason why public images (of a party or a candidate) matter so much. Politicians, in turn, who make identification processes easier will more easily obtain votes. Issue positions are not enough; a candidate’s whole life must testify in his or her favor.

Political psychology, used by political scientists interested in the ways in which mass opinion is created, is hardly psychological in the eyes of “genuine” psychologists because it considers external structures of psychology as well as internal factors. Cultural linkages, as well as the cognitive, ideological, and institutional structures of the political arena, are all taken into account when considering why citizens make a particular choice. In electoral studies, this kind of political psychology has been drawing more and more attention. Since the later 1970s, research based on surveys or various attitudinal scales has attempted to give a more precise picture of different types of voters by taking into account psychological factors such as whether one is pessimistic or optimistic, self-directed or other-directed, or confident or suspicious. In a survey, counting likes and dislikes about issues and candidates has become of the utmost importance in predicting electoral choices. These studies have focused less on personality factors than on psychological styles. They are the product of responses extracted from aggregated statistical data, so that certain general categorizations can be correlated with the appeal of public figures in a highly personalized competition. When Jack Doppelt and Ellen Shearer identify five types of nonvoters—doers, unplugged, irritated, don’t know, and alienated—they shed some new light on the phenomenon of abstention and the reasons why such behavior can be volatile from one election to another. These analyses tend to depreciate the idea that electoral motivations are always based on pure rationality and controlled economic calculus.

The ways in which psychology matters in the voting process are well known. Electoral campaigns mostly activate psychological predispositions. Beliefs and emotions like fear or hope and anger or enthusiasm influence perceptions and evaluations of public figures (parties or candidates) that, in turn, determine the final choice. But news media attention to particular incidents or hitches in the campaign can also modify the evaluation process, depending on what problems are being stressed: for example, threats to national security, economic crises, immigration, taxes, or purchasing power. Political scandals can also have significant negative effects. So voting should be understood not only as a political outcome but also as a mediated psychological process.

People cannot be locked into precise categorizations. Many citizens change their mind as situations develop, in accordance with changes in the political arena. Even the Michigan model never claimed that party identifications remain indefinitely stable. So snapshots taken at different times of the fluid mood of an electorate enable us to better understand the way in which beliefs and fantasies cause opinions and emotions and eventually lead to a political choice. An interesting discovery in the United States, valuable to some extent for other Western democracies, is that a large range of public likes and dislikes, extracted from frequent surveys, can be aggregated in a “policy mood” (James Stimson) that has swung, over four decades, from a “liberal” high to a low, in regular increments. Politicians cannot take this finding lightly. It remains to be emphasized again that pure rationality and controlled calculus will never successfully explain any particular behavior. But people with higher levels of political information (and education) know better than novices or lower educated persons how to express through strict political rationalizations their candidate or issue preference.

**Emotional Intelligence and Related Concepts**

Since the later 1980s, emotional intelligence has been given increasing attention in a wide range of academic publications that draw on observations from political scientists. Just as the neurosciences underscore the links between reason and emotion in the way the human brain works, these psychologists dismiss the idea of pure intelligence. Political
scientists may borrow some crucial assertions from Daniel Goleman’s book *Emotional Intelligence* (1995)—above all, the fact that all people harness their emotions, even negative ones, to understand and decipher external information and manage these emotions to achieve their intended goals. Some cross-cultural research suggests that there are many universally recognized emotions, which means they are biological in origin even if cultures interfere in their expression. Of this list, which ranges from 6 to 15 in Paul Ekman’s works (the most noteworthy being *What the Face Reveals*, 1999), some are of greater interest for political studies: anger and fear, disgust, shame and contempt, all are often described as negative emotions; hope and pride, relief, and compassion are all perceived as positive ones. But this opposition (negative/positive), most clearly expressed by the pairing of satisfaction and frustration, needs to be reappraised even if it is still employed in some field research. Why should shame or pride be always seen negatively? More important, each of these emotions is dynamic, and its intensity is strongly related to the internalized ability of each individual to maintain self-control (which develops through early socialization) as well as to the nature of the challenges faced in his or her environment.

The first lesson of this literature is that we cannot avoid taking into account the primacy of feelings in political evaluations—about issues as well as actors. Affects and emotions interfere with political value judgments and contribute to a selective memory of past events, whether they were pleasant or unpleasant. The fact is well-known to politicians but continues to be underestimated by social scientists. One must expect a complex interaction of emotion and cognition during any deliberation over political decisions. Stressful circumstances, affective states such as fear or anger may unsettle otherwise sound political judgment, resulting in a misperception of the adequate response to a given situation. Noticeably, this is the case when high-level violence occurs, targeting personalities, assets, or even public values. Islamist terrorism has led to suspicion toward Muslim populations, strong war threats have resulted in an overwhelming denouncement of foes, and ethnic disturbances reduce those affected to a single trait of their identity, whether this be origin, religion, or language. But less noticed, even in day-to-day political life, is that emotions diminish or stimulate an individual’s capacity to judge actions or actors. Satisfaction prompts people to distance themselves from disturbing or unpleasant information or to adopt convenient interpretations of it, which in turn make it easier for them to remain satisfied. Frustration causes a symmetrical mechanism of increasing frustration. The more this process remains unconscious, the more it weighs in political evaluations and, particularly, voting decisions. Hope and fear, and pride and humiliation, whether well founded or imagined, are the main emotions interfering with rational evaluations of citizens. In electoral campaigns, this phenomenon is greatly reinforced either by the scarcity or, conversely, the excess of information available, which is in all cases hard to control. Uncertainty in cognition gives way to more emotional investment.

The second lesson is that emotions are the engine of behavior. Where you stand depends on what you feel. When taking any action, most people search to build their self-esteem and earn a good reputation among the individuals or groups whose opinions matter to them. This is at the root of both conformism and rebellion. What differs between people are the values or guides to which they refer. Understanding the intensity and direction of such inclinations is decisive for the interpretation of political choices. But such an investigation may be misguided if too much importance is attached to authors’ statements of their own intentions. If circumstances compel people to take actions of which they are not proud, their real motives will, if at all possible, be hidden behind more noble legitimizations. In some cultures, ambition, outrage, or compassion are more or less valued, even if everywhere they are decisive factors that determine the degree of political engagement and its relationship to the quest for self-esteem. So political psychology must study the complex factors that, in any society, tend to stimulate or diminish the public acknowledgment of these motivations. Other people are mainly directed by their fears or even by paranoid hatred. In these cases, it is necessary to delve into the conditions under which these feelings arise or even affect an entire population. We know that people who express strongly held anger as a result of difficult challenges they cannot properly face want to hold
external agents responsible as scapegoats for their troubles. But what explains the trajectory that leads to mass murder or genocidal violence? A combination of sociological and psychological factors must be acknowledged here.

To take into account these dimensions of the political life, it is useful to refer to the theory of rational choice but understood in an untraditional way. The basic assertion of this economic paradigm is that people evaluate the costs and benefits of the choices they have to make and generally prefer the object that provides the greatest reward (utility, attractiveness) at the lowest price. But in political life, this kind of calculus, when restricted to material costs and rewards, is a myth. This is not only because information is restricted—individuals are unwilling to pay the high costs for complete information—but also because there are costs and rewards of another kind to be taken into consideration. Rational choice theory sets emotionality and rationality against each other. This is an error. Even if emotions easily spin out of control under certain circumstances, they are always part of the rational calculus. Individuals tend to choose the option that will diminish the emotional costs of fear or humiliation. They want to feel more secure as well and search to heal any frustrations, regardless of whether this may take them down a favorable or unfavorable path. But individuals are also attracted by intangible rewards, such as pride, self-esteem, and even surpassing their image of themselves. All these considerations are just as rational as purely material estimations of gains and losses. And as they weigh heavily in political life, researchers, therefore, should be interested in studying what is called (in contrast to ego-psychology) “situation psychology”—that is, the study of emotional costs and rewards that are predictable in a specific environment. Economic crises create particular concerns and fears; the rise of new leaders with a reputation of efficiency or integrity awakens new hopes for economic improvement, political uprightness, and so on. Politicians value emotional appeals when these further their own goals. In dictatorships or in populist discourses, they will not hesitate to mobilize hatred, suspicion, or aversion. In democracies, fear or hope, and pride or outrage remain instrumental but in a way that encourages sufficient monitoring of their effects. Nevertheless, even in these regimes, it happens that “rational calculus,” including material and emotional rewards or costs, is somewhat suspended because the level of emotional intensity can spiral out of control. This is the reason why it may be said—under these circumstances but only under them—that emotion can become “irrational.”

It should not be forgotten that people problematize their own levels of emotional comfort in accordance with their early socialization and expectations derived from their actual position in social life. On the one hand, some research strongly suggests that individuals acquire, in childhood or late adolescence, lasting predispositions that shape their evaluations of the situations they confront. Racial prejudices, ideological identifications, or an aversion to communism or capitalism all may persist throughout life. On the other hand, short-term considerations also influence attitudes and subsequent responses to challenges. For instance, Linda Putnam refers to the concept of “bounded emotionality” to suggest that “interrelatedness” helps shape individual expectations in organizations. In any situation, many factors that can be perceived as opportunities—bringing hopes or threats, or inducing fear—matter as well. So in these instances, attitudes and choices reveal some kind of “rationality,” even if (or, more precisely, because) this rationality is based on emotions. Even if sometimes it happens that emotions get out of control, more often than not they are useful in clarifying the real interests and aspirations in a given environment.

Symbolic Politics

The power of political symbols lies in their strong capacity for evocation—that is, to create associative meanings that enrich the way in which people react to them. This can occur first of all with knowledge more or less forgotten but open to being revived when appropriately stimulated. But above all, reactions are elicited from the emotional charges contained in the symbols—because of their historical origins and/or added content since then. Some words in political discourses are not purely referential but engage strong connotations under special circumstances. They are cognitively and affectively loaded. That is the case, for instance, when a highly respected politician is abruptly charged with corruption or treason by an authoritative agency.
Everybody can understand the destructive stigma of such a powerful allegation. When used in all seriousness, some terms that refer to positive values, such as liberty or human rights, or those that negatively describe political foes, such as fascists, terrorists, plutocrats, or communists, appear to contain heavy emotional associations. Choosing an effective label for a political competition or defining appropriately a social mobilization can give an organization or a political figure a distinct advantage in politics. Take the prochoice and prolife movements: Both attempt to associate their position with indisputable values while denouncing their opponents as being antichoice or antilife.

Strong cognitive and emotional connotations are linked not only to single words but also to elaborate arguments. Storytelling discourses, which often incorporate ethical messages, whether strongly negative or strongly positive, can spark any number of emotions, from praise to reproach or even to outrage. This is often the way history is taught at school to very young children, with the aim of having them embrace the heroism of their country’s forefathers and feel connected to the accomplishments of their nation while being repulsed by the actions of their enemies. This can have a lasting effect throughout their lives. Political parties may similarly refer to historical figures or invoke long-lasting doctrines to make their assertions more authoritative. They may also recall past disasters to extract painful lessons. So some events, personalities, and accomplishments can become overloaded with affective cognition.

Within these storytelling narratives, there are codified lines of argumentation that use a common thread to make sense of the past and the present or to help decipher the future. To identify them, some academics (Ibarra, Kitsuse) have put forward the concept of “rhetorical idioms.” These are common-sense constructions of moral competence. Their deployment tends to presume that the listeners are obliged to acknowledge the importance of the values expressed. Moreover, rhetorical idioms are useful in enlisting people to make sympathetic moves in a particular language game. For example, the “rhetoric of loss” or the “rhetoric of endangerment” prioritizes facts and behavior that show, in a more or less simplified way, how people should fear the extinction or devaluation of something highly valuable and cherished, whether this be national pride, ethnic or religious identity, or political ethics. Such rhetoric appeals to emotional responses: mourning, apprehension, or even dread but, above all, admiration for the potential rescuer and a desire to identify with such a wise prophet.

Symbolism is not restricted to discourses but is also found in both material objects and rituals performed in the political arena. A flag is much more than a simple piece of cloth: it symbolizes the nation, its identity, and glory. Burning a flag is the utmost form of abuse that can be inflicted on the people it represents. The architecture of governmental palaces similarly exhibits power or glory. Statues and monuments, particularly war memorials, signify that they deserve a central place in peoples’ imagination and memory. Political rituals such as the opening of a parliamentary session, the appointment of a new prime minister, or diplomatic formalities and protocols—all of these highly codified ceremonies intend to arouse intimidation and deference, to exhibit the gap between ruling personalities and ruled citizens, to signify where the power is and who is to be viewed as being at the center of the social order (Clifford Geertz). But, of course, the substance of the symbolism does not lie within these material objects or ceremonies. Their ability to evoke emotional cognition is contingent on the attitudes and comments they arouse in a given cultural environment. So it may be said that symbolism results from an ongoing process of emotional construction, undertaken by authorities perceived as entitled to do so: intellectuals, social leaders, and politicians interacting with each other. If this process fails, it may be that the symbolic appeal has been exhausted. This may occur when indifference, or even disrespect toward such materials or rites, has developed over time.

What are the uses of symbols and symbolic gestures in politics? They can possibly fulfill three functions, which are all decisive in political life. First, many symbols help develop a feeling of mutual liking and appreciation—what is called “solidarity” in political language. Governments must necessarily try to stimulate solidarity because life in society compels them to impose obligations and sacrifices, which may be more easily accepted if people think they have much in common beyond strict material necessity. A sense of allegiance to a community, within which the members supposedly share the same values and history, makes exercising power much easier. Constructing collective identities, national or otherwise, relies on emotional narratives
that emphasize the great things the people have realized together and the highly prized goals they may achieve if they remain united. The reality of this “imagined community” (Benedict Anderson) is exhibited through the symbols everyone learns to love: keywords such as republic, national state, and liberty and equality; material objects such as flags, war memorials, and other emblems of the community and its legacy; historical figures that are endlessly praised; economic, cultural, and sports achievements as a source of communal pride; and so on.

A second function of symbols in politics is to control the need for peace and stability. In international relations, a policy of recognition—one that accepts the principle of equal dignity between states and recognizes the necessity of taking the blame for injuries and damages inflicted on another by the state—is a major factor permitting appeasement between peoples. For this purpose of building better relations with other people, words and gestures matter a lot, as suggested by the respective German Chancellors’ kneeling down at the Ghetto Memorial in Warsaw (1970) or a visit to Yad Vashem (2008), both highly charged with emotions. Within any particular state, symbolism appears to be much more intense when institutions become more vulnerable—which predictably occurs at certain stages of institutional life. This is the case, for example, with the formation or the replacement of a government. Constitutions provide explicit rules for such transitions. It is necessary to ensure that these rules are uniformly respected in order to create a consensus about the way in which power must be exercised. When people go to the polls, it is of the utmost importance that the outcome be honored. If not, disorder and instability may quickly appear and destroy the rule of law. It is in these times of uncertainty, when current governments are challenged by opposition figures, that comments on the value of an emotional attachment to democratic principles will intensify on all sides. Any fear of death will similarly evoke symbolic displays, whether this be the deaths of soldiers on the battle front or the unforeseen death of a prominent leader. Elaborate ceremonies and rituals are used to restrain confusion and to prevent the situation from getting out of control.

A third function of symbols is to mobilize citizens to support a “good cause.” Purely rational considerations are not always sufficient to get people involved in political life, even when their own interests are at stake. Invoking the breach of equality or the infringement of human rights, both highly prized values, is an effective way to awaken their moral sensibilities and provoke some kind of outrage, which may possibly lead to a commitment to action. More broadly, social problems to be managed by those in power are coded through contextually grounded discourses and vocabularies that designate and dramatize in the same way. Noticeably, they are inhabited by the concept of victim, a putative person being subject to harmful conditions of which a victimizer is the causal agent. For example, common victims include an unemployed, impoverished populace or powerless minorities, while the victimizers may be the wealthy, capitalism, or even the “system” itself. All of these words, when related to a victimization process, become charged with emotional connotations set up by ideologies and, thus, tend to appear as signals for action. In this way, symbolic politics constructs victim-and-victimizer categories within particular universes of morality where there is good to be loved and evil to be condemned.

Short Methodological Considerations

Political science needs scientific precision. This presents a particularly strong challenge in political psychology. First, because emotions are typically volatile or subtle phenomena and, second, because psychological costs and rewards are often far from being transparently displayed. In the past, the key obstacles included a false consensus on imprecise core definitions, a diversity of underlying psychological theories, and above all, insufficient techniques for data collection. Dramatic advances have recently been achieved with the development of rich interview materials using projective questions, ingenious experiments (the first of them being Stanley Milgram’s), the construction of attitudinal scales and EQ (emotional quotient) to measure preferences and subjective reactions with performance metrics (Likert, Altemeyer), and even computer simulations. But these methods must avoid traps such as an abundance of missing data points, sample bias, poor psychometric techniques, and the possible contradictions between attitudinal factors and real behavior. Certain phenomena will never be well understood without longitudinal research that still remains quite scarce. Furthermore, even
if the positivist-empirical leaning of modern political psychology indisputably favors strong breakthroughs in better understanding the emotional dimensions of political life, there are possible negative implications as well. One may be tempted to give up questions that are too difficult to translate into solid empirical inquiries or to use exaggerated simplifications. Less sophisticated observations may produce more richness, even if the findings cannot be so strongly asserted.

At this point, it is necessary to discuss what room may be left to psychoanalysis. In mainstream political psychology, this theory is widely ruled out as a method of analysis. This is right because its techniques are far from being compatible with social science requirements of intersubjectively transmissible and controllable findings. Nevertheless, if something is to be borrowed from psychoanalysis, it should be the theory of defensive attitudes in a protection of the self. The blocking of cognitive representation and affect (denial), a sudden reversal to take the opposite position, a projection leading to rationalization or identification with the other—all these processes matter greatly when dealing with psychological or sociological material. The more a researcher seriously engages with these processes, the more likely it is that he or she will be able to identify both the bias that may interfere with his or her interview or discourse material and the bias he or she may experience when setting up a research project.

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See also Beliefs; Electoral Behavior; Groupthink; Identity, Social and Political; Psychological Explanations of International Politics; Rituals; Symbols, Political

Further Readings


Political Risk Analysis

Political risk analysis is rooted in the intersection between politics and business. It analyses the probability that political decisions, events, or conditions will significantly affect the profitability of a
business actor or the expected value of a given economic action. This definition incorporates three different approaches among early theorists about the sources of political risk—namely, a focus on foreign national governments, the recognition of the impact of actors from both government and nongovernment circles, and an emphasis on historical and cultural environments. A wide spectrum of political risks may affect business, and political risk analysts use both qualitative and quantitative frameworks to analyze and assess the risks to business.

Cross-border traders and investors are often involved in forms of political risk analysis. However, political risk analysis only became recognizable as an institutionalized business practice in the United States in the 1970s. Several factors enhanced the prevalence of international business activities at the time. Simultaneously, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil boycott in 1973 resulted in a partial institutionalization of the political risk function in more U.S. companies. This function became full-time and more firmly centered in many businesses after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Most initial academic research on political risk analysis was also done in the 1970s and 1980s.

Political risk analysts identify political risks and their variables, assess their significance and the relationships between them, and make recommendations regarding the management and mitigation of political risks. Social science research and nonacademic interpretations of current affairs influence all three phases—namely, the analysis, assessment, and management of political risk. In principle, political risk could also be useful in analyzing the general judgment and policy design of politicians under conditions of uncertainty. However, political risk analysis is undertheorized in this regard and currently remains rooted in the intersection between politics and business.

Although political risk analysis could apply to domestic business, in practice it mostly comes into play when a business is considering business activities in other countries. In the academic literature, the focus tends to be on political risk analysis related to foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than relatively passive portfolio investment. The exposure of assets or personnel in FDI reinforces the relevance of political risk analysis. However, political risk can also affect the expected profits and market stakes of exporters, contractors, and licensors.

**Sources of Political Risk**

Several, sometimes overlapping, government functions can have an impact on business. In many industrialized countries, its role as a regulator is especially extensive, resulting in legislation related to the environment, health and safety, employment, trade unions, and consumers. A government can also serve as a restrictor (tariffs and trade quotas), redistributor (taxation and welfare policies), director (training, regional and sectoral development, and human resource policies), customer (procurement), or sponsor (subsidies).

Some authors contend that there is an inbuilt potential bias in political risk analysis, whereby any government intervention in the economy is seen as potentially negative, even though such an intervention may be motivated by relevant local interests and aspirations. It is in any case meaningful to locate the particular relationships between multinational business and national governments or other political actors when assessing the actual political risk. The particular cultural and historical context may also influence political risk—for example, where energy or mineral companies are associated with earlier colonial projects in Africa or the Middle East.

The most familiar relationship between business and political authorities is a cooperative arrangement, where negotiations are ongoing and a normal part of operations. While the government would not act deliberately to affect operations, the company would only use lobbying, either singly or through participation in probusiness pressure groups and associations. A second relationship would be collaborative, consisting of joint-venture relationships with public sector companies or privately owned companies with a strong governmental presence.

An authoritative relationship applies when a multinational corporation and a government are at loggerheads. Mostly, a government can impose new rules, which may result in divestment by the company. Two other relationships are far less frequent. A home government may use a multinational company to promote its political objectives. Alternatively, in the case of subversion, a multinational company may actively work to undermine a
host government, partly with the covert encouragement of the company’s home government. In the latter two cases, the conduct of business can also constitute a source of political risk.

Risks to business in a country may not only ensue from a government in a foreign country but also from actions by the governments in its neighboring or other countries. Transnational or international actors, opposition groups and other domestic stakeholders, and the particular political field in a country may become linked to political risk. In some countries, due to the power or authority of informal networks linked to the government, these groups, rather than the government, may be the main source of political risk to a particular business.

**Types of Political Risk**

Political risk may vary at different business levels—that is, for all foreign business actors, a particular industry or company, or a particular project. It also depends on the type of investment, its methods of financing, its location, and the time frame involved. Political risk may have an impact on one or more aspects of a business actor, including personnel, assets, contracts, operations, transfers, company goals, and business continuity. The impact may be directly or indirectly in the form of opportunity costs foregone.

Risks to personnel and operations may include intimidation, kidnapping, sabotage, and terrorism, if these risks are motivated by political concerns. However, some of these risks may also ensue from nonpolitical actors and constitute a general security risk only, requiring a different set of preventive measures and incident responses. Asset risks may include general nationalization and specific expropriation, restrictions on ownership, and an insistence on locally owned shareholdings or local directorships. Contractual risks may include changes in contractual conditions due to legislative or bureaucratic action, or the frustration of contracts due to violent or political change, including a revolution, civil war, secession, interstate war, coup d’état, or peaceful succession.

Risks to operations are a wide category and include all host country regulations that affect business operations. These may include labor relations, taxation, restrictions on labor or technology transfer, and local product content regulations. Some other examples include quotas and tariffs, environmental and consumer protection, antitrust and merger laws, discrimination in awarding contracts, and bureaucratic nepotism. Transfer risks could include exchange controls, profit repatriation, and restrictions on royalty payments. Local variations in these risks are also possible in countries where the regional authority of an area is at loggerheads with the central government of the country or where a local power broker is the actual authority on the ground.

**Differentiating Political Risk Analysis From Country Risk Analysis**

Political risk analysis partly grew out of the country risk analysis conducted by major banks and international economic agencies. The analysis of country risk and political risk differs but may sometimes overlap. Country risk analysis tends to include political risk but also economic and operational risk. Some of the economic factors included under country risk, for example, a bad balance of payments and low creditworthiness, may reflect an inability to pay debt but may also result in a political risk—namely, an unwillingness to pay debt. Political risk may also overlap with some of the country risk factors, where events, foreign confidence, and capital inflows meet.

Political stability as an indicator is included in comparative country risk-rating systems such as the Peren-Clement Index or the Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) Index. However, the management of political risk may differ from that of country risk. For example, many political risks are insurable, whereas many economic and financial risks included under country risk are not.

Political risk analysis may distinguish between a microlevel and a macrolevel political risk. A microlevel political risk is a risk specific to a business or some sectors only. A macrolevel political risk is a non–project-specific risk that affects all participants in a given country. However, it does not include country-level political risk alone, but it may link local, national, and regional political forces, events, and environments. Depending on the requirement of the particular business, political risk analysis can focus on both or one of the two levels.
The Methodology of Analysis

Some major business actors have in-house analysts, while others at least partially outsource the task of analysis to specialist providers. A company’s need for political risk analysis may differ at different times. The perceived need for political risk analysis tends to be higher around the decision to enter or avoid a particular country’s marketplace, but different forms of political risk analysis are also used as a regular form of early warning, to periodically review in-country operations, or sporadically in response to new uncertainties or setbacks.

Political risk itself is a subjective category and will vary according to the actor defining the risk and the field of action. While pure risk only entails loss or a chance of loss, speculative political risk can entail the chance of both loss and opportunity. In this regard, political risk analysis is not necessarily a linear process of unilateral communication but may become part of an ongoing dialogue between the analysts and (other) actors within the particular business, who may have a better appreciation of the particular business or project than the analyst.

Analysts use both quantitative and qualitative models for analysis, and there is no consensus on the methodology. A model is an extended representation to better understand, adapt to, manage, and control identified political risk factors. The number and nature of variables, their combinations, and the weights assigned to them by the model builders are based on the interpretative frameworks used by political risk analysts.

Quantitative assessment models include complex econometric models and simpler macropolitical risk indexing models that purport to assess various indices such as political stability, based on nominal, ordinal, or interval variables. Some models have been designed for particular sectors, for example, the financial or energy sector, and most models also include an element of qualitative judgment.

The main qualitative techniques are judgmental forecasting, for example, the so-called Delphic method or accumulation of expert opinion under controlled conditions and involving expert feedback. Informal brainstorming between experts is also used, especially where time is of the essence. A more systematic scenario model may be used to identify key assumptions and key drivers to then construct several alternative futures within different time frames and to estimate the likelihood of different outcomes and their impact on particular business concerns. Political risk analysis aims to provide insight into where a business needs to intervene in the political process if it wants to change the environment, mitigate its potential risks, and maximize its potential opportunities.

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See also Risk and Public Policy; Stability

Further Readings

European thinking on politics to the Enlightenment, enriched by medieval, Renaissance, and early modern authors. They are still considered relevant by a substantial number of political scientists—not, quite clearly, by a majority. Political science began to be recognized as a legitimate academic discipline, on the same plane as history and economics, and later sociology and psychology, in the second half of the 19th century, in Europe and the United States, and with surprising speed in the latter country. This institutional recognition is considered first. The second part of this entry deals with the birth, programs, and impact of the international institutions, communication media, and exchanges that have shaped the present political science community since the end of World War II. This account draws on an extensive literature, too abundant to be quoted, and also on the author’s close connection with the International Political Science Association (IPSA) since 1952.

Institutional Institutionalization Through Recognition

The first professorships and chairs dealing with politics were created in the Netherlands, at the University of Leiden (1613); in Sweden, at the University of Uppsala (1627); and at the Åbo Akademi (1640), now in Finland. Several professorships and departments, including in their title political science or government, were created in the United States in the second half of the 19th century, starting in 1857 at Columbia University. In Europe, political topics started to be taught at about the same time, as part of the training of future civil servants and members of the political elite. In France, the École libre des Sciences Politiques [Free School of Political Sciences], set up in 1872 as a private institution in reaction to France’s defeat in 1871 in the war with Prussia, used in its name the plural, thus including the study of politics in the social sciences. The École inspired the creation of the Columbia School of Political Science (1880) and the London School of Economics and Political Science (1895), both of which used the singular; similar institutions that followed the École’s model were later created in Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

The main impetus came, however, from the United States, where a substantial number of chairs and departments of political science, and also of government or public administration, were established in the fourth quarter of the 19th century. The existence of an American community of political scientists led to the creation in 1903 of the American Political Science Association, the first of its kind, and of the American Political Science Review (1905). National political science associations were later created in Canada (1913), in conjunction with economics, and in China (1932), Finland (1933), and India (1938).

In Europe, with few exceptions, political science topics were investigated, analyzed, and taught in the 1920s and 1930s by journalists and civil servants and by academics from disciplines such as history, public and constitutional law, sociology, geography, and philosophy. Politics was meant to provide flesh to the abstract approaches; thus, the study of political parties and elections added reality to the traditional state doctrine and constitutional law. Analysis of political ideologies led to the study of political movements and revolutions, for which traditional political philosophy did not account. Political science was not recognized as a discipline and certainly not as a “science.” At best, political topics were seen as belonging to an interdisciplinary field and politics as a “crossroads” discipline.

At the same time, in the United States, partly under the influence of American sociologists, social psychologists, and empirically minded economists, political scientists were increasingly attracted by theoretical rigor, quantitative analysis, and systematic comparisons. The influx of German and Central European social scientists, including refugee scholars before and during World War II, contributed to that transformation. The study of mass phenomena, such as elections, public opinion, communications, authoritarian regimes, and international relations, justified innovative approaches, enriched by the views and the experience of the refugees, who found a hospitable haven in American universities at a time when Europe was isolated and European social science stifled, when not suppressed, except in the United Kingdom (UK). Cross-breeding was important, as these European scholars discovered the unfamiliar realities of American politics and America’s political traditions.

When the war ended, émigré social scientists, some of whom had, at U.S. and Canadian universities, embraced political science, were invited to
teach at universities of their home countries, together with native American colleagues, and laid the ground for the recognition of their discipline in Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and many other countries. Their courses and some of the research fields that they opened up or investigated in new ways contributed greatly to interest in political science as a discipline. European graduate students crossed the Atlantic, professors met foreign colleagues at professional conferences, and the gap was progressively closed. Their contributions to a better and richer understanding of politics and the use of more rigorous approaches and research methods were increasingly accepted, not without resistance, however, from traditional scholars. The same applied to Asian countries such as Japan and later Taiwan and South Korea.

The recognition of political science as a discipline outside of the United States was generally a slow process. It depended very much on the strength of contrary academic traditions, on the sympathy or hostility of scholars in other fields of learning, and on the institutional setting. It was understandably more difficult in educational systems where decisions concerning the curricula and recruitment procedures were made at the ministerial level than in those where universities enjoyed substantial autonomy; this was more rapid in the United Kingdom and in countries where the knowledge of English made for easier and more intense exchanges and access to the relevant political science works. The UK itself, however, was for many years a hotbed of such resistance.

Thus, even in countries where political science topics were commonly analyzed and taught, the obstacles to recognition proved difficult to overcome. In the UK, with its long and glorious tradition of political inquiry and reflection, there was thus still no political science department at the close of the 1940s, and it is significant that the discipline’s academic association, founded in 1950, is still called the Political Studies Association of the UK and its official journal, Political Studies (1953); the rival British Journal of Political Science was launched only in 1971. Political topics were long taught by historians, sociologists, and sometimes very eminent constitutional lawyers and political philosophers, even at the London School of Economics and Political Science, rather than by political scientists.

The situation was partly similar in France, with an additional institutional obstacle: While in the UK, the Scandinavian countries, or the Netherlands universities enjoyed great autonomy, French universities had only a nominal existence until 1968; higher education was administered by a government department and organized at the level of facultés. Of the various social sciences, history and sociology as well as philosophy and geography belonged to the Facultés des Lettres (schools of liberal arts), and law and economics to the Facultés de Droit (law schools). The proponents of modern political science were thus divided between two separate schools in the universities in which they were active. Introductory political science courses, which became mandatory in the law schools’ curriculum in the 1950s, were taught mainly by professors of public law who had had no training in political science and often not much respect for it. For many years after 1945, the main institutions that developed both teaching and research in political science were the Paris Institut d’Études Politiques [Institute of Political Studies] and the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques [National Foundation of Political Science], the heirs of the École libre des Sciences Politiques, jointly known as Sciences Po, where research centers on French politics, area studies, and international relations were created in the late 1950s and the 1960s. The resistance of the law schools, finally overcome by public law professors who considered themselves political scientists, prevented, until 1971, the creation of political science doctorates and the adoption of a procedure for the recruitment of political science professors. With a distinct chronology, conditions were not very different in Germany, Italy, and Spain, unlike the UK, where academic autonomy allowed a spectacular development of disciplinary teaching and research, with ever more professorships and departments attracting an increasing number of students.

American political science has remained dominant, thanks to the number and variety of U.S. university institutions and the recognition of the relevance of the discipline for nonacademic careers. It has been supported by the major foundations concerned with the development of the social sciences and by the creation of cooperative institutions such as the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research established in 1962.
at the University of Michigan, which has provided access to a huge international collection of social science data. The annual American National Election Studies, also based at the University of Michigan, and since 1997 considered a national resource by the National Science Foundation, have provided since 1948 invaluable data on the electorate and public opinion. Institutions linked to the military, such as the RAND Corporation, have contributed to the development of strategic studies. Many new theoretical approaches and methodological innovations or improvements have thus originated in the United States and spread everywhere. Some proved to be fads, but the “behavioral revolution” of the 1960s, which emphasized rigorous analysis of political processes—sophisticated treatment of quantitative data, comparative analysis, and the study of new fields—decisively supported by nongovernmental bodies such as the Social Science Research Council and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, has had a lasting influence, despite its excesses. A large number of increasingly specialized journals were created; the advent of the information technology revolution, which has transformed both research and teaching, resulted also in what many political scientists consider an unhealthy fragmentation of the discipline.

By the 1960s, it became obvious that for its acceptance and development, political science needed an environment that favored, or at the very least allowed, freedom of investigation and thought. Authoritarian regimes do not encourage or even tolerate analyses that highlight their shortcomings. The political science map coincided very clearly with that of democracy. But there were hidden exceptions: The rulers of powers such as the Soviet Union understood that for policy-making purposes, they needed reliable information and analyses. Strongly controlled centers were set up, where broad access to foreign publications was provided. The collapse of communism revealed their existence, and starting in the 1990s, there appeared in many countries of the former Soviet bloc political science journals and books of a quality close to the internationally recognized standards. A new generation of well-informed political scientists, secretly self-trained, became visible. Political science began to be taught in universities, and the map changed rapidly. The same phenomenon had earlier happened in European countries such as Spain and Portugal and in various Latin American countries, where dictatorships had prevented the open development of political science. High-quality scholars, who had found refuge in the United States and Europe, went back when conditions changed and contributed to the academic acceptance and development of their discipline.

International Institutionalization Through Organizations and Associations

A new and important factor of institutionalization at the international level was the creation in 1949 of the IPSA, to which most of this second section will be devoted.

Before World War II, political science was highly developed, recognized, and taught in the United States in a majority of colleges and in most research universities at the graduate level. It was also taught under various names and in various forms in certain European and Asian countries. There were, however, almost no organized international contacts other than visits and exchanges of scholars and students. The Political Science Congress held in Paris in 1900 was not followed by any large international meetings except for a few regional ones, such as the Scandinavian Political Science Congress held in Stockholm in 1930.

The only organization of any importance was active in the field of international relations. Sponsored by the League of Nations’ International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIC), located in Paris, a Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations had been created in 1928; it changed its name in 1933 to International Studies Conference (ISC). The ISC used for its operations the Secretariat of the IIC and held annual conferences, the last of which was held on the eve of the war, on August 30, 1939. It was unable to survive the postwar creation of the broader IPSA.

A few other bodies had existed. The International Institute of Political and Social Sciences in their Application to Countries With Different Civilizations did survive but devoted itself mostly to the study of colonized areas. The International Institute of Political and Constitutional History, renamed the International Academy of Political Science and Constitutional History, was, despite efforts by
some of its leading members, active mainly in the
field of history.

The organization responsible for the conception
and birth of IPSA was the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO). Implementing a recommendation
made at its very first General Conference (Paris,
1946), the second General Conference (Mexico,
1947) instructed the Director General to promote
a study of political science. The UNESCO Social
Science Department had singled out that discipline
because political phenomena were considered
major factors of tensions and because intellectual
cooperation was hopefully seen as contributing to
the maintenance of peace.

The process soon gained impetus. A massive
international study of political science, or its
absence, was undertaken by UNESCO in 1948
under the leadership of an American scholar,
William Ebenstein, of Princeton University. The
huge resulting volume, including no less than 51
national reports, was published by UNESCO in
1950. At a coordination meeting held in 1948 at
UNESCO’s headquarters in Paris, political science
was tentatively defined as comprising political
theory; central, regional, and local institutions;
parties, groups, and public opinion; international
policy and organization; and international law. It
was also decided to call a conference to examine
the possibility of creating an IPSA.

At that conference, held in September 1949, at
the initiative of UNESCO’s Director General, 23
scholars—political scientists, political theorists,
sociologists, constitutional lawyers, and histori-
ans—considered and approved a draft constitution
for the future body, constructed as a federation of
national associations, and elected a provisional
executive committee. UNESCO was similarly
active in the creation of associations in other social
sciences and the International Social Science
Council.

IPSA thus came into existence officially at the
end of 1949, as a “foreign association,” under
French law and regulations, with its legal seat in
Paris. Its founders were four associations, those
already active in the United States, Canada, and
India, plus a French association set up largely for
that purpose. Its provisional executive committee
elected as chairman Quincy Wright, a professor at
the University of Chicago, and a Frenchman,
François Goguel, the secretary-general of the
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, as
executive secretary. A first World Congress,
attended by 80 participants, was held in Zurich in
1950 and the second one at The Hague in 1952.
Subsequent congresses were organized triennially,
at first in Europe only, then in more exotic places
such as Montreal, Rio de Janeiro, Washington,
D.C., and Buenos Aires. From 1997 (Seoul) to
2008 (Santiago de Chile), all congresses were held
outside Europe. Attendance has grown to about
2,000 participants, with IPSA funding many travel
grants for young scholars and scholars from
developing countries.

Over its 60 years of existence, the number of
IPSA’s collective members (national associations)
has grown from the initial 4 to more than 40.
IPSA’s existence has contributed to the creation of
associations in almost all Western European
countries; in a few cases, such as that of Italy,
IPSA has had to recognize a new association to
replace a previous collective member considered
too traditional by the younger generation of
political scientists.

Never a Cold War instrument, IPSA empha-
sized inclusion and dialogue, and the rulers of the
Soviet bloc preferred to have delegates participate
in it, as in UNESCO. A Polish association was thus
created as early as 1950 and was soon admitted to
IPSA. Associations were later set up in Yugoslavia
(1954), the Soviet Union (1960), Czechoslovakia

Against strong opposition, especially in the
United States, IPSA stood by its decision to hold its
1979 Congress on strict conditions in Moscow,
despite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the
end of 1978. It was later acknowledged that the
Moscow Congress had helped young political sci-
entists establish the discipline both in the Soviet
Union and in several satellite countries. The “mis-
ionary” purpose of IPSA also inspired assistance
to political scientists in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America, especially where dictatorial regimes were
hostile to political analysis.

A major problem arose when Taiwan was, in
1989, admitted as a collective member, under the
compromise name of Chinese Political Science
Association (Taiwan), although its association
claimed to be the legitimate heir of the Chinese
Association created in 1932. The compromise
accepted by the delegate of the Chinese Political Science Association (People’s Republic) was soon rejected, and as of 2010, the Mainland Chinese Political Science Association had not returned to IPSA.

Starting in the mid-1960s, IPSA was strengthened and enriched in its operations by the creation of Study Groups and Research Committees, later merged under the second denomination. Numbering about 50, the committees meet at each Congress and at least once between congresses, with participation by scholars from different countries. They deal with both traditional topics and innovative issues and approaches. Several research committees have their own journals. Associate members—about 100 political science departments and research organizations—and individual members—nearly 2,500—find IPSA’s activities valuable.

IPSA’s first journal, *International Political Science Abstracts*, launched in 1951, 2 years after IPSA’s creation, and prepared since then in Paris at Sciences Po, is still the standard reference tool of the discipline. From 1951 to 1962, it published annually, in four issues, about 1,400 abstracts of journal articles. It now provides each year more than 8,000 abstracts, in six issues, reflecting the explosion in the number of journals; it has since 2007 been published by SAGE Publications. Its database goes back to 1951; at the end of 2009, it contained 270,000 abstracts and is distributed by both EBSCO and Ovid. The second, started in 1980, is the *International Political Science Review*, also published by Sage, which has been recognized as one of the leading journals in the discipline. In recent years, the two journals have also contributed substantially to IPSA’s budget. To the journals must be added the *IPSA Portal*, created and maintained at the University of Naples, which selects, describes, and evaluates the top 300 political science websites, and IPSA’s newsletter, *Participation*.

Ever since its inception, IPSA has sought to participate in the diffusion of political science as a rigorous discipline and also to serve as a bridge between American political science, in many ways still central, and the rest of the world while respecting the distinct national traditions and different approaches, sometimes strongly critical of those dominant in the United States. Until relatively recently, the landscape seemed pretty clear, with IPSA playing the leading role. It has since then become increasingly complex and somewhat more competitive. Other international bodies have appeared in some regions. American organizations also sometimes supplement IPSA or compete with it.

Regional associations, of somewhat uncertain strength, have in recent decades been organized in Africa (1973) and Asia-Pacific (1983). In Europe, the creation in 1970 of the European Consortium for Political Research, based at the University of Essex and assisted in its first years by the Ford Foundation, has proved spectacularly successful. From 8 founding institutions, it has grown to more than 300, together with associate institutions throughout the world. Its workshops, conferences, and summer schools have contributed greatly to the emergence of a European political science community, and the reputation of its journals—the *European Journal of Political Research*, started in 1973, to which have been added *European Political Science* and the *European Political Review*—and its three book series is enviable. It entertains warm relations with IPSA.

More recently, in 2007, 23 European national and international associations have joined in a European Confederation of Political Science Associations, whose main aim, according to its website, is to “promote the interests of the discipline” and “make it more meaningful in public debate and policy-making.” The Confederation has a promising future, as it reflects the vitality of political science associations in some countries where none existed until recently as well as that of the established ones.

Challenges have also come from the United States. Thus, in the field of international relations, the U.S. International Studies Association and its journals have progressively become representative of International Relations scholars throughout the world. The same can be said of area studies organizations such as the U.S. Latin American Studies Association, which attracts and welcomes many Latin American political scientists.

Finally, the powerful American Political Science Association, which numbered more than 15,000 members in 2010, at least twice as many as there are political scientists in the rest of the world, has increasingly become a magnet for foreign political scientists. Its conventions have the dual function of
a forum for scholarly exchanges and an unrivalled job market in the discipline. They attract many participants from outside the United States, sometimes assisted by travel grants.

The international institutionalization of political science may thus be at a crossroads. IPSA has proved its ability to play a major role in it by continuously adapting to a changing landscape. Thus, it has of necessity practically forsaken French as its second language for its meetings and publications. Its secretariat, which until recent years used to move to the city of residence of its secretary-general whenever that changed, is now permanently established in Montreal, where the staff is bilingual. It also maintains IPSA’s archives, now assembled in a single location.

In this increasingly complex and competitive scholarly landscape, new activities and organizational schemes will need to be experimented with. Major gaps will need to be filled in Africa, Latin America, and Asia-Pacific, concerning obviously China but also countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines. The relevance and the vitality of the discipline seem, however, to be ensured for many years to come, certainly much better than a generation ago.

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Further Readings
Political socialization is not free of values. It is defined as the entirety of all learning processes that form a person into a political being (citizen). The learning processes can be measured in terms of how far they promote or impede political maturity. Maturity in this context means all abilities necessary to meaningfully participate politically—the competence of participation. Political socialization gains its specific political content from an understanding of democracy, which underlies this value orientation. The aim of socialization is maturity, in the sense of self-determination, and political decision making and responsibility. Democracy determines the political-social process in which politically mature individuals develop. The structural-organizational basis of this ability lies in the institutions and policies of political socialization, whereas the subjective-personal part is found in the competence of participation. This is perceived as a goal of political learning. The question of how this goal of learning can be founded theoretically and how it can be empirically achieved, for example, not only in political education but also in processes of participation, pervades considerable areas of work in the research on political socialization.

**Political Socialization as Political Learning/Education**

Political education is a historical phenomenon. “Political” thinking, learning, and acting (in a sense of politics as a struggle or competition for influence and power) was only established when a sphere of civil life developed besides the state. Civil life needed and claimed individual freedom from governmental and absolutistic-feudal power, beginning in Europe in the 18th century. The struggle for autonomy of the newly established class—the middle classes—was borne by ideas of the Enlightenment (“liberty, equality, fraternity” as the slogan of the French Revolution). The aim was to replace feudal arbitrariness of power with a constitutional framework that ensured freedom and equality before the law. The guarantee of equal rights for all citizens made political learning necessary for the first time. Political learning in its beginnings was more focused on the idea of civil freedom. Not long after the collapse of the medieval social order, political education turned into a problem from a historical perspective.

The social-historical background of political learning reveals different phases of development:

- **Education of classes in the feudal society:** Being politically educated meant knowing the rights and duties of one’s class.
- **Education toward the ideal of civil liberty in the early middle-class society:** It ought to serve as an instrument for the enforcement of civil rights as provided by the constitutional state.
- **Means of controlling the fourth estate of the society in the era of 19th-century capitalism:** In this phase, political education was an intellectual-political weapon for the suppression of the upcoming industrial proletariat;
- **Political education in nationalistic-authoritarian systems:** Political education is focused on the subordination of all people to the state.
- **Education toward a racist ethnic community under National Socialism in Germany:** Education served as a means for the forming of the national-socialist man.
- **Education toward the “new man” under communist systems:** It helped people live harmoniously in a classless society.
- **Education toward democratic behavior in contemporary democratic states:** Political learning takes part in the challenge of enabling the development and stability of democratic conditions.

Political learning continuously tries, in its contents as well as in its methods, to consolidate or to criticize existing forms of authority. In a democracy, its objectives include different concepts of democracy. Political learning that is focused on the imparting of political decision making and responsibility is interested in more than just the imparting of knowledge. It is geared toward certain states of awareness, abilities for political action, and attitudes and motivations for a democratic political commitment.

The achievements of socialization on a microdidactic level (political education/instruction) are limited, though. They are not able to compensate the deficits of the political system and the structural basis of political socialization. However, it is possible to implement the goals of political socialization on a macrodidactic level. Political learning can then be described as functional. This is how it can be distinguished from intentional political education.
Processes of learning that shape the potential of qualification and actions of political decision making and responsibility are processes of participation. Competence in participation can be acquired through participation itself. In this way, participation serves as an educational goal as well as an educational means. Political learning takes place when political consciousness can be applied and political participation can be reflected (learning by doing)—the basis of which is political communication.

Political Socialization Through Political Communication

Political systems and their social environment are in constant communicative exchange. The basis of such communication is the aggregation and conversion of social interests into political decisions (interest intermediation) as well as the transmission of political values and norms into society (intermediation of politics). Political communication consists of the exchange of information about politically relevant topics. It can take place because constitutional regulations organize this exchange of information and groups of citizens take part in it. Political communication can also take place without the exchange of information being organized by the governmental system. Effective political communication is established if, from the side of the political system, there is a high degree of transparency of its institutions and decisions. Political communication is the basis of participation in political decision making and decision processes. Political communication acts as a socializing process if, in the system and the system environment, the efficiency of exchange of information between institutions and participants is ensured by steering processes (through norms, culture, sanctions, etc.).

Transparency, participation, and efficiency are regarded as the “magic triangle of social science.” They are principles of organization that determine the success of political communication. The relevance of the principle of participation determines the extent to which political communication enables the learning of participation skills.

As far as political communication is organized by a political system, its institutions act as agents for political socialization. The accomplishments in socialization are the result of the practice of organized political communication between the system and the environment of the system. Through passing on of prevailing norms and values and thereby the culture of the system (political culture, organizational culture, etc.), it allows the possibility of evaluation of the system output (laws, party platforms, etc.) and ensures the return of information (input) into the system, whereby innovation (e.g., political reforms) is made possible. The socialization of the political system thus increases the learning capacity of the political system and its facilities. It is the basis for a successful conveyance of politics.

Conclusion

The learning capacity of the political system and thereby its survivability depend on an organized exchange of information between politics and society as well as between political and administrative facilities and citizens. In a democracy, this exchange is organized by parliament and through intermediate actors of civil society (parties, organizations, associations, etc.). Their achievements are measured in terms of how far they are able to exercise political communication. In a democracy, the medium of political communication is the political public. In the medium of the political public, socialization obtains its empirical location, and from the political public, it derives its normative power.

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See also Participation; Political Communication; Political Culture

Further Readings


**Political Sociology as a Field of Study**

Political sociology deals with the nexus between social and political life. Traditionally, the political consequences of social arrangements are stressed, but attention has also been paid to the social consequences of political arrangements. Combining these two perspectives, political sociology studies links political and social phenomena; that is, it is an interdisciplinary endeavor combining social and political factors to explain distributions of power and dominance in state and society. Almost by definition, intermediary actors and institutions such as interest groups, political parties, and voluntary associations play an important role. The main research topics of political sociologists are voting behavior, new social movements, parties, civil society, and interest groups (usually input-oriented microlevel approaches), on the one hand, and state formation, transformations of political systems, and political reform processes (usually output-oriented macrolevel approaches), on the other.

In the past decades, the distinction between state and society gradually disappeared and has been replaced by a melding and blending of political and social phenomena. The rise of multinational corporations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the spread of international interdependencies and supranational arrangements changes the position and nature of the state, whereas rising levels of education, welfare, social security provisions, secularization, and individualization imply similar changes for society. As a consequence, political sociology as a field of study seems to have lost much of its traditional position to more specific approaches. The first question to be dealt with here concerns the distinction between the use of social factors to explain political phenomena (a “sociology of politics”) and the explanation of social phenomena using political factors (a “political science of society”). Political sociologists stress the reciprocal nature of these relationships and the need for integrated approaches. Second, the main theories used in political sociology—modernization theories, variants of Marxism, rational choice theories—are presented by following the debates since World War II. For each of these approaches, the major goals and attainments are presented and illustrated with a closer look at one or two seminal works. As will become clear, these newer approaches still rely on the presumption that a distinction—or at least an analytical distinction—between political and social phenomena makes sense. Finally, the consequences of the massive shifts in the relationships between state and society for political sociology as a field of study are scrutinized.

**An Interdisciplinary Hybrid**

Political sociologists study topics such as interest groups, state formation processes, old and new social movements, class-based power, public opinion, elites, trade unions, civil society, the spread of governance practices, and social and political participation. What do those very diverse subject matters have in common that arouses the curiosity of political sociologists? Ordinary answers to this question usually point to *power* and *domination* as core concepts to draw a line of demarcation. In this way, typical broad definitions of political sociology presented in social science encyclopedias refer to the “operation of power in social life” and the distribution of power at the various levels (individuals, organizations, communities, countries, etc.). Other definitions stress the “social causes and consequences of given power distributions” or the “study of power and domination in social relationships” as the defining characteristics of political sociology. In this way, it could include studies of the distribution of power in families, the
mass media, universities, parliaments, trade unions, and so on. These broad definitions underline the wide range of topics studied by political sociologists. Referring to power and domination is certainly helpful to characterize the field in general terms, but the use of these terms is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to define political sociology. Since virtually every topic studied by social scientists is related to the operation and distribution of power, further specifications are required. Such a more specific definition of political sociology as a field of study implies, first, a closer look at the distinction between the political and the social and, second, a specification of the presumed causal directions in our explanations and interpretations.

Any study of the relationships between political and social life—between state and society—is based on the conjecture that these two areas, indeed, can be distinguished. Yet in the history of ideas, this is a fairly recent invention. In his essay on the origins of political sociology, Walter Runciman (1963) points to the national state and the rise of the bourgeoisie in the 18th century as the main factors stimulating a distinction between the political and the social. Exactly that distinction made political sociology possible and sensible, and it initiated a wealth of studies focusing on the relationships between state and society from a wide variety of perspectives. More recently, a distinction between state and society or between the political and the social has become increasingly problematic. The developments in the last few decades show a remarkable extension of politics and political power. Besides, the distinction between political and nonpolitical activities or areas became blurred or disappeared completely. Yet characterizing political sociology on the basis of a distinction between social and political life does not presume that these two areas can be distinguished empirically unequivocally. In fact, using this distinction analytically and conceptually allows political sociologists to point out the historical roots of their discipline and to analyze actual developments in terms of a melding and blending of political and social phenomena.

Accepting an analytical and conceptual distinction between social and political life gives rise to a second complication. Traditionally, specific demarcations of political sociology are obtained by drawing attention to the relationships between state and society. In this approach, political sociology deals with the ways in which social and societal factors have an impact on political phenomena, or vice versa, it deals with the ways in which political factors influence social phenomena. The first perspective might be labeled as a “sociology of politics” and is common among American sociologists. For instance, the major aim of the Political Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association is to promote activities of those concerned with a sociological understanding of political phenomena. The combined Committee on Political Sociology of the International Sociological Association and the International Political Science Association (IPSA) relies on a somewhat broader approach. In their view, since political sociology is about the nexus between social and political life, the focus is on organizations or individual acts that seek to take or influence political power. Both approaches share an unambiguous interest in the relationships between state and society—they differ, however, in the extent to which the focus is on social factors. Whereas a “sociology of politics” stresses the relevance of social factors for political phenomena, a “political science of society” reverses the argument. In practice, the disciplinary roots of sociologists and political scientists appear to be highly relevant for the selection of one of these perspectives.

In his seminal article on sociology, political science, and political sociology Giovanni Sartori (1969) explicitly rejects the idea that political sociology is characterized by one of these single-directional perspectives. For him, political sociology is an interdisciplinary hybrid whose main goal is to combine social and political explanatory factors as suggested by both sociologists and political scientists. It is not the direction of impacts presumed in the analyses (social factors explaining political phenomena vs. political factors explaining social phenomena) but, more generally, the nexus between social and political life that defines political sociology as a distinct subfield.

As in every major area of the social sciences, political sociologists do not agree on a straightforward definition of their activities or the objects they study. A minimum consensus, however, includes the focus on power and domination in the relationships between social and political phenomena. Political sociologists use this last distinction for analytical and conceptual purposes and presume a
Political Sociology as a Field of Study

The reciprocal relationship between political and social life—that is, between the state and society. Claims by either sociologists or political scientists to seize political sociology as an exclusive subdiscipline are not only gratuitous but also do not teach us much about the distribution of power and domination.

The Rise and Fall of Modernization Approaches

Although its roots go back to the work of 19th- and early-20th-century social scientists (Karl Marx, Alexis de Tocqueville, Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Vilfredo Pareto, to mention only a few), the heydays of political sociology started after World War II. The spread of modernization approaches especially contributed to this advance. These approaches consider the development of societies as an evolutionary progressive process that is driven by economic and technological forces. Its basic ideas were spelled out by early social scientists and philosophers (Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx). Every society evolves from simpler to more complex ones and passes through various phases or stages depending on the available resources and challenges confronted. In this way, “primitive” societies will gradually become more complex, heterogeneous, and differentiated.

Political arrangements, especially state formation and nation building, develop accordingly and are attuned to the social requirements of each evolutionary stage or phase. Modern industrial society—with its capitalist ownership, market allocation, and division of labor—establishes the culmination of this progressive evolutionary process. Conceptualizing social and political developments in this way almost directly leads to the study of reciprocal relationships between social and political phenomena, that is, to the study of political sociology.

Modernization theories obtained their strongest impulses from the spread of structural-functional system theory as a universal framework for studying the evolution of societies. Mainly following the work of Max Weber, Talcott Parsons distinguished between four major social subsystems: the economic system, the political system, the community system, and the sociocultural system. These four subsystems are interdependent and each contributes to the persistence of the system as a whole by performing, respectively, four functions: adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latent-pattern maintenance (the AGIL scheme). Approaching the relationships between the social and the political on the basis of the Parsonian system theory has many evident advantages. First, a universal framework is presented that offers (functional) explanations for the development of entire societies as an evolutionary process. Furthermore, political phenomena are handsomely conceptualized as a distinct subsystem whose features and developments are systematically integrated in the system as a whole. Third, Parsonian system theory underlines the progressive character of the evolutionary processes studied: A structural-functional explanation is offered to show that primitive societies inevitably will become more complex, heterogeneous, and differentiated. In the end, all societies will converge to a liberal-capitalist society of the U.S. and Western European type.

Early examples of the application of modernization approaches by political sociologists can be found, for instance, in the works of Gabriel Almond, Seymour Martin Lipset, Stein Rokkan, or Robert Dahl. These authors mainly focus on the consequences of social arrangements for the distribution of power to assess the chances for democracy in capitalist society. Major variants include elite theories, pluralist theories, and class-based theories.

The idea that specific groups obtain privileged and leading positions in society directly follows from the basic presumption of modernization approaches that societies increasingly become more complex, heterogeneous, and differentiated. As such, the rise to power of specific groups (elites) is well founded in these theories. Traditional examples can be found in the works of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and especially Robert Michels. For Mosca, the driving force behind societal developments is the continuous struggle between groups to gain dominance and power. As a result, society always consists of two groups only: the dominating and the dominated, the powerful and the powerless. As Mosca, Pareto considers elites to be unavoidable. Since human beings are very unequal, society is, by definition, not homogeneous—and elites will not be homogeneous either. Following this argument, Pareto concludes that social change is always based on elite
circulation. The replacement of elites is also an important aspect of the work of Michels. Instead of continuous battles or circulation of elites, Michels presumes that a permanent amalgamation of members of old and new elites takes place. Elite amalgamation is ascertained in organizations, and so Michels focuses his attention on developments within organizations and, in particular, within political parties. On the basis of this work, he formulated his famous Iron Law of Oligarchy already in 1911: “Who says organization, says oligarchy.”

Pluralist theorists accept the idea that in modern societies elites are inevitable. For pluralists, however, this does not imply that in each area of social and economic life the very same elite group is in power. In fact, increasing complexity, heterogeneity, and differentiation of societal arrangements make it highly unlikely that a single group would be able to dominate several different areas at the same time. Pluralist approaches presume, first, that modern societies are complex and highly fragmented and, second, that different elites gain power in each area. As a result, social life is characterized by conflicts between elites from various areas, which are based on different groups. Pluralists do not simply consider these elites or conflicts between elites as a threat to democracy. On the contrary, especially because of elite competition, progress is possible, and group interests will be taken into account. To avoid the destructive consequences of severe conflicts between elites, the social groups on which they are based should overlap; that is, they should not be completely distinct. If these structural arrangements are fulfilled, successful democratization will be the outcome of modernization. An example of a pluralist approach is the seminal study of Robert Dahl on the distribution of power in an American community in the early 1960s. Conscientiously, he studied decision-making processes in various policy areas in a small town (New Haven, Connecticut) and was able to show the existence of distinct, competing elites in different areas. The existence of these elites does not endanger democracy; it is an essential precondition for its functioning.

Most class-based approaches accept the idea that societies increasingly become more complex, heterogeneous, and differentiated. Instead of focusing on elites, class-based theories prefer a broader conceptualization of the consequences of ongoing modernization for power struggles between social groups and for the resulting social inequalities. Broadly speaking, class as a term to depict some group of people is used in two ways: by referring, first, to functional contributions in (industrial) production processes (e.g., working class) or, second, to positions in some hierarchy (e.g., middle class or ruling class). Directly following Marx, political sociologists in the Marxist tradition use class concepts based on contributions to the production process. Other social scientists—among them Max Weber—prefer relational concepts. Since positions in a production process and in a social hierarchy are evidently related, actual research usually deals with both class concepts. In his seminal article on the “social requisites of democracy,” Lipset (1959) pointed to the fact that economic development is an important precondition for democracy. Modernization does not only result in complexity, heterogeneity, and differentiation but also implies massive expansion of production capacities and wealth. Increased wealth dampens class struggles and permits broad support for distributional compromises. Besides, a rising middle class will claim political rights and promote democratic values. These combined effects of modernization, Lipset argued, strongly favor democratization in countries with high levels of economic development.

Whereas Lipset searched for the mechanism behind democratization, Stein Rokkan attempted to explain the varieties of modernization in Europe. Political developments in Europe are, according to Rokkan, mainly a consequence of the deep-rooted cleavages that arose in the aftermath of several invasive events (the Reformation, nation building, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution). Since these events occurred differently in different places and times, European societies show both similarities and differences. Accordingly, political arrangements show similarities and differences too. Together Rokkan and Lipset analyzed these similarities and differences, especially for party systems and voter alignments in Europe: Evident similarities (such as the existence of social-democratic and Christian Democratic parties) are combined with striking differences (such as the spread of liberal parties). Rokkan and Lipset underlined the strong impact of cleavages by pointing out the fact that party systems and voter alignments in Europe
remained “frozen” from the early extension of suffrage until the mid-1960s; that is, the impact of social factors survived two world wars and severe economic turmoil.

The closeness of political sociology to modernization theories in the first 2 decades after World War II provided the upcoming discipline with many advantages. Nonetheless, from the very beginning, modernization theories provoked strong criticism—criticism that applied also to political sociology as its main intellectual ally. A major concern of many critics is the idea that (American) capitalist society and liberal democracy should be seen as the end-stage of a progressive evolution of humanity. This teleological tendency in modernization approaches is rejected as being ideologically biased and epistemologically unwarranted. On a closer look, the presumed progressive evolutionary process in many societies appeared to be fragile, inconsistent, nonmonotonous, and not necessarily following a European or Western model. Furthermore, the basic idea that economic and political developments are interdependent was challenged and replaced by a much more open approach conceptualizing economic and political modernization as two distinct processes whose potential interdependencies should be studied carefully instead of simply being taken for granted. Furthermore, methodological criticisms were raised. Since modernization approaches are based on general frameworks and claims of universality, the usual methods applied were quantitative and comparative (typically, statistical analyses of cross-national data in large-N designs). Newer approaches challenged these ideas and considered in-depth historical analyses and case-oriented methods (usually hermeneutic-interpretative and cultural-historical approaches in small-N designs) as much more appropriate to the study of complicated reciprocal relationships between the social and the political.

Main Approaches
In a somewhat exaggerated way, one might regard many developments in political sociology in the last half century as attempts to present alternatives for the apparent limitedness, erroneousness, and ideological bias of the modernization approaches of the 1940s and 1950s. Alternative approaches challenge the capitalist distribution of power and its implicated social inequalities as well as the strong emphasis on structural-functional arguments. These disputes reflect a more general change in the social sciences away from social-scientific approaches (emphasizing causal explanations based on regularities and mainly applying quantitative, comparative methods) toward cultural-scientific approaches (emphasizing specific cultural meanings and constructions of meanings; mainly applying qualitative, case-oriented methods). The three major groups of alternatives presented for liberal-capitalist modernization approaches consist of Marxist theories, critical and conflict theories, and postmodern and poststructural theories. But agents of social-scientific approaches did not simply abscond from the battle field. Following mainstream microeconomic theory, deductive approaches based on the idea of human rationality resulted in the blossoming of rational choice approaches as the key to understanding social and political developments. Besides, a revival of modernization theories—based on social-scientific as well as on cultural-scientific approaches—can be observed currently.

Marxism
Liberal-capitalist modernization approaches emphasize structural-functional interdependencies between the political subsystem and other parts of the system. In this sense, American society is usually depicted as the end-stage of progressive evolutionary developments. These propositions have been challenged by political sociologists working in a Marxist tradition. According to these approaches, the capitalist state is not some “subsystem” that adjusts itself in neutral ways to the functional requirements of other subsystems. The genesis of the late-medieval idea of a “state,” with its territorial-based claim on sovereignty, can only be understood by looking at the requirements enabling the accumulation of capital—that is, by looking at property rights and the protection of markets at home and abroad. In this way, social and political developments are based on developments in the production process and the accompanying arrangements to acknowledge rights and to legitimate the distribution of wealth. Like modernization theories, Marxist approaches depict liberal
capitalism as a stage in the progressive evolution of societies. Contrary to many modernization theorists, however, Marxists regard capitalism and liberal democracy as a transitory phase and not as the end-stage of this evolutionary process.

The renaissance of Marxist approaches in political sociology reaffirmed the idea that politics is based on social, in particular on economic, developments. Two main areas of research benefited especially from this advance: (1) state formation and state building and (2) the distribution of power and social inequalities. In his detailed study on the *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Barrington Moore showed that various countries took different routes to come to the modern industrial world. According to his view, the power of bureaucracies in raising taxes and granting privileges was counterbalanced by the nobility and the upcoming bourgeoisie, which laid the basis for democracy in England and France. Since these countervailing forces were largely suppressed by a coalition of bureaucrats and aristocrats in Germany (Prussia), dictatorship was more likely than democracy in Central Europe. Although Moore did not concentrate on state formation, his book highly stimulated the revival of analyses dealing with that topic, gradually moving the emphasis from Marxist theories based on economic primacy toward more complex approaches. Charles Tilly, especially, attempted to overcome the limitations of retrospective arguments and the neglect of noneconomic factors in explanations of the formation of national states in Europe. In his view, nation-states proved to be the most effective way to mobilize and organize the resources required for the severe political conflicts and wars in medieval Europe; that is, arms and warfare strongly stimulated the rise of the state. The renewed debate also provided the opportunity to move well beyond the eurocentrism of many approaches and to strongly stimulate interest in state developments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Economic causes also are at the heart of Marxist approaches dealing with the distribution of power in capitalist society and the implied social inequalities. George Domhoff, in a controversial publication, answered the question “Who rules America?” unambiguously: The country is dominated by political and economic elites. He stressed that the dominant pluralist approaches of the 1950s and 1960s tended to overlook class consciousness and class struggles in capitalist society and are slanted toward political decision-making processes instead of the resulting inequalities. Although he did not consider himself to be a Marxist, Domhoff’s approach and terminology clearly reflect the economic primacy characteristic of Marxist approaches.

Debates about the power structure in capitalist society were strongly influenced by the publication of Nicos Poulantzas’s work on classes and power in the late 1960s. The capitalist state, he argued, is not simply an instrument in the hands of the capitalists who use it for their own interests. Instead, the capitalist state is a relatively autonomous actor ensuring the smooth operation of capitalist society. It is the structure of the system—not the short-term interests and preferences of the capitalist class—that works to the benefits of that class. Therefore, major problems in capitalist society consist of the clashes between the demands of various classes, on the one hand, and the need for the system to provide social stability to reproduce itself, on the other. Authors such as Claus Offe expanded this line of reasoning by focusing on the unavoidable tensions produced by the actions of capitalist states to overcome class divisions without endangering the long-term benefits of the capitalist class.

With the theories of Tilly, Domhoff, and Offe, we have left orthodox Marxism. The relevance of economic factors is almost universally accepted; likewise economic determinism and economic reductionism are widely rejected as being one-sided and insufficient. With a few exceptions, political sociologists focus on reciprocal relationships between social and political phenomena and try to avoid one-way lines of reasoning in explanations of power and dominance.

**Neo-Marxism: Conflict Theories and Critical Theories**

Neo-Marxism is a rather loose term referring to approaches that amend Marxist theory, usually by incorporating elements from other traditions to overcome the deficiencies of orthodox Marxism, especially economic determinism and reductionism. Major blends of neo-Marxism consist of
combinations of Marxist approaches with conflict theories and critical theories. Conflict theories stress that resources are scarce. Therefore, conflict and competition, rather than cooperation and consensus are characteristic of human relationships in all societies. Struggles to maximize benefits and to defend interests depend on the ability and resources to exercise power and dominance in a society. Powerful groups use their power to exploit groups with less power—through brute force and suppression if necessary but also by securing ideological hegemony and structural advantages. Inevitably, permanent social struggles deeply affect the political and social order and imply societal and political changes. Conflict theories are unmistakably based on the work of Marx and Weber and are easily discernible in almost each and every sociological theory: pluralists, elitists, and class theorists all agree that conflicts and struggles between social or political groups are crucial to understand the reciprocal relationships between the social and the political. Conflict theorists, however, claim that these struggles are the exclusive driving force behind social and political developments.

Analyses of the distribution of power and dominance are the main objects of conflict theories. From this perspective, not only the work of Domhoff but also the classic study of C. Wright Mills depicting the American ruling class as a Power Elite can be seen as an important neo-Marxist and conflict-theoretical contribution to political sociology. In his book, Mills points out the strong overlapping of interests of the military, business, and political elites in the United States. Behind the façade of pluralism and interest differentiation, the aims of elites in various areas appear to be remarkably attuned and congruent to each other. By contrast, the ordinary citizen is perceived as relatively powerless and an easy subject of manipulation by those elites. Power, conflict, and social inequality, then, appear to be robustly related in the world’s largest liberal-capitalist democracy.

Class provides the major way to distinguish competing social groups in conflict-theoretical approaches. As we have seen, Marxists define classes based on the functional contributions of groups in production processes, whereas many other social scientists use the concept to refer to positions of groups in a hierarchy. Both conceptualizations usually refer to deep and persistent social distinctions. Yet class is certainly not the only distinction offering a basis for conflicts and struggles between various groups. Race and ethnicity definitely play an important role in many societies and are a cause of virulent conflicts both within and between states. In a similar way, geographical and regional differences are used to define conflicting interests. Furthermore, the social definition of distinct roles for men and women (gender) and the resulting inequalities lead to various conflicts and struggles. For centuries, religion has proven to be an extremely vigorous basis for social and political conflicts. Religion, and not class, played the key role in the political history of many European countries, and numerous contemporary conflicts in the world are based on religion. The list of social distinctions that can be articulated in conflicts between groups for power and dominance is virtually endless. As we have seen, Rokkan’s theory of long-standing social cleavages covers many diverse social distinctions and is an example of the openness of conflict-based approaches. In the early 1990s, Samuel Huntington advanced the proposition that world politics would be increasingly dominated by conflicts based on a Clash of Civilizations: People are likely to see “us” versus “them” in the relations between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion. According to Huntington, the resulting clash will take place not only between people and groups within states but also between states and between groups of states.

Conflict theories and critical theories have a lot in common. The main difference does not lie in the depiction of capitalist society as conflictual and contradictory but in the emphasis placed on the rejection of the positivist background of modernization approaches and conflict theories. Positivists—especially logical positivists—attempt to understand and explain social phenomena by searching for regularities and general statements. Besides, they strictly observe a distinction between facts and values and consider the normative consequences of their work as exogenous. Critical theorists reject that model of science and support emancipatory (usually anticapitalist) causes; that is, emancipation, freedom, and decreasing domination are explicitly stated as the normative bases for social research. According to critical approaches, the social sciences are not concerned with isolated
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Social phenomena but with society as a whole as well as its historical specificity. Consequently, critical theories cannot rely on work in distinct disciplines alone—understanding society requires the integration of all the major social sciences.

Critical theory originated with the Frankfurt School in the 1930s. In political sociology, important representatives are, among many others, Pierre Bourdieu and Jürgen Habermas. Bourdieu's main interests are the mechanisms that reproduce social hierarchies (inequalities). The reproduction of the social order and the simultaneous dominance of specific groups over others cannot be explained with economic factors only. Instead, Bourdieu stresses the relevance of educational and cultural factors for the active engagement of people in the (re)production of culture. In each society, people are struggling to reach their goals in distinct social arenas (fields such as the economy, sports, or the family). These struggles, however, depend not only on the objective conditions in each arena but also on the persistent skills and dispositions (habitus) of the people involved. The skills and dispositions generated are compatible with the objective conditions (including the development of different tastes for art or food in different arenas) and legitimize existing social structures. Moreover, they exclude improbable practices as unthinkable or unnatural. By focusing on the close interdependencies between objective and subjective factors, Bourdieu presents explanations for both the existence of social hierarchies as well as the reproduction of these hierarchies as social and political inequalities.

Already in the 1960s, Jürgen Habermas started his attempts to liberate critical theory from its Marxist and Frankfurt School roots. Whereas Bourdieu presents a sociological analysis of social processes of power distribution and the reproduction of inequalities, one of Habermas's main interests concerns the opportunities for democracy in the modern world. In his early study on *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, he explores the historical development of public contacts, characterized by an expansion of public interactions (from families to coffee houses and parliaments) and by a contraction through the market and bureaucracies. Public interactions, Habermas stresses, should enable people to interact with each other in critical ways on the basis of equality. Through self-reflection, critical knowledge can offer an important contribution to ascertain the public character of these interactions by enabling people to emancipate themselves from dominance. Basically, Habermas approaches modern society positively since its ongoing complexity and functional differentiation provide opportunities for democratic forms of self-organization. In other words, the very fact that complexity and differentiation make total control over social life in the modern world illusory enables people to gain control over their own life on the basis of mutual recognition and democratic interactions.

It is not always easy to distinguish between neo-Marxist, conflict-theoretical, or critical-theoretical approaches, and these labels are not used consistently. Moreover, many conflict theorists rely on critical approaches, whereas virtually every critical theorist stresses the importance of conflict between various groups in society. Yet they all dismiss Western-centered structural-functionalist modernization approaches as well as orthodox Marxism. Liberal capitalism is not seen as the end-stage of a progressive evolutionary process but as a system whose inherent social and political inequalities have to be confronted and battled against.

**The Cultural Turn: Postmodernism and Poststructuralism**

The rise of conflict and critical theories was mainly based on attempts to overcome the shortcomings of positivism, with its epistemological proximity to the natural sciences and its claims on normative neutrality. In addition, the economic determinism and reductionism of Marxism as well as the Western-centeredness of most approaches in early political sociology were criticized. Generally speaking, conflict and critical theories do not question the close interdependencies between structural (objective) and cultural (subjective) factors. Especially among French social scientists in the 1970s, attention shifted from structure to culture, and a new wave of post-Marxist approaches developed under labels such as postmodernism and poststructuralism.

Postmodernism and poststructuralism are part of the “cultural turn” in political sociology. In these approaches, cultural factors are considered to be more important for the study of power and
dominance in a society than structural ones. The emphasis is shifted toward (the construction of) meaning, and culture is considered to be more relevant than politics or economics. The rationale for this “turn” lies in the developments in modern societies as they could be especially observed in the United States in the late 1950s and 1960s. According to postmodernists and poststructuralists, life is defined on the basis of cultural factors: The cultures of consumerism, leisure, lifestyle, fashion, arts, and so on are much more important than positions in the production process or in some hierarchy. The spread of mass media strongly stimulates these cultures, and these are, in fact, important parts of the fundamental changes in society. Exactly because modern society is characterized by complexity, heterogeneity, and differentiation, people increasingly rely on cultural factors to define their life and their position within society. As a consequence, no common or general distinctions between groups of people can be presumed or predicted—it is exactly the apparent lack of common and general distinctions that characterizes postmodern societies.

Almost by definition, it is hard to find a common understanding of postmodernism. Literally, the term refers to the passing of “modernism” only. A regular feature of many postmodernists is that they clearly criticize “modern” society as it developed in the Western world in the past 2 centuries, especially its claims of being based on universal principles of progress, equality, and freedom. Postmodernists do not challenge the meaning or importance of each one of these principles. Instead, they reject the possibility of universal, normative, and ethical judgments in general and stress the relative nature of all such statements. From this, it follows that truth and knowledge depend on the social and historical context. Depicting scholars as postmodernists is a difficult task since most of them reject such general labels as being inconsistent with their theories. Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, and Anthony Giddens are among the most prominent authors being typified as postmodernist. For political sociology, Foucault and Giddens probably are the most influential.

The nature and distribution of power and dominance in societies are the major concerns of Foucault. He studies these topics in various institutions (such as psychiatric hospitals and prisons) and introduces a number of new concepts to deal with power and dominance. The concept discourse refers to the way in which language is used to express acceptable, institutionalized ways of thinking; it defines what can be said about a topic with the vocabulary and expressions available. Since every idea is phrased in some terms, discourses affect our views on everything. In that way, discourses construct the phenomena about which we speak. In other words, ideas, concepts, attitudes, and ideologies do not only arise within specific contexts, but they also define the way in which we consider the various aspects of those contexts. The study of power and dominance, then, is the study of discourses about power and dominance (such as texts, speeches, policies, and practices) in various historical and social settings. Therefore, to understand power and dominance, it is necessary to study both power and dominance themselves and the systems of knowledge that are used to produce power and dominance. According to Foucault, power is not possessed by individual people or groups but is an activity that all people can engage in. Exercising power will always provoke resistance and competition by challenging the dominant discourse. Starting with the discourse concept, Foucault’s actual work became the study of how knowledge is produced. Since knowledge production underlies the same principles of cultural conditioning and competing meanings as any other area, it cannot be based on structural determinants only. For that reason, these approaches are summarized under the label poststructural theories.

The interdependencies of structural and cultural factors also play an important role in the work of Giddens. With his theory of structuration he attempts to take into account that, although people are not free to do what they want and their knowledge is imperfect, there are acts of individuals that reproduce the social structure and enable social change. Therefore, what we call “society” can be understood neither as a set of institutions nor as a simple aggregation of all human acts. Relying more on Weber than on Marx, Giddens approaches social and political actions from the perspective that individual thoughts and behavior are structured by social institutions, conventions, and ethical codes. Besides, the social structure is reinforced and reproduced by the continuous repetition of human acts; that is, social action creates structures
that, at the same time, make social action possible. In this way, individual acts also provide the key for understanding social change: If people start to break from repetitive acts, the social structure will be reproduced differently.

Like Foucault, Giddens rejects a distinction between structure and culture. But whereas Foucault considers the two hopelessly entangled by the very same discourse they rely on, Giddens returns to the notion of mutual dependency. The idea that actions are constrained by structures, which are, in turn, created and reproduced by those very actions, avoids the fallacies of social determinism and reductionism. In modern societies, new information constantly challenges and modifies social practices, altering their character constantly, too. Since a sound foundation for knowledge is missing and the expansion of the social sciences increasingly results in differences of opinion, people more and more “reflect” on their own situation and the social structures they live in. As a result, uncertainty gradually drives out confidence and certitude. According to Giddens, we are observing not the rise of some postmodern society but merely a “radicalized modernity.”

**The Economic Turn: Rational Choice**

Neo- and post-Marxist theories revitalized theoretical thinking in political sociology and stimulated new directions. Postmodernist and poststructuralist scholars, especially, presented proposals for radically different approaches. Their extensive epistemological and ideological criticisms of positivist social-scientific theories and methods are accompanied by appeals for social-cultural approaches and the use of appropriate strategies. Yet research based on these approaches is usually characterized by rather narrow definitions of the actual objects studied in terms of power and dominance. Neo- and post-Marxists drew attention to the old questions about the relationships between structure and culture and did present new approaches to study these interdependencies. Not all social scientists are convinced, however, that approaches to deal with these questions necessarily have to be based on epistemological criticism, the rejection of positivism, or the application of radically new research methods.

Presumed causal links between social entities such as interest groups or states are difficult to analyze. What do we mean when we say, for instance, that “parties try to win elections” or that “economic development leads to democracy”? Usually, these phrases are not based on ontological presumptions about actual “behavior” of parties or economic systems but are shorthand for the activities of party leaders or middle-class people only. In fact, one could argue that causal explanations are only possible for human behavior—all other statements are interpretations based on the aggregation of the behavior of individuals and its consequences. By concentrating on the behavior of individual consumers, citizens, producers, and so on, macrosocial and macropolitical phenomena can be explained as aggregations of microsocial behavior. This so-called methodological individualism rescues the idea of regularities underlying social phenomena from neo- and post-Marxist attacks and reconfirms the search for regularities as an intellectually fruitful goal for the social sciences.

At least since the 19th century, deductive reasoning starting with straightforward axioms about individual behavior is the typical field of mainstream microeconomic theory. It is clear that many sociologists and political scientists are fascinated by the way in which economics proceeds and relies on rigorous deductive ways of thinking. This allure resulted in the rapid annexation of large parts of the social sciences by so-called rational choice approaches in the past decades. Individuals are presumed to have persistent “preference functions” that guide their actions: Each person attempts to reduce “costs” and maximize “gains” under specific constraints; that is, each individual tries to maximize his or her “utility.” Rational choice approaches rely on methodological individualism and the presumption that individual behavior and its consequences can be aggregated by using formal modeling and mathematical reasoning. Most rational choice theorists do not use the rationality of individuals as a necessarily correct description of human behavior. Instead, they stress the need for strict deductive reasoning starting with elementary statements and leading to the formulation of falsifiable hypotheses. Successful hypotheses are not necessarily based on intuitively plausible presumptions; successful hypotheses are those that survive rigid empirical testing. In this way, rational choice approaches provide prescriptions for both theoretical arguing (deductive and
formalized) and empirical work (falsification of hypotheses).

The application of rational choice theories in political science and sociology started in the 1950s and 1960s. Clearly working in the tradition of descriptive democratic theory presented by Joseph Schumpeter in his book *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Anthony Downs argued that citizens vote on the basis of a rational calculation of which party is most likely to meet their preferences. Voting decisions are similar to those of consumers in a market who calculate the costs (taxes) and benefits (public services) of choosing one political party rather than another. To win elections, parties try to locate themselves and their policies close to the median voter. In this way, both the behavior of individual voters and the strategies and policies of political parties are explained. From a sociological perspective, the advantages of using deductive reasoning started with the idea of individual rationality evident in Mancur Olson’s book, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, published in the mid-1960s. Why would rational individuals contribute to the production of collective goods that, by definition, are freely available to everybody? Olson argues that rational individuals will only join groups and contribute to collective goods if separate and “selective” incentives are provided that are strictly available for group members only. In other words, the provision of collective goods by rational individuals is only possible if the free rider problem is solved. Olson’s work bridges the gap between economical and sociological explanations of joint actions and group activities. As did Downs’s work on democracy, Olson’s work initiated a wealth of research on the consequences of individual behavior.

Rational choice approaches provide the instruments to study the microfoundations of macrosocial and macropolitical phenomena in rigorous ways. Even clearer than neo- and post-Marxism—which usually focus on power and dominance—rational choice does not provide an object specification but a specific method and research strategy principally based on positivist epistemology. Due to this openness, rational choice approaches have been applied to an enormous variety of themes and topics, many of which are in the field of political sociology: voting behavior, bureaucracies, state formation, interest groups, new social movements, social mobility, class reproduction, participation, and social capital are only a few of the most prominent examples. The almost unrestricted opportunities to apply rational choice approaches to various questions are clearly underlined by the use of rational choice as a basis for Marxist theories of class and exploitation. Jon Elster, especially, strongly rejects the functional explanations typical of Marxism and many other social sciences. Instead, he uses the analytical tools of rational choice approaches (especially methodological individualism) to provide microfoundations for the explanation of social and political phenomena.

Rigorous deductive reasoning usually takes individuals as a starting point, but—as phrases such as *rational choice institutionalism* already suggest—this does not imply a restriction to psychological explanations only. However, it is clear that rational choice simply takes “preferences” for granted and runs the risks of being circular, non-falsifiable, or even tautological. How can we tell when people are not acting in their own self-interest, and what counts as nonrational behavior? Some people define their preferences in terms of the public good and are prepared to risk their life for others and their own beliefs, but whatever they do, this can always be depicted as a “rational” calculation of self-interest. Critics of rational choice theories, therefore, do not reject the need for rigorous deductive reasoning in the social sciences but point to the limited advantages of restricting explanations of social and political phenomena to the consequences of individual behavior only. Preferences, interests, utility, or the application of rational strategies are all embedded in historical, cultural, political, and societal contexts and cannot merely be taken for granted and reduced to axioms in deductive arguments.

**The Return of the State and Modernization Approaches**

The cultural turn in political sociology mainly followed the general shift in many social sciences away from social-scientific approaches toward cultural-scientific approaches. Yet not every political sociologist was convinced by the arguments of neo- and post-Marxists to abandon modernization and positivism. Moreover, the cultural turn had
taught us a lot about power and dominance in areas such as sexual relations and national identities, but it contributed relatively little to our understanding of the reciprocal relationships between the social and the political. Postmodern theorists usually simply reject the usefulness of such concepts, and many authors inspired by conflict and critical theories would consider the relationships between social and political phenomena as a relatively unimportant specimen of more general questions about power and dominance. By contrast, rational choice theories have proven their usefulness in many areas of human behavior but do not seem to offer much for the explanation of, say, the rise of the nation-state or civic engagement in revolutionary eras.

Criticisms of structural-functional system theories and modernization approaches has not just led to a cultural turn of the neo- and post-Marxist type. In fact, some political sociologists continued to improve modernization theories and to apply them to social and political developments. A general feature of these approaches is that they are all highly stimulated by actual major social and political events in the past decades and not by the desire to contribute to epistemological and ideological debates or to develop a new research methodology. Faced with the wave of political unrest sweeping Western countries in the late 1960s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the success of European integration in the 1990s, and the ongoing processes of economic and political globalization, political sociologists renewed their interest in evolutionary approaches. Furthermore, the nation-state apparently did not disappear but appears to be surprisingly flexible and able to attune itself to the new challenges of a globalized world and the rise of many competitors. Within states, ongoing complexity, heterogeneity, and differentiation do not seem to result in converging social and political arrangements but in perceptibly different ones. Between states, we observe a continuous rise in the number of states and a further differentiation of their nature all over the world.

Pursuing his goals with determination and well aware of the cultural turn proposed by neo- and post-Marxists, Ronald Inglehart has been urging for a very different cultural turn ever since he published his theory of postmaterialist value change in the early 1970s. Confronted with the startling wave of political unrest in many Western countries in the late 1960s, he points to the rise of a new generation with value orientations that are different from those of their predecessors. As a consequence of ongoing modernization, the generation born after World War II, especially, rejects authority, material advantage, and tradition. Instead, it gives priority to goals such as self-fulfillment, participation, and lifestyle issues. As newer generations replace old ones, deep-seated social and political changes will take place (a “silent revolution”). Evidently, Inglehart uses a modernization-theoretical approach and positivist methods, but he does not presume that developments in modern society necessarily will be progressive. Nor does he take value priorities for granted. The share of postmaterialists among new generations is likely to increase only if economic growth is secured and social unrest remains absent. Originally starting with a focus on new modes of participation in Western countries, Inglehart expanded his research to almost every country in the world and to many aspects of social and political developments. Using standardized comparative surveys of representative population samples, his work also shows that epistemological criticism of positivist approaches does not necessarily mean that highly interesting information about social and political developments cannot be obtained. Moreover, methodological individualism and deductive reasoning are not exclusive privileges of rational-choice approaches.

Modernization theories experienced a strong revival with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of democratic political systems around the world in the early 1990s. At first, the question about the causes or favorable conditions for democratic changes attracted renewed attention. Was the old Lipset thesis about the social requisites of democracy still valid? On the basis of a strong correlation between democracy and economic development, many authors concluded that economic development provides sufficient (and probably also necessary) conditions for democracy. Yet deviate cases are easy to find. For instance, Nazi Germany was a dictatorship in spite of being economically advanced, and India is a vibrant democracy despite its socioeconomic problems, which casts doubts on the general validity of the argument. Economic development plays an important role, indeed, but is certainly not the only motivating force. Returning
to the work of Tocqueville, Robert Putnam (1994) showed that democracy relies on an active "civil society" and much less on economic development. His theory unequivocally underlines the need for social capital (especially trust and confidence) to produce collective goods efficiently. As Tocqueville had observed in the United States in the early 19th century, voluntary associations are extremely important for the functioning of democracy since in these clubs, groups, organizations, alliances, associations, and the like, people develop and maintain social networks. Established social networks, in turn, facilitate social trust, which enables the production of goods without coercion. The functioning of democracy is such a major collective good. Putnam's research in Italy and the United States initiated a lively debate on the "social requisites of democracy"—depicting social capital as the crucial determinant and curtailing the importance of economic factors.

Whereas Putnam's work focuses on requirements for the functioning of democracy, the establishment of democracy is a different topic. Analyses of a transition (or transformation) of a political, social, and economic system require encompassing approaches based on explicit specifications of the reciprocal relationships between social and political developments. For the transition of authoritarian systems into democratic ones, evolutionary approaches distinguishing between distinct phases or stages of democratization rely heavily on Samuel Huntington’s idea of a “third wave.” The first wave of democratization (from the mid-19th century to the end of World War I) coincided with the rise of the nation-state, whereas the second one, starting after World War II through the early 1960s, was mainly the result of decolonization. According to Huntington, the third wave, from about 1975 to the end of the 20th century, consists of the spread of democracy in Latin America and Asia and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Economic growth, the declining legitimacy of authoritarian rule, and the changing role of the Catholic Church as well as international structural factors such as the rise of the European Union and the agreement on human rights included in the Helsinki Treaty in 1975 all contributed to the spread of democracy. By the end of the 20th century democracy had reached all regions of the world. South America, all of Europe, and considerable parts of Asia and Africa have been turned into democracies. At the same time, it is clear that the three waves are characterized by different processes and that no general explanation for democratization is available. As Huntington and numerous other scholars have shown, democracy can be reached through many different paths.

Modifying the modernization framework of the 1950s proved to be very helpful in studying democratic transformations. The idea of evolutionary social and political developments with distinct phases or stages appeared to be even more helpful for the study of democratic consolidation. In each phase or stage, the changing relationships between social and political factors are specified. In the initial phase, opposition toward the ruling elite and undemocratic arrangements is mobilized. The request for more liberty is broadly accepted and generally seen as the main goal. The next phase is characterized by the establishment of institutional arrangements to replace the old undemocratic ones. A new constitution is adopted, and general elections are organized for the first time. An easy return to the Old System is no longer feasible. In the advanced phase, attention shifts toward the achievements of the new democracy to satisfy group interests, and economic performance becomes crucial. Finally, the phase of democratic consolidation is reached where the new arrangements are institutionalized, and the system is able to meet the demands and expectations of large parts of the population.

The study of democratic transformation and consolidation, once again, shows the advantages and pitfalls of modernization-theoretical approaches to study links between social and political phenomena. Especially, the use of phases and stages easily runs the risk of backsliding into teleological and ideological prejudices. Just as American liberal-capitalism was the highest stage of social development in the evolutionary modernization theories of the 1940s and 1950s, various transformation and consolidation theories implicitly take democracy as the “highest” or “most sophisticated” system. All other systems are lumped together as negative deviations from this ideal, under terms such as illiberal democracy, pseudodemocracy, partial democracy, or defective democracy. More recent approaches reject teleological interpretations and treat political systems with a mixture of authoritarian and democratic features not as “deviant” cases.
but as novel systems. Obviously, these approaches do not exclude the chance that the direction of democratization processes can be reversed. Only a close look at the reciprocal relationships between state and society can provide explanations for a return to authoritarian rule.

The introduction of concepts such as postmaterialism, social capital, or transformation and consolidation establishes a cultural turn in political sociology that is quite different from the cultural turn initiated by neo- and post-Marxists. The new variants of modernization approaches do not presume that increasing complexity, heterogeneity, and differentiation inevitably prepare the way for a liberal-capitalist society as the highest stage of human development; they do, however, presume that the opportunities for democratic transformation and consolidation strongly depend on the social and economic development of a society. Further, the revival of modernization approaches did not follow the shift in the social sciences from social-scientific approaches toward cultural-scientific approaches and its accompanying change in research methodologies. Discussions about the character of political systems are usually based on quantitative, standardized, and comparative indicators (e.g., the Freedom House Index or large cross-national surveys among populations), and terms such as social capital and the third wave clearly underline attempts to summarize divergent phenomena under general concepts and to stress regularities. In a similar manner to rational choice approaches, recent modernization approaches are not based on a rejection of positivism or appeals for a radically different epistemology.

The End of the State?

Political sociology has come a long way since its start in the 19th century. The heydays of modernization approaches in the 1940s and 1950s seemed to mark the definite breakthrough and establishment of political sociology as an independent subdiscipline. Yet the list of criticisms and objections against conventional political sociology is long, and many modifications and alternatives have been presented. Furthermore, the main object of political sociology—power and dominance in the reciprocal relationships between state and society—changed dramatically in the last few decades. As a consequence, political sociology has been confronted with the dual task of dealing with severe epistemological and ideological criticism and with deep-seated changes of its object at the same time. Several appeals for a paradigm shift, a new political sociology, and a political sociology for the 21st century have been presented. For instance, Kate Nash (2000) pleads for a new political sociology that should not be mainly concerned with states or class-based approaches to narrowly defined political phenomena but with cultural politics. These “politics” should be understood in the broadest possible sense, and the focus is on conflicts about social identities and structures and the opportunities to change them. Although this depiction does not exclude the state as a major object of political sociology, it is clear that power and dominance are the key features of such a new political sociology.

For discussions of actual and desirable modifications of political sociology, a reappraisal of the changing position of the state is required. Traditionally, political sociologists have a complicated relationship with the state as their pet topic. They celebrate the concept as the main subject matter of their studies of state formation, the development of the state (especially the nation-state), and the chances for democratic consolidation. They study the ongoing blending and melding of social and political phenomena within states and observe the blurring of the distinctions between the two in an era of radicalized modernity. Some of them examine the disappearance of the state in a world characterized by globalization and increasing interdependencies. Others observe the rise of new forms of the state (particularly in Europe) and study the evaporation of states confronted with powerful multinational corporations, criminal gangs, or NGOs. By the mid-1980s, the diminishing position of the state as a central topic for political sociologists was counterbalanced by attempts to “bring the state back in.” Following appeals by Theda Skocpol and her collaborators, the state was rediscovered and reacknowledged as an autonomous actor. Formal political institutions, especially, attracted renewed attention as important factors for the distribution of power and dominance. Not only the behavior of politicians but also that of citizens or elites is relevant for the relationships between state and society: The constitutional framework, electoral laws, the composition of government, and many
other institutional arrangements are evidently relevant as well. In short, institutions matter.

Among the divergent depictions of the position of the state, all agree that the domain of politics lost its characteristic features and government its preeminent position in the distribution of wealth and the management of public services in society in the past decades. For many, the distribution of power and dominance changed fundamentally with the changing nature and position of the state. The observation that nowadays there is no escape from politics is correct but does not imply that the social and the political cannot be distinguished analytically and conceptually. With its traditional focus on the reciprocal relationships between the political and the social, political sociology is essentially open to all these observations and interpretations. The question remains, however, as to whether the changes in the nature and position of the state require a new political sociology—and if so, what such a renewal should look like.

The rapid and permanent changes of the relationships between state and society are highly relevant for political sociologists, and none of the processes referred to can or should be abandoned as study topics. Examining the consequences of these developments, Irving Horowitz (1999) observed that classical political sociological approaches are not very useful since we are confronted by a “larger scale,” which lies very far beyond anything that could have been imagined by Montesquieu, Tocqueville, Durkheim, or Weber. Although important, the idea of differences in scale between traditional and actual states and societies does not cover the fundamental changes experienced. Studying these changes and their implications for the relationships between state and society is only possible if political sociologists stick to a broad conceptualization of the political and the social and avoid any a priori restrictions. Major developments relevant for making political sociology more amenable to study are discussed as follows.

Identity

The consequences of the ongoing process of blending and melding of social and political phenomena for citizens are hard to summarize. Many authors have pointed out changes in social identity—that is, the ways in which individuals label themselves as members of particular groups. Social identity can be based on nation, class, ethnicity, gender, and so on and has important consequences both for the individual concerned and for the distribution of power and dominance in society. For political sociologists, the fact that societies increasingly become more complex, heterogeneous, and differentiated always implied a constant change in social groups. Especially, critical theorists emphasize that in postmodern societies, the development of social identities cannot be explained by structural factors alone. Instead, it is the process of acquiring identities itself that has changed. Although usually starting with quite different assumptions, much of the work on social capital and political culture is also based on the recognition that blending and melding of social and political developments have radically changed the ways in which people identify with groups. Social identity—and not the structural aspects of the social or the political—becomes increasingly relevant for political sociology.

Civil Society

Closely related to the rising relevance of social identity is the need for a reassessment of the role and function of groups and associations in societies, where social and political processes are hard to distinguish. Considered to be intermediaries between state and society, groups and associations have been textbook topics in political sociology for a long time. More recently, several authors point to the fact that a shift from state-centered governance toward self-governing associations in civil society can be observed. Groups and associations still perform many of their traditional functions—such as interest mediation and mobilization—but instead of being participants among many other participants, they gradually developed into more independent entities, claiming to be essential elements of the fabric of domestic society. Clearly, in the spirit of many political sociologists, starting with Tocqueville and Marx, democracy and civil society are seen as two sides of the same coin. In a world characterized by the blending and melding of the social and the political, the rise of civil society and its drive to replace conventional interest groups and associations is one of the most interesting challenges for political sociologists.
States and Other Actors

Acknowledging the end of the dominant position of the state implies the recognition of the increasing relevance of other actors and participants. This expansion can be easily accepted and discussed in terms of the erosion of sovereignty or the loss of regulatory control by the state. Important aspects include struggles between states and big companies (limits of private initiatives, antitrust legislation, etc.) and competition between multinational corporations. The most threatening danger here is that the main advantage political sociologists realized in the past few decades—the rejection of attaching a priori causal direction to either society or the state in their analyses—is given up effortlessly and replaced by a fashionable depiction of the state as the main loser in a world controlled by multinational corporations and NGOs. Unless political sociologists come up with fruitful conceptualizations of the relationships between states and other actors, we will see a revival of society-centered approaches and a relapse to a sociology of politics of the pre-Sartori era.

Democracy

Democracy is closely linked to the rise of the national state and clearly defined within its borders. States can do very well without being democratic, but so far, it has taken the organized and limited forms of political power of the conventional state to promote democracy: no state, no democracy. Furthermore, democracy continues to spread around the world. Freedom and liberty are not restricted to wealthy countries, and many poor and developing states have a record of respecting political rights and civil liberties. The problem with this development, however, is that it appears to be rather easy to create a blend of formal democracy and political corruption, civil rights abuses, and autocratic rule. While only a few countries have slid backward into military rule, many more seem to reach a standoff or cease-fire between democratic and nondemocratic forces, where elected governments fail to regulate or take control of the most powerful social and economic groups in society. For political sociologists, very interesting cases and questions develop that bring us back to the heart of the traditional discussions about social conditions for democratic rule—and for undemocratic rule.

Globalization

Since democracy is closely linked to the nation-state, many scholars emphasize that globalization presents new challenges to the study of the reciprocal relationships between state and society. If political power is no longer concentrated in states, then democratic control should be expanded beyond the borders of the state. A global civil society is presumed to fill the gaps here. The struggles between competing groups in a globalized world, however, are a familiar topic for political sociologists, and no radical changes are required to deal with questions about democracy and globalization. Yet the old focus on reciprocal relationships between the social and political within states is no longer appropriate, and the global connections and interdependencies of social, economic, and political actors should also be considered.

New Technologies

It is not just advocates of modernization approaches who presume that technical developments in communication and transportation have a clear impact on power and dominance between individuals and groups. As the cliché goes, the world has become smaller in many respects in the past few decades. Important consequences of this development are already included above under headings such as changing identities and globalization. New technologies further reduce the traditional lines of demarcation between social and political phenomena by making information universally available and communication a routine matter. There does not seem to be much need to expand studies on the impact of technological innovations in general, but political sociologists should include the spread of new technologies as an important aspect of each of the aforementioned five topics.

Recent social-end political developments—the rise of postmodern civil society, democratization, globalization, and new technologies—have important consequences for political sociology because they fundamentally change the distribution of power and dominance. The conventional distinction between
the social and the political as the main object of interest for political sociologists, however, is absolutely indispensable for analytical purposes. Precisely because the state appears to change its nature and position rapidly, a coherent conceptual framework is required to study these developments. Appeals for a new political sociology lay too much emphasis on the ways in which the world is changing and tend to undervalue the analytical and conceptual clarity provided by the old approaches. New directions for political sociology, then, should be based on the acceptance of fundamental changes and of evident continuities in the role and position of the state as well as on the recognition of the need for theoretical and conceptual innovations and on the demonstrated usefulness of available approaches.

**Political Sociology as a Field of Study?**

The heydays of political sociology appear to be over at first glance. Newer approaches and variants—such as neo-institutionalism, comparative sociology, political economy, comparative politics, and postmodernism—gradually seem to seize the intellectual arenas that used to be reserved for political sociologists. The almost euphoric postwar period of widely shared structural-functional modernization approaches was followed by vivacious controversies about the object of the discipline as well as its epistemological foundations and methodological performance. Two cultural turns, one economic turn, and a renaissance of modernization theories apparently left the field dispersed and divided. Feasible accounts for this ostensible decline are, first, the disappearance of a clear-cut distinction between the social and the political and, second, a general move toward more specialized subfields in the social sciences.

Already, Runciman depicted the enormous “expansion of the political” as the most important change in the history of the modern state. This development still continues. Important as this extension is in quantitative terms, we experience not only a strengthening of the position of the state but also a change in the nature of the relationships between the social and the political. The distinction between state and society—the main premise of political sociology—has gradually disappeared with the expansion of the state and has been replaced by a much more ambiguous melding and blending of state and society. The reluctance to deal with the changing distribution of political power within and between states probably contributed considerably to the decline of political sociology as a self-reliant field of study. Power and dominance can be studied in many spheres of life—hospitals, neighborhoods, executive boards, and so on—without referring explicitly to some reciprocal relationships between the social and the political. However, it is precisely the disappearance of a clear distinction between state and society that makes the study of power and dominance much more interesting and relevant by focusing on the connections between the two phenomena; that is, power and dominance are not the main objects of interest in themselves but as part of the processes underlying the dissolution of the conventional distinctions between state and society. Political sociology as a field of study offers excellent opportunities to deal with the melding and blending of the social and the political.

A second explanation for the apparent decline of political sociology is related to the move toward more specialized subfields in the social sciences. This change is part of the more general change away from social-scientific approaches (emphasizing causal explanations based on regularities, mainly applying quantitative, comparative methods) toward cultural-scientific approaches (emphasizing specific cultural meanings and constructions of meanings, mainly applying qualitative, case-oriented methods). With the economic turn and the renaissance of modernization approaches, this general change is counterbalanced. As a result, many subfields flourish, while the label political sociology increasingly appears to be too unspecific. The apparent decline of political sociology as a field of study, then, is at least partly due to the evident accomplishments of the initial enterprise: If many more specialized subsubfields carry on successfully, the broader idea loses much of its appeal.

Political sociologists continue to contribute to our understanding of the distribution of power and dominance in society. Many of the actual topics suggested by advocates of new approaches—identities, citizenship, new social movements, and so on—do not differ from topics studied by traditional envoys of political sociology. Instead of debating claims for new approaches or paradigm shifts, the consensus about the selection of relevant
topics should be stressed. Political sociologists have been mainly concerned with input-oriented microlevel approaches (voting behavior, new social movements, parties, interest groups, etc.), on the one hand, and with output-oriented macrolevel approaches (state formation, transformations of political systems and political reform processes, etc.), on the other. The very rapid spread of rational choice approaches in many social sciences in the past few decades reflects a need for more precise theoretical arguments than is usually provided by available approaches. Therefore, the most important theoretical enhancements in political sociology as a field of study focus on the reformulation of existing approaches in more rigorous ways—that is, in more deductive ways. Note that this does not necessarily imply a reduction of all behavior to naive utility maximizing nor does it require the use of formal modeling or quantification. Institutions, norms, and values; historical peculiarities; collective goods; and frustrations all can have a place in deductive theories attempting to provide microfoundations for macrophenomena. Forthcoming theoretical approaches in political sociology as a field of study, then, will mainly consist of attempts to provide these foundations.

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See also Class, Social; Cleavages, Social and Political; Marxism; Modernization Theory; Postmodernism in International Relations; Power; State

Further Readings


POLITICAL SYSTEMS, TYPES

The term political system is an abstract concept and is used widely and often with different meanings. In this entry, a political system is defined as a form of governing society that is embedded in a legal (constitutional), economic, and cultural environment. The essence of a political system relies on the interdependence of its institutions (rules of the political game) and collective actors (political
parties, organized interests, governments, and bureaucracies) that operate within such a system. From this definition, it follows that political systems are seen as a whole: Authority is exercised over a territory through the body politic, including its state format, organization of public decision making, and related processes of policy formation. The study of types of political systems is—almost by definition—comparative by means of developing typologies. One can distinguish between two directions in the study of types of political systems: one, the descriptive approach and, two, the analytical approach by developing typologies.

The descriptive approach has a long-standing history in political science and focuses on typologies of political systems—often on the basis of taxonomies, that is, a (more or less) logical ordering of types that are hierarchically organized. An example of such a taxonomy is Aristotle’s classification of political regimes. On the one hand, Aristotle divided the politics of his time into two types: good versus corrupt governance. Many of these typologies have been developed over time, and more often than not, they were directed by normative ideas (e.g., Montesquieu, the separation of powers). Other typologies have been driven by forms of culture, economic systems, or stages of societal development, and so on. All these classifications are not only subject to normative belief systems but are also limited, as they describe the state of affairs rather than explain how and why these differences have emerged or what they pertain to.

The analytical approach aims at developing comparative typologies that are not only (or only indirectly) normative but also evidence based. One of the earliest attempts was made by Lord Bryce, who compared the democracies of his time by means of seeking the commonalities between democratic systems that made them different from other political systems (e.g., direct vs. indirect forms of representation and decision making). Others tried to develop classifications on the basis of theory (e.g., Max Weber’s trichotomy of traditional, charismatic, and rational rule and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s idea of variations in political culture) or by means of evidence-based induction (e.g., Arend Lijphart, 1999).

The use of typologies in political science is widespread and considered as useful for theory development, descriptive analysis, and reducing. This entry first elaborates the method of typology construction and offers some examples. As will become clear, the use of a typology is more often than not an instrument for analysis in comparative political science (see also Paul Pennings, Hans Keman, & Jan Kleinnijenhuis, 2006). Second, this entry discusses a number of existing typologies of political systems that can be labeled as descriptive and have figured in comparative political science. Third, the focus is on typologies where the aim is to explain the patterned variation in politics that emerges from empirical investigation. For example, Robert Dahl and Arend Lijphart have developed typologies to highlight the intradifferences within democratic polities. Whereas the former focuses on the institutional configuration of rules and rights resulting in polyarchy, the latter developed a typology (i.e., majoritarian vs. consensus democracy) to understand the actual working of a democratic political system. Finally, the entry moves to a specific approach in political science: A Systems Analysis of Political Life (1965) as developed by David Easton. This approach is deductive and claims to explain the variations across diverse systems. In this approach, the organization of government is the core of each system. This approach is elaborated by examining patterned variations of government.

Developing a Typology

Although typologies are not exclusive to comparative politics, they are frequently used in this subdiscipline to sustain and develop arguments as regards the organization and institutional design of political systems. This is not surprising since political systems are seen as closed entities (like states, polities, governments, etc.). To reduce the real-world complexities, comparativists have always made attempts to translate their ideas on political systems into typologies. Aristotle did so, as did Polybios (comparing various Greek city-states) and, later, Montesquieu and Lord Bryce.

Typologies are seen to be useful as a proto-theory. They are used not only to reduce complexity but also to inspect certain (hypothetical) relationships. For instance, one can develop a typology that combines two dimensions such as democracy (yes/no) and economic development
(high/low) and inspect the hypothesis that democracy and welfare correlate. It is easy to understand that such relatively simple typologies are more often than not victim of the choices made by the researcher and, therefore, lead to biased perspectives. However, as a proto-theory, a typology can certainly help refine and develop concepts. Furthermore, a typology assists in observing to what extent concepts function empirically. In short, a properly developed typology is conducive to concept formation, theory development, and validation in view of empirical evidence (Mattei Dogan & Dominique Pelassy, 1990).

Typology development is in some ways a Scylla and Charybdis problem: On the one hand, simple typologies can enhance clarity in a systematic fashion; on the other hand, however, over-elaboration lurks around the corner (by developing too many categories or subdivisions within one category). Although a refined typology can be useful and points to all logical possibilities, it also tends to produce confusion and complexity. There is no solution to this problem other than empirical verification. As a methodological principle, the researcher has to follow as a rule of thumb that a classification scheme as applied to a typology should include as many real cases as feasible, and at the same time, these cases should exclusively fit only one of the cells of the typology. This means that arbitrary cases are to be avoided as much as possible. This not only avoids confusion but also prevents the occurrence of hybrid systems.

Take for example Lijphart’s typology of democracies (Lijphart, 1968). There are two dimensions: (1) elite behavior (cooperation vs. competition) and (2) whether society is divided or not (homogeneous vs. fragmented societies). This leads to a 2 × 2 typology with four types: centripetal, centrifugal, depoliticized, and consociational. In this typology, the basic argument is that under divisive societal conditions—where sociocultural cleavages are politically organized (by parties or organized interests)—the key condition for stability is elite behavior (being the first dimension of the typology) to regulate political behavior at the mass level. Lijphart argues that whether elites produce stability depends on the type of conflict in plural societies.

So far, so good: There is an explanation, and it appeared plausible (at the time). However, others have also attempted to use this typology for other systems and found it difficult to decide for all relevant cases where to locate them in this fourfold table or to accept that the proposed mechanism did indeed explain the political process for all the cases in each separate cell. This is not the place to discuss Lijphart further. The main point is that typologies often flounder in view of empirical evidence or are biased in terms of case selection and measurement problems. In addition, one problem with this is that many typologies tend to be exclusively focused on the commonalities among the cases rather than taking into account the differences that exist. Finally, sometimes cases do not fit the defined cells because of additional circumstances that defy the hypothesized relationship. In other words, typology construction is certainly a useful tool for comparing political systems, but it is also vulnerable to misplacement and biased results.

In summary, typologies are considered as a useful instrument to develop a proto-theory or a conceptual design and can serve as operational controls on how far they travel in reality. In addition, typologies help reduce the complexities of researching political systems in order to create a systematic account of how the real world can be ordered. Even taking into account the pitfalls and the caveats mentioned here, the typology has been and continues to be one of the foremost tools of comparative political science. Hence, and this is the topic of the next section, typologies are an essential analytical step to analyze and investigate types of political systems.

**Descriptive Typologies of Political Systems**

Throughout the development of political science, classifications have been developed, and those of Polybios, Aristotle, Montesquieu, and others have already been mentioned. A number of these are basically (unidimensional) listings according to a feature considered to be a central one, such as, for example, the “state” or “forms of government,” as has been developed by Samuel Finer (1997). Other examples are developmental classifications that define historical stages of society, each producing a specific type of political authority.

A classic example is Friedrich Engels’s description of the change and development from a primitive society to a communist society. This anthropological
Political Systems, Types

approach related the production/consumption patterns of society to political authority (from absence of rule to authoritarian rule to self-rule). This teleological model can be seen as an almost conditional set of political-economic stages predicting the type of political system to emerge in the course of history, based on Marxist ideas regarding societal development culminating in “classless communism.”

Max Weber, a famous German sociologist, has earned a reputation by defining the state as well as developing a typology of ruling systems. Whereas his definition of the state essentially rested with the exercise of (legitimate) power over a territory, his typology concerned an ideal type that served as a proto-theory, arguing that the degree of state development is associated with a certain type of political rule, of which the rational-legal rule (i.e., bureaucracy) is the modern one.

Contrary to Engels’s teleological approach, the Weberian approach can be considered as a proto-theory. Most approaches before the 1960s were in fact descriptive, were based on broad—if not vague—analytical distinctions, and often tended to be close to teleological reasoning (i.e., a future goal-oriented argument). In particular, developmental studies focusing on the poorer regions suffered from this bias.

More recently, classification-based typologies of wholesale political systems are becoming less popular among comparativists. The analytical focus of researchers concerned with the study of political systems has shifted to highlighting specific features of political systems. This change in focus also meant that typologies were confined to specific types of systems such as democracies. Examples are party systems, electoral systems, cleavage systems, parties, governmental features, and so on (see, e.g., Dogan & Pelassy, 1990).

Jean Blondel (1982) developed, for instance, a simple comparative typology of party systems by counting the number of parties that are represented on average (from a two-party system to a multiparty system). This would explain the differences between legislatures in terms of interactions between parties and government. His contemporary, Maurice Duverger, argued that the effect of a party system is related to government stability: The fewer the number of parties, the more stable party government would be. Hence, according to Maurice Duverger, the nexus between the electoral system and the party system could be considered as a predictor of how a (democratic) political system would function. In fact, Duverger’s law (as it is also known) is conducive to a typology of electoral laws and system stability. The so-called first-past-the-post electoral system would be superior to proportional representation because it produces a stable single-party government as opposed to an unstable coalition government. Most of the classifications made regarding electoral and party systems, however, remain simple, but as regards questions of voting and party behavior, they are merely descriptive.

Stein Rokkan is also well-known and respected for his work on modeling (the term Rokkan is used for developing a typology of political systems) the emergence of national states in Europe. His concern was to understand how political systems developed to take on the contemporary shape and organization of the nation-state in Europe. To this end, he developed grids of reference or, in fact, dimensions to account for the functional and territorial differentiation across the European area from a historical perspective. In his view, the only way to do so is to make macromodel comparisons that are subsequently specified by means of region-specific models and highlighted by individual cases.

Rokkan’s typology (see Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle, & Derek Urwin, 1999) contains, first, a trichotomy: economy—territory—culture. From these master dimensions, specific indicators to analyze pathways to the contemporary form of the state are developed: religious diversity, linguistic variation, ethnic distinctiveness, dispersal of land ownership, urbanization, industrialization, trade, geographical location and size (including center/ periphery situations), (de)centralization of authority, and polity formation (constitutional development). This grid of reference served the purpose of accounting for the cross-system variation of state formation over time and ultimately of explaining the Europe-wide democratization within the emerging nation-state.

Rokkan’s model is—in retrospect—less a model and more a typology since the classification is conducive to certain types (or paths) of democratization that are more favorable than others (earlier fully accomplished democratization). It enables the researcher to examine both the similarities and the differences in the development of political systems
Political Systems, Types (in Europe). In addition, it was the basis for understanding not only how political systems emerged but, foremost, how they shaped the democratic state in the early 20th century. Although Rokkan’s work is widely acknowledged, it is nowadays more often politely referred to than actually used.

Another attempt to develop a diachronical typology of political systems stems from Finer (1997). His attempt focused on regime types that identify over time the organization of political authority (or who governs). Finer listed four “pure” types: palace, forum, nobility, and the church, representing the type of rule. In addition, the four types could well develop as hybrids. The resulting 10 cells serve as an empirical grid to be filled by real-world cases; for example, the pure church category only concerns two cases: the Vatican and Tibet, whereas forum includes all modern, secular democracies. However impressive Finer’s book is, the typology is purely descriptive and fails to pass the mentioned methodological rule of thumb on typologies: In many cases, one may question whether there are overlaps in the located position of cases or whether cells remain (almost) empty.

The typologies presented so far are mixtures of description and modest explanation. Second, they represent either whole-system approaches or systemic (intrasystem) typologies (e.g., electoral systems or types of government). Third, it must be noted that many of these typologies of political systems are often forgotten or only sparsely used at present. Yet there is an exception to this: In 1996 (originally 1989), Denis and Ian Derbyshire published *Political Systems of the World*. In this monumental and ambitious book, the authors set out to cover all existing political systems (N = 192 at the time), classify them according to social and economic influences, and highlight a number of particular political features common to many but not all: a constitutional design, an ideological base, executive/legislative relations, an electoral system, and political parties. In other words, Derbyshire and Derbyshire follow the traditional pattern of descriptive analysis of political systems (i.e., the unit of comparison is the independent state). Although the book contains some cross-tables that hint at more elaboration, most of the (useful) information is based on one-dimensional classifications. In fact, it concerns a kind of political map of the (contemporary) world, and only the sections on ideology and political parties can be considered analytically novel.

The authors argue that, in addition to parties competing for office or representing the population as a whole (as under communist rule), there are pressure groups and interest groups that are functionally equivalents of parties within the political system. Therefore, Derbyshire and Derbyshire introduced the concept of corporatism as an alternative mode of interest representation vis-à-vis pluralism. In fact, they introduce a new type of state: the corporatist state. Apart from the fact that this type of state (as far as it [has] existed) is limited to Western Europe with some similar practices elsewhere, it is questionable whether or not this type of polity is relevant to understanding political systems all over the world in a comparative perspective.

The ideological base of a political system is considered by Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) as “a body of ideas which reflects the beliefs and values of a nation and its political system” (p. 23). Hence, in their view, the ideological base of a political system (i.e., national state) refers to a (often underlying) shared belief system on dominating values within a society (including religion). As the authors admit, the labeling of nation-states by ideological base is bound to be arbitrary, and hybrid forms are to be found as well. Nevertheless, it is interesting to examine how this dimension is distributed across the world.

Derbyshire and Derbyshire distinguish eight different ideological bases (see Table 1). In fact, some of these are closer to being a type of state than a belief system per se. In this table, the ideological divisions by Derbyshire and Derbyshire are reported in connection with socioeconomic factors and indicators of quality of life. The idea is obviously that there is a relation between economic development and social conditions, on the one hand, and the ideological base of a state, on the other.

As is known from the literature, the relationship between types of political systems and social and economic development is not straightforward, nor is it that statistically strong (Keman, 2002). The only solid observation is that fully fledged democratic systems are almost always among the prosperous countries and are highly developed in socioeconomic terms. The other categories may
perhaps tell us something about the background of the form of government that has emerged around the world, but—given the broad categories—very little more. In addition, the defining categories remain vague (what distinguishes nationalist from authoritarian?). Probably, there are various cases that are hybrids or that simply overlap (e.g., Kenya appears to be authoritarian and nationalist, whereas Tanzania is labeled as socialist and nationalist by the authors).

In particular, the distinction between liberal democracies and emergent democracies is confusing and debatable. First, the definition tells us little about what the ideological differences are between the two (apart from the fact that the former have had an undisturbed history [as a state] in terms of coups d’état, whereas the latter emerged in the various postwar waves of democratization and often experienced political disruption). Second, comparing the listings of Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) with others, it appears that a number of cases are misplaced as regards being democratic, or emerging or not. All in all, classifications as developed by Derbyshire and Derbyshire are certainly useful as reference sources but have little added value in terms of understanding the differences between types of political systems and are limited in their descriptive-analytical value (e.g., as a proto-theory or in explaining comparative differences). In some scholars’ view, a typology should add to existing knowledge rather than only recycle existing knowledge regarding the similarities of and differences between political systems. Hence, typologies are useful but only if they are systematic, two- or multidimensional, and related to a theory-driven research question (e.g., Lijphart’s typology of democratic variations and Rokkan’s models of state development).

This section has discussed various types of typologies as they have been developed and elaborated in comparative political science. On the one hand, pure descriptive classifications and typologies have been presented (Finer; Derbyshire & Derbyshire). On the other hand, a number of analytical typologies have been put forward. It should be noted that typologies either aspire to classify all political systems of the world (like Finer) or confine themselves to regions—such as Europe (Rokkan)—and to specific regime types—for example, democracies (Lijphart). In addition, it was argued that after the 1970s, another kind of typology emerged in the form of systemic or intra-system classifications (e.g., party systems and type of government; see Blondel, 1982).

Hence, the present strategy for developing types of political systems involves going from descriptive to analytical approaches and from focusing on whole systems to attributes of political systems. The focus on attributes of political systems can be applied to comparative politics and enhance insight

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological Base</th>
<th>No. of Political Systems</th>
<th>Gross Domestic Product (% World Share)</th>
<th>GDP per Capita ($)</th>
<th>Literacy Rate (%)</th>
<th>Human Rights Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal democratic</td>
<td>73 (38.0%)</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>8.475</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging democratic</td>
<td>73 (38.0%)</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1.490</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>5 (2.6%)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>8 (4.2%)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.500</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>3 (1.6%)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian*</td>
<td>20 (10.4%)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolutist</td>
<td>10 (5.2%)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>8.235</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\* Distinction military and authoritarian collapsed by this author.
for the student regarding both the cross-system and intrasystem variation around the world or within certain regions or regime types. One useful way of developing further theory-driven typologies is to derive them from Easton’s *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*.

**Variations of Political Systems: Types of Political Governance**

Systems theory is derived from evolutionary biological models that emphasize the interdependence of the elements that are considered to be essential for the survival of the system. Systems theory applied to analyze political systems is in the form of a set of interactions between political actors whose behavior is structured by institutions and is embedded in a wider environment. It departs from the idea that these institutionalized interactions shape the dynamics of a system toward more or less an equilibrium situation. This approach was already developed in the 19th century (e.g., Herbert Spencer) and has been applied to political science since the late 1950s. Easton (1965, 1981) has been the main advocate of this approach, and others like Almond and Verba applied it to compare polities (institutionalized rule of a society).

Easton conceived of politics in terms of its relationship with society by means of the authoritative allocation of material and “immaterial” for a society (i.e., by means of public policy formation). The political system receives inputs from society in terms of demands and support, such as policy preferences of organized interests and political parties, and electoral support, for example, for parties in government or the junta in power. The political system converts these into outputs in the form of decisions and enforceable policies that feed back to society. If and when demand and support are (more or less) in balance, it would imply an equilibrium situation—that is, political stability. Of course, this process is not an automatic one but is driven by the types of institutions and political actors. Gatekeepers, like parties or interest groups, cumulate various preferences from the public and direct the system of governance (i.e., the conversion process). The resulting outputs (policy) feed back into support and demand for the actors that are responsible for government.

More often than not, the Eastonian approach of systems theory has been criticized for being mechanistic, teleological, static, and not fit for empirical analysis. However, the practitioners of comparative politics have helped refute these criticisms. First, they applied systems theory to compare countries as political systems; second, by elaborating Easton’s model by specifying political actors and institutions, they analyzed the “black box” of the conversion process (or governance); third, with the data available now, which allow for closer scrutiny while comparing political systems, they developed whole-system and systemic classifications of political systems.

In the remainder of this section, the differences and similarities between political systems are elaborated by means of the Eastonian approach to demonstrate the extent to which types of political systems do vary. This allows for assessing the extant typologies. Recall that a distinction was made between descriptive and analytical typologies, on the one hand, and between whole-system comparisons and systemic or intrasystem typologies, on the other. The Eastonian approach allows for an analytical systemic typology.

In what follows, the focus is first on the institutional variation of polities (in this case, the countries of the world) in terms of their types of political rule, both representative and nonrepresentative.

**Institutional Variations of Political Systems**

As we have observed, there have been and always will be classifications of political regimes. The term *regime* simply means a system of ruling society. Numerous indicators are used, but here we shall concentrate on the institutional configuration of government. As has already been stated, political institutions are basically the rules of the political game, and these rules shape and direct the behavior of the players involved (e.g., parties, movements, interest groups, bureaucrats, people, and also the members of government) with respect to the political process of governing. The main types of representative government are introduced in the section that follows. In addition, the nondemocratic types are also discussed. This enables us to define the relationship between government as the conversion agency (making decisions on policies) and the eventual policy performance in terms of its societal impact (or feedback process).
Representative Government

This type is related to the political-ideological basis regarding the “liberal-democratic” and “emerging democratic” types of governance (see Table 1). The connection lies with the idea of democracy. Central to democracy is that the executive is elected indirectly by the population and, thus, the population (or more precisely, the electorate), through its representation in the Assembly, directs and controls government. Hence, the way in which the relationship between the executive and legislative is institutionalized shapes the role and position of government. This relationship is constitutionally driven almost everywhere or laid down in a basic law. In addition, there are the “conventions” that shape the structure of representative government. Hence, institutions are determining the “room for manoeuvre” for government and more often than not, will be conducive to its “leadership and optimisation” (see Blondel, 1982). For instance, differences in the formal relationship between the executive and legislative, on the one hand, and the type of electoral system, on the other, influence the composition of government and its policy-making capacities. Four types of government can be distinguished within the category of representative government:

1. presidential government,
2. parliamentary government,
3. dual-power government, and
4. single-party government.

According to Derbyshire and Derbyshire, the cross-national distribution of these types is as shown in Table 2.

The parliamentary type of representative government is quite dominant in Europe. Only one out of five government types outside Europe is parliamentary. Presidential government is the dominant type within both the consolidated and the emergent democracies in the rest of the democratic world. Yet since the late 1980s, the number of dual-power governments has doubled (particularly in Central and Eastern Europe). This typology of representative government is driven by the constitutional features of the polity.

Presidential Government. The role and position of the head of state is crucial for each type. Although most states have a president as head of state, in most cases, the presidency is merely symbolic, and its main function is to represent the sovereignty of the nation and government. In this sense, presidents are comparable to constitutional monarchs. However, in other systems—for example, the United States—the president has been assigned the role of executive (as head of government), and the related power is separated from the legislative powers of the (elected) assembly. In most cases, the executive head of state cannot be removed by the legislative (he or she appoints the other members of government) and derives his or her legitimacy from popular election to office (i.e., elected leadership).

The foremost feature is that of the one-person executive who dominates the politics of government. He or she can call on the public, by whom he or she is elected, and represents national government at home and abroad. This feature of a one-person executive also reinforces the position of the bureaucracy, which, at least in many cases, is indirectly subservient to the president. Of course, this differs from system to system, but if

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Presidential</th>
<th>Parliamentary</th>
<th>Dual Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>49  (31%)</td>
<td>15 (30%)</td>
<td>24 (48%)</td>
<td>10 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>43  (27%)</td>
<td>29 (58%)</td>
<td>12 (35%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the world</td>
<td>67  (42%)</td>
<td>43 (64%)</td>
<td>19 (28%)</td>
<td>5 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>159 (100%)</td>
<td>87 (52%)</td>
<td>55 (36%)</td>
<td>17 (12%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Percentages of types of representative government are row totals.
well organized, the president can direct the bureaucracy effectively and even strengthen the coordination of policy implementation.

Typical for presidentialism is the executive command of the head of state, who is also head of government. Conversely, parliament plays an indirect role by exerting legislative control. It is clear that the structure of presidential government is characterized by quite a few lines of command. Conversely, the lines of control are either reciprocal or indirect. This implies that the institutional configuration of presidential government can be, and often is, conducive to conflict (e.g., think of “divided government”—i.e., the political “color” of the president is different from the majority in the legislature) and considered to be prone to political instability.

Parliamentary Government. Parliamentary government is organically linked to the legislature, or parliament. The government emerges from the assembly and can be dismissed by a vote of no confidence (and often also needs a vote of investiture by the same parliament). At the same time, government can—often after consultation with the head of state—dissolve parliament and call for a new election. Whereas presidential government appears strong and relatively independent, parliamentary government is often considered to be weak because of the mutual dependence of the executive and legislature. In other words, a typical consequence of parliamentary government is that both powers are fused and bargaining eventually directs the outputs of the system. Hence, the institutional means of command and control are distributed across the executive and legislative.

Given these differences from presidentialism, it is usual to differentiate between parliamentary governments by means of their conventional shape and working. On the one hand, there is the one-party government, where the majority party in parliament forms the government (e.g., in the United Kingdom until recently). On the other hand, there is the coalition government, where a combination of parties forms a government that is supported by a majority in parliament. A subtype is the minority governments (one-party or coalition, occurring often in Scandinavia). In short, in parliamentary types of government, the political representation is mediated by means of parties.

All in all, in parliamentary systems, government is structured differently from presidential government. The formal powers of the executive and legislative are largely fused; consensus formation between parties in government and in parliament is a prerequisite to make policies, and therefore, negotiations take place in both government and parliament, where, in the final instance, parties do really matter.

What should also be clear is that the electorate only indirectly influences government. Hence, as is often argued, parliamentary systems of governance are indeed an indirect form of democracy. Whereas in presidential systems the head of government is primarily directly elected, this is not the case in parliamentary systems. To push this argument further, in parliamentary democracies, parties are the key factor linking the electorate to parliamentary government.

Dual-Power Government. This type of government has often been considered as an anomaly or as a residual category. But, as a consequence of the criticisms raised versus both presidential and parliamentary government, dual-power government is taken much more seriously nowadays, and more attention is paid to this type of government (usually labeled semipresidentialism) as an alternative to both presidentialism and parliamentarism. The majority of the cases can be found in Europe: France, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and, to some extent, Portugal, Finland, the Czech Republic, and Poland. It should be noted that most of these states have developed this dual system only recently. This may well be an expression of a growing dissatisfaction (given the apparent disadvantages) with both the straightforward presidential and parliamentary systems of democratic and constitutional government. The third type of representative government is presented in Figure 1.

Dual-power government is strongly influenced by constitutional rules (the direct arrows in Figure 1) and the multiple relations that exist. The main disadvantage is the delicate interrelations in terms of command and control between all powers. This may well imply that imbalances and disruption lead to stalemates, gridlocks, and, thus, governmental instability. However, the fact that the electorate has a more direct influence on both the executive and the legislative than in the other
types of representative government appears to be an advantage.

Nonrepresentative Government

These types of government overlap to a large extent with the ideological bases that have been distinguished in Table 2 and that do not belong to the democratic family. Here, the distinction between one-actor government and autocratic governance is made. The first type is characterized by the fact that one political actor—be it a party, movement, or a (charismatic) leader—rules the state in the name of the whole nation. Often, these regimes are ideologically inspired by communism or variations of nationalism. Autocratic governments can also be characterized by one political actor who rules but not in the name of the collective interest. The same line of reasoning can be applied to military and religious rule. The polity is not the framework of reference, but rather, a specific interest or idea provides an ideological basis of and justification for autocratic rule. Autocratic government concerns about 15.6% of all regimes in the world, and together with the one-actor government, this covers 24% of all the regimes of the world.

One-Actor Government. The basic feature of a one-actor government is that a party or movement or, eventually, a leader represents the “will of the people” and governs for the people but by no means is the state governed by the people. Hence, insofar as there exists representation, it is limited to a “top–bottom” type of indirect representation (see Figure 2). In most cases, these ideas are laid down in a constitution or in a set of basic laws by one party or movement. In addition, the constitution preamble serves to justify the nature of the system in terms of ideology (e.g., socialism or patriotism) and the need for a unified actor steering the state and society. In essence, this implies that both the executive and the legislature (which almost always formally exist in this type of government) are formed by the same party or movement (hence, there is no competition between parties). In fact, government is formed by an “elite” that is either confined to party membership (like in communist regimes) or to having a function in the movement. In particular, this pattern can be observed in the developing and postcolonial world.

It would appear that the charismatic style of leadership, the avoidance of personality cults, and self-interested behavior of the elite are requirements for smooth change and adequate societal performance by means of such a type of government. If these requirements are not met or external pressure mounts, a fundamental regime change is almost inevitable. Many of these changes (in particular, in the past decades) are going in two directions: either toward emergent democracy or toward an autocratic type of government.

Autocratic Government. The fundamental features that shape this category of governance are that not only is it not representative but also that there is no explicit link with society at large and hardly any formal or constitutional organization of the polity. Instead, the ideological basis is often derived from
absolutism or religion, on the one hand, or based on military rule (operating by suspending the basic laws), on the other.

The structure of this form of government is that it is completely self-organized, and command and control are organized by force, ruling out any form of political and civil rights for the population. The most extreme form is tyranny, more often than not by means of (personalized) dictatorship (e.g., Joseph Stalin [Iosif Vissarionovic Dzugasvili]). This means that government equals the “rule of the day” and that force and fear prevail over the well-being of the nation and its population. At the end of the day, neither the leadership nor its subservient elite is accountable to anybody but itself.

Nonrepresentative government is hardly structured by formal rules. Informal rules tend to be beneficial and shaped by the leadership and its concomitant elites and are often insufficient for stable and enduring government. The major difference between both types distinguished here is the absence of abuse and outright perversion of human rights in combination with attempts to enhance the public welfare of the nation by one-actor governments. Yet in reality, it is difficult to draw a line between the two types. Often the one develops into the other.

Toward a Typology of Contemporary Forms of Governance

The different forms of government that have been discussed are all derived from one theoretical model: Easton’s systems theory of political life. The focus has been on the institutional configuration of each type: presidential, parliamentary, dual power, one-actor, and autocratic government. It has been shown how the central actors representing the systems of governance are interrelated (directly, indirectly, or not) through the institutions that are typical for each political system. In this way, one can fill in the real cases that belong to each type as well as consider how in each of these political systems, the central actors are ordered in terms of (supposed) influence and their powers to command or control (or both).

Of course, not all systems within each category are perfectly the same; there is variation in presidential systems as there is in autocratic systems. In addition, all systems are more or less in flux: Institutional arrangements are changed and sometimes completely altered (e.g., the transition of the Fourth French Republic to the Fifth in 1958 or the degradation of Kenya from a one-party state to an autocratic system in the 1980s). Finally, there are cases that tend to be hybrids—that is, some features of two of the main types appear in one system: Finland, for example, showed strong features of presidentialism until the 1980s, but at the same time, it could well be considered to have a parliamentary type of representative government. Finally, it is fair to say that in reality, it is a thin line that separates autocratic systems from one-party systems (think of the absolutist kingdoms that exist in the Arabic world).

At the end of the day, it is up to the comparative political scientist to make a decision on the basis of
Political Theory

The different types of political systems have been discussed throughout history, and many typologies have been developed. The construction of a typology is more challenging if the researcher not only wishes to use it as a descriptive tool to systematically reduce the comparative complexities but also aims to arrive at an analytically driven typology. As a methodological rule of thumb, this entry emphasized that a proper typology of political systems should contain those cases that not only belong in one cell but are also empirically mutually exclusive across cells. In addition, this entry distinguished between typologies that are whole-system oriented or intrasystem focused. Whole-system typologies of political systems had been quite frequent up to the 1970s, whereas the intrasystem ones came more into use after World War II.

The variation in both descriptive and analytical typologies of political systems was also treated. In addition, this entry also discussed that types of political systems may well be enhanced on the basis of Easton’s idea of systems analysis of political life. To this end, systems of representative and nonrepresentative government were discussed as an example of constructing a typology of political systems in terms of their institutional design. This resulted in an analytical typology that is neither static nor teleological and allows for interpreting the process of government as the crucial component of any political system together with its systemic features.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Democracies, Types of; Democratization; Hybrid Regimes; Parliamentary Systems; Presidentialism; Semipresidentialism; Systems Theory; Totalitarian Regimes

Further Readings
Lijphart, A. (1968). Typologies of democratic systems. Comparative Political Studies, 1, 3–44.

Political Theory

Theory is defined as a set of propositions that is internally consistent and based on a certain set of axioms and assumptions. Theory must be logically derivable in all cases. It must be politically persuasive, especially when it deals with norms. It must be empirically verifiable when it deals with reality. Therefore, political theory is defined as a set of propositions about “who gets what, when, how” (Harold Lasswell) and “the authoritative allocation of values in society” (David Easton). Thus defined, political theory covers a very wide range of subjects in the form of propositions.

In what follows, first the origins and types of political theory are examined. Among the types of political theory, this entry takes into account the
following three: (1) classical philosophy, (2) empiri-
cal political theory, and (3) formal political theory.
Next, this entry examines schools of political the-
ory and their evaluation. Under this heading, 10
schools are evaluated: 4 schools of normative
political theory (conflict, shared values, exchange,
and coordination) and 6 schools of empirical poli-
tical theory (systems theory, behavioralism, rational
choice theory, institutionalism, neuroscience, and
globalism). Third, this entry discusses the need to
enhance conversations between normative political
theory and empirical political theory, or between
“ought” and “is.” In other words, normative
political theory should talk more about the plausi-
bility, feasibility, and self-sustainability of the nor-
mative order it advances, and empirical political
theory should discuss normative implications more
seriously. With the aim of providing for more con-
dversations and interactions within political theory,
concise and concrete illustrations of such proposed
conversations and interactions are given.

Origins and Types of Political Theory
Although political theory as a part of the modern
discipline of political science emerged only in the
20th century, the origins of political theory are
unquestionably in ancient thought—whether in
the philosophy of Greece, Mesopotamia, Egypt,
India, or China. One can cite passages from
Aristotle, Kautilya, or Confucius easily to demon-
strate that they are political scientists indeed and
that political science, although modern, has very
ancient roots. One of the major differences the
discipline of political science can claim to have vis-
à-vis other social science disciplines such as eco-
nomics and sociology is that the ancient versions
of political science, such as those of the three phi-
losophers mentioned above, retain much power
and relevance to the current reality in politics.
Aristotle is often mentioned in contemporary writ-
ings on politics and political science. Kautilya is
referred to in discussions on rulers’ state craft both
at home and vis-à-vis their rivals. Confucius con-
tinues to be taken up as providing possible ver-
sions of authoritarian politics. It is rare for
Aristotle to be discussed in relation to economics,
although his ideas on this subject are significant
for the history of economics. All these disciplines
are relatively young, since they have grown as
modern social science disciplines in the West, espe-
cially in the 20th century. Yet one can argue that
political science has retained its ancient origins
even at the dawn of the 21st century. Thus, its
development is very complex.

In Western Europe, the major distinction
between the sacred and the secular was made
gradually but quite steadily during the Enlighten-
ment and the Reformation, and it diffused to
European settlements and later to the rest of the
world as well, at least superficially; secularism is
therefore closely related to Western cultures.
Religion and politics are said to have been distin-
guished in the West since the modern age. The
same can be said about the relationship between
religion and science. William of Ockham gave an
early epistemological foundation for what would
be called modern science by making a clear distinc-
tion between realism and nominalism. Realism
refers to the school of thought that believes that
God does exist in reality and that reality was con-
ceived as the basis of that knowledge; nominalism
refers to the view that God exists insofar as the
concept of God is imagined. With this stance, sci-
cence was able to separate itself from the cosmos
of the sacred. With this separation, modern science
was able to make spectacular progress in the West.

Needless to say, the separation between God
and science and between God and politics did not
come about so neatly or once and for all; rather,
the picture is complex. The separation between
religion and politics has been tenuous at best. At
any rate, for our purposes, the separation of poli-
tics from God was a step forward in distinguishing
political theory from philosophy. Also the separa-
tion of science from God was a step forward in
distinguishing political theory from political phi-
losophy. This distinction tries to separate God’s
judgment from that of scientists or political leaders.

At the crux of political theory is the mixture of
the normative and the empirical—that is, what
ought to be versus what is. The normative has to
do with the judgment by which a verdict on justice
is determined. While in medieval times, such judg-
ments came from the Catholic Church or, in some
cases, duels were fought between opposing parties,
in modern times, they come from the courts where
secular matters are concerned. Courts have been
conceived like God. The concept of the empirical
refers to something that can be experienced or
tested in the daily lives of people. It was not until modern times, with the increasingly sharp distinction between the sacred and the secular—which made “reality checks” possible—that empirical testing became common.

Political theory comprises all this under one umbrella, including both classical philosophy and empirical political theory. To complicate matters further, political theory contains within its territory what is called formal political theory. Classical philosophy refers to prescientific and pre-empiricist statements about what justice is, how it should be achieved, and how it should be conceptualized. Empirical political theory refers to statements made from the scientific and empiricist viewpoints on how politics is played out. Formal political theory refers to logically and/or mathematically derivable statements that may or may not be amenable to empirical testing. Dealing with the normative and the empirical is inherently not easy. Compounding the problem is the recent tendency toward overspecialization and mutual isolation, rather than mutual engagement, among political scientists dealing with the normative and the empirical. Mutual isolation between classical normative theory and empirical theory has gone sometimes too far as their borderlines are not always very clear.

In practice, normative political theory and empirical political theory are far apart for several reasons. First, their knowledge base differs. Classical political theorists often are concerned with philosophy, theology, and intellectual history, whereas empirical political theorists are often interested in other empirical social sciences such as economics, sociology, and social psychology or in other applied empirical sciences such as neuroscience in politics. Second, their methods of training are very different. Classical political theory focuses on text critique and robust argumentation. All study is based on careful reading and argumentation. Empirical political theory focuses on hypothesis testing conducted according to positivistic practices or a systematic reality check. Yet these differences are not strong enough to undermine their disciplinary identity as political science and to split it into two or more subdisciplines. Although no solid and systematic evidence exists, it looks as if the shared fascination with how power is built and exercised seems to give many political scientists identity and solidarity to band together.

The types of political theory—classical philosophy, empirical political theory, and formal political theory—are discussed in turn in the remainder of this section.

Classical Philosophy

Classical philosophy comprises almost everything from the normative to the empirical, the prescriptive, and their mixture. In *The Great Learning (Daxue)*, one of the famous Confucian teachers instructs his disciples to do the following: “Tackling things, seeking truth, nurturing yourself (morally), sorting the family, governing the state, and pacifying the world under heaven.” This sentence instructs the disciples that to stand above people they must start studying many things and knowing a lot. Then, they must discipline themselves morally. That leads them to sort out things in their family, and this process becomes the basis of governing the country. Only by going through all this can disciples envisage “pacifying the world under heaven.”

This philosophical statement is described in a number of ways: (a) the authoritarian conception of governing by the sage, (b) the moralistic conception of governing, and (c) the familial conception of the state. The way in which the argument is constructed is bottom up. But the argument itself is replete with authoritarian, paternalistic, and personalistic overtones.

The no less famous classical philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli, author of *The Prince*, is also prescriptive and empirical. He warns his readers that politics is determined by virtue and fortune. By virtue is meant a range of strengths including moral strength. Such an exercise of strength is needed to deal with the effects of fortune. This classical philosophy was meant to teach the monarch to act properly and prudently. Thus, it is largely prescriptive. At the same time, it is sometimes speculated that since Machiavelli was republican, his preaching was meant to subvert monarchism by deliberately encouraging the monarch to act most “monarchically”—that is, always assuming one’s superiority, not trusting anyone but oneself, and acting mostly on the basis of strength—thus undermining the basis of popular support, which was becoming increasingly significant.

Classical philosophy includes the *Federalist Papers*, in which precursors of empirical political
theory are often found. The view that federalism is a viable alternative to a unitary state is an example. This proposition has generative affinity with the work of William Riker (1964) and his Rochester School on formal political theory. Riker’s brand of formal political theory on democracy and democratic choice has some affinity with both classical philosophy and empirical political theory.

Immanuel Kant’s famous essay *Perpetual Peace* has been empirically tested lately, with quite stimulating debates arising from such efforts. In 1795, Kant argued that three conditions should be nurtured to bring about eternal peace. First, commerce should be invigorated, with free passage and free trade ensured among nations. Second, one should encourage the republican form of politics rather than the monarchical form, to make war more difficult. Third, international institutions should be created to allow for the expression of voices of varying assertions, to facilitate discussion, and to come up with formulas for conflict resolution. Kant’s formulation has been reformulated in the tradition of empirical political theory by Michael Doyle, Bruce Russett, and others. The first is called *liberal peace*. The second is called *democratic peace*. The third is sometimes called *peace by consortium*. The second is the most popular, and U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush used this doctrine to justify U.S. military interventions. Kant’s affinity with empirical political theory is abundantly clear, even if it is not universally accepted as such.

Thomas Hobbes is arguably the most frequently mentioned author in relation to the state in the social sciences, along with Max Weber and Karl Marx. Facing what he saw as anarchy both at home and abroad in 16th-century England, Hobbes argued that absolutism and an absolutist state should be the answer to these anarchies—what people wish to achieve cannot be accomplished unless anarchical situations are overcome. In discussions of failed states and rogue states, therefore, Hobbes is one of the philosophers most frequently referred to. Describing and analyzing what is seen as anarchy in places and time points such as Cambodia in the 1980s and 1990s, Somalia since the early 1990s, Sudan in the 1990s and 2000s, Afghanistan for the past 40 years, the Democratic Republic of Congo for most of the 1990s and 2000s, Rwanda in the 1990s and 2000s, and the West Balkans in the 1990s and 2000s, many authors point to the need to establish a monopoly of violence and the legitimate use of power in the initial and yet critical phase of state building, along with the concord forged with the international community. A similar diagnosis and prescription are offered to show the process of state building that may evolve from a democratic spirit and under globalizing circumstances and the process of absolutism arising from claims of state sovereignty. Needless to say, the yearning for state sovereignty cannot be suppressed fully—one form of which is expressed by the concept of “sovereign democracy” coined by Vladislav Surkov, chief of staff to former Russian President Vladimir Putin and now President Medvedev. Sovereign democracy implies a sovereign state whose representative heads are chosen democratically but that disallows foreign interference from abroad, even if by democratic means—for example, the attempts at “colored revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. Chinese leaders view “peaceful change” (*heping yanbian*) as anathema because it means foreign interference to force a regime change on the basis of human rights and democracy as universally shared values. Thus, on the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre (June 4, 1989), China was placed under high-level alert. In short, Hobbes is just as relevant now, at the dawn of the 21st century, as in 16th-century England.

**Empirical Political Theory**

Empirical political theory aims at generating hypotheses that can be empirically tested and that are also capable of generating a higher level set of generalizations. In other words, empirical political theory places utmost importance on two aspects of research: (1) empirical validation (or falsification) and (2) empirical generalization (or theorization). Thus, empirical political theory first proposes an empirically verifiable hypothesis and then tests it. If it is confirmed, it can then be generalized. A good example of this type of theory is voting in U.S. presidential elections. To link with political theory, the characteristically American utilitarian model of electoral victory based on the death toll of American troops in combat situations and on per capita net income level change over the preceding year(s) serves as an example. As pointed out by
Douglas Hibbs (1989), the question of whether the candidate of the party that occupies the executive office is elected in the presidential elections is likely to be determined by the combination of the death toll of U.S. troops in combat situations and per capita net income level change over the preceding year(s). This model hypothesizes that voters yearn for peace (i.e., having no Americans killed in combat) and for prosperity (i.e., increasing income). If one considers the 2008 U.S. presidential race, two Ss were important: Operation Surge in Iraq and subprime housing loans. Operation Surge reduced the death toll of American troops from the summer of 2007 through Election Day. How this affected the voter equation is one of the key points. The other S is the economic setback triggered by the subprime housing loans crisis. Not only were stock prices going down, but the U.S. dollar also lost value. Whether the government could prevent a recession by stimulating the economy through pumping a massive amount of money into it was also a key issue in the voter equation. Expecting the economy to recover seemed premature. This worked against the Republican presidential candidate, John McCain, who did not support such an economic stimulus.

A number of studies suggest that trust and health are quite significantly related. Those who hold concerns about social institutions such as social insurance are more likely to report bad health. Similarly, those who do not trust others very much tend to report their own bad health. The reasoning is as follows: Those with lower vertical trust, that is, those who do not place much confidence in social institutions, cannot enjoy the benefit of making the best use of them, one of the consequences of which is the loss of health. In a similar vein, those with lower horizontal trust, that is, those who do not place much confidence in other persons, cannot enjoy the benefits of working together, one of the consequences of which is the loss of health. Loss of health is measured by self-reported health using the World Health Organization’s Quality of Life questionnaire. This proposition is interesting from a public policy perspective in that keeping public confidence in social institutions is important in itself. Otherwise, the service that can be supplied by social institutions cannot be fully provided. Thus, from a more conventional public policy perspective, public policy performance is a dependent variable and is to be explained by a number of factors. However, from the version of public policy perspective, the dependent variable is something individuals can experience physically, such as health, or emotionally, such as happiness and honor.

The electoral system can be either divisive or cohesive. In the political theory of representative democracy, how to choose electorates is of key importance. Representative democracy takes into account at least two forms of justice. “Representative democracy requires two conditions to be successful”: (1) fair representation, reflecting electors’ preferences, and (2) government stability, enabling government to execute policy pledges to the electorate. Two major systems exist: (1) proportional representation, whereby parliamentary or legislative seats are awarded according to the percentage of votes polled by a party, and (2) first pass the post, in which the person from a district who receives the highest number of votes is awarded the seat; this method awards a disproportionate number of seats to parties that get a larger number of votes and reduces the number of seats awarded to parties with a smaller share of votes. The proportional representation system is said to give fair representation but not regime stability, whereas the first-past-the-post method is said to give moderately unfair representation but regime stability. The latter is widely adopted in many English-speaking countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and, until recently, New Zealand. The former is widely adopted by Continental European countries. Lately, the mixed system combining both methods has become more popular, especially in non-European regions such as the Asia-Pacific region, and seems to provide fair representation and regime stability to a reasonably satisfactory degree.

Proportional representation can be very divisive, as, for example, in Israel or in Iraq. The state of Israel is sometimes said to have committed two institutional mistakes in its founding days: First, it was unable to promulgate a constitution, largely because of the fundamental cleavages manifested on the issue of religion and the state, and, second, it adopted proportional representation as the mode of election. Parenthetically, there are only three states in the world that do not have a constitution: Israel, the United Kingdom, and New
Zealand. The United Kingdom does not have a written constitution, except for the Magna Carta, and it seems that New Zealand has inherited that tradition. Interestingly, the Iraqi constitution adopted a proportional representation electoral system, whereby ethno-religious cleavages have been amplified and invigorated. The one-person-from-one-district, or first-pass-the-post, system, common in the United States and the United Kingdom, tends to exaggerate the number of votes the winning party gets to obtain parliamentary seats. In other words, more proportional strength is given to the winning party so that government can enjoy at least a minimally stable majority.

Formal Political Theory

Formal political theory is a set of propositions that are logically derived from a set of assumptions about politics. A formal political theory of electoral democracy was first formalized by Anthony Downs (1957). This theory relates the statistical distribution of electorates’ ideological and policy positions on a number of dimensions to the policies parties make to capture more votes. In other words, political parties shape their positions according to the number of voters who are likely to vote for them. Anthony Downs propounded an economic theory of democracy that has become very influential for those political scientists who believe that political science should be able to generate theories from which empirical claims about political phenomena can be deduced (after the theories themselves have been tested as described above). Downs’s key insight into spatial economics is illustrated by his example of gas stations, which he explains are located close to each other because the spatial distribution of consumers of gasoline is that of a statistically normal curve. In other words, rather than opening a gas station miles away from another gas station, one might as well open it close to the other one, with the chance of getting many more customers for both. Downs applied this insight to the dynamics of electoral democracy. Suppose there are two major parties, one right-wing and the other left-wing. Further suppose that voters who support extreme views are fewer than voters who support moderate views, statistically speaking. To gain more votes, candidates will moderate their views, whether about war and peace, bread and butter, or honor and humiliation. The consequence is that the two major parties move closer to each other. As a result, such parties start to look alike. Many empirical efforts have been made to validate or invalidate empirically this Downsian theory of party competition. Thus, formal political theory has been quite well linked in many ways to empirical political theory. By using the statistical distribution patterns of electorates in a multidimensional space, this formal political theory shows that under representative democracy, electorates are sovereign whereas candidates or political parties are the subjects. This analysis is one example of how formal political theory has been applied to explain empirical phenomena.

Politics is played out most commonly in and among organizations. How people react to the decline of organizational life is one of the key questions in politics. Albert Hirschman (1970) formulated the model of exit, voice, and loyalty. The binary choice is between loyalty and exit. These binary choices are most commonly observed in the market: One’s choice is between purchase and nonpurchase. In organizational life, if one is loyal, one will remain with the organization in spite of decreasing rewards. The exit option is to get out without procrastination. Between the two options is a third, more common one: raising one’s voice to ask others to join forces in improving organizational life. This is more common in politics. But when one starts thinking about the major consequences of each option, it is much more complex. Consider an exit-prone country whose income has not increased dramatically in a long time, such as the Philippines. Filipinos earn a substantial amount of income through emigration—by sending doctors to the United States and maids to the Gulf countries, as they bring back a substantial amount of their earnings to their country. One can speculate that a consequence of a large migrant population is the lack of momentum for endogenous development. In contrast, in a loyalty-prone nation such as Japan, not leaving the country is a common response to the decline of organizational life, so migration rates are low. At the height of organizational decline, as conditions become intolerable and such loyalty fails to attract attention or admiration, loyalty may take on the character of voice. This is a formal political theory, but it could be an empirical political theory as well. The theory
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of exit, voice, and loyalty touches on complex manifestations of organizational life and varied options of human endeavor to improve it. In other words, the exit option is based on conflict, the voice option is based on coordination, and the loyalty option is based on loyalty.

Other than classical philosophy, empirical political theory, and formal political theory, there are two major genres that can be sometimes treated under the umbrella of political theory: epistemology and methodology. Epistemology refers to the study of how human beings recognize what they see and hear as knowledge. René Descartes, a French philosopher, most famously in *Le Discours de la Méthode*, laid down what might be called the modern positivistic method. It is a set of advice and instructions that would be helpful to obtain a clearer understanding of what one observes. Methodology refers to the study of various instruments through which reality can be observed and analyzed effectively.

**Schools of Political Theory**

Schools of political theory are sometimes messy in part because empirical political theory has grown, at least initially, out of other disciplines such as psychology, psychiatry, sociology, economics, and anthropology. One of the direct origins of empirical political theory is to be found in the deep transformations and the new needs following World War II. The application of methodologies and concepts from these disciplines to political science was first done by Samuel Stouffer and Harold Lasswell. For empirical political theorists, historical and institutional descriptions were the only methods used in their research. With the new methodologies and concepts from these disciplines to political science was first done by Samuel Stouffer and Harold Lasswell. For empirical political theorists, historical and institutional descriptions were the only methods used in their research. With the new methodologies and concepts, empirical political theory expanded its scope dramatically. Observing, measuring, and assessing in a generalizable fashion became conventions in political science, which allowed schools of empirical political theory to proliferate. Prior to World War II, the discipline of political science was concerned mostly with constitutions and institutions, on the one hand, and political philosophy, on the other. World War II was also a catalyst for empirical political theory, because governments were interested in measuring and assessing the morale of their troops and the effectiveness of propaganda and of military actions.

Stouffer and colleagues conducted a morale study that contributed immensely to the development of survey research. Similarly, Harold Lasswell, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and colleagues advanced a propaganda study that contributed immensely to the development of intelligence analysis. Robert MacNamara and colleagues developed a bombing effects study that contributed immensely to the development of strategic analysis of costs and benefits associated with strategic options. Another example is the military occupation study by Ruth Benedict, which was instituted through a psychocultural analysis of the Japanese people. It took more than two decades after World War II for political science to come into its own with empirical political theory.

With regard to normative political theory, schools are commonly linked to great philosophers like Aristotle, Machiavelli, John Locke, Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas. But the increased interactions with other disciplines and related methodologies and concepts have also helped advance schools of normative political theory. One of the schemes adopted here is that of Russell Hardin, which distinguishes four schools of normative political theory.

**Four Schools of Normative Political Theory**

Hardin classified normative political theory in terms of theory based on conflict, on shared values, on exchange, and on coordination.

**Conflict**

Normative political theory focusing on conflict of interest includes the work of Carl Schmitt (1922/1985). Schmitt defines politics as a friend–foe relationship within and across nations. His theory is commonly categorized as ultra-conservative and sometimes fascist. Its explanatory capacity is high under conflictual situations such as wartime but not in more peaceful contexts. Although it is not necessarily categorized as work in the area of normative political theory, Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War* has a strong normative affinity with the notion of the friend–foe relationship. Clausewitz defines war as no more than the continuation of politics by other means. In a similar vein, Field Marshall Boris Shaposhnikov defines
peace as no more than the continuation of war by other means. The fact that both Clausewitz and Shaposhnikov were military officers may mean that their theories may be regarded not as normative political theory but as a technical guide for action, but the simplicity and clarity of their works may appeal to those studying war and conflict. Turning to a Marxist work that tends to focus on class conflict, Barrington Moore’s (1966/1993) book, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, can be regarded as normative political theory focusing on class conflict. His argument is that agriculture is pivotal. The rise of democracy, fascism, and communism in the 20th century may be explained by studying the evolution of agriculture: Commercialization of agriculture led to its advancement, as in England and France; agriculture stagnated due to the indifference of the land-owning class, as in Germany, Japan, and Italy; and agriculture was overexploited by state-led capitalism, as in Russia and China—which corresponded to the advent of democracy, fascism, and communism in these countries, respectively.

Shared Values

Normative political theory focusing on shared values was dominant in the 20th century, especially after the Cold War. The ascendency of shared values as a normative political theory has much to do with the rise and spread of liberal democracy since the past century. Liberalism is based often on the utilitarian calculation of free individuals, as John Rawls argued (1971). Democracy is based on the aggregation of the preferences of citizens, as described by Downs (1957). In a sense, liberal democracy demands a regime in which shared values are key. As long as liberal democracy is premised, the type of normative political theory focusing on shared values flourishes. Even the latest definition of politics by Robert Goodin (2009), as the constrained use of social power, reflects this. It is important to note that liberalism does not require either the knowledge or the sharing of values of other individuals. Downs’s An Economic Theory of Democracy is a formal political theory with normative implications. Values are often illustrated by the left–right ideology. In a two-party system, the two parties tend to move toward the center from both directions, that is, from left to center and from right to center. Moderate or “centrist” citizens share values, whereas extreme or fringe citizens have few fellows. To win votes, the two parties target the numerically large central point. This leads the parties to adjust their ideological and policy positions and to compete to attract the large number of citizens located at the center. The explanatory capacity of normative political theory on the basis of shared values is high, especially when the tide of globalization weakens the intermediate and high-level organizations within the national body politic, so that individual citizens become more important than ever before.

Exchange

Normative political theory based on exchange is represented by Adam Smith. It is well known that of Smith’s two major works, The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations, the former explains the sources of the human ability to make moral judgments. His key concept is sympathy, whereby the act of observing others makes people aware of others’ behavior and the morality of their own behavior. Without sympathy in interpersonal relations, exchange loses its solid base. Even when it is writ large in national and global markets, exchange functions well only if it is grounded in sympathy in social relations. Sympathy is sometimes called social capital by authors such as James Coleman and Robert Putnam, among others. It is not necessary to note that human life cannot function sufficiently well if it is equipped only with exchange instruments and mechanisms. As long as the system of numerous exchange relationships called markets functions well, those normative political theories can be evaluated highly. More frequently, political life calls for schemes and instruments that go beyond exchange. To the extent that exchange helps resolve conflict, normative political theory based on exchange does have good explanatory capacity.

Coordination

It may be surprising to find that the notion of coordination has not played a major role in the development of normative political theory. It is natural that normative political theory based on conflict abounds, given that all politics is regarded as dealing with conflict-of-interest situations and
friend–foe relations. It is also natural that normative political theory based on exchange abounds because conflict resolution can be achieved often by making use of exchange on a small to large scale. Hardin (2009) points out that normative political theory on the basis of coordination has been insufficiently advanced, perhaps because of a lack of awareness of coordination as a scheme and instrument of politics in a normative political theory framework. Even Hobbes’s argument on absolutist rule by a sovereign king can be rendered as normative political theory articulated by the notion of coordination if Hobbesian theory is reformulated within a multilevel, multistage framework. In such a framework, a powerful concept is strategy. Determining how to coordinate when you take Strategy A and your adversary takes Strategy B is complex. Implementing a two-party coordination based on multilevel and multistage strategies makes normative political theory more complex. Yet this line of theorization has been conducted since the mid-20th century in other disciplines, such as military science, business management, and different branches of engineering, often in the form of game theory. Normative political theory with coordination as a key concept is bound to grow, since politics relies heavily on coordination.

Six Schools of Empirical Political Theory

As noted before, schools of empirical political theory are difficult to classify (see Robert Goodin, 2009; Robert Goodin & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 1996; Fred Greenstein & Nelson Polsby, 1975). Two yardsticks are the behavioral revolution (the 1950s through the 1960s) and the postbehavioral revolution (the 1970s through the 1980s), followed by the “perestroika” movement in the American Political Science Association (the 1990s through the 2000s). With the behavioral revolution, systems theory and behavioralism became prominent. With the postbehavioral revolution, new attempts were made beyond the behavioral revolution in political science. The postbehavioral revolution and the perestroika movement tried to make political science more interpretative, reflective, context sensitive, and path dependence attentive, on the one hand, and more focused on institutions as contrasted to individuals, on rigorous utilitarian calculus versus culturally derived motivations, on neurophysical movement as opposed to manifested human behavior, and on a global outlook as against the perspective of the national organic whole, on the other.

Systems Theory

Dissatisfied with the state of political science in the 1940s, which was very different from what it is today, Easton attempted, during the 1960s, to make political science a scientific discipline whose theories are derived from empirical testing of theoretically formulated hypotheses on the basis of systematically generated data. By so doing, Easton aimed at creating a “general theory” of politics with a systems theory framework. Easton’s famous definition of politics as the “authoritative allocation of values for a society” was born of this systems theory thinking. It was refreshing to those political scientists who were dissatisfied with the political science of that period, with its focus on constitutions and institutions on the one hand and ideas and ideologies on the other. Easton, with Jack Dennis, embarked on the study of a political system in terms of the political socialization of children, whereby children learn about politics from parents, peers, teachers, and preachers. Norms, values, and rules are those components that are channeled from one generation to another in a political system. What was probably felt by those self-claimed systems theory–influenced political scientists was that the political system is a vastly complex set of interactions of actors under a vast array of rules and norms and that theorizing it at a systems level on the basis of empirically derived evidence is definitely a daunting task. The behavioral revolution was raging in the United States concurrently with the acceptance of systems theory thinking. Then came a mild disillusionment with both systems theory and behavioralism in political science, concurrent with the turmoil in the world during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In other words, the limitations of systems theory thinking were deeply felt. Easton himself confessed later that his systems analysis and behavioralism had clear limits.

Behavioralism

Calls for behavioral persuasion were hailed as revolutionary by enthusiasts, who proclaimed that
it would transform political science from an old, rusty discipline to one of the newest, acclaimed disciplines, with its focus on action rather than intention and motivation and on analysis rather than interpretation. Despite the short-lived enthusiasm for behavioralism, the spirit and style of behavioralism were consolidated in highly reputed journals. Returning to the explanatory capacity of empirical political theory, we can take up Bruce Russett’s (1993) democratic peace theory. The hypothesis tested is one of the arguments made first by Kant: A republican regime (as contrasted to a monarchical regime) is less prone to waging war against another republic than against a non-republican regime. In contemporary parlance, the hypothesis states that democracies rarely fight each other. Russett made use of pooled time-series data composed of pairs of all the sovereign states each year from 1815 through 1989.

Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory was born of formal political theory. Yet it is normally attached to the testing of propositions that are logically derived from a certain set of assumptions and axioms. Its rise was due in part to the steady influence of economics in political science. Also, among the sub-disciplines of political science, political economy, in which economics-trained academics like Anthony Downs (1957), Mancur Olson, and Gerald Kramer exerted considerable influence, was widely studied in the 1970s and 1980s. It was also due in part to the reaction against the kind of behavioralism that was criticized as blind and barefooted empiricism. Daran Acemoglu and James Robinson’s (2005) Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy is an example. It starts with the presence of different social groups. They prefer different political institutions with different ways of allocating power and resources. The highly resourceful groups want to monopolize power. The rest want democracy. In due course, democracy prevails because the majority wants it. In Thailand, the old elites and the newly growing masses fight each other intermittently, using violence. The old elites have not acquiesced in the capture of power by the masses and have recaptured power by resorting to a military coup d'état. But their reasoning is lucid and general, unlike the largely descriptive political science accounts of such struggles between democracy and dictatorship.

Institutionalism

As distinguished from the institutionalism of the past, institutionalism today is called neo-institutionalism. Its key features are (1) a strong empiricism using detailed institutional mechanisms and (2) an ardent comparativism of institutions, which is used to highlight the strength of the argument being made. The following contrast is intended to make the general orientation and product of institutionalism much clearer. If Acemoglu and Robinson are the representative authors of rational choice theory, John Ferejohn is the representative author of institutionalism. Acemoglu and Robinson formulate and test in a more general way. Ferejohn formulates and tests in a more comparative fashion, making the best use of a comparative exercise in hypothesis formulation and testing. These features are forcefully presented in his work on federalism and on war and state building. The limit of institutionalism can be said to depend on the scope and angle of comparative institutional screening and investigation, whether it examines the electoral consequences of electoral rules such as proportional representation and one-person-from-one-district or the social policy consequences of the taxation system.

Neuroscience During the revolutionary period of behavioralism, Easton’s A Framework for Political Analysis and A Systems Analysis of Political Life may be called the bible of behavioralism. Another work that might be considered seminal is Karl Deutsch’s (1963) The Nerves of Government. It highlights the importance of the nerves of the body politic, which enable flows and feedbacks of information. The work can be regarded as a forerunner of the neuroscience school of politics in a sense, although his framework did not delve into neurons and other neuro-physical components and functions. Since Deutsch’s interest moved from social communication and nationalism in a divided country to regional integration across the Atlantic, he is often categorized as a behavioralist. The steady advances in neurophysical science since the 1990s may make Deutsch a true forerunner of neuroanalysis. If Tip O’Neill is right when he says, “All politics is local,” a neurophysician is right when he or she
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says, “All politics is neural.” Neuroanalysis is sharply contrasted to behavioral analysis in that the former focuses on intention and motivation as revealed by changes in the neurons in the brain whereas the latter focuses on concrete, visible action. The former does not probe into real intentions and motivations. Scientific advances such as magnetic resonance imaging and other devices have made it possible to interpret and understand human intentions and motivations. In detecting suspected criminals, both assembling material evidence and deciphering the motivations of crime suspects are indispensable. Neuroanalytical data are increasingly used to fathom politics. Giacomo Rizzolatti and Corrado Sinigaglia’s (2008) Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions, Emotions, and Experience reveals how political science can benefit from neuroanalysis. Although neuroanalysis is not limited to political science, its use is bound increase because, after all, the complexity of politics lies in the fathomability of the movement of brain neurons.

Globalism

Political science at the dawn of the 21st century is moving in two opposite directions simultaneously: One is a neuronal direction, while the other is a global direction. Advances in science and technology have enabled human beings to connect with each other far and fast in order to “macrograsp” politics and dig deep into the brain in order to “micrograsp” politics. The tide of globalization was energized by the technological advances in the 20th century. One of them is the electronic revolution in communications, which enabled the movement of money to go “mad,” in the words of Susan Strange. It now moves incredibly fast, and along with money, many other things (e.g., commodities, education, medicine, migrants, viruses, crimes, drugs, weapons, and information) move fast on a global scale. Politics is not an exception to this irresistible and irreversible tide of globalization. David Held (1995) is the representative globalist. His Democracy and the Global Order builds the normative stand of cosmopolitan democracy founded on various democratic theories. The extent to which normative political theory is really universal and global at the same time was questioned until recently because a large bulk of normative political theory originated from modern Europe, where state building and political theory construction were both carried out mostly on a national scale.

Conversations Between Normative and Empirical Theories

So far, this entry has summarized three kinds of political theory: classical, empirical, and formal. It has also shown that they are intimately related to each other. In this section, a few illustrations are used to show that normative and empirical political theories can conduct fruitfully their conversations in ways that would help articulate them more sharply and precisely and identify their blind spots, thus enriching each other. Examples drawn from to make this point include warlike democracies and bottom-up regime typology. Both of these draw their propositions from classical political theories, such as those of Kant, Machiavelli, Aristotle, and Charles de Montesquieu, and conduct empirical testing of such propositions to see how much revision is desirable in both classical and empirical theories.

Normative political theory is meant to transcend the particular time and space in which it is generated in its argument about how justice is to be achieved. That is its raison d’être in a sense. At the same time, it is recognized that in normative political theory, issues based on conflict, shared values, and exchange tend to dominate. Those based on shared values have been especially numerous. This is in part because in the latter half of the 20th century, political science publications and their readership have been dominated by academics in the United States who have shown an enduring affinity with liberalism. Empirical political theory is also meant to go beyond the particular temporal and spatial settings so as to be valid under universal circumstances. At the same time, it is recognized that the bulk of empirical political theory has tended to be focused on the latter half of the 20th century and on the United States and the European Union. These two facts together represent a serious problem: Empirical political theory is heavily biased to present the West as a fountain of universal truth and justice.

It is remarkable that Kant, living in Koenigsberg his entire life and witnessing the vicissitudes of life
in European environments, grasped the wave of the future in a most succinct way. Although democracies are peace loving among themselves, they are war prone toward nondemocracies, which they fear are a threat to their existence. The right-wing Kantians were born in the 2000s, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the Afghan and Iraq wars. They argued that if Kant had been alive and had observed these events, he would have supported the Iraq war to prevent the weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) state of Iraq from exploding externally. They argued that democracies cannot be just passive, sitting idly by while innocent civilians are being killed and when democracies are challenged by the threat of force. Instead, democracies should fight against antidemocratic forces.

In stark contrast to the democratic interventions of right-wing Kantians, the left-wing Kantians called for democracy that rejects interference from outside in the internal democratic affairs of a country, termed sovereign democracy by Vladislav Surkov. This refers to the incidents that took place in relation to the democratization and secessionist movements in those societies that used to be united in the former Soviet Union, such as Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

In the late 18th century, Europe saw the French Revolution and the Napoleonic War. Kant believed that the advent of a republican regime, free trade, and multilateral treaties and international organizations would herald eternal peace in a fledgling form. It is clear that Kant’s ideas are surely bound by time and space. In the dawn of the 21st century, we saw the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Afghan and Iraq wars, leading the right-wing Kantians and the left-wing Kantians to argue as to whether humanitarian interventions are justified (the right-wing Kantians) or not (the left-wing Kantians) to propagate democratic regimes from the outside. Thus, we can conclude that normative political theory has, not surprisingly, a context boundedness.

Along a different line of argument, Kant’s republics have two types of checks-and-balances mechanisms, according to John Ferejohn and Frances Rosenbluth (2008). Horizontal checks are those mechanisms working between the elite and citizen levels. Kant’s republican democracies distinguish between the decision-making elites and the decision-shaping citizens but only on the condition that they interact with each other. In other words, elites take into account citizen preferences in their decision making, while citizens express their preferences verbally and demonstrably to elites in their decision shaping. Ferejohn and Rosenbluth argue that Kant must be differentiated from Machiavelli in that the republican democracies equipped with checks-and-balances mechanisms in Kant’s argument prescribe tangentially against Machiavelli’s democratic mobilization theory and, thus, his war-prone democracy theory. Machiavelli’s argument is based on the comparison between republican Rome and monarchical Florence. Republican Rome was endowed with soldiers whose war-fighting motivation and capacity were high because it was a politically inclusive regime. Monarchical Florence was plagued by mercenaries whose war-fighting motivation and capacity were not high. Ferejohn and Rosenbluth use Machiavelli to make sense of war-prone democracies as witnessed in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Therefore, according to them, peace-loving and war-prone democracies are not separate but different sides of the same coin.

In 1835, focusing on the armed forces in democracies, Alexis de Tocqueville observed and pointed to the inherent danger of the military conducting activities that might give a bad reputation to democracies. Tocqueville observed that the army in America defended the invaders, who plundered the land originally possessed by natives and broke armistice and peace treaties with the natives. The army was hugely supported by the Americans, who advanced to the west from the initial patches of land on the Atlantic coast as if it were their “manifest destiny,” before this phrase was coined later. Tocqueville was apprehensive of the danger of the military having its conduct legitimated by democracies whose ideas he emphatically approves and expressly admires. In the wake of 9/11 and the acts of revenge the United States engineered, Reiji Matsumoto sensitizes this aspect of American democracy fully, citing Tocqueville. In other words, democratic peace and war proneness are different sides of the same coin.
American authors like Max Boot and Robert Kagan make the same set of observations of American being prone to the use of force in settling conflicts of interest abroad even before its independence from England. Both authors are called neoconservative in the United States; in Russia, they are called the Bolsheviks of the 21st century. The American neoconservatives and the Russian Bolsheviks led by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin during the previous century have two things in common: They are idealists, pursuing their ideals with commitment and compassion, and they are realists, legitimating the use of force if their casus belli is deemed justifiable in light of their ideals, such as democracy and human rights. Perhaps Tocqueville was right in his instinctive apprehension since he had experienced democratic imperialism in Europe in the form of the revolutionary war waged by Napoleon Bonaparte.

Classical political theorists often talk about regime types. Aristotle, in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, argues that ethics is the basis of politics. Thus, depending on the prevailing ethics in society, three regime types are identified: monarchy, aristocracy, and politeia. Monarchy is shaped by the kind of ethics that prevail between a father and a son; aristocracy is shaped by the kind of ethics that prevail between a husband and a wife; and politeia is shaped by the kind of ethics that prevail between an elder brother and a younger brother. Aristotle’s theory is monadic in the sense that once the prevailing ethics is identified, the regime type is automatically determined. Montesquieu’s (1748) *Spirit of Law* is also monadic. Three regime types—republicanism, monarchy, and autocracy—are determined by the driving spirit of a regime. Republicanism is driven by virtue, aristocracy is driven by honor, and autocracy is driven by fear. It is clear that the relationship between citizens and the state is monadic and that once the regime type is specified, the prevailing ethics of citizens is also specified. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Weber talked about regime types via means of regulation—that is, charisma, force, and legal rationality. Again, the monadic determination is assumed. Once the means are specified, regime types are determined, and vice versa. The state of affairs has not changed much even in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. For instance, Stein Rokkan, during the 1960s, articulated the formation of democratic states in European history. Yet Rokkan talks about only regime types, not citizens. One may wonder why there has been little interest in citizens and their relationship with the state when opinion polls are conducted all over the world, including in many authoritarian societies. Until recently, one could explain the paucity of discussion on citizens in theories about the state as the main theories deal with the institutions rather than with the social actors.

Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* makes ethics shared and practiced by a certain set of people the determinant of regime types—thus his regime types of monarchy, aristocracy, and politeia. Within politeia, he has three regime subtypes: autocracy, oligarchy, and democracy. How are the three regime subtypes of politeia determined? Some scholars conjecture that those regimes subtypes are not well “disciplined” by a certain set of ethics the way monarchy and aristocracy are determined by what is called the societal regime prevailing at the bottom. Ethics here is broadly understood as the prevailing political culture, whose key components are defined as identity, confidence, and satisfaction. These few societal regime types are not quite formulated at an abstract level that may be comforting to some political theorists. But it is important to stress the need to initiate conversations. The classical theorists may start from anywhere they wish. The empirical theorists may start from the point where they are most comfortable. What is important is that they must move in new directions, which could bring them to carry out conversations tête-à-tête, instead of digging holes on both sides of what might be called the Maginot line of both schools of theorists.

With survey and nonsurvey data being continuously collected, empirical political theorists must grapple with the bottom-up determination of a regime type. So must normative political theorists. Neither normative nor empirical political theorists should discuss a regime type without examining the bottom level, that is, the citizens. The theoretical problem does not end here. Even in the general discussion of a regime type, say democracy, fuzziness abounds in the usage of this term.

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See also Concept Formation; Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; History of Political Science; Normative Political Theory; Political Philosophy; Political Science

Further Readings


POLITICIZATION OF BUREAUCRACY

Politicization of the bureaucracy is best understood in reference to two phenomena that are sometimes related. The first is the attempt of political principals to exercise control over the bureaucracy. Because politicization thus understood is in the first place an aspect of particular institutional structures, it may be called institutional politicization. The second form of politicization occurs when this control is exploited—that is, when the bureaucracy behaves in a manner responsive to politicians. Because the entailed notion of politicization refers primarily to patterns of behavior rather than features of institutions, it is significantly distinct from institutional politicization. This second notion is called behavioral politicization. Although both types of politicization are often criticized, their social consequences vary. Thus, while a given instance of politicization can be evaluated, a broad a priori claim about politicization of the bureaucracy is difficult.

Institutional Politicization

Politicians have many means at their disposal for influencing and controlling the bureaucracy. These include administrative procedures, budget controls,
oversight, and prior review of agency action. The mechanism most commonly associated with politicization is staffing an agency with appointees chosen by politicians, usually in the executive branch; the higher the proportion of political appointees within the agency and the greater the extent of their penetration of the agency hierarchy, the more politicized the agency is. Thus, the United States Office of Management and Budget, with more than 7% of its staff appointed by the executive, is more politicized than the United Kingdom’s Treasury Ministry, with only seven political appointees, or 0.5% of its staff. This entry focuses on political appointees rather than the other mechanisms of institutional politicization.

A politicized bureaucracy can be contrasted with one that is neutral, autonomous, or insulated—that is, one free from influence by the political branches and able to pursue its own agenda. Agencies may be free to do so by virtue of stalemates between political actors, each actor seeking to influence agency decisions, having cultivated a sufficiently influential constituency of its own, or monopolizing the information necessary for effective oversight. Political appointees within the bureaucracy can also be contrasted with careerists who enter the civil service and work their way through its ranks. This distinction is particularly important because careerists typically enjoy tenure, promotion, and salary protections. Careerists are thus not chosen by politicians. Rather, they are typically selected on the basis of objective measures, such as a competitive exam or special education (e.g., the Écoles Nationale d’Administration and Polytechnique in France), and are insulated from politicians. This insulation should not, however, be overstated: Politicians can still influence careerists within many systems by offering transfers to prestigious posts and manipulating budgets.

There are two general motivations for institutional politicization. The first is patronage, where political appointments are created and filled as rewards to political allies or in exchange for favors. Patronage appointments are often “spoils” distributed by winners to those who aided in the campaign. The second is policy oriented. Politicians, usually executives, can politicize an agency to acquire greater control over it, staffing it with personnel of their choosing and whom they can dismiss. In this manner, politicization is a means by which executives steer policy. Similar reasoning informs the extent of institutional politicization when programs are enacted or implemented. If they anticipate losing political control, supporters of a new bureaucratically administered program may try to place it in an insulated agency dominated by careerists, whereas opponents may do the opposite, favoring increased politicization of the agency as a means of managing the program when they come to power. Similarly, a legislature faced with a hostile executive may prefer careerist administration of policy rather than politicization as a means of cabining the executive’s influence.

Behavioral Politicization

Institutional politicization is frequently a determinant of behavioral politicization; structures that grant politicians influence over the bureaucracy will make it more responsive to them. Institutional politicization is not, however, a necessary precondition of behavioral politicization. The bureaucracy can adjust its behavior out of an internal norm, for example, or in anticipation of a threat of institutional politicization. Likewise, as indicated by the patronage motivation for political appointments, institutional politicization does not always lead to or seek to implement behavioral politicization. Institutional and behavioral politicization, as defined here, have a close relationship, but one does not necessarily imply the other.

Analytically, behavioral politicization can be further divided into two types. Behavioral politicization can indicate a shift in policy mediated through the bureaucracy. A new administration can usher in a new set of priorities and programs, and agencies may alter their behavior to better realize these goals. It can also indicate using agency discretion for purely political ends, such as directing government funds toward political allies or targeting opponents for investigation and scrutiny by enforcement agencies. The first, more general type of behavioral politicization is not normatively suspect, while extreme or egregious examples of the second are often made unlawful, such as under the Hatch Act in the United States, which forbids many government employees from using their official authority to influence or interfere with elections. An a priori normative evaluation of behavioral politicization in general is therefore difficult.
Effects of Institutional Politicization on Agency Performance

Some research indicates that increased institutional politicization in the form of political appointees decreases agency performance. However, this finding hinges on the presence of several key conditions. First, it requires that bureaucratic management expertise is site specific, so that it is not enough that the manager understands the policy area, the political environment the agency operates within, and so on. Instead or in addition, it assumes that an effective agency requires staff with particular knowledge about agency structure, budget, internal culture, and so on. A variation on this assumption is that public management is idiosyncratic, so that other management experience—which political appointees tend to have—does not transfer well. The contention is that appointees are generally less familiar with navigating the bureaucratic environment or marshaling coalitions to support their agenda. The second condition is that appointees with the relevant expertise and experience cannot be found or that the costs of doing so are unreasonably high. The third is that political appointees do not offer their own countervailing advantages. The alternative being assumed away is, for instance, that a political appointee, who is far more likely to have served in the White House or Congress, could not use those connections to facilitate achieving the agency’s goals within its political environment.

If all these conditions hold, then ceteris paribus, the greater the extent of institutional politicization through political appointees, the less effective the agency will be at its allotted tasks. But these conditions are demanding. While there exists some empirical support for the first and second conditions, they may not hold universally even in the archetypal case of a patronage appointment where a neophyte is given a position as a reward or political favor. Furthermore, the alternative—careerist bureaucrats—can have its own drawbacks. Careerists, especially if they are insulated from political principals, can shirk their duties, become captured by the interests they are charged to regulate, or cultivate their own influence over policy.

Civil service career protections may help encourage bureaucrats to develop expertise, which alone would support concerns about institutional politicization. However, the most systematic arguments for this view demonstrate that bureaucrats only develop expertise if they have policy preferences and are given some control over such issues. This implies that perhaps the ideal system is a hybrid of institutional politicization and the civil service protections typically enjoyed by careerists: Politicians can staff agencies with those who care about the relevant policies, rather than using an objective staffing mechanism such as an exam, and then provide agency employees with job protection. So long as the bureaucrats are given some influence over policy, they will invest in developing expertise.

Politicization and Democracy

In addition to its possible impact on agency performance, institutional politicization can strengthen democratic control over policy by making the bureaucracy more responsive to (elected) politicians. There is thus the potential for trade-offs between efficiency or expertise and democratic accountability.

As previously noted, institutional politicization can lead to behavioral politicization. If voters exercise effective control over their representatives, then behavioral politicization does not threaten democratic control. The politicized bureaucracy is responsive to politicians and acts accordingly, and in this case, the politicians are in turn responsive to the voters. The result is essentially the same as if the bureaucrats were elected directly. Put another way, if the principal–agent problems between the voters and elected officials are resolved, then politicization need not undermine democratic control of policy. Institutional politicization is a possible means of resolving the principal–agent problems between politicians and bureaucrats, so that the politicized bureaucracy’s behavior (i.e., behavioral politicization) is ultimately responsive to the voters.

This analysis assumes, however, that bureaucratic policy is a salient issue for voters, that is, that they are willing and able to condition their vote for the political controller of the agency on the bureaucracy’s actions. If out of ignorance or other reasons they cannot, then behavioral politicization can be used to deliver targeted benefits (penalties) to allies (enemies) in order to gain political advantage.

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See also Accountability, Electoral; Agencies; Bureaucracy; Bureaucracy, Rational Choice Models; Effectiveness, Bureaucratic; Politicization of Civil Service; Principal–Agent Theory

Further Readings


Politicization of Civil Service

The term politicization of civil service refers to the introduction of political considerations into actions traditionally carried out by the civil service, thus changing political-administrative relations. There are three established ways of studying this process, reflecting somewhat different understandings of the basic concept. The first tradition concerns how civil servants are appointed and promoted. In politicized appointment and promotion processes, merit-based criteria are replaced by political criteria. Scholars in the second tradition study the political preferences of civil servants, often using attitudinal data, with the aim of answering questions such as whether the civil service is dominated by the political left or the political right. In the third tradition, the actions of civil servants are analyzed to assess to what extent civil servants are directly involved in political decision making. If they are involved, it is seen as an indication of politicization. In this entry, political-administrative relations are first described generally, followed by a discussion of the three traditions just mentioned.

Underlying the concept of politicization is the normative ideal of the separation of politics and administration. The argument is that to prevent corruption and patronage and to shield the expertise of the civil service, the two spheres should not be merged. The scholarly interest in political-administrative relations dates back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when influential authors such as Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber advocated a clear distinction between policy making and administration. The dominant view at the turn of the 20th century was that politicians should be responsible for policy making, while civil servants should execute the decisions taken.

The sharp distinction between the activities of politicians and civil servants has been questioned by many scholars. It has been pointed out, for example, that elected politicians have a legitimate interest in controlling what government organizations do. From a politician’s point of view, having party loyalists implementing policies ensures that policies are not changed, or in any other way obstructed, on the way from decision to implementation. The basic idea of this line of argument is that neutral competence is not the only important virtue of the civil service in a democratic society. The neutrality should be complemented by responsiveness to democratically elected leaders. From this point of view, some degree of control, even if it is imposed by politicization of the civil service, could therefore very well be advocated.

However, although it has been claimed that the distinction between politics and administration has been overstated, the ideal of a separation of activities for politicians and civil servants is still very important. Most students of political-administrative relations would today agree that a collapse of political and administrative activities would have severe consequences for both democracy and the efficiency of the civil service.

Political Appointments

The common view is that political appointments and promotions have increased dramatically during the past decades. There have been numerous reports from countries belonging to different Western administrative traditions, for instance, the
United States, Sweden, Belgium, and the United Kingdom (UK), of an increasing politicization of the civil service. There is also evidence pointing to widespread politicization of the civil service in the developing world. These studies have created a growing and often critical debate regarding the move toward a more politicized civil service, which has engaged also international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank.

Nevertheless, even if scholars have suggested that there is a common trend of politicization of the civil service, one should be aware of the large differences among countries in terms of the methods, levels, and trends of politicization.

Generally, there are two methods of imposing political control over the civil service using political appointees. The most common method in the Western world is not to directly replace civil servants with political appointees but rather to add a layer of political appointees to the civil service. Political appointees within this new layer take on advisory, public relation, or managerial functions. These functions could otherwise have been carried out by the civil service. In some cases, for example, during the Blair administration in the UK, political appointees mix these roles and serve as spin doctors involved in policy-making processes, the implementation of policies, and public relations. The system with a layer of political appointees has a long tradition in the United States, historically rooted in the so-called spoils system, where party loyalists fill important functions in the executive branch and in federal agencies. Another example of a similar strategy is found in Belgium, where ministers in the government have large private offices, so-called ministerial cabinets, that duplicate civil service functions and give ministers a political apparatus to turn to for advice. There are, however, also examples where political appointments are used directly within the civil service. Germany has, for example, the institution of political civil servants, which refers to the top two ranks of the civil service in Germany. Other examples with a more widespread and direct substitution of civil servants can be found in Southern European countries such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain and on the African continent.

Not only do the methods differ among countries but also the levels of politicization of the civil service. Generally, the levels of politicization of the civil service are higher in developing societies, the two main reasons being a political demand for a committed civil service and the fact that the civil service not only functions as a provider of public goods but is also a valuable asset for the employee. Scholars studying administrative reforms in India have, for example, observed that the neutral civil service was seen as “a hindrance rather then a help” and noted the politicians’ demand for a more committed civil service. Another example can be found in sub-Saharan Africa, where the state often is the main employer. Some scholars argue that the primary objective of the civil service in sub-Saharan Africa is not to provide service to the general public but to give rewards to the supporters of the political leader. Turning to the Western democracies, they can be divided into several administrative traditions with different levels of politicization. Countries such as Italy and Belgium, which are influenced by the French administrative tradition, have the highest levels of politicization. This group is followed by countries in continental Europe that are influenced by the German administrative tradition. Then, there are the Scandinavian countries, together with countries belonging to the Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition, such as Ireland, New Zealand, and the UK, with relatively low levels of politicization. There are, of course, several exceptions to this very general observation, but it should especially be noted that the United States, belonging to the Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition, is fairly politicized in comparative terms.

Political Attitudes

Studies of the political attitudes of civil servants have been used as an indication of the politicization of the civil service. There are at least two different ways in which the attitudes of civil servants are important in the political process. First, the civil service can make up a substantial part of the electorate and therefore be an important actor if it is politically mobilized. Second, and maybe more important in this context, the attitudes of civil servants might sometimes conflict with the attitudes of the political party in government, and this can create obstacles for policy implementation even if the civil servants are not mobilized. Sweden can
serve as an example. In 1976, for the first time since 1936, a government not led by the Social Democratic Party was elected. It is often claimed that the new center-right Swedish government had problems implementing new policies because of the social-democratic attitudes of senior civil servants (even if they were not politically appointed). To avoid similar situations, most countries have subsequently created some kind of legal or normative framework stating the political neutrality of the civil service and/or limiting the political involvement of civil servants. Another example, from the Thatcher years in the UK, can, however, illustrate that conflicts between the political leadership and the civil service are not always about party politics. The Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher tried to implement a radical reform program in the public sector. Studies have shown that the civil service was not trusted to carry out these reforms, and therefore, civil servants in key positions were replaced by persons committed to the reform program. Politicization was based on attitudes to that reform program rather than to the Conservative Party.

Political Actions

It is inevitable that civil servants take part in the political processes to some extent, since they are parts of politically led machineries. In most countries, top civil servants are also, to some extent, involved in giving policy advice to ministers. However, there are large variations in how the civil service is involved in political actions.

Participation in the policy-making process is regarded as a critical indication of politicization. Generally, the civil service can participate in three different ways: (1) directly, (2) indirectly as actors in the political decisions, or (3) as advisors to the elected politicians.

One example of direct involvement is the Japanese tradition, where the civil service does not limit its role to policy implementation or technical advice but is considered to be a powerful actor in the policy-making process. Until the end of the 1990s, top civil servants even took part in discussions in the Japanese legislature, the Diet, something that would be unthinkable in most other countries. In Spain, civil servants are indirectly involved in the policy-making process. Spain traditionally has a close connection between the political and administrative elites. The political elite is largely recruited from the Spanish administrative corps. It could, therefore, be argued that the civil service is involved in the policy-making process, although not in the same direct way as it is in Japan.

A third example, illustrating the advisory functions of the civil service, can be found in Denmark. It is one of the countries in the world with the fewest political appointments in the civil service. This puts the politically elected leaders in a situation where the civil service is the only body outside the party organization where they can turn for advice. Civil servants in Denmark, therefore, play a significant role in the policy-making process as advisors, and this is paradoxically due to Denmark’s low-level, rather than high-level, political appointments.

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See also Bureaucracy; Civil Service; Legitimacy; Politicization of Bureaucracy; Responsiveness of Bureaucracy; Weber, Max

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Politics of Language

Political language narrowly defined refers to a specific use of language for political means. In a broader sense, political language refers to language policy or political linguistics—that is, the ways in which governments attempt to shape the linguistic structure of the society or the claims issued by linguistic groups to change existing language arrangements or legislations. Neither of these working definitions fully captures the relevance of language issues to politics and political science. This entry therefore reviews three types of related but not overlapping issues: (1) the way social sciences address the relationship between language and politics, (2) classical language policies and legislation, and (3) the “normative turn.”

Until recently, language matters in social sciences have been addressed in anthropology, sociolinguistics, and sociology, focusing almost exclusively on language identity (class or group identity) and language as an expression of a specific culture—hence its intrinsic value as a unique cultural vehicle. These approaches are consequently committed to language diversity. But language diversity generally hinders efficient political administration, and comparative politics have shown that the most classical sequence of nation building is language rationalization, that is, the imposition of one or more official national languages. Monolingualism is not the norm; most countries have to manage language diversity, either by admitting a set of official languages or by tolerating language diversity.

Language and Politics

To the Greeks, language and politics are so closely related that the practice of democracy is impossible without a theory of language. “Nature makes nothing in vain . . . man is the only animal with the gift of speech” (Aristotle, Politics, I, 2). Politics is language, because language enables deliberation and debate and rules out violence, as Norbert Elias has shown in his Civilizing Process. Language is therefore central to any political activity.

Language is also central to social interaction, and social scientists have been indebted to pioneer linguists such as Ferdinand de Saussure, who claimed that language is the epistemological model of society. In other words, society is structured like a language. Structuralism indeed claims that there is a “social grammar,” and social sciences in general became fond of the idea that the implicit and explicit code ruling society resembles a constraining grammar of interaction. Social theory in the 1970s understood social action as either conforming to that grammar or violating its rules.

Three main movements characterize the past decades of research:

1. The first is the reception of nominalism in analytical philosophy and its durable influence on constructivism in general. Nominalism holds that there are no universal concepts, only empirical observations; referred to language, reality pertains to our ways of constructing/naming it; John Austin’s illocutionary acts, for instance, are means of “doing things with words”: A minister saying, “I baptize this child,” ipso facto baptizes it.

2. The second involves studies on language and domination, with two subfields. One is concerned with routinized forms of domination, as in Pierre Bourdieu’s Language and Symbolic Power (1982, 1991), for whom the linguistic market is similar to any other market, or Basil Bernstein’s Class, Codes and Control (1971), where a sharp line is drawn between the “elaborated speech codes” of the middle classes seeking social mobility and the “restricted speech codes” of the working classes. Speech responds to strong cultural pressures: An elaborated code summarizes general social means and ends, whereas a restricted code is limited to local means and ends. The other subfield is concerned with the exacerbated form of domination: propaganda and totalitarian language. George Orwell depicts the deterioration of language in his novel 1984, and Viktor Klemperer’s diary (Lingua Tertii Imperii) describes the sheer truth of how the Nazis systematically destroyed the German language, not only by evacuating the bald words but by substituting them with euphemized codes, such as “final solution” or “special treatment.”

3. The last movement is a legacy from philosophy and anthropology and relates to the profound skepticism concerning the written form of language and its potential link to illiberal policies (Plato, accusing the logographs, wrote that script
lies and that speech is sincere; script is compared to a *pharmakon*—poison and medicine alike). Anthropology confirms that script is historically linked to despotism, as the original use of script was for accountability and domination of vast territories, not poetry. Classification might be a natural property of language; it enables governments to control society through rules enabled by script.

**Language Policies**

Language policy is an attempt to weigh collective language choices by institutional means, to prescribe the public use of one (or more) language(s), and to adopt language legislation. Historically, creating, rationalizing, or maintaining a language is the classical (European) sequence of language policy, mostly congruent with nation building in the 19th century. Official languages are not always national languages (an official language can coexist with a set of national languages), and subordinate national communities or groups with a strong regional identity may challenge the official language and make new language claims. Official- and national-language policies are only efficient alongside compulsory education, a wide interest in learning and using the official national language, and some kind of reward for doing so (professional, symbolic)—the latter is particularly true for national-language policies: “What the eye is to the lover, language is to the patriot” (Benedict Anderson, 1983, p. 154).

The French example is telling. From the 16th century (the Édit de Villers-Cotterets, 1539) to the 1992 constitutional revision, France has always aimed at rationalizing, spreading, and maintaining the French language as a symbol of common belonging, a means of effective administration in a centralized state, a key element of republican identity, and a sign of equal citizenship. Ironically, it was an abbot during the peak of the French Revolution (1790–1794), Grégoire, who was convinced that revolutionary ideas could only be thought of in French and who implemented the first true language policy: Political praxis and language practice are inseparable.

**Language Legislation**

The next step is language legislation and consequently language rights. All states “speak,” issue laws, and administer; language, therefore, cannot be benignly neglected as religion, for instance. In monolingual settings, the public sphere is entirely ruled in/by one language. In multilingual states, mostly federations, legislators have a choice between two principles: the territoriality and the personality principles. The first, and most widespread, principle is based on territorial rights (Belgium, Switzerland, and Cameroon): It legally recognizes a monolingual territory. Variants are territorialized individual rights (Catalonia and South Tyrol), special policies for minorities (Australia, the United States, and Germany, Hungary), and territorial bilingualism for minorities (Estonia, Bosnia, and Pakistan). Territoriality is usually associated with administrative bilingualism (civil servants speak all or part of the official languages) to ensure statewide communication; it provides language stability and language security (small languages are protected on their territory, and language scales are relatively stable) but obliges all to speak the official language in its territory of reference. Territoriality generally leads to juxtaposed unilingualisms and may disrupt intercommunity communication, such as in Belgium. The personality principle, on the other hand, is best described by institutional multilingualism: The state acknowledges and recognizes individual language choices. Regardless of where one is in the territory, civil administration has to cater to the individual’s language choices. Most of Canada follows this principle, with both French and English as official languages; however, in response to Québec’s desire to preserve the French language, legislation (Bill 101, 1977) was passed that makes French the sole official language in the province.

Language legislations are mostly a blend of different types of territoriality associated with individual rights. Strategic multilingualism in India or South Africa hints at political rather than linguistic difficulties in a postcolonial or postapartheid era, respectively. Very few states have achieved “liberation” from the colonial tongue. The Arabization movement in Algeria (the return to Arabic as the only official language) was a linguistic and political failure: The Algerian upper classes continued to speak French, the token of upward mobility. One interesting feature of language policy is internationalization (spreading a national language worldwide). Colonial empires did so in Africa, Australia,
and India; and half a century after decolonization, means of social mobility are still linked to “colonial” language skills.

Almost all states enforce linguistic assimilation policies, and very few states decide not to intervene in language matters, favoring as such the dominant group(s). A complete language shift is generally achieved in the third generation; diglossia and bilingualism are common among immigrant children.

Language and Fairness

Noam Chomsky’s theory about the grammatical similarity of all languages within a universal mind-brain set had expelled sociolinguistics and diversity studies from the linguistic departments in the 1970s. A similar change of paradigm took place in the 1990s with the normative turn in language studies. Until recently, and despite a fair amount of language conflicts, normative literature in political science had not paid much attention to language and even less to the linguistic dimension of democracy. Post-Rawlsian political theory has been discussing many culture- or identity-related topics but has barely considered language. Neither liberals or liberal-culturalists, nor communitarians have really addressed language equity. It is only in the 1990s that scholars in comparative politics and economics started to invest in language issues. However, shedding a new light on linguistic diversity and linguistic justice in a system dominated by powerful global languages rapidly led to a wider discussion on the usefulness and the threats of a common language, a lingua franca (in Europe but also in multilingual societies and sometimes even on a global level), the founding idea being that somehow a healthy democracy depends on a common tool of communication. The path taken by recent literature is an attempt to reconcile the polity’s systemic and linguistic capacity alongside the citizen’s effectiveness or voice. The “deliberative turn” of the 1990s and the following “talk-centric” theories of democracy indeed focused on communication and debating rather than on voting but without mentioning the precondition of a successful public debate: a common language. The discussion on such a common language as a necessary condition of a more substantial democracy has been particularly vivid in Europe and poses interesting questions: Do we need a common language for a supranational or even a global democracy? Do we need a common tool to discuss global concerns (environmental issues, for instance)? Would social mobility and employability be enhanced if we all spoke the same language? The possible answers are contained in three different models. The identity model argues for some kind of restorative justice after centuries of nation building and linguistic rationalization: The claim for language diversity is morally relevant, and states ought to acknowledge those claims instead of reducing language variety by imposing global/official languages. The procedural model is not outcome oriented: People should fairly discuss the language choices of their polity. The economy or utility model focuses on the social and economic usefulness of one or more linguae francae, the costs and benefits of learning/spreading common language(s).

Many political theorists would argue that given the huge translation costs in the European Union, the most efficient policy would be a fair combination of three official languages (English, French, and German) and a three-communication-languages repertoire, including one of the official languages. Such a language coordination policy would rest on an official language set and a free language market for the citizens; it would cost less, enable governments to invest in language training, enhance the possibilities of communication among European citizens, and maintain the possibilities of connecting European repertoires with extra-European language constellations.

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See also European Integration; Identity, Social and Political; Nation Building; Nationalism; Normative Political Theory; Postcolonialism; Regionalism; Rights; State Formation; Territory

Further Readings

The term *popular culture* has three levels of meaning, which though interrelated are mutually distinct. It refers first, in a generalized way, to the form taken by the totality of everyday practices followed by a society or a group within a society. In this sense, the term is, from the cultural history perspective, a descriptive one, devoid of any further theoretical implications. Historically, a second, more narrowly defined meaning of *popular culture* first came into use. It was applied to the culture and lifestyle of a population’s lower social strata and referred—mostly within a historical perspective—to the perceived polarity between the culture and lifestyle of the general population, seen as the uneducated masses, and the dominant high culture of the elites. The third meaning of the term *popular culture*—which, in the English-speaking world in particular, equates *popular culture* with *pop culture* and thus denotes cultural industry products distributed by the mass media unrelated to the canon of classical high culture—arose from the specific dynamics of the breakdown of Marxist class antagonism in the intellectual circles close to the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (established in 1964). In effect, the vertically and hierarchically conceived juxtaposition of two cultures was now replaced by a horizontal array of multiple equal-status “cultures” subsisting within the polarities of class, race, and gender. Below, the historical developments and the interaction of these concepts are discussed.

### Early Developments

The concept of a (popular, indigenous) “folk” culture (*Volkskultur*) existing in its own right originated in the second half of the 18th century, born partly of the physiocrats’ interest in the population at large and partly of the romantic notion of a “folk soul” (*Volksseele*) characterized by supra-individual, nation-specific features. During the Napoleonic period, and in the context of the nascent discourse of nationalism, this concept of *Volk* underwent reformulation; the relationship between popular culture and high culture came to be conceived of as an organic unity, its elements defined in terms of each other. Yet at the same time, in the context of industrialization and of the developing social crisis, the mutual antagonism of the two cultural levels became an increasingly prominent feature of socialist and Marxist cultural theory. The origins of the concept of popular culture at the time of the Enlightenment are linked to the physiocratic interest in resources, generally— to agricultural production, mineral resources, and proto-industrial production—linked ultimately, that is to say, to the discovery of the productive capacity of a territory’s working population to increase its wealth. Michel Foucault used the term *biopolitique* (biopolitics) to denote this new, calculating concern with the productivity potential of the population as a feature of the new power structure, directed against the ancien régime.

This same interest was accompanied, and dignified ideologically, by the notion of a productive national soul (*Volksseele*), in which the quintessential nature of a people was supposed to find its expression. It was this latter notion, too, that underlay the romantic preoccupation with collecting nation-specific texts—folksongs (Johann Herder, William Wordsworth), fairytales (Jacob & Wilhelm Grimm), proverbs, and diverse idiomatic materials. Among those thinking in terms of the nation-state, from about 1800 onward, the biopolitical interest became ideological: The idea of a nation as an entity, at one with itself and clearly distinct from other nations, was no mere matter of drawing geographical frontiers. Much more
important, it called for cultural demarcation to take place—a process complicated by the conflicting pulls of a nation's high culture and its "cultural substrate" (Friedrich Jahn and Wilhelm Riehl). The term *folklore*, coined by William Thoms in 1846, denotes the attempt to record the cultural substrate of individual nations, national minorities, or groups in genealogical form and to subject the recorded materials to comparison with a view to identifying what is universal in human socialization, along with what is specific to the respective groups. The positivist collector activity focused on folklore was now accompanied by scientific analysis and sorting of the material under the disciplines of ethnography and ethnology. During the ensuing development of the cultural and social sciences, the culture of the people (*Volk*), of "the nameless masses," was identified for the first time as a subject meriting research. As such, it embraced the material and ritual-performative patterns of existence and action peculiar to the lower social strata of people or genealogical groups and their ideas on religious, juridical, and everyday practical matters, along with their approach to positioning the individual in society (relative to ancestral descent, family, and sequence of generations).

Depending on the political and social conditions prevailing in national groups, cognizance of the everyday perspectives and material culture of the lower strata will tend toward one or the other of two postulates: comparative and open-minded or ethnocentric and hypostatizing. It is unlikely that there has ever been a clearer example of the latter than the direction taken by German ethnology from about 1900, which amounted to disinventing the tradition of a comparative ethnology or anthropology concerned both with industrialized societies and with nonstate groups. However, neither line of development succeeded in demonstrating a robust link between high culture and cultural substrate. It was only 20th-century sociology that first developed sophisticated models for such a linkage. The behavioral standards in Norbert Elias’s theory of the civilizing process and the habitus variants represented by Pierre Bourdieu must both be seen as distinction-drawing processes, as deliberate differentiation of the elites from the "broad masses"—though this was later rationalized from the psychological angle in the contexts of social, medical, or public hygiene debates.

**Nationalist and Marxist Approaches**

Thus, in its early stages and subsequent development, the concept of popular culture marked off the sociocultural living patterns of what was initially the agrarian, peasant population, and later included the proletariat and lower middle classes, as separate and distinct from those of the higher and socially influential classes. Two conflicting inheritances can be traced, one nationalistic and focused on origins, the other Marxist and antagonistic. The nationalistic, origins-focused line reaches its culmination in National Socialist ideology; here, the existence of cultural antagonism within a society is denied, and a countermodel, based on ideas such as national character and the "bonding" of a nation’s various cultural levels, is proclaimed: the *Volksgemeinschaft*. This was seen as a closed continuum, within which cultural substrate and high culture cross-fertilize and interweave, since both are rooted in the same humus and are inseparably linked. The soil metaphor is complemented by that of blood—*blood* standing here for the vitality and strength of the current generation at any given time.

The background to this blood-and-soil fixation can be traced to 19th-century organic models of society: Nationalistic thinkers generated, for the benefit of the nation’s imagination, the self-image of a solitary tree, its roots reaching deep down to the first beginnings of the nation’s separate cultural identity and the new blossoms seen on it each year (i.e., individuals who have to put the community before themselves) representing national uniqueness and vigor. In this figurative thinking, every nation constituted a self-contained entity, a clearly demarcated “body” of the people. Being the social stratum seen as tillers of the soil and as essentially enduring, farmers became the ideological standard-bearers for this ideology of *Volkstum*, or national distinctiveness, which postulated a continuity stretching from early origins to the present level of development. The continued efficacy of the strength-giving pure origin was exposed to many and various dangers: nonrecognition and relinquishment of the *We* as a consequence of fascination with the Other (or Alien) or the sustained infiltration of the “body” of the people (or nation) by “alien elements,” the existence of which was perceived as parasitical (e.g., anti-Semitism). It has to be emphasized that all postulates of *Volkstum* and folklore
regarding industrialized societies and the research on them, both the more radical and the moderate variants, are ideologically motivated. While it is true that this readiness of the upper strata of society to turn to the Volkstum and folklore of the lower strata embraces a certain element of compensation for modernization Angst, the ideologically transmitted postulate of pure origins with minimal contamination from outside is nevertheless preeminent. In other words, the everyday perspectives of the lower social strata were almost lost from sight in the idealised canon centered on origins and race.

The Marxist approach, focused as it was on class antagonism, led to the evolution of the theory of “two cultures” in “the same society” (Lenin). The antithesis inherent in the power disparity will prove to be a productive stimulus for both sides; high culture, having become weak and decadent, will be goaded into repressive action, while proletarian counterculture, with hitherto untapped reserves of energy to draw on, will indeed lose some of its impetus but will prove unstoppable in the long run. With the concept of the struggle for cultural hegemony as outlined by Antonio Gramsci, this black-and-white characterization of the cultural confrontation (subordinate to the economic) becomes less simplistic and more applicable empirically. So Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony being “negotiated” within society after the demise of both the origin-focused and the class warfare–motivated models of national culture was to prove exceptionally fruitful in both historical and contemporary social research.

Modern Approaches
Inquiry into such negotiation (there are a host of parallel developments besides those of Gramsci) implies knowledge of the specific thinking of the actors concerned. Thus, while the special fascination of the term folklore lay in its inbuilt tension between “knowledge of the people” and “the people’s knowledge,” the need that now arose for empirical study of the multifarious “culture and way of life” of the population’s lower strata ensured that it was their viewpoint that now became the central concern. The common feature of all these more modern approaches is that they seek to collect and to focus on the inside views peculiar to the various social environments and thus—here revealing an anthropological cast of mind—to supplement the “grand historical narratives” with detailed studies at the grassroots level (microhistory). The now widely established pursuit of historical research on popular culture owes much to a history that started from the bottom.

Among the points of departure for this historical anthropology was the school that developed around the French journal Annales d’histoire économique et sociale (launched in 1929). Its founders, Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, announced a historiography that would subordinate event history to a structural history concerned with everyday life and the mentalities that it engendered. The long duration (Ferdinand Braudel’s longue durée) of production methods, ideas, and behavioral patterns now became no less a central focus than single events: violently erupting rebellions (as described, e.g., by E. LeRoy Ladurie, Carnival in Romans) or ideas about the nature of the world, put forward at Inquisition hearings but running counter to contemporary trends (e.g., the worldview of a miller around 1600 in the benandanti, the work of Carlo Ginzburg). The ethnological line taken by the Prague School applied the structuralist method of meaning-constitutive opposition—this was still before Claude Lévi-Strauss—to elements of popular culture (P. Bogatyrev). Mikhail Bakhtin, with a background in Russian formalism, developed his theory of folk laughter in late medieval popular culture from the antithetical pairing of work culture and feast-day culture.

Particularly in academic research in the fields of family, childhood, women’s, and gender studies (and, not least, feminist studies), but also in the field of everyday living patterns and of power relationships in agrarian, early-modern urban, and proletarian industrialized cultural phenomena, popular culture researchers have set new and lasting standards in historiography. In its early stages, still adhering to the Marxist class antagonism concept, the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies later came to place the dynamics of the hierarchically subordinated cultural forms qua counterculture and subculture, possessing their own symbolic language, at the very heart of its activities: “culture as a whole way of life” (R. Williams; R. Hoggart). This assumed the recognition of individual identity positioned on criteria of social background, occupation, and philosophical-political, religious, and sexual orientation as a decision in favor of a form
of living that constitutes a cultural sector in its own right. Under the influence of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, the counterculture and subculture theory evolved—with youth culture and music culture in the forefront—into a new theory that accords parity of status to a range of cultures; the erudition-laden high culture of earlier times is now just one culture among many.

The most complete transformation has been in the area of mass media cultural products. The Adorno/Horkheimer thesis of a culture industry manipulating the scene from the top has been challenged, in S. Hall’s encoding/decoding model, by consumer appropriation of the narrative. John Fiske, taking all categories of mass media–transmitted pop culture products into his purview, demonstrated the creative resistance potential of this appropriation process. From a feminist perspective, Angela McRobbie has emphasized the gender specificity of the manner of appropriation. Cultural studies had already gone separate ways by the time the Birmingham Center was wound up in 2002. Influenced by accelerated media transmission and communication, by the increasing dominance of the visual in cultural output, by consumer-centeredness (among young shoppers no less than others) in the developed societies contrasting with abject poverty in the underdeveloped world, and by the enormous differences globally with regard to women’s autonomy of action, the lines of research pursued today in cultural and postcolonial studies are characterized by a bringing together of class, race, and gender.

A detailed study of popular culture (Facebook, blogs, discussion forums, etc.) on the World Wide Web is beginning, but it will take time until web culture research becomes an established discipline in its own right.

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See also Culturalism; Feminism; Marxism; Nationalism; Political Culture

Further Readings


**POPULISM**

*See* Populist Movements

**POPULIST MOVEMENTS**

A distinction must be made between more or less coherent populist movements on the one hand and populism as a generic theoretical concept referring to a variety of demagogic messages and attitudes on the other. In the following, the various phases of populist movements and ideas are discussed in their historical contexts. The conclusion points to current concerns.

**Phases of Populist Movements**

Scholars conventionally identify the first historical manifestation of populism in the Russian intellectual populism of the late 1840s Narodnikis (i.e., populists in Russian; the word narodnichestvo—populism—appeared in the 1870s). Influenced by the ideas of Aleksandr Herzen, Mikhail Bakunin, and Nicolai Tchernichevski but devoid of any elaborate ideology, these Narodnikis emerged as a revolutionary movement adhering to some kind of idolatry of the peasantry and the rural village (*obchtchina*). They were ultraleftist, prone to the use of violence and even political assassinations.
This led, later on, to nihilism—terrorism as propagated by Nicolai Nekrassof and Sergei Netchaiev. They were also fiercely anti-Western (Orientalists) and proslavist (an extremely radical variety of revolutionary slavophiles).

Thereafter, during the last quarter of the 19th century, populism made a second appearance in the very different world of the European and North American industrialized societies. It thoroughly transformed itself into an anti-elitist, anti-parliamentarian, and nationalist-chauvinistic movement, especially in France between 1886 and 1889 (Boulangerism, derived from the name of its charismatic leader General Boulanger) and in the United States during the 1890s (with the xenophobic Protestant and anticapitalist People’s Party of the small White Anglo-Saxon Protestant [WASP] farmers and miners). Under these circumstances, populism shifted from the most extreme Left to the radical nationalist Right, appearing to some extent as the ancestor of today’s xenophobic and anti-immigrant Western European populist parties. Both French and U.S. populism of this second period only enjoyed a short time span. In this way, they introduced a feature of populist movements that remained for a long time quite typical—that is, their short duration, due to the ephemeral excesses of popular fever generated by a recurrent hostility to the existing ruling elite or to a newly established democratic government (in Europe of the late 19th century in particular). They also inaugurated populism as an unsteady form of mass electoral movements cemented by an orientation toward the “citizens of true stock.”

Between 1925 and 1955, populism made a third appearance. This time, it emerged in Latin America, with the semidictatorships of Getulio Vargas in Brazil and Juan Peron in Argentina (notwithstanding other populist governments, e.g., Carlos Ibañez’s in Chile or General Rojas Pinilla’s in Colombia, alongside their much more recent revival in Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela or Evo Morales’s Bolivia). In this region, populism seems to revive in part the older tradition of caudillismo, that is, that of a predestinate Savior of the People, wielding power by virtue of Providence against the lofty and corrupt oligarchy of big landowners. This inheritance did not prevent Latin American populism from becoming the most accomplished of all populist manifestations till now, a complete political regime of some sort, offering an actual alternative to West European or North American representative democracy. This alternative could be called “incarnate democracy,” considering its embodiment of the Sovereign People by a charismatic leader. Institutionally, these regimes are based on state-controlled labor unions for the incipient working class rather than on a single party inspired by European totalitarian states. Though rather authoritarian and by no means liberal, they, indeed, introduced for the first time some kind of political participation of the Latin American masses into the political arena to gain support from this popular base. They did so to such an extent that they deserve to be considered in some countries as the real forerunners of democracy in this part of the world. This particularity makes Latin American national populist regimes unique.

After World War II, other forms of even more dictatorial charismatic populism occurred in East Asia (Kusno Sukarno in Indonesia, Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines) and in the decolonized countries of Africa (Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Ahmed Sekou Touré in Guinea, and Kwame N’Krumah in Ghana). These personalized regimes generally gave birth to a Third World populism in which the unity of the nation was expressed in a single party).

In a fourth period, populism has dramatically evolved in Western Europe during the past 30 years. Between 1980 and 2000, it first resuscitated and modernized at the same time the hitherto customary form of factious agitators acting as outsiders opposing the “political correctness” and hypocrisy of representative democracy. In Denmark and Norway, to begin with, “progress” parties were born as antitaxation groups committed to denounce the excessive fiscal pressure of the Scandinavian social-democratic welfare states. Later on, mainly in Jean-Marie Le Pen’s France, Jörg Haider’s Austria, Christoph Blocher’s Switzerland, Bruno De Winter’s and Vlaams Belang’s Belgium, or Pim Fortuyn’s Netherlands, these xenophobic parties now have toned down their discourse in many cases. Some of them at least, particularly in Scandinavia, are trying to
get a better position inside the democratic party system. To this end, they do their best to touch a more sympathetic chord in the middle classes and authenticate the new political respectability they are trying to gain. Simultaneously and more interestingly, a number of established politicians belonging to the great parliamentarian parties now imitate a part of the campaign techniques of the formerly infamous populists (without admitting it, of course). This is the great novelty that makes the populist performance becoming commonplace instead of being irregular, temporary, and subversive. In a first mutation, a few respectable politicians claimed to do so in order to fight the populists of an orthodox persuasion with their own weapons (this partly was the case with Jacques Chirac in France or the People’s Party [Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP] in Austria). But now, they are geared to use these methods indiscriminately in order to face the competition of any other party—whether populist or not. From 1994 onward, Silvio Berlusconi in Italy outperformed everybody else in this unprecedented art of improving his popularity by giving up the condescension of old-style politicians. Later on, the 2007 French presidential campaign spectacularly went along this path, even though Tony Blair’s and Edmund Stoiber’s 2002 electoral campaigns can be considered as the first examples of this populist contagion in Britain and Germany.

**Current Concerns**

The term *populism* has so often been misused as an insult by pouring scorn on almost any politician capable of winning an election that difficulties arise to define it more strictly as a social science concept. If we do so, we would argue that its core classical feature relates to the strong and emotional direct relationship that exists between the mass of a population and the populist charismatic leader—or sometimes a party as in Mexico before 2000—who pretends to embody the People and whose ideas and feelings are supposed to correspond to the People without any mediation of representative democracy. According to Max Weber, the term *charisma* applies to a certain quality of a personality, by virtue of which this person is treated as endowed with exceptional powers or qualities. “We believe in the common sense of the common people,” as stated on page 9 of the Reform Party of Canada’s *Principles and Policies: The Blue Book* in 1991. Populism is also antipolitical inasmuch as it assails the art of using time as a resource for delaying and cooling down premature or counterproductive popular demands, an art that commonly represents the core technique of moderate liberal governments. In this way, populist leaders dismiss the “pseudodemocratic” classical management of the political agenda by professing that they are able to keep their promises overnight. Furthermore, Ghita Ionescu, Ernest Gellner, and Edward Shils in particular distinguished a number of additional features for a description of populism in general:

1. Populism is moralistic rather than programmatic.
2. Populism is generally loosely organized and ill disciplined, a movement rather than a party.
3. Populism is based on a state of mind rather than on an explicit doctrine or ideology.
4. Populism is anti-intellectual.
5. Populism is strongly opposed to the Establishment and to the alleged treachery of the elites, most commonly with an anticapitalist pretence.

In addition, populism is first of all a polemical style of political communication that places emphasis on the alleged will of the “True People” and that defends a culture of decency against a culture of irresponsibility. This is perhaps the reason why it increasingly permeates the behavior of politicians and the political stage of the old democracies. Since for inhabitants of emerging countries often a revolution in practical lifestyles has priority over general human rights and political freedom, it seems reasonable to reckon under such conditions that populism still has a promising future in the postindustrial societies as well as in the less affluent parts of the world.

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*See also* Charisma; Democratization; Social Movements
Further Readings

Positive Peace

Positive peace implies more than the absence of war. It suggests creating social relationships that contribute to mutual well-being and human flourishing. The concept goes beyond the negative definition of peace as the absence of war, which is upheld in international law. According to Johan Galtung, the Norwegian sociologist and father of peace studies, peace is not necessarily the opposite of war. Indeed, peace and war are not necessarily exclusive states. Galtung’s innovation was to define negative peace as the absence of direct violence and positive peace as the absence of structural violence or, to put it positively, the presence of conditions in which people can realize their potential. This wider understanding of peace has been controversial but has fostered an enriched understanding of the relationship between building peace and ending war.

Concepts of Positive and Negative Peace

A positive understanding of peace has been implicit in the term for peace in many cultures. The Greek word eirene meant not only the cessation of hostilities between states but an organized common peace. The Roman pax meant an order governed by laws and common citizenship. The Hebrew word shalom comes from a root meaning “wholeness” and has connotations of well-being, social peace, and living in accordance with God’s will. The Christian sense of the peace of Christ carries this forward and evokes the idea of the community of Christendom. The close idea of reconciliation means “to make whole again.” The Muslim word salaam also echoes the Hebrew concept. It means peace with Allah, with one’s neighbors, and oneself. The Indian saptopnati embraces inner harmony and avoidance of harm, while the Chinese heping denotes harmony in society and with nature. A positive, though variously interpreted, meaning to peace seems to be part of our common heritage.

As Europe became secular and organized in sovereign states, the understanding of peace began to change. At the domestic level, the king’s peace implied a state of law and order. Between states, relations were either in a state of war or a state of peace. Hugo Grotius elaborated this distinction and international law embodied it. Complete peace became a distant goal. While Desiderius Erasmus had sought to ground peace and tolerance between Lutherans and Catholics on reason and common Christianity, Immanuel Kant looked to a future state of perpetual peace, outside the frame of existing state relations. Peace required voluntary consent to an agreement to abstain from wars between states, on the basis of reason and a moral imperative. Thomas Hobbes similarly saw peace as far from the present state of affairs. Peace meant only the time when states were neither fighting nor being predisposed to fight. Given the nature of sovereignty, this predisposition was ever present in anarchic systems, and so the normal state of Europe was one of war. Thus, political theorists relegated positive peace to a remote future in which people either consented to renounce war or accepted a common sovereign.

In the deadly context of European wars, however, negative peace seemed enough to strive for. A generation shocked by the destruction of World War I founded international relations as an academic inquiry into the conditions of war and peace. They wanted to understand the causes of wars and find a basis for peaceful settlement of disputes and peaceful change. After World War II, when realists became dominant in international relations, this became the central research question for peace studies. The most urgent concern was how to prevent a global war, wrote the editors of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, in the first issue...
in 1957. Researchers on the correlates of war aimed to reduce the frequency of wars. Others, such as Anatol Rapoport, aimed to eliminate war as an institution. In the early years of the nuclear age, when warfare appeared to threaten human survival, the top priority was to secure the absence of war.

But critical voices in peace studies questioned this emphasis on negative peace. They pointed to the war of “pacification” in Vietnam and the widespread inequalities and injustices between the developed and the developing worlds. Was peace between states real peace if it rested on relations of dominance between hegemonic powers and their clients and coexisted with exploitation of the poor by the rich? Could a cold peace be acceptable if it was maintained by the threat of nuclear weapons? It was in the context of such criticisms that Galtung launched his idea of positive peace.

Galtung had already put forward a first notion of positive peace in 1964, in his editorial to the first edition of the Journal of Peace Research. Here, he saw negative peace and positive peace as two dimensions, with the task of peace research to understand progress in both dimensions—both to eliminate war and to secure solidarity, community, and empathy—in short, “the integration of human society.” In 1969, he sharpened this idea with his distinction between direct and structural violence and their opposites, negative and positive peace. Galtung retained the idea of peace as absence of violence but broadened the meaning of violence to denote the difference between the actual and the potential. Any deprivation of life chances, whether deliberate or not, constituted a form of violence. Direct violence is harm directly imposed by an actor on a victim. Indirect or structural violence is imposed by a whole social system, with no conscious intention to harm. Negative peace is the absence of direct violence and positive peace, the absence of structural violence. Galtung left the relationship between positive peace and negative peace indeterminate. His goal was general and complete peace, achieved by peaceful means, but progress could be made in either dimension independently.

Galtung later added cultural violence to direct and structural violence. The corresponding state of absence of cultural violence was a culture of peace in which people regard each other with respect and understanding. Feminists insisted that an understanding of positive peace also needed to include equal relations between men and women and the upholding of human rights. Thus, positive peace is emancipation from oppression, in gender as well as in other social relations. Others extended positive peace to balance with the environment. Peace between people could hardly be at the expense of other species; so Gaia peace was juxtaposed with ecological violence. Finally, inner peace was included as the opposite of violence against oneself. All of this gave a rich spectrum of meanings to positive peace but at the same time made its achievement an all-encompassing task.

Critique of Galtung’s Concept of Positive Peace

The main critique of Galtung’s idea of positive peace came from the British political scientist Peter Lawler. Lawler argued that Galtung’s definition of structural violence was intrinsically value laden and devoid of substance. It could be taken to mean anything one dislikes. To define peace as the full realization of human potential and the absence of war was tantamount to making the study of peace a quest for nirvana. Instead, he argued, it was more important to focus on direct violence and to see peace studies as a way of articulating wider developments in social and political theory with the narrower analysis of violence and its conditions. Lawler argued that the concept of positive peace made peace studies “a black hole” from which nothing could be excluded and left it with no distinctive identity or purpose. The economist and peace researcher Kenneth Boulding made a similar point when he argued that poverty and violence were distinct phenomena with different causes. It blurred the distinction between them to extend the meaning of violence to cover both. The Peace Research Institute at Oslo (PRIO), which Galtung had founded, resisted his broad agenda and continued to focus on the causes and conditions of wars.

Positive peace has remained controversial and is interpreted in different ways. Critical theorists argue that peace depends on a form of emancipation that must include liberation from discourses based on power and hegemony. Peace is constituted by an intersubjective dialogue in which the Other is included. Some poststructuralists see it as a pluralistic encounter through agonistic dialogue between actors who recognize and accept their differences.
The Way Forward

The notions of positive and negative peace had a strong influence on the literature on peace building, which combines the aim of avoiding a return to war with the need for new institutions, relationships, and structures on which to found a durable peace. It was clear that effective peace building could not be limited to the repression of fighting but must involve the creation of positive associations and healing of social injustices.

This highlights the importance of understanding the relationship between steps toward positive peace and the ending or prevention of wars, which returns to the earlier preoccupation with the causes and conditions of wars. Most schools of thought in international relations accept that peace must be more than the absence of war. Even realists emphasize the importance of establishing a stable and legitimate international environment that reflects the realities of power but allows for peaceful change. The issue that divides different schools in international relations is what conditions are necessary for durable peace—or to put it in other terms, what the constituents of positive peace really are.

A way forward beyond the terminological disagreements is to consider the idea of peace not as a state but as a process in which initiatives or “seeds of peace” have peaceful consequences. The philosopher Gray Cox suggested that peace is a practice of cultivating agreements. Adam Curle, Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University, argued that peace involves the coming together of people to achieve goals they could not have achieved separately. In this sense, positive peace is a process in which responses to other people and to suffering lead to greater empathy, cooperation, and solidarity (following Galtung’s 1964 definition). If this becomes self-sustaining, it constitutes a form of peace that can be created, even at times of war. Such associative and integrative processes also limit the incidence of violence. Seen in these terms, the relationship between peaceful processes and the ending of war is a matter for research and analysis and not only a matter of definition.

See also Conflict Resolution; Peace; War and Peace

Further Readings


Positivism

The concept of positivism has had different careers in the philosophy of science and in the social sciences and political science. Whereas in the philosophy of science, it is often used to denote a specific school in the history of philosophical thought of its époque, the concept is still used in the social sciences to refer to a broad range of theses, attitudes, and dispositions generally associated with the scientific method. As a school in the history of philosophical thought, positivism is usually characterized by its research of the identification and explanation of universal laws in unity, or in conformity, within the practice of the natural sciences and especially physics. These laws should be discovered not through induction but by theoretically oriented experimentations. In the social sciences, there is a tendency among some tenants and critics of positivism to characterize it as a homogeneous epistemological tradition. This entry nuances this social representation.

Auguste Comte and the Early Positivist Program

Many thinkers (Francis Bacon [1561–1626], Madame de Staël [1766–1817], Henri de Saint-Simon [1760–1825]) have been associated with different philosophical and epistemological positions later associated with positivism. However, it is generally the French sociologist Auguste Comte...
(1798–1857) who is regarded as the father of positivism. In the history of philosophical thought, late-19th-century positivism was a theoretical movement in reaction to different branches of idealisms, Kantism, and Hegelianism, to which it proposed a greater emphasis on empirical knowledge. In his *Cours de philosophie positive* (*The Course in Positivist Philosophy*, 1830–1842), Comte described his positivist perspective as an approach seeking to ground theoretical models on empirical knowledge and observations. Once acquired through cognitive processes, knowledge had to be verified through empirical testing. Empiricism, therefore, was brought back to the forefront of epistemology. To the extent that it was led by an adequate conception of science, *un esprit positif* (a positive spirit), Comte was tremendously confident as regards the future of modern societies. His writings were no stranger to a national context that had celebrated a *culte de la raison* (cult of reason) after the Revolution. One could still find a similar optimism in the work of Marie Curie (1867–1934).

Comte’s philosophical project was much broader than a mere philosophical or epistemological intervention. Following Staël and many of his contemporaries, Comte’s conception of science was embedded in a teleological philosophy of history where the triumph of science was linked to the triumph of humanity. The core of his philosophy of history comprised the description of three evolutionary stages: theological, metaphysical, and positivist. With the last stage, humanity was seen as realizing its full cognitive and political potential with the elimination of anterior, primitive, or chimerical schemes of cognition. Positivism’s political project was also conceived as an antidote to social “disorder,” the latter being an important preoccupation for the emerging social sciences of the late 19th century. Comte’s esposal of a form of social evolutionism was not unusual in this context. Social Darwinists such as Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) had a similar conception of history, and so did Karl Marx (1818–1883), Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936), and Max Weber (1864–1920), who adopted a teleological reading of history, even though they did not locate the motor of history in the same social processes. Comte spent the end of his life trying to build a religion of humanity in accordance with positivist principles.

Historically, positivists have been accurately depicted as the tenants of an opaque opposition between sentences of fact and sentences of value. Social and political scientists, according to the tenants of this opposition, should hold back from deriving normative propositions from factual ones. Positivists, however, have not been alone in defending this standpoint. In the philosophy of social sciences, the neo-Kantian sociology of Max Weber shares it without agreeing with an epistemological position hostile to the development of interpretative strategies in the social sciences.

Another important posture generally associated with positivism is the adhesion to the project of a unified scientific program, or the defense of a unity of science. As a philosophy of the social sciences, therefore, positivism is usually associated with a commitment to either methodological naturalism or ontological naturalism. While methodological naturalists argued that the social sciences should adopt the same methods as the natural sciences, ontological naturalists, or physicalists, defended the naturalization of the social sciences. Through the 20th century, different variants of this program or project have been formulated via different epistemological or ontological positions, not all of which were enunciated by positivists.

Toward the dawn of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the optimistic philosophy and teleology of history at the core of Comte’s *Cours de philosophie positive* had been given up by several European practitioners of positivist methods and other philosophical currents such as romanticism and phenomenology. The German philosopher and historian Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) is among the important figures to have defended an antipositivist dualism between the human and natural sciences in this context. Among other things, Dilthey developed two arguments often found in the camp of the tenants of such a dualism: (1) the rejection of evolutionism as an adequate prism to analyze social processes and (2) an emphasis on the category of meaning and the use of interpretative strategies in the social sciences.

The often heard claim that the triumphalist conception of social and cognitive progress was a shared feature of modernity in general should be nuanced. Positivism was an important chapter of the intellectual history of the 19th century. Yet it
was fostered by specific social and intellectual contexts that do not represent a complete picture of the contradictory intellectual trends of the modern era. It remained influential and a source of political inspiration in parts of the world where local liberal movements sought to overcome traditional religious elites by importing France’s institutions.

The Vienna Circle

In 1929, a handful of scientists and philosophers of science (Moritz Schlick [1882–1936], Rudolf Carnap [1891–1970], Otto Neurath [1882–1945]) published a manifesto titled *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis* (A Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle). The manifesto became a central artifact in the history of positivism and the platform of logical positivists. At the confluence of the empirical tradition and the analytical philosophy of Bertrand Russell, logical positivism was characterized by three elements: (1) its critique of speculative metaphysics, (2) its quest for a foundation of empirical sciences, and (3) the project of unifying the scientific language (Robert Nadeau, 2000).

Logical positivists adhere to a theory of meaning grounding the meaningfulness of a sentence on its empirical conditions of verification. As a corollary, all propositions whose conditions of truthfulness could not be described were considered “meaningless.” This argument was notoriously put forward by Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) in *The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language* (1959). This position was a declaration of war against Martin Heidegger, his disciples, and idealists in general. During the following decades, most of the core elements associated with logical positivism were contested in turn by its former exponents or by its heirs. Carl Gustav Hempel (1905–1997) explicitly renounced the program of a scientific unity of science. He gave up the belief that specific theories could be captured through the same analytical vocabulary as broader general theories (ontological naturalism).

Even though the tenants of logical positivism were against the idea that science was morally or politically laden, several signatories of the manifesto believed that the struggle against metaphysics was entirely reconcilable with socialist political views. Therefore, while logical positivism is associated with a reaffirmation of the fact–value dichotomy, in practice several members of the circle were socialists and critics of the characteristically metaphysical ethos of the German and Austrian nationalist jargons. Unsurprisingly, the Circle was banned by the Nazis in 1938.

The Rejection of Verificationism, Popper, and Critical Rationalism

Neo-positivism, or critical realism, is an epistemological posture that was developed by Karl Popper (1902–1994) as a critique of some of the weaknesses of the logical positivism associated with the Vienna Circle. Among other things, it sought to address the problem of induction, or raw empiricism, unsatisfactorily dealt with by the logical positivist theory of verification. Popper revolutionized the positivist tradition by adopting the principle of refutation, or falsifiability, instead of the principle of verification. This epistemological model distinguishes theoretical from experimental laws. Theoretical laws are formulated as universal laws. They are of a higher level of abstraction. Experimental laws direct how to carry out an experiment so that it leads to an eventual validation or invalidation of the theory’s predictions. A theory is articulated by means of an ensemble of interlinked propositions, the theoretical laws, via logical connectors. Theoretical laws can only be put to the test through the experimental laws that are derived from them. To be falsifiable, a theory must be potentially false. That is, there must be potential empirical cases, the observation or occurrence of which would go against the predictions provided by the theoretical frame. If it is not possible to point to a fact whose occurrence would mean the invalidity of the theory, the theory is not falsifiable and is thus not part of the scientific domain. According to Popper, one cannot prove that a hypothesis has been verified as true; one can only contend that it has yet not been falsified. For instance, the empirical observation of one white swan does not prove the conjecture that all swans are white. On the contrary, this proposition would be refuted by the occurrence of a black swan. To “test” this theory is a question of looking for a nonwhite swan rather than accumulating the occurrences of white swans. As the author of *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* puts it, “Now I hold
that scientific theories are never fully justifiable or verifiable, but that they are nevertheless testable. I shall therefore say that the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested” (Popper, 1992, p. 22).

Science, therefore, according to Popper had to be conceived like a never-ending process of attempts to falsify conjectures. Accordingly, a scientific theory had to be considered “true,” along a regulatory concept of truth, until it had been definitely falsified. He attributes a character that is in principle objective, universal, and intersubjective to the results of research, insofar as each subject must be able to achieve the same results through experimentation. The principle of falsifiability remained consistent with the positivist objective of achieving a unity of science. Here, the ground of this unity was not ontological naturalism, or physicalism, but methodological naturalism. Thus, the unity of science resides in a specific methodology: falsificationism. It relies on a processual conception of truth rather than a physicalist ontology. As a philosopher of the social sciences, Popper thought that sociology was the discipline more apt to achieve such a methodological unity. He was suspicious of behaviorism in psychology, which he deemed incompatible with his epistemology.

Popper was not an apolitical animal. He developed a conception of liberalism in continuity with his epistemology and with liberal theories of totalitarianism. His feelings for Marxism were the complete opposite of those of some members of the Vienna Circle and especially from those of the sociologist Otto von Neurath. In The Open Society and Its Enemies, published in 1945, Popper argued that Plato, Hegel, and Marx had formulated proto-totalitarian philosophical systems. The core philosophical assumptions of their political thought, he argued, were teleological and could not be submitted to falsifications. Hegel, here, was presented as an inspiration of National Socialism. It is generally admitted today that there was something naive and polemical in Popper’s crusade against these three pillars of Western philosophical thought, not only because few research programs in the social sciences would survive the criteria put up front by Popper’s philosophy of science but also because some have raised serious doubts regarding the adequacy of Popper’s philosophy of science to describe the practices of natural science itself (Thomas Kuhn, 1996). Critiques of the adoption of Popper’s standards in the social and political sciences have argued that whereas in the natural sciences there are situations where only one research program is in a position of quasi monopoly in a given discipline, thus creating the conditions of possibility of a period of normal science, in the social and political sciences, it is very unlikely that only one theoretical paradigm could dominate the entire discipline. Social and political scientists have come to accept that this theoretical pluralism is an important characteristic, rather than a weakness, of their discipline.

Neo-positivism had its hours of glory after the translation and publication in English of The Logic of Scientific Discovery in 1959. More important, it dominated the perceptions that some social scientists had of the natural sciences until even later. When the international relations theoretician and father of neorealism, Kenneth Waltz (1924– ) formulated his critique of induction and of the criterion of predictability in the literature on international relations, he was very close to Popper’s conception of science. In the field of Anglo-American international relations, the multiplication of contending approaches to the mainstream of the discipline was labeled as a “postpositivist” era by several observers (Steve Smith, Ken Booth, & Marysia Zalewski, 1996). Most of the time, what was at stake was less the rejection of positivism, as traditionally understood in the philosophy of science, than the rejection of a narrowly conceived definition of the discipline and its methodology by neorealism and institutional neoliberalism.

From the Positivismusstreit to Theoretical Pluralism in the Social Sciences

While the end of the positivist hegemony in the social sciences is often associated with the rise of postmodernism, it would be more accurate to locate it within the debate notoriously labeled the positivismusstreit, or the German dispute in social sciences (1961–1969). During the dispute, Popper’s conception of the philosophy of the social sciences, critical rationalism, was challenged by, among others, Theodor Adorno, Ralf Dahrendorf, and Jürgen Habermas. It is not possible here to summarize the block of arguments that were raised
against Popper in the context of this epic disagreement. They often came from different, and contradictory, traditions of the social sciences from scholars of different political inclinations. What matters, however, is that most of the epistemological positions that were injected in the dispute were developed and, sometimes, radicalized during the 1970s and 1980s. Since then, there has virtually been no pause to the development of new arguments in defense of historicism, of interpretative strategies or hermeneutics (Hans-Georg Gadamer, 2004), of standpoint epistemologies (Sandra Harding, 2004), of a critique of the relation between positivism and social engineering and power (Michel Foucault, 1980), or of a more reflexive approach to the social sciences (Pierre Bourdieu, 2004). Moreover, most epistemologists and methodologists have abandoned the idea that to practice good science, social and political scientists should imitate the natural sciences. For a few decades, one of the epistemological controversies emerging in political science has been to what extent political scientists should borrow the methods and models of the economists, not of physicists.

One of the central critiques of the covering law model often associated with tenants of positivism is that it cannot escape reifying the observable regularity of a specific historical context resulting from petrified relations of power. What if, for instance, the concepts of state, nation, sovereignty, or power meant very different things in different sociohistorical contexts? What if the theoretical hypotheses of a general covering law model in the social sciences were guiding social researches in systematically ahistorical directions (Habermas, 1988)? And what if these intellectual practices had the impact of silencing, marginalizing, or negating alternative social experiences and modes of being? Are positivists not guilty of an implicit favoritism in favor of a defense of a given social order? These are some of the questions that recent scholarship by critical theorists, postmodernists, feminists, and postcolonial scholars has raised.

One should note that the critique of positivism has been especially important during the 1980s and 1990s in the subfields of the discipline of political science where the use of quantitative methods had become synonymous with real science. The tradition of American international relations, for instance, is one subfield where the critics of positivism have been notoriously active in the 1980s and 1990s. In the field of development studies, researchers working with the dependency theory have been extremely skeptical regarding the application of ahistorical and nation-centered models of economic and political developments along the lines of modernization theory. Among other things, they have argued that the idea that economic and political development can be reproduced with the precision of a laboratory experiment was a problematic remnant of a positivist conception. Against this conception, they have argued that economic and political institutional developments had to study within the broader context of the global historical development of capitalism, where specific national institutional developments never occurred in national concepts.

Today, most philosophers of science have given up the concept of positivism. The different lines of demarcation that several philosophers of science have historically tried to draw between science and nonscience have not proven decisive. Among the core arguments underlying a certain conception of positivism, the claim that there could be a clear line of demarcation between judgments of facts and judgments of value has been under heavy fire (Hilary Putnam, 2002). Some philosophers of science and social scientists, notoriously scientific realists, have also challenged the positivist emphasis on directly observable entities, leading to an inversion of the hierarchy between ontology and epistemology (Roy Bhaskar, 1989). The former argued that if one had to rely only on a methodology with an emphasis on direct observation, one would have to reject the validity of new scientific territories where the progress of knowledge depends on the observation of the effects of unobservable entities on other entities.

Even though positivism does not have the intellectual authority that it once had, one cannot conclude from what precedes that the positivist tradition did not have an important impact on contemporary research practices and methodological dispositions in social and political sciences. Most practitioners of political science are still working along standards that were developed by the positivist tradition. For instance, few practitioners would give up the idea that the theoretical laws of a theory have to be internally consistent.
Furthermore, practitioners of the social or political sciences by and large agree that a theory that fails to find support in empirical evidence should be either revised or abandoned. In addition, the argument that the result of social research should be accessible through intersubjective processes remains a central claim held by the majority of social and political scientists. Along this line, while most tenants of reflexive social theory would renounce the quest for an opaque line of demarcation between judgments of fact and judgments of value, they tend to agree that judgments of value should be submitted to a similar intersubjectively oriented ethic of discussion rather than judgments of facts. However, the early positivist claim that the development of science and technology will necessarily lead to the achievement of a greater humanity has been thoroughly challenged by the history of the 20th century.

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See also Behaviorism; Causality; Comparative Methods; Critical Theory; Epistemic Communities; Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; Experiments, Laboratory; Experiments, Natural; Hermeneutics; Measurement; Paradigms in Political Science; Prediction and Forecasting; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods; Statistics: Overview

Further Readings


POSTCOLONIALISM

There is no consensus regarding what the term postcolonial connotes; indeed, both the range of meaning of the term and of the issues covered by it are immense. However, despite the contestations around the range of meaning and issues, certain fundamental assumptions are subscribed to postcolonialism. First, postcolonialism suggests that the colonial juncture played a critical role in the shaping of the modern world. Second, although there have been both continuities and ruptures from the world of classical colonialism, its presence, legacies, and hierarchies still endure in the modern world. It is thus important to note that the post in postcolonialism does not allude to an era in which colonialism is dead. Nor does it imply an uninterrupted classical colonialism. Rather, postcolonialism suggests that the modern world exemplifies both historical continuities and ruptures with classical colonialism. This entry provides an introduction to the ways in which these complex shifts and continuities manifest themselves in the variety of meanings assigned to postcolonialism, its genealogy, and the criticisms leveled against it. Finally, it discusses the usefulness of postcolonialism.
for understanding the politics of the modern world.

Meanings, Controversies, and Criticisms

Although it is unusual to begin the discussion of a topic with the controversies and criticisms surrounding it, highlighting at least three controversies that haunt postcolonialism will help clarify what postcolonialism means. The first controversy focuses on the dissimulations and the political acceptability of the term *postcolonial* in Western academic circles. Some scholars suggest that the prefix *post* in postcolonial implies that we are now past the era of colonialism, global dominance, and hegemony. The term is thus preferred and has gained currency in Western academia because it is politically less threatening than terms such as *neo-colonialism*, *imperialism*, and the *Third World*. Postcolonial scholars have challenged this misconception and stated in no uncertain terms that postcolonial does not imply the end of colonization: Rather, postcolonialism enables us to examine both the historical continuities and ruptures with classical colonialism.

The second controversy raises questions regarding the spatial parameters of postcolonialism. Should all societies that were once colonized be included under the umbrella term *postcolonial*? Should the United States, Australia, and South Africa, which had an experience of being both colonized and colonizers, be included with other postcolonial societies such as India, Senegal, and Brazil? In other words, are there specific features of the “truly” postcolonial countries that help us distinguish them from non-postcolonial ones, or is *postcolonial* a catchall word? On this issue, some postcolonial scholars suggest that while it is important to discuss the differences in the particular colonial histories, all colonizing practices, including the contemporary colonizing practices of nation-states, can be included under the term *postcolonial*.

The third controversy focuses on the allegedly culturalist focus of the postcolonialists and their neglect of materialist concerns. Critics accuse postcolonial scholars of neglecting traditional Marxist issues such as capitalism, poverty, and inequality and focusing too much on issues of concern to the poststructuralists, such as representation, identity, and culture. While some postcolonial scholars are guilty of focusing solely on culturalist concerns, most suggest that culturalist and material issues are mutually embedded. For them, isolating materialist from culturalist concerns would be a serious analytical shortcoming of any scholarship. For example, scholars like Edward Said, demonstrating the cultural underpinnings of classical imperialism, have suggested that the success of imperialism would not have been possible without the dissimulations affected by the cultural constructions of African, Asian, and American peoples as the savage, uncivilized “others.” Calls for *mission civilatrice* (the civilizing mission) and “the White man’s burden” not only obscured the violence and exploitation engendered by colonization, they were also successful in legitimizing the colonial enterprise.

Even as postcolonial scholars continue to be influenced by Karl Marx, they seek to wrest Marxist analysis from its heavy Eurocentrism. Postcolonialism “historicizes” Marx. In other words, it contextualizes Marx’s scholarship in the changes of 19th-century Europe and argues that despite the usefulness of Marxist analysis, Marxism cannot be imported in its wholesale Eurocentric form to other situations. For example, the focus on class in Marxist analyses, which subsumed other categories of social stratification, has led to the neglect of important factors such as race, gender, caste, and ethnicity. Offering a corrective, postcolonial scholars stress the importance of these categories of analyses, at the same time stressing their mutual imbrication with each other and class.

The Genealogy of Postcolonialism

The origins of postcolonialism cannot be traced to a single event or a single author. Scholars trace the origins of postcolonialism from the postcolonial fiction of writers from ex-colonial countries, such as Chinua Achebe, Ngugi W’Thiongo, Wole Soyinka, and Ousmane Sembene; through the literary criticism of the 1980s and 1990s; to the new historiography of the Subaltern Studies Group. In addition, others point to certain events in decolonization such as the Bandung conference of 1955 and the anticolonial movements in Egypt, Ghana, India, Cuba, Vietnam, and China as foundational to the emergence of postcolonialism.

The anticolonial movements of the 20th century are among the first organized institutional
challenges to European myths about European superiority, laying the foundations for postcolonial scholarship. For example, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s challenges to British imperialism are as foundational to postcolonialism as are the Marxist/Maoist-inspired liberationist movements of Cuba, Vietnam, and China and the Algerian anticolonial revolution in which Frantz Fanon participated. These decolonization movements are foundational to postcolonial narratives as they systematically challenge European narratives of modernity, race, gender, and the like. Several key figures of the decolonization struggles, like Gandhi, Fanon, and their counterpart Albert Memmi, recognize that the decolonization struggle is not merely the physical removal of the colonizers from colonial territory—it should also include the struggle for cultural decolonization. They suggest alternative paths for nationalist futures, recognizing that breaking from the stranglehold of the colonial imagination is difficult.

The postcolonial condition is marked by a paradox; the colonized both fear/loath and admire the colonizers. They want to exhume the presence and memories of colonization, yet they desire to become “modern” like the colonizers. These insights frame postcolonialism.

The postcolonial fiction of writers from ex-colonial countries is also critical in the genealogy of postcolonialism. Since colonial occupation rested on racialized and gendered constructions/representations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the first wave of postcolonial fiction sought to both deconstruct received national identities as well as to reconstruct them in more “positive” ways. This project of forgetting and recovery was complicated, and it continues to be so, by several legacies of colonization. First, the politics of using a colonial language to re-create national identity haunted several postcolonial writers; some like Soyinka opted for local languages, while others like Sembene opted for making films in local languages. Second, the desire for modernity, as defined by the West, in the nationalist imagination has led to mimicry as well as hybridity, both of which are discussed later in this entry.

The iconic scholarship of Edward Said has been enormously influential in shaping postcolonialism as it has brought to the forefront the importance of discursive formations to the imperial project. Influenced by Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci, Edward Said’s orientalism highlights the mutual imbrications between colonial/Eurocentric knowledge and colonial/Western power. According to Said, intellectual and cultural activity regarding the “Orient” is intimately linked to the “West’s” colonial project of producing, managing, and controlling the Orient. These cultural productions not only are critical in the production of the orient in the Western imaginary, they are also central to the production of Western identity that is produced in opposition to the non-Western world. Postcolonial debt to Said’s scholarship on the imbrications of knowledge with power; the sociality and materiality of texts, which suggests that all texts are political and social commentaries and are embedded in relations of power; the salience of discourse to ideological formations; and the importance of agency to resistance cannot be underscored enough.

The influence of the school of Subaltern Studies on postcolonial scholarship has also been significant. Influenced by Antonio Gramsci’s scholarship on the subaltern classes (those who are at the margins of state power such as peasants, the working class, etc.), this school was created by historians of South Asia to produce an alternative to the elite focus of South Asian history. Although the many volumes produced by the Subaltern Studies project have provided inspiration, it has also raised important questions about subalternity that are discussed in the following section.

What Is Postcolonialism?

Although it is not possible to identify a singular postcolonial approach, there are certain foundational characteristics that can be ascribed to postcolonialism. The following section identifies characteristics of postcolonialism, including postcolonial feminism, that may enable us to think about what postcolonial scholarship, in all its variance and vitality, means. Clearly it is not possible to highlight every key postcolonial/postcolonial feminist concept in such a brief space. The following points highlight what many postcolonial scholars consider some of the more prominent concepts in postcolonialism. It is important to note that the discussion under each concept is limited in scope
as the length constraints of this entry do not permit a detailed discussion.

1. Postcolonialism begins with the assumption that the imperialist juncture was critical in the shaping of the modern world. Although the modern world exhibits both continuities and ruptures from its colonial past, what is clear is that the legacies of imperialism continue to haunt us.

2. Postcolonialism focuses on the imbrications of knowledge with power; For example, it suggests that what passes for expert and universal knowledge in the humanities, social sciences, and other disciplines is deeply embedded in the colonial enterprise and is essentially Eurocentric. This body of knowledge developed in juxtaposition with colonization and was used (and continues to be used) in instrumental ways to bolster Euro-American power. The aim of postcolonial scholars is to “provincialize” this knowledge—that is, to uncover its universal pretensions and to always historicize and contextualize these claims.

3. The interconnections between European political and material power and their power to represent “the other” is highlighted by Edward Said, Chandra Mohanty, Gayatri Spivak, and Trinh Minh-ha, among others. In her classic “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,” Chandra Mohanty suggests that a discursive colonialism, a sort of neo-orientalism, is at play in some Western feminist texts discussing the “Third World woman.” In many such discourses, a monolithic image of the poor, victimized, oppressed, and other such “Third World woman” is created in contrast to the Western, liberated, educated woman, who is free and in control of her own destiny. The authoritative power of these representations is enormous, as is their influence. As stated earlier, the allegedly civilizing mission of the colonizers was seen as legitimate in part because of the success of the racialized and gendered images of inferiority and savagery that came to be associated with the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Similarly, images of Third World women are contemporarily used to legitimate various types of interventions into the Third World.

4. Despite, and maybe because of, their Marxist leanings, many postcolonial scholars focus on the importance of race, ethnicity, gender, caste, religion, nation, and class in the construction of colonial, postcolonial, and national power. Interrogating these constructs of stratification and their deployment by global, national, and local structures of power enables postcolonial scholars to “world” these issues—that is, to interrogate the ways in which dimensions of power are embedded in global, national, and local discourses.

5. Some scholars prefer to identify postcolonial theories as interrogations of modernity. Postcolonial and other scholars trace the origins of modernity to the ideas that emerged in Europe during the Renaissance, their consolidation in Europe during the 16th century, and efforts at spreading them throughout the world during European colonization of Africa, Asia, and the Americas. The use of modernity in colonial discourse can be seen in its efforts to explore, conquer, categorize, and map the peoples of Africa, Asia, and America. The discourse of modernity is thus associated with historical developments in Europe and North America. In this discourse, modernity also becomes a tool for the construction of new identities; to be modern is to be superior, more rational, more in charge of one’s own destiny, and more Western than one who is described as traditional. In addition, the identity of the “modern” West, the “developed” world, is contrasted to the “traditional,” “underdeveloped,” or “developing” world. In addition, the idea of modernity has become a tour de force for nationalist dreams and aspirations as well as the spread of globalization. Postcolonial scholars interrogate the discourse of modernity to highlight its seductions as well as its slights and marginalizations.

6. The concepts of nation and nationalism are important in the lexicon of postcolonial scholarship. The first wave of postcolonial scholarship focused on decolonization and the creation of independent nations, the recovery of national identity through the creation of nationalist histories that challenged colonialist representations and histories, and the development of nationalist consciousness. However, as the euphoria of national independence subsided and it became obvious that the newly independent nations bred their own exclusions, the very idea of nation came into question. Contemporary postcolonial scholarship highlights this disillusion with the nation. Focusing on the social construction of nation as an “imagined
community,” postcolonial scholars, like many scholars of nation and nationalism, suggest that this community is forged around certain markers of identity such as ethnicity, religion, race, gender, and sexuality. However, these same markers are also used to identify those who do not belong or are marginal to the body of the nation. According to Partha Chaterjee, this dynamic of inclusion/exclusion, corresponding with the liberal and illiberal faces of the nation, reflects the inherent contradiction within the nation as it is currently imagined.

The construction of nationalist discourses is critical for the creation and maintenance of nations. Dominant, idealized, and elite narratives of the nation’s history, including the history of decolonization and originary myths, are often constructed that leave out the histories of subaltern groups within the nation. The Subaltern Studies collective and postcolonial scholarship focus on highlighting the histories and lives of the subaltern within the nationalist project. According to Homi Bhabha, there are two types of nationalist discourses that work simultaneously to construct the undivided, unified nation: pedagogical and performative. Pedagogical discourses about the nation claim a fixed origin for the nation and an essentialist national identity. These discourses establish the nation as an unquestioned and legitimate political, social, cultural, and so on, unit in which people, as national subjects, “naturally” belong. In these discourses, nation, national subjects, and their histories are genealogically developed, linking in a “natural way” the past with the present. In contrast, performative nationalist discourses refer to the need for nationalism to be constantly created and recreated, or in other words, nationalism needs to be constantly performed. While performative modes may reinscribe old nationalist symbols and signs, they may also provide an apertura in which the subaltern may be able to perform new counter-narratives about the nation that disrupt its essentialist identities. This is what Bhabha calls the “disruptive double narrative movement.”

8. While the commitment of postcolonial scholars to resistance and agency is strong, their focus varies. As stated earlier, for the first wave of postcolonial scholars, resistance and agency not only meant participation in decolonization struggles, it also meant the development of counternarratives to recover history, identity, and the “native” self from the degenerative effect of the colonial narrative. For the “postnational” wave of postcolonial scholars disenchanted with the marginalizations engendered through nationalisms, it has meant recuperating the stories of the subaltern as well as arguing for a postnational, global politics. However, the politics of recuperating subaltern histories and voices became the subject of controversy when Spivak raised the fundamental question, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” While some have focused on the conclusion by Spivak to support or critique her argument that the subaltern cannot speak, others have suggested that her question is better understood as rhetorical and an effort to make researchers aware of the difficulties inherent in representing the subaltern “other.” For example, through this question Spivak alerts us to several questions regarding voice, authority, representation and the subaltern: Who is the “authentic” subaltern? Is it possible for the researcher to avoid presenting himself or herself as the authoritative voice of the subaltern? Can the voices of the subaltern be heard through these authority claims?
Politics and Postcolonialism

Although postcolonialism has only recently started to assert its presence in the field of politics and international affairs, the essentially political lenses of postcolonialism provide critical vantage points from which to understand politics. As the discussion above demonstrates, postcolonial approaches provide essential tools for interrogating, among others, the politics of race, class, and gender in the making of the modern world. In addition, they help us understand the inclusions and exclusions of nation and nationalism, modernity, globalization, and diaspora. Most of all, postcolonialism’s focus on the interface between materialism and culturalism in the maintenance of power provides us with a more holistic understanding of the exercise of power globally. All these insights from postcolonialism are fundamentally political treatises about power and hegemony that deepen our understanding of the “modern” world.

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See also Colonialism; Empire; Feminist Theory in International Relations; Gender; Hegemony; Marxism; Nationalism; Orientalism; Racism

Further Readings


Edward Said Archive: http://www.edwardsaid.org/?q=node/1


Subaltern Studies: Bibliography of Articles and Reviews: http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/subaltern/ssmap.htm

Postcommunist Regimes

The concept of postcommunism is disputed because it merely describes the previous regime in a given country and says nothing about the newly formed regimes subsequent to the collapse of communism. As such, the concept of postcommunism is imprecise, both as a descriptive and as an analytical category in social science. It can be applied only to the relatively short period of time between the collapse of the old and the establishment of the new regime—in other words, to the period in which the social and political relationships are defined far more by the legacy of the previous regime than by internal and external factors. The essence of postcommunism is to stress the domination of a non-democratic political legacy in new settings after dictatorship. It is for this reason that the concept had been used, first and foremost, in the international political science literature in the 1990s. This entry discusses the uses of this concept and its reduced utility in recent years.

Communist regimes operated in the countries that are now termed postcommunist, representing a systemic alternative to liberal democracies. These regimes were based on Marxist–Leninist ideological foundations, or referred to these ideologies, while striving to attain global communism vis-à-vis Western capitalist democracies. The Cold War era, which emerged after 1945, was characterized by the confrontation between “two world systems” and the potential threat of a third world war. The “First World,” led by the United States, saw the systems of Soviet Union and China, who dominated the “Second World,” as communist.

The extent to which these regimes were communist in the original, Marxist sense is disputable,
given that market coordination was not replaced by the voluntary collaboration of social communities but rather by the domination of the party-state. Left-leaning critics of these regimes, precisely for this reason, claimed that the systems that had emerged in the Second World were not in fact communist but rather state-capitalist. Others had considered these systems as state-socialist, arguing that nationalization had only represented the first step in building communism, after which the process of social reconstruction would have to follow. One could speak of communist systems, collectively, in the sense that the political leadership in these countries had referred to themselves as Communists: They shared similar ideologies; employed similar political, police, and military methods; and endorsed similar goals for social transformation. Attaining these goals had failed not due to a lack of will but because these political goals were simply unrealistic.

A study of posttotalitarian systems reveals that despite the fact that the term *postcommunism* is imprecise, it has nonetheless achieved a successful career in the international political science literature; the same cannot be said for the term *postfascism*. Often, many ex-communist countries, even 20 years after the democratic transition, are still called postcommunist; however, it can be recalled that ex-fascist countries 20 years after World War II were not labeled postfascist. The evolution of these two terms is clearly related to the Cold War and the confrontation of the two world systems, in which the majority of the once-fascist regimes had become democratic and joined the Western political and military organizations, thus confronting the Soviet Union–led political and military bloc. Fascist regimes were relatively short-lived, and their collapse was followed by the global confrontation between the forces of communism and democracy. Communist systems, by contrast, endured for longer periods, and their collapse was not followed by a confrontation that generated a threat of a world war. The image of a common enemy and the lack of alternative world systems enabled the perception of the legacy of communism to endure, which in turn gave space for the term *postcommunism* to blossom. East Germany was the first among the ex-communist countries to shed the stigma of postcommunism and in 1990, with the reunification of Germany, ceased to exist as an independent state. It is interesting to note that researchers do not label Germany as postcommunist, and the integration of the East German territories appears as a domestic policy issue, much more so than a question of political system.

In the 1990s, the international political science literature used the terms *postcommunist countries* and *new democracies* interchangeably, which for a long time nourished the hope that the end of communism would eventually lead to democracy in all ex-communist countries. It took nearly a decade for researchers to arrive at a consensus and agree that postcommunist countries cannot be treated as a unitary bloc. The expression *postcommunism*, as the term *communism* had in the past, highlighted the fundamental commonalities among countries ranging from Poland to Mongolia, or from Slovenia through Turkmenistan. In other words, it harnessed a false image that the political structures in these countries were essentially similar. For this reason, the concept of postcommunism could not evolve to become a valid analytical category for all countries that for shorter or longer periods had experienced regimes based on communist ideologies. The concept suggested that there are far greater similarities between these countries than differences. Moreover, as we know today, existing similarities do not necessarily stem only from the communist legacy: Precommunist historical traditions, and their long-term consequences, are equally important.

Nevertheless, some fundamental commonalities, at least in the beginning, could be observed. In addition to the transition from communist rule, a fundamental restructuring of the economic and social systems, and thus a “triple transformation,” has been taking place. All this had to be done in a relatively short period of time, and indeed, in the apt formulation by Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich Preuss (1998), it required “rebuilding the ship at sea.” This, generally, went into the direction of more market-oriented capitalist economies but with distinct forms of transferring state-owned enterprises into private hands. Not rarely, this was accompanied by the emergence of “newly rich” and “oligarchs” who benefited from their positions in the old regimes in these transformations. By contrast, the populations at large often suffered from deindustrialization processes, increasing unemployment, and rising costs of living, contributing to the
emergence of strong social inequalities on a scale that was unknown before in these societies.

Similarly, different ways of coping with the communist past and often considerable human rights violations by the security apparatuses of the previous regimes created new tensions. In a number of countries, “lustration” procedures (i.e., procedures for screening persons seeking public positions in the new democratic government to avoid inducting former communists, especially those who worked for the secret police in previous regimes) were carried out. In others, former perpetrators of human rights violations and those politically responsible remained largely untouched. The former communist parties often acted under new labels such as “socialist” or “social democratic” ones. In the course of time, however, they became integrated in the new parliamentary systems. At the other side of the political spectrum, some strongly nationalist parties emerged. On the positive side of the communist legacy, a high level of literacy of the population and of education in general must be noted. Nevertheless, levels of political interest and participation still show a rather mixed picture.

The use of the expression postcommunism subsided somewhat after the change of the millennium. This decreased popularity of the term can be linked to events such as the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., in 2001, the ex-communist East-Central European countries joining NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), or the accession of 10 ex-communist countries to the European Union in 2004 and 2007. Today, the new member states of the European Union, which include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, are usually no longer described as postcommunist countries but rather as new member states. Freedom House has classified these countries as full democracies for more than a decade, and according to the Human Development Index, they belong to the most advanced group of countries on a global scale. Most of the Balkan countries, with the exception of Bosnia and Kosovo, are on their way in joining the league of the Baltic republics and the Central European countries in terms of democratic development. These countries have become, or are increasingly becoming, a part of Western political, military, and economic integrational frameworks, in a world in which religious fundamentalism and large-scale immigration from Third World countries have become important issues. Faced with these challenges, the West has found allies in the East-Central European countries, enabling them in turn to shed the term postcommunism and its derogatory connotations.

The term postcommunism continues to be employed widely across those countries in which the process of democratization was stalled, or had been reversed, after 1991. For the most part, these countries had been part of the ex–Soviet Union: They range from Belarus to Kazakhstan, Georgia through Kyrgyzstan, and Russia to Armenia. When applied to these countries, the term postcommunism not only serves to describe a common past, it also highlights the fact that the process of democratization has come to a halt. The term postcommunism here indicates the most convenient common denominator, based on which the various new, hybrid regimes, ranging from electoral democracies through competitive authoritarianism to almost full authoritarian systems, can be mentioned. The systematic study of these regimes began only after the year 2000 and had produced significant findings in understanding and describing the political and economic transformations in the Caucasian states and the Central Asian countries as well as in Ukraine and Russia. Yet again, the concept of postcommunism has proven imprecise and much too broad an umbrella term, by bringing very dissimilar, nondemocratic systems under the same rubric. Until a broad consensus concerning the academic classification of the new hybrid regimes emerges, it is likely that the concept of postcommunism will continue to be applied to these countries.

The concept of postcommunism cannot serve as a legitimate analytical category for a comprehensive description of consolidated regimes. However, as a modifier it can be broadly applied for a better understanding of certain social and political processes. Contemporary historians, political scientists, and sociologists will most probably analyze, for a long time to come, the various aspects of the historical transformation, which as a modifier can be labeled as postcommunist transition and which in scientific thinking and historical awareness will doubtlessly remain
one of the fundamental historical narratives of the 20th century.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Cold War; Communism; Communist Systems; Democratization; Marxism; Political Systems, Types; Totalitarian Regimes; Transition

Further Readings

POSTMATERIALISM

The term postmaterialism refers to a specific set of modern values that form a contrast to traditional “materialistic” values. In his seminal work The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles in Western Publics, Ronald Inglehart introduced this term to the scientific discussion about changing value orientations in advanced industrialized societies. In earlier publications, Inglehart had initially used the term postacquisitive values instead of postmaterialism. Postmaterialism primarily covers values such as environmental protection, quality of life, citizen participation, gender equality, autonomy, and self-actualization. In contrast, materialistic or acquisitive values focus on internal and external security, obedience, material affluence, and economic growth. In Inglehart’s understanding, the term postmaterialism (as well as the term materialism) concerns social and not private values. Values are defined as conceptions of the desirable; therefore, postmaterialism describes a specific concept of a desirable type of society and not a concept of the desirable order of private life. As abstract conceptions, social values are not part of the belief systems of individuals. They are cultural objects that exist independently of their supporters. But individuals can internalize such values, so that they become individual value orientations. A value orientation then is a value that a person has accepted as a moral guideline. In contrast to attitudes, value orientations are conceptualized as being more central and more deeply rooted in the belief systems of individuals. Thus, value orientations determine attitudes and are more resistant to change. This relative stability of value orientations is one of their most central definition elements. In this entry, the essentials of Inglehart’s theory of the silent revolution are presented first. This is followed by a short description of the most important survey instrument for the measurement of postmaterialism. Finally, the main arguments of Inglehart’s critics are summarized.

Inglehart’s theory claims that postmaterial value orientations became gradually more widespread among the publics in advanced industrialized societies after World War II. His theory is based on two simple hypotheses: the scarcity hypothesis and the socialization hypothesis. The first states that an individual’s priorities reflect one’s socioeconomic environment, while the second postulates that to a large extent, one’s basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one’s preadult years. To put Inglehart’s theory in a nutshell, the need structure of human beings develops as Abraham Maslow predicts in his theory of the need hierarchy. There are lower needs, such as hunger, thirst, and the need for housing and security. Inglehart calls these needs material. Furthermore, there are higher needs, such as the desire for social integration, esteem, and self-realization. Inglehart calls these needs postmaterial. In the logic of the need hierarchy, higher needs do not gain priority as long as lower needs are not satisfied. Inglehart further assumes that in the preadult years, the fundamental need structure of a person is cognitively transformed into social value
orientations, which remain relatively stable in the adult years. The next step in his argument is that after World War II, the great majority of the population grew up under conditions of peace, security, and economic prosperity. Their material needs were satisfied, so they developed higher order needs that were cognitively transformed into post-material value orientations. Even if Inglehart allows for period effects, that is, short-term value fluctuations in response to altered environmental circumstances, he sees the major force of value change in the generational change. In his theoretical perspective, the postwar generations are the demographic basis of postmaterialism, and when the older generations disappear, the society as a whole develops toward postmaterial values. Inglehart calls this process the “silent revolution” because generational change works only slowly.

One important peculiarity of Inglehart’s theory is that it deals with value priorities. Inglehart is not interested in the absolute importance people give to different values but in their relative importance. He is especially interested in the question whether a person gives greater priority to material or to postmaterial concerns. This focus on value priorities has several causes. First of all, it follows directly from the Maslowian need hierarchy, which is the theoretical basis of Inglehart’s argument and deals with relative priorities. Further, Inglehart argues that in the field of politics, priorities are crucial. Most people will find material and postmaterial concerns important: They want to have economic growth and a clean environment, wealth and greater possibilities to participate in politics. But because politics is about choices and it is not possible to have everything—so goes Inglehart’s argument—people have to decide between different desirable political goals. The fact that Inglehart’s theory deals with value priorities implies that the value space in his concept is necessarily a one-dimensional continuum with the poles of materialism and postmaterialism. People are either materialists or postmaterialists, but they cannot give priority to both material and postmaterial values.

The most important and widespread survey instrument for the measurement of postmaterialism is the so-called Inglehart Index. Inglehart constructed it to measure value priorities in which he is primarily interested. For that reason, the Inglehart Index forces respondents to rank order four political goals, each of which by itself would be rated as very important by the respondents. The underlying assumption is that the respondents rank these goals according to their basic value priorities. This instrument has been regularly included in the biannual Eurobarometer surveys of the European Commission since the beginning of the 1970s. In the Eurobarometer surveys, the Inglehart Index is implemented in the following form:

There is a lot of talk these days about what [name of the Nation]’s goals should be for the next ten or fifteen years. On this card are listed some of the goals that different people say should be given top priority. Would you please say which one of them you yourself consider to be most important in the long run?

- Maintaining order in the country
- Giving the people more say in important government decisions
- Fighting rising prices
- Protecting freedom of speech

And what would be your second choice?

In the empirical analysis, respondents who give top priority to the two materialistic goals (first and third goal) are classified as materialists, while those who give top priority to the two postmaterial goals (second and fourth goal) are coded as postmaterialists. Finally, respondents who name a material and a postmaterial goal on top of their priority list or vice versa are classified as a mixed type.

Inglehart’s numerous books and articles on postmaterial value change as well as his measurement instrument have been extremely influential in the scientific discussion about changing value orientations in Western publics. Nevertheless, Inglehart’s work generated a lot of theoretical and methodological criticism. From a theoretical point of view, it was criticized very early that Inglehart did not distinguish clearly between the concepts “individual need” and “social value orientation”: Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, which is a psychological model of personality development, may not necessarily be adequate for the analysis of the escalation of public wants and political demands. Furthermore, there is no reason why individuals must set priorities among material and postmaterial goals and values,
since these options are not at all exclusive of each other in real-world politics. There is, for instance, no natural trade-off between giving people more say in government and fighting inflation. In addition, there is a lot of empirical evidence that value orientations can and do change over the life course and that they do this in a predictable manner. Inglehart’s socialization hypothesis has therefore been repeatedly challenged by a rival life cycle hypothesis. Finally, the validity of the Inglehart Index cannot be taken for granted. When there is no natural trade-off between material and postmaterial goals, forcing the respondents to rank order these political goals is not appropriate. Empirically, the Inglehart Index reacts very sensitively to the rate of inflation: When the inflation rate is high, the percentage of materialists in a country is high too; when the inflation rate is low, the issue “fighting rising prices” is not of importance and the percentage of materialists is consequently low. These short-term fluctuations do not fit in with the theoretical status of value orientations as relatively stable constructs. So, possibly the Inglehart Index does not measure value but issue priorities.

During the past 2 decades, the focus of Inglehart’s work has gradually shifted away from postmaterialism. He now interprets postmaterial value change as an important but by far not the only component of a broader process of postmodernization. In his latest work coauthored with Christian Welzel, he puts postmaterialism in the even broader context of the so-called human development sequence.

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See also Modernization Theory; Political Culture; Postmodernism in International Relations; Values

Further Readings


Postmodernism in International Relations

Postmodernism names an increasingly varied set of intellectual strategies that, in contradistinction to the rational empiricist method of mainstream international relations thinking, in particular, and political science, in general, foregrounds the interpretive, ethical, and/or political nature of international relations scholarship (see particularly, Robert Walker, 1993). Its general aim is to test the limits and assumptions of our forms of knowledge of the political world and open up alternative ways of conceiving and practicing the political. With its focus on contingency, uncertainty, and plurality, postmodernism considers itself an appropriate form of political thinking for a global political age. In comparison to the schools of liberalism, realism, and Marxism in international relations theory, postmodernism does not present a school of thought however. According to David Campbell (1998), no scholar of a postmodern disposition accepts the term uncritically, and a wide variety of practices are covered by the term. That said, the above definition underscores, in Wittgensteinian terms, a basic “family resemblance” between the arguments of these scholars. This resemblance has allowed the concept of
“postmodernism” to acquire in the past 25 years intellectual consistency in the disciplinary field of international relations (IR) and to designate something like a specific approach to IR. In this light, the following considers (a) the intellectual origins of the term and its application to the discipline of IR, (b) its major strategies and engagements within the field, and (c) future perspectives.

Origins
Postmodernism in IR can be traced back to the major moves of French thought in the 1960s and 1970s. Amalgamating a set of arguments from modern linguistics, anthropology, psychoanalysis, post-Kantian philosophy and phenomenology, and literary theory, intellectuals like Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Julia Kristeva, and Roland Barthes launched a series of critiques of the major tenets of humanism in the humanities and soft sciences. They questioned, in particular, the authority of the modern subject qua the ground of modern knowledge, ethics, politics, and aesthetics; representative theories of truth and reality; and progressive theories of history. Although these critiques were different in kind and, at times, mutually incompatible, all the above thinkers engaged, to greater or lesser degrees, with the following: to look to differences, otherness, and the nonhuman where the modern period, within a larger metaphysical movement or not, secures identity through reason; to undermine any straightforward correspondence between representation and reality, the knowing subject and the known object; and, by showing the constructed nature of our representations of the world, to prise open the limits of these constructions and allow marginalized and alternative voices to emerge. All have been concerned, in other words, with undermining and transcending Cartesian-inspired epistemology, with expositing forms of critique that do not rely on a final instance of truth (God, humanity, the modern subject, the proletariat, and nature), and with rehearsing a distinction between ethical transcendence and political determination. (The work of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault—together with the that of the Heideggerian philosopher Giorgio Agamben—has foremost importance in this respect.)

From the 1980s onward, this thought began to influence the subdiscipline of IR within political science. Scholars like Richard Ashley, David Campbell, James Der Derian, Michel Dillon, Jim George, Michael Shapiro, and Robert Walker are important figures in this translation. The aforementioned critiques of language and representation help, notably, to critique the empirical rationalism of mainstream IR thought: The belief that theory describes the world and is validated through empirical evidence. The above refusal of an ultimate referent in language and of the concomitant “performative” nature of all knowledge allows IR scholars, on the one hand, to historicize the dominant objects of international relations thought (interstate relations, the sovereignty of the state, security, peace, and interdependence) contra the perceived abstractions of rational choice theory and the empirical research methods of neorealism and neoliberalism. On the other hand, it allows them to reveal relations of interest and power within any theoretical construction of political reality. Since knowledge is not neutral (representing its object as such), it always already involves hierarchies of interpretation. As a result of these two gestures, the field of international relations is pulled away from explanatory analysis and related back to political theory and political sociology, and its objects are, in principle, opened up to alternative possibilities of political knowledge, power, and organization.

Engagements
Since the establishment of these strategies within IR theory, postmodern IR thought has increasingly weighed theoretical understanding with empirical investigation. Some standard themes and authorships are briefly listed here. Postmodern topics in IR range from genealogies and deconstructions of the IR tradition (Walker, Campbell), through focused attention on modern delimitations of sovereignty (Ashley, Walker, Shapiro), to theorizations of contemporary modalities of warfare and security (Michel Dillon and Julian Reid, Maja Zehfuss), of “liberal” regimes of governance and surveillance (Didier Bigo, Claudia Aradau, Louis Amoore, and Marieke de Goede), of American and British foreign policy (David Campbell, Michael Hardt, Toni Negri, and Michael Shapiro),
of “humanitarian” interventions (Michel Dillon and Julian Reid), and of migration, asylum, and refugeeship (Jenny Edkins). Since postmodern approaches to these topics simultaneously open up questions of patriarchy and Western domination, they have also dovetailed with respective concerns in IR with feminist and postcolonial issues (e.g., Kimberly Hutchings and Vivienne Jabri). Given constraints of space, rather than expounding these arguments, this entry focuses on the topic of “modernity” as such in postmodern IR theory. All the above engagements presuppose something like a common approach to it. To understand the “how” of these postmodern positions in the field of IR entails, in other words, first understanding this presupposition.

In its strongest formulations, the “post” of “postmodern” designates neither an “after” nor an “against” of the modern period, of modernization processes, or of the general descriptive “modernity.” It refers, rather, to a critical, ambiguous relation to the general tenets of the modern. These well-known tenets consist in a belief in progress, in the emancipating powers of reason, in the political centrality of subjectivity, and in ethical and—in historical tension with nation-state particularism—political universalism. Together with these tenets, the discourse of modernity affirms the exemplarity of Western processes of modernization: the distinction between religion and the state, the separation of civil society from the state, the emergence of the individual and the categories of ethical and political personality and solidarity, democracy and the rule of law, industrialization and urbanization, and so on. For postmodern thought, following Foucault (1980), these processes dominate and discipline the individual as much as they individualize and empower him or her: Subjectivity implies, also, subjection. Following Derrida (1992), modern law is considered to cover over its own violent emergence and is consequently unable to reflect on its own ethical and political limits. Liberalism affirms, for example, universal tolerance and general assembly. But the spaces of both are necessarily exclusive and violent, organizing the “others” of liberalism in self-legitimating ways. Finally, for postmodern thought, following Emmanuel Levinas’s attention to ethical singularity, the immanent relation between theoretical and practical reason in modernity codifies ethics and turns the Enlightenment principles of freedom into those of abstract domination with little eye to locality and contingency (the major critique of Western interventionism). In these three respects, modernity’s promise of a generalizable axiomatics of freedom hides practices of discipline and domination. Modernity is to be neither avoided nor transcended; its limits of violence are, however, to be critiqued and negotiated.

Within the field of IR this kind of argument has meant the following. IR turns on the “anarchy” of relations that befall the state outside the parameters of its own sovereignty. For postmodernists, sovereignty and anarchy are mutually constitutive, violent constructions whose respective delimitations suppress the multiple differences and pluralities of the real. Modern political organization does wrong to these differences. Contra cosmopolitanism, however, postmodern IR thought does not affirm either the individual against the modern state or the transnational human rights regime that increasingly underpins supranational juridical personhood. For the limits of the individual are as constructed as those of the modern state. Modern liberal individualism and its international equivalent, cosmopolitan liberalism, codify subjects in particular ways as bearers of rights, as fully delimited and conscious persons, as beings prior to social interaction and meaning. These philosophies risk depoliticizing social agents. Therefore, aware of the freedoms gained through modernity (in distinction to the hierarchies of the premodern age), postmodern IR thought considers the state as only one actor in the plural fields of global politics and sees the individual and universalism as the legacies of Western Enlightenment. This legacy is particular. It cannot consequently theorize for humanity as a whole. When it does, non-Western social actors risk being perceived in a nonpolitical context; the consequences of universalism can be utterly self-contradictory (see particularly Mahmoud Mamdani, 2009). Postmodern thought converges here with neo-Marxist and postcolonial critiques of Western imperialism. Modernity cannot be a straightforward counterforce to such imperialism, for, however much it distinguishes itself from authoritarianism, it is also complicit with strategies of domination.

What emerges from the postmodern analysis of modernity? Any countersubject to replace Western
modernity would simply reproduce the tenets of modernity. Postmodernists do not consequently seek a new political subject. They seek to untie and foreground what is repressed by political subjectivity as such, hence their practical concern with the excluded, the marginal, the dissenting, and an (often too) implicit engagement with political organizations that are more inclusive, less exclusive. Postmodern thought’s ultimate concerns are, therefore, with ethics and (more long term) with the overall rethinking of modern political categories. The former ethics is not that of rational universalism, however; it addresses, as reasonably as possible, what political reason and subjectivity will necessarily exclude. It is an ethics of contingency, of uncertainty, of singularity in the interstices of political arrangement and institution. Given the recent economic and technological globalization, postmodernism in IR befits, it is argued, a global age. For in this age, plurality and difference are increasingly critical values. The postmodern engagement with modernity leads, as a result, to critical and dissenting approaches to all international topics, approaches that anticipate, some way down the road, a new politics of freedom.

Immediate Futures

Postmodernism is now settled within international relations theory. Its position remains, however, marginal. Just as French thought has been unable to dislodge scientific rationalism in the social sciences (remaining effective in the humanities and soft social sciences alone), so postmodern thought in IR has not perturbed, let alone dislodged, mainstream IR thought (political realism, rational choice theory, game theory, and empirical research methods in general). Although its present critiques of domestic and global liberal regimes are important, future perspectives for postmodernism in IR should be considered in this light. Two possibilities seem convincing here. Given its postpositivist roots and ethical orientation, postmodernism in IR will refuse to become more “mainstream,” resisting empirical procedure and attending to the marginal—postmodernism will remain a marginal critique in this sense. Or it will theorize how to think and practice less violent political organization in an age of globalization and fragmentation. Although both options are intellectually justifiable, the second requires on the part of postmodern scholars more rehearsal of postmodernism’s own assumptions (especially around the concept and practice of freedom). This entry concludes with two examples. First, if all theory is interpretive to a greater or lesser extent, the criteria by which one theory is interpretatively better than another should be formalizable and, therefore, testable. If so, at the methodological level, postmodernism and empiricism could talk to each other. At the political level, postmodernism could expose more what the lesser violence entails in global political life. Second—and consequently—for postmodern theory, freedom tends to be situated beyond liberal law, with the latter seen as coercive, disciplinary, and, at worst, depoliticizing. A clearer negotiation with the inextricable relation between freedom and law is, however, needed if postmodern thought is to help foster more progressive forms of governance. In an age of uncertainty regarding the future of global political configurations, both positions are of interest to progressive reorganizations of international relations. The future of postmodern thought in IR will probably depend on a careful balance struck between the two.

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See also Constructivism; Critical Theory; Identity, Social and Political; Political Theory

Further Readings


Power

Power is a concept broadly used both in personal and political communication and in scientific discourse. Everybody claims to know what power is. Yet looking at the wealth of meanings given to this concept in everyday life and among social scientists, the confusion is striking. There are several reasons for this confusion. By way of introduction, only two reasons need to be mentioned.

One reason for this confusion is that the use of the concept of power in common and scientific language is highly morally loaded. Power researchers committed to the Weberian epistemological norm of Werturteilsfreiheit (freedom from value judgment) are under extreme pressure both from the members of their own scientific community, who follow the contrary norm of critical analysis, and from the public to take a clear moral position on power. Critical theorists who have committed themselves to fighting power with the means of science, on the other hand, have been accused of normative bias when dealing with power analysis. Ever since power has been on the social scientific research agenda, it has provided one of the most prominent battlegrounds for conflicting epistemological approaches, political interests, and cultural beliefs. What is left after all these battles is not easy to put together again into one picture of social scientific power research.

There is a second reason why power research constitutes a particularly slippery ground for social scientists. Scholars of power are, like laymen in general, prone to being influenced by cultural images and ideologies of power. In Western culture, there are mainly two contrasting images of power that have left their imprint on social scientists’ efforts to deal analytically and empirically with this widespread phenomenon. According to the first image, power is a negative phenomenon. It is seen as a social force suppressing the weakest members of society and making them dependent on the power holders. According to this cultural image, power is considered “bad” because it is believed that the concentration of power undermines generally accepted social norms and values of democracy and disturbs the smooth functioning of its institutions. Popular Western culture continually feeds this negative image of power. Western mass media produce and reproduce stereotypes of bad power: The power holders are mainly males, meeting other powerful men in secret sessions and gathering around the top power holder, their boss. Violence is their ultimate power resource. Implicit in this stereotype of bad power are the beliefs that secret power in general is stronger than public power, that power has a gender bias in favor of the males, and that the strongest power resource is violence.

The imprint left by this cultural stereotype on social scientific research is threefold. First, following the first element of the cultural image of power according to which “real” power is invisible, scholars of power have insisted on the imperative to discover hidden power as their main research goal. Second, the gender bias implicit in the cultural image of power is reproduced by power research. Power is mainly a male affair. The overwhelming majority of power researchers are males, and their research subjects, the power holders, as a rule are males as well. There is practically no research on female (political, social, economic, cultural, and religious) power and their peculiarities, if any, as to its exercise. There is a third and contradictory imprint that the popular image of power has left on power research in the social sciences. Although it is generally believed that physical muscular components are the ultimate instruments of power, analyses on violence do not constitute a self-evident part of conventional power research. Leaving aside those cases when force and violence represent the last instance, as in riots, revolutions, and war, conventional power research has usually explored cases in which the exercise of power appears to be a bloodless, largely psychological, and mainly intellectual affair.
Whereas the negative image of power is strongly represented in Western cultural industry, its counterpart is less pronounced. When power is considered “good,” it is generally associated with a small group of gifted and qualified men constituting an elite in a specific societal segment. As long as these fragmented elites do not coalesce into one and the same elite, they produce the positive effects of power: know-how, expertise, trust, and vision. If power is good, it works on the basis of nonphysical and mainly intellectual means of convincing others. According to the institutionalized division of labor within the social sciences, elite research is separated from power research. This illustrates that the cultural image of positive or good power is underrepresented not only among laymen but also among students of social science.

All said, it becomes quite easy to understand why power is one of the most elusive, yet most widely used concepts in the social sciences. Some scholars have suggested getting rid of it, but the concept of power is and remains an essential tool of analysis. Power has always been the object of many controversies, both definitional and analytical. Accordingly, there are many different ways of how to define this concept and how to study power.

Definitions and Constituent Elements

As for many other social science concepts, Max Weber (1978) provides an excellent point of departure: “‘Power’ (Macht) is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (p. 53). Weber stresses that there are a wide variety of power bases: “All conceivable qualities of a person and all conceivable combinations of circumstances may put him in a position to impose his will in a given situation” (p. 53). It is with reference to this wealth of possibilities to mobilize and exert power that Weber has qualified this phenomenon as “sociologically amorphous.”

Departing from Weber’s definitions, four constituent elements of power can be distinguished: first, power is relational; second, it is intentional; third, it is based on social resources; and fourth, power is related to specific contexts.

Relational

Many authors have followed in Weber’s footsteps and see power not as a specific quality of a person but as a relation between two actors (A and B) or entities. For instance, according to Richard Tawney (1931), “power may be defined as the capacity of an individual, or group of individuals, to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the manner which he desires” (p. 230). Robert Dahl’s (1957) elegant definition highlights the relational character of power: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (pp. 202–203). If power is understood as a relation in which not only can A modify B’s intentions and will, the question arises of how B can “relate” to A. On its part, B can try to resist A’s will by mobilizing counterpower. According to Heinrich Popitz (1992), the ultimate chance to break A’s power consists in B physically withdrawing from the power relation either by escaping from the situation, by committing suicide, or by being prepared to be killed. The willingness to die or to commit suicide is the strongest counterpower B can mobilize against A. Both in conventional and in terrorist warfare, it is a commonly used weapon.

Intentional

The definition of power is limited to cases in which A intends to carry out his will vis-à-vis B. In contrast, if B conforms with A’s wishes even without A’s intention to impose them on B, we are dealing with the phenomenon of influence. However, the borderline between influence and power is fuzzy. Carl Friedrich (first articulated in 1941, then in 1963) has suggested that a power relationship may exist even when no visible pressure or influence is applied. There may be cases when B seems to implement A’s will without pressures being put on B. B does so because, on the basis of B’s and others’ previous experiences, B is aware that A desires that specific type of behavior and is in a position to impart sanctions if it is not fulfilled. For instance, a U.S. senator votes in a certain way, contrary to his or her previously manifested views, because he or she knows that otherwise the president has the power to punish any contrary behavior by withdrawing some precious resources and/or acting in such a way as to exclude him or her from
prestigious positions and appointments. Behaviors of this type are, in Friedrich’s language, instances of “anticipated reactions.”

Not all scholars agree that (manifest or anticipated) intentionality is the definitional distinction between influence and power. As shown below, a heated debate has taken place from the mid-1950s to the 1970s focusing on, among other things, this distinction. Other controversies have dealt with the question of how the intention to use power manifests itself. Generally speaking, the expression of one’s intention to use power depends on the type of resources available and the type of sociopolitical context in which power relations take place. Political scientists have given special prominence to the realm of decision making. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan (1950) define power as “participation in the making of decisions: G has power over H with respect to the values K if G participates in the making of decisions affecting the K-policies of H” (p. 75).

Control is another concept often used synonymously with the concept of power. The distinction between these two concepts, however, is important and useful for grasping two different phenomena. The powerful person or entity uses different resources including, if necessary, violence to enforce his or her intention. In contrast, the concept of control is used when the other’s behavior is supervised and/or guided without wanting to change it. In politics, both informal and formal mechanisms of control are at play. Among the latter ones, the institutionalization of competition between political parties and the institutionalization of opposition to the governing party or party coalition are of crucial importance for making democracies work. The institutionalization of control mechanisms has the function to prevent the abuse of power and to stimulate power holders to use their resources according to the generally accepted goals and values. However, there is a tricky relationship between control and power.

Control without power can turn out to be inefficient when it is confronted with strong power holders. But who controls the controllers if they are given power resources? On the other hand, powerless controllers typically run the risk of being drawn into the very power constellation they have been given the function to supervise. United Nations peacekeeping and observer forces, for example, have often enough become part of the conflicting groups they were supposed to control. Obviously, a necessary precondition for control mechanisms to perform their function of limiting power abuses is the knowledge of who uses power where and when. But, evidently, not all power relations are open and accessible. Secret power networks infiltrating official power centers are difficult, if not impossible, to check by institutionalized control mechanisms. If power works in the underground, also controllers have to move underground, taking the role of spies, concealed investigators, or secret agents. The power of power vis-à-vis its controllers consists in its capacity to dictate the means of control. Just because the relationship between power and control is so highly flexible, it is important to keep these two phenomena conceptually apart from each other.

The intention to exert power can also be expressed explicitly as an order to obey. This is especially the case when and if the power relation takes place within a system of authority. In this sense, David Easton (1965) speaks about the “power of the authority roles” (p. 207). In more informal social contexts, the powerful person can express his or her intention with the help of more or less subtle means of body language, with a sign of the hand or a raise of the eyebrow (Erving Goffman, 1963). Typically, only a limited range of persons are able to interpret these signs according to the intentions of the power holder. The intention to use power and the translation of this intention into action can be divided between A, the power holder, and persons who function as the staff of A. If this division of “labor” is given, power analysis has to shift from the analysis of dyadic relations between A and B to the analysis of triadic relations between A, C, and B. Whenever dyadic power relations are transformed into triadic power relations, power is undergoing the first stage in its transformation into authority (Herrschaft; Popitz, 1992, p. 232).

Resources

According to Weber, power relations can be built on a variety of possible resources. Efforts have been made to classify the types of resources that lend themselves most likely to be exploited as power bases. M. Rainer Lepsius (1968, 1990) has
proposed three different bases of power: the market, the association, and the state. Power based on the *market* refers to Karl Marx’s insight into the power potential related to the ownership of the means of production. Understandably, the owners of the means of production in general have a higher chance to press through their will on others than nonowners do. Power based on *association* or organization refers to the chances A has to realize his will if this will has been transformed into an organizational goal of a political party, trade union, or voluntary association. Another lively debate fought out in the 1960s and 1970s refers to the role performed by organizations as a power basis. As Elmer Schattschneider (1960) aptly put it, “Organisation is the mobilization of bias” (p. 71).

Power based on the *state* refers to the (legitimate) use of violence as the ultimate means of compliance. Power can be strengthened if it is based on a combination of all three power resources. Actors who are situated in a privileged market position, whose power intentions are organized, and who have access to (legitimate) means of violence have a greater chance to succeed than nonorganized actors in an unprivileged market situation without access to (legitimate) means of violence. Strong power resources have the tendency to attract each other, whereas weak power resources tend to remain fragmented. Different patterns of power distribution within a society have been identified. Two extreme models of power distribution, the “elitist” and the “pluralist,” have especially attracted the attention of U.S. scholars and been in the focus of a highly ideologically loaded controversy. Although this debate has taken place more than 4 decades ago, it is still of importance, especially for scholars dealing with the tension between democracy and power.

Taking into consideration the plurality of power resources and the ubiquity of power in social interaction processes, system theorists have conceptualized power more abstractly. Within his complex structural-functional framework, Talcott Parsons (1969) has suggested treating power “as a specific mechanism operating to bring about changes in the action of other units, individual or collective, in the processes of interaction” (p. 353). Even more abstractly, system theorists also speak about power as a medium of communication comparable with money in economic relations. As such, it structures social relations by selecting the types and limiting the amount of action alternatives. Power conceived of as a medium of communication has the function to regulate the dynamics of interaction processes (see the classic study by Peter Blau, 1964). Like money, power obeys the law of diminishing returns. If inappropriately used, it can be wasted and may lose value. There is no fixed relationship between the increase in power and the increase in the selection of action alternatives. The system theoretical point of view of power allows for opening the scope of power analysis and integrating both positive and negative functions of power understood as a resource of the system into the empirical research.

**Context**

Power relations vary according to the type of the context within which they take place. These contexts can be more or less formal and/or have more or less systemic character. In informal contexts, the values, norms, and sanctions regulating power relations are not defined precisely and explicitly. Therefore, they tend to be more arbitrary, and the risk is that they will escape the control of both power holders and subordinates. If it is left to the personal whims of a powerful person how and when to press through his or her will, then the subordinates have no chance to appeal to common values, norms, or sanctions in order to limit the scope of their submission. In these cases, power tends to become “despotic.” The more the context is formalized and the more it is constituted by systemic characteristics, the more the power relations become predictable and, therefore, manageable.

Weber’s (1978, p. 212) famous distinction between three types of authority has been used to distinguish between three types of contexts within which power relations develop: (1) the context of *charismatic authority*, (2) the context of *traditional authority*, and (3) the context of *rational or legal authority*. In all three cases, the decisive criterion of distinction between power and authority is the claim on legitimacy by A and the belief in its legitimacy by B. Speaking in terms of ideal types, B who is confronted with A’s power has to comply willy-nilly with A’s intention; B who is confronted with A’s authority obeys A’s order because B believes in its legitimacy.
In addition to the type of context within which power relations take place, it is also important to specify on which level power is studied: on the microlevel of power relations in everyday life, on the medium level of power relations in communities, or on the macrolevel of power relations on the top of authority systems or regimes. The more the power relations are globalized, the greater the need for power analyses both (horizontally) between different power centers and (vertically) between different interconnected levels of power.

In summary, it can be said that the concept of power consists of four constituent elements:

1. it is relational,
2. it is intentional,
3. it is based on resources, and
4. it is related to specific sociopolitical contexts.

The concept of power has two counterconcepts, influence, on the one hand, and authority, on the other. The distinctive criterion of definition between influence and power is the intention to exercise power; the distinctive criterion of definition between power and authority is the claim and the belief in the legitimacy of power. These distinctions help in presenting some of the most important debates among mainly American scholars of power and their contributions to power analysis and research.

Debates and Controversies

Between the 1950s and the 1970s in the United States, heated controversies concerning power raised significant questions from both substantive and methodological perspectives. In the research on power, substance and methodology have proved to be intimately connected with each other and have to be taken into consideration simultaneously in the presentation of these debates. Political scientists have applied three methods: the reputational, the positional, and the decisional. With reference to the patterns of distribution of power resources, two outstanding models have been formulated: the elitist and the pluralist.

To discover the powerful ones in a community, Floyd Hunter, who is positively responsible for launching the wave of research and controversies, resorted to the reputational method. In 1953 he asked a panel of persons supposedly possessing a fair amount of information concerning the city of Atlanta the names of who they thought were the most powerful individuals in the affairs of the city. Though he supplemented the information obtained this way with his own acquired knowledge, his method was criticized as having several drawbacks. Not necessarily are those who are visible automatically powerful. Not always will prestige be translated into power. Moreover, often the very powerful ones succeed in keeping themselves out of the limelight. Interestingly, however, he reached the conclusion that, indeed, in the city of Atlanta, a few powerful individuals, most of them not necessarily occupying political or other types of office, were considered capable of guiding and controlling significant activities. There was a dominant elite. Aware of some of the pitfalls of the reputational method, other scholars decided to rely on the positional method. That is, they acquired information on all those individuals occupying important offices in the city government, in the business community, in the mass media, and in religious associations. In a few cases, they found some overlapping. In general, their conclusion was that many of those holding important offices, political offices as well, could influence in a significant way the activities of their community. There did not exist a single unified and dominant elite but groups of elites in competition. Hence, the structure of power could be defined as pluralist.

The positional method too was subject to well-founded criticism. Wealthy people, especially, may neither need nor want visible offices. In many cases, the politicians may appear in charge, but they are to a great extent dependent on individuals who, for instance, finance their electoral campaigns; who control the most important economic activities, as occurs in many company towns; and who manipulate the mass media and the presentation of special technical knowledge indispensable to justify some choices and to defeat opposing alternatives. The positional method was accused of almost inevitably but unconvincingly leading to a pluralist conclusion.

Largely relying on the positional method, a highly provocative book made a thunderstorm irruption into the debate. Rightly and wrongly, The Power Elite by C. Wright Mills (1956) was
intended to challenge the received wisdom of the common perception that the U.S. republic is based on an irrepressible, competitive, and fruitful democratic pluralism. In the wake of McCarthyism and in the midst of the Cold War, Mills bluntly stated that the decision-making process at the federal level was dominated, if not monopolized, by a restricted combination of politicians (chief executives), military officers (warlords), and businessmen (corporate rich): the power elite. Interestingly, when leaving the presidency in 1960, former General Dwight H. Eisenhower himself warned against the exaggerated power of the “military-industrial complex.” The question raised and the conclusions reached seemed so important and delicate that the response to Mills’s analysis was provided by a score of the most outstanding social scientists of that period: Talcott Parsons, Daniel Bell, and Robert Dahl.

Indeed, Dahl and some of his students, especially Raymond Wolfinger and Nelson Polsby, engaged in a prolonged battle against both the method used by Mills and the implications of his substantive analysis. The battle was continued by several scholars well after Mills’s death in 1962. At issue were two extremely important political and methodological problems. The political problem concerned the very nature of American democracy: Was it still open and pluralist, as Dahl and his disciples attempted to prove, or had it come to be dominated by a few groups as maintained by Mills (and the neo-Marxists)? The methodological problem was how to test the distribution of power and the way power was being exercised.

In response to Mills’s *The Power Elite*, Dahl formulated the *decisional* approach to the study of political power. Focusing on one community, New Haven, Connecticut, where his university, Yale, is located, he chose three issue areas that he considered the most important ones: political appointments, public education, and urban redevelopment. The guiding assumption was that if a cohesive power elite existed in New Haven, its members would always be present and prominent in all three areas. If different groups of decision makers were present and influential only in some of the three issue areas, but not in all of them, the theory of the pluralists would be vindicated. At the end of a long and detailed study, Dahl (1961) came to the conclusion that there was no or little overlapping among the decision makers and that no single group of elites controlled political power in New Haven. The decisional approach seemed to be more appropriate than both the reputational and the positional in identifying those effectively holding and exercising political power. According to Dahl, it was also superior and preferable to the other approaches because it provided for better empirical testing. Nevertheless, the debate was by no means exhausted and closed.

In an article published in the *American Political Science Review* (originally in 1962, then collected in a book in 1970), which became the single most quoted one, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz questioned the method and the conclusions reached by Dahl and by the pluralists. Their fundamental thesis is that there are “two faces of power.” One is a visible face that finds expression in decision-making activities. It is not necessarily the most influential. There is a second face that may often be decisive and that the decisional method cannot illuminate. It is the invisible face that prevents important, perhaps the most important, issues from coming before the decision makers. Therefore, those issues cannot be discovered by the decisional method because they imply or are “nondecisions.” Nor will the powerful ones be easily identified exactly because they operate, so to speak, in the dark.

Bachrach and Baratz’s critics immediately pointed out two problems concerning their approach and conclusions. Who is in a position to convincingly claim that there are important issues in community life that are not even taken into consideration? The pluralists argued that all truly important issues are eventually articulated. In any case, as to the method, how can scholars study nondecisions? Inherently, nondecisions are not researchable and not subject to any empirical test.

The contrast between elitist and pluralist thinking about community power is very stark and revolves around all the most important aspects of the ownership, distribution, and exercise of power. The pillars of the two competing views have been summarized in an excellent and impartial manner, without any bias either political or methodological, by T. R. Dye (1970, pp. 36–37; but see also Andrew McFarland, 1969). The following paragraphs provide a comparative synthesis of the two views (Dye, 1970, pp. 36–38).
Whereas elitists believe that “political power is inextricably bound together with social and economic power” (Dye, 1970, p. 36) and, therefore, it is likely that “men of wealth and social position in the community are also men of power” (p. 36), pluralists consider power an attribute of individuals that finds expression in the ability to induce other individuals to act in ways they would not otherwise do if power were not applied. Where elitists stress that power is “structured” and, therefore, bound to last as long as the men having power continue in their roles, pluralists believe that power is bound to pass and that, in any case, it may lapse away after some specific decisions are made.

Whereas elitists state that there is a clear and persistent distinction between the elites and the masses and that the members of the masses will rarely succeed in joining the ranks of the elites, pluralists almost rule out the distinction between elites and masses and believe that it is possible for many individuals to exercise decision-making power at different points in time. Elitists stress that power derives fundamentally from the unequal distribution of economic resources and that politicians enjoy limited autonomy vis-à-vis business and financial leaders, while pluralists hold that the power to participate in decision making derives from the amount of interest individuals have in some specific issues.

Elitists consider that the powerful are a small group in any and all communities because political power is correlated with higher degrees of education, higher levels of income, and more prestigious occupations; in contrast, pluralists believe that power is acquired through superior leadership skills, greater managerial capabilities, and better knowledge of the democratic process. Wealth may help, but it is never decisive. For elitists, the image of power in a community is that of a pyramid: very few on the top having very much power. For pluralists, power is better depicted in the shape of an onion: a limited concentration of power on the top, much power given to those in the large middle of the onion, and very few powerless individuals at the bottom. For elitists, men of power share the same basic values and outlook, while pluralists point at the existence of a competition among different leaders seeking divergent policies and being obliged to bargain and to compromise.

Finally, according to elitists, the elites do not have to be responsible to the masses, who are misinformed and unable to exert pressures on the elites. To avoid potential tensions and conflicts, however, the elites may behave in a benevolent manner out of a sense of duty to their respective communities. According to pluralists, however, community leaders are responsible to a variety of associations. Elections enforce an additional sense of accountability and allow some elite circulation.

The next stage of the debate focused on the question of how nondecisions could be defined more precisely and whether they could in fact be identified and made amenable to empirical research. To rescue the idea lying behind nondecisions, Frederick Frey (1971) suggested speaking of “suppressed issues,” that is, issues that do exist, are important, and would deserve attention. However, dominant groups are capable of vetoing them and preventing them from even getting on the agenda, for fear of diverting their political path. The implication is that the structure of power in a given community would make it rather unlikely or well-nigh impossible that some controversial issues be raised and find a place in the decision-making process. Avoiding any reference to Marxist scholars, the authors engaged in stressing the possibility of nondecisions have been fond of quoting a sentence by Schattschneider (1960):

> All forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others, because organisation is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out. (p. 71)

Of course, not even the recognition of the possible existence of a mobilization of bias offers a completely satisfactory solution key to the analysis of the suppressed issues of when, how, by whom, and with what consequences. A convincing explanation is still required of why there is a specific structure of power, how it came into being, and how it succeeded in consolidating itself and in persisting. If the answer is that the structure of power itself has come into being thanks to the suppression of some not visible alternatives, then scholars would find themselves engaged potentially in an infinite regress. It will also be of not minor interest to know whether and how that structure of power has withstood what kind of
challenges and whether and how it has been transformed.

Reanalyzing and summarizing the entire debate in an incisive essay, Steven Lukes (1974) tried to go beyond both approaches. He referred to the decisional approach as one-dimensional, to the nondecisional approach as two-dimensional, and then he offered his own three-dimensional view. Lukes’s view (1974) combines and redefines all the elements of the two other approaches, focusing on “(a) decision-making and control over the political agenda (not necessarily through decisions); (b) issues and potential issues; (c) observable (overt or covert) and latent conflict; (d) subjective and real interests” (p. 25). This highly ambitious blueprint has not found any practitioner so far. Moreover, one cannot refrain from remarking that, since Lukes refers to covert and latent conflicts and to subjective and real interests, his research proposal automatically falls under the criticism of all scholars who consider of the utmost relevance the identification of power through observable behavior and the drafting of an operational definition.

In a way, however, though unwillingly, Lukes exemplifies the major problem involved in the analysis of power. There are many faces of power. While the one that refers to decision making is easy to identify, scholars know that decisions are only the last stage in a long process/procedure. At the beginning of that procedure, power may be expressed in writing the agenda and in initiating or vetoing some issues. Of course, this face of power requires the difficult acquisition of information that the powerful may want to suppress and may succeed in doing so. Therefore, the scholarly (and the political) attention should turn to the analysis of the overall social and political structure to detect whether that structure has incorporated some bias and, in case it has, what kind of bias it is. The inescapable conclusion is that power must be studied with reference to an existing system (political, social, economic, religious, cultural, and media). As a consequence, the overall characteristics of the system acquire major importance in drawing the boundaries of its exercise and in assessing its impact.

**Power in the International System**

At this point, a digression is needed to briefly address power in the international system. Unfortunately, the interaction between political scientists interested in the distribution and exercise of power within specific political systems and international relations analysts has been poor, infrequent, and sterile. However, it should be clear that power among nations constitutes a significant field for analysis. For more than a century, the debate among historians on what kind of equilibrium existed in European politics was dominated by the expression and the theme of “balance of power.” That such a balance existed so that no single European state should acquire control of Europe was, indeed, the goal successfully pursued by the United Kingdom throughout the 19th century. Historians and international relations analysts are perfectly aware that the ways some states exercise power over other states; control, overtly and/or covertly, their behavior; shape the international agenda; and organize the international system are all themes worthy of analysis in terms of power. Some (see, especially, A. F. K. Organski & Jacek Kugler, 1980) have also come to the realization that even in the domain of international politics, power is neither simply nor exclusively a matter of physical resources. It consists more specifically of the capability in mobilizing, organizing, deploying, and orienting those resources. Not surprisingly in war, democracies have shown more power than expected: far superior to the supposed power of authoritarian regimes of all varieties.

Several of the tools and the approaches used in national contexts can be put to work when dealing with the international system. Some truly significant historical phenomena affected by the resort to power and that cannot be convincingly explained without taking into account several forms of power are, for example, colonialism and imperialism.

The reappearance of a debate on whether and how the United States, revealingly defined as a superpower (the only remaining one), can be characterized as an empire or not has brought to light a distinction between *hard* power and *soft* power (Joseph Nye, 2004). Hard power is based on military force leading to outright war; soft power relies on diplomacy, persuasion, manipulation of circumstances, and cultural influence. A superpower may launch and perhaps win some or even most battles, but it will be unable to conquer the minds of individuals if it resorts only to violent actions. On the contrary, hard power is likely to arouse
and excite hatred. Though from many points of view the United States is, indeed, a superpower, in the not too distant future likely to be challenged in terms of power by China, there are scholars who believe that at the international level it has become quite difficult to identify who really has power. Globalization seems to be a process dominated by impersonal factors and hidden protagonists, affecting, of course, in very different ways, all states and actors, whose responsibility and power cannot be easily (or at all) ascertained and attributed (Susan Strange, 1996). Even at the level of the international system, power seems to be everywhere, but its detection and its analysis have become and remain extremely complicated tasks. And, of course, when dealing with events taking place at the level of the international system, there are scholars who believe that most events are affected by one player, the United States, and scholars who believe that the situation is extremely complex and that there are a plurality of actors, including several international organizations, affecting the distribution and the exercise of power in the international system.

There has always been another important sector of power research, identified mainly in Europe in the late 1960s. It is less ideologically loaded than the debates among U.S. scholars and more aimed at a historical and sociological understanding of the functioning above all of totalitarian regimes in the past. This research has been focused on regime types—democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian, roughly—and on the formal and informal rules presiding over all the processes from the acquisition to the transmission of political power. Especially noteworthy in the three regime types must be considered the relationship between power and the existence of organized groups and their competition and transformation through time. The dispersion of power among several competing groups is a crucial feature of democratic regimes. Limited, not competitive, and not responsible pluralism, as defined by Juan Linz (1964), is the hallmark of authoritarian regimes, while the power monopoly of one actor, the single party, characterizes totalitarian regimes.

With reference to the Nazi regime, M. Rainer Lepsius (1968) has analyzed the structure of intermediary groups and its relation to charismatic leadership. The process the Nazis called Entmachtung (de-powerization) “meant a double process of reducing and relocating social power in society” (p. 297). Powerful interest groups were destroyed, and the remaining less powerful ones transformed into agencies of the Nazi party competing with each other for their survival. Under the condition “that there exists an atmosphere of competition and suspicion” (p. 63), no bonds of solidarity between the different power groups were created, thus leaving a space of direct control to the charismatic leader. The combination of a fragmented and weak power structure on the intermediary level with the centralization of power on the top level of the regime was the structural precondition for the excessive and arbitrary (mis)use of power by Hitler.

When looking at more complex chains of power structures on the international level, an interesting observation has been made by, among others, John Gerard Ruggie (1998). Along with the formation of international regimes, the role of power has changed. In international regimes, the capability to cooperate and to make compromises has become more important in making politics than the capability to mobilize power resources and to exercise power. Accordingly, power research has been integrated into game theory, bargaining theory, and theories of rational choice. This is why it may seem that power research has disappeared from the social-scientific agenda. But with the change of the role and the appearance of power, social-scientific research on power also has changed its theoretical approach and conceptual labels. The more power is spread worldwide into “multiple overlapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power” (Michael Mann, 1986, p. 1), the more also power research is spread into multiple overlapping research areas. The question “Who has how much power over whom?”—which had dominated power research in the last decades of the 19th century—has been replaced by the questions: “Which intended and unintended effects does power have?” and “Which functions does power fulfill for the development of complex, interrelated supranational regimes?” The integration of nation-states into supranational systems can have the effect of neutralizing the power the nation-state has over its citizens. This is, for example, the case when the European Court of Justice intervenes in the domestic legal practices of its member states. The principle
of “subsidiarity” can be understood as the member states’ attempt to institutionalize counterpower against what Christopher Booker (1996, p. 203) polemically has coined the “new totalitarianism” of the European Union (EU). This principle is, however, overruled by the European Court of Justice. With the increasing importance of supranational systems, power research is confronted with the demanding task of analyzing two- and multiple-level power games (Andrew Moravcsik, 1996, p. 299). What is gained in terms of power on one level can be lost on the next level and vice versa. The possibility of binding allocation of power may get lost in multilevel power games. Moreover, the example of the history of the formation of the EU shows that successful bargaining power can produce unintended consequences and even paradoxes. In this sense, Fritz Scharpf has coined the concept of the “joint-decision trap”: “What is missed is the possibility that authority might not be allocated, in zero-sum fashion, to either one or the other level of government, but it might be shared by both” (1996, p. 271). The institutional development of the EU is, according to Scharpf, blocked by joint-decision traps. Although Parsons did not develop his idea of power with relation to the empirical case of the institution building of the EU, his insights about the positive function of power can be applied to this example. If the institutional context fails to allocate power in a binding way, power cannot function as a mechanism to reduce action alternatives and to speed up the decision-making process.

The study of power on and between levels of complex political regimes makes it possible to liberate the notion of power from its negative normative bias, which characterized the debates in the 1970s. Power was mainly seen under the perspective of its threatening potential for democratic institutions. There is no doubt that power research under this critical perspective is necessary if social scientists desire to fulfill their task and to detect violations against the institutionalized norms and values of democratic rule. But it is equally important for social scientists to investigate the conditions under which binding power allocation fails and prevents the working and development of institution building.

One must recall Max Weber’s realist definition of politics: “He who is active in politics strives for power either as a means in serving other aims, ideal or egoistic, or as ‘power for power’s sake,’ that is, in ‘order to enjoy the prestige-feeling that power gives’” (Hans Gerth & Charles Mills, 1948, p. 78). A realist approach to the study of power should take into consideration the multiple functionality of power for complex political regimes. This is especially urgent under the conditions of globalization. Curiously, the processes of globalization have seemed to suggest that economic and political power exists and manifests itself in significant ways and doses but that it cannot be precisely located and assessed. The truth of the matter is that the power of power consists also in being and remaining quite, if not substantially, elusive.

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See also Balance of Power; Legitimacy; Power and International Politics

Further Readings
Power and International Politics

Different aims inform the study of power. Simplifying somewhat, power plays a role in two distinct, if related, domains. In the field of political theory as understood here, the purpose of analyses of power is to capture the nature of the polity in which questions of the organization of (organized) violence, the common good, and freedom are paramount. In these studies, power stands for “government” or “governance” and political “order,” as well as personal “autonomy.” The logic in the field of explanatory theories, on the other hand, is to think of power in terms of a theory of action first and a theory of domination subsequently. Here, power is central to the explanation of behavior and the outcomes of social action. It refers to “agency” and “influence,” if not “cause,” and to rule or domination. This entry considers various conceptions of power in international relations, including the realist, institutionalist, structuralist, and constructivist views, and discusses how they approach the nature of the polity and the explanatory use of the concept of power.

Classical realists argue that because there is no mechanism for controlling the competition among sovereign states, power is simply the possession of
resources and their use to exercise control at the international level. For classical realist thinkers in international relations (IR), the particular context of world politics suggests that these domains could be fruitfully merged—if there is no governance at the international level, the first description of power as a political order can be merged with a theory of action. With no world government, the international system seems to lack not only an ordering authority but a polity altogether. In a sense, therefore, it is possible to think of world politics as the simple aggregation, and balance, of agent capacities to influence, such that no further theory was needed. In the explanatory domain, power then becomes a central variable in a double causal link. Power understood as resources or capabilities is an indicator of the strength of actors and, consequently, of the capacity to affect or control events. Likewise, a general capacity to control outcomes has been used as an indicator for the ruling of the international system. Rather than seeing the two domains as separate, the special nature of world politics could combine them in an explanatory sequence: By knowing who can be expected to win conflicts, we would also know who or what governs international politics, which, given the absence of a world polity, is all there is to know about power as order and government.

Power analyses in recent decades have challenged these tacitly assumed links and ultimately also the neglect of the concerns of political theory. Criticizing realism’s “lump” concept of power (according to which all the elements of power can be combined so that the degree of a state’s power can be measured by a single indicator), neo-institutionalism has tried to redefine the link between resources and outcomes. Similarly, with regard to the understanding of “rule” and “governance,” different structural power approaches have demonstrated the need to conceive of more encompassing power concepts so as to capture important but otherwise neglected facets of international rule. Poststructuralist and constructivist approaches focus on power as authority and legitimacy, established not through an open social contract but in the habitual working of discourses and practices that disempower/empower agents. When aiming at an understanding of the world polity, they also refer back to the domain of political theory. But by starting from a historical reconceptualization of politics and order, they do this by stepping altogether outside an analysis in terms of these two tacitly assumed links.

The Concept of Power in Realist Theories

Although classical realism does make strong political assumptions about human nature and the role of power in politics, the two-step analysis of power mentioned above, which is driven by the explanatory domain, has become dominant. There, on the macrolevel, realist theory relies on the concept of the balance of power. This presupposes a common denominator for power in which all its aspects can be coherently aggregated. On the microlevel, realist theory relies on the idea that states are interested in relative gains in power. Each of these concepts presupposes that power is measurable. Indeed, such theories require a concept of power akin to the concept of money in economic theory. In this analogy, the striving for utility maximization expressed and measured in terms of money parallels the national interest (i.e., security) expressed in terms of (relative) power.

This central assumption has been challenged by early realist critiques and more recent institutionalist approaches. In an early argument that also anticipates and implicitly criticizes the economic analogy in neorealist theory, Raymond Aron opposed this aggregated concept of power and the underlying power–money analogy. The different degrees of the fungibility of money and power resources make this impossible. The term fungibility refers to the idea of a moveable good for which another good in the same class can be freely substituted. Fungible goods are universally applicable or convertible, in contrast to those that retain value only in a specific context. Whereas fungibility seems a plausible assumption in monetarized economies, it is not so in world politics; even apparently ultimate power resources such as weapons of mass destruction may not be of great help in getting another state to change its monetary policies.

Aron recognized that economic theory can be used to model behavior on the basis of a variety of conflicting preferences. But for him, with the advent of money as a general standard of value within which these competing preferences can be situated on the same scale, compared, and traded-off, economists were able to reduce the variety of preferences to one utility function. Because power
in world politics lacks a real-world fungibility, it cannot play a corresponding role as a standard of value. Therefore, power cannot be the currency of world politics, and national security in terms of power is not equivalent to a utility function.

In response, realists insisted that diplomats had repeatedly been able to find a measure of power, and hence, the difference is just one of degree, not of kind. Yet even if actors can agree on some approximations for carrying out exchanges or establishing power rankings, this is a social convention that by definition can be challenged and exists only to the extent that it is agreed on. Power resources do not come with a standardized price tag.

With the link between resources and outcomes forgone, the realist chain of causes for understanding the international structure is broken, for a single international power structure relies either on the assumption of a single dominant issue area or on a high fungibility of power resources—neither of which are realistic.

**Neo-Institutionalism: Redefining the Link Between Resources and Outcomes**

When the United States lost the war in Vietnam, some scholars tried to explain this power paradox away by identifying the lack of “will” on the part of the United States to use its resources—that is, so-called conversion failures. According to such an explanation, the war did not indicate the relative weakness of the United States (in spite of its military capabilities) but simply its inability to use its strength. Obviously, such an explanation can re-interpret any outcome *ex post* to suit any power distribution. Often, the trouble with this type of power analysis is not that it is wrong but that it cannot go wrong. Neo-institutionalist analysis offers two responses.

One conceptual way out consisted in accepting the apparent lesson of the Vietnam War. Consequently, control over resources, even issue area-specific ones, does not necessarily translate into control over outcomes. Power no longer functions as a determining cause. In Robert Keohane’s analysis, for instance, determinacy in the explanation shifts from interests defined in terms of the distribution of power to rational choice made on the basis of given interests defined in terms of power, expectations, values, and conventions. Hence, only predictions of a very limited kind are possible, with a secondary role for power.

Another solution to the paradox of unrealized power has been proposed by David Baldwin, who has taken the issue of power fungibility most seriously. His approach keeps a strong causal role for power by further specifying the relational and situational context that defines which policy instruments can count as actual power resources in the first place. Baldwin’s conception is shaped by his relational understanding of power. If power is about the capacity to get someone else to do what he or she would not have otherwise done, then threatening a suicide candidate with a gun implies that the person holding the gun has no power. In other words, power resources have no intrinsic value or effect but depend on the actual value systems of human beings in their relations with each other.

Hence, the major difference from utilitarian action theories is that personal value systems cannot be simply assumed in the empirical power analysis. Instead, the researcher has first to analyze the value systems of the interacting parties in order to establish whether there are any power resources in the first place. For this reason, Baldwin insists that one can only study power if understood as a causal variable in well-circumscribed policy contingency frameworks. Any assessment of power independent of such situational factors is erroneous, and any generalization beyond such cases is contingent and has to be established separately.

The price for this, however, is that power analysis must potentially be very narrowly confined to particular instances, where no prediction is possible. Whereas Keohane’s institutionalist move retained, in a limited way, the predictive capacity of a theory based on rational choice and not on power, Baldwin’s move saves a central causal role for power at the price of predictability in IR/IPE (international political economy). Keohane’s solution points to the direction of a rationalist neo-institutionalism and Baldwin’s to a less generalizable, contingent, and situational solution to historical institutionalism.

**Structural Power in the Global Political Economy**

With the link between resources and control weakened, the micro–macro link between control over
outcomes and international rule might not be worthwhile studying at all. Yet this is where international political economy (and constructivism and poststructuralism; see below) have made their most important contributions to the analyses of power. In fact, concepts of structural power redefine the context within which strategic interaction takes place, the resources considered important for assessing capabilities in the first place, and the outcomes that should be included in power analysis. Their common claim is that the sole reference to the first link, as made by neo-institutionalists, is insufficient, if not biased, for understanding rule in the international system. It is the second link, between outcomes and rule, that becomes the starting point in analyses of power.

A first version of structural power might be called indirect institutional power. This refers to the conscious manipulation of the institutional setting within which bargaining relations take place. Many important issues are decided before they reach the bargaining stage—indeed, often because they never reach it. For understanding the distribution of power, it is as important to see who prevails in decision making as it is to analyze which “nondecisions” were made. Despite occasional claims to the contrary, this version is perfectly compatible with neo-institutionalist approaches.

Structural power has also been conceptualized as nonintentional power. Susan Strange’s concept of structural power stresses both the diffusion of the origins of power (and the variety of power resources) and the diffusion of its effects. Here, there is no reason to exclude from power analysis all those crucial effects that might not have been intended. As an old Chinese saying has it, it makes little difference to the trampled grass beneath whether the elephants above it are making love or war. This analytical shift from intentions to effects diminishes the importance of the neo-institutionalist approach for understanding power based on resources, interests, and rationality. It focuses on the systematic and structural aspects of power, not on the chosen ones.

Third and finally, structural power can also be understood as systematic bias or impersonal power. This refers to an impersonal “mobilization of bias” whereby social structures systematically favor certain agents. Such an understanding of power is common currency in both Marxist and non-Marxist writing on dependency, as well as in neo-Gramscian approaches; it also applies to constructivist and poststructuralist approaches that emphasize nonmaterialist structural biases (see below). Such a conceptualization has been criticized for deducing power from rewards, the so-called benefit fallacy of power. We usually do not consider a free rider powerful because the free rider typically has no control over the systematic arrangement that makes free riding possible. But the benefit fallacy exists only within a causal framework. To say that a system systematically benefits certain people does not mean that they have created that benefit or that they control it. It simply means that to understand power in a social system, we need to take into account the links between rules and outcomes that systematically benefit some actor.

Structural power analysis in international political economy tries to overcome the difficulty of conceiving power along the resource–outcome–rule line by starting from the other end. These approaches run into two types of problem, however. First, they tend to overplay the causal strength of their analysis. Moving backward from rule to outcomes faces similar problems to moving from resources to outcomes. “The United States won because of its structural power” faces the same translation or conversion questions as classical resource-based analysis. It often appears to offer an answer when in reality it begs the question. The second risk is related to this. IPE approaches tend to understate the nonmaterialist aspects of rule or governance, particularly values and beliefs, and, indeed, the extent to which structures affect events only though the meaning given to them.

Rule in World Politics: The Social Construction of Legitimacy and Order

Still staying with IR’s emphasis on the explanatory domain of power analysis, constructivism redefines power at the systemic and agent levels in IR. Its systemic analysis of power often looks at the origins of consent in terms of practices of tacit legitimacy. It is therefore close to power concepts of the family of “authority.” But rather than looking at formal or institutional authority, constructivism is interested in the intersubjective practices of
power—not in the position of authority, therefore, but rather in what “authorizes,” “legitimates,” or “empowers” it. Moreover, it is not necessarily looking at intentional or agent power but at the impersonal effects of discourses and/or habits for the production and reproduction of order, particularly in cases where practices go without saying, appear natural, and are therefore, perhaps, the most effective power relations there are.

At the actor level, such a view implies an emphasis on the process of interest formation as a primary locus for power relations. For constructivists, interests cannot be understood outside their intersubjective contexts in terms of shared constitutive norms, of shared knowledge and understandings, and also through the effects that practices have on self-understandings or identity. For constructivists, what we want follows from who we are (or want to be).

One larger power research agenda therefore concerns the background knowledge or constitutive “rules of the game” that mobilize certain biases and define the competent players and their effective moves. Naturalized understandings evoke certain actions and empower certain agents. Understanding an event as analogous to “Munich” mobilizes a collective memory that authorizes some actions and undermines the legitimacy of others. Whether or not the end of the Cold War has ushered in a “clash of civilizations,” such an understanding mobilizes and is empowered by pre-existing Cold War scripts in which totalitarianism has been replaced by fundamentalism in security discourse. It gives it the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Just when the security sector started to be demilitarized, the increased use of private military companies such as Executive Outcomes gave them “epistemic power” because their practices shape the understanding of security and the self-understanding of its actors. These practices have the effect of authorizing an increasingly technical and military understanding of the field while being, in turn, authorized through them.

With regard to their focus on identity, constructivist scholars have looked not only at the impersonal effect of discourses and/or practices on self-understandings but also on the “power politics of identity.” If identity is crucial for interest formation, then it is only a small step to analyzing how diplomatic practices, sometimes intended, can be used for blackmailing actors by profiting from the contradictions in the actor’s self-representations.

As a result, some constructivist research agendas converge with Foucauldian approaches in their understandings of order as diffused practices of rule rather than as clear and/or formal hierarchies. Such convergences can be seen, for instance, in the analysis of how international standards, which are often established by private actors, are practices of rule once they become accepted convention and interact with the actors and issues they were supposedly only neutrally measuring (e.g., credit rating).

But at the same time, such analyses link power in explanatory theory back to political theory or, particularly in the post-Foucauldian vein, actually put the latter first. The understanding of power is not primarily about cause and effect, or influence and outcomes. Instead, it embeds power in a historical analysis of the changing nature of the modern and liberal order, which, so the thesis goes, increasingly works by making the subjects of order active subjects of their own ordering. Ole Jakob Sending and Iver Neumann, for instance, analyze the role of nonstate actors in this vein, understanding them not so much as civil society in opposition to the political power of states but as part and parcel of a decentralized and self-disciplining logic of a global order (i.e., governmentality).

The Politics of Power Analysis

Even if careful scholarly discussion can discard some conceptualizations of power, there is no one root concept that we can unravel simply by digging deeper, neither in the domain of political theory nor in explanatory theory. Power concepts derive their meanings from the theories in which they are embedded, and there they meet the metatheoretical or normative divides that plague and enrich our theorizing. At the same time, the debate has come full circle. Initially, realist writings combined the domains of political theory, centered on the understanding of order in the polity, with the domain of explanatory theory by assuming that in the absence of a genuine world polity the analysis of capabilities and influence was all there could be. By attacking the double link between agent influence and the balance of power, later studies redefined a more or less causal role for power, be it at the
agent or the structural level. Hence, they stressed the explanatory domain of power at the expense of the political theory of power. But this can work only so far, since the two domains intrude into each other; structural power is necessary to understand not only outcomes but also autonomy in a polity; inversely, the analysis of the changing nature of global governance and order provides the background against which the very processes of power can be understood in the first place. So, to close the circle with the poststructuralist and constructivist turn, the analysis of power returns again to show the links between the two domains. But contrary to early realism, it does so by assuming the existence of a genuine world polity within which power has to be understood. Yet so far it cannot pretend to have a theory of power capable of combining the two domains.

Finally, power analysis is not only tied to the understanding of politics; it is itself political. The reason is that concepts such as power have a special status in our political discourse. They are used for a variety of purposes. For power, two are particularly important. Power is used in practical contexts in which we are interested in what we can do to others and what others can do to us. It is also important in moral and legal contexts where it functions as an indicator of effective responsibility: If actors could not have done an act (if they did not have the capacity to do so), they cannot be found guilty of it. The first indicates the realm of action: Power becomes an indicator of politics as the “art of the possible.” The second assesses possible blame. Since power is often conceived of as a counterfactual—that is, about things that could have been otherwise—invoking power is to call for a justification of why things were done the way they were. As a result, choosing concepts of power that are relatively narrow diminishes the realm where “something can be done” and in which action needs to be justified; unintended effects, for instance, are handled as regretful but unavoidable collateral damage. Inversely, wider concepts of power suggest realms for action even where there may be none. The fundamental point for such a performative analysis of power—not what it means but what it does—is that invoking the presence of power politicizes issues.

This also explains a curious paradox. Scholars and practitioners often engage in debates about where power “really” lies, for example, whether it is hard or soft. By doing this, they must appeal to an underlying idea that we can know this in a somewhat objective manner. If power were measurable, however, such debates would be quite pointless. Precisely because power is not as fungible as money and its understanding is to some extent conventional, observers try to shape the common understanding and fix the meaning of what power is and where the power really lies: For such understandings have authoritative effects on national security and foreign policy doctrines when used to define the national interest, as well as on actual political rank and standing when an actor’s main potential power resource comes to be considered insignificant.

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See also Balance of Power; Bargaining; Behavioralism; Bipolarity and Multipolarity; Causality; Common Goods; Concept Formation; Constructivism; Constructivism in International Relations; Institutions and Institutionalism; Interdependence; International Political Economy; Legitimacy; Measurement; Power; Realism in International Relations

Further Readings


**Prediction and Forecasting**

Political forecasting and prediction refers to any effort to anticipate events that will occur at a future point in time, usually with the intention of determining actions that will either exploit or mitigate the effects of those events. Forecasting is implicit in almost all political decision making, but the techniques vary widely in their level of explicitness, ranging from simple intuition to detailed historical analogies to elaborate statistical models. This entry discusses the sources of regularity in political behavior; conditional and unconditional forecasts; the concepts of forecast horizons, windows, and specificity; modes of traditional (nontechnical) forecasting; and simulation and statistical approaches to technical forecasting.

Evidence for the importance of forecasting to political elites can be found in some of the earliest available records of organized human behavior, such as the biblical story of Joseph interpreting the dreams of an Egyptian pharaoh found in Genesis 41. A wide variety of divination methods—for example, augury, astrology, dream interpretation, and consultation with oracles—were nearly universal across cultures in premodern times, and practitioners in these fields often enjoyed high official status. These supernatural techniques were gradually supplemented with the use of historical analogies and collections of aphorisms or “wisdom literature,” but prediction techniques remained nontechnical until relatively recently.

The prospect of systematic forecasting of political behavior became attractive following the development of highly accurate forecasting models of physical phenomena, particularly the example of Isaac Newton’s laws of motion in the 17th century, and the next 2 centuries saw the production of a number of works on “laws” of political and economic behavior that were effectively forecasting models. However, the systematic development of reasonably accurate numerical forecasts did not occur until the development of modern statistics in the early 20th century. With the increase in communication and computing power, accurate technical forecasts in some domains, most conspicuously election outcomes, were common by the late 20th century, and the methods are now being extended to other types of behavior, notably forecasts of political instability.

**Forecasting in Political Decision Making**

Forecasting is ubiquitous in political decision making for the simple reason that to decide between multiple courses of action, a decision maker must have some sense of the likely outcome of each option. These outcomes are rarely deterministic—that is, entirely determined at the time the choice is made—and predictions are further complicated by the fact that many political decisions occur in a context where actors are working to achieve opposing objectives (a topic explored in detail in game theory). Political forecasting may be dispersed throughout an organization, with every agent responsible for assessing the likely consequences of policy choices, or there may be specialists in forecasting, for example, intelligence agencies projecting the future behavior of other states or the emerging commercial field of political risk analysis, which assesses the possible economic impacts of political changes (e.g., whether a country will default on a loan).

Because humans exhibit free will and are capable of a wide range of behaviors, human behavior (political or otherwise) will always remain less predictable than the behavior of a closed physical system such as an object travelling through the vacuum of space, which can be predicted to a high level of accuracy decades in advance. However, political behavior tends to be constrained in ways that makes it considerably more predictable than, for example, deciding what a randomly chosen household will be having for dinner.
Three factors are particularly important in establishing predictability. First, most political activity is strongly constrained by material circumstances. For example, an unemployed plumber deciding to run for mayor has a considerably different set of options than does a billionaire running a third mayoral campaign. Second, political forecasts frequently deal with mass behaviors, and these have a substantially lower probability of changing rapidly than does the behavior of a single individual: If a candidate is leading by 20% in the polls, the probability of a set of individual decisions (or polling errors) that would cause a loss is considerably less than if they are leading by 0.5%. Likewise, the likelihood that a critical mass of individuals will decide to rise in rebellion against a democratically elected government with a stable economy is considerably less than the probability of rebellion against an aging ruler in the midst of an economic crisis. Finally, many political institutions that are stable over long periods of time—notably bureaucracies and legal systems—are explicitly designed to produce predictable behavior: A set of given inputs to the organization is expected to produce a consistent outcome.

Unconditional and Conditional Forecasts
Forecasts can be divided into “unconditional” and “conditional” forecasts. An unconditional forecast is one that assumes nothing important in the information used to make the forecast will change. The nature of that information may or may not be explicitly specified in nontechnical forecasts; it is usually explicit in the variables and equations found in technical forecasts. A conditional forecast, in contrast, assumes that certain things will change: The most common use of conditional forecasts is for what-if analyses of the possible changes projected to occur if a specific policy is adopted. For example, a model might attempt to predict the change in unemployment in a city if the city does or does not receive funding for a job training program.

The accuracy of conditional forecasts is closely linked to the issue of causality. The high degree of accuracy of Newton’s laws of motion is due to the fact that within a known set of boundary conditions (e.g., Newton’s equations break down for an object travelling near the speed of light), they completely specify behavior. In contrast, forecasts of political behavior usually have a much higher level of uncertainty than that found in simple physical systems, though not necessarily less than the uncertainty of complex physical systems; for example, many political forecasts are considerably more accurate than weather predictions at comparable time horizons.

Three key factors affect this accuracy. The first is the well-known observation that correlation does not imply causation: The fact that two variables covary does not mean that one necessarily causes the other. If both are caused by a third variable, the correlation may be very useful for prediction—that is, the existence of the correlation supplies information that increases forecast accuracy—but unless there is a true causal linkage, changing one of the variables will not change the other. For example, for a number of years the linkage between cigarette smoking and lung cancer was dismissed as simply correlation; both were assumed to be linked to other lifestyle issues (e.g., individuals working in polluted industrial environments were more likely to be smokers), and only after extensive research isolated smoking as a near-certain causal factor were changes made in public policy.

A second issue is the degree to which the projected change is within the range of prior experience with the system. A forecast for the effects of increasing the funding of a job training program in a city that has previously had a series of such programs at a variety of levels of funding is more likely to be accurate than the forecast for a city where no job training programs had ever been tried.

A third source of error is the possibility that the human object of the prediction will change its behavior to either reinforce or negate the prediction, a possibility not occurring in physical systems. Such situations are generally known as “self-fulfilling” and “self-negating” predictions. Consider the case where an intelligence agency makes a widely publicized prediction that the government in a country is likely to fail. If, as a consequence, allies of the government withhold aid and rebel groups inside the country are emboldened and increase their activity, the government may fail in part because of the prediction itself: a self-fulfilling prediction. This makes the prediction conditionally accurate, but not unconditionally accurate, since in the absence of the prediction
itself, the government might have survived. Conversely, in response to the prediction, the threatened government might change its policies and, as a consequence, not fail: a self-negating prediction. In this case, the prediction appears incorrect, even though unconditionally it may have been correct.

The possibility of predictions influencing outcomes is particularly critical in election forecasting, where predictions can have the effect of suppressing or increasing turnout, increasing the amount of campaign contributions to the projected winner, or decreasing the vote for candidates who are likely to lose. As a consequence, many democracies prohibit the publication of polling results during some period prior to an election or on polling day. Similarly, intelligence projections of possible instability in other states, particularly allies, are often considered politically sensitive and thus classified.

**Forecast Horizons, Windows, and Specificity**

All forecasts—either implicitly or explicitly—have three characteristics: a horizon (how far ahead in time the forecast is being made), a window (the period of time for when the forecasted event will occur), and specificity (the extent to which an exact prediction is made). In general, the accuracy of forecasts will decline with longer forecast horizons because insufficient information is available on the effects of current variables on the future, and unanticipated events may occur to substantially change the projected outcome. For example, the accuracy (and specificity) of an election forecast typically will be lower 6 months prior to the election than the day before the election, and even a short-term forecast could become irrelevant if the projected winner dies before the election. Many statistical forecasting models provide explicit estimates of this uncertainty.

For some forecasting problems—notably elections—the time horizon is simply determined by the known date of a future event. In some other domains—for example, policies affecting long-term public health or the environment—the horizon may be on the order of decades. However, the typical policy-relevant time horizon is on the order of 6 months to 5 years: Shorter times are irrelevant because a policy will not have had time to be implemented and take effect, and longer times tend both to accumulate uncertainties and may be beyond the professional interests of those concerned with the forecast (e.g., elected officials).

The forecast window is only relevant in situations where there is uncertainty as to when an event might occur. Predicting the term of office for a prime minister in a parliamentary system, predicting whether a government will be overthrown in a revolution, or predicting when a country will suffer a major currency crisis would be examples. In some cases, a change is inevitable—no prime minister is immortal—and in others, the projected event may never occur.

Finally, predictions differ widely in their specificity. The predictions of oracles and astrologers were notorious for their lack of specificity: The classical Greek historian Herodotus reports the Delphic Oracle advising the Lydian king Croesus that if he attacked the Persians, “a great empire will be destroyed.” On this advice, Croesus attacked, but the Persians destroyed his empire: The oracle showed good accuracy, but from the perspective of Croesus, the advice was less than optimal in terms of specificity.

Beyond this extreme, many nontechnical forecasts are relatively vague as to exactly what has been predicted, because of the informality of the techniques and the use of natural language in reporting the predictions. Technical forecasts, in contrast, are usually much more precise, with complete probability distributions across a range of possible outcomes, whether a numerical range such as forecasting the percentage of votes for a candidate or the range of probabilities across a fixed set of categorical outcomes, such as whether or not a government will remain in power. This precision does not necessarily translate into accuracy but at least allows competing technical forecasts to be unambiguously compared and, after the time of the forecast horizon, their accuracy to be calculated.

**Nontechnical Forecasting**

Nontechnical forecasting predominantly takes three forms: (1) intuition, (2) the use of rules of thumb or aphorisms, and (3) the use of narrative archetypes and historical analogies. Intuition is the use of subcognitive mental processing—the brain is engaged in a great deal of work, typically pattern recognition, but this occurs in a manner that the
thinker is not consciously aware of (much as an uneducated native speaker of a language will have perfectly mastered the complex grammar of the language but cannot systematically articulate its rules). A typical explanation for an intuitive forecast is “I have a feeling . . .” or “I know it when I see it.” While social pattern recognition in humans and other primates is highly developed and hence frequently accurate, the disadvantage of the intuitive forecast is that it is dependent on the skill and experience of the individual making the forecast, and only the forecast itself, not the process of determining the forecast, can be shared and evaluated. To the extent that they were successful in making unambiguous forecasts, oracles, astrologers, dream interpreters, and other premodern forecasters were probably good at intuitive methods.

Aphorisms and rules of thumb are a form of succinct and very general if–then models that link specific observable situations with outcomes and summarize frequently observed regularities; all cultures have a large number of these for dealing with common social situations. Unlike intuition, aphorisms are explicit, though the evidence backing them is usually not. The disadvantage of aphorisms is that multiple aphorisms frequently contradict each other—for example, the common English-language aphorisms “Birds of a feather flock together” and “Opposites attract”—and aphorisms are often vague in both their antecedents and their consequents.

Narrative archetypes and historical analogies are the most sophisticated of the nontechnical forecasting methods and are very commonly (if often implicitly) found in policy analysis and political rhetoric. In both approaches, a set of observed events and circumstances is matched to a set of events and circumstances in a series of idealized narratives or historical cases, and a prediction is made on the basis of the outcome that occurred in the best matching case. Historical analogies use situations that actually occurred in the past (perhaps with adjustments for technological and cultural changes); with an archetypical narrative, the comparison is with a hypothetical event that has the general characteristics of a large number of historical cases (e.g., “peasant revolt,” “populist electoral campaign”) or a counterfactual that seems plausible but has never actually occurred (“crisis leading to a nuclear missile exchange”).

Nontechnical forecasting is widespread and prior to the availability of statistical methodologies and computers was virtually the only form of forecasting used in political analysis. Systematic research has shown, however, that it is not particularly accurate: Many “experts” do barely better than chance on difficult forecasting problems, and the expert’s self-confidence and public reputation is sometimes negatively correlated with their accuracy. These failings have long been recognized, and a wide variety of methods have been suggested for improving the accuracy of nontechnical forecasts, particularly by gaining improved accuracy through aggregation of the forecasts of multiple experts. Among the better known of these are the Delphi method, devil’s advocate, brainstorming methods, and, recently, prediction markets.

Simulation

Simulation is a method of forecasting that bridges the nontechnical and technical approaches. In the earliest versions, pioneered by the war games of the Prussian military in the 18th and 19th centuries, individuals play the roles of various actors, constrained by an oftentimes elaborate set of rules. These “games” can be as simple as those played on a table or as elaborate as extended field exercises involving real persons and equipment. The method is still widely used, although now it usually combines training and experimentation with specific tactics rather than being used for strategic forecasting.

From the 1960s forward, computer simulations have been used: The two most common methods are (1) systems dynamics, where equations are specified for the aggregate behavior of key variables in the system, and (2) agent-based models, where equations or algorithms are specified for the behavior of simulated individual actors in the model, and the behavior of the system as a whole is derived by simulating a large number of these. Both forms of simulation usually involve multiple runs with different values for random variables so that a full probability distribution of the predicted outcomes can be obtained. The advantage of simulation is that systems of almost unlimited complexity can be specified and evaluated; the disadvantage is that determining the appropriate values of the parameters of the equations is very difficult, and in some
simulations those results are largely determined by a small set of key parameters.

An important type of sensitivity that affects dynamic simulations containing nonlinear interactions is the effect of chaos theory, where the predictions of a model can be highly sensitive to values of critical parameters and to the initial values of some variables. In such models, some combinations of parameter values and initial conditions can differ by arbitrarily small numerical amounts—differences far more precise than could ever be estimated from actual data—and yet produce widely divergent outcomes. Even chaotic systems, however, may provide some level of predictability—these usually exhibit multiple "basins of attraction" where the system is likely to find a long-term equilibrium—and systems that are chaotic for some parameter values can be well behaved and predictable for other values.

A comparable problem can be found in agent-based models when the simulated agents continually adapt their behaviors to the strategies of other actors, and consequently patterns of behavior found in one period of time may be completely different from those found in another because of the different strategies being used. This phenomenon has been observed empirically in stock market trading strategies and in military strategies—a new technique that is highly successful when first introduced will become less effective over time as other actors adapt to it. In evolutionary biology, this is known as the Red Queen hypothesis—named after the eponymous figure in Lewis Carroll's fantasy Through the Looking Glass—whereby organisms continually have to adapt their strategies to maintain the same level of fitness vis-à-vis their competitors. Such systems may be predictable in the short term—some adaptations are more likely to be successful than others—but the nature of the regularity can change substantially at longer horizons.

**Statistical Forecasting**

By far the most common form of technical forecasting involves the use of statistical models. Models used in political forecasting were originally borrowed from basic mathematical statistics and then adopted from economics, and now increasing use is made of models originally developed for the prediction of medical outcomes, as well as some models developed specifically for political and policy analysis. A wide variety of statistical methods are now in use, and many can be estimated using standard statistical packages, though some require specialized time-series analysis software. Among the more commonly used methods are

- autoregressive time series, which predict future values of a variable based on a linear combination of past values—common approaches include autoregressive moving average (ARMA) and autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models;
- autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models, which predict the future variance of an indicator rather than specific values—these are useful in predicting future uncertainty;
- event history or survival models, which predict the probability of a specific event as a function of time—variables are assessed on the degree to which they are risk factors that raise or lower these probabilities;
- vector autoregression (VAR), which predicts the response to specific numerical shocks to the system; and
- cross-sectional time series, which takes into account variation both across time and within groups of cases.

The advantage of statistical models is that they are completely transparent in their specifications, they are replicable, and they are grounded in a formal theory of statistics and probability. Statistical models also provide forecasts with a high level of detail—for example, probabilities of a specific numerical or categorical outcome at a specific point in time. The disadvantage is that they may require a great deal of data (which may vary in quality and availability) to be accurately estimated and they are completely dependent on the appropriate specification of both the mathematical form of the model and the variables used as input to the forecast.

Three other issues are relevant to statistical time-series models. First, the accuracy of a model on the data used to estimate the model—the in-sample accuracy—is usually higher than the accuracy on new data—the out-of-sample accuracy.
Furthermore, raising the in-sample accuracy to account for all of the idiosyncratic data points—fitting the error—will usually decrease out-of-sample accuracy. Consequently, the development of robust statistical models may require a great deal of experimentation, and determining the “best” model for forecasting the out-of-sample future requires elements of art as well as science.

Second, many political variables are strongly autoregressive—their values change little (or change very predictably) from time point to time point. This means that the models are very accurate, but departures from the autoregressive pattern—for example, a sudden swing in public opinion or unemployment—are difficult to predict. Such changes, however, are likely to be of greatest interest to analysts. Granger causality analysis, for example, looks at the effects of variables only after the autoregressive factors have been taken into consideration.

Finally, in some domains, particularly those involving major political or economic crises, the number of observations of the event of interest is very small—this is referred to as a rare-events estimation problem—and it is difficult for a statistical model to extract sufficient information to predict such occurrences. Because of the importance of rare events, this is an active research area and mathematical methods can be modified to at least partially adjust for this, but the problem is not fully solved.

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See also Causality; Election Research; Event History Analysis; Game Theory; Granger Causality; Policy Analysis; Political Risk Analysis; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian; Time-Series Analysis

Further Readings

PREEMPTIVE WAR

The concept of preemptive war refers to a legitimate anticipatory war waged by a state in order to counter a threat emanating from an adversary. Like many other notions used as much by politicians as by scholars, preemptive war is an essentially contested concept, all the more so as it cannot easily be dissociated from the concept of preventive war.

The idea of a legitimate anticipatory war goes back to the founders of the modern just-war tradition in the 17th and 18th centuries. Writing about the lawfulness of wars, Hugo Grotius and Emer De Vattel claimed that natural law as well as the law of nations permitted states to repel force by force in order to defend themselves against danger. They acknowledged two types of danger: First, a state is in danger once it has been attacked, and in this case resorting to arms is legitimate for the sake of self-defense; second, a state is in danger when an attack against it is imminent, and in this case resorting to arms is legitimate to forestall the intended attack. The criteria put forward by Grotius and De Vattel introduced a breach in the then prevailing Hobbesian conception of international politics—considering any war to be justified per se and postulating that a danger, and an ensuing right to prevent such a danger, existed as soon as there was a real or a perceived increase of another state’s power capacities.
and the British empire at the Canadian border in 1837, the criteria put forward by Grotius and De Vattel were revisited by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster; according to Webster, an anticipatory war could be considered to be legitimate on the condition that it was undertaken as a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no time for deliberation.

From that time on, it has been generally acknowledged that a distinction must be made between legitimate anticipatory wars, called preemptive wars, and illegitimate wars, called preventive wars. Although both relate to the same better-now-than-later logic and designate an anticipatory and winsome war waged by a state eager to forestall a threat at time \( t \) in order not to have to wage a riskier war under less favorable circumstances at times \( t + 1, t + 2, \ldots, t + n \), the material dissimilarity of the threat concerned induces a normative difference between them.

Concerning the material dimension, the first difference lies in the temporality of the threat countered by an anticipatory war; a preemptive war is undertaken to confront a threat perceived to be imminent, whereas a preventive war aims at forestalling a threat likely to become effective only after a certain period of time. In other words, a preemptive action is a tactical riposte to a short-term threat, while a preventive action is a strategic reply to a long-range threat, such as a future imbalance of forces. The second material difference, complementary to the first one, relates to the source of the threat. In a preemptive war, State A faces an irresistible threat: It attacks at the point in time \( t \) when an adversary, State B, is about to mobilize actual military capacities against A, whereas a preventive war launched by State A seeks at time \( t \) to impede State B from building up military capacities that might be mobilized against A at times \( t + 1, t + 2, \ldots, t + n \). In other words, a preventive war aims at countering a real threat, whereas a preventive war strives to forestall a hypothetical threat.

A normative opposition ensues from these material differences. In the legalist paradigm underpinning the United Nations (UN) Charter, resort to war is permitted only under two narrow conditions. The first is the traditional—both individual and collective—self-defense principle according to which a country that is attacked has the right to defend itself in a defensive war in order to repel its attacker and to secure its security and survival, either alone or with the help of other states joining in such a defensive war to guarantee the respect of the prevailing norms of appropriate international conduct. The second type of legitimate resort to arms refers to preemptive war, considered to be the only kind of legitimate anticipatory war precisely because it is a war launched in response to a threat that is at once overwhelming and so imminent as to allow no time for deliberation and no choice of means. Conversely then, resorting to preventive war is viewed as illegitimate, as was made clear by the diverging reactions in the world to Israel’s air strikes against Iraq’s Osirak nuclear plant in June 1981 and against Egyptian and Syrian military airports in June 1967. The 1967 attack was considered to be a legitimate preemptive strike, because the Israeli government knew with certainty that the Egyptian and Syrian military air forces were about to bomb Israel’s territory: Tel Aviv could not afford to rely on diplomatic negotiations; the only option at its disposal was to destroy its enemies’ bombers on the ground before they could take off. The situation was totally different on June 19, 1981, when the Security Council of the United Nations in its Resolution 487 condemned the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the norms of international conduct. Though Iraq was allegedly building a nuclear facility that might one day be used to produce nuclear weapons likely to threaten Israel’s security, such a threat was neither imminent nor overwhelming at the time the Israeli government decided to launch its bombing campaign.

This consensus was broken on the occasion of the decision by the United States and some of its allies to go to war against Iraq in 2003. In September 2002, the National Security Strategy of the United States claimed that the United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to its national security; it also announced its intention to act preemptively in order to forestall hostile acts by its enemies. In March 2003, the United States undertook such an action, launching Operation Iraqi Freedom, which it justified as a preemptive war, given that the only course of action against terrorists was to defeat them abroad before they attacked America at home. The vast majority of scholars reacting to the military action against Saddam
Hussein’s regime, however, refused to label Operation Iraqi Freedom as a preemptive war. In September 2002, Michael Walzer wrote that a possible war undertaken by the United States against Baghdad would be a preventive rather than a preemptive war. Commenting on the war in 2008, Michael Doyle asserted that the so-called Bush Doctrine of preemption actually was a doctrine of prevention.

In light of the values shared by the members of contemporary international society, there is little doubt, among the majority of scholars as well as international observers, that Operation Iraqi Freedom did not match the criteria of a preemptive war. On the one hand, the United States faced no instant or overwhelming threat emanating from Iraq, neither against itself nor against its regional allies. On the other hand, it could have chosen other means to cope with Iraq’s revisionist behavior, such as a vigilant containment strategy. After all, inspections by agents of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were taking place on the Iraqi territory to find a pacific solution to the problem of the possible weapons of destruction possessed by Baghdad, and the pursuit of diplomatic negotiations within the legal UN framework was favored by many states, including the allies of the United States. The Bush administration, while eliding the differences between preemption and prevention, did not ignore the criteria defining a legitimate anticipatory war, all the more so as Jeane Kirkpatrick, its UN ambassador during the Osirak crisis, had voted for the resolution condemning Israel’s air strike and as in 1986 the International Court of Justice had refused to consider that the United States had acted in collective self-defense of El Salvador when it had used force against Nicaragua, accused of providing weapons to Salvadoran rebels. Actually, the United States consciously proposed a new conception of preemption, based on the idea of the necessary adaptation of the concept of imminent threat to the objectives and capacities of unpredictable rogue states and terrorist networks likely to target civilian populations and to use weapons of mass destruction rather than to resort to those conventional means enumerated in the traditional preemption doctrine, that is, visible mobilizations of armies, navies, or air forces.

Beyond the Iraqi Freedom case, what is at stake today in the preemption versus prevention debate is the potential emergence of new norms of state conduct. Such an evolution would not merely be tantamount to a departure from the prevailing just war tradition because of the weakening of moral restraints. It would also break with those realpolitik considerations that in the past led policymakers such as Otto von Bismarck to equate preventive war with suicide from fear of death and to reject it as a rational means of foreign policy given that it is impossible to know things beforehand. If indeed the Bush Doctrine were adopted universally, it would probably permit any state to resort to arms by invoking its own definition of imminent threats. International instability would be the logical result of a universal diffusion of Bush’s unilateral way of foreign policy making.

This said, international norms are not laid down once and for all; their meaning is fixed by usage. While ultimately reflecting power distribution, they are what states, and actors shaping states’ behavior, make of them. Many researchers believe that international adoption of a new doctrine of legitimate anticipatory war will require that such a doctrine be revisited and accepted within the United States.

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See also Collective Security; International Law; International Society; War and Peace

Further Readings
**Presidentialism**

Presidentialism is one of the three major organizational models for government institutions in contemporary representative democracies. This entry discusses its conceptualization, reviews its origins and diffusion, summarizes its different varieties, provides an outline of the debates about its advantages and disadvantages, and evaluates its current relationship with democracy.

**Definition**

Presidentialism can be defined by the simultaneous presence of three characteristics. The first is the existence of two agents of the electorate: a chief of government—known as president—and a legislative assembly—usually known as congress—both of which are elected separately and by popular vote. The second characteristic is that both the president and members of congress are elected for preestablished fixed terms, which means that each agent’s survival does not depend on the other’s confidence. The president cannot be removed by a legislative vote of no confidence on political grounds. While the president can be removed through impeachment proceedings, impeachment is intended as an exceptional response to illegal or improper presidential behavior, and it requires the support of a qualified congressional majority. Likewise, the president cannot dissolve the legislative assembly and call for parliamentary elections at his or her discretion.

The third characteristic of presidentialism is the blending of the roles of head of government and chief of state in the same institution, the presidency. As the head of government, the president has authority over the overall direction of government, appoints cabinet ministers and the upper echelons of public bureaucracy, may influence the legislative process through the introduction of bills, and has veto and decree powers. As head of state, the president is also the symbolic representation of the state, signs international treaties, commands the armed forces, and has the authority to grant pardons.

Under parliamentarism and semipresidentialism, the chief of government is not directly elected and does not serve a fixed term. Rather, the chief of government is chosen by a legislative majority and remains in power subject to maintaining the confidence of such a majority. In addition, in these two systems the government can dissolve (or ask to dissolve) the parliament and call for legislative elections before the legislative term ends. The combination of these mechanisms functionally provides that the party or coalition that enjoys a parliamentary majority is also the one in charge of government. In contrast, under presidentialism, situations of “divided government” can exist, in which the party (or coalition) of the chief of government—the president—does not enjoy a majority in congress. Under divided government, cooperation between the executive and the legislative majority is crucial to avoid deadlock and stalemate.

In addition, both parliamentarism and semipresidentialism are dual-executive systems. Under both arrangements, the prerogatives of the executive are divided between a chief of government (usually called a prime minister) and a chief of state (a monarch or a president with limited and/or symbolic powers under parliamentarism and a president with extensive powers under semipresidentialism).

**Origins and Diffusion of Presidentialism**

Presidentialism’s origins can be traced to the constitutional convention that took place in Philadelphia and produced the U.S. Constitution of 1787. The main theoretical underpinnings, motives, and aspirations of the constitution were expressed by the writings of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, published as *The Federalist Papers*.

The most important elements of this institutional design were novel at the time: a written constitution that aimed at defining and limiting political authority, a government based on popular sovereignty, a chief of state named “president” instead of a hereditary king, and a system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches designed to guarantee order and security and avoid tyranny.

The inspiration that grew from the origins and characteristics of the U.S. Constitution legitimized later ruptures with other premodern monarchical regimes that came soon after the American struggle for independence. Indeed, the presidential model
expanded widely throughout Latin America with the end of Spanish rule, the advent of wars of independence (1808–1824), and the process of state formation that followed. Outside the Americas, presidentialism never found the same conditions to expand and thrive. In fact, Latin America is really the continent of presidentialism today; there are only a handful of non-American countries employing the system, including Benin and Nigeria in Africa and the Philippines and South Korea in Asia.

**Types of Presidentialism**

The term *presidentialism* does not necessarily imply that the executive is always and in all cases the most powerful of the branches of government. Researchers have identified different types of parliamentary governments depending on the primacy of the government or the parliament (i.e., cabinet government, *Kanzlerdemokratie* [chancellor democracy], or assembly government). A similar distinction can be made between at least two types of presidential systems: those based on “equilibrium among branches” and those based on “executive dominance.” Three variables differentiate these categories: (1) the powers of the president vis-à-vis congress, (2) the role of the Supreme Court as an arbiter of executive–legislative conflict, and (3) how parties and the party system are structured. The United States is the paradigmatic example of presidentialism based on “equilibrium among branches,” while most of the other cases fall into the “executive dominance” category.

The U.S. president faces a powerful legislative branch with significant legislative and oversight prerogatives and complete autonomy with respect to its agenda and its session calendar. On the other hand, the majority of the remaining presidential constitutions establish a more powerful president and a weaker legislature than exists in the United States. In contrast to the U.S. president, Latin American presidents not only enjoy reactive powers (such as veto power) but also proactive and agenda-setting powers. Among the latter are the following: (a) power to legislate through emergency decree powers, (b) exclusive right of legislative initiative in some areas (such as the budget or the organization of public administration), (c) ample powers over the budgetary process, (d) authority to initiate a referendum on general topics or specific laws, (e) authority to convene congress for special sessions, and (f) authority to ask congress to prioritize executive initiatives. Notwithstanding these powers, Latin American legislatures are not mere rubber stamps. They do exercise their legislative and oversight powers but to a lesser extent than their U.S. counterpart.

In addition, the Supreme Court historically has played a crucial role in the working of U.S. presidentialism, acting as arbiter in conflicts between the executive and the legislature. The combination of the Court’s recognition as an arbiter of interbranch conflict and its significant institutional prestige has resulted in the Court operating as a third branch of government. This is distinct from other presidential countries where Supreme Courts have often been unable to adequately exercise their role as arbiter due to undue influence from the executive.

Historically, in executive-dominant presidential systems, the usual way of limiting presidents’ power has been through the adoption of non-reelection clauses (either lifelong or nonimmediate). These measures produce presidents with ample ruling powers but without the ability to extend their terms of office. In spite of term limits, a number of Latin American presidents have attempted to remove these clauses, provoking an increase of executive–legislative conflict, a weakening of the mechanisms of horizontal accountability and oversight, and, more generally, increased levels of political instability.

The nature and structure of parties and party systems also differentiate the types of presidentialism in functional terms. Two-party systems with low internal party discipline such as that of the United States not only provide the president a wider margin to rule under divided government conditions but have also contributed to limiting the power of presidents who enjoy a majority in congress. In any case, while the existence of a two-party system with weak parties might allow presidents to more successfully push their agendas, it also obliges presidents to pay careful attention to congressional autonomy, power, and will.

On the other hand, presidential forms of government that coexist with multiparty systems or two-party systems with disciplined parties, as is the case in much of Latin America, have produced both cases of executive dominance and cases of compromise between executive and congress.
Clear examples of dominance situations include those cases in which presidents, supported by a disciplined legislative majority, take full advantage of the situation and push their own agendas without seeking agreements with opposition parties. Presidents who lack congressional majorities may also decide to use (and abuse) their proactive powers and rule alone, circumventing congress. Alternatively, presidents facing a minority situation can build coalitions to avoid deadlock and stalemate, offering cabinet positions to parties with legislative representation in exchange for legislative support for executive initiatives. This is an example of consensual interbranch relations.

Criticisms and Debate

During the 1980s, a large number of countries (first in Latin American and then in Eastern European) moved toward democracy, requiring them to restore, modify, or even create constitutions and rules for political competition. This context provided an opportunity to discuss different government designs, to compare the advantages and disadvantages of presidentialism and parliamentarism, and to revise and eventually modify how political institutions were organized. The political scientist Juan Linz occupied a prominent position in this debate as he took the lead in a fierce scholarly criticism of presidentialism, basing his criticism on the numerous presidential democracies in Latin America that underwent institutional crises and eventually broke down during the 1960s and 1970s. In short, critics argued that presidentialism was less efficient than parliamentarism in guaranteeing political stability and democratic governability. They identified four perils or problems inherent in the logic of presidential design.

First, the dual legitimacy created by presidentialism is prone to deadlock and stalemate. Under presidentialism, both the agents of the popular vote (the president and the legislature) have a legitimate claim to power and popular support without an official procedure to solve conflicts between the two. Situations of divided government constitute a serious difficulty as opposition parties in congress have few incentives to cooperate if credit for success is not attributed to them, while at the same time they will likely bear the cost of failure. Presidents may even encounter problems in marshaling support from their own parties, as legislators of the president’s party can resist or reject bills from the executive, risking neither their positions nor the dissolution of congress. This problem does not exist under parliamentarism, where governments can maintain themselves in office only if they enjoy legislative support.

A second problem with presidentialism is, according to its critics, the rigidity implied in fixed terms. Fixed terms make institutional responses to critical situations much more difficult. The possibilities for replacing an unpopular or moribund president (e.g., resignation, impeachment) are complicated, and the mere intention of applying them might result in further complications and a deepening of the crisis. On the contrary, under parliamentary arrangements, the replacement of government and the call for anticipated elections are normal institutionalized political solutions that are always available and easy to use in times of crisis.

The third shortcoming of presidentialism is the majoritarian and zero-sum character of presidential elections: Elections with only one winner generate strong political tensions. What makes the zero-sum nature of presidentialism even more serious is that under certain electoral rules, a candidate with little popular support or one who is strongly deviant from the median voter can win, potentially generating crises of legitimacy and situations of conflict, polarization, and/or crisis. Critics of presidentialism invoke as the quintessential example the Chilean elections of 1970: The leftist candidate Salvador Allende won the presidency with only 36.2% of votes against the center-right candidate Jorge Alessandri with 34.9% and the Christian Democrat candidate Radomiro Tomic with 27.8%. Despite this close margin of victory, and facing a hostile congress, Allende began to carry out radical policies. In a context of increasing political polarization, the government of President Allende was overthrown by the military in a coup d’état on September 11, 1973.

The last shortcoming that critics note is the dual character of the presidential office, generated by the system’s fusion of the roles of head of state and head of government. The symbolic and/or ceremonial duties of the chief of state often collide with the tasks of a head of government. To its critics, the symbolic functions of a chief of state are less legitimate when carried out by an individual who
is the leader of a party and therefore involved in partisan power struggles.

The contributions of Linz and other critics of presidentialism sparked a revival in interest in governmental institutions and their effect on stability and democratic performance as well as several responses that challenged Linz’s argument. For example, scholars like Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, while admitting some difficulties associated with presidential systems, presented counterarguments noting some of the advantages of presidentialism over parliamentarism. First, according to these scholars, presidentialism offers more electoral options to voters, who can cast votes for both the legislature and the executive and can decide to split their vote, a possibility parliamentarism precludes.

Second, presidentialism offers citizens more opportunities to exercise accountability and express their preferences in public policy neatly. Under presidentialism, citizens can choose between at least two clearly different alternatives (the incumbent and the opposition) for president and a number of alternatives from among which they can select the candidate closest to their preferences for congress. In contrast, in Westminster-type parliamentarisms, government and opposition are clearly defined and it is possible for voters to determine governmental responsibility for policies, but there is no room for minority representation. Under multiparty parliamentarism, the exact opposite takes place: Citizens do not know in advance how their vote will reflect on the final composition of government. In these cases, changes in the partisan composition of the ruling coalition can take place even between elections, and parties originally in the opposition might be invited to join the government.

The third argument in favor of presidentialism is that it better facilitates legislative control over lawmaking and oversight of the executive. As the survival of government is not at stake, members of congress enjoy wider margins of maneuver to adequately analyze bills and look for broader support for an initiative, ultimately having a greater effect on legislation.

Fourth, presidential fixed terms generate higher democratic stability in countries with governability problems due to weak parties or highly fragmented or polarized party systems, where it would be difficult to form coalitions in a parliamentary context.

Finally, some scholars argue for caveats to the notion of the zero-sum nature of presidentialism. The existence of two agents of the electorate results in the possibility of more than two winners. A party that does not win the presidency but obtains a considerable number of seats in the assembly can limit the executive and block its initiatives, especially if the president possesses only reactive legislative powers (or limited proactive and agenda-setting powers). In contrast, Westminster-style parliamentarisms are good examples of one party taking a dominant position in both branches of government and exercising power with few limitations.

**Presidential Democracies Today**

For many years, the combination of presidentialism and democracy only succeeded in the United States. In no other place did presidentialism coexist with a stable democratic regime. For example, at the beginning of the 1980s, only three Latin American countries were ruled by presidents elected in competitive elections: Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. The remaining countries were ruled by different varieties of nondemocratic regimes, including hegemonic party systems (Mexico) or military dictatorships (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay).

In 2010, however, presidential democracies prevailed across the Americas. Many of them have suffered periods of political crisis and instability, but all of them have shown unanticipated resilience in recent years. There have been major setbacks, such as the autogolpes (self-inflicted coups by ruling presidents to close the congress) by the Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori in 1992 and by the Guatemalan president Jorge Serrano in 1993. In other cases, presidential democracies survived thorny circumstances including presidential impeachments, as was the case in Brazil (1992) and Venezuela (1993), or presidential resignations amid usually violent social protest and uprisings, as in the case of the Paraguayan president Raúl Cubas Grau in March 1999, the Ecuadorian Jamil Mahuad in February 2000, the Argentinean Fernando de la Rúa in December 2001, and the Bolivian Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in October 2003.

In spite of scholarly suggestions and initiatives by some politicians to modify presidential arrangements, all the constitutional conventions convened throughout Latin America since the late 1980s...
have maintained or strengthened presidentialism's basic logic and tenets. As a consequence, today the combination of presidentialism and democracy is not an oddity but a common feature of the political systems of a large number of countries.

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See also Constitutionalism; Government; Parliamentary Systems; Semipresidentialism; Separation of Powers

Further Readings

Principal–Agent Theory

Principal–agent theory (PAT) was developed in the field of economics in the 1970s to understand the prevailing problems that appear every time Person A (the “principal”) asks Person B (the “agent”) to do something on his or her behalf for a given price. The basic assumption of PAT is the existence of a double asymmetry between the principal and the agent, since they have different preferences (e.g., the customer/principal wants healthy teeth, while the dentist/agent wants to receive good pay) as well as different levels of information (e.g., the customer/principal can observe the outcome but not the costs of the action that the dentist/agent takes). The solution to this double asymmetry is an outcome-based contract in which it is stated that the agent receives a bonus in case a certain outcome is reached. PAT explores how these contracts should be designed according to the variations in the informational asymmetries between principals and agents in different settings.

Similar to many other economic tools, PAT has been incorporated into political science with the general aim of creating more parsimonious models. Ironically, PAT has only marginally been used for understanding one of the most important principal–agent relationship in politics—the one between citizens, or constituencies (as principals), and elected politicians (as agents). The reason is that the nature of this relationship differs too much from the basic premises of PAT, in which the principal holds a dominant position and is endowed with all the bargaining power. As a consequence, the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent, which becomes the main object of study for the standard PAT. On the contrary, in the central political delegation chain, the citizen/principal has a subordinate role vis-à-vis a politician/agent, who can single-handedly write or, at least, substantially modify the terms of the “contract” between them. In simple words, governments are the only agents in the world that tell their principals what to do.

PAT has nevertheless been applied extensively for understanding the second delegation chain in a polity—that of politicians as principals and bureaucrats as agents. The main reason is that bureaucracy is one of the fields in political science that has resisted more theoretical progress, and PAT offers a useful tool to develop highly analytical models with clear testable propositions. In addition, PAT seems particularly well suited to address one of the most long-lasting puzzles in bureaucratic politics: the so-called Weberian asymmetry. As Max Weber indicated, a profound problem of
democratic polities is that “political masters” find themselves in the position of dilettantes who stand opposite of expert bureaucrats. This asymmetry has initiated recurrent scientific and ideological debates—most notable among them being the discussion on “state failures.” For the public choice literature in general, and for William Niskanen in particular, bureaucracies are too big and too inefficient.

Since it was imported from economics in the early 1980s, PAT has offered creative answers to these debates surrounding public bureaucracies and, while answering them, has also undergone an important evolution. This entry surveys the main aspects of this transformation of a fundamentally economic PAT into a more political theory.

**From Ex Post to Ex Ante Theories**

The first setting in which PAT flourished was the American literature on congressional control of bureaucracy. Prior to PAT, the prevailing view was that of an unresponsive bureaucracy—based on the fact that Congress devoted only a small fraction of its resources to the direct oversight of bureaucratic actions. Against this perspective, PAT authors argued that the lack of monitoring activity was actually a signal that control was working properly. It is the possibility of *ex post* sanctions (e.g., hearings, investigations, limited budgetary appropriations) that acts as an effective incentive for the bureau to serve congressional interests. Similar to how a car lot owner’s properly designed commission system can ensure that a car sales agent performs well without any need for direct monitoring, Congress may possess sufficient *ex post* rewards and sanctions to control public bureaucracies.

This “congressional dominance” approach contributed to the bureaucratic literature by providing numerous empirical tests derived from rigorous theoretical predictions—mostly showing the congruence between federal regulatory agencies and changes in congressional ideological preferences. The ultimate empirical proof that bureaucratic agents follow legislators’ preferences would be the latter’s high incumbent reelection rate (more than 90% in the U.S. House of Representatives, according to some calculations/estimations).

Nevertheless, many authors have cast doubts about the usefulness of *ex post* PAT sanctions in the political sphere. Unlike what happens in the private sector, where the principal may openly expose an agent’s misbehavior, a politician who denounces bureaucratic noncompliance runs the risk of being accused by the electorate of lack of previous monitoring zeal. Since politicians cannot credibly rely on *ex post* controls, they may develop *ex ante* mechanisms of bureaucratic oversight, such as imposing detailed administrative procedures that “stack the deck” in favor of congressional constituencies. For example, members of Congress can establish transparency requirements or order the bureau to consult some interest groups before entering into any relevant decision. That would also be the PAT explanation of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act that was burdened with multiple requirements that limited *ex ante* bureaucratic discretion. In general, PAT arguments, based on politicians’ electoral interests, challenged the prevailing view in the law and economics literature that had traditionally explained administrative procedures as being the result of normative concerns for fairness and equity. This shift of focus from *ex post* to *ex ante* mechanisms represents the first step away from economic orthodoxy in the political evolution of PAT models of bureaucracy.

**From Dyadic to Complex Theories**

PAT, as directly imported from economics, initially focused on the dyadic relationship between Congress and bureaucracy. Nevertheless, from the mid-1980s onward, more realistic models of political control of bureaucracy were developed in which the dyadic relationship became a more complex one, with Congress sharing, and frequently competing for, bureaucratic oversight with other principals, such as the presidency, federal and state courts, and interest groups.

The main picture that is emerging from these complex models—some of them involving up to 14 principals—is more pessimistic than the one from the early dyadic PAT models of congressional dominance. In general, political control of bureaus is poor because they can play some political principals (e.g., a Republican Congress) off against others (e.g., a Democratic president). In addition,
the political control hypothesis seems to fail even in the most favorable conditions, which has been demonstrated by the case of the probusiness Reagan administration and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Despite that all possible political control tools were mobilized, the Reagan administration was unable to significantly reduce EPA’s activities.

**From Control to Organizational Theories**

Most public administration scholars agree that while PAT has successfully explored the issue of political control of bureaucracies, it has been at the expense of treating bureaucracies as black boxes that mysteriously transform inputs into outputs. The (extremely varied) organizational characteristics of bureaucracies have been mostly left out. One reason is that PAT, which emerged in the congressional control debate, initially became more of a theory of legislatures than a proper theory of bureaucracies. Nevertheless, researchers started to acknowledge that the study of the political control of bureaucracies presents serious problems of scientific validity, chief among them being the dilemma of “observational equivalence.” The same empirical observation, the lack of political monitoring and sanctions for bureaus, may be an indication of bureaucratic independence and, at the same time, of its exact opposite—that is, a bureaucracy so compliant that there is no need for supervision.

Accordingly, in what has been considered to be the most important single development in the modern theory of bureaucracy, PAT scholars have increasingly shifted their attention from how politicians control bureaucrats to how politicians design bureaucratic organizations. One of the most explored organizational features is the variance in the autonomy of public employees: why some public bureaucracies are like their private counterparts—that is, the principal (government) is free to choose its agents (public employees)—and, on the contrary, other (most, but far from all) public bureaucracies have autonomous civil service systems that limit the capacity of government to choose the public employees that are working for it. The study of this puzzle has forced PAT scholars to seriously question the source and nature of the problems that exist in a principal–agent relationship.

**From Agent-as-the-Problem to Principal-as-the-Problem Theories**

The canonical-economic PAT had focused on the problems created by the agent, who may take advantage of his or her “hidden information” and “hidden actions.” The credible commitment problem of a car lot owner (principal) not paying the promised commission to a salesman (agent) is quite unrealistic in the private sector, given the existence of an external third party (public institutions) with the ability to enforce contracts. Nevertheless, in politics, the principal is at the same time the third party—or, at the least, may be able to affect the third party’s behavior through legislative measures. As numerous scholars have shown, the problems of credible commitment created by all-powerful principals may overshadow the traditionally explored informational advantages of agents. One of the most significant examples is monetary policy, where governments, no matter how benevolent they may appear, face an unavoidable problem of credibility in the eyes of investors. Just before elections, governments will always find an advantage in granting opportunistic short-term benefits to their constituents.

A more political strand of PAT has explored how different mechanisms, such as the delegation of monetary policy to an agent that is known to have different monetary preferences, may mitigate this inherent problem of credibility. One paradoxical result of this literature is that multiple principals overseeing a bureaucracy, considered as a recipe for disaster by the standard economic PAT, actually have beneficial effects for monetary policy because a safe “core” of economic policies is protected from politicians’ opportunism. The loss of political control over the bureaucracy—at least over bureaucracies dealing with potentially time-inconsistent policies—can thus be a socially desirable outcome.

All in all, two main patterns emerge from this review of the influence of PAT in political science. First, the parsimonious models of PAT have revolutionized the study of politics and particularly of public bureaucracies, illuminating numerous empirical puzzles. At the same time, the study of politics has also changed the core assumptions and predictions of canonical PAT. In sum, thanks to the importation of the economics-born PAT, political science has evolved into a more economic
Prisoners' Dilemma

The prisoners' dilemma (PD) is usually presented with the following narrative. Two men are arrested after committing a crime. Only a confession by one or both of them can lead to a conviction for the crime. If both of them remain silent, each will be charged with a lesser offense and serve a light sentence. If one confesses while the other remains silent, the one who confesses will be set free in exchange for his testimony against the other, and the one who remains silent will be convicted of the crime and receive a full sentence. If both confess, both of them will be convicted of the crime but will receive a reduced sentence. The dilemma here is that regardless of what the other chooses to do, it will be better for each of them to confess. However, if they both confess, they will be worse off than they would have been if both of them had remained silent. In this entry, various game-theoretical strategies and possible applications in political science are discussed.

The basic structure of the game is presented in Table 1, a $2 \times 2$ matrix that specifies the payoff each player receives, where $T > R > P > S$.

The game, thus, has a unique equilibrium in which both players defect and receive payoff $P$. They would have received a higher payoff, $R$, had each of them chosen “cooperate,” but this is not possible since each of them has a dominant strategy to “defect.”

In a repeated PD, the choices made today not only determine today’s outcome but can also influence the choices made in the future. If the players were to repeat the game for a finite and known number of times, backward induction would imply that both players defect in every round. In the last round, neither player fears the consequences of current choices, so they will both choose “defect.” As a result, both players end up choosing “defect” in each round, expecting the other player to “defect” in the following round. However, if the players were to play an infinitely repeated PD or a finite repeated PD for an unknown number of times, backward induction no longer applies. When a game is repeated infinitely or repeated for a finite but unknown number of times, players use weighted-average payoffs to determine which strategy to choose. To calculate the weighted-average payoffs in a given round, future payoffs are multiplied by a discount factor $q$, either to reflect that future payoffs are valued less than present payoffs or as a probability that there will be another round in the future. The value of cooperation in a given round depends on the value of $q$, increasing as $q$ approaches one. As long as $q$ is not zero, both players are better off if they both choose “cooperate” in every round.

Table 1  Prisioners’ Dilemma

| Player 1 | Player 2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate</td>
<td>Defect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate</td>
<td>$R, R$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>$T, S$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is an equilibrium in which both players defect in every round because each player chooses a strategy to “always defect” and such an equilibrium exists for any value of $q$. However, it is no longer the only possible equilibrium outcome for both players to defect in every round because players can play reciprocal strategies that condition their choices in a given round on the course of the game. For instance, players can choose to play a grim trigger strategy, which punishes the defector by playing defect for all future rounds of the game. This reciprocal strategy can produce an equilibrium in which both players cooperate in every round for certain values of $q$. In fact, according to the Folk theorem, a wide range of payoffs can be supported in infinitely repeated games or repeated games with finite but unknown number of rounds as long as $q$ is not zero, and consequently, the set of strategies that support mutual cooperation in every round can be quite large depending on the value of $q$. There exists as yet no consensus with respect to the reasons that may be invoked for favoring one reciprocal strategy over the other when any of them can support mutual cooperation in every round.

Games of incomplete information offer another scenario in which players might achieve mutual cooperation even in a repeated PD with a finite and known number of rounds. For instance, suppose there is a probability $z$ that Player 2’s payoffs are different from those depicted in Table 1 and that his dominant strategy is a tit-for-tat strategy. A tit-for-tat strategy player cooperates in the first round and then does whatever his or her opponent did in the previous round. When this uncertainty is introduced, a “cooperate” by Player 2 in a given round may be interpreted as a sign that Player 2 is a tit-for-tat strategy player. If Player 2 is a tit-for-tat strategy player, Player 1 is better off if he or she chooses “cooperate” in the following round and achieves mutual cooperation in future rounds. There is a chance that the “cooperate” choice by Player 2 is a mistake and that Player 2 will choose “defect” in the following round. Then, Player 1 will receive $S$, which is worse than the $P$ that he or she would have received if he or she had kept on playing “defect.” However, if $z$ is high enough and there are enough rounds left in the game, Player 1 will be willing to risk this possibility. At the same time, there is an incentive for Player 2 to pretend to be a tit-for-tat strategy player even if he or she is not when Player 1 faces such an uncertainty because then both players can achieve mutual cooperation and receive payoff $R$ for some rounds. As they near the last round, they will be less willing to choose “cooperate” since the fact that they will both choose “defect” in the last round has not changed. They will not be able to achieve mutual cooperation in every round, but they will be able to achieve mutual cooperation in some rounds.

Since Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher devised PD as part of a RAND Corporation experiment on game theory, experiments have been a major part of PD literature. The most frequently examined dependent variable in PD experiments is the number of mutual cooperations achieved relative to the number of games played. However, the results will vary depending on the specific environment of the experiment. It has been established that that share is never zero, but it is never 100% either. The fact that observations of real people have shown that people usually manage to achieve mutual cooperation even in repeated games with a finite and known number of rounds motivated the research on finitely repeated PD with uncertainty, which appears to be more consistent with the experimental results.

Computer simulation is another way researchers experiment with PD games. They are particularly useful in exploring the evolutionary aspect of repeated PD, such as the best strategy for players’ survival, the change in strategies among populations, or the stability of strategy composition. Robert Axelrod’s computer tournaments conducted in 1980 are part of a study on the emergence of cooperation. A number of strategies were submitted to a tournament of repeated PD, in which each strategy was matched against all the other programs submitted, against itself, and against a program that chooses cooperation or defection randomly. Axelrod tallied how well each strategy did, and the winner was a tit-for-tat strategy.

The PD is generally applied to demonstrate the difficulty involved in achieving cooperative outcomes when there exists an incentive to cheat and take advantage of the other. International politics has been an area in which PD has been applied actively because states engage in bilateral interactions without a formal enforcement mechanism. For example, it is difficult for two states in an arms race to make and implement an agreement to stop
Privatization

According to Stuart Butler, one of its chief advocates, privatization can be thought of as the shift of a function in whole, or in part, from the public sector to the private sector. This can refer to a variety of policies, including the sale of state assets, the contracting out of public services to private providers, the deregulation of various market-based activities, or even the affixing of user fees for places that might earlier have been open access (parks, museums, schools, or highways). This entry discusses alternative conceptions of privatization, assesses the arguments for and against privatization, and examines some attempts by governments to withdraw from involvement in some aspects of their economies.

Alternative Conceptions of Privatization

Privatization is not a new phenomenon. While most economists have normally assumed the private sector to be something like a default position, with government activities being invented, added on, and often at the expense of the private sector, in fact the reverse is the case. Oliver Letwin, a British conservative theorist, observed that the private sector had to be invented. This occurred with the creation of the great European trading companies, such as the British and Dutch East India companies, founded in the 17th century. Notions of property before the Renaissance assumed that different actors had different relations to the same property. Manorial estates were, true enough, the domain of the local lord, but he was required to provide security, order, and justice to the inhabitants of the domain, while they

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the arms race, although they will be worse off than if they are able to cooperate and stop it. Each state fears that it will be taken advantage of should it stop while the opponent continues. Each state is also tempted to take advantage of the opponent that stops by continuing to accumulate arms. The same logic applies to any international relations in which states can achieve favorable outcomes through international agreements but will be tempted to cheat on implementation. It can also been applied to civil conflict situations.

Although PD is generally applied in the context of a two-player game, games with the payoff structure of PD have been applied in the context of an \( n \)-player game (i.e., \( n > 2 \)). For example, some have interpreted a game of common-pool resources with \( n \) players who have PD incentives to be what Garrett Hardin referred to as the *tragedy of the commons*. All the people in a community have a collective interest in sustaining common resources. However, as people are self-interested, each will be tempted to overexploit the resources. The tragedy arises because, at any point in time, each individual finds it in his or her interest to exploit the common resources (i.e., “defect”) no matter what the others do. This can be seen to explain the need for and the emergence of a formal enforcement device, government or a government agency in most cases, to provide public goods or to enforce contracts among individuals. Work by the Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom and her collaborators explore other, private ways in which individuals can solve the common-resources problem.

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See also Arms Race; Cooperation; Game Theory; Tragedy of the Commons

Further Readings


had certain rights to the usufructs of the property and owed the lord fealty and obedience. The lord in turn owed fealty to the king. This changed slowly. For example, only with the rise of the enclosures of common pastureland did Britain develop modern notions of property. Private property did, of course, exist in earlier eras, and much of its modern conception is owed to the rediscovery of Roman law, which had a well-articulated set of rules governing such property. However, as the economic abuses associated with the collapse of communism demonstrate, private property cannot exist without a political system that defines its existence, its use, and the conditions of its exchange. That is, private property is defined by and exists only because of politics.

Although state asset sales occurred in many European countries during the 1950s, when conservative parties took over from left-of-center parties, these were relatively limited in scope. Privatizing government assets and services became a major policy fashion in the 1980s and continued through the first decade of the 21st century until the financial crisis of late 2008, when many of the conservative policy trends of the late 20th century were called into question. This is not to say that only conservatives advocated privatization. Regimes as different as Margaret Thatcher’s Britain, Bill Clinton’s United States, and François Mitterrand’s France all actively pursued privatization policies. They often had different reasons for pursuing such policies, and these are explored as follows.

At the end of the 20th century, the privatization movement was rooted in the collapse of Keynesian economics in the late 1970s. The oil crises of 1973 to 1974 and then 1979 were followed by periods of economic stagnation and high inflation. Keynesian orthodoxy saw employment and price levels as trade-offs, described by what was called the Phillips curve. Keynesians thought that inflation only occurred in economies experiencing full employment and had no explanation for the stagflation that followed the oil crises. Their inability to explain the behavior of the economy created a window of opportunity for neoclassical economists to step in and stipulate that these problems were due to public sector distortions that had accumulated over the postwar years. The solution to economic stagnation was, they asserted, less government. These were the advocates of privatization.

Arguments for and Against Privatization
Belief in the superiority of markets became widespread as the best way to organize not only the production but also the allocation of all goods and services, with “market failure” being considered rare and the only justification for public intervention. Even governments were thought to work better if they were organized using market principles. This latter version of privatization became known as “the new public management.” Here government was to be organized as a private enterprise, while citizens were to be treated as “customers.”

While privatization was something of an international trend in the late 20th century, it was not adopted everywhere for the same reasons. Harvey Feigenbaum, Jeffrey Henig, and Chris Hamnett (1998) argued that privatization was essentially a political phenomenon and that one could distinguish three types of privatization policies. The types of privatization were differentiated by the motives and intentions of the policymakers. The least political kind of privatization might be called “pragmatic.” Pragmatic privatizations fill immediate needs without political motives, such as selling a state asset to fill an immediate budgetary shortfall or contracting out to a private provider because the government simply lacks the expertise. “Tactical” privatizations serve short-term political goals, such as rewarding supporters by awarding a no-bid contract or offering discounted shares in a public enterprise privatization to allies of the party in power. “Systemic” privatizations are intended to permanently transform the political landscape: The sale of public enterprises to create a nation of share holders was intended to create new and enduring constituencies for the Conservative Party in Britain, while “shock therapy,” the rapid sale of public enterprises in Russia, was intended to permanently block a return to socialism by selling off most of the state’s assets. In developing countries, the impetus for privatization often comes from international aid and lending institutions that require the policy as a prerequisite to aid. These institutions usually favor privatization because they are staffed by neoclassical economists or influenced by large, conservative contributors such as the United States. In other cases, international lenders are simply seeking to pragmatically avoid nepotism and other inefficiencies in recipient countries.
Often, of course, privatizations are supported by different groups for different reasons. Bureaucrats might favor a particular privatization for pragmatic reasons; the ruling party might see political advantages, while outside consultants based in think tanks might be motivated by ideology. Thus, the typology offered above might be better thought of as Weberian ideal types rather than hard and fast categories in the real world.

**Government Attempts to Withdraw From Economic Involvement**

Whatever the motives of the privatizers, the impact of privatization has also been quite varied. The goals may have been, as stated by Daniel Golden, a one-time administrator of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “faster, better, cheaper!” However, realistically, privatization policies could at best accomplish two out of the three. While there were some successes at the municipal level, cost savings due to privatization were rare. Where they were achieved, this was often because the private providers had hired lower-wage workers. Hence, privatization policies have normally been opposed by labor unions.

In a number of cases, privatization policies drove up costs and reduced service. The privatization of British Rail led to significant reductions in service, though part of this was because the Conservative government had anticipated privatization and necessary investments in infrastructure were not made before the railroad was sold. Privatization of water utilities in Britain followed a similar pattern. Perhaps the most spectacular increases in cost were associated with privatization in the military. Profiteering often accompanies military contracts and is alleged to have reached spectacular proportions in the case of U.S. contracts during the Iraq War. It should be noted that privatization of the military may be pursued not because the governments have any illusions about efficiency but because the use of private contractors is an expedient way to expand unpopular military activities.

Experience with privatization since the 1980s suggests that there is less abuse where privatization leads to a genuinely competitive market, where private service providers are carefully supervised by public authorities, and where well-articulated systems of accountability are in place. Even when these conditions obtain, privatization does not necessarily result in greater efficiencies or cost savings, although this is a matter continually under debate. It also seems clear that privatization policies frequently have serious distributional consequences. Thus, cost savings due to new efficiencies are frequently negated by the need for new subsidies to those citizens adversely affected.

In recent times, privatizations have not had the popularity that was evident in the 1980s and 1990s. This is partially because there is now significant experience with privatization and the promised savings and efficiencies have not been realized. Moreover, the shocks occurring in financial markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 have led to a serious reevaluation of the philosophy that underpinned the privatization movement.

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**See also** Economic Policy; Neoliberalism; New Public Management; Property

**Further Readings**


**PROCESS TRACING**

Process tracing is a key method of qualitative analysis of case studies. As discussed in this entry,
Process Tracing is defined as the empirical analysis of the hypothesized observable implications of alternative theoretical processes that purport to explain the outcome of a single case. As such, it is a method of within-case analysis that can be used to develop and test a historical explanation of an individual case, although it can also be used together with cross-case comparative methods to assess whether similar or different processes are at work in different cases. This entry reviews the epistemological and methodological context of process tracing, discusses standards of doing it well, and identifies its limitations as a means of causal inference.

The Epistemology and Methodology of Process Tracing

As outlined by Alexander George and others, process tracing can be used to develop and test historical explanations of a single case. George and other proponents of process tracing often use the metaphor of detective work to illustrate the technique. Just as a detective assesses alternative suspects’ potential means, motives, and opportunities to have committed the crime under investigation, a social science researcher can use evidence to assess the alternative explanations proposed for the outcome of a historical case. This involves close attention to the hypothesized causal mechanisms, processes, and sequences that alternative theories predict must be evident in the history of a case if these theories are to explain the outcome of the case.

The emphasis that process tracing places on causal processes and mechanisms makes its epistemological assumptions similar to those of the scientific-realist school of thought in the philosophy of science. As Fred Chernoff has noted, there are many variants of scientific realism. Most self-identified scientific realists agree, however, that there are entities in the world with causal powers and that these entities act through causal mechanisms to generate the phenomena that we observe. In this view, although causal mechanisms are ultimately not directly observable, our hypotheses about how these mechanisms operate generate observable implications that we can test against actual observations to make (potentially fallible) inferences on the validity and scope conditions of our hypotheses. The observable implications of hypothesized causal mechanisms and processes may concern predictions on population-wide patterns, which can be assessed through statistical means. According to Henry Brady and David Collier, this analysis involves inferences from “data set observations” or from measurements of variables across many different cases. The observable implications of hypothesized causal mechanisms may also involve detailed predictions about processes and sequences of events within individual cases. It is these within-case observable implications that process tracing assesses through what Brady and Collier term causal process observations, or evidence on sequences and events within a single case.

Process tracing proceeds through a combination of deduction and induction, with the mix varying depending on the state of development of theories on the phenomenon under study and the availability of relevant evidence. Deductively, the researcher uses extant theories to generate observable implications within a case, which can then be tested against the evidence. In this mode, the researcher asks questions such as “Who should have known or who did what, where, when, and how if this explanation of the case is true?” Inductively, the researcher develops detailed knowledge of the sequence of events in a case and uses this knowledge to generate additional potential explanations of the case. These inductive explanations, once translated into more rigorous and deductive theories, can generate additional testable implications within the case or within other cases, thereby helping the researcher guard against confirmation bias. Even when the outcome of a case is already known, there are usually many details about processes and sequences within the case that are unknown to the investigator prior to undertaking process tracing. These previously unknown details can provide an independent check on the investigator’s theoretical assumptions.

Process tracing also proceeds through both affirmation of theories that prove to be consistent with evidence from the case and eliminative induction of theoretical explanations that prove to be inconsistent with the evidence. In this sense, process tracing is similar to Bayesian analysis, in which the analyst uses evidence to update prior expectations on the relative likelihood that alternative theories or explanations are true. As in
Bayesian analysis, a single piece of evidence might be consistent with one explanation of a case while simultaneously disproving many alternative explanations. The more an observable implication is likely to be true if one explanation is true, and the more unlikely it is to be true if any of the alternative explanations is true, the more this evidence, if found, would increase our confidence in the one theory it fits and decrease our confidence in the alternatives. Thus, whether an instance of process tracing is convincing and determinate in narrowing the field to one explanation of a case depends not on the number of cases, pieces of evidence, or alternative explanations but on the probative value of the evidence regarding the alternative explanations.

Thus, even though it involves only one case and potentially includes many variables and explanations, process tracing does not raise a “degrees of freedom” problem, which arises in statistical analysis when there are too many variables and too few cases to assess alternative explanations with any confidence. Process tracing does face the more general problem of indeterminacy, of which the degrees of freedom problem is one variant, as process tracing may be indeterminate if several incompatible explanations are equally consistent with the evidence of a case. This is an inherent problem because there are always potential additional explanations that the researcher may not have conceived of or examined, a challenge that Bayesians refer to as identifying the “catchall factor,” or the probability one should place on the possible truth value of all alternatives to the explanation of interest. For these reasons, many researchers who use process tracing would agree with Bayesians that one should never put 100% confidence in a theory or explanation.

Although it is a within-case method of analysis, process tracing can supplement cross-case comparisons and compensate for some of the limits of such comparisons. For example, a most-similar case comparison involves the comparison of two cases that are similar in all but one independent variable and that differ in their outcomes. A standard challenge in this research design is that cases are never perfectly matched on all but one independent variable. Process tracing can help determine whether the difference in the independent variable of interest is related to the outcome, and it can also help assess whether the residual differences between the two cases might also, or instead, contribute to the differences in their outcomes.

Two contentious issues are whether process tracing can lead to generalizable knowledge and whether it is suited to interpretivist or constructivist epistemological assumptions. Nathaniel Beck has critiqued process tracing for producing only explanations of individual cases rather than generalizable knowledge. Defenders of process tracing respond that the explanation of cases of historical significance is an important goal in its own right and that inferences based on statistical inferences are more convincing if they can be shown to be consistent with the mechanisms and processes of individual cases. Moreover, they argue that while the explanation of an individual case may not generalize to other cases, it is also possible to use a combination of induction and deduction to uncover explanations via process tracing that may prove widely generalizable. Charles Darwin’s detailed examination of a few species, for example, led to hypothesized causal mechanisms on evolution and natural selection that should apply not just to the species he studied but to all living things. It is nearly impossible to know whether an explanation of a case will prove generalizable, however, until one has first developed and tested that explanation through process tracing.

Coming from another perspective, Jeffrey Checkel has critiqued process tracing as being too neo-positivist and insufficiently attuned to the recursivity of social agents and social structures. Proponents of process tracing would respond that it has much in common with some forms of narrative analysis, event history analysis, and discourse analysis but that it does aspire to verifiable and generalizable explanations. If one believes that agents and structures are inherently recursive and mutually constitutive “all the way down,” no matter how finely one slices time or space, then one is likely to remain skeptical of process tracing and all other forms of inference that aspire to causal explanations.

Standards of Good Process Tracing

There are many excellent examples of process tracing in the social sciences, a number of which are discussed in the Further Readings. Good process tracing shares several characteristics. First, it
Process Tracing considers a wide range of the potential explanations of a case proposed by theorists, historians, journalists, and participants, and it gives a balanced assessment of the evidence for each. Second, it provides a fairly continuous explanation of the major events in the case, with a convincing explanation of each important turning point. It is both impossible and impractical, of course, to give a fully continuous account of everything in a case, and even on important turning points, the relevant evidence may be inaccessible, but the more the critical steps and potential anomalies can be convincingly explained, the better it is. Third, good process tracing weighs the probative value of evidence relative to alternative explanations and takes into account the potential biases of the sources of that evidence. Fourth, and similar to Bayesian analysis, diversity of evidence—alogous to a detective’s search for evidence on means, motives, and opportunities—helps provide more convincing explanations via process tracing. Finally, the use of evidence that has “use novelty,” or evidence that was not known or observed by the investigator prior to deductively predicting its expected value or measurement, provides protection against confirmation bias.

The Limits of Process Tracing

Like all forms of causal inference, process tracing is potentially fallible. A researcher can never be fully confident of having thought of all the relevant alternative explanations. Process tracing also usually requires a great deal of information and research and can be intensely time-consuming. Even with the most diligent research, there may be gaps and biases in the availability of information on key steps in a hypothesized process, especially on sensitive political issues on which actors have an incentive to hide their actions and motives. The results may be indeterminate if incompatible explanations are equally consistent with the evidence. Extant theories are often not sufficiently developed to make detailed predictions on the processes we should expect to find in individual cases, and different theorists might predict different processes within a case using the same theories. The results of process tracing may not be generalizable beyond the individual case in any particular study, and whether the results will prove generalizable cannot be known with confidence at the outset. Finally, there is no simple answer to how much process tracing is enough. How detailed should one be in explaining a phenomenon, or how far back should the researcher go in time? Only a pragmatic Bayesian answer is possible: One stops when one is confident that the currently accessible additional evidence would not markedly change one’s confidence in the alternative explanations.

Conclusion

All methods of causal or explanatory inference, including process tracing, are potentially fallible. Despite its limitations, process tracing remains an important method for developing and testing explanations of individual cases. As methodologists continue to develop techniques of process tracing, they might focus on three areas. First, they might work out more fully the similarities and differences between process tracing and Bayesian inference. Second, they might address more fully critiques on whether and how the results of process tracing can be generalized and how process tracing relates to interpretivist and constructivist methods. Third, they might work out more specific guidelines on the kinds of evidence to look for to assess and adjudicate among different kinds of explanations, including rational choice, social-constructivist, power, institutional, and psychological explanations.

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See also
Comparative Methods; Constructivism in International Relations; Event History Analysis; Qualitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian

Further Readings

Property

If for more than 2 centuries the concept of property appeared to be understood, it is no longer possible to act as if this were the case. In common language as much as in the language of jurists and economists, the term property was associated with the notion of the absolute and exclusive right of a person over a material thing. This definition is no longer accepted by experts, a fact that led Thomas Grey to formulate the hypothesis of the disintegration of property.

Therefore, the notion of property has presumably suffered a rapid philosophical decline. Until recently, it was considered essential to the relevance of public and political institutions, a core component of the debate surrounding the legitimacy of capitalism—so central that the origins of the main ideologies and schools of thought that still largely structure our political world could be traced back to it. Today, however, property rights are not seen as central to issues such as the legitimacy of liberal democracies and the institutions of mature capitalism; instead, protection of individual rights and of the rule of law is seen as a primary concern in establishing such legitimacy.

It seems hardly questionable that the notion of property as the absolute right of a person over a material thing has lost both its technical relevance and its philosophical importance. But it is equally incontestable that the contemporary evolution of large legal systems tends toward proprietarization, a term that describes the expansion of the range of objects that can be owned, the spread of ownership mechanisms, and the strengthening of legal protection offered to owners. If the aforementioned notion of property has indeed disappeared, property itself remains central, although in new forms, to how institutions of mature capitalism function.

History of the Contemporary Notion of Property

The history of the contemporary notion of property can be divided into three stages: (1) rise, (2) triumph, and (3) fall. The emergence of the notion of property can be traced back to the Second Scholastic, which took place during the 17th century following and commenting on the Renaissance. Its final definition as the natural, absolute, and exclusive right of a person over a material thing was formulated by modern natural law theorists, especially by Thomas Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf. A more legal, less philosophical genealogy could recount the slow rejection of the divided-ownership theory (which distinguishes between direct and eminent owners) and would put forward the ideas of French jurists such as Francois Hotman, Jean Donneau, or Charles Dumoulin. In any case, the idea of property as an absolute right nourished physiocratic writings and, at the end of the 18th century, became a truism of legal thinking, made famous by Robert-Joseph Pothier or William Blackstone’s well-known phrase in Book 2 of the Commentaries on the Laws of England: “the right of property . . . that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”

An individual’s subjective property rights are acknowledged by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”), by Article 17 of the Declaration of Human Rights of 1789 (“Since the right to property is inviolable and sacred, no one may be deprived thereof, unless public necessity, legally ascertained, obviously requires it, and just and prior indemnity has been paid”), and by Article 544 of the Napoleonic Code (“Property is the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute way, provided this usage is not prohibited by laws or regulations”). In 19th-century Europe, Article 544 became the symbol of a unitary and centralized conception of property. After 1804, the
consensus about property, at least in continental law, was broad enough to raise this notion to the level of a legal dogma. On that basis, a general theory of property was progressively constructed, defining property as a subjective, unitary, complete, and perpetual right over material goods that gives the owner, directly and without any personal mediation, the power to exclude anyone else and to use those things both physically and legally. Moreover, this dogmatic consensus was coupled with a very large political consensus about the legitimacy of the institution of property.

Not until 1840 and Pierre Joseph Proudhon’s famous pamphlet What Is Property? did this political consensus collapse, quickly giving rise to a violent dispute—which turned into civil war—between the supporters and despisers of property. This dispute concerned the origins (natural or conventional), limits, distribution, and legitimacy of property but was based on the same dogmatic definition of this institution. In his pamphlet, Proudhon himself wrote that property was the “absolute, exclusive, autocratic domain of a man over a thing.” The political dispute did not weaken the prestige of the legal dogma.

It was only at the end of the 19th century that the canonical definition of property was finally put into question because of the evolution of property law itself. Although this evolution is quite complex, some of its aspects should be highlighted:

- **The strengthening of statutory and judicial limitations related to property law**—the concept of the abuse of right, the development of urban regulations, the expansion of state powers of expropriation and regulatory takings, and so on. This evolution leads some authors to conceive of property as a social function more than a subjective right.

- **The emergence of so-called corporate properties or large companies’ collective properties, especially after World War I**—recorded by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in a well-known book The Modern Corporation and Private Property, published in 1933. According to the authors, the switch from individual property belonging to physical persons to social property belonging to legal bodies leads to a dissociation between the owner and the manager—the property and the power of control that it bestowed.

- **The dematerialization of property**—forcing legal theorists to conceive of property as an intangible object. Gradually, the rights of authors and inventors over their creations and inventions have come to be characterized as a “property right.”

Evolutions specific to mature capitalism have in fact jeopardized the property dogma. At the end of the 20th century, it became obvious that this dogma did not reflect the reality of property rights “in action.” Or is it that we no longer know what property is?

### Theories of Property

In law, a theoretical definition is self-fulfilling only if it slowly brings about a consensus. Equally, a theory of property will be empirically validated only if it is commonly accepted and applied by political representatives, judges, lawyers, and academics. As of today, we do not have such a theory at our disposal. Reconstruction projects are numerous, often ingenious and exciting (the work of Charles Reich, Richard Posner, Margaret Radin, Jeremy Waldron, and Stephen Munzer, among many others, should be mentioned here), but none of these projects has succeeded in imposing uniform beliefs and practices on legal actors, and some researchers such as Duncan Kennedy doubt that it is even worth trying.

However, the term *property* has not completely lost all significance, even among experts. Its meaning can be established by enunciating the specificities of property rights according to their (a) contents, (b) characteristics, (c) object, or (d) holder.

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Property is frequently associated with the triptych *usus, fructus, abusus* (use, enjoy the fruits of, abuse) in Continental law or still sometimes with the right to occupy, exclude, transfer, or transmit, to refer to one of Jeremy Bentham’s expressions. Even more frequently, a Hohfeldian nomenclature has been used to enable the contents of the rights to be analyzed according to the following four fundamental legal relationships of opposition and correlation:

1. claim-rights (≠no-rights) and duties,
2. privileges (≠duties) and no-rights,
3. powers (≠ disabilities) and liabilities, and
4. immunities (≠ liabilities) and disabilities.

Having a claim-right means being able to demand something from another, with the latter having a duty to meet the demand; a privilege exists where there is no duty; a power refers to the capability of creating legal relationships (e.g., marriage); and a person has immunity when he or she has no duty to follow a command from another.

Property should therefore be considered as a *bundle of rights*, a defined set of rights and duties, privileges and no-rights, powers and liabilities, and immunities and disabilities. Thus, according to Wesley Hohfeld, with absolute ownership over land (*property in fee simple*), the owner has the *right* to exclude anyone else, as well as some legal *privileges* (e.g., the right to use the land) and the legal *power* to alienate his or her property or some of its uses by giving legal privileges to third parties (e.g., by giving temporary access to a neighbor). Finally, he or she benefits from legal *immunities* (e.g., the property cannot be expropriated except through a specific procedure).

This nomenclature reveals the difficulty of giving a general definition of property, since it is impossible to specify rights, privileges, powers, disabilities, and immunities that could be universally and necessarily stated in every relationship characterized by legal actors as a property relationship. The best one can do is to note that the composition of the bundle of rights varies considerably according to situations and the objects concerned. Certainly, it might be useful to try to identify “types of bundles” in similar legal situations—“forms” of property—but to date, no theoretical proposition has succeeded in establishing, in a largely convincing way, one of these forms as an ideal type (as defined by Max Weber) of the institution of property.

Indeed, the notions of property and exclusivity are frequently associated. But there are good reasons to doubt that this association is both universal and necessary. First of all, exclusivity is sometimes only relative (some collective properties exclude third parties but not co-owners). Some rights of ownership are *inclusive* (the holder of these rights is given a no-right to exclude any third party); for example, in French administrative law, public property of things assigned to free public use or even creative commons licenses—share-alike or free software—that allow the creator of the initial software to give third parties the right to access and transform the initial software, coupled with a no-right to forbid access to and transformation of the upgraded version (this amounts to giving the creator of the upgraded version a no-right of exclusion for this version, even though he or she owns it).

Similarly, property and free use are often associated. Generally, property rights are composed of legal privileges, including the right to use the thing, to benefit from it, and so on. However, there are numerous forms of ownership that do not include free use and even sometimes exclude it. In French law, this is the case when a private body owns something that belongs to the public domain and is either open to free public use or assigned to a public service holding a no-right to use the thing in a way contrary to its intended purpose (e.g., Paris airports). It is then possible to conceive of a form of private ownership that would be applied to things that are strictly inalienable.

**Characteristics**

In Richard Posner’s version of the economic analysis of legal rules, the focus shifts from their contents to the conditions that they must fulfill for a system of private property to function efficiently—these conditions being the exclusivity, universality, and transferability of property rights. This position is under debate, and some questions have been raised about the real efficiency of such a system, the relevance of the efficiency criteria, and the benefit to be derived from the widespread use of such a model, given that the model only applies to certain specific situations in which ownership rights meet the required conditions and that—after all—those situations might not be so frequent.

**Object**

The impossibility of defining property according to the rights it confers or these rights’ specificities leads some authors, such as Charles Donahue, to state that what distinguishes property law from all other jural relationships is that property law deals with things. This statement has been criticized on the basis that almost anything can legally
qualify as a “thing.” Depending on legal systems and existing laws, manpower, ideas, the moon, traditional dances, and human DNA are, could be, or are not “things,” which results in a “thing” being legally a thing only when it is owned. Therefore, the object of a property right is a thing but a thing defined, according to the terms of the law, by the fact that it is owned.

This was not always the case. There was a time when things were considered things by nature and what distinguished them was the fact that they were tangible. But slowly, jurists have designed complex legal mechanisms for the ownership of intangible objects—rights (e.g., stocks ownership has been a constitutional right in France since 1982), status (e.g., a person owns his or her retirement pension according to the European Court of Human Rights), and even, in memory of the late Jeremy Bentham, future things or legitimate wishes (which have been recognized as things by the European Court in its 2004 decision in the Kopecky v. Slovakia case). If even a purely “imaginary” thing can be owned, anything that can be somewhat useful to someone can be the object of property rights. This approach brings to an end the property “dematerialization” process that started in the 19th century and in fact amounts to replacing the notion of “thing” with the notion of value. But since it is truly possible to own a thing without value, this distinction does not help advance a new and satisfactory definition.

Holder

A strong philosophical current associated with the political tradition of “possessive individualism” has tried to equate subjective freedom, personal identity, and self-ownership, property rights being consequently the proper expression of individual freedom. During the first half of the 19th century, it was even common to consider that ownership of property, beyond being a right, was a real political and moral status that gave access to active citizenship (the right to vote) and privileges before the courts (“The master is believed on the basis of his own affirmation,” Article 1781 of the Napoleonic Code).

In contemporary law, the full legal ability, the right to have rights, including the right to property, constitutes the freedom of the subject. But legal theory and legal practice have created mere rights holders, meaning subjects capable of enjoying rights that they are unable to exercise (minors, the mentally disabled, animals, corporate owners, etc.). Legal imagination has even produced properties without owners through the notion of patrimony of affection (patrimony dedicated to a specific legal entity/Zweckvermögen), invented by the German doctrine during the second half of the 19th century. Therefore, we cannot make the distinction between private, public, or collective forms of ownership by only taking into account the jural character of the rights holders.

At most, we can say that the notion of property is frequently associated with exclusivity and free use, even with universal opposability and transferability; that the definition of its object refers to the notions of thing and/or value; and that it is often presumed to take root in the subjective freedom of owners. It is also possible to try to pinpoint the coexistence, within the same legal system, of several contradictory conceptualizations of property, all of which are used by legal actors simultaneously (and often implicitly) in their reasoning and argumentation, or even more generally to link certain forms of property to certain trends (unitary ownership and the unlimited power of wealth accumulation, private property and selfishness, collective property and inefficiency, etc.), although these associations are quite often disputed because of their ideological bias.

We might then conclude that property is not a purely technical notion (neutral and objective) but rather a “floating” concept whose applications are always both technical and ideological. From this point of view, the expression bundle of rights is helpful because it expresses the various types of rights that the term property can imply. It might then be advisable to stop wondering what property is and instead try to determine the purpose of calling certain legal prerogatives “rights of property.”

Why Do We Talk About “Property”?

Legal actors who make abundant use of the word property have goals that are simultaneously technical and ideological, as shown by the history of copyrights (but there are other examples such as modified living organisms, material cultural goods, human body parts, etc.).
Since the 18th century, it has been acknowledged that authors own an exclusive right to reproduce their scientific and literary productions and that this right can be transferred to a third party at the will of the author—for example, to distributors for a percentage of the income generated by the sales of these copies. Copyright is limited in time as far as the commercial applications are concerned; its object is intangible (the work is an “original expression”), and multiple holders have simultaneous rights over it (the author owns the copyright and, in continental law, the moral rights; the public enjoys its intellectual utilities). In the past, this has led some to conclude that copyright was not a property right, the latter being an exclusive and perpetual right over a material object (Augustin-Charles Renouard defends this position in his Traité des droits d’auteur, dans la littérature, les sciences et les beaux-arts [Treaty of copyright, in literature, science and fine arts], Paris, 1838–1839)—or even that it was an imperfect property right that could be perfected by granting authors a copyright for perpetuity, as suggested by Charles Comte in his Traité de la propriété [Property treaty] of 1834. That copyright should be characterized as a “property right” was therefore not a benign transformation; it tended to integrate legal copyright rules into the general system of property, as it was understood by most legal actors. In the 19th century, this general system included rights in perpetuity.

Since today it is quite possible to conceive of temporary property rights, the designation of copyright as “intellectual property” is no longer related to the question of unlimited duration but rather to a willingness to increase the level of legal protection for copyright holders to the level of protection enjoyed by owners of tangible things, to slowly unify all the legal rules pertaining to various intangible creations (works of arts, inventions, trademarks, etc.), and to extend the scope of these rights to new objects (publicity rights, business methods, etc.)—in other words, to reinforce third-party exclusion mechanisms, to add new legal privileges for owners, and to expand the range of intangible things that can be owned. Moreover, using the term intellectual property when referring to copyright helps promote a political belief in the legitimacy of property. Property being a prestigious institution that is commonly associated with individual freedom, the “property of authors” is an easier cause to defend than the cause of their “temporary monopoly.” In turn, some experts refuse to talk about property when it comes to copyright, either because they reject the conception of law that supports those rights or because of the collective character of works and the public’s right to access them freely.

The strength of these critical trends has reignited the “property dispute” by reintroducing the notion of “positive community,” which has theological origins. It has contributed to the creation of legal settings of “nonownership,” even of “anti-ownership,” as is the case for some software with freeware or creative commons licenses.

Today, property law is characterized by the disintegration of the idea of an absolute right of a person over a tangible thing and by the number of definitions used to designate the institution of property and the diversification, expansion, and spreading of ownership mechanisms. Is there a link between the destruction of the dogmatic framework that stands around the notion of property and the current growing trend of proprietorization? As long as it was collectively impossible for legal actors to imagine the ownership of intangible objects, property was limited to material things. As long as property was conceived of as a unitary right, concentrated in the hands of a single owner, legal ownership mechanisms remained basic and did not allow the ownership of intangible or future things. Today, the ownership of any object is legally imaginable; what might be difficult to imagine are the limits of this proprietorization trend. For some, this might be good news, and they may welcome the advent of a broad and efficient private property rights system. For others, this might be unfortunate and may require the design of a new dogmatic framework to stop the expansion of ownership. A third position may be that if the legal imagination has largely played its role these past few years in inventing original ownership mechanisms, it may work to conceive and establish a large number of human activities outside the legal preserve of property.

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See also Capitalism; Common Goods; Communism; Liberalism; Natural Law; Public Goods; Redistribution; Rights; Socialism

Further Readings
Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 35(c), ECHR 2004-IX.

Prospect Theory

This entry discusses the most prominent psychological theory of decision making under conditions of risk, called prospect theory. It was developed by the psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky to explain decision making under conditions of risk, originally published in 1979 in Econometrica. Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 for the work he conducted in this area with Tversky, who died in 1996. This work represents the apex of models of cognitive psychology in both timing and importance. The model has been imported into a number of fields and has been used to analyze various aspects of political decision making, especially in international relations.

Prospect theory was developed in explicit opposition to theories of rational choice based on more normative assumptions. The intuition that guided the original work grew out of insights into the nature of bounded rationality and a desire to explore the nature and limits of those constraints. Prospect theory was based on a series of experimental empirical demonstrations of actual human choice behavior; it was explicitly developed to present a descriptively accurate model of human decision making. Nevertheless, the domain in which prospect theory explored human decision making was primarily based on choices among a series of financial bets and gambles. It was not originally intended to provide wider generalization beyond that domain, although it has subsequently been invoked to explain a wide variety of phenomena across many fields, including law, political science, and economics.

Prospect theory states that decision making depends on choosing among options that may themselves rest on biased judgments. Thus, it built on earlier work conducted by Kaheman and Tversky on judgmental heuristics and the biases that can accompany assessments of frequency and probability. Such judgments involve evaluations of the external world; decisions involve more fundamentally internal choices across values. Thus, the essence of decision making involves a trade-off between values. Prospect theory encompasses two distinct phases: (1) an editing phase and (2) an evaluation phase.

The editing phase refers to the way in which individuals characterize options for choice. Most frequently, these are referred to as framing effects. Framing effects demonstrate the way in which, contrary to the axiomatic assumptions of expected utility models, which argue that choice should remain invariant, the substance of people’s choice can be affected by the order, method, or wording in which it is presented. The classic demonstration of this effect took place in the so-called Asian flu paradigm, in which people were asked to make a choice among public policy plans for responding to an endemic disease. Although the actual statistical probabilities remained identical, the percentage of people supporting a given plan changed dramatically based on whether or not the outcomes were
presented in terms of the number of people who would live versus the number of people who would die. In perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of this effect, real-world patients suffering from cancer made different choices of whether to undergo surgery or chemotherapy for treatment of their illness based on whether the outcome percentages were presented in terms of survival or mortality. Once people are presented with both choices side by side, they can easily see that the substance of the decision remains the same, even if the psychic pull to perceive them differently remains.

Once choices are framed for decision, prospect theory enters its second, evaluation phase. This phase involves two component elements, similar in function, but not identical in conception, to the notions of utility and probability in expected utility models. The first element is graphically represented by the value function. This function differs from standard normative models by including a left-hand side to the graph that represents how people respond to loss. In this way, prospect theory differs from standard economic models that always encourage prudence as the better part of valor. Regardless of the normative imprimatur of such advice, this does not accurately characterize how most people make decisions. There are three important aspects to the value function that effectively distinguish it from expected utility in particular. First, the model examines the way in which value is related to the original reference point, or the start of action or choice. In most situations, this reference point is assumed to refer to the person’s current status quo position, but this is not necessarily required within the confines of the model. Rather, the operative reference point can be defined by some future level of aspiration or some kind of social comparison. But the key insight of the model is that the hedonic value of choice options is assessed by the way in which people evaluate change, movement, distance, or difference between where they are, or where they want to be, and the outcome offered by a particular choice. In other words, relative outcomes matter more than absolute outcomes. This intuition clearly reflects the realist world of international relations over, for example, the more cooperative image supplied by neoliberal models.

The second important insight offered by the value function relates to the central prediction of the model. People tend to be more risk-averse when in a domain of gains, where things are going well and appear to be likely to continue to improve or where actors confront primarily opportunities for gains. Simultaneously, actors tend to be much more risk seeking in the realm of losses, where they are much more likely to take risks in order to recoup previous losses or to recover from a loss in order to revert to a previous position.

The last important element of the value function recognizes that losses hurt more than equal gains please. Loss aversion has indeed become the most robust finding in the entire model. In general, people have to be offered about two and a half times as much as a loss in order to prove willing to take a risk for the chance of a gain.

The second element of the evaluation phase is characterized by the weighting function. This function contains two critical insights. First, people treat outcomes that are deemed to be either certain or impossible very differently than those whose changes take place in the midrange of probability. In other words, people simply assign more psychological weight and importance to outcomes that they can characterize with greater certainty. While this is not justifiable from a normative perspective, most people treat quite unlikely events as though they were impossible and quite likely events as though they were certain to occur. Second, people tend to overweight, or attribute more importance than normatively justified, to low-probability events. They simultaneously apply less psychological weight to medium- and high-probability outcomes than are normatively warranted.

The interaction of the value function and the weighting function lead to some very interesting and counterintuitive explanations and predictions for phenomena such as insurance (taking a sure loss against the small possibility of a larger loss) and lotteries (taking a sure loss against the even smaller possibility of a large gain). Because people overweight small-probability events, the main prediction of prospect theory reverses close to the reference point as individuals become risk seeking in gains (lotteries) and risk-averse in losses (insurance).

Applications in Political Science

Prospect theory has been applied to a number of cases in political science, particularly in the area of
Protectionism

Protectionism refers to trade policies that attempt to restrict the inflow of foreign goods into a domestic market. These policies generally fall into two categories: tariff and nontariff barriers (NTBs) to trade. Protectionism diverges from the logic of maximizing economic efficiency characteristic of classical economic liberalism, instead focusing on advancing individual national interests more characteristic of classic mercantilism.

Historically, protectionism has been the norm in the international political economy. Most early-modern European states followed the principles of mercantilism, starting in the 16th century by attempting to maintain positive balances of trade with their trading partners, most readily reflected in their gold reserves. A large stockpile of gold meant that the state was a winner, while others were losers in this zero-sum approach to trade and national power. Great Britain’s repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 is often seen as the first significant step toward free trade. Thereafter, protectionist policies waxed and waned, often in response to economic crises such as the Great Depression or the need by late industrializers to catch up in the development of their economies. The use of tariffs declined significantly after World War II, as the

Further Readings


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United States and its allies launched the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) treaty framework, which would eventually become the World Trade Organization (WTO). The GATT and WTO have successfully reduced tariffs in most areas of trade and now concentrate on combating the rise of nontariff barriers to trade.

**Theories of Protectionism**

Most theories of protectionism focus on the demand for protection raised by pressure groups. In pressure group models, groups seek protectionism from the state to increase their incomes. The task for scholars has been to try to explain more specifically which groups will seek protection and under what conditions they will be successful in getting it. The theoretical basis for the source of trade preferences is usually traced to one of two models: Heckscher-Ohlin or Ricardo-Viner. The Heckscher-Ohlin model argues that factors of production (land, labor, capital) have very low specificity—thus, they move freely among sectors. If a country moves from free trade to protectionism, the income of factors in which a country is relatively scarce will rise, while the income will decline for factors in which a country is relatively abundant. According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, scarce factors will then demand protectionism, while abundant factors will oppose it. The Ricardo-Viner model posits that factor specificity is very high, thus factor income is industry or sector specific. The factors involved in import-competing sectors will therefore lose from free trade, while those attached to export-oriented sectors will gain income from free trade. Unfortunately, neither model explains how trade policy preferences are actually translated into political action.

Pressure group models require more than similar interests in increasing income to overcome the collective action problem associated with securing protectionism. If collective action were not a problem, then consumers who largely gain from free trade should easily organize to defeat any movement toward protectionism. Olson has suggested that small groups with specialized interests are easier to organize to secure rents from the state than large groups with diffuse interests, such as consumers. Geographic concentration and firm concentration are sometimes seen as useful proxies for collective-action costs, since spatial proximity may reduce the costs of organizing to secure protectionism.

The supply of protectionism from the state is also a crucial piece of the puzzle, since it may help identify the conditions under which pressure groups may be successful in obtaining protection. Institutional features of the state along with policymaker preferences also affect the supply of protectionism. Studies have shown that policymakers' beliefs or ideas are critical in determining whether they will pursue protectionist policies. Others have shown that the state of the economy is critical in influencing the supply of protection from policymakers. A number of institutional aspects of the state may also influence the supply of protectionism, including the size of electoral districts, whether a country has a proportional representation or a majoritarian system, and whether a country has a parliamentary or a presidential system. Large electoral districts, proportional representation, and parliamentary systems are thought to insulate policymakers from protectionist pressures. The nature of the party system may affect changes in the status quo on trade policy as countries with highly fragmented or polarized party systems may be unable to initiate trade reform. Protectionism may also be more likely in presidential systems characterized by divided government—when one party controls the legislature and another, the executive. The administrative capacity of a state may affect its proclivity toward protectionism, as developing countries with poor capacity to extract direct taxes from their populations often rely heavily on trade taxes, which are much easier to collect from limited ports of entry. Some have also argued that democratic and autocratic regimes may have different proclivities for protectionism, though empirical studies are mixed.

Adherents of strategic trade theory argue that the state need not accept the dictates of comparative advantage under conditions of free trade. States might try to manipulate comparative advantage to produce a competitive advantage in a certain industry. This could involve the formulation of an industrial policy and the use of protectionism to support domestic producers in an imperfect market such that they will reap the benefits of production and yield spillover effects in the domestic economy. This type of policy falls under the general category
of neo-mercantilism, with the state taking an active role in selecting industries, often so-called infant industries, that need protection as they mature to compete in global markets. Many developing countries experimented with import substitution industrialization (ISI). The logic was to produce a domestic industry in some sector where one did not previously exist in any meaningful way. The main problem faced by these neo-mercantilist approaches is that it is often hard for a state to know how to pick an industry that will eventually be competitive. Many ISI ventures ended in mounting government debt and inefficient industries that never could compete on the world market. Once protectionism is supplied to support such ventures, the demand for them also tends to be locked in place, since they will be reluctant to relinquish the economic benefits.

Types of Protectionism

Despite the decline in the number and costs of tariffs due to multilateral efforts organized under the GATT/WTO, a number of other forms of NTB protectionism remain, including subsidies, quotas, exchange rate manipulation, and labor, health, and quality control protections. Despite the general reduction in tariffs, countries are often still able to enact policies to protect their own nation’s industries from foreign competition.

Tariffs

Tariffs are the most common and best known form of protectionism. A tariff artificially increases the cost of a good. The most common form of tariff is an import tariff. Import tariffs put an additional price, either a percentage of the good’s value or an absolute amount, on foreign imports. This increases the costs of foreign goods and provides domestic firms with an advantage in cost production. Since domestic products do not face this tax, they are able to sell products at a lower price and for more profit than foreign competitors.

Subsidies

Subsidies can also be used as a form of protectionism. The two basic forms are direct or indirect subsidies. Direct subsidies are payments from the government directly to producers. Indirect subsidies include government price guarantees, tax exemptions, and other forms of payment that are not direct subsidies. This allows producers to sell products at a lower price than foreign competitors, making them artificially competitive.

Quotas

Quotas are quantitative limits to the number of items that are permitted to be imported by a country. Quotas can be compulsory or voluntary. Compulsory quotas are enforced by government officials. Actors who attempt to exceed the quota are smugglers. Voluntary quotas are agreements between a government and foreign manufacturers of a specific number of goods that are to be sold within a country. Foreign producers may agree to this in order to extract large rents from the limited quantity of goods or in order to have access to the market for fear of even greater protectionist policies. Domestic interests may agree to quotas to limit the overall competition. Voluntary quotas are sometimes known as voluntary export restraints (VERs).

Exchange Rate Manipulation

Countries that do not have floating currencies can artificially depress or inflate the value of their currency. Long-term attempts to depress currency make it more difficult for foreign competitors to compete with the low costs of domestic goods while at the same time increasing the costs of foreign goods.

Labor, Health, and Quality Controls

Labor, health, and quality controls can also be used as a form of protectionism. These standards are sometimes used as ways to restrict foreign competition from entering a domestic market. Claims of mistreatment of labor can be used by domestic labor groups to pressure the government to restrict the importation of goods. Health standards may be employed even when there is dubious scientific risk associated with the imported products. Quality control measures can be similarly employed. In addition, quality control units may be understaffed, protracting the length of time
between a product’s arrival and its sale. While each of these reasons can be used by countries in a justifiable manner, it can often be difficult to parse out the difference between such instances and the occasions when states create artificially high standards or requirements to restrict or eliminate foreign competition.

Many of these different types of protectionism are quite controversial. As was stated with labor, health, and quality controls, it can sometimes be quite difficult to differentiate between malicious and virtuous intentions. Furthermore, different countries have differing values; standards or assistance at a level that is acceptable in one country may be perceived as clearly subversive among trade partners. As such, each of these is a major point of contention in trade negotiations.

Last, differing types of protectionism may be employed in different sectors. Nearly all countries limit foreign competition in areas of national interest. What those national interests are varies by country. These can include, but are not limited to, areas related to national defense, agriculture, resource extraction, and others.

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See also Mercantilism; Trade Liberalization; World Trade Organization (WTO)

Further Readings


Protest Movements

See Social Movements

Psychological Explanations of International Politics

Psychological explanations of international politics focus on the impact of cognition and emotion on choice. Through the analysis of decision making, political psychologists have explored a wide range of topics that are central to international politics: the onset of war, nuclear strategy, deterrence and reassurance, signaling and bargaining, conflict management and conflict resolution, and peace. Recent neuroscientific research on emotion is changing the analysis of foreign policy decision making and rational choice. This entry looks first at psychological theories of decision making. Second, it examines the consequences of new understandings of decision making for strategic models of interaction. Third, the entry looks at the contribution of psychological explanations to the analysis of collective beliefs and moods on international political issues.

Cognition and Emotion in Decision Making

The Cognitive Revolution

Forty years ago, psychologists started a “cognitive revolution” as they rejected simple behaviorist models and looked again at the way cognition shaped the choices people make. Although this was not its original purpose, the cognitive revolution can be understood largely as a commentary on the limits of rational choice. Much of the early work accepted rational choice as the default position and then demonstrated its boundaries. Research has now cumulated to show that people rarely conform to the expectations of the rational model and that these deviations are not random but systematic.

Cognitive psychology has demonstrated important differences between the expectations of rational decision models and the processes of attribution, estimation, judgment, and choice that people
frequently use. It explains these differences by the need for simple rules of information processing and judgment to make sense of environments that are both uncertain and complex. People have a preference for simplicity; they are averse to ambiguity and dissonance; and they misunderstand fundamentally the essence of probability. And people have risk profiles that depart from what models of rational choice would expect; according to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, we are far more averse to loss than we are to gain-seeking. Together, these attributes compromise the capacity for rational choice.

Robert Jervis posits that political leaders making decisions about the world need to order their world and make a very complex world somewhat simpler. When they look to the past to learn about the future, political leaders tend to draw simple one-to-one analogies without qualifying conditions. In 1991, President George H. W. Bush called Saddam Hussein “another Hitler,” with little attention to what was different either about the two men or about Iraq in 1990 and Germany in 1938. Yet fitting Saddam into an existing frame through the use of analogical reasoning gave the president a readily accessible script about how to respond to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

Cognitive psychologists have produced robust evidence that people strongly prefer consistency, that they are made uncomfortable by dissonant information, and that they consequently deny or discount information that is inconsistent with their beliefs to preserve them. This drive for consistency impairs the processes of estimation and judgment. The well-established tendency to discount inconsistent information contributes significantly to the persistence of beliefs. Political leaders in the United States were generally resistant to changing their beliefs about the Soviet Union after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power with a reform agenda. Three years after he became the general secretary, senior policymakers were arguing that his strategy was to lull the West while the Soviet Union recovered.

Cognitive processes of attribution can also confound policy making. One of the most pervasive biases is the fundamental attribution error, where people exaggerate the importance of dispositional over situational factors in explaining the disliked behavior of others but explain their own behavior by the situational constraints that they face. When explaining behavior that they like, they simply reverse the pattern of inference. When the government of North Korea makes a concession in the talks about its nuclear program, leaders in Washington see that concession as a function of the situational constraints Pyongyang faces but explain their own willingness to participate in the talks as evidence of their disposition to search for a peaceful compromise. The double standard in reasoning is clear.

Cognitive psychology has generated robust evidence that loss is more painful than comparable gain is pleasant. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky found that leaders tend to be risk-averse when things are going well and relatively risk acceptant when things are going badly, when they face a crisis in which they are likely to lose or have lost something that matters to them. Leaders are also likely to take greater risk to protect what they already have—the endowment effect—than to increase their gains. They are also likely to take greater risk to reverse losses, to recapture what they once held, than they would to make new gains. And when decision makers suffer a significant loss, they are far slower to adjust to these losses than they would be to incorporate gains. These general findings apply directly to foreign policy choices. President Sadat of Egypt, for example, never “normalized” for the loss of the Sinai to Israel in 1967. Even though Israel had an obvious advantage in military capabilities, Sadat was undeterred and highly motivated to recapture the Sinai; thus, he launched a high-risk war in 1973, which was designed to begin a political process of negotiation with Israel that would restore the Sinai to Egypt.

**Emotion, Cognition, and Choice**

New research in neuroscience is revolutionizing the understanding of the relationship between emotion, cognition, and decision. Two results stand out. First, many decisions seem to be the result not of a deliberative thought process but of preconscious neurological processes. Second, emotion is primary and plays a dominant role in choice.

Emotions are adaptive programs of action that have evolved over time to ensure survival and then
reproduction. A useful way of thinking about emotion and cognition is to see affective processes as those that address the go/no-go questions, while cognitive processes are those that answer true/false questions. Choice clearly invokes both kinds of processes. Establishing truth claims about states of the world is usually not enough for people to make a choice. What people value is an emotional as well as a cognitive process, and both are important in whether they decide to approach or avoid making a choice. Hence, emotion carries utility. The new field of neuro-economics is beginning to conceive utility as something one experiences subjectively.

There is an ongoing and vigorous debate among psychologists, neuroscientists, and behavioral economists about the relationship between affect and cognition. Three approaches are particularly relevant. The first is the somatic marker hypothesis, the second is the affect-as-appraisal hypothesis, and the third is affect-as-information. Each understands the relationship between emotion and cognition differently.

The first argues that the information people receive through their senses, which they experience physiologically, creates emotions that then cue decision and action. These physiological experiences, or somatic markers, create learned emotional responses that allow people to decide quickly what should be approached and what should be avoided, notes Antonio Damasio. In the early stages of decision making, emotions are primary. The appraisal approach to emotion is quite different. It reflects the long-standing view that cognition precedes emotion. It is thoughts that evoke feelings. The cognitive process of appraising—a treaty, a leader, a new institution—as good or bad elicits an emotion. This approach is inconsistent with that of neuroscientists who see emotion as primary and as the carrier of value.

A third approach, presented by Gerald Clore and Karen Gasper, treats affect as information. Emotions carry information to people about their unconscious processes, which then become conscious thoughts and feelings and an input into the decisions they face. In this sense, emotion does not follow cognitive appraisal but creates appraisals through the information it provides.

Affective and cognitive processes can collaborate or compete. At low levels of intensity, affect appears to play a largely “advisory” role; it provides information about cognitive processes. At intermediate levels of intensity, people begin to become conscious of a conflict between cognitive and affective inputs and the struggle for self-control. At high levels of intensity, affect can be so powerful that it short-circuits thought and moves to action. Emotion precedes cognition and can swamp cognition. Only after the fact can people reflect on the choices that they made.

**Emotion and Cognition as Explanations of Strategic Interaction**

Emotion is a core driver in theories of decision making, with significant consequences for the understanding of foreign policy decision making. Psychological explanations of foreign policy choice have been extended to strategic interaction in international politics. The credibility of signals, an essential component in theories of deterrence, compellence, and bargaining, is not only a property of the sender, as some formal models of signaling suggest, but also a function of the beliefs of the receiver, notes Jonathan Mercer. These beliefs are not only cognitive but emotional as well. The emotional cues that signals evoke—such as fear and anger—matter insofar as these emotions then prompt beliefs and action in turn. Research demonstrates that fear prompts uncertainty and risk-averse action, while anger prompts certainty and risk acceptance. Threats that evoke fear are likely to prompt hesitancy and a risk-averse response; that is the purpose of most deterrent threats. Frightening threats are less likely to be successful, however, when they are designed to compel adversarial leaders to act. And threats that humiliate are likely to evoke anger and provoke the risk-acceptant response that a threat-based strategy is designed to avoid. Threat-based strategies consequently become much more complex and dangerous to design and implement.

Research also demonstrates that credibility, a fundamental component of theories of action in international politics, is emotional as well as cognitive. Credibility is not simply a function of either the cost of the signal or past behavior, as some theories of bargaining claim. It is an emotional belief that is held by its intended receiver. Russia’s credibility is not only a function of what its leaders say and do, or have said and done, but what
Georgia’s leaders believe Moscow will say and do. Psychological explanations call into question reputational models based exclusively on the past behavior of states or on the costliness of signals. They give theoretical weight to the pattern of inference leaders make and build in emotion as the primary driver of assessment in the early stages of decision making.

**Emotion, Cognition, and Collective Beliefs**

Psychological models explain not only leaders’ choices and the interactive sequencing of these choices across a range of domains in international politics but also collective beliefs and moods. Epidemiological and viral models help explain the diffusion of emotion from an individual to a larger group. The spread of emotions from one individual to another is similar to other contagious processes.

Trust and confidence are central to workings of the international order. Confidence and trust are emotional states, an indicator of optimism about the future. They are also cognitive, one person’s sense of how confident others are and their perceptions of how confident still others are. An individual’s mood is in part a function of the mood of others, and in this sense, it is as reasonable to speak of a collective mood as it is to speak of shared norms. Psychological models speak to both collective beliefs and collective moods. Emotions, political psychologists argue, constitute feelings and moods that can be powerful spurs to action in international politics or can lead to panic and withdrawal.

Nationalism is an emotional belief, an attachment to one’s society that is evoked by emotional cues and expressed through emotional identification with the collective. Mobilizational appeals to nationalist loyalty for both constructive and destructive purposes are emotional, phrased as “love of the motherland [or fatherland].” Slobodan Milosevic’s appeal to Serb nationalism, for example, invoked past humiliations and grievances in an effort to mobilize anger and support for action. The onset of ethnic war in the former Yugoslavia cannot be understood without referencing the “emotional entrepreneurship” of the Serbian political leader.

Psychological models explain both individual and collective behavior in international politics. Research in neuroscience is bringing emotion back into the analysis of international politics across a wide variety of issues. The research challenge will be to connect psychological processes to political and institutional streams and to identify and explain the amplifying feedback loops.

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**See also** Bargaining; Credible Commitment; Experiments, Laboratory; Foreign Policy Analysis; Judicial Decision Making; Nationalism; Nationalist Movements; Nuclear Proliferation; Prospect Theory; Rational Choice; Rationality, Bounded; Utilitarianism

**Further Readings**


**Public Budgeting**

Public budgeting allocates public resources. This allocation function means that budgeting lies at the very heart of politics. Who gets what and when from the government in financial terms is what politicians and publics alike care about. It is distinct from “private” budgeting in several respects. First, in all but one-person dictatorships, public budgeting is a collective decision. The processes
used to make decisions vary. Second, decision makers do not spend their own money. They must raise these funds somehow. The most common device is taxation. Governments may also make money from the management of public property, such as land or firms, as well as from profits that arise from the sale of public resources, such as copper or oil. They may also borrow money to fund current expenses. Finally, the question of whether budgeted funds are being used in the public interest is an ongoing theme that a private individual or firm does not usually confront.

Decision Making in Public Budgeting

The fact that public budgets arise from a collective decision presents several challenges. First, consider the lessons from the formal theory literature about the multidimensionality of a policy space. A policy dimension, to be clear, is simply one line on which one can rank a given option. The traditional dimension used in many studies is a simple left–right one, but in budgeting, one can imagine many such dimensions that correspond to spending on a given subject. One person may want the government to spend a lot on health care but only a little on defense, for example. The formal theory literature tells us that when one can line up the preferences of actors along one dimension, there is a stable outcome that arises from a simple majority vote. When one has multiple dimensions, however, several outcomes are usually possible. Moreover, these outcomes are not “stable”; that is, they will lose to one or more other feasible outcomes, which in turn are not stable either.

All this means that the rules that structure the way decisions are taken on the budget are crucial. If the rule is to stop consideration of the budget after just one vote, then one would want to know who gets to decide the content of that vote. The “agenda setter” will have the ability to select an outcome closest to his or her preferred outcome. If the congress does not have the right to make amendments that raise aggregate spending beyond what the president proposes, it takes a simple majority in congress to pass the budget, and the president’s budget simply becomes law if the congress cannot pass it. In this case, the congress has a stronger hand to play.

The decision-making rules have additional importance when one considers that government is spending not its money but someone else’s money. Assume that politicians do a simple cost–benefit analysis for the people who support them. The politician cares about the benefits of additional spending and the costs of additional taxation only with respect to his or her constituency. Assume as well that taxes go into a common revenue pool and do take the form of “user fees” so that there is a direct correspondence between spending and costs. Under such conditions, one can imagine a situation where a given constituency receives the benefits of spending but pays only a tiny fraction of the costs. For example, consider an agriculture minister who worries only about the interests of farmers. The government provision of subsidies to the farm industry may equal $1 billion, but the total additional tax the farmers pay for this is only $10 million. In the literature, this situation is known as a “common pool resource problem.”

Once again, the decision-making process is crucial. If the agriculture minister determines spending programs for farmers, he or she will allocate more spending than in the case where he or she considers the full tax implications of his or her decision. If the budget is then simply the sum of the requests of ministers who worry only about narrow constituencies, spending will be higher than the ministers themselves would want if they could make the entire budget on their own. One can imagine a different outcome if there is an actor
in the process whose job is to worry about the entire tax burden and not just the burden on a specific constituency. In practice, this person is usually the finance minister. But it is not strictly necessary to give all budgetary power to a finance minister. Negotiations among decision makers can also lead to full consideration of the tax burden so long as they do not take the form of “logrolls” of different proposals, that is, so long as the parties involved consider the full burden of their spending decisions and do not simply vote for each others’ proposals.

One technique to centralize the budget process that one sees increasingly is top-down budgeting. The idea is that one should first vote on a total amount of spending before deciding on the distribution of that amount according to different spending categories. This is in contrast to bottom-up budgeting, where one votes on each item and then simply aggregates them all to get the total budget. The top-down system, for example, was instituted in the Swedish parliament in the mid-1990s for all budget votes. Whether this procedure really leads to lower spending and—as a consequence—better aggregate fiscal discipline is open to question. In an influential theoretical article, John Ferejohn and Keith Krehbiel illustrate that the combination of preferences among the relevant voters decides whether the top-down or the bottom-up process leads to a smaller aggregate budget.

There is less controversy about the desirability of budget transparency. When it is easy for the public to follow what the government is doing, it is difficult for policymakers to use “tricks” to make figures appear rosier than they really are. It is also easier to cut spending if one knows about it. James Alt and David Dryer Lassen indicate that the way states provide information on the budget, whether there is independent verification of budget figures, whether there is use of arbitrary language, and whether there is required text that justifies different parts of the budget, are connected to fiscal outcomes. Countries with more transparent budget systems have higher levels of fiscal discipline.

Public budgeting also involves a temporal element where institutions also play a role. For example, it is common for politicians to promise immediate spending but to delay the “pain” of the costs. One way to do this is through public borrowing. The government in this case runs a budget deficit and carries debt on its books that it will have to repay later. Another way the temporal element matters is when a benefit is promised to a specific group that is small at first but that is projected to grow over time so that the costs also grow. Public pensions are a prime example of this dynamic. Many countries have populations that are aging. The number of people who will be entitled to a public pension will increase while the number who will be paying into a given system will decline. Such a scenario is one where the pension system is designed as “pay go,” where workers pay for a benefit that is given today in the expectation that they will receive that same benefit at some future date. Public budgeting involves decisions about how to structure such systems. Australia, for example, created a type of sovereign wealth fund that invests public money today in the expectation that it will be able to cover the pensions of an increased number of retirees tomorrow.

An increasingly important part of budgeting therefore involves multiannual planning. Annual budgets with no planning encourage short-sightedness and overspending for the reasons given above. They also tend to make a government fairly conservative in its assessment of what it is doing—one cannot recognize the future impact of today’s incremental changes. There are also types of spending that are inherently multiannual. Capital expenditures, for example, are often on items that take several years to build. There may also be contingencies, such as loan guarantees or bank recapitalizations, that do not appear in an annual budget but that should be included in decision making. The traditional way to plan would be to set multiyear plans with fixed projections. The plan in this case is indicative only; that is, it forecasts what will happen if there are no changes in current spending obligations.

**Trends in Public Financing**

A trend in the public finance field is to move planning toward medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs). One first determines an overall constraint for the period that is based on anticipated revenues. One then looks at the expected spending at the agency/ministerial level. There should be a clear distinction between ongoing and new programs. There should also be measures to
produce savings in low-priority areas that can create fiscal “space” for ministries to reallocate funds where appropriate. A good example is that of the Australian government, which begins with a baseline projection and provides forward rolling estimates of spending for the next 3 years. The country’s Department of Finance then updates these plans. While the goal is to get decision makers in government to consider the temporal implications of their actions, the law also requires the government to provide an update of this framework to voters 3 months before an election.

While several international economic organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, have suggested that countries adopt such medium-term expenditure frameworks, one should also be aware of the prerequisites for such planning. A country needs to have enough macroeconomic stability so that revenue and expenditure predictions can be made with some accuracy. Politicians have to agree to use the frameworks. There also has to be core capacity in different ministries to do the planning.

The focus so far has been on the decision-making process that is involved in making the public budget, but how the money is spent is another important topic that is increasingly making its way into even the initial decision-making stages. This brings us to the standards that one uses to make the evaluation. The first standard is usually a fiduciary one, namely, whether the budget upholds fiscal discipline and, ultimately, whether the state is solvent. The second standard concerns allocative efficiency. Does the state budget reflect government priorities? The third standard is operational efficiency. The state should not pay too much for the services and goods it provides its citizens.

This then begs the question of what one should evaluate. One can assess a budget according to its inputs, or how much is spent on each budget category, but increasingly governments are assessing budgets according to their outputs, or even outcomes. The examples here illustrate the differences among the three concepts. The amount of money a city spends on its police force is an input. The number of police personnel would be the output, while the overall crime level would be the outcome. Concerns about fiscal discipline usually focus on inputs and discuss the budget balance as well as the debt burden of the state. Here are some of the questions regarding fiscal discipline that one may need to answer: Who finances any debt that is generated? How much interest does the state pay on that debt? Is the government credible enough to be able to repay it at some point in the future? Discussions of allocative efficiency can also look at inputs, but generally, a detailed discussion of both forms of efficiency requires some knowledge about both outputs and outcomes.

“Performance budgeting” is perhaps the hot topic in budget circles these days, and countries have in practice adopted different techniques under this heading to get at output and outcomes. The simplest form of this technique is when information on targets or results is included as part of the budget documentation, but it is really only background information in practice. Performance-informed budget, in contrast, means that information enters the budget process but it does not have any real effect on how resources are allocated. A true direct-performance system allocates future resources depending on the achievement of specific goals. For example, there may be an expectation that a school district educate a minimum number of students, and if it does not, it will lose funds to districts that educate more students.

A historical example illustrates how the system can work. In the 1950s, the different branches of the U.S. military generally decided how many tanks, aircraft carriers, and other equipment they needed. President John F. Kennedy’s defense secretary, Robert McNamara, instituted a new budgeting system known as the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). It extended the planning horizons from 1 to 5 years. It also instituted planning that asked what the threat was the U.S. military was supposed to address, what the appropriate force mix should be given the threat, and what funding should be allocated to develop that force mix. While there has been some retrenchment on this system, it had a practical political effect of moving some of the “power” from the joint chiefs of staff, which was composed of the heads of each branch of the military, to the civilian leadership in the Department of Defense.

Some variation of performance budgeting has appeared in many countries over the past 2 decades, and their experiences have raised a series of challenges. One issue concerns the information that is needed to do performance budgeting. It is often
costly to generate, and some items are easier to assess than others. Moreover, one would ideally like to have information that allows one to estimate whether different levels of expenditure generate different levels of results, and such information is hard to get. Finally, there are monitoring issues. If it is in the best interests of a given school to project good performance, for example, and the school authorities collect the information themselves, how can one be sure that the less flattering information is indeed passed along to policymakers?

The number and type of output- or outcome-based targets can also overwhelm policymakers. Richard Hughes indicates that the United Kingdom (UK) had more than 300 performance targets and more than 600 specific targets when it introduced the Labour government’s version of performance budgeting in 1998, and politicians and bureaucrats alike were overwhelmed. Prime Minister Tony Blair decided to focus on the 35 he found the most important, and in practice, the number of targets has declined after each spending review to only 30 in 2007. While France included more than 1,000 targets in its first budget after it adopted performance-based budgeting in 2006, one suspects that the number of targets ultimately will decrease in this country as well.

Finally, to collect all the data necessary to do performance budgeting, to evaluate performance, to adjust spending given that performance, and to update targets takes a professional, and competent, bureaucracy. Countries that have adopted performance budgeting and that have generally found the approach worthwhile have had some of the best bureaucracies in the world. As Allen Schick notes, such countries generally have decent budgeting systems anyway and are probably the least in need of performance budgeting in the first place. According to Salvator Schiavo-Campo, Ghana is one country where such budgeting techniques may have been doomed from the start. The African country set more than 2,500 targets in the late 1990s, or several times the number of accountants in the public sector, and the most important item in the budget, personnel expenditure, was not included at all.

Joining performance budgeting are other trends, such as private finance initiatives, that blur the difference between “public” and “private” budgeting. Consider who should pay for the construction and maintenance of a bridge. Traditionally, the government would build the bridge, maintain it, and—if it chose to charge a toll—receive any revenues. This meant that the government was responsible for raising the money for bridge construction. It also bore any risks associated with the bridge, be they bad weather that delayed the finish date to the effects of saltwater on the durability of the materials used. The government faces a constraint from its revenue base on how many investment projects it can build and maintain. In recent years, private finance initiatives have brought the private sector into such projects. Generally, the private sector arranges the financing from private capital markets. It also bears the risks from the construction phase onward. Many such arrangements also assign the maintenance of the investment to the private sector. In exchange, the private part of the arrangement gets the revenues from the investment for a fixed amount of time.

Such private finance initiatives have become widespread in the UK, but one also finds them in other countries, such as Germany. Because the arrangements do require fairly large-scale private financing, they depend on stable, and liquid, capital markets. The financial crisis that began in 2007 put some of these arrangements in jeopardy, and in the UK, the state had to bail out the private sector and assume the remaining risk from a given project. This development begged the question about how “private” such initiatives are in practice.

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See also Agenda Setting; Budgeting, Rational Models; Performance Management; Tax Policy; Tragedy of the Commons; Voting Rules, Electoral Effects of

Further Readings
Public Employment

Public employment has many aspects depending on the level one is considering. It has a role in national economy and national employment, in the public sector generally, and at the level of public institutions such as ministries and agencies. This entry describes the nature of public employment and its significance in government and society.

Public Employment in the Economy
The role of public employment varies substantially depending on the role of the state in society. In countries following the model of a welfare state, such as the Nordic countries, the share of public sector and public employment can be quite high—30% of the national economy or even higher. Any numerical estimation of the size of public employment involves a number of assumptions. For example, it is important to know what percentage of public employment is composed of those employed by the armed forces, because this share of employment is considered to be outside the working force. Also, given the complex relationships now involved in the delivery of many public services, it has become more difficult to determine who is in the public sector and who is outside.

In less developed countries, the role of public employment in the national economy is usually much smaller, in part because it fulfills different functions. On the one hand, the public sector plays a more significant role in development functions such as education and in social and health policy. On the other hand, the limited resources available to the public sector do not permit these countries to employ many public servants. Also, patronage and clientelism in many of these systems may prevent hiring of employees through the merit systems that are more typical of industrialized democracies. The politicization of public service creates both management problems and difficulties in providing equitable public services.

Public Employment in the Political System
The structure of the public sector determines where the bulk of public employment will occur. In federal states, the central government may be relatively small compared with that found in unitary systems. For example, in Germany, the central government has small policy-making ministries. On the other hand, in a centralized regime such as France, central government employees include elementary and secondary school teachers.

Public employment reflects the internal structure of the policy sectors in the public sector. Under each ministerial sector, there are agencies, regional units, and local units, which together form administrative sectors. For instance, under the Ministry of Interior, there are the police forces, the front guards, and different kinds of organizations that are responsible for the security of the country. These organizations have employees, such as police and fire personnel and the like, who belong to the public employment sector. The number of ministries and associated functions vary among countries, but typically, the number of ministerial sectors ranges from 10 to 20. The size of employment varies greatly from sector to sector. In welfare states, the largest sectors are social affairs, health care affairs, and education.
(schools and universities). As each country has developed, the size of its ministerial sectors has also changed as a result of the modernization or development process. For instance, during the initial period of rail and public road construction, the number of public employees in the traffic and communication sectors was very high, but today it has decreased. Thus, public employment to some extent can be used as an indicator of the priorities of government and the desire of the public sector to control important policy sectors.

General rules and steering systems within the public sector and governments have organized public employment into a common system. These public employment systems generally contain several categories of public employees, which are more or less governed by formal rules. In these systems, civil servants play a major role. These employees tend to be in a defined career and to be governed by laws that are distinct from other labor laws in the society. Unless they fail woefully in their tasks or are guilty of malfeasance, civil servants in particular may have secure employment for a lifetime. In many civil service systems, rewards for office are also strictly defined by law. This more secure position of the civil servant follows Max Weber’s model of neutrality of civil servants.

Additionally, there are other public employees whose position in the public employment system is not as legally formalized as that of civil servants. School teachers, nurses, and doctors usually belong to this group of public employees. These employees may have some of the protections of civil service law but often are employed either as professionals or under ordinary labor law. Furthermore, many of these employees have only a tenuous relationship with the public sector because the institutions for which they work (e.g., hospitals, universities, etc.) are managed as autonomous organizations rather than as components of the public sector per se.

Since the 1970s, in modern national states such as most European countries and many others around the world, national-level steering systems have been created to tackle public employment policy issues. In the most developed countries, the formal rules of public employment may be controlled by both legislation and negotiation systems. These systems, which include rules for negotiating salaries and other work conditions of public employees, complement civil service laws that fix the legal position of public employees. These systems help develop better relationships between public employer organizations and trade unions for negotiations. In many countries, such negotiation systems have provided not only public employees but also civil servants the right to strike. Traditionally, civil servants did not have the right to strike.

Especially since the 1980s, new public management (NPM) has created a more flexible framework for public sector employees. The number of ordinary civil servants has decreased, while at the same time, greater numbers of public employees have been hired on contracts, following private sector labor laws. In many countries, with more people moving in and out of the public sector, there is a decline in the number of people opting for a career in civil service. This has meant increasing similarities and closer contacts between public and private working life, which has resulted in a better understanding of the obligations of public employees.

In fact, a small core group of civil servants, and the legislative systems built around their position, provides a national profile for public employment. In developed countries, there are competing profiles of the core civil servants. The British system is famous for its civil servants, who are politically neutral but are increasingly being managed by rules more similar to those in the private sector. The French system is widely known for its career civil servants, who are educated in the best Parisian lycées and universities and have received training at the publicly run École Nationale d’Administration (ENA). One can also distinguish the German profile, in which a legal education and the organization culture of Rechtstaat have played a prominent role. In the Nordic countries, the neutrality and legal basis of civil servant activities are emphasized, but recruitment and career development are moving toward open hiring, by which anyone who has the necessary qualifications can be appointed to the civil service.

In addition to the issues of politicization in public employment mentioned above, the issue of representativeness also can undermine the effectiveness of the public sector. Especially, for street-level bureaucrats in contact with clients, the extent to which the public bureaucracy is representative of society in social and gender terms will influence the success of government in delivering programs as well as the legitimacy of the political system.
Public Goods

Unlike private goods, which the market can produce and sell, public goods are ones that people can freely use and share with others. A pure public good is nonexcludable (people cannot be excluded from its use) and joint in consumption or nonrival (use by one person will not reduce its availability to others). This entry describes the nature of public goods and contrasts the approaches to them taken by economists and political scientists. When allocating public or semipublic goods by means of the coercive powers of the state—legislation, budgeting, and taxation—governments have to handle the problematic of these goods, including tax evasion (free riding), oversupply (rent seeking), and undersupply (preference distortions), as well as allocation and distribution in trade-offs. The entry examines these phenomena and concludes with a look at the allocation of common goods in a global context.

Public Goods and Public Finance

Since the identification and conceptualization of this special set of goods or services by Italian public finance scholars in the 19th century, public goods have attracted a lot of theoretical interest from both economists and political scientists. Whereas in economics the question of the optimal supply of public goods has dominated the concern with these goods and services, which differ from private goods as conceptualized in market theory, political scientists have looked at how goods and services with the characteristics of public goods are allocated in domestic as well as international political systems. The political preoccupation with public goods has led to inter alia theories of collective action, free riding, and transaction costs.

The theory of public goods offers an economic approach to public policy making and implementation, suggesting criteria that public programs should fulfill, derived from conceptions of market failure and collective-action difficulties. It targets the allocation of public services as well as the regulation of the economy, disregarding distributive aspects. Although its basic model of an optimal supply of public goods offers an ideal-type construction bypassing transaction costs, opportunism, and
bounded rationality, it still captures the essence of the state as the guardian of law and order, financing its operations with taxation.

**Nature of Public and Semipublic Goods**

A pure public good is characterized by nonexcludability and jointness in consumption, or “lumpiness,” meaning that people can enjoy it without paying for it and share it whole with others. The two properties of nonexcludability and lumpiness create market failure, as pure private goods are excludable by the price mechanism and completely appropriable. Impure or mixed public goods have either nonexcludability or nonappropriability but not both. Nonexcludability is also called externality (external effects), and nonappropriability involves economies of scale (natural monopoly). Public safety and defense are pure public goods, whereas environmental resources (“common pool” goods), such as water in a river, which are open to all but can be depleted by use, are semipublic goods, as are those supplied through infrastructure (“common club” goods), such as toll roads—individuals must pay for access, but use does not deplete such goods. According to Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler (1996), there are both positive and negative externalities, and the extent of scale economies varies, as one speaks of global, national, regional, and local public goods.

**Problematic With Public Goods**

No single person has any incentive to supply public goods, since he or she cannot internalize all its benefits. And once a public good has been supplied, the best strategy for an individual is to free ride on it. Since the allocation of public goods faces market failure, they invite government intervention. The key question is “How and in what form should government support or manage the allocation of public goods?” Government tends to allocate pure public goods through its bureaucracy, in order to regulate the externalities by agencies and to undo natural monopolies by policies of deregulation, privatization, and leveling the playing field. However, when government corrects for market failures, then the risk of government failure arises, as the public good is captured by rent-seeking actors.

**Optimal Supply of Public Goods**

Efficient allocation of public goods requires that the willingness of people to pay for the lumpy good cover the cost of its provision. This can be achieved only by summing individuals’ willingness to pay through some process of aggregation. A voluntary supply of public goods is theoretically imaginable (by way of demand revelation schemes, through which people indicate their desire for a good by indicating how much they are willing to pay for it), but when the number of people demanding the public good increases, then transaction costs quickly become prohibitive. To avoid free riding and preference distortion as well as delaying tactics, government replaces the voluntary mechanism with state authority. One may argue that the first theoretician of public goods was Thomas Hobbes, who regarded safety as a country’s most important public good.

**Real-Life Distortions With Public Goods**

The allocation of public goods—pure or impure—is in practical terms at the core of the political process, as government at various levels in the political system engages in policy making and implementation of programs having the characteristics of public goods. The aggregation procedure for summing up the willingness to pay for public goods is in reality the democratic procedure, or elections as well as legislative budgeting and taxation. Thus, party politics and coalition politics basically provide the set of possible demands for public goods, whether pure or impure.

In democratic politics, the allocation of public goods may be combined with distributional policies, with policy combinations that are conducive to fiscal illusions involving the over- or undersupply of public goods. The rational strategy for the citizen is to free ride on the supply of public goods, minimizing as much as possible his or her contribution to covering their costs. The efficient prices for public goods—“Lindahl tax prices”—are not feasible due to preference revelation distortions and free riding. Thus, government imposes taxes and borrows money as needed to pay for the lumpy goods allocated to the entire political community. There is no guarantee that what a citizen is willing to pay will equal what he or she is forced to pay—the Lindahl tax price. The allocation of public
goods has distribution consequences with regard to both their benefits and their costs. Thus, public goods involve more political than strictly economic concerns. This is true for both supply and demand.

On the supply side, public goods contracts tend to be lucrative for private entrepreneurs. Deciding how to allocate these contracts, worth millions or billions of dollars, involves a tendering/bidding process that is very difficult to fully institutionalize in accordance with a transparent competition regime. Politicians are easily “captured” by various enterprises, looking for rent in the construction of lumpy goods—see, for example, Robert Caro’s (2002) descriptions of Lyndon Baines Johnson’s rise to power and Senate dominance. Charles Rowley, Robert Tollison, and Gordon Tullock’s (1988) theory of rent seeking suggests that government contractors are willing to pay almost all of the economic rent captured in campaign contributions and the like.

**Externalities (Nonexcludability)**

External effects call for public policies, demoting negative ones and promoting positive ones. Since the social benefits or costs are not captured by market prices, there is market failure and thus a reason for government intervention. The key question is how much should government spend on generating social benefits, and how much should it impose as social costs? The theory of cost–benefit analysis was intended as a rational answer to this query, but it has proven difficult to target policy making so that social benefits or social costs are handled in an efficient manner. The problem is that there may be no limit to what government should do using externalities as the criteria. However, specific measures such as vaccination or control of contagious deceases are clearly defensible public goods policy. Externalities may be promoted as national public goods or local public goods depending on the size of the community involved.

**Club Goods (Jointness)**

The theory of clubs is an attempt to devise a rational approach to the problem of dividing competences between various levels of government, taking into account the capacity of a political community of a certain size to internalize externalities as much as possible, especially when benefits taper off or congestion arises. Federalism is one version of such a club theory about creating jurisdictions that are capable of internalization of as many externalities as feasible. It has received a novel interpretation in the theory of multilevel governance, including new regional organizations such as the European Union (EU).

**Infrastructure (Scale Economies)**

The public goods aspect of infrastructure used to be analyzed as natural monopoly regulation with a call for government intervention. However, with the deregulation and privatization starting in the late 1970s, both monopoly regulation and antitrust policy have lost some of their credentials. Again, it is capture theory in one version or another that favors a level-playing-field policy orientation with maximum open entry in enlarged markets beyond national borders. Today, regional competition policies, such as the EU regime with its commissioners, are considered appropriate to undo monopoly and invite competition. The occurrence of economies of scale is no longer considered a natural phenomenon but a market-related one. Increasing the size of the market is a better response to this type of market failure with club goods than entry regulation and price setting. The size of the market is a function of the extension of the law or common legal institutions between countries, such as EU law.

**Global Public Goods and Commons (Rivalry)**

Governments may handle the collective-action problems that arise concerning the allocation of public goods in their own domestic countries. Instead of relying on a voluntary mechanism for the supply of national or local public goods, governments employ state authority to make budgets, laws, and taxes. But the problems with a voluntary supply of public goods resurface on the global scene, where externalities such as global warming, carbon emissions, and the environmental destruction of common pools such as the oceans and endangered species call for a global ecology policy. Kyoto I was meant to set up such a global common pools policy, but it ran
into the typical collective problems of preference misrepresentation, free riding, and reneging. Negotiating a new global policy runs up against the tremendous transaction costs typical of a voluntary approach to public goods provision. Elinor Ostrom (1990) has argued that small groups may overcome the collective-action difficulty of protecting a commons, but in most such examples, the state helps the groups reduce transaction costs by somehow or indirectly enforcing the rules allocating the common pool goods. In the global arena, there is no world government or voluntary coordination scheme to do just that.

**Political Relevance of Public Goods**

While economists analyze the question of a voluntary supply of public goods and its optimality, political scientists know that such schemes will hardly be practical. Thus, they concentrate on understanding the allocation of public or semipublic goods by means of the operations of state institutions. In a representative democracy, political parties handle the demand and supply of public and semipublic goods. Due to bounded rationality, opportunism, and voter myopia, the political process will not arrive at an optimal allocation of these goods, where each individual’s marginal benefit equals his or her marginal cost (Lindahl equilibrium). It is widely recognized that the allocation of public goods does have distributional implications and that it is the mixture of allocative efficiency and justice in distribution that makes public or semipublic goods inherently political.

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**See also** Collective Security; Implementation; Policy Process, Models of; Transaction Costs

**Further Readings**


**PUBLIC OFFICE, REWARDS**

The term *rewards* refers to any kind of tangible income and intangible compensation or honor attached to public office. Rewards are relevant in political science because they link the adequate compensation of our rulers with their performance. On the one hand, in democratic systems, proper compensation includes the reward level and the transparency of the reward structure for public scrutiny. Concerns of transparency, corruption, and public trust in rulers are relevant for creating a proper reward system. On the other hand, the performance of public officials relates to achievement at the individual and organizational levels, which in turn are linked to the legitimacy of democracy. These dimensions have been tackled by normative and positive political theories.

Normative theories prescribe what political choices ought to be made according to some philosophical values, such as representativeness, competitiveness, and functionality of rewards for public officials in relation to the rest of society. Positive theories try to explain the particular political choices made for rewarding public officials. Different theories emphasize the role of institutions and past legacies, cultural values, or the rent-seeking strategies of individuals in accounting for the achieved reward level, visibility, and value of the different parts of the reward structure.

The structure of rewards covers financial (salary), material (with monetary value), and intangible elements. The combination of these elements varies among different categories: countries; public officials from the legislative, the judiciary, or the executive; the legal nature of institutions (regulatory agencies, independent national banks, bureaucracies);
or policy areas (public safety, education, health, etc.). Managerial public sector reform trends and the role played by democratic values are likely to have an impact on how the structure of rewards changes for different public officials.

This entry is further developed into four sections. First, the main normative and positive theories are described. A second section shows the elements of the reward structure. The third section is devoted to the recent emphasis on managerialism and performance-based pay. The final section links rewards to transparency.

### Political Theories on Rewards

#### Normative Theories

Normative theories of the 18th and 19th centuries define how public officials should be rewarded. Three different sets of values have been promoted. First, individualistic values have been fostered more frequently. Adam Smith (1723–1790) advocated for the exclusive link between payment and performance, although he did not propose a specific reward system. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) devised a more nuanced system for rewarding performance, indicating the degree of transparency required in defining the whole reward package, how potential corruption practices should be avoided, and the like. Frederic Taylor (1856–1915) also supported the idea of paying for performance when advocating his "scientific method" of work in mass production. Second, Georg Hegel’s (1770–1831) view on rewards was more functionalist, suggesting a level of pay that would make neutral and expert public servants focus on the general interest rather than the interest of a few. Sufficient pay was needed to avoid corrupt practices. A similar view was held by Max Weber (1864–1920). Third, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) hypothesized that the strengthening of democracy would result in a decline in the rewards of public officials, thus making them more representative.

These normative prescriptions coincided with the initiation of macroprocesses such as industrialization, the consolidation of modern public bureaucracies, recognition of individual universal rights, and the introduction of democracy. These disparate movements, with different emphases across countries, are likely to have led to the emergence of the aforementioned criteria on rewards. The introduction of mass production systems brought about a concern with performance and private sector benefits. Unlike in aristocratic times, the advent of democracy introduced issues of public accountability and representativeness, with the growth of the bureaucracy creating problems. The consolidation of public administration and its neutral competence entailed the implementation of a merit system to fight politicization practices, derived from democratization. Around the same time, the Northcote-Trevelyan report (1854), the Pendleton Act (1883), and other such regulations in Western societies tried to abolish the favoritism of political appointments and to replace them by merit systems.

At present, normative issues concerning rewards are ingrained in empirical research. The work of Christopher Hood and Guy Peters in the 1990s offered three different criteria, as expounded in earlier philosophical texts, against which the level of rewards and their contents could be decided on. First, a more egalitarian approach recommends that rewards of public officials, especially those holding high office, be representative of the population at large, that is, they should take into account the composition of the population according to the most obvious criteria (e.g., race, language, ethnicity). A second, more functionalist approach advocates paying a sufficient reward to prevent officials from engaging in corrupt practices. Finally, a market approach suggests that the level of rewards should be on par with the salaries for similar positions in the private sector. None of the approaches can be found in its pure form in any country, although some countries seem to have more representative rewards, while others use the functional principle of sufficient compensation. In any case, the introduction of managerial practices in the executive during the 1990s and 2000s has apparently caused a shift toward more individualistic and market-based practices.

#### Positive Theories

Since the early 1990s, political theories focusing on rewards have developed explanatory arguments trying to decipher why some systems have made particular choices when deciding reward levels for public officials and to describe the particular composition and the transparency of the reward structure. Christopher Hood and Guy Peters have fostered
several publications in which three types of explanations have been considered: (1) institutional, (2) political economy, and (3) cultural theories.

Institutional theories claim that formal and informal rules account for the particular evolution of reward systems. Rules define whether pay is determined through collective bargaining, independent review, market mechanisms, or specific regulation. Rules also set the level of pay at national, sectoral, or agency levels. Moreover, the proportion of the salary structure is decided by rules considering the basic pay and other allowances and the degree of transparency. Institutional theories are designed to explain the continuity in the working of certain institutions but have more problems in identifying when a change takes place, because the institutions by themselves, without the contribution of actors, are noncredible energizers of institutional change.

Economic theories of politics consider the constrained institutional settings of individual strategies, but they focus on individuals as benefit maximizers, that is, making their rewards as large as possible. Those theories are normally crafted as games for which two sets of actors have different preferences and strategies. To study rewards, games can be modeled to confront the (dis)trust strategies of citizens in relation to the strategies of public officials, who are more or less transparent in getting their rewards. Games can also model to what extent senior civil servants have more or less individualistic pay strategies than civil servants of lower hierarchical levels. Although embedded in institutional settings, political economy theory tends to consider the preferences of individuals as exogenous to the institutions and somehow universalistic—that is, shaped outside the institutional context in which they operate.

Cultural theory, dismissing this universalistic view of exogenous preferences, goes beyond the classic idea that national cultures matter in anchoring political phenomena to cultural views. Christopher Hood, either alone or with others, has contributed extensively to apply cultural theory to the evolution of rewards pattern over time. This theory is based on the “grid group” concepts of Mary Douglas. “Group” refers to what extent individual choices are determined by the groups in which individuals are incorporated. “Grid” indicates the role of external rules and prescriptions in determining the life of individuals. The combination of high–low grid and high–low group offers four dominant cultural types: (1) hierarchical, (2) individualistic, (3) egalitarian, and (4) hazardous.

Hierarchical systems are based on the predictability and automaticity of rewards progression within organizations. Individualistic systems are characterized by the rent-seeking behavior of public officials, which normally operates on the variable parts of the salary or on other perks of substantial monetary value, discarding the automaticity of rewards. In egalitarian systems, monetary rewards are accommodated at lower levels than what the individualistic behavior would predict because other intangible rewards are obtained. Hazardous cultural patterns imply the introduction of chance elements in the way in which promotion and rewards happen, making them nonautomatic and unpredictable.

Comparative work has used a combination of the three “lenses,” as they are not entirely alternative explanations of how rewards evolve. Most country case studies have a predominant institutionalist bias, which accounts for the creation of reward systems following traditional models. The introduction of changes in this account is normally referred to as a minor adaptation of traditional practices. In any case, institutionalists have difficulty explaining why there are shifts within the same society from more egalitarianism (or hierarchy) toward more individualism over time in the rewards of senior civil servants or why the salaries of lower level civil servants erode over time, while the monetary rewards of senior civil servants increase. Political economy theorists were not able to explain the erosion of the wages of politicians in several countries, in spite of them trying to maximize their rewards. Cultural theory seems to explain the shifts throughout time, using both institutionalist and political economy reasoning. Further research is needed to test these theoretical lenses.

The Structure of Rewards and Its Level
The list of components of a reward system is considerable and varies across countries and types of public officials. The first distinction is between financial rewards, material rewards with monetary value, and intangible rewards. Financial rewards constitute the pay received by public officials. They
can be classified into basic pay and other fringe benefits. Basic compensation is the salary paid for a position that includes insurance, tax deduction, and deferred compensation. Fringe benefits include considerations pertaining to the level or grade of the post, risk or abnormal working conditions associated with the post, acknowledgment of seniority, special duties or responsibilities, and performance bonuses. These allowances are directly linked to the job performed. However, the particular amount is not included in the basic pay in some cases because they compensate the job particularities associated with a particular post. In other cases, these allowances are not consolidated in the basic pay so as not to be included in the calculations of the future pension, which will burden the public budget.

Material rewards, or in-kind benefits, that have direct and substantial monetary value include variegated items such as promotion, inter- and/or intramunicipal transportation, housing, meals, travel, tax deductions, and private health insurance, to list the most popular items across countries. In most cases, these rewards are tax free.

Some rewards such as promotion, pension, and employment in a better paid job in a private or (semi)public corporation are deferred in time and enjoyed in the future. Traditionally, public officials were compensated for good performance by promoting them to higher positions with a hike in salary. As there are now not enough positions to promote high-performing officials, good performance is rewarded with extra compensation. Employment in a more lucrative position may constitute a typical path in the system but is at least subject to some kind of ethical code.

Finally, public recognition, delegation of authority, social respect, job security, some social privileges, or reputation are typical examples of intangible rewards. They are subjectively and contextually defined. Individuals bestow subjective recognition on some potential rewards, and the context may deem some rewards very important or irrelevant. For instance, in some countries, civil servants have high status and are well respected, while in other countries, this is not so. Unless they are misused, these rewards are not a matter of concern for public accountability.

Compensation for public officials includes many different financial supplements and other benefits, also colloquially known as perks, that make its analysis complex. The various financial rewards and in-kind tangible benefits, presently enjoyed by public officials or deferred to the future, belong to items subject to more or less transparency and individual negotiations. The managerialist trend in the public sector in the past 30 years has also introduced the relevance of performance bonus.

Managerialism, Rewards, and Performance
Managerialism implies more pay flexibility, that is, the ability of public sector organizations to match market rates, to compete for scarce skills and good candidates, and to reward individual efforts. The managerial reforms that started in the 1980s, inspired by private sector practices, have stressed the value of more flexible pay arrangements as well as the use of performance pay. The creation of agencies and organizations with a management ethos that is different from that of traditional ministerial departments and the possibility of hiring personnel under distinct contractual conditions has allowed for the introduction of a more managerial culture in some parts of the public sector. In these organizations, where direct entry from the private to the public sector has been possible, several countries have tried to match private sector rewards, although unsuccessfully.

Apart from uniform pay scales, performance pay is another flexible means of compensating individual or group productivity. When properly done, performance pay is not consolidated in the salary. Extra performance is explicitly recognized either through the comparison of achievements against predefined targets or through the appraisal negotiations between managers and subordinates. This financial bonus is said to motivate workers to higher levels of performance, according to normative theories.

Expectancy and reinforcement theories have been associated with performance pay. Expectancy theory predicts that employees’ motivation is led by their belief that making an effort will affect organizational performance. This increase in performance will lead to an increase in the monetary benefits of the employee, who specially values these benefits. In a nutshell, higher performance-related salary motivates employees. Reinforcement theory states that individuals are likely to choose responses associated with positive outcomes of the past. In positive reinforcement, valued behavior
will be preferred and repeated over time because it yields positive results, such as higher salary.

Managerialism, present in many countries, influences differently systems and groups of public officials. Its practices have likely resulted in greater pay differentials between civil servants and politicians, agency chief executives and senior civil servants, and senior civil servants and lower level civil servants. However, empirical research has often found a mismatch between the potential benefits of performance pay for individuals and for the organization and staff motivation. An overwhelming majority of studies reviewed by James Perry do not show evidence of positive effects of performance pay, especially for organizational performance and for higher managerial posts, where jobs are complex and tasks are not normally routinely defined. Positive effects in the more routine jobs are due to the easiness of establishing clear goals against which performance can be measured.

Several reasons explain this mismatch. First, civil service laws and procedures try to be uniform, while individual performance pay implies exceptions to uniformity. Second, budgetary allocations for performance pay cannot grow at the pace of performance. Unlike the private sector, higher performance does not necessarily mean concomitant higher financial benefits for the organization. Third, organizations do not invest much energy in performance appraisals, which results in unsatisfactory performance assessments. Fourth, individual performance cannot be properly rewarded if organizational goals are not clearly defined, as is the case in many public sector bodies with multiple stakeholders. Finally, transparency apparently makes performance pay less workable in the public sector, as there are some indications that secrecy in private organizations is helpful for performance schemes to succeed. Furthermore, transparency does not allow for a substantial increase of performance bonuses as this may cause a public outcry. In sum, performance pay does not seem to have increased greatly staff motivation. Therefore, public service motivation is analyzed by including other nonfinancial components. Success stories of performance pay have been more prevalent when individual and organizational goals were aligned.

In any case, there has been a general shift away from the fixed scales advocated by the functionalist approaches, which believe in the principle of adequate compensation and the need for a uniform reward system across the board for similar levels of public employees. This general shift has represented more individualization of salaries for senior civil servants in the executive, but not so much in the legislative and the judiciary. In spite of the limited success of pay for performance, pay differentials among groups have materialized. Civil servant salary levels have surpassed parliamentarian salaries in many countries, and the differences in compensation between senior civil servants and civil servants at lower levels have widened.

**Rewards and Transparency**

Transparency refers to the publicity and availability of data on rewards of public officials for public scrutiny. The gradation of transparency depends on the number of components of the reward structure that are open to scrutiny, the degree of publicity of this information without being demanded, and, alternatively, the availability of the data on request by individuals.

Lack of transparency is related to at least two different sets of practices. First, while basic pay may be frozen or pegged to annual inflation rates, other variable parts or perks may be kept away from public scrutiny. Second, there may be a potential for unethical behavior by claiming expenses that are unrelated to the incumbency of a public office, as the mass media are occasionally revealing in different countries.

Normative criteria for the level of transparency of a system are similar to the three different visions of the cultural theory. For egalitarians, rewards should have maximum visibility, and the amount of hidden perks should be kept to the minimum. Functionalists suggest that rewards should reflect the activities pertaining to the position. If travel or special risks are associated with the job, these should be paid separately in tax-free allowances. There would then be a certain justification for less visible rewards. Finally, a market approach would link reward to performance. Workable individual performance pay seems to be better adapted to non-transparent organizations, as in the private sector.

Empirical research in Western societies shows that the levels of transparency seem to be declining over the years. Transparency level differs for distinct types of public officials. While rewards for parliamentarians seem to have become more transparent with time, the availability of data for civil
servants, especially senior civil servants, seems to be decreasing. Furthermore, the analysis of salaries in Latin American and Australasian countries does not support the functional theory that high rewards for public officials entail lower levels of corruption in the system. Further research is needed, as it is difficult to find meaningful connections between aggregate figures of corruption levels and the general levels of rewards. This hypothesis should be tested for specific groups of public officials (local officials, security forces, teachers, etc.).

Managerialism and decreasing levels of transparency might have caused the increase in civil servants’ rewards compared with the reward levels of parliamentarians. There seems to be an implicit trend whereby in democracies, the rewards for politicians tend to be more representative or reflect the ideals of representation, with few possibilities of being rewarded for performance, except for the intensive use of per diems as a consequence of being appointed to different commissions, whose attendance, away from their constituency, allows for extra perks. Civil servants, especially senior civil servants, have found different functional and homogeneous ways to raise their salary level. In some countries, a senior civil service category has been created, separate from the rest of the civil servants. Further, individual performance pay has been introduced, although its success has been questioned, and the creation of arm’s-length agencies has fostered higher rewards for their managers. Despite a general increase of salaries in the executive, salaries of private sector enterprises have not been matched, even in those countries where such efforts have been more persistent.

Research on public sector rewards has been fostered in the past 20 years in political science, but further analysis is required. Comparative country studies should give way to other comparisons, especially among public officials working for agencies of different types (hospitals, regulatory agencies, independent banks, bureaucracies) and from different policy sectors (safety, education, health, etc.). The differences and similarities across countries within these sectors could yield further results and inputs for political theories.

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See also Individualism; Institutional Theory; Normative Political Theory; Pay for Performance; Performance Management; Political Theory

Further Readings


Public Opinion

Public opinion is a notion that is frequently invoked, not only in everyday parlance but also in political and scholarly discussions. Yet it is a concept that is extremely ambiguous and difficult to define—indeed, it seems that a common definition does not exist. When the scholar Harwood Childs
attempted to reconstruct the principal meanings of public opinion in the 1960s, he identified more than 50 different definitions. Since then, the frequency of use of the concept has grown substantially, together, probably, with the number of meanings attributed to it. This diversity of meanings—or polysemy—is implicit in the denomination of the concept, which associates two distinct, and somewhat conflicting, ideas. “Opinion” refers to the individual sphere, to reputation, evaluation, and judgments of value; hence, it is open to question, or debatable. “Public” refers to the collective dimension, to subjects and places accessible to all, of common interest, adopted by recognized and, therefore, “public” authorities. And here arises the question at the very heart of the debate that has always surrounded the topic: how to render compatible, consistent, and coinciding aspects that are both individual and collective, singular and common, subjective and objective. The question is further complicated by the increasingly widespread and entrenched tendency to consider public opinion as a unitary concept—an “objective” and “natural” basis for political choices and/or institutional decisions, in competition with the electoral response—and the tendency to consider public opinion as an indication of, or even synonymous with, the “will of the people.” This entry discusses these various meanings and their implications for contemporary democracies.

Definitions of Public Opinion

Looking beyond the meanings attributed to public opinion, it is important to note that the concept is linked to democracy and its affirmation. Democracy becomes a condition of public opinion, a component and a method. Democracy affects and characterizes the viewpoint, the language, and every discussion surrounding public opinion. Consequently, its definition in some measure also involves democracy.

Among the various definitions of public opinion that have developed and intersected over time, three prove particularly significant, in that they allow one to delineate the main interpretive elements, which are substantially distinct and competing.

The first approach takes its inspiration from the Enlightenment and first and foremost identifies public opinion with the “public sphere” (the theory of Jürgen Habermas), the area in which the “enlightened classes” exercise criticism of and provide a check against the action of power. In other words, the public sphere is the open debate around the decisions and issues of public interest. Public opinion accompanies the formation of bourgeois society and mediates the separation of the state from the publicly important “private sphere” of “civil society.” It promotes the advent of the “market,” of rational thought, and of “liberty” and is a necessary condition of democratic systems that have been established in the West alongside the great economic and national revolutions. According to this reading, public opinion is not the sum of individual opinions, as other interpretive currents sustain; rather, it is a context of relationships and communication that develops at the collective level (as several authors, from the Chicago School to Herbert Blumer, argue). It is a “public” discussion about emerging problems that involves different actors and arrives at producing a common shared position.

The second approach considers public opinion as an effect of the influence exercised by actors and agencies that control the channels of information and the formation of ideas. Consequently, the prevailing opinions in society, the images of reality that people express, actually would not correspond to reality; they do not emerge from free discussions and from debate among intellectuals but would instead depend on the pressure exercised by the media and by propaganda. Public Opinion (which Walter Lippmann writes in capital letters—and not by chance), hence, is fueled by stereotypes and prejudices. It evokes a sort of conformism: the adaptation by the masses to prevailing thought. To a certain extent, this interpretation is echoed in the model of the spiral of silence proposed by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, based on the analysis of electoral behavior in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. The study reveals that large segments of the electorate who did not express their preferences during the electoral campaign in the end aligned themselves with the positions of the candidates and parties favored to win and voted accordingly. In other words, their silence reflected not only uncertainty and indifference but also the fear of deviating from what was considered to be the predominant orientation. Interviewed by the polling agencies, they preferred to remain silent rather than contradict the beliefs expressed by the majority and emphasized by the media and in the public debate.
use the language of Noelle-Neumann, they preferred to conform to the “climate of opinion” that characterizes society during that time period. This explanation evokes the idea of common sense, this being another polysemic term possessing very deep historical and cultural roots. It is discussed and thematized by, among others, Antonio Gramsci, who cites The Betrothed by Alessandro Manzoni, observing that “there was even someone who didn’t believe the plague-spreaders, but couldn’t support his opinion against widespread popular opinion,” because, as Manzoni writes, “good sense was there, but it remained hidden in fear of common sense” (or general—i.e., public—opinion) (Gramsci, 1975, p. 216).

For some authors, however (in particular, Niklas Luhmann), public opinion constitutes a functional necessity, put into action by the political (sub)system to reduce social complexity. In this case, it is an area that is structured around relevant and important themes, conditioned and/or imposed by public communication. This reasoning appears exactly symmetric, and in many ways contrary, to that of Habermas, who holds that public opinion coincides with the public sphere generated from “below,” by civil society and by intellectuals. Instead, this reasoning stresses the role of the institutions of power, political actors, and the media, which aim to influence and direct public opinion.

The third interpretation is defined by some as populist and by others as methodological. It does attribute great importance to people’s popular opinions and at the same time to the possibility of studying them through the technologies of public opinion research (polling). Public opinion, in this case, is made to correspond with the sum or collection of individual opinions gathered and analyzed by means of surveys conducted on representative samples of the population. The first and most influential exponent of this position is George Gallup, who began conducting his public opinion polls in the 1930s in the United States, correctly predicting the outcome of the 1934 presidential elections. Gallup felt that polls are useful—and reliable—instruments that measure the will of citizens and are in some ways better than voting for discovering and understanding citizen demands, because surveys are able to articulate issues and demands, taking into account individual, social, cultural, and ecological characteristics. The only problem is to construct a sample that is truly representative of the population and to perform surveys through well-formulated questionnaires and well-conducted interviews. Public opinion, in this way, is traced back to the empirical sampling of aggregated individual opinions, whose meaning is summed up according to a majoritarian logic, as in elections where the popular will is deduced from the vote of a fraction. This may be majoritarian but is not necessarily the majority—and is often far from the totality of the population and/or voters.

**Normative Orientations**

The three ideas that orient the conception of public opinion are summarized by three different normative orientations that aspire to prevail as descriptive or real. They reflect three different ways of understanding the relationship between citizens and power, between society and institutions, in representative democracies. In the first case, public opinion is conceived of as a jury, an instrument by which the informed citizen judges decisions and those who make the decisions. In this case, public opinion is a space that renders “public” the exercise of authority, opening up to all those who so wish the chance to supervise and participate. In the second case, public opinion is conceived of as a consensus, the method by which to conform the orientation of citizens to the values and wishes of those who govern, or as a climate of opinion, or common sense—an assemblage of stereotypes and prejudices that inhibit critical thought and push the less aware and informed members of society to conform to dominant beliefs. In the third case, public opinion is considered truly as such, which is to say, as a fact, a given, an actual entity that coincides with society, voters, and citizens, without any distinctions. And it sums them up according to their individual opinions into an undifferentiated aggregate, recognized as having the value of “reality” because it is observed and observable, measured and measurable, by using polling technologies.

These three ways of understanding public opinion continue to coexist and interact over time. Media and public opinion agencies compete to shape public opinion from above. Influenced or commissioned by the centers of the political and institutional system, they seek to conform citizens’
opinions to the prevailing values and to strengthen consensus with the view of the elite.

In the same way and at the same time, public opinion is a critical space. It intervenes via groups, newspapers, social movements—and, in more recent times, through the web, via Internet blogs and social networks—to counter and affect public choices. In addition, public opinion also takes on an active role itself in forming individual opinions to shape the general beliefs.

Undoubtedly the public opinion polling and populist conception of public opinion is that which has progressively won out and today tends to dominate over the others, thanks in part to the contribution of the media—especially newspapers and television. The media have amplified and legitimized polls and have presented and imposed them as “reality.” In turn, the media and other actors that participate in presenting the polls—the pollsters, journalists, political commentators, and politicians themselves—have gained and continue to gain legitimation from the surveys, which additionally offer the chance for a “show,” while the political scene itself appears more and more spectacular, as we will see further on.

**Public Opinion and Democracy**

At this juncture, it is useful to shift our reflection to the relationship between public opinion and democracy. As we have already mentioned, this is a close and inextricable relationship. Public opinion gains importance with the establishment of democracy. First of all, it is considered as a condition, in that it is an area of control and also of public discussion. It is also an arena for the conquest of consensus, a field in which different actors compete and clash as they aim to impose their issues and dictate the agenda of problems to tackle, to influence the priorities and preferences that characterize the vision of life and society among voters and citizens. Ultimately, public opinion becomes a functional equivalent of the electorate, a synonym for the people, to be systematically polled so as to understand fundamental orientations and to constantly verify the degree of consensus enjoyed by politicians and their policies. It could almost be considered an election that takes place each and every day.

Therefore, the connection with democracy seems to be strong—a sort of symbiosis that in recent decades has become systematic and constitutive. In this regard, we can cite Bernard Manin’s analysis of the principles of representative government. In proposing a periodization, Manin indicates how the “democracy of the public”—or of the audience—has been established in the most recent phase.

Wherever communication takes the place of organization and participation, people assume greater importance than political parties—or they become the main reference of the parties—where the mechanism of the internal relationship among the different levels of the party and the relationship between the state and society is specifically and especially entrusted to the polls. The voters become “the audience” as they react to political propositions that escape their control; citizens become public opinion. Manin notes that public debate remains a condition of representative government. However, in reality, public opinion is ordinarily evoked to legitimize and measure the consensus—or dissent—concerning political actors. It is forced to coincide with the practically inseparable duo of the media and the polls. This brings about the problem of not taking for granted what actually cannot be—of not accepting the idea of public opinion that is dominant among such limited social components as the only possible public opinion.

Conversely, if public opinion is summed up through surveys communicated by the media, then it is impossible to avoid confronting the fundamental criticisms expressed in this regard. First and foremost among these criticisms is that expressed by Pierre Bourdieu in his noted 1973 essay, with the absolutely explicit title “L’opinion publique n’existe pas” [Public opinion does not exist]. The target of his unequivocal critique of the concept of public opinion is the presumption of forming it on the basis of surveys, which are imperfect tools for numerous reasons. However, his strongest criticism was of the claim, considered epistemologically untenable, of producing a “general” vision based on “individual” opinions: individual reactions to questions posed by strangers (the interviewers), during interviews dealing with mostly “unfamiliar” subject matters, posed to people who are for the most part not very interested or who may be completely extraneous to politics and the issues of the public debate. For this very same reason, it is considered improper to use
an aggregate of opinions to replace something that should instead emerge from public debate and the initiatives of social actors.

It is considered arbitrary—or even worse, deviant—to treat the responses of interviewees as equivalent, without distinctions that take into account the differing degrees of involvement or expertise of the people surveyed. It is as if everyone were an expert in all matters; as if there were no people who possessed a greater degree of expertise; and, most important, as if some people were not more involved and influential—over the “opinions” of others—on certain specific topics.

Polling as a Basis for the Concept of Public Opinion

Limitations of Polling

We can better articulate the limits imposed by a concept of public opinion—and by a democracy—based on polls by referring to a number of technical, methodological, and substantive problems. First, there is the question of the limits of representativeness of the survey samples, which increasingly include fewer numbers, are stratified by quotas, and are distorted by the process of acquiring the information where the share of people who refuse to be interviewed is growing larger and larger. The techniques of weighting the data, during the data analysis phase, should serve to adjust the sample to the “real” makeup of society. However, these techniques tend to distort the representativeness yet again, to the point of transforming the conclusive data into artificial products of sophisticated mathematical models.

The second problem to contend with is the methods and instruments of the interview. Surveys are now conducted mainly by telephone, to reduce time and costs. Thus, the interviews are conducted in an impersonal way, often by specialized marketing centers with little expertise in the subjects being considered. Furthermore, the home telephone, or landline, is becoming less and less popular, and so other means are used to conduct surveys—for example, by Internet, through the use of e-mail and social networks, or via mobile telephones. These new means create new problems that are difficult to resolve. Surveys conducted using the Internet are still not able to reach “representative” samples of the population, for the simple reason that the population segments that use the Internet are still quite specific—despite the fact that they are large and continue to grow. Certain segments of the population, in particular the elderly and those with less education, are largely excluded. Telematic interviews pose problems with interpretation (they are not conducted directly, nor do they take place in a shared conversation). And last, with regard to mobile telephones, complete lists of numbers are difficult to obtain (given the numerous providers) and even more difficult to use (as access to the numbers is rightfully limited by strict privacy laws). Furthermore, interviewing people via mobile telephone brings with it certain inconveniences (the locations and conditions in which the interview takes place are unpredictable). And in any case, the responses are obviously conditioned by the questions asked, by the style of the interview, and by the length of time required of the interviewees. To sum up, it is very difficult to consider the results of surveys as “faithful” and representative of the population’s beliefs.

The third problem raised is that the methods of data elaboration and analysis naturally and inevitably influence the results. The methods of weighting the data, as previously mentioned, increase the discretion of the researcher and the statistician. Furthermore, adequate attention is not always given to the absence of responses or the reticent responses that often affect the “valid” interviews to a great extent. Finally, in reading the results, there is the tendency to present the distribution of the responses according to a majoritarian logic, which is to say that the beliefs expressed by the majoritarian segments are emphasized, though they may not be those of the majority of the population. For example, an issue favored by one third of a sample, when other issues are chosen by lesser shares of interviewees, risks being amplified by media communications as the will of the people.

Methods for Addressing Technical Problems

To limit these technical problems that invalidate the claims of representativeness and significance of polling, certain methods of weighting have been proposed, as well as specific and alternative means of conducting the polls.

To begin with, there is the practice of introducing some questions at the end of the interview or
after a few questions, in order to determine the expertise or, at least, the significance interviewees attributed to the issues and questions posed. It was James Fishkin who elaborated a different method of conceiving and conducting surveys, known as deliberative polling. It entails that surveys are constructed in such a way that the “sample” of those interviewed can actually be informed about the subjects of the research and takes into consideration the different theories and interpretations that relate to it. The polling is carried out in such a way that those being interviewed can dialogue and discuss among themselves, which permits the “raw” opinion to be registered, as well as the “refined” opinion (following the process of information and discussion). This method seeks to reconstruct the foundations of public opinion at its origins, recognized by Habermas as the bourgeois public sphere and by others as the Athenian Polis in the age of Pericles.

However, the correctives proposed have only been employed conservatively and episodically. In the case of the techniques of self-verification, this has been true more out of carelessness and methodological negligence than for problems related to time and cost. Inserting qualitative questions to clarify the significance and the motivations of the quantitative responses would complicate polling. This is even more so the case following the widespread use of computerized techniques in telephone interviews. As for deliberative polling, it has been carried out in close relationship with experiences of deliberative democracy, therefore, where discussion with citizens is valued in decision making, especially at the local level. But the same critical principle that inspired this design at the same time constitutes a limit inasmuch as deliberative polling is a means of forming opinions, in a conscious way. Those who conduct and commission surveys, however, are interested in finding out everyone’s opinions rapidly—especially the opinions of the less well-informed.

All in all, polls are imperfect methods of learning individual opinions, which assume greater value and general importance. Polls serve and are used to “objectify subjective opinions.” For this reason, polls are important in democratic play. They are important not so much—or not only—because they define public opinion, but because they help (a) orient individual opinions, (b) impose a version of reality, and above all (c) establish the myth of a public opinion that actually exists, is scientifically based, and is therefore measurable. They assume and impose a substantial equivalence between opinions and people, between opinions and voters, and between opinions and votes.

Polling, Media, and the Market

However, polls and the surrounding media, unlike traditional methods of propaganda entrusted by mass parties to functionaries and internal specialists or to those with political affinities (militants and sympathizers), are conducted by professionals who operate in the market and who consequently respect, and are subject to, the rules of the market. This means that they are sensitive to the needs of their employer. Polling agencies and the media are businesses that are often under the control of economic groups or influenced by political entities of the government (and others).

Thus, public opinion based on the media and their polls is very different from the public opinion to which social and political actors contribute, in that it does not constitute an arena, or the result of the potentially conflictive interaction between different and distinct parties. Rather, it aims to coincide with reality, to represent and measure the real situation, because it is produced by technologies and technicians (who in turn, however, are the focus of pressures and involved in political and economic relationships).

Consequently, the field of public opinion is complex and cannot be traced back to a single subject. The interests of political and economic actors in particular are in competition and often in contrast with those of the media, cultural and scientific actors, polling professionals, political scientists, and journalists—who, in turn, derive economic compensation, prestige, and power from their roles as “experts” and witnesses of public opinion. At times, it is difficult even to determine the different interested parties and their roles: The politicians need—and at the same time fear—the polls and the media; just as the media and polling professionals need the politicians to be able to exercise their influence in order to reach their audience and achieve legitimacy. In this way, they themselves also become political actors.
Public Opinion as a Social and/or Political Construct

This suggests a further, and different, phenomenological interpretation, which holds public opinion as a social and/or political construct, whose purpose is not so much to guide the opinions of citizens but rather to impose a representation of public opinion that is recognized as true. This happens by fixing fundamental references around which it is structured: personal or social uncertainty, fear of others, and the vulnerability of the economy or employment. Thus, the political contest becomes a contest between differing and competing models of public opinion, which are proposed and even more so imposed as the only ones possible. These ways of creating a vision of reality, taken for granted as such, in turn influence relationships with power, relationships with institutions, and political and electoral choices.

The game played around public opinion is thus complex, and the number of players participating in the game contributes to the complexity. It suggests that in the era of democracy of the public, the political struggle is primarily a symbolic struggle, in which the fight is to prove a specific vision (or “narration”) of reality, inspired by specific values and by specific images. The weapons employed are marketing and communication techniques, which use the media and polling to erase the distance between everyday life and public life.

It suggests, finally, that the issue at stake is not only public opinion but also the very meaning of democracy. On the other hand, democracy has become personalized, and communication with citizens happens more and more through the media, which transforms them into an audience, into spectators. The understanding of social demands and orientation happens not so much through participation but through polls, which convert people into opinions. Therefore, it becomes difficult to isolate the discussion—and criticism—around the prevailing definition of public opinion, without involving democracy itself, whose prevailing “version,” in this phase, uses public opinion as a base, a constitutive principle—as a “fact.”

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See also Media, Electronic; Media, Print; Policy Framing; Political Communication; Survey Research

Further Readings

Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) was first introduced to the social sciences by Charles Ragin to identify complex patterns of causation by processing social science data with Boolean algorithms. By conducting a formalized comparison, QCA introduces the logic of qualitative research to the study of a larger number of cases than are usually examined with qualitative methods. QCA usually is employed with a middle-sized number of cases (10–30).

The approach taken by QCA has been described as a middle course between case-oriented and variable-oriented methods. In his initial presentation, Ragin (1987) argues that variables should not be examined detached from the cases, as this is done in purely variable-oriented approaches. Based on the assumption that a causal explanation of social phenomena always must include considerations about contextual factors as well as the possibility of conjunctural combinations of relevant conditions, QCA does not process individual variables but includes cases as configurations in the analysis to arrive at causal explanations. Described here is how QCA seeks to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions of a specific phenomenon (“outcome” in QCA terminology) as well as to achieve the most parsimonious explanation for all instances of the phenomenon.

Since the publication of The Comparative Method (Ragin, 1987), a series of techniques based on the ideas of QCA have been developed, which can be subsumed as “configurational” comparative methods. This entry first focuses on the ideas of the original crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) technique based on binary data and then briefly introduces recent developments.

Crisp-Set QCA

Originally, QCA performed calculations on Boolean, that is dichotomized, data only. In terms of set theory, this means that QCA deals with “crisp sets” as opposed to “fuzzy sets.” All data included in a csQCA analysis must therefore be coded dichotomously, which means that it has to be considered for each case whether the case fulfills the condition or not. The outcome has to be coded dichotomously as well. By convention, in csQCA, an uppercase notation indicates the presence of a condition, whereas a lowercase notation signifies the absence of this condition. By using Boolean algebra, the configuration for a case can then be written by concatenating the values for all the conditions included in the analysis. For example, in a study concerning the conditions of development of new ecological parties in Western democracies in the 1980s, it is theoretically feasible that the success of these parties depended on conditions such as the electoral system (proportional representation or not), a high level of socioeconomic development (measured by gross national product [GNP]), the construction of nuclear power plants, and the density of the population. In the case of
Norway, for example, a high level of socioeconomic development can be observed, as well as a system of proportional representation; these two conditions are met, but there are no nuclear power plants, and the density of the population is low. Thus, for Norway, the configuration can be written as \( \text{VOTING} \ast \text{GNP} \ast \text{nuclear} \ast \text{density} \) (* indicating the Boolean AND).

In the first step, all cases with the same configuration are grouped together. For each configuration, the outcomes of the cases included are compared. If all cases show the same outcome, the common value (positive or negative) is assigned; if not, the configuration is marked as contradictory. In the second step, for all configurations with the same outcome, the minimization rule is used to identify conditions that are not relevant for the outcome to occur: “If two Boolean expressions differ in only one condition yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined expression” (Ragin, 1987, p. 93). So if, for example, all cases with the configuration \( \text{VOTING} \ast \text{GNP} \ast \text{nuclear} \ast \text{density} \) and voting \( \ast \) GNP \( \ast \) nuclear \( \ast \) density show the same outcome, the condition VOTING can be considered to be superfluous. The minimization rule is applied iteratively to the identified simpler expression, minimizing the included logical expression as far as possible. This produces a number of “prime implicants,” each explaining only cases with the outcome examined.

To exemplify the use of the minimization rule, a data set with three conditions \( a, b, \) and \( c \) and an outcome \( o \) is used here. Each possible configuration is found in exactly one case, producing the truth table (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>( A )</th>
<th>( B )</th>
<th>( C )</th>
<th>( O )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C6</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1  Exemplary Data Set

To obtain the prime implicants for cases with Outcome 1, the minimization rule is applied to all pairs of configurations with this outcome. Each configuration in Table 1 with Outcome 1 is represented in the left column of Figure 1. For each pair of entries in this column, the minimization rule is applied, and if the two expressions differ in the value of only one condition, the minimized expression resulting from the minimization step is listed in the middle column (the minimization steps are indicated by the arrows). This procedure is iteratively repeated for the shorter expression that is produced. \( B \) is the only prime implicant consisting of one condition. Prime implicants are finally identified in Figure 1 as implicants that have not themselves been included in a minimization step (as \( aB \) and \( AB \) have generated \( B \), they are not prime implicants). Here, \( AC \) and \( B \) are the prime implicants for Outcome 1.

When only configurations with empirically existing cases are included in the minimization, the limited diversity found in comparative research can pose a problem. A large number of logically possible configurations may exist, which are not included for either outcome. To allow more parsimonious results, csQCA can include such logical remainders in the minimization process, which makes further minimization possible. Such logical remainders must, however, be included with caution, as doing so implies the assumption that this configuration does not contradict the examined

![Figure 1 Minimization Steps](image-url)
outcome; see Charles Ragin and Benoît Rihoux (2004) for possible strategies on how to deal with this problem.

In the next step, csQCA arrives at a solution covering all configurations with their respective outcomes by combining prime implicants with a logical expression that is as parsimonious as possible. This provides a short logical explanation for all cases found in configurations with an unambiguous outcome but does not include cases with contradictory configurations.

In the example, the solution for Outcome 1 would include both prime implicants and would be written as \( B \lor A \land C \rightarrow O \), where \( \lor \) indicates the Boolean OR and \( \land \) indicates the Boolean AND in Boolean algebra. The solution is read as “the presence of \( B \) or the presence of \( A \) combined with the presence of \( C \) leads to the outcome \( O \).”

**Necessary and Sufficient Conditions**

One key feature of all QCA procedures is the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions. A condition is considered necessary for an outcome if the condition is present in all configurations showing the outcome and does not occur in any configuration without this outcome. A condition is sufficient for an outcome to occur if the outcome occurs in all configurations with this condition. Nonetheless, other conditions may produce the outcome, too, so a sufficient condition does not have to occur in all cases with the same outcome. The analysis of the conditions of success of green parties in the 1980s, for example, produces the csQCA solution:

\[
SUCCESS = VOTING \land NUCLEAR \land GNP + VOTING \land DENSITY.
\]

This means that the presence of proportional representation combined with the construction of nuclear power plants and a high GNP are conditions that did lead to the presence of a successful green party, as did the presence of proportional representation combined with the presence of high population density. Here, the presence of proportional representation can be identified as a necessary condition, as all configurations of cases with successful green parties share this condition. In the solution for countries with no successful green parties, a number of sufficient conditions for the failure can also be identified:

\[
NO\ SUCCESS = voting + gnp + density \land nuclear.
\]

Here, the absence of proportional representation or the absence of a high GNP or the absence of high population density combined with the absence of nuclear power plants did lead to the absence of green parties. Thus, the absence of proportional representation as well as the absence of a high GNP was sufficient to explain the absence of successful green parties; see Lasse Cronqvist (2007) for details.

Although sufficient and necessary conditions can be identified with csQCA, many conditions found in csQCA solutions are INUS conditions, which are insufficient but necessary parts of a condition, only contributing to the explanation of an outcome together with other (INUS) conditions.

Within groups of cases with the same configuration, due to the deterministic procedure used to create truth tables, csQCA is sensitive to single cases that conflict with the outcome of the other cases within the group. As a configuration is defined as contradictory even if only one case differs from the outcome of the other cases, larger data sets may contain a greater number of contradictions, though only a small proportion of cases may show a different outcome. Here, the minimization process still produces a solution, but it includes only relatively few cases. These contradictions, therefore, should be reduced by adding more conditions or employing more refined procedures such as multivalue qualitative comparative analysis (mvQCA) or fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA).

**Further Developments**

Another problem related to the use of csQCA is the compulsory dichotomization of data. A condition with interval-scale raw data can only be dichotomized by the use of an often artificial threshold. Two approaches have been developed that share the main ideas of csQCA but allow the use of nondichotomous data: Whereas fsQCA seeks to identify necessary and sufficient conditions by applying measurements of coverage and
Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions

The use of quantitative methods in political science generally means the application of a statistical model to political science data, and a statistical model is simply a set of compatible probabilistic assumptions. Fundamentally, assumptions are modeling choices made by a researcher concerning the distribution of the data to be modeled, how the parameters of that distribution change over observations or time, and the dependence of one observation on another. The assumptions serve the dual purpose of reducing the number of parameters in the model that must be estimated and imbuing potential estimators with certain properties. The goals of the modeling process are description and inference, and how well a model accomplishes these goals is a direct function of how appropriate its assumptions are for a particular data set.

The structure of the entry proceeds as follows. First, the relationship between assumptions, models, and estimators is discussed. Second, the assumptions of the linear regression model are discussed in detail as more complex models are often defined as departures from this set of assumptions. Particular attention is paid to the assumptions necessary for attaining correct coefficient estimates and standard errors. Threats to these core assumptions are assessed in terms of their effects, both in theory and in practice. A brief discussion of possible remedies follows. The final sections discuss the degree to which the assumptions of the linear regression model are modified for use in the generalized linear model (GLM) and how the assumption of a random sample is dealt with in a discipline where random samples are rare.

Assumptions, Models, and Estimators

A statistical model is a mathematical representation of the actual process in the world that generated the data (known as a data-generating process, or DGP). The point of creating a statistical model is both to describe the data produced by the DGP and to make inferences about features of the DGP that are unknown. As noted above, the model itself consists of a set of assumptions. This account makes it clear that assumptions are characteristics of models and not characteristics of data, and the question to ask of a model is not whether it is true or false but how descriptively useful is it. Models are more or less useful in describing a given data set, and when an assumption fails to be useful in the
process of description, the error lies with the model, not with the data.

Once a model has been selected, then an estimator (a function of the sample data that provides an estimated value for an unknown parameter) is chosen. Many common models can be estimated by any number of estimators, and the choice among estimators is driven by the model’s assumptions, which imbue the estimators with various properties. An estimator with good (or better) properties under the assumptions of the model is chosen over an estimator with bad (or worse) properties under the assumptions of the model. The reference to “good estimators” and not to “good estimates” is by design. In frequentist statistics, a good estimate, by definition, is one produced by a good estimator. Properties of estimators that are considered good include unbiasedness (the estimator is on average neither high nor low), efficiency (the estimator has a small variance around the true value), and consistency (the estimator is near the true value almost all the time when the sample size is large). Often these properties are assessed in the aggregate, as a slightly biased estimator with a small variance may be preferred over an unbiased estimator with a larger variance.

The practice and art of data analysis lie in understanding which assumptions, and therefore which models and estimators, are appropriate for a given data set. This understanding comes from three sources: (1) the data themselves, (2) theory, and (3) substantive knowledge. Some assumptions can be tested, but such tests are often inconclusive, work only under specific conditions, and rarely provide anything more than vague recommendations. Information drawn from theory and substantive knowledge of the process being modeled are far more reliable guides. The discussion that follows necessarily abstracts from the particulars of a specific data set, but the importance of using information from outside the data should be kept in mind.

Assumptions and the Linear Regression Model

Most discussions of model assumptions begin with the linear regression model. Although linear regression is no longer the workhorse of political science—pride of place goes to the GLM—the linear regression model serves as a good starting point as the various roles that the assumptions play in the model are clear and some simple results can be established.

The discussion of the linear model centers on the equation

\[ y = X\beta + \varepsilon, \]

where \( y \) is a \( n \times 1 \) vector of observations on the dependent variable, \( X \) is an \( n \times K \) matrix of regressors (including a constant), \( \beta \) is a \( K \times 1 \) vector of coefficients, and \( \varepsilon \) is an \( n \times 1 \) vector of disturbances. The data represent a random sample from a population of interest.

The discussion also centers on the most common estimator of the linear regression model, the least squares estimator. Replacing the vector of unknown coefficients \( \beta \) with an estimate \( \hat{\beta} \) defines a vector of residuals

\[ \hat{\varepsilon} = y - X\hat{\beta}. \]

The least squares estimator is found by choosing \( \hat{\beta} \) to minimize the sum of squared residuals, or \( \varepsilon'\varepsilon \). The first step in this process is to take the derivative of the sum of squared residuals with respect to \( \beta \):

\[
\frac{\partial \varepsilon'\varepsilon}{\partial \beta} = \frac{\partial (y - X\beta)'(y - X\beta)}{\partial \beta} \\
= \frac{\partial (y'y - 2\beta'X'y + \beta'X'X\beta)}{\partial \beta} \\
= 2X'X\beta - 2X'y.
\]

The second and final step is to set the derivative equal to 0 and solve for \( \beta \):

\[ \hat{\beta} = (X'X)^{-1}X'y. \]

On its own, the result of the least squares procedure has no properties; it is simply a method for fitting a line to data. The least squares method produces an estimator when paired with a statistical model that makes certain assumptions. Five assumptions commonly make up the linear regression model:

1. No exact linear relationships exist among the regressors (\( X \) has full column rank).
2. \( X \) is nonstochastic (the regressors are fixed in repeated samples).
3. The expectation of the disturbance term is zero ($E[\varepsilon] = 0$).

4. There is homoskedasticity but no autocorrelation (spherical disturbances, $E[\varepsilon\varepsilon'] = \sigma^2 I$).

5. The disturbances are normally distributed ($\varepsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$).

The linear regression model makes these assumptions not because they are substantively likely to describe a data set (more on this later) but because they imbue the least squares estimator with certain properties that are considered good, namely, unbiasedness and efficiency. The technical reasons for these assumptions are discussed first to reinforce the point that this particular set of assumptions is driven by the choice of the estimator and not by the demands of the data.

**Technical Reasons for the Assumptions**

The five assumptions of the linear regression model are chosen for technical reasons, but they also have substantive implications. This section describes what part each assumption plays in deriving the good properties of the estimator, and the next details the substantive commitments their use demands.

The first assumption, that no exact linear relationships exist among the regressors, allows the computation of the least squares estimator:

$$X'X\hat{\beta} = X'y$$

$$\hat{\beta} = (X'X)^{-1}X'y.$$

If an exact linear relationship did exist among the regressors, it would be impossible to solve for $\hat{\beta}$ by premultiplying both sides of the above equation by the inverse of $(X'X)$. The inverse of a square matrix exists only if the columns and rows of that matrix are linearly independent.

Assumptions 2 and 3—$X$ is nonstochastic and the expectation of the disturbance term is zero—allow the claim that the least squares estimator is unbiased (technically, the expected value of the estimator equals the parameter, or $E[\hat{\beta}] = \theta$). To see this, substitute $X\beta + \varepsilon$ for $y$ in the estimator above, and write it in the following form:

$$\hat{\beta} = (X'X)^{-1}X'y$$

$$= (X'X)^{-1}X'[X\beta + \varepsilon]$$

$$= \beta + (X'X)^{-1}X'\varepsilon.$$

The estimator is unbiased if the second term above goes to zero. Taking the expectation of the estimator gives

$$E[\hat{\beta}] = E[\beta + (X'X)^{-1}X'\varepsilon].$$

The expectations operator passes through $\beta$ because it is a constant. Assumption 2 allows the operator to pass through $X$ as well, giving

$$E[\hat{\beta}] = \beta + (X'X)^{-1}X'E[\varepsilon].$$

Finally, Assumption 3 causes the second term above to be zero, and the claim that the least squares estimator is unbiased follows, $E[\hat{\beta}] = \beta$.

Assumption 4—homoskedasticity and no autocorrelation—allows estimation of the estimator’s variance. As variance is defined as $E[(X - E[X])^2]$, it is necessary to get the estimator in this form. Begin with the estimator in the form above, and move the parameter to the left-hand side of the equation:

$$\hat{\beta} = \beta + (X'X)^{-1}X'\varepsilon$$

$$\hat{\beta} - \beta = (X'X)^{-1}X'\varepsilon.$$

Square both sides (remembering that the inner product is the sum of squares and the outer product is variance/covariance matrix), and take the expectation (remembering that $X$ is nonstochastic):

$$\text{Var}(\hat{\beta}) = E[(\hat{\beta} - \beta)(\hat{\beta} - \beta)']$$

$$= E[(X'X)^{-1}X'\varepsilon\varepsilon'X(X'X)^{-1}]$$

$$= (X'X)^{-1}X'E[\varepsilon\varepsilon']X(X'X)^{-1}.$$

The expectation on the right-hand side includes $n$ variances and $n(n - 1)/2$ covariances:

$$E[\varepsilon\varepsilon'] = \begin{bmatrix}
\sigma_1^2 & \sigma_{12} & \cdots & \sigma_{1n} \\
\sigma_{21} & \sigma_2^2 & \cdots & \sigma_{2n} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
\sigma_{n1} & \sigma_{n2} & \cdots & \sigma_n^2
\end{bmatrix}.$$
as $E[\varepsilon_i^2] = \sigma_i^2$ and $E[\varepsilon_i \varepsilon_j] = \sigma_{ij}$. It is not possible to estimate this many variances and covariances with only $n$ observations. Assumption 4, however, reduces the number of items that must be estimated from $n + n(n - 1)/2$ to one, making estimation possible. Assumption 4 states that the variances are uniform, $E[\sigma_i^2] = \sigma^2$, and that the covariances are zero, $E[\varepsilon_i \varepsilon_j] = \sigma_{ij} = 0$. The expectation above then simplifies to

$$E[\varepsilon' \varepsilon] = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma^2 & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\ 0 & \sigma^2 & \ldots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \ldots & \sigma^2 \end{bmatrix} = \sigma^2 I,$$

and the expression for the variance is then

$$\text{Var}(\hat{\beta}) = (X'X)^{-1}X'E[\varepsilon' \varepsilon]X(X'X)^{-1} = (X'X)^{-1}X'\sigma^2 IX(X'X)^{-1} = \sigma^2 (X'X)^{-1}.$$

These four assumptions are enough to prove the Gauss-Markov theorem, which states that the least squares estimator is the most efficient estimator among the class of linear and unbiased estimators. The theorem does not say that the least squares estimator is the most efficient estimator; there exist estimators that are more efficient, but they happen to be biased or nonlinear, or both.

Finally, Assumption 5—normally distributed disturbances—allows derivation of the sampling distribution of the least squares estimates. Because the estimated coefficients are linear combinations of normally distributed disturbances, the estimated coefficients are normally distributed:

$$\hat{\beta} \sim N(\beta, \sigma^2 (X'X)^{-1}).$$

Correct $t$ tests, $F$ tests, and $\chi^2$ tests follow.

**Substantive Implications of the Assumptions**

While the five assumptions discussed above are primarily used to imbue the least squares estimator with good properties, the same assumptions have very specific substantive implications for the data being modeled. Rarely, however, do these assumptions accurately describe the data used by political scientists.

The assumption that no exact linear relationships exist among the regressors means that no regressor or set of regressors can be a linear combination of any other regressor or set of regressors. Not violating this assumption is mostly a matter of asking meaningful questions of the data. Problems with this assumption most often result from the careless use of dummy variables. As an example, consider a regression of the difference in votes obtained by two presidential candidates in a district on an intercept and a set of independent variables. The regressors include a dummy variable for districts in southern states and a dummy variable for districts in nonsouthern states. The regression, in part, asks the question “How do districts in southern states and districts in nonsouthern states differ from other districts?” The substantive problem, of course, is that there are no other districts (all districts have to be in the South or the non-South). The question is not a meaningful one. (The technical problem is that these dummy variables would be collinear with the intercept.)

The assumption that the regressors are fixed in repeated samples is equivalent to assuming that the analyst has performed an experiment where she has control over the inputs to the experiment. Thus, the experiment could be rerun many times with exactly the same values for the regressors, but with new values for the disturbances and therefore new values for the dependent variable. Each time the regression is rerun, the different values for the dependent variable would produce different estimated coefficients. Discussion of the distribution of the estimated coefficients is therefore possible.

The “fixed X” assumption fails to describe all but a very few political science data sets. The assumption can easily be relaxed, however, either by assuming the regressors to be exogenous and conditioning on them or by assuming stochastic regressors. What is important is how the “fixed X” assumption interacts with the assumption that the expected value of the disturbances is zero, $E[\varepsilon] = 0$. Combined, the two assumptions imply that the regressors are uncorrelated with the disturbances. The lack of correlation between the regressors and
the disturbances is the key assumption in regression analysis. When the assumption holds, the least squares estimator is unbiased. When the assumption does not hold, the least squares estimator is biased. Unfortunately, there are a variety of substantive reasons why this key assumption is unlikely to hold. The three biggest concerns—measurement error, omitted variables, and simultaneity—are discussed in depth in the next section.

The assumption of homoskedasticity and no autocorrelation is perhaps the assumption least likely to describe a political science data set. The assumption implies that all the unmeasured factors in the disturbance affect different observations in exactly the same way. It implies that observations drawn from physically adjacent areas are no more alike each other than observations drawn from nonadjacent areas. It implies that political processes that are observed over time are not sticky or sluggish. Finally, the assumption implies that the model has not been misspecified in important ways. Few of these implications accurately describe the majority of political science data sets. A detailed discussion follows.

**Getting the Coefficients Right**

When estimating a statistical model, political scientists are concerned with getting the estimated coefficients right. That is, a researcher would like his or her estimated coefficients to be close to the population parameter values. Unfortunately, there is no way to know whether an estimate is close to the true parameter value (short of adopting a Bayesian perspective, which is yet to be done by the majority of political scientists). All that can be done is to ascertain whether the estimator is good—and then assume that a good estimator produces a good estimate.

As noted above, there are two ways to think about a good estimator in this sense. One way is to say that an estimator is good if it is on average neither high nor low, a property that is known as unbiasedness. Formally, an estimator is unbiased if its expectation is equal to the population parameter, \( E[\hat{\beta}] = \beta \). The other way is to say that an estimator is good if it is near the true value almost all the time when the sample size is large, a property that is known as consistency. Formally, an estimator is consistent if its probability limit, or plim, is equal to the population parameter: \( \text{plim} \hat{\beta} = \beta \).

Of the two definitions of the term *good*, the latter is closer to what political scientists actually mean. An unbiased estimator only gives information about the average estimate, not the estimate actually calculated. Consistency, on the other hand, is the minimum requirement for any estimator; with a large sample size, the calculated estimate should be close to the truth.

A definitive statement choosing between unbiasedness and consistency is not necessary, however, as the major condition for achieving both is the same. The key assumption is that the disturbances have mean zero and are uncorrelated with each regressor or \( E[X'e] = 0 \). (This condition is weaker than assuming the independence of \( X \) and \( e \). Independence implies a correlation of zero, whereas a correlation of zero does not imply independence.) Given the importance of this assumption, it would seem that testing this assumption would be the first step in marshaling evidence for the statistical adequacy of a proposed model. The unknown disturbances, \( e \), could be estimated with the least squares residuals, \( \hat{e} = y - X\hat{\beta} \), and then correlated with each regressor. Unfortunately, this test is uninformative. The least squares residuals are, by construction, uncorrelated with the regressors. A simple manipulation of the least squares estimator demonstrates the point. Multiply both sides of the least squares estimator by \( X'X \), and then substitute \( X'\beta + \hat{e} \) for \( y \) on the right-hand side:

\[
\hat{\beta} = (X'X)^{-1}X'y \\
X'\beta = X'(X\beta + \hat{e}) \\
X'X\hat{\beta} = X'X\beta + X'\hat{e} \\
X'\hat{e} = 0.
\]

As this critical assumption is not directly testable, we need to consider the ways in which the assumption could be violated. The three most common violations include measurement error, omitted variables, and simultaneity. We will examine each in turn.

**Measurement Error**

Measurement error in political science arises from the difficulty of measuring the theoretical
constructs to which political scientists often refer in their work. Concepts such as power, democracy, and ideology can be measured in a variety of different ways, but each measure is an approximation of an abstract idea. Good measures include significant parts of the construct of interest, but invariably, they also include parts of other constructs (systematic bias) as well as random error. Measurement error is likely the rule, and not the exception, in most political science data.

Theory. Let the DGP include a single regressor:

\[ y = x\beta + \varepsilon. \]

Assume that the single regressor has been measured with some error. That is, the variable that is actually available to us is not \( x \), but \( w \):

\[ w = x + u, \]

where \( u \) is the random error and \( w \) thus comprises the true value, \( x \), plus an error component. In addition, assume that \( u \) has mean zero, is uncorrelated with \( \varepsilon \), and is uncorrelated with the single regressor, \( x \). If we write \( x \) as a function of \( w \) and \( u \), the model we actually estimate is

\[ y = (w - u)\beta + \varepsilon = w\beta + \nu, \]

where \( \nu = \varepsilon - u\beta \). The least squares estimator for this model is

\[ \hat{\beta} = (w'w)^{-1}w'y = \beta + (w'w)^{-1}w'\nu. \]

The problem here is that \( w \) and \( \nu \) are both functions of the random error, \( u \). Thus, \( w \) and \( \nu \) are correlated, which violates the assumption that guarantees consistency and unbiasedness.

In the special case just discussed (a regression with a single mismeasured regressor), the effect of measurement error is straightforward. \( w \) consists of a systematic part, \( x \), and a random part, \( u \). The random part of \( w \) is uncorrelated with the dependent variable by construction. The larger the variance of the random part grows relative to the systematic part, the closer the estimated coefficient is to zero. This effect is seen in the expression for \( \beta \)'s inconsistency,

\[ \text{plim}(\hat{\beta} - \beta) = -\frac{\beta \sigma_u^2}{\sigma_x^2 + \sigma_u^2}. \]

The inconsistency is negative, which accounts for the bias toward zero. The inconsistency is small only if \( \sigma_u^2 \) is large relative to \( \sigma_x^2 \). As the latter term increases in size, the greater is the attenuation.

Practice. The case just discussed is highly stylized and is unlikely to be encountered in practice. The comforting conclusions of these kinds of theoretical discussions—for example, that the effects are attenuated—generally do not hold in more realistic situations. First, most regressions are likely to include multiple regressors, with some subset being measured with significant error. In this situation, it is difficult to know the effects of measurement error. Even if the measurement error is confined to one variable, it affects the estimated coefficients of the variables measured without error. Second, the error in the above discussion is random error; it is uncorrelated with the disturbance, \( \varepsilon \), and uncorrelated with the lone regressor, \( x \). Actual measurement error is far more likely to be systematic. Any operational definition of a difficult to measure theoretical construct, such as power or democracy, is likely to pick up elements of other, unwanted constructs. The problem can be severe. It has been demonstrated, for example, that correlated measurement error between two variables can lead to an incorrect sign on an estimated coefficient. Including long lists of unevenly measured control variables in a regression, therefore, makes little sense. Third, measurement error can also appear in the dependent variable. This case is often ignored, as random error in the dependent variable is simply added to the error component of the model, and consistency is unaffected. Again, systematic error that is correlated with the included regressors is more likely, and the result is inconsistency and bias.

Omitted Variables

Hidden within the assumption that the regressors must be uncorrelated with the error term is
the claim that we have all the important variables that affect the dependent variable accounted for in the model. More specifically, the claim is that the model includes all the important regressors that are correlated with the other included regressors. Omitted variables, like measurement error, are probably the rule rather than the exception in political science research.

**Theory.** Let the true DGP be

$$y = X_1 \beta_1 + x_2 \beta_2 + \varepsilon,$$

where $X_1$ is an $n \times k - 1$ matrix of regressors and $x_2$ is a single regressor. Assume that $x_2$ is omitted from the model either because it cannot be measured or because it is unknown. The model actually estimated, then, is

$$y = X_1 \beta_1 + \varepsilon^*,$$

where $\varepsilon^* = x_2 \beta_2 + \varepsilon$. This expression makes the problem clear. The new error term, $\varepsilon^*$, includes $x_2$. If that variable is correlated with the included variables, $X_1$, the assumption that the regressors are uncorrelated with the disturbances no longer holds.

To see this, begin with the least squares estimator of the misspecified model, and substitute the right-hand side of the true model for $y$:

$$\hat{\beta}_1 = (X_1'X_1)^{-1}X_1'y$$

$$\quad = (X'X)^{-1}X_1'(X_1 \beta_1 + x_2 \beta_2 + \varepsilon)$$

$$\quad = \beta_1 + (X'X)^{-1}X_1x_2 \beta_2 + (X_1'X_1)^{-1}X_1\varepsilon.$$

Taking the expectation under the assumption that the included variables are uncorrelated with the disturbance term, the result is

$$E[\hat{\beta}_1] = \beta_1 + (X_1'X_1)^{-1}X_1x_2 \beta_2.$$

Thus, the difference between the expectation of $\hat{\beta}_1$ and the truth depends on two kinds of values. The first are the coefficients from the regression of the excluded variable on the included variables, $(X_1'X_1)^{-1}X_1x_2$. The second is the true effect of $x_2$, $\beta_2$. Using this information, it is possible to identify the direction of the inconsistency and bias.

Including irrelevant variables in a regression is considered a lesser problem. Let the true DGP be

$$y = X_1 \beta_1 + \varepsilon$$

and the estimated equation be

$$y = X_1 \beta_1 + X_2 \beta_2 + \varepsilon.$$

The variables in $X_2$ are irrelevant and thus have no effect on the dependent variable. When this equation is estimated, least squares correctly estimates $\beta_2$ as zero, and the estimator of $\beta_1$ is consistent. The only downside usually noted is that the variance of $\beta_1$ in the estimated equation,

$$\sigma^2(X_1'M_2X_1)^{-1},$$

where $M_2 = I - X_2(X_2'X_2)^{-1}X_2'$, is always as large as, or larger than, the true variance,

$$\sigma^2(X_1X_1)^{-1}.$$

This increase in the variance is considered to be a fair price to pay for the promise of avoiding inconsistency and bias caused by omitted variables.

**Practice.** As is true for measurement error, the theory and practice of omitted variables diverge, and comforting conclusions regarding the direction of the bias or inconsistency apply only in very special cases. For example, it is unlikely that a single variable is omitted from a regression. A set of omitted variables is more likely, making the expectation above

$$E[\hat{\beta}_1] = \beta_1 + (X_1'X_1)^{-1}X_1x_2 \beta_2.$$

Even more likely than a set of omitted variables is the situation where the researcher is deciding whether to include a known group of previously omitted variables while still omitting a group of unknown or unmeasured variables. This situation can be expressed using the following DGP and two misspecified models. Let the DGP be in scalar notation:

$$Y_t = \beta_{00} + \beta_{11}X_{1t} + \beta_{22}X_{2t} + \varepsilon_{t1},$$

and the two misspecified models be

- Model 1: $Y_t = \beta_{01} + \beta_{11}X_{1t} + \varepsilon_{t1},$
- Model 2: $Y_t = \beta_{02} + \beta_{12}X_{1t} + \beta_{22}X_{1t} + \varepsilon_{t2}.$
Model 1 omits both \( X_2 \) and \( X_3 \), and Model 2 omits just \( X_3 \). The prevalent view in political science is that the bias on \( \beta_{11} \), the estimated coefficient on \( X_1 \) in model 1, is always greater than the bias on \( \beta_{12} \), the estimated coefficient on \( X_1 \) in model 2. Letting the bias on \( \beta_{11} \), \( E[\beta_{11}] - \beta_{11} \), be denoted as \( b(\beta_{11}, \beta_{11}) \) and the bias on \( \beta_{12} \), \( E[\beta_{12}] - \beta_{12} \), be denoted as \( b(\beta_{12}, \beta_{11}) \), the mathematical argument is that

\[
|b(\beta_{11}, \beta_{11})| \geq |b(\beta_{12}, \beta_{11})|.
\]

This conclusion, however, does not hold in general. It can be demonstrated that the inclusion of additional relevant variables can increase or decrease the bias on the \( X_1 \) coefficient. Without knowing the effects of the still omitted variables on the newly included variables, it is impossible to know whether the newly included variables increase or decrease the bias and inconsistency.

**Simultaneity**

Simultaneity is the third major way in which the key assumption necessary for unbiasedness and consistency—the regressors and the disturbances are uncorrelated—can be violated. The problem of simultaneity arises when one of the right-hand-side regressors is determined simultaneously with the dependent variable.

**Theory.** Let the true DGP consist of two equations with two dependent variables, \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \), each of which is a function of the other. The equations also include two exogenous regressors, \( x_1 \) and \( x_2 \), and two sets of disturbances, \( \varepsilon_1 \) and \( \varepsilon_2 \),

\[
\begin{align*}
  y_1 &= \beta_{12}y_2 + \gamma_{11}x_1 + \varepsilon_1, \\
  y_2 &= \beta_{21}y_1 + \gamma_{12}x_2 + \varepsilon_2.
\end{align*}
\]

To see the problem in estimating these equations consistently, rewrite the first equation as

\[
y_1 = Z\delta + \varepsilon_1,
\]

where \( Z = [y_2, x_1] \) and \( \delta' = [-\beta_{12}, -\gamma_{11}] \). The usual ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is

\[
\hat{\delta} = (Z'Z)^{-1}Z'y_1.
\]

Substituting \( Z\delta + \varepsilon_1 \) for \( y_1 \) into the above equation and taking expectations, it is easy to see that the expected value of \( \delta \) does not equal \( \delta \):

\[
E[\delta] = \delta + E[(Z'Z)^{-1}Z'e_1].
\]

The expected value on the right-hand side of the above equation does not approach zero because \( Z \) contains an endogenous variable \( y_2 \), which is jointly determined with \( y_1 \) and thus is correlated with \( \varepsilon_1 \). The result is bias and inconsistency because the main condition for achieving unbiased and consistent estimates, that the columns of \( Z \) be uncorrelated with the disturbance, \( \varepsilon_1 \), is violated.

Faced with the above situation, it is possible to estimate an equation known as the reduced form by rewriting the original two equations as

\[
By + \Gamma x = \varepsilon,
\]

where

\[
\begin{align*}
  B &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \beta_{12} \\ \beta_{21} & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \\
  y' &= [y_1 \ y_2], \\
  \Gamma' &= [\gamma_{11} \ \gamma_{12}], \\
  x' &= [x_1 \ x_2], \\
  \varepsilon' &= [\varepsilon_1 \ \varepsilon_2]
\end{align*}
\]

Provided \( B \) is nonsingular, the equation can be solved in the following way:

\[
\begin{align*}
  y_1 &= -B^{-1}\Gamma x_1 + B^{-1}\varepsilon \\
  &= \Pi x_1 + \nu,
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \Pi = -B^{-1}\Gamma \) and \( \nu = B^{-1}\varepsilon \).

Most of the time, however, political scientists are interested in obtaining estimates of the original coefficients, not of the reduced-form coefficients. The big question is whether estimates of the original coefficients can be recovered from the reduced-form estimates. Consider the model given above, but this time premultiplied by a nonsingular matrix \( G \):

\[
GBy + G\Gamma x = G\varepsilon.
\]

Solving this equation for the reduced-form coefficients produces exactly the same coefficient estimates
as the model that is not premultiplied by the G matrix:

\[ y_t = -B^{-1}G^{-1}G\Gamma x_t + B^{-1}G^{-1}G\varepsilon \]

\[ = \Pi x + \nu, \]

where \( \Pi = -B^{-1}\Gamma \) and \( \nu = B^{-1}\varepsilon \).

It is impossible, then, to recover estimates of the original coefficients because both models produce exactly the same reduced-form coefficients. The equivalence of these two models is known as the identification problem, and much of the practice of simultaneous equations is devoted to solving it. Systems of equations where estimates of the original coefficients can be recovered from the reduced form are identified. Systems where recovery is not possible are unidentified.

**Practice.** In the context of simultaneous equations, the identification problem concerns the ability to recover estimates of the coefficients of interest from the reduced-form coefficients. Ensuring that a system of equations is identified generally requires the use of a priori nonsample information. Such information most frequently comes in the form of exclusion restrictions—a specification that certain endogenous variables and certain exogenous variables do not appear in certain equations. The point is to make it harder, and eventually impossible, to find a G matrix that produces the same set of reduced-form coefficients as the original model. If no such matrix is found, then the system of equations is identified.

Where does the nonsample information come from? As the necessary information cannot be deduced from the data, it has to come from theory. Unfortunately, little theory in political science is detailed enough to provide justifiable exclusion restrictions. Decisions about restrictions, then, are often made on ad hoc grounds. The consequences of making false exclusions are the familiar ones of bias and inconsistency.

Finally, it should be noted that the three major sources of endogeneity—measurement error, omitted variables, and simultaneity—do not occur in isolation from one another. Systems of equations use more variables than single-equation models and are therefore more likely, ceteris paribus, to suffer from measurement error. The use of false exclusion restrictions leads to omitted-variable bias. Any real-life data analysis situation is likely to suffer from all three problems, making any attempts to determine the direction of bias futile.

**What Does Not Need to Be Assumed**

Getting the coefficients “right” requires one major assumption, the disturbance has mean zero and is uncorrelated with each regressor, \( E[X\varepsilon] = 0 \), and one minor assumption, no regressor or set of regressors is a linear combination of any other regressor or set of regressors, or X has full column rank. The list of assumptions that do not need to be made is much longer. For example, it is not necessary to assume normality of any variables, dependent or independent. It is not necessary to assume that the independent variables are uncorrelated with one another or correlated at low levels. It is also unnecessary to assume anything about the variance/covariance matrix of the disturbances. Neither heteroskedasticity nor autocorrelation affects the bias or consistency of the estimator.

**Getting the Standard Errors Right**

Getting the standard errors right is not necessary for getting the coefficients right. The reverse, however, is not true. The problems that can plague estimates of the coefficients—measurement error, omitted variables, and simultaneity—can affect the standard errors. When trying to get the coefficients right, it is often difficult in practice to know the direction of the bias or inconsistency. The same is not true for the standard errors, however. In most cases involving endogeneity, the estimated standard errors are too narrow, leading to over-confidence in the results of the analysis.

Consider the omitted-variable case. When the true DGP is

\[ y = X_1\beta_1 + X_2\beta_2 + \varepsilon, \]

the true variance of \( \beta_1 \) is \( \sigma^2 (X_1^\prime M_2 X_1)^{-1} \). If the variables in \( X_2 \) are omitted from the estimated model, the variance of \( \beta_1 \) is \( \sigma^2 (X_1^\prime X_1)^{-1} \), which is always as small as, or smaller than, the true variance. A similar demonstration can be made in the case of measurement error. As the amount of random error in x increases, the estimated standard error on the coefficient of x decreases. The problem is that
the analyst thinks he has more information than he actually does.

The discussion that follows assumes that endogeneity problems do not exist, so that the other issues that lead to incorrect standard errors can be examined. It is important to remember, however, that the estimated standard errors are likely to be too small even before these additional problems are discovered.

Getting estimates of the regression coefficients right is a matter of making a single, albeit very important, assumption: \( E[X' e] = 0 \). Getting the standard errors right requires making another very important assumption involving the disturbances. This time the assumption is that the squared disturbances are uncorrelated with each regressor, its square, and all cross-products. Formally, the assumption is that \( E[e^2 X' X] = \sigma^2 E[X' X] \), where \( \sigma^2 \) is the expectation of \( e \). This assumption is implied by the more common assumption that the expectation of the squared disturbances is constant \( E[e^2] = \sigma^2 \). Under this assumption, as well as the two previous assumptions—\( X \) has full column rank and \( E[X' e] = 0 \)—the OLS estimator of \( \beta \) is normally distributed, and the standard errors, \( t \) statistics, and \( F \) statistics are asymptotically valid.

As with the previous big assumption, however, violations of the new assumption are both common and likely.

**Heteroskedasticity**

The assumption of homoskedasticity means that each of the disturbances is drawn from a distribution with the same variance as the other disturbances. In conjunction with previous assumptions, the homoskedasticity assumption is \( E[e^2_i] = \sigma^2 \). Violations of this assumption can occur in one of two ways: as a result of misspecification or as a result of the data themselves.

**Misspecification.** Heteroskedasticity due to misspecification can arise in a number of different ways. If the true DGP is

\[
y = X_1 \beta_1 + X_2 \beta_2 + \varepsilon,
\]

and the analyst omits the variables in \( X_2 \) from her model,

\[
y = X_1 \beta_1 + \varepsilon^*,
\]

then the error term is a function of the omitted variables, \( \varepsilon^* = X_2 \beta_2 + \varepsilon \). As the omitted variables vary, so does the error variance.

An incorrect functional form can also cause heteroskedasticity. If the true DGP is nonlinear,

\[
y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i^2 + \varepsilon_i,
\]

and the analyst estimates a linear model,

\[
y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i + \varepsilon_i,
\]

then the disturbance is again a function of \( x_i \), \( \varepsilon_i = f(x_i^2, \varepsilon_i) \). As \( x \) varies, so does the error variance.

A coefficient that varies across observations can also be a source of heteroskedasticity. Consider a data-generating process where

\[
y_i = \beta_0 + \beta x_i + \varepsilon_i,
\]

and \( \beta_i \) varies randomly around some fixed \( \beta : \beta_i = \beta + \nu_i \). Application of OLS estimates the model:

\[
y_i = \beta_0 + (\beta + \nu_i) x_i + \varepsilon_i = \beta_0 + \beta x_i + (\nu x_i + \varepsilon_i),
\]

and once again, the error term is a function of \( x \).

A multiplicative error term and an incorrect data transformation are other specification issues that could cause heteroskedasticity.

**Data.** The data can also be a source of heteroskedasticity. In the simplest case, an influential outlier can cause heteroskedasticity. By the same token, a heavily skewed regressor can also cause a nonconstant error variance.

Specific kinds of data can be a source of the problem. Aggregate data are a common source of heteroskedasticity. If the dependent variable is an average or a proportion, the variance is a function of the number of observations being aggregated in the different units. If the estimated model is based on an average,

\[
\bar{y}_j = \beta_0 + \beta \bar{x}_j + \bar{\varepsilon}_j,
\]

where \( \bar{\varepsilon}_j \) is an average for the \( j \)th unit over \( i \) individuals, the variance of the error term is
Var(\(\hat{e}_i\)) = \(\sigma^2/N_i\). The error variance, then, clearly varies with the size of the group. A similar demonstration can be performed for a dependent variable based on a proportion.

Finally, heteroskedasticity most commonly occurs with cross-sectional data where units of different sizes, whether they be individuals, firms, industries, or states, are taken together. It is easy to imagine larger units having larger absolute error terms. A $900 billion economy is more likely to see an absolute error of $10 billion than a $100 billion economy.

**Autocorrelation**

The assumption of no autocorrelation means that the disturbance associated with one observation is unrelated to the disturbance associated with any other observation. Formally, the assumption is \(E[\varepsilon_i \varepsilon_j] = 0\) for \(i \neq j\). As is the case with heteroskedasticity, violations are the result of misspecification of the data themselves.

**Misspecification.** Like heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation can be the result of omitted variables, incorrect functional form, or data manipulation. An omitted variable that happens to be autocorrelated causes the disturbances to be autocorrelated. A special case of this result occurs when the omitted variable is the lagged value of the dependent variable. Autocorrelation arises in this case due to the influence of the lagged value on the current value. If a linear functional form is used to model a nonlinear relationship, there will be sections of the relationship where the estimated regression line consistently underestimates or overestimates the relationship. Finally, smoothing techniques such as moving averages can induce a periodicity in the disturbances that did not exist prior to the smoothing.

**Data.** Autocorrelation is, somewhat obviously, most likely to occur in data that are observed over time. Such variables often display a “stickiness” and only change in small increments over time. State budgets, for example, only change marginally from year to year. Successive observations, then, are likely to be correlated. Similarly, random shocks to a system, such as war or a market crash, have prolonged effects across time periods, leading to correlated disturbances.

A more subtle form of autocorrelation arises from cross-sectional data. Spatial autocorrelation can occur when observations are taken from units that are physically adjacent to one another, such as states or countries. The behavior of individuals from adjacent West European countries is likely to be affected by similar unmeasured factors, which leads to correlated disturbances.

**What to Do**

The conclusion to draw from the discussion above is not that regression can never be trusted. All the problems that have been detailed have solutions that are examined elsewhere in this encyclopedia. The discussion that follows outlines a few broad approaches to addressing the common assumption violations encountered by political scientists using the linear regression model.

Endogeneity problems can often be dealt with through the use of instrumental-variables regression. Mismeasured variables, for instance, can be replaced with “instruments,” which are alternative variables that are uncorrelated with the disturbance term and yet are still correlated with the mismeasured regressors. Any regressor that is uncorrelated with the disturbance term can serve as its own instrument.

Let the matrix of instruments be \(Z\), which has at least as many columns (regressors) as the original matrix of regressors, \(X\). Next, premultiply the usual linear regression equation by \(Z’\):

\[
\hat{Z}’y = \hat{Z}’X\hat{\beta} + \hat{Z}’e,
\]

where the variance of \(Z’e\) is \(\sigma^2(Z’Z)\). The instrumental-variables (IV) estimator is, then,

\[
\hat{\beta}_{IV} = (X’Z(Z’Z)^{-1}Z’X)^{-1}X’Z(Z’Z)^{-1}Z’y,
\]

with variance \(\text{Var}(\hat{\beta}_{IV}) = \sigma^2(X’Z(Z’Z)^{-1}Z’)X)^{-1}\). Estimates are easily calculated by noting that \(\hat{X} = Z(Z’Z)^{-1}Z’X\) are the fitted values from the regression of \(X\) on \(Z\). The instrumental-variables estimator, then, is just

\[
\hat{\beta}_{IV} = (\hat{X}’\hat{X})^{-1}\hat{X}’y.
\]

It can be easily shown that the instrumental-variables estimator is consistent and, therefore, it
is possible to get correct coefficients. The trade-off for this gain in consistency is loss of precision.

Problems relating to the error term, such as heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, can be dealt with either through feasible generalized least squares or through calculation of robust standard errors. In the case of heteroskedasticity, the challenge is to estimate the correct variance/covariance matrix, which is

\[
\text{Var}(\hat{\beta}) = (X'X)^{-1}X'\sigma^2\Omega X(X'X)^{-1}
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{n} \left( \frac{1}{n} X'X \right)^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{n} X'[\sigma^2\Omega]X \right) \left( \frac{1}{n} X'X \right)^{-1}.
\]

Estimating \(\sigma^2\Omega\), the dimensions of which are \(n \times n\), is impossible with \(n\) observations. Estimating \(\left( \frac{1}{n} X'[\sigma^2\Omega]X \right)\), however, is not impossible, as its dimensions are only \(K \times K\), where \(K\) is the number of regressors in \(X\). It can be shown that this expression is equal to

\[
\frac{1}{n} \sum \sigma_i^2 x_i x_i',
\]

and the above can be consistently estimated by

\[
S = \frac{1}{n} \sum \hat{e}_i^2 x_i x_i',
\]

where \(\hat{e}_i\) is the residual for the \(i\)th observation. The correct variance/covariance is consistently estimated by

\[
\text{Var}(\hat{\beta}) = n(X'X)^{-1}S(X'X)^{-1}.
\]

It is important to remember that these techniques bring with them their own sets of assumptions, which may or may not be more plausible than the assumptions of OLS. The key assumption of the instrumental-variables procedure is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the disturbance. This assumption cannot be tested, and the use of “quasi instruments,” instruments that are only approximately uncorrelated with the disturbance, can produce incorrect inferences. Strong theory is required to make such assumptions plausible.

Assumptions and the Generalized Linear Model

As noted in the introduction to the linear regression model discussion, GLM replaced the linear regression model as the workhorse of political science. A GLM is one that assumes a distribution included in the linear exponential family. These distributions include, among others, the normal, the Bernoulli, the exponential, and the Poisson. These models are estimated by maximum likelihood, and their good properties only hold asymptotically.

GLMs require very strong distributional assumptions. In addition, they require many of the same assumptions as the linear regression model. Some of these assumptions, however, work very differently in this setting. Consider the probit model. The model is derived by assuming that a latent or unobserved variable \(y^*\) is a function of some regressors and an error term:

\[
y^* = X\beta + \epsilon.
\]

All that is observed of the latent variable is whether it is greater than zero:

\[
y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } y_i^* > 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } y_i^* \leq 0. \end{cases}
\]

Given the above, the probability of observing a one is

\[
\Pr(y_i = 1) = \Pr(y_i^* > 0) = \Pr(x_i\beta + \epsilon_i > 0) = \Pr(\epsilon_i > -x_i\beta) = \Pr(\epsilon_i < x_i\beta) = F(x_i\beta),
\]

where \(F()\) is the cumulative distribution function of \(\epsilon\). The probit model comes from assuming that \(\epsilon\) is distributed normally.

The probit model makes the same key assumption that the linear regression model does: \(\epsilon\) and the regressors must be uncorrelated with one another. Unfortunately, not all the lessons learned in the linear regression case are applicable to probit models. For example, the linear regression model does not require normality for consistency. The probit model, however, does. The \(\epsilon\) must be drawn from independent and identically distributed normal distributions. For the linear regression model, the OLS estimator is unbiased and consistent when a
relevant variable is omitted from the regression, provided that the omitted variable is uncorrelated with the included variables. This result does not hold for probit models. When a relevant variable is omitted from a probit specification, the estimated coefficients on the included variables are biased and inconsistent whether or not the omitted variable is correlated with the included variables. By the same token, robust standard errors are often a useful way of dealing with heteroskedasticity in the linear regression model. Robust standard errors, however, make little sense for the probit model. If the model is correct, so are the standard errors. If the model is seriously misspecified, use of robust standard errors provides asymptotically correct variance estimates on wrong coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors, then, are of little help in this context.

The lessons learned from the linear regression model have, at best, heuristic value when it comes to more complex models such as GLMs. New assumptions have to be made, and old assumptions often have to be revisited and reevaluated. Solutions to problems that work for the linear regression case may not work for GLMs. It is important to remember that complex models are more than just fancy linear regressions.

Assumptions and Inference

Of the two goals of quantitative modeling in political science mentioned in the introduction—description and inference—the latter is more difficult to achieve. The reason for this inequity is that inference depends on assumptions that are far stronger than the assumptions on which consistency and unbiasedness rest, and as argued above, these assumptions rarely hold in political science data sets. Although these assumptions can be relaxed with the use of more complicated statistical models, the fact remains that the model has to be nearly right for correct inference, and that is a tall order in political science.

Of all the assumptions needed for correct inferences, the most fundamental is yet to be discussed. When introducing the linear regression model, a random sample of size \( n \) from a population of interest was assumed. This assumption is standard in statistical analysis and allows traditional statistical inference to work. In very few situations, however, do political science data sets resemble anything even close to a random sample drawn from a population. The question then becomes “To what are political scientists making inferences?” Whether the data comprise a set of international wars, American states, or Western European democracies, there is no actual population to make inferences to, and these samples are rarely treated as populations in and of themselves. Political scientists pay little attention to this issue, and most articles that make use of quantitative modeling in the discipline make no mention of the population of interest, how the sample was generated, or to what the statistical inferences refer.

The real question that needs to be addressed concerns the source of the randomness in the data. In what is known as design-based inference, the population is seen as fixed, and the sample is the result of a stochastic process such as simple random sampling or stratified random sampling. Inferences are made in traditional fashion from the sample to the population from which it was drawn. In what is known as model-based inference, the observed values are seen as realizations of random variables and therefore constitute realizations of a random process. Most political scientists practice model-based inference as true random samples from known populations are relatively rare in the discipline.

Model-based inference comes in two versions. Political scientists, when asked what population they are making inferences to, often respond by talking about a superpopulation. A superpopulation is an imaginary population from which the data could have been randomly drawn had the imaginary population existed. A researcher first assumes the existence of an imaginary population (the superpopulation) and then assumes that the sample at hand is drawn randomly from the imaginary population. There are situations in the sciences where assuming a superpopulation makes sense. To borrow an example, it might be sensible to consider the hurricanes generated in the Atlantic Ocean in a given year under certain meteorological conditions as a random draw from the population of hurricanes that could have been produced in the Atlantic Ocean in that year. There is, in such a circumstance, a real stochastic process that generates the observations. The same cannot be said of, for instance, election data. Political scientists are fond of saying that the world could have turned out differently,
and thus, the data are like a random draw from the superpopulation of elections across different worlds. Unlike the process that generates Atlantic hurricanes, however, there is no actual stochastic process that could generate these imaginary elections.

The second version of model-based inference is closer to what political scientists actually do. In this version, there is no population, and no pretense is made about making inferences to a population. Instead, a model is proposed that accounts for the way nature produces the data. Inferences are then made back to features of the model. The sample design is irrelevant under model-based inference, which is why it fits well with political science. The downside of model-based inference is its dependence on a model, which may be misspecified in any of the ways discussed earlier. If the model is bad, so are the inferences based on it. An awareness on the part of political scientists that they are engaged in model-based inference is important because it highlights just how fundamental models and their constituent assumptions are to the practice of data analysis in political science.

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See also Categorical Response Data; Data Analysis, Exploratory; Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; Factor Analysis; Logit and Probit Analyses; Maximum Likelihood; Measurement; Misspecification; Models, Computational/Agent-Based; Sampling, Random and Nonrandom; Simultaneous Equation Modeling; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian; Statistics: Overview; Time-Series Analysis; Variables, Instrumental; Weighted Least Squares

Further Readings


Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods

Perhaps no division in the social sciences is so persistent, nettlesome, and poorly understood as the division between quantitative and qualitative ways of knowing. The cleavage can be traced back to the first applications of statistics within the disciplines of economics, political science, and sociology, and it became increasingly acute in the late 20th century as quantitative approaches gained in stature, grew in complexity, and pushed qualitative empirical analysis out of the limelight. During this period, the division between qualitative and quantitative methods became associated—perhaps inappropriately—with the rival epistemological positions of positivism and interpretivism. Charles Smith (1989) summarizes the now familiar standoff:

On the one hand, there are those who argue that only through the application of quantitative measurements and methods can the social sciences ever hope to become “real” sciences; on the other hand, there are those who claim that the subject matter of the social sciences is simply not amenable to quantification and all attempts to impose such measures and methods upon social behavior is just so much nonsense. (p. 29)

This entry looks at the strengths and weaknesses of both positions in terms of their contributions to the comparability of findings.

Debate Positions

While there have been many attempts to shed light on this persistent division in the social sciences, work on this question is generated primarily by writers who occupy one of the two camps. These
writers tend to be either strong partisans or visceral opponents of the quantitative worldview. A chronic dualism besets many of these debates, in large part because the distinction between quantitative and qualitative forms of descriptive and causal inference has been folded into the much larger and more “philosophical” debate between positivism and interpretivism. Positivists (or naturalists), usually identified with quantitative methods, present their perspective as hegemonic: There is, or ought to be, only one logic of inference. The conclusion of these scholars is that either there are no important distinctions between qualitative and quantitative work or, to the extent that such distinctions exist, they are to the detriment of qualitative scholarship. “When possible, quantify” is the motto of this camp. Where quantification is not possible, this camp encourages qualitative scholars to follow the logic of quantitative reasoning. Defenders of qualitative work typically emphasize the limits of quantification and the insights that can be gained through an interpretive approach to social action. Rather than a unified logic, interpretivists suggest that there might be multiple logics at work in the social sciences. These multiple logics stem from epistemological or ontological commitments, which may themselves be culturally prescribed and political or historical in origin.

A third position runs orthogonal to this debate. According to this view, the qualitative/quantitative division is inherently ambiguous and, hence, a distraction from the real work of social science. In this spirit, a recent lexicon focused on qualitative inquiry notes, in the entry for “Qualitative,” that “the adjective does not clearly signal a particular meaning” (Thomas A. Schwandt, 1997, p. 129). Rather, it is used as a “blanket designation for all forms of [hermeneutic] inquiry including ethnography, case study research, naturalistic inquiry, ethnography, life history methodology, narrative inquiry, and the like.” In sum, concludes the author of this dictionary of qualitative methods (with no apparent sense of irony), “Qualitative research’ is simply not a very useful term for denoting a specific set of characteristics of inquiry” (Schwandt, 1997, p. 130). The inherent fuzziness of the concepts “qualitative” and “quantitative” thus prompts some scholars to argue that the so-called debate must be a red herring, that is, a distraction from the real issues of social science methodology.

Thus, one finds three well-articulated positions: (1) naturalism (one logic of inquiry, based implicitly on the quantitative template), (2) pluralism (multiple logics of inquiry, with qualitative and quantitative work founded on different epistemologies), and (3) agnosticism. Many scholars are sympathetic to the naturalist goal of a single, unified logic of inquiry; only in this fashion can the scientific objective of knowledge cumulation be achieved. However, others are dubious whether the quantitative template provides an adequate framework for work across the social sciences. While the agnostic position is attractive, it seems to be mostly rhetorical. Scholars continue to divide themselves into camps—for example, departments, journals, editorial boards—and these camps are often classifiable as predominantly qualitative or quantitative. These two concepts refuse to be banished, suggesting that there must be something somewhere.

As a way of cutting into this subject in a new fashion, this entry proposes a new way of thinking about these issues: The principal factor separating qualitative observations from quantitative observations is the assumed comparability of the evidence at hand. Quantitative observations presume a population of things that can be readily measured, counted, and hence compared. Qualitative observations, in contrast, presume an empirical field where individual pieces of evidence are not directly comparable with one another, at least not to the extent that they can be precisely measured. In this sense, quantitative work is appropriately labeled “nomothetic” and qualitative work, “idiographic.” The key point is that the difference between these two kinds of observations rests on the presumed comparability of adjacent observations, not (at least not directly) on the size of the sample, the style of presentation (numbers or narrative), epistemology, ontology, or the formal structure of the method.

The purpose of this entry, it should be stressed, is not to reinforce existing cleavages in the social sciences. Rather, it intends to draw attention to an important underlying issue in these debates, an issue that has not received much recognition in the literature. This is not the only issue underlying the qualitative/quantitative divide, but it is a fundamental issue. If analysis is based on comparison, the central methodological question is what
researchers can reasonably compare and how precise those comparisons can be. In this case, there are legitimate differences of opinion, and they are not the sort that can be empirically proven.

**Comparability**

Comparable observations are understood as members of the same population and therefore potential members of the same sample. They are examples of a similar phenomenon. They are apples and apples, rather than apples and oranges, to use the time-honored metaphor. Note that comparing apples and oranges is not prohibited; however, to do so one must adopt a higher-order concept—such as fruit—according to which apples and oranges are similar. This commonsense meaning of comparability is widely understood and agreed on. But what does it mean for items to be comparable within the context of social science research? Surely, it is more than shared membership in an arbitrary linguistic category.

First, comparable observations must share a set of relevant descriptive attributes (dimensions). This is what makes them comparable. The observations need not demonstrate the same values for those attributes. Each observation in a sample may “score” differently on each attribute in either quantitative or qualitative terms—high/low, present/absent, and so on. But each observation must be *scaleable*, and the attribute must have the same meaning (roughly or precisely) across the contexts in which it is being compared. This can be labeled *descriptive comparability*, suggesting that it is a fundamental feature of conceptual validity. The defining attributes of a concept must be valid across the designated observations. Otherwise, the concept is being “stretched.”

A second kind of comparability refers to the interrelationship of two factors in a causal analysis, the cause (or vector of causal factors) X and the outcome Y. The specified X/Y relationship must hold across the chosen observations. This is labeled *causal comparability* (a looser version of *unit homogeneity*).

Thus, there are two kinds of comparability: descriptive and causal. The first is presumed in the second. If a sample of observations is assumed to be causally comparable, then it must also be descriptively comparable. In statistical research, the assumption of unit homogeneity makes this explicit, but it must also be true more generally, for causal comparability can exist only in the presence of descriptive comparability.

**Precision and Explicitness**

The underlying issues in the enduring qualitative/quantitative debate are tethered to the problem of comparability, as defined above. To “quantify” an observation is to formulate it in terms that can be *explicitly and precisely* compared across a large number of observations, that is, where a concept can be expressed on a numerical scale, a metric, or a variable (herein these three words are used interchangeably). Quantitative observations combine natural-language words (nouns, verbs, or adjectives) with numbers according to some preassigned metric. It is a question of measurement, which can be regarded as the assignment of numbers to phenomena in accordance with some uniformly applied rule.

Let us begin with a discussion of the concept of precision. Note that to simply recode a dichotomous natural-language category as a series of binary numbers does not make it any more precise. Thus, 0/1 is no more precise than pregnant/not pregnant. However, numerical scales offer the possibility of greater precision when the number of categories surpasses the categories inherent in natural language, as well as in circumstances where these categories can be understood as positions on a continuous (interval) scale. To say that one room is warmer than another is comparative, but it is less precise than saying that one room is 21 degrees Celsius and the other is 16 degrees Celsius. Thus, in many situations, the use of a quantitative idiom allows for more precise comparisons across units. In all situations, the use of a scale is *at least as* precise as natural language (in the sense that no precision is lost in the translation of words to numbers). Again, to use a quantitative idiom does not entail great precision; it entails the possibility of great precision (as well as a more explicit set of comparisons).

Precision should not be confused with *certainty*. Quantitative or qualitative statements may be uttered with more or less confidence. For example, one might say, “I would guess that the room is 21 degrees Celsius” or “I would guess that the room is warm.” With quantitative statements,
a mathematical indicator of uncertainty may accompany the point score. The statement that quantitative observations are more precise refers to the point estimate, not the degree of uncertainty (or dispersion).

Quantitative statements are both more precise (at least potentially) and more explicit. This is because the very act of creating a numerical scale requires a set of explicit comparisons and an explicit comparison set—a domain. Scales cannot be developed in highly specific contexts. Suppose that we classify the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, as a single event consisting of four jointly organized attacks. If we treat the attacks of September 11 as a single event rather than four separate events, the idea of developing a barometer for 9/11 is nonsensical because there is nothing to which to relate it—scales make sense only relative to classes of events (unless, of course, that event is being used as a metric for understanding other events, in which case it becomes a comparative metric). Weather can be measured precisely because, for one thing, there is lots of weather to measure, and temperature is thought to have the same general meaning in many different contexts. Granted, all scales are bounded; there is no universal scale (a scale applying to everything). Some things, such as metaphysics, have no temperature; the concept of temperature (and whatever scale might be used to measure it) does not apply in this domain. The point is that relative to words, which are only loosely and implicitly comparative, scales are precisely and explicitly comparative, and their range is usually quite broad (otherwise, why bother to develop a systematic scale?).

Now, it is true that some natural-language adjectives, such as warm, are explicitly comparative. But most words are more ambiguous. This is apparent in the extra locutions that are necessary to render ordinary language comparative. One must clarify “warmer than,” “more chairlike than,” and so on; whereas, to append such judgments to a numerical scale is redundant. (One does not say, “The temperature is 21 degrees Celsius, warmer than 18 degrees Celsius.”) Numerical scales are already comparative, and no matter what one does with a numerical observation, it cannot lose its precise, explicitly comparative quality.

To be sure, if one labels an object with a noun—for example, chair—one is implicitly (if not explicitly) comparing it with other objects: nonchairs. Language has this universal aspect; if we call something X, we imply that other things are not X, or less X or more X. However, the comparisons are vague. It is unclear, for example, where a chair leaves off and a stool begins, for few words—and very few key words in social science—have crisp boundaries. More important, most words are multivalent; they have more than one attribute and, consequently, can mean more than one thing. Thus, to say that an object is “not A” could mean a number of different things, depending on the attribute(s) that is intended by the author or understood by the reader. Moreover, a word usually gains meaning by its context, and this context is undefined in settings other than what the author is studying. Additionally, the other objects that are not X are typically not defined, in which case the larger population of cases (the domain of the inference) remains implicit. Finally, words are contingent on a particular natural language, and this imposes another sort of contextual boundary against comparison. (In contrast, the numeral “5” and the operator “=” mean the same thing everywhere—since the adoption of a uniform language of mathematics—and they also mean the same thing in all the contexts that they might be employed.)

Frequently, natural-language comparisons are without any obvious comparative reference point. The statement “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” is comparative in so many possible ways that it might be considered noncomparative: He did not cross it, he did not cross the Tiber, it was not Brutus who crossed the Rubicon, and so on. If this is comparative, it is so in the most minimal sense. Yet it is important for the purposes here to recognize that comparison is a matter of degree. Qualitative observations can be more or less comparative, but quantitative observations are almost always more precisely and explicitly comparative.

One final clarification is in order. This entry has stated that all quantitative statements about the world invoke a class of events; these form the basis for the metric. However, it does not follow that quantitative statements about the world are necessarily broader in scope than qualitative statements. Indeed, the very fuzziness of natural language gives us the license to generalize—for one can avoid saying anything very specific—while the exactness of quantification may rein in the temptation to generalize. It
follows that qualitative statements can be either very restricted in scope (as in the previous example about the singular event of 9/11) or extremely broad. Saying something in words does not affect the scope of the inference. Saying something with a metric, however, presupposes a class of referents, which is to say it must make reference to more than one discrete event (and these reference points must be fairly precise and explicit).

**Trade-Offs: Thick and Thin Description**

In principle, any qualitative observation can be converted to quantitative form, as attested by the plethora of methods and software designed to perform this function, for example, NUD*IST software, Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), and various narrative-based methods, as well as more generic forms of content analysis. There is no such thing as a non-quantifiable observation because any single statement that can be made about one phenomenon could also be made about another phenomenon, thus providing the possibility of some sort of scale. Yet it is not clear that one would always want to make this transposition from words to words-with-numbers (variables). Indeed, there are usually costs associated with this conversion. The trade-off may be understood in terms of precision and explicitness on the one hand and depth (or richness) on the other. More concisely, the analyst has the option of describing *thinly* (with less depth) or describing *thickly* (with more depth). The fact is that words are usually multivalent; they generally carry a variety of attributes, some of which may not even be logically consistent. This is particularly true of key words in social science—for example, democracy, justice, corporatism, political party. When one of these words is converted to a measurable variable, which is to say to a precise scale, the researcher is generally forced to drop one or more of its attributes. For not all these attributes will be precisely applicable to the class of phenomena that the concept is now (quite explicitly) intended to cover. This does not necessarily refer to an expansion in scope, for natural language can reach as far as mathematical variables. But in making the comparison precise and explicit, it is usually necessary to narrow the definition of the natural-language concept. It could be that the intension of the natural-language concept is also quite a bit narrower than the full set of attributes normally (in ordinary language) associated with the term. An author is free to define a term as he or she sees fit; qualitative work is not wedded to ordinary language. The point is, in creating a variable, one is forced to make explicit choices about which definitional attributes apply properly to a class of phenomena and which do not. This is likely to prompt some narrowing of the semantic options. And this is why the choice to quantify a concept is considered a move toward thin description. More explicit comparisons can be made, but they are narrowed down to one or several dimensions (the chosen attributes of the core concept).

Similarly, if one chooses to particularize rather than to generalize, natural language is the obvious vehicle of choice. As previously pointed out, it is inappropriate to construct a scale when the class of instances under investigation is one or several. A scale presupposes a population. In contrast, a word can be used in a highly specific context; it does not presuppose an explicit comparison with other instances. This means that in describing the singularity of an event, one is drawn toward the implements of natural language. The lack of perfect commensurability between words used in one context and the same words used in another context allows the researcher the facility to elucidate what is different—categorically (qualitatively), not marginally (quantitatively)—about that phenomenon. A very high score on some scale can be (indeed, must be) indicated with a quantitative metric. But a very different kind of score requires a word, perhaps a series of words.

In short, there are gains and losses in the transposition of words to numbers, and vice versa. What is interesting about this classic debate is that both may be described as “reductionist.” Quantitative studies are often accused of reducing reality and, in the process, distorting that reality to fit the austere requirements of the quantitative format. Each piece of reality must be sliced up into variables, and these must be comparable across all observations. Qualitative studies are accused of a different kind of reduction, in which a subject is shrunk down to a highly particular context—the country, neighborhood, or event of special interest.

These contrasting notions of reduction and expansion are best understood as arguments over comparability. Scholars inclined toward the tools
provided by natural language are often keen to explore a wide variety of different aspects in a particular setting. They wish to explore multiple dimensions of one thing. (*Dimension* is employed as a synonym for *variable* in this context.) Qualitative analysis is thus often focused inward, like a vast funnel. Many comparisons are made, but they are all understood as features of the same general topic, existing in one time and place. Natural language is adept for this purpose, for it is rich, textured, context specific, and multivalent. It elucidates a wealth of details about a person, event, or situation. This is why some scholars find a natural affinity between qualitative tools and ethnographic, historical, and—more broadly—interpretivist styles of research. In contrast, scholars inclined to a numerical understanding of the world are drawn to comparisons that are broad and thin. They intend to explore one particular dimension of many things.

The interesting aspect of this familiar contrast is that both qualitative and quantitative scholars perceive their work as conforming to the natural bend of the universe. Qualitative scholars usually assume a *case-centered* approach. Different aspects of the same cases are grouped; they go together. Quantitative scholars are drawn toward a *dimensional* approach to comparability. A single aspect (dimension) of an entity is assumed to be comparable across multiple cases. This is sometimes referred to as *variable-centered* analysis. While for a qualitative scholar it would seem natural to explore everything about A, for a quantitative scholar it would seem more natural to explore one thing about A, B, and C. Underlying scholars’ choices of method are certain assumptions about cross-case comparability. The tools scholars choose—words or numbers—are, in part, the expression of their relative confidence in the ability to compare across entities in a given research context. This is not to deny that many scholars use both words and numbers. The point is that, within a given context, the likelihood of choosing one or the other strategy is influenced by assumptions about case comparability.

**Construing Meaning Versus Analyzing Behavior**

The importance of comparison is illustrated in one of the most common defenses of qualitative work in the interpretive mode. It is often said that qualitative analysis focuses on human meanings, while quantitative analysis focuses on the behavioral components of human reality—that is, actions, institutions, or events. From the interpretivist perspective, the business of social science is one of construing meaning, not analyzing behavior. Yet one might reasonably inquire, why not study human meanings quantitatively—that is, with scalar measures—in addition to studying them qualitatively?

One rationale is that human meaning is constructed through language (which establishes the categories by which we understand the world); therefore, it makes sense to study these linguistic categories through other linguistic categories rather than the (somewhat alien) categories of numbers. Herbert Blumer (1969) concludes,

> The crucial limit to the successful application of variable analysis to human group life is set by the process of interpretation or definition that goes on in human groups. This process, which I believe to be the core of human action, gives a character to human group life that seems to be at variance with the logical premises of variable analysis. (p. 132)

The problem, though, is not that the analysis of linguistic phenomena must be carried out with linguistic tools; after all, the contemporary discipline of linguistics is heavily quantitative. Indeed, quantitative observations are necessarily rooted in language because all scales must be expressible in a linguistic category; every variable must have a name. What is it, then, that seems so problematic about collecting quantitative observations about semantic realities? Why is there no quantitative hermeneutics?

The problem is at the core of the qualitative/quantitative dispute: the problem of representing human meaning across diverse contexts in an explicit and precise fashion. It is a problem of comparability, not of language per se, that is at issue. And what makes it so problematic is a basic feature of human life. The ways in which we make sense of our lived experience are extraordinarily diverse—through time, across cultures, and across individuals. It is difficult to reduce this complexity to standard categories, as quantitative knowledge requires.
Consider the question of human happiness (variously understood as welfare or quality of life), which has attracted increasing attention on the part of psychologists, sociologists, and economists. The following scale was developed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census to measure the quality of life: (a) terrible, (b) unhappy, (c) mostly dissatisfied, (d) mixed, (e) mostly satisfied, (f) mostly pleased, (g) delighted. The question we might ask ourselves is whether human happiness is accurately captured in these categories. This is to say, does a person who answers \( b = \text{unhappy} \) have a lower quality of life than a person who responds with \( d = \text{mixed} \)? There are potential problems of conceptual validity, and the issue is not simply a lack of sophistication on the part of researchers. More fundamentally, the problem is that human meanings—such as happiness—are resistant to uniform comparisons across diverse subjects. One feels much more comfortable with imprecise comparisons expressed in the looseness, and contextual specificity, of natural language. We might say, for example, that “Smith is happy,” implying that across some undefined population, Smith’s level of happiness is, let us say, somewhere above the mean. However, we are probably reluctant to assign a precise score to Smith’s happiness, because such a score would presume a precise comparison with all others in the population.

This is not meant to imply that all human meanings are unquantifiable. Nor is it meant to imply that social scientists should abstain from quantifying difficult and ambiguous emotions such as human happiness. There may be much to learn from the quantification of abstract concepts that summarize a great deal of information about human experience. The point is simply that the profitability of quantifying varies with the topic, and the core issue is the comparability of the phenomena across the chosen population. Certain topics are more recalcitrant, and these tend to be tied up with the generation of meaning (values, ideas, intentions) rather than observable behavior. It is noteworthy, for example, that some human intentions seem to be more quantifiable than others, and these tend to be those where a high level of comparability across individuals or across cultures can be assumed. Thus, scholars routinely measure the concept of “economic voting” because the notion “pursuing material interests” seems comparable, and hence valid, across individuals and populations. In contrast, the measurement of religious influences on voting behavior is much more difficult to quantify because it is more difficult to compare.

**Conclusion**

Approaches in the social sciences are often understood as qualitative or quantitative. Scholars differ in their opinions about the utility of this distinction. Some dismiss it as a red herring; others feel that there is good justification for the division. Still others suggest that there is no plausible way of discarding the distinction but that it is greatly misunderstood, and the key to this misunderstanding is to be found in assumptions about comparability.

There is indeed a difference in basic-level assumptions between statements that are quantitative (i.e., understood through a numerical scale, a metric, or a variable) and those that are qualitative (i.e., expressed in natural language). Quantitative descriptive statements presuppose a class of cases that can be compared in an explicit and precise manner. To measure phenomenon X is to impose a very specific metric on it, one that is explicitly comparative (since other phenomena in this same category are assumed to be scoreable). Qualitative descriptive statements do not make any such presuppositions. There may or may not be an identifiable class of comparable cases that can be measured along some set of dimensions. Often, the assumption is quite the reverse—particularizing rather than generalizing. Thus, to quantify something is to compare in an explicit and precise manner. To qualify is to leave such comparisons open; one may or may not engage in explicit comparisons with adjacent cases, and any comparisons made are unlikely to be very precise. While this might seem to indicate a distinct advantage for quantitative work, this entry also shows that there are costs to assuming a quantitative idiom. Not only must the cases be (actually) comparable, but there is usually some loss of information since words are usually multivalent and metrics are usually unidimensional (or at most combine several dimensions). It is not clear that scholars always gain in analytic leverage by moving from words to numbers. They do, however, make different sorts of comparisons.
The choice between math and natural language as tools of social science is, therefore, a highly consequential choice. Methodological tools help us reconstruct the empirical world; they are not theory neutral. In this respect, the division between math and language is akin to the influence that the early anthropologists and linguists assigned to language. Different languages divide the world into different packages; they encourage us to visualize things in different ways. So, arguably, do the different “languages” of mathematics and ordinary speech. Quantitative tools help us compare and, hence, generalize; qualitative tools encourage us to differentiate.

It is quite another thing, however, to disentangle the causal priority of methodologies and ontologies. Do cultural anthropologists use qualitative tools because they envision a lumpy universe, or do they see a lumpy universe because they perceive it with qualitative tools? About all one can say with any degree of confidence is that there is a strong synergy between methods and ontologies. One can presume that they are, at the very least, strongly reinforcing. This may help account for the virulence and endurance of this central cleavage in the social sciences today.

It is not merely a matter of numbers versus words or a debate about what can or cannot be quantified. More fundamentally, the venerable debate represents fundamental disagreements over how precise, explicit, and extensive social science comparisons ought to be. Those who resist numerical analysis are dubious about the validity of comparisons. They see no need to enhance the precision or explicitness of comparisons because they do not seek to compare in the first place, or they seek a more restricted ambit of comparative reference points. Those who embrace quantification are more comfortable with such comparisons. This debate has been engaged at many levels—across individuals, levels of government, cultures, and time periods—and over many years. It shows no sign of dissipating.

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See also Comparative Methods; Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; Hermeneutics; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions

Further Readings

QUASI-EXPERIMENTS

See Experiments, Natural
Racism

Racism is a set of beliefs, practices, and social structures that treats groups of human beings socially defined by unalterable, often physical, attributes (races) as inherently unequal. Racism is a form of subordination and exclusion. It is a part of the power structure of institutions and social relations. Racism is sustained by coercion and consent, and it is expressed in prejudice, discrimination, oppression, violence, or, in some extreme cases, genocide. This broader perspective on racism, epitomized in the work of William Edward Burghardt Du Bois (1868–1963), is dominant in political science, sociology, and social anthropology.

In social and political psychology, the term is used more narrowly to describe a set of beliefs or attitudes. William Graham Sumner (1840–1910) took such an approach, identifying racism as a specific form of ethnocentrism related to the perception of ingroup/outgroup relations. Racism is a set of prejudices that enables and legitimates exploitation and scapegoating based on the “overgeneralization” that the different capacities and characteristics of a human being are determined by his or her belonging to a group. This standpoint is often associated with the work of Gordon Allport (1897–1967).

In everyday life, the term racism is often used loosely with respect to subordination or hostility toward a group.

From a historical perspective, racism is considered as a modern phenomenon. Besides the discussion on the existence of “proto-racism” in ancient Greek or Rome, the emergence of modern racism is connected to the Enlightenment and the appearance of scientific theories of the evolution of humankind. The search for the biological foundation of human behavior led to essentialist interpretations of the differences between groups of human beings, although the analytical distinction between biology and culture was increasingly used: One of the characteristics of racism is that the cultural characteristics and potentials of groups are seen as basically determined by biological differences.

Politically, racism is associated with conquest, colonialism, enslavement, and genocide. With the emergence of nationalism, racism became part of the social construction of national homogeneity. The emphasis on the cultural uniqueness of a nation-state led to certain types of culturally based exclusionary ideologies—for example, in romantic nationalism, often associated with the ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). The democratic revolutions on both sides of the Atlantic led to the first attempts at emancipation of Blacks from slavery and Jews from the ghettos. Contrary to those efforts at emancipation, racism as a system of beliefs became further elaborated, as exemplified in the work of Arthur de Gobineau (1816–1882). He combines the idea of there being essential differences between human “races” with the legitimization of the political subordination of one group to another and the idea that “race mixing” contributes to the decline of humankind.

At the turn of the 20th century, scientific racism became an accepted part of academia, associated
with new sciences such as eugenics (Francis Galton, 1822–1911) and the development of intelligence tests. Especially, newly developed statistical methods were used to “prove scientifically” the worth of different races. At the same time, racist political regimes stabilized, such as the institutionalized system of racism embodied in the “Jim Crow” laws of the U.S. South. The cruel climax of such racist political regimes was Nazi Germany, with its legally implemented idea of “race purity” (Nuremberg Laws of 1935; German: *Nürnberger Gesetze*) and the attempt to exterminate an entire part of the German population.

The word *racism* came into use in English in the 1930s; at first, it was used mainly to describe the Nazi regime. After World War II, it was increasingly used to describe colonial relations, especially between Africans and Europeans, and Black–White relations in the United States and South Africa. During the period of moral revulsion against racism after World War II, scientific racism was finally largely disavowed. International organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) started to mobilize against racism. In 1950, UNESCO declared in the statement “The Race Question” that it is one of the central goals of the organization to fight racism and suggested abolishing the term *race* altogether:

National, religious, geographic, linguistic and cultural groups do not necessarily coincide with racial groups; and the cultural traits of such groups have no demonstrated genetic connexion with racial traits. Because serious errors of this kind are habitually committed when the term “race” is used in popular parlance, it would be better when speaking of human races to drop the term “race” altogether and speak of ethnic groups. (UNESCO, 1952, p. 99)

As noted by Ashley Montagu (1998), this report was influenced by the work of the anthropologist Franz Boas (1858–1942), who defined race as a purely social construct. Antiracism became an integral part of social movements such as the anticolonial Black liberation movement and the anti-apartheid movement. The disaggregation of the American South and the abolition of apartheid were important victories in the antiracist struggle.

### Contemporary Approaches to Racism

Today, the following four different foci in political research on racism can be seen:

1. The changing faces of racism entrenched into the global order constitute an important topos. Racism as a transnational process has been a common theme in political analysis since the 19th century. Today, global communication and economic networks, together with the heritage of colonialism, contribute to the diffusion of what is sometimes called the “American model of race relations.” In this model, races are seen as stable internal differentiations of the nation-state, a structure in the United States famously called by David Hollinger (1995) the “ethno-racial pentagon” (Blacks, Whites, Asians, Hispanics, and Native Americans). This model is often associated with neoliberal ideals. Its emphasis on individual responsibility contributes to phenomena such as “color-blind racism.” Color-blind racism sustains racist structures through the denial of the importance of racism for social inequality. The concept of symbolic racism is used in political psychology to denote the opposition to policies designed to support specific racial groups.

2. Although scientific projects such as the human genome project emphasize the genetic unity of humankind, new types of biologically based benevolent racism have emerged—for example, in the advertising on drugs for assumed racial groups and the interrogation of these groups for the betterment of medical treatments. Connected with the rapid advances in genetics, we have reached a new phase of research on the biological bases of human behavior, strands of research that can be easily incorporated into racist ideologies. Further, as pointed out by Nadia Abu El-Haj (2007), new questions are raised on the very notion of “nature” in its relation to culture.

3. A disturbing facet of racism today is that it works as an ideology and practice often without legal or institutional support, expressed, for example, in ongoing segregation or discriminatory employer practices. These topics, together with investigations into the political successes of right-wing parties and right-wing movements, are an ongoing important line of discussion. Research here is based on a long tradition of attempts to measure racial prejudice and right-wing political attitudes, starting with the famous work of
Theodor W. Adorno (1903–1969) and a group of social psychologists on the “authoritarian personality” and continued in works such as Bob Altemeyer’s study of right-wing authoritarianism in the 1980s. Today, as noted by Leonie Huddy and Stanley Feldman (2009), the concept of racial stereotypes is one way to conceptualize more clearly the relation between racism and politics.

4. The analysis of racist beliefs, practices, and social structures has led to studies of whiteness and the different dimensions of identity politics. In this context, racial prejudices are also taken into account but more as hidden or subtle forms of racism. The concept of “unconscious racism,” advanced by Hart Blanton and James Jaccard in 2008, is one promising attempt to measure these types of beliefs. The mechanisms of social and political exclusion are interrogated in the intersection of different dimensions of inequality, such as class, gender, and nationality. The complexities of racism ingrained in modern institutions, giving unequal access to goods, services, and opportunities, are thematized under the rubric of “institutional racism.” So one of the central questions in current political research is how racism and racial discrimination are reproduced on the national and the world level irrespective of the intentions of the actor.

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See also Colonialism; Culturalism; Equality; Ethnicity; Justice

Further Readings


**Radical Attitudes**

Like many other concepts in political science, the notion of radicalism dates back to the political conflicts of the late 18th and early 19th century. Even then, its content depended on the political context and was far from well defined. Consequently, being “radical” has meant different things to different people at different times in different countries. Moreover, radicalism is closely related, if not identical to, a number of (equally vague) concepts, such as extremism, fundamentalism, and populism. As of today, there is no universally accepted definition of radicalism and, by implication, radical attitudes.

There is, however, a core meaning of radicalism: Radicals are willing to challenge the ground rules of politics to get to the root (Latin: *radix*) of what they perceive to be the most pressing political problems. In any given context, radicals will confront the political establishment and will support policies whose implementation would trigger systemic change. In this entry, the various historical contexts and attempts at measurement of this concept are discussed.

**Radicalism in the 18th and 19th Centuries**

In the last third of the 18th century, a heterogeneous group of philosophers, writers, and politicians began to campaign for a thorough reform of Britain’s political system. Among the goals of this
movement were abolition of slave trade, reform of the electoral laws, and better protection of citizens’ rights. They soon gained support from the emerging middle and working classes. The parliamentarian Charles James Fox is often credited with coining the name for this new movement when he demanded a “radical reform” of the electoral system in 1797, and by 1819, the “radicals” had established themselves as a separate political force that inspired the Chartist movement and played an important role in the creation of both the Liberal and the Labour parties.

Similarly, after the restoration of the monarchy in 19th-century France, supporters of republican principles called themselves “radicals.” Over the last third of the century, they drifted to the left and were instrumental in the foundation of the country’s first modern left-wing party, the Republican, Radical and Radical-Socialist Party, in 1901.

In Germany, radical was initially a political label chosen by those liberals who, in the spirit of the French Revolution, demanded civil liberties, universal male suffrage, and parliamentary representation. In the second half of the 19th century, this label was applied to those members of the workers’ movement who favored a revolutionary change of government (i.e., the end of the authoritarian monarchist regime). In a similar fashion, in many other European and Latin American countries, “radicalism” became shorthand for a subtype of liberalism that could be located either to the left or to the right of the political center. To the present day, “radical” parties exist in many countries, including Argentina, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Italy, Paraguay, and Switzerland. Most of them are today classified as either liberal or socialist/social-democratic.

Radicalism in the 20th Century

The gradual spread of liberal democracy and its crisis during the interwar period changed the meaning of the concept of radicalism. In the wake of the events in Germany, Italy, Russia, and many other European countries, radicalism became a collective term for the forces at the poles of the political spectrum, which had formerly been known chiefly as “ultras” and had threatened to overthrow liberal democracy: Communists on the one side, Fascists and National Socialists on the other. Consequentially, radicalism was transformed into a primarily spatial term (location on the left–right axis) with a connotation that was directly opposed to its original meaning. While the original radicals had been champions of freedom and democracy, the radicals of the 20th century were, by virtue of their ideological preferences, opposed to these values. Under the postwar consensus of the 1950s, this perspective on radicalism became dominant.

However, less than 2 decades after the end of World War II, Seymour Martin Lipset challenged the prevailing view of the connection between centrist and support for democracy. In his seminal study *Political Man*, Lipset (1960) claimed that fascism and national socialism were neither left-wing nor right-wing ideologies. Rather, they constituted an “extremism of the centre.” While this statement is problematic if interpreted in purely sociological terms—fascism and national socialism appealed both to the middle and to the working classes—it reflects the ambiguous location of these regimes on the traditional left–right spectrum. On the one hand, they violently suppressed the left-wing unions and parties. On the other hand, they were hardly champions of a free market economy: Fascism and national socialism insulated farmers and small businesses from competition, engaged in large-scale economic planning, and raised government spending on welfare to unprecedented levels.

More generally, Lipset argued that attitudes toward the economy and attitudes toward democracy could vary independently. In his view, any position on the left–right spectrum—radical or centrist—can be combined with “the repression of difference and dissent, the closing down of the market place of ideas” (Lipset & Raab, 1970, p. 6). This “tendency to treat cleavage and ambivalence as illegitimate” (p. 6) is what Lipset called *extremism*.

Lipset fruitfully applied this concept to right-wing extremism in the United States. In his view, the insistence on free market principles makes this particular breed of extremism “right-wing,” whereas anti-Semitism, homophobia, racism, religious intolerance, and xenophobia are simply manifestations of the same underlying generic phenomenon. Indeed, in a separate work, he convincingly demonstrated that these traits are also prevalent among members of the working class, whose criticism of free market principles marks them as left-wingers.
Lipset’s notion of extremism is so broad that it resonates with the even more general concepts that were developed around the same time by psychologists such as Hans Jürgen Eysenck (“tough-mindedness”) and Milton Rokeach (“closed-mindedness,” “dogmatism”) and refer to a tendency to unconditionally accept norms, prejudices, and authorities. Like Lipset, Eysenck, and Rokeach, many other scholars treat political preferences in general and political radicalism in particular as an essentially two-dimensional phenomenon. However, while Lipset argued that left–right ideology and support for democratic values and institutions can vary independently, other authors disagree.

In work that was partly inspired by Lipset, Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse claim that there is a U-shaped link between ideological radicalism and antidemocratic extremism. Although they acknowledge that radicalism and extremism are conceptually different, they argue that radical ideological positions have implications that render them incompatible with liberal democracy as defined by the core values of the French Revolution: liberty, equality, and fraternity. According to Backes and Jesse, left-wing radicalism (communism) overemphasizes equality to the detriment of freedom, whereas traditional European right-wing radicalism (fascism) as well as American right-wing radicalism disregards equality in favor of either fraternity or liberty. In Backes’s and Jesse’s view, centrist is conducive to liberal democracy, while radicalism is a necessary and sufficient condition for extremism. In a sense, the 20th-century view of radicalism has come full circle in their work, which has influenced many European scholars directly or indirectly. However, empirical evidence for the U-shaped link between radical ideological positions and opposition to liberal democracy is sparse.

**Measurement Issues**

If radicalism is interpreted in a purely spatial sense, it simply refers to the end points of the ideological spectrum. The most common instrument in this context is the general left–right scale employed in countless comparative and single-country studies. Since the left–right scale is still interpreted chiefly in economic terms, other, more specific scales that refer to the appropriate degree of government intervention in the economy, state control of prices and wages, or the importance of trade unions have also been used. On the other hand, more inclusive attempts at measuring radicalism include preferences on “postmaterialist” issues such as the environment, minority rights, and direct democracy.

The logical implications of extreme positions notwithstanding, most researchers would agree, however, that a position at the end points of any policy scale is in itself of little importance because people frequently hold inconsistent and contradictory attitudes. Therefore, a number of items and scales have been proposed to directly capture support for liberal democracy.

Arguably, the most influential among these were developed by Herbert McClosky in his work on democratic values. In his 1964 article, McClosky distinguishes between three subdimensions of democratic values: respect for the “rules of the game” and support for freedom of expression as well as support for political, economic, social, and ethnic equality. McClosky’s first dimension primarily refers to formal compliance. As long as a majority of citizens have internalized these rules, they will support democratic institutions even if their grasp of the underlying principles is patchy. His second and third dimensions, however, refer precisely to these principles.

A model (liberal) democrat would subscribe to both the principles and the rules, whereas an antidemocrat would despise both. Real-world citizens usually find themselves somewhere in between these two poles: They agree with the rules and abstract principles but sometimes struggle with their application. Some items on McClosky’s scale were specifically designed to capture these conflicts. For instance, 90% of his respondents believed in “free speech for all no matter what their views might be,” yet 50% agreed that books containing “wrong political views” did not deserve to be published and 25% were ready to suspend due process for “dangerous enemies like the Communists.”

To the present day, McClosky’s work has had a tremendous impact on the field, but there are some basic problems with his and all subsequent attempts to measure support for democratic values. First, the items inevitably reflect the political and historical context within which they were devised. For McClosky and many of his successors, communism was the main threat to liberal democracy.
With the advent of new ideological challenges such as Islamism and right-wing populism, this is obviously no longer true. Second, the rules and sometimes even the principles that constitute liberal democracy are bound to change gradually over time. Political behavior and issues from the New Politics agenda that were considered “radical” in the 1960s—minority rights, the environment, sit-ins and human chains—are now well within the political mainstream. Therefore, finding items that work well in all countries at all times is conceptually and empirically next to impossible. Third, even if these attitudinal scales generate measurements that are valid across time and space, they lack a natural cutoff point. At best, they are able to identify the most radical persons in society. Where the boundary lies between democrats and radicals, however, is an entirely different question.

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See also Communism; Democracy, Theories of; Democracy, Types of; Fascism; Fundamentalism; Ideology; Islamist Movements; Liberalism; Peasants’ Movements; Populist Movements; Postmaterialism

Further Readings

RATIONAL CHOICE

Rational choice, or rationality, has two meanings. First, in a technical sense, rationality implies that an individual’s preferences over choices possess two properties: completeness and transitivity. The first property holds that the individual’s preferences are well defined for any two possible alternatives in the set of available choices: Given any pair of alternatives \( x \) and \( y \), the individual prefers choice \( x \) over \( y \), prefers choice \( y \) over \( x \), or is indifferent between them. The second property maintains that if the individual prefers alternative \( x \) to \( y \) and \( y \) to \( z \), then the individual prefers \( x \) to \( z \).

Most commonly, when scholars mention rational choice, they refer to the broad set of work—the rational choice school—that builds on this technical definition of rationality. Although derived, at the core, from this single technical definition of rationality, the rational choice school is commonly associated with a number of additional views about human behavior. Notably, rational choice is commonly associated with self-interested behavior. This association reflects a common set of assumptions about the structure of individuals’ preferences, such as that people care only about their own personal welfare, not the welfare of others. This orientation leads many critics to juxtapose rational choice with theories in which individuals behave in other-regarding ways—for example, a Rousseauian citizen who strives for the common good. This, of course, puts aside the thorny issue of how to define or determine the “common good.”

Second, rational choice is closely associated with the idea of human interdependence and with a sub-field of economics known as game theory. Game theory provides a set of tools for studying the interactions among people. Crucially, game theory recognizes that one individual’s choices often depend on the behavior of other individuals. For example, if an individual is stopped at a four-way stop sign, his or her decision of whether to wait or to proceed depends on whether he or she expects the other cars stopped at the intersection to wait or to proceed.

Rational Choice: A Social Theory of Human Behavior

Although rational choice theory builds on individual decisions, it is fundamentally a social theory...
of human behavior. Indeed, part of the reason for simple assumptions about individuals is to build tractable models of social interaction. Rational choice theory is social in its approach to understanding individual decisions, contending that we condition our behavior on the anticipated behavior of other people. In addition, it is social in that it allows us to understand how groups of individuals reach collective decisions and produce social outcomes.

**Human Behavior Is Interdependent**

Most rational choice theories emphasize the interdependence of individuals: The behavior of one individual depends on how this person expects other people to behave. This fundamental insight has been applied by scholars to a wide range of questions in economics and political science, from the entry of firms into new markets to agenda setting and voting in Congress.

Charles Cameron, for example, studied the presidential veto in a rational choice framework. As an empirical fact, American presidents rarely veto legislation from Congress. This observation led many scholars to view the veto as unimportant to the legislative process. Congress, they argued, dominates the legislative process, and the president has little say over the content of any legislation. However, Cameron saw that the veto often has a profound influence on legislation. Members of Congress, he observed, anticipate that the president will veto a bill if it is too far from his preferred policy. Members of Congress design legislation so that it is sufficiently close to the president’s preferred policy to avoid a veto. Using rational choice theory, Cameron demonstrates how the veto influences public policy outcomes, even if the president rarely exercises the veto.

In another application, scholars study the policy-making behavior of executive agencies in the American separation-of-power system. The statutes passed by Congress often delegate to agencies—such as the Food and Drug Administration or the Environmental Protection Agency—considerable discretion in implementing the law. Some observers have called such delegation of power to agencies an abdication of power by Congress, leading them to question policy making by unelected bureaucrats. In contrast to this conventional perspective on agencies, rational choice scholars such as John Ferejohn, Charles Shuman, and Matthew McCubbins observe that agencies must anticipate the behavior of Congress. Just as Congress delegates authority to agencies, Congress can trim this authority, transfer it to another agency, withhold budgets, or invalidate the statute wholesale. If the agency implementation of a statute is sufficiently unsatisfactory to Congress, it is likely to override the agency. To avoid costly interaction with Congress, agencies must anticipate the possible reactions by Congress, adjusting policy to avoid negative treatment by the parent institution.

This example of congressional delegation is an instance in a broader class of interactions studied by rational choice scholars, known as principal–agent problems. This type of interaction is characterized by a principal (e.g., Congress) attempting to induce an agent (e.g., the executive agency), which often possesses divergent preferences from the principal, to perform some task (e.g., implement a statute). Principal–agent problems have wide applications in political science, including delegation of authority by citizens to elected officials, by officials to bureaucrats, and by the military to subordinates.

**Social Outcomes as Products of Individual Choices**

One of rational choice’s most important contributions is the idea of a social dilemma. Individually rational decisions often have unintended social outcomes; paradoxically, individual maximization often leads to socially suboptimal outcomes. Rational choice has been instrumental in identifying and clarifying these social dilemmas as well as in proposing solutions to them.

Scholars have long recognized the problems inherent in aggregating individual preferences into social outcomes. In the 18th century, the Marquis de Condorcet noted that decisions made by majority vote “cycle”; that is, they display intransitivity. Consider a simple version of this cycling. Suppose a polity exists with three voters, 1, 2, and 3, and three policy alternatives, A, B, and C. The voters have the following preferences: Voter 1 prefers A to B to C; Voter 2 prefers C to A to B; and Voter 3 prefers B to C to A. As an initial social choice, consider a vote between Alternatives A and C.
this case, Voter 1 votes for A, and Voters 2 and 3 vote for C, giving Alternative C a majority vote. Thus, on the basis of majority vote, the polity appears to favor C to A. Now consider a vote between B and C. Given these alternatives, Voters 1 and 3 prefer B, and Voter 2 prefers C. A majority, therefore, appears to favor B to C. Finally, consider a vote between A and B. With this choice set, Voters 1 and 2 prefer A, and Voter 3 prefers B; the polity prefers A to B.

These votes result in an intransitive social preference ordering. A majority prefers C to A, B to C, and A to B. This roughly equates to saying that C is greater than A, B is greater than C, and A is greater than B. This social intransitivity occurs despite the fact that the individuals in the polity have well-defined preferences over the alternatives. Technical studies of voting show that this example is not an aberration but typical. As William H. Riker explains, it is difficult to discuss the “democratic will,” for example, if the social preference ordering cycles through alternatives.

As troubling as it is, Condorcet’s cycling result is derived purely from the structure of individuals’ preferences and a simple voting rule. His result does not depend on individuals’ strategic behavior.

In contrast, a large number of other rational choice applications derive social dilemmas on the basis of strategic interdependencies. We will consider four canonical examples of such social dilemmas illustrating strategic interdependence.

The prisoners’ dilemma is perhaps the longest-recognized strategic dilemma, recorded by Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century. As a simple example, consider an environment with two individuals, A and B, who face two choices, to farm (F) or to defect (P). The value for Individual A of farming or preying on the other person depends on whether Individual B farms or predates (and the reverse).

Using numbers to simplify the example, we have the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Player B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F (x, y)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Player A</td>
<td>(3, 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4, 0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

where (x, y) represents the payoffs for Players A and B, respectively.

Each player must decide between F and P. If both players farm, they both receive a payoff of 3, maximizing social output. However, both players face a unilateral incentive to defect from farming. While the other player does the hard work of farming, the first player preys on his crops. This unilateral defection produces a payoff of 4 for the player who predates and a payoff of 0 for the player who is victimized. Because both players face the same incentives, neither will farm. The only stable outcome of the prisoners’ dilemma is where both players predate and both receive a payoff of 1.

In Hobbes’s view, the prisoners’ dilemma modeled a world in which life is short, nasty, and brutish, in which all prey on all. One productive way to think about the prisoners’ dilemma is in terms of the ability to commit to a certain course of action. Both players prefer to live in a world in which both members farm, but they cannot commit to farming in the face of incentives to prey on the other player.

The social outcome—a world of all preying on all—differs from the social outcome that every individual wants to occur. Nevertheless, the social outcome is a product of individually rational decisions: Each member acts in his or her best interest yet produces a social outcome that is not in his or her best interest.

The common pool problem, first articulated by William Foster Lloyd in the 19th century and sometimes referred to as the tragedy of the commons, is another social dilemma. Consider a common resource, such as land for grazing cattle, available to a society. Each individual unilaterally decides how many cattle to graze on the land, receiving some benefit for each animal he or she grazes. But individuals pay only part of the cost of grazing each animal: The cost of maintaining the land is divided among all members of the society. This structure of costs and benefits provides strong incentives to exploit the common land, grazing as many cattle as possible. When all the individuals do so, however, overgrazing occurs, which depletes the quality of the land. Common-pool problems have an enormous range of applications, including the growth of government, pollution, population growth (Lloyd’s initial concern), and the overuse of public roads.
Another class of dilemmas, known as collective action problems, studied by rational choice theorists focuses on public goods, or goods that are not excludable (no one is prevented from benefiting from them) and are nonrival (one person’s consumption does not influence the ability of another person to consume). “Common goods,” such as grazing land, differ from “public goods.” A public good is characterized by nonrivalry—for example, clean air. In the case of common goods, one person’s consumption influences the ability of others to consume the good. Grazing land, for example, becomes depleted.

Examples of collective action problems include national security and clean air. The fundamental difficulty in a collective action problem is that the ability of an individual to consume the public good is not linked to any effort to provide the good. For example, regardless of whether an individual pays taxes, he or she benefits from the national security provided by the standing army. This decoupling of benefits and costs creates an incentive to free ride off the contributions of others.

Collective action problems, therefore, represent another type of social dilemma. One implication of collective action problems is that societies often face shortages of public goods. Even though almost all members of a society would benefit from these public goods, such as stronger border security, preventing raids from the neighboring society, the incentive to free ride results in an underfunded, anemic security apparatus. The problem of an underdeveloped security apparatus was endemic for most of human history. Only recently, with the development of the institutions of the modern state, have security forces become well funded—too well funded in the eyes of some.

As a final example of a class of problem studied by rational choice theorists, consider coordination problems. In this type of problem, the members of a society benefit from acting in concert and suffer when they fail to do so. A classic example of a coordination problem is the choice of whether to drive on the right or left side of the road. If we all drive on the left, then we move about safely; the same holds if we all drive on the right. However, if people fail to drive consistently on the left or the right, driving becomes extremely hazardous.

Political science has applied the coordination problem to a wide range of political questions. Consider the choice of whether to protest or actively work against an authoritarian regime. If all the citizens who dislike the regime act simultaneously, they can overthrow the regime. However, if they act at different times, with only small groups on the street at any time, the police will suppress their movement. The group of discontented citizens faces a coordination problem. If they coordinate on a time and location, they benefit from a political transition to democracy; if they fail to coordinate, they receive a beating by the police.

Although we have focused on the problems that rational choice theory has helped us understand, this perspective has also generated a wide range of solutions. Studying collective action problems, Mancur Olson observed that members of groups have the incentive to free ride off the hard work of others. As a partial response to the problem of free riding, Olson argues, some groups provide “selective benefits”—benefits to those who provide their share of the collective good. Elderly people, for example, have a shared interest in lobbying Congress to pass laws that promote health care and various other forms of public policy beneficial to older Americans. However, due to free riding, older Americans benefit from these lobbying efforts even if they make no effort to support them, such as paying dues to the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), a principal interest group for the elderly. To combat the incentive to free ride, the AARP offers a number of benefits that accrue only to AARP members who pay dues, such as newsletters, discounts on medication, magazines, and other consumer products. Thus, selective benefits offer a partial solution to some collective action problems.

In another example, constitutions can help resolve coordination problems. As noted above, the choice of whether or not to protest against a regime is fraught with danger: Coordinate on a time, and the protestors often win; fail to coordinate, and the protestors often face suppression by the police. The rights enumerated in a constitution serve as a coordinating mechanism. When a regime violates a constitutional right, the citizens collectively understand that a transgression has occurred, and this triggers coordinated action to reverse the transgression. Without the enumerated rights, citizens will have difficulty determining what counts as a...
transgression, and they will face the real possibility of coordination failure and all its attendant dangers.

**Objections and Limits to Rational Choice Theory**

Rational choice theory is subject to several criticisms, which fall into three categories. First, critics suggest, rational choice theory is unsuitably restrictive because it typically assumes that people behave in a narrowly self-interested way. Critics observe that, in contrast to this common perspective, human motivations are often far more complex, reflecting a concern for other people.

A second criticism holds that rational choice theories are not sufficiently constrained. After an initial set of assumptions about the structure of preferences and the interaction between individuals, rational choice theories contain rigorous, highly constrained, internally and logically consistent analysis. However, scholars have discretion in their assumptions about the preferences and how they model the interaction between individuals. For example, altering the sequence of the interaction—allowing Player A to move before Player B, say—often appears innocuous, but it can have profound implications for the results of a rational choice theory. Similarly, the structure of individuals' preferences—not only what they care about but also how their payoffs respond to increases or decreases of what they care about—can dramatically influence the predictions of a theory. In this way, despite the appearance of rigor, rational choice theories have arbitrary elements.

A third common criticism notes that rational choice theories cannot explain important elements of human behavior. Voter turnout, for example, is exceptionally difficult to explain in terms of rational choice theories. Each voter has only a trivial influence over the outcome of an election: If any single voter decides not to turn out to vote, the probability that the outcome of the election will be altered is impossibly small. And yet, regardless of whether or not an individual's vote can influence the election outcome, each voter pays some cost for voting—the time and effort it takes to vote. The combination of highly uncertain benefits with certain costs suggests that voter turnout is a rare event. Yet people clearly vote in elections. Thus, rational choice theories fail, in this criticism, because they cannot account for important aspects of human behavior.

In response to these criticisms, rational choice scholars often provide two observations. First, although it is common to assume the narrow self-interest of individuals, this assumption is not necessary. Rational choice theory can also assume that part of an individual's welfare depends on the welfare of other people. For example, many people value a measure of equality in the distribution of wealth, and this preference often induces people to give to charity or to support programs that redistribute income. Donations to charity and other apparently selfless acts do not necessarily represent irrational behavior. Similarly, the rational choice perspective easily models these settings where people attach some value to being viewed as good citizens or value the welfare of their fellow citizens.

The second point is methodological. The goal of rational choice theory is to provide a way of understanding human interaction and social outcomes. Models are useful because they capture important elements of human behavior in a parsimonious way. Creating a useful model necessarily involves focusing attention on certain motivations to the exclusion of others. As the examples discussed above indicate, rational choice theory helps us understand problems of social importance. This contribution is possible because of—not in spite of—the narrow focus of rational choice theories. Moreover, as rational choice theories matured, they gradually expanded the focus to include less restrictive assumptions. The core insights, however, almost always derive from the study of a highly modeled environment that is unrealistic in a variety of ways.

The most serious criticism of rational choice theories is that they are not sufficiently constrained. As suggested above, modeling choices about preferences or the structure of interaction crucially affect the model's implications. The strongest rational choice models, therefore, are those that build on others, by which a consensus emerges on how to study a given problem, such as the assumption that elected officials maximize the probability of reelection.

**Frontiers**

Rational choice scholars extend this approach in a variety of new and exciting directions. For example,
an important literature focuses on problems related to information—who knows what and when they make a choice as well as the incentives for a player to misrepresent himself. In the interest of space, we focus on just one important innovation: behavioral choice.

Students of behavioral choice attempt to combine insights from psychology with standard rational choice theory. They question whether it is possible for humans to process information in the way implied by traditional rational choice theories or whether emotions or cognitive constraints systematically bias choices away from purely rational ones. Rather than calculate every contingent possibility, for example, behavioral choice scholars suggest that people use heuristics and rules of thumb to reach decisions. Similarly, the way in which a choice is presented to individuals appears to influence their ultimate choice. For example, whether people are asked to opt in or opt out of a program can control whether they join the program, a finding that is difficult to square with conventional rational choice theory. This approach remains in its infancy, but it promises important extensions and generalizations of the rational choice approach.

Conclusion

Rational choice theory relies on simplifying assumptions about individuals in large part because it is a theory of social interaction. Assumptions of individual rationality, as we have seen, lead to many important and unobvious conclusions about the behavior of groups of individuals or societies. As illustrated by various social dilemmas, maximizing individuals do not imply social maximization.

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See also Cooperation; Coordination; Credible Commitment; Game Theory; Principal–Agent Theory; Public Goods

Further Readings


**RATIONALISM, CRITICAL**

Critical rationalism is a school in the philosophy of science and in political philosophy centered on the works of the Austrian-English philosopher Karl R. Popper. The Social Democrat Popper fled from Vienna and the Nazis in the late 1930s to New Zealand and established himself in London after the war. Critical rationalism is characterized by the method of trial and error, applicable in all scientific disciplines, philosophy, or politics according to its adherents. In a problem situation, a tentative theory is advocated to solve the problem. Thereafter, all efforts should be directed toward demonstrating the falseness of this theory (falsification, error elimination), and when this has been done, we are in a new problem situation but with increased knowledge. We have learned from our mistake. This optimistic belief in the possibility of the growth of knowledge justifies the label “rationalism.” Moreover, this rationalism is “critical,” since a prevailing theory should always be exposed to a maximum of criticism. This is a particularly demanding requirement for the theory constructor; however, it is a crucial purpose of critical rationalism to depersonalize research and its theories. This entry presents the basic tenets of critical rationalism, reflecting the mainstream of contemporary social science and beyond.

In a political science perspective, critical rationalism is crucial both from a methodological viewpoint and as a substantial political philosophy.
Moreover, critical rationalism indicates how the political scientist can make himself or herself useful to society. Although it is a challenge to follow them in actual research, the prescriptions of critical rationalism have become mainstream in political science or social science methodology textbooks, even if they are occasionally contested. Further, Popper’s work on the “open society and its enemies” is an important ingredient in the political philosophy of the 20th century, known mainly for its attacks on the prophecies and societal utopias of Plato, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Karl Marx. It is actually in the spirit of critical rationalism that not even a classic Greek philosopher like Plato, normally over and above criticism, is spared. Subjecting his thought to criticism is a way of taking it seriously, according to critical rationalists. No historical or spatial barrier should protect against criticism. This side of Popper’s work belongs to normative political theory. As shown below, these two aspects of Popper’s philosophy, even though dealing with widely different matters, are well integrated in his own thought as they follow from a few basic assumptions.

It is not unreasonable to structure 20th-century philosophical debates around Popper: Popper versus the positivists (empiricists), Popper versus the relativists (the idealist philosophy of language or Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science), and Popper versus the Marxists and Neo-Marxists. Critical rationalism encompasses not only Popper’s philosophical followers (e.g., J. W. N. Watkins, David Miller, Hans Albert, William Bartley, and Imre Lakatos) but also many natural scientists and social scientists. Seven theses of critical rationalism are formulated below and put in their proper context. Their relevance for political science and its debates are then briefly discussed.

1. Reality exists “out there” (philosophical realism). Philosophical realism asserts that reality exists independently from our language and theories about it. A corollary of realism is the correspondence theory of truth: Truth means a statement’s correspondence with reality (as opposed to the coherence theory of truth, which stresses its coherence with previous knowledge, and the pragmatic theory of truth, which emphasizes its practical usefulness). This conception of truth is very common-sensical: Statements are about something, and if they fit with this something, the statements are true; otherwise they are not. This theory of truth makes it meaningful to compare theoretical expectations with observations of the relevant segment of reality, meaning that theories can, in principle, be evaluated and compared mutually as to how well they match reality. Therefore, some theories can be seen as better than others; one theory may represent progress in relation to another. This is a privilege compared with epistemologies, according to which theory and reality cannot be disentangled and therefore do not allow for any confrontation between them.

Occasionally, the school of realism in international relations, focusing on states and their relative power, is mistaken for philosophical realism as described here. Some international relations realists are indeed philosophical realists, whereas others are not, and for still others it is hard to tell. It is more obvious, however, that linguistically oriented schools such as poststructuralism, postmodernism, or constructivism are nonrealist in the philosophical meaning of the term. Studying the narratives of different political actors, the issue is not which of them is most “true” but their pragmatic functioning in the actors’ respective contexts. Analysts may have their own narratives in the name of science, but decoding their pragmatic or political agendas is crucial. Objective “truth” is uninteresting, if it exists at all. Relativism prevails.

2. Life is too short to quarrel about the meaning of words or concepts (anti-essentialism). A consequence flowing from the above disentangling of language and reality is that words or concepts can be defined by the analyst. They are decisions, although they are not arbitrary. Research strategic considerations may decide how to define a concept. Concept essentialism is thereby discarded: There is no such thing as what a concept “really” means. Popper did not want to quarrel over words. Assertions about reality are important and should be disputed—not the meanings of words or concepts. In other words, the theory that poverty causes revolution is significant and should be discussed and disputed, not the meanings of the concepts of “poverty” and “revolution.” What is the essence of poverty or the real meaning of revolution are fruitless questions. These definitional questions should be decided relatively quickly as a
preliminary step toward the interesting discussion concerning the causal relation between poverty and revolution.

Whether and how politicians use a concept is a part of political language and thereby reality. However, that should not affect whether and how political scientists use the concept for analytical purposes. For instance, it may be reasonably argued that the concept of “security” is worn out for analytical purposes. There is no deeper meaning in such an argument, only the practical consideration that the concept has been used in so many different senses that it no longer conveys any clear meaning but rather spreads confusion. Politicians’ use of this concept should be seen as political language with other purposes than analytical ones (things can be done with words [performatives], but that requires that they be spoken from a position of power and responsibility). Such use is interesting as an empirical object of study, but it is irrelevant for the analyst’s conceptual equipment. This thesis of critical rationalism stands in direct opposition to the “linguistic turn” of political science, including international relations, that took place from the 1990s onward in the form of poststructuralism, postmodernism, or constructivism.

3. Even though reality exists, it is difficult to grasp; there are no “facts” in themselves (antipositivism or anti-inductivism). Although reality exists independently of our theoretical constructs (Thesis 1), it can be grasped, according to critical rationalism, only through our conceptual lenses (critical rationalism thereby belongs to the philosophical tradition of Immanuel Kant). This means that there is no such thing as facts in themselves—apart from trivialities such as the numbers in a telephone directory. All interesting observation is theory impregnated. A good many of Popper’s philosophical efforts have been directed against the positivist quest for certainty, that is, that theory should be built inductively “from below” on a secure foundation of indisputable facts (this includes naïve realism, i.e., that things are what they look like and that truth is manifested through them). Knowledge cannot start from nothing, from a tabula rasa, or yet from observation. The growth of knowledge consists mainly in the modification of earlier knowledge. Such knowledge should not be understood in any puristic sense. Even if political science hardly encompasses established theories, there are general explanatory principles at our disposal, such as role, rationality, or inertia, that can be integrated into theoretical constructs. The main thing is that the expectations that we attempt to falsify (cf. Thesis 5) are theory derived, that is, derived from explicit sets of general justifications. In other words, a priori reasons should be formulated as to why we believe in the expectations.

In political science epistemological debates (positivism vs. the neo-Marxism of the 1970s and 1980s or, more recently, positivism vs. poststructuralism or other linguistic orientations), Popper has often been lumped together with the positivists. As should be apparent, this is erroneous. His criticism of inductivism obviously hits correlationally oriented branches of political science. For instance, a major problem with U.S. comparative foreign policy studies was their lack of explicitly formulated reasoning as to why various hypotheses deserved to be tested. Such explicitness would have increased the opportunities for learning from falsifications.

4. Theories should be parsimonious; among two theories with equal explanatory power, the simpler one should be preferred (the virtue of simplicity). Theories should preferably be simple (parsimonious): They should be able to explain much by little—by one or a few unifying explanatory mechanisms (be it rationality, role, or a unitary actor). We need a relatively simple starting point for inquiry into the “world of chaotic variety” (Marx’s formulation). Parsimony urges one to include only those factors in a theoretical construct that a priori seem able to account for a considerable part of the empirical variance. Critical rationalism demands bold conjectures in relation to what we already know (our background knowledge); in other words, science should aim at interesting truth rather than just truth. This demand follows from the virtue of simplicity: What is usually called the simplicity of a theory is associated with its logical improbability and, hence, its boldness.

In the field of international relations, the preference for parsimonious theory characterizes the work of Kenneth Waltz, for example, who is one of its most influential authors. However, as emphasized by Waltz’s critics, his assumptions do not correspond sufficiently to reality (Thesis 1), and
Imre Lakatos have refined falsificationism, it has cases. Even though followers of Popper such as utmost restraint and only in the most obvious hypotheses, however, should be used with the swan in question has been painted; such auxiliary porter of this law may object, for instance, that the one swans, it is possible to falsify it by observing only basis of the observation of a finite number of to verify the law “All swans are white” on the progress through a series of falsifications, each hence, the more falsifiable they are. Science should a priori likelihood that they are mistaken and, bolder the conjectures (Thesis 4), the greater the risk of being false—unlike Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, for instance; in short, it should be falsifiable. This thesis is probably the most famous in the methodology of critical rationalism. The bolder the conjectures (Thesis 4), the greater the a priori likelihood that they are mistaken and, hence, the more falsifiable they are. Science should progress through a series of falsifications, each time leading to the formulation of a better theory incorporating what has been learned from previous falsifications—that is, learning from past mistakes.

The doctrine of falsificationism was developed in opposition to the positivists’ verificationism and, as the latter failed, their skepticism toward the growth of knowledge. Whereas it is impossible to verify the law “All swans are white” on the basis of the observation of a finite number of swans, it is possible to falsify it by observing only one colored (nonwhite) swan. Of course, the supporter of this law may object, for instance, that the swan in question has been painted; such auxiliary hypotheses, however, should be used with the utmost restraint and only in the most obvious cases. Even though followers of Popper such as Imre Lakatos have refined falsificationism, it has faced criticism in philosophy, the natural sciences, and the social sciences. Not surprisingly, theory constructors often advocate a more lenient course vis-à-vis theories than that of falsification. Rather than consciously seeking to kill theories at the first occasion, they should be given a fair chance of “peaceful development,” at least at the outset. The prevailing view in political or social science today seems to be that a certain initial “protectionism” of theories is justified.

5. *Theories, to be scientific, should in principle be falsifiable (falsificationism).* It is not important how a theory is invented or discovered by a researcher; it may be inspired by societal developments or by specific academic colleagues, or it may be dreamt at night. Therefore, research psychology and the sociology of knowledge are redundant disciplines from the viewpoint of distinguishing good from bad theories or scientific from nonscientific ones. Only one thing counts: the theory’s falsifiability. It is easy enough to find “confirming” instances of almost any theory. If it is to be considered a scientific theory, however, it should run the risk of being false—unlike Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, for instance; in short, it should be falsifiable. This thesis is probably the most famous in the methodology of critical rationalism. The bolder the conjectures (Thesis 4), the greater the a priori likelihood that they are mistaken and, hence, the more falsifiable they are. Science should progress through a series of falsifications, each time leading to the formulation of a better theory incorporating what has been learned from previous falsifications—that is, learning from past mistakes.

6. *The development of society should be explained neither on the basis of traits or motives of individuals or groups within it (reductionism) nor on the basis of emergent properties of society as a whole (holism).* Instead, revealing unintended consequences is the way forward for social and political science. Reductionism means that unit-attributes are used to explain developments of the whole, the system. A special version of it is psychologism, meaning that attributes or motives of individual human beings are used to explain societal developments. Conspiracy theories are reductionist. Popper repeatedly warned against conspiracy theories that claim to explain various unfortunate societal developments on the basis of the characteristics or motives of individual human beings or a specific group, functioning as scapegoats (the Jews, immigrants, the Communists, etc.). However, we should not, according to critical rationalism, jump to the opposite extreme and seek to explain social phenomena solely on the basis of emergent properties of the whole (holism). The target here could be functionalism in sociology or political science, explaining developments on the basis of societal “needs” or “functions.” Instead, the preferred explanation of outcomes in the social sciences should refer to mechanisms producing consequences that were unintended by the individual or societal actors involved (as distinct from conspiracy theories dealing with the intended consequences of “evil” actions). For instance, rational choice theory or game theory, often used in international relations, may be an excellent instrument to understand such unintended consequences in the interaction of nation-states. Each state in a conflicting dyad proceeds from its own situational logic and wishes to safeguard its own security. An expensive arms race, further threatening the security of both sides, is the unintended consequence of
each actor following its own situational logic in order to be “safe.” Or, to take another example, international organizations may persist, although their original good purposes have been fulfilled or are no longer relevant. This is because some nation-states have vested interests in the persistence of these organizations, typically unintended at the time of their creation.

Both Popper and Hans Albert took up a fight on these issues in the so-called Positivismusstreit in German sociology in the late 1960s. The opponents were primarily the Neo-Marxists of the Frankfurt school, including Jürgen Habermas, but it was likewise seen as vital to keep a distance from positivism.

7. Belief in historicist laws is the basis of modern totalitarianism, be it of a Marxist or a fascist nature. In contrast, reform of the open society should be guided by piecemeal social engineering. Even worse than functionalism, holism may lead to historicism, the view that the whole develops deterministically according to its own immanent law of historical development (in contrast to scientific laws of the if-then type). A process law exists for the solar system because there are few, if any, factors disturbing the system. A human society, however, is a much more complex system, which cannot be explained by such a historicist law. There will always be disturbing factors, be they external or internal. From this methodological reasoning, Popper develops his political philosophy. Its target is totalitarianism operating within stages of human society, through which a determinist development will allegedly lead to a final utopia (such as the classless society or Hitler’s Thousand-Year Reich). Characteristically, The Poverty of Historicism (Popper, 1957/1972), the book in which these thoughts were formulated during World War II, was dedicated to the “countless men and women of all creeds or nations or races who fell victims to the fascist and communist belief in inexorable laws of historical destiny.” Perhaps it was unfair to ascribe this determinist belief to Marx personally in The Open Society and Its Enemies (Vol. 2). However, it can in any case be ascribed to much of the political Marxism that prevailed in the 20th century.

Popper, in the preface to The Poverty of Historicism, has added a further argument that should refute historicism: The course of human history is strongly influenced by the growth of human knowledge. Since we cannot predict, by rational or scientific methods, the future growth of this knowledge (then we would already have it!), it is impossible to predict the future course of human history.

The “closed society” is held together by “semi-biological ties—kinship, living together, sharing common efforts, common dangers, common joys, and common distress” (Popper, 1945, chap. 10, para. 1). It is a semi-organic unity, to which the “so-called organic or biological theory of the state can be applied to a considerable extent” (Popper, 1945). The closed society is characterized by elite rule and the belief in magical taboos, including dreams of a future utopia, while the open society is one in which men have learned to be, to some extent, critical of taboos and to base decisions on the authority of their own intelligence—after discussion. The change from the closed to the open society is a step from tribalism, xenophobia, and nationalism to humanitarism.

The open society is modeled after good science, with its free and critical discussion. Rather than a belief in process laws, reform of the open society should be based on “piecemeal social engineering.” (This label turned out, of course, to be a public relations failure: Few social or cultural scientists or debaters like to be associated with such a “simplistic” activity as engineering.) The role of social or political science would be to provide the inputs to this engineering. Notably, knowledge of unintended mechanisms would be valuable in the process. It is less important in the big picture, which specific ideological shading Popper’s open society should have. With his emphasis on social engineering, however, it seems to be social democratic or social liberal rather than liberal or conservative. The unique feature of critical rationalism is probably the link between sophisticated epistemological reasoning and a forceful political philosophy. Distinct from his positivist colleagues in the Vienna Circle, with whom he also had serious epistemological disagreements, Popper wished to connect his reasoning to the ominous political developments taking place outside the seminar room.

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See also Constructivism; Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; Positivism; Postmodernism in International Relations

Further Readings


RATIONALITY, BOUNDED

Bounded or limited rationality is a term coined by Herbert Simon in his theory of decision-making processes in administrative organizations. It focuses on the different types of limitations that actors or decision makers in formal or administrative organizations have when they make decisions. Decision makers have to make a selection of decision premises—goals, preferences, problems, solutions/alternatives, and potential consequences—to cope with these limitations when making decisions. The concept of bounded rationality relates to what kind of limitations actors have, how they can cope with these limitations, and what the effects of bounded rationality are. Bounded rationality is connected to the concept of “administrative man” and can be seen as a critique of and modification of the concept of “economic man”—in other words, the theory of full rationality. Bounded rationality relates to the concept of “satisficing,” meaning that decision makers are choosing decision premises that are “good enough,” while economic man is about maximizing or choosing the “best possible” action.

Many studies of decision making show quite clearly that decision-making processes are characterized by actors not having all goals and preferences available or unambiguously defined, not having all potential problems exposed, not having all alternatives or solutions lined up, or not having all potential consequences defined. Actors in the real world seem to decide based on a few selected goals/preferences, problems, solutions/alternatives, and consequences. Actors, according to the concept of bounded rationality, intend to be rational, although they are constrained in these efforts by limited cognitive capability and incomplete information.

Limitations on Decision Making

One important type of limitation on actors is problems of attention. Decision makers have problems related to time and capabilities. They have too many decision signals to attend to from internal and external sources; too many tasks to work with; too many strategies, plans, and policies to attend to; and too many contacts to cope with. And some information and decision-making premises are not ready available, so they have to search for them. Therefore, how they allocate their scarce resources is a critical factor. They are often part-time participants in many decision-making processes because they move around between decision opportunities depending on what is brought to their attention. And when they focus on some problems, solutions, and decisions, they have to defocus on others because of limited capacity. All these limitations indicate that decision theories should be centered more on theories of attention and search than on theories of choice among readily available goals, preferences, alternatives, and consequences.

Another set of limitations concerns problems of memory. Both individuals and organizations may
have problems in storing and retrieving information. Individuals may forget or may have problems of capacity concerning keeping records of actions and experiences, or their memories may be distorted. Organizations may have problems in systematically collecting information, interpreting and storing it, and retrieving information or making it fully available throughout the organization because of lack of capacity and competence or organizational barriers.

A third set of limitations is *problems of comprehension*. Individual actors and organizations may have problems of capacity concerning aggregating, organizing, using, and inferring from information. It’s therefore often difficult to learn from history about the relationships between actors and events, not to mention predicting further development. The information may be there, but actors may fail to put it together in a comprehensive way. The more complex the society and the organizations themselves, the more prevalent such problems will be. Actors may also compete in defining and learning from history, partly because they have experiences from different parts of an organization or see their experiences through different lenses of norms and values—for example, related to higher education and professions. There may also be some wishful thinking or superstitious learning going on. Actors may think that what happened had to happen or that all good things in their organization are related to their own actions and all bad things to the actions of other actors.

A fourth set of limitations deals with *problems of communication*. The more complex and specialized information and knowledge are, the greater the problems of communicating information. It’s difficult to share information and knowledge across generations, cultures, organizations, levels, tasks, professions, and organizational units. Specialized formal structures may be good at handling information internally but not at communicating and sharing their experiences externally. Different units or groups in an organization may use different information or different methods to simplify the world surrounding them.

**March’s Dynamics of Decision Making**

A key to understanding bounded rationality is to understand that decision makers are selecting decision premises to simplify the decision situations and make them easier to cope with, so a major question is how they are able to make such a selection. James G. March, in interpreting several psychological studies of individual decision making, says that there seem to be several ways to react to cognitive limitations and constraints. One is to use stereotypes to interpret actors and events. Decision makers construct patterns of attitudes or traits and accordingly interpret other actors’ behavior based on the typologies. They imagine and define intent based on observing other actors’ behavior or the consequences of that behavior. They define certain aspects or elements of a problem as crucial and ignore the other elements. Their understanding is based on socially developed theories, scripts, and schemas, where missing information is filled in based on interpretations of events, and they tend to ignore inconsistencies in their models of thought and action. All this makes it easier to comprehend information and to act systematically.

The simplified interpretations of problems, solutions, and actors that decision makers have is often path dependent, because their search for information is often biased and limited, meaning that they search where they recently have found problems and solutions. In this way, they save resources and modify their capability restraints. They see what they like to see, and like what they see, and overlook information and events that do not fit into their simplified world. In that respect, they often get their image of the world confirmed.

March summarizes the studies on simplification processes by describing four types of simplifications that decision makers use. One type is editing, meaning that actors tend to edit and simplify goals, preferences, problems, alternatives, and effects before entering into a decision process or making decisions, leaving only a small number of premises or decision elements left, which are combined in a simple way. Some information is overlooked or not processed, decision premises and alternatives are attended to in a sequential way, or decision elements are weighted unequally. Sequential attention may solve problems of consistency in the short run but increases long-term consistency problems.

The second simplification method is decomposition, meaning that actors decompose complex
provides problems and alternatives into simpler elements that are easier to cope with. The expectation here is, of course, that attending to the separate elements will eventually lead to an acceptable common outcome. One way of decomposing is to work backward, because some problems are easier to solve that way as it gives actors the opportunity to define an end state and come up with reasons for that to happen; that is, they can reconstruct history or make a rationalization afterward. Decomposing is often easier to enact in a loosely coupled world where actors, problems, and solutions are mostly separate—for example, when organizational units are semi-autonomous, as in a large university.

The third method is labeled heuristics, meaning that decision makers see patterns in a decision situation and apply rules or procedures for appropriate behavior that match those situations. Heuristics are rules of thumb that are related to calculating probabilities in complex decision situations, and the more differentiated this calculation is the more easily actors may cope with limitations of cognition and information.

The fourth of March’s types is called framing, meaning that decisions are framed by ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that define problems to focus on, information to collect, and dimensions to attend to. Actors have paradigms that focus and simplify preferences and options, something that makes sense of the decision situation. A problem may be framed in a narrow and local way, with limited trade-offs, to find a set of sufficient conditions for solving it. Frames of beliefs and cognition are part of both the conscious and the unconscious repertoires of decision makers. Frames are also path dependent and have a tendency to be used again and again, something that increases the competence of an actor and often the actor’s ability to convince other actors.

Effects of Formal Structures on Decision Making

Decision makers operate inside formal organizations, and the formal structure is an important element in understanding the existence of and coping with bounded rationality. The formal structure both helps and limits decision makers at the same time. It helps them look at the world in a simplified way but at the same time limits their ability to see connections and complexities, which would make them better equipped to have a broader perspective on their own tasks and roles. So where decision makers are situated in a formal organization determines what kind of limitations they are experiencing. Leaders are supposed to design the formal structure not only to use specialization to limit cognitive problems but also to have a more holistic perspective on how the specialized roles and units fit together to achieve collective goals.

Luther Gulick, in his seminal work on the design and organization of the federal governmental apparatus in the United States, pointed to the fact that there are two major principles of formal organizations, namely, specialization and coordination, two factors that are in a dynamic relationship. Specialization has a vertical and horizontal dimension and also an intra- and interorganizational dimension. Combining the two dimensions gives us four types of specialization: (1) intra-organizational vertical specialization means the hierarchy inside an organization and the way authority is allocated among leadership levels, (2) interorganization vertical specialization is exemplified by the specialized relationship between ministries and agencies in the public sector, (3) intra-organizational horizontal specialization denotes the specialization of roles and tasks/functions on each level inside a formal organization, (4) and interorganizational horizontal specialization is exemplified by the specialization among ministries or agencies.

Organizational Levels and Bounded Rationality

The relevance of this typology for bounded rationality should be evident. As regards the first type— intra-organizational vertical specialization—James Thompson makes a distinction between three levels in an organization: (1) the institutional or leadership level, characterized by much discretion because of many partly competing or ambiguous formal and informal norms and values; (2) the middle-managerial level, characterized by cross-pressure between demands from both the leadership level and the grassroots level; and (3) the operative or grassroots level, characterized by street-level bureaucrats often following formal
rules. On the top level, leaders have both more discretion and more authority to define their own roles than on the other levels, but at the same time, there are often more acute constraints on their rationality because of their having to attend to a more complex set of goals, preferences, problems, alternatives, and consequences. On the middle level, leaders have less discretion to enact their roles than at the top level but more than for actors at the operative level. But their limitation of rationality may be rather problematic to cope with because they are in a cross-pressure between the top and lower levels. The operative bureaucrats occupy a role with much less discretionary space. This makes their rationality limitations much easier to cope with, even though they may have problems seeing their roles in a more holistic perspective.

Vertical interorganization specialization, as exemplified by specialization between ministries and agencies, may also illustrate bounded rationality. Studies of such public organizations have shown that ministries, being on the highest hierarchical level, have the broadest and most comprehensive tasks, such as strategic and policy-oriented tasks, meaning that they, like Thompson’s institutional-level leadership, will have to cope with the combination of wide discretionary space and challenging limitations on their rationality. Agencies have more of narrow and technical tasks, based on highly specialized professional competence, making their discretionary space narrower but probably their rationality limitations less challenging.

Gulick defines four principles of horizontal specialization—based on (1) purpose (e.g., education or defense), (2) process (e.g., specialists in part of a process or coming from a particular higher-education group), (3) clientele (e.g., patient groups in hospitals), or (4) geography (certain levels or areas). In each case, the different principles afford both certain rationality constraints and opportunities. Civil servants working with a specialized policy will have advantages concerning cognitive limitations, because they are defined as specialists in, for example, education, defense, health, or social services. Civil servants such as jurists working on rule development will have the same advantages, as will professionals catering to certain client groups. And bureaucrats attending to control tasks on lower levels or to developing certain geographical areas will also operate under the same type of logic. The limitation problems for all these specialized bureaucrats may, of course, be related to having an overly narrow perspective when there are demands for a wider perspective and collaboration across tasks and sectors. Specialization among ministries and agencies also exemplifies the same logic.

According to Gulick, coordination is related to either formal organization or ideas. Organized coordination could be divided into hierarchical and collegial coordination, both having intra- and interorganizational features. Hierarchical coordination is the mirror image of vertical specialization; that is, what is vertically specialized must also be coordinated to secure superior central control and steering. With respect to cognitive capacity and eventual limitations, the advantage of leaders on a central level is that they can see how the different organizational levels, roles, and tasks are fitting together. The limitations are, of course, related to capacity and knowledge about what is going on at the lower levels; the more complexity there is across levels, the larger are the challenges of rational calculation. Related to new public management (NPM) as a reform wave, there has, for example, been a lot of discussion on the delegation of authority and functions/tasks to lower levels. Such delegation may potentially threaten the information basis of higher-level leaders and therefore increase their cognitive challenges, something that may limit their collective efforts. Delegation of autonomy increases the participation of lower-level actors and may change the patterns of influence to the disadvantage of the top leadership.

Collegial coordination poses other challenges. Here, there is no hierarchical tension and knowledge distance, but there is the problem of heterogeneity and different interests horizontally inside or across organizational units. The challenges concerning rationality limitations and constraint are greater across than within organizations, and the larger the organization, the more heterogeneity there is in tasks, roles, and professional expertise. The different ways to reach a decision under such circumstances also give insight into bounded rationality. One way is to vote, making winners and losers, or majorities and minorities. This may create unambiguous solutions but also more problems of legitimacy, thereby resulting in problems of implementation, so the solutions will be bounded
Rationality, Bounded

accordingly. Compromise may lead to increasing support but also to more ambiguous solutions, making for cognitive challenges to implementation. Sequential attention to goals and solutions, and quasi solution of conflicts, may solve pressing and current problems of consistency, but it will also create long-term challenges of consistency, probably posing the largest problems of cognitive limitations for leaders.

Role of Organizational Culture
Coordination through ideas may mean a strong organizational culture, as illustrated by Herbert Kaufman’s seminal book on forest rangers in the United States, which described how rangers in different geographical locations held approximately the same cultural views, norms, and attitudes. The cultural part may imply that information and cognitive limitations are modified, because actors intuitively know how to act in a culturally appropriate way. A strong culture may imply “trained incapacity,” a lack of ability to adapt to new conditions, as well as potential tension with norms related to formal structures. In a modern setting, however, a culture may appear strong because of the prominence of myths and symbols that bind members together, while in fact these elements may be superficial rather than actually influencing behavior and decisions. Myths or symbols have the advantage as rules of thumb to simplify the world, as shown in NPM concerning scripts such as competitive tendering, benchmarking, marketization, or privatization. Scripts or concepts may result in real problem solving but often function as window dressing, creating images of the organization.

Organizational Slack
Theorizing about bounded rationality has something to do with slack in formal organizations, with slack defined as the distance between available resources and demands. High slack means that performance exceeds goals; that is, demands are satisfied, and the organization has still more resources to use. This means often that the search for new alternatives is modest, slack is increasing, and aspiration is decreasing. But in such situations, slack can be used for innovation or experimentation, which makes it easier to respond to later crises without severe problems related to cognitive limitations. Low slack, meaning that performance is worse than expected, will stimulate a search for alternatives and new solutions, but the resources available for the search are few, increasing the possibility of severe information and cognitive limitation and eventually failure.

Bounded rationality may also be related to whether leaders and formal organizations are experiencing routine situations or crisis, turbulence, and unexpected events. In routine situations, the pressure on information and cognitive limitations is rather low, and traditional procedures and solutions can be used without too much use of resources. But crises and turbulence impose much more pressure on rational calculation. Leaders can try to use procedures and solutions developed for emergencies to simplify the challenges but will often have to improvise because the fit between ready-made solutions and the crises is problematic. In improvising, they can choose from a repertoire of alternatives and solutions, which is better than starting from scratch, but there is no guarantee that the responses will reflect successful adaptations to the turbulent conditions.

In political-administrative decision processes, it is often the case that saliency is important, meaning that political and administrative leaders will use more resources and expertise to attend to some processes and issues rather than others. This often means that the challenges of information and cognitive limitations are better attended to. But what is politically and administratively important may vary over time, and it is challenging to refocus on issues and cases that have been defocused. This returns to the question of slack and whether the organization has the resources to face such challenges.

Effects of Using Bounded Rationality
What are the effects of using bounded rationality as an important principle or logic in formal organizations? First, bounded rationality has the potential for increasing both efficiency and effectiveness, because preferences, goals, problems, solutions, and effects are framed in such a way that these can be handled satisfactorily. And bounded rationality may imply that one is going to the core of policies and issues in a complex world, without wasting resources on unimportant factors and aspects.
Second, bounded rationality may be related to developing a logic of appropriateness and a certain cultural path. Leaders participate in defining the appropriate aspects of a matter, which sets the stage for other actors to behave accordingly in an appropriate way.

Third, bounded rationality may also make it easier to use symbols and myths to enhance the legitimacy of leaders, institutions, and processes. The simplification and selection of decision-making premises may make the “pedagogical challenge” less severe when relating to other actors or a wider audience.

Three critical remarks could, however, be added. In fact, bounded rationality may lead to ineffectiveness and inefficiency. The reason for this may be (a) lack of enough knowledge to make the selection of the “right” preferences, goals, solutions, alternatives, and potential consequences or (b) that such elements are more the result of a negotiation process than an analytical process, making it harder to handle the decision processes and implement policies. The focus may be more on certain minor or deviant aspects of a complex problem and not on the core, which may lead to reruns of the processes and a lack of stability in solutions. In addition, if this is the case, the developing logic of appropriateness may lead to dysfunctions or increasing tension and conflicts with the environment. Moreover, a “failure” in the process of selection and modification of limitations on rationality may be covered up with extensive use of symbols, thus potentially eroding popular support for the leaders and making the followers more critical and cynical. A counterargument to these three critical points would, of course, be that there is no such thing as objectivity concerning the selection of decision premises in the logic of bounded rationality.

Garbage Can Theory

Bounded rationality is the central part of instrumental decision-making theory and is often contrasted with a more economic man-orientated rational theory. One can, however, also make another and different connection for the relevance of bounded rationality. Garbage can theory, developed by Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen in the early 1970s, stresses that decision makers are part-time participants and decision situations represent diverse and ambiguous stimuli, resulting in unpredictable decision-making processes with participants, problems, solutions, and decision opportunities coming and going, selected and coupled in unexpected ways. This type of theory could be seen as an extension of the cognitive parts of bounded rationality; that is, the rationality of actors may be so bounded or limited that “organized chaos” is the result. Whereas bounded rationality stresses the importance of formal structure for the views and thoughts of actors, garbage can theory focuses more on the relative lack of such structures, creating more of an “organizational irrationality.”

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See also Administration Theory; Logic of Appropriateness; Organization Theory

Further Readings

understand and conduct international relations based on international law. Its founders, Nicholas J. Spykman, Edward Mead Earle, Frederick Schuman, E. H. Carr, John Herz, William T. R. Fox, and Hans J. Morgenthau, asserted the realism of their power-based approaches to foreign policy, in contrast to what they described as the dangerous idealism of their predecessors. Writing in response to the appeasement of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, which they held responsible in large part for World War II, realist arguments had great resonance.

In the United States, realism appeared to offer intellectual justification for the Cold War and a range of policies pursued by the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations that were otherwise at odds with proclaimed American values. By the mid-1950s, realism had become the dominant paradigm in international relations and remained so until the Berlin Wall came down. Since the end of the Cold War, realism is at best *primus inter pares*, as liberalism, constructivism, feminism, philosophical realism, and poststructuralism have all become more prominent. Realism arguably remains the dominant frame of reference for policymakers, although even here, liberalism especially has made important inroads.

Three Waves of Realism

Looking back on the post–World War II era, we see three waves of realism, each with important implications for the study and practice of international relations and foreign policy.

The First Wave: Hans Morgenthau

The first wave, represented by the writings of the realists mentioned in the paragraph above, was far and away the most influential. Hans Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations*, its principal text, was first published in 1948 and went through six editions, the last two published posthumously in 1985 and 2006. Within the United States, and to a lesser extent in Europe, it became a core reading in undergraduate international relations courses. Morgenthau became a prominent public figure in the United States and achieved a certain notoriety for his early support of the civil rights movement and opposition to the Vietnam War. In “The Purpose of Political Science,” Morgenthau (1966, p. 77) lamented that the makers of American foreign policy had “overlearned” the lessons of realism and lost sight of the appropriate moral and legal limitations on the use of power.

In the first edition of *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau (1948) maintained that power is the currency of politics and should be the first concern of states. He divided the world into status quo, revisionist, and prestige-seeking states (pp. 21–25). Status quo states were intent on maintaining existing territorial divisions and revisionist states on overturning them. Prestige-seeking states sought to demonstrate their power to gain more influence. Morgenthau insisted that state goals were not essentialist but changed over time and were not always apparent to outside observers. He thought that peace was most likely to be preserved when status quo powers were more powerful than their revisionist challengers and that the power of either group could be enhanced through alliances. Morgenthau, and realists more generally, speak of the balance of power, which can mean the distribution of power in the system at any given moment, the balance between status quo and revisionist states, or an advantage in favor of the former. Morgenthau used it all three ways, to the consternation of his critics.

The balance of power assumes some capability of measuring power and its distribution. This has proven difficult for realists of all persuasions. Morgenthau conceived of power as an intangible quality that had diverse material and political components, among them territory, population, national resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, national character, morale, and the quality of diplomacy and government. None of these attributes translated directly into power because power was “a psychological relation[ship]” that gave those who wield it control over certain actions of others “through the influence which the former exert over the latter’s minds.” In *Politics Among Nations*, first edition, Morgenthau (1948) asserted that “of all the factors which make for the power of a nation, the most important is the quality of diplomacy” (p. 14). The other attributes of national power are the raw materials out of which the power of a nation is fashioned. Diplomacy “combines those different factors into an integrated
whole, gives them direction and weight, and awakens their slumbering potentialities by giving them the breath of actual power” (p. 105).

Morgenthau described his theory as scientific, but his description of the nature of power and the balance of power indicates that the measurement and exercise of power and the construction of a successful balance of power is more art than science. This is most evident in his analysis of bipolarity and its consequences. The term bipolarity was coined by William T. R. Fox in 1944 to describe the domination of the postwar international system by two “superpowers”: the United States and the Soviet Union. Morgenthau recognized the world as bipolar in the mid-1950s because the power of these two states had become so “overwhelming” in comparison with allies and third parties that “through their own preponderant weight they determine the balance of power between them.” The balance of power could no longer be “decisively affected” by changes in the alignments of their allies, at least in the foreseeable future. Nor could lesser powers easily defect from alliances, because “the two giants” had the power to “hold them there even against their will” (Morgenthau [Politics Among Nations], 1948, pp. 270–274; 1951, pp. 48, 52–54). The flexibility of the balance of power and its restraining influence on the power aspirations of the main protagonists had disappeared. The superpowers were free to define their respective positions as vital interests and engage each other with every means at their disposal in every arena in which they competed. In this novel situation, “the give and take of compromise becomes a weakness which neither side is able to afford” (Politics Among Nations, 1962 edition, p. 285).

Morgenthau was clearly uncomfortable with the pessimistic implications of his analysis and sought to hold out a ray of hope for the future. In the first edition of Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau (1948) argued that “the changed structure of the balance of power has made the hostile opposition of two gigantic power blocs possible, but it has not made it inevitable.” Bipolarity has the potential for “unheard-of good as well as for unprecedented evil” (pp. 285–286). In the last resort, peace does not depend on the nuclear balance but on the moral quality of leaders and their willingness to place the common goal of survival above the pursuit of unilateral advantage. Morgenthau’s theory, in contrast to those of his neorealist successors, stresses the independent power of agency.

In the third, 1962, edition of Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau recognized additional incentives for superpower restraint. He speculated that the experience of the Korean War may have taught Moscow and Washington that they have to adapt their policies to the wishes of their allies “if they wanted to draw the maximum of strength from their support” (pp. 351–352). The emergence of a number of newly independent and unaligned states might also serve the cause of restraint. The third edition continued to describe bipolarity as on the whole inimical to peace (pp. 362–363). In the fifth edition, published in 1972, Morgenthau expressed cautious optimism (pp. 355–356). Détente, explicit recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe, a corresponding decline in ideological confrontation, the emergence of third forces (e.g., Japan, China, West Germany), and the damaging effects of the Vietnam War on American power had made both superpowers more cautious and respectful of the status quo. For all practical purposes, the de facto acceptance of the postwar division of Europe had ended the Cold War.

For Morgenthau, the success of the balance of power for the better part of three centuries was less a function of the distribution of capabilities than it was of the underlying values and sense of community that bound together the actors in the system. When the European value consensus broke down, as it did from the first partition of Poland through the Napoleonic Wars, the balance of power no longer functioned to preserve the peace or integrity of the members of the system. The consensus broke down again in the 20th century, with even more disastrous consequences. At midcentury, Morgenthau was deeply pessimistic about the future. The balance of power was at its nadir. There were two great powers instead of many, Britain no longer had the capability to play the role of balancer, the colonial frontier had disappeared, and one of the principal powers rejected the very premises of the international order. International politics had been reduced “to the primitive spectacle of two giants eyeing each other with watchful suspicion” (Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, first edition, 1948, p. 285).
Morgenthau’s theory is descriptive and prescriptive. “Realism,” he insists, is superior to “idealist” approaches on both counts. It is more rigorous because its axioms are logically derived from its starting assumptions. It is empirically valid because “the facts as they are actually lend themselves to the interpretation the theory has put upon them” (Politics Among Nations, 1962 edition, p. 1). Morgenthau has been accused of making contradictory claims: He justifies his theory on the grounds that it provides a better description of reality, but at the same time, he criticizes French and British policymakers in the 1930s, and their American counterparts in the 1960s, for acting in sharp violation of its principles. He dismissed this criticism as beside the point. Politics Among Nations did not aim at an “indiscriminate description of political reality” but was an attempt to develop a “rational theory of politics.” The balance of power was “an ideal system,” and in his more pessimistic moments, Morgenthau was willing to admit that it was “scarcely found in reality.” Realism provided a benchmark against which actual policies could be understood and evaluated. For the same reason, it contained a strong normative element. It was a “theoretical construct” of a fully rational and informed foreign policy that “experience can never completely achieve” but that can be used as a guide for making and assessing policy (p. 8).

The Second Wave: Neorealism

Neorealism or structural realism, developed by Kenneth Waltz (1979), represents an attempt to purge the tensions and contradictions of Morgenthau and other realists of his generation to construct a more scientific theory based entirely at the system level. The starting point for Waltz is the alleged anarchy of the international system, which makes it a “self-help” system. Anarchy requires states not only to make the acquisition of power their first goal but, as Waltz’s disciple John Mearsheimer (2006) insists, to accumulate sufficient economic and military capabilities “to make sure that no other state sharply shifts the balance of power in its favour” (p. 72). For Neorealists, the yardstick of power is relative not absolute power because states must assess their power relative to that of other political units.

Drawing on Nietzsche and Weber, Morgenthau attributed conflict at every level of social aggregation to human nature: People were driven by a desire to dominate others (animus dominiandi) and to use them for their own ends. This behavior was less constrained at the international level due to the relative absence of institutions, rules, and mechanisms for channeling this drive into more socially acceptable channels. Neorealists find the explanation for interstate conflict entirely at the system level. They invoke the “security dilemma,” a phenomenon first described by John Herz, another prominent first-generation realist. The uncertainty of the international environment encourages states to seek a margin of safety in their military power. Their buildups and deployments threaten other states, who respond the same way. Because of the security dilemma, international conflict would arise even in a system in which every power had only benign intentions. Unlike Morgenthau, for most neorealists, regime type and regime goals are irrelevant. As the system itself causes conflict, actors, in the words of Mearsheimer (2006), can be treated as “black boxes.”

For Waltz (1979), the number of actors and the distribution of the power in the system are the key variables for understanding international relations as they determine the polarity of the system. Unipolar systems, dominated by a single hegemon, are the most stable because the hegemon has enough power to enforce order, as Rome did for centuries throughout the Mediterranean basin. Bipolar systems also have a degree of stability because each of the two dominant powers is strong enough to protect itself against any possible combination against it and is accordingly less worried about the addition or defection of allies than great powers in a multipolar system. Multipolarity is the least stable system because there is not that much difference in strength among the leading powers, making alliances, and additions to and defections from them, critical to the balance of power. The balance between opposing alliances is also much more difficult to calculate because it requires estimates of the strength and intentions of multiple powers. Miscalculation becomes an additional source of war in a multipolar system.

Neorealism is not monolithic. Its adherents differ in important respects. In contrast to Waltz’s commitment to a parsimonious system-level theory, Steven Walt (1987) maintains that states balance against perceived threats, not power. The United States, he contends, never worried about
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British or French nuclear arsenals, only about Soviet and Chinese arsenals because both were considered as adversaries. Mearsheimer (2001), author of his own theory of international relations, builds on the distinction between offensive and defensive realism. Traditional realists, whom he describes as defensive realists, maintain that other powers will balance against any state that becomes relatively too powerful. Mearsheimer advocates offensive realism on the grounds that other powers often bandwagon (make an accommodation with the dominant power) or buck-pass (sit on the sidelines) in preference to joining a balancing coalition. This behavior and offensive dominance—the likelihood that states who start wars will win them—create strong incentives for aggression.

Realists and neorealists disagree about the implications of nuclear weapons. Whereas Morgenthau recognized that they had revolutionized warfare, and with it, international relations, Waltz (1981) regarded them as an unalloyed benefit as they had a powerful deterrent effect. Other realists, such as Scott Sagan, stressing the problems of command and control and the fear of being the victims of a first-strike attack, saw them as potentially destabilizing.

Critics have identified numerous conceptual and empirical problems with neorealism. Alexander Wendt (1992) argued that anarchy does not automatically lead to a self-help system; the character of the international system depends very much on how states respond to anarchy. Richard Ned Lebow (1994) argues that neorealism’s definition of power is as problematic as Morgenthau’s. Waltz (1979) offers a definition of power almost identical to Morgenthau’s. He then asserts the overwhelming importance of material capabilities, especially military capabilities, because “force remains the final arbiter” of international affairs (p. 131). The superpowers are “set apart from the others . . . by their ability to exploit military technology on a large scale and at the scientific frontiers” (pp. 180–181). He insists that the determination of polarity can be answered by “common sense” and that the world was bipolar in 1945. Efforts by scholars to determine when bipolarity began range from Waltz’s 1945 estimate to Morgenthau’s mid-1950s estimate, as well as assertions by some that the postwar world was never bipolar.

The end of the Cold War has created a similar controversy, with Waltz (1990) arguing that the world is still bipolar, Mearsheimer (1990) that it has become multipolar, and other realists (e.g., Charles Krauthammer, William Wohlforth, and Michael Mastaduno) contending that it is now unipolar.

The most fundamental problem with Waltz’s theory is that it is, by his own admission, a theory of international relations, not of foreign policy, and thus says little to nothing about how individual states will behave. Its principal substantive proposition is that multipolar systems are less stable (enduring) and more prone to war than bipolar ones. Such a proposition is not testable because we would require a large sample of both kinds of systems and there have been very few bipolar systems in history. It is also meaningless because what anyone is really interested in is the likelihood of war in a particular system, and no inferences can be made about single cases from statistical distributions.

Mearsheimer’s theory, elaborated in his 2001 book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, has also encountered strong criticism. Offensive dominance has little empirical support. According to the critics, it is simply not true, as Mearsheimer claims, that initiators win most of the wars they have begun. Lebow shows that in the 30 wars fought since 1945, the initiators won only 7. Mearsheimer’s (1990, 2001) predictions that NATO would not survive the end of the Cold War and that Germany and Japan should and would acquire nuclear weapons have (fortunately) not come to pass.

Third Wave: Classical Realism

The third wave—classical realism—was ushered in by the peaceful end of the Cold War, which appeared to contradict the expectations of neorealism. Classical realism was also a response to the widespread recognition that problems of identity, globalization, justice, and world order were at least as important as the balance of power for understanding contemporary international relations. Scholars have accordingly revisited the works of Thucydides (Lebow, 2003), Hobbes (Michael Williams, 2006), and Morgenthau (Lebow, 2003; Williams, 2007) in search of insights relevant to these problems.

Lebow’s The Tragic Vision of Politics (2003) is perhaps the most extensive attempt to reconstruct
the wisdom of classical realism through hermeneutic readings of the texts of Thucydides, Carl von Clausewitz, and Morgenthau. He contends that all three authors wrote in the aftermath of destructive wars and sought to reconstruct order by drawing on the best of old practices and the most promising new ideas. In sharp contrast to neorealists, they recognized that the principal threat to world order came from dominant powers who succumbed to hubris and overreached themselves. Such powers were more effectively constrained by domestic restraints and external practices and institutions than by the balance of power. Support for this contention also comes from Stuart Kaufman, Richard Little, and William Wohlforth’s comprehensive 2007 study of the balance of power in the ancient world and non-Western systems. They find that it rarely worked to preserve the peace as most realist theories suggest.

Lebow further contends that classical realists were more interested in influence than in power. They recognized that material capabilities were only one component of power and power was only one source of influence. Influence is relational, and the least efficient way of exercising it is through threats and rewards. Rewards consume resources, and threats generate antagonism because they make other actors aware of their subordination. Influence is most effectively exercised through common projects that respond to common needs and build common identities. Influence of this kind is limited to projects considered to be in the common interest, and repeated efforts to advance common interests can earn honor for dominant powers and the corresponding willingness of others to accept their leadership. In a more recent work, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, Lebow (2008) explores the role of honor and develops a constructivist theory of international relations, but one that incorporates the key tenets of classical realism.

Morgenthau (1962) thought that nuclear weapons and environmental degradation were problems that could not be addressed by nation-states acting unilaterally. To address them, the world required “a principle of political organization transcending the nation-state and commensurate with the potentialities for good or evil of nuclear power itself” (p. 76). While Waltz and the neorealists sought to explain the status quo, Morgenthau looked beyond it. The principal task of international relations theorists was to facilitate the research by laying the groundwork “for a new international order radically different from that which preceded it” (p. 76). Thucydides, Morgenthau, and Herz are attractive to classical realists above all because of their concern for justice and the transformational nature of their projects.

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See also Anarchy; Arms Race; Balance of Power; Bipolarity and Multipolarity; Cold War; Containment; Diplomacy; Foreign Policy Analysis; Geopolitics; International Relations, Theory; International System; National Interest; Nuclear Proliferation; Power and International Politics; Security Cooperation; Security Dilemma; Sovereignty; Strategic (Security) Studies; Superpower; War and Peace

Further Readings
The term *redistribution* refers to the criteria and the mechanisms shaping the authoritative allocation of valuable assets in a given society. In the narrow sense used in political science, it refers to the value-driven, commanding intervention of the state in society to extract resources from some groups (mainly in the form of taxes) in order to give them to other groups (using public expenditure and other redistributive mechanisms). Thinkers on the left of the ideological spectrum argue that the state should play an active role in this process, while those on the right hold that interaction in a free market is the most efficient mechanism of distribution. In what follows, there are clarifications on the scope and scientific usage of the term *redistribution*, an account of the historical evolution of the concept, a classification of political science’s main theories on the role of the state and the dynamics of competition among groups, and a brief discussion of the empirical indicators of redistribution.

### The Concept of Redistribution

In the social sciences, the concept of redistribution refers both to the normative questions about the ideas, values, and criteria of justice that ought to illuminate the pursuit of fairness in a given society (from whom to collect? to give to whom? why?) and to the practical question about the means by which authorities should reallocate resources and valuable goods (the most common mechanisms being tax exemptions, public expenditure, cash transfers, subsidies, and social programs). The comprehensiveness of the term cannot be separated from the meaning of its predecessor, *distribution*. While distribution is an economic concept that refers to the allocation of resources that occurs in society as a result of the free interaction between private agents (mainly in the market but also by means of philanthropy, community organization, international cooperation, etc.), the term *redistribution* indicates the intervention of the state, as a public authority, in the sanction of the criteria to redistribute and in the administration of the mechanisms of redistribution. In the narrow usage of their respective disciplines, economists tend to focus on the distribution of monetary income (salaries), while political scientists and sociologies adopt a broader approach, looking at the redistribution of wealth, including not only material assets but also other opportunities in life such as health and education as well as entitlements and rights.

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Another conceptual distinction between these two terms is that distribution occurs when there are changes or there is reallocation of resources within the existing rules of the game (e.g., compared with retailers, farmers obtained more income than they did in 2009), whereas redistribution takes place when there are changes in the rules of the game (e.g., Congress passed a law granting tax exemptions to farmers).

**Explaining Redistribution**

Concerns about establishing norms for the redistribution of valuable goods have accompanied humanity since agriculture replaced nomadic hunting as the principal food source, calling for an unprecedented level of organization of tasks including the division of labor, accumulation of stocks, and redistribution of the benefits. Formulas for fair distribution of goods and concern for the weakest are present in the foundational writings of all religions, placing the judgment of fairness on the will of a divine god and offering detailed instructions to mortals on how to implement that justice. The return to humanism and the emergence of the secular state in the Renaissance period put both the judgment and the responsibility of redistribution in human hands, setting the stage for a debate that would prevail throughout modernity: the discussion between those arguing for active intervention of the state in the redistribution of wealth and those arguing that the state should have a limited role. Philosophers and economists such as Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and Karl Marx led the scholarly debates on distribution and redistribution during the birth of the Western nation-states, which were built on the foundations of the egalitarian beliefs consecrated by the French Revolution of 1789.

The initial success of the communist alternatives in the Soviet Union and China in the early 1900s, the horror of World War I, the emergence of authoritarian regimes in Central Europe, and the economic crises of Western capitalism in 1929 prompted questions about the political and institutional dimensions of human organizations. New covenants of coexistence and new models of interaction between the haves and the have-nots were needed to redress the previous concentrations of wealth resulting from the aristocratic governments of the 19th century at the domestic level and by the colonial exploitation of Africa, the Americas, and Asia at the international level. The development of the welfare state can be situated between the late 19th century and the 1980s, with the most archetypical examples located in the Nordic countries of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland. Finns, for instance, enjoy state-funded education, health, and welfare services, as well as unemployment insurance and retirement benefits, at no cost for the families other than the general taxes. The long-lasting impacts of these universal provisions are still evident. According to World Bank’s 2002 World Development Indicators, at the beginning of the 21st century, 48% of the national income in Brazil was concentrated in the richest 10% of the population, while the figure was 30.5% for the United States and 21.6% for Finland. The presidency of Ronald Reagan in the United States (1981–1989) and the prime ministership of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain (1979–1990) marked the return of a neoliberal ideology that attacked the welfare state, denouncing its over-spending and inefficiencies and shrinking it in favor of privatized and market-like social services.

The early 20th century marks the starting point for defining a specific political science approach to redistribution, the use of systematic scientific research to address the impact of power, politics, and institutions on the redistribution of public resources or “who gets what, when and how,” as Harold Lasswell put it in 1936. The New Deal implemented in the United States by President Franklin Roosevelt as a response to the economic crisis of 1929 represents a paramount object of study for those interested in the dynamics and outcomes of public redistribution of wealth. More specific questions on redistribution address the allocation of the annual budget to different governmental programs; the redistribution of revenues among subnational governments (states or provinces); the redistribution of resources across demographic, ethnic, religious, or tribal lines; and the way in which different groups in society use their power to influence the outcomes of those redistributions in their favor. To describe these processes of redistribution, political scientists have looked at forms of governments (Are they democracies or authoritarian regimes?), constitutional and legal frameworks (Is it a republic, a
constitutional monarchy, or a popular republic?), organization of the territory of the state (Is it a federal or a unitary system?), tax systems and laws (Are they progressive or regressive?), electoral provisions and enfranchisement (Who is entitled to stand for election and to vote?), groups’ strategies of influence and lobbying (How permeable is the political system to the organized pressure of interest groups?), the welfare state and public expenditures (How much is spent on social programs?), the aim and scope of social programs (Are they universal or focalized? who are the beneficiaries?), and so on.

There are three major theories in political science on the role that the state plays in redistribution. The first group of theories derives from the neoclassic economists of the 17th and 18th centuries (e.g., Adam Smith, David Ricardo) and argues that free agents pursuing their self-interests in free markets will achieve the best possible distribution of resources, therefore the state should limit its intervention to guarantee national defense, respect for private property, and the administration of justice. On the other hand, a group of theories in the tradition of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau argue that the market is full of imperfections that justify broad intervention by the state in the economy, including the planning, regulating, and implementing of large-scale economic plans. While liberal thinking prevailed in the 18th and 19th centuries, the 20th century was dominated by the broad intervention of the state both at the domestic and at the international levels; after World War II, most European nations and the United States engaged in state-sponsored recovery plans, centralized planning, rigid regulation and intervention in the most productive economic sectors, and comprehensive social programs to help the poor—in other words, the welfare state. A third voice in this debate was contributed by the early utopian socialism of Henri de Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier and later on by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who saw the history of humanity as a permanent class struggle and proposed the abolition of private property, termination of the state, and its replacement with the commons, in an ideal communist society in which the guiding principle of redistribution would be “from each according to his abilities, to each according to his need.”

Another set of theories in political science focuses on competition between groups to influence redistributive outcomes in their favor, to get a bigger portion of the pie. The iron law of oligarchy, as formulated by Robert Michels, affirms that no matter how many laws or institutions are in place to regulate access to public decisions, there will always be a small group of rich and resourceful people who will manage to access key decision points and bias public policy outcomes in their favor. An alternative interpretation, called power resources theory, championed by Gosta Esping-Andersen and others, suggests that the level of inequality and the redistributive outcomes in a given society are the result of the organizational resources of the working class and its mobilization. A third argument on the accessibility and dynamics of redistribution is offered by Philippe Schmitter’s theory of corporatism and its American variation, pluralism, initiated in the writings of the Founding Fathers of the United States and most recently reformulated by Robert A. Dahl; these theories hold that the greatest influence on the redistributive outcomes of the state are exerted neither by the people nor by the elites but by the organized activity of interest groups and factions. A fourth proposition is advanced by the institutionalist (Karl Deutsch and David Easton) and neo-institutionalist (Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio) approaches, which combine rational choice theory with institutional analysis to conclude that there is a dialectic influence between society and its political institutions so that the latter mirror and regulate the power of the former but at the same time limit its freedom.

Even when the most fertile studies on redistribution combine cultural, economic, and political approaches, cross-disciplinary efforts have been scarce, due to the difficulty of defining solid indicators, the scarcity of reliable and comparable data, and the excessive specialization of the disciplines. The Gini coefficient and Theil index of inequality are used as proxies to analyze the results of the redistributive outcomes of the state, but more accurate indicators of redistribution are the share of income and consumption of the richest (or the poorest) deciles of the population and indicators of the health (life expectancy and infant mortality) and levels of education (literacy rate and school attendance) of the poorest social groups. Political scientists also look for indicators of political participation (voting, petitions, participation
in rallies, and involvement in advocacy groups) as proxies to deduce the capacity of citizens for influencing the state and, conversely, the share of public resources that they obtain from it.

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See also Class, Social; Common Goods; Equality; Inequality, Economic; Justice; Social Exclusion; Social Movements

Further Readings

Referenda
A referendum is a device of direct democracy by which the people are asked to vote directly on an issue or policy. It differs from an election, which is a vote to elect persons who will make decisions on behalf of the people, or a recall, by which citizens are given the opportunity to remove from office an elected representative. Although this distinction between issue voting and person voting is apparently clear, it may be questioned, such as when the referendum is, formally or de facto, a vote of confidence or about the accession or permanence in power of a person. This is often the case in authoritarian regimes, but it also happens in democratic contexts (e.g., the use of referenda by de Gaulle in France). Such referenda are often qualified as “plebiscites,” although the word, which goes back to ancient Rome, literally means “a law enacted by the common people” (plebis scitum). Because a plebiscite is commonly regarded as highly manipulative, the term has a negative connotation. The use of a plebiscite is sometimes extended to all government-initiated referenda, especially if ad hoc, insofar as they would automatically trigger a vote of confidence. But the word has also traditionally been used in a more neutral way, to refer to popular votes on sovereignty issues (e.g., the plebiscites proposed by the League of Nations after World War I to settle boundary disputes). The word referendum appeared much later, possibly in 16th-century Switzerland, to indicate the procedure by which delegates to cantonal assemblies submitted certain issues to their constituents for ratification (ad referendum).

Typologies
A distinctive feature of the referendum is the great variety of forms that it can take. This introduces problems of comparability and makes general statements about the device difficult. Among the numerous modalities of the referendum, the one called initiative is considered to be the most important, as it indicates the maximum extent to which legislative power is delegated to the people. Most typologies of referenda are indeed based on this criterion and distinguish between mandatory (also termed compulsory or obligatory) referenda, on one side, and optional (or facultative) referenda, on the other, with a fundamental divide within the latter category between referenda initiated by institutional actors such as the executive, the legislative branch, or a parliamentary minority and popular initiatives. Many authors use the word referendum for mandatory referenda and referenda initiated from within institutions, while votes demanded by popular minorities are referred to as initiatives. Others use referenda for votes on legislative texts (current or pending legislation), whether they are initiated by institutional actors or by popular minorities, and initiatives for popular initiatives that are propositional (i.e., dealing with proposals for future legislation). The formal object of the referendum (current, pending, or proposed legislation), the category of legislative act it deals with (e.g., ordinary legislation, constitutional reform, international treaty), the subject (e.g., institutional,
territorial, moral, economic), the legal consequences of the vote (consultative—also termed advisory—or binding), and the territorial level at which it is organized (e.g., local/regional/national) are other frequent variables included in the typologies, creating numerous designations for the referendum. Here, we use the word referendum in a general sense, which includes all types of popular votes bearing formally on an issue. This entry does not consider agenda initiatives, whereby a number of citizens can submit a proposal that must be considered by the legislature but is not necessarily put to a vote of the electorate.

History

The history of the modern referendum is generally associated with three countries. On one side are Switzerland and the United States and on the other, France. In the first two, the practice of referendum has its roots in a tradition of direct democracy by popular assemblies at the local level (the American town meetings and the Swiss cantonal Landsgemeinde), dating back to the Middle Ages in the case of Switzerland. In America, the referendum experience was initiated with the submission of state constitutions to the people (the first case was the rejection of the Constitution of Massachusetts by the people in 1778) and the introduction in many states of the obligatory referendum on constitutional amendments proposed by the legislature. But it was never extended beyond the state level, neither in the federal constitution nor in practice. In Switzerland, the first major development of the referendum occurred at the cantonal level, under the impulse of the democratic Liberals in the 1830s, although early forms of referenda were found before this period (as mentioned above). At the time, it appeared as an acceptable substitute for the direct democracy assemblies, which had become impractical. In addition, the examples of the United States and France were very influential in promoting the constitutional referendum (the first nationwide referendum had actually been held in Switzerland in 1802 to approve the Napoleonic constitution). During these years, all cantonal constitutions, with the exception of Friburg, were approved through referenda, and provisions for popular initiatives, on constitutional or legislative matters, were introduced in many of them. The 1848 federal constitution was also submitted to the people in a majority of cantons, which included the obligatory referendum for amendments to the constitution as well as the constitutional popular initiative for total revision of the constitution. In both countries, a decisive extension of the referendum was achieved under the influence of political reform movements in the second half of the 19th century: the Democratic Movement in Switzerland (the 1860s) and the Progressive Movement in the United States (1890–1920). As a result of these movements, provisions for popular initiatives were enhanced in the Swiss federal constitution (1874: the initiative on laws within 90 days of their publication; 1891: the constitutional initiative for partial revisions) and introduced in many American states, especially in the west (more than 80% of the 24 states that have the popular initiative adopted it during the Progressive era). In the two countries, these movements drew support from the popular dissatisfaction with representative democracy, with politicians being accused of corruption and of fostering the interests of only the richest sections of the population. France has a different story as it had no tradition of direct democracy. Nevertheless, its referendum experience started much as it did in the United States, with referenda on the revolutionary constitutions of 1793 and 1795, following the end of monarchic rule. Moreover, the 1793 constitution greatly advanced democratic principles by introducing universal male suffrage and a popular initiative on laws within 40 days of their adoption. This constitution was actually a great source of inspiration for Switzerland. Ultimately, however, it was never applied, and the only form of referendum that found its way into France was the constitutional referendum. Overall, France would soon take a different road with the plebiscitary use of the referendum by Napoleon I and Napoleon III, to some extent perpetuated by the presidential use of the referendum under the fifth republic.

Constitutional Provisions

As suggested by existing data sets on referenda (see IDEA and c2d), in 2008, only a small minority of countries (about 20% of the 193 countries deemed independent by Freedom House) had no provision at all for referenda at the national or subnational
level; these were mostly in Asia (e.g., China and India), the Middle East, and Central America. Provisions for nationwide referenda are much more widespread (80% of the countries) than provisions for subnational referenda (40% of the countries). At the national level, mandatory referenda and optional referenda (the latter category including in our data set citizens’ demands on existing or pending legislation) are much more prevalent (54% and 60% of all countries, respectively) than citizens’ initiatives for future legislation (16%). Twenty percent of the countries have popular initiatives (either citizens’ demands or citizens’ initiatives). As may be expected, more free countries (by Freedom House ranking) have provisions for referenda (only 13% have no provisions of any kind at any level) than the other countries (24% have no provisions for referenda). This is partly due to differences with regard to popular initiatives: 23% of free countries provide for them compared with only 15% of not free and partially free countries (at the national level). It is remarkable, however, that such a device to challenge political authorities can be found in the constitutions of countries such as the Russian Federation, the Asiatic republics of the former USSR, Togo, or Uganda, although it is never used. But the major difference concerns provisions for subnational referenda, which are much more prevalent in free countries (55%), where they have tended to increase in recent years, than in the other countries (26%).

Practice Around the World
It is much more difficult to assess the effective practice of referenda, especially at the subnational level, for which no exhaustive data set exists. However, over the 1980 to 2008 period, it is possible to classify countries according to the intensity of their practice of national referenda. A preliminary observation should be that frequent use of the referendum is associated with the popular initiative and its practice on a wide range of issues (not strictly constitutional or of special importance). A first group of very frequent users includes Switzerland (246 referenda), with Italy (60), Liechtenstein (38), Ecuador (33), and Micronesia (31) far behind. All these countries have provisions for popular initiatives, which represent the bulk of the practice in Switzerland, Italy, and Lichtenstein. The second group consists of frequent users, such as Ireland (21), with its practice of mandatory constitutional referenda, Palau (19), Colombia (19 since it became free in 1990), and Lithuania (18 referenda since independence), the latter two showing occasional use of the popular initiative. The third group, consisting of medium-frequency users (7–13 referenda), has 16 countries, among which are some occasional practitioners of the popular initiative (e.g., Bolivia, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, New Zealand) and a more frequent user (Uruguay). Unlike the previous groups, this set of countries also includes not fully free countries (6), such as Egypt, Belarus, and Morocco. Nonfree countries are more prevalent in the next two groups of occasional users (23 countries with 4–6 referenda) and rare users (71 countries with 1–3 referenda), which include only a small minority of free countries (and only 3 countries with some practice of the popular initiative: Venezuela, Latvia, and Macedonia). This suggests that the sporadic use of the referendum often has to do with the quest for popular acclamation of authoritarian policies. It should be added that it is often difficult in the case of nondemocratic countries to assess whether a referendum has been mandatory, optional, or ad hoc. A prevalence of authoritarian regimes is not, however, found in the last group, consisting of nonusers (70 countries), which has comparable proportions of free countries and partially free or not free countries. Among the most prominent nonusers of the referendum are the United States, Germany, China, India, Japan, and Israel. The United States and Germany, however, have an intense practice of referenda, especially popular initiatives, at the state level, albeit with important differences from one state to another. Regarding subnational referenda, it should be noted that federal countries and decentralized countries actually have a major propensity for them (Switzerland being an exemplary case). It is also probably true, at least in democratic countries, that the decrease in territorial level (from nation to region or from state to city) will likely correlate with a higher number of referenda. From a dynamic perspective, a general trend toward an increase in the practice of referenda is clearly observable. The number of nationwide referenda between 1980 and 2008 (close to 900 referenda) is almost three times the number registered for 1950 to 1979 (362 referenda). Moreover, the use of referenda dramatically
increased during the 1980 to 2008 period. As a matter of fact, in the postwar period, there was a twofold increase in the use of referenda, and in the 1970s and 1990s, it more than doubled (compared with the previous decade). This does not mean that the referendum has become more frequent in every country or is practiced with the same intensity everywhere. For example, in Western Europe, the increase in referendum use has been much more marked in Switzerland, Italy, and Ireland than in other countries. Nonetheless, the referendum has become more prevalent in many countries where it had never been practiced before (e.g., Great Britain, the Netherlands), where it had not been practiced since 1940 (e.g., Finland, Luxembourg, Norway), and where it had not been practiced in a democratic context (e.g., Austria, Greece, Portugal, Spain). Much of this has had to do with the submission to the people of the different steps of European integration or of new, cross-cutting issues such as civil, nuclear, or so-called moral questions. Clearly enough, from a world perspective, the increase in referendum use in the 1970s and 1990s also reflects the rise in the number of independent countries and the use of the referendum during the process of nation-building in these countries, as well as the spread of democratic regimes around the world.

Empirical Evidence: Causes, Democratic Quality, and Effects

Why referenda are held and why their use has spread around the world, however, are matters for which no general theory has been articulated up to now. Only partial theories regarding specific countries or types of referenda (e.g., government-initiated referenda) have been formulated. For sure, the reasons for the use of referenda are different in democratic and in nondemocratic countries, and they are also not the same in new and in old democracies, where the recent increase has more to do with the crisis of representation and the rising expectations of democracy than with the legitimation of the new state or political regime. The absence of a general theory also characterizes more traditional concerns of the literature, like those pertaining to the democratic quality of referenda or their policy and political effects. Thus, the extent to which and the conditions in which referenda can be democratic, that is, promote policies that accurately reflect the popular will on the question raised, remain problematic. Some authors believe that representative democracy would be better than direct democracy at producing such policies, or at least better than semidirect democracy, to which, strictly speaking, the referendum belongs, as it is only a mechanism of popular decision, not of collective elaboration of policies (unlike citizens’ assemblies). Because of this, people would almost inevitably approve legislation reflecting the views of a few policymakers rather than their own preferences. Social choice theorists also point to inherent structural problems that would dispose referenda to produce only arbitrary majorities, while others believe that such a limitation is generic to all voting procedures and so affects representative democracy as much as direct democracy. From a different point of view, it is often argued that referenda result in minority decisions because of abstention, which has proved to be high when their use becomes frequent; because of manipulation by minorities; or simply because voters answer to a different question from the one formally asked, as typically occurs when they express a vote of confidence in the incumbents. To a large extent, the capacity of the referendum to produce true majority decisions is related to the level of interest and competence of voters on the issue, which itself depends on the frequency of referenda (or the number of propositions on the ballot), the type of question (its complexity, saliency, importance to daily life, etc.), or the fairness and quality of the campaign. But there is no articulated empirical theory on the influence of these variables. Studies on voting behavior at referenda, which form the bulk of the empirical works, rarely go beyond the assessment of voting motivations or the influence of party recommendations at specific polls.

Research on the effects of referenda is even less developed. Little is known, beyond particular country cases, about their policy effects. Do referenda favor the status quo and hinder change, as is often argued with reference to the Swiss experience? Do they have a structural bias in favor of the “No” votes, for they would more easily aggregate disents than create consent? Similarly, does the referendum harm minorities, and is it bound to do so because it “knows nothing about compromise,” as Max Weber pointed out? Those who believe so
generally also doubt that referenda can lead to more legitimate decisions and solve conflicts. Rather, referenda are believed to enhance divisions. Finally, do referenda lead to incoherent and incompetent policies, as their opponents most prominently denounce? The political effects of referenda are no better ascertained. A classical argument against them is that they weaken representative democracy by undermining the role and responsibility of political parties and elected representatives and that when used too frequently, they generate voter fatigue and low electoral participation. Moreover, it is argued, popular initiatives would overload the political system by continually introducing new demands. Supporters of referenda, on the contrary, view them as usefully complementing representative institutions, by making them more democratic and more legitimate. Referenda would enhance both citizens’ participation, in a large sense, and citizens’ education. Moreover, popular initiatives provide an alternative channel for raising issues and, as the example of Switzerland shows, encourage representatives to be more responsive and more accommodating in the preparation of laws, which would result in creating a stronger attachment of the people to the political system. Altogether, the debate on referenda remains largely inconclusive, due to the lack of a truly comparative study dealing with a sufficient number of cases and variables. Admittedly, such a theory is difficult to formulate because of the great variety of the forms of referenda and the contexts in which they are held, which stands as an impediment to any kind of generalization. For the present, it should be noted that the prevailing view among political scientists is not very favorable to referenda. This is explained by the fact that they are criticized by both elitists, in the name of representative democracy, and “participationists,” in the name of pure direct democracy, which is regarded as superior because it allows the collective elaboration of policies as well as more compromise and deliberation, leading to more enlightened decisions. Proponents of the referendum argue that it should not be evaluated against the ideal of direct democracy but against the actual performance of representative democracy, which can be more severely criticized on the same grounds as referenda. In conclusion, further research on referenda is all the more needed since they have become more frequent, and the issue is raised today of whether they should or should not be part of the current development of participatory mechanisms. In such a perspective, recent efforts by think tanks and institutes specializing in the improvement of democracy to advance referendum “best-practice” proposals that incorporate particular institutional designs and rules for their implementation deserve to be mentioned. Ultimately, as with elections, the correctness of referendum practice is to a large extent a matter of rules and of the democratic quality of the regime in which it occurs.

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See also Democracy, Direct; Democracy, Quality; Democracy, Types of; Participation

Further Readings
Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (c2d): http://www.c2d.ch
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: http://www.idea.int

REFORM

Modern societies are highly dynamic. Unlike static traditional societies, they constantly evolve, and
progress is the principal goal. Consequently, a central concept in these societies is that of reform, meaning an intended change of institutions or policies designed to overcome perceived deficits or to achieve particular goals. If successful, the change leads to a positive development: improvement of an existing situation or better performance. Reforms can refer to a government as a whole or its institutions and policies, but political science is also interested in the restructuring of nongovernmental organizations such as associations or firms. In all these settings, modernization is tantamount to reform. 

The concept of reform is used to designate extraordinary political decisions, as distinguished from ordinary decisions, by the degree of change involved. Moreover, reforms break with routine. As a rule, political leaders announce a reform to gain public attention and prove their ability to govern. In this way, they exploit the positive connotations of the term for political gain. In view of the dynamics of modern societies and technologies, even conservatives no longer defend the status quo but propose reforms to avoid negative developments. The ability to reform has become an indication of effective governance, while stalemate and stagnation are commonly identified with governance failure. Nevertheless, an analytical distinction between reform and ordinary decisions is difficult. If blockade is used as the antonym for reform, the concept is too broad for analytical purposes, because not all policy change can be construed as reform and not all opposition to such change can be construed as obstructionist. For this reason, reform should be defined as a policy that is particularly ambitious with regard to change, that is highly relevant for the promoters or affected actors, and that attracts special attention, often among the general public and the media. 

In contrast to revolutionary change, reform policies maintain a legitimized system of governance. Institutions or policies are not abolished but transformed in a more or less incremental process. This process follows existing rules, which usually stipulate the participation of actors that have a stake in the reform. As a consequence, the intended change causes conflicts, and every reform is confronted with the resistance of actors interested in maintaining the status quo or expecting to lose power. On the other hand, actors who push for change may veto a reform if they are not satisfied with the outcome. For these reasons, the challenge of a reform is to find sufficient supporters and arrive at decisions on change, whereas revolutions generate a self-enforcing dynamic that is difficult to control. 

Reform is an intended change effected by explicit decisions and actions of responsible policymakers. Usually, reformers pursue a design of renewed institutions or policies; at least they have ideas about the direction of change. Thus, a reform, concerning the formal institutions, rules, or procedures, differs from changes driven by ongoing interaction or interpretation of existing norms and practices. However, emergent patterns of interaction and interpretation influence the outcome of reforms. In political systems, as in the private sector, reform policies are often guided by designs derived from theories or copied from those of other governments or organizations. But more often than not, these plans fail due to open opposition from actors attempting to maintain their powers or due to the endogenous dynamics of collective action interfering with the intentions of reform policies. It is the interplay of intended and unintended change that explains the outcome of reforms. 

Depending on the specific situation or the desired objectives, the challenges and difficulties of reforms vary. Comprehensive constitutional reforms rarely meet with complete success. As the theories of historical institutionalism explain, changes in complex institutional settings are “path dependent”; that is, they are constrained by previous decisions on constitution making or creation of political systems. Moreover, because reforms affect the allocation of power in political systems, they give rise to intense conflicts and provoke strong resistance by actors who want to maintain their position or who profit from the existing rules. Rules of constitutional amendment require decisions with qualified majorities either in parliaments or through referenda, if not both. These rules favor coalitions of actors opposing a reform. According to institutionalist reasoning, we can expect “implicit change” of constitutional norms through court decisions or reinterpretation of rules by governments. Also possible are limited amendments designed to adjust constitutions to the development of prevalent values or power structures in a society. But major constitutional reforms should be regarded as unlikely events.
Reforming an organization gives rise to similar problems, even if a reorganization can be planned and enacted by political leaders. Administrative reforms, for example, often are initiated by governments or parliaments. By using their power to decide on competences, procedures, personnel, and the budget of administrations, they are able in principle to control reform processes. However, radical intervention in existing structures can destroy standard operating procedures or undermine the motivation of civil servants. Reforms enforced from above often thwart the collective “spirit” or culture of an organization, which is key to maintaining its performance. In this case, those affected by the change may resort to subversive activities or react by work-to-rule. At the end, governments may bring about changes to formal organizations but may fail to achieve the expected improvements.

Reforms related to policies face resistance from affected interest groups, but mostly, they get the support of groups profiting from the change. Whether they succeed or not depends on the comparative power and influence of these groups in the political system. As George Tsebelis has argued, intended policy change can be explained as a bargaining process the outcome of which is determined by the status quo, the preferences of the actors or coalitions involved, and their veto powers. Simply put, reforms are more likely to succeed in changing an existing policy the lower the number of veto players.

Although institutionalist and actor-centered theories often explain the failure of reforms, they do not tell us much about the conditions of change. Empirical research on organizational change has shown that the powers and preferences of actors and the history of institutional development play an important role in reform processes, but no less important are the ideas promoted by the advocates of change. As a rule, reform processes start with discussions leading to new perceptions of problems and new goals and proposals for renovating institutions or policies. If the different opinions merge into a new “paradigm,” or ideas shared among the players in the politics of reform, change in the proposed direction is likely. Moreover, strong “advocacy coalitions” or “change agents” are critical to trigger reforms.

The variables emphasized by different theories have impacts on reforms at different stages of the process. This is why we regularly can observe a cyclical development. Reforms are triggered by new ideas, elaborated and communicated by advocates of change. Public discussions in the concerned policy area cause a shift in perceptions, which tend to exaggerate the problems. Further, they generate concepts for new designs and create positive attitudes for change. Attention from the media and discourses in science have strong impacts at this stage of the reform process. If responsible reformers exploit the opportunities provided by this development with bold initiatives, they can achieve significant formal changes. However, such decisions provoke reactions by those actors that oppose the change; and the more ambitious the agenda, the more intense is the response. This stage of the process is characterized by conflicts, bargaining, politicking, and increasing negative assessments of the consequences of a reform. As the media begins losing interest in the issue at stake, reformers revise their ambitions, reduce their engagement in reform policies, and shift their attention to other tasks. At the same time, the actors defending their interests or positions gain influence, obstructive behavior increases in organizations or policy areas, and the formal changes are adjusted to emergent rules and patterns of interactions. This reform cycle can end in the restoration of former structures and policies, but in most cases, it results in moderate changes.

In view of this up-and-down nature of reform processes, scholars have debated on appropriate strategies of reforms. According to one opinion, successful reforms require strong leadership, clear goals and designs, bold strikes shaking up existing structures of powers and routines, and fast action in favorable situations. Others argue that good preparation of reforms, a broad consensus, participation of the affected actors, initiatives from inside organizations, and perseverance in long-lasting processes are decisive factors. Presumably, the strategies of reforms have to be adjusted to institutional frameworks and situations. Moreover, comparative studies have yielded ample evidence for the assumption that majority democracies can achieve more change through policy reform while consensus democracies tend toward incremental adjustment. Whether this finding also holds for
institutional or constitutional reform is still an open question. There is also debate as to whether crisis situations favor or constrain reforms. In fact a severe crisis increases the need for change and even can turn into a “critical juncture” if existing institutions break down or existing policies no longer work. But it also reduces the leeway for reform policies due to the pressure for immediate action. Experiences and comparative studies in administrative reforms have revealed that fiscal crises limit the opportunities to reform organizations. On the other hand, an abundance of resources reduces the need for change and can lead to increasing conservatism. Competition between governments or private organizations may stimulate reform processes, in particular if policymakers enter into an exchange of best practices. Nevertheless, the transfer of reform blueprints or abstract concepts can have negative consequences on the reform process if the particular conditions or cultures of governments or organizations are ignored by promoters of change. Again, the administrative reforms of the past decades provide examples of such developments.

Regardless of these debates, in modern states and in complex organizations, reforms evidently arrive within limits. Hardly any reform follows its initial aims or ideas. However, in view of the interplay between change of formal rules and the dynamics of emergent interaction, what reformers intend cannot be taken as an adequate standard for evaluation; rather, it is the way they manage conflicts and turn initiatives into a process of collective learning among affected actors. In the end, reforms can be regarded as successful if they balance change and stability and if the cyclical development leads not to restoration of the status quo ante but to ongoing evolution. Every reform is embedded in the dynamics of institutions and policy making. It never determines change.

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Further Readings

Regime (Comparative Politics)

Regimes are the various types of political systems found in the sovereign countries of the world. These can be defined as specific individual regime types or as contrasting types. In comparative politics, the concept of a political regime refers to the formal and informal structure and nature of political power in a country, including the method of determining office holders and the relations between the office holders and the society at large. These relations could or could not involve accountability of office holders to the demos and likewise could involve various freedoms granted to society or, conversely, none at all. The distinction as to whether a country is a democracy or not is thus a regime distinction—and indeed (as we shall see) the central regime distinction.

The first use of the concept in modern political science was by David Easton. Easton contrasted the regime with the ongoing political community (the country), emphasizing that there can be and have been fundamental changes to a political system (producing a different regime) even while the political community remains basically constant. This entry defines a regime; discusses the key distinction within a regime, that is, if it is a democracy or not (or how much democracy it has); and presents more generally the cases of ambiguity.
What Is a Regime?
Regime is a midrange concept, falling between the concept of specific governments (of individuals) and the concept of the state (the broader administrative-legal structure that has sovereign control over a country and the power to extract resources from it). That is, governments may vary (e.g., the shifts back and forth between Conservative and Labour governments in the United Kingdom), or presidential administrations may change (e.g., from George W. Bush to Barack Obama in the United States), but these are not changes of regime; the democratic regimes in each case remain. Thus, over time a given regime may involve many governments. Following from the above, for there to be a regime change, the political “rules of the game” must change in a systemic way, not merely the winner of the game. Thus, South Africa in 1994 underwent a regime change from a racial oligarchy to a liberal democracy; since then, there have been several presidents, starting with Nelson Mandela, but the regime has remained the same. Conversely, a change of regime may occur in a specific state, but the state itself normally remains the same (of course, states do get formed and dissolved, but the point here is that over the very long haul, a stable state is likely to experience multiple regime types). Key state institutions and actors (the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the military, etc.) thus tend to carry over from one regime to another, for example, from Imperial Germany to the Weimar Republic—in this example posing problems for the latter. Sometimes, though, a regime change will involve the creation of entirely new state structures, such as with the creation of the Soviet Union (the new communist bureaucracy, the Red Army instead of the Imperial Army, etc.). Finally, one must distinguish between public policies that speak to the nature of the regime (such as the extent of civil liberties) and more general socioeconomic policies, such as economic policy, health care, or same-sex marriage—the latter types of policies can change (and may well change with different governments) but do not involve regime change.

It should be noted that the word regime is sometimes used as the equivalent of “system,” for example, a parliamentary regime versus a presidential regime. However, this is too broad a use of the concept of regime. Thus, if a democracy changes from, say, a parliamentary system to a presidential system, as Gambia did in 1970, it is not a regime change. A similar point can be made about unicameral versus bicameral systems or unitary versus federal systems.

The Key Regime Distinction: Democracy or Not (or How Much of It)?
There are many different specific political regimes in the world, but the initial assessment of a regime normally begins with whether or not it is democratic. In the contemporary world, a democratic regime has three basic aspects: competitive elections, more or less universal suffrage, and a responsible government—that is, those elected in competitive elections both are accountable to the people (the voters) and have the actual power to govern, as opposed to effective power being in the hands of a monarch, the military, or a clerical figure. (Implicit in this definition of democracy is some sort of functioning state.) The opposite reality here is that of an autocratic regime. That said, since there are key differences among autocratic regimes, these are normally identified more precisely, as specific regime types. The main types of autocratic regimes are totalitarian regimes (involving a ruling ideology, mass mobilization, and total state control), such as Nazi Germany; posttotalitarian regimes (involving less emphasis on ideology and somewhat greater freedoms), such as the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev; sultanistic regimes (involving the personal rule of an individual and his or her family), such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein; traditional authoritarian regimes (involving rule by a monarch), such as Imperial Russia; military authoritarian regimes, such as the one ruling Myanmar; theocratic authoritarian regimes, such as the one in Iran (at least through 2009); and electoral authoritarian regimes (more on this type below). There are some autocracies, however, that straddle these specific regime types; for example, Cuba and North Korea have elements of both totalitarianism and sultanism.

Viewed as a simple dichotomy between a democratic regime and an autocratic regime, a clear majority of the 194 or so countries in the world today have democratic regimes. However, a standard further distinction is made between electoral democratic regimes and liberal democratic regimes. Electoral democracies have the three basic features
given above. Liberal democracies have these as well (and thus all liberal democracies are also electoral democracies), but they additionally have the liberal features of broad civil liberties, a strong rule of law (e.g., an independent judiciary), horizontal accountability of elected officials to other state actors (e.g., ombudsmen and state auditors), and a well-functioning state with limited if not minimum corruption. There are, thus, many democratic regimes that are electoral but not liberal. This is especially true in Africa and Latin America. The fact that the liberal democratic regimes of the world are overwhelmingly found in Europe, European settler societies, and the former Anglo-American colonies has led to the criticism that this is a Western rather than a universal concept.

By placing liberal democracies ahead of electoral democracies (which in turn are ahead of autocracies), the dichotomy between regimes has been transformed into a continuum. Indeed, most scholarly and related analyses use some sort of continuum of regimes. In terms of global assessments, Freedom House (an international nongovernmental organization that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, human freedom, and human rights) distinguishes among free, partly free, and not free regimes, based ultimately on 7-point scales for each of political rights and civil liberties. (Freedom House also has a separate dichotomous list of electoral democracies.) The Bertelsmann Transformation Index uses a 10-point scale that ultimately produces a continuum of five categories: democracies, defective democracies, highly defective democracies, moderate autocracies, and autocracies. However, it classifies failed states separately (within the broader autocratic area).

Continua can also be used for the submeasures of democracy. There are various measures of the rule of law, including that of the World Bank. Transparency International, a nongovernmental organization, publishes a Corruptions Perception Index. Yet these measures do not claim to make a clear distinction among regimes, perhaps because they deal with aspects of liberalism rather than democracy. Regime distinctions can be made based on the extent of the right to vote; this would lead to pre–World War II Belgium and France, for example, being classified as male democracies due to the absence of female suffrage. Of course, in the contemporary world, the vast majority of countries have more or less universal suffrage for both genders, so suffrage is now a limited measure for defining regimes. In terms of responsible government, scholars have produced measures of the extent of monarchical control, and especially of military control. There are potential gray areas here, especially with situations of monarchical or military tutelage; normally these are seen as being democratic regimes, but just so.

Without a doubt, however, the one submeasure of democracy where there are specific continua leading to regime classification is the extent of free and fair elections. By “free and fair elections,” one means many things: the ability of most, if not all, people and parties to run for election; access of candidates to voters; equal treatment of candidates and parties by state actors such as the police and courts; media pluralism so that opposition candidates have media access (as opposed to the media being controlled by government); secret ballot; no coercion of voters; neutral and transparent ballot counting with independent monitors allowed; no major or “mysterious” delays in reporting the full results; and impartial resolution of disputes. In a democratic regime, these factors exist sufficiently to allow a real opportunity for the government to be defeated; in contrast, in an autocratic regime, the government will tilt the playing field so that it has an insurmountable advantage and/or will simply fabricate the results (as presumably happened in Iran in 2009). Yet the dividing lines here are not always clear and decisive. Certainly if a government is defeated and hands over power, then one assumes that the elections were fair and the regime is democratic. However, if a government or president is reelected, does that reflect unfairness or simply the voters’ desire to reelect them? One point here is whether the opposition cries foul or accepts the results as legitimate. However, in some cases, the opposition may not bother to cry foul if it sees no point in protesting.

Even if the opposition is not allowed to win by the powers that be, they may still have some electoral success. At a minimum, they are allowed to exist. This gave rise to the concept of an electoral authoritarian regime, which conceptually is a relatively new regime type. In such a regime, multi-party/multicandidate elections are held but with no chance of the incumbents losing power due to
the lack of fairness and perhaps freedom as well. Yet it is the very reality of election “victory” that is used to give legitimacy to the regime, if not indeed to claim it as a democracy. Singapore is a classic case here. These electoral authoritarian regimes can be contrasted with fully closed regimes, where no opposition is allowed to exist (e.g., totalitarian and sultanistic regimes or certain traditional authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia). On the other hand, in some autocratic regimes elections are not just a rubber stamp, and election outcomes are of concern to the government. Opposition forces may win a significant minority of the seats or even some control of regional/local governments. Even if the playing field is not level enough, or fair enough, for the government to be defeated overall, it can still experience a worse or better result from election to election. Malaysia for decades (through the time of writing) fits this situation. Thus, scholars have developed the concept of a competitive authoritarian regime that, although clearly authoritarian as opposed to democratic, allows much more competition and pluralism (including media freedom) than (hegemonic) electoral authoritarian regimes, not to mention fully closed regimes. The concept of a competitive authoritarian regime thus overlaps with the Bertelsmann Transformation Index’s notion of a moderate autocracy. It is thus possible for such competitive authoritarian regimes to become competitive enough to produce a transition to democracy, as happened to Ukraine when the amount of vote rigging needed to produce victory for the regime’s presidential candidate in 2004 led to the Orange Revolution and the ushering in of a democratic regime.

These distinctions among democracies, competitive authoritarian regimes, hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes, and fully closed regimes essentially or ultimately reflect the electoral success of the opposition. To repeat, in democracies the opposition has a realistic chance of defeating the government (and if this does not happen in an individual election, it is the result of voter preferences and/or poor opposition strategies rather than an unfair playing field), in competitive authoritarian regimes the opposition is able to win a reasonably large number of seats (and thus also hold the government to some account in the legislature), and in hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes the opposition wins only a tiny and largely irrelevant number of seats (but it still exists, unlike in fully closed regimes). These differing regime classifications thus draw heavily on election outcomes, but the general level of freedom in a country (such as its Freedom House score) usually is related reasonably well to this specific indicator of election outcomes. There are also liberal autocratic regimes where the civil rights are much greater than the effective political freedoms, such as Monaco and Tonga; that said, in these countries the autocracy stems from a lack of responsible government (and thus “relevant” elections) rather than unfair elections per se.

All of this also raises the question of whether empirically there is a maximum level of support for a government/incumbent beyond which the result is not credible and the regime cannot be considered a democracy. Usually, something like 70% of the vote is suggested here. Yet in countries broadly considered to be democratic, such as Botswana and Namibia, incumbent parties have won over 70% of the vote in elections (however, in South Africa the African National Congress has never reached this level of support, its best result being 69.7% in 2004). In part, this may reflect the exceptional support given to parties that led the nation’s struggle for independence. Certainly in Western democracies, parties (or presidential candidates) competing in national elections never get much more than 60% of the vote, even in the most successful cases. Indeed, presidential elections in the United States are interesting in this regard, since there does appear to be an effective “ceiling” just above 60% of the vote. In descending order, the largest vote shares in such elections have been 61.1% (Lyndon Johnson in 1964), 60.8% (Franklin Roosevelt in 1936), 60.7% (Richard Nixon in 1972), and 60.3% (Warren Harding in 1920)—all very close values. Outside the United States, one can note the vote share of 64.7% that José Figueres got in Costa Rica in 1953—an undisputed outcome in a democratic regime. Consequently, it seems clear that a result of 90% or 80% cannot be consistent with democracy. That said, many dubious/nondemocratic outcomes are based on much less lopsided “official” results, such as 63% for President Ahmadinejad in Iran in 2009, 51% for President Salinas in Mexico in 1988, and 47% for President Kibaki in Kenya in 2007—all of
which were nevertheless (at best) competitive authoritarian regimes.

Ambiguous and Hybrid Regimes

Regardless of how many categories there are in a continuum of regime types, one needs to ask whether this continuum could be collapsed into two categories—democracies and autocracies. In other words, is every country ultimately considered to be a democracy or an autocracy, or is there some unclear middle ground? Scholarly and related research differs as to whether or not there is ever any such unclear middle ground. There are two rather different problems here. First of all, a country could have a fluid or unstable political system, making it hard to pin it down. In this case, one option is the concept of a transitional regime. Conversely, the previous regime could be deemed to remain in place (and the country be classified as such) until there is a clear shift to a new regime. Second, there could be genuine scholarly disagreement about the political reality in a country, with independent analysts having differing opinions as to, say, the level of competitiveness. This divergence is most common where the government/incumbent is reelected, and seems to be genuinely popular, but where there are (serious) procedural issues—for example, Russia under Vladimir Putin or Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. Such polities could be considered ambiguous regimes, at least until there is a reasonable consensus on their regime classification (which incidentally tends to be that they are authoritarian, leading to a related debate as to the point at which democracy broke down). A variant of this dilemma is where a country just places into a category. For example, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index refers to highly defective democracies as barely meeting its minimum criteria for democracy. It also acknowledges a gray area between democracy and autocracy.

These situations all involve ambiguity in classification. The resulting notions of ambiguous regimes or transitional regimes are meant not to be precise categories but rather to reflect the inability to be precise. Conversely, the notion of a hybrid regime involves combined aspects of democracy and autocracy in a fairly stable, ongoing way. This concept is more likely to be used if more aspects are included in the assessment. Narrow(er) assessments that focus on just competition and responsible government are likely to place every country on one side or the other of the divide—that is, as either a democratic or an autocratic regime. However, if there are multiple criteria—and if these are weighted equally—then the reality arises of countries that are democratic in some aspects and autocratic in others or that average out as being in the middle. This is the reality of, for example, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy, which has five aspects including political participation and political culture—indeed, what this really seeks to measure is consolidated democracy. Consequently, a substantial number of countries fall into its hybrid regime category, defined as having a score from 4.0 to 5.9 out of 10. Decomposing their components would categorize the vast majority of these countries as either (unconsolidated) electoral democracies or competitive authoritarian regimes, with a few countries scoring as they do because of a lack of sufficient stateness.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Democracy, Types of; Hybrid Regimes; Parliamentary Systems; Totalitarian Regimes

Further Readings


Regional Integration (Supranational)

When examining the macrostructure of the global system, three observations appear highly salient. Politically, the world is organized into 200 or so sovereign nation-states, each an aspiring zone of exclusive authority. Economically, there is a single though differentiated world economy, especially since the decline of the global socialist bloc. What lies in between these states and the world economy are numerous international institutions, many of them organized on a regional basis. Regional integration refers to the process of increasing political and economic cooperation among states in close geographic proximity to each other. The growth in the number of regional organizations is dramatic. While numerous regional organizations were reported to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the 4½ decades after World War II, an even more dramatic growth spurt has taken place starting in 1992. While the number of new regional organizations leveled off, that level remained very high in comparison with all years prior to 1992.

This worldwide trend toward regional integration presents two important puzzles. First, scholars debate the reasons for this tendency toward regionalism in an era of globalization. Economic theory pushes in the direction of larger units, while the demand for sovereignty and identity suggest smaller units. Second, why does one experiment in regional integration, the European Union (EU), stand out, distinguished not so much by the level of economic integration as by the breadth and depth of its political institutions? The distancing of Europe from other regional organizations has had the unfortunate consequence of compartmentalizing scholarship. Today, comparative studies of regional integration with the EU as one case are rare.

The New Regionalism in a Comparative Perspective

Regional organizations and agreements are proliferating all over the world, and more than 50% of international trade is now conducted within preferential trading agreements organized at the regional level. Regional integration has proceeded in waves, the most recent of which began in the wake of the Cold War in the early 1990s. The EU’s single market was completed in 1992, and the treaty at Maastricht that year set the timetable for achieving economic and monetary union by 1999. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed by Canada, Mexico, and the United States in 1992. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established in 1989 with the goal of becoming a free trade area (a goal not yet realized), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), though established in 1967, created a free trade area in 1992. It expanded its membership and its integration activities in the 1990s, and since the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. The three regional powers—China, Japan, and South Korea—have been included in regular ASEAN summit meetings.

These three sites of economic regionalism—Europe, North America, and East Asia—are home to the majority of the world’s intraregional trade and the most robust regional institutions, but steps toward regionalization have been taken elsewhere as well. There are regional organizations among states in the Middle East (Gulf Cooperation Council), Africa (South African Customs Union, West African Economic and Monetary Union), and South America (Southern Common Market [Mercado Común del Sur, MERCOSUR], Andean Community), and there are free trade agreements in
regions all over the world. As of July 2010, more than 474 regional trading agreements had been reported to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Of the agreements already in force, over 90% are free trade agreements. Almost every WTO member is party to at least one regional trade agreement, and these agreements often intersect in complex ways. At the same time, the depth and scope of regional integration are highly diverse, with the EU representing a level of both economic and political integration not seen elsewhere on the globe, while many regional agreements are little more than symbolic acts that have not generated any meaningful regional economic or political cooperation.

Given the institutions already in place at the global level to facilitate multilateral trade, and the widespread membership of states in these institutions, the “new regionalism” of the early 1990s is an interesting puzzle, for which scholars have provided several explanations. At the international level, some scholars point to the end of the Cold War as a catalyst for the sudden rise in the number of regional agreements signed by states in the early 1990s. According to these arguments, the move from a bipolar world characterized by stark political divisions to a multipolar world characterized by increasing global economic competition removed many of the constraints that had once operated on states’ foreign policies, both politically and economically. The end of the bipolar division restored regional sovereignty and allowed regional powers to develop. Asia, for example, had been geographically split along ideological lines, and with the end of the Cold War, countries such as China and Vietnam have been gradually integrated into regional institutions. The prospect of a more multipolar world and fears of “Fortress Europe” encouraged states to organize regionally to counter the growing economic weight of the EU and NAFTA.

Another line of argument focuses on the role of hegemony. Some theorize that the primary role of a global hegemon is to provide public goods; in the post-hegemonic international system, states began turning to regional organizations to overcome collective-action problems. As a hegemon, the United States influenced economic relations all over the globe, and it traditionally encouraged bilateral trade relationships in Asia, whereas in Europe, it supported multilateral integration efforts. The relative decline of U.S. hegemony in certain regions since World War II has afforded these regions more freedom to pursue their own integration projects. For example, in the early 1990s Japan overtook the United States as the leading provider of foreign aid in Asia, and it began to challenge U.S. dominance in trade and foreign direct investment within the region. With the strong economic linkages formed during this time between Japan and the newly industrializing economies in Asia, the door was opened for the development of stronger regional cooperation.

The third reason why states may have been motivated to pursue regionalism was difficulties reaching agreement in multilateral trade negotiations in the early 1990s. The GATT Uruguay Round is the most comprehensive trade agreement negotiated to date, and it was extremely frustrating for the participants, taking 8 years to complete and leaving many developing states unsatisfied. During this same time period (1986–1994), NAFTA, MERCOSUR, APEC, and the EU’s single market were initiated and completed in less time than it took to complete the Uruguay Round. These agreements were not only achieved more quickly, but also they provided solutions to issues that had come to a standstill in the GATT negotiations.

### Comparative Regional Groupings

While regionalization is a process taking place all over the globe, there is considerable variation in the institutional design of regional agreements, in the depth of integration they achieve, and in the success with which they meet their stated objectives. The EU is exceptional for its high level of both economic and political institutionalization. In North America, the three parties to NAFTA succeeded in creating a free trade area that is wide-ranging in its trade liberalization agenda; deep in its level of institutionalization, especially with regard to dispute resolution mechanisms; and prominent as a focal point for other subregional agreements that have sprung up among Latin American countries. MERCOSUR is the largest South American trading bloc, but it remains largely intergovernmental in nature, with weak implementation of basic integration measures and a continued preference for bilateralism among some of its members. There are many subregional trading agreements in place among African states, although the low level of
economic development and the absence of large cost differences in tradable goods across much of the continent make successful regional economic cooperation exceedingly difficult.

**East Asian Regionalism**

One of the world’s most important economic regions, East Asia, has been a relative newcomer to the process of regionalization. Until very recently, scholars commonly described this region as “under-institutionalized” when compared with the other two regional economic heavyweights, North America and Europe. While the EU is known for its robust multilateral and supranational institutions, in East Asia cooperation has taken a more bilateral and intergovernmental form in both economic and security areas. ASEAN has played an important role in relations among Southeast Asian countries since its founding in 1967, but it wasn’t until the late 1990s that ASEAN expanded to meet regularly with China, Japan, and South Korea, the three regional powers. The other prominent regional organization in Asia, APEC, has 21 member states from both sides of the Pacific Ocean, but its efforts at trade liberalization have stalled in recent years and left it largely on the sidelines. In addition, Asian countries have been notably reluctant to create supranational political institutions at the regional level. Instead, cooperation is largely limited to the economic realm, and it is informal, often led by transnational business networks. This informal, business-led form of economic cooperation in Asia has come to be known as the “ASEAN Way.”

Some argue that the diversity among East Asian states in their levels of economic development and government capacity to implement integration measures have hindered meaningful cooperation efforts at the regional level. Still others contend that the delayed regionalization in East Asia reflects the traditional U.S. preference for bilateral cooperation in this region. While the United States supported multilateral integration in Europe in the postwar period, it pushed the development of bilateralism in Asia, partially as a way to maintain its hegemony in the region. In the post-Cold War period, the continued political heterogeneity across East Asia has made integration difficult. In addition, Japan, a potential regional leader in the early 1990s, prioritized its relationship with the United States over the pursuit of a multilateral integration agenda with its neighbors. Bowing to U.S. pressure, Japan neither led integration efforts nor lent its full support to proposals by other Asian states for greater integration in East Asia.

The situation in East Asia dramatically changed after the crippling economic crisis in 1997. The crisis made it clear to Asian political leaders just how vulnerable their economies were to the flight of global capital. Further, there was deep disappointment with the response of the United States and U.S.-led international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund. The United States continued to promote neoliberal reforms in the wake of the crisis, despite the longstanding resistance to these reforms from East Asian governments, many of whom believed that such reforms had been a cause of the crisis. Japan’s proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund that would help maintain regional stability in the future was opposed by the United States, a move widely viewed in East Asia as a U.S. attempt to maintain its influence in the region, despite the cost to stability. Since 1997, the focus has shifted away from integration at the Southeast Asian or Pacific-wide level to wider integration across East Asia.

**Process of Regional Integration in Europe**

Limitations of space preclude a comprehensive review of regional integration theories, let alone of the wealth of regional experiences around the world. This section reviews functionalism and neoliberalism (collapsing most distinctions) and liberal intergovernmentalism as the two dominant approaches. The section concludes with some comments on new departures in regional integration theory concerning the EU, departures that signal a break with the questions posed by existing theoretical frameworks.

**Functionalism**

The causal factors emphasized by functionalism fit into three categories: (1) the fertile postwar environment, (2) the initial integrative successes, and (3) the interconnected nature of modern capitalist societies, which in turn leads to the expansion of these initial successes. The fertile postwar environment was characterized by late capitalism
(industrial and postindustrial), specialized and partly autonomous interest groups, and democratic forms of governance. In telling the story of European integration, it is easy to downplay Europe’s early postwar history, when major political problems (how to incorporate Germany, how to provide for European security) were addressed and resolved, and focus only on the economic side of the picture. The economic recovery of Germany, aided by a multilateral structure set up by the Marshall Plan, and the subsequent integration of Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955 provided the necessary preconditions for further integration. Analysts attempting to compare Europe with other areas of the world should keep these salient facts in mind.

The second explanatory factor offered by functionalism has to do with the hoped-for initial successes of the integration project. One could argue that the initial successes were contingent rather than a predicted outcome of functionalist theory. However, the success of the initial attempts to integrate was endogenous in the sense that the practitioners and analysts believed that by focusing on the less controversial sectors, they would stand a better chance of succeeding. In good measure, they were right about this prediction. The free trade area, the customs union, and much of the common agricultural policy were in place by 1968. There is little doubt that these successes paved the way for further integration, even though there was little movement on the policy front between 1968 and 1985.

Third, functionalists argue that the modern capitalist society is interconnected and these interconnections all but ensured that the initial success implied further integration. Several kinds of linkages are theorized. There are linkages among sectors (e.g., trade and monetary), linkages from the economic to political spheres (e.g., market participation generates citizenship rights), and purely tactical linkages. This last category offers negotiators the possibility of linking sectors that are not inherently connected; for example, market expansion may be linked to regional aid for the purpose of making the former more attractive to suspicious participants. These linkages are mechanisms that perhaps will lead to further integration, once the initial foundations are in place. In functionalism jargon, the secondary integrative processes set in motion by these mechanisms are spillover processes.

The preceding discussion can be thought of as dealing with the demand side of integration. But the demand for integration does not automatically lead to integration. Political market failures may occur. Inadequate institutional structures or weak leadership may thwart the process. For integration to occur, even when key social actors want it to occur, collective-action problems have to be overcome. For this reason, functionalists assigned a central role to supranational institutions, from the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the Commission and European Court of Justice of the EU.

In the able hands of first-generation scholars such as Ernst Haas, Philippe Schmitter, and Leon Lindberg, the basic analytics of regional integration theory were put into place. A second generation of neo-functionalist scholars (e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz, Paul Pierson) extended the basic research program to account for deeper processes of integration, including the completion of the single market, economic and monetary union, and subsequent treaty revisions (Amsterdam, Nice, Lisbon). In a 1998 work, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz increased our institutional understanding of the EU. Their work on the European Court of Justice takes pains to link active interest groups with the structure of litigation and legislation. The Commission, Council of Ministers, and European Parliament are all integrated into one comprehensive picture of triadic dispute resolution.

At the same time that Stone Sweet was building his model of triadic dispute resolution, Sandholtz was questioning the assumption of exogenous preferences. Sandholtz argued that preference formation was partly endogenous to membership within the EU itself. In his 1996 work “Membership Matters,” Sandholtz reasoned that attitudes were not formed in an insulated domestic context and then transported to Brussels, where officials acted on them. Instead, the experience of member states working together in the EU, solving problems collectively through EU institutions, was expected to contribute to the formation of preferences, along with the forces emanating from the domestic and international political economy. Sandholtz’s contributions should be seen as part of a longer line of research on socialization and the formation of preferences.
Finally, with regard to the extension of neo-functionalism, the theory gets a more rigorous dynamic dimension by reframing some old questions within a principal–agent framework. Of what importance are unintended consequences? Under what conditions do they occur? What accounts for the discrepancies between the incentives and information available to principals (national executives) and agents (their appointees in Brussels)? Pierson was able to provide a sounder theoretical foundation to neo-functionalism, giving some previously theoretically unanchored propositions a home.

**Liberal Intergovernmentalism**

The major rival of neo-functionalism is liberal intergovernmentalism (LIG). With a series of articles published during the early 1990s, culminating in his 1998 book *The Choice for Europe*, Andrew Moravcsik set out the foundations of a state-centric theory of the integration process, one that relies on the preferences of the member states, formed by processes external to member (socialization) pressures. Moravcsik theorizes that the formation of preferences of state actors is due mostly to the pressures emanating from the domestic and global political economy.

In Moravcsik’s “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach” (1993), he identifies a two-stage theory of integration in which the first stage is preference formation by state leaders and the second stage is intergovernmental bargaining. A third stage is added in *The Choice for Europe* (1998), in which bargained outcomes are institutionalized in an attempt to prevent them from being overturned. At the core of the model lie the social and economic interests of key producer and commercial groups.

After the preferences of state actors are formed, governments engage in international bargaining. Here, state power (oddly absent from much integration theory) plays a role. The relative costs of non-agreement, in particular the ability to revert easily to the status quo, are the main source of power. Countries that can do without an agreement, for example, Germany in the case of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), can hold out for favorable bargaining outcomes.

LIG has come in for its share of criticism. It limits itself to grand bargains, those momentous occasions when states confront each other over high-stakes outcomes. This focus misses the way in which small things may accumulate and create pressure leading to an important international negotiation. Indeed, this is a central functionalist point, namely, that relatively mundane and nonsalient events can become transforming if viewed in the long run. LIG and functionalism are seen as two separate theories, but they may actually be linked through a tissue of events tying together grand bargains.

A second criticism is that pressure for renewed change need not come from exogenous or endogenous change in the domestic or global economy. It may come from a disequilibrium present from the moment a grand bargain is struck. If state actors can bring about a bargain, and if they vote by consensus (which they do), then by definition they are satisfied with the bargain. But this may not be the case for institutional actors, for example, the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Court of Justice, or the European Parliament. Each has its own institutional interests, which are different from the interests of national executives. These actors may agitate for change the moment the grand bargain is struck.

**New Departures, Europeanization, and Approaches Based on the Social Purpose of Integration**

While functionalism and LIG occupy most of the debate regarding regional integration theory, some new approaches have appeared that ask different questions and introduce novel directions in our research. Significant new directions are provided by the Europeanization and Gramscian approaches. Space constraints allow only a brief word about each.

The Europeanization approach already claims a substantial following. In some sense, the Europeanization framework was a logical outgrowth of the success of European integration itself. When regional institutions were weak and policy was decided at the national level (in the early stage), the natural question was “How do we account for delegation of authority to the regional level?” When regional institutions became much
more developed, the problematic shifted to how these institutions functioned to make policies (hence “Europe as a polity”). And when Europe was sufficiently established as a polity, it became natural to ask, “How do its institutions and policies feed back onto the very political systems that compose it?” In a sense, the Europeanization approach closes the conceptual circle.

A final approach—labeled Gramscian—is singled out because of the novelty of the questions asked. The main departure from the other approaches is that it asks a question that is astonishingly absent from the functionalism/LIG debate. This debate centers mostly on the questions of how much authority is delegated to the supranational level (and under what conditions) and which actors are influential in the process. The Gramscian approach asks about the social and political content of integration. What goals are served, and what groups or class fractions are dominant? These questions are approached not as a pluralist battle among all organized interest groups but as a rivalry among the various “fractions” of productive and financial capital. A key advocate of this line of analysis is Bastian van Apeldoorn (2002), whose work on the role of classes and business groups charts out new directions in integration theory. Others, such as Fritz Scharpf (1999) and James Caporaso and Sidney Tarrow (2009), adopt a slightly broader emphasis. All of these researchers ask about the content of the integration project rather than the level, scope, or depth of regional integration.

The future of regional integration is likely to be increasingly involved with attempts at liberalization of international trade, especially in non-European settings. Efforts to find the “right” membership to pursue regional goals will be salient, especially in the Asian setting, where ASEAN, APEC, and ASEAN + 3 all compete for regional leadership. In Europe, the functionalist/intergovernmental debate will continue, though in muted form, but it will shift the stage with newer theories based on Europe as a polity, Europeanization theories, and theories emphasizing the social purpose of European regional integration, including the relationship among integration, the welfare state, and democracy.

As shown, regional integration processes are vibrant across the globe. It is hoped that the gap between academic theories of integration in Europe and in other parts of the world will be bridged by the continuing research on comparative regional integration.

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Further Readings

REGIONALISM

Regionalism refers to the political and cognitive idea of forming regions. It is usually associated
with a formal program, and since the mid-1980s, there has been an explosion of such regional programs on a global scale. The broadening and deepening of the European Union (EU) is perhaps the most obvious example, but regionalism is also evident in the revitalization or expansion of many other regional projects around the world, such as the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur, MERCOSUR), and, more recently, the Union of South American Nations (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, UNASUR).

Today’s regionalism is closely linked with the shifting nature of global politics and the intensification of globalization. Regionalism is characterized by the involvement of almost all governments in the world, but it also involves a wide variety of nonstate actors. This results in a multitude of formal and informal regional types of governance and regional networks in most fields of politics. This pluralism and multidimensionality of contemporary regionalism gives rise to a number of new puzzles and challenges in today’s politics.

This entry first defines the terms region, regionalism, and regionalization. Second, it provides an overview of the continuities and discontinuities between the early and the more recent debates on regionalism. Finally, it presents a brief discussion of regionalism and world order.

Regions, Regionalism, and Regionalization

The concept of a region evolved historically to mean the space between the national and the local within a particular state. This meaning may be captured by the term microregion, or subnational region. The concept may also be used to refer to macroregions (the so-called world or international regions), which are larger territorial units, as opposed to nonterritorial units or subsystems. They exist between the state level and the global system level. The macroregion has been the most common object of analysis in international relations, while microregions have more commonly been considered in the study of domestic politics.

A conventional definition of a macroregion, originally suggested by Joseph Nye, is a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence. Historically, a plethora of opinions have been advanced regarding which mutual interdependencies matter the most: economic, political, and social interrelationships or historical, cultural, and ethnic bonds. It has been argued that the definitions of what constitutes a region may vary according to the particular issue under investigation. This may lead to the identification of overlapping types of regions, such as economic regions, security regions, environmental regions, and cultural regions.

The overwhelming majority of studies in the field of political science and international relations have focused on predefined regions in the form of state-led and interstate regional organizations and frameworks. The AU, ASEAN, EU, SADC, and ECOWAS are examples. The argument that the composition of regions should not be limited to regional intergovernmental organizations has been stressed in recent constructivist and poststructuralist scholarship. From this perspective, all regions are deemed to be socially constructed and hence politically contested. Emphasis is placed on how political actors perceive and interpret the idea of a region and notions of “regionness.” According to this school of thought, there are no “natural” regions; all regions are (at least potentially) heterogeneous, with unclear territorial margins. The focus is often on the processes of region building and regionalization, which implies that the distinction between regionalism and regionalization is emphasized.

Regionalism means the body of ideas, values, and objectives that contribute to the creation, maintenance, or modification of a particular region or type of world order. It is usually associated with a formal policy and project and often leads to institution building. Further, regionalism ties agents to a specific project that is limited spatially or socially but not in time.

Regionalization refers to the process of region formation. It implies a focus on the process by which regions come into existence and are consolidated, their “becoming” so to speak. In its most basic sense, the term may imply no more than the concentration of goods, services, investment, peoples, and
ideas at the regional level. This interaction may lead to the emergence of regional actors, networks, and organizations. When they are active at the regional level, regional actors bring about regionalization, so-called region building. Regionalization may be caused by regionalism, but it may also emerge in the absence of a regionalist project and ideology. Hence, regionalism may not always have much practical significance for the reality of regionalization.

**Early and Recent Debates on Regionalism**

Experts on the subject often distinguish between the “old” and the “new” regionalism, or what is more appropriately labeled the early and the more recent debate on regionalism. The early debate covers research undertaken between the 1950s and the 1970s, and the key term was *regional integration*. These studies generally viewed regional integration as an endogenous process, that is, a development that arose from conditions internal to and specific to each region in question. With some exceptions, particularly studies conducted in Latin America and Africa, most early research dealt with European integration, as there were few other regional experiments to theorize about at that time. The dominant approach was neo-functionalism, which mainly considered the “spillover” from the economic integration of Western Europe to its political unification. Among the leading authors who wrote on such early regionalism were Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch.

The 1970s was a period of “Eurosclerosis” within the European Community, but the 1985 white paper on the internal market and the Single European Act resulted in a new, dynamic process of European integration, as there were few other regional experiments to theorize about at that time. The dominant approach was neo-functionalism, which mainly considered the “spillover” from the economic integration of Western Europe to its political unification. Among the leading authors who wrote on such early regionalism were Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch.

The 1970s was a period of “Eurosclerosis” within the European Community, but the 1985 white paper on the internal market and the Single European Act resulted in a new, dynamic process of European integration. This was also the start of what has often been referred to as the “new regionalism” on a global scale. To some observers, regionalism was “new” mainly in the sense that it represented a revival of protectionism or neo-mercantilism. However, most observers highlighted the fact that the closure of regions was not on the agenda. Indeed, one of the characteristic features of the more recent debate on regionalism, especially within the field of international relations, is its focus on the conditions related to globalization. The recent debate is to a large extent generated by the transformation of the Westphalian nation-state, the erosion of national borders, and the urgent question of how to find an alternative post-Westphalian order in the context of globalization. Perhaps the richest literature in this regard is on the role of regionalism in the context of multilateral trade and security.

One prominent scholar of the recent debate, Björn Hettne, stresses that regionalism needs to be understood from both an exogenous perspective (outside in) and an endogenous perspective (inside out). The former perspective refers to the fact that regionalization and globalization are intertwined articulations of global transformation, whereas the latter implies that regionalization is shaped from within a region by a large number of different actors. The exogenous perspective has developed primarily in the course of the recent debate, whereas the endogenous perspective finds continuity with functionalist and neo-functionalist theorizing about integration (of Europe), the role of agency, and the long-term transformation of territorial identities. In contrast to Haas, Deutsch, and the early regional integration scholars, today’s scholars identify many regionalisms, which provides a very different base for comparative studies of regionalism. It is apparent that neither the object of study (ontology) nor the way of studying it (epistemology) has remained static. One indication of this is the emergence of a variety of theoretical frameworks for the study of regionalism, such as constructivism, liberal institutionalism, regional security complex theory, governance approaches, the new regionalism approach (NRA), and the region-building and regional network approaches. Indeed, current regionalization may be seen as a new political landscape in the making, characterized by an expanding cast of actors (state and non-state) operating in the regional arena and across several interrelated dimensions: security, development, trade, environment, identity, and so on.

Historically, the study of regionalism and regional integration has emphasized states as actors and focused on sovereignty transfer or political unification within interstate regional organizations. Since the late 1990s, research has placed greater emphasis on “soft,” *de facto* or informal regionalization, acknowledging the fact that a range of nonstate actors has begun to operate at the regional level, within as well as beyond state-led institutional frameworks. For instance,
not only are business interests and multinationals operative in the global sphere, but they also tend to create regionalized patterns of economic activity. Oft-cited examples include the regional production systems in East and Southeast Asia and South African business expansion in Southern Africa. Similarly, the role of civil society is often neglected in the study of regionalism, despite the fact that its impact is increasing, as is evident in the transnational activist networks and processes of civil society interaction emerging at the regional level around the world.

The causal relationship between regionalism and regionalization (or formal and informal regionalism as it is sometimes called) has attracted considerable attention in the recent debate. Key issues are whether or not formal regionalism precedes informal regionalization and the ways in which state, market, and civil society actors relate and come together in different formal and informal coalitions, networks and modes of regional and global governance. Consequently, the study of regionalism is inseparable from the study of globalization and world order.

Regionalism and the World Order

Many regionalists contend that regions have become critical to contemporary world politics. As Peter Katzenstein (2005) points out, “This view is in stark contrast to those who focus on the purportedly stubborn persistence of the nation-state or the inevitable march of globalization” (p. 306). It is generally agreed that globalization challenges the Westphalian nation-state. However, political intervention, or at least some form of governance, is still needed. One way in which “the political” may return is as a reformed neo-Westphalian order (i.e., building on the nation-state system), governed either by a reconstituted state-driven multilateral system or by a more loosely organized global “concert” of the regional hegemons of the world, such as Germany, Japan, Brazil, and South Africa.

Regionalism may also be part of a post-Westphalian governance model (i.e., transcending the nation-state system) of coexisting regional communities. By comparison with economic and market-led globalization, regionalism is more anchored to territorial domains. By comparison with multilateralism, it is a more exclusive relationship based on conscious political strategies, potentially guided by world order values such as multiculturalism and interregional dialogue and cooperation.

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See also European Integration; International Organizations; Regional Integration (Supranational); Regionalization

Further Readings


REGIONALIZATION

Regionalization is the program or process of forming regions. This implies the reorganization of a territory according to various criteria or dimensions and with different aims. Considering a state or any political entity with a unitary essence, regionalization can be viewed as the process of rearranging or subdividing its territory into smaller administrative and/or political units. These would acquire powers and competences previously held by the superior unit. Hence, regionalization is a decentralized reorganization of territorial interests and political positions. Normally, both subnational entities (in the case of unitary states) and substate entities (in the case of federal states) are called regions; however, the same reasoning could
be applied at lower levels of decentralization, although in this case the term used to refer to these entities might be a different one. Nonetheless, under this common thread and with a wide range of terminology, many different realities, dynamics, and political or cultural traditions can be found: France’s Départements, Spain’s Comunidades Autónomas, Italy’s Regioni, and many other denominations that are rooted in the local traditions. This entry points out the key dimensions of the phenomenon, the various approaches to territorial politics, and the varieties of regionalization. The last section clarifies the ways in which different state policies unfold into different types of regionalization processes.

**Dimensions of the Regional Phenomenon**

The regional phenomenon took a leading role in politics, economy, and spatial planning—especially in the case of the more developed unitarian states—during the second half of the 20th century. Many states, mainly in Europe, underwent regional and decentralizing reforms, which are among the most important political and institutional innovations of the past decades. In these regional facts, at least three meaningful dimensions can be identified: First, there is the sociopolitical and/or economic dynamics underlying these regionalizing reforms, which change even the structure of the relationship between the state and the local entities. Second is the impact that globalization and other dynamics that promote suprastate integration—especially the European one—can have on this regionalization progress. Finally, there are cultural aspects that surround or impel regionalization, either rediscovering or reasserting territorial or regional identities, mainly in those arenas where regionalist and/or nationalist forces play an important role.

From another point of view, there are three other elements not to be ignored. First, the political and administrative decentralization created by regionalization affects the institutions and their relationships at the territorial level. Next, there is the socioeconomic ingredient of spatial planning, with an impact on uneven development and on interterritorial balance and cohesion. Last, there is a cultural or identifying element, which can be more or less challenging and self-assertive and which may in varying degrees constitute a mobilization in defense of territorial claims.

**Approaches to Territorial Politics**

All things considered, if territory is seen as an essential part of the state and the authority or political sovereignty the latter has over it, the way such territorial authority is managed and organized becomes territorial politics, and regionalization develops within this frame. Regionalization as territory management is, above all, a way to retain and renovate the state’s sovereignty, mainly in those contexts where there are identity conflicts or peripheral nationalistic demands. In these cases, regionalization can even go as far as secession, with a territory demanding a redrawing of territorial boundaries and instituting a different form of territorial authority.

The issue has been approached from different perspectives within political science, which reflect various theories about the formation and consolidation of states. Salient among these is the diffusionist approach, which dominated the paradigm for decades with its “center–periphery” model. (Modernization and integration theories consider the irreversibility of the homogenization process more plausible.) The key concept of this paradigm is the formation of societies and states around a dominant center that radiates its hegemony to the periphery, absorbing it and thus forming a common social, economic, and political system—we are referring here to state-building and nation-building paradigms. This hegemony builds on the values of the elites within the different public spheres, hence legitimizing the distribution of power in all domains—political, economic, social, cultural, educative, and so on. Obviously, this approach is not limited to a narrow geographic conception of the core–periphery relationship but is linked with an enlightened vision of economic and social development as well as social modernization. A strong socioeconomic determinism underlies many of the different versions of this diffusionist approach. This determinism maintains that the politics of the state are shaped by economic and social forces. The orthodox Marxist version of this conception does not question this core idea but instead corrects it from the point of view of historical materialism, in which the class
struggle is the power behind social and political transformation. Therefore, its state-centrism point of view dominates to the detriment of any territorial differences or identities, which are relegated to a second-tier status. Nonetheless, the center–periphery model has been revised mainly in its deterministic component. The processes that states undergo during territorial unification can be very different, and the same applies to the modernization of societies. As a consequence, we find asymmetric territorial development, territorial conflicts, and, in all, territorial differentiation, which can be more or less chronic or more or less acute within national states. Therefore, the territorial politics or matrix leading to regionalization is the result of the combination of the different factors that participate in the process of state unification.

However, some authors question the center–periphery paradigm due to its state centrism: There are states with more than one center, such as the United States and Canada; others may not have any clear center or periphery, such as the Federal Republic of Germany and the Swiss Republic; further, there are states where the peripheries relate to more than one center, such as Northern Ireland and its relation with London and Dublin, or the Basque Country, with Madrid and Paris. From this new point of view, and considering the existence of strong territorial identities that have been politicized and activated by nationalist and/or regionalist movements, a new paradigm can be found based on societal fragmentation, territorial asymmetry, and centrifugal politics.

**Varieties of Regionalization in Territorial Politics**

Regionalization processes vary depending on the characteristics of territorial matrices and the integration processes of national states, as well as whether there are nationalist or regionalist peripheral demands, which can be more or less powerful. States undergoing regionalization take into account territorial differences, even if these are, on the one hand, objective or material ones or, on the other hand, subjective or sociocultural ones.

The former, socioeconomic dissimilarities, are the result of uneven development and the dependence dynamics stemming from the processes of modernization and industrialization of societies. They can generate interregional geopolitical discordances, as well as other disparities among the central and peripheral elites—political, economic, social, and cultural.

The latter, subjective or sociocultural dissimilarities, are normally due to the contradictory perceptions that national and territorial elites have of the process of integration and homogenization at the nation-state level. These differences can generate tensions and conflicts of identity, especially when there are regionalist or nationalist movements in the periphery that claim their own signs of identity—their own history, ethnic or religious differences, linguistic struggles, and so on—and are responding to the centralization and homogenization process at the nation-state level. Therefore, the regional differentiation underlying the regionalization process can be due to political, economic, or sociocultural reasons, or even a combination of all these, and always seek to better the governance of the nation-state territory.

On the basis of this varied matrix, the different forms and strategies of the regionalizing politics that state-nations (territories that have undergone regionalization at the state level) apply under this new governance are the result of the characteristics that define and homogenize their regions, whether real or potential. These policies always aim at developing and improving the process of national integration and cohesion. They also seek to ensure the maintenance of territorial sovereignty of the state, which is endangered either by an excess of centralized homogenization or by the inefficiencies and limitations distinctive of economic and societal modernization processes. Hence, depending on those state policies, different types of regionalization processes can be found.

First, there is the sheer arrangement or management of the territory—applying economic and administrative criteria—by means of the creation of homogeneous regions. These regions assume the decentralized administrative management of the state’s responsibilities, in the interest of a better interterritorial balance. The unitary character of the state is not questioned at any point, nor is the symmetry of the new regional division, which is limited to the amount of state decentralization achieved.

The second type of process goes a step further in decentralizing institutions of a national character
within the region, as well as government functions that are recognized as properly subject to local sovereignty. This type answers the political claims of regional elites and politicians, following a type of federalizing dynamic—either symmetrical or not—that does not question the unitary nature of the state. The British and Spanish examples are a good illustration of this second type of regionalization.

Finally, we find federal or confederal structures, either symmetrical or not, with shared sovereignty. Here, Belgium is the most recent example. The extreme case is always territorial secession, when coexistence under the roof of the same nation-state becomes untenable for all elites, even after other forms of advanced regionalization have proved to be impossible. The former USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia are good examples of this impossibility.

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See also Autonomy, Subnational; Decentralization; Ethnicity; Federalism; Nationalism; Regionalism; Secession; Self-Determination

Further Readings

Regression

Regression analysis is, by far, the most commonly used statistical technique in political science. While regression analysis can be defined in many different ways, it is a tool for describing the relationships among variables. Regression is generally used for two complementary purposes. First, it measures the effects of one or more independent variables on a single dependent variable. Second, it can be used to predict the values of a dependent variable that can be expected to occur at specified levels of the independent variables. In the former capacity, regression is a useful tool for theory testing. In the latter capacity, regression is a forecasting tool that is useful for decision making. These two uses are closely connected. Theories are evaluated by their ability to predict as yet unobserved phenomena, and forecasting is carried out most effectively when predictions are based on a substantive theory. In the following, the major features and applications of regression analysis are discussed.

If there is one independent variable, the analysis is commonly called a simple or bivariate regression. If there is more than one independent variable, it is called multiple regression analysis. In traditional nomenclature, the dependent variable is generically represented as $Y$ and the independent variable is designated as $X$. If there are multiple independent variables, the $X$s are given subscripts, say $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_j, \ldots, X_k$ for $k$ variables (note that the specific order of the $X$s generally does not matter). For the moment, we will assume that all variables are relatively continuous and measured at the interval level.

The immediate objective of a regression analysis is to show how the conditional distribution of $Y$ varies across the values of $X$ (or across the values of the $X$s in a multiple regression). Attention is usually focused on the conditional mean of $Y$ rather than the entire conditional distribution. If the conditional $Y$ distributions (and, specifically, the conditional $Y$ means) do, in fact, differ systematically across the $X$ values, then $Y$ is said to be related to $X$. If the conditional $Y$ distributions do not vary across the $X$ values, then $X$ and $Y$ are unrelated to, or independent of, each other.

Bivariate Regression

There are several ways in which a regression analysis can be carried out. For example, a graphical approach would simply plot $Y$ against $X$ and
superimpose a curve that traces out the conditional mean across the range of \( X \). While this strategy is often useful for exploring bivariate data, it becomes much more difficult in the multiple regression case. And there are some practical limitations in using a graph as the final output of the analysis in any context. Further, the sample estimates of the conditional mean are likely to be somewhat unreliable and unstable since there are usually only a small number of observations at each distinct value of \( X \).

An alternative approach would be to specify a function that describes the hypothesized relationship between \( Y \) and the \( X_s \). The empirical analysis then estimates the parameters of this function and determines how well the function actually represents the data at hand. Probably the simplest function for relating the variables is linear in form. In the bivariate case, a linear function would be shown as follows:

\[
Y_i = a + bX_i.
\]

The subscript, \( i \), that appears with \( Y \) and \( X \) in the preceding equation is an index for the observations; it ranges from 1 to \( n \) (the total number of observations) and is used here to indicate that the values of the two variables are different from one observation to the next. The other two terms, \( a \) and \( b \), are the coefficients; they do not have subscripts, indicating that their numerical values are constant across the \( n \) observations in the data. Notice how this function provides a simple rule for starting with any observation's value on the \( X \) variable and producing the observation's \( Y \) value. If this function actually did provide an accurate description of a bivariate data set, then a scatterplot of \( Y \) versus \( X \) would produce \( n \) points arrayed along a straight line.

The \( b \) coefficient is often called the slope of the line. The absolute value of the number associated with \( b \) gives the steepness of the line. The sign of the number (plus or minus) indicates whether the line runs from lower left to upper right (a positive relationship) or from upper left to lower right (a negative relationship). The slope shows the difference in the values of \( Y \) that is associated with a single-unit increase in \( X \). This is generally interpreted as \( Y \)'s responsiveness to the \( X \) variable. The \( a \) coefficient is often called the intercept of the line.

It gives the value of the \( Y \) variable that occurs when \( X = 0 \). The intercept determines the vertical position of the line within the scatterplot of \( Y \) versus \( X \). But the intercept usually does not have a substantive interpretation.

The simple linear function depicted above is not very useful by itself because empirical data seldom (if ever) conform to such a clear-cut pattern. But a scatterplot of \( Y \) against \( X \) may show an approximately linear orientation that might be usefully summarized by a linear function. In that case, the previous equation would be modified as follows:

\[
Y_i = \hat{Y}_i + e_i,
\]

where \( \hat{Y}_i = a + bX_i \).

Hence, the full regression equation is

\[
y_i = a + bX_i + e_i.
\]

In the preceding equations, \( \hat{Y} \) is a new, "imaginary" variable, created as part of the analysis. Unlike \( Y \) itself, \( \hat{Y} \) is perfectly linearly related to \( X \). The other new term on the right side of the equals sign, \( e_i \), is a residual, indicating that the value of \( Y \) generally does not fall exactly on the line. If the value of the residual for observation \( i \) is a positive number, then the point representing \( i \) in the scatterplot falls above the line relating \( \hat{Y} \) to \( X \). If the residual is negative, then the point falls below the line. If the residual is zero, then \( \hat{Y} = Y, \) and the point falls exactly on the line.

The immediate analytical objective in the regression analysis is to define \( \hat{Y} \) (i.e., select numeric values for the coefficients, \( a \) and \( b \)) such that the line relating \( \hat{Y} \) to \( X \) passes through the middle of the point cloud in the scatterplot, coming as close as possible to as many of the points as possible. Here, "closeness" is defined as the vertical distance from each data point to the line; hence, it corresponds to the residual for each observation. But residuals can be either positive or negative in value, so they are typically squared to provide positive quantities for each observation. Then, the line is fitted such that it produces the smallest possible sum of squared residuals across the \( n \) observations in the data set. This is called the least squares criterion for fitting the regression line, and the mathematical procedure that is typically used to find the line is called ordinary least squares (OLS).
If the point cloud in the scatterplot really does conform to a linear pattern, then the line produced by the OLS method can be used as a model, or abstract representation, of the data. It provides a succinct summary of any systematic linear structure that exists within the observations. But it is important to develop a measure of how well the OLS line summarizes the observed data. To do so, we begin with the fact that \( Y \) and the residual term will be uncorrelated with each other (this is a consequence of the OLS procedure and our requirement that the fitted line runs through the middle of the point cloud in the scatterplot). Therefore, the variance of \( Y \) can be broken down neatly into the sum of the variance of \( \hat{Y} \) and the variance of the residual, \( e \). A goodness-of-fit measure, called \( R^2 \) (this term is used because \( R^2 \) is equal to the square of the correlation \( r_{xy} \) between \( X \) and \( Y \)), is defined as the ratio of the variance of \( \hat{Y} \) to the variance of \( Y \). \( R^2 \) is often interpreted as the proportion of variance in \( Y \) that is “explained” by \( X \), since it represents the part of \( Y \)’s variance that is linked to \( X \) through \( \hat{Y} \). Since \( R^2 \) is a proportion, it varies between zero and one. The value of \( R^2 \) indicates the degree to which the data conform to a linear pattern. If \( R^2 = 0 \), then there is no linear relationship at all between the variables; an \( R^2 \) of 1.0 occurs only when all of the observations fall perfectly along a single line within the scatterplot of the bivariate data.

### Multiple Regression

The idea of fitting a linear function to data can be generalized very easily to situations with more than one independent variable, producing a multiple regression equation. Once again, we begin with

\[
Y_i = \hat{Y}_i + e_i.
\]

But now, \( \hat{Y} \) is defined a bit differently than in the bivariate case:

\[
\hat{Y}_i = a + b_1 X_{i1} + b_2 X_{i2} + \cdots + b_j X_{ij} + \cdots + b_k X_{ik}.
\]

Here, the \( \hat{Y} \) variable is a linear combination of \( k \) distinct independent variables. The precise value of \( k \) is determined by the number of variables the researcher believes to be influencing the dependent variable, \( Y \). The coefficient associated with each independent variable (i.e., \( b_j \) for \( X_j \)) shows the difference in \( \hat{Y} \) that occurs when \( X_j \) is increased by one unit. The coefficient \( a \) is once again an intercept; it represents the value of \( \hat{Y} \) that occurs when all of the independent variables are equal to zero. The full multiple regression equation is formed by combining the preceding two equations:

\[
\hat{Y}_i = a + b_1 X_{i1} + b_2 X_{i2} + \cdots + b_j X_{ij} + \cdots + b_k X_{ik} + e_i.
\]

As in the bivariate case, \( e_i \) is a residual, indicating that \( Y \) is not a perfect linear function of the \( X_j \).

Once again, the least squares criterion is used to estimate the coefficients in the multiple regression equation. The value of \( k \) must be smaller than the number of observations; otherwise, there will not be enough information to calculate numeric values for the coefficients. But if that is the case, the OLS methodology can be generalized in a straightforward manner to produce the set of coefficients, \( a, b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_k \), that minimize the sum of the squared residuals across the set of \( n \) observations. Analogous to the regression line in the bivariate case, OLS for multiple regression produces a flat surface in the multidimensional scatterplot with axes formed by the \( k \) independent variables and the dependent variable. Once again, the OLS coefficients position this surface so that it comes as close as possible to the data points. Closeness is still defined in terms of the squared vertical distances from the regression surface to the data points. The overall fit of the multiple regression equation to the data is still measured with the \( R^2 \) statistic. The latter is defined as before: the ratio of the variance in \( \hat{Y} \) to the variance in \( Y \) itself. This gives the proportion of \( Y \)’s variance that is related to (or explained by) the independent variables through the regression equation. \( R^2 \) is equal to the square of the correlation between \( Y \) and \( \hat{Y} \); therefore, it is sometimes called the squared multiple correlation coefficient. The interpretation of specific \( R^2 \) values remains the same as in the bivariate case.

In the multiple regression equation, the \( b_j \)s are often called multiple regression coefficients or partial slope coefficients. They are generally interpreted...
as measures of each independent variable’s unique linear effect on the dependent variable, after the linear effects of the remaining \( k - 1 \) independent variables have been statistically “removed.” The OLS procedure estimates all \( k + 1 \) coefficients (i.e., the \( k \) partial slopes and the intercept) simultaneously; therefore, the value of each coefficient typically is affected by the values of the remaining coefficients. The only exception occurs when the independent variables are perfectly uncorrelated with each other—a situation that seldom (if ever) exists with nonexperimental data.

Political scientists typically use a regression equation as a model of the structural relationships among theoretically relevant variables. Substantive theories usually specify multiple causal agents for any given dependent variable. And there are often mediating factors that affect the relationships between variables. Such phenomena need to be incorporated into the empirical analyses that test theoretical propositions. For this reason, multiple regression is employed more frequently than bivariate regression in substantive applications. In addition, theories are broad statements. Therefore, researchers are often concerned with statistical inference. Rather than using the regression equation as a tool to describe the structure within a given data set, the objective usually is to generalize from the observed data to the larger, but unobserved, population of interest.

**Statistical Inference**

Statistical inference begins with a set of assumptions about the processes that generated the observed data. First, it is assumed that the regression equation accurately mirrors the structural relationships that exist within the population. So for a context in which \( Y \) is affected by \( k \) independent variables, the population structure is assumed to be

\[
Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_{i1} + \beta_2 X_{i2} + \cdots + \beta_j X_{ij} + \cdots + \beta_k X_{ik} + \varepsilon_i.
\]

The variables in the preceding equation are identical to those in the regression equation presented earlier (although they now encompass all objects in the population, not just a limited sample of \( n \) observations). The coefficients (\( \alpha \) and the \( \beta_j \) s) are interpreted as before; but now, they are fixed population parameters rather than statistics whose values vary from one sample to the next.

The last term on the right-hand side of the equation, \( \varepsilon_i \), is the error or disturbance term. This can be interpreted as the sum total of all influences on \( Y \) that are not explicitly included in the equation (i.e., apart from \( X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_k \)). The disturbance term is usually assumed to consist of random “noise.” That is, its distribution is assumed to have a mean of zero and a variance that is fixed across all possible combinations of \( X_j \) values. The disturbance is also assumed to be uncorrelated with all the variables (including itself). The \( X_j \) s are assumed to be independent of each other and measured without error. For convenience, they are also usually assumed to comprise fixed values for the \( n \) observations, meaning that they do not vary across repeated samples drawn from the same population.

When all of the preceding assumptions hold, the OLS coefficient estimates possess some useful statistical properties. First, the multiple regression coefficients are unbiased estimates of the corresponding population parameters; that is, \( \beta_j \) will not systematically over- or underestimate the corresponding \( \beta_j \). Second, the OLS estimates are consistent in that sampling variance decreases as sample size increases; in other words, larger samples generate more precise estimates of the population parameters, and with large enough samples, this precision becomes almost perfect. And third, the OLS estimates are efficient in that their sampling variances usually are smaller than those of alternative estimators of the \( \beta_j \) values. A result called the Gauss-Markov theorem proves that the OLS coefficients are the most efficient of all linear unbiased estimators (i.e., unbiased estimators that are a linear combination of the data).

The OLS coefficients are linear combinations of the sample \( Y_j \) values. Therefore, a generalization of the central limit theorem implies that the coefficients are normally distributed. Student’s \( t \) distribution can be used with the estimated standard errors to construct confidence intervals for and test hypotheses about the population values of the respective regression coefficients. One can also test the null hypothesis that the variance of \( \hat{Y} \) equals zero; this often is interpreted as a test of the statistical significance of the overall regression equation. In other words, it is the functional equivalent of testing
the null hypothesis that $R^2 = 0$ in the population and that any observed nonzero regression coefficients are due to the effects of sampling error alone.

Statistical tests of the joint effects of several independent variables can be carried out in several ways. For example, a t test can be performed on a linear combination of regression coefficients. Or an F test can be used to determine whether adding additional variables to an equation significantly improves the fit to the data. And, more generally, the F test can be used to test hypotheses about sets of linear combinations of regression coefficients. This flexibility in the strategies used for statistical inference is one of the most attractive features of OLS estimates in regression analysis.

Applications

Another reason for the popularity of the linear regression model is its adaptability to different research situations. For example, categorical independent variables (in which observations are distributed across $m$ discrete categories) can be incorporated into an equation by creating $m - 1$ dummy variables representing all of the respective categories except one (which is designated the “reference” category). And curvilinear relationships can often be modeled by applying transformations to the independent or dependent variables or by incorporating polynomial terms. Similarly, multiplicative terms between two (or more) independent variables can be used to represent conditional effects, wherein the impact of one independent variable on the dependent variable is itself affected by the value of another independent variable.

Since regression analysis is used primarily as a theory-testing tool, there is often great attention paid to the question of exactly which independent variables are included in the regression equation. While there are stepwise procedures that select regressors for inclusion from a pool of potential independent variables, they are not typically employed in political science because of their data-driven, “ atheoretical” nature. Instead, substantive theory is usually regarded as the appropriate guide for the specification of regression models. This is a critical issue. If theoretically relevant variables are excluded from the equation, then the coefficients of the included independent variables are likely to be biased estimates of their associated population parameters. This occurs because the included variables “pick up” some of the effects on the dependent variable that properly should be attributed to the omitted independent variables. Alternatively, including extraneous variables in the regression equation (i.e., $X$s that have no real effect on $Y$) will decrease the precision of the coefficient estimates since they introduce error into the estimation process.

In addition to theory testing, there are situations in which regression analysis is used as a forecasting tool, to predict the value of the dependent variable under specified conditions. When the various assumptions about the model and the disturbance term hold, the predicted value for a given observation, $\hat{Y}_t$, can be interpreted as an estimate of the conditional mean of $Y$. So the analyst can make predictions about the average level of the dependent variable that will occur when the independent variables are held at specified values. Further, a standard error for the conditional mean can be calculated very easily. So the precision of the prediction can also be estimated, using a confidence interval or a hypothesis test. This makes regression analysis a useful tool to provide formal guidance for decision making in a wide variety of substantive contexts.

As mentioned earlier, regression analysis typically is used with nonexperimental data. Therefore, nonzero correlations will almost always exist among the independent variables. This situation is called multicollinearity. Multicollinearity makes it impossible to identify the specific effects of each independent variable because to the extent that any two independent variables are correlated, they will exert a nonseparable, shared impact on the dependent variable. In practical terms, multicollinearity makes the coefficient estimates less precise and increases the standard errors. Multicollinearity is a condition that exists in the data; it is not a feature of the statistical model. There are diagnostic tests that can indicate the degree to which multicollinearity exists in a regression equation. But there is no way to “ fix” or eliminate its effects. Fortunately, multicollinearity really does not cause serious problems in most research contexts. The regression coefficients remain unbiased, and the inflation in the standard errors is usually not large enough to compromise the process of statistical inference.

Valid interpretation of the results from a regression analysis is only possible if the assumptions
about the model and the disturbances reflect the actual conditions that exist in the data. Therefore, it is critical to employ tools called regression diagnostics to check the veracity of the assumptions. This often involves examining a graph of the residuals against the corresponding \( \hat{Y} \) values. This scatterplot shows the spread of the observations around the fitted regression surface. If the regression assumptions hold, then the residuals are similar to the disturbances, and they should appear to be random noise with no systematic structure. To the extent that the researcher can perceive patterns or shapes in the residual plots, it indicates that the regression model is “missing” some type of structure that exists within the data. It is also important to identify outliers, or observations with particularly large residuals; in certain situations, such observations can be highly influential in determining the values of the regression coefficients. When such problems are diagnosed, there are usually corrective actions that can be taken to alleviate their effects on the model’s parameter estimates; this is yet another strong feature of regression analysis.

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See also Analysis of Variance; Causality; Interaction Effects; Multicollinearity; Nonlinear Models; Statistical Inference; Statistical Significance

Further Readings


\textbf{Regulation}

Regulation is a key component of the systems that make up our political, social, and economic lives. It is also one of the least visible and transparent components that shape our governance systems. To regulate is to legislate in public and private organizational arenas, that is, under indirect and often ex post judicial and parliamentary controls. In democratic and pluralist societies, all aim to regulate all, and thus, all contribute to “regulatory creep.” The amalgamation of these regulations defines our liberties, privileges, opportunities, and life plans in ways that challenge our conventions about politics and about the locus of democratic controls and accountabilities. In addition to defining the concept and the phenomenon, this entry discusses regulation as a key activity of administrative agencies, regulation beyond the state, the governance of regulation, and the phenomena of both the regulatory state and regulatory capitalism.

\textbf{Meaning and Empirical Content}

Like many other political concepts, regulation is hard to define, not the least because it means different things to different people. The term is employed for myriad discursive, theoretical, and analytical purposes that cry out for clarification. It is also a highly contested term. For the Far Right, regulation is a dirty word representing the heavy hand of authoritarian governments and the creeping body of rules that constrain human or national liberties. For the Old Left, it is part of the superstructure that serves the interests of the dominant class and frames power relations in seemingly civilized forms. For progressive democrats, it is a public good, a tool to control profit-hungry capitalists and to manage social and ecological risks. For some, regulation is something that is done exclusively by government, a matter for the state and law enforcement, while for others, regulation is mostly the work of social actors who monitor other actors, including governments. State-centered conceptions of regulation define it with reference to state-made laws, while society-centered analysts and scholars of globalization tend to point to the proliferation of various forms of civil and business-to-business regulation.

For legal scholars, regulation is often a legal instrument, while for sociologists and criminologists, it is yet another form of social control. For some, it is the amalgamation of all types of laws—primary, secondary, and tertiary legislation—while
for others it is confined to secondary legislation. For economists of the Chicago school, regulation is usually a strategic tool used by private and special interests to exploit the majority. For institutional economists, regulation is less a strategic tool and more a constitutive element of the market; for them, it is often understood as the mechanism that constitutes property rights or even as a source of national competitiveness. The French Regulation School seems to have developed a similar institutional perspective but with a more critical tone and without the functionalist orientation of some English-speaking economists (Robert Boyer, 1990). Whereas scholars of public administration seem to perceive it with direct and in-depth reference to the scope of state authority and formal regulatory organizations, scholars of global governance tend to focus on standards and soft (nonbinding) norms. While some seem to think of the rise of regulation as yet another indication of the advance of neoliberalism and the retreat of the welfare state, others tend to see it as a neo-mercantilist instrument for market expansion, high modernism, and social engineering. In European parlance, for most of the 20th century, regulation was synonymous with government intervention and, indeed, with all the efforts of the state, by whatever means, to control and guide the economy and society. This rather broad meaning of the term seems to have faded, and scholars now make an effort to distinguish rule making from other tools of governance and, indeed, from other types of policy instruments, such as taxation, subsidies, redistribution, and public ownership.

Regulation not only is a distinct type of policy but also entails identifiable forms and patterns of political conflict that differ from the patterns that are regularly associated with redistribution and distribution. In addition, while other types of policy such as distribution and redistribution are about relatively visible transfers and direct allocation of resources, regulation only indirectly shapes the distribution of costs in society. Government budgets include (relatively) visible and clear estimations of the overall costs of distribution and redistribution but hardly any of the cost of regulation (with the exception of the administrative costs of fact finding, monitoring, and implementation). The most significant costs of regulation are compliance costs, which are borne not by the government budget but mostly by the regulated parties. The wide distribution of these costs and their embeddedness in the regulatees’ budgets make their impact, effects, and net benefits less visible and therefore less transparent to the attentive public.

For some, regulation is a risky business that is prone to failure, but for others, the business of regulation is the business of risk minimization. Some contend that regulation comprises mostly rule making, while others extend it to include rule monitoring and rule enforcement. For some, regulations are about the rules and functions of the administrative agency after the act of delegation; for others, as already observed, regulation includes every kind of rule, including primary legislation and even social and professional norms. The extensive literature on regulation in the United States and the extensive attention paid to regulation could have resulted in a consensual definition of regulation. Yet this is not the case. The American Administrative Procedure Act defines the term rule but not the term regulation, and what it defines as rule is confined to the scope of the act itself.

**Regulation and Administrative Agencies**

One important aspect of any discussion of the different connotations and characteristics of regulation is the relation between regulation and the existence of an administrative agency. Rule making and rule-making agencies are closely connected. An emphasis on the workings, characteristics, failures, and merits of regulation by administrative agencies is prevalent in the literature on regulation. Indeed, these aspects are expressed in one of the most widely cited definitions of regulation, namely, as “sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by the community” (Selznick, 1985, p. 363). Not only does this definition include an explicit reference to public agencies, but it also stresses the sustained and focused nature of regulation, which requires a continuous action of monitoring, assessment, and refinement of rules rather than an ad hoc operation. Implicit in this definition is also the expectation that ex ante rules will be the dominant form of regulatory control. The definition is apt also in the sense that it recognizes that many, perhaps the most important, regulations are exercised not by
“regulatory agencies” but by a wide variety of executive organs. This definition is less successful, however, in other respects. It recognizes regulation only as a public activity by a public agency and thus excludes business-to-business regulation as well as civil regulation. It also does not clarify which kinds of focused control the public agency applies (is it rule making only or also other forms of control such as arbitrary commands?); and the definition unnecessarily limits regulation to those actions that are valued by the community.

Regulation Beyond the State

The focus on administrative aspects in the study of regulation might be less useful for scholars who emphasize the limits of “hard law” and who are aware of the importance of social norms and other forms of “soft law” in the governance of societies and economies. A wider definition of regulation that captures regulation as soft law would suggest that regulation encompasses all the mechanisms of social control, including unintentional and nonstate processes. Indeed, it extends to “mechanisms which are not the products of state activity, nor part of any institutional arrangement, such as the development of social norms and the effects of markets in modifying behavior” (Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott, & Christopher Hood, 1998, p. 4). Thus, the notion of intentionality in the development of norms has been dropped from this definition of regulation, and anything producing effects on behavior may be considered regulatory. In addition, a wide range of activities that may involve legal or quasi-legal norms, but without the mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement, might also come within the definition. This definition connects widely with the research agenda on governance, “the new governance” and the “new regulatory state,” where elements of steering and plural forms of regulation are emphasized in an effort to capture the plurality of interests and sources of control around issues, problems, and institutions. This rather wide definition of regulation also allows us to “de-center” regulation from the state and even from well-recognized forms of self-regulation. De-centered approaches to regulation emphasize complexity, fragmentation, interdependencies, and government failures and suggest the limits of the distinctions between the public and the private and between the global and the national.

Scholars of regulatory systems often point to the growth in the number of civil and business actors that invest in regulation and accordingly also to the growth of civil and business-to-business regulatory institutions and instruments. At the same time, there are indications of the transformation of the politics of interest groups and nongovernmental organizations. Civil actors are often associated with advocacy (e.g., lobbying) and service provision (e.g., replacing the state in the provision of welfare), but in our areas of study they also produce, monitor, and enforce regulation. The concept of civil regulation aims to capture this evolving feature of civil politics. The term, as noted by David Vogel (2005), refers to the institutionalization of voluntary global and national forms of regulation through the creation of private (nonstate) forms of regulation intended to govern markets and firms. Civil regulations attempt to embed international markets and firms in a normative order that prescribes responsible business conduct. They include old and traditional forms of self-regulation but go beyond them to include regulatory techniques such as third-party accreditation and certification, gatekeeping strategies, metaregulation, enforced self-regulation, self-regulation, and league tables. Business-to-business regulation is another form of a nonstate source of regulation. Here, the growth of regulation is driven by the ability of some businesses (most often big business) to set standards for other businesses (most often smaller ones). One relevant example is the ability of big supermarket chains to set standards for food manufacturing, processing, and marketing all over the world.

The Governance of Regulation

Much of the academic and public discussion of regulation nowadays deals with the governance of regulation itself (or regulating regulation) rather than governance via regulation. The expansion of regulation represents two major challenges: of effectiveness and of democratic control.

Effectiveness

The first challenge focuses on the alleged weakness of command-and-control systems with
prescriptive rules that tell regulated entities what to do and how to do it. These prescriptive rules tend to be highly particular in specifying the required actions and standards and are usually backed up by state sanctions. Peter J. May (2007, p. 9) observes that when compared with the alternatives, principles and norms, regulations are characterized by clear-cut lines of responsibility and, thus, accountability. Yet clarity, the ability to sanction, and direct lines of accountability all come at a price. Six shortcomings of regulation are important to note:

1. expensive and ineffective regulatory strategies;
2. inflexible regulatory strategies that encourage adversarial enforcement;
3. legal constraints on the subjects, procedures, and scope of regulatory discretion;
4. regulatees’ resentment, which leads to noncompliance or “creative compliance”;
5. strict regulation, which often presents an obstacle to innovation; and
6. regulation that often serves to set a lowest common denominator for regulatees to follow rather than supplying incentives for improving standards.

According to Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky (1998), and Steven P. Croley (2008), there are five major strategies of response to these weaknesses. The first and the most controversial is to deregulate existing regulation and to constrain new rule making. These “ossification” strategies might result in a race to the bottom, or degradation of economic and environmental performances, unmitigated risk, and immoral economies and societies. The second is to turn to “lite” and management-based regulation and to harness economic incentives as much as possible toward politically determined public goods. The third is to promote responsive forms of regulation. The fourth is to improve the regulatory arsenal (e.g., by employing auctions and using benchmarking) as well as the quality and training of the regulators and the quality of the regulatory design. The fifth is to institutionalize regulatory impact analysis and cost–benefit techniques. These control measures are becoming increasingly popular, and some countries have even established regulatory agencies to regulate regulation itself (e.g., the British Better Regulation Executive, and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the United States).

**Democratic Control**

The second governance challenge that regulation represents is derived from the democratic qualities (or, more accurately, weaknesses) of regulation. The belief that the legislator should legislate, the judiciary should adjudicate, and the executive should govern via the bureaucracy takes regulation to be, at best, a “necessary evil.” Yet this necessary evil is expanding and diversifying to an extent that raises important challenges for democratic theory and practice. First, regulators are not elected and are accountable to the people only indirectly, hence the arguments about the democratic deficit of regulatory systems. Second, while it is a fundamental idea of law that people should be subject to fixed, known, and certain rules, the sheer numbers of rules and the frequency and the process with which they are changed create a situation where it is beyond the capacity of most, if not all, individuals to act without legal advice. The sheer volume of regulations represents a challenge for democratic, judicial, parliamentary, and administrative systems of control. Third, the growth of international administrative law makes supposedly sovereign polities into rule takers rather than rule makers. Regionalization, internationalization, and globalization of regulation all raise issues of legitimacy and may lead to new and innovative forms of democratic control over regulatory systems. Fourth is the emergence of “private regulatory regimes” and “private governments,” which may weaken democratic legitimacy and may change the balance of power between corporations and states. To deal with these democratic challenges, it is necessary to develop and strengthen three systems of control over bureaucratic legislation: parliamentary, judicial, and participatory.

**The Regulatory Agency and the Regulatory State**

One of the most important indicators of the growth in the scope and depth of regulatory activities in modern society is the proliferation of...
regulatory agencies as the administrative and intellectual core of national and global systems of regulatory governance. Regulatory agencies are not a new feature of modern systems of governance, but they have become a highly popular form of regulatory governance since the 1990s. A regulatory agency is a nondepartmental public organization mainly involved with rule making, but it may also be responsible for fact finding, monitoring, adjudication, and enforcement. It is autonomous in the sense that it can shape its own preferences; of course, the extent of the autonomy varies with its administrative capacities, its ability to shape preferences independently, and its ability to enforce its rules. The autonomy of an agency is also constituted by its establishment as a separate organization and by the allocation to this agency of a policy space where it is expected to operate by way of exercising its functions and responsibilities. Note that while rule-making, fact-finding, monitoring, adjudication, and enforcement capacities are the defining characteristics of regulatory agencies, other organizations, both within and outside the state, can also acquire and successfully deploy these characteristics.

The expansion in the number of regulatory agencies, and arguably also in the scope of regulation and in the policy capacities of these agencies, has been manifest since the 1990s in the popularity of the notion of the regulatory state. In its most straightforward form, the term regulatory state "suggests [that] modern states are placing more emphasis on the use of authority, rules and standard-setting, partially displacing an earlier emphasis on public ownership, public subsidies, and directly provided services" (Hood et al., 1999, p. 3).

As noted by David Levi-Faur and Sharon Gilad (2004), three elements are especially useful in characterizing the regulatory state. First, the bureaucratic functions of regulation are being separated from service delivery. Second, the regulatory functions of government are being separated from policy-making functions, and thus, the regulators are being placed at arm’s length from their political masters. In this way, regulatory agencies became the citadels that fortify the autonomous and influential role of the regulocrats in the policy process. We are witnessing the strengthening of the regulators at the expense of politicians on the one hand and of the managerial elite on the other. Third, and as a result of the first two elements, regulation and rule making emerge as a distinct stage in the policy-making process. Accordingly, regulation is emerging as a distinct profession and administrative entity. Professional affiliation to global networks of experts is becoming a major source of innovations, worldviews, accountability, and legitimacy.

From the Regulatory State to Regulatory Capitalism

The term regulatory capitalism denotes the growth in the scope, importance, and impact of regulation at the national and global levels and the growing investments of political actors in regulation in general and regulatory strategies in particular. It suggests that regulation and rule making are the major instruments in the expansion of global governance. The notion of regulatory capitalism takes regulation theory analysis beyond national boundaries (hence beyond the notion of the regulatory state) and beyond formal, state-centered rule making (therefore toward civil regulation and de-centered analysis of regulatory systems). It also denotes a world where regulation is increasingly a hybrid of different systems of control: Statist regulation coevolves with civil regulation; national regulation expands with international and global regulation; private regulation coevolves and expands with public regulation; voluntary regulations expand with coercive ones; and the market itself is used or mobilized as a regulatory mechanism.

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See also Policy Instruments; Self-Regulation

Further Readings
Religion

Any investigation into the interdependencies between religion and politics first of all calls for a definition of the subject matter and hence for a definition of religion. However, such a definition faces considerable difficulties because religion historically is a universal phenomenon and encompasses today an enormous variety of experiences, convictions, and practices the religious character of which is far from being unequivocal. The distinction between religious phenomena and other social phenomena is found in religious sociology and anthropology, mostly with regard to specific contents or functions. As to content, the experience of or interaction with superhuman, preternatural, or transcendental creatures, powers, forces, or orders often is defined as a universal characteristic of religion. Functionalist approaches use functions such as the individual coping with contingency or a collective foundation of identity. Content criteria, however, often prove to be too exclusive and functionalist definitions, too inclusive. The attempt to determine criteria for the identification of religion as a unique area of activity clearly to be differentiated from other societal or cultural spheres of action is also highly selective from an intercultural point of view, because it refers to a large extent to Western Christianity, with its characteristic notion of a differentiation between the worldly and spiritual spheres. Nevertheless, the category “religion” has established itself as a global concept of reference even for non-Western religious traditions, and it has admittedly been rephrased and revised in the course of its global reception. Because of this global, pluralistic, and contextualized debate about the term religion, James A. Beckford recommends a constructivist approach to its definition. Constructivist approaches assume that the concept of religion, like other concepts, is the result of conflictual definition processes and advocate following this everyday practice when defining social science terms. This entry sketches the role of contemporary religion in politics and discusses some issues of current research and their different perspectives.

Religious traditions and religious actors have been highly relevant in politics and hence also in political science. After all, religious traditions have at their disposal specific notions about the constitution of the self and the world as well as about proper conduct in one’s individual and collective life. These concepts and moral guidelines have also left their mark on the political orientations of individual and collective religious actors. However, not only do religious politics exercise an influence on the constitution of the political community, but religious actors and traditions, symbols, and practices in nearly all historical and contemporary societies have also been instruments and objects of political action and control. Often, the specific dynamics of the religious–political complex result from the interaction of religious politics and the politics of religion. The interactions between religion and politics are currently of particular interest because since the end of the 1970s, a (re)vitalization of religious traditions and the politicization of religious actors can be observed in many parts of the world.
The current practice of researching the interactive relationship between politics and religion is also due to its rediscovery by political science. At least since the 1960s, religion was regarded in large parts of the discipline as a social complex whose historical destiny had been settled. The reason for this was the underlying conviction of secularization theory that, in the course of processes of modernization and functional differentiation, religious traditions had lost many of their former societal and political functions as well as their attractiveness and persuasiveness. They would, therefore, be relinquished to the private sphere if not disappear altogether. Even the normative issues about the relationship between politics and religion seemed to be settled. Many traditions of political theory, such as liberalism and republicanism, agreed on the basic tenet that religion had to be limited to the private sphere because neither was it suitable for forming a universally acceptable normative basis for democratic political communities nor was it able to supply arguments or justifications for political decisions that could be universally agreed on. Moreover, large parts of the social sciences were shaped by a “methodological atheism,” according to which experiences with or interactions with supernatural powers are illusionary. This methodological atheism led to reductionist patterns of explanation that regarded and reconstructed religion as a mere epiphenomenon of social or political processes. Based on these underlying convictions, religion was found interesting at best in the sense of a relic of religious influence on politics, which could be found in political cleavages, voting behavior, party systems, or types of welfare states.

The relative neglect of research into the interaction of religion and politics started to change with the globally observable (re)vitalization of religious traditions and the mobilization and politicization of religious actors since the late 1970s.

(Re)Vitalization, Mobilization, and Politicization

Phenomena of (re)vitalization have become discernible in nearly all religious traditions. The number of followers of Islam as well as of Catholicism and Protestantism outside the Western Hemisphere has increased considerably. Even the Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe has seen an unexpected renaissance following the breakdown of the communist regimes. Moreover, new religious movements are forming in many parts of the world, especially in Asia. Phenomena of politicization also can be found in nearly all religious traditions. First and foremost among them is the formation and political mobilization of fundamentalist or conservative religious movements. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the phenomenon of religiously motivated terrorism has increasingly entered the public consciousness. Also, since the 1990s, the number of religiously motivated or influenced violent conflicts and civil wars has increased.

Particularly in the Western world, with its increasing religious pluralism, the traditional institutional arrangements for the relationship between state and church, politics and religion, have become the cause for and object of political debate and the mobilization of religious actors. But religious actors, organizations, and movements have also played an important, even decisive, role in the processes of democratic transition. All over the world, an increasing political activity of Christian churches and organizations can be registered. This increasing presence of religious actors in the public sphere is also an effect of the transformation of politics itself. In the course of the comprehensive politicization of current societies, almost no societal situation is exempt from becoming the object of political decisions and regulatory actions. Due to this fading distinction between the public and the private sphere, the formerly guaranteed areas of a self-determined religious way of life are further reduced. Another case in point is that due to cultural pluralization and technological progress, more and more value-oriented conflictual issues, such as the relationship between the sexes, sexual identity, and biomedicine, have been put on the political agenda. These are questions touching the religious beliefs of many citizens. Finally, globalization leads not only to the internationalization and transnationalization of religious actors but also to an accelerated diffusion of political activity patterns and problem perceptions.

Issues of Current Research

The first reaction by political science to the (re)vitalization and politicization of religion consisted in the research of religious fundamentalism. Similarly, in political theory, a new debate began
about the principles of determining the relationship between religion and politics. Now as in former times, the classic liberal and republican positions of a strict separation between religion and politics and the referral of religion to the private sphere are being defended. Alternative approaches do uphold a minimum necessary mutual autonomy of politics and religion, but with regard to religious and cultural pluralism, they no longer consider the exclusion of religious points of view from politics as mandatory. At the same time, they grant politics considerable leeway in determining the relationship between religion and politics. This debate has also led to an increase in comparative empirical research into the genesis, mechanisms, and effects of different models for representing the relationship between religion and politics. Another important focus of political science research into the interrelationship of religion and politics concerns the compatibility of democracy with specific religious traditions, especially Islam. The starting point of this debate is the finding that the majority of current democracies have a predominantly Christian population, whereas the majority of Islamic countries have nondemocratic constitutions. One explanation of this finding is that only in Latin Christendom has there been the concept of the fundamental distinction between the worldly and the divine. Critics of this argument refer to the variety and changeability of religious traditions, citing among others the example of the Catholic Church, which only after the Second Vatican Council changed into an important promoter of democracy. The nondemocratic constitution of many Islamic countries is ascribed instead to specific historical, regional, or cultural factors. However, there are still considerable deficits of research, for example, regarding the instruments and strategies, and also the opportunities and limitations, of religious actors exerting a political influence at the national and international levels. This concerns, for example, research into the religious conditioning of welfare states or on the effects of religious influences on public policies.

Perspectives for Future Research
Research into the interaction of politics and religion is a current trend. The dynamics of the religious-political complex will—together with the competitively organized national and international research in political science—open up new issues and debates. It can be expected that existing gaps in this research will soon be filled. But what will also be necessary is a stronger reflection on the term and the phenomenon of religion as well as on the discipline’s underlying convictions about religion and its interrelationship with politics. The debate about the concept of religion is irrefutable for two reasons. On the one hand, the discipline is also conducting research into phenomena such as civil religion and political religion, which share a number of characteristics with religions without being religions in the classic sense of the word. On the other hand, the religious field is changing due to the formation of new individual and syncretistic forms of religiosity and spiritualism. Reflecting on the underlying convictions is necessary because the latter predetermine not only the selection of issues but also the interpretation of findings. That is especially true for assumptions about the capability of the religious field for transformation, change, and adaptation; for the concept of religion as a (latent) threat to the peaceful integration of societies; and also for methodological atheism and the reductionist strategies of explanation usually associated with it.

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See also Christian Democratic Parties; Church-State Relationships; Fundamentalism; Religiosity; Secularism

Further Readings
Religiosity refers to the strength and scope of religious activity among faith-based communities. Although “religion” and “religiosity” are often used synonymously, there is a considerable difference between these two terms. Whereas religion sociologically denotes beliefs and practices in relation to the sacred, religiosity encompasses a variety of representations that symbolize religious involvement. Within the religions of the Abrahamic traditions, for example, there exist monotheistic belief systems involving a multitude of practices that adhere to the teachings of literary texts. However, the religiosity of these traditions would be found within any number of activities including patterns of religious involvement, forms of religious expression, manifestations of religious structures, and the like. This entry discusses some historical and contemporary political implications of the different manifestations of religiosity.

In the international political climate of the 21st century, for example, religiosity has become a crucial feature in discourses concerning global security. In a controversial assessment of religiosity’s role in global politics, Samuel P. Huntington’s (1996) book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* attributed the potential for post–Cold War conflict to religious and cultural clashes between nations and differing civilizations. Despite Huntington’s classification of some eight civilizations based on cultural lines, these civilizations are largely bound by the demarcations of religiosity. Given this type of reasoning and categorization, religiosity represents a critical position in transnational conflicts.

Notwithstanding some other factors, the conflicts of the early 21st century generated by religious groups suggest that Huntington’s thesis is supported by a considerable amount of evidence. Demonstrated through the violent incidents of September 11, 2001, the 19 hijackers can be said to have been defending their religiosity through a type of aggression that they felt would stem the spread of Western values and ideologies. Western encroachment in this way on what Huntington called “Islamic civilization” may, perhaps, engender the greatest amount of conflict.

When one’s religiosity becomes systematically threatened, contentions appear to be elevated to another level. Mark Juergensmeyer, in his 2000 book *Terror in the Mind of God*, coined the term *cosmic war* to describe a situation where battles between perceptions of good and evil emerge. In this case, a person’s or group’s religiosity becomes the basis for at least one side of such a cosmic conflict. For example, the indifference that the West often displays toward the contradictory interplay between modern customs and traditional sacred beliefs and practices creates an atmosphere where religious expression marks a quasi-ideological status. In this way, dealing with religiosity in a culturally insensitive manner is detrimental to the resolution of conflicts of this magnitude.

Given the importance of religiosity in global affairs, measuring its attributes is particularly useful. Religiosity is often measured in terms of practices that indicate the religiousness of a population, including prayers, worship, service attendance, adherence to established principles of faith, commitment to belief, and any number of other activities that suggest an interaction with religious institutions. Basic examples of the results of such measurements may yield quantitative data such as correlations between the frequency of church attendance and physical well-being or qualitative data that suggest, for example, that the social mobility and economic success of an individual is linked to his or her commitment to a particular set of religious beliefs. One of the most well-known examples of studies pertaining to religiosity is Max Weber’s ([1904/1905] 1998) book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Weber focused on an insightful finding about the relationship between religiosity among the Calvinist branch of Protestantism and the emergence of modern capitalism. As Weber noted, the religious doctrine of predestination led to an ethic of hard work combined with an innerworldly asceticism that indirectly resulted in an early accumulation of capital.

In one of the most widely cited pieces of literature on the topic of religiosity, a group of Utah-based researchers created a model for measuring religiosity among members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. M. Cornwall, S. L. Albrect, P. H. Cunningham, and B. L. Pitcher (1986) used the components of religious belief, religious commitment, and religious behavior,
combined with two modes of personal and institutional types of religious practice, to construct a cross-classification for measuring religiosity. This schema generated six dimensions of religiosity: (1) traditional orthodoxy, (2) particularistic orthodoxy, (3) spiritual commitment, (4) church commitment, (5) religious behavior, and (6) religious participation. Through the analysis of these six dimensions, the categories of cognition, affect, and behavior were established as components used in measuring religiosity.

Such a multidimensional approach to classifying religiosity suggests similar multidimensional approaches to the more general study of religiosity. Rather than creating standardized models for all religious activities, much of the literature suggests a movement toward case-by-case assessments of what constitutes religiosity in different cultures, including its significance and meaning.

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See also Buddhism; Christianity; Hinduism; Islam; Islamist Movements; Judaism; Religion; Religious Movements; Zionism

Further Readings

Religious Movements

A religious movement is an organized effort that intends to bring about religious reforms. Many religious movements also have political goals because the kinds of reforms they want appear possible only by altering, sometimes fundamentally, political and/or social contexts and arrangements in which they operate. This entry discusses some major manifestations of such movements in contemporary politics.

In recent years, social scientists have consistently noted that religion can influence politics. Three decades ago, the Iranian revolution showed that an Islamic religious movement could overthrow a regime once seen as a key example of the modernizing effects of secularization in the Middle East. More recently, the rise of the Christian Right (CR) in the United States demonstrated how religious movements can evolve as a result of changing political circumstances. Further, the emergence and consolidation of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India was made possible because of the party’s foundations in Hindu religious movements. Similarly, Jewish fundamentalist movements have emerged in Israel with plenty to say about the Israel–Palestinian issue.

All these examples point to the inadequacies of modernization and secularization theories, which predicted that the importance of religion in politics would decline. Although secularization has clearly occurred in many countries, especially in Western Europe, this has taken place at the same time that religion has exhibited sustained presence—some would call it a resurgence—in many parts of the world. Overall, the impact of religion on politics has not declined but instead changed in complex ways, including the political involvement of some religious movements.

Until recently, such issues were judged to be remote from central political questions. The explanation for this neglect lies in a key assumption embedded in the social sciences. One presupposition, especially evident in theories of modernization and political development, was that the future of the integrated nation-state lay in secular participatory politics. The assumption was that nation building would be ill served by perceived “obscurantist” beliefs—such as religion. Nearly everywhere, it seemed, secular political leaders dominated, displacing once powerful traditional and religious figures from prominence. The implication was that, to successfully build nation-states, political leaders would have to remain as neutral as possible from the entanglements of particularistic claims, especially those derived from religion. It is hoped that
Religious Movements

this would avoid dogmatism and encourage citizens' tolerance, a crucial prelude to building viable nation-states and democracies. Decades of apparently unstoppable movement toward increasingly secular societies in many parts of the world reinforced the assumption that religion and piety would inevitably become private matters everywhere. Consequently, in political analysis, religion was often regarded as an increasingly minor problem of little or no significance in the search for national unity and political stability.

Such a view is, however, problematic. If it were correct, how could we explain and account for many religious movements' current political significance? Consider again the examples mentioned above:

- In officially secular India, the Hindu nationalist BJP came to power in the mid-1990s after staging a 10,000-kilometer march that sought to destroy an ancient mosque at Ayodhya, alleged to have been built on the remains of a temple dedicated to Lord Rama.
- In the United States, where the principle of separation of church and state is incorporated in the nation's constitution, the organized CR—a religious movement with social and political goals—has become very influential.
- The continuing conflict between Israel and Arab neighbors encouraged the emergence of Jewish fundamentalist movements and settlers in occupied territories after the 1967 war.
- The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is a religious movement that emerged in Egypt in the 1920s, becoming politically and socially prominent from the 1970s, with the aim of establishing an Islamic state.

These cases obviously differ greatly, and this entry does not offer a comprehensive theory of politics and religious movements. Instead, it briefly examines religious movements in four countries (India, the United States, Israel, and Egypt) from four religious traditions: Hinduism, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. We will see that in each case, religious movements from different religious traditions engage significantly and consistently with politics, seeking to achieve various goals that relate to the nature of the state and the moral and ethical universe that informs it.

Hindu Religious Movements in India

At independence in 1947, the victorious Congress party reluctantly accepted partition (between India and East and West Pakistan) but decisively rejected the ideology of Hindu nationalism (known as Hindutva). From the 1980s, India saw tensions increase between Muslims and Hindus, leading to the political rise of the BJP.

In officially secular India, an explosion of militant Hinduism focused on, but not confined to, the incident in which the Babri Masjid mosque at Ayodhya was demolished by a Hindu mob in 1992, served to transform India's political landscape. Hindu nationalists, concentrated in the BJP, achieved significant political gains in the 1990s and early 2000s. They were reacting against the secular visions of the country's nationalist founders, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. They used various strategies to bring about change in political structures and processes. What was especially striking was how consistently they aimed at political targets not only to solve religious problems but also to try to bring about the consolidation of religious identities and values.

The rise of the politics of religious identity in India underlines a central problem: How can religiously plural India survive the creation of a powerful sense of identity based on religion? Of the population of 1 billion Indians, 82% are Hindus, while about 11% are Muslims, 2.5% are Christians, and around 1.6% are Sikhs. There are also small numbers of Buddhists, Parsis, Jains, and followers of tribal religions. This religious diversity encouraged Indian nationalists to pursue a development path firmly located within a secular sociopolitical and cultural milieu.

Over time, the issue of Hindu–Muslim relations became a key political topic, a concern emphasized by the rise of the political ideology of Hindutva (Hinduness). Hindutva is a Hindi word, a neologism first used by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, a politician and independence movement activist, in his 1923 pamphlet Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? The term now generally refers to Hindu movements that advocate Hindu nationalism in India. The leading Hindu nationalist political party, the BJP, which dominated Indian politics for a decade from the mid-1990s, is Hindutva’s political focal point. Its foundations are in a number of Hindu movements, collectively promoting Hindutva,
known as the Sangh Parivar (meaning “family of associations”). Leading organizations within the movement include the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the Bajrang Dal, and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad.

The overall aim of the Sangh Parivar is to increase the predominance of Hinduism in India, in relation to its societal, political, and cultural presence. It seeks to pursue this goal through various means, including violence and terror. The Hindutva agenda includes attempts to suppress or drive out Muslims and Christians. This is because, for the Sangh Parivar, they were alien faiths, historically introduced to India by external conquerors. Islam was patronized by the Muslim Moghuls in the 16th century and Christianity by the British, mainly from the 19th century onward.

The Christian Right in the United States

The CR is an influential religious movement with social and political goals, which emerged at the time of the presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977–1981). The CR shared many of the ideals and goals of Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan (1981–1989), facilitating its development into a significant and influential entity. The election of George W. Bush in 2001 saw a resurgence of the CR. Conservative Christian leaders were able to arrange sessions with senior White House aides. This was widely understood to reflect an ideological empathy between leaders of the CR and prominent government insiders, including the President himself.

The CR has key concerns, including what form of Christianity should take precedence in America, reshaping American society according to their understanding of Christian values, the importance of “family values,” and the relationship between these values, public education, and public policy generally. After George W. Bush’s first term (2001–2005), CR leaders were emboldened by their role in reelecting him and galvanized by their success in campaigning for constitutional amendments to ban same-sex marriage, eventually passed in 18 states. The aim was to organize and build on these early successes, to solidify their agenda-setting role, and to help elect sympathetic public officials.

It used to be said that every 4 years at the time of the U.S. presidential elections American and foreign journalists rediscover religion. This was the periodic occasion when the media scented the electoral possibilities of the influence of the CR, a significant domestic political lobby group, on electoral outcomes. Initially, the CR comprised mainly Protestant conservative evangelicals. Over time, however, its makeup became more eclectic, referring to a broad community of mostly Christian religious conservatives. Prior to the 1970s, the CR had been a subculture, largely keeping its distance from electoral politics. But with a new focus on social conservatism, around the time of the presidency of Ronald Reagan, Republican Party strategists—together with neoconservatives and other right-wing ideologues—encouraged the politicization of CR members as part of a “New Right” fusionism that saw Ronald Reagan elected as president in 1981 and reelected 4 years later.

Despite ideological and political differences among the different organizations that make up the CR, many members share a belief that secularism poses a serious threat to liberty, democracy, and pluralism. The CR is “radical” in that it advocates dramatic changes in society and “religious” in that its members and leaders tend to base their ideologies on religious doctrines drawn from the Bible. In the mid-2000s, it was estimated that those claiming identification with the ideas of the CR comprised around 20% (some 60 million people) of the adult population of the United States. Today, the CR seeks to uphold and perpetuate “Christian values,” regarding as anathema manifestations of “excessive liberalism,” including legal abortion, absence or downgrading of prayers in public schools, and science teaching that adopts a rationalist, rather than a “creationist,” perspective.

Jewish Religious Movements in Israel

Since Israel’s founding in 1948, state policy has traditionally favored the political middle ground. This implies that neither religious nor secular political ideas have on their own been able to dominate the political agenda. Over time, religious Jews organized themselves through a number of religious movements and became an increasingly significant political voice. They were especially vocal in opposition to the policy of conceding parts of Biblical Israel to the Palestinians, especially the West Bank of the River Jordan. The topic is a subject of intense controversy that divides the
country. It has dominated the political agenda since the early 1990s, focused in the divisive Oslo peace accords of 1993, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination in 1995, and, following pressure from the government of the United States, handing over control of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinians in 2005.

In addition to various religious political parties, including Shas and United Torah Judaism, Israel’s political landscape also includes a number of influential Jewish movements, including Edah Haredit (God Fearful Community), Neturei Karta (Guardians of the City), and Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful). One of the most influential is Gush Emunim, founded in 1974 in the West Bank settlement of Kfar Etzion. Gush’s main aim is to achieve conquest and settlement of what it regards as the Biblical land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael). During the 1980s, the movement grew rapidly, especially after the 1978 Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt that led to the return of the latter to the Sinai desert—grabbed by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War. Along with Gush, other extremist religious movements, such as the late Rabbi Meir Kahane’s organization, Kach (meaning “Thus”) and Kahane Chai (“Kahane Lives”; founded after Kahane was assassinated in 1990), argue on religious grounds against giving back territory not only to Egypt but also to the Palestinians or any other non-Jewish entities. This is because they regard such a policy as a contradiction of God’s will expressed in the Torah.

Organized in movements such as Kach and Kahane Chai, Jewish religious zealots seek to be the voice of the mostly religious Jewish settlers, who try to influence Israeli policy in relation to both Egypt and the Palestinians so as not to hand land back to non-Jews. Following the 1993 Oslo peace accords with the Palestinians, involving the latter receiving autonomy in the Gaza Strip from August 2005 and an area around the West Bank city of Jericho, religious opposition to the accord with the Palestinians was manifested in mass murder. A Jewish religious zealot, Baruch Goldstein, linked to both Kach and Kahane Chai, murdered 29 people and injured approximately 100 more in a dawn attack on a mosque in the West Bank town of Hebron in February 1994. Following the massacre, the Israeli government, as a sign of its commitment to crush Jewish extremist groups that systematically used violence to try to achieve their objectives, banned both Kach and Kahane Chai.

The political significance of religious parties and movements on policy making in Israel is unlikely to fade soon for several reasons. First, the basis of both nationality and the creation of the state of Israel remains a sense of religious identity, making the issue consistently vulnerable to the influence of religious Jews, some of whom are also political extremists. Second, there has been strong growth in the numbers of religious Jews since the early 1970s, including recent immigrants. Now, it is claimed that up to half of Israeli Jews “respect the religious commands,” while 1 in 10 belongs to the haredi (ultra-orthodox) community. Around 60% of the haredi population is younger than 25 years of age—and the proportion of the ultra-orthodox will grow because many have large numbers of children. Many such people form the core support and activist base of the—sometimes extremist—religious movements and parties. Third, the latter will continue to have major political influence because of the nature of the country’s political system, which is based on proportional representation and a very low minimal threshold of 1.5% of the vote to be represented in the Knesset (Israeli parliament). As a result, such parties have the ability to acquire political rewards in return for supporting the main secular political parties, including Kadima, Likud, and Labour, in the context of the formation of coalition governments. Finally, in recent years, there has been a dovetailing of secular security concerns (concerned with Israel’s regional national interests and power) and religious interests (an aversion to handing over land to the non-Jewish Palestinians, as it is believed to be against God’s will). Overall, the Jewish movements are a powerful coalition of interests, often able to apply significant pressure on Israel’s government via both the ballot box and civil society.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949) established the MB in Egypt in 1928 as an organization providing welfare services, aiming to encourage and defend morality. The aim was to Islamize society “from below.” Initially, the MB was just one of a number of small Islamic associations engaged in charity work among the poor of the country’s fast-growing
cities. MB built mosques, schools, and clinics, providing an Islamic welfare framework by which Muslims could live without reference to the Western and secular influences around them. However, the MB was soon drawn into politics. It developed explicit political goals, involving a radicalization of its philosophy and tactics and the creation of an armed wing. Nonetheless, the MB’s main focus remained education from below and the infiltration of Egypt’s political and social institutions. The combination of its welfare services, its religious credentials, and the government’s increasing authoritarianism combined to make the MB Egypt’s largest religious movement, with tens of thousands of followers, which also pursued explicitly political goals.

It is important to understand that the brotherhood, despite its own rhetoric, is not a manifestation of “traditional Islamism.” Instead, the MB is a key example of a modern social movement: mass based, populist, supported mainly by the urban middle and lower classes, using a cell-based structure, and embracing religious reformism. In addition, the MB focuses explicitly and primarily on Egypt’s domestic situation: It wishes to reform the country, not the universal Islamic community as, for example, the transnationalist group Al Qaeda aims to do. Like Egypt’s secular nationalists, the MB struggles primarily for Egyptian independence, with a rallying cry that reflects this aim: “Egypt for the Egyptians.”

After al-Banna’s assassination in 1949, the MB became close to the revolutionary government of Gamal Abdul Nasser, following its accession to power in 1952. By the mid-1950s, however, relations had soured following an unsuccessful attempt on Nasser’s life. As a result, the MB was proscribed, thousands of members were imprisoned, and its leader, Sayyid Qutb, arrested. He was executed in 1966. During his captivity, Qutb produced a comprehensive commentary on Islamic history, arguing that Egypt was not an Islamic country, as it was in a state of jahiliya (religious ignorance). Muslims could not live a proper religious life in such circumstances. It was therefore necessary to overthrow the existing political order by any means.

Qutb’s ideology was deeply influenced by the revolutionary radicalism of a contemporaneous Indian Islamist, Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi (1903–1979). Qutb’s ideological development fell into two distinct periods: before 1954 and from 1954 until his execution. During his second, radical phase, Qutb declared “Western civilization” the enemy of Islam, denounced leaders of Muslim nations for not following Islam closely enough, and sought to spread the belief among Sunni Muslims that it was their duty to undertake jihad to defend and purify Islam.

Following President Anwar Sadat’s accession to power in 1970, the brotherhood enjoyed improved relations with the government—because it was anxious to cultivate the MB’s support in the state’s fight against secular leftists. Taking advantage of Sadat’s overtures, the brotherhood built mosques, schools, and clinics. Its financial position improved following the founding of a range of profitable companies and financial institutions. Such entrepreneurial flair was not, however, appreciated by all brotherhood members, and the movement split into two sections: the “radicals” and the “moderates.” The latter believed in a gradualist approach, to Islamize society slowly by increasing the brotherhood’s influence as a popular movement, while the former wanted a speedier, more radical action. Later, after Sadat’s assassination in 1981 at the hands of Islamists, moderate MB members entered electoral politics. Since then it has consistently won seats in parliament, in line with President Mubarak’s goal of “limited democracy” in Egypt.

The radicals were too impatient for change, too opposed to what they perceived as a sham democracy to join in such a program. Breaking away from the moderates, several new Islamist movements—including Takfir wal-Hijra and al-Jihad—were founded. Together they were the core of a shifting set of religious-political movements under the general title of al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Groups). Stimulated by the writings of Qutb, they were characterized not only by a denial of conventional electoral politics but also by the use of terrorist tactics to achieve an Islamic state. Members of Takfir wal-Hijra were responsible for a number of political assassinations, while the al-Jihad group not only killed President Sadat but also tried to kill two government ministers and the parliamentary speaker at the same time. The state then decided to crack down on the radicals. More than 300 members of al-Jihad were arrested and some executed, specifically for their alleged involvement in the murder of members of the state security forces in the town of Asyut in the early 1980s.
The divisions between the secular nationalists and the MB in Egypt developed in the 1980s into a conflict between two different conceptions of society and two different ideas of what are desirable social and political changes. The conflict spilled over from the religious sphere into the fields of politics, economics, and social affairs. The goal of the MB—to build an Islamic state—was an attempt to transform the language of politics, to build as broad as possible a coalition of opposition forces, and to deliver welfare benefits, especially to the underprivileged urban poor. More generally, the Islamists of the MB wanted to reverse what they saw as a cataclysmic slide into godless modernity, exemplified by a secular society.

Conclusion

As this discussion of the relationship between selected religious movements and politics has shown, religious movements have specific aims and objectives that differ according to their specific contexts, backgrounds, and history; however, they share an overt disavowal of the desirability of secularization and associated modernization that highlight state attempts to restrict religion to the private sphere. Religious movements work at the level of civil society. Their aim is not usually to enter conventional electoral politics and try to achieve the changes they want to see by involvement in political society. Instead, their focus is on the community or grassroots level, where they seek to build mass support, whether working alone or in coalition with other like-minded groups. The intention is to change both the status quo and the prevailing power equation, so as to build a society with more involvement of religion in everyday matters that affect the well-being, norms, and values of the mass of the people.

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See also Christianity; Hinduism; Islam; Judaism; Religiosity; Secularism; Social Movements

Further Readings


REORGANIZATION

This entry discusses the meaning of the term reorganization in the public sector, the targets, the argument, and the models for reorganization and concludes by assessing the consequences of these changes.

The Meaning of Reorganization

In political science and public administration, reorganization usually refers to government reorganization. But one can talk about legislative reorganization and judicial reorganization as well. Reorganization refers to the imposition of a new way of organizing, or “to organize differently,” which often involves an extensive alteration of the structure of government.

Any such reorganization or “shake-up” introduced must by definition produce extensive and drastic changes to government; minor changes in government are not considered to be an act of reorganization. In addition, there may be a wide range of goals in reorganization, but the assumption is that these goals—efficiency, effectiveness, and changes in policy—are all being addressed through structural changes in the public sector.

The expression “government reorganization” has a neutral connotation. It does not directly praise or condemn the Old System as being good or bad. The emphasis is on the introduction of a different way of organizing government. On the other hand, the word reform is value laden. Reform refers to a change for the better as a result of correcting
abuses, as in the common statement, “Corruption in government is rampant, so there is an urgent need to reform government.” So the words government reorganization and government reform are different, although at times they tend to be used interchangeably.

Recent developments in the field of political science and public administration have emphasized “reform” over “reorganization.” The new buzzwords are, for example, “administrative reform,” “government reform,” “governance reform,” “NPM reform,” “reinventing government,” and “revitalizing government.” One reason why the phrase word government reorganization is being replaced by these new words has to do with the beliefs among practitioners and scholars that the old government machines are in an urgent need of being changed drastically. This has been true in both the developed and the less developed countries. The phrases administrative reform and government reform are very broad and do not specify the intended nature of reform. In fact, administrative reform is a broader term than government reform because the latter focuses on the reform of government, while the first covers broader areas such as the public sector and civil society. Meanwhile, the terms governance reform, new public management (NPM) reform, and reinventing government are driven by specific doctrines or principles of reform. We will return to this topic later in the entry.

The Targets of Government Reorganization

There are many ways to implement programs for government reorganization. The most common kind of government reorganization is structural. For example, government reorganization may involve the creation of new ministries and departments, the merging of several lower level units into a higher one, and the structural expansion of a government agency. The assumption is that the manipulation of structural variables is the key to improving how the system operates. Other targets of reorganization are more focused on procedures. For example, one of the common targets for reorganization has been budget processes. Other targets have included personnel policy in government, policy making, ethics, and strategic management.

Changing the structure of government organization involves, for example, choices between pyramid or flat organizations, centralization or decentralization, strong or weak leadership, small or big government, the variety of forms of public organizations in government, the size of the public sector in relation to the private sector, the role of the civil society and citizens in public affairs, and the configurations of multilevel governance. One of the most common structural reforms during the past several decades has been the creation of executive agencies that have responsibility for a limited number of functions and enjoy a good deal of autonomy from direct controls by the rest of government. The contrary pattern of reorganization has been to create very large cabinet-level departments that are designed to coordinate a wide range of public functions and provide more coherent packages of services to the public.

The systemic choices for reorganizing public budgeting are, for example, line item budgeting, performance budgeting, program budgeting, or zero-based budgeting; nonintegrated or integrated budget; and annual or multiyear budget. In personnel reorganization, the system choices have been, for example, spoils or merit system; for recruitment; position classification system or contract system; and performance appraisal or seniority for internal promotions. An example of the reorganization of the policy process may involve the extent to which government mechanisms facilitate citizen participation in the policy decision-making process and implementation. Attempts to change the nature of personal morality, professional ethics, organizational ethics, and social ethics can also be seen as a reorganization of the agency’s normative system that is used to control the behavior of individuals within government. Reorganization in strategic management may involve the implementation of strategic tools such as best practices, benchmarking, and balanced scorecards. Again, these represent attempts to control the behavior of individuals within the public sector.

The Arguments for Government Reorganization

The most common reason given for carrying out government reorganization is to improve the efficiency of the government machine. Government officials responsible for reform will usually justify a major bureaucratic reform by claiming that such
institutional change will bring in better services to the people and savings to government. Efficiency is defined as the ratio between input and output: More output is obtained from the same amount of input. There are, however, hidden agendas in every reorganization effort.

Scholars have pointed out that there are vested interests involved in any attempt to reorganize government. Reform, as a matter of fact, is politics. After government reorganization, there are always those who gain and those who lose in the reform process. For example, the splitting off of a new ministry from an old one opens up new opportunities for senior government officials to fill in new higher positions, and there may be a better “target” for interest groups attempting to influence policy. As a separate entity, the new ministry can also demand more allocation of budget. New laws, rules, and regulations are issued to provide legitimacy and authoritative power to the officials in the new ministry. Another example is that reform proposals put forward by central agencies such as the Civil Service Commission, the Budget Bureau, the Ministry of Finance, and the Government Reform Commission have tendencies to consolidate power and tighten control over the entire bureaucracy. Such organizations will claim that central executive control was necessary to promote bureaucratic responsiveness, especially from line agencies. Proposals by a single department such as the national police or a regulatory organization usually contain clauses to increase their autonomy and authoritative power. In short, more positions are requested, new suborganizations are proposed, new legal power is justified, and bigger budgets are requested.

Further, most proposals for government reorganization designed by government officials involve suggestions for bureaucratic structural expansion and power aggrandizement. Scholars (such as Anthony Downs, 1967) have pointed out that, in fact, all organizations have inherent tendencies to expand. C. Northcote Parkinson’s famous law states that “work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion” (quoted in Downs, 1967, p. 16). Downs summarized the reasons why bureaucracy inherently seeks to expand as follows: (a) an organization that is rapidly expanding can attract more capable personnel and more easily retain its most capable existing personnel than one that is expanding slowly, stagnating, or shrinking; (b) the expansion of any organization normally provides its leaders with increased power, income, and prestige; (c) growth tends to reduce internal conflicts in an organization by allowing its members to increase their personal status without lowering that of others; and (d) increasing the size of an organization may also improve the quality of its performance (per unit of output) and its chances for survival (p. 17). Subsequent analysts have pointed out that increasing the size of an organization may create more managerial problems than it creates benefits, but many bureaucratic organizations persist in seeking expansion.

Launching a major government reorganization plan also can be good publicity for the government. It creates the impression that the problem lies in the government machine, not the political executive and that the elected government is seriously addressing the problem of inefficiency and corruption in the bureaucracy. This kind of bureaucratic bashing pleases the public voters, who are bored with and frustrated by their bitter experiences with government bureaucrats. Indeed, when governments have few opportunities to address a policy problem directly, they often reorganize government in order to appear to be doing something.

The experiences of countries at reorganization indicate that despite all the publicity on government reorganization, at the end, the bureaucrats are often able to outsmart the political executive. In many cases, not much has been achieved from government reorganization. Instead, the reform commissions have produced mountainous piles of reports and studies on the ideas and reform plans that never got implemented. Not much bureaucratic reform was actually undertaken, and the “ugly old bureaucracy” remains as inefficient and venal as ever. Again, reorganization and reform are as often as not symbolic policies rather than effective means of solving public problems.

Another reason why government reorganization is needed is the argument of the turbulent environment. Government reorganization is needed because of the volatile, unpredictable, and rapidly changing environment. For example, the Minnowbrook Conferences, held by Syracuse University in 1968 and 1988 for scholars in public administration, were organized to bring in new ideas about government reorganization and
improvement. In the age of rapid globalization, there is an urgent need to reorganize government in line with this new international system. Another factor in support of government reorganization is the revolution in information technology that is drastically changing the way governments work. Most recently, the economic crisis of the early 21st century is forcing substantial rethinking of the role of government and of the means of organizing the public sector.

Reorganization in the public sector can also be used to alter the policies adopted and implemented by government. While efficiency may be difficult to attain, given the numerous barriers that exist within the public sector, reorganization may be more effective in altering policy, simply because of the different priorities that may be involved when an organization is independent or when it is contained within a different department or ministry. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard moved from the Department of Transportation to Homeland Security after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. After that move, the agency shifted its priorities toward security and away from safety on waterways.

The Models of Government Reorganization

Thinking about how to implement government reorganization leads us to making choices about centralization and decentralization, big or small government, strong or weak leader, pyramid or flat structures, the extent of citizen participation, the power relations between superiors and subordinates, the appropriate values and culture, and the nature of environment one is facing. All these variables are important for defining how government will function and the type of choices that the organizations have on which to base their decisions.

B. Guy Peters (1992) proposes a theoretical analysis of “government reorganization.” According to him, reform and reorganization is one of the most common activities in government. He pointed out three sets of approaches to reform: purposive model of reform, environmental dependency, and institutional models of organization change. First, purposive-action approaches assume that one or more actors in the reorganization process have a particular end state in mind for the public sector when they propose the reform or reorganization.

The need to reorganize government may come from perceived inadequacies of existing arrangements, a sense of “overload” and “ungovernability” in public organizations, and the desire of the rational individual bureaucrat to maximize his or her personal utility. Second, the environmental-determinism approach assumes that changes occur as a function of the relationship of the administrative structures to their environment. The need to reorganize comes from the reaction of government to innovations in their environment that provide them with the opportunity to exploit the new situation. Another explanation is from contingency theories, which argued that “the internal structuring of organizations will, over time, come to reflect the characteristics of the task environment” (Peters, 1992, p. 206). The population ecology models assume that the best way to understand government reorganization is to look at the evolution of entire populations of organizations. Third, institutionalism approaches assume that reform requires to some extent altering the internal values of the organization, which includes the modification of the operative values of organizational members. Institutional models in political science “stress the durability of organizational values, or cultures, and therefore the extreme difficulty that may be encountered in attempting to produce any rapid or significant changes in performance through reorganization” (Peters, 1992, p. 211).

The traditional model of government organization, and perhaps reorganization, often follows the classic ideal-type bureaucracy of Max Weber. The characteristics of bureaucracy are as follows:

1. There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules—that is, by laws or administrative regulations.
2. The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones.
3. The management of the modern office is based on written documents (the files), which are preserved in their original or draft form.
4. Office management, at least all specialized office management—and such management is
distinctly modern—usually presupposes thorough and expert training.

5. When the office is fully developed, official activity demands the full working capacity of the official, irrespective of the fact that his obligatory time in the bureau may be firmly delimited.

6. The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive and which can be learned.

The literature in public administration is marked by efforts to find a more suitable way to reorganize government than Weberian bureaucracy. Peters (1996) proposes four alternative models: the market model, the participatory state, the flexible government, and the deregulated government. Michael Barzelay and Barbak Armajani (1992) observed the shifting from the bureaucratic paradigm to the postbureaucratic paradigm as a movement away (a) from the public interest to the benefits for individual citizens, (b) from efficiency to quality and value, (c) from control to winning adherence to norms, (d) from enforcing responsibility to building accountability, and (e) from justifying costs to delivering value.

In many parts of Europe and the Antipodes, the reform movements are loosely called the NPM. Christopher Hood (1991) summarized the doctrines of NPM as consisting of (a) hands-on professional management in the public sector, (b) explicit standards and measures of performance, (c) greater emphasis on output controls, (d) shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector, (e) shift to greater competition in public sector, (f) stress on private sector styles of management practices, and (g) stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use.

The NPM model was not, however, widely adopted in Southern Europe because of the emphasis on administrative law as the means of controlling within the public sector.

In the United States, the use of private sector styles of management came to be known as the reinventing government movement. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1992) attacked the “sluggish centralized bureaucracies” as unfit for the rapidly changing, information-rich, knowledge-intensive society and economy of the 1990s. They proposed, instead, “the entrepreneurial government,” consisting of 10 principles:

1. catalytic government (steering rather than rowing),
2. community-owned government (empowering rather than serving),
3. competitive government (injecting competition into service delivery),
4. mission-driven government (transforming rule-driven organizations),
5. result-oriented government (funding outcomes not inputs),
6. customer-driven government (meeting the needs of the customer, not the bureaucracy),
7. enterprising government (earning rather than spending),
8. anticipatory government (prevention rather than cure),
9. decentralized government (from hierarchy to participation and teamwork), and
10. market-oriented government (leveraging change through the market).

This style of reform was more compatible with governing in the United States because of the long-standing emphasis on management within the public sector.

Another emerging framework for reorganizing government is “governance.” At the abstract level, as noted by Bidhya Bowornwatana (1996), governance in public administration refers to a reform model that advocates the following principles: a smaller government that does less, a flexible and global-vision government, an accountable government, and a government that is fair. From the government’s experience in the United Kingdom, R. A. W. Rhodes (1996) concludes that governance is about managing networks that are self-organizing and autonomous. The governance approach has involved the use of social actors through networks as a means of providing public services, as well as a means of shaping public policy. These social actors have tended not to be market actors but more often represent a variety of civil society organizations and interests.
For some, mostly practitioners, government reorganization meant the introduction to government of management tools such as the balanced scorecard, strategic planning, the learning organization, reengineering. Many scholars have criticized such practices as being part of management fads and fashions that do not really improve government performance and that the management tools applied will soon go out of fashion.

The Consequences of Government Reorganization

The study of government reorganization cannot be complete without considering the impact of government reorganization. What are the intended and unintended consequences of government reorganization? Who gains? Who loses? Have the power relationships in a ministry or department been changed? Have public services delivery been improved? What are the positive and negative unintended consequences? Several observations can be made about the results of reorganization. First, important consequences of government reorganizations take a long time to materialize. The time span of such an impact bypasses the time in office of the policymakers. Second, the question of who is responsible for any negative consequences of reform can get very complicated, as during the course of time (e.g., 10 years) several actors may have been involved with the reorganization policy. New policies may be introduced one after another, with the effect that it is almost impossible to trace accountability.

Third, the immediate gainers and losers of government reorganizations are the political executives and subordinate bureaucrats. Some actors are promoted to newly established positions. Some others are reshuffled to less important positions. The political executive in the short run gets political points from their publicity of the reform plans. Fourth, the success of reorganization efforts to change the values and cultures of government programs, and of the system more generally, cannot be easily proven. They are not easily visible, and change takes a long time. As Frederick Mosher (1967) pointed out, a reorganization effort is not a one-time thing but a step in progressive history. Fifth, the majority of reorganization efforts tend to fail in meeting their proclaimed goals. Although new positions have been created and more money spent, efficiency has not improved.

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See also Administration Theory; Bureaucracy; New Public Management

Further Readings

Representation

Political representation is a basic institution of Western modernity. Put simply, it exists so that those governed can govern indirectly. It thus creates a minimum level (considered to be the only realistic one) of self-government. Under the systems of modern representation, the governed choose those who will govern through elections and authorize them to do so in their name, thus
granting representatives a mandate to look after the interests of the governed.

In its original Latin form, the word *representation* covered a vast semantic field, and this has been further widened over time. To represent means to portray, describe, narrate, and duplicate—to *make present* something that is not and cannot be so. Hence, the problems begin with the very word, and circumscribing its significance by talking about “political” representation does little to resolve this.

Even if, officially, they do not bear this name, forms of representation—or, at least, institutionalized communication between the governed and the governing—can be seen even within those political regimes not commonly classified as representative. Further, theoretically, no collective body can exist without some form of (even symbolic) representation. A people, nation, political party, class, interest, or religious belief needs to be represented—and have its own spokespeople—so that it can be recognized by both its own members and everyone else. However, if representation is a constituting element of a collective body, this raises the key question of how the wishes of that body can be transmitted to its representatives.

Belying modernist rhetoric regarding the individual, a collective body in the real world of politics is effectively the aggregation of preexisting collective bodies. A plurality of collective bodies—territorial communities, associations, organized interests, political movements and parties, and so on—decides to constitute a unitary political body with representatives who lead them and act as their spokespeople. It is thus represented to the external world through these spokespeople, and a plurality of wills is thereby transformed into a collective will. We might ask, however, how can representatives perform this task? If the collective body consists of heterogeneous parts, willing or induced to cohabit, but possessing different and often conflicting desires, what will these representatives effectively represent?

Of course, no form of representation is ever a perfect replication of the original concept. To represent means to interpret, and interpretations are inevitably arbitrary and distorting. To represent something—and political representation is no different from literary, pictorial, photographic, cartographic, or any other form of representation—can also signify improving and embellishing it. However, this can never be a perfect replication, especially so in the case of a collective body. Here, to represent implies generalizing, abstracting, and, basically, manipulating, especially when the mandate is reduced to such a simplified and stylized act as voting—in other words, a mark on a ballot paper. Allegiance is therefore a constant, theoretical, and political obsession for political representation. What defines it and to what degree this mirrors the original is another fundamental issue of the debate.

Some theorists even deny the idea of a mandate conferred on representatives and/or of representation itself. Two illustrious authors—Hans Kelsen and Joseph A. Schumpeter—crudely define representation as being nothing more than a “fiction,” which, according to Kelsen, is useful for its legitimizing role since it convinces those governed that they are governing, while, in Schumpeter’s view, this fiction is inevitably damaging because electoral mechanisms force those governing to be opportunistic rather than to pursue the collective good. Therefore, what is conventionally called a representative government is merely a device legitimizing the division of work between the governed and the governing, transforming electoral consensus—which is often fictitious given the workings of electoral systems—given by voters to a political party, a coalition, or a leader, into the will of the collective body. Rather than hereditary or other principles, representation is the mechanism that modern societies have adopted to validate their governors. This is not without its complications, beginning with the fact that representative regimes not only authorize the representatives of the majority party obtaining electoral success to govern but also give a voice, again through representatives, to the defeated minorities, thus enabling and encouraging them to interact with the representatives of the majority. It is then expected that everyday politics will establish in what way and to what degree this takes place.

However, even if what we call “representation” is not really representative, it still offers a series of extremely valuable advantages: Mandates (at least in the West) are limited over time, there is the opportunity to replace governments, and the electoral procedure allows citizens to voice—individually or
collectively, peacefully or otherwise—their opinions and interests. Above all, representation creates for both the governed and the governing the not inconsiderable opportunity of communicating fairly regularly with each other. The process is anything but linear, and the equality of citizens is a myth; however, representation establishes an incentive structure that enables the governing to govern and to minimize conflict with those governed. Of course, these incentives do not always work because the governed are a heterogeneous body with variegated interests, and satisfying the wishes of all is thus inconceivable. However, to date, representation has generally worked, albeit with some notable accidents along the way.

Experience tells us that representation also considerably reduces the costs of cultural, political, and social conflicts. These do not disappear, but the electoral and parliamentary procedures of representation increase the chances of their being managed peacefully. A represented interest is an acknowledged interest and, once it has accepted representation (and is allowed to be represented), its explosive potential is attenuated. It may not happen: Some interests transcend the boundaries of representation and maintain a position of rejecting it and refuting the rules. While there are many such examples, these only serve to confirm the fact that representation and representative government are inevitably somewhat imperfect.

Given the number of controversial issues and questions surrounding the topic of “representation,” it is no surprise to discover that, for the past 3 centuries, theoretical work has attempted to give form to the necessarily provisional device of representation. The great challenge facing representation at the outset is what could be defined as the challenge of pluralism. This is a challenge, which, to date, aside from momentary defeats, representation has generally won. However, it is a challenge that is not yet over. It has been (and continues to be) very demanding, and it is interesting to observe how theory has approached the issue.

What can be defined as the “pure” theory rejects pluralism outside the political arena, based on the logic that there is a fundamental unity of the collective body and its representatives and that representation essentially aims to legitimize the representatives’ authority. Representation denotes the population as a whole, and any mandate dictated by the represented to its representatives—who are, therefore, “trustees”—is to be discouraged because it would prejudice the independence and ability of representatives to transcend specific interests when in pursuit of what the theory solemnly defines as the common good.

Alongside this pure theory, however, there is an “impure” or pragmatic theory, which over time has undermined the former. This enjoys a more relaxed relationship with pluralism since it acknowledges the composite nature of the collective body and comes to different conclusions. From this perspective, there is nothing wrong with seeing the representative as a delegate or a spokesperson for particular interests, but it is to be hoped that such representatives will be capable of rising above these interests to have a more farsighted view. The synthesis effect is achieved through the interaction, whether through negotiation or conflict, between different interests within the representative body. The outcome is not necessarily more modest than what was promised but is effectively something not quite achieved by the pure theory.

Obviously, under these conditions, no government is sufficiently representative (not least because the objectives are very unclear), and this insufficiency has been a recurrent issue within public debate. There is always someone ready to denounce the lack of representation and to look for reparation. There is always some political force that claims to be more representative than its competitors. This is still happening at the dawn of a new millennium when representation is clearly encountering considerable difficulties.

In recent decades, the decisions taken by authorities not based on any electoral mandate, or that have minimal representative links to those affected by their decisions, have multiplied. As an example, it is sufficient to consider the deterritorializing processes of political authorities provoked by globalization. Moreover, in large part, thanks to the media, the sophisticated manipulative methods with which electoral competitions are now held shape (and distort) communications between the governed and the governing. Democratic regimes have recently tended to enhance the role of the executive power to the detriment of the elected assemblies. The executive is always a representative
body, as is its leader, because it is chosen by the electorate. But what is the level of representation of an individual and the limited committee working with them in relation to the complexities of contemporary democracies? If representation implies interpretation, will what contemporary democracies propose be all too simplistic and dismissive? Finally, according to current theories, there are also those who want to remove representation from the political vocabulary, acknowledging the possibility both of forms of representation not supported by a popular mandate and of forms of democracy not founded on representation.

Put simply, it is possible to divide representation as occurring in three main periods:

1. individual representation, in which the representatives were chosen from a minority of notables, a limited group based on wealth and culture; social prestige was thus the decisive element in electoral competition;
2. collective representation, organized through political parties; and
3. post–political party collective representation—that is, the current era, which is fairly uncertain and complicated.

The outlines of these three epochs will be described below as we disentangle the key (pure and impure) theories relevant to the definition and social construction of representation.

**Pure Representation Theory**

Modern political representation was invented in Great Britain in the 17th century by reusing and renewing long-standing institutions. Needing to replace a monarch who ruled by divine right and was, therefore, the representative of God on earth, parliament had the idea to designate itself as the representative of the people. The problem was that while God is abstract and remote, the people are rather closer and more concrete. Although it is not entirely clear who and what “the people” were, representation had a precedent in that of the ancien régime.

From the time that large territorial, political entities began to organize themselves around a central power, the problem arose for sovereigns of persuading civic and religious potentates, collective bodies, and lower level territorial units to acknowledge their authority and cooperate with them. The solution adopted was that of consultation through agreements and reciprocal recognition of powers, privileges, and rights. This practice also had the advantage of assembling in a single place, and at the same time, the entire collective body, whose unity was thereby “represented” while at the same time “representing” (since it was frequently impossible for the existing potentates to be directly present).

However, both the transition to modernity (which eroded the old centers of power and established new ones) and the growing monarchical ambitions of unifying and governing the territory required a change in representation methods. The dispersion of power over a multiplicity of potentates, which had been confirmed by ancien régime representation, had become intolerable for large territorial states. There were two main alternatives available to such states. The first was that the monarchy should limit the competing powers without formally annulling them, as would be the case in the French model: The States General ceased being convened in 1614. The second was that of unifying the competing powers in a single body representing the whole of collective society, as was the case in England.

The extraordinary theoretical move devised by Hobbes was that of representing the entire collective through an artificial figure and imagining it to be constituted no longer by preestablished powers but by a crowd of autonomous individuals who renounce their powers through a social contract. However, history ignored his preference for an individual as the representative of the multitude and the owner of sovereignty, and in the 1640s, following the conflict with the King (although the Malmesbury philosopher had not excluded this second possibility), England opted for a parliament, which, according to Hobbes, is nonetheless also a single artificial figure constituting the unity of the people rather than the dispersion of the crowd.

Once it had liberated itself of power by divine delegation, the elite sitting in parliament pursued the following logic: It was prepared to represent the people but was little inclined to hand over the power conquered in the people’s name. On the contrary, it wanted to concentrate this power,
monopolistically, among its members. However, if “the people” is an invention of parliament and if it exists only in so much as it is represented, the constraints of representation are, obviously, different from those of the ancien régime. Not only are the people unified by a single mandate but the mandate holder also receives a mandate that is no longer bound by the instructions of a preexisting power. Modern representation thus requires that the representative is not a delegate but a trustee who looks after the interests of the collective as a whole.

As frequently occurs, practice struggles to correspond to the ideal prescriptions of theory. If “the people” is an invention, there nonetheless exists a scattered population of aggregated interests that want to have a voice. Further, as representation is materially based on a formal act such as elections through which the mandate is manifested, it is sufficient that elections are minimally competitive so that, on the one hand, the electorate (even when carefully selected through requirements of property and wealth) may advance requests in exchange for their vote and, on the other, those aspiring to the mandate may encourage such requests. This raises the question, however, given the stiff competition for a parliamentary seat, of how candidates can be expected to merely display their personal merits and capacities and appeal to generic superior values and interests, thus renouncing the attempt to attract voters through the offer of some specific advantage.

The debate surrounding the nature of the mandate thus immediately became entangled. Among those who attempted to unravel the knots, the name of Edmund Burke leaps to mind. He stressed the idea that, over and above what he considered the legitimate pluralism of particular interests, the role of parliamentarians is not to satisfy the desires of this or that representative but to pursue, with full independence of judgment, what they consider to be the interests of the nation. The electorate is mandated by the nation, which is a much more vast and noble entity than those holding the vote. Burke’s parliament, in his famous 1774 Speech to the Electors of Bristol, was not a convention of ambassadors representing opposing interests but a representative assembly of a single nation sharing the same interests in a common good. As a consequence, representatives should not receive any binding mandate but should simply and solely obey their own judgments and conscience.

Given that they had a number of illustrious precedents, Burke’s pronouncements were not intended to formulate a new theory of representation. Rather, he wanted to persuade voters that elected representatives would, first, provide the best possible service without receiving their instructions or having generalized aims and, second, would subsequently account for their actions. Since political circumstances are always the stimuliants of theory, Burke was very familiar with the Whig ideas that opposed those of the Tories, according to whom it was the monarch who represented the nation—while parliament should content itself with transmitting local demands and partial interests.

In practice, the impact of Burke’s ideas was limited. An indication of this was possibly the fact that his speech was followed by a resounding electoral defeat. However, his arguments had been established as part of the theory of representation, reappearing on the other side of the Channel where revolutionary political theory, and, above all, Emmanuel Sieyès, laid down a fairly similar but much more linear and decisive path. The French situation in 1789, however, was different possibly because history did not allow it to update and adapt preexisting institutions but required it to found and construct new ones and possibly also because there were different challenges against which theory and practice were measured.

Rejecting Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s praise for democracy and condemnation of representation as incompatible with modern society, Sieyès not only argued that society should request that the principles of the division of labor be applied to politics and representative government, but, with revolutionary resolution, he also called for the autonomy of representatives. However, recalling Hobbes’s lessons, his solution, despite initially being similar to Burke’s, was rather more drastic. Sieyès’s concept of society was a compact, homogeneous, and unified space without any of the asymmetries of ancien régime society against which the Third Estate had arisen. Indeed, given that such a society did not exist in reality, rather than being discouraged, Sieyès invented his own. He promoted the nation to the role of a third, virtual actor, standing between the people and its representatives, hence
averting the possibility that one would assume a superior role in relation to the other since the nation could only be constituted through the legislative body. The nation was, therefore, a unitary and indivisible body but, equally, so too was the assembly as its exclusive spokesperson.

According to Burke, society and its articulations were not without political relevance. Worried by memories of the ancien régime and concerned with liberating at all costs the actions of the elective body and, therefore, the state, from claims by partial interests, Sieyès indicated the nation as the only alternative to the state. As for the citizens, they would express themselves only at the moment of voting. Pluralism was dissolved in the representative body, the single mind and voice of the nation, together with any inequality or diversity between individuals. According to Sieyès, it was not even important whether the assembly was divided into majorities and minorities: The singleness of the nation’s intents allowed the will of the majority always to coincide with the common interest.

Among all the inventions, and all the hypocrisies, of modern political theory, the latter appears to be one of the most prized and persistent. It is assumed that the individual choices made by majority choice are based on a “unanimous will of the associates,” equipped with the means—such as a majority principle—to allow the collective body to function and pursue its own ends. Underlying the majority principle—Sieyès was not lacking in common sense—there was also an indication of method: There should first be a division into majorities and minorities. The elected had the honor of debating issues together and, therefore, according to an expression that has recently come back into fashion, to “deliberate”—to discuss, negotiate, persuade, change opinion, and make compromises in order to arrive at a common will. Further, Sieyès perfected these arguments by formulating a plan of social and cultural engineering (which the French revolutionaries and their successors earnestly cultivated) and establishing a related model destined to be successful. We refer, of course, to the nation, which, according to Sieyès, in addition to its role as a virtual political actor, should also be established as a collective identity in which the material articulations of society could truly be transformed.

Impure Theory and the Revival of the Pure Theory

Burke and Sieyès transformed representation. Members of a class of notables, selected by census suffrage (a system in which votes are not equal but are weighted according to the social rank of the voter), wanted to entrust government to an assembly of notables, isolating it from its environment and thereby reducing eventual conflicts to differences of opinion. However, there was also an alternative model. The fathers of democracy in the United States had previously come up with a more pragmatic solution in relation to social and political pluralism, possibly because the constituting process took place under different conditions. First of all, they had no ancien régime to exorcize. Second, only a handful of colonies sought self-government and these contractually decided to unite, giving themselves a constitution along with common bodies of representation and government.

The authors of The Federalist Papers, and James Madison in particular, were well aware of the threat of factions. Nonetheless, since their existence was seen as inevitable, they also believed that any attempt to eliminate them would be a threat to liberty. Undoubtedly, as proposed by Burke, filtering them through an assembly that brought together a wise, enlightened, and patriotic minority ready to sacrifice its particular interests for the good of the nation would help reduce any potential threat (Federalist Paper No. 10, 1787). However, it seemed better to focus on the possibility of applying a representative government to a state with broad dimensions, which contained a numerous and diverse population among whom interests would be not only multiplied but also dispersed and balanced against one another in representative institutions.

In other words, representation was a risk, but it would have been senseless to pretend to ignore it like Sieyès by creating a virtual people. Given the presence of an established and peaceful tradition of self-government, of citizen and village assemblies, it was considered preferable to focus on the confrontation of opposing interests and on the capacity of a representative government to create equilibrium. The U.S. doctrine, more realistic than that in Europe, was thus not scandalized by the idea of sectoral interests and constituency service (harshly stigmatized in Europe as clientelism) since
it was felt that solutions would always be found for large collective issues.

The United States was still a distant province, unable to influence significantly representation in Europe where, for a further century, representative theory would continue along the path traced by Sieyès, convinced of the need to exclude any particular interest from the sphere of stateness. Moreover, circumstances were such that, just as the requirements of wealth and ability that limited access to the vote were beginning to weaken, a new and more rigorous version of the pure theory was created by those who were not political but were, instead, a new category of public law scholars formed under the shadow of the state. These scholars claimed that only the state has an autonomous life since nothing precedes it and nothing can oppose it—neither society nor the people, even less so the forces of social or political pluralism.

This area of reflection was inaugurated by a German doctrine, of which an emblematic exponent was Paul Laband. He disputed the concept of representation, resolutely rejecting the notion that the Reichstag’s members were representatives of the people or even that they represented anyone at all. According to Laband, the electorate did not confer any mandate nor did it govern through its representatives. Once voting had ended, public participation definitively ceased.

Laband’s sentiments were soon echoed in other European countries. In France, Raymond Carré de Malberg similarly reduced representation to a mere technical device for the recruitment of the ruling political class. According to Malberg, the representative represented the nation—considered as a unitary body, distinct from its individual and collective parts and even from the state itself. The members of parliament are hence the organ of the state, while voters only exercise nominal power and do not confer any mandate.

In reality, what this generation of jurists was pursuing was another goal that was much more important than the independence of those elected. In Germany, the aim was to reduce any possibility of competition between elected bodies, the monarch, and the executive’s power. In France and Italy, the purpose was to rescale the parliamentary regime within the state—that is, the parliament, the political parties, and representation itself, in addition to the pronouncements of the electorate. Nonetheless, a radical criticism of the representative regime was needed to address the enigma of representation based on electoral mechanisms. This was the task taken on by Gaetano Mosca, who, finding in this a confirmation of his theory of the political class, contrasted the normative structure of the pure theory with empirical observation: Not only were candidates and the elected subject to even the most modest private interests, but, to gain consensus, they flattered the electorate and actively encouraged particular interests. Voters, according to Mosca, prefer representatives who look after the interests of the voters. However, it is not just the voters who elect the representatives but the representatives who persuade the voters to elect them, by raising expectations and making commitments regarding their future work.

Further, Mosca believed that the impending intervention of political parties was destined to increase such disadvantages. His key idea, however—in truth, previously advanced by The Federalist Papers—was, above all, that political representation would be unable to comply with the prohibition of an imperative mandate. Theoretical work had denied this at length but should have been aware of this. Indeed, according to Mosca, it was perhaps precisely because theory had in reality always known this that it continued to deny it with such vehemence. Hence, it was an illusion to deny the existence of a pluralism of interests outside the state, essentially because political-electoral competition multiplies the number of candidates, making them spokespeople and, at the same time, transforming politics from a mission reserved for an elite identified with the state into a set of opportunities facilitating the social ascent of individuals and groups seeking to obtain favorable political measures.

In discussing representation, Mosca thus outlined an entrepreneurial concept of politics that was destined to last. Max Weber further developed this by identifying the existence of the “party enterprise,” which competes to obtain votes and public roles. This idea was then perfected, in the early 1940s, by Joseph A. Schumpeter, who definitively dismantled the myth of representation (and democracy) and reread politics as a marketplace. Schumpeter’s ideas, inspired by U.S. democracy, saw the problem as lying in how democratic politics was constructed. He considered there to be a vast
range of latent interests that the political representative brings to light, puts into a form, and exploits to his or her own advantage. The political entrepreneur thus transforms latent questions into significant political interests to be used in mobilizing the electorate to his or her own advantage. The risk that follows from this is that government actions may become a mere subproduct of electoral competition. In other words, if the transformation by candidates of the latent preferences of voters into political demands is a key strategy within the competition for power, it therefore constitutes not only a resource but also a handicap for political representation, which is thereby more inclined to favor particular interests to the detriment of general interests.

Representation and Political Parties
The great novelty of the 20th century, as Mosca had perfectly understood, consisted in the advent of mass political parties whose success was strictly linked to the introduction of universal suffrage (which they enthusiastically promoted). Mass political parties were imposing machines with millions of members and solidly organized apparatuses. Never before, within national boundaries, had there been such a dangerous challenger to the authority of the state. This produced apocalyptic pronouncements by theorists, of which Mosca’s was only the precursor. The reaction of one of the most sophisticated exponents of antiparlamentarianism between the two World Wars, Carl Schmitt, was exemplary as regards its catastrophic overtones: He imputed no less than the destruction of representation and liberal parliamentarianism to the intrusiveness of political parties and organized economic interests. According to Schmitt, once the elected had become party delegates, parliaments could do little other than ratify decisions made elsewhere.

It is difficult to deny the fact that, with the advent of mass political parties, a demanding intermediary imposed itself between the electorate and the elected. Compared with the parliaments of notables in which the elected were linked to each other only by fragile bonds of association, the introduction of party discipline hardened both parliamentary confrontation and political lines of division. However, Schmitt’s depiction of a situation whereby the intervention of political parties deprives democratic parliaments of the possibility of rational discussion while unrestrained centrifugal dynamics lacerate society and irreversibly prejudice the primacy of the state and its capacity to pursue the general interest was dictated, above all, by his own authoritarian leanings. In fact, if anything, political parties constituted a formidable reducing and reordering element as regards the pluralism of ideas and interests.

This was the view expressed by Max Weber in 1918, following World War I. Political parties, seen as large mass associations, served to discipline the conflict and, due to their preferred method of establishing leadership, were a precious antidote to the “iron cage” of instrumental rationality. It was not even true that the advent of political parties destroyed the possibilities for discussion and deliberation but merely moved their location to within the parties themselves. Schmitt’s catastrophist ideas were challenged, again during the tempestuous Weimar years, by another illustrious jurist, Hans Kelsen, who, far from reprocessing liberal principles, attempted to reconcile representation with pluralism in order to recreate a credible form of political synthesis in place of that originally offered by the liberal state.

According to the Kelsenian critique, the use of the expression “representation” can even be considered abusive as it serves only to foment the illusion that the people really govern. However, when linked by party political mediation to universal suffrage, what is commonly called representation could be invigorated and given new meaning. Kelsen’s thesis was that the combination of representative institutions and universal suffrage creates a renewed structure of political opportunities that in turn encourages old and new political entrepreneurs—previously concerned only with cultivating a limited electorate or securing entry into the political marketplace—to mobilize large numbers through political parties. Thus, not only can individual citizens, in association with others, overcome the conditions of marginality to which they would otherwise be condemned, but even the weakest interest groups are offered the opportunity to join together, demonstrate, and influence political decisions. According to Kelsen—an intellectual with social-democratic leanings—representation may well be a fiction, but, thanks to political
parties, it at least allows the governed to communicate with the governing, in addition to balancing society’s inequalities. Refuting the idea that mass political parties prejudice every political synthesis, Kelsen argued that it would ultimately be elected bodies and the interactions between parties that would recalibrate the pluralism that the latter have previously reordered.

Kelsen’s view was revived after World War II when political parties obtained official recognition, in some cases in the newly established Western European constitutions. Whether based on an illusion or not, political parties renewed and revitalized representation, receiving an exemplary recognition—but obviously not the only one—from another German jurist, Gerhard Leibholz, who had originally shared Schmitt’s position. At the end of World War II, Leibholz pleaded the case for the official recognition of political parties and also raised a question that would soon backfire on them. If political parties are, he asked, rightfully incorporated into the constitutional structure, why not fully ratify this inclusion with all its consequences? In other words, he raised the extremely delicate subject of the internal party democracy.

While this, of course, has long been a thorny issue, political parties can effectively represent it, among other things, by adopting a “descriptive” method of representation—the driving force behind “substantive” representation. While promoting the social classes they represent to elected office and broadening the recruitment pool for political leadership, the premise is that, by sharing the same life experiences of the represented, representatives will become more sensitive to the former’s needs. This understanding of political parties was, above all, symbolic. However, the argument on which descriptive representation is founded is not to be underestimated. So much so that it has recently been revived through propositions (albeit often unsuccessful) for the introduction of quotas benefiting segments of the population considered to be underrepresented.

However, the fundamental novelty that political parties embodied in the European experience was something different. They undertook the responsibility for a large part of the representative relationship. They received a mandate from citizens to represent them and became the repositories of their collective hopes (and therefore their trustees), while representatives in elected assemblies were party delegates. As ever, of course, reality is more complex and often belies the image both of parliament as the exclusive place for negotiations between parties and of parties as an irremovable obstacle between the elected and the electorate. Mass political parties were more complex, and less disciplined, machines than those described in abstract models. They were the site of bitter internal conflicts and interacted in very different ways with the various segments of the electorate: For example, the middle classes were treated differently than the working classes, and confessional parties were represented in a different way from socialist parties. Even the most disciplined parties allowed space for direct contact between the elected and their electors—clientelism was frequently practiced—and party discipline was also considerably softened at times in elected assemblies. Thus, while in theory political parties (especially ideologically based parties) were trustees, in reality they were much more adaptive.

The equilibrium achieved by representation, thanks to political parties, was called into question by their transformation due to exogenous reasons: social change, political competition, and the intrusion of the media. Within a generation, the social transformations created by the great postwar developments, the erosion of class cleavages, the demise of ideologies, and the downsizing of political competition, on the one hand, made parties less attractive as large collective associations and, on the other, encouraged them to dilute their policy offer, to differentiate between electorates, and to concentrate mainly on their leadership. Already by the mid-1960s, Otto Kirchheimer had indicated the new political technology of the catch-all party and, 15 years later, when public financing of political parties was introduced, the concept of the cartel party (a party that uses the resources of the state to maintain its position within the political system) served to highlight the restrictions imposed on party competition. As a result of these changes, party machines have increasingly specialized in election campaigns and the selection of political personnel while simultaneously ceding a consistent part of their representative functions to interest groups.

Previously, traditional mass political parties had nurtured the grand ambition of covering the needs
of society as a whole. At the height of its development, sectors within society would disperse in all directions in the search for new methods of representation and new instruments to make themselves heard by public authorities. The political scene would be rapidly crowded with actors and organizations offering representation in competition with the parties: entrepreneurial associations, trade unions, and territorial communities. At the same time, a multiplicity of forms would emerge that, technically, must be considered representative but that would claim legitimacy on the basis that they offered possibilities for direct citizen participation: We refer, of course, to the associations and collective movements making up the galaxy of organizations that has become known as civil society. In various ways, therefore, the pluralism of interests and opinions has spilled over the sides of the “political party as container,” running down new paths. As a result, the geometries and landscapes of representation known to date have been overturned.

Representation After Political Parties

Overcoming liberal prejudices toward them, political parties adapted representation to mass democracy. However, toward the end of the 20th century, ancient anti–political party prejudices reappeared, presenting themselves as the defense not only of representation but also of democracy. The criticism was paradoxical. Political parties were simultaneously accused of being both an excessively permissive and an overly rigid filter of society, of representing too much and representing too little. They were accused of allowing themselves to be led by electoral opportunism and of being too amenable to partial interests (with highly damaging consequences for government performance). They were also charged with being intrusive bureaucracies concerned with the interests not of those they were supposed to represent but of their executives and managers. Parties sought, it was said, merely to optimize vote shares and public positions, to the detriment of technical competencies, the public purse, and the spontaneous generosity of civil society. None of these of course is an unfounded criticism.

As we know, political parties are anything but defunct. Nonetheless, they have been profoundly changed: From large collective associations, they have become mainly political enterprises. The cartel party (as described by Robert S. Katz and Peter Mair) is a very different machine from the traditional mass political party, having ceded a large part of its representative capacity to other institutions. Parties are also hotly pursued by the media, which, through its extensive and obsessive use of surveys, claims to represent public opinion. Thus, the great concern that stimulated the pure theory of representation has resurfaced, as we can see in the work of the U.S. academic Hannah Pitkin, who effectively illustrated in The Concept of Representation the atmosphere of uncertainty surrounding representation and elaborated an essentially normative, but empirically based, response that recalled the lessons of The Federalist Papers.

When Pitkin’s book came out in 1967, the demise of conventional mass political parties in Western Europe had only just begun. However, in the United States this had taken place some time earlier. As a consequence, Pitkin returned to the argument (dear to those in the United States) of the representative as delegate, along with that regarding the systemic effects of representative government. The representative, according to Pitkin, must demonstrate the qualities of a delegate and a trustee (and, even better, of a leader). That said, a delegate’s role is far from easy. What is he or she a delegate of? Of the constituency from which he or she was elected? Of a group? Of a particular interest? Or of the party that has facilitated and sponsored his or her election? Appearing at the dawn of the era of collective movements (and the rediscovery of civil society), Pitkin’s book constituted a detailed and updated inventory of the classic dilemmas of representation. It primarily confirmed that the vote is an approximate tool for identifying the electors’ preferences, as well as directing the electorate’s choices. Among the issues reproposed, or raised, by Pitkin, in addition to those concerning delegates and trustees, the most striking are those about standing for and acting for and “descriptive” and “substantive” representation. However vital political representation may still be, Pitkin argues, it is a problematic tangle from which it would be an error to expect too much. What counts, above all, is the overall performance of representative government. Representation requires the presence of the people in government activities, even if it does
not permit them to act directly and/or individually. To this end, representatives must know how to act, when required, based on what they believe in good faith to be the interests of the represented. The latter, in turn, will need to monitor the actions of their representatives—with both sides seeking to avoid conflict between the preferences of the represented and the decisions of the representatives. Representation, therefore, must be not only responsive but also accountable.

This formula does not preclude representatives from making decisions independently of preferences expressed by the citizenry; however, this can happen only in those cases where representatives provide public, credible justifications that allow the public to assess and sanction the choices made in their names. Government ceases to be representative, Pitkin concludes, when the contrast between the work of the representatives, general interest, and public opinion becomes systematic. The plurality of the representatives and the possibility of them not only deliberating together but also reciprocally controlling one another combine to reduce the risks.

An heir to the “impure” theory of political representation, Pitkin seeks to reconcile democracy and representation. She acknowledges the intrinsic difficulty of their cohabitation, admitting that the balance between the two will always be somewhat precarious. However, as she recently emphasized, it is not necessarily a foregone conclusion that the marriage between democracy and representation is a thing of the past. Rather, it could yet be saved by strengthening the role of citizens and injecting representative institutions with a more substantial dose of self-government and participation. Indeed, the latter consideration is one of the most frequently raised issues in the theoretical and political debates of the past decade.

The Last Metamorphosis?
The transformation and repositioning of political parties have had enormous effects on representation. Being unable to herald a return to the liberal model of representation, typical of a society of notables, it has led instead to the rediscovery of a double circuit of representation. The official circuit, in the main, connects the electorate, parties, parliament, and the executive, where, due to the much discussed “presidentialization” of politics, the mandate conferred by voters has been significantly strengthened, making the head of government its direct consignee. Thus, a “lengthening” of the representation relationship—hinged on the personalization of government action—has occurred. Moreover, this relationship is often tinged with strong plebiscitary tones.

While political parties appear to have specialized in the selection of leadership candidates as well as electoral marketing, this does not exclude them from every representative activity. They remain as gatherers of interests, and great conflicts of interest still take place within them. However, the “presidentialization” of democratic regimes has created a more rigid filter than was the case in the past. The position and status of the representative institution par excellence—that is, parliament—is decidedly less certain, however. It would be wrong to say that parliaments have become marginal institutions, given that they still provide for the preparation of legislative norms and their members generally maintain constant contact with the electorate. However, they are now usually far more subordinate to the executive’s power than was previously the case.

Rejected by political parties, interests have managed to establish a second unofficial and nonelectoral path that stands in competition with the official one. This phenomenon had already assumed importance thanks to neocorporate negotiations (involving collaboration between unions and the government), but it has become even more crucial thanks to the social changes brought about by post-Fordism and globalization. Representation of interests, as a result, has been separated from electoral representation: For example, in Europe, the phenomenon of lobbies, well-known in U.S. politics, has taken root and appears to be flourishing. So much so that it has been fully recognized and validated by the European Union (EU). Further, the unofficial path has been widened to embrace advocacy groups, nongovernmental organizations, and social movements.

What conclusions can we draw about these innovations? Not that official representation has become optional for democratic regimes. This is confirmed both by the debate about quotas for both elected and nonelected positions—to help
disadvantaged social groups—and the debate on political rights for immigrants. Representation is thus still a decisive condition of existence and recognition. It still implies that the people (despite the problems surrounding that term) must be taken into consideration. Nonetheless, we can see a swinging back of the pendulum toward the pure theory, thanks to the prominence given to representatives, whether official or unofficial.

Ultimately, it is no coincidence that theory has sought to replace the rhetoric of representation as responsiveness with that of retrospective judgment. Accountability is the new parameter against which the quality and legitimacy of democratic regimes are measured. The concept of accountability is discussed elsewhere in this encyclopedia; but, in general terms, we can say that accountability is the link created between the performance of representatives and the expectations placed on them. Their degree of receptiveness with regard to the preferences of the governed is left to the judgment of the governing. It is up to representatives to establish whether it is opportune or not to accept the suggestions of voters—evaluated alongside indications from opinion polls, the media, and pressure from organized interests and civil society. In return, the right of citizens to assess political performances is legitimized and bolstered. Further, a horizontal, less asymmetric accountability of government activity also takes place, thanks to both the separation of powers and private power. It goes without saying that what is thus offered at the end is a rather different interpretation of representation than that which previously prevailed.

Above and beyond the rhetoric surrounding it, representation implied an impulse from below (the represented) to above (the representatives). The rhetoric of accountability casts those governing as trustees, who, from their lofty position, decide which policies should be adopted, interpreting the needs of the governed and, above all, leaving to the latter the possibility of sanctions afterwards. The motives that necessitate such a change are the dissolving of the large collective bodies of reference (class and religious affiliations, etc.), the very evident growth of cultural pluralism, the difficulties that political parties have encountered in reconstructing themselves, the tendency of the media to dramatize issues while also influencing the political agenda, and the preeminence assumed by rather sui generis institutions such as those governing the EU.

The rules established by theory for accountability are neither hurried nor superficial. It remains to be established, obviously, if and to what degree they are effective, and there are solid reasons for supposing that if representation is a fiction, then so too is accountability. Since representation, despite being a fiction, has produced effects that continue to be appreciated, the same reasoning could hold true for accountability.

However, the difficulties of representation encourage other innovations. Alongside the unofficial circuit of interests, a third one has been created, which, to varying degrees, reproposes direct democracy—not as an alternative to the representative form but as a complement—to foster and promote greater citizen engagement in decision making. An established product of similar attempts is that denoted by the term governance. Located at the crossroads of interest representation and citizen participation, governance claims that policies are the product of partnership negotiations conducted by stakeholders and public institutions, with the latter no longer viewed as a consistent and hierarchical system pursuing the general interest, but as a varied constellation of agencies (and other kinds of interests) performing particular services.

Combining the representation of interests and participation, governance appears to be very insubstantial (particularly as a form of direct democracy). It is no surprise therefore that attempts are continuing, both in theory and in practice, to graft forms of direct democracy onto the trunk of representative government. Through neighborhood democracy, citizen juries, participative budgets, and associative and deliberative democracy, representative democracy continues to call on ordinary citizens to assist it, while the features of elected assemblies—discussion, confrontation between different points of view, and reciprocal persuasion—appear to be enjoying a second youth beyond the confines of such assemblies among the citizenry.

The effectiveness of these forms of course is also questionable. It is not a given that, as promised, they can indeed serve to transcend particular interests and bring ordinary citizens closer to politics. One could argue that deliberation appears limited to the periphery of the system and that citizens are
only periodically given a voice, with grassroots representatives, probably carefully selected by public authorities, taking the floor. However, as often is the case with innovations, the process is open-ended. By way of conclusion, we might finish with another question: Thanks to this double movement of political representation—on top toward personalized leadership and below toward direct democracy—is it the case that, after almost 4 centuries of resurrections, the phoenix of representative government is rising from the ashes, or are these innovations simply diversions accompanying the definitive burial of representation?

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See also Accountability; Accountability, Electoral; Accountability, Interinstitutional; Democracy, Direct; Democracy, Theories of

Further Readings


**Representative Bureaucracy**

The central tenet of the theory of representative bureaucracy is that passive representation, or the extent to which a bureaucracy reflects or mirrors the demographic characteristics of the population, leads to active representation, or the pursuit of policies reflecting the interests and desires of represented groups. The theory is premised on the belief that such attributes or characteristics lead to certain early socialization experiences that in turn give rise to attitudes, values, and beliefs that ultimately
help shape the behavior and decisions of individual bureaucrats. The theory of representative bureaucracy is based on the idea that the demographic composition of bureaucracy should reflect the demographic composition of society. Supporters believe that a bureaucracy that reflects the diversity of the general population implies a symbolic commitment to equal access to power and that shared personal characteristics of distinctive group members will offer a shared voice in the policy process. When members of identifiable groups, such as a specific racial or ethnic group, become public officials, they become legitimate actors in the political process with the ability to shape public policy and implementation. A representative bureaucracy provides a means of fostering equity or at least the perception of equity in the policy process. If the bureaucracy reflects the demographic origins of society, the theory implies that government will be more responsive to the public interest by better ensuring that all politically significant interests and values are represented in the formulation and implementation of public policies and programs. This entry continues with a discussion of the existing three main research streams on such a theory (passive representation, active representation, and linkage between passive and active representation) and concludes with remarks on possible future developments.

Research on Representative Bureaucracy

For more than 50 years, scholars have been interested in both the normative and empirical study of representative bureaucracy. Three important streams of research have emerged. First, researchers have focused on passive representation or the extent to which public bureaucracies reflect the demographic composition of society. Second, scholars have explored whether passive representation affects active representation. Third, scholars have explored factors that moderate the linkage between passive and active representation.

Passive Representation

Studies dating back to the 1960s examine passive representation or the extent to which women and racial and ethnic minorities are employed in the public sector. Researchers in the United States first focused primarily on race and ethnicity as the demographic characteristics of interest, but similar approaches were later applied to examine the representation of women in public organizations. Because of the marked social, cultural, and economic differences among different minority groups, research on representation in the United States moved from combining minorities into one category to splitting minorities into four groups—African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Asian Americans. Researchers have examined a number of other demographic factors, such as age and disabilities and the interaction between race/ethnicity and gender. In the U.S. context, race, ethnicity, and gender are considered the most salient characteristics because numerous politically relevant attitudes and values are defined along these two dimensions.

In early works, scholars examined aggregate public employment trends to ascertain the extent to which women and minorities were broadly represented, but to understand the phenomenon better, subsequent studies segmented the employment figures by organizational level and occupational category. While women and some minorities appear to be reasonably well represented in terms of presence in public organizations (penetration), they tend to be overrepresented in the lower echelons of bureaucracies and underrepresented in the managerial and executive ranks (stratification). Penetration refers to how well minorities and females are represented in total numbers, while stratification is concerned with how well these groups are represented throughout the career ladder, particularly in senior executive positions. Thus, penetration examines the quantity of employment, and stratification provides information about the quality of the employment.

Mary Guy’s work shows that while American women have found great success entering public service, they lag behind men in their ability to advance to the highest ranks and tend to be disproportionately located in certain agency types. Similarly, African Americans and Hispanics have had difficulty advancing to the highest levels of public service. While women and minorities have gained greater access to positions in government in the past several decades, a key challenge facing public organizations is advancing women and minorities into positions of greater responsibility and power.
Active Representation

Students of representative bureaucracy also suggest that bureaucracies broadly representative of the general public should produce policy outputs that meet the needs of all citizens. Here, scholars have examined the relationship between employment of minorities and women and agency outputs and outcomes affecting these groups. Specifically, research has examined the relationship between demographic representation and disciplinary actions and ability groupings in school systems, charges or complaints of discrimination filed by a regulatory agency, child support collection, housing loan eligibility determinations made by a federal agency, federal procurement decisions, and student educational achievement.

The evidence is largely supportive of the linkage between passive and active representation for minority groups. In the first study, linking demographic representation and policy outcomes, Kenneth J. Meier and Joseph Stewart found that the increased presence of African American street-level bureaucrats (e.g., schoolteachers) had a significant effect on policy outcomes favoring African American students. In a similar approach, John Hindera found that as the employment of African Americans in the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission increased, discrimination charges filed on behalf of that group also increased. Sally Coleman Selden’s research demonstrated that as the employment of African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians Americans increased in the Farmers Home Administration, the percentage of rural housing loan eligibility determinations favoring each group increased. Craig Smith and Sergio Fernandez found that increasing minority representation at the senior executive levels resulted in increased contracting with small minority-owned businesses.

The evidence for women is mixed. Early studies did not find that increased representation of women results in policy outcomes favoring women. However, Lael Keiser and her colleagues outlined several conditions that moderate the linkage between passive and active representation for women.

Factors That Moderate the Linkage Between Passive and Active Representation

As noted above, implicit in the linkage between passive and active representation is the expectation that civil servants will hold similar attitudes to citizens with similar backgrounds and experience and that attitudes, in turn, will influence policy decisions. This expectation is founded on the following logic: Bureaucrats from a particular demographic group experience similar socialization patterns and therefore hold similar values and beliefs with members of that particular demographic group. Scholars have taken several approaches to examine whether conditions and attitude moderate the link between passive and active representation. Research has demonstrated that active representation is more likely to occur when administrators have considerable discretion, or at least the perception of discretion, in decision making and when policy decisions are meaningful or salient to a particular group. Bureaucrats need to have enough discretion to translate their value preferences into actions that will improve policy or program outcomes benefiting represented groups.

Some scholars have examined attitude congruence between minority and women bureaucrats and citizens. Recently, Mark Bradbury and J. Edward Kellough found that African American administrators hold attitudes very similar to those of African American citizens. Moreover, they found that White administrators exhibit very different attitudes from African American citizens. There are a few studies that demonstrate that attitudes shape role perceptions, which subsequently affect behaviors or produce policy outputs favorable, at least for minorities. Selden found that minority status is largely mediated by the adoption of a minority representative role. That is, active representation is driven by the degree to which minority bureaucrats perceive of themselves as minority representatives. Bradbury and Kellough’s study showed that African American...
bureaucrats are more likely to adopt a minority representative role than White bureaucrats. Because the research examining attitudes is less clear regarding women, Julie Dolan proposes that scholars measure and examine the linkage between gender consciousness and active representation of women in the population.

Another factor that moderates the linkage between passive and active representation is organizational socialization. Depending on the nature of how an organization socializes its members, it may either hinder or promote active representation. In one of the few studies that examine this factor directly, Vicky Wilkins and Brian Williams find that an organization’s structure and processes can hinder representation. African American police officers revealed that they felt pressure to conform to the norms of their departments, which affected both their attitudes and their actions.

**Future Development**

Scholars interested in representative bureaucracy have much opportunity. In the United States, most of the existing research focuses on African Americans or minorities, generally. Future studies need to focus on the observed patterns of representation of Hispanics, Asian Americans, Native Americans, and women. Internationally, scholars need to examine further factors that affect the ability of administrators to translate their values into actions and factors that influence the adoption of a representative role.

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See also Bureaucracy, Street-Level; Implementation; Representation; Responsiveness of Bureaucracy

**Further Readings**


**Republic**

The word *republic* is derived from the Latin *res publica*, meaning “the common thing” or “the public good.” Cicero, among other Latin writers, translated the Greek *politeia* into res publica, and, in 55 BCE, he wrote his famous political treatise *De Re Publica*. Although the term *republic* has been used in a variety of ways and historical contexts, we can distinguish two main meanings, “substantive” and “formal.” In the substantive sense, “republic” refers to a government in which the supreme power resides not in a monarch or a king but in a body of citizens entitled to vote. Thus, in a republic, power is exercised by elected officers and representatives governing according to law and accountable to the people. In this sense, Cicero refers to res publica as *res populi*, a thing or good that belongs to the people, or the public. Referring in turn to the Greek city-states, the Roman republic, the American republic, the French one, or the Dutch one, various authors from Cicero to Niccolò Machiavelli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, James Madison, and Hannah Arendt have understood “republic” as a political model (formal). This model is based on the absence of the oppressive rule of a monarch and the establishment of rule of law and mixed government, as well as a concern for the public good and virtue. The different versions of the republican model of public virtue and collective liberty have been opposed to liberalism, as being one-sidedly focused on individual liberty and private interest. In addition, the term has referred, in recent times, to a government having a chief of state who is not a monarch but, as a general rule, a president. In this minimal sense, it has been applied at a global scale. Sovereign political units such as Romania,
Bulgaria, or Iran (as an Islamic republic) have embraced this form of government. A republic can also be a constituent political and territorial unit, as seen in regimes such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or Yugoslavia.

The Roman republican model, with its respect for rule of law and results of elections, complemented by the alliance between the rulers and the ruled and sealed in victorious military combats, has been revered from the Renaissance until the present day. This entry traces the different meanings and realities of the republic through medieval times and the beginnings of modernity, the American and French revolutions, and into the contemporary period when it has continued to capture the political imagination.

**The Middle Ages and the Beginning of Modernity**

During the Middle Ages, res publica generally designated the political community in opposition to the church. It was composed of a body politic whose head was the prince or the king. In the late Middle Ages, new republics (e.g., the Swiss confederation) appeared in Europe when a number of small states or city-states embraced republican principles of government. Generally, these were small states or city-states in which the merchant class had risen to prominence. In Italy, given the absence of a powerful central government, prominent towns gained considerable independence and adopted communal forms of government (e.g., the Republic of Venice and that of Genoa). In Florence, the memory of the Greek city-state, the Roman republic as well as of the successful restoration of the republic between 1494 and 1512 inspired an exceptional generation of Florentine republicans. Machiavelli, its most outstanding representative, served as second secretary in the Chancellory of the restored Florentine republic between 1498 and 1512. Machiavelli’s reinterpretation of the political legacy of antiquity was based on the notion of virtu—common liberty and love of the country—and inspired antiroyalist, republican literature in 17th-century England (e.g., James Harrington’s republican tract *Oceania*). The republican revolts in Britain and the Netherlands were linked to the formation of a large merchant class who prospered from the trade. The Dutch Revolt, beginning in 1566, saw the Dutch republic reject the rule of Hapsburg Spain in a long conflict that would last until 1648. The Dutch republic resisted the greatest military power of the day and was the wonder of 17th-century Europe. In contrast to the Roman republican model centered on military virtue, the Dutch republic was centered more on mild commercial virtues. The Dutch commercial republic brought together the values of republicanism with those of democracy and tolerance. However, in a world of emerging large absolutist monarchies, the defense of the liberty of small republican governments was short lived. It was the modern revolutions in America and France that would leave a definitive scar on the “system” of absolutist monarchies. The actions of both nations marked the beginning of the Democratic Age and brought about a historical reversal of balance in favor of the republican and the modern democratic model of government.

**American and French Revolutions and Their Aftermath**

The American and French Revolutions did not start as antimonarchical movements, but they both led to the establishment of influential republican regimes. The American Founders drew inspiration from the history of the republics. Whereas the term republic does not come up in the Declaration of Independence, it appears, for instance, in Article IV of the Constitution, which “guarantee[s] to every State in this Union a Republican form of Government.” The American Constitution established a federative republic, whose justification is to be found in *The Federalist Papers*. Using Publius as their common pen name, the authors of *The Federalist Papers* gave a novel meaning to the term republic. In contrast to a long-standing tradition of thinking epitomized by Rousseau, they argued that a republican regime is also possible in a large territory and population. In addition, in the influential *Federalist Paper* No. 10, James Madison opposes “republic” to direct democracy, but in the name of the democratic-universalistic principles of liberty and equality. The term referred to a government indirectly controlled by the people—in other words, what we call representative democracy. The United States developed into a federative republic through a system of indirect representation and the
dispersal of powers in the republic out of the concern, famously voiced by Madison, to avoid centralized despotism.

In contrast to the American case, the French Revolution resulted in a state of permanent instability and the gradual creation of a centralized republic. The model of the French republic, while centralized, was based on the democratic-universalistic principles of liberté, égalité, et fraternité (liberty, equality, and fraternity). Surely, Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire were initially more interested in the notion of constitutional monarchy than that of republic, arguing that republics tended to fall into anarchy or tyranny. Such thinkers quoted Montesquieu who had claimed that a city-state should ideally be a republic and had maintained that a limited monarchy would be better suited to a large nation. In fact, the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) and the new constitution promulgated in 1791 were not antimonarchical in principle, as the Revolution looked initially for a redefinition of the terms of monarchy—for instance, the 1791 constitution acknowledges the king to be the representative of God and of the nation, the instrument “from which all powers emanate.” The French Revolution turned “republican” only after Louis XVI’s “flight to Varennes,” which resulted in his condemnation as a traitor. The subsequent radicalization of the political climate led to the King’s eventual decapitation, the declaration of France as a republic, and the infamous Reign of Terror. Radicalization led France to a state of war both at home and abroad. Between 1792 and 1815, there was a permanent war between France and the European monarchies. The success of France in the Revolution pitted republican France against the European monarchies and saw republics spread by force of arms across much of Europe as a series of client republics were set up across the continent. The rise of Napoleon marked the end of the First French Republic, and his eventual defeat allowed the victorious monarchies to put an end to many of the oldest republics on the continent, including Venice, Genoa, and the Netherlands. Napoleon aimed to build a French continental Europe but stumbled especially in front of the British monarchy. The consequence was the strengthening of the grip of the European monarchies that crushed the Revolution of 1848 and the awakening of nationalist feelings. Outside Europe, the Napoleonic Wars allowed some of the states of Latin America to gain their independence (e.g., Venezuela under the leadership of Simón Bolívar). These movements, despite their ambiguities, carried on the echo of emancipation and universal message of the democratic revolutions, gradually leading to the association between the concept of “republic” and the modern democratic principles of equality and liberty.

The 20th Century and Beyond

At the beginning of the 20th century, republics in Europe were but a few. This situation would radically change with the two World Wars. In both wars, political mobilization was, by and large, not driven by the monarchical principle. The aftermath of World War I was marked by the dismantling of empires: The Austro-Hungarian Empire, the German Empire, the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire were turned one by one into republics. The most violent conversion occurred during the Russian Revolution of 1917, in which the czar and his family were brutally executed. In Eastern Europe, Asia, and Cuba, the communist regimes brought to power—often by means of force—meant the abolition of the existing monarchies. The resulting communist republics (e.g., China, Romania, and Albania) proved in practice to be authoritarian or totalitarian regimes.

The formation of new republics was also linked to the process of decolonization. The years after World War II saw most of the remaining European colonies gain their independence, and many of them became republics. France, for example, encouraged the establishment of republics in its former colonies. However, in the Middle East, Britain installed local monarchies in several colonies and mandates, including in Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, and Libya. In the following decades, revolutions and coups overthrew a number of monarchs and installed republics. For instance, in Iran, the Iranian Revolution overthrew the monarchy and created an Islamic republic. Several monarchies remain, and the Middle East is the only part of the world where several large states are ruled by monarchs (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco).
The fall of the Berlin Wall did not mean a return to the monarchical form of government. Today, republic is one of the most widespread terms designating existing states. But the popularity of the term came at the cost of its losing its explicative power. It has been applied to different and even opposing regimes, from liberal democracies to authoritarian and even totalitarian governments. Overall, the opposition between republic and monarchy has become less salient. Especially in the West, the monarchy has mainly a symbolic value (e.g., in Great Britain, Spain, and Norway). Some formal republics (Syria, North Korea) act like absolutist monarchies, totalitarian regimes, or a combination of both. In general, the tension that existed between the republicans and monarchists has lost its impact in many places in the West, as well as in Latin America or Asia, even if it remains a divisive issue in some Islamic countries. The decreased relevance of the opposition between monarchical and republican regimes is, however, only a part of the story. In the past decade, there has been a revival of the interest in the substantial meaning of republic, in relation to the Roman, Dutch, American, or French historical experiences. The republican emphasis on common good, rule of law, and public virtue has become even more relevant in a time of consumer individualism and disaffected democracies.

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See also Democracy, Theories of; Monarchy; Republicanism

Further Readings

Republicanism

In the realm of political concepts, republicanism appears as the doctrine favoring the prevalence of the republican regime, whether this prevalence is the outcome of some activism (eager to see the achievement of the republic considered as the best regime) or of intellectual considerations (the republic encapsulates valuable political ideas and ideals). A more anecdotic subset of acceptations is linked with the existence (as is the case in the United States) of “republican” parties: Republicanism is no more than the fact of belonging to them. Republicanism is anything but a recent lexical creation: According to English dictionaries, the word made its grand debut in the language in the wake of civil troubles in 17th-century England. Its conceptual and semantic roots go back even further than its 3-centuries-old existence. Coined from the word public and the adjective derived from it, republican, the idea of “republicanism” encapsulates one of those long intellectual histories that are the privilege of only a handful of modern political concepts. It refers to a concept inherited from antiquity: the Roman res publica (which resulted in the modern republic). As such, it has this rare supplementary specificity among political concepts of having an authentic Roman origin: Classical Greece, which has influenced in so many ways the political history of the West, has only indirect equivalents for the Latin res publica. The success of the concept is all the more remarkable because, and is sufficiently measured by the fact that, in the 2 millennia of its history, the word has hardly changed in many European languages. The Latin res publica is still easy to retrieve from the French république (from which the English republic was imported), the German republik, or the Italian repubblica.

The meaning of the word has probably known more significant changes than its phonetics. Res publica means literally in Latin “the public thing.” Public in its turn (publicus in Latin) derives from populus, which means “people,” and thus, as Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BCE) puts it in his De Republica, “The public thing is the thing of the people”; “res publica, res populi.” This is why the traditional translations of res publica as “commonwealth” or even “state”
(when it is not just "republic") are not totally satisfactory as they do not spell out what was evident for the Romans when they talked about the republic: the dimension of the collectivity, the dimension of the people.

This meaning is equally lost in contemporary acceptations of the word republic. It has eventually specialized in characterizing a type of political regime, where, basically, the head of the state is not a monarch. Roman conceptions do include this aspect: The end of the monarchy and the instau-ration of republican institutions by Marcus Junius Brutus after the destitution of Tarquin the Proud is an important part of the political mythology of Rome. But it is a secondary aspect compared with the role of the people, which receives the real emphasis in the Latin expression. Being a notion defined by what it is not, the modern conception of the republic is even vaguer. It is not surprising that it applies to a large variety of situations, from the proudly secular French one (with a history of no fewer than five different “republics” in the span of nearly 230 years) to the “Islamic Republic of Iran,” created in 1979, where there is no separation between religion and the state.

“Republicanism,” as the derivative of the already protean notion of the republic, reflects its many understandings. In English as well as in many other European languages, the suffix ism develops the root of the word to mean a doctrine or a norm, and most modern English dictionaries follow these lines in their definition of republicanism. The two first (and main) acceptations screened by the Oxford English Dictionary are “the spirit characteristic of a republic or republican ideas; support for or adherence to republican principles; republican government or institutions” and “the principles and policies of the Republican Party. Also: support for or membership of this party.” However, as a concept of political theory or thought, “republicanism” has retained many of the original traits of the Latin res publica. It refers to the crucial importance of the part of social life that is appropriated by the form of collectivity called a “people.” This sector is not to be understood as a material one (the republic is not principally the public real estate, so to say) but as something more immaterial: It is the common interest of the people in participating in the decisions that affect their lives. Republicanism, as the sets of values involved in this conception, largely draws on a conception of the people as citizens and of liberty as the supreme political value.

History

In its most neutral conception, republicanism refers to the doctrine of those who, in established monarchies, want to suppress the monarchic system. It is the case of the “republicans” in England or Luxembourg, for instance: They want to put to an end to the monarchy in the United Kingdom or the Grand Duchy and have them replaced with republics. By this token, republicanism would not really exist in republics, where the goal that “republicanism” ascribes to politics has already been reached. But other acceptations prove to be richer, when they qualify something specifically ideological: the idea that the republic is not a fact but an ideal of governance that has to be deepened or protected even in existing republics. In this conception, republicanism is less a doctrine than a doctrinal agenda for pursuing the attainment of political goods considered as crucial in a political collectivity defined by the preeminence of the people. It ultimately defines the shaping of a specific political togetherness far beyond the mere question of the republican form of the regime.

Such a conception of the republic can be called normative as it entails the consideration of norms (i.e., representations of the world from the standpoint of ideal, regulating behaviors). It can trace its origin back to classical Rome. It is true that the Romans did not know the word republicanism (or rather did not have any equivalent to it). But they linked their idea of the republic with specific values and virtues; they were convinced that politics was about the norms and collective ideals that republican forms of collective life reflected and helped achieve. To them, the republic did not correspond solely to a form of governance (such as democracy, aristocracy, or monarchy) but to the hope for better governance. They thought of the republic as a specific regime, an inherently superior one, a desirable one; in this sense, the Romans could not separate the republic from what we now call “republicanism.” This conception obviously lost its preeminence with the rise of the Empire, which followed the fall of the Republic. The expression res publica gained the more neutral
meaning of a political collectivity without precise reference to the values attached to it. It is the acceptance retained in medieval Latin, and the evolution of Roman languages, that even led to legitimate talk of a monarchy as a “republic.”

It was only at the dawn of modernity, mostly at the beginning of the 16th century, that the concept of the republic regained some of its original specificity. Since then, authors have considered more and more often that even if the term means something broader than what the Romans had in mind, it could not refer to all types of governance. For them, despotism is mostly the kind of governance that cannot be considered as a republican one. We see it ruled out by Étienne de La Boétie (1530–1563), the French author, in his Discourse About Voluntary Servitude (1549): He insists that one could hardly call an absolute and tyrannical political organization a “republic.” Two centuries later, Jean-Jacques Rousseau is still undecided in his Social Contract (1762/1997). When in the second book he notes that “any legitimate government is a republican one” (II 6), he seems to consider that republics include monarchies that comply with his standards of legitimacy. But in the third book, he places the “monarchic government” “under the republican one” (III 6), thus indicating that, in his opinion, a monarchy should eventually not be considered as a republic. In 1788, when James Madison writes in the 39th release of The Federalist Papers about the “Republican Principles” of the American Revolution, it is done with hesitation. That diverse regimes have been called a republic is only an “impropriety” and only shows “the extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used in political disquisitions.”

The reticence in completely identifying the word republic with any kind of political collectivity, and the subsequent specialization of the word at the end of the 18th century in different languages, illustrates the progressive rediscovery of classical republican ideals and the rebirth of republicanism. Since Hans Baron’s The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in an Age of Classicism and Tyranny (1966), it is often considered that the Italian Renaissance was the time and place of the rediscovery of these republican ideals. The “humanist” movement of the time would have seen a growing interest in civic action and participation in public life. Baron and his followers, such as John G. A. Pocock, in his Machiavellian Moment (1975/2003), insist on the reestablishment of the republican tradition inherited from antiquity under the form of a “civic humanism.” In this intellectual tradition of the Renaissance, the value of the individual, his (political notions were still strongly gendered) enlightened opinion, and his culture, nourished by the reading of the great ancients, are reflected in a civic engagement based on the commitment to defend one’s collectivity and its rights and liberties. This is the basis for what Pocock calls the “Atlantic republican tradition,” which drags on at least until the 18th century in America. His work, focusing on the English-speaking world after the Italian Renaissance, neglects in quite a spectacular fashion the prominent French republicanism of the 18th and 19th centuries as well as the continental republican ideologies of the 19th and 20th centuries. But it provides a historiography that, though contended, has the merit to indicate how—and when—the influence of classical Rome found its way back into modern politics.

The People

The reengagement with the model of republican Rome during the Renaissance period is crucial for modern republicanism. Even if the details of the “Machiavellian moment” in Western history might be challenged, and the role of the Florentine ideology of the Renaissance is nuanced, it is difficult to deny that with the Renaissance, and the role played in it by Italy, a shift in the conception of the relation between humanity and the world is perceptible. This change influences the conception of legitimate politics, laying the ground for modern conceptions of republicanism.

As Baron, and then Pocock, underline it, the Renaissance was characterized by a new conviction that it is necessary to be involved in the life of the city. According to these authors, this contrasts sharply with the tendency in the Middle Ages to emphasize among clerical elites the superiority of contemplation. The substance of what Baron calls “civic humanism,” which has become an iconic expression for studies on republicanism, is precisely the alliance between a new vision of humanity promoted by intellectual elites and the sense that the natural outcome of this vision is involvement in state affairs. Such an involvement is obviously at
odds with traditional monarchical ideologies, where political decision making and actions are concentrated at the level of the reigning monarch. The Renaissance transformed this core conviction of the Middle Ages. In a way, it reinforced it strongly with the rise of absolutism and the progressive debasement of traditional aristocracy, which gave the figure of the monarch an increasingly central role. But at the very same time, the dawning of capitalism, a new critical culture influenced by the reading of the ancients and the taste for new ideas, challenged the authoritarian grounds of absolutism. Modern republicanism is an inherent part of these changes.

The pivotal concept in this reinvention of republicanism is the rediscovery of the “people” considered as a “public.” Indeed, the “people” played its role in medieval conceptions of politics, as the monarch was supposed to govern for the common good. However, this role was mostly the passive one of a recipient of good politics consenting to the action of the leader. On the contrary, in the republican tradition inherited from classical Rome, the “people” is an active subject of politics, and the role of the leader (the prince) is significantly transformed. If, as republican ideologies claim, politics is “public,” then it is not a “private” thing, owned by private tenants such as kings, who would “have” the collectivity as one of their belongings. The contrast was already familiar to Roman thinkers. Tacitus, for instance, opens his Annals, which retrace the beginning of the empire after the fall of the republic, with a remembrance of the early Roman kings, evoking this period when “Rome was ruled by kings,” as the English translation stands. In fact, Tacitus’s Latin is more precise. He writes literally that “kings had the City of Rome.” What he has in mind is the contrast between the king, who “has” the power, and the republican magistrate, who “exerts” power—exerts it in the name of the Roman people. This distinction between the public exercise of power, which should include the popular will, and monarchy as a form of privatization of politics is one of the strongest elements of differentiation in the Roman experience of politics. In the late history of Rome, the most powerful emperors carefully avoided taking the title of king, only using the title of prince for this reason.

Modern republicanism did not have, in its early stages, a notion of the people as thoroughly formed as was the case in classical Rome (after all, Machiavelli, one of the heroes of Pocock’s “republican tradition” wrote a book about the prince and not about the people). But it still proved to be averse to absolute monarchy: The English republic in the 17th century—when the word republicanism entered the English vocabulary—was the first illustration of the fact, with the execution of Charles I. In the 18th century, the “people” gained a still stronger presence in political affairs and started to play a role as a prime actor of political life in an evolution that finds its ultimate formulation in the American and French revolutions. The American constitution, which grants in its Article IV, Section 4, a “Republican Form of Government,” opens with the legendary formula: “We the people. . . .” The first French Republic (1792), in its turn, states in its 1793 constitution that “there can be no constitution but [that] accepted by the people.”

The sense that the republic is public in that it involves the people is one of the most stable features of republicanism. This is how Madison (1788)—18 centuries after Cicero—still defines the republic:

We may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. (The Federalist Papers, No. 39)

This definition undoubtedly adds to the classical idea a democratic sentiment that was not always present in ancient conceptions. Rome, for instance, was not a democracy, no more than the “Florentine” republics were, which serve as an early model for modern republicanism. Politicians and theorists were very aware of this fact, and in Rome, they even took pride in not being democrats. Cicero, in the De Republica, insists on a conception of the republic that illustrates Aristotle’s theory of the “mixed” government: According to Cicero, the republic combines a regal element, an aristocratic one, and a democratic one, seeing in them the qualities of “affection,” “talent,” and “liberty.”

The difference between a republic and a democracy is probably one of the oldest debated issues as regards republican matters, and to a certain extent,
it has remained the same: In a democracy, the people that rule are in fact a majority, whereas in a republic, it is considered as a whole. This could be the basic difference between a public instance of politics and a popular one. In the public conception, decisions are not necessarily unanimous. But there is the idea that they should be made in the interest of the people as a global entity. This conception of the republic is akin to the concept of “general will” that Rousseau designs to explain how a public decision (about law) integrates all the differences expressed by individuals. In such a model, each individual has a voice, but everybody should recognize his (and later in the history of republics, her) best interest in the final decision even if it is not the one initially favored by the individual. In this case, Rousseau adds, it is just that the individual was wrong about what he thought was best for himself.

Rousseau’s outlook cannot be considered as encompassing all sorts of republicanism. Moreover, his thought is not solely dedicated to spelling out republican ideologies but also tries to embrace the source of political legitimacy. However, both undertakings are eventually the same in his mind, as “a legitimate government is a republican one” (Contract, II 6), and this is how Rousseau’s paradigm can serve as a general model for the republican conception of the people. It allows understanding of what is at stake in the republican idea: the attempt to articulate individual wills and rights in a collectivity that would not be dependent on individual behaviors but would aggregate them.

This model is a powerful one when it comes to understanding how the republican and democratic conceptions of the people might diverge. This is not always the case, however. Many prominent figures of modern republicanism of all periods have not differentiated between the two. The politician-thinker Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826) in the United States, where he was recognized informally as the leader of a “democrat-republican party,” and the republican intellectual Alain (Émile-Auguste Chartier, 1868–1951) in France do not really imagine that republican ideals can limit the role of the people in politics. However, other authors lean toward qualifying republicanism as a specific way to consider democracy or even, like Auguste Comte (1798–1857), as a way to avoid democracy. This conception of the republic as separate from a democracy promotes a vision of the demos (“the people” in Greek) as standing united by showing a superior capacity to silence its internal divisions. This tendency is often critical of “liberal” conceptions of democracy, for which the division of interests is legitimate. It is even sometimes dangerously at odds with a proper liberal state: the first French republic (1792–1804) slid into “the Terror” precisely when its leaders, following Maximilien Robespierre (1758–1794), considered that any kind of opposition was the seed of a division that had to be suppressed. Because republican ideals emphasize the “agreement about justice” that Cicero talked about, they can end up, in radical practices of the republic, legitimizing the elimination of dissenters within.

The Citizen

The radicalization of terror is neither an accident in the history of republicanism nor its fate. It is not an accident in the sense that the promotion of the unity of the people in republican ideologies has often been linked with the necessity of defending the preeminence of the country. This is why nationalism, or at least a jealous affirmation of one’s sovereignty, is a frequent trait of republicanism in its modern versions. It might favor a strong communitarian and possibly violent reaction against dissent. One can see it in the history of the Roman republic, which has constantly suffered from coups, exiles, and brutal evictions. The Renaissance republicanism, which serves as a paradigm for Baron and his successors, also corresponds to the dark history of the Italian republics, and Machiavelli’s indifference to political violence is a symptom of this rather rough republican history.

The privilege given to the collectivity also encourages bellicose behavior toward outsiders for the sake of defending the integrity of “the people.” Since classical Rome, war is often considered as a sign of the strength of true republics. The rationale for such an attitude is easily understandable. If the unity of the people is the supreme reference for republican politics, whatever threatens this unity is regarded as the most lethal menace, whether the threat comes from the inside or from the outside.

At the same time, it would be wrong to assume that republicanism is limited to an authoritarian affirmation of the people without tolerance for
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diversity. On the contrary, if republicanism has been rediscovered in the early stages of modernity, it is because it makes room for another value of political modernity: the individual.

The question was already raised by Cicero, who noted that a people is not “any junction of men united in any fashion” but “the junction of a multitude, which associates on the grounds of an agreement about justice and a commonality of what is useful” (I 25). The collectivity is not a collection of persons, and the people is not a multitude but its “junction” due to shared principles and interests. Hence, a way of considering the people as a public consists in paying attention to its composition. If the people is a collective entity, the public is also made of individuals who belong to the common sphere of deliberation—what Cicero calls the “agreement about justice.” For this reason, republicanism cannot be unilaterally associated with a communitarian approach of politics. Cicero, and with him more largely the Roman conception of the republic, was keen on differentiating between the people in the sense of the republic and the people in the sense of a mass that would dissolve individualities. The distinction between what is public and what is “popular” parallels the distinction between a collectivity of individuals reasoning about their common interest and an indistinct crowd often suspected to be prey to momentary passions, leading to anarchy and disorder. It also parallels the opposition between politics as the outcome of rational decisions made by individuals and politics as influenced by the spread of passions through the mob. This value of republicanism has been particularly important for the reflection on French republicanism. Authors such as Jules Barni (1818–1878), Edgar Quinet (1803–1875), and Alain insist on the value of individual reasoning to achieve a more efficient republic. The people is worth what each part of it is.

This individual that republicanism celebrates as the vivid part of the people is not the one lost in his (and later, her) special interests; it is the individual who is able to understand the common good and reflect on it. This individual is the citizen. For this reason, the republican prominence of the individual does not solely reflect the rise of modern individualism, though it is obviously compatible with it. Rome also promoted the individual citizen as an important aspect of its “republicanism.” But in modern times, the figure of the citizen is a practical solution that republicanism offers to solve the delicate equation of contemporary politics, for which the necessity to govern, the voice of the governed in public matters, and the place of the individual in a social life that is by necessity a collective one are as imperative as they are contradictory.

The major device in this configuration is the role of the law. The republican tradition considers that law is the product of the collective reasoning of the citizens, the citizen being defined since Aristotle (384–322 BCE) as the one who has the right to participate in the life of the city. Hence, law is a testimony to the appropriation of politics by the people, who can recognize themselves in the ruling of their country, and hence ensures that the republic is truly public—that is, a product of the people’s will. This is why the citizen, as we have seen with Rousseau, does not decide from a personal point of view. He makes his decision in view of what he thinks best for his country. This kind of abnegation is both integrative and exclusive: By deciding the rules that are applied to the whole political body (or, in a representative government, by choosing those who make or apply the law), the citizen extends his real sphere of influence to the coalescence of his vote with those of his peers in a ballot. This is a particularly strong way of integrating each individual into a collectivity that he can grasp. At the same time, this very integration has been the reason why republicanism has often supported the exclusion of those who were considered unable to participate in the elevated sense of the public sphere because they were too tied to private interests—slaves in antiquity and, until the 20th century, women, whom many republics, such as the French or the Helvetic republics, have adamantly excluded (until 1944 in France and until 1971, even until 1990 at the local level, in Switzerland).

This elevated sense of the public good is often linked, in the republican literature, with the theme of a specific virtue on which republicanism depends. The virtue of the citizen is not solely moral. It is also an important political device, as this virtue consists in being able to see beyond one’s immediate benefit and to favor the collectivity over oneself. This attitude regularly leans toward a sacrificial rhetoric, in which the individual must be
ready to forgo his personal interests for the sake of the public good. The Romans had a particularly rich mythology of citizens sacrificing their life or their well-being for Rome. This bold conception of virtuous devotion resurfaced in the Italian Renaissance and continued to feed republicanism during the American and French revolutions in the 18th century. During World War I, the theme of the sacrifice of the soldier for the homeland is constant in the French republican propaganda, for instance.

There is another important aspect of the republican conception of the law: the equality of citizens before the law. This allows differentiating between the individual engaged as an equal to any other individual in the public sphere and the same individual in the private sphere, where inequalities dominate and where the individual is limited to local interests and constraints. The law is thus placed between the citizen and the wider public collectivity in which he still recognizes himself. Republicanism thus promotes a universal conception of politics, in the sense that everybody is supposed to be integrated in this equal sense of the common good that translates into laws.

Liberty

From a republican standpoint, the rule of law is thus not only a way to govern the people. It is also a way to preserve and reinforce a central political value: liberty.

While liberty is not solely a republican concept, it is not possible to imagine, whichever period we consider, a republican ideology that would not favor liberty as the most important aspect of its public values. This, once again, is linked with the centrality of the people in the conception of politics that republicanism develops. Maintaining the integrity of the people means that it must not be subject to any foreign law. To that extent, liberty concentrates all the functions of politics from a republican standpoint.

Freedom is first linked with the absence of tyranny. This aspect explains how suspicious monarchical regimes look in a republican conception; there is the deep fear that the personal sovereign might turn into a despot. But republican freedom is more than just protection from the evils of personal subjection; it is also perceived as a function of the law. As the French republican Jules Barni (1872) underlines it in his Manuel républicain, law in a republic has as its object to regulate the reciprocal relations of citizens, in order to insure both the respect of their individual rights and the well being of society as a whole. . . . Instead of hindering individual freedom, laws must . . . protect its legitimate usage. (II 6, 36)

Barni’s analysis is a significant illustration of republican principles; he sums up many of the values of late-modern republicanism, for which law is a means to protect freedom and not to “hinder” it. If the people is the foundation of the republic, the law made by this people is its own expression of freedom, and the republican tradition as a whole could illustrate the proud aphorism of Rousseau (1762/1997): “Obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty” (Social Contract, I 8).

However, this conception of the law is at odds with a more pessimistic outlook that states that any form of law is a limitation of somebody’s liberty. This analysis, developed by Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997) in his famous article “Two Concepts of Liberty,” leads to the idea of “negative freedom,” which is based on noninterference: One is free inasmuch as nobody interferes with one. This conception of liberty is often labeled as the “liberal” one. Berlin opposes this conception and puts forth a “positive” understanding of liberty, which claims that freedom is the participation of the people in the making of the law, as one cannot be self-oppressed. These categories, originally crafted after Constant’s remarks (1767–1830) in his 1819 lecture “On the Liberty of the Ancients Compared With That of the Moderns,” provide an easy contrast between a liberal conception of freedom based on noninterference and a republican conception that takes its roots in collective participation in the public sphere. Contemporary republicanism contends that the former allows the retreat of citizens from the public sphere to enjoy private freedom and insists on the necessity for citizens to engage in the public sphere in order to preserve their liberty.

The two positions are not incompatible. Constant, and then Berlin, emphasize that political freedom is a combination of private enjoyment and political mobilization to promote and defend freedom. This
Republicanism does not entirely satisfy the requisites of republicanism, and the contemporary republican thinker Philip Pettit insists that the aim is less a “combination” of positive and negative liberties than “a third alternative.” This alternative would be “the conception of freedom as non-domination.” This, Philip Pettit (1997) writes, “requires that no one is able to interfere on an arbitrary basis—at their pleasure—in the choices of the free person. This is the conception espoused in the long republican tradition” (chap. 1). Such a conception is for him the path to a renovated republicanism that can accommodate both the republican tradition of an engaged people developing a strong sense of the autonomy of its community and a modern sense of freedom that makes room for differences in lifestyles and values the private sphere, without forgetting that the pursuit of happiness is thoroughly hampered in a world devoid of true political freedom.

Conclusion
Republicanism, beyond its venerable antique origins, has undoubtedly proven to be a dynamic way of addressing the questions of political modernity. By providing political theory with an integrative conception of the law and by highlighting a conception of freedom that respects individual rights and the necessity to build a strong collectivity, republicanism is able to frame a particularly efficient conception of modern democracy. Its ambition is also to avoid the less favorable outcomes of the latter while retaining its most valuable inspiration. The balance is neither always easy to maintain nor always favorable to republican conceptions. Republicanism also contains, not solely as a theory but also as a political reality, the seeds of authoritarian behavior and the temptation of conservatism and of elitism. Liberal democracy might be criticized, and efficiently so from a republican standpoint, for its propensity to comply with the rule of a changing, superficial majority. But republicanism might not give a fully satisfying response to these evils when it pretends that majorities rule legitimately not on the grounds of their numerical superiority but because they are or should be the voice of the people as a whole. If, as republicanism contends, liberalism is never completely immune from the temptation of relativism and indifference, republicanism is also never fully above the suspicion of desiring, as Rousseau put it, to force people to be free.

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See also Citizenship; Equality; Liberty; Participation; Revolution; Rights; Rule of Law

Further Readings
Responsibility

Responsibility is one of those big political words that are commonly used but whose precise meaning is often left obscure. Responsibility is a concept that implies a value judgment, but the values it embodies can differ according to the context, the discourse, and the views of the speaker. Responsibility is a state of affairs—more precisely, as the Oxford and Webster’s dictionaries define it: the state, quality, or fact of being responsible. However, one can be responsible in a variety of ways, which signify various usages of the concept of responsibility.

Usages of the Concept of Responsibility

Responsibility as Agency, Cause, or Capacity

The concept of responsibility can be used to indicate that someone or something has had the power to cause a particular event to happen. In a mere descriptive sense, responsibility, in this sense of agency, coincides with causality. “Responsible for” can be replaced by “caused,” or any other expression that suggests a causal connection. Not only human agents but also things, situations, or circumstances, can be said to be responsible—for example, “a virus was responsible for the outbreak of the epidemic.” In a moral sense, however, responsibility can be ascribed only to human agents, who moreover must have the capacity to act responsibly. This implies that they must have had the possibility to act otherwise—that is, they must not have been compelled by external forces and they must have possessed sufficient mental capacities to have realized the consequences of their actions and to direct their will. This is a major issue in criminal law and moral philosophy and has sparked legal and philosophical debates about mens rea and about determinism versus free will.

Responsibility as Task, Duty, or Obligation

The concept of responsibility can also be used to indicate the tasks, duties, and obligations that flow from a social role, position, or office. For example, “The president is responsible for appointing the heads of federal agencies,” or “It was his responsibility to coordinate the crisis response.” Often the plural “responsibilities” is used, as in “She has many responsibilities.” Responsibility in this sense is often followed by the preposition “for.” This meaning of responsibility is often at stake in administrative law and is relevant in determining the width and extent of political accountability.

Responsibility as Accountability, Answerability, and Liability

Very often “being responsible” is used to indicate moral, political, or legal accountability for a sorry state of affairs. In the first instance, this may amount to simply having to provide an account to a forum, such as parliament, a congressional committee, or a legal court, and to provide information about one’s conduct. Second, this can involve answerability. The forum may ask questions and the actor will be asked to provide justifications or excuses. Finally, this can involve liabilities. The forum may pass judgment on the conduct of the actor—it may approve of an annual account, denounce a policy, or publicly condemn the behavior of an official or an agency. Judgment also implies the imposition of formal or informal sanctions on the actor in case of malperformance or, for that matter, of rewards in case of adequate performance. Responsibility as accountability is often followed by the preposition “to.” This sense is highly relevant in politics, for example, with regard to the doctrine of ministerial responsibility in parliamentary systems.

Responsibility as Virtue

“Being responsible” can also be used to indicate a positive moral attitude, a desirable character trait, or praiseworthy conduct. We can say of someone that she or he is a “responsible administrator,” “behaves responsibly,” in short, that she or he is a person with a “sense of responsibility.” What these various usages have in common is that they see responsibility as a desirable quality in officials and organizations. Responsibility is used as a normative concept, as a set of standards for the behavior of actors, or as a desirable state of affairs. Often, in this type of discourse, the adjective “responsible” or the adverb “responsibly” are used, as in “responsible government,” “the responsible administrator,”
or “we want public officials to behave responsibly.” In these usages of the concept, responsibility is seen as a virtue, as a positive feature of institutions or officials. It is used to positively qualify a state of affairs or the performance of an actor. It comes close to “responsiveness,” considerateness, and a willingness to act in a transparent, fair, and equitable way. This sense is often used in discussions about political morality and administrative ethics.

**Historical Roots**

The noun *responsibility* is relatively modern. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the first references date back to the end of the 19th century. It appears, for example, in *The Federalist Papers* and in the work of Edmund Burke, where it refers to both capacity and obligation. The adjective “responsible” is found much earlier, for example, in the work of both Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, as being liable and virtuous, respectively. Responsibility used in the sense of virtue can be found in modern Christian ethics from the 19th century onward. Both the English “responsibility” and the French *responsabilité* can presumably be traced to the word *responsabilis*. This term, meaning having to answer, does not occur in the classic Latin vocabularies and probably dates from the legal jargon of the late Middle Ages.

**Active and Passive Responsibility**

In the realm of politics, with its multiple and often evocative uses of the word *responsibility*, it can be helpful to distinguish between active and passive responsibility. This distinction more or less amounts to the distinction between responsibility as a virtue on the one hand and accountability or a liability on the other.

When responsibility as a virtue is at stake, the focus is on action in the present, on the prevention of undesirable situations and events. Active responsibility is about taking responsibility *ex ante*, about behaving responsibly. The central question is “What should be done?” An example of such a proactive use of the concept of responsibility in the realm of politics is Max Weber’s famous distinction between an ethics of principle and an ethics of responsibility. According to Weber, a strictly deontological approach to politics, in which all that matters is adherence to political principles, is highly irresponsible. The truly responsible politician takes the foreseeable consequences of his own decisions into account when deciding on a course of action.

In the case of passive responsibility, the focus is on determining accountabilities and liabilities after the fact. Passive responsibility is retrospective in nature, it is about responsibility *ex post*, about holding someone accountable for a given state of affairs. The central question is “Who is to blame?” Passive responsibility has both a practical dimension—who is to be held accountable?—and a normative dimension—who is to bear the blame and suffer the consequences? In the realm of politics, a major issue in this regard is the problem of many hands, which was first coined by Dennis Thompson. Because many different officials contribute in many ways to decisions and policies of government, it is difficult, both practically and in principle, to identify who is responsible for political outcomes.

**Political Responsibility**

In most Western democracies, the problem of many hands has led to introducing a kind of vicarious liability for ministers, heads of departments, and other political officials. They are, at least in principle, accountable to parliament or congress for anything that goes wrong under their guidance, whether or not they were actually in a position to do anything about it. In political practice, however, political leaders often accept complete responsibility only *in retoricis*, without accepting further consequences. Political responsibility is often limited to giving an account and to answering questions from journalists or political representatives and does not extend to resignation.

In Westminster parliamentary systems, this vicarious liability is known as the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. Ministers are accountable to parliament not just for their own conduct but also for any acts or omissions of their civil servants. The traditional view of ministerial responsibility holds that in the case of serious mistakes of civil servants a minister should not only give an account to parliament but should also take the blame and resign, regardless of whether he himself or she herself was
Responsiveness

The most general connotation of the notion of responsiveness pertains—as a noun—to reactivity or sensitivity. Descriptively, it denotes the quality of being responsive to stimulation: as a dynamic process of reacting quickly. The adjective responsive refers to “answering, replying, and responding” as well as being “susceptible to the feelings of others.” In technology, the term is used to describe how quickly the system responds to user input. This entry analyzes in greater depth the meaning of the notion, points out the components of responsiveness and its foci, and discusses what its “causal links” are.

Meaning

The political meaning of responsiveness is rather faithful to all the foregoing meanings. Responsiveness in political science is closely related to concepts such as “representation,” “accountability,” “delegation,” and “representative government.” Many scholars consider the stable responsiveness of a government to the preferences of its citizens to be a fundamental feature of a representative democracy.

Before disentangling the concept of responsiveness, let us concentrate on the other aforementioned notions and phenomena. Accountability—reads one of the political science dictionaries—has two major meanings, which partly overlap. First, the more common and standard one is that those who hold power are, in a broad sense, stewards and must be able to manifest the fact that they exercise power and fulfill their duties properly. (It is precisely the issue of fulfilling their duties that is at the crux of the concept of responsiveness.) Second, accountability refers to arrangements that secure conformity between the values of a delegating body and the person to whom the powers and responsibilities are delegated. In contemporary democracies, governments are accountable to the people through the process of election. This means that political

See also Accountability; Agencies; Virtue

Further Readings


accountability confines the use of power and, if need be, sanctions its abuse. Institutionalizing accountability means de facto binding the use of political power to specific, clearly defined, and publicly accepted standards.

The hidden dimension of these relationships pertains to the phenomenon (and concept) of delegation. Governing and political decision making in large entities, such as contemporary democratic states, entails the delegation of authority. The right to make decisions is designated—in agency relationships—to an agent by a principal. However, this task is conditional; it continues only if the principal is satisfied with the deeds of the agent and the former is satisfied when the agent performs in accordance with the principal’s wishes and interests. It may be withdrawn, however, if the principal’s evaluation is poor. This very conditionality, coupled with the possibility of withdrawal, is the essence of accountability mechanisms. This threat of withdrawal need not materialize; as a confidence procedure, accountability works even when the principal is not trying to replace the agent with an alternative. Yet she or he has the potential and means to do so. Consequently, “governments are accountable”—as the classic volume on the topic puts it—“if voters can discern whether governments are acting in their interests and sanction them appropriately, so that incumbents who act in the best interests of citizens win reelection and those who do not lose them” (Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, & Bernard Manin, 1999, p. 40). The single macromechanism behind this, approximating the phenomenon of responsiveness, is the one that forces the incumbents to choose policies that enhance their chances of reelection. In the same volume, one finds yet another proposal of a linkage between accountability and responsiveness: “Accountability is . . . a property of institutional structures, whereas responsiveness is a consequence of interaction within such structures. . . . Responsiveness is a measure of how much accountability an institutional infrastructure permits” (Przeworski et al., 1999, p. 131).

The notions introduced here might be better understood if approached from a policy process perspective. A simplified model of policy process assumes that what drives politics is people’s interests and values, which are translated into preferences; these preferences are then aggregated and signaled (via elections, demonstrations, and opinion polls) to respective politicians. In contemporary representative democracies, “mandates” are the essential form of such “signals” sent out at elections, constituting, in fact, a choice between the different political programs offered by competing parties. Once elected, politicians implement policies, which result in certain political outcomes. It is these outcomes that are evaluated—one criterion of which is their congruency with voters’ preferences; if the evaluation is positive, it is very likely that the incumbent will remain in office; if it is negative, the likelihood of replacing one camp of politicians with another is high. In short, representation is a relation between interests and outcomes; the essence of responsiveness is in the relationship between “signals” and “policies” as well as between “mandates” and “policies.”

A responsive government is one that takes into account the preferences of the citizens and acts according to these preferences. The key purpose of the mechanism of accountability is guaranteeing that agents do not depart from the expressed or tacit, though objective, interests of their principals. In a way, accountability is a means to a political end, which is responsiveness. Put differently, one may state that accountability is the property of an institutionalized relationship in which the exercise of power by one actor or set of actors is constrained and subject to some requirement of responsiveness to those over whom the power is exercised.

Defined in such a way, accountability can be further divided into two functional dimensions: Transparency in the exercise of power and enforceability of the principle of responsiveness via the establishment of some means by which sanctions can be imposed on representatives in case they misrepresent constituents or violate commonly accepted standards.

Unfortunately, citizens at large cannot participate in all decisions that affect them; however, accountability mechanisms assume that representative responsiveness requires a certain level of citizen competence and participation in controlling representatives. Obviously, political systems differ; one of the fundamental domains of empirical research concerns exactly this—what kind of political institutions provide incentives for representatives to be
responsive. The main distinction in this respect lies either between presidential versus parliamentary systems or between two visions of democracy, one coined the “majority control vision” and the other the “proportionate influence vision.” The major difference between the latter two is whether the government ought to be responsive to the majority of people, as the first Westminster majoritarian design assumes, or to as many people as possible, which is the underlying political logic of proportional, consensus-type democracies. Many empirical studies confirm theoretical expectations and indicate that different visions of democracy, manifested by the relevant institutional infrastructures, have an impact on the type and quality of responsiveness in an anticipated direction. At the same time, the intricacies within responsiveness are sensitive to representational role orientations (i.e., party role, pressure group role, and constituency-representational role).

General politics is divided into issue packages or policy areas. Responsiveness is not an unmitigated virtue. In some areas, we expect politicians to be responsive; in others, more complex and specialized, we believe that politicians and their advisers should decide on our behalf without great attention to our preferences (e.g., monetary policy, defense spending). As a result, how much accountability there should be is a difficult issue to resolve and can be decided only in view of to what extent popular responsiveness is desired.

**Components of Responsiveness**

Responsiveness ought to be viewed as a complex, multidimensional phenomenon composed of a variety of targets in the relationship between the representatives and the represented. Most commonly, responsiveness pertains to policy congruence. However, there are at least three other components, which result in service responsiveness, allocation responsiveness, and symbolic responsiveness. It is only when all four components are taken into account simultaneously that one can truly cover the representation phenomenon.

**Policy responsiveness** refers to the relationship between a district’s or electorate’s stance on a policy issue, determined by some measure of central tendency, and the policy orientation of the representative and, consequently, to his or her decisions concerning its implementation. This concerns the congruence or fit between the two sides of the representational bond; one expects a meaningful link between the policy preferences of the electorate and the deeds of their representatives, be they attitudinal or behavioral. To claim that policy responsiveness exists, one must ensure that both the representative and his or her constituents agree on a particular policy. Many problems arise: (a) some scholars point to the alleged incompetence of the constituents, (b) others indicate that in many policy areas they usually prove incompetent, (c) another problem derives from responsiveness to the long-term interests of the constituents versus their immediate wishes, and (d) still another problematic issue concerns biased information that the representative has about either the wishes or the interests of the constituents.

**Service responsiveness** covers a wide range of activities performed by the representative, often dubbed “pork barrel politics” or “case work.” This concerns the benefits a representative can secure for the constituents outside his or her legislative work. At the individual level, this ranges from responding to letters and inquiries to interventions on behalf of citizens in state or local institutions. On a more collective, macrolevel, the representative might embark on the role of an advocate or lobbyist for local interests.

**Allocation responsiveness** is relatively similar to the “service” type, except that in this case the initiative is rather on the side of the representative and the scope of activity is broader. Allocation often concerns what is usually called “public goods” and is related to the development of the welfare state and expansion of the state’s role in society and the economy. Usually, such allocations benefit entire regions as a whole and, in reality, this very much depends on the representative’s future orientation and his or her ability to anticipate the prospective needs and developments of a given area. Seen from another angle, this means she or he invigorates local entrepreneurship, animates local communities, and stimulates people’s needs.

**Symbolic responsiveness** is less behavioral and more psychological. It is also more vague and diffused in its manifestations. Symbolic responsiveness pertains more to diffused trust and support caused by how the representative’s role is performed and is less related to the particular,
instrumental satisfaction derived from acquiring some material goods or profit. It more often concerns fundamental values, confidence in political procedures, and the way a politician behaves; it concerns his or her integrity. What matters most in symbolic responsiveness is that voters feel represented, which is at the crux of the legitimacy of the general political system.

Consequently, because of the relative independence of these four forms of responsiveness, there is no reason to assume that good, effective responsiveness in one domain ought to be accompanied by equally effective and sound responsiveness in another domain. Particular voters and social groups might be unsatisfied with the performance of their representative in some policy area, but at the same time, they may be relatively satisfied by the way he or she delivers services.

There are, however, certain patterned relationships regarding the frequency of the occurrence of particular forms of responsiveness. If politicians—for whatever reason—are oriented toward local interest, what follows is the high priority given to “service” and “allocation” responsiveness. If, however, they are focused on the party role, they are more likely to give precedence to “policy” or “symbolic” responsiveness.

A frequently debated issue within the political representation domain is the extent to which, on the one hand, the “will to represent” and, on the other, the problem of the district’s or electorate’s heterogeneity are important for the quality of representation. The former—the will to represent—is at the crux of the responsiveness phenomenon, although in the classical formulation of the “standing for” descriptive representation, the will is not necessary. The representative might simply look responsive because he or she is from the constituents’ geographical district. Moreover, even if the representative has a distaste for representing the will of the people, he or she might nevertheless deliver high-quality representation—that is, look responsive—because his or her values, attitudes, and preferences are similar to the constituents’, notwithstanding a knowledge or willingness to follow their expectation of principals. In a nutshell, it is important to know where such unintentional and accidental responsiveness occurs and what are its long-term effects—for instance, for the reelection of the representative. It is worth noting that the mainstream classical approach to political representation and responsiveness assumes the will to represent as an important point of departure for deciding to whom exactly, what precisely, and by what means the representative is intentionally attempting to be responsive.

The latter—the issue of the district’s or electorate’s heterogeneity—is even more acute for the quality of responsiveness. In an ideal world, which is rarely the case, the existence of a perfectly homogeneous constituency would allow the representative to—at least potentially—become an ideal representative, achieving perfect responsiveness vis-à-vis a constituent’s preferences. In fact, the extent to which his or her representational merits approximate perfection depends completely on him or her, assuming that the representative has access to reliable information about the district’s sentiments and the will to familiarize himself or herself with them. The world is, nevertheless, much more complicated, and the usual state comprises complex heterogeneous constituencies coupled with a limited ability of the latter to effectively communicate its preferences. In such an instance, what a “willing to be responsive” representative can do is offer issue stances and enact policies that minimize the unsolvable problem of representing conflicting interests. The best the representative can do is to follow the majority, more precisely; learn about some central tendency in his or her constituency; and follow the preferences of such a majority. If, however, there is no clear majority, or—worse—the district preferences are highly polarized, the representative can either decide to be responsive to one end of the spectrum or offer some “central” policies that will rarely represent the sentiments of anybody but will at least minimize the discrepancy between the representative and the constituency at large. One should note, however, that such a far-from-unique situation regarding significant district heterogeneity is a sound excuse for the representative to follow his or her own considered judgments or conscience when having to make ultimate legislative decisions, which are often supported by details of competent deliberation among peers.

Focus of Responsiveness

Another method of depicting the multidimensionality of responsiveness is through the foci of the
representation relationship. Briefly stated, the foci can be organized into three baskets. The first is a geographical focus; both representatives and constituents may think that the crucial representative bond is between the representative and the constituency defined in terms of region, state, city, or district. Second, the representation focus can be viewed by means of a classical functional approach, conceiving what is to be represented in terms of class, professional group, ethnic or religious group, or ideological camp. Third, the focus of responsiveness can be individuals, be they socially important and influential local celebrities, or rank-and-file citizens, or unknown clients in need of assistance.

The Causal Link

Some scholars mistakenly assume that responsiveness by its very nature is always a dependent variable. The representation relationship is far more complex: Transactions between the represented and representative are dynamic, top down and bottom up, and their very essence depends to a large degree on both the exact component and the focus of responsiveness. Responsiveness and response are not the same. In fact a “purely reactive” representative is a far cry from the ideal role model assumed in contemporary democracies.

This is a relevant place to check the classics. Hanna Pitkin, in her now classic 1967 work on representation, does not define the concept of responsiveness. The responsiveness phenomenon features, however, in the chapter on the mandate–independence controversy. Following Burke’s famous opposition, Pitkin also asks many detailed questions related to the issue of whether a representative ought to do what the constituents want, and be bound by mandates or direct instructions from them, or be free to act as he or she chooses based on his or her skills, knowledge, and competence to guarantee their welfare. To precisely grasp and conceptualize the responsiveness phenomenon, it is extremely important to decide at which point we lie between the two poles of the ideal model of the mandate–independence controversy. On the one hand, one may assume that “good representation” occurs only when the representative acts on direct and explicit instructions from his constituents, and any deviation from them is considered unacceptable. At the other end of the scale, good representation means complete independence and full discretion; consequently, constituents have no right even to assess the fulfillment of campaign promises; in this stance, once the representative is elected, he or she must be completely free to use his or her own judgment and competence. Of course, there are solutions that fall in between: One might expect a “good representative” to act as he or she thinks the constituents would want, unless he or she receives instructions from them, which then must be obeyed. Whatever the precise understanding of good representation is assumed to be, it has direct consequences on the way we conceive the notion of responsiveness.

An additional requirement for clarifying this paradox is that it is expected that the represented must reveal the ability to be active. Pitkin highlights throughout the book that “the represented must be both present and not present” to talk logically of the very sense of representation. The representative must, of course, act and be independent; however, the represented must be in some sense acting through him or her. Moreover, the relationship between the two becomes meaningful only if the represented is capable of action, and has and is ready to present a will, judgment, or a preference on his or her own. If this capability and readiness to act is missing, the whole idea of representation as substantive activity is questionable. Acting on behalf of someone who is completely helpless, has no idea of what his or her preferences are, or is totally incompetent is not representing. As a consequence, the process of representing consists of supporting and achieving the interests of the represented, assuming that the represented is capable of judgment and action, but at the same time, it does not act and does not object to what is done on his or her behalf by the representative.

What [italics added] the representative does must be in his principal’s interest, but the way [italics added] he does it must be responsive to the principal’s wishes. . . . Responsiveness seems to have a kind of negative criterion: conflict must be possible and yet nevertheless not occur. (Pitkin, 1967/1985, p. 155)

The reasons for either following the will of the people or promoting their interest is crucial from
yet another perspective—the cognitive ability and mobilization of the citizenry at large. Numerous methodologically sound empirical endeavors show that a very small proportion of the public can actually articulate their interests; moreover, even fewer people can manifest coherent belief systems that allow their values and preferences to be translated into comprehensive rational policies. In such a situation, the dilemma of the representative, whether and to what exactly he has to be responsive, is extremely complicated. If no conflict between citizens’ wishes and their interests is visible, the role of the representative is relatively simple, but on rare occasions, this does occur. Obviously, the representative need not follow the wishes of the represented, but he or she must consider them, especially when they are in conflict with what he sees as the constituent’s interests, because the reason for this discrepancy must be found and clarified. This stipulation is at least true for democracies. In other words, if a representative behaves and acts contrary to the publicly known wishes of his electorate, some explicit rationale is required. Such behavior calls for explanation and justification. It is precisely at this point that the issue of responsiveness comes into play. The representative has to explain why he or she is unresponsive; and not any explanation will do, and only certain clarifications will be legitimized by the people. On the other hand, accepted justifications boost the chances of the representative’s reelection.

Throughout this classic volume, one finds a convincing picture of political representation that is impersonal and institutional. Whenever we refer to a system or government as “representative” we are in fact describing an institutional arrangement and its mechanisms. The representation, and its quality, emerges not from an individual will to represent, but from the logic of the structure and functions of the system. Political representation comes about when the system is effectively looking “after the public interest and is responsive to public opinion except insofar as nonresponsiveness can be justified in terms of public interest” (Pitkin, 1967/1985, p. 224). These traits of representation—its “public” and “institutional” character—contrary to many assumptions about the individualistic, dyadic nature of responsiveness, can emerge independently from any deliberate interactions between voters and representatives. It is because of the very mechanisms of free media, separation of powers, regular fair elections, and other inventions of liberal democracies that responsiveness is likely to emerge even from a political system in which particular individuals, voters, and representatives are pursuing quite other goals.

This problem—to what extent responsiveness is a systemic property and to what extent it should be treated as emerging from individual deliberate interactions—remains a question open to empirical inquiry.

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See also Accountability, Electoral; Accountability, Interinstitutional; Competition, Political; Democracy, Quality; Equality; Freedom; Participation; Representation; Rule of Law

Further Readings

RESPONSIVENESS OF BUREAUCRACY

Responsiveness is one member of a family of related and positively valued concepts such as
Responsiveness of Bureaucracy

Responsiveness of Bureaucracy

responsibility and answerability that have to do with the accountability of bureaucrats. There is, at first glance, generally, little controversy about the proposition that bureaucrats should be responsive to the (elected) politicians or their appointees at the top levels of governments. This seems obvious, or it would be impossible to hold politicians accountable for the actions of the governments they lead. However, beneath these simple statements lurks a minefield of complications.

Responsive to Whom or to What?

How responsive do we want bureaucrats to be to those at the top levels of government? Might we also want them to answer to those they serve, their “customers,” in the language favored by recent reformers? Or to the norms and traditions of the organizations they serve? Or to external expectations that come from their professions—to the standards and norms of their roles as scientists, engineers, social workers, or related professionals? Or to some moral standards that are widely shared in the society? Or to the desires of those in the legislative branch of government, especially if they work in a separation-of-powers system, such as that of the United States?

When there is a clash between the demands of the many forces that affect bureaucrats and the orders of those at the top of governments, the situation becomes complex. The most extreme and, in a sense, the most straightforward to deal with is when government leaders demand actions that clash with common morality—mass killing, torture, depriving people of basic rights, and the like. There bureaucrats are looked on, at least after the fact, as heroes when they are not responsive.

Most situations are not so clear, even in retrospect. Bureaucrats in agencies responsible for protecting the environment may be pressured by scientific evidence on the one side that suggests the need for strict regulation of pesticides or of factory emissions and on the other by political leaders who oppose such regulation and interpret the laws in these areas in a way that preclude strict regulation. Customers or constituents of organizations may have preferences that differ from those at the top of governments, and they may be in a position to make life very uncomfortable, now or in the future, for those who do not respond to them.

Bureaucrats who have been trained as scientists, engineers, or social workers may face demands from political leaders who would rather please an important constituency than follow a course recommended by scientific findings or the standards of a given profession. Legislators, especially in systems with strong legislative committees, may have different perspectives than executive leaders on what should be done, and these legislators may be quite influential because of longevity in office or the related possibility that they will be there long after executive leaders have departed.

Responsiveness Problems

Bureaucrats, especially those at or near the top levels of their organizations, have numerous resources that they bring to the relationship with politicians. They have the expertise gained through long service in a given area, supplemented often by specialized training prior to entering the civil service and training on the job and in programs designed to increase their knowledge. Max Weber, perhaps the most famous theorist of bureaucracy, put a great deal of emphasis on the power this expertise brought, and though those who study bureaucracy may debate the level of bureaucratic influence under various circumstances, few would deny it. Senior career civil servants have a great deal of knowledge about the history of their programs, the proposals that have been made in the past to change their programs, the constellation of forces that stand in support or in opposition to their programs, and what has worked or failed to work in the past. This is useful information to politicians, and they ignore it at their peril, but it also permits bureaucrats to help shape the agenda and to exert control over what is or is not done. In a real sense, bureaucrats responding to requests for information may make their nominal masters responsive to them rather than the other way around. This is a consistent dilemma for executive politicians seeking change.

A related problem is that leaders may be reluctant to give clear signals to their subordinates about policy changes because too much clarity can be a source of political opposition or embarrassment after proposals have been compromised to secure adoption. This ambiguity gives civil servants opportunities to shape their responses in
ways that insert their own preferences or those of supporters of their programs into the mix without seeming to act in an unresponsive manner.

Civil servants can also act in a passive-aggressive manner, withholding information that would be very useful to their superiors. Political leaders should want to avoid this, but if they distrust or ignore civil servants, they may inadvertently encourage such behavior.

On the other side of this problem is the dilemma bureaucrats may face when they deliver advice or analyses to politicians based on what they believe in good conscience are the facts or are reasonable conclusions based on experience. Politicians, motivated by their ideologies—and research shows that they are generally more motivated by ideologies than bureaucrats—may react harshly to such information if it does not fit their predilections and may blame the messenger for what they are told. The easy way out for bureaucrats is to avoid providing such information or advice, or even to distort what is communicated to fit the predilections of political superiors, though one can make a strong argument that such a course is not the responsible way for a professional to be responsive.

Finally, as mentioned above, in real political systems, especially in separation of powers systems, there are multiple authorities with some say over what civil servants do. How to deal with conflicting demands from these authorities can be a big problem for those who see it as their role to be responsive and an opportunity for those with their own agendas.

**Exit, Voice, or Loyalty?**

The most famous book relevant to this general subject is *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, by Albert Hirschman. Hirschman argues that an organization’s customers or employees have three basic things they can do when they are dissatisfied with the policies or actions of those who head the organization. One option is exit. Civil servants, the focus of this essay, can resign in protest. This may be a futile gesture, but it may also—if handled astutely—result in much negative publicity for the organization or policy that is the target of the resignation. A problem for a career civil servant is that he or she may not have the resources to cope effectively with the aftermath of exit. In addition, the gesture may be futile. The organization may be able to simply shrug off the resignation and continue doing what it did before with relatively little problem. On the other hand, a dramatic resignation may cause the organization a good bit of trouble; indeed, even the threat of resignation may be adequate from the standpoint of the civil servant. Whatever the ultimate outcome, exit is a way to avoid responsiveness.

A second option is voice. Here, the civil servant stays in the organization and gives voice to his or her concerns. At one level, this is an expression of loyalty because the civil servant stays and expresses what he or she believes should be done (or what the available evidence suggests should be done), but it may be greeted with hostility by those at the top of the organization. The civil servant who gives voice may be relegated to an unimportant job, not receive promotions, or be the target of other acts of recrimination. Evidence indicates that there is a cultural dimension to voice—that is, how appropriate people think it is as a means to express dissent. For example, in a comparative study done in the mid-1980s, 82% of West German civil servants felt that they should support their government’s policies even if they personally disagreed and found them “very undesirable or ill considered,” whereas only 42% of U.S. civil servants felt the same way.

A more aggressive form of voice, especially attractive if exiting is not a readily available choice, is sabotage. Here the civil servant remains in the organization but gives voice by passing information to those in a position to use it against the organization. Ironically, those who feel extremely attached to the organization may find this the best course of action. So-called whistle-blowing has become more and more institutionalized in U.S. organizations, with formal protections in place to protect the whistle-blower, but the simple leaking of information that can compromise the direction of an organization by the current leadership is a time-honored practice in bureaucracies. Research findings in the United States indicate that civil servants would prefer to give voice within the confines of the government, resigning if persuasion does not work and the disagreement is severe. Leaking, then, may be thought of as something between voice and exit.

The final option is loyalty. Here the civil servant sticks with the organization and follows its
directives no matter what he or she might think of what is asked. This is responsiveness that may be attractive to organizational leadership because what it wants will be implemented no matter what the people in the organization’s bureaucracy might think or prefer. But there is a cost, and the cost can be significant if the leadership’s goals are unattainable, extremely costly, extremely unwise, or some combination of the above. Bureaucratic voice, at a minimum, is often in the interest of the leadership; abject submissiveness may be much regretted after the fact.

Conclusion

Bureaucratic responsiveness is important in a governing system where top decision makers are ultimately held accountable for the policies and actions of the governments they lead. We would not want politicians to say credibly that while the law permitted alternate actions, the career bureaucracy was unresponsive and there was no way because of that to change programs or policies. On the other hand, we also should be wary of a totally submissive bureaucracy. Bureaucrats carry with them the expertise and experience to help make policy decisions viable and policy implementation effective. They know a great deal about what has worked in the past, what has failed for technical or political reasons, and what course might be best for accomplishing what political leaders would like, though this may require changes and compromises that political leaders would prefer to avoid. Ideally, bureaucrats also adhere to a code of personal and professional conduct that makes them valuable servants of the nation, leading them to resist the worst impulses that might seize national leaders. An “unresponsive” civil servant who refused to send victims to concentration camps or to help organize torture sessions would deserve the thanks of his or her nation. It is hoped that cases where this is necessary will be extraordinarily rare. In between that extreme and abject obedience is found a complicated world where bureaucratic responsiveness is much sought after but, for the most part, not fully attainable or even fully desirable.

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See also Bureaucracy; Cabinets; Democracy, Theories of; Executive; Governance, Good; New Public Management; Parliaments; Policy Advice; Principal–Agent Theory; Responsiveness

Further Readings


Revisionism

As a term of art, *revisionism* surfaced in the late 1800s and has since steadily gained in scope. Its meaning may be either critical or assertive, but its purpose is always to probe the intellectual validity and the political legitimacy of a dominant orthodoxy. The notion typically implies an ongoing attempt to revise, revisit, or reconsider an official, mainstream, well-established, or at least widely accepted tenet, brought forth by the history of political thought and events that claims ethical authenticity and prescribes normative conduct in public affairs. For regular criticism to qualify as revisionism, it should challenge canons of interpretation of facts, processes, and/or ideas that are conducive to the configuration (or are the intended outcome) of a system of power relations in the international arena, national politics, or academia. Revisionism deserves its name to the extent that it remains a failed orthodoxy and its proponents are singled out as deviationists not only from a prevailing construal of truth but also from
the social administration of it. Hence, revisionism and revisionists are often subject to coercive interventions from the incumbent orthodoxy: sanctions in international relations, purges and trials in nondemocratic national settings, and marginalization and exclusion in the academic sphere. Revisionism itself, especially when manifested—as is frequently the case—in the realm of arts and letters, is sometimes inclined to prize such an imposed peripheral position in the production of values emphasizing negation and evasion as creative hermeneutical forces. At any rate, revisionism could be the name of a contentious politics of practical knowledge. This entry is especially focused on the variety of revisionisms and the ambiguities of the concept.

**Variety of Revisionisms**

Three authoritative interpretations of intellectual and political history, and the political arrangements that accompany them, have engendered the main versions of revisionism. They are related to Marxism, the Great War, and the Holocaust. As a strong and recurrent political label, revisionism was used aggressively in 1908 by Vladimir Lenin with the explicit intention of defining a canonical brand of Marxism against what he deemed to be the nonrevolutionary reformist trend gaining sway over German and Austrian social democracy. The evolution of Marxism as the official ideology of state socialism could be read from then on as a narrative of orthodoxy enforcing its speculative outlook and political command by permanently exposing and overcoming present or suspected revisionisms. In the history of international relations, revisionism is a descriptor of the foreign policies of the former Central Powers that stood in defiance of the status quo established in 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles. The classic example would be Hungary, a polity traumatized by severe territorial losses and insulated in a culture of denial of its new identity as a diminished European actor. The normative elusiveness of the international order presided over by the Society of Nations allowed Japan, albeit a victor of the Great War, to adopt a revisionist language, critical of Western supremacy, and to embark on revisionist operations in East Asia and the Pacific; in the process, the democratic-oriented Japanese governments of the 1920s were replaced by a military-driven direction of national politics in the 1930s. German revisionism was rooted in the 19th-century völkisch (ethnic) movement and related to previous forms of national revanchism (a term used since the 1870s to describe a political manifestation of the will to reverse territorial losses incurred by a country, often following a war) and irredentism (any position advocating annexation of territories administered by another state on the grounds of common ethnicity or prior historical possession, actual or alleged). The initially progressive, then turned “Old Right” American scholar Harry Elmer Barnes (1889–1968), perhaps the most prominent and prolific revisionist historian, echoed the German style in his work. In his book *The Genesis of the World War* (1929), Barnes argued against what he described as “court historians,” that the Great War (World War I) was by no proper historical account a just one, and that all the powers concerned share responsibility for its causes and course of events. He extended his argument after World War II, theorizing against the “blackout” of mainstream historiography, which he denounced as a myth factory working for political purposes and under political command. Expanding his prior analyses, Barnes maintained that Nazi German war crimes and the extermination of the European Jews were to be considered at best unproved facts, anyway matched by the treatment imposed by the Allies to the vanquished Germans.

The legacy of Barnes is twofold. On the one hand, he remains a source of inspiration for many libertarians connected to the Mises Institute, among whom Murray N. Rothbard (1926–1995) stands out. According to them, revisionism should be construed as a teacher of freedom of speech and thought, of truth and rationality in a world subdued by propaganda, and of indoctrination and spectacular mythologies taking advantage of the gullibility of a misinformed general public. On the other hand, Barnes’s work is used as a cornerstone by the massive body of literature displaying a diverse array of conspiracy theories, efforts of revision of national canonized histories, the explicit or implicit denial of the Holocaust, and other varieties of negationism. This last form of revisionism aims not only at questioning and raising doubts as to the veracity and the scale of the Hitlerian genocide but also, and most important, at leveling the guilt of all parties, civilians included, involved in the two
of the 20th century and their respective aftermaths. Had abjection been evenly distributed, there would ultimately be no irrational aggressor and no defender of just causes, no victim to be remembered, and no executioner to be held responsible. In the negationist view, the politics of retribution and memory are but tools of control of the public mind employed by conspiring minorities ruling over markets, the media, and some governments. This literature, networking across Western cultures and the Middle East, manifests itself as an alternative type of historical writing and habitually addresses marginal but committed audiences associated with extreme Right and fundamentalist political persuasions. Fostered by the language of history and doctrine, revisionism is always pleading, if only by implication, for a transfiguration of a domestic political regime or the international order.

Ambiguities of the Concept

However miscellaneous its major historical shape, revisionism emerged in normative terms as a word of no certain meaning. Its first uses point to this built-in ambiguity. The earliest revisionists appear to have been, rather technically, the advocates of the judicial review of the notorious Dreyfus affair that stirred political passions in 1894–1895 France. After the exculpation of Alfred Dreyfus, the notion itself was inverted by conservative voices denouncing not a mere reversal of justice but a revision of history. The case may provide a pattern for understanding the very fabric of revisionism: It is almost never an intellectual controversy about how reason could restore facts to their pristine historical state but rather a political contention on how a society should form its beliefs about what facts ought to stand for and who is entitled to expound their position. This indistinct word turned into a concept at about the same time in Marxist German thought. Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932) authored between 1896 and 1898 a series of articles devoted to The Problems of Socialism, instantly arousing a long-lasting controversy as to how Marx’s entwined theories on capitalism and proletarian revolution, coined in the mid-1800s, should be empirically tested for the political use of the working-class movement. Bernstein’s critique of the inaccuracy of the Marxian predictions about the inevitable collapse of capitalist economy, the accelerated impoverishment of the working class, the evaporation of the middle class, as well as his reshuffling of the labor theory of value and the dismissal of class struggle as the privileged venue of social change were initially rejected by his fellow socialists (Karl Kautsky, August Bebel, and Rosa Luxemburg) only to lay a few years later the foundations of the enduring orthodoxy guiding the policies of the Western and Central European Socialist and Social Democratic parties. What emerged as orthodoxy in Germany, France, and later Britain was dubbed revisionist by the Bolsheviks even before they seized power in Russia. Lenin wrote it clearly: To amend Marx is blatant proof of hostility toward Marxism (even if a Fabian anecdote has it that the elderly Marx did not consider himself a Marxist). Hence, revisionism grows to be the elaborate but standard crime of betrayal of the communist project. After October 1917, Lenin’s triumphant party imposed itself as nothing less than revolutionary (i.e., genuine) Marxism incarnated in one country and organized globally in the Communist International. By way of consequence, to tell apart orthodoxy from reformism was no longer the task of a “professorial science” of Marxism (to quote Lenin) but the public policy of a political regime that raised “scientific socialism” to the dignity of a practical philosophy able to have recourse not only to means of persuasion but also to instruments of coercion. Plain intellectual criticism (expressed, suspected, or attributed) deserved to be qualified as revisionism as soon as a sociological dimension raised “social fascists,” promoters of state capitalism, elitists, and agents of imperialism. Henceforth a matter of bureaucratic decision and penal sanction, revisionism multiplied its facets and materializations as the Soviet leadership moved to provide a Marxist/Leninist-certified interpretation of international and domestic political events and social processes. As long as he was in command, Stalin’s thinking and actions embodied orthodoxy for all seasons: Yesterday’s orthodoxy might have easily been unmasked as today’s revisionist, as in the case of Trotsky and many others. Or else, an orthodox at home could look from abroad like a revisionist. For instance, in 1957, the Polish leader Władysław Gomułka, while...
formally charging Leszek Kolakowski with revisionism (alongside other Marxist philosophers who were experiencing the Khrushchev report as an intellectual liberation), was himself accused of revisionism by his Romanian communist counterparts. In the early 1960s, Nikita Khrushchev was in turn denounced as a “modern revisionist” by Mao Zedong. Two decades later, Mao himself was labeled as one by the Albanian communists, proud to proclaim themselves antirevisionists. The term was briefly revived in 1989 by the Romanian hardliners as a causal explanation for the roundtable talks through which Hungarian or Polish ruling parties were contemplating free and fair elections and eventually a transition to political pluralism and unplanned economy. After the demise of communism, revisionism (self-styled, imaginary, or indisputable) still lends itself to a variety of uses in international and domestic politics or in academia but seems to have exhausted its career as a concept. As a moral and political language, it still can map the hermeneutical and ethical encounters of politics and history.

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See also Communism; Hermeneutics; Historical Memory; Marxism; War and Peace

Further Readings


Revolution

Social scientists have provided two alternative definitions of revolution. Some theorists articulate a political definition of revolution characterized by the forcible transfer of state power. Charles Tilly defines revolution as forcible transfer of power in the course of a struggle involving at least two distinct blocs of contenders that make incompatible claims to control the state with some significant segments of the population supporting the claims of the rival contenders. Others developed criteria that incorporated significant segments of the population supporting the claims of the rival contenders. Theda Skocpol is interested in social revolutions—that is, alterations in both the political and economic structures of society. Skocpol’s definition requires a rapid, basic transformation of the state and class structures that are carried out in part through class-based revolts from below. Social revolutions, though rare phenomena, have produced the most fundamental changes in the modern world and social life. For this reason, this entry will focus on the causes, processes, and outcome of social revolutions and will review alternative theories, namely, class analysis theories, state-centered theories, political-conflicts theories, and theories that stress the role of ideological transformation in accounting for revolutions.

Revolutions have played a significant role in the rise of the modern world and, over the past few centuries, have transformed the political and economic systems of social life and at least partially altered the nature of social relations. In the West, modern revolutions have been produced by conflicts over the distribution of material resources, the allocation and extent of political power, and the essence of social relations. These revolutions, in turn, eventually gave rise to modern capitalism, democracy, and various social movements, including the abolition of slavery, socialist and labor movements, civil rights, women’s equality, and gay and lesbian rights. In the developing world, national liberation movements and revolutions have produced independence, nationalist regimes, and, in a few cases, socialist transformations.

Revolutionary movements and transformations have also stimulated scholarly debates about the causes, processes, and outcome of revolutions and large-scale social conflicts. Indeed, 18th- and 19th-century European revolutions and revolutionary movements influenced Karl Marx’s analysis of capitalism, class conflict, and revolution, which in turn influenced generations of 20th-century social scientists.
Causes of Revolutions

Modernization and Political Instability

Modernization theorists claim that rapid economic development and social change in developing countries can be destabilizing as large-scale social transformations such as commercialization, industrialization, and urbanization dislocate and uproot large segments of the population. These changes, in turn, may generate some measure of confusion and anomie, leading to antisocial activities and destructive violent behavior. In the absence of integrative forces within the existing order, the uprooted may join revolutionary movements to integrate into the new social system. Other versions of the theory emphasize the political dimension of rapid modernization, which may extend political consciousness, expand political mobilization, and instigate demands for political participation. These developments, in turn, may undermine traditional political authority and complicate the creation of new political institutions, which may result in disorder and political instability.

Class Conflict and Revolutions

Class analysts of revolution claim that the key to understanding revolutions lies in the conflict over the distribution of material resources. These theorists often point to economic polarization, concentration of wealth and income, and rising disparities in promoting conflicts and revolutions. Under highly polarized economic conditions, the dominant and lower classes may not find common ground for compromise and peaceful coexistence but instead may adopt extremist political positions leading to conflict and revolution.

Marx was a leading proponent of the class conflict model. He viewed the contradiction between the forces and relations of production within a single mode of production to be pivotal in generating class conflict and revolutions. He claimed that class exploitation and domination within the economic sphere would generate shared interests within the working class, which would lead to class solidarity, consciousness, and organizations. Market competition and endemic economic crises under capitalism continuously undermine the position of the petty bourgeoisie and force them into the ranks of the proletariat, the industrial working class. According to Marx, these transformations would expand the proportion of the working class in advanced industrial societies and convert them into a giant force capable of disrupting the social structure. Marx expected that class conflict would inevitably find expression in the political sphere. In times of economic crisis, when the capitalist system is most vulnerable, industrial workers armed with revolutionary ideology would target the state whose policies generally support the interests of their class enemy, the capitalist class. Given the ever-expanding size of the working class and recurrent capitalist crises, the working class would ultimately be able to overthrow capitalism and establish a socialist system.

Although Marx’s predictions on revolutions in advanced capitalist countries never materialized, his class analysis inspired a number of scholars to undertake studies of revolutions and large-scale social conflicts in a wide variety of countries. In a seminal work, Barrington Moore, Jr. demonstrated the ways in which alternative coalitions of urban and agrarian classes produced a constellation of 20th-century revolutions that determined the nature of the modern political systems of capitalist democracy, fascism, and communism. Moore also employed class analysis to explain conditions that produced peasant uprisings and revolutions. Other scholars, such as Jeffery Paige and Eric Wolf, also used class analysis in different ways to explain 20th-century peasant revolts and agrarian revolutions in developing countries.

State-Centered and Structural Theories of Revolution

State-centered theories of revolution shift the focus of analysis away from class conflict and toward the power structure, notably the state, which is regarded as relatively autonomous. State-centered theorists locate the state within the international political system and examine the political and military pressures that may render it vulnerable. According to Skocpol, a leading proponent of this model, military pressures and defeat in wars may undermine the state’s coercive apparatus and lead to revolution. In agrarian bureaucracies, external pressures combined with state efforts to promote industrial development may generate schisms between the state and the dominant class,
with each sector competing to extract greater resources from the peasantry. In such conflicting situations, dominant classes may be able to block state policies and frustrate government attempts at economic transformation. Such conflicts between the state and the dominant class may result in state breakdown, paving the way for revolutionary upheavals. Peasants may be able to revolt and bring about a revolution if they have communal solidarity and strength.

In another view of state-centered revolution in developing countries, Misagh Parsa points out that state autonomy does not prevent states in the developing world from serving the interests of the privileged. Interested in promoting development, state policies often serve the economic interests of large capital, often adversely affecting the interests of the rest of the population and providing favorable conditions for coalition formation.

In particular, highly centralized, exclusive, and hyperactive states may be vulnerable to attack in times of crisis. Such states contract the scope of the polity, use repression to block access to the state, and thus undermine support for the regime, increasing the likelihood of polarization and revolution. In Parsa’s analysis, the relationship between the state and the economy has significant implications for the nature of social conflicts. The level of state intervention in capital accumulation can affect the nature and outcome of social conflicts. In regulative states such as market economies, the low level of state intervention in capital accumulation reduces the probability that the state will become the direct target of collective action and thus diminishes the likelihood of revolutionary conflicts. Capital allocation and accumulation are determined by an abstract, decentralized, depoliticized, and “self-regulating” market system, which tends to defuse and privatize conflicts, confining them to the civil society. Because markets are abstract, decentralized, and depoliticized, they cannot be attacked or overthrown. As a result, the regulative state is unlikely to attract direct attacks or challenges because class conflict remains confined within the economic sphere and the civil society. Should such conflicts escalate, aggrieved groups may clamor for the regulative state to intervene on their behalf rather than attacking it, increasing the likelihood of a reformist, nonrevolutionary outcome. Where state intervention is low, the regulative state may be perceived as an autonomous entity that serves general, societal interests. In such cases, the regulative state may actually become an integrative rather than a divisive force.

Alternatively, low state intervention in capital accumulation may increase the likelihood and intensity of class conflict, which can remove the regulative state as the principal target of attack and thereby reduce the likelihood of revolution.

Hyperactive states, in contrast, intervene greatly in the economy and, as a consequence, can become vulnerable to challenge. Hyperactive states tend to be major economic actors, control abundant economic resources, and intervene extensively in capital allocation and accumulation. High levels of intervention entail significant political consequences for these states. As they become direct producers and financiers, the abstract, decentralized, and depoliticized market mechanism is replaced by a visible, concrete social entity, which can be attacked during conflict or crisis. High state intervention expands the extent of political conflicts in times of economic crisis, as economic and political conflicts converge in the political arena, when the hyperactive state rather than market forces are held accountable for failure and mismanagement. Finally, hyperactive states that employ sizable segments of the workforce tend to become the target of workers’ economic conflicts. Workers’ attacks against the state may reduce the intensity of class conflict and, in turn, increase the likelihood of coalition formation. Broad coalitions and disruption of the social order are very important in Parsa’s theory of revolution. In the absence of broad coalitions, revolutionary challengers might be repressed and rendered ineffective.

Jeff Goodwin articulates another version of state-centered revolutionary theory in contemporary developing countries. Although class interests and economic grievances are important, Goodwin argues that the roots of revolutionary movements are to be found in the political context in which class relationships and economic institutions are embedded. Revolutionary movements in the periphery have been inadvertently facilitated and encouraged by the formation of violent, exclusionary, authoritarian governments that are also organizationally incoherent. Despotic regimes provide a visible focus of opposition for groups and classes that may have different grievances but come
together in a broad coalition. Exclusionary, repressive states render political moderates and reformists relatively impotent and inconsequential. Thus, revolutions often take place in countries that reject peaceful attempts to redress social and political grievances through elections and organizing and instead resort to blatant fraud and violent repression. Revolutionary movements may attract broad popular support where states sponsor or promote unpopular economic or social arrangements, repress or exclude mobilized social groups, and alienate the elite through corruption and arbitrary personalistic rule. Even moderate and predominantly middle-class political parties and voluntary associations can join in broad alliances that effectively support radical movements waging armed revolutionary struggles.

Tilly argues that a natural history of revolutions that could specify necessary and sufficient conditions for revolutions is not possible because as regimes vary and change historically, they also alter conditions for the violent seizure of state power. Nevertheless, Tilly does provide a state-centered explanation of revolution, analyzing a state’s vulnerability to revolution as determined by its capacity to control resources and the activities of its population and the extent to which the public enjoys equal rights and is able to influence governmental affairs and policies. He reasons that high-capacity democratic regimes are not vulnerable to revolutions because they are popular, and high-capacity nondemocratic states are unlikely targets for revolution because their rulers are able to impose strict controls on the people. Low-capacity nondemocratic regimes likewise do not produce revolutionary outcomes because once the revolutionaries seize power, the state apparatus tends to fragment and create difficulties for forming a new state. Thus, in Tilly’s model, medium-capacity nondemocratic regimes are the most likely to foster revolutionary outcomes.

**Ideology and Revolutions**

Some theorists attribute independent power and dynamics to ideology in the analysis of revolutions. Maintaining that ideology has a central, even independent role in any existing social structure and in its transformations, they argue that class, economic, and political conflicts by themselves could not lead to revolutions and that only revolutionary ideologies can convert social discontent into revolutionary crisis. Using the example of the Iranian revolution, some theorists emphasize the role of the Shi’a culture of martyrdom that inspired devout Iranians to oppose the Shah in the face of repression and death. Proponents of this perspective maintain that without a revolutionary ideology and culture of resistance, revolutions are highly unlikely.

Theorists who stress the role of ideology in revolutions are correct in one important sense: Ideologically driven challengers have been in the forefront of revolutionary struggles in developing countries. In the 20th century, intellectuals and students adopted revolutionary ideologies and struggled to transform their societies. Ideological shifts among students and intellectuals not only fostered solidarity and cohesion among these vanguards of revolutionary struggles but also provided an analysis of the causes of the conflicts and provided a formula out of those conditions. Although these revolutionaries fought for their ideology, they were also aware of the need to form broad coalitions to bring down the ruling powers. To minimize ideological conflicts, revolutionary challengers often adopted alternative public approaches to ensure coalition formation. To attract those who did not share their ideologies, revolutionary leaders were sometimes circumspect about their ideologies. In Iran, for example, Ayatollah Khomeini never told the Iranian people about his theocratic goals, but instead, he borrowed significant aspects of the nationalist ideology of the 1950s and attacked the Shah’s regime for failing those aspirations. In the case of Nicaragua, the Sandinistas compromised and modified their program to ensure a broad coalition that was able to overthrow the government in 1979.

**Revolutionary Processes and Outcome**

Modern revolutionary conflicts often begin with the rise of a revolutionary challenger or coalition of challengers that attempt to gain exclusive control over state power. These challengers are often ideologically driven intellectuals and students inspired in part by the success of revolutionaries elsewhere and antagonized by domestic economic structures and political systems. Revolutionary challengers may emerge in many societies, but
most fail due to government repression and/or lack of popular backing. Those revolutionary challengers that do survive are successful in gaining the support of dissident intellectuals and students who contribute resources and new recruits. Revolutionary challengers become serious contenders for power when they acquire adherents among major classes or collectivities such as workers, peasants, or segments of the middle class.

Revolutionary situations emerge when popular backing for revolutionary challengers becomes substantial and rulers are incapable or unwilling to suppress the challengers. It is important to note that revolutionary situations often arise as a result of certain societal characteristics and major economic and political crises, not because of the actions of revolutionary challengers, who often constitute a very small segment of the population. Specific characteristics render certain societies more vulnerable to revolutionary situations. Countries marked by high levels of inequality in the distribution of wealth and income are vulnerable to economic and political crises. Further, countries that are highly dependent economically on other countries tend to be more susceptible to economic crises. Vulnerability is especially acute for developing countries that rely heavily on exports of one or a few raw materials and primary commodities. Fluctuations in the world market and falling prices for their goods, combined with an economic downturn, can be devastating. The impact may threaten broad segments of the population, contributing to a decline in support for the government and a rise in popular backing for revolutionaries. In revolutionary situations, states lose popular support, and rulers may become isolated and be abandoned even by the dominant classes who are not generally given to supporting revolutionary or radical social change.

Revolutionary outcomes result when members of the polity defect from the regime or when challengers successfully neutralize or defeat the armed forces and seize control of the state apparatus. Where the core of a regime refuses to relinquish power in a revolutionary situation, challengers may have to resort to large-scale disruptive tactics and armed struggle to overthrow the government. Certain states are especially vulnerable to revolutionary outcomes. States that are highly exclusive, repressive, and corrupt often have a narrow base of support and may be quickly abandoned by members of the polity, facilitating a revolutionary outcome. States that depend on external support are also vulnerable to a revolutionary outcome. Such dependent states may lose their external support for various reasons, including an interest in preventing deteriorating conditions and further radicalization of politics. These shifts in international alignment and the withdrawal of external support may expedite the overthrow of the government, producing a revolutionary outcome.

Complex processes affect the immediate political outcome of revolutions. In most revolutionary situations, alternative contenders such as radical and moderate challengers compete against each other for state power. Generally, in economically polarized situations of the developing world, where income inequalities are high and growing, liberal and moderate political organizations do not gain a great deal of strength and popular support. But the political ideology and organizational strength of challengers do not always affect their likelihood of seizing power. In fact, the immediate political outcome of revolutions is not easily predictable at the outset of revolutionary struggles. The mobilization options that are available are central in determining which challengers will be victorious. For example, in Nicaragua, state policies under the ruling Somoza family marginalized the moderate opposition for decades. When the government refused to hold free elections in 1978, any chance for peaceful change was blocked, and the opposition became radicalized, thereby narrowing the mobilization options. This improved the position of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, a small, militant guerrilla organization who had already launched an armed struggle to overthrow the regime and was eventually able to seize power. In Iran, the majority of the opposition fought for independence, freedom, and social and economic justice, but the Shah’s policies had severely repressed the secular political organizations and closed all mobilization options. As a result, mosques remained the only public spaces that enjoyed some measure of autonomy from the state and provided relatively safe places for the people to gather and mobilize. Mobilization through the mosque enabled Khomeini and a small segment of his clerical supporters to lead the struggles in the final stages of the conflicts and seize
power. In the Philippines, radical leftist revolutionaries, the most powerful political organization in the 1980s, failed to seize power in part because their radical ideology threatened the privileged classes and prevented the formation of a broad coalition. When the radicals boycotted the fateful election in 1986, moderates were able to take the lead in the struggles against Marcos, and in the end, the reformist elite was able to take power. Thus, it is reasonable to say that the revolutionary process itself exerts a great deal of influence on the eventual outcome of the revolutionary struggle.

Once the state is overthrown, revolutionary coalitions generally break down. Although revolutionary challengers need broad coalitions to seize state power, these coalitions become superfluous once the revolutionaries control the instruments of coercion. The new revolutionary regime is often more centralized and sometimes more repressive than the old one and may not fulfill all its prerevolutionary promises. The long-term structural outcomes of revolutions are often determined by complex factors and not easily predictable. The interest and ideology of the revolutionary regime only partly determine the structural changes pursued by the new government. Other internal forces, from both within and outside the polity, can mobilize to realize their interests, thus affecting the structural outcome of revolutions. The overthrow of the state’s repressive apparatus often leads to reduced repression and provides an opportunity for various classes and collectivities to mobilize and demand change. Additionally, international political and ideological conditions may also influence the internal development of post-revolutionary societies, particularly where the country’s economy depends on external sources and the state requires outside support.

Future analyses of social revolutions would benefit from perspectives that synthesize and analyze large-scale social transformations, class analysis, states, ideologies, and role of global forces. It is important to understand the large-scale social changes that often precede social revolutions. They can affect major interests and the capabilities of various actors and set the stage for social conflicts. Changes in the class structure are also critical in understanding social revolutions. While class conflict may prevent and delay revolutions, class coalitions seem to have played a very important role in revolutions in developing countries by disrupting the social structure and facilitating the overthrow of the government. State-centered theories of revolution can contribute much by specifying state vulnerabilities and conditions that may result in the isolation of the state and its abandonment by broad segments of the population. Finally, analyses of ideology can contribute immensely to explanations of social revolutions by analyzing the causes of the rise of revolutionary challengers and explaining why large segments of the population shift their support to such challengers.

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See also Civil War; Conflicts; Marx, Karl; Peasants’ Movements

Further Readings
Modern political theory locates the notion of “rights” at the center of its debates. The liberal state and constitutional theory have emphasized rights as fundamental building blocks of the social order. In political thought, after a long lull, rights are once again a renewed focus of interest. Political theorists now commonly opt to articulate social demands in terms of rights rather than (for instance) as a general utility or integrity of the body politic. In this vein, several theorists—above all, those with liberal roots—have adopted the Lockean vision of the just political order whose primary obligation is to respect the moral rights of its citizens.

However, there is a broad spectrum of definition for the concept of rights. In its older, objective usage, a right means “what is just” or “what is fair.” Aristotle, for instance, used dikaion to indicate that a society is rightly ordered. However, this “objective” sense of right is not equivalent to our modern, subjective notion of rights, which originates, according to historians, in the thought of John Locke in the 18th century—or perhaps even further back, in late-medieval European thinking. In this subjective sense, rights are sometimes defined as “normative attributes” that pertain to persons. Other approaches see rights as entitlements to choose, entitlements (not) to perform certain actions, or entitlements to expect that others will (not) perform certain actions.

This entry defines a right as a legal or moral recognition of choices or interests to which a particular weight is attached. It proceeds in three steps. The first section elucidates the different types of rights and the second section the forms and functions of rights. The final section delivers a brief overview of the major theories of rights.

Types of Rights

Any study of rights should begin with an elucidation of the multiple categories of rights. In the realm of politics, one can distinguish between legal and moral rights, between rights as such and “human rights,” and between civil, political, social, and cultural rights.

Legal and Moral Rights

Legal rights describe a type of institutional arrangement in which interests are guaranteed legal protection, choices are guaranteed legal effect or goods, and opportunities are provided to individuals on a guaranteed basis. Assertions that X has a legal right to Y are tested according to whether the law does in fact recognize and implement X’s right to Y.

Moral rights express the justified demand that such institutional arrangements should be implemented, maintained in the name of a fundamental principle that accords importance to certain basic individual values such as autonomy or moral agency. The assertion that X has a moral right in the absence of any legal recognition of this right may take the form of a demand for the law to be changed.

Natural rights can be considered as a subclass of moral rights. These are fundamental rights, derived from nature or divine authority, and enjoyed by all men and women regardless of their beliefs and position in society. They pertain to human beings in the state of nature, prior to the institution of society. Natural rights are thus considered to precede civic rights held in the political order. They are therefore universal, inalienable, and indefeasible: They cannot be contested by political authority, and indeed, it is the responsibility of those who govern to protect them. Consequently, the concept was used to justify the revolutions of the 18th century on the grounds that the existing law infringed on individuals’ natural rights. In the United States, for instance, the Declaration of Independence (1776) against the British colonial state was based on an appeal to the natural rights of all Americans. The Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789) also refers to certain “natural rights” of mankind.

Rights and Human Rights

This distinction between moral or natural rights and legal rights leads to another difference: the difference between rights and human rights. One agrees with Michael Freeden (1991) that human rights are the most basic prerogatives pertaining to what is essentially human, while other categories of rights are more specific, limited, and normally
derivative. Freeden defines human rights as a “conceptual device, expressed in linguistic form, that assigns priority to certain human or social attributes regarded as essential to the adequate functioning of all human beings” (p. 7).

The promulgation of the French Declaration in 1789 gave an impetus to the debate about the rights of man. In his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), Edmund Burke attacked the abstract, metaphysical, and simplistic character of human rights, which he contrasted with the “real rights”—related to their particular history and circumstances—of “Englishmen.” In reaction, Thomas Paine published *Rights of Man* (1791) in which he argued that having been created rational and equal, man had natural rights including those to liberty, property, and security, as well as the right of resistance to oppression. Two other major critics of human rights were Jeremy Bentham and Karl Marx. For the former, the term *right* should be confined to its legal sense, since the demand for a right is no more a right in itself than a hungry man’s plea for bread. Marx claimed in *On the Jewish Question* (1843) that there was an inherent contradiction in the French Declaration. Whereas in the “political community” man regards himself as a “communal being,” in “civil society” he acts as a private individual who regards other men as a means. Marx therefore concluded that “not one of the so-called rights of man goes beyond egoistic man, man as a member of civil society, namely, an individual withdrawn into himself, his private interest, and his private desire and separated from the community.”

**Civil, Political, Social, and Cultural Rights**

In a seminal essay published in 1950, Thomas Marshall divided the development of citizenship in England into three parts: civil, political, and social. The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom/liberty of the person: freedom of speech, thought, and faith; the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts; and the right to justice. These so-called first-generation rights were most prominently proclaimed during the revolutions of the 18th century, particularly in the French Declaration of 1789 and the 1791 Bill of Rights in the United States. The institutions most directly associated with civil rights are courts of justice. In theory, civil rights exist independently of state action, protecting the freedom of the individual against potential encroachments by state power. They are often called “liberty rights” since they are based on a “negative” conception of freedom.

The political element means the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. These so-called second-generation rights developed principally over the course of the 19th century, and their corresponding institutions are parliaments and local government councils.

The social element ranges from the right to a modicum of social welfare and security, to the right to share fully in the social heritage, and to live the life of a civilized human being according to the standard prevailing in society. These rights, which represent a continuation of several claims made by 19th-century socialist movements, came to fruition in the 20th century in the framework of the welfare state. The institutions most closely associated with social rights are the educational system and social services. These rights are also known as “claim rights” on the grounds that they represent “positive” freedoms—that is, concrete rights that individuals and groups can expect to enjoy a decent standard of living. They rely on state intervention to guarantee societal solidarity and equality. Codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), social rights have also been formalized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (United Nations, 1966).

The International Covenant of 1966 also recognizes “cultural rights,” which can be defined as the body of rights guaranteeing respect, protection, and promotion of cultural references and expression—that is, the ensemble of values, convictions, beliefs, language, and knowledge—through which individuals identify themselves, communicate with each other, forge a shared sense of belonging, and consider themselves to be recognized with dignity. Sometimes known as “fourth-generation,” cultural rights were recognized in the second half of the 20th century, particularly in North America. “Multiculturalist” authors interpret cultural rights as being clearly individual and not collective since their ultimate purpose is the protection of the individual. Indeed, cultural rights such as the freedom
to speak one’s native language are intimately linked to other individual rights such as dignity or freedom of expression.

**Forms and Functions of Rights**

An analysis of rights can be divided into two parts: a description of the internal structure of rights and a description of what rights do for those who hold them.

**Forms of Rights**

The most famous legal analysis of the form of a right is that of Wesley Hohfeld (1879–1918). Hohfeld argued that the proposition “X has a right to do R” could mean four things:

1. First, it could mean that X has a **privilege** to do R. In this case, Y (or anyone else) has “no rights” toward X, and X has no duty to perform that action. Singing in your bath or painting your bedroom blue would be examples.

2. X has a **claim** (or a right) against Y. Consequently, Y has a duty toward X to do R. For instance, an employer has the duty to pay wages to employees or a parent has a duty to provide food to his or her child.

3. X has a **power** to do R, which alters the legal rights and duty of Y. For instance, a police officer has the power to ask to see the license of a speeding driver.

4. X has an **immunity** with regard to R. In this case, Y (or anyone else) lacks the power to bring about a certain consequence for X. For instance, witnesses in court have a right not to be obliged to incriminate themselves.

However, Hohfeld’s categorization makes no attempt to clarify what the function of a right is. There are two broad accounts of the special relation between duties and right bearers that have been proposed: the choice theory of right and the interest (or benefit) theory of rights.

**Functions of Rights**

The “choice theory” (or will theory) singles out the rights bearer. It holds that when I have a right to do something, what is effectively protected is my choice of whether or not to do it. It accentuates my freedom and my self-fulfillment. In a famous article, Herbert L. Hart argued that if there was one natural right, it was the equal right of all men to be free. In addition to this right of freedom, Alan Gerwith establishes a right to well-being. John Rawls, too, assumes in his theory of justice that rights pertain to primary goods that rational and moral individuals would regard as necessary to the functioning of a just constitutional framework. In all cases, the end is to ensure the conditions without which autonomy is impossible and without which human agency cannot be realized.

The “benefit theory” maintains that the function of a right is to further the interests of the individual who enjoys it. An owner has a right not because owners have choices but because ownership makes the owner better off. To have a right is, then, to be the intended beneficiary of someone else’s duty. In other words, rights and duties are correlative. A less strict version (the “interest theory”) maintains that individuals have rights whenever an interest that they hold is regarded as sufficiently important in itself to justify obliging others to promote that interest in some way. In this interpretation, rights thus generate duties.

**Theories of Rights**

Richard Tuck has correctly pointed out that the meaning of a term such as right is “theory dependent.” In other words, the elucidation of a complex notion such as rights requires an account of the possible theories about politics that employ the concept.

**The Natural Rights Paradigm**

According to Freedren, the theory of natural rights includes four elements. First, it argues simply that human beings are born with such rights, that they are part of our initial equipment in the same ways as our bodies are. A common core of human nature is thus defined by encircling it with a succinct list of natural rights. They are innate, inalienable, and indefeasible. Second, natural rights are presocial. They are not the product of any social artifice; rather, political societies are created for the very purpose of ensuring the recognition and
implementation of natural rights. Third, natural rights are absolute; they prevail over any other consideration that might deny their validity, applicability, or range. Fourth, such rights are universal; all human beings, irrespective of time and space, enjoy them. Historically, appeal was made to natural law or the law of God. The primary exposition of natural law is to be found in the writings of the Dominican St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) who defined natural law as the participation of divine law—discoverable by reason—in God's rational creatures. For John Locke (1632–1704), since we are all creatures of God, we have inalienable rights. The modern age, however, is more skeptical about revelation as a basis for political morality. Recent theories have attempted instead to identify the deep moral values and principles that underlie the idea of rights. John Finnis (1940–), for example, has revived some of the central tenets of natural law: If the overriding rationale of natural law is to establish what is truly good for human individuals, it follows that one needs some conception of human good—of individual fulfillment in a form (or in a range of forms) of communal life that fosters rather than hinders such fulfillment. This might include, among other things, the right not to be tortured, not to be deprived of one's capacity to procreate, the right not to be lied to, and so on. Finnis insists that the first principles of natural law are not deductively inferred from any speculative principles or metaphysical propositions about human nature. To discover what is naturally right is to ask not what is in accordance with human nature but what is in accordance with reason.

Legal Positivism

This central claim of natural law is rejected by legal positivists who deny that the legal validity of a norm depends on its substantive moral quality. Bentham (1748–1832) attacked natural rights in his Anarchical Fallacies as "rhetorical nonsense—nonsense upon stilts," calling rights in general "fictions," before distinguishing between the "bad" fiction of natural rights and the "good" fiction of legal rights. He analyzed rights as a rational human contrivance necessary for political and social life. Rights could exist only within this framework and were not anterior to law: "From real laws come real rights, but from imaginary laws, from laws of nature... come imaginary rights" (Principles of Legislation, Chapter XIII). Together with his disciple John Austin (1790–1859), Bentham laid the foundations of legal positivism, which rejects the conception that rights exist independent from human enactment. The validity of any right can always be traced to an objectively identifiable source—be it the command of a sovereign for Bentham and Austin, the rule of recognition for Hart, or a basic norm that validates the constitution for Hans Kelsen. Consequently, legal positivism establishes a clear distinction between "ought" (what is morally desirable) and "is" (what actually exists). It does not follow, however, that they subscribe to the proposition that an unjust law must be obeyed. Both Austin and Bentham, for instance, acknowledged that disregard for unjust laws is justified if it promotes change for the good. According to Hart, rights are distinguished from other moral considerations by the fact that they protect and promote the specifically human interest in freedom.

Rights as Trumps

In the 1970s, the foundations of legal philosophy were shaken by the vision of law advanced by American jurist Ronald Dworkin (1931–). Dworkin's attack on legal positivism and utilitarianism is founded on his concern that the law ought to "take rights seriously." Rights are best understood as "trumps" over some background justification for political decisions that state a goal for the community as a whole. For instance, if someone has a right to publish pornography, this means that it is wrong to act in violation of that right even if there are some reasons to believe that the community would be better off without pornography. Dworkin's thesis is grounded in the conviction that no government may impose any constraint on a person that this person could not accept without abandoning her or his sense of equal worth. Utilitarianism—which identifies the notion of average or collective welfare as the goal of human action—should be replaced by a rights-based theory centering on individual independence. However, this liberal conception of rights differs from a libertarian conception such as that advocated by Robert Nozick. While the latter is concerned with preserving individual choice
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(limited only by the rights of others to the same good), the former insists on an equal treatment of all members of society. Dworkin’s conception of political morality includes three elements: (1) justice, which incorporates both individual rights and collective goals for treating citizens with equal concern and respect; (2) fairness, which designates the procedures that give all citizens equal influence in decisions that affect them; and (3) procedural due process, which relates to the correct procedures for determining whether a citizen has violated the law.

This metaphor of rights as “trumps” raises the question of whether there is any absolute right. According to Gerwith, a right is absolute when it cannot be overridden by any circumstances, can thus never be justifiably infringed, and must be fulfilled without any exceptions. Gerwith asserts that there is at least one such absolute right: All innocent persons have an absolute right not to be the intended victims of a homicidal project.

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See also Citizenship; Civic Culture; Civic Participation; Democracy, Quality; Equality; Human Rights, Comparative Perspective; Human Rights in International Relations; Individualism; Judicial Review; Judicial Systems; Justice; Liberalism; Liberty; Locke, John; Multiculturalism; Pluralism; Positivism; Utilitarianism

Further Readings

Risk and Public Policy

The relationship between risk and public policy goes back to the 17th-century Prussian origins of scientific enquiry into policy and state science, as part of cameralist Polizeiwissenschaft (German for “public policy”). The systematic study of policy was to ensure the well-being of the local state and its subjects. There has been little change to that understanding since. Risks include not only threats to health through environmental, economic, or social processes but also risks to actors arising from political processes themselves. In terms of definition, the literature usually follows the economist Frank Knight in suggesting that risks are associated with events whose probabilities are known. Consequently, three sets of linkages between risk and public policy can be distinguished: (1) related to the substantive analysis of risks, (2) the context of policy making related to risk, and (3) the policy instruments employed in addressing risk.

Substantive Analysis of Risks

The relationship between risk and public policy can be defined in a substantive sense. Accordingly, the interest here is how public policies deal with particular types of risk. Within this discussion of substantive risks, three separate but overlapping concerns can be identified.

Risks to Individual and Collective Health

One key consideration over the past 3 decades has been the interest in risk as a result of environmental and technological developments, namely,
the risks to individual and collective health that public policies are supposed to protect against. The field of science and technology studies has considered how organizations deal with uncertainties (potential events to which probabilities cannot be assigned) and risks (potential events to which probabilities can be assigned). Significant attention has been paid to the socially constructed nature of expert decision making, such as regarding the specifications of nuclear reactors or civilian aircraft. Further, there has been significant interest in organizational processes, whether relating to the “normalization of deviance” as part of (interorganizational) processes; the inevitability, as discussed by Charles Perrow (1999), of things going wrong; or the avoidance of such errors in so-called high-reliability organizations. This interest has moved into the field of environmental and civil contingency-related risks, especially given the concern over the impact of climate change (e.g., flooding) and security. A related category of interest has concerned itself with how changing values among the population have led to a growing distrust of large technical systems, especially those associated with risks of catastrophic consequence, for example, nuclear reactors. But attention has not merely been paid to high-tech or catastrophic large-scale risks. In a comparative study of nine risks (e.g., air pollution, dangerous dogs, and pesticides), Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein, and Robert Baldwin (2001) found significant differences in risk regulation regimes that could not be explained by a purely functional “risk profile” explanation. Related to this, Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge (2005) found institutional similarities in regulatory responses to one particular risk, namely, dog bites in public, across significantly different national institutional contexts. Regardless of the political system, regulatory responses to media pressure in the wake of fatal dog-bite attacks was remarkably similar.

**Risk and the Political Process**

A second key consideration relates to how actors deal with risk affecting them as part of the political process. Such substantive issues of risk to actors are at the heart of the public policy literature on regulation, in particular regarding the regulation of infrastructures. Here, the key interest is in understanding the institutional conditions that accentuate so-called political risks. In contexts in which developmental outcomes (such as investment in infrastructure modernization and expansion) depend on private investors, as governments lack budgetary resources, private investors will adjust the levels of their investment according to the risk of their being expropriated through administrative-regulatory means. The risk of such expropriation is particularly high following the initial investment in fixed assets (such as infrastructure). As a result, private investors seek regulatory devices that reduce political and regulatory discretion. Therefore, policies need to be devised that reduce administrative discretion in the context of specific political institutional constellations. At the same time, the literature has also been interested in reducing the risk of “capture” and “drift”—that is, the risk that private parties will not fulfill their mandate or rather redirect the goals of regulation away from oversight toward advocacy of their own interests. Following a period in which the literature assumed a near inevitability that “agents” would escape oversight, more recent literature in institutional analysis has pointed to devices to hardwire regulatory regimes in order to reduce problems of political and “private” risks.

**Risk and Responsibility When Things Go Wrong**

The third area of concern is the risk of being blamed when things go wrong. This literature links to the long-established interests in explaining why politicians delegate certain tasks to agencies rather than maintain decision-making authority (the “blame-shift” hypothesis that has not received much empirical support) as well as other strategies by which politicians seek to avert or divert the risks of being blamed, such as strategies of presentation (relying on spin and other communication devices) or on policy strategies. The latter can be either explicit by abandoning particular public activities or less explicit in the sense of frontline abandonment. For example, street-level bureaucrats, such as police forces, withdraw from particular activities that have caused public backlash. It has been suggested that an increasingly adversarial and legalistic environment has accentuated the trend toward frontline abandonment.
The Context of Policy Making

Looking at the contextual setting of risk and public policy indicates the ways in which either the context of policy making has shifted or the specific conditions under which policies associated with particular risks arise. Again, three literatures can be distinguished.

In the first understanding of a changing context, the key environmental change is associated with Ulrich Beck’s “risk society.” According to Beck, societies are not just organized by risk but are also confronted with risks that are generated through processes of modernization itself. Whereas in the past, risks were associated with exogenous (or external) events (rain, asteroids), contemporary society is faced by endogenous (or manufactured) risks, such as industrial and automotive emissions. Importantly, the nature of these endogenous risks leads to a redistribution of positions within society in which wealth no longer directly insures against risk exposure. Instead, position is defined by knowledge and access to information, as risks are largely “invisible.”

Further, the risk society is also characterized by increased skepticism, if not hostility, toward traditional sources of authority and expertise. Moreover, as noted by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (1982), accounts informed by grid group cultural theory highlight value conflicts and shifts within society and therefore stress the importance of risk perceptions, thus challenging the supposedly neutral technologies of risk assessment.

A further literature considers how risks provoke “moral panics.” Heightened public attention translates into pressure (transmitted by the media) for something to be done to which politicians seek to respond. Their knee-jerk reactions are regarded as suboptimal, not just because decision making under pressure is said to reduce information flows but also because uncertainty regarding cause and effect is prevalent. Consequently, inappropriately designed responses emerge that are made even more problematic by agencies seeking to regulate for the “last 10%,” thereby incurring substantial costs.

Risk and Policy Instruments

A third type of linkage between risk and public policy is particularly interested in instruments. Indicating a fundamental divide between normative assumptions, the literature is divided into two key areas. One focuses in particular on the importance of deliberative and proceduralized solutions to questions of risk, pointing in particular to the societal context, as described by Beck. In light of inherent value conflicts within society, it is argued that deliberative processes are likely to narrow rather than widen differences and that therefore procedural devices need to be established to allow such deliberation to take place. A key example of this literature has been the rise of the precautionary principle, a policy approach that has gained considerable attention, with accusations that it invites “capture” and “populism” as it suggests (depending on exact definition) that the burden of proof can be reversed if considerable doubts regarding safety exist. Particular activities or products are no longer innocent until proven guilty; instead, they are assumed to be guilty unless proven otherwise.

In contrast to the deliberation-oriented literature, a separate strain argues the case for improved “risk analysis” instruments—that is, attempts at rationalizing decision making by enhancing the quality of information used. Such instruments and technologies have garnered substantial interest, especially since the 1970s and the rise of the “cost–benefit state” in the United States. Subsequently, such instruments have gained increased currency in other jurisdictions, for example, in the form of regulatory impact assessments or the advocacy of diverse “risk management” tools. These tools supposedly improve decision making and reduce “irrationality” among politicians and civil servants alike. Whereas the attraction of these instruments is partly to reassert authority in decision making and prevent “hasty” decision making (and thus “overregulation”), it is less evident that these instruments have actually reduced the impact of interest groups and heightened public attention on public policy. In contrast, they appear to have themselves become part of contested policy making, given that their performance in terms of controlling risks has proven to be less than satisfactory. Indeed, Michael Power has suggested that such attempts at rationalizing risk in policy making is likely to accentuate rather than reduce risks. Not unrelated to contributions that seek to “rationalize” decision making regarding risk, there have been debates about instruments to insure against actualized risks and
Rituals are a challenge for political science. They can be found in a great variety of forms and are multifunctional to such an extent that science has been unable to find an unambiguous definition up to now. Already the term *ritual* was used in antiquity in a double sense—with a primarily religious meaning (religious cult) or modally (the type and manner of carrying out the ceremonies of the cult). In Roman religion, *ritual* denotes an ordered ceremonial activity. Theology and religious studies adhere to this day to the concept of *ritual* as a collective term for religious ceremonies as well as for individual sequences therein. It includes the cults and worshipping customs of Jews and Christians as well as those of various peoples in different times and places, from the Egyptian Isis cult or the Roman priestly authority of the Vestal Virgins to the religious forms of contemporary Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Islam. Early on, Confucian philosophers investigated the legitimate role of ritual (in Chinese, *li*) in the guidance of a society. This entry will discuss the impact of such traditions on recent developments in the social sciences and the renewed importance of the study of rituals.

From the perspective of religious studies, ritual is a matter of cultic actions that follow fixed rules for the purpose of worshipping God, the gods, or figures considered to be holy. Religious rites express explicit wishes for propitiation, solace, recognition, and order. They refer to a transcendental power. Their rules, texts, and notes are gathered in Christian churches into official liturgical books. For instance, in the Roman Catholic Church they are described in the Rituale Romanum dating from 1614 (Pope Paul V), which in 1918 became obligatory for all dioceses. Anthropology, ethnology, anthropological religious research, sociology, and psychology attach great significance to the conceptual-theoretical recording, collection, and classification of religious and profane ceremonies.

The founder of anthropological religious research, Edward Burnett Tylor (1873), distinguished religious rites as an expressive-symbolical gestural language of theology from those that serve for communicating with and influencing...
Rituals

spirits. With his investigation of the religion of the Semites, William Robertson Smith created an initial foundation for the systematic investigation of rituals. He developed the thesis that religions essentially consist of beliefs and rites, with rites and practical customs being dominant. Arnold van Gennep’s *Les Rites de Passage* recognizes the rhythm-creating function of rituals as a reflection of natural rhythms. A phase pattern serves for classifying rites or individual sequences. Transitional rites are intended to allow individuals and groups to transcend spatial, temporal, and social borders. For Gennep, rites are “compelling actions.” Thus, the acceptance of a gift has an obligatory effect on the recipient. Gennep’s conceptualization gained lasting recognition for the anthropological investigation of initiatory rites.

The social sciences speak of rituals as a collective designation with which, however, individual scientists relate different categories and theories. Ritual and rite are frequently used as synonymous terms. Émile Durkheim and his students Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss developed, with regard to the sociology of religion, a theory later taken up by social anthropology and French structuralism. Durkheim defined religion as a system of beliefs and practices that are united in a single moral community. For the Durkheim school, rituals bring about social integration; they are mechanisms that produce social conformity and solidarity. Whenever people come together, there is, according to Durkheim, a natural tendency to coordinate, standardize, and repeat their actions. Durkheim designated the feeling of participating through group activity in something transcendent as “the sacred,” which is represented in symbols.

With Max Weber, too, rituals can have the function of creating identity, based on common interests and the “ritual qualification” of membership, as he demonstrated with early religions or the cultic communities of the polis. Subsequently, in Chinese Confucianism and Taoism, those well versed in writing and literature (ritually trained scholar-politicians) occupied high political offices. According to Weber, rituals can mark the social differentiation of a society. Thus, caste societies are based on the ritual separation of occupations and professions. Social scientists at the turn of the 20th century focused mainly on the rituals of traditional, preindustrial societies. They linked them closely to religion and magic and excluded other (profane) manners of behavior. Social rationalization, however, caused religions and rituals to diverge more strongly. The tendencies of Western societies toward rationalization, which were analyzed by Weber, are capable, through a “disenchantment” of the world, of relegating religious rituals to the margins of public and private life, or of situating them in the political and social domains.

### Political Rituals

Terminologically, the concept of ritual cannot be limited to religious and magical rituals, for the conceptual core consists of ritual acts. These are omnipresent in modern and postmodern societies, additionally and especially in political life: from ceremonies in parliaments, inaugurations of presidents, jurisprudence, diplomatic protocol, and electoral campaigns all the way to debates in the mass media. Political leaders endeavor by means of rituals to shape a political reality for their followers. Revolutionaries seek new paths for the legitimation of a political regime. Through their participation in rituals, citizens identify themselves with political parties and social movements that are comprehensible only in symbolic form. The political elite live amid rituals that regulate the interaction among its members and with the public at large.

Edward Shils found that ritual still had a bad reputation among utilitarian-thinking intellectuals in the 1960s; the advance of rationalization and secularization had caused it to be considered as no more than a relic. There are, however, good reasons to treat it as a contemporary phenomenon sui generis. Political rituals have been noted, but their empirical investigation is only now getting under way. Impulses for research came from three directions: (1) from the debate concerning symbolic policy and politics of symbols (as discussed by Murray Edelman, 1971), (2) from analyses of fascist and communist dictatorships (such as that of Charles Lane, 1981), and (3) from political culture research such as that of Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. Attention shifted from religious to symbolic rituals. Inasmuch as symbols imbue actions with meaning, rituals allow persons and groups to develop their own worldviews. Politics is then the art of understanding and further developing (in
accordance with one’s self-interest) the predominant symbols of an era.

Symbolic politics are capable of simply feigning political activity before a mass audience and of providing benefits for an elite. But as a rule, they are structured so as to include the audience in political activities. They refer to the symbolic and cultural capital of individuals (as noted by Pierre Bourdieu), which determines social prestige through the use of language, education, and culture. Symbolic politics are engaged in an unswerving struggle over the designations, concepts, and interpretations of the agenda of public life. When successfully used, they become a communicative power for the purpose of promoting interests. In repressive regimes, rituals can be used to stifle contradiction and to destroy regime opponents, as, for example, in the Moscow purges of the 1930s.

In addition to the interest in the ritual activity of integrated groups in the tradition of Smith and Durkheim, questions arise as to the function of rituals in conflicts within and between groups and societies or with regard to the establishment of social and political borders. Civil wars, ritualistic terrorism, and failed states demonstrate the political relevance of ritual. They help represent political power openly inasmuch as, for example, constructed traditions and myths are ritualized. In the heterogeneous global society, nationally or culturally based rituals may appear to be dangerous—for instance, in the Western world, the rituals of honor and disgrace. But rituals can also have a pacifying effect, such as the ritual of recurring world conferences, or they can symbolize the concept of peace, as in the sit-ins and human chains of the peace movement during the 1960s and 1970s. Consideration is also given to the biological bases of social behavior that influence the fundamental forms of politics: hierarchy, peer groups, authority, fear, and competition. The ethologist Julian Huxley introduced the term ritualization for the stylized, repetitive gestures and postures of animals. Proceeding from this perspective, ethnological sociology understands this term as a mechanism for regulating social behavior, with which intimacy, formality, territoriality, hierarchy, or difference in age can be expressed, and which simultaneously fosters self-identification. Rituals thus are multifunctional, open processes. The anthropological and literary-critical mainstream regards ritual phenomena as symbolic, expressive activity. Anthropologists such as Victor Turner (1969) applied the concept of ritual to industrial societies, and political scientists such as David I. Kertzer (1988) argued for an application to modern politics. It is basically a matter of inquiring into how symbolic processes enter into politics and why they are important.

For a long time, political scientists tended, through their belief in ongoing secularization, to overlook the phenomena of ritual and concomitantly of the body as carriers of communication. Later, in the 1980s, in the United States, a cross-disciplinary investigative approach was established around the Journal of Ritual Studies. Sociologists, political scientists, jurists, media and communications scholars, art theoreticians, dramaturgists as well as literary and cultural scholars united in the investigation of ritual aspects in the subsystems of postmodern societies. The political, social, cultural, and religious dynamic since the end of the East–West conflict has sharpened the awareness of ritual forms in the political sphere. In parallel, religion has been rediscovered as a crucial social-political factor. Samuel P. Huntington’s 1996 study The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order became an important point of reference. Initial analytical steps brought to the fore, out of existing microstudies and theoretical outlines, a series of attributes or attributive dimensions. Jan Platvoet (1955) suggests distinguishing between 13 characteristics or functions with which rituals may be identified. He argues that rituals are interactive, collective, a habit, a traditionalizing innovation, expressive, communicative, symbolic, multimedial, a performance, performative, aesthetic, strategic, and integrative. Proceeding from the experiences of participants in various ritual acts, Ronald L. Grimes (1995) formulated a typology that endeavors, under the generic term of ritual, to classify the entire area into six types: ritualization, rules of propriety, ceremony, magic, liturgy, and celebration.

Communication, Performance, Political Performance

The three key concepts of communication, performance, and political performance are characteristic
of various social-scientific approaches toward explaining ritual processes. The widespread conception of rituals as communicative activities is related, on the one hand, to the theory of action that goes back to Max Weber and Talcott Parsons and, on the other hand, to the shift toward language as activity accomplished in the 20th century by philosophy and by the theory of science. According to the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, speech is an activity guided by rules. The ritual as text, as script, determines sequences of actions and those engaged therein. Its symbols refer to certain systems of belief or knowledge. Rituals are thus a special genre of communication within the communicative repertoire of a social unit.

Alongside stands an application of philological methods to the study of human activities that is derived from structuralism (e.g., the work of Leonard Bloomfield, Claude Lévi-Strauss, etc.). The speech acts of a ritual or of other forms of activity are segmented into repetitive parts whose distribution is classified with the goal of comprehending the synchronous coaction as a structured semiotic system. The analysis is text related and without contextualizations, for example, of a social-historical, geographical, or economic type. The primary object of investigation consists of the frequently unconscious ritualizations of everyday speaking (performance). There are significant investigations into rituals of transition (e.g., by van Gennep) or rituals of accessibility (e.g., by Erving Goffman) on entrance into a new situation, a new office, an assembly, or a segment of life and into the changes in status and roles that are contained therein. The accent of these investigations is on social borders.

The terminology of performance that has spread from the artistic program of “action art” to the analysis of ritual should draw attention to the fact that activities embody and construct meaning. Clifford Geertz and others have included this realization in the term cultural performance; Turner speaks of social drama. The analysis thus reacts to social upheavals during the 1970s that were triggered by new social and political movements, by a sensitization to spiritual ideas and foreign traditions (New Age), and by the liturgical renewal (Second Vatican Council) of the Roman Catholic Church. Inasmuch as the processes and transformative power of theatrical dramaturgy and ritual prove to be interrelated, it is expected that rituals will be able to help channel social crises into the reconstruction and renewal of societies.

Above all, the mass media have taken over the role of staging reality for a worldwide audience through the ritual formats of the news broadcast, talk shows, and political events such as inaugurations, parliamentary hearings, conferences, and wartime reports. The holders of political office have at all times made use of a broad repertoire of symbols to create solidarity among people and to impart to them—in Durkheim’s sense—a group or community identity: flags; hymns; insignia of power such as coats of arms, the throne, the crown, ceremonial clothes, and reserved colors; political symbols of above and below, good and evil, or left and right; and certain animals (e.g., lions, eagles), key words, sounds, and images, as well as buildings.

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See also  
Durkheim, Émile; Political Communication; Political Culture; Religion; Symbols, Political; Weber, Max

Further Readings

Robust Statistics

Traditional methods for estimating regression models can be unduly influenced by a small subset
of the data. For example, using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to model economic growth in 15 industrialized democracies, Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett find that the interaction between Left governments and organized labor is positively and significantly correlated with economic performance. In his analysis of the data, however, Bruce Western illustrates that these findings are largely determined by the Norwegian case. Using robust estimation techniques to account for this observation reveals much greater uncertainty about the influence of the interaction effect on economic performance. OLS estimation minimizes large residuals at the expense of degrading the fit of the remaining observations. The coefficient estimates it generates can thus be strongly influenced by even a single large residual, as was the case in the model estimated by Lange and Garret. Like OLS estimation, unusual points may also influence traditional maximum likelihood methods. The likelihood often depends on means and variances, whose estimated values can be largely determined by points lying outside the majority of the data. Thus, when implementing any regression method based on the mean and variance, the analyst must be wary of unusual observations. In this entry, various ways of dealing with this problem are discussed.

Observations can be unusual in two important ways: First, an observation may be an outlier if the value of the explanatory variable is typical of the sample but the value of the outcome variable is atypically large or small; alternatively, an observation may be a leverage point if the value of the explanatory variable(s) is demonstrably different from the rest of the data. An influential observation refers to either an outlier or leverage point whose inclusion in the analysis substantially alters the estimates of the statistics of interest, including parameter estimates and predictions, the estimated variance of these values, and the goodness-of-fit statistics. These influential observations can result from “bad” data (such as data that have been recorded incorrectly), improper modeling of an outcome variable with a heavy-tailed distribution, or models that fail to describe the data well for certain values of the predictor.

Even if only a small fraction of the data—or even a single observation—is influential, estimation strategies that assume all data are modeled correctly may produce erroneous results. To avoid producing incorrect estimates, regression analyses must account for influential observations. A popular strategy for dealing with these observations is the diagnosis and removal of these points before the estimation of a regression model to the remaining “good” data. This technique is acceptable if the observation has been recorded incorrectly and the true value cannot be recovered, if the observation arises from a different population than the other data, or if there is a theoretical justification for excluding the observation from the analysis. It is problematic, in contrast, if the influential point emerges because of heavy-tailed distributions or inadequate models. In these cases, an observation cannot be discarded simply because it fails to fit the model, as removing this data point provides unwarranted support to the incorrect model. Instead, robust regression provides a compromise between deleting influential observations and allowing them to violate the assumptions of traditional regression estimators. When data conform to conventional assumptions, robust and nonrobust methods provide similar estimates of statistics of interest. Robust estimators, however, are resistant to the effects of influential observations and retain their efficiency when data are nonnormal.

### Diagnosing Influential Points

To determine if a robust regression approach is necessary, the analyst must establish whether there are influential points in the data set. Before fitting a regression model, the investigator often conducts exploratory data analysis such as visualizing the variables in scatterplots and box plots. While a visual examination of the data can sometimes be used to detect outliers and leverage points, it cannot determine whether these points are influential, nor does it capture all potential influence points. Another popular strategy for detecting outliers is a post hoc examination of the residuals from the regression analysis. Though a large residual indicates that an observation is an outlier, this outlier may not be an influential point. Moreover, leverage points can exhibit small residuals while altering the estimates of the statistics of interest. Given the limitations of these techniques, it is necessary to examine influence statistics before assuming that there are no influential observations in the data set.
The three most popular measures of influence rely on regression deletion diagnostics that examine the effect of removing a given observation on the estimated quantities of interest. The most commonly used diagnostic for influential cases is Cook’s Distance (Cook’s D), which measures the impact of an unusual observation on the slope coefficients. Unless the observation is an influential point, the coefficient estimates calculated when observation $i$ is removed from the analysis should be similar to the estimated values when this case is included. The Cook’s D is usually assessed by comparing its value with an $F$ distribution, and while there is no universally acknowledged cutoff, a percentile value greater than 50% demonstrates that the $i$th observation has a significant effect on the estimated slope coefficients.

While Cook’s $D$ measures the influence of the $i$th observation on all slope coefficients, the $DFFIT$ provides the actual changes in the prediction estimates caused by the deletion of each case through a measure of the influence of the $i$th observation on the fitted value for $y_i$. The resulting statistic represents the number of estimated standard deviations that the fitted value increases or decreases with the inclusion of the $i$th observation in the model. Any observation with $|DFFIT| > 2\sqrt{(p + 1)/n}$, where $p$ is the number of linear predictors and $n$ is the number of observations, should be investigated.

Finally, the $DFBETA$ is an analogous statistic for examining an observation’s influence on a particular coefficient. It is obtained by calculating the difference between the coefficient estimated with and without the $i$th observation. The resulting statistic measures the change in the number of standard deviations for these two estimates of the coefficient. A large $DFBETA$ value may indicate that the $i$th observation has a large influence on this regression coefficient. The cutoff value for $DFBETA$ statistics is $2/\sqrt{n}$.

These three deletion diagnostics are used to uncover individual observations that are influential. It can be possible, however, for a case that is not individually influential to become highly influential when grouped with other observations. This is known as the masking effect, because the influence of the observation is masked by the presence of a neighboring case. Single-case deletion diagnostics can be extended to assess the changes caused by the deletion of more than one observation at a time. Although this strategy may be effective for small subsets of the data, if all possible subsets of cases are considered multiple-case deletions, diagnostics become computationally burdensome. Thus, measures of influence employing cluster analysis may have to be implemented in order to detect subsets of influence points.

**Robust Regression**

After diagnosing the presence of influential points in the data, an appropriate regression method must be selected to mitigate the effect of these points. In selecting a modeling strategy, an important factor to consider is the breakdown point of the method. The breakdown point is the proportion of incorrect observations that an estimator can support before giving an arbitrarily erroneous result. A breakdown point cannot exceed 50%, because if more than half of the observations are problematic, it is impossible to differentiate the underlying distribution from the contaminating distribution. In the context of estimating the center of a distribution, the mean has a breakdown point of 0, as it can be made arbitrarily large by changing a single observation. The median, in contrast, exhibits the maximum breakdown point.

Resistant statistics are those with breakdown points near 50%. There are three main robust regression techniques that generate resistant statistics: M-estimators, least median estimators, and likelihood modifications. Each of these strategies approaches robust regression differently. M-estimators can be used to weight observations to reduce the effect of influential points. Least median estimators, in contrast, are naturally resilient to influential points due to a high breakdown point of the median. Finally, likelihood modifications allow the investigator to model the distribution of the influential points. While all three techniques are superior to regression models that do not account for influential observations, each method has theoretical and computational strengths and weaknesses that must be considered when choosing a modeling strategy.

**M-Estimators**

Most fitting criteria find parameter estimates that minimize (or maximize) an objective function
of the observed data and the parameters. Minimizing the sum of squared residuals is an example of a broader class of estimators, known as M-estimators, which provide statistics that minimize an objective function of the form \( \sum w_i \rho(r_i) \), where \( r_i \) is the residual of the \( i \)th observation. The function \( \rho \) represents the type of error that the investigator wishes to minimize, such as the squared error, the absolute value of the error, and so on. Many robust regression methods are based on iteratively reweighted M-estimators, where weights \( (w_i) \) are used to diminish the effect of influential points. Because these weighted M-estimators have a higher breakdown point than traditional regression estimators, they are more resistant to influential observations.

The estimates of the parameters \( (\hat{\beta}) \) are easy to calculate (though the standard errors can be obtained only through the use of bootstrap methods). Iteratively reweighted M-estimators are estimated using the following algorithm:

**Step 0:** Assign weight 1 to each data point.

**Step 1:** Find the value of \( \hat{\beta} \) that minimizes \( y_i \).

**Step 2:** Compute the new residuals \( (r_i) \).

**Step 3:** Redefine the weights \( w_i \) using the residuals \( r_i \) by the prescribed weighting scheme.

**Step 4:** Return to Step 1, substituting the new residuals and weights into the objective function.

**Step 5:** Repeat the iterations until the values of \( \hat{\beta} \) have converged.

When using M-estimators, the most important consideration is prescribing a weighting scheme that down-weights influential points in a reasonable way. Since the weights depend on the values of the residuals, plotting \( w_i \) as a function of \( r_i \) shows how large residuals are treated by the weighting scheme. Deletion methods have a weighting function that is 1 on an interval until the residual exceeds the cutoff point determined by the method, and the weighting function immediately drops to 0. A continuous weighting function, in contrast, gradually decreases the weights as the residuals increase.

A popular continuous weighting scheme is Tukey’s biweight method. This iteratively reweighted least squares M-estimator assigns weights between 0 and 1 to all observations, decreasing from 1 to 0 as the residual becomes larger. This method results in the removal of observations whose residuals are too large, but in contrast to deletion methods, a residual that is close to the cutoff point receives a weight that is close to 0, rather than a weight of 1. Like other down-weighting M-estimators, Tukey’s bi-weight method adequately accounts for influential outliers. Under certain circumstances, however, both Tukey’s method and the broader class of M-estimators can be susceptible to high-leverage observations.

**Least Median Estimators**

In contrast to the reweighting methods, it is also possible to define objective functions that are already robust in some sense. In place of \( \sum \rho(r_i) \), functions of the form \( \text{median} \rho(r_i) \) give rise to least median regression. The intuition behind this method is straightforward. Since the median is a statistic that is naturally robust to extreme values, minimizing the objective function allows one (or several) influential points to take a large value of \( \rho(r) \) while the remaining observations have a value of \( \rho(r) \) that is small. The few large values have little or no effect on the estimate of the median, and the values of \( \hat{\beta} \) that are obtained best fit the majority of the data.

One theoretically appealing choice is least median squares (LMS) regression, which arises from choosing \( \rho(r) = r^2 \). The breakdown point of LMS regression for \( p > 1 \) is

\[
\frac{n - 2p + 4}{2n},
\]

which is 50% in large data sets. Although both this method and M-estimation techniques handle outliers in a satisfactory manner, LMS regression is more robust to leverage points. For this reason, it is preferable to other robust regression techniques. However, an exact solution to a least median squares estimation problem necessitates searching over a space of size \( \binom{n}{p+1} \) and inverting a \( (p+1) \times (p+1) \) matrix at each step, which is infeasible for large \( n \) and moderate \( p \). Random subsampling must therefore be used to achieve a good estimator with high probability.
Likelihood Adjustments

In contrast to minimization techniques, the effect of influential points can be reduced using likelihood methods. OLS regression is equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation when the errors are assumed to be independently and identically distributed from the same mean 0 Gaussian distribution. To account for influential points, the sampling distribution of the data can be changed from a Gaussian to a heavy-tailed distribution. This allows for more large residuals to be observed without greatly modifying the estimated mean structure of the regression. A natural choice of heavy-tailed distributions is the Student’s t family. These distributions have polynomial decay, which is slower than the exponential decay of the Gaussian, and as $n \to \infty$, the Student’s t with $v$ degrees of freedom converges to a normal distribution. In contrast to the other techniques, the confidence bounds on parameter estimates, and predictions can be easily obtained from the likelihood function. However, while this likelihood method accounts for influential outliers, like the $M$-estimator, it remains susceptible to leverage points. To account for leverage points in the likelihood framework, it may be necessary to fit a mixture model. This approach acknowledges that the observations may arise from multiple data generating processes, each of which must be modeled.

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See also
Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions;
Regression; Statistics: Overview

Further Readings

ROUSSEAU, JEAN-JACQUES
(1712–1778)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau is a unique figure in the history of political thought whose legacy spans literature and political philosophy with equally outstanding creativity. As a political thinker, Rousseau helped formulate with the greatest rigor the normative standards of modern Western politics. Many ideas and convictions now considered fundamental to modern democracy originated with Rousseau or were revisited by him—sovereignty of the people, the role of the individual, the requisites of fair governance based on respect for the voice of the collective, and the revolutionary dimension of these aspirations. All are to be found in Rousseau’s works. Although not literally a democrat himself (he notes in his most important treatise of political philosophy, *On the Social Contract*, that only a “people of gods” could govern itself under such a regime), Rousseau sketched many of the concepts on which modern democracy rests. In the 18th century, when philosophy contributed new ideas to radically reshape the norms of what is acceptable and desirable in politics and when new classes came to power, Rousseau was seen by many as the soul of his era and a major inspiration for the future. This entry reviews first his life, then his career as a philosopher, and finally his works.

Rousseau’s prominence as a political philosopher should not eclipse his eminent position as a writer. A gifted stylist, Rousseau rightly ranks as one of the most revered authors in the French literary tradition. His literary influence has been of no less importance than his political heritage. Rousseau’s daring *Confessions* (published after his death in 1782) made him the inventor of the major modern autobiographical genre. In the *Confessions*, as well as in other personal narratives, Rousseau does not gloss over the minutiae of his character or its flaws, thus reflecting a new interest in the depiction of the self without any self-aggrandizing descriptions of one’s virtue. In texts such as his *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, Rousseau also set the tone for the early French romanticism—something like half a century ahead of its time—where admiration for nature, recognition of the power of feelings and
emotions on moral behavior, and the taste for solitude and the sentiment of isolation predominate.

Early Life

Born in 1712 in Geneva, Switzerland, to a modest watchmaker who had married the daughter of a pastor, Rousseau belonged neither to the traditional aristocracy nor to the rising bourgeoisie, from which many of the intellectual elite arose. Nothing in his early years or his family background seems to have predestined him to produce the most influential works in political philosophy.

Rousseau’s childhood is like that of many others of his time, a story of multiple separations and loose family links: His mother died soon after his birth, he hardly knew his only brother, and his father had to flee Geneva when Jean-Jacques was 10. Rousseau was left in the custody of a pastor, who oversaw his formal education. Despite these separations, Rousseau considered that he had a happy childhood until age 13, when he became an engraver’s apprentice, suffering the violence of a particularly brutal master. Three years later, this caused him, for fear of being beaten once more, to leave Geneva, after he had found the doors of the city closed because of a curfew. Rousseau began a vagabond lifestyle, traveling to France and Italy, returning at some point to Switzerland, all mostly by foot. For all his life, Rousseau loved walking, eventually giving his last (unfinished) book the title *Reveries of a Solitary Walker*.

In a few years, Rousseau had travelled across many countries, eventually settling down in France. He became a Catholic (converting back to Protestantism in 1754). He discovered the minor provincial nobility with his first patroness, Mme de Warens, who oversaw his conversion to Catholicism. Until his mid-30s, he was employed in a series of positions of domestic service, from lackey to embassy secretary in Italy and from steward (as well as lover) to Mme de Warens to singer and music master or private tutor. All his life, Rousseau resented his dependence on powerful protectors and made sure that he could make an independent living with a modest employment as music copyist. In 1744, he met Thérèse Levasseur, a seamstress and chambermaid, with whom he had at least three children, whom he would abandon. He married her secretly late in his life.

Literary Career

Rousseau’s literary career started in the 1740s, when he met Denis Diderot and the team of the *Encyclopedia* through one of his patronesses, Mme d’Epinay. The *Encyclopedia* was a collective endeavor to present systematically the sum of knowledge of the time. Rousseau contributed several articles on music and also an important text on political economy. He was acquainted with some of the brightest minds of the time, the philosopher Etienne de Condillac and the mathematician and philosopher Jean le Rond d’Alembert, and was in communication with Voltaire. Fame came to him following the publication in 1750 of his *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, which he had submitted to the Academy of Dijon in competition for a prize. His work received the award despite an audacious central claim that the development of sciences and arts (in the parlance of the time, *technique*) contributed not to the development of man but to his regression. His well-crafted paradox satisfied not only the religious conservatives, who were critical of the idea of progress founded on the development of reason and science, but also the modernists, who could see in his text a critique of the building of prejudices through misguided reasoning and a praise of natural reason. It also attracted enough polemics to draw flattering attention to itself.

The *First Discourse*, although certainly not Rousseau’s strongest work, nevertheless inaugurated his systematic reflections on politics. The second discourse—*What Is the Origin of Inequality Among Men, and Is It Authorized by Natural Law?*—written in 1754, clarifies his position. A radical manifesto in favor of equality among men (and, to a certain extent, women), the *Second Discourse* purports to show that inequality is not a social fact but the sign of corruption in society. Rousseau’s position is situated, in the wake of the contractarian theories that had dominated political thought for over a century, in time with Samuel von Pufendorf, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke: Social bonds are not natural but constructed, and any rational explanation of politics has to justify
precisely why it has been built. But Rousseau added one consideration that radically changed the meaning of the social contract: Why should human beings accept a contract that is obviously to the detriment of those being oppressed?

To answer this mystery, Rousseau sketches a new anthropology of the individual, insisting on the rupture between the state of nature and civil society. Rousseau notes the inconsistency of the contractarian theories before him, which suppose that society starts with individuals but assume, like Locke, that they are tied by the rules of natural law. He is equally critical of Hobbes, who reduces the natural links between men to the “battle of all against all”: Conflict is still a social relation. Only people who can relate to one another can fear each other. The informal cooperation imagined by Locke, just like the perpetual strife pictured by Hobbes, already presupposes society and so cannot provide a true outlook on the natural state of man and, thus, any explanation of the beginnings of society.

**Maturity and Isolation**

The *Second Discourse* opens up many major themes for modern political thought. The first is the economic dimension of social links: Only the invention of property—which for Rousseau is not natural—and the necessity to protect it make crucial the guarantees that society offers. Second, the book is characterized by a fundamental pessimism about the origins of society, which could be described as a soft-power coup of the wealthy against the poor: Society was established when the wealthiest convinced the poorest that they both had a similar interest in becoming engaged in the bonds of society, thus making the strongest stronger with the help of the weaker. But this pessimism is balanced with a sort of optimism about the very nature of society. Since men engaged themselves in the bonds of society freely and equally to seek protection, any legitimate social organization should respect this equality and this freedom. Equality and liberty are not solely natural rights; with Rousseau, they have also become legitimate political claims.

With the publication of two major works in 1762, *On Social Contract* and *Emile*, Rousseau develops his thought, insisting that people’s sovereignty derives from the necessity to grant freedom and equality and thus denying any rule by divine law. In the *Second Discourse*, he directly opposes the notion of original sin, or rather the idea that it was a justification for inequalities. In *On Social Contract*, he refuses the justification of domination in the name of religion. Hence, his praise of religious tolerance and, in a famous section of *Emile*, the idea of a natural religion that would be the heart’s call for faith versus the artificiality of established religions.

With such claims, Rousseau would confront again the religious conservatives (be they Protestants or Catholics). But he also opposed the “philosophers” who, in a liberal tradition, considered after Montesquieu that the people could not be the direct source of law. For Rousseau, on the contrary, law was solely the translation of the will of the people—the “general will.” There was to be a direct link between the existence of a people and its actual organization as a political body expressing itself in laws. Otherwise, it was all too clear to Rousseau that the Age of Enlightenment was not a grand solution if it meant continuing dispossession of the people from their rights.

Within a few years, Rousseau came to be isolated (his illicit relationship with Levasseur was publicly condemned, and he was accused of abandoning his children), while his support in the intellectual community grew thin as former friends like Diderot turned into enemies—the most venomous being the powerful Voltaire—and hostility turned to persecution (Rousseau’s views on religion led to his condemnation by both Catholics and Calvinists). Rousseau was threatened with imprisonment and had to flee to England. Although he returned to France during his last years, he was a deeply unsettled man whose mood was darkened by what he considered to be plots against him.

**Conclusion**

The richness of Rousseau’s thought makes its interpretation difficult. Countless disputes have arisen about meaning. For the longest time, Rousseau appeared as a radical individualist, belonging to a certain tradition of liberalism in the context of contractarianism. But he also has been reproached for his insistence on the collective power of the people, to the point of being portrayed as a “proto-socialist.”
His influence on the French Revolution also has been discussed heatedly. Rousseau, perhaps more than any other thinker, encapsulated in many aspects of his work the contradictory meanings of political modernity. For this reason, he is probably best understood as a political philosopher at the cross-road of ideologies that would diverge only after him, for they hardly existed before.

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See also Hobbes, Thomas; Individualism; Locke, John; Natural Law; Political Philosophy; Republic

Further Readings

Rule of Law

The phrase rule of law is commonly understood to mean the method of government of a sociopolitical system featuring the following properties:

1. Conflicts among actors—individual and collective—are governed by means of rules that are impartial and equal for everyone.
2. Rules are enacted by means of a “limited government” that wields its own functions within the confines of the same rules (supremacy of rules over the rule of men).
3. Compliance with such rules is rooted in a legal and political culture (nomos as a sociolegal order).

This entry first explores the meaning of the concept and how it has evolved historically, as a basis for a comprehensive definition of the concept. It then considers the relationship between the rule of law, sovereignty, and democracy and distinguishes between the formal and substantive/normative aspects of the rule of law. The various dimensions of the rule of law as it is realized in particular cultural contexts are then discussed. The entry then examines empirical research on the rule of law in relation to political action and the implementation of the rule of law, and it also describes recent research agendas, touching on the way the rule of law contributes to the quality of democratic processes. The entry concludes with a look at directions for future research, including the way the rule of law is transformed by the transnationalization of law and politics.

Historical Roots of the Concept

Prima facie, the institutional ideal of the rule of law pivots on the meaning of impartial and abstract rules, on the foundations of the nomos (order). The origin of the concept of rule of law dates back to classical Greece. By emphasizing the importance of relations among equals, Plato’s Laws and Aristotle’s Politics, Book III elaborate a vision of nomos whose rules transcend the subjective will and men’s protean proclivities. A nomos is the rule of laws, which is in contrast with the rule of men. The relevance of cogent laws for the entire political community became one of the pillars of Roman civilization, within which the law (ius) split into ius gentium (the Roman law that is in force for other populations) and ius civilis (the ensemble of laws deriving from legal experts, assemblies, and emperors’ rule-making activities). Part of the ius civilis was constituted by laws in the strict sense of the word or, more precisely, by those laws adopted by assemblies (lex). As Charles McIlwain (1940) stressed, the difference between the concepts of ius and lex can be summarized against this background in classicism, from which the term rule of law inherited a semantic ambiguity, being understood as both rule by ius and rule by lex.

The Middle Ages grafted on this first form of ambiguity (law vs. enacted law) the seed of a second element of criticality. In the Middle Ages, the
political order was legitimate to the extent that it reflected the rationale (ratio) of a transcendent order, the divine one. From this viewpoint, formal legitimacy and substantive legitimacy could only converge. As noted by James Blythe (1992), a political order, such as the Holy Roman Empire, that emanated from divine investiture (and from obeying the behavioral precepts mandated by the religious tradition) had to derive from that investiture the pledge of its own “fairness.” The appearance of modernity on the institutional scene, and with it the separation of the moral system from the political and legal system, created an irreparable split between the formal and the normative understandings of the rule of law.

How could the convergence between formal legitimacy and substantive legitimacy be guaranteed within the political order? A possible response comes from the Age of Enlightenment, which accepted that the rules of the political order were legitimized by their relationship with the natural order (natural law). Nevertheless, since the link between natural laws and government rules is created by human activity, either by jurisprudential law or by statutory law, the passage from the first to the second is influenced by a human motivational and value-laden predisposition. As noted by Herbert Hart (1961), the rule of men, with their different moral and value-laden positions, seems to go back therefore to the rule of rules.

If these questions seem to be imbued with exquisitely philosophical considerations, no one can deny their bearing on empirical research. What do we measure when we use the concept of rule of law? The form of government? The content of governmental rules? To what level of reality does the unit of analysis belong? To what extent do recent institutional changes affecting both law and politics exert an influence on the semantics of the concept of rule of law? The remainder of this entry presents a critical overview of the knots that were left hanging by the secular debate around the concept of rule of law and offers an overview of the main findings from empirical research conducted in political science. Historical and analytical arguments are presented to delimit the meaning of the concept of rule of law. Finally, a multidimensional conception of the rule of law is analyzed in relation to two main approaches adopted by political scientists: the first focusing on rule of law as a **precondition for** unfolding political processes and the second on rule of law as the **outcome** of unfolding political processes.

Given its polysemy, the definition of the concept of rule of law needs to be based on its historical foundation and on both the consideration of organizational forms exemplifying the rule of law in the history of Western political institutions and the philosophical meanings that this concept has acquired in Western legal and political thought.

The first meaning of **rule of law** has its historical roots in the Anglo-Saxon experience of common law: the ensemble of legal rules created through the jurisprudential elaboration of ordinary courts within the territory of the Kingdom of England (Albert Dicey, 1915). With regard to the original nucleus, which remains bound up with the legal tradition of common law, as suggested by Gianfranco Poggi (1978), European institutional experiences have induced a modification and extension of the meaning of the concept in light of the emergence of the modern state during the 16th and 17th centuries.

With the emergence of the state as a center of power, the concept of rule of law deviated from the initial conception, which had been grounded in common law. The first deviation arose out of the new vision of the *Rechtsstaat*—the state as a rational organization of society originating from the foundational act of a sovereign entity, to which the legal system should conform. The second deviation draws attention to the correspondence between legal rules and the orientation of the popular will as expressed by the legislative body—the parliament—first pointed out by Emmanuel Sieyès in 1789. The postrevolutionary French experience advanced the idea of *état de droit* (rule of law) and the belief that “popular sovereignty” is the source of the legitimization of the rule of rules.

Only vaguely does this look like the United States’ formulation of constitutionalism. Across the Atlantic, the creation of a republican form of government centered on political and institutional liberal-constitutional principles, introducing the idea of a “rule of rules” based on the supremacy of “constitutional rule,” as pointed out by John Ely (1980). This is conceived in contraposition to the rule of men, as stated in *The Federalist Papers*, where “Publius” (the public) justifies the need for
limited government by referring to the intrinsic fallibility of human nature:

If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. (Hamilton, Jay, & Madison, 1787–1788, No. 51)

If in postrevolutionary France the supremacy of the rule of rules is to be understood as supremacy of the legislative rule (of the law), American constitutionalism pivots on the supremacy of the constitutional rule and the Bill of Rights. Alexis de Tocqueville saw this difference as rooted in the fact that the two constitutional orders have different historical origins. Only the French constitution was born out of a breaking point with the ancien régime, which implies the search for a foundational act—namely, a constitutive moment of the state. This is the fundamental distinction for understanding the difference between the ways in which the French and American democracies work.

During the 20th century, the historical experiences of European totalitarian regimes highlight a critical aspect of the continental version of the rule of rules. When by “rule of rules” one means rule of laws—that is, of legislative rules—one can run into the following perverse effect. Laws can comply with all formal criteria of legality and procedural correctness and yet can undermine individual rights on the substantive plane. In extreme cases, they can (as it happened in totalitarian systems) transform themselves into instruments of domination and violence. The debate on Gustav Radbruch’s dilemma of unfair law is the apogee of a cultural and legal process that puts emphasis on the substantive aspects of the rule of rules, especially if they exemplify themselves as the état de droit and the Rechtsstaat.

As Ronald Dworkin (1978) points out, this is the start of the constitutionalism of rights, of the constitutional charters and catalogs of fundamental rights built into constitutions. The constitution, and to a larger degree the activity of constitutional courts in charge of interpreting the constitution and controlling the constitutionality of laws, become instruments used to anchor democratic political regimes and ensure the legitimacy of legislative norms (valued not only in terms of procedural correctness but also for substantive coherence with a superior normative order, that of fundamental rights). The introduction of the requirement of a qualified majority or referendum to modify the constitution formally ratifies the assurance or the persistence of such an anchorage.

Studies conducted on the different forms that the democratization process has taken in areas of Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe emphasize the role of the rule of law as capable of granting stability for democratic transition. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) maintain that the rule of law is a necessary condition for the good functioning of those dimensions or “arenas” whose development is required to construct a democratic regime. In particular, noncompliance with the rule of law forecloses any possibility of developing an independent civil society and a pluralist and competitive political system.

Since the 1990s, the contribution of political scientists has been enriched by experiences and reflections drawn from policies intended to promote the rule of law. As Daniela Piana (2010) has noted, it is precisely because of their orientation toward crafting interventions for countries in the democratization stage that such policies have contributed to identifying the institutions and capacities necessary for the emergence and maintenance of the rule of law. In many cases, the same meaning of the concept has been operationalized to comprise the ensemble of institutions to which the promotional politics of the rule of law point.

In general, these contributions draw attention to the political-institutional dimension of the rule of law. In a different way, Russell Hardin (1999) interprets the rule of law as a rule of rules that spontaneously emerges to solve problems of social coordination where conditions of pluralism of values and preferences exist. According to Hardin, the concept of rule of law denotes those systems of collective action where power asymmetry exists. He thus puts emphasis on the importance of the
social fabric that underlies institutions, on a par with what political science studies on social capital have pointed out.

History teaches us that the institutional configurations adopted to implement the principle of the rule of rules can vary according to the cultural context, although they all tend to vouch for the legality and legitimacy of political power. For this reason, it is possible to identify a common thread among the different exemplifications of the concept of rule of law, referring to the way in which the form of government ensures that rules (laws) do not become a mere instrument of domination. It is in this vein that, as noted by Gianluigi Palombella (2010), the history of liberal constitutionalism gives flesh to an institutional ideal, the rule of law, whose meaning is determined in relation to the nature (source, form, and content) of government rules. The organizational form of power—the form of government that substantiates an architecture where powers are separate or are mutually accountable—cannot but operate by virtue of the institutional ideal of the rule of law, never being the rule of law itself.

Rule of Law, the Sovereign State, and Democracy

As the concept of the rule of law has evolved, it has become a polysemic one, with multiple meanings that allow its application in a variety of contexts. However, this polysemy also makes it challenging to conduct empirical research on the rule of law. Despite the internal variability of the concept, it is useful in such empirical research to maintain a distinction between the rule of law and other aspects of modern liberal political systems, such as state and democracy. Although there is a strict relation between these two concepts and the rule of law, the relation cannot be reduced to a relation of either causal necessity or synonymy.

Rule of Law and the Sovereign State

With the concept of the sovereign state, the rule of law entertains a relation of semantic inclusivity. In other words, the rule of rules, under specific historical and cultural conditions, has become, as Joseph Raz (1996) notes, the rule of statutory laws and regulations, both expressions of the modern state. Conceived as the state of law, the rule of law prompts empirical research focused on the formal correctness with which the law is applied. The state of law contributes to legitimize the use of power because it ensures the following:

- **Formal legitimacy:** Actions are predicated on formalized rules that are clear, ratified, and neutral in terms of their values.
- **Consistency over time:** The actions of centralized decision-making bodies conform to such rules, making possible the orderly operation of the state.

In this respect, the presence of the state of law, understood as a form of government pivoting on the logic of synoptic rationality, based on written law, and codified in a systematic and coherent fashion is a condition of democracy as we conceive it today. However, this does not exhaust the meanings of the concept of rule of law. If the rule of law were to be defined as the rule of rules, not of men, then the presence of the state conceived as a modern state—much less as a nation-state—is not a necessary dimension of the rule of rules. It becomes, though, a necessary part of it if the concept of “rules” is intended to refer to “statutory laws.”

This point is important for understanding the process of adoption and implementation of the principles of the rule of law in cultural contexts where the formation of the state has not taken place. As noted by Leonardo Morlino (2009), hybrid regimes exist in which some embryonic forms of rule of law mingle with a territorial administration that lacks some fundamental features of the state of law, the proceduralization of the application of the law. In this regard, it is appropriate that the two concepts of rule of law and of the state are kept separate, since it is possible that there is a state without rule of law, and in some case even vice versa, or that the second appears as a mechanism capable of applying laws in a formally correct way without, however, ensuring that such laws comply with citizens’ fundamental rights.

To conduct empirical research, one needs to observe how the machinery of the state embodies legality in its legislative and regulative law-making processes. As stressed by Poggi (1978), since the state is a bureaucratic legal order, founded on laws
that define and ratify—in a constitutive fashion—the spheres of action of all the areas of the public machine, from the individual (public sector employees) to the collective (the branches and departments of the public administration), it is in addition appropriate to study how far the obedience of legality is not only an objective property of rules (laws) but also a cognitive feature of public sector actors (how far the obedience of legality is a guiding principle of public action).

**Rule of Law and Democracy**

The rule of law does not necessarily imply a democratic form of government. This theoretical premise has influenced a large part of the Western literature on the rule of law and on democracy. As noted earlier, the meaning of the rule of law does not emerge historically in relation to the construction of a democratic regime. To be sure, the rule of law requires merely that government functioning obey some fundamental constraints, represented by rules that, even in a monarchy, first the sovereign and next the executive must follow. The introduction of democracy in sociopolitical systems where the rule of law is in force happens in the second instance, after the consolidation of the modern state and the party function of political representation.

The union between the rule of law and democracy brings with it an intrinsic tension. If, as a matter of fact, the rule of law provides for rules that constrain political power, democracy makes it possible that through lawmaking one can wield political power, the latter made legitimate thanks to its stemming from democratic consensus. Therefore, between the two forces, one that limits government via rules and the other empowering a democratic government by means of rules, it is necessary to find a point of equilibrium. The balancing of the democratic principle and the constitutional principle takes on different forms according to which countries one takes into account. Broadly speaking, Robert Dahl’s (1971) position should apply. Starting from a minimum concept of democracy, Dahl speaks of obedience to the rule of law, provided that polyarchies are characterized by conditions of equal access to public offices, respect for individual freedom, and valid rules *erga omnes* (for all). Yet this condition is necessary but not sufficient to ensure a fair union between the rule of law and democracy. Indeed, Dahl is concerned with the rule of law in its formal meaning. The existence of formal legality, as Dahl describes it, does not guarantee the implementation of the rule of law. Formal legality leaves open the relationship between the value system of legislative majorities and the value system of a normative order regardless of the majority’s will. The rule of law in a system that is formally a democracy does not determine whether such a system recognizes and protects the fundamental rights of citizens; thus, we need to distinguish between the broad and narrow senses of the rule of law—the substantive versus the formal or procedural.

Adam Przeworski (1991), who does not dismiss a purely formal vision, claims that the rule of law clears up two sets of problems: the “Madisonian” dilemma, which is the need to set limits to the potential capacity of the state to overwhelm citizens’ rights, and the “Hobbesian” dilemma, namely, the need to protect individual rights from the potentially predatory actions of other private actors. He identifies two dimensions of the rule of law: One pertaining to freedom, which has to do with the capacity of the state to protect citizens’ rights, and the other pertaining to safety, which has to do with the capacity of the state to protect citizens from other citizens. While to perform the first function one needs mechanisms that constrain the public hand, the execution of the second requires mechanisms that make the public hand sufficiently powerful and effective to maintain social control. Such conditions define the minimum requirements to say that a democracy is subject to the rule of law.

If, however, one wants to broaden these conditions and integrate the substantive dimensions of the rule of law, the systems of democratic governance should give rise to an implementation of rules so that the fundamental rights can be fulfilled in a comprehensive and enduring fashion. In this regard, rule of law and democratic principles—that is, the legitimacy of rules that constrain the power and legitimacy of the objectives pursued through the power of the majority—must therefore be made compatible through a vision of the constitution that is not an *ex ante* given (guaranteeing the formal conditions of the democratic game) but that stems from the same democratic
Concretely, each Western liberal democracy has configured itself along an axis where the different forms with which history has changed the principle of rule of law and the democratic principle have been located. Yet since the beginning of the 20th century, the majority of contemporary democracies have included such principles in their constitutional charters. Together with the rules that define the democratic institutional system, these constitutions ratify even lists of fundamental rights unavailable to political majorities. Such constitutional principles entail that parliamentary will, even when pursuing collective objectives legitimized by majority consensus, cannot compromise the fundamental rights of citizens. The constitution defines at the start of political processes those areas where ordinary politics can be legitimately practiced according to democratic practices and in compliance with fundamental rights. These are established and arranged once and for all in the constitutive rules of political order. In this regard, a constitutional democracy sets forth the form the government must take, the rights guaranteed to citizens, and the procedures by which such rights are implemented.

In addition, written constitutions provide for institutional devices with which it is possible to protect the constitution from both attacks by parliamentary majorities and possible drifts of executive power. Among these, the most common, as noted by Mauro Cappelletti (1989), is the inspection of constitutionality that constitutional courts can perform against primary and secondary legislation and against the norms of international law. The growth of politics aimed at safeguarding one’s rights is an additional feature of the Western democracies that emerged in the second part of the 20th century as a reaction to the totalitarian and authoritarian drifts that prevailed over the democratic majorities at the beginning of the century. The history of the 20th century revealed that the constitution is not only an initial given of the political process. Rather, it should be conceived as the aggregate effect of the interaction between the demand for and the supply of justice, such interaction taking place not only through the dialogue between the judiciary and the legislative but also through the dialogue between jurisdictions and individuals or social groups.

**Dimensions, Units, and Levels of the Rule of Law**

Beyond the different forms of instantiation of the rule of law, the concept of rule of law can also refer—at a more abstract level—to a system where the rule of rules is in force, intended as an institutional ideal available in different organizational forms (administrative-legal structure and government standard procedures) according to the source, form, and content that rules gain (jurisprudential, legislative, and administrative-regulative). Concept formation should then follow the path of all multidimensional concepts, whose advantage stems from being able to incorporate into their semantics different aspects related by juxtaposition—conjunction—rather than by disjunction. The rule of law is many things together, all of them combined into a real instantiation in different patterns.

The extension of the rule of law is, thus, composed of a combination of five dimensions:

1. **Civil order**: a focus on the right to life, freedom from fear and torture, personal security, and right to own property, guaranteed and protected throughout the country; low rates of crime and social conflict; a persistent and durable culture of legality

2. **Independent judiciary and a modern justice system**: a focus on mechanisms establishing an independent, professional, and efficient judiciary system that allows equal access to justice, free of undue pressures and with enforcement of decisions

3. **Capacity of the sociopolitical to formulate, implement, and enforce the law**: a focus on a governance system (legislative and executive branches) capable of ensuring the production of high-quality legislation and its implementation throughout the country; a transparent policy-making process allowing for the participation of the civil society; and the presence of a professional, neutral, accountable, and efficient state bureaucracy

4. **Low if nonexistent rate of corruption, illegality, and abuse of power by state agencies**: a focus on the internalization of the law by public officials and social actors; the existence of self-constraint mechanisms of public ethics
and, in case these mechanisms are ineffective, effective policies for fighting corruption and abuses of power.

5. Security forces that are respectful of citizens’ rights and are under civilian control: a focus on the mechanisms of civilian control over security forces as well as on efficient, uncorrupted, and disciplined police forces respectful of human and political rights.

This strategy enables research to encompass different ideal types or forms of government, provided that the nature of rules whose supremacy is suggested by the phrase *rule of law* is specified. The concept of rule of law here takes on a precise meaning and can be operationalized once the origin of jurisprudential, legal, and administrative-regulative rules has been determined. The term *rules* is meant in a broad sense, not restricted to positive law. Rules consist of jurisprudence, doctrine, and the interpretative principles that judges of different rank and jurisdiction refer to, as well as the social rules that stem from institutional tradition and are implicit in the very fabric of political community. This is a fundamental point. It emerges as a “thick” formulation of the rule of law that redefines what has been stated by scholars of democracy and in particular by authors such as Guillermo O’Donnell (2004), who have highlighted that the legality and formal correctness of rules (the “thin” vision) are not sufficient to ensure that a country is subjected to the rule of rules.

If one narrows the field of observation to democracies, the rule of law is not only a necessary condition for achieving a high degree of quality of democratic governance but also the effect of the interaction among different factors, including both social and political aspects. This distinction does not entirely cover the previously mentioned dichotomy between formal and substantial rule of law—which belongs more properly to the realm of normative theories—nor can it be considered as a way to reword the relationship between rule of law as an end and rule of law as a means to an end. Both these second distinctions belong as a matter of fact to a normative, prescriptive discourse, whereas the distinction between rule of law as a precondition and rule of law as an outcome is phrased in terms of the empirical analysis of a democracy.

This double vision finds its own reference even within the contemporary debate developed by the supporters of the rule of law, namely, law or administrative science experts, who together with policymakers, diplomats, and bureaucrats are committed to the diffusion of the principles of the rule of law in developing countries or those countries in transition toward democracy. According to Rachel Belton (2005), all these options fall within two broad concepts, which are not necessarily in opposition to each other: the first focused on the rule of law as an end of the political order and the second on the rule of law as an instrument of the political order. The rule of law as an end in itself means limited government and a guarantee of fundamental rights. This is the definition of constitutionalism. According to Morlino (2009), the rule of law as an instrument means an independent legal system, a transparent and efficient public administration, and an ensemble of police forces and law enforcement agencies subject to civil control. However, the distinction between rule of law as a means and rule of law as an end does not provide any profitable way to conduct empirical research. Indeed, it presupposes by *petitio principii* that actors who comply with the rules that underlie the very basis of the institutions to which the five dimensions listed above refer—civil rights, the judicial system, the administrative system, military force, and the police—are pursuing an end or are using their compliance as a means to a different end. One may argue instead against such a teleological view of the rule of law. Rule of law has been unveiled by empirical research as a complex process imbued within political institutions, whose direction and whose main rationale cannot be grasped simply on the basis of the means–end dichotomy. Rather, it may be of some interest to distinguish between strategies of research and empirical analysis, being fully aware that reality is ontologically unified and this distinction serves only human cognitive goals.

**Empirical Research on the Rule of Law**

**Rule of Law as a Source of Opportunities for Political Action**

This scholarship is framed in a neo-institutionalist approach and ultimately restored to the social sciences the primacy of agency as the source of social processes. Law as a condition of action basically...
entails that research should focus on the way actors interact under the conditions set down by the law and on the way actors take advantage of the existence of laws and institutions believed to instantiate the principle of the rule of law—as, for instance, the judicial branch. Two types of actors have been taken into account: (1) institutional actors, in particular with regard to the use of the constitutional courts as clearinghouses for institutional conflicts, and (2) social actors, in particular with regard to legal mobilization.

When law is thought of as an opportunity to apply pressure, the organizational and cognitive resources handled by social and political actors become of utmost importance in transforming an opportunity for political pressure into an effective instrument for the exercise of power. Non-governmental organizations and citizens associations that can take cases before the courts and make their actions visible by any means may bring about a major change in the legal and the constitutional system of a country, achieved through pressure from below.

A large body of scholarship has been developed over the past decade in the field of European studies by devoting energies to cast light on the use of European Community law to make policies or to enact new ways of enforcing traditional rights. The so-called supranational rule of law that has been identified in European legal norms and judicial institutions—for instance, the European court of justice and the European court of human rights—has been thought to be a promising arena that actors endowed with resources and capacities can enter to push forward their own interests and values. European scholars are vigorously debating the type of rule of law used by the European Union (EU) (in the context of the constitutional debate developed over the past years). As a matter of fact, the EU seems to be more intelligible as a rule of law in process—rule of law as an outcome—than as a rule of law as a precondition for democratic processes. To phrase it differently, European constitutionalism, thought of as a complex and multilayered system of rights enforcement, is not given ex ante but instead is made up as a political, social, and cultural construction.

**Rule of Law as Outcome of Political Processes**

The rule of law may be thought as a social system in which interactions, both social and political, are ruled and shaped according to fundamental, impartial, stable, and predictable rules, some of them of *longue durée* (long term). Rule of law as outcome is highlighted by nonformalist and non-positivist scholars such as Hardin (1999) and Morlino (2009), who have devoted time and energy to restore to the field of research the study of how rules are implemented.

Some research has been developed to bring political processes to light, both at the macrolevel and at the mesolevel. A major point related to the study of the rule of law as an outcome impinges on the capacity of a society for settling disputes on the basis of the law. An extensive scholarship has revealed the importance of cultural and cognitive conditions, which exist alongside, and sometimes even in opposition to, structural conditions.

These studies have observed that the legitimacy of legal rules and political institutions is key to maintaining, in the long run, the rule of law. Civic engagement and a civic culture have been pointed out by scholars working on political culture and related matters as a cornerstone of a well-functioning democracy and ipso facto of a system based on the rule of law. The argument put forth about the positive correlation that should exist between civic culture and the rule of law is as follows: Civic culture helps maintain a low level of social conflict, and as a consequence, it reduces indirectly the need to use rules to foster social behaviors based on common principles of peaceful social life.

Empirical research has recently pointed out the role played by factors that stand outside the political system, for instance, the existence of the supranational networks in which standards of rule of law are set down, promoted, and disseminated internationally. In a way, this fairly new phenomenon is associated with the increasing importance of the interplay of domestic and supranational factors in making the rule of law a multilayered configuration of rules and principles rather than the epiphenomenon of a hierarchical system of rules enacted exclusively by domestic actors. International scholars and comparative political scholars have joined in exploring the mechanisms that work in the interstices of the two-level games played by domestic and supranational institutions nowadays. The result has been a spectacular growth of normative production, pursuing the implementation of the rule of law that transcends the usual traditional, domestic, judicial, and legislative arenas.
Empirical Research on Democratic Quality

Complexity and polysemy can be handled effectively if the rule of law is meant to be a multidimensional, conceptual tool covering different aspects of sociopolitical systems. This approach appears promising when framed in a broader context, as the empirical analysis of the quality of democracy. Democratic-quality assessment appears today to be the contemporary way of phrasing an old and perennial question cutting across all Western political experiences, namely, the search for good government. Democratic assets address the issue of expanding the spectrum of political participation, injecting the principle of political competition under conditions of formal equality and given the primacy of the law. However, although formal designs may perfectly satisfy abstract criteria, in practice democratic institutions work differently in different countries and may deliver different types of services and goods, resulting in differing levels of citizen satisfaction despite being designed similarly. In brief, what matters in reality is how democracy works and what puts into motion the formal institutional designs. This point is fully accepted by the comprehensive and empirically oriented approach to democratic quality that has recently been developed by Morlino (2004). Following this approach, one refers to the qualities of a democracy. These qualities are grouped into three types:

1. qualities associated with the procedures of the political system,
2. qualities associated with the content of the policies, and
3. qualities associated with the products of the political processes.

The first comprises rule of law, interinstitutional accountability, electoral accountability, competition, and participation. The second relates to the responsiveness of the democratic processes. The third concerns the equality and solidarity that are in reality offered to citizens.

Accordingly, the rule of law is not only a procedural dimension of the democratic regime—one of the qualities it is expected to feature. It is also one of the crucial dimensions on which many other aspects—or qualities—of democratic governance depend. As a matter of fact, the rule of law enters into patterns of regular interaction with other procedural dimensions. First among these is interinstitutional accountability. In those cases in which legislative oversight of the policies enacted by government proves to be weak and ineffective, judicial institutions—for instance, the constitutional courts—can perform a subsidiary function and put into motion an alternative mechanism of checks and balances. In a different setting, the rule of law may specifically interact with the participants and thereby contribute to the enforcement of the rules that govern a society. One way for this to happen is through legal mobilization. Civil society organizations and rights advocacy coalitions may help enforce or deepen the fundamental freedoms of citizens, thereby bringing about a change in the political system. Judicial arenas may become in this view an opportunity to act, of which social actors may take full advantage if they have the resources to mobilize and bring a case before the courts.

A further point that deserves to be emphasized is that the empirical approach to democratic-quality assessment illustrates and reveals the several different ways by which the law enters into a combination and intertwines with the extralegal norms of a society. In a way, the wide range of policies and programs put into motion to promote the rule of law in nascent democracies has provided scholars with a formidable experiment of institution building, something that in old and consolidated democracies would have never been possible. Such an experiment creates quasi-optimal conditions to detect and disentangle the relative weight of prelegal dimensions incorporated into the daily life of social communities and to assess the role such dimensions play in transforming formal legal rules into effective social practices. Drawing lessons from these experiences of social and legal engineering, a comprehensive democratic-quality assessment exercise considers the interaction between the procedural aspect of the rule of law and the degree to which legal norms and jurisprudence match the diffuse legal culture (an aspect referred to by the notion of responsiveness). By focusing on the prelegal dimension of the rule of law, a scholar may be accused of naive optimism. If on the one hand rule of law proves to be a fairly vague concept, on the other hand prelegal aspects show resistance to empirical investigation. Indeed, for social scientists, this exploration is forced to deal
Rule of Law

with a never-ending puzzle, namely, the intangible nature of unobservable forces, whose effects we can measure and whose intrinsic ontology we can only guess. However, by denying the importance of the prelegal aspects of rule of law, one does not get very far either in understanding the way society functions or in providing policymakers with sound frameworks to set their agenda for legal and judicial reforms. According to Leonardo Morlino and Wojciech Sadurski (2010), a way out would be to refer to the democratic rule of law in order to incorporate those aspects that refer directly to the prelegal dimensions of social enterprise. In this way, as Palombella (2010) has observed, rule of law would mean simply the primacy of rules, whereas the determinacy of what these rules are, where they come from, and where they are going remains an open question, to be addressed empirically. As a matter of fact, rules used in a society to deal with an inescapable part of social life—disagreement—might have different sources and different formats. By endorsing this view, scholars are able to appreciate the delicate intertwining that exists among democratic qualities and, more specifically, between the rule of law and the different components that characterize a democratic society.

A valuable aspect of the way the democratic-quality assessment addresses the rule of law comes from its pluralist theoretical stance. As mentioned before, the rule of law is a “thick” concept, in which traditionally normative and descriptive aspects are mingled in a complex interlacing of mutual influences. Democratic-quality assessment accepts this plurality of views and interprets them as a variety of configurations in which the rule of law as an institutional principle can be instantiated into a democratic regime. In countries in which the rule of law is grounded in a vibrant civil society and the extension of the public sector is limited because of historical reasons, democratic-quality assessment does not endorse an evaluative position; that is, it does not assess this specific configuration as a better or a worse one than others equally represented by Western institutional experiences. It simply recognizes that each configuration of a democracy is characterized by the specific way in which each quality participates to determine the whole of democratic governance.

Beyond the Rule of Law?

A further development witnessed by contemporary scholarship concerns the way legal and political reality challenges traditional definitions and conceptions of rule of law. Despite its being a concept with a long history, the rule of law does not cease to be subjected to a steady and permanent confrontation with reality and, thereby, to restlessly readapt its meaning and its normative value. In fact, this complex and polysemic concept mirrors the multiplicity of the institutional and cultural experiences that are observed by the numerous and different models of organization of power—both in the Western tradition and nowadays outside it—and by the many different models through which individuals have managed to accommodate selfishly oriented behavior in a collective setting of predictable and stable rules of interaction. In a way, this is a sign of the state of good health of the concept, because it bespeaks its capacity to accommodate different instances of the same general principle, namely, the idea of constraining power through rules, legal and extralegal.

However, in recent decades, new institutional phenomena and new ways of thinking and practicing law making and law enforcement have come to light. The diffusion of democratic institutions and the emergence of regimes that combine nondemocratic features with elements of the rule of law have added richness and complexity to an already large spectrum of empirical cases to which the concept of rule of law have been applied both in the presence and in the absence of the democratic conditions in which politics takes place.

One can mention at least three new developments undergone by political institutions that call for a rethinking and a reconsideration of the meaning of the rule of law and, consequently, the way the concept is operationalized in empirical research design.

1. The unpredicted growth of the production of legal norms, which is currently being experienced in many advanced democracies. The idea of constraining power through rules that are “law” seems to encounter some difficulties, due to overproduction of legal norms. In this respect, too much regulation shadows the magic glamour of the rule of law as a limit to the rule of men. When the legal norms are persistently changed, the
intervention of the will of men becomes dominant and even overrules the "rule of rules."

2. The uncontrollable process of transnationalization of the rule of law. This is related to the multiplication and fragmentation of the sources of law. Laws, quasi laws, and so-called soft laws are produced at the subnational, national, and supranational levels. In practice, they mix together. In reality, they offer to social and political actors the possibility of moving between different normative systems, in a way that owes much more to a contingent and strategic logic than to a stable, predictable, and valid erga omnes logic.

3. The increasing hybridization of legal, judicial, and institutional practices and procedures. Social and political systems have deployed extensive processes of mutual imitation, which have transferred practices and procedures from other systems where they had once been adopted or invented. This occurs at all levels of the organization of the state, in new and advanced democracies as well as in nondemocratic and hybrid regimes.

These comprehensive changes entail a number of important consequences for the political science research agenda. When the rule of law is studied as an outcome—as rule implementation—it should be considered a radial concept, composed of semantic building blocks radiating outward from a center. Not all the blocks have empirical meaning in all instantiations of the rule of law. They can even have different relative weights in different empirical contexts. This may allow researchers to accommodate the large variety of different forms of rule of law, without stretching the concept to the point of emptying it of value.

It is of paramount importance that typological studies are used. When the rule of law is studied as a precondition, it is extremely useful in analytical terms to start from ideal types, which feature a specific way of combining law, politics, and society. The rules that constrain power are produced not only by making laws but also, over the long run, by social processes. History has provided us with experiences that took different paths through law, politics, and society. Once developed as an abstract typology, the research then can go in depth and see to what extent each real case instantiates the features presented in the ideal types.

Generally the rule of law seems to carry an intrinsic dilemma, which is mirrored in the way it has been used as a concept in empirical research projects. Basically and substantially, it has been thought of as a way to steer and control social processes on the basis of general, abstract rules that are able to remove the unavoidable discretionary power from the process of resolving social and political conflicts. However, these general rules must be implemented by the actions of individuals, and thus, the rule of law does not eliminate the inherent tension between the rules and those who make them.

It is important that dialogue continue to develop between those whose chief concern is concept building and observation of reality and those concerned with broadening the theoretical base of the rule of law, thereby accounting more fully for the different aspects of democracy with which the rule of law interacts. For these reasons, empirical research in all the social sciences—and particularly empirical research using a comparative methodological approach—deserves more than ever to be elaborated on and intensified by future generations of social scientists.

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See also Corruption; Democracy, Quality; Democracy, Theories of; Hybrid Regimes; Judicial Independence; Judiciary; Security Apparatus; State

Further Readings


SAMPLING, RANDOM AND NONRANDOM

In its most general form, a sample is simply a subset of a larger population or group. In scientific applications, the purpose of sampling is to be able to draw conclusions about a larger population. There are many reasons to sample rather than attempt to collect data on the full population. They include the following:

- **Cost**: It is often cost prohibitive to collect data on the entire population.
- **Speed**: To collect data on the entire population would take an excessive amount of time.
- **Feasibility**: Often the complete set of population elements is unknown. Most populations do not have centralized lists of their members. Even when such lists exist, it is usually impossible to collect data on every single member.

This entry discusses the major types and problems of sampling procedures.

The sampling procedure can be described using the following terminology.

**Population Unit.** The population unit is the unit at which the data are collected. In survey research, population units are typically people, although they can also be at other levels, such as households. Other types of research designs may look at larger units of analysis, such as nations, cities, organizations, or institutions.

**Target Population.** The target population is the group of elements that the sampling procedure aims to represent. For example, a public opinion survey may attempt to represent all adult Americans or may limit the population to individuals with certain qualifying characteristics, such as parents of school-age children, voters, people with heart disease, or residents of South Carolina.

**Sampled Population.** In contrast to the target population, the sampled population refers to the portion of the population from which the sample is actually drawn. In an ideal world, the sampled population and the target population are nearly the same thing, but for a number of reasons drawing a sample from the target population is usually not feasible. For example, survey data collected using random digit dialing is unable to include respondents who do not possess telephones. Low-incidence target populations exacerbate these issues. For instance, if a researcher wants to do a representative study of people who run for local office, using a random digit dialing technique would be enormously expensive, as many contacts would need to be made to get a single eligible respondent. For this reason, studies of low-incidence populations are often conducted on prescreened individuals (e.g., those from membership lists or clinics). In all cases, it is important to consider any systematic differences between the target population and the sampled population.

**Sampling Unit and Sampling Frame.** To select the sample from the population, the population must
first be divided into sampling units, or elements that are subject to being selected. The collection of the list of sampling units is referred to as the sampling frame. In a simple random sample design, the sampling frame may consist of a list of individuals who belong to an organization, with the sampling units being each individual. Cluster designs may have a more complex relationship between the sampling frame and the sampling unit, as described in the next section.

### Types of Sampling

Sample selection can be broadly defined as being random or nonrandom—that is, as either probability or nonprobability sampling. The primary difference between these two approaches is that nonprobability samples require some judgment on the part of the researcher as to which cases should be included, while probability samples are selected such that any member of the population may be included (although not necessarily with equal probability). Additionally, self-selected samples have no sampling frame in the traditional sense.

There are numerous approaches to random and nonrandom sampling. The next section describes some of the most commonly used designs.

### Random Sampling

- **Simple random sample (SRS):** In a simple random sample of size \( n \) in a population of size \( N \), every possible subset of size \( n \) has an equal probability of selection, and the probability that an individual unit is selected into the sample is \( \frac{n}{N} \).

- **Systematic sampling:** In a systematic sample of size \( n \) of a given population of size \( N \), the first step is to pick a random starting point \( R \) between 1 and \( k \), where \( k \) is the next integer after \( \frac{N}{n} \). Next, \( R \) and every \( k \)th element after \( R \) in the population are selected into the sample. One risk of using systematic sampling is that if there is any periodicity in the list, the sample variance may be large.

- **Stratified sampling:** The stratified sampling procedure first divides the population into subgroups, called *strata*, and then selects an SRS from each stratum. One potential downside of using an SRS design is that simply due to chance, certain groups in the population may be underrepresented, especially when smaller sample sizes are used. One way to guard against this is to use stratified sampling on measures of interest. For instance, when conducting a survey of political attitudes in a U.S. state, one might want to ensure that urban, suburban, and rural areas are adequately represented. To achieve this, the researcher can stratify the state into levels of urbanicity and then sample within each urbanicity level. Stratified sampling improves efficiency if within-strata units are relatively homogeneous and most of the variance in the survey measurements is between strata.

- **Multistage cluster sampling:** A variation on the previous design is multistage cluster sampling, which effectively is a series of nested clusters. Taking the previous example, suppose the same researcher wants to interview a representative sample of restaurant workers at the state level. While one could sample from the list of restaurants in the state, to do so may be an inefficient use of limited resources and time. For that reason, it makes sense to first take a random sample of the regions in the state (e.g., counties), with the probability of selection proportional to the population in the region; then a random sample of cities within the selected counties; followed by a sample of several restaurants in each city; and finally of employees in the selected restaurants.

### Nonrandom Sampling

Nonrandom sampling comprises a broad category of approaches that are similar primarily in
that subjective criteria are used in case selection rather than randomization. While nonrandom samples lack the statistical properties that random samples have, there are often compelling reasons to use them, ranging from feasibility to convenience to specific criteria tailored to the research design. Some examples of nonrandom sampling are as follows:

- **Quota sampling**: Quota sampling resembles stratified sampling in that strata are created with target numbers for each group. Where quota sampling differs from stratified sampling is that the elements within each strata are not chosen at random. Quotas can be based on marginal distributions of individual variables or by the joint distribution of a number of variables. The main risk in using quota sampling is that the selected elements are subject to bias, including the following:
  
  *Judgment*: The respondents are selected by the interviewer, which introduces the interviewer’s preferences as to whom to interview within the quota groups.
  
  *Self-selection*: The respondents opt into the study. While these respondents may fill the quota groups, they may be qualitatively different from members of the group who do not opt in.
  
  *Nonignorable bias*: The factors defining the quota groups are insufficient to explain the differences between the respondents in the quota groups and the population in those groups.

- **Convenience sampling**: A convenience sample contains a group of participants who select themselves into a study. Clinical trials for medical treatments frequently use this type of design. Because it is impossible to sample patients at random, these studies rely on the willingness of patients to volunteer for a clinical trial. Once in the clinical trial, patients are assigned at random to receive the drug being tested or a placebo.

- **Purposeful sampling**: Other types of nonrandom sampling rely on case selection by the researcher. In these situations, cases are selected based on a cluster of characteristics that allow the researcher to test a theory. Generally, these designs are used when a relatively small number of cases are to be examined in depth. There are many types of purposeful sampling. Some examples are as follows:
  
  *Typical cases*: Cases are selected by virtue of not being unusual or exceptional with respect to the larger population.
  
  *Most similar/most different*: Cases are selected based on having very similar or very different characteristics. For example, two nations with a similar set of policies but very different outcomes may be examined.
  
  *Critical cases*: In critical case sampling, cases are selected that are considered to be particularly important to understanding the logic behind a causal phenomenon. Critical cases are often used to make the argument that if an outcome is true for that case, then it is likely true for all cases.

- **Snowball sampling**: Snowball sampling builds a sample in stages by starting with a (generally small) group of subjects who are considered to be good sources of information, who then recruit additional subjects from their own social networks. The new recruits then find more recruits, and so on, until a “snowball” of recruits is built up. While the resultant sample may not be representative of the population at large, snowball sampling is especially useful for collecting data on populations that are hard to reach (e.g., people engaging in illegal activities).

### Sampling and Nonsampling Errors

Samples are often used to obtain estimates of population parameters of interest. A population estimate obtained by a sample estimator may contain errors that can arise from many sources. The total error can be decomposed into two pieces: sampling error and nonsampling error.

#### Evaluating Sampling Measurements and Errors

Sampling error is the random error that arises as a result of selecting a sample of a population. In a random sample with no bias present, an individual sample may differ from the true population parameter, but many repeated estimates from a sample will on average cover the true population parameter. The degree of uncertainty that is introduced by sampling error is quantified by the standard error.
of the estimate or the margin of error of a sampling procedure. This section discusses the characteristics of sample estimators in general and the characteristics of estimators derived from simple random sampling in particular.

Sample Measurements

Given a sample of \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) units from a population of \( N \) units, measured with respect to characteristic \( \chi \), the sample mean of an attribute is given by the sum of the values of \( \chi \) over all the units in the sample, divided by the sample size:

\[
\bar{y} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i.
\]

The sample mean is considered to be an estimate for the population mean.

The precision of this estimate can be described using the sampling distribution. The sample variance is a measure of the spread for a given attribute \( \chi \), calculated as the average squared deviation from the sample mean:

\[
s^2_y = \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (y_i - \bar{y})^2.
\]

The sample standard deviation is the square root of the sample variance:

\[
s_y = \sqrt{\frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (y_i - \bar{y})^2}.
\]

The statistic that is typically reported to quantify the amount of sampling error is the standard error (SE), or the standard deviation of the sampling distribution:

\[
SE_y = \sqrt{\left(1 - \frac{n}{N}\right) \frac{s^2_y}{n}}.
\]

The standard error can be used to generate the confidence interval of the sample mean. Because the distribution of all possible sample means is approximately normal, the 95% confidence interval of the sample mean is

\[
\bar{y} \pm 1.96 \times SE_y.
\]

Nonsampling Errors

Nonsampling error refers to any error introduced into the sample estimate that is not attributable to sampling variation. If these errors are systematic, then they introduce bias into the sample estimate. In probability sampling where the selection probabilities are known, unbiased estimates of the population parameters and their standard errors can be calculated. For nonprobability samples, or probability samples where the selection probabilities are not known, this is not always the case, and at a minimum, a model of sample inclusion is necessary. For both random and nonrandom sampling designs, however, nonsampling errors are often present.

Nonsampling errors can systematically bias parameter estimates to a greater extent than the deviation caused by random sampling errors. These errors can be due to selection bias, where some set of the target population is systematically not included in the sample. For instance, coverage error results when units in the target population are not included in the sampling frame (undercoverage) or when some units in the sample do not originate from the target population (overcoverage).

Additionally, errors in the survey instrument can lead to bias from measurement error. Measurement error can be introduced into a survey instrument in several ways. Not all are preventable, but a carefully constructed survey design can minimize these errors.

- Question wording, order, and context can introduce bias into the survey instrument. The respondent may be “primed” to provide a particular response, or a question may not be neutrally worded.
- An imprecise measurement device may prevent respondents from expressing their actual opinions.
- Respondents may provide inaccurate answers to survey questions unintentionally, because of poor questionnaire design or simple mistakes.
- With sensitive material and when sampling human subjects, the researcher also has to consider the possibility that respondents are deliberately misrepresenting information in the survey responses. For example, respondents may lie when asked about their yearly income or when asked whether they voted in the previous
general election. Respondents may also forget
details when answering questions about activities
in the past and may provide guesses in response.
• Human errors can also be introduced into the
survey when coding the responses for analysis.

Nonresponse error can create significant bias in
samples. Often, the characteristics of non-responders
are systematically different from the characteristis of
those who do respond. This problem is especially
significant if the measurement of interest is affected
by nonresponse. For example, in a study of political
participation, if people who participate are more
likely to respond than people who do not, then esti-
mates of participation rates will almost certainly be
affected. In cases such as these, nonresponse is non-
ignorable. There are two basic types of nonresponse.

• **Unit nonresponse** occurs when an entire
  sampling unit is missing from the sample. A
  respondent who refuses to answer any of the
  questions in a survey is an example.
• **Item nonresponse** occurs when a single or
  multiple survey items are missing, but not all of
  them, for a single unit. For example, a
  respondent who skips a question about income
  level but responds to the rest of the survey
  exhibits item nonresponse.

In cases where the probability of response is
affected only by observed variables rather than
survey measurements, the data are considered
*missing at random*, and the effects of nonresponse
can be considered ignorable, as a model can adjust
for any effects of nonresponse. Using a different
participation example, suppose women were more
likely to respond to the survey than men were. If
the participation rate among the women surveyed
is the same as it is for the population of women
and, similarly, the participation rate among the
men surveyed is the same as it is for the population
of men, then survey weights can correct for the
effects of unit nonresponse.

*SanctionS*

Originally conceived by Woodrow Wilson as a
key component of the post–World War I order
within the League of Nations, the effective appli-
cation of economic and other sanctions did not
develop unilaterally until after World War II and
developed multilaterally only after the post–Cold
War era. Despite some examples of punitive sanc-
tions taking an economic toll when imposed uni-
laterally, such as the United States against Cuba
and Iran and the former Soviet Union against
Armenia, multilateral sanctions have become the
norm as they have both the greatest legitimacy
and chance of success. Thus, they constitute the
main focus of this entry.

Since 1990, the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) has imposed sanctions against 19 nations
and entities, while regional organizations, most
notably the European Union and the British
Commonwealth, have increasingly resorted to
sanctions as well. The legal authority for United
Nations (UN) sanctions appears in Chapter VII,
Article 41, of the UN Charter, which provides that
the Security Council may call on states to impose
nonmilitary measures, such as interruptions of eco-
monic and diplomatic relations, to protect interna-
tional peace and security. In its first 45 years
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*SanctionS*
measures in just two cases: in Southern Rhodesia in 1966 (S/RES/232) and in South Africa in 1977 (S/RES/418). The end of the Cold War removed the political roadblocks preventing collective action, while the dynamics of economic globalization convinced nations that they derived little benefit from cheating on the enforcement of sanctions. Instead, nongovernmental actors and criminal networks have tended to be the major sanctions busters.

UN multilateral economic sanctions have been imposed for a diverse set of reasons: to promote democracy and human rights, to enforce international law and resolutions of the UNSC, to prevent military aggression and armed conflict, to encourage military demobilization and postconflict reconstruction, to counter terrorism, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The list of the sanctions imposed by the UNSC from 1990 to 2009 reveals a substantial set of cases where sanctions are not imposed against a government but rather against nonstate actors or militia forces operating within a particular country. Examples of this trend include the cases of UN sanctions against actors in Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Côte d’Ivoire. In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, sanctions initially were imposed against governments, but after the U.S.-led overthrow of these governments, the Security Council measures were redirected against individuals and entities associated with the former regime and/or insurgent/terrorist groups. Sanctions imposed in Iraq, Somalia, Liberia, and Afghanistan have changed significantly over the years, in line with changing political conditions within the targeted regime.

Of all UNSC sanctions, only those imposed against Southern Rhodesia (1966), South Africa (1977), Iraq (1990), Yugoslavia (1991), and Haiti (1993) included comprehensive trade sanctions as part of a larger set of coercive techniques. Contraversies regarding the devastating humanitarian impact of such sanctions in Iraq led to a reevaluation of general trade embargoes and prompted the adoption after 1994 of more selective and targeted measures—the so-called smart sanctions. Smart sanctions are aimed exclusively against wrongdoers rather than entire economies. These include individuals holding specific government positions, economic elites, and entities who provide significant support to—or benefit from—the sanctioned government or who have violated international law or Security Council resolutions on their own accord. Smart sanctions seek to control, capture, or restrict the movement and use of financial assets, specific products—such as luxury goods, arms, or particular commodities—that are often critically necessary for the supply and financing of armed conflict or that are being moved illegally to aid an illegal action or actor. Smart sanctions include

- financial sanctions, which freeze the assets (including property) of and block financial transactions with designated individuals and entities, including restrictions on dealing with specific banks;
- arms embargoes, which ban the supply of weapons, military-related technology, and other forms of military assistance;
- travel sanctions, which deny visas and ban the travel of designated individuals or prohibit travel on designated airlines or to the airspace of targeted regimes;
- commodity sanctions, which prohibit imports or exports of specific materials or goods, such as diamonds, oil, timber, and selected stones and metals; and
- diplomatic sanctions, which deny national participation in international events or organizations or withdraw the diplomatic privileges of designated individuals or regimes.

To implement these focused, targeted financial measures, the UN has relied on state implementation and enforcement through banks and major financial institutions. Most international hard-currency transactions are screened through name detection software, which provides an effective means of interdicting illicit transfers. Many nations also have financial intelligence units that assist law enforcement officials in detecting and thwarting financial crime and sanctions violations.

The Security Council has also created sanctions committees and authorized them to establish lists of designated individuals and entities whose assets are to be frozen. In most cases, those listed are also subject to travel and visa restrictions as well. The Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee (UNSCR [UNSC Resolution] 1267) has the largest
and most contested list, with approximately 500 names. Designation lists also exist for the sanctions in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan and for the sanctions against insurgents and supporters of the former regime in Iraq. As of 2009, the total number of individuals and entities on UN sanctions committees’ lists was more than 900. The procedures for designating and removing names from these lists have proven to be highly controversial, especially for the Security Council’s consolidated list of alleged supporters of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Arms embargoes are the most frequently employed forms of sanctions, but in many ways, they are the least successful. The enforcement of arms embargoes requires a high degree of international cooperation. Arms smuggling networks are highly sophisticated and pervasive and are often able to circumvent interdiction that is poorly enforced in some borders. Only in the sanctions against Iraq has international cooperation been sufficiently strong to make Security Council restrictions on the supply of arms and the advanced weapons technologies relatively effective.

Commodity sanctions are a means of preventing militia and criminal actors from exploiting natural resources to finance and sustain armed conflict. Commodity sanctions have also helped facilitate more effective governance by newly emerging postconflict regimes in the wake of the UN-approved peace settlements. The Security Council imposed oil embargoes as part of the sanctions against Iraq, former Yugoslavia, and the other countries in the 1990s. An embargo on the export of logs was imposed in Liberia in 2003. The most significant and successful commodity sanctions came against the so-called blood diamonds. Beginning in 1998 with the case of Angola, and continuing with the sanctions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Security Council prohibited the import of diamonds from territory controlled by rebel groups. This effort spurred the creation of the Kimberley certification system that, in turn, has helped shrink the financial base used by criminal groups and militias in armed conflict.

UN smart sanctions have also been used as a means of controlling nuclear proliferation. The end of these efforts will depend on the intelligent integration of incentives, sanctions, and security assurances as part of a diplomatic bargaining process. Sanctions can be imposed and implemented by the UNSC, but security assurances and inducements are the purview of individual nations, particularly the United States and other major powers, acting on their own or in concert beyond the UN framework.

Scholars have engaged in contentious debate regarding how to evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions generally and UN sanctions in particular. The most authoritative empirical study is that by Gary Hufbauer and colleagues, which examines 204 cases from 1914 to 2006. Their data set includes a large number of cases of unilateral sanctions, mostly imposed by the United States. Their conclusion is that sanctions contributed to policy change in 70 of the cases studied, for an overall success rate of 34%. Other scholars have found that sanctions are most effective when economic costs are high for the target but low for the sender, when the gross domestic product of the sender is much larger than that of the target, and when the target and the sender have extensive trade relations. To these results, Daniel Drezner has added the “sanctions paradox,” noting that sanctions are most likely to be effective when the sender and the target are interdependent economically and have cooperative political relations, yet coercive measures are rarely necessary under such conditions and in fact are often imposed when political relations and interdependence are low. David Cortright and George Lopez found the 1 in 3 success rate noted by the Hufbauer study replicated for the UN sanctions as well, especially when the Council maximized the use of expert panels, monitoring groups, and aggressive sanctions committees.

Many analysts would consider the current state of sanctions a mixed success. On the one hand, the diversity of global economic relations has made it possible for the UNSC to institute many refinements in the design and implementation of targeted economic sanctions that have some success in curtailing violent conflict and enforcing international norms of counterterrorism and counterproliferation. The record of success for multilateral sanctions is mixed but no less so than for the use of military force.

On the other hand, concerns about the lack of due process rights in the listing and delisting procedures for smart, targeted sanctions have created political backlash against UN sanctions. A number of European states, longtime supporters of
sanctions, have both criticized the Security Council procedures and redrawn some of the boundaries of sanctions imposition as a result of court rulings and administrative decisions.

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See also Diplomacy; Human Rights in International Relations; International Law; Intervention; Multilateralism; Power and International Politics

Further Readings

Scaling

Scaling methods used in the social sciences typically are statistical procedures that take observed data and extract latent (i.e., abstract) dimensions on which the objects or subjects are ordered. In political science, the primary focus has been on issue/public policy and/or ideological scales using individuals’ judgments or observed voting behavior. One important example is the estimation of ideological dimensions for all of congressional history by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal. Below, the development of these techniques and their applications in political science are discussed.

Scaling methods used in political science for the most part have their origins in psychology. The original work on scaling in psychology done at the turn of the 20th century was aimed at measuring general ability or intelligence. The pioneers were Karl Pearson and Charles Spearman. Spearman in 1904 used factor analysis to analyze a correlation matrix between test scores of 22 English high school boys for Classics, French, English, Math, Pitch, and Music. Spearman computed a form of rank-order correlation between each pair of skills across the 22 school boys and then extracted a common or general factor (g factor) from the matrix. His method of computing pairwise correlations and calculating the g factor was quickly supplanted by later work.

In particular, Pearson invented the product-moment correlation coefficient that is universally denoted as $r$, and he should also be credited with the invention of principal components analysis (what we now would think of as straightforward eigenvalue/eigenvector decomposition). Pearson in 1901 called it “the method of principal axes” and stated the problem quite succinctly: “In many physical, statistical, and biological investigations it is desirable to represent a system of points in plane, three, or higher dimensioned space by the ‘best-fitting’ straight line or plane” (p. 559). Remarkably, this also describes the essence of the famous Eckart-Young theorem (1936), which is the foundation of general least squares problems.

Lewis Leon Thurstone thought that Spearman’s one-factor theory of intelligence was wrong, and he succeeded in developing a method for extracting multiple factors from a correlation matrix. Thurstone’s theory of intelligence postulated seven rather than one primary mental ability, and he constructed tests specific to the seven abilities: verbal comprehension, word fluency, number facility, spatial visualization, associative memory, perceptual speed, and reasoning. Thurstone also developed the law of comparative judgment. Thurstone’s law is
more accurately described as a measurement model for a unidimensional subjective continuum. Subjects are asked to make a series of \( n(n-1)/2 \) pairwise comparisons of \( n \) stimuli. It is assumed that a subject’s response reflects the momentary subjective value associated with the stimulus and that the probability distribution of these momentary values is normally distributed. It is then possible to recover the underlying continuum or scale by essentially averaging across a group of subjects. If the variances of the stimuli (the discriminant dispersions) on the underlying scale are the same (Case 5 of the model), the requirement of the parallel-item characteristic curves in the Rasch model is satisfied. Case 5 of Thurstone’s method should yield essentially the same results as the Rasch model for dichotomous data.

In the decade after World War II, Thurstone’s scaling work inspired the development of what became known as Guttman scaling and multidimensional scaling (MDS). These methods represent measurements of similarity between pairs of stimuli as distances between points in a low-dimensional (usually Euclidean) space. The methods locate the points in such a way that points corresponding to very similar stimuli are located close together, while those corresponding to very dissimilar stimuli are located farther apart. Warren Torgerson showed a simple method of MDS based on the Eckart-Young theorem. However, Torgerson’s method assumed that the similarities were measured on a ratio scale, which is very unlikely in most cases.

Roger Shepard argued that the relationship between the true distance between a pair of stimuli and the observed distance was exponential. This led him to develop nonmetric multidimensional scaling in which distances are estimated that produce a weak monotone transformation (or rank ordering) of the observed dissimilarities. Shepard’s program worked, but the key breakthrough was Joseph Kruskal’s idea of monotone regression that led to the development of a powerful and practical nonmetric MDS program. By the early 1970s, this was known by the acronym KYST (Kruskal, Young, Shepard, and Torgeson) and is still in use today.

MDS methods can be seen as evolving from factor analysis and Thurstone’s unidimensional scaling method with the key difference being that MDS methods are applied to relational data—that is, data such as similarities and preferential choice data that can be regarded as distances. At the same time that MDS methods were evolving, Louis Guttman developed scalogram analysis or what is more commonly known as Guttman scaling. A Guttman scale is the basis of all modern skills-based tests. It is a set of items (questions, problems, etc.) that are ranked in order of difficulty so that those who answer correctly (agree) on a more difficult (or extreme) item will also answer correctly (agree) all the less difficult (extreme) items that preceded it. Rasch analysis (more broadly, item response theory [IRT]) is essentially a sophisticated form of Guttman scalogram analysis. These are techniques for examining whether a set of items is consistent in the sense that they all measure increasing/decreasing levels of some unidimensional attribute (e.g., mathematical ability, racial prejudice).

At the same time when Torgerson was developing classical scaling and Guttman was developing scalogram analysis, Clyde Coombs developed unfolding analysis. Coombs came up with the idea of an ideal point and a single-peaked preference function to account for the observed rank orderings. The idea was to arrange the individuals’ ideal points and points representing the stimuli along a scale so that the distances between the ideal points and the stimuli points reproduced the observed rank orderings. Coombs called this an unfolding analysis because the researcher must take the individuals’ rank orderings and “unfold” them.

Unfolding analysis deals with relational data and is therefore an MDS method. Both unfolding analysis and scalogram analysis deal with individuals’ responses to a set of stimuli. But Guttman’s model is very different from the unfolding model. In terms of utility theory, unfolding analysis assumes a single-peaked (usually symmetric) utility function. That is, utility (the degree of preference) declines with distance from the individual’s ideal point. In contrast, Guttman scaling is based on a utility function that is always monotonically increasing or decreasing over the relevant dimension or space. Above some threshold, the individual always responds with a Yes/Correct, and below the threshold, the individual always responds with a No/Incorrect. The counterpart to an ideal point is the position on the scale where the individual’s responses switch from Yes/Correct to No/Incorrect.
Interestingly, these two very different models are observationally equivalent in the context of parliamentary voting. In the unfolding model, there are two outcomes for every parliamentary motion—one corresponding to “Yea” and one corresponding to “Nay.” Legislators vote for the option closest to their ideal points. In one dimension, this forms a perfect scalogram. Hence, Guttman scaling methods and their IRT parametric descendants can be used to analyze parliamentary (binary choice) data.

In the 1970s and 1980s, political scientists began to combine techniques from econometrics and statistics with approaches developed by psychometricians. John Aldrich and Richard McKelvey in 1977 developed a unidimensional scaling method for 7-point scales. This method uses the respondents’ perceived locations of the political stimuli to recover an underlying latent configuration. It also will recover the respondents’ self-placements on the same latent scale. Henry Brady made contributions to the statistical foundations of nonmetric MDS as well as methods for and problems with the analysis of preferences. Poole and Rosenthal combined the random utility model developed by economists, the spatial model of voting, and alternating estimation methods developed in psychometrics to develop NOMINATE, an unfolding method for parliamentary roll call data.

In the 1990s and the early 2000s, the availability of inexpensive and fast computers made simulation methods for the estimation of complex multivariate models practical for the first time, and these methods were fused with long-standing psychometric methods by political scientists. Specifically, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation within a Bayesian framework coupled with the IRT model can be used to perform an unfolding analysis of parliamentary roll call data. Political scientists have successfully blended methods from statistics and econometrics with psychometrics to produce unique scaling applications. The coming decades should see even greater advances due to the availability of ever-faster parallel computing methods and the increasing sophistication of political science methodological training.

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See also Measurement; Measurement, Scales; Scaling Methods: A Taxonomy

Further Readings


Scaling Methods: A Taxonomy

Scaling methods germinated in the pioneering work of Karl Pearson and Charles Spearman, who in the first decade of the 20th century developed methods to describe relationships between variables. Pearson created the correlation coefficient for metric data, while Spearman introduced the rank order correlation and an algorithm designed to document the existence of a general factor in intelligence research. Since then, these ideas have been extended to permit an (in theory) unlimited number of factors obtained from data ranging from crude categorical to refined metric and permitting the imposition of a variety of constraints on the variables. What all scaling methods have in common, however, is that they can be used to transform a set of observed variables to a smaller number of latent variables or factors (dimensions).
Scaling methods differ with respect to the type of input data for which they are most appropriate. Principal component analysis (PCA) and factor analysis (FA) make the assumption that the data are metrically scaled. If the data are ordered categories, such as Likert-type responses, categorical (or nonlinear) principal component analysis (CATPCA) is probably the best choice. Multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) is particularly suited for the analysis of unordered categorical (or nominal) data. For paired-comparison data, the proper choice would be multidimensional scaling. Rasch scaling or the unfolding model are proper choices when the response options are dichotomous (Yes/No) with an implicit item difficulty order, which usually means that they have a one-dimensional solution. The following documents the similarities and differences of the most popular scaling methods in the political and social sciences, namely, PCA, CATPCA, and MCA.

To demonstrate these methods, we chose seven variables on national pride from the U.S. portion of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2003. To avoid a lengthy discussion on missing data, possible imputation techniques, and their impact on the solution, we use listwise deletion, which reduces the sample from 1,216 cases to 1,148 cases. The seven variables (identified with the abbreviations that will be used in subsequent figures) are as follows:

- **A.** I would rather be a citizen of [Country] than of any other country in the world.
- **B.** There are some things about [Country] today that make me feel ashamed of [Country].
- **C.** The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [Country Nationality].
- **D.** Generally speaking, [Country] is a better country than most other countries.
- **E.** People should support their country even if the country is wrong.
- **F.** When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be [Country Nationality].
- **G.** I am often less proud of [Country] than I would like to be.

Five response options ranging from agree strongly (1), to neither agree nor disagree (3), to disagree strongly (5) were made available for all items. Five of the seven variables have a positive formulation, such that agree strongly implies a favorable attitude toward the country. The remaining two items (2 and 7) have a negative formulation, requiring respondents to (strongly) disagree to express a favorable attitude.

**Principal Component Analysis**

Assume that there are $m$ observed variables with $n$ respondents each. In PCA, these $m$ observed variables are reexpressed without any loss of information by $m$ latent variables; that is, when the number of factors equals the number of variables, the original observed scores can be recaptured. However, the usual aim is to reduce the dimensionality of the data by using a substantially smaller number of $m^*$ factors. Specifically, each observed variable ($z_i$) can be expressed through its association ($\alpha_{jk}$) with each latent factor ($f_k$), resulting in

$$z_i = f_1\alpha_{i1} + f_2\alpha_{i2} + \cdots + f_{m^*}\alpha_{jm^*} + \cdots + f_m\alpha_{jm}.$$

Here, $z_i$ is a vector that contains the $z$-transformed categories of the $j$th variable for all $n$ respondents, $f_k$ contains the categories from the $k$th latent variable of all $n$ respondents, and $\alpha_{jk}$ is the correlation between the $j$th observed and the $k$th latent variable.

In matrix notation and for the full solution (i.e., where the number of observed variables is equal to the number of factors), $Z = FA^T$, with $1/nF^TF = I$. $I$ is an identity matrix, which by definition has ones in the main diagonal and zeros in the off-diagonal elements; in other words, the factors are orthogonal (uncorrelated) with each other. Because $z_{1i} = (x_{1i} - \bar{x})/s_x$ and $z_{2i} = (y_{1i} - \bar{y})/s_y$, it follows that $r_{12} = (1/n)z_{1i}z_{2i}$, and in matrix notation, $R = (1/n)ZZ' = (1/n)AF^TF = AA^T$, which is known as the fundamental theorem in FA. Since the idea is to reduce the set of $m$ observed variables to $m^*$ factors, with $m^* < m$, it follows that $Z \approx FA^T$ and $R \approx A_m^mA_m^T$.

Applying canonical decomposition produces $R = B\Delta B^T$, where $B$ is the matrix of the eigenvectors and $\Delta$ is the diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues, with $\lambda_1 \geq \lambda_2 \geq \cdots \geq \lambda_m \geq \cdots \geq \lambda_m$. From...
\( \mathbf{R} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{A}^\top \), it follows that the correlations between any two variables \((j, l)\) can be recomputed from the corresponding factor loadings: \( \sum_{k=1}^{m^*} \alpha_{jk} \alpha_{kl} = r_{jl} \). The factor loadings \((\alpha_{jk})\), ranging between \(-1\) and \(+1\), can be interpreted as correlations between the latent and observed variables. The communality \((h_j^2)\) describes the proportion of the variance in variable \(j\) explained by those \(m^*\) factors that were used to construct the reduced space.

Several possibilities exist for deciding on the number of dimensions to be included in an interpretation. The eigenvalue (or Kaiser) criterion, which is the default in many statistical packages, is most often applied in the social and political sciences. The rationale for this criterion is that a latent variable should explain more of the variation in the data than an observed variable. Since each observed variable has an explained variance of 1.0 (the correlation of a variable with itself), the eigenvalues of the factors to be considered in the solution have to be greater than one—that is, \( \lambda_{m^*} > 1 \). This is an arbitrary criterion that nevertheless is sometimes useful. An alternative criterion is the so-called scree test: The eigenvalues are plotted in successive order; the factor that forms an elbow (i.e., a substantial change in magnitude in the increasing/decreasing list of eigenvalues) will be the first one that is not considered in the solution. Finally, it is sometimes preferable to consider just those factors for which one can provide a substantive interpretation.

After choosing the number of factors to be retained in a solution, scholars often rotate the solution to obtain a better interpretation; varimax rotation is most commonly applied. In an iterative procedure, the coordinates of variables and cases in the \(m^*\)-dimensional latent space are changed in a way that maximizes the sum of the variances of the squared loadings on each factor. Using this technique, median loadings become either smaller or larger and are therefore more clearly associated with a single factor. While varimax rotation keeps the orthogonality of the factors (i.e., the factors remain uncorrelated), other rotation methods such as oblimin allow the factors to be correlated after rotation.

The literature sometimes confuses PCA and FA. The difference between these methods is that PCA does not incorporate any error term, since \( \mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{F} \mathbf{A}^\top + \mathbf{V} \) and \( \mathbf{R} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{A}^\top \). In contrast, in FA, it is assumed that each variable has an item-specific error term \((v_i)\); from this, it follows that \( \mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{F} \mathbf{A}^\top + \mathbf{V} \) and \( \mathbf{R} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{A}^\top - \mathbf{V}\mathbf{V}^\top \). If the errors are uncorrelated, only the main diagonal elements of the correlation matrix \( \mathbf{R} \) (which are by definition one) have to be reduced iteratively to correct for the item-specific error. The manner of estimating these error terms differentiates the various methods of FA. The aim of structural equation modeling (SEM) is to allow for correlations between the error terms and for correlations between the latent factors themselves and to classify observed and latent variables as dependent and independent ones. While PCA is used to explore the structure of the data, SEM is used to test whether the data are consistent with the models developed on the basis of the literature.

Input for PCA and FA is usually the matrix of product–moment correlation coefficients, which assume metric data. Hence, the PCA of categorical variables such as the 5-point Likert items in our example is problematic. Nevertheless, such variables have often been treated as if they were metric. In the following, we apply PCA to the ISSP data described above to show the solution that one would typically find in the literature. Using the seven variables on national pride as input data, Table 1 shows that the first and second eigenvalues are 2.631 and 1.086, respectively; together, they explain 53.1% of the variation. After varimax rotation, the two eigenvalues are 2.227 and 1.490 (Table 1).

According to the eigenvalue criterion, the solution is two-dimensional since only the first two eigenvalues are greater than one. However, the difference between the first and the second eigenvalue is large, while there is only a small difference between the second and the third eigenvalues. By the scree test criterion, the solution would be one-dimensional. With respect to the factor loadings (Table 2), all variables are associated with Dimension 1: Positive loadings are found for the positively formulated items and negative loadings for those of reversed polarity. Substantively, this factor appears to reflect the extent to which respondents report feeling national pride. On the second dimension, all variables have positive loadings, regardless of the content or polarity of the item. This latent variable might be interpretable as a methodological artifact known as acquiescence (the tendency to
agree with statements regardless of their content). By the scree test criterion, as well as that of substantive meaning, the solution is one-dimensional. However, since most scholars use the eigenvalue criterion, we tentatively follow this procedure, keeping the two-dimensional solution and performing a varimax rotation.

After varimax rotation, the loadings of the positively formulated items remain almost unchanged on the first dimension, while the loadings of the negatively formulated items move to the second dimension to define their own factor. Therefore, the rotated solution suggests a two-dimensional structure mirroring just the polarity of the items: Positive-polarity items form Dimension 1, and negative-polarity items define Dimension 2. Findings such as these have sparked a lively debate about whether the underlying structure consists of two unipolar concepts or one bipolar concept. Regardless of which position is taken, it is insufficient to base it just on the rotated solution and the eigenvalue criterion.

A more appropriate technique for analyzing ordered categorical variables is CATPCA, in which the categories are replaced by optimal scores. The optimal scoring process allows order constraints to be imposed so that ordered categorical variables get increasing, or at least nondecreasing, scores as the category levels become increasingly severe. Responses inconsistent with the implied ordering manifest themselves in tied optimal scores for two or more successive categories. In contrast to PCA, the number of dimensions \( m^* \) to be used for the fit must be specified in advance, and the solutions for \( m^* \) and \( m^* + 1 \) dimensions are not nested. Once the optimal scores have been calculated, they replace the category codes, and the remainder of the analysis can be regarded as (classical) PCA. In short, CATPCA is an appropriate technique to display relationships between cases associated with a set of ordered categorical variables. Like PCA, the method produces eigenvalues and explained variances, factor loadings, and factor scores with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Essentially, CATPCA can be regarded as PCA applied to ordered categorical data. An additional advantage of CATPCA is that the solutions can be visualized with the help of biplots. It is possible to impose linearity on the optimal scores, in which case the biplots can be expressed as vectors. John Gower and David Hand (1996) simplified this approach by showing that biplot axes can be interpreted just like other coordinate axes—that is, by projection and by reading a value off a scale. The closer two biplot axes are to each other, the stronger the association of the corresponding variables in the \( m^* \)-dimensional space.

Running CATPCA on the ISSP data described above and restricting the solution to two dimensions, the first factor explains 38.2\% of the variation and the second an additional 15.6\%. Comparing the CATPCA with the PCA solution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Initial Eigenvalues</th>
<th>Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings</th>
<th>Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% Variance</td>
<td>Cumulative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.086</td>
<td>15.519</td>
<td>53.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>11.505</td>
<td>64.610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.771</td>
<td>11.018</td>
<td>75.628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td>9.511</td>
<td>85.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>7.760</td>
<td>92.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td>7.100</td>
<td>100.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), National Identity II (2003). Distributor: GESIS Cologne Germany, ZA No. 3910.
shows a small increase in the explained variation. An increase in explained variation is always the case since CATPCA does not restrict the items to have constant distances between successive categories as does PCA. The differences in the explained variances can be interpreted as one indication of the quality of the data: The smaller the difference between the solutions, the better the data. Comparing the factor loadings of the unrotated PCA with the CATPCA solution (Table 2) reveals only trivial differences. Dimension 1 reflects the difference between positive and negative formulations, while all items have positive loadings on Dimension 2.

Figure 1 shows the biplot axes of the seven variables, with tick marks to symbolize the category-level points and with labels affixed to the agree strongly end point. The factorial axes are excluded since they are not useful in the biplot presentation. Two sets of items are distinguished, corresponding to the positive and negative formulations. As numerically shown for PCA via varimax rotation, the two sets of items could be described as separate factors. Inspecting the distances between all successive categories on each item shows that there are no ties—that is, there are no two single categories measuring the same level of agreement/disagreement to a certain item. However, the distances between the categories are quite unequal. Take Item A as an example: The first category (agree strongly) is relatively far from the second category (agree); in fact, the first category is located in the negative parts of Dimensions 1 and 2, while the second category is already located in the positive parts of those dimensions (i.e., on the other side of the mean, which is the point where the lines for all items cross). In other words, the midpoint of the latent concept behind Item A is not “3”; rather, it is a point between “1” and “2.” Furthermore, the categories neither agree nor disagree and disagree are relatively close to each other, indicating that these two responses are rather similar for the average respondent.

Table 2  PCA and CATPCA Factor Loadings, Before and After Varimax Rotation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PCA, Unrotated Solution</th>
<th>PCA, Rotated Solution</th>
<th>CATPCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dimension 1</td>
<td>Dimension 2</td>
<td>Dimension 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item A</td>
<td>.647</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item B</td>
<td>−.556</td>
<td>.612</td>
<td>−.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item C</td>
<td>.646</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item D</td>
<td>.719</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>.764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item E</td>
<td>.554</td>
<td>.222</td>
<td>.590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item F</td>
<td>.601</td>
<td>.148</td>
<td>.592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item G</td>
<td>−.549</td>
<td>.656</td>
<td>−.136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), National Identity II (2003). Distributor: GESIS Cologne Germany, ZA No. 3910.

Note: CATPCA = categorical principal component analysis; PCA = principal component analysis.
In the final step, we perform MCA on the same data. While PCA restricts the data to be metric (i.e., all distances between two successive categories are equal), and while CATPCA keeps the ordinality of the successive categories, MCA makes no assumptions about the measurement level of the variables. In sum, MCA can be regarded as PCA with (unordered) categorical variables. In contrast to PCA and CATPCA, the visualization of the data is usually of primary interest in MCA.

Figure 2 presents the visualization of the seven variables with its total of 35 categories. In this figure, the successive categories of the individual variables are connected by trajectories. Projecting the categories from all variables onto the first dimension shows that all items retain the ordinality of their categories. Dimension 1 reflects the substantive meaning, which is the level of national pride, with the negatively formulated items running in a direction opposite to the positive ones. The second dimension shows the horseshoe (or the Guttman effect), with extreme values in the negative part and moderate values in the positive part. This effect is methodologically induced; for the given example, it has already been suggested that these are due mainly to acquiescence. It is precisely to exclude methodologically induced variations of such kinds in ordinal data that Jan de Leeuw (2006) proposed the use of CATPCA.

**Figure 2** Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) Presentation of National Identity Data

Source: Data from International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), National Identity II (2003). Distributor: GESIS Cologne Germany; ZA No. 3910.
It should be noted that CATPCA also allows a combination of metric and categorical (ordered and unordered) data within a single analysis. In such situations, the metric variables are restricted to a metric scale with equal distances and the ordered categorical variables to their implicit successive order of categories, while no order is imposed on the categories of the unordered categorical variables.

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See also Correspondence Analysis; Factor Analysis; Measurement, Scales; Model Specification; Scaling; Structural Equation Modeling

Further Readings

SCHEMA

A schema (plural schemata) in the field of social science represents a person’s mental structure used to organize current knowledge about the world and to guide cognitive processes and behavior. In this way, we use schemata to categorize objects and events, based on their elements and characteristics, to interpret and predict the world. While evaluating the world, new information is being processed according to how it fits into the mental structures, or rules. In the field of social science, and particularly in cognitive science, we retrieve knowledge from various areas, such as artificial intelligence, with the main goal of developing simplified mental structures about our knowledge to draw conclusions about missing or non-evidential information, such as during decision making or political evaluation. Examples of schemata include rubrics, social roles, stereotypes, and worldviews. This entry discusses meanings and the use of schemata, as well as their application to social science.

The Concept and Its Application
Schema as a concept was first introduced into psychology by the British psychologist Frederic Bartlett (1886–1969) through his learning theory. Bartlett perceived organized knowledge as an elaborate network of abstract mental structures that represent our understanding of the world. Bartlett’s main studies concentrate on the impact of our cultural background in rephrasing and memorizing certain events. For example, in one of his most well-known studies, Bartlett examined whether subjects could recall events that strongly deviate from their own environmental background, and he showed that the more culturally deviated one’s own background was from that of the presented story, the less likely it was that participants could remember the story. Bartlett concluded that the participants distort the presented story in favor of their own cultural stereotypes, and details that were difficult to interpret were omitted because they did not fit in with the participants’ own schemata.

In general, the learner in schema theory actively builds schemata and revises them in light of new information. Here, it is important to mention that each schema is unique and depends on an individual’s experiences and cognitive processes.
David Ausubel (1968), in his meaningful learning theory, argues that there exists a hierarchical organization of knowledge where new information will be added to the already existing hierarchy. In contrast, Jean Piaget shows that there is more than one body of knowledge available to learners. Piaget claims that there exists a network of context-specific bodies of knowledge and according to specific situations we apply a specific body of knowledge. Piaget’s definition of schema is useful for interpreting information in which situation-specific schemata are useful in distinguishing between two types of categories of interpretation of knowledge: the expert and the novice. Experts are more complex and developed schemata that function better in any given domain, and the novice has no schema or inadequate schema to help interpret new information. Since schemata are perceived as context specific, they depend on the individual’s experience with the subject.

Beside interpreting information, the literature also suggests that schemata are crucial for decoding how that information is presented to oneself. One possibility is reflection in text structure. This means that readers use their systematic representation of text to help them interpret the text. Also, as Robert Kaplan (1966) points out, it is important to note that an essay style is culturally determined. Moreover, schemata have two types of hierarchies that concentrate on the relationship between the part and the whole. It shows that on the basis of partial information structures, we are able to perceive the whole picture of an event. This reference is possible because each schema has a main category, a so-called slot that connects different semantic networks and provides us with a whole picture of an event or object. For example, in the main slot “house,” we store the information “wall,” “roof,” and “floor,” among others. Within the context of part–whole relationships, we can therefore infer that a house has a wall, a roof, and a floor. Moreover, each schema is developed in a way that helps us simplify drawing conclusions of a represented concept. For example, if we know that an object is a door, then according to the definition of a schema “door,” we can assume that it has a lock, a handle, and hinges, which shows that we apply all the attributes of a door.

Moreover, William Brewer and James Treyens (1981) studied the effects of schemata in human memory. They conducted a study in which 30 subjects were brought into the office of the principal investigator and were told to wait there. After 35 seconds, the subjects were asked to leave the room and to list everything that they could recall being in the room. Brewer and Treyens showed that the subjects could recall all those objects that fit into their schema of “office room,” and they had a much more deviated memory of those items that were not a part of their schema. For example, 29 of the 30 subjects recalled that the office had a chair, a desk, and walls; however, only 8 could recall the anatomic skull or a writing pad. Interestingly, 9 subjects mentioned that they had seen books, when, in fact, there were no books in the office. Being able to recall books when books were not among those objects present shows that our memory of the characteristics of certain locations depends on schemata that we associate with those types of locations.

Schemata can also contain so-called event concepts, which can be defined as a conceptual structure. Roger Schank and Robert Abelson (1977) developed one version of an event concept that they defined as “scripts.” If we define an event, for example, as a “restaurant visit,” then we are able to determine stereotypical sequences of action that define a restaurant visit. A study shows that different subjects recalled different sequences from the same event. Among the total number of 32 subjects in their study, there was no consistent recall of the sequences of actions. In fact, in an overlap of 73% of all subjects, Schank and Abelson found that only a stereotypical sequence of “taking a seat,” “ordering food,” “eating,” and “paying” was the same.

### Applying Schema Theory

Applying a schema to social science represents our common understanding about an event or a concept. Hence, each individual has his or her own understanding of this event, which depends on the characteristics that he or she associates with the object, content, or location, which, in turn, depends on his or her cultural and political background. Several misrepresentations of an actual event
The notion of cognitive scripts, closely related to schema theory, became especially important in the 1970s, when cognitive psychologists (e.g., Robert Abelson, 1981; Roger Schank & Robert Abelson, 1977)—and, later, scholars of international relations—began to explore the role of cognitive shortcuts in information processing and decision making in social science. Many areas in political science apply schemata when decision making occurs—for example, during peace negotiations or United Nations summit meetings, where a vast variety of cultural-political backgrounds are represented. It can be inferred, therefore, that the more detailed the description of an event, the more likely are larger proportions of members to reach agreement.

The literature on schemata concentrates primarily on strategies that focus on how different representatives with a defined set of schemata communicate and interpret the events. Here, abstract theories and exemplary theories apply to how schemata are actually used by distinct learners. Abstract theory works through the usage of a prototype that represents a certain category, and exemplary theories work through the individual comparison with the prototype. In the exemplary theory, we do not store concepts in our schema but individual examples, and the schema functions through comparisons rather than representation, as in abstract theory.

Certain strategies of simplifying schemata include stereotypes and archetypes that drive our decision-making process. Here, the literature suggests that numerous strategies follow from schema theory. Sharon Widmayer (2007) acknowledges the role of prior knowledge in cognitive processing and shows that already existing schemata related to the new information need to be activated. This is described in the literature as “stimulating recall of prior knowledge.” Teachers, for example, activate student’s prior knowledge through reading the heading and the title before starting a new subject related to it. Another teaching strategy is using analogies and comparisons to activate the learner’s existing schema in particular to help learners draw connections among already existing schemata. Here, it is crucial that teachers use the most realistic familiar scenarios instead of conventional abstract methods. With regard to the familiarity of already existing schemata, the literature points out that with highly familiar scenarios, the learner will activate the already existing schemata more successfully, and the strongest connections among schemata will thus be achieved. To support this conclusion, Edward Price and Marcy Driscoll showed in their 1997 study that around 11% of the subjects could solve a particular problem in an unfamiliar context, while around 58% of those participating in the study could answer a very similar problem in a familiar context.

In conclusion, schemata help us represent our knowledge of how characteristics of certain events are recalled. However, there remain limitations such as the applicability of schemata across knowledge domains that are relevant. Here, one’s self-knowledge as well as one’s cultural-political background are crucial determinants.

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See also Attitude Consistency; Attitudes, Political; Script; Values

Further Readings

SCRIPT

The notion of cognitive scripts, closely related to schema theory, became especially important in the 1970s, when cognitive psychologists (e.g., Robert Abelson, 1981; Roger Schank & Robert Abelson, 1977)—and, later, scholars of international relations—began to explore the role of cognitive shortcuts in information processing and decision
making. According to Abelson, one of the leading advocates of this approach, scripts are “conceptual representations of stereotyped event sequences.” Put more simply, a script may be thought of as a particular kind of schema or “mental box” that provides the typical default values for an event of some kind or an act that we are accustomed to performing, such as watching a movie or eating out at a restaurant. We usually experience little difficulty dining at a restaurant we have never visited before, for instance, since we simply rely on the default values stored in our memory to guide our behavior; we wait to be seated by the host or hostess, a server presents us with menus, we pick what we want to eat, we eat it when it arrives, and so on. By the same token, if a friend informs you that she went to see a movie last night, you can easily use the default values you keep in your head for typical visits to the cinema to guess how her evening probably went. Scripts can help decision makers assess the nature of a situation quickly but can sometimes be a source of cognitive error, a fact that has not been lost on students of foreign policy decision making. The notion of scripts has been broadly accepted within international relations, but it has also been subjected to various criticisms (as discussed below).

The concept of a script clearly draws itself on the cognitive image of a movie or theatrical script in which events are played out one after the other, and it can also be compared to a cartoon strip. This idea is consistent with the more general notion that human beings are “cognitive misers,” and the approach may be viewed as part of the bounded rationality tradition within political science, which stresses the ways in which individuals depart from “pure” or comprehensive rationality. Rather than considering everything we experience sui generis, according to this view, we are usually far more economical in our information processing. We commonly fit new sensory data into established mental categories, both because this requires little effort and because it allows us to make sense of the outside world quickly and expeditiously. This is particularly the case under conditions of high uncertainty and ambiguity, when the individual is being bombarded with too much information, or when he or she possesses too little. As well as helping us make sense of what has happened in the past or is happening now, scripts often play a strong predictive role in decision making, allowing us to ascertain in advance with a reasonable degree of confidence what is likely to occur in the future (or at least what we think is likely to occur).

Scripts can also be a major source of cognitive error, however. Because they contain information about things that are only typically true, at least in that individual’s experience, there is always the potential for oversimplification of a novel stimulus. We may make assumptions based on the typical or prototypical behaviors that may be entirely misleading or false. Scripts can also compete with one another in our minds in situations where it is unclear what is actually happening. Two or more scripts may seem relevant to the case in hand, and the decision maker may grapple with uncertainty as to which best suits the issue in question.

Scholars of foreign policy decision making such as Deborah Larson (1985) and Michael Shapiro and G. Matthew Bonham (1973) were quick to pick up on the political relevance of scripts in international relations. “Balkanization” and “the Trojan Horse,” for instance, are two scripts often used in international relations, and as noted by Yaacov Vertzberger (1990), scripts appear to play an especially prominent role in the analysis of strategic threats. In American foreign policy, the “Munich script” and the “Vietnam script” have frequently influenced the deliberations of decision makers, both during the Cold War and since. This provides a useful political example of the ways in which rival scripts can compete for a decision maker’s attention and of the manner in which scripts are used to predict future events. The generation of policymakers who had experienced World War II were particularly attuned to the memory of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain after the Munich conference of 1938, where he famously waved a piece of paper on which Adolf Hitler had agreed not to invade Poland and Western Europe in exchange for part of what was then Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain famously emerged from the conference promising “peace in our time.” When this attempt at accommodation failed and was followed by World War II, many policymakers (especially in the United States) drew the wider lesson that any effort to “appease” a dictator was bound to lead to disaster. The widespread use of the domino theory by
U.S. decision makers during the Cold War, for instance, was clearly based on the cognitive appeal of this script. From this perspective, attempts to appease an adversary inevitably lead to well-intentioned but empty negotiations; verbal or written promises are followed by betrayal, causing a nation to fight a war against an enemy it should have confronted much earlier using its military might. During the Cuban missile crisis, John F. Kennedy appears to have had the World War I script in mind, urging his advisers to read Barbara Tuchman’s book *The Guns of August*; he was determined not to allow events to spiral out of control in 1962, as they had in 1914 prior to the onset of World War I. The Munich script was evoked on far more numerous occasions during the Cold War, however, and it was perhaps most famously used by President George H. W. Bush after Saddam Hussein’s troops invaded Kuwait in 1990. Bush argued that if Hussein’s aggression was not confronted early on—if the Iraqi leader was appeased, in other words—events similar to those of the 1930s would play out, albeit in the Middle East rather than Europe and with Hussein as the antagonist rather than Hitler. This cognitive image remains highly potent in American political discourse today, despite the passage of (to date) more than 70 years; during the 2008 presidential election in the United States, for instance, the then candidate Barack Obama was accused by Republicans of appeasement for advocating direct talks with Iran over the issues of nuclear weapons and terrorism. The Vietnam script—which remains equally potent—stresses, on the other hand, the dangers of confrontation rather than accommodation. Recalling the military and political errors that cost the United States so much blood and treasure, one popular interpretation of Vietnam suggests that a nation should exercise extreme caution when contemplating the use of military force. Images of “body bags,” “getting bogged down” in enemy terrain, and mass protests are all evoked by the Vietnam script, as well as the considerable human and political costs of a military intervention that effectively destroyed Lyndon Johnson’s presidency.

The prominence of the Munich and Vietnam scripts in the United States illustrates the perils of “overlearning” the lessons of a single event. The former illustrates the dangers of overgeneralizing one set of historical events into a script that purports to predict what will usually happen when a ruthless or expansionist leader is appeased (or, taken to its extreme, when any form of diplomacy is used). Equally, one can argue that the Vietnam script has often led American leaders to be overly cautious in responding to genuine threats, creating a sometimes inappropriate reluctance to use military power. As a young antiwar activist, Bill Clinton had been strongly influenced by the costs of Lyndon Johnson’s decision to escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War. As president, he was consequently often slow to use military force, most notably when the former Yugoslavia began to break up in the early 1990s. Eventually, U.S. firepower was used against the Serbs in 1995, helping to bring the parties together at a peace conference in Dayton, Ohio, but not before hundreds of thousands had perished in the conflict. Similarly, Clinton may also have been reluctant to intervene in Rwanda when major acts of genocide erupted there in 1994, because he was relying on what might be termed the Somalia or “Black Hawk Down” script; the latter suggested that military interventions and/or attempts to “nation build” in Africa are fraught with danger, drawing on the cognitive image of the disastrous 1993 attempt by U.S. forces to capture the Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid during which 18 American soldiers died and 73 were wounded (the death toll among Somalis was much higher). Although the similarities between the Somali and Rwandan cases were arguably superficial, Clinton administration officials later admitted that the dangers of committing troops to intervene in the slaughter of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda dominated their thoughts as a result of what had happened the previous year in Somalia.

While the notion that leaders use cognitive scripts has been generally (if perhaps grudgingly) accepted by most scholars within international relations, a number of potential problems within this area should also be highlighted. The first is simply that there has been relatively little development of the script idea within international relations or political science since the 1980s. For good or bad, the rational choice or game-theoretical tradition—which makes the “as if” assumption that decision makers possess pure rationality—has in general proven more attractive to many political scientists for modeling purposes than the admittedly messy
notion that policymakers employ a variety of cognitive shortcuts (not the least because the latter assumption renders decision makers somewhat idiosyncratic). Indeed, one of the scholars who originally helped popularize the idea of scripts and schemas within political science—Robert Axelrod—joined the rational-choice tradition some years ago. Second, many scholars of foreign policy decision making have preferred to use the competing but obviously related notion of analogical reasoning in their work, a now well-established tradition that covers the same ground as early work on scripts but has generally proven itself to be somewhat more popular among scholars of foreign policy analysis. Third—and in a related vein—there has been a general failure in the literature to disentangle the notion of scripts from strongly related concepts such as schemas and analogies. If scripts are simply “event schemas,” do we really need the former label? Are scripts merely the same thing as historical analogies, or are they something analytically distinct? Last, there has also been an overemphasis, perhaps, on the “cold” information-processing tradition from which the focus on scripts derived, and some political psychologists are themselves turning away from the computational analogy on which much of the original literature of schemas and scripts was based.

Nevertheless, whatever terminology we use, scripts will remain highly relevant to the study of politics because both elite decision makers and ordinary voters must often make decisions with only incomplete information about the situation at hand. Political actors can and do make incorrect inferences by fitting individuals or events into the wrong categories or scripts, based on their observable but all too frequently superficial similarities.

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See also Foreign Policy Analysis; Game Theory; Genocide; Historical Memory; Policy Process, Models of; Rational Choice; Schema

Further Readings


Secession

Secession is the formal withdrawal from an established, internationally recognized state by a constituent unit to create a new sovereign state. This entry analyzes the meaning of the notion, its empirical dynamics, and its justification and finally addresses the key question on the reasons why there are not a higher number of secessions in the world.

The decision to secede represents an instance of political disintegration, when the citizens of a sub-system withdraw their political activities from the central government to focus on their own center. To the observer, secession may appear irrational as it often entails the sacrifice of economic opportunities and the endurance of social upheaval. Because of the state’s opposition and monopoly of coercive force, secessionist struggles frequently become violent and protracted. Thus, secession is disintegrative in the most fundamental sense: It involves not the overthrow of the existing government but rather its territorial dismemberment.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and Ethiopia and the fragmentation of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia have created some 20 new states through secession, which has grudgingly received international recognition and legitimation. Indeed, from 1776 onward, secession has been one of the most frequent ways of creating new states. With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires after World War I, numerous new states were created through secession. Given the countless unresolved cultural and territorial disputes and the many unsatisfied aspirations of
nations in Africa, Asia, and even in the West—for example, Quebec, Catalonia, the Basques, Flanders, Scotland, and Wales—secession continues to be a force to be reckoned with in international politics.

**Dynamics**

The dynamics of secession rest on four preconditions: nation, territory, leaders, and discontent. Secession demands must be presented by an identifiable community that is smaller than the state and that threatens to withdraw if not satisfied. Questions of identity underpin this community of people, or nation, who perceive the characteristics that distinguish their members from other groups, who feel a commitment to each other, and who then undertake the challenge of changing their circumstances. This community must be associated with the territory on which it would establish its newly independent state. Without effective leadership to translate community needs into demands, threats to the nation might merely degenerate into social unrest as pent-up frustrations are vented. Discontent with the current circumstances motivates the community’s demands for change. Often a nation is bound together, and perhaps even defined, by common claims of discrimination, neglect, exploitation, or repression in economic, political, cultural, linguistic, or religious terms. The U.S. Declaration of Independence points to the “unbearable tyranny of the state” as both the reason, in the sense of providing the motivating force, and the moral justification for secession.

Embedded in any secession lies the perceived justice of the community’s cause. The debate surrounding the “right of secession” and its close relative, “the right of national self-determination,” revolves around (a) the argument that secession may be justifiable either in circumstances where state rule over a nation is particularly oppressive and tyrannical or when a majority of a territorially concentrated community desires secession and (b) the argument that secession may be desirable due to the benefits it provides for nations to organize themselves according to their own values.

**Justification**

Those seeking to justify secession extend the argument that if a society may overthrow an unbearable government, then a segment of the population may also remove itself from a particularly objectionable government. John Stuart Mill acknowledged that freedom and liberty may not be possible when the state is an artificial amalgamation of two or more distinct nations with one dominating the government and, thus, conceded that secession may be a necessary alternative to promote liberty. One need only think of the experiences of the Armenians, Jews, Kurds, and people from many other nations facing government-sponsored slaughter to understand how nations would believe that they could guarantee their safety and even survival through possessing their own state. For revolution or secession, thus, the underlying principle of protest is the same.

President Woodrow Wilson extended the argument from when secession may be justifiable to when it may be desirable. Above all else, Wilson sought peace based on justice. He believed that the subjugation of one nation by another was unjust and would lead inevitably to a threat to peace. Implicit in Wilson’s approach lies the belief that secession was a desirable way to create states coterminous with nations. Every historic nation should possess the same right to organize its communal affairs according to its own values, not simply those who through foresight, geography, or luck gained their own independent states. Some have even argued that a more peaceful world may not be possible without the completion of the international system of states through continued secession based on national aspirations.

**Low Incidence of Secession**

Given these arguments, one might reasonably question why there have not been a larger number of successful secessions. According to one account, the world possesses approximately 8,000 different languages and cultures but fewer than 200 independent states. The forces arrayed against secession—both domestic and international—go far beyond simply the philosophical difficulties surrounding the “right of secession.”

Secession, by its very nature, presents the international territorial system with instability and chaos. The potential conclusion for the logic of secession would be the infinite division of existing political entities. More often than not, given their legitimate monopoly of force within a territory,
most states have effectively opposed secession attempts. And even if the secessionist community were to win on the battlefield, it stands to lose the diplomatic contest. The principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity function as fundamental norms of post-1945 international relations, thereby effectively limiting secession as a means of altering existing borders. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter states,

The Organization and its Members . . . shall act in accordance with the following Principles: . . . (4) all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

As a consequence, the international community has consistently withheld diplomatic recognition from secessionist entities.

The comparative study of secessions and separatist movements from Western liberal democracies, former communist states, and developing countries reveals that a nation’s decision to secede can be thought of as a function of its appraisal of its circumstances. Whether or not to attempt secession depends on the costs and benefits associated with the nation’s political alternatives: continued membership within the existing state or secession. This appraisal is dynamic and continuous and can be affected both by policies of the central government and by developments in the international system. Indeed, although the road to independence is frequently a long one, the actual decision to secede only arises when government action or international developments change the community’s view of the balance among these costs and benefits. A nation’s decision to seek independence can change with circumstances; in some instances, sensitive government policy can convince a secessionist community to accept greater autonomy within the existing state, while in other cases, evolution in the prevailing international climate can outweigh domestic factors in the dynamic of secession.

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See also Nationalism; Self-Determination

Further Readings

SECRET SERVICES

From an academic point of view, there is no canonical definition of secret services. The word secret qualifies the most apparent characteristic, even if hidden, of these services’ modus operandi. Obviously, unlike other administrations, the secret services are discreet and their activities are hidden, but the term secret gives no indication of their exact role. The secret services’ function is first to gather information. The two main areas in which they specialize are intelligence and counterespionage. They are also responsible for a third mission, referred to as “covert actions.” In most countries, these three activities are implemented by several intelligence agencies. However, this kind of definition only insists on a functional dimension.

Nature and Function of Secret Services
In 1966, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency analyst and academic historian Sherman Kent wrote a short, seminal book in which he defined the three dimensions of intelligence services: (1) these services are organizations, (2) they undertake activities, and (3) they produce knowledge. This approach is very helpful for scholars insofar as it shows that intelligence agencies are not merely the tools of executive authorities. The very nature of secret services means that they try to escape from all kinds of external scrutiny and especially from academic analysis. As a result, current literature concerning the secret services is influenced, on the one hand, by journalistic bias (the need for scoops and permanent suspicion...
toward what is hidden) and, on the other, by conspiracy theories. Today, this lack of academic literature is problematic especially since the assessment of “global” threats and the so-called war against terror have increased the role played by intelligence organizations. During the Cold War, most countries, apart from the former USSR and the United States, had only limited means. In recent years, most intelligence services have seen their size, budget, and means increase considerably. They are no longer an insignificant part of the state, a weak side of public policies. That is one of the reasons why governments in liberal democracies have tried to improve accountability and oversight.

Most intelligence agencies now publish some of their reports and documents and edit their own official histories (usually written by academics), and the parliamentary committees in charge of overseeing their activities edit the annual reports on the agencies. It is surprising, then, to note the paucity of academic literature considering the ever-increasing available material (the current published official documents and declassified archives). For a long time, intelligence has been described as the “missing dimension” in the study of international relations, but the same could also be said of domestic policy studies. Despite the criticism of intelligence activities by its detractors, the first academic works were published in the 1970s by “practitioner-scholars” like Sherman Kent. Academic scholars began to work on the topic in the 1980s. Today, intelligence studies is an authentic scientific research field with its own research centers, departments in college and universities, and journals and series. Different stakeholders meet regularly at conferences and contribute to journals. The majority of academic literature comes from English-speaking political scientists specializing in international relations and from historians. This would indicate that intelligence is not yet entirely recognized as a bona fide subject by all social sciences: The same can be said of sociologists and scholars working on politics while not taking intelligence into account. The situation is worse in continental Europe, where the first works only appeared at the very beginning of the 21st century.

Despite this doubtful state of affairs, it is possible to pinpoint some truths in the field. The specialization of a part of the state in the gathering of information illustrates the existence of a specific function in the contemporary state. Secrets function like a veil: They hide the fact that intelligence services are organizations—that is, one part of the bureaucracies in our liberal democracies. Indeed, these secret bureaus have to cope with special rules—essentially concerning information and law—yet they are nevertheless a growing part of states. The activities of the secret services, whose aim is to provide governments with intelligence, sometimes of a strategic nature, make them powerful. Despite the progress of civil liberties and transparency, this core of the state remains hidden for the most part. In this secret area, the state finds more autonomy and, theoretically, more power. Intelligence agencies are an important part of what could be called the secret state. In fact, the study of secret services leads us away from the view that the state has become more transparent and has less influence on citizens in the long term. Nowadays, the existence of secret states in liberal democracies could restimulate studies on the current nature of states.

The Political Dimension

One can also consider the existence of intelligence agencies in the state from a political perspective. Despite the theory of the law-abiding state, whereby the entire state has to comply with the law and implement neutral policies, the existence of the secret services linked to the political authority would indicate that some part of the administration is not a neutral tool for high-ranking officials but, conversely, that its nature is profoundly political. Politics in intelligence operates at three different levels.

1. The secret services are located within the state but are very close to political authorities. The sensitive dimension of intelligence often transforms the agencies into advisors or think tanks. This means that the agencies can be used to elaborate political agendas or they can themselves influence them.

2. Then, intelligence is, of course, a tool for political authority when it implements policies at home and abroad. Many public policies are not neutral. Here, scholars face a problem. The fact that the most important parts of these policies are
not publicized diminishes the capacity to assess them, and at the same time, it automatically suggests that they are more efficient and powerful than they perhaps really are. It is impossible to go beyond this limit, except for scholars working on archives or historical material.

3. Politics in intelligence is not only linked to the position of the agencies within the state; being civil servants or contractors, their members are sometimes in a situation where they can express their political opinion through their professional occupations. The politicization of agencies is a common case.

Finally, intelligence activity is one part of public policies and one part of politics. This implies that the very essence of the state remains close to politics. It means that the Weberian illusion of a neutral state preoccupied only with efficiency must be left aside when studying the secret state.

**Recent Developments and Future Directions**

Most agencies first appeared in the 20th century. At this time, their staff was composed of civil servants and military officers. The fact that the agencies served the state was indubitable. However, the nature of the intelligence services has considerably evolved in recent decades because of a significant transformation in the conception of their work and their management. Now, more and more agencies have recourse to contractors or to people coming from the private sector for short missions. Furthermore, retired officials from agencies often work for private intelligence firms that become contractors for the agencies. The classical borders between private sector and public administration are vanishing slowly. This has an effect on the way we define the secret state, which remains secret in its process but has become less public. Finally, the transparency/secrecy tandem seems to be more prevalent than the private/public one.

If a sociological study of the state could help demarcate the nature of the secret state and outline its real borders, empirical works would be necessary to delineate the limits of the notion of intelligence community that is often used by scholars and also by officials. The fact that people working in or for the agencies are subjected to clearance processes and use sensitive information isolates them from other professionals. This does not mean that intelligence careers avoid the traditional features of other professions. The notion of an intelligence community produces a false feeling of cohesiveness that is reinforced by the secret dimension of its activity. A sociological study of the different stakeholders and professions inside the agencies could enable us to study them from a more impartial point of view in order to understand the relationship between the different agencies and within each agency in each country.

If this could be helpful to understand what intelligence is today, its study is also useful to approach the features of secrecy in contemporary democracies. Indeed, the secrecy of agencies is not only something that is not submitted to publicity; throughout the 20th century, the state enacted special regulations to protect what it judged to be most sensitive. These regulations became the borders of the emerging contemporary secret state, and the first written judicial rules were in fact the first rules to hamper the agencies in their being a part of the secret state. The creation of official secrecy through regulations and classification processes was a major step in the secret state–building process, but it also refers to its features in the shadows of liberal democracy. This shows that democracy accepts and adjusts to a special area where transparency and liberalism are ineffective. The fact that a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was passed in the United States and in the United Kingdom (UK) is a landmark in this evolution. Today, the FOIA is a lawful weapon against public secrecy, even if not all-powerful.

Finally, it is important to understand that the comprehension of intelligence needs both comparison and a historical approach. There is no single model of a secret state or of an intelligence agency. The building of the agencies is the result of a long process that began in the 19th century. Wars and international crises have played a major role in this evolution. However, despite these common features and the current expansion of agencies after the end of the Cold War, the essence of intelligence agencies is very different depending on the country. If we can talk of a U.S.–U.K. model in so far as most agencies aspire to have the same position in the state as in these countries, the reality is very different. The means accorded to the agencies, the role of the law, the kind of states into which the agencies
fit, and their influence on public policies are not the same. This emphasizes once again the need for more social science studies to understand what intelligence really is.

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See also Administration; Agencies; Diplomacy; Police; Politicization of Bureaucracy; Politicization of Civil Service; Security and Defense Policy; State

Further Readings

Secularism

The term *secularism* has different senses. It is used to refer to secular humanism and atheism; the social process of secularization; and political, state-driven projects. This entry is concerned solely with the third sense, which is most frequently used in political science.

What Is Political Secularism?

Broadly speaking, secularism, anywhere in the world, means the advocacy of a separation of organized religion from organized political power (the state) that is inspired by a specific set of values. In this general sense, secularism is a normative doctrine that pretends to be universal, although it is applied in different cultures that are more or less compatible with it. Secularism can be understood in its strict meaning of separateness between political power and religion or, more broadly, as bearing several values such as tolerance, equal religious liberty, and freedom of religion. Sometimes these two definitions may be in contradiction, as illustrated in France over the issue of Muslim women wearing the veil. However, its constitutive elements can be differently interpreted, giving rise to multiple forms of secularism.

Secular states are disconnected from religion at three distinct levels: (1) ends, (2) institutions and personnel, and (3) law and public policy. This distinguishes them from theocracies and states that establish single or multiple religions. In a theocracy, a deep connection between state and religion exists at all three levels. A priestly order directly administers the state by reference to what it believes are ends inscribed in divine laws (e.g., the Islamic Republic of Iran as Ayatollah Khomeini aspired to run it). In states with established religions, in which one religion is accepted as the official one, a priestly order does not govern directly, and a large measure of institutional and personnel differentiation exists. This disconnection, at Level 2, also referred to in some contexts as church–state separation, goes hand in hand with an overall ideological connection. Religion and state share common ends. The state is subordinate to religious ends even though it has its own function, power structure, and internal norms. Thus, in states with an established religion, because of this primary connection at Level 1, there is an automatic connection at Level 3. For example, the revenue collected by the state is available for religious purposes.

A secular state is nontheocratic and has no established religion. Disconnection from religion at this level distinguishes secular states from both theocracies and states with established religion. A secular state has its own secular ends. The second-order disconnection, church–state separation, demarcates it only from a theocracy.

Given that ethical reasoning is best when it is contextual and comparative, what are the positive and negative aspects of secular and nonsecular states? Historically, nonsecular states have
recognized a particular version of the religion enunciated by the dominant church as the official religion, compelled individuals to participate in only one church, punished them for failing to profess a particular set of religious beliefs, and levied taxes in support of one particular church. Nonsecular states embody a regime of inequality between religions (e.g., between Christians and Jews) and also among the churches of the same religion. Societies with such states were either wracked by inter-/intrareligious wars or have persecuted minority religious groups. States with substantive establishments have not changed with time: such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Israel. Opponents of theocratic states and of those with an established religion argue that such states perpetuate inter- and intrareligious domination and are incompatible with the values of freedom and equality.

**Secular States and Religion-Centered States**

Are all secular states better than religion-centered states? This does not follow. As mentioned above, a secular state must have secular ends. However, these ends themselves may be of two kinds. The first are amoral. Amoral secular states are so called when their entire purpose is to maximize power, wealth, or both. But just as without separation there is no true secularism, a value-less separation does not add up to secularism. A state may separate itself from the ethics and morality of religions for wealth and power, as we can observe in plutocracies (government based on wealth) or in totalitarian regimes that are based on material ideologies. Such a state is secular but does not instantiate the normative perspective of secularism and in fact is incompatible with it.

Value-based secular states are distinct from amoral states. Several values are constitutive of secularism: prevention of cruelty, toleration, equal religious liberty, the freedom to exit from religion and to profess no religion, and equality of both passive and active citizenship rights (equal distribution of benefits such as protection of life, availability of health care, emergency services, welfare benefits, and education and nondiscrimination in the distribution of the right to vote, to stand for public office, and to deliberate on the public good). Furthermore, some of these values can be interpreted both individualistically and nonindividually (the right to worship or education can be given to both individuals and communities—that is, to maintain their religious practices or to set up their own schools).

These values-based secular states differ from one another in the selection and combination of values and the weight assigned to each, but most important in how they unpack the metaphor of separation at a third level, concerning laws and public policy. One type of secular state conceives of disconnection at the third level in a wholly one-sided manner. To disconnect is then to exclude religion from its affairs but without setting any limits on its own interventionist powers in the affairs of religion. Such states (e.g., the former communist states, Kemalist Turkey, and to some extent France) exclude religion to regulate, control, or sometimes destroy it in the name of a single value such as equality. This may help states deal with aspects of intrareligious domination (e.g., anticlericalism in France) but not to address interreligious domination—that is, when members of one religious community discriminate against, marginalize, or even oppress members of another religious community.

The explanation of this contradiction is to be found in history: Issues of radical individual freedom and citizenship equality arose in European societies after religious homogenization. The birth of confessional states was accompanied by the massive expulsion of subject-communities whose faith differed from the religion of the ruler. Such states found a place for some toleration in their moral landscape, but this was consistent with the deep inequalities and the virtually invisible, marginalized existence of members of religious minorities. The liberal democratization and the consequent secularization of many European states have helped citizens with non-Christian faiths acquire most formal rights. But critics of secularization and advocates of pluralism and consociative order may argue that such a scheme of rights neither embodies a regime of interreligious equality nor effectively prevents religion-based discrimination and exclusion. Indeed, it masks majoritarian, ethno-religious biases. This is evident in the different kinds of difficulties faced by Muslims. For example, in Britain, a third of all primary school children are educated by religious communities. Yet applications for state
funding by Muslims have been frequently turned down. This is also manifest in demands by the Muslims that they be allowed to build mosques (as in Germany, Italy, and Switzerland) or have proper Muslim burial grounds of their own (as in Denmark). Another ongoing area of controversy, especially in Western European states such as France, concerns policies that restrict the wearing of the hijab (headscarf), niqab (face veil), or burka.

A second type of values-based secular state conceives of this third-level disconnection as mutual exclusion. Such a state maintains a policy of strict or absolute separation in which religion is excluded from the affairs of the state but the state too is excluded from the affairs of religion. The state has neither a positive relationship with religion—for example, there is no policy of granting aid to religious institutions—nor a negative relationship with it; it is not within the scope of state activity to interfere in religious matters, even when the values professed by the state are violated. This noninterference is justified on the ground that religion is a private matter, and if something is amiss within the private domain, it can be mended only by those who have a right to do so within that sphere. This, according to proponents of this view, is what religious freedom means. When a state is disconnected from religion at all three levels in this particular way, then we may say that a wall of separation has been erected between the two. American political secularism could exemplify some aspects of this model.

It is now increasingly clear that both forms of Western secularism have persistent difficulties coping with community-oriented religions such as Roman Catholicism, Islam, and Sikhism, which demand a greater public presence and even official recognition for themselves—particularly when they live in the same society. Moreover, they were not designed for societies with deep religious diversity. Both of these versions developed in the context of a single-religion society and to solve the problems of one religion, namely, Christianity. Both understand separation as exclusion and make individualistically conceived values—individual liberty or equality between individuals or both—as the ground for separation.

India provides another model of secularism, with multiple religions being a part of its foundation. Indian secularism is inextricably tied to deep religious diversity. It has a commitment to multiple values—liberty and/or equality—not conceived of narrowly as pertaining to individuals but interpreted broadly to cover the relative autonomy of religious communities. While there are boundaries between the state and religion, these boundaries are porous. Thus, the state may intervene to inhibit some practices, just as it respects and lends support to other practices, of a religious community. India’s commitment to multiple values and principled distance means that the state tries to balance different, ambiguous, but equally important, values. Thus, its secular ideal resembles a contextual, ethically sensitive, politically negotiated arrangement that evolved to deal with tensions generated continuously by deep religious diversity.

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See also Equality; Religion; State

Further Readings


SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

The term security policy denotes the aims and means that are needed to protect a state from both external and internal threats. Defense policy has a
narrower extension, usually confined to the aims and means against external military threats.

Security and defense policies have always been at the center of international politics, but their nature has changed due to the advent of nuclear weapons and their proliferation, economic interdependence, the end of the Cold War, environmental problems, technological advancements and vulnerabilities, as well as other material and cultural developments typically linked to globalization. These phenomena have also brought about conceptual changes and competing terminological usages.

**Traditional and Contemporary Views**

It is widely assumed that every state must have a security and defense policy if it wants to survive in the anarchical international system. Security is seen as the key national interest of states, and that is why defense is needed. Security and defense policy is thus seen as belonging to high politics, which implies that it occupies a superior hierarchical position among state activities and ranks higher in importance than other fields of foreign policy.

These traditional views of security and defense policy are, however, in many ways challenged in today’s world politics. Both terms, *security* and *defense*, have been widened and are broadly applied in various ways. Also, the assumption that security and defense must be given priority (a normative claim) or are given priority (an empirical claim) among various policy issues is seen as questionable. Alternative views of security have been put forward by critical security theorists, environmentalists, and proponents of “human security.”

*Security* is a difficult concept, because it can refer both to the objective absence of threats and to a subjective feeling of security. It is also debatable whether security means an absolute absence of threats or whether security refers to a state of affairs where the likelihood or “risk” of major threats is low.

The traditional view links defense and security to military affairs. It starts from the assumption that there is a security dilemma in world politics because of the anarchical nature of the international system. Because there is no central authority, states need to be prepared for defending themselves. International security has been associated with balance of power and stability.

Against this background of traditional security thinking, it can be suggested that “defense” and “security” are actually euphemisms for war and military. States used to have ministries for war; after World War II, they were renamed ministries for defense. Military officers are “security professionals,” and “private security companies” conduct war operations. “Security studies” is often another name for strategic or war studies. If security and defense policy are understood in this way, the term denotes all military activities regardless of whether they have to do with security as a goal and whether they are defensive or offensive. This definition, however, reflects quite a common usage that emerged after World War II.

Security policy is often seen as a combination of foreign and defense policy. The administrative utility of adopting the concept of security was in tightening the link between defense and foreign offices, for example, in the United States through the establishment of a National Security Council. In some countries, the concept of security policy implies that foreign policy goes (or should go) ahead of defense policy. According to this view, defense policy is a subset of security policy, whereas parts of foreign policy, such as development cooperation, can, but do not necessarily, fall outside the realm of security policy.

There is no agreed definition of security policy partly because there is no agreement on the notion of security. The narrow notion of security emphasizes military threats, but a broader notion of security, *comprehensive security*, includes all kinds of “new” threats, such as financial instability, climate change, environmental risks, natural catastrophes, energy shortage, organized crime, piracy, drugs, technological hazards, international migration, and epidemic diseases. Moreover, a security policy can also address internal threats, such as political opposition, social unrest, famine, aging, or street violence. These days, one of the meanings most often used for “security policy” deals with the security of information systems.

The problem with the wider understanding of security is that the concept lacks focus. For example, one important border to uphold is the difference between intentional and unintentional threats. Moreover, although a wider concept of security has become widely accepted also by many state authorities, this has not necessarily led to notable
changes in practices. The role of the military in understanding security and defense has not disappeared; it has just been framed within a larger view of security.

In particular, after the terrorist attacks of 2001 in the United States, the internal aspects of security policy have become more salient. Administratively, therefore, ministries of interior and other agencies such as ministries of justice have become much more active agents of security policy than before. At the same time, technical methods of producing security through control and surveillance have dominated the discussion about how to manage various security problems.

The concept of defense policy can also be related to actions other than military. Like “security,” “defense,” too, has a larger broader definition that includes all measures that are taken to defend a country or an organization against all sorts of threats. It can thus denote the economic, civil, and psychological aspects of defense in addition to the military aspect and covers activities during both war and peace. Such a concept of “total defense” has been adopted in particular in small countries such as Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Singapore. Peace movements have also proposed other alternative understandings of defense, laying emphasis on civilian resistance and nonviolent means.

Among the alternative paradigms to the traditional notion of security, proponents of human security suggest that human needs should be at the center of security concerns and that this would put emphasis on development as well as on health issues and the economic, social, and political rights of individuals. Advocates of critical security studies are generally dissatisfied with the traditional, realist view of security. They also want to broaden the understanding of security and emphasize the potential of overcoming security problems through emancipation. Postmodern approaches to security regard security discourses as essential in creating state identities in the first place.

The theory of securitization developed by the so-called Copenhagen school of security also subscribes to a broader view of security consisting of various sectors, such as military, political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors. It also stresses that labeling something as a security threat is a speech act, which means that there are no security threats before they are made into such in the political discourse. Because securitization means lifting security issues above normal politics, often justifying emergency measures and exceptions, it could hamper open political debate and have negative effects on the policy-making process.

Characteristics and Implementation of Security and Defense Policies

States are usually seen as principal actors that adopt and implement security and defense policies, partly because they are seen as legitimate holders of means of violence. However, in particular, if the military aspect of security and defense is downplayed also, international organizations, regional actors, international companies, and other human groupings can have a security or defense policy.

The object of security or defense can also vary. It can be the state, its government, critical infrastructure or territory, society, population or individuals, or principally anything that is seen as worth securing and defending. It is also possible to talk about global, common, or international security and to defend the existing world order or the ecosystem.

Many countries and institutions have their own specific definitions for the terms security and defense. After the terrorist attacks of 2001, the United States adopted the concept of “homeland security” to deal with military, terrorist, and other threats inside the territory of the country. For example, when launching the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the European Union adopted its own conceptual scheme, according to which security and defense policy deals with crisis management and not with common defense.

Security and defense policies have traditionally been surrounded by a realm of secrecy, information gathering through intelligence, and a lack of democratic control by parliaments. Many states, however, lay out their doctrine on security and defense in the form of a “white book” or a public statement on security or defense. Such governmental documents create transparency, promote public discussion and legitimacy, and enable long-term strategic planning.

A nation’s defense can take various forms even when restricted to the traditional military meaning
of the term. One basic choice, for example, deals with offensive and defensive defense strategies. Another choice is whether to acquire nuclear or other unconventional weapons. A state relying on conventional forces has to find the right balance between air, naval, and land forces. States can also choose whether to emphasize territorial defense or intervention forces. Furthermore, states can choose between conscription and a professional army or a mixed system and can decide whether to use private security companies. Finally, defense policy also covers various other political and social issues such as civil–military relations and democratic control of the military, defense economics, and gender and sexual equality within the military.

States also face security policy choices and can develop different security strategies. Besides choosing between a narrow and broader concept of security for the basis of their security policy, states can choose whether or not to securitize certain threats. Furthermore, states can try to seek security within an alliance, in a multilateral framework of collective security, or alone, for example, on the basis of a policy of neutrality. The classic security strategies in world politics are balancing, bandwagoning, and buck-passing. Balancing means gathering strength against the opponent either by domestic mobilization or with external alliances; bandwagoning leads one to accommodate and join the opponent; and buck-passing refers to shifting the responsibility for resisting the opponent to other actors.

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See also Arms Race; Collective Security; Democratic Peace; Strategic (Security) Studies; Terrorism, International; War and Peace

Further Readings


Security Apparatus

The concept of security apparatus builds on distinct yet functional elements with dynamic and structural value. This entry examines security as the state of being—or at least feeling—secure and considers, in particular, the meaning of security defined as the safety of a state or an organization against criminal activities such as terrorism or espionage and other potential dangers. The security apparatus is considered as a complex structure, usually a segment of a larger organization, as well as the equipment required for a particular purpose. The structures responsible for providing security to a society and its population reflect the contemporary values held by a country or any other human organization. As such, the security apparatus also provides the state of affairs of the underlying cultural, social, and political elements and, in addition to its primary function, allows a “health check” of a society that can help assess its status and predict its future. This entry first considers various ways in which security and security threats have been defined and then describes various types of threats to security at the national, regional, and global levels. A centralized national approach to security (e.g., the U.S. Office of Homeland Security) is contrasted with the decentralized European approach, in which responsibility is distributed among various agencies. Descriptions of the security apparatus in Italy and France illustrate two ways in which nations may implement security policy. Last, the role of international security organizations is considered.

Evolving Definitions of Security

The geopolitical, social, and economic developments that have occurred since the last decade of
Security Apparatus

the 20th century have made the distinction between internal and external security increasingly blurred, thereby influencing both the concept and the structure of security apparatuses throughout the world. The rise in independent states and in worldwide travel and exchange, for example, and a more open communication society have greatly influenced the strategic thinking underpinning national and international security affairs.

Whether geared toward facing risks, threats, or actual dangers, the security apparatus will require several basic elements to meet its challenges, as it would normally be triggered by an asymmetric scenario where the attacker would have at its disposal a range of targets to strike through different tactics. Hence, a security strategy will represent the basic framework of any security apparatus, one encompassing all the elements that may need protection as well as the tools and measures available to provide such protection. The key to any strategy is accurate information and skilled users who are able to receive it and take appropriate action. Therefore, information gathering and processing also need to be assessed in view of their value and meaning for a security apparatus.

A list of what must be protected and the corresponding security measures may be only tentative due to the dynamic character of the security environment; nonetheless, the broad categories of internal and external security may generally be broken down into elements such as resources, infrastructures, and civil protection; natural and man-made disasters; policing, intelligence, military, and diplomatic sectors; nongovernmental and intergovernmental cooperation; and low-intensity conflict and state of war. An open-ended list may be further developed through an examination of issues of concern to national security, including “megaprotection” in conventional, strategic, and nuclear deterrence; serious and organized crime, including illicit arms and drugs trafficking, and terrorism; commercial, industrial, financial, and economic competitiveness; environmental decay; and cultural and ethical values.

The range of security concerns that may come to the forefront of public concern is matched by the depth of the apparatus called on to ensure the security, safety, and well-being of individual societies. The traditional divide between external and internal security has normally reflected the distinction between conventional and emerging threats, which largely fell within the mandate of the military and the civil infrastructures, respectively. The evolution toward a multipolar and multidimensional environment contributes to giving a new shape to the security concept and relevant apparatus, particularly as it concerns domestic security.

Threats to Security

The structure of the security apparatus is influenced by the threats affecting security, whether at the domestic, regional, or global level. Since World War II, the Western Hemisphere, particularly the Western European countries, has known an unprecedented period of peace and stability mostly due to their cooperation through common institutions such as the Council of Europe, the European Communities, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Still, Europe, just like other major international actors, including the United States, Russia, China, India, or Japan, faces security threats and challenges that originate both within and beyond the regional borders. As a matter of fact, the 2003 European Security Strategy was premised on the consideration that, while large-scale aggression against any member of the European Union was unlikely, Europe faced new threats of a more diverse, less visible, and less predictable fashion.

Terrorism and its complex social, cultural, religious, and developmental causes constituted the first security threat on the European agenda, because of the then still fresh memory of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States; the bombings in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004; and the bombings in London, United Kingdom, on July 7, 2005. European countries have been and continue to be both a target and a base for terrorism, whether politically motivated or linked to religious extremism. This continuing threat raises questions about the integration of foreign communities; it also draws attention to the stark contrast between modernization and secularism, on the one hand, and strict observance and religious zeal, on the other.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was assessed as potentially the greatest threat to European security given the risks implied in an arms race in bordering regions, especially in the
Middle East, and the increased potency of weapons facilitated by advances in the biological sciences, which could be supported by the spread of missile technology. The deadly scenario of a terrorist group armed with weapons of mass destruction and able to inflict damages previously available only to state actors demonstrates the equation produced by the combination of conventional and emerging threats, which requires a uniform reaction.

Regional conflicts were also listed as top security concerns for they threaten stability, destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures, and challenge fundamental freedoms and human rights. Furthermore, regional conflicts may lead to extremism, which facilitates and provides opportunities for two other strategic security issues: state failure and organized crime.

The collapse of the state not only entails domestic threats such as bad governance, corruption, weak institutions, and a lack of accountability but also has international resonance. Failed states also risk providing a home for terrorist and organized criminal groups, thereby undermining regional stability and global governance.

Finally, organized crime represents an internal security threat with an important external dimension through its activities, particularly cross-border illicit trafficking and its possible links with terrorist activities.

Most recently, the international economic and financial crisis affecting all national systems has added to the list of security threats in view of its implication for, among other things, the growth of extremist and antisystem movements that can destabilize weak societies and the increased geopolitical tensions between countries that are struggling to defend critical national assets such as the banking or the industrial sector. The economic crisis may affect peace and stability in countries and entire regions that have emerged from or are still struggling with conflict and tension, thereby affecting their own security as well as the security of their neighbors with increasing risks for the national financial systems, including the security of sovereign financial viability. Security risks may become opportunities for political movements or criminal organizations seeking to exploit weak or unstable governments through social unrest, predatory financial practices, or common criminal activities.

The security apparatus builds on prevention and law enforcement and intelligence efforts to ensure domestic security, combating terrorism and protecting the public, infrastructure, and historical and cultural sites. Recent terrorist attacks have led to suggestions for strengthening legislation and other measures dealing with border control, illegal immigration, and related criminal activities such as trafficking in human beings, transport security, and terrorism financing; however, countries with a multiagency approach normally assign complementary tasks to the different agencies. The Italian and the German security apparatuses are examined as they typify the European system for security protection, while each represents a specific subsystem, namely, the central approach and the federal approach, respectively.

Organization of the Security Apparatus: Contrasting Approaches

Two clear approaches emerge among those countries that have been confronted with serious natural and man-made disasters over the past decade. On the one hand, the United States, following deadly terrorist attacks on its soil, attacks against its interests abroad, and natural disasters, underwent a thorough reorganization of its national security and security apparatus, which led to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. At the other end of the spectrum, countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom have elected to preserve the existing organization of their security apparatuses where responsibilities are allocated through different public agencies and levels. The different philosophies behind the choice between a unified, central department and a system of central and local agencies reflect historical, cultural, and political considerations, chiefly the debate over the protection of civil liberties and the need to ensure protection against deadly dangers, which involves a proper balance between increased security and the adequate safeguarding of personal freedoms.

While the U.S. Department of Homeland Security builds on a concept of security that includes border protection, transport security, emergency preparedness, and the protection of critical infrastructures, European countries have mainly invested in law enforcement efforts and
have sought to integrate counterterrorism and preparedness programs into emergency management efforts with a view to greater flexibility in responding to security challenges with often limited personnel and resources. Regardless of the security apparatus elected to ensure the safety and well-being of the nation, a consistent pattern has recently emerged whereby increased investments are made in intelligence and law enforcement initiatives, and often a combination thereof, to fight against organized crime and terrorism.

At a time when the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic threats is blurring, the ability to plan and carry out devastating attacks—particularly through cyber warfare or chemical, bacteriological, radiological, and nuclear agents—enables relatively small groups of terrorists or criminals to challenge state actors and their defenses. Even those countries with experience in terrorist attacks and counterterrorism policies need to improve their security apparatus in a way that allows for ready information exchange among disparate government agencies that, by their very nature, professional culture, or legal requirements, have been used to create organizational barriers, with the consequent segregation of duties and knowledge.

The vexing question concerning the exchange of information among law enforcement and intelligence agencies brings with it, as related issues, the balance between strategic and tactical intelligence; data collection, its exploitation, and dissemination in view of the intrinsic need to maintain secrets, methods, and sources; a review of the classification methods that would allow sharing information with other agencies nationally and abroad; the exploitation of intelligence data in the framework of law enforcement operations intended to investigate crimes for prosecution and adjudication; and the need to improve security while respecting civil liberties.

**Two European Models**

**Italy**

In Italy, the government (Council of Ministers), comprising the head of the government and the ministers, is the collective decision-making body, and it coordinates the efforts made by governmental ministries and agencies to protect domestic security.

The Ministry of Interior is the lead government ministry on public order and security, immigration and border controls, and civil protection. The Public Security Department manages the national police force and is responsible for implementing the public order and security policy; the Civil Liberty and Immigration Department sets immigration and asylum policies; and the Fire Brigade, Public Aid, and Civil Defense Department leads efforts in emergency preparedness and response policies.

The activities carried out by the Ministry of Interior are normally supported by several other government ministries with responsibility over particular aspects of national security, including the Defense Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Infrastructure and Transport Ministry. Customs and financial policies are under the responsibility of the Economy and Finance Ministry.

To coordinate the various efforts, interministerial bodies are usually set up to bring together department ministers and officials. The Public Order and Security Committee examines issues related to the protection of public order and security and to the organization of the police forces. The committee is chaired by the interior minister and comprises the chief of police/director general of public security and the undersecretary entrusted by the prime minister with special responsibility for the intelligence services. The heads of the other police forces also take part in the committee, and additional ministers may be involved depending on the issue at hand. The Interministerial Committee for Intelligence and Security, which provides advice and makes proposals on the general direction and fundamental objectives for intelligence and security policy, is chaired by the prime minister and comprises the ministers for the Interior, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Economy and Finance departments, while the heads of the intelligence services and other government officials may also be invited to participate. Finally, the security apparatus includes the Politico-Military Unit and the Department of Civil Protection of the Prime Minister’s Office, which have, each in its own respect, responsibilities for drawing up and implementing emergency plans to deal with any chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents; transport safety and bioterrorism; and civil and military preemptive measures against major incidents or attacks. The
Department of Civil Protection coordinates and works with a tight network of central, regional, provincial, and local administrations as well as other public agencies and voluntary organizations, thereby forming a “national service” operating on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.

The Interior Ministry has responsibility over the State Police (Polizia di Stato) through the Public Security Department, which coordinates police tasks and activities at the central level and hosts the Anti-Terrorism Strategic Analysis Committee (Comitato per l’analisi strategica del terrorismo, CASA). At the provincial level, the top public security authorities are the prefect, who is appointed by and answerable to the central government, and the questore, the State Police’s senior provincial officer with operational control and jurisdiction in the field of public order, security, and criminal and intelligence matters. The State Police includes different specialist units that may play a role in protecting various aspects of domestic security: The antiterrorism police have primary responsibility for investigations aimed at preventing and fighting terrorism, including information collection and analysis; the traffic police patrol roads and highways; the railway police ensure the security of travelers and their belongings, the security of railway stations, and the control of dangerous goods transported by rail; the immigration and border police are responsible for the entry and stay of foreign nationals and immigrants in Italy, as well as the prevention and control of illegal immigrants; and the postal and communications police seek to prevent and tackle the illegal use of communication technologies. Other specialist units may be deployed to perform high-risk interventions, for example, in the case of a hostage incident, or to provide rescue services in areas affected by natural disasters.

The Italian security apparatus also has a military corps (Carabinieri) that carries out police duties among the civilian population, not unlike units in other European countries, such as the French Gendarmerie or the Spanish Guardia Civil. The Carabinieri, which are empowered to gather intelligence, investigate terrorist and organized crime organizations, and respond to high-risk situations, are institutionally accountable to the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. A third police force with responsibilities over financial, tax, and customs issues is the Guardia di Finanza, directly attached to the Minister of Economy and Finance, with a structure resembling the Carabinieri, although its specialized tasks make it a prime actor in the prevention, investigation, and disruption of money laundering, fraud, tax evasion, and illicit financing.

In addition to the law enforcement agencies, the Italian security apparatus also includes intelligence and security services with distinct responsibilities for the defense of the state’s independence and integrity against any danger on the military front with counterespionage and counterintelligence duties (Agenzia informazioni e sicurezza esterna, AISE) and for the defense of the democratic state and its institutions against all forms of subversion (Agenzia informazioni e sicurezza interna, AISI). The AISE and AISI work under the authority of the prime minister, or an undersecretary with due delegation of authority, who exercises the relevant functions through the Department of Information for Security.

Germany

Germany, like Italy, has no department or ministry for “homeland security.” Its long-established organization for protecting security and responding to emergencies within the national borders is defined by the 1949 Basic Law (Grundgesetz, i.e., the Constitution), which involves ministries and agencies at the federal, state (16 Länder), and local levels. The German approach to dealing with incidents, whether natural disasters or terrorist acts, is bottom-up, beginning at the local level, involving state authorities if necessary, and relying on federal agencies if needed.

Since September 11, 2001, the German government has assessed terrorism as the most immediate threat to national security, although Germany’s experience with terrorism dates back to the 1970s, when both domestic and international terrorism were a cause of serious concern. At the federal level, security functions are the responsibility of several ministries, including the Interior, Justice, Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Finance departments, as well as other departments and agencies. The German security apparatus relies on intelligence, law enforcement, and judicial prosecution to prevent terrorist acts and to identify and neutralize potential terrorists.
The most important intelligence authorities are the Federal Intelligence Service (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*, BND), which is responsible for gathering intelligence abroad under the Federal Chancellery; the Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*, BfV), which gathers domestic intelligence and is placed under the Ministry of the Interior; and the Military Counterintelligence Service (*Militärischer Abschirmdienst*, MAD), which is under the Ministry of Defense. The federal law enforcement agencies include the Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigations (*Bundeskriminalamt*, BKA); the Federal Police (*Bundespolizei* [BPol], formerly *Bundesgrenzschutz*), which has responsibility over border protection and aviation security and carries out the screening of border traffic (BKA and BPol are placed under the Ministry of the Interior); and the Federal Public Prosecutor General (*Generalbundesanwalt*, GBA).

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the BKA has been given authority to lead its own investigations without a formal request from the BfV, as had been previously required. Furthermore, since 2004, the federal and state ministers of the Interior have introduced measures to improve coordination, which include a central database regarding religious fundamentalists suspected of terrorism and a coordination center under the Ministry of Interior comprising BKA, BND, BfV, and MAD, as well as state and local agencies. These coordination initiatives prompted the debate over the need for greater centralization of security activities, which, however, faces opposition from the state and local authorities and finds obstacles in the constitutional laws and arrangements. The German structure for civil protection and emergency response is also a joint responsibility of both the Länder and the federal republic and their local jurisdictions and the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Response (*Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe*, BBK), which was established in 2004 under the Ministry of the Interior, is called to support state and local authorities in the event of significant disaster and damage situations.

Germany’s history, geographical location, and its industrial and economic prominence have greatly affected the shape of its security apparatus. On the one hand, strong emphasis has been placed on the protection of the civil rights and liberties of all those residing in Germany, including noncitizens; on the other hand, its position in the heart of Europe and its economic strength have made Germany attractive to millions of immigrants, thereby calling for the need to protect its borders and introduce robust security controls.

### International Security Organizations

The external dimension of security issues has triggered the establishment and development of institutions forming an embryonic international security apparatus supporting domestic activities. Two organizations deserve a closer scrutiny as they facilitate cross-border police cooperation and support national services and authorities whose missions is to prevent and combat crime.

The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), established in 1923, is the world’s largest international police organization and currently has 188 member countries. INTERPOL operates through its General Secretariat (Lyon, France) and a network of National Central Bureaus located in each member country. Its core functions cover secure global police communication services through a system (1-24/7) that enables national police services to request, submit, and access police data instantly and the management of operational data services and databases with information on known criminals, wanted persons, fingerprints, DNA profiles, stolen or lost travel documents, stolen motor vehicles, child sex abuse images, and stolen works of art. Support to police services is provided in six priority crime areas: corruption, drugs and organized crime, financial and high-tech crime, fugitives, public safety and terrorism, and trafficking in human beings. While mostly devoted to operational police assistance and support, INTERPOL’s mandate may also extend to civil protection activities such as disaster victim identification in case of a terrorist attack or a natural disaster; following the tsunami that hit Thailand and Sri Lanka in December 2004, INTERPOL took an active role in the international effort to identify the victims of the disaster.

A notable example of what may be considered a regional security apparatus is the European Police Office (EUROPOL), established by the member states of the European Union with the mandate to handle criminal intelligence and
improve cooperation in preventing and combating serious international organized crime and terrorism. EUROPOL supports the member states’ competent authorities by facilitating the exchange of information with and among Europol liaison officers, seconded as the representatives of the national competent services to the headquarters (at The Hague, the Netherlands), and by providing expertise, technical support, and criminal intelligence analysis in support of operations. EUROPOL also produces strategic reports, notably the yearly Organized Crime Threat Assessment and the Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, as well as crime analysis on the basis of information and intelligence provided by the member states and third parties and assessed through different information, index, and analysis systems.

Conclusion
The structures responsible for providing security to a society and its population reflect the contemporary values held by a country or other human organizations. As such, the security apparatus also provides the state of affairs of the underlying cultural, social, and political elements and, in addition to its primary function, allows a “health check” of a society that can help assess its status and predict its future.

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See also Collective Security; Police; Secret Services; Security and Defense Policy; Security Apparatus; Security Cooperation; Strategic (Security) Studies; Terrorism, International

Further Readings


SECURITY COOPERATION

This entry deals with security cooperation in a classical sense: It focuses on state security and cooperation. This does not imply that other actors are not subjects of security or do not participate in related cooperation; it pays just tribute to the fact that states are still the main actors in both domestic and external security activities, including cooperation. It is worth noting that international and nongovernmental organizations, substate actors, companies, and others are involved in these activities as well.

International security cooperation is counterintuitive to the notion of “international anarchy.” To entrust a part of the responsibility for state survival to other actors thus sounds far-fetched; neorealism has expressed this skepticism distinctly. Yet in everyday international life, security cooperation is found in ever more varied forms: It is an ubiquitous pattern in world and in regional politics.

Cooperative strategies in security policy accept the notion of anarchy but view it in a more relaxed way than neorealists do. These strategies see states as security seekers. Security interests have become interdependent owing to the penetrability of national borders and the impossibility of perfect defense, and national interests in general have become interdependent through globalization. Competing interests are mitigated by common interests. States can signal effectively benign intentions. “Predators” and sincere partners can be distinguished. Common security institutions supply reliable information about present and future capabilities and intentions, and common norms channel the goals, interests, and actions of states in a mutually agreeable direction.

This entry provides a typology of security cooperation in today’s world. It distinguishes between exclusive security cooperation, where entry rights are limited and controlled and which
coordinates policies toward the nonmembership, and inclusive security cooperation, which is open and which regulates the policies of the members toward each other. Exclusive institutions contain a strong element of realism, though they are by no means exclusively rooted in realist theory. Inclusive institutions have stronger relations to liberal-institutionalist, constructivist, and normative-idealist theories. The following sections describe the basic structure, advantages and disadvantages, and theoretical underpinnings of each type.

**Exclusive Security Cooperation**

**Coalitions of the Willing**

Today’s “coalition of the willing”—a short-term association of states that ally for a single strategic purpose at a certain point in time and space—was the standard type of alliance in the classical Westphalian world. In this type of coalition, the alliance does not define the mission, but the mission defines the alliance. Coalition partners are selected for their particular capabilities to achieve the specific purpose, not by more intrinsic attributes and considerations.

Coalitions of the willing contain no legal obligations, develop no institutional structure, have no common staff, entertain no common ideology or culture, elaborate no grand strategy, and refrain from integrating military forces. Their members have only a short-term time horizon. Since the strongest member or a few core members select the partners, they are exclusive.

Because of its short time horizon, the coalition of the willing cannot mitigate the security dilemma: No long shadow of the future reduces the remaining distrust among its members; no expectations are created over how relations might evolve after the short-term objective has been achieved. As an example, the “coalition against terror” includes even long-term enemies (e.g., India and Pakistan). However, with regard to nonmembers, high uncertainties emerge over whether such coalitions might turn against other states in the future. Being exclusive and unilaterally, coalitions of the willing might stimulate “coalitions of the unwilling,” or even “counter-coalitions of the threatened.”

For the leading great powers, several advantages emerge. In the absence of institutional structures, customary, political, or legal rules exist; symmetries translate directly into influence; and the command of the strongest is unchallenged. Burdensome consultation procedures are absent (e.g., Kosovo 1999 vs. Afghanistan or Iraq 2003). Because the coalitions are shaped for a single purpose, unity of political will is granted—no opposition force within the coalition must be expected. Also, transaction costs are very low, no future obligations ensue, and freedom of action remains unconstrained. For smaller states, coalitions of the willing are a cheap way of bandwagoning, enhancing their security, and sharing the eventual spoils without the burden of enduring dependence.

On the downside, smaller coalition members have little influence on the coalition’s politics, which are dominated by their powerful partners. They bear the consequences of actions decided and conducted unilaterally by others. These, in turn, are helpless against any moves of the smaller allies to desert the coalition. Coalition performance is thus uncertain because of the lack of predictability within the coalition.

Hence, coalitions of the willing appear fit to achieve short-term, straightforward objectives. If circumstances are complex and problems enduring, these advantages fade in comparison with more stable and reliable structures.

**Alliances**

Today, the notion of “alliance” has been shaped by the model of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), even though its longevity and institutional complexity constitute a historical singularity.

Alliances are a corollary of international anarchy. Each ally’s security is enhanced against potential enemies by the pooling of resources. To rely on the promises of somebody else goes beyond a common sense notion of “self-help.” Within the realm of neorealist theory, the puzzle is all the larger as the problem of “relative gains” affects allies as well. Because of this problem, distrust is not uncommon in alliances, and a lot of symbolic politics is deployed to deal with this destructive factor.

Realists dispute which variable triggers an alliance. According to the classical view, states ally against the biggest power in their environment. Another perspective has gained increasing support in the past 2 decades: States ally against the biggest
perceived threat in their environment. This amendment modifies basic neorealist assumptions. “Threat” resides in the behavior of the threatening actor and is a unit-level attribute. Assessment of threat depends on subjective (or collective-cultural) factors. Finally, according to neoclassical realism, in a system without “predators,” alliances will evaporate, as predators are the only threats that can emerge and without them, ally ing would be a waste of resources.

Alliances, once formed, face several dilemmas. Allies do not necessarily hold identical security interests. As a consequence, they must expect two opposite types of behavior from each other. First, one ally’s security guarantee for the other ally may embolden that ally to engage in brinkmanship, provoking an armed conflict one does not want (entrapment risk). Otherwise that ally might switch sides and desert to the erstwhile enemy (risk of abandonment). By reassuring one’s ally of one’s own loyalty, one is reducing the danger of abandonment, but only to enhance the risk of entrapment as the ally will take one’s loyalty for granted no matter what. If one keeps a distance from one’s ally, the ally might be less emboldened to practice brinkmanship, but disappointment might drive that ally toward the enemy.

An alliance between a great power (as protector) and a couple of smaller powers (as protected) contains a specific dilemma. The protector worries about the risk of the guarantee it is giving to the small allies. Individually, they may not amount to much, but together, they may be geopolitically important. But is the value of each single one worth marching into a war with another great power? For the smaller allies, the reliability of the alliance guarantee can also be a reason to be nervous: Will the protector risk a war against the threat I am facing?

Vast distances exacerbate the alliance dilemma: Geopolitics is not the same for all allies; vital interests differ. Politically, the allies are at pains to agree on the threat and on the trigger that triggers the “alliance case.” Physically, the allies struggle hard to devise a strategy, a posture, and logistics that make the alliance’s promise credible. The enhanced risks of the nuclear age have exacerbated this dilemma.

Asymmetric alliances quarrel about burden sharing. The biggest member makes the decisive contribution. Assets of the smallest allies add virtually nothing at the margin. Smaller allies have thus an incentive to contribute less than their “arithmetic” share—they are up for a free ride, while the larger member produces most of the public good alliance security.

Many alliances in history were weakly institutionalized. With the growing speed of, and the stakes involved in, modern warfare, alliances try to achieve greater effectiveness and to mitigate the defection problem by higher institutionalization. NATO has been the first fully institutionalized alliance with a headquarters, a bureaucracy, a general staff, a council, an agreed strategy, and a far-reaching military integration. Institutionalization enhances alliance efficiency, trust, and stability. “Sunk investment costs” motivate members to keep the alliance under changed circumstances: Enduring collaboration creates social bonds. As a consequence, NATO has survived the loss of its enemy.

Clubs

International club governance is on the rise. Clubs are less institutionalized than alliances but more so than coalitions of the willing. They are distinct in that they are not necessarily confined to rendering security services to their members alone but deliver “security products” to a broader community, including nonmembers.

“Clubs” in the security field are, for example, the export control regimes (e.g., Nuclear Suppliers Group [NSG]), the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the G8 [Group of Eight]). They do not rest on treaties and have an exclusive membership that is enhanced by consensual co-optation. They are meant to be permanent. All have a flat institutional structure: some agreed rules and norms, even in written form (e.g., the export guidelines of the NSG). And they all have established decision-making structures (usually consensus rule).

The form of “club” permits members to escape from the constraints of legally regulated cooperation. It allows for an opaque style of proceeding that might be helpful to achieve consensus on politically difficult issues (e.g., export control) while creating mutual confidence that the partners are sincere. This might be a condition to establish cooperation in controlling the export of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) between potential political rivals. It might also facilitate substantial coordination in areas of high-security salience, such as G8 antiterrorism collaboration. And it allows for greater flexibility than formal treaties. The guidelines for clubs are easy to change and amend, namely, by simple agreement of the executives and without the often cumbersome ratification procedures. The downside is a lack of accountability.

**Concerts**

_Consert_ is a mechanism to coordinate great power policies. The historical model, the Concert of Europe, was established at the end of the Napoleonic wars, and it kept the peace between the European great powers from the Vienna Congress (1815) up to the Crimean War (1853), contained the ensuing wars of Italian and German unification, and provided an arena for conflict management afterward until the breakdown in 1914. It was a tool to provide security for its members against each other, to prevent third parties from disturbing stability, to offer the public good of broad conflict management, and to mitigate the consequences of inevitable political change.

The classical concert relied on a combination of behavioral and procedural norms. Great powers guaranteed each other’s existence and territorial integrity and recognized each other’s vital interests. They committed not to change the status quo by force. They accepted restraint on their right to intervene unilaterally in other states’ internal affairs. Crisis management was to be conducted jointly (with the option to opt out when vital interests were not at stake). A rough balance of forces was maintained. The overarching norm was to avoid a devastating major war in Europe. The concert maintained an elaborated system of conferences, meetings of ambassadors, and occasional encounters between monarchs. Consultations were intensified when an international crisis arose.

The strength of the concert was based on the common experience of large-scale, enduring war after the French Revolution and on a similar social basis of largely aristocratic or great bourgeois leaderships and diplomatic corps. These commonalities permitted collaboration despite value differences between the more liberal Britain and France, on the one hand, and the much more conservative Russia, Prussia, and Austria, on the other. When the memory of the wars faded, extended suffrage in Britain and France brought new social forces to the seats of power, and nationalism led to higher political mobilization everywhere, it became harder to achieve a consensus. The concert suffered also from the shortcomings that a Russian attempt failed to place arms control on its agenda and that extra-European issues remained largely outside its concerns, but it influenced the balance of power and mutual perceptions of the members. Interests of small states or national movements were not generally ignored—the concert helped with the independence of Belgium, Greece, and Romania and managed the transfer of the province of Neuenburg from Prussian possession to Swiss sovereignty—but smaller states had a voice only if the concert granted it occasionally.

The concert realized security cooperation among major powers of different ideological orientation in a phase of great change, and it worked for an impressively long period of time. It combined realist (balance of power), normative, and institutionalist features; this might be a hint that successful real-world security cooperation has to rely on paradigmatic synthesis rather than purism.

**Inclusive Security Cooperation**

**Collective Security**

The concept of collective security has never been realized in pure form and with resounding success. It aims to establish a system of generalized deterrence and reassurance, which relaxes the need for self-help efforts. An operating system of collective security would reduce the security dilemma for everybody tremendously.

The basic principle of collective security is “all for one, one for all”: Members commit to assist an attacked partner. Collective security is an inclusive provisional alliance without a predefined enemy. The aggressor is supposed to be one of the partners who, by attacking, defines himself as the enemy of the rest. The basic feature is thus the marshaling of overwhelming defense in the moment of aggression (which assumes that no member has more power than the rest together).

The difficulties start with the question of who the aggressor is. Escalatory processes leading to
war can be interactive and incremental, making it difficult to identify an aggressor unambiguously, as at the outset of World War I. Countries may feel compelled to engage in preemptive defense, as Israel claimed in 1967, in which case the one who fires the first shot does so for defensive purposes. Those who are assessing an aggression claim may suffer from biases as they feel friendlier to one party than to the other. The next hurdle is an assessment of which measures are to be taken and which forces should intervene on the basis of what strategy and under whose command. Once a war for collective security is under way, when and on what conditions it should be terminated and what the postwar settlement should look like are divisive issues. Collective security can fail on each of these choices.

A public good problem arises because the utility of collective security is enjoyed by all, while the burdens in the hour of truth are more likely to fall only on a part of the membership. Geostrategic interests differ, as do military resources. Few countries can project and maintain power over long distances. The more powerful an aggressor is, the riskier a collective military counteroperation will be. A further complicating factor is the enormous risk of escalation into gross destruction should the aggressor be a nuclear weapons state.

For these reasons, realists have shrugged off collective security as inferior to self-help security systems. Nevertheless, the disruptions emerging from unfettered self-help in an increasingly interdependent world have led analysts repeatedly to reconsider collective security. It is at least possible to define some conditions that would enhance the chances that it might work: (a) if the great powers are not in existential conflict and share an interest in stability, (b) if nuclear weapons are not in the hands of would-be aggressors (or could be reasonably defended against), and (c) if efficient joint assessment capabilities and procedures are available to steer parties through the difficult choices to be made. In other words, collective security assumes the existence of concert-like features as its basic condition.

**Security Regimes**

Security regimes offer a more modest form of cooperation. They aim at regulating policy subfields rather than security at large. Regimes exist, for example, in subfields of arms control and non-proliferation, in curbing terrorist financing, or in the United Nations (UN) routine for peacekeeping operations. As other international regimes, they consist of four different levels: (1) *principles* state what the objective of the regime is and how cause-and-effect relations in the specific field are seen by regime members; (2) *norms* contain general guidelines for the behavior of members; (3) *rules* consist of specific prescriptions and proscriptions, specifying selectively the meaning of the norms; and (4) *procedures* establish how decisions are taken.

Regimes might be treaty based or informal. They might be supported organizations that administer the regime and perform services for members, such as verification or technical assistance (e.g., the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW] in the chemical weapons regime).

Regimes perform valuable functions in the security sector. Specific rules for behavior create precise expectations for the future, reducing the uncertainty that is at the root of the security dilemma. Transparency, verification, and procedures for the clarification of ambiguous information give insight into the faithfulness of regime members. Moreover, arms control regimes that curb seriously the opportunities for surprise attacks and comprehensive offensives suggest the benevolent intentions of all partners, in addition to providing information about their capabilities. A dense network of such regimes might help transform relations of mutual distrust into mutual confidence and help overcome the security dilemma: In the end phase of the Cold War, progress in arms control and political change reinforced each other. This effect, however, is not determined. The overall interstate relationships and the opportunities for progress in arms control are connected. If a conflict is harsh and mutual distrust high, field-specific regimes might be too piecemeal to help. Either party in the conflict might request such fundamental changes in the position of the other side as a precondition for negotiations that the whole cooperation process falters. The failure of arms control and regional security talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors during the 1990s is a telling example. Likewise, arms control is vulnerable to domino effects if something else in the relationship goes wrong; For example, U.S. concern
about a Soviet army brigade on Cuba sealed the fate of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) ratification in the Senate in 1979, even though the two issues were not substantially related.

**Regional Organizations**

Regional organizations are increasingly important in security cooperation. Only a few regions are lacking in related structures (the Middle East and South Asia). A great number of war-driving factors are most likely to occur in regional settings: territorial conflict, enduring rivalry, contiguity, and overlapping transborder ethnicities. Neighbors are most prone to face the risk of war, while, on the other hand, they might be more similar in terms of historical experience or cultural traits than countries far away and may also harbor a considerable potential for mutually beneficial cooperation. Thus, while the security problem is particularly virulent, remedies are also more easily available.

International organizations, regional ones in particular, have potential effects that make them fit for conflict management and security production. They create permanent contact among officials, leading to greater familiarity and, eventually, more mutual confidence. They provide information and enhance transparency, reducing the uncertainty problem behind the security dilemma. They create the expectation of further cooperation, lengthening the “shadow of the future.” In these functions, they are similar to international regimes. But they can address interstate conflicts among their members more comprehensively. They offer communication channels that facilitate talks about conflict solutions. And embedding rivals in the same organization offers other actors opportunities for mediation.

Some regional organizations have been created with an ostensible focus on nonsecurity issues but perform important roles for regional security or have evolved their agenda to include security explicitly (e.g., the European Union [EU], Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or the Economic Community of West African States). Others have been created for security collaboration, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. It might also be that a setting is created ad hoc with the specific mission to manage a particular project but evolves into a broader multilateral institution. This might be the future of the six-party talks in East Asia, which came into being to contain the regional risks emerging from North Korea’s nuclear activities.

The success of these organizations appears to depend more on specific regional conditions and on leadership and practice and less on prefixed structural conditions. It requires fundamental political willingness and truly shared objectives. Where these conditions are absent, regional cooperation does not take off at all (e.g., in the Middle East) or with limited success (e.g., the OSCE).

**Security Communities**

In security communities, cooperation reaches such a level that the security dilemma evaporates altogether: The specter of military conflict is replaced by the expectation of peaceful change. While security communities may start from utility motivations for working together, in their mature state, they are transformed. The key change is the development of a shared identity. This identity makes the idea of warring “against one’s own kin” out of the question. Military contingency plans against each other and related preparations do not exist. The EU is the most outstanding example.

Mature security communities contain a tight interrelationship between material (utilitarian) and ideational factors. Close relations provide collateral utilities: enlarged freedom of movement for citizens, economic benefits, scientific collaboration, and so on. Common values and the observation of established behavioral norms, instantiated in everyday practices, keep the community tightly linked. Close-knit elites serve as “community entrepreneurs”; they may compensate for a less determined popular commitment. Communities tend to develop more elaborate organizations and communication channels. Military collaboration might grow into partial integration. This evolutionary perspective on security communities should not be confused with a eufunctional bias: If environmental circumstances change drastically or if domestic upheaval produces new attitudes, communities may decay.

While the main thrust of security communities is the pacification of intracommunity relationships, they may also create outside effects. They might
erect a joint defense against a common threat, like an alliance, and offer security services for third parties (e.g., capacity building for export controls, the transfer of counterterrorism-relevant information, and providing troops for peacekeeping). While the “alliance” function can have destabilizing effects for excluded parties, security services might transfer the pacifying effects.

Security communities are ambiguous as to inclusiveness/exclusiveness: Inclusiveness applies only to countries that share criteria of membership; the procedure for entry is co-option. On the other hand, security communities bind themselves to welcome everybody fulfilling these criteria; in that sense, they are inclusive. Uncertainties about EU boundaries illustrate this ambiguity.

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See also Alliances; Collective Security; Cooperation; Institutions and Institutionalism; International Organizations; International Regimes; Regionalism; Security Dilemma; War and Peace

Further Readings


Security Dilemma

A security dilemma is a situation in which the actions taken by a state to increase its own security cause reactions from other states, which leads to a decrease rather than an increase in the state’s security. Some scholars of international relations find that the security dilemma is the most important source of conflict in international relations. They argue that in the international realm, there is no legitimate monopoly of violence—that is, there is no world government—and as a consequence, each state must take care of its own security and survival. For this reason, the primary goal of states is to maximize their own security. Even if states focus solely on this goal and have no intention of harming others, many of the actions taken by states to increase their own security—such as weapons procurement and the development of new military technologies—will decrease the security of others. Decreasing the security of others does not automatically place the state in a dilemma, but because of the anarchic structure, other states will follow suit if one state arms. They cannot know whether the arming state will use its increased military capabilities for attack in the future. For this reason, they will either choose to increase their own military capabilities in order to reestablish the balance of power or they will launch a preemptive attack to prevent the arming state from upsetting the balance in the first place. If they choose the first option, the result may be a security spiral. A security spiral is an action–reaction process, where two states are tied in an armaments race with each state responding to increases in weapons procurement and defense expenditure by the other state, leading them both to arm themselves more and more heavily. This may lead to war in the long run. If they choose the last option, military conflict will be imminent.

The logic of the security dilemma was first described by Herbert Butterfield in 1949. The term itself was coined by John Herz in 1950. Although
the logic seems to fit particularly well with the security competition between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, proponents of the term do not see it as tied to a specific historic era. Rather, it reflects the fundamentally tragic nature of international life: State actors strive for peace and stability but end up in military conflict. Thus, even if all states are status quo powers wishing only peace and security, war may occur because of the fear and insecurity following from the anarchic structure of the international system. This focus on the effect of international anarchy on the behavior of states is typical of so-called structural realism—sometimes termed neorealism—which posits that the international system is a self-help system, where states must focus on their own interests to maximize their chance of security and survival. In particular, the security dilemma logic is central to so-called defensive realism. Proponents of defensive realism argue that states seek to maximize their chance of security and survival by maintaining their position in the international system, not by expansion. Still, scholars working within alternative theoretical traditions have discussed how the security dilemma logic looks from their perspective and have used their own theoretical insights to suggest how we might move beyond the security dilemma logic and create a more peaceful world.

A large number of international relations scholars have applied and developed the logic of the security dilemma. Some of the most prominent security dilemma scholars are Robert Jervis, Barry Posen, and Charles Glaser. From a more critical stance, the security dilemma logic has been explored by, among others, Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler. Recent research on the security dilemma has applied the logic to most regions of the world, and it has resulted in a proliferation of more fine-grained distinctions between different types of security dilemmas.

Some scholars of international relations argue that all states face a security dilemma all the time, but most of them agree that the intensity of security dilemmas tends to vary over time and space. The literature on international relations points to different sources of variation in the security dilemma. Security scholars such as Stephen Van Evera argue that the intensity of the security dilemma depends on the ease of conquest. If conquest is easy, states will typically face an intense security dilemma, because the risk of military defeat is raised every time a competing state adds to its military capabilities. Conversely, if conquest is difficult, the security dilemma is ameliorated, because other states may add to their military capabilities without posing a direct offensive threat. If we are able to tell the difference between offensive and defensive weapons, states may even signal their benign intentions by deploying defensive weapons. Other states will know that they have acquired weapons not to attack but to defend. Offense and defense dominance vary over time and space depending on a number of factors, including geography, military technology, and military doctrine.

Also, regime type may affect the intensity of the security dilemma. Although democracies often go to war, they rarely go to war against other democracies. When two autocracies face each other or when a democracy and an autocracy face each other, security spirals sometimes spin out of control, because each side interprets the move by the other side as potentially threatening. But this is rarely the case when two democracies face each other. Two characteristics of modern, stable democracies explain why. First, the policy processes in liberal democracies is fairly transparent, even when viewed from outside the country. Parliamentary debates are usually open to the public—sometimes even televised—and political parties outside government, mass media, and interest groups ensure that few government decisions of any importance are taken without scrutiny and public debate. Second, democracies usually have rules and regulations preventing them from rushing into war. Some policies are made extraordinarily difficult, thereby binding the policymakers and signaling to the outside world that decisions cannot be taken without prior warning. Both of these characteristics of modern, liberal democracies reduce uncertainty and thereby ameliorate the security dilemma. As summed up by Charles Lipson (2003), “Because democracies have more accurate perceptions of each other, they are better able to cooperate, build trust and avoid war” (p. 72).

Other scholars argue that the security dilemma is largely irrelevant, because international conflict is not the result of status quo powers seeking to maximize security but of revisionist powers
Selection bias refers to the inaccurate estimates that can occur when a sample of data is nonrandomly selected for study. Samples may be purposefully nonrandomly selected by researchers. More often, however, nonrandom (also called “selective”) samples result from choices made by the actors being studied or by others whose choices affect them. This entry discusses the importance of such biases and the ways to avoid them.

The samples available for studying political processes are often selective. For example, to learn about the escalation or resolution of international disputes, one must study a sample of states involved in disputes. These countries have made or been the recipients of demands or threats. To learn what leads citizens to vote for particular parties or candidates, one must study a sample of persons who have registered to vote and decided to go to the polls. To learn what makes economic sanctions or peace-building missions effective, one must study a sample of cases in which sanctions have been applied or civil wars have ended, respectively. To learn about public opinion, one must study persons who have consented to respond to surveys and to do so informatively. In each of these cases, the sample available for study is not a random sample from the population of interest; instead, it is a sample that has been nonrandomly selected or self-selected.

The economist James Heckman was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 2000 for his...
work on methods for analyzing selective samples without bias. Heckman popularized these methods and applied them extensively to the study of labor economics. Christopher Achen was the first political scientist to develop methods for analyzing selective samples. Achen explained how nonrandom selection often affects analysts’ attempts to evaluate public policy. For example, an analyst might wish to evaluate a pretrial release system: Are appropriate criteria used to decide which defendants will and will not be released? One criterion that judges use in determining whether or not to release a defendant is the seriousness of the accusation; those accused of serious crimes are less likely to be released. The analyst might therefore wish to know whether those accused of serious crimes are more likely to flee or commit additional crimes if released; if not, perhaps judges would want to release more defendants accused of serious crimes. This question is difficult to answer, because the sample of released defendants is selective. When judges do release those accused of serious crimes, it is because they have some additional information (e.g., exemplary courtroom behavior) indicating that these defendants are unlikely to be rearrested. Thus, in the sample of released defendants, everyone is unlikely to commit additional crimes—in some cases because those accused of more minor crimes are unlikely to do so and in some because those who are released after being accused of serious crimes are exceptional. For this reason, a study of released prisoners will show little or no relationship between the seriousness of the accusation and the chance of rearrest, even if such a relationship truly exists. However, methods that correct for selection bias show that those accused of serious crimes are more likely to flee or be rearrested if they are released without regard to courtroom behavior. Failure to correct for selection bias might lead judges to release more defendants accused of serious crimes and to regret this decision when those defendants go on to have a higher rearrest rate.

In statistical terms, selection bias can lead to biased or inconsistent estimates, depending on the model. Stated more formally, selection bias refers to the biased and/or inconsistent estimates that may occur as a result of nonrandom selection. To see the problem, consider a researcher’s attempt to test the hypothesis that pairs of states are more likely to go to war when their military strength is nearly equal (they have power parity); one rationale behind this hypothesis is that leaders are less likely to know which side would win a war when states are more evenly matched, and so the ultimate loser is willing to fight. Assume, for example, that whether or not two countries are roughly equal in power determines their likelihood of being in a military dispute (selecting into the sample) as well as their likelihood of escalating a dispute to war (the outcome of interest). Assume further that an unobserved variable, the interests at stake in the dispute, also affects both initiation and escalation. Pairs of countries enter the sample of militarized disputes in one of three ways. Some pairs are involved in disputes because they are roughly equal in power, some because one or both of the states has strong interests at stake, and some for both reasons. Informally, the problem is that in the sample of disputing dyads, pairs of countries that do not have equal power contain at least one country with particularly strong interests at stake, while pairs with equal power may or may not contain a country with strong interests at stake. For this reason, dyads in the sample with equal power are likely to go to war, and dyads with unequal power also are likely to go to war. When we use the countries involved in disputes to estimate the effect of power parity on whether or not states go to war, parity appears to have little effect—even though it has a strong one. In other words, the estimate of the effect is inaccurate.

This problem can be represented formally. In the equations that follow, the importance of the issues is one component of the error term in the selection equation ($u_{1i}$ in Equation 1) and also one component of the error term in the outcome equation ($u_{2j}$ in Equation 2), so that the two error terms are correlated:

\begin{align*}
U_{\text{select}_i} &= \alpha_1 = \gamma_1 \text{parity}_i + \gamma_2 X_{2i} + u_{1i}; \\
U_{\text{war}_i} &= \alpha_1 = \beta_1 \text{parity}_i + u_{2j}.
\end{align*}

In this example, the observed dependent variables are dichotomous; the country has some
unobserved utility of being in a dispute, and we observe that \( Y_{i1} = 1 \) (the observation is in the sample) if \( U_{\text{select}} > 0 \) and \( Y_{i1} = 0 \) (the observation is not in the sample) otherwise; similarly, the country has some unobserved utility of going to war, and we observe that \( Y_{i2} = 1 \) (the case goes to war) if \( U_{\text{war}, i} > 0 \) and \( Y_{i2} = 0 \) otherwise. The variable \( X_2 \) is another variable that influences selection but not the outcome of interest; it is called an exclusion restriction (see below). Since by assumption power parity has a positive effect on selection and on escalation to war in the example, \( \gamma_1 \) and \( \beta_1 \) are positive. If the states have roughly equal power (parity has a value of 1), the observation is more likely to have a high value of \( U_{\text{select}} \), select into the sample, even if the error term, \( u_{i1} \), is small or negative; but if the states have unequal power (parity has a value of zero), the observation will only select into the sample if the other independent variable \( X_2 \) leads it to do so or if the pair has a large value of the error term in the selection equation, \( u_{i1} \). Thus, observations with parity that get involved in disputes can have any value of \( u_{i1} \), and observations without parity that get involved in disputes more often have large values of \( u_{i1} \).

The selection process and the correlated error terms in Equations 1 and 2 lead power parity, the independent variable of interest in the outcome equation, to be correlated with the error term in that equation. Because of the correlation between \( u_{i1} \) and \( u_{i2} \), the sample of dyads available to estimate the impact of power parity on whether countries escalate their disputes to war includes (a) pairs of countries with equal power \( (X_{i1} = 1) \) that may have large or small error terms in the outcome equation (values of \( u_{i2} \)) and (b) states with unequal power \( (X_{i1} = 0) \) that have large error terms in the outcome equation (values of \( u_{i2} \)). Thus, power parity is negatively correlated with the error term in the equation of interest, and the researcher’s estimate of its effect (\( \beta_1 \)) using standard techniques (probit or logit) is inconsistent.

The problem of selection bias often is given short shrift by researchers, who ignore selection because they believe that the estimates are accurate for the sample in which they are interested. However, without modeling the selection process, the researcher cannot obtain an accurate estimate of the causal effect of the independent variables of interest on the dependent variable in the equation of interest, even for the sample under consideration. The reason is that the independent variables of interest are correlated with the error term in the selected sample whether or not they were correlated with the error term in the selection equation; the selection process creates the correlation. In the power parity example, power parity is not associated with a greater probability of war in the sample of disputes. However, power parity does have a causal effect on war for states involved in disputes; this causal effect is hidden by the fact that among disputing dyads, those with uneven power are more likely to have serious disputes due to the selection process.

Fortunately, the problem of selection bias can be surmounted, given appropriate data. Heckman showed that when the dependent variable in the selection equation is continuous, the problem described here leads to what is known as omitted-variable bias in the outcome equation. He further devised an easy, two-step estimation technique that avoids the bias. Other researchers have developed techniques for avoiding selection bias with different types of data. Techniques to avoid selection bias almost always require a valid exclusion restriction \( X_{i2} \) in Equation 1 on previous page), which is a measured variable that influences whether or not the observation is selected into the sample but does not affect the outcome of interest. Critics of selection methods have argued that appropriate exclusion restrictions often are difficult to obtain; without a valid exclusion restriction, evidence from computer simulations suggests that selection methods may be more misleading than estimates obtained with standard techniques.

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ICC. See International Criminal Court
ICCPPR. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
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Self-determination is a highly contentious concept that encompasses a variety of meanings and political claims. Each of these claims is based on the theory that particular population groups possess an inherent right to control their own political institutions. The term has been used in at least three different ways. First, self-determination can refer to the collective right of a defined ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or religious community to create and administer their own state. This is often the foundation for an argument in favor of secession or irredentism, the doctrine that populations should live under the sovereignty of the country to which they are ethnically or culturally related regardless of existing juridical borders. Second, it can refer to the right of a population to decide how they will be governed and who will represent them in government, the bedrock of democratic theory. Finally, the concept of self-determination also represents the claim that all states and societies have the right to determine their own political, economic, and social institutions. In this sense, it is synonymous with the principle of sovereignty and nonintervention, reflecting one of the most important concepts in diplomatic practice and international law. More specifically, the principle of self-determination has been advanced by populations challenging the role of foreign powers in influencing their governments and its political structures. This claim has long been associated with anticolonial resistance movements and, following decolonization, with efforts by popular movements to challenge intervention by foreign powers in their internal affairs.

Although all of these approaches are viewed as paths to liberation, in practice they are often competing doctrines. Because there are often competing claims over who the “self” is in self-determination, the concept has been the source of both civil and international conflict. This occurs on a number of levels.

First, the liberal principle of popular sovereignty emphasizes social distinctions within the population as the political foundation of the state. Since all citizens are juridically equal, the principle of democratic decision making gives priority to the will of the majority. On the other hand, national sovereignty is based on the will of the nation and gives priority to the needs of the national community. It has been common over the past century to have competing claims of self-determination based on these differences. Whereas a national community may claim the right to secede or amalgamate to create a new state out of at least some of the territory of existing states, the principle of popular sovereignty holds that the entire population should decide whether to break up the country. Thus, although a plebiscite or referendum would reflect the popular will and likely result in a vote against creating a new sovereignty, the principle of national autonomy would demand that each community be given the right to decide for itself with whom it wishes to associate. Moreover, the principle of territorial integrity as the foundation of the modern nation-state system is inconsistent with secession except in the most extreme circumstances.

Second, what constitutes the national community that can legitimately evoke the principle of self-determination? There is no objective definition of nationality that can be applied in all circumstances. Nationalists have alternatively defined themselves in terms of culture, ethnicity, language, religion, and political association. Thus, since nations are usually self-defined, their composition is subject to contestation and even redefinition. It is therefore not always clear who gets to define what constitutes the community. In the face of competing claims, at least one group’s assertion of self-determination will inevitably be denied. Moreover, there is not even agreement around the foundation of nationhood. Some, such as the German romanticists and their followers, argue that nationality is primordial—that is, it reflects the long-standing natural divisions inherent in human societies. Individuals are born into their national communities, and therefore, one’s national identity is not a matter of personal choice. Constructivists like Benedict Anderson, on the other hand, argue that nations are imagined communities that reflect mental images of an affinity that its members create rather than any natural grouping based on actual historical or physical properties. This construction of nationality, Ernest Gellner adds, is primarily a product of industrialism and the alienation from the community that it produces.

Third, the liberal notion of popular sovereignty is built on the assumption of a common citizenry, and therefore, ethnicity and religion had little to do with the definition of either the state or the
nation. John Stuart Mill, for example, argued that
democratic institutions are next to impossible in a
country made up of different nationalities. Without
a fellow feeling, a unified public opinion, which
he argues is necessary for the working of a repre-
sentative government, cannot exist. If this is the
case, then the only way to resolve the issues raised
above is through a policy of ethnic cleansing.
Thus, as Eric Hobsbawm holds, the ideal of the
national state advocated by U.S. President Wood-
row Wilson in 1919 is one that could only be
attained by barbarians.

**Self-Determination in Practice**

The revolt of the American colonies against British
rule in the late 18th century was the first successful
assertion of the right to self-determination against
an external ruler, although the frequent but unsuc-
cessful Irish revolts against English rule predated
the American Revolution. However, though the
American War of Independence was waged against
a colonial ruler, the cry for independence by the
colonists was not based on claims of nationalism,
nor did the revolutionaries specifically challenge
colonialism per se. Rather, the Declaration of Inde-
pendence was based on the democratic principle
that the consent of the governed was the only
legitimate foundation for government. The chal-
lenge to British taxation, which provided the initial
spark for the revolution, centered on the arguments
that the colonists were not represented in the
British Parliament and, moreover, that British rule
itself did not reflect the will of the colonial popu-
lation. For revolutionary leaders like Thomas Jeffer-
son, self-determination meant self-government and
popular sovereignty. In this sense, the right to self-
determination was held individually by each citi-
zen. This idea of popular sovereignty was also the
foundation of the 1789 French Revolution and its
radical conception of citizenship.

During the 19th century, the concept of self-
determination shifted to collectivist claims
advanced by European nationalist movements
seeking to create national states out of the large
multiethnic empires that ruled Central and
Eastern Europe. Such movements argued that all
national groups were entitled to a state of their
own and that national self-determination was
the only legitimate criteria for statehood. This
philosophy provided the foundation for the cre-
ation of Italy and Germany, as well as for the
claims advanced by dozens of ethnic groups liv-
ing within the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires.
This conception of self-determination saw the
right as one that was held collectively by a self-
defined national, ethnic, linguistic, or religious
community. Sovereignty, then, was held not by
the people per se but by the nation as a whole.
Self-government, defined as one that reflected the
individual wills of the population, was not a
requirement for the fulfillment of this ideal.

These movements reached their peak around
the time of World War I. Both U.S. President
Woodrow Wilson and the Bolshevik leader Leon
Trotsky voiced strong support for the concept of
self-determination as the foundation for a just
peace. Wilson original concept of self-determination
was synonymous with self-government. However,
he later adopted the nationalist perspective, advo-
cating a reorganization of the Hapsburg, German,
and Ottoman territories along national lines after
the collapse of the three empires during the war.
He was particularly influenced by the political
pressures created by the publication of the Bolshe-
viks' peace program and by the agitation for
national independence that swept the Czech,
Hungarian, Polish, and South Slav territories. The
core of the Bolshevik platform for the settlement
of the war was the realization of national self-
determination for peoples throughout Europe, a
proposal that drew particular favor with the
nationalist movements challenging the Hapsburg
monarchy. The allies knew that they needed to
develop a program of their own if they hoped to
compete for the hearts and minds of the public and
forestall the spread of Bolshevism among the disaf-
fected populations of Eastern and Central Europe.

Wilson responded to these events by reframing
the war as one for national self-determination.
There could be neither justice nor order, Wilson
argued, so long as national (i.e., ethnic) communi-
ties were denied the right to choose their own
political affiliation. His solution would be a read-
justment of borders and a redistribution of territory
based on the ethnic composition of the population.
He articulated this political vision for the new
European order in a series of speeches known as the
Fourteen Points Address, the Four Principles, the
Four Ends, and the Five Particulars.
At the same time, although the reorganization of Central and Eastern Europe provided for the creation of a dozen new states, the postwar settlement did not abolish the practice of colonialism, nor did it provide for political independence for those living under the former Ottoman Empire. It was not until the aftermath of World War II that millions of people living in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East were granted the right to form their own states. Following World War II, the institution of colonialism quickly collapsed. In some cases, the colonial powers determined that colonialism was no longer either feasible or sustainable and granted independence to their colonies. This was the case in much of Africa. In other cases, however, colonial powers such as France and Portugal refused to do so, sparking anticolonial rebellions and wars of national self-determination. These challenges were particularly acute in Vietnam, Algeria, Angola, and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).

Yet even voluntary decolonization produced problems of its own with regard to the ideal of self-determination. First, the European powers did not facilitate decolonization in Africa and the Middle East by creating national states based on the composition of the ethnic, religious, linguistic, or tribal populations living there. Rather, they built new states from the existing colonial boundaries that had been established almost a century earlier at the Congress of Berlin. The self-determination principle would be based on political independence, not on national or cultural autonomy. While this was probably the most practical method for transferring sovereignty to the native populations, it violated the principle of national self-determination by creating states that failed to coincide with the distribution of the traditional political communities on the continent. This not only forced the populations to reconceptualize their identities from tribal or clan-based affinities to “citizens” of a new abstract state that was alien to their cultures and histories, it also created significant internal conflicts among groups over who would dominate the new states. Thus, conflicts over self-determination erupted between various communities within many of the new states, sparked by resentment from those peoples who felt that they were being oppressed by a dominant tribal or ethnic group.

In addition, both the former colonial powers and the emerging U.S. superpower began to exercise a significant amount of influence in the economic and political development of the new states. As newly formed weak states, the new formations were highly susceptible to external pressure, and the great powers emerged as dominant forces within these states. The governments of such states tended to be authoritarian and often worked closely with these great powers in defiance of the popular will. This led to new types of movements for self-determination, popularly known as “anti-imperialist,” often escalating into decades-old civil wars. The resolution of these conflicts is still partial at best.

The revolutions in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s did not only bring down communist governments allied with the Soviet Union. They also reopened questions of national identity that had been settled for almost half a century. Lacking the secular identity that the communist governments had provided to the population, the emerging authorities viewed liberation as synonymous with ethnic nationalism. As such, they asserted that their states would reflect the will of their dominant nations, often in the face of large, newly oppressed national minorities. Using the popular sovereignty principle of majority rule, many imposed the dominant nationality on the entire population, often resulting in ethnic conflict and civil war. This was most pronounced in the breakup of Yugoslavia, a political entity that had been formed after World War I on the principle of Pan-Slavism. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, parochial nationalism emerged as the dominant political principle, encouraging the Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian authorities to assert their autonomy and reject a common Slavic culture. This resulted in the worst political violence and gross human rights violations since the 1930s.

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See also Colonialism; Democracy, Theories of; Liberalism; Nation Building; Nationalism; Nationalist Movements; Sovereignty

Further Readings
Self-regulation describes the way a specific group controls and supervises any or all aspects of its own activities in terms of public interest. It is an extraordinarily fluid concept. The term bleeds into neighboring ideas, such as voluntary regulation, self-policing, corporate social responsibility or coregulation. Self-regulation applies to institutions ranging from local sports clubs, to professions, to global industrial networks, leaving out little of what lies in between. Self-regulation covers myriad activities and comes in various organizational guises. Consequently, the idea is the subject of some controversy. This entry defines the notion, shows the past traditions, discusses professional self-regulation with its issues and criticisms, and finally presents its recent evolution.

Definition and Background

The term self-regulation implies two dimensions, as emphasized by Anthony Ogus (1999). First, regulatory regimes differ in the amount of control they have over the supervision they give the group, that is, the extent of self-regulation. Some forms of self-regulation are handled entirely by the group in question, such as self-regulation of the medical profession. In other instances, notably industry technical standards, self-regulation may rely on third-party oversight, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Second, regulatory approaches may differ in the capacity to enforce regulation, that is, the ability to self-regulate. Some self-regulatory regimes have legal or quasi-legal status, for example, for law or accountancy. Others are little more than a set of normative aspirations, such as the nonbinding industry codes of conduct in, for example, the tobacco industry.

Historical antecedents of self-regulation go as far back as ancient Rome. In medieval and Renaissance Europe, largely self-governing guilds regulated trades and crafts. According to Philippe Dollinger (1998), the Hanseatic League, a politically autonomous alliance of trading cities and their guilds, was probably the culmination of trades-based self-governance in premodern Europe. In Asia, there are records of associations of craftsmen and trades, called shreni in India or banghui in China. In general, premodern forms of self-regulation contributed to the broader goal of self-governance. With the rise of the modern state and its monopoly on political power, self-regulation evolved into an alternative to direct state oversight, albeit an alternative that was to complement rather than replace the general regulatory legitimacy of the state. Particularly in the English-speaking world, self-regulation of this kind is most commonly associated with the oversight of professions, most prominently of medicine and law. In Europe and the United States, as noted by Donald Irvine, much of the legal basis for professional self-regulation was established in the 19th and 20th centuries. Symbolizing the status of an independent profession, professional self-regulation has become the gold standard for aspiring vocations.

Professional Self-Regulation

Proponents of professional self-regulation contend that it solves the problem of information asymmetry between the state and the professions. Professions, not only medicine and law but also accountancy, have traditionally argued that effective regulation requires a level of expert knowledge found only within the profession itself. Regulation by peers, so the argument goes, creates the trust and reciprocity crucial to supervising a highly complex, knowledge-intensive, and dynamic field of activity. Since expertise, trust, and collegiality lead to fewer regulatory errors, proponents point out, the costs of self-regulation to the taxpayer are lower than in the case of external regulation. For this reason, professional regulation typically is independent and equipped with considerable
enforcement capacities, for example, the barring and disbarring of legal practitioners.

In the past, social scientists have viewed professional self-regulation with suspicion. For schools of thought committed to methodological individualism, such as Public Choice, self-regulation puts the lunatics in charge of the asylum. This distorts market mechanisms in a number of ways. First, by issuing licenses to practice, professionals tend to keep the supply low to inflate prices—a claim that resonates well with the fact that, for example, U.S. health care costs have consistently made up about 14% of the gross domestic product. Second, professional trust and collegiality—articulated in jargon and reproduced through impenetrable hierarchies—blur the lines of accountability between individuals within professions and between the professions and society. In this way, professional self-regulation becomes a system of private law (or, literally, privilege) that, in the view of critics, eludes democratic accountability and legitimizes the violation of consumer rights (Ogus, 1999). Third, self-regulating institutions, such as the American Automobile Association (AAA) in the United States or the Law Society in the United Kingdom, occupy a privileged position in the policy process. Equipped with requisite independence and legal clout, thinkers have argued, institutions of self-regulation invariably bring about self-serving policy. In sum, economists such as Milton Friedman have concluded, the practice of professional self-regulation ensures that whenever professional self-interest is incongruent with the public interest, the interests of the professions prevail. Suspending market competition, so the argument goes, creates opportunities for rent seeking that no rational individual could, or indeed should, let pass. Typically, economists such as Milton Friedman have suggested that the market be allowed to allocate professional resources and services. Market competition would then regulate all else.

In the past 3 decades or so, self-regulation has departed from its traditional home within the professional services. Partly in response to shifting beliefs about the role of the state in regulation and partly in response to emergent global trends, productive and extractive industries the world over have experimented with self-regulation. Here, the justification has been cast in terms of efficiency by pointing out, as Richard Andrews (1998) has done, that so-called command-and-control regulation has proven unwieldy, ineffective, and expensive. What is more, particularly for environmental regulation, as Andrews notes, new, more diffuse forms of environmental degradation—climate change or stratospheric ozone depletion—elude conventional end-of-pipe regulation. Self-regulation of this kind is believed to work with the grain of the market by allowing competition to determine and diffuse best industrial practices. Unlike traditional professional self-regulation, industry self-regulation takes place in widely varying degrees of independence. Significantly, as both Richard Andrews and Virginia Haufler (2001) have observed, very few self-regulatory regimes for industry can demonstrate the enforcement capacities of the traditional professions.

This too has been the object of criticism. For these commentators, including Denis Smith and Steve Tombs (1995) as well as Andrews (1998), industry self-regulation, however dressed up, is almost synonymous with no regulation and is unable to protect the public interest. First, critics argue that effective market-based self-regulation often requires rather specific industry or socio-political conditions. For example, best practice models are important in industries that rely on reputation. In markets driven predominantly by price, such as the garment industry, best practice usually equates to cost minimization. Similarly, political and socioinstitutional cultures based on consensus and cooperation, such as the Nordic countries, favor effective industry self-regulation more than countries where industrial relations are characterized by animosity and competition. In industries where these conditions do not hold, classical collective-action problems, such as free riding, undermine self-regulatory regimes. Second, even under ideal conditions, so the argument goes, self-regulation by itself is unlikely to address the social, environmental, or health-related external costs of industry activities. Yet it is precisely these costs to the environment, society, and human health that legitimate regulation in the first place (Haufler, 2001). Third, state regulation in the past has been a reaction to the lack of enthusiasm on part of industry to voluntarily rein in harmful activities (Andrews, 1998; Smith & Tombs, 1995). Critical observers argue that empirical evidence offers no reason to believe that this has changed. Similarly, proponents claim, evidence suggests that lack of institutional
distance between regulator and industry often leads to agency capture and, as a consequence, rent-seeking behavior. The upshot of the argument is that industry self-regulation amounts to a carte blanche for industry to pursue profits with little or no regard to social, environmental, and health-related costs. The pressures of highly competitive global markets, so the argument goes, ensure that even well-intentioned firms are forced into the “race to the bottom.” The solution here is to install external, preferably public, instances of oversight.

Despite coming to opposite conclusions, both critiques consider self-regulation primarily as a strategy for pursuing individual self-interest through public institutions. Recently, however, researchers have started thinking about self-regulation as a process of institutional evolution. Ongoing social, political, and environmental changes around the globe, so the argument goes, have profoundly transformed the environment for regulation in ways that are not always straightforward. On the one hand, globalization blurs organizational and ideological boundaries, say, between nation-states or the political Left and Right. On the other hand, it (re-)creates powerful new divisions at global level, for example, between the rich and the poor or between the advocates and skeptics of climate change policy. New opportunities, argue these thinkers, go hand in hand with new problems. For example, firms today can operate in “governance voids” where regulation is light and costs are low. On the other hand, these very same firms face highly discerning consumer citizens who demand ethically, environmentally, and socially sound business practices, all this at a time when fragmentation of national polities into highly specialized policy subsystems—often spilling over national boundaries—erodes public sector regulatory capacities.

The Future of Self-Regulation

For institutionalists, the variety of self-regulatory practices suggests an open-ended process of institutional evolution. Thus, they argue, it would be a mistake to dismiss out of hand either the potential or the risks of self-regulation. Instead, self-regulatory regimes need to be assessed as social systems that define norms, create organizational structures, and generate patterns of (recursive) practices. The complexity and uncertainty of contemporary regulatory challenges rule out a priori assessments of regulatory effectiveness. Today, effective self-regulation has become “responsive regulation” that evolves according to the requirements of the specific policy subsystems. Consequently, institutionalists argue that setting up regulatory choices in terms of polar opposites—market versus state versus civil society—is likely to yield no benefit. Instead, regulation requires the tailor-made interplay of skills and knowledge found throughout society. Effective self-regulation, then, is about finding a robust public/private/civil society mix. The precise ingredients of this mix—the relative roles and functions of contending policy actors—will depend on the institutional circumstances in which regulation takes place.

Therefore, institutionalists contend, self-regulation requires openness: of institutions, of networks, and, not the least, of minds. While traditional self-regulation was about closing off professions to external scrutiny, “responsive” regulation entails encouraging experimentation and debate. On this view, self-regulation is an integral part of a larger process of “coregulation” in which all social sectors, including the state, play a vital, if constantly changing, role.

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See also Governance; Regulation

Further Readings


Semipresidentialism is a constitutional type that combines a popularly elected head of state with a head of government who is responsible to a popularly elected legislature. Semipresidentialism is therefore a mixed regime form that combines features of parliamentarism, which prescribes a fusion of powers and mutual dependence between executive and legislative powers, and presidentialism, which is, in contrast, characterized by a separation of powers and mutual independence of executive and legislative powers. Semipresidential systems thus maintain a dual power structure in which the head of state shares executive power with a prime minister and his or her cabinet.

**Semipresidentialism as a Mixed Regime**

The concept of semipresidential government was coined during the 1970s by the French political scientist Maurice Duverger in an attempt to investigate and appraise the constitutional uniqueness of the French Fifth Republic. In 1980, in what is by now a classic article, Duverger introduced his model to the greater international public and defined semipresidentialism as a combination of three elements: (1) the president is elected by universal suffrage, (2) the president possesses considerable powers, and (3) the president has opposite him or her a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament is not in opposition to them. Applying this definition, Duverger identified seven semipresidential regimes, in Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and the Weimar Republic in Germany (1919–1933). More recent identifications come up with much larger numbers, and a 2008 survey by Robert Elgie lists no less than 54 semipresidential regimes in existence. To mention just a handful of cases in addition to those identified by Duverger, the list includes countries such as Angola, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Mongolia, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Tajikistan, and Timor-Leste. Several of these more than 50 countries have nondemocratic regimes being run under the cloak of semipresidentialism, but a good 30 or so are partial or full democracies.

The remarkable increase in the number of such regimes reflects two partly intertwined circumstances. First, this type of regime has gained much ground in recent years. For instance, the dualistic logic of semipresidentialism having much in common with the previous communist system of government, varieties of semipresidentialism have frequently been adopted in constitutional developments following the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Second, the increase also reflects deviations by authors and analysts from the criteria laid down by Duverger, which are, admittedly, contestable and anything but transparent. For example, the criterion that the president is elected by universal suffrage is interpreted by some to mean a direct election and by others to mean election by a popular vote, either direct or indirect. While the first interpretation excludes elections in an electoral college, the second does not. To give another example, when and if the criterion is that the president must possess considerable powers, authors may differ in their view of what set of powers is to be regarded sufficient to satisfy this criterion. Also, how the powers are divided between president and prime minister vary greatly between countries, and this variation carries problems of classification and interpretation in its wake.

Furthermore, while some classifications rely on institutional criteria only, others employ in addition criteria that relate to actual or political power. Clearly, this adds to the confusion, as constitutions that are relatively similar may still be applied differently. Duverger was certainly very much aware of this, as he maintained that the constitutions of Austria, Ireland, and Iceland are semipresidential, while political practice in these countries is parliamentary. In fact, according to Duverger, the very purpose of the concept of semipresidential government was to explain how it was the case that a
similarity of rules may still result in a diversity of games. The differing views and interpretations of semipresidentialism have even come to concern the very status of the concept. According to one school of thought, the alternation between presidential and parliamentary power that is inherent in this form of regime implies that semipresidentialism is a hybrid form or a synthesis between parliamentarism proper and presidentialism proper. Others maintain, however, that semipresidentialism is rather a specific and separate regime form. Having like presidentialism two sources of popular legitimacy, namely, presidential elections on the one hand and legislative elections on the other, semipresidentialism, the argument goes, is a regime form closer to presidentialism than to parliamentarism.

Given that the concept of semipresidentialism has been and still is a source of confusion, it is only natural that most listings of semipresidential regimes tend to come up with divergent findings, at times including cases that may only with hesitation be referred to as semipresidentialism. For instance, the small African island state São Tomé and Príncipe often figures in lists of semipresidential regimes; in this country, however, the directly elected president is charged with dismissing the prime minister. In fact, according to the constitution, the government is politically responsible before the president as well as the assembly. Clearly, this constitutional order is some distance away from the basic idea of semipresidentialism. Finland, to mention another example, was earlier regarded by many as a model case of semipresidentialism. However, presidential powers were much reduced in the new Form of Government Act from the year 2000, and they now boil down to a statement in the Finnish Constitution that foreign policy is led by the president in cooperation with the cabinet. Given that trends toward internationalization and globalization have much blurred the distinction between foreign and domestic policy, the correct interpretation of this vague constitutional statement has become a source of much political dispute in the country. The point to be made here, however, is that Finland nowadays represents a much weaker variant of semipresidentialism than before. Indeed, future inclusion of Finland in the semipresidential camp may even be seriously questioned.

Empirical Findings on Semipresidentialism

From the difficulties of definition it follows that the empirical findings concerning the politics and impact of semipresidentialism are in like manner indistinct and even contradictory. In practice, however, semipresidential systems tend to oscillate between two forms. On the one hand, the president gains in power if the legislative majority is of the same party as the president. On the other hand, if the legislative majority is of divergent parties, it will strengthen the position of the prime minister. This second form is named cohabitation and may result in a formally or informally agreed-on division of labor between the two heads of government. For instance, in France during the cohabitation period of 1986 to 1988, President François Mitterrand retained responsibility for foreign affairs, while Jacques Chirac as prime minister was responsible for domestic affairs. Such inoffensive solutions are not always obtainable, and findings suggest that cohabitation creates political tension in times of crisis and may in some cases even be responsible for the collapse of democracy. Of course, if authority is fragmented in the legislature, with no party or coalition enjoying a substantive majority, the outcome may be that the president resorts to executive decrees and emergency rule. Further findings from the study of the new democracies that have resorted to semipresidentialism are that the dual executive is in general likely to generate conflict; however, systems that accentuate the position of the prime minister are likely to maintain better democratic performance than systems that emphasize the position of the president. If both the president and the prime minister have significant powers, the situation becomes complex and perhaps even risky to newly democratizing regimes.

The main lesson to be learned from the confusion of definitions and from the less than consistent research findings concerning semipresidential politics is that there is not one kind of semipresidentialism but many. In consequence, as the manifoldness brings forward operationalizations that are muddled and easily contested, the concept of semipresidentialism should not really be used as such as an independent or dependent variable in attempts to chart the consequences or the determinants of regime choice. True, the fact that semipresidential regimes operate in different ways may
be accounted for by reference to historical and contextual factors and to factors that relate to the operating of electoral and party systems, but the differences also follow from the simple fact that the regimes in question are not all alike. Reformulations of the term are therefore called for, and in recognition of the analytical difficulties, attempts have been made to establish more finely differentiated categories. A volume from the early 1990s by Matthew Shugart and John Carey (1992) has emerged as a landmark publication in this respect, as it replaces the semipresidential category with a distinction between premier-presidential systems and president-parliamentary systems. The former type comprises cases in which the prime minister exerts greater executive power; the latter is about cases in which the president wields greater authority. Attempts have also been made at a further division of premier-presidential systems; these attempts build on the significance of the nonlegislative powers vested in the presidency.

Future Directions

Efforts at promoting the future use of the semipresidential category should probably advance further along these lines. Semipresidentialism has often been conceptualized as a sort of umbrella model, intended to cover somehow the terrain between parliamentarism and presidentialism. When strictly and narrowly defined and applied, the concept of semipresidentialism no doubt brings analytical rigor and capacity to the study of political regimes; at the same time, however, precisely because it is strictly and narrowly defined, the concept fails to cover all the varieties and the diversified arrangements of checks and balances that have been introduced in many contemporary constitutional frameworks. As these varieties have been incorporated into the semipresidential frame, the frame has become fuzzy and difficult to fit into the practices of research. Obviously, future efforts need to depart from the ambition to preserve conceptual clarity while advancing the capacity of the concept to cover and manage an expanded field of empirical observations. In these efforts, one is well advised to consider that as there are subtypes of semipresidentialism, there are subtypes of parliamentarism and subtypes of presidentialism as well. At some point these latter subtypes merge with the subtypes of semipresidentialism. Recognizing this, constitutional political science needs to work out and adopt in future research a full-fledged typology that describes by including also semipresidential subtypes the relative levels of parliamentarism and presidentialism in political regimes.

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See also Constitutional Engineering; Parliamentary Systems; Presidentialism; Separation of Powers

Further Readings


Separation of Powers

Governmental powers are separated for several reasons. This entry analyzes the notion and its rationale, discusses the concept of mixed government, assesses the influence of Montesquieu, reviews the American experience, and shows how the separation of powers is actually implemented.

Nations may decide that it is necessary to separate functions that are considered unique and exclusive in nature, such as the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Another motivation is to divide the functions of government to ensure that no one body can accumulate sufficient power to
violate the individual rights and liberties of citizens. The first reason is analytical and based largely on experience and practicality. The second is more theoretical and value laden, especially because it involves making judgments about the human tendency to abuse power. To check that inclination, powers are kept separate. The U.S. system of separation of powers draws from both sources.

The Notion in the Classic Literature

The concept of separation of powers is found in the works of political analysts from the time of the Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle. Misinterpretations and misconceptions about separation of powers are perennial problems. If there is no separation of powers, one branch of government might acquire too much influence and threaten other branches and the people. With too much separation, government does not function properly, creating conditions that invite a dictator to appear in order to restore order and efficiency.

The constitutions of 1791 and 1848 in France represented concerted efforts to establish a pure separation of powers. The first experiment resulted in the Committee of Public Safety, the Directory, and the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte. The second led to Louis Napoleon, reaction, and the Second Empire. Professor M. J. C. Vile (1967) observed that “this last flirtation with the pure doctrine ended in the same way as others had ended in France—in absolutism” (p. 207). The framers of the American Constitution attempted to avoid those violent swings. Justice Joseph Story (1905) said that the framers accepted a separation of powers but “endeavored to prove that a rigid adherence to it in all cases would be subversive of the efficiency of the government, and result in the destruction of the public liberties” (p. 396).

The Concept of Mixed Government

The framers of the American Constitution were familiar with efforts over the centuries to combine different political interests to provide for balanced government. The principle of mixed government, as a method of stabilizing a political order, can be traced back to Greek philosophy. In Book III of his Laws, Plato combined monarchy and democracy to form a well-governed city. Aristotle, in Book IV of his Politics, mixed different types of oligarchies and democracies to create a stable state. He also divided government into separate departments: the deliberative, executive, and judicial.

In an effort to ensure balance and stability in a political order, Polybius, a Roman historian of the 2nd century BCE, studied different types of constitutions to prevent ideal forms from degenerating into perverted ones. In Book VI of his Histories, he settled on a mix of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy: The force of each being neutralized by that of the others, neither of them should prevail and outbalance another, but the constitution should remain for long in a state of equilibrium like a well-trimmed boat. Niccolò Machiavelli, in his Discourses, adopted a similar method of avoiding the risks of a pure form of government. It was better to pull out portions from each form, so that there is combined under the same constitution a prince, a nobility, and the power of the people—then these three powers will watch and keep each other reciprocally in check.

John Locke studied the bloody civil wars in 17th-century England, which pitted the monarchy against Parliament and brought ruin to the people. What system of government could check against those misfortunes? He concluded that what was needed was not a balance among political classes but rather a division among political institutions: legislative, executive, and federative, with the latter representing external affairs. As he explained in Book II of his Two Treatises of Civil Government (1690), men discovered methods of restraining any exorbitances of those to whom they had given authority over them and of balancing the power of government by placing several parts of it in different hands. It was a mistake to entrust government functions to a single department: It may be too great a temptation to grasp at power, for the same persons who have the power of making laws to have also in their hands the power to execute them.

In dividing the departments of government, Locke did not attempt a pure separation. The legislative branch could punish the executive for maladministration of the laws, and the executive was empowered to assemble and dismiss the legislature. Locke did not provide for an independent judiciary. Under his system, the judicial function was placed largely under the executive. In 1701, a
decade after the appearance of his political treatise, the Act of Settlement in England helped secure judicial independence by guaranteeing tenure to judges as a reward for their good behavior.

From these studies, one can appreciate how the doctrine of separated power evolved. For early writers on the mixed state, stability came from dividing the sovereign power among three social classes: (1) the king, (2) the nobility, and (3) the common people. In later developments of political thought, authority is allocated by assigning power to three different governmental bodies and expecting them to check one another.

Montesquieu's Influence

There have been frequent claims that the French political theorist Baron de Montesquieu had a profound impact on the American framers and their reliance on separation of powers. Woodrow Wilson (1908) wrote that the framers of the Constitution “followed the scheme as they found it expounded in Montesquieu, followed it with genuine scientific enthusiasm” (p. 56). James Bryce concluded that the U.S. Constitution was created “de novo, on the most slender basis of pre-existing national institutions,” relying in large part on Montesquieu’s seminal work, The Spirit of the Laws (1748). According to Bryce (1891), “no general principle of politics laid such hold on the constitution-makers and statesmen of America as the dogma that the separation of these three functions is essential to freedom” (pp. 20, 26).

The American framers did indeed refer to Montesquieu favorably and with great respect. In Federalist No. 47, James Madison spoke of “the celebrated Montesquieu” as the “oracle” who was also cited on the separation doctrine (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, & John Jay, 2002, p. 337). There are similarities between Montesquieu’s theory and the U.S. Constitution, but the evidence is persuasive that the American framers relied on their practical experiences in the colonies and state government after their break with England. Also, Montesquieu anticipated a far greater separation between the branches than exists in the U.S. Constitution, and he misperceived the British form of government at the time of his study.

In providing for the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, Montesquieu selected the British Constitution as his model and visited London from 1729 to 1731 to study its distribution of powers. As one of several critiques, Frederick Maitland wrote that it was “curious that some political theorists should have seen their favourite ideal, a complete separation of administration from judicative, realised in England; in England of all places in the world, where the two have for ages been inextricably blended” (Kenneth Davis, 1951, p. 28). To Walter Bagehot (1895), the English system represented the “close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers” (p. 78). Montesquieu’s model was highly theoretical and failed to pick up political developments in England. Power began to rest in the hands of the Cabinet and leading ministers such as Robert Walpole from 1721 to 1742.

The concept of an independent judiciary, coequal with other branches, owes little to Montesquieu. He did not view the judiciary as a permanent branch. It was to be drawn from the body of the people at different points of the year, as had been the custom in Athens during the time of Socrates. Compared with the legislative and executive branches, Montesquieu called the judiciary to some extent “next to nothing.” This framework for the judiciary had little application to the U.S. Constitution, which creates a Supreme Court with permanent jurisdiction and grants its members life tenure.

Montesquieu captured well the tension and checks among the three branches. To form a moderate government, it was necessary to combine the several powers; to regulate, temper, and set them in motion; to give, as it were, ballast to one, in order to enable it to counterpoise the other. Again he stressed how the experience shows us that every person invested with power is apt to abuse it and to carry his or her authority as far as it will go.

The American Experience

Much of what the American framers discovered about the structure of government came from what they learned during the colonial period, their break with England, and efforts under the Continental Congress to develop a form of government that would be both effective administratively
Separation of Powers and protective of individual rights. Even during the colonial period, with political power theoretically centered in London, Americans created legislative bodies and assemblies that exercised the rudiments of representative control. When London decided on a stamp tax in 1765 to help pay for the costs of the French and Indian wars, colonial opposition was so intense and bitter that the British government decided to repeal the statute within a year. America had its first taste of political independence and democratic rule.

After declaring their independence from England in 1776, many of the American states wrote into their constitutions explicit provisions for a separation between the branches of government. New Hampshire, the last of the 13 states to form a constitution, recognized that separation could not be so extreme to prevent effective government. The three departments were to be kept

as separate from the independence of each other, as the nature of a free government will admit or as is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity. (Francis Thorpe, 1909, p. 2457)

After the break with England, America operated under a single branch of government at the national level: the Continental Congress. Delegates gathered to pass laws, sat in committees to handle administrative duties, and sat on other committees to settle adjudicatory disputes, especially those involving questions of admiralty. By 1781, the burdens were so great that the Congress decided to create a single executive to carry out administrative matters and set up a court of admiralty. Those bodies were not independent. They were creatures of the Congress and subject to legislative control. But more from practicality than theory, the Congress had evolved separate bodies to carry out the functions of government (Louis Fisher, 1972).

By the time of the constitutional convention in Philadelphia in 1787, there was broad agreement among the arriving delegates that the new charter of government must have three branches of government. The structure and operation of the Continental Congress had been thoroughly discredited. It was well said by the historian Francis Wharton (1889) that the Constitution “did not make this distribution of power. It would be more proper to say that this distribution of power made the Constitution of the United States” (p. 663).

After the convention had drafted the Constitution and adjourned, James Madison confided to Thomas Jefferson that the boundaries between the three powers “consist in many instances of mere shades of difference.” In Federalist No. 47, Madison upheld the maxim that tyranny resulted whenever three branches were concentrated in the same hands. However, he charged that the principle had been “totally misconceived and misapplied” (Hamilton et al., 2002, pp. 336–337). Neither in Montesquieu nor the British government were the three powers separated in any pure sense. In turning to the state constitutions, the same pattern of overlapping powers emerged. The intent of Montesquieu, Madison said, could be no more than that in cases where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands that possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.

When the draft constitution was released for public discussion and ratification by the states, critics condemned the intermixture of the branches. By 1788, however, the doctrine of separated powers in any pure sense had lost ground to the concept of checks and balances. One contemporary pamphleteer called the separation theory a “hackneyed principle” and a “trite maxim” (Vile, 1967, p. 153). Madison and Hamilton had to contend with those who objected that the branches of government were not separate but blended. The impeachment process, for example, was attacked for combining legislative and judicial powers in the same department. In Federalist No. 66, Hamilton argued that the true meaning of the separation maxim was “entirely compatible with a partial intermixture” and that overlapping was “not only proper but necessary to the mutual defence of the several members of the government against each other” (Hamilton et al., 2002, p. 431). For those who objected that the treaty process mixed the executive with the Senate, Hamilton responded wearily in Federalist No. 75 to “the trite topic of the intermixture of powers” (Hamilton et al., 2002, p. 475).

During the ratification debates, three states (North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) insisted that a separation clause be added to the
national bill of rights. Different proposals were advanced to keep the branches separate and distinct. Among the other items to be included in a bill of rights, the House and the Senate debated the merits of a separation clause. It was finally omitted. Had it been adopted, it would not have affected the blending of departments and powers already sanctioned by the Constitution (Fisher, 1972).

Separation in Practice

The framers of the U.S. Constitution offered general guidance to the structure and operation of government. Much of their efforts could not have anticipated how the three branches would exercise their powers or how the national government would grow in size and dominance. An early dispute concerned the president’s power to remove executive officials. In 1789, when the first three executive departments were being created, Madison argued successfully that the president possessed an implied removal power over department heads who prevented him from fulfilling his constitutional duty to see that the laws were faithfully exercised. At the same time, also in 1789, Madison insisted that certain officials who carried out what he considered duties of a “judiciary” nature should not serve at the pleasure of the president, especially when those officials were responsible for determining that federal funds were being spent in accordance with law.

Another restriction on presidential control over the executive branch concerned the distinction between two duties. Some executive officials owed allegiance to the president. Those were political duties. Other responsibilities were to the statutory direction from Congress. Those were legal duties, referred to as “ministerial acts.” Over time, courts understood that they could not order officials to fulfill political duties but could compel the discharge of legal duties. Through this development, both legislative and judicial branches became involved in directing the administration of law within the executive branch.

The Constitution does not expressly provide for the power of judicial review, allowing courts to strike down as invalid the actions of the states, Congress, and the president. Judicial review evolved as another implied power, invoked in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison. A sentence in that decision later came to be interpreted as “judicial supremacy,” meaning that a U.S. Supreme Court ruling had finality and could not be challenged or overridden by the other branches. Yet nothing in the sentence implies any level of finality: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This means that courts decide cases, not that what they say is the “last word.”

In studying other governments and constitutions, the framers concluded that single executives had involved their countries in wars not for the national interest but for reasons of personal fame and ambition. In Federalist No. 4, John Jay warned,

> It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting any thing by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory.

Those motivations led a ruler “to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people” (Hamilton et al., 2002, p. 101).

The framers understood that British theorists such as John Locke and William Blackstone vested the responsibility for foreign affairs and war with the executive. The U.S. Constitution assigns none of those powers to the president (foreign commerce, making treaties, appointing ambassadors, declaring war, or issuing letters of marque and reprisal). They are either assigned exclusively to Congress or shared between the president and the Senate (treaties and appointments). From 1789 to 1950, all major wars were either declared or authorized by Congress. The president had no independent authority to take the country from a state of peace to a state of war. However, President Harry Truman in 1950 ordered U.S. troops to Korea without ever coming to Congress for statutory authority. Since that time, other presidents have also claimed the right to engage the country in war without legislative authority, seeking “authority” instead from the United Nations Security Council or from countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Truman was also the first president to use not only express, implied, and emergency power but what has been called “inherent” authority—powers that somehow inhere in the nature of an office and supposedly are not subject to checks and balances from other branches. In claiming that power in 1952 when seizing steel mills to prosecute the war in Korea, Truman was rebuffed by the federal judiciary. Other presidents, including Richard Nixon and George W. Bush, cited inherent authority to justify their actions but typically encountered defeat in both the courts and Congress.

Over the past 6 decades, Congress has often failed to defend its constitutional powers over war and spending. It has repeatedly deferred to presidential initiatives. In this manner and others, the three branches have not had what the framers assumed they would: the incentive to fight off encroachments and protect their institutional powers. When checks and balances are weak, political institutions gain powers that exceed constitutional limits and threaten individual rights and liberties. To the framers, individual freedoms depended mainly not on courts acting as guardians or the president acting in the “national interest” but on the structural checks supplied by the separation of powers.

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See also Democracy, Theories of; Executive; Judiciary; Locke, John; Machiavelli, Niccolo; Parliamentary Systems; Parliaments; Representation

Further Readings


Signaling Games

See Game Theory

Simultaneous Equation Modeling

Ordinary least squares (OLS), along with its cousins such as probit, is the workhorse method of empirical political science. Starting with, as usual, the linear model,

\[ y = a + \beta x + \theta z + \varepsilon, \]

OLS is a fine way of estimating \( \beta \) and \( \theta \) as long as \( x \) and \( z \) are exogenous. An explanatory variable is exogenous if whatever statistical process determines it does not depend on the statistical process that determines either the dependent variable or the error term. If an explanatory variable is not exogenous (and so is said to be endogenous), then OLS has severe problems. These problems are typically worse than for other forms of misspecification and do not disappear as the sample size grows. Endogeneity issues cannot be fixed by the usual tweaks to OLS (generalized least squares); different estimation methods are required.

Predetermined socioeconomic characteristics are, by definition, exogenous. Beyond a few simple variables (physical characteristics of people or
countries), the argument that a variable is exogenous must be made theoretically and must be made relative to the dependent variable of interest. Thus, for example, if we believe that democracy is exogenous to economic development, a regression of economic development on democracy yields meaningful results; but we need some theory to know that democracy is exogenous—that is, that it is not the case that increased wealth leads to more democracy. Empirical results are conditional on this assumption; the assumption of exogeneity cannot be tested empirically.

Suppose, for example, that we are interested in explaining attitudes toward political candidates. Let \( y \) be a measure of how much one likes a political candidate and \( x \) be a measure of how close the candidate is to the voter on various issues. It may be the case that voters who like a candidate more are more likely to perceive the candidate as being close to them on issues, so \( x \) may not be exogenous. If \( x \) is endogenous to \( y \), it is well known that OLS can be badly biased, and these problems persist even with huge sample sizes (i.e., OLS is not even consistent). The solution, worked out in the 1940s by various Nobel Prize-winning econometricians associated with the Cowles Foundation, is to estimate a series of simultaneous equations for both \( x \) and \( y \).

Thus, for two equations, if \( x \) determines \( y \) but \( y \) also determines \( x \), we can write

\[
\begin{align*}
    y &= \beta x + \theta z + \varepsilon \\
    x &= \gamma y + \kappa w + \xi,
\end{align*}
\]

(2)

(3)

where \( z \) and \( w \) are exogenous and \( \varepsilon \) and \( \xi \) are error terms that may well be correlated with each other (but separately satisfy the usual Gauss-Markov conditions). One issue is what method is best for estimating the various model parameters; but a more fundamental issue is whether it is even possible to estimate these parameters. The latter is called the identification problem.

Identification

The identification issue is critical, and dealing with it comes before any estimation issue. The basic question is whether more than one set of parameter estimates is equally consistent with the data; almost always, if more than one set of estimates is consistent with the data, an infinite number of estimates are consistent with the data. In such cases, the model is not identified. In this situation, even if we were sure we had ideal estimates of the parameters, someone else could have equally ideal but different parameter estimates. This problem does not arise with models typically estimated via OLS (but only because we assume away the problem by assuming that all explanatory variables are exogenous) but is always a potential issue with simultaneous equation models. A simple example shows the problem.

Suppose we have an infinite amount of data, so there is no statistical uncertainty. Consider the model where \( x \) determines \( y \) and vice versa but nothing else. We run our favorite computer program and obtain, say,

\[
\begin{align*}
    y &= 2x + 3 + \varepsilon \\
    x &= -y + 2 + \xi.
\end{align*}
\]

(4)

(5)

Nothing can prevent us from adding the two equations together, giving, after simplification,

\[
\begin{align*}
    y &= x + 1 + \varepsilon + \xi, \\
    z &= x + 1 + \varepsilon + \xi, \\
    w &= x + 1 + \varepsilon + \xi.
\end{align*}
\]

(6)

Since the compound error in brackets looks like a perfectly good error term (remember that the errors in the equations may be correlated), if we are sure that \( \beta = 2 \), we are just as sure that \( \beta = 1/2 \), and similarly for the second equation. This is the unidentified situation, and no amount of fancy estimation will help.

If both equations contain the same additional exogenous variables, there is nothing to prevent adding of the two equations together to mimic the original equation but with different coefficients. But suppose that theory tells us that there is some exogenous \( z \) that belongs in the first equation but not in the second equation, and the opposite for a different exogenous \( w \). Then, we cannot add the equations together without making either \( y \) depend on \( w \) or \( x \) depend on \( z \). These conditions must be given by theory, since if they are not correct, the system is not identified and so estimation cannot proceed.

For our example, we might have liking for a candidate depend on whether one shares one’s ethnicity with that candidate (but where theory
tells us that ethnicity does not affect how close the candidate is to the voter on the issues, a very strong assumption) and closeness on the issues affected by the voter’s occupation (which would not be expected to directly affect how much the voter likes a candidate but might affect issue positions). These are strong assumptions, but without these or similar assumptions the system is not identified and empirical research cannot proceed. Sometimes the correct conclusion is that theory is inadequate for identification; other times theory allows further empirical work. (Resorting to OLS does not solve the problem, since this would imply, incorrectly, that \( x \) is exogenous.)

We can check to see if a system is identified by counting the number of exogenous and endogenous variables in each equation. An exogenous variable is excluded from an equation if it is used in the system but does not appear in that equation. An equation is identified if it has at least as many excluded exogenous variables as it has included endogenous variables. If this condition is met exactly, the system is said to be exactly identified; if there are more excluded exogenous variables than included endogenous variables, the system is said to be overidentified. It is possible that some equations are identified, some overidentified, and others not identified. Obviously, we can say nothing about the parameter estimates of the unidentified equations. For the others, we can proceed to estimation.

It is possible to test where the restrictions that overidentify a system are valid, but the restrictions to test where a system is just identified must be justified purely theoretically. It is possible for a system to be weakly identified, where the excluded exogenous variables in an equation have only a weak effect in equations where they are theoretically included. This leads to problems similar to those of underidentification. Weak theory is inadequate for identification purposes.

**Two-Stage Least Squares**

There are many good ways to estimate a system of simultaneous equations, but by and far the most common is two-stage least squares (2SLS). 2SLS works because we can always solve the system of equations to get each endogenous variable to be a linear function of all (included and excluded) exogenous variables. This is called the reduced form of the system. Each of the equations of the reduced form can be well estimated by OLS, since all the explanatory variables in each equation of the reduced form are exogenous.

The first stage of 2SLS estimates the reduced form. Each of these OLS estimations (one for each endogenous variables) is used to predict the values of the endogenous variables as a function of the exogenous variables in the usual way. These predicted values then replace the endogenous variables in a second OLS regression (equation by equation). This provides good estimates of the coefficients of the system of equations. If we just do two OLS regressions, the estimated standard errors will be wrong, but any computer package will automate the process and provide the correct standard errors. There are other ways of estimating simultaneous equation models, but none are great improvements over 2SLS.

**Simultaneous Equations Today**

After the initial burst of enthusiasm, the estimation of systems of simultaneous equations in political science (and in social science, in general) is today rarely done. While there are a number of reasons for this (including the rise of other research methodologies for assessing complex causal situations), probably the main one is that it is hard to find strong theory to allow for the identification of the entire system.

Over the past decade or so, there has been a huge increase in the use of instrumental variables. This focuses attention on a single equation of interest where one or more explanatory variables of interest are endogenous. Researchers then look for instruments that are simply exogenous variables that explain the endogenous explanatory variables but do not explain the dependent variable directly. This method is identical to 2SLS, except for the focus on only one outcome variable. Often it is easier to find variables that we believe explain one or more endogenous explanatory variables but do not explain the prime dependent variable of interest. Thus, 2SLS has again become a critical tool but one that lives on under another name. Note that instrumental variables have exactly the same identification issues as do simultaneous equations (except that we are interested in only one equation, not the whole system), and the
estimation method is exactly the same as 2SLS. The various issues discussed above thus continue to be critical.

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See also Causality; Misspecification; Model Specification; Statistics: Overview; Variables, Instrumental

Further Readings

Social Capital

The central premise of social capital is that social ties have value. The term social capital refers to the collective value of all social networks and the inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each other. In other words, social capital refers to the people we know and the norms of reciprocity that exist between us. The notion of social capital, therefore, emphasizes a wide variety of specific benefits that flow from the trust, reciprocity, information, and cooperation associated with social networks. In this way, value is created for people who are connected and, at least sometimes, for bystanders as well. This entry reviews the concept of social capital by unpacking its perspectives and components as well as assessing its implications in social, economic, and political arenas.

This simple definition of social capital serves a number of purposes. First, rather than focusing on the consequences of social capital, it concentrates on the sources thereof and recognizes that the features of social capital, namely, trust and reciprocity, are developed in an iterative process. Second, this definition includes the different dimensions of social capital and acknowledges that communities can have varied access to each dimension. Third, it identifies community as the primary unit of analysis, while conceding that individuals and households can appropriate social capital. As a result, the notion of social capital has become an influential theoretical concept in the analysis of contemporary social and economic development, and change and cohesion in various societies, communities, and groups. In addition, social capital is related to the description and explanation of social action. While it features in much academic and interdisciplinary discourse, including political science, economics, sociology, and social anthropology, it also has parallels with political agendas, social and economic development and, more recently, social policy development. This has to a large extent become visible in the influence of international bodies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in defining research areas as well as structuring the debate surrounding social issues related to the analysis of social capital.

Social Capital: Different Types and Perspectives

The wide variation of interest in the concept of social capital is partly evident in early works by Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman and was popularized by the most widely recognized proponent of social capital, Robert Putnam. The focus of social capital for each of these authors lies on networks and relationships as a resource; however, they have done so in different ways. This conceptualization of the role of social relationships in development marks a significant departure from earlier theoretical approaches and as such has direct implications for contemporary development research and policy. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish between the four perspectives on social capital, which identify the types of social capital in different ways.

The Communitarian View

The communitarian perspective equates social capital with mostly informal and local horizontal associations, such as clubs and civic groups. The focus of this perspective lies in the number and density of these local organizations and associations within a community. The basic premise for communitarians is that social capital is essentially good and the more social capital that is present in
a given community, the more positive its effect on that community’s welfare. Critics of this view, however, have pointed to *perverse* social capital, which exists in communities that are isolated or parochial. Furthermore, this perspective implicitly assumes that communities are homogeneous and strive to achieve the society’s collective interest; however, racial and ethnic exclusion, inequality, and gender discrimination are only a few examples that suggest otherwise. This downside of social capital has the potential to hinder development.

**The Networks View**

The networks view is a more nuanced perspective on social capital as it stresses the importance of vertical and hierarchical as well as horizontal associations between people and also attempts to account for relations within and among organizational entities such as community groups and firms. This view also distinguishes between two types of social capital, namely, *bonding* and *bridging* social capital. The former refers to strong intracommunity ties that provide families and communities with a common purpose and a sense of identity, while the latter refers to weak intercommunity ties, namely, those that cross social and cultural ties such as gender, class, race, ethnicity, religion, and socioeconomic status, which can form the basis for sectarian interests.

The networks view has two key propositions. The first proposition is that, although social capital can provide a range of services for the members of a community, there are potential negative economic consequences resulting from the costs that these ties can place on the noneconomic claims of a member’s commitment. The second proposition is that a distinction needs to be made between the sources of social capital and the consequences derived from them. Thus, to make claims with regard to the efficacy of social capital, the network view acknowledges the necessity of both strong intercommunity ties and weak extracommunity networks and that the range of outcomes associated with social capital are attributable to the different combinations of these two dimensions. The strength of this view lies in its ability to engage in policy discussion based on empirical evidence and assessments of contending explanations. A clear challenge, however, lies in retaining the integrity of the many positive aspects of bonding social capital while trying to ensure increased access to formal institutions and facilitating a diverse stock of bridging social capital.

**The Institutional View**

The third perspective on social capital builds from the first two perspectives, adding formalized national structures to the mix. The basic premise of this view is that the legal, institutional, and political environment facilitates the strength of civil society and community networks and that social capital is regarded as a dependent variable—in contrast to the communitarian and network views, where social capital is regarded as an independent variable. The institutional approach stresses two points: first, that social groups’ capacity to act in accordance with collective interests depends on the quality of their formal institutions and, second, that the performance and effectiveness of the state and firms are dependent on their internal credibility and competence as well as their external accountability to civil society.

There are two primary approaches to research from this view. The first approach employs case studies that are based on comparative history and postulates that civil society is only able to thrive to the extent to which the state encourages it. The second approach adopts quantitative cross-national techniques to measure the impact of social divisions and government performance on economic performance. The ability of this view to address macroeconomic policy concerns is its greatest strength as well as its weakness in that it fails at a microeconomic level.

**The Synergy View**

The forth and most recent perspective on social capital, the synergy view, encompasses an integration of the work from the networks and institutional views and focuses primarily on conditions that may foster developmental synergies. This approach identifies *complementarity*—mutually supportive relations between various private and public actors that are embodied in legal frameworks—and *embeddedness*—the nature of and the extent to which ties connect citizens and public officials—as the basis for synergy between government and citizen action. In
other words, this approach can only work when the actions of public officials are embodied by performance-oriented organizational environments that are credible and competent.

The synergy view can be used for three fundamental functions: (1) to identify the nature of a community’s social relationships and formal institutions as well as the extent of the interaction between them; (2) to develop institutional strategies on the basis of these social relations, with particular reference to the two types of social capital—namely, bonding and bridging social capital; and (3) to determine the ways in which the positive manifestations of social capital can counteract isolationism, sectarianism, and corruption.

The four perspectives on social capital thus differ in terms of the unit of analysis that each focuses on; their treatment of social capital as a dependent, independent, or mediating variable; and the extent to which they integrate state theory. However, the four perspectives on social capital also have a number of common features: They all link the social, economic, and political spheres; they all recognize that social relationships can improve development outcomes and that these outcomes are dependent on the horizontal versus hierarchical relationships and broader political and legal context; they all recognize how the formal and informal organization of the relationships between economic agents can improve economic activities; and all infer that desirable social relationships and formal institutions have positive externalities.

Components of Social Capital: Networks, Norms, and Trust

Definitions of social capital vary considerably, and this becomes problematic when trying to establish a set of indicators for measuring social capital or in reaching a consensus on the best ways of measuring the concept. To date, census data of groups and associational memberships in a given society and survey data measuring levels of trust and civic engagement have been the two broadest approaches taken. Producing anything similar to that of a census of a society’s stock of social capital could be described as practically and logistically impossible because it would rely on the multiplication of numbers that are nonexistent or subjectively estimated. Surveys on trust and civic engagement are the other source of data that has been widely used as a proxy for social capital.

Social capital exists in two methodological dimensions: one qualitative and one quantitative. The quantitative dimension is simply the number of social contacts that people within a society have. The more the social networks to which people have access, and the more extensive those social networks are, the more social capital a society has. Extensive and varied networks are an asset in almost all situations, and such social contacts need not be strong or deep on the personal level. As noted previously, there is also strength in organizations and societies distinguished by extensive weak ties. However, this quantitative dimension alone is inadequate for the analysis of social capital and its components. In addition to the sheer number of social contacts, we need to add the quality of those contacts. The reason for this is obvious: It cannot be an asset to know a lot of people whom you cannot trust or tolerate. Networks alone thus do not have value. Instead, the value of contacts and networks depends on the quality of relations—trust and tolerance—within these networks. The concept of social capital can be measured by a wide range of indicators. Most empirical researchers have made contributions with regard to three of the core elements or components of social capital, namely, the number of voluntary organizations (networks) that individuals are actively engaged in, tolerance, and trust.

Networks

Two approaches have been used to measure social networks, the most common of which has been a structural analysis whereby the focus rests on formal associational membership as opposed to informal social ties. Most empirical research has relied on data from longitudinal surveys tracking the trends in associational membership; however, these are often limited to a small number of sectors, such as religious organizations (church, etc.) and labor unions. Subsequently, the official records of membership in voluntary organizations such as sports and social clubs and humanitarian societies have been the focus of most historical institutional studies.

The importance of associational membership, for some authors, rests with its capacity to act as a
proxy indicator for both the structural features and the cultural norms of social capital—that is, social networks as well as trust and cooperation. Macrolevel trends, or trends at the societal level, are often investigated among a number of voluntary organizations such as sports or recreation clubs, arts and cultural societies, and professional associations; however, the challenge has been to measure the extent to which associational membership in these organizations is able to generate and facilitate tolerance, reciprocal cooperation, and social trust, which are the components of social capital.

Although earlier works regarded formal associational membership as proxy indicators of social networks, the significance and value of informal social ties as a means to generate and facilitate the norms of reciprocity, mutual trust, and tolerance, as opposed to card-carrying membership, are widely recognized and gaining momentum. In other words, although formal associational membership is regarded as a strong indicator of societal networking, it is only one such indicator and not necessarily the most important.

**Tolerance**

Tolerance is consistently related to perceptions of threat and one’s willingness to put up with others who are perceived as the least liked. To tolerate is to allow something from which one recoils, which one considers unacceptable and would prefer not to identify with, and is a disposition directed at an object of aversion or dislike. Tolerance entails the forbearance to admit, to accommodate, to put up with, and to overcome the hostility generated by dislike. Intolerance emerges when revulsion finds expression in prejudice and hostility.

In a democracy, tolerance requires one to accept that one’s political opponents, even one’s enemies, have the right to participate in a contest for power under the principled assumption that they might win the contest and assume power, albeit limited and constrained by the rule of law. Within a multicultural context, it is to accept as fellow and equal citizens those people who hold cultural beliefs and practices rooted in values that may be unfamiliar, and even incompatible with, and offensive to one’s own cultural beliefs. Such allowance may take the form of negative tolerance, which amounts to forbearance by way of ignoring, avoiding, and disengaging with the object of tolerance. In this case, tolerance entails having to grit your teeth and to “grin and bear it.” Positive tolerance, by contrast, is based on the principled assumption of being able “to agree to disagree,” which allows opponents to engage with rather than shun one another.

Tolerance is considered an essential requisite for democracy as it is required for the effective functioning of the competitive processes of representative democracy, as well as the effective maintenance and deepening of a doctrine and practice of human rights. Representation is achieved through elections by organized political parties, who compete for the popular vote. Competition occurs as parties present different campaign promises to the voters and vie for the voters’ preference by showing their policy positions to be superior to those of others. This is a process of comparative evaluation that can be stressful, as personalities and the personal virtues and weaknesses of candidates become easily enmeshed with ostensibly dispassionate policy differences.

Policy differences themselves can also become matters of intense contestation when high interest-based stakes are involved in the election outcomes. Tolerance is needed in such intense contests, as the liberal model of democracy prescribes that all such actions be conducted within the boundaries of law and the rule of law. Opponents are to be defeated at the ballot box, not eliminated from the political arena. Winners must bear with losers, and both need to be prepared to face up to one another again and again in subsequent contests. And the arena of contestation itself, with its constraining laws, has to be maintained.

The functioning of human rights doctrines also requires tolerance from citizens. Rights, as special claims against the state or other civic bodies or other citizens, function alongside one another, and unless a clear hierarchy of rights is established, such rights hold equal claims against one another. The advancement of any right by a citizen then becomes contingent on its not being infringed on by the claims advanced by other rights holders. Constant litigation becomes one way of dealing with rival claims, but for the effective functioning of society on a regular basis, tolerance becomes essential as an operating norm.
**Trust**

Trust in any person emerges from a prior conviction that that particular person holds no malevolent intentions toward one and is not intent on willful exploitation of or doing harm or damage to oneself. Trust is a disposition toward others that follows from their reputation for reliability, honesty, and integrity. A person is trusted by others to the extent that these others have confidence in the commitments made by the said person—that is, when predicted, expected, and promised outcomes do in fact materialize accordingly. Such trust can be directed or dispersed. If dispersed, it is referred to as generalized trust and is indicative of an individual's overall worldview of other people. If directed, trust is a disposition that addresses clearly demarcated categories of people.

Democracy requires both political trust and interpersonal trust. Political trust is directed at institutions of power. In a liberal democracy these are, in the first instance, the institutions of political representation, which elected representatives occupy after having contested free and fair elections. In electoral contests, promises are made thick and fast, and trusting voters cast their ballots on the expectation that such promises will be kept and duly executed by the newly elected rulers. But liberalism limits the kinds of promises politicians can offer to the electorate. For example, human rights doctrines proscribe promises to exterminate one's opponents after the election or even to limit their human rights. On the contrary, an inbuilt, implicit promise of each and every politician has to be that the rule of law, the doctrine and practice of liberal rights, and the procedural as well as substantive commitments entailed therein are going to be upheld. Without a certain threshold level of trust in politicians that such system maintenance will take place, the legitimacy of the entire liberal democratic regime is open to question.

Interpersonal trust is also of vital importance to the maintenance of democratic regimes. As is the case with political trust, interpersonal trust entails the confidence that certain expectations about the behavior of others will actually materialize. In interpersonal relations such a reputation for reliability is usually vested in the knowledge that people have of one another and of the personal traits that are attributed to others on the basis of such knowledge or are explicitly or implicitly derived from it. It is, therefore, not a generalized but a directed form of trust. People who know one another personally and meet on a daily basis have the best opportunity to gain the knowledge necessary for establishing trustworthiness.

Family, friends, and community relations form this inner core of interpersonal relations, from which reputations for reliability can be established and from which so-called thick trust can be established. Slightly less intimate relations in the form of shared values and cultural practices (such as religion) as well as presumed kinship relations that together form the basis of ethnic identities provide another source of knowledge for thick trust. Thin trust, by contrast, is established between strangers and may even be typified by the very absence of overt socially shared denominators such as language, religion, or heritage. Such trust is established on the basis of ongoing joint engagement in projects and/or more formally shared identities, such as corporate membership or, at the national level, citizenship. Both these kinds of trust are required for the maintenance of a liberal society. Thick trust cements families and households, the core social units from which overall social cohesion is constructed and the primary units of general and political socialization. Thin trust is needed to bridge larger social divisions in society and is required for very large projects of collaborative endeavor such as socioeconomic development, which typify modernizing societies.

Both kinds of interpersonal trust, as well as political trust, are ultimately established under conditions of imperfect information, albeit at varying levels, and require an element of risk taking. The trusting person is always vulnerable to exploitation. The classic liberal conviction argues that such risk taking is warranted because of the presumed reasonableness of people and of their ability to sense that they can pursue their own interests in collaboration with others rather than in perpetual opposition to them. And liberals assume reciprocity—that is, that other citizens will calculate likewise. One way of minimizing such risk in emergent liberal societies, and the attendant vulnerability of trusting citizens, has been to establish an extensive set of explicit rules within which to construct the liberal “open society.” The fundamental rules are those found in human rights charters, usually
embodied in a rigid formal constitution and backed up by an independent judiciary within a constitutional state to oversee its maintenance and implementation.

**Conclusion**

In essence, social capital is a multidisciplinary concept that has a growing influence over ideas in health science, urban studies, regional studies, social policy, criminology, business studies, and social and economic geography and history. It is a concept that has captured the imagination of policymakers and professionals in many fields and has influenced research and theory right across the social sciences.

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**See also** Civil Society; Networks; Social Cohesion; Tolerance; Trust, Social; World Bank

**Further Readings**


**Social Choice Theory**

The theory of social choice aims to explain collective outcomes as derived from individual decisions and institutional rules. The founding contributions in the 1950s and 1960s eroded a previously unquestioned confidence in the capability of certain common aggregative procedures, including majority rule, to guarantee consistent social choices satisfying individuals’ preferences. According to several “impossibility” theorems, no decision procedure can guarantee social choices fulfilling some apparently simple requirements of fairness, but all of them are vulnerable to strategic manipulation and may produce arbitrary or unstable results. This entry discusses the history, problems, and current applications of social choice theory.

The problem of aggregation of individual preferences into a social welfare function or a collective decision by voting led to revisions of certain traditional utilitarian assumptions in welfare economics and democratic theory. The study of institutions, decisions, and voting rules became of paramount interest to explain inefficiencies and undesirable collective results. In more recent developments, social choice theorists have also contributed to distributive justice theory by approaching classical topics such as auctions, negotiations, fair division, and other resource allocation procedures. The explanation of unsatisfactory social choices provides room for normative concerns of better institutional and mechanism design.

In a foundational theorem, Kenneth Arrow proposes a set of normative conditions to make a social choice acceptable. They include, for individual preferences, (a) transitivity or internal consistency (if somebody prefers A to B and B to C, he must prefer A to C) and (b) universal domain, or admission of all preferences without previous restrictions. For social choices, his conditions are (a) monotonicity, or the requirement of a consistent relation between individuals’ preferences and the social choice (which contains the Pareto criterion favoring unanimous decisions); (b) independence of the social choice from individual preferences regarding irrelevant alternatives that cannot win; and (c) “no dictatorship,” or the nonexistence of an automatically decisive actor. According to Arrow’s
theorem, no decision rule can fulfill all these conditions all the time.

A typical example of inconsistency and instability is the so-called Condorcet cycle. Assume that three voters, A, B, and C, have different preferences over three alternatives, X, Y, and Z, as shown in these profiles:

A: X > Y > Z
B: Y > Z > X
C: Z > X > Y,

where “>” means “is preferred to.”

If we apply majority rule to comparisons of the three alternatives by pairs, we find that X is socially preferred by majority to Y (because a majority formed by A and C prefers X to Y), Y is preferred to Z (because A and B prefer Y to Z), and Z is preferred to X (because B and C prefer Z to X). Thus, we have a cycle of successive social choices: X > Y > Z > X. Even if the individual preferences are complete and transitive, the social choice by majority rule is not transitive but is unpredictable—in practice, any choice would be arbitrary and potentially unstable.

However, this and other paradoxes do not mean that all social choices made by majority or any other rule are never fair or always arbitrary and, thus, vulnerable to instability. They mean that no decision rule can guarantee that, under any distribution of individuals’ preferences, the social choice will always fulfill a set of normative conditions. In particular, the distribution of preferences in the above example is prone to haphazard results because it implies that the alternatives are located on two “dimensions” (since some of the preferences are and some are not consistent with the alphabetical order). Generally, it is not the case that social choices are always unstable but that they can be unstable. In further developments, certain conditions regarding individuals’ preferences have been identified that guarantee consistent and stable social choices. Many exercises to test instability have used simulations in which an “impartial culture” or “random society” involving an equal probability of each conceivable individual order of preferences is assumed. This assumption, however, maximizes the probability of inconsistent and unstable social choices.

An alternative is to relax the founding theorems’ prescription that no restrictions should be imposed on individuals’ preferences (or “universal domain”). Specifically, a sufficient (although not necessary) condition for social choice stability is the single-peakedness of individual preference curves, which is formally equivalent to the condition that all individuals’ preferences can be ordered along a single linear dimension (e.g., the left–right axis). More in tune, it has been found that arbitrary and potentially unstable social choices are more likely the higher the dispersion of individuals’ preferences (the proportion of multipeaked individual curves or the number of issue dimensions) and the dispersion of alternatives (the number of alternatives and the distance between them).

These contributions suggest the advantages of relatively harmonious societies in producing consistent and stable social choices, even with potentially manipulable procedures. Yet the restriction of relevant preferences may also result from the decision process itself, ultimately depending on the institutional rules of the game.

**Institutional Rules**

A subsequent line of research promoted by social choice theory attempts to evaluate the relative performance of different institutional and decision rules in satisfying individuals’ preferences and producing acceptable social choices. The impossibility theorems tell us that it is impossible to guarantee fair and stable social choices with any rule. But certain rules tend to produce inconsistent choices more frequently than others. In a world of uncertainty, the likelihood of consistency and stability may be a useful guide to institutional evaluation and design.

With these lenses, some decision procedures based on the majority principle can be reviewed. The spatial theory of voting shows that if there are only two alternatives along a single issue or value dimension (e.g., the left–right axis), majority rule tends to make the alternative closer to the median voter’s preference the social choice. By definition, the median voter—that is, the voter whose preference is located in an intermediate position with less than half of the voters on each of the two sides—is always necessary to form a consistent majority on a single dimension. Since the median position has
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the property of minimizing the sum of the distances from all other positions, the winner by majority rule in a two-alternative contest can not only be stable but also minimizes aggregate distance from all individual preferences and thus maximizes social utility.

However, this model relies on two strong assumptions: only two alternatives and a single-dimensional issue space. If the set of alternatives submitted to majority decision is not bound, interested actors can manipulate the social choice by the introduction of new alternatives—such as a party or candidate’s platform that includes a “package” of proposals on several issues—or new issue or value dimensions. If there are more than two alternatives, even in a single-dimensional space, no alternative may obtain more than half the votes, thus making majority rule indecisive and unable to produce a social choice. In a multidimensional space, even with only two alternatives, the majority winner can be unpredictable, depending on which issue or value takes higher salience in voter choice; in the long term, there can be a series of successive winners relying on different salient issues and values, with no foreseeable “trajectory.”

Several procedures loosely related to the majority principle can then be adopted. With plurality or relative majority rule, the winner is the alternative that obtains a higher number of votes than any other alternative while not requiring a particular proportion of votes. It guarantees a winner (except for a tie), but it may imply minority support. For example, the winner by simple plurality rule among three alternatives may be the one most rejected by an absolute majority of voters having split their votes among the other two alternatives. From a social choice perspective, simple plurality is usually considered the least desirable decision rule.

The procedure of majority runoff requires an absolute majority of votes in the first round of voting, while in a second round the choice can be reduced to the two alternatives receiving the highest number of votes in the first round, so as to secure majority support for the winner. Majority-preferential or instant-runoff voting also requires an absolute majority of voters’ first preferences, while successive counts of further preferences are made to find an alternative with majority support. In contrast to what can happen with plurality rule, these procedures prevent the most rejected alternative from winning, since if it has not been eliminated at the first round, it will be defeated at the second round.

However, with both plurality and majority-runoff rules, the median voter’s preference can be defeated or eliminated in the first or successive rounds. This implies that the nonmedian winner by any of these procedures might be defeated by another alternative by absolute majority if the choice between the two were available. These procedures are, thus, dependent on irrelevant alternatives; they encourage strategies aimed at altering the number of alternatives, such as “divide and win” and “merge and win,” as well as nonsincere or strategic votes in favor of a less preferred but more likely to win alternative.

Additional voting procedures based on the majority principle were invented by several Christian philosophers and enlightened academics. The 13th-century Catalan philosopher Ramon Llull and the 18th-century French Marquis de Condorcet almost concurred in proposing variants of pairwise comparisons. By these procedures, an election requires multiple rounds of voting between all possible pairs of alternatives. In Llull’s version, the winner is the alternative having won the greatest number of pairwise comparisons, while in Condorcet’s version, an alternative is required to win all pairwise comparisons—that is, the majority winner is the alternative able to win by majority against every other alternative. When the alternatives are perceived by the voters as ordered along a single linear dimension, the Condorcet winner can be considered highly satisfactory for the electorate and can be used as a positive reference for comparison with the results obtained with other procedures. However, in multidimensional spaces, such an alternative may not exist, as shown with the example at the beginning of this entry.

Another sophisticated procedure, known as rank order count, was devised independently by both the 15th-century German Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa and the 18th-century French academic Jean-Charles de Borda. This procedure requires that the voter order all the alternatives and award them 1, 2, 3, and more points, ranking them from the least to the most preferred. The winner is the alternative that has collected the highest sum of
points. The “Borda winner” can also be considered highly satisfactory for the electorate and can be used as a normative reference. Yet this voting procedure can be manipulated because some voters can award lower points to rival alternatives than would actually correspond to their sincere preferences in order to prevent their victory. For this reason, Cusanus warned that electors should “act according to conscience,” and Borda remarked that his procedure was conceived “only for honest men.” Nevertheless, the likelihood of making a sincere loser a strategic winner is lower the higher the differences in votes and ranks between the two alternatives, as had already been shown by the Spanish mathematician Joseph Isidoro Morales in Seville in the late 18th century.

Approval voting has also remote origins in medieval times. It allows the voters to vote for those alternatives that they consider acceptable, from a minimum of one to a maximum of all minus one, and the alternative with a plurality of votes becomes the winner. Approval voting tends to produce broadly consensual social choices. Yet it is still vulnerable to strategic manipulation since voters with information regarding others’ preferences and whose preferred alternatives have wide support can concentrate their votes on one or a few alternatives and present their intermediate preferences as unacceptable.

Finally, according to classical utilitarian assumptions about cardinal utilities, as presented by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham in the early 19th century, range voting gives voters the opportunity to give different numbers of votes (or scores) to alternatives. As voters have both the incentive and the opportunity to provide detailed information about their preferences, this procedure may produce the most satisfactory outcome for the greatest number of voters. All in all, the aforementioned procedures tend to produce results that are more consistent with individuals’ preferences than plurality rule.

Certain formal findings in voting theory can also enlighten performances of institutional formulas implying different degrees of fusion or division of powers. According to spatial theory, the “single-package” social choice in a policy “space” formed by multiple issues and dimensions can be highly unpredictable, as mentioned. This may correspond to single-party parliamentary regimes, as well as presidential regimes with a president’s party majority in the assembly, where a single election may become decisive for all the multiple policy issues that may enter the government’s agenda. These institutional frameworks tend to produce relatively changing and unstable policies.

By contrast, in multiparty elections producing coalition cabinets, different issues, roughly corresponding to different portfolios, can be dealt with separately on single-issue spaces. Also, in regimes of separation of powers, each separate election for a different office can focus on one or a few issues and favor the consistency and stability of social choices. In these institutional frameworks, each issue can be the subject of a broad multiparty or interinstitutional agreement around the median voter’s position, which can preclude drastic changes and induce policy stability in the mid- or long term.

**A Model of Social Choice**

A simple geometrical model can illustrate the relevance of social choice models for the analysis of institutions and their performance. Let us use the simplest case of an electorate composed of three voters with different preferences (or three voters’ groups with the same preferences and a similar number of members). If the voters’ preferences can be located on a single-issue dimension, such as A, B, and C on the horizontal axis in Figure 1, the median voters’ preference, B, may win any election by majority rule against each of the other alternatives.
If, alternatively, there are two issue dimensions, the three voters, A, B, and C, can hold different preferences on Issue 1 \((a_1, b_1, \text{ and } c_1)\) and on Issue 2 \((a_2, b_2, \text{ and } c_2)\), as presented in Figure 2. Then different institutional formulas involving separate and joint elections can produce different social choices. Let us assume, first, that there are two separate elections for different offices, such as congress and presidency or two chambers in parliament, dealing with different sets of issues or issue dimensions. On each separate election, the intermediate alternative close to the median voter is advantaged and may win. In Figure 2, \(b_1\) wins in the election on Issue 1, and \(a_2\) wins in the election on Issue 2. The social choice is represented by the intersection point of the winning positions on each issue, \(b_1-a_2\). As can be seen, the social choice of separate elections on different issues under the above assumptions is a somewhat centrist point located inside the minimal set containing all voters’ preferences, or the Pareto set (the triangle ABC in the figure).

Now, let us assume, alternatively, that the social choice on all the issues is made in a single election, as would correspond to a simple institutional framework, such as a unicameral parliamentary regime by plurality rule. The institutional setting forces the voters to choose, not between alternatives on separate issues but between packages of alternatives on all the issues at the same time. The set of possible winners, or win set, in such a joint election depends on the status quo. Let us adopt the hypothesis that the status quo is the social choice previously produced by two separate elections, the point \(b_1-a_2\) in Figure 2. The set of possible winners in a single, two-dimensional election from this point is represented by the multipetal shaded area in the figure. This is formed by circular indifference curves around the voters’ preferences and crossing the status quo. It is assumed that every voter prefers the alternatives that are closer to the voter’s preference and in particular prefers those inside the indifference curve to those outside. Accordingly, the set of possible majority winners in a joint election is formed by all the points at which a majority of voters (any majority of two voters out of three in the example) is more satisfied than they would be in the status quo; that is, the win set is formed by the intersections of pairs of indifference curves.

![Figure 2: Joint and Separate Elections](image-url)
As can be seen, the set of possible winners in a joint election is relatively large, which makes the prediction of results difficult. A number of possible social choices are located outside the Pareto set and even beyond the rank of voters’ preferences (e.g., the set includes some points located beyond the extreme preference, \( b_2 \), on Issue 2). The possibility that many different alternatives can win may generate instability in a series of successive social choices, since any winning point can be further beaten by some other point in the corresponding win set. This analysis allows us to state that a joint election on a multidimensional set of issues, as a model for the typical single election in a simple regime, can be more uncertain and unstable over time than separate elections on different issues, such as elections for different offices in regimes with division of powers.

How to Choose

The analysis of the relative successes and pitfalls of different institutional rules has moved social choice theorists to study how institutions are chosen and how they ought to be chosen in order to favor fair and stable developments—or the problem of choosing how to choose. Game theoretical models have also been used for the analysis of strategic behavior in such a field. In consistency with the assumptions regarding human behavior within institutional constraints, it can be assumed that people may prefer, choose, and support those institutional formulas producing satisfactory results for themselves and reject those making them permanently excluded and defeated. As a consequence, institutions producing widely distributed satisfactory social choices should be better able to develop endogenous support and endure. In general, widely representative social choices should feed support for the corresponding institutions, while exclusionary, biased, or arbitrary outcomes might foster rejection of the institutions producing such results. These findings have led to the establishment of a positive relation between institutional pluralism, social efficiency, and democratic stability.

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See also Democracy, Theories of; Economic Theories of Politics; Electoral Systems; Fair Division; Institutional Theory; Voting Rules, Electoral, Effects of

Further Readings


Social Cleavages

See Cleavages, Social and Political

Social Cohesion

In the work of the founders of sociology, society was conceived of as an organism that needed to respond to the main challenge posed by modernity: How do societies marked by social differentiation and distinct social groups create mechanisms to live together? The concept of social cohesion features prominently in the work of its originator, Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), for example, and was later revisited, though not always under the
same name, in the functionalist tradition. However, Durkheim, in his major work on the subject (1893), used the notion of solidarity to describe ways in which social integration is achieved. Solidarity is a “force” that binds the different parts of a whole, creating bonds and relations of reciprocity between individuals.

Progressively, and more so in recent times, and far removed from the initial analytical use that Durkheim gave to the concept of solidarity, social cohesion has become increasingly intermingled with normative and policy-making purposes. Therefore, the current literature reflects two different visions of social cohesion. The first perspective is policy oriented and part of the political discourse; it strives to put in place a battery of objective indicators for assessing the degree of social cohesion observable in a society. The second, by contrast, a sociological perspective, interrogates the nature of social cohesion, focusing on social dynamics and the cultural and political mechanisms that bind society. The following presentation focuses on both visions.

The Policy-Making Concept of Social Cohesion

The concept of social cohesion adopted by the European Union (EU) is an excellent example of the first strategy. It is essentially a normative reference associated with operational criteria revolving around indicators (e.g., employment, health) that are selected by public debate, politicians, and technocrats. This predominant concept of social cohesion in the current international debate was developed in the 1990s by the EU as part of a political discourse imbued with an essentially normative-evocative meaning that seeks to define a desirable horizon for society. The concept of social cohesion is defined as the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding polarisation. A cohesive society is a mutually supportive community of free individuals pursuing these common goals by democratic means. (European Committee for Social Cohesion, 2004, p. 3)

The notion of social cohesion is believed to represent the central values of solidarity and equality that are the original features of the “European model.” It is contrasted sharply with the so-called Anglo-Saxon (English-speaking countries) model, which is regarded as steeped in more individualistic values and less concerned with distributive aspects or the state’s role as guarantor of the common good (European Commission, 2007).

According to Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Duncan Gallie, Anton Hemerijik, and John Myers (2002), explicitly underlying the EU’s concerns with social cohesion are the changes in its economy and demography in recent decades, particularly its inclusion in the globalization process and the subsequent impact on job creation/unemployment and distribution of wealth, and the resultant challenges to its welfare state. These changes provoke social tensions, which, in turn, jeopardize social cohesion. The EU concept of social cohesion has to do with an effort to maintain the (idealized) standard of the immediate past that it would like to preserve.

As the concept of social cohesion became increasingly central to the EU’s discourse, criteria and indicators were developed to measure it. Known as the Laeken indicators, they deal mainly with distributive variables (employment, income, access to public services). In this way, the notion of social cohesion, a normative framework, became operational and, therefore, a target for public policies intended to influence the indicators. In sum, the concept of social cohesion is associated with a specific political context that evokes what is regarded as a desirable state of affairs relative to the status quo ante.

This use of the concept of social cohesion has tended to be disseminated in recent years among international agencies. To do so, they have separated the concept from the concrete European context in which it originated, producing an abstract and ahistorical concept of social cohesion. For example, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social cohesion is “the dialectical [relationship] between instituted social inclusion and exclusion mechanisms and the responses, perceptions and attitudes of citizens towards the way these mechanisms operate” (2007, p. 18) and implies a previous theory and an empirical analysis of what is meant by “citizens” and “inclusion/exclusion mechanisms” in the Latin American context.
The included–excluded dichotomy produces a preconceived vision of society that fails to take into account the different and complex processes differentiating society that are far broader than a single cleavage. Of course, limited access to social services, income, and opportunities in the labor market is frequently the cornerstone in the construction of a sense of social exclusion. But concrete situations are mostly in the gray areas, and most citizens feel simultaneously included and excluded.

Analysis of social cohesion can neither be dissociated from the category of relative deprivation (e.g., the expectations and feelings of inclusion or exclusion of a recent migrant originally from a rural setting are not the same as those of a generation born and raised in the city), nor can it overlook the fact that feelings of exclusion, frustration, and social anomie may be even stronger among sectors with a better state of social well-being. In general, analyses of social cohesion guided by the included–excluded dichotomy tend to consider economic mechanisms (usually employment and social policy) as the main, or even the only, factor of integration, against which individual leanings are juxtaposed. This vision does not consider other social processes of solidarity formation that are extremely important to preserve social cohesion, such as religion or the mass media.

Societies whose cohesion revolves around egalitarian values can intensify feelings of exclusion among individuals and groups that would be considered acceptable in other contexts. In certain cases, greater economic inclusion can increase feelings of symbolic and political exclusion, and conversely, greater symbolic inclusion can intensify feelings of economic exclusion. In sum, the objective and subjective dimensions of inclusion/exclusion are complex and require theoretical and empirical analyses sensitive to the historical formation of values systems in each society.

The Analytical Concept of Social Cohesion

As social theory teaches us, all societies generate some form of cohesion. Otherwise, they would not exist. But the mechanisms for maintaining social cohesion vary according to the historical formation of each society. In complex societies, this is reflected in the existence of universes of beliefs and values shared, to varying degrees, by all members of society and by systems of authority rooted in consensual norms and coercive systems that ensure the functioning of the established order. Mechanisms of social disintegration are also many and varied. They may be the product of exclusion, anomic violence, or authoritarian ideologies. Social cohesion in modern times cannot be dissociated from social change and from social conflict. Modern societies are in constant mutation, which means that some forms of sociability are always disintegrating and giving way to new mechanisms for integration in which citizen participation and demands play a critical role.

If every society has, by definition, some form of social cohesion, then what is at stake from an analytical standpoint is the understanding of the mechanisms by which social cohesion is produced and absorbs the processes of change and social conflict, as well as the mechanisms through which these are expressed and resolved. This means expanding the horizon of analytical and normative social cohesion beyond (but inclusive of) public policy to encompass the functioning of political and cultural systems. Social cohesion has not only to do with the most adequate or effective public policies, but it also requires us to ask ourselves about the mechanisms for the symbolic and political mobilization of citizens, which are a prerequisite for the possibility (or impossibility) of public policies and state reforms.

In this view, the concept of social cohesion requires more sensitivity to, and the effective inclusion of, social, political, and cultural issues, an interdisciplinary dialogue that incorporates the required contributions of the various disciplines in the social sciences. This means bringing together economists, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and historians in an effort to discover the many nuances evoked by the concept of social cohesion (societies that value democracy and equity and transmit a sense of belonging and dignity to their citizens). Broadly speaking, cohesion is not so much a matter of developing a theory of social cohesion as of placing this concept at the service of a multidisciplinary examination of the social processes under way in contemporary societies.

The challenge, in particular, is to make sure that sociocultural dynamics are not overlooked in the reports of governmental and international agencies.
Social Democracy

One of the reasons for this absence is that when handled in an intellectually responsible manner, sociocultural dynamics require a sensitivity to, and acknowledgment of, the diversity of national values and histories in which values acquire specific symbolic meanings that are hard to quantify and generalize. This ultimately conspires against the analyses developed by international organizations whose vocation is to come up with generalizable and quantifiable solutions, sometimes at the expense of the complex webs and the particularities of national histories. This also means accepting social conflict as a legitimate and critical component of the construction/transformation of mechanisms for social cohesion in democratic societies.

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See also Cleavages, Social and Political; Conflicts; Political Culture; Political Socialization; Solidarity; Symbols, Political

Further Readings


Social Democracy

Social democracy (sometimes used synonymously with democratic socialism) refers to a political tendency resting on three fundamental features: (1) democracy (e.g., equal rights to vote and form parties), (2) an economy partly regulated by the state (e.g., through Keynesianism), and (3) a welfare state offering social support to those in need (e.g., equal rights to education, health service, employment, and pensions). Very often, socialist democratic parties are members of the “Socialist International,” an organization of social-democratic, socialist, and labor parties that pursues mutual cooperation. This entry discusses social democracy’s roots and its fundamental characteristics and modern development.

Origins

Inspired by the 19th-century German economist and sociologist Karl Marx (1818–1883), social democrats traditionally deemed total equality the final goal of efforts to remedy the plight of the working class. They regarded the capitalist economic system as the cause behind society’s ills. With close ties to the then budding labor movement, social-democratic political parties began, toward the end of the 19th century, to form and organize themselves. A key demand was public ownership of the means of production as a way to transform society into a socialist economic system, thus ending the exploitation of the working class by the bourgeoisie and creating true democracy. Very soon, different groups began to debate the means by which to reach the end. Could and should what was regarded as capitalism’s inner contradictions be passively allowed to develop, or
Social Democracy should the final collapse be speeded up by resorting to violent revolution? Others instead suggested “revisionist,” peaceful, and gradual reforms of the system launched through liberal democracy via political parties in parliament, including cooperation between social classes. Soon, the nature of the end itself became a bone of contention. Could and should the entire capitalist economic system really be thrown overboard? Or rather, were reforms of the economic system preferable, so as to sustain its ability to create wealth? Were not welfare state measures sufficient to alleviate the system’s perceived unfair wealth distribution effects? Led by the German socialist Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932), the revisionist camp evolved into the social-democratic movement. The other camp opted for more revolutionary, far-reaching solutions including “dictatorship by the proletariat,” culminating in the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the first communist state. Subsequently, most social-democratic parties began reorienting themselves from being solely the political branch of the working class to becoming “catchall” parties.

The issues of how extensive the transformation of society should be and by what means it should be achieved did not end with the social democrats’ break with the Communists. Applying the commonly used “left–right” ideological continuum to two analytical aspects, “public ownership” and “social policy,” many researchers would certainly place social democracy slightly left of center regarding public ownership and perhaps a little further to the left on social policy. However, consensus is less solid when “left” and “right” are to be defined. Normally, left would signify more public enterprises and more dirigiste state involvement in the economy, but the actual mix of socialist and capitalist policies differs considerably between parties and between different time periods. Actual ownership of the means of production has seldom formed a vital part of policies. As to the social policy dimension, the left would stand for a more extensive welfare state in terms of covering more people with more generous support at higher cost and with fewer if any market-emulating characteristics.

Postwar Developments and the “Third Way”
Social democracy evolved after World War II into a political ideology that focused on working inside the overall framework of a mixed-market economy while trying to protect and make life decent for all those who were economically the most vulnerable. Although often critical of aspects of the market economy, social democracy accepted its fundamentals. The exact policies were always a balancing act between “planning,” “steering,” and “control” on the one hand and “efficiency,” “profit,” and “competitiveness” on the other. Rather than putting the economy in the hands of politicians, most parties chose the welfare state as the primary step to “decommodifying” society, although few would argue for complete decommodification. The status of equality is a moot point. Originally, most social democrats defined equality as a situation in which most people enjoyed roughly the same standard of living. To attain this condition, redistribution from the haves to the have-nots would be necessary. Later, the meaning underwent a shift to signify equality of opportunity rather than of outcome, thus lessening the emphasis on redistribution through transferring resources from one group to another. Although the focus was no longer specifically on retribution, measures were advocated to ensure that no one fell below a decent or minimally acceptable standard of living.

Once there, the welfare state had to be protected. Generating fresh resources for the welfare state became imperative. The parties increasingly came to rely on the efficiency of the market economy to create those resources. Gradually, the idea of abolishing the market economy was pushed into the background. Indeed the mixed-market economy became core social-democratic ideology—with public policies, for example, through so-called Keynesian countercyclical policies and through active labor market policies and sometimes through corporatist solutions, to help the economy function even better than if left on its own.

However, occasionally, parts of social democracy have contemplated further steps toward a more socialist society. Yet any concrete plans about real planning institutions have only rarely emerged. A peak of ideological revival occurred from around 1970 to 1983, when some groups in some parties began questioning whether the welfare state alone would suffice to create the desired society. The ownership issue reemerged with force as an internal issue in many parties. Some—for example, certain groups in the British Labour
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advocated the return to older policies in which state nationalizations of major, if not all, businesses would take center stage. Others—for example, in the German and the Swedish Social Democratic Parties—suggested extended union influence over business decision making as the way forward. Perhaps the most innovative and controversial of the new policies were plans for “economic democracy” through so-called wage earner funds put forward by sections of the Swedish social democracy. In their original, blue-collar union draft proposals, the funds were designed to tax major parts of businesses in order to create funds that would soon be able to take economic control of private companies. However, the social-democratic leadership was far less enthusiastic about any takeover plans and considerably watered down the final version that was adopted in 1983. A number of nationwide funds were set up much like pension funds. A special business tax funneled off resources to the funds for buying shares on the regular—private—stock market with an overall ownership cap set at about 10%. When a nonsocialist government was formed in 1991, the funds were abolished and have not since reappeared in social-democratic policy making.

No doubt social democracy has been a very successful ideology. Some would even stress that after World War II many Western societies became more or less permeated by social-democratic ideas. Although support varies, social democracy has enjoyed remarkably stable parliamentary strength over the decades. This is a movement optimistic about the possibilities of modernizing society through technological advances and prepared to use an array of policies with which to improve people’s lives by correcting the market economy’s inequitable effects. However, in practice, several other political tendencies, such as Christian democracy and social liberalism, also propose far-reaching public sector measures including welfare states and other regulations designed to correct the adverse effects of an unregulated market economy. These parties strive to establish socially beneficial societies too. Still, even though similarities with Christian democracy and social liberalism are strong, many researchers would agree that social democracy is more ambitious in its quest to eradicate unfairness rather than just alleviating the effects of social injustices, although the differences may not always be easy to pinpoint.

Toward the turn of the millennium, many social-democratic parties began to feel concern about some perceived tendencies, all of which basically had to do with the financial burden of the welfare state. It was always evident that the expansion and even maintenance of welfare states would be expensive. Therefore, public incomes were of the essence. Taxes were essential not only as a means to narrowing down real-income gaps between the different strata in society but also as a means to create budget incomes. A growing tax base was deemed equally important to support public sector budgets. As the welfare states grew, further expansions would entail not only higher taxes but also heavier reliance on ever-growing economies. Even though many voters have accepted high taxes in countries where welfare state measures have been universally enjoyed, some resentment toward high marginal taxes was beginning to be felt during the 1980s and 1990s. Many parties began debating whether taxes had perhaps reached their ceiling. If so, welfare state programs would have to rely even more on a growing tax base and, thus, on an ever more efficient market economy. Whether real or not, the perceived effects of economic globalization and the ensuing constant structural changes at the same time caused many parties to reconsider how far the market economy could in fact be regulated without negative efficiency consequences. Simultaneously, mounting criticism of welfare state bureaucracy, planning inertia, and lack of citizenship choice led many parties to try new policies, including lower taxes, deregulation of financial markets, and various public–private combinations including elements of competition inside the public sector.

Soon, social democracy was criticized for being “neoliberal,” unacceptably diluting true social-democratic ideals, and finally closing the door to more genuine reforms of capitalism. Others fervently defended new policies as a “Third Way” between socialism and capitalism. It has been suggested that “equality” was replaced by “fairness,” “collective rights” by “individual rights,” “redistribution” by “individual chances,” and “the state as a provider” by “the state as enabler.” How drastic the changes have actually been is a recurring academic theme. No doubt a change of rhetoric has
taken place, but there is a case to be made for substantial policy continuity with the past. Aiding the market and enabling citizens to overcome changes were vital parts of the golden age (roughly 1945–1980) of social democracy. Socialism “today” was never on the agenda. Efficiency, full employment, and an element of equality took center stage. Sometimes policies such as these were described as corresponding to a “planned” society. However, they closely conformed to a mixed-market economy but—and this is the key to social democracy—where the economy is regarded as the means to a higher end, a decent society.

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See also Capitalism; Christian Democratic Parties; Communism; Economic Policy; Equality; Globalization; Ideology; Labor Movement; Liberalism; Market Economy; Marx, Karl; Neo-Corporatism; Neoliberalism; Revisionism; Revolution; Socialism; Solidarity; Tax Policy; Welfare State

Further Readings

**Social Dominance Orientation**

Social dominance orientation (SDO) is a concept developed in social dominance theory (SDT) to describe an individual-level value structure that prefers inequality and stratified categorization among social groups. Individuals with high SDO desire a society marked by stratification and are thus inclined to accept such social structures as warranted. They differentiate between groups on the basis of superiority and subordination, which, in political practice, often leads to attitudes and behavior that entail discrimination and segregation.

Insight into the existence of SDO emerged from growing interest in the group-based aspects of human life. SDT, of which orientation forms an integral and crucial part, was first developed by Felicia Pratto and Jim Sidanius in the early 1990s and since then has been frequently used in psychology and social psychology research, mostly in journals focusing on personality or experimental psychology. As issues of multiculturalism, integration, and assimilation due to increasing migration and societal diversity have risen on the political science agenda, the SDO concept has begun to make its way into parts of the discipline. This entry defines SDO in greater detail, including how it is measured and what is known of its distributional pattern. The important matter of how SDO relates to authoritarianism will also be touched on. Finally, some political and practical implications of SDO are introduced.

SDO is defined as a personality trait that predicts certain attitudes, a basic structure that in turn translates into several more concrete perceptions. In research into values and culture, “orientation” refers to basic cognitive structures and beliefs, of which we as individuals possess relatively few. Orientations tend to be stable, formed in a process of early-childhood, adolescent, and young-adulthood socialization and experience. Attitudes, in contrast, are more numerous and malleable and emanate from orientations. Individuals with SDO are characterized by strong perceptions of their own ingroups as hierarchically and justifiably superior to other groups, most prominently so in relation to immigrants, people of other ethnicities, and the opposite sex. SDO has a number of attitudinal consequences, all of them favoring hierarchy over equality. Concrete expressions of SDO include ethnic prejudice, nationalism, cultural elitism, sexism, and a belief in meritocracy (i.e., people with superior competence or skill should occupy favored positions in society). SDO has been claimed to be a personality variable on par with what are known in personality psychology as the “Big Five” traits: extraversion, agreeableness, openness, neuroticism, and conscientiousness.

The SDO concept has developed in the interface between personality and social psychology, and experimental studies have demonstrated that it can successfully predict prejudice. Through measuring SDO, one can differentiate individuals based on
their level of SDO inclination. The South African nationalists, who introduced apartheid and openly defended it with arguments of hierarchy and superiority, exemplify SDO. Anti-Black racism in the United States is yet another well-known example of the orientation, as is India’s caste system, as it is a social order based on human hierarchy.

Authoritarianism has been related to socializing experiences in childhood—for example, dominating parents—which in adulthood are translated into an individual desire to dominate others. SDO is not believed to originate from formative experiences but from a combination of socialization and personal temperament.

SDO is measured using a scale developed by Felicia Pratto, Jim Sidanius, Lisa Stallworth, and Bertram Malle (1994). The various items constituting the scale all concern perceptions of hierarchy (e.g., “Some people are just more worthy than others” or “It is not a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others”) as opposed to equality (e.g., “If people were treated more equally, we would have fewer problems in this country”). The original seven-step scale runs from “very negative” to “very positive.”

**SDO and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)**

SDO is often studied and analyzed in relation to another neighboring, yet different, individual value structure, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Both SDO and RWA predict prejudiced action that is discriminatory and could be perceived as intolerant, for example, supporting the persecution of immigrants and other “outgroups.” However, the RWA scale, which grew out of the research of Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford (1950) into the authoritarian personality (measured using a scale originally developed by Robert Altemeyer), is driven by conformity bias (as opposed to autonomy), submissiveness to authority figures, ethnocentrism, and aggressiveness toward outgroups. SDO, in contrast, is motivated by concern for social hierarchy between groups (as opposed to egalitarianism). RWA has been demonstrated to be preoccupied with relationships between the individual and the group (i.e., intragroup relationships), whereas SDO is concerned mostly with relationships between groups (i.e., intergroup relationships). Individuals guided by RWA support assimilationist practices for immigrants and marginal groups, which lessens these outgroups’ potential to introduce change. For people with high SDO, assimilationist practices are instead viewed as threatening, because they conflict with and even blur social boundaries. There is a distinct difference between the more individual-oriented RWA and SDO, which focuses on the collective, group level. SDO and RWA are thus complementary but only partly overlapping in predicting prejudice. RWA is related to uncertainty reduction in various respects: High-RWA people tend to be religious and to desire order, structure, security, and tradition—desires that generally do not characterize those with high SDO. It has been argued that SDO represents a more modern kind of prejudice than the conformist and traditionalist RWA. Differentiating between SDO and RWA, as done, for example, by Sam McFarland and Robert Altemeyer, has advanced and fine-tuned our understanding of individual preference and value structures. Because of their similarity at an aggregate behavioral level, as evident, for example, in anti-immigration rhetoric and prejudiced perceptions of groups such as Jews, homosexuals, African Americans, and women, it is easy to miss their different bases of such sentiments and policy preferences.

**Gender and SDO**

SDO is claimed to have evolutionary roots. Most research has found systematic variation between the sexes in the level of SDO and that men, almost regardless of cultural context, have higher SDO than women. A few studies of homosexual men have concluded that they have lower SDO than heterosexual men or women. Although absolute levels of SDO vary among cultural settings, due to differences in distributional policy and economic system between, for example, the United States, India, Sweden, or Ukraine, men always have relatively higher SDO than do women. In SDT, this is called the “invariance” hypothesis, explained by the different reproductive patterns of the sexes, which leads women to be more selective in choosing mating partners to ensure reproductive success (defined as raising a sexually mature second generation). Consequently, females choose higher
status men, making men competitively involved in a status struggle for the more selective women, a struggle, a desire, and even a need to dominate other men and groups of men that could threaten their access to fertile women. As a behavioral consequence of their higher SDO, in professional contexts, men are more often found in hierarchical social milieux, such as the military, and politically are more inclined to support intolerant political parties. The cross-cultural similarities in SDO distribution between the sexes have thus been explained by biological predispositions in mating selection. This gender bias in SDO allows an analysis in which worldwide male dominance in society as well as in politics and economics could have some evolutionary explanations.

A second major hypothesis in SDT is called the “interaction” hypothesis, predicting that among “arbitrary set” groups (e.g., class and ethnicity), SDO levels will vary between the groups depending on the hierarchical structure of a society. In low-hierarchy cultures, the level of SDO will be more similar throughout a range of groups, while the differences will be much greater in highly hierarchical societies. Evidence has been found to support both the interaction and the invariance hypotheses.

**Implications**

Research has identified important behavioral implications of SDO. These concern the roles of both the private person, who may be highly prejudiced and aggressive toward outgroups, and the citizen, who may vote for anti-immigration, xenophobic, and intolerant parties. Individuals with high SDO are inclined to move into jobs and institutions that maintain or increase social hierarchy, and they prefer policies that support social separation rather than integration or assimilation.

Are there ways to modify SDO at the aggregate or individual level? Knowing that societies with more equal relationships display more similar levels of SDO between high- and low-status groups, we could single out redistributive welfare policies as one such way. Since SDO is focused on group relationships, relaxing group rhetoric and sentiment and instead emphasizing individual aspects has been proven in experimental research to have some beneficial effects. Similarly, empathizing with members of the outgroup could reduce high levels of SDO too.

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See also Attitudes, Political; Discrimination; Ethnicity; Groupthink; Multiculturalism; Racism; Values

**Further Readings**


**Social Exclusion**

Distinct from, and typically broader than, the traditional concept of poverty, social exclusion is a contested, broad concept that can take very different meanings from one policy setting to another. A central aspect of most definitions of social exclusion available in the literature is the lack of adequate work opportunities, which can lead to unemployment or underemployment. But reducing social exclusion to employment-related issues would be a mistake, as the concept refers to issues
ranging from gender and ethnic discrimination to housing problems and limited access to health and social care, among other things. Another central aspect of social exclusion is its complexity. According to Hilary Silver and S. M. Miller (2003), for example, social exclusion appears as

1. **multi-dimensional** [italics added] ( . . . );
2. **dynamic**, [italics added] denoting a process, movement or trajectory from full integration to a condition of multiple exclusions;
3. **relational**, [italics added] in that exclusion entails social distance or isolation, rejection, humiliation, lack of social support networks and denial of participation;
4. **active**, [italics added] in that people and processes do the excluding; and
5. **relative** [italics added] to context. (p. 8)

Although analytical remarks such as this have done much to clarify the meaning of this concept, social exclusion remains contested, and some social policy scholars reject it altogether, claiming that it is overly vague or, even worse, misleading. Consequently, there is no consensus in the social science literature about the analytical usefulness of this concept. This entry elaborates the history and meaning of this concept and examines its role as a central idea in contemporary social policy.

**History and Meaning of the Concept**

The French writer Jean Klanfer published a book *L’Exclusion Sociale: Étude de la Marginalité dans les Sociétés Occidentales* [Social Exclusion: The Study of Marginality in Western Societies] in 1965 that defined social exclusion in terms of irresponsible behavior and economic marginalization. In the mid-1970s, another French writer, René Lenoir, helped popularize the concept of social exclusion in his country. According to him, social exclusion was the product of factors such as poverty and disability, which prevented some citizens from fully participating in the French economy and society. However, in France, it is only during the 1980s and early 1990s that social exclusion became a major policy idea. A number of issues contributed to this situation. First, long-term unemployment became a permanent feature of the French economic landscape. Second, the debate on immigration and the status of ethnic minorities increased interest in the concept of social exclusion, which can refer to the negative effects of racism and discrimination. From a political standpoint, however, social exclusion became a major term in French public discourse partly because centrist politicians referred to it to reinforce their reputation as compassionate actors who care about the fate of the nation’s less privileged citizens. In general, fighting social exclusion is a source of legitimacy for the state and for political actors who seek to fight what is widely perceived as a social evil.

Beyond France, the concept of social exclusion has become a key policy idea, even if the emergence of this concept at the forefront of international policy debates is relatively recent, as it was only during the 1990s and 2000s that it became a permanent feature of international debates about social inequality and the future of the welfare state.

Since the 1990s, the concept of social exclusion has become increasingly popular across Europe. For instance, in the United Kingdom (UK), after taking office in 1997, New Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair depicted himself as a crusader against social exclusion. A major symbol of this emphasis on social exclusion was the creation of a state unit devoted to this issue in late 1997. As in France, although a powerful rhetoric surrounded social exclusion, critics noted that the resources allocated to fight this set of social ills remained quite modest in scope. From a political standpoint, the rhetoric about social exclusion helped the Blair government reinforce its social policy credentials at the same time as it was pursuing a broad liberal economic agenda. Importantly, however, significant resources have been allocated to the struggle against social exclusion, which has become a legitimate public policy concept, both in government and in academia. In comparative terms, the political discourse around social exclusion in the UK was based more on moral and behavioral issues than in France; however, in both cases, social exclusion has become an enduring aspect of policy debates in a way that makes it difficult to reduce it to a short-term political fad.

Beyond France and the UK, social exclusion has become increasingly influential in many other European countries, largely through the platforms and initiatives of the European Union (EU), which
has explicitly embraced this concept as part of an attempt to increase its policy legitimacy. Although the EU discourse about social exclusion can be traced back to the late 1980s and 1990s, the concept only emerged as a central EU policy concept in 2000, as the main legacy of the European Council conference held in Lisbon. At that meeting, member states agreed to transform the fight against poverty and social exclusion into a core aspect of the EU’s employment and social policy strategy. Articulated around the idea of a “European social model,” the EU approach to social exclusion is based on the “open method of coordination,” which is based on the interaction between EU-defined goals and national policy initiatives. Substantively, the EU stressed the central role of employment policy in the struggle against social exclusion. From this perspective, social exclusion is closely related to the quest for activation and the European Employment Strategy. As stated in a European Commission document titled *Fight Against Poverty and Social Exclusion* (2000), “Employment is the best safeguard against social exclusion. In order to promote quality employment it is necessary to develop employability, in particular through policies that promote the acquisition of skills and life-long learning” (p. 3). Additionally, income maintenance programs such as social assistance schemes and pension programs are depicted as major tools in the fight against social exclusion.

**A Central Idea in Contemporary Social Policy in Europe and Beyond**

Since 2000, social exclusion has remained a prominent aspect of EU policy debates. According to Even Nilssen, the popularity of this concept within the EU is related to the fact that it has been defined mainly in economic rather than in moral terms. By focusing mainly on employment and economic issues, the EU has largely reduced social policy to labor market regulation. From this perspective, the EU push to transform social exclusion into a major policy issue reinforces its economic focus while creating the sense that the “social question” has become a political priority, which may not effectively be the case. Overall, although social exclusion has become a major component of EU discourse and policy guidelines since 2000, there is no consensus about the true impact and the long-term policy consequences of the various EU initiatives launched in the name of the struggle against social exclusion.

Outside Europe, since the 1990s, the concept of social exclusion has been increasingly debated in other parts of the advanced industrial world. This is the case in countries such as Australia and Canada, for instance. Although social exclusion is perhaps not as central a policy concept in these two countries as it has become in Europe, it is now part of mainstream international policy debates. Considering this remark, one country within the advanced industrial world where social exclusion remains a relatively marginal policy idea is the United States. As critics have pointed out, this is puzzling considering the comparatively high levels of poverty and social inequality in U.S. society. Clearly, the phenomena that are described as social exclusion in Europe and other parts of the world are widespread in the United States; however, terms such as *inequality* and *poverty* remain largely used due to the fact that social exclusion and ways to deal with it are explicitly associated with social policy and redistribution in some sense. Thus, in the United States, the concept of social exclusion is best known among students of comparative social policy and largely remains a terminology for academic discourse. A more likely explanation for the absence of a widespread social exclusion discourse in the United States is the fact that, in contrast to the situation prevailing in the EU and in other parts of the world, prominent U.S. political actors have rarely embraced this concept as part of a broader electoral and/or policy strategy. Only time will tell if this concept has a political future in the United States.

Finally, the concept of social exclusion as formulated in Europe and other parts of the advanced industrial world is known and debated in developing societies. Yet, as Ruhi Saith notes, the concept of social exclusion cannot be transposed from the wealthiest to the poorest regions of the planet without substantial analytical adjustments being made. For instance, because the concept was first adopted in a European society characterized by a formal labor market and large welfare state programs, it takes a different meaning when used in the context of much poorer countries, where the informal sector can be larger than the formal one and where
Social Movements

public social programs do not adequately cover very large segments of the population. This situation has led scholars, policy experts, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to adapt this concept to the realities of the developing world. Thus, in the developing world, concerns over social exclusion have taken the form of poverty reduction programs sponsored mainly by international financial institutions and designed to address the negative social impacts of previous macroeconomic adjustments as well as to provide some basic protection for the most vulnerable members of society.

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See also Cleavages: Social and Political; Discrimination; Gender; Immigration Policy; Inequality, Economic; Racism; Social Cohesion; Solidarity; Welfare Policies; Welfare State

Further Readings


Social Identity

See Identity, Social and Political

Social Movements

In a comprehensive sense, the concept of social movement refers to (a) mostly informal networks of interaction, based on (b) shared beliefs and solidarity, mobilized around (c) contentious themes, through (d) the frequent use of various forms of protest. This entry begins with a discussion of the elements of this definition. Next, specific forms of (nonconventional) participation, mobilization, and organization of social movements are identified. Their impact in recent decades on political systems, democratization, public policies, and even the international sphere is then highlighted. Finally, the consequences for normative political theory and deliberative or direct forms of democracy are discussed.

Social movements are constituted by networks of informal relations between a plurality of individuals and groups, which are more or less structured from an organizational point of view. While political parties and pressure groups have relatively well-defined organizational boundaries, such as card-carrying members of specific organizations, social movements are composed of scattered and weakly connected networks of individuals who feel they are part of a collective effort. While organizations that refer to movements exist, movements are not organizations but rather networks of relations between diverse actors that often also include organizations with formal structures.

These networks of relations are considered as constituting a social movement when their members
share a system of beliefs that nourish solidarity and collective awareness. In fact, one characteristic of movements is the elaboration of alternative world visions and value systems that differ from those dominating at that time. For this reason, movements have been considered as protagonists of social change.

These emerging values form the basis of the definition of conflicts around which actors mobilize. In particular, from the 1970s onward, new social movements were defined as actors in new conflicts. While Marxist analyses traditionally posited the centrality of capital–labor conflicts, the transformations that followed World War II stressed the relevance of social criteria—such as gender or generation—that were not based on class position. Scholars of the new movements, such as the French sociologist Alain Touraine, agree in highlighting the declining relevance of the conflict between capital and labor. As Alberto Melucci has observed, in complex societies, which require increasing integration and extend their control even over the motivations for action, new social movements (e.g., ecological, feminist) try to oppose the penetration of the state and the market into social life, reclaiming individual identity and the right to shield one’s private and romantic life from the omniscient manipulation of the system.

Finally, social movements are characterized by their adoption of “unusual” forms of political behavior. Many scholars pinpoint the fundamental distinction between movements and other political actors in the use by the former of protest as a form of exerting political pressure. Protest is defined as a nonconventional form of action that interrupts daily routine. Protestors generally address their actions to public opinion over elected representatives or public bureaucracies. In fact, movements are characterized by their fundamental critique of representative democracy, and they challenge institutional assumptions about conventional ways of doing politics in the name of participative democracy.

Over the past few years, the analysis of social movements has been approached through the concept of contentious politics, defined as episodic, public, collective interaction among claims makers and their targets (when at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claim and the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants). Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly developed a broad research project that addressed the similar mechanisms at play in social movements, revolutions, democratization processes, and ethnic conflicts. Advocating a dynamic use of concepts, the scholars involved in this project have tried to single out general mechanisms of contention. Although social movement studies first developed in the field of sociology, they have also contributed, as will be discussed below, to the main disciplinary subfields of political science.

Nonconventional Participation

The first pieces of research on social movements in the field of political science were carried out within the solid research tradition on political participation. While this field of research was initially focused on conventional forms of participation, underlining the unequal participation of various social groups, from the 1970s onward, scholars began to observe a rapid growth of new, nonconventional forms of political participation, such as petitions, sit-ins, boycotts, the occupation of buildings, and the blocking of traffic. This led them to investigate the different styles of participation of different social groups, generations, or nations and the conditions that would provoke the development of new forms of participation.

In an important piece of comparative research carried out in the 1970s on different Western democracies, Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase observed that, with respect to laws and decisions seen as unjust or illegitimate, ever-wider groups of citizens are ready to resort to forms of action characterized by their nonconventionality. Yet we cannot speak of a real split between those who use “orthodox” participatory tactics and those who use so-called direct-action tactics. In fact, conventional participation is often accompanied by nonconventional participation, indicating that those interested in politics and competent in the field tend to use a range of the various available instruments for exerting pressure on governments. If there are individuals who prefer one or the other type of strategy, there are nonetheless many who combine the two types. The conclusion is that the increase in nonconventional participation is not an indicator of the decline of the legitimacy of liberal democracies, where, on the contrary, a growth in
political competence has been observed, in particular among young people. It is instead an expression of a lasting enlargement of the strategies available to citizens.

Later pieces of comparative research (among them work by Russell Dalton and Pippa Norris) have revealed that while levels of traditional types of political participation have remained stable or (in some forms) declined in the 1990s and the new millennium, levels of noninstitutional participation have increased enormously. This growth concerned all of the countries analyzed, and inside the single countries the differences in levels of participation linked to gender, age, and educational level had lessened, leading some to speak of a “participatory revolution.”

Research on social movements has made a particularly rich contribution to the analysis of political participation in work on repertoires of protest. Charles Tilly has defined a modern repertoire of collective action as formed by the set of means a group has at its disposal for making collective claims. Tilly has, in particular, identified the differences in the types of contentious action in particular historical periods. Protest was certainly not unheard of prior to the formation of the nation-state: Peasants burned down mills in protest against increases in the price of bread; subjects dressed up to mock their superiors; and funerals could be turned into occasions for denouncing injustices. The tactics adopted by protestors varied from the use of irreverent symbols and music (as in the custom of charivari or shivaree) to field invasions and grain seizures. However, they all were parochial in scope, addressing local actors or the local representatives of national actors; moreover, they relied on patronage, appealing to local power holders to convey grievances or settle disputes. In the 19th century, however, forms of collective action began to change, as the old parochial and patronage-dependent repertoire was replaced by one that was national and autonomous, involving actions such as strikes, electoral rallies, public meetings, petitions, marches, insurrections, and the invasion of legislative bodies. This transformation in the form of protest was the result of the creation of the nation-state, the development of capitalism, and the emergence of modern means of communication. The new repertoire, therefore, responded to a new situation in which politics was increasingly national in character, the role of communities diminished, and organized associations spread, particularly among the working class.

Resource Mobilization and Organizational Approaches

Another significant contribution from scholars of social movements is found in organizational theory, from research on organizational populations to the most recent neo-institutionalist approaches. In particular, placing itself within the open-system approach (which maintained the relevance of interactions between organizations and their environments), research on social movement organizations, carried out by scholars such as Mayer Zald and John McCarthy, has underlined the role of organizational entrepreneurs in the mobilization of resources in the organizational fields of single groups.

Until the 1960s, studies on social movements were dominated by a functionalist approach that interpreted them as reactions to systemic malfunctions, thereby reducing them to purely reactionary, pathological phenomena. Criticizing this representation, throughout the 1970s, the resource mobilization approach considered social movements as a normal part of the political process, focusing analyses on the mobilization of those resources necessary to collective action. According to the resource mobilization approach, social movements act in a rational, prognostic, and organized manner. Protest actions derive from a calculation of costs and benefits, influenced by the presence not only of conflicts but also of the resources that are required to be mobilized around those conflicts. In a historical situation in which unease, contrasts, conflicts of interests, and ideological clashes appear ever present, the rise of collective action cannot be explained on the basis of these elements alone, begging the study of the conditions that permit the transformation of discontent into action. The type and extent of available resources explain the tactical choices of movements and the consequences of collective action for the social and political system.

In this sense, the mobilization capacities of groups vary enormously, and this reinforces the inequalities present in society. As far as the so-called weak interests—of those poor in resources—are concerned, their organization often depends on
the mobilization of influential patrons and/or strong organizational structures. Organization, aided by solidarity links, can therefore compensate for the absence of material resources.

Unlike the “mass society” theories, which had presented some forms of political aggregation as effects of the uprooting of individuals from primary groups and of the social disaggregation stemming from modernization, the resource mobilization approach instead explains mobilization through both the moral gratification intrinsic to the pursuit of a collective good and the existence of horizontal (i.e., internal to the collective) and vertical (i.e., between different collectives) solidarity links. The density of relations between people who share some cultural characteristics tends to facilitate the construction of solidarity. Social movement activists are in fact well integrated within various types of social networks, both formal and informal. It is above all due to these links that the potential activist develops a particular vision of the world and acquires the information and skills necessary for collective action. Given that social environments (and groups) are differentiated on the basis of the density of the networks that characterize them, this gives rise to different capacities for participation. Charles Tilly has argued that the mobilization of groups is influenced by their level of catnet-ness, a synthesis of characteristics linked to social categories and the density of social networks. Indeed, the passage from a category (an aggregation of individuals who share determined characteristics) to a social group (a community capable of collective action) is facilitated by the simultaneous presence of specific categorical traits and networks of relations that link the subjects shared among those traits.

That opportunities for participation grow for those social groups characterized by similar structures and intense social relations is indicated by numerous studies on the labor movement. This was linked in particular to the presence of large masses of workers who carried out similar tasks and tended to spend not only their working hours but also their leisure time together, living in socially homogeneous areas found close to the factories. The presence of socially homogeneous networks characterized by intense social relations favored the choice to cooperate. Collective action then reinforced the awareness of holding common interests—causing the growth of what Karl Marx called class consciousness. Socialist ideology would then politicize many social struggles, proposing a wider vision of the world.

Modernization has on the whole increased organizational capacities. Above all, technological developments have increased the quantity of resources available in the environment. In an imposing piece of research spanning the past 4 centuries, Charles Tilly has uncovered an evolution from decentralized and informally coordinated movements to centralized and formal movements—that is, from solidarity or community groups to proactive and prolonged actions, organized on a grand scale by associations constituted with the aim of gaining specific ends. This development was rendered possible by the expansion of means of communication (today, in particular, of communication via computer). Economic progress too had a generally positive effect on the associative capacities of individuals, increasing the quantity of resources available for collective action. In particular, the diffusion of education and the proportional upward shift in socioeconomic class heightened propensities to associate, since more people are able to subscribe and give money. In addition, together with education, faith in one’s own ability to influence the outside world tends to increase, and with it the motivation for collective action.

**Identities and History**

Research on social movements has also contributed to the debate, an increasingly relevant one in political science, on the development of collective identity. According to Alessandro Pizzorno, a characteristic of politics is its reference to solidarity systems that form the basis of the definition of interests. Those who are mobilized defend certain interests, which are recognizable only with reference to a certain value system. Interest in one’s own material welfare is not, for example, absolute or innate but linked to a certain conception of the world. Value options lead us to identify with larger groups, to which we feel a sense of belonging and in the interests of which we are disposed to act. The process of participation thus requires the construction of sympathetic collectives inside which individuals consider one another as equals.

Identity as the awareness of belonging to a collective “we,” or to a class, thus facilitates political
participation. If the construction of an identity is a precondition for collective action, it is at the same time a product of it. In fact, participation transforms the identity of individuals, reinforcing the feeling of belonging to some groups and weakening identification with other roles. In the evolution of collective action, identity is produced and multiplies. The barricades of the revolutionary movement, the strikes of the labor movement, and the occupations of the student movement are all forms of action oriented toward influencing public decisions. But they also have an internal effect, creating solidarity between participants, making them feel part of a collective effort. It is the same action—participation—that then reinforces the sense of belonging in a sort of virtuous circle.

For collective action to occur, it is necessary that those who act elaborate a definition of themselves, of other social actors, and of the content of the relations that connect them. They must identify not only a “we” with whom to sympathize but also a “they” to attribute blame to for the conditions they wish to change. The construction of identity requires not only a positive definition of who is part of a certain group but also necessarily a negative definition of who is excluded. For interaction to occur it is necessary, on the one hand, that the identities of diverse actors be recognized by external actors, so that a part of the mobilization is oriented toward this search for recognition, inseparable from identity itself. On the other hand, collective action itself contributes to building and consolidating identity through the definition of boundaries between actors involved in a conflict.

**Political Opportunities and Comparative Political Systems**

The analysis of social movements has been particularly lively in the field of comparative politics. Although concentrating mostly on liberal democracies, studies of social movements have systematized their observations on the relations between institutional political actors and protest. As challengers to a given political order, social movements interact with the actors that enjoy a consolidated position in that order. The characteristics of these interactions affect both the form that collective action takes and its probabilities of success. In the study of social movements, the most widely used concept for defining the characteristics of the external environment relevant to the development of social movements is the *political opportunity structure*, developed in particular by the American political scientist Sidney Tarrow. Integrating various empirical observations into a theoretical framework for his study of protest cycles in Italy, Tarrow considered the degree of openness or closure of formal political access, the degree of stability or instability of political alignments, the availability and strategic postures of potential allies, and the political conflicts between and within elites as the main categories of political opportunities for social movements.

With the increase in interest in social movements by political scientists, European scholars, including Hanspeter Kriesi, Dieter Rucht, and Donatella della Porta, started to use the concept of political opportunities in cross-country research projects. Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous contrast between a “weak” American government and a “strong” French one is usually the implicit or explicit starting point for analyses linking institutional factors with social movement development. Some criticism notwithstanding, the idea that a state’s strength or weakness influences social movement strategies remains central to the literature on collective action in general and on revolutions in particular. In Europe especially, this approach resonated with a focus on the cross-national comparison of different types of European democracies, based on different institutional assets and cultural traditions. In general, an institutional system has been considered more open (and less repressive) the more political decisions are dispersed (through functional differentiation of power, territorial decentralization, and direct democracy). The prevalent belief is that the greater the number of actors who share political power (the greater the checks and balances), the greater the chance that social movements will gain access to the system. However, while a weak executive may ease access to the decision-making process, it will have little hope of implementing policies to meet the demands of social movements. Formal institutions do, however, interact with informal strategies to deal with opponents, with either inclusive or exclusive historical traditions that tend to reproduce themselves.

Beyond the comparison of different institutions, the political process approach also stressed the role
of institutional allies for social movements. A more dynamic set of variables—susceptible to change in the short term and the object of pressure from social movements—included aspects such as electoral instability and elite divisions. Attention to allies such as trade unions and political parties also resonated with the relevance assigned to these actors.

One of the reasons for the spread of the political opportunity approach in Europe may have been the interest, well developed in European political science and sociology, in cross-European comparisons. In the 1990s, in particular, this interest produced large comparative research projects, singling out and exploiting different dimensions of comparison among European countries, such as citizens’ regimes in research on mobilization, migrant rights, welfare regimes, or issues of unemployment. Historical comparisons, looking at long-term evolution, singled out a trend toward an increasing diffusion of protest repertoires and social movements.

The Effects of Social Movements on Public Policies

Another area to which research on social movements contributed is the analysis of public policies. A growing number of studies have addressed the effects of protest on the policy process. In one of the first and most influential studies on social movement effects, William Gamson identified the factors contributing to success as a minimalist strategy (“thinking small”), the adoption of direct action and a centralized and bureaucratic organization. Other scholars of collective action have, however, challenged this vision. In particular, it has been noted not only that violence can sometimes appear as a winning strategy but also that when organizations, including social movements, become bureaucratized, the desire for organizational survival comes to prevail over declared collective objectives. According to Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, the effort to build organizations could be not only futile but also damaging. The search for material resources to ensure organizational survival leads inexorably toward cooptation and the taming of protest. However, it has been remarked that no particular strategic element can be evaluated in isolation without taking into account the conditions within which social movements must operate as well as the presence of alliances or opponents in power. Most important, movements are never the sole actors to intervene on an issue; rather, they are part of alliances including political parties and sometimes even public agencies.

The attribution of credit for obtaining substantive successes is in fact complex. The presence of a plurality of actors makes it difficult to attribute success or failure to any one particular strategy, and whether the results of protest should be judged in the short or the long term represents a further problem. While social movements demand long-term changes, protest cycles instead tend to stimulate immediate “incremental” reforms. Policy development is characterized by steps forward and backward, moments in which public policy approaches the demands made by social movements and others in which the situation deteriorates. Factors peculiar to social movements, such as their distance from the levers of power, the heterogeneous definition of their objectives, and their organizational instability, further complicate matters.

These difficulties notwithstanding, social movements have had relevant effects on different stages of public decision-making processes. Generally, social movements are formed to express dissatisfaction with an existing policy in a given area. Although it is usual to make a distinction between political and cultural movements, the first following a more instrumental logic, the second more symbolic, all movements tend to make demands on the political system: Environmentalist groups have demanded interventions to protect the environment; pacifists have opposed the culture of war; students have criticized selection and authoritarianism in education; the feminist movement has fought discrimination against women; and the world social forums have criticized neoliberal globalization.

The definition of specific policy claims is often relevant for the very self-definition of a social movement. Frequently, a particular demand becomes nonnegotiable, being the basis for a movement’s identity. In many countries, for example, the feminist movement has been constructed around the nonnegotiable right of women to “choose” concerning childbirth; the halting of the installation of nuclear missiles in the countries of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) fulfilled a similar role for the peace movement. In the first case, mobilization was proactive, seeking to gain something new, the right to free abortion; in the second, it was reactive, seeking to block a decision (to install Cruise missiles) that had already been taken. One of the founding organizations of the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and for Civic Action (Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financières et pour l’Action Citoyenne, ATTAC), emerged around demands for a tax on transnational transactions; also present in Porto Alegre, the debt relief campaign asked for the cancellation of foreign debt for poor countries. Demands whose symbolic value is very high, such as the Equal Rights Amendment in the case of the American feminist movement, remain central for a movement even when their potential effectiveness is questionable. The importance of such nonnegotiable objectives is confirmed by the fact that, although activists may be willing to negotiate on other demands, even partial victories on these issues, such as a woman’s right to voluntarily interrupt pregnancy, are considered as defeats. While nonnegotiable demands are particularly important in the construction of collective identities, social movements rarely limit themselves to these. In fact, they tend to articulate specific requests for reforms.

The changes brought about by social movements may be evaluated by looking at the various phases of the decision-making process: the emergence of new issues, the writing and applying of new legislation, and the analysis of the effects of public policies in alleviating the conditions of those mobilized by collective action. Various levels of responsiveness to collective demands within the political system can be distinguished: from the availability of the authorities to listen to the protesters, to their willingness to put an issue on the agenda, and, then, to adopt and implement specific policies. Research on social movements initially concentrated on the production of legislation, with quantitative and qualitative analyses of the responses of parliaments and governments.

More and more, however, research has developed also on the implementation of decisions demanded by social movements as well as the cultural transformations they produce. Although movements tend to request legislative change, it is also true that this is neither their only nor perhaps even their primary objective, as movements are in fact carriers of symbolic messages by influencing bystanders and spreading their own conception of the world and alternative values. Typically, new ideas emerge within critical communities and are then spread via social movements. While the capacity of social movements for reaching their general aims has been considered low, their capacity for thematization, the introduction of new issues into public debate, and their long-term cultural influence have been considered high.

**Local Protest and Urban Policies**

From the 1990s onward, research on social movements and public policies has also focused on protest campaigns against large-scale public works in urban and semirural contexts. If the presence of territorial conflicts is certainly not a new phenomenon, the 1990s saw a growing analytical focus on new forms of protest, which have been portrayed as limited and localized. It has been observed that those seeking to defend the quality of life in a limited territory tend to oppose public works that are seen as compromising either the ecological equilibrium (e.g., refuse incinerators) or public security (e.g., the insertion of unwanted social groups in their territory). The presence of localized conflicts has met with great concern, given the multiplication in both these types of protest against locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) in recent years.

Local conflicts are usually seen in the social science literature (and more generally) as being motivated by a “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) syndrome, associated with conservative behavior and an egotistical resistance to social change. In public policy analysis, local opposition is often associated with “free riderism”—that is, the refusal to pay the necessary costs to attain public goods. This interpretation of the NIMBY syndrome has, however, been disputed. In fact, empirical research on local oppositions has indicated a complex reality, with committees characterized by a diverse capacity or will to present their particular claims within a more comprehensive framework.

In contrast to a NIMBY reading of the situation, sociological research has often interpreted LULU conflicts as an expression of different types
of social movements. In the discourse of those who protest, the defense of local natural resources is often accompanied by a more general defense of natural resources. From this point of view, local conflicts can be interpreted as an evolution in the ecological movement, characterized not only by the growth (in numbers, resources, and legitimacy) of environmental organizations but also by the diffusion of environmental awareness into public opinion as well as an extension of collective action beyond traditional organizational networks or environmental discourses. In contrast to the 1970s and 1980s, the main role in the mobilization of the protest is now played by citizens’ committees—that is, organized but weakly structured groups of citizens that unite on a territorial basis and use forms of protest to oppose interventions that they claim to be damaging for the quality of life in their territory. Additionally, although previously framed mainly as a “postmaterialist” concern, shared by a “new bourgeoisie” with high levels of education, environmental conflicts now tend to involve more and more underprivileged groups, above all in degraded areas, where projects with high environmental impacts (e.g., incinerators) are often executed. In these conflicts environmental associations are usually present, but they often cooperate and conflict with other organizations based in the territory.

Local conflicts are also discussed in the light of earlier research on urban “growth machines,” defined by formal and informal networks between public and private actors oriented toward increasing investment for economic growth. Against these networks, social movements, groups, and associations opposed to the reduction of welfare resources destined for marginal social groups, as well as residents’ associations who see themselves as damaged by projects for urban transformation, propose a different model of development.

To overcome the NIMBY label, social movements mobilized in these local conflicts tend to bridge the opposition to specific land use with frames of social justice. Faced with those who accuse them of protesting on behalf of the individual interest (rather than the common good), they develop a “not on planet Earth” (NOPE) discourse. Moreover, they often define their protest through a procedural rhetoric that defends their action as opposition to the abuse of power and lack of transparency in public decision making, as well as the collusive alliance between government and entrepreneurial interests.

**Social Movements and Democratization**

Reflections on social movements are also relevant for the analysis of democratization processes. The role of social movements for democracy has been discussed with very different expectations. Initially, social movements were considered either as marginal (vis-à-vis political parties) to democratic development or as dangerous for democracy, promoting excessive levels of societal mobilization. Later on, however, these assumptions have been contested, and more and more attention has been paid to the development of civil society organizations.

It is true that some movements have refused democracy altogether (e.g., fascist and neo-fascist movements), while others have the unintended effect of producing a backlash against democratic rights. Additionally, identity politics, often seen in ethnic conflicts, have sometimes ended in religious war and racial violence. However, since the 1970s in particular, the assessment not only that social movements flourish in democracies but also that most, albeit not all, social movements support democracy has become widespread. Pushing for wider suffrage or the recognition of associational rights, social movements contributed to the first waves of democratization and the development of democratic public spheres. Later on, the labor movement has contributed to the enlargement of citizens’ rights, and social movements have played a fundamental role in the struggles for democratization as well as in democratic consolidation.

The social science literature on regime transformation has stressed that social movements contribute to democratization under certain conditions. In particular, only those movements that explicitly demand increased equality and protection for minorities actually promote democratic development. In fact, looking at the process of democratization, it may be observed that collective mobilization has frequently created the conditions for the destabilization of authoritarian regimes and can also lead to the intensification of repression or the collapse of weak democratic regimes, particularly where social movements do not stick to democratic conceptions. While labor, student, and ethnic
movements brought about a crisis in the Franco regime in Spain in the 1960s and 1970s, the worker and peasant movements and the fascist countermovements contributed to the failure of the process of democratization in Italy in the 1920s and 1930s. Moreover, social movements have often formed transnational alliances to overthrow an authoritarian regime. In Latin America, as well as in Eastern Europe, social movements have asked for (different forms of) democratization, producing a final breakdown of neo-fascist as well as real-socialist authoritarian governments.

Research on various transition processes has stressed that the first steps toward democratization include a demobilization of civil society and the development of more institutionalized political actors following the opening of institutional opportunities, or the “pacted” strategy of the elites’ settlement, as in Spain after Franco and toward the end of the Pinochet regime in Chile. In recent democratization processes, the availability of public and private funds in the Third Sector contributed to an early institutionalization of movement organizations. This does not, however, necessarily seem to be the fate of social movements in phases of democratic consolidation: The presence of a tradition of mobilization, as well as movements that are independent from political parties, can facilitate the maintenance of high levels of protest during transition and consolidation—as the shantytown dwellers’ movement in Chile, the urban movement in Brazil, or the environmental movements in Eastern Europe illustrate.

In turn, consolidation fuels the development of social movements. Resources for collective action tend in fact to increase over time, as movements become institutionalized, construct subcultural networks, create channels of access to policymakers, and form alliances. This organizational continuity means that the experiences of “early-riser” movements represent both resources and constraints for those that follow. Processes of imitation and differentiation, and enforced repetition and learning take place simultaneously. Movement activists inherit structures and models from their predecessors. The social movement sector grows with the diffusion, during each wave of mobilization, of the capacities required for collective action. In fact, mobilization is facilitated by the presence of networks of activists willing to mobilize around new issues, where these are seen as compatible with their original identities. Moreover, the substantive gains made by one movement can have beneficial consequences for the demands of other movements, and their success can encourage further mobilizations. It can be concluded, therefore, that the importance of social movements tends to grow insofar as there is an ever-increasing amount of resources (both technical and structural) available for collective action.

International Relations and Transnational Movements

Social movement studies, like other areas of the social sciences, have been late to address the phenomena of transnationalization and are still in search of adequate methods, concepts, and theories to explain them. There are several reasons for this. First, most scholarship has time and again confirmed the relevant role that national political opportunities play in influencing social movement mobilization, its dimensions, duration, and forms. The modern repertoire of protest emerged with the creation of the nation-state, and social movements have played an important role in the development of (national) citizenship rights. So it is at the national level that they fought for access, suffered state repression, and found allies. Second, social movement studies focused on Western (and Northern) democracies. Furthermore, research in international relations has long considered the states as the only relevant actors.

In the field of social movements as in others, phenomena of transnationalization were first, and not by chance, addressed within the fields of international relations and international sociology. Bringing “transnational relations back in,” Thomas Risse, Kathryn Sikkink, and others have pointed out the role of transnational environmental and human rights campaigns in developing international normative regimes. In doing this, they took into account the role of nonstate actors, as well as emphasizing cooperation over competition. Research on human rights regimes or peace and war also stressed the emergence of international norms that challenged the vision of international politics as an anarchic system of states.

At the same time, research emerged on the development of international governmental organizations
(IGOs) and, in parallel and related to these, on a population of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), often taking the form of transnational social movement organizations. Over the past 2 decades, these nongovernmental actors have grown enormously in terms of numbers, membership, material resources, public resonance, and institutional access. This research also recognizes the interplay of actors at different geographical levels, going beyond disciplinary borders between internal and international politics. In human rights campaigns, national actors, suffering repression in authoritarian regimes, found allies abroad in epistemic communities, involving IGOs, national governments, experts, and INGOs.

Focusing on the interactions between social movements and IGOs, in the first studies from a social movement perspective, Hanspeter Kriesi, Dieter Rucht, Sidney Tarrow, and Donatella della Porta emphasized the capacity of transnational social movements to adapt to IGOs’ rules of the game, with a diplomatic search for agreement over democratic accountability, discretion over transparency, and persuasion over mobilization in the street. In this, they found some resonance in the more normatively oriented literature on civil society seen as the beginning of a global civil society.

Research on transnational processes and social movements first developed around reflections on multilevel opportunity structures. In this sense, two main paths of transnationalization were singled out: (1) social movements with domestic political concerns (especially in authoritarian regimes) searching for external, international allies and (2) social movements addressing their own governments to influence international political decisions.

Attention was also paid to the resource exchanges between transnational social movement organizations and IGOs. Exchanges of knowledge as well as a potential reciprocal legitimization were singled out along with the capacity of transnational social movements to sensitize public opinion to global problems. At the same time, the difficulties in protesting beyond national borders were stressed by looking at different data on protest events, which generally seemed to remain anchored at the national level. Some studies also pointed out the cognitive effects of globalization, for example, in the intensification of relations beyond borders in terms of the cross-national diffusion of movement frames and strategies for maintenance of public order. Here as well, attention is paid not only to the potential for increasing exchanges but also to their limits.

With the development of campaigns addressing various and diverse IGOs, more reflections were developed concerning the different opportunities that different international assets offered to different social movements. Opportunities such as a consensual culture and a reciprocal search for recognition were available, for example, for the United Nations (UN) but not for (the much more closed and hostile) international financial institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, which became the targets of lively protests. In fact, more recent research has indicated that there are as many types of institutions at the transnational level as there are national ones. The social movements that target them, therefore, have to find specific leverage, for example, in the unanimity rules of the WTO, which make alliances with some states particularly relevant, while international experts and formal channels of consultation are exploited in interactions with the ILO. Additionally, in recent research, IGOs have emerged as complex and fragmented institutions, made of different bodies that provide external actors with differentiated opportunities. Looking at the European Union, the European Council, Commission, Parliament, and courts are all targeted by social movements, but protest strategies vary with the different characteristics of these specific bodies. Furthermore, different movements can have a more difficult or an easier life in terms of gaining access to specific (sympathetic) Directorates General in the European Commission or opposing powerful ones.

Different opportunities require different strategies. If previous research had stressed the moderation of social movement tactics when addressing IGOs, with a move from the street to the lobbies, recent studies have rediscovered protest. In fact, going beyond the specific experiences of the parallel summits organized by the UN on environmental or women’s issues, many interactions between social movements and IGOs have involved protest. With time, the frustration over the results of more moderate forms of interaction brought about the
Social Movements, Democracy, and Normative Theory

Although mainly addressed within the empirical subfields of political science, social movement studies have recently begun to interact with political theory, more specifically the branch reflecting on participatory and deliberative conceptions of democracy.

Social movements often do not limit their interventions to single policies but challenge the ways in which political institutions work. Movements demand, and often obtain, the decentralization of political power, the consultation of interested citizens on particular decisions, or appeals procedures against decisions by the public administration. They also interact increasingly with public administrations: They ask to be allowed to testify before representative institutions and the judiciary, to be listened to as counterexperts, and to receive legal recognition and material incentives. In fact, social movements increase the possibilities for access to the political system, both through ad hoc channels relating to specific issues and through institutions that are open to all noninstitutional actors. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, social movements have indeed been able to introduce changes that move toward greater grassroots control. They have produced a change in political culture, in the whole set of norms and reference schemes that define the issues and means of action that are politically legitimate. Repertoires of collective action, which were once condemned and dealt with simply as public order problems, have slowly become acceptable, and new policy arenas have been created on issues of major concern for social movement activists (see, e.g., environmental or gender rights agencies). Not only were some public bureaucracies established under the pressure of movement mobilizations and movement activists regarded as potential allies, but also movement activists have been co-opted into specific public bodies as members of their staff. The public administrators working in these institutions mediate particular social movement demands through both formal and informal channels and frequently ally themselves with movement representatives to increase the amount of public resources available in the policy areas over which they have authority. They tend to have frequent contacts with representatives of the social movements involved in their areas, with the movements taking on a consultancy role in many instances. In addition, they sometimes develop common interests.

Social movement activists also maintain direct contacts with decision makers—participating in epistemic communities, made up of representatives of governments, parties, and interest groups of various types and persuasion. Nongovernmental organizations critical of neoliberalist globalization have, in particular, resorted to bringing pressure to bear at both the national and the international levels, cultivating specific expertise. From human rights groups to environmentalists, advocacy networks—composed of activists, bureaucrats belonging to international organizations, and politicians from many countries—have won significant gains in a number of areas, such as the protection of the environment or human rights violations. Some social movement organizations have, indeed, been
highlighted as having not only increased in number but also strengthened their influence on the various stages of international policy making.

Most important, so-called participatory and deliberative institutional experiments have developed over the past 2 decades, especially at the local level. They are based on the principle of participation by “normal citizens” in public arenas of debate, empowered by information and rules for high-quality communication. Actors associated with social movements have intervened in the development of some of these experiments, sometimes as critical participants, sometimes as external opponents.

More generally, social movements have developed a fundamental critique of conventional politics, affirming the legitimacy (if not the primacy) of alternatives to parliamentary, liberal democracy. Especially since the 1960s, many social movements have supported the direct participation of citizens in public decision making, criticizing the delegation of decision making to representatives who can be controlled only at the moment of elections. Moreover, they seek to switch decision making to more transparent and controllable sites. In the social movement conception of democracy, the people themselves (who are naturally interested in politics) must assume direct responsibility for intervening in the political decision-making process. More recently, the normative debate on deliberative democracy has found resonance in some social movement organizations that have developed norms and practices of consensual decision making, stressing the need to improve the quality of communication. Some attention on the part of political theorists has also been focused on the role of social movements in the creation of alternative public spheres, free from state intervention.

In the global justice movement, in particular, several organizations have experimented with participatory, discursive models of democracy both in their internal decision making and in their interactions with political institutions. Internally, social movements have—with a greater or lesser degree of success—attempted to develop an organizational structure based on participation (rather than delegation), consensus building (rather than majority votes), and horizontal networks (rather than centralized hierarchies). As far as the social movement critique of existing democracy is concerned, their search for an alternative cannot be considered as over. Not all students of social movement organizations agree that they have overcome the risk of producing oligarchies and personalistic leadership, the very problems at the center of their critique of traditional politics. Although it maximizes responsiveness, the direct democracy model has weaknesses as far as representation and efficiency are concerned. Problems of efficiency affect the success of movement organizations themselves; problems of representation concern the legitimization of new forms of democracy. The refusal by social movements to accept the principles of representative democracy can undermine their image as democratic actors, particularly when they begin to take on official and semiofficial functions within representative institutions, assuming the form of parties or public interest groups. Social forums, by bringing together heterogeneous actors, pay great attention to the quality of internal communication but with unequal results. These limitations notwithstanding, social movements have helped open new channels of access to the political system, contributing to the identification, if not the solution, of a number of democratic problems.

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See also Advocacy Coalition Framework; Civil Society; Conflicts; Democracy, Theories of; Feminist Movements; Labor Movement; Mobilization, Political; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Participation

Further Readings

Social Stratification

Social stratification refers to the positions held by individuals and groups in the structures of inequality existing in a society. Specifically, it denotes the classification of individuals and groups into different categories on the basis of the amount of one or more privileges enjoyed by the members of each category and/or the intensity of power that they are able to exert over other people. In contemporary advanced societies, based on democratic political regimes and market economies, these categories are usually referred to as strata or classes, depending on the criteria chosen to identify them. Strata and classes are groups based on factual inequalities—that is, disparities produced by the workings of societies with legal systems stipulating the equality of all citizens before the law. Hence, strata and classes are open groups that individuals can enter or leave according to the acquisition or the loss, during their lives, of the characteristics defining membership of a specific class or stratum. By contrast, in most traditional societies, social inequalities were based on legal and/or religious rules that led to the formation of closed groups—such as castes, orders, or estates—to which people belonged from birth and for their entire lifetimes, with no chance of escaping from their initial condition. In this entry, the major factors determining social positions and various ways to group them into broader categories of strata and classes are discussed.

Social Stratification Systems of Advanced Societies

From an analytical point of view, the advanced societies comprise a plurality of institutional orders characterized by distinct systems of social stratification. For instance, within the political sphere, heads of states, prime ministers, and ministers of central governments perform more crucial roles and hold superior positions compared with those performed and held by members of parliaments, mayors, members of city councils, and the like. The latter, in their turn, are politically more influential than simple citizens. Indeed, even mayors and members of city councils can (a) take decisions regarding the needs and interests of different people and the whole community and (b) frame these decisions in legal rules. No simple citizen has this authority. However, some simple citizens can hold commanding positions in the economic sphere, such as chief executive officers of big corporations or proprietors of medium- and small-sized firms. Chief executive officers and entrepreneurs can determine the goals of their companies and firms, their organizational features, and the tasks undertaken by their managers and professionals. In their
turn, managers and professionals are responsible for organizing the work of routine nonmanual employees, foremen, and skilled and unskilled manual workers. Obviously no white- or blue-collar worker can take any decision regarding the firm’s economic strategies and organizational arrangements. As a consequence, they are placed at the bottom of the stratification system of the economic realm. Yet even national politicians have no direct role to perform in this sphere, and in no sense can they be considered as holding top positions in the relevant stratification system. Similar situations can be observed in the cultural and educational sphere, in the religious realm, and so on.

Though largely independent, the main institutional orders of contemporary advanced societies are not reciprocally disconnected. On the contrary, they are functionally interdependent. Educational systems and universities are required to produce not only intellectuals but also skilled workers for the economy. Moreover, a high level of schooling can be a useful asset in the political and economic arenas. In their turn, the workings of the economy, besides being dependent on the availability of suitably skilled labor, depend closely on infrastructural interventions, trade and tax policies, labor market regulations, and welfare and educational measures decided by central and local governments. Politics can take even more incisive action in the economic realm by determining specific financial support in favor of individual sectors or firms to prevent unemployment episodes or to guarantee the survival of economic activities considered as crucial national or local assets. In parallel, the economy, through taxation, supplies politics with the financial resources needed to develop public policies and to pay the costs of political assemblies, related bureaucratic bodies and administrative staffs, the army, and so on. Furthermore, companies, firms, and actors with higher positions in the economic sphere can influence the workings of the political realm by selectively funding parties and politicians.

Owing to the functional interdependence among institutional orders, those who perform superior roles and hold higher positions in one such order can influence both their counterparts in other orders and, even more so, those occupying subordinate roles in them. As a consequence, the incumbents of higher positions in the political system, for instance, are usually able to secure advantages for themselves, civil servants, and related social groups. In a similar way, people in higher positions within the cultural sphere are frequently able to obtain sizeable material and symbolic privileges. Moreover, they are quite often able to use these advantages and their cultural capital to achieve desirable standings in the political or economic sphere. Obviously, the same holds for the incumbents of higher roles in the economic or other institutional realms. These people may also use their power and privileges to obtain social acknowledgments and honors and to pursue political careers. By contrast, people occupying lower positions within an institutional order can only with difficulty compensate for their disadvantages by exerting some kind of influence in other social realms. It is decidedly more likely that they will play subordinate roles in the latter as well.

It is precisely because advantages and power linked to one specific structure of inequality can be transformed into advantages and power linked to other forms of social disparity that most social scientists maintain that there exists a general system of stratification in contemporary advanced societies. This general system is thought to be much more important than those existing within each individual institutional order: first, because it involves all members of a society, and second, because it concerns the overall living conditions of persons and groups. The roles underlying the positions held in specific systems of stratification are usually made up of occupations. This is all the more so in the case of a general stratification system. Obviously, occupation is not the sole feature conditioning the allocation of persons and groups in specific and general systems of stratification. Gender, generation, race, ethnicity, educational credentials, level of technical skills, type of social competencies, and so on can operate as factors generating several specific forms of inequality and hence influence the positions of individuals in the relevant stratification systems. Yet the vast majority of social scientists maintain that, in advanced societies, several inequalities—and hence the overall social positions of persons—mainly depend on the occupation that they (or the members of their household) perform. Indeed, crucial aspects of the disparities observed in people’s living conditions—such as income, consumption, prestige, health,
psychological well-being—are deeply affected by occupations. As a consequence, all the schemes developed by social scientists during the past 50 years to represent the main features of general stratification systems have used occupations as their observation units.

Despite this basic similarity, the stratification schemes and measures developed by social scientists differ substantially. A fundamental distinction can be made depending on which aspect of social inequality—distributional or relational—is the main concern. Distributional disparities refer to the amount of a privilege, or a set of privileges, enjoyed by different groups of people. Relational inequalities concern power disparities occurring between these groups and their capacity both to condition the conduct of other groups and to successfully fulfill their interests and choices. These two aspects of inequality are connected. Power is a means to achieve social advantages, while advantages can be used to achieve power. However, precisely because they are conceptually distinguished, the distributional and relational aspects of social inequalities can be studied separately.

Social Strata and Occupational Stratification Scales

Some scholars focus on the distributional aspect, arguing that it is more directly linked to the disparities among the living conditions of individuals and groups. As a consequence, they maintain that general stratification systems are made up of strata. Indeed, a social stratum can be defined as a set of individuals and families who share similar living conditions because they enjoy similar amounts of one or more advantages. Strata form a linear hierarchy in which each of them (except the highest and the lowest) is adjacent to two other strata: one standing above and one standing below. The reason why strata form a completely ordered hierarchy is that privileges are gradational properties. For instance, it may happen that the poorest family in a country does not possess anything. But it is not true that the wealthiest family possesses the entire national wealth. It possesses only a part of it. Moreover, between the poorest and the wealthiest families lie numerous other families who own intermediate amounts of wealth. In principle, one may say that each individual person or family possesses a different amount of wealth and hence that the number of strata identifiable on the basis of the distribution of this characteristic is virtually infinite. Yet social scientists tend to identify a discrete and reasonably small number of positions by grouping together persons and families with similar amounts of privilege(s) and hence rather similar living standards.

Usually, individuals and families are grouped in each social stratum by means of statistical procedures that lead to the specification of stratification scales, where each stratum is given a specific score (and hence a rank). In their turn, the scores are intended to measure the entire range of inequality underlying the distribution of one or more privileges, to define the distances (in terms of strength of inequality) between the various strata, and to express the specific position occupied by a given stratum in a stratification system. Social scientists have developed stratification scales of various kinds. A first distinction differentiates between analytic and synthetic scales. The former refer to just one privilege, whereas the latter pay attention to (more or less formally specified) combinations of several privileges. Analytic scales mainly regard income and prestige. Income scales are intended to identify the economic disparities among socio-occupational strata, while those based on prestige (in the strict meaning of the term) are intended to identify status groups and the amount of honor, deference, respect, and social consideration they receive. Synthetic scales intend to measure the overall social standing of socio-occupational strata by combining two or more privileges—for instance, income level, amount of social prestige, intensity of psychological gratification, degree of autonomy in performing job tasks—typically associated with the occupations belonging to a stratum.

Besides their synthetic or analytic character, socio-occupational scales can be distinguished on the basis of the information used in their construction. Objective scales rely on data sets recording factual properties of occupations (e.g., the amount of salary or wages, the intensity of unemployment risks) or their incumbents (e.g., education level, technical skills, the occupations of friends and spouses). Subjective or reputational scales are based on surveys that collect popular evaluations of the overall social standing of occupations. It is to be noted that, despite their subjective foundations
and the considerable changes that the occupational structures of advanced societies have undergone, these scales prove to be rather stable over time and across countries. This indicates that the mechanisms underlying the generation of socio-occupational strata are similar in most countries with a market economy and a democratic political regime and that the new occupations produced by technological progress do not alter the basic features of individual strata and the related stratification system.

**Social Classes and Class Schemes**

Class schemes furnish representations of social stratification alternative to those based on socio-occupational strata and scales. A class can be defined as a social category made up of individuals and families who possess the same power assets and hence hold the same positions in the overall system of social relations of domination and subordination existing in a society. The reason why some scholars prefer to represent social stratification in terms of class schemes is quite simple. They argue that distributive inequalities ultimately depend on relational disparities.

Most class schemes envisage stratification structures based on a rather small number (5–15) of different positions—in other words, different classes. This is so because power resources (or effective combinations of some of them) are rather scarce and the control exerted over each of them by individual classes is either (almost) complete or (almost) nonexistent. Indeed, if a power resource were gradually distributed between classes, no class could dominate another. As classes are rooted in relational inequalities, they do not necessarily form a linear hierarchical order. It may happen that two or more classes, controlling different power resources, stand in a position of reciprocal equilibrium. Nonetheless, classes give rise to a partially ordered social hierarchy in which higher classes dominate the remaining ones and in which middle classes are dominated by higher ones but in their turn dominate lower classes.

Because the amount of the power assets controlled by members of a given class can vary, as well as their ability and opportunities to exploit it, classes are internally stratified. However, according to scholars who adopt a class perspective, the inequalities in living standards that may occur within classes are markedly smaller than those observed between classes. Despite the unavoidable internal heterogeneity of classes, the boundaries among them are far less conventional than those drawn among strata. Indeed, it is the control, or the lack of control, over power resources, rather than the decisions of scholars, that automatically define the class positions and the class memberships of individuals and groups.

Most class analysts maintain that, in advanced societies, the process of class formation is mainly influenced by power relations in the economic sphere. In their turn, these power relations depend on the power assets controlled by the members of individual classes. Four types of power assets are usually identified:

1. means of production,
2. educational qualifications and technical skills,
3. labor power, and
4. control over organizations exerted by top and middle managers and civil servants.

Power resources, however, are not equally effective. Control over the means of production and organizations furnishes greater power than that afforded by the possession of educational credentials or technical expertise, and all of these guarantee greater influence than that furnished by simple labor power. It is essentially this inequality of effectiveness that engenders the specific relations between classes. Power assets can be combined, and the social position of some classes is defined precisely by their combinations. This is typically the case of self-employed workers owning very small firms and frequently labeled the *petty bourgeoisie* (shopkeepers, plumbers, electricians, mechanics, stockbreeders, vinedressers, etc.). Indeed, they possess their own means of production, have specific technical expertise, and directly contribute with their own labor to the operation of their small firms. A similar case can be made for self-employed professionals (lawyers, financial consultants, architects, and medical doctors). Their class position is based on the possession of both high educational credentials and means of production. Obviously, numerous people are equipped with high educational credentials or technical skills, and everybody is endowed with his or her
own labor. But in many cases, these assets are intangible and can be ignored. The class positions of entrepreneurs and chief executives entirely depend on their control of means of production. Indeed, an entrepreneur remains an entrepreneur even though she or he may be in poor health and does not possess any educational qualification.

As in the case of socio-occupational stratification scales, social scientists have developed several definitions of classes and numerous class schemes. However, those linked to the Marxist and Weberian traditions are still the most influential. Neo-Marxist scholars maintain that classes are rooted in the social relations of production and the related processes of exploitation. However, they acknowledge that the social stratification of advanced societies is much more complex than envisaged by Marx in the mid-19th century. They state that, besides the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, there are classes whose members are simultaneously exploited by the owners of means of production and are exploiters of the working class. These middle classes are distinguished according to the amount of educational and professional credentials possessed by their members and the control that they can exert over the organizational arrangements of firms and public bureaucracies. Moreover, neo-Marxist authors maintain that the owners of means of production do not form an entirely homogeneous class, and they split them among the bourgeoisie (i.e., entrepreneurs and chief executive officers of large- and medium-sized firms), small entrepreneurs (owners of firms with a small number of employees), and the petty bourgeoisie (i.e., the self-employed with at most one or two employees).

Authors who adopt the neo-Weberian perspective draw up their class schemes by considering both the work and the market situation of individuals and groups. In their opinion, the process of class formation does not revolve solely around the social division of labor; it also revolves around the economic life chances of individuals and groups. In their more recent developments, neo-Weberian representations of class structure first separate employers from the self-employed and employees and then group employers into three classes: large employers, small employers not in agriculture, and small employers in agriculture. The same sectoral distinction is performed for the self-employed. Finally, employees are allocated to different classes mainly according to the employment relations between them and their employers. Two main dimensions underlie the forms of employment contracts usually available in the labor markets of advanced societies: the (high or low) specificity of the human assets possessed by employees—that is, their level and kind of technical and social abilities—and the (high or low) difficulty of monitoring their work by employers. The combination of these two dimensions produces three basic types of contract: (1) service relationship, (2) labor contract, and (3) mixed forms of service relation and labor contract. These contractual categories are then internally subdivided according to the usual organizational roles of the relevant employees and/or the economic sector (industry and services vs. agriculture) in which they work.

Recent Developments

In recent years, the two standard approaches to the study of social stratification have progressively converged, and currently, several lines of empirical inquiry on social inequalities are carried out using class schemes or socio-occupational scales indifferently. This convergence has been produced by the increasingly detailed information about interviewees’ occupations collected by socioeconomic surveys, the progress achieved in the statistical techniques used for the relevant analyses, and the conviction that both ways to express social positions of individuals and groups can be useful in clarifying the effects of these positions on specific inequalities and the mechanisms underlying them.

The convergence of the class and stratum perspectives has not increased their popularity among social scientists, however. On the contrary, both have been challenged by authors who maintain that strata and classes are disappearing, or have already disappeared, from contemporary advanced societies. In the opinion of such authors, social inequalities are becoming increasingly fragmented on an individual basis. Two main arguments are put forward to support this thesis. First, advanced societies have undergone a long process of institutionalization of individualism: that is, a process that places personal rights and personal independence at the center of cultural, political, economic, and juridical
arrangements. As a consequence, collective entities, such as professional associations, local communities, classes, strata, churches, and even families, are increasingly less able to shape the life trajectories and destinations of individuals. Second, the globalization of the economy exposes everybody, no matter how privileged in their current social positions, to increasing risks of suddenly lapsing into unemployment, financial hardship, poverty, multiple deprivation, and similar distressful situations.

Social stratification scholars react to the thesis of the individualization of social inequalities by maintaining that it has not yet received convincing empirical support. These scholars admit that advanced societies are experiencing a secular trend toward emancipation of individuals from the strict social control exerted in the past by different communities. But they also point out that a large body of empirical analysis has shown that several different expressions of crucial inequalities—such as those regarding educational opportunities, inter-generational mobility and career chances, risks of unemployment, level of income and wealth, and health conditions—and even the mating selection process are still linked to the class and stratum of origin and current belonging. Authors supporting the thesis of the crystallization of inequalities around classes and strata recognize that the latter are less socially visible than they were at the beginning of the industrialization process. Moreover, they acknowledge that contemporary advanced societies are becoming somewhat more socially fluid and open. But they stress that this movement toward greater social fairness is feeble and slow, so that most of these societies still exhibit highly effective processes of social closure structured around strata and classes.

Indeed, as shown by the experience of the Nordic countries, only systematic and long-lasting policies aimed at increasing levels of social equality can guarantee a stable reduction of social disparities. In the past 10 years, however, these policies have been weakened everywhere by both the increasing popularity of market-oriented economic thought and the more recent negative effects of economic recession.

See also Capitalism; Class, Social; Inequality, Economic; Social Exclusion

Further Readings


Socialism

By the final third of the 19th century, socialism had emerged in Europe, both as a critique of liberalism and as the only comprehensive alternative to it. In this sense, socialism was an intellectual reckoning with the world created by the British industrial revolution and the French Revolution of 1789, and it was initially confined to dissident groups within these two countries. But like its main ideological rival, socialism came in many competing, dynamic varieties. Uniquely, socialism in all of these varieties was concerned with understanding the world both as it is and as it might be or would become. As such, it represented an alternative socioeconomic system to capitalism based on principles of egalitarianism and collectivism. The main currents of socialism also became champions of democracy.

Origins and Early Development

Socialists and liberals drew on a common stock of Enlightenment assumptions. In this view, humankind had struggled successfully to control nature
by the application of reason. History was an ascent, though one in which irrationalist forces had obstructed the march of progress and were yet to be swept away completely. Reason applied to human affairs could in principle produce the same advances as science had already made possible in the effort to understand and subdue nature. The social world was the work of humanity, and human beings could understand its evolution and promote their self-improvement in the process.

Radical and dissentist opinion within the Enlightenment pointed beyond mainstream liberalism and inspired future socialists. Thomas Paine, for example, had shown the imagination and audacity to advocate old age pensions, land nationalization, more liberal marriage and divorce laws, family allowances, free education, and a host of other reforms that became part of the social-democratic program in the 20th century. Jean-Jacques Rousseau contradicted his Enlightenment peers in the mid-18th century by identifying civil society (and the division of labor) as the source of inequality, which the political superstructure merely legitimated and protected. He also stressed the iniquities of private property, the multiplicity of artificial wants and the dependencies they generated, and the growth of invidious distinction, base rivalry, and competition that emanated from the same quarter. Where mainstream liberalism saw only progress, Rousseau saw also “an assembly of artificial men and factitious passions.”

Rousseau blamed these discontents on the whole course of civilization, whereas the socialists accepted that industrialism, its most recent phase, was here to stay. It was capitalism that would have to be reformed or overthrown. For large sections of the population, the first industrialization (in Britain) was experienced as a social and economic catastrophe—the destroyer of community, family, environment, and the quality of life in general. The motivating force behind this “great transformation” was individual profit. The socialists did not deny that wealth and technological advances were associated with this change, but they were also concerned with understanding and overcoming its destructive and divisive features. A new language was developed. It gave us terms such as working class, industrialism, capitalism, and middle class. In November 1827, the word socialism appeared in print for the first time in the Co-operative Magazine in Britain. The argument was now set forth that the problems of the new society were not attributable to industry as such but to capitalism in particular.

Robert Owen, himself a factory owner, had for 10 years previously argued that the source of problems such as poverty lay in unrestrained competition. The answer lay in the principle of cooperation. Owen was a firm believer in social engineering; human beings would improve as their environments were altered to induce desired changes in behavior, health, morals, educational attainment, and so on. He thus believed that the suffering created by capitalism was avoidable. He changed his factory regime at New Lanark in Scotland to demonstrate in practice that pauperism, squalid housing, chronic ill health, and unemployment were unnecessary evils. In 1813, he published an account of these changes in A New View of Society. At first, Owen argued that profits would improve rather than be damaged by such enlightened reforms. Later, as his ideas developed, he denounced property, religion, and the family—forfeiting his respectability in elite circles in the process. He turned to funding egalitarian and communitarian experiments in the United States, such as the one at New Harmony in Indiana, begun in 1826. After the Great Reform Act of 1832 failed to enfranchise the working class in Britain, Owen, who had returned to London, associated himself with both the cooperative movement and the creation of the Grand National Consolidated Trade Union. His followers in Britain strengthened their critique of capitalist exploitation by developing the argument that labor was the source of all wealth—a doctrine inspired by the labor theory of value expounded by David Ricardo in Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817).

Meanwhile, in France, the radical reconstruction of society was an ambition promoted and legitimated by the revolution of 1789. The principles of this revolution—expressed in the name of “the people”—included the “rights of man” and “liberty, equality, and fraternity.” These ideas had international resonance and were opposed internationally by the counterrevolution of the aristocracy and monarchy. France was involved in a virtually continuous war between 1792 and 1815. In 1793, the most radical wing of the revolutionary leadership, the Jacobins, seized power in Paris in circumstances of French military reversals. The Jacobin
dictatorship itself was overthrown a year later, and a process was begun that promoted the army and the person of Napoleon Bonaparte. The most extreme radicals in the Jacobin milieu began to conclude that the revolutionary dynamic had been stopped at the point where it benefited only the bourgeoisie. They now formulated demands of economic as well as political equality. This Society of Equals, a Parisian political club led by Gracchus Babeuf, was suppressed by Bonaparte himself. But before Babeuf and the leaders were executed in May 1797, the Society of Equals had laid the foundations of a communist political current stressing abolition of private property in land, the need for social planning, the provision of state-supplied basic necessities to ensure a national minimum standard of life, communal living arrangements, the universal obligation to work, and the abolition of divisions of rich and poor.

After Napoleon’s final defeat, the principal object of the victors at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 was to suppress “the Revolution.” But the Jacobin and Babouvist traditions were kept alive in France by men such as Filippo Buonarroti (1761–1837), Etienne Cabet (1788–1856), and Louis-Auguste Blanqui (1805–1881), who stressed the need for a revolutionary dictatorship to complete the unfinished business of 1789 in the creation of a new social order based on a radical egalitarianism. These doctrines commanded support within the urban working class, as the insurrections of 1830 to 1848 in cities such as Lyons and Paris showed. The secret societies of the French communist tradition, though they envisaged a world without class distinctions, were less successful in elaborating theoretical alternatives to bourgeois society. This was better accomplished by socialist reformers such as Charles Fourier (1772–1837) and the Comte de Saint-Simon (1760–1825), who separately elaborated detailed schemes—many of them frankly fantastic—and seminal ideas that others (including Karl Marx and Auguste Comte) would take forward in different ways.

Saint-Simon and his followers believed that they were developing a science of society that disclosed the centrality of production and consumption. They argued that scientists and producers must be at the top of any rational hierarchy of merit and should play a major role in the government of the future, committed as it would be to the scientifically planned improvement of humanity. Saint-Simon’s vision of progress imagined such elites—including the propertyed elite—exercising an enlightened self-interest by solving conflicts of interest with the improvement of the poor in mind. This was the way to avoid violence and increase the security and prosperity of the propertyed, as well as to promote the good of society as a whole. In elaborating his doctrines, Saint-Simon parted company with liberal individualism, embraced feminism and pacifism, and imagined pan-European structures of cooperation. He also inaugurated forms of Christian socialism (in his *Nouveau Christianism*). His ideas spread across Europe in the years up to 1848, thanks to the work of followers such as Barthelemy Enfantin, Amand Bazard, and Pierre Leroux, who systematized the chaotic original.

Charles Fourier’s (1772–1837) thoughts were even more detailed and confused than Saint-Simon’s but no less original and provocative. Fourier championed feminism and cooperation as keys to, and measures of, social progress. He proposed and set up model communities, which he called *phalanstery*, based on assigning individuals to jobs for which they were suited. In describing these communities, Fourier ignored no detail of social organization. But his big ideas centered on the relationship between environment, education, and character. From a competitive, selfish, exploitative system could come only greedy, dishonest people. The influence of Rousseau is evident, as indeed it is in Saint-Simon’s thinking. Fourier’s best known follower, Victor Considerant (1808–1893), also championed the “right to work” and was prominent in the 1848 revolution in Paris as well as the First International Working Men’s Association, established in 1864.

Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen were known to later socialists by the collective name given to them by Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels—the Utopian Socialists—largely because their schemes depended on methods of persuasion, education, and example, which the founders of “scientific socialism” deemed impractical. Marx and Engels were nevertheless converted to socialism through the work of these pioneers and their German followers (e.g., Wilhelm Weitling and Moses Hess). In 1842, an observer such as Lorenz von Stein could associate socialism in France with peaceful reform
and detailed thinking about the nature of reform, whereas communism signified, according to the same author, a revolutionary rejection of existing society, with proletarian roots, stressing the need for practical actions to overthrow the status quo. The French Revolution had bequeathed both the Jacobin model of the dictatorial, insurrectionist vanguard—kept alive by the secret societies—and the ideal of a republican democracy. Louis Blanc (1811–1882) became the best known exponent of the latter, arguing that any social change to socialism had to be democratic. But the insurrectionary tradition survived not the least because the urban working class was everywhere a small minority except in Britain, and it was far from clear that a “democratic revolution,” as suggested by Blanc and the German émigré Moses Hess, was possible. Even in Britain, the remarkable campaign of the Chartists (1837–1848) for male suffrage came to nothing, and socialism itself disappeared from view in that country until its revival in the 1880s. From the perspective of Europe in the 1840s—a continent still consisting predominantly of peasants and autocracy—socialism as a reforming movement of the working class was a nonstarter. Yet the work of Marx and Engels made this very connection.

Marx and His Legacy

Marx came to socialism via German philosophy, especially the work of G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) and the critiques of Hegel associated with Ludwig Feuerbach and the Left Hegelians. He shared Hegel’s idealization of the Greek polis and the conviction that the modern world was scarred by fragmentation and alienation. He also adopted Hegel’s dialectical method while giving it a materialist foundation not found in Hegel’s own philosophy. In Paris from 1843, Marx encountered the proletariat for the first time and studied the works of the mutualist socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as well as those of the Utopians. He learned more about the working class through Engels’s The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844, the product of the author’s investigations in Manchester since 1842 and his knowledge of Owenite, Chartist, and trade union circles. Together, Marx and Engels were active in German communist émigré circles in Brussels between 1845 and 1848, and it was here that they were commissioned to write a manifesto for the clandestine Communist League. Their involvement in the revolutions that swept across Europe from Paris in 1848 led Marx to permanent exile in London a year later. He devoted his studies from this time to the critique of capitalist political economy, culminating in the publication of the first volume of Das Kapital in 1867.

Marx’s intellectual revolution effected the single most important development of socialist thought. He argued that the economic basis of society—its mode of production—determined its social and political structures. On this foundation, social classes arise, and it is conflict between classes that generates historical change. In capitalist society, the basic classes in conflict were those of the bourgeoisie—the owners of capital—and the proletariat. Marx regarded his greatest insight as the theory of surplus value, which showed the way in which capitalists exploited their workers. Such exploitation was an integral structural feature of capitalism and would persist for as long as capitalism existed. But the development of capitalism would lead to class polarization, periodic crises of overproduction, and opportunities for the emergence of proletarian class consciousness. Eventually, when objective conditions and subjective class consciousness were aligned, the proletariat—the vast majority in a mature capitalist economy—would overthrow the system of exploitation and the political institutions that served to legitimate and defend it. This is how socialism would emerge as the successor to capitalism in the march of human progress.

Most of what Marx and Engels wrote remained unpublished or unread outside the small groups of British and German socialists with which they had contact in the 1840s, 1850s, and 1860s. During this period, their thinking moved emphatically against the mentality of the secret societies in favor of revolutionary change as the product of open, mass struggles arising from conditions generated by capitalism itself. When the First International was formed in 1864, with Marx as a foundation member, it brought British trade unionists, French Proudhonists, German Communists, and anarchist followers of Michael Bakunin together. Marx failed to convert the trade unionists to his vision but succeeded in marginalizing the anarchists, Blanquists, and Proudhonists, even at the cost of relocating the International to New York City in
1872 and thereby effectively terminating it. But there were other, more important indications that Europe was moving in the direction Marx expected, such as the spread of industrial capitalism, the growth of trade unionism and class conflict, and the creation of nation-states in Italy and Germany, which Marx believed would pave the way to the formation of united workers' movements. The German Workers' Association had already been set up by Ferdinand Lassalle in 1863 to press for universal suffrage and socialism through the existing state machinery. Marx's own followers were involved with those of Lassalle in creating the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1875. Throughout this period and up to Engels's death in 1895, the "Marxists" in Germany were guided by the doctrine's founders, such that the SPD as a whole could be called a Marxist party by the 1880s. After Marx's death in 1883, Engels did what he could to systematize and codify the doctrine for the widest dissemination, establishing contacts throughout Europe as he did so, watching as the SPD moved from strength to strength and new Marxist parties were created across the continent, coming together in a new federation of national parties in 1889 as the Second International.

Socialism nevertheless lost none of its capacity for disputation and dissent. In part, this was because it continued to display a dual temporal existence, being both an account of the world as it was as well as an account of the world as it might be. On both counts, there was enormous scope for disagreement. There was the question of how the transition would come. Would it be revolutionary or by incremental reform, would the transition be peaceful or violent, and would it be dependent on skilled leadership or the result of blind economic forces or some combination of the two? One important variable in providing answers to these questions was national. The Marxist parties themselves were noticeably more committed to an insurrectionist reading of Marx the more one travelled east across Europe and into the zones of autocracy, censorship, and political intolerance. In Russia, Marxists argued among themselves about the need for a prior bourgeois-democratic revolution and their role in relation to it. But there was no argument that they had to organize clandestinely and that any political work that they did was necessarily illegal. By contrast, socialism in England, when it came back to life in the 1880s, developed in circumstances of emerging parliamentary democracy and a strong liberal tradition that accommodated currents sympathetic to state-sponsored social reform. In Germany, the most successful socialist party of them all, the SPD, was practically divided and ideologically challenged from within by "revisionism" as the century came to an end. Meanwhile, in the United States of America, it was noticed in the first decade of the 20th century that the most powerful industrial nation on earth had failed to produce a socialist movement of corresponding size and significance. Thus began enquiries into "American exceptionalism," but even in the heartland of socialism, there were well-developed doubts about the Marxist analysis of capitalism and its inevitable demise.

In theoretical terms, it was Eduard Bernstein, a protégé of Engels himself, who questioned whether the evidence supported Marx's vision of class polarization, working class immiseration, capitalist breakdown, and the necessity of a revolutionary rupture. Instead, he pointed to the persistence, even growth, of multiple class strata, the need for class allies, the evidence of improvements in living standards, and the prospect of further gradual change via the ballot box. In practice, sections of the SPD—notably the Reichstag Fraktion and the trade unions—were already home to strong reformist currents. Though the "revisionism" debate (1898–1903) was concluded with apparent victory to the revolutionaries, events soon showed how misleading this was. In August 1914, the major powers of Europe went to war, and the SPD initially supported Germany's war effort with as much enthusiasm as the avowedly reformist Labour Party supported Britain's. The immense strains engendered by the war in all the belligerent countries eventually brought revolutionary Marxists to power in Russia in November 1917. Lenin's Bolsheviks moved quickly to establish a rival Third (or Communist) International in 1919, and by 1921, communist parties had been formed in most European countries.

The Russian Revolution and Its Aftermath
Ideologically, the consequences of World War I and the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia were immense. Lenin was able to argue persuasively
that the war signaled the beginning of “an epoch of wars, civil wars and revolutions” in which bourgeois democracy would wither and the prospects for meaningful reforms recede. The empirical evidence of the interwar years—economic dislocation, the world crisis sparked by the Wall Street Crash, and the rise of fascism—did not contradict this reasoning. Nor did growing conflict in the colonial world, for which the Bolsheviks claimed a special relationship as the first revolutionaries to embrace anti-imperialism as a foundation value and permanent project. In these circumstances, Communists were persuaded to model themselves on Lenin’s Bolsheviks. A party once justified as a necessary adaptation to Tsarist persecution was now the model for all Communists, whether in England or China. The Jacobin tradition was restored, not the least in the dictatorial way in which the Bolsheviks purported to represent the workers and peasants of the old Tsarist Empire.

World interest in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), as it was known from 1922, massively increased after 1930 when the global capitalist economic crisis coincided with the apparently successful inauguration of Soviet Five-Year Plans. Socialism became increasingly associated with the idea of state-centered planning. Soviet prestige was also enhanced by its role—real and imagined—in the struggle against fascism and Nazism, culminating in the expansion of the Soviet sphere as far west as central Europe in 1945. Thereafter, the Soviet Union was perceived as a model of how conscious economic planning could transform a backward, peasant society into a modern, industrialized, technologically advanced state, free of foreign domination. Throughout the Third World, socialism and the Soviet Union exercised this appeal almost until the final dissolution of the USSR in 1991. Socialism was equated with modernization, social progress, and various forms of unity in the first decades after World War II, giving rise to claims for specific forms of African, Arab, Islamic, and Third World socialism. In postcolonial Africa, in countries marked by “poverty, ignorance, disease and illiteracy,” as Kwame Nkrumah itemized the legacy of imperialism, leaders arose such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who pointed to precolonial forms of collectivism and egalitarianism on which an indigenous socialism could be built. There was no disguising, however, that socialism appealed because the high road to prosperity and real independence was thought to lie with industrialization and rapid modernization under the direction of the Plan.

In the advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe, the reformist parties that regrouped as the Labour and Socialist International in 1923 were led by men who emphatically denied the socialist credentials of the Bolsheviks precisely because of Lenin’s violent and undemocratic methods. The dictatorship of Lenin’s successor Stalin provided gruesome support for their insight. But it was not until the long period of full employment and prosperity following World War II that they could boast a coherent alternative to Soviet socialism. This “Keynesian” alternative depended on the belief that democratically elected governments could steer economies to ensure annual economic growth. By this means, the goals of socialism could be obtained: full employment; an egalitarian distribution of income, wealth, and opportunity; the elimination of poverty; and the end of economic crises and their destructive consequences. Social-democratic Sweden was the shining model of this approach as late as the 1970s, though the left wing of the social-democratic parties continued to insist on the need to further reduce private economic power.

The Crisis of Socialism

In the years 1970 to 2000, socialism in all its varieties entered a profound crisis. Economic stagnation and authoritarianism in the communist world led eventually to the collapse of these regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and finally the Soviet Union itself as the communist leaders failed in their attempts to reform the system from within. Socialism as an alternative system lost its powers of attraction because of this failure, coming as it did on top of the moral calamity of communism, with its death toll of millions, which some socialists had forecast shortly after the Bolshevik seizure of power but which others had ignored for as long as they could. Meanwhile, social democracy entered a period of ideological retreat as the Keynesian approach broke down in the 1970s, and the future of the welfare state was called into question by long-term changes in the structure of societies and markets. The term globalization was often invoked as a shorthand for these subversions
of the old social-democratic paradigm. Though radical ideas of left-wing provenance continued to develop after 1970, socialism had ceased for the foreseeable future to provide them with a coherent vision of an alternative social system.

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See also Communism; Globalization; Marxism; Social Democracy

Further Readings


**SOCIALIST PARTIES**

Socialist and social-democratic parties are the main and the most electorally successful party family of the Left. The first socialist parties appeared in Europe during the last quarter of the 19th century as a result of the politicization of the class conflicts generated by the Industrial Revolution. The formation of socialist parties was one of the outcomes of the cleavage between capital and labor and of the political mobilization of the working class. This entry discusses the origins, programs, and political role of these parties.

Prior to World War I, there were socialist or social-democratic parties or candidates in almost every European country and in some states in other regions of the world (Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and some Latin American countries). In some cases, they were part of a subculture milieu in which a socialist mass-party organization was linked to a trade union and to a network of ancillary groups. In its early years, the European socialist or social-democratic parties emphasized some core ideas concerning the transformation of capitalist societies into more egalitarian ones built on solidarity, cooperation, and social justice. These parties, many of them Marxist, postulated the end of human exploitation, class divisions, and economic inequalities. The 1940s witnessed the expansion of socialist parties to places distant from their European origins, as some anticolonial organizations adopted socialism as their ideology in Asia and Africa. However, this phenomenon resulted in the formation of parties that—from the ideological point of view—could only partially be considered socialist given their combination of a socialist ideology with anticolonial and nationalist ideas.

The socialist movement experienced, almost since its birth, divisions over its program and policies for the transformation of capitalism (e.g., concerning the role of the state in the management of the economy) and over the best strategies to achieve it (e.g., divisions between reformists and revolutionaries). These debates among parties and leaders were already present in the First (1864) and Second (1889) International Working Men’s Associations. In his analysis of electoral socialism, Adam Przeworski argues that the early socialists confronted three choices: (1) whether to achieve socialist goals from within or from outside the political institutions of capitalism, (2) whether to trust exclusively in the working class as the agent of socialist change or whether to appeal to other social classes as well, and (3) whether to transform society through partial reforms or to devote all efforts to the final abolition of capitalism. The responses to these three choices caused internal strife, shaped the evolution of the socialist parties, and contributed to differentiate them from other left-wing organizations.

The socialists decided to participate in elections. In doing so, socialist parties tried to take advantage of the political rights that capitalist societies accorded to the workers as a means to achieve improvements in their life conditions. This option clearly differentiated socialist parties from “abstentionist” streams
of the workers’ movement, such as the anarchists. Despite the acceptance of the electoral process to win political power, within the socialist parties, there was a certain ambivalence about the need to eventually use revolutionary means to conquer political power or to defend it once attained by peaceful means. However, democracy eventually became not just the main path to socialism but the parties’ very goal. In a certain sense, the ideal defended by socialist parties consisted in the extension of democratic political principles to the economic and social domains. The abandonment of revolutionary roads to gain power differentiated socialist and social-democratic parties from other groups of socialist and Marxist origin, such as the Communists.

Socialist parties originally opted for the electoral route to obtaining improvements in the living conditions of their electorate and to extend its influence among working class voters, but they were also convinced that this path would give them political power relatively easily. They believed that they would win elections in the short to medium term, given the unstoppable growth of the working class inherent in capitalism. However, the working class did not grow to become the social majority in most capitalist societies, and in any case, it never voted as a single cohesive electoral bloc as socialist leaders and intellectuals had hoped for. Under these circumstances, the socialist parties were confronted with the decision either to appeal to other social groups, if they wanted to maximize their votes and their possibilities to form governments in Western countries, or to remain a minority party appealing to an exclusively working class constituency. They decided to build a multiclass electoral coalition that reflected the evolution and differentiation of the social structure of capitalist societies. This wider electoral coalition—at least in class terms—blurred many socialist goals. In any case, the socialist project, regardless of the class orientation of its appeals, hardly attracted the support of a clear majority of the electorate in many countries during the first decades of its development. Hence, socialist parties rarely had the opportunity to implement their program without incorporating other political allies.

The socialist program was characterized by its reformist nature. This feature also differentiated socialist parties from other revolutionary and radical groups. In its original implementation, these reformist policies were understood as steps in the path toward the complete and future transformation of capitalist society, following the socialist ideal. Therefore, socialist parties originally believed that the accumulation of economic and social reforms would eventually produce a radical transformation of the social order in a socialist way. But what was far from clear was what these reformist economic socialist policies should exactly be. The socialist parties were formally favorable to the nationalization or socialization of the means of production. However, once the socialist parties were in government during the end of the 19th and first third of the 20th centuries, hardly any overarching policy of nationalization took place in Western Europe. Despite their electoral successes, socialist parties did not gain enough political and electoral support to promote their own programs. Furthermore, they did not want to risk their political prestige in a policy they were unsure how to implement and that could find strong resistance. In the absence of a well-defined and differentiated socialist economic policy, socialist parties promoted public policies directed toward the expansion of social welfare through different plans on housing, health, salaries, unemployment, and so on.

In the 1930s and 1940s, some West European socialist parties began to defend and to implement Keynesian policies to regulate the economic crisis and to reduce unemployment. The socialist parties defended an active role of the state in the economy, anticyclical policies, public investment, and public debt, aiming to maintain jobs and to reinvigorate the economy. After World War II, socialist parties generally adopted Keynesian policies to regulate the economy; the projects of nationalization or socialization were almost forgotten, nationalizations were rarely implemented (although some took place during postwar economic reconstruction), and the parties assumed a non-Marxist program for the increase of equality and social justice within the limits of capitalism. Consequently, the possibilities of an advancement of equality were linked to the expansion, inclusiveness, and redistributive efforts of state intervention and of social welfare programs. However, in the view of the socialist parties, the state should limit itself to the provision of public goods, compensating through these policies the inequalities generated by the market. Given that
this program should be developed within a capitalist economy, social welfare policies were very dependent on the evolution of the free market economy, of its efficient management, and of its growth rate. The socialist economic and social policies, welfare state programs, state investment, and state fiscal revenues through direct taxation that would make possible all these policies were subject to sustaining a growing and full employment economy that ensures private sector returns.

This bundle of socialist policies encountered a benign economic environment for its implementation from the end of World War II until the 1970s. This period has been sometimes described as the golden age of West European social-democratic parties and policies. In any case, in spite of the influence of non-social-democratic parties and governments in the creation of West European welfare states, some elements of the social-democratic program became a crucial component of the West European policy status quo after the postwar period.

However, what could be termed as the social-democratic settlement faltered in the 1970s, when the economic context worsened notably. The Keynesian and economic redistribution policies did not seem to be feasible under the new economic circumstances. The principles that guided the policies of the socialist parties were challenged: The role of the state in the management of the national economies, its role in the regulation of the market dynamics, and the welfare state policies suffered from economic and financial crises, decreasing growth rates, rising unemployment, and growing internationalization of the economy. Later on, the social-democratic orthodoxy—that rising social expenditure, together with state intervention and regulation, ensured better functioning of the market—was severely challenged by economic globalization.

In the 1980s and 1990s, not only did socialist parties confront important challenges coming from social, cultural, economic, and institutional changes that made their platforms less appealing than the neoliberal or neoconservative ones, but they also confronted new competition from New Left parties. In this context, the socialist parties began a yet unfinished search for a new program that could provide them with a new identity adapted to the changes in the socioeconomic environment and in the patterns of electoral competition. During this period, social democracy underwent a substantial programmatic change that in many cases has meant an abandonment of the previously traditional social-democratic concerns, moving toward more centrist and promarket policy positions, sometimes called the third way.

In the long term, socialist parties have successively abandoned their original anticapitalist and Marxist positions of the late 19th century, have adopted Keynesian policies compatible with the efficacy of macroeconomic management in the context of a capitalist society, and finally have moderated their reformist impulses to match the strongly market-oriented political environment that has existed since the 1980s. Although they still have more favorable policy positions than other party families toward social justice, income redistribution, and state social expenditure, a policy convergence between socialist parties and right-of-center party families has taken place in Western Europe.

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See also Communism; Marxism; Social Democracy; Socialism

Further Readings

Socialist Systems

Socialist systems are those regimes based on the economic and political theory of socialism, which advocates public ownership and cooperative
management of the means of production and allocation of resources. These include states described as socialist, communist, or Marxist, all of which claim to be based on efforts to achieve social justice and equality. The best term for these regimes may be state socialism, which has gained wide currency in the political science literature. In response to the crisis and collapse of state socialism at the end of the 1980s, many analysts have emphasized that the universalistic goals of socialism were not thereby invalidated, since many other currents of socialism, for instance, social democracy, have been vigorously developing around the world.

According to the classical Marxist approach, socialism is only the first stage of the postcapitalist society, followed by communism as a second stage in which people receive “according to their needs.” Marxist theory was elaborated for, and based on, the most developed countries of the world. Although the state socialist project originated from Marxist theory, it was, however, a deviation from the original theory of Karl Marx. The application of this theory in backward countries, starting with Lenin’s Russia, can be considered as turning it to the other extreme—that is, to a revolutionary theory for the poorest countries of the world. This trend reached its peak under Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong and, later, was embraced by Fidel Castro of Cuba and by other local leaders in the developing countries. What is more, there have been two basically different paths to state socialism. Along the above-mentioned lines was a series of internal revolutions and subsequent transformations, as in Russia, China, and Cuba, leading to state socialist regimes on different continents. In the second case, there were also some repressive impositions of communist rule on some countries by conquest, as for instance in Poland and Hungary. This second path to state socialism has usually been distinguished from the first, since these state socialist regimes were to a great extent alien in terms of the historical course of the countries concerned.

The following sections briefly describe the history and main features of state socialist systems, the political science models that account for their emergence, and their historical trajectories from their origins, through phases of industrialization and social transformation to their abrupt collapse in response to the global economic and political crises of the 1970s and 1980s.

**Characteristics of Socialist Systems**

The main features of state socialist systems are the following:

**One-Party System.** Political rule is based on the unified power of partocracy or on the concentration of power in the Communist Party as a superstate. In state socialism, there is no division of power because the party represents the dictatorship of the proletariat and builds a bureaucratic system of political control. Democratic centralism, first in the party and then in all political institutions, became the general organizational principle for state socialism. In the constitutions of the countries concerned, the leading role of the party in state and society is stipulated.

**Command Economy.** This is an economic system with central planning (Five-Year Plans) in the state-administered economy. There can be no private ownership of the means of production, since these are nationalized and state owned. Directive planning as instructions from above is the method of economic management in an economy based on state property, in which the State Planning Agency (Gosplan in Russia) acts as a superministry. But planning was a bargaining process between/among various actors and organizations, with centrally determined prices, heavily subsidized products, and huge subsidies for the heavy industries. Command economy is accompanied by the coercive collectivization of agriculture, which produced a general scarcity and low quality of agricultural goods.

**Personality Cult of the Leader.** A cultural system based on the ideological monopoly of “Marxism–Leninism” and on the “charisma” of the number one leader was followed. This ideological monopoly means that the official ideology penetrated all spheres of cultural life, demanding ideological conformity and uniformity. State socialist systems had a future-oriented legitimacy; that is, they tried to legitimate themselves in these backward countries as the means for catching up with the most developed Western states. However, this legitimating device was more and more eroded in the 1980s in the European “socialist” countries by the slowing down of economic growth and by the growing attractiveness of the Western world with its abundance of goods and services.
The chief actor in state socialist countries was the *nomenklatura*. It meant that the Communist Party was involved in the appointment of people to all senior posts in society. The *nomenklatura* principle was the main instrument for the exercise of democratic centralism. It was applied not merely within the party itself but also in the state administration, the police, the military, the judiciary, education, the economy, and social organizations such as the trade unions and the people’s fronts—in short, it involved total control over appointments in all major organizations. The party structure was highly hierarchical; the real power was in the hands of a larger central committee and a smaller politburo controlled by the almighty leader. The party congress and/or the party conference were only legitimizing devices for democratic centralism and the official communication platforms for the economic and political decisions of the party leadership. The Communist Party was also a mobilizing instrument since there was a rather large party membership—between 6% and 10% of the adult population—as a “transmission belt” to the population as a whole to implement party decisions.

The emergence of state socialist systems was one of the most important historical developments of the 20th century. In the 1980s, at its peak, 40% of the world’s population lived in the socialist world (i.e., in countries run by communist parties), and one third of the global industrial output was produced by the various state socialist systems. The core state socialist countries were military allies and economic partners of the Soviet Union in two major organizations: the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or Comecon, 1949–1991) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (1955–1991). These organizations were instruments of the great power efforts of the Soviet Union for global dominance. The Warsaw Pact and Comecon were the two pillars of Soviet global power as the basic military alliance and economic organization in the bipolar world on the side of the Soviet-dominated state socialist countries. Comecon was organized in January 1949 as a reaction to the Marshall Plan (1947), and it was extended beyond Europe with the entry of Mongolia (1962), Cuba (1972), and Vietnam (1978). The Warsaw Pact as a reaction to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was also an instrument of the coercive control of the Soviet Union over its allies. The major principle of the Warsaw Pact was formulated in the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty (December 1968) after the Soviet Union’s crushing of Czechoslovakian reform efforts in the “Prague Spring.” The state socialist countries in general had a network of multilateral treaties, but there were also a series of bilateral treaties between the core state socialist countries modeled after their contacts with the Soviet Union.

**Varieties of State Socialism**

The socialist world system embraced four continents with many countries for shorter or longer periods, reaching its largest territorial extension in the mid-1980s. However, these countries claiming to be “socialist” were not homogeneous at all, nor did they form a real “world system,” since they were split by serious tensions and deep cleavages, first of all by the adversarial competition for dominance between the Soviet and Chinese models. The state socialist countries were usually allies of one of these two big powers that tried to extend their respective spheres of influence, even against each other. Given their diverging and conflicting approaches to the one-party state, command economy, and personality cult of the leader, the state socialist countries were sometimes fierce enemies of each other in different historical periods. First, after World War II, a conflict emerged between the Soviet Union with its allies and Yugoslavia and, parallel with it, between Yugoslavia and Albania; then in the 1960s between the Soviet Union and China (and their allies); and finally between China and Vietnam. China and Vietnam fought a real war in 1979, but the Soviet Union and China also had a series of border clashes. As state socialism spread in the world, so the controversies became deeper between its leading powers; therefore, in fact, no unified socialist world system ever existed.

One can distinguish the following territorial groupings of state socialist countries in the 1980s:

- **European group:** Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia
Asian group: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, China, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea, and Vietnam

Latin American group: Cuba, Guyana, Nicaragua, and Surinam

Arab socialist group: Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen

Black African group (usually called socialist orientation): Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique, Somalia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe (These countries were fragile, nondurable systems, and it was very difficult to define their “socialist” character beyond official declarations.)

Three models have been offered in political science for the explanation of the emergence and transitory survival of state socialist countries:

1. Totalitarianism: This involved the state penetration of society for its total control. This theory was very fashionable after World War II and also after the collapse of the Soviet-dominated socialist world system. Totalitarianism is an ideological label for modern tyranny. It is simplistic but is still very popular as a journalistic term. However, this theory fails to answer two basic questions: first, how totalitarian control over the society can work at all, and if it is so, then second, how political change can be explained according to this static and rigid model. No doubt, this theory makes some contributions to the partial understanding of the worst and most repressive period of Stalinism, between 1949 and 1953, or the current history of North Korea, for instance. But it is unable to explain the state socialist project as a whole in its historical dynamism from the October Revolution in 1917 to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, with its internal fights, oppositions and counterelites, and increasing social resistance. The totalitarian form of state socialism is a unique phenomenon in world history as a worst-case scenario of historical blind alleys.

2. Radical revolution: This is the “Bolshevik”-type seizure of power by the working class or the poor peasantry through a long internal war or “permanent revolution.” These transitory societies have been in between, or have combined elements of, capitalism and socialism. The internal revolutionary potential of these poor countries has played a dominant role in the fight against dependency on world capitalism and for national independence, so “socialism” and “nationalism” have also been combined. According to this model, the fate of these revolutions supposedly remains open. They may develop toward a “real” socialism, toward communism, or toward the capture of power by the state bourgeoisie as nomenklatura, leading to the bureaucratic deformation of state socialism. For the theory of radical revolution, state socialism is a historical hybrid, a combination of “genuine” socialism or anticapitalism and dependent capitalism in the guise of revolutionary nationalism, that has survived nowadays mostly or exclusively in the Third World.

3. Modernization: This refers to the catching-up exercise of a modernizing elite organized in the form of a communist party to establish an industrial society belatedly. The repressive state apparatus is in fact acting as an instrument of state capitalism to carry out the process of capital accumulation through the forcible extraction of surplus from the working class and the peasantry. In the last analysis, this modernization exercise leads to the convergence with world historical development, if the catching-up effort proves to be successful. Thus, in the final analysis, state socialism is just one of the more peculiar ways of reaching the stage of modern capitalist society. For modernization theory, state socialism is not an aberration or “hell on the earth” but only one of several transitory and controversial routes that early industrial societies take to converge finally with mainstream global development.

Historical Trajectory of State Socialism

The usual descriptions follow only the historical trajectory of communist ideologies from the theoretical foundations by Marx and Engels through Lenin and Stalin to Mao Zedong and Castro. Lenin indeed elaborated the revolutionary theory for a backward Russia with the basic principles of the Bolshevik party as its democratic centralism. He emphasized the revolutionary potential of Russia as the weakest part of the imperialist world system. After the victory of the October Revolution and the failure of the “world revolution,” Stalin
introduced the principle of “socialism in one country.” To consolidate the state socialist system, Stalin exercised a high level of political repression to overcome social resistance and to complete the state-building process in the early stage of industrialization. He completed the building of the repressive one-party state and a command economy with the personality cult, reducing the Russian populace to infantile dependence on the state. The vigorous development of industrial society led to the growth of Russia as a great power after the victory in World War II. Mao Zedong and later Castro extended the state socialist ideology more and more to the peasantry as the main revolutionary force. These ideological forms have been in fact a combination of the class struggle theory with the rise of nationalism in the (post)colonial world, where large peasant masses were dislocated.

Behind these ideologies, the “existing socialism” had to cope with real, not only ideological, obstacles and controversies. State socialism emerged after World War I as an alternative to world capitalism, and it vanished in the early 1990s as a meaningful alternative. It came to an end as an important social formation, even if some of its hybrid forms have survived in China and Vietnam; in some other archaic forms with traditional authoritarianism, as in North Korea; and with some vague postcolonial variants elsewhere. There were some basic internal and external built-in obstacles that were responsible for the vanishing of state socialism or the “really existing” socialism as a major type of development by the end of the 20th century. The previously noted catching-up exercise from inside as well as underdevelopment and external dependence were the domestic and international reasons that emerged, but a combination of internal and external built-in obstacles caused its abrupt demise at the end of the 20th century. If, and when, state socialism generated development, it also produced some economic factors and sociopolitical forces that turned against it. As extensive industrialization came to an end, the problems of economic management were aggravated, and the command economy proved to be unable to achieve economic integration and steer the structures created by intensive industrialization. Therefore, the economic crisis cycles were integral parts of this system of recurring imbalances. The historical trajectory presented different models from war communism to market socialism, but the policy of perestroika failed, and the reforms instituted by Premier Mikhail Gorbachev were the last attempt at a revival. At the same time, the external obstacle of world capitalism proved more and more that the economies of state socialist countries were not competitive in the world market. They were suitable only for the first and most drastic phase of industrialization, followed in the 1980s by economic decline in the core state socialist countries during their second phase of industrialization, although at the same time, state socialism had spread to the world’s poorest countries, where early industrialization was still taking place. State socialism lost the economic competition with the West in the 1980s, when the Soviet Union had become the world’s largest industrial society of the late-19th-century type, with an obsolete socioeconomic structure and a high level of militarization and also with an economy of shortage that would lead ultimately to mass discontent and full delegitimation of the socioeconomic system.

Although all state socialist countries had a legacy of authoritarianism from their previous history, the new type of repressive state soon became itself an internal obstacle to their socioeconomic development. Political reforms were always high on the agenda because it was clear that the political system could not work properly, since it continually created new obstacles to its own working—the new industrial and educated classes that had arisen as a result of socioeconomic development could not fit into the political system. When the urbanized strata, including the new working class, began to demand more human rights and freedoms, they were confronted with the implacable tenets of state socialism as a one-party state. Thus, they turned against the ideological monopoly of the party and demanded an open society.

In the core state socialist countries, a series of grave political crises in 1956 (Hungary), 1968 (Czechoslovakia), and 1988 (Poland) finally culminated in a deep crisis of political legitimacy at the end of the 1980s. Two factors—economic and political—produced a combined internal pressure at the end of the 1980s, when the democratic erosion was strengthened by the external pressure of globalization. As global telecommunication penetrated to these countries, the advantages of the Western economic order and world market were
displayed in much more detail than before and resulted in the spread of democratic ideas through the new types of media. All in all, the year 1975 may be considered as a turning point for both internal models and external competition:

1. Until the mid-1970s, the core state socialist countries developed much more quickly than the Western states; thus, the future-oriented legitimacy of the catching-up model seemed to work. But the global crisis in the 1970s caused the economies of the state socialist countries to slow down, and owing to this deceleration of socioeconomic development, state socialism in the most developed core countries lost its legitimacy step by step. The development model of state socialist countries was shifted to the poorest countries, so as a result of this qualitative failure, state socialism was significantly weakened in the core countries, but paradoxically, it became attractive in the poorest countries, and it began its largest quantitative territorial extension in the Third World.

2. During their industrialization process, the state socialist countries looked externally competitive for a long time; therefore, even the Western modernization models suggested that they were successful industrial societies. But they could not adapt to the structural changes in the world economy during the 1970s; their obsolete structures remained and, increasingly, were lagging behind in the global competition. At the peak of détente in 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe; OSCE)—with the participation of the United States and Canada—became instrumental in the erosion of state socialism through the permanent campaign for human rights (Helsinki Watchdog groups for human rights in Central and Eastern Europe).

3. There was also an imperial overstretching of Russia’s resources, both externally and internally. To sustain such an empire and its full apparatus of oppression demanded vast energy and expenditure, creating an internal obstacle for Russian society from the combined effects of full militarization, the economic burden of producing military hardware, and the social-ideological burden of suppressing human freedom. In the end, the Soviet Union was too weak economically to maintain such a world empire, which was very costly and diverted resources from Russia’s own socioeconomic development (around one third of its gross domestic product). Consequently, the system’s eventual collapse was not only a political failure but also an economic necessity.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Marxism; Postcommunist Regimes; Totalitarian Regimes; Totalitarianism

Further Readings

Soft Law

Although law is often thought of as binding on those to whom it applies, and sanctions are associated with breaking the law, some legal rules are voluntary and not coercive. Particularly in international law, legal rules are not legally binding, and legal sanctions cannot be used in cases of noncompliance. Soft law refers to those legal rules that are not legally binding and for which legal sanctions cannot be used in cases of noncompliance. These rules can be guidelines, codes of conducts, standards,
and other voluntary rules. In contrast to hard law, soft law can be decided by a variety of actors, public and private. Making hard law is the prerogative of legislative assemblies, national parliaments, and the European parliament, with a few exceptions. Soft law can be created by governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the business community. It should be noted that the distinction between hard and soft law is hard to make in practice. Legally binding law often contains references to standards and other non-legally binding rules, and soft-law rules often contain references to legally binding legislative rules. The two types of rules are therefore ideal types that cannot easily be found in their pure form empirically. This entry defines soft law, contrasts it with other forms of public sector intervention, and discusses its applications in the European Union (EU) and elsewhere.

**Definition**

Ulrika Mörth defines soft law as legitimate rules that may have political and legal effects, although the rules are not legally binding. This means that not every voluntary rule can be regarded as soft law. In cases of noncompliance, the sanctions are social and political rather than legal. A good example of how these social sanctions might look is the peer pressure mechanism in the international body the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). OECD lacks competence to issue legally binding laws. However, it is often argued that the organization has had important influence on the policies of member states, as these concern, for instance, reforms in the public sector, often labeled as the new public management reform. Social and political pressures are put on the member states by “naming and shaming” countries that do not follow the OECD recommendations. The soft law-making processes in the OECD are also characterized as social processes in which there is confidence building, exchanges of experiences, identity building, and socialization among the national officials; this can explain why the member states implement the OECD recommendations.

A classic and often used definition of soft law is that by Francis Snyder, in which he states that they are rules that have no binding force but that they may in any case “have practical effects” (Snyder, 1993, p. 198). A more thorough definition is presented by Karel Wellens and Gustaaf Borchardt (1989). Soft law is

the rules of conduct that find themselves on the legally non-binding level (in the sense of enforceable and sanctionable through international responsibility) but which according to the intention of its authors indeed do possess legal scope, which has to be further defined in each case. Such rules do not have in common a uniform standard of intensity as far as their legal scope is concerned, but they do have in common that they are directed at (intention of the authors) and do have as effect (through international law), that the conduct of States, international organizations and individuals is influenced by these rules, however without containing international legal rights and obligations. (p. 274)

The essence of these three definitions is that soft law is defined in a procedural way, that it consists of non-legally binding rules, and that it comes in many varieties. What Mörth’s definition adds to the traditional ones is thus the aspect of legitimacy.

**Forms of Public Sector Intervention**

The phenomenon of soft law has for a long time been used in global organizations, in the EU, and in nation-states, but it was not until the 1970s that the very concept of soft law was established. One explanation for why the concept started to be used by scholars and others was the fundamental changes in international politics. The oil crises in the 1970s changed how students of international politics defined international power. They changed their power perspective from a state-centric one to a more pluralist view on power in a globalized world. The increased awareness in the 1970s of globalization has since given rise to a vivid literature on the need for global rules in a globalized world. Studies of international regimes, as a way of analyzing the new international landscape, have argued that international cooperation consists of private and public actors and that non-legally binding rules are sometimes the only ones possible. Indeed, many international organizations use soft law because they have no other alternative. The absence of a world government that can decide on
supranational and legally binding rules makes voluntary rules the only viable alternative. Even coercive rules, which can be decided by the United Nations Security Council, are sometimes viewed as soft because of the lack of credible legal sanctions in cases of noncompliance. There is an illusory expectation that legally binding rules are more efficient when it comes to compliance in a globalized world, which lacks the authority of and democratic system found within nation-states.

Applications in the European Union

The use of soft law has increased in the EU, which seems to contradict the explanation mentioned above that soft law is often the only alternative for international organizations. Indeed, the EU has the legal competence to decide on hard law. One explanation of why soft law is used more is the increased need for flexibility when there is a concern about the possibility of noncompliance. Soft law is preferable when you are dealing with problems that are complex and diverse and characterized by uncertainty. Thus, rule making concerning highly controversial issues is politically the only way of moving forward in the European integration process because the member states want to retain national sovereignty in these areas. These controversial questions often go beyond the issues on the domestic market and other issues, such as economic policy, taxes, pensions, and other welfare topics, that are decided within the EU member states. The alternative to soft law is in practice never hard law. This is so because of the unwillingness of EU member states to delegate supranational decision-making powers to the EU with respect to politically controversial welfare state issues. By deciding on soft law, the national governments can argue to their EU-skeptical citizens that as these rules are voluntary, they have not delegated national sovereignty to the EU.

Nonstate Actors

So far, we have only discussed the use of soft law by international organizations. Legitimate rule making is not only a prerogative of intergovernmental organizations or of states. Private actors, both for-profit and nonprofit actors (nongovernmental organizations), are sometimes also seen as legitimate rule makers. Soft law is often linked to nonstate actors and to their participation in national, European, and global rule making. The private actors are not formally part of the hard-law legislative process that one finds in nation-states or in the EU. If they want to set up rules that regulate their activities, they have to use soft law. Voluntary rules are often the preferred alternative for the business community, which wants to preempt any state interference. One telling example is the emergence of corporate social responsibility, which consists of various codes of conduct that regulate how a socially responsible firm should behave. Whether these soft rules are complied with or not is often monitored by various nongovernmental organizations and not by states or other public actors. What is interesting with the emergence of corporate social responsibility is that it seems to support the idea that we are living in a time when soft law is the most readily available regulatory mode not only for private actors but also for states. States are less prone to use their hierarchical authority and so become advisory rather than directing. This change from hierarchical authority to a more horizontal steering is sometimes characterized as a move from government to governance. The steering mode of governance has empowered private actors and given them an authority that traditionally belonged to the state and the public sector. The spread of codes of conduct, standardization, and other voluntary rules indicates that a range of actors other than public ones strive to establish regulation through innovative mechanisms. The recent trends in making private firms more socially responsible suggest that we are dealing with a cross-sectional phenomenon. It is a reflection of transformed boundaries and relations across societal sectors—business, state, and civil society. These transformed boundaries can partly be explained by new demands on the three sectors and spheres. Modern society places many demands on private companies and on public actors. States are placing more emphasis on regulation instead of on public ownership and directly provided services. The state has a regulatory role and a contracting role in agreeing on rules between the public and the private spheres. These rules are increasingly soft or a complex combination of hard and soft law in which one may also find legally binding rules that are decided not by legislators but by the contracting partners. This
A mixture of actors and rules seems to blur the border between private and public actors. A new public domain emerges in which there are actors and rules from the state, from business, and from civil society. This public domain is transnational rather than national or international. Soft law makes boundaries less relevant and important. From a democratic point of view, this state of no borders between the public/private and the national/international could be a problem. Democracy is often practiced in terms of representative democracy, which means that elected politicians are the hard law legislators. They are accountable for the laws and for the decisions that they make. The use of soft law broadens the possibilities for who the legitimate rule makers may be and extends rule making to actors other than elected politicians. This means that the realm of the rule-making sphere expands but the democratic realm only concerns some of the actors. This, in turn, could lead to a situation in which those who have power are not democratically accountable for the decisions they make and that those who can be democratically accountable have no power.

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See also Accountability; Regulation

Further Readings

Solidarity

Solidarity is a feeling of being connected to and responsible for others. This experience of connection and obligation is a key aspect of the life of any collectivity and its members. Solidarity has therefore received much attention in political thought concerning both premodern and modern politics. In the context of democratic culture, it has been one of the celebrated ideas and ideals, although perhaps not as much as liberty and equality, among others. This has to do with the central, yet difficult, nature and role of solidarity. Hence, the two questions that this entry strives to answer are “What are the general characteristics of solidarity?” and “What are the challenges it entails?”

Characteristics of Solidarity

Solidarity refers to the type of relation in which people feel that they have an obligation to help others, for instance, because they experience a connection and “we-ness” with them based on a community of interest and values—to help others so that they are empowered and can stand on their own feet. Obviously, the modalities of this feeling of solidarity and of obligation, including its level of intensity, vary with the configuration of the environment in which it takes place. In this perspective, solidarity can be organized and analyzed according to three categories. Although these categories can overlap in reality, we present them separately for the sake of clarity. They concern the structural character of solidarity, its scope, and its subjective dimension. From this, we can infer that solidarity has a strong connection with responsibility and justice.

Structural Solidarity

Solidarity, understood and defined as structural, alludes to the social role that it plays in a collective entity, whatever this collectivity is (group, community or society, public or private, etc.). This role suggests that a collectivity cannot progress and develop if its members are not working together to achieve the common goal(s) with which it identifies or if they do not feel and act on a sense of solidarity toward one another and the
collectivity. This structural aspect of solidarity is why solidarity tends to be seen as the expression, instrument, and result of a commitment to the group, its members, and their well-being. Even the emergence and sustainability of cooperation, so essential socially because it epitomizes mutually beneficial interactions and the collective good, would be quite impossible if people did not think that they can count on the help of others—on their sense of solidarity—when needed.

Because solidarity as a structural phenomenon is about the possibility of collective life, it implies that each individual existence is social; that is, it relies in crucial ways on the sense of solidarity with others. This comes down to the fact that people cannot be and do much on their own. To a large extent, all people—no matter how capable—depend on the care of others to grow and flourish. Hence, at most junctures of their life, mundane or fundamental, individuals are the recipients of multiple actions of solidarity. The final stage, when the end has come, is no exception. It is a deep sense of human and spiritual solidarity that allows us to be buried with dignity and remembered after we are gone.

The structural character of solidarity and the modalities of the social dimension of each individual existence are not fixed forever. They differ according to the type of social group in which they unfold. Regardless of whether his analysis and classification of solidarity is correct, Émile Durkheim had this in mind when he distinguished mechanical solidarity from organic solidarity. For him, mechanical solidarity was characteristic of the relatively undifferentiated social structures of premodern societies, where, in his view, members are bound together by shared values, beliefs, and customs and are generally engaged in the same activities. The flipside of this “thick” inward solidarity tends to be its exclusive character. The translation of the “us” versus “them” divide into the “in” versus “out” difference has a heavy bearing on who is a recipient of solidarity and who is not. In comparison, modern solidarity in its various forms, springing from democratic values, tends to be wider than the ties of family. The norms of universality and equality at their core introduce and call for a connectedness among people. This connectedness goes much beyond the boundaries of the immediate communities in which individuals live. As a result, these norms have historically worked in favor of a widening and deepening of solidarity at the national and, subsequently, international levels.

This is not to say that the disparities between traditional and modern solidarity necessarily amount to absolute differences of scope. For example, although premodern solidarity has the tendency to be exclusive, it contains significant cosmopolitan orientations fueled by philosophical (e.g., the Stoics) and religious (as represented by Saint Paul and Christian universalism) beliefs. Not surprisingly, modern humanism and democratic culture built on these to develop their own brand(s) of solidarity. As for modern solidarity, although it was meant to be wide, it is also inclined to be thin. As universality and equality expand the circle of human solidarity, relating to people and offering real solidarity becomes abstract, fragile, and attenuated. Moreover, democratic considerations do not eliminate the existence of priority and hierarchy in any social setting and its selective and limiting impact on the projection of solidarity. How could it be otherwise considering that priorities and hierarchies are a part and parcel of human life, because without them, there are no particular guidelines to allocate the always limited resources at hand? Furthermore, when solidarity takes place within the framework of nationalism, a product and expression of modern democratic culture, it

The Scope of Solidarity

A second way of analyzing solidarity is related to its scope: In other words, to whom does it apply, and how deeply does it apply? Or to what extent is the realm of solidarity and of those who are in it wide or narrow, closed or open, and to what extent are the benefits it brings about thick or thin? To illustrate this point, it is helpful to recall the distinctions that have often been drawn between traditional and modern solidarity.

In traditional forms of social organizations, solidarity connotes a tight bond among people, frequently based on kinship. The sense of solidarity runs deep and permeates the collective’s internal relations. The flipside of this “thick” inward solidarity tends to be its exclusive character. The translation of the “us” versus “them” divide into the “in” versus “out” difference has a heavy bearing on who is a recipient of solidarity and who is not. In comparison, modern solidarity in its various forms, springing from democratic values, tends to be wider than the ties of family. The norms of universality and equality at their core introduce and call for a connectedness among people. This connectedness goes much beyond the boundaries of the immediate communities in which individuals live. As a result, these norms have historically worked in favor of a widening and deepening of solidarity at the national and, subsequently, international levels.
can conceive of and implement inclusiveness in an exclusive manner. This may happen both among countries where nationalist solidarity may be pursued without regard for the welfare of other states and within countries where dominant groups may deny the legitimacy of minorities and their right to observe their own traditions.

**Subjective Solidarity**

The third characteristic of solidarity, subjective solidarity, refers to the requirement that individuals carry out actions that create the structure needed for solidarity. They depend on the collaboration of people to function and, therefore, need to be activated by people. The negative effects accompanying actors’ disengagement best illustrate this. Once people feel that there is no point in upholding a sense of solidarity, particularly due to a lack of expected reciprocation, structural solidarity is in danger of disappearing. Exit strategies develop, each of them amounting to a “desolidarization” from others and from the collectivity with which the individual had previously identified.

But subjective solidarity is not limited to its contribution to structural solidarity. It can be at work in the absence of structural solidarity or against it. For instance, cosmopolitanism and the sense of solidarity it extends to all individuals certainly exceed the realms that solidarity has socially shaped, be it within the primary communities (e.g., the family) or at the national level. This is where solidarity is more—or less, depending on how we see it—than organized social reality and can become a product of individual initiative and, as such, dependent on subjective morality and solidarity. The individual decides that solidarity is owed to someone regardless of the existing collectivities of allegiance and the discriminations of solidarity they entail. In his own way, Emmanuel Levinas defends a radical version of this form of solidarity when he argues that our fundamental moral situation as people is not one of autonomy but of heteronomy, or obedience to the voice of the other.

**Solidarity, Responsibility, and Justice**

From these elements of solidarity, we can infer that it is closely connected to the notions of responsibility and justice. Concerning solidarity and responsibility, one of the highlights is that to experience solidarity is also to experience responsibility. In addition, since responsibility calls for action, if not leadership, solidarity as responsibility is neither simply theoretical nor an end in itself. It is geared toward action, toward helping others in a concrete manner and, if the gravity of the situation demands, with the commitment of an activist. Short of this, professing solidarity and doing next to nothing is destined to be no more than hypocrisy.

Such a letdown is all the more damaging since, ultimately, solidarity is a requisite of justice, in four principal ways. First, solidarity serves as a trigger mechanism vis-à-vis the concerns of justice. If there is no identification and connection and, consequently, no solidarity with others, experiencing and calling for justice is not likely to happen. Second, the fact that solidarity toward others presupposes that they have rights and that these have to be fulfilled is another illustration of the strong link between justice and solidarity. Third, as solidarity stresses the social conditions of possibility of a collectivity and the social nature of each individual’s existence within it, it necessarily asks for the interests of each to be taken into account and looked after. Hence, the distributive characteristic at the core of justice is at the center of solidarity as well. Fourth, while solidarity underlines what is owed to others in general, similar to justice, it pays special attention to the less fortunate and to the one who has been victimized.

**Challenges of Solidarity**

The challenges that solidarity has to confront are not to be ignored. Its importance makes them all the more daunting. Among them is the pressure that solidarity can put on human agency. There is also the difficulty of handling the conflicts among solidarity traditions. Finally, there is the problematic future of solidarity.

**Solidarity and the Question of Agency**

Although solidarity is essentially viewed as a positive phenomenon, what makes it an asset for the collectivity and its members can make it a liability. This Janus-faced nature applies to premodern and modern solidarity.
As noted earlier, solidarity tends to be about both inclusion and exclusion. Another problem is related to this perhaps unavoidable ambiguity and limitation of solidarity—the fact that solidarity has had difficulty finding a balance between too much and not enough and, in the process, endangering the sense of human agency—a somewhat paradoxical turn of events, since solidarity’s goal is empowerment.

Regarding the existence of too much solidarity and not enough agency, the constraining aspects of primitive forms of solidarity have at times led anthropology, sociology, and political science, for example, to stress that in these primitive forms, people have no room for a life of their own. To a lesser degree, a similar assessment has been put forward concerning how long-established traditions fix collective and individual existences in more or less unquestioned and difficult-to-change patterns. From the 18th century onward, criticisms of the social role of religion have frequently taken place in this context.

A classic charge against modernity has been that it leads to a very thin and perhaps inadequate solidarity, with debilitating effects on human agency. Two kinds of shortcomings have been underlined in particular. Connected and standing at the intersection of democracy and capitalism, they point to the fact that modern culture strengthens individual and collective agency in some ways but weakens it as well.

The first alleged shortcoming of modernity arises from the individualism of modern democratic solidarity. Although its values originate from a commitment to universality and equality, which engineers empowerment, at the same time, it encourages individual and anomic tendencies. From this perspective, many have argued that the liberal branch of democratic culture, especially in its celebration of individual liberty, is more prone to this than the republican one, which stresses the dynamics of rights and duties among individuals. In any case, in the worst circumstances, individuals can end up being loyal to and in solidarity with no one. As such, they can be deprived of the social anchoring with, and belonging to, the world and others that is so important to feeling and being at home in one’s life.

A second shortcoming arises when those in charge politically and economically are eager to minimize the sense of obligation associated with democratic values. What is interesting is that the principle of responsibility and its individual and social virtues are often put forward both as a justification for a decreased sense of responsibility and as an alternative to redress the ills that this may produce. An example of this shortcoming of modernity can be seen at the national level in the United States. There, a cultural tendency toward self-reliance is at times instrumentalized by self-serving economic forces to discredit the idea that institutions have a duty to make possible and underwrite social solidarity. The debates on health care, in 2009 and later, provide a case in point. But the reduction of solidarity to a bare minimum is taking place internationally as well, as the state of international human rights indicates. To be sure, conventions calling for their defense in their various dimensions create a framework of international solidarity. However, this sense of solidarity is not imperative. Despite the costs incurred by people beyond their borders, countries never fail to give preference to their national interests and those of their citizens. Their reluctance to act decisively to address the humanitarian crisis of the 1990s and the insufficient policy efforts at the global level to overcome widespread poverty, to say the least, are part of this story. The absence of international mechanisms of accountability to tackle these limitations only expresses and reinforces the lack of commitment.

Conflicts Among Traditions of Solidarity

The difficulty of accommodating and reconciling the variety of solidarity traditions is another major challenge. Conflicts between these competing traditions concern access to and distribution of resources, on the one hand, and redefinition of identities, collective and individual, on the other.

The different forms of solidarity of the past and the present and those constituting the diverse layers of social life show that solidarity comes in many shapes and sizes. In addition, as each of them orients people and collectivities in set ways, it is not easy to find a constructive middle ground between status quo and change.

Already in the West, it has been difficult. Most of the economic, political, social, and cultural battles related to the evolution of Western countries
have taken place in connection with tensions among visions of solidarity. The conflicts surrounding the various welfare state models of the European continent and even more so between them and the American model are the latest illustration of this situation. That being said, no matter how formidable these struggles and the pain of accommodation have been, they appear relatively benign compared with the ones generated by the clash of Western and non-Western traditions of solidarity since the West started its worldwide expansion at the end of the 15th century. Over time, to formulate and advocate their claims of individual and collective rights in support of their emancipation, non-Western countries have borrowed extensively from the values and structures of modern democratic solidarity. Therefore, not all is bad. Still, the non-West has paid a heavy price for the hegemonic domination of the West.

National alliances with the West have often led to the elimination of local forms of solidarity, with no replacement by other forms. Furthermore, although countries may have gained nominal independence, in fact, the majority of citizens have often been relegated to second-class status. In the worst case scenario, with the local elite playing the double game of being Westernized and yet fixated on preserving their ancestral privileges and regular people left with no place to go, the types of solidarity that had glued people together can disintegrate. In the process, it can open the gates of radicalization and violence within and across national boundaries. While gradually, non-Western communities have had, nolens volens, to forge hybrid and workable new identities, the trauma and resentment generated by cultural dislocation and alienation have been deep, with subsequent success in development, when it took place, easing but not erasing these.

The West has been equally effective in imposing its vision of solidarity internationally. At this level, too, non-Western countries have made the best of the Western culture of solidarity expressed in the norms of human rights, self-determination, and sovereign equality of states, in particular to liberate themselves from the shackles of colonialism. Nevertheless, beyond this, it has been an uphill battle. Although Western powers have been to some extent willing to bring on board non-Western traditions and concerns of solidarity in the negotiation, conceptualization, and implementation of international norms of regulation, their worldview and interests have prevailed and continue to prevail. This dominance could be seen in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights when the United Nations was created. Today, the battles concerning development and climate change indicate how developed countries, essentially the West, continue to concede very little to the developing countries—by and large, the non-West.

The consequence of this somewhat one-sided story of solidarity is not simply that it undermines or even expels non-Western traditions of solidarity but that the message of solidarity, and of the democratic solidarity projected by the West, also becomes a contradictory one. It is made of and oscillates between predatory and humanistic orientations. This is not new, since this has been the trademark of Western relations with the rest of the world during more or less the past 5 centuries. Critics of Western solidarity call attention to several issues. First, they ask, what kind of solidarity, especially one that claims to be democratic, offers the spectacle of people being consistently inclined to overlook the interests and rights of others? Second, if the solidarity is geared toward monopoly and exclusiveness, the risk is high that this will result in a world without options and reflexivity. If only for this, it is at odds with the commitment to pluralism at the core of modern democratic solidarity. Finally, these critics argue that at a time when societies are increasingly not self-sustainable because they are increasingly not self-contained, these are counterproductive ways to conceive and implement solidarity. It engenders more disintegration than integration.

The Future of Solidarity

Part of the solution for this problem, and the future of solidarity, lies in establishing relations and systems of dependencies among individuals and collective actors that are more positive and inclusive than negative and exclusive, as is presently the case. This will not eliminate all the dilemmas of solidarity, particularly when these have to be addressed in the context of the democratic demands of pluralism, universality, equality, and liberty now serving as benchmarks of legitimacy,
nationally and internationally. But at least it shows a path for winning not at the expense of others but with and through taking account of others. From this perspective, inequalities should never be so profound and entrenched that they deny countries and individuals who suffer from them the possibility of overturning them and achieving at some point a threshold of decent empowerment.

Solidarity, one of the oldest notions of social life and political thought, far from being a thing of the past, is at the center of the future of individuals and collectivities. Its relevance endures.

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See also Anomia; Cooperation; Durkheim, Émile; Empowerment; Individualism; International Solidarity; Responsibility

Further Readings


Sovereignty

In practice, sovereignty is one of the most contested concepts in political science, although it is conventionally used to connote supreme authority within a given polity. The meanings of sovereignty vary widely depending on the context, as well as on its inferential connections to other concepts. Although long crucial to modern political science and international relations, the concept of sovereignty is notoriously ambiguous and thus hard to define with any precision. During the past decades, it has been argued that the concept of sovereignty has lost some of its analytical purchase due to the intensified exchange and increased interdependence between political communities. This entry examines issues related to the definition of sovereignty, traces its historical evolution since the Middle Ages, and considers its relevance to political science today.

Issues of Definition

The proper source, locus, and scope of political authority have been subjected to constant debate in the history of political thought. From where does such authority derive its legitimacy? With whom should it reside? What are the proper limits of its exercise? While these are some of the questions that any account of political authority must confront, most modern definitions of sovereignty imply that such authority—quite irrespective of the sources of its legitimacy and its exact locus—must be both indivisible and absolute to qualify as properly sovereign and nothing else. While being indivisible implies that it must—at least in theory—reside with a single agent in a given polity, being absolute entails that this agent either is sovereign or not but nothing in between. These formal characteristics distinguish sovereignty from related concepts such as autonomy and independence, both of which are thought to be matters of degree. Insofar as sovereignty is defined in terms of
authority, it is also thereby distinguished from mere power, since the latter concept does not normally carry the same connotations of acceptance, obligation, or obedience as does authority. Taken together, these defining characteristics have raised the question whether sovereignty is best understood as a rule or as an empirical fact. In analogy with grammatical rules, we could say that the concept of sovereignty contains both descriptive and prescriptive elements. Sovereignty thus not only refers to a state of affairs but also implies that this state of affairs constitutes a norm to which political life ought to conform in order to be intelligible. Finally, there is a performative dimension to the concept of sovereignty, insofar as it is frequently used by various agents to claim supreme authority in different contexts.

Modern theories of sovereignty frequently distinguish between the internal and external aspects of sovereignty. Internal sovereignty is attributed to the governmental institutions of a state by virtue of fulfilling some or all of the above criteria, while external sovereignty is attributed to the state as a whole by virtue of being recognized as such by other states. Since the terms of recognition are dependent on the internal attributes of sovereignty, the requirements of external sovereignty have varied considerably over time. Recognition has been granted on different grounds, ranging from principles of dynastic succession, via national self-determination and territorial integrity, to the more recent requirement that states should be governed according to democratic principles to merit international recognition.

**Historical Evolution**

Although quintessentially a modern concept, the history of sovereignty can be traced back at least to the political theology and feudal practices of the late Middle Ages. At this point in time, supreme authority was vested in the person of the prince, who derived his authority both from theological sources and from his relative ability to protect his subjects from internal and external enemies. The subsequent articulation of modern conceptions of sovereignty followed a series of cumulative steps.

The first step toward the articulation of a recognizably modern conception of sovereignty was taken when claims to supreme authority were territorialized. This took place in sharp contrast to prevailing views of imperial authority, which emphasized its universal and boundless character. While the idea of imperial authority implied no restriction on the scope of temporal power, rulers who contested such imperial claims during the 13th century did so by asserting that individual kings ought to enjoy the same political and legal status within their domains as does the emperor within the empire. A decisive break with the imperial order occurred when the rulers of the medieval kingdoms of France and Naples refused to recognize the authority of the emperor Henry VII over matters considered internal. In support of their claims, they could draw on the doctrines of jurists such as Andreas de Isernia and Bartolus of Sassoferrato, who argued that temporal authority ought to be territorially delimited.

A second, and largely simultaneous, step toward a modern conception of sovereignty was taken with the gradual depersonalization of political authority. During the Middle Ages, authority had often been conferred on the physical person of the prince through anointment and other acts of liturgy that established his divine right to rule. Depersonalization meant that supreme authority was relocated to the fictitious person of the crown and then transferred to the royal domain or to the body politic as a whole. This transition culminated in the creation of an abstract state concept during the 17th century, to which sovereignty could be attributed independently of the physical person of the prince.

The third step toward a modern conception of sovereignty was taken during the 16th and 17th centuries, when sovereignty was defined in terms of indivisibility and absoluteness. Legal theorists such as Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and Thomas Hobbes argued that sovereign authority could not be divided within one and the same polity and that it is either attributable to a given agent or not. The consequence of these conceptual mutations was that the modern concept of sovereignty came to connote supreme, indivisible, and absolute authority within a given territory, while the questions of its proper locus and scope within each state was left to succeeding generations to handle. This shift implied that the very identity of the early-modern state, along with the emergent international society
of states in Europe, became dependent on the existence of sovereign authority and its recognition by others.

The fourth and final step toward a fully modern conception of sovereignty was taken when sovereignty was popularized by being relocated from kings to the people. From Rousseau onward, the will of the people was regarded as the source of sovereignty. Yet the rise of popular sovereignty did little to challenge the underlying requirements of territoriality and indivisibility, which left modern political theory with the problem of accounting how the sovereignty of the people could be justified in democratic terms. The final outcome of this transition was the modern nation-state, governed according to the principles of popular sovereignty. Toward the end of the 19th century, this entity became the main object of inquiry for modern historiography and political science.

During the 20th century, the concept of sovereignty became increasingly controversial within political science. Whereas many pluralists argued that the concept of sovereignty was redundant to understand how modern democratic societies are governed, Marxists argued that sovereignty was but a fiction designed to conceal the uneven distribution of power and wealth between classes in capitalist societies. Still others argued that the concept of sovereignty should be banished from the vocabulary of political science because of its opacity and ambiguity.

The Contemporary Debate
More recently, the usefulness of the concept of sovereignty has been contested on other grounds, however. At the heart of this debate, we find the question whether sovereignty is a permanent condition of political order or whether it is likely to be replaced by other forms of political authority in the near future.

Many political scientists today dispute whether it is meaningful to speak of political authority as being absolute and indivisible since the processes of European integration and globalization have brought relocations of political authority to levels below as well as above that of the state. Today, political authority appears to be both relative and divisible in character. Consequently, many political scientists argue that the concept of sovereignty has to be either redefined to fit present conditions better or, more radically, abandoned altogether in favor of other concepts such as autonomy. Other critics have contested the usefulness of the concept of sovereignty on more philosophical grounds, questioning the ontological status of this concept and its ideological functions in justifying abuses of power and international warfare. Many of these critics have argued that sovereignty has been reified by modern political science and international relations theory. Rather than simply referring to a legal norm or an empirical fact, constructivists and poststructuralists have argued that the concept of sovereignty has been constitutive of the modern political order through its usage in political discourse. By implication, sovereignty is believed to be historically contingent and hence mutable, rather than a necessary condition of political order.

Such a diagnosis of course begs the question of available alternatives. Like many earlier attempts to contest the concept of sovereignty, the recent critique of sovereignty presupposes what it sets out to criticize, namely, that there is, or at least has been, something like indivisible and absolute political authority. The concept of sovereignty, along with all its traditional connotations of supremacy, territoriality, indivisibility, and absoluteness, nevertheless continues to exercise a powerful influence on the contemporary political imagination, to the point that alternatives either seem out of reach or carry features similar to that of the good old sovereign state.

This should be evident from contemporary attempts to justify a relocation of sovereignty to the global level, which despite their aspirations often remain premised on the notion that political authority needs to be both bounded and centralized for a political community to be viable. Hence, symptomatically, the present contestation of sovereignty seems to be what keeps this alive within political science and international relations theory. By focusing on sovereignty and the question of its endurance, recent critics have left some more basic questions of political authority—questions that the concept of sovereignty once was invented to address—unanswered. To answer these questions without presupposing that political authority needs to be indivisible, or that political communities have to be bounded, remains one of the main challenges.
Spatial Models of Politics

Spatial models are widely used by political scientists to analyze decision making in a wide range of settings, from elections and legislatures, to government formation, to international organizations, to the U.S. Supreme Court, and many other things. Spatial models provide what has proved to be a fruitful way to think rigorously about politics, grounded in a simple intuition with a reach far beyond the narrow confines of professional political science. At least since the days of the French Revolution, indeed, references to “left” and “right” and to changing policy “positions” have been a part of day-to-day political discourse. The general public generally understands what it means to talk about politics using “spatial” language, as such language is not just a conceit of political scientists. In this entry, mathematical and empirical approaches to spatial modeling and their applications to various forms of political decision making are discussed.

The words left and right refer in this context to directions along a “dimension” of political preference. But one dimension is rarely enough for a good description of how real people think in a given setting. It is easy to imagine two people who are both on the economic right, with similar views about government intervention in the economy, who nonetheless have very different views about government intervention in matters of personal morality. One can think of views on matters such as abortion and same-sex marriage, for example, in terms of a liberal–conservative dimension that is quite independent from—in spatial language orthogonal to—the left–right dimension. If economic and social issues are all that concern political scientists, then they can consider political preferences to be well described using a two-dimensional space, spanned by a left–right economic policy dimension and a liberal–conservative social policy dimension. Building systematically on this spatial metaphor for describing political preferences, a metaphor that does seem to be deeply rooted in real politics, political scientists tend to take one of two distinct but related approaches when they analyze political decision making. These approaches can be thought of as mathematical and empirical.

Mathematical and Empirical Approaches

One can, as a mathematical construct, think of an abstract space of possible outcomes. An integral part of the formal definition of individual rationality is having preferences that rank such outcomes in a transitive way: Preferring outcome A to B and preferring B to C implies preferring A to C. Many cost–benefit calculations involve specifying “how much” A is preferred to B, relative to how much B is preferred to C. Information or assumptions about such matters can be expressed as perceived “distances” between A, B, and C in an assumed “metric” space comprising a set of possible outcomes and a measure of the distance between these.

One key distinction between mathematical and empirical approaches to spatial modeling arises as soon as the metric used to measure distances between outcomes is considered. A typical approach by mathematical modelers is to assume a
distance measure that is analytically tractable. By far, the most common assumption is the Euclidean metric, familiar to all who know elementary geometry. The Euclidean metric uses Pythagoras’s theorem to measure the distance between two points in a multidimensional space as the square root of the sum of the squares of interpoint distances on each dimension. If individual \( i \), with ideal point \( x_{id} \) on dimension \( d \), evaluates outcome \( j \), perceived as having a position \( x_{jd} \) on dimension \( d \), then \( i \)'s perceived Euclidean distance from \( j \), \( D_{ij}^E \), is

\[
D_{ij}^E = \sqrt{\sum_d (x_{id} - x_{jd})^2}.
\]

While Euclidean distances are often implicitly treated as being “natural,” they make a key empirical assumption about how real people trade off distance from their ideal points on one dimension against distance on other dimensions. For example, if important issues to be decided concern abortion and public spending and if some voter is evaluating two policy packages, the Euclidean assumption is that this evaluation is not the aggregate distance between packages on abortion and public spending but rather the square root of the sum of the squares of these distances. This is an empirical assumption about how real people think. There is, furthermore, consistent psychological evidence that if two dimensions are separable—that is, if a person’s evaluations of outcomes on one dimension can be described without knowing his or her evaluations on the other dimension—then decision making by real humans is more realistically modeled using the city block metric. This assumes that the perceived distance between two outcomes is the simple sum of their distances on each dimension:

\[
D_{ij}^{CB} = \sum_d |x_{id} - x_{jd}|
\]

Notwithstanding the evidence that a city block metric may generate a more realistic empirical representation of the preferences of real humans, it is far less tractable analytically. Thus, most published formal analyses of spatial models in a multidimensional setting assume a Euclidean metric or some generalization of this that is convenient for manipulation using calculus. This is an aspect of a more general distinction between mathematical and empirical approaches to spatial modeling.

The empirical approach uses a space as a way to describe the real preferences of real people in real settings, not as a formal scheme for characterizing the possible preferences of possible agents in possible settings. In the empirical approach, in stark contrast to the mathematical approach, dimensions of difference in the outcome space have substantive meaning. As opposed to a horizontal or \( x \) dimension, left and right may be described, for example, in terms of economic policies; similarly, a second dimension may be described in terms of specific social or moral issues. Much more important than the words used to describe dimensions, however, the structure of the space is defined in terms of structures of preferences in real populations. For example, political scientists may be able to predict attitudes on same-sex marriage in a given population from attitudes on abortion, gun control, and capital punishment; indeed, they may be able to predict attitudes on any one issue in this bundle from attitudes on the other issues. In this event, they can think of attitudes on same-sex marriage, abortion, gun control, and capital punishment as if, in this population, all correlate with an unobservable “latent” dimension. And they can give this latent dimension a name, such as liberalism versus conservatism. This is an empirical description of how real people think in this population—not an abstract mathematical characterization of how possible people might possibly think. Thus, while it is theoretically possible to envisage vegetarians who favor capital punishment for humans, if, indeed, most real vegetarians oppose capital punishment, then we think of vegetarianism and capital punishment as if they are both predicted by a single underlying dimension. The same set of issue areas may thus generate different empirical spaces for different human populations if attitudes correlate in different ways.

This focuses attention on the dimensionality of policy spaces, which are fixed by assumption in mathematical spatial models but are the primary focus of interest for empirical models. Empirical policy spaces are estimated from data on real attitudes (or assumed from assumed data on these). One way or another, this estimation involves data reduction; information on a large number of specific matters on which real people do, or might, have preferences is summarized in terms of their
positions on a much smaller number of latent dimensions with substantive interpretations.

There are many ways to do this. One way is to analyze manifest behavior, such as voting in legislatures. A political scientist might think, for example, that legislators’ voting records reflect their real preferences and that people who typically vote on the same side of a set of motions in a legislature have more similar preferences than people who typically vote on different sides of these motions. Observed behavior on legislative voting can be used to derive a matrix of interlegislator differences; the political scientist can then seek a low-dimensional space that represents these differences reasonably well. Alternatively, he or she can use surveys to ask politicians directly about their preferences on a range of issues. Expert surveys can use country specialists as surrogates, in essence asking them how politicians would answer a set of questions on the issues if they were asked and if they were to answer honestly. Speeches and texts generated by real politicians can be analyzed for content about the authors’ preferences by human interpretative coders or by automated computational algorithms. There are many potential sources of raw data on the preferences of real political actors.

Having collected raw data on preferences, a high-dimensional data space can be reduced using some scaling technique to a low-dimensional summary space that is taken as the most efficient description of preferences of many different people on many different matters. The most detailed possible description of preferences is always high-dimensional—everyone is different from everyone else in some way. For a given substantive problem, therefore, there is always a trade-off. Analysts ultimately seek a spatial description of preferences that is a parsimonious (low-dimensional) summary of relevant similarities and differences between people yet does not miss something that is both substantively important and critical to theoretical conclusions. This means that there is no such thing as the abstract dimensionality of the structure of preferences in a given setting. In this sense, there is no “one true space” to be discovered if only political scientists could find it. For any substantive problem, there are high-dimensional background data that can be collected on “raw” attitudes in the real population under investigation. There are also “metadata,” which cannot be collected, on potential attitudes on matters that have yet to arise and cannot yet be conceived. Given the data on attitudes, there is a best estimate, $d$, of the dimensionality of the relevant policy space (with $d$ lying somewhere between zero and infinity) that is the most useful low-dimensional summary of preferences for the problem at hand. Once the problem is specified, scaling techniques that reduce high-dimensional data spaces to low-dimensional summaries typically have measures of “fit” that show how much variation in the raw data is captured by a given low-dimensional description. Such measures help the analyst make substantive judgments, for example, that the best spatial representation in a given setting is two-dimensional—in the sense that a two-dimensional representation fits the data much better than a one-dimensional representation but adding a third dimension does not yield much improvement in fit in relation to a given problem. Notwithstanding this, the ultimate decision on the dimensionality of an empirical space is a judgment call for the analyst, who in a sense is always an activist in imposing some low-dimensional representation on high-dimensional data about preferences.

**Implications**

The dimensionality of a given policy space, a fundamentally empirical matter, has profound implications for abstract mathematical models. This is because logical inferences derived from formal spatial models of political decision making, and especially of voting, depend critically on the dimensionality of the assumed outcome space as well as on other detailed assumptions about the preferences of real humans. One well-known reason for this arises from the possibility of voting cycles over outcomes in multidimensional spaces, whereby A beats B, B beats C, and C beats A in majority votes. While the famous formal proofs of this are known as the chaos results, the substantive implication in such settings is not “chaos” but that “something else,” over and above unconstrained majority voting, is needed before models can make unambiguous predictions about outcomes. Mathematical models of voting in multidimensional outcome spaces, therefore, tend to be very sensitive to precise substantive assumptions about the local institutional setting under investigation—assumptions that may drastically narrow both
their formal generality and their empirical applicability—and hence their susceptibility to scientific testing.

Spatial representations of preferences over outcomes, whether assumed arbitrarily or estimated empirically, are not of course models in themselves; they are key inputs to such models. Thus, there is no such thing as “the” spatial model of voting, of legislative behavior, or of government formation. There are many different spatial models of these important political phenomena, each model building on some spatial characterization of preferences by making precise behavioral assumptions about decision-making agents and the institutional setting in which their decisions are manifested. What makes all these very different models spatial is that the utility functions of key agents, which may of course include many different things, all include terms that compare expected utilities deriving from different points in the outcome space. Relative utilities of pairs of outcomes are described in terms of perceived distances between these points and an additional assumption about how the agent feels about “policy loss.” Let $U_{ij}$ be the utility derived by agent $i$ from outcome $j$ and $A_{ij}$ be some vector of other sources of agent utility, perhaps the charisma of some political candidate or a bribe paid, that have nothing to do with policy preferences. It is conventional to assume that agent utilities decline as a function of increasing policy distance between an ideal point and the outcome being evaluated. This function is often assumed to be linear ($U_{ij} = A_{ij} - D_{ij}$) or quadratic ($U_{ij} = A_{ij} - D_{ij}^2$). As with the choice of metrics, the choice of loss functions is often made on the basis of analytical convenience rather than empirical evidence about how real people actually think. The assumption of quadratic loss is the more common and is occasionally justified as an empirical assumption that real humans are risk-averse, though hard evidence about risk aversion in the real world typically concerns economic decision making, and there is very little evidence one way or the other concerning whether real people tend to be risk-averse when making political decisions. It seems equally plausible to argue that voters, for example, are more sensitive to policy differences between two parties whose policies are close to their own ideal points than they are to the differences between two parties whose policy positions are very remote, yet this runs counter to the assumption of quadratic loss. For this reason, a number of spatial models of political decision making assume linear rather than quadratic policy loss in the agent utility functions that they specify, although justifications for this, when explicit, tend to be casual.

Model Types

Within the general spatial modeling framework set out above, there is huge variation in the type of model one encounters. One famous application, associated with the name of Anthony Downs, though predating his work, concerns voting in elections. A spatial model of voting in elections might assume an exogenously fixed institutional setting of an election to one single-seat district with a simple plurality formula for mapping votes cast into seats won. It might assume two species of agents—politicians and voters—with an exogenous given set of politicians assumed to prefer winning the support of as many voters as possible and with voters assumed to prefer voting for the politician who promotes the policy package that seems to them to be closest to their own ideal policy. These assumptions define premises for one of many possible spatial models of electoral competition—in this case, one possible model of presidential elections under plurality rule. If voters’ preferences on all relevant issues can be represented using a single latent dimension and if politicians have good information about these preferences, then such a model generates the well-known implication that, in the absence of some other assumption, the policy positions of both candidates will tend to converge on the ideal point of the median voter, who in this sense will be pivotal in deciding the election result. The reader will have noticed a lot of ifs in this informal statement of the model, however, hinting at the many possible spatial models of this one single political process.

Quite different spatial models may be generated by different institutional settings. Such models might allow the strategic “entry” of new candidates into the competition. They might assume a diverse set of single-seat districts, in which candidates from the same party must all set the same policy position. Given some assumed structure of political communication, they might assume that politicians can set different policy positions in different
districts. They might also assume the following: a diverse set of multisepct districts, with exogenous or maybe endogenous boundaries, and various, maybe endogenous, electoral formulae used to translate votes cast into seats won. Different models may make different behavioral assumptions about politicians—for example, that politicians are motivated to enact policies rather than maximize votes or have some specified trade-off between these objectives. Also, it may be assumed that voters are motivated to have an impact on the composition of the eventual government rather than supporting their closest party, or some trade-off may be assumed between these objectives. There is thus no limit to the number of possible spatial models of voting in elections. A particular model is identified by its explicit (and often implicit) assumptions about agent behavior and the institutions structuring this.

Moving beyond voting in elections, characterized by elite–mass interactions between a small set of candidates and a large set of voters, spatial models have also been applied to elite–elite interactions such as voting in committees and legislatures and in the U.S. Supreme Court as well as bargaining between party leaders over government formation in parliamentary democracies. Such high-stakes settings with interactions between small numbers of sophisticated agents may well imply different empirical assumptions about the following: how much each agent knows about the preferences of all others, whether all agents perform the same type of complex strategic calculation about matters that may or may not be important to them, and how much agents focus on optimizing decisions on the problem under investigation, such as voting on some issue, when they must in reality make many decisions on many different matters. Voting in elections may be important, but not that important, for voters, whereas bargaining between seasoned politicians over who becomes the prime minister is likely the most important deal they ever do.

In each of these cases, there remains a sharp analytical distinction between spatial models that make the assumption that real-world preferences on all important matters can be well represented by a single latent dimension and those that assume that more than one dimension is needed for a realistic representation of preferences. One-dimensional spatial models tend to be analytically tractable, even if they can sometimes be difficult to resolve. They are thus appealing to formal theorists, who would be the first to acknowledge that the assumption of a one-dimensional preference structure is substantively unrealistic. Many published spatial models are, for this reason, one-dimensional, and the claim is typically that, even when patently unrealistic, they are in some sense aids to intuition. Multidimensional models, while of their essence offering greater potential realism with regard to descriptions of how real people think, tend to be analytically intractable. One response to this is to constrain the model with further strong institutional assumptions that make it tractable while at the same time reducing its generality. The other solution is to investigate the model using carefully designed suites of computer simulations.

Conclusion
Spatial modeling is a general approach to analyzing political decision making. The more abstract and formal the approach, the more the resulting models are about decision making in general. The more empirical the approach, the more they are about decision making by human beings in settings where data could possibly be collected. Within this general approach, there is no single spatial model of decision making, by either abstract agents or real humans, in any specified setting. The considerable intellectual attraction of the spatial modeling approach is that it offers a conceptual language that allows different modeling assumptions to be compared in relatively explicit ways. The spatial modeling approach thus provides a set of building blocks for different models of important political processes but leaves all important substantive assumptions firmly in the hands of the modeler.

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See also Voting Rules, Electoral, Effects of

Further Readings
Political stability is an elusive concept, one that is difficult to define and operationalize. In simplest terms (and, as will be seen, the concept simplest terms can itself be misleading), stable political systems are those in which governance and the transfer of power occur in regular, predictable ways. When we think of stable political systems, therefore, we think of those that hold regular elections and incumbents who vacate offices and allow opponents to take over those offices. We also envision systems in which protests are not widespread, especially violent, or challenging to the basic system of governance. As is evident from this definition, however, stable systems that are not democratic would seem to be excluded from it. Yet dictatorships can last for decades and, thus, in this sense, are stable. Consequently, we must acknowledge that the proposed definition is problematic, and so we need to think more deeply about the topic. This entry is consequently focused on the three questions that should be addressed when dealing with this topic: how to define, how to achieve, and how to measure stability.

Defining Stability

Two primary difficulties confront us when we think more deeply about the meaning of political stability. First, while most journalistic and some academic accounts treat stability as a dichotomous variable, meaning that a given political system is either “stable” or “unstable,” on-the-ground reality is quite different. Only at the most basic level is such a dichotomy justifiable. For analytical purposes, however, there is widespread recognition among experts that political stability in the real world covers a very broad continuum. There are some political systems that are chronically unstable, with elections occurring irregularly (if at all), and in which the outcome of elections is often contested and likely to lead to mass protests, elite subversion, or both. On the other hand, there are systems in which regular, predictable political processes are almost always the norm. Finally, there is a wide range between these two extremes and cases of nations that fluctuate between stable, unstable, and everything in between.

Political science has recognized the continuous nature of political stability and as a result has accepted the wide variation in degrees of stability as an important variable to be studied in comparative politics and international relations. Indeed, there often exist regions within a given country that exhibit more stability than others. Far less consensus emerges on the normative benefits of stability, which leads to the second and more vexing challenge in coming to grips with the term stability.

Is stability a good thing, and if so, is more of it always better? Consider the argument in favor of a state of continual instability. This position was perhaps most strongly and dramatically argued by China’s Mao Zedong. From Mao’s perspective, China (and indeed all Marxist regimes) benefited from a state of constant revolution; in the absence of such revolution, bourgeois forces could threaten to reinstate capitalism. As a result, Mao plunged China into the Cultural Revolution in 1966, producing social unrest, violence, and purges. From Mao’s point of view, however, and from that of the intellectual leadership of the Red Guards who held sway during this period, instability was to be institutionalized as the new “normal” in order to prevent the communist revolution from being extinguished. Only with the death of Mao and the arrest of the so-called Gang of Four in 1976 did this protracted, nonstop “revolution” come to an end.

Whereas for Maoists political instability was a cherished ideal, for other regimes, whether on the right or the left, instability of any kind has been seen as an existential threat. Cases on the left include Cuba under Fidel Castro, a country ruled for nearly 50 years by one man until his health failed, and the case of North Korea under the rule of Kim Il-sung, who ran his country from 1948 until 1994. At the opposite extreme, are the cases of Alfredo Stroessner, who ruled Paraguay from 1954 until 1989, and the Somoza family dynasty, which controlled Nicaragua from the 1930s until their fall in the Sandinista Revolution in 1979. These and similar regimes see any form of instability as
threatening and have routinely imprisoned and/or killed anyone who has challenged them. In these cases, then, extreme stability is clearly not a positive state from most normative perspectives.

Even when we move away from such cases of extreme stability or extreme instability, it is unclear how much stability is normatively ideal. From an instrumental point of view, however, it does seem clear that the extremes are highly dysfunctional in a variety of ways. At the most basic level, human life is often threatened when instability is high. The great famine that affected China from 1958 to 1961, in which at least 15 million people are said to have died, is an illustration of the negative impact of such instability. Beyond death from famine, instability also affects health more generally, as well as education, since schools and universities are often shuttered in conditions of permanent revolution. On the economic side, financial investment is almost certainly attenuated in countries that exhibit high levels of instability, as the risk premium is too great for all but the most risk-tolerant investors. In addition, political careers are hard to shape and plan for when instability is high, since the rules of the game are constantly in question and subject to change. Young people who aspire to a political career can find themselves with their political parties banned or the political office to which they aspire eliminated.

Extreme political stability, on the other hand, produces other costs. Dictatorships discourage investors because, although the regime itself may be stable, its decisions are often unpredictable, since they depend on the whim of a single individual or clique of noncompetitively selected rulers. Investors can find themselves with their factories, farms, or banks expropriated virtually overnight. Recourse to the courts is futile, as the rule of law is no more than what the dictator declares it to be. Innovation is stifled in such regimes, since there are few incentives for individuals to be creative. Indeed, dictatorships inculcate fear in those who wish to accomplish any sort of change, since such change will be seen as a challenge to the status quo. Political careers are often truncated by purges, as parties or families fall out of favor.

In sum, it would appear that as one moves to the extremes of stability or instability, the costs grow exponentially, suggesting that the gains for stability may conform to a quadratic form with the highest returns of all kinds (human, economic, and political) lying at the top of an inverted U curve. In effect, it would appear that the ancient Greek philosophers had got it right—Aristotle criticized Sparta in the Politics for its exclusive focus on making war and its lack of attention to making peace.

Achieving Stability

The key question in the literature of contemporary political science is how to achieve stability. Much of that literature has focused one way or the other on the link between political legitimacy and political stability. Most modern theorizing goes back to Max Weber in his classic work Politics as a Vocation. Weber saw three types of legitimacy: charismatic, traditional, and rational-legal, only the last being a stable form. In Political Man, Seymour Lipset drew on Weber and hypothesized that stable democracies are achieved when political systems are seen by their citizens as being effective at delivering public services and are held accountable for their actions. Lipset as well as David Easton realized that regimes that achieved these goals would produce citizens uninterested in violent or radical change. Moreover, such systems would be better equipped than others to weather the storm of periods of especially poor performance. Hence, legitimate systems can overcome sharp economic downturns because they have built up a reservoir of political support, and citizens are prepared to grant them significant degrees of freedom to “fix up the mess.”

Beyond legitimacy, stability also seems to depend on reasonable equality in the distribution of wealth. Considerable literature, beginning with Aristotle and continuing into modern political science, has linked instability to inequality. Academic disputes have emerged, however, as to how to measure inequality and whether scholarly attention should be focused on income inequality, wealth inequality, or land inequality (see, e.g., the works of Manus Midlarsky, and Edward Muller and Mitchell Seligson listed in the Further Readings).

Measuring Stability

Stability has been measured extensively by databases in political science that have counted the number of coups, revolutions, insurrections, violent protests, and so on. Debates center on the
significance and weighting of each of these events: Do 10 violent protests add up to the equivalent of one attempt at insurrection, and how can one measure these events? The empirical work on factors related to legitimacy, which in turn would lead to stability, has been extensive, but much of it has suffered from a narrow empirical perspective. Here, as Arthur Miller notes, the “trust in government” paradigm has held sway, in which a small number of items in surveys measure the extent to which citizens trust their government “to do the right thing.”

More recently, the conceptualization of legitimacy has been broadened considerably. One approach, as noted by Bruce Gilley, includes measures based on public opinion (from the World Values survey) as well as objective indicators, such as tallies of protests. Another approach argues that legitimacy is fundamentally an attitudinal construct and looks at it as the extent to which citizens express various degrees of their support for their political systems. Surveys are ideal for measuring this notion of legitimacy. A six-dimensional system developed and tested by John Booth and Mitchell Seligson (2009) in a number of countries was found to powerfully predict political stability. This approach, rather than making stability part of the legitimacy phenomenon itself, makes legitimacy a predictor of it.

Important research frontiers lie ahead. We do not know if there are important worldwide trends in stability. The widespread movement toward democracy with the end of the Cold War has produced some stable regimes, but it has also been associated with expanding conflicts in others. It remains to be seen if the world as a whole is moving toward more stable or less stable polities.

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See also Democracy, Theories of; Equality; Legitimacy; Political Systems, Types; Support, Political; Weber, Max

Further Readings


STAGES MODEL OF POLICY MAKING

A common method of examining the operation of a policy process is to break it down into several stages and substages. Each of these can then be analyzed separately, and commonalities across stages can also be identified. Over the course of the history of the policy sciences, several distinct models of the policy process were put forward before the current five-stage model of agenda setting, policy formulation, decision making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation was settled on. The evolution of these models and their advantages and disadvantages as analytical and empirical constructs are set out below.

One of the most popular means for simplifying public policy making has been to disaggregate the process into a series of discrete stages and substages. The resulting sequence of stages is referred to as the policy cycle or stages model of policy. This simplification has its origins in the earliest works on public policy analysis but has received somewhat different treatment in the hands of different authors.

The idea of simplifying the complexity of public policy making by breaking the policy-making process down into a number of discrete stages was first broached in the early work of Harold Lasswell, one of the founders of the policy sciences. Lasswell divided the policy process into seven stages: (1) intelligence, (2) promotion, (3) prescription, (4) invocation, (5) application, (6) termination, and (7) appraisal. In Lasswell’s view, the seven stages described not only how public policies were actually made but also how they should be made. The policy process began
with intelligence gathering—that is, the collection, processing, and dissemination of information for those who participate in the decision process. It then moved to the promotion of particular options by those involved in making the decision. In the third stage, the decision makers actually prescribed a course of action. In the fourth stage, the prescribed course of action was invoked; a set of sanctions was developed to penalize those who failed to comply with the prescriptions of the decision makers. The policy was then applied by the courts and the bureaucracy and ran its course until it was terminated or cancelled. Finally, the results of the policy were appraised or evaluated against the aims and goals of the original decision makers.

Lasswell’s analysis of the policy-making process focused on the decision-making process within government and had little to say about external or environmental influences on government behavior. It simply assumed that decision making was limited or restricted to a presumably small number of participants staffing official positions in government. Another shortcoming of this model was its lack of internal logic, especially with reference to placing appraisal or evaluation after termination, since policies are usually evaluated prior to being wound down rather than afterward. Nevertheless, this model was highly influential in the development of a policy science. Although not entirely accurate, it did reduce the complexity of studying public policy by allowing each stage to be isolated and examined before putting the whole picture of the process back together.

Lasswell’s formulation formed the basis for a model developed by Gary Brewer in the early 1970s. According to Brewer, the policy process was composed of six stages: (1) invention/initiation, (2) estimation, (3) selection, (4) implementation, (5) evaluation, and (6) termination. In Brewer’s view, invention or initiation referred to the earliest stage in the sequence when a problem would be initially sensed. This stage, he argued, would be characterized by an ill-conceived definition of the problem and suggested solutions to it. The second stage of estimation concerned calculation of the risks, costs, and benefits associated with each of the various solutions raised in the earlier stage. This would involve both technical evaluation and normative choices. The objective of this stage is to narrow the range of plausible choices by excluding the unfeasible ones and to somehow range the remaining options in terms of desirability. The third stage consists of adopting one, none, or some combination of the solutions remaining at the end of the estimation stage. The remaining three stages consist of implementing the selected option, evaluating the results of the entire process, and terminating the policy according to the conclusions reached by its evaluation.

Brewer’s version of the policy process improved on Lasswell’s pioneering work. It expanded the policy process beyond the confines of government in discussing the process of problem recognition and clarified the terminology in use to describe the various stages of the process. Moreover, it introduced the notion of the policy process as an ongoing cycle. It recognized that most policies did not have a definite life cycle—moving from birth to death—but rather seemed to recur, in slightly different guises, as one policy succeeded another with only minor or major modifications. Brewer’s insights inspired several other versions of the policy cycle to be developed in the 1970s and 1980s, the most well-known of which were set out in popular textbooks by Charles Jones and James Anderson.

To avoid a plethora of models of policy stages and their variants, it is necessary to clarify the logic behind the cycle model. In the works of Brewer, Jones, and others, the operative principle behind the notion is the logic of applied problem solving. The stages in applied problem solving and its corresponding stages in the policy process are depicted in Table 1.

In this model, *agenda setting* refers to the process by which problems come to the attention of

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<th>Phases of Applied Problem Solving</th>
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<td>Proposal of solution</td>
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governments; *policy formulation* refers to the process by which policy options are formulated within government; *decision making* refers to the process by which governments adopt a particular course of action or nonaction; *policy implementation* refers to the process by which governments put policies into effect; *policy evaluation* refers to the processes by which the results of policies are monitored by both state and societal actors, the result of which may be reconceptualization of policy problems and solutions.

The most important advantage of the policy cycle model as set out above is that it facilitates the understanding of public policy making by breaking the complexity of the process into any number of stages and substages, each of which can be investigated alone or in terms of its relationship to any or all the other stages of the cycle. This aids theory building by allowing numerous case studies and comparative studies of different stages to be undertaken. Another advantage of the model is that its breadth permits examination of the role of all actors and institutions dealing with a policy, not just those governmental agencies formally charged with the task.

The principal disadvantage of the stages model is that it can be misinterpreted as suggesting that policymakers go about solving public problems in a very systematic and more or less linear fashion. This is not the case in reality, as the identification of problems and the development and implementation of solutions are often an ad hoc and idiosyncratic process. Decision makers often simply react to circumstances and do so in terms of their interests and preset ideological dispositions. Another problem with the model is that while the logic of the policy cycle may be fine in the abstract, in practice, the stages are often compressed or skipped, or they are followed in an order unlike that specified by the logic of applied problem solving. Thus, the cycle may not be a single iterative loop but rather a series of smaller loops in which, for example, the results of past implementation decisions have a major impact on future policy formulation, regardless of the specifics of the agenda-setting process in the case concerned. In short, there is often no linear progression of a policy as conceived by the model. Third, and perhaps most important, the model lacks any notion of causation. It offers no pointers as to what or who drives a policy from one stage to another, a matter of crucial interest to scholars working on the subject.

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*See also* Policy Process, Models of

**Further Readings**


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**STALINISM**

The term *Stalinism* in its proper sense denotes the essence of a specific social system that emerged in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s under the leadership of Premier Joseph Stalin. The term is also used to refer to (a) a specific way of behavior and thinking dominant in Soviet politics from the late 1920s to the mid-1950s or influenced by and similar to it, (b) a corresponding ideology or class of ideologies justifying Stalin’s policies, or (c) constitutional arrangements and institutional designs typical of or similar to those developed under Stalin’s leadership.

One of the first, if not the first, documented usage of the word *Stalinism* appeared in an article by Karl Radek published in December 1934 in *Pravda*, where he introduced the expression *Marxism–Leninism–Stalinism*. This initiative was short-lived. Neither Stalin himself nor party ideologists used the word, preferring *Marxism–Leninism*
as the title of their ideology and *socialism* as a typical description for the social order developed in the Soviet Union. Since the mid-1950s, *Stalinism* essentially has become a derogatory term. Even its champions—with very few exceptions (see Sergeev’s 1999 apology for “mystical Stalinism”)—avoid using the word. Furthermore, a word *Stalischina* emerged in Russian with essentially the same meaning as *Stalinism* but with much more offensive connotations.

Traditionally, interpretations of Stalinism vary between a limited focus on highly specific characteristics of Soviet politics, often attributed to Stalin’s weird personal impact, and a shallow explanation of related phenomena as mere instances of totalitarianism. A more balanced view requires a combination of a still broader perspective with adequate reference to precise historical particulars and conditions of political developments.

**Origins and Characteristics**

By the beginning of the 20th century, the spontaneous development of European countries and their overseas colonies extended over great expanses and held sway over civilizations and cultures hardly ready to adjust to the modes and models of modern behavior. The world became integrated into a single interstate system of territorial rule that was internally divided by imperialist rivalry and structural disproportions. Political leaders had no institutional and intellectual resources to manage such development even on national levels, to say nothing of an international one. The worldwide expansion of modernization coupled with the imperialist enclosure of the entire surface of the globe into a single interstate system made the issue of control of development critical. The inability to adequately respond to that great challenge provoked World War I.

Postwar reconstruction implied a grand project to meet the challenge. The Entente winners relied on national self-determination and the creation of a universal quasi polity in the form of the League of Nations. This project proved too simplistic and straightforward, however, to be adequate. It immediately provoked an alternative one. During World War I, radical Marxists had called for transforming an imperialist war into a world revolution through a series of civil wars. The October Revolution and the civil war that followed seemed to prove the underlying logic. Thus, Soviet power and the Comintern emerged as an alternative grand project. This was the historical context for the first wave of democratization and the Soviet experiment that evolved into Stalinism, as well as for a number of national alternative projects that produced a variety of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.

Soviet power was highly ambivalent. On the one hand, it relied on mass participation and thus had a clear democratic calling coupled with an institutional form of direct democracy of Soviets—Councils of Workers and Peasants Deputies. On the other hand, the emergent system could only be run by a highly integrated and disciplined new-type vanguard party. Lenin, in his seminal book of 1920, “*Left-Wing* Communism: An Infantile Disorder,” clearly fixed a hierarchy of power: leaders → party → working class → masses.

Further development reshaped the initial combination of democratic conceptual and institutional insights with authoritarian and repressive trends into a highly contradictory pattern of rule known as Stalinism. Its core was the “totalitarian democracy” (Jacob Talmon, 1952) that prevailed during the civil war (1918–1920) and successive postwar periods (1920–1922, 1924–1927). This nascent system was gradually made more and more effective by institutional and ideological innovations. Some of those innovations could be attributed to Stalin personally, but many were developed by his counterparts and would-be political rivals. The first decade after the October Revolution saw a successive accumulation of traits that could be considered attributes of Stalinism, particularly through an increasing authoritarianism. Correspondingly, the years and decades after Stalin’s death may be seen as a gradual de-Stalinization or a series of structural and substantive changes that had a very profound effect despite the claims of radical anti-Soviet critics that “the system is untransformable.”

The dating of Stalinism and its specific periods is problematic. Widespread attribution of Stalinism to the period between the respective deaths of Lenin (1924) and Stalin (1953) seems to be inaccurate, greatly exaggerating agency factors at the expense...
of structural ones. Rather, it is the congresses of the new-type party that should be considered critical junctures. Thus, all the years of profound internal political struggle within the party up to the 15th Congress in December 1927 could best be seen as a period of nascent Stalinism.

The age of Stalinism proper could be divided into a number of periods. They include emergent Stalinism, up to the 16th Congress of July 1930; early or initial Stalinism, up to the 17th Congress of January to February 1934 and the subsequent death of Sergey Kirov in December 1934; the complete or full-fledged Stalinism of 1934 to 1941; the Word War II interlude; the advanced Stalinism of 1945 to 1952, the year of the 19th Congress; and the late Stalinism of 1952 to 1956, concluding with the 20th Congress.

Some essential characteristics of Stalinism, however, had started to be elaborated much earlier. The core of the new political system was a new type of party. Initially, it was a highly disciplined and motivated clandestine vanguard party organized and molded by Lenin on the basis of the principle of democratic centralism. After the October Revolution, in a number of realignments, Communists managed to keep dominant positions and after the Civil War emerged as the only commanding power. At the 10th Party Congress of March 1921, internal party factions were banned, but policy options could be discussed on the basis of alternative platforms. Soon after, in the first purge (чистка, meaning “cleansing”), about a third of the membership was expelled from the party. Launching campaigns against oppositions of various kinds and using purges, Stalin managed to consolidate the party by its 15th Congress. Only then was it possible to start its transformation from a party proper into the core of a party–state totalitarian system.

The conception of building socialism in a single country was another cornerstone of the Soviet experiment. Already in his 1915 article “On the Slogan for a United States of Europe,” Lenin had declared that uneven economic and political development made the victory of socialism possible, first in a few countries or even in a single country alone. Lenin’s criticism of left Communists in 1920 and his subsequent playing down of the idea of permanent revolution, as advanced by Leon Trotsky, marked a significant departure from the orthodox Marxist vision of world revolution. By the end of 1924, Stalin recognized that “the proletariat can and must build a socialist society in one country” in the second edition of his book Foundations of Leninism—the statement was missing in the first edition earlier in the same year. Soon after, Nikolai Bukharin elaborated on the issue. He argued that the existing economic base of the Soviet Union was sufficient for socialist construction in case its security could be militarily provided. By the time of the 15th Congress, the idea was a fully accepted cornerstone of official policy.

After coming to power, the Communist Party made consistent attempts to control appointments to most important posts. Stalin himself did a lot to establish special departments in regional party committees that would oversee the most important appointments. As Secretary-General, beginning in 1922, he personally handled similar control in the center. That practice foreshadowed the future system of номенклатура (described below in the discussion on complete Stalinism).

Historical Development

Emergent Stalinism (1927–1930) was primarily linked with the beginning of industrialization and collectivization as well as the launching of the so-called 5-year plans. With all the economic importance of those policies, their social aspects were far more crucial. A highly heterogeneous economy and society were radically transformed. The economy became state controlled and planned. Society was first atomized and then reshaped with imposed homogenization. All those steps seemed highly modern, but in fact, such radical and one-sided modernization would turn out to be dysfunctional.

The second general party purge of 1929 to 1930 was a major event of the period. About 100,000 Communists, or some 10% of the membership, were purged. At the same time, a significant number of new members—industrial workers—joined the Party.

Early or initial Stalinism (1930–1934) was marked by further consolidation of party control. During that period, a theory of aggravation of the class struggle in the process of building socialism was advanced. In his speech on the results of the
first 5-year plan in January 1933, Stalin (1951) began as follows:

Eradication of classes is accomplished not by cooling down the class struggle but by its heating up. Withering of the state would be achieved not by weakening of state authority but by its maximal strengthening, necessary to crush the remnants of the dying classes and to organize a defense against capitalist encirclement, which is not yet destroyed and would not be destroyed soon. (p. 211)

This argument supplied a theoretical basis for the claim that ongoing repression of political opponents is necessary.

The third general party purge was performed during 1933. This time, during the period of the purge, new memberships were temporarily suspended. About 400,000 Communists, or some 18% of the membership, were purged.

Complete Stalinism (1934–1941) was marked by the growth of the personality cult of Stalin and the fastening down of a full-fledged nomenklatura system. The term nomenklatura (from the Latin nomenclatura, or “list of names”) denotes a practice of advance nomination of candidates to various important positions by respective party committees. For example, important positions at the union level were staffed by the Central Committee of the Party, at the republican level by each republic’s Central Committee, at the regional level by regional committees, at the local level by local committees, and so on. Nomination implied that a person’s name appeared in the list of names, or nomenklatura. The person was controlled, replaced, promoted, or disgraced within that system. One could have access to significant positions only by virtue of joining the nomenklatura.

Nomenklatura is often interpreted as a new class (e.g., by Milovan Djilas and Michael Voslenksi). Strictly speaking, it was not so. Nomenklatura itself was highly stratified. It was more a system of control and rationalization of government by and through the party than a social grouping, much less a class. In fact, it was nothing but a central link between the party as a core of the Soviet totalitarian system and administrative infrastructure integrated into the system. In fact, its development was coupled with the reduction of the state to an administrative arrangement.

From 1936 onward, purge campaigns were replaced by the “struggle with traitors of the people.” This struggle culminated in what came to be known as Yezhovshchina. The worst of the repressions occurred while the People’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (Narodnyy komissariat vnitrennich del, NKVD) was headed by Nikolai Yezhov from September 1936 to August 1938. Stalin made him responsible for the repressions. Yezhov was subsequently arrested and executed. The very term Yezhovshchina was coined to integrate the campaign of criticism.

The World War II period created a new reconfiguration of world politics that influenced many aspects of Stalinism. The idea of building socialism in a single country was reinterpreted, putting the Soviet Union at the center of capitalist states, ranging from its most reactionary fascist foes all the way to its allies. Intensification of the class struggle was linked to this picture. While the totalitarian party–state formation proved effective and instrumental, it was supplemented by the traditional great-power apparatus of the Russian imperial autocracy; thus, Stalin’s personality cult was greatly boosted and became more deeply entrenched.

Advanced Stalinism (1945–1952) saw a further transformation of the theory of building socialism in a single country. People’s democracies in the countries that fell into the sphere of Soviet geopolitical control formed the so-called socialist camp. Consolidation of the new system gave impetus to the idea of intensification of the class struggle. Stalinism made claims to global domination. Its conceptual basis of Marxist scientific teaching was extended to integrate all science. The natural sciences were supposed to elaborate dialectical materialism, while social scholarship was to be informed by historical materialism. Several public campaigns on specific sciences were launched, with Stalin himself publishing a book on linguistics.

All in all, the system of advanced totalitarianism became too complex and complicated to be run by simple principles of total control. The system was bound to change.

Late Stalinism (1952–1956) saw a series of reforms begun by Stalin himself, finishing with the thaw initiated during the premiership of his successor Nikita Khrushchev. The 19th Congress, organized after a 13-year interval, signaled the beginning of the process. It was Georgy Malenkov, not
Stalin, who made the main speech (report on party activities). The speech highlighted the need for criticism and self-criticism. The theme was developed by Stalin himself and most of the speakers. Many historians interpret this as preparation for a new wave of purges. This was probably true, but it also signaled the coming reforms. They followed, coupled with a power struggle after Stalin’s death in March 1953. Several projects of de-Stalinization emerged, ranging from strengthening state structures and emancipating them from the party (Lavrentii Beria, Minister of the Interior) to revivalism of Leninist principles, including totalitarian democracy (Khrushchev).

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Further Readings

State

The three sections of this entry examine the very complex and controversial political phenomenon commonly referred to as the state. The first section presents a conceptual statement that takes as its point of departure the ideal-typical treatment of the state presented at the beginning of the 20th century by the German scholar Max Weber (1864–1920). This choice reflects the significant influence that treatment exercised, over the remainder of that century, within the disciplines of law, political science, and sociology. (Note that Weber’s arguments, while markedly original in parts, echoed and elaborated theoretical views widely shared within the juridical and social science literature of his time, both in Germany itself and elsewhere. However, neither at the time nor later were they universally accepted as valid.). Included here are comments that support, qualify, and modify Weber’s own treatment. The next section of the entry summarizes the major historical developments that in the course of Western modernization imparted to the political institutions of certain European countries the distinctive features emphasized in Weber’s state concept. They turned the state itself into the model arrangement for the generation and management of large-scale political power, first in other European countries and then in other parts of the world. The third section of the entry considers very briefly the major events that, since Weber wrote, have markedly affected the institutional physiognomy of the state itself and its position within the larger society and highlights some aspects of the contemporary discussion about “the state of the state.”

A Conceptual Portrait of the State

Weber’s understanding of the state is most often recalled in a definition he proposed in various texts: “The state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence [italics added] within a given territory” (Gerth & Mills, 1946, p. 78). But a more elaborate definition may provide a better start to our own discussion:

The primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as follows: It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have gained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only insofar as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it. (Weber, 1978, p. 56)

Although Weber here as elsewhere uses the expression “the modern state,” in his own view,
the qualifier modern is largely superfluous. While
his best known work, The Protestant Ethic and
the Spirit of Capitalism (1905/2002), investigates
(famously and controversially) a religious aspect
of the economic component of Western moderni-
zation, Weber views state formation as the most
significant political component of that same,
broad-ranging, universally significant historical
phenomenon. By the same token, the state consti-
tutes a distinctive, relatively recent moment
within the historical career of a universal but
highly varied phenomenon—that of Herrschaft
(an expression often translated as “authority” or
“domination,” which below we generally refer to
as “rule”).

Conceptually speaking, rule itself is a variant of
an even broader phenomenon—that of political
power. In the Weberian construction of it, political
power exists in a situation where given two parties
(individual or collective) pursuing incompatible
interests, one can overcome the resistance of the
other to its own pursuits by engaging or threaten-
ing to engage in violent action and thus putting at
stake the other’s physical vulnerability. The result-
ing inequality between the two parties can be more
or less marked, more or less durable, and wide-
ranging. It can become sharper and more stable,
involve greater numbers, and affect a broader
spectrum of social affairs when the superior party
no longer needs to exercise or threaten violence
in order to get its way but establishes and manages a
relation where its own command routinely engen-
ders the other party’s obedience. To the extent that
this happens, we can say that political power has
become institutionalized into rule.

Weber’s greatest contribution to the study of
the institutionalization of political power lies in his
emphasis on its legitimation; indeed, he views rule
as legitimate political power. This is the case to the
extent that the inferior party is not subjectively
induced to obey by its sheer, unquestioning habitu-
tion to its own position or by a calculation of the
material costs and rewards it can expect respec-
tively from granting or denying obedience. Rather,
its obedience expresses the belief it entertains in
the superior party’s entitlement to issue-binding
commands and in its own corresponding moral
duty to obey them. This is of course an ancient
insight, but Weber develops it most creatively.
First, he argues that the beliefs in question, for all
the historical variety in their content and in the
situations that engender them and that they sus-
tain, can all be subsumed under three basic, ideal
types of legitimacy: traditional, charismatic, legal-
rational. Then, he shows that this tripartition is
correlated with other significant distinctions con-
cerning diverse aspects of systems of rule.

Building to an extent on this and other contribu-
tions of Weber’s, the contemporary German sociologist Heinrich Popitz (1925–2002) de-
veloped a broader theory of the institutionalization of
political power and of its development into rule.
There are three components to this process:

First, power relations become de-personalized.
Power is no longer undistinguishable from the
particular individual who at a given time is in a
markedly advantageous position, but increasingly
appears to be connected with functions and
positions which transcend the individual.
Furthermore, a formalization of power takes
place, in that its exercise is more and more
oriented to rules, procedures, and ritual practices.
(This does not exclude its arbitrary use; but one
can talk about this, or about undue favor, only
when arbitrary or favourable acts are contrasted
with what happens in most situations.) The third
aspect of the institutionalization of power is the
growing integration of power relations within a
broader order. Power gears itself into the pre-
existent situation. It becomes part of and is
encompassed within the social edifice, which it
supports and by which it is in turn supported.
(Popitz, 1992, pp. 38–39)

The French social theorist Jean-Yves Calvez sug-
jects that we characterize the state as a polity where
institutionalization is particularly thorough and
advanced. This proposal is significant but considers
expressly only the extent to which institutionaliza-
tion is realized in state building and disregards the
question of how it is institutionalized. In some sys-
tems of rule—for instance, in the classical Chinese
empire—a very extensive and penetrating institu-
tionalization process was carried out largely by
means of what Popitz calls ritual practices, both
those of an expressly religious nature (the emperor
was supposed to have a mandate from Heaven) and
others that we might call ceremonial and etiquette.
Here, political and administrative practices were
standardized primarily by reference to values and norms perceived as sacred, stylized in ways chosen for their symbolic appropriateness, conveying and instilling a respect for tradition and a commitment to its protection.

Although in the West ritual and similar practices have also been used in constructing and managing political power, already in ancient Greece and Rome, it was institutionalized and managed by means of rather different practices, both originally unique to the West. On the one hand, significant political and administrative decisions came to depend, more or less, on express, legitimate, public deliberation over alternative views of what policies to adopt. On the other, those polities structured themselves by means of law—that is, of general commands that articulated the polity itself into organs and offices with distinctive faculties and responsibilities.

Furthermore, the formation of policy itself and (as far as possible) its subsequent implementation were also regulated by law, which the Greeks and Romans increasingly understood as a body of principles and rules of secular nature, capable of being taught, learned, and rationally interpreted and applied. Its bearing on a huge variety of contentious matters could be determined by means of a distinctive form of legal discourse—highly literate, sophisticated, intellectually prestigious (especially in Rome)—which, in principle, could produce choices demanding rational assent between alternative solutions to a given practical problem.

Thus understood, law is much better than ritual at confronting open-ended situations and at handling and generating contingency. Now, contingency itself—the understanding that much (perhaps all) that is the case in the world is not so of necessity but merely because it is the case, often (not always) as a result of human agency—is a central aspect of modernity. On this account (among others), one may understand why law played a large role in the building of the typical polity of Western modernity and in the formation and implementation of its policies. For while legal decisions are occasioned by the possibility of alternative choices, they settle for one or the other via a work of interpretation intrinsically open to contestation and reconsideration. This is all the more so when they draw on principles and modalities of argument not perceived as divine or supernatural in nature and, thus, not endowed with absolute and utterly unchallengeable validity.

Later Western polities, particularly during the Middle Ages, maintained a close relationship between law and rule. But here, law itself was seen chiefly as the product of long-lasting, spontaneous social and cultural processes, mainly embodied in locally evolved customs; these expressed widely shared moral convictions, often interpreted and inculcated by priests as constituting religious commandments. Rulers related to the law, so understood, chiefly as its (more or less effective and reliable) custodians and enforcers.

A rather drastic change in the relation between rule and law associated with (indeed, constitutive of) the advance of modernity (though oddly enough, it finds a significant precedent in the Gregorian reform of the Church in the 11th century) was associated with the emergence and development of so-called positive law. Here, lawmaking comes to be seen as a distinctive and exclusive prerogative of rule, turning law from a framework of policy into an instrument for it. It has become possible to make law(s) in order to confront the situation and change it by selecting and mandating new policies.

This “positivization” of law, by making it depend on express, deliberate, time and place-bound human decisions (rather than on its presumed agreement with the supreme religious and moral dictates of the divinity or of nature itself, or with the folk’s jural traditions), makes it relevant to a distinctive feature of the ideal-typical, Weberian state—its rationality. The system of rule can treat law as one instrument for optimizing the relation between the costs and benefits of its own activities. This, in principle, is not possible where the system’s prevalent mode of institutionalization relies on ritual, where the connection between activities and intended results is chiefly symbolic, not intrinsic.

But turning law into a political instrument raises a threatening problem: how to secure the third aspect of the institutionalization of political power, its integration into the larger society—a balance between what a society is induced (or indeed compelled) to do for the state and, vice versa, what the latter does for the former. States generally deal with this problem by establishing a hierarchical distinction between different sources
of law—between a state’s constitution and its statutes or between these and the authoritative acts applying them (judicial sentences, ministerial decrees). Legal commands at lower levels are valid only if, while in principle their content is open-ended, they can be discursively shown to be consistent with higher level commands. These come to represent, so to speak, a more deep and abiding commitment of the polity to the protection and fostering of some societal interests. But the formation and execution of commands at each level can be expected to reflect, once more, a preoccupation with rationality, a sustained effort to attain optimal results in the face of changing circumstances while minimizing costs and risks. Thus understood, legal commands can both confront and generate a great deal of contingency.

When it is thus “positivized”—that is, rendered contingent on express, deliberate, and time and place–bound human decisions—the making and application of law empowers the state. Instead of closely monitoring multiple, diverse, and changing circumstances to issue commands that activate specific responses from specific individuals, the state can address abstractly formulated, general commands to an open-ended plurality of individuals, both those actively involved in its own operations and those at the receiving end of them; it can program and make predictable their response to those commands. It can evoke in them not just ad hoc responses but lasting and broad-ranging dispositions to act, frame their activities within an environment of sanctioned expectations, and structure both their private relations to one another and those they entertain with the state itself. And it can do this not only by ordering, authorizing, or forbidding specific activities of individuals but also by enabling them to produce valid, actionable legal effects in their own open-ended, selective pursuit of their interests.

Insofar as it does this, the state recognizes as differentiated from, complementary to, and autonomous of itself (though to some extent controlled and empowered by its own activities) a whole realm of social and cultural processes that we can label civil society. This exists insofar as individuals and collectivities subject to the state’s law also hold under it rights of their own, that is legally recognized and protected claims—private rights, which they exercise in their dealings with one another, and public ones, the exercise of which concerns their relations to the state itself and asserts some entitlements vis-à-vis it. The complementarity between the state and civil society is the state’s characteristic mode of integration—the third aspect of the institutionalization of rule mentioned by Popitz.

All this presupposes the peculiar and historically rare juridical development whereby the center of political power to some extent, in some fashion, binds itself to the observance of rules of its own making. To quote Popitz (1992) again,

Only rarely, in the history of society, has one found it possible even just to pose systematically and consequentially the question, how to lay boundaries on institutionalized violence. Essentially, one has accomplished this only in the Greek polis, in republican Rome, in a few other city-states, and in the history of the modern constitutional state. The answers to that question have remained strikingly similar: the postulate of the supremacy of the law and of the equality of all before it (isonomia), the idea of delimiting in principle all legislation (basic rights), procedural norms (decisions taken by organs, publicity, appeals to higher authorities), norms on the attribution of offices (turn taking, selection), and norms of the public sphere (freedom of thought and of assembly). (p. 65)

Nothing less than that is at stake in the state–law relation—but also, nothing more. An excessive emphasis on that relation may obscure the sheer factuality of other aspects of the state’s operations—not just its ultimate grounding on violence but also the question of whether it does or does not at a given moment possess the material resources required for those operations, be these once more of a violent kind or of a peaceable kind. (The saying C’est l’argent qui fait la guerre—it is money that makes war—suggests that the two kinds are closely connected.) Much of Weber’s political theorizing has to do with the arrangements whereby under different kinds of rule those resources are gathered, managed, and committed, thus, with administration. The administrative arrangements typical of the state are bureaucratic; this means (in Weber’s own famous ideal type of bureaucracy) that administration is carried out on the basis of
various forms of knowledge—juridical, military, fiscal, managerial, statistical, geographical, all of which are perceived as different from (and superior to) purely factual information and practical know-how. When deployed in the course of express deliberation, they are expected to yield decisions that command assent and that activate and orient the conduct on the ground of merely executive activities. The state’s capacity to apply such forms of knowledge via its bureaucratic apparatus further qualifies it as a distinctively rational kind of political enterprise, purposefully seeking both effectiveness (the maximal achievement of its own ends) and efficiency (the optimal relation between means and ends). It can use its bureaucratic staff to monitor changing circumstances; identify and forecast dangers and opportunities; maintain, suspend, or modify existing arrangements; and make appropriate dispositions to confront (and to generate) contingent situations.

The diversity in the contents of the knowledge that the state can mobilize is paralleled by the diversity in other resources at its disposal—guns and gallows, sophisticated financial instruments, buildings, various means of communication, specific juridical faculties, moneys. Both diversities (and the consequent one in the vocational identities within the staff) reflect themselves in the varied nature of the tasks the state can take on itself in managing a society’s political affairs. In turn, the diversity in the *savoirs*, the materials, and the personnel available to the state finds visible expression in the organizational design of the state itself. It is in the first instance articulated functionally, that is, into units that are each normally engaged in different activities, reflecting the varied nature of the tasks those activities must accomplish and of the relative bodies of knowledge and of relevant material resources. Again, in matching as far as possible its structures to its functions, the state expresses its rationality. (The familiar image of the state as a machine best conveys this principle.)

The second mode of articulation is instead hierarchical. The performance of the various state activities by diverse personnel on the ground—soldiers, teachers, diplomats, policemen, judges, tax collectors, and social workers—is controlled by personnel higher up, who activate the personnel under them and instruct them on how to operate, monitor, and if necessary sanction those operations.

Here, the telling image is that of the pyramid, where the base is provided by the personnel on the ground and the apex by the controlling bureaucratic elite. In this way, the state secures its unity and the uniformity or, at any rate, the consistency in the way its activities are carried out over time and in various locales. Furthermore, the higher levels not only can mandate and thus constrain the local, time-bound exercise of the same activities at lower levels, but they can also merge and coordinate diverse activities and effect the convergence of different bodies of knowledge and of personnel.

Both in their functional and in their hierarchical arrangements, bureaucratic systems embody the first two dimensions of institutionalization according to Popitz:

1. **Depersonalization**: The basic components of bureaucratic units are offices, ensembles of resources, entitlements, and responsibilities to which the physical individuals appointed to each office are expected to orient their activities. To guarantee this expectation, officials do not own the facilities they use, and in using them, the officials are expected to serve the interests of the office, not those private to the occupants themselves.

2. **Formalization**: The activities of the occupants are imputed to the offices themselves and rendered valid only insofar as they implement certain rules, both of a technical and of a legal nature, both substantive and procedural.

The state can produce such rules directly, by means of positive law that at successive levels—a statute turned into bylaws, a bylaw into concrete ordinances—can activate the discretionary capacity of the administrative personnel. It can also produce such rules indirectly, by authorizing activities that mobilize the bodies of nonlegal, professional knowledge, which have qualified individuals for entering that profession. In both ways, it can program the conduct of the office-holders, on the one hand, making it predictable and, on the other, making it respond to the particularities and contingencies of the *hic et nunc* that the officials confront.

A system of administration that mobilizes very diverse resources and articulates itself into a variety of units permits the state to exercise rule in a
continuous and intensive manner. It can thus match the demands and opportunities presented by the increasingly complex and changing societies of modernity and acknowledge their growing preference for a rational and secular orientation to action, individual and collective, and the particular significance they attach to economic affairs.

This conceptual portrait of the state has expressly considered only the ways in which rule is structured and carried out within it. But the modern political universe is constituted by a plurality of states and characterized also by the relations that typically exist among them, for the monopoly of legitimate violence constitutive of each state refers to a specific portion of the globe, at the boundaries of which it encounters the monopoly vested in other states. Together, they make up the states’ system, the critical feature of which is that the units making it up are not empowered and controlled by an overarching power center. They are equal to one another in some respects: Each is territorial, being bounded by the portion of the globe over which it exercises the monopoly of legitimate violence; each is sovereign, in the sense of constituting the overriding fount of all legitimate political authority; and each is expected and entitled autonomously to define its own interests and to pursue them by committing its own resources at its own risk.

This elementary view of international affairs, and the decisive role unavoidably played in them by sheer relations of might between the participating states, is grounded on the principles laid down in the Treaties of Westphalia (1648). The extent to which these still hold is a key issue within the discipline of international relations, given the number and magnitude of events that have occurred since that time in the relations between states. Weber himself seems to have held a Westphalian view of these matters, perhaps because many of the aforementioned events (such as the development of certain kinds of international organizations or the advent of nuclear weapons) occurred after his death. In fact, his theoretical writings are largely silent on these matters, but some of his political ones, especially from the times of World War I and immediately afterward, throw some light on them.

There is thus a marked contrast between the import of state building within the state itself and its import between the states. At the first level, state building is typically associated with pacification, since the state monopolizes legitimate violence and commits it to sanction the activities of an extensive, differentiated but at the same time unitary system of law and administration. All this, it might be said, has an ordering effect, reducing the contingency in the relation between the parts. At the second level, contingency is instead increased, since the states take their own initiatives vis-à-vis one another (including the recourse to violence) in light of their own autonomous definition of their own interests. For each, chief among these is its own security, but a state of affairs that secures one state may desecure another. Under these conditions, for each, the pursuit of security must take the form of increasing as far as possible its own might.

Major Phases in State Development

An overview of “the state’s story” is possible only by means of considerable oversimplification. This discussion reduces it to three phases, each comprising institutional developments that varied considerably from one context to another in their timing and in their concrete manifestations.

Consolidation of Rule

The first phase can be labeled consolidation of rule; it took place in Europe between the 12th and the 17th centuries. During this phase, a number of locally based rulers sought to extend the territorial reach of their political control. Naturally, this engenders between them a competitive process whose outcome favors a few rulers and compels a considerably larger number of others to remain in the business of rule (if at all) only in a subordinate position, their own territories being subsumed under the larger ones now controlled by the successful competitors. As a result, the political map of the continent becomes simpler and simpler, comprising fewer distinct areas, now mostly geographically more continuous and historically more stable ones—unless, of course, they become themselves objects of further processes of consolidation.

Sometimes, these are peaceful. For instance, the scions of two dynasties ruling over different parts of Europe marry, and the territorial holdings of one spouse become soldered with those of the other. Or a political center temporarily hands over
to another a part of its own territory as security for a loan but then defaults and surrenders that security. But mostly, consolidation is the more or less direct outcome of open conflicts between two centers of rule over which one will control which territory. Such conflicts are mostly settled by war, which leads to conquest and forcible annexation of all or a part of the loser’s territory to the advantage of the winner. “States make war,” as Tilly (1992) has memorably put it, “and wars make states” (p. 42).

Thus, a decisive role in the consolidation of rule is played by military resources. But these in turn require the “sinews of war,” that is, the financial capacity to muster those resources—troops, officers, and material—and deploy them against opponents with the intent of prevailing over them in the clash of arms. Very often, military innovation confers an advantage to armies and fleets that are larger, for these can wage war on more than one front and become internally differentiated into “services,” which can effectively perform distinct, complementary tasks in warfare. But only rulers who marshal larger resources can afford such armies and fleets, and to this end, they need to raise troops from larger populations, tapping the wealth produced by larger territories. This premium on bigness is a strong inducement to what we call consolidation.

When weapons are silent, however temporarily, resources of a different nature also come into play. Often, political centers intent on consolidating rule do this in response to an appeal to peace that recurs most frequently in European history, being often voiced by religious leaders. Each center seeks to prove that by establishing its control over a larger territory, it can put an end to tensions between rivalrous lesser powers, which would otherwise occasion war or other violent disorder. This does not always involve prevailing over those powers in battle. Diplomatic action, the game of alliances and coalitions, the ability to isolate opponents or to make them accept a degree of subordination, and sometimes the recourse to arbitration by the empire or the papacy also play a role.

In addition, military activity itself requires and produces rules of its own, the very core of an emerging body of law seeking, more or less effectively, to regulate aspects of the relations between states. Another significant part of such law makes conflict over territory less likely by laying down clear principles for succession into vacant seats of power, mostly by making legitimate descent the exclusive entitlement to rule. Other developments contribute to the same “pacification” effect. For instance, thanks to the remarkable advances in geography, in the measurement of terrain, and in cartography, the physical reach of each center of rule comes to be clearly delimited by geographical borders, in turn often determined by features of the terrain. It remains true, as Thomas Hobbes puts it, that states adopt toward one another, even when they are not fighting, “a posture of warre [sic].” But they partition the continent of Europe, and later other continents, in a clear and potentially stable manner. (There are also rules concerning the seas.)

**Rationalization of Rule**

Consolidation of rule produced larger, more visible and stable territorial containers for the next phase in the “state’s story,” which can be labeled rationalization of rule. Postmedieval Western modernization entailed a thorough-going institutional differentiation between diverse spheres of social existence and cultural practice. This allowed the rationalization of each sphere, for it allowed the efficiency and effectiveness of the workings of each to be verified with reference to distinctive criteria of success and failure. This also happened, in highly varied ways, as concerns the relation between the political and the other societal spheres. Rulers increasingly sought to place themselves in charge of all political concerns of society and only those. One expression of this was the successful (though contested) enthronement of the idea of state reason as the distinctive, imperious standard and polestar of their action. Much more significant was the secularization of the state—the protracted, controversial process whereby, so to speak, the state got out of the business of sending souls to heaven, in which previously it had been much involved.

Less visible, but in the long run at least as significant, was a process that found early expression in a formula adopted by absolutist rulers. They claimed for themselves all the imperium—that is, all faculties and facilities related to the political management of society—but left to the “particulars” (which at the time meant chiefly the landowning
estates and various city-based corporate bodies) the *dominium*, that is, the property of most economic resources. In due course, this led to an increasing institutional autonomy of the economic sphere. The progressive marketization of the production and distribution of wealth would progressively limit some of the economic policies pursued by the absolutist rulers themselves and replace them as far as possible with legal frameworks within which the private initiatives of individual market actors could display their peculiar, powerful dynamics.

This process of differentiation and mutual autonomization of parts (which can be characterized as the progressive matching of structures to distinct societal functions) was carried out also within the political sphere itself through what came to be called the separation of powers (legislative, jurisdictional, and executive) and, as noted above, through the increasingly complex structure of the state’s administrative apparatus. Here, the rationalization of rule finds further expression in the emergence of a professional body of administrators. These, in the name of their competences (assumed to be proved by the possession of degrees and by success in open competitions for public appointment), displace and replace (without depriving them of their economic advantages and status privileges) the members of traditional elites who had previously exercised various political, administrative, judicial, and military functions as a matter of right. Increasingly, those functions come to be exercised instead as a matter of duty by expressly selected, appointed, and promoted individuals. The consequent rationality gain is obvious, for instance, in the ease with which their activities can be programmed, coordinated, monitored, and sanctioned from the political center.

**Expansion of Rule**

Having strengthened and rationalized their administrative apparatus, states can embark on a third phase of their development, which can be called the expansion of rule. This phenomenon has that apparatus as its protagonist (and, in some interpretations, its main beneficiary). But it has roots also in other institutional processes, including some pertaining to the relation between state and society itself.

The latter increasingly constitutes a complex and changing environment, set in motion by modernizing processes such as increasing literacy, the first printed media, incipient processes of urbanization and industrialization, and the formation of new social groupings and new elites.

In certain political contexts, the rationalized administration seeks to take charge of those processes on behalf of the ruler. Consider a statement on Polizey from 18th-century Prussia, a state with a marked tendency to authoritarian rule and a particularly advanced administrative system:

> Police, in the broad understanding of the term, refers to all those measures in the internal affairs of a nation through which the wealth of the state may be more permanently established and maintained. . . . Police, in the narrow sense of the term, refers to all that which is required for the proper condition of civil life, and in particular for the maintenance of good order and discipline among subjects. (Charles Maier, 1997, p. 110)

In other contexts, however, the developments mentioned above generate new forms of social, cultural, and economic power in the hands of groups that resist and sometimes openly oppose the political practices of the ancien régime, such as the privileged roles it reserved for members of the aristocracy; the *arcana imperii*, which excluded the processes of policy formation from the observations and the inputs of an increasingly informed and sophisticated public; or extensive censorship of printed materials. Where such groups are successful, the result is the emergence of the liberal public sphere. Here, private individuals and spontaneously formed groupings can address each other regarding matters of common interest, formulate claims and critiques concerning their handling by the authorities, generate bodies of opinion, and eventually form expressly political alignments, which compete for electoral success within increasingly broad and active constituencies and thus for the formation of governments.

By establishing a liberal public sphere, a state can project itself as to some extent mandated and empowered by its population, committed to serving its needs. The involvement in the public sphere of broader and broader strata of the population and the fact that normally the outcomes of public
decisions are accepted also by those whose proposals are not successful increasingly legitimize and strengthen the state.

However, since a liberal public sphere operates as a hinge between civil society and the state and transmits to the latter impulses from the former, it unavoidably also reveals the divided nature of the society itself, the cleavages (political, socioeconomic, cultural, and regional) that traverse it, and the contrast between the interests activating its different components. The mechanisms of political representation increasingly map these antagonisms onto the legislative organs, all the more so as the suffrage is broadened. Policy formation becomes largely adversarial; the policy proposals and critiques of government and opposition advocate contrasting demands; and the elites guiding the parties commit themselves, if put in control of government, to preserve or modify the current distribution of economic advantage within the population.

Adversarial policy formation confirms and emphasizes a characteristic of the state we have already mentioned: the contingent, open-ended nature of political initiatives. By the same token, however, it threatens the state’s abiding commitment to its own unity, its claim to represent and pursue the general interest and to override those of a sectional nature that divide civil society and, within the public sphere, articulate intrinsically controversial issues.

There are two basic responses to this threat, both of which in different ways promote the expansion of rule. The first is the promotion of citizenship. Here, only the most antagonistic and subversive claims conveyed in the public sphere are (more or less openly) suppressed, while others are allowed expression and a measure of realization, thus institutionalizing the related conflicts and making them less divisive. In this way, contrasting proposals can be moderated and made the object of compromise. Policies of this nature are generally associated with progressive parties but were sometimes undertaken by conservative governments—for instance, Bismarck initiated in Germany some of the early provisions characteristic of what would later be called the “welfare state.”

The other response confronts in a different fashion the threat to state unity generated by some aspects of political modernization. Oriented to the promotion and the fostering of nationhood, it consists in evoking within the population an emotionally compelling sense that it shares politically significant commonalities, expressing a single political identity and a single political destiny. These commonalities supposedly transcend and relativize all existent cultural and socioeconomic divisions within the society and are focused on the state itself, investing its unity and its might with value in everybody’s mind. The promotion of nationhood, in a sense, attributes to the early-modern notion of reason of state—originally conceived as the exclusive concern of a very narrow political elite, the object of deliberations and machinations covered by the arcana imperii—a broader and deeper resonance and makes it attain significance in the hearts and minds of the masses.

At any rate, in the prevailing political rhetoric, the notion of national interest becomes the lodestar of the most important forms of policy making. The state itself acquires a new justification as the political instrument of the nation itself, conceived as a social entity grounded on prepolitical commonalities, which generate in its components a shared belonging. Among other things, nationhood entails that the population has a close, abiding, intensely meaningful relation with the state’s territory and construes it as the very body of the nation. When this relation cannot be attained or maintained, their frustration feeds nationalist complaints and aspirations.

There are significant differences between these two positions, revealed among other things by the style and content of the respective flows of political communication. Citizenship, as indicated, aims to moderate and, to an extent, reconcile differences revealed by the public sphere; nationhood aims to transcend them. The latter does so by focusing on the fact that, as already emphasized, each state exists next to others and together they constitute an unstable and threatening environment, whereas the promotion of citizenship addresses in the first place a state’s internal conditions. The politics of nationhood are high politics, focused on the pursuit of collective destiny chiefly through might; the politics of citizenship are sometimes labeled low politics, for typically, they address humdrum issues of distribution of the domestic product by increasing or abridging the rightful claims of different sections of the population. What we may call the discourse of citizenship
tends to be conducted in a relatively factual, cognitively oriented manner, largely to establish what contribution various groups make to the economy and whether they are properly rewarded for it. The discourse of nationhood is largely intended to evoke and celebrate shared sentiments; its content is highly symbolic and is often the product at least as much of creative intellectuals and literati (musicians, poets, and novelists) as of experts and specialists. (Characteristically, the book that in late-19th- and early-20th-century Italy did the most to generate nationalist feelings among schoolchildren bore the title *Cuore* [Heart].)

For all this, the two responses do not differ radically, and there are affinities between them. For instance, the expansion of suffrage has been historically associated with the increasing rate of military participation required by the modernization of warfare; other rights of citizenship have sometimes expanded to reward subaltern groups of the population for efforts made and sacrifices borne in times of war on behalf of national interests. Policies to remedy some extremes of socioeconomic inequality within the population, particularly those associated with regional differences, have often been considered necessary for the promotion of nationhood. More generally, both citizenship and nationhood project, in somewhat different ways, the same view of the population as the constituency of the state, and both may be considered as different but overlapping aspects, on the one hand, of progressive democratization of the state and, on the other, of the expansion of rule.

**Vicissitudes of the 20th-Century State**

Both the previous sections have had as their focus (the first in conceptual terms, the second via a schematic narrative) the “state story” as it developed up to Weber’s times. Only some of the most significant later developments can be treated here, and that too only briefly, with an emphasis on the more problematical ones.

First, the late 19th and 20th century witnessed what could be called the state’s success as the universally recognized institutional arrangement for constructing and managing large-scale polities with a territorial base. By the end of the 20th century, almost every part of the world had fallen under the jurisdiction of one state or the other. (The major exception, not discussed here, is that of extraterritorial waters.) This drastic extension of a model that originally had a regional basis in Western Europe took place over a few centuries but was accelerated by phenomena such as nationalism (which in a sense challenged and inverted the sequence proposed earlier “first state, then nation”), decolonization, the position of unique visibility and legitimacy gained after World War II by the United Nations and a few other international organizations (mostly with states as their constituents), and the breakdown of empire-like polities such as the former USSR and Yugoslavia and the establishment of numerous new states on parts of their territory. However, the state model can be interpreted and implemented in various ways, some of which hardly qualify as states in the meaning of the expression we derived from Weber. There are in any case strong states and weak states, and the current expressions failed states and rogue states point to further dimensions of variability.

Furthermore, arguably, no contemporary state entirely possesses a key characteristic of the classical state: territorial sovereignty. The territorial component has been weakened by some aspects of economic and cultural globalization; by ecological phenomena that ignore territorial boundaries; by massive, uncontainable migration flows; and by forms of warfare the protagonists of which have no distinctive territorial bases. The sovereignty of many states has been compromised by their more or less open surrender of various jurisdictional faculties and resources to international organizations of various kinds. The development of nuclear weapons has called into question a basic component of “Westphalian” territorial sovereignty—the right of states to assert interests they deem critical by waging war—because the “ascent to the extremes” characteristic of warfare has acquired the potential to visit utter and final doom on both parties and, possibly, the rest of humankind as well.

The domestic dimension of the state’s institutional mission—its relationship to civil society—also has seen massive developments in the 20th century. The most significant of these can be seen in the development of totalitarianism. This happens in some states when unbounded political power has not just modified that relationship to the state’s advantage but in a sense abolished it by denying any autonomy to the institutions and processes that
structure civil society itself: the family, organized religion, the market, public opinion, education and science, and social and cultural movements. If some complementarity with civil society is conceptually essential to the state itself, totalitarianism can be seen, paradoxically, as abolishing the state itself. In fact, it has been suggested that in totalitarian systems, ultimate political power lies not with state institutions proper but with a single party and its supreme leadership—sometimes a single individual. Only these can activate and direct the powers vested in state institutions.

Even in states committed to liberal democracy, the expansion of rule has continued powerfully into the 20th century, generally shifting the boundaries between state and society by allowing the former greater leverage over the latter. This is an “overdetermined” phenomenon, produced by a number of diverse and often not otherwise related causal influences. Schematically, these can be seen to arise either from the state or from the society side of the boundaries.

On the state side, expansion has been produced in the first place by the states pursuing those distinctively political interests related to each state’s position in the international order. This holds particularly for the great increase in state involvement in societal management occasioned by the two world wars. More sustained and equally significant in the long run is the impulse that involvement received as a result of the fact that, under liberal democratic rules, adversary politics is the main matrix of policy. However, it is not the only matrix, for a further impulse has come from the state administrative apparatus’s own interest in gaining a greater and greater capacity for authoritative oversight and regulation of social affairs, with the result that there has been an increase in its own size and complexity, the entity of the resources it extracts and manages, and the related degree of discretion.

A look at society’s side, however, suggests that the often evoked imagery of an increasingly invasive, interfering, and greedy state has serious limitations. In the first place, societies may witness structural developments (e.g., new forms of communication or financial innovations) or cultural developments (e.g., those inspiring “identity politics”) that displace existing forms of legal and administrative regulations. Often, the resultant vacuum can only be filled by the state modifying previous regulations and adding new ones; if this does not occur, large-scale social and economic disaster may take place. Furthermore, state-ruled societies are all characterized by persistent and significant divisions, some of which can only be tempered or accommodated by the state’s distributive policies and the related forms of administrative intervention. The social demand for this is generally expressed through adversarial politics and/or by alignment with the state’s administrative apparatus to establish new units and acquire new faculties and resources.

The most visible product of this phenomenon is the great 20th-century expansion of the welfare state. But seeing this as the product chiefly of “the politics of envy” is facile and ignores multiple demands for state intervention and spending that originate instead from powerfully entrenched economic groups, seeking public support for their financial needs, their technological innovations, and their search for secure markets at home and abroad. In other terms, there is a welfare state also for the rich, not just the poor.

The continuing and intensified expansion of state rule in the 20th century engenders, as we have suggested, the tendency of the administrative apparatus to grow in size and complexity. In turn, this makes it more and more difficult for the state’s political summit to coordinate the activities of that apparatus across its multiple, diverse, and often-times competing units to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations.

The widely used notion of state overload explains these problems but should be complemented by other considerations. To some extent, the bureaucratic mode of organization of the state itself, as Weber presented it by way of the ideal-typical method, is rendered problematical by the increasingly diverse, changing, dynamic, open social and cultural environments characteristic of contemporary advanced societies. One senses that, in such a context, that model can no longer deliver on its promise of continuing rationalization of existence. Although the state is by no means the only sphere in which the bureaucratic model asserted itself in the course of modernization, that model appears to have been successfully revised, improved, or to an extent supplanted in other spheres, especially the economy. In the political
sphere, it seems to suffer from an additional degree of rigidity, of a denial of its own difficulties as it were, although here too there are attempts at transcending those limitations: Consider the late-20th-century slogan “reinventing government.” But by and large, it is not unfair to call attention to the contradiction between, on the one hand, the state’s increasing attempts at intervention and regulation of societal affairs and, on the other, the intrinsic clumsiness and costliness of its modus operandi.

But this critique should not be taken entirely at face value. In most of its formulations, it is an ideological aspect of a phenomenon that warrants some suspicion—the deliberate, self-interested offensive against the state of large accumulations of economic power characteristic of the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. Essentially, the dominant units of the contemporary economy have been seeking to take over more and more aspects of general societal management; and while doing so in the pursuit of their own interests, they have appealed to what they claim to be the undeniable, intrinsic, across-the-board superiority of “the market” over “politics/the state.”

The most visible aspect of this offensive is constituted by so-called economic globalization. But this, in the words of Vincenzo Roppo (2001), an Italian legal scholar, is in essence “a gigantic process whereby state functions are transferred to markets” (p. 531). The arguments for the legitimacy and necessity of the process are the core of neoliberal ideology, and their pars destruens consists largely in denouncing the intrinsic, unavoidable weakness and wastefulness of rule itself as the only alternative mode of societal management.

The vast resonance imparted to such arguments by media of all kinds (including academic literature) has put the state (and politics) on the defensive, under charge, especially, of inefficiency. There are serious grounds for the charge, but the arguments present them as uniquely valid, whereas the criterion of efficiency itself should be recognized as not being unmistakably and universally valid and paramount but as constituting an arguable value preference and thus, unavoidably, as itself entailing a political choice.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Democracy, Theories of; Legitimacy; Regime (Comparative Politics); Totalitarian Regimes

Further Readings


STATE, VIRTUAL

A virtual state is a country unit that, like a virtual corporation, has largely transferred its production
overseas. This occurs for two reasons. First, the industrialization process itself stresses manufacturing production but ultimately locates greater value in the output of high-level services. Thus, every industrial economy goes through this shift from an emphasis on the products of land, to manufacturing, and then to services. Second, even if manufacturing output is still critical for the corporation, it can best be produced in countries with low-wage but technically competent labor supplies. The virtual corporation, in this way, abets the development of the virtual state. This entry reviews small states, large states, and the impact of “virtuality” on peace.

Small and Large States
Initially, small-island or littoral countries such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Holland produce goods at home. Then, they discover that these goods may be produced more economically on the Chinese mainland, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, or Bangladesh. Shares of gross domestic product (GDP) in the various virtual states shift increasingly toward services, with Hong Kong ultimately having little or no home production at all. Foreign direct investment rises as a consequence, and production takes place in areas that the home country does not control. Guaranteed economic access to that region then becomes the necessary substitute for imperial governance.

The process is not confined, however, to small or island nations. Even major and large states experience “virtuality” as they shift away from home manufacturing to technical services such as research and development. Japan still retains 30% of its GDP in manufacturing, but in the United States, the figure is less than 20%. European countries are moving in the same direction, and India, a developing country, has grown particularly because of the value of its service industries. It follows, of course, that some nations must do the manufacturing that is outsourced to them from overseas. Brazil, China, Mexico, Poland, Hungary, and the East European states have benefited from this shift. In this sense, there is a distinction between “head nations”—countries that decide what shall be produced and do the design, financing, and marketing—and “body nations,” which perform the manufacturing tasks. This is not a hard-and-fast distinction; however, many erstwhile body nations such as South Korea and China are now in the process of becoming head nations. Nor do head nations fail to do manufacturing for others. Taiwan has devolved many manufacturing functions on China, but it also acts as a “foundry” to produce goods to order for client head countries. In this way, even the United States has acted as a body nation for Japanese, German, French, and even Chinese production located within its borders. Countries that produce abroad may seek to have their production sold in those markets, and they thereby escape the tariff walls between them and their market. As Robert Mundell has shown, the movement of factors of production abroad can compensate for limits on export trade. In the 1930s, however, this process did not occur, and nations seeking raw materials and markets believed that they had to conquer territory to retain access to both. The military conflict that followed was in part the result of economic restrictions.

In theory, the virtual state, a model to which many states are tending, carries with it a new system of international politics. In the past, when military conflict and the irrepressible desire for territory determined relations among states, the main flow between countries consisted of armies. If the virtual model holds, future flows will be largely economic as capital, technology, labor power, and information move rapidly among states. In the long term, national access to mobile factors of production (capital, technology, and labor) can replace the need to control or own additional land.

Transferring the bulk of their home production overseas and shifting most of their economy to high-level services, virtual states reshape both productive and international relationships. They inaugurate a world based on mastery of flows of production and purchasing power rather than on stocks of goods. They emancipate labor from routine mechanical tasks and offer new employment in technical or creative services. They usher in a world based on education and human capital rather than on machines and physical capital. They offer nations the opportunity to forge international links of production that are difficult if not impossible to break. (Some believe that the relation between the United States and China in both political and economic terms is reaching an important level of
"unbreakability." Like the headquarters of a virtual corporation, the virtual state determines overall strategy and invests in its people rather than amassing expensive production capability. It contracts out other functions to states that specialize in or need them. Imperial Great Britain may have been the model for 19th-century practice, but Singapore may be the model for the 21st century. The state no longer commands resources as it did in mercantilist yesteryear; rather, it negotiates with foreign and domestic capital and labor to lure them into its economic sphere and to stimulate its growth.

The virtual state, however, is not equal to the small state. Even large states undergo the economic transition from land, to manufacturing, to services. Like larger states, small states can shift their production overseas only if they are protected in doing so. They therefore depend on guarantees of freedom of the seas and open trade routes to carry on their business. Some larger power or powers have to provide these protections, and it is not surprising, therefore, that, to continue to exist, small virtual states need to have either alliances with, or de facto support from, much larger and stronger powers. The small virtual state depends on a single Great Power protector or on a balance of power internationally. In addition, if tariffs rise or even if they fail to fall, virtual states are in jeopardy. This is because capital moves much more quickly than goods. An indebted country cannot quickly send new cascades of exports abroad and hope to finance a looming deficit. The first moves slowly: the second instantaneously.

In recent years, small virtual states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea have needed “spare tires.” They have required access to “spare finance” to tide them over periods of economic crisis. In 1997–1998, Thailand could not meet payments on its international obligations, and speculators withdrew their money. The Thai currency—the baht—had been overvalued for some time. It began to lose parity with the dollar and the yen. Since Thai borrowings were in foreign currency, Bangkok needed more local currency to compensate for it. When this was printed, it inevitably caused inflation. When Thailand devalued, it did not have enough foreign currency to cover its obligations. It needed money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or other lenders to cover its losses, but these sources would only help if Thailand put on high interest rates and threw its economy into recession, cutting imports. After Thailand devalued, speculators attacked the currencies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea, all of which were (in relation) overvalued. All three were thrown into recession to meet the demands of international investors. Small virtual states, thus, needed access to much larger stores of capital. They were too small financially to stand on their own feet. At the same time, Japan and China, much bigger economies—with greater hoards of foreign capital—breezed through the 1998 crisis without a tremor. Economic size began to tell the tale.

As larger states become virtual, they establish production chains that save on labor costs and that link them to distant markets. Few links in this chain remain within the home country. The Hong Kong firm Li & Fung, experts in fashion textiles, illustrates this point:

Li and Fung work with 10,000 suppliers in 48 countries to source materials and makers for clients. So a fabric from India that gets dyed in China will go to Thailand to be embroidered (with sequins made in Korea and rhinestones from Brazil) and then return to China to be cut into garments. The firm adheres to a “30/30” principle; it guarantees that it will purchase at least 30% of the business from each supplier, but it will not exceed 70%... And it requires that suppliers have to go outside the network to survive—and thus be in a position to bring in new ideas from the outside. The results are impressive. In terms of asset productivity, Li & Fung earns 30–50% return on equity. Regarding personnel productivity, it earned $1 million per employee per year. And it scales elegantly. The firm took in $11 billion in 2004. (Kenneth Cukier, 2007, pp. 22–23)

The Impact of “Virtuality” on Peace

The United States, Germany, France, and Japan became almost equally dependent on overseas production chains, units of which, however, did not work for one corporation or even one country. They were available for many headquarters firms in different parts of the world.

Production chains make warfare among participating units difficult, expensive, and perhaps ultimately self-defeating. No such chains existed in
1914 or 1939. Aggressive states will have to choose, geographically, between trying to capture the headquarters of the virtual state or its production links with other countries and firms. In an era of capital and labor mobility, the first suggests a loss of capital and headquarter talent overseas. Whether the in-house experts will work with foreign occupiers is doubtful, and international sanctions will in any event likely occur. If an aggressor seeks to capture one or more links in an overseas production chain, it may also be disappointed. Will car chassis separated from engines, transmissions, wheels, tires, and shocks serve much of an instrumental or even financial purpose? Units can, of course, be sold off but at diminishing prices, because the links with headquarters and research and development have been severed. To guard against nationalization, recent research shows that multinational corporations investing in developing countries have tried to avoid placing full assembly or component manufacture in one place. The effect is equally marked in deterring foreign seizure. The effect is redoubled for corporations in states that enjoy economies of scale in production.

Software, finance, autos, long-haul civil aircraft, insurance, microprocessors, and pharmaceuticals are monopolized in a small number of states. Aggression that strives to engross such industries will fail unless Europe, Japan, and the United States are captured simultaneously, a very difficult task. And even then, in all three cases, the economies are gained by major production chains overseas that would not be seized coincidentally with headquarters nations. The greatest long-term advantage of virtual states is not just economic; it is also pacific. By linking with countries and economic capabilities overseas, such states achieve their competence and power through a form of hard interdependence with others. These essential ties did not exist in 1914 or 1939, but they are becoming characteristic in recent years. Not only that: As “virtuality” comes to attach itself to large states and Great Powers—such as China, the United States, Japan, and Europe—it provides an insurance against major war that did not exist before in human history.

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See also Capitalism; Interdependence; International Political Economy; International Trade; War and Peace

Further Readings

State Collapse

State collapse represents a rare and an extreme level on a continuum of state decay, when a weak state becomes unable and/or unwilling to fulfill its task as the provider of public goods. Although there is no consensus on a precise definition of the term, still there are several traits that collapsed states share. The first is the disappearance of state authority as grantor of security and welfare of its citizens. The second is the appearance of subnational leaders, mainly in the form of strong warlords, who control several hundred armed militias that rob, rape, and pillage to finance their war efforts. Third, the national identity is replaced with subnational identities, including those of ethnic group, religion, and race. Finally, the territorial integrity of the collapsed state becomes compromised when all other state and nonstate actors, especially neighboring states, intervene. This entry analyzes the causes and consequences of state collapse and the possible remedies for avoiding it.

The phenomenon of state collapse is a recent addition to the political science parlance that came with the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. In this
period, the number of internal wars around the globe began to rise, with deadly consequences in places like Rwanda and Bosnia. Many of these conflicts have been described as “ethnic conflicts”; nonetheless, ethnicity is only one aspect of political violence. While violent conflicts must be considered as a failure of the state to perform some of its fundamental tasks, one must also pay attention to the formation of the state, especially in most of the developing world such as Africa. The foundation of these states is colonialism, which made use of clan-based divide-and-conquer tactics in addition to their military superiority. Furthermore, state formation in places such as Africa did not begin on a contractual basis; rather, predatory powers conquered the land, created state institutions, and imposed taxes and forced labor intended only to facilitate the extraction of wealth, mainly in the form of raw materials, in these territories.

The postcolonial state in areas like Africa began with divided societies and economies that rely heavily on rent from the sale of commodities. Since the 1960s, however, many economies in the region have witnessed a decline in their livelihood as a result of unstable political regimes and diminished commodity prices that shattered the ability to adequately provide public services. Many of these states went through an initial phase of ethnic group federation as a substitute for the lack of essential services to all their citizens. Often, a just system of redistribution within and among groups is the key to creating solidarity among citizens, and its breakdown often triggers deadly political violence. Thus, in most of the conflict-ridden countries, nepotism and favoritism were practiced rather than a fair and just redistribution system.

With the end of the Cold War, two reforms, heavily promoted by the West, further undermined the already weak states in many parts of the developing world. The first one involved structural adjustment programs grounded in neoclassical economics, which promoted privatization, discouraged subsidies, and devalued currencies and which were complemented by the reduction of the amount of aid; together, these measures led to heightened inflation and reduced many government services. The second is the imposition of political reform based on the idealization of representative democracy, which had been promoted as the only ingredient for stability and development.

However, as has been proven, a sudden democratic transition in the midst of economic devastation facilitated the widespread internal wars and cases of subsequent state failure and collapse of the 1990s. During this period, state after state in Eastern Europe and Africa experienced deadly internal wars that claimed (and still claim in places like Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo) many lives, created thousands of refugees and internally displaced populations, and eventually redrew the map of Eastern Europe. Moreover, with the absence of superpower involvement, states began to intervene in neighboring conflicts, which led to the widespread availability of arms and mercenaries, especially child soldiers.

Nevertheless, since the beginning of the 21st century, the overwhelming majority of collapsed states are in the continent of Africa. According to Fund for Peace, 7 out of the top 10 failed states are in the African continent. The remainder of this entry examines the factors behind the collapse and what actions, if any, can be taken to reverse their status.

The Process of Collapse

A strong state can be described as a state in control of its territory and able to deliver a full range of political goods to its citizens. Conversely, weak states are incapable of controlling their territories and unable to adequately provide public goods. Such states become weak either as a result of inherent factors, including geographical, physical, and fundamental economic constraints, or because of internal antagonisms, greed, or despotism. Weak states typically harbor ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other tensions, which may be transformed into all-out conflict between contending groups. Their ability to provide adequate political goods becomes diminished. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and similar indicators fall, corruption becomes widespread, and the rule of law is hardly practiced.

In some instances, weak states turn into failed states as they are no longer able to provide essential political goods. They progressively forfeit their role as the preferred national suppliers of political goods, which in turn impels warlords and other nonstate actors to fill the vacuum. Its institutions are flawed where both legislature and
judiciary, if they exist at all, ratify the decisions of a strong executive rather than being independent. The bureaucracy loses its sense of professional responsibility. Failed states exhibit deteriorating infrastructures where telephones fail, water supplies dry up, and power falters. Educational and medical facilities crumble, resulting in increased illiteracy, infant mortality, poverty, food shortages, and hunger. Failed states are insecure and cannot project power much beyond the capital city. However, failed states offer unparalleled economic opportunity for a privileged few, mainly those within the ruling class. These faltering state failures become obvious even before, or as, rebel groups and other contenders arm themselves, threaten the residents of central cities, and overwhelm demoralized government contingents, as in the cases of Liberia, Nepal, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Côte d’Ivoire.

Nevertheless, many states recover as they open the political space to other concerned parties and move toward inclusive and stable polity. Unfortunately, some states progress toward more decay and eventually collapse. As argued, collapsed states are rare and extreme versions of a failed state. They exhibit a vacuum of authority and mere geographical existence, where the forces of entropy have overwhelmed the state and its ability to provide some semblance of order. Political goods are obtained through private means. Security becomes the rule of the strong, where warlords take over. However, parts of the collapsed state may exist and function, albeit unrecognized and in a disorderly manner.

The collapse of states is a combination of two processes of decay that simultaneously work from inside and outside the country, weakening and eventually destroying the state. The primary force of the inside–out process is the prevalence of bad leadership. These leaders over the years weaken their states through kleptocracy, neopatrimonialism, corruption, and politicization of elements such as ethnicity, religion, and race. Often, state property becomes the private property of the ruler, thus making the control of the state zero sum. The collapsed state is not only unable to develop a stable political system but lacks the administrative capacity to govern the territory effectively and ignite sustainable economic development. The weakness of the state is most apparent in the periphery, while all services and facilities are concentrated in urban areas. Thus, while the core of the state weakens through mismanagement, pressure from the periphery becomes emboldened. Finally, competition for the control of state functions ensues between different forces in the country, and in the end all of them lose.

Nonetheless, the decay that leads to state collapse also simultaneously occurs from outside in. As noted, it is in Africa that, with devastating impact, the largest concentration of collapsed states is found. The external influence began with slavery, which caused millions of casualties, dehumanization, and massive depopulation, followed by colonialism, which resulted in artificial borders and economies that currently depend on rent from commodity and foreign aid. Finally, the conflicts in many collapsed states are fueled by the latest weaponry, and the warlords receive support and legitimization, which further delays any hope for ending the political violence.

Possible Remedies for State Collapse

The revival of a collapsed state is like putting together a broken pot. Unfortunately, systematic analyses and comparative studies in the field of peaceful conflict settlement are largely underresearched. Nevertheless, the reconstruction of a collapsed state initially requires reliable conflict mediation and facilitation. The term mediation entails activities requiring a dynamic influence by reputable individuals and groups as go-betweens. Facilitation involves activities such as inviting the warring parties to talk to each other and providing conditions for talks. The focus of facilitation and mediation should be on long-term prevention of violent conflict rather than on producing short-term, “bandage” solutions. Therefore, it is imperative that efforts be made to enhance the capacity of the middle and local levels rather than concentrate on the warlords. Additionally, the warlords must at the same time be disarmed, isolated, and eventually punished for their crimes against humanity.

In addition to the facilitation and mediation efforts, there is also a need for genuine efforts to rebuild state institutions. While there has been success in the rebuilding of many collapsed states,
mainly in Eastern Europe, others remain in a collapsed condition, especially in Africa. Many states in Africa continue to face great challenges in the reconstruction of their state institutions and establishment of rule of law in their territories. Collapsed states, as argued, require strong support to rebuild legitimate institutions, which in turn will bring law and order, create trust among the combating groups, and revive the destroyed economic infrastructure.

In the past few years, international efforts have been mainly focused on achieving cessation of hostilities and signing of peace agreements while neglecting other, more pressing factors, especially creating favorable political and economic conditions. As a result, the conflicts, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, tend to be longer and deadlier, mainly due to lack of international finance and capital to curb humanitarian disasters and, more important, help in reconstruction after peace settlements. The donor countries continue their abandonment, and the critical help needed to reconstruct the political and economic institutions is usually not provided. Finally, collapsed states can only backtrack along the path from collapsed to failed to weak status, which is only possible if sufficient security is restored to rebuild the institutions and strengthen the legitimacy of the revived state. This backtracking can only be realized through a strong and genuine intervention force, as in the case of Lebanon with Syrian security and Sierra Leone with British intervention. Finally, the citizens of collapsed states must be educated and empowered to demand their rights and become active in rebuilding their broken state.

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See also State; State Failure; State Formation

Further Readings


State Failure

State failure is composed of two elements: the failure and the state. This entry first examines the diverse notions of failure, including their definition, their components and processes, some examples, and rehabilitation. It then addresses divergent conceptions of the state, with particular attention to ideas about the non-Western state that impinge on an understanding of failure and associated processes. State failure is the basis of a large array of concepts, starting with a rare and narrow concern, already containing certain ambiguities of definition, measurement, and remedy, and expanding into nearly the entire field of comparative politics, democracy, development, and interstate policy.

Failure

Failure refers to several overlapping concepts, unfortunately often confused with each other: collapse, failed, failing, fragile, and weak.

The most narrowly defined category is that of collapsed states. Collapse, the most extreme form of damage, occurs when states can no longer perform their basic functions, defined as enforcing internal and external security, extracting and allocating resources, and providing social services, for some time or where the structure, authority (legitimacy), law, and political order have fallen apart. There are few unambiguous modern cases of the disappearance of a state (Ghana, 1979–1981; Chad, 1979–1985; Lebanon, 1983–1987; Haiti, 1986–1991; Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s; Afghanistan, 1992–2002; and Liberia, 1989–1997—although none have done so as lengthily
and conclusively as Somalia since 1990). State collapse can occur because of but also without civil war, although the collapse of law, order, and legitimate authority does create a security vacuum that opens society to lawlessness. I. William Zartman (1995) has identified some signs of the process of collapse: conflict at the political center, decision failure, a narrow central clique, defensive policies, and privatization of state agents. But there is no notion of any sequence, of necessary and sufficient components, or of the nature of the process. These conceptual weaknesses are present in all other types of state failure analysis.

Equally uncertain is the process of rehabilitation after collapse. Unsolved issues include the need to rehabilitate the state versus a state, the priorities of the process, the relation between security and institutionalization, the role of welfare, the role of the international community, the relation between state building and nation building (see below, under “States”), and the need for a Man on a White Horse or a strongman. Again, these conundrums will appear with regard to other types of state failure, although, there, they are more specifically addressed.

Failed states constitute the next larger circle. The immediate problem with the concept is that it is not clear whether it refers to states that have failed as states—hence being closer to the collapsed category—or to states that have failed in one or more of their functions while still holding onto their state status. In the latter case, how many functions must have failed before the state itself can be termed a failure? Furthermore, some cases of state failure often cited, such as Yugoslavia or old Pakistan, refer to constituted units (states) discarding an overarching federal framework (state) to take over geographic pieces of the formerly larger unit and are scarcely cases where some institutional framework was ever completely absent. Another problem with the concept of failure is its geographic reference: Frequently, states continue to be effective, often strongly effective, in a given part of their territory, leaving the rest beyond their control to a more or less effective opposition; thus, they fail in their duties as rulers of their assigned territory but succeed in ruling a part of it while leaving the rest as a proto- or counterstate. Examples include Colombia and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), Sudan and the SPLA/M (Sudan Peoples Liberation Army/Movement), and Sri Lanka and the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).

These problems do not invalidate the concept but rather indicate its complexity and the difficulty of applying it to a multifaceted reality. In most works on failed states, it is the components of failure that drive the analysis, so that analysis can pinpoint at what the state has failed, if not at “everything.” These functions can be classified in many ways, but according to Stuart Eizenstat and colleagues (2004), an effective categorization is in terms of security, capacity, and legitimacy. The striking fact is that there is little overlap between the three types of failure: conflicted states, neglecting states, and illegitimate states. One measure gave two overlaps on all three (Congo-Brazzaville and Afghanistan), with 25% appearing on two columns; another gave none, with 10% on the listings appearing in two columns. Listings vary substantially over a span of several years. Immunization rates were used as indicators (proxies) for capacity, battle deaths for security, and a composite measure of “political freedom” for legitimacy, but other measures can give very different results.

When analysis turns to individual cases, not only the component concepts and indicators but also the paths to failure can be seen to vary enormously, indicating that the causes of failure only coincide at a high level of abstraction that is often circular. Rapacious concentration of power, and hence resources, in a small, often ethnically and/or geographically concentrated clique, to the neglect of the general population—the “privatization” of states—is a frequent characteristic. Thus, for example, behind the capacity gap lies a political rather than a resource failure; states do not fail because they are poor but are poor because they fail, although poverty admittedly makes good governance more difficult.

Failed states is the next largest circle, both broader and softer. It refers to states that show signs of doing badly in some crucial sector or function but that have not necessarily reached an end point of failure in that function. Again, definition and measurement problems arise: It is not clear how failing a state has to be on how many sectors to qualify for the general category, particularly since most states can be said to show weakness in many policy areas. Most treatments have handled this problem by avoiding it with a sliding scale and
a complex set of indicators, taking the analysis closer to bumpy reality and further from implications of clear-cut categorization. An understanding of the paths of sectoral failures and then their relation to each other both causally and in creating a whole picture of “failing-ness” is still underdeveloped, although some work, such as that of Robert Rotberg (2003), has been undertaken to disregard the causal problematic and address sectorally the rehabilitation problem.

The name of the condition measured also varied. One index, that of the Fund for Peace, measures instability using 12 indicators: demographic pressures, refugees and internally displaced persons, group grievance, population flight, income inequality, economy, legitimacy, welfare/services, human rights, security apparatus, elite factions, and foreign interventions. Another index, by Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick (2008), seeks indications of weakness with a more complex set (only partially overlapping with the previous set) of measures, divided into four baskets (as opposed to the previously mentioned three gaps), with five subindicators in each: (1) economic (per capita gross national income, GDP growth, income inequality, inflation, and regulatory quality), (2) political (state effectiveness, rule of law, accountability, corruption, and freedom), (3) security related (conflict, human rights, conflict territory, coups, stability, and absence of violence), and (4) welfare related (child mortality, water and sanitation, undernourishment, primary schooling, and life expectancy). Only 15 of the top 20 states were on both lists, in very different rankings. The instability study puts a causal emphasis on poverty, particularly in the more failing states, although Paul Collier et al. (2003) found structural weakness to correlate only distantly and indirectly to cause political instability. The study also indicates that remedies vary according to levels of instability: Failed states need greater attention to security first, whereas states of middle-range failures need to give targeted attention to specific sectoral weaknesses.

It is not clear how much significance lies in the difference between instability and weakness. However, another study (for the Central Intelligence Agency), which started out as a task force on state failure and used rigorous statistical analysis, was led by its data and correlations to focus instead on political instability. The report found failure and collapse to be new labels for a kind of severe political crisis and reduced their cause to three basic variables: child mortality, trade restrictions, and lack of democracy—variables so distant from the effect as to suggest a complex causal chain.

Other concepts such as fragile, vulnerable, and weak, even broader than failing, constitute the focus of the broadest research, appearing in the end as a variable characteristic of all 140 to 160 developing or non-Western countries. Studies focus on the economic functions of the state, with more than 100 indicators; on weakness in authority, capacity, and legitimacy, using 74 indicators; on fragility, measured through effectiveness and legitimacy in the economic, social, political, and security spheres, using 33 indicators, as does the USAID Fragile States Strategy of 2006; or, as in Paul Collier and colleagues’ 2003 study, simply on conflict proneness, among others. Different indicators of different dimensions lead to strongly different diagnoses. However, even though the terrain is uneven and slippery, they do permit a debate over causes, relations among causes, and remedies, which is useful both for understanding state failure and for policy making. On the other hand, the analysis has moved away from a single identifiable concept that can be explained and also away from consensual understandings of even a broad condition that can form the basis of comparative analysis.

As a result, rehabilitation—measures to overcome or, in a preventive manner, to avoid the subject condition, that is, state failure—has also been the subject, or at least the end purpose, of some attention. Most work on state failure, in all its forms, ends with prescriptions for rehabilitation and specifically for third-state—usually Western—interventions. The compass, which once headed toward institutionalization, now seems to be turning to antipoverty measures, reviving an old leitmotif of the World Bank and also a constant interest of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United States Agency for International Development, and the UK Department for International Development. A third compass point, which continually reappears, is security, often seen as the precondition of poverty reduction and institutionalization. In the end, these three foci correspond, of course, to the three disciplinary baskets of economy, polity, and security, totally interdependent but fighting for precedence. When
States fail, everything must be corrected at once, and waiting for one sector to be completed before starting another means that failure will not be overcome. That said, aid missions and state builders will agree that security comes first, even though it may well end last.

States

Beyond this analytical and remedial disagreement lies uncertainty about the nature of the state. The state, as we know, is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,” in Max Weber’s restrictive terms. A similar definition with force only subsumed terms a state “the authoritative political institution that is sovereign over a recognized territory” (Zartman, 1995, p. 5). Weber’s name is also associated with the idea of a Weberian state, distinguished by the bureaucratic, institutional nature of its routinized, performance-based legitimacy. By this definitional complex, therefore, the state’s functions include internal and external security, internal and international legitimacy, territorial control, institutionalization, and by some extension services, possibly welfare-oriented programs. To some, a state is a state, so defined; the definition is highly abstract and can be used to judge performance or other characteristics such as failure or collapse. It is not a phenomenon of all times and places; although the state as defined took some centuries to emerge in Europe and then was transferred to the Western Hemisphere, it has been slower to take root across other parts of the world, despite earlier isolated instances. Probably the most widespread alternative to the state, as defined, is the nonterritorial polity, which has exercised many of the functions of the territorial state while also extending sovereignty over a people, wherever they may be at the moment. Notions such as the Muslim umma ([mother] community), expressed in the diverse ideas of Muammar Qadhafi of Libya and Osama bin Laden of Al Qaeda, are contemporary examples, constrained in practice by the existence of territorial states.

To some, however, it is inappropriate to talk of a state in some parts of the contemporary world, notably in Africa. There, states are not in a condition of shortfall with regard to a claimed or aspired condition (statehood) but are simply not there because they are not native to the land and its people. Hence, attempts to analyze the causes of a shortfall would be pointless, although it is also sometimes suggested that new entities should be established (by someone) that would be more natural to the terrain. To these arguments, the notion of state failure or failings provides a useful alternative, indicating how states are doing on various measures and functions on the ladder to effective statehood.

This evaluation is based on the working assumption that a broad category such as state is applicable, even if not fully attained, around the contemporary world. While historical, geographical, and cultural peculiarities affect the ability of the polity to climb the ladder, it is considered a ladder that applies to functions that are universally required and desired.

One element not explicitly covered in either of the definitions of state (although perhaps implicit in Weber’s reference to a community) is the notion of a nation, the identity community contained within the state. Since the end of the 19th century, customarily associated with the French Revolution, state and nation have been assumed to be coincident, although not synonymous, as the nation-state. The term state has two meanings, both relevant to state failure. One is that sovereignty lies in the identifying population, rather than in an elevated figure such as a monarch (or a deity). The other is that the population of the state coheres in a shared identity. However, again there are ambiguities in reality. The first meaning is assumed to be symbolically true, but in practice, the ruler can often take decisions on his or her own without any reference to popular will. The matter is usually covered in accountability measures in many failing-state indices. This element edges state failure or nonfailure toward considerations of democracy, a concept that is not directly associated with most aspects of failure but that slips in measures of legitimacy. Confounding the two notions opens up a great debate. The second meaning also carries a significant assumption: Many developing states and even some developed states can be far from failure, even though there is no effective sense of national identity coherence. Even before the notions of failure became current, new states looked to the needs of national coherence and sought to create a nation to fit the state, or state-nation. The imposition of a new identity drew critical reactions from traditional
or ethnic nations and in turn contributed to state failure. “Nation-ness” is not covered in most evaluations of failure, although it is a critical underlying variable in matters such as the measurement of internal conflict.

Whatever the evaluation of a particular state’s position on the ladder, state building becomes the prescription for improvement. The term is not to be confused with nation building, which is often mistakenly used as a synonym; nation building refers to the policy of building the identity unit and can only be conducted indigenously within the state, whereas state building can be contributed to by external assistance, at least to a limited extent. In a specific sense, state building refers to institutionalization and good governance, terms particularly important to international financial institutions and their policies toward low-income countries under stress or fragile and conflict-affected countries. In policy terms, whether state building is an internal or external exercise is an important aspect of the debate, basic to decisions on specific policies and measures. The answer that it is both does not solve the kernel of the debate over proportions. Too much international attention removes the element of ownership and responsibility from the failing state, an element that is at the core of the failure question: A state must overcome failure itself; by definition, it cannot be “unfailed” from the outside. However, states in failure, like those in conflict, need help; their very condition removes elements that are needed for its correction. State building is a topic of particular focus specific to the post–World War II era but especially to the post–Cold War world. During both periods, the dominant focus was on the limitation of overpowering, totalitarian states, whereas the contemporary focus is on building state capacity; inclusion of the notion of good governance, which contains a notion of restricted effectiveness, is a corrective to the danger of overwhelming state power.

Finally, one of the most important questions with regard to state failure, which is still unresolved, is the relation between state failure and civil society failure. While it has been suggested that state collapse is made possible by the concomitant collapse of civil society, which is unable to promote candidates to fill the gap, other work indicates that civil society expands to fill the functional gap. Like other questions with regard to the topic, the relationship is fraught with conceptual ambiguities. A useful definition, but by no means the only one, considers civil society to cover civil organizations independent of government. The functions civil society can fill the range between none and all, either extreme constituting a contribution to state failure. The more functions civil society can perform, the less the state has to perform, beyond some (undetermined) degree of regulation of civil society performance. Yet some functions, such as security (policing and military defense) and national adjudication, are uniquely state functions and relegation to civil society (as to external contractors) weakens the state rather than strengthening its functional performance.

The Challenge of State Failure

In sum, state failure is a serious problem in contemporary politics. The topic of state failure faces a double challenge. On the one hand, as a problem, it calls for correction of conditions of state weakness to varying degrees. On the other, the topic itself and its component concepts are all ambiguous and open-ended. The first runs up against the limited capabilities of external support to help deal with the situation and to do so without the further weakening of effective foreign involvement. The second calls for more detailed conceptual measurements and indicators, involving further concepts related to more specific aspects and unrealistic precision. Yet both challenges are inherent in the paths to greater effectiveness and understanding.

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See also State; State Collapse; State Formation

Further Readings

**State Formation**

State formation refers to the processes leading to the centralization of political power within a well-defined territory. These processes are not historically and geographically uniform, and there is no single explanation for them. There have been a variety of paths to statehood. This entry deals with the most general question of state formation concerning the historical origin of states as such as well as with more specific questions connected to the development of the modern states system and to state formation in the contemporary world. State formation in early agrarian societies, in the early capitalist West, and in the era of decolonization and imperial dissolution display different processes and institutional features and will also be analyzed.

There are at least three major theoretical perspectives on the state and state formation. The pluralist view describes the state as a set of various interest groups, an arena for contending actors. The state developed, accordingly, through bargaining processes between interest groups. The Marxist view is instrumentalist, with the state as a committee for managing the common interests of the ruling class. Here, the state was established as an instrument of domination. The statist perspective implies that states have emerged as distinctive structures with institutions and modes of operation that cannot be derived from interest group maneuvering or class structure. The latter perspective is particularly associated with Max Weber and even with neo-Marxist critiques of orthodox Marxism. In empirical accounts of state formation, the major theories are rarely employed one-sidedly or spelled out explicitly, but they are often combined into a more compound analysis.

**The Origin of the State**

State formation requires cooperation and rule within a unit far greater than a kinship group or a community based on face-to-face recognition. A possible explanation for cooperation on a grand scale is population pressure and scarce resources, particularly the shortage of soil. Increasing population density and scarce resources stimulate more intensive food production. Thereby, social complexity increases because agriculture requires division of labor and specialization. Early state formation emerged after the establishment of agricultural societies.

The basic idea here is that societies organized as states will be more efficient externally and internally. Externally, they are stronger, better organized, and more competitive in relation to less well-organized societies. Internally, big units with intensive production may serve the population with services and conditions of life that are unavailable for small groups or individually. Conflict and common defense abroad may also support social integration at home. The inhabitants of a state are in the same boat, sharing threats from the outside.

State formation has not been a linear historical process. States and empires have disintegrated, collapsed, and disappeared, while others have thrived and enlarged over long periods. If the authorities are unable to supply the population with a minimum of services and security, legitimacy and support will erode. This has happened in failed states as well as in many former empires and colonial territories.
States and empires may also disintegrate due to a principal–agent problem. The central authority delegates power and responsibility to the local and regional representatives. The representatives in the periphery may then exploit the derived resources in a quest for autonomy. Imperial erosion and state failure have various elements of these mechanisms.

Population pressure as a state-building factor is accompanied by division of labor and social inequality. Agriculture and other modes of intensified food production allow for the emergence of a rent-collecting upper class. In a state, there is a vertical division of labor into social classes with differentiated access to land and other productive assets. In contrast to the roaming gangs and bandits in an anarchy, the stationary rulers in a territorial state will benefit from more limited surplus extraction whereby the productive capacity of the people—and thereby the tax basis—is upheld in the long run. Here is a source of support from below, whether or not government is representative.

From another perspective, the increased productivity in agricultural societies could hardly be handled by relatively egalitarian tribal communities. With increasing productivity, the available surplus was distributed on the basis of power. State organization was an organization of command whereby inequality and legitimacy could be combined in new ways.

More specific accounts of the processes of state formation have introduced religious, technical, and geographical factors. Religion is a mode for the legitimation of social stratification and command, conducive to state formation at the early stages. The evolution of script made possible the centralization of information and the spread of precise, long-distance messages. Variation in geography, soil, and climate, certainly, had crucial consequences for the ways and means of state formation. Island states and states surrounded by high mountains were relatively easy to defend, compared with states with borders in open, continental areas.

One specific hypothesis of early state formation is the irrigation hypothesis, which states that the organization of states on a large scale started with big hydraulic constructions in the drylands of the Middle East, Asia, and Meso-America. The theory of a hydraulic society, made famous by Karl Wittfogel, has been opposed by references to numerous early state formations prior to large-scale irrigation, to societies where irrigation was organized locally, and to state formation in areas of the world where complex hydraulic systems were out of the question.

Numerous states have been born by conquest. When agricultural communities are conquered by nomadic tribes or nomadic tribes establish control over large territories, state organization is the stabilization of command. The productive capacity of an agrarian society is fused with the political interests of nomadic conquerors. Generally, however, the expansive Eurasian nomadism is younger than the first high cultures with organized state power. States have been established and enlarged by conquest, but this is not the prime mover in historical state formation. Morton Fried differentiated between the endogenous factors that were prevalent in primary state formation in the Middle East, Meso-America, and the Far East and the exogenous factors—such as conquest and pressure from the outside—in secondary state formation.

Externally, war supported the internal mechanisms in early state formation. In the rivalry between states, the more efficient and powerful polities survived either by their own mobilization of force or by protection in powerful alliances.

The Modern States System

The modern states system arose in Europe with the development of international law. The turning point in legal terms was the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, after 30 years of unruly war between principalities and religious authorities. Roman Catholic emperors fought against Protestant kings and Roman Catholic kings against Protestant princes. The treaty stated that the individual principalities could choose their religion freely, independent from imperial or papal control—cuius regio eius religio. This was a long step toward the idea of autonomous territorial states, sovereign and formally equal. The idea implied that the system of governance, public religion, and economic principles could be shaped without external interference. This idea of state sovereignty was elaborated in the theory of international law by 18th-century writers like Christian Wolf and Emmerich de Vattel; it has been confirmed in a series of international treaties right up to the still valid United Nations (UN).
convention of 1945. The long-term effect of the Treaty of Westphalia was the contemporary delineation of the globe into constitutionally sovereign states.

The legal formalities of European state formation was substantiated by technological and socioeconomic transformations. The building and centralization of the states was served by technological innovation. The development of firearms and cannons in the early-modern epoch made local fortifications inefficient. Political centralization was a prerequisite for the economic extraction necessary for the finance of standing armies.

The modern state has been characterized by Max Weber as a monopoly of legitimate force and by Joseph Schumpeter as a monopoly of taxation. Modern state building may thereby be described as increasing territorial control by force—army, police, and bureaucracy—on the one hand and effective taxation on the other. New resources are then controlled by the central authority. A specialized state bureaucracy is a prerequisite for this kind of control, and it is in turn reinforced by it.

Weber’s idea of the modern state combines the monopoly of physical violence with legitimacy and territoriality. Without these characteristics, anarchy would ensue. The fundamental ambition of the state authority is to legitimate the structure of domination. In this context, Weber developed the categories of traditional, charismatic, and legal types of legitimation. In specific instances of state formation and state power, there is a variable mix of these pure types.

Warfare was revolutionized with the development of standing armies, field weaponry, and heavy artillery. The central state power was strengthened, while the earlier feudal warrior aristocracy lost their military advantages. Armored cavalry became obsolete, local fortifications were no longer defensible, and hired troops and enlisted armies were beyond the financial means of the local nobility. The war technology undermined the position of the feudal aristocracy to the advantage of monarchical centralization.

Financial resources are the nerves of government, as Jean Bodin noted toward the end of the 16th century. Taxation upheld the preindustrial states, but public financial means were chronically in short supply with increasing expenditures. Low productivity, inefficient markets, and arbitrary tax burdens resulted in tax riots and political setbacks as the fiscal pressure increased. On the other hand, the crises of legitimacy brought about by increasing taxation led to administrative buildup and reform to cope with tax resistance.

The monarchy acquired a tax monopoly and a control with central banking. Schumpeter argued that the concentration of state power was linked to the development of early capitalism. The market economy led to increased economic growth, while the central authorities acquired an increasing part of the economic surplus through taxation and state enterprise. Capitalist growth could not proceed without a rational bureaucracy for public administration and a rational system of law for stable transaction rules and predictable frameworks for entrepreneurship. In Max Weber’s view, these bureaucratic and legal conditions were unique to the European trajectory, in contrast to the charismatic, patrimonial, or traditional modes of rule elsewhere.

With political centralization and economic expansion, the capacity for warfare increased accordingly. The perspectives of Weber and Schumpeter are echoed in Charles Tilly’s famous dictum that war made the state, and the state made war.

An absence of government would have been disastrous for economic growth. Anarchic conditions would breed disorder, localism, and infrastructural defects. The development of communications, certified knowledge and expertise, legal frameworks for market transactions, justice, and order would all suffer. State formation was favorable for the development of trade and industry.

On the other hand, an overdeveloped state—a self-serving power structure alienated from civil society—would also be hostile to economic development. The state bureaucracy as a new ruling class could easily degenerate to kleptocratic and corrupt practices. Predatory governments are systematically exploiting society rather than being responsive to it. Arbitrary and predatory rule drain the surplus away from long-term investment and undermine the stable conditions of law and predictability. This is the liberal account of state power.

The liberal perspective on early-modern state formation has been tied up with the advantages of political fragmentation in the early-modern epoch. Whereas the empires of antiquity were characterized by administered trade and a coalescence of
economic system and territorial control, capitalist expansion and industrial growth thrived with an economic market system beyond the borders of state polities. The economic division of labor gained vitality from a more open space than a single political unit. The economic system was wider than any single state before the emergence of the modern states system. The plurality of states stimulated economic growth and provided their inhabitants with an escape system that served as a barrier to arbitrary government. The importance of the multipolarity in Europe was considered already during the Enlightenment and developed at length by Edward Gibbon in his monumental study of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire.

At closer range, there is a variety of reasons for the specifics of modern state formation in different parts of Europe. While Britain emerged as a centralized polity in the early-medieval epoch, Italian and German lands were not unified until the second half of the 19th century. Above the specifics of individual states, Perry Anderson has drawn a major line of division between the East and West in Europe. The absolutist state in the West emerged on endogenous lines of development, through antiquity and feudalism, while the Eastern variety of statehood was a response to external challenges. Western absolutism was erected above an emerging urban network and a relatively free peasantry, while Eastern absolutism built on small, subordinate urban societies and rural serfdom. Thus, the socioeconomic forms of the West were dynamic and adapted to a modernized state, while the Eastern institutions remained economically stagnant with the state as a response to exogenous military pressure.

Historically, state formation in Africa, Asia, and the Americas has taken a variety of forms. Precolonial chiefdoms in Africa were centralized polities with large territories and often with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, some of them intact right up to the onslaught of European colonization. The Asian empires evolved in a continuous rivalry between nomadic and sedentary societies; even the long history of Chinese dynasties was highly dependent on the border fortifications and challenges from the outside. The indigenous realms in Meso-America and South America were unified in defense against hostile tribes until the technologies and diseases of European conquerors brought them down.

These instances of early state formation did not lead continuously into the contemporary world. The political trajectories were broken by revolution, as in China, or by colonial occupation and control, as in Africa and—earlier—in the Americas. Postcolonial state formation is a complex mix of endogenous and exogenous change, with new international conditions as a crucial factor.

Recent and Contemporary State Formation

Modern statehood has expanded throughout the globe in four major waves during the past 200 years: first the formation of independent republics in the Americas from the late 18th century, then the dissolution of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires during World War I, followed by the process of decolonization—with the dissolution of the European empires overseas—from about 1960, and finally the emergence of new states in the wake of the collapse of the communist regimes and the dissolution of the Soviet Union from 1991.

These waves of state formation were orchestrated by the victory of rebellious movements, the collapse from above, and the withdrawal of external control. The key to state formation here was different from the processes in the neolithic revolution or the emergence of postfeudal absolutism in the West. Still, the European postfeudal and post-Renaissance state provided a formal model toward which recently acquired states gravitated.

In terms of international law, as a formalization and codification of the modern states system, there were approximately two dozen entities within this system at the end of the 19th century; they included the European states, the former American colonies, the Ottoman empire, and other entities recognized by treaty with European powers—Persia, Siam, China, and Japan. In the 19th century, however, it was unclear what state formation and statehood really were. There have been shifting criteria for the definition of a sovereign state. International power relations have been crucial in modern state formation, as illustrated by the attempt by the Western powers to establish Kurdistan and Armenia as independent states in 1920, withdrawn 3 years later under Turkish pressure.

The states system of the 19th century was based on a constitutive theory of state formation. The status as an independent state was derived from
diplomatic practice—through treaties and the exchange of ambassadors—without explicit criteria or formal registration. The states system had no clear borders, and the exact number of states was uncertain.

This lack of formal criteria became increasingly awkward with international conferences and treaties, including the League of Nations after World War I. Which political entities were qualified for admission? General recognition required standardized and universally accepted criteria for statehood. The League of Nations Treaty circumvented the problem by stating that any fully self-governed state, dominion, or colony could be voted in as a member, but this left the field open for diplomatic maneuvering and power politics.

The problem was addressed at an inter-American conference in Montevideo, Uruguay, in December 1933. The final treaty defined a state according to objective criteria in a way that is still the current view according to international law. To be a state, a political entity has to have a permanent population, well-defined borders, a government, and a capacity to honor international obligations. This was called a declaratory theory of statehood, whereby an effective government was a prerequisite for international status and recognition. As statehood no longer hinged on recognition as such, it was not abolished by the withdrawal of recognition. The fact of statehood was moved from recognition to the empirical prerequisites for recognition.

Furthermore, the League of Nations soon codified the prevalence of the territorial integrity of established states above the right of secession, whatever the composition of the population or the public opinion in the contested areas was. How was it possible to adapt post–World War II decolonization to the idea of territorial integrity? There were 51 original members of the UN in 1945, increasing to 127 member states in 1970, 157 in 1981, and 191 in 2004. This is a fast and radical process of state formation, within an international states system where the established polities were eager to protect their territorial integrity and avoid secessional dismemberment.

The eventual solution was pragmatic and finite, with a doctrine of decolonization that limited the new states to colonies overseas and prohibited further secession from these new sovereign states. According to the doctrine, decolonization should proceed in one step across salt water, without further legitimate challenges to the integrity of old and new states. This principle was accepted by governments throughout the Third World, in defense of the new state order. When the former USSR and the federation of Yugoslavia dissolved after the Cold War, sovereign states were established within the borders of the former republics, without further secessions or border revisions. The contested independence of Kosovo in 2008 is the only exception here.

The postcolonial states and their borders are the result of exogenous processes. State formation is based, first, on arbitrary colonial delineations and, second, on diplomatic principles. Due to the combination of a colonial past and a postcolonial lack of national integration and legitimacy, many postcolonial states have been bureaucratically overdeveloped, predatory, and inefficient. Robert Jackson has called them quasi states, lacking the institutional qualities of the Weberian state. The modern state proper, after a long historical evolution, developed institutions by sailing between the Scylla of anarchy and the Charybdis of predatory rule. The quasi state, on the other hand, was fully recognized abroad, but it was predatory or partially anarchic internally.

In Max Weber’s terms, many postcolonial states are neopatrimonial in the sense that the public bureaucracy is mixed up with clientelism, kinship relations, and personal dependency. In the neopatrimonial state, political support is either for sale or based on kinship obligations. Moreover, neopatrimonial features are a matter of degree, on a scale from the Weberian ideal type of formal rationality to the failed state.

War may have been a prime mover in early-modern European state formation, but this explanation is not generally valid in the non-European world. War and waves of conquest contributed to state formation in some parts of Asia, such as Vietnam, but were hardly relevant in the African context. In many cases, formal independence was followed by territorial disintegration, ethnic strife, and civil war.

Postcolonial state formation has been a process against heavy odds. Early-modern war in Europe unified the states against external threats, while modern wars in the non-European world have
been mostly domestic. External powers may continue to exploit the economic weaknesses of post-colonial states, in contrast to the centralization of surplus extraction in the early-modern epoch. Weak institutions and deficient leadership contribute to the failure of state formation in many post-colonial areas.

**State Formation as a Nonuniform Process**

State formation takes place in a historical context. There is only a superficial similarity between the origin of the state in neolithic times, the evolution of the early-modern state in Europe, and the variety of geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions behind state formation in the modern era. It is the outcome of a certain class of phenomena—the centralized political structures within relatively large territories—that bind these processes together. State formation is a generic term. The state and the mechanisms behind it cover a wide range of political forms and experiences.

No single explanation can explain state formation in general—during the neolithic, the early-modern, and the contemporary epochs. Nor can a single explanation adequately deal with modern state making in, for instance, Britain, France, Germany, or the United States. We have to combine the more general preconditions with those mechanisms that are specific to the emergence of the individual state.

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**See also** Capitalism; State; State, Virtual; State Collapse; State Failure; Statism

**Further Readings**


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**STATISM**

The English word *statism* and its equivalents in other languages denote an idea of the supremacy of the state and the corresponding principles, ideologies, policies, institutions, and even specific instances of state intervention in personal, social, or economic matters.

**Origins**

As a vague and contested term, *l'étatisme* emerged in France and then spread throughout Europe in the late 19th or early 20th century, either as a transliteration (German *Etatismus*, Polish *etatyzm*, and Swedish *etatism*) or in the form of a calque (Italian *statalismo*, Spanish *estatismo*, Portuguese *estadismo*, Turkish *Devletçilik*, and Finnish *Valtiojohtoisuus*), or as both transliteration and calque (Russian *этатизм*, *государственничество*; English *etatism*, *statism*; and Dutch *etatisme*, *statisme*). Later, there emerged transliterations of the English term (e.g., Lithuanian *statizmas*).

The idea of the supremacy of state emerged much earlier then the term *l'étatisme*. Soon after Niccolò Machiavelli and Francesco Guicciardini coined the word *stato* in early 16th century, signorial or kingly supremacy over a territorial polity was gradually depersonalized and conceptualized as a core notion of political order. In the mid-17th century, Thomas Hobbes identified the state as “Mortal God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defence” (*Leviathan*,...
chap. 17) or as the ultimate and supreme authority. He claimed that there was no power on earth to be compared with the Leviathan—“Non est potestas Super Terram quae Comparetur ei” (There is no power on earth that can be compared with him). Accordingly, the state was to be a departure point for all political thinking and practice.

**Historical Evolution**

Further development of statism in the 17th and 18th centuries was challenged both by its repersonalization by absolute monarchs (as in Louis XIV of France’s declaration “L’Etat c’est moi”) and by attempts to usurp state prerogatives by political factions of all kinds. At the same time, the viability of the idea of state supremacy was confirmed by “public policy science” (Polizeiwissenschaft) and constitutionalism. They highlighted the transition from “state of estates” (Ständestaat) to “good-policy state” (Polizeistaat), and then to various forms of limited monarchy, and finally to constitutional ones.

A major problem was posed by a lack of clarity about the source or sources of state authority. A conflict of alternative viewpoints ranging from divine to popular mandate made the idea of state supremacy highly contestable. It was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel who tried to develop a decidedly abstract perspective that would justify philosophically the supremacy of the state. In his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts), he further developed the Hobbesian idea of the state as Mortal God:

> The state is the march of God through the world. Its foundation is the power of reason that implements itself as will. To pursue the idea of state one has to consider not specific states but the idea for itself or the actual God. (sec. 258 addendum)

In other words, the idea of the state could not be reduced to specific instances but should be enhanced to the higher abstraction of transhistorical development. The state was made a part of the divine strategy, not a mere product of human endeavor. To this day, Hegel’s claim remains the purest expression of the philosophical justification of statism.

In the postrevolutionary era of the 19th century, statism was challenged by its many rivals. It was opposed by individualism, anarchism, socialism, communism, and radical brands of liberalism, to mention only the most important ones. Marxism advanced a “scientific” theory of universal development according to which the state was supposed to wither away. It was the most radical and clear expression of antistatism at that time.

It was in the 19th century that the word statism acquired its pejorative or derogatory sense, which is still widespread in ideologically motivated discourses. But it was also the moderate liberalism and particularly the constitutionalism of the 19th century that helped clarify many aspects of the idea of the supremacy of state as the crucial framework for international and national political order.

The Second Empire periods in France (1852–1870) and in Germany (1871–1919) were the main vehicles of statism. The term welfare state (État providence) was originally coined by Émile Ollivier, a deputy in the National Assembly, in 1864. He used it to identify a new system of social solidarity (système de solidarité national).

In Germany, statism was not only related to strengthening the traditional aspects of state power (military might, administrative capabilities, etc.) but also marked by the intrusion of the new imperial state into areas that previously were the domains of nonstate agencies. The policy of culture struggle (Kulturkampf) allowed the German state to promote effective secularization and to play down the authority of the Catholic Church. As a result, the state gained control over certain functions that hitherto had belonged exclusively to the church, such as education, marriage ceremonies, and so on. The church was forbidden from participating directly in political affairs. The state assumed responsibility for the training and appointment of clergy. Under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s May Laws of 1873 and 1874, the state assumed responsibility for the training and appointment of clergy. (In 1886, however, this policy was relaxed, returning education of clergy to the seminaries.)

Bismarck’s policy of social insurance (soziale Fürsorge) meant a more direct and decisive intrusion of the state into the private sphere. It helped introduce health insurance, accident insurance, disability insurance, and old-age retirement pension in the 1880s. The policy helped further
develop the German tradition of the welfare state (Wohlfahrtsstaat) that dated back to the “good-policy state” (Polizeistaat) of the 18th century and paved the way for the “social state” (Sozialstaat) of the 20th century. In fact, Bismarck himself identified his policy first openly as practical Christianity and then informally as “state socialism” (Staatsozialismus). Both identifications were correct since the traditional church domain of care-taking for the poor and needy was taken over by the state to forestall socialist claims on the issues of well-being of working people.

At the turn of the 20th century, statism was provided with sound intellectual justification by a prominent Swedish political scientist, Johan Rudolf Kjellén. He advocated that only states as main political units made domestic and foreign politics possible. States collectively provided the arena of international politics; each individual state comprised a framework for national politics. He identified states as a “life-form” (lifisform), stressing their organic unity with the life stories of respective peoples in their natural environment. Thus, Kjellén secularized the Hobbesian “Mortal Gods” into “life-forms” subject to scientific investigation.

World War I led to a major breakthrough of statism. All the belligerents were forced to develop state-controlled wartime economies. Both political thinking and institution building were greatly influenced by this development. At the same time, this also provoked a reaction, boosting antistatism of various sorts, ranging from serene pacifism to the exclusive advantage of a party and of a regime identified his policy first openly as practical Christianity and then informally as “state socialism” (Staatsozialismus). Both identifications were correct since the traditional church domain of care-taking for the poor and needy was taken over by the state to forestall socialist claims on the issues of well-being of working people.

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The October Revolution posed a major challenge to statism, launching an alternative form of direct “workers’ and peasants’ democracy of Soviets.” A supposedly antistatist drive soon led to the adoption of the Stalinist policy of a “socialist state in a single country” and the creation of a totalitarian “party-state” (партия-государство).

Policies of self-determination swept many countries in the wake of the World War I. To a great extent, this trend depended on state efforts and promoted various kinds of statism. For example, in Turkey, statism, or Devletçilik, became one of the six “arrows” or principles of Kemalism (the political philosophy of Mustafa Kemal, founder of the modern Turkish Republic). According to that principle and policy, the state was to direct the country’s economic development. It was also to engage in areas where private enterprise had proven to be inadequate, or where national interest required direct state involvement. In promoting Devletçilik, the Turkish state emerged as the owner of the major industries of the country.

Statism was also one of the cornerstones of Italian fascism. At a meeting in October 1925, Benito Mussolini formulated the guiding motto of his regime: “Everything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State” (Tutto nello Stato, niente al di fuori dello Stato, nullo contro lo Stato; Karl Bracher, 1973). Such verbiage incited resentment. Soon the fascist brand of statism was labeled statolatry (statolatria). In his encyclical Non Abbiamo Bisogno of June 29, 1931, Pope Pius IX denounced fascist attempts to monopolize completely the young, from their most tender years up to manhood and womanhood, for the exclusive advantage of a party and of a regime based on an ideology that clearly resolves itself into a true and genuine pagan worship of the state (“in una vera e propria statolatria pagana”—statolatry. Later, the term statolatry was widely used by a staunch critic of statism, Ludwig von Mises.

Such claims to total control were beyond the capabilities of fascist Italy to sustain. Instead, it developed a state structure known as the corporate state with the ruling party acting as a mediator between “corporations” making up the body of the nation. Similar designs were quite popular elsewhere in the 1930s. The most prominent examples were Estado Novo in Portugal (1932–1968) and Brazil (1937–1945), the Austrian Ständestaat (1933–1938), and authoritarian experiments in Estonia, Romania, and some other countries of East and East-Central Europe.

Much more consistent attempts to develop totalitarian versions of statism were undertaken in the German Third Reich and the former USSR. Still, the “success” was fairly ambiguous and self-defeating since the emergent models actually integrated state structures into a more inclusive system of total control, in the form of the Hitlerite “movement-state” (Bewegungsstaat) and the Stalinist “party-state” (партия-государство). Thus, the
**State** in the proper sense of the term was actually eradicated.

Liberal versions of corporate statism of the 1930s developed into welfare states. The most notable examples are the United States, Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Uruguay, Sweden, and other Nordic countries.

The advancement of the American welfare state was highlighted by the New Deal, a series of economic programs President Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration initiated between 1933 and 1936. The First New Deal, of 1933, was aimed at short-term recovery programs to combat the effects of the Great Depression. The Second New Deal (1935–1936) included labor union support, the Social Security Act, and programs to aid farmers and migrant workers.

In Sweden, a policy of taking over the system of parish welfare by the state and the development of additional state-controlled social services was introduced in early 1930s. It is known as *people's home* (*Folkhemmet*), a very telling term introduced already in 1928 by the Social Democratic Party leader Per Albin Hansson, with inspiration presumably coming from Kjellén.

**Recent Developments**

In the later part of the 20th century, the welfare state and statism had their ups and down. Emergence of new states, economic crises, social unrest, and revolutions were typically accompanied by an upsurge of statist policies and thinking. Periods of relatively steady development tended to incite withdrawal of the state from economic and social spheres. The most prominent examples are Thatcherism and Reagonomics.

Statism’s influences on political science are mainly found in the traditions of normative and legal studies of states. Far more outspoken are antistatism traditions related to liberal and Marxist sources of inspiration. In a more general context, both the behavioral approach and structural functionalism helped play down elements of statism from the 1950s to the 1970s, introducing concepts of political systems and political culture. Reaction followed and “brought the state back in” (see Theda Skocpol, Peter Evans, & Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 1985). The globalization debate reintroduced expectations of the state “withering away.” Currently, a more balanced approach seems to prevail. It is generally recognized that the system of states is indispensable as a kind of reference grid for world politics and the respective territorial units are vital institutional frameworks for internal policies.

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**See also** Liberalism; Socialism; State; Welfare State

**Further Readings**


**Statistical Inference**

*See* Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian
**Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian**

Statistical inference is a form of induction and can be broadly defined as “learning from data.” The two dominant forms of statistical inference are “classical” (or “frequentist”) inference and Bayesian inference.

Briefly, classical inference assesses the plausibility of a hypothesis by asking how frequently we would see results like the one actually obtained in repeated applications of the data generation mechanism, assuming the hypothesis to be true. If a statistic \( \theta \) computed with the observed data is judged to be sufficiently unusual relative to its expected value under the hypothesis, then the hypothesis is considered falsified. The assumed hypothesis is often a “null” or “no effects” hypothesis; if this hypothesis is rejected (in the sense given above), then we usually say that we have a “statistically significant” finding. The assumptions here are that statistics vary randomly across repeated applications of the data generation mechanism (e.g., random sampling, say in the case of the analysis of survey data), while the objects of interest—population parameters \( \theta \)—are constants. Repeated applications of the sampling process, if undertaken, would yield different \( y \) and different \( \theta \). The distribution of values of \( \theta \) that would result from repeated applications of the sampling process is called the *sampling distribution* of \( \theta \); the standard deviation of this distribution is the *standard error* of \( \theta \). For many statistics, asymptotic theory gives the form of the statistic’s large-sample sampling distribution (e.g., normal, \( \chi^2 \)).

The sampling variance of a statistic is often also easy to estimate; for instance, if \( \theta \) is the maximum likelihood estimate, then \( V(\theta) \) is often estimated with the inverse of the information matrix (minus the second derivatives of the log of the likelihood function with respect to \( \theta \), usually evaluated either at \( \hat{\theta} \) or at a hypothesized value \( \theta^* \)). This approach is by and far the most frequently taught and frequently deployed framework for statistical inference in the social sciences.

By contrast, Bayesian inference uses Bayes rule (we will drop the apostrophe in “Bayes’ rule”) to compute the conditional probability of hypotheses given the data at hand, without any explicit reference to what might happen over repeated applications of the data generation mechanism. Bayes rule states that if \( A \) and \( B \) are events then

\[
P(A|B) = \frac{P(B|A)P(A)}{P(B)},
\]

where \( P(A|B) \) is the conditional or posterior probability of \( A \) given that event \( B \) has occurred, \( P(A) \) is the prior probability of \( A \), and \( P(B) \) is the marginal probability of \( B \). This proposition—an uncontroversial result given the conventional definition of conditional probability—can be restated more provocatively as

\[
P(H|E) = \frac{P(E|H)P(H)}{P(E)},
\]

where \( P(H) \) is the prior probability of a hypothesis and \( P(E|H) \) is the likelihood of “evidence” (or data) \( E \) under hypothesis \( H \). This form of Bayes rule underscores its relevance as a tool for statistical inference. In the case of a finite set of competing hypotheses \( H = \{H_1, \ldots, H_j\} \), the law of total probability implies that

\[
P(E) = \sum_{j \in H} P(E|H_j) P(H_j).
\]

Note that the resulting posterior probabilities constitute a proper probability mass function over the set \( H \); that is, \( \sum_{j \in H} P(H_j | E) = 1 \). For the case of a continuous parameter \( \theta \in \Theta \subseteq \mathbb{R} \) and data \( y \sim p(y|\theta) \), Bayes rule becomes

\[
p(\theta|y) = \frac{p(y|\theta)p(\theta)}{\int_\Theta p(y|\theta)p(\theta)d\theta} \propto p(y|\theta)p(\theta),
\]

or (in words) the posterior density for \( \theta \) is proportional to the prior density for \( \theta \), \( p(\theta) \), times the likelihood for the data given \( \theta \), \( p(y|\theta) \). The integral in the denominator in Equation 3 ensures that the posterior density integrates to one and thus is a proper probability density.

Note that Bayesian inferences do not rely on how \( \theta \) might vary over repeated applications of random sampling. Instead, Bayesian procedures are geared toward answering a simple question: What should I believe about \( \theta \) in light of the data available for analysis, \( y \)? The quantity \( \hat{\theta}(y) \) has no
special, intrinsic status in the Bayesian approach, although a statistic such as a least squares or maximum likelihood estimate $\hat{\theta}$ is a feature of the data that may be helpful in computing the posterior distribution for $\theta$. In the Bayesian approach, the roles of $\theta$ and $\hat{\theta}$ are reversed relative to their roles in classical, frequentist inference: $\theta$ is random, in the sense that the researcher is uncertain about its value, while $\hat{\theta}$ is fixed, a feature of the data at hand. An example will help make the distinction clear.

**Example: Attitudes Toward Abortion.** In the 1994 General Social Survey (GSS), 1,934 respondents were asked, “Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if the woman wants it for any reason.”

Of the respondents, 895 reported “yes,” and 1,039 said “no.” Let $\theta$ be the unknown population proportion of respondents who agreed with the proposition in the survey item—that a pregnant woman should be able to obtain an abortion if the woman wants it for any reason. The question of interest is whether a majority of the population supports the proposition in the survey item.

Under the assumption that the survey responses are independent (not an unreasonable assumption for a survey such as the GSS), the binary survey responses can be modeled as binomial process; that is, the likelihood has the binomial form

$$p(y|\theta) = \binom{1934}{895} \theta^{895} (1 - \theta)^{1934 - 895}. \tag{4}$$

**Frequentist Approach.** The maximum likelihood estimate of $\theta$ is $\hat{\theta} = 895/1934 = .46$, the approximation coming via rounding to two significant digits. With this large sample, the normal is an excellent approximation to the sampling distribution of $\theta$. Interest focuses on whether the unknown population proportion, $\theta$, is equal to .5. A typical classical approach to this question is to test the null hypothesis $H_0: \theta = .5$ against all other alternatives $H_\neq: \theta \neq .5$ or, say, a one-sided alternative $H_\geq: \theta > .5$. We would then ask how often we would see the value of $\hat{\theta}$ actually obtained, or an even more extreme value if $H_0$ were true, by centering the sampling distribution of $\hat{\theta}$ at the hypothesized value. The variance of $\hat{\theta}$ under $H_0$ is given in the usual way, computed as minus the inverse of the second derivatives of the log-likelihood function evaluated at the hypothesized value of $\theta$. In turn, the standard deviation of the normal sampling distribution (the standard error of $\hat{\theta}$) under $H_0$ is

$$se(\hat{\theta}|H_0) = \sqrt{\frac{\hat{\theta} (1-\hat{\theta})}{n}}$$

$$= \sqrt{\frac{.50 \times (1-.50)}{1934}} \approx .011.$$

The realized value of $\hat{\theta}$ is (.46 - .46)/.011 = 3.64 standard errors away from the hypothesized value. Under a normal distribution, this is an extremely rare event. Over repeated applications of random sampling, only a small proportion of estimates of $\theta$ will lie 3.64 or more standard errors away from the hypothesized mean of the sampling distribution. This proportion is

$$2 \times \int_{3.64}^{\infty} \phi(z) dz = 2 \times [1 - \Phi(3.64)] \approx .00028,$$

where $\phi(\cdot)$ and $\Phi(\cdot)$ are the normal PDFs and CDFs, respectively. Given this result, most (frequentist) analysts would reject the null hypothesis in favor of either alternative hypothesis, reporting the $p$ values for $H_0$ against $H_\neq$ as .00028 and for $H_0$ against $H_\geq$ as .00014.

**Bayesian Approach.** The unknown parameter is $\theta \in \Theta = [0, 1]$. Suppose that we bring little or no prior information to the analysis, assigning $\theta$ a uniform prior over $\Theta$. Applying Bayes rule, we seek the posterior density $p(\theta|y) \propto p(y|\theta) p(\theta)$. The uniform prior is constant with respect to $\theta$ and is absorbed into the constant of proportionality. With a binomial likelihood and a uniform prior on $\Theta$, the posterior density of $\theta$ is a Beta density, which is well approximated by a normal density for samples of even moderate size. That is, our working approximation to the posterior density for $\theta$ is a normal density centered on the maximum likelihood estimate of .46 with standard deviation .011; that is, $p(\theta|y) \approx N(.46, .011^2)$. Note that most of the posterior probability mass lies below
.5, suggesting that the hypothesis \( \theta > .5 \) is not well supported by the data. In fact, the posterior probability of this hypothesis is

\[
\Pr(\theta > .5 | y) = \int_{.5}^\infty p(\theta | y) d\theta = \int_{.5}^\infty \phi\left(\frac{\theta - .46}{.011}\right) d\theta = .00014.
\]

Note an apparent symmetry between the frequentist and Bayesian answers. In both instances, the “answer” involved computing the same tail area probability of a normal distribution, with the probability of \( H_0 \) under the Bayesian posterior distribution corresponding with the \( p \) value in the frequentist test of \( H_0 \) against the one-sided alternative \( H_B \) (see Figure 1). But this similarity really is only superficial. The Bayesian probability is a statement about the researcher’s beliefs about \( \theta \) obtained via application of Bayes rule, and is \( \Pr(H_0 | y) \), obtained by computing the appropriate integral of the posterior distribution \( p(\theta | y) \). The frequentist \( p \) value is obtained via a slightly more complex route and has a quite different interpretation from the Bayesian posterior probability since it conditions on the null hypothesis; that is, the sampling distribution is \( f(\theta | H_0) \), and the \( p \) value for \( H_0 \) against the one-sided alternative is the proportion of \( \theta \) less than .46 we would see under repeated sampling with the sampling distribution assumed under the null hypothesis.

**Figure 1**  
Attitudes Toward Abortion: Posterior Density of \( \theta \) Contrasted With Sampling Distribution of \( \hat{\theta} \) Under \( H_0 : \theta = .5 \)


*Note:* The top right panel shows the posterior density in the neighborhood of \( \hat{\theta} \) .5, with the shaded region corresponding to the posterior probability \( p(\hat{\theta} > .5 | y) = \int_{.5}^\infty p(\hat{\theta} | y) d\theta = .00014 \). The lower right panel shows the sampling distribution in the neighborhood of \( \hat{\theta} = .46 \), with the shaded region corresponding to the proportion of times one would observe \( \hat{\theta} \) .46 if \( H_0 : \theta = .5 \) were true, corresponding to .00014 of the area under the sampling distribution.
Relevance of the Classical/Bayesian Distinction to Social Science

The distinction between the classical/frequentist and Bayesian approaches to statistical inference is important in at least three ways: (1) although the frequentist approach is ubiquitous in social science training and practice, it is unclear whether its premises apply in many social science contexts; (2) many social scientists often give Bayesian interpretations to the outcome of classical procedures and (3) since parameters are considered random variables in the Bayesian approach, extensions such as multilevel or hierarchical modeling are straightforward, as is inference for latent variables, missing data, and so on.

Inference Without Random Sampling

Consider the analysis of cross-national data in economics, political science, or sociology, say using national accounts data from the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). Alternatively, consider researchers in American politics analyzing all trade votes in the U.S. Senate in a given period or an analysis of the determinants of civil war, using an authoritative, comprehensive listing of all civil wars in the world since World War II.

In what sense do data such as these comprise a sample from a population? Repeating the data collection exercise would not yield a new sample from the population, but rather, save for coding error or errors in transmission or transcription of the data, “repeated sampling” would yield exactly the same data set and statistics, \( \theta \). In cases such as these, there is no uncertainty due to variation in repeated sampling from a population. Nonetheless, one can feed data of this sort to a computer program and have standard errors and significance tests reported for various statistics (e.g., means, correlations, regression coefficients) as usual. But what do those standard errors mean in this context? What do we mean when we say a result is “statistically significant” in this setting?

Several possibilities come to mind. Coding error might see the numbers changing over repetitions of the data collection process, say, if the data were being manually transcribed from archival sources into a database. But this form of measurement error may have quite different operational characteristics from classical sampling error: For example, what is the population of possible data sets that might be generated via transcription error, and how do we (randomly) sample from that population? Are those transcription errors distributed randomly and, if so, via what distribution? In short, does a central limit theorem apply to the resulting estimator and standard errors? Almost surely not: As \( n \to \infty \), frequentist sampling error vanishes (and, for independent data, at a rate of \( \sqrt{n} \)), but this hardly seems likely for coding errors.

Nor is it satisfying or particularly helpful to say, “The data are just one of many possible data sets that could have been generated if history were to be replayed many times over.” What is the sampling mechanism that selected the history we happened to observe? No one knows, or can know. Adhering to a frequentist conception of probability in the face of nonrepeatable data seems dubious.

Moreover, it is not clear how to attach frequentist probabilities to past or nonrepeatable events about which one may be uncertain (e.g., the probability that an asteroid impact caused the K-T mass extinction) or to future events (e.g., the probability that Democrats will hold a majority of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives after the next election). That is, there is a large class of events of interest to social scientists for which the frequentist notion of probability is inappropriate. In these situations—quite common in the social sciences—the Bayesian approach provides a coherent basis for inference.

What Is a Confidence Interval?

The stark contrast between classical and Bayesian inference is also particularly evident when we consider a staple of statistical practice, the confidence interval. To illustrate this, consider the abortion attitudes example again. Using a large-sample, normal approximation, a 95% confidence interval for \( \theta \) is \( \theta \pm 2 \times \text{se}(\theta) = .46 \pm 2 \times .011 = [.438, .482] \). But what exactly is the interpretation of this confidence interval? Many social scientists in this situation would say, “There is a .95 probability that \( \theta \) lies between .438 and .482.”

But this is not the correct classical interpretation. In the classical approach, parameters are fixed characteristics of populations, so either \( \theta \) lies in the interval, or it doesn’t. The correct interpretation of a classical or frequentist confidence interval depends on the repeated sampling characteristics of a sample
The prior density \( p(\theta) \) plays a key role in Bayesian inference. Some critics of Bayesian inference point to the arbitrary, subjective nature of the prior density as a weakness of the Bayesian approach. But the prior density also provides a way for model expansion when working with data pooled over multiple units and/or time periods. Data of this sort abound in the social sciences. Individuals live in different locations, with factors that are constant for anyone within that location but that vary across locations; students attend different schools; voters live in different constituencies; firms operate in different types of markets; politicians compete under different sets of electoral rules, and so on. Understanding the relative weight of microlevel variables and macrolevel or “contextual” variables—and critically, the interaction between them—is central to many research programs in the social sciences. A key question in research of this type is how the causal structure that operates at one level of analysis (e.g., individuals) varies across a “higher” level of analysis (e.g., localities or time periods).

The Bayesian approach to statistical inference is extremely well suited to answering this question. Recall that in the Bayesian approach parameters are random variables. Thus, it is not difficult to replace the prior \( p(\theta) \) with a richer model to allow for the way the parameters \( \theta \) might vary across groups \( j = 1, \ldots, J \), perhaps as a function of the characteristics of the groups: For example, \( \theta_j \sim f(z_j, \gamma) \), where \( \gamma \) is a set of unknown hyperparameters. That is, the model is now composed of a nested hierarchy of stochastic relations: The data from unit \( j \), \( y_j \), are modeled as a function of covariates and parameters \( \theta_j \), while cross-unit heterogeneity in the \( \theta_j \) is modeled as a function of unit-specific covariates \( z_j \) and hyperparameters \( \gamma \).

Models of this sort are known to Bayesians as hierarchical models but go by many different names in different areas of the social sciences depending on the specific form of the model and the estimation strategy being used (e.g., models with “random” or “varying” coefficients models, “multilevel” or “mixed” models). It is no exaggeration to say that hierarchical modeling is one of the great successes of the Bayesian revival of the past 20 years. Simple models of causal heterogeneity—in which parameters are assumed to vary in a nondeterministic way across units—are substantively attractive and yet nontrivial enough to estimate in a classical setting. A suite of models known as Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) made Bayesian computation for these models rather simple.

**Feasibility of Bayesian Inference via MCMC**

As recently as the 1980s, applications of Bayesian inference were limited to a relatively small set of problems in which the posterior density for \( \theta \) can be expressed in closed form; even a problem as simple as logistic or probit regression models for binary data was mathematically intractable, and so Bayesian inference was more a philosophical position than a practical strategy for data analysis. But throughout the 1990s, there was something of an explosion of interest in Bayesian approaches, almost entirely driven by the fact that cheap computing power made it feasible to do simulation-based, Bayesian statistical data analysis. The MCMC made the Bayesian approach not just a theoretical curiosity but a
practical reality for applied researchers. Briefly, MCMC works by using Monte Carlo methods to generate simulation-based characterizations of posterior densities; the results from Markov Chain theory show that the stochastic explorations of posterior densities typically generated by MCMC algorithms nonetheless yield “simulation-consistent” summaries of the posterior density.

MCMC algorithms have proven themselves amazingly powerful and flexible and have brought wide classes of models and data sets out of the “too hard” basket. We have already mentioned hierarchical models. But other examples include data sets with a lot of missing data, models with many parameters, models with many latent variables, mixture models, and flexible semi- and non-parametric models. Thus, whatever one’s view of the intellectual or philosophical virtues of Bayesian inference, by adopting a Bayesian approach to inference, researchers can avail themselves of MCMC algorithms, an extraordinarily powerful set of techniques for estimation and inference.

**A Historical Note**

The result that we now refer to as Bayes theorem appeared in an essay attributed to the Reverend Thomas Bayes and communicated to the Royal Society after Bayes’s death in 1761. This famous essay has been republished many times. Several authors have noted that there is some doubt whether Bayes actually discovered the theorem that was named after him. Nor is it clear that Bayes himself was a “Bayesian” in the sense that we use the term today.

Apparently unaware of Bayes’s work, Pierre-Simon Laplace stated Bayes theorem in a more general form. Perhaps because of Laplace’s work on the subject, Bayes’s essay went unnoticed until after 1780 and played no important role in scientific debate until the 20th century. This said, Bayesian inference was the dominant mode of statistical inference until the early 20th century, although it was known at that time as the “method of inverse probability.”

The adjective *Bayesian* did not enter the statistical vernacular until the 20th century. The first use of *Bayesian* as an adjective was by Ronald Fisher, in his introduction to a paper originally written in 1921. Not surprisingly, Fisher’s use of the term was not flattering, since he was at pains to contrast his approach to statistical inference from the subjectivism he disliked in the Bayesian approach.

**See also** Mixed Methods; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Statistical Significance

**Further Readings**


**Statistical Significance**

Political scientists use the concept of statistical significance to validate theoretical assertions about statistical relationships. In the most basic sense, statistical significance means that the hypothesized statistical relationship is probably true. That is, the hypothesized relationship is not due to random
chance. When a result is highly significant, it is very unlikely to be due to chance. But this does not mean that the hypothesized relationship is strong. Statistical significance is not to be confused with substantive importance. A research finding may be strongly validated but not very important. Moreover, significance tests in political science, and social science in general, do not directly test the significance of the researcher’s belief about the statistical relationship between the variables of interest. Instead, statistical significance relates to how likely the findings are, given the assumption that there are no differences in the subgroups of the population. This entry is presented in four parts: (1) it discusses the relationship between the significance test and the research hypothesis, (2) it presents the elements of the significance test, (3) it explains the relationship between statistical significance and the power of the significance test, and (4) it briefly discusses the relationship between statistical significance and sample size.

The Significance Test and Hypotheses

A hypothesis is a statement about an underlying population that may be true or false. Relationships in political science are generally probabilistic rather than deterministic, and this fact has major implications in the design of attempts to prove the existence of hypothesized relationships between variables. In political analysis, researchers are often interested in establishing a causal relationship between variables. Establishing this causal relationship involves meeting three conditions: (1) establishing association between variables, (2) establishing an appropriate time order between variables, and (3) eliminating alternative explanations. Statistical significance is most related to establishing association between variables and is only tangentially related to the other two conditions.

Establishing statistical significance involves testing a hypothesized statistical relationship. Ronald A. Fisher is credited most with the development of the statistical significance concept. Fisher proposed a procedure that produces significance levels from the data about a single hypothesis with a known distribution and a specified test statistic (such as $z$, $t$, $F$, and $\chi^2$). Meanwhile, Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson proposed a procedure that tests the probability of a null or restricted hypothesis against a research (alternative) hypothesis. As political science has matured as a discipline, political scientists rely more and more on quantitative data and statistical methods to test hypothesized relationships. Over time, the fusion of Fisher’s significance test procedure and Neyman-Pearson’s hypothesis test procedure produced the null hypothesis statistical test, which is now the dominant procedure for determining statistical significance in political science and in social science in general.

An important aspect of significance tests is determining whether to use a one-tailed or two-tailed test of significance, and this decision is related directly to the form of the paired hypotheses. The null hypothesis ($H_0$) is the hypothesis to be tested and is usually a statement of a parameter value, say $\theta$, that corresponds to a parameter value of no effect, say $\theta^*$. In turn, the null hypothesis takes the form $H_0: \theta = \theta^*$. In many political and social research applications $\theta^*$ is zero. Meanwhile, the form of the alternative hypothesis determines whether the significance test is one-tailed or two-tailed. The two-tailed test takes the form $H_1: \theta \neq \theta^*$. This means the alternative hypothesis includes values falling below and above the value of $\theta^*$ listed in $H_0$. Conversely, one-tailed alternative hypotheses have the directional forms of $H_1: \theta < \theta^*$ or $H_1: \theta > \theta^*$. The alternative hypothesis $H_1: \theta < \theta^*$ refers to detecting whether $\theta$ is smaller than the particular number $\theta^*$. The alternative hypothesis $H_1: \theta > \theta^*$ refers to detecting whether $\theta$ is larger than $\theta^*$. In short, the researcher predicts deviation in $H_0$ in a particular direction. It is generally safest to use a two-tailed test, but there are some situations in which the one-tailed test is more appropriate.

Elements of Significance Tests

All significance tests have five elements: assumptions, hypotheses, test statistic, $p$ value, and conclusion. The concept of significance relates most directly to the $p$ value, which contains information concerning the probability of observing a result like the researcher observes if there is no difference in the corresponding groups in the population from which the sample is drawn. A significance test involves comparing a test value that the researcher has calculated with some critical value for the statistic.

Assumptions

Significance tests require certain assumptions for test validity. These include the type and scale of the
data, the form of the population distribution, the method of sampling, and the sample size. Data may take quantitative or qualitative forms. Additionally, data may be collected from different research sources: attitude surveys, governmental documents, historical records, newspaper files, voting statistics, or other stored data. These types of data collected from various sources suggest different distributional forms. Typical parametric distributional forms include the normal, Student’s $t$, gamma, binomial, and chi-square. Additionally, some data may preclude the use of parametric testing procedures (e.g., count or rank data). Assumptions must also be made concerning the type of sampling that is required for the conclusions drawn from the sample to be applicable to the specified population. Many significance tests require a minimum sample size, and the validity of most tests improves as the sample size increases. Sample size is an important factor in statistical significance, which is discussed in greater detail as follows.

**Hypotheses**

Significance tests generally examine two hypotheses about the value of a parameter: the null hypothesis and the alternative or research hypothesis. The investigator designs the research to determine the amount of evidence that exists to support the research hypothesis. That is, evidence against the null hypothesis is evidence in support of the research hypothesis.

**Test Statistic**

Test statistics generally follow the normal, Student’s $t$, $F$, or chi-square distributions. The formation of the test statistic usually involves a point estimate of the parameter to which the hypotheses refer. Commonly used test statistics include the $z$ score for large sample means ($\bar{y}$) and proportions ($\hat{p}$), the $t$ statistic for small-sample means and proportions and individual coefficients in linear regression models, the $F$ statistic to test the significance of multiple linear regression models, the chi-square statistic ($\chi^2$) to test independence of variables and goodness of fit for generalized linear models (GLMs), the likelihood ratio test statistic ($-2 \log L$) to test nested GLM models, and the Wald statistic ($z^2$) to test the significance of parameters in GLM models.

**p Value**

The $p$ value provides a means to interpret the evidence provided by the test statistic on a probability scale. The $p$ value is the probability of obtaining a test statistic value as large as the one obtained, conditioned on the null hypothesis being true. The smaller the $p$ value, the more strongly the data contradict the null hypothesis. Conversely, a moderate to large $p$ value indicates that the data are consistent with the null hypothesis. The $p$ value is the summary of the evidence in the data about the null hypothesis.

**Conclusion**

Significance tests are designed to minimize Type I error, which is the error of rejecting the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true. To establish the minimization of Type I error, the investigator sets the predetermined and small $\alpha$ level at which $H_0$ is rejected. The $\alpha$ level of .05 has become the conventional level of statistical significance in social research. The .05 level provides that only 5 times out of 100 the null hypothesis will be rejected when the null is true. The researcher is interested in the range of values of the test statistic for which the null hypothesis will be rejected. If the statistic produces a $p$ value that is smaller than the critical alpha level, the researcher has fairly strong evidence against the null hypothesis ($H_o$). In the case of a two-tailed test, $\alpha$ is divided by 2 so that half of the .05 probability is in the left tail of the distribution and half of the probability is in the right tail of the distribution.

**Significance and Power of the Test**

The Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test approach yields the idea of the power of the test. Type I error can only be made when the null hypothesis is true. Conversely, Type II error can only be made when the null hypothesis is false and is defined as the probability of failing to reject the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is false. Type II error is usually referred to as beta ($\beta$). Power ($1 - \beta$) is related to statistical significance in that it is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis conditioned on the fact that the null hypothesis is false. In other words, power is the probability of detecting an association (effect) given that there is indeed an association (effect). Under the power rubric, the researcher seeks to develop and employ the test that has the highest power for a given
predetermined α level through sample size, desired significance level, and the research hypothesis.

**Statistical Significance and Sample Size**

There are two misunderstandings related to the relationship between statistical significance and sample size: (1) statistical significance in large samples translates into substantive importance and (2) p values associated with larger samples are more reliable than identical p values in smaller samples. In the first misunderstanding, as sample size increases, the researcher is increasingly likely to detect a significant effect. Additionally, as sample size increases, it is more likely that the investigator will detect smaller population effect sizes progressively. This means that large sample sizes are more likely to reveal statistical significant relationships, but these statistically significant effects may relate to small substantive effects. In the second misunderstanding, a p value derived from a larger sample is not more reliable than an identical p value produced by a smaller sample. Two studies that reject the null hypothesis with the same p value are equally likely to make Type I errors. This statement holds true even if the sample sizes are dramatically different.

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See also Hypothesis Testing; Sampling, Random and Nonrandom; Statistical Inference

**Further Readings**


pain, and swelling. Post cards, smaller classes, job training, and sanctions per se do not cause voters to turn out, students to get higher test scores, wages to increase, or countries to bargain, but we proceed as if we believe they do.

Causal statements vary in the confidence one has in the causal logic or in the chain of events linking Y to X and therefore in the prediction of how Y is likely to be different if X is different. For example, one can confidently predict that your thumb will hurt, swell, and turn purple if you hit it with a hammer. There is less confidence in the prediction that turnout will increase if all potential voters receive a mailing or a phone call before election day. And there is far, far less confidence in the prediction that economic sanctions will lead a rogue state to negotiate. This entry provides a brief introduction to the types of data and statistical methods used in the social sciences to try to reduce this uncertainty about causal arguments and to estimate the magnitude of the relationship between Y and the X.

The entry begins with a very brief discussion of the common models representing causal statements. This is followed by a discussion of the different strategies for designing empirical studies, of the types of data that are frequently available in these studies, and of some of the common statistical methods used to evaluate and estimate the causal model. The entry concludes with some cautions about the types of conclusions that can be reached in these different circumstances and with a plea for modesty in any empirical study.

Models, Empirical Analysis, and Causal Inferences

Models facilitate predictions of how an outcome is likely to differ if some other variable is changed, represented as \( \Delta Y = F(\Delta X) \). Since the social sciences discuss outcomes probabilistically, the expression should refer to the expected change in Y, or if Y is a discrete variable, the change in the probability that Y changes its state—that is, \( E\{\Delta Y\} = F(\Delta X) \) or \( E\{Pr(\Delta Y)\} = F(\Delta X) \). For the purposes of this discussion, the origin of the model, be it mathematical deduction, previous empirical results, or conventional wisdom, is not important. What is important is that there be a set of logical and consistent statements about how or why changes in X cause changes in Y.

In some instances the model may be extremely simple. Consider Harold Gosnell’s pioneering field study of whether pre-election mailings increase voter turnout. Here the outcome variable \( V \) indicates the probability that a subject votes. The variable \( X \) indicates whether the person received the mailing and is a binary variable—the person did or did not receive the mailing. The model is

\[
Y = B_0 + B_1 X_1,
\]  

(1)

where \( B_0 \) is the probability of voting among those who did not receive the mailing, \( X_1 = 0 \), and \( B_1 \) is the increase in that probability among those who received the mailing, \( X_1 = 1 \). In the NHR model, \( B_1 \) is the magnitude of the counterfactual of what would have been the outcome if a person who did not receive the mailing had received it.

The purpose of the study was to estimate the magnitude of \( B_1 \). It was not just enough to know that the mailing increased turnout, it was also important to estimate by how much, as that would determine whether it was worth the costs in money and time to use mailings in future elections. Although Gosnell does not refer to this as an explicit model, there very definitely is a causal model in his study. Other models often relate continuous variables in the same manner. Studies of educational achievement use Equation 1 to relate the expected performance on standardized test scores, \( Y \), to class size, \( X_1 \), both of which are continuous variables. Here, \( B_1 \) indicates how test scores are expected to change with each reduction in class size, with the expectation that \( B_1 \) is negative. Again, the magnitude of \( B_1 \) is important as it is central to any benefit-cost analysis for hiring more teachers. Though models rapidly became more complex, this simple model is the basis for much empirical work.

Models often include multiple causal variables because of what is being modeled and because of the model’s purpose. Most outcomes of interest to social scientists are not the result of single causal factors, so it is important to understand and to compare the influence of the various factors. Voter turnout, for example, can be stimulated by personal contacts, \( X_1 \); phone calls, \( X_2 \); media promotions, \( X_3 \); and same-day registration, \( X_4 \), as well as mailings, \( X_5 \). Decisions are often based on the relative influence, cost, and side effects of these factors: Are personal contacts more cost-effective at stimulating turnout than mailings, than phone calls?
calls, than same-day registration? These interests lead to multivariate models—for example,

\[ Y = B_0 + B_1 X_1 + B_2 X_2 + B_3 X_3 + B_4 X_4 + B_5 X_5. \]  

(2)

One may conduct an empirical study where only one \( X \) is varied to isolate the effect of changes in that \( X \) on \( Y \), but ultimately the analyst will want to know the magnitude of all the coefficients.

Increasingly, models are featuring nonlinear specifications, which add to their richness as well as to their complexity. The simplest nonlinearities are introduced with algebraic transformations, such as logs, powers, roots, and trig functions, of continuous variables. Such transformations make the relationships between \( Y \) and the \( X \)s nonlinear and nonseparable. Many studies of educational achievement, for example, model the log of test scores as a function of the logs of the various explanatory variables. This specification allows for increasing or decreasing as well as constant returns to each input and indicates that the marginal effect of any one input depends on the levels of the other inputs. This property contrasts with that of the linear and separable model, where the marginal effect is constant and independent of the values of the other variables.

Models may also be nonlinear in the values of the parameters, which may vary randomly or systematically with time or as functions of other explanatory variables. This general form is

\[ Y_i = F(X_i, B). \]  

(3)

Note that Equation 2, which is linear in the coefficients, is a special case of Equation 3. The nonlinearities add greatly to the ability of the models to represent complex phenomena, including the possibility that some coefficients may vary systematically among potential observational units. In the linear model in Equation 2 this could mean that the \( B \) coefficients are denoted with an \( i \) subscript, indicating that they vary across cases. While being more general in form, the nonlinear models present estimation challenges.

Models may also encompass multiple outcomes, which are both the consequence and the cause of other variables. An early form of such a model is Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan’s hierarchical model of U.S. occupational status attainment. An individual’s occupation at time \( t \) is modeled as a direct function of his or her father’s occupation, the person’s education level, and the first job; while the latter two variables are themselves related, both are related to father’s occupation. In this model, status attainment entails the interrelationship among several endogenous variables. A more complex example is Patrick Brandt and John Freeman’s model of the U.S. macropolitical economy, which uses nine interacting variables, each with its own equation. As discussed in the section on multi-equation models, models with multiple endogenous, or outcome, variables present challenging data and estimation problems. These are a consequence of the model and the phenomena being represented, and a single endogenous variable and equation would be inadequate.

The discussion of models and their uses is an important introduction to empirical estimation. The empiricist’s task is twofold. One objective is to provide evidence about the model’s credibility—how consistent the model is with empirical evidence, in how broad a set of contexts, and when compared with other possible explanations. Arthur Stinchcombe, in 1968, made the still relevant point that most empirical studies do not refute theoretical propositions but demonstrate their consistency with observable data. The more frequent and broader the contexts in which this consistency is observed, the more credible the model. This increased credibility then raises one’s confidence in the model’s predictions about what change in \( Y \) to expect from a specified change in \( X \). The second empirical task is to estimate the magnitude of the model’s parameters. This enables one to say what change in \( Y \) is expected from a change in \( X \), or in different \( X \)s, and something about the uncertainty in this expectation.

A second reason for this brief summary of models is that empirical researchers must have a clear understanding of the model prior to any study. A model’s content and structure determine the most appropriate empirical strategy, including the design of the study, the types of data, and the statistical methodology. The linear model in Equation 1 or 2 can be estimated with a range of methods and data that would be inappropriate or unavailable for models with nonlinear coefficients or extensive interactions among the explanatory variables. Models that emphasize dynamic adjustments may require time-series data with stringent stability and equilibrium properties. Many important phenomena are not amenable to explicit manipulation as is done in experimental studies, so the models must be
examined with observational data. And the list goes on. It is critical for a credible empirical study that the design, data, and methods match the properties of the model, a requirement that must be met before any data are collected and any numbers crunched.

The Experimental Method
The textbook lab or field experiment is often cited as the gold standard for empirical work. The model in this case is Equation 1. In a well-designed and conducted experiment, the values of X are determined by the researcher and randomly assigned to subjects, and neither the subject nor the individuals measuring the outcomes know the values of X for each subject. We refer to these conditions as exogeneity, randomization, and double-blindedness, respectively. If these conditions are met, a simple linear regression will give unbiased estimates for $B_1$ with both binary and continuous variables. And as the number of subjects becomes larger, the balance between the control and treatment groups with respect to unobserved variables becomes better, meaning that estimated results become more accurate estimates of the true causal relationship. An experiment may also be conducted under very controlled conditions so that other factors that might influence Y are constant. It is worth examining these conditions and their contribution to accurate estimates as these conditions become important in developing other methods.

The fact that the researcher determines the values for X precludes the possibility that these variations are the result of changes in Y or of some aspect of the data collection process, both of which will prevent accurate estimates of $B_1$. This can be a major problem with observational data. Consider the positive correlation between media attention and turnout. Does hearing more political information lead one to vote, or does an intention to vote cause one to pay more attention to media coverage of the campaign? If the researcher determines each person’s media exposure within the experiment, it rules out the latter explanation.

Randomization is critical in any experiment. Subjects will not be identical on all factors other than the variable of interest. Gosnell’s mailing would reach people of different ages, education levels, genders, political interests, and so on. All these, and many more, factors will be associated with differences in turnout. These excluded factors are represented in the model by adding a stochastic term denoted by $U$ to Equation 1:

$$Y = B_0 + B_1 X_1 + U,$$

where $U$ represents all these factors and how they affect the observed value of Y. Now suppose that the mailings happened to be sent to, or read by, those more disposed to vote. Then comparisons of turnout between those receiving and those not receiving the mailing would badly bias the estimate of the effect of the mailing. Formally, the values of $U$, which include the effects of predispositions, would be correlated with $X_1$.

Randomization, if done properly and if the sample is large enough, ensures that the composition of the group receiving the mailing is identical to, or balanced with, the composition of the group that did not receive the mailing. Turnout will be higher among those predisposed to vote, but because each group has an equal proportion of such people, differences in turnout between the two groups would not be the result of one group having more committed voters than the other. More formally, X and U are uncorrelated. Randomization, when done properly, makes the reliability of experiments far greater than that of observational studies and greatly simplifies the statistical analysis, as one only needs to estimate the coefficients in Equation 4, which can be done with ordinary regression or comparisons of means if X is binary.

Any factor that does not vary in the sample can be ruled out as an alternative explanation for the observed variations in Y, lending greater credibility to the variations in X as the cause. If Gosnell had sent mailings only to people under 25 who had not voted before and compared their turnout with that of 25-year-old nonvoters who did not get the mailing, then age and past voting behavior would not explain any differences in turnout between the two groups, increasing one’s confidence in the conclusion that turnout differences are related to receiving the mailing. In some research, it is possible to design or select observations such that possible confounding factors are constant within the sample, greatly reducing the possibility of bias.

If Equation 1 accurately models the substantive question and an experiment is feasible, then a well-designed and executed experiment will provide very credible estimates of the effects of X on Y. Much of political methodology, however, addresses
situations where the model of interest does not conform to Equation 1 or where an experiment was not or could not be conducted according to the requisite standards, though there has been a dramatic increase in the development of creative experimental designs in the social sciences. The remainder of the entry discusses the procedures analysts use to deal with these shortcomings. The detailed discussion of the experimental method is important in understanding these procedures as many of them are designed to reproduce what can be accomplished with a proper experiment. It is also important to see the experimental approach as being consistent with one, but not all, models.

Observational Studies

Many substantive areas of interest in political science are not amenable to experiments, despite recent expansions in the use of experiments. In some instances, the manipulations required by the model are technically possible but are prohibited on ethical grounds. More often, X cannot be controlled and varied by the researcher. Astronomers cannot create black holes or alter galaxies, medical researchers cannot force people to engage in risky behaviors, and political scientists cannot create economic depressions, randomly assign representatives to districts, start or stop wars, and so on. All rely on observational studies, meaning data that are generated by the world outside researchers’ control. Observational studies question the randomization and exogeneity conditions. Considerable attention is devoted to addressing these questions. The types of data generated by observational studies also increase the uncertainty of the causal interpretations one can draw from the analysis of these data.

Nonrandomization

The classical response to the lack of randomization in observational studies is the multivariate regression shown in Equation 2, expanded to include the stochastic term and as many explanatory variables as necessary:

\[ Y = B_0 + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + B_3X_3 + \cdots + B_KX_K + U. \]  

The additional variables are included not to assess their relative influence on Y, though this may be an important result, but to include potentially confounding factors in the analysis. The interpretation of Equation 5 is that \( B_1 \) indicates the change in Y expected for a unit change in \( X_1 \), holding \( X_2 \) through \( X_K \) constant. If one has been successful in including all those factors that are causally related to Y, meaning their true coefficient is different from zero, and that are correlated with \( X_1 \) in the sample, then \( U \) is uncorrelated with \( X_1 \) and the estimate for \( B_1 \) obtained with an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is unbiased, as it was in the experimental setting.

In some applications, OLS is not the most appropriate estimator because of the limited nature of the outcome variable. Examples are when outcomes are observed as dichotomies, such as turnout; discrete categories, such as votes in a multiparty election; event counts, such as the numbers of conflicts in given time periods; or durations, such as the likely length of governments formed under different conditions. The latter example is also directly related to hazard models, which estimate the probability of failure at some time \( t \), given survival up to that time, and event history models, which examine the length of time between events. These outcome measures, which are not continuous, unbounded, interval variables, violate the conditions assumed in OLS regressions. The form of the relationship between the observed variables is unlikely to be linear, and it is even unlikely to be linear in the coefficients, precluding the conventional transformations that might create such a linear model. Furthermore, the form and distribution of the stochastic term, \( U \), in Equation 5 will not meet the requirements of the OLS estimator. Taken together, these difficulties are likely to lead to biased estimates of the coefficients if OLS is used with the observed data.

These problems have stimulated the development of a vast array of estimation methods tailored to the specific distributional properties of the
resulting stochastic term. These have the popular names of probit and logit, with their various modifiers; Poisson and negative binomial; Weibull and Cox hazard models, and so on. They have a common approach, which is to specify a distribution for the stochastic term and to use this distribution to derive an expression for the likelihood of observing the data. This description of the data is referred to as the data-generating process, and the expression is referred to as the likelihood function, which measures the likelihood of the data for specific values of the parameters. (The value of the likelihood function is directly proportional to the probability of observing the data given the model and parameters.) Estimation proceeds by finding the values for these parameters that maximize this likelihood function—or, in most instances, the log of the likelihood function—hence the name maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). If, for example, the stochastic term in Equation 5 is normally distributed, the maximum likelihood estimator is OLS. If the data-generating process is described properly, the MLE-derived estimates will have desirable statistical properties if the sample size is large, and in most applications, they are easily computed. These methods’ statistical properties only hold in large samples and usually require stricter distributional assumptions about the Us than the more straightforward uncorrelatedness of X and U required in OLS estimation.

Unfortunately, what is straightforward in theory is quite difficult in practice. There are no statistical tests to determine if U is uncorrelated with each X or if one has the correct data-generating process. The Us are not observed and for individual observations are not well approximated by the residuals in the regression. Furthermore, by construction the correlation between these residuals and each X is zero, so that result cannot be used to argue that U and the Xs are uncorrelated. One must use the available theories and detailed knowledge of the context in which the data were collected to argue that the uncorrelatedness condition is met. Simply adding more variables in the hope that U will eventually become uncorrelated with the Xs is not a remedy as this process introduces its own problems and errors. Such “kitchen sink” regressions may not reduce bias and certainly run the risk of increasing the coefficients’ standard errors and thereby increasing the coefficients’ mean squared errors.

**Mimicking Experimental Methods With Observational Data**

Deep skepticism about the ability to meet the conditions for unbiasedness using linear regression models has led to an extensive, growing, and sophisticated literature on alternatives for situations where only observational data are available. This section briefly reviews three of these alternatives. Readers wanting more detail are referred to other survey articles.

**Natural Experiments.** Though this would seem to be an oxymoron, there are instances where “nature” randomly assigns treatments to one set of observations and not others, creating balanced treatment and control groups. If these assignments are truly random, then analysis of the resulting data using comparisons of means and simple linear models can proceed as if the data were generated by an experiment. An example of research based on a natural experiment are studies assessing the effect of additional income on a range of behaviors, such as political attitudes or consumption, by studying lottery winners. The assumption is that lotteries are random events, so that the amount of money won is equivalent to random assignment and thus is uncorrelated with other factors that are related to the behavior being studied.

Natural experiments are also useful in creating continuous variables that are correlated with outcomes of interest but uncorrelated with other measures of behavior because of nature’s randomness. The value of such variables is discussed in a subsequent section on endogeneity and instrumental variables (IVs). Studies of the ability of U.S. federal disaster relief aid to buy support for incumbent administrations and of the effects of past vote patterns on its distribution rely on the randomness of hurricane paths in Florida. The destruction caused by a hurricane can eventually cover a wide area, but its exact path over local areas is random. This randomness means that the local variations in a hurricane’s severity are unlikely to be correlated with the community’s characteristics, such as income or support for the current government in previous elections. A variable measuring this severity can then be used to predict what aid levels would be independent of economic and political considerations.
Regression Discontinuity. This strategy, which is a more elaborate version of the natural experiment, takes advantage of the natural random assignment of observations to treatment and control groups. The term discontinuity arises because these natural experiments occur around some exogenously given threshold. The outcomes for the two groups can then be compared to assess the effects of the natural treatment. For example, a study of the electoral advantage of incumbency uses this method to compare the vote share of incumbents who won their previous election with less than 52.5% with that of the freshman representatives who replaced incumbents who lost more than 47.5% of the two-party vote. The proposition is that election outcomes are sufficiently random within this band (around 50%) so that incumbency is effectively a random treatment. This randomization is used to justify the comparison of the vote shares of these two groups as a measure of the incumbency advantage. Regression discontinuity designs have a relatively long history, coming into and out of favor in different disciplines. They are currently generating considerable interest in economics and, more recently, in political science.

Matching. This method stems from the work of Donald Rubin and Paul Rosenbaum, separately and jointly with others. It does not try to create random assignment but compares observations in the treatment group with observations selected from the control group that have similar characteristics. A logical difficulty with the NHR causal model is that it is impossible to answer the counterfactual of what an untreated subject would have done if she or he had been treated because both states cannot be observed for the same individual. The ideal next step is to have identical cases of those receiving treatment and those who do not. The statistical exercise called matching finds those appropriate matches, meaning the most similar untreated and treated observations, among the observed data. This process gets complicated when one has to match on a multidimensional set of variables, some of which may be continuous, such as age. There are a number of procedures for measuring similarity and for deciding which observations to compare.

If certain conditions are met, then matching methods have very desirable statistical properties, including reduced bias and smaller mean squared errors relative to other multivariate methods.

Comparisons of results from experiments with randomization with results from analysis of non-randomly assigned groups using matching report comparable results with both methods. This gives further credence to the efficacy of the matching strategy, when done properly.

The design in these methods is to re-create statistically the advantages of a true experiment by either controlling potential confounding variables through the matching process or randomizing them through the natural setting or the discontinuity. The causal model in each instance is still the one represented in Equation 1, in which the effect of the treatment is separable from and additive to any other factors.

Observational Data and Causal Interpretations

Observational data limit in a number of ways one’s confidence in the causal interpretations given the model and the empirical results. Causal arguments have an implied time frame, with changes in X preceding changes in Y. In an experimental setting, this condition is met as the researcher controls for each case the change in X prior to observing whether Y changes. Often with observational data, the information on X and Y is not observed within the necessary time frame, making it hard to determine if a change in X preceded a change in Y and by how much Y changed as a result.

Observational data come in several forms. Some data may be from a cross section of the population, meaning the cases are observed only once; from a panel, meaning the same units are observed multiple times; from a time series, where units are observed at regular intervals; and from pooled time series and cross sections, where multiple units are observed at regular intervals. The distinction between panel data and a time series is the number and frequency of the temporal observations. Event history data, which are commonly used in some subfields in sociology and political science, are a form of time series that provides data for an individual’s, an organization’s, or a country’s history.

Causal inferences with cross-sectional data and the model in Equation 5 require several conditions. Assume that the adjustment process for any cross-sectional observation i from \( Y_i = X_iB + U_i \) to \( Y_i \) for a new value of \( X_i = X_i^* \) is

\[
Y_i = \rho Y_i + (1 - \rho)X_i^*B + U_i
= X_i^*B - \rho(X_i^* - X_i)B + \rho U_i + U_i.
\]
If $X_t$ is stable for at least $t$ periods, the equation for $Y_t$ is

$$Y_t = \rho Y_{t-1} + (1 - \rho)X_t + U_t$$

$$= \rho Y_{t-1} + \rho (X_{t} - X_{0}) + U_t + \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} \rho^i U_{t-i}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

If each $U_t$ is independent of $X_t$ for all units, the randomization condition, and if $t$ is large and/or $\rho$ is small so that the term in Equation 6 involving $\rho^i$ becomes ignorable, the regression estimates for $B$ will become unbiased. The estimates will also be unbiased if the change in $X$ is uncorrelated with $X_t$, but this is a more sample specific and stricter condition. Accurate estimation of Equation 6 also requires that the values of $B$ for each observation be constant over the period encompassed by $t$. Subsequent sections discuss appropriate methods to use if the values of $B$ vary among the cross-sectional units and conditions for accurate estimation if the observed units are not independent.

Panel data offer substantial advantages over cross-sectional data in that one can observe $\Delta Y$ and $\Delta X_t$ for the same unit for the interval between waves, permitting a more direct estimate of $B$. Results from the analysis of panel data increase confidence in the original model, but limitations remain. Consider Equation 6 with $Y_t$ denoting the observations of $Y$ at the second wave, with $t$ indicating the number of time periods between the second wave of interviews and when $X$ first equalled $X_t$. Subtracting $Y_{t} = X_t + U_{t}$ from both sides of this equation gives

$$\Delta Y_t = \Delta X_t B (1 - \rho^i) + (U_t - U_0)$$

$$+ \sum_{i=1}^{t} \rho^i U_{t-i}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (7)

Unless $\rho$ is small and/or enough time has elapsed between when $X$ changed and the second wave, as measured by $t$, regressions of $\Delta Y$ on $\Delta X$ will underestimate $B$. Again the relationship between $Y_t$ and $X_t$, the estimate $B_i$, must be constant over the interval of the panel. Panel data have a distinct advantage if there are fixed individual effects, as part of the stochastic term, the first difference in the $U$s, will eliminate most of their effects. Multiple-wave panels provide even greater advantages in estimating these relationships and in assessing their stability.

The informationally richest data that enable the most reliable estimate of the time sequences relating changes in $Y$ to changes in $X$ are those with a long time series, including event history data, and particularly pooled time-series and cross-sectional data. As discussed in subsequent sections, time-series data permit more extensive modeling of whether and how $Y$ reaches a new equilibrium following changes in $X$. This modeling can also include heterogeneity in equilibrium and in how fast units might reach that equilibrium. If one’s substantive interests and the model developed to represent those interests include temporal dynamics and heterogeneity, then time-series data are required to estimate and evaluate the model.

### A Model-Based Approach to Empirical Analysis

A limitation of the work described so far lies not just in whether the data and/or analysis constitutes or mimics a well-designed experiment by meeting the randomization condition. The limitation is in the structure of the model being estimated. This model will be an appropriate representation for the phenomena being analyzed in some circumstances, particularly those that resemble medical trials, where these techniques have been used extensively. In many instances, however, the separable and additive expression in Equation 4, or even its multivariate form in Equation 5, will be an inadequate representation of the causal structure. This brings us back to some form of Equation 3. Some examples of such models and possible estimation strategies will be described in the following sections.

### Models With Variable Relationships

The simplest form for Equation 3 are models where the relationship between $Y$ and $X$ is conditional on the value of the other variables. These propositions are increasingly common in political science, where many theories are about the magnitude of the effect of an $X$ on $Y$. These propositions lead to models with interaction terms of various forms and various degrees of complexity.

**Interaction Terms.** The simplest model with varying relationships is a straightforward interaction term,
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Choice of applications of game-theoretic models require effects of institutions, of cultural differences, and the macroeconomy in accord with its preferences. The government’s autonomy does not contribute directly to inflation but alters the influence that one or more variables have on inflation. The bank’s autonomy affects the influence central governments have on inflation. The bank’s autonomy equals zero for intervals before the critical period and one for the periods following. This creates interaction variables that consist of the explanatory variable of interest multiplied by \(D\). This shifts the relationship between \(Y\) and \(X\) up or down for the second period but leaves the relationship constant within these periods. More complicated variations in the relationship between \(Y\) and \(X\) can be modeled through a variety of functions, such as polynomials: for example, \(B(t) = a_0 + a_1t + a_2t^2 + \cdots + a_n t^n\). The more complex models necessitate more sophisticated estimation procedures than the linear models shown so far, but the main point is that these models, which are required for studying dynamic processes, as with studies of the federal open market committee and monetary policy, have a far more complex structure than Equation 4 or 5.

Random Coefficients. Models with randomly varying coefficients are used in a variety of contexts. Here, the relationships between \(Y\) and the \(Xs\) are

\[
\text{Choice}_t = b_0 + (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 * T_t - \alpha_3 * T_f) * \text{Choice}_{t-1} + \text{Eval}_t * (\beta_1 - \beta_2 * T_t + \beta_3 * T_f) + U_t
\]

where \(T_t\) and \(T_f\) indicate the type of treatment, that is, an ad that cues enthusiasm or fear, respectively. Brader uses a well-designed and executed experiment to collect the information to estimate this model. The estimation is done with a probit version of the MLE estimator because of the dichotomous nature of the Choice variable. The important point here is not one of experimental or observational data. It is the need to be clear about the model, about what evidence can be used to evaluate or enhance the credibility of the model, and about the most appropriate statistical procedure given the model and the evidence.

Equation 8 is a straightforward example of the broader group of models that feature propositions about systematic variations in the relationships between \(Y\) and \(X\), which are represented by the interaction terms. Many central propositions in political science relate to systematic variations in the influence that one or more variables have on some outcome of interest. For example, central bank autonomy affects the influence central governments have on inflation. The bank’s autonomy does not contribute directly to inflation but alters the ability of incumbent governments to manage the macroeconomy in accord with its preferences. William R. Clark suggests that most studies of the effects of institutions, of cultural differences, and of applications of game-theoretic models require models with interaction terms. The need to model systematic variations in coefficients is evident in sociology as well. Parameters describing important aspects of the intergenerational transmission of occupational status are expected to vary nationally and temporally.

Estimation of the simplest models with interaction terms have been the subject of considerable and long-standing discussion in political science. In models such as Brader’s, the interaction terms constitute another explanatory variable, and the model remains linear in the parameters, which justifies the use of a linear model such as OLS or probit in Brader’s study. Statistical inference about the marginal effects on \(Y\) of changes in an \(X\) require more complicated calculations than in models without interaction terms because these marginal effects change with the values of the exogenous variables.

An important variation in this structure with temporal models occurs when the coefficients vary with time. There are a number of different propositions one might make about the pattern of these variations. One can depict such models as \(Y_t = X_t B(t) + U_t\), where \(B(t)\) represents some function of time. The simplest variation is when there is a sharp break in the value at a critical point but the coefficients are constant on either side of that break. In this structure, \(B_t = (B_i + B_j D_t)\), where \(D_t\) equals zero for intervals before the critical period and one for the periods following. This creates interaction variables that consist of the explanatory variable of interest multiplied by \(D_t\). This shifts the relationship between \(Y_t\) and \(X_t\) up or down for the second period but leaves the relationship constant within these periods. More complicated variations in the relationship between \(Y_t\) and \(X_t\) can be modeled through a variety of functions, such as polynomials: for example, \(B(t) = a_0 + a_1t + a_2t^2 + \cdots + a_n t^n\). The more complex models necessitate more sophisticated estimation procedures than the linear models shown so far, but the main point is that these models, which are required for studying dynamic processes, as with studies of the federal open market committee and monetary policy, have a far more complex structure than Equation 4 or 5.
not identical for all observations, as in Equation 5, nor do they vary in some systematic way with time or with other variables but are themselves random variables. The model with random coefficients can be represented by

\[ Y_i = X_i B + U_i = X_i (B + e_i) + U_i, \]

where \( e_i \) denotes the variations in the relationship between \( Y \) and \( X \) among observations. If \( E(e_i) = 0 \) for all observations, meaning that \( B_i \) is uncorrelated with \( X \) then \( B \) denotes the mean effect of \( X \) on \( Y \).

The random coefficients model has been used to critique the use of regression adjustments to experimental data. Some statisticians consider the outcome for individual \( i \) to be fixed or random for that individual conditional on whether the person is in the treatment or control group, respectively. These constant individual effects then vary among individuals, so that \( Y_i = X_i T_i + (1 - X_i) C_i \), where \( X_i \) equals one if the subject is in the treatment group and \( T_i \) and \( C_i \) are the outcome for person \( i \) if she or he is in the treatment or control group, respectively. The average treatment effect is

\[ \bar{T} - \bar{C} = (1/n) \sum Y_i - (1/n) \sum Y_i, \]

which corresponds to the mean of the coefficients on \( X_i \) and \( (1 - X_i) \), for the treatment and control groups, respectively.

Estimation of the model with random coefficients requires one important condition and some specialized methods. The condition is that

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} (X_{ik} - X_k) e_{ik} = 0 \]

for all \( K \) explanatory variables, meaning that the coefficient variations are independent of each explanatory variable. If the condition is met, then OLS estimates are consistent but inefficient. More elaborate estimators are required for efficiency and to get the standard errors correct as the stochastic term created by inclusion of the coefficient variations does not meet the homoskedastic conditions for OLS estimation. If this independence condition is not met, the result is biased estimates for \( B \). The correction if \( X \) and \( B \) are correlated involves modeling the systematic variations in \( B_i \) as a function of some exogenous variables, for example, \( B_{ik} = Z_i A_{ik} + e_{ik} \), so that \( e_{ik} \) is now uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Including this expression for \( B_{ik} \) in Equation 5 gives the model with interaction terms between \( X_k \) and \( Z \).

**Hierarchical Models.** Often the context for studying outcomes of interest consists of multiple levels. Individuals in voting studies reside within a layer of election districts. In the United States, this hierarchy consists of municipalities, counties, congressional districts, and states. In the European Union, individuals are nested within districts, provinces, and countries. It is likely that the factors affecting individual behavior vary among these different higher level units but are constant for all individuals within a unit. Party organizations, resources, strategies, and competitiveness, which affect individuals’ turnout and vote decisions, vary substantially among local areas and states. In democratic countries, there is substantial institutional variation, which affects individual decisions. Models that adequately represent these hierarchical relationships are more complex than Equation 5 and are an application of the previous models with interaction terms and random coefficients.

Models with these multiple levels, frequently referred to as hierarchical or mixed models, combine explicit interaction terms and random coefficients to represent these multilevel effects. Consider the following two-level model, where \( Y_{ij} \) refers to the outcome for person \( i \) residing in Level 2 of unit \( j \), such as a state or a country; \( X_i \) refers to if individual-level explanatory variables; and \( Z_i \) refers to \( M \) variables describing state or country characteristics for unit \( j \). The full model is

\[
Y_{ij} = B_{oj} + \sum_{k=1}^{K} X_{ijk} B_{kj} + U_{ij},
\]

\[
B_{oj} = A_{o0} + \sum_{m=1}^{M} Z_{jm} A_{om} + \epsilon_{oj},
\]

\[
B_{kj} = A_{ok} \sum_{m=1}^{M} Z_{jm} A_{km} + \epsilon_{kj}.
\]

Combining these equations gives

\[
Y_{ij} = A_{o0} + \sum_{m=1}^{M} Z_{jm} A_{om} + \sum_{k=1}^{K} X_{ijk} A_{ok}
\]

\[
+ \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{m=1}^{M} X_{ijk} Z_{jm} A_{km} + U_{ij}
\]

\[
+ \epsilon_{oj} + \sum_{k=1}^{K} X_{ijk} \epsilon_{kj}.
\]

The \( A_{om} \) terms estimate the Level 2 (e.g., state or country) effects on Level 1 (e.g., individual)
behavior by shifting the intercept for all individuals in the same Level 2 unit. The coefficients \(A_{ik}\) estimate the effects of individual-level variables on individual behavior. These are the terms in the conventional individual model possibly represented by Equation 5. Finally, the coefficients \(A_{km}\) indicate how the Level 2 factors, \(Z_{jm}\), alter the relationship between the individual variables and the individual outcome. For example, if the competitiveness of the two U.S. parties within a state affects both voter turnout in a state and the relationship between education and turnout, then the model needs to include an interaction term that is the respondent’s education, \(X_{ik}\), times the two parties’ competitiveness within state \(j\), \(Z_{jm}\). The \(e_{ij}\) and \(e_{kj}\) terms represent heterogeneity in the higher unit’s intercepts and coefficients, respectively, and are terms in the random coefficients model just discussed.

**Summary.** There is a major distinction between the models described in this section and the one represented by Equation 4 or 5. Both structures are linear and separable in the parameters, meaning that the basic model is described by the expression \(Y_i = \sum_{k=1}^{K} X_{ik} B + U_i\), but the models in this section are not linear and separable in the relations between \(Y\) and \(X\). In Equations 4 and 5, \(\partial Y/\partial X_k = B_k\) regardless of the value of \(X_k\) or of any other \(X\). Transformations of \(Y\) and \(X\) such that \(Y^* = f(Y)\) and \(X^* = f(X)\) still leave the expression \(\partial Y^*/\partial X_k = B_k\). In the models with interaction terms, the expected marginal change in \(Y\) for a marginal change in \(X_k\) is not the constant \(B_k\). Consider the simple model with one interaction term:

\[
Y_i = B_1 + B_2 X_i + B_3 Z_i + B_4 X_i Z_i + U_i. \tag{10}
\]

This produces the marginal relationship \(\partial Y_i/\partial X_i = B_2 + B_4 Z_i\). This changes the marginal relationship between \(Y\) and \(X\), even to the point that for certain values of \(X\) there may be no change in \(Y\) for a change in \(X\), depending on the values of \(B_2\) and \(B_4\). Any effort to use or mimic experimental methods to estimate \(\partial Y/\partial X\) must take the context, meaning the value of \(Z\), into account. More important, if the interest is in estimating how the relationship between \(Y\) and \(X\) varies with the value of \(Z\), as it is in many studies, one must have observations in which both \(X\) and \(Z\) vary. Estimation of both \(B_2\) and \(B_4\) may not require observational data, as Brader demonstrates, but it requires an estimation method that matches the structure of the model in Equation 10 and data with systematic variations in both \(X\) and \(Z\).

**Models With Interactions Among Observations**

Some substantively important topics require models with explicit interactions among the observations, whether temporal or spatial. Such models are necessary to examine the temporal dynamics of social processes and their possible equilibrium properties. The extensive work on the interaction of macroeconomic and political conditions exemplifies such models. In these studies, the effects of conditions in one time period on conditions in later periods are an explicit part of the model, the data, and the estimation procedures. There is increasing interest in models that include explicit interactions among individuals or geographically defined units. Communication of political attitudes and information among individuals and the diffusion of policy innovations among states are examples of these substantive interests. The substantive questions focus, at least in part, on the interdependence of observational units, and this interaction is more than a statistical nuisance. Models that treat the interdependence of either temporal or cross-sectional units as an integral part of the structure are more complex than those in Equations 4 and 5 and require sophisticated statistical methods to estimate these interactions.

Interdependencies among observations imply a different model and their estimation requires different statistical methods from those derived from the experimental paradigm. A central necessary condition of the experimental method and of the techniques developed to mimic it is that each observation is observed and is behaving independently of all the other units observed. This is referred to as the SUTVA (stable unit treatment value assumption) condition. In the context of Gosnell’s and other voter turnout field experiments, it means that there is no interaction between someone receiving the “treatment,” for example, a mailing or a phone call, and an individual not receiving the treatment. For subjects living in the same neighborhood and
possibly attending meetings of the same local organizations, such as a church or PTA, this condition might be problematic. The basic premise for SUTVA is obviously violated for studies of how units interact, be they time periods, individuals, or political units.

**Temporal Interdependence.** For studies of dynamic processes, the interactions among observational units are a primary focus. Even when an examination of the temporal interactions is not the primary interest but one must use observational time-series data, the possible interdependence cannot be ignored but must be included in the model. At one point, these interactions were treated as nuisance terms that had to be diagnosed and then dealt with statistically in order to obtain efficient estimators and accurately estimated standard errors. The extensive use of the Durbin-Watson statistic and of models with first-order autocorrelated error terms exemplifies this thinking.

Increasingly, this autocorrelation is interpreted as being substantively interesting, and efforts being are made to incorporate temporal interdependencies into the model. Consider the commonly used error correction model (ECM), which is an elaborated version of Equation 6:

\[ \Delta Y_t = \Delta X_t B_1 + (1 - \rho)(Y_{t-1} - Y_t) + U_t, \]  

(11)

where \( Y_{t-1} = (1 - \rho)^{-1} (B_0 + X_{t-1}B_2) \) is the long-run equilibrium value of \( Y \) at time \( t - 1 \) given \( X_{t-1} \) and \( \rho < 1 \). Changes in \( Y \) from \( t - 1 \) to \( t \) depend on its responsiveness to exogenous shocks, defined by \( \Delta X_t B_1 \); and how quickly \( Y \) responds to being out of equilibrium, given by \( (1 - \rho)(Y_{t-1} - Y_{t-1}) \). With appropriate manipulation of terms, this model is estimated as

\[
Y_t = B_0 + X_t B_1 + X_{t-1} (B_2 - B_1) + \rho Y_{t-1} + U_t,
\]

\[
= B_0 + X_t B_1 + X_{t-1} B_2 + \rho Y_{t-1} + U_t. \tag{12}
\]

In time-series models of the macropartisanship of the U.S. electorate, for example, the interest is in whether the electorate’s partisanship responds to short-term economic shocks, \( \Delta X_t \), and how quickly it returns to equilibrium after these shocks. The ECM also predicts a new equilibrium, given by \( Y^* = (1 - \rho)^{-1}[B_0 + X^*(B_1 + B_2)] \), if there is a permanent shift in the exogenous variables from \( X_{t-1} \) to \( X^* \) and estimates how long it takes to approximate that equilibrium. In this framework, macropartisanship might shift to a new equilibrium if the electorate permanently shifts its preferences on a major issue, if the parties adopt new platforms, and/or if the electorate sees a permanent shift in the parties’ ability to manage economic or foreign policy issues.

**Spatial and Individual Interdependence.** The treatment of cross-sectional interdependence is experiencing a comparable and extensive transformation. One approach treats the stochastic terms as spatially interdependent and develops tests and methods for incorporating this interdependence. There is no causal interdependence, whereby the actions of one unit influence the actions or outcomes in the other units. An example of this stochastic interdependence would be a model of voter turnout in election districts where bad weather reduces turnout and weather patterns are not confined to individual districts but spill across boundaries, reducing turnout in the adjacent districts. More substantively interesting models incorporate interdependence whereby the actions or outcomes in one unit directly influence the actions of the other units. This type of interdependence has a long history in political science research. Propositions about how political attitudes are communicated among individuals and about the diffusion of policy innovations among states within the United States are examples.

Here is the formal distinction between the two types of interdependence:

**Stochastic interdependence:**

\[ Y_i = \sum_{k=1}^{K} X_{ik} B_k + \epsilon_i, \]

\[ \epsilon_i = \lambda \sum_{j=1}^{N} w_{ij} \epsilon_j + U_i \]

gives

\[ Y_i = \sum_{k=1}^{K} X_{ik} B_k + \lambda \sum_{j=1}^{N} w_{ij} \epsilon_j + U_i. \]  

(13)

**Structural interdependence:**

\[ Y_i = \rho \sum_{j=1}^{N} w_{ij} Y_j + \sum_{k=1}^{K} X_{ik} B_k + \epsilon_i. \]  

(14)
The terms $w_{ij}$ indicate the pattern of interdependence among observations, so that $w_{ij} = 0$ if units $i$ and $j$ are independent and $w_{ij} \neq 0$ otherwise. There are various ways to measure $w_{ij}$ for the non-independent case, depending on how dense one expects the interactions to be and whether one standardizes each unit’s values for $w$ based on the number of connections. The terms $\lambda$ and $\rho$ indicate the magnitude of the stochastic and structural interdependence, respectively.

In Equation 13, the expected effect on $Y_i$ of a change in $X_{ik}$ remains fixed and is given by $B_{ik}$. Random shocks in one observation are shared among the other observations as their effects are propagated through the other stochastic terms. This indicates that the stochastic terms in the equation to be estimated are no longer independent, which means that the OLS estimates are unbiased but inefficient and the computed standard errors are incorrect. In Equation 14, by contrast, any change in $X_{ik}$ leads to direct and indirect changes in $Y_i$ as its effects are propagated through the other observations. The total magnitude of these direct and indirect effects depends on the structure of interdependence, the $w_{ij}$, and the magnitude of the interdependence, $\rho$. [These effects are shown better in matrix notation as $Y = (I - \rho W)^{-1}(XB + \epsilon)$, where $W$ is an $N \times N$ matrix showing the full pattern of interdependencies.] This latter model is by far the more substantively interesting as it proposes some form of strategic or learning behavior among the units. This would be the appropriate model for discussing the diffusion of innovations among states or the communication of political information. Common programs such as Stata describe and include various tests and estimation procedures for each type of interdependence.

**Summary.** The substantive questions that motivate Equations 11 and 14 are different from the ones embodied in Equation 4 or 5. The parameter $\rho$, which measures the interdependence among units, does not have an analog in Equation 5. So it is not surprising that the structure of the models is different, even to the point that Equation 14 is not even linear in the coefficients. Estimation of $\rho$, and therefore of the whole model, requires different types of data and methods. Furthermore, the observational interdependence embodied in $\rho$ is not a nuisance parameter or a property of the data to be excised, if possible. It represents a substantive part of the model.

**Nonlinear Models**

The most general version of the model in Equation 3 is nonlinear in the coefficients. This form is useful for modeling a large set of complex processes. The model in Equation 14 is an example of a model that is nonlinear in its coefficients. Some models with interaction terms can become nonlinear in the parameters. For example, a model of central bank and governmental control of monetary and inflation policy posits interaction terms that are functions of unobserved variables, which are modeled as functions of observables. When the functions for the latent variables are introduced as interaction terms, it produces a model that is nonlinear in the coefficients because of the constrained multiplicative terms.

Nonlinear dynamic systems are likely to include nonlinear functions of parameters. Processes that might be path dependent, for example, have received considerable attention in some areas of political science. Path dependence in a temporal process requires a time-varying transition parameter. Incorporating this requirement in a dynamic model similar to Equation 6 requires a $\rho$, that is a function of time-varying variables in the system, denoted by $Z$, giving $\rho_t = \rho(Z_t)$. This variation in and extension to the temporal models discussed above gives

$$Y_t = \rho_t Y_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_t)X_tB + U_t$$

$$= \rho(Z_t)Y_{t-1} + [1 - \rho(Z_t)]X_tB + U_t. \quad (15)$$

There is an important difference between this model and the ECM model in Equation 11, although $Y$ has the same long-run equilibrium in both if $\rho_t < 1$ for all $t$. In the ECM model $\rho$ is constant, while here $\rho$ varies with time as a function of the values of $Z$. The constraints on a dynamic system are that $0 \leq \rho_t \leq 1$, which implies that it is a nonlinear function of $Z$. An example of such a function is $\rho = a_t e^{-a_2Z_t}$, which ensures that $0 \leq \rho_t \leq a_t$. The resulting model has important
dynamic properties that are vastly different from
those of the linear model in Equation 5, and pos-
ibly even Equations 6 and 11. For example, if \( a_i = 1 \), meaning that \( \rho_i < 1 \) when \( Z_i^2 \neq 0 \) and \( \rho_i = 1 \)
when \( Z_i^2 = 0 \), if the variance of \( U_i \) goes to zero as
\( Z_i \) goes to zero, it produces a path-dependent sequence for \( Y_i \), whose equilibrium value depends
both on the values for \( X_i \) as in Equations 6 and
11, and on the sequence of values for \( X_i \) and for
\( U_i \) prior to the point where \( Z_i = 0 \). If the varia-
e of \( U_i \) does not go to zero when \( \rho_i = 1 \), the pro-
cess becomes what is called a random walk after
\( Z_i = 0 \).

If the stochastic term is separable and additive,
as it is in Equation 15, a method called nonlinear
least squares can be used to estimate the model’s
coefficients. Derivation of the nonlinear least
squares estimator is straightforward. As in
Equation 3 let \( Y_i = F(X_i, B) \) and \( \hat{Y}_i = F(X_i, b) \), and
let there be \( K \) coefficients \( B_k \) to be estimated. As
with OLS, the nonlinear method chooses the values
for each \( b_k \) that minimize the expression \( \sum_{t=1}^{T} e_t^2 =
\sum_{t=1}^{T} (Y_i - \hat{Y}_i)^2 = \sum_{t=1}^{T} [Y_i - F(X_i, b)]^2 \). The central
term in this minimization is the matrix of the par-
tial derivative of each \( F(X_i, b) \) with respect to each
coefficient \( b_j \), \( f(X_i, b_j) = \partial F(X_i, b_j)/\partial b_j \). There are
\( K \) such derivatives for each observation, which
when done for all \( T \) observations gives a \( T \times K \)
matrix. The non-linear least squares estimator is the
solution to the set of \( K \) nonlinear simultaneous
equations:

\[
\sum_{t=1}^{T} f(X_t, b_k)e_t = \sum_{t=1}^{T} f(X_t, b_k)(Y_t - \hat{Y}_t)
= \sum_{t=1}^{T} f(X_t, b_k)Y_t - \sum_{t=1}^{T} f(X_t, b_k)[F(X_t, b)] = 0. \tag{16}
\]

With the linear model, \( \hat{Y}_t = \sum_{k=1}^{K} X_{it}b_k \), and the
partial derivative of \( \hat{Y}_t \) with respect to \( b_j \) is sim-
ply \( X_{it} \), so the \( j^{th} \) equation in Equation 16 then
becomes

\[
\sum_{t=1}^{T} X_{it} \partial = \sum_{t=1}^{T} X_{it}(Y_t - \sum_{k=1}^{K} X_{it}b_k) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} X_{it}Y_t - \sum_{j=1}^{K} b_j \sum_{t=1}^{T} X_{it}X_{ij} = 0.
\]

which is the familiar expression for the OLS esti-
imator. (In matrix form, this expression is \( XY - (XX)b = 0 \), which may be more familiar.) Finding
the solution to the equations in Equation 16 is
much more complicated than for the OLS estima-
tor, but with the power of current computers and
numerical methods, most estimations can be
accomplished relatively easily. The resulting esti-
mates are consistent and asymptotically normally
distributed.

As in many models of nonlinear dynamic sys-
tems and other applications of nonlinear least
squares, the substantive process is best, or possibly
only, modeled by a structure that is nonlinear in
the coefficients. Also, in many of these applica-
tions, accurate parameter estimates are very im-
portant as the models may have vastly different
equilibrium and dynamic properties for different
coefficient values, as is the case with the model of
path dependence above. The properties of these
models render the linear model inappropriate, giv-
ing rise to the need for a nonlinear estimator.
Fortunately, as various simulation studies illus-
strate, the nonlinear least squares estimator per-
forms quite well, even for potentially difficult
parameter values.

**Multi-Equation Models**

Some important processes can only be repre-
sented by multiple equations, as there are several
interacting endogenous variables, and these inter-
actions are the central concern. The Blau and
Duncan model of occupational status attainment
features two predetermined but not necessarily
exogenous variables, father’s occupation and edu-
cation, and three outcome measures for the respon-
dent, education, first job, and current job status.
These five variables are organized in a hierarchical
system in which the variables expressed earlier in
the system are not functions of the variables
included later. By then treating all the stochastic
terms in the separate equations as uncorrelated (a
strong assumption), the system is recursive and can
be estimated with the same methods used to esti-
mate Equation 5. This early multi-equation model
stimulated an extensive amount of work on mod-
els with multiple outcomes. This subsequent work
and earlier but related work in economics removed
both the hierarchical structure and the condition
of uncorrelated stochastic terms, leaving a fully endogenous system.

A much more complex example is Brandt’s and Freeman’s recent model of the U.S. macropolitical economy. This model uses nine equations to model the contemporaneous interaction of nine economic and political variables, emphasizing the dynamic interactions within the political economy. Each of these variables is the left-hand-side variable in one equation and a right-hand-side variable in the others. Multi-equation systems with joint endogenous variables, whether hierarchical or not, present difficult estimation problems as the endogeneity of the variables included in each equation violates the basic principle of independence between the explanatory variables and the stochastic term, referred to earlier as the exogeneity condition.

As with some of the previous models, the early treatment of multi-equation models considered the presence of endogenous variables in an equation to be a necessary nuisance resulting from the observational nature of the data. There is an extensive literature in econometrics related to dealing with these nuisances, usually under headings such as endogenous regressor, instrumental variables, two-stage least squares, or simultaneous equations. These concerns are real, and endogeneity poses serious estimation problems, even in the best of conditions.

The thumbnail description of the IV estimator is as follows. The equation being estimated is

$$y_t = \sum_{k=1}^{K} X_{tk} B_k + \sum_{m=1}^{M} Y_{tm} C_m + U_t, \quad (17)$$

where the \(X_{ts}\)s are exogenous variables and the \(Y_{ms}\)s are endogenous variables. The \(Y_{ms}\)s are considered endogenous because they are correlated with \(U\). IV estimation requires one or more exogenous variables, denoted by \(Z_n\), that are correlated with \(Y_{ms}\) but uncorrelated with \(U\). There must be at least as many instruments as there are included endogenous variables, that is, \(L \geq M\). Formally, these requirements are that

$$E\left(\sum_{t=1}^{T} Z_{nt} Y_{tm}\right) = \sigma_{lm} \neq 0$$

and

$$E\left(\sum_{t=1}^{T} Z_{nt} U_t\right) = \sigma_{nu} = 0.$$  (These conditions are usually stated as probability limits, but the covariance form is easier to picture.) Informally, this means that \(y\) is related to each instrument variable \(Z_{nt}\) but only because of \(Z_{nt}\)’s association with \(Y_{ms}\); that is, \(Z_{nt}\) has no direct association with \(y\).

The natural experiments discussed earlier can be a good source of instruments. If the consequences of some natural event, such as the local severity of a hurricane’s winds, are a random event, then measures of this event can be good instruments. The research estimating the ability of federal aid to build support for an incumbent administration had to treat the amount of aid distributed to communities as endogenous as it was also proposed that aid distribution was influenced by votes for the incumbent in previous elections. The hurricane’s intensity should be related to the amount of aid, but because of the randomness of hurricane paths, wind intensity should be uncorrelated with previous vote patterns over the larger area covered by the hurricane.

The selection of instruments is often aided by the model itself. Many applications contain equations modeling each of the endogenous variables in the system, which means that there are separate equations for each \(Y_{ms}\) in addition to the equation for \(y\). This set of equations is referred to as a structural model, and each equation will usually contain both exogenous and endogenous explanatory variables. In estimating the equation for \(y\), the exogenous variables not included in this equation but that are included in the equations for the other endogenous variables become the natural instruments. Denote by \(X^*\) the \(K^*\) exogenous variables that are included in the equations for \(Y_{ms}\) but not included in the equation for \(y\). The variables in \(X^*\) become the instruments, that is, the \(Z_s\). The propositions that argue for their inclusion in the other equations imply that they are correlated with \(Y_{ms}\). The logic for excluding them from the equation for \(y\) is that they are uncorrelated with \(U\). Together these define the properties of an instrument.

A necessary condition for estimating the equation for \(y\) is that the number of included endogenous variables be less than or equal to the number of excluded exogenous variables, \(M \leq K^*\). This, however, is only a necessary condition. The sufficient conditions, referred to as identification, require a more detailed knowledge of which variables in \(X^*\) are related to which included endogenous variables. If there is only one included endogenous variable—for example, the structural model contains only two equations—the necessary
condition is also the sufficient condition. Determining if the equation for $y$ is identified and can be estimated if it contains more than one endogenous variable is a more exacting process, for which there are no simple, uniform rules. A more detailed discussion of identification and how to determine if an equation is identified can be found in any econometrics textbook.

IV estimation is a general estimation strategy for equations with endogenous variables. Its application to multi-equation systems is a special case. Regardless of the application, the requirements for IV estimation are the reason why one should approach IV estimation with caution, because they may be difficult to meet. The requirement that the $Z_s$, or the $X^*_s$, and $Y_m$ be correlated can be tested as these variables are observed. The tests for this correlation require more than a simple correlation. First, what is important is the partial correlation between $Y_m$ and the $Z_s$, controlling for the included exogenous variables, the $X_s$. Second, if there is more than one included endogenous variable, each $Y_m$ must be correlated with a different instrument or set of instruments. This is another statement of the identification condition, but it means that it must hold for the data at hand, not just as a theoretical statement.

The condition that the $Z_s$ and $U$ are uncorrelated is not testable, as $U$ is not observed. In cases where there are more instruments than endogenous variables, that is, $K^* = L > M$, referred to as the over identified case, there are some weak tests for the adequacy of the instruments. These tests are based on the fit between the residuals from the estimated equation for $y$ and the instruments. The better this fit is, the less likely the instruments are to be independent of $U$. But these are relatively low-power tests, meaning that they are not highly reliable for deciding whether to accept the null hypothesis of independence.

There are other, and very different, estimation strategies for accommodating endogeneity as illustrated by the model of the U.S. macropolitical economy mentioned earlier. But they are beyond the scope of this entry. These estimation methods rely on different constraints and assumptions from those in the IV estimator. They also nicely illustrate the development, specification, and use of multi-equation models to provide important insights into the intricate interactions among the components of complex social phenomena. Substantive use of these models extends far beyond models of political economy. The challenge in these models is to continue to develop estimation methods that are tailored to the models and to the types of data available to estimate these models. The estimation task posed by these models is not simply the reliance on observational data due to the difficulty, maybe impossibility, of performing experiments that carefully and exogenously manipulate one variable at a time. The central feature of these models is how to represent and then to estimate the complex contemporaneous and lagged interactions among a set of variables, which are endogenous because of these interactions.

Concluding Comments

The focus of this entry is on models that represent causal statements about social processes and on some of the data and estimation methods that are consistent with these models. The models discussed here (from Equations 4 through 17, regardless of whether the data are derived from experiments or observations, share one common feature. The stochastic component is separable and additive to the systematic part. This condition simplifies the estimation process and facilitates derivation of the estimator’s statistical properties. There are methods beyond the scope of this discussion that rely on other specifications, assumptions, and conditions that need to be considered in any empirical study.

There are a variety of strategies one might use to estimate and evaluate the various models. There is no single “best” method for all studies. The choice of estimation method should follow from the substantive question, from the model used to study that question, and from the available data. The limitations of OLS regression in accurately estimating Equation 5 with observational data are well documented, if not always acknowledged in practice. Lab experiments are often considered the “gold standard,” and they have very desirable properties in many contexts. They also need to be considered carefully. The experimental setting, stimuli, and subjects must closely approximate the actual setting, stimuli, and individuals on which the results will be applied. Artificial experimental
settings may generate artificial findings. Field experiments will overcome the validity concerns but may raise other problems. Randomization and double-blindedness may be difficult to achieve when working with real organizations with their own agendas and procedures.

Natural experiments and regression discontinuity designs and matching methods all use observational data. This gives them the advantage of analyzing “real” data from “real” subjects in their natural setting and in ways that can overcome some of the problems associated with regression analysis of observational data. One must be sure, however, that there are no subtle selection processes that prevent true randomization. For example, in the studies based on lottery winnings, can one be sure that those with large winnings were not playing different games from those with small earnings and thus might have different personal characteristics that could be correlated with how the money was spent or with political attitudes? In the regression discontinuity study of incumbency mentioned earlier, the electoral margins were taken as 50% ± 2.5%. Is assignment to incumbency or nonincumbency still random within that range? And what about a margin of ±1% or ±5%? With matching methods, one must be sure there are no unobservables omitted from the propensity score that might be correlated with the treatment. Matching procedures can also be compromised by subtle biases in the selection processes and the failure of those in the treatment group to actually receive the treatment. Subjects reachable by phone may have different characteristics from those who are not, and receiving a mailing is not the same thing as receiving and reading a mailing.

There is an important aspect to the decision about what method to employ that is not captured in the debates about the limitations of observational data, regressions, experiments, and the methods that mimic them. This is the match, or mismatch, between the proper causal model, the available data, and the empirical method. For models with additive and separable variables, such as Equations 4 and 5, experiments, when possible, and the methods that mimic them with observational data are indeed powerful tools that should be and are used regularly. But, as discussed here, there are many models of important substantive phenomena in the social sciences and many types of data for which these methods are inadequate. As always in the social sciences, and maybe other sciences as well, this situation leads to some less than desirable choices. One can choose to study phenomena that are suited to particular methods because of their desirable properties, for example, sticking with phenomena that can be studied experimentally or with matching techniques. But this means choosing substantive topics that are well modeled by the additive and separable equations and the SUTVA condition. One can choose to use methods that are powerful in one setting to examine phenomena that are better represented by more complex models, in the hope that the power of the method trumps the cost of having an inadequate model. Or one can examine substantive questions of interest with the appropriate models and the best available methods and data, recognizing the limitations of each. Good science requires a combination of the three, with a conscious and modest admission of their limitations. It is also the case that important methodological advances have come from efforts to advance the third strategy.

Particularly in the case of the third strategy, where the substantive questions require complex models, where the available and observed data may be far from perfect, and where the “best” methods are weak, the process of building confidence in causal statements and applications will be slow and highly contested. Scientists would do well to follow the description of this process offered by Arthur Stinchcombe quite a while ago, which every empirical researcher should read. He is very emphatic that not only can empirical research not prove theories, it seldom rejects theories. What it does do is lend credibility to theories. This credibility is enhanced with a cumulation of studies in multiple settings and with multiple types of data and methods. For some questions and evidence, this credibility may quite high. But for many others, because of the complexity of the causal process that connects X to Y of the available data, or because of the limitations of even the most appropriate best methods, this credibility may remain low and contestable. In this context, proposals for another study, for a new design, or for the use of a new method are a critical part of normal science. As is some honest modesty about
Within the discipline of political science, the study of security was, until the 1990s, dominated by strategic studies. The end of the Cold War dealt a significant blow to the legitimacy of strategic studies as the centerpiece of the study of security, resulting in the transformation of the field into what we now know as security studies. This entry traces the history of that transformation, beginning with the evolution of strategic studies, its challengers, and the emergence of security studies as the new moniker for the field. It begins with the so-called golden age of strategic studies, in which the central concepts of Cold War security and defense were elaborated, and in particular, intellectual work was performed to integrate nuclear weapons into the discussion on national defense. It then considers the other two periods of Cold War strategic studies: the first characterized by the operationalization of arms control in the period of détente and the second coincident with the period known as the Second Cold War. As the Second Cold War swiftly gave way to the rapid transformation of Europe and the Cold War’s end, the criticisms of strategic studies that had been voiced throughout its history gained greater purchase within the discipline. The entry traces first the emergence of security studies in the 1990s as a reformed study of security after the Cold War’s end and then the changes wrought to the field by the events of September 11, 2001. The final section in the entry considers the state of the field today.

The close connection of the periodization of strategic and security studies with the major events of the postwar world is no accident. Security studies is a policy science and was intimately connected to the creation of the national security state in the United States following World War II. The close connection of academic disciplines and the security state is by no means unique to strategic studies and has been particularly noted in the creation of area studies within political science, but the ties were particularly overt in the case of strategic studies. While strategic studies developed as a recognized academic discipline within the universities, it was always closely tied to military institutions, as in the case of the RAND Corporation, formed to

See also Methodology; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions

Further Readings


conducted research for the U.S. Air Force. As a policy science with a military focus, strategic studies was underpinned theoretically by the political realism that emerged in the 1950s as the dominant approach to the study of international relations (IR) in the English-speaking world. Even as the marginal variant of realism, liberal institutionalism, grew in importance in the 1970s and 1980s, strategic studies remained largely immune, and was, indeed, at the heart of the reassertion of a parsimonious “neorealism” in the period. With the development of security studies, theoretical pluralism has developed in the field, with the various theoretical traditions of IR reflected in security studies. This pluralism has included the development of what has become termed critical security studies, drawing the traditions of critical social theory into the study of security—which has, in turn, led to the suggestion that security itself be abandoned.

Strategic Studies

In the aftermath of World War II, the United States undertook one of the largest reorganizations of its state institutions in its history—a reorganization exceeded only by that following the events of September 11, 2001. The centerpiece of this reorganization was the National Security Act of 1947, but that was only the most prominent piece of legislation among a range of legislative and executive actions that collectively created the U.S. national security state. Explaining the nature and meaning of this transformation of the U.S. state depends on the theoretical position taken to look at it. The overt explanation, accepted by most in the mainstream of IR and reflected in strategic studies, is that the United States was responding to the emergence of a global threat posed by its erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union. Based on this reading, the National Security Act (1947) and its attendant reorganization of the U.S. state were strategic responses to the security threat of the former USSR, designed to achieve “national security” for the United States. One problem with this explanation is that the very idea of “national security” was a product of the same processes that gave rise to the national security state in this period. Scholars informed by critical theories have therefore argued that the national security state and the threat to which it purports to respond were both a creation of the same practices, designed to maintain an increasingly globalized American liberal capitalism.

On either account of the creation of the national security state, the development of strategic studies paralleled the state’s transformation and supported the goals of U.S. national security. The nature of the enterprise, however, is seen rather differently in each account. The mainstream view is that strategic studies developed as a policy-relevant science in response to the same problem that gave rise to the transformation of the U.S. state: the growing animosity between the United States and the former USSR and the addition of nuclear weapons to the traditional great power conflict. The goal of strategic studies, based on this view, was to build on previous work on great power relations and the nature of warfare in order to understand the dynamics of the emergent Cold War and to develop concepts for understanding the application of force and the provision of defense in the nuclear era. Critically informed scholars reject this reactive view of the strategic studies field and see rather that the conceptual development performed by strategic studies was part of the production of a particular kind of United States, a particular kind of Soviet Union as its enemy, and of the specific form the nuclear-armed Cold War took. This entry will provide an account largely consonant with the critical view of the place of strategic studies, both because it is more compelling and because the mainstream account is easily read through the critical one.

Strategic Studies’ Golden Age

The “golden age” of strategic studies was dominated by the question of nuclear weapons. Indeed, nuclear weapons provided the raison d’être for strategic studies as a separate, civilian, academic enterprise in the context of the early Cold War and the production of the national security state. The problem strategic studies set out to solve was how to normalize nuclear weapons—that is, how to take a technology whose destructive power was orders of magnitude greater than any that had preceded it and make of it a usable military and political instrument. The scale of the problem was magnified soon after the field’s founding when the United States successfully tested a thermonuclear
device in 1954, making the explosive potential of nuclear arms all but unlimited. The explosives that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki were roughly the equivalent of 25,000 tons of high explosive; the thermonuclear devices that were developed after that initial test in 1954 are measured in the millions of tons of equivalent trinitrotoluene (TNT). Plotting how to make something this destructive appear meaningfully as a “weapon” was truly, in Herman Kahn’s evocative phrase, “thinking about the unthinkable.”

**Deterrence**

The primary solution that was developed by strategic studies to the problem of nuclear weapons and national security was the theory of deterrence. The basic concept of deterrence is quite simple, as it involves issuing a threat of some kind in an attempt to prevent another from doing something that they would otherwise do. Even as a military concept, deterrence much predates the nuclear age, as the issuing of threats is a common military tactic. Nuclear deterrence is different in two ways, however. First of all, strategic studies reformulated deterrence as a strategy rather than a tactic, and second, it developed deterrence to be mutual.

The elevation of deterrence from tactic to strategy solved the central problem of nuclear weapons for the national security state. A strategy of deterrence placed nuclear devices at the heart of the military (and political) organization but structured the system of management in such a way that the devices did not need to be detonated to be useful. Deterrence produced nuclear devices as “weapons” in name only, as they were intended only to be used as a threat; the actual use of nuclear weapons would mark the failure of deterrence. Deterrence is therefore an elegant solution to the problem of vast destructive capability being framed as “weapons,” because it produces a strategy that never actually calls on the explosive potential of the devices to be realized.

As elegant as the deterrence solution is to the nuclear problem, it raises a number of problems of its own, not the least of which is that it frees nuclear weapons from any rational constraints. A “normal” explosive weapon, the purpose of which is to be detonated in the course of a military campaign to achieve certain ends, is limited by its tactical uses and the ends to be sought. Those uses and ends will largely dictate both the size of the explosive needed and the number of explosives in a usable arsenal. Together with some assumptions about the likely scale and duration of any conflict, military planners will have a fair sense of the necessary development of any given weapon. By contrast, deterrence produces nuclear weapons simply as the materialization of threat, rather than as explosives to be deployed, and so more and bigger are likely to be better as they are even more threatening than smaller and fewer.

Strategic studies provided one solution to the problem of constraint in developing nuclear deterrence as mutual. Without nuclear weapons, deterrence is generally a unilateral tactic: The relatively larger, stronger, more capable potential combatant can threaten the smaller and weaker to shape the latter’s actions, but the smaller, weaker combatant is unlikely to be able to threaten the stronger sufficiently to deter. Nuclear weapons were seen to change this simple equation, because if both sides in a conflict had them, they would be able to inflict tremendous damage on each other without one having first to “win” on the battlefield. This observation led to one of the most memorable products of golden age strategic studies: mutually assured destruction, or MAD. MAD was not considered a strategy but rather a condition. With enough weapons and delivery systems, both the United States and the Soviet Union would be able to inflict untold damage on each other, at the same time, regardless of anything either tried to do to defend itself.

Most of the work of golden age strategic studies was devoted to operationalizing a strategy of deterrence in conditions of MAD. Central to this effort was the concept of “strategic balance,” which provided an answer to the problem of limits. Deterrence, strategic studies argued, would be workable in conditions of MAD if the two sides were roughly equivalent. It is worth noting that this conclusion does not derive from the logic of nuclear deterrence under MAD, where all that is necessary is to retain the capacity to devastate an opponent under any conditions, and so the relative size of the arsenals is irrelevant. However, a strategic imbalance in which the former USSR held more weapons than the United States was politically
unacceptable and so was never seriously counte-
nanced in strategic studies, an indication of the
mutually constitutive relationship between the
study of strategy and the production and mainte-
nance of the national security state.

While strategic stability provided a relative
solution to the problem of limits, it provided no
guidance in absolute terms. As long as there was
rough parity and the two arsenals were configured
in such a way that MAD obtained (i.e., each
retained a so-called survivable second-strike capa-
bility), the absolute numbers of arms could
continue to climb. The solution to the arms race
problem was the second major output of strategic
studies’ golden age: the theory of arms control.

Arms Control

While deterrence theory provided no upper limit
on the level at which strategic stability could be
achieved, it did have consequences for lower limits.
The most important of these was that zero was not
an option: Eliminating nuclear weapons does not
allow for strategic stability in the terms developed
by strategic studies. Before the emergence of strate-
gic studies, attempts to limit arms were generally
conceived in terms of disarmament—the United
States had even attempted to entice the former
USSR into mutual nuclear disarmament under the
United Nations (UN) control with the Baruch Plan
of 1946. With the elaboration of nuclear deter-
rence theory and the demonstrated ability of the
former USSR to develop and build nuclear weap-
ons, seemingly at the same pace as the United
States, strategic studies took up the problem of
devising limits to their development.

Through the latter half of the 1950s, following
the test explosion of a Soviet thermonuclear device
in 1955, strategic studies turned its collective
attention to the question of controlling the de-
velopment of nuclear weapons. This effort culmi-
nated in the special issue of the journal Daedalus
in 1960, which was described by the issue’s editor
as a “handbook on the problems of arms control
and national policy.”

The two outputs of the golden age of strategic
studies were intimately interconnected, as arms
control was developed as a means of achieving the
balance required of “strategic stability,” which was
in turn the necessary condition for the successful
functioning of deterrence. The handbook that stra-
tegic studies devised was then put into operation
by the U.S. state throughout the 1960s, producing
a series of bilateral and multilateral arms control
agreements, culminating with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT, 1968) on the multilat-
eral side and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
(SALT, 1972) on the bilateral one.

While both the theory of deterrence and that of
arms control were seen to be scholarly answers to
objective problems, they were rather more political
programs that required the mutual consent of
those operating them to function. What this meant
in particular was that the managers of Soviet mili-
tary and foreign policies needed to accept the basic
tenets of deterrence for both it and arms control
to function, and initially they did not. Deterrence
theory is more formally termed rational-deterren-
ce theory, and the modifier “rational” is important.
To develop its impressive edifice of theory, strate-
gic studies assumed that decisions were taken by
strategically rational men—that is, by applying a
simple cost–benefit analysis to the situation in
which the decision makers find themselves—and it
further assumed that the costs and benefits associ-
ated with nuclear war were fairly clear. Those
responsible for Soviet policy, however, had been
trained in a tradition quite different from that of
liberal economics, which gave rise to the parsimo-
nious assumptions of strategic rationality and to
the game theories that were derived from these
assumptions, which, in turn, informed the strategy
of deterrence.

For deterrence to function, therefore, the United
States needed not only to build weapons and issue
the appropriate threats but also to educate the
Soviet Union in the intricacies of strategic rationa-
licity and the theory of deterrence that flowed from
it. The arms control negotiations that followed
strategic studies’ development of an arms control
theory in the 1950s therefore served two purposes
in facilitating the functioning of deterrence. The
first, overt function was to reach agreements on
limits to the size and structure of the two sides’
nuclear arsenals, creating the much sought strate-
gic stability. However, at least as important, if not
more so, was the educative function of the negotia-
tions, as the U.S. delegations socialized their Soviet
counterparts into the nature and functioning of
deterrence theory. This was, perhaps, strategic
Strategic (Security) Studies

The greatest contribution to the successful functioning of the U.S. national security state—that is, the development of a body of concepts that could be successfully communicated to the Soviet Union to construct it as the particular enemy called for in the security doctrines of the United States. It was truly a singular achievement.

Détente and a New Cold War

The successful SALT negotiations ushered in a period of détente between the Soviet Union and United States and seemingly reduced the urgency of the problems that defined strategic studies as a field of inquiry. In the broader discipline of IR, this period was marked by the growth of liberal institutionalism as a challenge to political realism and a reorientation of the discipline toward issues of political economy and international cooperation rather than those of security and conflict. Interest in strategic studies waned through the 1970s, although the institutional basis in both universities and think tanks was not seriously eroded, and with the return of the Cold War following the election of Ronald Reagan to the U.S. presidency in 1980, strategic studies experienced what Stephen Walt has termed a renaissance.

As with the golden age, the renaissance in strategic studies was driven by the complicity of the academic field with the security policies of the United States. The Reagan administration ushered in what is generally termed the Second Cold War, a period of heightened rhetorical tension between the United States and the former USSR and of staggering growth in U.S. defense spending. In particular, two elements of the Reagan foreign policy required the intellectual talents of strategic studies: (1) dissatisfaction with a deterrence theory that pronounced any actual use of nuclear weapons as a failure and (2) a closely related desire to escape from nuclear vulnerability by technical means.

There are a number of terms used to denote the first of these changes in U.S. state attitude. The most official is the term countervailing strategy, but its opponents attempted to offset the poor public relations of MAD by terming it the Nuclear Utilization Targeting Strategy, or NUTS. Whatever term is used, it denotes a change in U.S. military thinking about the way in which nuclear weapons would be used in times of war. The golden age answer to this question had been that nuclear weapons should be held as a threat and should only be used in the case of deterrence failure to punish the Soviet Union for not heeding those threats. The countervailing strategy, or NUTS, sought to develop a tactical doctrine for nuclear weapons, giving them a real military mission, with the ultimate goal not just of deterring the Soviet Union but of doing so by planning to win a nuclear war.

The shift to a countervailing strategy, which triggered the renaissance in strategic studies, is associated with the bellicose Reagan administration, but in fact, it was put into motion during the Carter administration. It represents, therefore, not a partisan shift in policy as much as a reinvigoration of the national security state, and, as with the foundation of that state in the 1940s and 1950s, strategic studies undertook much of the necessary intellectual work. Strategic studies through the 1980s was dominated by literature working through the problems posed by the countervailing strategy, testing them through the rigors of academic contestation by those still committed to deterrence strategies that were not so overtly war-fighting strategies.

The second prompt to the renaissance of strategic studies was rather more partisan in its origins, though it reflected the flip side of the move to a war-fighting strategy for nuclear deterrence: Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In the often-quoted words of the presidential speech that launched SDI in March 1983, the initiative was designed to render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete” by providing a defensive shield against incoming Soviet nuclear missiles. The strategic implications of a defense of this kind would have been extraordinary, though nothing compared with the technical achievements required to make it happen. The twin challenges of technology and strategy drove a second constituent of the strategic studies renaissance of the 1980s, as analysts grappled with how to realize Reagan’s dream and also questioned whether or not it was a dream that should ultimately be pursued.

The renaissance of strategic studies also marks the apogee of the field as the heart of the study of security. Critics of strategic studies in the 1980s had increasing grist for their mills, as the patently absurd “winnable nuclear war” was taken up as a serious issue for scholarly debate, and similarly,
the science fiction dream of an impenetrable missile shield was actively pursued. While these two intellectual pursuits undermined the legitimacy of strategic studies, the ground on which it had been built was unceremoniously removed from underneath the field by the end of the Cold War.

**The Critics of Strategic Studies**

Given the close connection of strategic studies to the national security system in the United States, it is not surprising that much of the criticism of the field came from outside the United States. There were certainly criticisms of strategic studies raised within the United States in the 1980s, particularly from outside the discipline, but many of those with the deepest resonance came from scholars based in the United Kingdom (UK) and continental Europe.

One of the most extensive critiques of strategic studies was developed institutionally around peace studies. Peace studies, or peace research, as an alternative discipline to strategic studies was largely concentrated in Scandinavia (notably at the Stockholm Peace Research Institute and the Peace Research Institute of Oslo) and in the UK. Peace studies grew alongside strategic studies in the postwar period, and where strategic studies were largely the product of political science, peace studies attracted substantial involvement from natural scientists, particularly nuclear scientists, who were concerned with the destructive potential their work had produced. It stressed pacifism in its approach to foreign policy and rejected the rational and instrumental approach to nuclear weapons adopted by strategic studies. In particular, peace studies argued that the potential devastation of nuclear conflict—including the potential extinction of the human species, what Jonathan Schell in an influential text called “second death”—meant that rational cost–benefit analysis was inappropriate and, particularly, that nuclear explosives had to be conceived as something other than military weapons. The peace studies’ critique did not gain much purchase within political science until the 1980s, when the MAD versus NUTS debate made the peace studies’ position considerably more generally comprehensible.

A second important line of critical argument was advanced by Ken Booth in the UK in an important book, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*. Booth also took aim at the instrumental rationality of strategic studies, arguing that it represented a construct of a particular Western philosophical tradition. Decision makers outside that tradition, he argued, would not necessarily accept the arguments underpinning rational deterrence theory, nor, therefore, would they act in the ways predicted by strategic studies. The need to socialize the Soviet Union into the logic of deterrence is a clear example of the sort of problem Booth’s work raised.

A third line of criticism that has informed much of what followed in security studies after the end of the Cold War took issue with the narrowly military focus of strategic studies. The most prominent exponent of this criticism was Barry Buzan in his noted work *People, States & Fear*. Buzan argued that while military defense was, of course, important to the security of states, there were a number of other “sectors” in which states faced threats from which they needed to be secured. These sectors—political, economic, societal, and environmental, in addition to the military—call for security strategies that are not necessarily (indeed, not usually) military and thus for a study of security that is potentially quite different from that found in strategic studies.

Taken together, these and related criticisms of strategic studies informed a significant transformation in the study of security within political science following the end of the Cold War. Strategic studies was a creature of the Cold War in a number of quite fundamental ways. The national security state that it serviced was built for the Cold War, and the principal research focus of strategic studies was the Cold War nuclear contest between the East and the West. Even more significant than this, however, was the evident failure of political realism to anticipate or even explain the end of the Cold War. Realism was the theoretical foundation of strategic studies, and as the end of the Cold War undermined realism’s claims, so too did it undermine the legitimacy and supremacy of strategic studies as an approach to security.

**Security Studies**

The end of the Cold War appeared to transform the global security environment fundamentally. The contest between the Soviet Union and the United States had defined the international security
environment since the end of World War II. Its passage seemed to herald an era in which cooperation rather than conflict might define global security, in which direct military threats to the future of the state might recede in importance, and in which security was divisible—that is, not every security issue worldwide was connected to a central great power rivalry. Furthermore, the apparent changes to a more peaceful global order led many in both the West and the East to seek a “peace dividend,” an opportunity to redirect resources away from military security and toward other social goals.

Although the end of the Cold War was clearly a tremendous opportunity, it also posed a difficult problem for the management of international security. The Cold War had guided policy practitioners in the practice of security policy—they knew what the risks were, and they knew how to “go on” in conditions of Cold War. Indeed, providing the stock body of answers to the nature of the risks and the best means of response was precisely what strategic studies provided to the national security state through the latter half of the 20th century. Without the Cold War context, neither the risks nor the strategies were accepted as understood, and what is more, the discipline that had been providing the answers was undermined by its own failure to comprehend this extraordinarily significant change in its own object of study.

In this context of global political change, policy uncertainty, and intellectual fluidity, there grew a series of movements to redefine security, to understand it in some new way, and to provide a reconfigured study of security for the new era. These movements have given rise to what is now called, in political science, security studies, which is a much broader, theoretically plural, and interdisciplinary activity compared with strategic studies, which both preceded it and continues within it. The fragmentation and flowering of security studies began with a simple question: What is security?

What Is Security?

Booth (1991) characterized the study of security during the Cold War as “looking at world politics through a missile-tube and gun-sight” and said that in such a study “weapons provided most of the questions, and they provided most of the answers—whatever the weapon, whatever the context, and whatever the cost” (pp. 315–316). Booth’s caustic comment points to the assumptions of strategic studies in the Cold War: that security, first and foremost, meant the defense of the state against external threats, specifically those that threaten the continued existence of the state itself. Such existential threats against the state are military threats, particularly nuclear threats, and the defense against them is primarily a military matter. In Walt’s (1991) terms, security concerned the “threat, use and control of military force” (p. 212).

Once the Cold War’s end undermined the military conception of both security and the study of security that followed from it, scholars took to asking the deceptively simple question “What is security?” The debates that followed from this question rapidly identified two axes along which answers could be organized. These axes followed from challenges to the two key elements of the traditional answer to the question of security by strategic studies: that it was the protection of states from military threats. The first axis emerged from considering the question of what security is by asking, “What if there are security threats to the state other than military threats?” This refinement on the question led to a discussion of the broadening of security. The second axis developed from challenging the first element of the traditional answer—the focus on states. This second line of argument began by asking what happens if we are concerned with securing objects other than the state, leading to a debate on deepening security. Post–Cold War security studies is, therefore, born from a debate characterized by the broadening and/or deepening of security.

Broadening Security: Multiple Threats/Multiple Responses

The arguments suggesting the broadening of security followed from, or largely reproduced, Buzan’s critique of strategic studies from People, States & Fear. Buzan had argued that the state was threatened in a range of ways, which could be organized into five sectors, of which the military was only one. The broadening argument looked at the other sectors Buzan outlined—the political, economic, societal, and environmental—to suggest
that a post–Cold War security needed to be concerned with the threats faced in these areas, at least as much as those in the military realm.

There is an important consequence of any move to broaden the security agenda by considering non-military threats to the security of the state: The military will not necessarily be the most useful tool in responding to those threats. Consider, for example, the threat supposedly posed to Western Europe by “communism” during the early Cold War. This is an evident example of a threat in the “political” sector, according to Buzan’s schema: a threat aimed at the organizational stability of the (in this case, liberal-capitalist) state. While there may have been a connection between the European Communists and the Soviet Union, the military could not provide any meaningful protection against that external influence, and it was entirely irrelevant to the ideological threat posed by the appeal of communist parties internally. The same is true of societal, economic, and, particularly, environmental threats.

The final of Buzan’s sectors—the environmental—attracted considerable attention in the debate over the broadening of security in the early 1990s. A variety of issues that later became gathered under the label of “climate change”—global warming, rising sea levels, desertification, and environmental pollution such as “acid rain”—were gathering significant political attention. Several of these were seen to pose important risks to the state, and a literature on “environmental security” developed as part of the argument for broadening security studies. Not only was the environmental security debate important in its own right, but it also raised a number of the issues that have defined much of the rest of security studies since the early 1990s.

The first question of the environmental security debate was what sort of security issue was posed to the state by environmental change. One line of argument was that environmental change posed a direct threat to the state, in much the same way as external armies did. Under extreme conditions, climatic change could threaten the very existence of the state. However, the conditions under which this was possible seemed extremely rare in most instances: The most common example raised was that of Pacific Island nations that could be inundated by rising sea levels. For the Western states generally serviced by security studies, however, it was difficult to imagine such a direct threat to their continued existence. A second line of argument suggested that the environmental threat was not direct but rather that climatic change could produce effects that were generally recognized to be issues of security, most commonly the mass movement of people and conflict over increasingly scarce resources.

The second line of environmental security argument, that climatic change would produce conflict, did not fundamentally challenge the traditional notion of security as a military affair but rather argued that military threats could emerge from nontraditional locations. This rather conservative consequence bred a third argument within the environmental security debate, which focused on the contradiction between military means and environmental security. Essentially, the argument was that the military, in both preparation for and prosecution of wars, was tremendously destructive to the environment. Environmental security, this argument suggested, was therefore best seen as protecting the environment from the military! By making such an argument, however, its proponents posed a fundamental challenge to traditional security studies, as it was no longer the state that was to be secured but rather, in this case, the environment itself. Such a conclusion tied the “broadening” security arguments to the second stream of the security studies debate in the early post–Cold War period, that of considering “deepening” security.

Deepening Security: Protecting Other Referents

The “deepening” security discussion began from the question of whether what should be secured (i.e., the referent object of security) should be something other than the state. The environmental security debate led to the suggestion that it was the environment itself that needed protection from, among other things, the very practices that are generally considered to provide security. However, a number of other answers to this question were advanced in the context of the discussion of what security meant. Some argued that the state was a representative of a community—usually termed the nation—and that what should be secured was not the state as such but rather the nation. Others rejected the narrowness of even thinking of states as “nations” and suggested that security studies should be concerned with the security of communities,
regardless of the terms under which they were constituted. Any of these forms of communal argument were particularly useful in drawing attention to those circumstances in which the state, rather than providing security to its population, was an active threat to at least some part of that population.

The most influential argument for broadening security was drawn into security studies from international development, specifically the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 1994 annual report, *New Dimensions of Human Security*. The basic notion of human security was that individuals, rather than states, should be the referent object of security. As the UNDP formulated it, human security was a very broad notion, encompassing all threats to the lives and livelihoods of people. In many ways, the UNDP’s conception of human security was an attempt to reformulate the notion of development, particularly human development, in terms of “security,” driven in part by a desire to capture some of the expected peace dividends from the end of the Cold War for the global development agenda.

Coming as it did, just as states, and the security studies that serviced them, were searching for a way to think about security in a post–Cold War world, human security has had a significant impact on both policy and scholarship. It has been picked up particularly by midranked states in the international system, who have seen in it a means of forging for themselves a significant role in the global security agenda, often otherwise dominated by the larger states. As the states and security studies have turned to human security, the breadth of the original UNDP conception has been lost. Indeed, two competing conceptions of human security have emerged from this debate, with Canada championing a conception of human security as “freedom from fear” and Japan championing one of “freedom from want,” both of which are contained within the UNDP’s formulation. Canada’s formulation has had, perhaps, the most obvious policy impact, as it led to actions to ban antipersonnel land mines, a global plan of action on small arms and light weapons, and some consideration of action on child soldiers.

**Securitization**

The attempt by the UNDP to recast human development in terms of human security can be usefully described using one of the most important concepts to be developed in post–Cold War security studies: that of “securitization.” In these terms, it would be said that the UNDP attempted to “securitize” the development agenda, or at least some significant part of it, though it would then be a question of whether or not that “securitizing move” was successful. The term *securitization* was introduced into security studies by Ole Wæver, who then later teamed with Buzan to marry the latter’s sectoral approach to securitization in order to form what has been termed the *Copenhagen School of security studies*. There are some deep tensions between securitization and Buzan’s security sectors, and so in addition to the Copenhagen School, the idea of securitization has spawned a wide range of scholarship, often simply called “securitization studies.”

The idea of “securitization” is at once simple and radical. Wæver counsels that we treat security as a “speech act,” by which he means an utterance that produces something in the world by virtue of its being said. Promising is one of the more common examples of a speech act: A promise only exists by virtue of someone saying, “I promise.” Wæver suggests that security only exists by virtue of someone authoritatively saying “such and such is an issue of security” and (importantly) having that utterance broadly accepted by its target audience. The effect of a successful securitization, he argues, is to remove an issue from the realm of normal politics and so make it possible for extraordinary means (often, but not necessarily, military means) to be applied in response.

The radical implications of securitization are also quite easily seen. Securitization fundamentally undermines the claims of political realists, and the forms of security study that follow them, that the world is a dangerous place, and security involves identifying the threats “out there” and responding appropriately. By contrast, securitization argues that there are no objective security threats; rather, an issue becomes a matter of security if and only if it is successfully securitized. Security is socially produced—socially constructed to use language common in the field—and securitization provides a broad conception of the means of that construction. Securitization also, therefore, makes security intensely political. While successful securitization removes an issue from normal politics (it is
worth thinking here of the range of extraordinary measures taken in response to “terrorism” as a security threat following 9/11, the act of securitization itself is a potential site of political contestation. For strategic studies, by contrast, security is “too important” for politics. What securitization illustrates is that this assertion by the academic study of security is part of the securitizing apparatus of the state, designed to insulate the most extreme forms of violent state action from political opposition.

**Critical Security Studies**

The treatment of security as a social construct and, therefore as a site of politics, is a feature of a number of approaches to security that have grown up in the period following the end of the Cold War, in addition to securitization studies. These approaches are loosely termed critical security studies, after a 1997 volume of the same name. The volume, and the conference from which it came, drew a range of scholars dissatisfied with strategic studies as the heart of the study of security and sought theoretical pluralism among the disaffected. Theoretical pluralism, however, does not sit well with the professional practices of academics, and so the inclusive home for opponents to the mainstream has divided into rather more exclusive and exclusive literatures, largely along theoretical lines.

The first theoretical tradition that gathered under the critical security studies name was social constructivism, which had emerged in the United States in the late 1980s. Constructivism was concerned with the role of ideas in international politics, particularly the ways identities and interests were constructed in social interaction. Borrowing from Anthony Giddens’s ideas of structuration, IR constructivism sought to overcome the debate between agency and structure in IR through the reflexive production of identities and social institutions in world politics. The constructivist position, however, did not accept a complete break with the epistemological realism of mainstream IR, which closely allied it to the Copenhagen School and, particularly, securitization studies. The same is not true of the other two broad streams of critical security studies, which drew on continental European critical social theory for theoretical guidance: The first laid claim to the critical security studies label by virtue of its drawing its primary theoretical inspiration from the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and the related post-Marxist German social theory; the second is a looser gathering of scholars informed by poststructural French social theory.

Critical Theory, with capitals, is a product of the Frankfurt School, which is both an institution and an intellectual tradition, and is associated with a series of important social theorists, including Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Walter Benjamin. The most prominent contemporary social thinker associated with the Frankfurt School is Jürgen Habermas. The ideas of these thinkers have been drawn into the study of security, largely by Booth and his colleagues at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, and so have spawned what is sometimes termed the Welsh School of critical security studies. The Welsh approach to security sees emancipatory politics at the heart of security studies—that is, security studies that in reality works for those presently oppressed by the global capitalist security system, rather than being an academic exercise undertaken by the national security state, which is the principal institution of that oppression.

Progressive political change is also a hallmark of the French tradition of social critique. French social theory is not so clearly organized into a school as is its German counterpart, but it is generally associated with the work of a number of influential French thinkers—Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Jean Baudrillard, among the most commonly cited in security studies—as well as a number of others with similar philosophical starting points: Slavoj Žižek, Judith Butler, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and Giorgio Agamben. What marks out the poststructural contribution to security studies is an acceptance of a radical epistemological break with the modern tradition, an epistemological break that is resisted by mainstream security studies, constructivism, and even the Welsh School. This break, often termed antifoundationalism, leads, for example, to an acceptance of contingency and contextuality in understanding social formations, including security institutions and practices. In relation to security, the contributions of a post-structural approach can be found most prominently in the work of David Campbell, Simon Dalby, and James Der Derian, among others. Poststructural security studies has also flourished in response to the dramatic reexpansion of the national security state following the 9/11 attacks.
Feminism and Security

Most accounts of security studies, even critical security studies, exclude feminist scholarship, and yet feminist work on security has flourished in the same period, and much of it draws on a similar range of mostly critical social theory, as do other parts of the field. The range of feminist scholarship is particularly important, because there is not one single feminist approach to security but rather feminist analysis begins from the full range of social theory—including liberal, post-Marxist, poststructural, and postcolonial—and in no way seeks to distill these theoretical traditions into a single “feminist” theory. What does unite feminist scholarship is a concern with gender in social life and, for those interested in security, the relationship of gender to security. Gender refers to the constitution of sex-related social differences, of masculinities and femininities, and so feminists are concerned with the ways in which these social categories are (re)produced and with its effects.

Feminist security scholarship has explored the ways in which masculinities and femininities have been produced in and through security institutions and practices, as well as the ways in which those institutions differentially affect the lives of men and women. The military is perhaps the quintessential such security institution, and much feminist scholarship has explored the ways in which the military produces and relies on a particular kind of masculinity (often termed hypermasculinity), which is also (re)produced in wider society. Feminist scholars have also demonstrated the ways in which, unsurprisingly, the hypermasculine and necessarily violent military has particular, and highly gendered, effects when it acts. These effects are seen most obviously in rape as a tactic of war and in the persistent use of prostitution to service soldiers in the field, both of which have been shown to be long-standing features of militaries. Indeed, Sandra Whitworth has turned the feminist gaze on UN Peacekeepers, and she found that donning a blue beret does not alter these violent, hypermasculine practices.

More broadly, much feminist scholarship can be said to show the way in which the national security state as a whole is a product and producer of patriarchy. In other words, the state and the form of “national security” it produces and practices, (re)produce a broad social structure that differentially benefits men at the expense of women. For an account of security studies, this finding is particularly important, because of the role that security studies has played in providing intellectual service to the national security state. The inescapable corollary of the feminist critique of that state is that security studies is not only an enabler of the national security state but is a product and producer of gender inequality too. Security studies, in other words, is in itself a highly gendered practice.

The End of Security?

The post–Cold War era has seen a burgeoning of security. The peace dividend anticipated from the end of the superpower confrontation was never realized as the decade following the transformation of Europe saw the national security state reassert itself in novel ways. In its search for continued relevance, the national security state and its academic support, security studies, looked to the world outside the Central European front and found it dangerously unstable. The national security state and security studies, therefore, retooled to bring security to the violent hinterland—particularly when that hinterland bordered on the core, as it did in the wars of the former Yugoslavia. Security studies provided the intellectual resources for this retooling, providing a wealth of literature exploring the dynamics of what, most notably, Mary Kaldor has termed the New Wars. The fact that these new wars tend to be fought in some of the least advantaged parts of the world—Afghanistan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone, for example—has led to a growing merger between security and development, although ironically not in the fashion the UNDP would have hoped in launching its notion of human security. Rather than capturing the power and resources of “security” for the hard work of human development, the merger of security and development has harnessed the global development institutions to the national security state’s violent export of its liberal-democratic self.

Having survived the 1990s, security received its largest single boost since the end of World War II with the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. Suddenly, the homeland appeared once more to be under threat, and this time, unlike during the Cold War, even the United States had been successfully attacked. Security spread like a virus throughout Western societies in response: Antiterrorism legislation was passed, amended, updated, and passed again; borders became sites of ever-greater
scrutiny and potential violence; state surveillance spread rapidly; and a wide range of legal protections in Western societies, which had been won through centuries of struggle, were summarily cast off. The prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, stood as the symbol of this renewed security, but security was far from contained in an island limbo. The United States undertook the largest reorganization of its state structure since the National Security Act of 1947 with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which in turn has served as the model for the reinvigoration of the national security state among the allies of the United States. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that security studies has likewise flourished, since the transformed national security state has just as much need for intellectual support work as it did at its postwar founding.

Much of the work in security studies as it emerged from strategic studies, however, leads to troubling questions about the future practice of security studies itself. The original securitization work, for example, argued that the best security politics was “desecuritization,” an attempt to remove as much of it as possible from the ambit of security and into the realm of normal politics. The feminist work on the gendered character of the national security state similarly suggests that there is something deeply troubling about the services provided to that state by security scholars. Mark Neocleous gave a strong and clear voice to these questions in his 2008 book, Critique of Security, in which he suggested that security was the central logic of the liberal state, and so speaking in terms of security, even to oppose the extravagant security practices of the state, is to reproduce the national security state and insulate it from the possibility of political transformation. Just as security studies is maturing in its new, poststrategic studies guise, therefore, we are led to ask whether we have now reached the end of security.

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Further Readings

Structural Equation Modeling

Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a very general statistical approach for modeling and estimating data. It is seen as a combination of factor analysis and regression or path analysis. These procedures are regarded as special cases of SEM. It contains, in addition, classical multivariate
Structural Equation Modeling

techniques such as analysis of variance, analysis of covariance, dummy regression, and canonical correlation as special cases. A structural equation model contains latent variables that should correspond to theoretical constructs from substantive theory and their reflective indicators or items that form the measurement model. The relationships between the latent variables (constructs and factors) and their indicators (observed variables) are quantified by the corresponding factor loadings. The regression coefficients between the latent variables (structural relations) take random and nonrandom measurement error into account and are, therefore, not biased. This part of the model is called “structural model” and represents the underlying theory. This entry presents some of the basic features of SEM using an example from the European Social Survey (ESS).

SEM models can be visualized by a graphical path diagram, which represents the relationships between the latent variables (structural model) and the relationships between latent and observed variables (measurement model). The latent variables are symbolized by circles, the observed variables by rectangles, and the postulated direction of influences by directed arrows (see Figure 1). The path diagram can be translated into a set of linear or matrix equations. Figure 1 displays a diagram that graphically represents a structural equation model with the measurement and the structural part. It contains one exogenous (independent) construct and one endogenous (dependent) construct. Each construct in Figure 1 is measured by three indicators to control for all forms of random and nonrandom measurement errors.

In Figure 1, $\xi_1$ is an exogenous latent construct, measured by three indicators $x_1$, $x_2$, and $x_3$. Their measurement errors are designated as $\delta_1$, $\delta_2$, and $\delta_3$. $\eta_1$ is an endogenous latent construct, measured by three indicators $y_1$, $y_2$, and $y_3$. Their measurement errors are designated as $\epsilon_1$, $\epsilon_2$, and $\epsilon_3$. $\lambda$ is the symbol for the unstandardized factor loading. The residual of the latent endogenous variable is $\zeta_1$. It represents the unexplained variance of the latent endogenous variable. The regression coefficient between the exogenous and the endogenous latent variable is $\gamma_{11}$. The first subscript refers to the dependent variable, the second to the independent variable.

The corresponding equation system for the model in Figure 1 is as follows:

**Structural model:**

$$\eta_1 = \gamma_{11} \xi_1 + \zeta_1$$

(1.1)

**Measurement model:**

$$x_1 = \lambda_1^x \xi_1 + \delta_1$$

(2.1)

$$x_2 = \lambda_2^x \xi_1 + \delta_2$$

(2.2)

$$x_3 = \lambda_3^x \xi_1 + \delta_3$$

(2.3)

$$y_1 = \lambda_1^y \eta_1 + \epsilon_1$$

(2.4)

$$y_2 = \lambda_2^y \eta_1 + \epsilon_2$$

(2.5)

$$y_3 = \lambda_3^y \eta_1 + \epsilon_3$$

(2.6)

The intercepts of the structural and the measurement model have been omitted.

![Figure 1](https://example.com/figure1.png)

**Figure 1** The General Model for Two Latent Variables
The items are conceptualized as reflective indicators, as in confirmatory factor analysis, which means that the researcher postulates a direction of influence from the latent to the observed variable. Both the measurement model and the structural model can be generalized to take into account \( n \) indicators and \( m \) constructs. One can now differentiate between three types of parameters: (1) free parameters to be estimated from the data, such as in classical multivariate analysis; (2) fixed parameters that are set a priori to a certain value such as 0 or 1; and (3) constrained parameters that are set equal to another parameter. For estimating the coefficients, several estimation methods are available. The standard method is maximum likelihood estimation. By using this method, all the free parameters are estimated simultaneously taking into account both the fixed and the constrained parameters in the minimization of the fitting function. Other estimation methods take nonnormal distributions into account such as robustified maximum likelihood, asymptotic distribution free estimator (ADF), and weighted least squares (WLS). In addition, Bayesian estimation is possible, which allows the testing of a broader class of hypotheses and which may be more robust in smaller samples. The model testing is mostly done in at least two steps, because otherwise the necessary model modifications are too complex.

The measurement model is first tested via confirmatory factor analysis. After one has found a well-fitting measurement model, in the second step, the full structural equation model, which includes the fitted measurement model, is tested. There are three approaches for testing SEM models: (1) strictly confirmatory, (2) the use of alternative models, and (3) model generating.

1. In a strictly confirmatory situation the researcher has formulated one single model and has obtained empirical data to test it. The model should be either accepted or rejected.

2. The researcher has specified several alternative models (or competing models), and on the basis of an analysis of a single set of empirical data, one of the models should be selected.

3. In the model-generating approach, the researcher has specified a tentative initial model. If the initial model does not fit the given data, the model should be modified and tested again using the same data. The respecification of each model may be theory driven or data driven. (cf. Jöreskog, 1993)

As with classical multivariate analyses, the estimation procedure (in the standard case this is maximum likelihood estimation) provides unstandardized and standardized coefficients and standard errors and \( z \) values for the unstandardized coefficients from the estimation procedure. In addition, global- and detailed-fit measures for the specified model are provided. The global-fit measures are all some function of the chi-square, the degrees of freedom, and, in some cases, the sample size. There are descriptive measures such as the comparative fit index (CFI), probability-based ones such as the chi-square test and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and those based on information theory (e.g., Akaike's information criterion [AIC]). Cutoff values for these measures have been proposed, although there is an ongoing discussion about which ones should be used in which way.

Generally, the process of model building in SEM can be described in the steps visualized in Figure 2. It is important to understand that most specified models are in the first step falsified, and one has to modify the model according to detailed fit measures such as the modification index and the expected parameter change that together with substantive theoretical knowledge should guide the respecification of model modifications. This process corresponds to model generating (the third

![Figure 2](Image)

**Figure 2** The Process of Causal Modeling
approach) rather than model testing (the first or second approach).

The following example uses data from the British sample of the ESS, Round 1 (2002). Results of a model to explain attitude toward immigration by the two latent variables “education” and “tradition/conformity” value are reported. These relations represent the structural model. This model is specified as a partial mediation model, as education influences both values and attitude toward immigration, and the effect of education is only partially mediated by value. As a consequence, the structural model is composed of two equations for explaining the two latent endogenous variables value and immigration. “Immigration” is measured by three reflective indicators, “tradition/conformity” by four observed variables, and “education” by two. The question wordings and the unstandardized factor loadings and their standard errors are reported in Table 1; the standardized solution is reported in Figure 3. All factor loadings are significant ($p < .001$). The fit of the model is very good according to the standard criteria ($\chi^2 = 32.82$ with 24 degrees of freedom; CFI = .999; RMSEA = .013).

Figure 3 shows that the loadings of the three items to measure attitude toward immigration are all very high, indicating a high formal validity. The same is the case for the two indicators of “education.” The standardized factor loadings of the value construct “tradition/conformity” are generally lower than those of the other constructs, and they range from 0.44 to 0.72. The regression coefficient between “education” (EDU) and “tradition/conformity” (TR/CO) is significant, but weak (0.24);

### Table 1  Question Wordings and Unstandardized Factor Loadings

| Source: ESS Round 1: European Social Survey Round 1 Data (2002). Data file edition 6.1. Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway—data archive and distributor of ESS data. Results computed by the authors. |
| Notes: $\lambda =$ unstandardized factor loadings; SE = standard error of $\lambda$. |
| a. No SE is estimated because 1.0 is a fixed parameter, which is necessary for identification of the model. |
more education is associated with less agreement on the TRCO scale. The effect of education on “immigration” (IMM) (−0.34) is higher than that “TRCO” on “immigration” (−0.15). The regression coefficients on “immigrants” are partialized coefficients. Substantively, more education and more disagreement on the TRCO scale are associated with less negative attitudes toward immigration. One can see in the path diagram that “education” has not only a direct effect on “immigration” but also an indirect effect mediated by “TRCO.” Direct (−0.34) and indirect effects (0.24 multiplied by −0.15) are added as total effects (−0.38) of one variable (education) on another (immigrants). The asymptotic standard errors and bootstrapped standard errors for indirect effects and total effects and their significance levels are additionally calculated in most SEM software.

In Figure 3, one can see for the latent variables that the explained variance is 0.06 for “TRCO” and 0.17 for “immigrants.” These low numbers indicate that especially for the explanation of “TRCO,” but also for the attitude toward immigration, the relevant explanatory variables are missing.

The model can be extended as a generalized latent variable model to multiple groups or models, estimating latent means and intercepts; autoregressive, cross-lagged, latent growth curves; latent curve models; and stochastic differential equations for longitudinal/panel data, testing mediation and moderation, nonlinear models, multilevel models, and mixture models. Furthermore, it can be extended to ordinal and categorical data, where other estimation techniques are used. The latent variable approach can be embedded easily in a Bayesian framework.

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Subject Culture

Among scholars of political culture, the term subject culture signifies a specific subtype whose members are not actively participating in the central political system. The members of all political systems at all times exhibit significant differences in their orientations, attitudes, and beliefs about politics. Many of the differences depend on the inequalities in access to the political opportunities existing in these political systems. Especially, gender differences, with women disadvantaged vis-à-vis men, are clearly the product of solidly structured biases against women’s participation in politics. Many differences are also the consequence of some aspects of the processes of socialization. Finally, some of the differences simply derive from the preferences of the individuals, from their willingness to devote more or less of their time and energy to learning about politics and to taking part in political activities. Some political cultures encourage and reward political knowledge, involvement, and participation; others do not. However, differences among individuals appear in all political systems. These have been the object of quite a number of studies, mainly carried out by political anthropologists, but in the 1960s, the study of political culture became an important component of the field of political science and, more precisely, in the work of scholars attempting to explain modernization and political development.

The first major contribution to the field of political culture was made by the survey of citizens’ attitudes in five democracies performed by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. In their seminal book The Civic Culture, they explored the dense web of relationships between political attitudes and the survival/stability of Germany, Italy, Mexico, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States. The underlying hypothesis was, understandably, that there should exist significant differences in the political cultures of citizens to explain the differences in the various political systems, two of them (the United States and the UK) stable and effective democracies, two of them (Italy and Germany) democracies that had previously failed, and one (Mexico) a single-party hegemonic regime. To capture the nature and quality of the respective civic cultures, the authors identified three different orientations: cognitive, affective, and evaluational. Cognitive orientations refer to the knowledge of and the beliefs about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs and its outputs. Affective orientations are the feelings about the political system and its roles, personnel, and performance. Evaluational orientations concern the judgments and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings. Combining these orientations with aspects of the political system and its inputs, outputs, and the role of the individual in the system, Almond and Verba suggested the existence of three types of political cultures. More precisely, in a parochial political culture, individuals have no knowledge concerning the political system—that is, neither its inputs nor its outputs. By contrast, in a participant political culture, individuals know about the political system and its inputs, outputs, and the role of the individual in the system. Subjects have come to know about the political system and its actions, the outputs, but they are not familiar with how they themselves can affect the inputs and how to play a role in the political system.

All political systems contain varying combinations of individuals with parochial, subject, or
participant orientations. It makes a great difference for any political system, of course, whether any one of these three types of political culture is or has become dominant. Almond and Verba argue that there must exist and develop some congruence between political cultures and political structures. They suggest that a parochial culture is most congruent with a traditional political structure, a subject culture with a centralized authoritarian structure, and a participant culture with a democratic political structure. One could also remark that, for instance, a centralized authoritarian structure may devote some resources to the transformation of parochials into subjects, but it will certainly also pursue the goal of preventing the subjects from becoming participants. Unfortunately, the analysis by Almond and Verba did not aim at providing sharp profiles of the types of political cultures prevailing in the five political systems they had taken into consideration. Instead, they shifted their attention to the relationship between cognition, affect, and evaluation and three additional dimensions of political culture: allegiance, apathy, and alienation. However, they did not even explore whether the parochials, the subjects, and the participants were more likely to become allegiant, apathetic, or alienated. Nor did they give enough attention to the presumably differentiated impact of diverse combinations of parochials, subjects, and participants in the political culture of a democracy. Moreover, as Verba has recognized in *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Almond & Verba 1980), a dynamic view and a careful interpretation of how these processes and situations were bound to be affected by time were sorely lacking. Finally, practically none of the studies that followed their path-breaking empirical research (Lucian Pye & Sidney Verba, 1965), not even the book reappraising their original contribution, has devoted specific attention to the category of *subject* political culture.

According to Almond and Verba, two variables have a significant impact on all types of political culture: the amount of information and the level of education. In slightly different ways, of course, both the parochials and the subjects have a rather low level of education and are exposed to a limited amount of political information. Therefore, they are easily manipulated by the rulers. In a way, one can say that both information and education, increasing their political knowledge, will encourage their eventual transformation into participants. Indeed, this was the most important message conveyed by Daniel Lerner in his 1958 book, *The Passing of Traditional Society*: The revolution in communications will produce significant consequences for the political cultures of traditional societies. The most important among these consequences were thought to be the almost complete disappearance of the parochials because, inevitably, all individuals living in the same territory, under the same rulers, and affected by similar processes would become increasingly cognizant of the political system and its inputs and outputs and would probably also come to realize that they might have a role, though subordinate, to play. Even more so for the subjects, their growing knowledge of the political system and its outputs might motivate them to learn more about the way to produce inputs (demands and support) and to become personally active in politics.

Scholars studying political development have often been accused of having a teleological and ethnocentric bias in their approach—that is, of being oriented to foresee and predict for developing countries the political future already reached by Western democracies. Curiously, though, when it came to the likelihood of the transformation of political cultures, most of the same scholars were significantly more cautious. There was no explicit prediction of any possibility of a swift appearance of a widespread participant culture. On the contrary, most scholars believed that for some indefinite period of time, the majority of developing countries would suffer exactly because of the difficulty of transforming parochials and subjects into participants. In any case, in the 1960s and early 1970s, the scholarly and policy-making emphasis was placed on the need to build states and to strengthen their structures (the bureaucracy and the armed forces and, to a minor extent, representative assemblies) more than on the creation of nations, an idea not easy to export into developing countries. The analysis of the agencies and processes of socialization—families and schools—so important for the transformation of political cultures, remained of limited interest and was rarely carried out with specific commitment. That social and political movements, for instance, those active in the national liberation struggles, could exert some influence in accelerating cultural
changes, especially among those “subjects” who might become involved in their activities, was not a common theme worthy of in-depth studies.

The concept of a subject culture disappeared rather quickly from the language of scholars interested in modernization and political development. It had never made significant inroads among scholars studying political participation. The attention shifted to more precise and better manageable and researchable directions. The following three elements, interest, information, and efficacy, have been explored extensively by subsequent scholars who were specializing in the study of political participation. Nevertheless, one can still stretch the concept of subject culture to indicate the type of political culture shown by those individuals who have some interest in politics, not much information, and a very low sense of political efficacy. Their interest in the working of the political system may be stimulated only by their awareness that it affects their lives. They collect the amount of political information that seems sufficient to cope with the outputs of the political system. They are more or less painfully conscious of their inability to play a successful role in the working of the political system. With reference to the wealth of existing data on the quantity and quality of political participation in contemporary political systems, it is possible to state that, contrary to the views formulated by Almond and Verba in the 1960s, there remain significant numbers of individuals, not only in centralized authoritarian regimes but in all contemporary democratic regimes as well, whose political culture shows the features of a subject culture.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Efficacy, Political; Participation; Political Culture; Political Socialization

Further Readings


Superpower

International relations as a field of study has traditionally been defined as a science whose primary purpose has been to explain the behavior of states operating in an anarchic world where power—usually measured in terms of economic resources, military strength, and moral influence—has always been unevenly spread among its various units. How to measure power, the uses to which power is put, how states acquire and lose it, and what impact its unequally distributed character has on relations between states in the wider international system have been central issues discussed by scholars of international relations ever since Thucydides wrote his classic History of the Peloponnesian War in the 4th century BCE.

Measuring the power of states has, of necessity, created its own taxonomy. Thus, different states may be defined as great, weak, imperial, regional, global, or even—more recently—failed, largely in terms of three attributes: (1) their own set of unique capabilities, (2) the distribution of capabilities in the wider international system, and (3) their capacity to exercise control over both their own affairs and those of others. Inevitably, most attention has been paid to the actions of great powers insofar as they have exercised most influence on the international system. Thus, when the Napoleonic wars ended with France’s defeat in 1814, it was naturally assumed that the future of Europe would be shaped by at least five “great” powers: Great Britain, the Austrian Empire, Russia, Prussia, and France. A century later, it was taken for granted that the outcome of World War I


would, in the end, be determined—once again—by
the policies and capabilities of the various great
powers.

World Wars I and II

The term superpower only emerged in the period
following the “Great War” (World War I) of 1914
to 1918. Hitherto, writers had hardly used the
term, preferring instead to speak of certain states
possessing vast powers that extended well beyond
their own territory as empires. The term super-
power was thus very much a modern creation and
was first used in the early 1920s with special refer-
ence to the greatest of all modern empires—the
British Empire, with one in four people around the
world living under its flag. It then became more
commonly employed during World War II. Indeed,
the idea that the war would conclude with an
enormous concentration of power in the hands of
only three states—the British Empire, the United
States, and the former USSR—was initially mooted
by the Dutch American geostrategist Nicholas J.
Spykman, first in his 1942 study America’s Strategy
in World Politics and then 2 years later in his
short, but highly influential, book The Geography
of the Peace. Spykman was a power theorist par
excellence. But he made a clear distinction between
different kinds of power and concluded (against
the then influential arguments advanced by the
British geographer Halford Mackinder) that the
dominant global actor after the war would not be
the Soviet Union, which now controlled the
Eurasian land mass—what Mackinder termed the
heartland—but rather the United States, with its
unmatched maritime global supremacy.

The belief that the defeat of the Axis powers
would lead to the creation of a new kind of world
order dominated by “super” powers was also
advanced by William T. R. Fox, a Chicago-trained
academic who after forming part of the interna-
tional staff at the United Nations conference in San
Francisco went on to influence many up-and-
coming international relations scholars in the
United States. In his justly famous 1944 book, The
Super-Powers: The United States, Britain and the
Soviet Union—Their Responsibility for Peace, Fox
effectively helped popularize the term superpower.
Interestingly, like Spykman, he identified three (not
two) states that could lay claim to this particular
status as the war came to an end. Two of these—
the United States and the Soviet Union—had
acquired their position in the process of waging
war against Germany and Japan; the third (the
United Kingdom [UK]) had for some time been the
most extensive empire in world history. Fox, how-
ever, drew different conclusions from those of
Spykman. Spykman never believed that the three
would easily work together to ensure the peace
after the war. In his opinion, they were doomed to
compete. Fox, on the other hand, was more optim-
istic and initially hoped that the three powers
could work in concert to secure a more stable
world. Indeed, as the subtitle of his book sugges-
ted, they had a responsibility to do so.

The Cold War Period

The period between 1944 and 1950 saw a signifi-
cant change in the application, if not the meaning,
of the term superpower. This led to the deletion of
the British Empire from the original trio. Weakened
by war and increasingly dependent on the United
States in a new world order that was fast decolo-
nizing (India declared independence in 1947), it
became more and more difficult to think of the UK
as a superpower. This of course left only two
superpowers in play—the United States and the
Soviet Union. They in turn were said to be “super”
for a variety of different reasons: their sheer geo-
graphical size, their respective hard power capa-
bilities, their global reach, their pursuit of defined
missions worldwide, and their ability to shape the
policies and choices of other increasingly depen-
dent small- and medium-sized powers.

The idea that there were now only two super-
powers also gave rise to another connected idea:
bipolarity. This notion was popularized by the
most widely read international relations scholar of
the immediate postwar years: the German-born
American scholar Hans J. Morgenthau, who in
1948 spoke of a radically new world organized
around two dominant “poles” of power and
attraction. This system could quite easily conclude
in war, he feared. But as time passed, Morgenthau
began to wonder whether this bipolar interna-
tional system might even contain within itself the
basis of a more stable international order. Later,
another international relations scholar, Kenneth
Waltz, developed this argument even further. Like
Morgenthau, Waltz noted the apparent stability of the postwar order and the success of the superpowers in defying earlier predictions that the Cold War would sooner or later turn hot. This, he argued, happened in part because of nuclear weapons. But it was also a function of the bipolar distribution of power. This, he insisted, was less war prone than a system where there were many power sources (a multipolar order). He believed that error was more common in the latter system because of the difficulty of estimating accurately the power and cohesion of shifting and often unstable coalitions. In a bipolar world, on the other hand, where the two superpowers relied on their own vastly superior power for their security, coalitions were less important and so stability more likely.

As a simplifying device, the idea of a bipolar world composed of two superpowers to describe the international system after 1947 was useful enough. But it was not without its limits. Four at least deserve mention here.

One was that it could not really explain the Cold War itself. To do this, one required to look at more than just the uneven distribution and concentration of power in the world. This only provided one kind of measure. It did not necessarily explain the deeper reasons for, and unique character of, the conflict. To do this, it was necessary to examine the very different socioeconomic foundations of the two states, their opposing worldviews, and their quite different histories.

Second, the idea of a “superpower” implied a rough-and-ready equality between the two states. But as we know, from the outset—and for the duration of the Cold War—the United States was always in a superior position. This was partly for the geographical reasons originally suggested by Spykman. But it was also because its economy was larger and more productive and its allies richer and generally more willing to follow its lead than say Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were ever prepared to follow that provided by the former USSR.

Third, the notion of there being just two superpowers having the capacity to project power anywhere in the world does not explain significant alterations in the balance of power in the world after 1947. In 1950, for example, there were only two nuclear weapons states: the United States and the former USSR. By the late 1960s, however, there were five, including China, the UK, and France. In 1947, the United States was “super” in nearly every conceivable way. Twenty-five years later, it faced quite a different set of circumstances brought about by the emergence of new economic players such as Europe and Japan. Nor could the United States and the former USSR control events quite so easily as the notion of a superpower might have implied. Thus, both lost significant allies in the 1960s when China broke from the former USSR and France left the military command structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Then, in the 1970s, the United States was unceremoniously ejected from two key countries—Vietnam and Iran—while the former USSR was thrown out of Egypt. And during the next decade, the Soviet Union fought a long and unsuccessful war on its southern border in Afghanistan.

Finally, the notion of superpower really had no predictive capacity. Indeed, precisely because many scholars viewed the former USSR as a superpower, it may well have misled them into assuming it was far stronger than it turned out to be. Certainly, one of the more important reasons why so many students of international relations failed to anticipate the sudden and unexpected end to the Cold War in 1989, followed 2 years later by the collapse of the former USSR itself, was because of an attachment to a concept that ultimately proved to be more an obstacle than an asset in understanding how the Soviet Union actually worked.

1991 and After
If a superpower is a state traditionally considered to be one step higher than a great power, it remains an open question as to how we should characterize the distribution of power following the collapse of the former USSR in 1991. Clearly the world was no longer bipolar. But what kind of world was it? For a while, some predicted the rise of a new multipolar world order consisting of Japan, the newly empowered European Union, and the United States. It soon became clear, however, that this was not to be. Japan failed financially. Europe proved to be weak in efforts to end the civil war in (former) Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, the United States experienced one success after another from military victory in Iraq in 1991 through to Kosovo.
just a few years later. At the same time, the U.S. economy boomed, the Russian economy declined, and the capabilities gap between the United States and the rest of the world grew and grew.

In a world without rival (or indeed without balance) in which American values seemed to be driving all before them, it was hardly surprising that scholars and policymakers alike were drawn to the distinctly radical conclusion that we were now living in an entirely, almost unique, world order whose single most obvious characteristic was that there was only one single pole in it. This in turn raised the intriguing question of how one should then characterize the United States itself: “Superpower” seemed too weak and anyway was too much associated with a period now long since passed—namely, the Cold War. Analysts thus began to look around for new ways of defining the United States. Some, like the French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, preferred the idea of a “hyperpower,” suggesting that the United States now had unprecedented power and capacity. Others were attracted to the notion of hegemony, implying that the United States had not only enormous power but also a capacity to lead and inspire others. A few writers, however, began to define the United States as a new form of liberal Empire—a new Rome on the Potomac, as one observer put it—which, even if it did not seek to acquire other people’s territory, did what all empires have done in the past: It shaped the choices of others and defined the rules of the game while punishing those who did not play by them.

By the beginning of the 21st century, therefore, the term superpower was no longer much used. Indeed, according to many thinkers, the very term had little value in trying to explain international politics in an increasingly interdependent world composed of several actors often facing challenges that did not necessarily arise from the possession of vast concentrations of power. Some even suggested that the distribution of power had changed so much in the first 10 years of the new millennium that it would be quite meaningless to think of the world in terms of any kind of superpower determination. That age, it was argued, was now past.

Yet the idea did not die away entirely. On the contrary, as America’s fortunes began to fade and those of China started to rise, many began to view the emerging international order in increasingly superpower, possibly even bipolar, terms. China may have been no Soviet Union. Still, its potential was huge and its ambitions global. Nor was it the only potential superpower on the scene seeking to compete with the United States. Europe, and perhaps India in time, could also lay some claim to being, or over time becoming, superpowers of a sort. Policymakers certainly seemed to think so and, while talking the cooperative language of globalization and global governance, continued to act in ways that would have been easily recognizable to policymakers from a bygone age. The Cold War with all its ideological baggage might have been over. The market may have also triumphed. But very powerful states, or groupings of states, with serious capabilities, international ambitions, and a desire to mould the future, still sought to determine the way the world looked. Even if one kind of superpower rivalry had concluded by the beginning of the 1990s, nearly 20 years later, it very much looked as if another was just starting to take shape.

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See also Balance of Power; Bipolarity and Multipolarity; Hegemony; Power and International Politics

Further Readings
The concept of political support was initially devised by David Easton in the context of his theory of political systems. According to Easton (1965), political systems have inputs and outputs, with inputs taking the form of demands and support. Political support occurs when “A acts on behalf of B or when he orients himself favorably toward B” (p. 159). A more precise definition was provided by this author in a later work where he defines political support as the “way in which a person evaluative orients himself to some object through either his attitudes or his behaviour” (1975, p. 436). Easton develops a multidimensional conceptualization of political support in which he distinguishes both between the objects of support and the types of support. Within the first, he differentiates from each other support for three distinct objects: the political community, the regime, and the authorities. Within types, he distinguishes between two: specific and diffuse.

As important as it has been for the study of political attitudes, Easton’s conceptualization of political support has been seen by some as unclear and has led to much research that has been criticized as ambiguous, confusing, and noncumulative. Different understandings of Easton’s original arguments have led to a variety of schemes, approaches, and indicators that have aimed to capture the different dimensions of political support. There is no consensus on how exactly Easton’s ideas should be empirically assessed. Long-standing debates among scholars have concentrated not only on which are the best ways to measure the different dimensions empirically but also on what the evidence gathered thus far has meant.

**Objects of Political Support**

An initial distinction put forward by Easton deals with the classification of the different objects toward which political support might be extended. According to him, support is fed into the political system in relation to three basic objects, which he orders in a scale of abstractness. At one extreme lies the most intangible or “abstract” object: the political community, or nation. At the other extreme lies the most immediate, concrete object: the political authorities. Between the poles lies a third object of support: the regime, or the “rules of the game,” that allow a political system to be maintained. Easton warns that the fact that support for a political system can be broken down into three elements does not mean that support for each one of these objects is independent of the others. Many times the three kinds of support are closely interrelated, so that the presence of one is a function of the presence of one or both of the other kinds.

Authors such as Pippa Norris and Russell Dalton have followed Easton’s line in differentiating certain objects of support that are more generalized from others that are more concrete. Both authors offer refined versions of Easton’s classification of objects of political support, in which they argue about the need to differentiate between three different components of the political regime: regime principles, performance, and institutions. Along these lines, they suggest and empirically confirm a five-dimensional structure that includes as objects the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political authorities. John Booth and Mitchell Seligson have confirmed through factor analysis that a similar structure is operating in several Latin American
democracies, with the addition of a sixth dimension that reflects attitudes toward local government.

**Diffuse and Specific Political Support**

Besides classifying the objects of political support, Easton (1975) distinguishes between two kinds of support, specific and diffuse, which are of different natures and have different implications for the political system. On the one hand, specific support is described as the type related to the “satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities” (p. 437). On the other hand, diffuse support refers to “evaluations of what an object is or represents—to the general meaning it has for a person—not of what it does” (p. 444). Thus, specific support is the temporary and relatively ephemeral acceptance or approval that citizens express for a political object as a result of its satisfaction of their specific demand; whereas diffuse support is conceived of as a deeper, more enduring, and more generalized political loyalty resulting from early-life political socialization and, therefore, is more immune to short-term inducements, rewards, or performance evaluations.

This distinction is an important contribution. Specific support can be object specific in two ways: In the first place, people are assumed to be capable of being aware of the political authorities working on behalf of the system; in the second place, it takes into account the perceived decisions, policies, actions, utterances, and style of the authorities. In this sense, members of a political system can perform a rational calculation of whether the authorities’ actions address their needs and demands. Under such conditions, specific support, which can only exist in societies whose institutions allow authorities to be held accountable for their actions and the resulting consequences, will fluctuate according to people’s perceived benefits and satisfactions. Diffuse support instead hinges on the general meaning given to political objects and is defined as a “reservoir of favorable attitudes” that members of a given political system possess, which allow them to overlook outputs that do not benefit their wants. It is more durable than specific support and more resistant to or even independent of sudden epiphenomena such as policy outputs and performance. This support also remains, despite the ups and down in outputs and beneficial performances. While diffuse support may change, it is difficult to weaken when strong and to strengthen when weak. Rooted in early socialization and experience, diffuse support might be generated and fostered independent of the fulfillment of particular needs and demands by the authorities.

**The Problem of the Multidimensionality of Political Support**

Most research has interpreted Easton’s conceptualization as a unidimensional axis that ranges from specific to diffuse support, along which the different political objects are arrayed (Figure 1) (Norris, 1999). In this conception, support for each political object is given a level of specificity/diffuseness, implying that specific and diffuse support do not represent distinct kinds that could be extended toward every political object. This approach has been criticized by other readers of Easton such as Mariano Torcal and José R. Montero (2006) for its simplicity, which has given birth to an excessively
broad concept of support, which “empirically works as a sort of umbrella under which different dimensions are not differentiated” (p. 10).

The latest refinements to the multidimensional understanding of political support have been developed by Dalton (2004) and by Torcal and Montero (2006). These authors have argued that the correct interpretation of Easton’s theory implies that every political object is subject to both specific and diffuse support. Thus, a multidimensional structure of political support is devised, where objects may be subject to both diffuse and specific support at the same time (Figure 2). This view does not imply that support for a political object, in every context, will be a combination of both specific and diffuse support. What it means is that each political object should be “addressed alternately or jointly by both diffuse and specific support” (Torcal & Montero, 2006, p. 9).

**Measurement and Hypothesis Testing Problems**

The disagreements over the multidimensional nature of political support have been extended to debates regarding the appropriate ways of measuring it. No consensus has been reached among scholars on which are the best indicators for capturing the different components of political support. Furthermore, discussions regarding what the indicators aiming to measure specific and diffuse support have meant date back to the 1970s, when scholars debated whether the increasing levels of discontent shown in surveys reflected attitudes toward the incumbents or toward the regime. Almost 40 years later, the debate is still open. Indicators that have been used to measure political support have been criticized severely and recurrently for their problems of validity. For instance, it is still common to measure regime support (both specific and diffuse) with satisfaction with democratic functioning, an indicator highly contaminated by incumbent support, which in a way is reproducing the 1970s debate between Jack Citrin and Arthur Miller, reaching again the same inconclusive results.

Dalton (2004) has warned about the difficulties on drawing fine theoretical distinctions when aiming to measure the different components of political support. In fact, there are doubts about the efficiency of empirical research when trying to isolate the different types of support, as public sentiments can blend adjacent orientations and indicators of public support frequently overlap between levels. Despite the obstacles in measuring the different components of political support, Dalton argues that it is important to depart from a multidimensional framework, as “public orientations towards different objects of support carry different political implications” (p. 7). Therefore, he proposes different indicators to measure specific and diffuse support for each different political object, leaving aside the frequent assumption, discussed before, that each political object contains by definition a level of specificness/diffuseness. However, this approach, although not too critical of Easton’s theoretical proposal, does contain a problematic assumption: It assigns an a priori meaning of specificity or diffuseness to different survey indicators for each political object. Some critics or researchers argue, instead, that the level of conditional (specific) and unconditional support (diffuse) can only be estimated by assessing empirically the role of different variables in explaining political support for each political object. Support
is specific, and therefore conditional, when it can be explained by variables such as ideological preferences, party preferences, underlying values, or satisfaction with the economic or social performance. Support becomes diffuse, and therefore unconditional, when neither of these factors influences the level of individual support in a significant way.

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See also Democracy, Theories of; Democratic Consolidation; Legitimacy; Systems Theory

Further Readings

Survey Research

Survey research is a method of measurement based on the systematic collection of information from a sample of members of a population. This sample is only a fraction of the population of interest. It represents the whole population by the way it is selected. Conclusions about the total population are reached through a process of statistical inference.

Samples can be drawn of anything whose properties can be defined and, therefore, can be made of many types of populations, such as persons, products, institutions, organizations, or events. The most familiar surveys are those taken from persons about their opinions using a structured questionnaire. This entry is mostly about survey research of human populations. In the United States and other English-speaking countries, surveys are also called polls. There is no precise distinction between these terms and there are no significant methodological differences between polls and surveys. The term survey is frequently used when speaking of polls done by academic institutions, and polls are surveys reported in the media. The first part of this entry describes the general scientific bases of survey research and offers an overview of the principal aspects involved in the design of surveys. The second part gives an account of the key moments in the evolution of survey research. The third part describes the principal contributions of survey research to the social sciences along with some criticisms.

Scientific Bases of Survey Research

Survey research is based on sampling techniques founded on probability theory. People attribute different meanings to the concept of probability. Most often it is interpreted as the relative frequency of events, such as the number of red or black cards in a deck. Its precise meaning is centered on the concept of a “normal distribution.” The most important characteristic of the normal distribution is that even when the actual values of a variable do not have a normal distribution, the mean of that variable estimated from a large sample can be regarded as having come from a normal distribution of sample means. This is what the central limit theorem states. If researchers draw a large number of independent random samples of any variable, the mean value of the means obtained in each of the random samples will be close to the actual mean of the population. Moreover, they will be able to calculate the standard error of the mean. Hence, researchers can draw samples of populations and infer that the mean of the variables observed will be close to the mean of the population with a known margin of error.

Good, reliable surveys follow basic scientifically founded rules to select the sample of the population.
to be studied. First, the researcher has to precisely define the population he or she wants to study. The sample of individuals to be interviewed is selected in such a way that every member of the total population has a not necessarily equal, but a known, chance of selection. If all members of the total population have the same chance to be selected, every individual in the sample represents the same number of persons in the population. These are self-weighted samples. If the selected individuals have different chances of being selected, weights are used to estimate the number of persons in the population they represent.

Any bias in the selection of the sample would produce distorted measurements. Errors of selection come from many sources, but selection errors are frequently produced when the researcher has some preconceived ideas about the individuals he or she wants to select—for instance, when the researcher looks for typical or relevant individuals of a population, when the poll depends on volunteer or easy-to-contact subjects, or when interviewers are asked to look in the field for some specific type of subjects. A random selection of a sample, such as choosing a specific number of persons from a list using random numbers or selecting every n-th number of persons from the list, minimizes selection biases. The designer of a survey can improve the accessibility of the sample-selecting groups of individuals that can be found in the same location or area, in clusters of individuals, such as electoral precincts, counties, or neighborhoods. This technique is known as area probability sampling. The survey designer can also subdivide the population into more homogeneous subparts, known as strata, to improve the quality and accessibility of the samples. This technique is known as stratification. For instance, in an electoral study, the researcher can select in the first stage a sample of precincts from a total list of polling areas, a list that was previously divided according to turnout and voting behavior. In the second stage, the researcher selects households within each of the precincts selected following a systematic method, such as every other household starting where the voting site is installed. In the third stage, the interviewer selects the persons to be interviewed following some almost random method of selection, such as asking for the person with the most recent birthday.

When a sample is selected following these basic rules—that is, if it is truly probabilistic—it will be unbiased and will therefore reproduce the characteristics of the total population within a known margin of error. In the electoral example, the aggregate vote of the sampled precincts should be very close to the actual vote in previous elections, and the sociodemographic characteristics of the population interviewed would be very similar to the total population. In other words, once aggregated, the statistics obtained from the sample will reproduce the actual parameters of the population with a known margin of error.

The adequate size of a sample does not depend on the extent of the total population. The decision on the size of a survey is always a delicate balance between the value of the additional information and the cost to obtain it, but ultimately, the designer of the study has to determine the lowest number of cases on which he or she is willing to generalize from the sample to the total population and the size of the error he or she is willing to accept. In any case, as the size of the sample is increased, its quality improves, but at some point, any increase in size produces very limited gains in quality. Common sample sizes for national or regional studies usually vary between 1,200 and 2,500 cases, but if the designer of the study wants to generalize about something of very low occurrence, say some rare illness, he or she would get very few cases with these sizes. For instance, imagine that only 3% of the population has been infected by the H1N1 virus at some moment. In a well-designed survey of 1,000 cases, the researcher would generalize about the infected population based on only 30 cases, a very small number.

Surveys are interviews with the individuals of the sampled population using a structured questionnaire. The interview with the sampled individuals can be done by an interviewer or can be self-administered. Individuals can be interviewed in person or by telephone. Wherever the extent of telephone lines is not significantly biased toward the upper-level economic strata, the telephone is the preferred way to interview. The new information technologies offer new forms of interviews. Self-administered interviews are questionnaires to be filled out that were given to the sampled population directly or sent via e-mail or the Internet. In
some cases, surveys can be done using more than one mode of interview, but the sample has to be very carefully designed, and the researcher should be aware that the mode of interview can have some effects on the results that the researcher must take into account.

The design of the questionnaire is another fundamental aspect. Questions should produce good, unbiased, and objective information. The questions in a survey should answer what the designer of the study wants to know and should be equally accessible to all respondents. For some topics, the researcher asked could produce something called social desirability biases, simply because they are embarrassing, or because the respondent might be afraid to reveal what he or she assumes to be “bad” behavior. Some questions might be simply deliberately biased because they include approval of means and results, what is known as double-barreled questions. The order of the questions in a questionnaire should be also carefully designed, because some questions might lead to the answers of the following questions.

The biggest challenge to survey research is the problem of nonresponse. Even if the sample and the questionnaire are carefully designed, and the field execution of the actual process of data collection is done by well-trained professional interviewers and close supervision, people can refuse to participate or not answer the questions asked in the survey. In some environments, the intense use of polls by the media has resulted in an increasing number of refusals to participate. Survey research is based on the information provided by those who participated in the survey. Based on the random selection of the sample, in survey research, it is assumed that those who refused to participate or did not answer some of the questions are not substantially different from those who participated, except for their unwillingness to participate. This may be a sound assumption, but ultimately there is no way to be sure about it, since the researcher does not have actual information from the nonrespondents. Consistent trends in public opinion data or the rationality of actual changes in these trends and other indicators show that the assumption about nonresponse is sound, but surveys with very large numbers of nonresponse should be read with some degree of skepticism.

### Information Obtained in Surveys

Surveys can produce factual or perceptual information. The objective information can be actual facts of different matters such as how many individuals in the sampled population are employed or unemployed, the extent of the audience of a TV program, the number of years a person attended school, or the types of goods the family owns or uses. They can also measure past or present behavioral experiences, such as cigarette consumption, crime victimization, or use of public transportation. Likely future behavior can also be measured, but there is a general consensus that polls are not a very good instrument to do this. The typical electoral forecasts are based on questions about the vote preference of the respondent at the moment of the interview, and a typical error in predicting the election results usually comes from late changes in preferences that surveys might fail to register.

Perceptual information can measure attitudes or opinions, such as the evaluation of the job performance of different authorities, the state of the economy, or opinions about some general topics or issues. Attitudes are positive or negative orientations toward objects, persons, governments, institutions, public policies, or party programs. Surveys can measure not only the prevalence of the attitudes explored but also their intensity. Preferences based on comparisons of attitudes are also measured in surveys. Comparisons of candidates, parties, specific public policies, or general orientations toward them are frequently obtained from the public in surveys of all kinds. People have opinions or perceptions about the objective state of the world. For the researcher who measures these beliefs, it is not relevant if the belief is true or not, the relevant finding is that a population thinks that the state of affairs at a given moment is as they describe it. Many times, perceptions about the state of the economy or crime are not in correspondence with actual reality. As in the case of attitudes, surveys can measure how important these beliefs are for the public.

A survey taken at some particular moment produces a cross-sectional measure of the value of variables at the moment of the interview. Many variables are constantly measured, resulting in extremely useful longitudinal studies that show changes and continuities. If these continuous measurements are obtained from differently sampled
individuals, they can show changes over time in the mean values of the variables studied, but conclusions about the behavior of the individuals would be unfounded. The researcher would have to interview the same individuals over time to come to sound conclusions about the individual’s changes of behavior. These are panel studies with specific methodologies.

**Development of Survey Research**

Survey research evolved gradually from various social needs. A survey is any comprehensive view or appraisal of any population. In this broad sense, surveys have probably been done since the first tax collectors valued the extent and resources of their desired contributors. Actually, the first evidences of written language are records of commercial transactions and of tax or tribute payers. In the Middle Ages, poll began to mean “head” and acquired the contemporary meaning of taxing. In the 16th century, every Spanish conquistador was always accompanied by an accountant in charge of the survey of the conquered territories. These tax collectors produced hundreds of invaluable surveys of the “New World,” first recovering the tax records of the Indian authorities where available and later carrying out their own appraisals. The Industrial Revolution created a complex set of new social problems and the need to understand them. There are records of some surveys that were done on different matters such as poverty, education, and health in many of the countries that are now called industrialized or developed. In the newly independent national states, the need to create new tax rolls kept tax collectors busy.

These were enterprises of data collection that attempted to survey the entire population of interest. The evolution of surveys based on fractions of the populations took longer to become the common practice of today. The desire to predict the results of upcoming elections has been a constant incentive in the development of survey research. Besides the value that the news media attribute to these forecasts, particularly in presidential systems, electoral predictions based on surveys offer the rare if not unique opportunity to evaluate ex post the accuracy of the polls on which they are based. The first of these surveys were the so-called straw polls that some newspapers in the United States conducted to predict the winner of upcoming elections. It is generally agreed that the first such poll was taken in the summer of 1824 by the *Harrisburg Pennsylvanian* in the election between Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams. Other straw polls were done in the 19th century, and at least nine newspapers and magazines published the results of straw polls for different state and presidential elections in the first quarter of the 20th century. The newspapers obtained the information to do their prediction by various methods. In some cases, the newspaper printed a ballot for some period of time and asked its readers to cut it and mail it back to the journal. Others polled citizens attending political meetings or in selected areas.

From 1916 through 1932, the magazine *Literary Digest* predicted the outcomes of the U.S. presidential elections correctly but missed in 1936 with data obtained with its well-known straw poll. At every presidential election, the *Literary Digest* mailed millions of ballots some time before the elections to a mail list taken from the telephone directories of state car registrations. In 1936, the magazine announced that the Republican candidate Allan Landon was expected to obtain 57% of the national vote. He obtained 38.5%. This fiasco marked the demise of the straw polls. Regardless of the occasional accuracy of some of the predictions estimated with the data obtained with this form of data collection, the ballots were tabulated ignoring the implicit biases involved in the way the respondents were selected. The mail list used by the *Literary Digest* magazine was clearly biased to upper-income households, and the magazine received information only from those who were willing to respond to the poll. They assumed in aggregating the results that car owners willing to respond represented the entire population. In other words, the researcher assumed that the participants in the poll had the same chance of selection as those who did not participate in the survey, either because they were not contacted or because they refused to answer. These nonresponse biases favored the most committed Republicans, resulting in the mistaken estimate. These were typically what we call now nonprobabilistic samples.

By the 1930s, vast changes in the production and in the marketing of goods and services started to develop. New information about the markets and the demands of consumers was needed, and
market research appeared to satisfy it. A long tradition of social statistics supplied in Western Europe the needs of this new market research, while in the United States, data collection based on surveys became a common practice, and survey research received a substantial impulse that has prevailed until today. By the end of World War I, many large manufacturers and advertisement media had market research groups, and new firms began to offer market and consumer information to their clients; among them were those founded by Elmo Roper and George Gallup. They adopted the methods of market research to measure public attitudes and, in fact, created today’s public opinion polls. In July 1935, Fortune magazine published the first Fortune poll produced by Roper, and in October, Gallup published the first Gallup poll as a syndicated service to 35 newspapers and magazines.

The methodologies used by this new industry were closer to the scientific standards of the methods in use today but insufficient to produce unbiased results. Usually, respondents were contacted and interviewed either in clusters of neighborhoods or in places of great attendance of visitors such as commercial plazas. To try to prevent biases in the data collected, researchers selected very diverse points of interview, and interviewers were asked to complete predefined sociodemographic quotas in such a way that the aggregate would resemble the strata defined in the population census.

Another big fiasco marked again the change in methodologies and the real incorporation of the probability principles to the selection of the sampled population. Polls had predicted with great accuracy the U.S. presidential elections of 1940 and 1944, but in 1948, the three major producers of electoral forecasts, George Gallup, Elmo Roper, and Archibald Crossley predicted a substantial victory for Thomas E. Dewey over Harry S. Truman who was the actual winner by a comfortable margin of more than four points. Hearings were called by the House of Representatives to discuss the big mistake, and the Social Science Research Council produced a study of the major polls. The study pinpointed various reasons for the error, but the most important in terms of the adoption of better sampling methods pointed to the persistence of selection biases associated with the quota sampling in use. Instead of following loose quota samples, the industry began to assign interviewers to specific areas previously selected through a random process. As the installation of telephone lines dramatically expanded, interviewing respondents over the phone became the most common form of contact and interview. Respondents were selected through a process known as random digital dialing where the researchers do not need lists or directories since the lines are selected automatically following random processes. Survey research expanded all over through market research and government production of social studies and economic data. As large producers or marketing companies entered new territories, local market research began to be demanded, and local industries emerged. Gallup opened local offices in many places, and by the outbreak of World War II, public opinion polling was a common practice in most democratic societies.

**Perspectives of Survey Research**

Public acceptance of surveys varies constantly. Big flaws, such as those that still occur in electoral forecasts, produce widespread criticism and disappointment. During political campaigns, when polls tend to be more present in the media, criticism increases, and the idea that polls influence voters is frequently expressed. The use of polls as a source of information for politicians to craft their messages has become a constant source of criticism of survey research. The media, particularly broadcast media, play an increasingly important role in politics today. Image and constructed messages prevail in the public arena. A new breed of political consultants has emerged to polish the image of politicians and to construct their messages. These consultants struggle to tune their designs to public opinion based on polls and surveys. Critics claim that this use of survey research leads to the trivialization of democracy and that it manipulates the desires and choices of the public.

These are serious criticisms, but survey research has produced many positive things as well. The electronic and printed media routinely report public sentiments on a wide variety of issues and closely follow electoral campaigns. This common practice in established democracies set in later in younger democracies, but in the long run, the use of survey research to monitor governments and elections developed together with the consolidation of democratic practices. This intensive use of
Survey Research Modes

Systematic surveys of the opinions, attitudes, and behavior of human populations are one of the major inventions of 20th-century social science research. Although survey research has its origins in the pre–World War II era, in the late 1940s, social scientists began to conduct high-quality survey research on a regular basis. Since that time, surveys have become a staple of social science research, and data generated by such studies are used by thousands of scholars around the world. These data are gathered in a variety of ways, which methodologists call survey modes. In the early 21st century, major survey modes are in-person interviews, telephone interviews, self-completion questionnaires, and Internet questionnaires. Below, these modes and their respective advantages and disadvantages are discussed in greater detail.

In-Person Interviews

The in-person or face-to-face interview occupies a preeminent position in scientific survey research. Such interviews typically are carried out in respondents’ homes, although, historically, survey firms (“houses”) have used other venues as well. In-person interviews have been a major data collection method for decades. In-person interviews allow researchers to ask complex questions and receive immediate feedback from respondents. They are also flexible, allowing researchers to adapt the interview to the respondent’s pace and comfort level.

In-person interviews have some drawbacks, however. They can be costly and time-consuming, especially when field staff must travel long distances to conduct interviews. In-person interviews are also subject to the potential for interviewer bias, as interviewers may unintentionally influence respondents’ answers. Furthermore, in-person interviews may not be suitable for obtaining data from certain populations, such as those with limited mobility or language abilities.

Telephone Interviews

Telephone interviews have become a popular alternative to in-person interviews. They are less expensive and can be conducted over a wider geographic area. Telephone interviews also have the advantage of allowing respondents to answer questions at their own pace and in a private setting.

Self-Completion Questionnaires

Self-completion questionnaires, also known as mail surveys, are a popular method for collecting data. Respondents are sent a questionnaire in the mail, and they complete and mail it back. This method is relatively inexpensive and can be used to reach a large number of people in a short amount of time.

Internet Questionnaires

Internet questionnaires have become increasingly popular in recent years. They allow researchers to reach a large and diverse audience, as they can be accessed from anywhere with an internet connection. Internet questionnaires can also be automated, allowing researchers to efficiently collect large amounts of data.

Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian

Survey Research Modes

Further Readings


collection device since the inception of survey research and—when used in conjunction with probability samples of populations of interest—still are considered by many scholars to be the gold standard for valid and reliable measurement. The claim is that experienced, well-trained interviewers doing in-person surveys can gather higher quality data than would be possible using any other data-gathering mode. Working in the face-to-face mode, interviewers can build rapport and trust with respondents, thereby minimizing social desirability biases that threaten data quality. Also, although in-person surveys have a long history, they are not technically primitive. Using computer-assisted personal interview techniques, sophisticated experiments can be conducted without recourse to a researcher’s lab. Data can be e-mailed back immediately from the field to project headquarters, ensuring the close and continuous monitoring of a survey’s progress.

Despite its virtues, the face-to-face mode has significant drawbacks that have prompted some researchers to consider alternative data collection modes. One very serious problem is the high cost. National surveys with large probability samples have become extremely expensive, and their cost is escalating rapidly. Another problem is declining response rates. Although some major in-person surveys continue to have very high response rates, others have experienced a sizable erosion in the percentage of people willing to participate.

**Telephone Interviews**

Starting in the 1980s, social scientists and commercial pollsters reacted to these emerging problems by employing computer-assisted telephone interview methods, with probability samples chosen by random digit dialing procedures. In addition to their relatively low cost, these surveys can be conducted quickly, with fieldwork completed in a fraction of the time needed for a face-to-face study. This is a very important consideration for researchers interested in monitoring the dynamics of public opinion. Using telephone interviewing techniques, researchers can conduct daily interviews with random subsets (replicates) of larger samples to produce fine-grained portraits of the evolving public mood during national election campaigns. Yet another desirable feature is that telephone interviewing facilitates survey experiments.

These pluses notwithstanding, the attractiveness of the telephone mode has faded in recent years. Response rates have fallen substantially, with implications that are not yet well understood. Although some studies suggest that the impact of low response rates on data quality is not particularly pernicious, deleterious effects may vary by subject matter. Coverage problems are also increasing as people abandon landline telephones for cell phones that are not reached using traditional techniques. And there is emerging evidence of an enhanced social desirability bias relative to other modes.

**Self-Completion Questionnaires**

Another survey mode is the self-completion, mail back questionnaire. A cover letter, a printed questionnaire, and a self-addressed return envelope are mailed to a list of potential respondents. If the names and addresses of a population of interest are available, a researcher can draw a probability sample and deploy the standard machinery of statistical inference. The self-completion mail back questionnaire also can be used in conjunction with an in-person survey, with the questionnaire being given to respondents after they have completed a face-to-face interview. The interviewer can wait while the respondent fills out the questionnaire or request that it be returned later.

Self-completion questionnaires have enormous cost advantages relative to in-person and telephone interviews. In Australia and New Zealand, national election studies have been conducted quite effectively using mail back questionnaires. The British Election Study and the British Social Attitudes surveys cut costs and expanded their data collections by having interviewers deliver supplementary self-completion questionnaires to respondents when face-to-face surveys were conducted. The response rates for these surveys have been very good. However, the overall report card for self-completion surveys is not stellar. Researchers using this mode typically find that response rates are mediocre to dismal unless careful attention is paid to the incentives needed to secure participation by members of particular study populations.
Internet Surveys

Over the past 2 decades, a new mode, the Internet survey, has become increasingly popular. Internet surveys have several attractive features. Total cost is typically at least an order of magnitude less than that for a comparable in-person survey, and the marginal cost of increasing the sample size is extremely low. These cost advantages make it possible to do extremely large-N surveys and to employ multiple waves of data collection to track individual-level dynamics. Low costs also mean that multiple surveys on the same topic can be fielded simultaneously or in rapid succession, thereby making replication a realistic possibility. There is more. Speed is spectacular, and the reach is global; Internet surveys have the ability to enter and exit from the field in countries around the world in a matter of hours. In addition, with the spread of high-speed broadband connections, sophisticated experiments involving a variety of audio and visual stimuli are realistic options.

These exciting features notwithstanding, Internet surveys are controversial. A major sticking point is the failure of the vast majority of Internet surveys to employ probability samples. The reason is a lack of Internet sampling frames for populations of interest. In pioneering work in the 1980s, the Dutch social scientist Willem Saris addressed this problem by recruiting a panel of Internet respondents via initial telephone contact. The Internet coverage problem—that is, that some potential respondents lacked a computer—was handled by giving them one. Saris’s methodology was subsequently adopted by the American firm Knowledge Networks. Although the Saris methodology initially seemed to be a sound method for obtaining a probability sample of Internet respondents, it was only as good as the obtained telephone sample. With telephone surveys suffering from declining response rates and increasing coverage problems, the quality of an Internet panel recruited by telephone cannot be assumed. A related problem may be long-term panel retention.

Other Internet survey researchers do not attempt to recruit a traditional probability sample. For example, the British survey house YouGov draws stratified random samples from a huge list of people that it has recruited to its master Internet panel by a variety of non–probability-based methods. Poststratification weights based on demographic characteristics, media consumption patterns, and political partisanship are used to improve sample representativeness. YouGov’s U.S. partner, Polimetrix, employs an innovative respondent selection technique in which people chosen at random from large-scale surveys using high-quality probability samples are matched with participants in its enormous PollingPoint panel on several demographic and political characteristics. The panelist with the closest match to the person from the probability sample is then sent an Internet survey. Polimetrix argues that its matched sample estimates outperform poststratification weighting procedures and have a sampling distribution similar to that used for simple random samples. Yet another innovative approach has been developed by George Terhanian of Harris International, who uses a propensity score matching technique to select respondents for Harris’s Internet surveys.

Some analyses of the quality of the data produced by these non–probability-based Internet surveys indicate that they can produce results comparable with high-quality probability surveys. For example, the marginal distributions for key variables in the Internet component of the 2005 British Election Study are very similar to those produced by the traditional in-person survey. Perhaps, more important, the vast majority of parameters for models of electoral choice estimated using the two data sets are statistically indistinguishable. YouGov has experienced great success in predicting vote shares in recent British elections; there are similarly encouraging results for U.S. survey data gathered as part of the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. However, other studies conducted using U.S. data, particularly those by Jon Krosnick and his colleagues, report significant differences between results of analyses of Internet data gathered using panels of respondents recruited by non–probability means and data gathered using either in-person interviews or Internet questionnaires administered to national probability samples.

These discrepant findings are part of the larger, very lively debate concerning the advantages and disadvantages of various modes of survey research. As this debate unfolds, considerations of cost-effectiveness, representativeness, sample size, speed of data collection, and possibilities for sophisticated experimentation and replication will be key factors that analysts weigh when deciding which
survey mode is best able to accomplish their particular research goals.

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See also Cross-National Surveys; Interviewing; Public Opinion; Sampling, Random and Nonrandom; Survey Research

Further Readings

Sustainable Development

Sustainable development was famously defined in the 1987 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (The Brundtland Report) as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Long accepted as a guiding notion aimed at reconciling developmental and environmental concerns, the concept has been criticized as being based on the anthropocentric notion of nature as a resource requiring expert human management. Others point out that this is too closely linked with notions of capital-intensive economic development to be of any use in the formulation of an alternative environmental vision that can restore the balance in human interaction with the ecosphere.

Proponents and detractors of the concept agree that it is a vague notion that can be interpreted in divergent ways, depending on whether the emphasis is placed on development or on resource sustainability, on economic development only, or on broader notions of human development. Despite the appropriateness of these and other criticisms, there is no evidence that the concept is soon to lose its privileged position in the national and international politics of development and the environment.

Development refers to the process of increasing people’s welfare. The welfare of a group ultimately depends on the extent and quality of stock of all natural and human assets in their economy—commonly referred to as wealth. The notion of sustainable development reminds us that current changes in wealth must have consequences for welfare in the future of both the current generation and generations to come. Attempts to increase people’s welfare must therefore be accompanied by genuine savings in wealth: the offsetting of resource depletion and environmental degradation, limiting exhaustible resource exports, protecting critical natural capital, and maintaining and increasing investment in human resources.

Intergenerational and Global Inequality

Sustainable development’s biggest contribution is to broaden the scope of ethical thinking to include future generations among those to whom we owe obligations. It also holds important consequences for the practices of national accounting and for issues of global governance. Appreciation of the importance of genuine savings implies that we have to look anew at national accounts and indicators of development. Analysts have long agreed that national production and income figures provide little evidence of the fundamentals of development, as they indicate only how successfully the current generation is exploiting resources. With its measure of human development the United Nations (UN) Development Programme and its annual Human Development Reports have attempted to introduce a broader and intergenerational measure of development by combining data about education and health with national production/income figures. However, the literature on sustainable development prescribes that we also consider how countries manage their natural and human
resources with an eye to the future. Income ratios between the rich and poor have converged in recent decades (according to some measures and in some parts of the world) and infant mortality is declining across the majority of countries. There is also a perceptible narrowing of average human development index scores over time in the cross-sectional data. Some analysts take this as indicative of a narrowing of inequality between countries (which is only one but a very important dimension of the phenomenon of global inequality). However, when we measure in what shape the production processes and social policies of the industrial era have left the human and natural resource base of many parts of the world, it is clear that a devastating global divide is widening between those parts of the world where genuine savings have kept pace with population growth and those where fertility increasingly outstrips genuine savings. The evolution of this genuine savings divide is a tale of the misuse of power and the generation of privilege and of marginalization, and it places humankind before one of its most daunting policy and moral challenges: how to reduce global poverty and inequality now without exacerbating both in the future. Unfortunately, the international politics of sustainable development makes it unlikely that we will be able to meet that challenge anytime soon.

**Sustainable Development and International Politics**

From its inception, the term *sustainable development* has had a bearing on international politics. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the newly independent industrializing countries of the South started to use UN resources to frame their needs for economic modernization in terms of the structural inequities of the global economy. The emerging green political revolution in the industrialized states, precipitated by reports of imminent resource scarcity, compelled leaders of the rich North to focus on possible causal links between economic modernity and environmental degradation. In contrast, John Vogler argues, the leaders of the South coalition in global affairs saw their own rapid economic modernization, supported by generous official development assistance from the industrialized North, as the solution for the interrelated problems of poverty and environmental degradation.

These diverging conceptions of the relationship between development and protection of the environment were carried into the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm but were largely left unresolved. Nevertheless, Stockholm led to the mainstreaming of environmental concerns both internationally and nationally and precipitated, among others, the formation of the UN Environment Programme and the creation of departments of environmental affairs in many countries. It was only with the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987 and the UN Conference on the Environment and Development (Rio “Earth Summit”) of 1992 that it became possible diplomatically to strike a tenuous balance between the interests of the North and the South. The concept of “sustainable development”—first popularized in the Brundtland Report and then institutionalized at Rio with the creation of the Commission for Sustainable Development—persuaded the leaders of the South that after the end of the Cold War development issues were to be placed at the center of world attention. When the Rio Declaration and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—two of the major outcomes of Rio—formulated the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” the long-standing resource concerns of the South also seemed to be alleviated. On the other hand, the term *sustainable development* and its operationalization at Rio also came as a bonus for the leaders of the North, as it allowed them to satisfy the demands of their increasingly environmentally conscious electorates to mainstream environmental issues; to build up domestic modi vivendi between agriculture, business, and environmental activists; and to attempt to add environmental standards as a new weapon in their protectionist armor.

**Problems and Future Prospects**

While the normative framework of sustainable development continues to be the focal point on which global environmental and developmental regimes converge, it appears as if the underlying bargain that was struck at Rio is eroding. Bitterly disappointed by the failure of the North to live up to its resource-sharing promises, and after the indecisiveness of the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, emerging
centers of power in the South are falling back on a distributive bargaining strategy in global negotiations on development, the environment, and international economic interaction. This is evident in their vocal resistance to the inclusion of environmental issues in trade negotiations and in their resistance to accept any climate change mitigation deal that will undermine their economic modernization. Having been conned before by sustainable development, the major countries of the South are adamant not to let their “right to develop” be compromised by a deal on the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, no matter how persuasive the case for mitigation is. With growing concerns about fuel and food shortages becoming more common in the first decade of the new millennium, the emphasis for the leaders of the South again falls on how to make development sustainable.

Both conceptually and politically, the notion of sustainable development thus seems less sustainable than it was in 1992. However, there is no conceptual or normative challenger in sight, and it remains embedded in numerous dimensions of global and national governance. Successive secretaries general of the UN have elevated the notion of sustainable development to an overarching norm in multilateral attempts to secure global public goods. These efforts no longer include only government leaders, but they also include transnational nongovernmental organizations and private corporations. The very definition of a global public good favored in the UN system is based on the idea that a public good can claim to be global only if it allows for nonexcludability and nonrivalry across generations.

Its institutionalization at the highest governance levels has allowed the notion to contribute a range of principles and managerial tools to the governance of the environment, both nationally and internationally. Among the lasting principles that it has contributed are the so-called precautionary principle that is now deeply ingrained in multilateral negotiation practice, the notion of common but differentiated responsibilities, the importance of taking an ecosystem approach in dealing with challenges, the “polluter pays” principle, and the principle of environment policy integration. In recent years, emphasis has also shifted to the political conditions of sustainability: subsidiarity (i.e., that decisions should be taken at the appropriate level of governance), participation by and responsiveness to the people directly affected by decisions, and gender equity.

The concept of sustainable development has also presided over the emergence of international environmental law dealing with the protection of the ozone layer, the protection of biological diversity, biosafety, the protection of natural forests, the combating of desertification, and the stabilization of climate change. It has also had a profound effect on corporate governance, where it joins profitability and social responsibility as one of the three “bottom lines.”

Political scientists have good reasons to be interested in sustainable development. First, the concept prompts a broader, more inclusive basis for ethical deliberation by introducing intertemporal considerations (i.e., an analysis that takes into account a large span of time). Second, sustainable development has become an integral part of the contemporary state’s managerial apparatus. Third, it progressively has become the normative focus around which the global governance of the environment converges. Fourth, it adds a significant new dimension to distributive battles between the industrialized North and the industrializing South and to analytical attempts to measure inequality between states. Finally, the concept itself continues to be politically highly contested.

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See also Development, Political; Governance, Global; Inequality, Economic; Measurement; Multilateralism; United Nations

Further Readings
SYMBOLS, POLITICAL

Political symbols are signs (images, flags, slogans, etc.) that represent political reality. Political symbols constitute the foundation for the cognitive, emotional, and psychomotor processes with which individuals evaluate the political sphere. Political symbols can be used strategically in a quest for political power; they may, however, also have unintended consequences. This happens because the interpretation of political symbols is not only informed by predefined notions but is the social, political, and cultural context that adds another dimension of meaning to a given set of political symbols.

Political symbols reduce the complexity of politics by making references and increasing the amount of information in the communication process. While the term political symbol describes the objects of political communication, the term symbolic politics subsumes the occurrence of a specific process of political communication. In habitual language, symbolic politics means a publicly displayed deception or surrogate action that is used to detract from actual political reality. In this sense, symbolic politics is considered to be a surrogate for politics. Symbolic politics differs from substantial policy. As a policy of signs (terms and slogans, badges, banners and pictures, gestures, ritual acts, and political staging), symbolic politics evolves in a semantic field. Substantial policy, by contrast, consists of a revisable succession of political decisions (e.g., legislation, contracts, and taxes). Symbolic politics and substantial policy can be related to each other. On the one hand, symbolic politics can have an impact on substantial policy. On the other hand, substantial policy can be implemented, or averted by symbolic politics. In the following sections, the relationships between political symbols and symbolic politics and their various functions are discussed.

The Use of Signs and the Nature of Symbolic Politics

Political symbols/symbolic politics constitute a specific dimension of how we construct, represent, and perceive political reality. As is always the case, when we deal with the reality of social phenomena, this happens against a backdrop of questions concerning the difference between substance and appearance. The negative connotation of symbolic politics, which is often expressed in public opinion polls, does not correspond to the more sophisticated view of symbolic politics in cultural studies and the social sciences, for symbolic politics in a broader sense also means the strategic use of signs to meet society’s requirements of political orientation. Attention may be attracted; willingness to engage in political action, to express loyalty, or to demonstrate protest may be shown by symbolic politics. In doing so, the symbolic value of signs is converted into political power.

This process is not a common cultural, philosophical, or epistemological phenomenon of nomination or interpretation. The use of symbols in politics is the expression of a struggle for a certain view of life. Thus, questions of dominance or subordination are involved, resulting in the tendency to unilaterally implement or achieve by mutual agreement what should be generally binding. The strategic use of symbolic instruments in politics does not simply aim at achieving interaction. Political symbols are neither mere decorative attachments nor ideological ballast, in contrast to “real” politics. Symbolic politics was, and is, still an integral part of political communications in the media society and thereby of politics in general. Thus, symbolic politics is not restricted to acts of state with ostentation, national commemoration ceremonies, or mass rallies. Precisely because there is no pure form of politics—it is more or less always a dual reality of occurrence and interpretation—there is a need for the use of symbolic means.

Symbols have a constitutive meaning for social reality in an all-embracing cultural and philosophical sense. They are neither simply an image of
reality nor an exponent of its objects but, as the philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1985) points out, are a medium for the perception of reality and thus part of the aesthetic construction of the world. They create a transcendental precondition for the construction of human reality. From a sociological point of view, social reality is not perceived by firsthand experience but by a symbolic world of meaning. This symbolic world can overlap or assimilate antithetical parts of everyday life.

An important impulse for the international debate about symbolic politics was provided by Murray Edelman in his works *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (1964) and *Politics as Symbolic Actions: Mass Arousal and Quiescence* (1971). He argues in favor of an analysis of political power based on substantiated social theory. Edelman ties in with the basic assumptions of the symbolic interactionist and the interpretative school of sociology, as exemplified in the work of George Herbert Mead (1863–1931), which propagates the extension of normative and institutional political concepts by affective and evaluative aspects of politics. He understands political action as playing a certain role, which finds its expression in dramatic or symbolized form. Edelman connects subjective and intersubjective forms of analysis—microphenomena—with the production of general binding decisions—macrophenomena. Referring to Walter Lippmann’s (1922/1997) classic study of public opinion, he draws the conclusion that politics is too complex to be accessible to the public. Instead of improving real conditions, a dramatic symbolic scene of abstractions appears. A panoptic view is built by images, staging, and symbols. This surrogate world may refer to objective reality (“referential symbols”). But then there are also “condensation symbols,” which deceive about reality. Permanently installed democratic rituals encourage belief in political participation and rational acts of state, even though they are instruments of political “quiescence.” Publicly communicated policy is becoming ritual, a political sport for spectators. According to Edelman, political symbols and symbolic politics are becoming instruments of manipulation for political elites.

To a large extent, there has been no result in the critical debate initiated by Edelman to correlate the assumed real politics and their legitimation by symbolic politics. Furthermore, symbolic politics has to deal with collective actors and institutions that are symbolic regimes themselves, being central elements in forming, stabilizing, and transforming social relationships. Political symbols/symbolic politics are successful when they make room for interpretations that are compatible with the way a culture endows its politics with meaning. As Pierre Bourdieu (2000) observed, symbolic politics is successful if it refreshes a specific repertoire of interpretation that can be affiliated to the culture of political interpretation or “symbolic space.”

So symbolic politics, in the sense of pseudopolitics, is just a negative special case of a fundamental aspect of political acting that always has instrumental and expressive parts. Four fundamental functions of symbolic politics can be defined:

- Political symbols as well as symbolic politics have a signal function: They attract attention, breach routines for providing or placing information, organize the perception of politics, and contribute to the reliability of behavior.
- By decreasing complexity, they provide a regulator to cope with the mass of information.
- The use of political symbols not only aims to denominate political circumstances but is also a part of the political fight for the disposal of denomination.
- By perceiving symbols in a mode of suggestive immediacy, symbolic politics not only addresses rationality but also activates emotions.

**Conclusion**

Symbolic politics is policy and as such neither principally good nor bad. It is an essential component of political communications. Symbolic politics is not an invention of a media society. However, the permanent presence of politics in the media and a high-level display of modern media systems bring about responses concerning mediation and the impact of “symbolic power” (as portrayed by Bourdieu) to an extent that has never occurred in history before. The mere existence of symbolic politics is not itself a political problem. A striking question concerns its quality. An analytical, differentiated evaluation may result from varying stress ratios: between retrogressive or reflexive, withdrawn to privacy or active citizenship, relating to persons or relating to factual issues, entertaining or informative, causing emotions or solving problems,
concerning actors or concerning affected persons, being hermetic or proceeding from an idea to logically following an idea, and so on. By using such an analytical concept, an incorrect dualistic understanding can be avoided, one that regards symbolic politics as being a phenomenon of political acting on stage, while “real” politics are seen as taking place backstage. Politics, including symbolic politics, are played on many different stages at the same time. In this action, politicians can only succeed if they know how to play different roles and are able to use symbolic politics.

Research concerning symbolic politics shows serious gaps. In cultural studies, the dominant interpretive of symbolic politics should be reinforced with an analysis of social sciences, especially with the results of evaluation research. Researching symbolic politics should not be restricted to a view on the interior logic of systems of symbols. It should contain the structure of material and pragmatic problems, as is the case in various cultural-historical evaluations. An analysis of symbolic politics has to evaluate the relationship of symbolic and pragmatic means in structures of political interpretation and construction. By detecting coherences and antitheses between the logic of fact and the logic of presentation, such an analysis can contribute toward understanding the logic of the function of the political dimension as well as the rating of political communications according to the quality of democracy.

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See also Political Communication; Political Culture;
Public Opinion; Rituals

Further Readings


Systems Theory

Systems theory is a science that has the comparative study of systems as its object. There are different types of systems: organisms (animals, humans, and particularly cognitive mechanisms in organisms), machines (particularly computers), physicochemical systems, psychic systems, and social systems. Such a comparative research program for heterogeneous types of systems presupposes a highly general concept of systems, for which numerous features have been proposed: the interdependency of the parts of a system, the reference of any structure and process in a system to the environments of the system, equilibrium and adaptedness and continuous readaptations to environmental demands as core elements of the understanding of a system, self-organization of a system as the principal way it responds to external intervention, and complexity as a trigger mechanism for system formation and as the form that describes the internal network structures of connectedness among system elements. After examining the historical roots of general system theory, this entry focuses on the main two theories that have been elaborated in social sciences from this perspective.

General System Theory, Information Theory, and Cybernetics

Systems theory is an understanding related to those definitions developed in the years after 1940 on the basis of suggestions from biology (the “general system theory” of Ludwig von Bertalanffy), physiology (Walter B. Cannon, Walter Pitts, and Warren McCulloch), and information theory and
cybernetics (Claude Shannon, Norbert Wiener, and William Ross Ashby). Particularly, the idea by Shannon and Wiener of defining information as a selection among alternative possibilities turned out to be a generalization transcending heterogeneous systems and pointing to systems theory as a kind of general selection theory. This was connected to the strictly binary way of operation Pitts and McCulloch postulated in a paper on nerve cells published in 1943. This idea that at any branching of nerve cells there are only two alternative states available proved to be the simplest suggestion of how to make use of a network of cells for long chains of numerical operations. From this came the computer and, at the same time, came more general ideas regarding the operational realities of any observing system whatsoever.

Since its beginnings, the social sciences were an important part of the establishment of systems theory. Jürgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson were in 1951 the first who tried to base a social science discipline on an information and communication theory coming from cybernetics (Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry). But the two most influential suggestions were the comprehensive sociological versions of systems theory that were proposed by Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann beginning in the 1950s and the 1970s, respectively.

**Talcott Parsons**

Parsons (1902–1979) had been influenced by equilibrium ideas from physiology (Cannon), the system–environment thinking of the Harvard physiologist Lawrence Henderson, and the duality of information and energy that Wiener had proposed. From these materials, he developed a sociological systems theory. Social systems are related either to the internal environment of other social systems or to external nonsocial environments (psychic, biological, and cultural environments). Furthermore, they differ in the way they refer to time: They are either oriented toward realizations in the future or to satisfactions of needs in the present (instrumental or consummatory). From these two distinctions, internal/external and instrumental/consummatory, Parsons derived four possibilities for the formation of systems: first, there are adaptive systems (combining external reference and future orientation, e.g., the economy); second, systems that are specialized on goal attainment (internal reference and future orientation, e.g., the polity); third, systems focused on integration of system elements (internal reference and present orientation, e.g., the society conceived as a community); and fourth, systems that are responsible for the maintenance of long-term patterns (external reference and present orientation, e.g., cultural institutions in society).

There is one further aspect that Parsons adds to this elementary distinction of the four types of systems. Among these four system types, he distinguishes those in which a primacy of the transfer of information obtains all cultural institutions and systems from those that are focused on transfers of energy (e.g., the adaptive economic system). Information-rich systems control energetical systems. These, on the other hand, are thought of as conditioning factors that limit the scope of information-rich systems. This argument was taken from Wiener, and Parsons derived from it a bidirectional hierarchy of conditions and control that interrelated all types of systems.

On the basis of these elementary distinctions, Parsons worked for a further 3 decades on a social theory that identified in any concrete social system these four universal functional aspects (adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and pattern maintenance), which often constitute autonomous subsystems of the respective system. In an analogy to economics, he then added input–output analysis. Systems and subsystems are interrelated via the input and output of resources that are either the result or the precondition of ongoing system processes. Among these resources are the cognitive and motivational resources of participants and the rights and values that are attributed to them. These different types of resources are transferred in exchange processes between systems. For analyzing these exchange processes going on between systems, without which systems would never be able to procure the resources they need for their functioning, Parsons created a theory about media of exchange.

Parsons started again with an analogy to economics in theorizing about media of exchange. He postulated that there is first of all money in its economic function as a medium of exchange, well-known to economists. Then, he added power and argued that it is best understood when analyzed as
analogous to money, as an exchange medium that mediates the transfer of resources (decisions, support, responsibility, etc.) important in political processes. And after having written theories for power and money, Parsons added further media of exchange for input–output processes between systems, among which influence and value commitments play an especially prominent role on the level of societal exchanges.

In continuing his decades-long work on media of exchange between systems, Parsons affirmed once more the cognitive starting point of systems theory in the 1940s: Systems theory as an interdisciplinary endeavor making use of intellectual resources, from the sciences as well as from the humanities, always focused on strategies for comparing heterogeneous systems and diverse system processes.

Niklas Luhmann
Luhmann’s (1927–1998) writings always presupposed what Parsons had done. But it is also true that he started systems theory anew. For him, the system–environment distinction as inspired by Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s theory of open systems was a much more important starting point than it was for Parsons. Whereas for Parsons the environment of a social system always consists of other systems, for Luhmann, a phenomenological understanding of environment is far more prominent—one that looks at the difference between system and environment, environments being structured in a completely different way than is the case in systems. Order from noise, the formula of Henri Atlan, which Luhmann later on cited very often, gives a good idea of concepts of environment that look for contrasts and for differences and not for a simple plurality of other systems.

From the start, complexity was another central term in Luhmann’s writings. Systems process complexity; they arise by establishing and stabilizing the difference in complexity with respect to their environments. As is the case in the work of Wiener and Bateson, systems for Luhmann are those originating in communications, and as such they are based on a way of processing information that Luhmann calls meaning. Meaning is formally similar to information as it is based on something being a selection among plural alternatives. But what is characteristic of meaning and thereby constitutive for social and psychic systems, as the two types of systems making use of meaning, is that the alternatives not chosen are still remembered. One can come back to them, one can criticize selections by pointing to the alternatives that were available, and one can write history on the basis of this dual structure of meaning.

For Luhmann, too, systems have a functional orientation. They specialize in certain problem solutions characteristic and constitutive of them. But he completely refrains from making a finite catalog of the basic functions that have to be dealt with everywhere. Instead, every system is conceived to be singular in fulfilling the functional need that somehow was the catalyst around which the process of system formation came about as a historical and a contingent process. Sports, for example, is a global function system in present-day world society. But the formation of this system is contingent on the improbable synthesis of very heterogeneous traditions (the hunting and riding traditions of the European nobility, boxing and wrestling as popular amusements in early-modern Europe, ball games in English public schools, the gymnastics of Northern Europe, etc.). On the basis of such examples, one can understand that for Luhmann, modern society consists of huge and global function systems for economic relations, science, religion, law, and intimate relations—and for a number of other functional problems in communication. Functional differentiation is the guiding principle of differentiation in contemporary society.

Further elaboration of the theory then was done by work on three theories that were added to the theory of social systems. There is a theory of socio-cultural evolution, conceived as a neo-Darwinist theory, which analyzes how structure formation is possible on the basis of chance events. Second, Luhmann reformulates the Parsonsian theory of media of exchange that mediate input–output processes between systems as a theory of communication media, which are conceived as being internal to functional systems. These communication media are effect mechanisms. They are based on symbols that are thought to be effective in communication—such as symbols of money, power, truth, or love—and as such effective symbols, motivate other
social actors to do something they would not otherwise have done. In this version of the theory there is no exchange implied, as communication is not understood as an exchange process. Third, Luhmann works out a differentiation theory that embeds the empirical core diagnosis of functional differentiation into a more general theory of forms of system differentiation, including segmentation and stratification. The guiding idea is once more to have an instrument for doing comparative research on social systems. Different historical formations can be compared by looking at the forms of system differentiation that are dominant in them.

A further shift in the foundations of systems theory arose in the late 1970s as the result of a new interdisciplinary import. Luhmann adopted the theory of auto-poesis proposed by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, which differs from the Bertalanffy tradition of open systems in looking at systems (e.g., cells) as being completely closed on the basis of their own production processes. Whatever they consist of—elements, structures, processes, or boundaries—systems are conceived to produce all their elementary constituents by their own production processes. Luhmann connected this hypothesis to communication theory. He then described social systems as autopoietic communication systems, which always produce and reproduce a specific type of communication (e.g., payments in the economy or published truth claims in the social system of science) and which do this only on the basis of processes internal to the system. At the same time, he held on to the primacy of the system–environment distinction. Regarding autopoietic systems, this means that for them, too, it is true that they only can continue their processes of production and reproduction of their components if they incessantly observe their relevant environments and generate information instructive for their production processes on the basis of these observations.

**Systems Theory Today**

Systems theory today continues in its two variant forms: first, as general systems theory, primarily influential among some biologists, chemists, physicists, and mathematicians and holding an important institutional place in the Santa Fe Institute and, second, as a paradigm of sociological theorizing and research, linked to the writings of Parsons and Luhmann. As a sociological paradigm, it is attractive because of its universalism, conceiving a multifaceted approach to the analysis of social systems that, in the plurality of theoretical approaches it brought about, promises to be applicable to a whole range of problems relevant for sociology. In political science, this tradition was deepened by David Easton (1953), who opened the way to a more empirical use of the concept of “political system” that was clearly compatible with the behavioralist approach to politics and challenged the classical use of the concept of the state. Strongly present during the 1960s, this tradition faded by the end of the 1970s.

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**See also** Comparative Methods; Functionalism; Self-Regulation

**Further Readings**


TAX POLICY

Taxes are monetary charges imposed by governments on natural or legal persons. They are compulsory and unrequited: Taxpayers are legally obliged to pay taxes and cannot expect to receive any specific benefit in return, such as a piece of public property or a particular health care treatment in a public hospital. Taxes are not fees. While taxes are ostensibly collected for the sake of the public good, the liability of the individual taxpayer is independent of the personal utility he or she derives from that good. Taxes are levied in virtually all countries of the world. They constitute the major source of revenue of the modern state.

This entry deals with tax policy generally. It considers the major types and purposes of taxation, reviews common trends and national variations in the tax policy of advanced Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, reflects on the causes and constraints of tax policy making, discusses the effects of taxation on growth and inequality, and highlights specific features of taxation in developing countries.

Types of Taxes

It is conventional to distinguish between direct and indirect taxes. A direct tax is paid directly to the government by the (natural or legal) person on whom it is imposed. Direct taxes are usually based on the taxpayer’s ability to pay. The most important direct tax is the individual income tax levied on the labor, capital, or other income of a person or household. Other important direct taxes include the corporate income tax on business profits, the property tax on real estate holdings, the wealth tax on net worth, the inheritance tax on bequests, and social security contributions. An indirect tax is paid to the government by a person different from the person on whom it is imposed. The most important examples are general consumption taxes, such as the value-added tax (VAT) or the sales tax, and specific consumption taxes, such as excises on fuel, tobacco, or alcohol. These taxes are indirect in the sense that they are imposed on the consumers of goods and services but paid to the government by the seller of the goods or services. In contrast to direct taxes, indirect taxes cannot take into account taxpayers’ ability to pay. While poor people usually pay less income tax, absolutely and relatively, than rich people, they always pay the same rate of VAT or excise.

Another typology sorts taxes according to their presumed distributive effect. The individual income tax is usually considered a progressive tax because it typically combines a progressive statutory rate schedule with a personal exemption for a minimum level of income. Both features ensure that income earners pay progressively more of their income in tax the higher their earnings. Corporate income, property, and wealth taxes are also often considered to be progressive. Social security contributions, by contrast, can be considered proportional to the extent that they are charged at flat
rates and with little or no personal exemption. Often they are charged only up to a maximum level of income. This tends to make their distributional effect regressive because taxpayers with incomes above the income cap owe an ever smaller share of their income to social security contributions the more they earn above the income cap than taxpayers with income below the cap. General consumption taxes and excises are commonly considered to be regressive because the share of income spent on consumption tends to decrease as the level of personal income increases. The theoretical basis for distinguishing taxes according to their distributional impact is shaky, however. The link between corporate income taxation and tax progressivity, for example, is by no means clear and crucially depends on assumptions about incidence. There is also empirical evidence to suggest that common intuitions about the distributive effects of taxes are often inaccurate. For example, income and property taxes are not invariably progressive in end effect and may sometimes even be regressive.

**Purposes of Taxation**

According to the American economist Richard Musgrave (1959), taxation serves three broad purposes, which are discussed below.

**Resource Allocation.** Taxes allocate resources to the public sector. This is the obvious fiscal function of taxation. During the 19th and 20th centuries, alternative sources of revenue—ownership of productive resources, sales of public office or monopoly power, coercive confiscation of domestic or foreign wealth, monetary debasement—decreased in significance. For the modern state, taxation is the single most important source of government revenue. Taxes can also improve resource allocation in the private sector, for example, by forcing actors to internalize externalities, as in environmental taxation or tobacco and alcohol taxation. Hence, taxation may also serve a regulatory function for private resource allocation.

**Redistribution.** Taxation is one major instrument to reduce inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth either directly through tax progressivity or indirectly through funding redistributive expenditure programs.

**Stabilization.** Taxation, together with public expenditure, monetary policy, and public debt, can help stabilize the business cycle and ensure high levels of employment and growth.

**Common Trends and National Variations**

Tax policy in advanced OECD countries has followed broadly similar trends over the past 50 years in terms of tax level, tax mix, and tax design, but significant national variations remain.

The level of total taxation has risen in all advanced OECD countries. Taxation as a share of GDP grew from roughly 25% on average in 1955 to 38% on average in 2005. The level of taxation is highest in Nordic countries, such as Sweden (49% of GDP in 2005) and Denmark (51%). It tends to be below average in Anglo-Saxon countries, such as Australia (31%). It is also below average in the United States (28%). Tax levels in continental Europe and in Mediterranean states lie between these extremes.

The tax mix has grown more uniform. All advanced OECD countries derive the bulk of their tax revenues from just three taxes: individual income tax, social security contributions, and a general consumption tax, usually a VAT. While these taxes accounted for only about 45% of total tax revenues on average in 1955 and for as little as 21% and 23% of total revenues in Ireland and Portugal, respectively, by 2005, they accounted for an average of 71% of total tax revenues. Other taxes, the most important of which are excises on specific goods and services, have lost in fiscal importance. Significant national variations still remain in the relative reliance on the three major taxes though. Anglo-Saxon countries tend to rely more heavily on the individual income tax (and also the corporate income tax) than other OECD countries but less on general consumption taxation and social security contributions. Australia and New Zealand collect no revenue from social security contributions at all. Continental European and Mediterranean countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Portugal, and Spain, tend to rely disproportionately on social security contributions, while the revenue raised through individual income taxes is often below average. Finally, Nordic countries rely heavily on income tax (but not corporate income tax) and
VAT but less on social security contributions. Denmark is the extreme case, raising almost 50% of total tax revenue through income tax and 20% through VAT but hardly anything through social security contributions in 2005.

In terms of tax design, the most prominent recent development in income taxation has been the flattening of the statutory rate schedule. The top individual income tax rate fell from an average of almost 70% in advanced OECD countries and more than 90% in the United Kingdom and Japan in 1975 to an average of slightly below 48% by 2005. In some states, rate cuts were accompanied by a move away from a global income tax, under which income from whatever source is aggregated and subjected to a single rate of tax, toward a so-called schedular income tax, under which income from different sources is taxed at different rates. Thus, interest income is increasingly subjected to a separate final withholding tax outside the individual income tax in OECD countries. The so-called dual income tax, introduced in Norway, Sweden, and Finland in the 1990s, separates the taxation of capital and labor income completely, subjecting only the latter but not the former to taxation at high progressive rates. Corporate income taxation has been characterized by a general move toward lower statutory tax rates and broad tax bases since the 1980s. The dominant trend in consumption taxation has been the spread of VAT since the 1970s. In 2010, all OECD countries except the United States had a VAT. At the same time, the number of excises has generally fallen, and some new environmental taxes have been introduced.

Determinants of Tax Policy
Various factors shape the choice of tax level, tax mix, and tax design, including public spending, administrative capacity, domestic politics, and international influences.

Public spending has increased even faster than total taxation over the past 50 years. It went up from 27% of GDP on average in 1950 to 45% on average in 2005. The main driver behind the growth in spending was social expenditure. As the welfare state expanded, the outlays for social purposes went up. Social expenditure now accounts for more than 50%, on average, of public spending in advanced OECD countries and explains virtually all the variance in national tax levels. The major difference between high-tax and low-tax countries is simply that the former have a large welfare state while the latter do not. While the close association between public spending and taxation is obvious, the direction of causation is more contested. Some, such as Junko Kato (2003), argue that the establishment of high-performance tax systems preceded and enabled the growth of large welfare states, while others, such as Peter Lindert (2004), maintain that high taxation is a consequence of high levels of social expenditure.

According to B. Guy Peters (1991), administrative capacity has a major influence on the level and shape of taxation. Early taxes, such as tolls, tariffs, excises, and property taxes, targeted the easy-to-monitor bottlenecks of economic activity. This helped economize on scarce administrative resources but was economically distorting and fiscally ineffective. As administrative capacities grew during the 20th century, these bottlenecks were relieved, and the tax burden was spread more widely and efficiently. Tolls, customs duties, and excises were replaced by general sales taxes and, since the 1960s, by the technically superior but administratively complex VAT. In direct taxation, property and wealth taxes were supplanted by income tax. The spread of the withholding method of income tax collection since the 1940s, whereby the tax due is retained (“withheld”) by the income’s paying agent (the employer or bank) rather than the income earners themselves, facilitated the conversion of an income tax originally restricted to the upper class into a mass tax and increased the timeliness and buoyancy of tax collections. Problems of assessment, monitoring, and enforcement also explain why, for example, capital (net wealth, capital gains, owner-occupied housing) or fringe benefits are usually taxed more leniently than labor income or why financial services are often exempt from VAT even though they constitute an important part of economic activity.

Taxation is a major issue in domestic politics. It is commonly assumed that left parties favor high and progressive taxation because their core constituency comes primarily from the lower half of the income distribution, while right parties prefer moderate levels of proportional or regressive taxation because they represent the upper half of income earners. All else being equal, high levels of
inequality should move tax policy to the left, low levels to the right. However, various contextual factors modify or even reverse this simple logic. First, electoral competition is usually multidimensional, and this tends to moderate the parties’ policy positions on any one dimension, including taxation. Second, left-party governments may be deterred from high, progressive taxation by the possibility of negative macroeconomic consequences. Actually, left governments in Sweden and elsewhere have often opted for regressive consumption taxes and social security contributions rather than progressive income taxes, to fund social spending. Finally, institutional factors shape the translation of party preferences into government policies. Consensus democracies, characterized by multiparty systems, proportional representation electoral institutions, broad coalition governments, interest group corporatism, and strong judicial review, decrease the responsiveness of tax policy making to the policy preferences of the median voter, while majoritarian systems with two-party systems, majority elections, single-party governments, and interest group pluralism tend to increase it. Some argue that this difference explains why majoritarian Anglo-Saxon democracies rely more heavily on progressive income taxes and corporate taxation than the more consensus-oriented continental and Nordic European countries: In these countries, as noted by Jude Hays (2009), the majoritarian impulse to impose heavy taxes on the rich has been kept in check by multiple veto players, while in majoritarian Anglo-Saxon democracies, it dominates tax policy making during periods of leftist government.

Various international influences shape national tax policy making. One is the diffusion of tax policy examples and ideas across national borders. It has been argued, for example, that the highly visible “market-conforming” 1986 U.S. Tax Reform Act triggered a wave of reform in other OECD countries, which emulated the U.S. example and established a new, “neoliberal” tax policy orthodoxy. This may account for the general trend toward low statutory tax rates and broad tax bases in corporate and individual income taxation. International organizations can also influence national tax policy. The European Union (EU) severely constrains the freedom of its member states in matters of tax design and administration by detailed tax harmonization in indirect taxation and through the case law of the European Court of Justice in direct taxation. The influence of other international organizations is more selective and less obvious. The World Trade Organization stipulates international norms for the tax treatment of international trade. The so-called OECD Model Tax Convention, which serves as an almost universally accepted blueprint for bilateral double-tax-avoidance treaties, exerts some soft harmonizing pressure on national income taxation by defining basic tax concepts that have become established features of national taxation, such as the distinction between active and passive income or between subsidiaries and permanent establishments. Also, OECD revenue statistics, by defining a common classificatory frame for the comparison of national taxes, exerts subtle pressure to design national taxes such that they can be fitted into this frame. Finally, national tax policy is constrained by international tax competition. Tax competition has been a major driver behind the general fall in corporate tax rates since the 1980s. Corporate tax revenues remained largely unaffected partly because of the offsetting effects of broadening the tax base. But the corporate tax burden shifted from high-profit firms, which benefit most from low rates, to low-profit firms, which suffer most from base broadening. Arguably, individual income tax also suffered because low corporate tax rates increase the incentives for rich individuals to shift income into the corporate sector in order to protect it from taxation at the top individual income tax rate. Generally, tax competition is more constraining for small states than for large states: They suffer more in terms of tax base flight if they try to maintain high corporate tax rates. However, they also potentially benefit more from undercutting foreign tax rates. Ireland has set aggressive corporate tax rates to speed up national economic development, and many new EU member states in Eastern Europe have tried to emulate Ireland’s apparent success.

**Taxation and Economic Growth**

Perhaps surprisingly, there is little evidence for a negative correlation of economic growth and taxation. High-tax states do not systematically grow more slowly than low-tax ones in the OECD area.
Most observers agree that a crucial key to explaining what Lindert (2004) called the “free-lunch puzzle” is that high-tax, high-spending welfare states in Scandinavia and continental Europe have a more growth-friendly tax mix than the relatively low-tax Anglo-Saxon states. Some highlight the fact that the former group of states relies more heavily on regressive taxes on labor and consumption (social security contributions, VAT, and excises on alcohol, tobacco, and fuel) and less on progressive income taxes than the latter. As Lindert notes, a more regressive tax mix is said to promote growth by reducing the disincentive effects of taxation. Progressive taxes purportedly discourage extra effort by subjecting extra income to a higher tax burden; regressive taxes encourage effort by rewarding extra income with lower effective tax rates. Others note that progressive taxes may also stimulate growth. A progressive tax system is praised for putting money into the hands of those most likely to spend it—namely, the poor. According to Achim Kemmerling (2009), a progressive tax system invigorates the labor market by facilitating the take-up of low-wage work and by discouraging wage drift, and it smoothes disposable income over the business cycle and, thus, helps stabilize the macroeconomy. From this perspective, continental European and Scandinavian tax mixes appear more growth friendly than the Anglo-Saxon tax mix, not because they are more regressive but because they burden capital less. Steffen Ganghof (2006) suggested that focusing taxation on labor and consumption stimulates savings and investment and, therefore, innovation and employment.

Taxation and Inequality
Taxation can reduce income inequality either directly, by a progressive rate schedule that imposes a higher tax burden—relatively and absolutely—on the rich than on the poor, or indirectly, by funding redistributive social expenditure. According to Lane Kenworthy (2008), while advanced OECD countries rely on both strategies, they generally achieve more inequality reduction by social expenditure than by progressive taxation. The redistributive effects of both strategies are not completely equivalent though. While poverty alleviation calls for social expenditure because the poor have little or no taxable income to begin with, the reduction of high-end income inequality calls for progressive taxation because the rich do not depend on social transfers and public services. The combination of progressive taxation and redistributive expenditure is made difficult by economic and political trade-offs. Redistribution by progressive taxation requires a high tax burden on the rich and also a high tax burden on capital because the rich are likely to derive a large share of their income from capital. This tends to increase the efficiency costs of taxation in terms of reduced savings, investment, and work effort, and to alienate the rich and parts of the middle class from the welfare state. This may explain why countries relying strongly on redistribution by progressive taxation, such as the United States, usually allocate less funds to social expenditure. It may also explain why countries with high levels of social expenditure, such as Sweden and Germany, rely strongly on regressive consumption taxes and/or social security contributions and have a low income tax burden on capital. Harold Wilensky (2002) suggested that these features reduce the efficiency costs of taxation and keep the well-off committed to the welfare state thus allowing for higher levels of taxation and spending.

Taxation in Less Developed Countries
Developing countries rely less on taxation and more on nontax sources of revenue—debt, seigniorage (the “inflation tax”), and foreign transfers—than advanced OECD countries. This is reflected in a significantly lower level of total taxation. According to some estimates, the tax take of an average developing country has stagnated at less than 20% since the late 1960s. The tax mix of developing countries is typically geared toward indirect taxation, especially excises and taxes on international trade, while direct taxes on income, property, wealth, corporate profits, or capital gains typically contribute little to total revenues. Various potential explanatory factors have been discussed for the specific tax features of developing countries. Low levels of legitimacy and trust in state institutions are said to increase tax resistance, constraining revenue-raising potential. High levels of corruption purportedly have a similar effect. There is empirical evidence of a substitution effect as people do
not like to pay for public services twice, first via taxes and then again via bribes. The economic structure can also have a constraining effect. High levels of agricultural employment and a large informal sector tend to be negatively associated with tax revenue, whereas industrialization and a concentration of economic activity in resource extraction tend to increase tax revenue. Also, developing countries are more vulnerable to the pressures of tax competition and have purportedly suffered revenue losses because of it. Finally, administrative problems help explain the strong focus on easy-to-monitor tax handles, such as specific transactions (excises and trade taxes) or large corporations (the corporate income tax).

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See also Economic Policy; Public Budgeting; Redistribution; Welfare State

Further Readings


TERRITORY

Several dimensions of politics come together in the word territory: land, a functional factor such as communication infrastructure, and a symbolic factor such as national identity. Typically associated with a polity, particularly a nation-state, the term can also be applied to any portion of space referred to otherwise as a region, locality, or place. Sometimes, a territory is an area awaiting formal incorporation into an adjacent state, as in the case of Alaska before it became one of the U.S. states. In general, however, territory is particularly, if not exclusively, associated with the spatial organization of the modern state with its claim to absolute control or sovereignty over a population within carefully defined external borders. Indeed, until Robert D. Sack extended the understanding of human territoriality as a strategy to individuals and organizations in general, use of the term territory was largely confined to the spatial organization of states. In the social sciences, such as sociology and political science, this is still the case, such that the challenge posed to territory by networked forms of organization (typically associated with globalization) is invariably characterized in totalistic terms as “the end of geography.” This signifies the extent to which territory has become the dominant geographical term (and imagination) in the social sciences. It is then closely allied to state sovereignty. As John Agnew (1994) pointed out, because sovereignty is seen to “erode” or “unbundle,” territory is also assumed to behave likewise. From this viewpoint, territory takes on an epistemological centrality, in that it is understood as absolutely fundamental to modernity.

The territorial nation-state is a highly specific historical entity. It first arose in Europe in the 16th
and 17th centuries. Since that time, political power has often been seen as inherently territorial. Politics take place only within “the institutions and the spatial envelope of the state as the exclusive governor of a definite territory. We also identify political territory with social space, perceiving countries as ‘state-societies’” (Paul Hirst, 2005, p. 27). Much interstate conflict is about competing territorial claims. The process of state formation has always had two crucial attributes. One is exclusivity. All the political entities (the Roman Catholic Church, city-states, etc.) that could not achieve a reasonable semblance of sovereignty over a contiguous territory have been steadily delegitimized as major political actors. The second is mutual recognition. The power of states has rested to a considerable extent on the recognition each state receives from the others in the form of noninterference in its “internal” affairs. Together, these attributes have created a world in which there can be no territory without a state. In this way, territory has come to underpin both nationalism and representative democracy, both of which depend critically on restricting political membership by homeland and address, respectively.

In political theory, control over a relatively modest territory has long been seen as the primary solution to the security dilemma: to offer protection to populations from the threats of anarchy (disorder), on the one hand, and hierarchy (distant rule and subordination), on the other. The problem has been to define what is meant by “modest” size. To Baron de Montesquieu (1949), the Enlightenment philosopher, different size territories inevitably have different political forms: “It is, therefore, the natural property of small states to be governed as a republic, of middling ones to be subject to a monarch, and of large empires to be swayed by a despotic prince” (p. 122). Early modern Europe offered propitious circumstances for the emergence of a fragmented political system, primarily because of its topographical divisions. Montesquieu further notes, however, that popular representation allows for the territorial extension of republican government. The founders of the United States added to this by trying to balance between centralizing certain security functions, on the one hand, and retaining local controls over many other functions, on the other. The recent history of the European Union can be thought of in similar terms.

Human activities in the world, however, have never conformed entirely to spaces defined by proximity as provided by territory. Indeed, and increasingly, as physical distance proves less of a barrier to movement, spatial interaction between separated nodes across networks is an important mechanism of geographical sorting and differentiation. Sometimes posed today in terms of a world of flows versus a world of territories, this is better thought of in terms of territories and/or networks of flows rather than as one versus the other. Territories and networks exist relationally rather than mutually exclusively. If territorial regulation is all about tying flows to places, territories have never been zero-sum entities in which the sharing of power or the existence of external linkages totally undermines their capacity to regulate. If at one time territorial states did severely limit the local powers of transterritorial and local agencies, the fact that this is no longer the case does not signify that the states have lost all of their powers:

 Territory still matters. States remain the most effective governors of populations... The powers to exclude, to tax, and to define political rights are those over which states acquired a monopoly in the seventeenth century. They remain the essentials of state power and explain why state sovereignty survives today and why it is indispensable to the international order. (Hirst, 2005, p. 45)

Territoriality is the strategic use of territory in either the organization and exercise of power, legitimate or otherwise, over blocs of space or the organization of people and things into discrete areas through the use of boundaries. In studies of animal behavior, spatial division into territories is seen as an evolutionary principle, a way of fostering competition so that those best matched to their territory will have more surviving offspring. With human territoriality, however, spatial division is more typically thought of as a strategy used by organizations and groups to organize social, economic, and political activities. From this viewpoint, space is partitioned into territorial cells or units that can be relatively autonomous (as with the division of global space into territorial nation-states) or arranged hierarchically from basic units in which work, administration, or surveillance is
carried out through intermediate levels at which managerial or supervisory functions are located to the topmost level at which central control is concentrated. Alternative spatial organizations of political and economic institutions, particularly hierarchical networks (as in the world-city network) or reticular networks (as with the Internet), can challenge or supplement the use of territoriality.

Theoretically, territory can be seen as having a number of different socioeconomic origins. As Sack notes, these include the following:

1. as a result of explicit territorial strategizing or territoriality to devolve administrative functions but maintain central control,
2. as a secondary result of resolving the dilemmas facing social groups in delivering public goods (as in Michael Mann’s 1984 sociology of territory),
3. as an expedient facilitating coordination between capitalists who are otherwise in competition with one another (as in Marxist theories of the state),
4. as the focus of one strategy among several of governmentality (as in Michel Foucault’s writings), and
5. as a result of defining boundaries between social groups to identify and maintain group cohesion (as in the writings of Georg Simmel and Fredrik Barth and in more recent sociological theories of political identity such as that of John Agnew).

Whatever its origins, territoriality is put into practice in a number of different, if often complementary, ways: by popular acceptance of classifications of space (e.g., “ours” vs. “yours”), through communication of a sense of place (where territorial markers and boundaries evoke meanings), and by enforcing control over space (by surveillance, policing, and legitimation). When combined, these practices constitute a political hegemony exercised territorially.

In a distinctive formulation, that of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, the term deterritorialization has been used to refer to the breakdown of territorial organization. Epistemologically juxtaposing “state philosophy” with “nomad thought,” Deleuze and Guattari associate territorialization with the former and deterritorialization with the latter. Ontologically, however, there could be quite different territorial systems at play over time as, for example, with pre- and postcolonial contact between colonizers and natives leading to the breakdown of one system followed by a period of deterritorialization before the imposition of a new territorial organization. Crucial to the concept of deterritorialization of Deleuze and Guattari is the claim that “processes are becomings, and aren’t to be judged by some final result but by the way they proceed and their power to continue, as with animal becomings, or nonsubjective individuations” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 146).

More typically, however, two other approaches tend to dominate most thinking about the contemporary erosion of territorial organization. In the first case, territory is posed as a physical base for economic activities, and deterritorialization is viewed as either the lessening importance of local constraints or the weakening of the impact of physical distance on economic transactions. Such ideas are part and parcel of much discussion of economic globalization. In the second case, territory is perceived as a declining spatial assemblage of power relations and identity strategies. From this perspective, ideas such as the “end of territory” and the rise of network space are linked to the recent onset of a worldwide deterritorialization. This camp tends to see deterritorialization in terms of the overall weakening of territorial identities in the face of globalization and the proliferation of “nonplaces” such as airports and fast-food joints.

In summary, there have been important historical dimensions to and philosophical disputes about territory. It takes various forms, and they have waxed and waned in relative significance. Overall, churches and polities (states, empires, federations, etc.) have been the most important users of territory. Some churches (such as the Roman Catholic Church) and some states (such as the United States) have more complex and formally hierarchical territories than do others. Today, transnational and global businesses often erect territorial hierarchies that cut across existing state-based ones. So even as some uses of territory fade away, others emerge. State-based territory may undergo a renaissance in the face of recent challenges to the
sustainability of financial globalization. Therefore, though varying in precise form and complexity, territory seems still to be very much with us in one form or another.

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See also Geopolitics; Globalization; Sovereignty; State

Further Readings

Terrorism, International

“International terrorism” is a contested term. In popular usage, it is typically taken to refer to groups that use “terrorist” tactics, such as targeting civilians, across national borders. A contemporary example of “international terrorism” is the transnational Al Qaeda network. But the term has been used to describe phenomena as diverse as the 19th-century anarchist movement, the Palestine Liberation Organization in the 1970s and 1980s, and the various Marxist groups operating in Europe and elsewhere during the 1970s, such as the Italian Red Brigades.

Both parts of the term are contested. The term “terrorism” continues to elicit passionate debate, both in terms of how it should be defined (and whether it constitutes a separate category of violence) and how it is used. Definitions range from those encompassing most forms of political violence (rendering it indistinguishable from other forms of warfare) to those encompassing most oppositional activism (rendering it indistinguishable from nonviolent activism). A more precise set of definitions defines it with reference to the type of target selected (usually noncombatants) and to the way in which violence is used to inculcate fear in a wider audience than those actually targeted, to achieve political change. Disagreements persist, though, over who can be considered a “noncombatant” and whether one can generalize such a definition, given that the very notion of “noncombatant” is intertwined with the development of the modern state and warfare in Europe, while boundaries between combatants and civilians are blurred by practices such as conscription and aerial and asymmetric warfare.

Similarly, controversy continues to rage over how the term is applied. Acts of violence against military personnel, for instance, are regularly labeled “terrorist,” while state actors engaging in “terrorist” tactics (as defined above) are typically not labeled thus—unless they are considered “rogue” states. Definitions are routinely used beyond their analytical reach to describe any acts by actors who have been labeled “terrorist” by state elites. What or who is considered “terrorist” is thus profoundly shaped by political context. Before terrorism became a widely accepted term, acts of violence in 1970s Italy, for instance, were described as bombings or kidnappings. Only in retrospect, when the term had gained international credence in the context of the Cold War, were these acts labeled “terrorist.” The term is, moreover, used by governments and nonstate actors alike to delegitimize opponents and justify extraordinary measures against them. This has led some, particularly critical terrorism scholars, to argue that the term is a political–normative tool, rather than a useful analytical concept.

The “international” part of the term is also contested. Some reserve the term “international terrorism” for the acts of those whose goals, membership, and operations cross national boundaries. Others
apply it to the acts of any group operating in more than one state, even if goals and membership are limited to one state. Yet others use the term interchangeably with “terrorism,” particularly in the context of the global war on terror where “terrorism” has become synonymous with opposition to the international order, regardless of one’s aims. The U.S. State Department, for instance, refers to all organizations it has labeled “terrorist” as indulging in “global terrorism.” Intriguingly, few use “international terrorism” to describe acts of state terrorism across borders, even though within the discipline of international politics, the term “international” is usually reserved for relationships between states (as opposed to “transnational,” which refers to nonstate actors across borders). Those who recognize this distinction tend to use the term “transnational terrorism” to refer to nonstate terrorism across boundaries.

The “new terrorism” debate has added further fuel to these definitional controversies. According to a number of scholars, a “new terrorism” has emerged since the 1990s, which is transnational, religiously inspired, organizationally decentralized, and more lethal, radical, and uncompromising. Al Qaeda is the primary example, but other groups, mostly Islamist, are also cited. Critics of this trend have pointed out that many aspects of this so-called new terrorism can be found in examples of “old terrorism” and that by calling this type of violence “new,” insights from the “old terrorism” literature and from past conflicts are ignored. Moreover, by linking the “new” to the ostensibly “religious” motivations of these groups, the “new terrorism” literature overemphasizes the religious aspect of these groups while downplaying political and socioeconomic dynamics. It also downplays the vast differences between groups that draw their inspiration from religion. Hamas, for instance, draws its inspiration from Palestinian nationalism as well as religion and has shown more willingness to compromise and practice restraint than Al Qaeda.

Because there is little agreement over what constitutes “terrorism,” let alone “international terrorism,” debates over what drives this type of violence are problematic. Most “terrorism databases,” for instance, exclude nonstate violence in sub-Saharan Africa because this is usually classified as “civil war”—with significant implications for analyses of the relationship between “terrorism” and “poverty” or the availability of mineral resources. Similarly, few databases include acts of state terror, and most do not distinguish between violence against noncombatants and violence against combatants, if the perpetrators are classified as “terrorist.”

**Contributing Factors**

With this caveat, numerous factors have been cited as facilitating “terrorism.” Political exclusion and repression have been found to play a role in many instances (e.g., Algeria, Egypt, Colombia), but so has (rapid) political liberalization and an increase in political opportunities (e.g., Indonesia, Colombia, Spain). Ethnic and religious cleavages can contribute to violence, especially when overlapping with socioeconomic cleavages or with interethnic occupation or repression. Modernization—and in particular urbanization, the expansion of education, the weakening of traditional power structures, and unequal development—has been a factor, but so has lack of development and recession (especially following economic growth). Recession played a part in the slide of Algeria into civil war in the 1990s and in the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada in the late 1980s (both of which conflicts included “terrorist” acts as defined above). The weakening of traditional power structures and expansion of the university sector, coupled to unequal development, facilitated the development of, among others, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, Hizbollah (also known as Hezbollah) in Lebanon, and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. But without state violence and discriminatory policies these socioeconomic factors would not have been sufficient to trigger a violent response.

Transnational safe havens and support from third-party states have played a part in a number of conflicts, as have—facilitated by the processes of globalization—the presence of transnational diasporas or criminal networks (such as those linked to the blood diamond trade). The Tamil Tigers, for instance, were strengthened by support from elements in the Tamil diaspora. The Basque nationalist ETA benefited from safe havens across the Spanish border in France, while Lebanon’s Hizbollah has been profoundly shaped by Iran’s support. Al Qaeda’s transnational character is
similarly in part a product of the transnational networks of volunteers arriving in Afghanistan during the 1980s, just as it is a product of globalization and its effect on resources, a sense of self, culture, and territory. But it is important not to overstate the significance of transnational factors because this can obscure the, often, very local reasons for political violence. The Tamil Tigers’ struggle was rooted in deeply felt grievances over the marginalization of Tamils by the Sri Lankan government, just as Hizbollah’s emergence was a response to Israel’s 1982 Lebanon invasion and local Shi’i grievances against the Lebanese state. Even Al Qaeda has roots in local struggles across the Middle East and Asia between secular state elites, reformist Islamists, and militant Islamists.

Macrofactors alone cannot explain “terrorism.” Modernization, political exclusion, and inequality have not everywhere given rise to political violence. Political liberalization in Morocco did not usher in the level of violence seen in neighboring Algeria. This underlines the importance of complementing macro with micro- and mesolevel explanations. What type of organization emerges, how many competing groups materialize within a particular social movement sector, what resources are available, how macro and micro events are interpreted—all these factors influence whether or not violence ensues.

Research on what factors facilitate “international state terrorism” or state sponsorship of nonstate “terrorism” (beyond that carried out by so-called rogue states) is still in its infancy even though the scale of violence emanating from states far outstrips that of its nonstate equivalent. There is a nascent literature on the role of Western states in supporting state repression or nonstate “terrorism in the Global South.” But there is nothing (yet) resembling the amount of research that has been done on nonstate “transnational terrorism.”

International Coordination of Responses

Until the attacks on New York’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, most responses to “transnational terrorism” remained within the national sphere, limited cooperation notwithstanding. Since 2001 and the declaration of a Global War on Terror, responses have become more coordinated internationally, facilitated by the broader processes of globalization. The establishment of the international Financial Action Task Force, which has coordinated the freezing of financial assets of internationally designated “terrorist” groups and individuals, is a case in point, as is the involvement of an international alliance in the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Cooperation between states has increased on practices such as extradition, the sharing of intelligence data, rendition (transporting suspects to states that allow torture), and replicating deradicalization models, such as the rehabilitation programs for prisoners accused of “terrorism.”

The notion of “international terrorism” and the term’s malleability has arguably helped state elites to forge a united response to a plethora of different threats, both local and international. Critics have argued that such an approach risks downplaying local differences, encouraging a homogeneous counterterrorism model that advances a hegemonic globalization (seen as part of the problem) against all dissenters, and privileging military over nonmilitary measures, such as the controversial invasion of Iraq. The notion of an all-threatening “international terrorism” has, according to its critics, served to increase state power while weakening mechanisms of accountability, facilitating the birth of a surveillance society, particularly affecting those believed to be “at risk” from radicalization (so-called suspect communities). Against this, protagonists point to the success in foiling “terrorist” plots through increased international cooperation, including cooperation with previously uncooperative states, and to the development of nonmilitary responses, such as rehabilitation programs, economic development, and the strengthening of “at risk” communities.

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See also Globalization; Social Movements; Terrorist Groups; Violence

Further Readings
Defining a terrorist group is as difficult as defining terrorism, which is a highly contested concept politically. There is no universally accepted, legally binding definition of the term, and national legislations or international organizations attach different meanings to the concept. As a consequence, the United Nations, for example—in 13 conventions and protocols adopted since 1963—confined itself to defining and proscribing specific acts of terrorism (such as skyjacking, hostage taking, and nuclear terrorism). A review of the literature by Alex Schmid produced more than 100 different definitions some of which diverge strongly. However, there are commonly cited criteria, such as the use of violent means, the political motivation of the perpetrators, and the intention to create panic and fear among segments of the population or the population as a whole. In the following, the major characteristics, forms of action, and types of such groups are discussed in light of a number of current explanatory approaches.

Against this background, terrorist groups or organizations can be described as actors who use primarily terrorist tactics and means to pursue their political goals. This does not exclude the use of other violent or nonviolent means. Most groups labeled terrorists are, therefore, multifaceted: For example, they may also conduct guerrilla-style operations; they may act as political movements or parties by instigating a political wing; they may work as business actors through the establishment of companies and fund-raising organizations; and they may serve as social welfare organizations by delivering services to particular segments of the population. Thus, terrorist groups are usually not only interested in pursuing terrorist activities but in a whole range of different issues. Nevertheless, the frequent or occasional use of terrorism remains a key characteristic of these groups, which has severe implications for the recruitment and training of activists; internal organization; operational planning and logistics; methods of internal and external communication; transfer and channeling of money, weapons, and people; and leadership and their opportunities to act and maneuver. Most of this is simply because terrorism is a tactic that attacks people and institutions from underground. “Going underground” and acting from the hidden, however, has material and political costs, which affect the entire organization, their followers, and supporters.

Distinguishing Terrorist Groups From Other Phenomena of Violence

Terrorist groups—or more precisely terrorist cells, squads, and commands—should analytically be distinguished from other phenomena of violence. First, terrorist groups are groups in the sense that they comprise a number of members who are bound together by some kind of organizational structure, which exists over a certain period of time. According to some national legislations (e.g., that in Germany), a minimum of three persons is required in an organization to speak about it as a “terrorist organization.” This implies that violent acts by single individuals (gunmen, killers, snipers, homicide, etc.) do not fall into that category. Second, because of their political ambitions, however defined, terrorist groups differ from primarily criminally or economically motivated organizations—such as criminal gangs, mafia structures, syndicates, warlords, or mercenaries. This distinction does not exclude the fact that individual members of terrorist organizations may be economically motivated; indeed, sometimes, terrorist groups may exploit the socioeconomic needs of particular persons or segments of the society for their own ends. Moreover, terrorist groups often undertake criminal activities (e.g., drug trafficking)—or cooperate with criminals (e.g., to get weapons and explosives)—to finance and launch terrorist operations. Therefore, a terrorist-criminal nexus usually exists. But the key question still remains as to whether the economic and criminal activities are
ends in themselves or whether they are instruments to further a political and ideological agenda. Third, terrorist groups should be distinguished from other politically motivated actors, in particular from rebel or guerrilla groups, militias, and paramilitary organizations. Rebel movements in general aim at the conquest of and—if possible—permanent control over territory. Terrorist groups, on the other hand, might have territorial ambitions; however, they simply lack the capabilities to conquer and control larger territories. In addition, while rebels usually employ physical violence in the context of unconventional warfare (insurgencies) to diminish their opponent’s military clout, to defeat the enemy, or force it to surrender, terrorist groups are mainly interested in the psychological effects of violent acts. In the real world, it may still be difficult to uphold these ideal-type distinctions as some groups may transform from one type of actor to another in the course of a conflict, while others have to be seen as hybrid organizations, which incorporate features of both rebel or militia and terrorist groups (e.g., the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and Hizbollah [also known as Hezbollah] in Lebanon).

Fourth, terrorist groups are nonstate actors and should not be equated with state institutions responsible for acts of state terror. Phenomena of state terror have variously been subsumed under the specific terms of war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, extralegal killings, human rights abuses, and genocide—labels that are much more adequate than the concept of terrorism. State terror (tyranny, at worst) and terrorist groups differ fundamentally in that the former is oriented toward keeping and consolidating the political status quo, while nonstate actors use terrorist tactics to change the situation and, finally, to overthrow a political regime. Moreover, state actors or those acting on behalf of a government do not typically operate covertly but seek visibility to intimidate either the population at large or particular groups (such as opposition groups or minorities). Furthermore, terrorist attacks can be the work of a few armed individuals, while state terror requires a relatively powerful security and intelligence apparatus. There is, however, a gray area of state-sponsored terrorism, which implies state toleration of, support for, or direction of terrorist groups. Thereby, state actors strategically sponsor terrorist groups in pursuit of their own agenda. In a few cases, they may even actively promote the founding of terrorist organizations or may be directly involved in terrorist operations, thus blurring the line between state and nonstate actors.

**Rationale and Characteristics of Terrorist Groups**

Despite the fact that terrorist groups differ largely in size, organizational structure, ideology, political goals, and support, their rationale has remained basically unaltered since the beginning of modern terrorism during the 19th century, even though terrorist methods have changed over time. First of all, terrorist groups—even the largest ones—are relatively “weak” actors compared with regular armies or security forces. Terrorist tactics, such as car or truck bombs, suicide bombings, targeted assassinations, kidnapping, and hostage taking, are therefore used because of lack of alternatives. Terrorist groups use this kind of violence—frequently against targets of high symbolic value—not only to shock and intimidate particular segments of the society at large but also to mobilize sympathizers and supporters as well as to contribute to the radicalization of political movements. They see themselves as the vanguard acting on behalf of “oppressed,” “humiliated,” and “marginalized” groups, thus, adopting a sense of moral superiority, which serves to justify their immoral and illegal acts in their eyes and that of others. In this sense, terrorism is a “communication strategy” conveying political messages to friends and foes alike.

In addition to the operational level, terrorist groups also rely on the spread of propaganda in the form of claims of responsibility after attacks, the launch of warnings, and political declarations, which nowadays are usually disseminated on the Internet or on videotapes. For this purpose, some larger groups even have their own media departments and ways of transmitting their messages. Propaganda aims not only at conveying signals but also at purposeful deception and disinformation; it provides terrorist groups with a platform that makes them appear “bigger” and “more powerful”—an effect that an isolated terrorist attack can hardly produce. Terrorism would simply not work without publicity. Yet terrorist attacks and terrorist
propaganda in and of themselves do not necessarily produce the desired mobilization of supporters. Rather, mobilization is achieved through the reaction that an attack provokes among those against whom it is directed. Attacks are aimed at prompting the opponent to adopt brutal and disproportionate measures, which will—as terrorist groups frame it—“delegitimize” and “unmask” him. For terrorist groups, the objective is to convey the impression that the target of their attacks (e.g., a government) is the actual aggressor, while the attack itself is justified as a means of legitimate self-defense and self-assertion.

Terrorist groups employ an action–reaction spiral, which allows them to swap roles and portray themselves as the actual victims. As many observers note, there is an asymmetrical relation between terrorist groups and the state’s security apparatus: On the one hand, terrorists are typically inferior to the state’s police and military potential—logistically but also in terms of manpower. On the other hand, they operate underground and, thus, have the element of surprise on their side. It is enough for them to succeed every now and then to demonstrate that even comprehensive and cost-intensive security measures by the state cannot offer complete security for the population. Moreover, many terrorist groups have a time horizon that is different from that of their counterparts; they see themselves as being on a historical mission and, therefore, think long term; they do not aim at quick victories but believe that “history” or “destiny” will be on their side and that in the long run, they will prevail.

These strategic advantages do not come without costs, however. Terrorist groups are forced to be innovative—on the one hand, because they are usually constantly on the run and, on the other hand, because they have to do the unexpected to remain successful. They have to be unpredictable; they must avoid adopting behavioral patterns and must therefore change their methods from time to time. By the same token, this increases the risk of failure. Not every terrorist organization is able to be innovative in the long run due to the lack of resources, adequate leadership, or a favorable environment. Terrorist groups face a structural dilemma: On the one hand, they have to implement considerable precautionary measures to avoid being discovered—measures that, however, limit their freedom of movement and their operational capacity. On the other hand, their political visibility and influence crucially depend on their ability to launch successful and surprising attacks. But each plot, in turn, inevitably provides investigators with information about the group, their logistics, and their operational patterns. A further difficulty for terrorist groups lies in securing their financial and logistical base for a longer period of time. To some extent, actors are preoccupied with sustaining themselves and organizing their survival. Doing this from the underground and with discreet support from outside does have a number of implications for the internal organization and the cooperation with others. In many instances, for example, terrorists need to cooperate with organized crime groups in acquiring weapons, laundering money, or trafficking illegal goods. In other cases, terrorist groups undertake legal or shadowy business activities; they are involved in fund-raising or in collecting a “revolution tax.” A critical juncture is when the means become an end in themselves, and the self-sustaining aspect of a group becomes more important than the actual political ambitions. Then, terrorist groups or, at least, certain segments of that group, simply degenerate into criminal or money-making organizations—such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) and the IRA—which no longer care about mobilizing larger parts of the population for political ends.

Over time, the conspiratorial character of terrorist groups often leads to psychological defects—mainly due to group-think as well as to strict black-and-white thinking. The groups tend to create their own reality, perceiving and interpreting every event and all information according to their own worldviews. From their perspective, each setback or “failure” is merely an “insignificant episode” on the long-term path to “victory.” Terrorist leaders generally disregard contradictory developments and the possibility of pursuing alternative strategies. This development culminates in terrorists feeling reassured in their behavior, irrespective of what is happening around them. Progressive loss of reality frequently goes hand in hand with increasing radicalization and brutalization in the use of violence. The latter may also be directed against group members or supporters. Doubts, dissent, or even compromise
with the opponents is usually not tolerated because they jeopardize the group’s internal coherence.

**Numbers and Types**

Since the labeling of militant groups as terrorists is loaded with political considerations and terminological problems, there can be no authoritative list of terrorist groups. The most comprehensive set of data is provided by the Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START] at the University of Maryland). The database contains information about more than 80,000 terrorist attacks beginning in 1970 and conducted by more than 2,000 squads, commands, or groups with distinct names, ranging from very small fringe groups to large, full-fledged insurgencies. These data, however, just indicate how many groups may use inter alia terrorist tactics, but it does not say anything about a consistent pattern of behavior, which would justify the term terrorist group and which would enable analysts to distinguish them from other armed nonstate actors. The same problem applies to the comprehensive list of groups in a 2008 study by Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, which refers to 648 “terrorist organizations” that existed between 1968 and 2006—244 are still active and 241 have been active for 10 or more years, which underscores how persistent militant groups can be once they have been established. This set of data also points to the fact that most terrorist groups are very small and count in the 10s rather than the 100s. But the list also includes a number of larger groups, which are better understood as rebel or guerrilla movements (such as FRELIMO in Mozambique, the Maoists in Nepal, or the Sandinistas of Nicaragua) or simply as organized crime groups. Not least because of these difficulties, governments’ official lists of terrorist groups are much smaller. For example, the U.S. State Department has listed 45 groups as “foreign terrorist organizations” (July 2009); the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 40 (November 2008); and the Council of the European Union, 47 (January 2009); a large number of them are characterized by an Islamist ideology.

Beyond the issue of numbers, the literature on terrorism mainly deals with the question of typologies since terrorist groups differ greatly according to various aspects. The most common typology focuses on the ideological orientation and worldviews of terrorist groups. Depending on the author, they are categorized as follows:

- social revolutionary, Marxist, or left-wing groups (e.g., the German Red Army Faction);
- ethnonational, separatist groups (e.g., the IRA or the Basque Homeland and Liberty [Euskadi ta Askatasuna, ETA]);
- right-wing, neo-fascist, or racist groups (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan in the United States);
- religious groups (e.g., Al Qaeda and other Jihadist groups); and
- apocalyptic groups (the Aum Shinrikyō sect in Japan may be a case in point).

The assumption is that the form of ideology does explain other aspects of terrorist groups, such as the political agendas, the links with particular communities and milieus, the level of public support, the duration of the group, or their destructive potential.

An alternative typology distinguishes terrorist groups on the basis of their geographical reach, that is, based on whether their actions and goals are limited to a local area or whether they pursue an overarching, global agenda.

First, national or domestic terrorist group refers to a terrorist group that operates mainly in its home country to challenge the domestic political status quo, either by regime change or by territorial separation; perpetrators and victims are both residents of the same state. Despite their contacts with like-minded groups elsewhere, the Basque ETA, the IRA, the Kurdish Workers’ Party (Partiya Karker Kurdistan, PKK), the Sri Lankan Tamil Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the European left-wing groups of the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Brigade Rosse in Italy, Action Directe in France, and Red Army Faction in Germany) do by and large fit into that category.

Second, the label international terrorism—or internationally operating terrorists—applies to groups that aim at internationalizing a local conflict to attract the attention of a wider public and to put their issues on the international agenda. They deliberately choose and attack targets abroad; typically, assassins and victims are not residents of the same state. Examples for this kind of terrorism
have been Palestinian groups, such as the Palestine Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the PFLP–General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Abu Nidal Group, which in the late 1960s consciously decided to undertake spectacular operations abroad to make the world aware of the Palestinian cause.

Third, transnational terrorism—sometimes also called new terrorism—involves groups and networks of groups that aim at changing the global or, at least, the regional political order. Their acts are directed against the actual or assumed dominance or hegemony of certain states, ideologies, and ways of life (e.g., the Western culture). These groups may be engaged in local conflicts also, but they see these struggles in a broader context of a global or regional fight. Transnational terrorist groups share a number of features, including a transnational ideology, multinational membership, and transnational network structures designed to bypass states and regions. The paradigm case is the Al Qaeda network of Osama bin Laden. Since 1996 at the latest, bin Laden’s Islamist movement has been directly targeting U.S. and Western influence, or “imperialism,” in the Islamic world, which in its view has to be defeated first in order to “liberate” Muslim populations from their “corrupt” rulers and install a “true” Islamic order under the rule of the Caliphate. In its ideology, Al Qaeda has linked local conflicts with Muslim involvement (e.g., Bosnia, Chechnya, Mindanao, and Indonesia), with the mission of a global jihad against the “Jewish–Christian crusaders.” Moreover, in contrast to most conventional terrorist groups, Al Qaeda works as a multinational enterprise, which—despite its Arab origin—comprises persons of different ethnic, national, and linguistic backgrounds bound together by a common transnational Islamist ideology. Other groups—associated with Al Qaeda to a greater or lesser extent—such as Jemaah Islamiyyah in Southeast Asia, the Al Qaeda of the Maghreb region, and some Central Asian as well as some Pakistani jihadi groups—have adopted a similar worldview.

Understanding and Explaining Terrorist Groups

There is no single theory that could explain the emergence, persistence, transformation, and decline of terrorist groups in general—the universe of groups is simply too diverse for that. However, it has been widely established that most terrorist groups are the radical outgrowth of domestic or international conflicts. Thus, terrorist groups typically emerge in three different situations: The first is a latent conflict that terrorists aim at escalating by their acts to mobilize parts of the population in order to trigger a mass movement (e.g., left-wing terrorism in Western Europe in the 1970s). Here, terrorist groups view themselves as “catalysts” of a subversive or separatist movement. The second case of terrorist groups emerges in the context of an armed struggle, which has already escalated to a greater extent. The militarily weaker actor—feeling backed into a corner—then frequently resorts to terrorist methods. Depending on the circumstances, terrorist acts may replace previous strategies altogether, which leads to the actor’s transformation and the consolidation of terrorist structures. In the third scenario, a ceasefire or peace agreement would have been concluded between the warring factions, which will then be undermined and sabotaged by radical fringe groups that may have frequently split from existing militant factions. These groups continue the “fight” by launching terrorist attacks to reignite the conflict (e.g., Real IRA in Northern Ireland after the 1998 agreement).

Despite this common terrorism–conflict nexus, there are a number of factors that determine the circumstances under which terrorist groups emerge and exist. These factors can be analyzed on three levels and using various social science theories. First, the microlevel refers to individual motivations and circumstances to establish or join a terrorist group. Here, biographical analysis, theories about deviant behavior, identity theories, psychological and sociopsychological theories, and rational choice theories are often used for isolating explanatory variables, such as, inter alia, traumatic events, past or current experience with violence, personal revenge, altruism, narcissistic personality, paranoia, peer pressure, frustration and aggression because of “relative deprivation,” and cost–benefit calculations, which may influence the behavior of individuals. Second, the mesolevel considers the group as a collective actor together with its decisions and activities. In this regard, theories on collective action (e.g., resource mobilization theory); social learning and group behavior (e.g., ingroup–outgroup thinking); organizational and network
studies; perceptions, belief systems, and mind sets; political economy; concepts and theoretical assumptions about the role of ideology; and myths and symbols as well as theories about the role of leadership (e.g., charismatic leadership) are usually applied in order to analyze the establishment, the internal coherence and structure, and the prospects for persistence of a group. Third, the macrolevel addresses the general political, cultural, and socio-economic environment in which a terrorist group operates. This level refers to modernization theories; center–periphery models and theories about structural imbalances; issues of historical injustice; approaches of conflict and peace studies; theories on globalization, transnationalization, and space; sociological questions about the political system; and the behavior of ruling elites as well as concepts of statehood. Based on these, a number of explanatory factors are mentioned in the literature, such as poverty, relative deprivation, political frustration and marginalization, fragile or failed statehood, lack of democratic governance, geographical aspects, and the effects of shadow economies and global markets. In any case, the three levels have to be studied in combination because they are deeply intertwined: For example, factors at the meso- or macrolevels may influence individual motivations and the demands, needs, and identity of individuals, which, in turn, have to be reflected at the meso level to keep a group together.

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See also Anarchism; Conflicts; Islamist Movements; State Failure; Terrorism, International; Violence

Further Readings

Theocracy

The term theocracy was coined by Flavius Josephus in the 1st century CE to label a political system in which political rule is exercised by the clergy or other religious officials deemed as representatives of God on earth. This entry discusses the meaning of the term theocracy and its presence in various religions, historically and in the present. Theocracies have existed throughout the world at various points in history, not only in the Catholic and Islamic worlds but also in contexts as varied as that of the early Mormons in the United States, under Joseph Smith and Brigham Young, and in Tibet from the 13th until the mid-20th centuries. After describing the concept of theocracy in various religions, this entry further explores the meaning of theocracy through the example of the role of the Russian Orthodox Church. It concludes with questions about whether political society in general presupposes some broadly theocratic foundation.

The Concept of Theocracy in Various Religious Contexts

In the strict sense of the term, theocracy is not parallel to the categories of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy. One would indeed be at a loss if one wanted to situate God, who certainly is not of this world, in a concrete political function of any kind.

The word theocracy has, however, a real history, related to the justifications given by both ecclesiastical and secular authorities for the imposition of
Theocracy

their views in the political sphere or in some aspects of it. There is a theocratic aspect to a given viewpoint if it is presented as indisputable because it is derived from a scripture deemed religious, or sacred, such as the Bible or the Koran, or from an assertion coming from a religious authority not recognized as competent in the political sphere. The latter is the case with fatwas, the decrees proclaimed by one form or other of Islamic authority, an ulema or a college of ulemas, even if it is on the other hand affirmed that in Islam there is no authority of any kind above the individual believer’s reading of the Koran.

During the Middle Ages, the removal of a king or an emperor by a pope could also be termed an act with a theocratic basis, since papal sovereignty gave the pope indirect power over the political sphere. Another example is the pope’s authority to intervene in the case of sin (ratione peccati) when there is a question of morality.

On the other hand, some princes and some kings, especially those who were the objects of quasi-sacramental coronations, seemed to be invested with a divine right proper; there was something theocratic about them, their power, and their commands. One may wonder whether this form of pretension still exists today anywhere. It may have been the case, probably, with the Japanese emperor until after World War II. The present Iranian regime, in which the final authority lies with an ayatollah (presently Seyed Ali Khamenei), can in some real sense be termed theocratic, and the same applies, with the differences specific to the Sunni world, to the Wahhabi monarchy of Saudi Arabia. Today’s jihadist movement advocates the restoration of the caliphate system, abolished almost a century ago by Atatürk at the fall of the Ottoman Empire.

John Calvin is known, for his part, to have ruled Geneva, the city of his reformation, in a theocratic way and with a theocratic justification. Luther, contrariwise, reinforced the profane power of the temporal sovereigns, freeing them from any pretense of jurisdiction of the Catholic authority. Thus, in his theory of two kingdoms, he made them dependent on God alone (Zwei Reiche).

In the Catholic world of the 17th century, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627–1704) was convinced of the divine character of the absolutist power of his king. More generally, he thought that there is something divine in the proper sense of the term invested by God himself in the princes as such. One had consequently to show “religion” proper toward them, though it was to be the religion of “second majesty,” or second degree, in comparison with the religion of first majesty, which we owe to God (La politique tirée des propres paroles de l’Ecriture sainte, III 2, 3). All this again sounded theocratic, at least in the broad sense of the term. Perhaps one can ask whether there is any branch of religion that has not known something of this in the past. But even today, in Tibetan Buddhism, the power of the Dalai Lama, at the same time temporal and spiritual, is invested with a similar dual character.

The Russian Orthodox Church

On the other hand, the close association of a state with a religion—even if it is short of a state religion—produces, similarly, some kind of a theocratic effect. In contemporary Russia, where, in spite of the constitutional separation of church and state, there exists a special recognition of the Orthodox Church (Moscow patriarchate) in some documents of the state, one can sense a special religious aura of favor to the advantage of the Church in many actions of the government. In the perception of many citizens, the government is not quite purely profane. Conversely, this has to do with the special relationship to the “nation” that appears in the statements of the Orthodox Church. In the Sotsialnaia kontseptsia (Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church), approved by the Holy Synod in the year 2000, one reads,

The Church does not distribute men according to nationality or social origin. . . . The universal character of the Church does however not mean that the Christians do not enjoy a national specificity, a national expression. [There exists] a Christian national culture. . . . Among the saints whom the Russian Orthodox Church venerates many have made themselves famous by their love and fidelity to their fatherland.

While it is true that no mention is made here of the 1941 case when the Patriarch was called by Joseph Stalin to the rescue of the nation, the
insistence is, however, significant. Following Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, Stalin relaxed his formerly vigorous antireligious and anticlerical policy and adopted a more tolerant stance toward the Russian Orthodox Church. According to some historians, this shift occurred in part to satisfy U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt’s conditions for increased American support in the war against Adolf Hitler and also because, particularly with clerical approval, many who might resist an appeal to go to battle for communism could be relied on to do so for the Holy Russia of Orthodox Christianity. The Russian Church has many times given its blessing to the people for their participation in the Liberation wars.

Today other Christian denominations in Russia complain about the special treatment of the Orthodox Church. Some Muslims too are critical of this situation of privilege enjoyed by the Russian Orthodox Church.

Of course, the Russian Orthodox Church, however, is far from theocratic in Ayatollah Khomeini’s sense of running a state as of a few years ago in Iran, or even in Khomeini’s sense of running a state today. It is Islam that most frequently looms on the horizon whenever one speaks of theocracy today, even if it be in a vague sense in countries that do not kowtow to politicoreligious authorities as such.

The Possibility of Political Authority Without Theocracy

The word theocracy may also come up in discussions on the question of whether any political authority can exist without an aura of religious transcendence, such an aura signifying conversely that the political authority bows to conscience and stops from acting whenever conscience or conscientious objection is at stake—the latter being, of course, of utmost importance. There is indeed such a majesty in political power that some authors do not hesitate to see an element of theocracy in the democratic governments themselves. In March 2007, the Paris Revue d’éthique et de théologie (Journal of Ethics and Moral Theology) published an article of strongly paradoxical intent by the prominent French scholar Rémi Brague under the title “Un régime autre que la théocratie est-il possible?” (“Is a Regime Other Than Theocracy Possible?”). Brague, an expert on medieval Arabic, Jewish, and Latin philosophy and cultural history, notes that democracy particularly is some kind of theocracy:

Whether the fundamental idea in democracy is the law or conscience does not make much of a difference: the two of these ideas have theological foundations. This is why our democratical ideals of the supreme power of the law (Law state) or of an interior tribunal of ethics as the last authority in the each person’s soul, are theologically grounded. (p. 110)

In Western political regimes, Brague says, law is considered to be “anchored in the people’s will,” but

the people consists of free human beings, apt to recognize what they should do through listening to the voice of their conscience. In this case too, law is grounded in the last instance in the idea of the human conscience. Vox populi, vox Dei is the origin of “one man, one vote.” (p. 111)

Brague then discusses in the same vein the nature of divine law and Islam and notes also that with respect to Western democracy, “we Westerners live, or have lived, in a certain sense, in a theocracy of conscience” (p. 117). Although today Westerners want to conceive of their regime as a democracy, Brague asks whether, in fact, that is the kind of society we really want. He argues that, instead, we want a regime of free citizens. That freedom means “that we have to obey no other instance but our conscience, the presence of which in us expresses God’s care for his creature” (p. 118). With Rousseau, Fichte, and Kant, there has been a secularization of conscience. But, says Brague,

The secularized state of our democracies is [itself] a problem. One can indeed ask whether a human community can live in the long run otherwise than a “laos” (people under a conscience) or without some kind of a theological basis. . . . Is a non theocratical regime possible in the long run? (p. 120)

If we take theocratical in a broad sense of the term, the answer is indeed clearly no. No one is self-engendered. The social contract, so praised as the
foundation of political society, does not produce those who themselves make the contract. So, at the least, it seems that political life presupposes some sense of moral authority as a condition for the social contract, though this may not be considered a theocratic concept in the strict sense, especially today, when the term is used primarily in reference to Islam.

Authorities in the Religious Sphere Itself

Can the religious authority exercised in the religious sphere proper—that is, the authority of the Christian bishops, and of the Catholic pope in particular—be termed theocratic? It is not so, at least in the official documents of the Catholic Church. Any such reference is normally avoided because, among other things, it is obvious that such authorities are under the authority of the Scriptures themselves. The Vatican II Council has of late repeatedly stressed that there is a term of reference beyond any episcopal or pontifical authority itself.

Such authority is religious when it is derived from the faith of the believers, but this does not mean the same as theocratic, because here there can be no pretension to enjoying God’s very authority, or some part of it. There is the pretension only of some participation in the authority of Jesus Christ as the founder of this body, the Church, in which he is in some sense continued. Vatican II in its document Lumen gentium (1964) says, “The social whole which constitutes the Church is at the service of the Spirit of Christ who gives it life, for the growth of that body” (No. 8).

Aftermath of “Political Theology”

In the realm of political philosophy, one should finally also mention here the Christian legal scholar and philosopher Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), whose views on the national socialism of Nazi Germany probably were drawn from his adherence, in his early writing Politische Theologie (1922), to the idea of some form of perpetuation of the Holy Empire. In a context of “neutralization” and “depolitization,” dominated by a technicist way of thinking—the Weimar Republic—he defended a view of politics as not innocent but instead characterized by the dialectics of friend and foe and the presence of power (Macht), as well as a certain transcendence. This colored in some way the very positive attitude he showed, at least for a time, toward national socialism. (For this reason, it would of course be dangerous to associate all ideas of transcendence in political philosophy with such an extreme vision of the political realm).

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See also Buddhism; International Regimes; Islam; Religion

Further Readings


Thick Description

Thick description is a research method enabling us to discern meanings within the contexts in which social actions take place. It originated as a tool for ethnographers engaged in participant observation and was later adopted by a wider range of qualitative researchers, including some sociologists and political scientists. In his famous 1973 essay titled “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” the anthropologist Clifford
Geertz explained the contrast between “thick” and “thin” description. Drawing from the Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle’s reflections on thinking as entailing an account of the settings, circumstances, and intentions that give actions their meanings, he showed how important it is to go beyond mere facts and appearances when it comes to interpreting behavior. The most well-known illustration provided is that of the contraction of one eyelid, which may be taken as either an involuntary twitch or as a wink (impacting a particular message, related to a socially established code), as a parody of wink, or even the rehearsal of this parody. Geertz goes on with other examples taken from his own field experiences. The core of the argument is that performing empirical research involves accurately describing social actions and exploring underlying meanings. In other words, thick description leads to thick interpretation. This entry discusses the basic assumptions underlying this method and its relevance for political science.

**Methodological Critique and Epistemological Debate**

From a methodological point of view, such an approach marks an important departure from traditional assumptions. What is explicitly criticized is the empirical “thinness” of some research traditions—such as behavioralism—which largely overlook what makes sense to the social actors studied. A typical reproach from the advocates of thick description is that in many sectors of the social sciences, there is too much abstract theorization and not enough serious field research. Interpretivists are notably skeptical about “armchair scholars” who delegate the collection of data to polling organizations or junior assistants and concentrate on the more noble tasks of calculation and theory building. To some extent, this opposition coincides with the endless debates between researchers who use quantitative indicators that are deemed reliable insofar as they are replicable and those who resort instead to direct observation or long interviews because they believe that only intense immersion into particular settings will yield the information required. Within the first (positivist) tradition, the norm is to handle “objective” data or at least evidence that is not excessively dependent on what might be seen as the researcher’s subjective reading; moreover, all sorts of highly sophisticated analytical instruments (correlation coefficients, causal modeling based on econometric techniques, etc.) are seen to guarantee “true science.” On the other (interpretivist) side, serious doubts are harbored about the reliability of the procedures and the outcomes these procedures, which are often influenced by the questions asked.

At the epistemological level, it is claimed that thick description leads, for better or worse, to contextualism. Rich information is a leading hallmark of thick descriptive qualitative research—not in the sense of pooling superficial comparable data from many places but in amassing many contextually relevant details. This richness may be seen as commendable in the context of monographs; however, it is somewhat problematic when theoretical ambitions or even comparisons are involved. Once again, here, we are at the core of hotly debated axiomatic beliefs. Many social scientists share the view that it is incumbent on them to emulate the natural sciences and provide universal laws. Any “excessive empiricism” is consequently viewed as a posture making it difficult to develop necessary generalizations. On the contrary, in the other camp, it is held that the chief merit of in-depth field studies lies precisely in making us understand that efforts to explain the social world with grand theories held to be ubiquitously valid amount to ubiquitously valid amount to denying important sources of difference and complexity. In political science, contextual analysis—referring to historical, cultural, psychological, and demographic dimensions and others—is sometimes taken quite seriously (see Robert Goodin & Charles Tilly, 2008). However, the question arises as to what extent context matters and whether the main goal of the discipline should, or should not, remain the defense of abstract and homogenizing models, even at the price of glossing over important contextual dimensions.

We are touching here on several key themes, such as context dependency possibly leading to relativism, the sensitive question of causality and, more generally, that of whether or not the social sciences should seek to ape the methods used in the “hard” sciences. To return to Geertz, who clearly defined himself as an “anti anti-relativist,” the world is incorrigibly diverse because human development has led to infinite sociocultural arborescence, with
ever multiplying branches. This enabled the existence of myriad cultural expressions and an unlimited number of potentialities and motivations, each of which should be understood in its particular context. This clearly draws attention to the importance of culture and, more specifically, to what concerns us here—its place within the analysis of political life. In what is probably his most often quoted phrase, Geertz (1973) explains,

> Believing with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning. (p. 5)

It is important to note that he adds that culture must be understood as a “deep” context and not merely as “reflecting,” “expressing,” “corresponding to,” “emerging from,” or “conditioned by” interest-based social cleavages. This perspective obviously defies the assumptions of several classical schools of thought (e.g., Marxist visions in terms of ideology or constructivist theories of social reality), and it was to have a considerable influence on several disciplines, leading notably to what is now known as the new cultural history or cultural sociology.

### Universalism Versus Relativism in Political Science

As far as political science is concerned, and more specifically if we look at the subfield of comparative politics, it might be argued that two rival metatheoretical frameworks for research are used: the universalist and the relativist. Within each one of them, obviously, there are distinct standpoints. For example, both structuralist and rational choice perspectives are universalist. Similarly, there is a variety of cultural approaches. In the following, an attempt will be made to clarify the positioning of interpretive perspectives based on thick description vis-à-vis other established traditions in this discipline. Within the universalist paradigm, there is, first of all, the political philosophy tradition. Geertz insists that cultural categories emerging from the past hold us in thrall. Therefore, one should wonder whether ways of thinking formulated in one particular context—say that of Athens during the 4th century BCE—are relevant when it comes to interpreting politics in settings far removed from those from which those views derive. Likewise, having systematic recourse to the concepts of political economy, a discipline elaborated to account for the dynamics of the rise of capitalism in Europe, might not always be relevant to non-Western polities. There, it may be more appropriate to reason in terms of “moral economy” or “economy of affection,” concepts that have been applied, respectively, to Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa as a result of the empirical observation of actual political practices. In a Geertzian perspective, one should think twice before using any apparatus with universalistic ambitions because they are usually ethnocentric and normative. This inevitably raises the tricky issue of the dominance of a terminology drawn from the experience of Europe and North America, which is assumed to apply to the entire world. However, if each “terrain” generates its own operational notions, how can political scientists communicate with each other, and how can we make comparisons possible? We shall return to this crucial point and suggest how the conundrum can be resolved at the end of this entry.

As was already mentioned, the Geertzian approach holds that culture is not merely to be defined as a by-product of more fundamental factors. This does not necessarily mean that we should argue in terms of primacy of culture but only that we should beware of approaches that systematically resort to the same structural determinants (economic ones, for instance). Structuralists frequently accuse those they classify as “culturalists” of having an overly impressionistic and “essentialist” viewpoint. Seeking to identify universal features transcending cultural diversity, they are eager to reduce the range of observable cases to a limited number of given types, looking for functional equivalents if need be. Pivotal to the dispute between the two schools of thought is the question of meaning. In sharp disagreement with the idea that local meanings would merely be a negligible surface phenomenon, interpretivists hold that it is imperative to unravel what makes sense (or not) to the actors concerned. Hence, there is a dialogue of the deaf between adherents of structuralist approaches, who argue that it is necessary to avoid
being blinded by the apparent diversity of concrete situations, and advocates of thick descriptions, who are constantly wary of reductionist approaches prone to fitting realities into preconceived molds.

Another influential perspective, within the universalist paradigm, is rational choice. We can all agree that human beings are possessed of reason. However, the motivations and interests that motivate groups or individuals in one milieu are often incomprehensible to those in another. For interpretivists, the aim is not to deny the possible use of the concepts of interest and rationality. It is merely to place them in context. Even if we take it for granted that human beings always carefully weigh the consequences of their actions, we need to accept that the realm of possible choices is constrained by the prevalent universe of meaning within which they live. This is where thick description is viewed as fundamental. We would all like to believe that it is easy to transcend the limitations of our own culture and to understand those of others. In reality, this is an exercise that requires lengthy training and is never fully completed. To take just one example, Scandinavian diplomats may deplore the fact that in international summits “the poorer the country, the more ostentatious its representatives,” but reciprocally, the conspicuously modest behavior of the members of some Nordic nongovernmental organizations appears to be incomprehensible in the eyes of some sub-Saharan elites. The role of the interpretivist is to go beyond such ethnocentric views and to make sense of the respective attitudes and cross-perceptions.

The developmentalist schools of thought may be placed at the intersection of the universalist and the relativist paradigms. The singularity of these approaches is that their adherents are usually rather conscious of important disparities between societies or polities, but they also share the assumption that it is quite possible to move toward a desirable direction. Their frameworks are affected by the fact that they take their own model of reference as the end point toward which all others should be converging. The teleological goals might be different, and indeed radically divergent (suffice it to think of the Cold War era and the two systems in competition), and largely biased by ideological convictions. However, evolution toward the supposedly best system would only be a matter of time, willpower, and application of the right recipes. Even if some macromodels of deep sociopolitical mutations deserve to be admired for their sophistication, the question is whether they are generally applicable. Adherents of cultural approaches are often accused of promoting a fairly static and immutable vision of societies. It is true that they are particularly attuned to the longue durée and thus to the resilience of cultural traits or some logics of adoption/adaptation. However, they think it useful to reason not only in an evolutionist way (when appropriate) but also in terms of involutions—that is, to pay full attention to the possible specific dynamics of some societies. This heuristic concept, widely used by Geertz in his studies of Indonesia, makes it possible to account for cultural patterns that are no longer traditional but not evolving into a recognizable modernity either.

Relativism, Postmodernism, Interpretivism

Let us now consider the relativist paradigm. As is well-known, some confusion is engendered by the fact that there are so many conceptions of what is exactly meant by culture. Space limitations preclude the full enumeration and discussion of all the schools of thought that take cultural dimensions seriously, but it is important to explain, at least, in which ways an interpretivist approach diverges from perspectives in terms of values and from postmodernist views. In political science, a large number of scholars equate culture with systems of beliefs and customs. At the heart of all these definitions lies the notion of values, which refers to that “conception of the desirable” commonly shared within a given social grouping. If it is arguable that such an approach is useful as concerns small, traditional communities, it is less likely that it can offer insights regarding modern polities, characterized by a high degree of social differentiation, and even less regarding postmodern societies in which normative conventions have been shattered. As Bertrand Badie has noted, the great advantage of an approach in terms of meaning is that once we accept that culture is not a concatenation of normative standpoints but the language that makes understanding possible, it becomes easier to explain why individuals who live within the same cultural setting can hold antagonistic convictions based on different values and still belong to the same culture. For similar reasons, interpretivists distance
themselves from conceptions in terms of political culture. If they accept that the notion of culture refers to a wide semiotic framework, the idea of a political culture autonomous from the rest of a society’s cultural codes presupposes the existence of a political sphere strongly differentiated from other spheres (religious, economic, etc.)—which is far from being generally the case, even in the contemporary world. Beyond the antagonistic visions of the ideal society held by political parties, what is of interest to an interpretivist approach is that they all operate within shared systems of meaning.

It is sometimes assumed that Geertzian anti-positivist writings have paved the way for postmodernist skepticism (see, e.g., Goodin & Tilly, 2008, p. 8). Admittedly, some postmodernists praise interpretivists for having recontextualized “Western knowledge” and also for having emphasized the need to study other systems of meaning in their own terms. Nevertheless, they typically criticize interpretivists for not following them all the way when it comes to challenging dominant cultures and glorifying those of the so-called oppressed minorities. There is obviously a huge gap between militant postures eager to propagate multiculturalism and a scientific one merely aiming to underline the magnitude of cultural cleavages. An interpretivist approach does not exalt differences; it just seeks to analyze them seriously. Likewise, if interpretivists are fairly critical of much of the apparatus of the natural sciences, including hypothesis testing or the formulation of dependent and independent variables, it does not mean that they readily adhere to deconstructivist perspectives considering that reality is pure illusion and that everything is intertextual. The intention certainly is to challenge the premises on which earlier approaches have been constructed but with the aim of providing a new form of science generating rigorous theorizing driven by data collected through serious fieldwork.

This has several important consequences. First, thick description implies thinking semiotically. It should be underlined that the semiotic approach espoused here does not refer to semiology and assorted structuralist theories of signs derived from linguistics but entails being particularly attentive to the worlds of meaning of others. A key aspect that should be noted is that, whereas thin descriptions use experience-distant concepts, thick descriptions resort more willingly to experience-near concepts. In other words, this tradition of studies is not very comfortable with ubiquitous abstract concepts that confer an illusion of analytical familiarity to all places and situations. As already alluded to, a major problem is our need to operate at a certain level of generalization and to find ways of translating the unfamiliar logics of other cultures into an idiom that all political scientists can understand without falling prey to excessive universalism. This is not necessarily an impossible mission. Following Bertrand Badie and Guy Hermet (1990), one possible approach to resolving this dilemma is to make a distinction between concepts that are transcultural and those that are monocultural. For instance, according to these two authors, the concept of norm falls into the first category but that of state would fall into the second—insofar as, thanks to the insight provided by historical sociology, we understand that the state is not the natural framework of political activity but merely one specific mode of political organization, which unpremeditatedly emerged in some European countries at the end of the Middle Ages. Moreover, we know that its transplantation to other contexts has often proved problematic, largely because of cultural factors. What is required is not the evaluation of states according to an ideal-type model or according to a gradualist approach that would put Scandinavian countries at one extreme of a continuum and Somalia at the other. It is rather to study all sorts of polities without necessarily placing the concept of the state at the heart of our research and, instead, to pay full attention to the thick description of the nature and working of social and political relations. Consequently, comparative studies should question the explanatory value of concepts and analytical models across cases.

Second, a thick description perspective involves thinking inductively rather than deductively. This means beginning with an examination of empirically observed realities and only at a later stage mobilizing the most appropriate instruments. The chief merit of in-depth field studies is precisely in avoiding the temptation of a priori generalization on the basis of grand theories held to be universally valid. Although many apparatuses are worthy of note, it is often relatively simple to supply empirical
findings that do not readily fit with their respective predictions. The existence of such discrepancies necessitates not a further elaboration of alternative theories with global explanatory ambitions but limited ones succeeding in making sense of nonnegligible variations across time or space. The scientific reasoning suggested here is not one that attains the highest level of abstract generalization but one that takes into account various logics of meaning. Placing the issue of meaning center stage leads us to rethink the merits and demerits of the classical approaches and challenges the supposed universality of some mechanisms (see the many illustrations in Patrick Chabal & Jean-Pascal Daloz, 2006). Such an interpretivist standpoint leads to theoretical eclecticism. Needless to say, its intention is not to juxtapose largely incompatible theories but rather to move toward an awareness of the limited validity of exclusivist conceptual frameworks. The result is certainly not sterile empiricism or subjectivism but a nondogmatic perspective seeking to illuminate a great diversity of scenarios. At the paradigmatic level, in contrast, ecumenism (see, e.g., Mark Lichbach & Alan Zuckerman, 1997, which attempts to marry rationalist, cultural, and structuralist approaches in the field of comparative politics) can only be considered with skepticism. There is obviously little possibility of analytical dialogue or theoretical convergence between the proponents of universalist and relativist paradigms.

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See also
Comparative Methods; Culturalism; Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; Participant Observation; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods

Further Readings


THINK TANKS

The term think tank has been used to describe both private and public organizations that provide advice to governments. A generally accepted definition would describe think tanks as organizations that are distinct from government and whose objective is to provide advice on a diverse range of policy issues through the use of specialized knowledge and the activation of networks. What follows in this entry is, first, a discussion of the historical and geographical development of the concept; second, a typology of think tanks; third, a discussion of characteristics and myths related to think tanks; and finally, some thoughts about the impact of globalization on think tanks.

Origins

The term think tank was first used in military jargon during World War II to describe a safe place where plans and strategies could be discussed, but its meaning started changing during the 1960s when it was used in the United States to describe private, nonprofit policy research organizations. It has been proposed that in reality the first example of a think tank was the Fabian Society, which was aiming to influence public policy in Britain at the end of the 19th century. For many years, the majority of scholars studying think tanks considered them as a uniquely American phenomenon that boomed in the United States because of the exceptionality of its political system and its rich tradition of private funding available for think tanks. From a global perspective, however, the argument that think tanks are a uniquely American phenomenon is not convincing. Think tanks have also flourished in other industrial Anglo-American countries, such as Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), and Australia, where normally, they are more modest than in the United States. European think tanks vary
considerably. In Germany, for example, large, influential think tanks are encountered, but they are often state funded and associated with political parties or universities. In France, what could be described as think tanks are organizations gathered around the government in Paris that operate in a conflictual but subordinate relationship with political parties. In southern Europe, think tanks are a more recent phenomenon as they began to appear in the 1970s after the establishment of democratic governments. Research on think tanks outside the Western world shows that it is likely that an even greater variety of organizations exists globally.

Typology

The diversity of organizations that fall under the term *think tank* has led to the creation of typologies. At least four types of think tanks can be observed. The first is the ideological tank, which refers to organizations that have a clearly specified political or, more broadly, ideological philosophy and are clearly related to the category of advocacy tanks. Examples include the New Right think tanks in the UK and the think tanks that are affiliated to political parties in Germany. This type is the closest to the stereotypical idea of what a think tank is. The next type is the specialist tank, which includes institutes that have a thematic focus. The most common subjects are foreign and public policy, but think tanks also specialize in other issues, such as the environment. The third category includes institutes that do not work at the national level. They could either work at the regional level, such as the American state tanks, or at the supranational level, such as the think tanks that are based in Brussels and are aiming at the European Union (EU). The final category is the think-and-do tanks that relate to organizations that apart from their traditional research activities, are starting to be active at a more practical level, such as in the funding of charity projects. This type of think tank is closer to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Following the above typology, it can be observed that think tanks are similar, but they can be distinguished from other organizations that are involved in the political arena. A think tank is different from a university unit that offers courses but also conducts research. It is different from philanthropic organizations that have as one of their lower priorities the funding of research and prefer the funding of actions directed to society in a more straightforward way. They are different from government advisory organizations because they play a distinctive and unique role by providing more independent intellectual support to, or new alternatives for, public policy. Nevertheless, there have been government research institutes, for example, in France, that are often described as think tanks. Finally, think tanks are also different from pressure groups and interest groups. This division has become less obvious because pressure groups increasingly develop in-house, well-researched critiques of existing policy. One of the most important differences is that pressure groups have a membership of individuals as one of their central characteristics. When they do get involved in research, they do it to support their campaigns, and it does not constitute their preliminary interest.

Common Characteristics of Think Tanks

If these are the types of think tanks, what are the common characteristics of these organizations? First, it is their policy focus, which means that their objective is to bring knowledge and policy making together by informing and, if possible, influencing the policy process. Think tanks conduct and recycle research that aims to solve policy problems and not solely to advance the theoretical debate. The second characteristic is public purpose, which refers to the reason for the existence of think tanks. Most of the think tanks claim that they conduct research to inform the public and the government on how to improve public policy. Their rhetoric often claims that their work is for the common good and to educate the public. Third, the expertise and professionalism of their research staff is the key intellectual resource of think tanks and a way of legitimizing their findings. Finally, the key activities of think tanks are usually research analysis and advice, which come in the form of publications, conferences, seminars, and workshops.

Myths Concerning Think Tanks

It has been argued that think tanks do not always possess the characteristics described above and that some of these features are better described as myths. The first myth concerns the policy focus of think tanks and their role as bridges between knowledge and government policies. As has already
Think Tanks

been discussed, no one type of think tanks exists. Furthermore, the borders between think tanks and organizations such as interest groups, professional associations, consultants, and university institutes are blurred. The result is that it is not always easy to identify an organization as a think tank and that bridging knowledge and policies can happen in a variety of ways, if indeed it is a priority of the organization. Another obstacle for think tanks that wish to play the role of a bridge between knowledge and government is that in many countries, the directors and experts of think tanks are closely related to politicians and bureaucrats. In reality, they belong to the same elite; they have similar worldviews, and they often move between governmental organizations and NGOs. Thus, think tanks cannot fulfill their role as bridges.

The second myth is that think tanks serve the public purpose. Although the public purpose is always in their rhetoric, think tanks are themselves organizations that have private interests, and they are dependent on their sources of funding. Often, their concern about their image and reputation limits the spectrum of their policy proposals. It is even doubtful to what extent think tanks can determine their own research agendas because this is often dependent on contracts and funding opportunities. This myth is closely related to the alleged independence of think tanks, which as has been shown is only partial given their needs for funding and publicity. The third myth concerns the knowledge resources of think tanks. Although think tanks do normally recruit experts and provide policy analysis, they often recycle rather than produce academic knowledge. Their aim is to make academic findings more palatable for busy politicians and policymakers. This means that think tanks play an important role in setting the research and policy agenda and in prioritizing some subjects over others.

International Think Tanks

Globalization has affected think tanks, especially by increasing their appetite and capacity for international networking. International think tanks and global networks have emerged since the 1990s. International think tanks, although they are based in one country, claim not to have any specific national links. An example is the European Policy Centre in Belgium, which claims that it is interested in the EU and not in a particular member state. Additionally, there is a tendency for transnational communication between think tanks to occur through the creation of regional and international fora, such as the Global Development Network. International organizations, such as the World Bank, are encouraging this kind of activity through the organization of a number of regional and international conferences for the promotion of think tanks and their work. On the other hand, think tanks are increasingly offering their services to international organizations, such as the World Bank and the EU. All this international activity has translated into a proliferation of the number of such organizations globally.

Future Challenges

The challenges, but also the opportunities, that think tanks are facing are many. First, the nature of funding has changed, and at times of economic recession, obtaining it has become difficult. Second, the proliferation of think tanks and other NGOs has meant increased competition but also increased possibilities for synergies, better productivity, and broader audiences. Third, the rise of the Internet has multiplied their communication possibilities, but it has also signified the spread of information that is not always accurate. Fourth, the emergence of specialist think tanks in new areas, such as biotechnology and genetics has facilitated the provision of more focused analysis. Finally, globalization has meant an increased demand for policy advice and a new role for think tanks that are forced to study policy alternatives from around the globe and then adapt them to their local context.

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See also Advocacy Coalition Framework; Epistemic Communities

Further Readings
Time-series analysis is a type of statistical analysis of observational data that vary over regular units of time. In political science, the data used are typically aggregate descriptors, such as unemployment rates, levels of presidential approval, the incidence of terrorist attacks, or the percentages of Democratic and Republican Party identifiers in the electorate. The data used are usually years, quarters, or months, but data gathered over much shorter periods also may be employed. For example, political economists studying variations in currency exchange rates or volatility in stock markets may use data gathered every day, every minute, or even every second. Although there are exceptions, time-series analysts normally do not generate their data de novo but rather rely on data gathered by government statistical agencies or private entities, such as public opinion polling agencies. In the following, the basic features and recent advances in this field are presented.

Historically, time-series analysis was closely integrated with other aspects of econometrics. Researchers typically began by specifying a model where the dependent ($Y_t$) and independent ($X_{kt}$) variables as well as the stochastic error term ($\varepsilon_t$) were subscripted with $t$ to denote variation over time. Equation 1 is an example with a single predictor variable ($X_t$). The coefficients $\beta_0$ and $\beta_1$ in this equation were assumed to be time invariant and were estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression:

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_t + \varepsilon_t. \quad (1)$$

A standard set of postestimation diagnostics was performed, with a Durbin-Watson test used to detect the presence of first-order autocorrelation in the residuals. Autocorrelated residuals prompted analysts to infer the existence of autocorrelation in the error process, that is, $\varepsilon_t = \rho \varepsilon_{t-1} + \nu_t$, where $\nu_t$ is a well-behaved Gaussian error term that is $\sim N(0, \sigma^2)$ by assumption. In turn, autocorrelated errors were treated as a nuisance, rather than as an indicator of model misspecification. This nuisance could be eliminated by a variant of generalized least squares (the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation), with the parameter $\rho$ being estimated from the data.

The resulting model (Equation 2) involves first-order partial differences of all left- and right-hand-side variables, including the error process:

$$Y_t - \rho Y_{t-1} = \beta_0 - \rho \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_t - \beta_1 \rho X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t - \rho \varepsilon_{t-1}. \quad (2)$$

The model thus contains a common factor restriction $(1 - \rho L)$, where $L$ is a backshift operator. Political scientists using this technique often appeared to be unaware that the model had dynamic properties with effects of all predictor variables being distributed over time by the presence of a lagged endogenous variable $Y_{t-1}$, with the rate of decay of these effects being governed by the parameter $\rho$.

Starting in the 1970s, analysts became increasingly aware of the restrictive nature of the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation, and many began to address the “nuisance” of autocorrelated errors by inserting a lagged endogenous variable on the right-hand side of their model (Equation 3).

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \lambda Y_{t-1} + \beta_1 X_t + \varepsilon_t. \quad (3)$$

This specification avoided the common factor restriction associated with the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation, but it still imposed a possibly theoretically unattractive uniform dynamic on the effects of all predictor variables, with the rate of decay of those effects being governed by the parameter $\lambda$ associated with the lagged endogenous variable. In addition, the lagged endogenous variable heightened the possibility that parameter estimates would be biased and inconsistent. Analysts recognizing this possibility typically tested model residuals for first-order correlation using statistics such as Durbin’s $H$ (the Durbin-Watson test being inapplicable for models with lagged endogenous variables).
Another important development in the 1970s involved threats to inference posed by trending (nonstationary) data. The stationarity condition requires that variables have constant means, constant variances, and constant autocovariances for any lag \( k \) regardless of the value of \( t \). Well before World War II, prominent statisticians and economists (e.g., George Udny Yule and John Maynard Keynes) worried about the fact that relationships between variables as suggested by statistically significant coefficients estimated in time-series regressions might be artifacts of nonstationarity. The reality of this spurious regression threat was documented by Clive Granger and Paul Newbold in 1974. Using simulated nonstationary variables that were independent by construction, Granger and Newbold found that they falsely rejected the null hypothesis for regression coefficients at alarmingly high rates. Type I errors (rejecting a true hypothesis) were a serious problem when data were nonstationary.

Traditionally, researchers concerned about this threat had “detrended” their data by regressing them on a time counter corresponding to the units of temporal aggregation of their data. However, many analysts believe that such deterministic trends are rare in the data-generating processes for variables of interest to social scientists. In this regard, Granger and Newbold had assumed that nonstationarity was a product of a local-level process, such as a random walk (see Equation 4).

\[
Y_t = 1.0 \ast Y_{t-1} + \epsilon_t. \tag{4}
\]

As Equation 4 shows, a random walk “remembers everything”: that is, its value at time \( t \) equals its value at \( t - 1 \) plus a contemporaneous random shock, \( \epsilon_t \). Since shocks are not discounted over time, the value of a random walk at any time \( t \) is the sum of all shocks to that point in time, plus the initial value of the series. The variance of such a process increases without bound as \( t \) goes to infinity. If the random walk model also includes a constant on the right-hand side, the resulting model—a random walk with drift—generates a deterministic trend. Random walks, with and without drift, are clearly nonstationary.

Given the seriousness of the spurious regressions threat, it is important to diagnose the presence of nonstationarity in time-series variables. Historically, the simplest of these diagnostics has been an ocular inspection of the graph of successive values of a time-series variable. If the variable appears to move predominantly upward or downward over the period for which data are available, the analyst concludes that the process “trends,” that is, it is nonstationary. A second diagnostic was suggested by George Box and Gwilym Jenkins, who demonstrated that “stochastic trending” variables, such as random walks, have characteristic autocorrelation functions. An autocorrelation function is the correlation of a time-series variable with itself at successively longer lags. The autocorrelation function for a random walk will have very large values at low lags, and the value of those correlations will decay only very slowly as the lag length increases. The autocorrelation functions of stationary variables are very different, either decaying at geometric rates in the case of an autoregressive process or having one or more significant “spikes” (correlations) in the case of a moving average process.

Inspection of graphs and autocorrelation functions involves judgment calls rather than formal statistical tests. However, over the past three decades, econometricians have developed a large battery of formal tests for nonstationarity. The most widely used of these unit-root tests was proposed by David Dickey and Richard Fuller (DF):

\[
(1 - L)Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T + \lambda Y_{t-1} + \epsilon_t, \tag{5}
\]

where \( T \) represents time.

The DF test involves regressing the first difference of a variable on its lag in levels plus possibly a constant and a deterministic trend (as in Equation 5), depending on hypotheses about the data-generating process. The key parameter is \( \lambda \), with a significance test (\( t \) test) for \( \lambda \) determining whether the variable is nonstationary. For the DF and many other (but not all) of these tests, the null hypothesis is nonstationarity. The \( t \) distribution for the DF test is nonstandard, and special tables of critical values must be used for significance tests. If one is concerned that test results may be biased because the error process of the DF regression is not “white noise,” lags of the dependent variable may be added to the right-hand side. The result is an augmented Dickey-Fuller test, and again, special \( t \) distributions must be used. Like other unit-root tests, the DF has been criticized for having low power, thus, raising the possibility of incorrectly...
failing to reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity (a Type II error).

Since the 1980s, it has become standard practice for analysts who conclude that variables of interest are nonstationary to first-difference these variables prior to doing regression analyses, that is, to compute \( Z_t = Y_t - Y_{t-1} \). If subsequent diagnostics suggest that the differenced series remains nonstationary, a second difference is taken, that is, \( W_t = Z_t - Z_{t-1} \). If we assume that the data-generating process is characterized by a stochastic trend, such differencing will engender stationarity.

Analyses of models using differenced variables will not be subject to the spurious regressions threat. However, by virtue of being specified with differenced variables, these models address only the short-term effects of various predictor variables. Any long-run relationships will be ignored. Since such relationships can be of considerable theoretical interest, a methodology for incorporating them in the analysis of nonstationary data is very useful. Such a methodology was provided in 1987 by Robert Engle and Clive Granger, who developed the concept of co-integration and demonstrated its relationship with error correction models in the context of applied time-series analysis. (Engle and Granger were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for this work in 2003.) They showed that it is possible for a linear combination of two nonstationary variables to be stationary. If this is the case, then, the variables are said to be co-integrated. Engle and Granger's proposed test for co-integration is simple—regress \( Y_t \) on \( X_t \) in their original-level form, and then, test the residuals for nonstationarity. (Again the requisite \( t \) distribution for a DF test on these residuals is nonstandard.) If the residuals are stationary, one concludes that the two series are co-integrated. If \( Y \) and \( X \) are co-integrated, Engle and Granger show that it is possible to model both the short- and long-run effects of \( X \) on \( Y \) via an error correction specification. This error correction model (an autoregressive distributed lag model with restrictions) is

\[
(1 - L)Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (1 - L)X_t + \alpha (Y - C_t X)_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t. \tag{6}
\]

where \( C_t \) is the correction term.

In Equation 6, the short-run effect of \( X \) operating at time \( t \) on \( Y \) is captured by the \( \beta_1 \) coefficient. The long-run effect is captured by \( \alpha \), with \( (Y - C_t X) \) operating with a one-period lag constituting the error correction mechanism. If such a mechanism is operating, the expectation is that \( \alpha \) will have an absolute value less than 1.0 and carry a negative sign. For example, an estimated \( \alpha \) of \(-.5\) implies that, ceteris paribus, any shock to the system that disturbs the long-run dynamic equilibrium between \( Y \) and \( X \) will be eroded at a rate of 50% in all subsequent time periods. Engle and Granger suggested that \((Y - C_t X)\) could be measured as the residuals from the co-integrating regression of \( Y \) on \( X \). Then, Equation 6 could be estimated using OLS. However, this two-step approach to estimation is not necessary, and equations such as Equation 6 can be estimated in one step using nonlinear least squares or maximum likelihood procedures. If one is not interested in a standard error for \( C_t \), OLS can be used.

In contrast to the methods described above, Box and Jenkins in 1976 offered a class of ARIMA (autoregressive, integrated, moving average) models designed to simplify and improve forecasting. Reacting to the perceived theoretical inadequacies and empirical failures of the traditional Cowles Commission approach to forecasting, which involved the specification and estimation of large multi-equation models, Box and Jenkins proposed that the future values of a time series could be forecast using only its own history. As illustrated in Equation 7, the resulting ARIMA models had autoregressive and moving-average components, with the variable of interest \( (Y_t) \) being differenced one or more times if necessary to achieve stationarity. A variable that becomes stationary with one difference is said to be integrated of order 1 (i.e., \( I(1) \)). Using Box and Jenkins’s \((p, d, q)\) notation, the model in Equation 7 is a \((1, 1, 1)\) model; it has one difference to produce stationarity, one autoregressive term \([(1 - \varphi L)Y_{t-1}]\), and one moving-average term \((\theta \varepsilon_{t-1})\). The parameters \( \varphi \) and \( \theta \) are estimated from the data:

\[
(1 - L)Y_t = \varphi (1 - L)Y_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t + \theta \varepsilon_{t-1}. \tag{7}
\]

Since univariate ARIMA models are theoretical forecasting tools, the data are used as a guide to model identification (specification). In this regard, Box and Jenkins showed analytically that
autoregressive and moving-average models have characteristic patterns in their autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions that could be used as specification guides. In addition, they suggested diagnostic procedures for assessing the quality of ARIMA models. These include significance tests for model parameters, parameter values consistent with the assumption that the (differenced) series is stationary, and the presence of white-noise residuals from a series filtered with an estimated ARIMA model; the latter condition was typically assessed via Ljung-Box or Box-Pierce portmanteau tests. Ex post forecasting performance using a portion of currently available data is another important diagnostic.

ARIMA models may be extended to include explanatory variables. These may be a mixture of continuous variables ($X$s; e.g., inflation and unemployment rates) and interventions ($I$s; e.g., a national election, a terrorist attack), with the latter typically being measured using dummy variables 0 and 1 (see Equation 8). Depending on how these dummy variables are coded, interventions may be specified as having permanent or temporary effects. The impact of any explanatory variable may begin contemporaneously or with a delay of $k$ periods. Also, unlike garden-variety time-series regression models with lagged endogenous variables, multivariate ARIMA models may specify different dynamics for the effects of different predictors. For example, in Equation 8, the immediate (time $t$) impact of $I$ is captured by $\omega_i$, and the lagged effects (growth or decay) are captured by $\delta_i$. Lagged effects of $X$ are estimated with $\delta_x$, which need not have the same value as $\delta_i$. Depending on the available degrees of freedom, several $\delta$s may be specified in a single multivariate ARIMA model:

\[
(1 - L)Y_t = \varphi(1 - L)Y_{t-1} + \omega_i/(1 - \delta_1 L)(1 - L) I_{t-k} + \omega_x/(1 - \delta_2 L)(1 - L)X_{t-k} + \varepsilon_t + \theta \varepsilon_{t-1}.
\] (8)

Recent research on long-memoried processes has produced a class of autoregressive, fractionally integrated, moving average (ARFIMA) models that generalize the integration concept in traditional ARIMA models. As Janet Box-Steppensmeier and Renée Smith argue, time-series variables are not simply stationary or nonstationary in a knife-edged sense; rather, they can be thought of as having degrees of integration. Thus, the $d$ term in the Box-Jenkins $p$, $d$, $q$ models is no longer an integer with values 0 if a variable is stationary or 1 if it needs to be differenced once to make it stationary. In ARFIMA models, the values of $d$ lie along a continuum from $-0.5$ to 1.0, with values equal to or greater than 0.5 and less than 1.0, indicating that the variable is nonstationary but ultimately mean reverting.

The $d$ parameter and its associated standard error, together with any specified autoregressive and moving-average parameters, can be estimated from the data using maximum likelihood or other procedures. An example of such an ARFIMA model is Equation 9. Lacking any autoregressive or moving-average terms, this model is called “pure fractional noise.” As with conventional ARIMA models, explanatory variables can be included in ARFIMA specifications. A recent extension of these models involves the development of the concepts of fractional co-integration and fractional error correction:

\[
(1 - L)^dY_t = \varepsilon_t.
\] (9)

The desire for simple, easily estimated, accurate forecasting models did not abate with the development of ARIMA models. In 1980, the econometrician Christopher Sims offered a penetrating critique of conventional multi-equation forecasting models and suggested a radical alternative. Sims argued that many of the parameter restrictions required to achieve identification in multi-equation models (with endogenous regressors) were simply “incredible.” Researchers imposed these restrictions not because they were justified by theory or evidence but rather because they were necessary to avoid simultaneity biases. Given this ad hoc nature, the poor forecasting performance of such models was hardly surprising.

Sims did not claim that econometricians were radically ignorant of their subject matter. Rather, he asserted that researchers could use theory and experience to assemble sets of variables that were dynamically interrelated in possibly highly complex ways. Researchers wishing to forecast could “round up the usual suspects,” even if that complexity kept them from developing credible identifying restrictions needed for the estimation of...
structural parameters. But all was not lost. Sims proposed that forecasters use these sets of variables to develop simple multi-equation autoregressive models comprising unrestricted reduced forms. Each variable of interest was a function of one or more lagged values of itself and one or more lagged values of all other variables in the system. Additional variables capturing important exogenous shocks could be added if desired. The resulting set of equations is called a vector autoregression or VAR. In Sims’s original formulation, parameters in VARs could be estimated simply—via OLS or SUR techniques. Equations 10a and 10b are an example of a simple two-variable VAR with a single lag on both variables in the system:

\[
Y_t = A_0 + A_1 Y_{t-1} + B_1 X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t, \quad (10a)
\]
\[
X_t = C_0 + C_1 X_{t-1} + D_1 Y_{t-1} + \eta_t. \quad (10b)
\]

Although the simplicity of these VARs was attractive, researchers soon attempted to improve their forecasting performance by imposing restrictions on various parameters in a system. Later, analysts attracted by the ideas of co-integration and error correction developed vector error correction models that incorporated hypothesized long-run relationships explicitly into a VAR setup. Others, wishing to extract explanatory power from VARs, respecified them as moving-average representations of a system of interest. By so doing, they could trace the dynamic effects of shocks to a variable on other variables in that system. These analyses are not entirely theory-free; rather, general hypotheses about the flow of causality are required to order the variables in a system and, hence, how shocks are transmitted through it. Still others have leveraged recent developments in applied Bayesian statistics to specify and estimate VARs.

Another important methodological advance enables researchers to study the evolution of the variance of a time-series variable. These autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models were pioneered by Engle in 1982, with a subsequent generalization by producing the generalized ARCH (GARCH) model that closely resembles traditional ARIMA models. Equations 11a and 11b are an example. Here, the error process \( \varepsilon_t \) for \( Y_t \) in Equation 11a has a heteroskedastic variance that evolves according to Equation 11b.

The scaling parameter for this conditional variance, \( \beta_1 \), is driven by its own past value as well as the size of the variance at \( t-1 \), that is, \( \varepsilon^2_{t-1} \):

\[
Y_t = \beta_0 + \lambda Y_{t-1} + \beta_1 Y_t + \varepsilon_t, \quad (11a)
\]
\[
h_t = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 h_{t-1} + \lambda_2 \varepsilon^2_{t-1}. \quad (11b)
\]

Econometricians have extended GARCH models to incorporate ideas such as asymmetry, non-linearity, integration, and fractional integration. GARCH models also may be specified such that the conditional variance influences the evolution of the mean of a process, and explanatory variables may be included in the equation for \( h_t \) to help account for how it evolves.

To date, the vast majority of applications of GARCH models have been in the field of finance, where investigators are keenly interested in measuring risks associated with holding an asset at any time \( t \). Conditional heteroskedasticity, tapping overtime variation in the size of shocks to a system and, hence, volatility, is a natural way of calibrating such risks in empirical analysis. Other applications are possible. For example, in 2009, Harold Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne Stewart, and Paul Whiteley used GARCH models to study the development of consensus in public opinion regarding the performance of British Prime Minister Tony Blair. A key explanatory variable in the model of the GARCH process for the conditional variance of Blair’s performance evaluations is a measure of civilian casualties in the Iraq War. This application of GARCH modeling illustrates how advanced time-series methods can be used in empirical analyses of phenomena of long-standing interest to political scientists.

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See also Event History Analysis; Path Dependence; Process Tracing; Time-Series Cross-Section Data and Methods

Further Readings

Advantages and Disadvantages of PTSCS Data Analysis

Panel data pool observations for units (i) and time periods (t). The typical data-generating process can be characterized as

\[ y_{it} = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k x_{kit} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad i = 1, \ldots, N; \]

\[ t = 1, \ldots, T, \quad (1) \]

with \( k \) independent variables \( x \), which have observations for \( N \) units (i) and \( T \) periods (t). The dependent variable \( y \) is continuous (though in principle, it can be limited dependent, which requires nonlinear estimation procedures) and also observed for \( i \) and \( t \). \( \varepsilon_{it} \) describes the error term for observations \( i \) and \( t \) and we can assume an \( NT \times NT \) variance–covariance matrix \( \Omega \) of the error term with the typical element \( E(\varepsilon_{it}, \varepsilon_{js}) \). In case all Gauss-Markov assumptions are met (the error term is \( i i d \)), this model can be straightforwardly estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Because PTSCS data combine time-series and cross-section
information, this is rarely the case. However, the analysis of PTSCS data offers significant advantages over the analysis of pure time-series or pure cross-sectional data. First, using pooled data increases the number of observations and, therefore, the degrees of freedom, which allow us to test more complex arguments by employing more complex estimation procedures. More important, most theories in the social sciences generate predictions over space and time, and it seems, therefore, indispensable to test these hypotheses by using data providing repeated information for theoretically interesting units. PTSCS data analysis allows the modeling of dynamics, which is impossible when pure cross sections are examined, which may lead to spurious regression results. Finally, analyzing pooled data allows controlling for unit heterogeneity beyond the inclusion of additional right-hand-side (RHS) variables. Accordingly, pooled data can be used to get rid of some kinds of omitted-variable bias, make the best of the available information, test theories that predict changes, and test theories that predict parameter heterogeneity.

The most prominent disadvantage of panel data analysis lies in the fact that an econometrically sound model specification is typically hard to find since the data structure not only combines all the problems of cross-sectional and time-series data, but also these problems typically arise simultaneously. Specification problems in pooled data analysis can be summarized as follows:

- The residuals are typically serially correlated and not independent of each other.
- The residuals have different variances for different units (panel heteroskedasticity).
- The residuals of different units are contemporaneously correlated.
- The residual of unit \( i \) covaries with residuals of unit \( j \) for different points in time.
- The expected mean of the error term deviates from zero for different units.

While each single violation of the underlying model assumptions is often straightforwardly accounted for by existing econometric measures, combinations of problems might not be solved simultaneously in a satisfying manner. Econometric solutions are often incompatible with theories. Sometimes, it is hard to find models that at the very same time are econometrically sound (unbiased, efficient) and provide an appropriate test of the theory. Weighing the advantages and disadvantages of pooled data analysis, the positive aspects certainly prevail, especially because the analysis of pooled data allows the testing of complex arguments over space and time, which are characteristic for the social sciences. From this perspective, the steep increase in the popularity of panel data analysis does not seem to be surprising.

### Heteroskedasticity and Contemporaneous Error Correlation in Panel Data

Heteroskedasticity in pooled data presents a more complex problem than in pure cross sections since (a) the error term can have unit-specific variances (panel heteroskedasticity), (b) the error term can be contemporaneously correlated, that is, the error term of unit \( i \) is correlated to that of unit \( j \) in the same year, and (c) the error term of one unit \( i \) can be correlated with the error term of unit \( j \) at different points in time. In addition, the error term can have time-dependent error variances (autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity). Panel heteroskedasticity mainly occurs if the model specification fits different units differently well. Correlations of the errors across units are determined by unobserved features of one unit that are linked to another unit. Both features violate Gauss-Markov assumptions: While they leave the simple estimators consistent, such estimators are now inefficient, and standard errors may be incorrect. More important, both heteroskedasticity and error correlation often signal omitted-variable bias since in both cases something that should have been included into the structural part of the equation was left out.

This problem can be solved in a substantive way by identifying the causes of the omitted-variable bias and including these variables into the RHS of the models. Often, this approach is not feasible since the sources for heteroskedasticity are unknown, or excluded factors cannot be measured. In this case, several econometric solutions have been proposed.

A first approach brought forward by R. W. Parks and Jan Kmenta is a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimation, which is characterized by an \( NT \times NT \) block diagonal matrix with an \( N \times N \) matrix \( \Sigma \) that contains contemporaneous
covariances along the block diagonal. Parks and Kmenta also suggest an $\Omega$ matrix with a panel-specific first-order autoregressive, AR(1), error structure and contemporaneously correlated errors, but in principle, FGLS can handle different correlation structures.

Because the true structure of $\Sigma$ and $\Omega$ are unknown, this procedure requires the estimation of a very large number of parameters to obtain the error covariances, which in turn leads to very inefficient and therefore unreliable results. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz show that the Parks method highly underestimates standard errors and therefore induces overconfidence in estimation results. As a result, this estimation procedure is very rarely used in recent work using pooled data. Beck and Katz suggest a different way of dealing with panel heteroskedasticity. They argue that coefficient estimates of OLS are consistent but inefficient in pooled data and that the degree of inefficiency depends on the data and the exact error process. They suggest using OLS and correcting the estimated standard errors by taking the specific panel structure of the data into account:

$$\text{Var}[\beta] = (X'X)^{-1}X'\Omega X(X'X)^{-1},$$

(2)

with

$$\Omega = (E'E/T) \otimes I_T.$$  

(3)

This is called the panel-corrected standard errors method. Other violations of Gauss-Markov assumptions, such as serial correlation of the error term, have to be treated beforehand. Since this approach manipulates only the standard errors of an OLS model, the coefficients are biased whenever OLS is biased.

Dynamics and Serial Correlation

As pooled data combine information across units and over time, another problem arises if the error term is serially correlated. The error term in $t$ is dependent on the error term in $t-1$:

$$\varepsilon_{it} = \rho \varepsilon_{i,t-1} + \xi_{it}.$$  

(4)

Again, violating the independence assumption econometrically only influences the efficiency of the estimation. Yet since the residual of a regression model picks up the influences of those variables that have not been included, persistence in excluded variables is the most frequent cause of serial correlation. Several remedies for serial correlation are available, all of which have different consequences for the model specification and interpretation of the estimation results.

A substantive solution to the problem of serial correlation is the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable (LDV) $y_{it-1}$ to the RHS of the regression equation. In many cases, this is enough to eliminate serially correlated error terms. However, there are also many perils of adding an LDV to the list of regressors. One of the main problems arises because the inclusion of an LDV makes it difficult to interpret effects of the substantial RHS variables directly and correctly since the conditional effect of $x$ on $y$ is dynamic and aggregated over all periods. It can be described by the following polynomial:

$$y(x)_{1, t-p} = \beta_1 x_{it} + \sum_{p=1}^{t_p} (\beta_0^p \beta_1 x_{it}).$$  

(5)

Unfortunately, the standard errors of the function in Equation 5 cannot be easily calculated.

Since including an LDV resembles a shortened distributed lag model, we implicitly assume that all variables exert an equally strong one-period lagged impact on the dependent variable. Therefore, finding a nonsignificant coefficient of a theoretically interesting explanatory variable in an LDV model does not necessarily mean that this variable has no effect; it only tells us that this variable does not affect the dependent variable contemporaneously—it might still have a lagged effect. From this, it follows that the coefficient of the LDV estimates at best the average dynamic effect of all substantive RHS variables rather than the actual dynamic effect of each explanatory variable.

Another (lesser) problem occurs when combining an LDV with the estimation of unit-specific effects by a fixed-effects (FE) specification or a least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model (see the next section for a more detailed description). This leads to biased estimates since the LDV covaries with the time-invariant part of the error term. This problem is called Nickell bias. The best known suggestions tackling the problem of Nickell
bias are the instrumental variable approach by Theodore Anderson and Cheng Hsiao (AH), the differenced GMM (generalized methods of moments) model by Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond (AB), and the Kiviet correction (by Jan Kiviet), which proposes a corrected within estimator that subtracts a consistent estimate of the bias from the original FE estimator. The first two approaches solve the bias problem by first differencing both sides of the regression equation and instrumentation of the LDV with higher order lags of the LDV. Thereby, AH only uses the two-period lagged LDV as an instrument while AB allows the use of all possible lags of the LDV and all exogenous variables in the model. Both approaches generate asymptotically consistent estimation results, whereby AB produces more efficient estimates due to the exploitation of all moment conditions. In finite samples, however, both estimators are problematic with regard to efficiency as Monte Carlo experiments examining the finite sample properties reveal. Higher lags of the LDV provide good instruments only in the case when \( y \) is highly persistent over time. Unfortunately, in such a case, the probability that the instruments also covary with the error term remains high. From this perspective, both estimators cannot solve the problem of Nickell bias if \( y \) is highly persistent, or they solve the problem very inefficiently in the case of low persistence.

A Prais-Winsten (PW) transformation of the model offers another solution to serial correlation. The advantage of the PW approach consists in the preservation of the first period. The differences between a PW and an LDV model might be substantial depending on \( \rho \) and the serial correlation in both \( y \) and \( x \).

### Heterogeneity

One of the advantages of analyzing pooled data is the possibility of controlling for heterogeneity across units. When examining cross-sectional data, it is impossible to tell whether the estimated effects are contingent on unobserved effects that are specific to each unit and, therefore, biased. PTSCS data analysis rests on the assumption that units are similar enough to be pooled together. If that were not the case, we could still find appropriate specifications that allow accounting for differences across units that might influence the estimation results. Textbooks discuss this problem usually under the header “unit-heterogeneity” and offer remedies such as FE or random-effects (RE) models. However, these models only deal with time-invariant unit-specific effects, but units can also be heterogeneous with respect to slope parameters, dynamics, or lag structures. The next sections discuss different versions of unit heterogeneity.

### Unit Heterogeneity

When units have specific characteristics that cannot be measured and are time invariant, they offer different initial conditions that might influence the regression model. Especially, if these time-invariant unit-specific effects are correlated with any of the RHS variables, coefficient estimates are distorted by omitted-variable bias. If that is the case and we do not control for unit-specific effects, the Gauss-Markov assumption of \( x \) being deterministic is violated:

\[
y_{it} = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_{k} x_{kit} + \sum_{m=1}^{M} \gamma_{m} z_{m} + u_{i} + \epsilon_{it},
\]

And the transformation for \( t = 1 \) is as follows:

\[
\sqrt{1 - \rho^2} y_{1i} = \beta \left( \sqrt{1 - \rho^2} x_{1i} \right) + \sqrt{1 - \rho^2} s_{1i}.
\]
where \( \mu_t \) denotes the unit-specific effects and \( z \) the other explanatory variables that are time invariant but can be measured and are of theoretical interest. If \( \mu_t \) is excluded from the estimation, it becomes part of the overall error term and will make the model less efficient in the case when it does not covary with any of the \( x \) or \( z \) but will induce bias if it is correlated with any of the regressors. Econometrically, we can solve for correlated unit-specific effects by including a dummy variable for each unit into the RHS of the model, which generates unit-specific intercepts. This estimation procedure is called the LSDV model:

\[
y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_k \sum_{k=1}^{K} x_{kit} + \gamma_{a-1} D_i + \varepsilon_{it}. \tag{11}\]

The unit-specific dummy variables \( (D_i) \) are multicollinear to any time-invariant variable \( z \); the coefficients for \( z \) are therefore not identified. We can also employ a so-called FE specification, which is econometrically equivalent to an LSDV model. The FE model first de-means all variables in the model and then estimates the transformed equation by OLS:

\[
y_a - \bar{y}_i = \beta_k \sum_{k=1}^{K} (x_{kit} - \bar{x}_{ki}) + \bar{\varepsilon}_i + \bar{\mu}_i - \bar{\mu}_i. \tag{12}\]

The FE transformation eliminates not only the unit-specific effects but also the time-invariant variables that might be of theoretical interest. FE can become highly inefficient because it only uses the within information of all variables. Yet not controlling for unit-specific effects leads to biased estimates if unit effects exist and are correlated with any of the regressors.

If unit-specific effects do exist but do not covary with any of the RHS variables, not controlling for unit effects does not bias the estimates but increases the sampling variation of the OLS estimator and therefore generates less efficient results. A straightforward remedy is an RE specification, which treats the \( \mu_t \) as a random unit specific part of the error term. The RE model only quasi-de-means the variables: Rather than removing the time average from the explanatory and dependent variables at each \( t \), RE removes a fraction of the time average. The RE estimator generates more efficient results than the FE estimator, but the RE model produces biased estimates if the RHS variables covary with the unobserved unit-specific effects. RE resembles a feasible GLS estimator where the \( \Omega \) matrix \( (\text{variance–covariance of the errors}) \) matrix of the error term) has a specific RE structure that only depends on two parameters: \( \sigma_u^2 \) and \( \sigma_e^2 \). RE and FE estimates tend to be close if \( T \) gets large or the variance of the estimated unit effects increases as compared to the error variance.

Since the RE estimator is more efficient than its FE counterpart in the case when the unit effects are uncorrelated with the regressors, it is useful to determine which of the two specifications should be used. Textbooks typically suggest employing the Hausman test. The Hausman test is based on the following logic: Since the RE estimator is biased if unit-specific effects are correlated, differences between FE and RE estimates are interpreted as evidence against the RE assumption of zero covariance between \( x \) and \( \mu_t \). Econometricians confirm that the Hausman test has good asymptotic properties. Nevertheless, in finite samples, the test results are influenced by the trade-off between bias and efficiency. The Hausman test is only powerful in the limit: Since FE is consistent, the difference between RE and FE estimates can only be caused by biased RE estimates. In finite samples, however, the differences can result from two sources: biased RE estimates and unreliable FE point estimates due to inefficient estimation of variables with low within variation. The Hausman test actually mirrors this trade-off since it divides the difference of RE and FE estimates by the difference in the asymptotic variances of the RE and FE estimates. From this, it follows that the test results are especially unreliable if the estimation equation contains regressors that are both correlated with the unit-specific effects and rarely change over time.

Highly problematic in a FE specification is the estimation of time-invariant or nearly time-invariant variables. While the problem of including completely time-invariant variables is apparent, the estimation of rarely changing variables does not seem as problematic since FE specifications generate an estimate. However, this estimate might be very inefficient since FE specifications eliminate all cross-sectional variation, and only
the variance over time is used to compute the coefficient. If this within-unit variation is very small, the sampling variation of FE estimates increases drastically, which leads not only to large standard errors but also to very unreliable point estimates. In the case of time-invariant variables, applied researchers often resort to a simple pooled OLS or an RE model, which allow the estimation of coefficients for time-invariant variables that are biased in case the unit-specific effects covary with the regressors. Hausman and Taylor suggest an estimator that uses the uncorrelated RHS variables as instruments for the correlated regressors. If the instruments are poor, the Hausman-Taylor estimator produces highly inefficient parameter estimates. Plümper and Troeger developed an estimation procedure combining the favorable characteristics of FE with the possibility of efficiently estimating time-invariant and nearly time-invariant variables. This procedure is called a fixed-effects vector decomposition (FEVD). FEVD is a three-stage estimation procedure that decomposes the unit fixed effects into a part that can be explained by the time-invariant and rarely changing variables and an unexplained part. FEVD generates estimates with smaller root-mean-squared errors than competing estimators (Hausman-Taylor, FE, RE, pooled OLS) under a wide range of conditions.

Parameter Heterogeneity

As compared with unobserved time-invariant unit heterogeneity, we observe parameter heterogeneity if the coefficient of an explanatory variable differs significantly across units or over time. If parameters change across time or units, we are likely to deal with unobserved and therefore excluded interaction effects, or it could be that we have assumed the wrong functional form for the statistical relationship. If the source of parameter heterogeneity is known or our theoretical model even predicts differences in parameters across units or time periods, we can straightforwardly specify the correct model by including interaction terms between time periods or groups of units and the specific RHS variables.

In cases where the source of parameter heterogeneity is unknown, seemingly unrelated regressions (SURs) or random-coefficients models (RCMs) offer an econometric solution to the problem. SUR models estimate a single regression for every unit but exploiting the panel structure of the data by assuming a joint error process for all units. This increases the efficiency of estimation by “borrowing strength.” SUR models only generate acceptable parameter estimates for long time series, that is, when \( T \) is much larger than \( N \). SUR models employ a GLS-type estimator for the VC matrix, which weights the standard errors by the cross section–specific mean-squared errors.

The random-coefficients estimator (e.g., Beck and Katz) provides a compromise between estimating the fully pooled model and a fully unpooled estimate (separate OLS for each unit). Pooled OLS depends on the stark assumption of unit homogeneity, whereas separate OLS estimation for each unit produces inefficient results. The RCM borrows strength by shrinking each of the individual unit OLS estimates back to the overall (pooled) estimate. It is, therefore, also a good test for “poolability” of the data. The RCM generalizes the RE estimator from the intercept to all parameters of interest

\[
y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_i x_{kt} + \delta_m w_{mt} + \varepsilon_{it},
\]

\[
\beta_i \sim N\left(\beta, \sigma^2_{\beta}\right).
\]

The RCM can be made more useful by allowing the \( \beta \) to be functions of other unit-specific variables.

Heterogeneity of Dynamics and Lag Structures

In pooled data, not only do coefficient estimates vary across units but also dynamic effects. In addition, different RHS variables might exert a differently lagged impact on the dependent variable, and the lag length can differ across units. Different dynamics can be straightforwardly incorporated into an RCM or SUR models by including an LDV with unit-specific coefficients. PW specifications also allow for unit-specific autoregressive processes in the error term.

Since statistical tests for heterogeneous dynamics or lag structures are not readily available, defining specific dynamics should be based on theoretical grounds. Unit-specific dynamics can then be more
directly modeled by making the relevant regressors or the LDV interact with dummies for specific groups of units. Since different explanatory variables can have differently lagged effects across units as well, it is not plausible to just vary the estimates of the LDV because the marginal effect of an RHS variable at time \( t > 1 \) partially depends on the estimate for the LDV.

In summary, different kinds of unit heterogeneity do not prevent pooling of information over time and across units. Theoretically, unit heterogeneity leads to interesting research questions that can be empirically analyzed with the appropriate model specification. The possibility of controlling for unit heterogeneity renders pooled data analysis more attractive than pure cross-section or time-series analysis.

**Conclusion**

This entry provides a short overview of basic estimation procedures and specification issues in PTSCS data. Due to space constraints, other important topics, such as spatial effects in pooled data, nonstationarity, and the usefulness of error correction models as well as estimation procedures and specification issues in limited dependent-variable models for pooled data, could not be discussed. While estimators and statistical tests are discussed in most econometric textbooks, a thorough discussion of specification problems in pooled and panel data remains important. This also holds true for the question of how asymptotic properties of estimators translate to finite-sample analysis.

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**See also** Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Regression; Robust Statistics; Statistical Inference; Statistical Significance; Time-Series Analysis; Variables, Instrumental

**Further Readings**


**TOCQUEVILLE, ALEXIS DE**  
(1805–1859)

French political thinker, author, historian, and political philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville, known primarily for his *Democracy in America* (two volumes, 1835–1840), has constantly gained readership after a hiatus from 1880 to 1945. The development of liberal democracies, demands for pluralism, and the demise of the communist model seem to explain this worldwide renewal of interest. It is important not to succumb to the allure of a visionary who saw it all coming, however. Instead, let us gauge the work’s originality with respect to its era and the tradition of political philosophy. Three points in particular come to the fore: the relationship between freedom and equality, the concept of democracy, and the vision of despotism.

**Freedom and Equality**

Compared with a predecessor, such as Benjamin Constant, or a contemporary, such as François Guizot, Tocqueville pondered the consequences of
the principle of equality promoted by the French Revolution in 1789 in far greater depth. He believed that the aspiration to equality is the driving force in history that would inevitably transform not only class relations, law, customs, and language but also all of modern humanity’s self-representations. The “gradual and progressive development of equality,” as the introduction to *Democracy in America* states, upsets hierarchies and shapes minds in such a way that Tocqueville wondered if they are compatible with freedom—the other great modern value. It was because he was of the liberal school but also of aristocratic stock (old nobility by his father, noblesse de robe by his mother) that Tocqueville pursued this inquiry. He viewed the aristocracy, due to intermediate bodies and the decentralization of power under the feudal system, as the very source of the spirit of liberty in Europe, together with the Christian idea of human freedom.

For Tocqueville, the conflict between freedom and equality largely corresponds to the opposition between aristocratic society and democratic society. This gives rise to the second originality, less with respect to his era than our own: modern democracy does not necessarily promote a society of freedom, contrary to what today has become a widespread idea. Guizot shared this opinion. He preferred the representative system, in which payment of the poll tax determined eligibility to vote, over democracy, which he believed, like Sieyès, was a primitive and oppressive form of societies in their infancy. Guizot considered that the model for free societies was found in the English parliamentary system and not in the young republic of the United States of America. For Tocqueville, France had certainly experienced a period of despotic democracy in the form of the Napoleonic Empire and even a bloody democracy during the Terror practiced by the revolutionary government of 1793. But America offered food for thought as it had found the means to curb the dangers of popular sovereignty by dispersing the locus of power and allowing civil society to organize, thereby, diminishing the threats that the spirit of equality posed to freedom via associations, freedom of the press, systematic recourse to justice, religious freedom, the separation of church and state, local community life, and more generally speaking, federalism.

Traveling to investigate President Jackson’s America at the age of 26 (1831), Tocqueville thus reproduced Baron de Montesquieu’s accomplishment as regards the English Constitution: to draw overarching principles from a particular case. The liberal tradition had taken the British monarchy as a model. Tocqueville took this same comparative stance, in line with Montesquieu’s aspiration, that is, aristocratic liberalism, but this time, he aimed to draw lessons from the American republic. This young writer, with his aristocratic background, did not seek to salvage the values of his milieu by taking the supposedly right model or right version of society: England, with its aristocracy, a service class, and open to merit, which was a stark contrast to the social sterility of the French nobility steeped in its privileges of birth. He instead aimed to reform, elevate, and spiritualize a lifestyle that he had little sympathy for: a society of commerce and jealous competition among equals, calculated self-interest, utilitarianism, and the lack of any official hierarchy. The typical example is America, but it was bound to gain favor in Europe. He hoped nevertheless to breathe certain aristocratic values, such as the spirit of freedom, public service, and protection of the weak, into this social form that was making advances in history with the expansion of the bourgeoisie.

**Democracy**

Actually, Tocqueville’s new concept of democracy consisted of two very different components: the political system on one hand (elections, constitution, political debate as a public scene) and the social state (*état social*) on the other—that is, civil society, but including in it customs, beliefs and public opinion, forms of self-representation, and relations between individuals.

What is there in common between these two constitutive spheres of democracy? Majority rule triumphs in both civil society and government, but—it is remarkable to note—political despotism in government can very well gain acceptance by democracy as a social state. Tocqueville himself witnessed with sorrow and helplessness the rise to power and the coup d’état of Napoleon III and then his lasting triumph. The Second Empire regime illustrated, unfortunately, what he had described in *Democracy in America* some 20 years
earlier. In the foreword to the *Ancien Régime and the Revolution* (1856), he alluded to a few pages of the introduction to *Democracy in America* (1835) pertaining to the immoderate thirst for wealth, lack of interest in politics, cynicism in social relations, respect for brute force as being the very passions aroused by democracy that can lead to despotism. “Democratic societies that are not free can be wealthy, refined, even splendid.” It is in that sense that a democratic society can be not free, despite the opinions we hold today.

**Despotism**

From this derives the treatment of despotism as a theoretical problem to which Tocqueville, building on the analyses of Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, takes an entirely new approach. The originality is to consider that despotism can arise out of the very logics of democracy (considered as civil society), as we have already seen. But actually, two possibilities exist, which are sometimes combined and sometimes separate.

Apathetic, depoliticized citizens devoted to the constant search for “material gratifications” (to use Tocqueville’s expression) will in the long run unburden themselves of the task of governing themselves if a power (and a leader) offers its services, promising to satisfy their thirst for wealth and take charge of all aspects of their everyday life. In this sense, despotism, “soft and tutelary” (as Tocqueville calls it), occurs when a centralized and bureaucratic state extends its intervention, replacing citizen freedom with egalitarian paternalism, even if it means harshly repressing unruliness. The picture of this new brand of despotism is found in the now famous pages at the end of Volume 2 of *Democracy in America*.

Further, given both the numerical and moral weaknesses of an individual faced with the mass of his equals and fellow men, despotism is realized in the form of this *conformism* that always plagues democracies. The “tyranny of the majority” that is given free rein in a parliamentary regime if minority rights are not preserved by appropriate institutions finds its counterpart in civil society as well. The democratic paradox is thus as follows: Proud of his individual freedom of judgment, the individual feels intimidated before the majority judgment every time he is told that public opinion has spoken. Can one be right alone against thousands of people when one makes the equality of minds the cornerstone of the regime and life in society? In a democracy, it may seem that enlightenment, wisdom, and truth lie in numbers, which make up the public or public opinion: Tocqueville believed that he had observed in America the paradoxical union of freedom of thought, proclaimed as a founding axiom, with the stifling of this selfsame freedom—in certain periods—under the Empire of the Public: “In the United States, the majority takes it upon itself to provide individuals with a range of ready-made opinions and thus relieves them of the obligation to form their own.” (p. 491).

Modern democracy would thus be a confirmation of the fact that democracy embodies just as much the potential for freedom as it does a new brand of despotism and that it is in general profoundly ambivalent as is its chief principle, the principle of equality. Equality even embodies a new religion that democracy eagerly builds on:

> Regardless of what political laws men are subject to in ages of equality, we may anticipate that faith in common opinion will become a sort of religion, with the majority as its prophet. (p. 492)

The Public is democracy’s new god; it worships itself through the practice of consulting public opinion. No one more than Tocqueville has arrived at such a richness of expression on this question, however much it was debated during the 18th century: What is the new power of public opinion? What is government by opinion?

We will note that Montesquieu, after Plato, had described the disadvantages of total equality (*The Spirit of the Laws*, VIII 3, “Of the Spirit of Extreme Equality”). Tocqueville makes use of this analysis but enriches it as well with his readings of the French moralists and especially the Jansenists, such as François de la Rochefoucauld, Blaise Pascal, and Pierre Nicole: He analyzes the endless pursuit of material gratifications as an equivalent to what Pascal had called “distractions” (in which man hides his own mortality from himself by the pursuit of satisfactions that occupy him entirely); he even says explicitly that perfect and definitive equality flees on an “eternal flight,” according to an expression Pascal had used and that Tocqueville cites. As regards the situation of the French after the 1789
revolution, he adopts a tone that is both patrician and one of a Jansenist-influenced author, so to speak: “Having destroyed the obstructing privileges enjoyed by some of their fellow men, they run up against universal competition” (p. 627). Such is “democracy” according to Tocqueville—at once a set of political institutions, mentalities, and social behaviors. It is a system that can be improved on, with which one must learn to live, he explains to his family and his friends in the legitimist party: local freedoms, the power of public opinion, the search for material well-being are all fields of action offered to democracy and that should draw the attention of reformers, theoreticians, and political professionals alike.

Influence on U.S. Political Science

Tocqueville has inspired many works of political science, especially in America. We might mention Louis Hartz, for whom liberalism in America developed in the absence of a feudal past to be fought against (The Liberal Tradition in America, 1955); Robert Bellah expounds on a typically Tocquevillian theme in Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (1985), as does Robert D. Putnam in his theory of “social capital” more recently (Bowling Alone, 2000): the communitarian stream takes Tocqueville as one of its reference points.

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See also Democracy, Theories of; Liberalism; Political Philosophy; Political Theory

Further Readings


Tolerance

Tolerance is derived from the word tolerate, which is broadly defined as permitting or enduring what is objectionable. This entry discusses the historical and philosophical background of tolerance with an emphasis on liberal doctrines and examines its connection to human rights as well as the limits of tolerance.

Social tolerance involves a permissive attitude toward those whose race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, sexual orientation, opinion, or habits differ from one’s own. In politics, tolerance can be a quality of an individual, group, corporate entity, or state. Although the meaning of the concept has changed over time, tolerance for different opinions and, thus, allowing for freedom of expression and association is considered the hallmark of a liberal democratic state. Although it started as an exclusive political system, some commitment to religious pluralism and the gradual expansion of political rights have contributed to its identification with social tolerance as well.

Historical and Philosophical Background

Eurocentric historiographies of tolerance attribute its origin to the Protestant movement or the age of Enlightenment, which respectively, invited religious pluralism and humanism. Arguments raised by natural law and social contract theorists, such as John Locke (1632–1704) and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau (1712–1778), against the “divine rights of kings” or aristocratic privileges of the ancien régime and in favor of religious freedom or secularism constitute the core of liberal theories of tolerance. John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) emphasis on liberty and utilitarian endorsement of nonconformity, deemed necessary for the creative mind to flourish and help advance the society, have been very influential as well.

However, the philosophy and practice of tolerance existed in both European and non-European societies since ancient times, and the latter ones were usually more advanced and informed the former. The Edicts of Ashoka, issued by the 3rd century BCE ruler of the Maurya Empire with the purpose of spreading his recently adopted religion of Buddhism, also included provisions of ethnic and religious tolerance. Islamic empires, in general, were known for respecting other major religions and protecting their followers. These protected people (the dhimmi) originally included “the people of the book” (the Abrahamic texts: the Old and New Testaments and the Koran), but the definition was expanded to include Hindus and Buddhists when the Mughal Empire expanded Islamic rule into the territories of some older Asian civilizations.

Andalusian Spain, ruled by the Moorish Muslims between the early eighth and late fifteenth centuries, was a hotbed of multiculturalism and collaboration of intellectuals of all creeds and cultures. Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126–1198) and Rabbi Moses Maimonides (1135–1204) argued not only for tolerance but also promoted the Stoic notions that there was an eternal and universal natural law that governed the entire universe, that all human beings were born with the ability to reason, and that human conduct therefore needed to be harmonized with this universal law. For Christian Europeans, Andalusia served as a door to new ideas; in addition to the Moorish philosophers’ writings, their ancient Greek sources entered the European worldview, especially after the completion of the Christian conquest of Spain in 1492. However, this exposure had no immediate impact on discriminatory practices. In fact, the Inquisition and other mechanisms were employed more vehemently than before, and the persecuted “heretic” Christians and Jews sought refuge in the multicultural Islamic Empire of the Ottomans.

The recognition of the legitimacy of diversity and allowing different cultural groups to maintain their customs and identity, however, did not make these empires immune to discrimination. In fact, the noninterference form of tolerance, advanced or practiced in highly authoritarian or hierarchal empires, involved considerable discrimination. For example, the Ottoman state, often praised for allowing all nationalities to freely practice their customs, language, and religion, also imposed heavier taxes on its non-Muslim subjects.

In the West, the natural rights philosophers usually fell short of upholding the universalism of the Stoic teachings and denied equality to certain segments of humanity. John Locke, for example, claiming that the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and estate were held by land-owning men, trusted only that small group of people with governance and political rights, disenfranchised other men and all women, and justified slavery. Though more egalitarian, John Stuart Mill denied equal treatment and rights to “those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage” (Chapter 1, On Liberty). The blatant sexism of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), who wondered why God would even create woman, a “misbegotten male,” in the first production of things, has been expanded on by others who questioned if women had souls (if they were fully human). In the early modern era, Western imperialist expansion instigated similar queries about whether aboriginals had souls. Colonialism, often justified as an enlightening and civilizing mission, involved repression, assimilation, and the ultimate devaluation of the colonized and their cultures.

Liberal Doctrines

The democratization of liberal philosophies and states drew them closer to universalism. However, while the contemporary liberal democratic stance against discrimination constitutes an improvement over the discriminatory tolerance displayed in ancient and medieval empires, it maintains a similar negative conceptualization of tolerance. Both the liberal democratic and imperial models of tolerance allow different people or peoples “to exist” by employing a “let them be” approach, which is considered a major flaw by their contemporary critics.
Feminists, postcolonial theorists, and postmodernist detractors have scrutinized the egalitarian claims of the liberal tradition and democratic systems. They find that the liberal model’s demand of and reliance on noninterference translates to a lack of full recognition, thus, permitting the continuation of inequalities and discriminatory practices. In fact, they consider the act of toleration as hierarchical and patronizing, because by tolerating the “objectionable,” the person (or the dominant group in a society) passes a judgment and creates an “other” that is considered less valuable, yet harmless enough to be allowed existence. Thus, instead of promoting tolerance, which would involve a vertical recognition, they call for horizontal recognition, which would mean recognizing that other individuals and cultures are equal in value.

In Western societies, these debates on the accommodation of differences have included questions about the limitation of legal equality and freedoms. Arguments about the repressive impact of nonrecognition of the achievements and contributions of minority cultures and the notion that indifference to one’s identity or culture can in fact harm the person ushered in the advocacy of multiculturalism, which is also referred to as identity politics or politics of recognition. (The main and overt battleground of multiculturalism has been educational systems, where the debates ranged from the means and merits of preserving minority languages, e.g., French in Québec, to revising the curricula to include the historical, literary, and other contributions of non-White, non-Western populations, e.g., Africans and African Americans in the United States.) While the movement has promoted equality in dignity and recognition, the means of evaluation of cultures and parameters of recognition continue to be contentious issues.

**Connection to Human Rights**

Arguments in favor of tolerance have been always closely related to arguments on human rights, which are rights claimed against the state and society for the sole reason of being a human. While human rights can be traced back to ancient times, a leap toward a common definition of human rights and their universal recognition was made with the establishment of the United Nations (UN), the Charter (1945) of which included the promotion of human rights as one among the goals of the organization. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, provided a list of human rights, and the subsequent conventions and treaties issued by the organization created a body of international human rights law.

The principles of antidiscrimination and equality in dignity lie at the core of the normative framework of the international human rights law. First, the UDHR spells out that human rights are put under protection because “human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (Article 1). In addition to the UN Charter, which specifies that human rights apply to all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, Article 2 of the UDHR expands the list to include “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” and objects to discrimination based on “political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs.” The same extensive nondiscrimination list is repeated in various articles of the subsequent human rights treaties but without taking a position on the value of the specified categories of differences—they do not call for their elimination or protection. The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, which was adopted in 1966 and came into force in 1976), however, brings ethnicity, religion, and language under protection as minority rights (Article 27).

In addition to nondiscrimination, the international human rights law promotes respect for differences. For example, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted and entered into force in 1966 and 1976, respectively) not only recognizes everyone’s right to education but also stipulates that “education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and sense of dignity” and “enable all persons to participate in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups” (Article 13).

The emphasis placed on equality in dignity and respect for differences provide for a “nonnegative” conceptualization of tolerance in the international human rights law. It promotes positive and
horizontal tolerance by requiring the acceptance and full recognition of differences, and the unique identity of individuals or groups without discrimination. This approach has been displayed in other UN documents and activities on tolerance, including the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981), the designation of 1995 as the “Year for Tolerance,” and holding a World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (2001).

The Limits of Tolerance

A question that applies both to the liberal notion of “negative” tolerance and to the broader conceptualization of it as recognition is whether tolerance warrants tolerating the intolerant. In other words, what are the limits of tolerance? While the liberal philosopher Karl Raimund Popper (1902–1994) considered the intolerant (especially the advocates of totalitarian ideologies) as the enemies of open society and thus objected to the idea of tolerating them, another liberal philosopher, John Rawls, argued that tolerance for all was necessary to maintain a just (tolerant) society, but that could be allowed only if the intolerant ones do not endanger the tolerant essence of the society. In a similar vein, stating that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law,” the ICCPR sets boundaries of tolerance in the international human rights law (Article 20). Although paradoxical, these propositions address some concerns about hate speech, violence stemming from bigotry, or authoritarian takeover of democratic systems. However, calls for cultural preservation and recognition, prevalent in the discourse of politics of recognition and multiculturalism, make women and others, whose subordination is dictated or enforced by cultural norms and values, uneasy. It is not only gender equality and other emancipatory aspects of the international human rights law that can be jeopardized in the name of religious freedom or celebration of multiculturalism, cultural relativism, but also the right to self-determination in primarily undemocratic contexts, where members are not allowed to interpret the cultural sources and determine their own lives, may help sustain discrimination and serve the privileged.

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See also Colonialism; Democracy, Theories of; Discrimination; Feminism; Human Rights, Comparative Perspectives; Liberalism; Locke, John; Multiculturalism; Postcolonialism; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; United Nations

Further Readings


TOTALITARIAN REGIMES

The most common definition of totalitarian regimes, categorized generally under the concept of “totalitarianism,” refers to modern antiliberal and antidemocratic regimes based on the monopolization of power by a revolutionary single party led by a charismatic leader and dominating over the state and society by means of terror and propaganda. Totalitarian regimes carry out their policy using a variety of institutions controlled by the single party: a highly centralized bureaucracy, an official and secret police, a party militia, the manipulation of culture and public opinion through the monopoly of mass media, and a network of organizations set up all over the country under the control of the single party, whose tasks are to regiment, indoctrinate, and mobilize permanently the individual and the masses.

More specifically, some scholars consider mass extermination as a necessary feature whose presence makes a regime truly totalitarian; other scholars argue that there can be totalitarianism
terror, or they emphasize the role of the charismatic leader or the mobilization of the masses as an essential characteristic of totalitarian regimes. However, all scholars, whatever their definitions of totalitarian regimes, agree that these are new types of antidemocratic political systems that differ substantially from traditional dictatorships and civil or military modern authoritarian states, whose concentration of power is based mainly on repression but does not require a revolutionary single party, an all-encompassing ideology, or a network of collective organizations for the mobilization of the masses.

The definition of totalitarian regimes has been a matter of endless debate, with highly ideological and political implications. Hence, any definition of totalitarian regimes necessarily implies a survey of the origins and development of the concept of totalitarianism. This will be done in the following sections of the entry, complemented by an analysis of this type of regime in the Cold War. Next, the entry examines the eclipse of the concept of totalitarianism in political science from the middle of the 20th century through the 1970s. The entry concludes by examining the renewed interest in this concept that began in the 1980s and has led to new interpretations of it.

The Name and the Thing

Contrary to widespread opinion, the terms totalitarian and totalitarianism were not invented by Mussolini, even if the Fascist regime was the only one to label itself as totalitarian. Both words were originally coined by Italian antifascists a few months after Mussolini was appointed by the King as Prime Minister in October 29, 1922. In November 1923, the liberal antifascist Giovanni Amendola, probably the inventor of the word totalitarian, described fascism as imbued with a totalitarian spirit, using violence to impose its ideology as a form of faith obligatory for all Italians. In the same period, Catholic antifascists used this new adjective to define fascism as a political religion sacralizing the nation and the state, thus being anti-Christian in essence. Since June 1924, when the socialist deputy Giacomo Matteotti was assassinated by a Fascist gang, the word totalitarian was also applied to the Fascist extremists pushing Mussolini hard to establish a dictatorship. In December 1924, the Marxist antifascist Lelio Basso used the substantive totalitarianism for the first time to describe the new Fascist state in the making by transforming traditional institutions such as the monarchy, the parliament, and the magistracy, as well as the armed forces, into the instruments of a single party.

We must bear in mind that totalitarian and totalitarianism were coined by anti-Fascists before the establishment of the single-party regime in Italy. Therefore, they did not refer to Fascist ideology or to Fascist rhetoric but to the reality of the Fascist party’s practice of ruling over the country using an armed militia to terrorize, persecute, and kill political opponents. It was the first time that an armed militia party, identifying itself with the nation and attacking all political opponents as internal enemies of the state, took power in a Western parliamentary democracy to destroy it. The novelty of the phenomenon required a new concept to define it.

The concept of totalitarianism was first developed by the Italian priest Luigi Sturzo, the founder of the Popular Party, who was forced into exile by the Fascists in 1924. In his book Italy and Fascism, published in English in 1926, Sturzo compared the reality of the two regimes fascism and bolshevism and defined both as totalitarian because of their points of resemblance, in spite of their differences in historical background, social support, ideologies, and method of achieving power. The points of resemblance were the rejection of the principles and method of democracy, the monopoly of power and politics by a single party, the violent suppression of all opponents, and the regimentation of society under party control. Sturzo’s book was soon translated into German, French, and Spanish, thus spreading the concept of totalitarianism in Europe and America from the late 1920s.

The Totalitarian State

After Adolf Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933 and the establishment of a single-party regime in Germany, the expression totalitarian state was being commonly used by intellectuals and politicians to define the new antidemocratic regimes in Russia, Italy, and Germany in order to distinguish them from ancient despotism and the modern dictatorships mushrooming all over Europe during the interwar period. Most of these antidemocratic
Totalitarian Regimes

regimes believed in the concentration of power in the hands of a king, an army official, or a “strong man” representing the old establishment. During the 1930s, an increasing number of scholars in Europe and the United States, such as Raymond Aron, Franz Borkenau, Alfred Cobban, Michael Florinsky, Hans Kohn, Fritz Morestein Marx, Elie Halevy, Carlton J. H. Heyes, Emil Lederer, and José Ortega y Gasset, put forward various interpretations of the totalitarian regimes, emphasizing their novelty.

According to these scholars, the basic feature of totalitarianism was a single-party regime created by an antidemocratic mass movement that used paramilitary violence and terror combined with electoral consensus, as in the case of fascism and Nazism, to conquer and maintain power, rendering permanent its own dictatorship as a police state based on the supremacy of a charismatic leader and the oligarchy of the single party, which comprised an elite group of “new men” emerging from anonymity. Other peculiar features of a totalitarian state were the cult of the supreme leader of the party, who was exalted and revered like a demigod by the followers and by the masses; absolute state centralization in the administrative and political fields; state control of the economy; the militarization of society through the permanent and capillary rule of the single party, whose main goal was to remodel and transform the individual and the masses in the image of its ideology; the fanaticism and missionary spirit of the single-party regime; a rigorous monopoly of education militarizing the youth; the use of methods of technological and organizational modernization for the mobilization of the masses; and the development of an intense and constant activity of collective indoctrination through mass organizations, festivals, parades, pageants, plebiscites, and sports.

Here again, we have to bear in mind that it was the reality of these regimes, their structure and functioning, and their concrete policy toward the masses, and not their ideologies, intentions, or goals, that were at the origins of the definition of totalitarianism.

Interpretations of Totalitarianism

Theories of the totalitarian regime were also developed by the intellectuals mentioned above to explain its origins, workings, and foreseeable evolution. The theories focused mainly on modern phenomena and events that contributed to the emergence of totalitarian regimes in different countries such as Russia, Italy, and Germany. Since all these regimes were established after World War I and were strictly connected to the war, although in different ways, the war was considered as the seedbed for totalitarianism. Conditions for the emergence of totalitarian regimes were the radicalization of politics and social struggles; the incapacity of the parliamentary system to provide an effective solution to social and economic conflicts; the impoverishment and disorientation of social classes hit by fierce economic crises, moving toward a revolution or a counterrevolution to survive; and the rebellion of the masses, looking for simple and reassuring solutions by subordinating themselves to the command of a “strong man,” who promised to resolve the crisis with brutal yet efficient methods. From the war experience, the revolutionary movements that built up a totalitarian regime derived the militarization of politics, the use of violence, total state control over society, and brainwashing propaganda as basic methods to maintain the monopoly of power. A feeble or short-lived democratic tradition, widespread political fragmentation, and a sequence of weak governments were also reckoned as conditions for the emergence of totalitarian regimes.

In a broader historical perspective, the roots of the totalitarian state were linked to the mounting tendency toward centralization of the modern state, expanding its control over public and private life. Some scholars pointed to the advent of the mass society, the atomization of individuals, the political mobilization of amorphous masses, and the use of modern techniques of propaganda by ruthless and cynical demagogues as the main factors for the making of a totalitarian regime. The totalitarian state was also seen as a perverted experience of mass democracy in the age of industrialization. The Jacobin dictatorship during the French Revolution as well as the regimes of Napoleon I and Napoleon III were numbered among the harbingers of totalitarianism.

More specifically, scholars of religious orientation, such as Adolf Keller, Waldemar Gurian, Jacques Maritain, and Eric Voegelin, attributed the
origins of the totalitarian state to the process of secularization: They defined totalitarianism as a political religion deifying the state, race, or class and enforcing state control over the body and mind of the people to mold them into obedient believers and servants. Hence, totalitarianism was anti-Christian in essence, even if fascism and Nazism did not preach atheism as bolshevism did but pretended to be respectful of the churches.

Theories of totalitarianism had their heyday in 1939, when many writings on totalitarian regimes were published. The nonaggression treaty between Nazi Germany and Soviet Union in August 1939 was regarded as a confirmation of the affinity between the two totalitarian regimes. In his book *The Totalitarian Enemy*, published in 1940, discussing the conflict between the democratic and totalitarian types of regime, its origins, and its results, Franz Borkenau called Nazism “Brown bolshevism” and affirmed that Russian communism was inherently the most expanding and aggressive form of totalitarianism.

After 1941, however, when the Soviet Union was attacked by Nazi Germany and hence joined the Allied forces in World War II, the tendency prevailed among anti-Fascists not to talk about Joseph Stalin’s regime as totalitarian, one exception being Sigmund Neumann’s book *Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Ages of International Civil War*, published in 1942. Neumann put forward the most systematic and in-depth comparative analysis of the totalitarian regimes of the time. Taking into account earlier interpretations of the roots, features, and structure of totalitarianism—the legacy of the Great War, mass democracy, single-party rule, the new elite, the cult of the leader, state control of the economy, the militarization of society, the mobilization of the masses, political religion—Neumann systematized them into a new comprehensive theoretical framework, adding new concepts to define totalitarianism: the revolutionary dictatorial party, the permanent revolution, and the international civil war. The revolutionary dictatorial party was antidemocratic in essence, imbued with a quasi-religious missionary spirit and claiming an exclusive identification with a collectivity, the nation, the proletariat, or the race. It was driven by its own ideological dynamism to acquire monopoly of power, to build a one-party state, and to organize, regiment, and mobilize the masses in order to regenerate them and create “a new man,” aiming also at extending its revolution through territorial and ideological expansionism, therefore promoting an international civil war to achieve its goals. While emphasizing significant structural similarities, Neumann also stressed that communism, fascism, and Nazism must be differentiated through their historical background, ideological orientation, social mobilization, and ultimate goals. Hence, he concluded, a full definition of the totalitarian regime must include this diversity, avoiding therefore any sweeping formula.

**Totalitarianism in the Cold War**

Following the fall of fascism and Nazism in 1945, the only surviving totalitarian regime was the Soviet Union, which never accepted being labeled as such. After the breakdown of the international antifascist alliance and the start of the Cold War, there was a new wave of interest in totalitarianism, this time with a strong anticommunist orientation. This time, because of the Holocaust and the mass killings under Stalin’s regime, terror and mass extermination were added as necessary features in the development of the concept of totalitarianism. At the beginning of the Cold War, the concept was widely used in anticommunist propaganda to identify Stalin’s regime as a political “evil” similar to Hitler’s regime. Two major works in the 1950s triggered off new debates on totalitarianism: Hannah Arendt’s *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, published in 1951, and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski’s *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, published in 1956, after a conference on totalitarianism held in March 1953 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, whose proceedings were published 1 year later.

In her interpretation of totalitarianism, Arendt echoed many concepts developed by earlier scholars—the atomization of society, the amorphous masses, the ruthless elite, and the permanent revolution—while stressing the role of an all-encompassing ideology and the subordination of the state to the single party as key features of the totalitarian regime. Arendt also theorized that the totalitarian regime was the result of a totalitarian movement, but she argued that actually
only the Nazi party was a totalitarian movement, while denying this characterization to the Bolshevik party. She considered only Germany under the Nazis and the Soviet Union under Stalin’s rule as examples of “true totalitarianism,” asserting that Lenin’s Bolshevik party and the Soviet Union were not totalitarian until Stalin’s rule. Even Mussolini’s regime, according to Arendt, was not totalitarian until 1938. Nevertheless, she also asserted that only if Nazi Germany had won World War II would Hitler have been able to establish a fully developed totalitarian regime. Arendt considered that the essence of totalitarianism was mass terror and mass extermination, as the Holocaust under the Nazis and the purges under Stalin’s regime. Therefore, she defined totalitarianism in its final stages as an absolute evil. Arendt’s approach to the question of totalitarianism was more philosophical than theoretical. Notwithstanding serious criticism of her interpretation of totalitarianism based on what were claimed to be its many shortcomings and contradictions, Arendt’s work had a major impact on the debate on totalitarianism in the following decades.

More theoretically oriented, Friedrich and Brzezinski analyzed the structure of the totalitarian regimes in Russia, Italy, and Germany, classifying their similarities in a syndrome of six basic features:

1. an official ideology that covers all vital aspects of man’s existence and is projected toward a perfect final state of mankind;
2. a single party led by one man, unquestionably dedicated to its ideology, hierarchically and oligarchically organized, and either superior to or completely intertwined with the bureaucratic government organization;
3. a system of terroristic police control;
4. technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly control by the party of all means of mass communication;
5. similar technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly and control of all means of effective armed combat; and
6. central control and direction of the entire economy through bureaucratic coordination of its formerly independent entities.

Modernization and industrialization were also emphasized by Friedrich and Brzezinski as necessary conditions for the establishment of the totalitarian regime.

Friedrich and Brzezinski were criticized because their totalitarian syndrome was considered a descriptive concept instead of an explanatory theory, while historians who were skeptical about the validity of the concept of totalitarianism put into question the applicability of their static model of similarities to the complex reality of the so-called totalitarian regimes, obscuring their substantial differences and their contradictory reality.

The Eclipse of the Concept of Totalitarianism

Debates on totalitarianism flourished during the Cold War. Among the totalitarian regimes then included were the communist states established in Eastern Europe, China, and North Korea after the end of World War II, as well as Castro’s regime in Cuba after 1959. However, after Stalin’s death and the condemnation of Stalin’s cult of personality and his crimes by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1956, there was mounting criticism of the concept of totalitarianism. It was rejected by communist and left-wing scholars as a mere propaganda slogan to denigrate the Soviet Union and the communist regimes by comparing them to the Nazi regime.

The use of the concept of totalitarianism came under fierce attacks through the 1960s. It is significant to note that in the 1967 edition of her book on totalitarianism, Arendt mentioned the spread of totalitarian governments in Eastern Europe after World War II because of the imposition of bolshevism by Stalin, but she also asserted that Stalin’s death was followed by a process of detotalitarization. She recognized also that the Chinese Communist Party’s totalitarian traits have been manifest from the beginning and that Mao Zedong’s regime was characterized by mass terror and extermination, but she denied that Communist China was totalitarian because she felt that Mao’s was not a criminal mind like Stalin and Hitler.

Attacks on the concept of totalitarianism went so far as to propose that the name itself should be banned from encyclopedia entries and political science itself, because there has never been such a thing as a totalitarian regime. In the wake of
Arendt’s interpretation, some historians asserted that fascism was not totalitarian; other historians made similar claims about the Nazi regime and the Soviet Union, denying any validity to the concept of totalitarianism. The more traditional and generic term authoritarianism was preferred to describe all types of modern dictatorships and one-party states.

In the following decade, there was actually a sort of “eclipse of totalitarianism.” One scholar proposed seriously in 1976 that we should cease to speak of totalitarianism. Ten years later, another scholar asked ironically if there has ever been such a thing as totalitarianism. The rejection of the concept meant actually the rejection of the thing, thus producing a sort of conceptual void in the analysis of the variety of single-party regimes in the 20th century, though new experiences of domination, such as the Khmer Rouge regime established in Cambodia in 1976 to 1979, did replicate the fundamental traits of the totalitarian regime in its most extreme form—mass extermination—to transform human beings and create a “new man.” Many features of totalitarianism were also present in many secular nationalist one-party states in the Islamic world and the Third World: the cult of the leader, an armed militia, mass mobilization, a political religion, and the myth of regeneration.

Going Back to Reality: New Interpretations

However, since the late 1980s, mainly due to the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been a revival of interest in totalitarianism, resulting in new approaches to the question of totalitarianism and new interpretations of it. Pioneers in the revival of the concept, even during its eclipse, were scholars such as Hans Buchheim, Karl D. Bracher, and above all Juan J. Linz. They dealt with the definition of totalitarianism going back to the historical reality and revising previous theories according to the result of new research. They argued that the nature of the totalitarian regime is not static but dynamic and that such regimes are monistic but not monolithic. Hence, a more nuanced interpretation of the relationship between the leader and the party and between the party and the state arose from their revision of the concept of totalitarianism. While stressing the prominence of police control and repression, they denied that terror was the essence of totalitarianism and argued that it was not sufficient to define it. Finally, they did not underestimate the role of ideology, mass mobilization, and even popular enthusiasm in totalitarian politics but recognized also that the totalitarian claim to total control over society had never been achieved.

Linz’s definition of what characterizes a regime as totalitarian has been fundamental in the revision of the concept of totalitarian regimes and its revival. In an essay published first in 1974 and then in 2000 with an up-to-date introduction, Linz defines a regime as totalitarian when the following characteristics apply and only when they occur together: an exclusive ideology, a single mass party and other mobilization organizations, and power concentrated in an individual and his or her collaborators that is not accountable to any large constituency and cannot be removed by legal, peaceful means. When one or more of these characteristics are missing, the regime could be defined as pretotalitarian or posttotalitarian.

Since the early 1990s, there has been worldwide a flourishing of new discussion about totalitarianism. New historical works, mainly those on Italian fascism, have also contributed to renewing substantially the interpretation of totalitarianism. The result of this new research and interpretation can be summarized as follows.

The totalitarian regime is a modern experiment in political domination undertaken by a revolutionary movement, with an integralist conception of politics, that first secures total power monopoly, whether by legal or illegal means, and then destroys or transforms the previous regime and constructs a new state. This new state is based on a single-party regime under the rule of a charismatic leader and has as its chief objective the conquest of society—that is, the subordination, integration, and homogenization of the ruled by means of the integral politicization of existence, whether collective or individual. The new reality is interpreted according to the categories, myths, and values of an exclusive and all-encompassing ideology, institutionalized in the form of a political religion, that aims to shape the individual and the masses through an anthropological revolution, thus regenerating the human being and creating the new man, dedicated in body and soul to the realization of the revolutionary and imperialistic policies of the totalitarian party. The ultimate goal
of this regime is to create a new civilization along expansionist and supranational lines.

Defining the totalitarian regime as an experiment is intended to emphasize that totalitarianism is a continual process or a permanent revolution; it is a method of rule to achieve a goal, not a goal in itself.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Democracy, Theories of; Fascism; Fascist Movements

Further Readings

TOTALITARIANISM

All political concepts are essentially contested, but some are more contested than others. This is certainly the case for totalitarianism. It is almost impossible to reach a consensus based on an operational definition of this term. Many of its users apply it to any dictatorship, autocracy, or fanatical belief or behavior. Many of its critics see it as an invention of Cold War propaganda, aiming to identify Nazism and communism in order to delegitimize the latter or excuse the former. While the scientific character and the present relevance of the concept of totalitarianism can be challenged legitimately, the discussion must first get rid of the two temptations mentioned above. If the use of the term totalitarianism is to be justified, it makes sense only if it is applied to a regime, a movement, a mentality, and an aspiration that goes beyond the limits of politics to encompass the whole of society, culture, and human life by negating the autonomy of domains such as science, religion, or art. Also, whatever the propagandistic instrumentalization during the Cold War, it is simply historically wrong to see in it the origins of the concept. In this entry, its origins, different uses, and contemporary relevance are discussed.

Origins and Definitions
The first known use of the term totalitarianism occurred in 1922 in Italy. It is due to liberal opponents of Mussolini, like Piero Gobetti and Giovanni Amendola, who were accusing him of wanting to dominate not only government but the whole of social and institutional life—an accusation that Mussolini proudly accepted by proclaiming his “ferocious totalitarian will.” While Italian fascism was in fact less totalitarian than German Nazism, it made abundant use of the term the total state, while the German Marshal Ludendorff was promoting the idea of total war. As for totalitarianism as such, it was mainly used by left-wing German émigrés like Emil Lederer in his “State of the Masses” or Sigmund Neumann, trying to pinpoint the novelty of Nazism. They converged with Catholic authors like Waldemar Gurian and Eric Voegelin who were putting forth the notion of “political religion” to indicate the ambition of both fascism and communism to bring salvation on earth and their appeal to total faith and total commitment, similar to that demanded from the members of a sect.

The “totalitarian syndrome” continued to take shape in the 1930s, centered on fascism but, more and more, involving an implicit or explicit comparison with communism. It included the three elements of an ideology, a movement or a party, and a regime. The ideology characteristically combined an interpretation of the world and of history, claiming to be based on science (a racist biology in one case, scientific materialism in the other) and a quasi-religious appeal. The movement or party
Totalitarianism was a totally devoted elite. The regime was based on a complete monopoly of power and a claim of total unity, typically incarnated in one leader, and total war against the enemies of the faith and against the groups (racial in one case, social in the other) who were supposed to be the sources of all evil and who had to be eliminated in order to bring about the triumph of justice.

For some authors, like the French philosopher Claude Lefort, the essence of totalitarianism is the effort to bring back societies based on modern individualism and differentiation to a premodern unit with a total primacy of the community, albeit through modern means. Others emphasize the other side of the coin: the attempt at totally eliminating an enemy—the inversion of the Clausewitzian formula, “War is the continuation of politics by other means” into “Politics is the continuation of war by other means.” The perfect formulation would be that of Carl Schmitt, which he, ironically, applied to the enemies of Nazism rather than to Nazism itself: “Total enemy, total war, total state,” the total enemy being the key.

Two works provide the central formulation of this classical notion of totalitarianism: that of George Orwell (Animal Farm and 1984) and Hannah Arendt (The Origins of Totalitarianism). Orwell’s lasting contribution is above all the notion of total surveillance (“Big Brother is watching you”), the manipulation of feelings (with the conclusion of 1984: “He loved Big Brother”), and even more, the “newspeak,” the creation of a new language where love can mean hatred and peace means war. Hannah Arendt’s emphasis is on the dynamics of ideology and terror (the latter literally eliminating the groups condemned to historical extinction by the former), which become an irresistible process and a force by themselves, beyond their original content and target. Here, too, a “supersense” is created, a kind of “mad logic” through which Hitler diverts precious vehicles from the war effort to the extermination of the Jews and Stalin purges the Soviet elite, including the Red Army leadership, on the eve of the German invasion.

A third, less illustrious but more academic work has nevertheless become a classic of totalitarianism studies. It is Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. It provides a number of criteria that distinguish a totalitarian regime from an ordinary tyranny. These refer to the existence of a single party; a monopoly on ideological, political, cultural, and economic affairs; and the use of modern technology for a degree and pervasiveness of control and indoctrination that were not at the disposal of earlier authoritarians. Raymond Aron provides an analogous list of criteria, but he also makes a point that is more important—that the totalitarian dynamic, powerful and fearsome as it is, is not the only one at work even in societies in which it rules. Other dynamics, like that of economic development, the arms race, or of external contacts, which cannot be entirely suppressed, may compete with it or deviate from it.

Earlier, the great social historian Barrington Moore had distinguished three forces in Soviet evolution: power (leading to totalitarianism), rationality (leading to bureaucracy or to democracy, or to both), and tradition (leading to the reassertion of old Russian cultural and imperial patterns). Similarly, Alex Inkeles proposed in 1966 that the logic of totalitarianism be combined with that of development and that of industrial society. This more complex and, in a way, more modest approach, is in any case more able to respond to the barrage of criticism aimed at the key notion of totalitarianism, particularly toward the end of the Cold War, by a number of historians and social scientists.

The attacks revolve mostly around two themes. First, the notion of totalitarianism is supposed to gloss over the fundamental difference between Nazism (or fascism) and Stalinism (or communism). It seems to rely on an essentialist and fixed view of politics, neglecting the changes that have affected, in particular, Soviet communism over the years. Clearly, communism and fascism come from two different traditions. As the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski put it, one is the monstrous child of the enlightenment, the other the monstrous child of romanticism. While both react against bourgeois democracy, the one does it in the name of a radical equality, the other in the name of the superiority of an esthetic, aristocratic, or heroic elite. Both were propelled by World War I, but one by a pacifist reaction and the other by a cult or nostalgia for war. Above all, one was bound to alienate the entire world since it proclaimed the national and racial supremacy of one
people, while the other stood for universalism as well as for equality. But this can be seen as one more argument in favor of the problem raised by totalitarianism: How can a universalistic, egalitarian, and libertarian doctrine, whose official song proclaimed the refusal of any supreme savior, be it God or Caesar, end by adopting the divinization of one man, the absolute power of the rulers, and a permanent war against supposed enemies, all practices that seem to go much more naturally with Nazism?

It is precisely this strange convergence that is the strong point of Hannah Arendt, whose analysis is essentially based on a parallel between the two extreme periods of the two regimes—1936 to 1939 for one and 1941 to 1945 for the other. Even there, however, there are enormous differences. Nazi totalitarianism was more directly murderous and targeted a number of categories (Jews, Roma, homosexuals, communists), which had to be destroyed, whereas normal apolitical Germans were left in peace. In Russia, totalitarianism was extended to every sphere of life and literally any citizen could be its victim.

Of course, the end was very dissimilar: violent overthrow from outside through lost war in one case and the decay of ideology and terror and the considerable reduction of its role over time in the other. This leads us to the other group of objections: about the possibility of change. Of course, nobody knows whether de-Hitlerization or de-Polpotization would have occurred in Germany or in Cambodia after the death of their respective leaders. The loss of self-confidence in their power and legitimacy, which obviously occurred in the European communist elite, or the attempt to combine their power with an adoption of the most extreme form of capitalism, as in the Chinese case, are not a unique evolution, yet who can say that they were inevitable in each case? Two pure cases of totalitarianism, the Maoist and the Cambodian ones, appeared or were flourishing at a time when a process of de-Stalinization was already well under way in the Soviet Union. And an almost pure totalitarian fossil-like North Korea survives to this day.

At any rate, the end of the Soviet Union surprised the critics of the totalitarian model as much as its advocates. Most of the former believed that the Soviet Union would reform and evolve toward a kind of social democracy. Most of the latter thought that totalitarianism could never change. In fact, it did. But due precisely to the nature of totalitarianism, the attempt to reform it led to its collapse.

**Contemporary Relevance**

Where, then, are we now? Is totalitarianism dead, or alive and well? The most likely answer is that it has taken a postmodern turn; in other words, its various components are dispersed and carry on independently or in various new combinations. It does not seem likely that the combination of a general doctrine and a revolutionary practice claiming to be scientific but appealing to religious feelings and commitment can rule a country or an empire in the 21st century as in the 20th. Theocratic fundamentalism seems to be on the rise rather than “secular religions,” and while less exposed to verification and disappointment than the latter, it seems even less able to adapt to modern society. Totalitarian regimes in their pure form—like North Korea—do survive for the time being but ever more precariously. Genocidal regimes like that of the Khmer Rouge, collective genocides like in Rwanda, mad dictators, or oppressive military regimes are likely to appear and disappear with catastrophic results, but they are more likely to be based on nationalism, ethnicity, religion, or old-fashioned personal tyranny than to be or remain specifically totalitarian, unless the progress of biology enables a government to fulfill one old totalitarian dream: that of changing human nature and creating a posthuman society that would be totally controlled. But for the time being, this possibility still belongs to science fiction rather than political analysis.

The same cannot be said, with the same probability, of totalitarian movements. The combination of fanaticism and technology, to use George W. Bush’s formulation, in movements that attempt to use science and technology to destroy the existing order, or even the planet itself in a grand apocalypse, is certainly a possibility. The Aum Shinrikyō sect in Japan, with a membership that includes scientists and engineers, trying to destroy Tokyo in order to hasten or forestall the end of the world, may be a harbinger of things to come. But should one call it totalitarian?
More broadly, should one call global terrorism or a movement like Al Qaeda totalitarian? Or should we reserve the term for the historical phenomenon born in the 20th century and assuming a specifically modern character? Both choices are legitimate, and depend on whether one adopts a narrow and precise or a broad and approximate definition of totalitarianism. What seems certain, however, is the permanence or the periodic resurgence of a third element—totalitarian aspirations and passions. The wish to be God; the wish to eliminate one’s enemies; the wish for absolute security or for “escaping from freedom”; passions such as compassion or indignation, which can lead to hatred and revenge; and, above all, the search for sacrifice and for identifying with a great cause or conversely the search for stability and for definitive answers in an ever-changing and complex world—all these are permanent possibilities of human nature. But they are particularly likely reactions to a regime like liberal democracy and an era like that of globalization, both of which generate anxiety because they deprive us of the old certainties about the fate of the individual and of the world.

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See also
Communism; Fascism; Fundamentalism; Ideology; Totalitarian Regimes

Further Readings


TRADE LIBERALIZATION

Trade liberalization refers to the opening up of markets to foreign imports and entails the abolition or reduction by governments of tariff and nontariff barriers (quotas, standards, etc.) that limit trade in goods or services across countries. Governments can liberalize trade unilaterally or on a reciprocal basis in negotiations with other countries and can apply any cuts in a preferential or a nonpreferential manner. Preferential liberalization removes barriers to imports only from selected countries and can lead to the establishment of free trade areas and customs unions, whereas nonpreferential liberalization applies to all countries that are covered by a most favored nation clause. The modern international trading system built around the World Trade Organization is based on the nonpreferential liberalization of trade and thus limits member countries’ discretion to liberalize trade preferentially. A country that abolishes all its trade barriers engages in free trade. This entry first presents a brief history of major moves toward international free trade and then discusses the possible causes and consequences of trade liberalization.

Most major European countries engaged in trade liberalization from the mid-19th century until the start of World War I, producing the rapid growth in international trade that was a key feature of the first phase of globalization. By contrast, nearly all countries increased barriers to trade in the interwar years, leading to a collapse of international trade. The process of trade liberalization was restarted by the United States in 1934, when Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act that conferred authority on the president to agree on reciprocal tariff cuts with other countries, which entered into force without requiring further congressional approval. After the end of World
War II, other developed countries joined the process of trade liberalization and agreed to repeated negotiations in the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947–1994).

While initially these trade rounds yielded only minor tariff cuts, the Kennedy Round (1964–1967), which was launched as a response to the creation of the European Economic Community (1958), led to a reduction of average tariffs by about one third. Overall, the multilateral negotiations caused a drop in the average tariffs on industrial goods applied by developed countries from more than 40% at the end of World War II to less than 4% after the implementation of the cuts agreed on in the Uruguay Round (1986–1994). For some time, these tariff reductions were partly offset by the imposition of nontariff barriers to trade and the use of administrative trade instruments, such as antidumping duties. Since the 1960s, however, a series of international agreements have also imposed limits on the use of these instruments for protectionist purposes.

Throughout most of the postwar period, developing countries hardly participated in the process of trade liberalization, not least because they received one-sided preferences from developed countries, which gave them little incentive to reduce their own barriers. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, many of them undertook partly substantial unilateral tariff cuts when moving away from import-substituting industrialization policies. Developing countries have also become eager participants in the proliferation of preferential trade agreements that characterize the current international trading system. There has been little progress in multilateral trade liberalization since the mid-1990s, and therefore, it seems safe to conclude that international trade is currently as free as it has ever been, which also explains the rapid growth in international trade over the last few decades. Variation in trade barriers across countries and sectors obviously still persists: on average, developed countries have lower trade barriers than developing countries, and industrial goods and services face lower trade barriers than agricultural goods.

Causes of Trade Liberalization

While the economic case for free trade is very strong, trade liberalization is puzzling from a political science perspective given that politicians have short-term incentives to impose barriers to trade. These incentives derive from the fact that although overall a country is expected to gain from freer trade, trade liberalization imposes costs on some sectors of the society—generally, the scarce factor of production and producers of goods and providers of services that face competition from imports. A political economy model of trade policy making expects these losers to defend their interests—namely, averting trade liberalization—in the policy-making process, for example, by lobbying and voting for parties or politicians that promise protectionist policies. By contrast, consumers, who benefit from the lower prices on imported goods and services resulting from trade liberalization, are unlikely to become politically active to defend their interests because of the diffuse nature of these benefits.

The puzzle of trade liberalization in the face of short-term political incentives to provide protection has motivated a large political science literature that stresses factors such as hegemony and geopolitics, societal demands, political institutions, and ideas and learning. One of the earliest explanations provided for trade liberalization emphasized the existence of a hegemonic power in the international system that may either have an interest in an open trading system or provide openness as a public good. A hegemonic power’s interest in free trade may stem from its ability to reap the traditional gains resulting from trade while at the same time avoiding the associated costs because the large internal market cushions the distributional effects of trade. A hegemonic power, moreover, may open its market in pursuit of geopolitical objectives, such as strengthening allies, creating relations of asymmetric dependence, and fostering security alliances. A prominent explanation for the liberalization of trade after World War II, consequently, highlights the hegemonic position of the United States at that time and its geopolitical rivalry with the Soviet Union.

Another school of thought looks for a change in the balance of societal demands when trying to explain trade liberalization. Following this reasoning, the rise of multinational companies, which benefit from low trade barriers when shipping inputs across borders and selling finished goods abroad, may have given impetus to the
liberalization of trade after World War II. Moreover, an increase in the number of firms that can take advantage of economies of scale should foster trade liberalization since these firms are likely to be competitive on world markets. As the United States is the home country to both many multinational companies and firms that benefit from economies of scale, these arguments may explain why that country was at the forefront of trade liberalization after World War II. At the same time, these arguments have relatively little to say about trade liberalization in the second half of the 19th century, when neither multinationals nor economies of scale played a major role. Equally based on societal demands is the argument that trade liberalization may be a reaction to the trade policies chosen by other countries. If the trade policies of a country reduce foreign exporters’ market access, these exporters are likely to react and lobby their government to engage in negotiations with the foreign country with the aim of eliminating the obstacles they face. These negotiations, in turn, may lead to a liberalization of trade. Finally, an initial step toward trade liberalization may have feedback effects that strengthen free trade forces. By bolstering exporters and weakening import competitors, it should change the balance of societal demands in a way that favors further liberalization.

Trade liberalization may also be a result of changes in political institutions. At the domestic level, an increase in the size of electoral districts, for example, should undermine the influence of protectionist forces by exacerbating their collective action problems and thus pave the way for freer trade policies. Moreover, democratization may lead to more liberal trade policies in countries in which labor is abundant. The reasoning behind this argument is that in labor-abundant countries, workers are expected to benefit from more trade; therefore, inclusion of their preferences in the political process should make that country’s trade policy more liberal. At the international level, the existence of an international regime that facilitates trade cooperation among countries by reducing the transaction costs associated with trade negotiations and providing a commitment device may also lead to trade liberalization. The international trading regime after World War II may not only have resolved intergovernmental bargaining problems but also reduced domestic opposition to trade liberalization by enabling the coexistence of relatively free trade and domestic compensation—a system that has become known as embedded liberalism.

Ideas and learning provide for final potential causes of trade liberalization. In the second half of the 19th century, the spread of the idea that free trade is beneficial for all countries may have motivated the abolition of trade barriers, first in the United Kingdom and later in the rest of Europe. In the second half of the 20th century, decision makers may have been influenced by their perception that the protectionist policies in the interwar years had contributed to, and had made worse the consequences of, the Great Depression. Most recently, developing countries may have reacted to the perceived failure of import substitution industrialization policies when enacting relatively liberal trade policies from the 1980s onward. In this last case, economic ideas may also have become causally relevant because they were carried by international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, which applied them when arranging for conditionality agreements with debtor countries.

Consequences of Trade Liberalization

Whatever the causes of trade liberalization, a step toward free trade is likely to have consequences for the distribution of wealth in a country and the political organization of that country. With respect to the distribution of wealth, trade liberalization produces winners and losers in a society. Unless a government redistributes income, this will lead to greater inequality—an effect that is confirmed by a series of empirical studies. What is more, some authors have suggested that free trade will undermine a country’s capacity to redistribute income, since an open trading system makes it easier for companies to relocate to countries with lower taxes and less welfare spending. The evidence concerning this expectation, however, is at best mixed.

Trade liberalization may also have an impact on the political organization of countries, especially if an initial move toward freer trade makes them dependent on continued openness. A country that becomes dependent on relatively free trade may require changes in the political structure that lock in liberal policies. This may be achieved, for example, by adopting corporatist practices, with strong domestic compensation mechanisms. Alternatively,
countries may insulate decision makers from protectionist pressures by increasing the size of electoral districts and moving toward proportional representation. Trade liberalization may even foster political disintegration. By allowing small countries to benefit from a large market, an increasingly open international trading system removes one of the incentives for their continued stay within a larger federation. This reasoning may provide a rationale for the recent increase in the number of sovereign countries in the world.

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See also International Political Economy; International Trade; Political Economy; Protectionism; Regionalism; World Trade Organization (WTO)

Further Readings

Traditional Rule

As indicated by F. Nyamnjoh (2003) in the 1950s and 1960s, modernization theorists predicted that traditional rule would soon become outdated and would be replaced by “modern” bureaucratic offices and institutions. Nyamnjoh further contends that even underdevelopment and dependency theorists did not seem to give chiefs and chieftaincy much of a chance; they saw chieftaincy as lacking in mobilizational ability for social and political change. However, political scientists, sociologists, historians, and educated traditional leaders in Africa acknowledge the resilience of chieftaincy institutions (cf. Nyamnjoh, 2003, pp. 233–250; Chief Linchwe II, 1989, pp. 99–102). Today, new scholarship in Southern Africa such as that by Lungisile Ntsebeza (2005) is paying attention to chieftaincy, intrigued by the manner in which the institution remains part of the cultural and political landscape constantly negotiating and renegotiating its position within the modern institutions of countries such as Botswana. This entry examines the place of traditional rule in Africa, using Botswana as an example.

Botswana enjoys a good reputation for its record of good government and democracy. Over decades, Botswana has demonstrated to the world an immense socioeconomic strength driven by a combination of modern and conservative traditional leadership despite diversification of socioeconomic bases. The country’s leadership has been able to face and overcome challenges of great magnitude, such as the scourge of HIV/AIDS. Several scholars have attributed the country’s pillars of modern democracy and ability to withstand 21st-century socioeconomic challenges to its traditional government system (cf. G. Somolekae & M. H. Lekorwe, 1998). In Botswana, there are intangible but identifiable group sensibilities toward democratic discourse, a discourse that is situated within culture, leadership, and development. In this entry, traditional rule in Botswana and its contemporary methods for avoiding and resolving conflicts in the past and the present are examined. The role of chieftaincy (bogosi) and the kgotla system is emphasized. Bogosi and the kgotla institution are deeply ingrained in Botswana society, and the chiefs (dikgosi) are a critical component of chieftaincy. In fact, one cannot conceive of chieftaincy without a chief who is placed at society’s helm. A few relevant examples will be cited as illustration for Botswana’s historic and contemporary tools for dialogue, consultation, and mediation. However, the entry does recognize limitations that still exist within the bogosi institution.
On several occasions, the kgotla institution has been cited in contemporary studies as an institution that encourages mutual knowledge, appreciation, respect, and tolerance (cf. Somolekae & Lekorwe, 1998).

**Bogosi and the Kgotla: Agents of Sustainable Democracy and Development**

One important feature of the precolonial Tswana traditional rule was the use of tribal assemblies or kgotlas and the conduct of public affairs, including the tradition of peacemaking, that took place through the kgotla. Tswana institutions of governance, such as bogosi (chieftainship) and the kgotla system, have continued to be relevant to the lives of Batswana.

Earlier studies suggested that the kgotla had been a central element in the traditional machinery of Tswana government. Kofi Darkwah (1996) argues that before 1966, the kgotla may be said to have been not just a public meeting place but also the seat of the government or administration of the community. As Isaac Schapera (1994) notes, the central kgotla of the kgosi was the public assembly where he not only delivered judgments and laws but also listened to the people when matters of public interest were discussed. Chiefs (dikgosi) presided in large kgotla meetings (pitso or phuthego), where after lengthy discussion in which “all” could participate, the Kgosi had the right to make final decisions on all matters. The chief exercised authority over a large area (a district today) through a hierarchy of relatives and officials, including close advisers and ward headmen (P. M. Mgadla & A. Campbell, 1989, p. 49). During the 19th century, BaNgwato in what is today the central district and BaTswana of Ngamiland (northwest district) extended their political control over other groups considered of lower status than the Tswana dominant groups. The so-called minority groups included San/Basarwa, BaYei, Bambukushu, BaKalanga, BaBirwa, and BaTswapong. BaNgwato and BaTswana were among those who considered themselves superior to others because of their strong political and administrative system, which included monarchy, as well as courts of laws and an economy based on large-scale animal husbandry. In both the Ngwato and Tswana hierarchical system of government, the whole area under their thraldom was divided into “counties” with senior Tswana each in charge as chief’s representatives (baemedi ba kgosi). The chief’s representatives would supervise their areas and ensure that the paramount chief’s (kgosi e kgolo’s) property, such as cattle, ivory, and furs, was properly guarded. Representatives of the constituent wards expressed their opinions at the main kgotla on behalf of their charges. The constituent ward far from the administrative center of the traditional rule also had its own small kgotla, which gave certain semiautonomy from the paramount chief and invested the group with the authority to regulate some of its affairs and to address the chief.

Although the subordinate kgotla did not have the power to legislate, they formed part of the traditional government machinery in the sense that they were part of the administrative and judicial system of the community. Early accounts of the Tswana chief portray him as relying a great deal on consultation with leading men, both agnates and commoners, hence the Tswana aphorism “Kgosi ke Kgosi ka batho” [The chief is the chief by the grace of the people]. Omulf Gulbrandsen (1995, pp. 415–444) points out that on the one hand, the Tswana strongly felt the need for an effective ruler, while on the other hand, they were strongly aware of the need for a check on the powers entrusted to him as expressed in the above proverb. Pauline Peters (1994, p. 34) argues that the kgotla embodied the consultative aspect of ruling authority; thus, it played the role of counterweight to central power. The great kgotla was the arena where the chief promulgated laws, which had been discussed in detail at prior meetings, and where the many not included in the select circle around the chief were able to express their opinions on the proposal. In theory, all men who attended the kgotla had the right to air their views without fear of reprimand. The dictum, “mmualebe o bua la gague” or “mahoko a kgotla a mantle otlhe” meant that no one could be debarred from voicing his or her opinion, no matter how unpopular.

In defining the contemporary kgotla, during an interview, Isaac Tudor (August 23, 2001) of Kgosing ward in Maun (Ngamiland district) describes it as a democratic institution, you are free to say anything from your mind, it’s your freedom of
speech, and nobody will send you to court for
talking nonsense. Everyone deserves to be heard.
You are bound to have endless Kgotla meetings,
depending on the seriousness of the subject
discussed.

It is common that each male speaker randomly
stands up to speak. In what is considered Tswana
custom and tradition, respectable adult men wore
hats (which they had to remove at the kgotla); by
contrast, female adults had to cover their heads
with scarves when attending the kgotla.
The result was a government with a certain
openness, and the whole idea of debate was recog-
nized as an important part of policy making. While
all major decisions and pronouncements appear to
have been subjected to public appraisal, it also
seems clear that once a decision was made, it was
expected to be observed by all. Peters (1994, p. 35)
has described the kgotla, therefore, as an open
forum where consensus politics decided the out-
comes of debate. Although the powers of the
kgotla were advisory only, the chief and his offi-
cials could use that forum to generate a consensus
before taking action and to sense opposition to
particular proposals.

There were exceptions to this openness. L. D.
Ngcongco (1989, pp. 46, 58–74) has cited the
example of exclusions in Kweneng where
BaKgalagadi were not as a rule expected to speak
at a kgotla, even though they were free to attend.
In the case of Ngamiland, likewise, subordinate
groups such as the BaSarwa (San) felt intimidated
and thus found it difficult to stand up and speak at
the Maun Kgotla. Tswana societies, like other
African societies, did not consider public affairs a
domain for women (Somolekae & Lekorwe, 1998,
p. 187). Like other subordinates, women were
treated as children. Thus, as a rule, they did not
participate in kgotla debates unless they were
invited to give evidence during the settlement of
disputes. The aggregate functions of the kgotla
rendered it a space that was historically a male
domain. Only during the colonial period were
Western-educated women, such as Pulane Moremi
of BaTawana (1947–1964) and Gaogangwe
Gaseitsiwe Ntebogang Ratshosa of BaNgwaketse
(1924–1928), made regents. Gradually, after
World War II, nonroyal women found their place
in the kgotla and could speak in meetings.

Chieftaincy has presented the strongest chal-
lenge to women’s struggles against their minor
status than any other factor. Arguments have been
advanced against chieftaincy in Africa with the
assumption that this is a predominantly male insti-
tution. Gender and human rights activists have
called for reform within the traditional rule struc-
ture, which is often viewed as an institution of an
undemocratic nature. Although chieftaincy has
been dominated by men in the past, the approval
of the appointment of female paramount chiefs by
the Botswana Minister of Local Government in the
past few years is an indication that traditional rule
has reformed and that the institution accommod-
ates women as capable leaders. The ascension of
Kgosi Mosadi Seboko to head a kgotla in 2002 is
a good example of the few women who have
broken new ground. Her official installation as a
chief, draped in a leopard skin like other male
traditional leaders, marked her authority among
her tribal group, the Balete, 30 km south of the
capital, Gaborone. Seboko became the first woman
to serve in the Ntlo Ya Dikgosi mandated to advise
both the government and parliament on issues
relating to custom and tradition, including tribal
property. The transformation of bogosi was noted
by several speakers during this historic moment in
Botswana. During Kgosi Mosadi Seboko’s inaugu-
ration, Athaliah Molokomme, the first Botswana
female Attorney General remarked,

The institution of chieftainship and the installation
of Botswana’s first woman paramount chief
cannot be seen in isolation from the tremendous
socioeconomic changes that have taken place in
our country and the world. (Mmegi, 2003)

On her side, Seboko thanked her people for
support. “You were able to transcend the gender
imbalance that many are still grappling with, and
installed me not because I am a woman, but rather
on the basis of birthright equity.” (Mmegi, 2003).
Since her installation as paramount chief, her
major concern has been the increase in the num-
ber of disintegrating families, crime, domestic
abuse and violence, unemployment, and HIV/
AIDS. Nyamnjoh (2003) observes that these new
developments in Botswana point to an institution
that is adaptable and negotiating with changing
political and social realities in the country. Since
Seboko’s installation, several women, such as Keleatile Moremi of Batawana, are now claiming full citizenship as provided for in Botswana’s constitution. The Bill of Rights in the Constitution suggests that actually women have equal rights as men. On August 26, 2009, Mosadi Seboko was recognized at Riverwalk cinema in Gaborone, with a few other women, through a Botswana home-produced film documentary not only contributing to the socioeconomic and political development of Botswana but also for serving as a mentor to the younger generation.

Another visible transformation within traditional rule in the country is the installation of young and educated chiefs to strengthen the voice in the Ntlo ya Dikgosi, negotiating their way into the democratic discourse. In the past, educated chiefs, such as Kgosi Seeapitso IV of BaNgwaketse and Kgosi Linchwe of BaKgatla II, not only served as traditional authorities within the confines of the then House of Chiefs (an advisory body to Parliament and government on matters pertaining to Botswana tradition and culture) but were at some point assigned by the government to serve as diplomats in countries such as the United States and China. The number of young, educated, and elite paramount chiefs has been increasing since the installation of a number of Tawana II of BaTawana in the late 1990s. Among these young cadre of chiefs are Lotlamoreng II of BaRolong (2002); Kgari Sechele II of BaKwena (2002), who was enthroned chief of Puso Gaborone of BaTlokwa (2006); the new chairman of Ntlo ya Dikgosi and more recently Kgafela II of BaKgatla (2008).

In 2009, Kgosi Tawana II, who had resigned from chieftainship to stand for public office, was elected to Parliament. As men such as Tawana move from traditional authority into modern politics, they remain royalty and carry the prestige of being Kgosi into Botswana’s modern politics. Like the first president of Botswana, Seretse Khama, and his son and current president, Seretse Ian Khama, their relative Tawana is likely to enjoy a legitimacy drawn from his position as former chief of the dominant BaTawana tribe. Ian Taylor has observed that the electorate of Botswana is still inclined toward a traditionalist culture of respect for authority, and this may explain why Kgosi Bathoen II of BaNgwaketse in 1969 played a dominant role in local politics and won support for the opposition Botswana National Front Kanye South constituency. The well-educated but non-royal Quett Ketumile Masire, a Botswana Democratic Party candidate, lost the constituency to Bathoen II. The Kanye South constituency was in the hands of the opposition for a very long time. In his recent biography, Masire (2006, p. 103) contends that in the mid-1950s, tradition or authority was often used to undermine the emerging non-royal elites. However, it is worth noting that when the Chieftainship Act was introduced in 1965, it meant that power was granted to the president to recognize or not recognize a traditional ruler, making all chiefs subordinate to central government. Ntlo ya Dikgosi has no legislative powers, and the positions of chiefs are dependent on recognition by the state.

Transformation in chieftaincy in Botswana should also be understood in the context of ethnic minority representation in the Ntlo ya Dikgosi. In 2006, the President of Botswana Festus Mogae toured the country to address and consult Batswana on issues of bogosi and the reconstitution of the House of Chiefs to become Ntlo ya Dikgosi. The president’s tour was a follow-up to the Balopi Commission, which had been assigned earlier to undertake a national consultation exercise to come up with proposals for change that would have a profound impact on national unity (Republic of Botswana, 2000, pp. 93–110). After independence (1966), some sections of Botswana society repeatedly voiced concern at the inadequacy of the constitution in addressing the aspirations of some sections of the nation. According to President Mogae, “The House of Chiefs, as it was then known, was singled out as a classic symbol of inequality as it was perceived to be an exclusive club of some tribes” (Piet, 2007). He observed that this did not go well with some citizens of Botswana and viewed this as a threat to national unity and lack of political will for democratization and political development. The inequality that existed then had to be addressed by amending sections 77, 78, and 79 of the Constitution of Botswana in order to render them tribally neutral. On February 1, 2007, Botswana’s historic opening of the first meeting of the Ntlo ya Dikgosi was held at which 20 new members, including a few women, were welcomed to the house. The forum of communication for these presidential deliberations was the kgotla.
Conclusion

Bogosi and the kgotla have gradually evolved as institutional agents of democratization and development. Since independence, chiefs have become active agents of government. However, traditional rule has displayed remarkable dynamism and adaptiveness to new socioeconomic and political developments in the country. Traditional institutional functionaries have over time learned to adapt themselves in accessing and using resources such as political power and education in building sustainable change in governance. It is worth emphasizing that to promote interaction leadership and a culture of peace and to support actions that foster understanding, tolerance, and solidarity in Botswana, traditional rule still requires further transformation to address gender equality and minority representation in the Ntlo ya Dikgosi. Leadership skills, such as strategic planning, communication and presentation, team building, creative problem solving, consultation, and conflict resolution, are very relevant to bogosi and the kgotla for fostering democratic participation.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Democracy, Theories of; Dictatorship; Transition

Further Readings


Tragedy of the Commons

The tragedy of the commons is a concept that denotes a specific type of social dilemma in which interdependent individuals face incentives to choose independent actions that maximize their individual benefit but generate a suboptimal aggregate outcome. Garrett Hardin is credited with first introducing the concept to describe the potential conflict between individual rationality and collective efficiency inherent in the management of a common-pool resource (CPR). A CPR is a natural or man-made resource characterized by a low
degree of excludability and a high degree of subtractability. Excludability refers to the feasibility and hence costliness of excluding potential users from using a resource; subtractability, on the other hand, concerns whether a user’s appropriation of units from the resource would reduce the amount of the units available to others. The two physical attributes generate what are known as provision problems facing individuals managing a CPR. Once a CPR is provided, it is difficult to exclude potential users from using the resource, regardless of whether or not they have contributed to the resource’s provision. A rational individual who considers the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action would find no incentive to contribute and instead would wait for others to provide the resource. Collective inaction is often the outcome.

In his famous 1968 article in Science, Hardin depicted a hypothetical world of a pasture open to all. Every herder faced the incentive that by bringing in an additional animal to graze in the pasture, he would reap all the benefit generated by the additional animal but bear only a small fraction of the cost of overgrazing. A rational herder facing such a cost–benefit calculus would likely choose to bring in as many animals to the pasture as possible to maximize his short-term personal gain. When every herder adopted the same calculus and acted on it, however, the collective outcome would be a complete depletion of the pasture—an outcome that would harm every herder. As Hardin pointed out, what makes the situation a tragedy is not the unhappy ending per se but the remorselessness involved. Although every herder would see the predicament coming, they would find themselves trapped in a dilemma from which they could not escape.

The tragedy of the commons is in fact one type of social dilemma in which interdependent individuals face the incentive to make independent choices that, while maximizing short-term individual benefit, collectively generate an inefficient aggregate outcome. The outcome is inefficient because there is at least one alternative that can generate a higher level of collective gain benefiting all the individuals involved. While the individuals are fully cognizant of their contributing to the suboptimal situation by failing to exercise temperance and restraint, they find themselves left with no choice but to continue to pursue short-term interest so as to avoid falling prey to others. In a social dilemma, aggregate inefficiency is not necessarily a result of evil acts by some malicious culprits who means to harm others. Even for a group of benign and innocent individuals, as long as they have to choose independent actions in an interdependent situation and are unable to read others’ minds, the possibility of a social dilemma always exists.

The “tragedy of the commons” provides policy analysts with a powerful metaphor for describing and deciphering public problems that are rooted in human interdependence. Moving from the more traditional forms of CPRs, such as irrigation, fishery, forestry, groundwater, transport systems, and budgets, studies of the commons have extended to cover nontraditional sectors, including the intellectual domain and the Internet. Recent studies of the new commons—forms of shared resources formerly not recognized as CPRs—have been a result of changing understanding of resource management and organization in new policy areas or sometimes an improved appreciation for the formerly unrealized extent and complexity of long-existing problems. Starting with high-seas fisheries and other more traditional forms of cross-border commons, the field of “global commons” now includes abstract common properties—biodiversity, genetic commons, atmosphere, social diversity and interconnectedness, equality, and knowledge.

**Governing the Commons as a Search for Policy Panaceas**

Hardin’s grim prediction about the tragedy of the commons prompted generations of social scientists and policy analysts to engage in a search for effective ways to govern the commons. Hardin himself sees a change in human values and ideas of morality as the only way to escape from the tragedy; the crux of the problem lies with the question of how the morality of temperance can be put in place. Hardin is pessimistic about the possibility that a morality of temperance could emerge out of conscience; the perverse incentives embedded in a commons are simply too strong for the development of credible mutual commitment, which is the very foundation for conscience. To Hardin, the second best alternative is to create mutual coercion that is mutually agreed on. Although Hardin is
well aware that coercion can be generated by various mechanisms, such as shame, he argues that for the commons, which are on a large scale and involve a large number of individuals, restrictive laws passed by a government are the more feasible way to generate mutual coercion.

A caveat is warranted here. Hardin did not naively argue that coercion by government is a foolproof and straightforward solution. In particular, he cautioned that the morality of temperance is highly context sensitive, and hence, it is almost impossible to stipulate a law that could take all conditions into account. Hardin also recognized that a major challenge of legislating temperance is to make sure that those who make and monitor the rules are themselves properly monitored and controlled.

For many policy analysts who favor simple and clear-cut policy advice, however, the tragedy of the commons metaphor provides not only a diagnosis of the problem of the commons but, more importantly, also a neat policy panacea. Given that the users of a commons are trapped in a social dilemma and are presumably unable to get out of it by themselves, direct government intervention seems to be the logical solution to help them out. In irrigation management in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, many international donors and governments in much of the developing world considered direct government intervention a policy panacea. When put into practice, the panacea took the form of outright nationalization of the existing irrigation systems, large-scale infrastructure investment, and the establishment of a strong, centralized irrigation bureaucracy. As policy analysts embraced the policy panacea, Hardin’s caution about the context specificity of the morality of temperance and the need to monitor the monitors fell largely on deaf ears and was often considered a trivial matter involving implementation details.

At the time when direct government intervention was hailed as a policy panacea for coping with the problems of the commons, policy analysts trained in economics, in particular property rights economics, advocated the imposition of private property rights as an alternative policy panacea. The logic of their argument is straightforward: By putting in place private property rights and hence some sort of (pseudo)market exchange, individual owners of a CPR would be able and willing to internalize all the costs and benefits of their actions in relation to the provision and use of the resource. Without externalities, the maximizing behavior of the individuals will aggregate into collective efficiency.

Although the privatization panacea seems to offer a neat analytic solution to the problems of the commons, attempts to apply the panacea in the real world have been subject to the thorny questions of whether it is practically possible and, if so, how to divide up a commons and how to keep the transaction costs involved in the exchange at a reasonably low level. In irrigation management, for example, ample evidence has shown that an effective water market is possible only if there exists both a strong physical infrastructure that allows for efficient transfers of resource units and a solid social infrastructure that enables the users to engage in exchange activities in an orderly manner. Unfortunately, in the real world, both types of infrastructure are often in short supply; this is particularly the case in many developing countries where the livelihood of the poor often directly hinges on the effective management of various CPRs, such as irrigation systems and other rural infrastructure.

Empirical Research on the Commons

In the early 1980s, as direct government intervention in CPR management, particularly in the developing world, had produced rather mixed outcomes, scholars and policy analysts began to question the viability of the panacea of centralized control and regulation. Instead of taking Hardin’s pessimistic prediction for granted, researchers started to seriously take stock of existing ethnographic evidence of the governance of the commons and conduct systematic empirical research. If there were major lessons that the decades of empirical research on the commons had to offer, three would stand out.

First, a commons is not destined to be a tragedy. While there are instances of failure, there are many cases of success in various policy domains ranging from irrigation, fishery, groundwater, and forestry, to grazing lands. In most of these successful cases, resource users and managers are able to develop an appropriate governance structure to manage and regulate the use of the resources so as to maintain a certain level of sustainability.
Second, the users of a CPR are not doomed to be helpless individuals awaiting help from an external authority. Empirical evidence has shown that around the world many communities of resource users are able to organize effective collective action to govern the commons. In fact, self-governance is not only a possibility but a commonplace. Moreover, contrary to what conventional theories have suggested, successful self-governance is not confined to CPRs of a small scale. In irrigation management, for example, there are cases in which local communities have successfully governed and managed irrigation systems that serve a service area of thousands of hectares over long periods of time. What is intriguing is that self-organized community-based irrigation systems have often significantly outperformed government-managed irrigation systems, which are often characterized by sophisticated physical infrastructure and management by professional engineers.

Third, contrary to what Hardin presumed, a CPR is not necessarily an open-access resource that is available to all at any time. In a majority of the successful cases, the users of the commons are able to define membership in relation to their resource through a diversity of institutional arrangements. The existence of considerable diversity in the design of CPR institutions raises a fundamental question as to whether the tripartite choice of the state, markets, and open access can fully capture the empirical diversity and provide an adequate analytical framework for the study of the commons.

**Governing the Commons as a Search for Effective Design of Institutions**

Hardin’s analysis of the commons and the conventional CPR theories are anchored on two assumptions. The first assumption is that those involved in the commons dilemma resemble the neoclassical rational man, who is portrayed as having clear and definite preferences and excellent information-processing capabilities. While the neoclassical rational man may not make the right choice every time, he commands good knowledge of the probability distribution of what might happen for alternative courses of action. Theoretical and policy analyses, then, focus on examining the logic of action of the neoclassical rational man in a social dilemma and explicating possible ways to circumvent the perverse incentives embedded in the dilemma.

The problem of the neoclassical assumption of rationality is not so much that it oversimplifies but that it has been overgeneralized, as if it were the only viable assumption of rationality. Recent research has shown that the neoclassical model works relatively well only in stable situations where the information required for decision making is more or less complete, such as in a perfectly competitive market. For the analysis of individual choice making in a commons where a high level of uncertainty is involved, and hence learning is essential, the more complex model of bounded rationality, which takes into account human beings’ cognitive limitations as well as their ability to learn and engage with one another, would be more appropriate. An implication of the model is that fallible individuals, while capable of making mistakes, can learn from the mistakes, improve their understanding of action situations, and design new institutional arrangements and strategies to cope with the social dilemma. The model points to the need to understand problem solving as a process of trial and error in a search for both means and ends (common understanding) and to the relevance of choices at multiple levels.

The second assumption underlying the conventional analysis of the commons is that individuals make choices in an institutional vacuum. The conventional theories not only fail to acknowledge the process of socialization as central to the creation of the individual but also decontextualize the analysis of actors’ behavior. As argued by many researchers, individuals in a commons are in fact making situated choices; their decisions are shaped and conditioned by the greater contexts of culture and social rules.

As a result of a better appreciation of human fallibility and the importance of institutions, beginning in the 1980s, the focus of CPR research has shifted toward examining how the boundedly rational individuals struggle to cope with social dilemmas by crafting institutions and identifying design principles for institutions that can bring about effective outcome. Among the contending definitions of institutions in CPR research, the one developed by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues in a tradition of institutional analysis and development (IAD) is a particularly useful analytical construct. In the IAD framework, institutions are defined as
“rules-in-use” adopted by a community of individuals to regulate their repetitive interactions pertaining to the physical–biological world. The rules-in-use are linguistic prescriptions that require, prohibit, or permit a range of action for individuals under particular situations. When individuals ponder their actions and strategies in relation to one another, they take the rules into their calculus.

Based on careful theoretical analysis and meta-analysis of a large number of empirical case studies, Ostrom and her colleagues have identified eight principles of institutional design for robust governance of CPRs. These now well-known principles are

1. clearly defined boundaries,
2. congruence between rules and physical conditions,
3. collective-choice arrangements,
4. monitoring,
5. graduated sanctions,
6. conflict resolution mechanisms,
7. minimal recognition of rights to organize, and
8. nested enterprises.

Unlike conventional theories that focus on how users choose strategies of action in response to a given incentive structure, the IAD framework looks at the governance of the commons as an ongoing process that requires continual contribution from the users and recognizes the possibility of the users developing and modifying institutions to govern the resource. Empirical evidence has shown that institutions that are characterized by some or all of these design principles are better able to provide incentives for users of a commons to engage in collective action and, more important, to craft and continuously recraft institutions (rules-in-use) to govern the commons.

First, individuals in a CPR situation would be more likely to participate in the provision and management of the resource if they perceived a possibility that they would enjoy the benefits generated by their collective effort. Rules that stipulate clearly how consequences of collective endeavors would impact on whom are of major significance in providing incentive for individuals to engage in collective action. The existence of well-defined boundary rules and user rights is a particularly important factor accounting for system performance.

Second, individuals in an interdependent situation are not always able to see their interdependence and its implications for aggregate efficiency. Only when the users of a CPR are aware of and understand how their interests relate to those of one another, how much potential benefits could be generated by working with one another, and how fragile one could be when acting alone in an interdependent situation can they begin to see the potential of and need for arriving at a broader conception of preference in which self-interest is conditioned by recognizing the need to take the interests of others into consideration. When institutions provide opportunities and incentives for the users to communicate, reason, and share information with one another about not only the physical conditions of the commons but also their concerns, the users are more ready to work with others in managing the resource.

Third, research has found that the users of a CPR are better able and willing to cooperate with one another if they have a better understanding of the physical conditions of the resource and are able to monitor and keep track of the change in the physical environment. Institutions can serve an information-inducing function if they embody useful information, encourage the gathering and use of local information at various settings, and allow the users to use time-specific and place-specific information in their daily exigencies. Moreover, by ruling in certain actions and ruling out some others, institutions also provide information not only about the structure of the action situation faced by individuals but also about the choices of others. Such information allows them to form expectations, which in turn enable the individuals to make choices by taking the possible choices of others into consideration.

Fourth, strategies available to resource users that are ruled in by institutions are usually the ones that maximize collective outcomes but not individual payoffs. Hence, a collectively optimal outcome usually hinges on quasi-voluntary compliance, where the compliance of a user is contingent on the compliance of others. Quasi compliance can be sustained only if the users expect long-term gains from complying with the rules and perceive some prospect of being sanctioned if any one user
among them breaks the rules. For monitoring and sanctioning to be effective, they have to be designed in such a way that the activities of monitoring and sanctioning involve only low costs, are diffused in scope, and are perceived by users in the community as fair and reasonable.

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See also Governance, Multilevel; Institutional Theory; Natural Resources; Rationality, Bounded

Further Readings

Transaction Costs

Transaction costs figure prominently in formal political decision making as well as in informal processes of political negotiation. Transaction cost considerations are highly relevant in a number of domains, such as social choice theory, public sector reforms aiming at contracting in or out, and the design of global governance.

Costs linked with transacting among humans arise when there is cooperation in one form or another. Cooperation resulting in agreements requires a number of measures for it to be effective, such as negotiation of the terms of agreement, specifying a contract or writing down the agreement, and implementation of the agreement, possibly through court action.

As these costs before and after an agreement tend to be measured chiefly in time, effort, and frustration rather than in money, they are distinguished from ordinary production costs in economics. Although transaction costs were first theorized about in economic theory, they have figured prominently in politics, less often as the costs of contracting and more often as so-called decision costs. One may here recall the much debated institutions of *liberum veto* and the filibuster, both of which tend to maximize transactions costs. Today transaction costs are a major consideration in public sector reform, especially in new public management, where government seeks to replace long-term contracting (bureaucracy) with short-term contracting (tendering/bidding).

Foundations of Transaction Cost Economics

Transaction cost economics started with the 1937 article by Ronald Coase on the firm and continued with his 1960 article on social costs. Economic life is replete with different forms of contracts, whose shape transaction cost theory helps explain. Thus, in the Coasean tradition, internal firm organization with long-term contracts presents a mechanism to reduce transaction costs when relying on massive short-term contracting in the market. This 1937 insight received a much needed elaboration by Oliver E. Williamson, underlining the implications of transaction costs for both hierarchies and markets. In the Williamson tradition, minimizing transaction costs is of paramount importance in economic life where strong forces like opportunism and asymmetric information with economic agents, especially when possessing asset-specific knowledge, are conducive to economic inefficiency, such
as monopoly. The 1960 Coase article broadened transaction cost economics to the domain of public policy and externalities, arguing that with zero transaction costs, external effects and market failures could be handled by means of bargaining and compensation. This claim about the ability of market forces to allocate responsibility for external costs is known as the Coase theorem. It anticipated recent debates about extending the “polluter pays” idea to a global ecology policy to reduce carbon emissions. In general, institutional economics (new or neo-institutional) combine the insights from both Coase and Williamson, emphasizing that economic evolution aims at minimizing transaction costs (Oliver Williamson & Scott Masten, 1997). No similar teleology concerning a fundamental drive to develop institutions that minimize transactions is to be found in politics, however.

Transaction Costs in the Political Sphere

In politics, transaction cost arguments are primarily found in the theory of voting and the public choice school. Transaction costs arise in any political group taking decisions by some mechanism of voting, whether the group be a domestic one like the national assembly or an international organization like the World Bank, the United Nations, or the International Monetary Fund. In a group of choice participants—political parties, legislators, state representatives, faculty members, and club members—any decision or collective action will result from the summation of the preferences of the participants according to some mechanism of aggregation. Alternative social choice mechanisms—majoritarian techniques, proportional methods, utilitarian scoring, positional techniques—result in varying transaction costs for the group as a whole.

Given the assumption that no participant in the choice group should be given a separate status, the decision method that appears to be the just one is the Wicksell unanimity principle. It epitomizes the idea of deliberative democracy—namely, that a group decision must take into account the views of all participants. By deliberating the relevant issues, the “correct” group decision will emerge. In 1896, Swedish economist Knut Wicksell had already identified this kind of efficiency justice with the veto principle, meaning that all choice participants have not only a say but in effect a no capacity. By favoring the consensus method, Wicksell wanted to avoid the situation of a minority getting pushed over, having to bear alone the heavy costs from a collective decision. Thus, unanimity would secure Pareto optimality in politics. However, Wicksell did not recognize the full scale of the transaction costs that attend the unanimity principle when employed in practice. Consensus is the most transaction cost–burdensome decision rule for a choice group. Thus, alternatives must be employed, at least in domestic politics, to avoid decision inertia. As noted by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), Wicksell’s insights into decision costs—for the loser (external costs) and for the group as a whole (transaction costs)—form the backbone of the public choice school.

It is interesting to note that in politics, minimizing transaction costs is not an overall manifest objective or latent function, as it were. One may distinguish between domestic politics and international relations. Only for the first domain can one speak of a search for institutions that minimize transaction costs, such as the simple majority decision procedure and majoritarian election techniques. In contrast, choice participants in international institutions—the governments of member states—are reluctant to give up the Wicksell unanimity principle. The principle of state sovereignty entails that governments can protect their vital interests in international organizations with a firm veto. Similarly, in regional organizations, with the exception of the EU, the veto rule is upheld, although it maximizes transaction costs.

Transaction costs surface in decision making in political groups whether domestic, regional, or international. They are inversely related to the decisiveness of the group, which is the ratio of the number of winning coalitions to the total number of coalitions among the choice participants. When decisiveness is low, then, a stalemate is probable because of the ensuing strategies of delaying and holding out. Voting under a simple majority or qualified majority increases decisiveness and reduces transaction costs. The existence of a dictator in the group minimizes transaction costs but also increases the majority’s risk of losing out on its preferred positions. A simple majority minimizes transactions costs in social choice while at the same time letting the majority prevail.
The fact that regional and international organizations seldom employ simple majority entails that minimizing transaction costs is not the sole preoccupation of these choice participants. They may favor unanimity or qualified majority because these regimes increase the choice participants’ power to block, which may be a more important concern than the decisiveness of the group. Thus, transaction costs in politics may be supported because they follow necessarily from the highly valued blocking power of each participant.

These insights into the inverse relationship between blocking power and group decisiveness stemming from the logic of transaction costs in political decision making have been elaborated on in constitutional economics and N-person game theory. Recognizing the positive effect of increasing transaction costs, many constitutions provide for a qualified majority on sensitive matters, increasing the individual power to block and decreasing group decisiveness. Constitutional decision making is especially surrounded by inertia that leads to more substantial transaction costs. Realizing that transaction costs may become staggering as a result of delays and holding out, international organizations have deviated from unanimity and introduced qualified majorities of one or another kind. Yet procedural matters, being less sensitive, are often decided by simple majority.

Measuring and Managing Transaction Costs

In economics, several attempts have been made to measure transactions, but they are far less identifiable than standard production costs like labor and capital. More specifically, the costs of establishing a patent in various countries have been measured in the form of the length of time it takes from the launching of an application. Some scholars estimate that transaction costs may amount to a staggering one third of the GDP, including both financial operations and enforcement costs. Yet it must be pointed out that these measures of transaction costs in the economic literature are somewhat imprecise. It has even been argued by Eirik Furuobotn and Rudolf Richter that transaction costs include the costs of maintaining or changing the political institutions that legislate about or administer contracts. More convincing are the attempts, such as that by Yoram Barzel, to estimate the reduction in transaction costs involved in introducing more efficient institutions like the Aktiengesellschaft, private property to land and partnership schemes.

In political science, transaction costs can be identified as being related to the inverse of the decisiveness of an assembly or a decision-making board. In domestic affairs, one tends to opt for a transaction costs minimizing mechanism like simple majority, whereas in regional and international coordination, unanimity or a qualified majority is favored, resulting in sometimes heavy transaction costs. Transaction costs in political assemblies are minimized when the individual blocking power is not substantial. N-person game theory, especially the power index approach, offers a convenient method for estimating the decisiveness of a choice group under alternative institutional arrangement, as, for instance, in the European parliament, the European Council, and various international bodies.

In public administration or public management, the seminal move toward contracting out or externalization has raised a concern over rising transaction costs. Relying on a multitude of delivery agents—public, private, and third sector—governments have become more anxious about getting the contracts correct as disputes under the new public management will be settled in court. It is an open question as to whether the reduction in production costs that come with short-term contracting is enough to compensate for the sharp rise in transaction costs with tendering/bidding schemes, especially litigation costs. When giving up long-term contracting in standard employment relations, the government also loses its general authority to direct the work effort and to train its employees continuously—sometimes described as the hollowing out of the state.

Transaction Costs in Global Governance

Today, transaction costs surface strongly in global governance as the governments of the countries of the world confront a number of issues arising from growing interdependences. Groups like the G8 or G20 are basically unanimity groups and are, therefore, associated with decision inertia and delays. Since the decisions of international coordination
bodies are not only time-consuming in the making but can also be reneged on ex post, transaction costs loom large in several domains of global governance. To reduce these transaction costs, international organizations need to reconsider their structure, avoiding unanimity but allowing for quantitative voting in order to recognize the immense differences in scale between various countries. They also need to examine the enforcement problem in global governance as few of them have explicit dispute settlement mechanisms, at least not those that operate speedily.

Transaction costs have also been taken into account in global policy making in the form of the carbon emissions scheme—the Kyoto agreement. If a price on carbon abatement could be set and emission rights be allocated to all countries globally, then, a global emissions policy imitating the market would be conducive to an efficient reduction in carbon emissions, following the Coase theorem. However, arriving at such a comprehensive global emissions policy has not yet been successful due to transaction costs both in negotiating the emission rights (ex ante) and in enforcing the agreement against reneging (ex post).

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See also Governance, Global; Governance, Multilevel; New Public Management; Social Choice Theory

Further Readings

**Transatlantic Relations**

Like many of the most widely used concepts in the political science subfield of international relations, the term *transatlantic relations* defies precise definition and has been used to refer to a variety of historical, political, cultural, social, and economic interactions between polities, societies, institutions, groups, and individuals in Europe and North America. As such, the phenomenon, if not the term itself, stretches from the period of European exploration and colonization of the Americas, especially in the 16th and 17th centuries, through the ensuing political upheavals of the late 18th century—in particular those associated with the United States War of Independence—the consolidation and extension of U.S. power and influence across the New World in the 19th century—primarily at the expense of Spain and France—to the projection of U.S. power and influence into Europe itself. The latter process was most clearly reflected in the United States’ crucial contribution to the outcomes of the two world wars of the last century and the establishment of a permanent military presence in Europe, which, although it outlived its origins in the Cold War, continues today. Because of their origins in the efforts of European powers to colonize the New World, however, transatlantic relations have never been limited to merely political or security affairs. They have always been influenced by economic and cultural interactions, with trade and immigration constituting the most important components of transatlantic relations in the 18th and 19th centuries.

The rich history of transatlantic relations and the membership of Canada in important transatlantic institutions, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe notwithstanding, the term today is most often used with reference to post–World War II relations between the United States and Europe. In security affairs, it primarily comprises relations between the United States and its European NATO partners. In economic affairs, the frame of reference is the United States and the members of the European Union (EU), although relations between the EU and the North American Free Trade Area are sometimes covered by the term. Generally excluded from the
Transatlantic Relations
in the Postwar Period

Although there were some efforts to systematically analyze transatlantic relations in the interwar period, they first emerged as a central topic of concern in international relations theory and practice in the period following World War II. In particular, the breakdown of the wartime alliance between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, the extension and consolidation of Soviet control over the states of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union to the war-ravaged states of Western Europe implied the need for close economic and military cooperation between the states of Western Europe and the United States and led to the Marshall Plan, the development of NATO, and the strategy of containment. For the first three decades of the Cold War, transatlantic relations were characterized by a high degree of asymmetry. In economic and military affairs, the United States was the provider and Europe the consumer. In both fields, the United States was a global superpower. Europe, by contrast, was at most a regional junior partner.

Both sides of the Atlantic drew large benefits from this asymmetrical relationship; however, transatlantic relations experienced frequent and serious controversies. Whereas the states of Europe were quite happy to accept American economic assistance and security guarantees on the continent, the former colonial powers found it difficult to cede to the United States those prerogatives that had accompanied their previous status as great powers. A general American aversion to Europe’s continued colonial pretensions resulted in strained relations throughout the 1950s and erupted into a serious crisis when the United States demanded the withdrawal of British and French forces from Egypt, which together with Israel they had attacked in October 1956 in response to President Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. For their part, Europeans often resented the fact and exercise of American power. In the wake of Suez, French president Charles de Gaulle set out to enhance France’s military and political independence by developing nuclear weapons, successfully testing an atomic bomb in 1960. In early 1966, he announced that France would alter the terms of her participation in the Atlantic Alliance. As a result, France withdrew its ground and air forces as well as headquarters personnel from NATO commands, demanded the removal of U.S. and Canadian forces from French territory, and forced the relocation of NATO headquarters and installations to neighboring countries.

The 1970s and 1980s were similarly marked by periodic strains in transatlantic relations, in particular over nuclear strategy and arms control, as well as relations with the Soviet Union and its East European satellites, but the debates were generally conducted within a larger consensus over basic interests, goals, and values. It is perhaps a paradox of transatlantic relations that their very success has tended to engender subsequent tensions between Europe and North America. Hence, the American decision to condition receipt of Marshall Plan assistance on the development of a common European economic policy contributed to the development of the European Communities and eventually the EU. Premised on transatlantic cooperation, Europe’s economic recovery nonetheless led to conflict with the United States over questions of economic policy especially in the fields of trade and investment.

By the beginning of the 21st century, the economic asymmetry between the United States and its European trading partners was all but eliminated. Ongoing efforts to widen and deepen European integration in the fields of foreign and security policy by means of a European Constitution hold the prospect of eliminating the political asymmetries between the United States and Europe, although Europe’s capacity for power projection lags far behind that of its American ally.
Transatlantic Relations After the Cold War

The rapid and unexpected end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and communist governments across Eastern Europe in 1989 to 1990 dramatically changed the context within which transatlantic relations had developed for almost a half century, leading many to question their future course. If transatlantic relations had been premised on meeting the threat posed by the Soviet Union in a global anticommunist struggle and the reinforcing imperative of economic recovery and if the early asymmetry in capabilities between the two sides of the Atlantic was disappearing, could a basic consensus on both sides of the Atlantic over fundamental interests, goals, and values in international and domestic affairs suffice to sustain the history of close cooperation? Since 1990, the question has preoccupied policymakers and scholars alike.

Scholars of international security and defense policymakers wondered whether NATO could survive without an identifiable enemy. Prominent political scientists maintained that NATO was indeed disappearing, while influential politicians argued that NATO would have to go out of area if it were to retain relevance. Meanwhile, many observers of transatlantic economic relations argued that with the opening of the economies of Eastern Europe augmenting ongoing economic liberalization in China, the end of the Cold War would accelerate the ongoing processes of globalization. As a result, Europe and the United States were expected to engage in fierce competition for mobile capital and a declining number of high-paying jobs. Moreover, as the relative importance of other regions of the world for both Europe and the United States increased, some reduction in the level of importance that was accorded to transatlantic relations seemed unavoidable.

After an American-led coalition defeated Iraq and restored the Kuwaiti Emir to power in 1991, the transatlantic agenda of the 1990s was largely dominated by two broad strategic issues. The first involved the expansion of NATO and the EU to the newly independent states of Eastern Europe; the second issue was how to respond to the campaign of mass murder and ethnic cleansing that emerged after the breakup of Yugoslavia and resulted in the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia. With respect to the latter issue, NATO proved unwilling or unable to develop and execute a coherent strategy for the first three and a half years of the conflict. In light of that failure, the logic of NATO expansion was less than entirely persuasive. Meanwhile, the EU pursued a strategy of sanctions, United Nations resolutions, and threats of diplomatic isolation in an effort to coerce Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs to stop the ethnic cleansing but to no avail. Following a series of transatlantic recriminations and a change of government in both the United States and France, NATO eventually intervened militarily and forced the parties to negotiate a resolution to the crisis. The lessons of the Bosnian War still fresh in their minds, United States and European leaders responded in a swift and effective manner to the 1999 crisis over Kosovo.

The question of the future course of transatlantic relations again became acute in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., and the ensuing transatlantic debate over the course and scope of the global war on terror and how to deal with the perceived threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of so-called rogue states. The debate was focused primarily on Iraq, which the U.S. and European intelligence agencies believed possessed WMD and which was invaded by U.S. and British forces in March 2003. The ensuing dispute pointed to divergent perceptions of core interests between the United States and important European allies—France and Germany in particular—and led to a breakdown of allied cooperation in the United Nations and a wave of anti-American sentiment across Europe. Many regard the crisis over Iraq to have been the most serious of the post–World War II era.

Transatlantic relations appeared to reach a nadir during the two administrations of U.S. President George W. Bush (2001–2009). For example, in Germany, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder not only opposed the United States on a fundamental question of security but premised his 2002 reelection campaign on opposition to American foreign policy. But the transatlantic divide was not limited to debates over single issues or the rhetoric of individual politicians. A series of differences over issues as diverse as the role of religion in politics, the establishment of an International Criminal Court, climate change, and the death
penalty, many of which predated the Bush presidency, led substantial numbers of citizens on both sides of the Atlantic to conclude that the postwar consensus over fundamental interests, goals, and values had dissipated.

**Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Transatlantic Relations**

Given that the field of international relations is characterized by a number of competing paradigms, theoretical traditions, or schools of thought, the absence of a scholarly consensus over the basic causes and consequences of transatlantic relations should come as no surprise. Owing to the interdependence of facts and theory, disputes begin at the level of description—that is, over the question of what precisely needs to be explained. Thus, many state-centric approaches find it difficult to describe, let alone explain, what constructivist or culturally oriented approaches regard to be a major development in transatlantic relations over the course of the second half of the 20th century: the emergence of a pluralistic security community in the North Atlantic area. Although the relevant literature is vast and includes Marxist and other critical perspectives, mainstream scholarship has come to cluster around three broad approaches.

**Realism**

Although no longer as dominant as it was during the Cold War, realism as an approach to the study of international relations remains influential, particularly in the subfield of international security. Realism does not offer a single theory of international relations, but realist theories tend to share a set of common assumptions about the fundamental causes of international outcomes. These include the following: that international relations are characterized by the absence of legitimate authority above the sovereign state, which is to say that the ordering principle is anarchy; that sovereign states are the primary actors in the international system; and that states at a minimum seek to survive but may strive to dominate the system by maximizing their power relative to other states. Because of anarchy and the possibility that some states may try to dominate others, the use of force is always possible and hence states are fundamentally insecure. Realism assumes that the insecurity produced by anarchy leads states to jealously guard their relative position in the international system. When considering opportunities for economic cooperation, states will worry that the eventual distribution of benefits might leave others better off. Moreover, they will fear that economic gains might be converted to military capability. Hence, realist theory expects relatively little cooperation in international politics.

Among realist theories, the balance-of-power theory is the most developed and relevant for the analysis of transatlantic relations. Because realism in general is skeptical regarding the prospects for durable cooperation in international politics, the long history of cooperative transatlantic relations appears puzzling. At first glance, balance-of-power theory appears to offer an explanation. When confronting a potential threat to their security, states are expected to try to balance it through the acquisition of arms or allies. Hence, the history of post-war transatlantic cooperation is explained as a response to the commonly perceived Soviet threat. Although rivalry between the United States and its European allies was never completely absent, the need to maintain a united front against the Soviet bloc kept conflict within manageable bounds.

From the perspective of balance-of-power theory, however, because the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact eliminated the overriding common interest that sustained close transatlantic relations, it should have led to a significant weakening of transatlantic cooperation and the collapse of common institutions, including NATO. Indeed, balance-of-power theory would appear unable to explain not only NATO’s persistence but also its expansion to Eastern Europe in the 1990s and the early years of the 21st century as well as the decision of French President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2009 to reverse President de Gaulle’s decision of 1966 and to reenter the alliance’s integrated military command. With regard to economic relations, even the largest economic crisis since the Great Depression during 2008–2009 did not lead to a repeat of the “beggar thy neighbor” policies that plagued transatlantic economic relations during the 1930s. Rather, transatlantic relations were characterized by intense efforts to coordinate American and European macroeconomic policies in an effort to stimulate the global economy, an outcome clearly
at odds with the predictions of realist-inspired analyses.

**Liberalism**

Like realism, liberal theories tend to assume that states are the most important actors in international politics and generally regard their identities and interests as fixed and given. Nonetheless, liberal theories of international relations are more sanguine with regard to the future of transatlantic cooperation after the Cold War. In particular, institutional theories maintain that by reducing structural impediments to cooperation—high transaction costs, informational asymmetries, and insufficient communication principal among these—international institutions can produce durable patterns of cooperation even in the absence of world government by creating a common set of rules and norms to govern the interactions of states. Because the long-term benefits of cooperation are held to outweigh the short-term gains that states might achieve from unilateral defection, they are expected to place a high value on maintaining institutions even if the conditions under which they were established no longer obtain.

Hence, in the wake of the Cold War, liberal theorists would expect Europe and the United States to maintain a high degree of cooperation even in the absence of a common enemy. From this perspective, NATO’s persistence is explained in terms of its ability to adapt to the challenges of a new era and its potential for managing security relations among its members. Moreover, although there is a surprising lack of formal institutions specifically directed at governing transatlantic economic relations, some have argued that a dense transnational network of like-minded bureaucrats, regulators, and lawyers constitutes an informal institution that has helped Europe and the United States avoid a rupture in their economic relationship.

**Constructivist and Cultural Approaches**

Whereas both realist and liberal theories of transatlantic relations begin from the standpoint of states with fixed preferences or interests, constructivist theories stress the embeddedness of states in social structures of shared norms and beliefs—that is, culture—which evolve over time. Not only are these social structures shaped by state behavior, but they serve to shape and reshape the conceptions of the identity and interests of states. Constructivists stress the transformational potential in international politics. When states come to share the values, norms, and symbols that provide their social identity, their relations may come to resemble those of individuals in a society or even a community in which the use of force by one member of the community against another is considered unthinkable.

Although security communities are not unprecedented in the history of international relations, the postwar international system appears unique. In modern times, there has never been a period in which war among the European great powers or between a European power and the United States was considered unthinkable. Yet with the end of the Cold War, this appears to be the case. Given the scale and frequency of great power wars in the past, Robert Jervis has argued that the emergence of a security community among the great powers constitutes the single most striking discontinuity in the modern history of international relations.

If true, the claim suggests serious limitations to many realist and liberal theories and their application to the subject of transatlantic relations, which might be better understood from the perspective of actors enjoying shared identities and values. But although they point to the possibility of transformational change, constructivist theories have not done a good job of establishing the conditions under which such changes are likely to take place. Understanding the role of agency in path-dependent processes, thus, poses key challenges for the further development of constructivist theory.

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**See also** Alliances; Balance of Power; Institutional Theory; Realism in International Relations; Security Cooperation

**Further Readings**

The term economic transformation is often used in economics vocabulary, though it is not defined in the discipline’s textbooks and dictionaries. In general, the term refers to structural changes in the economic, monetary, and financial systems of states, which are generated by passing from one mode of production to another or by the transition of one model of development to another.

Since the beginning of the modern era, several economic theories have contributed to these structural changes by advocating for the replacement of one mode of production by another, or of one model of development by another, that is more able to ensure the prosperity of nations and individuals. Over time, those that have had the largest influence are mercantilism, classical liberalism, Marxism–Leninism, the heterodox liberal theory, and neoliberal theory.

This entry retraces the history of economic transformations since the 17th century by showing the major impacts of the evolution of economic ideas with regard to such changes. It also examines several approaches in political science that have analyzed the impacts of economic transformations on the political regimes of states and in international relations. It is indeed difficult to devote more attention to the work of political scientists as most have ignored economic transformations and those who have noted them have not carried out any additional analyses of such changes. They have instead focused on the legal, social, cultural, and political impacts of economic changes. Although enormously interesting, the aforementioned literature is not pertinent to this entry.

**Mercantilism**

Mercantilism appeared in the context of the formation of the first European nation-states during the 16th and 17th centuries. The central idea of this theory, as it was applied in France and England, was that the state had to support the development of trade and industry in order to expand its economic power, which was the principal support of its military and political strength. To this end, the state had to promote the growth of production by subsidies, privileges, monopoly concessions, and maintaining the lowest wages possible. The state also had to encourage the conquest of colonies, which provided a source of primary goods and an opportunity for manufacturing; this involved the construction of a powerful navy to protect trade between colonies and the homeland and to block out rival nations. While this economic model enabled all the European colonial empires to expand, only in countries such as the Netherlands and England, which practiced a form of commercial and financial mercantilism, was the development of a capitalist economy dominated by a rich bourgeoisie in the manufacturing, trading, and banking sectors favored. Over time, this bourgeoisie became more and more hostile toward the
constraints of mercantilism, such as laws that for-
bade the concentration of businesses, limitations on
the importation of primary goods, and the iron law
of wages, which hindered consumption, provoked
overproduction crises, and lowered investments and
profits. This conflict was the root cause of the revo-
lution of 1688, which allowed the English bourgeoi-
sie to implement a new economic model inspired by
classical liberal economics.

Liberalism
According to classical liberalism, conceptualized
notably by John Locke, Adam Smith, and David
Ricardo, all individuals are rational and naturally
seek to improve their economic well-being at the
least possible cost. It is from this common desire
that the market is created, a place where producers
attempt to sell the largest number of goods at the
most advantageous price and where consumers
seek to purchase the goods that they need at the
lowest possible price. The free market naturally
tends toward equilibrium between supply and
demand and between the growth of production
and income. It is the state’s interference in the mar-
ket that causes the misallocation of resources (unemployment or a lack of manpower), imbal-
ances between supply and demand (overproduc-
tion or a shortage of goods), and excessive rises
and falls in prices (inflation or deflation). According
to this theory, free trade—not only within but
between nations—is the source of wealth. Since
depositories of the state’s advantage to be
protectionist when they are weak or in in economic
shift or favor free trade when they are
strong or in a period of economic growth. The
application of this doctrine permitted both
countries to become great economic, political,
and military powers in less than a century.
However, if the United States practiced a peace-
ful and isolationist neo-mercantilism because of
their vast domestic market, Germany, deprived
of both such a market and colonies, opted for an
imperialist neo-mercantilism that was one of the
causes of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and
World War I.

Neo-Mercantilism
However, in the 19th century, liberalism was
rejected by Germany and the United States, both of
which adopted a model based on British mercantil-
ism in order to strengthen their industries behind
protectionist barriers. According to the founders
of neo-mercantilism (Alexander Hamilton,
Friedrich List, Wilhelm Roscher, and Gustav
Schmoller), it is to the state’s advantage to be
protectionist when they are weak or in economic
decline and to favor free trade when they are
strong or in a period of economic growth. The
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causes of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and
World War I.

Marxism
In the 19th century, the most radical critics of lib-
eral English political economy were Karl Marx
and Friedrich Engels. Their theory argued that
within the framework of capitalism, value was not
found in labor, as Adam Smith and David Ricardo
claimed, but rather in surplus value or in unpaid
wages to workers. To outlast the competition,
businesses would have to constantly raise their
growth or profit rates by replacing workers by
machines and by creating monopolies, which
would bring about overproduction crises, a rise in
unemployment, bankruptcy of small businesses,
and the impoverishment of the middle class. These
barriers to growth in supply and demand would
inevitably bring about a relocation of businesses to
periphery markets. Such actions, far from countering
the falling rate of profit, would generate conse-
quences of the contradictions and evils of capi-
talism, which would create conditions favorable for a
global socialist revolution. Thus was born the
famous slogan of the Communist Manifesto:
“Workers of the world, unite!” Vladimir Ilyich
Ulyanov Lenin, founder of the Russian Bolshevist
party, took the theory of Marx and Engels further.
According to Lenin, over the course of the last
third of the 19th century, capitalism had reached
the “highest stage of imperialism.” Capital was
now more concentrated in the hands of financial
oligopolies, which stemmed from the merger of
monopolistic commercial, industrial, and banking
firms. These oligopolies ferociously struggled among each other for the possession of resources and already conquered or available territories, which led to imperialist wars that victimized the oppressed lower classes. Over the course of World War I, the Bolshevik party called on Russian workers and farmers to mobilize and take up arms against the Tsar, which led to the revolution of 1917 and the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Confronted with the construction of socialism, a subject largely ignored by Marx and Engels, Lenin developed a theory that would largely serve as a model for those communist regimes that came into being after 1945. According to this theory, the first step in the construction of socialism is the dictatorship of the proletariat, in which the state assumes control of all means of production and moves toward a progressive collectivization of agriculture in order to finance the development of heavy industry, both civil and military—a key sector of the economy and national defense. The development of consumer goods industries is thus pushed back to a later stage.

From 1920 to the Present: Heterodox Liberalism

The troubled interwar period, characterized by several failed attempts at a socialist revolution, the establishment of fascist regimes in a number of countries, the economic depression of the 1930s, and the abandonment of liberalism in favor of protectionism, led several liberal economists, such as John Maynard Keynes, James Meade, Joan Robinson, and Gunnar Myrdal, to develop a new economic theory—heterodox liberalism. This theory argues that neither liberalism, which led to the worst economic depression in history; nor nationalism, which was the source of several wars; nor Marxism, which attempts to mitigate socioeconomic inequalities at the expense of political liberties; is capable of guaranteeing sustained economic growth, greater social justice, democracy, and peace. Following World War II, most advanced capitalist countries adopted this theory. It would serve as the basis for the developmentalist theory of Raul Prebisch, Oswaldo Sunkel, José Serra, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, which was used by a large number of developing nations. It was at the origin of the Bretton Woods compromise, the foundation of the new world economic order of the postwar period. Due to the economic and social progress that it brought about, it contributed to limiting the expansion of communism. Nevertheless, this theory was adopted, under the influence of the USSR, by roughly 40 countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa in the years following 1945.

According to Keynesian heterodoxy, it is not the rise in supply but the increase in household and business demand that serves as the lifeblood of economic growth. Governments thus sought to promote full employment by investing in infrastructure, protecting labor-intensive industries that produce consumer goods, and encouraging unionization. They also had to support the income of those excluded from the labor market (e.g., unemployed, dependents, pensioners) by social programs and liberalize consumer credit, all while requiring central banks to maintain low interest rates. To counter the imbalances of an unregulated international market, governments were left to establish multilateral institutions that provide the necessary capital to rebuild the European and Japanese economies and to aid the industrialization of developing countries, ensure the stability of currencies and the balance of payments, and promote a gradual and sectored liberalization of trade adapted to the unequal development of nations. These precepts served as the basis for the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). They would eventually inspire the creation of the European Economic Community and several other regional integration agreements. They also allowed for the adoption of agreements facilitating the exportation of manufactured goods from newly industrialized countries (NICs) to industrialized countries (ICs), such as the Multi Fibre Arrangement and the Preferential Trade System.

Theories Inspired by Heterodox Liberalism

For 30 years, the heterodox liberal model generated the longest growth cycle in history; a decrease in socioeconomic inequalities, especially in ICs; a reinforcement of state interdependence and cooperation; and mitigation of North–South disparities from the emergence of South European, East Asian, and Latin American NICs. These transformations were the origin of several new theories in political science.
The most notable of these is the modernization theory developed by Seymour Martin Lipset, which argued that the progress of economic and social development is the main determinant in the emergence and stability of democracies. During the 1960s and 1970s, the validity of this theory was challenged by the domination of authoritarian regimes in most NICs. However, the democratization of most NICs between 1974 and 1995 and the instability of democracies established in developing nations after the Cold War would confirm the legitimacy of the modernization theory. David Mitrany’s functionalist theory argued that the modernization of societies generates myriad nonpolitical problems whose solutions require the collaboration of experts from several countries. One of the benefits of such collaboration is that it encourages states to strengthen cooperation by concluding economic integration agreements that contribute to the development of their political integration. This analysis, confirmed by the early stages of European construction, was completed by Ernst Haas’s neo-functionalist theory. According to this theory, the creation of supranational institutions is not uniquely determined by the benefits of economic integration. It follows when national leaders are convinced that it is in their interest to transfer their loyalty and their ability to respond to institutions that have supranational jurisdiction. The neo-institutionalist theory advanced by Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner attempted to demonstrate that the economic interdependence of states reinforces their common interest to cooperate within international regimes; as such, regimes allow them to reduce uncertainty and their transaction costs. Unlike neorealists, neo-institutionalists argue that international cooperation does not necessarily stem from the leadership of a hegemonic power. The results and actions of international organizations affirm both theories. International cooperation without a hegemon is possible in areas of low politics (economic, environmental, social, and cultural issues) but not in areas of high politics (political and military issues).

Transition to Neoliberalism
At the start of the 1970s, several problems brought about the decline of the heterodox liberal model and the ensuing crisis. The transnationalization of firms and capital gave rise to an increase in the volume of Eurodollars in circulation and a depletion of American gold reserves, in such a way that in 1971, the United States had to abandon the gold exchange standard, which was fundamental to the system of fixed exchange rates administered by the IMF. The latter was replaced by a floating-exchange-rate system entirely at the mercy of the monetary market’s supply and demand. For 30 years, the rise in public spending and in consumption was largely financed by public and private debt, which took advantage of surplus capital and low interest rates. However, this dynamic led to a general rise in prices and wages. This inflationist context prompted firms in developed countries to lower their investments and accelerate the relocation of their production to NICs. This movement created a situation of stagflation in ICs, which was aggravated by the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 and the subsequent recessions of 1974–1975 and 1980–1983. Pressure from financial institutions, worried over the solvency of governments and firms, convinced central banks to sharply raise interest rates in 1983. This decision brought about a severe crisis in the public finances of states, which was the determining factor in the transition toward a new economic model based on neoliberalism.

Neoliberal theory is the synthesis of new American economic theories derived from classical and neoclassical liberal economics, which were developed in opposition to Keynesianism during the 1960s and 1970s. Milton Friedman’s monetarist theory argues that inflation is caused by maintaining low interest rates through government control of central banks. Governments should allow monetary authorities to adjust interest rates as a function of the market, which would raise the level of money and combat inflation, the principal cause of slowdowns in growth. The supply-side theory, advanced by Arthur Laffer and Jan P. Seymour, maintains that excessively high taxes on incomes and profits discourage initiative, savings, investment, and productive effort, all while encouraging tax evasion and leading to reductions in government revenues. The theory calls for lower taxes for the rich, who spend more than the poor, and for a transfer of social spending to the private sector. Gary Becker and Jacob Mincer’s human capital theory maintains that all human activities are determined by cost–benefit calculations. This
logic must prevail in public and para-public institutions to raise their productivity and efficiency and to lower deficits and government debt.

The precepts of neoliberalism were upheld by the IMF and the World Bank during the 1980s and 1990s. They eventually led to the creation of structural adjustment programs, which would become conditions for aid to ICs, NICs, and developing countries. Progressively, governments of capitalist countries the world over began to embrace this philosophy. However, very few countries fully applied the recommendations of neoliberal theories. Most adopted mixed economic policies, which combined the ideas of heterodox liberalism and neoliberalism. Contrary to the fears of the Left, the transition toward neoliberalism did not lead to a dismantling of the state or to the destruction of the economic and social achievements of Keynesianism. Nevertheless, the neoliberal model was at the origin of an unprecedented liberalization of international trade. The Uruguay Round of the GATT (1986–1993), the adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994, the transformation of the European Economic Community into a common market (following the Single European Act of 1986) and then into an economic and monetary union (following the Maastricht Treaty of 1993), and the creation of the Mercosur customs union in 1994 have all not only abolished trade barriers for manufactured goods but also liberalized the flow of services and capital. The opening of markets has reinforced the power of multinational firms and banks and weakened the control of states over their economies. In 2008, Peter Willets counted 77,200 nonfinancial multinational firms in 138 countries. The few hundred with the most important assets are Western European, Japanese, or American, but a large number are also found in other ICs (Canada, Sweden, and Australia) or in emerging countries (China, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, India, Brazil, and Russia). Nonfinancial multinational firms have enormous power over governments as they can relocate their production to other countries that offer better advantages. Financial multinational firms not only largely determine the value of currencies and the interest rates for states but also make investment decisions that determine the profitability of their banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and other financial institutions.

The Crisis of Communism

The crisis of the heterodox liberal model coincided with the crisis of the communist model. In the USSR, it was caused by the concentration of government spending in the military industry and the decline of productivity in other sectors of the economy caused by a disillusionment with the communist ideology, unable to fulfill its promises “of a better tomorrow.” In China, it was brought about by the disastrous cumulative economic effects of “The Great Leap Forward” and by the “Great Cultural Revolution” envisioned and led by Mao Zedong. Though the outcome of these crises was a transition toward capitalism, they ran very different courses in each country. In the USSR, the combination of economic liberalization (perestroika) and the liberalization of the political system (glasnost) led to the disappearance of the Communist Party, the breakup of the USSR, and the collapse of communist regimes in central and eastern Europe in less than 5 years (1987–1991). Russia subsequently adopted an orthodox neoliberal model that had some disastrous effects while mortgaging the democratization of the political regime. Conversely, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe succeeded, between 1991 and 2004–2007, in establishing functional market economies and stable democracies, largely due to the European Union’s accession process, closely supervised by Brussels. In China, the transition toward a market economy has been very gradual and controlled by the Communist Party. It has been accompanied by a progressive yet limited liberalization of the political system, with the authorities seeking to preserve the country’s unity and stability. This stability has encouraged the inflow of capital and investment by foreign firms, and has been the principal cause of the very strong economic growth that China has seen in the years since 1980.

Conclusion

History demonstrates that over the past four centuries, the capitalist mode of production has been the source of economic transformation in a majority of nations. The communist mode of production appeared in about 40 countries during a brief period of less than 50 years. Today capitalism
spans the globe, with the exception of certain regions in central Asia, Africa, and Oceania, where precapitalist modes of production exist. The industrialization and modernization of developing countries are the lifeblood of growth and of the globalization of capitalism. Given that over time these transformations are more and more rapid—the industrialization of European countries happened in 200 years, while the process in NICs in the 20th century lasted 4 or 5 decades—it is highly probable that the possibilities of an expansion of capitalism will dry up before the end of the 21st century. What will happen then? Will we witness the onset of imperial wars, as Lenin predicted; or the establishment of a world order founded on specialization and the economic cooperation of states, as liberals claim; or rather, the institution of a postcapitalist model, characterized by the protection of natural resources, a decrease in population and consumption, and orientation of economic activity toward human needs rather than material ones, as ecologists desire? No one knows for sure. One thing is certain: No mode of production or model of development lasts forever.

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See also Capitalism; Communism; Communist Systems; Democratization; Developing World and International Relations; Development, Political; Liberalism; Neoliberalism

Further Readings

TRANSITION

The term transition is one of several used in research on the transformation of political regimes. Other competing terms include transformation, regime change, system change, and democratization. These terms not only are closely related to each other but also overlap in meaning; however, they are not identical in their meaning. Moreover, they all have specific connotations and are often linked to particular theoretical concepts or even reflect ideological biases.

The term transition was first used in political science by Dankwart Rustow in his 1970 article “Transitions to Democracy.” However, it was not until 1986 that the term was transformed into a more coherent theoretical concept by the seminal 1986 work of Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. They defined transition as “the interval between one political regime and another” (p. 6). Transitions are limited in time: on the one hand by the dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, “by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative” (p. 6). The two authors deliberately introduced contingency as an important variable with respect to the regime outcome. They do not deterministically speak about “transition to democracy,” but “transition from authoritarian rule” to an “uncertain something else” (italics added; p. 3). However, the study triggered and inspired an avalanche of empirical research in democratization, first on Southern Europe and Latin America and later on in the 1990s on Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe.
Transitologists conceive the (not necessarily) successful transition from authoritarian to democratic rule typically in three subsequent phases: first liberalization, then democratization, and finally consolidation. Liberalization marks the beginning of transition. It is the process of granting some of those “liberal” rights to the citizen that are traditionally associated with habeas corpus, (partial) freedom of movement, free speech, freedom of association, the sanctity of the home, and so forth. Authoritarian rulers grant these rights typically in situations when the regime suffers from a crisis of legitimacy and the so-called softliners among the ruling elites prevail over the hardliners by arguing that a limited liberalization and controlled broadening of the ruling base can ultimately save the political power of the authoritarian regime. However, Adam Przeworski has shown that this often turns out to be a misperception. The changing power relations and the dynamics of regime change are barely controllable and often trigger a chain of events and decisions that finally lead to democratization by default. Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the beginning of democratization constitute only one of many examples.

Democratization by default occurs when the newly conditioned and nonguaranteed civil and political rights open a new space for an emerging civil society. The more civil society grows beyond the control and repression of the authoritarian regime, the more the risk of punishment decreases for protest movements and prodemocratic demonstrations. The increasing number of protesters lowers the costs for individual and collective actions against the authoritarian regime. The granting of some liberal rights by authoritarian rulers is often motivated by their calculation of avoiding protests and broadening the base of legitimacy of the old regime. However, the contrary has often been the case: Liberalization has triggered more protests, leading to the emergence of a stronger civil society, which then led to the beginning of democratization.

The phase of democratization is the proper core of each transition. It is the time when the old institutions and the repressive apparatus of the authoritarian regime have lost their power, and the new rules of democracy are not yet fully established. The lack of effective institutions opens a large space for new political actors. In these situations, where the precise power relations are not transparent, the relevant actors of the remaining old regime and the new opposition decide to negotiate form and content of the next steps of democratization. The core of these negotiations involves crucial democratic institutions, such as electoral laws, the form of government, its relation to the parliament, the debate surrounding the decision to have a presidential or parliamentary system, majoritarian or consensus forms of democracy, and a centralized or federalist state. Although the social and historical context of a country and society matters, the final configuration of the new institutions is above all a logical outcome of the power relations and the power struggle between the relevant actors of the old authoritarian regime and the democratic opposition and their strategic decisions.

The role of actors is decisive in transition research. Philippe C. Schmitter and colleagues and Adam Przeworski ascribe to them the crucial role within any transition from authoritarian rule. Structural and socioeconomic constraints or opportunities that are at the core of modernization theory are neglected or deliberately excluded from the analysis by an implicit ceteris paribus clause. It depends above all on the constellation of actors whether a transition leads to democracy or falls back to dictatorial rule. Inspired by the transición pactada in post-Franco Spain (1975-1977) and confirmed by the negotiated transitions in Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile in the 1980s or the roundtables in Eastern Europe after 1989, pacted transitions became the paradigmatic key of successful transitions. Particularly when the reformers (softliners) of the old regime and the moderates of the democratic opposition dominate their respective camps and agree in negotiations or even formalized pacts on the next steps of political reforms, democracy is the most probable outcome of the transition. Elite settlements, where the relevant actors agree on the fundamental rules of the democratic game, are considered to be a solid base for further democratization. Elites play the decisive role in the movements, whereas the actions of the masses are mostly understood as a transient phenomenon at the beginning of the political transformation.

Since it is basically an analytical distinction, it is not precisely clear in reality when the phase of liberalization ends and the transition begins. The same is true for the borderline between transition
Transitional Justice

One of the effects of the third wave of democratization that took place in the last quarter of the 20th century has been to confront newly democratizing countries with the need to come to terms with their “evil past”—the human rights violations committed under authoritarian rule. Transitional justice, one of the fastest growing areas within the study of democratization, deals with the manner in which the claims arising from such wrongdoings, often undertaken by the state and its agents, should be handled fairly and equitably.

to, and consolidation of, democracy. Both lines are blurred, and the different phases can best be understood and researched as overlapping processes. However, the mainstream of transitology argues that transition has finished when the first democratic elections, the founding elections of the new democratic regime, have taken place. Others, such as Wolfgang Merkel, believe that the passing of a revised or new democratic constitution is the proper end of the transition. Only when the transfer of political power from one person or a group of persons to a set of institutionalized rules has taken place, which are equally valid for both the ruling and the ruled, can the formal rules of democracy be said to be established.

What is the theoretical contribution of transition to democracy literature to our understanding of regime changes or democratization of political regimes? Theoretically, the transition paradigm can be considered, according to Barrington Moore, as an answer to historical structuralism and, according to Talcott Parsons, Seymour Martin Lipset, and others, to modernization theory. While structuralists focus particularly on class relations and the link of social classes to the state, modernization theory could never get rid of a certain deterministic bias. It is above all socioeconomic development and the emergence of the middle classes that lead sooner or later to democracy; actors are not taken seriously into account. One of the strengths of the transition paradigm is that it can shed light into the black box of political actors, actor constellations, and finally political action. Transition theory brought political actors back into the limelight. However, the transplantologists constructed their own black box: They did not sufficiently integrate in their analyses the socioeconomic opportunity structure for political action. For some, such as Giuseppe Di Palma, democracy can be crafted only if the actors agree regardless of the socioeconomic and structural constraints. Despite all its merits, the transition paradigm could never overcome the theoretical burden of a considerable degree of voluntarism. The disregard of structural and historical factors was not the least of the issues that contributed to the exhaustion of the transition paradigm in the late 1990s. Since then, historical institutionalism has taken over the paradigmatic lead in regime research and democratization studies linking actors and actions to the structural and historical context. However, the theoretical merit of the transition paradigm lasts: Political actors and agency are back in research on the transformation of political regimes.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Change, Institutional; Democracy, Types of; Democratic Consolidation; Democratization; Liberalization

Further Readings

The study of transitional justice is by no means confined to lawyers or to the discipline of the law. It is an eminently interdisciplinary field in which law, political science, history, sociology, anthropology, theology, and other disciplines converge. A number of institutes in several continents have been established in the first decade of the 21st century to study the many dimensions of transitional justice, to analyze the different policy tools used to achieve its objectives, and to disseminate best practices in the field. The handling of transitional justice issues and their consequences affects the dynamics of the political transition and the subsequent democratic consolidation.

Much like the latter two processes, transitional justice itself is also marked by contingency and paradox. Much depends on the historical context and the legacies of any given political trajectory. Transitions are, by definition, highly fluid, and both political action and the uses of the law find themselves under a different set of rules from those obtaining in periods of stability and calm. To identify the transformative opportunities presented by the conjuncture, which will allow change to proceed toward the new order, becomes an essential task both for political leaders and for those responsible for the transitional justice tools.

**Historical Context**

Transitional justice falls squarely within the broader issue of human rights. The latter emerged as an international issue in the aftermath of the Holocaust, and was formalized as such in the 1948 United Nations (UN) Human Rights Declaration. However, it was not until the early 1970s, in the light of human rights violations committed in the Southern Cone of Latin America, that the issue of transitional justice came to the forefront of international relations and foreign policy agendas.

In its original incarnation, transitional justice was seen as mainly concerned with transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule. It first drew heavily on the experiences of Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s as well as on those in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 and in Southern Africa in the mid-1990s. It shared some of the same value orientation of democratization studies more generally—what Abraham F. Lowenthal has referred to as the “thoughtful wishing” school of scholarship. Over time, however, transitional justice has expanded to other instances, encompassing a much broader scope, to include postconflict societies more generally, arising both from international and civil wars. The field has thus become somewhat less normative and more neutral, with a stronger emphasis on empirical work. After the many internal conflicts that erupted in the post–Cold War world—mainly in Southeastern Europe, Africa, and Asia—transitional justice has emerged as an important tool within the wider panoply of nation- and peace-building instruments to be deployed after wars come to an end.

In all these cases, however, the critical question is the same: What to do “the morning after”—be it after the fall of the dictator or the signing of the peace. And here come to the fore the many dilemmas and paradoxes that are such a hallmark of transitional justice. On the one hand, there is so much to do on so many fronts that the last thing the new leaders may want is to “frontload” their own political agenda—a problem often compounded by the possibility of authoritarian regression. On the other hand, the very legitimacy of the incoming coalition will often be based on their alleged moral superiority over the outgoing elites. It was the new order’s denunciation of those human rights violations that contributed to depleting the political capital of the ancien régime. To do nothing now, safely ensconced in office, would seem the height of cynicism. There will thus be strong domestic and international pressures against a policy of “do nothing.”

What to do, then, about this evil past and about the evildoers? Though some countries (Brazil and Spain come to mind) effectively decided to do nothing—although this does not mean that the issue itself disappeared—many new governments have felt it necessary to take some sort of action. The reasons for this go beyond the routine pressures the rulers experience “to do something” about a given matter. After dictatorship or after war, there is a deep-felt need to draw a clear line between the old regime and the new dispensation, between yesterday’s order and that of today. In many cases—that of apartheid in South Africa is one of them—the suffering inflicted on significant portions of the population has been such that the very notion of pretending that nothing happened or that it is best to simply forgive and forget is abhorrent to many.
Elements of Transitional Justice

Transitional justice, then, as Mark Freeman has pointed out, encompasses four distinct sets of activities:

1. trials in their various manifestations, be they criminal or civil, national or international;
2. fact-finding bodies, of which the most prominent are truth commissions (TCs);
3. reparations to the victims of human rights violations and/or their relatives; and
4. criminal justice reforms designed to avoid the repetition of mass abuses.

Trials and Amnesties

The question is how to go about this highly sensitive task. The classic response to this after wars has been the successor trials—to put the high command of the outgoing regime in the dock. The best known example in the contemporary period is the trial of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, ending in his conviction and execution. And although there are many precedents, the most relevant one for these purposes is that of the Nuremberg and the Tokyo trials after World War II, which in many ways set the template for the form. Nuremberg was largely a response to the Holocaust, which caused such a shock to humanity that it triggered a large number of legal responses and innovations.

Something similar could be said about the post–Cold War era. The large number of internal conflicts that have erupted in the absence of the constraints imposed by the bipolar international dynamic have led to the growth of international criminal justice institutions. The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and hybrid (i.e., courts that combine national and international elements) criminal tribunals in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste are among them. The most significant addition to this roster of tribunals is, of course, the International Criminal Court (ICC), established in the Rome Treaty signed in 1998, and which came into being in 2002 in The Hague. Despite the unwillingness of some large powers to ratify the Rome Treaty and become party to it (most prominently the United States, which went so far as to formally unsign the treaty), as of 2009, 108 UN member states had ratified it. The ICC has come to fill a long-standing void in international law, making it possible to bring individuals to justice, something for which the International Court of Justice, also based in The Hague, has no jurisdiction (only states have standing).

Hand in hand with this development has been the expansion of universal jurisdiction. By this is meant the ability of judges to investigate, indict, and ultimately, arrest individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and massive human rights abuses committed anywhere in the world. Although, under normal circumstances, the jurisdiction of criminal courts is fixed territorially (i.e., by the boundaries of the state in which the crime was committed), globalization and a higher awareness of the need to stand up for human rights have started to change this, and a more expansive notion of jurisdiction has taken hold. Spain, where a law allows for universal jurisdiction in cases of human rights violations involving Spanish citizens or Spanish residents, has been a country whose judges have been especially active in this regard.

In 1998, General Augusto Pinochet became the first former head of state arrested abroad (in London) for human rights violations committed at home. Shortly thereafter, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic became the first sitting head of state to be indicted for such crimes by the ICTY, being eventually arrested and taken to stand trial in The Hague, where he died in prison. Former Liberian strongman Charles Taylor suffered a similar fate, awaiting trial in The Hague. In 2008, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir became the first head of state to be indicted by the ICC special prosecutor for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in Darfur. In 2009, the ICC issued arrest warrants against Bashir on the last two charges but not the first.

Domestically, however, as Ruti Teitel has observed, much as successor trials are seen as crucial for the reestablishment of the rule of law, considered to have been compromised by the ancien régime, they also, paradoxically, may endanger the legal foundations of the new order. A basic principle of criminal law is that of nonretroactivity of the penal code: *Nulla poena sine lege*. Yet the crimes for
which the authorities and functionaries of the old regime are to be held accountable for are often not typified as such in the statutes of the preexisting order. The risk, thus, is to give the appearance of highly politicized, quasi “show trials” that make a mockery of the moral and juridical superiority claims of the new leaders. Some have argued that that is exactly what happened with the trial of Saddam Hussein. After the return of democracy, both Greece (in the 1970s) and Argentina (in the 1980s) prosecuted the members of the military junta and had them stand trial in special tribunals set up for that purpose.

At the other end of the spectrum of responses are amnesties. The enactment of amnesty takes cognizance of the fact that evil deeds were committed and that they need to be addressed. However, it is estimated that the needs of national peace and reconciliation take precedence and that, for their sake, it is best to let sleeping dogs lie. After its own transition to democracy in 1985, Uruguay enacted such a law. A variant of this is self-amnesty. In 1978, Chile’s military regime, led by General Augusto Pinochet, approved such an amnesty law, covering human rights violations committed during the 1973 to 1978 period.

According to some legal scholars, self-amnesties are null and void as they violate a basic legal principle: No one should be entitled to enact legislation for his or her own benefit. Yet when President Patricio Aylwin (1990–1994) gave consideration to derogating Pinochet’s amnesty law, one counterargument he faced was that once the penal responsibility for a given crime has been extinguished by an amnesty law, it cannot be recreated simply by derogating the amnesty law.

The limitations and, in some cases, the unsatisfactory results of both successor trials and blanket amnesties have contributed to the rise of a third option in the tool kit of transitional justice—that of TCs.

Truth Commissions

TCs are officially appointed (although usually independent) bodies tasked with investigating human rights violations during a specific period (often that of the previous authoritarian regime or the one on the losing end of a war). Their powers vary, but they are generally made up of respected personalities who are supposed to produce within a specified time period (ideally not more than 6 months to 2 years) a report that documents those violations for the record and establishes a factual truth about them. They serve as group exercises in collective expiation and memorialization. They are not tribunals, and they may be formed by nationals (the general rule), foreign citizens (in cases where nationals dare not tread, as happened in the one in El Salvador), or both.

TCs are not necessarily incompatible with pre-existing amnesty provisions, nor do they preclude subsequent prosecutions by the courts. They have increasingly become the policy tool of choice of new democracies as they come to terms with their evil past. Several dozen of them have been established in the course of the past decades. Two particularly significant ones, associated with two emblematic transitions of the 1990s, were the Chilean (1990–1991) and the South African (1995–1998) Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs). If the quality of the report of the former was considered to have set a standard of sorts, it was the latter, led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, that most enhanced the profile of TCs, particularly because of its innovative use of public hearings. Since then, countries such as Peru, Panama, Timor-Leste, Ghana, Burundi, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone have relied on them, with varying results. As a rule, TCs have largely not been used in Eastern and Central Europe, where the preferred system of dealing with the past has been that of lustration, whereby former party officials and high-ranking functionaries are disqualified from government service in the new dispensation.

The reasons for this veritable explosion of truth commissioning are many. On the one hand, they provide a reasonable compromise between the extremes of outright prosecution through special courts and full amnesty. On the other, through their fact finding, they can lay the foundations for much of the work that needs to be done to heal the body politic of the blows inflicted on it by dictatorship and/or war. The truth must be established: Violations need to be put on the public record. A measure of justice must be meted out: The culprits deserve some punishment, even if only symbolic. With the facts on the open, reparations can proceed. Not bound by the exacting evidentiary standards of judicial procedures, they have more flexibility to call on
witnesses and to gather relevant data. The established judiciary, compromised by its acquiescence to dictatorship, is often not in a position to undertake anything comparable to this. Still, it may well be able to follow up on the work of the TC, using the initial evidence thus gathered to prosecute the culprits of human rights violations.

TCs are most appropriate after a significant regime change, in which major human rights violations were committed primarily by one side, and when there is still a certain balance between the democratizing forces and those of the outgoing coalition. Under such circumstances and when there is often some dispute about what actually happened under the previous regime, the need to have a common national narrative about those facts is especially acute to overcome past divisions and forge a common future.

The parallel has been made with the needs of patients suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder. People who have undergone major traumas in their lives often find themselves disoriented and in acute need of telling their story to someone who will take it seriously. It should not be surprising to realize that individuals who lost their loved ones and/or were themselves submitted to torture and were then publicly denounced as subversives should often suffer from all sorts of psychological difficulties and should need help.

Beyond individual grief and the imperative to overcome it, looms a larger issue, what José Zalaquett has referred to as the cathartic function of TCs. After the collective trauma of repressive dictatorship or war and all it entails, nations need a moment of rebirth or regeneration of their sense of identity and being, one that provides a clean break with that oppressive past and thus gives them the necessary impetus to forge ahead and build a better future. If conducted properly, TCs can perform this function. The experience of the South African TRC, which in its 2.5 years of existence engaged in one of the most extraordinary exercises in national soul-searching ever undertaken, remains a prime example of that. The public hearings held during those years, often in churches, with strong religious undertones and amply covered by the media, made the country come to terms with the legacy of apartheid in a way that perhaps no other mechanism could have.

Until the South African TRC, no TC had ever held public hearings. Since then, many countries, including Nigeria, Grenada, Timor-Leste, Ghana, Peru, Morocco, and Paraguay have done so. Public hearings have distinct advantages over those held in camera. In our media-driven societies, they generate enormous public attention, increase the awareness of past abuses, and are more likely to trigger public debate than the mere publication of a report. However, they are time-consuming, expensive to set up, and demand enormous amounts of staff time. They are also a high-risk endeavor. The need for procedural fairness in the proceedings of TCs is especially apparent in the case of public hearings, given the lack of ordinary judicial rules like witness cross-examination.

Another critical issue is that of “naming names.” A key feature of TCs is their victim-oriented approach, so different from the regular adversarial penal proceedings prevailing in the West, mainly directed toward establishing guilt rather than toward highlighting the victim’s plight. In that context, the issue of whether the report of TCs should actually name the likely culprits of human rights violations is highly contested. For some, given the lack of exacting evidentiary standards in the TC’s hearings and procedures, this would be an inherently unfair and even dangerous exercise. For others, it would be the equivalent of the journalistic mention of the suspects of a crime, no more and no less. Yet given the official weight that the TC reports carry, the latter is a complex, if not downright dubious, proposition. Passing on the relevant information to the courts for further action rather than making such names public would seem to be the more prudent course of action.

Reparations

Inextricably intertwined with TCs, though analytically separate from them, is the issue of reparations for human rights violations. Lost lives cannot be resurrected, and cutting off limbs inflicts permanent damage to its victims. Yet some degree of reparation is both of material and symbolic significance. Through reparations, the state effectively acknowledges its responsibility for past human rights violations. Who qualifies? For how much? How fair is it to impose what may be a
heavy budgetary burden for reparations on the
governments of developing societies that have
great difficulty in balancing competing social and
economic priorities? What about intergenera-
tional justice? Why should present and future
generations pay for the sins of past ones? These
are some of the questions raised by the vexed issue of reparations.

The report of TCs provides an important initial
data set that makes it possible to identify, at least
on a preliminary basis, the likely beneficiaries of
such reparations. There is consensus in the litera-
ture, however, that the formal handling of repara-
tions claims should be done by a separate body, established after the TC has discharged its man-
date. This is likely to be a long and cumbersome
process, which may take several years to be
completed.

Reparations are by no means limited to cash
payments. Lump sum payments (especially involv-
ing high sums to large numbers of people) can be
particularly onerous on the public purse, which is
why pensions and scholarships are often preferred.
As Pablo de Greiff has pointed out, reparations
include apologies, educational and health services,
pensions, property and job restitutions, business
loans, and other types of assistance. A particularly
sensitive issue is how to determine the reparations
due to torture victims, as evidentiary questions
often arise.

Some TCs, though by no means all, have added reconciliation to their name. This has also become
a contested term. Prima facie, there is nothing
wrong with it. Presumably, the very purpose of
any TC is to bring the country together, to recon-
cile it with itself, and to avoid the repetition of
another cycle of human rights abuses. Yet some,
including Chilean president Michelle Bachelet,
herself the victim of human rights violations, have
argued that reconciliation is a very personal pro-
cess that cannot be expected to occur in a collective,
such as a nation. Others have stated that it is a
concept with religious overtones, which has no place in contexts of separation of church and state.

Setting the record straight in terms of the vic-
tims and what happened to them (the “Truth”);
aiming for a measure of limited, even if only sym-
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Triangulation

Triangulation is a research strategy in which one brings multiple forms of evidence to bear on a single research question. The term triangulation is often modified by an adjective (e.g., within-method triangulation) to reflect how the evidentiary variation is introduced. In the years since the term was introduced into the research methods lexicon, two primary accounts of the value of triangulation have emerged. One account views triangulation as valuable for what it reveals about the validity of a descriptive or causal inference. The second views triangulation as valuable for how it enriches the perspective one gains on the question under investigation. The endorsement of triangulation for one or both of these reasons is widespread within the social sciences, but skeptical and cautious voices are heard as well. This entry discusses varying perspectives of triangulation and points to new developments.

Early references to triangulation focused on measuring concepts with data gathered from multiple methods. The classic reference is to the 1966 volume *Unobtrusive Measures* by Eugene J. Webb and colleagues. The advice was threefold: (1) supplement measures of social and political behavior drawn from interviews and questionnaires with (unobtrusive) measures drawn from physical trace evidence, documents, and observation; (2) test any given hypothesis repeatedly using the different measures of key concepts; and (3) treat the hypothesis as more credible if all the tests converge in support. The reasoning is that measures built from different data sources will each be flawed in ways that the researcher should be able to anticipate, if not correct, in advance. But the particular flaws will vary across the measures. A survey-based measure of alcohol consumption, for example, would likely suffer from social desirability bias, which would not threaten the validity of a measure based on (covert) observation of how many liquor bottles were found in a person’s trash, even though the latter will have its own limitations. If, therefore, one finds similar results when testing a hypothesis with each measure, one can draw conclusions with greater confidence. It becomes implausible to view the findings as an artifact driven by biases unique to each measure.

Note that the major concern here is systematic error in the measures (a question of measurement validity) not random error (a question of measurement reliability). Hence the advice is to repeat one’s analysis using each measure, not to form indices from the set as if they were simply parallel measures. This strategy loses value, however, if it is plausible to view the bias in each measure as having concordant effects; even if the hypothesis were false, flaws in the measures could produce converging results. Hence, it is important to select measures where the biases are expected to produce discordant effects on the results.

Influenced by Norman Denzin’s more expansive treatment of the topic in 1970, social science understanding of triangulation quickly extended beyond the measurement context. To represent the varying ways in which different forms of evidence can be combined, triangulation is now routinely differentiated into types. Between-method triangulation involves multiple methods of data collection (focus groups, sample surveys, participant observation in field settings, content analysis of documents, laboratory experiments, and so on). In within-method triangulation, the data collection method is held constant but the design (e.g., analyze a panel and a cross-sectional survey) or measurement technique (e.g., work with different survey questions or question types) may vary. Data triangulation refers to the use of data on multiple samples, obtained at different times and/or in different contexts. With investigator triangulation, multiple investigators work at least semi-independently on a joint venture. In analysis triangulation, the same data are analyzed using multiple techniques (e.g., apply narrative and conversational analysis to in-depth interview texts or analyze quantitative data with both Bayesian and non-Bayesian statistical techniques).

Two accounts of triangulation’s purpose and value emerged alongside this expansion of its forms. One follows the same logic of corroboration laid out in the earlier work on measurement: Because each piece of evidence—generated from research that varies in method, design, measurement technique, sample, investigator, and/or mode of analysis—has weaknesses not shared with the other(s), working with multiple forms of evidence should help the researcher reach conclusions that are more valid than if any one evidentiary source had been used alone. Whether the goal is descriptive
or causal inference, triangulation should enhance the researcher's ability to rule out rival explanations for the findings and/or establish their generality.

Of course, just what is gained in any study depends on the research question and form(s) of triangulation employed. Working with multiple samples, as with data triangulation, will speak most directly to questions of generalization. Combining lab and field experiments will offer evidence both on the validity of a causal hypothesis and on whether a result found in the lab setting generalizes to the natural setting. Corroboration of a result when using two or more analysis techniques demonstrates that the finding is not an artifact of the specific assumptions that underlie each one. As these examples suggest, for triangulation to be effective, the researcher must deliberately select forms of evidentiary variation to achieve specific objectives.

The second account of triangulation's purpose and value follows a logic of complementarity rather than corroboration. It boils down to three propositions:

1. Any one form of empirical evidence will inevitably yield a partial or incomplete understanding of the phenomena under study.
2. Different forms of evidence will provide different perspectives on and insights into the phenomena.
3. Thus, by combining forms of evidence, a research project will generate a richer and more complete body of knowledge about the phenomena.

Examples abound. Observational data may make evident what interview data do not because of people's tendencies to focus on what is salient, novel, or positive. Analysis of quantitative data sets might establish an empirical regularity while in-depth case studies provide insights into causal mechanisms. Interviews with multiple actors who work within or interact with an organization will provide multiple, situated perspectives on the dynamics of interest. Documents may be used to gain insight into the historical and institutional context of a problem while interviews are used to acquire perspectives on current debates.

Some social scientists embrace both purposes of triangulation. One version of this position simply conceives of triangulation as a multipurpose research strategy—one that may at times be used to see if a descriptive or causal hypothesis can be corroborated with multiple forms of evidence and that may at other times be used to generate a more complete (deeper, broader, multifaceted, contextualized, complex, and/or holistic) understanding of a topic. Another version sees both purposes as potentially relevant to any hypothesis-testing study, depending on the results: If the triangulated results converge, the hypothesis will be validated by the logic of corroboration, but if the findings are inconsistent or contradictory, the researcher can develop a more complete (nuanced, contextualized, deeper, etc.) explanation that reconciles the divergent results.

Other social scientists adopt one version of the virtues of triangulation but not the other. In some of the literature, triangulation is simply associated with one objective (corroboration via convergence vs. enrichment via multiplicity) while the other is ignored or underplayed. Scholars who work primarily with qualitative methods frequently go further, however, and reject the corroboration point of view entirely, arguing that it presupposes an (positivist) epistemology that is inconsistent with their own. The issues here are complex and the viewpoints many, but they often revolve around the interpretation of convergence versus divergence in results. Consider, for example, a project on the topic of “bureaucratic conflict” that finds widely varying accounts of how much conflict there is between political appointees and civil servants depending on who is being queried about the matter and that uncovers discrepancies between interview reports and evidence gleaned from public records. A simple (perhaps simplistic) application of the convergence logic would treat that variability as due to bias in each indicator of the true or objective level of conflict. To scholars working within constructivist or interpretivist traditions, this would make no sense at all. Differences in perspective across individuals are to be expected, public records have their own generative processes, and all this variation is constitutive of the phenomenon of bureaucratic conflict and central to the inquiry, not getting in the way of a clear understanding of it.

Ideas about triangulation are still evolving. New issues are arising in the burgeoning literature on research strategies that mix quantitative and
trust, social

Social trust is the expectation of reliance that individuals in a community have toward each other on the basis of shared norms, mutual reciprocity, and cooperative behavior. Trusting others is based on the belief that their behavior will not be harmful or deceitful. Although trust in family and close friends may be common in most societies, the concept of generalized social trust involves trusting people in a much wider scope of social, political, and economic relations. Also referred to as interpersonal trust, social trust is regarded as a cultural trait that develops with the formation and maintenance of social networks and secondary associations. Rationalist approaches also see social trust as a learned reciprocal and cooperative behavior. Whether it is cultural or rational, social trust varies significantly from one society to another, and this variation is thought to have an impact on politics and economics. This entry reviews the origins of the concept of social trust, the ways in which it has been more commonly measured, the limitations attributed to its measurement, the more general theoretical and empirical relationships between social trust and economic growth and democracy, and the role of social trust as a key component of a broader concept of social capital.

Origins of the Concept of Social Trust

The idea of trust can be found in various political thinkers from different ages, but its current understanding as trust in others within a community or a set of social networks can most prominently be traced back to Alexis de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America*. He wrote that in 19th-century America vast numbers of associations “are formed and maintained by the agency of private individuals” on the basis of trust and shared interests. From this perspective, trust is strongly related to associational life, which in turn facilitates the pursuit of common goals that would be harder to achieve through purely individual efforts. The link between trust, secondary associations, and democracy has been emphasized by many authors throughout the second half of the 20th century and still attracts a lot of attention, particularly because indicators have shown a significant decrease in social trust, a point that we will return to later.

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See also Measurement; Mixed Methods; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods

Further Readings


In the late 1950s, an influential culturalist approach to politics put the concept and measurement of social trust at the center of the academic debate. The Civic Culture study, published in 1963, established a theoretical and empirical relationship between trust and democracy. The authors, Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, conceived of trust as a component of a democratic political culture. In their view, stable democracy requires a set of democratic values and beliefs that supports it, and trust in others is one of those values. Their book, based on survey data from five nations, reinforced the idea that social trust is a condition for the formation of secondary associations and, as a consequence, a feature that fosters the development of a participatory society, a pillar of democracy.

The relationship between social trust and democracy was very persuasive, and it had a great impact on subsequent empirical political research. As trust was part of a more general democratic political culture, higher levels of interpersonal trust were consequently linked to higher levels of democratization. Subsequent research has shown that social trust is related to effective democratic governance, not only because secondary associations are a vital part of democracy but also because trust enhances the development of a loyal opposition respecting the “rules of the game,” facilitates self-compliance of political agreements, and fosters tolerance. Democratic politics is based on rules and procedures that require the acceptance and compliance of the parts, and trust is a positive intervening factor. It is important to note that the close relationship between social trust and democracy as a form of government does not mean that trusting other people is the same as trusting political institutions. Social trust and political trust, generally understood as confidence in political institutions, may be related, but they are two different concepts, and each one is subject to different explanations.

Measures of Social Trust

Social trust has been measured in various ways but mainly through survey research. The most common indicator was used in The Civic Culture study, but it was only one of five original survey items designed to measure “faith in people” that its authors borrowed from previous research. The measure of social trust derives from the following question: “Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can’t be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?” The percentage of survey respondents who chose the option “most people can be trusted” became an empirical representation of social or interpersonal trust as well as an initial basis for cross-national comparisons. Today, many comparative public opinion surveys include this item in their questionnaires, and some of them have kept record of it for several years, providing a relatively standard measure for a wide array of societies with different levels of economic development, political institutions, and cultural traditions.

Although many surveys use this indicator as a standard measure of social trust, the question from which it is derived has been subject to criticism and continual revision. One of the main complaints is that the question is posed as a simple dichotomy in which people in general can only be trusted or distrusted. This implies that trust is not a matter of degree. However, this is questionable because, as some argue, some groups in society can be trusted at a higher rate than others, or the same group of people can be trusted under some circumstances but not so much under different ones. This leads us to a second criticism, which is that the standard question fails to provide any social context or group reference that could help evaluate who can be trusted and who cannot. If a person says that “most people can be trusted,” who is included in that response and who is not? Moreover, can the same person be trusted under different circumstances or situations? This leads to a third criticism—that the question is ambivalent and, therefore, an unreliable indicator of social trust.

Despite these problems and the development of alternative, context-specific questions in cross-national survey research, the standard question of generalized social trust continues to be widely used. And this is so mainly for two reasons: First, many believe that, despite its limitations, the standard question does tap generalized social trust, and second, the percentage of respondents who say “most people can be trusted” has a high level of cross-national variation. This is shown by the most recent European Values and World Values Studies, conducted in 2005 to 2007. The data from those surveys display a range that goes from a high of 74% of respondents in Norway who think that
“most people can be trusted” to a low of 4% in Trinidad and Tobago (see Table 1). This significant variation in trust also correlates with other variables, such as the level of economic development and democracy. Richer and more democratic societies tend to express higher levels of generalized social trust.

**Trust and Economic Development**

Cross-national comparative studies as well as more particular case studies on social trust have shown that some societies are highly trusting while others are driven by a culture of suspicion and distrust. The economic and political implications of this variation have been documented in various works. On the economic side, some authors argue that high-trusting societies where social networks exist are far more efficient and much more able to take advantage of information technology, for example, than low-trusting societies. The latter face several organizational and competitive disadvantages when compared with the former. Others argue that norms of trust and reciprocity facilitate good economic performance and create economic prosperity. Part of the explanation is that trust diminishes the costs of transaction and makes economic relations more efficient. Also, data gathered in different environments have shown that the rates of financial investment are related to trust, thereby, influencing economic growth. Organizational perspectives have linked trust to teamwork and higher levels of productivity. From any of these perspectives, trust is clearly an economic asset.

**Trust, Democracy, and Social Capital**

On the political side, the relationship between trust and democracy has been extensively discussed.

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**Table 1** Social Trust by Country: Percentage of Respondents Who Say “Most People Can Be Trusted”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>Hong Kong</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>Britain</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td>Britain</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>16</td>
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</table>

Interpersonal trust is viewed as part of a set of values that are related to the development of democratic institutions, although the causal direction in this relationship has been the subject of an ongoing debate. The role of trust and its accompanying associational life influence the functioning of democracy, and civic engagement is thought to have a positive effect on democratic governance. But this is where a more general concept of social capital unfolds, and social trust is only a part of it. Social capital, generally understood in terms of social networks and norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness, is a more comprehensive construct. However, social trust can be seen as an important but autonomous component. Recent research has found, for example, that the link between social capital and socioeconomic development is mainly mediated by trust and not by an organized civil society. Thus, social trust is a component of social capital, but it should not be equated to it.

Social capital studies have recorded a steady decline in trust and associational life during the last decades, mainly in the United States. This decline has several theoretical and empirical implications, and scholars have asked whether a decline in trust is also a decline in democracy or a decline in socioeconomic development. Following social capital studies, as trust and social networks are strongly associated to giving and volunteering, to participatory communities, to higher levels of tolerance, and as Robert Putnam has called them, to “many other forms of civic virtue,” the decline of trust has been an alarming trend. Some argue that this decline is the result of an increase in economic inequality, which means that the once achieved horizontal social relations are returning to vertical and hierarchical ones. Others argue that the decline in associational life is only observed in traditional organizations but that, increasingly, autonomous individuals driven by self-expression and emancipative values are creating different ways of organizing, even through the use of new technologies. Trust, for example, is seen as part of a more postmodern cultural syndrome of well-being than a part of civic traditions.

We can confidently say that the literature on social trust takes on a vibrant topic that is not limited to the macrophenomena of democracy and socioeconomic development but that contributes to important issues in organizational research, where social trust is viewed as a process, even a strategy, for successful joint work between individuals, groups, institutions, and nations.

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See also Civic Culture; Civic Participation; Political Culture; Social Capital; Tolerance

Further Readings
UNILATERALISM

The most precise and parsimonious definition of unilateralism is numerical: a state acting alone. However, unilateralism has a wide range of definitions, none of which has emerged as predominant within the literature. A further complication is that some definitions of unilateralism are general and can be applied to either security affairs or the global economy, whereas other definitions are specific to only one of these realms. This entry first reviews four general definitions of unilateralism, followed by two definitions that pertain specifically to the global economy, and then two definitions concerning security affairs.

Although the term unilateralism has long existed, it rose dramatically in prominence during the George W. Bush administration. The Bush administration was widely regarded by scholars and pundits as promoting a strong turn in U.S. foreign policy away from multilateralism and toward unilateralism. The widespread debate over the Bush administration’s foreign policy led to greatly renewed interest among scholars about the practice and consequences of unilateralism.

Of the four general definitions of unilateralism, the easiest one to operationalize focuses on the number of countries that coordinate: An action with a single participating state is regarded as unilateral, whereas one that has three or more coordinating states is multilateral. The clarity of this definition notwithstanding, many analysts question whether the mere fact that three or more states coordinate is sufficient to constitute multilateralism. Critics of this quantitative definition argue that the real question is not how many countries coordinate but the way in which they do. Some critics argue that for an action to be considered multilateral, the burden of coordination must be widely shared. These analysts argue, for example, that if a powerful country contributes the vast majority of its troops for a military operation, then it is still best seen as unilateral even if three or more countries do participate in the action. In his critique of the quantitative definition, John Ruggie argues that what distinguishes multilateralism is that it involves the coordination of policies by three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct. In this view, ad hoc coordination by even a large group of states should not be considered multilateralism. The fact that more than 20 countries contributed troops to the 2003 Iraq War, for example, does not constitute multilateralism since this coordination did not occur on the basis of generalized principles but instead reflected particular interests.

The second general definition of unilateralism is a state acting on the basis of narrow self-interest without regard for the interests of other countries. Using this rubric, unilateralism is easy to identify in those situations when a state acts by itself against the wishes of all other countries. Conversely, an action is clearly not unilateral if all countries agree that it should be undertaken. Yet it is rare in international politics that either all or no states agree with a given action, and the literature is unclear regarding how many countries must agree
with an action before it is no longer considered unilateral. In this regard, analysts sometimes apply the term unilateralism to actions that many states see as beneficial and participate in.

A related general definition of unilateralism is when a state acts without consulting other states beforehand. The literature does not specify, however, how much consultation must occur for a state or leader to avoid being regarded as undertaking a unilateral foreign policy. In this regard, the Bush administration was generally viewed as acting unilaterally during its first term, in significant part because it was seen as not consulting very much with its allies. Yet American consultation with its allies on some matters—such as intelligence sharing regarding terrorists—remained extremely high under the Bush administration. Moreover, in areas where U.S. consultation with allies did drop off, the decline was not to zero; for example, the United States continued to have a very close working relationship on military operations with states such as Britain and Australia.

A final general definition of unilateralism is a state not complying with international institutions and/or withdrawing from them. Actions such as the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, its failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and its efforts to undermine the International Criminal Court were roundly criticized by the international community as unilateral. As with the previous two general definitions, the literature lacks a threshold regarding this third definition: It is unclear exactly how much noncompliance with institutions and/or treaty withdrawals must occur before a state is regarded as pursuing a unilateral foreign policy in an overall sense. It is notable in this regard is that the Bush administration followed its predecessors in continuing to comply with many international institutions, particularly in the economic realm.

Unilateralism has two principal definitions with respect to the global economy, the first of which is a departure from the principle of nondiscrimination. The significance of nondiscrimination is typically outlined with respect to trade, in which a defining feature of the Bretton Woods order was the extension of most-favored-nation treatment to all members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Unilateralism can also be applied to the monetary sphere; in this regard, unilateralism is typically equated with the creation of exclusive currency blocks, as occurred during the interwar period.

A second definition of unilateralism pertaining to the global economy is the aggressive use of power by a dominant state to force a weaker state to accept concessions in economic negotiations. Analysts who advance this definition, such as Jagdish Bhagwati, stress that a powerful state such as the United States is at inherent advantage over other states in bilateral negotiations. In this view, a departure from negotiations within the context of global international institutions such as the World Trade Organization constitutes unilateralism.

With respect to security affairs, there are two key definitions of unilateralism. The first focuses on operational conduct. According to this perspective, a military action is obviously unilateral if only one state participates. Yet it is rare for a state to act in the military realm without any help whatsoever from other states. In light of this, Sarah Kreps argues that an action by a coalition of states should still be considered unilateral if one state contributes the vast majority of the troops and financial resources and also if the lead state is able to effectively control the decisions made by the coalition. Kreps argues that from an operational standpoint, the 2003 Iraq War was clearly unilateral in nature since the United States contributed around 90% of the troops, bore the vast preponderance of the financial costs of the war, and was dominant in terms of the planning process for the timing and conduct of the military operation. She argues that, in comparison, the 1991 Gulf War was multilateral since it was much more balanced on all three of these dimensions: The United States provided less than 75% of the troops, was responsible for only 11.5% of the coalition expenditures for the war, and had relatively less authority regarding the planning of the war since most of the other major powers in the world also participated.

Second, many scholars define unilateralism in the security realm on the basis of whether an international institution authorizes or endorses a military action. Scholars who make this argument typically argue that a military action is unilateral if it does not receive the backing of the United Nations (UN). A key reason for this focus on the UN is international law. According to customary international law, the use of military force is
unlawful without the authorization of the UN (the sole exception is self-defense in response to an armed attack). Other scholars argue that it sets too high a standard to say that any action should be considered unilateral if it fails to receive UN authorization; they stress that if this standard were adopted, then the 1999 Kosovo War would be considered unilateral even though this military action was approved by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and was prosecuted collectively by its members. For these analysts, the Kosovo case suggests the need for a more narrow definition of unilateralism: A military action should be considered multilateral if it is approved by any international institution and is unilateral only if it completely fails to receive institutional backing.

Although the concept of unilateralism is used very prominently by scholars and pundits, analysts typically employ the term without specifying it. Given the plethora of different meanings of the term, it is incumbent to be precise about the particular definition that is being used. It is only recently that scholars have moved to establish detailed coding procedures for clearly distinguishing unilateralism from multilateralism, and more work along these lines would be beneficial.

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See also Foreign Policy Analysis; International Law; International Organizations; Multilateralism

Further Readings


United Nations

The United Nations (UN) is an intergovernmental organization dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and security. It achieved nearly universal state membership in 2002. With 192 members at the beginning of the 21st century, the organization rests on the principle of collective security, by which its members commit themselves to reject the use of force in the settlement of their disputes and promise to act jointly against any aggressor. Founded at the close of the modern world’s most destructive war, the final provisions of the UN Charter were negotiated at the San Francisco Conference, which met from April through June 1945. The organization came into being on October 24 of that year with the issuance of sufficient ratifications by member governments.

History and Philosophy

At the time of its creation, the UN was the latest manifestation of a 130-year-old search for mechanisms of international cooperation and law to supplant the traditional methods of national self-defense and war that had been common to international relations. Following the defeat of the French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte in 1815, the victorious allies gathered at the Congress of Vienna and crafted an arrangement dubbed the Concert of Europe to maintain a hoped-for peaceful continent. Under the arrangement, the major powers of Europe agreed to meet regularly and to act collectively against any threat to the post-Napoleonic settlement. Often considered a conservative settlement, the Vienna meeting nonetheless ushered in a reasonably tranquil 19th century, which experienced a creative expansion of international organizations. Early river commissions such as the Central Rhine Commission (1815) and the European Danube Commission (1856) reflected a new interest in “functional” international organizations that built trust among peoples by providing venues of cooperation to resolve common problems. The International Telegraphic Union (1865) and the Universal Postal Union (1874) paved the way for numerous future international agencies dealing with issues as diverse as narcotic drugs, agriculture, health, weights and measures,
railroads, time zones, and tariffs. “Political” international organizations meant to ease tensions and resolve formal disputes between governments also proliferated. In 1899 and 1907, the Hague Conferences established the Permanent Court of Arbitration for the resolution of legal controversies between states.

The Congress System collapsed in the carnage of World War I. However, the war itself convinced many leaders of the need for a world organization with the authority and political will to avert another major conflict. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson led the effort at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference to create the League of Nations, committed to maintaining peace and security, fostering international cooperation, and developing comprehensive international law as enforceable substitutes for the use of force by any member of the league.

The League came into being on January 10, 1920, with its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. The organization consisted of an Assembly composed of all members, a Council that included permanent members from the great powers, and a Secretariat. Both the Assembly and the Council required unanimity on any decision. The Covenant also established a Permanent Court of International Justice to hear disputes between states and a mandate system (whereby major colonizing powers would prepare colonial areas for independence) that foreshadowed the end of colonialism. The most controversial provision of the Covenant, Article 10, called for collective security to assure nations of the League’s protection against aggression.

Wilson’s League proved ineffective in resolving the most important conflicts of the interwar period. In no small measure, the U.S. rejection of the Versailles Treaty, and, therefore, its nonparticipation in the League, undercut the will and authority of the organization. Also, the Covenant requirement that decisions in the League’s Assembly and Council secure unanimous approval—acknowledging each member’s sovereignty—made action to stop an aggressor nearly impossible. The League collapsed as fascist governments ignored the terms of the 1919 peace settlement and carried out aggression in both Europe and Asia.

Just as the League of Nations was the brainchild of Woodrow Wilson, so too the UN had its origins in the deliberations of an American president and his administration.

When President Franklin Delano Roosevelt entered World War II as an advocate of great-power realism, he argued that the League had been too dependent on world public opinion and not adequately sensitive to the realities of power. By 1943 he had come to believe that only a world organization that had none of the League’s weaknesses was needed to secure the postwar peace. Roosevelt himself would name the organization the “United Nations,” taking the name from the “Declaration by United Nations,” signed by the allies in January 1942.

Roosevelt’s views shifted in part because of the strong advocacy by the U.S. State Department for some postwar agency that could enforce the rule of law and the pacific settlement of international disputes. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull was the primary promoter of the idea. He established a departmental committee to draft plans for an international organization. This committee, largely under Leo Pasvolsky’s leadership, worked until the end of the war to develop the proposals that would ultimately be the basis for the UN Charter itself. The projected Charter, like the League’s Covenant before it, created a plenary conference, a secretariat, agencies for technical services, and most important an executive committee, in this case consisting of the four allied powers—the United States, Great Britain, China, and the former USSR—plus other nonpermanent member states.

In a series of meetings during the spring and summer of 1943, Roosevelt informally gave his blessing to the effort to obtain British and Soviet assent to a new international organization. Following the Tehran Conference of wartime leaders in November 1943, Roosevelt approved a “Plan for the Establishment of an International Organization for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security.”

The most serious Charter issue that Roosevelt had to solve in the final months of the war was the question of voting; from his perspective, the issue was how to protect the traditional sovereignty of the nation-states that would be members of the world organization and yet not allow the UN to fall victim to the requirement of unanimity among the members. The topic was addressed at the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference and at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Josef Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, while acceding to
majority voting in both the General Assembly and the contemplated Security Council, insisted on an absolute veto in the latter even over the discussion of any issue that threatened international peace or security. The United States opposed the Soviet position, and in the end, a compromise emerged under which any issue could be brought to the Council but substantive action on the matter required an enlarged majority and the concurrence of the five permanent members—the four allied great powers plus France—in effect, giving each a veto.

As many as 50 governments sent representatives to the UN Conference on International Organization in San Francisco. While the Big Three—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain—already had agreed on important aspects of the new organization, the participation of many other nations, with their own interests, made the conference a complex exercise in multilateral diplomacy.

The great powers often were required to make meaningful alterations in the proposed Charter in order to achieve the necessary votes for passage. In response to small-state concerns, the competence of the General Assembly was expanded. It was given control of the UN budget. The conference agreed that the Assembly could discuss any issue, including security concerns and threats to the peace, at least until the Security Council was “seized” with the issue. Further, the secretary-general, elected by the General Assembly, would be able to bring any matter that he believed threatened international peace and security to the attention of the Council (UN Charter, Article 99).

States from Latin America, Africa, and Asia envisioned an institution of universal membership with extensive activities in the economic, cultural, and human rights domains. In particular, they pressed for a UN role in the achievement of “independence” for existing colonial possessions. Their demands led to a declaration on self-government being incorporated in the final Charter. Under the leadership of Latin American governments, there was also an effort to promote human rights. The final UN Charter draft reflected this new concern, becoming the first international treaty to use the term human rights, in this case citing those rights six times in the text and calling for their protection. To support this effort, the founding delegates called for the creation of a Commission on Human Rights. Once established in 1946, the Commission proceeded under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt to draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Structure and Purposes of the United Nations

The UN Charter serves as the constitutional basis for the organization’s structures and procedures, the rights and responsibilities of UN members, and the UN’s authority to act in the international community. The Charter envisions an institution with revolutionary powers and authority in international affairs. The organization is granted not only the traditional instruments of diplomatic practice but also the authority to impose crushing sanctions and to use military force (Article 41), with nation-states required to put their troops at the disposal of the institution. Chapters VI and VII of the Charter provide the legal legitimacy for these sweeping powers. Chapter VII contains the primary mechanisms for collective security, allowing the organization to undertake enforcement measures, while Chapter VI provides for the traditional means of diplomacy to achieve the “pacific settlement” of disputes.

Chapter VII, Article 39, gives the Security Council the authority under international law to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” and to “decide what measures shall be taken” to halt the threat or punish the aggressor. Article 40 empowers the Council to take provisional measures to prevent an escalation or aggravation of a dispute. In July 1987, the Soviet Union and the United States for the first time joined in a resolution (598) on the Middle East and demanded that Iran and Iraq “observe an immediate cease-fire” in their ongoing war. Citing Article 40, the Council decided “to consider further steps to ensure compliance” if either of the parties refused to accept the UN’s demands.

According to the original conception of the UN as the guarantor of international peace, the organization was expected to command military forces under the authority and direction of the Security Council and with the help of a Military Staff Committee. All member states, as charged by Articles 43 and 44, were obliged to contribute troops and equipment to these UN-led operations.
Despite the intentions of the founders, the Military Staff Committee quickly fell into disuse, largely ignored after 1946 as the Cold War intensified. In place of direct UN military action, the more common practice emerged of the Council empowering individual states to take such action, usually in the form of ad hoc coalitions. In this context, the Council’s role of legitimation is critical. Using Article 48, which requires member states “or some of them,” to “carry out the decisions of the Security Council,” the body has regularly authorized coalitions “to use all necessary means” to restore peace and stability. Thus, the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq and interventions in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, Albania, Liberia, Afghanistan, and the Central African Republic were authorized UN-enforcement operations.

On paper, Chapter VII worked a revolution in international politics. The Cold War, however, made that revolution more theory than practice. With the Security Council locked in a superpower stalemate, Chapter VII provisions generally could not be implemented when conflicts arose. Council members and the General Assembly were forced to fall back on the more traditional methods outlined in Chapter VI in the hope of resolving a dispute or ending hostilities.

Chapter VI describes mechanisms for noncoercive measures to settle disputes peacefully between nations.

On its own, Chapter VI gives the Council little beyond the means of international public persuasion to end disputes. Yet without the far-reaching remedies of Chapter VII at their disposal, the Security Council and the General Assembly often have turned to broad interpretations of Chapter VI to end a particular conflict. It is through this process of reinterpretation that the devices of “peacekeeping” and “observer” missions have come about. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld coined the term Chapter VI½ to designate the Charter-based authority for these operations. A new “gray area” of UN action emerged, keeping UN involvement relevant to the resolution of disputes in ways that neither the Charter formally established nor earlier practice by the League of Nations contemplated.

The Charter establishes six principal organs to guide the organization: (1) the General Assembly, which serves as the plenary body of the full membership; (2) the Security Council, made up of five permanent members and, as of 2009, 10 nonpermanent members who are elected on a rotating basis to 2-year terms; (3) the Economic and Social Council, which oversees the myriad functional agencies reporting to the world body; (4) the Trusteeship Council, which is now defunct, having presided over the end of the colonial system; (5) the Secretariat headed by the secretary-general, which provides the international civil servants for all the administrative tasks of the UN; and (6) the International Court of Justice (ICJ), successor to the League of Nations Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). All but the ICJ are headquartered in New York City. The Court sits in the former chambers of the PCIJ in The Hague, the Netherlands.

These six organs are at the center of a much larger umbrella organization. The “United Nations System” includes a full array of UN entities, programs, funds, specialized agencies, and international bodies related to the UN and scattered around the world. Much of the work of the UN is done far from New York City, in other headquarters cities, most particularly in Geneva, Switzerland, where more diplomatic meetings are convened each year than in New York and where the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Labour Organization have their offices; in Nairobi, Kenya, the home of the UN Environment Programme; and in Vienna, Austria, the seat of the International Atomic Energy Commission.

Some entities in the UN system act independently, but as a rule, intrasystem communication is directed from the various wings to the six principal organs of the UN. The secretary-general manages this sprawling system by way of the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB). The CEB is made up of the heads of UN bodies and agencies. The specialized agencies on the CEB are autonomous, self-governing entities that, nonetheless, fall under the rubric of the UN. In 2009, 17 specialized agencies were affiliated with the UN, including well-known entities such as the World Health Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, World Bank Group, Food and Agriculture Organization, and Universal Postal Union. Among the UN “Programmes and Funds,”
the most important are the UN Development Programme, World Food Programme, UN Children’s Fund, UN Population Fund, UN Environment Programme, and International Fund for Agricultural Development.

The public “face” of this worldwide system is the secretary-general, who is nominated by the Security Council and elected by the General Assembly to a 5-year renewable term. By tradition, the post is never held by an individual from a major power. As of 2011, there have been eight secretaries-general: Trygve Lie (Norway, 1946–1952), Dag Hammarskjöld (Sweden, 1953–1961), U Thant (Burma, 1961–1971), Kurt Waldheim (Austria, 1972–1981), Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (Peru, 1982–1991), Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt, 1992–1996), Kofi Annan (Ghana, 1997–2006), and Ban Ki-moon (South Korea, 2007– ). Secretaries-general must be both adroit managers and world-class diplomats. Often during their tenure, their attempts to fulfill both of these roles have led them into conflict with one or the other of the great powers. In the 1960s, for example, the Soviet Union attempted to replace Dag Hammarskjöld, calling him a puppet of U.S. policy. In the 1990s, the United States vetoed a second term for Boutros Boutros-Ghali, largely for being ineffective in carrying out administrative and budgetary reform in the UN.

The United Nations and the Cold War

In the late 1940s, the expected cooperation among the world’s great powers essential to UN success dissolved into a Cold War contest between the United States and the Soviet Union, each with their respective allies. Superpower competition affected the working of the UN Security Council most intensely because the veto could deadlock any contemplated UN action. Early confrontations in Iran, Greece, and Turkey highlighted the ineffectiveness of the Council when the national security interests of the United States and the former USSR conflicted. They also foreshadowed Council inaction in later conflicts in Vietnam (1947–1974), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968). Only in Korea in 1951 was the Security Council able to invoke its powers under the Charter’s collective security provisions to declare the North Korean government the aggressor in the conflict and to order member nations to take all necessary military measures to repulse the attack. This was only possible, however, because the Soviet Union was boycotting Council meetings at the time to protest Western willingness to seat the new government of Mao Zedong as the legitimate representative of China in the body.

When the Soviet delegate returned to the Security Council, the United States circumvented the Council by pushing through the General Assembly the “Uniting for Peace Resolution,” which allowed the Assembly to make recommendations on the restoration of peace and security when the Council was deadlocked by the veto. The Soviet government protested the maneuver as an unconstitutional revision of the Charter. Korea was a prime early indication of the Cold War’s impact on the UN. Fighting ended with an armistice in 1953, but the country remained into the 21st century, long after the end of the Cold War, the last divided country dating from the end of World War II.

The Congo crisis of the early 1960s further underscored the Cold War challenge to the UN. When the Congo became independent from Belgium in 1960, a complicated civil war broke out, with one side being supported by the Soviet Union, one side by Washington, and a third side trying to secede. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld tried to insert a UN presence to bring the disorder to an end. Believing Hammarskjöld to be carrying out the wishes of the United States, the Soviet Union demanded a reorganization of the office of secretary-general, replacing the single secretary with a “Troika,” whereby there would be a three-person executive with equal representation from the Western bloc, the Eastern bloc, and the neutral countries in the UN. The Soviets, along with the French, also refused to donate their assessment for the Congo operation, claiming it to be illegal since it had not been approved by the Security Council. Their refusal to pay contributed to a serious financial crisis for the UN that would plague the organization for the rest of the century.

Because of the deadlock in the Security Council, the locus of UN activity shifted to the General Assembly, where, after 1960, states from the developing world gained a working majority. As a result, UN attention shifted to the problems of the so-called Third World. Economic development and the amelioration of social dislocation in postcolonial
Figure 1  The United Nations System

Source: UN Department of Public Information (2009). Used by permission.
regions became primary concerns of the membership. In 1965, the Assembly established the UN Development Programme to address the extraordinary challenges of poverty, underdevelopment, and the humanitarian crisis in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Of course, General Assembly decisions imposed no mandatory requirements on the member states. Consequently, the Assembly depended on moving world public opinion and putting in place new programs that could command near-universal support for their success. In the context of the Cold War, where the Soviet/Third World bloc, after 1970, had a working majority in the Assembly, finding such a consensus proved nearly impossible. UN debate became increasingly acrimonious, and UN decisions proved to be less and less commanding of world attention.

Post–Cold War Cooperation and Reform at the UN

The 1980s witnessed the first glimmer of a new and expanded role for a world body such as the UN. The rise of Mikhail Gorbachev to power in the Soviet Union in 1985 and the Kremlin’s rapid fashioning of a new, less antagonistic foreign policy opened the door to possible U.S.–USSR cooperation under UN auspices to address global conflicts. By the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Gulf War in 1991, Gorbachev’s anticipation of an effective UN seemed prescient, as Moscow and Washington cooperated within the Security Council to declare Iraq the aggressor and to authorize military action under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Success in the Gulf War translated to a new optimism that the UN might be an effective instrument for resolving global problems. After 1985, UN peacekeeping operations evolved into nation-building experiments, with some success in Namibia, Cambodia, and East Timor. More problematic were UN efforts in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The UN, reinforced by a newly engaged Security Council, took on a plethora of global challenges: terrorism in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States; HIV/AIDS, particularly in Africa; pandemic disease in Asia; climate change; human rights violations, which it met not only with sanctions against governments complicit in human rights abuses but also by its creation of the International Criminal Court; and the endemic economic and social problems of the developing world, which it attempted to meet by the implementation of a set of Millennium Development Goals, established in 2000.

Under strong pressure from the United States, the UN also carried out a significant reform program. Particularly under the leadership of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the UN apparatus streamlined its budgetary and administrative processes, cutting the staff by a quarter and operating with a zero-growth budget for nearly 5 years. After 2005, UN members also took up structural reform. They replaced the much maligned Commission on Human Rights with a new Human Rights Council and established a Peacebuilding Commission to manage assistance to postconflict states and regions. Eased regulations opened many of the UN decision-making bodies to influence from nongovernmental organizations and private actors such as corporations, social groups, and individuals. There were also lengthy discussions and several proposals to expand the Security Council to include states representative of new centers of power in world politics. While several permanent members of the Council blocked these efforts for the time being, there was a general recognition that structural change at the UN would need to come sooner or later to reflect the changed realities in the international system. As the millennium began, there appeared to be an emergent “new” UN, still reflective of the basic Charter provisions established in 1945 but prepared to respond to the changed conditions of the 21st century.

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See also Collective Security; Intergovernmentalism; International Law; International Organizations; International System; Multilateralism; Sanctions; Sustainable Development

Further Readings
Utilitarianism

Throughout the history of moral and political philosophy, the idea of welfare as a moral good has repeatedly appeared. Utilitarians distinctively take welfare consequences to be the central good and the principle by which to judge the morality of individuals’ actions. It would be odd, even perverse, to suppose that political theory should not attend to the consequences of actions or policies, because consequences are the very point of important policies. Hence, moral and political philosophy is a joint program in the view of utilitarians. Indeed, Jeremy Bentham’s most cited statement on utilitarianism is in his 1789 book *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Thereafter, utilitarianism was more or less a dominant moral theory into the beginning of the 20th century with Henry Sidgwick’s *The Methods of Ethics* (1907) in philosophy and down to this day in the work of many economists. Herbert Hart (1958/1983) states that it dominated legal theory from Bentham through roughly the 1960s, when somewhat disorganized and often contradictory theories of rights rose to a brief heyday. Since then, a hundred flowers and not a few weeds have grown. This entry examines both act utilitarianism, which focuses on the consequences of individual actions, and rule utilitarianism, which states that we should act in accordance with the rules that achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number. It also considers the role that institutional rules play in utilitarian assessment of public policy and examines the utilitarian perspective on distributive justice.

During all of this development, utilitarianism was often taken in new directions. For much of its first century, it was grounded in the value theory of interpersonally comparable and additive utility theory. This was cardinal rather than ordinal utilitarianism, roughly in keeping with views in economics, most especially in the utilitarian discussion of Francis Edgeworth. If utility is interpersonally comparable, 10 utiles for you is equal to 10 utiles for me in our overall evaluation of our society. If it is additive, your utiles added to mine sum to 20 utiles.

Paul Samuelson notes that many issues in economics can be well understood only if we treat utility as not simply additive but as ordinal. You can prefer A to B, but you cannot say by how much you prefer it. It follows that your utility from a policy cannot simply be added to mine to yield an overall value of the policy. Although this view has been criticized because it is not part of Bentham’s statement of utilitarianism, such critics incorrectly assume that utilitarianism is all and only what Bentham states. In fact, utilitarian theory develops in tandem with the value theory of utility in other fields, particularly, of course, in economics but also in psychology and in recent experimental games. More typically, John Rawls (1999) compares his own theory of justice with utilitarianism. But after smartly canvassing David Hume’s value theory and implicit utilitarianism, which he seems to think are more credible than Bentham’s, Rawls then argues for the superiority
of his own theory over utilitarianism as though the only definitive utilitarian vision is that of Bentham (1789/1970).

An obvious problem with ordinal utilitarianism is that it is much harder to do aggregations. We cannot simply add everything up to determine how great a particular community’s welfare is. It is important to note that this difficulty is not an artifact of the theory; it is inherent in the world to which the theory is applied. On our best current understandings of economic value theory, the ordinal, noninterpersonally comparable value theory is descriptively correct. It is the underlying reality that is difficult. The developments in utility theory and therefore in utilitarianism are clearly driven by the wish to achieve realism.

Rawls gives himself the trivially easy task of basically attacking act utilitarianism, which should be distinguished from rule utilitarianism and which focuses our concern narrowly on individuals’ actions, many of which cannot be motivated by interest but only, if it is available, by beneficence. Indeed, no standard classical moral theory for individuals can be the basis for a distributive theory. No serious utilitarians would disagree with this point, nor would they think it relevant to start from an account of individual action to reach distributive judgments. To dismiss utilitarianism in its most primitive Benthamite version in order to reach conclusions about distributive justice is irrelevant both for any theory of distributive justice and for aptly sophisticated utilitarianism.

Hume’s general concern is the naturalist analysis of our motivations and actions. He virtually dismisses act utilitarianism—before the term existed—because it requires too much beneficence, which Hume thinks is in too short supply to have much impact at the societal level. He thinks that the supposition that we can all be motivated by beneficence violates human nature. Our concern with ourselves largely trumps our beneficence.

Any moral theory that cannot address institutional issues may be reduced to a sideline game with trumped-up examples. A useful theory must be a joint moral and political theory and must address real issues in the world in which we live. Combining moral and political theory is an easy challenge for utilitarianism, which from Bentham forward, and arguably even from Hume forward, is inherently a joint theory. We can label the broader concern as institutional utilitarianism. Such utilitarianism addresses many of the problematic issues that have arisen since Bentham. Beginning arguably with John Stuart Mill, theorists have tried to accommodate the theory to institutions and norms with a theory of rule utilitarianism. This idea solves the seeming problems of calculating which of the available actions would contribute the most to overall welfare. Unfortunately, the difficulties in determining what rules we should follow might commonly be as great as those in directly calculating what action to take. This difficulty has generally been resolved in practice—typically without any reference to utilitarianism—by creating institutions that guide us or even control us in following institutional rules. Daily life is full of such institutional rules. Many of these merely coordinate us on some good action, as argued by Hume for a remarkable array of social contexts. It could be true that many people see the usefulness—one of Hume’s favorite terms—of various institutional arrangements, but if they follow the rules of the institutions, that will be because the institutions can give them incentives to do so, not because they see and are motivated by the good of having people comply in general.

Finally, we take note of the intellectual reception of utilitarianism. Far more than any other moral theory, utilitarianism is invoked explicitly or implicitly by social scientists. This fact does not make the theory morally correct. Most social scientists are essentially naturalists. With Hume, they seek to explain people’s moral views, their morally motivated actions, and their moral failings, as when their interests trump their moral visions. Utilitarians and social scientists share a central concern with institutions and their workings. Institutions have a minor secondary role in most of moral theory and no role at all in some of it. Competing moral visions, such as Kantianism and virtue theory, are taken far less seriously by nonphilosophers. Strangely, its critics arguably have spent more time on utilitarianism than its advocates have. Many of the criticisms wrongly claim that utilitarianism is self-contradictory. For example, critics argue that utilitarians must spend so much time calculating that they have no time left for living, so that utilitarianism is crippling in practice. This criticism was demolished with ridicule by Mill nearly 2 centuries ago, and yet it lives
Utopianism

Utopianism is the systematic use of utopias—that is, forms of thinking that depict a desirable but impractical state of things. As with all other isms, the concept may also have a pejorative connotation but not necessarily so.

The term *utopia* derives from the eponymous book (1516) by Thomas More, who coined it to designate the imaginary ideal society that he described in the second part of his book. More intentionally, it played with the ambivalence of the term, since *u-topia*, from ancient Greek, can be a contraction of both *eu-topos* (the “good-place”) and *ou-topos* (the “no-place”). This, as we shall see, would have enduring consequences. With time, the term came generally to mean all ideas or proposals that are good but unrealistic or even impossible. As Karl Mannheim famously put it, a state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the reality within which it occurs: Utopias break the bonds of existing social order. This entry discusses the concept of utopianism by reconstructing its forms, its functions, and, finally, its prospects in the contemporary world.

See also Constructivism; Economic Theories of Politics; Game Theory; Individualism; Liberalism; Normative Political Theory

Further Readings


Forms of Utopianism: “Good-Place” or “No-Place”?

Generally speaking, we can distinguish between two forms of utopianism. The first is the literary genre that followed the example of More’s *Utopia*. Tommaso Campanella’s *City of the Sun* (1602), Francis Bacon’s *New Atlantis* (1627), and William Morris’s *News From Nowhere* (1891) are all examples of such a genre. The description of the good-place often takes the form of a narrative by a traveler who discovers the land of utopia, typically an island or at least a territory separated from the others. Some works in this genre are negative utopias, such as Orwell’s *1984* (1949), which describes the dreadful dream of a disciplinary and totalitarian society ruled by Big Brother. These works are also at times called “dystopias”—from the Greek *dys*, which means abnormal, faulty, or bad.

The second form of utopianism is that of works that are not part of the literary utopian genre but nevertheless enclose significant utopian elements. Political treatises such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *The Social Contract* (1762) or Immanuel Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* (1795) contain important utopian moments in that they depict societies that are good-places but also no-places. The degree to which they are realizalbe is still a matter of controversy: Rousseau portrayed a direct democracy where human beings stand as free and equal, whereas Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* defined the articles of the hypothetical international treaty that would put an end to the international condition of anarchy and war. In synthesis, a work contains utopian elements when it expresses the belief that some (or all) social evils can be eliminated and a better society created.

While in the case of the literary genre it is relatively easy to determine whether a work is part of it or not, the degree of utopianism of works that contain utopian moments is highly controversial. Things are further complicated by the fact that the concept of utopianism has at times a pejorative connotation. A significant example is Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’s *Communist Manifesto* (1848). On the one hand, perhaps, no other authors have been as influential in spreading the belief that social evils can be eradicated and a good-place developed. On the other hand, Marx and Engels’s prospect of a communist society does not derive from imagination alone but is grounded on a scientific analysis of the historical conditions of the proletariat. In their *Manifesto*, they strongly criticized former socialists such as Comte de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, and Robert Owen for their utopianism—used here in the pejorative sense. Having theorized about the emancipation of the proletariat in an epoch when the material conditions for emancipation were not yet ripe, utopian socialists necessarily failed in identifying the economic presuppositions for such a transformation, so that their social criticism remained a merely fantastic picture of an impossible future society. To such utopian socialism, in which personal inventiveness takes the place of historical action, Marx and Engels opposed their scientific communism.

Some authors have criticized utopianism by arguing that by depicting inexistent perfect societies, it can generate authoritarian and totalitarian attempts to endorse them. According to Karl Popper, for instance, utopias such as Plato’s idealized republic endorse visions of a “closed” society that anticipate those of modern thinkers such as Hegel and Marx and must therefore be repudiated. Utopias can, however, be defended in many ways from their critics. First, one can argue that utopias are by definition no-places. Indeed, most utopian thinkers did not even think of trying to enforce their schemes of perfect society. Even those who actually tried to transform their no-places into something real most often favored means such as education and small-scale experiments. Those who endorsed the possibility of a violent revolution remain a minority.

Second, the accusation of totalitarianism holds at best only for major utopias. The distinction between major and minor utopias is another helpful distinction to group the different forms that utopianism can take. As Jay Winter observed, major utopians are those, such as Hitler and Stalin, who radically aimed at extirpating all social evils from the world and resorted to unconditional violence to realize their projects. Their totalitarian visions and their commitment to ruthless removal from the world of those malevolent elements blocking the path to a beneficent future, even at the price of extermination, render them major utopians. Minor utopianism is generated by imaginings of liberation on a usually smaller scale, which also sketch out a world very different from the one
we live in but from which not all social conflicts and evils are eradicated. Examples of such minor utopians are the authors of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) or the ideologists of ecological movements.

The Functions of Utopianism
Against the critics of utopianism, it can also be observed that the latter performs very important functions within society. In the first place, utopias are the means to exercising a critique of the present. By depicting “good-places,” they tell us where we are and therefore also how far away we are from that ideal. It comes therefore as no surprise to find out that the first part of More’s Utopia was devoted to the analysis of the evils affecting the society More lived in. Even when utopians do not explicitly go through the detailed description of the evils of society, a criticism is implicit in the radical alternative to the existing order that they disclose. To put it in a nutshell, utopias transcend reality but do not depart from it.

Utopianism has therefore an important regulative function. By “regulative,” we mean the capacity of an idea to serve as a guiding ideal for human conduct independent of its content of reality. Utopias in this sense are not necessarily blueprints for the creation of a radically new society. They are the means to measure the good and the bad contained in each society. The presupposition of such a critique is the conviction that the current state of affairs is modifiable. This can be the result of a belief in the perfectibility of human nature or of the social world.

Finally, we should observe that utopias also help develop new ideals. Utopias not only tell us where we stand, they also uncover the new directions that we may take. They are the result of the work of the imagination that discloses alternative scenarios and, therefore, enrich the sense of human possibility. As Victor Hugo once said, today’s utopia is tomorrow’s reality. The aphorism is usually understood in the sense that utopias can be realized, at least to a certain extent. But we could also reverse it by saying that tomorrow’s realities are today’s utopias. Indeed, modern conquests such as the abolition of slavery or universal suffrage have all been utopias once. In a way, all ideas that contribute to social progress have to contain a certain degree of utopianism insofar as what they portray is a no-place.

The Prospects of Utopianism Today
We have seen that utopianism unfolds itself in the disclosure of “good-places” that are also “no-places.” This also means that utopianism breaks away from the present but only to criticize it. One could even argue that utopianism is realistic in the sense that it tells us where we do not stand. Of course, utopias can be more or less realistic in this sense. If the literary utopias of the Golden Age or the Paradise Lost after the original sin have very little grasp on contemporary reality, the most significant utopias of modernity have all contributed to the critique of existing societies and the disclosing of new directions for their development. Utopias are often reality whose time is not yet ripe. This clearly emerges if we think of major social conquests such as universal suffrage or the abolition of apartheid, which used to appear as impossible, utopian goals. The societies that have been created after their achievement are not perfect but certainly better ones.

Although historically less significant, we should also mention the attempts to realize integral utopias. Even if this remains a small phenomenon, there is a type of utopianism that has inspired the design of integrally utopian experimental communities. These living utopias range from religious communities such as the Oneida community in the United States, first formally established in 1848, to the socialist phalanxes inspired by Charles Fourier that were created in France and the United States in the 19th century, to the kibbutz, a form of Jewish settlement that began early in the 20th century.

Despite the fact that utopianism is far from vanishing, many authors have claimed that we live in an epoch of the death of utopia. For instance, they observe that the utopian genre is increasingly limited to literature and fiction. This is partly because the high degree of specialization in the social sciences has rendered global utopias unacceptable to the academic community. But according to some interpreters, behind the alleged death of utopias, there are more structural reasons. Herbert Marcuse, for instance, observed that the concept of utopia becomes obsolescent in the contemporary world.
because today any transformation of the technical and natural environment is a real possibility. On the opposite front are those who consider utopia dead because they see no possibility of envisaging an alternative to the status quo. In an epoch when many celebrate the end of history, there seems to be no space in terms of time, and also no need, to embark on a journey to the land of utopia. Yet the societies we live in are far from perfect, and this ultimately guarantees the possibility of and also the persisting need for utopias.

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See also Communism; Democracy, Direct; Idealism; Ideology; Justice; Kant, Immanuel; Marx, Karl; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Socialism

Further Readings
Several definitions of values have been influential in the social sciences. For the anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn, a value is a conception of the desirable that influences the selection of available modes, means, and ends of action. Central to this definition is the notion of “a conception of the desirable.” A desire is a wish or a preference, while the term desirable goes beyond a wish or a want by bringing in considerations of moral content.

For the psychologist Milton Rokeach, a value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is preferable to opposite or converse modes of conduct or end states of existence. Rokeach’s definition includes several elements that can be used as a point of departure for discussing several dimensions of the value concept. Rokeach indicated that there are two types of values: (1) consummatory (end state of existence) and (2) instrumental (mode of conduct) values. Rokeach also differentiated between personal and social values. People have values that they want to emphasize in their own lives (self-centered) and also those that they would emphasize in their social environment (society centered). This differentiation can be expanded to different domains, and one can talk about, for example, family values, work values, bureaucratic values, and political values.

For Rokeach, a value is a basic and relatively stable element in a person’s belief system. A value is a prescriptive belief wherein some means or end of action is judged to be desirable or undesirable. Values are sometimes contrasted with attitudes, which are often defined as a set of beliefs organized around a specific object or situation. A value is considered to be a basic (prescriptive) belief that often influences a specific attitude together with other beliefs. Beliefs, attitudes, and values can be conceived to lie on a center–periphery dimension where values are the most central, intensive, and enduring and beliefs are the most peripheral.

Building on Rokeach and others, Shalom Schwartz identifies six formal characteristics that are the defining features of basic human values: (1) Values are beliefs (2) about desirable end-states or behaviors (modes of conduct) that (3) transcend specific situations or actions, (4) guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and (5) are ordered by relative importance to form a value system. (6) The relative importance of values guides attitudes and behavior.

Other researchers such as Jan van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough consider the relationship between values and attitudes as a reciprocal one that, at the individual level, provides opportunities for the modification and adaptation of values. These scholars use the notion “value orientation”
for constellations of attitudes that can be patterned empirically and interpreted theoretically in a meaningful way. This implies that value orientations can be studied with data that include indicators of attitudes.

Culture can be considered as the rich complex of meanings, beliefs, symbols, norms, and values prevalent among people in a society. Cultural differences can be studied along many dimensions. Given that values are the central elements in individuals’ belief systems, the values that are emphasized in a society are a very central feature of culture. A major conceptual advantage of an approach in which values are central is that values can be considered as important intermediate variables between several independent background variables and various variables that can be considered to be consequences of values.

Sociostructural, personal (including personality traits), and various institutional variables can be considered independent variables that can explain variations in value priorities. Values are considered determinants of virtually all kinds of social behavior: evaluations and attitudes, moral judgments, and justifications of self and others. Values are also determinants of political behavior, for example, various types of political participation and voting behavior.

Given the central intermediate role values have in the causal chain, from background variables to behavior, values often play a central role in explaining the impact of background variables on behavior. Some general value dimensions have received considerable attention. First, these are presented. Then, the focus is on political value dimensions, political value change and comparative patterns of value priorities, and political values’ antecedents and consequences.

General Value Dimensions

The Dutch social scientist Geert Hofstede’s studies of national cultural differences have received worldwide attention. Culture consists of values, rituals, heroes, and symbols, according to Hofstede, but values are seen as most fundamental. His famous five dimensions of national cultures are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, and long- versus short-term orientations.

Hofstede studied in detail national differences in culture in more than 50 nations along these dimensions and examined the consequences of the cultural dimensions along a series of domains, for example, family patterns, school and work organizations, and politics.

Another influential theory of human values was formulated by Schwartz, who describes 10 types of basic human values that are distinguished by their motivational goals. These values are power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security. This theory formulates a structure of dynamic relations among the values. This is indicated by a classification of the 10 value types in a circular continuum. Adjacent value types share some motivational emphases and are therefore compatible, while other values are more distant from each other and are considered to be conflicting or even diametrically opposed.

The oppositions can also be summarized by organizing the values into two bipolar higher order dimensions. One dimension contrasts openness to change and conservation values. This dimension puts self-direction and stimulation values—which emphasize independent action, thought, and feeling and readiness for new experiences—in opposition to conservation values, security, conformity, and tradition—which emphasize self-restriction, order, and resistance to change. The second higher order dimension contrasts self-enhancement and self-transcendence value types. This dimension puts power and achievement values—which emphasize one’s pursuit of success and dominance of others—in opposition to universalism and benevolence values—which involve concern for the welfare and interests of others. There has also been considerable research on the causes and consequences of each of these value types.

Political Values and Political Value Dimensions

Consummatory political values can be considered as end states that individuals would like to see characterize the society as a whole and see implemented through the political system. Instrumental political values are modes of conduct that are considered legitimate (or illegitimate) to influence political decisions, for example, various types of political participation and ways of influencing
political decisions. In political science, the concept of values is at the core of David Eastons’s famous definition of politics—as interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society.

The most well-known political value dimension is that of the materialist/postmaterialist value orientations. These value orientations were originally formulated by Ronald Inglehart, who argues that “new” postmaterialist values are deeply rooted and stand in opposition to more traditional materialist values. Materialist values emphasize economic and physical security, such as economic stability and growth, law and order, and strong defense. Postmaterialist values emphasize self-expression, subjective well-being, and quality of life. The new postmaterialist political values are central to the “New Politics” because these values are associated with new political issues such as environmental concerns, lifestyle issues, social and political participation, minority rights and social equality and social issues, and a change in the social base for radical, change-oriented politics. Another way of conceptualizing the New Politics is represented by environmental versus economic growth values. Today, this conflict is firmly rooted in the public consciousness, and in many West European countries, conflicts over environmental values seem to be the most manifest expression of the New Politics conflict. A clear manifestation of this is the emergence of Green parties, which have gained considerable electoral support in many Western democracies.

Scott Flanagan has emphasized that Inglehart’s conceptualization of value change combines two dimensions: (1) a materialist/nonmaterialist dimension and (2) a libertarian/authoritarian dimension. Flanagan considers value change along the latter dimension as most important. The overarching concept that integrates libertarian values is self-actualization, and the central value orientations within the notion of libertarian values are autonomy, openness, and self-improvement. The authoritarian value orientations designate a broader cluster of values, which, along with concerns about security and order, includes respect for authority, discipline and dutifulness, patriotism, intolerance toward minorities, conformity to customs, and support for traditional religious and moral values. The libertarian/authoritarian value orientations are also the central components in Herbert Kitschelt’s important work on changes in the party systems of Western democracies.

Though dominant, research on materialist/postmaterialist political values has gradually been supplemented by work on other political value dimensions. Political value conflicts can be considered to originate in the most crucial sociopolitical cleavages. For example, according to the seminal work of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, the most important political cleavages in industrial society are the religious cleavage and the class cleavage. Both of these cleavages are associated with important value orientations. Christian values focus on the importance of Christian morals and on traditional moral guidelines in school and society in general. Secularization is often understood as a process whereby mundane reality is less and less interpreted from a supernatural perspective, and secular values are based on more modern norms of morality that people want to decide for themselves without the guidelines of the church. Religious/secular values tap these contrasting orientations. Religious orientations are often considered to comprise two different aspects. One aspect is the religious beliefs that people hold. This can be tapped by concrete questions about which religious conceptions and dogmas the respondents believe in, how important God is in their life, or what kind of God—if any—they believe in. The other aspect is church-oriented religion or church religiosity. The essence of this dimension is “church integration”: The more people participate in the relevant church’s rites and services, the more church integrated they are.

The Industrial Revolution gave rise to economic interest conflicts that were anchored in hierarchical sociostructural variables. The most important political value orientations that emerged from the Industrial Revolution were the economic (materialist) left–right values. These value orientations are economic in nature, and they refer in particular to the role of government in creating more economic equality in society versus the need for economic incentives and efficiency. These value orientations incorporate value conflicts related to control, power, and the degree of distribution of resources in the production sphere. They include workers’ control and state regulation of the economy versus private enterprise, private property, and the market economy, and the size of the welfare state and
economic and social equality versus the need for differentiated rewards for stimulating effort. The moral value dimension and economic left–right values are often referred to as “Old Politics” because they capture the essence of the traditional lines of conflict in industrial society. In contrast, the New Politics refers to value conflicts emerging from postindustrial society.

Inglehart has broadened his study of value dimensions by emphasizing that his materialist/postmaterialist dimension is only one component of a much larger value syndrome. In an alternative way of conceptualizing and analyzing value orientations in a long-term perspective, he focuses on a two-dimensional value structure: one dimension based on traditional versus secular-rational values and the other based on survival versus self-expression/well-being values. These two dimensions are associated with the structural changes from preindustrial to industrial and from industrial to postindustrial society, respectively. The most essential values in the first dimension are religious versus more secular values, but the traditional pole also includes family values, social conformity rather than individualistic striving, deference to authority, high levels of national pride, and a nationalistic outlook, while the secular-rational pole has the opposite preferences.

The self-expression values on the second dimension are values and attitudes such as tolerance, trust, emphasis on subjective well-being, and civic activism that emerge in postindustrial societies with high levels of existential security and individual autonomy. At the opposite pole, survival values emphasize economic and physical security, and they include orientations such as intolerance of outgroups, an authoritarian outlook, insistence on traditional gender roles, and resistance to cultural change. Materialist/postmaterialist values are central in the second dimension. Economic left–right values do not appear to be central in their characterization of either of the two dimensions, but they could, nevertheless, be primarily located along the first dimension.

**Value Change and Cross-National Differences in Political Value Priorities**

Inglehart incorporates most explicitly the issue of cultural change in his work. He identifies a “silent revolution” in which a gradual value change takes place along the materialist/postmaterialist dimension. As older and more materialist generations die, they are continuously replaced by younger, less materialist generations. Inglehart’s theory is based on two hypotheses: (1) The scarcity hypothesis implies that short-term effects may induce all cohorts to emphasize postmaterialist values when economic conditions are good and materialist values when economic conditions decline. The cohort differences are explained by differences in economic and physical security during the formative years of the various cohorts. (2) The socialization hypothesis predicts a watershed between the post–World War II and the prewar cohorts in value priorities because they have such different experiences in the formative years regarding economic security (economic scarcity vs. economic prosperity) and physical security (war vs. absence of war).

The theory of value change is based on a strong and consistent relationship between age and materialist/postmaterialist values and presupposes that life cycle effects are not dominant for explaining age differences. These expectations are supported by comparative survey data. Inglehart finds also that support for postmaterialist values is strongest in wealthy countries and that generation differences are largest in countries with high economic growth. This is explained by differences in economic security during childhood and youth (formative years): In wealthy countries, a large portion of the population has grown up in an economically secure environment. In countries with a high level of economic growth, the various cohorts have experienced dramatic changes in levels of economic security. Similar patterns and explanations have been put forward for comparative differences and generational differences on the broader survival/self-expression value dimension.

Empirical research has shown a fairly consistent decline in religiosity in rich, advanced industrial countries along the different dimensions discussed above. In the discussion of secularization in Europe, some have argued that this applies only to the church-oriented dimension, not the belief dimension. Comparative longitudinal empirical research, however, has found that these two sides of religious involvement are highly correlated and even that the distinction between them is difficult to uphold in empirical analysis. Church-oriented and
belief-oriented religious involvements tend to “go together” and are difficult to separate in empirical research. There is even evidence that the changes in the two measures take place simultaneously, with changes in church integration being paralleled by similar changes in religious beliefs. The most important aspect of secularization at the individual level is the decline in both religious beliefs and church attendance. In other parts of the world, religiosity has been much more stable. Overall, the world is apparently becoming more religious even though the advanced industrial countries in the West have become considerably more secular.

The late 1970s and the 1980s saw a revival of conservative and neoliberal ideas and movements and increased support for nonsocialist political parties that challenged the postwar Keynesian consensus on the welfare state, state intervention, and citizenship rights in the social domain—economic leftist values that had been implemented in most West European polities. This right-wing ideology underscored the superiority of market mechanisms in promoting both economic prosperity and the maximization of individual freedom. It was also adamant that state intervention did not work and accorded a minimal role to the state in the operation of the economy and the social order. In many countries, nonsocialist governments with a neoliberal agenda came to power. The value change that underpinned these rightist trends was a move toward economic rightist values that could be documented in many countries. However, the 1980s saw a trend toward leftist values, and in many countries, the mass public’s values were as leftist as they had been before the shift toward the right around 1980. In the 1990s, many social democratic governments came to power but with more centrist programs than before, and trends in economic left–right values from the 1990s show stability or inconclusive patterns.

Two different perspectives on comparative differences in priorities of economic left–right orientations are found in the literature. The first one is that values will vary according to the welfare regime that exists in the given country. The point of departure is the well-known distinction between the universal or social democratic, the conservative or Christian democratic, and the liberal or residual welfare state. Welfare state attitudes are—according to this perspective—formed by the character of the institutional regimes of social policy. Universal welfare states are underpinned by strong popular support because most social groups are included as recipients. This is not the case with the liberal welfare state, where the recipients are the lower social classes. Support for these hypotheses is rather mixed.

The second perspective predicts that leftist orientations will receive greatest support in the least advanced Western societies, where welfare programs and the regulation of the economy have been low and where social inequalities are fairly large. People in these countries want change in a more egalitarian direction, while those in more advanced welfare states live in a different economic environment where the need for further development of leftist policies is not appreciated. In Inglehart’s conceptualization, there is a diminishing marginal utility or return of classical economic leftist policies such as economic regulation and income equality in advanced welfare states. This view is supported by different comparative studies of attitudes toward income equality and state intervention, as well as general economic left–right orientations.

**Antecedents of Political Value Orientations**

Most of the research has been done on materialist/postmaterialist values. According to the theory of the New Politics, the social basis of these values turns the old order upside down: The spread of postmaterialist values is explained by economic growth and wealth, generational replacement, the growth of the new middle class, and the spread of higher education. Change-oriented postmaterialist values should be most frequently found among the higher educated strata, the new middle class, and the younger cohorts. Studies have found that support for environmental and libertarian values in advanced industrial societies is strongest among the younger age-groups, those with higher education, and those who belong to the new middle class.

Regarding religious/secular values, age and gender are the most important predictors, while education has a smaller impact and other sociostructural variables such as social class are of less importance. Men and the younger cohorts have more secular values. Economic left–right values are coupled with the class cleavage. Leftist values are strongest
among the working class, those with lower income, and the lower educated strata. The correlations between these class variables and economic left–right values have, however, declined considerably over time. Age and gender are seldom consistently correlated with economic left–right values in comparative research.

Consequences of Value

Personal and social values can have important consequences, as research on Hofstede’s and Schwartz’s value dimensions has shown. Most of the research on political consequences of values, however, has focused on political values. According to the theory of the New Politics, materialist/postmaterialist values will have important consequences for political attitudes and behavior in advanced industrial democracies. This is framed within a developmental perspective: There is a transformation of cleavage structure from ascriptive variables (e.g., gender and religious denomination) and achieved or hierarchical (social status) variables to postindustrial (political value) variables. New value conflicts are gradually replacing traditional social structural variables for explaining political behavior, or—in Inglehart’s words—there is a change from a “class-based to a value-based pattern of political polarization.”

In accordance with New Politics theory, materialist/postmaterialist values have several aspects:

1. They have shown themselves to be important predictors for attitudes toward social change. Individuals with postmaterialist values express stronger support for radical social change.

2. They are increasingly the basis for identification with the ideological labels “Left” and “Right.” This implies that the ideological meaning of Left and Right changes from meanings related to the social structure and values in industrial society to postmaterialist values.

3. They are an important cause of the “participatory revolution”—that is, the increase in protest activities or unconventional participation.

4. They will increasingly become an important determinant for party choice. They will constitute a new political axis that will cut across the established social cleavages and polarities between the New Left and Green parties and the New Right parties.

5. They are determinants of a series of political attitudes that are closely related to the New Politics, environmental concerns, lifestyle issues, social and political participation, minority rights, and social equality and social issues.

However, when economic left–right values and religious/secular values are included in the analyses, these values sometimes have an even larger impact on attitudes and behavior than materialist/postmaterialist values.

There are also different views on the impact of values on political attitudes and behavior. When Van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (1995) explicitly examined the impact of the three sets of political value orientations, the main finding was that the behavioral consequences of value orientations are rather modest: They are not uniform across countries, and the impact of values on different phenomena did not change much from the 1960s to the 1990s. A major exception to the modest impact of political values is party choice, where all three sets of value orientations have considerable impact and tend to cut across each other in the way they differentiate between various political parties.

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See also Electoral Behavior; Political Culture; Postmaterialism; Public Opinion; Religiosity; Secularism; Social Cleavages

Further Readings


The term *variable* is used in a variety of senses in social science methodology, with the various usages unified by reference to a score on an indicator that in some sense could have been different. Variables, in the broadest sense, are indicators that are not constants; contrasting usages of both terms are briefly considered below. Social scientists and other methodologists often make more fine-grained distinctions among variables in terms of their statistical or causal characteristics. In this entry, these distinctions and their applications are discussed.

**Variables and Constants**

Some indicators capture traits that are ontologically variable: If a study were to be in some sense repeated, the score on this indicator for a given case could have been other than what it was. An intuitive example of a variable in this sense is the result of rolling a die. If the die were to be rolled again, there is no particular reason to believe that it would show the same number of dots as on an earlier roll. Hence, the number of dots shown on the die after a roll is a variable in the ontological sense. An equivalent example in social science research involves random experimental assignment of a subject to one of a number of treatments: If the process of assignment were to be repeated, one may reasonably expect that many subjects would get a different assignment than they did in the initial iteration of the study. For this reason, one may conclude that experimental assignment is a variable, not a constant.

A second common usage of the distinction between variables and constants involves describing the data actually produced by a particular study, rather than the ontological characteristics of the data-generating process. In this usage, an indicator is said to be a variable if the cases included in the study have more than one score on the indicator. Thus, a research design in which only political activists are selected for analysis may be described as one in which political participation is a constant; in contrast, if some apolitical individuals are added to the research design, participation would then be said to be a variable. This is the usage employed in the common aphorism that it is impossible to explain a variable with a constant.

These two usages are nonequivalent. An indicator may be ontologically variable while still producing the same score for every case in a given study. As a simple example, consider an extremely unfair coin that shows heads in 99.9% of flips and tails in 0.1%. The study involves flipping the coin 100 times, recording 1 for each instance of heads and 0 for tails. With this setup, the probability of observing a score of one for each of the 100 cases of flipping the coin is about 90.5%, so it is quite probable that the resulting indicator will be a constant in the second sense. However, each coin flip obviously involves a variable in the ontological sense: It is not impossible (although obviously unlikely) that a given flip will show tails rather than heads.

Likewise, an indicator may take on different scores across the cases in a given study without
being ontologically variable. Consider a hypothetical, badly designed experiment in which the students in a large lecture course are assigned to one of two treatments by the decision rule that students whose last names start with the letters A to M receive one treatment (recorded as 0), while those falling between N and Z receive the other (recorded as 1). Clearly, the indicator recording the resulting treatment status does not have the same score across all cases and is thus a variable in the second sense. Nevertheless, consider the research design. The set of experimental subjects is fixed; if the study were to be repeated, the same students in the same lecture course would be the participants. Likewise, the decision rule for assignment to treatment is deterministic—that is, a person would always get the same treatment assignment (unless he or she were to change last names during the course of the term). Therefore, in the ontological sense, treatment assignment in this study is a constant, even though it takes on different scores for different cases. The key idea is that, for a given individual in this research design, treatment assignment could not have been other than what it was.

Types of Variables

Probability theory distinguishes variables in terms of the mathematical characteristics of the set of values that the variable may take on, as well as the probability that each specific value (or sometimes a value within a narrow window of the specified point) will actually turn up in a specific realization of the variable. The first of these criteria produces the distinction between discrete and continuous variables, while the second generates the various families of named random variables discussed in probability theory. Discrete random variables are those that take on values that can be associated with (some subset of) the integers. Discrete variables in political science may include the number of times a survey respondent was contacted by representatives of a political party during the past year, the number of battle deaths during an armed conflict, or the number of seats per voting district in a legislative election. These variables may or may not have an upper limit; the number of battle deaths in a conflict is essentially unlimited, whereas the number of legislative seats in a district probably cannot exceed several hundred. What all discrete variables, whether bounded or not, share is that some numerical values between the lowest and highest observed scores are in principle nonsensical. For example, it makes little sense to speak of a conflict that produces 134.52 battle deaths or of a survey respondent who was visited three and a half times by representatives of a party.

Continuous variables, in contrast, are those that take on values that are too numerous to be mapped onto the integers. A simple example of a continuous variable is the angle between the minute and the hour hand on a clock. Because the angle can, in principle, be measured with virtually unlimited precision, the set of possible results of this variable is essentially infinite. In political science practice, few variables are measured with such high precision. However, variables that are measured with sufficient detail to take on a very large number of possible scores are essentially treated as continuous, even though in principle they are discrete. By this reasoning, variables such as an individual’s age or years of education, a country’s per capita gross domestic product, or the proportion of the population of a country belonging to the country’s largest ethnic group are effectively continuous.

The distinction between discrete and continuous variables has sometimes played a major role in recommendations for data analysis, with researchers being advised to choose techniques that are close fits for the characteristics of the variable that they seek to explain. Hence, unbounded continuous variables may be explained using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, while discrete variables should be explained using techniques such as logistic regression, Poisson regression, negative binomial regression, and so on. A different perspective, which places less emphasis on the distinction between continuous and discrete variables, has recently received increased attention. In this perspective, OLS regression always predicts the mean of the variable to be explained, conditional on the values of the other variables included in the model. Further, the mean is an important quantity regardless of whether the variable of interest is discrete or continuous. Therefore, OLS regression may be a useful analytic tool regardless of whether the variable to be explained is itself discrete or continuous.

Probability theorists and statisticians have described a large number of more specific families...
of discrete or continuous variables. These families of variables are characterized in terms of the probability that specific outcomes will occur. For example, consider two different kinds of continuous variables. One can take on any value between 0 and 10, and each of those values is equally likely to occur. This is one example of the family of uniformly distributed variables; other members of the family are generated by moving the lower and higher bounds of the variable’s range of possible values. The second variable is unbounded, although most of the scores fall between 0 and 10. Whereas with the uniformly distributed variable all values within the range are equally likely, with this second variable, the probability associated with a given value increases as the value gets closer to 5. If the distribution of probability across values follows what is informally described as the bell curve, then this is a normally distributed variable; otherwise, it may follow one of many similar distributions, such as the t distribution.

These formally characterized families of variables have highly specific mathematical forms and generally tolerate no deviations from the ideal. Thus, for example, if the second variable described above is slightly more likely to take on values below its mean than above its mean, then the variable does not follow the normal distribution or any of the other bell-like distributions. Indeed, statisticians routinely argue that most real-world variables do not exactly conform to any of the mathematically described families of variables. Instead, they may typically have their own idiosyncratic probability structures. Named and well-studied families of variables may nonetheless be useful as approximations to the probability distributions of real-world variables, although specific arguments about why a given approximation is useful in a particular context are needed.

Social scientists routinely distinguish among types of variables in terms of their causal, rather than statistical, structure. A hypothesis to be tested, or the report of a finding, may be specified in terms of a series of variables that are said to play certain roles with respect to each other. The most common distinction in this vein is between dependent and independent variables, but scholars also discuss confounding or omitted variables; collider variables; intervening, mediator, or mechanism variables; moderator variables; exogenous variables; endogenous variables; and instrumental variables. These categories of variables largely crosscut the various meanings of variable vis-à-vis constant discussed earlier.

A dependent variable is the variable to be causally explained; it is the outcome of interest. Such a variable is said to be dependent because, if the hypothesis is correct, its value depends causally on the values of several other variables specified by the analyst. The variables that are hypothesized to cause the dependent variable are routinely described as independent variables. This usage seems to draw on experimental research contexts, in which one or more key hypothesized causes of the outcome in question are randomly assigned to subjects. With a large enough sample, random assignment will make these hypothesized causes have no statistical relationship with each other or with any other variable that they do not cause; hence, they are independent of each other and of all other causes of the dependent variable. In nonexperimental research, the independent variables are rarely statistically independent in this sense. Thus, for nonexperimental research, it is best to regard the term independent variable as a synonym for hypothesized cause.

Confounding or omitted variables are usually variables that cause one or more of the independent variables in a hypothesis and also the dependent variable. (Confounding variables may also have more complex positions in a causal chain.) Omitted or confounding variables are important because, if they are not dealt with in some appropriate way, they can distort the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable—making a causal relationship appear to exist when it does not or changing the apparent direction or magnitude of a really existing relationship. Strategies for dealing with confounding variables include randomly assigning cases to different categories on the key independent variable or variables to ensure (with large enough samples) that no confounding variables exist; choosing a set of cases in which a suspected confounding variable does not vary, such that its effects are constant across the cases; identifying some component of the key independent variable that is known to be unrelated with the confounding variable and using that component to test the hypothesis; or incorporating the confounding variable into a statistical model to remove its interference.
Collider variables, first discussed by Judea Pearl, are variables that meet the following criteria. First, they are caused by a key independent variable or by a cause of that independent variable. Second, they are also caused by an unmeasured variable that is statistically and causally unrelated to the key independent variable. Third, that unmeasured variable is a cause of the dependent variable. Collider variables typically pose no problems to causal inference when they are left out of a research design; however, if the research design mistakenly identifies a collider variable as a confounder and either selects cases so as to hold the collider constant or incorporates the collider into the statistical model, the result will be to induce a statistical relationship between the key independent variable and the unmeasured variable, thereby distorting any causal inference.

Variables that are said to be intervening, mediator, or mechanism variables are those that constitute a step in the causal process, linking an independent variable to the dependent variable. These variables thus help answer the question, “How does the independent variable cause the dependent variable?” Researchers often attend to intervening variables because they regard accounting for the causal process connecting the independent and dependent variables as central to their analytic task. Moderator variables are variables that act to change the causal effect of an independent variable. For example, watching a campaign advertisement might increase Democrats’ evaluation of the candidate in question while decreasing the evaluation of Republicans and leaving political independents unaffected. In this case, if watching the advertisement is regarded as the independent variable, then a subject’s party identification is a moderator variable.

Exogenous variables are independent variables that have no causal or statistical relationship with any confounding variable. Typically, this is either because of random assignment or because the causes of the exogenous variable or variables are not themselves causes of the dependent variable. If an independent variable is exogenous, then its apparent relationship with the dependent variable will generally provide information about the true causal relationship between the variables. Endogenous variables are independent variables that are not exogenous (sometimes, the dependent variable is also said to be endogenous). In other words, an endogenous variable is causally or statistically related with one or more confounding variables. As a result, the apparent relationship between an endogenous variable and the dependent variable provides little direct information about causal relationships.

Finally, instrumental variables are exogenous variables that cause an endogenous independent variable but have no direct causal relationship with the dependent variable. That is to say, instrumental variables are variables that cause one of the hypothesized causes of the outcome and that are unaffected by confounders. Sometimes, an experimental assignment can serve as an instrumental variable if the outcome caused by that experimental assignment is itself a hypothesized cause of another variable of interest and if the experimental assignment has no direct effect on that other variable. Alternatively, researchers seek instrumental variables by looking for causes of their key independent variable that seem to be in some sense like an experiment. For instance, the amount of rainfall in a given year may be usefully like an experiment as a cause of agricultural productivity, which in turn may have effects on various political outcomes that are not themselves directly affected by rainfall. Instrumental variables are useful because they can identify a component of an independent variable that is not affected by confounders.

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See also Measurement; Measurement, Levels; Variables, Instrumental; Variables, Latent

Further Readings
Variables, Instrumental

Confounding is a pervasive problem for drawing inferences about political causes and effects. In brief, some individuals, countries, or other units are exposed to a “treatment” or “intervention,” while others are not. Differences in outcomes may reflect the effect of treatment, or they may be due to confounders—that is, variables associated with exposure to treatment and with the outcome. For example, does civil war inhibit economic growth? Do political institutions shape development? How does service in the military affect wages after war? Such questions are difficult to settle, because a range of unobserved variables are associated with the presence of civil war, types of political institutions, or service in the military, and these may shape growth, development, or individual wages. Reverse causality can also be a problem.

Instrumental variables can be used to address the problem of confounding, in both experiments and observational studies. In randomized controlled experiments, a coin flip determines which subjects are assigned to treatment, or they may be due to confounders—that is, variables associated with exposure to treatment and with the outcome. For example, does civil war inhibit economic growth? Do political institutions shape development? How does service in the military affect wages after war? Such questions are difficult to settle, because a range of unobserved variables are associated with the presence of civil war, types of political institutions, or service in the military, and these may shape growth, development, or individual wages. Reverse causality can also be a problem.

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Instrumental-Variables Analysis of Experiments

In experiments, subjects often fail to follow the treatment regime to which they are assigned. In A. Gerber and D. Green’s (2000) study of the effect of door-to-door canvassing on turnout, for example, some voters who were assigned to receive a get-out-the-vote message did not answer the door. It is misleading to compare subjects who answer the door with subjects who do not because there may be confounding. However, treatment assignment can serve as an instrumental variable for treatment receipt, which allows an estimation of the effect of treatment on Compliers.

An example from the health sciences helps make the logic clear. In the 1960s, the Health Insurance Plan (HIP) clinical trial studied the effects of screening for breast cancer. About 31,000 women between the ages of 40 and 64 years were invited for annual clinical visits and mammographies, which are X-rays designed to detect breast cancer. The group of women invited for screening was called the assigned-to-treatment group, or just the treatment group. In the control group, 31,000 women received the status quo health care. The invitation for screening was issued at random, so that the women in the assigned-to-treatment group and the control group were just like the women who were not, up to random error.

Table 1, adapted from D. Freedman (2009), shows death rates from breast cancer 5 years after the start of the trial. In the assigned-to-treatment
group, 20,200 women or about two thirds of women accepted the invitation to be screened, while one third refused. It might seem natural to compare the women who received screening with those who refused. Yet women self-select into screening, and those who accept screening are different from those who refuse. There is an important confounder: Richer and better-educated women tend to come in for screening, and while such women are less vulnerable to other diseases (see the final column of Table 1), they are more prone to breast cancer (probably because they tend to have fewer children and childbearing is protective against breast cancer).

The correct, experimental comparison is between women randomly invited to come in for screening—whether or not they were actually screened—and the whole control group. This intention-to-treat analysis shows a strong effect in relative terms. In the assigned-to-treatment group, there were 1.26 deaths per 1,000 women, while there were 2.03 deaths per 1,000 women in the control group. So the effect of assignment to screening is $-0.77$ deaths per 1,000. However, the intention-to-treat analysis likely understates the effect of screening—after all, one third of the women in the assigned-to-treatment group were not actually screened.

What, then, was the effect of screening on women in the treatment group who accepted screening? Instrumental-variables analysis answers this question. To begin, it is useful to think about the experimental population as comprising two kinds of subjects: Compliers and Never Takers. Here, Compliers are women who accept screening if they are assigned to treatment but are not screened if assigned to control, while Never Takers are women who are not screened, whether they are assigned to treatment or control. By looking at the control group alone, we cannot tell which is which: Never Takers look just like Compliers, since neither type of subject receives the treatment when assigned to the control group. In the treatment group, however, 20,200 or about two thirds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Deaths From Breast Cancer and Other Causes (Health Insurance Plan Study)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned to treatment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepted screening</td>
<td>20,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused screening</td>
<td>10,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned to control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would have accepted screening</td>
<td>20,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would have refused screening</td>
<td>10,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31,000</td>
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</table>

of the women accepted screening. Because subjects are randomly assigned to treatment and control, the mix of Compliers and Never Takers should be about the same in both groups. We can thus estimate that two thirds of women in the control group are Compliers, just as in the treatment group.

Instrumental-variables analysis compares death rates of Compliers in the treatment group with death rates of Compliers in the control group. It is easy to measure the former quantity because we observe which subjects are screened in the treatment group and can track their death rates. But what about the latter? First, note that Never Takers in the treatment group and Never Takers in the control group should have a similar incidence of death from breast cancer—after all, neither group was screened. In the treatment group, 16 women who refused screening—these were Never Takers—died from breast cancer. Thus, about 16 of the women who died from breast cancer in the control group were also Never Takers. Because 63 women died from breast cancer in the control group, it implies that about 16 of the women who died from breast cancer in the control group were Compliers.

We can then fill in the third column of Table 1 for the subjects assigned to control, dividing deaths from breast cancer by group size. The analysis implies a death rate of 1.14 deaths per 1,000 women among Compliers in the treatment group and 2.33 deaths per 1,000 among Compliers in the control group. Thus, the effect of screening on Compliers is $-1.19$ (i.e., $1.14 - 2.33$) deaths per 1,000 women—a substantially larger effect than suggested by the intention-to-treat analysis. One may arrive at this same estimate by dividing the estimated intention-to-treat parameter by the fraction of the treatment group that was screened—that is,

$$\frac{0.77}{0.65} = -1.19. \quad (1)$$

In the instrumental-variables estimator in Equation 1, we are implicitly assuming that no women in the control group were screened. (In the 1960s, few women sought out mammography on their own.) In other contexts, subjects who are assigned to the control group may seek out the treatment. With a double crossover, the model for compliance would be extended to include Always Takers—that is, subjects who receive treatment whether assigned to treatment or control—as well as Compliers and Never Takers. In the denominator of the instrumental-variables estimator analogous to Equation 1, we would then need to subtract the fraction of the control group that was screened from the fraction of the treatment group that was screened. Note that random assignment is crucial here, because it allows us to estimate the counterfactual outcomes for women in the control group who would have accepted screening had they been assigned to control.

Some assumptions are required. For one, we must assume that there are no Defiers: These are subjects who do the opposite of what they are told. In the HIP breast cancer study, Defiers are subjects who would take an exam if assigned to control but would refuse an exam if assigned to treatment. Notice also that Equation 1 estimates the causal effect of treatment for a specific subset of experimental subjects—namely, Compliers. When the effects of treatment are heterogeneous for different subjects, this “local average treatment effect” may not in general be the same as the average causal effect of treatment for all subjects in the experimental population.

**Instrumental-Variables Analysis of Observational Data**

In observational studies, researchers do not apply the treatment or intervention; instead, the subjects select themselves into treatment or control groups. Selection is usually highly nonrandom, and there is typically confounding. However, under some conditions, researchers may exploit instrumental variables to recover the effect of an endogenous treatment variable. Just as in experiments, a valid instrumental variable must be independent of other causes of the dependent variable, and it must influence exposure to treatment but not influence the outcome, other than through its effect on exposure.
to treatment. The latter condition is sometimes called an exclusion restriction, with reference to the exclusion of the instrumental variable from a causal equation governing the outcome.

Joshua D. Angrist (1990), for example, uses draft lottery numbers as an instrumental variable for military service during the Vietnam War. Understanding the effects of past military service on labor market earnings is difficult, because people who choose to serve in the military may be different from those who do not, in ways that matter for future earnings. A key assertion in Angrist’s study is that the draft number is as good as being randomly assigned: Whether one’s draft number is high or low is, therefore, independent of factors that influence future earnings. With a dichotomous treatment (military service/no military service), the instrumental-variables estimator is analogous to Equation 1, though the denominator should be adjusted for a double crossover: Some people dodge the draft, while others serve in the military even if they are not drafted. An important but reasonable assumption is that there are no Defiers—that is, people who sign up for the military if not drafted but emigrate to Canada when their number comes up. Note that, here, instrumental variables estimate the effect of treatment for a particular subset of subjects—those who serve in the military if drafted, but not otherwise. Whether this effect is informative about the effect of military service for other subjects may be a matter of opinion.

A second example comes from an influential study by E. Miguel, S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti (2004) of the effect of growth on the probability of civil war in Africa. Confounding poses a big problem in this research area, since many difficult-to-measure variables may affect both growth and the likelihood of civil war. However, year-to-year variation in rainfall is plausibly as-if random, and it may influence economic growth—that is, treatment receipt—without independently affecting the probability of civil war through other channels. If so, an instrumental-variables analysis may allow estimation of the effect of economic growth on conflict for those countries whose growth performance is shaped by variation in rainfall. This application illuminates another, distinct concern about the interpretation of instrumental-variables estimates: Variation in rainfall may influence growth only in particular sectors, such as agriculture, and growth in distinct economic sectors may have different effects on the probability of conflict. Using rainfall as an instrument for studying growth may capture such idiosyncratic rather than general effects, so caution may be advised when extrapolating results or making policy recommendations.

Finally, D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2001), in a pathbreaking study of the effects of institutional arrangements on countries’ economic performance, use colonial settler mortality rates as an instrumental variable for current institutions. These authors argue that settler mortality rates during colonial years do not affect current economic performance in former colonies, except through their effect on current institutions; they also argue that settler mortality is as good as randomly assigned, at least conditional on covariates. Since neither assumption is verifiable from the data, a combination of historical evidence and a priori reasoning must be used to try to validate, at least partially, these core assumptions. The portion of current institutions that is “explained” (in a statistical sense) by past settler mortality rates may also have idiosyncratic effects on economic growth, which could limit the generalizability of the findings.

**Strengths and Limitations of Instrumental-Variables Analysis**

As these examples suggest, instrumental variables provide an important tool, because they help confront the problem of confounding—a first-order issue in the social sciences. Instrumental-variables regression may also be used to correct for error in the measurement of independent variables, which can pose important inferential obstacles in social scientific research. In recent years, instrumental variables have been used to estimate causal effects in many substantive domains.

Nonetheless, the use of instrumental variables often requires strong assumptions, which can be only partially validated from data. Some empirical tests can be performed to assess the central assumption that the instrumental variable is as good as randomly assigned; for instance, the
Variables, Instrumental

instrument may be shown to be uncorrelated with pretreatment covariates (those that are determined before the intervention). A priori reasoning and detailed knowledge of the empirical context may also play an important role. In observational studies, however, because there is often no actual randomization, the validity of an as-if random assignment is often a matter of opinion; this assertion may be classified along a spectrum from “less plausible” to “more plausible,” but it is difficult to validate the placement of any given study on such a spectrum.

Additional issues arise in many applications, often in connection with the use of multiple regression models. For instance, concerns about the endogeneity of a single treatment variable will typically lead researchers to use instrumental-variables regression. Yet analysts typically do not discuss the possible endogeneity of other covariates in their multiple regression models. (One reason may be that the number of instruments must equal or surpass the number of endogenous variables, and good instruments are difficult to find.) Furthermore, instruments that are truly random may not be strongly related to an endogenous treatment; in this case, a substantial small-sample bias can arise. One recommendation for practice may be to report “reduced-form” results. (Reduced form is a synonym for intention to treat; here, the outcome is regressed directly on the instrumental variable.)

Another recommendation may be to report instrumental-variables regressions without covariates; with one endogenous treatment variable and one valid instrument, including covariates can be unnecessary and even be harmful. The estimand should be carefully defined, and difficulties that may arise when extrapolating results to other contexts and types of subjects should be considered. In multiple-regression models, the statistical model itself must be validated, to the extent possible; with regression, the identification of causal effects depends not just on the exogeneity of instrumental variables in relation to a posited regression model but also on the validity of the underlying model itself.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that neither of the core criteria for a valid instrumental variable—that it is statistically independent of unobserved causes of the dependent variable and that it affects the dependent variable only through its effect on the endogenous treatment—are directly testable from data. Analysts using instrumental variables should defend these assertions using evidence and reasoning, to the extent possible. Yet instrumental-variables estimates should be interpreted with an appropriate degree of caution, especially outside the experimental context.

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See also Experiments, Field; Hypothesis Testing; Matching; Measurement; Statistics: Overview

Further Readings


Variables, Latent

See Factor Analysis; Logit and Probit Analyses
A veto player is an individual or collective actor who possesses veto power in a political process and behaves strategically. Particular conceptions of the basic concept have to specify, among other things, what the relevant process is, who the veto players are, and what motivates them. The most influential conception of veto players has been developed by George Tsebelis (2002) in his veto player theory. That model has been elaborated in a number of different ways by subsequent scholars.

Tsebelis relies on the concept of the veto player to unify the comparative analysis of political systems. One part of this unification is conceptual. Tsebelis argues that traditional institutional dichotomies such as between unicameral and bicameral parliaments or between presidential and parliamentary systems of government can to a significant extent be replaced by analyzing political systems and situations as particular veto player configurations.

But veto player theory also aims at unifying our causal understanding of politics. The basis of this causal unification is the concept of policy stability—that is, the difficulty of changing the existing policies (the status quo) in a political system. Policy stability is the causal mechanism that links veto player configurations to particular outcomes of substantive importance. Tsebelis argues that in parliamentary systems, in which the cabinet depends on the confidence of the assembly, policy stability leads to cabinet instability. If the cabinet cannot agree on policy change, it will be replaced. For presidential systems, in contrast, veto player theory predicts that policy stability is likely to encourage a coup or some other form of regime instability. Neither of these two arguments is completely new, and they can be criticized, but veto player theory embeds both of them, and many others, in one relatively parsimonious and coherent framework.

Tsebelis distinguishes two types of veto players: (1) Institutional players are those established by a country’s constitution. For example, the U.S. Constitution identifies the president as a veto player. (2) Partisan players are established by the way political competition plays out in a given country at a given time. One important analytical strategy of veto player theory is to focus on partisan veto players whenever possible. For example, instead of treating the Finnish parliament as one institutional veto player, the theory treats cabinet parties forming a majority coalition within the parliament as partisan veto players. One advantage of “replacing” institutional with partisan veto players for analytical purposes is that we may be able to ascribe particular policy preferences to the latter. Estimating actors’ preferences is crucial for the application of veto player theory.

A superficial reading of veto player theory often misunderstands it as proving a seemingly trivial point—that a higher number of veto players increases policy stability. Yet one crucial insight of the formal analysis is that the number of veto players alone tells us little about the potential for policy change. What matters is how this number interacts with the distances between the ideal points of veto players’ preferences. Moreover, the location of the status quo, the allocation of agenda-setting power, and the internal cohesion of collective veto players may also be of great importance for the outcome of collective decisions. Veto player theory analyses the interplay of these explanatory factors.

One important formal result of veto player theory is the “absorption rule.” This rule states that if a (potential) veto player has an ideal point that is geometrically embedded within the ideal points of other veto players—that is, if its ideal point is in the so-called unanimity core—then this player does not matter in the analysis; it is absorbed. For example, Tsebelis argues that even courts with the authority to review and veto legislation can often be ignored in veto player analyzes because they are selected in ways that virtually guarantee their absorption.

**Discussion and Critique**

Distinguishing between “pure” and “interpreted” veto player theory is helpful in discussing the limits and criticism of Tsebelis’s theory. The pure
theory consists of the formal models in which the conclusions follow logically from the assumptions. Yet we know that the assumptions are idealizations or useful fictions. The combination of these two facts—“false” assumptions and valid conclusions—implies that testing the “truth” or “falsity” of the veto player theory is not a meaningful enterprise. The more important question is whether the theory is useful for particular purposes.

In contrast to pure theory, interpreted veto player theory includes assumptions about how the formal models relate to reality. It is mainly these assumptions that give empirical content to the theory and hence make it testable. Moreover, while no theorist doubts the validity of Tsebelis’s deductions, many theorists make conflicting assumptions about how these deductions are to be applied to the real world.

Consider an example. In a five-party, multidimensional legislature, parties A, B, and C form a majority coalition whereas parties D and E are in opposition. Tsebelis’s interpreted veto player theory assumes that A, B, and C are veto players on all policies. A competing assumption, proposed by Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle (1996), is that each minister is a sort of policy dictator for his or her portfolio so that one of the three parties alone determines policy on a particular issue. A third assumption, highlighted by Anthony McGann (2006), is that legislation may reflect the preferences of all five parties. The reason is that one of the opposition parties may undermine the existing coalition by forming an alternative coalition that makes some of the members better off. Taking opposition parties’ preferences into account may thus be a way of reducing their incentive to challenge the existing coalition. Formally speaking, while Tsebelis expects the collective decision to be within the unanimity core of the putative veto players A, B, and C, McGann expects it to be within the so-called uncovered set for the entire five-party parliament. For Tsebelis, it is sufficient to be a member of the actual winning coalition in order to be a veto player. For McGann, a true veto player must be a member of every possible winning coalition, as would be the case if one party had a majority in parliament.

Just as Tsebelis’s pure veto player theory may be interpreted differently, theorists may also use the label of “veto players” to refer, at least in part, to other pure theories. For instance, Scott Basinger and Mark Hallerberg (2004) question the importance of Tsebelis’s absorption rule. They highlight the relevance of the mere number of veto players, regardless of the distances between their preferences, based on the view that many veto players increase transaction costs.

Interpreted veto player theory is often tested in isolation rather than along with competing theories. Or it is simply applied to some phenomenon. Even these noncomparative tests or applications are not without problems, however, for two related reasons: It is difficult to adequately measure actors’ policy preferences, and it is difficult to unambiguously identify the actual veto players.

The problem of identification is most obvious in the case of minority cabinets. By definition, the parties forming a minority cabinet do not have sufficient seats in parliament to change the status quo, but it is not known in advance which party or parties will support the cabinet on a particular piece of legislation. Tsebelis argues that minority cabinets tend to have a privileged position in the policy space as well as strong agenda-setting powers, so that they typically do not have to make significant concessions to support parties. Hence, he treats only cabinet parties as veto players. Other authors, such as Steffen Ganghof and Thomas Bräuninger (2006), doubt Tsebelis’s assumptions and believe that support parties can be quite powerful. Assumptions about how to identify veto players are part of the interpretation of pure veto player theory: They increase the theory’s empirical content and hence testability, but they may be contested.

The problem of measuring preferences is as follows: Veto player theory refers to actors’ final (all things considered) preferences over legislative proposals. Yet these preferences are often difficult to measure, especially in broad comparative studies. Empirical estimates of preferences based on party manifestos or expert surveys often measure parties’ general ideological orientations or outcome preferences (e.g., more growth vs. more equality) rather than their final policy preferences (e.g., a high or a low business tax rate). If this is the case, there is a significant gap between theory and measurement. If this gap is ignored, the predictions of veto player theory may be misunderstood. For example, if an empirical analysis measures veto players’ outcome preferences, it is far from clear whether large distances between these preferences lead to policy stability. It is also possible that policy preferences are much more proximate, possibly
due to strong economic or technological constraints faced by the players, thus allowing for significant policy change.

The problems of identification and preference measurement also imply that veto player theory is strongest when applied to cohesive and/or disciplined parties. While veto player theory has all the formal tools to deal with situations of noncohesive parties, comparative analyses typically lack the detailed information on individual preferences that would be needed to apply these tools empirically. The difficulty of dealing with noncohesive parties is quite significant because the likelihood of such parties is much greater in presidential systems. At the same time, presidential systems are also more likely to have significant institutional veto points in addition to (the first chamber of) parliament. Applications of veto player theory, therefore, often focus on parliamentary systems and boil down to the assumption that cabinet parties are veto players.

Despite these limitations, veto player theory is a significant achievement. It helps unify our understanding of political systems and political processes. And such unification of knowledge is central to scientific progress.

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See also Coalitions; Game Theory; Parliamentary Systems; Presidentialism

Further Readings


VIOLENCE

In addition to finding food and shelter, the containment of violence has always been a vital issue for humankind. Violence denotes the use of physical force to inflict injury on persons or cause damage to property and manifests itself in forms as different as homicide or state violence (e.g., repression, coercion). This definition is independent of agents, objects, or circumstances of violence. Political violence can be distinguished from collective or civil violence (such as social banditry) by (a) the number of persons involved, (b) the intentions of the actors, and (c) the reactions of the public.

The more discontent is blamed on the political system, the greater the potential for political violence. Often, there is no clear boundary between a bargaining, a coercion, and a terror model in the use of violence. Also, domestic (political) violence is to be distinguished from interstate violence in that at least one participant is not a government.

Typologies of violence flourish (violence against persons/nonhumans, direct/indirect, physical/ psychological, individual/collective, organized/spontaneous, criminal/political, and noninstitutionalized/institutionalized [e.g., the Mafia or the period in Colombian history known as La Violencia, or noninstitutionalized]). Our definition precludes the dichotomy between personal and structural violence, the latter implying no direct actor but rather “structural or indirect” (Galtung, 1969, p. 170) causes. Such a definition excludes very little and thus inflates the concept of violence.

The most important differentiation is between legal/illegal and legitimate/illegitimate violence. Max Weber defines the modern state by its specific means, that of physical violence. Where the authority of the state is considered legitimate, stable rule will result. In the opposite case of illegal and illegitimate violence, social disorder prevails, with the violence and instability envisioned by Thomas Hobbes. To a lesser extent, social order also breaks down where legal state violence is not
accepted by the population and in the reverse scenario where violence is illegal but considered highly legitimate by the people. These are instances of classical, often revolutionary protest.

The challenge to the state monopoly of violence can be combined with challenges to the national borders, by separatist groups or foreign powers, and to the societal consensus, for example, by revolutionary groups. This leads to a three-dimensional table classifying at least eight different forms of violent political conflict.

Note that with violent protest and demonstrations, usually, neither the state monopoly of violence nor the societal order is challenged. As noted by Douglas Hibbs (1973), the response of the state authorities, to a large extent, determines whether protests escalate into internal war (civil war)—the organized, initially often clandestine form of challenging the state monopoly of violence. Robustly, these two dimensions have reoccurred in analyses of diverse forms of violent political conflict. Apart from genocide and massive external warfare, internal wars claim the largest numbers of victims.

There are many overlaps between these different forms of conflict, especially from a dynamic perspective. International terrorism, for example, would have to be located between the first and second box in the first row of Figure 1. Together with the challenge of international order, a fourth fundamental dimension arises here. Yet there are analytical and empirical limitations for all 16 types to emerge.

Political violence can be analyzed at four different levels: (1) international (wars, militarized interstate disputes, and external military interventions), (2) national (macrolevel), (3) subnational groups (mesolevel), and (4) participating individuals. According to Ted Robert Gurr (1970), both variants of deprivation (i.e., the discrepancy between expected value positions and the capabilities to achieve them), absolute deprivation and relative deprivation, fall short in explaining violent political conflicts. There are many more such situations of deprived masses but few manifest conflict events. The lack of a unifying ideology and charismatic leadership that can overcome the collective-action problem (viz., incurring relatively high costs and little rewards at the beginning of a protest action) is one factor. Without these factors making for mass mobilization, it is simply too costly for an
individual to undergo the burden of violent conflict in view of its limited success.

A broader and theoretically more pertinent approach, resource mobilization, stresses the resources available to potential conflict agents (number of participants, money, weapons, organizational skills and networks of mobilization, availability, leadership, and unifying ideology). Yet even such a rational-choice view of resources, contrary to the approaches of need deprivation, cannot explain the point in time when conflict potentials materialize. This usually occurs in situations of a widening political opportunity structure marked by elite dissent, fiscal crises, external military defeats, electoral realignments, inconsistent repression, and unforeseen events. All these factors add up to making predictions at the macrolevel difficult if not impossible. As Timur Kuran (1995) points out, only the occurrence of informational and emotional “cascades” among the protesters made the dramatic changes of system collapse and transformation understandable in the demise of communism in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. Individual and group behavior is codetermined by macrofactors at the national and international level, and only through group-mobilized (violent or nonviolent) actions and particular elite responses can the changes at the macrolevel be explained. There can be no plausible explanation by relying on macroprocesses alone.

At least five major explanatory variables have been found at the macrolevel, distinguishing more violent nations/states from others. (External wars are excluded here.)

**Economic Development and Growth**

Developed states with at least some social security provisions display lower amounts of violent conflicts (measured in terms of dead and injured victims). It is unclear whether this is a consistent linear trend or whether a curvilinear relationship predominates, with mid-level states reaching the maximum values. Here, incentives for protest would be strongest, combined with higher demands and still limited means to satisfy them. Highly developed democracies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and many Mediterranean states frequently exhibit strong patterns of protest and demonstrations but usually avoid their escalation into violent internal war. There is also a group of rather quiet democracies consisting of Scandinavia, Switzerland, and the democratic outposts of former British rule overseas (New Zealand, Australia, and the Caribbean islands). In particular, semiauthoritarian states in the Third World and successor states to the Soviet Union in the Caucasus and Central Asia, in sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere often exhibit high values on both dimensions simultaneously—protest and internal war. Only totalitarian states with high and consistent repression succeed in avoiding both forms of conflict. North Korea is the remaining prime example. Once state repression is lowered, however, events parallel to the disorders in Zimbabwe and parts of the former Soviet Union often occur.

Surprisingly, rapid economic growth may spur protests due to the uneven distribution of benefits from such dramatic changes (e.g., Iran in the 1970s). Corruption and rigged elections often are further contributing factors. In situations of manifest economic crisis, one often finds less conflict due to obstacles in overcoming the free riding problem—that is, incurring particularly high costs when being among the first protestors and with little hope of achieving goals. Fears of becoming unemployed dominate and lead to individualistic solutions to such mischief. Yet where the system capacity to deal with these problems is massively reduced, conditions furthering mobilization are more likely to be expected.

**Socioeconomic Inequality**

Contrary to much speculation, inequality in landownership, wealth, or income is not often associated with more violent conflicts. Ideological and religious beliefs (e.g., caste systems) may justify the persistence of such patterns. Only where these inequalities become the focus of mobilized social groups does more violent conflict have to be reckoned with. Thus, for example, massive oil revenues are passed on to the lower classes in some Latin American countries, buying off (temporary) protest and conflict. Albert Hirschman, with his “tunnel effect” (i.e., waiting in a traffic queue further back in a tunnel but still moving ahead and thus having hope for progress), predicts tolerance for inequality as long as growth trickles down. Again, deprivation must be articulated and mobilized before such structural factors may contribute directly to violent conflicts.
State Repression

The conflict-instigating effect of political repression (political censorship, bans on opposition parties and basic political rights, large internal security forces, manifest acts of repression, etc.) is countered by a deterrent effect once the level of repression has passed a vital threshold where protestors become concerned with their own physical safety. This double reasoning makes it understandable why state repression in liberal democracies often contributes to more protest, while more repression in highly authoritarian states can reduce both forms of violent conflict. Also, the turning point of driving protest underground becomes understandable—namely, where a protestor starts fearing for his or her own life. Semirepressive regimes are thus most unstable and often the place of the most persistent forms of violent conflicts, due to injustices from the past, fears for the future, and inconsistent repressive measures.

Ethnocultural Fractionalization

Ethnocultural fractionalization is the most likely and most persistent causal factor in predicting the incidence of violent conflict, even though almost any hypothesis about the size composition of the underlying populations and violent conflict has been tested and partially rejected due to other factors and contrary logic. Thus, an equal division of two distinct populations could lead not only to continual fighting (e.g., Israel and Palestine) but also to the insight that neither population will win permanently. A majority of four to one by one group may deter any challenges from a minor group, which, in effect, often may be economically more successful as, for example, the Basques in Spain, Tamils in Sri Lanka, or the Chinese in Southeast Asia show. In contrast, it may vigorously instigate such challenges due to feelings of long-term discrimination. At least four structural factors turn those multicultural relations between dominant and dominated groups into persistent ones:

1. Distinct cultural groups produce lower transaction costs for respective group members in everyday-life behavior. Also, the public good of security in the end rests only with one’s own kin.

2. Such groups in the past often have been victims of violent conflict.

3. This memory effect produces a lasting legacy for the future.

4. Moreover, state institutions may possess private information withheld from subordinate groups. Such information may be used at the next opportunity, to the detriment of subordinate groups. Perhaps only supranational supervision, as supplied in part by the European Union or the United Nations, may serve as a “permanent” control here.

There is also Karl Deutsch’s (1966) prediction at the macrolevel that, with an underlying heterogeneous population, the means of modernization and social mobilization will be used for within-group strengthening, thus causing larger between-group differences. Homogeneous populations, in contrast, do not face these challenges. At least one major study (Hibbs, 1973) corroborates this general effect of ethnocultural differentiation combined with social mobilization. Irredenta populations created by colonial border drawing or other historical effects exacerbate this conflict scenario.

Finally, there are many linkages between internal and external conflicts, such as attempts at diverting internal tensions, intervention by external agents, or the spillover of defeat in war.

Territorial characteristics, shortages of natural resources, and disputed boundaries have been identified as causes of internal wars and guerilla warfare; often combined with terrorism, they have become a renewed and intensified focus of a group of researchers, largely at the Institute of Peace Research (Oslo) and the University of Zurich. Also, there are specific accounts, such as that by Stathis Kalyvas (2006), of why and how some peaceful multicultural settings break down, while others persist. Dynamic analyses at the communal level thus strengthen insights in the understanding of violence.

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See also Civil War; Conflicts; Terrorism, International

Further Readings

Voting Rules, Electoral, Effects of


Virtual State

*See* State, Virtual

Virtue

*See* Ethics

Vote, Types

*See* Electoral Systems

Voting Rules, Electoral, Effects of

Voting rules determine how voters cast their ballots and how vote shares are converted to seats or mandates in the elected assembly or office. Voting rules are thus among the principal building blocks of representative democracy. They establish the most fundamental theoretical and empirical links between public preferences, political representation, and, ideally, government formation and policy making. Thus, the political consequences of alternative voting rules have always concerned political scientists. Both majoritarian and proportional voting rules exert profound effects on alleged political efficiency (i.e., the format and the fragmentation and polarization of political party systems and their propensity for sustaining single-party or coalition governments) and for different modes of formal and substantive political representation (i.e., the distortion of vote shares and seat shares and the representation of the median voter in parliament, in government, or actually in enacted policies).

The study of voting rules and their respective consequences belongs to the very core of comparative political research. As illustrated by William H. Riker, research on voting rules and electoral behavior has been organized as a cumulative science. In theoretical and conceptual terms, the arguments have advanced from the early, inductive reasoning by John Stuart Mill, Henry Droop, or Thomas Hare toward the codification of Duverger’s law and hypothesis, thereafter toward their refinement by scholars such as Giovanni Sartori or Rein Taagepera, and, more recently, toward the sophisticated, game-theoretical treatment by Gary W. Cox. Further research extended the scope of the analyses so as to also consider the additive effect of social structure or direct presidential elections and, most important, the interactive effects of institutional structure and political cleavages.

Voting Rules and Electoral Fragmentation

Inductive Generalizations at the National Level

Supporters of majoritarian democracy focus on the efficiency dimension and thus on the effects of voting rules on the number of viable electoral and/or parliamentary parties. The fragmentation of national party systems is their most important and politically most consequential feature, which is directly related to the impact of the respective voting rules. Riker took what is now canonized as Duverger’s sociological laws as a yardstick to assess the truly scientific character of the discipline—the cumulative process of generating knowledge by a series of constant revisions and improvements. Riker’s theoretical point of departure was Maurice Duverger’s analysis and lawlike codification of the effects of alternative voting rules, which he discriminated into Duverger’s law and Duverger’s hypothesis: (a) the law states that plurality rules tend to systematically favor two-party systems and (b) the hypothesis suggests that majority systems and proportional representation (PR) tend to systematically produce multipartyisms.
These processes are fueled by two interrelated causal mechanisms: (1) The mechanical effects of voting rules operate in a deterministic way and refer to the formal conversion of exogenous given vote shares to seat shares. (2) The psychological effects, in contrast, work in a probabilistic fashion and evolve from the anticipation of these mechanical effects by (a) voters who want to avoid wasting their vote (*strategic voting*) and (b) party elites who want to avoid fielding and investing scarce resources for candidates or lists that are in fact out of the running (*strategic entry*).

**Majoritarian Voting Rules**

Majoritarian voting rules require successful candidates or lists to win a—however defined—majority of the votes. This broad category comprises a number of heterogeneous subtypes that are associated with different political consequences.

*Plurality* or “first-past-the-post” systems apply the relative majority rule. In an electoral district that consists of \( n \) seats, the \( n \) strongest competitors are awarded a mandate. In empirical terms, plurality rules are most frequently implemented in single-member districts. However, this combination does not necessarily belong to the core concept of plurality but merely flags an empirical regularity.

In contrast, *majority* rules build on an alternative concept and definition of majority. These voting systems regularly require an absolute majority for the assignment of a seat in the assembly or office—that is, candidates or electoral lists need to obtain at least 50% plus one vote of the overall votes cast. In multiparty systems, this threshold often cannot be cleared by any competitor so that vacant seats need to be assigned by either a runoff of the (two) strongest parties (runoff systems) or by a second ballot that builds on some kind of plurality rule (majority plurality systems). As before, majority rules also tend to be implemented in single-member districts, but this is not included in the definition of majority voting rules.

Although every voter still casts an exclusive, individual vote, the *single nontransferable vote* (SNTV) implies the application of plurality voting rules in multimember districts. The available seats are filled by the \( n \) strongest candidates or electoral lists.

Empirical assessments of voting rules did not sustain Duverger’s law as a deterministic national-level generalization. Systematic analyses, for instance by Douglas W. Rae, Arend Lijphart, or Gary W. Cox, have illustrated that majoritarian voting rules grosso modo (roughly) tend to allow for lower levels of electoral and parliamentary fragmentation than proportional voting rules. However, plurality in single-member districts does not unambiguously sustain two-party systems anywhere outside the United States. Instead, the empirical effects of classical “first-past-the-post” systems happen to depend on a variety of specific technical and contextual features, for instance, district boundaries that may be subject to the practice of gerrymandering, the structure of political competition, and alternative degrees of party system nationalization.

**Proportional Voting Rules**

Proportional voting rules require successful candidates or lists to win the support of a certain share of the votes that is either defined by the electoral quota or determined by the application of some highest-averages method. While majoritarian rules can in principle be combined with any possible district magnitude, PR logically only works in multimember electoral districts.

Quota systems define an electoral quota, which is calculated by the numbers of votes and available seats in an electoral district, as the price of a seat. Each party is awarded as many seats as it has full quotas, and eventually, the remaining seats are often distributed by some largest-remainder criterion. Common quota variants are, for example, the Hare quota, which is based on the number of votes divided by the number of seats; the Droop (or Hagenbach-Bischoff) quota, which divides the number of votes by the number of seats plus one; or the Imperiali quota, which divides the number of votes by the number of seats plus two.

Highest-average rules divide the votes cast for a respective party list by a series of divisors. The d’Hondt system applies the divisor sequence \{1, 2, 3, \ldots, \( n \)\}, the Sainte-Lagué method implies division by the series of odd numbers \{1, 3, 5, \ldots, \( n \)\}, and the Imperiali quota builds on the divisor sequence \{1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, \ldots, \( n \)\}. In the second
The single transferable vote (STV) system realizes candidate-based PR and aims at limiting the potential for wasted votes by a system of preferential voting. STV initially assigns seats according to the stated first preferences. After candidates have been either elected or eliminated, surplus votes or wasted votes are transferred to the remaining candidates based on lower-ranking preferences of the voter.

Empirical analyses revealed ambiguous evidence for Duverger’s hypothesis. Grosso modo, proportional voting rules do allow for higher numbers of viable parties or electoral lists than majoritarian ones. However, depending on societal polarization and political cleavage structures, proportional voting rules are also compatible with highly concentrated two-party systems.

Within the scope of proportional voting rules, there have often been intense debates about the mechanical consequences of alternative proportional formulae. However, their empirical consequences regularly do not differ much and have often been profoundly overestimated. Generally, the highest-average formulae, especially d’Hondt, are expected to benefit larger parties, while quota systems are supposed to be fairer for small parties. Simulation studies have illustrated that the effects of either group of voting rules overlap and, unless they are reinforced by a multitude of parallel electoral districts, do not have significant electoral consequences. When the mechanical consequences of alternative proportional allocation methods tend to be limited, alternative proportional voting rules do not bring about the need for strategic behavior by voters or by party elites. Note that in empirical electoral systems, pure proportionality is normally restricted by additional regulations—for example, low district magnitudes as mathematical and predefined legal thresholds as formal entry barriers. Typically, the mechanical and psychological effects of average district magnitudes and legal thresholds clearly exceed the consequences of alternative PR rules.

Further Refinements

Giovanni Sartori has contributed additional refinements and reformulations to Duverger’s sociological laws. Instead of the conceptually dubious and problematic established dichotomy of proportional and majoritarian technical rules and conceptual ideal types (and some combinations of different systems in between), Sartori arranged voting rules along a unipolar continuum from feeble to strong. Voting rules that are a priori supposed to exert a significant modifying impact on actual electoral behavior (i.e., majoritarian voting rules) are considered “strong,” while those that are not expected to induce these substantial psychological effects (i.e., proportional voting rules) are labeled “feeble.”

The second dimension of Sartori’s typology brings in contextual features. Parallel to the voting rule dimension, Sartori contrasts strong (i.e., structured and nationalized) and feeble (i.e., unstructured and heterogeneous) party systems. In the resulting $2 \times 2$ matrix, Sartori expects a reduction in the number of viable political parties and a drive toward a two-party format where strong (i.e., plurality) voting rules meet strong (i.e., highly structured) party systems. However, when strong voting rules are combined with feeble, unstructured party systems, the reductive effect is actually less developed or limited to local bipartism within isolated districts. Any combination of feeble voting rules with structured party systems still implies restrained political competition, but then, political competition is structured by political incentives that originate not from the institutional rules of the game but solely through party channelment. Eventually, feeble party systems might be combined with feeble, unstructured party system contexts, indicating a “no effect” situation.

Subsequent empirical analyses revealed that Sartori’s observance of contextual features, above all the party system context that fosters or prevents the effectiveness of voting rules, adds significant insight when the scope of an actual analysis is extended beyond the long-standing democracies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) world. Transition countries typically lack structured modes of party competition and thus regularly fail to meet the necessary conditions for the effectiveness of constraining effects that originate from strong electoral systems. Problems with “strong” rules in these contexts can be clearly illustrated by the recent electoral history of postcommunist polities.
Searching for a general expression that ties together Duverger’s law and hypothesis, Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart proposed an inductive inspection of actual electoral returns that replaces the analysis of qualitative voting rules by an exclusive focus on quantitative district magnitudes. They reason that their measure of electoral fragmentation—the Effective Number of Electoral Parties—is on average linked to district magnitude by a logarithmic association:

$$E[N|M] = 1.25 \log M + 2.5,$$

with \( N \) denoting the Effective Number of Electoral Parties and \( M \) denoting the district magnitude at the national level. The equation allows for the prediction of fragmentation levels that will, as the authors argue, usually fall within an interval of \( \pm 1 \) unit from this quantitative generalization of Duverger’s law.

At the national level, any link of the national number of parties and average features of the respective electoral system at the national level cannot be more than a rough, inductive generalization that lacks the necessary causal argument or mechanism. While the substantive quantity of interest, the number of electoral or parliamentary parties, is observed at the national level, the conversion of votes into seats and thus the causal mechanisms that lie at the bottom of the wasted vote argument and Duverger’s psychological effect all operate at the district level. From a conceptual point of view, there are additional problems with Duverger’s law and subsequent generalizations. A number of recent empirical studies sweep under the carpet an important distinction incorporated in the original law and hypothesis. Duverger linked plurality systems to bipartism, while both majority and proportional voting rules were supposed to allow for different degrees of multipartyism. As a consequence, any exclusive focus on the key variable district magnitude, therefore, no longer applies to the original argument, obviously disregards its core causal mechanisms, and potentially introduces an omitted variable bias to the empirical analysis.

Moreover, national-level analyses often follow Duverger’s flawed idea of a multiplying effect of proportional voting rules: The more permissive an electoral system (i.e., the higher the district magnitude), the more parties will be viable in the electorate. This notion is established as a quasi-deterministic argument that does not take into account intervening factors such as social heterogeneity or collective action problems partisans face when setting up their platforms. However, even the most effective PR system just reflects social heterogeneity and political polarization, which are the products of social structure and political cleavages; political institutions like voting rules do not artificially produce these phenomena. As a consequence, electoral systems need to be conceptualized as constituting an upper bound to the number of viable candidates and/or political parties and not as artificially producing an institutionally defined quantity of party system fragmentation or multiplying the number of viable competitors.

**Causal Mechanisms at the District Level**

In a series of contributions, Cox has explicitly focused on the district level of electoral systems, strengthened the causal stringency of Duverger’s original argument by an elaborate game-theoretical formulation, and attached conditions to its functionality. His argument concentrates on the role of expectations in electoral competition and subsequent strategic coordination attempts by voters and by party elites—that is, it concentrates on Duverger’s psychological effect. Building on both classic statements of formal theory and the inductive tradition of data analysis in comparative political science, he was able to strengthen the causal argument, to broaden its applicability, and attach conditions to its functionality. In essence, Cox’s contribution deals with problems of strategic cooperation in electoral politics. Formal modeling suggests, quite in accordance with the original propositions by Maurice Duverger, that in each single-member plurality district \( M = 1 \) there will be only two vote-getting candidates in a game-theoretical equilibrium. Next, Cox extends his arguments to multimember districts \( M > 1 \) with majoritarian SNTVs and, eventually, with proportional voting rules (d’Hondt). As a direct generalization of Duverger’s law, he suggests that there may be no more than \( M + 1 \) viable candidates in each district of the magnitude \( M \). This proposition, labeled the \( M + 1 \) rule, is the central building block of Cox’s contribution to the analysis of electoral systems: \( E[N|M] \leq M + 1 \), with \( N \) denoting the
raw number of electoral parties and $M$ denoting the magnitude of a local electoral district.

The formal argument spelled out in detail by Cox overcomes some of the central flaws of inductive macro–macro generalizations. In the first place, it explicitly focuses on the district level, the wasted vote argument, and the causal incentives that drive strategic voting and strategic entry. Second, Cox also develops an explicit generalization to double-ballot majority systems when he argues that the limit of $M + 1$ viable candidates does not actually relate to the actual district magnitude ($M = 1$) but to the number of first-round candidates that can qualify for the usually decisive second round (either $M = 2$ for the classical runoff system or even $M > 2$ for two-round majority plurality systems like the French one). Third, the $M + 1$ rule does not suggest a specific number of viable contenders that would be deterministically produced by the electoral structure, but in contrast, it conceptualizes institutional constraints as erecting an upper limit to or a carrying capacity for the number of viable candidates or lists in a game-theoretical equilibrium.

Next, Cox spells out a set of conditions that need to be fulfilled so as to induce a restriction to a maximum of $M + 1$ viable candidates or lists in a game-theoretical equilibrium. In particular, these contextual factors involve the presence of strictly hierarchically ordered, transitive voter preferences (as opposed to voters who do not distinguish between two or more electoral options); the absence of a Condorcet winner, short-term instrumentally rational calculations on the voters’ side; and full, common information about the state of the electoral contest with the clear identifiability of competitive and trailing candidates or lists.

However, causal stringency and clarity do not come without substantive costs. The argument provided by Cox is presented in two successive stages of strategic coordination: first within the electoral districts and second across these districts. Therefore, the $M + 1$ rule does not directly address the politically meaningful number of parties at the national level but the quite politically, somewhat inconsequential fragmentation of local electorates within the respective electoral districts. The subsequent step evolves into another, second-stage coordination game when the locally viable competitors decide to link up or to abstain from cross-district linkages, to coordinate (or not to coordinate) across the various districts of an electoral system so as to form a nationalized political party, or to remain a regionalized political force. Cox specifies national policy goals, the presidency, the premiership, and the existence of upper-tier seats in the electoral system as potential factors pressing toward cross-district linkages.

### Voting Rules, Formal and Substantive Representation

The theoretical visions of democracy in which alternative majoritarian and proportional voting rules are rooted also incorporate different standards for the assessment and evaluation of political representation. Supporters of consensus or consociational democracy emphasize the alleged legitimacy dimension and focus on the inclusiveness of electoral rules and descriptive representation. Their assessment of the formal quality of representation builds on the relation of vote shares and seat shares—that is, on disproportionality indicators that have been, for instance, suggested by John Loosemore, Victor J. Hanby, and Michael Gallagher. Theoretical models and empirical analyses have illustrated that proportional, “feeble” voting rules tend to foster descriptive representation, while majoritarian, “stronger” voting rules tend to trade descriptive representation for more effective party system concentration, probably easier government formation, and supposedly higher government stability.

Supporters of the majoritarian vision of democracy would generally not accept formal, descriptive representation as a conceptually adequate and substantively meaningful criterion for evaluating alternative voting rules but rather adopt a principal–agent perspective on political representation. Thus, representation means having one’s voice represented either in the decision-making process or in its outcome—actual enacted policies and their correspondence to the preferences of the electorate. In the classical spatial model of politics as devised by Harold Hotelling and Anthony Downs, two parties or candidates that compete under plurality rule and on a single policy dimension are expected to converge toward the median voter’s position so as to maximize their vote shares and their probabilities of victory (the famous “median voter theorem”). When more than one mandate is at stake and some proportional voting rule is...
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adopted—that is, when a majority of the votes is no longer necessary but some share of the vote suffices—these centripetal incentives cease to apply, and parties or candidates are expected to spread evenly along the policy space.

The theoretical argument spelled out by Cox and others posits that majoritarian voting rules have a higher potential to ensure the correspondence of public preferences and government policies. Strong centripetal incentives generated by “strong” voting rules foster enacted policy representation; the absence of these centripetal incentives under proportional voting rules in contrast potentially allows for the fabrication of (coalition) governments and enacted policies that are more distant from the median voter’s position. Vice versa, as its proponents are ready to concede, the political consequences of majoritarian voting rules depend on effective strategic coordination by voters and by party elites, and thus effective representation of the median voter position depends on a variety of contextual parameters. Subsequent empirical analyses by G. Bingham Powell and others have, however, cast serious doubt on the capability of “strong” voting rules to produce more adequate policy representation than weak ones.

Voting, Causal Complexity, and Intervening Factors

Ultimately, voting rules—as any social or political institutions—do not originate from nowhere and, quite contrary to the notion of a sociological law, institutional pressures and the virtues of “constititutional engineering” tend to be only one impact factor in the formulation of voting rules, alongside and in interaction with others.

Empirical findings that indicate an association of voting rules and electoral fragmentation, voting rules and inner-party democracy, or voting rules and the quality of political representation do not “prove” anything about causality and the direction of potential causal effects. While the institutional perspective suggests that voting rules profoundly affect these features of party systems and political representation, scholars such as Harry Eckstein or John G. Grumm have first concluded that voting rules are either inconsequential or themselves a product (rather than the reason) of political competition and party systems, but they are designed and negotiated by party politics to cater to partisan interest.

Theoretical and empirical insights reveal that voting rules have political consequences, for instance, on the number of viable political competitors or parties and on the quality of political representation. In turn, the very idea that voting rules might have (redistributive) effects implies that politicians will be interested in manipulating these effects in their favor. Politicians would thus not bother about electoral rules when these were of no or little significance for party competition and their respective interests.

Voting rules (or other institutional features) are only one factor among many others that affect party system fragmentation and the quality of political representation. Empirical analyses, for example, by Peter Ordeshook, Octavio Amorim Neto, and Gary W. Cox, have demonstrated additional institutional effects such as direct presidential elections and the electoral cycle. Moreover, political cleavage structures and the number of societal groups are consequential for party system fragmentation. In-depth analyses have shown that these macrosociological variables often do not directly affect the fragmentation and political representation but interact with electoral structure. Taking on the above notion of the carrying capacity of electoral systems, this means that electoral fragmentation does not originate when there are either many polarized sociological groups or a permissive electoral system (additive causation) but occur only when social and institutional factors operate conjointly (interactive effects).

These findings correspond exactly to the theoretical insights incorporated in the M + 1 rule: Voting rules do not artificially “produce” a specific number of viable candidates or political parties, but they only, in combination with additional features of the electoral system, establish and define the certain carrying capacity and thus an upper bound to the number of (locally) viable candidates or electoral lists. However, whether the empirical number of parties approaches these respective upper bounds is determined by sociological and organizational aspects.

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Voting Rules, Legislative

Legislative voting rules are the rules that govern the lawmaking process, as opposed to the voting rules that govern the election of representatives to lawmaking bodies. There are two kinds of rules that govern the lawmaking process. First, there are rules that define and regulate the lawmaking bodies and the relationships between them (“constitutional rules”). These rules determine the number of legislative chambers, their relative powers, and their relationship to the executive, among other things. Second, there are rules that govern the internal working of the legislative bodies (“parliamentary rules”). These rules cover matters such as control of the legislative agenda and the committee system and are usually made within the legislature. In this entry, we will discuss the theory of voting, constitutional rules and their effects, and finally parliamentary rules.

The study of the rules of lawmaking can be traced back at least as far as Aristotle. Although there are exceptions, traditional approaches to legislative rules have tended to be descriptive and formal, drawing heavily on constitutional law. As political science took a more behavioral turn from the 1950s, many scholars put less emphasis on formal rules, as these rules did not seem to have much effect on how political agents actually behaved. However, approaches based on social choice and rational choice theory (the “new institutionalism”) did give a central place to formal rules and provided a link between these rules and behavior. Social choice theorists characterized the mechanical properties of voting rules and found these often produced counterintuitive results. Rational choice theorists considered how maximizing agents would act within a framework of formal rules. The key insight was that small changes in seemingly unimportant rules could have very large effects on predicted behavior in equilibrium.

There has also been a growth in comparative empirical work on political institutions. Recent work has considered the effect of differences in constitutional rules (and to a lesser extent, parliamentary rules) on policy outcomes such as redistribution, state size, and growth. These various approaches to legislative voting rules are likely to be complementary. For example, rational choice approaches emphasize the importance of small, seemingly insignificant rules; identifying these rules in specific legislatures requires that someone do “thick” descriptive work.

The Theory of Voting

Before considering actual voting rules, we will briefly consider the theoretical analysis of voting rules. This gives a powerful illustration of the effect that voting rules can have. The voting rules in virtually every legislature in the world use some variant of a binary amendment procedure. Here, a proposal is made, and amendments to this proposal are considered one at a time. The final bill, with amendments, is then voted on. This procedure is binary because only two alternatives are voted on at any one time. The most common procedure
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for deciding between two alternatives is majority rule, although supermajority rules (a proposal fails unless it receives, say, 60% of the votes) are used in some instances. Majority rule has a special place in democratic theory in that it is the only binary rule that treats all voters and proposals equally. The pervasiveness of binary amendment procedures may be due to their simplicity; it may also be due to the fact that procedures that consider more than two alternatives at a time can be manipulated by adding extra (possibly irrelevant) proposals.

While binary amendment procedures eliminate one kind of manipulation, they are vulnerable to another. Simplifying greatly, Arrow’s theorem shows that majority rule or any other nondictatorial binary procedure is vulnerable to cycling (or, strictly speaking, intransitivity). That is, it is possible for the voters to choose A over B in a head-to-head contest, to choose B over C, and to choose C over A. Cycling creates opportunities for agenda manipulation. Suppose we first have a vote between A and B and then put the winner up against C. A beats B in the first round but is then beaten by C, so C is chosen. However, suppose we put B against C first, B beats C but loses to A in the final, so A is chosen. If we put A against C in the first round, B is the eventual choice. The outcome thus depends completely on the order in which we consider the alternatives. It should not surprise us that those who get to decide the order in which alternatives are considered, such as the Rules Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives, have considerable power.

How much influence the agenda has over outcomes will depend on how often voter preferences produce cycles. Later work in social choice suggested that if more than one issue is considered at a time, cycles are almost inevitable and an agenda can be found to produce absolutely any outcome. This led some to the conclusion that political institutions and elite agenda manipulation, not voter preferences, controlled outcomes. William Riker’s Liberalism Against Populism was perhaps the strongest statement of this position. More recent social choice results lead to more moderate conclusions. If legislators are just as smart as the agenda setter, they can resist agenda manipulation by voting strategically. Nicholas Miller showed that strategic voting with a fixed agenda, an open agenda, or a competitive agenda would produce outcomes in the “uncovered set,” which is typically a relatively small, centrally located set of alternatives. Thus, agenda setting would influence the outcome, but this would be quite tightly constrained by the preferences of the voters. Under this scenario, voting rules matter, but we are not driven to the extreme conclusion that they are the only things that matter.

Constitutional Rules

We have made a distinction between constitutional rules (which define the lawmaking bodies and their relations with each other) and parliamentary rules (which govern the internal workings of legislatures). Constitutional rules are often codified in a written constitution, which requires either the agreement of multiple institutions or a referendum to amend. Parliamentary rules can usually be changed by the legislature itself. There are some exceptions where this distinction is less clear-cut. For example, there are countries where the constitution can be changed by statute law (e.g., the United Kingdom, Israel).

One important constitutional feature that is not dealt with here is the choice of electoral system. Clearly, the effect of the legislative voting rules may vary depending on how the legislature is constituted. In particular, whether the electoral system produces a single-party government (as is often the case with plurality elections) or multiparty coalition governments (usually the case with proportional representation) is important. In some cases, electoral laws are defined or restricted by the constitution, but in others, they are simply defined by ordinary legislation. They may even be made (as in the United States) by subnational legislatures.

Constitutional rules differ over a variety of dimensions. However, they can be considered in terms of whether they concentrate legislative authority in one body or disperse it among several bodies. Rules that require the concurrence of several bodies to pass legislation have an effect similar to having a supermajoritarian rule in a single legislative body. Having more veto points means that more than a simple majority is required. For example, it is harder to pass legislation through two legislative chambers than through one, even if both chambers use simple majority rule voting. This is particularly the case when the two chambers are
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Constitutional features that may have an effect similar to a supermajoritarian voting rule include the following.

**Bicameralism.** Having two legislative chambers instead of one creates an extra hurdle for proposed legislation to clear. How significant this hurdle is will depend on whether the two chambers have equal powers or whether the second chamber has limited powers to amend/propose legislation or can be bypassed by the first chamber. It will also depend on whether the two chambers are elected the same way and, thus, have very similar policy preferences. The term *strong bicameralism* is sometimes applied to systems with equally powerful chambers that are elected in different ways, while *weak bicameralism* is applied to bicameral legislatures without these characteristics.

**Presidentialism.** If there is a presidential veto, then the president is essentially an extra chamber of the legislature. Thus, a system like that of the United States is essentially *tricameral,* although the presidential veto can be overridden by a supermajoritarian vote of the other chambers. Even without a legislative veto, presidents can effectively change or block legislation by the way they implement it, while in a parliamentary system, the executive is directly answerable to the legislature.

**Federalism.** Under a federal system, implementing a policy may require the cooperation of both central and subnational governments. Federal systems also often have strong bicameralism in the national legislature, with the second chamber representing subnational units.

**Judicial Review.** Constitutional courts may provide another veto point. The legislature may overcome this by changing the constitution, but this often requires a supermajoritarian procedure.

**Referenda.** These allow the entire population to be treated as a chamber of the legislature. Constitutions vary as to whether referenda can be demanded by the voters or whether they can only be called by the government; and they also vary as to whether they can propose new legislation or only invalidate legislation passed by the legislature. Referenda can be used to break a legislative gridlock, but they can also be used obstructively to dismantle a multi-issue legislative program one issue at a time.

The normative justification given for constitutional rules that disperse legislative power (and thus work in a supermajoritarian manner) is that this prevents the abuse of power by the government and protects minorities from majority tyranny. Critics of this position argue that by making government action difficult, such rules effectively entrench existing injustices and prevent the remedy of new ones, thereby harming vulnerable minorities. Regardless of one’s normative evaluation, we should expect constitutional rules that are effectively supermajoritarian to lead to slower change in government policy. Empirically, countries with such rules seem to have less redistributive government policy and have built welfare states more slowly. This should not be surprising, as the constitutional rules provide more opportunities for groups that lose from redistribution to block the process.

**Parliamentary Rules**

There are a variety of parliamentary rules (rules that regulate the internal workings of legislatures) that will significantly affect outcomes. As was argued in the first section, the theory of voting suggests that the order in which proposals are considered can change the eventual choice. The way proposals are bundled together can have a similar effect. Suppose, for example, that one proposal has the enthusiastic support of 40% of the legislature, while another proposal has the support of a different 40%. If the two proposals are bundled into a single bill, it may well pass with a majority, even though each proposal would have failed if considered separately. This process is known as logrolling. In some legislatures, it is carried out through decentralized deals between legislators, while in others, there is centralized negotiation between party leaders (the coalition agreements that follow elections in some European countries can be regarded as large, centrally negotiated logrolls). In either case, we would expect whoever has control over the order of business and what bills get to be proposed to have considerable influence. The following are among the institutional features that affect this:
Control Over Proposing Legislation. The legislative leadership (usually the government in parliamentary systems) will be in a more powerful position if it has a monopoly (or near monopoly) of the right to introduce new legislation. It is notable that some legislatures delegate the developing of some legislation to legislative committees or independent commissions (such as the Royal Commission in some Scandinavian countries) in which both government and nongovernment parties are represented.

Control Over Amendments. Once legislation is introduced, the legislative leadership may exercise different levels of control over how it may be amended. If there is a closed rule, the legislature is not allowed to amend the legislation and must either accept or reject what has been proposed. This increases the influence of whoever gets to propose legislation. However, under an open rule, where anyone can propose new amendments, the power of the agenda setter is far weaker. An intermediate position is a rule that allows only certain kinds of amendments. An important feature of some European legislatures is that the government has the right to propose the last amendment. This restores a considerable degree of agenda-setting power to the government because counteramendments to this last amendment are not possible.

Control Over Legislative Timetable. Control over what is debated, when, and for how long is also important. The legislative leadership obviously cannot get its program passed if it cannot get it debated. An extreme example of a lack of leadership control in some legislatures is the right to unlimited debate. This allows a minority to filibuster or essentially veto legislation by refusing to stop debating it (although there may be a procedure allowing a supermajority vote to end debate, as in the U.S. Senate).

Committee System. Detailed consideration of legislation is usually delegated to legislative committees before being presented to the full legislature. The legislators on these committees may develop policy expertise and be deferred to by other legislators. In some legislatures, committees may act as veto points in that all legislation on a particular topic has to pass through them. The number and importance of committees varies considerably between legislatures. In some legislatures, the governing party or coalition controls all committee chairmanships, while in others, they are shared between all parties.

Degree of Party Discipline. In some legislatures, representatives are more or less free agents, who may represent the interests of their constituents as much as their parties. In other legislatures, parties are tightly disciplined, and important decisions are made by negotiation among the party leaders. If party discipline is tight, parliamentary rules may serve to facilitate agreements between parties (in particular the coalition agreement) rather than agreements between legislators.

There are, however, two reasons to be cautious about trying to explain policy outcomes in terms of parliamentary rules. The first is the problem of heritability. Parliamentary rules are usually chosen by the legislature itself. Further, the legislative leadership that implements the rules is also chosen by the legislature. If the legislature does not like the outcomes the rules produce, they could presumably change either the legislative leadership or the rules themselves. If this is the case, rules do not so much produce outcomes but are rather the means by which the ruling coalition in the legislature gets what it wants. This would suggest that the effect of constitutional rules may be more profound than those of parliamentary rules.

The second problem is that of functional equivalence. It may be possible for the governing coalition to get its way by a variety of different means. For example, in some countries, the government keeps very tight control over the legislative agenda. In other countries, nongovernment parties have far more ability to amend legislation, but the government has the right of last amendment. However, in both sets of countries, the government seems to be able to get most of the legislation that was laid out in its coalition agreement passed. Similarly, in some countries, there are very detailed committee hearings on legislation, while in other countries, these appear to be little more than a formality. However, if the legislation in those countries was developed by a Royal Commission on which the legislative committee members served, this compliance is not surprising. This in no way diminishes the importance of parliamentary rules in understanding the
working of legislatures, but it does make it harder to find statistical relationships between parliamentary rules and outcomes.

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See also Agenda Setting; Constitutionalism; Electoral Systems; Parliaments; Social Choice Theory; Veto Player; Voting Rules, Electoral, Effects of

Further Readings


WAR AND PEACE

The 21st century has begun much as the 20th century ended: in war and armed conflict. Conflicts of many types, old and new, are under way in war zones such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Lebanon, Chechnya, and Sudan. The threat of war remains, but the nature of warfare is changing in tandem with often unforeseen geopolitical, technological, economic, and ethnic changes. According to the studies performed since 2005 by the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia, violence is in decline: In the past dozen years, there has been a significant decrease in violence as measured by the number of wars, genocides, and human rights violations.

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of armed conflicts has fallen by about 40% from about 50 in 1991 to about 30 in 2004. High-intensity conflicts (those that cause more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year) are down 80%, also down are civil wars (80%), genocides (80%), major and minor terrorist attacks (50%), the number of refugees (45%), coups and attempted coups (60%), and international crises (70%). More than 100 conflicts have ended, including 70% of secessionist conflicts, and the average number of battle deaths per armed conflict decreased by 98%, from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. (Iraq since 2003 is an exception to the trend.) There were 20,000 battle deaths in all wars combined in 2003, compared with 700,000 in 1950. In the 1990s, the ratio of battle deaths to population was a third of what it had been in the 1970s. However, these positive developments were mitigated by continued strife in some regions, particularly in Africa, where war is claiming more victims than on all other continents combined. But even in Africa, there are fewer armed conflicts today (about 10 compared with 15 per year 5 years ago). The number of African countries torn by armed conflict has therefore dropped by a third. During the same period, direct battle deaths have decreased in Africa by 24%.

At the dawn of the third millennium, inhabitants of the planet had an average risk of becoming a casualty of war of approximately 0.4%, compared with an average of about 1% between 1945 and 1990. People are much more likely to die of disease and pandemics (91%) or in car accidents (2%) than in a war. However, there is little cause for celebration, for armed conflicts that could, theoretically, have been prevented or controlled continue to claim hundreds of thousands of direct and indirect victims year after year. Of the 22 million people who have perished in armed conflicts since World War II, 5.5 million died between 1990 and 1995. The causes of conflict are far from being resolved, and the dangers attendant on conflict have by no means been eliminated, although they are perhaps being anticipated and managed more successfully. In short, it is too early to say that war is being eradicated or even curbed. Human insecurity remains a challenge and a serious danger. Many armed conflicts continue to rage with deadly consequences and wars that seemed to be coming
to an end have flared up again. In the wake of the genocides in Rwanda and Sudan, the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the new outbreaks of violence in Ivory Coast, Somalia, and Angola, there is no guarantee that we will not witness other unexpected and tragic events in Africa. Interstate conflict also remains a possibility: For example, hostilities could break out between North and South Korea should the North Korean regime decide, despite the armistice, to attack the South; between China and Taiwan over the latter’s desire to secede; between India and Pakistan over their long-standing dispute over Kashmir and recently because of terrorism; between Ethiopia and Eritrea over unresolved border disputes that caused 70,000 deaths between 1997 and 2000; in central and Western Africa, where internal chaos and quarrels between neighboring countries make for a dangerous mix; in the Persian Gulf, where the Kurdish question has yet to be settled in Iraq and between the countries in the region; and in Lebanon, as the Israeli intervention in the summer of 2006 demonstrated.

These disputes are only a few examples of the continuing impact of interstate rivalries and domestic insecurity. There can be no doubt that the end of the Cold War has led to greater peace between states than at any previous time in history (hence Francis Fukuyama’s well-known “end of history” thesis of 1992). However, the real challenge now is preventing or resolving intrastate wars. In other words, present-day conflicts are of a new type: In the past, states fought each other, but now clans, ethnic groups, and factions are challenging the state itself. Interstate warfare is therefore being replaced by ethnopolitical warfare. State actors are losing their monopoly on violence as infrastate players get in on the act. Supranational bodies are intervening in matters that were previously the exclusive preserve of states, in a bid to manage and control crises. It can be argued that the words war and conflict have taken on new meaning.

The Transformation of Armed Conflict
War between great powers in the industrialized world has lost its raison d’être in view of technological developments (nuclear weapons), demographic changes (low birth rate), economic factors (trade), and political factors (liberal democracy).

However, wars continue to ravage underdeveloped and developing regions of the world. The creation of a relatively unipolar system dominated by the United States has not prevented armed conflicts from breaking out. The world is no longer divided into strategic “protectorates” as it was during the Cold War, and the emerging multipolar system is aggravating geopolitical rivalries in some regions.

War is becoming “deinstitutionalized” and reverting to what it was before 1648—hence the suggestion that we are returning to “premodern” warfare. Classic warfare is disappearing as war becomes “privatized,” in the sense that it is being waged increasingly by private armies rather than conscripts or professional soldiers. Since the beginning of the decade, there have been growing numbers of nonstate armed conflicts—that is, fighting between different factions within a state as opposed to fighting between the state and one or more factions. For example, in 2003, there were 29 armed conflicts involving states and 30 nonstate conflicts. However, both types of conflicts are in decline.

Forty percent of the casualties of war are direct victims (killed in battle), and 60% are indirect victims (those who die as a result of the consequences of armed conflict—displacement, disease, pandemics, malnutrition, and famine). Civilians, who make up a large percentage of the casualties, are 10 times more likely to be indirect victims than direct victims. It is estimated that approximately one third of the civilians who die in armed conflicts are killed by government forces and two thirds by intrastate groups.

The indirect victims of armed conflict are largely women and children. Many are sexually assaulted. Of the male casualties, 90% are direct victims of combat, but there are also large numbers of men among the indirect victims. Men are more likely than women to perish in mass killings or to die of pandemics or malnutrition.

More wars are ending than there are new wars breaking out. For example, between 1991 and 2004, 28 armed struggles for secession began or resumed, while 43 were curbed or ended. In 2004, there were 25 such armed conflicts under way, the smallest number since 1976.

Every year, “ethnic wars” account for the majority of “major” armed conflicts (12 out of 19 in 2005). However, the number of such wars has plunged since the end of the 1990s, as has the
number of civil wars. Typically, ethnic conflicts are caused by the collapse of states, not the reverse. They grow out of severe crises of governance that cause states to disintegrate. (Half a dozen states have crumbled over the past 20 years, including Afghanistan, the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Somalia.)

Armed conflicts are also spurred by the profit motive; fierce competition for control of resources, particularly minerals, diamonds, oil, and water. Elites, guerrillas, mafia, and mercenaries engage in warfare to exact tribute or to lay their hands on a nation’s wealth. The geography of a conflict—its fault lines—is shaped more by the distribution of resources than by ideological or political differences (as is clearly seen in Central and Western Africa).

Democratization is a growing source of violence. Approximately one third of states are in transition. There are more democracies today than ever before in the history of the world, but the recent wave of democratization has left scars in its wake because of the failure of many transitional states to protect human rights or establish a state of law and because the democratization process has given rise to instability and bouts of political violence (examples include the former Yugoslavia, Colombia, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan, the Palestinian territories, and Iraq).

The Phenomenon of War

Interstate war is a recurring phenomenon that appears to be part and parcel of the Westphalian system; there were 278 such wars between 1648 and 1940, or one every 2 years. In 2003, J. David Singer calculated that there had been 412 interstate and intrastate wars between 1816 (when there were 23 states) and 1997 (when there were 181); 135 of these wars occurred after 1950. In all, there were 179 wars in the 19th century and 233 in the 20th century. Of the 2,340 weeks between 1945 and 1990, only 3 were entirely free of war. According to Singer, the record is not encouraging: The two decades with the largest number of wars since 1816 have been the 1970s (36 wars) and the 1990s (31 wars). In recent years, between 10% and 15% of states have been at war. The good news is that as a proportion of the number of states in the world and the world’s population (both of which are growing), the number of wars is decreasing. The ratio of wars to states has fallen steadily over the decades, from 0.74 in the 1890s (the highest in history) to 0.26 during the 1940s and 0.17 during the 1990s (one of the lowest in history). However, the number of battle deaths has been stable since 1950, at an average of approximately 2.6 million per decade, or one per 1,000, for a total of approximately 13 million dead. (These figures do not include indirect victims of war.) Wars caused an estimated 38 million battle deaths (including 11 million soldiers) between the years 1 CE and 1899 and more than 46 million deaths (including 22 million soldiers) between 1900 and 2000. From 1816 to 1939, interstate wars caused 28.4 million battle deaths and civil wars 6.8 million. Between 1940 and 2000, the proportions were reversed: 3.3 million battle deaths in interstate wars and 11.5 million in civil wars. World War I claimed a total of 20 million direct casualties, counting both soldiers and civilians, and World War II killed 40 million. Five wars accounted for more than half of all combat deaths during the 1946 to 2002 period: the civil war in China, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Iran–Iraq war, and the Afghan wars. These numbers do not include government-backed massacres of their own people (genocide, politicide, and femicide), which are estimated to have caused more than 175 million deaths between 1900 and 2000, of which approximately 125 million were caused by genocides and famines (70 million in China alone), 24 million by light arms, 17 million by artillery, and 2 million by aerial or naval bombardments.

Definition of War

We will return later to the statistics and trends, but first, we must attempt to define what war is. There is no consensus in the abundant literature. One of the classics, A Study of War, written by Quincy Wright (1942) of the University of Chicago, defines war as “violent contact of distinct but similar entities” (chap. 1). States may enter into violent contact, but so too may lions or tigers: This definition is inadequate since it ignores the importance of the political dimension of war. In Chapter I of his classic On War, the traditional strategist Carl von Clausewitz described war as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill
our will” and then famously commented, “War is a continuation of politics by other means.”

War may be considered, then, to be an armed confrontation between enemies with irreconcilable or incompatible political goals, which always has the potential to escalate into an unlimited engagement aimed at achieving total victory and the destruction of the opponent. It is the ultimate instrument of policy where political differences cannot be resolved except by the use of force. War is also an organized process, a dimension stressed by the expert on war, Gaston Bouthoul: “War is armed and bloody struggle between organized groups.”

From a realist point of view, therefore, war implies acts of violence conducted and organized by political and military actors with antagonistic motives, which may be governments or infranational or supranational entities. Similarly, in the negative, we can say, with the realists, that peace is the absence of organized violence between groups or states. We shall see that, in the case of intrastate and ethnopolitical wars, there is disagreement between those who believe that war is inherent in the security dilemma (realist theorists) and those who argue, on the contrary, that war is constructed through the manipulation of identity by political entrepreneurs and decision makers (critical theorists).

War can take different forms in different eras:

*International war* is war between states, such as the Gulf War of 1991, North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) war against Serbia in 1999, the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It may be a regional war, such as the wars in the Middle East or between Pakistan and India, or a world war if the conflict spreads, as in World Wars I and II.

*Intrastate war* has been the most common type of warfare since the end of the Cold War. The examples of the former USSR, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka illustrate the wide scope of violence between governments, factions, ethnic groups, and other groups trying to win or maintain control over territory and political power. Intrastate war may also be associated with civil strife or traditional ideological warfare (revolutionary wars, national liberation wars, guerrilla wars).

War may be conducted by *conventional means* (invasion, bombing, coercion) or *unconventional means* (terrorism, insurrection, using chemical, biological, or nuclear arms). The means used determine the nature of the war.

Wars may be *short, long, or indeterminate*. They range in duration from the Six-Day War in 1967 to decades-long conflicts, such as the Vietnam War, which continued from 1945 to 1975. Civil wars, such as the ones in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Kurdistan, which long appeared interminable (or still do), may come to seem like a permanent condition.

War may be *total or limited*. In the first case, it knows no bounds: The annihilation of the enemy, the extermination of its population, and the end of its regime are the objectives. In the second case, the war is conducted within a restricted framework and is aimed primarily at preventing an escalation to unbridled violence. The restrictions limit the geographic scope of the conflict, the number of opponents, the use of specific means or specific weapons, and the intensity of the fighting. Examples of “limited war” include the U.S. military engagement in Korea and Vietnam, and the Soviet engagement in Afghanistan.

*Unconventional wars* include psychological warfare, proxy or indirect wars, “nonwar operations,” and cold war (the potential for violence is ever present in all these types of warfare); *new wars* include information wars, “star wars,” the war against international terrorism, the war on drugs, and wars for control over resources (cases in which the potential for the use of force and armed conflict is high).

### Definition of Armed Conflict

Some research centers that compile statistics, such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), use the term *armed conflict* rather than war. An armed conflict may flare up sporadically, without necessarily constituting a war as defined above, but is more than a mere conflict in that it is not limited to a political dispute. There are generally some 20 “major armed conflicts” in any given year, as defined by SIPRI (“the use of armed force between the military
forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organized armed group, resulting in the battle-related deaths of at least 1,000 people in any single calendar year). The international environment is shaped to a large degree by these armed conflicts. Most are intrastate, and the majority occurs in Asia or Africa. A significant proportion, but less than half, began before 1989. Civilians make up the bulk of the victims. As a result, the number of refugees and displaced persons remains high. Recently, the Human Security Centre has begun compiling deaths resulting from armed violence between nonstate actors as well as from government-led violence against its own people.

More broadly, the term conflict can be used to refer to a situation of opposed interests that does not necessarily lead to armed confrontation (e.g., the 40-year East–West conflict). If it does develop into armed conflict, it can be the same thing as a war. Conflict generally implies a situation of strong opposition between a state, ethnic group, clan, or other group and another of these entities due to incompatible goals, which may be of a territorial, political, diplomatic, economic, military, ethnoreligious, internal, or external nature. The range of distinctions that can be applied to conflicts, armed or otherwise, indicates their diversity:

A conflict may be over control of the government and the state and therefore involve deep nationalist, ideological, or ethnic divisions (Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are good examples). Conflicts of this type can escalate into violent confrontation between groups or factions seeking at least partial control of the state (e.g., the rival guerrilla groups in Colombia).

Territory is a key issue in many conflicts. The motives may be ethnic (as in the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Nagorno-Karabach, Georgia), economic (Iraq and Kuwait, the Spratly Islands), or strategic (Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights, India and Pakistan in Kashmir, Morocco, Western Sahara).

Ideology can be an important factor when it is enmeshed in a long-festering dispute (as in the China–Taiwan and Israel–Palestine conflicts).

Many conflicts fall into more than one of these categories. In some, all the above factors come into play, intensifying the conflict. Collapsed states often present political, territorial, and ideological challenges that can be difficult to manage or contain. Numerous examples can be seen in Africa (Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia), the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan), and Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador). Some major conflicts are regularly in the news; other conflicts are minor in scope and limited in time (such as the fishing disputes between Canada and Spain or between Iceland and Great Britain). Finally, in a minority of cases, we see local or regional conflicts that are confined to one country or neighboring countries, but a growing proportion of these have consequences with international ramifications (e.g., refugees, fears of escalation, collapsed states, displaced persons, humanitarian crises).

Trends and Developments in Armed Conflict

Violence, a prominent characteristic of the international system, is changing with time. What then are the main features of such violence, and how have they changed? What are the major trends in war, conflict, and violence around the world?

First, “major” wars (between major powers) have declined substantially, from 27 in the 16th century to 17 in the 17th century, 10 in the 18th century, 5 in the 19th century, and 5 in the 20th century. There have been no wars between major powers since 1945. If the trend holds, there should be no—or at the most very few—major wars in the 21st century. On the other hand, the destruction wrought by major wars has increased exponentially due to more advanced weaponry and the defense dilemma. The European wars of the 16th century caused slightly more than a million casualties, while 60 million soldiers and civilians died in the two world wars of the 20th century, more than the casualties of all previous wars combined. Since 1945, wars have caused an additional 40 million civilian and military casualties. (Civil wars and wars of independence in the Third World account for a large proportion of these.)

Second, 95% of armed conflicts and wars are intrastate. One of the goals of warfare today is the creation of smaller states, not larger ones as was the case in the past. As Kalevi Holsti observes, the great majority of wars since 1945 have been waged within states: “Almost 77% of the 164 wars were
internal, where armed combat was not against another state but against the authorities within the state or between armed communities.” Notwithstanding the oft-heard thesis that this is a phenomenon of the post–Cold War period, it has in fact been a well-established trend for 50 years. In other words, states have been under threat of fragmentation for some time.

On the one hand, interstate wars are becoming less frequent; on the other, intrastate wars are becoming more so. While there were a dozen civil wars per decade in the first half of the 20th century, the average has increased to 20 in the last 50 years. During the 1990s, the majority of civil wars lasted more than 5 years, two fifths lasted more than 10 years, and a quarter more than 20 years. Between 1989 and 1996, more than one third of United Nations (UN) member states—countries with a combined total of 20 million soldiers and a civilian population of 3.3 billion—were torn by civil war. Civil wars in the Third World left some 40 million dead.

Third, territorial factors are becoming considerably less important as a cause of war. Between 1648 and 1945, about one half of wars were territorial in nature, compared with 30% since 1945. As noted above, between 1945 and 1989, close to 77% of wars were internal, of which half were ideological and the other half ethnic conflicts or wars of secession.

Whereas during the Cold War armed conflicts were fairly evenly divided between conflicts of a territorial, ideological, and ethnopolitical nature, since 1989, the greatest proportion of conflicts has fallen into the last category; most commonly, these have been ethnic and identity-based conflicts in states at risk of collapse. On the other hand, serious territorial conflicts have a greater chance of escalating into war than do other types of conflict. While there are fewer and fewer disputes between states over territorial sovereignty, 17% of the world’s 309 land borders are disputed, and 39 countries are still involved in jurisdictional disputes over archipelagos or islands. Some observers argue that territory remains an important issue, particularly in the age of globalization, as some states fight fiercely to maintain their integrity while they see their economic independence slipping away.

Fourth, the majority of wars and armed conflicts are being waged in the Global South, primarily in Africa and Asia but also in the Middle East and the Caucasus. In Latin America, the number of armed conflicts has declined considerably. Three regions have seen no interstate wars since 1945: North America, South America, and Western Europe (except for the intervention against Serbia in 1999).

Fifth, fewer soldiers and more civilians are involved in wars. Civilians have become the leading victims of armed conflict by far: In the 1990s, 90% of the victims of war were civilians, compared with 65% during World War II and 40% during World War I. There were nearly 5 million military and civilian battle deaths in intrastate wars (counting both colonial and civil wars) between 1900 and 1949, and more than 10 million between 1950 and 2000. Interstate wars claimed 27 million military and civilian battle lives during the 1900 to 1949 period and 3 million between 1950 and 2000. These figures do not include state genocide perpetrated against domestic populations in the former USSR, China, Cambodia, and elsewhere, which have claimed more than 100 million victims.

Civil strife has had devastating effects. For example, there have been close to 4 million battle deaths in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 1998. With 1,250 people dying daily, the war in the Congo has been the deadliest since World War II. The use of rape as a weapon of war and the spread of pandemics such as AIDS, which are rampant in many countries and in the armed forces in particular, should also be noted (60% of soldiers are infected with the human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] in Zambia, 55% in Zimbabwe, 40% in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and 10% to 30% in Tanzania, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria). A growing proportion of civilian victims are children, and the majority of armed conflicts involve child soldiers under the age of 15. In the Third World, industrialization and the expansion of the service economy are creating an influx of young people into the urban centers where more jobs are available. As a result, the population of the cities is swelling, leading to the “urbanization” of conflicts. Jean-Louis Dufour has predicted that cities will be the battlefields of the next century.

In light of this survey, there is reason for both optimism and pessimism about the prospects for violence in the future.
On the one hand, while there are many more states today than there were 200 years ago, there has been no increase in armed conflicts between states. In proportionate terms, there are fewer armed conflicts today than there were at the beginning of the 20th century. On the other hand, it is clear that the human tendency toward violence has not subsided; in fact, it has become more intense and less state driven.

The Future of Peace Missions

Since the early 1990s, the UN has played a central role in the implementation of conflict prevention and resolution strategies. As a rule, the UN is automatically involved in peace missions. The existence of an international organization that is able to deploy soldiers supplied by member countries in order to maintain or restore an often fragile peace is a new development of historic significance. Over the past 50 years, the UN has sent hundreds of thousands of Blue Helmets (i.e., peace forces) to carry out a variety of observations and to monitor missions designed to help prevent a resumption of hostilities. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has adopted two additional goals: (1) creating conditions for a lasting peace settlement and (2) supporting efforts toward reconciliation and reconstruction in societies that have experienced violent conflicts. This expanded agenda explains the significant increase in peacekeeping missions during the past decade.

Seventeen UN peace missions were launched in the 4 years following the end of the Cold War, from 1989 to 1993—as many as during the preceding four decades. There had been a total of 15 missions up to 1989, all but 5 in connection with interstate conflicts. Between 1989 and 2000, there were a total of 38 new missions, all but 5 for intrastate conflicts. In 1991, there were about 11,000 peacekeepers on the ground; 2 years later there were more than 78,000, an all-time high. In the late 1990s, a certain amount of fatigue, coupled with cost concerns, set in, and the number of Blue Helmets dropped to 30,000 in 1999; however, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, there were again almost 80,000 UN soldiers involved in more than 20 missions (approximately 100,000, if one includes military observers and civilian police). In addition, 65,000 NATO and European Union (EU) soldiers were on duty in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia as part of robust operations aimed at maintaining a fragile peace. The UN is therefore more active than ever. The number of peace missions has increased, even though the number of conflicts has decreased. Three quarters of the total number of peace missions in the history of the UN have been launched since the end of the Cold War at an annual cost of around $5 billion (equal to 1/100 of the U.S. security budget). According to Peter Wallensteen, the UN helped work out 25 of the 39 peace agreements that were signed between 1989 and 2000 for the purpose of ending armed conflicts. The UN is involved in peacemaking and peacebuilding in no less than half of the civil wars taking place today. Between 1990 and 2002, peacemaking initiatives increased fourfold; the imposition of sanctions, fivefold; preventive diplomacy missions, sixfold; and mediation mechanisms and truth and reconciliation commissions, sevenfold. The total number of peace operations more than tripled from 7 in 1988 to 23 in 2008 (see the reports from the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia and the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations from the Center on International Cooperation at New York University). Between 1948 and 2008, some 2,200 Blue Helmets were killed during peace missions; more than half of those have died since 1993. Since intrastate wars have largely replaced interstate wars, to which UN mechanisms appear better suited, peace missions have become more demanding and more dangerous. In the new international security environment, the UN has been redesigning the mandates and methods of peace operations launched to end civil wars and ethnic conflicts. The results, however, have been mixed. The UN’s own self-assessment reports on the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the massacre in the Bosnian village of Srebrenica in 1995 uncovered serious weaknesses in peacekeeping mechanisms and decision making. Since these events, there have been many analyses of the shortcomings of the UN’s peace operations and international security efforts. Those deficiencies have been made evident again by the UN’s inaction in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The impartial Blue Helmets, standing between the combatants with the consent of both parties, seem to be a thing of the past. In today’s peace missions, UN soldiers (and, ironically enough,
NATO soldiers) are called on to maintain and strengthen the standards that underpin peace. In a country that has become ungovernable, the mere presence of UN forces can be enough to provide a level of security, which will enable the country to get past the roots and the effects of war, at least for a time. In addition, there is hope that as they move toward a liberal conception of democratic standards and a market economy, these countries will recover the peace that they lost or never knew. Together with other actors, particularly humanitarian organizations and financial institutions, the Blue Helmets are taking initiatives and applying principles that go beyond the limited, traditional concept of peacekeeping. Their new role pursues the far more ambitious objectives of peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding. Realists consider this to be a praiseworthy but naive approach that is based on false hopes and doomed to failure. In their view, the UN cannot abandon the Westphalian conception of security on which it was founded in 1945. According to the realists, if the UN claims a right of interference, which entails an increased practical commitment to human security, it will flounder on the severe limitations and enormous obstacles faced by intrastate peace missions. For one thing, the possibility of artificially reshaping a society in the image of a Western democracy appears to the realists to be doubtful at best. A basic contradiction immediately presents itself: The UN and other organizations such as NATO are increasingly expressing a desire to keep the peace not only between states but also within states. Whereas during the Cold War, most states wanted the UN to be no more than an arbiter of interstate relations, and a weak one at that, some now expect the UN to rescue and, if necessary, revive collapsed states that are unable to govern themselves or maintain security. Can the UN fulfill this role? Are UN peace forces able to resolve intrastate conflicts? This question can be expected to arise with every new peace mission and to fuel bitter debate for years to come.

Definitions of Peace

In general, a peacekeeping mission refers to the deployment by the UN (or another intergovernmental organization [IGO]) of civilian personnel, police, and Blue Helmets for the purpose of conflict prevention, management, and resolution. The UN’s military operations include a full range of activities aimed at curbing and resolving conflicts, from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

Peace has often been defined as the absence of violence. In the post–Cold War period, this classic, primarily “negative,” definition has come to be seen as inadequate, and the international community is working toward a more progressive and “positive” definition of peace. The negative conception of peace implies that peace is only temporary. Peace exists when we succeed in preventing the outbreak of conflict. It is a fragile interval produced by the balance of forces. It may be based on the hegemony of one state, the balance between major powers in the international system (e.g., where several countries possess weapons of mass destruction), or the play of alliances. These are all shaky foundations for peace and, in the view of the realists, have not prevented the persistence and regular resurgence of war, the natural order of things, throughout history.

The positive conception of peace is based on the establishment of values, networks, and multilateral mechanisms that can ensure the long-term survival of a stable international system. The threat is no longer military in nature and cannot be addressed by states acting on their own. The principle “every man for himself” is replaced by “all for one” and the idea of power by the concept of sharing. Individual attitudes must change, the machinery of war must be abandoned, and peace and justice education must be promoted.

Approaches to Peace Missions

Approaches to peace and peace missions sometimes adopt a positive and sometimes a negative conception of peace.

During the Cold War, the (negative) concept of peacekeeping was the only one in common use. With the proliferation of peace missions and mandates since 1989, new (more positive) concepts have gained currency. Most notably, the Agenda for Peace proposed in 1992 by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and revised in 1995 set out principles and terms that gave new impetus to research efforts and introduced a more precise classification of peace missions. From the
voluminous literature on peace missions, we will discuss four terms that are now widely in use.

Peacekeeping means deploying UN personnel—primarily, military personnel—with the consent of the parties to the conflict to maintain a cease-fire and prevent a resumption of hostilities. By positioning multinational forces between the parties, the UN tries to preserve or increase the chances of peace. The forces are deployed only when a peace agreement has been reached and has taken hold. The forces remain impartial and neutral. They can fire only in self-defense. If hostilities break out again, they are immediately withdrawn. The UN Charter made no provision for such forces; they are often said to be mandated under a fictional Chapter VI and a half, halfway between the cooperative means of Chapter VI and the coercive means of Chapter VII.

Peacemaking includes all forms of mediation and negotiation intended to bring the parties closer together, essentially by peaceful means. The cooperative means referred to in Chapter VI of the UN Charter are used to help achieve a settlement of the conflict. Preventive diplomacy, particularly the preventive deployment of peacekeepers, can also be useful for containing the outbreak and escalation of violence between the parties. The deployment of forces with the consent of the parties can help establish a climate of trust and security conducive to the resumption of negotiations and mediation.

Peace enforcement refers to coercive action authorized by the UN Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter in response to “threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.” Multinational military forces under UN command must then enforce the agreements that they are supposed to guarantee and, if necessary, engage in armed action. Peace enforcement can also be undertaken by a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter and in accordance with rules stipulated by the Security Council.

Peacebuilding means a concerted effort by the UN and the international community as a whole to develop political, economic, and security infrastructures to achieve long-term suppression or resolution of a conflict. Peacebuilding attempts to lay the foundations for reconciliation and reconstruction. It seeks to avert any resumption of violence in a bid to redraw the settlement. While it is intended primarily for the postconflict phase, it can also be applied as a preventive measure before violence breaks out or even during the conflict to firm up an unstable or precarious peace. It is based on the economic and social measures described in Chapters IX and X of the Charter, among others.

These approaches are used in succession as part of an overall strategy for peace.

Development of Peace Missions

The development of peace missions can be thought of as spanning two periods: (1) the Cold War, from 1948 to 1988, during which traditional peacekeeping operations were conducted by the Blue Helmets, and then (2) the 1989 to 1993 period, during which the deployment of peacekeepers and their assignments expanded exponentially. A third emerging phase, the post-1994 period, is less distinct: It is a continuation of the preceding period with some accentuated features.

The first period opened with the UN Observer Missions monitoring in Palestine in 1948 and Kashmir in 1949 (the dates of the beginning of the operations). The goal of the “Blue Beret” missions was to monitor cease-fires and armistice agreements that had been agreed to by states. The deployment of the “Blue Helmets” (a Canadian invention) along the Suez Canal in 1956 was the beginning of a new, more engaged phase. Similar operations were subsequently carried out to enforce, as far as possible, other demarcation lines and cease-fires between opposed countries or communities, such as Cyprus in 1964, the Sinai in 1973, and the Golan Heights in 1974.

The Blue Helmets were positioned between the combatants to police a buffer zone and reduce the risk of a resumption of hostilities. The principle was clear, and the success criterion was the absence of war—that is, the realization of the negative conception of peace. Other missions were mandated to verify the suspension of hostilities between Iran and Iraq in 1988, to supervise the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan in 1988 and Angola in 1989, and in the first intra-state conflicts that the UN has dealt with, to
restore order in Congo in 1960 to 1964 and in southern Lebanon in 1978. This period also saw multilateral operations outside the UN framework, such as the one in Lebanon in 1982, in which several countries joined forces to deploy an implementation force.

During the second period, which extended from 1989 to 1993, 17 new missions were conducted. As the Agenda for Peace noted in 1992, the UN deployed tens of thousands of Blue Helmets to carry out expanded missions. They supervised elections (Namibia and Nicaragua in 1989), helped settle disputes (El Salvador in 1991, Cambodia and Mozambique in 1992), and served as a prevention force (on the Kuwaiti border in 1991 and Macedonia’s border in 1992). They also monitored disarmament (Iraq in 1991), ensured the security of humanitarian operations, protected refugees and displaced persons (in northern Iraq in 1991, in Somalia and Bosnia in 1992), and observed and monitored the (often futile) implementation of peace agreements (in Angola in 1991, in Rwanda in 1993).

These examples confirm three notable changes in Blue Helmet missions.

1. They affirm (reinforce) the new right of intervention to provide humanitarian assistance, proclaimed by the Security Council after the Gulf War in 1991.

2. Most of these Blue Helmet missions addressed intrastate conflicts, without necessarily obtaining prior consent from the government or the rival factions.

3. The missions were multidimensional; that is, they simultaneously comprised peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peace-building components.

Since 1994, a third generation of missions has emerged: The focus is on peace enforcement to stabilize collapsed states through reconstruction, democratization, and development. In these missions, peace enforcement and peacebuilding interpenetrate.

In one new feature, many of these missions were originally conducted by an actor other than the UN but with the UN’s approval. This occurred for the first time with the deployment of U.S. troops in Somalia in 1992, initially for strictly humanitarian reasons. The subsequent use of force by the United States in Haiti in 1994, by NATO in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999, by Nigeria and Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone in 1997, by Australia in East Timor in 1999, by Great Britain in Sierra Leone in 2000, by NATO again in Afghanistan in 2001, and by France in Ivory Coast in 2002 revealed the UN’s significant shortcomings when it came to deploying an armed force without the full consent of the host country’s political authorities. Over the past 6 years, UN peace forces, acting in some cases with the support of small contingents from the African Union (AU), Organization of American States (OAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or the EU, have taken over such missions in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, and East Timor but only once the situation was relatively stable. In Somalia, Haiti, and East Timor, the UN Blue Helmets took over the missions only once security had been reestablished. Elsewhere, the Blue Helmets continued to conduct traditional monitoring and peacekeeping operations lasting for years in Cyprus, the Middle East, Western Sahara, Kashmir, and the Ethiopia–Eritrea border. There has been lively discussion about the role of the peace forces and heated polemics about their operations against the background of UN reform and the redefinition of its mechanisms.

Clearly, there are huge obstacles to giving the UN real peace enforcement capabilities. These include the lack of a real military mechanism at the UN, archaic command structures and doctrines, lack of equipment and financial resources, poor coordination, overly decentralized training and supervision of peace forces, inability to react swiftly, and, most important, the UN’s dependence on the countries that supply the Blue Helmet troops.

Hence, it is not surprising to see devolution of military operations to defense organizations, including NATO, and to major powers, such as the United States, which have greater experience and more resources in this area. Another promising approach might be to “regionalize” peace enforcement and provide regional organizations such as the AU with the logistical means, funding,
and training in command and coordination that they need to conduct enforcement and combat missions more independently, although still under the aegis of the UN. Hybrid missions of this type would also better reflect the contribution of southern hemisphere countries to UN peace missions: Five nations—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Ghana—are now supplying three quarters of the Blue Helmet troops. At the end of the day, the UN serves the cause of peace more effectively in its role as impartial mediator than in a military capacity. However, it appears that armed force is needed to establish and shore up the peace. This is a battle that the founders of the UN clearly did not foresee and that the Blue Helmets are not equipped to wage.

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See also Arms Race; Cold War; Conflict Resolution; Democratic Peace; Disarmament; Intervention; Mediation in International Relations; Peace; Peacekeeping; Positive Peace; Security Cooperation; United Nations

Further Readings

The term warlord reemerged on the political scene due to a number of bloody intrastate conflicts since the beginning of the 1990s. In particular, the long-standing wars in West Africa, in Somalia, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in Afghanistan led to the frequent use of the term in politics, media, and academia to describe powerful men and their armed organizations, which profit economically from war and violence. Modern archetypes, such as Charles Taylor (Liberia), Johnny Paul Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mohammed Farah Aideed (Somalia), Jean-Pierre Bemba (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Mahmud Khudoberdyev (Tajikistan), and Gul Agha Shirzai, Ismail Khan, and Abdul Rashid Dostum (all Afghanistan) are regarded as both a result and a key characteristic of the so-called new wars. This entry analyzes the phenomenon, in general, and points to the main characteristics of organization, leadership, and other key aspects.

The Phenomenon of the Warlord

The warlord phenomenon is not a new challenge for governments and the international community. On the contrary, warlords have been constant companions of wars since the ancient times and the medieval period. In particular, the situation in Britain in the early Middle Ages with a number of rival armed local commanders, dukes, and lords is seen as a historical precedent. But also during the Thirty Years’ War of the 17th century, feudal warlords—Max Weber used the terms Kriegsfürst and Kriegsfürstentum—dominated European battlefields. They recruited and paid their own soldiers, and they were known for plundering the local population; perhaps the most prominent figures being Duke Albrecht von Wallenstein and Duke Mansfield. Another historical point of reference is the Chinese warlord era after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Due to the fragmentation of the Empire as well as the competition of local rulers and army commanders, about 1,300 warlords (in Chinese called junfa), subdivided in different cliques, were involved in more than 140 greater and smaller wars in the 1920s and 1930s. From a historical point of view, the figure of the warlord can thus be seen as the classical antagonist to the modern state’s monopoly on the use of force, which was successively established in Europe and later elsewhere against various forms of warlordism.

In general, warlords are portrayed as profit-driven, economically motivated actors who have an interest in ongoing conflicts and, therefore, undermine peace and stability. As Max Weber (1978) pointed out, “The warlord becomes a permanent figure when there is a chronic state of war” (p. 1142). Moreover, warlords may also be present in a fragile postconflict setting or in situations of state failure. Under such circumstances, as demonstrated, for example, in Afghanistan after 2001 or in Bosnia after 1995, warlords and their private militias aim at consolidating the territorial, financial, or economic gains that they have made during a violent conflict. In other words, warlords may also exist outside of war times and may influence postwar economies and politics, in particular, as long as state structures are weak or failing and the state’s monopoly of the use of force does not exist.

In press reports as well as in the academic literature, the label warlord has been used for very different persons and groups. In some cases, presidents, heads of government, leaders of political parties, or former army generals also have been described as warlords. But mostly the term refers to an armed nonstate actor who is able to control a particular territory and its inhabitants, during or after the end of a violent conflict. Or as James
Warlords (1966) put it, a warlord is a man who exercised effective governmental control over a fairly well-defined region by means of a military organization that obeyed no higher authority than himself. The regions or territories dominated by warlords are often remote, far away from the capital, and beyond effective control of the national government. In some cases, territorial control exceeds even international borders. For example, in 1992–1993, Charles Taylor controlled not only most of Liberia but also parts of Sierra Leone and the border region with Ivory Coast (known as “Taylorland”).

Generally, warlords aim at controlling areas rich in resources such as timber, oil, minerals, diamonds, gold, or other precious metals, which are easy extractable. These resources are exploited directly or indirectly, such as by selling concessions to national or international companies. The population under the control of a warlord organization also serves as an important resource. Warlords and their fighters may regularly plunder and loot villages and farms, they may raise special “taxes” for granting physical security, and they may also benefit from local businesses and trade relationships as well as from criminal activities (e.g., drug cultivation and trade, human trafficking, smuggling of goods), which they either control or at least allow as long as they can enjoy their share of the profits. In addition, warlords—like other armed groups—may use humanitarian or developmental aid, provided by international donors, for their own purposes. Or, alternatively, they demand money or goods for allowing nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or aid agencies to supply the local population with basic services or to start infrastructure projects. As emphasized by Mark Duffield (1998) and William Reno (1998), warlord organizations need to operate across borders and try to get access to regional and global networks as well as to gray and illicit markets in order to persist. Therefore, successful warlords establish transnational links with businessmen, companies, governments, or organized crime.

The Organization and Other Key Aspects
These economic activities, however, are not only driven by selfish profit interests, but they are a necessary requirement to finance a warlord’s activities, including acquiring weapons and paying their fighters and supporters. Warlords have to be able to recruit, maintain, train, and equip their own private paramilitary forces. Sometimes they also use child soldiers, but mostly they will rely on experienced comrades and fighters. The relationship between them and the warlord is often based on personal loyalty and to a lesser extent on ethnic ties or political ideology. Therefore, a warlord should be distinguished from a clan chief or a rebel leader. It may, however, be the case that key members of a warlord organization come from the same ethnic group, tribe, clan, or family to enhance the coherence of the group and to ensure trust among its leadership. This pattern can be found in particular in Somalia and Afghanistan where clan and tribe organizations are still very strong. In some instances, the charisma of the warlord and the myths about his (“glorious”) life play an important role in attracting supporters, in particular young men. The kind of organization differs from case to case and ranges from rather hierarchical structures to a loose band of commanders and subcommanders who pursue their own interests and have a certain degree of autonomy.

Nevertheless, to stay in power, warlords have to rely on their leadership and organizational skills as well as on their ability to sustain coalitions and networks. In this respect, many warlords can make good use of their capabilities and contacts they have made in their former lives. As several biographies show, they have often been part of the political or military establishment of a country; sometimes they come from wealthy, influential families (e.g., Bemba), a number of them have made a professional career in the army or the security sector (e.g., Khan, Dostum, Koroma, Aideed, and Khudoberdyev). Others had experience as businessmen and a few even studied abroad such as Taylor in the United States or Bemba in Belgium (both earned degrees in economics). Most of them first supported the existing regime but later joined the opposition and set up armed groups (e.g., Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia [NPFL]) or used the opportunities offered by state failure and civil wars. For example, during the 1980s and 1990s, the Afghan warlords managed to establish themselves as key field commanders and build territorial strongholds. Warlords, however, cannot always be
seen as antagonistic to state actors. Sometimes, they collaborate with the government and may even join forces with the state’s military if this fits their interests and as long as the government does not challenge the warlord’s autonomy.

To sustain their rule, warlords cannot only rely on the (potential) use of violence to deter enemies or intimidate the population; they often perform a political role and try to achieve some form of governance. As Paul Jackson (2003) pointed out, established warlord organizations can be understood as “quasi governance” or “embryonic states” that aim at enhancing support and legitimacy of the population by providing basic services and maintaining infrastructure. “Taylorland” serves again as an illustration since it had its own currency and banks, media, transport, and communication infrastructure as well as “external” trade relationships. Many warlords, therefore, made attempts to act as “politicians” in order to secure their power base as well as their resources and profits. They establish political movements and take part in elections; others become incorporated in official state structures. In Afghanistan, for example, a number of warlords became—at least for a certain period of time—provincial governors, ministers in the central government, or members of parliament. Similar careers can be studied in Tajikistan, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Somalia, or in West Africa. The most prominent figure has certainly been Charles Taylor who was elected president of Liberia (1997–2003). However, it can be stated that warlordism is not a long-term phenomenon. Only in very few cases were these figures able to keep their position for more than 10 years; more often they vanished from the scene, they became ordinary criminals, or they were defeated or killed by their enemies or by internal rivals. Even in the case of Charles Taylor, the story did not end gloriously; first he had to live in exile in Nigeria before he was arrested and transferred to Sierra Leone in 2006, where he faces the Special Court on war crimes.

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Further Readings


WEBER, MAX (1864–1920)

At the beginning of the 21st century, the International Sociological Association asked its members to list five books published in the 20th century that were most influential in their work as sociologists. The book that was listed most often overall was Max Weber’s Economy and Society, and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism ranked fourth. The latter was also listed among the New York Public Library’s Books of the Century (1895–1995). The regard for Weber’s thought thus extends beyond sociology, and it continues to inform a variety of disciplines, including political science, today.

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is arguably Weber’s best known study, but its purpose and main results have often been misrepresented or misunderstood. Both terms in the title represent what Weber called “ideal types,” that is, they are not directly observable entities but rather constitute one-sided conceptual abstractions that provide the social scientist with a tool to better understand and interpret aspects of reality. In this

See also Militias; Terrorism, International; Terrorist Groups; Violence
work, the particular aspect of reality that Weber was most interested in was a core constitutive element of the specifically modern type of capitalism: its underlying motivation or “spirit.” For Weber, modern capitalism’s constitutive features were not only the systematic pursuit of profit and a rational organization of the production factors of labor and capital in the economy but also a distinctive modern ethos that guided work and acquisition.

Weber illustrated this ethos by using Benjamin Franklin’s admonitions of how to act in order to succeed in business. Franklin stressed methodical, industrious, and frugal conduct, viewing it as an ethical responsibility to increase one’s material well-being through honest hard labor and focusing thereby on long-term results. Such ethical responsibility, or duty, to pursue one’s vocation or (secular) “calling” in a diligent and competent—thus, in the modern sense, professional—manner sets the “spirit” of modern capitalism and also sets apart modern capitalism itself from other economic motivations and forms of the economy. At the most general level, Weber distinguishes capitalism and its profit motive from (a) socialism/communism, which does not aim for profit making but for the satisfaction of the needs of a collective; (b) the “hand-to-mouth” existence in a subsistence economy, with no surplus to trade on markets; and (c) traditionalism, an economic motive according to which a person works only as much as is necessary to achieve or sustain a certain standard of living—an economic motive antithetical to dynamic and expanding markets. Capitalism itself can be differentiated into market capitalism and what Weber termed political capitalism. In political capitalism, a state uses its political power and resources to extract a surplus from its own citizens or even from other countries. This use of force contradicts the formally peaceful means employed in modern capitalism. The “spirit” of modern capitalism à la Franklin undergirds modern rational capitalism and sets it apart from robber and booty capitalism, by which a corporation or an individual employs force and illegal activities to gain an economic advantage, and from adventure capitalism, which, though not necessarily illegal, involves irrational speculation and a daredevil attitude. The motives of adventure and robber capitalists are incompatible with the spirit of capitalism and its emphasis on the engagement in a vocational calling with the aim to make renewed, long-term profit.

Weber considered the “spirit” of modern capitalism the heir of the “Protestant ethic.” The “Protestant ethic,” according to Weber, was a form of inner-worldly asceticism practiced among ascetic Protestant groups that ultimately derived from Calvinist theology and its concept of a “calling.” These groups shared the view that individuals had to prove themselves in their entire life conduct, for it was through ascetic conduct, particularly in one’s profession and vocation, that members could gain assurance of their salvation status. Such ascetic moral conduct, Weber wrote in a companion essay, “The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism,” also allowed ascetic Protestants to gain and retain membership in groups that provided certification of moral qualification and thus business and social creditworthiness. In this context, Weber acknowledged not only the sectarian discipline in these groups but also their flat hierarchies and self-governance, which contributed to the emergence of public citizenship in civil society, dynamism in governance, and the social responsibilities of the rights-bearing individual. Ultimately, however, while Calvinist doctrine had led to the disenchantment of the world, as the use of magical means was no longer considered legitimate, paradoxically, it also laid the foundation for secularization (the decline of religion’s influence on other social spheres) and the embrace of materialism (the pursuit of material gain instead of religious goals), which led Weber to his oft-quoted characterization of the modern world as an “iron cage” devoid of meaning.

In spite of Weber’s claim that his study was merely an illumination of how ideas can become effective in history and focused on the emergence of the modern professional (Berufsmenschentum) in its significance as a component of the capitalist spirit, The Protestant Ethic has sometimes been seen as an anti-Marxist idealist construction of history, and many historians have raised doubts about the imputed influence of religious notions on economic activities in the early modern age. Weber himself sought to broaden the scope of his inquiry by addressing the mutual influence of religious and economic factors in his writings on the “Economic Ethics of the World Religions,” in which he also widened his thematic focus beyond
religion and the economy to religion and the rationalization of all spheres of life.

**Economy and Society**

Many social scientists consider *Economy and Society* as Weber’s major work and one of the most important contributions to the discipline. Due to the fragmented nature of the compilation, it is often used as a compendium from which scholars draw selectively on Weber’s ideas, frequently from the first four chapters, which contain Weber’s “Conceptual Composition” and are the only parts that Weber actually had sent off to the printer before his death. In contrast to this newer part, the older parts of the compilation include Weber’s writings on communities, in general; religious communities; law; domination; and the city.

Among the most influential perspectives is Weber’s sociology of domination. Weber distinguished between power and authority. Power is the chance to realize intentions even against the resistance of others, whereas authority is the probability that specific commands are obeyed by a group of people. Weber believed that people typically obeyed commands so long as they considered them legitimate. He further specified three different claims to such legitimacy. **Traditional legitimacy** is based on the belief in the validity of long-standing traditions and customs. The ruled owe a personal loyalty to the ruler, who may rule over a household as a patriarch or use staff or other administrative apparatus, as in the case of patrimonialism. The social and political order under traditional rule is static. **Charismatic authority** is based on the extraordinary and exceptional qualities, or charisma (literally, a “gift of grace”), of a person, who in declaiming a “mission” motivates others to become followers and even disciples. Charismatic authority is apt to break through the static order of traditional rule. It tends to be unstable, however, as it is tied to a person; thus, Weber addressed the ways by which the inherently unstable nature of charismatic authority is depersonalized and transformed into a more stable system of authority, a process he called the routinization of charisma. One outcome of the routinization of charisma is “office charisma,” in which an office is vested with authority from customs (traditional authority) or legal-rational rules (bureaucracy). Finally, **rational-legal authority** rests on the formal legality of enacted rules and the right of those in authority to enforce rules. The purest manifestation of such authority was modern bureaucracy, which in Weber’s view was the most formally efficient and rational way to administer complex modern societies. A bureaucracy relies on the knowledge of trained professional officials, whose duties and obligations are expressly defined in written regulations and whose employment and promotion are based on administrative training and experience.

Weber’s views on domination had implications for his views on politics. In modern society, the bureaucratization of society could lead to its ossification into an “iron cage,” governed by bureaucrats, who, unlike politicians, were typically not elected nor subject to direct public oversight. He foresaw the bureaucratization of modern capitalism through the proliferation of bureaucratically run corporations and the bureaucratization of politics through the emergence of party machines run by political functionaries. He believed that what he called a plebiscitary leader democracy, in which a charismatic leader injects politics with dynamism yet remains tied to approbation by the ruled masses, could be a solution to this problem of the bureaucratization of politics. In one of his most famous lectures, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” he elaborated on this thought.

**“The Profession and Vocation of Politics”**

Weber noted that the modern state is characterized as a community that successfully claims a monopoly on legitimate physical force on a certain territory, using a bureaucratic apparatus and holding ownership over administrative means (including those that involve force). Weber not only related his notions about the state to his views on authority and power but also more precisely outlined the characteristics of a modern politician, whom he viewed as the product of larger societal trends of democratization, bureaucratization, and professionalization. The modern politician was a full-time professional who lived both for and off politics. The action of politicians, in contrast to that of bureaucrats, is not about administering rules and regulations impartially.
but governed by the principle of taking responsibility in leadership. In doing so, the politician can adopt either an “ethic of conviction,” which is motivated by good intentions but does not take into account the outcomes of action, or an “ethic of responsibility,” which takes them into account and which Weber personally preferred over the former and considered more appropriate for modern politics. Leadership by professional politicians is part of the struggle among parties, which Weber saw headed toward governance by an impersonal apparatus, unless a politician who saw politics as both profession and vocation established a plebiscitary form of leadership democracy. This notion has proved controversial, for some scholars have viewed Weber’s concept as an endorsement of nationalist power politics that paved the way to fascist rule in Europe after Weber’s death, while others have pointed to Weber’s cosmopolitan, Anglophile political liberalism to reject this view.

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See also Bureaucracy; Capitalism; Charisma; Historical Sociology; Legitimacy

Further Readings

**Weighted Least Squares**

Weighted least squares (WLS) is a standard compensation technique for nonconstant error variance (heteroscedasticity), which is common in political science data. By assigning individual weights to the observations the heteroscedasticity can be removed by design. The square root of the inverse of the error variance of the observation is typically used as a weight. The key idea is that less weight is given to those observations with a large error variance. This forces the variance of the residuals to be constant. WLS is an example of the broader class of generalized least squares estimators. The idea was first presented by Alexander Aitken (1935). The foundations of this procedure and a concrete example are presented below.

**Motivation**

Standard regression modeling assumes that the variance of the residuals is constant across the levels of the explanatory variables. Often in political science this is violated, causing potential problems of fit and interpretation. George Downs and David Rocke (1979) give the well-known examples of increasing spread around consumption as income increases, increasing spread in the proportion of felons incarcerated in states as legislative interest increases, and decreasing spread in that proportion as the average education level in the state decreases. All of these are examples where one aspect of the relationship between the explanatory variable and the outcome variable, outcome uncertainty, changes as the levels of the right-hand side are altered. WLS addresses this problem by modeling this heteroscedasticity rather than ignoring it. Thus, there is a trade-off between increased model complexity and increased interpretational complexity.

**Theory**

The ordinary linear model has the form \( y = X\beta + \varepsilon \), where \( y \) is an \( n \times 1 \) outcome vector with continuous measure, \( X \) is an \( n \times k \) nonsingular matrix with explanatory variables down the columns and a leading column of ones, \( \beta \) is a \( k \times 1 \) parameter vector to be estimated, and \( \varepsilon \) is an \( n \times 1 \) error vector with assumed mean zero. The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator of \( \beta \) is arrived at by minimizing the squared error terms and is formed by (\( X'X \))\(^{-1}\)X'y. In the presence of heteroscedasticity, the OLS estimator of \( \beta \) is not the best linear
unbiased estimator (BLUE). The term best here means that the estimator achieves the minimum possible variance.

WLS allows one to reformulate the model and generate estimates that are in principle the BLUE. The introduction of a weight matrix $\Omega$ into the calculation of $\hat{\beta}$ removes the heteroscedasticity from the model. The $\Omega$ matrix is created by taking the error variance of the $i$th case (estimated or known), $\nu_i$, and assigning it to the $i$th diagonal, $\Omega_{ii} = 1/\nu_i = \omega_i$, leaving the off-the-diagonal elements as zero. In this way, large error variances are reduced by premultiplying the model terms by this reciprocal. We can premultiply each term in the standard linear model setup by the square root of the $\Omega$ matrix (i.e., by the standard deviation). This “square root” is actually produced from a Cholesky factorization: If $A$ is a positive definite symmetric ($A' = A$) matrix, then there must exist a matrix $G$ such that $A = GG'$. A matrix $A$ is positive definite if for any nonzero $p \times 1$ vector $x$, $x'Ax > 0$. In our case, this decomposition is greatly simplified because the $\Omega$ matrix has only diagonal values (all off-the-diagonal values equal zero). Therefore, the Cholesky factorization is produced simply from the square root of these diagonal values. Premultiplying gives

$$\Omega^{1/2}y = \Omega^{1/2}X\beta + \Omega^{1/2}e.$$  

Instead of minimizing the squared errors in the usual manner, we now minimize $(y - X\beta)'\Omega(y - X\beta)$, and the subsequent WLS estimator is calculated as $\hat{\beta} = (X'\Omega X)^{-1}X'\Omega y$. The WLS estimator gives theoretically the BLUE of the coefficient estimator in the presence of heteroscedasticity.

Weighted Least Squares and Feasible Weighted Least Squares

In this setup, it is required that the variance of the error, $\nu_i$, be known. In principle, there are two possibilities: (1) $\nu_i$ is derived from the underlying data-generating process or (2) $\nu_i$ is estimated. An example of the first is the linear probability model in which the structure of heteroscedasticity is known. In a binary model, the variance is $\text{Var}(\epsilon_i) = X\beta(1 - X\beta)$. This gives an expression of the form of heteroscedasticity and allows the analyst to estimate a linear model with WLS. The weights are directly computed by using the OLS estimates of $\beta$ to compute $\text{Var}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$. Because $\beta_{\text{OLS}}$ is an unbiased estimator, $\text{Var}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ is also unbiased. A possible obstacle here is that the linear probability model may produce a $\hat{y}_i$ that lies outside the $[0, 1]$ interval and therefore produces negative weights.

Often the form of heteroscedasticity is not known, and $\hat{\nu}_i$ rather than $\nu_i$ is used. By relying on an estimate of $\nu_i$, the WLS estimator is no longer unbiased. But it is still a consistent estimate and asymptotically more efficient than the OLS estimator. This is often referred to as feasible weighted least squares (FWLS). This implies a two-step procedure. In the first step, a linear model is estimated using OLS, and based on $\hat{\epsilon}_{\text{OLS}}$, one can derive $\hat{\nu}$ and therefore $\hat{\Omega}$. The FWLS estimate is obtained by minimizing $(y - X\beta)'\hat{\Omega}(y - X\beta)$. The next section illustrates an FWLS estimation.

Example

This illustration is based on political data from Swiss cantons in 1990 (Adrian Vatter, Markus Freitag, Christoph Müller, & Marc Bühlmann, 2004). The outcome variable is the number of cantonal employees per 1,000 inhabitants. The two predictor variables are the degree of proportionality (PR) in the electoral system and cantonal gross domestic product (GDP, in 1,000s). The results from a standard OLS estimation of the linear model do not allow rejection of the null hypothesis for either of the explanatory variables at standard thresholds.

Based on the results presented in Table 1, the conclusion is that the degree of PR has no effect on the number of public employees. It is possible to test for heteroscedasticity by using, for example, the Breusch-Pagan test (Trevor Breusch & Adrian Pagan, 1979; Dennis Cook & Sanford Weisberg, 1983). In this example, the squared residuals ($\hat{\epsilon}_i^2$) are regressed on the predicted values of the outcome ($\hat{y}_i$). If the residuals have a common variance, the explanatory power of the regression is low. The null hypothesis of the test states a constant error variance. In the example here, the test value is 5.68 ($X^2$ with 1 degree of freedom), which corresponds to a $p$ value of .017. Based on this, the null hypothesis can be rejected.

In Figure 1, the residuals from the OLS estimation are plotted against the outcome variable.
There is a strong positive trend, which visually confirms the Breusch-Pagan test result. The WLS approach is an effective way to address the heteroscedasticity in such cases. Based on the estimation results of the OLS procedure, it is possible to derive $\hat{\Omega}$, where $\hat{\Omega}_{ii} = 1/\hat{\varepsilon}_i^2$ and $\hat{\varepsilon}$ is the estimated error of the OLS procedure. The second column in Table 1 reports the results from the WLS procedure, $\hat{\Omega}^{1/2} y = \hat{\Omega}^{1/2} X\hat{\beta} + \hat{\Omega}^{1/2} \hat{\varepsilon}$. The GDP of a canton still does not have a reliable effect on the outcome variable. But in the WLS procedure, the effect of the degree of PR on the number of cantonal employees is negative and significant at conventional levels.

**Conclusion**

WLS allows analysts to estimate linear models in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Premultiplying the observations by a weight matrix, $\Omega$, makes the error variance constant. There are also other possible remedies for heteroscedasticity. First, heteroscedasticity may be the result of a misspecified model and may require the researcher to change the model. Second, the OLS estimates may still be unbiased, and robust standard errors such as the Huber-White sandwich estimator can be used to correct for heteroscedasticity. WLS estimation is a standard regression tool for social scientists and others, and is used in iteratively WLS to estimate generalized linear models (Jeff Gill, 2007).

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See also Regression; Robust Statistics; Structural Equation Modeling

**Further Readings**


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**Table 1** Comparison of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Weighted Least Squares (WLS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>WLS</th>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>-1.95</td>
<td>-1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(2.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>26.14</td>
<td>24.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.40)</td>
<td>(12.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breusch-Pagan</td>
<td>5.68</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Notes*: The outcome variable is the number of public employees per 1,000 habitants. Absolute $t$ values are in parentheses. GDP = gross domestic product, in 1,000s; PR = proportionality.

**Welfare Policies**

This entry examines the role of the state and the political dimension surrounding the recognition of social needs to improve the well-being of citizens. It then discusses the multiple meanings of the term *welfare policies* across jurisdictions and analyzes welfare policies defined as actions to provide a basic level of subsistence for individuals. The type of policy instruments used to address basic needs has also generated a rich literature on the causes of poverty and on the consequences of welfare policies, which is summarized in the third section. The conclusion of the entry presents two new recognized needs: (1) low wages obtained by the working poor and (2) social exclusion.

Generally, welfare policies represent various programs, transfers, and assistance provided by the state or other organizations aimed at improving the well-being of individuals. It is impossible to develop policies to fulfill every citizen’s well-being, as there are unlimited wants but limited resources. As a result, governmental authorities must decide on welfare priorities, which generate political debates usually involving a discussion of social needs and risk. First, most welfare policies seek to address recognized social needs. As stressed by the sociologist Richard Titmuss, defining what constitutes a need is very trivial and it is constantly changing. For example, Titmuss mentioned that Britain’s needs in 1900 were very different from those in the 1950s. The process of need recognition and, subsequently, the development of a policy to address a need can be long and arduous. Providing income relief to the elderly and facilitating alternatives to the poorhouse took decades, and it took nearly a century to raise substantially the living standards of retirees. Major events, such as wars, can accelerate both the identification of needs and the implementation of solutions to address them. For example, a major extension of welfare policy in Japan is attributed to World War II with one key issue being the ill health of its citizens, resulting in high rates of failed physicals to join the army.

There are other elements that affect the recognition of needs. For example, citizens tend to consider the needs of seniors more favorably than the needs of young adults because the former are considered to be more worthy and vulnerable. Thus, there will be stronger support to provide social assistance for an elderly citizen who failed to re-integrate the labor market near retirement age than a young citizen who cannot find employment on graduation even though both conditions can be caused by a weak labor market. The recognition of need can also be based on other factors such as the meaning of citizenship. Historically, in the United States, access to welfare policies often excluded African Americans, and race continues to permeate discussions surrounding welfare policies. In a similar optic, the gender critique stresses that recognized needs often fail to consider women. Also, immigrants often face multiple obstacles to obtaining the same treatment as citizens who were born in the country of residence. In Canada, for example, immigrant retirees must have resided in the country for at least 10 years prior to receiving the Guaranteed Income Supplement, which is given to low-income retirees.

The role of the state with regard to social needs is also politically salient. In multiple jurisdictions, social assistance is still not fully endorsed by all elected officials as a need that must be covered by governmental authorities. Worse, a need can be recognized and the state can opt to address it, but policies may still fail to resolve it. The lack of universal coverage granted by the American health system has been acknowledged, but reform efforts have failed to resolve this issue. Some needs also consist of policy problems that cannot be fully resolved. It can be possible to reduce poverty, but eradicating poverty may be impossible.

An alternative way to conceive welfare policies is by considering the ways in which they protect individuals against social risk. This form of welfare
policies is often termed social insurance because the policies fulfill primarily insurance functions. This includes, for example, sickness, unemployment, disability, and retirement insurance. Other programs such as active labor market policies also fall into this category since they seek to alleviate the risk of an individual to leave the labor market and fall into poverty.

Within this perspective, an interesting debate spearheaded by the Danish sociologist Gösta Esping-Andersen has sought to classify industrialized nations within welfare regimes. In a liberal regime, exemplified by the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States, the private sector plays a dominant role in providing social insurance and the state is involved primarily as a last resort. In a corporatist regime, the state has sought to preserve status along occupational lines, which explains the complexity and multiplicity of social insurance schemes in countries such as France and Germany. The state plays an integral role in providing generous universal coverage in Scandinavian countries, which typifies the Social Democrat regime. While Esping-Andersen argues that there are three welfare regimes, critics have pointed out that Australasia and Southern Europe are distinct and could represent welfare regimes in their own right. The feminist critique has been the most salient, however, by demonstrating that women are not attached to the labor market in ways similar to men, resulting in a very different experience of social insurance.

In the past 10 years, a strand of the welfare literature has focused on the emergence of new social risks caused by the socioeconomic changes that have transpired with the transition to a postindustrial society. This shift has led to an increasing number of single-parent families and elderly, to employment precariouness, and to the rising importance of education and training in the labor market. This literature on social investment assumes that the role of the state is not to satisfy a basic need but rather to invest in individuals in order to empower them to assume more responsibilities. As such, it seeks to make individuals more competitive in the new economy.

The literature on both social needs and risks has stressed the impact of preexisting programs on the capacity of the state to adapt its welfare policies to new realities. Once a welfare program is adopted to fulfill specific needs and/or cover a social risk, it fosters a clientele and support groups, which can facilitate its expansion. This clientele will likely oppose the creation of new programs or a redefinition of welfare objectives. Further, there is a substantial literature stressing that organizations have a bias toward improving existing programs, which occurs at the expense of developing new ones.

These conclusions are, however, being increasingly challenged. In light of increasing budgetary pressures that are accentuated by an aging population and a recent financial crisis, multiple reform initiatives have been introduced. Contrary to previous expectations, political leaders have not shied away from substantial reforms even if it leads to a noticeable impact on opinion polls. The literature has been quite eclectic in providing explanations for this reversal of fortune for the welfare state. While some contributions have reverted to traditional cleavages such as class and party politics or a reconsideration of arguments related to globalization, others have targeted the role of political leadership in altering successfully the discourse surrounding the goals and objectives of the welfare state. The latter stresses that the basic understanding of social rights has been altered. In many instances, such as in health and pensions, the state has been assuming less responsibility by facilitating the creation and/or expansion of private alternatives while reducing the generosity of public benefits. The roles of international financial associations have been considered to be particularly important in prompting privatization in developing countries. Nonprofit organizations have also seen their role expand in many countries by providing a growing range of welfare services to an increasing number of citizens.

Multiple Meanings of the Term Welfare Policies

It is important to note that there are many national differences with regard to what welfare policies entail. For example, the term welfare has traditionally been used in the United States as a synonym for transfer payments to the poor (e.g., “being on welfare”). As such, it is a synonym for social assistance. In contrast, welfare has a more general use in Sweden, focusing mostly on social services, but it
Welfare Policies

can also include policies such as taxation, pensions, employment, health care, and social assistance. In the latter case, the term is closely related to welfare state. What welfare policies include and do not include has been the source of multiple debates in the social sciences. The remainder of this entry focuses primarily on welfare policies in the context of providing a basic level of subsistence for individuals. Beyond the enactment of programs and services, this also includes goals such as alleviating poverty and social exclusion.

The role of the state in combating poverty varies noticeably across industrialized countries. The use of means-tested benefit, where the state plays the role of last resort, is predominant in the UK and its former colonies (i.e., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) but not confined exclusively to this group of countries. In these cases, the influence of the English Poor Laws remains. Although previous acts and practices dealt with the poor and the working poor, the first set of formalized poor laws was adopted in the early 17th century (Old Poor Law), followed by the New Poor Law in 1834. Immediately on its creation, a sharp distinction was made to distinguish between those considered too ill or too old to work and those capable of working. This distinction is often stated as a difference between the deserving and undeserving poor. Individuals in the latter group had to enter workhouses (in the United States, these were referred to as poorhouses), whose conditions were pitiful and where individuals were often referred to as inmates. This was done deliberately to ensure that this would be a solution of last resort in order to receive poor relief.

The creation and expansion of friendly societies, the emergence of social programs (such as unemployment insurance and old-age pensions), and changes in attitude toward the poor resulted in the abolition of the workhouses in the early 20th century. The causes behind these welfare improvements have been the object of multiple debates in political science. They have been attributed to protest actions by the poor, industrialization, the rise of socialist parties and unions, the leadership role of the civil service, state capacity, and even war. While the private sector continues to perform a role in providing welfare provisions, whose importance varies across jurisdictions, the state is now the primary welfare giver in industrialized countries. However, in many developing countries, the importance of employers and other private parties remains noticeable. When employers provide social benefits, which can include child allowance, death benefits, and health and pension insurance, to name a few, it is usually termed occupational welfare since the type and scope of benefits offered varies across occupations. Although not provided by the state and granted exclusively to some members of the labor force, these benefits often receive a subsidy by the state to provide an incentive to both employers and employees to establish this kind of social benefit.

Types of Welfare Policies

There are currently multiple types of welfare policies based on needs and instruments. The most common form of welfare policies involves the transfer of financial resources where recipients receive a sum of money or a tax credit. First, there are policies put in place to provide a source of income for individuals living with disabilities. This can include physical and psychological disability, and eligibility is usually based on medical recommendations and the extent to which an individual can thrive in the labor market. Second, financial assistance is granted to poor retirees based on the value of their retirement income and assets. Third, social assistance is granted to individuals who, for various reasons, exit or fail to enter the labor market. Fourth, payments can be made for families to help raise children. Rather than giving financial assistance directly to the recipient, the state can also subsidize basic needs or limit the goods and services an individual can obtain with the financial support offered. This is achieved by tying benefits to specific needs such as housing (subsidy) and food (food stamps). Financial help cannot assist with issues such as sickness, substance abuse, or being homeless. As a result, welfare policies also involve a wide range of services such as health care, shelters, and job training.

In spite of strong variance in the level of support across industrialized countries, survey research demonstrates that benefits targeting the old and the disabled receive substantially more support than policies assisting other groups. The schism between deserving and undeserving poor remains
strongly embedded in most debates surrounding welfare.

Still, today, welfare remains stringent on fulfilling social, economic, and financial conditions. The demonstration of needs plays a key role in accessing benefits. Means-tested benefits are often the norm, which implies that individuals must demonstrate a lack of resources and/or a specific condition to be eligible. The means test can actually take multiple forms. When related to a medical condition, individuals must often substantiate the claims that they are unable to participate in the labor force. Authorities can also develop criteria on the basis of various sources of income (including wages, dividends, and interest earned) and/or assets such as an automobile, a dwelling, or even artwork. Moreover, the income and assets of a third party can also be considered for assessing eligibility. It is quite common to consider the revenues and/or assets of a spouse or partner, but this is sometimes extended to others such as parents (which can occur in the case of students seeking public financial aid) or roommates in the case of shared living space.

The means test can also apply to socioeconomic conditions that are not related to health and financial resources such as age, citizenship, location, and marital status. Younger adults face the most difficulty in receiving social assistance with the requirement of prior work experience being the most important. They also tend to receive less generous benefits irrespective of employment opportunities. Citizenship also matters quite often when it comes to means-tested benefits. Recent immigrants are often excluded from receiving state aid. In some instances, authorities consider the region where a claimant resides to increase or restrict the generosity of social assistance. In regions where unemployment is widespread, eligibility criteria might be more relaxed than in regions where labor shortages are present. Marital status continues to play a role in the treatment of need. The way in which an individual becomes a single parent is sometime considered in the application of the means test, with a widower receiving preferential treatment to someone who failed to declare a parent.

As a result, street-level bureaucrats, or third parties such as medical doctors, often play a key role in assessing who can and cannot receive assistance.

The stigma attached to welfare often results in admissible individuals not seeking their benefits. For example, the British Treasury still assumes in its budget that 25% of elderly, considered to be deserving poor, will not collect their means-tested pension. Another issue involves the process on which individuals receive the benefits. It is often onerous, intrusive, and complicated. The application for the British Pensions Credit has 18 pages, which can make reading cumbersome for many seniors and make the benefit less accessible. This is in stark contrast to the Canadian case where federal authorities consider only taxable income. Individuals can access the benefit easily by adding a one-page attachment when they file their income tax.

At the heart of welfare policies are two important debates on the causes of poverty and, ultimately, reliance on welfare benefits. First, to what extent does welfare cause dependency? This has been a hallmark of recent American debates surrounding welfare. Conservative critics have stressed that welfare policies create disincentive to work and create a culture of poverty that makes a return (or entry into) to the labor market less likely. These concerns are hardly new. The Royal Commission of 1832 in England, established to study the Poor Law, was particularly concerned with the impact of granting cash benefits to non-working individuals. Thus, it stressed that individuals in poorhouses should face conditions worse than those of the poorest working poor. An underlying assumption by these critics is that individuals on welfare are primarily responsible for this outcome and eventually feel entitled to their allowance. With the expansion of welfare benefits to a higher number of individuals, they became one of the neoconservatives’ favorite targets for retrenchment. In the past 25 years, multiple jurisdictions have tightened qualifying conditions to receive welfare benefits with countries such as Canada (particularly the states of Alberta and Ontario), the United States, and the UK even introducing some forms of workfare, whereby individuals must perform compulsory labor or service to obtain their benefit.

Critics have emphasized that individuals on welfare are not themselves mostly responsible for their inability to find work, as indicated by the rise of welfare cases during a recession. Moreover, the use
of the word *dependency* in the context of welfare policies evokes powerful negative images of specific groups, such as single African American mothers in the case of the former Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and it fails to acknowledge that non–welfare recipients also receive substantial state support. For example, the “hidden” welfare state in the United States, consisting of multiple tax credits, costs far more than the totality of welfare programs targeting the poor.

Second, another important debate within the literature focuses on the consequences of having welfare policies targeted at specific groups of individuals, as opposed to being universal. The more universal a benefit is, the more likely that it will receive strong political support, which is in stark contrast to targeted benefits such as social assistance, where beneficiaries lack numbers and resources to bolster their support. Survey research demonstrates that citizens are more likely to support universal programs such as education than targeted programs such as subsidized housing and social assistance. The retrenchment literature has actually stressed that politicians have been far more successful with the latter.

Targeting the poor (or any other group) may actually result in a growing gap between the policy outcomes generated by public programs and the original need behind their creation. Ironically, there is strong evidence suggesting that means-tested programs fail to combat poverty and may even accentuate it. The type of program or mixes of programs needed to alleviate poverty has been the source of multiple debates in the literature.

**New Focus: The Working Poor and Social Exclusion**

In recent years, welfare policies have been developed to tackle two newly recognized needs: (1) poverty among full-time workers and (2) social exclusion. The first is a direct consequence of stagnant wages for low-income individuals. In many industrialized countries, minimum wage has not been indexed properly, resulting in an actual decrease in real income. Various measures, such as granting tax credits and readjusting the minimum wage, have been introduced.

The term *social exclusion* originated in France and it has since been adopted by the European Union (EU), which has made social inclusion a vital component of its fight against poverty. The EU defines social exclusion as “a process whereby certain individuals are pushed to the edge of society and prevented from participating fully by virtue of their poverty, or lack of basic competencies and lifelong learning opportunities, or as a result of discrimination” (European Commission, 2004). EU countries have been elaborating and implementing national action plans to tackle social exclusion and the World Bank has recently included social exclusion within its own analyses of poverty.

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See also Citizenship; Policy, Employment; Policy Analysis; Policy Process, Models of; Welfare State

**Further Readings**


Welfare State

The expression welfare state denotes a number of policies through which the government provides protection against a predetermined set of social risks and needs. The term made its appearance in the political vocabulary of English-speaking countries during the 1930s and early 1940s. State activism in the social sphere dates back, however, to the second half of the 19th century and was essentially prompted by the modernization process and its accelerating pace throughout Western Europe.

From an institutional viewpoint, the essence of the welfare state is the rights-based character of protection. Through social policies, the government defines rules and standards regarding resources and opportunities, which are considered to be highly relevant for individual life conditions and thus worthy of being “guaranteed” by state authority. In contemporary democracies, such rules and standards are typically incorporated in the notion of social citizenship. Being a citizen means to enjoy not only certain civil and political rights but also specific social rights—that is, entitlements to obtain resources such as a pension or opportunities (e.g., access to medical or employment services) that uphold life chances. Social citizenship thus contributes to the concrete realization of the great normative ideals of Western modernity: freedom, equality, solidarity, and security.

A welfare state does not only limit itself to defining citizens’ entitlements (and, of course, the corresponding financial obligations) but also typically organizes the production and distribution of social protection, for example, through public insurance schemes or health services. Welfare administrations occupy the center stage of contemporary bureaucratic systems (e.g., in terms of staff employed), while social spending makes up around 50% of the public budget in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) area. In the European Union (EU), social-protection expenditures amount to about 27% of GDP (gross domestic product; 27 average, mid-2000s). State programs funded by tax money are not the only providers of welfare: markets, families, and intermediary associations are other important spheres and channels of provision. Each society has its own composite welfare “mix” or “regime.” In the course of the 20th century, however, the state has extended and strengthened its regulatory power over all forms of welfare provision (e.g., through family or labor law) and has affirmed itself not only as the most salient but also as the ultimate “social sovereign.” By expanding its sovereignty in the social sphere, the state has fundamentally transformed its own structure, function, and legitimation basis, prompting the appearance of novel political actors and dynamics. The following sections of this entry will illustrate the main stages of development of the welfare state, from its early origins to the present phase of crisis and reform.

Early Origins

The historical background of the modern welfare state is constituted by the various “poor relief” measures introduced in European states since the 17th century and codified in some of them (e.g., England) in organic sets of provisions (the Poor Laws). The institutional watershed was, however, the establishment of compulsory insurance, resting on the new principle of a rights-based protection backed by state authority. In contemporary democracies, such rules and standards are typically incorporated in the notion of social citizenship. Being a citizen means to enjoy not only certain civil and political rights but also specific social rights—that is, entitlements to obtain resources such as a pension or opportunities (e.g., access to medical or employment services) that uphold life chances. Social citizenship thus contributes to the concrete realization of the great normative ideals of Western modernity: freedom, equality, solidarity, and security.

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jeopardize conservative hegemony. Despite their more advanced level of socioeconomic development, the early democratizers, such as Britain, lagged somewhat behind: In these countries, political elites were less worried about legitimation and consensus, and the introduction of social insurance had to wait for the strengthening of socialist representation within national parliaments.

The early phase of “instauration” witnessed the emergence of two distinct basic approaches to social insurance. The occupational approach (prevailing in continental Europe) was based on labor market status and proceeded through the establishment of several occupational schemes (the first typically covering blue-collar industrial workers), often with different regulations. The universalist approach (typical of English-speaking countries and Nordic Europe), in contrast, was based on need and later citizenship. In 1913, Sweden introduced, for example, the first universal pension scheme for all elderly citizens, including a modest flat-rate benefit topped by means-tested supplements. Rooted in different institutional traditions and reflecting historical variations in class structures and systems of corporate and political representation, the early choice of the occupational versus universalist path had significant implications for subsequent institutional developments and distributive outcomes.

The Golden Age of Postwar Expansion

In many countries, World War II spurred ambitious reform projects (e.g., the Beveridge Plan in Britain) for strengthening social protection, also with a view to underpin national cohesion. The 3 decades from 1945 to 1975 witnessed an impressive growth of the welfare state in both quantitative and qualitative terms. At the beginning of the 1950s, social expenditure was still below 10% of GDP in most European countries. By the early 1970s, many countries (e.g., Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden) had come to pass the 20% mark and most of the remaining ones had already surpassed 15%. The vast majority, if not the totality, of the population had come to be included in social protection schemes for all the “standard risks”: old age, disability, and bereavement; sickness, maternity, and work injuries; and unemployment and family dependents. At least in terms of eligibility, the European welfare states had “grown to limits”: They had reached or were about to reach their widest possible domestic boundaries, coinciding with the whole citizenry. During this “golden age” of welfare state expansion, the more localized systems of protection were progressively marginalized in their financial size and functional scope. Sophisticated techniques were invented and deployed to improve and rationalize the extraction of taxes and contributions, govern redistributive flows from the center, and deliver benefits and services to the various clientele. Finally, alongside the various insurance schemes for the standard risks, new noncontributory programs of general social assistance were created, as well as increasingly complex health care systems providing a wide array of medical services.

A vast literature has explored cross-national variations during the long expansion phase. According to the Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s influential analysis, three distinct welfare “regimes” (i.e., systems of relationships between state policies, labor markets, and the family) consolidated themselves between the 1950s and the late 1970s: a social democratic regime, prevailing in the Nordic countries and centered on encompassing and generous schemes; a conservative-corporative regime, prevailing in the continental countries and centered on fragmented schemes linked to labor market status; and a liberal regime, prevailing in the English-speaking countries, centered on universal but means-tested schemes offering only meager benefits. The three regimes were the product of specific class coalitions and their capacity to mobilize “power resources” in their own interest. Each regime had also specific distributional implications, especially in terms of decommodification; that is, the extent to which workers are freed from market dependence for the satisfaction of basic needs. Esping-Andersen’s pathbreaking work led to a vast debate. By looking in more depth at the experience of specific areas or countries (e.g., southern Europe, Australia and New Zealand, the United States, and, more recently, the postcommunist countries or East Asia) various authors have articulated the original regime tripartition, adding new types and models, and have highlighted additional analytical dimensions (e.g., the
capacity of regimes to “defamilize” care and promote gender equality) and theoretical insights.

The Crisis and Permanent Austerity
In the wake of the oil shocks of the 1970s, the developmental trajectory of the welfare state started to invert its direction: The “golden age of expansion” gradually faded away and was replaced by a new phase of “permanent austerity.” This shift was mainly the result of exogenous pressures coming from the environment of the welfare state: the environment external to the nation-state and the internal environment (i.e., changes in domestic economies and social structures). The following section briefly reviews the nature and impact of all these pressures, starting with the external ones.

Globalization
Since the 1980s, the growing international integration of markets has started to impose new constraints on the welfare state, by restricting the margins of maneuver that national governments enjoyed during the golden age in designing, managing, and funding their social-protection systems. The globalization of finance has seriously weakened governments’ control over national tax bases. Policy liberalizations have widened the “exit options” for capital, investors, and firms, thus making it much more difficult for the state to steer the economy and the labor market and to reconcile the twin goals of economic competitiveness and social consensus.

In the political debates of the 1980s and early 1990s, globalization was often portrayed as a subversive force, inevitably conducive to a “race to the bottom” through regulatory competition. During the past decade, a number of serious systematic comparative analyses have, however, challenged these negative and pessimistic views. Far from being an irresistible destroyer of social protection institutions and a “flattener” of country-specific preferences and diversities, globalization is now seen as a challenge that (a) is filtered through various elements of domestic political economy configurations and (b) can be more or less effectively contravened through politico-economic responses and institutional adaptations. The debate has noted that, if appropriately (re)configured, social policies can play a precious role in upholding the performance of domestic political economies in the new globalized environment.

European Integration
When it was launched in the 1950s, the project of European integration did not intend to challenge the institutional foundations of the nation-based welfare state. Quite to the contrary, the founders conceived of European integration as a project capable of creating and sustaining a virtuous circle between open economies and outward-looking economic policies on the one hand and closed welfare states and inward-looking social policy on the other.

The international economic crisis of the 1970s prompted, however, an ambitious project to enhance economic integration, based on two steps: (1) completing the internal market and then (2) moving toward a fully fledged economic and monetary union (EMU). The Single European Act of 1986 unleashed a dynamic of “market making,” primarily through measures of negative integration (i.e., the removal of national barriers to economic transactions). By setting fixed macroeconomic requirements and deadlines for admission into the “euro,” the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 imposed further constraints on the autonomy of national governments in the welfare state sphere.

Like globalization, the EMU project was largely considered in the early debate of the 1990s as a subversive factor for national social contracts, in the wake of increasingly stringent market compatibility requirements, the new power of business, the hardening of budgetary constraints, and the impossibility of creating some sort of Social Europe due to the institutional obstacles to “positive” integration. Recent discussions have adopted a much more nuanced view. European integration has indeed forced several domestic adjustments but not necessarily for the worse: the economic, fiscal, and monetary discipline enforced by supranational authorities has prompted or accelerated a dynamic of welfare state recalibration, which was anyway appropriate and desirable for coping with a host of endogenous problems. Liberalizations have made several goods and services more affordable to consumers, enhancing the range of options available to them; in certain areas, such as health
and safety, market integration has also brought about more consumer protection and higher labor standards. Some regulatory competition has indeed taken place but not necessarily with the worst results. As in the case of globalization, the literature has moreover highlighted a multitude of factors that mediate the impact of European integration on domestic redistributive arrangements, as well as the scope and intensity of their “Europeanization.”

Internal Challenges: The Transformation of Domestic Economies and Social Structures
In addition to external pressures and constraints, welfare state programs have also been facing growing challenges posed by the transformations of their domestic economic and social environments. The foundation and the expansion of such programs in states had taken place in the context of “industrialism”—understood as a general mode of organizing the spheres of economic production and social reproduction. The past 3 decades have witnessed a rapid transition toward a new “postindustrial” order, in the wake of the rising importance of services, changes in household patterns, and behaviors and population ageing.

The shift from an industrial to a postindustrial economy, mainly centered on the service sector, has originated serious upheavals in the occupational structures of advanced countries. “Fordist” employment (stable and guaranteed jobs with permanent contracts) has been witnessing a steady decline since the 1970s, not fully compensated by the rise of nonstandard “atypical” forms of employment (such as temporary or part-time jobs). Low wages and poor-quality jobs have increased the numbers of “working poor,” systematically exposed to the risk of the labor market and social exclusion.

The second important change has involved family and gender relations. While in postwar industrial societies, traditional families with a male breadwinner and a housewife predominated, the postindustrial age is characterized by a greater plurality of household forms: dual-earner families, single-parent households, de facto unions, and so on. Average household size has declined, not only partly due to a fall in fertility rates but also due to the greater number of single-person households and to a drastic drop in multigenerational households. In parallel with the increase of separations and divorces, these changes point toward a general “precarization” of social relations in advanced societies. Another important trend since the 1970s has been the increased participation of women in the labor market—a phenomenon that is closely connected to the rise of the service sector.

The third significant transformation has been demographic aging, due to lower birth rates and higher life expectancy. The proportion of elderly people in the advanced societies has been constantly increasing in the past 3 decades. All projections point toward a dramatic intensification of this process, especially in Europe and Japan. The OECD estimates that the over-60 age-group, mainly retired people, will rise by almost 50% by 2020: For each elderly person, there will be fewer than two workers. Largely due to the full maturation of the generous benefit formulas introduced in the past, these elderly will retire on average with higher pensions than current retirees: Thus, the real intergenerational transfer of resources will grow by much more than 50%. A similar syndrome will affect the real expenditure on health care.

These internal transformations have reinforced the pressures and constraints (especially in financial terms) linked to external changes and have originated delicate policy dilemmas. They have also generated a host of new social risks and needs: from new forms of poverty and social exclusion to personal dependency and from skills obsolescence (and thus unemployability) to situations of work–life imbalances. The rebalancing of social expenditure toward the new risks and the more vulnerable social groups has clashed with the high “stickiness” of the institutional status quo—a defining feature of that “new politics of the welfare state,” which has been the object of a lively debate in the literature of the past decade or so.

Welfare State Recalibration at a Glance
Despite the gloomy prospects outlined by the early “crisis” debate, the welfare state has not crumbled under the weight of the contextual changes described so far and has actually given signs of at least some adaptive capacity. Institutional adaptation has been a complex incremental process, which has proceeded with different speed and success across the various countries and which has involved different policy areas: from macroeconomic management
and industrial relations to tax policy and labor market regulation. Limiting ourselves to the core elements of social protection, at least four key general trends of reform can be identified.

The first—and the most significant—of these trends is constituted by structural adjustments in response to socioeconomic developments. In the field of pensions, the 1990s witnessed a substantial wave of reforms, based on the following ingredients: increasing the age of retirement, tightening qualifying conditions, restricting indexation rules, or strengthening the link between contributions and benefits. In the field of health care, reforms have been introduced with a view to enhancing efficacy and efficiency in the allocation of resources and in the provision of services through better incentives at both the macro- and the microlevels. Social services and family policies have also witnessed some innovation in both substantive and organizational terms, with a view to responding to the rising needs of the elderly population, the changing gender division of labor, and new forms of poverty and exclusion.

A second general trend has been a move to an active approach in the management of work incapacity (e.g., disability) and especially unemployment, with a view to preventing long-term dependency on income support. In the course of the 1990s, the “job first” principle has gradually made its way throughout OECD (un)employment protection systems. Access to benefits has been generally made more restrictive and conditional, but at the same time, new networks of public and private employment services have been set up to promote and facilitate the labor market reintegration of workers without jobs. Activation strategies have proceeded hand in hand with wider exercises of labor market reconfiguration, pioneered by the Netherlands in the 1980s under the banner of “flexicurity.” Reforms in this field have received explicit spurs by the EU and in particular by the European Employment Strategy (EES), launched in 1997.

A third general trend—which cuts across various social protection programs—has been greater “targeting” or selectivity of resources toward those most in need, also in the wake of the policy recommendation of influential international bodies such as the OECD or the World Bank. Different strategies have been experimented with, depending on national preferences, constraints, and opportunities: greater use of traditional means testing, linking the amount of benefits received to income or means testing from the top, clawing back transfer payments from those less in need via the tax system, and so on. Alongside these strategies of “vertical” targeting based on economic resources, a trend is also observable toward “horizontal” targeting based on social risk: reducing the generosity of some core transfer programs (e.g., old age, disability, and survivor pensions) while increasing family benefits, introducing new subsidies for caregivers or categories with special needs, or expanding programs against social exclusion.

A fourth general trend has involved the financial side of social protection. Pension systems have witnessed a strengthening of “funding” (i.e., the accumulation of real financial reserves) to make income security at retirement less vulnerable to demographic imbalances and to shift some of the responsibility for its provision from the state to individual workers or the social partners. Another important development on the financing front has been the attempt at reducing charges on business and labor, particularly those in the form of nonwage labor. This development has been primarily motivated not only by competitiveness preoccupations but also by the wish to neutralize the vicious circles generated by “contribution-heavy” social insurance systems. More generally, most countries have reviewed the incentives of their tax-benefit systems to make them more “employment friendly.”

Conclusion

The welfare state can be considered as one of the most salient achievements and legacies of the 20th century: Its programs have greatly contributed to consolidating democratic institutions and to harmonizing economic growth with changing social needs. A child of Western-style (and in particular European-style) modernization, the welfare state has been rapidly growing throughout the developing world as well during the past decades. A number of socioeconomic transformations are posing today serious challenges to the sustainability and effectiveness of this institution. Although many of its traditional objectives and instruments will have to be reconsidered and redesigned (a process that is already under way in many countries), it seems,
however, plausible to predict that the 21st century will witness a further strengthening and articulation of rights-based social protection, anchored not only to state-national but also possibly to supranational and international institutions.

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See also European Integration; Globalization

Further Readings


Westphalian Ideal State
Westphalian ideal state is the conceptualization of the modern state widely assumed to have derived from the Peace of Westphalia treaties of 1648. The Münster and Osnabrück treaties ended the Thirty Years’ War and made sovereignty and territorial principles the cornerstones of the new international arena: They paved the way to the state as the main actor in international relations (IR) and are accepted by the scientific community as the symbol of the “interstate system,” which is still preeminent now, even if it is more and more contested. The modern state has been central to political science and IR since their consolidation as academic disciplines around the turn of the 20th century; in fact, both disciplines have long regarded it as axiomatic that the state is of primary importance, indeed indispensable to society. Even when, in the 20th century, it became fashionable to predict the obsolescence of the state as we know it, this in itself paid tribute to the state’s significance and tended to cement it. This entry first defines the ideal state, including its historical context and key aspects such as sovereignty, internationally recognized territory, and nonintervention of other states. It then critically examines the theory that this state originated with the Westphalian peace treaties.

Defining the Ideal State

What is the state? Prevailing opinion considers it to be coeval with civilization; thus, as far as “Western” civilization is concerned, the Sumerians are usually credited with its invention and with passing it on to peoples further west. Both the “city-state” and imperial structures that transcended it have, since the 19th century, been held to be instantiations of “statehood,” in the case of the Sumerians as well as in the case of the pre-Christian Greeks and Romans or of the kingdoms of ancien régime Europe.

Semantically, this attribution of statehood to the political structures of bygone eras was necessarily retrospective, since the process by which words such as state in English and its homologues in other European languages came to designate the state as we know it did not get under way until the 15th century at the earliest and was not complete until the 19th century; the Latin status, from which those words are derived, has never had this meaning. Retrospective attribution of statehood also necessarily presupposes that statehood is in fact independent of the words used to designate it, that the state exists independently of political
discourse—a premise that constructivists, in particular, must question.

Moreover, this notion of the timeless and ubiquity of the state has always sat somewhat uneasily with the realization that political structures have varied greatly in history. That realization has virtually never, as yet, led modern writers to challenge the belief in the inescapable historic necessity of the state for civilization in principle. It has, however, encouraged attempts to track the evolution of concrete historical forms that the state is thought to have taken—more particularly, the evolution of the modern state over the past few centuries.

Such attempts were helped—indeed made possible—by the efforts of social scientists around the turn of the 20th century to define what could be called the ideal state. Most important, Georg Jellinek in 1900 posited that the state needs a territory, a people, and a government. Max Weber, in his lecture *Politics as a Vocation* (1918), identified the state as an “entity which claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force.” In practice, this monopoly, which the wording chosen by Weber vests in the state as such, can of course only be wielded by the government or those empowered by it.

Sovereignty is another concept commonly regarded as an indispensable ingredient of statehood—indeed, semantically, the two are commonly yoked together in the expression “sovereign statehood.” Although in modern democracies sovereignty is said to emanate from the people, it is, in practice, essentially wielded by the government and closely related to the monopoly on legitimate violence singled out by Weber, giving the government the last word in most domestic matters. Domestic sovereignty is complemented by external sovereignty, which, conversely, denies the right of any agency outside the state to dictate to it or any of its parts or members. The “rule of nonintervention,” proscribing interference in the internal affairs of another sovereign state, is a corollary of this. International law in what may be called its “classic” modern form—likewise elaborated around the turn of the 20th century by scholars such as Lassa Oppenheim—also laid great stress on sovereign statehood, considered the precondition for being able to create order norms as a subject (rather than merely an object) of international law.

It is quite clear that many of the preindustrial political structures to which 19th- and 20th-century historiography habitually applies the term *state* fell short of the ideal state as defined by scholars such as Jellinek, Weber, or Oppenheim, which their own time came at least close to making a reality. Rightly or wrongly, the general conformity of more ancient structures—such as the “city-state” of the Greeks or the Roman Empire—to the ideal state is not normally called into question. Concerning Christian Europe, however, the “feudal system” is widely perceived to have been at odds with the ideal state, that system being characterized by diffusion rather than centralization of power, by competing and entangled, rather than territorially exclusive, jurisdictions (borrowing from Friedrich Meinecke, John Ruggie has, influentially in IR, called them “heteronomous”) and by a corresponding lack of any monopoly on legitimate violence.

Moreover, the collective memory of Western civilization correctly holds that civilization was informed by a lingering sense of the oneness of the Christian community (at least to the extent that it was traditionally focused on Rome) even in the late pre-Reformation phase and indeed, if probably to an ever-decreasing degree, for a century or two after the Reformation. The continuing influence of a political paradigm that emphasized oneness over diversity is, less correctly, thought to have provided a platform for the Western emperor (the ruler of the Holy Roman Empire) to claim suzerainty over Western Christendom, this of course being at odds with the concept of sovereignty.

**Critical Issues**

A well-known article by the international lawyer Leo Gross, published in 1948 to mark the tercentenary of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, helped shape the widespread view of that settlement as marking a watershed in the consolidation of the ideal state as conceived today. Gross was not offering a wholly new interpretation—thus, the archetypal IR textbook, Hans J. Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations*, contains brief allusions to the 1648 peace that are consistent with the article by Gross, and since Morgenthau’s book first appeared in the same year as that article, it is unlikely that it was influenced by it. Rather than create a new orthodoxy, Gross articulated authoritatively an orthodoxy that already existed.
Echoing (unwittingly and indirectly, while also adding a further “spin” of its own) the 17th-century anti-Habsburg propaganda, this view presents the Thirty Years’ War as a struggle between Habsburg aspirations for universal monarchy and attempts by other actors to emancipate themselves from such aspirations in the name of sovereignty. It takes many liberties with the historical evidence—beginning with the text of the peace settlement itself, which Gross suggested need not be taken too literally, which later exponents of the same view have most often ignored entirely, and which, it should be stressed, provides no corroboration at all of the interpretation in question. But this Grossian view nevertheless commended itself by offering, or at a minimum cementing, what has become the founding myth of the modern state. In this view, that state was freed by the Peace of Westphalia from the shackles of feudal “heteronomy,” and the concept of sovereignty and the attendant rule of nonintervention were considered (wrongly) to have been enshrined by the text of the settlement for the entire European system.

It is true that writers and diplomats started a custom of declaring the 1648 peace as being of special significance within a few decades of its signing. The grounds for doing so have not been uniform, to the extent that they are actually spelled out—once established, the habit probably became self-perpetuating, eliminating the need to give a reason for it while at the same time opening up the possibility of identifying new grounds for this special significance. The view expounded by Gross thus put the established significance of the Peace of Westphalia on a new foundation in line with the political agenda of its own period.

This gave rise to the still solid consensus among IR scholars that the “international system” as we know it began with the Peace of Westphalia—hence its designation as the “Westphalian” system in much IR literature. Once that expression had become established usage within the discipline of IR, the epithet Westphalian came to be applied also to the type of state that is the modular unit of this system and that is the ideal type described earlier. More recently, usage of the epithet has started spreading beyond the confines of IR.

At the same time, criticism of the epithet has been growing as well. As pointed out, there is nothing about the state as such in the text of the Westphalian settlement, nor is that settlement concerned in any way with issues such as sovereignty, territorially exclusive jurisdictions, or the rule of nonintervention, which are key aspects of the modern state. It has also been asked whether the modern state did not in fact begin to emerge only at the very end of the ancien régime and was consolidated only in the course of the 19th century. Thus, whereas external sovereignty is today considered to be vested in the state as a corporate entity, in 18th-century Europe sovereignty was still vested, not only in fact but also in law, in rulers as persons rather than what they ruled over or represented. Moreover, while those rulers did, for the most part, have effective external sovereignty, their domestic sovereignty was still severely limited—for example, no central power in ancien régime Europe was capable of policing its own territory effectively, or of passing, let alone enforcing, general legislation on a regular basis, which, in contrast, became normal in the 19th century.

Such criticism, on historical grounds, of the epithet Westphalian seems so far to have had little impact. It may of course be argued that the appellation does not matter unless, beyond the reference to a current political phenomenon, it is intended to make a statement about history as well. This, however, is usually the case, implicitly or indeed explicitly, with much of the textbook literature, for example, expressly recalling the presumed historical origins of the modern state and the modern international system and thereby perpetuating the “Westphalian myth.” Political scientists were probably more in search of a name for this interstate system that was progressively shaped; historians generally do not point to a sharp break and designate a specific year for the emergence of this system, as political scientists did with 1648. Political scientists, focusing on the tension that opposed old empires to new states, considered the Westphalian Peace as the symbol of passing from one to the other. Nowadays, the state monopoly is more and more challenged by the growing influence of nonstate actors—as a result, the concept of “post-Westphalian” system is more and more frequently used.

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See also Constructivism in International Relations; Hegemony; Historical Sociology; International Law; International Society; International System; Political Systems, Types; Sovereignty; State

Further Readings


**WORLD BANK**

The genesis of the World Bank lies in the creation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), following a conference at Bretton Woods in 1944 (which also led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund). Today the World Bank Group comprises in addition to the IBRD, the International Development Association (IDA), International Finance Corporation (IFC), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Since their inception through 2009, the institutions comprising the World Bank group have been involved in lending nearly three fourths of a trillion dollars (Table 1). There are two key questions about the World Bank: (1) how is power and influence brought to bear on the institution and (2) how does the institution itself exercise power and influence on others, especially its borrowers?

International organizations in general are plagued by severe agency problems, and the World Bank is no exception. Long chains of delegation and multiple stakeholders make this inevitable. Larger shareholders obviously have greater influence, with the United States being the most dominant. Nonetheless, even the United States is a distinct minority shareholder, which places considerable limits on how much it can directly influence the institution. The key mechanisms that have shaped the World Bank’s governance have been senior personnel appointments (especially the President, who has been a U.S. national since inception) and importantly, the nature of the institution’s finances. The financial design of the Bank, relying as it did on Wall Street initially and global financial markets in later years, was critical in establishing a degree of political autonomy for the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The World Bank Group Institutions</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Number of Member Countries</th>
<th>Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>Cumulative lending: $479 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development Association (IDA)</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>Cumulative commitments: $207 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Finance Corporation (IFC)</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>Committed portfolio: $34.4 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>Cumulative guarantees: $20.9 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>Total cases registered: 292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on data from *The World Bank Annual Report 2009.*
institution, although this came at the expense of greater reliance on the preferences of financial markets.

This began to change with the advent of IDA as the market-based autonomy (from governments) that the IBRD built for itself was slowly eroded by the public resources that funded IDA. The replenishment procedures of IDA—its periodicity and burden-sharing procedures—made it susceptible to the goodwill of major shareholders. In any burden-sharing scheme, the largest contributor sets the tone. From the late 1960s onward, as the United States began a long process of reducing its financial share, other donors began to link their contributions to that of the United States—which paradoxically increased the bargaining power of the United States even as its contributions declined. The periodicity meant that every 3 to 4 years, new demands could be made on the institution. The peculiarities of the U.S. budgetary process with annual authorizations ensured that the exercise became perennial and further enhanced U.S. influence. Thus, over time, the Bank’s overall strategic direction was set not by its own board but by the IDA deputies—the personnel representing donor countries who were charged with completing the IDA replenishment process.

The reliance on governmental monies also resulted in a shift in power (most acutely in the United States) from the executive branch to the legislative branch and nongovernment actors, a trend that accelerated with the end of the Cold War. A different tack was taken by some donors (particularly the Nordic countries and Japan) after the 1980s, who supplemented the institution’s budgetary resources through “trust funds,” thereby seeking to shape institutional priorities and governance and bypassing the Bank’s budgetary process.

For most observers, the World Bank’s exercise of power and influence has been through its lending—who it lends to, for what purpose, and with what conditions. Although the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank specifically proscribe political considerations in its lending, as a creature of nation-states, whose governance has long been dominated by the industrialized countries (and especially the United States), political factors inevitably affected its lending priorities. During the Cold War, foreign aid was an instrument of the West, and the World Bank was firmly embedded in this architecture. Radical and left governments such as Chile in the Allende era, Vietnam in the 1970s and 1980s, and Nicaragua and Panama in the 1980s were denied Bank lending. With the end of the Cold War, countries engaged in actions deemed hostile to Western interests were similarly penalized—Iran in the 1980s and 1990s, the reduction of lending to India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests in 1998, and the hiatus in lending to China in 1989 (after Tiananmen). In contrast, the continuation of lending to countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Russia, despite staff concerns about their policies in different years, are all examples of lending being swayed by political pressures. Nonlending in the 1950s and 1960s and later during the 1980s debt crisis and the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis was at least in part shaped by pressure from major shareholders to press debtor countries to settle with private (mainly Western) creditors. In most cases, however, there has been a veneer of plausible justification since judgment as opposed to a strict rule-based approach is integral to the Bank’s work. If the political biases of the major shareholders had leaned differently, then the decisions could easily have gone the other way.

The purposes of World Bank lending are another key mechanism by which it seeks to influence a borrower. Lending focused on physical infrastructure until the 1960s, agriculture and rural development in the 1970s, policy-based loans (so-called structural adjustment lending) in the 1980s, and human capital and public sector governance–related loans in the 1990s. More recently, lending has focused on the financial sector and global public goods, and is done in support of the Millennium Development Goals. As with country allocation decisions, lending priorities have been affected by a specific view of what constitutes development and how best to achieve these goals as well as by political and ideological considerations. Indeed, lending by the Bank invariably came packaged with certain messages and conditions on what to do and how to do it. Through its loan conditions, the World Bank has acted as an external institution of restraint as it has sought to restrain developing country governments from engaging in poor economic policies, especially microeconomic policies (the IMF plays the same role with regard to macroeconomic policies). The wider the perceived gap
between norms of “sound” economic policies and actual policies, the more important this role. In early decades, this role of the Bank was tacit and less visible. Later on, especially in the 1980s, with the advent of policy-based structural adjustment lending, with specific loan conditions, this role became more overt and visible (and also encountered much greater resistance). However, the demise of the Soviet Union and the concomitant shift in global ideological currents made it easier for the Bank’s lending to press for neoliberal economic policy changes and equally, to tread into sectors that were politically sensitive and previously off-limits. Significantly, the Bank began to stress the relationship between political variables in borrowing countries and their impact on the poor. “Governance,” or the quality of government and corruption-related issues, began to be debated openly. Rather than dealing exclusively with governments, the Bank began to work with civil society and NGOs in implementing its antipoverty programs. By educating, convincing, and exposing LDC (least developed country) elites to a set of ideas and practices, the Bank has acted to diffuse global neoliberal economic norms and ideas. Thus, in many cases, especially in countries with a reasonable set of economic institutions and a bureaucracy, the Bank has often gone into countries whose policy doors have already been unlocked from within instead of being forced open through loan conditions.

The World Bank’s influence has been a function of several factors: the structural power of its major shareholders in the world system, the degree of competition, and the demand for its money and advice. Until the 1980s, major shareholders had strong influence, but the imperatives of the Cold War also limited the degree to which the Bank could be hegemonic. With the end of the Cold War, while the influence of major shareholders grew even more, the phenomenal growth of international financial markets began to chip away the Bank’s role in the larger, emerging developing countries. But with failures inherent in financial markets, the boom–bust cycle in private financial flows has meant that to the extent that international capital flows have a cyclical component, the importance of the World Bank will be much greater in the down cycle. Indeed, in times of crisis—whether financial or in the aftermath of natural disasters—the insurance role of the Bank inevitably gives it greater influence.

In the large set of poor developing countries, where private financial flows have been limited—not as a cyclical but as a trend phenomenon—the Bank’s soft loan facilities (namely IDA) are still important. For nearly three decades (since the early 1980s), the economic travails of these countries (especially in sub-Saharan Africa) made them much more dependent on the World Bank. More recently, however, a revival of their own economic fortunes and growing investments from China and other emerging markets, with fewer strings attached and with much lower transaction costs, has given these countries more bargaining power. Indeed, major shifts in global economic power are bound to affect the governance of major international institutions such as the World Bank whose power structures still reflect the world as it was when the institution was established. How these shifts influence the Bank’s own governance, and in turn, its roles and functions, is an open question.

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World Systems Theory

World systems theory is one of the most influential of the Marxist-inspired theories of international relations. Its impact has been felt across the social sciences and humanities, influencing not only students of politics but also historians, geographers, and sociologists. The focus of analysis is on a global economic system, which is the source of processes of historical change and many features of the social world. The key influences on world systems theory include Lenin’s analysis of imperialism, the work of dependency school theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank, and the French Annales school, in particular Fernand Braudel. World systems theory is most closely associated with the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, and his work provides the focus for this entry, although the general approach has been adapted, developed, and critiqued by a number of other writers.

Key Features of the Theory: An Analysis

Three main characteristics distinguish world systems theory:

1. It is ontologically and epistemologically systemic.
2. It provides a historical explanation of the development of social structures.
3. It provides an account of the spatial division of the world.

World systems theory is arguably the most systemic approach to understanding international relations. As such, it offers a radically different perspective on world politics. Rather than a world of states, diplomats, and international organizations, the focus is on a global economic system. Wallerstein’s earliest research was on the characteristics of poverty in Africa. He came to the conclusion that it was not possible to understand the persistence of poverty by studying individual countries. Instead, the poverty of specific countries could be understood only by considering their position within a wider economic system and international division of labor. That a higher level of analysis was necessary led to the development of the idea of a world system. The “world” in world systems does not necessarily refer to a global reach. Instead, a world system is the smallest unit of analysis that can be described as a stand-alone entity, or, in other words, can be investigated without reference to elements outside of the system. Within a world system, all developments can be analyzed with reference to forces within the system. Further, Wallerstein argues that the character of a world system determines all features of the social world at any particular time. So, for example, in the current world system, key features such as states, markets, and even the family are produced through the workings of the system. Additionally, except for periods of crisis, when a system is about to collapse, there is very little potential for agency—in other words, there are few possibilities for escaping the constraints of the system.

A second key feature of a world systems approach is that it provides an account of social change. The current world system, which Wallerstein labels the “modern world system,” is one of a succession of world systems. There have been two main types of world systems: (1) world economies and (2) world empires. The modern world system is an example of a world economy, and, according to Wallerstein, there have been examples of world
systems of both types. What differentiates world systems from world economies is the system of political control. In world empires, there is one political center that has dominated the whole system (e.g., Rome in the Roman Empire), whereas in world economies, there are multiple, competing centers of political control. In the modern world system, these competing systems have been states. Historically, world empires have tended to be more enduring compared with world economies. The modern world system, however, has been remarkably stable. A number of factors have contributed to this stability, one being the efficiency and expansive character of capitalism. A second feature has been the emergence of a "geoculture," a set of ideas and norms that has acted to provide legitimation for the key features of the modern world system.

In addition to a sequence of world systems through history, each world system has its own unique history. The modern world system is no different in that it had a beginning, a middle, and will at some point come to an end. The origins of the modern world system can be found in Europe in the 16th century, where a combination of factors led to the emergence of capitalism. This system expanded rapidly and ultimately led to the incorporation, for the first time, of the entire globe within a world system. In the three volumes of The Modern-World System, Wallerstein outlines in great detail the early expansion of this system. The developmental path of the modern world system has been influenced by rhythms and tendencies within capitalism itself. Wallerstein draws on the work of the Russian economist Nikolai Kondratieff, who argued that capitalism goes through successive waves of expansion and contraction on a regular basis (known as Kondratieff waves). Although these waves are regular, the start and end point of each wave are not exactly the same, meaning that secular trends in the capitalist system can be detected (expansion or contraction). Capitalism is also affected by contradictions, and Wallerstein argues that there is a tendency for underconsumption—the capitalist system produces more than can be consumed, leading to a decline in profitability. For a while, the world system can absorb contradictions; however, ultimately they lead to a crisis, resulting in collapse and replacement by another world system. Much of Wallerstein’s most recent work has focused on the end of the world system, as his analysis indicates that the modern world system is now in a state of terminal decline and will be replaced by some other form of system.

The final defining characteristic of Wallerstein’s world systems theory is the division of space. In the modern world system, there are three main areas: a core, a periphery, and a semiperiphery. The core constitutes the most powerful countries of the system. These have the highest living standards, the most effective systems of social provision, highest education levels, most profitable industries, and the largest coercive forces. The periphery includes the most exploited countries in the system. The periphery is the main source of raw materials for use in manufacturing in the core and provides a market for the core’s manufactured goods. In the periphery, states are typically weak and are unable to provide high standards of welfare for their citizens or to protect their populations from the depredations of core states. The countries of the core and periphery are linked by a process of “unequal exchange,” the implications of which are that wealth is systematically extracted from the periphery for the benefit of the core. This marks an important distinguishing feature from more traditional Marxist approaches. Wallerstein sees exploitation as deriving from exchange rather than being a result of the production process. In between the core and periphery lies a semiperipheral zone. The countries of the semiperiphery are involved in some manufacturing but primarily in those industries that are no longer profitable in the core. These countries are also involved in supplying raw materials to the core. The semiperiphery is a transitional zone, including some states that were once in the core, but that have lost their competitive edge, and some countries that have managed to escape from the periphery. The semiperiphery, according to Wallerstein, plays an important part in stabilizing the modern world system. It is an intermediate zone that is both exploiter and exploited. In its intermediary role, it plays important functions in maintaining the stability of the system. First, by dividing the opposition to the core (and sharing some of the core’s interests), it deflects some of the pressure from the periphery for changes to the exploitative system. Second, it also acts as a reserve pool of labor, which can be used to undermine wage militancy in the core.
Much of Wallerstein’s recent work focuses on the more immediate developments in the modern world system. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War did not mean the “end of history” in the sense that there was now no competitor to liberal capitalism. On the contrary, he argues, the system is now in a final crisis. While it cannot be predicted what form the world system (or potential world systems) will take that replaces the current system, ominously, Wallerstein warns that it may be replaced by an even less just set of arrangements. However, in this point of crisis and transition, much rests on personal choices and decisions. The determinism of the world system lessens, and there is much more potential for individual agency. Wallerstein advocates the study of “utopistics,” a consideration of alternative world orders that could be more equally organized, as a means of pushing the world toward a more just future system.

Recent Developments

Wallerstein’s work has been taken and developed by a number of writers within a world systems school. Some approaches have been more sympathetic to Wallerstein’s general approach. For example, Christopher Chase-Dunne has retained Wallerstein’s basic framework and historical analysis but has focused more attention on the development and roles of the system of states within the modern world system. Other writers have been more critical. Janet Abu-Lughod argues that rather than emerging in Europe, the European world economy was a peripheral offshoot of an economic system that had its core in the Middle East. Extending the analysis even further, Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills have argued that the existence of a world system can be traced back 5,000 years, with its core in Asia. As such, their work offers a direct challenge to the notion that capitalism emerged exceptionally in Europe—a view held by most analysts of capitalism of all perspectives.

Conclusion

The world systems theory provides a radically different approach to the understanding of international relations. Rather than being a set of relations primarily between states, the key determinant of social relations is the global capitalist system; this system is the source of the main features of the social world, and the fate of the world system will have impacts for all social relations. While being a systemic approach to international relations, it also provides the basis for an historical and geographical account of global developments, particularly the division of the world into differing zones, where the life chances of the individual will be radically different. Finally, if Wallerstein is correct that the demise of the world system is imminent and that this is a period where the impacts of social structures on individual agency slacken, then it is also a political call for action and analysis to bring about a more just and equitable social order.

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See also Capitalism; Crisis; Dependency Theory; Globalization; International Political Economy; Marxism

Further Readings


World Trade Organization (WTO)

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the heir of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). The GATT treaty was hastily—almost by default—adopted in 1948, and GATT as an institution was barely known until the mid-1980s. For
many years, it had little in common with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, the World Bank) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), both founded in 1944 with great unanimity and pomp. However, half a century later, the WTO is widely seen as an institution that is as important as the two others.

Economics and Politics of Trade Policy

Such success is due largely to GATT’s capacity to fit well the basic economics and politics of trade policy, a crucial heritage for the WTO. GATT was largely shaped by the views of Cordell Hull, Roosevelt’s Secretary of State (and in 1945, he won the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in creating the United Nations). Hull believed in an open world trade regime based on no discrimination among countries as a key instrument of world prosperity and peace. But as Hull was deeply involved in the opening of U.S. markets to foreign goods after 1934, he was well aware that trade policy required both economic soundness and political realism—a difficult blend.

Economic soundness values trade liberalization as the best policy (exceptions are very limited in practice). It is in the best interest of the consumers, and consumers’ interest is the widest possible form of “general” interest (it can even include future generations, as in the case of environmental issues).

But consumers are too numerous to build strong coalitions and make their voices heard. This creates a deep political problem because it leaves governments under the pressure of producers alone. Fortunately, producers have opposite interests. On the one hand, domestic producers facing increased competition at home are eager to maintain or increase the level of domestic protection. They are powerful (they are often close to the political establishment in their own countries), few enough to build coalitions easily, and induced to lobby hard (they gain a lot from keeping things unchanged). On the other hand, domestic producers who are able to export to foreign markets support the opening of domestic markets, if this is the price to be paid for opening the foreign markets to which they could export. They are less powerful than protectionist interests: They are often embryonic (they need foreign markets to expand), more diverse, and more focused on foreign markets to conquer than on domestic governments to lobby. Their interests are close to those of the consumers, but their influence stops as soon as they get the market access they want.

In short, liberalizing is not easy and requires political will from governments. Joining efforts in a multilateral (world) forum makes such an endeavor politically easier while amplifying its expected economic benefits. This then is GATT’s, and WTO’s, role.

GATT’s Growing Success (1947–1986)

In 1947, the Havana Conference tried to solve this complex blend of economics and politics by drafting a long charter, reflecting the diverging views between the United States and the rest of the world, led by the United Kingdom. The British view, shaped by John Maynard Keynes, did not see trade as a key instrument to achieving world growth and stability; hence, it was favorable to preferential trade agreements and moderately opposed to protection. The charter ended up as a stack of contradictory provisions. The U.S. Senate evidently recognized this and rejected the charter.

This decision left trade negotiators in a difficult situation. They had already agreed on tariff cuts that needed to be consolidated rapidly. They then took the charter’s chapter on Commercial Policy and converted it into the GATT text, with some limited additions.

The GATT text suits political realism by stating three—only three—key rules:

1. The “most favored nation” (MFN) rule states that a member lowering a tariff (opening up a market) has to do so for the same goods from all the other GATT members—rich or poor, weak or strong.

2. The “national treatment” rule states that imported and locally produced goods should be treated equally after the foreign goods have entered the market.

3. The “binding” rule states that, once declared bound, commitments cannot be reneged upon by a member without paying compensation to the other members or risking retaliatory measures from them.
These three rules have little to do with liberalization. A protectionist-minded country can abide by them as easily as a “free trade” country. Their value flows from the trust they create. GATT members are assured that they will not be discriminated against and will have collective ways of dealing with breaches of commitments. This is GATT as a “rule maker.”

GATT “Rounds” promote economic soundness. A Round consists in GATT members negotiating concessions in terms of tariff cuts or other means to open markets. A Round is launched when enough members feel ready to open their economy more (the United States was mostly in charge of testing the waters) and is concluded when members feel that they have got an acceptable deal. The agreements are achieved by consensus, with all the members having the same weight (there is no vote). This is GATT as a “negotiating machinery.”

Such a “collective” liberalization occurred in seven Rounds scattered between 1947 and 1986. It generated a progressive—hence politically manageable—liberalization of the industrial sector in an increasingly large number of countries. As Hull had hoped, trade became a powerful engine of growth: It has grown almost two times faster than domestic production since the 1970s.

Of course, growth is not enough. Issues such as distribution of the benefits from growth are key. But economics and politics converge to suggest that such issues are domestic matters heavily loaded by national values. Hence, they should be handled by domestic policies (taxes, subsidies, regulations) that GATT rules allow in the vast majority of cases, contrary to what is often said.

From GATT to WTO:
The Uruguay Round (1986–1995)

This remarkable success—nothing comparable happened during the 19th century—had some serious limits. First, in 1986, GATT was a de facto club of rich (or rapidly becoming rich, like Japan or Korea) members. Most developing countries remained opposed to trade liberalization. Second, GATT Rounds covered only the industrial sector (which ranges from 20% to 30% of GDP for most countries) but not key sectors for developing countries (textiles). Last but not least, agriculture and services were totally untouched.

The key objective of the last GATT Round—the Uruguay Round, 1986 to 1995—was precisely to bring these untouched sectors under GATT rules, by the same token becoming more attractive to developing countries. Agriculture was key to changing the mind-set in countries such as Brazil and Argentina. Services played the same role for India and Pakistan. This new mind-set was boosted by China’s rapid growth since its late 1970s reforms (though not yet a GATT member, China was rapidly becoming a more open country than most developing country GATT members).

The Uruguay Round results have been mixed. New market openings were substantial in manufacturing, in particular, with the elimination of nontariff barriers on trade in goods of key interest for developing countries (textiles). But in agriculture, the liberalization process was so badly designed that, despite the rhetoric, market openings were very limited.

Turning to a broader picture, the Round succeeded in expanding the GATT negotiating machinery to services and intellectual property rights. It also established a “litigation machinery,” with a dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) that was much more credible than the one that had existed until 1995. To evaluate some of these results requires caution. Although there is no doubt that the potential gains from liberalization in services are huge, the case of intellectual property rights is more debatable (these rights consist in granting monopoly rights, possibly endangering future competition). A stronger DSM makes it more probable that WTO members will litigate rather than negotiate. Such an evolution (not yet observed) would be worrisome since it assumes a drastic change of mind in the way international relations at large are conceived.

And there were outright failures. The Round was unable to discipline the use of the “escape clauses” (safeguard, antidumping, and antisubsidy), which allow members to reestablish protection too easily. Even more important, the Round adopted the “Single Undertaking” approach—all members shall agree on all the results of a Round (GATT allowed members not to sign some agreements at the end of a Round). Such a condition
deeply rigidifies, hence weakens, the WTO negotiating process since it gives an implicit veto to any member.

The WTO: Challenges and Ambitions

While the Uruguay Round was shaping the WTO, an old world was vanishing: Centrally planned economies disappeared, and developing countries opposed to freer trade had begun to open their domestic markets. These changes were epitomized by China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 (today, one third of the Chinese provinces are close to becoming as rich as the Central European countries that are members of the European Community).

These sweeping changes induced the WTO to abandon GATT's low-key approach. The cautious preparations of GATT Rounds were replaced by a rush to launch a new Round (the European Community proposed to launch the Millennium Round 5 years before the end of the enforcement of the Uruguay Round). The price was high: The TV cameras that the WTO ministerial meetings attracted made it the favorite target of antiglobalizers of all kinds, disturbing WTO’s first years of operation and making cumbersome the launch of the Doha Round in 2001 (technically, the Round has not yet been officially launched).

However, the key challenges facing the WTO are not from the increasingly scattered antiglobalization ranks. Indeed, most Americans, Europeans, Chinese, and Indians realize that even though globalization has its drawbacks, closing their doors to foreign products would be a much more costly solution. Also, the current economic crisis has not so far witnessed any notable move toward reprotection.

The WTO’s key challenges will come from the new world that is emerging. First, there is an ongoing tectonic shift among key players. GATT greatly benefited from the benevolent role of the United States. The United States was always very careful to keep in mind the interests of the world economy and not exploit its full power (if the United States had wanted to exploit its leverage fully, it would have concluded bilateral agreements, not pushed for a nondiscriminatory world trade regime). The rise of China and India is slowly making the United States one key player among a few others. Multipolarity is a laudable concept, but it is hard to practice. To what extent the four to six largest economies will be eager to play collectively the benevolent role that the United States played alone for the past 50 years is a crucial open question for the years to come.

The second challenge concerns the WTO negotiating machinery. In trade in goods, the WTO will be doing “GATT business as usual”; eliminate the remaining high industrial tariffs (all the members), bind more firmly and systematically the other industrial tariffs (emerging and developing members), and cut the high protection (tariffs and subsidies) in agriculture (industrial members).

Trade liberalization in agriculture will be particularly crucial. Today, the issue of climate change or water availability is widely seen as antagonistic to the world trade regime relying on GATT–WTO rules. As some critics have pointed out, this is a major mistake. Climate change will require more—not less—trade in agriculture. The half dozen models assessing the impact of climate change have only one common result: The key way to soften the adjustments required by climate change is to facilitate trade among countries. In short, cuts in barriers to trade get a new raison d’être—to be a key tool for fighting climate-driven hunger and water-driven conflicts.

Another big challenge to the WTO negotiating machinery is services. Because they amount to 50% to 70% of GDP, opening these markets will offer huge gains to consumers for many decades to come. But negotiating concessions in services is notoriously difficult. On what basis can opening a domestic audiovisual sector be considered equivalent to the opening of a foreign distribution sector? More crucially, such negotiations require trust in trading partners because services liberalization consists in a dynamic and long process of domestic regulatory reforms, which are often hard to anticipate when negotiating the initial agreements.

Such a trust cannot be delivered by the WTO because the regulatory reform capacities of its members are too heterogeneous. This makes it attractive to negotiate agreements in services among a narrower group of countries (“plurilateral”)
agreements). Such agreements could be negotiated during (probably more frequent) WTO Rounds, but they could also be initiated outside the WTO and then repatriated under the WTO rules of non-discriminatory binding.

In short, the systemic shift of focus from goods to services suggests that the role of the WTO as a negotiating body may become less prominent. But the role of the WTO as a rule maker is as crucial as ever, buttressed by its capacity for litigation.

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See also International Monetary Fund (IMF); International Organizations; Liberalization; Multilateralism

Further Readings
The word Zionism was created in the late 19th century to describe an ideology and a political movement whose objective was the rebuilding of a Jewish nation within a political framework. The goal was defined as a Jewish national home until 1942, when the establishment of a state was officially endorsed by the Zionists. Although nourished by the 2,000-year-old Jewish commitment to the land of Israel (Zion), and by religious practice, Zionism is not merely a simple extension of this longing. It basically embodies a nationalism, deeply marked by the European nationality movement of the second half of the 19th century, whose project is highly political. However, from the start, this project was contested both within the Jewish world and, more forcefully on the ground, by the Arab majority in Palestine, which saw Zionism as a settler movement.

Zionism and Its Jewish Critics

The Zionist project came up at a time of crisis for the Jewish world, which faced a double challenge during the 19th century. The first challenge was internal, linked with the weakening of traditional community structures, speeded up by the growing interaction between Jews and their surrounding societies. The second challenge was external and stemmed from the hostility that Jews continued to face in European societies, be it the “old anti-Judaism” based on religious grounds or the “new, racial anti-Semitism,” which was aimed primarily at newly assimilated Jews. Zionism presented itself as a way to overcome this double challenge by inventing a new form of togetherness, a national one. As Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, wrote in his manifesto The Jewish State (1896), the “Jewish question” was first and last a national issue that had to be resolved by the building of a state for the Jewish people.

Half a century later, this objective was reached with the founding of the state of Israel in May 1948. The eventual success of Zionism should not obscure the fact, however, that among the Jews the issue was passionately debated and met with strong, sometimes fierce, opposition from some quarters of the Jewish world.

The critique of Zionism took three main forms. Those who chose to assimilate had implicitly rejected the basic premise of Zionism concerning the historical continuity of the Jewish people. For the followers of Marxism or supporters of political liberalism, the Jews were no longer a people; they were just human beings following a particular faith who had to take part either in the general revolutionary struggle against capitalism or in the political debates within the states of which they had become citizens during the emancipation process. The second criticism came from the followers of Jewish ultra-orthodoxy (who were numerous in Eastern Europe): They fully accepted the idea that the Jews were a people—but a people apart from
the others, with a strictly religious calling. The longing for political normalization, which was the aim of Zionism, was condemned because it broke with this unique destiny. The third form of opposition was driven by other Jewish nationalisms, particularly the one advocated by the Bund (General Jewish Labor Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia), which campaigned for the recognition of the cultural autonomy of Jewish communities and their political rights in the diaspora.

If Zionism at the beginning was clearly a minority movement, how did it manage to become an almost undisputed fact within the Jewish world?

**Reasons for the Historical Success of Zionism**

Efforts to explain why Zionism was historically successful have focused on three reasons: (1) its strong ideological coherence, (2) its capacity for mobilization of support, and (3) its political record. Among the various Jewish nationalisms that came to life in the late 19th century, Zionism was the most inclusive. Unlike its main rival, the Bund, which wanted to be the representative of the Jewish proletariat and thus excluded large segments of the Jewish people, Zionism had as a goal the creation of a “home secured by public law,” which was able to attract a wide range of Jews regardless of their cultural, political, and social differences. Its ideology was comprehensive enough to attract both middle-class people and workers, religious and laypeople, Ashkenazim (European Jews) and Sephardim (Jews from Islamic countries), supporters of the left and followers of the right. Of course, ideological cleavages, sometimes marked, persisted, and in the 1930s, the struggle was fierce between socialist Zionism, the dominant force in Palestine as well as within the World Zionist Organization, led by David Ben Gurion, and its rival, right-wing revisionist Zionism, led by Vladimir Jabotinsky. Nevertheless, the differences (e.g., on the nature of the future society or the pace of state building) were always subordinated to the primary objective: the achievement of political independence within a national framework.

Second, Zionism was the sole Jewish nationalism that reached the ultimate stage of development—namely, mass mobilization. Zionism was defended by an intelligentsia—composed chiefly of journalists, teachers, and students—that strove to revive the Hebrew culture and provide it with a “political roof.” Although in Western Europe, Zionism remained a minority phenomenon in Jewish communities, where the goal for many was integration into the mainstream culture, it became a genuine mass movement in Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania, where historically the most violent anti-Jewish pogroms had occurred. (In Russia, the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks quickly led to a ban on Zionist activity.) It also had considerable success in South Africa, where most of the Jewish immigrants were of Lithuanian origin. Zionism had more difficulty in winning over the Jews in the United States because its nationalist creed clashed with the dominant ideology of Americanization of the Jews, but it nonetheless gained influence in the 1940s with the gradual discovery of the genocide of European Jews. Although the Holocaust did not “produce” Zionism, it appeared like a tragic confirmation of its central thesis—namely, the vulnerability of Jews in the diaspora. From then on, Zionism—often manifested as unconditional support for Israel—had no difficulty in rallying around its cause the vast majority of the Jewish world.

Finally, the historical rise of Zionism was greatly advanced by its positive political record, while its Jewish political rivals could not show any tangible results. On the one hand, Zionism was recognized as an international political force in 1917 with the Balfour Declaration, in which Britain declared itself in favor of the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. On the other hand, in the interwar period, Zionism also asserted itself as a socio-political reality in Palestine. Gradually, an independent Jewish society, regularly strengthened by the arrival of new immigrants, took shape—with its own economy, Hebrew culture, political parties, and institutions. This quasi–Jewish state lacked only full sovereignty, which it finally gained, first through endorsement by the international community (the United Nations resolution of November 29, 1947), then by the force of arms in 1948, during the war against the Palestinians and the neighboring Arab countries, which had rejected from the start the political rationale of Zionism. Indeed, like Janus, Zionism always had two faces: (1) a legitimate national self-determination
movement for the Jews and (2) an enterprise of gradual dispossession for the Arabs.

Zionism Seen From the Arab Side: A Colonial Process

The political equation Zionism had to solve seemed intractable. Indeed, in 1897, when the Zionist Organization was created, its leaders claimed for the Jewish people, 99% of whom were living in the diaspora, the land of Palestine, which culturally and demographically was Arab, the Jews being only a small minority of 5%. Zionism could only hope to reverse this unfavorable trend by building a strong territorial foothold, despite the opposition of the native population, and with the help of an imperial outside power, namely, Great Britain. In practice, the fulfillment of Zionism had to come through colonial settlement, which seemed perfectly legitimate in the age of imperialism. Apart from a small minority of left-wing Jewish intellectuals who defended the idea of binationalism, the majority of Zionists shared the then common, dominant Orientalist vision, which viewed non-Europeans as irrelevant. The latter rejected outright this ideological depreciation and fought forcefully against Zionism in the interwar period. To become reality, the Zionist dream had to be imposed on the natives, who refused to relinquish or compromise their own right to self-determination. Of course, unlike other colonial settlers overseas (e.g., the United States, Australia), the Jewish immigrants were symbolically connected with the land in which they had settled, but for the Palestinian population, this did not make any difference: “For the Palestinian, Zionism has appeared to be an uncompromisingly exclusionary, discriminatory colonialist praxis” (Edward W. Said, 1980, p. 69). The return of the Jews was, for the Arabs, akin to a conquest.

The year 1948 was a turning point: Both the local Arabs and the Arab states refused the partition plan because they saw it as basically unfair. War was inevitable and led to a massive Arab depopulation of what became Israel. The authorities of the new state chose to make this demographic upheaval irreversible: Palestinian refugees were immediately barred from returning, while at the same time the small Arab minority remaining in the state of Israel was controlled and marginalized. These policies could not but strengthen the Arab conviction that Zionism was structurally linked with the subjection of Palestinians, a conviction that was restated after 1967, when in the newly occupied territories (Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai) the state itself encouraged the building of new settlements.

Reconciling the Jewish and Arab narratives on Zionism seems, to many, utterly unrealistic. Perhaps the best hope is that the former acknowledge that their national movement has had tremendous negative consequences for the native society, which has retained the inalienable right to build a state of its own, while the latter recognize that, despite its initial colonial component, the Israeli polity has become a legitimate reality in the Middle East. In other words, a two-state solution may be the only credible way out of a situation of permanent conflict. Many observers believe that such a solution should be the objective of the peace process launched in the 1990s between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, but its realization remains uncertain as it is caught in the complexity of vexing issues such as the status of Jerusalem, the question of Jewish settlements, and the plight of Palestinian refugees.

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See also Judaism; Nationalism; State

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